



PAST OR PRESENT? THE TREATMENT OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AND TANGIBLE ASSETS IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN CAPITAL CITIES

by

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A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY



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PAST OR PRESENT? THE TREATMENT OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AND TANGIBLE ASSETS IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN CAPITAL CITIES

The cultural heritage landscape of any town or city will change over time; new monuments appear, old ones are taken down and others neglected. This is often in relation to political change or significant events in a country's history when heritage is frequently used as a tool for countries to present a particular version of the past or political thought. This thesis presents an exploration of the cultural heritage and tangible assets of three selected Central European capital cities, in order to understand how the treatment of such things informs us of the political and social climate of a place, in addition to providing a methodology for future research.

Six field trips across three Central European capital cities; Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb were undertaken, with the heritage sites visited built into a dataset. The dataset forms the backbone of this study and allowed me to draw out and present a number of patterns in the treatment of heritage across these cities. This is complimented by a methodology that explores these sites further through a variety of lenses.

The results of the study show that, whilst each city is unique in their history and presentation of heritage, there are identifying themes that help us to understand the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets in other urban landscapes, as well as providing insight into the cities themselves. In addition, this study presents a methodology for how we can analyse cultural heritage and tangible assets across other locations.

DEDICATION

For my dad, Eugene Clancy, who died in November 2021. You almost saw me to the end...
but you are still with me, I know.

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1. MANAGEMENT OF THE ~~PAST~~ PRESENT IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN CAPITAL CITIES

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This body of work analyses the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets within central European capital cities in order to understand how the treatment of such things informs us of the political and social climate of a place. In addition, this body of research explores the range of material that can be analysed in order to understand a city, and the potential consequences that decisions relating to such material may have on the political and social climate. The thesis presents a methodology for how we can analyse cultural heritage and tangible assets within an urban setting. This methodology is both quantitative and qualitative and the thesis will present the benefits of such as combined methodology. Supported by a dataset of ~350 sites across three central European capital cities, the investigations will show that, whilst each city is unique in their history and presentation of heritage, there are identifying themes that can help to understand the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets in other urban landscapes.

The treatment of cultural heritage during war and in post-conflict situations has been investigated throughout the twentieth century. The catastrophic damage to towns and cities during World War Two, led to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and subsequent protocols. Post-World War One and Two, there was much debate on how to rebuild the cities damaged during the war, both in

terms of lost cultural heritage and infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War ‘city ruins were fairly universally replaced by literal reconstructions of the symbolic public buildings and sites that had been destroyed... Conserving what actually remained became a major issue later’ (Hobsbawm, 2014, p. 151). One of the approaches to damaged cultural heritage, that will be discussed later in this study, can be seen in Berlin, Germany and Coventry, United Kingdom. Both the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church and Coventry Cathedral were heavily bombed during World War Two and each city took the decision to conserve the damaged remains, keeping them as a memorial and reminder of the destruction of war. Modern structures were built onto the remains to enable the structures to continue as places of worship. These examples of post-war reconstruction show that the decision prioritised symbolic and political reasons over practical ones. Another approach can be seen in Warsaw, Poland, a city that meticulously documented its historic architecture and commenced reconstruction of such architecture almost immediately after the end of World War Two, ‘[D]espite enormous privations, hunger and homelessness’ (Bevan, 2007, p. 181), showing that the desire to reconstruct Warsaw as it appeared before the World Wars was greater than the practical needs of the residents.

In more recent decades, academics such as Ashworth (2007) developed understanding of the link between politics and the treatment of cultural heritage further, whether this treatment is destruction, reconstruction, or something else entirely. This led to studies focusing on the political and cultural impact the destruction or reconstruction of cultural heritage may have on a place (Ascherson, 2005; Jordan, 2006). As the discipline of cultural heritage studies developed further, some questioned what cultural heritage is. Some, such as Ashworth (2007), view heritage as a concept, applied to objects to legitimise who we are in the present, asking the question ‘what are the needs of the present that heritage can satisfy?’ Others have

questions whether cultural heritage can be defined (Lowenthal, 1998), or if it even exists at all (Smith, 2006).

Whilst cultural heritage is difficult to define, it is widely accepted by organisations such as ICOMOS and UNESCO that cultural heritage is artefacts bestowed on the present by the past. Over the last few decades, intangible cultural heritage, such as traditional crafts and social rituals, has also been accepted within this definition (ICOMOS, 2002; UNESCO 2017). It has also been shown above that cultural heritage is not defined by the past, but the present. This raises a question. If objects from the past are actually about the present, and may be used for political or symbolic purposes, what about objects of the present? Some, such as Schofield (2005) have broadened their scope to include the investigation of artefacts, such as graffiti, that would not traditionally fall within the scope of cultural heritage. Despite this, there has been less focus on the study of the other ‘stuff’ using the same methodologies. By ‘stuff’ I refer to tangible objects that do not fall into the traditional categories of cultural heritage but may well have been destroyed or reconstructed for the same political reasons. This thesis brings all of these objects together, to understand the treatment of the contents of urban landscapes, how they are erected, destroyed, reconstructed, and neglected and how this informs the political and cultural climate, in addition to presenting a methodology for future research.

1.2 CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE POLITICAL AGENDA



Figure 4. One of the Bamiyan Buddhas, Afghanistan. Before and after destruction.

(Behzad & Qarizadah, 2015)

In 2003, I came across a news article about the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas. Initially interested by the powerful before and after images showing the once tallest free standing Buddhas in the world turned to rubble, it was the content of the article that stuck with me and brought me to this thesis. The article quoted Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, stating in 1999 that the Bamiyan Buddhas should not be destroyed but protected (Harding, 2001). At this point in time, the Buddhas were not perceived to be a threat to Islam as there were no Buddhists in Afghanistan and they were also seen as a potential source of income through tourism. However, less than two years later the position had changed, Omar declared the Buddhas a threat to Islam and ordered their destruction (Figure. 4). Officially, the Buddhas were destroyed in accordance with Islamic law yet, in an interview with an Indian news outlet, Omar also said he ordered their destruction as he was angry that the international community

had offered to help restore the Buddhas but were not offering to feed hungry Afghans (Rediff 2004).

These mixed messages, along with Omar's hatred of the Western international community led me to understand that the Buddhas were not destroyed for religious or historical reasons, but for political reasons. Research into the destruction of heritage in other Twentieth Century conflicts highlighted that not only were the Bamiyan Buddhas destroyed for political reasons, but there are also numerous other examples where politics was at the centre of cultural heritage destruction. Examples from my previous study included the destruction of churches and mosques during the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the destruction and appropriation of Palestinian cultural heritage at the hands of Israel. This led me to further investigate the treatment of damaged cultural heritage in post-war Croatia, to understand what happens to the landscape in the aftermath of conflict. This solidified the link between cultural heritage and politics as I saw that the treatment of churches, monuments and museums can be just as politically motivated in post-war situations as it is during the conflict. This research developed my use of historical re-evaluation, a methodological tool which will be outlined below and defined further in chapter four.

1.3 THESIS FOCUS – TREATMENT OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AND TANGIBLE ASSETS

If the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets during and after war is politically motivated, the same must be said for any other moment in time. I explore the methodology

that can be employed in order to understand the potential impact of this on the political and social climate of a place. War and conflict may heighten the use of cultural heritage and tangible assets as a political tool. As Benton writes, '[a] common feature of ethnic cleansing and conquest is the destruction not just of political or religious targets but also of cultural ones' (2010, p. 126). This was seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina, during the break-up of Yugoslavia, where there was widespread destruction of cultural heritage of the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) communities (Riedlmayer, 2002). This suggests a deliberate campaign by Bosnia Serbs to eliminate the history of opposing ethnic groups, alongside the people themselves. However, political motivations and the desire to control historic narratives does not stop once the war ends. Post-war reconstruction can be equally as challenging and contentious. Furthermore, the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets during any period does not stop having an impact on the cultural and political identity of a place.

As referenced above, this study looks at the treatment of tangible assets in addition to cultural heritage. It has been noted that cultural heritage on its own is not easy to define, with organised bodies referring to cultural heritage as tangible and intangible objects, representations of society passed down from one generation to the next. Academics take a different view, with many referring to cultural heritage as a set of values, rather than a definition in its own right. In addition to this, my own previous research (Clancy, 2010) highlighted that objects not traditionally viewed under the definition of cultural heritage are erected, damaged, and destroyed for the same reasons as cultural heritage. This research will show that there is no distinction between the treatment of physical objects that fall in or outside traditional cultural heritage. Whilst "tangible asset" is a broad term, for the purpose of the thesis, it relates to a physical object that has been established for the purpose of sending a political message or cultural to outside observers. This could include a protest camp, graffiti,

or new monument. This, and previous, study show that the motivations behind the treatment of what is traditionally seen as cultural heritage is often the same as the treatment of other artefacts. Governments, groups, and individuals use what is at their disposal to brand the landscape, control the historic narrative or portray their political message.

I chose to focus the study on urban landscapes, more specifically, capital cities. The reason for this is because capital cities are often the largest city in a country, the seat of government and the city most visited by tourists. Therefore, it is potentially the greatest opportunity for government, groups, and individuals to influence the social and political climate through the use of its cultural heritage and tangible assets. There are, of course, cities where this does not apply such as New York and Istanbul, two of the most visited cities in the world that are not capital cities (*Forbes*, 2019). However, capital cities are generally the first city that comes to mind when referring to a country. Capital cities may also be a hub for activities relevant to this study, such as the start of revolutions or the city most targeted during war, potentially leading to a concentration of memorialisation or reconstruction in the aftermath.

The capital cities I focus on are Berlin in Germany, Budapest in Hungary, and Zagreb in Croatia as archetypal cities of central Europe. The definition of central Europe for the purpose of this investigation is outlined in chapter four. Acknowledging that central Europe is a fluid concept and open to interpretation, I used a series of maps to make a judgement on the boundaries for this study. Central Europe was chosen due to the concentration of significant events that have occurred over the last century in a geographical area that is relatively easy to travel around. What was also of interest is that many countries in Europe experienced the same or similar events from very different perspectives, particularly in relation to the World Wars and revolutions during Communist rule or influence. I was motivated by understanding how this relates to each country's treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets.

Zagreb in Croatia was the first capital city identified for this thesis. Zagreb was chosen due to my previous experience studying Croatia and my interest in progressing further to understand how Zagreb is presenting its tangible assets and cultural heritage today. The second capital city chosen was Berlin in Germany. Berlin is a unique example of a city in Europe that has had to negotiate its past after former leader, Adolf Hitler, led the Holocaust during World War Two, in addition to being a city physically divided for almost three decades. Budapest in Hungary was chosen to compliment and contrast Zagreb and Berlin. Much like Croatia and Germany, Hungary was impacted by both World Wars and decades of life under Communism. Despite this, the experiences of each country are still unique and presented in more detail in chapter three. This thesis was interested to understand how each country's past is reflected in the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets today, and to provide an understanding of the patterns that exist and the impact of these heritage decisions, in addition to a methodology for future research.

1.3 EMERGING THEMES

Currently, there is an abundance of literature focusing on aspects of this study. Schofield (2005), Bevan (2007) and MacDonald (2009) have look at the treatment of heritage during and post-conflict. Spiridon (2006) and Assmann (2010) have looked at the human interaction between people and *things* from the field of cultural identity studies. Then there are those who have studied architecture (Walker, 2015), urban exploration (Arboleda, 2016), theories and methodologies of study (Buchli (1998) and Goulding & Domic (2009). Archaeology,

heritage studies, history, cultural memory studies and architecture, in one form or another, all research the relationship between objects and the people and places they inhabit. The purpose of this investigation is to cross into these disciplines and more, in order to understand the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets in central European capital cities. The aim of this body of work is to show that we cannot look at one type of tangible asset to understand how a city is presenting itself and how that reflects and is reflective of the political and social climate. Throughout the study, a number of themes emerged from the qualitative and quantitative analysis. The investigations identified the theme of victimhood, running throughout the case studies, most notably in Budapest and Zagreb. The study will show that, in Zagreb, this narrative is aimed primarily at local citizens, whereas Budapest draws tourists and outside observers into this narrative. The use of cultural heritage and tangible assets as an agent of change was also identified. Examples are presented that show how the tangible landscape of a place can change dramatically alongside political shifts and regime change. The thesis will show that the physical landscape can be influenced by Nationalist revivals and also feed Nationalist revivals through the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. Spomen-park Dotrščina is discussed in chapter six as an example where the political climate may have led directly to vandalism at the site, and the neglect of the site by the government could, in turn, feed the Nationalist sentiment in the political climate. Relationships of power is another theme present throughout the case studies. This can be identified through the appropriation of sites by governments, such as the example of Zid Boli in Zagreb, the reinterment of historic sites, such as reconstruction of a monument of Gyula Andrassy in Budapest, or through the attempt by one group to control the historic narrative of a place, such as Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie, in Berlin. These themes led to a number of insights into the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets, and also

into a methodology to provide such insight. These findings are summarised later in this chapter.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary question this study addresses is:

How are Central European capital cities treating their cultural heritage and tangible assets and how can this inform us about the current social and political climate of the country?

To answer this question, I analysed ~350 sites to understand the following:

What themes exist in the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets within Central European capital cities and how does this manifest itself at different levels: site level; across each city; across the case studies?

How does the examination of cultural heritage and tangible assets within a capital city enable an assessment of the cultural and political climate?

In order to achieve this, I had to first make a number of decisions which will be discussed in more detail further in the thesis. These are:

What is the range of material that should be examined in order understand how cities use their tangible assets to communicate a cultural and/or political message? This is introduced further in this chapter, and the success of the approach is outlined in chapter nine.

What methodology should be employed to understand how Central European capital cities are treating their cultural heritage and tangible assets, which can be applied to other geographical areas for future research? This is first introduced later in this chapter and outlined in more detail in chapter four.

What is the impact and importance of understanding how Central European capital cities are treating their cultural heritage and tangible assets? This is first introduced later in this chapter and summarised in more detail in chapter nine.

1.6 THESIS APPROACH

The methodology employed throughout this investigation, discussed in detail in chapter four, is a development of a methodology I have previously used with success. Over the course of two years, I visited three Central European capital cities, cataloguing sites, and building a data set of cultural heritage and other tangible assets. For each site, I captured detail such as type, size, location, and languages present. Whilst some sites were identified through preliminary research, these tended to be the more popular and historic sites. This would only enable me to understand the treatment of a subsection of a city's assets. Therefore, when visiting the cities, I adopted a phenomenological approach. I navigated the cities as a visitor, finding sites that

drew my attention along the way. This enabled me to capture smaller, local monuments, new structures, art installations and graffiti. Each of these can provide as much insight of relevance to this study as an historic monument. This has been recognised by academics such as Schofield (2005) and MacDonald (2013), whose works have both gone beyond artefacts traditionally seen as cultural heritage, exploring graffiti, newly erected monuments and even currency. Post-field research, I developed the data set further by building on information I was not able to gather at the scene, for example, whether there was a previous use to the site. The dataset can be seen in appendix A. I then completed the quantitative analysis of the sites, looking for patterns, themes and even lack of patterns in the treatment of sites across the data set, which is outlined in chapter five. A selection of sites was then analysed through a number of lenses in order to draw out themes. These lenses are historical re-evaluation, history gaps and monuments of human failure and are defined in chapter four. Chapter four discusses the benefits of using the lenses to apply different perspectives to the analysis the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. Chapter four further outlines the challenges and realisation that monuments of human failure was a less helpful lens due to the difficulty in defining a monument of human failure. For this reason, the lens was not used throughout the remainder of the analysis in chapters six and seven. Historical re-evaluation is the act of changing an object to alter the historical narrative in a physical and intangible way. This is the primary lens and enables us to focus on the act of change as a process that impacts society, rather than a standalone event. History gaps may be seen as a sub-lens of historical re-evaluation. History gaps also alter the historic landscape in a tangible and intangible way. What makes history gaps different is that it focuses on the deliberate forgetting of certain events and period, such as the removal of Communist statue on central and eastern Europe post-1989.

The investigation was conducted from an archaeological, heritage management and phenomenological perspective. Initially interested in the tangible manifestations of the past, and a desire to understand history through the study of objects, my early investigations enabled me to understand that this is not accurate. I started to understand that ‘archaeological remains as an object of enquiry can constitute a record of something, or evidence for something’ (Carman, 2002, p. 13), but that something is not necessarily a record of the past, it is an interpretation of the past, based on the values of today. Equally, what is chosen to be presented in museums and exhibitions, or indeed not chosen, is in the hands of those tasked with presenting a narrative. This subjectivity and rooting in the values of today was of particular interest throughout my studies. My archaeological background is where the interest in uncovering what is buried comes from. Traditionally, archaeologists uncover tangible artefacts. In this study, the artefacts are in plain sight, but the intention behind the treatment of the artefacts and how that impacts and is impacted by the political climate is what is uncovered.

In conjunction with this interest is the phenomenological perspective this investigation took. In understanding the subjective nature of interpreting object of the past, I wanted to fully accept that my experience of a place is unique and biased but understand what methodologies could be employed to understand themes in the treatment and presentation of a capital city. This body of work looks at the phenomenon of experiencing a place, in this case capital cities, to understand what tangible assets are being used to portray a particular message or historic narrative, therefore, providing insight into the political and social relationship between people and their capital cities’ tangible assets. The investigation has been conducted from my perspective and interpretation, with a supporting qualitative analysis forming the backbone of

the study. This thesis is not intending to present a set of recommendations for how governments, groups and individuals should manage their heritage. The purpose is to understand the impacts of the decisions made in relation to cultural heritage and tangible assets and to present the benefits of using the methodology outlined in chapter four. This is one of the key findings that is presented in chapter nine. In addition, this body of work focusses solely on tangible objects. Whilst recognising that the questions and themes may equally apply to intangible cultural heritage, this was excluded from the investigations primarily as the research focuses on the visual presentation of sites and to enable a more in-depth presentation of the research.

Whilst this body of work is highly inter-disciplinary, much influence comes from the field of cultural heritage studies, a field striving to understand the processes for managing cultural heritage and the political and social context in which they lie. Cultural heritage study is itself interdisciplinary, drawing on 'archaeology, anthropology, and museum studies to explore the meanings of materiality, the values projected onto it, and how it is preserved and presented' (Viejo-Rose, 2015b). One of the assumptions this study takes is echoed in the works of many cultural heritage academics such as Smith (2006), noted previously in this chapter. This assumption is that cultural heritage does not really exist. As mentioned above, it is a set of subjective values applied to the actual tangible object. If we accept that cultural heritage is a set of values and does not really exist, the following assumption must also be true, that cultural heritage is not about the past, it is about the present, often politics of the present (Ashworth, 2007; Ascherson, 2005, pp 22-23). These values are applied in the present and, as our values change over time, so does our interpretation of cultural heritage. Where this study differs from cultural heritage studies is in the scope of the material and this investigation will

show that we need to look beyond traditional forms of cultural heritage in order to understand the political environment in which capital cities are treated.

1.7 FINDINGS

This body of work has six key findings that are outlined in detail in chapter nine. The first finding outlines the benefits of studying a range of material, including and outside the scope of cultural heritage definitions. Humans do not erect things by accident, there is always intentionality and, where capital cities are concerned, there are often political motivations behind this intentionality. This thesis shows that objects outside the scope of cultural heritage should be studied within the same methodology in order to understand the impact of decisions in relation to the built environment. This study will show that by defining sites as either cultural heritage or tangible assets is, in fact, inconsequential and that no material difference was found in the treatment of sites in either group.

The next finding is that the built environment can be used as a language to present a particular historic narrative or portray certain values to local citizens and outside observers. It is not just historic objects that inform viewers of history - reconstructed monuments, neglected monuments or protest monuments can all inform us of the historic narrative a place wishes to present, and the narratives in opposition. Many objects within a place carry meaning and act as a method of communication.

The third finding focuses on the potential for using lenses as a methodological tool for analysis. Whilst I had use historical re-evaluation as a lens during previous studies, this study brought two new lenses into the methodology, history gaps and monuments of human failure,

to understand whether this can deepen our understanding of the motivations and impact of the treatment of tangible assets. Monuments of human failure was not found to be successful in adding value and the reasons are outlined in chapter four. However, historical re-evaluation and history gaps were successful in drawing out themes across the treatment of tangible assets within and across the cities.

This connects to the fourth finding, the benefits of a combined methodology. When both the quantitative and qualitative analysis were combined, they complement one another. The study also shows that this methodology enables a significant amount of data to be obtained and analysed within a relatively short period of field research. Both aspects of the analysis form a control to validate one another.

The next finding outlines the importance of impact-focused decision making. Whilst this concept is not new, this investigation has identified both direct and less direct impacts of some of the decisions being made in relation to cultural heritage and tangible assets. This allows for rich and more comprehensive impact-focused decision making.

The final finding from this study is that, despite increasing research and debate onto the management of cultural heritage, its treatment, including the treatment of other tangible assets, continues to perpetuate division within places. These treatments are varied, it is not simply the erection of a contentious figure that creates division. The neglect of a monument can send a message to communities as to influencing what and who they should value, and the removal of a statue or a change in road names can do the same thing.

There are three impacts of these findings. Firstly, this body of work has contributed to the understanding of how cities are using their cultural heritage and tangible assets in order to

control their image and historical narrative, emphasising the importance of governments and those who manage places to understand the impact of the decisions they make in relation to their built environments. Secondly, the study has presented a methodology that is successful in understanding the impacts of the ways in which cultural heritage and tangible assets are treated. The methodology is also practical when extensive field work is not possible, yet also scalable if it were. Finally, the thesis has further challenged more traditional definitions and ways of working, such as the type of artefacts that should be studied in order to understand how the treatment of such artefacts can inform and be informed by the political and social climate. As discussed above, there are archaeologists and heritage academics already looking at a wide range of material, and other disciplines, such as architecture may focus primarily on tangible assets not traditionally deemed as cultural heritage. However, this study reaches out across multiple disciplines in order to gain broader insight, showing the importance of interaction across disciplines. This, alongside the phenomenological approach to field research has resulted in a combined methodology that is process-led and able to evolve, as societies and politics will continue to do.

1.8 CHAPTERS

This thesis is comprised of nine chapters that explore the treatment of tangible assets in central European capital cities and sets out a methodology for future research. Chapter one introduces the study, setting out the purpose of research and providing broader context in which it lies.

Chapter two situates this investigation within wide, multidisciplinary fields of literature in order to show how our built environment has been studied over time from a range of perspectives. These are areas such as heritage management, political science, archaeology, architecture, and cultural identity studies. Whilst these disciplines are naturally different in focus, they each have an interest in the way's humans are interacting and are influenced by their surroundings. This chapter shows that, whilst each discipline has its own unique contributions, regardless of the academic discipline, politics and relationships of power come into play time and time again.

Chapter three provides historical context to the study, outlining a brief history of Germany, Hungary, and Croatia from the mid-Nineteenth Century through to 2016. It is not a comprehensive history, instead the chapter focuses on the key events that impacted the political climate such as the World Wars and a number of Revolutions. The importance of understanding the history of each country is to provide insight into the political climate and the reasons cultural heritage and tangible assets may have been erected, damaged, or removed. For example, Communist statues in each of the countries were removed or damaged post-1989, highlighting a link between the fall of Communism and a change in the cultural landscape of each country.

Chapter four outlines the research questions and key decisions and methods employed throughout the study to address the questions. A combined qualitative and quantitative approach will be seen to support each other in chapters eight and nine. This chapter enables the reader to understand why this investigation has been applied specifically to capital cities and why Berlin, Budapest and Zagreb were chosen as case studies. Finally, this chapter provides two key definitions *historical re-evaluation* and *history gaps*, which are the analysis lenses used in chapters six and seven.

Chapter five presents the results of the qualitative methodology employed in the study. This was the analysis of a data set of ~350 sites across Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb. Each site captured 22 points of data, such as road names, sites type and languages present. The data set, presented in appendix A, enabled the sites to be analysed at a city level, pan-city level, and a thematic level, identifying patterns in the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets across central European capital cities. This resulted in a number of similarities and differences across the cities, in addition to a surprising lack of patterns where we might expect to see them.

Chapters six and seven detail the qualitative lens analysis of the sites across Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb. The chapters begin by outlining the prevalence of each theme both within each city and across the three cities. The chapters then go on to discuss individual sites through each lens. Each site has a brief outline, a description of how the site was identified as relevant to the lens and what insight we get from the analysis of the site through the lens. These chapters identified a number of themes present across the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets in central European capital cities. These themes include relationships of power in relation to sites, and the use of sites as an agent of change, to influence the political and social climate of a place. These themes will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight.

As mentioned above, chapter eight outlines the themes that have emerged from the qualitative analysis of sites through the lenses of historical re-evaluation and history gaps. Each theme is further supported by insight from chapter five, the qualitative analysis of the data set. The purpose of this chapter is to show how patterns and differences across each city informs us of the political and social climate of a place and how cultural heritage and tangible assets are used to influence this. In addition, the chapter gives insight into the effectiveness of the combined methodology employed by this study.

Chapter nine draws this study to conclusion, presenting the key findings of this investigation from two perspectives. The first perspective is one of contribution to the understanding of the ways in which cultural heritage and tangible assets are managed in central European capital cities, and how this informs us of the political and social climate. The second perspective is that of a contribution to the academic fields of a methodology that can be employed for future research. The chapter finalises by outlining the impacts of research, areas of future research and a summary conclusion.

2. EXPLORING CITIES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

As referenced in chapter one, the primary question this study is looking to answer is, how are Central European capital cities treating their cultural heritage and tangible assets, and how can this inform us about the current social and political climate of the country? To achieve this, the study explores a range of material, through qualitative and quantitative methodologies to understand the benefits and lessons of these methodologies.

In order to understand the complex nature of a city navigating its past and future through the use of tangible assets, it is important to consider opinions from a number of discourses, such as heritage management, political science, archaeology, architecture, and cultural identity studies. This is because cities develop with such a range of influence; changes may occur in a city due to infrastructure development, memorialisation, and natural decay, to name a few reasons. Whilst broad, these disciplines maintain a common thread of interest in the ways in which humans are interacting and influenced by their surroundings. The study will focus on this from a humanities and social sciences perspective rather than a physiological one. For example, one of the themes looks at memory. The study is not concerned with how the human brain processes memory but how humans may interpret the story of their built environment, forming and altering memory. This is because my background is rooted in archaeology and cultural heritage studies, investigating the physical object, and uncovering the intangible

meanings behind the tangible. Within these disciplines, a number of key areas emerged that provide insight and challenge to this study and which form the structure of the chapter.

The first area this chapter looks at is politics and the built environment, in particular academic thoughts on how cities may or may not modify post-political regime change. This is due to the widely accepted view that cultural heritage and politics are closely interlinked (Ashworth, 2007; Bevan 2007), which will be further supported by this study. Secondly, the chapter explores literature on identity and how academics believe identity is created, from an historical and archaeological perspective. This enables an understanding of the impact the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets, captured within this study's dataset, has on the identity of cities. Thirdly, chapter continues by looking at the ways in which academics believe heritage may, or may not, be read. This focusses on the ways in which heritage and tangible assets can be interpreted or used to tell a story. Understanding the narrative presented in the sites captured within this study will provide an understanding of the overall political and social climate. Fourthly, the chapter will look at remembering and forgetting. This theme centres on arguments on whether the built environment can be used to ensure certain historical events are remembered or forgotten. This will be seen throughout this study, which presents examples of the removal and neglect of sites, suggesting certain histories should be remembered or forgotten. Finally, the chapter reviews literature on commemoration and non-commemoration and what academics argue is the benefit and impact of each. This enables insight into the impact of the sites captured within this study, where certain people are commemorated, and others removed from the historic narrative. However, before exploring these areas, the chapter will take a broad, interdisciplinary look at the ways in which cities have been explored. This section is not to provide a comprehensive history of the study of the city. Instead, the section will emphasise the importance of a multidisciplinary approach. It

will also demonstrate how different disciplines lead to different perspectives however, at times, have surprising similarities.

The chapter will conclude with a summary of how the current literature supports the themes identified in chapter eight. These themes are as follows: victimhood; tangible assets as an agent of change; Nationalist revivals; relationships of power and heritage benefit. The chapter will finalise by highlighting how this study contributes to current literature.

2.2 UNDERSTANDING THE CITY

The relevance of studying capital cities is well expressed by Meisel who writes ‘capital cities are an important index to the dominant political values of their countries. And the lesson a capital city teaches may shed unusual light on the community it serves, light not revealed elsewhere’ (1993, p. 4). This is due to a city’s often unique ability to represent a nation, or at least represent how a country may wish to be perceived. As someone living in a city that is not the capital city of the country in which I live, I understand that London is not necessarily representative of the entire United Kingdom. However, London is often the face of the United Kingdom to the outside world. Capital cities are usually, though not always, the decision-making centre of a country (Claval, 2000) and therefore may embody the values a country wishes to express more so than other cities in the country. As Wildsmith (2018, p. 85) writes, ‘national pride and identity are synonymous with the master plan and architecture of the capital city.’ This may happen naturally, and unintentionally, because of the centralisation of power. It may also happen intentionally, as Van der Wusten (2001, p. 340) writes, because

historically, governments have intentionally expressed what they stand for through the presentation of the capital city.

This is where the themes for this chapter emerged. Through governments using capital cities as expressions of what a country stands for, it is important to understand the literature surrounding politics and the built environment, how this informs us of the identity of a place and how we can read the narrative through the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. Finally, how the concept of remembering and forgetting, and commemoration and non-commemoration is expressed through the built environment. This section presents a subset of these areas to emphasise the many ways cities have been studied which, in turn, will support later arguments in this study of an alternative, multi-disciplinary approach.

One of the more recent ways in which cities have been studied is in terms of globalisation, the rise of the nation state and the impact of economic changes (Yacobi & Shechter, 2005). Some see this as the development and growth of cities. Turner and Turner write that ‘the concentration of political and administrative activity in an urban center (sic) results in the city growing more rapidly’ (2009, p. 19). Therefore, the greater the political and administrative activity, the more the city can grow. Turner and Turner continue by referencing the decision to move the German capital from Bonn to Berlin, post-reunification in 1989, noting that some argued the decision would harm Bonn’s future development prospects (2009, p. 20). This is echoed by Dascher (2002) who writes that, whilst a city is often chosen as capital due to its size and location, its rate of growth is due to the concentration of government activity. Others, however, see this from a different perspective; that it is not actually the physical capital city that is growing, but rather the influence of city to wider regions. The development of cities has been seen as progressive decentralisation by some, with Amin and Thrift discussing how cities have spread over time to include a chain of connected metropolitan areas, suggesting

that ‘we can no longer even agree on what counts as a city... the city is everywhere and in everything’ (2002, p. 1).

The architectural discourse approach to studying capital cities is equally broad. Walker writes that architectural studies of cities ‘presumed that development was the object, end and goal of the metropolis’ (Walker, 2015, p. 699). Walker continues to challenge this assumption, quoting Rem Koolhaas, a pioneer of this thought who said early in his career, ‘more important than the design of cities will be the design of their decay’ (Koolhaas, cited in Walker, 2015, p. 700). Koolhaas suggests a term for what modernism has left behind, writing that ‘if space-junk is the human debris that litters the universe, Junk-Space is the residue mankind leaves on this planet’ (2002, p. 175). Whilst writing from an architectural background, this position is not dissimilar to one of the arguments in this study. Later in this study I will argue that to understand cities, we need to study more than traditional forms of construction such as cultural heritage, museums, and architecture. To truly understand capital cities, we need to look at further than this, at the ‘residue’ of the city. What is different in the approach is that Koolhaas suggests Junk-Space as being devoid of depth, practical and conditioned (Koolhaas, 2002). However, when looking past architecture and taken at a multi-disciplinary level, beyond the purpose-built monument and site, my study suggests there is depth and much to inform us about societies in the residue, tangible assets that are redundant, neglected or ignored.

In addition to more traditional studies, advances in technology have enabled people outside academia to explore cities and urban spaces and create their own form of documentary evidence. Conflict between urban explorers, in the context of illegal trespassing of abandoned places, and academics is discussed by Arboleda (2016, p. 368). This identifies that, as well as the different ways in which people study the city, there is conflict between groups and

disciplines as to what should be allowed. Urban exploration attempts to counter the traditional heritage approach of ‘top-down decoded sense of classical beauty, material conservation and the glorification of a common identity,’ (Arboleda, 2016, p. 369). Despite academic criticism, Arboleda argues that ‘urban explorers are extremely sensitive towards the sites they visit, although the way heritage is addressed by this community has clear differences’ (2016, p. 368). However, urban explorers may not be that different to those of the heritage and archaeological community. Urban explorers focus on the experience of a site, establishing ‘an intimate relation with abandoned places that allows them to construct their own narratives,’ (2016: 368), not unlike phenomenology and, indeed, the approach taken in this study. Equally, urban explorers align with scholars such as Newby (1994) & Holtorf (2001b) who do not always endorse preservation or reconstruction of built assets, with Holtorf stating archaeologists must not ‘concern themselves excessively with the side-issue of how some archaeological sites and objects will decay and disappear as time goes on’ (2001b, p. 294). Similarly, ‘for the majority of urban explorers the progressive and natural decay is a cultural asset which deserves to be passively maintained’ (Arboleda, 2016, p. 372).

Within all of these disciplines, there appears to be a consistency in development, whereby they start with the assumption of growth and preservation being the correct approach before the discipline itself starts to discuss the merits of decay and non-preservation. Each discipline provides unique perspective that enables understanding of capital cities. It is for this reason this study focusses not just on traditional forms of cultural heritage but tangible assets in general. This study argues that we cannot fully understand a city or a place without considering the above perspective and wide range of material used in the evolution of a capital city. The importance of looking wider than ‘cultural heritage’ at any tangible assets to understand a city, has been understood by McRae, who discusses the contribution of urban

explorers. McRae (cited in Arboleda, 2016, p. 375) writes, ‘the recounting of history and spatial conditions are relevant and important, and instead of playing [urban explorer’s data] down for having been collected in an illegal way, they have to be interpreted as added knowledge in the understanding of cities.’

In addition to the difference in approaches to the study of cities and places, there is also disparity in the extent to which cities themselves appear to have been studied. When searching for resources with the city name in the title within a university resource database, the search located 9,478 resources for Zagreb, 15,084 for Budapest and 138,651 for Berlin, despite Berlin being the youngest city by some distance. This suggests there is a difference in the external interest of each of the cities. Later in the study it will be shown that this pattern aligns to the level to which each city brands itself and its tangible assets, with Berlin promoting itself as an international symbol of freedom whilst Budapest and Zagreb position many of their assets primarily at local citizens.

2.3 POLITICS AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

This chapter continues by exploring the link between politics and the built environment.

Cochrane & Passmore (2001) note a dilemma faced by many capital cities, using the example of Berlin. They write that ‘Berlin faces the task of somehow combining one dream – that of national capital-building – with another – the promise of becoming a global city’ (Cochrane & Passmore, 2001, p. 343). The Berlin wall has been used by the German government to support the drive to become a global city and to also stand as ‘a metaphor for that whole period of

historical shift' (Cochrane & Passmore, 2001, p. 343). Germany's approach to the Berlin Wall shows us that 'material culture can be both manipulated and created by the dominant regime, and then re-used and re-appropriated in its aftermath' (Schofield, 2005, p. 110). In chapter eight, it will be discussed how Berlin is using the cultural heritage and tangible assets of its past to act as an agent of change and gain economic and political benefits.

Later in the study, it will be shown that the Hungarian government has attempted to re-brand the city of Budapest through the establishment of Memento Park, a graveyard of Communist memory. The park consists of a number of Communist and Socialist statues that once stood on the streets of Budapest. Whilst serving as a tourist site and education centre, the park may partially serve as a solution to a cultural heritage problem, with Kinchin (2012, p. 36) noting that some Soviet monuments have been protected from destruction due to a treaty with Russia, in return for the protection of Hungarian graves in Russia. However, the park is now being used by Hungary as a tool to manipulate the history of Hungary on a neutral stage, where they can address aspects of history that are less comfortable to remember. This emphasises the multiple layers by which politics and heritage interact. Heffernan goes some way to explaining this, writing that countries in Europe are struggling with their identity, 'Europe's inhabitants (however they are defined) seem genuinely uncertain about where their ultimate allegiances lie and similarly confused about the most desirable scale at which government, sovereignty, and citizenship should operate' (1998, p. 1).

Both politically and physically 'the cultural landscape, and the places within it, are constantly changing, rarely more so than at times of war or in its aftermath' (Schofield, 2005, p. 109).

This is echoed by Bevan who writes of the 'physicality of politics' (Bevan, 2007, p. 133) when discussing the consequences of partition in various places during the last century.

Benton (2010, p. 126) echoes the complexities, writing that 'revolution, war, liberation and

other dramatic political changes raise the difficult problem of how to adapt both tangible and intangible heritage to new conditions.’ It appears that there is a requirement of the times for objects deemed as heritage to hold a symbolism relevant to the contemporary society. Stirton writes that most research into public monuments, across different academic fields, ‘tended to regard the works as physical manifestations of complex regional, political, religious and ethnic values’ (2012, p. 41). However, Stirton continues to note that ‘there is a long tradition stretching back to ancient and biblical times in which effigies, representations and sculpted likenesses have been attacked... to remove the latent power in the image’ (2010, p. 41). This study argues that, in order to understand a city, we need to go beyond the public monument and traditional forms of cultural heritage. This is supported by Colaert, who argues that the exhumation of mass graves can be considered a form of heritage where ‘cultural and political meaning is formed through the performance of forensic exhumations of mass graves’ (2011, p. 101). This is due to the cultural memory that sits behind the graves, the majority of which were established during the Franco years. Colaert continues that local citizens often knew the location of the mass graves as they were made to bury victims and they may even lie about the fate of family members for fear of being branded ‘rojo’ (republican) or ‘vencido (loser of the Civil War)’ (2011, p. 103).

Stirton writes that ‘the iconoclastic impulse of monument destruction tends to act as an outburst of violence at moments of extreme instability’ (2012, p. 42). What is often less clear is the understanding of how monuments and tangible assets are treated in the post-conflict period. It has been recognised by some scholars that a period of political transition is often followed by, or includes, an increase in Nationalist politics (Kuzio, 2001) and where relationships of power start to manifest. It may be natural to assume that a country wants to reassert its independence after a traumatic political shift, however this Nationalism can also

go hand in hand with ‘national separatism and national xenophobia’ (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 4). This has been echoed by Heffernan (1998, p. 228) who writes that since 1989 there has been reasons to fear an increase in ‘racial, xenophobic geopolitics.’ Hobsbawm suggests that that ethnic conflict does not happen without nationalism, writing that ‘Croat conflict with Serbs, could not exist before 1918... Baltic nationalism, which had been the least of the Tsar’s political worries and barely existed in 1917, was nurtured by setting up independent little states’ (1992, p. 5). Rampley echoes this fear, writing ‘in the construction of a national heritage it is crucial to establish the claim to a particular site... Conversely, of course, constructing a heritage also involves the exclusion or neglect of what does not fit into the narrative’ (2012, p. 8). It is not just rising Nationalism that has an impact on cultural heritage post-political transition. The desire to create ideological hegemony is evident in a number of cases. In discussing Albania in the post-World War Two period, Iacono writes ‘[t]he narrative related to the liberation struggle was immediately (and effectively) mobilised by the Communist Party’ (2019, p. 509).

Ashworth (2000, p. 2) writes that ‘the past and the future are intrinsic characteristics in the modern city.’ Cultural heritage and tangible assets can be viewed to understand these characteristics and show that the urban landscape can have a different role before, during and after conflict. Before conflict starts, changes may be seen in the treatment of the cultural heritage and tangible assets of a place.

During conflict, groups may target the cultural heritage they feel is at odds with their own, such as the removal of monuments in Croatia, associated with the Yugoslavian period, that will be discussed later in this study. Bokova adds, in reference to conflicts in Iraq and Syria that, when heritage is damaged or destroyed during a war, ‘such acts of destruction cannot be decoupled from the killing of people’ (2015, p. 41). This has been further afield in places such

as the former Yugoslavia, where the intentional targeting of people from particular ethnic groups went hand in hand with the destruction of cultural heritage representing those groups. The significance of which is stressed by Zgonjanin who writes about the National and University Library of Sarajevo, which was targeted for destruction by Bosnian Serbs. Zgonjanin states that the library ‘contained the history and cultural heritage of all the peoples who lived in Bosnia and Hercegovina: Muslims, Serbs, Croats Jews and others. Destroying one’s own cultural heritage because it is part of the cultural pluralism... seemed to be cultural suicide and at the same time exposed the intricate nature of culture’ (2005, pp 136-137).

Academics such as Barakat (2005) and Herscher and Riedlmayer (2000) have discussed the treatment of cultural heritage both during and in the aftermath of conflict, with Barakat focussing on post-war recovery, writing that ‘[p]ost-war reconstruction, recovery, rehabilitation, peace building, and nation building are often used interchangeably, and differentiating between these terms is very difficult’ (2005, p. 572). Barakat continues to note the challenge with the term reconstruction, stating that ‘reconstruction focuses attention on the restoration of physical infrastructure, thereby overlooking the less tangible issues of rebuilding governance, reconciliation and psychological readjustment (2005, p. 573). This supports the stance taken within this study to refer to treatments of cultural heritage as historical re-evaluations, which is discussed in detail in chapter 4. Another problem with the term is hinted at by Holtorf, who discusses the need for resilience in managing heritage. The term reconstruction suggests physically going back in time, to put back what one was. Holtorf suggests we should instead be culturally resilient, with the ability to deal with both ‘continuity and change: disturbances that can be absorbed are not an enemy to be avoided but a partner in the dance of cultural sustainability’ (2018, p. 639).

Not all treatments of cultural heritage and tangible assets represent an attempt to gain political power or control the historic narrative of a place. Increasing tourism can bring economic benefit to a place, and this study will later discuss the ways in which the Berlin Wall has been used to increase tourism in Berlin. As Ashworth (2000, p. 53-54) writes, over the last thirty years, 'tourists have been demonstrably more and more interested in consuming heritage,' therefore, it is understandable a city would capitalise on that fact in order to benefit economically.

Holtorf (2010) writes that it is not just the governments of countries who are guilty of changing the historic narrative, discussing the role archaeologists play in contributing to contemporary culture through storytelling and how these stories help us to make sense of the past, yet may also be a danger to the future (Holtorf, 2010, p. 382). Holtorf uses the example of the Bosnian Pyramids that are being promoted by archaeologists inside Bosnia as potentially the oldest pyramids in the world, and a representation of Bosnia's collective identity (Holtorf, 2010, p. 387). This, he says, is 'reinforcing national pride in an unstable region that has recently witnessed war and ethnic cleansing' (Holtorf, 2010, p. 387). Holtorf continues that archaeology has the power to create 'an atmosphere in which war and ethnic cleansing are thinkable rather than unthinkable' (Holtorf, 2010, p. 390). This has been echoed by Kaiser who writes that 'the rise of nationalism in southeast Europe is intimately associated with the development of archaeology' (1995, p. 107). This informs us that the link between politics and heritage is not exclusive to governments and politicians but academic disciplines. Rampley takes this further by suggesting that heritage may be necessary to a modern society. Rampley writes that heritage is 'offering a temporal compass that could provide a framework of meaning within an increasing condition of spatio-temporal disorientation' (2012, p. 1).

In reference to capital cities, Dijkink (2000) has suggested that whatever the reasons a city became a capital, over time the capital is expected to become a representation of the whole nation. 'The age of nationalism that started at the end of the 18th century... proclaims the predominance of national interests over local interests. The capital became the symbol of national identity' (Dijkink, 2000, p. 65). Rather than a city showing its power by being the seat of government, a city would use the buildings and heritage contained within its boundaries to represent power and compete with one another. For example, leaders such as Stalin and Hitler historically re-evaluated the architecture of their cities to try and win the battle of political ideals. For the Soviets, in particular, 'size was also a major element in the symbolism that was crafted for the new Soviet capital' (Van der Wusten, 2000, p. 341). Whatever the reason, 'cultural heritage – one's own or a nation's heritage – is central to a sense of purpose and place in the world' (Lyons, 2002, p. 112). Amin and Thrift go as far as to say that '[C]ities are rarely the site of disinterested practices. They are full of subtle, and not-so-subtle, acts of brutality... certain ways of life gain priority over others – often at their expense' (2002, p. 105), therefore relationships of power can be understood by studying the urban landscape of a city. The capital cities of Central Europe will continue to evolve as the European Union, and what it means to be European continues to evolve also. Foote suggests that the study of Central Europe may be of particular importance. '[T]he causes and consequences of World War II and the Holocaust have been discussed for decades, but debate has hardly begun over the war's legacy of Communist rule in central and eastern Europe' (Foote, 2003, p. 353).

2.4 IDENTITY

The following section will look at the role of cultural heritage and tangible assets in creating identity, in particular national identity. Watson notes the role of museums and cultural heritage in forming identity; ‘they are moreover the driver of a sense of belonging – a key element that binds communities together’ (2018, p. 782). This is echoed by Rampley (2012, pp. 1-2) who states that cultural traditions have been used to form national identities since the Eighteenth Century. Schäuble (2017, p.135) argues that the identity created through cultural heritage impacts the way we understand the past, stating that ‘people’s relationship to their physical surroundings encompass much more than ‘symbolic inscriptions’ of values onto the environment. I contend that landscapes constitute mnemonic agents and sites of historic revisions.’ Stirton (2012, p. 42) furthers this, adding ‘[i]mages, physical sites, monuments and commemorative activities preserve such continuities of meaning by coordinating individual and group memories to reaffirm a shared identity.’ In addition to individual objects being used to establish identity, acting as an agent of change, Stirton acknowledges the importance of understanding both the object and the environment in which the object sits, writing, ‘physical and cultural environments, therefore, become as important in the generation of meaning as the ostensible subject... This is particularly true in the construction of social or ‘group identity’’ (2012, p. 42).

Harrison suggests that the use of cultural heritage to form identities has been increasing in recent years, writing ‘one of the reasons why groups of people might feel the need to employ heritage more consciously to reproduce their identities in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries relates to the rapid acceleration of change’ (Harrison, 2010, p. 167). Harrison

goes on to acknowledge that the use of heritage in creating a national identity is a form of control, reaffirming the relationship of power between governments and citizens. Harrison further notes that heritage has been used to establish country origin myths which are, in turn, ‘not only the norms of the current system of political and social power in individual societies, but also the series of behaviours and systems of class, gender and ethnic (or racial) inequalities on which such power rests’ (2010, p. 169).

It is well established that cultural heritage, however that is defined, is used to create national identities. For example, a city’s official tourist website may promote particular buildings and monuments to present the city as historic and established. Later in this study, the example of Zagreb’s Archaeological Museum will be discussed as an example of choosing which heritage to present, and indeed how it is presented, to support Croatia’s claim of being an independent nation today. However, this study will show that it is not simply the traditional forms of cultural heritage we should consider when trying to understand identity, whether national, local, or personal. This study will show that potentially any tangible asset within a city can be used to create or manipulate history and identity in some way, in order to benefit a particular group. For example, newly established monuments provide insight into how a city wished to be perceived today. Later in this study, a newly erected monument in central Budapest will be discussed as an attempt for the Hungarian government to present itself as victim of Nazi occupation, forgetting its part-time allyship. This, of course, extends to intangible heritage and practises. However, as noted in chapter four this is out of scope for this study. The importance of looking at a range of media has been recognised by Amin and Thrift who write that cities are read through ‘not only events in galleries and other closed spaces, but also open spaces used for artistic expression (concerts in parks, rap in the streets, ethnic festivals and parades). The city is the medium itself used as a canvas (murals, graffiti)’ (2002, p. 24).

Essentially, anything we place value on, or are told to place value on may be used to form identity but this is a complex process. Meisel writes that ‘values and capital cities are immensely subtle and complicated things, the full nature of which requires extensive study’ (1993, p. 5).

It is important to note that this complex process is made all the more complicated as societies become more and more pluralised. This can mean people value things in different ways and from different perspectives. Meisel writes of the conflicting nature globalisation has on identity within a city, with globalisation placing ‘a great many activities and thoughts in a worldwide context, interfering with national, regional and local perspectives’ (1993, p. 3).

In chapter four I discuss the background to the term *historical re-evaluation* which I developed and use throughout this study. In short, the term was coined in a previous study where I felt the terms *reconstruction* and *destruction*, in relation to cultural heritage, were unhelpful as they were essentially the same thing (Clancy, 2010). Equally, the study found that both the destruction and reconstruction of cultural heritage was being used by some parties for the same gain, to manipulate history and memory. This has been echoed by a number of academics such as Holtorf (2005) and Johnson (2001). This study accepts that, if destruction and reconstruction are the same thing, just as the establishment of cultural heritage and tangible assets creates memory, so must the destruction of the same. This is echoed by Benton who writes, ‘the destruction of heritage amounts to destruction of memory and sense of identity’ (Benton, 2010, p. 127).

Whilst it has been shown that tangible assets can be used to create national identity through visual representations and the creating of memories, the same can be said for forgetting. This will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section of this chapter, but it should be

noted that ‘heritage is formed not only out of what is preserved but what is actively forgotten’ (Rampley, 2012, p. 14). Rampley (2012, p. 15) uses the example of Berlin, which has attempted to forget much of its recent past through large scale building projects. This study will later show that this approach is continuing today.

In addition to cultural heritage and tangible assets being used to tell us who we are, the same process tells us who we are not and who is excluded from this identity. ‘Nations combine the idea that societies must hold shared cultural beliefs with heritage in order to root those beliefs, and the structures of power and authority that underlie them, in the past (Harrison, 2010, p. 169). This suggests that if this is not your own past, you are excluded from the society’s identity and narrative. Examples of which will be seen in this study, such as the protest monument opposite a monument to victims of Germany occupation in a main square in Budapest. This protest monument has been established for a number of years by citizens who believe the official monument does not represent their identity and inaccurately portrays the reality of Hungary’s relationship with Germany during World War Two.

2.5 READING HERITAGE

Over the last century, there have been many different approaches to interpreting cultural heritage. This section does not seek to provide a comprehensive discussion of each of these approaches. Instead, a number of key approaches of relevance to this study will be discussed.

From an archaeological perspective, processual archaeology, developed in the 1960's was seeking to interpret material remains of the past in a scientific way. Shanks and Hodder (1998, p. 3) describe a number of characteristics of processual archaeology including 'archaeology conceived as anthropological science rather than allied with history' and 'explanation via explicit methodologies modelled on the hard science.' Carman adds that processual archaeology 'represents a focus on the archaeological record as the source of patterned regularities' (2002, p. 7). Whilst Shanks and Hodder appreciate the ability of processual archaeology to accumulate knowledge of the past, they equally acknowledge that this knowledge is 'isolated in their own field and disconnected from the present' (1998, p. 3). This creates a gap between knowledge of material culture in relation to the past and what many believe to be true in present day, that material objects of the past are interpreted through influence of the present, for the present (Shanks & Hodder, 1998; Ashworth, 2007).

In addition to the above, processual archaeology is reliant on our own interpretation of the artefacts being correct and does not allow room for understanding the thought process behind any individual objects. This led to the development of post-processual and interpretive archaeologies, whereby the emphasis lies in the interpreter and subjectivity is celebrated (Shanks & Hodder, 1998, p. 5). That is not to suggest interpretive archaeology lacks structure, as West and McKellar writes that interpretation is 'a set of professional practices intended to convey meanings about objects or places of heritage to visitors or users' (2010, p. 166).

Another approach from the late twentieth century was to interpret material culture and cultural heritage as a form of text; the reading of a tangible object. Hodder (1998) discusses previous archaeological approaches that refer to material culture as a language, writing that 'archaeologists have assumed that material culture is equivalent to a writing and that it is in the mind of the author (the maker, the "Indian," etc.) that contains the real meaning' (1998, p.

255). However, Hodder suggests the following possibility, that ‘material culture itself constituted a text through which thought occurred and occurs’ (1998, p. 256). The language is differentiated from text in a number of ways including, as Hodder writes, ‘text is a work of discourse... discourse is temporal and in a present, whereas language is general and outside of time (1998, p. 256). This suggests that it is more appropriate to view material culture as text as it is interpreted in the present and does not sit outside of time. Another differentiation Hodder suggests is that ‘language is the condition for communication, while discourse [text] communicates to someone’ (1998, p. 256). However, taking the example of museums, whilst they could be referred to as a communication to someone, I believe you could equally suggest museums are a medium or condition for communication. Whilst both of these definitions provide value to the study of cultural heritage and material culture, they pose a risk outlined by Goulding & Domic (2009, p. 87), that ‘historical interpretation [is] often divorced from community or everyday experience.’ Olsen (2010, p. 90) adds that, reading material culture as text, ‘did little to help us understand what material culture is, the ‘nature’ of it so to speak, or to understand the role it plays in human existence on a more fundamental ontological level, therefore, its relevance is diminished.’ I suggest that a broader approach is required to fully understand the workings of a place in relation to their cultural heritage. It is for this reason, the methodology I outline in chapter four is a combined, multi-disciplinary approach. When discussing the concept of material culture as text across the discipline, Buchli highlights further challenge; ‘that we still are not quite sure what exactly we mean by a ‘text,’’ (1998, p. 183). Buchli goes on to say, ‘much of the confusion concerning text is related to how one falls along a continuum of belief, from whether one believes a retrievable ‘Past’...to many little ‘pasts’... or to the opposite belief that there is no past at all that can be meaningfully grasped’ (1998, p. 183). This is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, there does not appear to

be consensus or clear definition in the approach of material culture as text or language.

Secondly, the approach is rooted in understanding the past, which is at odds with one of the key principles of this study, that material culture, cultural heritage or tangible assets are not reflective of the past but of the present.

The idea that the study of cultural heritage and tangible assets is not a study of the past, but a study of the present has been echoed in more recent years. This is expressed strongly by Ashworth, who writes of heritage delusions, including statements such as ‘heritage is [not] a bridge between pasts and futures’ and ‘heritage [does not] [unite] people through a process of common inheritance from a common past to a common future’ (2007). This has been acknowledged in practise by Lähdesmäki (2014) who uses the example of the European Union using cultural heritage to support its policies, noting that ‘[h]eritage is a cultural and political concept which is easily instrumentalized for the use of diverse identity projects.’

Examples will be presented throughout this study where sites across Central European capital cities have been built, removed, damaged or neglected due to a particular political motive. To understand these motives, the methodology employed within this study encompasses elements of many of the approaches outlined above, aiming to understand a city’s use of its tangible assets in relation to its perception of the past and current political climate. However, most heavily, this study took on a phenomenological approach, adopting the concept of experience, whereby I would navigate the cities locating, experiencing, and cataloguing the sites. The phenomenological approach to fieldwork enabled the study to capture a larger amount of data than would have been achieved through a defined list of sites and site definitions. Equally, the combination of an interpretive, lens approach to site analysis, alongside a database enabling quantitative support provides a well-rounded approach to analysis and discussion.

2.6 REMEMBERING & FORGETTING

This section will focus on the theme of memory and forgetting. To achieve this, a number of areas of cultural memory studies will be explored, such as the different layers of cultural memory and whether memory and forgetting are essentially the same process.

The term cultural memory was first introduced by German scholar Jan Assmann who developed his ideas from Maurice Halbwach's collective memory. Collective memory is the idea that two or more members of a society will share the same memories and that memorials are the physical result of this. This idea suggests that disasters such as the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in 1945, or the attack on the World Trade Centre, New York in 2001 becomes part of a collective memory as it is shared by so many, including those who did not witness the event. Assmann developed this concept further, acknowledging the process may be more complex, that although people can witness the same event and remember it, that memory is not necessarily the same memory. Today, many academics accept that cultural memory sits within a wide, layered process. Erll (2010, pp. 3-4) presents the three-dimensional nature of culture: Social (the people); material (the artefacts); mental (ways of thinking). Within this, the memory is split into two areas, individual and collective (Erll, 2010, p. 4). Erll's structure is an attempt to create an order to an intangible concept of how humans identify themselves culturally within society. In addition, how humans identify between personal memories and those shared by fellow citizens. Assmann (2010, p. 109) breaks this down further and can be seen in table 1.

<i>Level</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Memory</i>
Inner	Inner	Inner self	Individual memory
Social	Social time	Social self, carrier of social roles	Communicative memory
Cultural	Historical, cultural time	Cultural identity	<i>Cultural memory</i>

Table 1. Layers of memory according to Assmann.

Assmann (2010, p. 109)

Assmann (2010, p. 109) writes that ‘memory is the faculty that enables us to form an awareness of selfhood’ which is split into three levels, individual, communicative and cultural. Assmann argues that memory relies on the interaction between people and *things* (Assmann, 2010, p. 111). The reverse of this will be discussed later in chapter eight, where it is argued that the interaction between people and things turns a tangible asset into an agent of change, influencing memory. Assmann’s process is dynamic and overlapping, where the three levels of memory work at the same time and are reliant on each other. Spiridon (2006, p. 200) echoes the approaches of Erll and Assmann, again referring to memory on three levels, individual, collective and public. All three approaches recognise that there are overlapping levels of memory starting with the individual memory, things we have experienced first-hand. The second level, the social or communicative, refers to our interactions with others. In Assmann’s approach, (2010, p. 110) this level has a life span of around 80 years or three interacting generations. Spiridon’s last level is the cultural or wider public level. This last level is the memory created when large groups of people experience the same event, such as a public celebration or disaster. Later, this study will show that this level of memory can be

impacted by the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets, such as the erection or neglect of a monument.

Memory extends and prolongs history and acts as a link between past and present (Spiridon, 2006, p. 200). This suggests that if memory can be manipulated, so can history as history is a memory of the past, not the true past. Kansteiner writes, 'collective memory is not history, though it is sometimes made from similar material' (2002, p. 180), and Viejo-Rose adds '[m]emorials exist in a space between history and memory, affect and identity, between past, present and future' (2011, p. 466). This may be manipulated by governments when there has been a significant regime change (Meyer, 2010, p. 173). Meyer (2010) writes about Germany's approach for coming to terms with their Nazi past, called *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, or "policy for the past". This approach is no longer specific to the Nazi era, but a policy for approaching the past in more general terms. Not all countries have such a formal approach, however, changes to the built environment post-regime change are common. Russian art critic, Viktor Misiano stated in a documentary entitled *Disgraced Monuments* that 'all successful revolutions end with statues coming down' (cited in Forty, 1999, p. 10), showing that every new regime will make their mark on the visual landscape of their territory. This links to one of the lenses used for analysis within this study, the definition of which is discussed in chapter four. This is the concept of history gaps, and the use of cultural heritage and tangible assets to alter the historic narrative by removing or destroying physical reminders of an old regime. Examples can be seen throughout history, for example the toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue in Iraq in 2003 or the recent reconstruction of the square outside the Hungarian Parliament to appear as it did before World War Two. Hálfdanarson (2006, p. 84) argues that events like these influence public and collective memory but, if successful, filters down to the individual memory as 'individual memory is

always shaped by social context.’ Hálfdanarson continues that people internalise national memories they have not experienced first-hand through ‘school books, national monuments etc’ (Hálfdanarson, 2006, p. 87). This can be exploited to create false memories or alter existing memories and memory is fluid and not fixed. ‘[M]emories and identities are not fixed things, but representations or constructions of reality’ (Gillis, 1994, p. 3). Holtorf (2001a, p. 612) adds that memory reflects, ‘first and foremost, the conditions of the present in which they originate,’ and for this reason memory cannot be viewed as recalling a true event but may often be a false memory, Or as Rampley puts it, the ‘mythification of history’ (2012, p. 6). This is further supported by Kansteiner (2002, p. 180), who writes that memory ‘can take hold of historically and socially remote events but it often privileges the interests of the contemporary. It is as much a result of conscious manipulation as unconscious absorption.’ This will be seen in chapter six, where I present examples of governments appropriating existing monuments and altering them to control the narrative.

As discussed above, statues of an old regime coming down will change the cultural landscape and, in time, the cultural memory of a place. The same can be said for new statues being erected, such as the many Lenin statues that were established in Czechoslovakia (Forty, 1999, p. 10) during Communist rule. This process was designed to both create a new cultural memory and to forget an old one. If memory can be created and manipulated for a political and social gain, it is worth exploring whether the same can be said for forgetting. As Erll states ‘memory, remembering and forgetting are closely intertwined on both an individual and a collective level’ (2005, p. 8). Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that the terms *destruction* and *reconstruction* are essentially the same thing, and this is the reason the study refers to acts of heritage change as *historical re-evaluation*. This is echoed by Yampolsky who states that ‘destruction and construction can be understood in a certain context, as two equally valid

features of immortalisation' (Yampolsky cited in Forty, 1991, p. 11). The same may be argued for memory and forgetting. As discussed earlier, memory is altered when the built environment changes and this intention is as much about forgetting as it is remembering, it is part of the same process. Erll notes that 'forgetting is necessary for memory to operate economically' (2005, p. 8). Iacono takes a slightly different view, arguing that the processes are separate, however overlapping, 'one of construction of new heritages and another one of destruction of what was deemed not to be translatable into the new authorised discourse of the time' (2019, p. 508). Whilst Erll is writing from the perspective of how humans process heritage, Harrison takes a similar view from a heritage management perspective. Harrison (2012) writes, in reference to heritage management and conservation, 'we have rarely turned to reconsider past conservation decisions, but have simply continued to add to existing heritage 'lists' and registers, allowing them to swell and replicate.' Therefore, whilst governments and groups may use heritage as a tool to manipulate the way the past is or is not remembered, the concept of forgetting itself is an integral part of how our memory works.

Schäuble (2017, p. 139) argues Croatia is undergoing a process of the 'politics of (self-)victimisation: memory politics that aim at highlighting recurrent suffering in order to divert suspicion from one's own people's wrongs.' This is an example of remembering and forgetting working alongside one another, remembering one event, in order to forget another. Watson writes that 'the most successful regimes, past and present, manage public emotions' (2018, p. 782). Adding that 'unity can, in this case, be encouraged by notions of victimhood in the past,' (2018, p. 782) using the example of Hungarians believing they were victims of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, which this study will later show is rising in the public consciousness once again.

2.7 COMMEMORATION AND NON-COMMEMORATION

‘Dissonant heritage’ (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1999), ‘heritage that hurts; (Uzzell, 1998), ‘signposts of discord’ (Rose, 2007) are all terms scholars have used to describe heritage that invokes a strong debate among governments or citizens. One such debate focuses on how contested heritage should be presented to the public, or if it should be presented to the public at all, due to the negative emotions it may invoke. Where contested heritage is presented, this raises the question of what form this should take, if it should be interpreted in a ‘hot,’ (Uzzell, 1989) real and potentially emotive way, or a ‘cold,’ dispassionate and considered way, to avoid potential hurt. Schofield (2005, p. 169) writes that ‘presenting troubled pasts will be most effectively achieved by emphasising the human experience.’ Yet some, such as Benton (2010, p. 154), write that at Auschwitz ‘for some, the very presence of carefully restored buildings with their appearance of normality, underplayed and betrayed the ultimate horror of what took place there.’

Silverman writes that ‘cultural heritage may be very painful or troublesome... At its worst the exclusion of heritage leads to violence’ (2011, pp. 7-8). This may be expressed in the example of Spomen-park Dotrščina, in Zagreb, where painful memories of Croatia’s war of independence from Yugoslavia could be in part responsible for the neglect and vandalism at the memorial park which hold monuments established during the Yugoslav period with some dedicated to anti-Fascist Communists. This suggests that the decision to no longer commemorate particular groups can lead to forms of violence. A more extreme example is noted by Layton and Thomas (2001, pp. 2-3) who discussed the destruction of the Babri

Masjid, a 450-year-old mosque in the town of Ayodhya, India, that was destroyed by Hindu fundamentalists in 1992. The destruction of the mosque led to riots between opposing groups that led to the deaths of two thousand people (*The Guardian*, 2020). This raises questions such as to how to deal with contentious and difficult sites, or the spaces left behind by the destruction of such sites. Bevan, in his book *The Destruction of Memory. Architecture at War*, discusses the attempts to rebuild mosques and monuments in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were destroyed during the break-up of Yugoslavia, writing that ‘rebuilding can be as symbolic as the destruction that necessitates it’ (2007, p. 176). However, Bevan acknowledges that this is not without problems, citing examples where attempts to rebuild have been met with hostility. This perpetuates the idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina being a divided nation and may feed Nationalist ideas. Whilst the treatment of cultural heritage can be linked to a rising nationalism, the real reason behind the treatment of heritage may go much deeper. Schäuble (2017, p. 137) believes that ‘present-day commemorative rituals at massacre sites in the Bosnian-Croatian border region are less intended to sustain or revive inter-ethnic animosity than to establish a version of history in which Croatia plays the role of an unprivileged and victimised nation.’ This is further stressed by Watson, who writes, ‘the danger of remembering the traumatic past is that we remember only perpetrators’ oppression and victims’ grievances. Thus many heritage sites attempt to turn remembrance into a form of commemoration that eschews blame and avoids addressing the political contexts that created the oppression’ (2018, p. 787).

Mach discusses the positive side to dealing with difficult heritage, whilst acknowledging that in ‘highly-conscious European societies, heritage has become a central and simultaneously highly contested issue’ (2018, p. 189). Mach writes that the European Union and democratisation of Europe provides an opportunity to balance the heritage of ‘different

nations, regions and communities in the European space.... Previously marginalised areas and communities may now have their voice heard' (2018, p. 191). However, this study will show that cultural heritage and tangible assets are still being used by dominant groups to gain power and, therefore, there may be a way to go before balance can be achieved.

2.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided an outline of literature across a number of topics relevant to this study. Section 2.2.1 showed us that cities such as Berlin can be used as an example of what Cochrane and Passmore describe as 'a metaphor for that whole period of historical shift' (Cochrane & Passmore, 2001, p. 343). In subsequent chapter, this study will show how cultural heritage and tangible assets become an agent of change and can benefit a city. However, these changes are expressed in different ways and have been more successful for some cities, such as Berlin, than others. This was discussed more broadly in section 2.2.2, where we saw academic consensus on cultural heritage and tangible assets being used to create national identity, which often occurs in a post-transitional period. This shows us that tangible assets can be used as an agent of change at different levels: national, regional, and local, which links to the layers of memory referenced by Erll in section 2.2.4.

Throughout this chapter, we have seen that politics appears multiple times, it is a leitmotif running throughout. This can be seen in the discussion in section 2.2.1 where Colaert suggested mass graves can be considered a form of cultural heritage but that the exhuming of such can stir up old politics and perpetuate division. Politics also appeared in sections 2.2.2

which acknowledges that when governments use cultural heritage to create national identity, this leads to the exclusion and disenfranchisement of other groups. This will be picked up in chapter eight when the study presents examples of the relationships of power between groups such as government and citizen, in addition to identifying Nationalist revivals through the analysis of tangible assets within a capital city.

This chapter has also shown that, through the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets within Central European capital cities, it can be seen who is deemed to be the victim and who is not. This is done through cities commemorating and remembering those deemed as victims through the authorised historical narrative and forgetting or removing traces of those deemed as perpetrators.

This study will continue with an overview of the historic background of Berlin, Budapest and Zagreb, the cities which form the case studies for this research.

3. SETTING THE SCENE. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GERMANY, HUNGARY, AND CROATIA AND THEIR CAPITALS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to set historical context to this study. The chapter will cover areas of historical relevance to Germany, Hungary, and Croatia with some focus on the capital cities which form the case studies for this thesis: Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb. The period this chapter will cover varies slightly for each country, starting around the mid-Nineteenth Century until 2016, the year of the final field trip undertaken for this study. This time period has been chosen for the following reasons. Firstly, most of the tangible assets captured in this case study were established during this period. In addition, many of the sites established prior to this period have been altered in some way during this period. Secondly, as this study is interested in understanding the reasons behind the historical re-evaluation of tangible assets, and how this informs the current political and social climate, recent history is of most relevance to the study. Particularly, as this study will show, many changes to cultural heritage and tangible assets are in response to events that have taken place during the Twentieth Century. The timeline has been extended slightly prior to the start of the Twentieth Century in order to provide some context to the first major event of relevance to this study, the First World War.

The structure of the chapter will focus on key historical events for each country, with additional reference to areas such as historical figures, political shifts in structure and stance,

changing borders, economic factors, demographics, and allegiances. This chapter is not designed to be a comprehensive timeline of each country and city but to focus on areas of relevance to this study. As this study, in part, assesses how the treatment of tangible assets can inform us of the political and social climate of a place, the historical focus will be on the political and social history of each country and city. It should also be noted that, whilst this chapter will reference a number of large-scale wars, it is understood that these wars are complex in their own right and will not be explained in great detail below. However, the pertinent points will be outlined in order to understand how countries have navigated their history and the key figures involved.

This chapter will continue with a brief history of Germany which established, and then destroyed, the traditional Eastern and Western European divide. Sitting on the Eastern side of the divide, and firmly under Soviet influence post-World War Two, the chapter will continue by outlining the history of Hungary, before concluding with a history of Croatia which, whilst Communist, will be shown to have a difference experience than those under Soviet influence. The purpose of outlining the countries in this order is to emphasise both the similarities and differences in how they experienced the last Century.

3.2 HISTORICAL TIMELINES

3.2.1 Germany (~1871-2016)

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, due to the particular relevance of the time period, this section will outline the history of Germany from 1871 to 2016. Prior to this date, it is believed the area known as Germany today has been occupied by Germanic people for centuries, though not exclusively. From the mid-Fifteenth Century, Germany was ruled by the House of Habsburg, a dynastic family who supplied Monarchs to other countries such as Austria and Spain. This continued until the mid-Eighteenth Century, when the Habsburgs lost control of some German states to powers such as Russia.

1871-1919

After a number of wars in the mid-Nineteenth Century, 1871 saw the founding of the German Empire, unifying the separately ruled German states. The German Empire was ruled by the King of Prussia with Otto von Bismarck as Minister President and Berlin as its capital city. For a period of time, the German Empire's foreign policy enabled it to avoid war through forging allegiances, however, this changed when Wilhelm II became King in 1888. Wilhelm II established Imperial policies, expansion claimed several colonies and cause conflict with the Empire's neighbours. During this time, the German Empire entered into an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy.

In June 1914, heir to the Austria-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated in Sarajevo. At this time, Sarajevo was capital of the Austria-Hungarian province

of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ferdinand was assassinated by a Bosnian called Gavrilo Princip (Mazower, 2001, p. 14), allegedly an assassin employed by a secret Serbian military organisation. This incident is widely regarded as a catalyst for Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia, starting World War One.

The war escalated due to competing allegiances and the German Empire, allied to Austria-Hungary, found itself at war with the Triple Entente, consisting of France, Russia, and Great Britain. As the war developed, more countries joined, allegiances changed and fighting spread across continents such as Europe and Africa, with Germany and its allies initially leading numerous offensives. Now known as the Central Powers, Germany and its allies began to see defeat towards the end of 1918. The war ended when the Central Powers, including Germany signed an armistice in November 1918, and Wilhelm II abdicated.

1919-1945

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Central Powers were forced to sign treaties, agreeing to terms that would break up their empires, change borders and restrict military capabilities in order to prevent future wars. In addition to this, Germany was forced to pay damages which they would struggle to pay, and which ultimately led to the collapse of the economy in 1931 (James, 1984). Many German citizens saw the treaties as a second humiliating and unjust blow after the defeat of war.

After Wilhelm abdicated, German President Friedrich Ebert established the Weimar Republic, governed by a democratic, parliamentary constitution. When the Great Depression hit Germany in 1929, it further exacerbated Germany's debt and the economic difficulties coincided with the rise in popularity of the Nazi Party, led by Adolf Hitler. In January 1933,

Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany. In February of the same year, a fire that devastated the Reichstag Parliament building was declared by Hitler as evidence that Communists were a threat to Germany. This led to the Enabling Act which gave Hitler the power to write law without consulting Parliament, establishing totalitarian rule (Fergusson, 1964, p. 248). Hitler used his powers to withdraw from previous agreed treaties and to establish incrementally discriminating laws targeted at Jewish and minority groups in Germany.

As Hitler's persecution of Jews and minority groups in Germany increased, so did his expansionist ideas. Under the pretence of defence, Germany invaded Poland in 1939, beginning World War Two. Much like World War One, this escalated due to the expansionist ideas of some, and the allegiances of others. By 1942, Germany and its allies Italy and Japan, known collectively as the Axis Powers, controlled large parts of Europe and North Africa. During this time, the Allied Powers, led by Great Britain, France, United States and Soviet Union, were on the defensive. Momentum swung and throughout 1944 and 1945, a number of Allied Offensives pushed the Axis powers into retreat. The Soviets were able to enter Berlin in Spring 1945, resulting in Hitler's suicide and German surrender, ending the war.

After the war, when German occupied territories were recaptured, the true extent of Hitler's persecution of Jews and minority groups became known. Whilst concentration and detainment camps were not new to war, the extent of the medical experiments and gas chambers to kill large numbers of detainees was not known until after the war.

1945-1989

After the war, the Allies divided Germany into four territories, one held by each of the Allies: Great Britain, France, United States and Soviet Union. Despite sitting in the Soviet quarter, the Allies also split the capital, Berlin, into four quadrants. In 1949, Britain, France and United States merged their territories, informally establishing East and West Germany. West Germany became known as the Federal Republic of Germany, with the city of Bonn as its capital, and East Germany became the German Democratic Republic with East Berlin as its capital.

During this period, West Germany started to receive aid, the economy grew and prospects for West Germany citizens improved. In East Germany, despite naming itself a republic, the country remained under Soviet control and ideology, effectively becoming a Communist state. Life for East Germans did not see the same economic growth and freedoms, and some East Germans started to move to the West. Tensions between America and the Soviet Union started to increase, and the Cold War started. Much like the First and Second World Wars, each side was supported by its allies. However, the Cold War differed in that there was no physical war directly between each side. Instead, each side used proxy wars and policies to increase their political and ideological influence in the world.

The Cold War led to a number of crises, of which the Berlin Blockade was one of the first. With Berlin sitting in East Germany, in order for Western allies to travel to and from West Berlin, they needed land access through Soviet held territory. In 1948, the Soviet Union blocked all land access for the Western allies which meant that essential supplies, such as food and fuel, could not be delivered. The West's response was the Berlin Airlift, a co-operation that saw 200,000 planes in one year dropping thousands of tons of supplies into

West Berlin. Realising their blockade was unsuccessful, the Soviet Union lifted the restrictions in May 1949.

In 1961, in response to the growing number of East Germans ignoring restrictions and defecting to West Germany, East Germany started to build a guarded wall. Whilst the official justification of the wall was to provide a form of defence, the true purpose is believed to be prevention for East Germans trying to leave, and to keep the ideology of the West out of East Germany. The wall was constructed some distance inside East Berlin to allow for a 'no man's land' at the border which, enabled line of sight to shoot anyone who tried to breach the barrier. Whilst a few thousand people were able to defect to West Berlin during time the wall was in situ, the numbers were dramatically less than the numbers defecting prior to the wall. During this time at least 140 people were killed trying to reach West Germany (BERLIN.DE, 2021).

From the mid-1980s, relations between East and West across Europe began to improve. President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, began a number of reforms in the late 1980s which included economic reforms, relaxing censorship rules and moves to democratise the Soviet Union. Eastern European satellite states welcomed the changes and endorsed them to implement similar reforms in their countries. However, Chairman of the East German State, Erich Honecker, was resistant to implement these reforms in East Germany. In spring 1989, Eastern European countries started relaxing and opening their borders. This sparked a chain reaction across Eastern Europe and opened routes for East Germans to travel to West Germany. Sensing change, mass demonstrations started happening in Eastern European countries, including East Germany. East Germany responded by relaxing border restrictions but a miscommunication in the timescales led East Germans to make their way to the wall on

mass. Overwhelmed and not wanting to use lethal force, border guards allowed East Germans to breach the barrier on 9th November 1989.

1989-2016

The breaching of the wall, and relaxing of restrictions continued and, in March 1990, East Germany held its first free elections and, subsequently, started to negotiate with West Germany. This eventually led to a unification treaty, which was formalised on 3rd October 1990, with both sides merging to become the Federal Republic of Germany, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

The now unified country had a number of challenges remaining that reached beyond the unification treaty. Whilst the wall had symbolically fallen, and had been broken and damaged in places, it remained largely intact. This caused logistical problems for the large-scale redevelopment programmes that had started to commence. Equally, the memory of the wall caused conflict between the German government, who wanted to retain the wall as a symbol of peace, and the German citizens, who wanted the wall taken down to remove a constant reminder of the division they lived under for so many years. Ultimately, a compromise was reached and most of the wall was taken down, with a number of sections kept as memorials. These will be discussed in more detail later in this study.

The urban reconstruction programmes that commenced after unification focused on high profile areas and buildings. The Palast der Republik, a building that held the East German government was closed in 1990 and left derelict until 2003 when a decision was made to demolish the site and rebuild an historic palace in its place. Berlin was chosen as capital city for unified Germany and the Reichstag Parliament building, destroyed in a fire before World

War Two, was reconstructed in the late 1990s to allow for the return of the German government. In addition to physical reconstructions, Germany began to negotiate its past through the building of memorials that honoured those who suffered at the hands of the Nazis during World War Two and Soviets during the Cold War.

Post re-unification, Germany started to take an increasingly active role in the European Union and is considered one of the leading members today. Germany has shifted dramatically from the politics of its past and, in the past two decades, the ruling Chancellors party has held a centre-left political stance, welcoming multi-culturalism. In 2015, the European migrant crisis saw unprecedented numbers of migrants flee war situations and economic deprivation in the Middle East. Once the migrants reached European land, many travelled on foot in large groups to reach the country they believed would give them the best prospects. Some European countries saw the crisis as a threat, building border fences and using force to push migrants back. However, German Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed migrants, publicly stating Germany would not limit the number of migrants entering the country. In addition, Merkel stated she would no longer follow current European Guidance that migrants should register themselves in the first country they enter, instead offering to register migrants who had travelled to Germany from other European countries.

3.2.2 Hungary (~1867-2016)

The history of Hungary outlined below will cover the period from 1867-2016, due to its relevance to the majority of sites captured within this study. The early history of Hungary saw the area of land known as Hungary today occupied by various empires and tribes, such as the Avars and Bulgarian Empire. Hungary is first believed to have formed as a country in the year

895 when various tribes, led by Árpád, agreed to unite. In the Tenth Century, Hungary became a Kingdom and, despite invasions over the centuries, remained so until the mid-Sixteenth Century when a series of wars with the Ottomans saw Hungary split up, with Hungary maintaining control over a smaller area of land.

1867-1919

During the early Nineteenth Century, Hungary was at war with a number of its neighbours. Defeats at the hand of Austria led Hungary to agree to a compromise and form the dual Monarchy of the Austria-Hungarian Empire (Mazower, 2001, p. 99). Austria and Hungary were to be governed separately, each with its own capital city, but with a common Monarchy and common international policies. In 1873, three neighbouring areas in Hungary were united to form the capital city known today as Budapest. These areas were Buda, Óbuda and Pest.

After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and the outbreak of World War One in 1914, the Austria-Hungarian Empire allied itself to the Central Powers, alongside Germany, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Despite success against the Allies on the Eastern front during the war period, Hungary suffered a disproportionate number of casualties in comparison to its allies. In 1916 Hungary sought an armistice with the Allied powers but was denied due to the Austria-Hungarian support for Germany. By 1918, strikes and growing pacifist movements in Austria-Hungary eventually led to the Empire withdrawing from defeated territories. There was also a growing desire within the Empire to separate the states. On 31st October 1918, Mihály Károlyi became Prime Minister of Hungary and cancelled the agreement that held Austria-Hungary together, establishing the Hungarian Democratic Republic.

1919-1945

Much like Germany after World War One, Hungary was forced to sign a treaty by the Allied Powers in 1920, outlining reparations and consequences for Hungary's alliance with Germany. The Treaty of Trianon outlined a number of consequences for Hungary, including being forced to hand over some of the Empire's land to allow ethnic groups to self-determine. This meant that, for example, a designated area of Hungarian land with a high proportion of Romanians was given to Romania. Hungary was also forced to hand over land to the Czechoslovak Republic, the First Austrian Republic and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In total, Hungary handed 72% of its empire to newly established countries. Despite protests from Hungary, the Treaty was signed under newly established Regent, Miklós Horthy. The consequences of the treaty went beyond land and population losses for Hungary. Infrastructure such as train lines and canals now ran through neighbouring countries allied to the powers that forced the treaty upon Hungary, in addition to losing arable land. One of Horthy's priorities during this period was to revise the treaty and re-establish some of the land Hungary lost.

During his rule of Hungary, Horthy led a Nationalist, Conservative government. Horthy continued to align himself with Italy and Germany, who held a similar stance and started to introduce anti-Semitic laws. Horthy also hoped Germany's Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, would help Hungary to regain territory lost through the Treaty of Trianon. The far-right politics grew support in Hungary due to the declining economy, as Fascist politicians promised economic recovery. Hungary grew closer to Nazi Germany in the late 1930s and was awarded some areas of land lost through the Treaty of Trianon via negotiations supported by Germany. In 1939, Hungary further regained some land from Czechoslovakia through force.

When World War Two broke out in 1939, Hungary allied itself with the Axis Powers, however, did not always provide front-line support. When Hungary did provide front-line support, it was often in order to occupy and regain territory lost through the Treaty of Trianon. In addition, despite enforcing anti-Semitic laws in Hungary and persecuting the Jewish community, Horthy was not prepared to go as far as Nazi Germany. Jews in Hungary were not killed or physically harmed, and Horthy refused to hand over Hungarian Jews to Germany. Uncomfortable in its alliance, Hungary attempted to negotiate with the Allied Powers and were invaded by Nazi Germany in March 1944 when Hitler found out. During German occupation of Hungary, Horthy was placed under house arrest and Fascist Hungarian politician, Ferenc Szálasi, became Prime Minister with the support of Germany. For the last few months of the war, Szálasi and his Arrow Cross political party persecuted, tortured, and deported hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews. Hungary remained occupied by Germany until the end of the war, when Hungary was invaded by the Soviet Union in September 1944 and subsequently surrendered in February 1945.

1945-1989

Much like the aftermath of the First World War in Germany, the Hungarian economy and standard of living declined in the post-war period. Hungary became a Soviet satellite state, led by Mátyás Rákosi who was chosen by the Soviet Union and who established the secret police force known as the ÁVH. The ÁVH would keep control through the imprisonment, execution and deportation of intellectuals and democrats.

After Stalin's death in 1953, some citizens believed there may be hope of liberalisation, and students and intellectuals began to speak more openly in Hungary. One such person was

politician was Imre Nagy who, whilst Communist, hoped for political reform. In October 1956, what started as a peaceful student protest attracted thousands of citizens who marched through Budapest towards the Parliament building, chanting demands including a desire to have Imre Nagy as their Prime Minister. The government responded by firing on the demonstrators, killing a number of students. However, the response forced citizens to fight back and started the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Fighting quickly spread as citizens formed militias and defended territory in strongholds. The Hungarian government collapsed and Imre Nagy became Prime Minister however, Nagy was unable to prevent Soviet troops from entering Hungary to regain control over Budapest. Nagy negotiated with the Soviets to stop fighting whilst declaring his support for the revolution. On 30th October, fighting had largely stopped, and Nagy had full control of the government. However, the Soviet Union felt the revolution had gone too far and needed to be suppressed. On 31st October, Soviet troops re-entered Hungary, attacked remaining strongholds and subsequently arrested Nagy. Nagy was tried and executed in 1958.

In the aftermath of the revolution, thousands of Hungarians were arrested and imprisoned, with a smaller number executed. János Kádár took over as Hungarian Communist leader and remained so until his retirement in 1988. Kádár remained loyal to the Soviets during his leadership of Hungary and suppressed the memory of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, however, he did make some concessions such as releasing those imprisoned after the revolution and allowing farmers to hold private land. Kádár also reduced censorship over time, allowed a degree of free market trade and, as a result, the economy grew, and Hungary was considered a liberalised Communist state in comparison to others. This continued until the 1980s when Communism began to weaken, ideas of Nationalism and Liberalism once again began to rise, and peaceful protests occurred throughout Hungary.

1989-2016

The growing civil resistance and calls for multi-party elections across Eastern Europe eventually led to Hungary holding what is referred to as the Hungarian Round Table Talks. The conclusion of these talks throughout the summer of 1989 resulted in Hungary transitioning from Communism to a multi-party Democracy. The denouncement of Communism was symbolised by the reburial of Imre Nagy in a State funeral attended by an estimated 200,000 people. This also started the process of reversing the memory of the Communist period, a theme that will be evident throughout this study.

In May 1990, Hungary held its first free elections and the Conservative, Hungarian Democratic Forum won. Despite this, and Hungary starting to reverse some of the decisions of the Communist period, the next elections in 1994 were won by the Socialist Party. Economic decline fed dissatisfaction amongst Hungarians and, for the next decade, the political landscape shifted back and forth. The political shifts occurred until 2010 when National Conservative, Viktor Orbán, was elected Prime Minister and has continued to hold office since. Throughout his leadership, Orbán is considered to have shifted from Centre-Right politics to increasing Right-Wing, even authoritarian leadership. Orbán has made statements criticising immigration and, during the 2015 Migrant Crisis, took a very different stance to Germany, referenced above, erecting fences along the Hungary-Serbia border to prevent migrants from entering Hungary. The country was also accused of using excessive force against migrants.

The increasingly right-wing politics of Hungary has paved way for more extreme voices to be heard. Hungarian political party, Jobbik, has been rising in popularity in recent years and are now the second largest party in Hungary. Jobbik has been criticised for extreme views, anti-

Semitism and demands for autonomy for Hungarians living outside Hungary, those in the territories lost after the Treaty of Trianon. Despite the two main Hungarian parties being from the Conservative Right, they have faced public opposition and Hungarian citizens continue to protest against both Jobbik and the current government, one such protest monument will be discussed later in this study.

3.2.3 Croatia (~1868-2016)

For the purpose of this study, the history of Croatia will start in 1868. Prior to this date, the area of land today known as Croatia was first believed to have been occupied by Croats in the 7th Century. Since then, the area had short periods of independence as a Kingdom under kings such as Tomislav, known as the first king of Croatia, who ruled in the Tenth Century (Tanner, 2001, p. 9). However, the region was often ruled under greater influence, such as the Habsburgs during the Sixteenth Century (Tanner, 2001, p. 35). During this period, the borders of what is today known as Croatia were not fixed and changed frequently.

1868-1919

In 1868, due to improved relations between the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary, Croatia, once allied to the Austrian Empire, agreed a settlement with The Kingdom of Hungary to keep peace and maintain a degree of autonomy (Tanner, 2001, p. 98). This led to the formation of the autonomous Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, which was formed out of much of modern-day Croatia. Part of the Dalmatian coast remained under Austrian control and the Rijeka region remained its status as an independent region. At this point in history, Zagreb was already the capital city of Croatia, being declared so in 1845.

In 1881, the territory of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia expanded after Austria-Hungary returned Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatian rule, though with close ties to Hungary remaining. Further efforts by the Austria-Hungarian empire to reduce the autonomy of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia was unsuccessful during the build up to World War One, with the imminent collapse of Austria-Hungary. During the war, weakening Austria-Hungarian empire led to Croats fighting on a number of fronts at different times during the war. After World War One, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia declared complete secession from the empire and, on 1st December 1918, agreed to a union with the Kingdom of Serbia to join the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Tanner, 2001 pp 120).

1919-1945

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, created at the Treaty of Versailles (Mazower, 2001, p. 114), was formalised as a unitary state ruled by King Alexander I in 1921. A key political figure who opposed this decision was Stjepan Radić, who led the Nationalist Croatian Peasant Party. Radić was against a union with Serbia, which he felt would lead to the loss of Croatian autonomy. By 1920, Radić was leader of the most widely supported Croatian political party (Tanner, 2001, p. 121) however, at times during his political career, Radić would be arrested or refuse to cooperate with the Kingdom's Parliament due to his criticism of Croatia's reducing autonomy and what he perceived to be Serbia's increasing hegemony (Tanner, 2001, pp. 121-123). Despite this, Radić's popularity amongst Croatians remained and, even today, is considered one of Croatia's most popular historical figures. Throughout the 1920s, political tensions increased in Yugoslavia until, in 1928, Radić was assassinated by a Serbian attendee in the National Assembly (Tanner, 2001, pp. 123-124). Radić's legacy

continues to current day, with Radić appearing on bank notes and having a day named in his honour. After Radić was assassinated, discussions within Croatian political parties over the level of autonomy Croatia should have from the Kingdom continued, with many Croats abstaining from Yugoslav government. In 1929 the Kingdom was renamed Yugoslavia and national political parties and nation flags were banned (Tanner, 2001, p. 124). However, a number of political parties continued to advocate for increased autonomy for Croatia underground. One such politician was Ante Pavelić, who established an illegal paramilitary organisation known as *Hrvatski Domobran* (Croatian Home Guard) and later the Ustaše Croatian Liberation Movement, before being exiled from Yugoslavia (Tanner, 2001, p. 125).

In the lead up to World War Two, the Yugoslav government started to cooperate with Germany, believing that 'Hitler posed less danger to Yugoslavia than the restoration of the Habsburgs in Austria' (Tanner, 2001, p. 131) but did not declare itself a formal ally. However, this was not to be and, during World War Two, Yugoslavia was invaded by Fascist troops. Pavelić returned with his Ustaše Party and, with support from Fascist Italy and Germany, was instilled to rule much of Croatia as a Nazi satellite state (Mazower, 2001, p. 123), including the area of land today known as Bosnia-Herzegovina. This enabled them to declare Croatia independent of Yugoslavia and form the Independent State of Croatia (NDH); some of Dalmatia and Northern Croatia were annexed by Italy and Hungary, respectively. During this period, the Ustaše took influence from Nazi Germany, introducing xenophobic laws and concentration camps such as Jasenovac, where large numbers of Serbs, Jews and Roma were held and killed (Mazower, 2001, p. 147); it was clear 'that the new state was to be a carbon copy of Nazi Germany' (Tanner, 2001, p. 144). This led to the formation of a number of opposition movements, most notably the Chetniks, whose ideology was rooted in anti-Fascism and Serbian Nationalism, and the Yugoslav Partisans, who were anti-Fascist and

pro-Communist and Yugoslavia (Tanner, 2001, p. 159-160). The anti-fascist stance of the Yugoslav Partisans, led by Josip Tito, garnered them support from the Allied powers, which included equipment and training. With the help of Soviet troops, the Yugoslav Partisans made territorial gains and established control of Yugoslavia by May 1945 (Tanner, 2001, p. 165-166), defeating the Ustaše and killing many of those associated with the Axis powers, including civilians, in what is known as the Bleiburg Massacre (Tanner, 2001, p. 169). This ended Croatian independence for the next 45 years.

1945-1990

After World War Two, and the defeat of the Ustaše, the former Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with each republic, including Croatia, receiving a degree of autonomy but led by Partisan leader Josip Tito. The Federation was made up of six Socialist Republics; Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro and two semi-autonomous provinces; Kosovo and Vojvodina. Whilst the post-war period was largely peaceful, there were still tensions. Relatives of those who were killed during the Bleiburg Massacre were persecuted and unable to know the location of where their relatives were killed. This would not change until after 1990, when Croatia went through another political shift which will be discussed later in this chapter. What continued throughout this period were movements calling for increasingly greater autonomy, and indeed, independence for Croatia from Yugoslavia. 1971 saw the Croatian Spring, a series of organised demonstrations, including thousands of students, on the streets of Zagreb. The protests were met with Police force and thousands were arrested and prosecuted. One notable figure who was arrested was Franjo Tuđman, who would later

become President of Croatia. Whilst the movement was suppressed, it eventually led to a compromise. There would be a new constitution that provided even greater autonomy to the Republics, as well as providing Tito presidency for life. Despite continued calls for autonomy within the Republics, Tito was considered a popular and unifying figure who was able to keep ethnic tensions under control. During the post-World War Two period, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a single party federation that was politically Communist.

However, Tito allowed its citizens a greater degree of freedom than seen in Soviet influence states elsewhere in Eastern Europe due to Tito's ability to keep Stalin at a distance. This led to tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union until Stalin's death in 1953. Tito is often credited with his ability to play the Cold War's East-West divide to his advantage. As a Communist, he was able to cooperate with Eastern countries but his ability to defy Stalin also afforded him some cooperation with Eastern countries. Tito is also credited with impressive post-war economic growth until the 1970s, when he struggled to control inflation. Tito's popularity is evidenced by his funeral attendance which was, at that time, history's largest state funeral with numerous politicians and heads of state from both the East and West.

Tensions began to rise again in 1980 when Tito died, leading to the weakening of a united Yugoslavia (Mazower, 2001, p. 137). The period of time between Tito's death and the ultimate break down in relations across Yugoslavia, which led to the subsequent declarations for independence, are complex and numerous to explore here. However, it is widely accepted one contributing factor was the failure of Yugoslavia in 'balancing the competing claims of the different nationalities' (Mazower, 2001, p. 139). What became consistent across Yugoslavia was the continued callings from Nationalists across each of the Republics for even greater autonomy. This was particularly evident in Serbia as the now Serbian leader, Slobodan Milošević 'began to reassert Serb power in Kosovo and Vojvodina' (Mazower, 2001, p. 139).

This escalated to what people believe was Milošević's attempt to create a Greater Serbia, encompassing land outside Serbia where ethnic Serbs lived.

1990 - 2016

With the fall of Communism across Eastern Europe in the background, the Yugoslav Republics held their first multi-party elections in 1990. In Croatia, Franjo Tuđman's Nationalist Party, Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), won. Nationalist parties won in each of the elections across Yugoslavia, leading to a dramatic shift for a once unified Communist federation. This led to some ethnic Serbs living in Croatia to respond by calling for greater autonomy and protection in areas within Croatia that had majority Serb populations. Croatia's HDZ party believed that it was now untenable to remain as part of Yugoslavia and declared independence in 1991, alongside Slovenia.

Yugoslavia responded by sending the Yugoslavian army (JNA) into Croatia and Slovenia, who did not yet have independent armies. By the end of 1991, the JNA gained control of around two-thirds of Croatian territory and non-Serb populations in those areas were forcibly removed or killed (Mazower, 2001, p. 140). The areas controlled by the JNA was declared the Serbian Republic of Krajina, and comprised of two areas, one bordering Bosnia and one bordering Serbia. In 1992, Croatian independence was recognised by much of the international community and, during the next three years, Croatia was intermittently shelled by JNA forces from the Serbian Republic of Krajina, despite the United Nations deploying the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to keep peace. During this time, Croatia was building its defence capabilities and, in 1995, won a decisive battle against the JNA known as Operation Storm. Croatia regained the territory it had lost to Yugoslavia in 1991

and Lieutenant General Ante Gotovina is credited as being instrumental in the success of the operation. During Operation Storm, many of the Serbs who had remained, or moved to the occupied territories, were forcibly expelled and some killed. Since 1991, Croatia has remained an independent country.

After the war, President Tuđman remained in power until his death in 1999, representing the centre right HDZ party. In 2000, Stjepan Mesić became President as an independent and, during his time in office, saw both centre-right and centre-left Prime Ministers. It was under Mesić that Croatia joined NATO in 2009. Mesić was succeeded in 2010 by Ivo Josipović who, alongside the Prime Minister of this period, represented the centre-left Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) and Croatia subsequently joined the European Union in 2013. More recently, Croatia's political leanings have become more right-wing, with the appointment of its first female President in Independent candidate, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović.

3.3 CONCLUSION

This short history of Germany, Hungary, and Croatia, from the mid-Nineteenth Century until 2016 shows us that, at a high level, the countries saw the same major events. Each country played a role in World War One, World War Two, was ruled by Communism, saw borders change over time and had a dramatic political shift in 1989, when Communism fell. However, the decisions made by each country's ruling party, and those of their neighbouring countries, led to very different paths and experiences for citizens throughout this period. For example, Hungarian belief that they were treated unfairly when forced to sign the Treaty of Trianon has

been kept alive, intermittently, by ruling Hungarian parties, which has led to Hungarians today still believing they have claim to neighbouring lands. Germany, the only country split between East and West during the Cold War led to a unique post-1989 response. Unlike other ex-Communist countries, the fall of Communism and German re-unification forced Germany into a dialogue amongst citizens to bring the split ideologies together and form a cohesive political direction. Finally, Croatia, living through a more relaxed Communist period under Tito, nevertheless rebelled against Yugoslav unity after his death, resulting in war and the break-up of Yugoslavia, disrupting the period of transition other ex-Communist countries navigated post-1989. These unique responses provide insight which will complement the discussion later in this study and enable understanding of the ways in which Central European Capital cities treat their cultural heritage and tangible assets, and how this is reflected in the social and political climate.

4. A COMBINED METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the methodologies employed in undertaking this study, including the approach to field research, dealing with documenting the data gathered and determining how to advance the analysis. This chapter starts by discussing the scope of the study and a number of key decisions made during the preliminary phases of research, as well as listing some terminology and definitions to support the remainder of the thesis.

4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary question this study addresses is:

How are Central European capital cities treating their cultural heritage and tangible assets and how can this inform us about the current social and political climate of the country? By treatment, the study refers to acts such as promoting, reconstructing, removing, or neglecting cultural heritage and tangible assets.

To answer this question, the study analysed ~350 sites to understand the following:

What themes exist in the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets within Central European capital cities and how does this manifest itself at different levels: site level; across each city; across the case studies? This will be addressed through the quantitative analysis of the data set and supported through the qualitative lens analysis, discussed below.

How does the examination of cultural heritage and tangible assets within a capital city enable an assessment of the cultural and political climate? This will be addressed by drawing out patterns and themes in the quantitative analysis of the data set, in addition to the qualitative lens analysis which considered changes over time.

In order to achieve this, the study had to first make a number of decisions which will be discussed in more detail further in the study. These are:

What is the range of material that should be examined in order to understand how cities use their cultural heritage and tangible assets to communicate a cultural and/or political message? This is discussed in more detail further in this chapter.

What methodology should be employed to understand how Central European capital cities are treating their cultural heritage and tangible assets, which can be applied to other geographical areas for future research? This is discussed in more detail throughout this chapter and summarised in chapter nine.

What is the impact and importance of understanding how Central European capital cities treating their cultural heritage and tangible assets? This is first introduced in chapter 1 and summarised in more detail in chapter nine.

4.3 KEY DECISIONS AND SCOPE

As outlined in chapter one, previous to this study, I researched the treatment of cultural heritage in post-conflict situations, focusing on the cultural heritage of Croatia since the break-up of Yugoslavia and the end of the war in 1995. The study identified that towns and cities within a country can have vastly different experiences to war, yet governments use cultural heritage to create a ‘one-size fits all’ identity that can create discord within society (Clancy, 2010). In order to deepen our understanding of the treatment of cultural heritage, this study presents a broader look at cultural heritage and tangible assets across three countries. These are countries that have experienced similar events, such as World War Two and Communist rule, yet this study shows that the way in which the experiences manifested in the past and today differ.

This study researched the cultural heritage and tangible assets of capital cities within Central Europe. I present three case studies that show how the study of cultural heritage and tangible assets can provide us with an understanding of the politics and attitudes that sit behind the treatment of sites individually and as a collective. In viewing sites through a variety of lenses this study provides two primary benefits. Firstly, a deeper understanding of the cultural heritage and tangible assets within the case studies. I show that the study of cultural heritage and tangible assets can inform us of how changes to the intangible, such as changing attitudes and politics, can affect the tangible cultural heritage of a place. Equally, I show the reverse of this also to be true, that changes to the physical cultural heritage can affect the intangible, such as the political climate of a place. Secondly, the study provides the discipline of heritage studies with a new approach to the study of cultural heritage. The study shows how viewing a

wider range of material through a variety of lenses, in combination with quantitative analysis, can provide a multi-layered understanding of the cultural and political climate of a place.

4.3.1 Why these cities were chosen

Central Europe has seen significant political and ideological transitions within the last century as a result of events such as World War One, World War Two, the Cold War and the fall of Communism. These events have contributed to the changing landscape of Central Europe, as places are damaged during war, rebuilt, developed, and changed. Having such a rich, long and, at times, contested history, this places greater meaning on the people, events and places that are being promoted or demoted through the treatment of sites captured in the study.

Whilst the same applies to other regions, Central Europe has a relatively high concentration of countries, comparative to its size, which benefitted the study as it is logistically simple to travel to and around Central Europe. Central Europe's diverse past and accessibility leads to an ideal place to apply the study's methodology and show what we can learn about how countries manage their cultural heritage and tangible assets in response to their past.

Capital cities are often the decision-making centre of a country and the place that represents or attempts to represent the national identity of its citizens. As early as the mid-Nineteenth century, governments began to develop the idea of capital cities being global cities, 'capital cities became the windows to the world collecting diplomats, foreign tourists, international conferences, anarchists and all kinds of information sources about the external world' (Dijkink, 2000, p. 66). In addition to this, leaders and governments have historically tried to turn their capital cities 'into major landmarks of their reign and important expressions of what they stood for' (Van der Wusten, 2001, p. 340). Capital cities can inform us of how countries

want to be perceived and how they are perceived by outsiders. As capital cities are a concentration of cultural and political identity, either real or perceived, this study chose to use capital cities as the case studies for research. It is in these places, above all else, where countries are telling both the citizens and outsiders who they are and what they stand for. Due to this, it may also be where challenges to this identity, and where exclusions to this identity, may be most visible.

The cities chosen for this study are Berlin in Germany, Budapest in Hungary, and Zagreb in Croatia. These cities were chosen because they have, relatively recently, gone through a significant political transition and have joined the European Union. It is acknowledged that this applies to a vast number of countries within the European continent however, these three cities were chosen as I felt their experience of significant events, such as World War Two and Communism were both shared yet experienced differently. This enabled the study to identify both similarities and differences in the city's responses to their past. Where the difference lies between these cities is in their history and the nature of their political transition. Berlin was chosen as preliminary research suggested the city has a unique approach to the legacy of World War Two. Zagreb was chosen due to my previous research studying Croatian cultural heritage in a post-war environment, providing a number of building blocks in which to start this research but also with the knowledge that there were areas in Zagreb I had not yet explored. Finally, Budapest was chosen in order to complement and contrast against the histories of Berlin and Zagreb, as it felt important to include a country with a different experience of the post-World War Two years as a Soviet Satellite state. The reason for choosing countries that are part of the European Union is that each country has made a conscious choice to be part of a wider political and cultural union. This study will show that,

at times, the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets in Central European capital cities suggests a contradiction with the decision to be part of a wider union.

4.3.2 Types of sites in scope for analysis.

Further in this chapter, a number of definitions are presented for what can be described as more traditional object of cultural heritage. However, in order to discuss the type of sites that were recorded during field study, it should be noted that the term cultural heritage is one that is subjective and difficult to define. UNESCO (2017) writes, 'Cultural heritage is the legacy of physical artefacts and intangible attributes of a group or society that are inherited from past generations, maintained in the present and bestowed for the benefit of future generations.'

This is a wide-reaching definition that would not be possible to do justice to in the course of this study. Therefore, the scope has been narrowed to focus solely on tangible objects. Whilst I acknowledge that intangible heritage can also provide an understanding of the political and cultural climate of a country or place, I have focused the scope primarily as the study is interested in the visual presentation of cities and the experience of visiting sites. In addition, the focus enabled a more in-depth presentation of the research.

In addition, this study has chosen to present a selection of sites that may not be traditionally thought of as cultural heritage, such as graffiti, new buildings and what I refer to as protest monuments. Protest monuments being a public, physical response to an existing site. This is due to both the subjective nature of the term cultural heritage and that the study, along with previous research, identified that a greater range of material is required in order to understand the cultural and political climate of a place. This study shows that these sites inform the cultural and political climate as much as traditional cultural heritage and will be discussed in

more detail in chapter nine. Therefore, the sites captured within this study are collectively referred to as cultural heritage and tangible assets.

4.3.3 Changes over time

The sites presented in this study were recorded over the course of two field studies to each capital city, approximately one year apart. This enabled the opportunity to record changes over time, in relation to individual sites or to landscapes within a city. The study presents examples of new sites being established, old sites being removed, sites neglected, and others developed during the period in between each field study. For example, by the second field trip to Berlin, the number of Berlin Wall exhibits had increased, and in Budapest I was able to record changes outside Parliament building, where a development programme is transforming the area to appear as it did before the end of World War Two. This provided insight into the attitudes towards these sites from both citizens and official bodies, examples of which will be discussed throughout chapters six and seven.

4.3.4 Limitations to the study

Bias can be seen as a negative limitation that a research project needs to overcome. However, this study accepts two aspects of bias. Firstly, bias is often unconscious, and the most willing researcher cannot understand, in the first person, how another person or culture will view their cultural heritage or tangible assets. Secondly, bias is not always negative. The purpose of this study is to provide a deeper understanding and alternative way of studying the treatments of cultural heritage and tangible assets within a place. One of the reasons for countries presenting their cultural heritage is to communicate who they are to outside observers. I am

one such observer and accept that others may view my interpretations and assumptions differently. This study will therefore provide, not only my discussions and conclusions, but the full data set in which these were made. This will be further supported by the scope and definitions laid out in this chapter, in addition to drawing on a diverse range of cross-disciplinary academic literature. I note that the study has been written from an academically, Western European, archaeological and heritage management background. I believe this provides me with a degree of detachment and an ability to read the sites within my case studies in a less emotive way, enhanced by the methodology employed, viewing the sites through a variety of lenses, complimented by a review of a large database of cultural heritage and tangible asset sites. This will be discussed in greater detail further in this chapter.

With respect to the language barrier faced, I acknowledge that a lack of fluency in German, Hungarian or Croatia may have led to some sites being missed from the study and potential misinterpretation of script. I show that there is a large enough sample size of sites to minimise any negative impact on the ability to draw conclusions. Despite this, I was supported by a basic knowledge of Croatian which I developed during my MPhil study, which was of benefit both logistically and in identifying road names or sites of interest that were not identified through preliminary research. It should also be noted that in spending a significant amount of time undertaking preliminary research, an understanding of key words and phrases can be developed. For example, it can soon be learned that any structures containing words such as “rat” (Croatian for *war*), “hősök” (Hungarian for *heroes*) and “mauer” (German for *wall*) would be of interest to this study. Throughout the study, any assumptions that have been made as a result of translated text will be noted. In addition, any text or names that required translating have been checked using different translation tools. The reason being that direct translation can often lose the context in which something is intended.

Time limitations were placed on the study due to full time employment commitments. Whilst the study could have seen benefits to a prolonged stay in each city, one of the study's key findings is that the methodology provides a comprehensive assessment of these cities, despite limited field research. The study shows there is a large enough samples size of heritage sites recorded (appendix A) in order to identify both patterns and similarities across cities and within the cities. There were also benefits to visiting each city one year apart. As discussed above, this approach enabled the study a clearer understanding of how the cities had changed even in a relatively short space of time. This provides insight into the political and cultural ebbs and flows of a country that might otherwise be invisible.

The final limitation that should be noted is a disparate amount of documentation on the sites which could impact the study. Older cultural heritage sites, particularly in Germany, are more likely to have been discussed in academic literature, providing support and alternative interpretations for this study. Newer sites across the case studies, in addition to many sites within Zagreb, can be found far less often in academic literature. Whilst there is a difference in the level of supporting literature across the sites, I will show that the methodology employed does not rely on secondary research for each site.

4.4 TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS

Definitions are rarely absolute and each of the below could mean different things to different people, depending on factors, such as demographics, geography, and personal experience. I

will continue by providing a definition of some key terms, within the scope of this study. These are definitions developed for the purpose of identifying a baseline for the study.

Central Europe

The countries that comprise of Central Europe will vary depending on a variety of factors. The boundaries can change depending on the perspective of the person using the term. Croatia has been traditionally seen by the West as an Eastern European country (*The Economist*, 2000). However, even within Croatia there may be differing opinions. Due to its diverse history with parts of the country being exposed or influenced by different empires and peoples, Croatia is considered to sit across both Western and Eastern European circles of influence (Klemenčić, Date Unknown, p. 160). The boundaries of what people believe to be Central Europe has also changed over time. Post-World War Two, Germany was split between East and West therefore, sitting at the very centre of Central Europe. However, today, Germany is viewed as part of Western Europe, particularly by those in the west. Another factor that can affect how people define the countries of Central Europe is context. For example, the boundaries of Central Europe, when used in a geographical context, may be slightly different than when used in a political context.

Whilst it is acknowledged that Central Europe is a fluid concept, and is open to interpretation, it was important to define what Central Europe means to this study. As previously noted, Central European capital cities were chosen partly because of their complex histories that were more heavily impacted by the East/West divide than those countries sitting definitively in the East and West. In defining Central Europe, I used a largely geographical definition of Central Europe, combining the countries included in two Central European Associations:

CENTRAL EUROPE (2013) and Interreg Central Europe (2013). This provided the following map of countries for this study to select case studies from (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Central Europe as defined for the purpose of this study: 1. Germany; 2. Poland; 3. Czech Republic; 4. Slovakia; 5. Austria; 6. Hungary; 7. Italy; 8. Slovenia; 9. Croatia; 10. Ukraine.

(d-maps.com, 2021. Modified from source by author)

Cultural heritage

Cultural heritage is traditionally believed to be a representation of the past, handed down to the present allowing us to observe, learn or remember past times. An example of one such definition is that of Historic England, which states, ‘inherited assets which people identify and value as a reflection and expression of their evolving knowledge, beliefs and traditions, and of their understanding of the beliefs and traditions of others’ (Historic England, 2008). However,

in more recent years, academics widely accept that cultural heritage ‘is never only about the past’ (Macdonald, 2013, p. 216) or even that cultural heritage does not really exist, ‘there is really, no such thing as heritage’ (Smith, 2006, p.11). This study accepts that cultural heritage is not just about the past, but of the present. It is also not just about evidencing where a society has come from, but what a society is, or wants to be in the present day. This can be done using traditional forms of cultural heritage, such as architecture and monuments, but may also be done through more modern interpretations such as graffiti and creating new installations. In addition, it is now commonly accepted that cultural heritage does not have to be a physical object that has survived the past. In 2013 alone UNESCO added twenty-five new items to the list of Intangible World Heritage that included the Mediterranean diet, Jamdani weaving and Men’s group Colindat which is a Christmastime, Macedonian ritual (UNESCO, 2014). For the purpose of this study, I will be referring to cultural heritage in the tangible sense. Whilst the study accepts that there are intangible forms of cultural heritage, in order to define a manageable scope, this study focuses on the tangible aspects.

Tangible Assets

As stated in the introduction, previous research has led me to understand that, in order to understand a societies relationship with its past and built environment, study needs to go beyond what is traditionally viewed as cultural heritage. This is echoed by academics in the field of heritage studies, such as Schofield (2005) and MacDonald (2013), who also research beyond the more classic forms of cultural heritage to include graffiti or recently established monuments many would not yet classify as cultural heritage. For the purpose of this study, the scope includes any tangible objects, identified through preliminary research or field study,

that appears to have been erected, destroyed, removed, damaged or neglected as a political or cultural communication to local citizens or outside observers.

Capital cities

In many instances, the capital city of a country is the seat of government and is also often the economic centre of a country. Traditionally, ‘what was common to all capital cities were the functions of social and political data gathering and decision making’ (Claval, 2000, p. 74). Van der Wursten writes that cities became capitals ‘because they represent and symbolize state power and national unity (2001, p. 339) suggesting that older capital cities became so after a natural concentration of power. However, there can be other reasons for a country to be named as capital, such as historic, geographical, or symbolic reasons. Other capital cities, such as Canberra in Australia and Brasilia in Brazil were planned, and purpose built. There are also examples of countries that have multiple capital cities, such as South Africa and Yemen. Equally, a country may change its capital city over time. There are no hard and fast rules yet, generally speaking, capital cities often ‘became the symbol of national identity’ (Dijkink, 2000, p. 65) and it is for this reason, capital cities were chosen as case studies for this research. For the purpose of this study, capital cities will be defined as the city named as capital by the country or territory itself.

City centre

As with many of the definitions relevant to this study, there is more than one way to define a city centre. A city centre, particularly in Europe, can be defined in an historical sense by the fortifications that enclosed a medieval settlement. Here, reference may be made to an historic centre, rather than city centre. In cities established more recently, the city centre may be the area of concentrated entertainment, commerce, or political power. Definitions may equally be provided for logistical and financial reasons, for example, transport systems may offer different prices to city centre and outer city travel. For the purpose of this study, several sources were used to define the city centre limits in each of the case studies. The defined limits were deduced by overlaying the city centre limits defined in various tourist and transport maps, the results of which can be seen in figures 6, 7 and 8.




Figure 6. City centre limits for Berlin.

(Google Maps, 2020a. Modified from source by author)




Figure 7. City centre limits for Budapest.

(Google Maps, 2020b. Modified from source by author)




Figure 8. City centre limits for Zagreb.

(Google Maps, 2020c. Modified from source by author)

Monument

ICOMOS (1964) defines an historic monument as ‘not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting in which is found the evidence of a particular civilization, a significant development or a historic event.’ More general definitions of a monument refer to a structure or building that was erected in order to honour a notable person(s) or event (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020). For the purpose of this study, the definition will be extended to include structures erected to commemorate relevant bodies, such as the European Union, or relevant abstract concepts such as freedom. The study also includes sites that may be referred to as memorials, designed to remember a person or event, often due to negative circumstances such as death.

Exhibition

Within this study, exhibition are sites that contain numerous objects, presented in a way that requires the audience to navigate the objects that have been curated for the purpose of telling a story. Exhibitions may be presented in a traditional format, such as a museum, or in an open air or temporary format.

Plaque

A plaque is ‘a flat piece of metal, stone, wood, or plastic with writing on it that is attached to a wall, door, or other object: (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020). For the purpose of this study, the term will be used to refer to plaques that stand alone, to honour a person, place or event. This

does not include plaques that feature as part of another site, for example, a plaque on a monument confirming its name.

4.5 RESEARCH METHODS

4.5.1 Documentary research

This study comprised of both documentary research and field study. The documentary research supported the identification of some sites, in addition to providing support to my own interpretations. The documentary research started in the preliminary stages to provide historic and disciplinary context, in addition to preparing for the field study. Documentary research continued through to the analysis, which will be discussed below.

The documentary research was comprised of a few focus areas. Firstly, research in a disciplinary context of which this study draws on a multitude such as cultural heritage studies, memory and identity studies, archaeology, and urban studies. Secondly, it was important for this study to understand and provide historical context for case studies and cultural heritage that sits within each city. Lastly, research focussed more specifically on the cities themselves and their contents to prepare for the field study and identify an itinerary of sites to visit. Each focus area consulted the academic literature however, the final focus area expanded into electronic media, such as websites and maps. The reason for this being that many sites, particularly newer sites, will not have been discussed previously in the academic literature. It is also of interest to this study to understand, by viewing the official tourist websites, which

sites the countries themselves wish to promote. In addition to the above, old maps and travel guides were also consulted to enable the study to understand if there have been any changes to road names or cultural heritage sites.

4.5.2 Field research

Whilst visiting each city with a pre-planned list of cultural heritage sites, this was simply a starting point. Previous fieldwork in Croatia identified that some of the most interesting and informative sites are not always identified through documentary research. This established my adoption of a phenomenological approach to field study, where I would navigate towns in Croatia as an observer, allowing myself to be drawn to any buildings or sites that caught my eye. For example, before visiting the Croatian town of Benkovac, I was unaware of the Holy Virgin Church despite preliminary documentary research. Whilst I had a list of sites to visit, I also chose to walk the town as a visitor, being open to any site that looked of interest.

Through this, I came across the church. When visiting the church, it was clear that the building was recently built. With this knowledge and the name of the church, it enabled more focused documentary research and I identified that the original church was destroyed during the break-up of Yugoslavia (Clancy, 2010). This place-led and phenomenological approach is imperative to the study in order to understand how and what is being presented in each city, not just formally through tourist websites or academic literature. The purpose of the phenomenological approach was to experience the city as a visitor, not just as an academic researcher. Walking through city streets, I would be drawn to sites not identified in the literature or websites. I would be led to sites not identified through preliminary research through a variety of ways. I may be drawn to a site due to clear and obvious signage. Other

times, I may identify a site due to a number of people congregating, flowers or simply by accident. These places are important as they provide insight into the established as a communication for the country, rather than tourists. For example, Zagreb's tourist website makes little reference to the break-up of Yugoslavia yet, through walking the streets of Zagreb, several plaques dedicated to those who fought or were injured during the war were recorded (appendix A). Across the case studies, a variety of site types were recorded, such as buildings, monuments, and plaques, as defined above. Each site was arrived at either by public transport or walking. This was to ensure that the site was experienced as it was intended, through the eyes of a citizen or tourist.

At each site, a building record forms was completed (table 2) and photographs were taken of the different aspects of the site. The record form included the basic physical aspects of each site, such as size, alongside whether the site had suffered any damage or change and how this was addressed. I took note of how the site was advertised, promoted and what was included on any tourist boards. I also took note of any graffiti or imagery that was not officially part of the site but could provide insight into local attitudes towards the site. In addition, I observed the surrounding area and how many visitors the site had. Once complete, each site was recorded into a spreadsheet and used to undertake quantitative analysis, discussed below.

As discussed above, field study was undertaken in each of the three capital cities twice, approximately one year apart. This was an important aspect of the study as it provided the opportunity to see how each city had changed during that time. It also allowed time for reflection, translating of text and further documentary research, supporting a more focused second field study to each city.

Name:	
Type:	
City centre location:	
Road:	
Size:	
Target audience:	
Visitors:	
Visitor numbers:	
Cost:	
Time:	
Date established:	
Related to a violent death(s):	
Site focus:	
Revolution/war:	
Established by:	
Altered over time:	
On official tourist website:	
Literature at site:	
Group negatively portrayed:	
Hero/victim:	
Languages present:	
Comments/observations:	

Table 2. Site Record Sheet

4.5.3 Documenting the data

Once each field study was completed, the site record forms and photographs were saved onto an electronic drive. This data was then used to complete the spreadsheet which would be used for the quantitative analysis, outlined in chapter five. Whilst much of the spreadsheet was completed from the data gathered during field study, documentary research was needed to complete some of the data fields. For example, whilst field study would enable me to capture the road in which the site is located, any previous road name would not be evident. This spreadsheet was designed to form the backbone of the analysis and enable easy identification of patterns and lack of patterns across the cities, in addition to providing support to the qualitative lens analysis.

4.6 APPROACH TO ANALYSIS

4.6.1 Analysis of site data

As discussed above, the data gathered during field study was built into a spreadsheet (appendix A) that would be used for the quantitative analysis. The spreadsheet is based largely on the information gathered in the site record forms with a number of other fields added. These additional fields included data that is relevant to the study but could not be obtained through fieldwork. For example, previous road names and whether the site is on the official tourist website. Guidance on the definition of each filter can be found in appendix B.

The spreadsheet was designed in order that the data could be analysed in different ways, drawing out the similarities and differences across the data and creating a golden source of data to support the analysis. The aim was to enable analysis at a city level, pan-city level, and thematic level. This was achieved by compiling a list of 87 comparisons which were built into tables, quantifying the comparison. For example, a table (figure 9) can be produced comparing the number of sites related to a violent death(s), against the revolution or war they reference in each city. This creates a visual, making patterns and similarities easier to identify and the analysis of these tables will be discussed in detail in chapter five.




Figure 9. Chart comparing the number of sites related to a violent death(s) against the revolution or war they reference in each city.

(Clancy, 2020)

The qualitative analysis was not intended to be ethnographic in nature. The study made a conscious decision not to collect data from observation or interview of visitors to sites, which may be employed by other researchers looking to understand the relationship between people and their environment. ‘Ethnography is employed when the aim of the research is to understand the ways in which individuals make sense of their everyday life’ (Palmer, 2009, p.

125) and this study was not intended to understand how citizens perceive their relationship with their environment. Instead, this study has presented how cultural heritage and tangible assets have been treated, and how I observe this to inform the political and cultural climate of a place. The study employed a phenomenological approach to data gathering, to purposefully compile a data set that could be analysed in a more traditional, quantitative sense to complement the qualitative analysis performed through the lens analysis.

4.6.2 How has any other data been dealt with?

In addition to the spreadsheet of data that forms the backbone of this study, other data sources were employed. Firstly, for each city, any road name changes that could be identified in relation to a site have been noted. The changes were identified through comparing contemporary maps with older maps, in addition to some identified through literature. The exact date of the road name change is often unknown. Where the exact date is not known, approximate dates can be assessed by comparing the road names on different dated maps. The purpose of collecting this data is to understand where there might be a connection between the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets and any change in road names, providing a richer analysis of a site and its wider landscape. Any road name changes of relevance are captured in the analysis of sites presented in chapters six and seven. An example of which is Meštrović Paviljon, a building sat in a square in central Zagreb, that has changed its name as frequently as the building has altered its usage. Another source of data for this study were photographs and images. During each field study I took a series of photographs of each site which provide insight into the scale, presentation, and location of each site. The photographs provided two benefits. Firstly, they acted as a prompt and tool for reflection throughout the

analysis. Secondly, they provided an opportunity to identify changes over time, where it was possible to compare to old photographs and descriptions of the site. These are shown in later chapters, where they are identified as having relevance to the study.

4.6.3 Post-field study documentary research

In addition to collating and presenting the data, there were additional post-field study activities that were necessary to prepare for the analysis phase of research. This was a second phase of documentary research, focusing on two key areas. Firstly, translating any inscriptions and literature that was written in a language other than the language of this study. This was to ensure all aspects of a site could be read and understood. Online translation tools were used for this purpose and the study accepts that there is a degree of interpretation with this method, as context can be lost. Secondly, field study identified sites and monuments that were dedicated to, or referenced, individuals that were not known to this study before commencing the research. It was important for the study to understand who these individuals are and how their dedication or memorialisation potentially informs the political and social climate of a place.

4.6.4 Lenses driven approach

As stated above, the data set of ~350 sites across Berlin, Budapest and Zagreb forms the backbone of this study and supports the conclusions made. However, the study aims to draw conclusions through both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The aim of this study was to be process led, rather than place led. By understanding how cultural heritage is being managed and viewed in a more thematic sense, it enables the benefits of the study to have a wider

impact. This study does not aim to present how three capital cities in Central Europe are managing their cultural heritage. Instead, the study shows how viewing the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets through a variety of lenses provides a deeper understanding of a countries political and cultural climate, beyond the physical site.

The study initially used three lenses to analyse the sites captured in the dataset. These lenses are historical re-evaluation, history gaps and monuments of human failure and will be discussed in detail below. The purpose of the lens analysis is to view sites through different perspectives, providing a deeper understanding of the impacts and decision-making behind the site. It will also be shown below that, whilst historical re-evaluation and history gaps provided useful insight which complement each other, the lens of monuments of human failure was less useful and not taken forward into the full and final analysis. Once complete, the analysis is compared against the qualitative analysis to understand whether they support or contradict one another. Once an assessment of the site has been made, it enables the research questions to be answered.

4.6.4.1 Historical Re-evaluation

In chapter one, I explained that previous research into the reconstruction of cultural heritage in post-war situations identified challenges with the terms destruction and reconstruction, as it became apparent that people would often have different reactions to the same event (Clancy, 2010). There were large numbers of people who felt that the reconstruction of someone else's heritage was a destruction of theirs. This can be seen in Palestine, where previously Islamic places of worship have been appropriated by Israel and altered or reconstructed to present the site as culturally Israeli (Clancy, 2010). Bevan (2007, p.110) gives the example of the grave

of Muslim Sheikh Gharib, which became the grave of Israel's Samson at the hands of Israelis. Equally, I saw that the destruction of heritage during war was being viewed as a reconstruction of heritage by some. This can be seen in the Bosnian town of Zvornik, where the destruction of mosques during the break-up of Yugoslavia led to the Bosnian Serb mayor stating, 'there were never any mosques in Zvornik' (Sells, 1996, p.4), declaring the town culturally Serbian.

The complexity of using the terms destruction and reconstruction have been echoed by scholars, such as Holtorf (2005), who writes that destruction and reconstruction are essentially the same thing. This is particularly evident in post-war situations where there has been an ethnic conflict, such as the Former Yugoslavia. For example, when Yugoslav troops invaded Bosnia, they were attempting to reconstruct Serbia's historic landscape by razing the mosques of the Bosniak community. However, the Bosniaks who fled from their homes in Bosnia felt that their cultural heritage was being destroyed (Riedlmayer, 2002, p. 4). In addition to the terms having a different meaning, depending on the political and cultural perspective of the viewer, the terms are also emotive. The emotive nature of the terms makes it more challenging to present an objective assessment of the treatment of cultural heritage in a place. It was particularly important to employ a more neutral term as previous research focussed largely on areas which had undergone ethnic conflicts. It was during this course of research that I developed the term historical re-evaluation.

The reason for choosing the term historical re-evaluation specifically, is in the nature of the words when combined. When put together, the words reference an intention to change or re-interpret an historical narrative, an attempt to change history as it is perceived today. My previous research indicated that in examples, such as the above, the motive behind the destruction or reconstruction is rooted in a political or cultural agenda. This agenda was often

to alter history or, at least, the perception of history to inside or outside observers. The research also indicated that this was a pattern of behaviour that can be identified under certain conditions. For example, during ethnic conflict, religious buildings and symbols that represent the 'other' are often destroyed. Post-occupation, cultural heritage may be reconstructed to make cities appear as they did before the occupation. Equally, there were other acts happening to cultural heritage that did not fall into the category of destruction and reconstruction. For example, cultural heritage may be neglected, created, or vandalised with each act similarly informing the political climate. The study, broadened to include both tangible assets and cultural heritage, highlighted that acts of change are part of an historic process, rather than individual closed events of destruction or reconstruction. Many acts of change are merely another event in the history of a building or place. However, historical re-evaluation looks at a broader picture and addresses questions which would not be addressed when looking solely at the specific destruction or reconstruction of cultural heritage and tangible assets. Another benefit to the term is that, by looking at change events as part of an historic process, it addresses the thought processes that have preceded the change, the physical change in state of the object and a change in the intangible landscape post-change. This can help us to better understand the factors at work in post-conflict societies and enable us to have a more informed approach to post-war situations. By looking at changes to cultural heritage and tangible assets in terms of destruction and reconstruction we are limited to those individual events. Historical re-evaluation accepts a change is not just a single event but a process with motives that are consciously or subconsciously politically rooted.

I have indicated above that historical re-evaluation is a process, rather than an event. For this reason, the analysis can be applied at different levels and this is the approach I have taken throughout this research. For example, an individual act of change to a site can be viewed

through the lens to understand the possible motivation behind the change and what impact that may have on the intangible landscape. Equally, the history of changes to a site can be viewed through the lens to understand the motivations over time. The lens can also be applied to a city or area within a city in order to understand patterns of behaviour within a capital city, enabling a view of the political and cultural trend of the city. This study presents examples, such as Szabadság tér, where a smaller area within a city appears to be a concentration of political narrative. Finally, the lens also enables an assessment across different cities, to understand where the lens is more prevalent than others and also how the lens manifests across the different cities. This analysis shows both similarities and differences across Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb.

The importance of understanding the intangible consequences of changes to cultural heritage has been suggested by Bevan (2007, p. 7) and Amiry (2006, pp. 165-166), who discuss how the destruction of an historic building may have a greater impact on an individual than simply the sadness of having lost that tangible object. Benton goes as far as to say that ‘the destruction of heritage amounts to the destruction of memory and sense of identity’ (2010, p. 127). This suggests that cultural heritage studies should be researched alongside other disciplines such as memory studies and politics sciences, amongst others. This echoes the approach taken throughout this study. Whilst coming from an archaeological and heritage studies background, this study is purposefully multi-disciplinary, seeking influence from discipline such as memory studies and architectural discourse. Uzzell describes heritage studies as ‘the lovechild of a multitude of relationships between academics in many disciplines, and then nurtured by practitioners and institutions’ (2009, p. 326). Historical re-evaluation allows for each of these perspectives by accepting the many causes and consequences behind the manipulation of cultural heritage and tangible assets within a place.

In addition to defining what historical re-evaluation is, it is useful to define what historical re-evaluation is not. What historical re-evaluation is not is any change to a city's tangible assets where there is no clear intention to alter the historic landscape in an intangible way, which is a key part of historical re-evaluation. Examples of sites excluded from this lens analysis were sites that appear to have a different intentionality. For example, Budapest has a number of metro stations with features outside, such as sculptures and fountains. These were generally excluded from the lens analysis, as the primary intention for the structure is to provide infrastructure and a landmark to identify the station. Whilst some artistic structures may carry deeper meaning, this would be a secondary intention that was not identified during the course of research.

4.6.4.2 History gaps

Whilst undertaking research into the reconstruction of cultural heritage in post-war Croatia, it became apparent there were attempts to remove or not acknowledge certain historical events or periods. For example, after the break-up of Yugoslavia, many towns and cities across Croatia changed the names of roads and squares to remove any reference to Communism or Socialism (Clancy, 2010). When undertaking preliminary research into Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb for this study, it became clear that similar processes were being carried across each of these cities. This study wanted to understand what gaps were being created in the history of these cities through the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. Therefore, it was decided to use the theme of history gaps alongside historical re-evaluation, to provide richer insight into the presentation of the cities. This study shows that when cultural heritage and tangible assets that represent a particular period or ideology are removed, it creates a visual

gap in the cultural timeline of the cities. This erases reminders of a period of time, impacting the cultural memory of citizens and potentially outside observers. The scale at which these cities have removed cultural heritage relating to certain periods, often replacing it with more historic monuments, suggests they are attempting to present a different historic timeline to citizens and/or outside observers, which this study believes warrants the use of history gaps as a lens, in its own right. For example, post-1989 the vast majority of Communist monuments in Budapest were removed, presenting the city as though Communism did not happen. It also became apparent that the steering of the historical narrative was happening in different ways. In addition to removing cultural heritage and tangible assets relating to certain periods, cultural heritage was also being created by recasting monuments from more historic periods, creating a false continuity. This steering can equally happen through the treatment and promotion of existing cultural heritage. By choosing cultural heritage to promote, by default, other cultural heritage has been chosen not to promote. This further impacts the cultural memory of a place as an act of remembrance is also an act of forgetting.

As stated above, the term history gaps started from the idea that places I have researched appear to be explicitly removing and altering cultural heritage and tangible assets in order to steer a particular narrative, creating a gap in the historic timeline. Schofield writes that 'objects play a role in provoking [memory], prompting reflective thought and creating dialogue with the past' (2005, p. 94). Therefore, destroying an object cannot destroy memory, but it can help to steer the narrative of a country's past. This study acknowledges that, whilst history gaps may be created intentionally, they can equally be created unintentionally. Cities will develop over time and there are many reasons behind changes, such as a desire to modernise. By looking at sites through the lens of history gaps, the intention is to understand if a government or party is attempting to alter the historic timeline. For the purpose of this

study, history gaps are defined as the manipulation of cultural heritage, tangible assets and official narratives to imply a different political or cultural timeline for a country or region.

As discussed further in chapter nine, this study has shown that history gaps is one mechanism by which historical re-evaluation is played out. This is because every gap created in the historic timeline of a country can be consider a re-evaluation of history. However, the same cannot be said for the other way round. An historical re-evaluation of a site may only, for example, re-evaluate the perception of an ideology, not attempt to remove that ideology from memory. Therefore, historical re-evaluation will be shown to be the overarching lens, with history gaps, monuments of human failure and potentially as yet unidentified lenses acting as different ways in which historical re-evaluation is played out. Whilst this may be the case, the study will show there is benefit in discussing history gaps as a standalone lens for analysis. As history gaps are also historical re-evaluations, they can also be applied as a lens at different levels. For example, the change to an individual site can be viewed through the lens to understand whether the historic timeline has been altered, intentionally or not. The Kossuth Monument analysed in chapter seven can be viewed through this lens. By re-casting, the original Kossuth Monument, a gap in the historic timeline is created, presenting the site as though the Communist period did not happen. The lens can also be applied to a collection of sites or a wider area. Finally, the lens enables an assessment across different cities, to understand where the lens is more prevalent than others and also how the lens manifests across the different cities. Much like historical re-evaluation, this analysis will show both similarities and differences across Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb.

Similarly, to historical re-evaluation, a site has not been identified as a history gap if the primary purpose behind a change to a site appears to be practical or logistical. For example, as an individual site, removing what was left of a statue of Stalin outside Budapest's city park is

not considered a history gap. This is because the monument was partially pulled down during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the removal of a damaged monument does not necessarily suggest an intention to manipulate the historic timeline. However, the removal of a statue that is not damaged, and is replaced by a statue dedicated to an opposing ideology can be considered a history gap.

4.6.4.3 Monuments of Human Failure

During an interview in 2009, Slavenka Drakulić, a Croatian writer who has lived through Communism, its fall, and the break-up of Yugoslavia, said in reference to the Berlin wall:

“It disappeared quickly, perhaps too quickly. I can understand a desire to abolish it completely, but on the other hand, perhaps big parts should have been kept as a monument of human stupidity. Now there is a risk that future generations would say: Wall? What wall? Already there is such a risk with communism: Communism? What communism?”

(Drakulić, 2009)

With this quote, Drakulić challenges us to imagine a world in which the wall had been kept in situ, in its entirety. For the re-unified Berlin residents, this alternate reality would have been incredibly inconvenient, as well as an unavoidable reminder of the ideology that came with the wall. Yet, arguably, it could have served as a reminder of the human stupidity that led to such a wall that did not serve its intended purpose. Built to keep East and West physically and ideologically separate, the wall failed. In reality, it could not prevent residents on each side of the wall from wanting to remain connected. Western culture still made its way to the East through means such as radio (Classen, 2013, p. 239) and it could be argued that it was the guards, and not the wall itself, that prevented Eastern citizens from escaping to the West.

Unlike historical re-evaluation and history gaps, lenses which developed from my own research, monuments of human stupidity was a term intended to be borrowed and adapted for use as a lens in this study. The term monument of human stupidity is arguably subjective and emotive. Therefore below, I outline both the criteria for the lens and an alternative way of framing monuments of human stupidity before discussing its usefulness and the reasons for not progressing the lens further.

In order to define a monument of human stupidity, this study outlined a number of potential criteria that can be seen in table 3. The chapter continues by discussing some of the criteria through examples.

1.	Failure of a site to fulfil its intended purpose
2.	Construction error, leading to a site not looking or being able to be used as intended
3.	Concept failure, leading to the target audience not engaging in the site
4.	Concept failure, leading to visitors not using the site as intended
5.	Concept failure, leading to an intended message being lost or misunderstood
6.	Creation or adaptation to a site leading to a severe adverse effect, such as loss of life or unexpected financial loss
7.	Sites that have failed over time, due to representation of a failed political movement

Table 3. Suggested criteria for *Monuments of Human Stupidity*

In taking Drakulić's example of the Berlin Wall as a monument of human stupidity, the stupidity can be assessed as the failure of the wall to fulfil its intended purpose. The purpose

was to keep the ‘West’ out of East Germany. This failed physically, as people managed to escape over the wall, and also ideologically, as it did not prevent East Germans from wanting to escape or from western influences reaching the East (Classen, 2013, p. 239). This could be further extended to monuments where there was an error in the construction of the site, leaving the monument unable to be used in the way it was originally intended or did not look as it was originally intended. For example, this can be seen in the Bent Pyramid in Dashur, Egypt. Whilst we can only speculate, it is thought that the angle of the pyramid was changed part way through construction, as a process of trial and error to build the perfect pyramid (Belmonte & Magli, 2015, p. 174). In this instance, the pyramid can be seen as a physical manifestation of human stupidity or error. However, this identifies subjectivity with the term, monument of human stupidity, as the Bent Pyramid could also be viewed as an example of the human capacity to experiment.

Another criterion for a monument of human stupidity was identified as a monument that represents a failure in the intended message behind a site. Such as the case of *A Real Birmingham Family* in Birmingham, UK, a monument of which the message has been challenged. The purpose behind the monument was to represent what a real Birmingham family looks like. Instead of depicting a typical nuclear family, the sculpture features two sisters and their sons. However, the sculpture has been criticised by various groups, including Fathers for Justice for portraying a fatherless family as the real Birmingham family (Hurst, 2014). After three years in situ, the sculpture has been removed due to planned development with the future of the monument unknown. The failure this monument represents is that of attempting to depict a typical Birmingham family in a city that is so demographically diverse. It is inevitable that any depiction would be challenging for a large number of residents to identify with.

To understand a monument of human stupidity it is important to identify what the opposite of this might look like. For example, the Shoes on the Danube monument may be viewed as a successful monument. The monument was erected on the banks of the Danube in Budapest to commemorate those who lost their lives during the Nazi occupation of Hungary. The monument itself reads 'to the memory of the victims shot into the Danube by Arrow Cross Militiamen in 1944-45.' The intention of the monument is to commemorate the victims but the clarity of the inscription, in Hungarian and English, suggests it is also there to educate visitors and act as a tourist site. The monument appears to be successful in meeting its intention as it is very popular. During my time in Budapest I witnessed numerous people, individuals, and large groups, visiting the monument. In addition to this, flowers and candles can be seen to have been placed in and around the shoes by visitors, in remembrance of the victims.

The above criteria are quite broad, however, what is clear is that, to represent human stupidity, there needs to be a human intention behind the monument that has failed at some point in the monument's history; the monument is a manifestation of the human error. Based on the above, for the purpose of this study, monument of human stupidity refers to sites where there has been an unintended consequence that led to a material effect. This effect is usually adverse but can sometimes be positive. For example, the Berlin Wall, which is viewed very differently today than when it was first erected. Whilst the Berlin Wall had an adverse effect on the people of Berlin for many years, today, the wall is bringing economic, cultural, and political benefits to Berlin.

As discussed above, the term monument of human stupidity is concluded to be too subjective and emotive a term to use in this study. Whilst some individuals may view a site as representing human stupidity, some people could be in full support of the site. However, it

was of interest to this study to explore how useful the term can be for understanding what is happening in the decision-making process of cultural heritage sites and tangible assets.

Therefore, a more neutral term was explored that encapsulates the above criteria. Some, such as monuments of human downfall or monuments of human inadequacy still felt too emotive and potentially restrictive. Monument of human downfall, for example, suggests a large-scale, collective human failing. This, however, may not be the case in all examples. It felt important to focus on the failing of the monument itself and how the original intention of the monument may have failed. Terms that came out of this thought process are ones such as, malfunctioning monuments or monuments of ineffectiveness. Whilst these terms felt closer to the criteria outlined above, they suggest a technical failing of the monument which risks focusing on the physicality of the monument, potentially ignoring any ideological failing. The term needed to be broader and accept the monument as a physical manifestation of a human error. In the interest of clarity, it became apparent that the word that kept coming out of discussion was the words fail and failure. The study, therefore, identified the most suitable term to address the monuments described in this essay as monuments of human failure.

Throughout this study, I attempted to analyse many of the sites captured during field research through the lens of monuments of human failure. One such site was Flughafen Berlin-Tempelhof (Tempelhof Airport) in Berlin, Germany, the historical background of which is discussed in more detail later in the thesis. Extensively redeveloped during the Nazi era, the airport was never finished. After German re-unification, the airport was used as a domestic airport for a period of time until larger planes, requiring longer runways, made the site redundant and it was agreed to close the site. The former airfield is now a park, occasional festival venue and the hangars are currently home to approximately 3,000 refugees. In addition to this, the building has periodically been used as a banquet hall, film set,

concentration camp, and currently holds office spaces and a police station. In recent years, there have been arguments between the government and local citizens over the future use of the site. Due to the expanse of land it covers, and its proximity to the centre of Berlin, there is opportunity to make money through the development of housing and commercial property. However, in 2014, the government lost a referendum with the public who voted not to develop the land. Tempelhof Airport and park was identified as a monument of human failure due to the varied use of the site which has led to none of the stakeholders being able to use the site in the way they would like, leaving the site unable to fulfil its intended purpose. The government cannot develop the site and those who wish to protect the site cannot due to the high cost involved for such a large site. Whilst this site meets the criteria of a monument of human failure, and the lens highlights the problematic situation of the site today, it does not provide the level of insight the other lenses will be shown to provide. In addition, whilst it is not able to fulfil its intended use, the lens of monuments of human failure does not allow for the possibility that uses will change over time and what is deemed to be an appropriate use is subjective.

Another site analysed through this lens was A Német Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the Victims of German Occupation) in Budapest, Hungary. This is a monument established in 2014 that was protested by local citizens before and during construction.

Discussed in more detail further in this study, the monument is accompanied by a protest monument immediately opposite the site. The site was identified as a monument of human failure due to a government attempt to create heritage that represents its people and a timeline of the country's history, but the people themselves are in direct opposition to this. The monument fails to have credibility due to the declaration in multiple languages from the protest monument that the official site portrays an incorrect narrative of Hungary's

allegiances during World War Two. Whilst the lens has identified a failing in the intention of the official monument, the same insight is also identified when using the lenses of historical re-evaluation and history gaps.

These challenges continued when analysing multiple other sites through this lens. Whilst focusing on the failed intentions of a monument was of interest and relevance to this study, the insight could have been identified through other means. In addition, the scale of failed intentions is not as large as history gaps in order to warrant use as a standalone lens. Slavenka Drakulić's idea of keeping monuments of human stupidity is a thought-provoking idea, however, it has not shown to provide the level of insight to be of benefit to this study. Therefore, the lens was not progressed further.

4.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has outlined the methodology that was employed in order to answer the research questions outlined in section 4.2 of this chapter. The study continues with a presentation of the outcome of the quantitative analysis of the data set.

5. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DATASET

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The study will continue by identifying the patterns which emerged through the analysis of the dataset, discussing a selection of these findings in detail. The analysis was completed by looking for patterns across the total number of sites. In addition, analysis was completed at an individual site level within each city, and these findings will be shown to support the qualitative analysis detailed in chapters six and seven. As discussed in chapter four, this was completed through both manual manipulation of the dataset and by creating charts to enable visual identification of peaks and troughs in the data. A sample of these charts are included in this chapter.

As detailed in chapter four, the data gathered during field study was compiled into a spreadsheet. The purpose of the spreadsheet was to enable me to maintain a single view of all sites visited and provide a tool to draw out any patterns or differences in the way cultural heritage and tangible assets are treated. In total, there are 358 rows of data across 22 filters, equalling 7,876 entries of data. Through the analysis of this data, I have been able to identify a series of patterns that help to enhance our understanding of the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets in Central European capital cities, both at an individual city level and across the three cities: Berlin, Budapest and Zagreb. Some of the filters in the spreadsheet are factual in nature, such as whether there is a cost to enter the site. Other filters are more

subjective in nature and definitions of these can be found in appendix B. This chapter will continue with a discussion of the findings drawn from the spreadsheet analysis.

5.2 PATTERNS EMERGING FROM THE DATASET ANALYSIS

5.2.1 Types of heritage site




Figure 10. Chart showing the break-down of types of sites across Berlin, Budapest & Zagreb

When looking at the total number of sites, monuments are the most common form of cultural heritage or tangible assets present (figure 10). Of the 358 sites captured, 61% are monuments. The second most common type of heritage captured are plaque monuments at 13%. This pattern is also present when Zagreb and Budapest are viewed independently. Of the sites captured in Zagreb, 55% are monuments and 23% are plaques. In Budapest, 77% are monuments and 11% are plaques. Berlin, however, has a slightly different distribution of

types of site. Monuments are also the most common type of site found (in 53% of cases) but the second most common type of site found are exhibitions which make up 23% of the total number of sites. Plaques in Berlin form just 7% of the site types located during field study. This suggests that Berlin is more inclined to establish exhibitions, which tend to be larger in scale, more likely to be visited by tourist and contain educational material, compared to Budapest and Zagreb. Budapest and Zagreb, on the other hand, appear to be more inclined than Berlin to establish smaller scale sites, such as plaques, that are targeted at the local community, rather than tourists.

5.2.2 Difference in focus across types of cultural heritage and tangible assets

This study shows that it is possible to identify patterns in the focus of sites across sites and cities. Looking at the focus of the full range of sites in this study, it is seen that the distribution of focus is similar in each of the cities. Across the total number of sites, those focusing on a person/group is the most common type of focus, totalling 54% across sites where the focus can be identified. This is followed by the category of “other”, at 21%. The least common focus across the full dataset are sites with a focus on religion, at 5%. This shows us that sites dedicated to individuals or groups of people are more likely to be established than sites with a different focus.

When analysing the focus of sites at a city level, the results are largely similar. Across Berlin, Budapest and Zagreb, sites focusing on a person/group form the majority at 41%, 61% and 57% respectively, indicating consistency in the drive to commemorate individuals and groups above other types of focus. The only deviation in pattern across the cities is in Zagreb, where the least common type of site focus is on the country, compared to Berlin and Budapest where

the least common type of focus is on religion. This could be explained by the fact that Croatia has been an independent country for less time than Germany and Hungary, therefore less opportunity to erect monuments dedicated to the country.

When looking at this in combination with types of sites, the pattern changes. However, it should be noted that this significantly reduces the sample size. There are some differences in the focus of plaques captured across Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb. The plaques found throughout Budapest overwhelmingly focus on people/groups (67%) and none of the plaques found commemorate an event of any kind. In contrast, plaques that commemorate an event were the most common type located in Berlin at 50%, with a smaller number of plaques dedicated to people/groups and finally, country/citizens. Zagreb has the largest total sample size of plaques in the study and, whilst the largest percentage (43%) were dedicated to people/groups, events and other dedications came in a close second and third, respectively. Looking at the plaques in more detail, one reason behind these differences may be in the approach each city takes to their cultural heritage and tangible assets. The plaques in Budapest are largely dedicated to individuals but appear to be on a small scale. For example, a plaque may sit outside the building where a prominent doctor once worked. There appear to be less plaques in Budapest dedicated to historic figures. Plaques in Berlin tend to focus on larger events of which the significance reaches further than the city or country. For example, each of the plaques focusing on an event are related to World War Two. Zagreb appears to have a mixture of two types of plaques. Firstly, those dedicated to individual, historic figures that would largely be unknown to the average tourist. Secondly, plaques dedicated to people who died during a violent event such as the Homeland War or World War Two. Only in Berlin did any plaques feature a non-native language, suggesting that plaques are generally erected for the local population and not with tourists in mind. When looking at the distribution of focus

across another type of site, such as monuments, a further difference can be seen. Whilst person/group are again the most common focus for monuments, in Zagreb, monuments focusing on a particular event are the second most common focus, unlike Berlin and Budapest where this focus comes in third.

5.2.3 Sites linked to war or revolution

In total 34% of the monuments captured in this study are directly linked to war or revolution.

Across all three cities, World War Two is overwhelmingly the most represented war referenced in the sites that focus on war or revolution, with 42% of the distribution. The second most represented war or revolution are those linked to the Cold War, at 22%.

Monuments referencing World War One are present in just 6% of cases, on par with country-specific wars and revolutions such as the Partisan Uprising in Croatia (6%) and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (5%).

When the cities are analysed individually, the results show that Berlin is more likely to establish or maintain sites that reference a war or revolution than not, with 53% of sites captured in the dataset referencing a war or revolution. Within Budapest and Zagreb, it is less likely for a site to reference war or revolution, with 27% and 29% referencing war or revolution, respectively. There are further differences when analysing the war and revolutions in question. Berlin's cultural heritage and tangible heritage offering references a much more limited number of events, primarily World War Two (51%) and the Cold War (45%).

Notably, there are no sites referencing World War One in Berlin that were located during this study. This could be explained by a number of factors. As Germany was defeated in World War One, there appears to have been less desire to erect monuments, even to those who lost

their lives. In addition, Berlin was heavily bombed during World War Two, which may have led to the destruction of any monuments that did exist.

Across Zagreb and Budapest, there are both similarities and differences in the distribution of monuments referencing war or revolution. In both cities, the most prominent focus is on World War Two, despite both cities having a complicated relationship with that period. Similarly, the second most referenced war or revolution is each city's most recent and, arguably, most politically current event. This is the Homeland War (27%) in Zagreb and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (26%) in Budapest. World War One and the Partisan Uprising, or Croatian Spring are still featured relatively often in Zagreb however, of these eleven sites in total, only one can be found in the city centre. The remaining ten monuments sit outside the city centre, occasionally neglected and/or vandalised. Vandalism of sites will be discussed in more detail further in the chapter.

5.2.4 City Centre Limits

As noted in chapter four, city centre limits, for the purpose of the study were defined, using tourist maps and city walls for guidance. Most of the sites catalogued within this study sit within the city centre boundaries however, the study did not limit itself to the city centre limits. Instead, sites were visited for a variety of reasons, such as being identified in academic literature or promoted through tourist leaflets. There are a number of patterns that can be identified by comparing the sites that sit within and outside the city centre limits.

Across the cities, sites that sit outside the city centre vary across each of the cities. In Berlin, the type of sites that are found outside the city centre are varied in both type and focus and are not traditional, purpose-built tourist sites. They are sites that have evolved due to events that

have taken place on that particular location. These are sites such as the Airlift memorial at Flughafen Berlin-Tempelhof (Tempelhof Airport), which was built outside the airport where the airlift occurred, or Orte des Erinnerns (Places of Remembrance) which was established around the Bayerischer Platz area. This area was a former Jewish district and was greatly affected by the Nazi laws that came into effect to control the Jewish population, eighty of which laws are depicted on the street signs that form this memorial. These sites in Berlin are most often promoted in some way. This is usually through the official tourist website or through tourist pamphlets and/or literature at the site (54% of cases). This suggests that Berlin is actively encouraging tourists to explore the full city, outside the most common and popular tourist areas. This differs to Budapest, where sites outside the city centre limits are generally monuments located in parks and depict a person or historic scene. None of these appear to be promoted by the city. Budapest has only one site captured in this study that is purpose-built heritage outside Budapest's city centre limits and is promoted by the official tourist website. That site is Szoborpark (Memento Park), built to house forty-plus Communist statues that once sat on the streets of Budapest.

Zagreb has the largest number of sites captured outside the city centre limits. The reasons for this can be seen as two-fold. Miragoj Cemetery falls outside the city centre limits defined in this study and due to the size of the cemetery and number of large monuments, each were catalogued individually. Also, Zagreb is smaller than Budapest and Berlin and so it is easier to find yourself wandering outside the city centre limits. Despite these reasons, I suggest it is still possible to notice some marked differences in how Zagreb approaches its heritage outside the city centre. Larger monuments dedicated to those who died in the Homeland war appear most often outside the city centre limits. No monuments were located inside the city centre, only smaller plaques. This could be to keep the most visible mourning away from tourists

however, the plaques were generally adorned with wreaths and ribbons. In addition, those outside the city centre that are linked to the Partisan Uprising rarely appear with text. Only when the form of the monument is an inscription does there tend to be text and text is exclusively in Croatian. It is also these monuments that are most often damaged or neglected, which will be discussed later in this study.

5.2.5 Sites altered over time

Sites being altered or changed over time can provide insight into how the cultural heritage sites are viewed by the government and population and this can be in both positive and negative ways. For example, a group may wish to promote a particular site and so it may be sign posted or even expanded. On the negative side, a site could be vandalised or damaged through natural causes and never repaired. This would indicate that viewers of the heritage are, at best, indifferent to the heritage and, at worse, find it contentious.

Across each of the cities, sites are altered in 31% of the cases captured in this study. Plaques and monuments form a large proportion of these (72%). In Budapest and Zagreb, the change to the site is usually in the form of wreaths or decorations however, in Berlin, the alterations to sites are more common and varied in nature. 37% of Berlin's heritage is altered compared to 25% in Budapest and 31% in Zagreb. In Berlin, the changes range from expansions (e.g., Topographie des Terrors), relocations (e.g., multiple sections of the Berlin Wall), changes in use (e.g., Flughafen Berlin-Tempelhof (Tempelhof Airport)) and changes in dedication (Neue Wache (e.g., New Guardhouse)). The multiple relocations and varied changes to cultural heritage sites can be explained by the dramatic and continuing changes Berlin has gone through since the fall of the wall in 1989. The current reconstruction of the

Stadtschloss/Humboldtforum in Mitte (Central Berlin) can be seen as an example of Germany's wider approach to its cultural heritage and tangible assets, and this will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis. Like Berlin, Budapest has sites that have been altered in a variety of ways however, I have not identified any patterns of note in the way sites are altered or not altered.

As noted above, many of Zagreb's plaques and monuments are altered through wreath and ribbon adornments. What is particularly notable in Zagreb is that the city has the highest number of monuments that have been vandalised in a way that attacks the message of the monument (as opposed to random street 'tagging'). Within the sites sampled in this study, there are seventeen sites that have been vandalised in a way that suggests there are political motivations behind the attack. Of the sites within this study that have been vandalised, 53% of these are found in Zagreb, with the remaining sites being split between Budapest and Berlin. The vandalism that occurs in Berlin is very varied in nature, featuring historical Soviet graffiti in the Reichstag, damage to a commemorative stone at the Soviet memorial in Treptower Park, part of the Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) memorial stolen by a pro-refugee activist group and continued graffiti on the East Side Gallery. In Budapest, the vandalism is again varied in nature. There is a grave memorial in Kerepesi Cemetery that has a star on the central monument scratched out, a number of shoes had to be replaced after being stolen from the Shoes on the Danube memorial, and during my 2015 visit to Budapest, a protest memorial in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) was defaced with Jobbik stickers, Jobbik being an extreme right-wing Nationalist party in Hungary. The vandalism that Zagreb's cultural heritage and tangible assets received is far less varied. Of the nine instances of vandalism that could be perceived as political, eight appear to be anti-Serb and/or pro-Fascist in nature. The type of vandalism ranges from Nazi and Ustaše graffiti on monuments in Spomen-Park Dotrščina

(Dotrščina Memorial Park), to monuments being defaced by scratching out the word Srba' (Serbs) and the removal of busts and monuments dedicated to anti-Fascists.

This is consistent with another pattern identified through the analysis of the spreadsheet. That, of the sites altered over time, of those that also reference a war or revolution, 51% of the total reference World War Two, suggesting that this is the most contentious event captured across the sites.

5.2.6 Appropriation by another party

Whilst there are a number of patterns that can be seen in the treatment of heritage in and across the three cities, there are treatments of heritage that may not form a pattern but are significant, nonetheless. Indeed, the rare treatment the following sites have been subjected to may in fact indicate the importance of the sites. Within this study, there are a small number of examples where the state has appropriated, moved, or repeatedly intervened with particular site, in order to control the narrative. This will be discussed in more detail further in the thesis, but it is interesting to take a look at what the data in the spreadsheet is telling us about these sites. Examples of these sites are Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain) in Zagreb, A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation) and the Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) in Berlin. Whilst the history of each of these sites are very different, each one has ended up as a memorial that has been either appropriated and re-visioned by the state, or at odds with the country's citizens. Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain) sits outside Zagreb's city centre in Miragoj Cemetery. It is a large stone monument that looks very different from the original monument which was a brick wall that had the

names of men and boys who went missing during the break-up of Yugoslavia written on it. Similarly, Berlin's Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) was started by a number of individuals looking to remember those who died attempting to flee East Berlin by crossing the River Spree. These individuals erected white crosses with the names of the victims on the west side of the border. A number of these are still present by the Reichstag, where it appears that early each morning a member of the public re-erects the memorial, along with newspaper clippings showing the victims and criticising the current German government. The official Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses), the version that appears on Berlin's tourist website, was erected along the River Spree at a new development area a short walk away from the older site.

There is a monument in Budapest that has gone through an almost opposite process to the above monuments in Berlin and Zagreb. A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation), in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) did not start out as a small, personal memorial erected by a number of independent individuals. The monument was always planned to be a large-scale memorialisation to those who suffered under German occupation in Hungary. However, some Hungarian citizens felt that the story the monument is telling is deceptive due to Hungary's history as a part-time ally of Hitler. In response to the monument a number of individuals created their own protest monument immediately opposite, placing belongings and stones with the names of those who died along the length of the monument. What is consistent about all three monuments is that each government has presented their own narrative through the appropriation and creation of cultural heritage and tangible assets, seemingly against the wishes of those who wish to memorialise the victims of each conflict.

5.2.7 Heroes vs victims

Zagreb has a number of sites dedicated to people who died during various wars or revolutions. Most of these do not explicitly say they are dedication to heroes or victims. It is up to the viewer to decide whether the people who died are looked upon as heroes or victims. These include the monuments within Zagreb dedicated to anti-fascists, in addition to the smaller monuments dedicated to those who died during the homeland war. 7% of Zagreb's sites do explicitly reference victims with 3% referencing heroes. The vast majority of these sites lie outside the city centre in Mirogoj Cemetery.

Budapest has similarly low numbers of sites explicitly dedicated to victims (5%), generally dedicated to the victims of Nazi or Soviet occupation. 4% of sites in Budapest were explicitly dedicated to heroes and, in all but one example, the heroes are those who fought against the Soviets in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The remaining example is the Soviet War memorial, declaring dedication to heroic Soviet soldiers.

Within Berlin, victims are explicitly reference in a greater number of instances captured within this study (13%), with additional sites that are dedicated to people who died during war, but the message is more abstract or does not explicitly reference victims. This study did not find reference to any heroes in Berlin. Berlin differs from both Budapest and Zagreb in that it distances itself from any victim status. Individual groups of people may be victims, such as the Jewish community who were persecuted during Nazi rule, however the country itself is not presented as a victim.

5.2.8 Negative portrayal

Across the full suite of cultural heritage sites in this study, 10% of sites portray another party negatively in a direct way for example, Terror Haza (House of Terror) in Budapest, which names the Nazis and Soviets as terror regimes, or where a site is dedicated to victims and also names the perpetrator. This means that 90% of the total sites do not explicitly portray any person or group negatively. When analysing the cities individually, there is a greater difference in the percentage of sites portraying another party negatively. In Zagreb, only 2% of sites directly portray another party negatively and both of these are sites related to the recent Homeland War. In Budapest, 6% of sites negatively portray a group and this is shared relatively evenly between the current government (in the form of protest sites), the Nazis (e.g., Shoes on the Danube) and the Soviets (e.g., Szoborpark (Memento Park)). Berlin has the greatest number of sites that directly portray another group in a negative way with 26% of sites doing so, the majority of which portray the Nazis negatively. The reason for this can be seen to stem from the response each city has to the history of World War Two. All three cities have a complex relationship with the Nazi era, having associations with the Nazi regime to some degree. However, Germany more outwardly expresses regret at its association and this can be seen through the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. In addition to this, Zagreb and Budapest negatively portray groups who they believe the country has fallen victim to. Berlin, on the other hand, portrays the Nazis in a negative light most often, a party that the country itself was not victim to. This suggests that Berlin's heritage approach is more outward focussed as the victims of the Nazis are primarily found in minority ethnic groups and other countries. This will be discussed further in this chapter.

Both Berlin and Budapest generally present these sites in both their native language and at least one other, usually English. This suggests the message they are presenting is for tourists

as well as their own citizens. This is further supported by these sites being presented with literature or additional information to support their message. This happens in approximately 50% of instances in Budapest and in 72% of instances in Berlin. At times, this information is substantial for example, Szoborpark (Memento Park) offers free entry to visitors who purchase a book entitled, Hungarian Revolution – 1956 and, Terror Haza (House of Terror) has at least one piece of A4 paper in each room with a large amount of text, in addition to the information boards and notes on the walls. This is in contrast to Zagreb, which only presents these sites in the native language and has no additional literature at the sites.

5.2.9 Site size

Differences can be seen in the size of sites in each of the cities. Across all sites captured in this study, 47% of sites fall into the category of medium sized. This is followed by 34% of sites classified as small, and 18% classified as large. When viewing the sites at an individual city level, it is seen that most sites within Berlin are classified as medium (43%), closely followed by large sites at 33%. In Budapest, medium sites are also the most prevalent at 52%, but the second most prevalent size are small sites at 32%. Just 17% of sites in Budapest captured within this study are classified as large. Within Zagreb, the distribution is also different. Small and medium sites in Zagreb are equally as popular (45%) and just 10% of sites are classified as large. This suggests that Berlin is more inclined to build larger sites that would be more visible for tourists. This compliments the finding captured below, which finds that Berlin is also more likely to build sites with tourists in mind.

When assessing the relevance of the size of sites across Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb, it can be seen that the larger the site, the more likely the site is to be aimed at tourists. Whilst the

majority of all sites appear to be aimed at local citizens (81%), and just 13% aimed at tourists (6% appear to be aimed at both local citizens and tourists), this percentage changes depending on the size of the site. Sites assessed as small under this study, appear to have just 9% aimed at local citizens. However, when large sites are reviewed, 26% appear to be aimed at tourists. This is broadly consistent with what would be expected. Cities with a number of large tourist sites will be more attractive to tourists and can be easier to promote than smaller sites.

Equally, smaller site will be more identifiable to local citizens who are more familiar with their own history.

Where a site is referencing a war or revolution, those aimed at the local population tend to be medium and smaller size sites, usually in the form of monuments and plaques. Of the 121 sites referencing a war or revolution, those aimed at local citizens make up 65% of the total and, of those, just 16% are large sites with the remaining 84% being small or medium size sites. Where monuments referencing war or revolution are aimed at tourists, or both tourists and citizens, large sites make up 35% of the total. These sites tend to be museums or large exhibitions focussing on a particular war or event. However, this is inconsistent across each of the cities, with Berlin being the outlier. Of the large sites referencing war or revolution, directed at tourists or both local citizens and tourists, the vast majority of these are in Berlin (71%) with the remaining in Budapest and Zagreb. This suggests that Berlin is more likely to create large scale sites directed at tourists, or tourists and local citizens, focusing on war or revolution. Whereas Budapest and Zagreb are more likely to keep sites focusing on war or revolution on a smaller scale for local citizens.

5.2.10 Target audience

Across the sites captured in this study, 81% are assessed as being primarily targeted at the local population, with 13% targeted at tourists and 6% targeted at both local citizens and tourists. The story is similar when looking at the cities individually. The local population is the primary target for sites across Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb. However, Berlin targets the highest proportion towards tourists (23%) in comparison to Budapest (8%) and Zagreb (10%). This suggests that Berlin is more conscious about catering for tourists or more willing to share its history with tourist compared to Budapest and Zagreb.

The analysis shows that, where sites are related to a violent death, most sites appear to be targeted at local citizens. Of the total number of sites related to violent deaths, 69% appear to be targeted at local citizens, 13% at both local citizens and tourists, and 16% at tourists. This suggests that sites related to violent deaths are more personal to the country and less likely to be utilised for tourism purposes. When comparing this approach to individual cities, it can be seen that the pattern is consistent in that the majority of these sites in each city appear to be aimed at local citizens entirely (41% in Berlin; 65% in Budapest; 92% in Zagreb). However, it is seen that Zagreb is far less comfortable presenting sites related to violent deaths to tourists, with just 3% that appear targeted at tourists and 5% targeted at both local citizens and tourists. In Budapest, 24% of sites appear to be aimed at tourists with 12% aimed at both local citizens and tourists, suggesting the city is more comfortable presenting difficult history to tourists. In Berlin, 22% appear to be aimed at tourists, and 37% aimed at both local citizens and tourists. When combined, this totals 59% of sites of which the city is comfortable presenting to tourists, indicating that Berlin is the city most comfortable with presenting site related to violent death to tourists and the outside community.

5.2.11 Date established

When reviewing the target audience across the sites captured in the study, where dates could be established, it is seen that the majority of sites were established in the Twentieth Century (53%) and 30% established in the Twenty First Century. The remaining sites were established pre-Nineteenth Century (7%) or during the Nineteenth Century (11%). Whilst it may be expected for the majority of sites to have been established in the Twentieth Century, as it is the most recent, full century, it is interesting that such a large percentage were established less than two decades into the Twenty First Century. This suggests that the creation of cultural heritage and tangible assets to create an identity for a city is still an important factor for countries. When looking at the cities individually, this pattern is consistent however, the data suggests that the creation of cultural heritage and tangible assets is most important for Budapest, with 39% of the sites created in the Twenty First Century, followed by Berlin (28%) and Zagreb (19%). However, it should be noted that the percentages may have been impacted by the destruction of cultural heritage during World War One and Two.

5.2.12 Related to violent deaths

This analysis shows us that, when looking at the total number of sites explicitly relating to a violent death or deaths, these sites appear in 27% of instances, with 73% not explicitly relating to a violent death. This pattern is very consistent when looking at the cities at an individual level. Both Berlin and Zagreb have sites that reference violent deaths in 30% of instances, with Budapest at 23%. This shows us that attitudes towards presenting sites that reference violent deaths is fairly similar across each city.




Figure 9. Chart comparing the number of sites related to a violent death(s) against the revolution or war they reference in each city.

When analysing the events these violent deaths are associated with, differences start to appear (figure 9). Across all cities, where a site is linked to a violent death, World War Two is the most commonly associated event (34% of these sites). However, Berlin has the highest proportion at 56%, with Zagreb at 30% and Budapest at 21%, suggesting that, for Berlin, World War Two is the most significant event to memorialise through its cultural heritage and tangible assets. This is followed by The Cold War at 30%. As referenced, for Zagreb, sites related to violent deaths are associated with World War Two in 30% of instances, with sites referencing the Homeland War in the 1990s second, at 19%. Whilst this suggest that World War Two is more significant to the recent war, the relatively fewer number of years that have passed since the Homeland War could have had an impact on this result. For Budapest, sites related to violent deaths most often reference the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (38%), with World War Two in second, at 21%. This suggests that the 1956 Hungarian Revolution is viewed at the most significant event to memorialise when concerning violent deaths. Of the

38% of sites relating to violent deaths associated to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 46% were erected in the Twenty First Century, suggesting that the memory of 1956 is as important, if not more important, that it was in the Twentieth Century (38% in the Twentieth Century, 15% where date could not be established).

5.2.13 Established by

Where it can be ascertained who established a site, 77% of all sites captured within this study were established by an official body, such as the government or an official group with the assumed permission of the government. This leaves 23% established by individuals. When looking at sites at a city level, the approach of Berlin and Budapest is similar, with 85% and 87% of sites established by an official body, respectively. However, Zagreb shows a smaller number of sites established by an official body at 61%, meaning Zagreb has a greater number of sites established by an individual or small group of individuals (39%). This suggests that Zagreb is more comfortable allowing decision to be made at a local level with regards to cultural heritage and tangible assets.

5.2.14 Tourist website

Of the total number of sites captured in this study, 20% of these sites identified were also found to be on the official tourist website for the respective city, with 80% not featuring on the website. When viewing the cities at an individual level, Budapest and Zagreb have similar proportions of their sites captured on the official tourist website (figure 11), with 12% and 13% respectively. Berlin, on the other hand, had a greater number of sites captured on the

official tourist website, at 44%. This suggests that Berlin is inclined to promote a greater number of their sites to tourists compared to Budapest and Zagreb.




Figure 11. Proportions of sites captured on the official tourist websites across all cities, and individual cities

The sites that feature on the official tourist website are typically the sites classified as large (60%), as may be expected. However, there are differences at an individual city level. The majority of sites captured on the official tourist website of Berlin are large sites (62%), consistent with the total average, with 25% of sites classified as medium and 13% classified as small. Zagreb has the same percentage of small sites on their official tourist website, but the majority is different, with 50% of the sites classified as medium and 37% classified at large. This may be impacted by the size of each city. Berlin is a larger city that Zagreb and would, therefore, have more opportunity to build larger sites. Budapest's official tourist

website primarily promotes sites categorised as large, with the highest percentage at 76% and have 0% sites categorised as small, suggesting that Budapest is only inclined to promote the largest sites such as museums and the largest monuments.

5.2.15 Visitor numbers

In reviewing the number of visitors at each site, it can be seen that the pattern in estimated number of visitors is consistent across each city. Each city shows that the majority of sites captured in this study had no other visitors than me at the time of visiting (Berlin, 42%; Budapest, 68%; Zagreb, 83%). Equally, each city had the lowest percentage of sites that saw greater than 200 visitors at the time of visiting (Berlin, 8%; Budapest, 2%; Zagreb, 0%). This is consistent with other findings which show that sites classified as large take up the smallest percentage of all sites (18%), and it is to be expected that large sites are more able to accommodate larger visitor numbers. However, despite the consistency across the cities, it is worth noting that the vast majority of sites in Zagreb saw no visitors at the time of visiting (83%), whilst visitor numbers at Berlin sites is the most evenly spread. This suggests that Berlin has busier and larger sites than Zagreb. Whilst this may be expected, it could also be associated with the type of sites in each city, where Berlin has a greater number of exhibitions than Zagreb (23% for Berlin, compared to 7% for Zagreb), which tend to draw greater number than monuments.

5.2.16 Cost

The analysis of the distribution of sites that charge a cost for entering shows that the majority of sites across all cities are free to enter or view. The total average across the cities finds that

94% are free and 6% charge a fee for entering or viewing. Whilst this is consistent across the cities, Berlin stands out with the highest number of paid sites at 12%, compared to 5% for Zagreb and 3% for Budapest. This chapter so far has shown us that Berlin, generally, has greater numbers at each site, and a greater number of exhibitions, that are more likely to be charged than sites such as monuments. Having greater number of tourists overall means that Berlin is more likely to be able to charge a cost to enter a site and still attract tourists.

However, I suggest the greater number of paid sites in Berlin is simply due to the greater proportion of museums and exhibitions compared to monuments and plaques.

When looking at paid sites that also reference violent deaths, another difference across the cities can be seen. Across all cities, where a site has a cost to enter, sites are also associated to a violent death in 32% of instances. Berlin and Budapest are relatively, consistent, showing that sites relating to a violent death or deaths are charged a cost in 45% and 40% of instances, respectively. However, this study found no instances of sites relating to a violent death that are charged a cost in Zagreb. There may be a couple of reasons for this. Firstly, Zagreb has one small exhibition that focusses on the experience of Zagreb during the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990's. This site explicitly references people who died and is free to enter. Zagreb may choose not to charge a cost for such sites in order to attract visitors, however, I suggest this is not the case as this particular site is not well promoted. Instead, I suggest the discrepancy is due to the types of sites captured within Zagreb that relate to violent deaths. Most sites in Zagreb that fall into this category are monuments and plaques that, naturally, do not charge a cost for viewing. In addition, Zagreb has not established large museums or exhibitions detailing their experiences of war, occupation, and revolution, like Berlin and Budapest, suggesting a preference for a more personal, local memorialisation in Zagreb.

5.2.17 Literature at site




Figure 12. Proportions of sites with additional literature at the site across all cities, and individual cities

In analysing the total number of sites captured in this study that include literature at the site, referring to literature above a brief title and description, it is seen that 26% of sites include additional literature. Budapest and Zagreb are consistent with this finding (figure 12), with sites including literature in 19% and 18% of instances, respectively. Berlin, however, includes additional literature in its sites in 48% of instances. Whilst Berlin has a greater number of museums and exhibitions, where additional literature is expected, this still suggests that Berlin is more inclined to provide additional narrative to educate or provide context to the sites in question. Budapest and Zagreb, on the other hand, are more likely to want site to stand on its own merit, without additional explanation. This also suggests that most sites in Budapest and

Zagreb are targeted at local citizens, rather than tourists, who may not require additional context or titles and descriptions translating to another language.

This is supported when reviewing the languages present at sites that include additional literature. Where literature is present at a site, Berlin has the smaller percentage of sites that are presented solely in the native German language, at 16%. The majority of sites in Berlin, where literature is present, include other languages in addition to German, at 84%. Budapest has more sites with additional literature solely in the native Hungarian language (33%) but still caters to non-Hungarian speakers in most instances (67%). In Zagreb, there is an equal split, where 50% of instances are presented solely in the native Croatian language, and 50% where additional languages are present. This suggests that Croatia has the highest proportion of sites that may be deemed not necessary for the outside community to view or understand. Budapest has a higher percentage of sites deemed appropriate for outsiders to understand, whilst Berlin includes the outside and tourist community in the majority of instances.

5.2.18 Languages present

It has been discussed that, where additional literature is present at a site, Berlin generally includes non-German speakers, whilst Budapest and Zagreb are progressively lower in the number of sites catered to non-native speakers. When viewing the languages present across all sites, regardless of whether there is additional literature present, a similar pattern can be seen. Where language is present across all sites in this study, noting that some sites have no title or description, non-native languages are present in 35% of instances. This suggests that in most instances, cultural heritage and tangible assets are established primarily with local citizens in mind. However, when looking at cities individually, it can be seen that Budapest and Zagreb

are consistent in that the majority of sites, where language is present, are aimed at local citizens, at 72% and 81% respectively. Just 28% (Budapest) and 19% (Zagreb) of sites contain languages other than the native language. This suggests that, in most instances, the outside community are not considered when establishing cultural heritage and tangible assets. This contrasts with Berlin, where sites include non-native languages in 72% of instances. This shows that Berlin is likely to consider the non-German community when establishing its sites.

5.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter has identified that by cataloguing numerous sites across each city, and capturing both factual and observational values, patterns can be seen in the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. In addition, lack of patterns can also be noted, which suggest that some aspects of the sites are not highly considered by some, or all, of the cities. This thesis continues with the qualitative analysis of a selection of sites through the lenses of historical re-evaluation and history gaps. The lens analysis will be supported by insights captured in this chapter.

6. HISTORICAL RE-EVALUATION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is the first of two, analysing the sites captured within the study through different lenses. Sørensen & Viejo-Rose (2015a, p. 1) writes that ‘cultural heritage is both affected and generated by conflict,’ suggesting you can analyse the aftermath of conflict through changes to a place. This will be seen in some of the sites in this chapter, the analysis of which will show some of the impacts conflict or political transition has on the cultural heritage and tangible assets of a place. The chapter analyses cultural heritage and tangible assets through a variety of lenses to understand this process further. In viewing individual sites through different lenses, I show how it deepens our understanding of the processes at work within Central European capital cities. In addition, it provides insight into the way countries and groups use cultural heritage and tangible assets as a tool to communicate to both its citizens and outside observers.

The sites within this chapter are analysed through the lens of historical re-evaluation. As defined in chapter four, historical re-evaluation developed out of previous research as a solution to what I found to be problematic use of the terms “destruction” and “reconstruction,” in reference to cultural heritage (Clancy, 2010). Historical re-evaluation enables sites to be analysed to understand their impact on the historical narrative, without having to navigate the subjective nature of other terms. In addition, historical re-evaluation is shown to focus attention on, not just the site in question, but its context within the broader,

immediate landscape. Historical re-evaluation is a lens to understand the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets of a place, to provide insight into the processes that have preceded the change, the physical change itself and a change in the intangible landscape post-change. This chapter continues with an overview of how historical re-evaluation manifests both within and across Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb, before applying the lens to a number of sites across each capital city.

6.2 HISTORICAL RE-EVALUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN CAPITAL CITIES

In Berlin, historical re-evaluation manifests through bringing the past and present together to symbolise the progression Germany has made. Sites such as the Reichstag and Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtnis-Kirchengemeinde (Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church) were damaged either in the lead up to, or during World War Two. Both sites were reconstructed with modern architecture complimenting the older, damaged structure, acting as a visual prompt for both survival and growth. In addition, Berlin is vocal in this historical re-evaluation. Not hiding from its difficult Nazi past, through information boards, free books, and tours, both of these sites are helping to historically re-evaluate Germany's past, using the events of the past as a lesson and now advocating for peace and victims around the world. This is further seen in the historical re-evaluation of the Berlin Wall. It is shown below how the wall has been historically re-evaluated from a symbol of division to a symbol of peace. Not only does this symbol of peace continue to grow through new exhibitions in Berlin, but the wall has also

been gifted and sold over the last three decades, symbolically spreading peace throughout the world.

Whilst Berlin is shown below to use its cultural heritage and tangible assets to present itself as a city of freedom, the city is not immune to the same actions as Budapest as Zagreb, that will be discussed shortly. Berlin too has undergone a programme of removing site related to Communism, reconstructing Unter den Linden, a significant road in former East Germany to appear entirely historic. The most contentious of these being the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace)/Humboldtforum, a hugely expensive building based on the former Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) and on the site of the Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic), a building that housed the East German government. However, the erasure of Communist memory in Berlin is not at the extent of Budapest and Zagreb. The Reichstag, for example, purposefully preserved the Soviet graffiti, written on its walls when they marched on the German capital at the end of World War Two.

The way in which historical re-evaluation manifests in Budapest is largely through using cultural heritage and tangible assets to influence the historic narrative to view Hungary as a victim of occupying regimes. Unlike Berlin, Budapest does not acknowledge its cooperation with Nazi Germany through its cultural heritage and tangible assets, only that Hungary was a victim of German Occupation. This can be seen in sites such as Terror Haza (House of Terror) and the A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation) that are discussed below. Either through extensive literature at Terror Haza (House of Terror), or the bold statement of the A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation), Budapest does not leave space for other narratives.

Another way historical re-evaluation can be seen in Budapest is through the placement of sites. Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) is a square in central Budapest that can be seen as an historic dialogue build up over time, with monuments placed as a response or message to another. This will be discussed in more detail throughout this study however an example of this can be seen in the placement of other monuments around the Soviet War Memorial, one of the only remaining Communist memorials in Budapest, protected by an agreement between Hungary and Russia (Foote, Tóth & Árvay, 2000, p. 325). The Soviet War Memorial is the central monument within the square and is watched over by several monuments of people who were anti-Communist or a victim of Communism, such as ex-Hungarian politician Imre Nagy, ex-United States President Ronald Regan and the American Embassy. In discussing the redevelopment of Berlin, Copley writes ‘certain buildings, sites and spaces have emerged as epicentres within these contests and functioned as battlegrounds upon which Germany’s memory contests are fought’ (2017, p. 699) and the same can be said of Budapest’s Szabadság tér (Liberty Square).

In contrast to Berlin and Budapest, historical re-evaluation in Zagreb is more subtle and does not appear to be expressed with outside observers in mind. This study located just one site that can be interpreted as having an intention to present Croatia’s interpretation of the break-up of Yugoslavia to outside observers. This is the Memorijalni Centar Raketiranja Zagreba 1991/1995 (Memorial centre for the shelling of Zagreb 1991/1995), that will be discussed further in this study. The centre outlines the experience of Zagreb during the war yet is not sign-posted, nor clearly advertised. Housed on the floor of an office block, the visitor rings a doorbell to enter and is navigated through the centre by a member of staff. The majority of other historical re-evaluations are less easy to identify and require an understanding of the context. Examples of such are, the reinternment of a statue of Ban Josip Jelačić in a square of

the same name, and removal of the original Glas Hrvatske *Žrtve - Zid Boli* (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain) memorial, all of which will be discussed below.

Neglect is another, subtle, way in which Zagreb historically re-evaluates its cultural heritage and tangible assets. Neglect sends an indirect message of what is no longer deemed important to the people of Zagreb today, primarily through the eyes of the government who would be expected to ensure the protection of valued monuments. Spomen-park *Dotrščina* (*Dotrščina Memorial Park*) is a memorial park that was established during the Socialist period between the end of World War Two and the break-up of Yugoslavia. Intended to be a memorial to those who died at the hand of Nazi's and the Ustaše, the park was never finished and now lies neglected. A number of monuments within the park are damaged, in addition to the park being victim to racist attacks where swastikas have been painted on signs and monuments. Another example, which will be discussed in the following chapter but can also be seen as an historical re-evaluation, is the bust of Ivo Lola Ribar, a Communist politician and one-time hero. His bust was stolen but the plinth showing his name remained, as a sign of neglect to those who represent the Communist period. This sentiment has been acknowledged in recent years with the Mayor of Zagreb reinterring Ribar's bust and noting the country's avoidance at acknowledging the anti-fascist movement.

Historical re-evaluation is highly prevalent across each of the cities, and this is reflective of historical re-evaluation being the overarching lens, which will be discussed in detail in chapter nine. What is different is the way in which the lens is reflected across the cities, and individual examples are discussed in detail below. This chapter will show that, within Zagreb, the historical re-evaluation of various sites is rebranding the city to reflect a country that is historic and independent. This can be seen in the treatment of cultural heritage from different time periods, where Socialist heritage is neglected yet monuments from the pre-World War

Two period appear in good condition. This is further reflected in the changing of road names, referring to historic figures from the Fourteenth Century, when Croatia first became an independent country. The historical re-evaluation in Budapest has some parallels to Zagreb. Budapest is also historically re-evaluating the city to appear more historic, however this is being achieved through the creation of heritage, such as the reconstruction of the square outside Parliament to appear as it did in 1945. What is different about the historical re-evaluation in Budapest is that the city is explicitly using its heritage to present Hungary as victims to both the local and tourist communities. This can be seen in the presentation of Terror Háza (House of Terror), which will be discussed in more detail below. The historical re-evaluation that has occurred in Berlin has a more outward focus. It will be seen, as the chapter continues, that rather than focussing on the nation's history and experience, Berlin's cultural heritage and tangible assets are often presented in ways that represent victims of oppression across the world.

This chapter will continue by analysing a number of sites across each city through the lens of historical re-evaluation. I will outline how each site was identified as an historical re-evaluation and what insight it gives us.

6.3 HISTORICAL RE-EVALUATION INDIVIDUAL SITE ANALYSIS

6.3.1 Berlin

The Reichstag



Figure 13. The exterior of the Reichstag, Berlin.

(Clancy, 2016)

Originally built in the late-nineteenth century, the Reichstag (figure 13) housed the Parliament of Germany until it was damaged in a fire in 1933. The fire was declared, by Chancellor Adolf Hitler, as the responsibility of Communists and proof that Communists were plotting against Germany. This act, which many believe was orchestrated by Hitler, enabled Hitler to pass a degree providing him greater powers in Germany and enabling the establishment of Nazi Germany (Snyder, 2010, p. 60). After the fire, the building fell into disrepair and subsequent governments held office elsewhere. When Germany reunified post-1989, the

building underwent reconstruction in a project led by British architect Norman Foster, who restored much of the building and built a large futuristic dome in the centre. The restoration enabled the reunified German government to return Parliament to the building and, therefore, to Berlin. This is consistent with the pattern, identified in chapter 5, whereby Berlin often chooses to change or restore site, with 37% of sites in Berlin altered in some form or another, compared with 25% in Budapest and 31% in Zagreb.

The Reichstag was identified as an historical re-evaluation as the decisions made during the reconstruction of the building shows that this was not a reconstruction for political reasons in a practical sense. Instead, treatment of the site suggests an attempt to project a chosen historic narrative to observers, one that enables Germany to transcend its difficult past. The futuristic dome, capping the original building exterior, historically re-evaluates the site to bring both the history of Berlin and its place in modern Europe together. The building symbolises that Berlin will continue to survive the Nazi period and look to the future, and the free tours show that this message may be as much for tourists and outside observers as it is for German citizens. By using the building that Hitler tried to destroy, it symbolically presents Germany as standing against the Nazi regime. In addition to the new dome and restoration of the building, a decision was made to keep the Soviet graffiti that was written on the walls of the building after Soviet troops marched through Berlin and declared victory in 1945. Whilst there was initially some opposition to keeping the graffiti, the building was historically re-evaluated, exposing and preserving the Soviet graffiti, which has been described as ‘a subtle warning against nationalism, hubris and jingoism’ (Kluth, 2014). This further shows that Germany is willing to expose the scars of its past in order to support the countries redemption.

Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtnis-Kirchengemeinde (Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church)



Figure 14. Exterior of Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church.

(Clancy 2015)

Built in Berlin in the late nineteenth century, Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtnis-Kirchengemeinde (Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church) church suffered heavy damage in a bombing raid during World War Two. After the war, there was a long debate over how and if the church should be re-constructed. There were protests against efforts to raze the church and it was eventually decided to keep much of the ruins and integrate it with modern structures (Kluth, 2014). This was not fully completed until the 1960s. The final design left much of the damaged spire in situ, with a modern belfry and chapel being built around the ruins (Figure 14). Today, the building is as much a tourist site as a church, where visitors can enter a memorial hall that

tells the history of the church and features the Cross of Nails, made from the ruins of Coventry Cathedral and given as a gift and symbol of reconciliation to Berlin's memorial church. The church is one of the many sites in Berlin, captured within this study, that tells a narrative both visually and literally, with 48% of Berlin's sites providing additional literature for visitors to read, over and above a name or title.

This site was identified as an historical re-evaluation due to the explicit use of the building to portray an historical narrative, in addition to the building standing in solidarity with that of Coventry Cathedral. The church has been historically re-evaluated as a symbol of Nazi terror and the church now presents itself as an ally to victims around the world. This help to historically re-evaluate the cultural memory of post-war Germany as one that hold the same values as places that suffered at the hands of the Nazis during World War Two, such as Coventry, using its heritage to further distance itself from Nazi ideology. In addition, the combination of presenting its war-time scars and presenting its anti-fascist values of today, the building is acting in a similar manner to the Reichstag, using cultural heritage as a symbol of redemption.

Berlin Wall

The image of Berlin Wall, or Anti-Fascist Protection Rampart, as it was initially named, has changed considerably since construction began in 1961. Originally built by the Soviets to keep East and West Germany physically and ideologically separate, the Wall became a symbol of division and opposing ideologies to those on both side of the wall (Bevan, 2007, p. 133). After the fall of Communism in 1989, despite initial opposition from German citizens who wanted the wall taken down, the German government kept some sections of the wall

intact. The largest of these being the East Side Gallery (figure 15) that had also become a large canvas for local and international artists to express their feelings on division and politics both in Germany and beyond.



Figure 15. A section of the East Side Gallery, graffitied with 'FREE PALASTINE.'

(Clancy, 2015)

The Berlin Wall was identified as an historical re-evaluation due to the varying changes and presentations of the wall in locations across Berlin, and how the treatment of the wall has enabled Berlin to re-brand the city into a symbol of peace. The treatment of the wall was at times a subtle representation of historical re-evaluation. Post-1989, the removal of large sections of the walls could be suggested as primarily logistical and reactionist, rather than a conscious attempt to project a particular narrative or message. However, over the years, the numerous wall memorials and promotion indicates a shift towards a more conscious historical re-evaluation. The narrative presented by the government is that the wall should be preserved

as a reminder to future generations of the consequences of division and includes numerous memorials to those who died or suffered as a result of the wall (*Berlin.de* 2020). However, there are several other benefits to the preservation of the wall. Firstly, the economic benefit the wall has on Berlin. The wall brings huge numbers of tourists who travel to the city to see the remnants, buy pieces of the wall and visit wall-themed cafes and theatres.

In addition to the economic benefit the historical re-evaluation of the wall has brought to Germany, there are other benefits. By turning the remaining wall sections into memorials and gifting other sections of the wall to organisations and museums around the world, the wall has been historically re-evaluated from a symbol of division to an international symbol of peace. The official tourism website for Berlin now states on the first page, ‘Welcome to Berlin. The City of Freedom’ (*Berlin Tourismus & Kongress GmbH*, 2017) and the cultural heritage of Berlin is being used to advance this claim. The success of this campaign goes further than the tourism industry. Whilst German citizens argued for its removal in 1989, in 2015 there were protests against the temporary removal of a small section of the wall at the East Side Gallery to allow access to a development site. The historical re-evaluation of the wall has change perceptions so thoroughly that today it is difficult to navigate the central areas of Berlin without coming across sections of the wall and existing memorials continue to expand or appear.

Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie (Checkpoint Charlie Museum)

Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie (Checkpoint Charlie Museum) is a private museum in the centre of Berlin that was first established by human rights activist Dr Rainer Hildebrandt in 1962/63. The main focus of the museum was the Berlin Wall, attempts to escape from East

to West, and the lives of significant individuals such as Raoul Wallenberg, who is seen as a hero for saving the lives of thousands of Jews during World War Two. However, the museum has expanded over time and features exhibits on a variety of conflicts and occupations from around the world, such as Spanish Civil War, the 2001 war in Afghanistan, former Yugoslavia, and North Korea, amongst others. Being a private museum, the site is unique compared to other museums in Berlin in that it can present its own narrative and is able to show stronger political opinions than perhaps a government funded museum would. For example, in 2015, a large banner replicating the Ukrainian Flag was erected on the outside of the building, with accompanying text that reads, in English and Ukrainian:

“By defending the liberty and unity of Ukraine we defend the liberty and unity of the countries of Europe. Vladimir Putin: abandon your geopolitical ambitions and set the whole of Ukraine free.”

(Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie, 2015) (Figure 16)

Much like Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtnis-Kirchengemeinde (Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church), Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie (Checkpoint Charlie Museum) was identified as an historical re-evaluation due to the explicit curating of cultural heritage and material to portray historical and political narratives. When navigating the museum, it initially appears that the primary purpose of the museum is to educate the audience, as reflected in the small lecture theatre and numerous classrooms within the building. However, in addition to presenting history and educating the audience, the museum also presents and promotes the activist work it has undertaken, such as campaigning for the release of political prisoners like as Nadiya Savchenko and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Whilst presenting issues from around the

world, much of the narrative holds an anti-Russian sentiment, particularly in the wording of some of the exhibition boards. For example, the presentation on political prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky makes claims of corruption and unjust court proceedings that, whilst may be true, do not appear to be proven and would likely be viewed differently within Russia. In using language such as this, the museum is presenting a political stance and is not attempting to be objective. The museum appears to be using conflicts from around the world to historically re-evaluate and influence its audience today on the stance they should take in relation to current political topics, rather than the historic politics that the museum developed from. In chapter five it was identified that, of the sites captured within this study, sites in Berlin are most likely to explicitly portray a particular group negatively (26%) compared to Budapest (6%) and Zagreb (2%). Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie (Checkpoint Charlie Museum) is one such example of those sites, suggesting that for both private and publicly ran sites, presenting a political stance and portraying a particular group negatively, is perhaps more accepted than in Budapest or Zagreb.



Figure 16. Exterior of Haus am Checkpoint Charlie, featuring a banner supporting Ukraine's political struggles

(Clancy, 2016)

Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace)/Humboldtforum

The original Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) was built in Berlin in the 15th Century and rebuilt in Baroque style in the 18th Century. The building was used by German Emperors until the end of the First World War when Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated. The building was then used as a museum and for state functions until it was damaged during WWII. After the war, the building sat in the Eastern sector of Berlin, occupied by the Soviets. Although the building was structurally sound enough to be restored, the building was razed in 1950. The East German government, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), used the space as a parade ground until 1973 when building started on the Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic). This would become a large, modernist, multi-functional building that housed the parliament of the GDR as well as art galleries, restaurants, a bowling alley, and disco. After the fall of Communism, the building was declared to be contaminated with asbestos and closed to the public. Some citizens believed the asbestos concerns to be false due to the timing of the palace, representing East Germany, being closed to the public just as the country re-unified (Dolff-Bonekämper, 2002, p. 247). The site is now a building site where a new palace will stand. The new building will see the original Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) façade being erected, at a huge expense. According to the official website, the project will require donations totalling 105 million Euros (*Association Berliner Schlosses E.V.* 2020). The new Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) (Figure 17) will house a new museum known as Humboldtforum and a library. The site is an individual example of historical re-evaluation, which will both reference the historic Stadtschloss and also look to the future with modern elements.

After WWII, East Berlin underwent a huge post-war development that was ‘the most prestigious and important urban planning project in the history of the GDR,’ (Jaeger, 2012, p.

81) which went from the Brandenburg Gate to Museum Island. Today, the rebuilding of the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) is part of a larger development project which can be viewed as an attempt by the current government to undo what the GDR started. This wider development project was identified as an historical re-evaluation as a process encompassing not just individual sites but considers the wider visual impact of making Berlin appear more historic. This historically re-evaluates central Berlin's cultural heritage and tangible assets as if Nazi Germany and the post-war Soviet occupation did not occur. In addition, much like the Reichstag and Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, Germany is taking back control of assets previously associated with the Communist period in an effort to control the narrative.



Figure 17. Exterior of the Stadtschloss/Humboldtforum.

(Clancy, 2015)

Flughafen Berlin-Tempelhof (Tempelhof Airport)

An airport was first built at Tempelhof in 1923 (*Flight International*, 2008) with the site being extensively developed by the Nazi's in the late 1930s (Starzmann, 2014, p. 215) into one of

the largest buildings in the world at the time. The airport was part of Hitler's grand plans to develop Berlin into a 'world capital' (Copley, 2017, p. 702). Contrary to plans, the site was never used as an airport by the Nazis due to the outbreak of World War Two. Instead, the hangars became forced labour camps where machinery and military equipment was repaired during World War Two. (Starzmann, 2014, p. 215). After liberating Berlin at the end of World War Two, the Soviets occupied the site until the city was split into four quarters and the airport fell into the United States quarter. The site is perhaps best known as the location of the Berlin Airlift, memorialised in figure 18, which saw more than Two million tonnes of food and fuel dropped into the airport by plane between 1948-1949 after the Soviets blocked land channels (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 9). After re-unification, the airport was used as a domestic airport for a period of time until larger planes, requiring longer runways, made the site redundant and the airport was closed. The former airfield is now a park, occasional festival venue and the hangars are currently home to approximately 3,000 refugees. In addition to this, the site has periodically been used as a banquet hall, film set and concentration camp, whilst the building houses office spaces and a police station.

In recent years, there have been arguments between the government and local citizens over the future use of the site. Due to the expanse of land it covers, and its proximity to the centre of Berlin, there is opportunity to make money through the development of housing and commercial property. In 2014, the government lost a referendum with the public who voted not to develop the land. According to German law, this decision must hold for ten years. This is particularly complicated for sites that have had such varying uses over time. This leads to an even greater number of groups identifying as stakeholders in the site, 'at such places, groups of veterans, victims and supporters battle to bring about confrontation with and commemoration of the events that occurred there' (Copley, 2017, p. 699). Despite the in-

fighting over use of the site, the site is one of the many within Berlin that presents its narrative in languages other than the native language. In addition to literature at the site in both German and English, tours of the site are also held in both German and English. This is consistent with the pattern identified in chapter five, that Berlin is most likely to present site in languages other than the native language at 72%, compared to Budapest (28%) and Zagreb (19%).



Figure 18. Berlin Airlift Memorial, Tempelhof Airport.

(Clancy, 2016)

Whilst less explicit than other sites discussed in this chapter, Flughafen Berlin-Tempelhof (Tempelhof Airport) and park was identified as an historical re-evaluation due to the attempts of various stakeholders attempting to re-frame the narrative of the site. There are local citizens pushing for the site to be preserved due to its historical importance and recreational benefits

of the site. However, during field study for this thesis, a tour guide from the site stated that it would cost 200 million Euros to refurbish the full site and that it takes 15 million Euros per year to cover the costs of maintaining the site. On the other hand, the government is reframing the site as a place of logistical and economic value, housing migrants, and attempting to ‘develop the land around the edge of the park with the construction of 4,700 apartments, commercial spaces and a new public library’ (Copley, 2017, p. 717). Due to the varied use of the site, this has led to none of the stakeholders being able to use the site in the way they would like to leave the site unable to fulfil its intended purpose. This is echoed by Copley, who argues ‘that the historicization of that site is currently at a crossroads... that between the ‘post-dictatorship’ city shaped by ongoing memory politics; and the modern, western city where authorities need to strike a balance between attracting corporate investment and listening to citizens’ demands to determine how their city is constituted’ (2017, p. 701).

Orte des Erinnerns (Places of Remembrance)

Orte des Erinnerns (Places of Remembrance) is an exhibition established around the streets of the Bayerischer Platz area of Berlin, south-west of the city centre. This area was a former Jewish district and was, therefore, one of the districts most affected by the Nazi laws that came into effect to control and suppress the Jewish population. The site features eighty street signs, with each sign depicting one of the laws established during the Nazi period. Laws such as ‘Jews may no longer purchase soap and shaving cream’ and ‘Post Office officials married to Jews must retire.’ The signs were erected primarily on lampposts (figure 19), much like the ordinary street sign, the intention of which was to emphasise the banality at which these laws were established and put into practise.

Unlike the majority of sites captured in this chapter, this site does not feature on the official tourist website and was privately established by two artists in 1993. This led to confusion and shock when the memorial was first established. Local citizens were not aware this was an art installation and memorial, and it was initially reported to the police as anti-Semitic activity (Stih & Schnock, 2009, p. 7). Once the public understood the context and purpose of the memorial, it was accepted and has remained in place to this day. The site is also one of the relatively small number of sites captured within this study that are established by an individual or group of individuals, with 85% of sites within Berlin established by an official body, as detailed in chapter five, indicating that the government controls the historic narrative.



Figure 19. One of the Places of Remembrance signs. Text on the back of the sign reads: *'Jews must declare their incomes and property "to ensure that these assets are used in the best interest of the German economy."*

(Clancy, 2015)

The site was identified as an historical re-evaluation due to the artists challenging the usual way in which memorials are presented. Rather than establishing a large monument in a central location. The artists have created a decentralised monument that turns an entire suburb into a reminder of the banality of oppression. The majority of memorials captured within this study

focus on victims who have been murdered, segregated or terrorised in some way. This memorial focusses on the journey to this point. The memorial reminds us that concentration camps do not appear overnight, built by monsters. Human being can make small, increasingly divisive decision that can lead down a dangerous road.

6.3.2 Budapest

Corvin Mozi (Corvin Cinema)



Figure 20. A monument to a child soldier at Corvin Mozi, Budapest.

(Clancy, 2015)

Sitting in the centre of Corvin K z (Corvin Place), on the outskirts of Budapest city centre, is a cinema that features monuments and plaques along the outside of the circular shaped building. There are numerous plaques to individuals, collective groups, as well as a map that

appears to show the locations in the square that are significant to events during the 1956 Revolution. Each of the plaques are written in Hungarian and, at the entrance to the cinema, there is a monument of a boy holding a gun in front of the Hungarian flag. The majority of the plaques reference the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, during which Corvin Köz (Corvin Place) became a stronghold for the resistance. What makes this site unique is that, along with adults who died fighting the Soviet army, many children and young adults also died at this site after taking up arms.

The cinema was chosen as a memorial site due to the fighting that occurred in the square during the Hungarian Revolution. Despite the square being used as a stronghold for 1956 revolutionaries for logistical reasons, the image of a memorial to a child soldier (figure 20) outside a cinema is particularly emotive because a cinema is where children should go for entertainment, not battle. Despite the plaques being written solely in Hungarian, the monument of the boy does not require text or translation and stands out amongst the many plaques. The site was identified as an historical re-evaluation due to the conscious and explicit way in which the building and square has been decorated with numerous plaques, along with the emotive monument of a boy. The memorialisation of Corvin Mozi (Corvin Cinema) and the square historically re-evaluates the square to promote a narrative of Soviet soldiers targeting children and young adults. Despite many of the revolutionary fighters at Corvin Köz (Corvin Place) being teenagers and young adults, the statue immediately outside the cinema appears to be a very young boy which, as Harms writes, ‘evokes the biblical fight between David and Goliath, the latter being Red Army tanks’ (Harms, 2017 p. 489). This further emphasises the citizens of Budapest as victims of Soviet terror to both locals and tourists. The site emphasises Hungarians as victims, particularly Hungarian youth as victims of Soviet oppression, a message which is aimed at local citizens, rather than outsiders as any narrative

is solely in the native language. As identified in chapter five, this site is one of the 19% of sites in Budapest that have additional literature at the site. In addition, where language is present at a site, 72% of sites in Budapest are solely in the native language, showing that the narrative is primarily aimed at Hungarian citizens, and Corvin Mozi (Corvin Cinema) is consistent with this pattern.

Kossuth Monument



Figure 21. The Third iteration of the Kossuth Monument, Budapest.

(Clancy, 2016)

There has been a monument dedicated to Lajos Kossuth, a Nineteenth Century President of Hungary, outside Budapest's Parliament building since the early Twentieth Century. The first monument was inaugurated by Miklós Horthy in 1927 and sits in a square that is also named after the former president. In the 1950s the original limestone monument was taken down and

replaced with a Communist interpretation of the monument. This monument looked very different, replacing the limestone statues with bronze versions standing on a red brick base. In 2011, the Hungarian government decided to reconstruct the square as it would have appeared in 1944, before Communist influence on the heritage of Budapest (*HNA*, 2017). This led to the removal of the Communist version of the monument in order to make way for a re-cast of the original Kossuth monument, which was inaugurated in the square in 2015 (*DNH*, 2015).

By removing the Communist style Kossuth monument and replacing it with a replica of an earlier version, the monument is being historically re-evaluated to show Hungarians that the government are distancing themselves from the Communist regime. This can also be viewed as an attempt, by the Hungarian government, to alter the cultural memory so that Hungarians no longer identify with Communism. Equally, the historical re-evaluation may have occurred because they no longer identify with Communism. The monument is an example of an historical re-evaluation that is explicit to local citizens, yet more subtle to outsiders. Local citizens would likely be aware of the history of the Kossuth monument therefore, it is a direct message from the government that they no longer associate with Communism. Outsiders are less likely to be aware of the history and, therefore, the impact is different. Tourists would not necessarily know that this monument has only been erected in recent years, as the style is historic, and the monument looks well established (figure 21). The erection of the new monument is an historical re-evaluation and communication to outsiders that Hungary is independent and is promoting its historical roots. This would also translate to citizens and may be an attempt to create a cohesive national identity. As Kolar-Panov states, when discussing the views of A.D. Smith, ‘no “nation-to-be” can survive without a homeland or a myth of common origins or descent’ (1997, p. 81). This further shows that heritage decisions can be made with national citizens in mind, tourists, or both. The inauguration of the original

monument may hold additional significance. The original monument was inaugurated by Miklós Horthy, former Hungarian leader, and one-time ally of Hitler, who has seen a cult revival in more recent years, representing Nationalist and anti-Soviet political leanings inside Hungary. The erecting of the original monument could be interpreted as an indirect message of support to their former leader, attempting to symbolically revert to a time when Horthy ruled Hungary.

The monument is one of 25% of sites in Budapest, captured within this study, that are altered over time, as identified in chapter five. The majority of sites that have been altered are in the form of being adorned with wreaths or decorations however, erecting a new monument in a different style is a large-scale change, emphasising the significance of this monument to Hungarian historic narrative.

Terror Háza (House of Terror)

Opened in 2002, Terror Háza (House of Terror) is a museum that sits in a building that was once used by the Fascist Arrow Cross Party, before becoming home to the Communist State security offices the AVO (Hungarian State Police State Defence Department) and AVH (State Security Authority). During each of these periods of use, the building's basement was used for the occupation, torture, and murder of political prisoners (Creet, 2013 p. 30).

Today, the outside of the building features a large permanent metal canopy with the word 'Terror' cut out which casts a shadow over the building, both literally and metaphorically, informing the viewer that this building casts a shadow over the history of Hungary (figure 22). The museum aims to show life under two totalitarian regimes, the Nazi, and the Soviets. Similarly to Arheološki Muzej u Zagrebu (Archaeological Museum in Zagreb), discussed

below, visitors are directed to navigate the museum in a particular order. Each room presents a different aspect of Nazi or Soviet terror and many rooms have at least one A4 page of dialogue for the visitor to take away, as well as several signs on the walls. Despite the museum aiming to show the terror inflicted on the people of Budapest by two regimes, the museum is heavily weighted towards life under Communism. This may be due to Soviet influence in Hungary spanning a greater period of time however, it feels unbalanced as the museum is actively promoting and advertising that it is a memorial to the victims of two terror regimes. It is only when you get inside that the amount of Communist material in comparison to Fascist material can be seen. This is supported by academics, such as Apor, who writes ‘the impression is truly puzzling: as if the House of Terror evoked the horrors of Communism only to render fascism irrelevant’ (2014, p. 335).




Figure 22. The outside of Terror Haza, Budapest

House of Terror Museum. 2020

In addition to the museum having more rooms focused on life under Communism, in comparison to rooms focusing on life under Nazi occupation, the way the rooms are presented also differs at times. The more emotive materials such as chains, torture instruments and first-

person recollections of torture are most often in the rooms reflecting life under Communism. Despite the genocide and deportations that occurred during Nazi occupation of Hungary, the rooms presenting life under the Nazi regime are generally more historical and educational. This historically re-evaluates the experience of life under the two regimes and presents a tailored narrative, presenting Communism as the more dangerous ideology, with Apor believing that '[t]he House of Terror was founded to disseminate the message of anti-Communism, to convince Hungarians that the political left was dangerously associated with the potential of a brutal dictatorship,' (2014, p. 334). Whilst it may be true that Communism had a greater impact of the population of Hungary, the impact the Nazi occupation had is just as great, albeit on a smaller percentage of the population.

The amount of literature at the museum further supports the identification of this site as an historical re-evaluation, as the museum does not leave much room for personal interpretation whilst it presents its narrative to observers, both locals and tourists. Unlike sites such as Szoborpark (Memento Park), there is an abundance of literature at the site, on the walls of the exhibition rooms, on A4 leaflets and via the audio guide. As discussed in chapter five, Terror Háza (House of Terror) is one of 28% of sites in Budapest, captured within this study, that are presented in language other than the native language. This suggests that this site is of particular importance to Hungary in presenting its chosen historic narrative to outside observers. This is further emphasised by the site being just one of 6% of Budapest's sites that explicitly portray another group negatively, against suggesting that the desire to present the Hungarian experience of Nazi and Soviet occupation to outside observers is important at this site.

The lack of dialogue at Szoborpark (Memento Park) allows the visitor their own interpretation however, this is not the case at Terror Háza (House of Terror) where the historical re-

evaluation is guided through the literature and emotive presentations. This is supported by Turai, who suggests that unlike Fascism, where people had relative freedom to discuss the impact after World War Two, those who lived under Communism were suppressed for many years and could not tell their stories (2009, p. 103) therefore, the amount of literature available at Terror Háza (House of Terror) is perhaps Hungary finally presenting this story to the world.

The museum itself is located on Andrásy út (Andrásy Avenue), which has gone through a number of name changes over the years. Andrásy út is the original name of the road, which was renamed Sztálin út (Stalin Street) during Soviet occupation. During the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, it was named Népköztársaság út (People's Republic Street) for a short period of time before reverting back to Andrásy út after the fall of Communism. The change in road name can also be described as an historical re-evaluation, further removing traces of Communism from the city, and referencing back to historic periods. However, this example does not explicitly inform us about the way Budapest manages its road names as removing the name of a former occupier, post-regime change, is typical across many countries and may be expected.

1956 Lengyelország Magyarország. Történelem és emlékezet' ((1956 Poland Hungary. History and remembrance)

On Károly Krt, a busy road in the centre of Budapest, is a temporary outdoor exhibition focusing on the 1956 Revolutions in both Hungary and Poland. Entitled '1956 Lengyelország Magyarország. Történelem és emlékezet' (1956 Poland Hungary. History and remembrance) (figure 23). The road the exhibition was placed on was part of the route taken by

revolutionaries on 23rd October 1956, as they marched towards Parliament. The exhibition appears to be a collaboration between Polish and Hungarian cultural organisations to commemorate the revolutions that took place in both countries in 1956. The exhibition features seventeen boards, containing various photographs and text, standing on the side of the road which visitors can walk around for free. The boards depict various aspect of the respective revolutions, attempting to show a wider artistic connection between the two countries through examples of anti-Soviet poetry and paintings.



Figure 23. 1956 Lengyelország Magyarország Exhibition, Budapest.

(Clancy, 2016)

The content of the exhibition emphasises solidarity between Hungary and Poland, as well as their shared experience in trying to fight back against Communism. This historically re-evaluates the 1956 Revolution in Hungary, validating the attempt to remove Soviet influence by showing that there are other countries that were victims of Communism and who can endorse the narrative Hungary is trying to present. This narrative is that Communism is a

dangerous ideology, of which, Hungarians were victims. By collaborating with Polish organisations on the exhibition, it presents victimisation by Soviets as a shared experience across Europe, not just a Hungarian experience. This exhibition further emphasises that, despite living under Communist influence for over four decades, Hungary, and other European countries, are declaring they are ideologically no longer associated with Communism and they feel they need to advertise this narrative as recent as 2016.

Like Andrásy út (Andrásy Avenue), referenced above, Károly Krt (Károly Boulevard) has undergone a number of name changes over the years. Károly Krt (Károly Boulevard) is the original name however, it has been known by at least four other names over the Twentieth Century such as, Népkörút (People's Boulevard) and Tanács körút (Council Boulevard). Unlike Andrásy út (Andrásy Avenue), none of the former names for Károly Krt (Károly Boulevard) appear to reference Communism yet in 1991 the road was given back its historical name. This shows that, alongside disassociating itself with Communism, the Hungarian government is actively trying to present the city of Budapest as more historic.

Szoborpark (Memento Park)

Szoborpark (Memento Park) (figure 24) is a memorial park situated on the outskirts of the city of Budapest. Established in 1993, this park is ‘simultaneously presenting the themes of dictatorship and democracy,’ (Boros, cited in Réthly, 2010, p. 3). The park consists of a selection of statues that were removed from the streets of Budapest post-1989. The majority of these statues are the original statues built in the Soviet era and depict Communists, Socialists and scenes representing their associated ideologies. In addition, the site holds a

reconstruction of the boots of Stalin, famously what was left from the statue of Stalin that was toppled in Budapest during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.



Figure 24. Statue of Marx and Engels at the entrance of Memento Park, Budapest.

(Clancy, 2015)

Szoborpark (Memento Park) aims to be counterpropaganda and allows the viewer to think freely about the tyranny of dictatorship. However, there is a lack of clarity at the park for a number of reasons. Firstly, without purchasing the guidebook, there is no narrative to support the viewer in understanding what each monument represents. Secondly, as Hatherley points out, ‘every part of the twentieth-century socialist experience has been thrown in here,’ (2015, p. 486) not just monuments that are directly related to the post-World War Two Soviet occupation. For example, there are statues of Marx and Engels, monuments dedicated to the Soviet Republic of 1919 and various worker’s movements. Whilst a viewer may understand negative connotations of a Statue of Stalin, it is far harder to connect a plaque dedicated to a

worker's movement to the tyranny of dictatorship. The lack of clarity is further expressed by Simon's description of the park reflecting a 'vague common memory,' (Simon, 2014, p. 75).

The site was identified as an historical re-evaluation due to the reframing of these monuments from their original intention. With the park established on the outskirts of the city, Foote, Tóth & Árvay write that 'The distance was necessary and intentional, for it separated statues physically and symbolically from their original sites and political meanings' (2000, p. 308). Erected on the streets of Budapest in order to honour Communist people and organisations, the monuments are now presented as negative representations of history. However, without context, many of the monuments are quite impressive and even comical due to their size. This is represented in viewing tourists taking photographs, imitating the pose of the monstrous structures. This has resulted in a site that is part serious and part satire. This has perhaps led to the intended message being lost or misunderstood. In addition, Simon discusses the state of the park, that it is apparently unfinished and asks, 'whether the political background has been changed,' (2014, p. 75) and perhaps this is why plans have been halted, the political climate is changing before the original plans of a site are fully realised. This suggests that the historical re-evaluation of the park is also unfinished, due to changing politics.

Stolpersteine (Stumbling Blocks)

The Stolpersteine (Stumbling Blocks) memorial (figure 25) is unique in this study, in that it appears in both Berlin and Budapest. Whilst not appearing in Zagreb, it does appear in another city in Croatia, Rijeka, in addition to approximately 2,000 locations across Europe (*Stolpersteine.eu*, 2020). Established by artist Gunter Demnig in 2009, the memorial 'remembers the victims of National Socialism by installing commemorative brass plaques in

the pavement in front of their last address of choice' (*Stolpersteine.eu*, 2020). Anyone can sponsor a Stolpersteine (Stumbling Blocks) in order to remember someone who suffered at the hands of National Socialism. The suffering could be in many forms such as murder, deportation or being driven to suicide. Equally, the victims could be from many backgrounds, Jewish, physically disabled or those considered Nazi deserters, amongst others. Whilst there are thousands of individual Stolperstein's (Stumbling Blocks) across Europe, the memorial is understated and easy to miss if you are not looking for them. The purpose of the memorial is not to be visual in the traditional sense. Instead, the memorial aims to ensure those who suffered will not be forgotten.



Figure 25. Stolpersteine on the pavement in central Budapest.

(Clancy, 2016)

Stolpersteine (Stumbling Blocks) was identified as an historical re-evaluation due to the stance the memorial takes to influence memory to focus on the life of the victim, rather than focussing on the suffering. Whilst Stolpersteine (Stumbling Blocks) often engrave the fate of

the victim on the brass block, the blocks usually start with the heading ‘here lived.’ The memorial also re-evaluates the approach of many other memorial dedicated to those who died during the Nazi era. Rather than establishing one memorial to a group of people who died, Stolpersteine (Stumbling Blocks) flips the narrative, naming individual victims, spread throughout the places across Europe they lived. Stolpersteine (Stumbling Blocks) is unique in this study as, it is one of the small number of sites not established by official bodies, with 13% of Budapest’s sites, captured within this study, established by individuals or groups of individuals. However, what makes this site unique is that it appears across both Budapest and Berlin, showing that is it a truly independent monument that does not fall part of the country’s official historic narrative. However, it should be noted that permission is required by local authorities before stones can be laid.

6.3.3 Zagreb

Meštrovićev Paviljon (Meštrović Pavilion)

The Square in which Meštrovićev Paviljon (Meštrović Pavilion) sits has gone through several names in its history (Table 4) and these changes have often been as a result of political change. In 1942, when Croatia was ruled as an independent state by the Fascist Ustaše party, the square was re-named Trg bana Kulina (Square of Ban Kulin). Ban Kulin was a late-Twelfth Century Ban of Bosnia, who is seen as founder of the first de facto independent Bosnian state. Pavlaković writes that the use of the name by the Ustaše was an attempt at ‘symbolically tying this physical space to the regime’s territorial pretensions’ (2012, p. 327). After the defeat of Fascist powers in World War Two, the square was renamed Trg žrtava fašizma (Square of the Victims of Fascism), which was subsequently reversed when Croatia

declared independence in 1990. The square would later revert back to Trg žrtava fašizma (Square of the Victims of Fascism) in 2001, after spending ten years known as Trg hrvatskih velikana (Croatian Nobles Square).

Further examples of road name changes across Croatia (Clancy, 2010), in addition to sites captured within this study's dataset (appendix A) show us that, after declaring independence in 1990, Croatia wanted to reverse some of the actions of the Yugoslav government. Changes such as these occur for different reasons, such as a particular person or event now being deemed more relevant to the current government. In the example of the 1990s change in road name, the reason behind the name change is unclear, perhaps due to the generic nature of the change, becoming trg hrvatskih velikana (Croatian Nobles Square). This indicates that the emphasis in this example rests on the removal of the name, rather than the choosing of a new name. As stated above, the changing of the squares name aligns with key political changes within Croatia and identifies an historical re-evaluation that, after Croatia declared independence in 1990, the government no longer wanted to honour the victims of Fascism. This is echoed by Pavlaković, who writes that 'the debunking of myths related to the [anti-Fascist] communist-led Partisan movement in effect rehabilitated, and to an extent legitimated, the fascist Ustaša regime' (2012, p. 319). This decision was reversed ten years later to honour the victims of Fascism once again when the HDZ, the wartime and right-wing political party, was defeated by the more moderate Social Democratic Party. The changes presented above shows that the renaming of roads is an attempt for each new political party to control the narrative and cultural identity through the historical re-evaluation of road names.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Name</i>
1927–1941	Trg Petra I. osloboditelja (Square of Peter I, the liberator)
1941–1942	Trg III (Square number III)
1942–1946	Trg bana Kulina (Square of Ban Kulin)
1946–1990	Trg žrtava fašizma (Square of the Victims of Fascism)
1990–2000	Trg hrvatskih velikana (Croatian Nobles Square)
2001–present	Trg žrtava fašizma (Square of the Victims of Fascism)

Table 4. Previous square names of Trg žrtava fašizma, Zagreb.

Much like the square, Meštrovićev Paviljon (Meštrović Pavilion) (figure 26) has undergone many changes over its almost eighty-year history, ‘as every regime and accompanying ideology has sought to manipulate this physical space to legitimate itself’ (Pavlaković, 2012, p. 323). Before World War Two, the building was an art gallery and under Ustaše rule it was converted into a mosque. After World War Two, the building became the Museum of the Revolution, until it was given to the Croatian Association of Artists and reverted back to its original use as an art gallery, which remains the buildings use to this day. The historical re-evaluation of the square and building over time emphasises the importance of names to a country’s identity, particularly during political transition. Each regime attempted to historically re-evaluate the square and pavilion to assert its influence over the cultural memory of the citizens. Pavlaković suggests that the historical re-evaluations could also have been for the benefit of the European community, writing that changes to the landscape of Zagreb occurred when the government ‘realized that nurturing the antifascist tradition was a key component of EU integration’ (2012, p. 348).



Figure 26. The outside of Meštrovićev Paviljon, Zagreb.

(Clancy, 2016)

Stjepan Radić Statue

Close to Trg bana Josipa Jelačića (Josip Jelačić Square), the main square in central Zagreb, and on a busy shopping street is a statue of Stjepan Radić (figure 27). Whilst the date the statue was erected is unclear, analysis of old photographs of the shopping street indicates that the statue was erected post-2007. Radić was a Croatian politician during the early Twentieth Century before being assassinated by a Montenegrin Serb politician, Puniša Račić, in 1928. During his political career, Radić founded the Croatian People's Peasant Party who advocated for Croatian independence and was opposed to the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and advocated for Croatian autonomy (Lampe, 2000 p. 80; pp.111-112). In 1919, he was arrested and imprisoned for 11 months after passing a resolution stating that the Croatian people do not recognise the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After his release, Radić continued to

promote and advocate for Croatian independence, whilst abstaining from political processes. This garnered his support amongst the Croatian people. Throughout the 1920s, Radić was arrested a number of times and made various attempts at forming coalitions to increase Croatian autonomy in the Kingdom which led to him receiving a number of death threats and, finally, being assassinated in 1928. The assassination of Radić saw him become a martyr for the struggle for the working class and Croatian independence (Grgić, 2018).

In the early 1990s, after the break-up of Yugoslavia, many monuments across Croatia were removed and erected in order to historically re-evaluate the cultural landscape to present Croatia as a historically rooted, independent Nation. This occurred alongside the changing of road names and squares to produce the same effect (Clancy, 2010). The statue of Radić was identified as an historical re-evaluation as the statue was erected sometime after 2007 and informs us that Zagreb is making recent, conscious decisions to honour figures associated with Croatian independence. Whilst at a slower rate, the historical re-evaluation of Zagreb is continuing. Erecting a monument to a national hero who fought for independence in more recent times, endorses the historical re-evaluation of the 1990s, showing that Croatians continue to honour those who they identify as fighting for their independence and against Serbian hegemony which, in turn, feeds Nationalist revivals.

The statue is another example of a site that is targeted at local citizens, of which, 90% of sites in Zagreb, captured in this study, are targeted as such. Erecting a new statue in a prominent place in the city centre, aimed primarily at local citizens indicates that in the current society, Croatia deems it important to honour historic figures that represent Croatia's fight for independence. In addition, chapter five indicates that this is a common way for countries to present their current values, with 57% of Zagreb's sites focusing on a person or group,

consistent with the view across all cities, which focus on a person or group in 54% of instances.



Figure 27. Stjepan Radić statue, Zagreb.

(Clancy, 2016)

Arheološki Muzej u Zagrebu (Archaeological Museum in Zagreb)

During previous study researching the cultural heritage of post-war Croatia, I discussed the way in which Croatia was historically re-evaluating the exhibits at the Arheološki Muzej u Zagrebu (Archaeological Museum in Zagreb) in order to endorse the legitimacy of the Croatian nation, ‘placing the Croatian exhibition between the Egyptian exhibitions seems to endorse the legitimacy of the Croatian history as it is set amongst possibly the most well-known and accepted civilisation in ancient history’ (Clancy, 2010). More recent field study at the museum identified that the historical re-evaluation process is continuing. Upon entering the museum, staff direct the visitor in how best to navigate the museum, by starting on the top

level, much like Terror Háza above. Similarly, to the 2010 presentation of the museum, the top level presents Croatian Vučedol culture side-by-side the exhibition on ancient Egypt. Vučedol culture is named after the Vučedol Dove, an artefact excavated from an archaeological site near Vukovar in eastern Croatia. By emphasising the ‘development and sequence of cultures in the prehistoric period in historically Croatian regions’ (AMZ, 2019) this legitimises Croatia’s borders and nationhood. This is further strengthened by the focus on Vukovar, a city which saw some of the most intense fighting between Croats and Serbs during the break-up of Yugoslavia. This suggests that the museum exhibitions are being used to historically re-evaluate the cultural heritage of Croatia, disassociating itself from Serbian culture and legitimising its claims over previously disputed towns.

This is further evident on the second floor of the museum, which focuses on Rome’s influence on Croatia, drawing Croatia closer to eastern and central Europe. The first floor of the museum presents an exhibition on Iberian culture. This takes the visitor even further west. Whether the intention is conscious or subconscious, the presentation of the archaeological museum uses the exhibits to take the visitor from the border with Serbia, where Croatian legitimacy is established, through Vučedol Culture, in a progressively eastward direction. For the tourist visiting the museum, this historically re-evaluates the history of Croatia to associate the country less with its Eastern and former Yugoslavian neighbours and more with Western Europe. Much like the historical re-evaluation of the name of the square at Meštrovićev Paviljon, this shows us that museum exhibits can be used as an agent of change to influence perceptions of history to both citizens and tourists. This is evidenced by the quantitative analysis detailed in chapter five, which shows that the Archaeological Museum is one of just 18% of sites in Zagreb, captured within this study, that have additional literature at

the site, and one of 19% of sites in Zagreb that are presented in a language other than the native one.

Glas Hrvatske Źrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain)



Figure 28. Wreaths in front of Zid Boli, Mirogoj Cemetery, Zagreb.

(Clancy, 2016)

Glas Hrvatske Źrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain) is a monument situated in Zagreb's Mirogoj Cemetery that was named after the pain of the mothers and relatives whose family members were killed or missing during the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. It was originally built in 1993 as a memorial and as 'an appeal for humanity and human rights address to the UN' (CHN, 2006). The wall was built from bricks with the names of those who died or were missing written on the outside (Tanner, 2001, p. 281). The bricks were then placed outside a building in Zagreb where the UN Peace

Mission to Croatia had their headquarters. People would light candles and place flowers at the scene. In 2005 the original wall was removed to Mirogoj Cemetery in Zagreb, against the wishes of those who built the original wall (Raos, 2012, p. 360). Some of the original bricks formed part of a larger, state-sanctioned monument called 'Voice of Croatian Victims - Wall of Pain.' This monument was a much larger, dark stone structure, containing the names of Croatians who died or went missing during the break -up of Yugoslavia. There is a wall at the back of the monument made up of a small number of the original bricks. The new monument also features moveable objects, such as candles and a stand, suggesting the site is also being used for speeches or commemorations (figure 28).

Whilst the original structure was deemed to be unstable and would have required some reconstruction and protection, many wanted it to remain in situ as it was believed that moving the site would erase its symbolism (Raos, 2012, p. 386). Despite this, the government wanted to formalise the monument and control the narrative and removed the bricks from everyday view. The site was identified as an historical re-evaluation largely for this reason, the conscious nature by which the government appropriated its own citizen's memorial. The monument has been historically re-evaluated as an attempt for the government to control the way citizens view the recent war, to alter the cultural memory. By removing the bricks from everyday life and putting them into a cemetery, the government is showing that the memory of the war is personal and does not need to be viewed by the outside world. However, the forgetting may have inadvertently spread to Croatian citizens as Raos describes the site as 'an important, yet nowadays largely forgotten, site of memory from the Croatian Homeland War,' (2012, p. 353). The significance of this site to the Croatian government and historic narrative can be seen, both in its appropriation, and in this site being one of the relatively small number of sites referencing the recent Homeland War (26%), where a site references a war or

revolution. In addition, the monument has been moved from a location that, whilst outside the city centre, was a busy location frequented by local citizens, to another site outside the city centre, inside Mirogoj Cemetery, where visitors would not naturally pass without a need to visit the cemetery. This emphasises that the drive to remove the memorial was not to remove it from the view of tourists, but to control the narrative of the local population.

Ban Josip Jelačić Statue

Sitting in the middle of Trg bana Josipa Jelačića (Ban Josip Jelačić Square) is an equestrian statue depicting the square's namesake (figure 29). Josip Jelačić was a mid-Nineteenth Century Ban of Croatia, known for his military campaigns and for abolishing the feudal system in Croatia (Tanner, 2001, p. 86). Shortly after his death in 1859, his statue was erected in the square that had been named in his honour two decades earlier. Despite this, Jelačić was not a universally popular figure within Croatia and, when Tito came to power after World War Two, the statue was hidden from view before being removed entirely (Walton, 2020, p. 694). Being viewed as a Nationalist character, Jelačić statues across Croatia suffered a similar fate, with some being covered up with Socialist iconography (Walton, 2020, p. 694). However, by 1990, the same year the first free elections were held in Croatia and the Nationalist party won, the statue was reinterred in the square.

This statue was identified as an historical re-evaluation due to the use of the statue to alter the reputation of an historic figure. Despite not being a particularly popular figure in the aftermath of his death, his removal during the Yugoslav period appears to have elevated Jelačić to the position of national hero. The act of reintering the monument so soon after Croatian Nationalists came to power historically disassociated Croatia from the Socialist

period and re-evaluates Jelačić's legacy as a national hero, one that is honoured more today than when he was alive or in the immediate aftermath of his death. This is echoed by Walton (2020, p. 696) who, as recently as 2017, witnessed the statue adorned with flags, candles and references to Jelačić as hero.



Figure 29. Statue of Ban Josip Jelačić, Zagreb.

(Clancy, 2015)

Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park)

Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park) is a monument park situated towards the outskirts of Zagreb. The park was founded in 1963 on the site of the execution of an estimated 7,000 anti-Fascists at the hand of the Ustaše during World War Two. The aim of the park was to commemorate the victims of Fascism in Zagreb and, within the park, several monuments

were built. There were plans to continue building and develop the site, however plans were put on hold in 1990 and have not commenced since. Today, the site appears to be used primarily by dog walkers and runners, however, there have been a small number of initiatives to commemorate anti-fascists at the park in more recent times. The park now appears neglected and overgrown, and you can see evidence of recent fascist graffiti on some of the monuments.

Monuments at the park include dedications such as, Spomen-Obilježje Revolucionarima i Domoljubima Poginulima u Zagrebu (Memorial to revolutionaries and patriots who fell in Zagreb from 1919 to 1941) and Aleja Hrvatskih Branitelja (Alley of Croatian veterans), dedicated to those anti-Fascists executed by the Ustaše during WWII. The park does not appear to be well maintained, somewhat neglected, similarly to other monuments dedicated to anti-Fascist, such as the bust of Ivo Lola Ribar, discussed in the following chapter. This is also reflected in the treatment Vojin Bakic, who was a well-respected sculptor who was contracted to build the monuments in the park. He is one of Croatia's most famous sculptors and would be expected to be celebrated, particularly after his death. Instead, his house in Zagreb is neglected, much like the park, and stands out from all the houses on the street, left to rot and decay. In addition, several of his works were either vandalised or removed in the 1990s. This indicates that it is not just the physical manifestations of an ideology, such as a monument, that may be removed or neglected post-political change, there is a desire to forget the person who designed the monuments.

Similarly, to Szoborpark (Memento Park) in Budapest, discussed above, this site has fallen victim to a change in the political climate. Initially designed to commemorate victims of Fascism, the site was still being built when plans to develop the site further were halted as the Nationalist government came into power, post-1990. Whilst it is understandable that development ceased during the break-up of Yugoslavia, the fact that the development did not

re-commence provides us with an insight into the political climate of Croatia post 1990.

According to news, as recently as April 2016, ‘the site of the biggest mass crime in Zagreb’s history was desecrated with fascists graffiti,’ (*EBLNews*, 2016) leading to a plea from local groups asking for the government to condemn the acts. The site was identified as a subtle historical re-evaluation due to this neglect. By failing to finish or maintain the site, the historical narrative has changed from the Socialist period when anti-Fascists were heroes. Today, whilst the monuments are not being removed, their neglect suggest an ambivalence at best to those who represent the anti-Fascist movement.

Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park) is one of 31% of sites in Zagreb, captured within this study, that have been altered over time, as referenced in chapter five. In this example, the site has changed through both neglect and vandalism. Chapter five also identified that, of the sites within this study that have been vandalised, 53% of those are found in Zagreb. This indicates that sites such as Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park), do not breed that same level of respect as site relating to other ideologies, or the same level of respect Budapest or Berlin may have to ideologies that are no longer practised today.

6.4 CONCLUSION

This analysis has identified a number of themes running through the treatment of tangible assets across the three, central European capital cities. One of these themes is the relationships of power being played out using the built environment. The desire of the governments to control the narrative of the countries and cities through the use of cultural heritage and

tangible assets can be seen in the changing name of the square in which Meštrovićev Paviljon (Meštrović Pavilion) sits. Each regime has attempted to control the narrative by changing the square's name to alter cultural memory and ignore aspects of history they do not wish to acknowledge. Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie (Checkpoint Charlie Museum) is equally leveraging its position as an established tourist attraction as well as its busy location in Berlin's city centre, to share its political stance and influence as many Germans and tourists as possible, perhaps with the hope that it will increase the power and influence of its activist causes.

Another theme emerging through the analysis is that cultural heritage and tangible assets are often used as an agent of change, particularly during political change. It can be seen throughout each of the cities that heritage is used, not necessarily to represent what the country is, but to represent what the country is not. This appears to manifest in a country reversing the actions of a particular group. For example, the Communist version of the Kossuth monument in Budapest was rebuilt in a previous style. This is also seen in Berlin, where the Berlin Wall has acted as an agent of change for Berlin to move from a city of division, to 'The City of Freedom' (*Berlin Tourismus & Kongress GmbH*, 2017). Meštrovićev Paviljon further shows us that some sites appear to be strategic, as they have been used as an agent of change over a number of years. Since 1927, numerous changes have been made to both the building and the name of the square in which the building sits. Each change can be seen as acting as an agent of change to support political transition or to influence outside observers, such as the European Union.

The historical re-evaluation of Zagreb's city centre, erecting a statue of Stjepan Radić post-2007, can indicate the political direction of travel within a country, as well as indicate continuing Nationalist revivals. The statue was erected over ten years after the country

became independent and the war with Serbia ended, yet the country felt compelled to erect a statue to a man who opposed Serbian rule and was ultimately assassinated by a Montenegrin Serb. Victimhood is another theme that has emerged, primarily in Budapest, where cultural heritage is used to present Hungarians as victims of terror regimes, supporting the anti-Soviet stance taken at sites such as Terror Háza (House of Terror) and Corvin Mozi (Corvin Cinema).

This study will continue with the analysis of sites through the lenses of history gaps in order to support the emergent themes and identify additional themes in the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets in central European capital cities.

7. HISTORY GAPS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter discussed a number of sites through the lens of historical re-evaluation. This identified themes emerging from the study, some of which will be further strengthened in this chapter, with others identified. This chapter will look at the lens of history gaps, looking at how the lens manifests itself within each city, the prevalence of history gaps in each city, in addition to reviewing several sites in each city through this lens.

In chapter four the study outlined the definition of history gaps as a lens for analysis. This lens identifies sites where a tangible asset has been intentionally altered in order to steer a particular narrative, creating a gap in the historic timeline. This disassociates a city or place with a particular period in history, regime or ideology which is used to strengthen the agenda of the current government or group initiating the change. Whilst the result is a potential manipulation of the historic timeline, the reasons behind the change and how this informs us of the current political and cultural climate of a place may differ. Themes will emerge showing the different intentions behind the various changes and this will be discussed in the conclusion to this chapter. For example, it will be shown that Zagreb and Budapest are using their tangible assets to support Nationalist claims and promote their own victim status, whereas Berlin uses its tangible assets to promote the victim status of others. This is supported by the spreadsheet analysis which shows that, of the 28 sites in Berlin that explicitly reference victims, 0% refer to Germans/Germany as victims. Whilst Zagreb and

Budapest have less sites explicitly referencing victims, when they do, they almost exclusively refer to the country or citizens as victims (67% of cases in Zagreb and 83% of cases in Budapest).

This chapter will progress with a summary of the ways in which history gaps manifests itself in each of the cities, before discussing the prevalence of history gaps in comparison to each city.

7.2 HISTORY GAPS IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN CAPITAL CITIES

Most often, in Berlin, history gaps manifest in the form of the government driving an agenda to make the city centre appear more historic and disassociated from the Communist past. This is evident in the changing of road names and in the treatment of several monuments and buildings. Of the five sites captured in the spreadsheet (appendix A) that sit on Unter den Linden, the main road through the city centre, three can be considered to create a history gap and one is a temporary exhibition dedicated to one of the other sites. In addition, since the end of World War Two, many of the buildings along the road have been reconstructed or restored from what the Berlin tourist website describes as ‘little more than a wasteland of rubble’ (*Visit Berlin*, 2020). Despite the original damage to the buildings and road, today, Unter den Linden looks like an historic road that has continuity with the period in which the buildings were originally built.

History gaps also appear to manifest differently, at times, across East and West Berlin. Examples of road name changes in Berlin over time are noted below. The examples identified suggest that Communist road names in East Berlin are more likely to have been changed post-reunification. Whilst this might seem obvious, as there were many more Communist-themed road names in East Berlin, there are road names in West Berlin, related to Communism and Socialism that have not been changed. For example, since 1989 Karl Marx Allee (Karl Marx Avenue) in East Berlin was changed yet, Karl Marx Platz (Karl Marx Place) and Karl Marx Straße (Karl Marx Street) in West Berlin have not been renamed. This suggests that, in Berlin, it is more important to neutralise the memory of Communism in East Berlin, than in the West of the city. However, it should be noted that in neither half of Berlin is Communist memory erased to the extent of Budapest, discussed later in the chapter.

Another difference between East and West Berlin is the style of the road name changes. The examples show us that many names in East Berlin revert back to or are given a name relating to a place or object. For example, what was Wilhelm Pieck Straße (Wilhelm Pieck Street) in 1967 is now Torstraße (Gate Street). In West Berlin, the name changes tend to relate to people or groups of people. For example, what was Hermann Göring Straße (Hermann Göring Street) in 1945 is now Ebertstraße (Ebert Street) today.

Despite the Nazi era being one of shame for Germany, the city is not using its tangible assets to create history gaps and erase memory of this period. Instead, the city actively uses this period in order to drive Berlin's identity as a city of freedom, honouring the victims of Fascism in numerous memorials and museums. There is a prevalence of exhibitions in Berlin that are being used to advance this message with 21 exhibitions in Berlin, captured within this study, in comparison to 12 in Budapest and 8 in Zagreb (appendix A). This contrasts with both Zagreb and Budapest, which is discussed below.

The way in which history gaps manifest in Budapest has similarities to Berlin, however the approach is more explicit. The area outside Parliament in Budapest is currently being reconstructed as to appear how it did in 1945, before Communist influence on Hungary. This includes erecting replicas of previous monuments, such as the Kossuth Monument discussed below, in addition to landscaping and other cosmetic work. This shows a drive, across Budapest, to make the city appear more historic and promote continuity with a time before Communism. Monuments typically give cities an historic feel and in order to achieve this, Budapest leans heavily on the creation and reconstruction of monuments. Of monuments captured within this study, 48% are in Budapest and 38% were erected in the Twenty-first Century (where dates could be established).

The significance of monuments as a tangible asset for Budapest is evident in the mass removal of monuments relating to the Communist period. In addition to the creation and reconstruction of monuments above, Budapest is creating history gaps and proposing an alternative historic timeline by removing monuments relating to a period of time the country wishes to forget. This study found just one remaining Communist monument within Budapest's city centre, showing that the removal of Communist monuments post-1989 was not simply the natural development that might occur when a new political party is established, it was a conscious act to change history through the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. This is further supported by Budapest's tendency to erect new monuments on the same place as significant, now contentious monuments. Examples can be seen alongside Dózsa György útca (Dózsa György Street) and will be discussed below.

There is a contentious way in which history gaps manifest in Budapest that has seen protests from Hungarian citizens. This is the lack of acknowledgement for any involvement in Fascism during World War Two, in stark contrast to Berlin, referenced above. This is most

clearly articulated in the A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation), which has faced continued protest from citizens who erected a protest monument opposite the site, stating that the official monument falsifies history. This monument will be discussed in more detail below however, when viewed with other sites such as Terror Haza (House of Terror), which has an imbalanced presentation of two terror regimes, a pattern emerges. This pattern shows that Budapest does not acknowledge cooperation with Nazi Germany and sees itself as a victim of both the Nazis and Soviets.

History gaps manifest in Zagreb, at times, through the neglect of monuments relating to the Yugoslav period. There are examples, some of which will be discussed below, where a monument has been neglected or vandalised with no apparent attempt to repair the monument. Of the sites within this study that have been vandalised, 53% of these are found in Zagreb. These history gaps are less explicit than those seen in Budapest, where there have been efforts to eradicate Communist memory. Instead, Yugoslavian period monuments that were not removed or stolen during the break-up of Yugoslavia are ignored, such as in the case of Spomen-park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park), where a number of monuments within the park are in disrepair.

There is a consistent way in which history gaps manifest across each of the cities in this study, which is the use of reconstruction or repatriation of historic monuments to central locations in order to make the city centre appear more historic. In Zagreb, this can be seen in the repatriation of the equestrian statue of Ban Josip Jelačić to the square in his name after it was removed during the Yugoslav period. Where the difference lies is in the subtle nature of the history gaps in Zagreb in comparison to Budapest and Berlin. Zagreb did not have any large-scale building projects to reconstruct historic buildings or to create historic urban landscapes, such as on Unter den Linden, Berlin, or outside parliament in Budapest. The subtle neglect of

monuments in Zagreb is however consistent with the overall approach Zagreb appears to take in relation to its past and tangible assets. Unlike Berlin and Budapest, Zagreb does not actively promote its difficult past to tourists, having just one exhibition solely dedicated to the war which is not sign posted and is situated on a floor of an office block. This suggests that the Croatian approach to their past is more personal, which is echoed in the example of the site, Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain), discussed in the previous chapter.

The analysis below will show that, unlike historical re-evaluation, which is highly prevalent across each of the cities, the prevalence of history gaps varies considerably. In addition to this, the way in which history gaps are created also varies. This chapter will show that less history gaps were identified in Berlin, compared to Budapest and Zagreb. In general terms, Berlin presents and often promotes the scars of its history, even where Germany were the perpetrators. An example of this is the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, which spans a large area in central Berlin and is accompanied by an underground Information Centre. History gaps are most prevalent in Budapest, where there are numerous examples of former Communist heritage being removed. As well as having numerous examples, the ways in which history gaps are created in Budapest also varies. Budapest uses a combination of removing Communist heritage and placing new monuments on the site, rededicating former Soviet built monuments and reconstructing monuments so they are no longer in a Communist style. This indicates a conscious drive to forget the Communist period, and the drive appears as important today as it was in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Communism. The identification of history gaps in Zagreb, again differs to that of Berlin and Budapest. The chapter will show that, whilst a number of history gaps can be identified, it is primarily through the changes in road and square names. There are a small number of history gaps

relating to tangible assets and this may be due to events during and immediately after the break-up of Yugoslavia. During this period, Croatia saw large scale removal and vandalism to monuments related to the Socialist period. Therefore, the history gaps are less identifiable today, as evidence of their removal is often no longer visible.

This chapter will continue by analysing a number of sites across each city through the lens of history gaps. I will outline how each site was identified as a history gap and what insight it provides.

7.3 HISTORY GAPS INDIVIDUAL SITE ANALYSIS

7.3.1 Berlin

Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace)/Humboldtforum

The previous chapter discussed the re-building of the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) in Central Berlin through the lens of historical re-evaluation. Through looking at the full history of the site, it can also be suggested that this new building has created a history gap in the historic timeline of Berlin. Like many sites that will be discussed in this chapter, Berlin has removed evidence of Communist influence from this site, presenting a city that has continuity with more historic periods and distancing itself from Communist ideology. However, this site differs from others in that it is not an exact replica of an earlier site. The new Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) is largely a reconstruction of the original building however, the interior of the building will be constructed in a modern design. This indicates that the objective behind

the reconstruction is not solely to reconstruct a once loved and destroyed palace but that it is more important that the building looks historic and not Soviet, than to reconstruct the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) true to original form. This is supported through the analysis of the wider dataset (appendix A) which identifies thirteen additional sites across Berlin that have removed traces of Communism or presents Communism in a negative light.

The site was identified as a history gap due to the removal of the Communist Palast der Republic (Palace of the Republic) and the reconstruction of an earlier building. This creates a false continuity with the past for two reasons. Firstly, the original Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) cannot be replaced, and the new building can only represent a reconstruction of the past. In addition, the continuity is only perceived as it is not a full reconstruction. Yet, despite this, this historic and new building is heavily promoted, emphasising the belief that the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) is the building that holds the right to this location, not the Palast der Republic (Palace of the Republic). The site is also promoted on the official tourist website, despite not being completed. This is consistent with the approach Berlin has taken with other sites, whereby the majority are presented to tourist, in comparison to Budapest and Zagreb, where the majority of sites are directed at the local community. This is supported by the analysis outlined in chapter five, that identified that 44% of Berlin's sites, captured within this study, are on the official tourist website. This is in comparison to Budapest and Zagreb, where just 12% and 13% of sites are on the official tourist website, respectively.

Changing Road Names

A pattern that is seen across many countries after war or political transition is an exercise in re-naming streets, squares, and parks to remove traces of unwanted past. My previous

research looking at the reconstruction of cultural heritage in Croatia, since the break-up of Yugoslavia, identified multiple examples of road name being changed. Many road names were changed to remove reference to Socialism or Communism. Typically, they were replaced with the names of historic Croatian figures and Croatian towns and cities (Clancy, 2010). Berlin is no exception and saw a large-scale renaming drive after reunification, ‘streets and places that had been named after political events, Stalinist or Communist persons’ (Jaeger, 2012, p. 82-83) became either their pre-1933 name or were given a different, more historic, name. ‘As early as November 1990, a list of about 230 proposed names had already been chosen by the “Street Renaming” working group,’ (Harmsen, 1991). Places that were once named after Communist leaders have since been changed and given more politically neutral names, the above two examples being named after towns in Germany, despite objections from local citizens (Harmsen, 1991). The changing of road names is identified as a history gap as it indicates that the re-unified German government was attempting to remove all trace of its Communist past through the re-naming of roads, squares, and landmarks. This creates a gap in the historic timeline for outside observers and younger generations.

Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses)

The Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) memorial (figures 30 and 31) is a memorial in Berlin that sits across two sites. The memorial itself features white crosses bearing the names of those who died trying to cross the River Spree during the division of East and West Germany. The original location of the memorial is along one of the outside fences of Tiergarten, near to the Reichstag building. Here, thirteen white crosses are attached to the fence, alongside photographs, newspaper cutting and written passages expressing their political views. One

such newspaper clipping, dated 2009 reads, “Amt will mauertoten-kreuze vor dem reichstag abreißen” (Office wants to demolish wall dead-crosses in front of the Reichstag). This appears to have been in response to the plans to move the crosses to a new site, mentioned above. The original crosses were not moved however, a duplicate site was established and sits on the bank of the River Spree and features eight crosses, inscribed on both sides.



Figure 30. The original White Cross memorial, Berlin.




Figure 31. The new White Cross memorial, Berlin.

(Clancy, 2015)

(Clancy, 2015)

The site was identified as a history gap due to the German government appropriating the original monument, identifying an intent to take control of this narrative. This has the potential to create a history gap by ignoring the experience of those who established the original memorial. In addition, a perceived history gap has been created in the display of the crosses. This is due to both sides of the crosses being used to present the names of victims, yet the crosses are positioned on the bank, overlooking the River Spree, making it less likely for the names facing the river to be read.

The significance of this site is further emphasised by it being one of the few sites captured within this study that have been appropriated by the government for their own purpose. However, the reason behind the governments appropriation of this site may be different to the intentions of other sites, such as the Croatian government's appropriation of Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain), discussed in chapter six. In chapter five, it was identified that Berlin has the highest number of sites altered over time at 37%, compared to Budapest (25%) and Zagreb (31%). When reviewing the types of alterations present in Berlin, it can be seen that the majority are associated with changing use, developments and expansions. Therefore, the appropriation of the Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) memorial appears to be due to wider development projects, rather than for symbolic or political reasons.

Neue Wache (New Guardhouse)

This guard house on Unter den Linden, in Berlin, has undergone multiple changes since it was first built in the early 19th Century. Throughout its history, the building has held various monuments inside and each time a new power occupied the site, the building was altered and re-dedicated, but it was always re-used as a monument. This is interesting and unlike other monuments that may be taken down when an occupying power takes over, such as the removal of Communist statues along Dózsa György útca (Dózsa György Street), in Budapest, which is discussed later in the chapter. At Neue Wache (New Guardhouse), the Nazis, Soviets, and the re-unified German government have all re-appropriated the site to fit their own purpose. Rather than remove the site, it is simply altered and re-named with the intention to change how the site is viewed.

Neue Wache (New Guardhouse) (figure 32) was identified as a history gap due to this continued re-dedication, where each regime attempts to remove traces of the previous regime through the use of the site. Originally designed as a memorial to those ‘who had fallen in the Napoleonic Wars and the Wars of Liberation’ (*Visit Berlin*, 2019) it was re-dedicated in 1931 to honour victims of World War One. During the Nazi period, Neue Wache (New Guardhouse) was used to hold Heldengedenktage (Day of Commemoration of Heroes) and was subsequently changed by the East German government to memorialise victims of Fascism and Militarism. Finally, in 1993 the site was re-dedicated to its current form as Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Victims of War and Dictatorship (*Visit Berlin*, 2019). In addition to the re-dedications, the most recent form of the site is said to be reminiscent of its 1920s form (Michalski, 1998, p. 92), skipping over almost 100 years of history and further supporting the identification of the site as a history gap.



Figure 32. Neue Wache, Berlin

(Clancy, 2015)

Post-Unification Redevelopment of Unter den Linden (Under the Linden Trees)

In addition to viewing individual sites through the lens of history gaps, it is possible to view a landscape or collection of sites through the lens. The post-reunification development of Unter den Linden (Under the Linden Trees), one of the main arterial roads in Berlin, is one such example. During the post-World War Two period, Unter den Linden (Under the Linden Trees) sat in the Eastern quarter of Berlin. With the Brandenburg Gate at the far west of the street, Unter den Linden was one of the gateways between East and West Berlin. Many buildings on Unter den Linden (Under the Linden Trees) had been badly damaged as a result of World War Two and in the aftermath of the war 'Berlin's planners and historic preservationists struggled with limited success to secure funding for provisional repairs to secure historic buildings against weather damage and looting' (Stangl, 2006, p. 354). However, over time, the East German government was able to restore a number of historic buildings, including building new structures such as Palast der Republik, the building which housed the East German government.

This chapter has discussed a number of individual sites on Unter den Linden (Under the Linden Trees) that can be identified as history gaps, such as Neue Wache (New Guardhouse) and the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace)/Humboldtforum. Each of these sites have been altered, developed, or erected in order to refer back to more historic times and remove the Communist period from the cultural heritage and tangible assets of Berlin. When viewed collectively, it seems that there is a concerted effort to make central Berlin appear more historic through the removal of cultural heritage and tangible assets that represent the Communist period on Unter den Linden (Under the Linden Trees), in addition to reconstructing and re-dedicating monument dating back to pre-World War Two periods. This

creates a gap in the timeline of Unter den Linden (Under the Linden Trees) where, today, it is difficult to find any visual reminders of the Communist period.

7.3.2 Budapest

Reconstructed monument to Gyula Andrassy



Figure 33. Statue of Gyula Andrassy, Budapest

(Clancy, 2016)

In the main square outside the Hungarian parliament building lies a newly erected monument (figure 33), officially opened after a small ceremony in 2016. The monument is dedicated to former Prime Minister Gyula Andrassy, who stood in office in the late 19th Century. The monument is built in an historic style, reminiscent of 19th Century equestrian monuments that can be seen across Europe. According to local newspapers, this statue is a reconstruction cast

from an original statue that stood in the same spot in 1904 (*mno.hu*, 2015) and that this is the final piece in the efforts to complete ‘the process of restoring the pre-1944 look of the Square’ (*Budapest[inc]*, 2016).

This is a conscious effort by the Hungarian government to remove all traces of Communist influence from the square and to reconstruct the square as though the Communist period did not happen. This can be further seen in the replacement of a monument to Lajos Kossuth, Nineteenth Century President of Hungary, with an earlier monument to Lajos Kossuth, due to the former monument being erected in a Communist style. This was discussed in the previous chapter as an historical re-evaluation, but can also be viewed as a history gap, due to the erasure of the Communist-period history of the monument. Whilst the square outside Parliament is largely a pre-Communist period reconstruction, there are some new additions in the square. One of which are staircases to a memorial to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and to the Museum of Ethnology. The purpose of these changes appears to be two-fold. Firstly, the square has been historically re-evaluated to create a history gap, removing the Communist history from view. Secondly, the new additions to the square outside Parliament form statement of how Hungary sees themselves today. The 1956 memorial declares the revolution against the Soviets central to their identity and portrays the Soviets in a negative light. This is consistent across many sites in Budapest. Of the sites in Budapest where a group is explicitly portrayed negatively, 62.5% portray Communism negatively, 25% are protests monuments against the current government and 12.5% portray Fascism negatively. In addition, 87.5% of all sites are located within the city centre, in busy locations.

The monument to Gyula Andrásy and the rest of the reconstruction outside Parliament, was identified as a history gap due to the explicit nature in which Communist sites are removed and pre-1945 monuments recast and erected in their original place. This creates a clear history

gap for those visiting who would not see any obvious indication that the square looked different between 1945-1989. The significance of this history gap to the Hungarian government can be seen in one of the patterns that emerged from the quantitative analysis, outlined in chapter five. This analysis identified that Budapest holds the smallest percentage of sites, captured within this study, that have been altered in some way over time, at 25%. Many of these changes are in the form of formal adornments at sites, such as wreaths. However, the reconstructed monument of Gyula Andrásy, much like the Kossuth Monument discussed in chapter six, are examples that are significant enough to the Hungarian government to have to change or reinter. This suggests that the memory of Gyula Andrásy is one that the government wishes to keep alive today.

Bust of Miklós Horthy

The entrance to the Református Egyházközség A hazatérés temploma (Church of Returning Home) in Budapest's Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) features several busts and monuments on display to visitors and passers-by. The central monument is a bust of Former Prime Minister Miklós Horthy, along with a small bronze plaque with the word *Trianon*. In recent years Budapest has seen a revival in the cult of Horthy and Trianon, with the latter referring to the 1920 Treaty of Trianon which cut Hungarian territory down to approximately one third of its former size. During his reign, 'attempts to revoke Trianon dominated Horthy's domestic and foreign policies, assuming material form in numerous monuments' (Kinchin, 2012, p. 21). Many of these monuments were removed during the Soviet era but, since 1989, the cult of Horthy and Trianon has resurfaced with some Nationalists mourning the loss of territory even today. There were formally four statues in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) representing

the four territories ceded to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania (Kinchin, 2012, pp. 24-25). There have been efforts since 1989 to restore these removed and lost monuments, which has not been successful. The erection of a bust of Horthy in memory to the loss of Trianon can be seen as a response to this, as some parties have been unsuccessful in obtaining approval to erect a Trianon monument on public space. Instead, a monument has been erected in a private space overlooking the public space. It is seen as inflammatory by some and an attempt 'to counter the historical death of the nation and retain an imaginative hold on heritage suddenly placed beyond Hungary's geographical boundaries' (Kinchin, 2012, p. 23). By reviving the cult of Horthy and Trianon, a political history gap is created suggesting that Hungary should revert back to its 1920s borders indicating that, territorially, some do not recognise the period since Horthy's reign or feel it is unjust. Whilst the Horthy statue is in a private space, a level of support for him can be established due to the statue being located in a prominent location in Budapest and the statue being accompanied by a double-barred cross, erected by right-wing Hungarian political party, Jobbik. As noted in chapter five, 13% of sites in Budapest, captured within this study, are established by individuals or groups of individuals. This suggests that it is not common for individuals to establish sites, yet the desire to honour Horthy in such a busy location was great enough to warrant the effort to erect the bust.

Monuments along Dózsa György útca (Dózsa György Street)

Dózsa György útca (Dózsa György Street) is a road that runs alongside the southern edge of Városliget (City Park). During the Communist period, the site was built as a parade route and there were several Communist statues running along Dózsa György útca (Dózsa György

Street). In order to make way for the parade route, a church named the Regnum Marianum, was razed and a monument was subsequently erected in its place, in addition to a number of other monuments along the route. Since 1989, other Soviet monuments have been removed and gradually replaced with sites representing an opposing message to those of the Soviet monuments. Post-1989, there have been a number of other changes along this route. In place of a former statue of Stalin now sits the official memorial to the 1956 Hungarian revolution (figure 34). Where a statue of Lenin once stood is now a large Timewheel, erected to commemorate Hungary joining the European Union. The changes along Dózsa György útca serve to create political history gaps by removing all traces of Soviet influence and replacing them with monuments that better reflect the politics of Hungary in more recent times. In addition, it undermines the memory of the Communist period by establishing new monuments in their place, ensuring they cannot return.



Figure 34. Memorial to the 1956 Hungarian revolution, Budapest.

(Clancy, 2016)

Erected in 2004, as of 2016, the Timewheel monument that is dedicated to Hungary joining the European Union is damaged and appears neglected. This is unlike the other monuments along this parade, and within the park, that appear to be kept in good condition. The Timewheel sits with the same broken glass and damage witnessed at least one year apart, which may be further reflecting the current political climate that has seen a rise in popularity of right-wing political parties such as Jobbik, a right-wing political party who received 20.5% of the votes in the last parliamentary election (Kovács, 2014). This suggests that a monument representing Hungarian association with the European Union is not a memory or a message that the Hungarian government wishes to portray, as there appears to be no effort to repair the monument.

The sites along Dózsa György (Dózsa György Street) útca were identified as history gaps due to the explicit removal of Soviet monuments which were then replaced by monuments representing more current Hungarian identity. By erecting new monuments on the site of the original monuments, it emphasises their deletion from the historic timeline of Budapest. In addition to the removal of monuments alongside Dózsa György útca (Dózsa György Street), name changes accompanied this act, further strengthening the desire to remove all traces of Soviet influence. For example, the new 1956 memorial sits in 56-osok tere (56 Square), which was known as Ötvenhatosok tere (Procession Square) during the Soviet period.

A Német Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the Victims of German Occupation)

As referenced earlier in the chapter, the A Német Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the Victims of German Occupation) in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) (figure

35) is a monument erected in recent years in a prominent location in central Budapest. The monument has been faced with protests even before the monument was inaugurated in 2014. The monument is dedicated to the victims of the Nazis in Hungary during World War Two and, like Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain), that was discussed in the previous chapter, was apparently completed under the cover of darkness (Kovács & Mindler-Steiner, 2015, p. 58). Since it was built, the monument has been accompanied by a protest monument opposite the site. The protest monument features a narrow path of personal objects belonging to people who suffered at the hands of the Nazis, as well as stones bearing names and a statement, in various languages, declaring the original monument to be one of falsifying history.



Figure 35. Memorial to the Victims of German Occupation, Budapest

(Clancy, 2015)

The monument has continued to become a political tool with opposition leaders declaring they would tear down the monument if they came into power. The contentious nature of the monument stems from its claim that Hungary were victims of German occupation during World War Two, despite Hungary being allies with Nazi Germany in the early stages of the War. Those opposed to the monument state that the current Hungarian government is attempting to delete that period from history and present Hungary as victims. Evidence of further contention at the site was seen during a visit in 2016, when stickers representing the right-wing political party, Jobbik, were added along the protest memorial. This suggests an additional narrative being played at the site, between right-wing voices and local citizens.

This site was identified as a history gap due to the perceived unwillingness of the Hungarian government to acknowledge its part in World War Two as cooperating with both the Allied and Axis powers at different stages of the war. This indicates that the Hungarian government are attempting to use the creation of heritage to control the country's historical narrative. This is echoed in an article by Foote, Tóth & Árvay, who write that 'Hungary and elsewhere destroy shrines, efface monuments, and eliminate commemorative traditions as they gain power and attempt to impress their own vision of history on the landscape and social life' (2000, p. 307). As discussed in chapter five, sites in Budapest reference a war or revolution in 27% of instances. Whilst this is the lowest number across the cities, it is a sizeable percentage and indicates that Hungary often uses war or revolutions to build cultural memory. In this case, Hungary is using a monument to reference the German occupation of Hungary towards the end of World War Two as a tool to present the country as a victim.

Szabadság-szobor (Liberty Statue)



Figure 36. Liberty Statue, Gellert Hill, Budapest.

(Clancy, 2015)

Based at the top of Gellért Hill, Budapest, this large monument features three statues, the largest of which is a bronze statue of a female form holding a large palm leaf. The statue was originally erected in remembrance of Soviet soldiers who liberated Hungary from Nazi occupation, with the original inscription in both Hungarian and Russian translating as, ‘To the memory of the liberating Soviet heroes [erected by] the grateful Hungarian people [in] 1945.’ Post 1989, rather than remove the monument, as happened with the majority of Communist statues, the monument was kept in situ with an amended inscription. The current inscription, now solely in Hungarian is translated as, ‘To the memory of those all who sacrificed their lives for the independence, freedom, and prosperity of Hungary’ (figure 36).

This site was identified as a history gap due to the adaptation of the monument to remove traces of Soviet influence. Whilst the statue was not removed in its entirety, this may be due to the scale and location of the monument, making its removal difficult and expensive, leading to ‘complex renegotiation of historical meanings, rather than any wholesale destruction of shrines’ (Foote, Tóth & Árvay, 2000, p. 329). Regardless, the intention is the same as the removal of a monument, to erase the Soviet period and disassociate Hungary’s tangible assets from the ideology of Communism.

Missing Statue on Jászai Mari tér (Jászai Mari Square)

As discussed throughout this study, post-1989, Hungary removed a number of statues and monuments that represented an ideology that the country no longer wished to be associated with. On a number of occasions, the statues and monuments were removed and replaced with something more representative of Hungary after the fall of Communism. Each of these examples, such as the monuments along Dózsa György útca (Dózsa György Street) discussed above, create history gaps due to the removal of monuments that represent a particular period in history. The same can be said for instances where a statue or monument was removed and remains a gap in the visual landscape. An example of this can be seen in Jászai mari tér, a square in central Budapest, north of Parliament.

In a prominent position, overlooking the river Danube is a base that once held a statue of German Socialist philosophers Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels are associated with Communist writings and political parties. After 1990, the statue was removed and eventually placed in Szoborpark (Memento Park) (Réthly, 2010, p. 17), discussed in the previous chapter. Since then, the space has remained empty, and it is clear to the observer that

something is missing from the base that remains. Whilst the intention to remove the monument may be the same as other examples, discussed above, this site is different in that the base was left empty for around two decades, suggesting the desire to remove Communist and Socialist history is greater than the desire to represent other time periods. As noted in chapter five, sites in Budapest that were captured within this study are altered in some way in 25% of cases. This is one such case, however, this site is unique in that an obvious gap remain in the landscape. This suggests that it is not usual practice, further emphasising the potential significance of removing the memory of those associated with Communism, such as Marx and Engels.

7.3.3 Zagreb

Arheološki Muzej u Zagrebu (Archaeological Museum in Zagreb)

Discussed as an historical re-evaluation in the previous chapter, the Arheološki Muzej u Zagrebu (Archaeological Museum in Zagreb) can also be viewed as a series of history gaps. The museum presents Croatian history as one descending from Vučedol culture, which is contemporaneous with the Old Kingdom of Egypt and is central European in origin. The museum mentions other ethnic groups who settled in Croatia over time however, when Slavic people are mentioned, the museum indicates that even they are mostly Croatian, with a brief mention of ‘immigration of the Southern Slavs, predominantly Croats’ (AMZ, 2017). In discussing some of the reasons for this approach to museum management, Domic and Boukas reference 1960s romanticised Nationalism among radical Croatian intellectuals and the diaspora who created a ‘national (a linguistic/historical national) framework... they are the

basis for current frontier claims' (2015, p. 5). By picking up where they left off Croatia is using their museums to revive the 1960s dreams and erase 50 years of history.

Domic and Boukas discuss how 'Croatian museums during the post-civil-war era have played a significant role in the reconstruction of an acceptable national identity which was displayed as being free of all Serb historical influences,' (2015, p. 2). Arheološki Muzej u Zagrebu (Archaeological Museum in Zagreb) appears to be following the same pattern, creating history gaps through a Nationalist agenda. As mentioned above, the museum claims Croatian's descended from Vučedol culture, the archaeological site of which is located South of Vukovar, a town in Eastern Croatia that borders Serbia and saw some of the worst fighting during the break-up of Yugoslavia. The site is also where the Vučedol dove ceramic was excavated, with the dove now featuring on Croatian bank notes. The museum appears to be using archaeology to create history gaps and legitimise Croatian independence. It was identified in chapter five that just 13% of sites in Zagreb that are captured within this study are promoted through the official tourist website. This suggests that, whilst Zagreb does not routinely promote all of its cultural heritage and tangible assets, those that are promoted are those with a narrative Zagreb most wishes to portray to tourists. This supports the idea that Croatia wishes to portray itself as an independent nation to outside observers.

Trg bana Josipa Jelačića (Josip Jelačić Square)

As discussed earlier in the previous chapter, Josip Jelačić was Ban of Croatia and an army general in the mid-Nineteenth Century. The central square in Zagreb was named after him during his reign and a statue of him was erected in the square shortly after his death. His statue was removed in 1947 and the square re-named Trg Republike (Republic Square) due to

the Yugoslav government believing Ban Jelačić served foreign powers and was not fit to have Zagreb's main square named after him. Once Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1990, the newly formed democratic government reversed this act. In reversing the actions of the Yugoslav government, this made a statement to Croatia and the rest of the Former Yugoslavia that Croatia's declaration of independence was final. The government was showing that they intended on reversing the decisions made during the Yugoslav years and that they would restore Croatian heritage as they believed it should be, with all traces of Communism and Yugoslavia removed.

This site was identified as a history gap due to the use of cultural heritage and tangible assets to reverse history and present the square as it would have appeared pre-1947. Like many of the history gaps referenced in this chapter, this is particularly effective on outside observers, who may not know that the square spent almost half a century known as Trg Republike (Republic Square), without research. By attempting to remove the Yugoslav period from its historical timeline, the government appears to be attempting to strengthen outside support for its declaration of independence, showing Zagreb as a city full of Croatian, rather than Yugoslavian, heritage. The significance of this is supported by the findings in chapter five, which shows that, whilst 31% of sites in Zagreb are altered over time, the alteration is usually in the form of adornments and vandalism. What is less common, are changes to entire monuments that are removed, moved, or reinterred. This informs us that the memory of Ban Josip Jelačić, a figure who supported Nationalism, is particularly important to Croatia today. This is further supported by the monument being one of the relatively small percentage of sites in Zagreb, captured within this study, that appear on the official tourist website (13%).

Ivo Lola Ribar missing (and re-erected) bust

Born in 1916, Ivo Lola Ribar was a Yugoslav Communist politician and one of the founders of the Unified League of Anti-Fascist Youth of Yugoslavia. During his life, Ribar collaborated with Josip Broz Tito, who was then leader of the anti-Fascist Partisan movement. In 1943, Ribar was killed by a German bomb and was awarded the recognition of People's Hero of Yugoslavia in 1944. After his death, many road names and buildings throughout Yugoslavia were named after him. In the lead up to the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the political climate started to change to become more Nationalist. This led to Communist and anti-Fascist memory falling out of favour and many monuments and roads that were dedicated to this memory were removed or damaged (Niebyl, 2016). One of these monuments was a bust of Ribar (figure 37), which stood in Park dr. Franje Tuđmana (Franjo Tuđman Park) in Zagreb and was stolen at some point during the break-up of Yugoslavia.



Figure 37. Missing bust of Ivo Lola Ribar, Zagreb.

(Clancy, 2015)

This site was identified as a history gap as the removal of his bust, along with the removal of other monuments, creates a physical gap in the cultural landscape of Zagreb. By removing the bust, it appears there is an intention to delete Communist and anti-Fascist memory, creating a gap in the cultural timeline of Croatia. This history gap has been recognised by others within Croatia. In 2017, a replica bust of Ribar was re-erected in the same place as the original bust, despite some objections from local politicians. Milan Bandić, current Mayor of Zagreb who was in support of the move, stated ‘almost nobody in this country has the guts to speak about the positive side of the antifascist movement and Josip Broz Tito,’ (Pavlic, 2017). This example is consistent with the treatment of monuments throughout Croatia that represent the Yugoslav period. After the death of Tito, leader of Yugoslavia who led the Communist Partisans during World War Two, Niebyl writes that the estimate ‘number of destroyed or damaged partisan monuments to be around 3,000’ (2016, p. 8).

It was identified in chapter five that 3% of sites in Zagreb, captured within this study, explicitly reference heroes. This site is one of those small number and, therefore, the significance of removing his bust may be great. By removing the bust, this portrays a message that this anti-Fascist is not a hero and does not deserve to be honoured, which continues today for those who opposed the new bust being erected on the plinth.

Changing Road Names

Along with the removal of monuments relating to the Communist and anti-Fascist period, many road and square names were changed during and after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Whilst this study has not been able to identify exact dates for the changes in road names, through using a variety of source such as references in literature, and comparing maps of

different dates, it is seen that many of the changes in relation to the removal of Socialist or Yugoslav names occurred after 1990. Šakaja & Stanić suggest that as many as 474 street in Zagreb were renamed in the period between 1990-2007 (2011, p. 499). An example of such is current day Trg kralja Petra Krešimira IV (King Peter Krešimir square). This square was originally called Trg kralja Petra Krešimira IV (King Peter Krešimir square) in 1928.

According to a Croatian website, the square was renamed Staljinov trg (Stalin Square) in 1920 and Lenjinov trg (Lenin Square) in 1950 (*Vintage Zagreb*, 2020). The act of renaming the square after its original, pre-Yugoslavia name, suggests a drive to remove associations with Communism, using road names to create gaps in the historic timeline of Croatia.

Stiperski, (*et al*) writes that this was common across post-Communist Europe and that ‘manifestations of a reconfiguration or restructuring of space and history, which was a vital and integral element of the post-communist transformation’ (2011, p. 182). A further example is Ulica Grada Vukovara (Street of the City of Vukovar), which was previously known as Proleterskih Brigada (Proletarian Brigades) (Vitas, 2016), referring to the Proletariat working classes, often associated with Marxism. These road names relate to the old Yugoslavia, not the independent nation that Croatia sees itself today.

It is not just names referring to Communism, Socialism and Yugoslavia that have been changed in recent years. A subtle example of a history gap can also be seen in the removal of the road name 8 Maja 1945, referring to Victory in Europe Day on 8th May 1945. This name has been replaced by a number of names referring to people, such as Baron Trenka (Vitas, 2016), an Eighteenth-Century Austrian Baron. More recently in 2017, a large square in central Zagreb changed its name to no longer refer to one of history’s most prominent anti-Fascists, Josip Tito. The square is now known as Trg Republike Hrvatske (Republic of Croatia Square) (*The Guardian*, 2017). Stiperski (*et al*) writes that ‘Street names were used in shaping

collective identity, collective memories and perceptions of history,' (2011, P. 183) suggesting that Croatia is continuing to negotiate its past, decades after gaining independence.

Many of the old street names have been replaced with two main types of names. The first type of name used in the changing of road names are those that are geographically significant to Croatians since 1990. These are names such as Ulica Grada Vukovara (Vukovar City Street), named after the town of Vukovar that suffered heavy shelling during the break-up of Yugoslavia. The second type of name refers to a much older Croatia, with the names of kings such as Ulica Kralja Zvonimira (King Zvonimir Street). This creates a history gap in the timeline of the country, with all reference to Socialism, Communism and Yugoslavia removed. In changing the names to more historic names, the city is projecting an image that is independent, Nationalist and historically established. This history gap can be particularly effective on outside observers who may be unaware of the name changes. This assessment is broadly consistent with the findings of a study conducted by Stiperski (*et al*), who conducted a study of Croatian street names in 2009. They found that the most prevalent type of names related to people, in particularly 'persons or families with political importance for the creation, protection or management of the state' (2011, p. 187). The second most prevalent street names in 2009 were those relating to places of national importance (2011, p. 189), showing that the nation state was of great value to Croatians in 2009.

Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park) is a monument park situated towards the outskirts of Zagreb. Whilst the park can be viewed through the lens of historical re-evaluation, the neglect at the site can also be viewed as a

subconscious attempt to create a history gap. By allowing monuments erected during the Socialist period to naturally decay, this sends an indirect message to viewers that the value of that time period is at odds with the values Croatians should hold today. It is a visual signifier that a monument such as Spomenik Poginulima za Na Ulicama Našega Grada (Monument to Those who Died On the Streets of their City) (figure 38) is not one to be celebrated by today's society. It suggests that the memory of the Socialist period should be left to decay and fall away, much like the monuments, many of which show evidence of damage and neglect.



Figure 38. Monument to Those who Died on the Streets of their City, Spomen-Park Dotrščina, Zagreb.

(Clancy, 2016)

As many of these monuments also represent anti-Fascism, there is also a secondary consequence of sending a message that anti-Fascist ideology may also be left to fade away. This is consistent with the changing of road names discussed above, where names referring to anti-Fascism were removed and replaced with the names of historic men. Schäuble writes that

this 'signified that the memory of the country's fascist past was officially replaced by the glorification of Croatian statesmen and heroes' (2017, p. 169). In contrast to the treatment of anti-Fascist heritage, there are examples of monuments to those who died at the hands of anti-Fascists faring better treatment. In Mirogoj Cemetery, on the outskirts of Zagreb, is a monument called, Hrvatskim Žrtvama u Bleiburgu I Na Križnim Putovima 1945 (monument to the victims of Bleiburg and the way of the cross 1945). Those who died at Bleiburg were Croatians associated with the Axis Powers, fleeing Croatia at the end of World War Two before being killed by Communist Partisans. Despite both memorials representing large numbers of people killed for their political beliefs, the Bleiburg monument is the only one that is well kept and maintained, with numerous candle offerings at the site, indicating which event is most worthy of memorialisation in the eyes of Croatia today. This is supported by the findings in chapter five which identified that, of the sites captured within this study that had been vandalised, 53% are found in Zagreb. In addition, of the nine instances identified, eight appeared to be anti-Serb and/or pro-Fascist in nature.

7.4 CONCLUSION

This analysis has highlighted a number of themes across the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets in each of the cities. One such theme is the relationships of powers, which was also identified in the previous analysis chapter. This can be seen in the desire of the governments to control the narrative of the countries and cities through the use of cultural heritage and tangible assets. Examples, such as the Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) Memorial

in Berlin and the A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation), identifies one way in which governments attempt to control the narrative by creating heritage that ignores aspects of history they do not wish to acknowledge, even if that is at odds with its own citizens. Cultural heritage and tangible assets may also be appropriated and ‘nationalised’ by governments, which again alters the narrative. The Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) Memorial and Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain) were both small, local memorials that no longer represent what the local citizens originally intended to memorialise. This emphasises the relationships of power over the management of cultural heritage and tangible assets, where the government exercises their power to create a narrative that aligns to their political agenda.

Another theme that has appeared throughout the analysis is the use of cultural heritage and tangible assets to create an economic or reputational benefit for each city. This may be direct, such as the establishment or development of museums to attract tourists. Sites, such as the Arheološki Muzej u Zagrebu (Archaeological Museum in Zagreb), directly provide economic benefit through the visitation of tourists and local citizens. This, in turn, enables the government to influence historic perceptions through the presentation of the cultural heritage within the museum. Sites like the Szabadság-szobor (Liberty Statue) in Budapest, which was originally built to commemorate Soviet soldiers, have been altered to fit with contemporary narrative, which ensures the site can still be used to attract tourists whilst not conflicting with the values of today. As discussed above, the scale of the site and difficulty in removing the site may have been a factor, but the government has ensured it can continue to benefit from the site by altering the commemoration. However, the most common way in which each city is benefitting economically from its cultural heritage and tangible assets is through the reconstruction and reinternment of historic monuments, in order to make the overall

appearance of the city centre look more historic. This can be seen in large scale redevelopment of both Unter den Linden (Under the Linden Trees) in Berlin, and the square outside Budapest's Parliament building.

The theme of victimhood has also emerged from this study, in particularly who is and is not seen as a victim in the eyes of the government. An example, such as the A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation) in Budapest, suggest that one way in which governments attempt to control the narrative is by creating heritage that declares who the victims are, even if that is at odds with the feelings of local citizens. Budapest is officially declaring that Hungary is a victim of German occupation, despite being allies at times during World War Two. Another way in which these cities are declaring who holds victim status is in the continuing erection of monuments years after events have passed. Both Hungary and Berlin continue to erect exhibitions and monuments to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Cold War, respectively. This ensures a constant reminder across the cities that the country are victims of these events. In addition to the above, cultural heritage and tangible assets can be used to show who is not a victim. Spomen-park Dotršćina (Dotršćina Memorial Park) is one such example. Whilst the park is outside the city centre, and would not likely be frequented by tourists, the park that was originally built for victims of Fascism is neglected, which suggests they may no longer be valued as victims in today's political climate.

Viewing these sites through the lens of history gaps has also identified the theme of Nationalist revivals. This is most prevalent in Budapest and Zagreb, where road names have been changed to remove any reference to Communism and replace them with references to historic national figures in many cases. Equally, the cities have seen reconstructions, captured above, which visually re-establish the cities as they were before they were occupied by

Soviets, and to reinter monument to historic figures who represent the countries fight for independence, such as the reinterment of the monument to Josip Jelačić in the centre of Zagreb and the bust of Miklós Horthy in Budapest.

This study will continue with a detailed discussion of the themes that have emerged throughout the analysis chapters: victimhood; tangible assets as an agent of change; Nationalist revivals; relationships of power; heritage benefit.

8. EMERGING THEMES

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the key themes and patterns that have emerged during the analysis of the data. Chapter five presented a review of the dataset that can be seen in appendix A and identified a number of patterns and differences in the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets across the case studies. For example, when analysing the target audience for sites, Berlin is shown to have the highest percentage of sites targeted at tourists (23%), compared to Budapest (8%) and Zagreb (10%). Chapters six and seven proceeded to analyse a selection of individual sites through the lenses of historical re-evaluation and history gaps, supported by some of the findings from chapter five. This resulted in a number of themes emerging from the combined quantitative and qualitative analysis that will be outlined in this chapter. The first theme is victimhood, where it can be identified that governments are using the cultural heritage and tangible assets of a place to communicate a country's victim status. The next theme shows how sites are used as an agent of change to smooth political transition or help drive an historic narrative. Nationalist revival is a theme whereby the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets both feeds and is fed by Nationalist ideology. The next theme will look at how relationships of power can be identified through the treatment of sites. Finally, the chapter will discuss how cultural heritage and tangible assets are used to gain benefits for governments or groups of people.

8.2 THEMES EMERGING FROM THE STUDY

8.2.1 Victimhood

Each of the cities in the study has a number of monuments and plaques dedicated to the victims of particular wars and revolutions. This is something that can be found in many cities throughout Europe and across the world. Whilst this is common practice, analysis of the treatment of such sites reveals various themes, such as the way in which each city presents the concept of victimhood through its cultural heritage and tangible assets. Berlin and Zagreb both have examples of sites where the State has appropriated heritage dedicated to victims in order to present their own narrative. This will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter under the theme of relationships of power, however they are also an example of how victimhood is presented through the eyes of official bodies. Glas Hrvatske Źrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain) in Zagreb, and WeiÙe Kreuze (White Crosses) memorial in Berlin, were both originally erected by local citizens to honour those who died during war and occupation. In both examples, the government erected their own version of the memorial against the wishes of the local community. In the example of Glas Hrvatske Źrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain), the government has built a larger, more formal memorial which shows evidence of ceremonies or speeches being held at the site. At one visit, there were a number of wreaths on stands, one of which appeared to have been from the President of Croatia. This ensures that a small, personal memorial has been appropriated and used as a symbol of national victimisation. Moving the memorial to Mirogoj Cemetery, a place for honouring loved ones who have died, adds to the symbolism and victim status.

The intention behind the appropriation of the Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) memorial in Berlin appears different. Whilst the government has attempted to create their own version of the monument, the original version does not appear to have been removed and, therefore, there was no requirement for it to be re-established. This version presents German people as victims and uses the monument as a way of criticising the current German government, through posters and newspaper clippings. Whilst the site is often attended by an individual who appears to be involved in the establishment of the site and preventing its removal, the site is not attended at all hours, so could presumably be removed if the will of the government were strong enough. In addition, the government version of the memorial, is smaller and forms part of a recent redevelopment of the city. Therefore, the intention to appropriate the original site may be due to aesthetics, rather than using the site to present national victimisation.

This shows us that, whilst both cities have appropriated local memorials for a larger purpose, the drive behind each action is different, with Zagreb, arguably, showing more intention to use sites as a symbol of national victim status. It further shows that, had Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain) and the Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) been left as they were, as independent memorials, the governments would not fully endorse each memorialisation.

Where cultural heritage and tangible assets explicitly refer to victims, in general, the sites of Berlin almost exclusively focus on the victims of the holocaust. In addition, these sites often reference groups of people, rather than a country. Examples can be seen in the Memorial to the Sinti and Roma victims of National Socialism, Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and Memorial to Homosexuals persecuted under Nazism. This suggests that Berlin is offering the status of victim to others, rather than the country, despite the fact that many of the victims

will also have been German citizens. There are examples of sites in Berlin that acknowledge German victims, but the focus leans more heavily to the event, rather than victim. Whilst the Berlin Wall takes up a large percentage of Berlin's heritage landscape, these sites often have no literature but, when they do, they tell the story of the Cold War as an event, rather than trying the present German citizens as victims. This may be because it would be unpalatable for Germany to present itself as victims to tourists when a German political party was responsible for the Holocaust, despite the current German government having vastly different views to the Nazi-era government. Even though the post-war German government is radically different from the Nazi party, they have not presented German citizens who lived through World War Two as victims. This stance seems to have contributed to Berlin's successful rebranding as 'City of Freedom,' (*Berlin Tourismus & Kongress GmbH*, 2017) by deflecting focus on to the memorialisation of particular groups of people who were victims of its own former political party.

In Budapest, where a site focuses on a war or revolution that was lost, it is often dedicated to heroes who lost their lives. This can be seen in the various monuments dedicated to the heroes and revolutionaries who fought in the 1956 Revolution such as the 1956 memorial in the Taban area of Budapest, the national 1956 memorial outside City Park and at Corvin Mozi (Corvin Cinema), the cinema in the square that became a stronghold during the 1956 Revolution. However, some of these sites, in addition to a number of others, focus heavily on Hungary as victims of outside aggressors. Unlike Germany, who moderate their presentation of Germans or the country as victims, Hungary has presented a narrative of Hungarians as victims at a number of sites, including sites erected in more recent years. This has led to protests from citizens, such as the protest monument at the A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation), which has been

discussed earlier in this study. Whilst the monument includes the text, 'IN MEMORY OF THE VICTIMS,' in English, Hebrew, German and Russian, the monument has faced continued criticism from some of the Hungarian community, accusing the government of falsifying history and presenting Hungary, unfairly, as victims of German occupation. To some, this minimises any part Hungary played as aggressors when allied to Nazi Germany, re-writing history to push Hungary's status as victims. Hungarians as victims can be further seen in sites such as Terror Haza (House of Terror). As discussed in Chapter six, Terror Haza is a museum dedicated to Hungarian life under two terror regimes, the Nazis, and the Soviets. Held in the former offices of the Fascist Arrow Cross Party, and later home to the Communist State security offices the AVO (Hungarian State Police State Defence Department) and AVH (State Security Authority), the museum leans heavily on the aggression of the Soviet influenced AVO and AVH, and the damage the inflicted on Hungarian citizens. Established in 2002, this suggests that thirteen years after the fall of Communism, this site is presented as a national symbol of Hungarians as victims of Soviet occupation and influence. This is further reflected in even more recent monuments, dedicated to the victims of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, such as the national Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom és Szabadságharc Emlékműve (Memorial to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence), established in 2006, and IN MEMORIAM 1956 October 25th, a permanent exhibition established in 2014 outside Parliament. This suggests that the desire to honour and present Hungary as victim of Communism continues to exist and, as these sites are in prominent places frequented by tourists, it is a message Hungary wishes to present to the outside community.

Much like Berlin and Budapest, Zagreb has a number of monuments and plaques dedicated to victims of both the World Wars and the recent Homeland War. However, contrary to Berlin

and Budapest, Zagreb's sites dedicated to victims are generally presented solely in the native language and with little, if any, additional text. This suggests that Croatia is using its cultural heritage to tell its own citizens that they are victims. In addition to Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain) discussed above, many of the sites dedicated to victims of the recent Homeland war come in the form of small local monuments, or plaques on the side of buildings that may not draw the attention of tourists. There is one example of a permanent exhibition dedicated to the victims of the Homeland war which is open to tourists, but as discussed in chapter six, this exhibition is not clearly sign-posted or advertised. This suggests that, whilst Zagreb does present itself as a victim through its cultural heritage and tangible assets, this message is primarily targeted at Croatian citizens and not outsiders. This echoes Schäuble, who writes of Croatia, 'discourses in (self-) victimisation have created a 'unity in suffering' through a continual conjuring up of collective discrimination' (2017, p. 194). This theory can also be extended to Budapest, with Schäuble adding, 'resultant acts of competing for victim status and emotional uncovering of past wrongs have become an integral part of the respective national identities' (2017, p. 194).

These examples show us that, where another party is portrayed negatively, Berlin and Budapest generally present the heritage site in at least two languages, native and English. There are a small number of instances that only use the native language, but this is where the site has been erected by individuals rather than the State. This further emphasises that, where Berlin and Budapest are promoting a narrative of victimhood, it is with both their citizens and tourists in mind, despite the narratives themselves being different. Unlike Berlin, Budapest is attempting to present itself as a victim of both Nazi and Soviet occupation and Hungary wants its own citizens and the international community to read this narrative. In contrast, we have seen that, in the small number of sites where Zagreb that presents itself as a victim or portrays

another group negatively, signage is seldom in a language other than their own native tongue. This suggests that the desire to create a victimhood status is less strong in Croatia, compared to Hungary and that this narrative is for its citizens and not the outside community.

The above tells us that, whilst it manifests in different ways, what is consistent across the cities is that being a victim and honouring victims is a preferable stance to being depicted as the winner or loser of a conflict. Winning a conflict comes with negative connotations and suggests that you are the cause of others' victim status. Being on the losing side is similarly not desirable to promote, neither is honouring heroes who were on the winning side of a conflict. Each city is using their cultural heritage to strike the delicate balance they require between different focuses.

8.2.2 Cultural Heritage and Tangible Assets as an Agent of change

Another theme that emerged from this study is the use of cultural heritage and tangible assets as an agent of change. This is often to influence the cultural and political climate. When the government of each city is behind the creation or promotion of a heritage site, they may be using the heritage consciously or subconsciously, to steer a particular narrative. This could be to smooth over a political transition such as in the re-branding of the Berlin Wall from a divisive structure to a symbol of peace, or to attempt to steer a particular narrative for either local or outside observers.

Further, in this chapter it will be shown how Berlin has re-branded the city over the years to gain political and economic benefit from its treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. However, firstly, this chapter will discuss how the theme of using cultural heritage and tangible assets as an agent of change emerged through the analysis of sites in Berlin. Berlin

has used sites, such as the Berlin Wall and Reichstag, to change perceptions of Germany as a whole. From 1961 until 1989, the Berlin wall was seen by many, though not all, as a symbol of division within a defeated, post-war Germany. This was a perception held by some both within and outside Germany. After the fall of Communism, the reunified German government kept some of the wall in situ and, over subsequent years, more Berlin Wall memorial sites were established. By turning sections of the wall into memorials, Berlin is shown to be using the wall as an agent of change, to change perceptions of the wall from a symbol of division, to a symbol of peace. Analysis of further sites showed more evidence of this. The Reichstag, Germany's Parliament building that was discussed in chapter six, is another site that can be seen to act as an agent of change. Damaged by fire in 1933, the site remained in its damaged state until after Germany's reunification. At this point, the building was a symbol of Hitler's increasing power before the start of World War Two. To act as an agent of change, the building went through a restoration project, which included a large futuristic dome replacing the one that was damaged. This changed perceptions of the building to now symbolise Germany as moving on from the Nazi era and looking towards the future. This is similar to Germany's approach to the rebuilding of the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace)/Humboldtforum, where Germany is linking back to the historic past in rebuilding the exterior of the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace), and also pointing to the future with the new and conjoining Humboldtforum. These building projects also suggest they are as a result of social change, as Begić and Mraović suggest, 'symbolic reinterpretation of monuments almost exclusively takes place in the times of social change (2014, p. 13-14).

In Budapest, sites within Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) suggest competing uses of sites as agents of change, with opposing groups establishing sites to direct and change the political and historic landscape for their own purposes. A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak

Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation) and the accompanying protest monument have been well discussed in this study. In addition to the A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation) acting as a symbol of national victimhood, the monument is also acting as an agent to focus attention away from the period of history Hungary was allied with Nazi Germany, toward the period of occupation, attempting to change the historic narrative so that Hungary is presented to citizens and tourists as victim, rather than part-time Nazi ally. The protest monument is attempting to prevent the narrative from changing. However, in addition to these monuments, there is another site close by that is equally trying to use itself as an agent of change. Behind the memorial and protest is the Református Egyházközség A hazatérés temploma (Church of Returning Home). At the entrance of this church is a bust of Miklós Horthy, leader of Hungary during World War Two. This church was historically associated with the Fascist Arrow Cross and is today associated with far-right political party, Jobbik (Eckholm, 2011-2020). This is evidenced by a large, double-barred cross, the symbol for Jobbik, opposite the church. The act of erecting a bust of Horthy in 2013 is an attempt to change and influence the political landscape by re-establishing the memory of Horthy, who himself attempted to re-establish Hungarian territory lost after World War Two. In addition, as Horthy was at times a Nazi-collaborator, the Jobbik's support for Horthy indirectly suggests that this collaboration was not an unacceptable political agenda.

Using cultural heritage and tangible assets as an agent of change was less evident when analysing sites across Zagreb. In general, Zagreb's treatment of its sites appears to be more passive when compared to Berlin and Budapest who are actively establishing and adapting sites. However, there are subtle examples of sites in Zagreb acting as agents of change.

Chapter seven discussed the missing, and then re-erected, bust of Communist politician, Ivo

Lola Ribar, who was killed by a German bomb in 1943. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, the bust was stolen with the empty plinth remaining until 2017, when a replica was re-erected, supported by the mayor of Zagreb, Milan Bandić. The re-erection of the bust was, at least in part, to reverse some of the mass removal Communist memory since the break-up of Yugoslavia and to recognise the ‘positive side of the antifascist movement,’ (Pavlic, 2017). Reinternment of monuments marks a change in the political landscape and therefore a monument becomes an agent of that change. This is both as a consequence of the political or ideological shift that has happened, and also as an agent supporting and promoting the transition. Another example within Zagreb is the equestrian monument of Ban Jelačić, in Zagreb’s main square, that was reinstated in 1990 after being removed in 1947 by the Communist government of Yugoslavia. This has also been seen in Budapest, for example, the statue of Harry Hill Bandholtz that was returned to Budapest’s Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) in 1989 after being removed by the Communist government in 1949, reflecting the use of cultural heritage as an agent of change by visually removing Communist influence on these cities.



Figure 39. Old and new street sign in Budapest

(Clancy, 2015)

One of the most common and consistent examples of using cultural heritage and tangible assets as an agent of change is through the use of changing road names. Whilst a name itself is not considered tangible, the physical sign is and acts as a reminder of what people, places and themes are valued in today's society. Each city in this study has gone through the process of changing road names alongside political transitions, to act as a supporting agent of change. Whilst it was not always possible to locate the exact date a road's names had been changed, reviewing street maps published on different dates provided support to the following discussion. In Berlin, for example, a square known as Adolf Hitler Platz (Adolf Hitler Place) in 1933 is today known as Theodor Heuss Platz (Theodor Heuss Place), Theodor Heuss being the first President of Germany after World War Two. Whilst this is an understandable change, it also stands as a visual reminder that Hitler and Nazism is no longer deemed and acceptable ideology. Another example can be seen in Wilhelm Pieck Straße (Wilhelm Pieck Street), named after a German politician and Communist. Today, the street is known as Torstraße (Gate Street), which indicates that the removal of a name can be more important than the replacement itself. Zagreb has equally used street names to act as an agent of change, changing many road names after the fall of Communism, often with the new name referencing geographical locations significant to Croatia's today, or historic figures that either ruled during previous bouts of independence or those who championed Croatian independence, as discussed in chapter seven. This enables the changing of road names to act as an agent of change, reminding citizens of the places in Croatia that suffered during their war for independence in the 1990's and those who championed independence throughout history. In Budapest, there remains some examples where the old and new street signs can be seen next to one another. Figure 39 shows the street sign for Piarista Utca (name origin unknown), alongside its former name, Pesti Barnabás Utca (Pesti Barnabás Street), named after a

Hungarian Communist. Whilst there are practical reasons for keeping the old and new signs, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the change, this serves as a visual reminder of what or who is no longer worthy of commemoration, with Palonen writing, ‘by affirming, contesting and controlling a space of commemoration, the gesture of street naming constitutes an attempt to construct and represent imagined communities’ (2008, p. 220).

8.2.3 Nationalist Revivals

The analysis has shown that Berlin’s cultural heritage appears to have an outward, even international focus, compared to Zagreb and Budapest. Many of Berlin’s heritage sites commemorate those who suffered during the Holocaust and, due to the nature of the war, these people represent victims outside of Germany. Zagreb and Budapest’s treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets appears more inward looking, particularly Zagreb, in terms of the way they present their heritage. Whilst Berlin has distanced itself from Communism through the re-branding of the Berlin Wall and removal of larger Communist buildings, such as Palast der Republike (Palace of the Republic), this has been combined with large, public memorials dedicated to those who suffered under the Nazi Regime. This has meant that, in combination with distancing itself from Communism, there is a strong anti-Fascist message. However, the analysis of sites across Budapest and Zagreb suggests a theme has emerged, whereby the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets, at times supports Nationalist revivals. This has largely been done through the distancing from Communist memory and a neglect of monuments representing anti-Fascists.

Before Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, the only time in modern history Croatia was an independent country was during World War Two, when the country was ruled as a Nazi puppet state by the Ustaše. During the recent War of Independence in the 1990's, the Ustaše were looked upon as inspiration for independence, despite their support for Fascism. This also meant that anti-Fascists and Communists were seen as those who opposed their independence. Whilst I do not suggest that Croatia supports the discrimination carried out by the Ustaše during World War Two, the country has used its cultural heritage and tangible assets to nod to this period. This can be seen in the re-emergence of the currency used during Ustaše rule, the Kuna, in addition to some of the imagery on banknotes. The 1000 Kuna note holds the image of Ante Starčević, a Croatian politician and Nationalist, whose writings were printed by the Ustaše (Clancy, 2010). In addition to Croatian currency, the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets in Zagreb may be seen to support Nationalist revivals. The remaining anti-Fascist memorials, many of which were removed during the Homeland War, are occasionally vandalised and often neglected. This can be seen at Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park), discussed in chapter seven, that was vandalised in 2016 with the Ustaše symbol painted on the central monument at the entrance. The monuments within the park themselves are in poor condition, with previous damage and neglect not repaired. This supports Nationalist revivals through being a visual indicator that the anti-Fascist movement does not deserve the same level of protection and neglect as, for example, monuments to historic Nationalists, such as Ban Josip Jelačić, whose statue was reinterred in the city centre's main square after the break-up of Yugoslavia. This is consistent with the experience of Niebyl, who discussed visiting an anti-Fascist monument in Zagreb, south of the city centre. The monument was designed to 'symbolise the breaking of the Axis ring around Zagreb, and the partisans who fell in the liberation of the city' (2018, p. 142).

However, after the break-up of Yugoslavia, a small plaque was added to the monument to honour two local men who died during the Homeland War. Niebyl notes that, whilst this monument is in good condition, all of the tributes left at the site are clearly left ‘for the Croatian Independence fighters, not that of the partisan fighters’ (2018, p. 143).

Similarly, Budapest’s attempt to distance itself from former occupying powers has led to Nationalist revivals. The entrance to the Református Egyházközség A hazatérés temploma (Church of Returning Home) in Budapest’s Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) features several busts and monuments on display to anyone who walks past. The central monument is a bust of Former Prime Minister Miklós Horthy, along with a small bronze plaque with the word “Trianon”. In recent years Budapest has seen a revival in the cult of Horthy and Trianon, with the latter referring to the 1920 Treaty of Trianon which cut Hungarian territory down to approximately one third of its former size. During his reign, ‘attempts to revoke Trianon dominated Horthy’s domestic and foreign policies, assuming material form in numerous monuments’ (Kinchin, 2012, p. 21). Many of these monuments were removed during the Soviet era. There were formerly four statues in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square), representing the four territories ceded to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania (Kinchin, 2012 p. 24-25). There have been efforts since 1989 to restore these removed and lost monuments however, this has not been successful. The erection of a bust of Horthy in memory to the loss of Trianon can be seen as a response to this. The erection of the Horthy bust is seen as inflammatory by some and an attempt ‘to counter the historical death of the nation and retain an imaginative hold on heritage suddenly placed beyond Hungary’s geographical boundaries’ (Kinchin, 2012, p. 23). In addition, this supports the stance of Hungary as a victim. By reviving the cult of Horthy and Trianon, it can be seen as an attempt

to create a political history gap and promote the view that Hungary is a victim of foreign policy and that the period since Horthy's reign is politically and territorially unjust.

Budapest and Zagreb are using their cultural heritage to support their Nationalist revivals, and this is not just in the form of creating or neglecting heritage. They promote their current political leaning by using their cultural heritage and tangible assets to emphasise what they are not, and this has typically been in the form of removing Communist and Socialist heritage. This happened throughout Croatia and Hungary in the 1990's. Whilst it is not known where many of the statues removed in Croatia now are, Hungary chose to establish a purpose-built home for such monuments, creating Szoborpark (Memento Park), a park full of Communist statues representing what Hungary believes it is not today. The difference between Hungary and Croatia is that Hungary's removal of Communist heritage is State-sanctioned. However, in Croatia, the treatment of Socialist heritage is subtler, in the form of neglect, enabling citizens to take matters into their own hands by vandalising and removing such heritage.

Earlier in this chapter, it was discussed that the changing of road names can be seen as using cultural heritage and tangible assets as an agent of change. The changing of road names can also be used to support Nationalist revivals. Much like the treatment of Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park), where anti-Fascist monuments are neglected, some streets and squares named after anti-Fascists have also been removed, most notably being the square named after anti-Fascist and Yugoslav leader Josip Tito. As discussed in chapter seven, the square named after their former leader is now known as Trg Republike Hrvatske (Republic of Croatia Square) (*The Guardian*, 2017). Whilst this is not a direct support for Fascists, it does add weight to the Nationalist agenda by declaring even the most prominent of anti-Fascists should not be commemorated. This can be seen in countries across the former Yugoslavia. West Mostar, home to majority ethnic Croatian population, is dealing with its

heritage in a similar way to Zagreb, and also Berlin; ‘new street names emphasize a shared history of the motherland of Croatia by recalling Croat historic personalities and important Croat cities’ (2016, p. 117). This is something Milevska calls the ‘renaming machine’ and recognises it across the Balkans. Milevska believes that ‘observing the Balkans through the optics of “the renaming machine” offers us a useful insight into matters of the post-1989 transition, collective memory and identity politics’ (2016, p. 77). Milevska goes as far as to say that ‘renaming can simultaneously shape relations between different nations in the region, the hegemonic narration of a country’s own history, as well as various attempts at subversion’ (2016, p. 78). Both Hatherley (2015) and Milevska (2016) recognise the dangers in this approach to heritage management, stating that Balkan states are recreating history to distance themselves from their Communist history ‘which has sadly also included forgetting their antifascist legacy’ (Milevska, 2016, p. 82).

8.2.4 Relationships of Power

The analysis outlined in the previous chapters identified a theme, whereby relationships of power can be identified through the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. These relationships of power could be intentional, to gain an advantage, or may be unintentional, resulting in an advantage of power and ownership. Some of the clearest examples of relationships of power have been discussed previously in this chapter through other themes. For example, the government’s appropriation of Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain) in Zagreb, and Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) memorial in Berlin, shows how governments exercise their power over their citizens in order to control historic narratives. However, there are examples of other sites where we can see this theme

being played out, where governments are using sites to exercise or gain power over citizens, and also outside the countries themselves.

After the fall of Communism, the German government exercised its power to keep some sections of the Berlin Wall in situ, despite citizens wanting the wall to be removed entirely (Dolff-Bonekämper, 2002, pp 239-240). Over time, this led to changing perceptions within Germany with the wall now accepted as an important symbol and part of Berlin's heritage. In 2013, there were protests at Berlin's East Side Gallery against the temporary removal of a small section of the wall to create an access point to a redevelopment site (*BBC*, 2013). In addition to successfully changing perceptions within Berlin and Germany, perceptions of the wall have changed for the international community too, and this has coincided with Germany's rise as a powerful, Democratic nation. Over the years, Germany has sold and gifted sections of the Berlin Wall to governments and organisations around the world, presenting the wall as a symbol of peace and anti-Fascism. Sections of the wall can be found in the Vatican City Gardens, Winston Churchill Memorial and Library in Missouri, United States (Zazzera, 2019) and, in 2004, sections were placed in Berlin Square, in Seoul, South Korea, as a 'symbol of hope for the reunification of North and South Korea' (Avakian, 2019). Whilst this act may not directly increase German powers across other countries, it is a way of spreading its influence and exercising its power of influence outside Germany.

The redevelopment of Unter den Linden, is another example that highlights the way relationships of power are exercised through the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets. Originally sitting in East Berlin, the famous road has undergone redevelopment since German re-unification. This has included the removal of symbols of Communist power, such as the removal of Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic), to make way for the new Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace)/Humboldtforum, as discussed in chapter six. Despite

scepticism at the claims of asbestos (Dolff-Bonekämper, 2002, p. 247), that led to the closure and eventual demolition of Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic), the building has been replaced by a pastiche of an historic German palace, Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace). This is an example of the new, re-unified German government exercising its power over Communist influence suggesting that, whilst the city is physically re-unified, East Germany is expected to fall in line with the values of the West.



Figure 40. Founding of the Croatian Army in 1991 Plaque, Zagreb

(Clancy, 2016)



Figure 41. Association of Croatian Defenders Plaque, Zagreb

(Clancy, 2016)

Within Zagreb, evidence of relationships of power being played out are less frequent and more subtle. Aside from Glas Hrvatske Źrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain), discussed above, the Croatian government appears to empower its citizens to memorialise events at a local and organisational level. Examples of such can be seen in the memorial plaques marking events relating to the establishment of the Croatian Army (figures 40 and 41), founded by Croatian officers and the Croatian National Guard, respectively. In addition to this, the mass removal of monuments associated to the Yugoslav period has slowed down, with remaining monuments in Zagreb left neglected, such as those at Spomen-

Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park), discussed above. Unlike the Weiße Kreuze (White Crosses) memorial in Berlin, where citizens have maintained their own version of the monument, this has not happened for Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain). Combined, this suggests that either the Croatian government feels less of a need to control the historic narrative of Croatia, or there is greater alignment between the government and its citizens in terms of which cultural heritage and tangible assets should, and should not, be maintained.




Figure 42. The landscape of Szabadság tér, Budapest:

1. Soviet War Memorial; 2. American Embassy; Carl Lutz book memorial; 4. Harry Hill Bandholtz statue; 5. Monument to the Victims of German Occupation; 6. Protest Monument; 7. Miklós Horthy bust; 8. Ronald Regan Statue; 9. Imre Nagy monument; 10. Hungarian Parliament.

(Google Maps, 2019. Modified from source by author)

Within Budapest, stronger relationships of power can be identified through this study's analysis and this is primarily aimed at gaining power over the remaining Communist heritage. In chapter seven, the A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation) in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) was discussed through the lens of history gaps. This highlighted the Hungarian government's efforts to exercise their power and control the historic narrative. Elsewhere in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square), relationships of power can be seen exercised across the landscape of the square. In a prominent position, at the head of the square remains a Soviet memorial, erected to honour Soviet Soldiers who liberated Hungary at the end of World War Two. Despite the majority of Soviet monuments and memorials being removed post-1989, this monument remained in situ due to a treaty between Hungary and Russia (Eckholm, 2011-2020).

Over the course of the last two decades, the square has developed, with old statues being reinterred and new statues erected. The landscape of the square in 2016 shows relationships of power being played out through the placement of cultural heritage and tangible assets. Figure 42 shows the placement of monuments in the square in 2016. The Soviet memorial is surrounded by a statue of Harry Hill Banholtz, a US army general, the American embassy, and a statue of Ronald Regan. In the top right corner, we have a monument of Imre Nagy, former Hungarian politician who supported the 1956 Hungarian revolution against the Soviets. He was executed as a traitor after the revolution was quashed but then declared a hero in 1989. His statue stands with his back to the Soviet memorial and his face towards Parliament. Despite remaining in such a prominent position in the square, the Soviet memorial is surrounded by sites that reduce its power and influence. This, in addition to A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation), protest monument and bust of Miklós Horthy, discussed above, suggests there

are multiple dialogues and attempts to gain power in the historic narrative being played out within this square. As heritage decisions are always about the present, and often rooted in politics (Ashworth, 2007), this suggests the conflicting narratives reflected in the landscape of the square may be indicative of conflicting ideologies and narrative in the political climate.

8.2.5 Heritage Benefit

The final theme that has emerged throughout this study is that it is possible to read benefits from the way cultural heritage is treated in each of the cities, and therefore assess whether a site has been established or promoted with those benefits in mind. For example, the analysis shows us that Berlin is continually expanding and creating exhibitions focusing on the Berlin Wall and Cold War. In 2016, there was a new exhibition being erected at the East Side Gallery that had not yet opened and there are segments of the Berlin Wall scattered around the city, even where the wall did not originally stand. I suggest that the expansions are due to the economic benefit the tourism brings to the city. The re-branding of the city as a ‘City of Freedom,’ which has been discussed throughout this study, also provides a political benefit, and complements the stance the country is taking as a liberal Democracy, providing an example to the rest of Europe. Berlin is capitalising economically on war tourism ‘in which people visit past scenes of battle or other types of memorials and monuments to past wars’ (Gordon, 2018, p. 9) through continually generating content.

Whilst not to the same extent as Berlin, Budapest also uses its cultural heritage and tangible assets to gain economic and political benefit. Sites such as Terror Haza (House of Terror) and Szoborpark (Memento Park) are both designed to present Hungarians as victims of the Soviets to tourists, in addition to playing on tourist interest in events such as the World Wars

and the Cold War. Szoborpark (Memento Park) for example, discussed in chapter six, manages to present the Communist statues both as representations of Soviet tyranny and as amusement for tourists. However, the park is some way outside the city centre and in a location with no other tourist attractions, therefore, may not receive a particularly high number of tourist visitors. Instead, examples such as the reconstruction of the landscape outside Budapest's Parliament buildings to appear as it did pre-1945, suggest economic benefit may not be Budapest's primary concern for individual sites. The city appears to be continuing to overhaul the appearance of the city to be more historic and less Communist, branding itself as an established nation that has been victimised by regimes such as Nazism but, most importantly for Hungary, Communism.

Zagreb does not appear to be trying to use the cultural heritage and tangible assets of the city to enjoy the same or similar economic benefits. There are heritage sites in Zagreb that are well maintained and promoted through the official tourism website however, the city rarely uses its own difficult history to draw in tourists. The difficult heritage is for its citizens only and, in all but one example, Croatian is the only language featured. This single example is the Memorijalni Centar Raketiranja Zagreba 1991/1995 (Memorial centre for the shelling of Zagreb 1991/1995). The memorial centre is featured on the official tourism website however it was not sign-posted, and not easy to find, with just a small sign on the outside of an apartment building which the centre shares with various other businesses. Once inside, a single member of staff greets you for a personal tour. Information here is in English and Croatian and presents the story of the Homeland War, focusing heavily on the shelling of Zagreb. Free entry, very few visitors and no gift shop indicate there is no economic benefit to the centre. Whilst not being heavily advertised, there could be some political benefit in presenting the Homeland War from the perspective of Croatian, should any tourists locate the

site, as it does present Croatia as victim of Serbian aggression. However, the treatment of the majority of Croatia's cultural heritage and tangibles assets suggests that this is not a primary motivation for the tourism industry.

8.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a number of themes that have emerged throughout the analysis presented in chapter six and seven. It has shown that, whilst each city is unique in its history and presentation of heritage, there are themes that run across these cities and can help us to read the cultural heritage and tangible assets of other Central European capital cities, or indeed cities further afield. This chapter, and the previous analysis chapters, have shown that it is possible to identify both similarities and differences in the way Berlin, Budapest and Zagreb approach the presentation of the cities to both citizens and outside observers. This suggests the methodology could be successfully applied to other cities or regions.

This has further identified a number of findings that will be discussed in detail in chapter nine. The findings include the range of material required to conduct such a study, and that limiting the scope to traditional forms of cultural heritage would have excluded some of the more informative sites captured within the study. In addition, this study did not identify any material differences in the treatment of sites that fall within and outside what is traditionally considered to be cultural heritage. Cultural heritage and tangible assets as a language is another finding that will be discussed in the following chapter, showing that the treatment of such sites is a form of communication to citizens and outside observers. This communication

is an indication of the historic narrative each city is trying to portray. The use of lenses as a methodology for analysis will be discussed as a way in which to look at sites to gain additional perspective. This leads onto the next finding that will be discussed; the benefits of a combined methodology, where both qualitative and quantitative analysis can support each other to build stronger findings. The next finding will look at the importance of impact-focussed decision making, and the need to understand the impact decisions may have to make more informed choices. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an explanation of how cultural heritage continues to perpetuate divisions within society and how this is evident through the analysis.

9. CONCLUSIONS

9.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapter one I outlined the purpose of this study, to explore how governments, groups and individuals are presenting and changing their built environment, using cultural heritage and other tangible assets. The purpose of which is to understand the potential impacts of such treatments of cultural heritage and tangible assets and how this can inform or be informed by the political and social climate of a place. In addition, this study presents a methodology that could be used for future research. The study has focused on central European capital cities in order to understand the processes at work behind this behaviour, as well as gaining insight into the impacts of those decisions. By cultural heritage, the study refers to tangible objects that are traditionally thought of as cultural heritage, such as monuments and museum collections. In addition, the study also includes less traditional forms of cultural heritage, and other objects, for example graffiti and sites that are referred to as ‘protest monuments,’ of which, definitions are presented in chapter four. Previous research into the treatment of cultural heritage in Croatia identified that objects not traditionally seen as cultural heritage are being used to communicate a historic narrative to outside observers. As this study progressed, it became clear that governments and individuals were using an even greater array of tangible objects to send a communication or portray an historical or political narrative to the observer. The study saw there was little to no distinction between the treatment of sites that may or may not fall into the category of traditional cultural heritage, as least not in terms of using a site to

communicate a particular narrative. Had the scope of the study not been widened to include these objects, the ability to read the capital cities in relation to their built environment would have been limited. Further in this chapter, it is argued that this approach was imperative to the success of the study. Chapter two outlined some of the key areas of heritage discourse such as victimhood, cultural memory, and commemoration. Chapter three provided historical background to the cities chosen as case studies for this research. Chapter four outlined the methodology employed during the research, a combination of quantitative analysis of a database of heritage sites (presented in chapter five) alongside the use of lenses as a form of analysis (presented in chapters six and seven), in addition to definitions, scope and approach to field research. Chapter eight discussed themes that emerged from the analyses and presented similarities and differences in the treatment of cultural heritage sites across Berlin, Budapest, and Zagreb.

This chapter begins by summarising the key findings of the study, of which there are six. The first finding looks at the range of material captured within the study and the benefits of including material outside the traditional forms of cultural heritage. The next finding looks at cultural heritage as a language, the ways it can influence an observer's perception of history, and how this study has presented the ways in which we can read this language. The third finding looks at the lenses and how useful they are as a methodology before discussing the fourth finding, benefits of a combined methodology. Next, the chapter summarises the importance of the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets having impact-focused decision-making, including understanding both the direct and indirect consequences of those decisions. The final finding discusses how this study shows us that cultural heritage and tangible assets continue to perpetuate division within societies. The chapter completes with a

review of the impacts of this study before suggesting areas for future research and concluding with a final message.

9.2 KEY FINDINGS

9.2.1 Range of Material

Cultural heritage, or tangible objects that would traditionally be viewed as cultural heritage, was the starting point for the scope of the study. Previous research, looking at post-war reconstruction in Croatia (Clancy, 2010), started to include less traditional forms of cultural heritage, such as graffiti. As discussed in chapter four, this established my employment of a phenomenological approach to field study which developed and continued throughout this current research. An important aspect of this research was the presumption that all tangible assets within a city are erected for the purpose of providing historical narrative of some kind; it is not just cultural heritage that performs this role. Lee writes, ‘human consciousness is always the consciousness of (toward) something,’ (2016, p.70) that there is always intentionality behind the treatment of an object. Although an itinerary was built ahead of each field trip, an essential part of the methodology was to experience the cities as an outsider and understand what sites are being built, neglected, and ignored, amongst other behaviours.

According to UNESCO, cultural heritage is “the legacy of physical artefacts and intangible attributes of a group or society that are inherited from past generations, maintained in the present and bestowed for the benefit of future generations” (UNESCO, 2017). Had the study developed a scope based on a definition such as this, a number of important sites captured

within this study would not have been included. This definition would have excluded new sites, such as the new Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace), that was not “inherited from past generations,” neglected sites, such as Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park), that is not “maintained in the present,” and temporary sites, such as the protest monument in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square), that may not survive long enough to be “bestowed for the benefit of future generations” (UNESCO, 2017). The definition according to ICOMOS is arguably broader but, equally, would have excluded some sites captured within this study. ICOMOS state ‘Cultural heritage is an expression of the ways of living, developed by a community and passed on from generation to generation, including customs, practices, places, objects, artistic expressions and values’ (ICOMOS, 2002). The idea that cultural heritage is developed by a community is at odds with a number of sites in this study, where we see relationships of power being played out. Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain), in Zagreb, was originally built by a community however, the government appropriated and moved the bricks that formed the memorial in order to establish their own interpretation of the site. A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation), in Budapest, was similarly erected without the support of large numbers of the community.

What resulted from this approach, to adopt a broad scope, was a study that is process led, rather than object led. This enabled the development of a database of sites that captured the many different ways governments and individuals are using or creating tangible assets to project a particular narrative or agenda. Rather than the study of cultural heritage, this has developed into the study of a physical, urban language. This further suggests that, in order to fully understand how we use and engage with our built environment, there should not be a reliance on institutional definitions. Institutional definitions might, instead, be a detriment to

studies such as these by excluding sites that can provide important insight into the treatment of tangible assets within cities. It should also be noted that, throughout the qualitative and quantitative analysis, this study did not find any evidential difference in the treatment of assets that fall in or out of the category of cultural heritage.

In addition to challenging the institutional definitions of cultural heritage, the study captured a range of sites that challenges the idea of what cultural heritage is or, at least, what type of sites should be considered when trying to understand how sites are used to dominate or change the historic narrative of a place. The lack of consensus on what constitutes cultural heritage has been acknowledged by others such as Merrill, who discusses 'whether vandalism at heritage places represents cultural significance or conservation sacrilege' (2011, p. 73). For example, it could be argued that the World War One memorials in Zagreb are cultural heritage, partly because they represented a community's desire to remember those who died during the war. The same could be applied to the protest monument in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square), which features personal objects and the names of those who fell victim to Nazi persecution during World War Two yet, this site would unlikely be viewed as cultural heritage by those who accept a more traditional definition. Protest monuments, tree memorials, graffiti and newly erected monuments and exhibitions might not be seen as cultural heritage by some, yet they are a representation of someone or some community's way of life. However, these sites can equally have no meaning to others, which further supports the idea that there may not be such a thing as cultural heritage. 'What we think of as the heritage largely depends upon the kind of people we are and the circumstances under which we work,' (Carman, 2002, p.12) emphasising that heritage is a concept that we apply to objects based on our personal experience. Equally, even what archaeologists deem to be cultural heritage will change over time. As Schofield writes, 'heritage interests have shifted

significantly in the past twenty-five to thirty years (since I became involved, in 1989—when anything post-Industrial Revolution was not considered heritage, except by enthusiasts and amateur special interest groups), how can we possibly claim to judge future priorities?’ (2017, p. 284). This idea is not new, and has been challenged by academics, in addition to Carman. Harvey (2008) writes that ‘heritage itself is not a thing and does not exist by itself... Rather, heritage is about the process by which people use the past,’ and Smith (2006, p.11) goes as far as to say, ‘there is really, no such thing as heritage.’ Much like art, cultural heritage is a subjective concept. Nardis and Alteri remind us that contemporary art has often been snubbed until decade’s later (2010, pp.128-129) and we should therefore keep an open mind as to what constitutes cultural heritage or indeed if the term is useful in attempting to understand our built environment in relation to our past.

In the academic fields, research into the treatment and presentation of the built environment of cities traditionally takes on a more focused scope that may cover one or two disciplines. Scholars within the field of heritage studies might look at the cultural heritage of a particular city. An example of which can be seen in Sharon MacDonald’s *Difficult Heritage: Negotiating the Nazi Past in Nuremberg and Beyond* (2009), which focuses largely, but not entirely, on Nuremberg’s architectural heritage. Scholars within the field of tourism studies might look at the sites promoted within the tourist industry and scholars from an architectural background may focus specifically on buildings or purpose-built structures. Heeley’s *Inside City Tourism: A European Perspective* (2011), which looks at the practicalities and challenges of tourism within European cities, and Großmann and Nielsen’s book entitled *Architecture, Democracy and Emotions: The Politics of Feeling since 1945* (2018), which looks at the relationship between politics and urban planning, are examples of these.

There are academics that have crossed a number of disciplines, such as Bevan (2007), who combines heritage, architecture and memory studies to look at the way memory is affected by the destruction of architecture.

In chapter one, I wrote that this study has been approached from an archaeological and heritage studies background. The benefit of approaching this study from the field of heritage studies is that heritage studies is often multi-disciplinary by nature. Archaeology and heritage studies have established links, with books such as Carman's *Archaeology & Heritage. An Introduction* (2002) and journals, such as *Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage*. Other heritage scholars draw upon further disciplines, such as Ireland and Schofield's *The Ethics of Cultural Heritage* (2015), which combines heritage studies with the social science of ethics studies, and *Heritage, Memory and the Politics of Identity. New Perspectives on the Cultural Landscape* (Whelan & Moore, 2007), which draws on disciplines such as politics and identity. These examples may all, indeed, touch upon disciplines outside their primary field however, this study believes it is important to be multi-disciplinary as a discipline, and to focus on the tangible objects, regardless of genre or medium, that are portraying a message or appear to be a communication of some kind. Therefore, it is important to note that this study is intrinsically multi-disciplinary.

The broad nature of the study, and therefore the catalogue of sites captured in the database, enabled a unique opportunity to analyse the way we treat our tangible assets without the constraint of a particular discipline. This led to a much wider range of themes and patterns being drawn out of the analysis than there would have, had the study kept to the scope of cultural heritage.

9.2.2 Cultural Heritage and Tangible Assets as a Language

This study has shown that it is possible to read the built environment of a city. In addition, the built environment is being used as a language or visual dialogue to portray certain values or a particular narrative to outside observers. This is different to the concept of material culture as text, as discussed by Buchli (1998). Buchli acknowledges the stance, by some archaeologists, that ‘material culture could express or contain ideas as language’ (1998, p. 181), essentially, a historic narrative waiting to be translated by archaeologists. Buchli notes one of a number of challenges with this theory, relating to ‘how one falls along a continuum of belief, from whether one believes a retrievable ‘Past’... to many little ‘pasts’... or to the opposite belief that there is no past at all that can be meaningfully grasped’ (1998, p. 183). This study has previously acknowledged that cultural heritage is not about the past, therefore, this study is not looking to read the past through cultural heritage and tangible assets. What I am doing is broader, acknowledging that there is no strict message, or single narrative to be decoded. The treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets provides an indication as to what historic or political narrative those in charge of the objects wish to portray. In addition, this historic narrative does not inform us about the past, but the present. This is echoed by Schofield, who acknowledges the relevance to how we perceive and treat our surroundings today, and that this physical language can take a number of forms, writing ‘for [archaeologists] graffiti and wall art – whether we consider it vandalism or not – forms part of the sites narrative’ (Schofield, 2005, p.76). It is a two-way process in that we consciously and subconsciously absorb and read our surroundings, and this is projected onto the way we treat our environment. This can lead to a sense of connection to a familiar place, particularly when we believe we are represented through our environment. Equally, it may lead to a person feeling disenfranchised, if we believe we are not represented, or our representation is reducing

(Tucker & Emge, 2010). At the same time, how we experience our environment is then consciously or subconsciously used to develop our built environment through the construction and changes within cities. Some of these changes are conscious changes, such as erecting new heritage sites or development programmes that intentionally present a particular type of heritage, for example, the partial reconstruction of the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) in Berlin and the reconstruction of Kossuth Lajos tér (Kossuth Lajos Square), Budapest. The intention is further evident in the relationships of power, discussed in chapter eight, where examples were presented showing different groups fighting for authority to speak through the heritage. Some changes, such as vandalism of sites, can be seen as a form of subconscious change, particularly where there is a pattern of destruction of the heritage related to a particular period. Macdonald sums up her experience of researching cultural heritage in Europe by calling the area a *memoryland* obsessed with both the preservation and disappearance of memory (MacDonald, 2013, p. 1).

One particular narrative that we have seen throughout this study is that cultural heritage continues to be used to tell us who is good and who is bad, based on the values of each current government. Each city presents victims and aggressors through its heritage, the only difference being the groups of people presented as victim or aggressor. What is consistent across this narrative is that, in Central European capital cities, Communist heritage is consistently portrayed in a negative light, perpetuating division and an East-West divide. The ability for cultural heritage to perpetuate division will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. However, it should be noted that the ability to read the East-West divide through each of the cities, almost three decades after the fall of Communism, is also seen in the political rhetoric of today. In 2018, Western news websites contain numerous articles on the ‘new Cold War,’ (*BBC*, 2018), ‘Russia's Reputation for Doping,’ (*HUFFPOST*, 2018) and ‘Corrupt

Russian oligarchs' (*The Telegraph*, 2018), further evidencing that the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets within Central European capital cities is an index for the political climate of a place.

9.2.3 Lenses as a Methodology for Analysis

It has been referenced in earlier chapters that the use of historical re-evaluation as a methodological lens developed from previous research into the treatment of cultural heritage in modern post-conflict situations (Clancy, 2010). This was successful in drawing out patterns and providing a deeper understanding of cultural heritage as part of an historic process. The current study took the use of lenses further in two ways. Firstly, rather than using the lens of historical re-evaluation to analyse post-war situations, the lens was applied to cities, in order to understand how cities are managing their tangible assets in relation to their past as a whole. Secondly, two new lenses were brought into the methodology: history gaps and monuments of human failure. The purpose of the different lenses was to understand if, by viewing sites through different lenses, and therefore different perspectives, an even deeper understanding of how cities manage their environment can be gained. The purpose of choosing Berlin, Budapest and Zagreb as case studied to apply the lenses, as discussed in chapter four, is due to their similarities and differences. Each city had experience similar, major events such as the World Wars, and life under Communism, yet how these experiences manifested in each city was different. Therefore, I wanted to understand two things. Firstly, how whether their different experiences led to differences in the way cultural heritage and tangible assets are treated today. Secondly, if the methodology could be successfully applied to cities that have gone through different experiences.

Each of the lenses were successful, at times, in gaining an understanding into the treatment of individual sites. In relation to Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain), in Zagreb, historical re-evaluation identified the relationships of power between governments and citizens. History gaps established that the neglect of sites such as Spomen-Park Dotrščina (Dotrščina Memorial Park) can feed and be fed by Nationalist revivals. Finally, monuments of human failure helped identify how Berlin's Neue Wache (New Guardhouse) has been rededicated and renamed numerous times over the last century, in order to act as an agent of political change.

Some sites benefited from the ability to analyse them through multiple lenses, each one gaining a unique perspective. This was discussed in relation to the changing of road names in Croatia post-1990 in chapter seven. When viewed through the lens of historical re-evaluation, it can be seen that road names have been historically re-evaluated to present a city that is historically rooted, referencing kings such as Zvonimir and Petar Kresimir IV. When viewed through the lens of history gaps, we are encouraged to focus in on the names that have been removed, rather than the present-day names. This helped identify a pattern emerging across the cities, which shows is it most often the Soviet and Communist identifiers that are removed.

Whilst each lens has its benefits, the study has shown that the lenses sit across two levels. Historical re-evaluation is a tier one lens and overarches the other lenses. All sites can be analysed through this lens as the lens accepts that any change to a site alters the historic timeline in both a tangible and intangible way. The remaining lenses, history gaps and monuments of human failure are tier two lenses (figure 44). These are more focused and may not be applicable to all sites. These lenses are mechanism by which historical re-evaluation is

done. For example, a history gap is a way of historically re-evaluating a particular site or place. In chapter seven it was discussed that Budapest has undertaken a programme to remove all traces of Soviet influence from the monuments within Kossuth Lajos tér (Kossuth Lajos Square), the square outside Parliament. This history gap historically re-evaluates the timeline of Budapest, making the city appear older and more culturally Hungarian. In this framework, there may be numerous other tier two lenses that support the historical re-evaluation of Central European capital cities.




Figure 44. The relationship between the analysis lenses

(Clancy, 2019)

When focusing specifically on the lenses of history gaps and monuments of human failure, this study has shown that the lenses are useful in providing a focus for analysis that may not otherwise have been achieved. For example, when analysing sites through the lens of history gaps, it has enabled a focus on, not what the site presents, but what the site is intentionally forgetting. This impacts what Assmann refers to as the cultural memory, which was discussed in chapter two. As memory is a layered process, when cultural memory is impacted, it further impacts memory at subsequent levels and, for cultural memory, that means that cultural identity, and historical and cultural time is also impacted (Assmann, 2010, p. 109).

This can be seen in the history gap created by the re-casting of the monument to Gyula Andrassy, in Budapest. This is an important and useful focus to take into future research. Much like archaeology, history gaps uncover what is hidden and buried. Whilst proven interesting at times, the analysis highlighted that monuments of human failure is a more difficult lens to define. During preliminary analysis, there were examples where the lens was useful in drawing out the success and failure of particular sites, such as Flughafen Berlin-Tempelhof (Tempelhof Airport), the varied history of which was discussed in chapter six. However, this lens has challenges which, it is suggested, lies in the subjective nature of whether an event or object is a success or failure. For example, the Berlin wall can be viewed by some as failing to keep Berliners separated ideologically and, at times, physically. Equally, families who were separated for a number of decades may argue that the wall achieved those aims.

An important benefit of the use of lenses to analyse sites is that the lenses encourage the viewing of sites as part of an historic process, rather than at a point in time. As the study develops, the world and the politics within each city continues to change and this methodology provides the opportunity to see how cities are developing and changing over time. This is particularly evident where the methodology has been applied to sites that have changed over the course of this research, such as the Berlin Wall, which continues to evolve as new monuments and sections of the wall appear in Berlin. By erecting new exhibitions on the Berlin Wall as recently as 2016, this suggests that promoting the memory of the Berlin Wall, and its use as Germany's symbol of freedom, is as important today as it was in the more immediate aftermath of the fall of Communism. Other changes identified were short term, such as the vandalism at the protest monument against the A Némzet Megszállás Áldozatainak Emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation), discussed in chapter seven,

where stickers representing the right-wing political party, Jobbik, were placed on numerous objects making up the protest monument. This, in addition to the monuments in the wider landscape, including the bust of Miklós Horthy and double barred crossed, associated with Jobbik, suggest the area continues to be a hotbed for those looking to control the political narrative. Changes were less evident in Zagreb, suggesting a greater consensus between the narrative the government wishes to portray and the narrative accepted by citizens.

9.2.4 Benefits of a Combined Methodology

The study has evidenced that the database of sites is a useful tool in drawing out themes and patterns in the treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets within the cities presented. Capturing an average of 119 sites in each city, and analysing them across 22 filters, provides 7,876 data fields, enabling a comprehensive assessment of the sites. Whilst the database alone identified a number of themes, it is when combined with the lens analysis that the study is most successful. When combined, the database and lens analysis have been shown to support each other. For example, the analysis of the database highlighted that, unlike Zagreb and Budapest, Berlin does not appear to explicitly reference heroes in any of the sites captured and references victims significantly more often than the other cities (13% of sites, compared to 5% (Budapest), 7% (Zagreb)). This lens analysis complements this finding by showing us that Berlin is historically re-evaluating the city's tourist offering to remove traces of Soviet history, yet create and promote sites dedicated to the victims of the Holocaust and the Cold War

The above example also shows that, by applying the combined methodology over two years, we can identify the direction of change within cities in relation to their cultural heritage.

Within Berlin, changes were primarily seen in the number of tourist sites appearing, and in the different ways the wall was being historically re-evaluated to promote Berlin as a city of freedom. Changes were also evident in Budapest over the course of the field trips. Whilst some of these changes might have been for the benefit of the tourism industry, it was also evident the changes were designed to steer a political narrative for citizens within Budapest. The development of Kossuth Lajos tér (Kossuth Lajos Square), outside Parliament, is an example of this. Reconstructing the square as it would have appeared in 1944, before Soviet influence in Budapest, in addition to the erecting of new monuments dedicated to the 1956 revolution, suggests a drive to make Budapest appear visually historic. This also compliments the political climate that is becoming increasingly Nationalist, with right-wing party, Jobbik, rising to become the main opposition party after the April 2018 parliamentary elections (*POLITICO*, 2018).

The smallest degree of change seen over the course of the field trips was in Zagreb, where there did not appear to be any specific increase in the way tourism was promoted or how heritage was being presented to local citizens. This is similarly reflective of the political climate in Croatia. During the course of much of this research, Croatia had a President and Prime Minister representing different parties. The President represented the Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske (SDP), who are seen as a centre-left party and the Prime Minister represented Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ), who are viewed as a centre-right party. In addition, there may be less of a difference in ideology between centre-left and centre-right parties. Therefore, it can be suggested that this party structure potentially prevented a strong narrative being pushed and, therefore, less change in the built environment of Zagreb. This is in contrast to Hungary which, over the course of this study and beyond, has

a governing party that can be considered as hard right in Viktor Orbán's Fidesz Party and, therefore, may result in greater opposition from those who do not follow this party.

The approach to the methodology within this study has shown that it is possible to obtain and analyse a significant amount of data within a relatively short space of time. At the outset, fieldwork totalling six weeks may have appeared challenging for a study based entirely in Central Europe. However, the study has captured over 350 sites across the cities, which enabled a comprehensive analysis of themes, patterns and even lack of patterns across sites. This presents two benefits. Firstly, had the study been able to spend a greater number of weeks in each city an even greater number of sites, and therefore findings, would have been captured, which is an interesting possibility. Secondly, it shows that if there are challenges to undertaking large scale research, a comprehensive and successful project can still be undertaken. There can be significant value in a scaled-back approach, challenging the need for extensive and expensive fieldwork.

9.2.5 Impact-Focused Decision Making

Studies such as this allow us to understand the direct impact of heritage decision-making. However, it also allows us to understand the more indirect impacts. For example, the study has presented a number of examples within the cities where late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century monuments have been re-cast or re-interred. The direct impact of this makes the cities appear more historically rooted to citizens and tourists. An indirect impact of these changes can feed a rise in Nationalism, as heritage relating to other cultures is removed to make way for new, national monuments. These changes can equally be because of a rise in Nationalism. In turn, this indirect impact can lead to the disenfranchisement of minority

groups within the cities, who may feel they are not represented, or their representation is reducing. This study does not comment on whether the decision-making behind the sites captured in the database is right or wrong. Instead, this study argues the importance of being aware of the direct and indirect consequences of those decisions so that future decision-making can be informed. For example, post-1989 the German government consulted on how to approach the Berlin Wall, now that the city was reunited. Several options were discussed, involving a number of groups, until a compromise was reached (Dolff-Bonekämper, 2002), which the study suggests in an example of informed decision-making. This approach has proved successful in enabling Berlin to present itself today as ‘The City of Freedom’ (*Berlin Tourismus & Kongress GmbH*, 2017). The reverse of this can be seen in the example of Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain), Zagreb. Apparently moved without consultation and public support, to form part of a larger monument in a different location, the monument is now described as ‘an important, yet nowadays largely forgotten, site of memory from the Croatian Homeland War,’ (Raos, 2012).

It was noted above that this study is not concerned with whether a decision impacting cultural heritage or tangible assets decision is right or wrong. This is important because the impact of the decision will be different depending on the perspective of the viewer. For example, the study has presented instances where Communist heritage has been altered or removed and replaced by, what the decision-making party believe to be, a more appropriate building or monument. In the example of the Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic) being replaced by a modern-day Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace), we can see these values at play. For those in support of the construction of the new Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace), the decision to build is a conscious attempt to create cultural heritage and restore the historic landscape of Berlin. However, the removal of the Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic) to make

way for the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) could be viewed as a destruction of East German heritage by others. This example also supports the study's argument that, as part of understanding the impacts of cultural heritage decisions, the subjective nature of how we engage with our environment should be acknowledged. Not only could the example above represent a reconstruction or destruction of heritage, depending on the perspective of viewer, the definition of cultural heritage is also at question. Those in support of the reconstruction of the Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) may not view the Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic) as cultural heritage, just a building, and will therefore not see its removal as a loss. This shows us that cultural heritage, destruction, reconstruction, and creation are all concepts that we apply to objects around us, based on the value we give them. This is often influenced by the society in which we live and recognising these differences is an important part of the conversation. In discussing the importance of debate and negotiation, Dolff-Bonekämper writes, 'The logic behind the concept of such debates on heritage is that, after the exchange of views, the opposing parties may be in a better position to identify what they disagree about and may perhaps accept some of the adversary's arguments and agree on some points, or gallantly agree to disagree, which is, after all, some kind of consensus' (2010, p. 14).

Whilst the link between heritage and politics has been acknowledged by academics for a number of years (Ashworth, 2007; Holtorf, 2005; Diaz-Andreu & Champion, 1996), this study has shown that the link continues to exist. In addition, the impact of this link is not always considered by the decision-makers who continue to make choices that can have a direct impact on the level of Nationalism within a country and, in turn, the treatment of minority groups. For example, the study has shown that Budapest and Zagreb are historically re-evaluating the cities to appear more historic and focused on the nation, whilst removing heritage that relates to other groups and political associations. In contrast, Berlin focuses

much of its monuments on the victims of the Holocaust and Cold War, and not on Germany as a nation. This is reflective of the stance each country took during the recent European migrant crisis, when outward looking Germany took in thousands of migrants whilst inward looking Hungary and Croatia built fences.

Whilst the decision-making that sits behind cultural heritage sites can have negative impacts, some of which have been discussed above, there are also positive impacts from the ways in which cultural heritage and tangible assets are created and changed. For example, the reconstruction of cultural heritage can have positive impacts on the levels of tourism in a city, providing an important economic benefit. Equally, the increased tourism may help to support charities and research groups associated with museum and exhibitions. Increased tourism and positive focus on a city may also provide political benefits. For example, the treatment of cultural heritage in Berlin could, in part, be credited with the escalation of Germany on the political stage. Whilst there are numerous reasons for this that sit outside the scope of this study, Germany has used the history and heritage of Berlin to declare itself 'The City of Freedom' (*Berlin Tourismus & Kongress GmbH*, 2017). By gifting sections of the Berlin Wall to museums and memorials around the world, Germany is using the wall to reach out to other countries and organising bodies as an ally in the quest for world peace.

9.2.6 Heritage Perpetuates Division

It was discussed earlier in the chapter that a benefit of analysing sites through the lens of history gaps is that it encourages focus on what is not being talked about. This study has presented numerous examples of Communist and Socialist sites being removed and replaced by monuments or buildings with a more national focus. The drive to focus on the nation

occurs most frequently in Zagreb and Budapest and suggests a pattern of behaviour. However, the lens analysis has highlighted that, just because something is removed, it does not mean it goes away, it simply feeds the “other” narrative. As previously mentioned, this can lead to minority groups feeling disenfranchised. This shows us that cultural heritage and other tangible objects within these cities continues to perpetuate division, which has been recognised by scholars such as Viejo-Rose, who writes ‘the construction of war heritage through memorials often gives preference to one group or version of events, to the detriment of others’ (2015a, p.17). In addition, it starts a precedent that, if we do not like something, we can remove it. When conducted on a large scale, the removal of heritage belonging to a particular group can lead to extreme actions. Orte des Erinnerns (Places of Remembrance), a site captured in this study, details the numerous small ways in which Nazi Germany used legislation to gradually withdraw the Jewish Community from German society. From not allowing Jews to keep pets, to preventing German and Jewish children from playing together, to the removal of Jewish publishing houses and bookshops. The legislation became gradually more extreme, culminating in the Holocaust. A more recent example can be seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the town of Zvornik, after destroying mosques and expelling the Bosniak Muslim population, the Serbian mayor declared there were never any mosques in the town (Bevan, 2007, p.7). Whilst these are extreme examples, the potential impact of cultural heritage and tangible asset decision-making should, nevertheless, be acknowledged.

Another consequence of the removal, and even neglect, of sites belonging to another group is that it sends a message of what these cities believe they do not represent. This can further perpetuate division. For example, Hungary erecting a monument to the 1956 Hungarian revolution on the site of a former Stalin monument, not only promotes Hungarian national identity, but it also sends a message that Hungary is no longer associated with Communism

and that Communism cannot return. This further emphasises an East/West divide highlighted in this study.

It was discussed earlier in this chapter that there are a number of direct and indirect impacts of cultural heritage and tangible asset decision-making. The removal and neglect of monuments can lead to political conflict and the main political conflicts are in relation to Fascist and Communist history. Whilst the governments of Zagreb and Budapest do not condone Fascism, they may attempt to justify some Fascist heritage or symbols if it supports their Nationalist and anti-Communist narrative. This can be seen in the use of currency in Croatia. Since 1990, the country has used Kuna currency which is the same currency used by the Fascist Ustaše party. This study has also discussed the neglect and destruction of monuments in Croatia that are linked to the anti-Fascist, Socialist period of Yugoslavia. Whilst the primary aim may be to create a national identity for a newly independent country, the rate at which national monuments are erected, and anti-fascist monuments neglected, feeds Nationalist rhetoric and normalises the far right. During the 2018 football World Cup, Croatian President, Grabar-Kitarovic stated that she enjoys the music of controversial band Thompson, who have been linked with Neo-Nazi groups (*FP*, 2018). There are also examples in Budapest that suggest the treatment of sites is, at times, feeding an increase in Nationalist and far right movements. In recent years, a number of monuments have been erected in Hungary in memory of Miklos Horthy and the Treaty of Trianon, including the monument facing Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) which was discussed in this study. Miklos Horthy was a part-time ally of Nazi Germany and advocated for the return of land Hungary lost after the post-World War One Treaty of Trianon. The rise in the cult of Horthy has coincided with the rise in prominence of far-right political party, Jobbik, who erected their party symbol opposite, and in support of, the statue of Horthy in Szabadság tér (Liberty Square).

9.3 IMPACTS OF THE STUDY

There are three primary impacts of this study. Firstly, the study has contributed to our understanding of how cities are using their tangible assets in order to control their branding and historical narrative. The study has shown the impact this has on the political climate, in addition to how the political climate impacts cultural heritage and tangible asset decision-making. This stresses the importance of understanding the potential consequences of the decisions, as they have a direct impact on citizens and groups. Whilst the study has focused on three capital cities in Central Europe, governments and organisations could undertake similar analysis or review the findings of the study as part of their heritage management planning to understand the potential impacts of their decision-making. The study should be used to inform at the decision-making stage, within towns and cities that are being re-built after conflict, as a way of understanding the potential impacts of those decisions.

The second impact of this study is the identification of a methodology that is intrinsically multi-disciplinary and successful in providing an understanding of the relationship between governments, groups, individuals, and their built environment. The methodology can identify the political direction of travel, for example whether a country is becoming more or less Nationalist, through the treatment of cultural heritage and other objects. This study captured 358 sites during a total of six weeks of field study. It is argued that this methodology, applied over an extended period of field study, would identify an even greater number of themes and impacts. The methodology has further shown that, to understand these impacts in full, it is essential to look outside the scope of traditional cultural heritage and take an approach that allows for the identification of any tangible assets that are being used to steer a political or historic narrative. The methodology could be used practically by governments and

organisations in two ways. Firstly, it is possible to assess the potential impact of cultural heritage and tangible asset decision-making, a forward-looking view. Secondly, it is possible to look backwards at the decisions that have been made historically and assess the impact the decision had on society. In addition to use by governments and organisations within a country, the findings in this study could be used by external bodies to challenge the way countries propose to develop their capital cities and encourage countries to develop in ways that reduce tensions and maximise economic benefits.

The final impact the study has is to further challenge institutional definitions and ways of working. Society and politics continue to evolve and, therefore, we need to apply a methodology that compliments this. Whilst there are benefits to institutional definitions for organisation such as UNESCO, who need to operate in a manner that is relatively stable and with the ability to apply a clear scope, UNESCO's definition of cultural heritage applied to this study would not have achieved the same results.

9.4 FUTURE RESEARCH

This study raises a number of questions that could be addressed through future research. How conscious are governments, groups and individuals of the impact their treatment of cultural heritage and tangible assets has on the historic timeline of a place? Whilst their actions may be conscious, would they take different action had they known the potential impacts? Equally, it would be interesting to understand whether the way a site is perceived today meets the original intentions of the site. For example, when the Berlin government insisted on

preserving sections of the Berlin Wall post-1989, against the wishes of citizens, did they ever envisage the wall one day becoming an international symbol of peace and a site Berliners would protest over to protect?

This study also raises questions as to how far the combined qualitative and quantitative methodology can go. Whilst I advocate for fieldwork as an important way of understanding a place, and value the perspective phenomenology provides, modern technology allows us to explore cities remotely with ever greater virtual reality. A city could be explored and analysed remotely from a qualitative lens perspective, and also catalogued and analysed through a quantitative approach using online satellite and map tools. This could allow for an even larger catalogue of sites to be compiled, enabling a more sophisticated statistical analysis.

The existing combined methodology of this study could be used to support future research in several ways. The methodology could be applied to another geographical region, in order to compare and contrast behaviours across continents. For example, it would be interesting to apply this methodology to capital cities in other continents such as Asia or South America, to compare how the political climate affects the treatment of capital cities. In addition, the methodology could be used on a case-by-case basis to deepen understanding of one particular area and could be applied to regions or towns, in addition to capital cities.

In addition to applying the methodology to different geographical locations, the methodology could be developed further in future research. This study developed over a period of time to capture the less traditional forms of cultural heritage, discussed above. Future research should formalise this by focusing on all tangible assets within a city that are potentially being used to portray a particular narrative at the outset. For example, when reviewing the official tourist website of each city, this study focussed primarily on the museum and heritage sections of the websites. However, future research should take a more holistic view across the websites to

analyse the official tourist narrative. Alongside sites that are more traditionally thought of as heritage, this study has shown that future research should also include people's response to their built environment in the form of protest monuments, graffiti, neglect, and the public's usage of sites (or lack of).

The study has largely focused on the narrative being projected through each city's tangible assets and has presented a number of potential impacts of this, such as a rise in Nationalism. However, the study has raised questions over the public's opinion, where there has not been a clear response to a site. For example, has a site been neglected because the government do not want it promoted, or is the government not promoting the site because there is a lack of interest from the public? Whilst this study suggests it is governments that are driving the agenda at most sites, it would be interesting if future research can uncover the intentions from the government's perspective.

9.5 CONCLUSION

This study has shown that, to understand the processes at work within society, research methodologies should be applied that are process led and intrinsically multi-disciplinary. In addition, it is possible to use such a methodology in order to understand how capital cities are using their built environment to portray a particular narrative. Whilst Berlin, Budapest and Zagreb are unique in their history and presentation of heritage, there are themes that run across these cities that help us to read the cultural heritage and tangible assets of other Central European capital cities, or indeed cities further afield.

APPENDIX A.

Site Dataset

City	Name	Type	City centre location	Road	Previous road	Size	Target audience	Visitor no.	Cost	Time	Date est	Related to a violent death(s)	Site focus	Revolution/War	Established by	Altered over time	On official tourist website	Literature at site	Group negatively portrayed	Hero / Victim	Languages present
Zagreb	Mirogoj Cemetery (as an individual site)	Other				L	Local	<50		>60	19th C	•	Person/group	Multiple	Official body	•	•	•		Hero(s)	Croatian
Zagreb	Grobница narodnih heroja (Tomb of the People's Heroes)	Monument				M	Local	<50		<15	20th C	•	Person/group		Official body	•		•		Hero(s)	Croatian
Zagreb	Glas Hrvatske Žrtve - Zid Boli (The voice of Croatian victims of the wall of pain)	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group	Croatian Homeland War	Individual(s)	•				Victim(s)	Croatian
Zagreb	Cross in Mirogoj	Monument				M	Local	0		<15		•	Person/group	Croatian Homeland War	Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	Palim Hrvatskim vojnicima u prvom svjetskom ratu (The fallen Croatian soldiers in WWI)	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	WWI	Official body			•			Croatian
Zagreb	Hrvatskim žrtvama u Bleiburgu I na križnim putovima 1945 (monument to the victims of Bleiburg and the way of the cross 1945)	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	WWII	Official body					Victim(s)	Croatian
Zagreb	Mjesto njemačkih ratnih grobova (German military cemetery)	Monument				L	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Person/group	WWII	Official body	•		•		Victim(s)	Croatian, German
Zagreb	Žrtvama željezničke nesreće u zagreb (victims of railway accidents in Zagreb 1974)	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event		Official body					Victim(s)	Croatian
Zagreb	Franjo Tuđman's Grave	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Official body	•				Hero(s)	Croatian
Zagreb	Stjepan Radić grave	Other				S	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group		Individual(s)	•					Croatian
Zagreb	Gojko Šušak grave	Other				M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Individual(s)	•					Croatian
Zagreb	Matija Liubek grave	Other				M	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Person/group		Individual(s)	•					Croatian
Zagreb	Bruno Ante Bušić grave	Other				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group		Individual(s)	•					Croatian
Zagreb	Edo Murtić grave	Other				M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/group		Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	Dražen Petrović grave	Other				M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Individual(s)	•					Croatian
Zagreb	Siniša Glavašević grave	Other				S	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group		Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	Rudolf Perešin grave	Other				S	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group		Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	Italian WWI monument	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group	WWI							Other (Italian)
Zagreb	WWII cross monument	Monument				S	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Event	WWII	Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	Mate šola grave	Other				S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Individual(s)	•					Croatian
Zagreb	WWII cross monument	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	WWII	Individual(s)	•					Croatian
Zagreb	Gordan Lederer grave	Other				S	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group		Individual(s)	•					Croatian
Zagreb	Cyrilic Cross	Monument				S	Local	0		<15			Religion								Other (Serbian)
Zagreb	Monument to Jews killed in WWI	Monument				S	Local	0		<15		•	Event	WWI						Victim(s)	Other (Hebrew)

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Zagreb	Monument to Jews - the victims of WWII	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	WWII		•				Victim(s)	Other (Hebrew)
Zagreb	Zagrebačka Katedrala (Zagreb cathedral)	Building	•	Kaptol Ulica (Kaptol Street)		L	Local	<50		<15	Pre 19th C		Religion		Official body	•	•				Croatian, English, German
Zagreb	Sv Marka (St Mark's church)	Building	•	Trg Svetog Marka (St Mark's Square)	Radićev Trg (Radic Square)	M	Local	50-200		<15	Pre 19th C		Religion		Official body	•	•				Croatian, English
Zagreb	Lotrščak Tower	Building	•	Dverce Ulica (Dverce Street)		S	Local	<50	•	15-60	Pre 19th C		Other		Official body		•	•			Croatian, English
Zagreb	Memorijalni Centar Raketiranja Zagreba 1991./1995. (Memorial centre for the shelling of Zagreb 1991/1995)	Exhibition	•	Ulica Frane Petrića (Frane Petric Street)		M	Tourist	0		15-60	21st C	•	Event	Croatian Homeland War	Official body		•	•		Victim(s)	Croatian
Zagreb	Muzej grada Zagreba (Zagreb City Museum)	Exhibition	•	Opatička Ulica (Opatička Street)		L	Tourist	<50	•	>60	20th C		Country/citizens	Multiple	Official body		•	•			Croatian, English
Zagreb	UN civilian and military memorial	Monument		Ulica Rudolfa Fizira (Rudolf Fizir Street)		S	Tourist	0		<15		•	Person/group	Multiple	Official body			•			Croatian, English
Zagreb	Ban Josip Jelačić Statue	Monument	•	Trg bana Josipa Jelačića (Ban Josip Jelačić Square)	Trg Republike (Republic Square)	M	Local	<50		<15	19th C		Person/group		Official body	•	•				
Zagreb	Kralja Tomislava statue	Monument	•	Trg Kralja Tomislava (King Tomislav Square)		M	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Person/group		Official body		•				
Zagreb	Shooting of hostages monument	Monument	•	Trg Kralja Tomislava (King Tomislav Square)	? & 8 Maja (8th May)	M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group	WWII	Official body						
Zagreb	U spomen prosićkim žrtvama 5.XII.1918 (Memorial to victims of December 5th 1918)	Plaque	•	Trg bana Josipa Jelačića (Ban Josip Jelačić Square)	Trg Republike (Republic Square)	M	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Event	WWI	Individual(s)	•				Victim(s)	Croatian
Zagreb	Military prison memorial	Plaque		Nova Ves (New Village)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Other	WWII	Individual(s)	•					Croatian
Zagreb	7th October 1991, rocket attack memorial plaque near Sv Marku.	Plaque	•	Trg Svetog Marka (St Mark's Square)	Radićev Trg (Radic Square)	S	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Event	Croatian Homeland War	Official body	•			•		Croatian
Zagreb	Herman Bolle memorial	Plaque	•	Trg maršala Tita (Marshal Tito Square)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	anti nato/anti capitalism graffiti	Other	•	Trg Marka Marulića		S	Local	0		<15			Other		Individual(s)				•		Croatian
Zagreb	WWI memorial	Plaque		Park Dr Franje Tuđmana (Dr Franjo Tuđman park)		M	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Event	WWI	Official body	•					Croatian
Zagreb	Spomen svibanjskim žrtvama 1995 (Memorial to victims of May 1995)	Plaque	•	Ulica Svibanjskih Žrtava (victims of May street)		M	Local	0		<15		•	Event	Croatian Homeland War	Official body	•			•	Victim(s)	Croatian
Zagreb	Sándor Petöfi memorial	Plaque	•	Vlaška Ulica (Wallachia Street)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Official body	•					Croatian, Hungarian
Zagreb	Monument of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary	Monument	•	Kaptol Ulica (Kaptol Street)		M	Local	<50		<15			Religion		Official body						
Zagreb	Anton Kržan memorial	Plaque	•	Kaptol Ulica (Kaptol Street)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	Stjepan Bakšić memorial	Plaque	•	Kaptol Ulica (Kaptol Street)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	Bible translation monument	Monument	•	Kaptol Ulica (Kaptol Street)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Religion		Individual(s)			•			Croatian
Zagreb	Ivan Marinkovic memorial	Plaque	•	Mikloušića Ulica/Kaptol Ulica (Mikloušića Street/Kaptol Street)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	August Šenoa monument	Monument		Medvegradska Ulica (Medvegradska Street)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Individual(s)			•			Croatian

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Zagreb	Andriji Kačiću monument	Monument	●	Ilica Ulica (Dryer Street)		M	Local	0		<15	19th C		Person/group								Croatian
Zagreb	Rajeni Isus Rimokatolička Crkva	Building	●	Ilica Ulica (Dryer Street)		M	Local	0		<15			Religion		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	Devet pogleda (nine views - Solar system)	Monument	●	Bogovićeve Ulica (Bogovićeve Street) & various		L	Local	0		>60	20th C		Other		Individual(s)						
Zagreb	Petar Preradović monument	Monument	●	Cvjetni Trg (Flower Square)		M	Local	<50		<15	19th C		Person/group								Croatian
Zagreb	Othodox Church	Building	●	Cvjetni Trg (Flower Square)		M	Local	0		<15	19th C		Religion		Official body						
Zagreb	Đuro Stjepan Deželić statue	Monument	●	Frankopanska Ulica (Frankopanska Street)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group			●					Croatian
Zagreb	Izidor Iso Kršnjiavi memorial	Monument	●	Trg maršala Tita (Marshal Tito Square)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Official body			●			Croatian
Zagreb	Sveti Juraj u borbi sa zmajem (St George kills the dragon)	Monument	●	Trg maršala Tita (Marshal Tito Square)		M	Local	0		<15	19th C		Person/group		Official body		●				
Zagreb	Ja Nisam Dobar Otac (I am not a good father graffiti)	Other	●	Savska cesta & Ulica Izidora Kršnjavog (Savska cesta & Izidora Kršnjavog Street)		S	Local	0		<15			Other		Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	Eugen Kumičić memorial	Monument	●	Savska cesta & Ulica Izidora Kršnjavog (Savska cesta & Izidora Kršnjavog Street)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/group			●					Croatian
Zagreb	Marko Marulić poem plaque	Plaque	●	Trg Marko Marulića (Mark Marulić Square)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/group		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	Don Frane Bulić monument	Monument	●	Trg Marko Marulića (Mark Marulić Square)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/group		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	Old Locomotive	Monument	●	Trg Kralja Tomislava (King Tomislav Square)		L	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other					●			Croatian
Zagreb	Homemade street signs	Other	●	Trg Kralja Tomislava (King Tomislav Square)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Other		Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	Model City	Monument	●	Ulica Tome Bakača		M	Tourist	<50		<15	21st C		Country/citizens		Official body			●			Croatian, English
Zagreb	Paviljon Jeka (Jeka Pavilion)	Building				S	Tourist	0		<15	19th C		Other		Official body	●		●			Croatian, English
Zagreb	Obelisk	Monument				S	Tourist	<50		<15	19th C		Other		Official body			●			Croatian, English
Zagreb	Steps monument	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other		Official body						
Zagreb	Meteorological clock	Monument	●	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15	19th C		Other		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	Andrija Medulić bust	Monument	●	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15	19th C		Person/group		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	Knez Krsto Frankapan Bust	Monument	●	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15	19th C		Person/group		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	Ivan Mažuranić bust	Monument	●	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	Juraj Julij bust	Monument	●	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15	19th C		Person/group		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	Nikola Jurišić bust	Monument	●	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15	19th C		Person/group		Official body						Croatian

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Zagreb	Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski bust	Monument	•	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Official body						Croatian	
Zagreb	Rugjer Bošković bust	Monument	•	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/group		Official body							Croatian
Zagreb	J.J. Strossmayer statue	Monument	•	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/group		Official body							Croatian
Zagreb	August Senoa bust	Monument	•	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/group		Official body							Croatian
Zagreb	Dragutin Domjanić bust	Monument	•	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/group		Official body							Croatian
Zagreb	Arheološki muzej u Zagrebu (Archaeological museum in Zagreb)	Exhibition	•	Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog (Nikole Šubića Zrinskog square)		L	Tourist	<50	•	>60	19th C		Country/citizens		Official body		•	•				Croatian, English
Zagreb	Ivo Lola Ribar missing bust	Monument		Park Dr Franje Tuđmana (Dr Franjo Tuđman park)	Trg Francuske Revolucije (French Revolution Square)	S	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group		Official body	•				Hero(s)		Croatian
Zagreb	Kino Europa (Cinema Europe)	Building	•	Varšavska Ulica (Warsaw Street)		M	Local	0			20th C		Other		Individual(s)		•					Croatian
Zagreb	Meštrovićev paviljon (Mestrovic Pavilion)	Exhibition	•	Trg Žrtava fašizma (Victims of Fascism Square)		M	Local	<50	•	15-60	20th C		Other		Official body	•	•	•				Croatian, English
Zagreb	Nikola Tesla statue	Monument	•	Masarykova Ulica		M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/group		Official body							Croatian
Zagreb	Spomen Područje Dotršćina (Memorial Park Dotršćina)	Exhibition		Štefanovec Ulica		L	Local	<50		15-60	20th C	•	Person/group	WWII	Official body	•						Croatian
Zagreb	Dolina Grobova (The Valley of the Graves)	Monument				L	Local	<50		>60	20th C	•	Person/group	WWII	Official body	•		•				Croatian
Zagreb	Spomen-obilježje revolucionarima i domoljubima poginulima u Zagrebu (Memorial to revolutionaries and patriots who fell in Zagreb from 1919 to 1941)	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	Partisan Uprising	Official body	•						Croatian
Zagreb	Spomenik poginulima za na ulicama našega grada (Monument to Those who Died On the Streets of their City)	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/group	WWII	Official body	•						Croatian
Zagreb	Spomen obilježje poginulim Zgarepčanima u NOB-u, 1941 - 1945 (Monument to people of Zagreb Killed in the Liberation Struggle, 1941-1945)	Monument				M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	WWII	Official body	•						
Zagreb	Aleja Hrvatskih Branitelja (Alley of Croatian veterans) sign	Other				S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group	Croatian Homeland War		•						Croatian
Zagreb	Stone monument at Plitvice Lakes.	Monument				S	Local	<50		<15	20th C	•	Other	Partisan Uprising	Individual(s)	•		•				Croatian
Zagreb	Street Art Gallery	Other	•	Ul. Kneza Branimira (Prince Branimir Street)		L	Local	0		15-60	21st C		Other		Individual(s)							Croatian, English
Zagreb	Strossmayer Gallery	Exhibition	•	Zrinjevac		L	Tourist	50-200	•	>60	19th C		Other		Official body		•	•				Croatian, English
Zagreb	1876 Plaque (remembering the founding of a university)	Plaque		Nova Ves (New Village)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other									Croatian
Zagreb	Tkalcic & Barle plaque	Plaque		Nova Ves (New Village)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group		Official body							Croatian
Zagreb	Dove statue	Monument		Mirogoj Cesti (Mirogoj Road)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Religion		Official body							Croatian
Zagreb	Museum of Broken Relationships	Exhibition	•	Čirilometodska Ulica		M	Tourist	<50	•	15-60	21st C		Other		Individual(s)		•	•				Croatian, English
Zagreb	Blue box with flag design	Monument		Park Pravednike među narodima (park of the righteousness amongst		S	Local	0		<15			Other									

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Zagreb	Cardinal Stepinac museum by Zagreb cathedral	Exhibition	●	Kaptol Ulica (Kaptol Street)		S	Tourist	<50		15-60	21st C		Person/group		Official body		●	●			Croatian
Zagreb	Razlistana forma 1960 (by Vojin Bakic)	Monument	●	Gajeva Ulica		S	Tourist	0		<15	20th C		Other		Official body						Croatian
Zagreb	Kotrujevic statue	Monument	●	Pavla Hatza		S	Local	0		<15			Person/group								
Zagreb	Discus Thrower	Monument		Maksimir Cesta		S	Local	0		<15			Person/group								
Zagreb	spomenikom palim borcima NOB-e (monument to the fought fighters of the Yugoslav People's Party by Tomislav Ostoje)	Monument		Park Pravednike među narodima (park of the righteousness amongst	Park Ciglenica	M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group	Partisan Uprising							
Zagreb	1941-1971 monument to the Society of Ciglenica	Monument		Park Pravednike među narodima (park of the righteousness amongst	Park Ciglenica	S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group	Partisan Uprising	Individual(s)	●					Croatian
Zagreb	U spomen na poginule i umrle hrvatske branitelje iz domovinskog rata (Monument to those who fell for the homeland)	Monument		Park Stara Tresnjevka (old Tresnjevka)		S	Local	0		<15		●	Event	Croatian Homeland War	Individual(s)						
Zagreb	Founding of the Croatian Army in 1991 memorial plaque	Plaque		Ulica Kranjčevićeva		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Event		Individual(s)	●					Croatian
Zagreb	Anniversary plaque, commemorating the 10th anniversary of the association of Croatian defenders.	Plaque		Ulica Kranjčevićeva		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/group	Croatian Homeland War	Individual(s)	●					Croatian
Zagreb	Plaque marking the location where a political newspaper was printed	Plaque		Ulica Kucerina		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other								Croatian
Zagreb	Plaque marking the location where Communist party headquarters operated.	Plaque		Ulica Kucerina		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group								Croatian
Zagreb	Plaque to journalist who died in the Homeland war	Plaque	●	Savska Cesta/Farkaša Vukotinovića		M	Local	0		<15	20th C	●	Event	Croatian Homeland War	Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	1966 memorial to journalists who died fighting in the uprising against fascists.	Plaque	●	Savska Cesta/Farkaša Vukotinovića		M	Local	0		<15	20th C	●	Person/group	Partisan Uprising	Individual(s)						Croatian
Zagreb	August Senoa statue	Monument	●	Vlaska Ulica		M	Local	0		<15			Person/group								
Zagreb	1873 gravestone	Monument	●	Ribnjak Park Pond Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/group								Croatian
Zagreb	Crouching statue	Monument	●	Ribnjak Park Pond Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/group								
Zagreb	Ivan Goran Kovačić stone ("and what with us robbed citizens" stickers and candles etc)	Monument	●	Ribnjak Park Pond Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/group			●					Croatian
Zagreb	Fountain on Rokov Perivoj	Monument	●	Rokov Perivoj		S	Local	0		<15			Other								
Zagreb	St George and the Dragon statue	Monument	●	Kamenita Ulica (Stone Street)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/group								
Zagreb	Kamenita Vrata (Stone Gate)	Other	●	Kamenita Ulica (Stone Street)		L	Tourist	<50		<15	Pre 19th C		Religion				●				Croatian
Zagreb	1260/1384 plaque	Plaque	●	Trg Svetog Marka (St Marks Square)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/group								Croatian
Zagreb	Tesla plaque near St Marks	Plaque	●	Čirilometodska Ulica		M	Local	0		<15			Person/group								Croatian
Zagreb	Plaque for the establishment of a charter after 1242 Tartar invasion	Plaque	●	Dverce Ulica		M	Local	0		<15	19th C		Other	Historical							Croatian
Zagreb	Monument of a man (est since 2011)	Monument	●	Jezuitski Trg (Jesuit Square)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/group								

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Zagreb	Stjepan Radic	Monument	●	Jurišićeva Ulica		M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/group								
Zagreb	1956 Ustashe Prison plaque	Plaque	●	Ulica Franje Račkog		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other	Partisan Uprising	Individual(s)						Croatian
Budapest	Terror Haza (Terror house)	Exhibition	●	Andrássy Út (Andrassy Street)	Népköztársaság útja (People's Republic street)	L	Tourist	>200	●	>60	21st C	●	Country/citizens	Multiple	Official body		●	●	●	Victim(s)	Hungarian, English
Budapest	Protest monument	Other	●	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		M	Local	<50		<15	21st C		Other		Individual(s)	●		●	●		Hungarian, various
Budapest	A nemzet megszállás áldozatainak emlékműve (Memorial to the victims of German occupation)	Monument	●	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		M	Tourist	<50		<15	21st C	●	Person/Group	WWII	Official body	●				Victim(s)	Other (Multiple)
Budapest	Soviet War Memorial	Monument	●	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		L	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Person/Group	WWII	Official body					Hero(s)	Hungarian, Russian
Budapest	Ronald Regan statue	Monument	●	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		S	Local	<50		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Official body						English
Budapest	Imre Nagy monument	Monument	●	Vértanúk tere (Martyr Square)	Ságvári tér (Ságvári square)	M	Local	<50		<15	21st C	●	Person/Group		Official body						
Budapest	Bullet holes outside Vidékfejlesztési minisztérium (Ministry of Rural Development)	Monument	●	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C	●	Other	1956 Hungarian Revolution	Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Kossuth Memorial	Monument	●	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		L	Local	<50		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Official body	●					Hungarian
Budapest	Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum (Hungarian National Museum)	Exhibition	●	Múzeum Krt (Museum Boulevard)		L	Tourist	50-200	●	>60	19th C		Country/citizens		Official body		●	●			Hungarian, English
Budapest	1956 memorial in Taban	Monument	●	Off Kereszt köz (cross road)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C	●	Event	1956 Hungarian Revolution	Individual(s)					Hero(s)	Hungarian
Budapest	Raoul Wallenburg memorial	Monument		Szent István Park		S	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Person/Group	WWII	Official body	●					Hungarian
Budapest	WWII Monument	Monument	●	Avar Utca (Avar Street)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C	●	Event	WWII	Official body			●			Hungarian, Russian
Budapest	Monument of the March for life	Monument	●	Március 15 ter (March 15th square)		M	Tourist	<50		<15	21st C	●	Other	Multiple	Official body						Hungarian, English
Budapest	Old/new street sign	Other	●	Piarista Utca (Piarista Street)	Pesti Barnabás utca (Pest Barnabas street)	S	Local	0		<15			Country/citizens		Official body	●					Hungarian
Budapest	Memento Park	Exhibition		Balatonai út (Balaton Street)		L	Tourist	<50	●	>60	20th C		Other	The Cold War	Official body		●	●	●		Hungarian, English
Budapest	Corvin Mozi (Corvin Cinema)	Building	●	Corvin köz (Corvin Place)	Kisfaludy köz (Kisfaludy place)	M	Tourist	<50		15-60	20th C	●	Person/Group	1956 Hungarian Revolution	Individual(s)	●		●	●	Hero(s)	Hungarian
Budapest	Millenium Monument	Monument	●	Hősök tere (Hero Square)		L	Local	50-200		15-60	20th C	●	Person/Group	Multiple	Official body	●	●				Hungarian
Budapest	Időkerék (Time Wheel)	Monument	●	Dózsa György út		M	Tourist	0		<15	21st C		Other		Official body	●		●			Hungarian, English
Budapest	Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom és szabadságharc Emlékműve (Memorial to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence)	Monument	●	Őtvenhatosok tere		M	Tourist	0		<15	21st C	●	Event	1956 Hungarian Revolution	Official body			●			Hungarian, English
Budapest	Buda meets Pest monument	Monument	●	Gellért hegy (Gellert Mountain)		S	Tourist	<50		<15			Country/citizens								
Budapest	Szabadság Szobor (liberty statue)	Monument	●	Gellért hegy (Gellert Mountain)		L	Local	50-200		<15	20th C		Person/Group	WWII	Official body	●	●				Hungarian
Budapest	Turul statue	Monument	●	Varhegy (Castle hill)		S	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Other		Official body						

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Budapest	Budavári palota (Buda castle)	Building	●	Varhegy (Castle hill)		L	Local	>200		15-60	Pre 19th C		Country/citizens		Official body		●				Hungarian, English
Budapest	Statue of the Independence War	Monument	●	Varhegy (Castle hill)		M	Local	0		<15	19th C		Event	Historical	Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Holt trinity column outside Mátyás Templom	Monument	●	Varhegy (Castle hill)		M	Local	<50		<15	Pre 19th C		Religion		Official body						
Budapest	Statue overlooking the Danube	Monument	●	Varhegy (Castle hill)		S	Local	<50		<15			Country/citizens								
Budapest	Matthias Fountain	Monument	●	Varhegy (Castle hill)		M	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Other		Official body						
Budapest	Gróf Bethlen Istvan monument	Monument	●	Szent György utca (St George Street)		M	Local	<50		<15	21st C		Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Oreg Huszár statue	Monument	●	Palota út (Palace Road)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group					●			Hungarian
Budapest	Mátyás Templom	Building	●	Szentháromság tér (Trinity Square)		L	Local	50-200		15-60	Pre 19th C		Religion		Official body	●	●	●			Hungarian
Budapest	Hadik András statue	Monument	●	Úri utca		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group					●			Hungarian
Budapest	XI. Ince Pápa monument	Monument	●	Hess András tér		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Halasz Bastya (Fisherman's Bastion)	Building	●	Varhegy (Castle hill)		L	Local	>200		15-60	20th C		Other		Official body	●	●				
Budapest	Makrisz Agamemnon memorial	Plaque	●	Tárnok utca		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Individual(s)						Hungarian, Other
Budapest	Garden of Philosophy	Monument	●	Gellért hegy (Gellert Mountain)		M	Local	<50		<15	21st C		Other		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Stones on Gellert Hill	Monument	●	Gellért hegy (Gellert Mountain)		M	Local	<50		<15			Other								
Budapest	Gerard of Csanád Monument	Monument	●	Gellért hegy (Gellert Mountain)		L	Local	0		<15	20th C	●	Person/Group		Official body	●	●				
Budapest	A Regnum Marianum memorial	Monument	●	Dvořák sétány		L	Local	0		<15	20th C		Religion		Official body	●		●			Hungarian
Budapest	Memorial tree	Other	●	Városliget (City Park)		L	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other								Hungarian
Budapest	Gallus Anonymus statue	Monument	●	Városliget (City Park)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Károlyi Sándor monument	Monument	●	Városliget (City Park)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								
Budapest	Ahneak Tai memorial	Monument	●	Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Individual(s)			●			Hungarian, Other
Budapest	Kós Károly monument	Monument	●	Városliget (City Park)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Fountain of the fishing children	Monument	●	Varhegy (Castle hill)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other		Official body	●					
Budapest	Sztehlo Gábor monument	Monument	●	Deák Ferenc Tér		M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group				●				Hungarian
Budapest	Szent István Bazilika (St Stephen's Basilica)	Building	●	Szent István tér (St Stephen's square)		M	Local	<50		15-60	20th C		Religion		Official body		●				

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Budapest	Fossil monument	Monument	●	Sas utca (Eagle Street)		M	Local	0		<15			Other								
Budapest	Podmaniczky Frigyes	Monument	●	Arany János utca		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Cyrilic cross in Taban	Monument	●			S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Religion		Official body	●		●			Hungarian, Russian
Budapest	1956 memorial	Monument	●	Hunyadi tér		S	Local	0		<15		●	Event	1956 Hungarian Revolution						Hero(s)	Hungarian
Budapest	Horn Gyula memorial	Plaque		Újpesti rakpart		M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Fejtő Ferenc memorial	Monument		Szent István park		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group			●					Hungarian
Budapest	1970 partizan memorial	Monument		Szent István park		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group	WWII	Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Lukács György monument	Monument		Szent István park		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Zsakhordo monument	Monument		Szent István park		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Missing statue	Monument	●	Jászai mari tér		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other		Official body	●					
Budapest	Arany Janos memorial	Monument		Kozma utca cemetery		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Polish Legion's memorial	Monument		Népliget (People's park)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body						
Budapest	Tinodi monument	Monument		Népliget (People's park)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group		Official body						
Budapest	Francois Mitterand monument	Monument	●	Üllői út (Anvil Road)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Floor monument	Plaque	●	Március 15 tér (March 15 square)		L	Local	<50		<15			Country/citizens					●			Hungarian
Budapest	Cohors-fighters Tar Istvan monument	Monument	●	Március 15 tér (March 15 square)		M	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Event	Historical							Hungarian
Budapest	Hermes Kut monument	Monument	●	Váci utca		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Váci Kapu monument (Pest gate memorial)	Plaque	●	Váci utca		M	Local	0		<15			Other		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	I. Tóth Zoltán monument	Monument	●	Széchenyi István tér		S	Local	0		<15	21st C	●	Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Klapka Gyorgy monument	Plaque	●	District 5		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Bem Jozsef Tabornok monument	Plaque	●	District 5		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body	●		●			Other (Polish)
Budapest	Edward Teller monument	Plaque	●	District 5		M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Dr Gyorki Imre monument	Plaque	●	District 5		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Viruli monument	Monument	●	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		M	Local	0		<15											Hungarian

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Budapest	Szechenyi bust	Monument	●	Október 6 utca (October 6 Street)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Monument to the Hungarian Athletics Club 1875	Monument	●	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Event		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Vertanui monument	Monument	●	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C	●	Person/Group	Historical							Hungarian
Budapest	Harry Hill monument	Monument	●	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group	WWI	Official body	●		●			Hungarian, English
Budapest	Carl Lutz memorial	Monument	●	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group	WWII	Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Multiple busts in Vidékfejlesztési minisztérium (Ministry of Rural Development)	Monument	●	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		S	Local	<50		<15			Other		Official body	●					Hungarian
Budapest	Rákóczi monument	Monument	●	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		M	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body	●					Hungarian
Budapest	Protest outside parliament	Other	●	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		L	Local	<50		<15	21st C		Other		Individual(s)			●	●		Hungarian
Budapest	Tisza Istvan monument	Monument	●	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body	●					Hungarian
Budapest	Parliament	Building	●	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		L	Local	50-200		15-60	20th C		Country/citizens		Official body	●	●				
Budapest	Haydn Monument	Monument	●	Atilla Ut		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Angelo Rotta Plaque	Plaque	●	Disz tér (Space Square)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body	●					Hungarian
Budapest	Koszorú Ferenc bust	Monument	●	Anjou Bastya		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Official body	●					Hungarian
Budapest	Abdurrahman Abdi monument	Monument	●	Anjou Bastya		S	Local	0		<15	20th C	●	Person/Group	Historical	Individual(s)					Hero(s)	Hungarian, Other
Budapest	Európa Liget (Europe Park)	Exhibition	●	Európa Liget (Europe Park)		M	Local, Tourist	0		<15	20th C		Other		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Hedyigis monument	Monument	●	Európa Liget (Europe Park)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Other (Latin)
Budapest	Gyula Maugsch Bear Statue	Monument	●	Európa Liget (Europe Park)		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Budavar Felszabadításának	Monument	●	Bécsikapu tér (Vienna Gate Square)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Country/citizens		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Hadtörténelmi Levéltár (Military History Archives)	Plaque	●	Kapisztrán tér		S	Local	0	●	<15	21st C		Other			●					Hungarian
Budapest	Jenő & Árpád plaque	Plaque	●	Kapisztrán tér		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	Kapisztrán statue	Monument	●	Kapisztrán tér		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Hadtörténelmi Múzeum (Museum of Military History)	Exhibition	●	Kapisztrán tér		L	Local, Tourist	<50		>60	20th C	●	Country/citizens	Multiple	Official body		●	●			Hungarian, English
Budapest	Mária Magdolna Templom (Church of Mary Magdalene)	Building	●	Kapisztrán tér		M	Local	<50		15-60	Pre 19th C		Religion		Official body	●	●				Hungarian, English
Budapest	Dohány Street Synagogue	Building	●	Dohány utca		L	Local	50-200		15-60	Pre 19th C		Religion		Official body		●	●			Hungarian, English, Other

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Budapest	Tree of Life - Memorial of the Hungarian Jewish Martyrs	Monument	•	Dohány utca		M	Tourist	50-200		<15	20th C	•	Event	WWII	Official body						Hungarian, Other	
Budapest	Ghetto Memorial Wall	Exhibition	•	Dohany utca		M	Tourist	<50		<15	21st C	•	Event	WWII	Official body			•			Hungarian, English, Other	
Budapest	Holokauszt Emlékközpont (Holocaust Memorial Centre)	Exhibition	•	Páva Utca (Peacock Street)		L	Tourist	<50	•	>60	21st C	•	Event	WWII	Official body		•	•		Victim(s)	Hungarian, English, Other	
Budapest	Jobbik double barred cross	Monument	•	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Other		Individual(s)							
Budapest	Miklós Horthy bust	Monument	•	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Individual(s)						Hungarian	
Budapest	Teleki Blanka plaque	Plaque	•	Szabadság tér (Freedom Square)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian	
Budapest	Attila József statue	Monument	•	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian	
Budapest	Andrássy Gyula statue	Monument	•	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		M	Local	<50		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Official body	•					Hungarian	
Budapest	IN MEMORIAM 1956 October 25th	Exhibition	•	Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		M	Local, Tourist	<50		15-60	21st C	•	Event	1956 Hungarian Revolution	Official body			•	•	Victim(s)	Hungarian, English	
Budapest	Dr Román András plaque	Plaque	•	Near Kossuth Lajos tér (Lajos Kossuth Square)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian	
Budapest	Stolpersteine (Stumbling blocks)	Monument	•	Multiple		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group	WWII	Individual(s)						Hungarian	
Budapest	Shoes on the Danube	Monument	•	Id. Antall József rkp.		M	Local, Tourist	<50		<15	21st C	•	Event	WWII	Official body	•	•		•	Victim(s)	English	
Budapest	Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)	Exhibition		Fiumei úti (Fiume Road)		L	Local	<50		>60	Pre 19th C	•	Person/Group	Multiple	Official body						Hungarian, Other	
Budapest	1956 Graves	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	1956 Hungarian Revolution		•					Hungarian	
Budapest	Abstract monument	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		S	Local	0		<15												
Budapest	Szovjet Katonai Emlékhely (Soviet Military Memorial Site)	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		L	Local	<50		<15	21st C	•	Person/Group	Multiple	Official body							Hungarian, Russian
Budapest	Világháboruban életüket vesztett magyarok emlékére (in memory of the Hungarians who lost their lives in WWII)	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		M	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Person/Group	WWII	Official body							Hungarian
Budapest	József Antall grave monument	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group					•			Hungarian	
Budapest	Ferenc Mádl grave monument	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		S	Local	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group					•			Hungarian	
Budapest	Mór Jókai grave monument	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group								Hungarian	
Budapest	István Bethlen monument	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian	
Budapest	örök dicsőség a magyar tanácsköztársaság 1919-ben kivégzett vörös karhatalmista mártirjainak (Monument to the red army of the Hungarian People's Party executed in 1919)	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/Group	WWI							Hungarian	
Budapest	Mihály Károlyi monument	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group								Hungarian	
Budapest	Kossuth Lajos monument	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		L	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian	

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Budapest	örök dicsőség a magyar tanácsköztársaság 1919-ben kivégzett vörös karhatalmista mártírjainak (in the memory of the heroes and victims of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence in an unknown place)	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		M	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Person/Group	1956 Hungarian Revolution	Individual(s)					Victim(s)	Hungarian
Budapest	A Kommunizmusért a népért éltek (they lived for Communism for the people)	Monument		Fiumei úti nemzeti sírkert (Fiume Road National Graveyard)		L	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Billboard Exhibition	Exhibition		Ötvenhatosok tere (56's Square)		M	Local	<50		15-50	21st C		Other		Official body						Hungarian, English
Budapest	Olof Palme	Monument		Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15		•	Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Abstract Monument	Monument		Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15											
Budapest	Pósa Lajos Monument	Monument		Városliget (City Park)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Benedek Elek Monument	Monument		Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Füst Milán Monument	Monument	•	Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Somlyó Zoltan Kolto Monument	Monument	•	Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Mitterpascher Lajos Monument	Monument	•	Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Tessedik Samuel Monument	Monument	•	Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Nagyváthy János Monument	Monument	•	Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Pethe Ferenc Monument	Monument	•	Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Achim L. Andras Monument	Monument	•	Városliget (City Park)		S	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Alpár Ignác Monument	Monument	•	Városliget (City Park)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Jean-Pierre Pedrazzini	Monument	•	II. János Pál pápa tér		S	Local	0		<15		•	Person/Group	1956 Hungarian Revolution							Hungarian, Other
Budapest	Mária terézia Budapesti Háziczred (Mary Therese is the Budapest Homelands)	Monument	•	Baross Utca		M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•									Hungarian, Other
Budapest	Maléter Pál	Plaque	•			M	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Event	1956 Hungarian Revolution	Official body						Hungarian
Budapest	az 1956-os forradalom és szabadságharc (the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence)	Plaque	•			S	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	1956 Hungarian Revolution	Official body					Hero(S)	Hungarian
Budapest	1956 Monument	Monument	•	Bakáts tér		M	Local	0		<15	21st C	•	Event	1956 Hungarian Revolution						Hero(S)	Hungarian
Budapest	Imre Kálmán Statue	Monument	•	Nagymező Utca		M	Local, Tourist	0		<15			Person/Group					•			Hungarian, English
Budapest	Ezen a sétányon a halhatatlanok társulata örökös tagjainak lábnyomai láthatók (this promenade shows the footsteps of the eternal members of the company of immortals)	Exhibition	•	Nagymező Utca		L	Local, Tourist	<50		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	1956 Lengyelország Magyarország (Poland-Hungary 1956)	Exhibition	•	Károly Krt		M	Local, Tourist	<50		15-60	21st C	•	Event	1956 Hungarian Revolution	Official body			•	•		Hungarian, English
Budapest	Gábor Ferenc	Plaque	•	Hold Utca (Moon Street)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body						Hungarian

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Budapest	Batthyány Lajos	Monument	●	Hold Utca (Moon Street)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								Hungarian
Budapest	Vák Bottyan	Monument	●	Andrássy Út (Andrassy Street)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								
Budapest	Zrinyi Miklos	Monument	●	Andrássy Út (Andrassy Street)		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								
Berlin	Weltzeituhr (World Clock)	Other	●	Alexanderplatz (Alexander Place)		L	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other								German
Berlin	Gedenkstätte Berliner Mauer (Berlin Wall Memorial)	Exhibition	●	Bernauer Straße (Bernauer Street)		L	Local, tourist	50-200		>60	20th C	●	Person/Group	The Cold War	Official body	●	●	●	●		German, English
Berlin	Bernauer Strasse Documentation centre	Exhibition	●	Bernauer Straße (Bernauer Street)		L	Local, tourist	>200		15-60	20th C	●	Country/citizens	The Cold War	Official body		●	●	●		German, English
Berlin	Nordbahnhof Gallery	Exhibition	●	Gartenstraße (Yard Rd)		S	Local, tourist	<50		15-60	21st C		Country/citizens	The Cold War	Official body		●	●	●		German, English
Berlin	Haus am Checkpoint Charlie	Exhibition	●	Zimmerstraße / Friedrichstraße (Room road / Friedrich road)		L	Local, tourist	>200	●	>60	20th C	●	Person/Group	The Cold War	Individual(s)		●	●	●		Other (Multiple)
Berlin	DDR Museum	Exhibition	●	Karl-Liebknecht Strasse (Karl-Liebknecht Road)		L	Local, tourist	50-200	●	>60	21st C		Country/citizens	The Cold War	Official body		●	●			German, English
Berlin	East Side Gallery	Exhibition	●	Mühlenstrasse (Mills Road)		L	Local	>200		15-60	20th C		Other	The Cold War	Official body	●	●	●	●		Other (Multiple)
Berlin	Fall of the wall preview exhibition	Exhibition	●	Mühlenstrasse (Mills Road)		M	Local, tourist	<50	●	15-60	21st C	●	Event	The Cold War	Official body			●	●		German, English
Berlin	Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church	Building	●	Breitscheidplatz (Breitscheid place)		M	Local	50-200		15-60	19th C		Religion	WWII	Official body	●	●	●			German, English
Berlin	Parlament der Bäume (Parliament of Trees)	Exhibition	●	Adele-Scheiber-Krieger Strasse (Adele-Scheiber-Krieger road)		M	Local, tourist	0			20th C	●	Person/Group	The Cold War	Individual(s)		●				Other (Multiple)
Berlin	Orte des Erinnerns (Places of Remembrance)	Exhibition	●	Bayerischer Platz (Bavarian place)		L	Local, tourist	<50		>60	20th C	●	Person/Group	WWII	Individual(s)			●	●		German
Berlin	The Reichstag (Parliament)	Building	●	Platz der Republik (place of the Republic)		L	Local	>200		>60	19th C		Country/citizens		Official body	●	●	●			German, English
Berlin	The Story of Berlin	Exhibition	●	Kurfürstendamm (Electors way/embankment)		L	Local, tourist	<50	●	>60	20th C	●	Country/citizens	Multiple	Official body		●	●	●		German, English
Berlin	Sowjetisches Ehrenmal Treptow (Soviet War Memorial Treptow)	Monument	●	Puschkinallee / Am Treptower pk (Pushkin Avenue / at the Treptower)		L	Local	<50		15-60	20th C	●	Person/Group	WWII	Official body	●	●	●			German, English, Russian
Berlin	Weißer Kreuze (White Crosses)	Monument	●	Ebertstrasse / Friedrich Ebert Platz (Ebert street / Friedrich Ebert place)		S	Local, Tourist	<50		15-60	20th C	●	Person/Group	The Cold War	Individual(s)	●	●				
Berlin	Soviet war memorial in Tiergarten	Monument	●	Strasse des 17 Juni (17th June street)		L	Local	<50		<15	20th C	●	Person/Group	WWII	Official body	●	●				German, Russian
Berlin	Ronald Regan memorial	Plaque	●	Strasse des 17 Juni (17th June street)		M	Tourist	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group	The Cold War	Official body						German, English
Berlin	Denkmal für die Opfer der Sinti und Roma des Nationalsozialismus (Memorial to the Sinti and Roma victims of national socialism)	Monument	●	Strasse des 17 Juni (17th June street)		M	Tourist	<50		<15	21st C	●	Person/Group	WWII	Official body		●	●	●	Victim(s)	German, English
Berlin	Brandenburger Tor (Brandenburg Gate)	Monument	●	Pariser Platz (Parisian Place)		L	Local	50-200		<15	Pre 19th C		Other		Official body	●	●	●			
Berlin	Reiterstandbild König Friedrich II von Preussen (Equestrian statue)	Monument	●	Unter den Linden (Under the Linden (trees))		M	Local	<50		<15	19th C		Person/Group		Official body	●					
Berlin	Neue Wache (New Sentry)	Monument	●	Unter den Linden (Under the Linden (trees))		L	Local	<50		<15	19th C	●	Person/Group	Multiple	Official body	●	●			Victim(s)	

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Berlin	Stadtschloss/ Humboldtforum	Building	•	Unter den Linden (Under the Linden (trees))		L	Local	<50		<15	Pre 19th C		Country/citizens		Official body	•	•	•			
Berlin	Wall and watch tower site between East Side and Treptower	Exhibition		Puschkinallee (Pushkin Avenue)		S	Local, tourist	0		<15	21st C		Other	The Cold War	Official body	•		•			German, English
Berlin	Stolpersteine (Stumbling blocks)	Monument	•	Multiple		S	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/Group	WWII	Individual(s)		•			Victim(s)	German
Berlin	Pfad der Visionäre (Path of Visionaries)	Plaque	•	Mehring platz (Mehring place)	Belle-Alliance Platz	M	Local, tourist	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group		Official body						Other (Multiple)
Berlin	Berliner Fernsehturm	Building	•	Alexanderplatz (Alexander Place)		L	Tourist	0	•	<15	20th C		Other		Official body		•				German
Berlin	BlackBox Kalter Krieg (Cold War)	Exhibition	•	Friedrichstrasse (Friedrich Street) / Zimmerstrasse (Room Street)		L	Tourist	50-200	•	15-60	21st C		Event	The Cold War	Official body		•	•	•		German, English
Berlin	Jüdisches Museum Berlin (Jewish Museum Berlin)	Exhibition	•	Lindenstraße		L	Tourist	50-200	•	>60	21st C	•	Person/Group	WWII	Official body		•	•	•	Victim(s)	German, English, Other
Berlin	Berlin Clock	Monument	•	Budapester Straße (Budapest Street)		M	Tourist	0		<15	20th C		Other		Official body						
Berlin	Monuments by Oberbaumbrücke	Monument	•	May-Ayim-Ufer		M	Tourist	<50		<15			Other								
Berlin	Berlin Wall section outside Parliament	Monument	•	Friedrich-Ebert Platz		S	Tourist	<50		<15	20th C		Country/citizens	The Cold War	Official body	•		•			German, Other
Berlin	Memorial trees in Tiergarten	Other	•	Straße des 17. Juni (Street of 17th June)		M	Local	0		<15			Other					•			German
Berlin	Statue opposite Brandenburg gate	Monument	•	Ebertstraße		M	Local	0		<15			Person/Group								
Berlin	Anhalter Bahnhof	Monument	•	Askaniischer Platz		M	Local	<50		<15	19th C		Event	WWII	Official body	•		•	•		German, English
Berlin	Pogromnacht memorial	Monument	•	Koppenplatz		S	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Person/Group	WWII	Official body						German
Berlin	The Missing House	Monument	•	Grosse Hamburger Strasse (Great Hamburger Street)		M	Local	<50		<15	20th C	•	Person/Group	WWII	Individual(s)	•					German
Berlin	Sophienkirche	Building	•	Grosse Hamburger Strasse (Great Hamburger Street)		M	Local	<50		<15	Pre 19th C		Religion		Official body	•	•				German, English
Berlin	Plaque outside Alter Jüdischer Friedhof (Old Jewish Cemetery)	Plaque	•	Grosse Hamburger Strasse (Great Hamburger Street)		S	Local	<50		<15		•	Event	WWII		•			•		
Berlin	Holocaust Memorial	Monument	•	Grosse Hamburger Strasse (Great Hamburger Street)		S	Local	<50		<15			Event	WWII		•	•				
Berlin	Alter Jüdischer Friedhof (Old Jewish Cemetery)	Other	•	Grosse Hamburger Strasse (Great Hamburger Street)		L	Local	<50		<15	Pre 19th C		Person/Group		Official body		•	•			German, Other
Berlin	Peace Wall	Other	•	Grosse Hamburger Strasse (Great Hamburger Street)		M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Other		Official body			•			German, English
Berlin	Fountain outside Planterwald Sbahn	Other		Am Planterwald		M	Local	0		<15			Other								
Berlin	Monument outside Planterwald Ubahn	Monument		Am Planterwald		S	Local	0		<15			Other								
Berlin	Monument near Frankfurter Allee	Monument		Frankfurteralle / Möllendorffstrasse		S	Local	0		<15			Other								
Berlin	Plaque on Levetzow Strasse	Plaque	•	Levetzowstrasse		M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	WWII		•			•		German

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Berlin	Deportation Monument	Monument	•	Levetzowstrasse		M	Local	0		<15	20th C	•	Event	WWII		•					German
Berlin	Tränenpalast (Palace of Tears)	Exhibition	•	Reichstagufer		M	Local, tourist	50-200		15-60	20th C	•	Country/citizens	The Cold War	Official body		•	•		Victim(s)	German, English
Berlin	Züge in das leben, züge in den tod (Trains to life, trains to death)	Monument	•	Georgenstrasse (Georges Street)		M	Local, tourist	0		<15	21st C		Person/Group	WWII		•	•				German, English
Berlin	Plaque on Rosenstrasse	Plaque	•	Rosenstrasse (Roses Street)		M	Local	0		<15			Event	WWII				•		Victim(s)	German
Berlin	Bench Monument	Monument	•	Rosenstrasse (Roses Street)		S	Local	0		<15			Other								
Berlin	Block der Frauen (Block of Woman)	Monument	•	Rosenstrasse (Roses Street)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Event	WWII		•	•	•			German
Berlin	Marx & Engels monument	Monument	•	Marx Engels Platz		M	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body	•	•				
Berlin	Stones marking distance to New York	Other	•	Platz der Vereinten Nationen (United Nations Square)	Lenin Platz (Lenin Place)	L	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other			•		•			German
Berlin	Gedenkstätte der deutschen interbrigadisten spanien (Monument to International Brigades in Spain)	Monument		Volkspark (National Park)		M	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Person/Group	WWII							German
Berlin	Bunker Hill	Other		Volkspark (National Park)		L	Local	<50		15-60	20th C		Other		Official body	•					
Berlin	Georg Elser monument	Monument	•	Wilhelmstrasse		M	Tourist	0		<15	21st C	•	Person/Group		Official body			•	•	Victim(s)	German, English
Berlin	Fuerst Leopold von Dessau	Monument	•	Mohrenstrasse		S	Local	0		<15	Pre 19th C		Person/Group		Official body	•					German, English, Other
Berlin	General der Cavallerie von Zienten	Monument	•	Mohrenstrasse		S	Local	0		<15	Pre 19th C		Person/Group		Official body	•					German, English, Other
Berlin	Jakob von Kieth	Monument	•	Mohrenstrasse		S	Local	0		<15	Pre 19th C		Person/Group		Official body	•					German, English, Other
Berlin	Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz	Monument	•	Mohrenstrasse		S	Local	0		<15	Pre 19th C		Person/Group		Official body	•					German, English, Other
Berlin	Kurt Christoph Graf von Schwerin	Monument	•	Mohrenstrasse		S	Local	0		<15	Pre 19th C		Person/Group		Official body	•					German, English, Other
Berlin	Hans Carl von Winterfeldt	Monument	•	Mohrenstrasse		S	Local	0		<15	Pre 19th C	•	Person/Group		Official body	•					German, English, Other
Berlin	Graves in Tierpark	Other		Tierpark (Zoo)		M	Local	0		<15	19th C		Person/Group		Individual(s)			•			German
Berlin	Berlin Wall section outside Potsdamer Platz ubahn	Monument	•	Potsdamer Platz		S	Tourist	<50		<15	20th C		Other	The Cold War	Official body						
Berlin	Wall section in Potsdamer Platz	Monument	•	Potsdamer Platz		S	Tourist	<50		<15	20th C		Other	The Cold War	Official body	•					
Berlin	Deutsches Spionagemuseum (German Spy Museum)	Exhibition	•	Leipziger Platz		L	Tourist	50-200	•	>60	21st C		Other		Individual(s)		•	•			German, English
Berlin	Spree Park	Other		Wasserweg		L	Local	<50		15-60	20th C		Other		Individual(s)	•					
Berlin	Stasimuseum Berlin (Stasi Museum Berlin)	Exhibition		Ruschestrasse		L	Tourist	50-200		>60	20th C	•	Other	The Cold War	Official body		•	•	•	Victim(s)	German, English
Berlin	Luftbrückendenkmal (Airlift Memorial)	Monument		Platz der Luftbrücke		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Event	The Cold War	Official body		•	•			German, English, Other

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Berlin	Flughafen Berlin-Tempelhof (Tempelhof Airport Berlin)	Building		Tempelhoferdamm / Columbiadamm		L	Local, tourist	>200		>60	20th C		Other		Official body	•	•	•	•		German, English
Berlin	Denkmal für die ermordeten Reichstagsabgeordneten (Memorial to the murdered members of the Reichstag)	Monument	•	Platz der Republik (place of the Republic)		S	Tourist	<50		<15	20th C	•	Person/Group	WWII	Official body				•	Victim(s)	German, English
Berlin	Protest monument outside The Reichstag	Other	•	Platz der Republik (place of the Republic)		M	Tourist	<50		<15	21st C		Other		Individual(s)				•		German, English, Russian
Berlin	The Wall Panorama	Exhibition	•	Zimmerstrasse		L	Tourist	50-200	•	15-60	21st C		Other	The Cold War	Official body		•	•			German, English
Berlin	Siegessäule (Victory Column)	Monument	•	Großer Stern (Great Star)		L	Local	<50		15-60	19th C		Event	Historical	Official body	•	•	•			German, English
Berlin	Albrecht Graf Von Roon Statue	Monument	•	Großer Stern (Great Star)		M	Local	<50		<15	19th C		Person/Group		Official body						
Berlin	Bismark Statue	Monument	•	Großer Stern (Great Star)		M	Local	<50		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body						
Berlin	Helmuth Moltke Statue	Monument	•	Großer Stern (Great Star)		M	Local	0		<15	19th C		Person/Group		Official body						
Berlin	Places of remembrance and reconciliation in Berlin (information boards)	Exhibition	•	Strasse des 17 Juni (17th June street)		M	Tourist	<50		15-60	21st C		Event	WWII	Official body			•	•	Victim(s)	German, English, Russian
Berlin	Lion Statue	Monument	•	Tiergarten (Zoo)		M	Local	0		<15	19th C		Other		Official body						
Berlin	Das Globale Stein Projekt (Global Stone Project)	Monument	•	Tiergarten (Zoo)		M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Other		Individual(s)			•			Other (Multiple)
Berlin	Bethoven Monument	Monument	•	Tiergarten (Zoo)		M	Local	0		<15	20th C		Person/Group		Official body			•			German, English
Berlin	Goethe monument	Monument	•	Tiergarten (Zoo)		M	Local	<50		<15	19th C		Person/Group		Official body			•			German, English
Berlin	Denkmal für die im Nationalsozialismus verfolgten Homosexuellen (Memorial to Homosexuals persecuted under Nazism)	Monument	•	Tiergarten (Zoo)		M	Local	<50		<15	21st C	•	Person/Group	WWII	Official body		•		•	Victim(s)	German, English
Berlin	Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas (Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe - in information centre)	Monument	•	Behrenstraße / Ebertstraße / Hannah Arendt Straße / Cora Berliner Straße		L	Local, tourist	50-200	•	>60	21st C	•	Person/Group	WWII	Official body		•	•	•	Victim(s)	German, English
Berlin	Topographie des Terrors (Topography of Terror)	Exhibition	•	Wilhelmstrasse		L	Tourist	>200		>60	21st C	•	Event	WWII	Official body	•	•	•	•	Victim(s)	German, English
Berlin	die Mauerskulpturen 1992 (The Wall Skulptures 1992)	Monument	•	Niederkirchnerstrasse		S	Local	0		<15	20th C		Other	The Cold War	Official body						German
Berlin	Comic book plaques	Plaque	•	Niederkirchnerstrasse		M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Country/citizens	The Cold War					•		German
Berlin	Die Liebenden monument (the loving ones)	Monument	•	Puschkinalle (in Rosengarten)		M	Local	0		<15	21st C		Other								German
Berlin	Bebelplatz memorial	Monument	•	Bebelplatz	Opernplatz Opera Place)	S	Tourist	<50		<15	20th C		Event	WWII	Official body		•	•			German
Berlin	Deutsches Historisches Museum (German History Museum)	Exhibition	•	Unter den Linden (Under the Linden (trees))		L	Tourist	>200	•	>60	20th C		Country/citizens		Official body		•	•			German, English
Berlin	Humboldtforum exhibition	Exhibition	•	Unter den Linden (Under the Linden (trees))		L	Tourist	50-200		15-60	21st C		Other		Official body		•	•			German, English

APPENDIX B.

Site Dataset Key

Category	Breakdown of category	Relevance/notes	Source of information
TYPE	Monument	Exhibition – Sites the visitor would walk around, including memorial parks and museums.	Fieldwork.
	Building	Plaque – Wall and floor plaques.	
	Exhibition	Other – Sites that do not fit into the categories above, such as graffiti or protests.	
	Plaque	Building - primary purpose is building, inc religious buildings that may also have exhibitions	
	Other		
CITY CENTRE LOCATION	Bullet to indicate yes, blank to indicate no or unknown	This category is differentiating between sites located in the city centre and sites located further out, but still in the capital city limits.	Fieldwork and maps.
		*Note: answer based on my experience of the city. Berlin	
ROAD	Original name and translation. Blank if unknown or multiple, n/a if site not on a road.	To see if there may be a link between the site and the road the site is located on.	Fieldwork and maps.
PREVIOUS ROAD	Original name and translation.	To see, if the name has changed, whether there is a link to the site and/or a historical event.	Old maps. Map dates vary however they are dated 1960-1989
	n/a = no change or site not on a road.		
	Unknown = Not known what the previous name was or if there		
SIZE	Small (S)	Directly linked to the type of site. For example, a monument categorised as small means the site is small in comparison to other monuments.	Fieldwork
	Medium (M)	- Monument: (S) smaller than a car; (M) larger than a car; (L) larger than a building.	
	Large (L)	- Building: (S) approx. house size; (M) larger than a standard house; (L) larger than a public building.	
		- Exhibition: (S) smaller than a house; (M) approx. house size; (L) larger than a standard house.	
		- Plaque: (S) approx. A4; (M) larger than A4; (L) larger than a door. - Other: (S) approx. A4; (M) larger than a person; (L) larger than a house.	
TARGET AUDIENCE	Local	Perceived intended target audience when the site was established.	Fieldwork and desktop research. I have drawn my conclusions largely based on the languages present, whether the site is on the official tourist website and the function of the site.
	Tourist	- Local refers to sites with a public function as well as sites deemed to be targeted at the local population.	
	Blank if unknown	- Tourist refers to sites where the primary function is to entertain or educate tourist both local and visiting.	
VISITOR NO'S	0 (no visitors seen)	Approximations based on counting people in an area of the site and multiplying.	Fieldwork
	<50	Numbers taken at a moment in time in order to roughly suggest the popularity of sites.	
	50-200		
	>200		
COST	Bullet to indicate yes, blank to indicate no or unknown	Cost to enter or visit the site.	Fieldwork
TIME	<15 (min)	This is the approximate time it takes to visit the site, in order to see all elements of the site.	Fieldwork
	15-60 (min)		
	>60 (min)		
DATE EST	Date	Date the site was originally established.	Fieldwork and desktop research.
	Blank if unknown		
RELATED TO VIOLENT DEATH(S)	bullet to indicate yes, blank to indicate no or unknown	This refers to whether the site is directly related to a person/persons who suffered a violent death where there was an intention to cause harm. I am not including accidents such as a car accident or a fall.	Fieldwork and desktop research.

Category	Breakdown of category	Relevance/notes	Source of information
FOCUS	Country/citizens - including city	Categories have been determined by what is most clearly referred to when visiting the site, or by desktop research if the focus is not clear at the site. For each site I have noted which is the clearest reference and determined the categories backwards, rather than listing common categories and fitting the sites into those categories. For memorial's I have tried to determine who/what the memorial is dedicated to. For example, if a memorial is dedicated to people who died during a specific event, I have selected the focus as those people, rather than the event. I have tried to categorise from the perspective of a tourist or visitor, and separate my knowledge of the history of a site. I have translated dedications if it is required to get an understanding of the site. I have noted (below) the languages to provide an understanding as to whether the site is designed for locals or with tourists in mind.	Fieldwork and desktop research.
	Person/group	Site focus is the current focus of the site. If this has changed over time it will be captured in 'has the site been altered,' below.	
	Event	Event refers to specific dates/event mentioned not, for example, deportations in general. In this instance it would be classed as 'person/group' as it is linked to the persecution of those people.	
	Religion		
	Other	Other or unknown/unclear	
REVOLUTION/WAR	1956 Hungarian Revolution		Fieldwork and desktop research.
	The Cold War		
	Historical		
	Croatian Homeland War		
	Partisan Uprising	Although technically a WWII resistance movement, the uprising has been included in order to assess the significance of a number of monuments dedicated to the movement/resistance.	
	WWI		
EST BY WHO (IF KNOWN)	Individual(s) - inc smaller groups of individuals	e.g. veterans group or community group. This also includes smaller organisation without State funding or support.	Fieldwork and desktop research. There is a degree of assumption in the categories. For example, if a site established by a group appears on the official tourist website, I am assuming the site has been endorsed by the state.
	Official body	e.g. established by the Government or an organisation with State support/permission. This includes internal bodies, such as a research foundation and external bodies, such as the United Nation	
	Blank if unknown	Should note who originally established the site, even if it has since been moved/altered by another party	
ALTERED OVER TIME	Bullet to indicate yes, blank to indicate no or unknown	Altered refers to any intentional change, from complete rebuilding to a change in memorial focus and sites that have been added to and adorned. I have not included changes that would be expected, such as a museum changing its displays or a grave that has flowers planted (however i would include graves that have larger wreaths and may have been visited by someone other than family members.	Fieldwork and desktop research.
ON OFFICIAL TOURIST WEBSITE	Bullet to indicate yes, blank to indicate no or unknown		Desktop research.
LITERATURE AT SITE	Bullet to indicate yes, blank to indicate no or unknown	Literature refers to any words in addition to a simple explanation or name for the site. This could be in the form of a plaque, signs or leaflets.	Fieldwork

Category	Breakdown of category	Relevance/notes	Source of information
GROUP NEGATIVELY PORTRAYED	Bullet to indicate yes, blank to indicate no or unknown		Fieldwork and desktop research.
HERO/ VICTIM/ VILLAIN	Hero(s)	This refers to sites that explicitly refer to a person(s) or group in one of these categories. It does not refer to sites that could be interpreted in such as way, depending on the perspective of the viewer.	Fieldwork and desktop research.
	Victim(s)		
	Blank to indicated no reference		
LANGUAGES PRESENT	Croatian	Provides insight into the intended target audience for the site.	Fieldwork: languages present at the site, including official signposts.
	German	Up to 3 languages present - each language is listed	
	Hungarian	>3 languages present - Other (multiple)	
	Russian		
	English		
	Other (specify)		
	Blank to indicate no text or unknown		

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