

Towards a Common Vision of Climate Security in KENYA

November 2022



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



AUDA-NEPAD
AFRICAN UNION DEVELOPMENT AGENCY



ClimBeR: Building Systemic Resilience Against Climate Variability and Extremes



FOCUS
Climate Security

Authors

Leonardo Medina^{1,2}, Anna Belli², Giulia Caroli², Tanaya DuttaGupta², Joram Tarusarira³, Frans Schapendonk², Adam Savelli², George Wamukoya⁴, Sunday Sokello Angoma⁵, Linda Ogallo⁶, Patricia Nying'uro⁷, Monicah Kinuthia⁸, Amos Onchiri Anyieni⁹, Stephen Omware¹⁰, Maurine Ambani¹¹, Dickson Kithinji¹², Johnathan James Hellin¹³, Ana Maria Loboguerrero Rodriguez¹³, Peter Laderach² & Grazia Pacillo²

¹ Leibniz – Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research (ZALF)

² CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security

³ University of Groningen

⁴ African Group of Negotiators Experts Support

⁵ Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

⁶ Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC)

⁷ Ministry of Environment and Forestry - Kenyan Meteorological Department

⁸ Ministry of Public Service, Gender, Senior Citizens Affairs and Special Programmes - State Department for Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands – ASALs

⁹ Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government - National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU)

¹⁰ ChildFund

¹¹ World Food Programme

¹² World Vision Kenya

¹³ Building Systemic Resilience Against Climate Variability and Extremes (ClimBeR)

Suggested citation

Medina L, Belli A, Caroli G, DuttaGupta T, Tarusarira J, Schapendonk F, Savelli A, Wamukoya G, Sokello Angoma S, Ogallo L, Nying'uro P, Kinuthia M, Onchiri Anyieni A, Omware S, Ambani M, Kithinji D, Hellin JJ, Loboguerrero Rodriguez AM, Laderach P, Pacillo G. 2022. *Towards a Common Vision of Climate Security in Kenya*. CGIAR Focus Climate Security.

Cover photo: @Leonardo Medina/CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security



Creative Commons License

CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

© 2022 CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security

Acknowledgements

This report benefitted from the excellent input, discussions and support of Veronica Ndetu (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Co-operatives), Paul Opio (FAOKE), Nancy Omolo, Nyang'ori Ohenjo (CEMIRIDE), Lilian Wandaka (ALIN), Joshua Laichena (KIPPRA), Dr. Linda Oucho (AMADPOC), and Gabriel Naaspan (Turkana Development Forum).

The authors are also grateful to all the workshop participants for their engagement and active support.

This work was implemented as a part of the OneCGIAR Initiative on Building Systemic Resilience Against Climate Variability and Extremes (ClimBeR). The authors greatly appreciate the support of the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Co-operatives, and the African Group of Negotiators Experts Support. Moreover, the authors are also thankful to the Nairobi Alliance of Bioversity-CIAT Office as well as to Caroline Mwongera, Stephanie Jaquet, Ivy Kinyua, Dorcas Jalango Anyango, and Evan Girvetz for their unconditional support.

This document builds on the reflections of the following conveners and participants:



Acronyms

AGNES	African Group of Negotiators Experts Support
ASALs	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
AUDA-NEPAD	The African Union Development Agency
CCCF	County Climate Change Funds
CGIAR	Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plans
ClimBeR	Building Systemic Resilience against Climate Extremes and Variability
CSA	Climate-Smart Agriculture
CSA-MSP	Climate Smart-Agriculture Multi-Stakeholder Platform
CSG	County Steering Groups
EDE	Ending Drought Emergencies
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GHACOF	Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum
IBEC	Inter-governmental Budget and Economic Council
NCCAP	National Climate Change Action Plan
NSAGs	Non-state armed groups

Executive summary

This report explores a crucial and yet persistent question: How are the linkages between climate, conflict, and security perceived in Kenya?

The security implications of climate variability and change, commonly referred to as the climate-security nexus, have been widely discussed in both policy circles and academia. While climate is rarely the sole cause of conflict, it can exacerbate conflict risks and outcomes by affecting societies' economic performance, amplifying patterns of marginalization and exclusion, and challenging the capacity of already strained institutions (von Uexkull & Buhaug, 2021). Because of its significant dependence on rain-fed agriculture, with high seasonal variations in the availability of water and pasture and high levels of political fragility, the Horn of Africa has often been portrayed as one of the regions more likely to suffer from climate-related political instability (Krampe et al., 2020). Kenya, in particular, has been the subject of several studies by research institutes and international organizations that explore whether and how climate change may affect peace and security in the country. While climate impacts will increasingly have destabilizing effects on societies and communities across Kenya, the question of how this is happening remains partially unaddressed.

This report presents and summarizes the findings of the first Climate Security Workshop held in Nairobi on the 22nd and 23rd of June 2022. The workshop, organized as part of the CGIAR's initiative Building Systemic Resilience against Climate Extremes and Variability (ClimBeR) and co-hosted by the Government of Kenya, the African Group of Negotiators Experts Support (AGNES) and the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), brought together over 40 experts and practitioners working across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors in Kenya to discuss how relevant climate and conflict connections are manifesting across the country, identify and map key stakeholders, as well as co-develop policy and programmatic recommendations towards integrating climate security considerations in climate action strategies. Through a series of brainstorming sessions and focus group discussions, participants reflected on and shared their experience of how the impact of climate influences the environmental, social, economic, and political processes that lead to conflict and insecurity. At the same time, participants also underlined how fragility and conflict further undermines communities' resilience to climate change, leaving them ill-equipped to cope with and adapt to the effects of climate variability and extremes. The discussion focused on Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) and illuminated context-specific pathways through which climate amplifies the risk of local conflicts. The pathways identified are summarized below:

- **Competition over scarce natural resources.** Rising temperatures coupled with the increasing frequency and intensity of drought and floods adversely impact the availability of resources for agricultural and pastoral livelihoods, such as water or land, thereby increasing the risk of conflict over scarce natural resources. This scarcity has also been shown to exacerbate human-wildlife conflict.
- **Weakening of livelihood strategies.** Livestock and crop losses and reduced agricultural productivity due to more frequent extreme climatic events like drought and floods, can lead to increased poverty and marginalization as agro-pastoral livelihood sources are lost, increasing the motive to participate in conflict or join non-state armed groups.

- **Displacement and mobility.** Climate-related livelihood insecurity drives changes in mobility patterns and can increase displacement due to sudden and slow-onset climatic events. Although migration is often considered an adaptive response, increased tensions can eventually result in conflict, particularly between host and migrant communities.
- **Warrior culture.** Climate-induced reduction in agricultural productivity and natural resources when combined with some religious and spiritual mechanisms can instigate violent episodes such as cattle rustling. Low-intensity violent traditional practices are currently also being intensified through non-climatic drivers, such as commercialization and globalization.
- **Increased mistrust in government.** Poverty and marginalization due to climate-induced loss of livelihood can undermine trust in government agencies, fueling societal instability and recruitment into non-state armed groups. For vulnerable populations, this can exacerbate the inadequate provision of basic social protection and public services, further eroding government legitimacy towards its constituents.

Following the development of a common understanding of the various ways in which climate variability and extremes may act as a risk multiplier for populations in Kenya's ASALs regions, the group focused on co-developing policy and programmatic recommendations to effectively integrate climate security into the country's climate action strategies. Considering that climate and security policies have historically been addressed in silos in Kenya, workshop participants agreed that an effective integration of this nexus first requires policy processes that support learning across multiple levels of governance. As a result, **the establishment of a multidisciplinary and multi-level community of practice was proposed as a first and critical step towards fostering a climate security agenda in Kenya** to break down policy silos across multiple climate, development, peace, and security sectors. A promising concrete action in this direction is to increase collaboration among national and sub-national actors to incorporate a climate security lens into **the Climate Smart Agriculture Multi-Stakeholder Platform (CSA-MSP)**, which is currently coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Co-operatives.

Involving diverse climate, agricultural, development, humanitarian, peace, and security actors within this framework can enhance the development and implementation of national and subnational climate- and conflict-sensitive action plans and policies, improve coordination, encourage collaborative reflections between climate and peace actors, and support evidence creation and knowledge sharing.

Along with this first tailored proposal, a number of recommendations were identified as further critical steps towards developing more integrated and responsive climate and security governance at the national and sub-national levels. Recommendations were divided into five action areas:

1. *Multi-level governance:* To support the effective integration of a climate security sensitive approach in climate and peacebuilding strategies, governance efforts must adopt deliberate plans to develop multi-actor agreements and foster shared perceptions of climate security risks that span across policy sectors and political-administrative levels. A preliminary approach to close the programmatic gap between climate adaptation and peacebuilding efforts include formalizing the integration of climate security in selected multi-stakeholder platforms across the governance system, thereby **fostering a community of practice for climate security in Kenya**. Existing collaborative spaces deemed suitable for this purpose

were the Climate Smart Agriculture Multi-Stakeholder Platform and the Kenya Food Security Meeting and Steering Group (at national levels); plus, the County Climate Change Funds and Peace Committees (at county level).

2. *Policy frameworks:* Recommendations for initiating a national policy dialogue to facilitate the adoption of climate action as an instrument for peacebuilding should focus on **identifying policies, strategies and action plans at national and sub-national levels that could be potentially updated through a climate security lens**. A first step in this direction would be to include climate security as an issue of concern in the updating of the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP 2023-2027). Additional policy instruments at multiple levels were proposed as potential entry points to strengthen collaborative action between the climate, peace and conflict sectors. Examples in this regard include the National peace policy, the Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) strategy, the County Integrated Development Plans 2023-2027 (CIDPs), and the County Climate Change Funds (CCCFs).
3. *Programmatic planning:* Increasing cross-sectoral and multi-level coordination on climate security through a national community of practice can also support the **design of climate adaptation programmes and initiatives that actively contribute to peacebuilding efforts in Kenya**. This endeavour requires a collaborative reflection by climate and security actors on existing programmatic practices to complement long-held assumptions and customs in both sectors. Building upon existing climate and peacebuilding programmes across Kenya that act at the intersection between the five climate security pathways presented in this report could guide efforts towards developing climate security-sensitive programming practices.
4. *Research and evidence gaps:* Increasing the availability of comprehensive and actionable knowledge will lead to a **better understanding of how various types of climatic extremes and variability could potentially exacerbate different expressions of conflict and insecurity that afflict Kenyan populations**. Research directions include: an expanded focus beyond ASALs regions in Kenya; the co-production of climate security assessments with affected communities that account for local particularities, gender dynamics and other intersectional sources of vulnerability; as well as expanding current modelling capabilities to better understand future risks.
5. *Finance for climate security:* Climate adaptation action has traditionally avoided conflict-affected regions due to their high-risk profile and security concerns. As a result, there is an urgent need to build upon existing climate and peace practices to increase the flow of funds and investment capital towards building conflict-sensitive resilience in climate security hotspots. For instance, Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) investments, which are increasingly common in Kenya, can be tailored to mitigate drivers of natural resource-based conflicts. Rather than creating new and adjacent organizing structures, climate and security practitioners should **leverage pre-existing networks to support the development, implementation, and scaling of financial interventions for climate resilience that actively contribute to peace**. These should also be co-designed in collaboration with the intended beneficiaries to ensure local ownership and suitability.



PHOTO: J. KARIUKI / ILRI

Contents

SECTION 1

Background 7

SECTION 2

**Climate-related security challenges:
The case of the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands 11**

SECTION 3

**Policy and institutional strategies to foster
climate security cooperation in Kenya 23**

References 30

ANNEX 1

Workshop methodology 31




PHOTO: NEIL PALMER/CIAT

SECTION 1:

Background

Kenya possesses a diverse set of climatic conditions due to its vast and varied geography. The coast is usually hot and humid, inland areas tend to be more temperate, while northern and southern regions are typically dry and extremely hot (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Kenya's natural resources base is similarly diverse, including forests, wetlands, drylands, aquatic, and marine resources. Despite its rich biodiversity, Kenya's unique ecosystems are threatened by various factors, including population increase, coastline erosion, deforestation, improper land management, and climate change (World Bank Group, 2021). Specifically, climate-related disasters, like floods and drought, have increasingly affected agro-pastoral activities and threatened the physical security of exposed communities and populations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

Rising temperatures and prolonged dry spells in the northern counties (Figure 1), have a detrimental impact on local water storage capacity, thereby leading to major economic losses, particularly in livestock and agricultural production. As shown by Figure 1, northeastern and northwestern counties are more prone to heat stress and rainwater scarcity than coastal and inland areas, making the former highly vulnerable to repeated drought episodes. Land degradation and soil erosion, exacerbated by more frequent floods, and lower agricultural productivity disproportionately affect the sources of income for the rural poor and throw into flux longstanding socio-cultural identities tied to place and production system (World Bank Group, 2021). As reported by Figure 1, floods are more likely to occur in the Lake Victoria Basin in western Kenya where high levels of precipitation not only positively ensure agricultural production but also negatively impact land, assets, and high-quality water supply.



Kenya's capacity to cope with and recover from climate shocks, particularly in the ASALs, is further compromised by internal social and political tensions, largely fueled by pre- and post-election tensions (Ladekjaer & Muriu, 2022), weakened administration and traditional governance systems, gaps in national land management regulations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018), and politicized and ethnicized competition over scarce farmland and natural resources (Theisen, 2012). The northern counties, the Rift Valley, the peripheral pastoralist drylands, and the coastal region have been identified as the areas most affected by insecurity (Wasike, 2021; Achicanoy et al., 2021). High density conflict clusters (red squares) are indeed located in these key regions, as presented in Figure 2. Historically, instability in these regions has been fueled by a variety of interconnected and compounding factors, including ethnic intolerance, border disputes, and competition over land and other resources (Huho, 2019). Furthermore, the presence of non-state armed groups (NSAGs), as well as institutional gaps to maintain security at the local level, reduced trust in formal and traditional authorities, poverty and underdevelopment, and marginalization have worsened instability. At the same time, central regions as well as areas along the Lake Victoria, have been reportedly affected by less frequent and severe conflicts, as showed by the moderate and limited conflict clusters of Figure 2, mainly due to increasing political tensions and unrest (Rarieya & Fortun, 2010).

Climate impacts are likely to alter the dynamics related to conflict in multiple ways, catalyzing some processes while simultaneously inhibiting others. For instance, in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands competition over natural resources, mainly water and pasture, has been exacerbated by drought-induced scarcities. A scarcity of natural resources has forced pastoralist communities to alter their traditional grazing routes,




Figure 2. Kenya Conflict Clusters Map - CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security – Source: ACLED.

migrate into new areas, move more often and farther than usual, spend longer time outside their traditional grazing areas and encounter groups with whom no previous resource sharing or conflict resolution mechanisms have been agreed (Scheffran et al., 2019). The likelihood of these encounters turning violent is increased by other compounding factors, such as weak local institutions, the proliferation of small firearms, political incitements, unclear property right regimes, and a longstanding culture of cattle-raiding. Drought has therefore been identified as a major contributing factor to violence, particularly among pastoral groups (and between farmers and herders).

In Kenya's coastal regions, land disputes arising from discrimination against ethnic minorities – combined with climate-related livelihood pressures and a lack of economic opportunities – have contributed to the recruitment of local youth by Non-State Armed Groups operating across national and county borders. There is also evidence of inter-ethnic and cross-border violence among coastal communities arising due to climate-induced food scarcity (World Bank Group, 2016). Dwindling fish populations and species range changes in marine fish around East African coastlines (IPCC, 2022), combined with jurisdictional disputes, have prompted Kenyan fishermen to fish close to (and occasionally into) Somali waters, or Somali fishermen to come to Kenyan waters. This tendency has resulted in frequent cross-border confrontations, showing the importance of accounting for the regional and cross-border dimension of natural resource-based conflicts and of international border arbitration.

Finally, as lake levels rise in the Western region, conflicts over water and land have become increasingly channeled into politicized ethnic clashes (Raini, 2009). Politically exacerbated resource-based grievances have fueled ethnic tensions and displacement along Lake Nakuru, as well as in Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu (Veit, 2011), primarily for political electoral gain (Mwamba et al., 2019). At the same time, in Baringo, heavy and intense rainfall has further contributed to rising water levels in the lake, increasing conflict over available land and awakening historical grievances, particularly between the communities of Baringo South and the neighboring Pokot (Government of Kenya & UNDP, 2021).

These examples underline how climate-related impacts are unlikely to act as a direct driver of conflict in isolation from other factors. Instead, climate represents a threat or risk multiplier, exacerbating pre-existing stresses, vulnerabilities, and insecurities (Rüttinger et al., 2015). This is particularly relevant in contexts marked by fragility, defined as the combination of risk, exposure, and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system, and/or communities to manage, absorb, and mitigate those risks (Desai & Forsberg, 2020). It is therefore critical to interpret climate-conflict links as the result of complex interactions between pre-existing stressors and vulnerabilities, as well as the role played by climate variability in exacerbating these by acting on important intermediary variables. Identifying these intermediary variables leading from climate impacts to conflict demands a focus on the interactions between factors from: ecological systems (including climate variability, natural resource access and quality, and ecosystem health); socioeconomic systems (including agricultural productivity, food and nutritional security, poverty, and inequity); and political systems and institutions (such as social structures and identities, the nature of institutions and governance, the presence of conflict/instability).



PHOTO: NEIL PALMER/CIAT

SECTION 2:

Climate-related security challenges

The case of the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs)

ASALs cover 80 percent of Kenya’s territory, are home to almost one-third of the Kenyan population, and heavily rely on climate-sensitive income generation strategies, such as crop and livestock production (FAO et al., 2015). ASALs are also experiencing multiple forms of conflict – including natural resource-based conflict, inter-ethnic violence, cattle rustling, border and land disputes, drug trafficking, and terrorism¹ – that are deeply rooted in the long history of marginalization, ethnic-based violence, and instability that has characterized the broader East African context. North-Western and North-Eastern Kenya are the two areas in the ASALs that are most exposed to compounding climate and conflict risks (Achicanoy et al., 2021). These hotspots are: within and between the Turkana and South Omo regions; the Marsabit, Borana, and Dawa region; the Mandera, Dollo Ado and Gedo region – comprising Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia; and the wider Karamoja cluster along the borders of South-Western Ethiopia, North-Western Kenya, South-Eastern South Sudan, and North-Eastern Uganda.

Figure 3 shows the ASALs climate-security nexus by displaying the direct and indirect links that connect all the factors involved in the relationship, namely environmental, socio-economic, political, and cultural variables. These variables have been identified as crucial components within the climate-security nexus for Kenya’s arid and semi-arid regions, given their relevance in translating the impact of climatic extremes and variability into rising social, ethnic, and political conflicts.





Figure 3. Schematic representation of the climate-security nexus in Kenya’s ASALs counties.

¹ Despite these diverse expressions of violence, the workshop outputs are grouped under a single term for “conflict”. While recognizing the limits of this simplification, a homogenous approach to conflict was necessary to manage the uncertainty of unknown dynamics within the climate-security nexus in Kenya’s ASALs regions. Although the present discussion refers mostly to the conflict risks as a standardized term, the document recognizes the need for further evidence of how climate change affects human security as well as the different expressions of conflict in Kenya’s ASALs regions.

The climate-security nexus is a vicious circle

It is important to recognize that the compounded risks of conflict as a result of climate extremes and variability represent a one-sided vision of climate-related security risk. Just as exposure to climate hazards under a context of high vulnerability can undermine human security and exacerbate the risk of conflict, the presence of conflict has a significant effect on the well-being of an affected population, increasing their vulnerability to future climate hazards. This reinforcing feedback loop can potentially trap societies in a “vicious circle” of increased vulnerability and fragility, whereby the presence of conflict and insecurity further undermines their capacity to adapt and cope with the effects of climate extremes and variability, while the impact of climate worsens the underlying drivers of conflict.



Conflict in ASALs regions is perceived to undermine community well-being and security through a wide variety of forms. The management of conflict imposes significant economic costs to both government and households; it also undermines investment in productive activities and in social security and access to basic infrastructure and services, hence reinforcing mistrust in government and institutional incapacity for effective governance. These effects can drive poverty and marginalization, which are already prevalent, hence diminishing people’s adaptive capacity in the face of climate extremes and variability. Conflict also undermines food security and livelihood strategies by restricting food and livestock production and access to markets. Furthermore, these effects increase dependence on natural resources and drive ecosystem

degradation. Finally, conflict is considered to be one of the main causes of displacement in Kenya's ASALs counties; while for some populations, especially pastoralist communities, the impact of conflict may undermine their capacity to migrate in search of grazing land and water.

Based on settings described by Figure 3 and 4, five potential pathways² were identified linking climate, conflict, and security in Kenya's ASALs counties, all of which are embedded in the complex, multi-directional relation described above. These pathways are presented and summarized below:

• Competition over scarce natural resources

Increasing temperature and rainfall variability are directly linked to increasingly intense, frequent, and prolonged droughts as well as sudden and destructive floods. Such extreme changes in climate variability can hamper the availability and access to natural and productive resources such as water and pastureland in the ASALs areas, where resource-dependent agro-pastoral activities are the primary source of livelihood. Given the prevalence of pastoral communities in these counties, ensuring regular and equitable access to natural resources for livestock and crop production is a major concern for communities reliant upon agro-pastoral livelihoods.

While resource scarcity does not necessarily lead to conflict, climate-induced natural resource scarcity is indirectly connected with a higher incidence of inter-communal conflict and tensions over access to these natural resources (DuttaGupta et al., 2021). Increased incidence of cattle rustling, banditry, and attacks by armed group are common manifestations of these conflicts in Kenya's ASALs regions. These risks are amplified by the fact that – as a consequence of climate-related impacts – cattle are more susceptible to disease and communities are forced to increasingly rely on the same narrow set of available resources.

Changes in pastoral mobility and routes to access resources can lead to more frequent interactions between communities. This may lead to tensions, especially if communities try to secure their seasonal herder routes or hold long-standing grievances based on inter-ethnic disputes. Furthermore, as opportunities for agricultural and pastoralist income generation are reduced, recruitment into armed groups is seen as an increasingly attractive option, reducing the opportunity cost to engage in conflict-related activities. Reduced availability of pastureland and water can also result in human-wildlife conflict, as the human-wildlife contact that may occur while searching for scarce natural resources can increase the risk of pastoralist communities engaging in conflict with conservation authorities.

² The use of pathways – which represent a specific causal sequence, either linear or non-linear – is a useful way to identify and demonstrate the emergent nature of climate-related security risks. The concept of pathways can help stakeholders such as policymakers and practitioners in navigating the complex relationships between climate change and security and inform policy formulation processes regarding climate insecurity. Pathways capture a range of pre-existing conditions, intermediary variables, and characteristics, thereby representing how climate-related impacts may cause insecurities to spill over and produce non-linear impacts across multiple interconnected systems and system dimensions. The pathways should not be considered predictive or prescriptive but rather a theoretical mapping exercise in which the potentially cross-scalar and cross-dimensional interactions of several key drivers and factors are mapped.




Figure 5. Schematic representation of the “Competition over scarce natural resources” pathway.

Rangelands in Laikipia have not regenerated due to the increasing frequency of droughts and extreme temperatures, which in turn increases the demand for managed water resources, such as the Rubere dam in Kinamba, Laikipia. Herders in the Laikipia Nature Conservancy, for example, travel to the dam during drought periods to look for water for their livestock. In the process, they encroach on land of agricultural farmers, especially throughout parts of Laikipia West, hence exacerbating the risk of conflict between them. Given that 50 percent of land in Laikipia is under privately held ranches, the herders have limited access to traditional forms of pasture, an issue exacerbated by more intense and longer droughts.

Extract from presentation of Lilian Wandaka, Arid Lands Information Network (ALIN)


• Weakening of livelihood strategies

Increased impact of both drought and floods are associated with the loss of livestock and crops. In Kenya's ASALs counties, livestock losses have a severe economic impact on pastoral households given that livestock production accounts for nearly 95 percent of family income and underpins food and nutritional security. Economic instability, and hence poverty and marginalization, are thought to be amongst the most important drivers of conflict since these factors enhance communities' propensity to engage in violence as an alternative source of revenue. As a result, most experts believe that the weakening of pastoralist and agricultural livelihood options increases the risk of conflict, criminal activity, and recruitment by non-state armed groups.

Food insecurity is also perceived as a driver of inter-communal violence (DuttaGupta et al., 2021), especially among young people who use cattle rustling and raids to replenish food reserves or gather enough resources to buy food. This is particularly worrisome given the fact that the Horn of Africa region has at the time of

writing experienced an unprecedented four consecutive failed rainy seasons, with a fifth later in the year also projected to yield much lower than average precipitation rates (FEWS-NET, 2022). Because of these climate-related impacts – as well as several other compounding drivers of insecurity and vulnerability, such as conflict – around 20 million people are currently at risk of acute food insecurity across the region (Kurzer et al., 2022).

Scarce employment opportunities as well as limited labour skills available as potential means of alternative livelihood strategies, along with limited access to infrastructure, basic services, and social protection, are critical contributing conditions that exacerbate the risk of conflict and food and nutrition insecurity. Additionally, the inability to move when mobility is an essential livelihood strategy, particularly in areas with limited opportunities for employment, may push individuals to seek alternative, and sometimes illegal, sources of income and reduce the opportunity cost of engaging in various types of violence.



• Displacement and mobility

Despite of the need for more empirical evidence on the complex nexus between climate extremes and variability, human mobility, and conflict in Kenya's ASALs counties, experts and practitioners recognize that climate change can exacerbate conflict risks by affecting mobility patterns. It is important, however, to untangle the complex ways through which climate-related impacts may shape different forms of human mobility, including pastoral migration, voluntary migration (as a result of, for example, deteriorating livelihood opportunities), and involuntary displacement (often as a consequence of natural disasters or weather extremes).


The decreased availability of natural resources, the deterioration of pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods, and the effects of extreme climatic events can combine to limit and shape the dynamics of pastoral mobility, an important consideration when discussing the impact of climate on a specific, pre-existing pastoral mobility pattern. Limiting or shifting the traditional mobility patterns of those who depend on them is likely to render such communities even more vulnerable to climate shocks in the long term, especially when climate-related impacts make traditional migration routes impractical. Pastoral mobility has historically been a commonly employed adaptation strategy to protect livestock productivity and minimize localized environmental degradation, yet as climate-related extremes progressively decrease the availability of water and pasture, pastoralist communities are increasingly forced to migrate towards and compete for the same resource bases. The disruption of traditional pastoral migratory routes might therefore indirectly increase the probability of inter-communal conflict over natural resources, for example between pastoralist groups and between pastoral and agricultural communities.

Aside from impacting on existing forms of migration, climate may also increasingly begin to influence individual (or, more often, household) decision-making processes with regards to pursuing in-situ versus mobility-driven adaptation strategies. Internal migration is quite common and frequently falls into pre-existing migratory trends such as urbanization, yet rural-urban mobility may be permanent, temporary, or seasonal/cyclical in nature depending on the specific characteristics and needs of a given household or community. At the same time, uncontrolled migration across international borders is currently spreading cattle disease, exacerbating pressure on natural resources and limiting labour opportunities, sometimes inducing communities to violently resist when contacting outsiders.

While it is therefore important to recognize the variability and context-specificity involved with climate-migration pathways, it is also true that rapid, non-linear growth in migration rates can result in increasing pressure on urban infrastructure, more precarious living conditions, and unstable jobs and revenues, limited access to basic services, insecure housing and land tenure, and high levels of competition for jobs. These circumstances can exacerbate ethnic and cultural conflict between host communities and migrants, increasing the willingness of people to engage in criminal activity as an alternative source of income.

Finally, those on the move may also have been forced to do so as a consequence of being displaced by extreme weather events and shocks. This form of migration is usually more episodic and rapid, and households often intend to return to their original location once it is deemed safe to do so. However, in circumstances characterized by extreme environmental degradation – or, alternatively, where other, perhaps conflict-related

circumstances, contribute to an area remaining unsafe – situations of prolonged displacement may arise. Prolonged displacement can, if not managed properly, similarly contribute to tensions between host and displaced communities, particularly when the presence of displaced populations in some way infringes upon the ability of host communities to pursue their livelihoods.



• Warrior culture

In the ASALs counties, understanding and dealing with the complex interconnections between climate and conflict requires accounting for the sacred beliefs and cultural practices – heroism, dowry payments, and initiation rites – that shape the relationship between pastoralist communities and their cattle. The elders bless cattle raiders, the young males who are primary agents in driving conflict through cattle rustling and inter-community clashes over natural resources, while women play a role in encouraging violence and supporting warriors. Traditionally, resource-based conflicts, mostly expressed through cattle rustling, involve small-scale and manageable violence motivated by the need for animal replacement and restocking, gaining access to grazing land, putting into practice religious and spiritual beliefs, as well as securing social status and dowry payments. However, recent trends – such as conflicts over political power and heroism, the proliferation of small arms and automatic weapons, and escalating disagreements over access to land and tenure rights – have exacerbated the severity and implications of resource-based violence amongst pastoralist groups.

The weakening of traditional institutions undermines the ability of existing conflict management systems to regulate violence. This is because it compromises the role of the elders and erodes forms of authority based on gerontocracy, which have historically served to guide behavioural norms during conflict mediation between ethnicities. A rapid change in the distribution of authority under conditions of fragility and low-State presence leads to a practical gap between eroded traditional practices and modern forms of conflict management.

Practitioners, on the other hand, emphasize that youth pastoralists' notions of becoming warriors and their desire to advance through a social hierarchy are grounded in the strength of local institutions, as it is often elders who, when appropriate, encourage and grant legitimacy to the youth seeking to prove themselves and gain social status. The impact of climate extremes and variability on natural resource availability and traditional pastoralist livelihoods are thought to influence pastoralist groups' religious and environmental sense-making, which has the potential to exacerbate community-based conflict driven by sacred beliefs around entitlements and attachments to cattle. It is also thought to exacerbate the search for higher social status amongst the youth, by increasing the need for cattle grabbing under conditions of scarcity.

Furthermore, religious organizations (such as churches, faith-based organizations, and even non-state armed groups with religious beliefs) play a significant role in filling the gaps in public service provision in areas with insufficient government presence. Under certain conditions, this role is thought to both potentially contribute to radicalization or support peacebuilding processes through better resource sharing and cooperation. Nonetheless, there is a general agreement that there are significant gaps in our current understanding of how religious and spiritual beliefs and cultural practices are indirectly affected by the impact of climate on scarce natural resources.

Legend

- Environmental
- Socioeconomic
- Conflict
- Cultural




Figure 8. Schematic representation of the "Warrior culture" pathway.

Before going on raids, the elders and fortune tellers bless the pastoralists, particularly those from the Turkana community. They can even tell the warriors if they will be killed. They get this information from the rituals they perform. They also inform them on the routes to take. And when they return home, they are stopped somewhere and the elders and the fortune tellers are called to bless them before they come into the community. They are blessed because they have killed so many people, so the elders cast out all the bad spirits and demons of those they have killed. They slaughter some of the livestock they have brought from the raid and use the blood to chase away the demons and the bad omen. Climate change has affected the pastoralists because they are now competing for the little resources, and that's why they cross the border to other countries to look for pasture and water. So, it is in the process of looking for resources that their rituals and practices also come in.

Interview with Gabriel Naaspan from the Turkana Development Forum, TUDOF.

• Increased mistrust in government

A lower availability of natural resources, the weakening of livelihoods, increased food insecurity and conditions of poverty and marginalization – all direct and indirect impacts of climate variability and extremes – are thought to contribute towards a widespread feeling of mistrust over government authorities, potentially increasing the willingness of individuals to participate in violence or be recruited by non-state armed groups. Practitioners generally agree that conflicts fuelled by natural resource shortages and the loss of resource-dependent livelihoods are characterized by a widespread belief that government is mostly to blame for the onset and continuance of conflict.

The lack of state presence, low provision of public services, exclusionary and discriminatory policies, corruption and misuse of public funds, and peace- and resilience-building interventions which lead to the unintended incitement of conflict were all cited as factors undermining the legitimacy of government as keeper of the peace in Kenya's ASALs regions. As a result, declining trust in government both enhances the chance of conflict emerging and hinders the ability of institutions to respond to the outbreak of conflict. For example, conflict resolution, post-conflict peacebuilding and disarmament in Kenya's northern border counties were perceived as implemented through top-down approaches that fail to account for everyday conflict dynamics or foster local ownership and therefore ultimately exacerbate conflict amongst pastoral communities. A diminished legitimacy of government to effectively maintain security, coupled with fundamental changes in traditional community and family structures, may lead to the replacement by the youth of these formal and informal institutions with non-state armed groups and organized crime organizations as units of belonging, hence increasing the risk of recruitment into violent activities.

Governance structures for policy making and programme implementation have a substantial influence on the extent to which climatic extremes and variability can enhance conflict risk. Although climate change impacts human security by increasing the scarcity of natural resources and through a loss of livelihood strategies, the impact can be mitigated by leveraging a variety of policy systems, such as resilience-building through climate change adaptation efforts, livelihood protection through social security schemes, and peace dividends achieved through sustainable peace-building interventions.

On the other hand, policies and programmes within these policy sectors that fail to recognize climate security risks in their strategic planning can unintentionally exacerbate the underlying drivers of conflict, for example, by profiting populations in a biased or partisan manner, hence increasing inequality and resentment between communities, or by deploying repressive security measures that enhance long-term grievances between state and non-state actors. In a context of widespread distrust in government authorities, institutional capacity for the effective implementation of climate, security, and peace-building efforts that strategically account for climate security threats can be considerably hampered. The secluded location of ASALs counties hinders the presence of formal institutions and increases local vulnerabilities to cross-border instability, hence complicating the challenge of strengthening government legitimacy in the region.




Figure 9. Schematic representation of the "Increased mistrust in government" pathway.

Indigenous Peoples in Kenya heavily rely on land, water and genetic resources for food production. When these are denied to them, the risk of conflict will of course increase. Laikipia represents an example of widespread resource-based conflicts, where struggles between conservationists and indigenous peoples are widespread. These people are not "illegal herders", they in fact previously owned that land which was taken away from them. It is an issue of historical injustice which should be accounted for and corrected during the implementation of solutions. Low availability and lack of access to water and grazing land are linked with increasing cattle rustling, killing of herders, kidnappings, among other forms of conflict. A situation that is worsened by government (mis)handling of conflict onset, which in some instances have in fact exacerbated antagonistic relations. This is because government responses are sometimes interpreted as favoring certain social groups over others. Due to climate-induced conflict, Indigenous Peoples experience lower agricultural production and loss of livelihood strategies, hence further increasing long-held resentment from political exclusion and reducing trust in government authorities.

Extract from presentation of Nyang'ori Ohenjo, Centre for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE)



PHOTO: C. SCHUBERT/CCAIF

SECTION 3:

Policy and Institutional Strategies to Foster Climate Security Cooperation in Kenya

Climate-related security risks in Kenya are very much a product of – and embedded within – an increasingly complex governance landscape. These risks can be best understood as cascading processes of change occurring over different spatial and temporal scales, dotting a complex landscape in which causes, and effects are exceptionally difficult to detect and frequently interconnected into feedback-type relationships. Effective governance in the face of these risks thus requires recognition of the multidimensional, and often multi-scalar, nature of how climate-related security risks emerge, as characterized by unpredictability and, in some cases, unknowability. Recognizing the existence of multiple and diverse indirect mechanisms linking climate, conflict, and security in ASALs countries, more concrete actions by multiple policy sectors and governance levels are required to develop an integrated approach (both vertically and horizontally) for managing climate-related security risks.

Preliminary research on how climate-conflict linkages are addressed in integrated and coherent ways – or, conversely, how they are not – in Kenya policy narratives and documents highlights the need for improved governance systems and processes across sectors and scales. For instance, Carneiro et al. (2021) investigate the importance and nature of climate security narratives and dynamics among policymakers at the national level by using innovative machine learning approaches to extract, process, and analyse thousands of Tweets from policymakers and government institutions. The findings suggest that the linkages between climate and conflict are poorly reflected in Kenyan government actors' official discourse on Twitter. These results are broadly in line with the preliminary findings generated by Schapendonk et al. (2022), who find that selected Kenyan policy documents (extracted from climate, peace and security, development, disaster risk reduction, and gender sectors) are more likely to engage with climate-conflict linkages at a surface level than they are to put forward and implement integrated climate-peace programmatic interventions. The authors also find that peace and security-related policy documents demonstrated little engagement with climate-related impacts and climate-related security risks, suggesting that peace and security actors do not currently tend to perceive climate action as an entry point for building peace and social cohesion.

Considering the critical importance of breaking down policy silos between climate and security, the recommendations presented here are intended to be short-term strategies for strengthening a climate security agenda at the national and subnational levels. They do, however, embody high-level recommendations based on an initial conversation with representatives of practitioner organisations working at the intersection of the climate and security nexus. Further coordination between sectors, levels, and stakeholders is thus proposed to translate the recommendations posed here into concrete actionable plans that build upon a diverse set of capacities, viewpoints, and interests. The formation of a community of practice is identified as a necessary first step toward more vertically and horizontally integrated and responsive climate security governance. Such a community should deliberate, implement, and design adaptive approaches that explicitly define climate adaptation as an instrument for peace.

A first concrete step in this direction is to increase collaboration among national and sub-national actors to incorporate a climate security lens into the Climate Smart Agriculture Multi-Stakeholder Platform (CSA-MSP), which is currently coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Co-operatives. Along with this first specific proposal, the broad recommendations included below are divided into five strategic areas of action: multi-level governance, policy frameworks, programmatic planning, research and evidence gaps, and climate security finance.

1. Multi-level governance

Implementing participatory spaces for collective conversation can support the establishment of policy networks composed of interdependent actors who then learn to operate in greater synergy, thereby effectively becoming a system. To modify current practices for climate adaptation and peacebuilding towards integrating a climate security sensitive approach – and for successful approaches to be scaled up where possible – governance efforts must adopt conscious strategies to develop multi-actor agreements and shared perceptions of climate security risks that span across policy sectors and political-administrative levels. Recognizing this challenge, workshop participants emphasized the need to implement efforts towards developing a community of practice for Climate Security in Kenya to:

- **Identify existing multi-stakeholder platforms at national and sub-national levels that may serve as a base towards integrating a climate security focus on both climate action and peacebuilding strategies.** These spaces should serve as potential meeting places for the existing communities of practice for climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and management, and peace and security. Along with the Climate Smart Agriculture Multi-Stakeholder Platform (CSA-MSP) mentioned above, the County-level Climate Change Funds (CCCF) and County Steering Groups (CSG) (sub-national), the Climate-Smart Agriculture Multi-Stakeholder Platform (national and sub-national levels) and the Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum (GHACOF) (regional level) were suggested as potential platforms.
- **Conduct a needs assessment of the designated multi-stakeholder platforms to identify actions required for increasing their capacity to include a climate security perspective.** This includes accounting for the needs of the platforms and their members in terms of stakeholder engagement, technical capacity on climate security, leadership, resources, and capacity for change as well as developing recommendations and action plans to increase the capacity of these spaces to effectively integrate climate security as a topic for strategic action.
- **Identify organizational mandates** within the platforms that could be complemented with a climate-security oriented action and cluster actors in thematic areas in relation to expertise and mandates.
- **Develop a multi-level governance strategy for the participating platforms** that ensure the effective participation and recognition of county- and community-level priorities for climate security action. For this goal, governance systems relating to both climate action and peace and security at the sub-county, ward, and community levels should be examined in order to identify where current cross-scalar integration mechanisms and processes are currently located and to discover local civil society groups that could be included in the community of practice. A consultation and dialogue process should thereafter be carried out with the objective of defining how and where multi-level coordinating structures can be made more effective.

- **Co-develop an agenda and clear terms of reference for the community of practice** that indicate coordinating mandates, priority areas of action and mechanisms for collaboration and building stakeholder capacity. Identifying channels for sharing experiences and information, and developing a knowledge management system that fosters capacity building at the network level could be steps forward.

2. Policy frameworks

Given that governance frameworks for climate change and peace have traditionally evolved independently due to inadequate cross-sectoral collaboration, a significant degree of institutional learning is required to effectively integrate climate security as a topic of concern in Kenya's policies and governance systems. Recommendations by workshop participants for initiating a national policy dialogue to facilitate the adoption of climate action as an entry point for conflict prevention, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding focused on identifying policies, strategies and action plans at national and sub-national levels that could be potentially updated through a climate security lens.

Priority actions identified included:

- **Define key priorities and actions towards integrating climate security as a topic of concern in the updated National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP 2023-2027).** Actions in this direction could build on the five climate security pathways identified by workshop participants, which could be seen as a summary of the priority areas of concern collectively evidenced by Kenyan stakeholders currently working at the intersection of climate and security. Priorities for action and intervention to sever the complex links between climate and conflict could, for instance, be designed for the purposes of mitigating some of the key contextual factors that render communities more vulnerable to climate-related security risks and impacts.
- **Map existing legal and policy frameworks relevant for climate and security at the national level and assess their coherence and integration in terms of climate security.** This includes policies and strategies like the Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) strategy and the National Peace Policy. The findings of the workshop should serve as a guide to identify relevant policy frameworks that currently or could in the future operate at the intersection between climate and security to effectively respond to local and national challenges presented by climate change and conflict.
- **Map existing sub-national policies and action plans that may be suitable to support county-level actions for resilience that contribute to peacebuilding efforts.** Examples of relevant sub-national instruments include the County Integrated Development Plans 2023-2027 (CIDPs), County Climate Change Funds (CCCFs), inter-county and county climate change policies, peace and social cohesion policies, spatial plans, and natural resource and rangeland management policies. It is important to inform the development and updating of these instruments through a climate security sensitive approach. Ways forward could be to incorporate a climate security lens in the conflict monitoring framework operated by the Peace Building and Conflict Management Directorate and integrating a natural resource-based analysis into administrative and political boundaries to manage border disputes from a climate security perspective. County-level spatial planning processes could be a starting point to account for sub-national perspectives on boundary disputes. Moreover, continued efforts for policy advocacy and lobbying towards increasing the relevance of climate security as a national concern are considered essential.

3. Programmatic planning

There is a need to design climate adaptation programmes and initiatives that proactively contribute to sustaining peace actions. Similarly, peace and security actors should undertake programme planning with a climate perspective. Such efforts should crucially be responsive to specific local contexts and needs. Integrating climate and security risk analyses into the design of resilience and peace dividend projects across Kenya therefore demands significant engagement and coordination across sectors and scales of governance, along with increasing capacity assessment where needed. These recommendations focus on facilitating continuous engagement between climate and peace related actors to identify cross-cutting and synergistic strategies that build upon existing programming practices to:

- **Map existing climate action and peacebuilding programmes throughout Kenya that may be relevant to address climate security risks.** A potential starting point is to identify resilience and peace building projects that act at the intersection between the five climate security pathways outlined above. This would ensure that efforts towards developing climate security-sensitive programming practices achieve a wider set of co-benefits and peace dividends.
- **Build upon a better understanding of community-level risk coping and conflict management strategies towards developing climate security action plans.** Climate-related security risks are frequently conceptualized through technocratic perspectives of system dynamics, favouring prescriptions for action that overly focus on high-level governance priorities rather than human security needs as experienced in everyday life. This highlights the need for conflict-sensitive interventions that account for people's self-articulated visions of risk, resilience, and peace. During programming processes, there is a need to incorporate approaches of linking weakened traditional institutions, youth preferences for resilience building and development, and formal mechanisms for peacebuilding and security.
- **Strengthen peacebuilding and climate actors' capacity to conduct conflict assessments that integrate a climate perspective and vulnerability assessments that account for conflict risks respectively.** Both sectors should be supported in implementing conflict-sensitive approaches to resilience building and natural-resource management strategies that protect rural livelihoods. This includes technical coordination and collaboration between peace and climate actors during programmatic planning and implementation. The latter should also account for complex assessments of the need to complement long-held practices and assumptions in both sectors, such as operating and evaluating metrics, trade-offs between programmatic priorities, sector level intelligence, and formal and informal norms that govern network dynamics.

4. Research and evidence gaps

The workshop emphasized the importance of upgrading and expanding present empirical research on climate security in Kenya. Given the diverse findings and scattered evidence, empirical research to date has been unable to provide coherent insights on the climate and conflict nexus. Stakeholders identified ways to fill gaps in existing research and evidence through:

- **Gaining a better understanding of how various types of climatic extremes and variability enhance multiple and diverse conflict risks,** such as resource-based, inter-ethnic or territorial conflicts, banditry and criminality, drug trafficking, and recruitment by non-State armed groups; along with their connection

with the weakening of agricultural and resource-dependent livelihoods, different forms of mobility, State-society relations, and inter- and intra-communal relations.

- **Expanding research focus both beyond and within the ASALs region.** There is a need for research on the climate-security nexus that differentiates between different settings within ASALs counties, as well as for performing analyses in non-ASALs counties to better guide development initiatives across the country. Western counties, for example, are largely absent from Kenya's existing climate security literature, even though floods and rising lake levels have been identified as potential contributing factors to conflict, particularly that of a political nature.
- **Developing further evidence on the indirect linkages between climate and conflict** – expanding on the role of migration and displacement, political drivers of conflict or loss of livelihoods. Most of the current research is focused on the increase in resource-based conflict because of climatic variability and extremes; however, such a focus risks undermining an understanding of the complexities of the entire climate security nexus, which involves various economic, social, political, and environmental factors.
- **Investigating further the gender dimensions of climate security in Kenya**, especially as gender roles are rapidly shifting in both rural and urban contexts. Consistently using and mainstreaming an intersectional approach to understanding risk and resilience with regards to climate-related security risks will likely be critical here.
- **Co-producing context-specific climate security assessments relying on community voices that account for traditional coping strategies.** It is critical to integrate, to a much greater extent, the experience of those living and working in areas subject to emerging climate-related security risks to co-produce knowledge, set research agendas, help prioritize efforts and investments, and re-orient the focus of the climate security field – something the CGIAR Climate Security Workshop has been designed to facilitate.
- **Expand climate modeling capabilities to gain a better understanding of future risks** by linking current dynamics of climate security with future hazards, while emphasizing the uncertainties inherent in modeling work, as well as the complex and non-linear interactions that are essential to decision-making processes.

5. Finance

Understanding that conflict-affected areas receive significantly less climate action investment than those viewed as secure (UNDP & the Climate Security Mechanism, 2021), workshop participants acknowledged the need for investments with co-benefits for both adaptation and peacebuilding in **Kenya's climate security hotspots**. Even though climate adaptation action has traditionally avoided conflict-affected regions due to their high-risk profile and security concerns, there is an opportunity to link investment initiatives with climate security hotspots. Building on the workshop's outputs, investment planning procedures are needed to co-design climate security investments together with local communities and multiple stakeholders that align incentives across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus with an emphasis on the following:

- **In conflict-affected areas, climate-smart agricultural investments can help mitigate the drivers of resource-related violence.** The development of climate-resilient value chains for production systems including (but not limited to) cassava, chicken, dairy, fish (catfish, tilapia), green grams, millet, and sorghum can increase household income, improving adaptive capacity to both climate and conflict

risks. Financial products with built-in environmental insurance components (that rescind the need for repayment if a pre-determined 'trigger point' is reached) can shift economic risk away from producers—who are already bearing the brunt of environmental risk. Areas where climate security risks are endemic can be prioritized for Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) interventions with peacebuilding potential. Finally, traditional resource sharing and conflict resolution mechanisms should be supported rather than sidelined by formal legal procedures.

- **Rather than create new and adjacent organizing structures, climate security practitioners should leverage pre-existing networks and multi-stakeholder platforms to support the development, implementation, and scaling of financial interventions.** Kenya's rich patchwork of actors and organizations working toward climate adaptation and peacebuilding goals is a resource for climate security practitioners that should be maximized to full advantage. Participation in multi-stakeholder platforms can help mainstream climate security concerns, raising awareness of climate security risks across disciplines and incorporating disparate forms of knowledge production. These would include the Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Platform, National Climate Outlook Forum among others. More generally, civil society groups, local non-governmental organizations, and public departments active in a variety of fields—agricultural development, climate action, disaster risk reduction/disaster risk management, economic development, rights-based social equity (gender, indigenous groups, minorities, pastoralists, or youth-oriented)—can bring a multidisciplinary approach to the development of climate security investments.
- **A co-design process is critical for ensuring the validity, accuracy, and local ownership of climate security investments.** This requires a participation process that begins at initiation and is cross-cutting throughout the investment lifecycle. Most importantly, the voices of households and communities at risk of climate insecurity must be centred to ensure a "user-based" approach to investment design, where the concerns and desires of beneficiaries form the core of an intervention's objectives. This can be achieved by including local civil society organizations in investment design and as finance beneficiaries, potentially as part of a sub-granting process through national organizations. Social equity frameworks should be included from the beginning of the investment development process to ensure marginalized groups are meaningfully included in its co-design.
- **More work is needed to measure climate security risks in order to structure financial products so that they are attractive to investors, allowing finance to flow to insecure populations.** As commercial investors view the agricultural sector as inherently risky even in stable contexts, the explicit targeting of areas vulnerable to insecurity is likely to exceed the risk appetite of conventional financiers. The evaluation of target value chains for climate security risks may address and alleviate these concerns. Additionally, the "peace dividend"—the financial return generated for investors through the maintenance of peace—needs to be defined. For pastoralist communities, an "anchoring" or place-based value chain may help to mobilize investment.
- **Climate security should feature more prominently in the public budget.** A dedicated budget line for climate security in budgets across different levels of government can help focus funds where they are needed. Tagging can help policymakers identify climate action investments at the national and sub-national levels that may need to be made climate-sensitive, and vice versa. Where possible, the architecture of the Inter-governmental Budget and Economic Council (IBEC), which serves as a coordinating platform for national and county-level governments dealing with fiscal issues, should be used to align investment priorities at multiple levels of governance.

- **Enhance the grant writing and fundraising skills of organizations working at the intersection of climate and security.** This action entails mapping funding partners and organizations, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), that are increasingly interested in climate security action, as well as learning from previous and current projects funded in other regions and countries.

References

- Achicanoy, H., Ramirez-Villegas, J., Mendez, A., Läderach, P., Pacillo, G. (2021). Where are the most vulnerable areas to climate induced insecurities and risks in Kenya? CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security.
- Carneiro, B., Resce, G., Läderach, P., Pacillo, G. (2021). Are policy makers aware of the climate security nexus? Mapping climate security policy narratives in Kenya. CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security.
- Desai, H., Forsberg, E. (2020). Multidimensional fragility in 2020. *OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers*, No. 79, OECD Publishing, Paris. <https://doi.org/10.1787/b4fbd27-en>
- DuttaGupta, T., Madurga Lopez, I., Läderach, P., Pacillo, G. (2021). How does climate exacerbate root causes of conflict in Kenya? An impact pathway analysis. CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security.
- Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS-NET). (2022). As an already historic four-season drought drives widespread need, a fifth season is now forecast. Available at: <https://fewsn.net/east-africa/kenya/alert/may-2022> Accessed: July 5, 2022.
- FAO, IFAD, WFP. (2015). Collaboration for strengthening resilience. Country case study. Kenya.
- Government of Kenya, UNDP. (2021). Rising Water Levels in Kenya's Rift Valley Lakes. Turkwel Gorge Dam and Lake Victoria. A scoping report.
- Huho, J. (2019). Resource Use Planning under Climate Change: Experience from Turkana and Pokot Pastoralists of Northwestern Kenya. Available online: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265995684_Resource_use_planning_under_climate_change_Experience_from_Turkana_and_Pokot_pastoralists_of_Northwestern_Kenya
- IPCC. (2022). *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Lösschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. *In Press*.
- Krampe, F., van de Goor, L., Barnhoorn, A., Smith, E., Smith, D. (2020). Water Security and Governance in the Horn of Africa. SIPRI. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-policy-papers/water-security-and-governance-horn-africa>
- Kurzer, J., Ballard, S., Abdullah, H.F. (2022). Concurrent Crises in the Horn of Africa. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/concurrent-crises-horn-africa> Accessed: July 5, 2022.
- Ladekjaer, G. M., Muriu, E. (2022). Three factors may spark violence in Kenya's 2022 elections, DIIS-Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018). Climate Change Profile, Kenya. URL: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenya_2.pdf
- Mwamba, J.G., Kagema, D.N., Kanga, B.M. (2019). Emerging Trends and Persistence of Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Kenya, *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol.9, No.16.
- Raini, J.A. (2009). Impact of land use changes on water resources and biodiversity of Lake Nakuru catchment basin, Kenya, *Afr.J.Ecol.*, 47, 39-45.
- Rarieya, M., Fortun, K. (2010). Food security and seasonal climate information: Kenyan challenges. *Sustain Sci* 5, 99–114. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-009-0099-8>
- Rüttinger, L., Stang, G., Smith, D., Taenzler, D., Vivekananda, J. (2015). A new climate for peace – Taking action on climate and fragility risks. Executive Summary. Available from: https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/new-climate-peace#report_toc-risk-analysis-compound-climate-fragility-risks
- Schapendonk, F., Sarzana, C., Scartozzi, C., Savelli, S., Madurga-Lopez, I. (2022). Policy Coherence and Awareness Analysis Report – East Africa and Kenya. CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security. *Forthcoming*
- Scheffran, J., Link, P.M., Schilling, J. (2019). Climate and Conflict in Africa, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science.
- Theisen, O.M. (2012). Climate Clashes? Weather Variability, Land Pressure, and Organized Violence in Kenya, 1989–2004, *Journal of Peace Research* 49(1): 81–96.
- UNDP, The Climate Security Mechanism. (2021). Climate Finance for Sustaining Peace. Making climate finance work for conflict-affected and fragile contexts.
- Veit, P. (2011). History of land conflicts in Kenya, Focus on Land in Africa, Placing land rights at the heart of development.
- von Uexkull, N., Buhaug, H. (2021). Security implications of climate change, *Journal of Peace Research*, 58(1), 3–17.
- Wasike, C.N. (2021). Conflicts in Kenya: Drivers of Conflicts and Assessing Mitigation Measures.
- World Bank Group. (2016). High and Dry: Climate Change, Water, and the Economy. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23665> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO
- World Bank Group. (2021). Climate Risk Profile: Kenya.

ANNEX 1

Workshop methodology

SESSION 1 - The climate-security nexus: developing a common vision

The purpose of this session was to facilitate an open-ended discussion around indirect linkages between climate change impacts and risks of social instability. To capture these complex links, the workshop sessions were designed to identify socio-economic, environmental, cultural, and political variables that act as intermediate links between climate hazards and conflict, while assessing the potential relations between them. First, participants were asked to reflect upon i) the main climate hazards faced by Kenyan populations; ii) the environmental, socio-economic, cultural, and political factors that may act as root causes of vulnerability towards climate hazards; and iii) the primary manifestations of conflict and societal instability throughout the country. Second, the group focused on identifying the links between the most relevant components defined for each of the three categories, as perceived by each participant in their context of work. The outputs from this first session were used to create a schematic representation of the climate-security nexus as perceived by participating stakeholders (see Fig. 3).

SESSION 2 - Actors at the intersection of climate and security

The main goal of this session was to identify the stakeholders acting at the intersection between climate change impacts and social insecurity, along with the means through which they currently engage with one another. The discussion focused predominantly on examining whether participating organizations – at the sub-national, national, and regional levels – have a mandate relevant to mitigating climate-related security links as identified in session 1, and the way they act upon these. Following the identification of the actors and entities operating within the governance system in question, the group focused on proposing spaces for engagement and coordination, such as multi-stakeholder platforms, that may serve as an institutional base to foster a climate security agenda in Kenya. Once the suitable platforms were identified, participants examined the challenges towards integrating climate security as a matter of concern within these.

SESSION 3 - Towards a Community of Practice for Climate Security in Kenya?

For this session, participants built upon the knowledge gained throughout the previous sessions to explore a shared vision of a climate security agenda in Kenya. The main question posed to the participant was: “What is needed to develop a Community of Practice on Climate Security in Kenya?”. Participants were asked to jointly develop a set of recommendations towards achieving this goal and propose short-term actions in line with building upon existing institutions to foster a community of practice for climate security; updating policy and governance systems through a climate security lens; integrating climate security in programmatic practices for climate and peacebuilding action; and financing climate security action.



www.climatesecurity.cgiar.org