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The “One Guilty Nation” Myth: Edith Durham, R.W. Seton-Watson and a Footnote in the History of the Outbreak of the First World War

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ABSTRACT

This paper will investigate the development of the War Guilt Question in interwar Europe through an examination of the dispute between two of Britain’s leading experts on the Balkans, Mary Edith Durham and R.W. Seton-Watson. The locus of their disagreement centred on the question of Serbian complicity in the plot to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914, and the subsequent debate over their responsibility for the outbreak of War. The dispute was prompted by revelations published by Ljuba Jovanović, former Serb Minister of Public Instruction. The debate over the Serb complicity in the Sarajevo crime, fundamentally shifted the debate over responsibility for the failure of peace in 1914, moving the focus away from Berlin, back to the Balkans.

Deem thou thyself, that deemest others deed, And Truth shall thee delyver, there is no drede.¹

Introduction

This paper will examine the pivotal role played by Mary Edith Durham, an anthropologist who never held an academic post. Mary Edith Durham was one of the most prominent women travellers in the Balkans during the first years of the twentieth century.² She was, however, far more than a mere travel writer, despite never holding an university position she wrote extensively on the Balkans. She was an anthropologist, as well as a historian, journalist and aid worker in her own right, passionately fighting the cause of an independent Albanian state after an initial flirtation with pan-Slavism, which did not survive her encounters with actual Serbs on her first visit to the region in 1900. She formed a close alliance with the Conservative M.P. Aubrey Herbert and was one of the founders of the Albanian Committee (which changed its name to the Anglo-Albanian Society in 1918, for which she acted as Honorary Secretary), agitating for the return of Albanian statehood in the aftermath of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of the country during the Great War. She became increasingly isolated after the premature death of Herbert in 1923, and was largely reviled by other British ‘experts’ on the Balkans, accused

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of having adopted the Albanians as her ‘pet Balkan people’ by Rebecca West.³ In part, this was because of her partisan advocacy of the unfashionable Albanian cause, but it was also reflective of her sharp personality which alienated both friend and opponent alike.⁴ The journalist Henry W. Nevinson, who travelled through southern Albania with Durham in 1913, when she was working as a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, noted that

Her language in conversation was even more racy than the style of her books . . . I have never known a woman to express facts or opinions with such startling vigour, especially in disagreement.⁵

Throughout the 1920s she fought an ‘open war’ with Professor R.W. Seton-Watson, the most prominent academic expert on Habsburg and South Slav affairs in Britain, who held the Masaryk Chair in Central European History at the School of Slavonic Studies at the University of London between 1922 and 1945 and played a prominent role in founding the School in 1915 with Sir Bernard Pares.⁶ Durham, did little to hide her anti-Serb prejudice, and extended this to those in Britain who promoted the Serb cause,

The Serb is the Prussian of the Balkans. The weaker he is made the better for the rest of the Balkans. Did you ever hear the rhyme? S.W. (Seton W) W.S (Wickham [Steed]) The two of them made the hell of a mess.⁷

The result of this dispute fundamentally shifted the focus of the debate about the origins of the Great War from Germany on to Serbia by the end of the 1920s.⁸

Long before the flood of publications that accompanied the centenary of the conflict, there had been successive waves of interest over the origins of the Great War. In 1914 itself, with the publication of a selection of official diplomatic correspondence in various Coloured Books, during the war as a key propaganda battleground, again in 1919 and subsequently, with the drafting and debate over the notorious ‘War Guilt Clause’, Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. Commemoration of the conflict began to emerge with the tenth anniversary of the assassination in 1924, but the toxic debate over war guilt ensured that it was still coloured by partisan considerations.⁹ By the last of these, the official German propaganda machine was well established, and had already made a significant impact on the charge of sole German responsibility, largely through the official publication of a mass of documents that sought, deliberately, to exonerate the German statesmen of 1914.¹⁰ Very little can be truly said to be novel in historiography, and this is especially the case with the debate over the question of responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War.

Christopher Clark’s account, in which he looked to move away from what he termed ‘blame-centred account[s]’, closely traces, some historians have suggested, the line put forward by patriotic German historians during the interwar years.¹¹ He, as they did, sought to suggest that all of Europe’s statesmen were ‘sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing . . . blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world’. Despite urging the necessity of eschewing the blame game, the reader of his book can readily be left with the impression that, if anyone were responsible for the war, then it was the ‘Serbian authorities [who] were partly unwilling and partly unable to suppress the irredentist activity that had given rise to the assassinations in the first place’.¹² By opening his account with the intricacies of Serbian politics at the turn of the century, Clark certainly provided a necessary corrective to an overwhelmingly Anglo-German-centric

historiography. The war, as Joachim Remak, a German-American historian, correctly asserted in 1971 was, after all, part of the wars of Ottoman succession, or the ‘Third Balkan War’ as he termed it.¹³ Among American historians in the interwar period in particular, the charge blaming German alone was successfully being challenged by the mid-1920s in the public debate, in particular by the historians Sidney Bradshaw Fay and Harry Elmer Barnes.¹⁴ By the late-1920s the focus had started to shift away from Berlin and towards Belgrade. Vital in this transfer was the use of a memoir written by a former Serb Minister of Education, which has been repeatedly referenced, in passing, in the subsequent literature.¹⁵

The *Kriegsschuldfrage* down to 1924

The question of war guilt had, of course, become intensely politicized through Article 231, and the fact that the justification for charging the German Government with the cost of the war through Reparations, was hung on this rather wonky nail. Again, the United States was central to this, fully involved as she was in the ‘interconnection of war responsibility . . . reparations’ and Allied war debt.¹⁶ Convincing the informed publics to their point of view, especially in America, became of paramount importance to the various involved foreign ministries. To contemporaries who engaged in this historiographical dispute, it sometimes seemed that the entire postwar international order rested on refuting the claims of the other side. One historian particularly keen to dominate the public discourse was R.W. Seton-Watson, who wrote to a Serb associate in early 1925 that

I do not need to remind you how closely the [War Guilt] question is identified with the Reparations Problem: and although to *implicate* Ljuba and Pašić [prominent Serb and then Yugoslav Radical politicians] does not in any way *exculpate* the Ballplatz (or the Wilhelinstrasse for its action in July 1914) it is an admirable weapon for confusing the issue and envenoming still further German public opinion.¹⁷

While it was possible for historians to over-emphasize the level of interest that the public had in such debates, they certainly were held to be important by politicians and officials. In these circumstances the line between academia and government became blurred, through the editing and publication of diplomatic documents, as well as the official and unofficial co-opting of historians to public service through their writing. This, as well as the long shadow cast by the war, ensured the public nature of the debate, which was undertaken through the press and scholarly articles, as well as weighty monographs.¹⁸

At the heart of this discussion in ‘contemporary history’ were the available primary sources, chiefly documents of state, released from the diplomatic archives, with historians closely following each tranche of newly released or revealed material.¹⁹ Interpretations tended to follow the available documents. The German Government, which had been the most pro-active in their release of documents, sought to deflect attention from her role in the crisis of 1914, attempting in turn to shift the focus on to Russia, France, Britain and even her old ally, Austria-Hungary. The attempts to throw dust in the eyes of contemporaries were increasingly successful, and even radical British historians such as G.P. Gooch were concerned with the implications of this policy. He wrote to Edmond Fitzmaurice, a former Liberal Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in

September 1924 arguing that ‘it is time that the victorious Powers—ourselves, France, Italy—published our documents. Till they do, they are suspected of having secrets to conceal’.²⁰ James Ramsay MacDonald, then serving as Labour’s first Prime Minister as well as Foreign Secretary, had already agreed in principle, prompted by a question in Parliament from his fellow Labour M.P. and Union of Democratic Control colleague, E. D. Morel, to publish documents from the prewar British archives, an undertaking his Conservative successor at the Foreign Office, Sir Austen Chamberlain, had honoured shortly after the fall of the Labour Government in November of that year.²¹

Sources, however, were not only coming out of Germany, but were beginning to emerge from other countries as well. The Bolshevik regime in Russia, eagerly helped by German historians, readily co-operating in the spirit of the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo, sought to undermine the international order through the publication of the series *Krasnyi Arkhiv* [Red Archive] from 1922 as well as other publications, that sought to discredit both the tsarist regime, as well as her victorious former Entente partners.²² In addition to massed volumes of official edited diplomatic documents, the interwar period was the golden age of the diplomatic memoir, and every statesman and envoy who served before the outbreak of the Great War seemed to want to have their say on their part, or more pertinently the role played by others, in the fateful months of late summer 1914. Eager historians, if not always the public, devoured these intensely problematic and partial recollections.²³ Gooch wrote to a colleague that,

I stick to my old view that none of the Govts wanted a world war and blundered into it . . . It is too early to pronounce final decisions, as new material is constantly coming out. . . Everybody with first-hand information should, as far as possible give it to the world & thereby submit it to criticism.²⁴

One key protagonist did not play to these already established norms. Serbia (now the dominant part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) was, for a variety of reasons, far from keen to open her archives to outside scrutiny.²⁵ The preferred Yugoslav narrative suggested that Serbia, much like Belgium, was merely an innocent victim of unprovoked aggression by the Central Powers in 1914, with her territory invaded, and her sovereignty violated.²⁶ Part of the basis of the entire legitimacy of the Yugoslav state stemmed from its position as an innocent party in 1914, and the recipient of unprovoked aggression by Austria-Hungary. In the absence of published documents, which did not appear until 1980, historians were forced to rely on other material in order to trace Serb politics and policy in 1914.²⁷ One imperfect source was provided by the private archive of the Serb Prime Minister in 1914, Nikola Pašić, which had been seized during the Austrian occupation of Serbia during the Great War.²⁸

Another increasingly productive font were the indiscretions of various Radical Politicians who had served in Pašić’s Cabinet in 1914. The tenth anniversary of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was little commented on outside of the lands of the former Serb state and the Austrian press. The anniversary was, however, marked by a commemorative publication, *Krv Slovenstva* [The Blood of Slavdom], which was edited by a White Russian émigré journalist, Aleksije Ivanovič Ksjunin, and published in Belgrade in July 1924.²⁹ The volume consisted of nine essays written by a mixture of prominent Serbs and Russians exiles, with the purpose of reminding the readership of the formerly close relationship between tsarist Russia and Serbia. Opening the collection was

the most prominent figure to contribute to the volume, Ljuba Jovanović, who was a founding Professor of History at the University of Belgrade, and had held the position of Minister of Public Instruction between 1911 and 1914, and subsequently Minister of Internal Affairs from 1914 and 1918 under Pašić. In 1924 he was serving as President of the Skupština, and was seen as the most likely successor to the aged Prime Minister. He opened his memoirs with the rider that he was merely 'giving out on this occasion a few excerpts, for it is not yet time to publish all'. He continued:

I cannot remember whether it was at the end of May or at the beginning of June when one day M. Pašić told us (he concerned himself in the matter chiefly with Stojan Protić alone, who at that time held the Ministry of the Interior, but he spoke in this sense to the rest of us) that some persons were preparing to go to Sarajevo to kill Franz Ferdinand and who was to proceed thither and be solemnly received on Vidov Dan. As they told me afterwards this was being prepared by a group of secretly organized persons and by circles of youthful Bosno-Herzegovinian patriots in Belgrade. We and M. Pašić all decided, and Stojan (Protić) undertook to issue an order to the frontier authorities on the Drina that they should prevent the passage of the youths who with this object had left Belgrade. But these frontier 'authorities' were themselves in the organization and they did not carry out Stojan's order but reported to him—and he passed it on to us—that the order had reached them too late, for the youths had already crossed. Thus failed the Government's attempt to prevent the execution of the murder which had been prepared, just as also failed the attempt to make on his own initiative by our Minister at Vienna, M. Jotza Jovanović, through the Minister Bilinsky to dissuade the Commander-in-Chief from the fatal journey he intended to make.³⁰

The rest of the article did not, unfortunately, continue in this indiscreet way, concerned as it was primarily with the period from the assassination to the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum and the subsequent declaration of war on 28 July 1914. The revelations in the opening passage did, however, provide some new pieces of evidence, hitherto unknown outside of official circles in Belgrade. First, that there had been fore-knowledge of the assassins and the assassination plot to murder the Archduke, second that an attempt had been made to stop their passage back to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and third that the Serbian Minister in Vienna, Jovan M. Jovanović (no relation to the author of the memoir) had attempted to warn the Joint Austro-Hungarian Minister of Finance (with responsibility for the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina), Leon Ritter von Biliński in June 1914.³¹ The heavy implication was that the Serb Government, with at least three weeks of foreknowledge of the plan, could or indeed should, have ensured that the plot to kill Franz Ferdinand did not succeed. The publication of a work by a still-prominent Serb politician, and perhaps more significantly, now an opponent of Pašić (who had recently relinquished the post of Yugoslav prime minister) still attracted little attention on its publication in Belgrade.³² Part of the reason for this may have been that this was not the first time that such allegations had been levelled at the Serb prime minister, but it was the first time by prominent fellow national.³³

The Jovanović memoir finds a ready audience

Despite the potentially incendiary revelations in the memoir, they remained obscure and little commented on outside of Yugoslavia. One figure who read the Jovanović memoir, and realized the implications of his revelations, was Miloš Bogičević, who had served as

the Serb Chargé d'affaires at Berlin in 1914, and had more recently been a paid employee of the Auswärtiges Amt.³⁴ He had sent a copy of *Krv Slovenstva* to Edith Durham, highlighting the propaganda potential of the work, urging her to use a meeting to discuss the new material, rather than merely publish them in a newspaper or journal.³⁵ Durham chose to make use of the Jovanović memoir at a round-table meeting of an informal working group of the British Institute of International Affairs, the Near East Group, which met at Chatham House on the evening of 3 December 1924.³⁶ The topic under discussion during the two-hour meeting was the question of 'Serbian Responsibility for the War'.³⁷ In addition to Durham, almost all of the prominent British figures interested in contemporary Balkan and European politics attended the meeting, including the historians G.P. Gooch and R.W. Seton-Watson, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who had served as Ambassador in Vienna between 1913 and 1914, Sir James Headlam Morley, Historical Advisor to the Foreign Office, as well as Henry Wickham Steed, Lionel Curtis, H.C. Woods, and Arnold Toynbee, who chaired the meeting. According to the account of one of the attendees of the meeting, she made a 'very considerable impression' despite 'her extremely unattractive manner and her obvious partisanship' against Serbia.³⁸ Seton-Watson, who had clashed with Durham while editor of the *New Europe*, was forewarned that she would come armed with revelations from Serbian documents, intended to confront her, and to make the 'sparks fly'.³⁹ Durham, brandishing her copy of Jovanović's memoir, berated the 'pro-Jugger and anti-Hun' element around the table and, according to her own version, claimed to 'have bamboozled poor Watson and Co. [Wickham Steed]' into silence.⁴⁰ Even Seton-Watson admitted that he 'was forced entirely on the defensive' despite what he characterized as Durham's 'series of scurrilous and objectionable misstatements', which he thought 'quite unusually offensive and tactless even for her'.⁴¹ Arnold Toynbee was called to silence Durham who, according to Seton-Watson, if not other witnesses, called the Serbs 'vermin' as part of her tirade.⁴²

The fact that the revelations had come to light in a public meeting further reinforced the Foreign Office's mistrust of what Sir Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under Secretary in the Foreign Office, characterized as the 'busy-body Institute' at Chatham House. Given the sensitive topic under discussion, the fact that the Near East Association had invited Friedrich Sthamer, the German Ambassador, to attend, Headlam-Morley admitted, was an 'extraordinar[ly] tactless . . .' move.⁴³ Even though Sthamer had delicately chosen to decline the invitation, the German Embassy was represented by Albert Dufour-Feronce, Councillor at the mission. Despite the convention of all meetings at Chatham House being 'closed', a report of the proceedings of the 'private' meeting made their way into the press. Durham was denounced by an unnamed BIIA member to the Executive Committee, which formally rebuked Durham for a 'deliberate communication to the Press' which was 'in conflict with the aims and established practice of the Institute'.⁴⁴ Toynbee, as 'leader' of the Group, was given the unenviable task of investigating the matter, to which Durham freely admitted speaking to her 'old friend' Emil Torday, the London correspondent of the German-language Budapest newspaper *Pester Lloyd*. She argued that she 'hadn't the least idea that these group meetings were deadly secrets'.⁴⁵ Torday published the story as part of his 'Londoner Momentaufnahmen' [London Snapshots] column on 11 December, a poor translation of which was anonymously supplied in order to be used against Durham by the Executive Committee.⁴⁶ The story was picked up initially by other newspapers in Budapest, before finding its way into the

German press.⁴⁷ Alfred von Wegerer, Director of the *Zentralstelle zur Erforschung der Kriegsursachen*, writing in the *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung* on 1 May 1925, reflected on the ‘significant revelations’ from Ljuba Jovanović, which came to light thanks to the ‘Balkankennerin’ [expert/connoisseur on the Balkans] Edith Durham.⁴⁸ He noted the ‘tremendous turnaround in favour of the Central Powers [in the debate over the origins of the war] ... as more and more voices ... emphasized and admitted the shared responsibility of the Serbian Cabinet in carrying out the assassination’. The furore stirred by Durham allowed German revisionists to shift the focus away from Germany firmly onto a more likely target than either France, Britain or even Russia had proved to be.

Durham had done little to conceal the new revelations that she intended to unleash on the Near East Group. *The Times* had refused to publish her summary, and interpretation, of Jovanović, and she was forced to submit her article to a more sympathetic, but fringe, journal.⁴⁹ This she found in E.D. Morel, editor of the U.D.C.’s periodical, *Foreign Affairs: A Journal of International Understanding*, shortly before his premature death (on 12 November 1924), summarizing the most incriminating aspects of Jovanović’s admissions, which were published in the December 1924 issue of the journal.⁵⁰ Durham’s ‘revelations’ were undoubtedly welcomed by Morel, who pursued Serbia almost as vehemently as Durham herself did, both in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*, as well as numerous pamphlets, which sought to show the falsity of Britain’s pre-war policy was, in effect, merely in service of Russian and Serb interests.⁵¹ The Foreign Office had long seen Morel as a troublesome element, and considered the U.D.C.’s journal as merely a vehicle for ‘propaganda purposes among the Germans’, which was thought to have a wide readership in that country, especially among those interested in the question of war guilt.⁵² In addition to this, on 20 November, Durham wrote to Ramsay MacDonald, who, two weeks earlier, had lost the November 1924 election, and consequently was no longer in office. She announced that she was in possession of ‘quite incontrovertible proof’ of Serbia’s knowledge of the plot to murder Franz Ferdinand, and, she argued, therefore primary responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914.⁵³ For Durham, who had ‘watched like a cat at a mousehole ever since [the War] for proof from the Serbs themselves’, the Jovanović memoir was finally the evidence that she had long been looking for of Serb complicity in the murders. Having spent much of the period before the war in the Balkans, first advocating the case of the Serbs and Montenegrins, before her experiences reporting on the Balkan Wars and their aftermath turned her against them completely, for their role in undermining the nascent Albanian state, and perpetrating massacres against Albanians in Kosovo and around Scutari in 1913–1914. On her return from Albania, with the outbreak of war in 1914, Durham had met with various members of the U.D.C. in order to discuss the ‘War Guilt Question’, by which she certainly meant Serb responsibility.⁵⁴ In Serbia, Macedonia and Albania during the Balkan Wars and after, she met various Russian military attachés, and took their bellicose statements as clear evidence that Russia was planning a European war with the intention of her conquest of the Balkans.⁵⁵ The evidence she had at that stage was either hearsay, or second-hand. The revelations of Ljuba Jovanović, however, were of a different character.

MacDonald’s private secretary forwarded the letter to his successor, Sir Austen Chamberlain, which prompted a flurry of correspondence between London and the British legation in Belgrade, seeking to obtain a copy of *Krv Slovenstva*, if not

a response to Durham herself.⁵⁶ Frustrated at the lack of reply to two successive letters (one was either not received, or was lost in the Office), she tried her luck with Harold Nicolson, the senior clerk in the Central Department, sending a letter that meandered between the murder of Aleksandar and Draga Obrenović to the Jovanović memoirs and the Salonika Process of 1917.⁵⁷ More pertinent was her casting aspersions against ‘poor timid little’ Seton-Watson, as being a mere ‘pussy-paw of the Serbs’ who made him ‘achieve their dirty aims’. In addition, she decried the present Yugoslav regime, under Pašić, as ‘absolutely untrustworthy and the damndest lot of liars in Europe . . . they simply jeer at Europe and the League’. Echoing the late E.D. Morel, she argued that this was merely the fault of British policy, as ‘we have let these brutes loose’. The letter produced a degree of confusion in the Foreign Office, C.H. Bateman, the most junior clerk in the Central Department, asked whether Durham wanted Britain to ‘put a spoke in Pasic’s wheel because he is a scoundrel?’⁵⁸ The letter, perhaps rather surprisingly, found its way all the way up to the Secretary-of-State, who could only minute a large “?‘?’ in response to Durham’s note.⁵⁹ While such missives were not entirely out of character for Durham, it was different from her recent communication with the Office, where she had been both respectful and restrained when writing to Lord Curzon, writing in support the controversial Croat politician, Stefan Radič’s application to visit Britain.⁶⁰ The exhilaration at finally ‘finding’ what she considered to be incontrovertible evidence against Serbia meant that Durham, to an extent, seemed to lose her sense of perspective, and her communication with MacDonald and Foreign Office officials show that her desperation to prove her case meant that the Foreign Office treated her communications with a greater degree of scepticism than had been the case in 1914, when she had been seen to be a reliable informant on Albanian affairs.⁶¹

In the Foreign Office meanwhile, there was alarm at the possible implications of the Jovanović disclosures, Headlam-Morley warned that,

The indirect results of the recent disclosures are very likely to be serious. They will strengthen the case of those who argue the origin of the war was not solely, in some cases not predominantly, the fault of Germany that we allowed ourselves to be misled by intrigue in which, though it started in Serbia, Russia, perhaps to some extent France, were implicated. This will make public opinion jealous and suspicious and greatly increase the difficulties in the future. People do not draw fine distinctions. They will say that our Government entered the war, as they were told, in the defence of the liberties of small nations, Belgium and Serbia; they now find that Serbia was merely a den of robbers and assassins.⁶²

Miles Lampson, Head of the Central Department, argued strongly that ‘this business should be left to the historian of the future’.⁶³ The evidence he argued was unreliable, ‘the odds are that those persons still alive who played roles in the drama are liars: those that are dead are necessarily silent, but anything written they may have left is probably quite untrustworthy’. It was not only the evidence that was deemed unreliable, but the messenger as well. P.A. Koppel, head of the News Department, on reading her article in *Foreign Affairs*, noted that ‘Miss D. twists what Jovanovitch says for his own purposes’.⁶⁴ Durham had a long history with the Foreign Office, having sent a long series of letters and demands to the Office when travelling in the Balkans as a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* during the Balkan Wars as well as in 1914 while undertaking humanitarian relief in Albania, as the new state collapsed under the pressure of

incursions from Serbia in the north and Greece in the south. Crowe, who had a long memory, 'retain[ed his] distrust against Miss Durham's propaganda activities'.⁶⁵ With Seton-Watson, the usual port of call for the Foreign Office when Yugoslav matters arose, unavailable (he was attending the American Historical Association Annual Conference in Richmond, Virginia), a copy of the publication was urgently requested from the Belgrade legation, a request which took some four weeks to complete.⁶⁶ There was no question of contacting Durham for her copy—even though the Foreign Office had only become aware of the publication after her letter to MacDonald. Its eventual arrival was of little use to the small group of officials and politicians in the Foreign Office, as the small legation staff did not have time to translate even this short article.⁶⁷ The only person in the Foreign Office who had any Serbian, William Strang, who served in Belgrade from 1920 to 1923 as First Secretary, was serving in the Northern Department, offered to translate the article at home and 'in a good literary style', for which he was paid the sum of £7-7-6.⁶⁸ It was not entirely straightforward process, due to the 'extreme naïvete of the language used', and Strang took a month to complete his task. On finally reading the offending article, the unanimous conclusion in the Office was that Durham had indeed distorted Jovanović's meaning, and the full chapter was deemed to be far less damaging than the selected excerpts published by Durham in *Foreign Affairs* and the *Manchester Guardian* were made to appear. The discussion again reached all the way up to the Foreign Secretary, who minuted 'Miss Durham is misstating the issue. For the Serb, as previously indicated, I distrust her judgement', and he agreed with Crowe that the memoir should be published in full.⁶⁹ The Foreign Office, however, had to distance itself from this, in order to avoid giving the impression that the memoir was in any way an 'authentic document'.⁷⁰ Conveniently, for this purpose, the Chair of the Publications Committee of the British Institute for International Affairs was James Headlam-Morley, who quickly arranged publication of Strang's translation of the chapter as 'After Vidov Dan 1914' in the next issue of the Institute's Journal.⁷¹ This attempt to get the full memoir published did not succeed in deflecting criticism towards the Office away from what one official termed the hostile triumvirate of 'Miss Durham . . . the Labour Party and the Manchester Guardian', who sought to use the episode to push the Foreign Office into criticizing a friendly, if capricious Government. It was clear that the Labour administration of Ramsay MacDonald had done little to bridge the gap between the 'radical' side of British politics and the Foreign Office establishment. The result, for the Foreign Office, was that in response to the Jovanović memoir, an official line was formulated against charges of revisionism between Headlam-Morley and Crowe, which formed the basis of the British line against the increasingly strident calls charges that the postwar settlement was founded on a false premise.⁷²

Seton-Watson responds

For R.W. Seton-Watson the public challenge by 'that poisonous woman' Edith Durham was particularly opportune, and he did not wait for the translation and publication of Jovanović revelations to respond, seeking to provoke the Yugoslav Government into opening their archives to scrutiny.⁷³ He had committed to a six week lecture tour of the United States between December 1924-January 1925, happily agreeing to speak on the 'Murder [at Sarajevo] and the Austro-Serbian dispute' as 'the evidence in favour of the

thesis of Austrian guilt and Serbian innocence which I have always upheld, seemed to me almost as overwhelming as ever'.⁷⁴ Just as he had his lectures 'practically ready' however 'a bomb has suddenly burst under my feet' thrown by Durham. As the most prominent historian and journalist in Britain writing on Central European and Balkan affairs, his pro-Yugoslav opinions carried much weight, albeit with some reservations, in the British Foreign Office. Harold Nicolson worked closely with Seton-Watson when he served in the Central European Department of the Foreign Office between 1921 and 1925. After Seton-Watson was denounced by C.H. Greig, the British Consul in Sarajevo, Nicolson defended Seton-Watson, stating that he 'is a man of erudition, modesty and independence . . . [he] is of a different calibre [to Greig], & should be recognized as such. He is often wrong; but there is no vulgarity in him'.⁷⁵ For Seton-Watson, he correctly recognised that his reputation was at stake, as well as of what he almost considered to be a state for which he saw himself to be the principal champion in the west. 'The matter cannot rest here, and will not be allowed to rest here' he wrote to the Serb journalist and politician, Jovan M. Jovanović.⁷⁶ But it was in his capacity as the last Serb envoy to serve in Vienna, between 1912 and the outbreak of War in 1914, that Seton-Watson was writing, asking for 'armour' to protect him from what he anticipated to be a potentially stormy tour of the United States, given the growing revisionist historiographical consensus in that country.⁷⁷

The implication from Ljuba Jovanović's recollections was that Serbia was in a position to not only prevent the killers from entering Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in a position to warn the Austro-Hungarian authorities, and they were in a position to give the names and descriptions to the Habsburg authorities. Jovan Jovanović had already revealed, on the tenth anniversary of the assassinations in the *Neues Wiener Tablatt*, that he had warned the relevant authority in Vienna, Biliński, on 5 June 1914.⁷⁸ Jovanović emphasized the vague nature of the warning, merely stated that he had warned that holding the annual military manoeuvres on the Drina (for which Ferdinand would attend in his role as Inspector General of the k.u.k. Armee), opposite Serbia would 'excite the greatest dissatisfaction' and that it would be considered an 'act of provocation' that might in turn incite a conscripted soldier to raise his rifle to the Archduke. Jovan Jovanović's revelations, much like his namesake Ljuba, were only partial, but it prompted a flurry of interest in the Austrian press, including an article penned by an anonymous ex-member of the Serb Legation in Vienna, in all likelihood the former Military Attaché, Colonel Lešanin, who alleged that the Serb Minister had received a formal instruction from Pašić to warn the Habsburg authorities, a charge denied by Jovanović.⁷⁹ Unsatisfied with his responses from his Serb associate, Seton-Watson determined to undertake three months of research in Vienna and Yugoslavia, that would be published in 1926 as *Sarajevo: A Study in the Origins of the Great War*.⁸⁰

Seton-Watson, however, did not wait for the fruits of his research before responding to Durham. He renewed his private attacks on Durham to correspondents in Britain, and publicly (without naming Durham, but prompted by her use of the Jovanović memoir) in *The Times* on his return from the United States.⁸¹ Toynbee noted that in his private correspondence with him, he had 'heaped coals of fire on Miss Durham's head. I hope she will feel them and have the grace to say that she does'.⁸² In addition, he did so openly on his arrival in Belgrade.⁸³ In the month following the meeting of the Near East Group, for Seton-Watson, Durham had unleashed a 'violent campaign of defamation of everything

Serb', in the *Manchester Guardian*, as well as G.P. Gooch's *Contemporary Review*, both of which were syndicated in the American and European periodical press.⁸⁴ Durham's influence, especially over American revisionists was especially clear.⁸⁵ Durham was not the only target of Seton-Watson's ire. Just as he had led the call to have the British prewar archives opened to scrutiny, he even more vehemently publicly challenged Pašić and his Government to do so as well, in the letter published in *The Times* on 17 February 1925, writing as 'a pronounced friend of Serbia' he wished to 'voice the demand for an explanation, rather than that it should be left to declared enemies'.⁸⁶ He closed by warning that any "failure on the part of Belgrade to provide an adequate explanation would not merely affect our verdict on the events immediately preceding the war, but above all our attitude to the official Yugoslavia of to-day, whose destinies are controlled by the same party leaders who were in power in June, 1914".⁸⁷

By quoting the most incriminating passage from the Jovanović memoir, and by correcting Durham's translation, which subtly changed the meaning of the passage, he sought to undermine Durham's credibility. Writing to Jovan M. Jovanović on the same day, he argued that if they did not do so, 'the present Belgrade Government will soon find itself morally in the same position as the Government with whom King Edward refused to remain on diplomatic terms, and friends of Serbia in this country will be reduced to silence or even alienated'.⁸⁸ Seton-Watson was a friend of Yugoslavia, yet held a long-standing hatred of Pašić and the other senior figures in the Radical Party, and he did not want to wait for 'nature . . . to remove him soon, thank God'.⁸⁹ His hostility was based on the failure of the veteran Serb politician's alleged corruption, as well as his obvious pacing of Serb interests over those of the wider South-Slav cause.⁹⁰ The Yugoslav Prime Minister, who had just successfully fought in his fourth election campaign since the foundation of the state in 1918, refused to take up Seton-Watson's bait, but the British historian was correct to surmise that 'Belgrade is quite mistaken if it calculates that the matter can be permanently evaded by mere silence'.⁹¹

Edith Durham, obviously not sensing how much Seton-Watson saw her as his virulent enemy, wrote to him twice in the weeks after his letter to *The Times* had been published, congratulating him on the fact that it had received no response. For all of their differences, they both essentially agreed on a number of points, namely that Pašić was harming Yugoslavia's interests on the international stage, as well as damaging the cause of South-Slav unity as he had 'carried out their original aim of making Great Serbia' rather than a South Slav state. She finished the letter by arguing that 'the important thing now is how to make Yugoslavia a credit to Europe'.⁹² For all of the mutual hostility between the two, it was a remarkable gesture, suggesting that she considered that they both simply desired the same thing, the truth about the guilt, or otherwise, of Serbia in 1914.⁹³ Seton-Watson, however, did not respond to Durham's attempts at conciliation.

The public debate in Yugoslavia

Despite some speculation in the Yugoslav press, the Yugoslav Government responded to neither Seton-Watson's nor Durham's public and private challenges.⁹⁴ A number of months passed before the Yugoslav press took up the story, focussing on both Ljuba Jovanović as well Edith Durham. In the relatively quiet period following Pašić's February 1925 election victory, with the Skupština adjourned until 28 April, the scandal

dominated the Yugoslav press. *Balkan*, the ‘yellow’ newspaper closely aligned to Pašić personally, chose to turn on Ljuba Jovanović, his rival and a more moderate member of his party. He was attacked for his disloyalty, ‘when it was once more necessary to find someone to stab his country in the back, M. Jovanović . . . was the most competent to attack the nation’.⁹⁵ The following week, *Vreme*, which was closely associated with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, carried an anonymous article, alleged to have been written by Ljuba Jovanović himself, on 13 March 1925, who merely saw a European-wide ‘journalistic pogrom, dear Miss Daram [Edith Durham], who out of her worship of the Macedonophiles, Radić and all enemies of Serbia has come to hate everything Serb, gave the first sign of attack’ by Germany.⁹⁶ Despite his differences to the group around Pašić, Jovanović’s defence was not dissimilar to theirs, arguing that while the ‘article of an old woman . . . was not worthy of attention’, the significance lay in the repercussions, and those who sought to benefit at the expense of Serbia. Germany ‘pull[ed] the strings’ making the ‘puppet’ Durham publish distorted extracts from his article, that had ‘altered the sense’ of his memoir, to merely show that Serbia was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914. The reason for the campaign, again, was that Germany needed to look ‘for someone to blame for the war’ in order to show the ‘need [to] not pay any reparations’. That the German Government, committed as it was to overturn what it considered to be the more unreasonable elements of the Treaty of Versailles, would exploit the latest ‘War Guilt’ controversy was obvious, but they were doing just this—exploiting, rather than instigating this particular hullabaloo. Two days later, *Vreme* asked ‘Who is Miss Durham?’⁹⁷ The answer, according to Lujo Vojnović, the former Montenegrin Minister in London, described her as a forgetful woman who had spread ‘vicious lies and mischief’ against Montenegro and Serbia, while undertaking propaganda on behalf of Albania since before the Great War. Using well-worn gendered tropes, he continued that “it is not uncommon in England for old maids to work themselves up for some eccentric cause with a purely feminine obstinacy, the reason being usually a physiological phenomena. But it is doubtful whether Miss Durham’s campaign is of a simple physiological nature. On the contrary it would seem to be a conscious defamation campaign in co-operation [with Germany] against our country”.

It would not be of consequence, he argued, but for the credence paid by Seton-Watson (who Vojnović had also known from his time in London) to the ‘expectations’ of Durham. In this way, she was seen to be nothing more than a desperate pro-German propagandist who would side with even anyone in order to discredit Serbia. Vojnović both dismissed Durham as being an insignificant old woman, yet emphasized that the episode was still noteworthy because Seton-Watson, ‘a friend of our country’, had been driven to attack Yugoslavia through the British press. After a significant amount of pressure, Ljuba Jovanović sought to clarify his statements made on the tenth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassinations, in an interview published in *Vreme*, in which he quoted Conrad von Hötzendorf’s memoirs in his defence and suggested that Trotsky would also be used in support of his case. Yet, ultimately, as many Serbs had done before, he blamed ‘a clique in Vienna and Budapest for deliberately encouraging [the Archduke’s] murder’.⁹⁸ Attacked by the Pašić press, Jovanović was forced further on the defensive, but merely continued to further muddy the waters by stating that he had not revealed anything more than ‘what was in 1914 actually known to everybody’.⁹⁹ One unimpressed observer, John Francis Charles, 7th Count de Salis-Soglio, who had known Durham since

his time serving as the British Minister Plenipotentiary in Cetinje between 1911 and 1916, observed “Ljuba is indeed a bad witness for the defence. He abuses the prosecution; What a breach of manners, of good education, to accuse a Balkan gentleman of knowing too much about a murder, even if he has made a few half confidences on the subject”.¹⁰⁰

With the convening of the Skupština, interest in the Yugoslav press finally turned its attention to more contemporary political matters. Beyond the Balkans, interest was sustained by the publication of Durham’s last published book, *The Sarajevo Crime*, in October 1925, which played especially well to the revisionists in Germany and the United States.¹⁰¹ The work suffered from Durham’s obvious bias towards sources that made a case against Serbia, as well as her rather less than rigorous interrogation of and selection of the then available evidence.¹⁰² Seton-Watson’s response, *Sarajevo: A Study in the Origins of the Great War*, has survived better than Durham’s inadequately researched volume, but appeared a crucial eight months later, on 27 May 1926, its publication delayed due to the inappropriate inclusion of closed British documents, shown to Seton-Watson by Headlam-Morley without permission.¹⁰³ For Seton-Watson, as ever, he was playing Balkan politics as well as looking to put down an opponent, wanting to use his book on Sarajevo to ensure that Jovanović did not succeed Pašić as Yugoslav Prime Minister.¹⁰⁴ In order to do this, and central to his overall argument, he looked to refute Jovanović’s central revelation and that it was not ‘highly compromising to the Serb Government’.¹⁰⁵ The result of Durham’s ‘fierce philipics meanwhile hold[ing] the field’ was that she became, for a short time, engaged as the ‘British’ expert at a number of ‘absolutely informal’ but secret meetings held by gatherings of revisionist historians.¹⁰⁶ Her avowed anti-Serb tendencies put her apart from even her radical friends and colleagues in Britain, forcing her to mix in the company of fringe, yet widely read, historians such as Alfred von Wegerer, Georges Demartial, Miloš Bogićević and Harry Elmer Barnes who tended to place political considerations over historical objectivity in their writing.¹⁰⁷ In public, as well as in private, she developed her views, and as the 1920s went on, more forcefully looked to excuse the Central Powers for their actions in July 1914. Writing to Ramsay MacDonald in November 1928, enclosing a copy of her latest article containing ‘some of my latest facts’, she argued that “As the Serbs themselves now boast of having planned murders in Austria for at least 12 years before the war for the purpose of leading to the break up of the Dual Monarchy there can be now no reasonable doubt that war was deliberately provoked. Austria was the goaded bull who was goaded till it turned and gored. And the bull always is killed and the toreador admired!”¹⁰⁸

The impact of the Durham-Seton-Watson dispute

Her temporary prominence quickly faded as the American historians Fay and Barnes increased in productivity. They acknowledged and built on her anti-Serb narrative to undermine the ‘one Guilty Nation myth’ that Durham had long sought to torpedo.¹⁰⁹ On the other side, both Seton-Watson and Yugoslav politicians used gendered language to attack Durham, both in private as well as in public. For Seton-Watson, his hostility was more than that of her gender, although this undoubtedly underlined his extremely hostile attitude towards her, as well as his particularly sharp reaction to Arnold Toynbee’s attempt to negotiate a truce between the two in 1929.¹¹⁰ His long-running dispute with

Durham led him to not even engage with her at academic meetings for fear that he ‘did not wish to be led into too sharp a retort’.¹¹¹ The antagonism he held towards her was most sharply focussed not on her arguments, but on her methods. Writing to Toynbee he was not ‘prepared to admit her title as a serious histor. [sic] student’, and he argued that ‘she is in no way qualified to speak’ at the BIIA.¹¹² It was not only in private that he criticized Durham’s *Sarajevo Crime*, rather abusing his position as editor of *The Slavic Review*, to publish a venomous seven-page review of the work, opening with the observation that “At first sight readers unfamiliar with the subject may be impressed by the *documenté* appearance of the book; but closer examination will soon show that it is always uncritical in the highest degree, often draws deductions quite unwarranted by the facts quoted, and sometimes advances charges of the gravest character without a shadow of real proof. The fact that some of these charges are merely quoted from other writers and not expressly endorsed by her, seems to me to aggravate the offence: for they then become innuendoes, intended to prejudice the mind of the reader. These are serious charges to level against an author who has long enjoyed a certain reputation as a specialist in Balkan matters . . . She has no inkling of what is meant by historical evidence”.¹¹³

Reading their work on the Balkans, he was almost as blindly pro-Serb as she was anti, with both inclined to be critical of the political leadership of their favoured Balkan states.¹¹⁴ She also sought to undermine Seton-Watson’s reputation by suggesting the he too was methodologically suspect. Reviewing his *Sarajevo*, she suggested that ‘the Scot makes a theory and searches facts to support it’, but did not follow-up on these allegations in the review.¹¹⁵ Much of Seton-Watson’s criticism of Durham’s work in methodological terms was fair, if too stridently put. It was over-reliant on unsubstantiated sources, and she was insufficiently critical of others who tended towards an anti-Serb line, but Durham was no historian. She freely admitted to Seton-Watson herself that as an anthropologist my interests are largely centred not on the details of separate ‘nations’ but on the sweeping racial and cultural movements which are what makes world history.¹¹⁶

His attacks on her were perhaps even more venomous than on his male colleagues and Yugoslav politicians. In the case of Ljuba Jovanović, Seton Watson dismissed his memoir as merely being a product of a combination of ‘Wichtigtuerei’ [pomposity] on the part of the Serb politician, as well as his attempt to use the revelations to his political advantage in his rivalry with Pašić.¹¹⁷ Seton-Watson characterized this as a ‘tendency to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds’, which was far more mild and measured than any of his public denunciations of Durham. Despite the open hostility Seton-Watson displayed towards Durham, she continued to send Seton-Watson naively innocent and remarkably frank letters, until he finally broke off relations with her in 1929.

Conclusion

The Jovanović revelations, and the publicity surrounding them, moved the narrative decisively away from Berlin, and focussed attention clearly on the Balkan aspects of the long-term origins as well as the immediate crisis of 1914, despite the contemporary views of Foreign Office officials in London who wondered whether the question of war guilt was of any ‘interest to the average man or the city?’¹¹⁸ Their contemporary political employment, used by Serbian politicians in the fight for the soul of the Radical Party, only ‘fell asleep’ with the death of Pašić on 10 December 1926 and Ljuba Jovanović on

10 February 1928.¹¹⁹ By the end of 1926 Jovanović's revelations had already been largely discounted in Yugoslav circles when challenged by Pašić.¹²⁰ This was, however, immaterial, the controversy surrounding Jovanović's reminiscences were far from the first time that the focus of those interested in the War Guilt question had looked to the role played in Belgrade, but significantly it was the first to engage the wider public outside of Germany and Austria.¹²¹ Durham certainly played an important role in bringing attention to the role played by Serbia, something that she later drew comfort from.¹²² In the last weeks of her life, ill, and holed up in her small flat in Glenloch Road, Durham returned to her last, unloved, book *The Serajevo Crime*, and wrote a short preface for a second edition that she never completed.¹²³ In it, she returned to the key themes of the second half of her life, the 'culpability of the Serbs & their brutal inability to govern with any semblance of justice the lands they acquired by murder & fraud'.¹²⁴

While she did not manage to convince many readers, outside those who were already predisposed towards finding Serbia guilty, she did play an important role in expanding the horizons of the debate over the responsibility for the outbreak of the war, indeed a far more significant role than many professional historians in Germany and the United States, sympathetic to her biases. A.J.P. Taylor would later write that 'a man with an intelligent interest in foreign affairs ... would read ... Seton-Watson on Hungary; Miss M. E. Durham on Albania ... one must add, he would be better informed than if he had stuck to official channels'.¹²⁵ It should be noted that neither was praised for their work on Serbia, Yugoslavia or Austria. It was Durham, by giving a far wider audience to the Jovanović memoir, that sparked any public debate in Yugoslavia, let alone outside the Balkans, almost a year after its initial publication in Belgrade. Far from being Clark's 'blind spot', the Balkans, and Serbia in particular, have long been the focus of historians, who have Durham to thank for ensuring that a rigorous examination of the sources was undertaken during the interwar period, when the contemporary resonance of the debate was at its height, down to the present when a more detached examination of a wider body of material has allowed historians, if not to come to any form of consensus on the question of responsibility, continue the 'debate without end'.¹²⁶

Notes

1. Geoffrey Chaucer, quoted by Durham to E.D. Morel, 6 October 1919, Morel MSS, LSE Archives & Special Collections (London), MOREL 58/51.
2. While largely forgotten in Britain, she is remembered vividly in Albania today, with streets named in her honour across the country. She was even complimented by Enver Hoxha, who wrote of Durham in his diary that 'Scholars such as Durham were not spies and did not write badly about Albania'. See, Daut Dauti, 'Gjergj Fishta, the "Albanian Homer", and Edith Durham, the "Albanian Mountain Queen": Observers of Albania's Road to Statehood', in Katrin Boeckh & Sabine Rutar (eds.), *The Balkan Wars from Contemporary Perception to Historic Memory* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 101.
3. See Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 120–121. Durham threatened to sue West over the slight, and the removal of any reference to Durham delayed the publication of *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*. Subsequent editions, published after the death of Durham, returned reference to an alleged conversation Durham had had with some Serb officers which she described as 'a malicious sneer about my gullibility'. See John Hodgson, 'Edith Durham: Traveller and Publicist', in John B. Allcock, Antonia Young & J.B. Allcock (eds.), *Black Lambs and Grey Falcons: Women*

- Travelling in the Balkans* (Oxford: Berghen Books, 2000), p. 29; Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 20.
4. Nevinson vouched for Durham, and (at her request) passed on Durham's private correspondence to him to officials in the Foreign Office in 1913 and 1914 calling for British intervention on behalf of the Albanian population. See, for example, Durham to Nevinson, 10 February 1913, The National Archives (Kew), FO 371/1782/8222.
 5. Henry W. Nevinson, *More Changes, More Changes* (London: Nisbet & Co., 1925), pp. 361–362, quoted in Gary W. Shanafelt, 'An English Lady in High Albania: Edith Durham and the Balkans', *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXX, no. 3 (September 1996), p. 296.
 6. Rebecca West erroneously noted that Seton-Watson 'had no favourite among the Balkan Peoples', West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, p. 20; Hugh Seton-Watson & Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of the New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson & the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 365–370. On Seton-Watson, see: Mark Cornwall, 'Robert William Seton-Watson es a kesi habzburg birodalom nemzetepitesi kiserletei', László Szarka (ed.) *Párhuzamos nemzetépítés, konfliktusos együttélés: Birodalmak és nemzetállamok a közép-európai régióban (1848–1938)* (Budapest: Országgház Könyvkiadó, 2017), pp. 327–349, available online: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/416880/1/SETON_WATSON_BUDAPEST_PAPER.docx (accessed 14 March 2021).
 7. Durham to Gooch, 13 December 1943, Frank Eyck MSS, University of Calgary Special Collections (Calgary), Eyck 333.83.30.2.12.2.
 8. Seton-Watson to Arnold Toynbee, 12 February 1929, Seton-Watson MSS, School of Slavonic and East European Studies Library and Archives (London), SEW 17/6/9. On Durham, see Marcus Tanner, *Albania's Mountain Queen: Edith Durham and the Balkans* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014). A summary of the correspondence between Seton-Watson and Durham held in the Seton-Watson MSS can be found in: Aleksandar Rastović, 'Robert Seton-Watson—Mary Edith Durham Polemics on the Responsibility for the Great War', Dragoljub R. Živojinović (ed.), *The Serbs and the Great War: Proceedings of the International Conference held at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts Belgrade, June 13–15 2015* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2015), pp. 435–445.
 9. Article 231: 'The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies'. 'Treaty of Peace With Germany', pp. 138–139: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf> (accessed 14 March 2021).
 10. Before the first volume of British Documents on the Origins of the War was published in 1926, 39 out of the eventual 40 volumes of the official German series *Die Große Politik der europäischen Kabinette* (some 10,800 documents covering the period 1870–1911) had been published, alongside the four volumes focussing on the July crisis, initially edited by Karl Kautsky, *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, published in December 1919 and a further six focussing on the part played by Aleksándr Izvolsky, the Russian Ambassador in Paris from 1910–1917, Friedrich Stieve (ed.), *Iswolski und der Weltkrieg 1911–1914: auf Grund der neuen Dokumenten-Veröffentlichung des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes* (Berlin: Dt. Verl.-Ges. für Politik und Geschichte, 1926). See R.W. Seton-Watson to Harold Temperley, 24 April 1926, Butterworth MSS, Cambridge University Library (Cambridge), MS.Butt/311. I would like to thank Dr Jon Singerton for making copies of this material for me.
 11. Jean-Yves Le Naour, 'Review: Les Somnambules. Été 1914: Comment l'Europe a marché vers la guerre, Christopher Clark', *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 79, no. 1 (Spring 2014), pp. 216–218, David Dutton, 'Review: Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*', *The International History Review* 36, no. 5 (2014), pp. 991–993.
 12. Clark notes in his conclusion that 'the Serbian authorities were partly unwilling and partly unable to suppress the irredentist activity that had given rise to the assassinations in the first

- place', Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London, 2012), pp. 560, 561, 563.
13. Joachim Remak, '1914–The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered', *The Journal of Modern History* 43, no. 3 (September 1971), pp. 353–366.
 14. For example, see Sidney Bradshaw Fay, 'New Light on the Origins of the World War, I. Berlin and Vienna, to July 29', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 25, no. 4 (July 1920), pp. 616–639, idem, 'New Light on the Origins of the World War, II. Berlin and Vienna, July 29 to 31', *The American Historical Review* 26, no. 1 (October 1920), pp. 37–53, idem, *The Origins of the World War* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), 2 vols. & Harry Elmer Barnes, 'Assessing the Blame for the World War', *The American Monthly* 16, no. 4 (1 June 1924), p. 107, idem, 'A Rejoinder to M. Poincare', *The American Monthly* 17, no. 10 (1 December 1925), p. 296, idem, *The Genesis of the World War: an Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926). It should be noted that the views of Fay and Barnes were not unchallenged by other American historians, see, for example, Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, *The Coming of the War, 1914* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), 2 vols.
 15. See, for example, Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), Vol. II: The Crisis of July 1914. From the Sarajevo Outrage to the Austro-Hungarian General Mobilization, pp. 90, 92–98, Clark, *Sleepwalkers*, p. 56, John Zarnetta, *Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One* (London: Shephard-Walwyn, 2017), p. 409.
 16. R.W. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 4 December 1924, Hugh Seton-Watson, Christopher Seton-Watson, Ljubo Boban, Mirjana Gross, Bogdan Krizman & Dragovan Sepić (eds.), *R.W. Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906–1941* (London & Zagreb: British Academy; University of Zagreb, Institute of Croatian History, 1976), Vol. II, no. 118, p. 121.
 17. R.W. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 16 February 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 121, p. 126. See also, R.B. Mowat, 'Germany and War Guilt—The Versailles Treaty—A Contract for Material Liability', *The Times*, 23 January 1925, p. 13.
 18. The best short summary of the interwar debate over the origins of the War is contained in Annika Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War: Controversies & Consensus* (London: Longman, 2002), pp. 21–118. Mombauer has, however, little to say on Serbia and the Balkans during the interwar period, for a cursory examination of Anglo-Saxon views on pre-1914 Serbia, see Slobodan G. Markovich, 'Anglo-American Views of Gavrilo Princip', *Balkanica*, Vol. 46 (2015), pp. 274–314.
 19. A good example of this are Fay's three long review articles, cited above, published in *The American Historical Review*.
 20. Gooch to Baron Fitzmaurice, 21 September 1924, Fitzmaurice MSS, Bowood Estate (Clare), I (c), quoted in Keith M. Wilson, 'In Pursuit of the Editorship of *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*: J.W. Headlam-Morley Before Gooch and Temperley', *Archives* 22 (April 1995), p. 87.
 21. The publication was announced through a series of letters between Chamberlain and Seton-Watson, published in *The Times*, 'Origin of The War—British Papers to be Published', *The Times*, 3 December 1924, p. 14.
 22. Despite other archival revelations, no documents relating to Serb 'war guilt' were published in *Krasnyi arkhiv*. See Derek Spring, 'The Unfinished Collection: Russian Documents on the Origins of the First World War', In Keith M. Wilson (ed.), *Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians through Two World Wars* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996), pp. 63–86, D.B. Kaufman, 'Restoring the "Unbroken continuity of our History": Commemoration of the Great War in the former Russian Empire', *Comillas Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2 (2015), pp. 37–38.
 23. Leonard Woolf opined that 'The more I read these books in which ex-Presidents, ex-Premiers, and ex-monarchs prove that somebody else caused the war, the more astonished

- I become at the contempt which they appear to have for us ordinary people', Leonard Woolf, 'Please Sir . . .', *The Nation & the Athenaeum* (26 June 1926), p. 355.
24. Gooch to William Henry Dawson, 28 August 1924, Dawson MSS, Cadbury Research Library: Special Collections, University of Birmingham (Birmingham), WHD/810.
 25. Much like the British official documents, the first volume published in the official Serb series covered the July Crisis, but was not published until 1980, Vladimir Dedijer & Života Anić (eds.), *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije* [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbia] (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Odeljenje istorijskih nauka, 1980), Vol. 7, part II, '1/14. maj-22. juli/4. avgust 1914', available online at: http://diplprepiska.mi.sanu.ac.rs/wb/Serbia-Forum/knjige/7_2 (accessed 14 March 2021). The Department of Historical Sciences of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA) only initiated the project in 1964 on the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of War. The forty-two volume series was finally completed in 2014, see Vasilije Đ. Krestić, 'A Scholarly Project of National Significance Accomplished. Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbia 1903–1914', *Balkanica* 47 (2016), pp. 461–464.
 26. Andrej Mitrović, *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918* (London: Hurst, 2007), pp. 61–62.
 27. See, for example, the memoir by Borivoje Jevtić, a playwright and member of *Mlada Bosna* [Young Bosnia] in 1914, Borivoje Jevtić, *Sarajevski atentat* [Sarajevo assassination] (Belgrade: Petar N. Gaković, 1924).
 28. Mark Cornwall, 'Serbia', in Keith M. Wilson (ed.), *Decisions for War, 1914* (London: UCL Press, 1995), p. 56.
 29. Aleksije Ivanovič Ksjunin (ed.), *Krv Slovenstva: spomenica desetogodišnjice svetskog rata: 1914–1924: sa 9 članaka i 16 slika* (Belgrade: Štamparija Save Radenkovića i brata, 1924).
 30. Ljuba Jovanović, 'Posle Vidov-dana 1914' [After Vidovdan 1914], Aleksije Ivanovič Ksjunin (ed.), *Krv Slovenstva: spomenica desetogodišnjice svetskog rata: 1914–1924: sa 9 članaka i 16 slika* [Blood of Slavdom: Monument to the 10th Anniversary of the World War: 1914–1924: with 9 articles and 16 pictures] (Belgrade: Štamparija Save Radenkovića i brata, 1924), pp. 9–23, here p. 9.
 31. There was reference to the warning in contemporary French documents, but these were not published until 1936, see Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1871–1914* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1936), 3e Ser. 1911–1914. Vol. 10 (17 mars-23 juillet 1914), documents 463 & 466.
 32. Pašić served three terms as Prime Minister of Yugoslavia (in addition to his periods in office as prime minister of Serbia between 1891 and the creation of Yugoslavia on 1 December 1918): 1–18 December 1918, 1 January 1921–28 July 1924 and 6 November 1924–8 April 1926. See Branislav Gligorijević, *Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji, 1919–1929* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1979) for more on the Pašić-Jovanović rivalry. I would like to thank the second anonymous review for pointing me in the direction of this volume.
 33. A brief account of the pre-Jovanović allegations by Luciano Magrini (an Italian politician and journalist) and Stanoj Stanojević (a professor at the University of Belgrade) is contained in Vladimir Dedijer, *Sarajevo 1914* (Belgrade: Prosveta 1978), vol. II, pp. 106–7.
 34. John W. Langdon, *July 1914: The Long Debate, 1918–1990* (New York & Oxford: Berg, 1991), p. 19.
 35. Bogičević counselled Durham that 'a written notice never can substitute a speech. The personal individuality and the personal acquaintance are also contributable to the better understanding', Bogičević to Durham, 25 August 1924, Durham MSS, University of Bradford Special Collections (Bradford), GB 0532 DUR, 'Letter & Newspaper Cuttings, 1922–1925. Concerning especially Croat and Serb dissensions & On Serb Guilt & the Serajevo Crime'.
 36. The Jovanović memoir was only translated and published in Germany after it came to prominence at the London meeting of the Near East Group, Ljuba Jovanović, 'Nach dem Veitstage des Jahres 1914', *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* 3, no. 1 (January 1925), pp. 68–82. Little trace has been left in the RIIA Archives or the *Journal of the British Institute for International Affairs*

about the Near East Group, Members of the BIIA were reminded that ‘groups attending the informal meetings must necessarily be small’. Rather than formal papers, as were presented to full meetings of the BIIA, the Near East Group meetings were intended to be ‘informal and conversational meetings of small groups of interested in specific problems of international affairs’, and that these ‘round-table conversations will materially add to the interest and effectiveness of the discussions at the larger and more formal meetings’. Discussion of the Near East Group were usually ‘led’ by the Chair, Arnold J. Toynbee, who suggested the meetings would allow members to discuss ‘controversial questions’ without having the ‘incentive to plead a case’, that attendees would have ‘more chance of learning from one another’ and finally that regular meetings would allow ‘more opportunity of carrying the discussion back into the past, which is the best means of viewing contemporary politics without head and in perspective’, Toynbee to the Editor of the *JBIIA*, n.d., *Journal of the British Institute for International Affairs* 1, no. 1 (January 1922), p. 32. See, ‘Programme for the Spring Session, 1922’, *Journal of the British Institute for International Affairs* 1, no. 1 (January 1922), pp. 31–32, & ‘Forthcoming Meetings’, *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* 1, no. 2 (March 1922), p. 74. The meeting on 3 December was publicly announced in the November issue of the *JBIIA*, but with no topic or name of principal speaker, ‘Near East Group’, *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* 3, no. 6 (November 1924), p. 322.

37. Durham wrote to G.P. Gooch the following day expressing that she ‘was very pleased with your speech last night’, presumably in sympathy with her line of argument about Serb complicity in the Sarajevo murders, Durham to Gooch, 4 December 1924, Eyck 333/83.30.2.12.2. Another account of the meeting can be found in: Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 4 December 1924, in *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 118, pp. 121–123.
38. Headlam-Morley minute, 16 January 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
39. In an exchange over an editorial note that stated ‘We are not prepared to endorse Miss Durham’s attacks on Greek and Serb’, Seton-Watson responded to Durham, ‘To be perfectly frank, yr. letter is hardly an encouragement to further amicable discussion’, M.E. Durham, ‘The Albanian Dilemma’, *The New Europe: A Weekly Review of Foreign Politics* 13, no. 164 (4 December 1919), p. 256, Seton-Watson to Durham, 3 March 1920, SEW 17/9/6. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 17 November 1924, *R.W. Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 117, p. 120.
40. Durham to Toynbee, 3 January 1925, Chatham House Archives (London), 4/TOYN/28.
41. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 4 December 1924 & Seton-Watson to Milan Ćurčin, 28 February 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, nos. 118 & 124, pp. 121, 129.
42. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 4 December 1924, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 118, pp. 121–123.
43. Headlam-Morley to Crowe, 10 February 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
44. G.M. Gathorne—Hardy [joint Honorary Secretary of the BIIA] to Durham, 7 January 1925, 4/TOYN/28. See also, ‘Minute 522. Near East Group meeting on 3rd December, 1924’, British Institute of International Affairs, 68th meeting of the Executive Committee, 7 January 1925.
45. Durham to Toynbee, 3 January 1925 & Durham to Toynbee, 6 January 1925, 4/TOYN/28.
46. E. Torbah, ‘Londoner Momentaufnahmen’ [London Snapshots], *Pester Lloyd*, 11 December 1924, p. 2.
47. ‘A hivatalos Szerbia a szerajevoi gyilkosságról’ [Official Serbia on the Sarajevo murder], *Budapesti Hirlap*, 12 December 1924, p. 5.
48. Alfred von Wegerer, ‘Der Umschwung in der Kriegsschuldfrage—Serbien wehrt sich’, *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung*, 1 May 1925, p. 3. On Wegerer, see Holger H. Herwig, ‘Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War’, *International Security* 12, no. 2 (Fall, 1987), pp. 5–44.
49. Durham to MacDonald, 20 November 1924, and corroborated by Sir Alban Young (Belgrade) to Chamberlain, 8 January 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
50. M.E. Durham, ‘The Guilt of the Serb Government in 1914’, *Foreign Affairs: A Journal of International Understanding* 7 (December 1924), p. 130.

51. Durham to Morel, 31 October [1919], MOREL F8/51. Indeed, Morel actually cited Durham as a source providing evidence that 'Serb officials were the real agents of the murder', E.D. Morel, *The Secret History of a Great Betrayal* (London: Foreign Affairs, n.d. [1922]), p. 30. See also, E.D. Morel, *The Poison that Destroys: The Case for a National Inquiry into the Causes of the War and the Disaster of the Peace* (London: The Independent Labour Party, 1922), p. 16. The pamphlet was an expanded version of an article originally published in the August 1922 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.
52. Edward Thurstan (Cologne) to Curzon, 3 July 1920, FO 371/4788/C 544/544/18, Alfred von Wegerer, 'Der Umschwung in der Kriegsschuldfrage—Serbien wehrt sich', *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung*, 1 May 1925, p. 3.
53. Durham to MacDonald, 20 November 1924, contained in Rosenberg to Selby, 21 November 1924, FO 371/9835/C 17,791/5277/92.
54. Durham recalled that she first met Ramsay MacDonald in September of 1914 to discuss the origins of the War, Durham to MacDonald, 12 November 1928, MacDonald MSS, PRO 30/69/1009.
55. In 1919 Durham felt that the war had come out of a desire by the Entente Powers to control the Balkans and Constantinople, by the mid-1920s her views had developed, arguing that the Serbs, actively encouraged by Russian military attaches in the Balkans planned the war for 1914. See Durham to Lady Constance Boyle, 7 November 1919, Boyle MSS, University of Leeds Library & Special Collections (Leeds), MS 1760, Box 3.
56. MacDonald responded in February 1925, congratulating Durham 'most heartily on the success which has crowned your long and uphill efforts showing that Serbia contributed substantially to bringing about the war. We are getting at the truth in bits, and I have not the least doubt but that the more of it we get, the more astounding will the credulities of our people be proved to be', MacDonald to Durham, 19 February 1925, Durham MSS, Royal Anthropological Institute (London), MS 56/1.
57. Durham to Nicolson, 30 December 1924, FO 371/9956/C 19,538/123/92.
58. C.H. Bateman minute, 2 January 1925, FO 371/9956/C 19,538/123/92.
59. Crowe was forthright, as usual: 'I confess to a good deal of scepticism regarding any statements made by this lady', Crowe and Chamberlain minutes, 6 January 1925, FO 371/9956/C 19,538/123/92.
60. Durham to Curzon, 7 December 1923, FO 371/8912/C 21,247/14146/92.
61. See, for example, Lord Cromer to Tyrrell, 10 March 1913, FO 371/1782/12592.
62. Headlam-Morley minute, 16 January 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
63. Lampson minute, 19 January 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
64. P.A. Koppel minute, 4 December 1924, FO 371/9835/C17791/5277/92.
65. Crowe minute, 19 January 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
66. Young to Chamberlain, 26 January 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
67. Young actually asked the Foreign Office to provide a translation for the Belgrade Legation, Young to Chamberlain, 8 January 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
68. R.C. Thomson minute, 6 February 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
69. Chamberlain minute, 19 January 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92.
70. C.H. Bateman, 'Draft Parliamentary answer to question from Arthur Ponsonby', n.d., FO 371/10794/C 5103/530/92. Chamberlain's actual answer was far more cutting, describing Jovanović's memoir as merely being 'contained in a volume of personal reminiscences published 10 years after the events to which they relate, and of very doubtful historical value', 8 April 1925, *Parliamentary Debates* 182 (1925), col. 2193.
71. Ljuba Jovanović, 'The Murder of Sarajevo', *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, no. 2 (March 1925), pp. 57–69. Leo Maxse also published the article in the April 1925 issue of the *National Review*. Strang's translation was simultaneously published in the United States, Ljuba Jovanović, 'More Light on Serajevo', *The Living Age* 325, Iss. 4218 (9 May 1925), pp. 305–311.
72. Headlam-Morley argued in the meeting of the Near East Group on 3 December 1924 that Sarajevo was not 'the real cause of the war ... but the Austrian actually using this as an

excuse for war, with the ultimate object to bring about complete change in the political situation in the Balkans'. His interpretation was endorsed by Crowe, who elaborated that 'We went to war because Germany made a deliberate and brutal attack on France, who was bound by her alliance with Russia, and because in making that indefensible attack she violated the neutrality of Belgium which we were bound by treaty to defend. The fact that Serbia's govt. in 1914 actually warned the Austrian govt. of the threatened plot to murder the archduke weighed strongly in the balance when we considered at the time the extraordinary demands put forward in the Austrian ultimatum'. Chamberlain agreed with both men. Headlam-Morley minute, 16 January 1925 & Crowe & Chamberlain minutes, 19 January 1925, FO 371/10794/C 530/530/92. This interpretation can be seen in the volume of *British Documents on the Origins of the War* edited by Headlam-Morley, and was used to replace the flawed, semi-official, volume published in 1919, Charles Oman, *The Outbreak of the World War of 1914-1918 - A Narrative Based Mainly on Official British Documents* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1919).

73. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 4 December 1924, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 118, p. 121.
74. For details of Seton-Watson's tour of the United States see 'Itinerary Professor Seton-Watson', & Seton-Watson, 'Private: Notes on Visit to America', SEW 8/1/4. Seton-Watson did not present a paper at the AHA Conference, as Sidney Bradshaw Fay presented on a similar topic, 'The Immediate Origins of the War', to the one that he had proposed to speak on the third day of the conference, 27 December 1924. Fay also employed the Jovanović memoir as part of his argument against Serbia. See 'The Meeting of the American Historical Association at Richmond', *American Historical Review* 30, no. 3 (April 1925), p. 464. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 4 December 1924, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 118, p. 121.
75. C.H. Bateman minute, 3 September 1925 & Harold Nicolson minute, n.d. [c. 8 September 1925], FO 371/10794/C 11,414/530/92.
76. Jovan M. Jovanović was not related to Ljuba Jovanović. In 1924, he was editor of the newspaper *Glasnik*, and owner of leading literary journal *Novosti*, as well as the leader of the Zemljoradnička i kmetijska stranka [Agrarian Party].
77. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 4 December 1924, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 118, p. 123.
78. Jovan Jovanovic, 'Meine Warnung an den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand', *Neues Wiener Tabblatt*, 28 June 1924, pp. 3-4.
79. Unnamed Serbian and Austrian sources added further speculation about the details of Jovanović's warning to Bilinski, see 'Zehn Jahre nach dem Attentat von Sarajevo. Mitteilungen eines früheren Mitgliedes des Serbischen Gesandtschaft in Wien', *Wiener Sonn- und Montags-Zeitung*, 23 June 1924, p. 4 & 'Vor zehn Jahren. Das Attentat von Sarajevo. Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand—Opfer und Schuldrtagender', *Die Stunde*, 29 June 1924, pp. 3-4. Luciano Magrini, *Il drammadi Seraievo. Origine e responsabilità della guerra europea* (Milan: Edizioni Athena, 1929), p. 115. Jovan M. Jovanović to Seton-Watson, 8 December 1924, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 119, p. 124.
80. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 16 February 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 121, p. 125. R.W. Seton-Watson, *Sarajevo: A Study in the Origins of the Great War* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1926).
81. 'The Serajevo Murder', Seton-Watson to the Editor of *The Times*, *The Times*, 17 February 1925, p. 8.
82. Toynbee to Seton-Watson, 16 February 1925, SEW 17/29/1.
83. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 4 April 1925, SEW 9/2/1, Seton-Watson to May Seton-Watson, 13 April 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 129, p. 134, Seton-Watson to H.A. Gwynne, 3 April 1925, SEW 17/9/3 & Durham to Toynbee, 3 January 1925, 4/TOYN/28. For an account of Seton-Watson's activities in Belgrade, see Young to Chamberlain, 16 April 1925, FO 371/10794/C 5304/530/92.

84. M.E. Durham, 'Serajevo Murder—New Information from Serbia. An Ex-Minister's Book', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 December 1924, p. 5, also reproduced in full in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* 3, no. 4 (April 1925), pp. 220–222. M.E. Durham, 'Further Light on the Origin of the War', *Foreign Affairs: A Journal of International Understanding* 8 (January 1925), p. 176. M.E. Durham, 'New Light on the Sarajevo Crime', *Contemporary Review*, January 1925, pp. 39–49, published as 'Neues Licht über die Entstehung des Weltkrieges', *Die Friedens-Warte* 25, no. 4, (April 1925), pp. 112–113; 'Fresh Light on the Serajevo Crime', *The Living Age* 324, Iss. 4209 (7 March 1925), pp. 532–529, and syndicated by the Leonard Scott Publishing Company.
85. See, for example, Sidney Bradshaw Fay, 'The Black Hand Plot That Led to the World War', *Current History & Forum* 23, no. 2 (November 1925), pp. 196–207.
86. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 16 February 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 121, p. 126.
87. 'The Serajevo Murder', Seton-Watson to the Editor of *The Times*, *The Times*, 17 February 1925, p. 8, also published in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* 3, no. 4 (April 1925), pp. 223–225.
88. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 16 February 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 121, p. 126.
89. Seton-Watson to William Miller, 17 February 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 122, p. 127.
90. This was starkly shown when Pašić met with Henry Wickham Steed in October 1918. For Wickham Steed's account of the meeting, see Henry Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years* (London: William Heinemann, 1924), Vol. II, pp. 235–239 a more contemporary account is contained in [H. Wickham Steed], 'Note of a Conversation between Mr. WICKHAM STEED, Chairman of the Serbian Society, and, HIS EXCELLENCY M. PASHITCH, Serbian Premier, at Claridge's Hotel on October 8th, 1918', SEW 5/1/10. See James Evans, *Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia: Negotiating Balkan Nationality and Identity* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 24–26.
91. Seton-Watson to Milan Ćurčin, 28 February 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 124, p. 130.
92. Durham to Seton-Watson, 8 March 1925, SEW 17/6/9.
93. Durham to Seton-Watson, 14 March 1925, SEW 17/6/9.
94. The semi-official *Vreme* carried a front page story to the effect that the Office of the Presidency of the Council and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were preparing a Blue Book showing that Serbia was in no way implicated in the Sarajevo murder, as the murder of the Archduke was carried out by Austrian subjects, for whom Serbia was not responsible. Jovan M. Jovanović suggested that, on reflection, the Serb case had already been made, and there was no further need for publication, 'Odgovor na Nemačke Klevete—Vlada spreva Plavu Knjigu kojom će se Utvrditi Ieodgovornost Srbije za svetski rat' [Answer to German Defamers—The Government has agreed to Publish a Blue Book to determine Serbia's responsibility for the World War], *Vreme*, 18 March 1925, p. 1, Jovan M. Jovanović to Seton-Watson, 24 March 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, Vol. II, no. 126, p. 132.
95. 'Odgovornost za svetski rat—Može M. Jovanovic biti ministar?' [Responsibility for the World War—Can M. Jovanović be a Minister?], *Balkan*, 7 March 1925, p. 1.
96. 'Jedna Sramna Kampanja Protiv Srbije—Na koji je način Nemačka mislila da se spase reparacija' [One Shameful Campaign Against Serbia—How Germany Seeks to End Reparations], *Vreme*, 13 March 1925, p. 1.
97. 'Jedna Sramna Kampanja Protiv Srbije—Ko je Mis Daram? G. Lujo Vojnovid o potrebi stvaranja jedne "narodne odbrane" u inostranstvu' [One shameful campaign against Serbia—Who is Miss Daram? Mr. Lujo Vojnović on the need to create a 'national defence' abroad], *Vreme*, 15 March 1925, p. 1.
98. Jovanović's initial rebuttal was originally published in *Novi život*. Seton-Watson was scathing, writing to Jovan M. Jovanović, 'It seems to me to make things worse, as it completely evades the point'. 'Sarajevski atentat i beogradska spoljna politika (povodom jedne

- kompanje) [The Sarajevo assassination and Belgrade's foreign policy (regarding one campaign)], *Novi život*, Vol. XXII, no. 1 (22 February 1925), pp. 3–8, before being published in Germany, Lj. Jovanowitsch, 'Das Attentat von Serajewo und die Belgrader Außenpolitik. (Anlässlich einer Kampagne.)', *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* 3, no. 4 (April 1925), pp. 213–220. Seton-Watson to Jovan M. Jovanović, 4 April 1925, *Seton-Watson & the Yugoslavs*, II, no. 128, p. 133. At the urging of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ljuba Jovanović gave an interview published in *Vreme*, in which his clarifications relied upon Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf's recently published memoirs. He closed by stating that he would soon provide 'sensational discoveries' from his 'significant witness', Leon Trotsky, Ljuba Jovanović's interview: 'Ko je krivac za Svetski Rat? - Svedočanstvo Konrada Fon Hecendorfa i—Trockog' [Who is to Blame for the World War? - Testimony of Conrad von Hötzendorf and—Trotsky], *Vreme*, 31 March 1925, p. 1. See, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit: 1906–1918* (Vienna & Munich: Rikola Verlag, 1923), Vol. 4, Die politischen und militärischen Vorgänge vom Fürstenmord in Sarajevo bis zum Abschlusse der ersten und bis zum Beginn der zweiten Offensive gegen Serbien und Rußland: 24 Juni 1914 bis 30 September 1914, pp. 81–82.
99. 'Izjava M. Ljube Jovanovića' [Statement by M. Ljuba Jovanović], *Politika*, 17 April 1925, p. 1.
 100. de Salis to Durham, 17 April 1925, Durham MS 57/5.
 101. See, for example Sidney Bradshaw Fay, 'Review of R.W. Seton-Watson, Sarajevo: a Study in the Origins of the Great War & M.E. Durham, The Sarajevo Crime', *The American Historical Review* 32, no. 1 (October 1926), pp. 118–120.
 102. Joachim Remak, *Sarajevo: The Story of a Political Murder* (New York: Criterion Books, 1959), p. 273.
 103. The American historian Bernadotte Schmitt reviewed the two works together and concluded that 'Mr. Seton-Watson exhibits far greater skill than Miss Durham. His book is a real contribution to our knowledge of an obscure subject', Bernadotte E. Schmitt, 'July 1914', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 5, no. 1 (January 1926), pp. 142–143. Seton-Watson completed his book in late July 1925, but the first volume (although the last chronologically) of *British Documents on the Origins of the War* was not published until May 1926, due to delays caused by requesting permissions from Entente governments for the publication of documents, Headlam-Morley to Seton-Watson, 7 August 1925, SEW 17/9/3, Headlam-Morley to Stephen Gaselee, 18 December 1925, FO 370/209/L 6261/152/402. Headlam-Morley admitted to being 'in great difficulty and much distressed about the situation which I have entangled myself over your book', Headlam-Morley to Seton-Watson, 2 January 1926, Headlam-Morley MSS, Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), HDLM ACC 727/40.
 104. Seton-Watson to Headlam-Morley, 5 April 1926, HDLM ACC 727/40. Pašić was not, after all, in need of Seton-Watson's help to expel Jovanović from the Radical Party, which took place on 25 April 1926 by 46 votes to 1 (with 24 abstentions). The main justification given by Pašić in an energetic speech given to the General Committee was that Jovanović had 'written the article concerning the Sarajevo Murder', 'Glavni Odbor radikalne stranke isključuje g. Ljubu Jovanovića' [Nikola Pašić Accuses Ljuba Jovanović], *Vreme*, 25 April 1926 & 'Glavni Odbor radikalne stranke isključuje g. Ljubu Jovanovića' [The main committee of the Radical party excludes Mr. Ljuba Jovanović], *Vreme*, 26 April 1925, p. 1.
 105. Seton-Watson, *Sarajevo*, pp. 10, 146, 153–159.
 106. Seton-Watson to Gooch, 2 March 1926, SEW 17/8/3. Coolidge, an American historian, shared a similar sentiment, 'I hate to see the field left too exclusively to Miss Durham', Archibald Cary Coolidge to Seton-Watson, 1 April 1926, SEW 8/1/5. Gooch was originally invited but was unable, or unwilling, to attend. Durham, 'Secret meeting on the War Guilt Question, August 1926 [actually 1930]', n.d. [c. 1944], Durham MS 57/2.
 107. These figures were the most prominent historians in the 1920s who argued that Germany was innocent of the charge of War Guilt.

108. Durham to MacDonald, 12 November 1928, PRO 30/69/1009. M.E. Durham, 'Fresh Light on Serbia and the War', *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 134 (September 1927), p. 309.
109. Durham to Gooch, 14 December 1922, Eyck 333.83.30.2.12.2. Fay's views developed down to December 1924, moving from a position where Serbia was seen to be largely innocent, to one where he argued that the Serb Government had prior knowledge of the plot, but attempted, unsuccessfully, to stop the murderers at the border. Barnes, on the other hand, argued that the responsibility for the immediate origins of the war lay entirely with Serbia. See Fay to S. Edward Fetz, 24 December 1924, contained in Fetz to Durham, 25 December 1924, GB 0532 DUR. Sidney Bradshaw Fay, 'New Light on the Origins of the War, III. Russia and the Other Powers', *The American Historical Review* 26, no. 2 (January 1921), pp. 225–254, Fay, *Origins of the World War*, Vol. II, pp. 61–76, Barnes, *Genesis of the World War*, pp. 156–166.
110. Toynbee's impulsive suggestion that the two Balkan experts produce 'a critical and authoritative edition of all the documents' was one he soon seemed to regret, and worried, rightly, that Seton-Watson would 'probably bite my head off', Durham on the other hand responded 'there is nothing that would please me better than to co-operate . . . if you can persuade Seton-Watson to work with me', Toynbee to Seton-Watson, 8 February 1929, SEW 17/6/9. Durham immediately wrote to Seton-Watson, even sending him the newly published second volume of Miloš Bogičević, *Die auswärtige Politik Serbiens, 1903–1914* (Berlin: Brücken-Verlag, 1929), Durham to Seton-Watson, 31 January 1929, SEW 17/6/9.
111. Seton-Watson wrote to Durham that 'I refrained from answering you at the Institute, not because I have nothing to say, but because I resent most intensely your whole treatment & interpretation of the question'. Durham was 'surprised and grieved' by his response, 'To me this is all history—a thing outside myself—and all personal feelings are quite barred out . . . Personally I consider all squabbling is silly—life is too short for it'. Her last letter to Seton-Watson, on 27 March 1929, remained unanswered. Seton-Watson to Durham, 12 February 1929 & Durham to Seton-Watson, 14 February 1929 & 27 March 1929, SEW 17/6/9.
112. He continued, 'she is now muddling everything up & drawing utterly exaggerated and false inferences, such as are likely to have a sequel. She treats ev. statement fr. these disgruntled Black Hand exiles as "gospel", and then defames Serbia as a mere nest of murderers. It is . . . illogical and unreasonable', Seton-Watson to Toynbee, 12 February 1929, SEW 17/6/9.
113. R.W. Seton-Watson, 'Review of: The Serajevo Crime', *The Slavonic Review* 4, no. 11 (December 1925), pp. 513–520.
114. It should be noted that he did refer to it in private as 'her poisonous book', Seton-Watson to Temperley, 24 April 1926, MS.BUTT/311. In private Durham had long held that Seton-Watson was 'made a cat's paw of and bamboozled by the Serbs', Durham to Gooch, 30 December 1924, Eyck 333.83.30.2.12.2.
115. Durham sent Seton-Watson a friendly letter when his book came out, with no response until six months later, she eventually provided a hostile review of his work (with a positive review of Harry Elmer Barnes's *The Genesis of the War*) for *Foreign Affairs*. The review was less academically rigorous than Seton-Watson's had been, and failed to make a coherent case against the work, or defend her own work on the subject. Durham to Seton-Watson, 17 August 1926, SEW 17/6/9, M.E. Durham, 'A Scot and an American on the Causes of the War', *Foreign Affairs: A Journal of International Understanding* 9 (October 1926), pp. -104–105. Durham expanded on her criticisms of Seton-Watson in private to Toynbee, quoted in Toynbee to Seton-Watson, 8 February 1929, 4/TOYN/28.
116. Durham to Seton-Watson, 4 December 1926, SEW 17/6/9.
117. Seton-Watson, *Sarajevo*, p. 158.
118. See, for example, Sidney Bradshaw Fay, 'Serbia's Responsibility for the World War', *Current History Monthly*, Vol. 23 (October 1925), pp. 41–48. C. Howard Smith minuted 'How much interest is Miss Durham's campaign raising . . . poor Mr. Seton-Watson continues to keep it before the public in order that the Serbs may be induced to publish proof that the whole study is untrue, as he devoutly hopes they may be able to do. But does all this newspaper talk

- really interest the average man or the City? I doubt it', C. Howard Smith minute, 8 April 1925, FO 371/10795/C 4830/530/92.
119. Horváth Jenő, 'A háborús felelősség kérdése. Az első évtized kutatásainak eredményei 1920–1930' [The Question of war responsibility. Results of the first decade of research 1920–1930], *Történeti Szemle* 15, nos. 1–4 (1930), pp. 114–142, here p. 131.
 120. Pašić gave an interview in *Politika* on 26 April 1926 in which he publicly challenged Jovanović's version of events. Jovanović declined to deny Pašić's version of events was correct, see Dedijer, *Sarajevo*, vol. II, p. 108.
 121. For example, a pamphlet published by a Serb historian, Stanoje Stanojević, was published at the height of the Ruhr Crisis, and received little attention in Britain, France or America despite (or perhaps because of) alleging that Austro-Hungarian politicians were complicit in the Archduke's murder, Stanoje Stanojević, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Weltkriegs. Aus dem serbischen Manuskript übertragen und herausgegeben von Hermann Wendel* (Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurter Societäts-Druckerei, 1923).
 122. 'It was not until I translated & brought out the article at the Near & Mid East and the Royal Institute some six months after its publication that they suddenly realized that Europe was horrified and also to their blank surprise that their friends in England had really believed in their innocence!' Durham to Headlam-Morley, 21 March 1929, HDLM ACC 727/41. Contemporaries also acknowledged Durham's important role in highlighting 'Jovanovich's testimony [which] provoked a storm that led to the general belief that the Serbian government was responsible for the outbreak of the World War', Jenő, 'A háborús felelősség kérdése', pp. 131.
 123. 'I bitterly grugged the labour that went to writing the Sarajevo Crime', Durham to Edward Boyle, 15 November 1928, Boyle MS 405.
 124. M.E. Durham, 'Preface: Notes about the Serajevo Crime', May 1944, Durham MS 56/1.
 125. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers: Dissent Over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939* (London: Panther History, 1969), p. 88.
 126. Clark, *Sleepwalkers*, p. xxvi.

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