Security Studies: The Next Stage?

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Since the late 1980s there has been a remarkable change in the way security is conceived, studied and practiced in academic International Relations. During this period, basic assumptions that were once widely regarded as self-evident truths have been challenged in fundamental ways. The result has been a series of stimulating debates about the character and purpose of Security Studies. This article discusses these debates by tracing the development of Security Studies from its Cold War past to its post Cold War present; looking to the future, it argues that a Critical Security Studies approach should represent its next stage.

COLD WAR SECURITY STUDIES

It will come as a surprise to many that 'security' is a relatively new concept in the study of International Relations. The term 'national security' entered the vocabulary of the Anglo-American academic world only after the Second World War. The first reference to the term in US official documents seems to have been the National Security Act of 1947; this aimed to provide 'integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national security.'[1] Walter Lippmann offered what some think was the first definition of the term in his *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (1943). 'A nation is secure' he wrote, 'to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.'[2] Lippmann's definition hints as the state--centric character of the concept: for him, as indeed for most subsequent security specialists, security could be equated unproblematically with the defence of the state. The largely unreflexive, pro-*status quo* bias of Lippmann's conceptualisation is also underlined by his tendency to use the terms 'security' and 'national security', and 'state' and 'nation' as synonymous.
The academic sub-field of Security Studies expanded in the Anglo-American world in the aftermath of the Second World War – in the Cold War environment its concepts, assumptions and findings helped to sustain.[3] In

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1 P.G. Bock & Morton Berkowitz, 'The emerging field of national security,' *World Politics* 19 (1966) 10-13.
2 Walter Lippmann, *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: 1943) summarised and quoted in Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore & London: 1962) 150.
3 Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict* (Oxford: 1990).

the United States, security was studied under the title 'National Security Studies,' but in Britain it was called Strategic Studies.[4] Both were premised on the same basic set of assumptions, namely that Security Studies should focus on the state as the 'referent object,' and on the military dimension of security. This 'conceptual focus' on states (conceived in unitary, 'billiard ball' terms) had far-reaching implications. It meant that Cold War Security Studies was not only *about* states (with the security of individuals, for example, being subsumed under the ambit of the state) but was also orientated towards the *needs* of states. Thus Security Studies regarded itself as generating information and analysis for states, and specifically the ruling elites within them, with respect to military attitudes and behaviour. This was expressed by Edward Luttwak as follows: 'Strategy is not a neutral pursuit and its only purpose is to strengthen one's own side in the contention of nations.'[5]

Cold War Security Studies was therefore a sub-field of International Relations devoted to states, strategy and the status quo. True, during the era of détente and oil shocks (1969-1976) a broader range of issues was allowed on to the agenda in recognition of the growing sensitivity of economic and human rights concerns. But this constituted more of a parenthesis than a break; things returned quickly to security-business-as--usual with the re-intensification of the Cold War in the late 1970s.

Security thinking during the Cold War was dominated by the outlooks of political realism. The realist position was expressed by one of its exponents as follows:

> Realists tend to be conservative in their views...[they] tend to accept a world subdivided into independent sovereign states as being the normal, if not the permanent condition of international society, and they consider realpolitik an inescapable feature of the international environment....The realists also emphasise the ubiquity of the power struggle, and their literature is dominated by the concepts of national power and interest. Conflict is regarded as an inescapable

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4 The Soviet Union, having its own 'nationalities question' opted for the term 'state security' instead of 'national security'. See Caroline Thomas, 'Conclusion: Southern instability, security and Western concepts – on an unhappy marriage and the need for a divorce,' in *The State and Instability in the South* Caroline Thomas, & Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, eds. (London: 1989) 176.

5 Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy and History: Collected Essays*, vol II. (New Brunswick & Oxford: 1985) xiii.

condition of international life. This simple assumption is the
starting point of realism.[6]

Contemporary critics of realism are sometimes attacked by realists for
caricaturing this old tradition of thought about the world, but as the
quotation shows, Cold War realists themselves projected a picture of their
assumptions that was as simple as it was bleak.
During the first decade of the Cold War (1945-55) security analyses
concentrated on issues of nuclear deterrence and aggression, massive
retaliation and limited war, nuclear surprise attack and arms racing. The
emphasis placed on the nuclear dimension of strategy during this period
is difficult to exaggerate. In the following three decades (1955-1985), the
same issues were tackled but within the context of increasingly self-
-conscious attempts to place the study of security on more methodologically
sophisticated and rigorous foundations. Major theoretical development
concentrated on four main themes, namely nuclear deterrence, disarmament
and arms control, crisis management and limited war. The decade between
1955 and 1965 was a particularly fruitful one, characterised as it was by
both intellectual efflorescence and institutional consolidation. John Garnett
has described it as the 'golden age' of strategic thinking.[7]
Despite its growing prominence and prestige, Security Studies always had
its critics and detractors. Even during its 'golden age' Cold War heyday
there was criticism of the methods and integrity of strategic analyses and
analysts. The former were criticised, for example, for being pseudo-
-scientific, while the latter were criticised for their close involvement with
governments on the grounds that this was not compatible with scholarly
independence.[8] Furthermore, the mainstream output of the 'golden age'
never appeared to be particularly convincing for those states and peoples
with alternative world views, less complacent attitudes towards the status
quo, or with different security interests. Events as diverse as the 'Ban the
Bomb' marches in Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the growth

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6 John Garnett, 'Security Studies and its assumptions,' in *Contemporary Strategy*, 2nd ed., vol 1, John
  Baylis et al. (New York & London: 1987) 9-10.
7 John Garnett, ed. *Theories of Peace and Security: a Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought* (London:
  1970).
8 For a range of criticisms and defences, see Hedley Bull, 'Strategic Studies and its Critics,' *World
  Politics*, XX: 4 (July 1968) 593-605; Colin Gray, *Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment* (London: 1982);
  and Philip Green, *Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (Columbus: 1966).

of Peace Research in North America, Scandinavia and elsewhere illustrate the cross-cutting differences over the theory and practice of security that existed even within the West. Outside Europe the relevance of Anglo-
-American strategic-realist discourse was limited to elites on the periphery attempting to ingratiate themselves with their superpower backers, and to those caught-up in the logic of global containment and 'limited' wars.
During the 1970s, Cold War Security Studies saw more emphasis placed on area studies, history and political psychology. Good work was done, for example, on psychology and deterrence, and aspects of Soviet military policy. It was also during this period that economic – in addition to military – aspects of security began to find some space on the security agenda, but the broadening should not be exaggerated, and with the onset of the Second Cold War following the collapse of detente and the arrival of the Reagan-Brezhnev era, the security agenda of the superpowers and their mainstream analysts returned to its nuclear focus with a vengeance. Such issues as 'prevailing' strategies, nuclear winter, ballistic missile defence and nuclear blackmail dominated security thinking, and in particular President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative ('Star Wars) and the debate surrounding theatre nuclear weapons (Cruise missiles and SS-20s). But significantly, some individuals and social movements refused to accept the mainstream response to the Second Cold War. They were committed to a search for alternative ways of thinking about, and acting for, security. We will now turn our attention to two of the main strands of thought which sought to challenge mainstream, militarised thinking: the 'alternative defence' and the 'Third World security' schools.

The 'alternative defence' school

Among those who refused to accept security-business-as-usual was a school of thought whose proponents came to define their approach as 'alternative defence.' Their central tenet was that the unilateralist and zero-sum notions of security prevalent during the Cold War were actually destabilising, and the major source of *insecurity* in international relations. Real peace and security was not just the absence of war, but rather depended on the establishment of the conditions for social justice and mutual understanding – a view also shared by academic Peace Research.[9] In addition to taking away the reasons

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9 Kenneth Boulding, *Stable Peace* (Austin: 1978); Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research,' *Journal of Peace Research*, 6:3 (1969) 167-192.

for conflict, 'alternative defence' thinking concentrated more urgently on seeking means whereby the dangerous military confrontation of the Second Cold War could be mitigated.[10] Consequently they developed ideas and policies such as common security, non-offensive defence, a nuclear freeze, military confidence building, democracy and disarmament, 'détente from below,' and alternative security orders.[11]

The 'alternative defence' school was not interested in theory for theory's sake; it was desperately concerned to promote alternative security practices, to overcome dangerous Cold War norms. Their ideas also helped stimulate politicians such as the left-of centre Western 'men of affairs' responsible for the influential report published in 1982 and titled *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament*. In its introduction, Olof Palme wrote:

> Our alternative is common security...[The two sides] can survive only together. They must achieve security not against the adversary but together with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction.[12]

The impact of 'alternative defence' thinking on politicians dissatisfied by the militarised, hide-bound nature of mainstream security thinking is difficult to assess, but the school's main impact of the school was felt through its involvement with social movements, including the US 'Freeze' movement, the UK based Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), and END (European Nuclear Disarmament). Strengthened by the developing ideas of 'alternative defence' specialists, these movements challenged the prevalent notion that state leaders, their advisors, and military and academic Security Studies, always knew best about matters relating to peace and security. The definition of 'expert' became challenged. They also underlined the constructive role that citizens' initiatives could play in trying to wind down the potentially catastrophic tensions that had built-up between East and West.[13] Support for

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10 See Nicholas J. Wheeler & Ken Booth, 'The security dilemma,' in *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*, John Baylis & N.J. Rengger, eds. (Oxford: 1992) 45-50.

11 See Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament* (London: 1982); Alternative Defence Commission, *Defence Without the Bomb* (London: 1983) and *The Politics of Alternative Defence* (London: 1987).

12 *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament*, ix.

13 David J. Dunn, 'Peace Research versus Strategic Studies,' in *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security*, Ken Booth, ed. (London: 1991) 57.

the 'alternative' defence school was given by the phenomenon of 'conversion on retirement' – when senior military officers from a number of Western countries announced their disatisfaction with existing policies once they had left office.

Thatcherites and Reaganites claimed that proponents of 'alternative defence' and their allies in the peace movements were wittingly or unwittingly aiding the Kremlin. What actually happened was rather different. The transformation that took place in Soviet grand strategy resulted in part from internal reassessments of the Soviet Union's position,[14] but the influence of external thinking on both the transformation itself, and the form taken by it should not be underestimated.[15] Gorbachev's 'new thinking' after 1986 was directly influenced by 'alternative defence' thinking, and was characterised by the same principles as those espoused by Western 'alternative' thinkers. The transmission belt for these ideas were the contacts that developed between 'alternative' specialists across the 'iron curtain' divide. The Soviet leaders' pursuit of the policies advocated by the 'alternative defence' school helped to revolutionise threat perceptions and political relations across Europe. After decades of impasse, Soviet reductions in force sizes and shifts in posture led to a situation where diplomatic negotiations and mainstream academic thinking about arms control and disarmament began to lag badly behind the dramatic changes occurring outside the conference chambers.[16] Through the practice of 'common security,' Gorbachev took away the West's threat, mitigated the security dilemma, and unwound the militarised Cold War knot.

'Third World security' thinking

The theory and practice of security in the Third World challenged Cold War security 'common-sense' in several important ways.[17] First, a number

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14 Michael MccGwire, *Military Obecjtives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington: 1987); *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington: 1991)

15 Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas do not float freely?: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war,' *International Organization* 48, 2 (1994) 185-214.

16 Jane O. Sharp, 'Disarmament and Arms Control,' in *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* op.cit., 121 ff.

17 It has become less and less meaningful to speak of *the* Third World since the term was first coined during the 1950s. It was their under-developed economies which brought this otherwise diverse states together under the banner 'Third World.' As they began to diversify in economic terms, and especially after the dissolution of the 'Second World', the use of the term 'Third World' has become increasingly problematic. See Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: the Third World in International Relations* (Boulder, Colorado: 1987) 1-2, for a discussion of the problematic nature of the term.

of academic specialists on the Third World argued that the ethnocentric bias inherent in some of the central assumptions of Security Studies meant that its concepts were of limited analytical relevance to the rest of the world.[18] They noted, for example, that it was the Western realist conception of the state that shaped Cold War conceptions and practices of security. In the developed West, threats to security were (and still are) conceived in terms of external threats to the state, whereas the reality in many parts of the Third World is that security threats usually emanate from inside, as a result of oppression, economic incapacity, social stress or whatever. This insight was without doubt an important corrective to mainstream conceptualisations of security even if some Third World states (the more settled ones) did have a theory and practice of security that was oriented towards external threats. It should also be noted that it is not only in Third World countries that security policy played (and indeed, plays) a vital domestic role. Many Western states have also utilised security policy in order to ameliorate internal problems – be they low levels of domestic cohesion or growing economic difficulties. Governing elites in both the West and the Third World utilise foreign and security policy to help constitute an identity for the state, enhance domestic cohesion, or simply to maintain their grip over domestic public opinion.[19] The point is that the character of Third World states makes the domestic dimension of the theory and practice of security more visible there.

Another Third World criticism of Cold War security thinking was that it tended to reduce consideration of all security problems to an analysis of their impact on the strategic balance between East and West. It was a rejection of the bipolar outlook of both superpowers and their allies that led Third World states to set up the Non-Aligned Movement. In practice, given the structural and strategic position of so many members, Third World non-alignment was imperfect. Some ostensibly non-aligned states had close links with one or other superpower. Nevertheless, the ideology of non-alignment represented a direct challenge to mainstream Western security thinking.

The theory and practice of security in the Third World also challenged the militarised focus of Cold War Security Studies. From the mid-1960s

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18 Caroline Thomas, 'Third World security and Western concepts: on an unhappy marriage and the need for a divorce'.
19 See Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War*; and David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: 1992).

onwards some Third World and left-of-centre opinion elsewhere began to see the grip of an iniquitous international economic system as a major security issue for Third World societies. Specifically, they recognised that peace and security were predicated on economic stability and development.[20] The consequent demand for a re-ordering of global economic relations was articulated in the call by the Third World 'Group of 77' for a New International Economic Order. While this idea floundered, leaving large parts of the Third World prey to falling living standards and even further economic marginalisation in the 1980s, the demand for a more comprehensive notion of security again provided a fundamental challenge to Anglo-American Cold War security thinking. The vulnerability of the economies of Third World countries, coupled with the relative weakness of their political institutions and lower levels of social cohesion, condemned them to a peripheral role within the global order as currently constituted. Accordingly, these states did not necessarily regard change in the status quo as a threat. Indeed, change could enhance security provided that it led in the desired direction – that is, towards an international economic structure sensitive to their needs. The Third World's 'Search for Security' – to use Caroline Thomas's phrase – was therefore characterised as least as much by nation-building, and the development of effective systems for the distribution of food and health services, as it was by the defence of the status quo through military power.[21]

Despite these important differences between the ways in which different schools in the Third World and the West conceptualised security, there were also important similarities, especially among governments. In particular, security in both cases was understood in terms of strengthening the state. Even notions of 'comprehensive security' used by some Third World governments were adopted in the context of attempts to develop what Mohammed Ayoob terms 'adequate stateness'[22] – by which he means enhancing the legitimacy of the state, often at the expense of particular groups within it. It was therefore simply not the case, as Thomas claims, that '[the Western] conception of security was basically top down, while the other [Third World] was bottom up.'[23] Rather, bottom up views of

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20 Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, *National Security in the Third World* (Boulder & London: 1985) 11.

21 Caroline Thomas, *In Search for Security*, 1.

22 Mohammed Ayoob, 'Defining security: a subaltern realist perspective, 'in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds. (London: 1997) 140.

23 Thomas, 'Introduction,' *Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security* (Cambridge: 1989) 4.

security were voiced by radical social movements in the Third World, by peace movements and 'alternative defence' thinkers in the West, and eventually, by the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

AFTER THE COLD WAR: SECURITY OPENS UP

Given the symbiotic relationship between Security Studies and the Cold War, it is not surprising that the end of the latter has led to a crisis in the former. After all, it was Cold War animosity that not only provided the subject with the bulk of its subject matter, but it also underpinned the socio-political context in which Security Studies could attract the funding necessary to support its institutional infrastructure. As a result, since the end (or perhaps 'endings'[24]) of the Cold War, the study of security has witnessed a series of fundamental debates. These have ranged over such issues as the definition of security, the appropriate referent for security, the methodology by which security should be studied, and the agenda for security in the 1990s and beyond. In the second part of this article we review three of the most significant of these debates: over 'broadening' the security agenda beyond narrowly military concerns; the issue of 'securitization' and 'desecuritization'; and the crucial question of the appropriate 'referent object' for security. Before we go on, however, it is important to stress that it is very easy to exaggerate the extent to which '1989' marked a turning point in Security Studies: as we have shown, there was a serious body of non-mainstream thinking before the end of the Cold War, and it will be evident that there remains much traditionalist thinking today.

'Broadening' security

The unfolding events in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc confirmed the worries of those who called for a broader security agenda to accommodate new – or old, but hitherto neglected – issues. Overnight, security specialists trained during the Cold War found themselves unable to account for the new threats, let alone recommend

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24 Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (London: 1993).

measures against them. Numerous analysts existed with expertise in nuclear deterrence, arms control, limited war and crisis management,[25] but few had the expertise to deal with the pressing issues of the post-Cold War years, such as the break-up of states (and ensuing problems such as ethnic conflict, refugee flows, famine), the need for the peaceful settlement of disputes, understanding the politics of identity, expertise in confidence-building, humanitarian intervention, conventional war, regional security in the Third World, and so on.[26] As we have already noted, Cold War Security Studies concentrated almost exclusively on actual or potential armed conflict between the superpowers, and as a result, specialised knowledge of other issues and other areas was sparse. Witness, for example, the way in which the study of crisis management was based almost exclusively on the Washington-Moscow rivalry. [27]

The concentration of Cold War security thinking on the military dimension of world politics was mirrored by much post-Cold War state practice. In 1992, world-wide spending on defence was $815 billion. In contrast, total spending on UN peacekeeping three years after the demolition of the Berlin wall was a mere $1.9 billion. Put in other terms, for every $1000 that member states of the UN spent on their armed forces, they only spent on average $1.40 on peacekeeping (1993 figures). [28]

Barry Buzan's seminal study *People States and Fear,* was the first sustained attempt from within Security Studies to re-think its central, core concept of 'security'.[29] Buzan, taking on board work by the 'alternative defence' school and Third World specialists, called for the broadening of the

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25 See *inter alia* Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: 1949); Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, NJ: 1959); Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, NJ: 1960); Morton Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York: 1963); Phil Williams, *Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age* (London: 1976); Kenneth Waltz, 'The spread of nuclear weapons: more may be better,' *Adelphi Papers* 171 (1981) 1-32; Roman Kolkowicz & Niel Joeck, eds. *Arms Control and International Security* (Boulder: 1984); John Mearshreimer, 'Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War,' *International Security* 15: 1 (1990) 5-56; Colin Gray, *House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail* (Ithaca: 1992).

26 See Ken Booth, 'Security and self: reflections of a fallen realist,' in *Critical Security Studies*, op. cit., esp. 104-109

27 See *inter alia* Alexander L. George, ed. *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management* (Boulder, Colorado: 1991); Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: 1994); Eric Herring, *Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes* (Manchester & New York: 1995).

28 The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (Oxford: 1995) 113, 125.

29 Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York & London: 1991[first published in 1983]).

concept beyond a purely military focus. He criticised those conceptions and practices of security 'bound to the level of individual states and military issues' as being 'inherently inadequate'.[30] While maintaining that states were the 'dominant' units and national security 'the central issue', Buzan at the same time argued that the security of human collectivities more generally had to be taken seriously, which in turn required analysts to get to grips with the multidimensional nature of security.[31]

Parenthetically, it should be noted that Buzan's broader conception of security ran parallel with some of the ideas of the Peace Researchers and World Society thinkers who, from the 1960s onwards, had gradually widened their conceptualisations of both peace and violence.[32] They argued that 'peace' signifies more than simply the absence of direct physical violence; peace should also capture some notion of international cooperation and the fulfillment of human potential. A distinction thus came to be drawn between 'negative' and 'positive' conceptions of peace. 'Negative peace' was used to refer to the absence or prevention of armed conflict, while 'positive peace' referred to the establishment of the conditions necessary for the (sustainable) fulfillment of human potential, namely social justice, economic equity, and ecological balance. The achievement of 'positive peace' required the overcoming of what were identified as forms of 'structural violence'; that is, those socio-economic institutions and relations which while not necessarily associated with direct physical violence, nevertheless oppress so many human beings and damage – indeed shorten – their lives. As will be discussed later, this concern for the well-being of individuals rather than states, and the belief that real security could only be achieved through human emancipation, later became identified with the Critical Security Studies approach.

Buzan proposed to broaden the conceptualisation of security to include four other 'sectors' (political, economic, societal and environmental) in addition to the military dimension. His argument was that the military aspect of security had until then been paid 'disproportionate' attention. This had resulted two consequences. First, the other dimensions had

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30 Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 1-6.

31 David A. Baldwin stresses that the mutlidimensionality of security is 'not a new discovery'. He cites Arnold Wolfers as the first author to dwell on the issue of multiple dimensions of security (in 1952). See Baldwin, 'The concept of security,' *Review of International Studies* 23: 1 (1996) 23.

32 Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism,' *Journal of Peace Research* 8(1971), pp. 81-117; and Paul Smoker, Ruth Davies & Barbara Munske, eds., *A Reader in Peace Studies* (Oxford: 1995), especially the chapters by Johan Galtung, Betty Reardon, and Birgit Brock-Utne.

received inadequate attention. The tendency to reduce security to military issues not only encouraged the strategic accountancy which characterised much of Cold War Security Studies – the so-called 'bean--counting' approach – but it also deprived security analyses of the depth and breadth which the complexities of an interdependent world require. This reductionist approach to security had earlier critics from within the realist ranks, notably George F. Kennan, the author of the famous 'X' article.[33] He was a staunch opponent of what he termed as 'the flat and inflexible thinking of the Pentagon, in which the false mathematics of relative effectiveness [of nuclear weapons] was given a sort of absolute value' whilst all other possible factors were left outside the equation 'as of no demonstrable importance.'[34] One of these factors – and again something that Kennan has been concerned with for many years – has been environmental issues. These, together with economic matters have only recently attracted the attention of some Western security specialists, even though they affect the calculations of policy makers – and of course, peoples' perceptions of their own security in many countries.

Buzan argued that by concentrating primarily on the military dimension of security, analysts became too preoccupied with 'national' security perspectives 'where competitive self-interest dominates perceptions, and consequently discourages analyses of security interdependence and the systemic aspects of the concept.'[35] For example, by their nature, environmental threats can only be ameliorated by common, cooperative action – the same is true of many other security problems. But because of their preoccupation with zero-sum, inherently conflictual notions of security, traditional analysts contribute little to understanding and overcoming these problems. The growing realisation of the imminence and seriousness of threats such as environmental degradation, overpopulation and intra-state ethnic conflicts, serves as a reminder of the inadequacy of Cold War Security Studies's concentration on inter-state, military conflict. Despite the evident rationality of their position, those calling for a broader understanding of security have generated fierce opposition from those who remain committed to the narrower Cold War focus.

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33 X [George F. Kennan], 'Sources of Soviet Conduct,' *Foreign Affairs* 25: 4 (July 1947) 566-82.
34 George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1950-1963* (London: 1973) 110-111.
35 Barry Buzan, 'Is international security possible?' in *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* op. cit., 36.

The case for continuing with an essentially military focus for Security Studies was given articulation in a much-read but disappointing article in 1991 by Stephen Walt entitled 'The renaissance of security studies'.[36] Walt seems to concede much of the force of the arguments for a broader agenda, stating that '[s]uch proposals remind us that non-military issues deserve sustained attention from scholars and policy makers, and that military power does not guarantee well-being.' Despite this, he opposes a broader understanding of security, apparently for two main reasons. First, he fears that a broader agenda will lead to a diminution in the attention paid to military threats, which he stresses have not been eliminated despite the end of the Cold War. Second, he is concerned that a broader conception of security will undermine the coherence of Security Studies as a field of academic study. In his view, to broaden the conception of 'security' underpinning Security Studies 'would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.'[37]

Neither of these arguments is convincing. The implication of Walt's first point is that those attempting to develop a broader understanding of security are unconcerned about military issues, or indeed, believe that military threats have been eliminated. This is far from the case. While it may be legitimate to posit the declining utility of force in some parts of the world, this is certainly not the case in others, and proponents of a broader understanding of security are well aware of this. Indeed, part of the case for broadening is that this encourages analysts to develop a fuller understanding of the inter-relationship between threats (or what Buzan calls 'sectors') in different regions. The analytical benefits of seeing security threats in a comprehensive fashion could well have significant practical implications for conflict-prevention, in that making non-military threats a part of the security agenda might make it possible to prioritise and manage them before they became intractable and possibly militarised. So, far from being a flight from 'hard-headed reality,' the move to broaden security actually allows a more variegated and realistic assessment of the dynamics of people's lives and well-being and how to meet them.

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36 Stephen M. Walt, 'The renaissance of security studies,' *International Studies Quarterly* 35: 2 (June 1991) 211-39.
37 Walt, 'The renaissance of security studies,' 213.

The weight of Walt's second point, that broadening will lead to incoherence, is diminished by a crucial inconsistency in his own argument.[38] While issuing a warning against broadening security, Walt simultaneously advocates his own very lengthy research agenda; this includes the role of domestic politics, the causes of peace and co--operation, the power of ideas, the end of the Cold War, economics and security, refining existing theories, and what he calls protecting the data base.[39] So despite his strictures against broadening, Walt's own position on the future of the study of security is to suggest just that! In effect, Walt is conceding that if analysts maintain a narrow militarised, state-centric notion of security, their work will become progressively irrelevant in the context of the processes of change dominating world politics. We would further argue that Walt's contradictory position whereby he has to abandon the parsimoniousness he covets in order to enjoy the relevance to which he also aspires, is a reflection of the deeper problems facing the realist mind-set which underpinned Cold War Security Studies. This debate that has been taking place over the conceptualisation of security – which traditionally stood at the heart of the discipline of International Relations – is just one manifestation of the crisis in contemporary realist thought. Realism, and in particular its neo-realist variant, are still dominant in Western Security Studies, but security theory is once again lagging behind practice, and the growth of alternative approaches highlights the increasing realisation of its inadequacies. In practice, notions of 'comprehensive security' on the part of governments crossed the Cold War/post-Cold War divide in important regions such as South East Asia,[40] while even traditionalist governments like that of Britain now make distinctions between 'defence policy' – which deals with military affairs – and 'security policy' – which deals with the broader context of threats to national interests.

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38 See Ken Booth and Eric Herring, *Keyguide to Information Sources in Strategic Studies* (London: 1994) 126-7; Richard Wyn Jones, '"Travel without maps": thinking about security after the Cold War,' in *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*, Jane Davis, ed. (Cheltenham: 1995) 207.

39 Walt, 'The renaissance of security studies,' 224-228.

40 See Ken Booth & Russell Trood, eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia Pacific* (London: Macmillan forthcoming).

'Securitization' and 'desecuritization'

Attempts to restrict conceptions of security to a narrowly military focus are rendered problematic not only by the interdependence of various types of threats, and the (growing) salience of those which are non-military in character (especially for some peoples and regions), but also by the particular role that the term 'security' plays in political discourse. As Ole Wæver's work has argued, the 'speech act' of labelling an issue – military or non-military – as a security issue has the effect of rendering it of particular urgency, and mobilising extraordinary measures to deal with it.[41] Wæver's concern is with what he calls 'securitization'; that is, how do particular issues come to be labelled as 'security' concerns, and what are the implications of this process? Concern has been expressed that 'securitization' renders problems more intractable by invoking militarised, conflictual mind-sets and responses. Wæver himself has asked: 'is it all to the good that problems such as environmental degradation be addressed in terms of security?' because 'addressing an issue in security terms still evokes an image of threat-defence, allocating to the state an important role in addressing it. This is not always an improvement.'[42] In the light of this concern, he goes on to argue that the most appropriate political response should be to attempt to 'desecuritize' issues – that is, remove them from the security agenda.

The fears underlying Wæver's call for a politics of 'desecuritization' echo the argument of Daniel Deudney against broadening security. Deudney is concerned that identifying more issues, in particular environmental problems, as security issues will simply encourage inappropriate militarised, zero-sum responses to them. He argues that 'the effort to harness the emotive power of nationalism to help mobilise environmental awareness and action may prove counterproductive by undermining globalist political sensibility' thereby making environmental threats insoluble. Deudney's worry is that declaring environmental problems as threats to national security will create a sense of 'us vs. them' or 'insider vs. outsider,' in other words an antagonistic atmosphere. As he rightly points out, 'in the environmental sphere "we" – not "they" – are the

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41 Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and desecuritization,' in *On Security* (New York: 1995) 46-86.
42 Wæver, 'Securitization and desecuritization,' 47.

"enemy".'[43] In other words, Deudney believes that it is inappropriate to 'securitize' environmental issues.

Deudney's response may be seen as illustrative of the problematic nature of Cold War conceptions and practices of security, i.e. the tendency to view security as always being sought *against* an adversary – be it another state or 'the enemy within'. This was one of the problems identified by the 'alternative defence' school in their critique of mainstream security thinking and practice during the late 1970s and 1980s. The counter-strategy which they posited was the notion of common security, i.e. security achieved together *with* another not *against* it. As Deudney himself accepts, this concept of security is entirely in harmony with the approach required to address environmental degradation.[44] So the problem seems to be not so much 'securitization' in itself, but rather the meaning attached to the term security: if security is understood in zero-sum, militarised terms then 'securitization' may well be a dangerous development, but if security is conceived in a co-operative, holistic manner, 'securitization' may well be extremely positive given its considerable mobilisation potential. Moreover, given that 'securitization' is ubiquitous – that all kinds of social groups, as well as states, 'securitize' issues which they regard as engendering insecurity – attempts to 'desecuritize' and narrow the security agenda are likely to prove fruitless. A more plausible and hopeful approach, both pragmatically and intellectually, is to change the way security is conceived and practiced – to make it less confrontational, less status quo oriented, less state-centric, and less reliant on the military instrument, all the time cognisant of the fact that in an interdependent and globalising world system, many significant threats are 'threats without enemies' which can only be dealt with through co-operation.[45]

The problem for the future of Security Studies therefore lies more with those who continue to conceive and practice security in competitive terms, than with their critics. As long as security is perceived as a zero-sum game, simply broadening the agenda will not be enough to develop new ways of thinking relevant for the next millennium. Security interdependence must become entrenched in our thinking. It is only in this way that issues such

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43 Daniel Deudney, 'The case against linking environmental degradation and national security,' *Millennium* 19: 3 (1990) 461-8. Also see Jef Huysmans, 'Migrants as a security problem: dangers of "securitizing" social issues,' in *Migration and European Integration: the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*, Robert Miles & Dietrich Thränhardt, eds. (London: 1995) 53-72.

44 Deudney, 'The case against linking environmental degradation and national security,' 468-9.

45 See Simon Dalby, 'Security, intelligence, the national interest and the global environment,' *Intelligence and National Security*, 10 (October 1995) 176.

as water scarcity in the Middle East, for example, will cease to be seen in competitive and confrontational terms. When security is conceived in collaborative terms, the 'securitization' of non-military issues would constitute the first step towards their solution.

Whose security? the referent object of security

Coming to terms with the multidimensional nature of security by way of broadening the agenda has been a significant step in developing Security Studies, both in terms of accounting for the range of threats to 'real people in real places' across the world, and potentially at least, in terms of offering a set of practices calculated to enhance human security. The broadening agenda includes threats such as human rights violations, social injustice, environmental degradation and economic deprivation. These are threats which have not usually been addressed by state security policies (and indeed, are often caused by them), but have nevertheless been encountered by individuals and groups in their daily lives.[46]

Broadening the research agenda alone is not satisfactory so long as our conception of security continues to privilege the state, regarding it as the sole legitimate focus for decision-making and loyalty (that is, *statism*). As was discussed earlier, security thinking during the Cold War treated the state as its subject, its primary referent. Based on realist premises, it emphasised 'national security' as opposed to the security of individuals, groups of one sort or another, civil society, world society or what many regard as common humanity' – not to mention the security of the less powerful nations or 'sub--nations' within the multinational state. According to this view, the state, in theory at least, provides security for all those over whom it has jurisdiction. Practice, however, shows that states – their governments and ruling elites – always tend to prioritise threats to their own security and often end up neglecting those posed to particular individuals or groups within the state, and certainly humanity as a whole. There are many more 'gangster' states – run for the well-being of a minority elite – than states that operate as 'guardian angels'.[47] The very widespread pattern of political oppression, human rights

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46 Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley, California: 1990).

47 Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: The ethical claims of International Society revisited,' *Political Studies* 44: 1 (March 1996) 123-136.

violations and torture attests to this. Nevertheless, most security analysts continue to consider those threats posed to the security of 'the state' as being more important than others, and have tended to ignore the reality that the 'protection of state sovereignty' is in fact almost always synonymous with the enhancement of regime security.[48]

The tendency to privilege an uncritical conception of the state is manifest in the old distinction drawn between 'high and low' politics. According to this distinction, anything relating to *state* security becomes an issue of *high* politics, in contrast to other less important issues of *low* politics; so strategy, for example, is regarded as high politics, while human rights is consigned to the status of low politics. When a broader security agenda dissolves the distinction between high and low politics, it might be thought that this in turn invites consideration of threats posed to units other than the state. However, not all authors who are in favour of a broader understanding of security agree with the need for considering bodies of people other than states as referents for security.

There are differing positions as regards the appropriate referent(s) for security. Barry Buzan, in *People, States and Fear* mentions other potential referents at the sub and supra-state levels, but he concludes that because it is 'states' that act for security, states have to be prioritised. [49] In Buzan's work, it is possible to see that one can still claim to be a realist while advocating a broader security agenda. However, there is a crucial inconsistency in Buzan's argument, and this stems from his confusion of the concepts of *agency* and *referent*. The state may be the major agent that acts for security, but this does not necessarily require its own security to be prioritised by the analyst (a mother is the main *agent* in terms of the security of her baby, but this does not mean that she is the primary *referent* in the relationship: she practices security for her child).

Buzan, in a later work he co-authored with Ole Wæver, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, developed the concept of 'societal security.'[50] This new formulation of the referent for security has come under severe criticism.[51] Martin Shaw points to the pitfalls of focusing on societal

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48 Brian Job, ed., *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (London: 1992).

49 Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, 329.

50 Ole Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: 1993). It should however be noted that the authors limit their analysis and conclusions to Europe.

51 See Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations* (Cambridge: 1994) 102; Bill McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School' *Review of International Studies* 22 (1996) 81-93; Wyn Jones, 'Travel without maps.'

security because this level of analysis omits other levels 'such as the security of individuals; of women as women; of couples and families; of mixed-ethnic groupings; and of those who refuse or downgrade ethno--national identities in favour of pluralist ideals.' Shaw's preferences lie in 'a sociologically adequate concept of security' that takes into consideration all of the aforementioned levels *and* change – that is, how actors at all levels are constituted, for what purpose, and how these processes may change in time.[52] As will be seen, the Critical Security Studies approach embraces multiple referents for conceptualising security, and also stresses the importance of understanding change.[53]

By exposing the dependence of Cold War Security Studies on the assumptions of the realist approach to International Relations, notably its state-centrism, we are reminded that security is a derivative concept. That is, our conceptions of security depend on the particular philosophical world-view we adopt. It is these philosophies that tell us what the world is like, and ultimately, whose security we should be concerned with, and how their security may be achieved. Realism, with its portrayal of world politics as a continual struggle for power among sovereign states in an anarchical realm, is obviously not the only possible picture of 'what makes the world go round'. Although realism was dominant during the Cold War, other understandings of world politics have always existed, and it is clear that they have become more influential since the mid-1980s. When conceptions of security are derived from these alternative philosophical perspectives, very different understandings – of referents, agendas and policies for example – emerge. In the remainder of this article, we will outline a conceptualisation of security based on a view of politics which privileges human security rather than statist conceptions of security, and which orientates itself towards the emancipation of people as individuals and groups.

THE NEXT STAGE? CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES

We have shown that Security Studies in the 1990s has been characterised by a series of debates ranging over fundamental questions. Many valuable

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52 Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations,* 103.
53 Ken Booth, 'A Security Regime in South Africa: Theoretical Considerations,' *South African Perspectives* 30 (February 1994) 3.

insights have emerged from these exchanges, and there can be little doubt that the field has attained a new level of reflexivity and sophistication – and, we would argue, a new relevance in the era of globalisation. However, with few exceptions, this process of rethinking has generally stopped short of overturning the privileged position of the sovereign state as *the* referent for security, and has not explored the implications of conceptualising security based on a different understandings of world politics. The result is that the *de facto* notion of security utilised by mainstream Security Studies is broader than in the past, but is still resolutely statist in ideology. We believe that Critical Security Studies should be the next stage for Security Studies. This is an approach that continues, and crucially, gives direction to the process of rethinking security that has been taking place since the early 1980s and the end of the Cold War in particular. The need to provide a new Security Studies was underlined by the critique we offered earlier. It was concern at the inadequacies of the realist assumptions underlying the field rather than the attraction of any particular alternative to them, which inspired most of the early attacks on traditional Security Studies in the first place. Critical Security Studies – which is still in an embryonic stage – attempts to bring together these various strands of criticism and weld them into a coherent whole.

Different approaches have important contributions to make to the Critical Security Studies project: the work of alternative defence thinkers in focusing on 'common security' and ways of mitigating the security dilemma; the work of Third World specialists in broadening the security agenda and emphasising the role of the structure of the international economic system in engendering insecurity in the 'peripheral' worlds; the works of feminists in underlining the relationship between the personal, political and international, and demonstrating the centrality of identity politics to understanding international phenomena; the work of Critical Theorists (of the Frankfurt School) in criticising traditional approaches to theory and in outlining a theoretical approach explicitly oriented towards human emancipation; the work of Peace Researchers in broadening the concept of violence and peace; and the work of world order theorists (WOMPERs) in outlining alternative visions of attainable and sustainable world orders.

The development of Critical Security Studies can also be understood as a particular manifestation of deeper changes underway in the way International Relations is studied. 'Post-positivist' approaches have made

inroads into mainstream International Relations hitherto dominated by positivism. According to positivism's scientific-objectivist understanding of knowledge, the role of theory is that of a neutral tool which helps to explain social and natural phenomena: theory and practice are therefore seen as being two mutually distinct enterprises with no necessary connection between them.[54] Critical Security Studies, on the other hand, follows the post-positivist turn in viewing theory as constitutive of reality. Accordingly, the distinction between theory and practice dissolves: theory is itself regarded as a form of practice, and practice is seen as always being informed, whether consciously or not, by theory. To recognise the dialectical relationship between theory and practice is to become aware that theorising is an inherently political activity. Put simply, theorising can be a self--fulfilling prophecy: if we say the nature of international politics is as classical realists claim – driven by a flawed human nature – then we will behave accordingly and ensure that international politics remains an arena of selfishness and conflict. The very questions we ask, and answers which we give to them, reflect particular assumptions and biases. Consequently, a good theory is one that lays bare, and reflects upon, its own presuppositions, rather than one that hides behind some spurious notion of 'objectivity'.[55]

The assumptions of Critical Security Studies can be highlighted through two key questions asked by its proponents. First, *what is security?* From a Critical Security Studies point of view, security is what we make it. Different world views and political philosophies deliver different views and discourses about security.[56] A security theory deriving from Critical Theory conceives security as a process of emancipation. Emancipation, in turn, has no objective or timeless meaning; different peoples in different cultural surroundings and socio-political contexts will attach different meanings to the idea. Emancipation is concerned with freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the social, physical, economic, political and other constraints that stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.[57] As circumstances change, so will the

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54 See, for example, Walt, 'The renaissance of security studies.'

55 Robert Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory,' *Millennium* 10: 2 (Summer 1981) 126-55.

56 See Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a fallen realist,' in *Critical Security Studies*, op. cit. 83-119.

57 See Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991) 313-26.

goals of emancipation. It is a situational concept concerned with 'concrete utopias.'[58]

The emphasis put on the word 'people' brings us to the second question Critical Security Studies raises: *whose security* is it that we are engaging with? By asking this question Critical Security theorists highlight and challenge the privileged position enjoyed by statism in Cold War Security Studies. This also means taking the broader agenda more seriously than others who favour re-thinking security, but remain statist in outlook. Critical Security Studies rejects statism because the majority of states fail to deliver to their citizens what they promise, i.e. daily security in their lives. Not only do some states fail on their own terms, but even those in the minority who provide security are, by definition, the means not the ends; and Critical Security Studies treats them as such. Moreover, those few states that do provide security for their citizens are able to do so because of their privileged position in the global economic structure. Hence, we believe that there is a need for a broadened and deepened approach to re-thinking security which will be able to account for the multidimensional nature of the security problematic at all levels – individual, group, societal, state, regional, and international. Statism is an irrational way to organise the global politics of common humanity.

The state exists – in theory – to provide security for its citizens, but, contra--Buzan, it is not the sole agent that acts for security. As the examples of 1980s peace movements and 1990s environmental movements show, different agents at different levels may act to promote their own and wider security. Where some humanitarian groups operate at the domestic level, others cross borders to provide famine relief (e.g. Oxfam). Some movements operate beyond borders to help bring change at home (e.g. Palestinian groups or the Chiapas) whilst others are transnational both in character and scope (e.g. Greenpeace, Amnesty International). The activities of progressive social movements strengthen the sense of global responsibility which in turn contributes to the growth and spread of a new form of political community – 'global civil society'. Progressive social movements also provide a new challenge to the top-down perspectives of the Cold War. By connecting the personal, political and international, they introduce a new understanding of what it means to act politically.[59] Social movements

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58 Rolf Wiggerhaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance*, Michael Robertson, trans. (Cambridge: 1994) 623.

59 See Mark Hoffman, 'Agency, Identity and Intervention,' in Forbes & Hoffman, 194-241. The relationship between the personal, political and international has been emphasised by feminists among others. See Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*.

take action themselves and try to influence governments to take action – as in the case of the global environment with the Rio Summit (1991) and the attempt to delegitimise nuclear weapons in the case of the World Court Project (1992-1997). In sum, in a world of selfish states, there exist multiple agents that act for security and there are multiple referents in need of security. These should all be on the agenda of a Security Studies worth its name in the context of universities.

Critical Security Studies not only challenges the way in which security has traditionally been conceived by broadening and deepening the concept, and by rejecting the primacy given to the state as the referent for, and agent of, security. It also challenges the aim of traditional Security Studies. If, as Robert Cox argues, 'all theory is *for* someone and *for* some purpose,'[60] those drawn to Critical Security propose that security thinking should be for those who are rendered insecure by the prevailing order, and that its purpose should be to aid in their emancipation. It is important to note here that the Critical Security Studies focus on emancipation does not rule out concern with the military dimension of security. On the contrary, Critical Security Studies favours a fuller agenda, one cognisant of the interrelationships between different 'sectors' of security. Work has been or is being done on critical approaches to nuclear proliferation, strategic culture, regional security in Southern Africa, nuclear deterrence and so on. It also favours a sociologically adequate concept of security which takes into account how different actors in world politics are constituted, interact over time, and may change in the future.

Critical Security Studies sees as crucial the relationship between theory and its historical/social/political context. From a Critical Security Studies point of view, theories are constitutive ('anarchy is what states make of it' as Alexander Wendt has aptly put it)[61] rather than explanatory (as realism with its positivist outlook tells us). The way we think and write about security enables certain practices, whilst disabling others, thereby helping 'shape' reality. What shape the future takes will depend on whose theories get to shape the future. This is why the proponents of Critical Security Studies are concerned more with the search for meaning in international politics rather than the endless accumulation of knowledge or the discovery

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60 Robert W. Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders,' 128.
61 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,' *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992) 391-425.

of ultimate philosophical 'foundations,' for they believe that the invention of an emancipatory future is more urgent than any other. Their view of the role of academics is not (and cannot be) that of a dispassionate observer but is rather that of Antonio Gramsci's 'organic intellectual' – hence the need to engage with social and political criticism, replication and practice. One of the attractions of the critical turn in Security Studies is that it should never settle into the complacency of that it seeks to overthrow; for the essence of a critical approach is that it expects change. By turning its own technique on itself, it invites regular renewal, as times and material circumstances change. Critical Security Studies gives space for change. It also focuses on multiple referents and takes into consideration multiple security agents. The world envisaged by Critical Security Studies may seem complex and confusing to some. But so is the world. The complexities of contemporary world politics require a more realistic approach – one more realistic than the abstractions of realist Cold War Security Studies will ever allow. We believe that Critical Security Studies gives us a better handle on what empirically exists and a better guide to practice the enhancement of human security.

The foregoing is a sketch of what we take the Critical Security Studies approach to be at this stage. Although many of the ideas brought together by Critical Security Studies are not new, the label itself is only of recent coinage (May 1994). The subject is being worked out and Critical Security Studies is gaining ground. Literature is being published, PhDs are being researched, academic papers are being given at conferences, courses at the graduate level are being taught, a book series has been started, and people are self-identifying as 'CSS' students. There is plenty of work to be done. The future agenda for Critical Security Studies presently crystallizes around four tasks: to provide critiques of traditional theory, to explore the meanings and implications of critical theories, to investigate security issues from critical perspectives, and to revision security in specific places. Critical Security Studies, as it is today, is a broad school with its students coming from different philosophical traditions and political perspectives. Our preference is an approach with an explicit commitment to emancipation (as opposed to leaving power where it is) and to a notion of common humanity (as opposed to forms of cultural or communitarian essentialism). Critical Security Studies, in our view, is a practical art, not just critique, for security is concerned with how people live – their life chances. An interest in practice (policy relevance) is therefore a crucial part of what is involved

in being a security specialist. Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice, nor will postmodern deconstruction without political re--construction. Critical Security Studies begins with critique, but it engages with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, overcome its structural and contingent wrongs.