Influences on Islamists:
An analysis of radicalisation and terrorism in an Australian context

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Statement of authorship and originality

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Abstract

Terrorism has long existed throughout history. However the Islamist terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (known as 9/11) in the United States represented a fundamental turning point and a significant change in the terrorism landscape. Since 9/11, terrorism discourse has dominated not only the media, but also a sense of security and safety globally.

Over a decade after 9/11, there was another significant shift with the declaration of a caliphate in June 2014 by terrorist organisation, Daesh. The atrocities committed by and in the name of this terrorist group sparked global outrage and horror and have had long lasting impacts around the world. Despite the fact that the conflict originated in the Middle East, the impact was felt domestically with a number of terrorist attacks perpetrated and planned in Australia in the name of an extremist neojihadist ideology.

To understand Islamist terrorism in an Australian context, this thesis explores the factors which have influenced the radicalisation of domestic Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts. This is achieved having regard to the characteristics of 194 Islamist terrorists from Australia who engaged in a multitude of terrorist acts between 2001 and 2018 (either domestically or overseas), their motives and the role of social and familial networks on their radicalisation and involvement in terrorism.

In responding to the central research question – In an Australian context, what has influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts? – this thesis:

- provides an overview of radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in an Australian context;

- evaluates the primary motives which have influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists;
- analyses the characteristics of 194 Australian Islamist terrorists who engaged in a terrorist acts between 2001 and 2018; and
- demonstrates how the interconnected social and familial networks these individuals belonged to facilitated their radicalisation and sustained their involvement in terrorism.

The results of this research reveal that whilst there are many factors which have driven Islamist terrorists to engage in terrorist acts, ideological motives and social and familial networks have been particularly influential in an Australian context. The impact of these influences on Islamist terrorists cannot be underestimated.

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List of abbreviations

ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AQI	Al-Qaeda in Iraq
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

Chapter One
Introduction

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States – now colloquially known as 9/11 – have come to symbolise "the most destructive day in the long, bloody history of terrorism" (Rapoport, 2004, p.46). Perpetrated by members of terrorist organisation, al-Qaeda, 9/11 represented "a turning point that [would] fundamentally change things forever" (Tuathail, 2003, p.859). The 9/11 attacks also signified a pivotal moment in history, drastically shifting attitudes and responses to terrorism and particular groups within society.

Of course, terrorism existed long before 9/11; history is replete with examples of the havoc wreaked by anarchists, communists, nationalists and various left- and right-wing organisations (Shelton, 2018). Right-wing extremist terrorism in particular became a growing concern in the 2010s. For instance, a right-wing attack perpetrated across two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019 resulted in 51 fatalities and an equal amount of individuals injured ("Christchurch shooting death toll", 2019). In 2015, an attack on a Charleston church in the United States resulted in the deaths of nine parishioners (Zapotosky, 2017). An attack in Norway in 2011 led to 77 fatalities (Wang, 2016).

In Australia, the far right movement has operated in groups and political parties such as the League of Rights, the Australian Nationalist Movement and Australians Against Further Immigration (Markus, 2018). In more recent years, it has functioned via small groups such as the United Patriots Front, Reclaim Australia and True Blue Crew, whose focus has largely been on publicity stunts and rallies (Tillett, 2019). In October 2015, for

instance, the leader and two other members of the United Patriots Front created and circulated on social media a video of themselves carrying out a mock beheading whilst shouting 'Allahu Akbar', to urge people to rally against the construction of a proposed mosque in Bendigo, a regional city north-west of Melbourne, Victoria. The trio later became the first people convicted under Victoria's *Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001* for inciting contempt of Muslims (Akerman, 2017). Moreover, Phillip Galea – a right-wing extremist who was charged with terrorism related offences for the first time in Australia's history in 2016 – was found guilty of planning and preparing a terrorist attack in Melbourne in December 2019 (Schelle, 2019; Victoria Police, 2018).

Whilst the threat from right-wing extremists domestically has increased in recent years, far right movements in Australia have been marginal compared to Europe and North America, with the immediate threat domestically coming from Islamist terrorism – particularly from small groups and individuals inspired, directed or encouraged by terrorist groups operating overseas (Commonwealth of Australia, 2019; Lentini, 2019; Tillett, 2019). For instance, in Victoria in 2016, Galea was the sole right-wing extremist to be arrested for plotting a terrorist attack, contrasting with the seven different police operations which investigated Islamist terrorism and resulted in over a dozen arrests (Victoria Police, 2018). Thus, in an Australian context, the primary threat requiring further examination and analysis is Islamist terrorism.

Islamist terrorism

There are a number of definitional dilemmas surrounding terrorism. Schmid (2004, p.376) appraises how, despite the fact that "hundreds of billions of [US] dollars" are spent globally fighting terrorism, there has been little effort made to actually define it. Schmidt and Jongman's (2005) collation of 109 different definitions of terrorism best evidences

the difficulties involved in arriving at a single meaning of the term, which the authors note contributes to considerable uncertainty about the right way to address it.

Some authors have concluded that "it is unlikely that any definition will ever be generally agreed upon" (Shafritz, Gibbons & Scott, 1991, p.260), likening the search for a legal definition of terrorism to the "quest for the Holy Grail" (Levitt, 1986, p.97). Current use of the term Islamist terrorism is often polemical and rhetorical, and challenges exist in developing a satisfactory definition that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence (Crenshaw, 2000). Moreover, terrorists consider their violence to be just, because they view themselves as freedom fighters or soldiers fighting a war to gain liberation, and therefore their terrorist acts cannot be labelled as crime or murder (Mullins, 2007; Wilkinson, 1997).

The establishment of a distinction between these so-called 'freedom fighters' and 'terrorists' is the source of much of the definitional debate surrounding terrorism (Dean, 2007). Townshend (2011) considers labelling to be the factor that makes defining terrorism difficult, as generally the term 'terrorist' is a description not voluntarily adopted by any individual or group, but is instead a pejorative label applied by governments and states. On this point, Hess (2003, p.339) notes that "terrorism is in the eye of the beholder". Hence arises the debate about the cliché that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter', which implies that the definition of terrorism is dependent upon the perspective and worldview of the one who is doing the labelling and which side they are perceived to be on (Dean, 2007; Ganor, 2002).

Conversely, Goldberg (2012, p.4) critiques the use of the phrase, arguing:

> [that it is] simply absurd to contend that because people may argue over who is or is not a terrorist that it is therefore impossible to make meaningful distinctions between terrorists and freedom fighters.

Moreover, Silke (2008, p.116) avers that some communities also perceive terrorist organisations as “freedom fighters”, “rebels” or “the resistance” rather than as ‘terrorists’. For example, in Post, Sprinzak and Denny’s (2003, p.177) study of Middle Eastern terrorists, the researchers found that recruits were treated with “great respect”, and perpetrators of armed attacks were hailed as heroes. Their families were also provided with a great deal of material assistance and attention by their communities, which in turn strengthened popular support for the attacks (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003). Suicide bombers in particular were perceived to be “holy fighters”, suggesting that by giving their life, they demonstrated the depth of their faith and earned the highest level of respect (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003, p.179).

This is problematic, as the view of the state is that the state alone has the right to use force and have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Townshend, 2011). Consequently this means that if any other group uses violence it is automatically considered illegal (Townshend, 2011; see also Russell, 2014).

Mullins’ (2007) defines Islamist terrorism as the use of politically or religiously justified violence against non-combatants by sub-state groups or organisations, and which is inspired by Jihadi-Salafi ideology. This definition is adopted throughout this thesis.

Salafism is a doctrine which advocates the reinstatement of theological purity and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad by uniting Muslims worldwide under religious rule (Byman & Pollack, 2008; Weiss & Hassan, 2015). Moreover, Salafism is a fundamentalist ideology which is committed to holy war, and which seeks to recreate past Muslim glory, restore authentic Islam in an Islamic state and which advocates the use of violence and terror to do so (Cockburn, 2015; Silke, 2008).

Terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and Daesh[1] are Jihadi-Salafi movements. Jihadi-Salafists are Muslims who purport to adhere to a selectively literalist interpretation of the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, and they honour armed struggle (or jihad) as a means for implementing their strict and intolerant vision of Islam (Haykel, 2016). The goal of Jihadi-Salafists is to raise awareness amongst Muslims that their religion is in a constant state of decline – religiously, politically, militarily, economically and culturally (Moghadam, 2008). They allege the source of this as being persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic 'apostates', and assert that waging jihad will reverse this (Moghadam, 2008). The concept of jihad will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Rapoport's four waves of modern terrorism

In order to understand modern terrorism, Rapoport (2004) proposes that there are four distinct waves which represent terrorism: (i) the 'anarchist' wave; (ii) the 'anticolonial' wave; (iii) the 'new left' wave; and (iv) the 'religious' wave (see Figure 1.1).

[1] See Chapter Two for an explanation of why the nomenclature 'Daesh' has been adopted in this thesis when referring to this terrorist organisation.

Figure 1.1. The five waves of modern terrorism



Source: Figure compiled by author

Rapoport (1984, p.672) suggests that each wave is the product of “significant political watersheds which excited the hopes of potential terrorists and increased the vulnerability of society to their claims”. Each of the four waves is governed by a definite set of ideas and has its own particular agenda and a core set of adversaries (Celso, 2015). Rapoport considers that revolutions in communication and travel have accelerated the global reach of terrorist organisations, allowing them to spread their ideals amongst radicalised diaspora communities (Celso, 2015). He also notes that each wave dissipates due to an amalgamation of internal weakness, generational change and external pressures (Celso, 2015).

Rapoport (2004, p.52; see also Sedgwick, 2004) postulates that the first ‘anarchist’ wave commenced in the 1880s in Russia and encompassed the 1890s – the “golden age” of international terrorism that saw anarchist terrorists assassinating many high profile targets

such as presidents and kings. The second ‘anticolonial’ wave comprised anti-colonial terrorism beginning in the 1920s and lasting about 40 years, and was precipitated by the Versailles Peace Treaty that concluded World War I (Rapoport, 2004). The third ‘new left’ wave was triggered by the Vietnam War and did not last as long as its predecessors (Rapoport, 2004). During this time threats were widespread, ranging from nationalist-separatist activist groups such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and far right and far left ideological activists such as the Red Army Faction (Nesser, 2008; Rapoport, 2004).

The fourth ‘religious’ wave encompasses contemporary religious terrorism and can be traced to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Sedgwick, 2004). Whilst numerous religious communities produced terrorists, Rapoport (2004, p.61) considers Islam to be “at the heart of [this] wave”, with Islamic groups having conducted the most significant and deadly international attacks.

There is a significant difference between the religious wave of terrorism and the preceding waves; twenty-first century terrorism has been more lethal and violent, and also more heavily motivated by fundamentalist religion (Lesser et al., 1999; Newsome, Stewart & Mosavi, 2017; Silke, 2008). In addition to being motivated by religious belief, the religious wave of terrorism is more fanatical, deadly and pervasive, differing in its goals, methods and organisation compared to the preceding waves (Berman, 2009; Crenshaw, 2000).

Laqueur (1999) elaborates on this point, suggesting that the primary difference in character between them is that unlike the preceding waves – which had political and

social aims – the religious wave of terrorism seeks the destruction of society and the elimination of large parts of the population. Additionally, whilst terrorists in preceding waves were connected in tight, centralised and structured groups, religious terrorists are decentralised and diffused (Crenshaw, 2000). Furthermore, while terrorists in preceding waves sought short-term political power by means of revolution, national liberation or secession, religious terrorists "seek to transform the world" and are willing to cause high numbers of casualties, commit suicide attacks and use weapons of mass destruction to do so (Crenshaw, 2000, p.411).

Kaplan (2007), building on Rapoport's (2004) four waves theory, suggests that a fifth wave has since emerged which stems from the earlier waves. He considers that the goal of fifth wave movements is to create a new "utopian society" populated by revolutionary beings uncontaminated by the old world (Kaplan, 2007, p.545). This involves killings on a mass scale and the procreation of children who can be isolated from the existing society at an early age to build up the 'utopia' (Kaplan, 2007). Terrorist organisations such as Daesh and Boko Haram certainly fit this criteria and support the idea of a fifth wave (de Rojas Díaz, 2016). In support of this view, Honig and Yahel (2017) propose that the emergence of terrorist semi-states – defined as rebel groups that control portions of a weak state's territory and maintain governance there, whilst launching terrorist attacks against third party victim states – are indicative of the commencement of a fifth wave of terrorism.

Simon (2016, p.27) posits, though, that the fifth wave is a technological one, which is emerging and paving the way for a "more level playing field" that incorporates terrorists with different ideologies and agendas. He predicts that during this fifth wave, no single

form of terrorist ideology will dominate, as was the case in the preceding four waves (Simon, 2016). Rather, Simon (2016, p.29) argues that the Internet functions as the "energy" for this wave, and continually revolutionises how information is gathered, processed and distributed, how communications are conducted and social networks formed, and the way in which terrorists – specifically lone actors – can utilise the Internet to learn about weapons, targets and techniques. Post, McGinnis and Moody (2014, p.331) support this contention, and concur that with the emergence of a communication revolution, a new fifth wave phenomenon is developing, in which lone actors will dominate by using the Internet to radicalise and find comfort in the sense of belonging to be gained from the "virtual community of hatred".

The proposal of a fifth wave of terrorism certainly holds merit if one is to go by the assertions of Kaplan (2007), de Rojas Díaz (2016) and Honig and Yahel (2017), with terrorist organisations such as Daesh and Boko Haram fitting their characterisations of a fifth wave. However, Lyon and Huang (2015) propose that rather than weakening the religious wave, communication technologies seem to be strengthening it, and that a wave can outlast the organisations within it. This would mean that even with the defeat of groups like Daesh and Boko Haram, the fourth religious wave could continue, assuming that new groups would arise to take their place (Lyon & Huang, 2015).

Moreover, Simon (2016) and Post, McGinnis and Moody's (2014) emphasis on the prominence of lone actors in the fifth wave is arguably improbable, with the literature overwhelmingly advancing that individuals do not radicalise alone, and that there are often connections amongst seemingly lone actors, even if not immediately obvious (see Bright, Whelan & Harris-Hogan, 2018; Harris-Hogan & Barrelle, 2018; Silke, 2008).

Indeed, the findings arising out of the data set in this thesis comparably reveal that lone actors rarely exist in the true sense of the word (see Chapter Six). It is possible to conclude that a new wave is emerging (or has already emerged), although it is one which is an amalgam of certain characteristics of the fourth religious wave, and one which also encompasses the novel innovations of the proposed fifth technological wave.

Radicalisation

An examination of Islamist terrorism also warrants discussion of the term 'radicalisation'. Radicalisation is considered by Bokhari (2010) and Veldhuis and Staun (2009) to be a difficult concept to define, with no consensus on the causes, nature and limits of it. Sedgwick (2010) proposes that the term's ubiquity implies that there is an established consensus about the meaning of radicalisation, but that the different ways in which it is understood can produce confusion. He concludes that radicalisation is the standard term used to describe "what goes on before the bomb goes off" (Sedgwick, 2010, p.479). Dearey (2009, p.14) equivalently postulates that in the absence of an adequately rigorous definition, there is an assumption that radicalisation is a concept that everyone simply knows "when they see it".

This thesis adopts the definition of radicalisation proposed by Hafez and Mullins (2015, p.960):

> Radicalization involves adopting an extremist worldview, one that is rejected by main-stream society and one that deems legitimate the use of violence as a method to effect societal or political change. There is some debate regarding how best to conceptualize radicalization, but the consensus view converges on three elements key to defining the phenomenon. Radicalization is usually a (1) gradual "process" that entails socialization into an (2) extremist belief system that sets the stage for (3) violence even if it does not make it inevitable.

This definition identifies that radicalisation is a process, which involves identifying with an extremist belief system which can (but does not necessarily) result in individuals engaging in violent behaviour. This is of particular importance to this thesis, which will examine a data set of Islamist terrorists in an Australian context. In so doing, this thesis will contribute to knowledge of not only those individuals who have been convicted of terrorist acts, but also those who have exhibited signs of radicalisation and engaged in terrorist acts but who have not been convicted or previously studied.

The definition of Hafez and Mullins is also consistent with Bartlett and Miller's (2012, p.2) definition of a radical:

> To be a radical is to reject the status quo, but not necessarily in a violent or even problematic manner. Some radicals conduct, support, or encourage terrorism, whilst many others do no such thing, and actively and often effectively agitate against it.

Having established the definition of radicalisation, let us now consider radical and extremist beliefs versus radical and extremist behaviour.

Extremist beliefs versus extremist behaviour

At the core of scholarly debate surrounding radicalisation is disagreement concerning the end-state of radicalisation and what constitutes it (Neumann, 2013). Some notions of radicalisation emphasise extremist beliefs (cognitive radicalisation) whilst others focus on extremist behaviour (behavioural radicalisation), with most scholars distinguishing between the two (Bartlett, Birdwell & King, 2010; Khalil, 2014; Neumann, 2013; Vidino & Brandon, 2012). This definitional debate stems from disagreement about whether radicalisation is solely a cognitive phenomenon which culminates in radically different ideas about society and governance, or whether it should be defined by actions (which are often violent or coercive) that result in those ideas (Neumann, 2013).

Scholars such as Borum (2011) consider that radical beliefs are not a necessary precursor for terrorism, as most people who hold radical ideas neither engage in terrorism, nor have they gone through a process of radicalisation. Borum (2011) argues that developing or adopting extremist beliefs which justify violence is only one possible pathway to terrorism. Horgan (2011, cited in Brachman, 2011) similarly considers the assumption that extremist beliefs are the precursor to violent action to be flawed, reiterating the notion that there is no unidirectional relationship between radicalisation and terrorism, because "not every terrorist necessarily holds radical views".

Conversely, Neumann (2013) has criticised this viewpoint, arguing that it is not possible to separate political beliefs from political action and that in attempting to do so, a holistic understanding of radicalisation is impeded. The effect of these disagreements is a difference in the way radicalisation is approached globally. This has resulted in two differing policies, known as the 'Anglo-Saxon' and 'European' approaches (Neumann, 2013). These two policy approaches reflect the various historical experiences and philosophical traditions on which the two approaches are based, as opposed to a description of past or current policies in specific countries or geographical settings.

The European approach places emphasis on both cognitive and behavioural radicalisation (Neumann, 2013). This approach originated in the first half of the twentieth century, when many European democracies were being challenged and destabilised by extremists from both the left and right (Neumann, 2013). This period in time – which saw Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler take power in Italy and Germany respectively – demonstrated that under the right conditions, extremist movements were capable of rapidly becoming mainstream, attracting mass support, gaining power through elections and eventually

destroying democracies “without a single shot being fired” (Ou, 2016). This period also demonstrated the fragility of democracy and its need to be defended before its enemies break laws or resort to violence (Neumann, 2013).

The result of this historical experience with fascism was deeply ingrained in the minds of many European approach policy makers and has shaped (and continues to shape) their attitude towards contemporary extremism (Neumann, 2013). At the most foundational level, this takes the form of their conviction that radicalisation is predominantly a political threat which needs to be treated as such (Neumann, 2013). The European approach presumes that extremist ideas can lead to extremist violence and that even on their own, extremist ideas are problematic and potentially dangerous (Neumann, 2013).

The Anglo-Saxon approach (which has been adopted in Australia) focuses on behavioural radicalisation, with a particular focus on acts of terrorism and violence (Neumann, 2013). Under this approach, government intervention only occurs when an individual intends to break the law, and is not dependent upon their political ideas or motivations (Chiha, Combres & Askofaré, 2017; Neumann, 2013). This means that freedom of speech is near absolute, with people being free to express their political views – irrespective of how extreme they may be – so long as they do so peacefully and do not inhibit others’ right to do the same (Neumann, 2013). Moreover, freedom of speech does not allow for the vilification of people based on national, racial or religious grounds (Attorney-General’s Department, n.d.). In the United States, for instance, the implementation of the Anglo-Saxon approach is evident with freedom of speech being one of the pillars of the nation’s constitution (Neumann, 2013).

These different approaches are also evident when examined in the context of how various academics define radicalisation. Della Porta and LaFree (2011), for example, emphasise that radicalisation is a process which entails a movement towards violence. In contrast, Bartlett and Miller (2012) argue that radicalisation is the process by which individuals are introduced to an ideological message and belief system, which encourages movement from moderate views towards extreme ones, noting that it does not necessarily entail engagement in violence.

Jenkins' (2009) definition, meanwhile, implies both extreme beliefs and extreme action, defining radicalisation as a process in which individuals adopt a commitment to both a system of beliefs and their imposition on the rest of society. In like manner, the Australian Attorney-General's Department (2015, p.28) defines radicalisation as:

> [a] process during which an individual's beliefs move from being relatively mainstream to being supportive of drastic change in society that would have a negative impact on the rights and freedoms of others.

In Australia, application of this definition was evident through the government's behaviourally-focused means of intervention against Australians engaging in terrorism overseas via the cancellation of passports, employed particularly at the height of Daesh's influence between 2014 and 2018. Numerous Australians attempted and failed to travel overseas to join a terrorist organisation due to their passports being blocked by authorities, with over 240 Australian passports cancelled as at November 2018 (Bergin et al., 2015; Coyne, 2018). Whilst removing someone's passport may prevent them from travelling to engage in conflict overseas, it will not change the belief system driving their behaviour, thus lending support to the argument that radicalisation should not be defined solely by actions.

Moreover, whilst the cancellation of passports may prevent individuals from engaging in conflict overseas, it does not guarantee that they will not plot terrorist attacks domestically. Cancelling the passports of Abdul Numan Haider (#102),[2] Sevdet Ramadan Besim (#137), Harun Causevic (#138) and MHK (#139) did little to cease their radical beliefs, with all four individuals planning acts of terrorism in Australia after being prevented from travelling overseas (*Gaughan v Causevic*, 2016; *Haider*, 2017; *R v Besim*, 2016; *R v MHK*, 2016). Further still, cancelling passports is not guaranteed to prevent people from leaving the country; Khaled Sharrouf (#38), for instance, managed to travel to Syria in 2013 using his brother's passport when he could not use his own, where he infamously carried out a number of atrocities in the name of Daesh (Norman & Gribbin, 2017).

Academics and policy makers alike concede that radicalisation is a process – one that involves an individual embracing values and opinions about a certain topic – which progressively become more extreme and begin to deviate from normative opinions, and can then result in the perpetration of ideological violence such as terrorism (Al Raffie, 2013; Aly & Striegher, 2012; Geeraerts, 2012). It is important to note that while most people can potentially hold opinions that others would consider radical, this does not mean that all individuals with radical thoughts are intent on committing acts of terrorism (Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell, 2013). Indeed, Jenkins (2010) highlights that whilst many people may share similar life circumstances, only some of them will consequently become radicalised, and even fewer will become terrorists.

[2] The number which follows an individual's name refers to their place in Appendix 1; see Chapter Three.

Radical beliefs in and of themselves are not illegal. While individuals may possess, download or upload graphic and radical material, doing so does not constitute an offence under Australian law as would be the case, for example, if the same practices were applied to child pornography (*R v EB*, 2018). Although an individual with radical beliefs may seek to substantially change the nature of society and government, for the most part their behaviour does not pose a danger to the community (Angus, 2016).

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014) argues that if radicalisation is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, it is not a threat to society and can actually be a force for beneficial change. For example, some movements throughout history – such as the suffragettes and those advocating the abolition of slavery – supported and attempted to implement positive, non-violent attitudes and actions to change politics and society (Attorney-General's Department, 2015; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014). Issue-based violence – which is grounded on a specific issue or cause such as animal liberation or environmental activism – may also be disruptive but is generally peaceful and used to garner attention to a particular issue (Angus, 2016).

The radical values and opinions which have led to individuals becoming involved in terrorism and which are the subject of this thesis should not be confused with such aforementioned examples. Radicalisation becomes a threat to society if individuals come to accept violence as a possible – or perhaps even legitimate – course of action, which may eventuate in the person advocating, acting in support of, or engaging in terrorism (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014). Striegher (2015; see also Aly, 2013) considers that whilst there is an interdependent relationship between

radicalisation and terrorism, there also exists a clear demarcation between the terms, suggesting that radicalisation is a precondition to terrorism and is the process through which an individual moves when justifying violence in pursuit of ideological goals.

Neojihadism

The ideology at the core of this thesis is neojihadism, which is a movement unique to the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries which has emerged from within Islam (Lentini, 2013). Lentini (2008b, p.3) defines neojihadism as:

> simultaneously a religious, political, paramilitary and terrorist global movement, subculture, counterculture and ideology that seeks through enacting violence, the realisation of states governed by laws according to the dictates of a selectively literal interpretation of the Qur'an, sunnah and hadith, with the ultimate goal of establishing a unified [caliphate] that straddles countries that have been dominated traditionally by the Islamic faith.

Neojihadism can be understood as a narrative which establishes that:

> Islam is in decline, Muslims are oppressed globally and that through using a martial form of jihad, which its participants have argued – in sharp contradistinction to mainstream Islam – can legitimately include civilians and non-combatants as victims of violence to advance their cause, elevate the ummah, and ultimately initiate Muslim resurgence, is the most effective and preferred method to end this cycle of humiliation, and stimulate the rebirth of Islam globally (Lentini, 2013, p.197).

Originating from the concept of jihadism,[3] neojihadism is distinct as it calls for the rejection of distinctions between direct guilt and guilt by association; simply being a citizen of a "designated enemy country" is enough to render that citizen a potential target (Lentini, 2013, p.197). Individuals who adhere to this narrative are known as neojihadists. Neojihadists justify their actions by citing reasons for revenge rather than solid theology

[3] Jihadism refers to a movement which is based on a radical interpretation of Islam and is characterised by a rejection of democracy and other secularised systems of governance, whilst justifying the use of violence against enemies by reference to a narrow interpretation of the Islamic concept of jihad (Hemmingsen, 2011; Khosrokhavar, 2015). Concepts such as jihad are rooted in centuries of Islamic scholarship; for a detailed discussion see Cook (2009); Khosrokhavar, (2015); Lia (2017).

and, significantly, have “removed restrictions against killing non-combatants and civilians, arguing that anyone who supports their opponents constitutes a legitimate target” (Lentini, 2013, p.197).

Brachman (2009, p.5) postulates that individuals who follow this ideology believe themselves to be “the tip of the Islamic spear”:

> In their eyes, they are the last remaining vestige of an Islam that was practiced and preached by the Prophet Muhammad and the generation that immediately followed him … The religion of Islam, they argue, has deviated from the true path, and Muslims will continue to face humiliation, oppression, and persecution so long as they passively sit, waiting for situations to self-correct. The solution, they argue, has always been, and can only ever be, Islam. But it is not any Islam. It is an Islam willing to fight and die by the sword. … It is an Islam where every believer is a warrior.

Harris-Hogan (2012, p.19) notes that neojihadism presents Australia with a “constantly evolving, global asymmetric threat with serious potential consequences”. It is therefore worth developing an insight into the impacts and structure of this ideology in an Australian context.

Sageman’s three waves of jihadism

The concept of the three waves of jihadism advanced by Sageman (2008c) falls within the fourth wave of Rapoport’s four waves of terrorism theory (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2. The three waves of jihadism



Source: Figure compiled by author

According to Sageman (2008c), the first wave of jihadism occurred in the 1980s, when Afghan Arabs came to Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Well-educated and from mostly middle-class backgrounds, the first wave consisted of mature terrorists in their thirties, some of whom formed the backbone of al-Qaeda leadership in the 2000s (Sageman, 2008c). The first wave was comprised of individuals of predominantly Egyptian descent who were the companions in arms of Osama bin Laden (Sageman, 2008a). Despite the lack of homogeneity in the group, they shared a common ideology, and many became involved in terrorism following the great upheaval that was occurring in the Middle East at the time in the 1980s (Saltman & Winter, 2014).

The second wave occurred during the 1990s, and mostly consisted of elite expatriates that moved to the West from the Middle East to attend universities as well as fairly well-educated young Muslim men in their mid-twenties (Sageman, 2008a; 2008c). Consequent experiences of separation from their families, friends and culture, as well as feelings of homesickness and marginalisation, became the catalyst for their radicalisation (Sageman, 2008c). It was from the pool of fighters of the second wave that al-Qaeda emerged, with this generation of young men participating in al-Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan (Sageman, 2008c; Saltman & Winter, 2014).

The third, contemporary wave of jihadism differs from its predecessors, consisting of mostly would-be terrorists angered by the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and looking to join the ranks of the men they perceive as heroes (Sageman, 2008c). They hold in high esteem and model themselves on the fighters that came before them in the first two waves of jihadism, with many hoping to rival their predecessors (Sageman, 2008a). Unlike the typically middle-class forerunners in the second wave, individuals in the third wave have

been of a primarily lower-class background, comprised of homegrown men in their early twenties that are generally poorly educated (Sageman, 2008a; 2008b). Mostly encompassing second or third generation Muslim males, the third wave has also been subjected to social strains and systematic discrimination in the labour market (Cottee, 2011). This group has been under-represented within public and political life, living in a hostile environment where their cultural and religious backgrounds are subject to distrust (Cottee, 2011).

Following al-Qaeda Central's retreat underground after 9/11, individuals within the third wave formed informal, self-financed and self-trained networks that had no physical headquarters (Sageman, 2008c). They turned to the virtual environment of the Internet as a sanctuary, where they found unity and purpose within a social structure that comprised a "leaderless jihad" (Sageman, 2008c, p.39). Sageman (2008c) argues that rather than being the product of poverty, ignorance or religious brainwashing, their leaderless self-recruitment, global Internet connections and lack of structure – coupled with the desire for significance and belonging – made this generation more dangerous and volatile than their predecessors.

Within the Western context, the individuals in the third wave were also torn between the conflicting views of two different cultures; that of their parents and that of the secular Western societies into which they were born or had been assimilated, and which routinely incited experiences of enmity and exclusion against them (Cottee, 2011). In this context, third wave jihadism has been labelled a collective solution to a structurally imposed problem, developed by young Westernised Muslim males to resolve their issues of both status-frustration and identity-confusion (Cottee, 2011). By participating in the terrorist

group's values and subcultural style, these individuals could express their denunciation of Western secular society – the source of their frustration and confusion – and justify retaliation against it (Cottee, 2011).

There are several other key differences between this third wave of jihadism and its predecessors. The third wave involved aspiring terrorists who were ideologically inspired by al-Qaeda, despite having no physical connection to the terrorist organisation (Cottee, 2011). Differing from their predecessors, who travelled widely across countries, the third wave of "wannabe jihadis" were also less mobile and dedicated much of their time to the Internet, which served as a type of "virtual training camp" for them (Cottee, 2011, p.733; see also Rotella, 2007).

Furthermore, individuals in the third wave were mostly comprised of second and third generation "Europeanised", lower class Muslim males (Cottee, 2011, p.741). In comparison to American Muslims, the European group, despite its immersion in Western culture, was systematically withheld from achieving the values and aspirations of the culture surrounding them, resulting in feelings of frustration and resentment (Cottee, 2011). Meanwhile the American group, whilst equally immersed in Western culture, had the advantage of being better placed within the social structure so as to enable them to actually achieve the rewards on offer (Cottee, 2011).

Sageman (2008b) observed that in the period of time since 9/11 up to 2008, over 2,300 arrests relating to Islamic terrorism occurred in Europe in contrast to about 60 in the United States, making the rate of terrorism related charges of Muslims six times higher per capita in Europe than in the United States. Sageman (2008a) suggests that the

inclusiveness and equal opportunity of the ‘American Dream’ are inconsistent with beliefs of there being a war against Islam, and therefore this reduces the likelihood of homegrown terrorism in the United States.

Cottee (2011) also appraises that having achieved the ‘American Dream’ and attained a reasonable education and income, American Muslims largely reject the ideologies of militant Islam. In Europe, however, rates of low income and high unemployment among some young Muslim males makes the appeal of terrorism greater than for their American counterparts (Cottee, 2011). Exclusion and discrimination in the labour market are also contributable factors for the disparities between European and American groups (Sageman, 2008a).

Sageman (2008a) avers that conviction that the West is engaged in a war against Islam resonated more with European Muslims than American Muslims due to differences in everyday experiences. From a socio-economic point of view, the United States had, for the most part, allowed the immigration of Muslim engineers, physicians, businessmen and scholars, making the American Muslim community mostly upper middle-class (Sageman, 2008b). In Europe, however, the unemployment rate for Muslim males was a lot higher than the average rate within the rest of society (Sageman, 2008a).

Whilst Sageman and Cottee’s assessments may have been accurate at the time of publication, there came a demonstrable shift regarding terrorism in the United States following a number of Daesh inspired attacks in the 2010s. On 2 December 2015, Syed Rizwan and Tashfeen Malik carried out the nation’s worst mass shooting in three years, when they killed 14 people and injured two dozen others during a shooting and attempted

bombing of a social services centre in San Bernardino, California (Schmidt & Pérez-Peña, 2015).

The following year, on 12 June 2016, Omar Mateen carried out the largest mass shooting in United States history at the time, when he killed 49 people and wounded 53 others at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida (Barry et al., 2016). Then, in the deadliest attack in New York City since 9/11, Sayfullo Saipov killed eight people and injured 11 others in a truck attack in Manhattan on 31 October 2017 (Weiser, 2018). However, it is not only the United States which suffered the consequences of Daesh's rise and expansion; as this thesis will demonstrate, the group's detrimental impact has been felt globally, including in Australia.

Thesis aims and research significance

The danger posed by Islamist terrorism in Australia warrants increased investigation. In particular, the unprecedented number of radicalised individuals who sought to support the cause of terrorist organisation, Daesh, over a number of years need to be examined, as there is knowledge to be gained which may inform how to prevent future radicalisation and address the threat posed by Islamist terrorism in Australia. As such, this thesis aims to add to the body of knowledge on radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in an Australian context.

The central research question in this thesis is: **In an Australian context, what has influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts?**

In addressing the central research question, a number of subsidiary questions will also be considered:

1. What do we know about radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in an Australian context?
2. What are the primary motives which have influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists?
3. What does an analysis of Islamist terrorists in Australia reveal about them?
4. What influence have social and familial networks had on the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in Australia?

To respond to the central research question, a data set of 194 Islamist terrorists from Australia who engaged in a multitude of terrorist acts between 2001 and 2018 (either domestically or overseas) has been constructed.[4] These acts included:[5]

- leaving Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas;
- conspiring to do or doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act;
- belonging to or being a member of a terrorist organisation;
- conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there;
- receiving, collecting, making or attempting to make funds available to a terrorist or terrorist organisation or to support incursions into a foreign state;
- providing or attempting to provide support, resources, goods or services to a terrorist organisation or to promote the commission of a terrorist offence;
- collecting, possessing or making documents connected with a terrorist act; and
- advocating terrorism.

Despite partaking in such activities – which encompass a range of federal offences under the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth) – many of the individuals in the data set were ultimately not charged with an offence. For instance, charges could not be laid against the large volume of individuals who left Australia to join Daesh from 2014 onwards. In some

[4] See Appendix 1.
[5] See Appendix 2.

cases, such as that of Neil Prakash (#74), the Australian government stripped individuals of their Australian citizenship. However, more often than not, those that left Australia subsequently died overseas engaging in terrorist acts. Despite not being charged, the individuals in the data set who left Australia nevertheless exhibited signs of radicalisation and it was deemed appropriate to include them in the research.

It was this evidence of their radicalisation – by undertaking the terrorist acts outlined in Appendix 2 – and by virtue of their status as Australian residents or citizens that individuals were deemed suitable for inclusion in the data set. This thesis has attempted to investigate the influences on the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in an Australian context by capturing as much data as possible over an extended period of time.

The findings from this research contribute data to the field of terrorism research, arising from case studies which have not been previously studied or analysed. As the issue of Islamist terrorism is a constant and persistent issue both in Australia and internationally, it is vital that research on terrorism continues to evolve to reflect developments in this field.

Existing analyses of Islamist terrorists in Australia have utilised small data sets and have not examined a large quantity of variables, often looking only at a limited number of factors such as age, marital status, ethnicity and religion. To address this gap in the canon of scholarship, this thesis undertakes an analysis of radicalised Islamist terrorists in an Australian context with a broader data set (n=194) which encompasses a 17-year period.

This data set has been constructed to gather information about a number of themes that have been acknowledged as significant in the existing scholarly literature. By bringing

these themes together in one large sample, this thesis significantly contributes to our understanding of the characteristics of radicalised Islamist terrorists in Australia. Moreover, frequencies in relation to the different types of offences committed by these individuals will also be assessed to determine the extent to which they engaged in terrorist acts. The use of case studies throughout the thesis will also provide qualitative insights into the stated motives of these terrorists.

Additionally, this research involves a social network analysis of the social and familial connections of these 194 individuals, which demonstrates the interconnectivity amongst Australian terrorist networks, and which has contributed to the radicalisation and sustained involvement in Islamist terrorism in Australia. The extensive work on the structure of terrorist networks in Australia conducted by Harris-Hogan has been an insightful reference throughout this thesis (see Bright, Whelan & Harris-Hogan, 2018; Harris-Hogan, 2012; Harris-Hogan, 2013; Harris-Hogan, 2014; Harris-Hogan & Barrelle, 2018; see also Kelly & McCarthy-Jones, 2019).

Building on Harris-Hogan's research, the social network analysis in Chapter Six provides an overview of the interconnected individuals and networks which have transcended time and geographic locations in Australia from 2001 to 2018. It will articulate the critical role that social and familial networks have played in sustaining Islamist terrorism in Australia, and a thorough understanding of this will assist in responding to the terrorist threat in the future.

Understanding radicalisation in particular is a vital step in combating Islamist terrorism, as radicalisation can create the motivational or cognitive preconditions for terrorism (Aly,

2013; Mandel, 2010). By quantifying the similarities and differences between radicalised terrorists and the means by which they came to know one another – as well as considering the motivating factors which fostered their radicalisation – this thesis contributes to a greater overall understanding of Australian Islamist terrorists and the factors which influenced their radicalisation.

Thesis overview

This thesis contains a further six chapters. To provide an Australian context, **Chapter Two** engages with material relating to Australia's Muslim communities. The chapter also outlines a history of Islamist terrorism in Australia. This is done so in the context of three 'waves' (2001-2004, 2005-2013 and 2014-2018), each of which represent significant shifts in and developments of Islamist terrorism in Australia. Terrorist organisation, Daesh, is discussed in this chapter owing to the significant role it played in shaping the third wave of Islamist terrorism in Australia, as well as its detrimental global influence.

Chapter Three establishes the quantitative and qualitative methodological approach used to conduct the research, and details relating to the case analysis, social network analysis and case studies at the core of this thesis will be set out. The chapter discusses how the data was collected and the limitations and challenges faced.

The focus of **Chapter Four** is on the various motivational factors that drive radicalisation. Ideological motives in particular have a powerful function, and are explored in this chapter having regard to the perceived 'war on Islam' and the 'war on terror'. Overarching here are the religious justifications cited by some individuals for their involvement in terrorism, such as the concept of religiously sanctioned jihad in response to experiences of humiliation and victimisation. Issues relating to identity and

belonging, status and meaning and socio-economic influences ought not be underestimated as motivational factors, and are assessed in Chapter Four.

Chapter Five presents the findings arising out of a quantitative analysis of 194 Islamist terrorists from Australia, who engaged in a multitude of terrorist acts between 2001 and 2018 (either domestically or overseas). A number of themes are addressed here: the terrorist acts committed and the terrorist organisations supported, youth, gender, the nature of the homegrown threat, religiosity and converts, education and mental health. Addressing these themes provides an insight into the characteristics of Islamist terrorists who were radicalised in an Australian context.

Chapter Six emphasises the critical role that social and familial networks play in the radicalisation process. An analysis of social and familial connections in Australia is again considered in the context of three 'waves' (2001-2004, 2005-2013 and 2014-2018), which illustrate how the interconnected networks individuals belonged to facilitated their radicalisation and sustained their involvement in Islamist terrorism. Lone actor terrorists are also considered in this chapter. Chapter Six assesses the role of the Internet and social media as echo chambers for like-minded individuals, whereby extreme and radical beliefs are amplified. This has been a growing concern especially since the rise of Daesh, as it has enabled individuals across the globe to connect more quickly and easily than previously.

Chapter Seven provides a synthesis of the key themes and identifies avenues for further scholarship on radicalisation and Islamist terrorism.

Chapter Two
Islamist terrorism in Australia

Chapter One observed that terrorism has long existed in the form of various groups with a number of different belief systems. However, the particular form of terrorism which has come to dominate the mediascape and public discourse – particularly since 9/11 – and which is the focus of this thesis, is Islamist terrorism. In Australia, Islamist terrorism is viewed by the Federal government as being comprised of "extremists who follow a distorted and militant interpretation of Islam that espouses violence as the answer to perceived grievances" (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010, p.ii). Furthermore, in Australia Islamist terrorism is considered by the Federal government to be the main source of international terrorism as well as the primary terrorist threat to the country (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010; see also Harris-Hogan, 2017).

Despite being much rarer than other types of violent crime, Islamist terrorism receives a vast amount of attention in the mass media (Freilich & LaFree, 2015). For instance, 5,755 Americans, domestically and internationally, died in terrorist attacks between 1969 and 2013; in comparison, there were 33,636 deaths resulting from domestic gun violence in the United States in 2013 alone (Bastian et al., 2016). While terrorist attacks against the West account for less than one percent of global terrorism, terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslims receive 357 percent more media attention than those committed by non-Muslims (Kearns, Betus & Lemieux, 2019).

This is significant, as it impacts the way Muslims are perceived in the community. Although Islamist terrorism creates an oftentimes frightening and unpredictable landscape, evidence suggests that reactions to it are unwarranted when compared to more

harmful issues (Walsh, 2016). As this thesis will emphasise, responses to terrorism are significant, as they can not only contribute to the perception of there being a war waged against Islam, but also legitimise Australia as a target amongst Islamist terrorists.

In order to address the first subsidiary question of this thesis – **What do we know about radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in an Australian context?** – this chapter assesses statistical data pertaining to Australia's Muslim communities – specifically Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) census data from 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016. By providing this Australian context, this chapter demonstrate the diversity of Australia's Muslim communities and the fact that Islamist terrorists are outliers in these communities. This chapter also provides a chronological history of Islamist terrorism in Australia. A particular focus is placed on the period 2001 to 2018, as this is the period under assessment in this thesis. This is achieved in the context of three 'waves' (2001-2004, 2005-2013 and 2014-2018), which represented significant shifts and developments of Islamist terrorism in Australia.

Australia's Muslim communities

It must be noted that the majority of Muslims do not have any connection with terrorism (Ellmann, 2003). Indeed, de-radicalisation expert Mohammed Chirani asserts that the majority of Muslims – "99 or 98 per cent" – oppose terrorism and violence (Jones, 2015). In order to provide an insight into Australia's Muslim communities, this section draws upon ABS census data from 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016. It should be noted that the individuals in the data set differed from most Australian Muslims, who are demonstrably capable of "living at peace with the unbelieving population of Australia" and have no inclination to abide by "purported instructions from Allah" to pursue religious violence (*R v Khaja*, 2018). Instead, they are able to peacefully observe other aspects of Islam, such

as faith, prayer, almsgiving, fasting and pilgrimage (*R v Khaja*, 2018). It is as a consequence of "fanatic and radical" Jihadi-Salafists that such majority of peaceful Muslims has had to pay the price for the actions of the minority (Chirani, 2015, cited in Jones, 2015).

Islam is Australia's third largest religion (after Christianity and Buddhism); Table 2.1 summarises the number of self-identified Muslims in Australia from 2001 to 2016. Islam is also the second-fastest growing religion in Australia, and notably the proportion of Australian Muslims has increased from 1.5 percent to 2.6 percent of the total population over the four census collection periods.

Table 2.1. Number of self-identified Muslims (2001, 2006, 2011, 2016)

Year	Number of Muslims (self-identified)	Proportion of total Australian population
2001	281,578	1.5%
2006	340,394	1.7%
2011	476,291	2.2%
2016	604,240	2.6%

Source: ABS (2001; 2006; 2011; 2016)

Census data has consistently revealed that Australia's Muslim communities are predominantly located in New South Wales (2006: 50%; 2011: 46%; 2016: 44%) and Victoria (2006: 32%; 2011: 32%; 2016: 33%) (highlighted in Table 2.2). In Appendix 3, 87 cases from the data set are outlined in accordance with the relevant counter-terrorism operation applicable to each case study. Of these 87 cases, 46 individuals were based in New South Wales and 39 were based in Victoria.

Table 2.2. Muslim citizens by Australian state (2006, 2011, 2016)[1]

State	2006		2011		2016	
New South Wales	168,789	49.6%	219,378	46.1%	267,654	44.3%
Victoria	109,369	32.1%	152,779	32.1%	197,029	32.6%
Queensland	20,322	6%	34,048	7.1%	44,881	7.4%
South Australia	10,518	3.1%	19,511	4.1%	28,547	4.7%
Western Australia	24,188	7.1%	39,116	8.2%	50,650	8.4%
Tasmania	1,051	0.3%	1,708	0.4%	2,497	0.4%
Northern Territory	1,088	0.3%	1,587	0.3%	2,332	0.4%
Australian Capital Territory	4,374	1.3%	7,434	1.6%	9,882	1.7%
Other territories	699	0.2%	729	0.1%	763	0.1%
Total	**340,392**	**100%**	**476,290**	**100%**	**604,244**	**100%**

Source: ABS (2006; 2011; 2016)

Census data relating to country of birth (illustrated in Table 2.3) indicates that overall, Muslim citizens in Australia are mostly Australian born; this was consistent over the four census collection periods. This is congruent with the findings provided in Chapter Five, which indicate that many of the Islamist terrorists in the data set were born in Australia.

Table 2.3. Top 10 countries of birth of Muslim citizens (2001, 2006, 2011, 2016)

2001		2006		2011		2016	
Australia	36.4%	Australia	37.9%	Australia	37.6%	Australia	36.4%
Lebanon	10.4%	Lebanon	8.9%	Lebanon	7.0%	Pakistan	9.1%
Turkey	8.3%	Turkey	6.8%	Pakistan	5.6%	Afghanistan	7.1%
Afghanistan	3.5%	Afghanistan	4.7%	Afghanistan	5.5%	Lebanon	5.7%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.5%	Pakistan	4.1%	Turkey	5.3%	Bangladesh	5.5%
Pakistan	3.3%	Bangladesh	3.9%	Bangladesh	5.0%	Iraq	3.5%
Indonesia	2.9%	Iraq	2.9%	Iraq	3.2%	Turkey	3.4%
Iraq	2.8%	Indonesia	2.5%	Iran	2.7%	Iran	3.0%
Bangladesh	2.7%	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.2%	Indonesia	2.6%	India	2.6%
Iran	2.3%	Iran	2.1%	India	2.1%	Indonesia	2.3%

Source: ABS (2001; 2006; 2011; 2016)

[1] Information unavailable for 2001 Census.

Australian Muslims come from over 180 different countries (International Centre for Muslim and non-Muslim Understanding, 2015). However, census data from 2006 to 2016 consistently indicates that individuals of Lebanese ancestry represent one of the top five ethnicities of Muslim citizens in Australia (see Table 2.4).

Table 2.4. Top five ethnicities of Muslim citizens (2006, 2011, 2016)[2]

2006		2011		2016	
Lebanese	18.0%	Lebanese	15.7%	Lebanese	13.0%
Turkish	13.1%	Turkish	10.5%	Pakistani	8.5%
Australian	6.9%	Australian	5.9%	Afghan	7.3%
Afghan	5.0%	Pakistani	5.7%	Turkish	7.2%
Indian	4.7%	Afghan	5.5%	Australian	6.8%

Source: ABS (2006; 2011; 2016)

Lebanese people have long been migrating to Australia, with the first cohorts from the late nineteenth century up until World War II (McKay, 1989). The first wave of Lebanese migrants was Christian and according to McKay (1989) integrated well, settling predominantly in Sydney. The second group to arrive did so after the Arab/Israeli war in 1967, and again were largely Christian (McKay, 1989). The third stream arrived after 1975, was comprised of individuals displaced by the Lebanese Civil War and was a mix of both Christians and Muslims (McKay, 1989). When considered in relation to the total Australian population, the number of Lebanese Muslims recorded in the census data is negligible, consistently comprising only 0.3 percent of the total Australian population. In contrast, the large number of Lebanese Muslims amongst the data set in this thesis is significant (see Chapter Five).

[2] Information unavailable for 2001 Census.

The age profiles of Australian Muslims compared to the overall population in Australia is also noteworthy as they are significantly younger (outlined in Table 2.5). At least 75 percent of Muslims in Australia were aged under 40 years consistently across the three census collection periods, in comparison with 53 percent of people from the overall Australian population who were aged under 40. This is important as the younger age group has the potential of significantly adding to the active labour force in Australia, and thereby contributing to economic productivity (International Centre for Muslim and non-Muslim Understanding, 2015).

Table 2.5. Age profiles of Muslims compared to total population (2006, 2011, 2016)[3]

	2006		2011		2016	
Age range	Muslims	Total	Muslims	Total	Muslims	Total
0-9 years	21%	13%	21%	13%	21%	13%
10-19 years	18%	14%	16%	13%	15%	12%
20-29 years	20%	13%	20%	14%	19%	14%
30-39 years	17%	14%	18%	14%	20%	14%
40-49 years	12%	15%	12%	14%	12%	14%
50-59 years	7%	13%	7%	13%	7%	13%
60-69 years	3%	9%	4%	10%	4%	11%
70+ years	2%	10%	2%	10%	2%	11%

Source: ABS (2006; 2011; 2016)

However, census data indicates a persistent pattern of Muslims performing below the national average, and a considerable discrepancy in terms of living standards and access to wealth among Muslims and non-Muslims (Akbarzadeh, 2013; Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014). Unemployment rates are higher amongst Australian Muslims compared to non-Muslim Australians (see Table 2.6). Moreover, Peucker, Roose and Akbarzadeh (2014) avow that Muslims occupy a disadvantaged position in the labour market.

[3] Information unavailable for 2001 Census.

Table 2.6. Unemployment rates of Muslims compared to total population (2001, 2006, 2011)[4]

Year	Muslims	Total population
2001	19.1%	7.4%
2006	13.4%	5.2%
2011	12.6%	5.6%

Source: ABS (2001; 2006; 2011)

The International Centre for Muslim and non-Muslim Understanding (2015) attributes this disparity in employment status to discrimination directed towards those with Middle Eastern names, finding that in the Australian labour market, applicants with such names are less likely to be given an interview than those with Anglo-Saxon names – even when their resumes are identical. Experiencing such a disparity in wealth and prospects of success works against an individual's sense of belonging, which can then increase their susceptibility to radicalisation (Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014).

For those Muslims that are employed, occupations are typically low skilled and characterised by hard physical labour, unfavourable work hours and/or low wages (Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014). The consequence of the disadvantaged labour market position is lower personal and household income, with Muslim households being represented in lower-income categories (Hassan, 2010; Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014). For instance, in 2011 37 percent of Muslims in Australia reportedly earned $500 and under a week and in 2016, 39 percent reported the same (ABS, 2011; 2016).

There are numerous factors that have been cited for these disparities, including racial and/or religious discrimination within the labour market (Booth, Leigh & Varganova,

[4] Information unavailable for 2016 Census.

2012); disregard for overseas skills and qualifications (Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2006); community factors (such as family patterns, gender roles and adjustment to settlement issues) and demography (such as a younger age profile and more families with young children) (Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014).

Challenges relating to socio-economic marginalisation are not only experienced by immigrants; Australian-born Muslims appear to be equally affected by marginalisation (Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014). Moreover, experiencing a sense of disappointment and unfulfilled expectations has the potential for far-reaching repercussions surrounding citizenship and a sense of belonging (Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014).

Socio-economic marginalisation means there is limited access to resources which facilitate civic and political engagement, and a lack of money and civic skills decreases an individual's capacity to engage with and contribute to society, thus preventing emotional connections with the polity (Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). A small minority of Muslims even refuse to participate in the election process, not accepting the general legitimacy of the Australian political system (Al-Momani et al., 2010).

A history of Islamist terrorism in Australia

Numerous overseas terrorist organisations – such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah – have had a long presence in Australia, focusing largely on fundraising and procurement whilst occasionally also escalating to violence (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). Nevertheless, as with most countries, Australia was far less concerned about Islamist terrorism prior to 9/11 than it is almost two decades on (Mullins, 2011).

Before 9/11, Australia was not considered to be a target for terrorists overseas, and domestic acts of terrorism were generally directed at officials of other countries (Mullins, 2011). Prior to 2001, incidences of terrorism in Australia included bombings in 1972, 1982 and 1986 of the Yugoslav General Trade Agency in Sydney, the Israeli Consulate in Sydney and the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne respectively, and in 1980 the assassination of the Turkish Consul-General in Sydney (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). It was intervention in East Timor commencing in 1999 that acted as the primary catalyst for Australia becoming a target, with terrorists labelling the intervention as an attack on Muslims (Neighbour, 2004).

Prior to 9/11, terrorist plots in Australia were externally guided. A division of Jemaah Islamiyah – known as Mantiqi 4 – was operating in Australia, led by Abdul Rahim Ayub (#3). The group occupied itself with recruitment, fundraising activities and jihadi training (Koschade, 2007). Of important note for its externally guided nature during this period, Jack Roche (#4) was recruited by Mantiqi 4 and sent to Indonesia to meet with the operational leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and then Afghanistan for terrorist training (Koschade, 2007). Upon his return to Australia, Roche attempted to recruit cell members for a potential operation until his arrest in November 2002 (Koschade, 2007). Following 9/11, seismic changes occurred in political and societal sentiments and in Islamist terrorism practices. We can consider the changing dynamics between 2001 and 2018 in three 'waves' (2001-2004, 2005-2013 and 2014-2018).

First wave (2001-2004)

The first wave represented a significant development in Islamist terrorism in Australia. Following 9/11, Australia adopted a new counter-terrorism model that was embedded in a globalised counter-insurgency thinking and practice, and the number of threats to

Australia's internal security increased (Hocking, 2004). Australia's alliance with the United States in their fight against terrorism after 9/11 legitimised the country as a target for attacks amongst Islamist terrorists (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010; Mullins, 2011). Moreover, Australia's support for what former al-Qaeda titular head, Osama bin Laden, dubbed "the infidels and the Crusaders" (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004, p.66) – by virtue of their participation in the 'war on terror' and provision of Australian troops in Afghanistan from 2001 and Iraq from 2003 – cemented amongst Islamist terrorists the perception that Australia was an "enemy of Islam" (Mullins, 2011, p.256).

During this wave, terrorist plots in Australia continued to be externally guided, with the most noteworthy case being that of Faheem Khalid Lodhi (#10), who planned to bomb the electricity supply system in Sydney between October 2003 and his arrest in April 2004 (*Regina v Lodhi,* 2006). In 2006, Lodhi became the first person to be convicted of preparing for a terrorist act. Together with Frenchman Willie Brigitte, Lodhi formed a terrorist cell which was supported by terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (Zammit, 2013). In addition to supporting the plot, the terrorist group also provided funding, arranged for Brigitte and others to travel in assistance of the plot and remained in contact with the main conspirators of the plot (Zammit, 2013).

Second wave (2005-2013)

A shift occurred during the second wave, as domestic terrorist plots became self-starting. In November 2005, 22 men were arrested in Melbourne and Sydney as part of Australia's largest counter-terrorism investigation, Operation Pendennis (*Benbrika & Ors v The Queen*, 2010; *Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010). Unlike predecessor Islamist terrorists in Australia, the men arrested as part of Operation Pendennis were not directed by an external terrorist organisation. Whilst several of the men had previously trained with

terrorist groups overseas (Moustafa Cheikho (#33) trained with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Shane Kent (#25) trained with al-Qaeda), the planned attack was not directed by any terrorist organisation.

The individuals involved in the two cells operating in Melbourne and Sydney were radicalised in the post 9/11 and post Iraq war environment (Zammit, 2013). Eighteen of the men were ultimately convicted of a myriad of offences including being a member of a terrorist organisation, conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act, possessing things connected with preparation for a terrorist act and providing resources to a terrorist organisation (*Benbrika & Ors v The Queen*, 2010; *Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010). Abdul Nacer Benbrika (#17) – the ringleader who was convicted of directing the cells (amongst other things) – will be discussed frequently throughout this thesis due to his particularly influential role in sustaining Islamist terrorist networks in Australia.

Another notable plot that occurred during the second wave involved five individuals arrested in Melbourne as part of Operation Neath. The participants in this plot had links to those arrested as part of Operation Pendennis, and one of them (Nayev El Sayed (#54)) even visited Benbrika in prison two months before he was arrested (Jopson, 2012). Three of the men were ultimately convicted of conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act (*R v Fattal*, 2011). The participants in the Operation Neath plot also had links to terrorist organisation, al Shabbab, although in contrast to the aforementioned cases, this terrorist group did not guide or support the planned attack (Zammit, 2013).

Third wave (2014-2018)

In 2014, there was again a significant shift in the terrorism landscape with the rise of terrorist organisation, Daesh, and the proclamation of an establishment of a global Islamic caliphate by its leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. This signified a supersedure of previous terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda because, unlike them, Daesh was able to successfully carry out guerrilla activity and establish a ground force capable of holding territory in parts of Syria and Iraq (Chaliand & Blin, 2016).

The third wave marked an increase in serious terrorist activity in Australia, defined by the planning of small-scale unsophisticated attacks inspired by Daesh in response to their directive to kill "disbelievers" in Western countries (Harris-Hogan & Barrelle, 2018; Wroe, 2014b). Domestically, the influence of Daesh had a detrimental effect: Australia was declared a target and Islamist terrorism in the country became operational. The first fatal act of Islamist terrorism was perpetrated by Abdul Numan Haider (#102), who stabbed two counter-terrorism officers in Melbourne before he was shot dead on 23 September 2014 (*Haider*, 2017).

This was followed by attacks perpetrated in Sydney by Man Haron Monis (#116) in December 2014, Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad (#146) in October 2015, Ihsas Khan (#173) in September 2016, and in Melbourne by Yacqub Khayre (#55) in June 2017, Momena Shoma[5] in February 2018 and Hassan Khalif Shire Ali (#191) in November 2018. Moreover, the national terrorism threat level was raised for the first time, indicating that the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia was probable (and which it has since remained).

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[5] Shoma has been excluded from the data set as she did not fulfil the requirement of being a permanent resident or citizen of Australia; see Chapter Three.

In contrast to the earlier waves of Islamist terrorism in Australia, the third wave also saw a marked increase in the number of counter-terrorism operations conducted, with over 20 operations resulting in over 60 arrests. The vast majority of these arrested individuals have now been convicted of numerous offences, including conspiring to do acts or doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act; conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there; and making funds available to a terrorist or terrorist organisation.

Notably during the third wave was Operation Appleby, which became the largest counter-terrorism investigation domestically since Operation Pendennis. In September 2014, raids were carried out on 25 homes and 15 suspects were arrested as part of this operation (Kelly & McCarthy-Jones, 2019). In Chapter Six, 13 individuals from the data set are identified as having played a key role in Islamist terrorism in Australia. These individuals established multiple connections with others in the data set, which transcended both time and place, overlapping across different locations and numerous terrorist plots and counter-terrorism investigations in Australia. Of these 13, four were arrested as part of Operation Appleby (Ahmad Naizmand (#70), Mohammed Ali Baryalei (#109), Sulayman Khalid (#151) and Milad Atai (#163)), and a further two were arrested as part of other operations which were on the periphery of Operation Appleby (Hamdi Alqudsi (#76) and Raban Alou (#147)).

Daesh

The significant role Daesh has played in shaping the third wave of Islamist terrorism in Australia, as well as their detrimental global influence, is the subject of extensive analysis in this thesis and consequently warrants considered discussion. Daesh is not the first jihadist group to announce the formation of Islamic 'states' or 'emirates' in many parts of

the Muslim world over the last three decades (including in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Caucasus, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, Gaza, Sinai, Cairo, Libya and northern Mali) (Lia, 2015; Lia, 2017). However, very few of these 'states' survived for more than a year, and not all of them have actually controlled territory in any meaningful sense (Lia, 2015). As noted, Daesh signified a supersedure of previous terrorist groups as they were able to successfully carry out guerrilla activity and establish a ground force capable of holding territory in parts of Syria and Iraq (Chaliand & Blin, 2016).

Whilst seemingly only gaining impetus and infamy in 2014 – following their declaration of a caliphate and the perpetration of countless brutal atrocities – Daesh had in fact existed long before these events occurred. A history of the names used by the group reveals that between 1999 and 2004, Daesh operated under the moniker 'Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad', followed by 'Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin' and 'Islamic State of Iraq' in 2006 and 'Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham' from 2013, demonstrating just how persistent and adaptable this group has been (Zelin, 2014).

Daesh has also been referred to by numerous names over more recent years, including 'ISIS' (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), 'ISIL' (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), 'IS' (Islamic State),[6] 'al-Dawlah' (the State) and 'Daesh' (based on the Arabic letters which formed the acronym of the group's earlier Arabic name) (Saltman & Winter, 2014). Whilst the Arabic acronym 'Daesh' means the same as all the aforementioned English acronyms, it also sounds very similar to the Arabic words 'daes', meaning "one who crushes or tramples underfoot" and 'dahes', meaning "one who sows discord" (Jeremiah,

[6] This is the name with which they are currently listed under the Criminal Code. They have also formerly been referred to thereunder as 'Al-Qa'ida in Iraq' and 'Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant'.

2016, p.182). Muslim opponents of this terrorist organisation refer to them as Daesh to express their scorn or derision, whilst many government officials globally (including in Australia, the United States, England and France) use the term Daesh as a means of removing the connotation that the group is an Islamic state, as the other terms imply (Jeremiah, 2016).

It is vital that Daesh not be permitted the legitimacy that would be granted by referring to it as *the* Islamic State, as it is neither a state, nor, arguably, is it Islamic (Lucas, 2015; Saltman & Winter, 2014). Furthermore, what the group is referred to is important, as the name can create a sense of solidarity for or against them and evoke feelings of familiarity or foreignness with specific target audiences, which in turn can aid in recruitment and assist in the radicalisation process (Lucas, 2015). Consequently, the nomenclature ‘Daesh’ has been adopted in this thesis when referring to this terrorist organisation.

Daesh has played a significant role in propagating a narrative seeking to utilise religion as a justification for the use of violence. It is a group comprised of Jihadi-Salafi Sunni Muslims, whose raison d’être is to establish a ‘caliphate’ – a jurisdiction which is to be ruled by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph – governed by their interpretation of Sharia law and characterised by acts of terrorism and extreme violence, which rely upon the radicalisation of large numbers of people (Bjelopera, 2013).

Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad was founded in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Jordan (Zelin, 2014). The movement gained momentum following the United States’ incursion into Iraq in 2003 (United States Institute of Peace, 2016). In 2004, operating under the name al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and Osama bin

Laden (Zelin, 2014). Though his rhetoric was similar to bin Laden's, al-Zarqawi had different targets; in particular his disdain was directed towards the majority Shiite population in Iraq (Ghosh, 2014). Bin Laden and al-Qaeda favoured a strategy targeting the 'far enemy' – namely the United States – whereas al-Zarqawi targeted the 'near enemy', which he considered to be 'apostate' regimes in the Arab world (Byman, 2015).

An ideological divide developed between al-Zarqawi and bin Laden: whilst al-Zarqawi considered that the global Islamic community could only be saved by purging it, bin Laden did not consider Muslims to be the problem and instead sought to change apostate institutions (Zelin, 2014). In seeking to purge the Muslim 'ummah' or community, AQI operated without constraint, and targeted the Shiite population as well as other religious minorities and rival jihadist groups (Byman, 2015; Turner, 2015).

So brutal and excessive was the group's violence and strict enforcement of Sharia law, that the then deputy head of al-Qaeda issued multiple stern warnings to al-Zarqawi (Zelin, 2014). After al-Zarqawi was killed in a targeted airstrike by United States forces in 2006, AQI underwent a significant process of restructure under the dual leadership of Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, ultimately rebranding itself as the Islamic State of Iraq (Furlan & Valensi, 2017). Following their deaths in 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over the group which was once again restructured until the group gained territorial control over areas in Iraq and Syria and dissociated itself from al-Qaeda (Furlan & Valensi, 2017).

On 29 June 2014, al-Baghdadi proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State (referred to as Daesh here on) which he dubbed a caliphate; in so doing, the group asserted itself as

the vanguard of Islam and as the only legitimate terrorist movement that outranked all other emirates, groups, states and organisations (Saltman & Winter, 2014). On this date, al-Baghdadi also proclaimed himself the successor to the Prophet Muhammad and, consequently, the political and military leader of Muslims globally (Hassan, 2017). As a result of prescribing himself the leader of all Muslims, emigration to the land over which al-Baghdadi ruled was considered an obligation; thus the announcement of a caliphate acted as a powerful driver of recruitment for Daesh (Saltman & Winter, 2014).

Despite both being grounded in Jihadi-Salafi ideology, al-Qaeda and Daesh interpreted and implemented key concepts such as jihad in different ways. Jihad is a contentious concept for Jihadi-Salafi movements such as al-Qaeda and Daesh, and the two groups differed in their views on this topic (Arosoaie, 2015) (just as al-Qaeda and Daesh's predecessors had done). For instance, the two groups disagreed as to who was a legitimate target of their jihad: for bin Laden and al-Qaeda the United States was the "head of the snake" that ought to have been primarily targeted, whereas for al-Baghdadi and Daesh it was the regime in Saudi Arabia (Bunzel, 2016, p.3).

While the ultimate goal of al-Qaeda was to overthrow the corrupt apostate regimes in the Middle East and replace them with 'true' Islamic governments, the United States was seen as the primary source of the Middle East's problems (Byman, 2015). By targeting the United States, al-Qaeda believed they could induce them to cease supporting Muslim state regimes and withdraw from the region, thereby leaving the regimes vulnerable to attack from within (Byman, 2015). Moreover, whilst al-Qaeda considered Shia Muslims to be apostates, they regarded killing them as being too extreme, a waste of resources, and detrimental to the broader jihadist project (Byman, 2015). Conversely, Daesh targeted

apostate regimes in the Arab world – such as the Assad regime in Syria – as a priority and favoured the approach of first purifying the Islamic community by attacking Shia Muslims and other religious minorities as well as rival jihadist groups (Byman, 2015).

Daesh came to hold territory in Iraq and Syria, stretching from the north of Aleppo to the south of Baghdad and including the cities of Raqqa and Mosul (Barrett, 2014b). The group accumulated land by taking over areas held by weaker adversaries and areas that provide resources such as oil, water and wheat, assisted by their alliances with various local actors, including primarily Sunni tribal groups, members of Saddam Hussein's army and intelligence services, as well as other casualties of the Shia-dominated governments (Barrett, 2014b).

At its height in 2014, Daesh's ideology and worldview centred on a global terrorist movement, with its social origins entrenched in an Iraqi and Syrian context (Gerges, 2014). Daesh depicted itself as "Allah's prophesied vanguard" whose purpose was to rejuvenate Islam by restoring unity, purging it of apostasy and fortifying the true Muslim community by combining political and religious authority under a single caliph (Celso, 2015, p.259).

The message propagated by Daesh had a significant impact on radicalisation, inspiring thousands of people globally to travel to the war zones in Syria and Iraq to become foreign fighters, or to carry out violent suicide attacks against civilians at home (Alghorra & Elsobky, 2018). Importantly, the propaganda material disseminated by Daesh – such as videos depicting the executions of American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, and British aid workers, David Haines and Alan Henning, in 2014 – were framed in the

context of a religious narrative. Decapitation, for instance, can be legitimised in Quranic verses about striking the necks of disbelievers (see Nanninga, 2017).

In justifying their actions through such an authoritative narrative, Daesh presented itself as the defender of Islam and as a sanctuary for Muslims who had been humiliated globally (Nanninga, 2017). Daesh's spokesperson, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, marketed the group as a state where justice prevails for "the oppressed, the orphans, the widows and the impoverished" (Nanninga, 2017, p.174). As will be demonstrated in Chapter Four, humiliation can act as a powerful motive for radicalisation and may explain why Daesh's message was so effective in driving recruitment to their cause.

Through their flagship magazine, Dabiq, Daesh called on the organisation's followers to target the "citizens of crusader nations … wherever they can be found", stating:

> At this point of the crusade against [Daesh], it is very important that attacks take place in every country that has entered into the alliance against [Daesh], especially the US, UK, France, Australia and Germany. … Every Muslim should get out of his house, find a crusader, and kill him (Wroe, 2014c).

Additionally, on 22 September 2014, an official Daesh spokesman issued a fatwa, calling on followers to kill "disbelievers" in Western countries (Wroe, 2014b). Amongst other things, the fatwa stated:

> If you are not able to find an IED [improvised explosive device] or a bullet, then single out the disbelieving American, Frenchman, or any of their allies. Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or poison him. … If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, then … kill him in any manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for anyone's advice and do not seek anyone's verdict. Kill the disbeliever, whether he is civilian or military (Benson, 2014).

Notwithstanding the devastating impact caused by Daesh between 2014 and 2018, in 2019 there transpired a visible and evident decline in their movement. This is because Daesh lost their stronghold on captured territory in Syria and Iraq due to military interventions from a United States-backed alliance of Kurdish fighters. This is worth noting, because despite the substantial attention dedicated to them, the focus of this thesis is most centrally on radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in Australia, and not an account of Daesh or any other terrorist group that may be especially prevalent at any given point in time.

Future threat

Following extensive United States led coalition air strikes in 2017, Daesh experienced major defeat, losing their control of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, with thousands of fighters, followers and civilians retreating as a result (Francis, 2019). In March 2019, the group suffered further downfall when United States backed forces liberated the last area held by Daesh in the Syrian village of Baghouz ("Islamic State defeated", 2019). Despite this victory, the threat posed by Daesh has not completely dissipated, with the group rebuilding in countries such as Indonesia and maintaining affiliates in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, Afghanistan and other locations (Barton, 2018; "Islamic State defeated", 2019). Having maintained active associates and supporters across the Muslim world following its defeat, Barton (2018) hypothesises that rather than being "far from over", the worst of the threat posed by Daesh may be "yet to come".

Furthermore, although they experienced significant defeat in their stronghold of Syria in 2019, history suggests that Daesh has not been entirely eradicated and may again emerge in the future, as the threat from them has not completely dissipated (see Quaedvlieg, 2019). This is further demonstrated in the list of prescribed terrorist organisations set out

in Table 5.2 (see Chapter Five) which documents various offshoots of Daesh in different geographical locations on five separate occasions. In time to come, Daesh may well again make efforts to capture territory and build up their forces before once more attempting to recruit individuals to their cause globally.

Following the loss of the last territory held by Daesh in Baghouz, there is now also the additional concern raised by the tens of thousands of Daesh fighters' family members detained in refugee camps (Addario, 2019). These individuals – many of whom will have their citizenship revoked and entry refused back to their home countries – remain radicalised, continue to pledge their unwavering support for Daesh and are seemingly "more dangerous than ever" (Addario, 2019). Furthermore, Barrett (2014a) postulates that the more time young people in particular spend displaced from home and school or in refugee camps, the more vulnerable they will be to terrorist recruiters.

However, returnee fighters also pose a complex problem; if brought back to Australia to be prosecuted for their crimes, their presence may increase the terrorist threat as they could return with dangerous skills and violent intent (Zammit, 2015). In addition to their enhanced capability of carrying out attacks (resulting from their battlefield experience and network connections), returnee fighters are thought to have been desensitised towards violence and thereby more motivated to carry out an attack (Pohl & Reed, 2017). The majority of domestic attacks perpetrated by foreign fighter returnees occur within one year of their return, with the average lag time between return and plot or arrest being less than six months for most returnees (Malet & Hayes, 2018). Monitoring returnees is particularly resource intensive, necessitating full time surveillance; Australian security

services estimate that the cost of monitoring just one returnee fighter a year would cost $8 million Australian dollars (Byman, 2016).

The current primary threat of a terrorist attack domestically is from an individual or small group using simple attack methodologies with readily available weapons, such as knives or vehicles, and which can be conducted in crowded places that have relatively low levels of security (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 2018). Moreover, the dissipation of one terrorist organisation simply creates a vacuum that can be filled by a succeeding group, and does not eradicate the ideologies that uphold such organisations. Indeed, there have been warnings that destroying Daesh's so-called 'caliphate' in Syria and Iraq could inspire overseas attacks, supporting the notion that violent extremism will not easily disappear once a terrorist organisation is eradicated (Nyst, 2018).

Victoria Police's officer in charge of counter-terrorism, Assistant Commissioner Ross Guenther, assesses the broad perception that Daesh's dissipation will lead to a decrease in the risk posed by the group as inaccurate (Le Grand, 2017). He argues that, if anything, counter-terrorism experts from the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of Australia, the United States, New Zealand, Canada and Britain are concerned that "the tempo will increase", and as individuals attempt to return across the borders from fighting with Daesh, the risk will escalate (Le Grand, 2017). Thus far, there have been no real issues with Daesh returnees in Australia; some have had their citizenship stripped, others have been imprisoned overseas, and many have been killed in conflict zones overseas. Nevertheless, understanding the mechanisms of radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in Australia is still an urgent and pressing problem.

Conclusion

ABS census data from 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 in this chapter has provided an insight into Australia's Muslim communities, who differ from the minority group of individuals in the data set that support a neojihadist ideology. The results arising from the case analysis in Chapter Five – which has an Islamic focus – cannot be generalised or applied to the wider Muslim population, as only a small selection of individuals from this population become involved in Islamist terrorism. This chapter has addressed the first subsidiary question of the thesis, providing a chronological overview of radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in Australia in the context of three waves which occurred between 2001 and 2018. Each wave presented new developments and ways of operating, and was significant in its own right. Daesh played a particularly influential role, especially in shaping the third wave of Islamist terrorism in Australia.

Chapter Three will outline the research methodologies employed in this thesis and provide details of the case analysis, social network analysis and case studies at the core of this thesis.

Chapter Three
Methodology

This thesis utilises two types of data to address its research objectives and central research question. The first is a quantitative analysis of relevant cases of Islamist terrorism, based predominantly on Australian trial documents and media reports, which comprises the analysis in Chapter Five. A further selection of these cases is also used to provide an in depth qualitative analysis about specific cases throughout the thesis. The thesis then returns to an additional examination of these cases in Chapter Six by utilising a social network analysis.

Drawing upon collected data relating to 194 Islamist terrorists from Australia, this thesis addresses the central research question: **In an Australian context, what has influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts?**

In doing so, a number of subsidiary questions are also considered:

1. What do we know about radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in an Australian context?
2. What are the primary motives which have influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists?
3. What does an analysis of Islamist terrorists in Australia reveal about them?
4. What influence have social and familial networks had on the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in Australia?

This chapter will outline the objectives of this research, considering how these were addressed and the methods of data collection utilised. Through a discussion of the

research methods, the challenges faced in this research – particularly in obtaining primary data – will be assessed. This will be followed by an explanation of the approach taken in conducting the case analysis and social network analysis, how the data was collected and how it was analysed.

Selection of research methods

This thesis employs a methodology which uses both qualitative and quantitative research. Qualitative research methods produce knowledge that mutually complements knowledge gained through quantitative research (Tewksbury, 2009), and a research process which uses both of these methods can be particularly beneficial in developing theoretical concepts (Pearce, 2002). In moving between the different types of data obtained, the researcher is able to draw on each of them to inform the process, specific questions and focus of the other, allowing for significant advances to be made and providing for a much more well-rounded understanding of a research topic or question (Pearce, 2002). DeWalt and DeWalt (2011) similarly posit that the most effective research involves the use of multiple methods, as this allows the researcher to investigate different aspects of the phenomena being studied and increases the likelihood of achieving accuracy and objectivity in the research.

Individually, both qualitative and quantitative research can be beneficial. Qualitative research has long been used in the study of criminal justice and criminology; it can provide a great depth of understanding of crime, criminals and the operation of the justice system, which results in knowledge that is informative, enhanced and rich (Tewksbury, 2009). A qualitative research methodology is fundamentally descriptive and inferential, with the benefit of allowing the researcher to "understand the meaning of what is going

on" by highlighting issues and presenting possible explanations for them (Gillham, 2010, p.10).

A benefit of utilising a qualitative research methodology is that it enables the researcher to "get under the skin" and "view the case from the inside out", thereby seeing things from the perspective of those involved (Gillham, 2010, p.11). Qualitative research also facilitates understanding of the meanings, traits and defining characteristics of events, people, interactions, settings or cultures, experiences, perceptions and processes (Tewksbury, 2009). This is particularly useful in this thesis, which examines the motivating factors that contributed to the radicalisation and involvement in terrorism of 194 individuals in Australia.

Quantitative research, meanwhile, is advantageous because it focuses on testing the strength and persistence of relationships between distinct measures, and is helpful when evaluating theories and testing whether they hold up under a variety of circumstances and instances (Tewksbury, 2009). Silke (2004) cogitates that quantitative research on terrorism is relatively rare, with most approaches heavily relying on a qualitative and journalistic methodology, which lacks the validity and reliability expected of social science research. Adopting elements of a quantitative research methodology in this thesis has allowed for an in-depth evaluation of Australian terrorists over an extended period of time, revealing the means by which they became radicalised and the factors which motivated them.

Utilising an approach that draws on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative research methods is advantageous, allowing for a contribution to the field of knowledge

through the collection of new data (Nelson, Wooditch & Gabbidon, 2014). Having been applied to this thesis, such a research methodology allowed for the production of a number of original contributions that add to the present body of scholarly work relating to radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in Australia.

Schuurman's (2018) review of terrorism research from 2007 to 2016 also identified a scarcity of statistical analyses, as the field has remained predominantly qualitative with the use of statistics remaining relatively low. In order to answer the central research question and related subsidiary questions, the use of a methodology which used both qualitative and quantitative research was deemed to be the most effective approach to address the shortcomings of terrorism research and make the most significant contribution to this field.

Case analysis

The original research in this thesis has three distinct parts: a case analysis, a social network analysis and a qualitative discussion of case studies. First, a quantitative case analysis of 194 Islamist terrorists from Australia, who engaged in a multitude of terrorist acts between 2001 and 2018 (either domestically or overseas), was conducted. These acts included:

- leaving Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas;
- conspiring to do or doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act;
- belonging to or being a member of a terrorist organisation;
- conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there;
- receiving, collecting, making or attempting to make funds available to a terrorist or terrorist organisation or to support incursions into a foreign state;
- providing or attempting to provide support, resources, goods or services to a terrorist organisation or to promote the commission of a terrorist offence;
- collecting, possessing or making documents connected with a terrorist act; and
- advocating terrorism.

The research design for the case analysis was longitudinal in nature, with cases analysed over a 17-year period. The inclusion criteria for this research was straightforward: individuals had to be Australian residents or citizens who had engaged in terrorist acts post 9/11 up to December 2018, either domestically or overseas. Within these parameters, 194 individuals were identified.[1] The 17-year period being analysed was selected on the basis that it represented an identifiable global peak in Islamist terrorist activity, and would facilitate an in-depth analysis of radicalisation in a post 9/11 context which was as current as possible.

As will be discussed in Chapter Five, a large number of these terrorist acts occurred outside Australia, after individuals had left the country to support a terrorist organisation overseas. In most of these cases, the terrorist act resulted in the perpetrator's death. By virtue of their status as Australian residents or citizens, these cases received widespread coverage in the Australian media. Despite the fact that many individuals were not formally charged with an offence, nor was there a warrant issued for their arrest, they still came to the attention of Australian authorities and were deemed relevant for this study,

[1] With regard to selection criteria for the data set relied upon throughout this thesis, it could not be legally established that all 194 individuals had engaged in terrorist acts. Whilst the empirical data indicates that they did so (see Appendix 2), some individuals left Australia or were killed and therefore were never charged with an offence. Thus, it is important to note that whilst individuals in the data set were identified as having engaged in terrorist acts, in the absence of a legal conviction the analysis of these individuals as part of this academic research has no legal bearing. Whilst these individuals were assumed to be involved in terrorism as they had come to the attention of authorities, this thesis makes no legal judgment as to their guilt or innocence. There remains an important distinction between an individual being identified by authorities as a terrorist (or involved in terrorist activities as defined by legislation) and actually having this legally established. Each of the cases included in the data set, both those that were dealt with formally through a legal process and those that were not, offer a clear picture of the networked nature of terrorism related activity in Australia. Specifically, this thesis considers radicalisation and terrorist activity that is significant enough to have come to the attention of law enforcement and that has been publicly reported. Indeed, it was significant enough that it has trickled into the public domain. Consequently, notwithstanding that not all cases included in the data set were processed through the legal system, had convictions recorded and sentencing outcomes made, these cases were included because they demonstrated the interconnectedness amongst the individuals in the data set which has been seen to transcend operational cells over a number of years.

which aims to gain an insight into the factors which influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in an Australian context who have engaged in terrorist acts.

Despite their involvement in the above-named activities – which encompass a range of federal offences under the *Criminal Code Act 1995* – many of the individuals in the data set were ultimately not charged, principally because they had left Australia to engage in terrorism overseas and died there. Despite not being charged, the individuals were deemed to have been radicalised based on their involvement in terrorist acts, and it was therefore appropriate to include them in the research.

It must be noted that the cases contained in the data set, whilst comprehensive, do not represent a complete list of Australian Islamist terrorists in the 17-year period being analysed. Legal and confidentiality issues surrounding the topic meant that not every case was publicised (in some cases, details were suppressed for national security reasons), and therefore the data contained in the case analysis only reflects information that was available in the public domain. Moreover, there are several case studies which other Australian terrorism researchers (see Mullins, 2011) have discussed in their research but which have been excluded in this thesis, because the terrorist in question did not satisfy the requirement of being an Australian resident or citizen to qualify for inclusion in the data set.

Willie Brigitte, for example, who was linked to Faheem Khalid Lodhi (#10) and who was deported from Australia for plotting a terrorist attack on a Sydney nuclear reactor, was excluded from the data set because he was neither a permanent Australian resident nor citizen (*Regina v Lodhi,* 2006; “Terror plotter Willie Brigitte”, 2012). The more recent

case of Momena Shoma, who stabbed a member of her host family several days after her arrival in Australia on a student visa, was similarly omitted as Shoma was not a permanent resident or citizen of this country (*The Queen v Shoma*, 2019).

The analysis of the 194 cases of Australian Islamist terrorists is discussed in Chapter Five and relates to a number of variables: the terrorist acts committed; the terrorist organisations which individuals were affiliated with or supported; age; gender; country of birth; immigrant generation; ethnicity; religion; education; mental health and criminal history. Before the data from the case analysis could be considered, it was compiled into a database which then formed the chronological table set out in Appendix 1. Employing a comprehensive chronological approach to understanding cases of radicalisation amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia ensured that assumptions and observations which may be based on other global contexts could be avoided. This method also allowed for an analysis of changes over time, as the period being examined spanned 17 years.

Obtaining the data for the case analysis was an exhaustive process. Initially, the cut off period that was determined to be considered for inclusion within the data set was 2016, coinciding with when the data was being collated by the researcher. However, as the project progressed, a number of new cases of Islamist terrorism in Australia emerged and so the end-date was extended to December 2018, thereby allowing for a more comprehensive and up to date analysis. As noted, the final sample contained 194 individuals.

Whilst the individuals identified up to 2016 had largely left Australia to join a conflict zone (where most subsequently died), many of those within the 2016 to 2018 period were

arrested across Australia for a number of terrorism related offences and have since been sentenced for their crimes. At the conclusion of this research, a number of individuals from this period were awaiting sentencing for their offending. As such, information about the individuals in the data set is necessarily incomplete. Data relating to all the criteria being examined as part of the case analysis was also not available for every individual in the data set. This was balanced out by the large number of individuals being investigated, which meant that despite this limitation, there was still a significant amount of data available for analysis.

The process of constructing the data set commenced by compiling a database of known Australians who had engaged in terrorist acts (either domestically or overseas). At this early commencement stage, the criteria being considered was age, gender, country of birth, ethnicity, education and religion. In the course of identifying these factors, information relating to a range of other variables was uncovered, and as the research progressed the benefits of considering these additional factors became evident. For example, a number of differing academic opinions arose throughout the literature review, such as the role of mental health, criminal history and relationships on radicalisation (see Crenshaw, 2000; Rae, 2012). Thus, it was deemed beneficial to add a number of extra elements to the case analysis, and this expanded to eventually include information about the arrival age of individuals in Australia (if born overseas), immigrant generation, mental health, criminal history, terrorist organisations affiliated with or supported, terrorist acts committed and relationships and children.

Information entered into the database was extracted from a number of resources. Australian legal information databases such as the Australasian Legal Information

Institute (AustLII) and BarNet Jade were used to access sentencing remarks from various Australian jurisdictions, and Google Scholar and academic libraries were used to access books and journal articles. These resources were the preferred search engines for data collection due to the credibility of information on them and their inclusion of primary source statements. Newspapers of record were also consulted as not all the cases identified went through a court and thus sentencing remarks were not always available.

Whilst open sources of information such as newspapers frequently omit details and are not always reliable and valid, Mullins (2011) argues that such drawbacks surrounding available data are outweighed by the potential benefits of conducting this kind of research, which significantly contributes to our understanding of terrorism. By consulting multiple sources of information, material about individuals in the data set could be verified to ensure accuracy in the data collated. Information that could not be verified across multiple sources was not included in the analysis.

As data was gathered, it was compiled into the table contained in Appendix 1. Once this was completed, IBM SPSS Statistics software was used to analyse and cross-tabulate the data. This included building charts (see Figures 5.1 to 5.7) which produced visual representations of individuals' support for terrorist organisations, age, country of birth, ethnicity, religion and education level. Doing so assisted in understanding how Islamist terrorism had changed over an extended period of time in Australia and highlighted changing trends, such as that the number of religious converts soared with the rise of Daesh in 2014. The frequencies function was also used to analyse data pertaining to terrorist acts, terrorist organisations, age, gender, immigrant generation, ethnicity, religion and education (see Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.5 to 5.7 as well as Tables 5.1 to 5.3, 5.5, 5.6,

5.8 to 5.10, 5.12 and 5.13). This allowed for an in-depth assessment of the characteristics of the 194 individuals contained in the data set.

A unique feature of the digital form of this thesis is that when specific cases from the data set are referenced, they are hyperlinked to that individual's entry in Appendix 1, allowing the reader to easily access further information about the person if they so choose by clicking on the number that appears next to the individual's name. This is their number in reference to their place in Appendix 1.

In the process of investigating the 194 individuals, it became apparent that the vast majority of them were linked to others in the data set by means of either familial or spousal connections. In addition to these associations, there were also numerous examples of social connections between individuals, and it was determined to be of benefit to visually map these to gain an insight into the links between different individuals in the data set. Doing so revealed just how significant such connections were, with clear evidence of multiple social and familial networks sustaining terrorism in Australia. The need to develop a comprehensive understanding of these networks thus led to the next stage of the research process.

Social network analysis

The second distinct part of this research is the social network analysis, which is contained in Chapter Six. Social network analysis refers to the study of social entities or actors, their interactions and relationships with one another and the way in which these interactions constitute patterns or structures that can be analysed (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994). Understanding these relationships, the conditions under which they were formed and their consequences are all key elements of social

network analysis (Freeman, 2004). Harris-Hogan (2012) proposes that at the core of social network analysis is the understanding that individuals are connected by complex albeit understandable relationships, and Chapter Six will set out examples of such relationships with reference to specific cases from the data set.

Social networks consist of a “finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them” (Wasserman & Faus, 1994, p.20), where individuals are reduced to nodes and their relationships to edges (Koschade, 2006). Social network analysis can be understood as a “mathematical method for ‘connecting the dots’ [which] allows us to map and measure complex, and sometimes covert, human groups and organizations” (Krebs, 2008).

Social network analysis aims to identify how groups of individuals operate and how they behave (Koschade, 2006). Rather than analysing individual behaviours, attitudes and beliefs, social network analysis considers social entities or actors interacting with one another, and how these interactions make up frameworks or structures which can be studied and analysed (Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994). For the purposes of this thesis, social network analysis was selected as a research method in order to illustrate the multiple connections amongst terrorist networks in Australia and identify the individuals who appeared the most influential amongst these networks.

There has already been much work done on social network analysis in an Australian context, with particular focus on smaller cells of Australian neojihadists (see Bright, Whelan & Harris-Hogan, 2018; Harris-Hogan, 2012; Harris-Hogan, 2013; Harris-Hogan, 2014; Harris-Hogan & Barrelle, 2018; Kelly & McCarthy-Jones, 2019; Koschade, 2006).

These works on social networks amongst Australian neojihadists have identified the integral influence that personal relationships have on the development of operational cells of Islamist terrorists. This thesis seeks to contribute to this body of knowledge by providing a broader picture of the connections amongst neojihadists in Australia by illustrating not only these smaller cells individually, but also how these cells were connected to one another over the 17-year period being studied.

There are a number of benefits of social network analysis: it allows for the identification of support structures and peripheral members of terrorist networks, as well as enabling for the mapping of the trajectories and dynamics of terrorist cells, networks and their peripheries (Harris-Hogan, 2013). This is especially important in this research, which investigates the impacts of social and familial networks on the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in Australia.

Social Network Visualizer software (also known as SocNetV) was used to create the social network maps set out in Chapter Six. This process commenced by first identifying the various connections and relationships between the 194 individuals in the data set. This was done by reviewing the literature available about each individual in the aforementioned sentencing remarks, books, journal articles, newspapers of record and other public sources of information. Initially, these connections were plotted on paper (because this was of great visual assistance) and were then mapped on SocNetV. Individuals for whom connections were identified were added as nodes through the software, with edges then inserted to represent the connections between them. The benefit of doing this was that it clearly identified the social structures which existed amongst neojihadist networks in Australia.

Eighty four percent of individuals (n=163) were identified as having a connection (or multiple connections) to others in the data set. Relationships between individuals broadly consisted of social and familial connections as well as via attendances at the same mosques or Islamic centres. These are represented in Figures 6.5 to 6.11.

Case studies

The third distinct part of this research relates to the case studies which are discussed thematically and qualitatively in detail throughout the thesis, and which provide an insight into the motives of individuals from the data set. For example, Chapter Four in particular – which examines ideological and personal motives behind radicalisation – discusses over 20 of these cases individually in the context of motives which fostered the radicalisation of the named individuals. One of the strengths of using this case study approach was the level of detail it provided into the rationales of individuals and what drove their involvement in Islamist terrorism.

The collection of primary data was a significant challenge when conducting this research. Due to ethical and legal constraints, it was not possible to gain access to convicted terrorists or those remanded in custody on terrorism charges to conduct interviews. Consequently, this thesis utilises secondary data. A long-standing criticism of terrorism research has been its overreliance on such data (Schuurman, 2018). In order to address this challenge and criticism, this thesis has (where possible) drawn on primary data in the form of interviews, surveillance material and the testimony of terrorism offenders contained in Australian trial documents and sentencing remarks.[2]

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[2] The researcher had the benefit of watching a number of trials of the offenders from Victoria in hearings that were open to the public and seeing some of them give evidence and be cross-examined in court. Research by observation is a legitimate data collection method (Kawulich, 2005). Although this was not incorporated here, it allowed for a greater understanding of processes surrounding the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offenders.

Such court documents have been an invaluable resource as they often contained excerpts of transcripts and surveillance material collected by organisations such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) as part of their investigations into Islamist terrorism in Australia, and which were recorded without the knowledge of the offenders. This was especially helpful, as classified material gathered from telephone intercepts and listening devices (such as those set out in the sentencing remarks) is rarely made publicly available (Lentini, 2011).

Not only is such information rare, but it is also particularly instrumental as it offers an insight into the mindsets and everyday behaviours of terrorists without after-the-fact rationalisations (Sageman, 2008b). Lentini's (2011) research on Operation Pendennis was highly insightful, as it contained transcripts of listening devices and telephone intercepts of the offenders which shed a light on their mindsets and motivations. For the purpose of this research – which considers what has influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts in an Australian context – this source of data has been particularly useful in addressing a limitation of this research, namely accessing the stated motives of terrorists, as it was not possible to interview convicted offenders.

Ethical issues

This project has ethical approval. However, as all the data obtained was sourced from publicly available documents and the names of individuals in the case analysis were already in the public domain, there was no ethical issues to address.

Conclusion

The use of both qualitative and quantitative research methods in this thesis has allowed for the construction of the three distinct pieces of original research to add to the current

body of scholarly work on radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in Australia. The large sample size and the up to date nature of the data fills gaps in other existing literature on these topics. Additionally, the use of both qualitative and quantitative research approaches allowed for a broad and deep analysis of the research area that is not currently replicated in the existing literature.

In addressing the central research question, the case analysis, social network analysis and case studies emphasise the importance of ideological motives and social and familial networks in the process of radicalisation, whilst also revealing a number of important findings about the characteristics of Islamist terrorists in Australia. The use of court documents, which contain excerpts of transcripts and surveillance material that would not otherwise be possible to access, has been particularly helpful in conducting this research. Moreover, it has helped address a research gap in current terrorism studies, which often fail to consider why individuals are motivated to do certain things, and result in scholars often looking to external factors or influences to find alternative explanations. The commentary and excerpts contained in court documents are an effective source of evidence which allow us to better understand the motives of individuals who have engaged in terrorist acts.

Chapter Four will consider the primary motives which have influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists, both globally, as well as specifically in an Australian context. Ideological motives in particular will be analysed, as these have played an instrumental role in driving the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists.

Chapter Four
Motives

There is no single motive or reason why individuals become radicalised. Rather, it is when several factors converge that the conditions under which radicalisation can occur are created (HM Government, 2018). In addressing the second subsidiary question of this thesis – **What are the primary motives which have influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists?** – this chapter will analyse the motives which drove the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists globally, as well as specifically in an Australian context. Such an analysis highlights that there is no single pathway to radicalisation, with terrorists being driven by a variety of complex social, psychological, ideological, religious and political motives (Bjørgo, 2011; Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014; HM Government, 2018; Vaisman-Tzachor, 2007).

Multiple factors can influence the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists, such as the influence of other individuals in a person's social networks, experiences of discrimination, segregation and alienation and the search for purpose and a desire to increase credibility or sense of belonging (Bizina & Gray, 2014; Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014; HM Government, 2018). Most individuals that experience these factors do not become involved in terrorism, because protective factors such as familial obligations and an absence of terrorist contacts prevent them from doing so (HM Government, 2018).

However, as Chapter Six will illustrate, the individuals in the data set *did* overwhelmingly establish such connections with one another. Moreover, in the majority of cases, their familial obligations failed to act as a protective factor against their involvement in

terrorism. In Chapter Six it will be emphasised that social and familial networks play a critical role in the radicalisation process. When such networks are combined with the ideological motives discussed in this chapter, they serve as the transformative element which drives the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists.

To develop an understanding of the motives of Australian Islamist terrorists in particular, this chapter will utilise a number of qualitative case studies. Reliance is placed on court documents, which contain excerpts of transcripts, evidence given by offenders at trial and surveillance material, to provide an insight into the motives of a number of individuals from the data set. The use of qualitative case studies throughout this chapter offers an insight into the perspectives and experiences of these individuals. This is important as it adds to the body of knowledge about the motivational factors which influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in an Australian context.

The motives explored in this chapter include the narrative utilised by many Islamist terrorists to justify their actions: that they are religiously sanctioned and obligated to engage in violent jihad against what they perceive to be the enemies of Islam. Furthermore, through an analysis of 9/11, the 'war on terror' and Western military involvement in Syria and Iraq, this chapter will analyse the perceived 'war on Islam'. As will be demonstrated, Islamist terrorists consider themselves to be justified in seeking retribution for such acts which they believe to be repressive, unjust and humiliating. Identification with victims in conflict zones also functions as a powerful motive which can facilitate radicalisation, and will also be considered here. This chapter will also assess identity and belonging, status and meaning, gender perspectives and socio-economic considerations as drivers of radicalisation.

The ‘war on Islam’ and the ‘war on terror’

Australia was legitimised as a target amongst Islamist terrorists following their construction of the narrative that Australian ties to and support for United States military action in Iraq and Afghanistan equated to support for the Western ‘war on Islam’ (Zammit, 2010). In order to radicalise and recruit vulnerable Muslim youth in the West to their cause, terrorist organisations frequently draw on the idea that Islam is “under attack” (Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014, p.17). This is done through the depiction of a vast global war on Islam, in which Muslims are being attacked by both the ‘near enemy’, such as apostate regimes, and the ‘far enemy’, such as the West (Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014).

The ‘war on terror’ – declared by former United States President George W. Bush in response to the 9/11 attacks – became central to the idea that Islam was under attack. The lasting impacts of 9/11 – which culminated in the deaths of nearly 3,000 people on the day of the attack and afterwards due to ongoing injuries, and thousands more dying or wounded fighting terrorism in the years since – are still evident almost two decades later (Law, 2016; Sekulow, 2014).

In the United States, 9/11 became a collective experience of trauma and loss that was projected onto the rest of the world (Tuathail, 2003). A poll by the Ipsos-Reid research company of 500 American adults nationwide conducted on the night of the attacks found that 74 percent viewed the attacks as “a turning point that [would] fundamentally change things forever” (Tuathail, 2003, p.859). This would certainly prove to be true; the events of 11 September 2001 represented a pivotal moment, whereby the world was divided into various binaries: ‘civilisation’ and ‘freedom’ versus ‘evildoers’ and ‘terrorists’, and ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ (Tuathail, 2003).

Said to represent a new kind of war, the perpetrators of 9/11 were portrayed as illusive and global, rather than part of a clearly defined group of violent Saudi dissidents (Tuathail, 2003). Bush asserted that the perpetrators were operating across over 60 different countries and comprised a "shadowy transnational terror network" whose attacks represented a declaration of war against the United States, capitalism, Western civilisation and freedom (Bush, 2001; Tuathail, 2003, p.865). He proclaimed that whilst the war began with al-Qaeda, it would only end when "every terrorist group of global reach [had] been found, stopped and defeated" (Bush, 2001, p.68).

In addition to reprisals from the United States for 9/11 contributing to the perception of a war waged against Islam, they have also been framed as being part of a war between 'good' and 'evil', and 'believers' and 'infidels' (Walsh, 2016). The American response to 9/11 has proven counter-productive for global security with the benefit of hindsight; instances of torture and prisoner abuse by the United States, drone strikes and the incursion into Iraq by the United States and its allies (including Australia) in 2003 all "breathed new life" into terrorist organisations (Byman & Pollack, 2008, p.56), affirming their claims of Western imperialism and assisting in the sustenance of the insurgency (Boggs & Pollard, 2016).

A 2006 United States National Intelligence Estimate found that the incursion into Iraq became the "cause celebre" for Islamist terrorists:

> … breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006, p.5).

The perception amongst some Muslims that global conflicts are part of a larger war against Islam by non-believers has the effect of dividing people susceptible to this message into camps of believers and non-believers with “no in between” – propagating the message that “you are either with us or against us” (Hoyle, Bradford & Frenett, 2015, p.11). Byman and Pollack (2008) assess that, united in the belief that American intervention in Iraq represented an attack on Islam and an attempt to subjugate a powerful Arab state, some Muslim communities globally perceived the Iraq struggle as justification for violent jihad. The presence of American troops occupying a historic centre of the Arab heartland inspired a large number of Muslims to travel to Iraq to kill Americans and their allies, effectively boosting al-Qaeda’s efforts to recruit new followers from around the world (Byman & Pollack, 2008).

This was further supported by Islamist terrorists demonising everyone else in a way that legitimised the use of violence in ‘self-defence’ (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). In the years since the incursion into Iraq, the actions of the United States government – and, by association, the actions of allies such as Australia – have served as a key motivational factor for radicalisation. Ramachandra (2008, p.32) proposes that everything that has occurred since the attacks has “reinforced the sense among Muslims of being under siege”. This is because when individuals experience mistrust, discrimination and Islamophobia, the idea of Western opposition to Islam is validated, which can then amplify the tensions that terrorist organisations depend on and which can facilitate radicalisation (Walsh, 2016).

To explain contemporary neojihadism, Sageman (2007; 2008c), proposes that the process of radicalisation consists of a four ‘prong’ process encompassing moral outrage,

interpretation, resonance with personal experience and mobilisation by networks. In the context of the moral outrage experienced in the first prong of his model, Sageman (2007) postulates that the major source of this outrage prior to 2003 was the killings of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir and the second Palestinian intifada. Post-2003, Sageman (2007) suggests that it was the Iraq War which fuelled the process of radicalisation.

A common interpretation of such aforementioned global moral violations is their perception amongst terrorists that they represent a unified Western global strategy – namely a “war against Islam” (Sageman, 2007, p.2). Sageman (2008c) argues that when frustrations are interpreted in the context of violations being attributable to a unified Western strategy – such as the United States led and alliance supported Iraq War – then moral outrage can lead to individuals supporting terrorism.

These perceived violations can also lead to resonance with personal experience, which influences some young Muslims to become angry and express their frustration on the Internet (Sageman, 2007). Sageman (2007) argues that the Internet increasingly aids mobilisation by networks, offering young people in particular support and validation online, promoting the image of terrorist heroes, linking individuals to the virtual social movement, giving them guidance and instructing them in tactics (Sageman, 2007). The role of the Internet and social media as echo chambers is discussed further in Chapter Six.

The perception of a war against Islam also serves to increase the number of young people in particular that are susceptible to radicalisation, as they begin to view themselves as the only ones that can defend Muslim interests and honour against the cultural and physical

aggression of the West (Sageman, 2008a). Sageman (2008a) proposes that such young people consider themselves to be part of a special vanguard intent on creating a utopic world in the name of a cause, which they are willing to sacrifice themselves for.

Terrorist organisations such as Daesh "thrive" whenever Western countries show any signs of discrimination or stigmatisation of Muslims, which can lead to some Muslims withdrawing from society and engaging with radical groups (Ansari, 2016). For example, the effect of laws banning burkinis, burqas and niqabs in France meant that many Muslims felt marginalised and unwelcome, which in turn impacted their ability and willingness to integrate into society (Ansari, 2016). In contrast, regions controlled by Daesh at the height of their power held appeal due to their depiction as utopic "safe haven[s]" for these women (Saltman & Smith, 2015, p.14).

Membership of a minority ethnicity and/or religion in and of itself tends to naturally foster a sense of 'otherness', especially for women wearing religious garments as a symbol of their faith (O'Neill et al., 2015; Saltman & Smith, 2015; Sauer, 2009). When such women experience additional discrimination and persecution, this can fuel feelings of isolation from the community or society in which they live (Saltman & Smith, 2015). Such an approach furthers the disparity between the 'other' group, and when individuals demonstrate certain religious beliefs in an overt manner – such as by wearing religious garments – they become tangible targets.

What started with a 'war on terror' and then grew into a 'war on Islam' has now seemingly developed into a war on otherness, evinced by the actions and attitudes of a number of politicians towards immigrants and any 'other' group in society. Examples of

such ‘othering’ include Donald Trump’s ban on travel from several predominantly Muslim countries (Liptak & Shear, 2018) and comments by Australian immigration minister, Peter Dutton, about the threat posed to Australians by “illiterate and innumerate” refugees (Bourke, 2016).

The continued perpetuation of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ narrative by world leaders may go some way in explaining why scores of young people who were only infants at the time of 9/11 (refer to Table 5.5 for data in an Australian context) have grown up to identify with neojihadist ideology almost two decades after the attacks.

Impacts of the ‘war on Islam’ in an Australian context

As noted, the ‘war on terror’ has come to be perceived by some within the Muslim diaspora as a ‘war on Islam’ (Al-Lami, 2008), and individuals from the data set frequently referenced the so-called war on Islam as a justified response which motivated them to engage in a terrorist act. Western intervention in the Middle East was also regularly cited as influencing their radicalisation. For example, Sulayman Khalid (#151) – who was convicted of conspiring with a number of other individuals from the data set to do acts in preparation for a terrorist act or acts – stated that:

> … the Australian government … need to stop … they need to leave our countries … stop killing and butchering the Muslims when you come to our countries. … if they’re going to leave their troops in Iraq … then something’s going to happen here [in Australia] (Brockie, 2014).

Khalid opined that as a consequence of military intervention overseas, the Australian government was effectively fostering radicalisation (Brockie, 2014). Together with his co-offenders, he considered that Islam was under attack both in the Middle East and in Australia, and that individuals were therefore permitted to pursue violent jihad in response (*R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017). Khalid argued that:

> Yous [sic] come to our lands and yous [sic] bomb and rape and kill. And butcher … the Muslims. … yous [sic] take over, and then yous [sic] calls [sic] the Muslims terrorists (*R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017, p.14).

As noted at the commencement of this chapter, multiple factors can influence radicalisation, and when ideological motives are combined with social networks, they serve as the transformative element which drives the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists. Throughout the data set there was evidence of this overlap of ideological motives with social factors. For instance, Sevdet Ramadan Besim (#137) – who was convicted of doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act – exhibited signs of being ideologically motivated to engage in terrorist acts, however he was also "stirred into such action" following the death of his friend, Abdul Numan Haider (#102) (*R v Besim*, 2016, p.2).

Besim sought to "fight [the] enemies of Allah", such as world leaders who had "declared war on Islam and Muslims" and were "invading lands, dividing us into separate nations, installing puppets, [and] killing and torturing Muslims" (*R v Besim*, 2016, pp.17, 25). Besim sought to undermine the authority of the government and "to strike fear into the hearts of the community" by planning to kill and behead a police officer on ANZAC Day in a public setting (*R v Besim*, 2016, p.29). Besim further sought to:

> … establish [his] jihad in Australia, to fight the oppressors, those who have implemented man made law, to fight to make Allah's word known and … to defend Islam and put fear into those who are enemies to Allah and his religion (*R v Besim*, 2016, p.25).

Abdul Nacer Benbrika (#17) – who was convicted of directing the activities of a terrorist organisation, being a member of a terrorist organisation and being in possession of a thing connected with a terrorist act – together with his co-offenders likewise sought to destroy buildings and kill people "in the cause of jihad" (*R v Benbrika*, 2009, p.9). The intention

of this was to coerce the Australian government into leaving the American alliance and withdrawing forces from Iraq, as Benbrika considered the presence of the troops to be oppressive to Muslims and the Islamic faith (*R v Benbrika*, 2009). Tamim Sahil Khaja (#161) – who was convicted of doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act – was similarly motivated to weaken the Australian government and spill "a lot of blood" for the sake of Allah, in retaliation for perceived wrongs done to Muslims, claiming "they've killed ours we will kill theirs" (*R v Khaja*, 2018, pp.9, 16).

The significance of such narratives is that they motivate individuals seeking to protect Islam against the war that they believe is being waged against it by the West, which can accelerate the process of radicalisation (Al-Lami, 2008; Perešin, 2015). Under the guise of a patriotic or ideological rhetoric, individuals claim their actions to be morally legitimate and a necessary defensive response to what they perceive to be Western attempts to control the Muslim world (Maile et al., 2010). As the aforementioned cases exemplify, a number of Islamist terrorists in Australia used this ideological narrative as a defence for their attempts to perpetrate acts of terrorism domestically, particularly in the name of jihad.

The pursuit of violent jihad

'Jihad' is a concept with theological roots which can be summarised as a "constant effort on behalf of Allah" (Phares, 2007, p.34). The literal meaning of the term jihad is to 'exert', 'strive' and 'struggle' (Shah, 2013). In Islamic tradition, there are two main types of jihad: the first is greater jihad, which refers to a process of self-purification (Shah, 2013). In this context, jihad refers to:

> … the promotion of Islam by non-violent means; the seeking of perfection in one's own moral life and relationship with Allah; [and] the diligent attention to one's religious and familial duties (*R v Benbrika*, 2009, p.8).

The second type is lesser jihad, which entails a struggle for self-defence, which can be carried out by tongue, pen or sword (Shah, 2013).[1] The premise of the religious dynamic advanced by terrorist organisations is that the West is the historical and irrevocable enemy of Muslims worldwide and can only be defeated by means of violent jihad (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009).

When it comes to the use of force, there are two theories of lesser jihad: the defensive and offensive. The defensive theory has a clear basis in the Qur'an and argues that:

> the use of force is allowed in self-defence; defending Muslims who are oppressed but unable to defend themselves; using force to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and allowing a Muslim ruler to use force against rebellion (Shah, 2013, p.346).

The offensive theory – which has been heavily influenced and espoused in the twentieth century by Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb – is not supported in the Qur'an (which provides rules for propagating Islam without the use of force), as their interpretation goes against the Quranic code of armed conflict based on the principle of neutrality (Shah, 2013).

As the cases cited below demonstrate, a vast majority of individuals from the data set favoured the interpretation of lesser jihad, believing jihad to solely refer to a violent struggle against the enemies of Islam, or the 'kuffar', in furtherance of Islam (*R v Benbrika*, 2009; *R v Khaja*, 2018; *R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017). Associate Professor Roger Shanahan, an expert in Arabic and Islamic studies who provided expert evidence in the terrorism trials of Omar Al-Kutobi (#130) and Mohammad Kiad (#131) – who were

[1] See Shah (2013) for a discussion of Quranic verses related to jihad.

both sentenced for conspiring to commit an act or acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act – describes that a key element of this belief about jihad is:

> … the need to fight [the] oppression of Muslims wherever they are in the world. [Its] simple message [is] that the best way to end the oppression of Muslims is to fight their oppressors. In the jihadi worldview the oppressors are the West or governments or groups sympathetic to, or supported by the West (*R v Al-Kutobi*, 2016, p.5).

There was a recurring motive throughout the data set, whereby multiple individuals sought to advance a religious cause – namely the pursuit of violent jihad – the intention of which was to coerce or influence a government or governments and/or to intimidate the public or a section of the public (*Regina v Lodhi*, 2006; *R v Abbas*, 2018; *R v Besim*, 2016; *R v Fattal,* 2011; *R v Kent*, 2009; *R v Khazaal*, 2009). The significance of this was the inherent belief of these individuals that they were acting in the name of a higher cause and that they were divinely permitted (if not obligated) to kill and intimidate non-Muslims in order to achieve Islamic domination under Sharia law, in place of a democratic constitutional government (*R v Khaja*, 2018).

Individuals in the data set consistently drew on this narrative of having a religious obligation to engage in violent jihad, and frequently cited religious texts to justify this view. It is important to understand these motives if we are to understand the people driven by them; evidently, when compelled by these sanctified goals, such individuals are unwilling to accept alternative worldviews that oppose such acts. For example, Wissam Haddad (#127) – who ran the al-Risalah Islamic Centre in Sydney prior to its closure in 2014 and whose house was targeted in a counter-terrorism raid which uncovered weapons, a Daesh flag, a large number of extremist DVDs, newspaper clippings and a machete – claimed that:

> [I]n Islam … we have to go back to the Qur'an and to the Sunnah [which] say that this fight is legitimate [so] I see nothing wrong with a Muslim going to do what his religion tells him to do (Brockie, 2014).

Abdul Salam Mahmoud (#133) – a Daesh supporter who left Australia to engage in the conflict in Syria and was subsequently killed there – echoed this sentiment, asserting that:

> In Islam we're obligated. Wherever our people have been harmed or been repressed it's an obligation to us to go and help them and fight tyranny and to fight oppression (Brockie, 2014).

Jibryl Almaouie (#154), Isaac Majzoub (#152), Mohamed Almaouie (#157) and Farhad Said (#169) (who were all sentenced in 2017 for conspiring to do acts in preparation for a terrorist act or acts with Sulayman Khalid (#151)) also adhered to an ideology of violent jihad, believing that they were religiously obligated to engage in violence "to advance what they considered to be the interests of Islam" (*R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017, p.12). Moreover, they perceived jihad to be a religious duty commanded by Allah on every Muslim (*R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017). Khalid voiced support for Daesh, claiming that the group was "following the Qur'an and Sunnah to the best of their ability" and that they sought to bring "justice, peace and humanitarian aid to the people", which was an obligation upon Muslims (Brockie, 2014). Together, Khalid and his co-offenders sought to carry out a terrorist attack in the name of violent jihad, intended to intimidate the Australian government and public (*R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017).

Tamim Sahil Khaja (#161) similarly considered jihad to be an obligation that must be "fulfilled wherever you are" and that he was bound by the militant instructions contained in the Qur'an (*R v Khaja*, 2018, p.12). Like Khalid, Khaja expressed the belief that Daesh's war-making was supported by the Qur'an and that Muslims were religiously

obligated to carry out violent attacks upon unbelievers, as they were dictated to do so by Allah through revelations recorded in the Qur'an (*R v Khaja*, 2018).

Raban Alou (#147) – who was sentenced for the offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a terrorist act by Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad (#146) – was motivated by the perceived advancement of his neojihadist beliefs (*R v Alou*, 2018). Alou spoke of the teachings of a thirteenth to fourteenth century Islamic scholar – Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (considered by many Islamist terrorist groups to be a significant intellectual source) – as rendering Mohammad's killing of police accountant Curtis Cheng permissible and justified because "we are in dark times" (*R v Alou*, 2018, p.30). Alou also spoke of a fatwa issued by a sheikh relating to the "blood of the Kaffir", claiming that:

> … jihad's everywhere. All around the world. … Middle [E]ast or not Middle East. … Allah ordered it in a lot of [Quranic verses] … in the Prophet's … times it was [compulsory] (*R v Alou*, 2018, p.30).

In an assessment conducted over three years following his arrest in 2015, Alou maintained his view that "jihad was a central aspect of Islam and that to deny this would be to practice an incomplete version of the religion" (*R v Alou*, 2018, p.40). Furthermore, he continued to embrace the need for violent jihad and refused to abandon his extremist beliefs, appearing to equate a re-evaluation of his actions with renunciation of his spiritual beliefs (*R v Alou*, 2018).

Sevdet Ramadan Besim (#137) believed that violent jihad against all non-Muslims was justifiable, and he admired terrorist organisations such as Daesh and al-Qaeda who he believed "spoke out boldly for Muslims", which culminated in him making a pledge of

allegiance to the leader of Daesh (*DPP (Cth) v Besim*, 2017; *R v Besim*, 2016, p.7). Omar Al-Kutobi (#130) and Mohammad Kiad (#131) also pledged allegiance to the leader of Daesh. This is a significant action, as it results in the person pledging:

> … [to feel] that they are allowed, and even duty bound, to attack targets in blasphemous countries, a description which includes Australia. They believe that in so doing they would be acting in accordance with God's will (*R v Al-Kutobi*, 2016, p.8).

Al-Kutobi and Kiad held certain shared beliefs about the Islamic faith, which included that Islam, globally, was under attack and that they had a religious obligation to come to the defence of Islam and other Muslims (*R v Al-Kutobi*, 2016). Both individuals believed that this religious obligation could be legitimately fulfilled by means of jihad (*R v Al-Kutobi*, 2016).

Ibrahim Abbas (#177) – who was convicted of conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act – believed that the jihad being waged by Daesh in Syria and Iraq was "fully legitimate", and he sought to carry out a terrorist attack in Australia because "Australia kills and bombs Muslims overseas regardless of age, gender, whatever" (*R v Abbas*, 2018, pp.2, 5). In seeking to cause as much "chaos, destruction, fear [and] bloodshed" as possible, Abbas described feeling proud – like he was "doing something honourable" (*R v Abbas*, 2018, pp.23-24).

Abdul Nacer Benbrika (#17) believed that violent jihad was authorised by the Qur'an and was an integral aspect of his religious obligations, and as a result he formed and directed two terrorist cells in Melbourne and Sydney to engage in violent jihad (*R v Benbrika*, 2009). Due to its military presence in Iraq, Benbrika considered Australia to be "a land of war" and used this as justification for the use of violent jihad in response (*R v Benbrika*,

2009, p.9). He considered the destruction of 'kuffar' or 'unbelievers' to be an essential aspect of the Islamic faith, and discussed in great length the necessity of engaging in jihad for the Islamic cause (*R v Benbrika*, 2009).

Like Benbrika, the offenders in his terror cells willingly and fully embraced the belief that it was their religious obligation as devout Muslims to come to the defence of Islam and other Muslims overseas by preparing for violent jihad in Australia (*Elomar v R*, 2014). Benbrika even instructed his co-offenders about "the permissibility of killing the innocents", stating that there were even "jihadi rules" which justified the killing of women and the elderly (*R v Benbrika*, 2009, p.55).

The Qur'an provides express rules on living in peace with non-Muslims (Shah, 2013), however Benbrika and the members of his cells considered it a necessity to engage in violent jihad due to their belief that Australia had violated a non-aggression treaty with Muslims in the country:

> Their understanding [was] that Australia's participation in [the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq] violated what they considered to be a treaty with Muslims, which prohibits Muslims from engaging in violence against the state in which they reside or which provides them safety (Lentini, 2011, p.4).

Benbrika used this belief to justify his attempts to engage in what he considered to be a legitimate and compulsory jihad in Australia (Lentini, 2011). His interpretation of the treaty is important, because the perceived violation of it resulted not only in feelings of outrage, but also constituted the enabling factor for the Benbrika cells to prepare to engage in violence against Australians domestically (Lentini, 2011). Moreover, Benbrika's views on matters such as jihad would often vary from those of mainstream clerics, who opposed terrorist activity being conducted in Australia (Lentini, 2013). In

fact, Benbrika deliberately deceived his followers about their obligation and “right” as Muslims to engage in violence by distorting his teachings in line with his interpretations (Lentini, 2013, p.122).

Gaining this insight into Benbrika’s teachings is important; Lentini (2011) emphasises the need for analysts to develop better understandings of how individuals begin their paths towards violence. When people rely on self-styled individuals such as Benbrika – who are not schooled or certified clerics and whose theology is largely acquired through independent learning (Lentini, 2013) – they can be presented with a distorted ideology that is at variance with the true religious principles they claim to be upholding.

Humiliation

Another consequence of the perceived war against Islam, which has also played a significant motivational role for many terrorists, is the experience of humiliation. Gilligan (2017) assesses experiences of ‘narcissistic injuries’ – such as feelings of humiliation, shame, being disrespected, dishonoured, slighted, ridiculed, rejected, insulted or treated as inferior – as being central to the aetiology of violence. The fundamental affective motive for violent behaviour is to eliminate such feelings and replace them with their opposite feelings of pride and honour, by injuring others and transferring one’s own shame and dishonour on to them (Gilligan, 2017).

There is consensus amongst researchers that humiliation motivates individuals seeking to restore dignity for themselves and the groups to which they belong, by in turn humiliating their enemies through violence (Cirincione et al., 2004; Stern, 2003). In his first public statement after 9/11, bin Laden exemplified this, stating:

> What America is tasting now, is something insignificant compared to what we have tasted for scores of years. Our nation (the Islamic world) has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation for more than 80 years ("Text: Bin Laden's statement", 2001).

Sarraj (2002), a Palestinian psychiatrist who founded the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights, concurred about how experiences of humiliation functioned as a motive for suicide bombers:

> What propels … Palestinian men, and now women, [to blow] themselves up in Israeli restaurants and buses … is a long history of humiliation and a desire for revenge that every Arab harbors. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the resultant uprooting of Palestinians, a deep-seated feeling of shame has taken root in the Arab psyche. Shame is the most painful emotion in the Arab culture, producing the feeling that one is unworthy to live. The honorable Arab is the one who refuses to suffer shame and dies in dignity.

Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of Daesh, proclaimed to followers that committing terrorist acts on behalf of the organisation was empowering, as terrorism equates to the refusal of "humiliation, subjugation, and subordination" (Juergensmeyer, 2017, p.230). The political head of the Hamas movement similarly argued that to die through suicide bombings is "better than to die daily in frustration and humiliation", and that religion and violence were the antidotes to shame (Juergensmeyer, 2017, p.231).

Experiencing shame and humiliation can also cause people to feel a loss of self-worth (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). Hogg and Adelman (2013) argue that when individuals lack such a sense of self-worth and identity, they are more inclined to identify with extreme groups. Uncertainty-identity theory, advanced by Hogg, Adelman and Blagg (2010), describes how people are motivated to reduce feelings of self-uncertainty, and effectively do so by identifying with groups. 'Extreme' groups such as terrorist organisations can be particularly appealing, by furnishing members with "an all-embracing, rigidly defined,

exclusive, and highly prescriptive social identity and sense of self, [and] a comforting sense of certainty in an uncertain world" (Hogg, Adelman & Blagg, 2010, p.75).

The incursion into Iraq is often referred to as a major cause of Muslim experiences of "humiliation by proxy" (Khosrokhavar, 2005, p.157), which has been cited as a driving factor for radicalisation (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). As discussed above, conflicts in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan are perceived by some Muslims as Western crusades against Islam and Muslims (Al-Lami, 2008). Subsequent humiliations and torture that have occurred at the hands of American soldiers in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay prisons have likewise been inflammatory and resulted in the experience of humiliation by proxy (Khosrokhavar, 2005; Sageman, 2008c; Stern & Wiener, 2006). As a consequence, there has been increased support for terrorist networks and an increase in recruitment, with Western Muslims identifying with the perceived suffering of the worldwide Muslim 'ummah' (Harrow, 2010).

In an Australian context, humiliation by proxy (particularly in response to Western incursions into Iraq and Afghanistan) was also evident amongst the individuals in the data set. For instance, Khaled Sharrouf (#38) possessed a plethora of material calling on Muslims to repel the "invaders" of their countries (*Regina (Cth) v Sharrouf*, 2009, p.6). Mehmet Biber (#67), meanwhile, considered radicalisation and hate to be a natural response to 9/11, which he deemed to be an "invasion of a whole nation" (*R v Biber*, 2018, p.13).

The frustration-aggression hypothesis advanced by Dollard et al. (1939) posits that frustration is a precondition of aggressive behaviour, and that the existence of frustration

always leads to aggression. According to this hypothesis, violence occurs in response to oppression, and when an individual finds their ambitions blocked they can react either by flight (repression) or fight (violence) (Horgan, 2003). The hypothesis also holds that when subjected to humiliation, individuals will consequently want to achieve revenge, and terrorism can be the means through which they choose to do so (Khosrokhavar, 2006, cited in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008).

Victimisation and identification with the Muslim community

Experiences of humiliation can also evoke feelings of victimisation. Norman (2016) uses the term 'jihadist complex' to refer to feelings of actual or perceived victimisation by a party against which there should be revenge, retaliation or retribution which is justified on ideological and religious grounds. In the development of a jihadist complex amongst youth, there are many contributing environmental factors involved in the heightening of awareness, such as the realisation of disillusionment, experiencing depression and aggressive anti-establishment behaviour, and subsequently accepting Islamist ideology (Norman, 2016).

Sometimes terrorist organisations will adopt somebody else's grievances and appoint themselves champions of a cause other than their own (Schmid, 2013). In adopting these "vicarious grievances", they identify with the fate of a constituency and act on its behalf (Schmid, 2013, p.26). A culture of humiliation can then enhance radicalisation and allow terrorism to thrive (Schmid, 2013). This was evident on an individual level in the case of Jake Bilardi (#98), who died in a suicide bombing after driving a bomb-packed car into an Iraqi army outpost in Ramadi (Brown, 2015). As he was becoming radicalised, Bilardi adopted the grievances of people in Iraq, stating:

> I saw the foreign troops burning villages, raping local women and girls, rounding up innocent young men as suspected terrorists and sending them overseas for torture, gunning down women, children and the elderly in the streets and indiscriminately firing missiles from their jets (Stapleton, 2015, p.125).

People who have been victimised tend to seek retribution against the individuals or groups they hold responsible for their victimisation (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009). Victimisation also tends to heighten perceptions of marginalisation, resulting in distrust towards state agencies within the criminal justice system, such as the police and defence forces (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009). Numerous cases involving the indiscriminate killing of innocent and unarmed civilians by terrorists have been staged as a means of retaliation against a perceived harm or previous injury or detention, and the political oppression of or discrimination against Muslim minorities (Williams & Head, 2006).

The perpetrators of the 2005 London bombings, for example, justified their terrorist attacks as being a show of opposition to British foreign policy that was engaging in a war against Muslims internationally (Humphrey, 2007). The perpetrators of the 2004 commuter train bombings in Madrid similarly wanted to punish the Spanish government for having being involved in the deployment of troops to Iraq (Nesser, 2006). Osama bin Laden also frequently invoked a sense of Muslim victimisation by drawing on grievances and frustrations to justify actions taken against what he believed to be the enemies of Islam (Charters, 2007). In his 1996 'Declaration of War', bin Laden stated that:

> [t]he people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity, and injustice … the Muslims' blood … was spilled … the world watches and hears, and not only didn't respond to these atrocities, but also, with a clear conspiracy between the United States and its allies and under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves (Rubin & Rubin, 2002, p.137).

In a videotape released following the 2002 Bali bombing, bin Laden again drew on the theme of injustice and victimisation by questioning:

> [w]hy should fear, killing, destruction, displacement, orphaning and widowing continue to be our lot, while security, stability and happiness be your lot? This is unfair. It is time that we get even ("Full text: 'Bin Laden's message'", 2002).

Hutson, Long and Page (2009) argue that if an individual perceives their victimisation to be due to them being Muslim, then Islam is likely to play a role in their response to their victimisation, whether it be radical, violent or otherwise. For many terrorists it is this ideological prism through which Islam legitimises violence, even if that violence is aimed at other Muslims (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009). Indeed, there was evidence of this throughout the data set. For example, Daesh depicted Shia Muslims as "heretics" (Cockburn, 2015, p.102) that were repressive to the rights of Sunni Muslims and could thus be justified as legitimate targets for mass casualty attacks (Lister, 2015). MHK (#139) – who was convicted of doing an act in preparation for or planning a terrorist act – accepted Daesh's message on this topic and promoted the view that Sunni Muslims were being victimised by Shia Muslims and the West (*DPP (Cth) v MHK*, 2017).

His posts on social media conveyed his hatred for both non-Muslims and those Muslims he considered to be apostates, with him writing:

> Shias might look like humans but don't be fooled. They are animals that learnt how to talk. They are the scum of the earth. They're nothing more than cockroaches who are using up the resources on earth. The next time you see one slap him across the head (*R v MHK*, 2016, p.7).

Ibrahim Abbas (#177) also noted this as a motive in his planning for a terrorist attack, stating:

> Australia is attacking Muslims [and] not distinguishing [between] innocent people, old people, young people, male or female. … This act of terrorism on my

> people makes legitimate that civilians of Australia deserve the same thing, the same treatment that we are treated (*R v Abbas*, 2018, p.5).

Identification with victims, in combination with occurrences of perceived injustice, can also act as a strong driver of radicalisation and cause for becoming involved in Islamist terrorism (Hoyle, Bradford & Frenett, 2015; Silke, 2008). Charters (2007) appraises that crises in Muslim societies have established fertile ground for the propagation of terrorism. Recruits to terrorist organisations have consistently said that prior to joining, they felt they had a very strong connection with other Muslims around the world, even with those they had never met or whose land they had not travelled to, and this wider connection gave them a sense of responsibility for these Muslims (Silke, 2008).

This adoption of another's victimisation has been referred to as "tertiary victimisation through the ummah" (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009, p.21). Catalyst events, such as violence that is perceived to be unjust, can lead to a strong sense of outrage and a powerful psychological longing for revenge and retribution in some individuals (Silke, 2003). These events do not need to be experienced firsthand for them to have a motivational effect; the events do not even have to involve friends or family members (Silke, 2008). For many terrorists, witnessing events on television or other forms of media is enough to identify with the victims on some level, even if they do not know the area where the events occurred or the people that live there (Silke, 2008).

This was a recurring narrative in an Australian context throughout the data set. For instance, MHK spent a lot of time watching films of atrocities being committed against Sunni Muslims and the suffering that was being inflicted on them in Syria, and wished to travel to Syria to assist Daesh's cause (*R v MHK*, 2016). Omar Al-Kutobi (#130) and

Mohammad Kiad (#131) also sought to travel to Syria and Iraq to "end [the] suffering that had been caused by tyrants and dictators", after seeing "how [their] brothers and sisters [were] getting bombed every day" (*R v Al-Kutobi*, 2016, p.37).

Terrorist organisations utilise the humanitarian narrative as a method of recruitment to cultivate allegiances and attract foreign recruits (Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014; Saltman & Winter, 2014). The messages they spread include denouncing the brutality of the regime against them, and describing attacks on civilians, women and children, as well as the mutilation of fallen bodies and desecration of holy places (Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014). By responding to the call to action, fighters are promised recognition as heroic liberators that protect the vulnerable (Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014). For this reason, Sageman (2008a) emphasises the importance of not allocating too much importance to terrorists who are arrested or killed, as this has the unfavourable effect of elevating their status to that of heroes, whereas low-key arrests and prosecutions are more likely to degrade the status of terrorists.

Roy (2015, p.10) evaluates young men as being motivated to become terrorists because they are fuelled by the narrative of a "small brotherhood of super-heroes who avenge the Muslim Ummah". Eulogies posted for killed or 'martyred' terrorists immortalise fighters and depict them as role models for Muslims, appealing to radicals who feel marginalised in their particular societies (Weimann, 2014). This leads to many terrorists aspiring to achieve martyrdom to further their ideological cause, considering it "the ultimate blessing" (Rees, 2005, p.248).

A key theme from the cases that have been discussed here is the justification that individuals are entitled to engage in violent jihad in response to perceived wrongs committed against Muslims. The impacts of the 'war on terror', experiences of humiliation (whether real or by proxy) and feelings of victimisation all lend support to the narrative advanced by terrorists of there being a war waged against Islam. For some Muslims, susceptibility to this ideological message – when supported and echoed by like-minded individuals in particular – functions as a driving force for radicalisation and involvement in terrorism. Clearly ideological motives are influential amongst Islamist terrorists. There are a number of personal motives which also influence radicalisation, and these are discussed below.

Identity and belonging

Issues of identity and belonging also play an influential role in driving individuals to becoming radicalised. Terrorist groups can provide their members with an important source of identity (Crenshaw, 1986). They can also offer individuals recognition and acceptance and allow them to transform frustrations they may have into glory and victory (Haggerty & Bucerius, 2018; Lester, Yang & Lindsay, 2004). Affiliation with a terrorist organisation can also satisfy an individual's emotional needs, compensate for the loss of family affiliation through socialisation, contribute to group cohesion and foster a sense of belonging, which terrorist groups largely exploit when recruiting new members (Vaisman-Tzachor, 2007).

Hutson, Long and Page (2009) evaluate individual identity as being fluid, susceptible to numerous external influences and highly determined by one's interactions with the social context. As a consequence of experiencing social isolation and disenchantment, some individuals turn to terrorism in their search for identity, acceptance and purpose (Bizina &

Gray, 2014). For many youths with "weak" identities in particular, the absolutist and uncompromising worldview of many terrorist organisations is particularly appealing (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008, p.6).

Clarke and Soria (2010) assess deprived young men in particular, who are in search of an identity, as being the most susceptible to recruitment by a terrorist organisation. For example, 45 year old Abdul Nacer Benbrika (#17) was able to direct a terrorist cell of young Muslim men aged in their twenties, exercising enormous influence over them and imparting onto them his fanatical ideologies in support of violent jihad (*R v Benbrika*, 2009).

Wiktorowicz (2004) postulates that identity crises are often experienced by Muslims in Western countries, and terrorist organisations manipulate them to attract recruits. Cottee (2011) comparably advances that strains experienced by individuals who join terrorist organisations are rooted in frustrations relating to status and identity. Omar Bakri Mohammed, the founder and leader of terrorist organisation, al-Muhajiroun, affirms this, noting:

> People are looking for an Islamic identity. You find someone called Muhammad, who grew up in western society, he concedes a lot so people accept him. He changes his name to Mike, he has [a] girlfriend, he drinks alcohol, he dances, [and] he has sex … After everything he gave up to be accepted, they tell him he is a bloody Arab (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.16).

When interviewing members of al-Muhajiroun, Wiktorowicz (2004) found that most of the members had experienced a severe identity crisis prior to their involvement with the group, which was exacerbated by an experience or perception of discrimination or abuse. Similarly, French authorities – commenting on the flow of volunteers that joined Daesh from France – categorised them as disaffected, aimless and lacking a sense of identity and

belonging (Barrett, 2014a). This is consistent with analyses of recruits of other nationalities, who were also deemed to be seeking a greater sense of purpose and meaning in their lives (Barrett, 2014a).

Chirani (2015, cited in Jones, 2015) argues that issues of identity and "sense of life" played a role in the number of young people who travelled to join Daesh from Australia, the United States, Britain and various other countries in Europe, stating:

> [t]hose people were lost in their life. They don't have good in their life. They don't know where they come from and where they are going. And Daesh, this bad – this satanic sect, gave them some sense. It's a bad sense, but they gave them sense.

For youths with low self-esteem, joining a terrorist organisation may provide an "identity stabilizer", which offers a sense of belonging, worth and purpose (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008, p.7). Crenshaw (2000) evaluates the support offered by the group as assisting individuals in maintaining self-respect and a sense of belonging that is increased by a sense of shared risk. Moreover, disaffected youths whose lives lack a sense of direction are driven towards mass movements such as terrorist networks, which appeal to them because by belonging to these groups, individuals are able to feel a sense of power and superiority (Flaherty, 2003).

This occurs through the adoption of an ideology which leads them to believe that they are "special, important, and have a glorious role to play" (Flaherty, 2003, p.51). In a study of Western females who had migrated to Daesh controlled territory, Saltman and Smith (2015) found that issues of identity and belonging ran concurrently with alienation. Individuals from ethnic minority groups within Western society were also identified as being likely to have been subjected to verbal (if not physical) abuse based on their ethnic

identity, which served to reinforce their sense of not belonging (Saltman & Smith, 2015). The researchers concluded that when defining oneself, an individual's sense of belonging is just as important as their sense of not belonging (Saltman & Smith, 2015).

Choudhury (2007) advances that the path to radicalisation often involves a search for identity at a moment of crisis, and this is underlined by a sense of not being accepted or belonging to society. In the case of Ahmed Mohamed (#179) – who was convicted of conspiring to do an act or acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act – the need to belong played an important role in his accessing of Daesh propaganda, exposure to which fuelled his radicalisation. The sentencing judge in his trial noted that:

> … in around 2014, [he was] exposed to IS videos, which [he] would watch and discuss with other men at the mosque. It seems that out of some particular need to gain a sense of belonging with this group of men, [he] started watching IS propaganda videos in bed on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, some of which were extremely graphic and violent. [He] said that [he] wanted to show [his] friends that 'I know what you guys are talking about' and [he] started to 'compete' in terms of who knew the most about the topic (*The Queen v Abbas*, 2019, p.33).

When such motives are combined with the social networks that foster such a sense of belonging (see Chapter Six), individuals can be at an increased risk of being radicalised. This was exemplified in the case of Ahmed Elomar (#47), who was arrested in Lebanon for his involvement in terrorism. His risk profile for committing further terrorism offences was assessed by senior psychologists and forensic psychiatrists to be elevated for these very reasons:

> [The risks] appear to be primarily associated with his social network and peer groups, and possible exposure to extremist networks, as well as his susceptibility to influence and his observed motivation by a desire for group belonging.
>
> … if Mr Elomar were to continue to associate with convicted terrorists and those known to harbour violent Islamic extremist beliefs, his risk of committing a serious terrorism offence would be significantly elevated, when compared to the rest of the population.

> … Mr Elomar's primary risk factor is his association with violent Islamic extremist peers and his increased population with extreme Islamic beliefs. Many of these peers appear to reside or be located in close proximity to his previous residential location or have contact with his family at that location. It would be important, in managing his risk, that Mr Elomar reside and work in an area physically distant from potential violent extremist peers and areas that these groups might congregate, such as in Bankstown where the Al Risalah Bookstore is located (*State of NSW v Elomar*, 2018, pp.5-7).

The role of identity in facilitating radicalisation has been described as a battle between a sense of belonging, loyalty and duty (McDonald, 2011). In this context, terrorist organisations seek to spread the message that Islamist violence is a duty for Muslims by virtue of their communal Muslim identity and religious loyalty (McDonald, 2011). There was evidence of this narrative having played a role in the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in an Australian context. For instance, Tamim Sahil Khaja (#161) spoke of killing unbelievers as a duty of his religion (*R v Khaja*, 2018). Adnan Karabegovic (#60) similarly considered it to be the duty of "every single man, woman and child" to pick up arms and fight to defend Islam (*R v Karabegovic*, 2015, pp.25-26). Alo-Bridget Namoa (#160) possessed propaganda material which conveyed the message that it is a Muslim's obligatory religious duty to wage jihad against all non-Muslims everywhere (*R v Bayda*, 2019).

Thus, issues of identity and belonging can play an influential role in an individual's susceptibility to radicalisation. To counter the message spread by terrorist organisations, it is important to propagate a narrative which enables individuals to embrace both their Islamic identity as well as a sense of belonging to their wider community, to feel loyalty to both the state and the Muslim ummah, and to reject the idea of terrorism as a duty (McDonald, 2011).

Status and meaning

Becoming involved with terrorist networks also has the potential of providing individuals with a deep sense of status and meaning. To explain why seemingly rational people would choose to support or engage in terrorist acts, McBride (2011, p.561) proposes that terrorist ideologies act as a meaning-giving construct that operate in a relatively simple cycle:

> existential anxiety compels individuals to seek meaning; for some individuals, support of a terrorist ideology functions as an anxiety-reducing, meaning-giving construct; these terrorist ideologies often result in acts of terrorist violence; terrorist violence ultimately exacerbates existential anxiety, compelling terrorists to defend their ideologies and returning them to the very state the ideologies were meant to relieve.

Having a cause worth fighting for – and in extreme cases, worth dying for – offers individuals more meaning than ordinary life ever could (Haggerty & Bucerius, 2018). Terrorist groups can also provide individuals with a sense of ultimate meaning:

> In defending the sacred, one experiences something larger than him- or herself, a meaning that gloriously soars above and renders insignificant one's own often frivolous and banal personal concerns. One experiences an ultimate meaning and purpose for which to live and even die (Cottee & Hayward, 2011, p.973).

Moreover, when involvement with a terrorist network is romanticised as being a "special" and "unique mission", it operates as a strong psychological motive (Vaisman-Tzachor, 2007, p.47). Vaisman-Tzachor (2007) posits that individuals with a heightened sense of self-importance are generally easy to recruit when terrorist organisations offer them promises of respect and immortality. Recruited individuals typically receive a lot of positive attention and are treated as a kind of celebrity (Moghaddam, 2005).

Hamdi Alqudsi (#76) for instance – who was convicted of seven counts of performing services for persons with the intention of their entering Syria to engage in armed

hostilities there – told a number of young Australian men that if they died fighting in Syria they would be "treated like celebrities" in heaven (Shanahan, 2016). When combined with the desire to be "known", "vicariously approved-of" and celebrated as a martyr, such statements act as a very strong motive for the individuals targeted for recruitment by terrorist organisations (Vaisman-Tzachor, 2007, p.47).

Vaisman-Tzachor (2007, p.52) also submits that membership and participation at any level within a terrorist organisation satisfies narcissistic emotional desires for approval and a sense of uniqueness or "specialness". This was noted in the case of Raban Alou (#147), whereby a psychologist assessing him found indications of narcissistic personality traits (*R v Alou*, 2018). According to the psychologist, this was significant because such traits may:

> … lend [themselves] to the type of belief system adopted by the Offender needing to be seen as part of an important group with a need for admiration, a disregard for the feelings of others, and a sense of entitlement with grandiose fantasies of power and political importance (*R v Alou*, 2018, p.41).

According to Victoria Police intelligence analyst, Dr Gaetano Joe Ilardi, the appeal and impact of belonging to an Islamist terrorist cell:

> … can instill in its members a sense of empowerment, control and purpose few experience outside this collective … The belief that one is performing God's work, in which one has a unique insight into what it means to be a 'true Muslim' … serves to elevate the individual's sense of confidence and self-worth … The life of a jihadi allows the individual to form a perception of their new self, frequently in contrast to their previous existence, as someone of importance and influence … The appeal of this new identity, frequently linked as it is to a glorious past and an elitist interpretation of Islam, is that it can restore an individual's pride and dignity by vilifying that identity group which was the source of the individual's earlier feelings of inadequacy and impotence (Neighbour, 2014, p.175).

Sageman (2008a) suggests that the process is driven by youths chasing dreams of glory by fighting for what they consider to be justice and fairness, and trying to impress their

friends with their heroism and sacrifice. Maley (2016a) supports this contention and proposes that for some of the individuals who were recruited by Daesh, the appeal rested on the fact that at home they often "[didn't] get much of a look-in on life" but in the so-called 'caliphate', the humiliations of their old lives were "replaced with the cheap power of a gun". Propaganda material circulated by terrorist organisations contributes to this, portraying terrorism as an exciting, dangerous and rewarding activity, which is considerably appealing to vulnerable youth (Silke, 2008).

Martyrdom is also portrayed as extremely honourable and brave, and as something that will bring the perpetrator fame, praise and establish their place in history (Vaisman-Tzachor, 2007), thus the opportunity to die as a martyr fighting the "[infidels]" and be favoured in the afterlife holds appeal for some susceptible individuals (Barrett, 2014a, p.18). Martyrdom is also seen to add religious legitimisation to one's identity because the cost is one's life (Weigert, 2003). Robert Cerantonio (#94) – who was convicted of engaging in conduct preparatory to the entering of a country to engage in a hostile activity there – exemplified this point of view. He preached about this to several of his co-offenders (Paul Dacre (#166), Antonio Granata (#167), Kadir Kaya (#168) and Murat Kaya (#170)), stating:

> … if you remain firm and you fight in the path of Allah and you achieve shahada (martyrdom), then you will have the greatest victory that there is: the victory that cannot be compared to any victory of this world; a kingdom far greater than the kingdom of this earth, promised to every believer (*R v Cerantonio*, 2019, p.12).

For some recruits, an influencing driver for joining a terrorist organisation is the lure of a "movement that claims to be changing history" (Lake, 2015) and the opportunity and desire to witness and participate in a battle prophesised 1,400 years earlier (Barrett, 2014a). Silke (2008) suggests that this holds particular appeal, because in many

communities and societies terrorists who support such an ideology are considered to be courageous, honourable and important. Additionally, some individuals consider fighting in defence of the sacred to be a spiritually rewarding and thrilling activity (Cottee & Hayward, 2011).

Loza's (2015, cited in Koplowitz, 2015) research, which examined individuals' susceptibility to terrorist ideology and willingness to commit terrorist acts, identified that some individuals are lured towards terrorism because "they want some status, they want to look cool". Seeing things as "black and white" and thinking in "extremes or absolutes", Koplowitz (2015) appraises these individuals as being consumed by feelings of anger, hatred, victimisation and humiliation, which makes the idea of terrorism appealing to them.

Bushman et al. (2016) note that anxieties about status, a history of social rejection and peer hierarchies all have the potential of creating conditions that increase the risk of violence perpetrated by youth. This is not particular to radicalisation; there is evidence of school shooters in the United States also having sought entry into small and cohesive peer networks, only to be faced with rejection (Newman et al., 2005). Rejection – which can take numerous forms such as exclusion, devaluation, disrespect and bullying – can lead to aggression and even (albeit less frequently) to lethal violence (Bushman et al., 2016). Amongst adolescent males, rejection which conveys powerlessness and devaluation of one's masculinity may be especially threatening (Bourgois, 1996).

Gender perspectives

For males, peer group rejection has a stronger impact than rejection from best friends or romantic partners, as is the case for females (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997). This is due to

the fact that unlike females – who focus narrowly on a small number of intimate binary bonds – males prefer a broader social structure with a larger number of people (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997). Baumeister and Sommer (1997) posit that such a quest for belonging inevitably leads to issues of status and power and, in turn, to issues of dominance.

Relevantly, Connell's (1995) concept of hegemonic masculinity is a practise which legitimises a patriarchal society and guarantees the dominant position of men whilst subordinating women. Some of the qualities and norms frequently associated with hegemonic masculinity include aggression, toughness, competitiveness and combativeness (Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2014). Kaplan (1978) suggests that partaking in terrorist activities – which embody many of these traits – leads to improved self-esteem and a renewed sense of masculinity.

War is typically seen as a masculine domain, and therefore imagery of warriors atop heavy machinery touting weapons in conflict zones is perceived as being the ultimate demonstration of manhood. This is also reinforced with many cultures associating 'manliness' with violence, and symbols such as the sword, rifle and bomb as an expression of 'machismo' (Kaplan, 1978). Correspondingly, Hage (2003) proposes that the technology of violence is a process grounded in an exceptionally masculine culture.

The masculinity narrative is exploited by terrorist organisations, with recruits promised respect and heroism by enacting typically masculine traits such as violence, dominance and risk taking behaviours. In participating, recruits are promised camaraderie, to go there 'a boy' and come back 'a man', and to be respected by their peers and seen as a hero or

martyr (Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014). For impressionable young men in particular, this acts as a powerful motivator, especially because 'becoming a man' is considered the ultimate social endorsement (Plummer, 2014). Individuals unwilling to participate in the conflict are denigrated, labelled as cowards and, in comparison to fighters that are willing to travel to conflict zones, are described as 'males' rather than 'men' (Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014).

This narrative was evident in the case of 18 year old Jake Bilardi (#98), whose death in a suicide bombing in Iraq was utilised in Daesh's propaganda to shame boys from Muslim families into coming to fight in Syria and Iraq (Bachelard, 2015). Daesh described Bilardi as a "lion on the battlefield" and stated that they needed "more true men like him" (Bachelard, 2015). Furthermore, they stated that despite Bilardi's young age, weak body and the fact that he came from an atheist family and then "sold his soul to Allah for a cheap price", he defended the community and religion, whilst those born into Islamic families sat in the comfort of their homes not doing anything to stop the oppression (Bachelard, 2015).

This message clearly had the intended effect, with Milad Atai (#163) – who was convicted of collecting funds for or on behalf of Daesh as well as aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a terrorist act by Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad (#146) – later justifying his involvement in terrorism by claiming that he had "sold [his] life for a cheap price" for the sake of the afterlife (*R v Atai*, 2018, p.58). For individuals fantasising about the perceived adventures and heroism associated with involvement in a militant struggle, joining a terrorist organisation can therefore equate to

the ultimate fulfilment of supposed masculine ideals or what it means to be “a real man” (Bjørgo, 2011, p.283).

There is widespread agreement amongst academics that young men are more involved in crime than young women, both in terms of severity and quantum of the offending (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997; Fagan & Wilkinson, 1998; Silke, 2008). Conventional wisdom likewise posits that the vast majority of terrorists are men, and that urban terrorism is a predominantly male phenomenon (Möller-Leimkühler, 2018; Russell & Miller Captain, 1977; Smith & Morgan, 1994). There are, nevertheless, women to be found in terrorist organisations; even before 9/11, Harmon (2000, p.212) claimed that “more than 30 percent of international terrorists [were] women, and females [were] central to membership rosters and operational roles in nearly all insurgencies”. Moreover, Nacos (2005) insists that there is no evidence of fundamental differences between male and female terrorists in terms of their recruitment, motivation, ideological commitment and brutality.

The number of female terrorists was bolstered following Daesh’s recruitment of followers. In 2014, it was estimated by Bergin et al. (2015) that up to 200 women from at least 14 different countries had joined Daesh, with this number rising to around 550 by March 2015 (Roworth, 2015). Daesh was especially keen to recruit females, evinced by their propaganda which claimed that women were valued as mothers to the next generation and as guardians of Daesh’s ideology (Saltman & Smith, 2015). Other terrorist organisations, correspondingly, have women’s wings, publications and other outreach programs aimed at women which recognise the important role that mothers, wives and

sisters can have in a male family member's decision to become involved in terrorism (Fair & Hamza, 2018).

Bergen, Schuster and Sterman (2015) evaluate that women have been represented in unprecedented numbers in recent studies of terrorists. In their data set (n=474), for example, women made up one in seven individuals – something that was rarely, if at all, seen in the earlier waves of terrorism (Bergen, Schuster & Sterman, 2015). The high rates of female recruits may be explained in part by the fact that women do not constitute the leadership of terrorist organisations, and are therefore perceived to be less crucial to the group and more dispensable, thus being delegated to the role of suicide bombers more often than men (Speckhard, 2008).

The gendered dimension of terrorism is significant, with notable examples of young girls and women (some even with disabilities) being utilised as suicide bombers (Warner & Matfess, 2017). Researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center in New York examined terrorist organisation Boko Haram, with their data set indicating that between 11 April 2011 and 30 June 2017, 434 bombers had been deployed by the group to 247 different targets during 238 suicide bombing attacks (Warner & Matfess, 2017). The researchers found that 56 percent of these bombers were women, with at least 81 of them specifically identified as children or teenagers (Warner & Matfess, 2017). The data set further identified girls as young as seven being used as suicide bombers, and that at a ratio of approximately four to one, girls were much more likely than boys to be deployed for suicide bombings (Warner & Matfess, 2017; see also Turner, 2016).

Terrorist organisations such as Boko Haram recognise the effectiveness and operational and strategic benefits of female suicide bombers, even employing a tactic whereby male bombers are sometimes dressed as women (Warner & Matfess, 2017). Moreover, the use of women as human bombs garners greater media attention, public interest and potentially even sympathy for terrorist causes precisely because of their gender (Speckhard, 2008). Consequently, terrorist organisations are keen to recruit English-speaking Westerners, particularly women, who can more easily pass through security controls to carry out terrorist attacks (Macleod & Black, 2010).

Such foreign fighters are portrayed in propaganda issued by terrorist groups as being so enamoured by the global Islamic community that they are willing to sacrifice themselves for it (Macleod & Black, 2010). Foreign fighters are also prized amongst terrorist organisations such as Daesh owing to the influential role they play in the recruitment process, by demonstrating that the group's appeal extends to a wide range of backgrounds and that it is an alluring pathway (Bergin et al., 2015). In December 2015, it was estimated that between 27,000 and 31,000 people from at least 86 countries had travelled to Syria and Iraq to join Daesh and other violent extremist groups (The Soufan Group, 2015). By world standards, Australia is believed to have provided the highest per capita contribution of fighters of any English-speaking country, and is also amongst the highest of fighters in any Western nation (Roose, 2016).

Another reason for the growing number of female terrorists may be explained by the fact that they can dispel the suspicions of security personnel more expertly than men, allowing them to enter areas that men would not have access to and thus increasing their chances of carrying out successful and fatal bomb detonations (Russell & Miller Captain, 1977;

Warner & Matfess, 2017). Furthermore, cultural and religious prohibitions against male police officers touching women mean that female suicide bombers are able to avoid being stopped and frisked and can then more easily blow up restaurants, hospitals and other crowded spaces (Sekulow, 2014).

Socio-economic considerations

On their own, socio-economic factors are unlikely to lead to radicalisation. However, when combined with other influences – such as the motives discussed above – they can contribute to an individual's susceptibility to radicalisation. Thus understanding these factors assists in addressing the central research question and contributing to our knowledge of what influences the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists.

In this section, socio-economic factors as possible contributors of radicalisation will be considered, having particular regard to experiences of displacement, disenfranchisement and disempowerment. Socio-economic deprivation is an often-cited and highly contested explanation for radicalisation (Al-Lami, 2008). Factors such as low education attainment, unemployment and underemployment are some of the most commonly cited justifications for radicalisation, with statistics indicating that Muslims – in comparison with other faith groups – have the highest rates of unemployment (Al-Lami, 2008).[2]

A 2014 investigation into the welfare status of Australian foreign fighters concluded that 96 percent had been on welfare benefits when they left Australia to join a terrorist organisation overseas (Benson, 2015). Reliance on welfare, though, is not a precursor for people becoming radicalised. Gill and Young (2011), for instance, argue that while many

[2] This is certainly the case in Australia, with unemployment rates being higher amongst Australian Muslims compared with non-Muslim Australians (see Chapter Two).

people experience frustrations and other issues, they do not all become involved in terrorism. Indeed, millions of people live under frustrating conditions, and only a fraction of them turn to terrorism (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008).

Widely held beliefs about poverty, lack of education and relative deprivation as explanations for what drives radicalisation have largely been challenged and refuted (Krueger & Malečková, 2003). The only consensus amongst terrorism researchers regarding the relationship between socio-economic determinants and terrorism is that there is general agreement that absolute poverty is not responsible for terrorism (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Krueger, 2007; Zammit, 2010).

Relative deprivation theory, advanced by Stouffer (1949), is based on the assumption that people who engage in acts of rebellious political behaviour are motivated by anger stemming from frustration or relative deprivation, and that the actions will result in expected gain (Muller & Weede, 1994). This theory postulates that terrorism occurs when people feel economically, socially or culturally deprived of benefits to which they feel entitled, and can be experienced when people compare their position in society to that of other societal groups (Gurr, 2016).

Based on this theory, it would be expected that deprived individuals would support violent behaviours as a consequence of frustration (Fair & Shepherd, 2006). Gill (2008) asserts that experiencing relative deprivation can drive individuals to radicalisation as a means of overcoming the deprivation. On its own, relative deprivation does not explain criminality, and whilst it breeds discontent, it can manifest in a number of ways – crime being only one of them (Young, 1999).

Similarly relevant is Runciman's (1966) theory of fraternal deprivation, which describes feelings of deprivation arising from the position of an individual's group relative to that of other groups. In the context of Islamist terrorism, when individuals perceive their group as being deprived, this can establish a feeling of being dutifully bound to take action. For instance, the perpetrators of the 2005 London bombings, whilst not economically disadvantaged, had developed a group identity entrenched in Salafism and perceived there to be a need to act on behalf of oppressed and deprived Muslims globally (Kirby, 2007).

Evidence of fraternal deprivation was illustrated in a video recorded by one of the bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan, who stated that:

> Our driving motivation doesn't come from the tangible commodities that this world has to offer … Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible … Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight (Kirby, 2007, p.422).

Some researchers (see Murshed & Pavan, 2011; Sageman, 2008b) posit that socio-economic disadvantage experienced by Muslims in the West increases their risk of radicalisation, as the global terrorist message is more likely to resonate with their personal experiences or beliefs. This frustration with socio-economic standing, together with a lack of self-fulfilment and experiences of racism, discrimination and Islamophobia, can contribute to radicalisation (Al-Lami, 2008). Wise and Ali (2008) support this contention and characterise exposure to a multitude of poor social and economic conditions – rather than their religious or cultural values – as precluding Muslims in Australia from integrating into Australian society. As a consequence, they assert that Muslims find a sense of belonging and self-worth within their own communities (Wise & Ali, 2008).

Other socio-economic studies examining the backgrounds of foreign fighters do not support the idea that factors such as poverty are primary motivational forces for involvement in terrorism (see Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014). Malečková (2005) argues that rather than economic factors, terrorists are motivated by beliefs in a political cause, supporting the finding that there is no clear link between poverty or deprivation and being a member of a terrorist organisation. Similarly, other researchers (see Krueger & Malečková, 2003) have also concluded that any connection between poverty and terrorism is indirect, complicated and lacking in strength, suggesting that rather than economics, it is political conditions and long standing feelings of injustice and frustration which drive terrorism.

Displacement, disenfranchisement and disempowerment

Experiencing severe internal political disenfranchisement is a factor which affects both migrants and refugees and which can lead to frustration and pessimism (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009; Shafiq & Sinno, 2010). As a result, individuals begin to feel stuck in a seemingly eternal exile and are liable to lose faith in non-violent mechanisms of redress (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009). The desire to violently enact change is then more likely to be acted upon if the disenfranchised individual develops relationships with like-minded individuals (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009).

Displaced communities demonstrate high levels of resilience in rebuilding livelihoods and in resisting political violence and radicalisation (Fleschenberg & Yousufzai, 2018). Despite this, individuals that have been displaced or disconnected from their cultural origins make up a large percentage of known international terrorists (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009). For example, in his study of global Salafi terrorists who were involved in terrorism in the 1990s and early 2000s (n=172), Sageman (2004) found that 70 percent

had joined the terrorist cause in a country away from where they grew up. From this it may be inferred that when disenfranchised individuals have the support of the community, they are less likely to be drawn into terrorism than those without such support.

One factor which can contribute to radicalisation is when there is a lack of opportunities to participate in decision-making and to voice opinions (Moghaddam, 2005); a lack of opportunity and the presence of social strains is central to many criminological explanations of offending behaviours. Sociologists such as Sutherland (1924) and Matza (1964), for instance, consider involvement in decision-making to be crucial in terms of adherence to social norms. This is because in the absence of societal involvement, individuals will develop feelings of powerlessness or disengagement, and may act outside of social constructs or associate with others that do so (Hirschi, 1969).

Consequently, a perceived detachment from and lack of representation by social constructs results in a greater inclination to digress from social norms or associate with organisations that do so (Duffy, 2009). Akbarzadeh (2013) suggests that in Australia, some of the Muslim population feels alienated from and powerless to affect foreign policy-making. There is also a disproportionate under-representation of Muslims in political decision-making processes (Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014). This sense of political disempowerment, in combination with socio-economic under-development and social and cultural isolation, is proposed to have contributed to Muslim alienation in Australia (Akbarzadeh, 2013).

Political alienation and socio-economic marginalisation can make some Muslim youth in particular vulnerable to violent extremist ideology, and drive them to seek a framework that gives meaning to their experiences (Akbarzadeh, 2013). Suffering from poverty, unemployment and deprivation can contribute to alienation and lead to radicalisation, however having a sense of one's aspirations and expectations not being fulfilled also plays a significant role (Akbarzadeh, 2013). When high expectations for improved economic circumstances and greater political freedom are not met, individuals experience growing frustration and anger (Moghaddam, 2005).

Durkheim's theory of anomie – first published in 1893 and one of the foundational concepts of modern criminological thought – proposes that a sense of 'normlessness' arises when socially defined goals are universally mandated, however access to legitimate means (such as education and job opportunities) are stratified by class and status (Siegel, 2011). The perception of blocked progress and existence within a system that does not allow an individual or group to excel can substantially affect the individual or group, giving them the impression that the social and political system is indifferent, if not hostile, towards them (Akbarzadeh, 2013). This leads to the affected group establishing a sense of solidarity and common purpose, often based on a victim mentality (Akbarzadeh, 2013).

When governments do not allow even minimal voice and democratic participation in addressing perceived injustices, they can be perceived as dictatorial "puppets of world powers" such as the United States (Moghaddam, 2005, p.166). Akbarzadeh (2013) argues that Australian Muslims consider there to be significant disconnect between their interests and government policies; survey results, for example, indicate that Australia's foreign

policy with regard to the Middle East has been perceived as misguided and detrimental to the interests of Muslims in Australia. Through disconnect with the process of policy-making, and by being alienated from the political system, many Muslims feel as though their voices are ignored by those in power (Akbarzadeh, 2013).

Consequently some Muslims have withdrawn from the political process and – aided by their assessment that some segments of the media have a systematic anti-Islamic agenda – they feel as though they are not welcome in Australia (Akbarzadeh, 2013). Some media agencies and populist political leaders have hinted at a link between Islam and terrorism, demonised Muslims as potential terrorists and have repeatedly pressured Muslims to denounce terrorism, which have all resulted in feelings of anger and alienation (Peucker, Roose & Akbarzadeh, 2014). As has been discussed, political alienation can drive young Australian Muslims towards a neojihadist ideology, as experiences of disconnect with the political system and a belief that the government is against them makes the appeal of terrorist organisations that much greater (Akbarzadeh, 2013).

Conclusion

Ideological narratives are clearly a driving force for radicalisation. The 'war on terror' which followed 9/11 – and which in turn led to perceptions of a 'war on Islam' – has had a persistent and influential impact on a vast number of individuals globally. Evidence of this in an Australian context throughout the data set – with individuals justifying their offending on the grounds that they were religiously sanctioned to respond to perceived injustices – has continued almost two decades after the 9/11 attacks occurred.

Here, the narrative of the permissibility of violent jihad is evident, with individuals continuing to draw on it to justify their actions. As this chapter has illustrated, this is closely

tied to identification with the Muslim community, and experiences of victimisation and humiliation, whether real or by proxy. All of these ideological elements are crucial motivators for radicalisation, and will undoubtedly continue to be into the future. Personal factors, such as issues of identity and belonging and status and meaning, are also highly influential. Gender perspectives and socio-economic considerations also ought to be taken into account as factors which can influence Islamist terrorists.

Chapter Five will analyse the characteristics of the data set of 194 Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts in an Australian context.

Chapter Five
Islamist terrorists in Australia

Chapter One noted that the terrorism landscape has drastically evolved over the last two decades, most notably following 9/11, and more recently with the global impact caused by Daesh and their movement. The demographic of individuals who have been involved in terrorism has also evolved. As this thesis seeks to assess what has influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts in an Australian context, it is also important to analyse the characteristics of these individuals.

This chapter will consider a range of factors in relation to the data set of 194 Islamist terrorists from Australia who engaged in a multitude of terrorist acts between 2001 and 2018. These include the terrorist acts committed and the terrorist organisations supported, youth, gender, the nature of the homegrown threat, religiosity and converts, education and mental health.

The findings outlined in this chapter will address the third subsidiary question of this thesis: **What does an analysis of Islamist terrorists in Australia reveal about them?** Gaining an evidence-based insight into Islamist terrorists in Australia yields significant potential implications for the intelligence and counter-terrorism communities. Similar to the discussion of Islamist terrorism in Australia set out in Chapter Two, sections of the data in this chapter will be assessed in the context of three 'waves' (2001-2004, 2005-2013 and 2014-2018), which represented significant shifts and developments of Islamist terrorism in Australia.

Terrorist acts

An examination of the types of terrorist acts the individuals in the data set engaged in reveals just how driven they were, particularly to travel overseas to engage in international conflicts. The data set revealed 71 instances of individuals leaving Australia to support or engage in Islamist terrorism overseas, with 64 of these being males (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Terrorist acts engaged in by individuals in the data set[1]

Terrorist acts	Total	Male	Female
• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas	71	64	7
• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act	28	27	1
• Belonging to or being a member of a terrorist organisation	20	19	1
• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts	19	19	-
• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there	15	15	-
• Receiving, collecting, making or attempting to make funds available to a terrorist or terrorist organisation or to support incursions into a foreign state	14	11	3
• Attempting to engage in a terrorist act and engaging in a terrorist act	9	9	-
• Providing or attempting to provide support, resources, goods or services to a terrorist organisation or to promote the commission of a terrorist offence	9	8	1
• Collecting, possessing or making documents connected with a terrorist act	7	7	-
• Advocating terrorism	6	6	-
• Arrested overseas for involvement in terrorism	6	6	-
• Possession of a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act	6	6	-
• Performing services with the intention of supporting a person or persons to engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state	5	5	-
• Detained or arrested on suspicion of involvement in terrorism	4	3	1
• Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a terrorist act	2	2	-
• Contacting terrorists from inside prison or communicating with known terrorists	2	2	-
• Passport cancelled on assessment of intention to travel to engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state	2	2	-
• Receive training from a terrorist organisation	1	1	-
• Directing activities of a terrorist organisation	1	1	-

[1] These acts encompass a range of federal offences under the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth).

Marc Trévidic, a French judge who specialises in anti-terrorism cases, suggests that:

> Ninety percent of those who leave, do it out of personal reasons: they are looking for a fight, or for adventure, or revenge, because they do not fit in society … and only 10 percent out of religious beliefs. … Religion is not the engine of this movement and that's precisely its strength (Coolsaet, 2016, p.26).

This statement supports research related to motivational factors outlined in Chapter Four.

The findings from the data set indicate that males were more prone to engaging in operational activities, such as doing acts or conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act. The females, meanwhile, largely played more supportive roles. For instance, in nine cases where females from the data set left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas (or attempted to leave Australia), this was overwhelmingly done with the intention of following their husbands to a conflict zone or with the intention of finding themselves a foreign fighter husband.[2]

To assess whether past criminality was likely to have played a role in their involvement in terrorist acts, the criminal history of individuals in the data set was also examined. Prior to their involvement in terrorist acts, 18 percent of individuals (n=35) were identified as having a criminal history. Their prior offences encompassed a range of crimes including burglary, criminal damage, theft, assault, possession of prohibited drugs, intentionally causing injury, driving offences and making false statements (*Regina (Cth) v Touma*, 2008; *R v Alqudsi,* 2016; *R v Benbrika*, 2009; *R v Fattal,* 2011). There was no evidence to suggest that any of these past crimes could have indicated the likelihood of any of the perpetrators later becoming involved in Islamist terrorism.

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[2] Amira Karroum (#83); Tara Nettleton (#86); Fatima Elomar (#89); Zehra Duman (#115); Hodan Abby (#118); Hafsa Mohamed (#119); Dullel Kassab (#122); Jasmina Milovanov (#140); Shadi Jabar Khalil Mohammad (#145).

In support of this theory, studies indicate that some criminals become involved in terrorism specifically to abandon their lifestyle of involvement in petty criminal activities (Sageman, 2004). Such individuals turn to religion to make up for their past 'sins' and seek vindication in neojihadism, which offers redemption from crime while simultaneously satisfying the personal needs and desires that led them to become involved in it (Basra, Neumann & Brunner, 2016). Terrorist organisations such as Daesh also offer a redemptive narrative for petty criminals to carry out terrorist acts (Clarke, 2017).

The Countering Violent Extremism research program's analysis of 100 global case studies of lone actor terrorists revealed that Daesh attracted younger recruits that were more likely to have criminal or violent pasts (Aly, 2016). It was found that in comparison to foreign fighters before the rise of Daesh, individuals recruited after 2014 had a higher likelihood of having previously been involved in criminal activity (Aly, 2016). Evidently, some criminals are very attractive to some terrorist organisations due to the skills they have which may be useful to the group. Many of the perpetrators of the 2004 commuter train bombings in Madrid, for instance, had criminal records for drug trafficking and other petty crimes (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Terrorist organisations

As of 2019, the Commonwealth *Criminal Code* lists 26 prescribed terrorist organisations, a list which is reviewed and updated every three years. Of these listed organisations, only six appear in the data set (outlined in Table 5.2). Another organisation which appears once in the data set, Asbat al-Ansar, was listed as a prescribed terrorist organisation under

the *Criminal Code* in 2006 but has since been removed.[3] Furthermore, the Benbrika cells (which operated in both Melbourne and Sydney) – whilst not prescribed terrorist organisations – have nonetheless being counted as such, because the emergence of the cells in 2004 "signalled an entirely new type of threat" for Australia, and their impact as such ought to be recognised (Neighbour, 2014, p.164).

Table 5.2. Terrorist organisations listed under the *Criminal Code* in 2019[4]

Terrorist organisation	Number of supportive individuals
Abu Sayyaf Group	-
Al-Murabitun	-
Al-Qa'ida	19
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula	-
Al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent	-
Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb	-
Al-Shabaab	6
Boko Haram	-
Hamas' Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades	-
Hizballah's External Security Organisation	-
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	-
Islamic State	111
Islamic State East Asia	-
Islamic State in Libya	-
Islamic State Khorasan Province	-
Islamic State Sinai Province	-
Jabhat al-Nusra	16
Jaish-e-Mohammad	-
Jama'at Mujahideen Bangladesh	-
Jamiat ul-Ansar	-
Jemaah Anshorut Daulah	-
Jemaah Islamiyah	4
Kurdistan Workers' Party	-
Lashkar-e Jhangvi	-
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba	6
Palestinian Islamic Jihad	-

[3] Organisations can be de-listed by the Attorney-General if they are deemed to no longer satisfy the legislative criteria.
[4] Note: there are some variations in the name spelling of a number of terrorist organisations.

Information relating to support for, connections with or participation in a specific terrorist organisation was available for 171 individuals in the data set. Twenty-one of these were affiliated with or supported more than one terrorist organisation (refer to Table 5.3). One of the individuals, Hussam Sabbagh (#15) was even identified as supporting four different terrorist groups over a number of years.

Table 5.3. Frequencies of support for terrorist organisations

Terrorist organisation	Frequency
Asbat al-Ansar	1
Al-Qaeda	19
Al Shabbab	6
Benbrika cell (Melbourne)	13
Benbrika cell (Sydney)	9
Daesh	111
Fatah al-Islam	7
Jabhat al-Nusra	16
Jemaah Islamiyah	4
Khaliyat Trablus	2
Lashkar-e-Taiba	6
Peninsula Lions	1

When examining the cases of the 150 individuals who only supported one terrorist organisation (based on their initial year of support for or affiliation with the group), it is possible to map the popularity of different terrorist groups over a period of 17 years. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that whilst al-Qaeda had the most consistent level of support amongst the terrorist organisations in the earlier years of the data set (especially from 2003 to 2006), this was not nearly as significant as what followed in the later years (specifically from 2014 onwards), with the unprecedented level of support shown for Daesh. Daesh has proven itself to be a resilient force, continuously evolving and

rebranding over a number of years (although as at 2019 they no longer have a stronghold on captured territory in Syria and Iraq – refer to Chapter Two).

Figure 5.1. Support for terrorist organisation by year



Youth

Information relating to age was available for 174 of the individuals in the data set. Age was captured at the time of their arrest, departure from Australia to engage in terrorist acts overseas or death (depending on what information was available). The average age of offenders was found to have visibly decreased with every wave of Islamist terrorism in Australia (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4. Average age of individuals by wave

Wave	Average age	
2001-2004	31.5	n=12
2005-2013	26.7	n=61
2014-2018	24.8	n=101
Total	**25.9**	**n=174**

These findings complement the work of Bergin et al. (2015), who assessed that since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Australian citizens involved in Islamist terrorism have been, on average, younger than individuals who were radicalised in the late 1990s and even those who were radicalised following 9/11. As Figure 5.2 illustrates, the peak age of individuals in the data set was in the low to mid-twenties with a peak point of individuals aged 22, and there was subsequently a visible decline in offending coinciding with the older age of individuals. This is consistent with literature which suggests that, on average, terrorists tend to be in their twenties (see Barrett, 2014a; Bergen, Schuster & Sterman, 2015; Sageman, 2004; Sageman, 2008b).

Figure 5.2. Age frequencies of individuals in the data set



Dubbed "9/11's children" by Roose (2016, p.xiii), 44 percent of individuals (n=76) in the data set were found to have been aged 11 or under at the time of the 9/11 attacks (see Table 5.5). This suggests that 9/11 and the ensuing 'war on terror' had a significant impact on these individuals, who essentially grew up in a world marred by terrorism and shaped by the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States and their aftermath.

Table 5.5. Age at the time of 9/11 attacks

Age at the time of 9/11	Frequency	Percentage of total
1	6	3%
2	2	1%
3	4	3%
4	9	5%
5	7	4%
6	4	3%
7	8	5%
8	5	3%
9	11	6%
10	11	6%
11	9	5%
Total	**76**	**44%**

The data in an Australian context is consistent with global findings. Whilst there is no definitive age group that represents terrorists (Rae, 2012), there was an evident decline in the average age of terrorist offenders from 2001 to 2018 globally. This is attributable to the growing appeal and marketing of violent extremist ideology amongst youths by terrorist organisations such as Daesh.

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Most Wanted Terrorists list published in 2001, the average age of the 22 individuals that were listed was 37 years (Sahito et al., 2013). A different finding was produced by Bergen, Schuster and Sterman (2015), who examined Western foreign fighters that had travelled to Syria to fight with Daesh over a decade after the Most Wanted list was published, and who concluded that the average age was significantly lower at 25 years for males and 21 years for females.

Through his examination of 172 cases of global terrorists linked to al-Qaeda from the 1990s up to 2003, Sageman (2004) similarly found the average age to be 25.7 years. In a later study of terrorists arrested in Europe and Canada from 2005 onwards, Sageman (2008b) observed that the average had decreased even more to approximately 20 years of age. A general trend has emerged since the mid-2000s of younger recruits being involved in Islamist terrorism; the average age of individuals joining Daesh, for example, was markedly younger than in the earlier waves of jihadism when the typical foreign fighter was 25 to 35 years old (Barrett, 2014a).

The average age range for many of the individuals who joined Daesh from around the world was 18 to 29 years, although there were also those in their 30s as well as many in the 15 to 17 years age range (Barrett, 2014a). This collective of "9/11's children" – young

men who were born or raised in the post-9/11 social and political context – are young, often powerless and marginalised males who are distinct from the older generation of radicals that came before them (Roose, 2016, p.xiii). Also referred to as the “selfie-generation”, the new cohort of fighters are not only younger than their predecessors, but also less educated about Islam and more often share a sense that they do not belong in their society (Australian Army, 2016).

Gender

Gender was found to be overwhelmingly skewed in the data set: 92 percent of individuals were male. This lends support to the argument that terrorism is a predominantly male phenomenon (see Möller-Leimkühler, 2018; Russell & Miller Captain, 1977; Smith & Morgan, 1994). The data set also indicated that coinciding with the rise of Daesh in 2014, there was an increased number of females who were radicalised and became involved in Islamist terrorism. Table 5.6 highlights how the number of females significantly rose in prominence in the third wave coinciding with the rise of Daesh.

Table 5.6. Gender by wave

Wave	Female	Male	Total
2001-2004	1	14	15
2005-2013	1	65	66
2014-2018	13	100	113
Total	**15 (8%)**	**179 (92%)**	**194**

Taking into account not only the unprecedented numbers, but also the seemingly novel phenomenon of Western women migrating en masse to join Daesh in the Middle East prior to their defeat, it seems likely that such a trend will continue (see Saltman, 2019).

The homegrown threat

Australia's relative geographic isolation, with its oceanic borders and strict border security, has made it difficult for terrorist organisations to infiltrate the country, making Australian terrorists largely homegrown (Rahimullah, Larmar & Abdalla, 2013; Zammit, 2010). Sageman (2008b) also attributes this to the greater scrutiny at borders and a hesitation to travel overseas, which has resulted in terrorists conducting operations within their own borders. Findings from the data set supported this theory. Of the individuals for whom data about country of birth was available (n=153), 51 percent were identified as being Australian born (depicted in Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3. Countries of birth



The homegrown nature of Islamist terrorists in an Australian context is particularly evident in comparison to Mullins' (2013) analysis of Islamist terrorists in Canada. Table

5.7 compares data from this thesis to the data gathered by Mullins, focusing specifically on the decade following 9/11 up to 2011.

Table 5.7. Australian Islamist terrorists compared with Canadian Islamist terrorists (2001-2011)

	Australia	Canada
Total	n=58	n=29
Dominant age group	Early to mid 20s	Early to mid 20s
Mental health	10%	3%
Criminal history	19%	14%
Education	10% university	24% university
Gender	96% male	100% male
Married	60%	38%
Born overseas	34%	72%
Top three ethnicities	Lebanese; Caucasian Australian; Indonesian; Somali	Canadian; Pakistani; Somali
Religion	15% converts	16% converts

Comparably, both samples were largely comprised of males in their early to mid-20s and had an almost identical number of religious converts. In contrast, however, was the large number of homegrown Islamists in Australia compared to their counterparts in Canada.

Mullins' (2011) observation that Western contemporary terrorists tend to be citizens and long-term residents of countries in the West was also supported by the data set. Data relating to age at the time of arrival in Australia for individuals born overseas (n=38) indicated that 37 percent came to this country aged 10 or younger, rendering them long-term residents of Australia. A further 39 percent had lived in Australia for 10 years or more prior to their involvement in terrorism. Where data was available relating to immigrant generations (n=74), Islamist terrorists were found to be overwhelmingly first or second generation Australians (refer to Table 5.8).

Table 5.8. Immigrant generations

Immigrant generation	Frequency	
First generation	50	68%
Second generation	23	31%
Fifth generation	1	1%
Total	**74**	

Former AFP Commissioner, Andrew Colvin, appraises that most local terrorism suspects are Australian born, raised and educated, and that the majority of persons of interest investigated by the AFP are first and second generation Australians (Woodley, 2017). Colvin argues that migrants, or the children of immigrants, have the greatest vulnerability and susceptibility to being radicalised (Woodley, 2017). In order to address this, he notes that:

> [w]e need to make sure that we are focused on social cohesion in this country. We need to make sure we are focused on education and opportunity, because otherwise what we're doing is giving people few alternatives but to feel that there might be something else that they want to hold on to … unless we're very careful [with] what we do, we are only making our problem bigger, not better (Woodley, 2017).

The prevalence of homegrown terrorists is not unique to Australia, with Bergen (2017) assessing that terrorists "mostly come from our own back yard". For instance, following the 2005 London bombings – which were perpetrated by homegrown second generation immigrants – there was incredulity amongst the population that the terrorists involved were so "unassimilated" as to have been able to commit such a crime (Hage, 2011, p.166). However, of the vast number of terrorist attacks that have occurred globally, perpetrators have frequently been homegrown, oftentimes second and third generation immigrants or long-term foreign residents of the country they attacked (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010), thus rendering the 2005 London bombings and similar terrorist attacks less of an anomaly than they may initially appear to be.

Social alienation amongst immigrants can be a powerful motivator for radicalisation, and second and third generation immigrants appear to be particularly susceptible (Haider, 2015; Komen, 2014). Hage (2011) suggests that a lack of assimilation equates to a lack of interest and emotion towards the culture an individual has not assimilated to. Consequently, this implies that hatred and pervasive destructive feelings towards a place stem from interaction with it, rather than a lack of assimilation (Hage, 2011). Hage (2011) also proposes that, if anything, it is an unrecognised sense of over assimilation and frustration that causes the hatred.

Comparably, Roy (2003) considers second and third generation jobless males to be the most susceptible to radicalisation, noting that their circumstances provide fertile ground for recruiting terrorists to radicalise them. Consequently, Western countries such as Australia, France, Denmark and England have all faced particular problems with Muslim youth, which has been attributed to the second generation's increased likelihood of experiencing a more intense sense of injury arising from racism than the first generation (Hage, 2011; Komen, 2014).

The first generation is subjected to the frustration of either not being recognised or being recognised negatively, and they come to expect the racism directed towards them (Hage, 2011). This racism takes the form of either non-interpellation – through a lack of recognition and feeling invisible, thus creating a desire to be noticed and acknowledged – or the form of negative interpellation (being made to feel racially inferior and less than human) (Hage, 2011).

Meanwhile, the second generation, whilst experiencing these forms of racism, is additionally subjected to mis-interpellation, a form of rejection that involves acts of exclusion (Hage, 2011). This entails an individual being addressed and hailed by a nation, and then experiencing rejection when the ideological structure of society expels them through exclusionary acts, such as telling them that they were not the one being addressed in the first place (Hage, 2011; see also Victoroff, Adelman & Matthews, 2012). For example:

> [w]hen the nation hails you 'hey you citizen' everything in you leads you to recognize that it is you that is being hailed, but when you do say 'yes it is me' … the ideological structure of society replies with cruelty: 'No. Piss off. It is not you I am calling' (Hage, 2011, p.162).

The term 'assimilation fatigue' is used to describe someone who paradoxically wants to and has tried to assimilate into a nation but has been rejected by the nation's racism (Hage, 2011; Jacobs, 2011). This is a traumatising experience that fragments an individual and drives them to seek a space immune from the effects of racism (Hage, 2011; Jacobs, 2011). Eventually they become "sick of trying" and turn to outside ideologies, such as religion, to find a place where they can develop a sense of self and protect themselves against the effects of psychological fragmentation caused by racism (Hage, 2011, p.171). This can occur in locations such as study groups and radical mosques – places which can act as 'echo chambers' and amplify grievances.

Hage (2011) concludes that the second generation consequently becomes 'oversensitive' to any form of exclusionary behaviour they are subjected to. This, in combination with the racism experienced by their parents and the racism they experience from a young age (directed at them in a language and culture that they identify as their own), results in the second generation feeling an excessive idealised sense of entitlement to non-

discriminatory treatment (Hage, 2011). The development of an exaggerated and idealised sense of non-discriminatory belonging, together with the experience of exclusionary behaviour and petty everyday racism, leads to a formidable sense of resentment amongst the second generation that was not felt by first generation immigrants (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Hage, 2011).

The data set in this thesis also examined ethnicity, with 34 different ethnicities identified for 153 individuals (refer to Table 5.9). Ethnicity could not be determined from the available information for the remaining 41 individuals in the data set. As illustrated in Appendix 1, 19 individuals identified with multiple ethnicities, and this is reflected in the table below where each ethnicity has been counted individually.

Table 5.9. Ethnicities of individuals

Ethnicity	Frequency	Ethnicity	Frequency
Lebanese	63	Malaysian	2
Caucasian Australian	18	African-American	1
Turkish	12	Algerian	1
Somali	11	British	1
Afghan	9	Cambodian	1
Kurdish	6	Fijian	1
Iraqi	5	German	1
Syrian	5	Indian	1
Bosnian	4	Iranian	1
Indonesian	4	Irish	1
Palestinian	4	Kuwaiti	1
Bangladeshi	3	New Zealander	1
Italian	3	Pashtun	1
Pakistani	3	Polish	1
Indigenous Australian	2	Scottish	1
Albanian	2	Sudanese	1
Egyptian	2	Tongan	1

The most frequently recurring ethnicity in the data set was Lebanese (n=63), with 41 percent of individuals identifying as either Lebanese or part Lebanese. Seventy percent of

these people had been born in Australia (n=44) and a further 21 percent were born in Lebanon (n=13). Figure 5.4 illustrates the broad range of other ethnicities identified throughout the data set, although Lebanese is clearly the dominant one.

Figure 5.4. Ethnicities of individuals



Of the 63 Lebanese individuals in the data set, five engaged in their offending behaviour in the first wave (2001-2004), 30 within the second wave (2005-2013) and 28 within the third wave (2014-2018). Of the 63 individuals, 59 were male. Details relating to age were available in 54 of these cases and Table 5.10 sets out these individuals by age range. Consistent with the ABS census data outlined in Chapter Two, the age profiles of the Islamist terrorists of Lebanese ethnicity in the data set indicate that they were overwhelmingly in their twenties at the time of their offending.

Table 5.10. Lebanese individuals by age range

Age range	Female	Male	Total
<19	1	5	6
20-29	2	32	34
30-39	-	10	10
40-49	1	3	4

A particularly interesting subgroup of the Lebanese men in the data set is that of the individuals who were involved in the two networks of convicted terrorists operating as part of the Benbrika cells in Melbourne and Sydney. Table 5.11 sets out the individuals of Lebanese ethnicity who were involved in these cells.

Table 5.11. Lebanese members of the Benbrika cells

Name	Country of birth	Arrival age	Immigrant generation
Aimen Joud (#18)	Australia	-	
Fadl Sayadi (#19)	Lebanon	3	1
Abdullah Merhi (#20)	Australia	-	2
Ahmed Raad (#21)	Australia	-	2
Ezzit Raad (#22)	Australia	-	2
Amer Haddara (#23)	Australia	-	2
Izzydeen Atik (#24)	Australia	-	2
Hany Taha (#26)	Australia	-	
Bassam Raad (#27)	Australia	-	2
Shoue Hammoud (#28)	Australia	-	
Majed Raad (#29)	Australia	-	2
Mohamed Ali Elomar (#30)	Lebanon	11	1
Khaled Cheikho (#32)	Lebanon	2	1
Moustafa Cheikho (#33)	Australia	-	
Mazen Touma (#35)	Lebanon	6	1
Khaled Sharrouf (#38)	Australia	-	

Figure 5.5 illustrates how, coinciding with the arrests of the almost exclusively Lebanese members of the Benbrika cells in 2005, the data set revealed a peak in Lebanese ethnicity that year (n=17).

Figure 5.5. Individuals of Lebanese ethnicity by year



The Melbourne branch of the Benbrika cells in particular had a high prevalence of Lebanese individuals: with the exception of an Algerian, Abdul Nacer Benbrika (#17), and an Australian, Shane Kent (#25), the cell was comprised of individuals from Lebanese families who had immigrated to Australia during the Lebanese Civil War, where they formed close-knit diaspora communities (Neighbour, 2014). Neighbour (2014, p.169) observes that the men grew up in a "transplanted milieu" and were alienated by virtue of distance from the culture of their parents and grandparents, as well as through their cultural beliefs and how they were raised compared to the values of mainstream Australian society.

In 2007 there was once more a number of Lebanese individuals (n=6) dominating the data set (see Figure 5.5). Demonstrating the power of social and familial networks (see Chapter Six), there was clear interconnectedness amongst the 2007 Lebanese group. These six individuals were linked by virtue of social and familial connections as well as through participation within the same terrorist networks as one another. In 2014 –

coinciding with the call to arms and declaration of a caliphate by Daesh – there was another increase in Lebanese individuals seen in the data set (n=15). Of the 15 Lebanese people identified in 2014, 13 were found to have either died in a conflict zone or left Australia to travel to one, and in 12 cases this was in support of Daesh.

What is perhaps most interesting about the high numbers of Lebanese individuals in the data set is the terrorist organisations which they supported. Despite Hezbollah being the most recognised militant group in Lebanon – and a listed terrorist organisation under the Commonwealth *Criminal Code* (see Table 5.2) – this organisation did not appear once in the data set, even though 41 percent of individuals identified as either Lebanese or part Lebanese, with 21 percent of them being born in Lebanon. The terrorist organisations supported by the Lebanese individuals in the data set (set out in Table 5.12) were all Sunni organisations, whereas Hezbollah is a Shia organisation.[5]

Table 5.12. Terrorist organisations supported by individuals of Lebanese ethnicity

Terrorist organisation	Frequency	Percentage of total
Al-Qaeda	4	5%
Al Shabbab	2	3%
Benbrika cell (Melbourne)	11	15%
Benbrika cell (Sydney)	5	7%
Daesh	32	43%
Fatah al-Islam	7	9%
Jabhat al-Nusra	8	11%
Khaliyat Trablus	2	3%
Lashkar-e-Taiba	3	4%

[5] The primary difference between the two Islamic factions is disagreement over the succession of leadership in the Muslim community following the death of the Prophet Muhammad (see Moore, 2015).

Harris-Hogan and Zammit (2014) note that as part of a Shia and principally nationalist orientated movement, Hezbollah is distinct from globally focused Sunni jihadist groups. Consequently, this may explain why the group is popular among extremists in Lebanon, whilst Lebanese individuals in Australia tend to identify more greatly with movements such as Daesh.

Another noteworthy finding related to when individuals in the data set engaged in terrorist acts in relation to their ethnicities. Individuals of Afghan and Iraqi descent were not found to have been engaging in terrorism during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s following 9/11. However five individuals of Iraqi descent and nine individuals of Afghan descent were identified as engaging in terrorist acts between 2013 and 2016. Of these 14 individuals – who were aged between 15 and 33 – 13 supported Daesh.

Only two were found to have been Australian born, while another nine (for whom data relating to country of birth was available) had been born in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. What these findings may suggest is that future generations of Islamist terrorists are likely to be borne out of present-day conflicts. Just as individuals of Afghan and Iraqi descent appeared in the data set over a decade after the conflicts in their home countries, so too may the next decade produce a cohort of Islamist terrorists who were directly affected by the conflict in Syria.

Religiosity and converts

Eighty nine percent of individuals in the data set were identified as being Muslim (n=172). From this it might be adduced that within Australia, individuals of the Islamic faith (though certainly by no means all) have been the most receptive religious group to

the ideologies spread by Islamist terrorist groups. However, as will be discussed below, it is important not to discount the fact that a Muslim upbringing is not a prerequisite for individuals to embrace neojihadist ideology.

Of the religious converts in the data set, five were female and 17 were male, averaging 29.7 years of age. Eighty two percent of these converts were Australian born (n=18). Figure 5.6 illustrates how there was a greater number of converts in the two-year period between 2014 and 2016 in comparison to the entire period of time between 2001 and 2013. As the 2014 to 2016 period coincided with the rise and prominence of Daesh, it may be inferred that in an Australian context, the message of belonging and brotherhood propagated by Daesh largely resonated with religious converts.

Figure 5.6. Number of religious converts by year



The circumstances around the 22 individuals in the data set who had converted varied. Robert Cerantonio (#94) converted at the age of 17 after becoming disillusioned with his Catholic faith, and considered a range of religious teachings before converting to Islam (*R v Cerantonio*, 2019). His co-offender, Paul Dacre (#166), meanwhile, converted at the

age of 23 after being introduced to Islam by a friend, which led to him giving up his old lifestyle involving drugs, alcohol and nightclubbing (*R v Cerantonio*, 2019).

Research by Coolsaet (2015), Lyons-Padilla et al. (2015) and Roy (2015) suggests that for the most part, radicalised individuals have a superficial understanding of Islam or are converts with no Islamic background, and that religion is sometimes used as a means of legitimising personal and collective frustrations and justifying violent ideologies. A key commonality between Western Muslim youth that become radicalised and involved in terrorism is that they are religious novices, who are vulnerable to extreme interpretations of Islam due to their limited or non-existent knowledge of Islamic theology, and their inability to assess the authenticity of the version of Islam that is presented to them through preachers and texts (Al-Lami, 2008; Harris, 2016). As a result, they often and blindly rely on "Sheikh Google" as their primary source of information (*R v HG*, 2018, p.32).

When individuals in the West have knowledge of Islam that is "sketchy" or non-existent, it contributes to them being more easily radicalised (Khosrokhavar, 2015, p.187). In what is perhaps the best evidence to support the argument that the 1,400-year-old Islamic faith has little to do with the modern neojihadist movement, Hasan (2014) highlights how convicted British terrorists Mohammed Nahin Ahmed and Yusuf Zubair Sarwar purchased the books *Islam for Dummies* and *The Koran for Dummies* online prior to their departure from Birmingham to fight in Syria in May 2013.

Professor Mohamad Abdalla, one of Australia's most prominent Muslim academic and religious leaders, assesses a lack of knowledge of Islam to be a significant risk factor for young people who are drawn to "charismatic, pseudo-religious scholars":

> … who are able to offer young people a narrative that says, "You don't belong to mainstream society. But you can belong to us. You have been marginalised" or, "You can never practice your faith in a country like Australia and so the only way you can do so is, is if you join our group" (O'Brien, 2015).

Bjørgo (2011, p.282) argues that converts, who are "somewhat out of place" in the terrorist networks they join, feel a strong obligation to prove themselves as worthy and trusted members of their group. In an attempt to achieve this, they often express strong ideological views and a willingness to commit acts of violence. Consequently, such converts might appear to be amongst the most extreme members of their group (Bjørgo, 2011). Australian convert, Jake Bilardi (#98), for example, willingly and enthusiastically volunteered for the suicide mission that claimed his life in Iraq (Owens & Maley, 2015).

Dubbed "convertitis", many Western Muslims similarly have a "born again" religiosity after growing up with little devoutness (Aly, 2007, p.5). Aly (2007, p.6) considers this to be a common social dynamic that regularly occurs when people embrace a new outlook, and for such people Islam becomes an "identity movement" as much as it does a traditional faith. Such 'born again' Muslims act and behave similarly to converts, despite many having grown up in a Muslim family (Arslan, 2017). Rambo (1993) suggests that this religious intensification – which involves a revitalised commitment to one's faith – is a type of conversion in and of itself.

There was evidence of this throughout the data set. For instance, in the case of Sevdet Ramadan Besim (#137) – who grew up in a Muslim household – religion did not play a major role in his life growing up:

> Up until the end of his Year 9 schooling, Mr Besim's only real connection with Islam was that he was born into a Muslim household. He observed some of the practices, but never fasted or attended the mosque. He was living very much a Western lifestyle. It was not that he rejected Islam; he simply did not practice its teachings. Nor did his parents insist upon his participation.
>
> Mr Besim became more interested in his religion towards the end of Year 9 … he was particularly friendly with some students who were devout and who often would talk about the Koran. He felt embarrassed and hypocritical that he did not know much about his own religion and its teachings. Through his association with those students, he began to learn more about Islam. He started reading the Koran and attending the Hallam mosque. His religious observance got to the point that where he was praying five times a day; and, when he was not at school, he would go to the mosque quite often (*R v Besim*, 2016, pp.6-7).

After being introduced to the al-Furqan Islamic Centre in Melbourne's south-eastern suburb of Springvale,[6] which was frequented by a number of influential and charismatic individuals from the data set, Besim's religiosity increased:

> In becoming more religious and then attending Al-Furqan, Mr Besim found a group to whom he had a greater sense of belonging. Many in that group were older, and he was quite influenced by the religion, ideology and politics that were being espoused at the centre (*R v Besim*, 2016, p.7).

Nesser (2006, p.326) comparably identified a pattern of young alienated immigrants in foreign countries becoming "newborn Muslims" and actively searching out information surrounding terrorism in places such as radical mosques.

[6] This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.

Education

The education levels of individuals in the data set were also examined. Table 5.13 outlines information regarding the highest level of education attained amongst individuals in the data set (where available, n=91), which ranged from primary school to university.

Table 5.13. Highest level of education attained

Level of education	Frequency	Percentage of total
College	3	3.3%
High school	12	13.2%
High school incomplete	30	32.9%
Primary school	2	2.2%
TAFE	8	8.8%
TAFE incomplete	9	9.9%
University	14	15.4%
University incomplete	13	14.3%

Figure 5.7 illustrates the different education levels by time period, contrasting the differences between the first half of the data set in comparison to the second half.

Figure 5.7. Education levels by time period



Findings relating to education levels in the data set support the findings of Bergin et al. (2015), that terrorists borne of the Syrian Civil War outbreak are, on average, younger and better educated than the generations radicalised before them. The individuals in the second half of the data set were not only younger (24.9 years of age on average in the period between 2010-2018 compared to 28.5 years of age on average in the period between 2001-2009), but there was also more advanced education levels amongst the 2010 to 2018 group. For example 10 individuals between 2010-2018 had completed high school, compared with just two between 2001-2009 who had done so (noting that they did not necessarily complete the schooling during these years, but that the cases are from these years).

Of the 2010-2018 cohort, there was also a greater number of individuals who had university degrees (n=10) compared with the 2001-2009 cohort (n=4). Additionally, more individuals had commenced (but not completed) university between 2010 and 2018 (n=12) than between 2001 and 2009 (n=1). It must be noted, however, that the higher numbers in the second half of the data set are partly explained by the fact that there were twice as many individuals who offended in the period of time between 2010 and 2018 (n=60) than there was between 2001 and 2009 (n=31).

Whilst literature on the economics of crime suggests that a lack of education can be connected to illegal activity (see Freeman, 1996; Lochner & Moretti, 2004), terrorists are different from ordinary criminals and a lack of education does not equate to radicalisation or involvement in terrorism (Sageman, 2007; Turk, 2004). Sageman (2004) suggests that a common complaint in the West is that potential terrorists are relatively ignorant, and are therefore susceptible to brainwashing by a terrorist organisation. The sample in the study

he conducted (n=172), however, discredited this argument, finding that 29 percent had some college education, 33 percent graduated from college, five percent had the equivalent of a Master's degree and four percent had the equivalent of a doctoral degree (Sageman, 2004).

It was not only Sageman's study which identified high levels of education amongst terrorists; Gill, Horgan and Deckert (2014) similarly found that 32.5 percent of their sample (n=119) of individuals engaged in or planning to engage in lone actor terrorism had attended a community college or trade school or had a university undergraduate education without graduating. An additional 6.5 percent of the sample held a Master's degree and 7.8 percent held a doctoral degree (Gill, Horgan & Deckert, 2014). Ameer Ali, a former chairman of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils, expressed surprise at the fact that university students would join terrorist organisations, instead expecting them to be more mature and able to critically analyse information about such groups (Weber, 2015).

Humanitarian organisation, Mercy Corps (2016), in their research on the impact of increased access to formal education on youth participation in and support for political violence in Somaliland, also found that improving access to secondary education increased support for political violence by 11 percent. Whilst not the case for all terrorists, the evidence does not appear to suggest that they are necessarily uneducated, and so their involvement in terrorism is unlikely to be the product of a thoughtless decision involving no rationalisation.

Mental health

Another factor examined in the data set was mental health. A number of individuals from the data set who had been convicted of terrorism offences (and consequently incarcerated) reported the onset of mental health symptoms, such as depression and anxiety, as a result of their time in custody (*Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010; *R v Benbrika*, 2009). Data on mental health issues brought about by detainment has been excluded from the case analysis, except where such issues were present prior to individuals being arrested or having left Australia to fight with a terrorist organisation overseas. Taking these exclusions into account, nine percent of individuals in the data set (n=17) were identified as having experienced mental health issues or having a diagnosable psychiatric condition (refer to Table 5.14).

Table 5.14. Mental health conditions prior to involvement in terrorism[7]

Name	Diagnosis
Mathew Stewart (#1)	Bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder
Ahmed Raad (#21)	Anxiety and depression
Izzydeen Atik (#24)	Schizophrenia
Shane Kent (#25)	Described as being "mentally disturbed"
Bassam Raad (#27)	Depression, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia
Khaled Sharrouf (#38)	Depression, depressive anxiety disorder and schizophrenia
Jake Bilardi (#98)	Described as having "psychological problems or mental issues"
Man Haron Monis (#116)	Described as having a "mental illness"
Omar Al-Kutobi (#130)	Depressive disorder
AH (#141)	Major depressive disorder
Guy Staines (#158)	Intermittent explosive disorder
Alo-Bridget Namoa (#160)	Depression and symptoms of generalised anxiety disorder
NK (#164)	Adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood
Farhad Said (#169)	Depressive disorder, anxiety disorder and features of adjustment disorder
Ihsas Khan (#173)	Schizophrenia
D (#181)	Unspecified psychiatric condition
Dunn (pseudonym) (#190)	Schizophrenia

[7] Bergin et al., 2015; Booker, 2015; *D v Director of Public Prosecutions*, 2018; Olding, 2016e; *Regina (Cth) v Sharrouf*, 2009; *R v AH*, 2018; *R v Al-Kutobi*, 2016; *R v Atik*, 2007; *R v Bayda*, 2019; *R v Benbrika*, 2009; *R v Kent*, 2009; *R v NK*, 2016; *R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017; Schliebs, 2016d; *State of New South Wales v Dunn*, 2018; Stewart, 2015; *The Queen v R B*, 2018.

By comparison, a national survey of mental health and wellbeing conducted by the ABS (2008) concluded that out of 16 million Australians aged between 16 and 85 years, almost half (45%) had a mental disorder at some point in their life. Consequently, the findings from the data set do not support the argument that terrorists have a specific psychopathology or suffer from abnormal psychopathological behaviour and terrorist attributes (see Cooper, 1978; Lasch, 1979; Pearce, 1977; Silke, 2008).

Of the 17 individuals identified as having mental health issues or having a diagnosable psychiatric condition, five were converts ranging in age from 18 to 43 (Mathew Stewart (#1), Shane Kent (#25), Jake Bilardi (#98), Guy Staines (#158) and Alo-Bridget Namoa (#160)). With the exception of Namoa, the converts with mental health issues were all male Caucasian Australians. Six of the 17 individuals with mental health issues had a spousal or familial connection to another individual (or multiple individuals) in the data set. When engaging in terrorist acts, eight of the 17 individuals did so as lone actors. This lends support to Corner and Gill's (2015) finding that lone actor terrorists have a significantly higher likelihood of having a mental illness than those involved in a group.[8] The findings from the data set also go some way in supporting Hamm and Spaaj's (2015) research on lone wolf terrorism in America, and their conclusion that mental illness was more prevalent in lone wolf actors compared to members of terrorist groups.

Based on the assumption that a causal connection or correlation exists between abnormal psychopathological behaviour and terrorist attributes – and that terrorists have a specific psychopathology – there has been debate regarding the link between mental health and the likelihood of involvement in terrorism (Crenshaw, 2000; Rae, 2012). Such an

[8] See Chapter Six.

argument involves a belief that the presence of certain personality traits or traumatic life experiences indicates a propensity towards terrorism (Rae, 2012). Psychopathological approaches to understanding terrorists also focus solely on the individual (as opposed to the individual and the group), reasoning that a terrorist is born, not made, and that compulsion to join a terrorist organisation or being susceptible to recruitment by one are inherent traits (Gill & Young, 2011).

A different finding was produced by Taylor and Horgan (2006), who assess that there is little or no evidence to suggest that particular or distinctive individual qualities can be applied to terrorists. An individual's psychology cannot predict their propensity to become involved in terrorism; for instance Post (2015) advances that there are no psychological characteristics or psychopathology separating terrorists from the general population. Sageman (2004, p.80) supports this contention, and assesses that whilst the "mental illness thesis" offers a simple and comforting explanation for terrorism, it is inadequate. While there are indeed people suffering from psychological disorders to be found in terrorist organisations, they are the exception and not the rule, and Silke (2008) reasons that their lack of discipline, rationality, self-control and mental stamina mean that they do not make good terrorists.

Early investigations into the root causes of terrorism did tend to assume that the behaviour was psychopathological and that the perpetrators were not rational actors but, rather, mentally unbalanced (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009). It was previously thought that terrorists suffer from narcissistic, psychopathic and other personality disorders (see Cooper, 1978; Lasch, 1979; Pearce, 1977; Silke, 2008). There is certainly reason to believe that particular psychological factors or tendencies have the potential to increase

an individual's susceptibility towards being radicalised or involved in Islamist terrorism, and certain psychological theories suggest this to be so (Hutson, Long & Page, 2009).

However numerous contemporary psychological studies (see Bergin et al., 2015; Hutson, Long & Page, 2009) critique the assumption that terrorists are mentally unbalanced or that mental illness causes radicalisation. Terrorist personalities can be as diverse as the personalities of individuals in any lawful profession, and there are no visibly detectable personality traits that authorities can rely upon to identify a terrorist (Hudson, 1999; Jenkins, 2010). Extensive empirical research has also concluded that terrorists generally do not exhibit any familiar signs or "signature" characteristics of psychological dysfunctionality that are present in criminal offenders (Dean, 2007, p.175; see also Crenshaw, 2003). Moreover, Townshend (2011, p.16) proposes that far from being "criminals, crusaders, and crazies", in most empirical studies terrorists appear to be "disturbingly normal people".

Despite the indiscriminate and extreme violence involved in many terrorist acts, researchers such as Horgan (2005) and Silke (2003) contend that terrorists are not psychologically abnormal. Interestingly, according to Maile et al. (2010) and Silke (2008), psychologists that have had face-to-face contact with terrorists have nearly always concluded that they were in no way abnormal and even had stable and rational personalities, with research findings supporting the view that terrorists are psychologically normal. Indeed, data available on individual terrorists suggests that normality is their outstanding characteristic (Crenshaw, 2003).

Seeing the atrocities committed by terrorist organisations, it can be difficult to accept that the perpetrators are rational and mentally healthy individuals, when it is so much easier to see them as highly deviant and likely to be suffering from mental illnesses and psychopathological disorders (Silke, 2008). However, psychological profiling has thus far failed to determine a single terrorist personality, with current evidence on the matter indicating that there is no causal progression from mental illness to the occurrence of terrorist intention (Rae, 2012). As such, whilst mental health does play a role in some cases, ultimately the evidence does not indicate that it is a consistent variable amongst Islamist terrorists.

Conclusion

The findings from the data set illustrate the diversity of Islamist terrorists in Australia over the 17-year period being examined (2001-2018). Individuals in the data set were largely driven to travel overseas to engage in international conflicts, demonstrated by the 71 instances of individuals leaving Australia to support or engage in Islamist terrorism overseas. Daesh had the highest level of support amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia, with no other terrorist organisation coming close to having the same number of supporters as Daesh.

It was found that the average age of terrorists has significantly decreased with every wave of Islamist terrorism in Australia. The findings also suggest that it is more probable for young Muslim males to become involved in terrorism than females, albeit there was a marked increase in females who were radicalised and became involved in Islamist terrorism coinciding with the rise of Daesh in 2014.

The data set reveals terrorism to be largely homegrown, with 51 percent of individuals identified as having been born in Australia. Furthermore, in Australia, Lebanese ethnicity has been especially prevalent amongst terrorists, with 41 percent identifying as either Lebanese or part Lebanese. Examining these individuals in detail reveals them to be members of close-knit social and familial circles, which have fostered the radicalisation of many group members. The data set also indicates that individuals of the Islamic faith were the most receptive religious group to neojihadist ideology.

Data relating to education levels revealed that following the Syrian Civil War outbreak in 2011, Australian terrorists were, on average, younger and better educated than the generations radicalised before them. The data did not support the argument that a lack of education equates to radicalisation or involvement in terrorism. Moreover, the findings demonstrated that whilst there were individuals suffering from mental health issues, the numbers were not so significant as to support the argument that terrorists are mentally unbalanced or that mental illness leads to radicalisation.

Having explored the characteristics of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts in an Australian context, Chapter Six will consider the influence of social and familial networks on the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in Australia, as these connections have drastically sustained terrorism networks in Australia. This will be achieved through a social network analysis.

Chapter Six
Social network analysis

As preceding chapters have highlighted, there are a number of factors which can influence the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists. Radicalisation is a process, and terrorists are made, not born. Understanding *how* terrorists are made is therefore of utmost importance if we are to develop strategies to prevent radicalisation. Central to the making of a terrorist are the social and familial networks which can play a pivotal role in the radicalisation process and sustain an individual's involvement in terrorism. Understanding the impact of such networks is one of the key objectives of this thesis, and addresses the final subsidiary question: **What influence have social and familial networks had on the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in Australia?**

Individuals "rarely awake with a sudden taste for radicalism" (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p.85) and can become receptive to the possibility of accepting radical views through conversations with friends and other familiar people within their social networks. This is because "jihadists don't fall from the sky; they are formed" (Dalton & Bearup, 2014). Harris-Hogan (2015, cited in O'Brien, 2015) appraises radicalisation as being a fundamentally social process that is defined by social networks, rather than by online propaganda, individuals being brainwashed or by "an evil, unknown, predatory figure somewhere on the Internet".

The social network analysis contained in this chapter will detail the relationships and links amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia and will identify the key figures who have sustained terrorist networks domestically. As will be demonstrated through a number of

qualitative case studies, there is also evidence of such interactions influencing radicalisation.

The influence of family and other close social relationships has played a critical role in the passing of ideology and in the recruitment of many Australian terrorists (Harris-Hogan, 2014). Familial or friendship connections overwhelmingly make up networks of individuals who pass ideologies on to others within their network and act as a platform for the planning and execution of terrorist acts (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010; O'Brien, 2015). Consequently, rather than disparate isolated plots occurring over time, individuals involved in Islamist terrorism in Australia comprise an interconnected network which has been seen to transcend operational cells (Harris-Hogan, 2012).

Lone actors will also be considered in this chapter to demonstrate how, even when individuals appear to be operating alone, there is still clear evidence of echo chambers functioning as a support mechanism in an individual's radicalisation and planning of terrorism offences. The impact of echo chambers will also be cogitated in this chapter, owing to the instrumental role that they play in the radicalisation process.

Radicalisation as a social process

As this thesis has thus far emphasised, there are multiple factors which can influence the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists. Chapter Four considered motives and *why* individuals may become involved in terrorism; this chapter will consider *how* they become involved in terrorism, particularly in the context of social networking. Before analysing terrorist social networking, this section will first consider a number of theories and models which emphasise the importance of socialisation in the radicalisation process.

In his research on global terrorists, Sageman (2008b) identified friendship and kinship as playing a significant role in individuals joining the global Islamist terrorist movement. This would occur when a "bunch of guys" – informal and self-organised groups of trusted friends – collectively decided to join a terrorist organisation (Sageman, 2008b, p.66). Approximately two-thirds of the people in Sageman's (2008b) sample were friends with others who joined the terrorist movement together or already had some connection to terrorism.

Wiktorowicz's (2004) al-Muhajiroun model similarly recognises the role of socialisation in the process of radicalisation. Using the terrorist organisation al-Muhajiroun as a case study, Wiktorowicz's (2004) model proposes that individuals move through a course of exposure and deliberation before joining a group that they believe represents the 'true' version of Islam. A key factor identified in this model of radicalisation is the importance of religious seeking, whereby individuals look for meaning through a religious framework (Wiktorowicz, 2004) (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1. Wiktorowicz's al-Muhajiroun model



Source: Figure compiled by author

Frame alignment then occurs when the religious framework "makes sense" to the individual and attracts their interest (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.1). The final stage of the model is contingent on frame alignment being achieved, because if the seeker is sceptical, then they will either continue seeking or abandon the process (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Thus, if it is achieved, the individual goes through a socialisation process whereby they experience religious instruction which facilitates indoctrination, identity-construction and value changes (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

The fact that this model recognises the importance of socialisation, as well as the fact that individuals require convincing that the cause is worth the risks and costs of belonging (Wiktorowicz, 2004) is supported by the data in this thesis. Moreover, the experience of a cognitive opening – which can take the form of economic disadvantage or experiences such as humiliation or discrimination, and which challenges previously accepted beliefs and renders individuals more receptive to alternative perspectives – is similarly supported by the data in this thesis (see Chapter Four) and in literature on this topic (see Al-Lami, 2008; Gilligan, 2017).

Moghaddam's (2005) 'staircase to terrorism' model likewise places emphasis on socialisation. Moghaddam examined suicide terrorism in the context of a metaphorical narrowing staircase to demonstrate the steps that lead to the commissioning of a terrorist act. According to this model, an increasingly small number of people ascend up the higher floors with only a few ever reaching the top (which represents the commissioning of a terrorist act). Moghaddam's (2005) model is depicted in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2. Moghaddam's 'staircase to terrorism'



Source: Figure compiled by author

On the ground floor of Moghaddam's (2005) model, perceptions of fairness and feelings of relative deprivation dominate, with individuals climbing to the first floor in search of solutions. Failure to do so leads to progression up the metaphorical staircase, with the most important transformation occurring on the third floor, when individuals become engaged with the morality of terrorist organisations and begin to perceive terrorism as justifiable. Recruitment occurs on the fourth floor, at which point terrorist organisations are legitimised and recruits develop an 'us' versus 'them' mentality. Upon reaching the last floor, certain individuals are selected and trained to sidestep inhibitory mechanisms which prevent them from injuring and killing themselves and others, and they are then deployed to carry out terrorist attacks.

This model emphasises a fixed set of steps, which individuals must climb sequentially, in order to reach the final stage where they are prepared to commit acts of terrorism. The

progression from the third floor (which stresses the importance of extremist beliefs) to the fourth floor (whereby extremist behaviour takes place) also lends support to the contention that radicalisation encompasses both cognitive and behavioural aspects (see Chapter One).

As with Moghaddam's model, Gill's (2008) pathway model recognises the importance of socialisation. According to Gill, four key stages are experienced in the radicalisation process, especially amongst suicide bombers, comprising of a socialisation process, catalyst, pre-existing ties and in-group radicalisation (see Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3. Gill's pathway model

Source: Figure compiled by author

Gill proposes that recruitment occurs on a gradual basis with there being a large emphasis on familial and friendship ties, as motivation to join a terrorist organisation alone is rarely enough to drive an individual to membership. The emphasis placed on the process of socialisation to the trajectory of individuals moving towards terrorism is important, as this model proposes that certain connections – such as social or familial bonds – can predispose individuals towards participating in violence and facilitate the recruitment process. As the social network analysis later in this chapter will illustrate, this finding is supported by the data set.

Experiencing a catalyst – which can be religious, political or personal in nature – motivates the individual to join a terrorist organisation, with pre-existing ties such as social or familial bonds facilitating and aiding the recruitment process (Gill, 2008). As a result of membership within the group, individual identities are redefined and a group identity is internalised (Gill, 2008). Self-esteem is also improved whilst in the group setting, which further strengthens the individual's identification with the group (Gill, 2008).

Comparably, McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008) 12 mechanisms of political radicalisation model acknowledges the influential nature of socialisation in the radicalisation process. McCauley and Moskalenko identified 12 'mechanisms' spanning three levels, which identify and elaborate on social psychological processes that account for political radicalisation (see Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4. McCauley and Moskalenko's 12 mechanisms of political radicalisation

Source: Figure compiled by author

In keeping with the predominant opinion amongst terrorism research – that the pathways leading individuals and groups to radicalisation and Islamist terrorism are numerous and diverse – McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) argue that radicalisation is likely to involve multiple mechanisms for an individual's trajectory to terrorism. Significantly, this model also emphasises the importance of social and familial connections, claiming that the path to radicalisation is through personal networks, whereby individuals are recruited by friends, family and lovers who seek to recruit people they trust will not betray them to the authorities (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

McCauley and Moskalenko's approach draws parallels with the model adopted by Moghaddam (2005), whereby the ascent to the top of the staircase is characterised by a particular psychological process, with the increasing narrowing representing the individual's narrowing choices which make it more difficult to disengage and descend the staircase.

Terrorist social networking

Hesitant to recruit someone that might betray them to the authorities, terrorists use personal connections and recruit from their network of friends, partners and family, with friendship and kinship forming the basis of the mobilisation of individuals into terrorism (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Sageman, 2008a). Former AFP analyst and al-Qaeda expert, Leah Farrall, even advances that armed jihad is “a mandated social activity” amongst terrorist groups (Schliebs, 2015b). This suggests that ultimately, the key to radicalisation lies in mechanisms such as socialisation, bonding and peer pressure within small groups that make up wider violent subcultures (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008).

The presence of these mechanisms gradually allows group members to overcome moral inhibitions against harming other human beings (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). Through a psychological process coined by Stoner (1961) known as 'risky shift', individuals gradually adopt the beliefs and faith of the more extreme members of the group and, in the process of dedicating their increasing focus to the group, their religious faith also grows in intensity (Silke, 2008). A similar phenomenon known as 'group polarisation' allows youths to form bonds with like-minded individuals and gain an avenue through which they may also become radicalised (Madden, 2008).

Also referred to as 'group process', individuals are motivated to do in a group what they would not do as individuals, and these processes make clear how group bonds become an influential force in motivating individuals to join terrorist organisations and commit terrorist acts (Decker & Pyrooz, 2011). Participation in terrorism then leads to increased cohesion within the group – because group bonds are strengthened by participating in such an illicit activity – as well as increased feelings of aggressiveness towards threatening out-groups (Orehek et al., 2010).

Differential association theory, meanwhile, proposes that criminal behaviour is learned in groups and that people learn from the tricks, successes and failures of those belonging to their group, rather than simply acting alone (Armstrong & Matusitz, 2013). Developed by Sutherland (1947) in his seminal works, the theory postulates that learning – especially the learning of violent behaviour – occurs in groups of like-minded individuals (Armstrong & Matusitz, 2013).

Research on social networks also indicates that similar people tend to find and interact with one another (Al Raffie, 2013; Brass et al., 2004). This can occur in ‘echo chambers’ – in places such as study groups and radical mosques or on the Internet – where individuals are able to interact with others who are like-minded and who echo and support their extremist beliefs and ideas (von Behr et al., 2013). Bonding social capital – which refers to the links between like-minded individuals, or the reinforcement of homogeneity – provides an explanation for this (Baron, Field & Schuller, 2000). This concept builds strong social ties but can also lead to “higher walls” that exclude those who do not qualify (Baron, Field & Schuller, 2000, p.10).

Silke (2008) explains how this occurs in small groups of friends, whereby individuals undergo a long period of intense social interaction and develop a strong mutual intimacy that relieves the previous isolation they experienced. Bizina and Gray (2014) similarly identified group phenomenon as playing an important role in the creation of terrorist networks, finding that close friends or relatives tend to join as a group. Atran (2006, p.135) correspondingly contends that terrorist activity in diaspora communities is typically carried out by “self-forming cells of friends”. In his studies of Australian terrorist networks, Harris-Hogan (2012; 2014) also identified a large interconnected network of terrorists which had strong social links to previous operational cells, with many individuals having pre-existing ties with members already inside the network.

The importance of social and familial networks is not unique to Australia; Sageman (2008b) produced similar findings amongst his sample of global terrorists (n=172); two-thirds were identified as already having a connection to the network before joining. Sageman (2004) also noted that about 75 percent became involved in terrorism as a group

with friends or relatives, or had pre-existing social bonds to individuals already involved in terrorism. Building on Sageman's database, Atran (2006) established that the social networks in the sample consisted of about 70 percent friends and 20 percent family.

Thompson (2011) found that in 2008, 96 percent of young Muslim men in the Middle East and Northern Africa who were radicalised and recruited into a terrorist organisation did so through interpersonal connections, such as through their religious institutions, family members, friends and neighbours. In another study conducted by Sageman (2004), and similarly concurred by Bakker (2006), individuals were found to gradually become radicalised within small groups. Within Bakker's (2006) study, social affiliation played a role in the recruitment into terrorism of over 35 percent of individuals. A study conducted by the Saudi Ministry of Interior throughout 2004 found that nearly two-thirds of the individuals in their sample (n=639) said their involvement in terrorism began through friends and about a quarter through family (Atran, 2008).

Furthermore, in 2015, New America (a United States-based think tank) collected information about 474 individuals from 25 Western countries who were reported as having left their home countries to join Daesh or other terrorist organisations in Syria or Iraq (Bergen, Schuster & Sterman, 2015). Based on the data New America collected, Bergen, Schuster & Sterman (2015) concluded that over a third of the Western fighters had a familial connection to terrorism, by means of relatives, marriage or some other link. Thus the literature establishes that social and familial connections are pivotal in the radicalisation process. As the analysis below will demonstrate, findings arising out of the data set entirely support this conclusion in an Australian context.

Social and familial connections in Australia

Harris-Hogan (2015, cited in O'Brien, 2015) evaluates radicalisation as being a social process with clear social group dynamics. He suggests that in the overwhelming majority of cases, individuals do not radicalise alone "in the true lone wolf sense of the word"; instead radicalisation occurs within social networks of close, trusted peers and family networks (O'Brien, 2015). As a result, social and familial connections within terrorist networks significantly increase the susceptibility of some individuals to the terrorist movement and can be a direct factor for their involvement in it (Harris-Hogan & Zammit 2014).

There were numerous examples of social and familial connections identified amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia, with individuals in the data set being connected by means of relatives, spouses and social groups, as well as via attendances at the same mosques or Islamic centres. Eighty four percent of individuals (n=163) were identified as having a connection (or multiple connections) to others in the data set. This illustrates the impact such networks can have on radicalisation, which occurs across face-to-face and mediated contexts.

Figure 6.5 provides an overview of the types of social and familial connections amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia. It also illustrates the effects of like-minded individuals clustering together, a fact also supported by the literature (see Sageman, 2007) which argues that through such connections and associations, the groups which individuals join act as echo chambers, thereby amplifying their grievances, intensifying group bonds, generating values which reject those of society and facilitating a gradual separation from the society in which they reside.

Figure 6.5. Overview of social and familial connections amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia[1]



[1] Yellow lines represent a family relation; green lines represent a social connection or association; blue lines represent involvement in the same terrorist plot or arrest as part of the same counter-terrorism investigation; and red lines represent a spousal connection. Attendances at the same mosque or Islamic centre or participation in significant groups or events are labelled accordingly.

There is a notable interconnectedness amongst the individuals in the data set in relation to spousal and familial connections; 42 percent were found to have a family member(s) or spouse also included within the data. This finding supports Harris-Hogan’s (2014, p.31) assertion that family influence is one of the “key drivers” of Islamist terrorism in Australia.

Figure 6.6 outlines the spousal and familial connections identified between individuals in the data set, highlighting the ways in which they were related or connected. This is significant, as it demonstrates how individuals were linked via a number of means including marriage, through their immediate family as well as through broader familial links. A number of these specific cases will be discussed throughout this chapter.

Figure 6.6. Spousal and familial connections amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia



Despite some assertions that familial obligations act as a protective factor against involvement in terrorism (see HM Government, 2018), this was not found to be the case in an Australian context. There were multiple examples of shared ideology between spouses throughout the data set, particularly in the third wave. Husband and wife Tyler Casey (#82) and Amira Karroum (#83), for example, travelled to Syria to join terrorist organisation, Jabhat al-Nusra, and were killed there shortly after (Bergin et al., 2015; Harris-Hogan, 2014).

Fatima Elomar (#89), the wife of Mohamed Elomar (#142), was arrested at Sydney Airport with her three children while trying to fly overseas with supplies and equipment for her husband (Olding, 2015d; Ritchie & Buckingham-Jones, 2016). Khaled Sharrouf (#38) relocated his convert wife, Tara Nettleton (#86), and five young children from Sydney to Daesh's stronghold in Raqqa (Saltman & Smith, 2015). Whilst there, at the age of 13, Sharrouf's oldest daughter, Zaynab, married Mohamed Elomar and gave birth to his child in Syria (Dredge & Welch, 2019; Olding, 2015d).

Social stereotypes about terrorists being single men lacking any attachment to society as a whole, and having the scope to perform acts of terrorism without being concerned about their responsibilities or fears of reprisals on their families, appear to be inaccurate (Sageman, 2004). Forty four percent of the individuals in the data set were found to be married (n=85), however Mullins (2013) posits that marriage does not appear to be a protective factor against involvement in terrorism. He argues that whilst it would seem to be counterintuitive for an individual with familial responsibilities to engage in terrorism, it is in fact not an uncommon occurrence (Mullins, 2011).

Silke (2008) similarly opines that factors which are usually associated with desistance, such as marriage, do not have the same influence on terrorists as they would on other criminal groups. Roy (2015, p.5) even notes that having a newborn baby "is never an obstacle to go for [a] suicide bombing", citing Omar Ismail Mostefai – one of the perpetrators of the November 2015 terrorist attack in Paris – as an example, as his wife had given birth shortly before he carried out the attack (Newton-Small, 2015).

The results arising from the data set support this literature, suggesting that for Islamist terrorists, the neojihadist ideology to which they adhere far outweighs their familial obligations. This is evinced by the 44 percent (n=85) of individuals from the data set who despite being married and 37 percent (n=72) who had children, set out to commit or did commit terrorist acts in the knowledge that they would likely result in either death or lengthy prison sentences.

A model which refers to the absence of personal constraints such as marriage, familial responsibilities and full-time employment is biographical availability, which proposes that in the absence of these factors, the costs and risks of movement participation may increase (McAdam, 1986). However, the data set indicates that marriage and family commitments do not appear to prevent individuals from becoming involved in Islamist terrorism. Rather than having a preventative effect, spouses can actually share ideological beliefs and influence one another's radicalisation, which was evident in the data set. West's (1982) finding that marriage only has a preventative effect in diminishing offending behaviour amongst older adults may go some way in explaining this, as the average age of the individuals in the data set was in their twenties.

Having now outlined a broad overview of the social and familial networks amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia, to critically exemplify their interconnectivity and assess the differences in how they radicalised between 2001 and 2018, the sections below will provide an analysis in the context of the three waves of terrorism discussed in preceding chapters. This is depicted in Figure 6.7 and colour coded to depict the first wave (2001-2004) in green, the second wave (2005-2013) in blue and the third wave (2014-2018) in red.

Figure 6.7. Social and familial connections amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia by wave



First wave (2001-2004)

Fifteen Islamist terrorists were identified in the first wave, and 10 of these were found to have a connection with another individual in the data set. However in two of these cases (Jack Roche (#4) and Hussam Sabbagh (#15)) the connections were not to individuals within the first wave but to others in Figure 6.7. Figure 6.8 depicts the eight individuals who had links to others in the first wave.

Figure 6.8. Social and familial connections in the first wave (2001-2004)



Connections amongst individuals in the first wave were predominantly familial, with spouses and two pairs of siblings identified. As noted, family influence is a key driver of terrorism in Australia. For instance, Moustafa Cheikho (#33), was noted as having made “a full commitment to the devout observation of his religion” as he came more under the influence of his uncle, Khaled Cheikho (#32) (*Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010, p.28).

Parents can also have a radicalising influence over their children; importantly in the context of the first wave, is the case of Rabiah Hutchinson (#7), whose influence highlights the important role played by parents as facilitators in the recruitment and retention of family members into terrorist networks (Harris-Hogan, 2014). Hutchinson's sway over her children contributed to the involvement of several of them in terrorism (Harris-Hogan, 2014). In 2006, Hutchinson's sons Mohammed Ayub (#41) and Abdullah Ayub (#42) were detained in Yemen on suspicion of being members of al-Qaeda, and several years later Mohammed also joined Daesh (Harris-Hogan, 2014; Schliebs, 2014d).

Terrorist networks have become increasingly endogamous over time, and it is not uncommon for individuals to marry the relations of other terrorists and ultimately reinforce group ties (Harris-Hogan, 2014). One of Hutchinson's daughters, for instance, married Khaled Cheikho, and Hutchinson also attempted to arrange for another daughter to marry her husband, Abdul Rahim Ayub's (#3), twin brother (who was a former al-Qaeda training camp instructor) (Neighbour, 2009; *Regina (Cth) v Baladjam*, 2008). As kinship bonds cement friendship bonds, the result is a network bound in a level of trust that makes it increasingly difficult to penetrate or break (Harris-Hogan, 2014; Sageman, 2008b).

Second wave (2005-2013)

Sixty six individuals were identified in the second wave. Sixty one of these were found to have a connection with another individual in the data set. However in four of these cases (Zouheir Issa (#39), Mustapha Al Majzoub (#59), Mostafa Mahamad Farag (#65) and Milad Bin Ahmad-Shah Al-Ahmadzai (#65)) the connections were not to individuals within the second wave but to others in Figure 6.7. Figure 6.9 depicts the 57 individuals with links to others in the second wave.

Figure 6.9. Social and familial connections in the second wave (2005-2013)



An examination of Figure 6.7 reveals several key figures in particular who had established multiple connections with others in the data set, which transcended both time and place, overlapping across different locations and numerous terrorist plots and counter-terrorism investigations in Australia. The most significant of these individuals are Abdul Nacer Benbrika (#17), Aimen Joud (#18), Mohamed Ali Elomar (#30), Khaled Sharrouf (#38), Ahmed Elomar (#47), Ahmad Naizmand (#70), Hamdi Alqudsi (#76), Mohamed Zuhbi (#80), Mohammed Ali Baryalei (#109), Mohamed Elomar (#142), Raban Alou (#147), Sulayman Khalid (#151) and Milad Atai (#163).

Eight of these 13 particularly influential figures were from the second wave. Five of the 13 were Lebanese, which lends support to Harris-Hogan and Zammit's (2014) supposition that thus far, individuals of Lebanese descent have been the most prominent amongst Islamist terrorists in Australia. Nevertheless, there was a mix of other ethnicities amongst the remaining individuals (Afghan, Algerian, Kurdish/Syrian, Italian/Iraqi and Palestinian). The 13 men were of varying ages (ranging from 18 to 45), they all supported different terrorist organisations and they all had different upbringings and backgrounds. The one thing they all had in common was the network of like-minded individuals which surrounded them and supported their adherence to neojihadist ideology.

One particularly significant case is that of Abdul Nacer Benbrika (#17), who according to a Victoria Police detective inspector, acted akin to the "Pied Piper" (Jopson, 2012) (see Figure 6.10) and led a conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in Melbourne and Sydney from 2004 to 2005 when he was arrested (*Benbrika & Ors v The Queen*, 2010; *Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010). This resulted in the large counter-terrorism investigation known as

Operation Pendennis[2] – which saw over 20 men indicted for a series of terrorism offences (*Benbrika & Ors v The Queen*, 2010; Caldwell, 2011; *Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010).

Figure 6.10. The connections of Abdul Nacer Benbrika[3]



Surrounding himself with young individuals who were vulnerable and susceptible to a person such as him, Benbrika exercised immense influence over those who followed him, and instilled (or sought to instil) in them "a fanatical hatred" of both non-Muslims and

[2] See Chapter Two.
[3] Yellow lines represent a familial relation; black lines represent a social or personal connection; and blue lines represent involvement in the same terrorist plot and arrest as part of the same counter-terrorism investigation (in this case, Operation Pendennis).

Muslims who oppose violence (Jopson, 2012; *R v Benbrika*, 2009, p.20). The flow on effect of Benbrika's influence also goes beyond the direct connections outlined in Figure 6.10. For instance, brothers Ahmed Raad (#21) and Ezzit Raad (#22), who were both convicted for their involvement in the Melbourne Benbrika cell, became further radicalised while in prison and were involved in recruiting other inmates there (Houston, 2016). Ezzit left Australia for Syria within months of his release from prison, with the effect of the brothers' radicalisation being that another brother, Mounir Raad (#78), and brother-in-law, Adam Dahman (#77), followed Ezzit to Syria shortly after his departure from Australia (Houston, 2016). Dahman ultimately died in a suicide bombing in Iraq (Roose, 2016).

The Benbrika cells exemplified hesitancy about betrayal to authorities, preferring to use personal connections and recruit from their network of friends, partners and family (*Elomar v R*, 2014). The cells were comprised of relatives and friends with deep social connections, dating back to individuals who were involved in terrorism in Australia in the early 2000s (O'Brien, 2015). Furthermore, the dynamic of individuals in the Benbrika cells can be traced through to the offenders arrested as part of joint state and federal police Operation Neath in Victoria in 2009 and further still to 2014, and those arrested as part of Operation Appleby in New South Wales.

Counter-terrorism expert, Professor Greg Barton, proposes that this is because following Daesh's declaration of a caliphate in June 2014, Benbrika became a *cause célèbre* amongst radicals, with his influence increasing as he became highly sought after in prison by people seeking his advice (Bedford, 2016). The five individuals charged in 2009 as part of Operation Neath had been on the periphery of the Operation Pendennis

investigation (O'Brien, 2015) (refer to Chapter Two). Nayev El Sayed (#54), one of the offenders charged under Operation Neath, even visited Benbrika in prison two months before he was arrested (Jopson, 2012). Harun Mehicevic (#61), another of Benbrika's associates, ran the al-Furqan Islamic Centre in Melbourne, which was attended by a large number of other individuals from the data set including Junaid Thorne (#81) – the brother of Benbrika's son-in-law, Shayden Thorne (#58).

Social connections have largely been established in Islamic centres – which have served as meeting places for radical Islamic supporters and which have been openly sympathetic of terrorist organisations such as Daesh – thereby attracting individuals who believe in a violent extremist interpretation of Islam (Chambers & Meers, 2014; *Gaughan v Causevic*, 2016). Recruitment "hotspot[s] for fundamentalists", such as al-Furqan in Melbourne and the al-Risalah Islamic Centre in Sydney's south-western suburb of Bankstown (refer to Figure 6.5), have attracted young idealistic men from Lebanese, Syrian, Arab and Turkish backgrounds in particular for recruitment (Chambers & McClellan, 2014).

Attendees at such centres become acquainted with one another and are exposed to "extremist, hate-filled thinking from older, hateful but charismatic individuals", which influences their radicalisation (*DPP (Cth) v Besim*, 2017, p.3). Wissam Haddad (#127), who ran al-Risalah prior to its closure in 2014, considered the reason why some young people were attracted to such centres as opposed to mosques, for example, was because:

> … the kids have had enough. Like our parents have lived for so long with [an] inferiority complex or the defeated mentality and the youth have had enough. So when the youth see somebody who is willing to stand up for Islam, to stand up for the Muslims, to stand up for the youth, obviously they're attracted to this (Brockie, 2014).

As noted in Chapter Five, a risk factor for young people in particular is the attraction of charismatic individuals – such as pseudo-religious scholars – who present a narrative that offers acceptance and belonging (O'Brien, 2015). Benbrika is one such example of a "self-styled Muslim cleric" who surrounded himself with a group of zealous and vulnerable young men (Boulton et al., 2005). A number of other "self-styled sheik[s]" from the data set – such as Mostafa Mahamad Farag (#65), Junaid Thorne (#81) and Robert Cerantonio (#94) – would similarly preach at venues such as al-Furqan and al-Risalah (Chambers & Meers, 2014). The danger posed by such individuals and comparable "internet hate-sheiks" is that they preach a "bastardised version of violent Islam" to vulnerable people who largely "[don't] even know how to worship the God" they decide to fight and die for (Maley & Lyons, 2015).

In so doing, such individuals can influence the radicalisation of others who turn to them for leadership and religious and spiritual guidance. This was reflected in the sentencing remarks in relation to Cerantonio:

> While [his] co-accused were all grown men with their own pre-existing extremist ideas held with varying degrees of conviction, Mr Cerantonio appears to have done all he could to confirm or even enhance those views and, in some cases, to persuade those who might have been vulnerable, and who seemed to be questioning the wisdom or righteousness of the plan, to his perverse way of thinking. … those who hold themselves out as leaders of groups such as this one and as preachers of such putrid ideas, and who, in doing so, corruptly influence – or attempt to influence – the thoughts and behaviour of others, deserve, all else being equal, substantially greater punishment than the subordinates who follow those leaders like lobotomised sheep. Mr Cerantonio is a man of obvious intelligence and ability. … his moral culpability is all the greater because he attempted to use his considerable gifts for evil, not good (*R v Cerantonio*, 2019, p.18).

Cases from the data set consistently illustrated that in an Australian context, the extremist teachings of persuasive figures who dub themselves 'scholars', 'clerics' or 'experts' on

Islam have played an influential role in the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts.

Third wave (2014-2018)

In the third wave, there were 113 individuals identified. Eighty three of these were found to have a connection with another individual in the data set. However in five of these cases (Mohomed Unais Mohamed Ameen (#90), Jake Bilardi (#98), Mohammad Yosof Keshtyar (#126), CMHV (#155) and Hazem Zuhbi (#172), the connections were not to individuals within the third wave but to others in Figure 6.7. Figure 6.11 depicts the 78 individuals with links to others in the third wave.

Figure 6.11. Social and familial connections in the third wave (2014-2018)



Social connections have evidently played a major role in propagating radicalisation in Australia, providing individuals with "a sense of belonging, identity and personal validation" (*R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017, p.111). For instance, in the case of Omar Al-Kutobi (#130) and Mohammad Kiad (#131), the relationship between the two offenders:

> … provided fertile ground through shared experience, for extremist ideology to take hold that provided the justification for planning to engage in an act of terror … and serve [Daesh] with the misguided belief that this might give life some purpose and meaning (*R v Al-Kutobi*, 2016, p.39).

For Milad Atai (#163), social connections were deemed by a forensic psychiatrist to have been critical on his pathway towards radicalisation. The psychiatrist assessed that:

> [Atai's] pathway towards radicalization, as with the majority of terrorism-related offenders, was likely facilitated through extremist social contacts and influences, his older brother being very religious and the friendships that he developed from 2013 onwards including other members of the so-called 'Appleby Group',[4] most notably Raban Alou (*R v Atai*, 2018, p.36).

Atai continued this cycle of radicalisation; just as he was influenced by social and familial contacts, he too influenced NK (#164) – the teenage relative of one of his terrorist contacts – to commit the offence of collecting funds for, or on behalf of, a terrorist organisation (*R v NK*, 2016).

By sentencing and removing from society figures like Benbrika and Mohamed Ali Elomar (#30) (who each played the most influential roles in the Benbrika cells) during the second wave, the influence of their ideology on their social and familial networks was not removed (Jopson, 2012). Rather, other individuals – such as Khaled Sharrouf (#38) and Mohamed Elomar (#142) (Mohamed Ali Elomar's nephew) – were able to "step into a vacuum" and take their place (O'Brien, 2015).

[4] See Chapter Two for a discussion of Operation Appleby.

In September 2012, Sharrouf and Mohamed Elomar led the most public outing ever of Sydney's neojihadists in Hyde Park, providing a virtual "who's who" of Australia's terrorists, and featuring a number of individuals who later came to be arrested and sentenced as part of Operation Appleby (O'Brien, 2015). This included Hamdi Alqudsi (#76), who in 2016 was convicted of aiding seven young Australians in travelling to Syria for the purpose of engaging in armed hostilities there (*R v Alqudsi*, 2016); Sulayman Khalid (#151), who in 2017 was convicted of conspiring to do acts in preparation for a terrorist act or acts (*R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017); and Raban Alou (#147), who in 2018 was convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of the terrorist act which caused the death of police accountant, Curtis Cheng (*R v Alou*, 2018).

Following his arrest, Emir Biber (#129), one of the younger offenders from the data set (aged 16 at the time of his arrest), demonstrated insight about his need to separate himself from the individuals he had been associating with, acknowledging the impact that social networks had on his radicalisation (*R v EB*, 2018). Biber noted:

> I know that ideology can slowly creep back into my mind as much as I try to avoid it. So that's why I am not going to hang around these people anymore (*R v EB*, 2018, p.21).

This statement denotes that prospects of successful de-radicalisation may be dependent upon the removal of influential figures and social connections which foster radicalisation. This is rendered particularly difficult for individuals who are sentenced and imprisoned together, because in such circumstances there is likely to be greater pressure not to disavow the extremist beliefs which led to the incarceration in the first place (see Jones & Narag, 2018).

On this basis, younger offenders who are incarcerated in youth justice centres, as opposed to adult prisons after having been convicted of terrorism offences, would appear to have a greater likelihood of successfully abandoning the radical beliefs and views they may have previously held, as they have the advantage of not being pressured by other terrorist offenders. MHK (#139) – another young offender in the data set (aged 17 at the time of his arrest) who was sentenced to a youth justice centre – was assessed as having good prospects for rehabilitation for this very reason (*R v MHK*, 2016).

Lone actors

Individuals overwhelmingly do not radicalise alone, and involvement in Islamist terrorism is a group phenomenon, with social relationships playing an integral role in the process (Harris-Hogan & Barrelle, 2018; Silke, 2008). In Bright, Whelan and Harris-Hogan's (2018) study of connections between terrorist networks, the authors found that even seemingly disparate groups, which may appear to be acting independently of each other, can still potentially be connected by individuals who assist in the spread of ideas and information across time. Examining networks of Australian neojihadists specifically, they concluded that domestically individuals do not radicalise alone and are evidently connected to a wider network (Bright, Whelan & Harris-Hogan, 2018).

Likewise in this thesis, whilst 84 percent were identified as having a social or familial connection to another individual in the data set, there were some individuals who did not appear to have such a connection, such as Jake Bilardi (#98) and MHK (#139). Nevertheless, involvement in terrorism almost always includes a human influencer who facilitates and drives the radicalisation process (Winter, 2015). Of the individuals not identified as having links to others in the data set, there were still clear ties found to other like-minded individuals. Bilardi, for example, travelled to Iraq, where he carried out a

martyrdom operation with the help of a ‘brother’ he found online (Bachelard, 2015). The ‘brother’, Mirsad Kandic, was subsequently charged in the United States with six federal terrorism offences, arising from his provision of material support and resources to Daesh (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017).

MHK was similarly engaging in online contact with Junaid Hussain, a British neojihadist from the United Kingdom, who was connected to Daesh and acted as a propagandist and recruiter for them until his death in Syria in August 2015 (*R v MHK*, 2016). Hussain encouraged MHK to launch a terrorist attack in Melbourne through the use of explosive devices, providing him with electronic links to bomb-making manuals, which detailed how to make and use such devices from readily available materials that were freely obtainable in the community, and that could be purchased without raising suspicion (*R v MHK*, 2016).

As such, it would appear that lone actors are arguably not really lone actors; that is, they invariably work with others in planning and committing acts of terror, even vicariously. Whilst not always immediately obvious, they often have a source (which can take the form of an associate on the Internet) that provides them with direction or guidance and echoes their radical beliefs. Schuurman et al. (2017, p.2) concur, noting that regardless of how small cells may be, “as soon as two or more people interact with one another with the aim of committing a terrorist attack, small-group dynamics come into play”. As social connections play such an integral role in the radicalisation of individuals and their motivation to commit terrorist acts, genuine lone actors are rendered so uncommon as to be anomalies (Schuurman et al., 2017; see also Spaaij, 2012).

A distinction is drawn in this thesis between individuals who radicalised in a group and acted alone, such as the aforementioned examples of Bilardi and MHK, and those who radicalised alone and acted alone. Ihsas Khan (#173) – who was sentenced for the offence of engaging in a terrorist act – radicalised and acted alone after watching extremist footage promulgated by terrorist organisations (*R v Khan*, 2019). Similarly, Man Haron Monis (#116) – who was killed after engaging in a terrorist act at the Lindt Café at Martin Place in Sydney – radicalised and acted alone.

Individuals who radicalise and act alone as opposed to radicalise alone and act in a group have been described as atypical, because "radicalisation is most commonly a social process and it is rare for a person to become radicalised entirely alone" (Coroners Court of New South Wales, 2017, p.239). The cases of Khan and Monis also support the findings outlined in Chapter Five relating to the higher likelihood of mental illness amongst lone actor terrorists compared to those involved in a group (Corner & Gill, 2015; Hamm & Spaaj, 2015).

The Internet and social media as echo chambers

As noted earlier in this chapter, the groups which individuals join act as echo chambers, amplifying their grievances and intensifying group bonds. The Internet and social media can similarly function as echo chambers. The latest generation of youth has grown up viewing social media as a commonplace platform to feed their information and social connection needs (Thompson, 2011). It is an effective tool used to assist in radicalisation and recruitment as it is ever-present and lures users with promises of friendship, acceptance and a sense of purpose (Thompson, 2011), with some users even finding it addictive (Ryding & Kaye, 2018). Terrorist organisations take advantage of this and utilise social media to systematically prey upon vulnerable young people, by offering

them various incentives in an attempt to make membership seem more appealing (Homeland Security Institute, 2009).

The Internet and social media platforms also act as ‘echo chambers’, which has the effect of “encouraging escalation of grievances and beliefs in conspiracy to the point of hatred” (Sageman, 2008b, p.87) and allows individuals to interact with others who are like-minded and who echo and support their ideas (von Behr et al., 2013). This is also a method which provides greater opportunity than offline interactions to confirm existing extremist beliefs (von Behr et al., 2013).

Social media quickly and easily connects people with a wide audience, allowing like-minded individuals to exchange ideas and sometimes even act on them (Thompson, 2011). This also gives the illusion of “strength in numbers” and affirms a radicalised individual’s beliefs (Saddiq, 2010, p.2). For example, this view was supported in the case of Emir Biber (#129), who used social media to seek out and support other known terrorists who had departed Australia, such as Amin Elmir (#165) (*R v EB*, 2018).

Von Knop (2007) considers that one of the reasons why young people in particular are drawn to radical Internet pages is as a result of them seeking a community with which they can self-identify. The Internet allows for the intensification of “a sense of identity” through group polarisation (Madden, 2008), with multiple studies having observed that socialisation with like-minded individuals reinforces extremist views (Al Raffie, 2013; Brandon, 2009). The Internet can also foster international connections; in the case of Sevdet Ramadan Besim (#137), it enabled the offender to connect and communicate with

a terrorist in the United Kingdom, thereby allowing them to plan a terrorist attack to be carried out on ANZAC Day in Melbourne in 2015 (*R v Besim*, 2016).

By enabling connections "with like-minded individuals from across the world 24/7" (von Behr et al., 2013, p.xii), such platforms significantly increase the opportunities for individuals to become radicalised. The Internet also has the ability to connect members of different terrorist organisations across the world, facilitating the exchange of not only ideas, but also information about topics such as bomb making, establishing terror cells and carrying out terrorist attacks (Weimann, 2004).

The Internet is a platform which facilitates radicalisation, with users generally seeking out information that strengthens, rather than challenges, their beliefs (Madden, 2008). 'Cyberbalkanization' is a concept which refers to the idea of the Internet being segregated into small political groups with similar perspectives, effectively leading to individuals developing a narrow-minded approach to others with contradictory views (Bozdag & van den Hoven, 2015). The effect of individuals being able to select their information sources is that the Internet can foster an environment where echo chambers are more common and dangerous (Dubois & Blank, 2018).

Social media platforms also foster a sense of community, and their functionality as echo chambers renders them capable of promulgating extremist ideas and facilitating radicalisation (Counter Extremist Project, 2018). Daesh employed social media to boost its visibility, spread propaganda, reinforce its image of power and threat and enhance its appeal to vulnerable recruits (Richards, 2014). The use of hash tags on social media posts was one such way they achieved this; one particular image tweeted by Daesh depicted the

severed head of an Iraqi police chief perched on his legs, captioned “This is our ball … it has skin on it” followed by “#WorldCup” (Richards, 2014). This image appeared on the news feeds of millions of people following the FIFA World Cup in 2014 (Richards, 2014).

Waters and Postings (2018) found that the ‘suggested friends’ algorithm employed by Facebook aided in connecting neojihadists, and thereby helped expand Daesh’s network by recommending to individuals suggested contacts who were terrorist sympathisers, propagandists and even fighters. The Facebook ‘Live’ feature was also found to be utilised by Daesh sympathisers to hold ‘meetings’ to discuss the group’s ideology and methods to avoid detection by law enforcement agencies (Waters & Postings, 2018). ‘Like’ features on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter can similarly have the effect of affirming and legitimising extremist ideas (Counter Extremist Project, 2018).

Bergin (2008, cited in Stacey, 2018, p.27) proposes that Islamist terrorists use social media platforms such as Facebook to target youths “in the same way a paedophile might look at those sites to potentially groom would-be victims”. Maley and Stewart (2015) aver that Daesh has employed similar tactics used by paedophiles to target susceptible youths in Australia, by identifying vulnerable targets such as teenagers on the Internet and then grooming them via communications on encrypted sites. This strategy has the effect of speeding up the radicalisation process, resulting in some otherwise moderate Muslim youths adopting neojihadist ideology in as little as one or two months (Maley & Stewart, 2015).

Whilst significantly different, there are certain parallels between the sexual and political exploitation of young people through the Internet and social media (Quayle & Taylor, 2011). Social media platforms act as a "virtual firewall" by shielding the identities of participants, thus making it easier for them to act (Kholmann & Noguchi, 2006). This anonymity and accessibility offers terrorists (as with paedophiles) various platforms to disseminate propaganda, as well as dedicated websites used to target young people specifically (Quayle & Taylor, 2011).

Through the use of the Internet, terrorist organisations can reach more people and increase the possibilities for interactive communication, thus multiplying opportunities for people to connect with the group (Conway, 2006). The Internet has also broken down some of the barriers that prevent certain people becoming involved in terrorism in the physical world; women in particular are afforded greater anonymity on the Internet, allowing them to express certain thoughts online that they would otherwise be unable to express (von Behr et al., 2013).

Daesh was especially reliant on the Internet and social media as tools for recruitment. Utilising these platforms to disseminate their propaganda and intimidate and broadcast threats against anyone displaying hostility towards them, Daesh was able to appeal to its young target audience of individuals aged between 16 and 25, who were interested in or felt emotionally sympathetic towards the crisis in Syria and Iraq (Saltman & Winter, 2014). Daesh's recruitment and propaganda videos generally centred around a utopianism narrative, which involved portraying life in the 'caliphate' in idyllic terms, and describing a perfectly functioning society in which Muslims lived happily in accordance with their Islamic values (Williams, 2016).

The utopian videos disseminated by Daesh depicted happy children, effective governance, sophisticated infrastructure and agricultural production, as well as a sense of normalcy, cleanliness, and peacefulness that was entirely disconnected from warzone imagery – all designed to entice others to join their ranks (Williams, 2016). Another strategy employed by Daesh was based on persecution, with propaganda material depicting Muslims, particularly children, being killed as a result of coalition air strikes in Syria and Iraq (Williams, 2016). Moreover, the propaganda would attack Western values and appeal to a Sunni Muslim sense of identity, through the use of imagery and messages of camaraderie and brotherhood, and a duty and obligation to assist the cause (Williams, 2016).

The effect of such propaganda is its appeal to a vulnerable, less educated and less enlightened audience, which in conjunction with factors such as social networks, enables young people in particular to become radicalised. Terrorist organisations have increasingly taken advantage of the Western world's reliance on information sharing and use of technology as a form of communication, utilising the Internet to manipulate the grievances of alienated youth and exploit and radicalise them (Homeland Security Institute, 2009).

Information technology gives terrorists "global power and reach without necessarily compromising their invisibility" (Tibbetts, 2002, p.5), and the Internet "puts distance between those planning the attack and their targets" without the same risks that are usually associated with using devices such as cell or satellite phones (Thomas, 2003, p.119). Bjelopera (2013) also proposes that the Internet normalises behaviours that would be considered unacceptable or inappropriate in real-world environments. Thus the effect of the Internet and social media functioning as echo chambers is that even the most

extreme ideas and suggestions receive encouragement and support, with radicalised individuals reflecting each other's views and amplifying them (O'Connell, 2016). This is important, as understanding the impact of platforms helps us understand the radicalised individuals being affected by them.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated that central in the process of radicalisation is the role of social and familial connections, which operate as echo chambers and sustain involvement in the terrorist networks that people join. This was demonstrated throughout the data set, whereby 84 percent of individuals had a social or familial connection to others in the study. Clearly, affective connections are influential, and the impact of their role in the radicalisation process should be used to inform practices and approaches to dealing with future radicalisation.

As this chapter has demonstrated, even lone actor terrorists typically have connections with other like-minded individuals who provide them with direction and guidance. The Internet and social media can also function as echo chambers for extremist beliefs and allow for socialisation amongst like-minded individuals. Evidently, when social and familial networks are combined with the motives discussed in Chapter Four, radicalisation is inevitably bound to proliferate.

Chapter Seven
Conclusion

This thesis has been concerned with investigating radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in an Australian context. The central research question – **In an Australian context, what has influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts?** – has been addressed by employing a research methodology consisting of a case analysis, social network analysis and case studies. This thesis has considered the history of Islamist terrorism in Australia, evaluated the motivating factors which drive radicalisation, assessed the diversity of Australian Islamist terrorists who engaged in a multitude of terrorist acts between 2001 and 2018, and analysed the role of social and familial networks in their radicalisation.

Answering the central research question has been attended to through the use of qualitative and quantitative systematic analyses of 194 Australian residents or citizens who engaged in terrorist acts (either domestically or overseas) between September 2001 and December 2018. The subsidiary questions to this thesis can be answered as follows.

1. What do we know about radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in an Australian context?

In an Australian context, Islamist terrorism is the primary terrorist threat to the country. As with many countries, Australia was far less concerned about Islamist terrorism prior to 9/11 than it is almost two decades on. In the years since 9/11, Islamist terrorism in Australia can be categorised by three 'waves' (2001-2004, 2005-2013 and 2014-2018), which represented significant shifts and developments. In the first wave, Australia was legitimised as a target for attacks amongst Islamist terrorists due to its alliance with the

United States in their fight against terrorism, and domestic terrorist plots were externally guided. In the second wave, domestic terrorist plots became self-starting, due to the influential Abdul Nacer Benbrika (#17), who was arrested during this wave as part of Australia's largest counter-terrorism investigation, Operation Pendennis, and who continues to exert his influence as he serves his prison sentence. In the third wave there was again a significant shift in the terrorism landscape with the rise of Daesh and a marked increase in serious terrorist activity in Australia.

2. What are the primary motives which have influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists?

Islamist terrorists are primarily driven by ideological motives. The rhetoric of a 'war on terror' and perceptions of a 'war on Islam' have been particularly influential. As individuals experience and identify with the victimisation and humiliation (whether real or by proxy) of the Muslim community, they justify their involvement in terrorism on the basis that they are religiously obligated to engage in violent jihad in response to these injustices. Personal factors, such as issues relating to identity and belonging, and status and meaning can also function as motives for Islamist terrorists. Gender perspectives and socio-economic considerations can also be influential.

The results arising from this thesis advance our understanding of radicalisation and Islamist terrorism in Australia. However, through the use of court sentencing remarks – which contain excerpts of transcripts, evidence given by offenders and surveillance material – this thesis has helped elucidate the motives of Islamist terrorists in an Australian context. This has also assisted in addressing a gap in previous research studies, particularly as the motives discussed in this thesis encompass the most up to date case

studies. Moreover, terrorism studies often pay little attention to why individuals say they do things, with scholars generally looking to external factors or influences to find alternative explanations for why individuals become radicalised. This thesis has remedied this by providing a direct insight from Islamist terrorists in Australia to better understand their motivations.

3. What does an analysis of Islamist terrorists in Australia reveal about them?

Islamist terrorists in Australia were found to have engaged in various terrorist acts, the most notable of which was leaving Australia to support or engage in Islamist terrorism overseas (in 71 cases). This was largely in support of Daesh. Islamist terrorism in Australia was found to be a predominantly male phenomenon, with the average age of offenders visibly decreasing with every wave. It was also found to be largely homegrown, with 51 percent of individuals identified as having been born in Australia. Lebanese ethnicity was especially prevalent, with 41 percent of individuals in the data set identifying as either Lebanese or part Lebanese.

Eleven percent of Islamist terrorists were found to be religious converts. Whilst there were individuals suffering from mental health issues, the numbers were not so significant as to support the argument that terrorists are mentally unbalanced or that mental illness leads to radicalisation. The data set likewise did not support the argument that a lack of education equates to radicalisation or involvement in terrorism. Moreover, the findings do not suggest that past criminality is an indicator of future involvement in terrorism.

The findings from the case analysis contribute to the field of terrorism research by analysing cases which have not been previously studied. As Islamist terrorism is a

constant and persistent issue both in Australia and internationally, it is important that research on terrorism continues to evolve to reflect developments in this field. Moreover, existing analyses of Islamist terrorists in Australia have utilised small data sets and have not examined a large quantity of variables. This thesis has sought to address this gap in the canon of scholarship by utilising a broader data set which encompassed a 17-year period and covered a variety of themes. Through the case analysis, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the characteristics of Islamist terrorists in Australia. It is helpful to have this context in relation to the individuals being analysed.

4. What influence have social and familial networks had on the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in Australia?

In Australia, social and familial networks have had a significant influence on radicalisation and have been central in sustaining individuals' involvement in terrorism. Individuals involved in Islamist terrorism in Australia were found to comprise an interconnected network which has been seen to transcend operational cells over a number of years. The finding that 84 percent of individuals in the data set had a social or familial connection to others in the study evinces the impact of such connections and how they can influence individuals to become engaged in terrorist networks. When the primary motives discussed above are combined with the social and familial networks that manifestly sustain Islamist terrorism, radicalisation is inevitably bound to proliferate.

The findings arising from this thesis complement similar studies on Islamist terrorism in Australia (see Bright, Whelan & Harris-Hogan, 2018; Harris-Hogan, 2012; Harris-Hogan, 2013; Harris-Hogan, 2014; Harris-Hogan & Barrelle, 2018; Kelly & McCarthy-Jones, 2019; Koschade, 2006). By utilising a larger sample size, the findings in this thesis

advance the literature on the relationship between radicalisation and social networks. This thesis has demonstrated the critical importance of social and familial networks in the radicalisation process, which operate as echo chambers and sustain involvement in the terrorist networks that people join.

Islamist terrorism is an evolving and moving target of ongoing concern for national and international security and law enforcement practitioners and other stakeholders. As such, it is important to continually update and enhance our knowledge of the individuals involved in Islamist terrorism. By broadening the sample size being studied from the aforementioned studies, this thesis has contributed to our knowledge of what has influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts in an Australian context.

This knowledge should be used to inform practices and approaches to dealing with future radicalisation. Individuals with connections to known terrorists or who interact in social networks with others who hold radical ideas, for instance, are likely to be more susceptible to radicalisation, and measures should be taken early on to prevent this. This was demonstrated multiple times throughout the data set, with individuals being driven to join terrorist networks due to the influence of their peers or relatives.

Future research should be dedicated to determining the viability of disengagement from Islamist terrorism after individuals have been exposed to the influences discussed in this thesis. For instance, can prohibiting an individual in the early stages of radicalisation from having contact with peers who are known to harbour extremist views aid in their disengagement? Evidence presented in Chapter Six suggests that this may be a possibility

in some cases (see Emir Biber (#129) and MHK (#139)), however this may be limited to more youthful offenders who are particularly susceptible to such influence.

There is no single driver of radicalisation, and as this thesis has demonstrated, there are many factors which have driven Islamist terrorists to engage in terrorist acts in an Australian context. In order to successfully address the future threat of radicalisation, a multitude of factors – particularly ideological motives and social and familial networks – need to be taken into account. The impact of these influences on Islamist terrorists cannot be underestimated.

References

Note: For ease of reference, the sources used in this thesis are herewith contained in two separate lists. The reference list set out below contains the secondary academic sources consulted throughout this thesis. The second reference list which follows contains the primary sources of information that were consulted.

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Appendix 1: Australian Islamist terrorists (2001-2018)

In the table below, the variables examined are comprised of:

- Date of either arrest [**A**], having left Australia to engage in conflict overseas [**L**] or death [**D**]
- Country of birth [**COB**]
- Age arrived in Australia if born overseas [**AA**]
- Immigrant generation [**IG**]
- Religion [**R**], being either Muslim [**M**] or convert to Islam [**C**]
- Highest level of education obtained [**EDU**]
- Having a family member(s) or spouse also within this data set [**S/F**]
- Mental health diagnosis prior to involvement in terrorism [**MH**]
- Criminal history [**CH**]
- Terrorist organisation supported or involved with [**ORG**], being any of the following:
    - Asbat al-Ansar [**AA**]
    - Al-Qaeda [**AQ**]
    - Al Shabbab [**AS**]
    - Benbrika cell (Melbourne) [**BCM**]
    - Benbrika cell (Sydney) [**BCS**]
    - Daesh [**IS**]
    - Fatah al-Islam [**FAI**]
    - Jabhat al-Nusra [**JAN**]
    - Jemaah Islamiyah [**JI**]
    - Khaliyat Trablus [**KT**]
    - Lashkar-e-Taiba [**LET**]
    - Peninsula Lions [**PL**]
- Relationship status and children [**R/C**], being either separated [**S**], married [**M**], divorced [**D**] and whether they had children [**C**]

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
1	Mathew Stewart[1]	04/08/01	L[2]	25	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C	HS		✓		AQ, JAN	
2	David Hicks[3]	09/12/01	[4]	26	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C	<HS				LET	SC
3	Abdul Rahim Ayub[5]	15/10/02	L	38	M	Indonesia	Indonesian	21	1	M	<Uni	✓			JI	MC
4	Jack Roche[6]	18/11/02	A	49	M	England	British	25	1	C					JI	M
5	Joseph Terrence Thomas[7]	04/01/03	A	31	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–	5	C	College				AQ	MC
6	Zaky Mallah[8]	29/09/03	A	20	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	TAFE					
7	Rabiah Hutchinson[9]	--/--/03	[10]	50	F	Australia	Scottish/ Caucasian Australian	–		C	<HS	✓			AQ, JI	MC
8	Maher Khazaal[11]	--/--/03	[12]		M	Lebanon	Lebanese		1	M		✓			KT	
9	Izhar Ul-Haque[13]	15/04/04	A	21	M	Pakistan	Pakistani	6	1	M	Uni				LET	

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1 Schliebs, 2016b; Stewart, 2015; Welch, 2015b.

2 Although he left Australia prior to 9/11, he is believed to have been active overseas in the years since, training fighters for Jabhat al-Nusra and starring in terrorism propaganda videos.

3 "David Hicks: 'Australian Taleban'", 2007; "David Hicks: Former Guantanamo bay detainee", 2015; McCoy, 2006.

4 Captured in Afghanistan and handed to the United States military.

5 Atkins, 2004; Neighbour, 2004; Neighbour, 2009.

6 *R v Roche*, 2005; "The Jack Roche story", 2004.

7 *DPP (Cth) v Thomas*, 2005; Lentini, 2008a; Mansouri & Wood, 2008.

8 *R v Mallah*, 2005.

9 Cassrels, 2015; Harris-Hogan, 2014; Neighbour, 2009; Shephard, 2008; Silber, 2012.

10 Passport cancelled due to her links to al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.

11 *R v Khazaal*, 2009; "Terror suspect Khazal brothers", 2004; "The baggage of Bilal Khazal", 2004.

12 Sentenced by a military tribunal in Lebanon for donating money to an Islamic group which was responsible for multiple bomb attacks in Lebanon.

13 Piggott, 2010; *R v Ul-Haque*, 2007; "Terrorism case tripped", 2004.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
10	Faheem Khalid Lodhi[14]	22/04/04	A	34	M	Pakistan	Pakistani	28	1	M	Uni				LET	M
11	Saleh Jamal[15]	28/05/04	A	28	M	Jordan			1	M		✓		✓	AA, AQ	MC
12	Hayssam Melhem[16]	28/05/04	A		M	Lebanon	Lebanese			M					AQ	
13	Belal Saadallah Khazaal[17]	02/06/04	A	34	M	Lebanon	Lebanese	16[18]	1	M	PS	✓		✓	AQ, KT	MC
14	Ahmed Jamal[19]	--/--/04	A	22	M					M		✓			AQ	
15	Hussam Sabbagh[20]	--/--/04 --/--/07 19/07/14	L A A		M	Lebanon	Lebanese		1	M					AQ, FAI, IS, JAN	
16	Tallaal Adrey[21]	--/05/05	A	30	M	Kuwait		21	1	M					PL	MC
17	Abdul Nacer Benbrika[22]	08/11/05	A	45	M	Algeria	Algerian	29	1	M	College	✓			BCM	MC
18	Aimen Joud[23]	08/11/05	A	21	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	<HS				BCM	
19	Fadl Sayadi[24]	08/11/05	A	25	M	Lebanon	Lebanese	3	1	M	<TAFE	✓		✓	BCM	M
20	Abdullah Merhi[25]	08/11/05	A	20	M	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M	<TAFE	✓			BCM	MC
21	Ahmed Raad[26]	08/11/05	A	21	M	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M	<TAFE	✓	✓		BCM	MC

[14] *Regina v Lodhi,* 2006; Silber, 2012.
[15] "Australian arrested in Iraq", 2004; Harris-Hogan, 2014; "Lakemba gun suspect", 2004; Olding, 2014c; Smiles, 2006.
[16] "Courts too 'lenient'", 2004; "Lakemba gun suspect", 2004; "Sydney man convicted", 2005.
[17] *R v Khazaal*, 2009; "Terror suspect Khazal brothers", 2004; "The baggage of Bilal Khazal", 2004.
[18] Arrived in Australia when he was six months old however returned to Lebanon one year later. Came back to Australia at 16 years of age.
[19] Harris-Hogan, 2014.
[20] Chambers, 2014; Ferguson, S., 2014; Schliebs, 2014b; Wroe, 2014a.
[21] "Aust man on terrorism charges", 2005; "Australian on terror charges", 2005; "Jailed Australian", 2005.
[22] *R v Benbrika*, 2009.
[23] Lentini, 2008a; *R v Benbrika*, 2009; "The Melbourne suspects", 2005.
[24] Rubinsztein-Dunlop, 2014; *R v Benbrika*, 2009.
[25] Kissane, 2008a; *R v Benbrika*, 2009.
[26] *R v Benbrika*, 2009.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
22	Ezzit Raad[27]	08/11/05 --/--/13	A L	23	M	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M	TAFE	✓		✓	BCM, IS	MC
23	Amer Haddara[28]	08/11/05	A	26	M	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M	Uni				BCM	
24	Izzydeen Atik[29]	08/11/05	A	25	M	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M	<HS		✓	✓	BCM	DC
25	Shane Kent[30]	08/11/05	A	28	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C	<TAFE		✓		BCM	MC
26	Hany Taha[31]	08/11/05	A	31	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M		✓		✓	BCM	MC
27	Bassam Raad[32]	08/11/05	A	24	M	Australia	Lebanese		2	M	<HS	✓	✓	✓	BCM	
28	Shoue Hammoud[33]	08/11/05	A	26	M	Australia	Lebanese			M					BCM	M
29	Majed Raad[34]	08/11/05 --/--/13	A L	21	M	Australia	Lebanese		2	M		✓			BCM	MC
30	Mohamed Ali Elomar[35]	08/11/05	A	40	M	Lebanon	Lebanese	11	1	M	TAFE	✓			BCS, LET	MC
31	Abdul Rakib Hasan[36]	08/11/05	A	34	M	Bangladesh	Bangladeshi	20	1	M	<HS				BCS, JI	DC
32	Khaled Cheikho[37]	08/11/05	A	32	M	Lebanon	Lebanese	2	1	M	<HS	✓			BCS, LET	MC
33	Moustafa Cheikho[38]	08/11/05	A	28	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	<TAFE	✓			BCS, LET	MC

[27] Houston, 2016; *R v Benbrika*, 2009.
[28] *R v Benbrika*, 2009.
[29] *R v Atik*, 2007.
[30] *R v Kent*, 2009.
[31] Fife-Yeomans, 2015; Silber, 2012; “The Melbourne suspects”, 2005.
[32] Brown, G., 2016; Hughes, 2008; Kissane, 2008b; *The Queen v R B*, 2018.
[33] Kissane, 2008b; Lentini, 2008a.
[34] Houston, 2016; Hughes, 2008; Kissane, 2008b; Lentini, 2008a.
[35] Bergin et al., 2015; Mullins, 2011; *Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010.
[36] Lentini, 2008a; *Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010; Wilkinson & Allard, 2005.
[37] Harris-Hogan, 2014; Neighbour, 2014; *Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010.
[38] Neighbour, 2014; *Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010; “The Sydney suspects”, 2005.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
34	Mohammed Omar Jamal[39]	08/11/05	A	21	M	Australia		–		M	<HS	✓			BCS	
35	Mazen Touma[40]	08/11/05	A	25	M	Lebanon	Lebanese/ Syrian	6	1	M	<TAFE	✓		✓	BCS	DC
36	Mirsad Mulahalilovic[41]	08/11/05	A	29	M	Bosnia	Bosnian	20	1	C	PS				BCS	MC
37	Omar Baladjam[42]	08/11/05	A	28	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian/ Indonesian	–		M					BCS	MC
38	Khaled Sharrouf[43]	08/11/05 --/12/13 11/08/17	A L D	24	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	<HS	✓	✓	✓	BCS, IS	MC
39	Zouheir Issa[44]	--/--/05 --/--/07 --/06/14	A A [45]		M	Lebanon				M					AQ	
40	Feiz Mohammad[46]	--/--/05	L[47]	35	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	Uni					MC
41	Mohammed Ayub[48]	17/10/06 --/--/13	A L	21	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian/ Indonesian	–		M		✓			AQ, IS	

39 Neighbour, 2014; Olding, 2014c; *Regina (Cth) v Elomar*, 2010.
40 Harris-Hogan, 2013; *Regina (Cth) v Touma*, 2008.
41 Lentini, 2006; *Regina (Cth) v Mulahalilovic*, 2009.
42 Cubby, Kennedy & Allard, 2005; Kennedy, 2005; "The Sydney suspects", 2005.
43 Bearup & Stewart, 2015; *Regina (Cth) v Sharrouf*, 2009; Welch & Dredge, 2017.
44 Chambers, 2014; Ferguson, J., 2014.
45 Accused of funding a central figure in the Syrian conflict.
46 Elliott, 2013.
47 Left Australia but later returned.
48 Allard, 2006; Harris-Hogan, 2014; Schliebs, 2014a; Schliebs, n.d.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
42	Abdullah Ayub[49]	17/10/06	A	19	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian/ Indonesian	–		M		✓			AQ	
43	Marek Samulski[50]	17/10/06	A	35	M	Poland	Polish		1	C					AQ	MC
44	Ahmed Ali[51]	--/12/06	D	25	M		Somali			M					AQ	MC
45	Ibrahim Sabouh[52]	20/06/07	A	33	M	Lebanon	Lebanese	2	1	M					FAI	MC
46	Omar al-Hadba[53]	20/06/07	A	45	M		Lebanese			M					FAI	
47	Ahmed Elomar[54]	20/06/07	A	24	M	Australia	Leba nese	–		M		✓			FAI, IS	MC
48	Muhammad Basal[55]	20/06/07	A		M		Lebanese			M					FAI	
49	Hussein Elomar[56]	20/06/07	A		M		Lebanese			M		✓			FAI	M
50	Bassam El Sayed[57]	20/06/07	A		M		Lebanese			M					FAI	M
51	Walid Osman Mohamed[58]	--/--/08	L	26	M					M					AS	MC
52	Saney Edow Aweys[59]	04/08/09	A	26	M	Somalia	Somali	15	1	M	<HS			✓	AS	MC

[49] Allard, 2006; Harris-Hogan, 2014; Olding, 2014c.
[50] Allard, 2006; Fife-Yeomans, 2011; Stewart & Chulov, 2006.
[51] Caldwell, 2007; Israeli, 2009; Kerbaj & Weisser, 2007, cited in Mullins, 2011.
[52] "Aussies on terror charges", 2015; "Australian dies", 2007; "Fourth man charged", 2007; Koutsoukis, 2009; Levett & Morris, 2007.
[53] "Aussies on terror charges", 2015; "Fourth man charged", 2007; Koutsoukis, 2009.
[54] "Aussies on terror charges", 2015; "Fourth man charged", 2007; Koutsoukis, 2009; *State of New South Wales v Elomar*, 2018.
[55] "Aussies on terror charges", 2015; "Fourth man charged", 2007; Koutsoukis, 2009.
[56] "Aussie terror suspect", 2007; "Fourth man charged", 2007; Zammit, 2014.
[57] "Fourth man charged", 2007; Smiles, 2007.
[58] Hall & Leuprecht, 2014; *R v Fattal*, 2011.
[59] *R v Fattal*, 2011.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
53	Wissam Mahmoud Fattal[60]	04/08/09	A	33	M	Lebanon	Lebanese	27	1	M	<HS			✓	AS	SC
54	Nayev El Sayed[61]	04/08/09	A	25	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	HS				AS	MC
55	Yacqub Khayre[62]	04/08/09 05/06/17	A D	22	M	Somalia	Somali	7	1	M					AQ, AS, IS	
56	Abdirahman Mohamud Ahmed[63]	04/08/09	A	25	M	Somalia	Somali	10	1	M					AS	MC
57	Shyloh Jayne Giddens[64]	14/05/10	A	30	F	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C		✓			AQ	SC
58	Shayden Thorne[65]	--/11/11 10/05/16	A A	23	M	Australia	Indigenous Australian/ Malaysian	–		M	<Uni	✓			IS	MC
59	Mustapha Al Majzoub[66]	19/08/12	D	30	M	Saudi Arabia	Syrian		1	M		✓			JAN	MC
60	Adnan Karabegovic[67]	12/09/12	A	23	M		Bosnian	7		M					AQ	MC
61	Harun Mehicevic[68]	--/09/12	[69]	40	M	Bosnia	Bosnian		1	M	Uni					MC
62	Sammy Salma[70]	--/09/12 15/04/13	L D	22	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M					JAN	

[60] *R v Fattal*, 2011.
[61] *R v Fattal*, 2011.
[62] Blair, 2017; Bucci, 2017; Harris-Hogan, 2014; Munro, 2010; *R v Fattal*, 2011.
[63] Munro, 2010; *R v Fattal*, 2011; Warne-Smith, 2009.
[64] Fife-Yeomans, 2011; Harris-Hogan, 2013; Macleod & Black, 2010.
[65] "Australian Shayden Thorne's terrorism case", 2013; Herbert, 2013; Lee, 2017; Maley & Schliebs, 2016b; *The Queen v Cerantonio*, 2017.
[66] Calligeros, 2015a; McKenny, 2012; Sales, 2015; Schliebs, n.d.; Stapleton, 2015.
[67] Bardos, 2014; Petrie, 2012; Russell, 2012; Russell, 2015a; *R v Karabegovic*, 2015.
[68] Bucci, 2012; Bucci, 2014; *Gaughan v Causevic*, 2016; Lee et al., 2012; Schliebs, 2014c.
[69] Property raided.
[70] Bucci, 2013; Schliebs, n.d.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
63	Roger Abbas[71]	--/10/12	D	23	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M					JAN	
64	Yusuf Toprakkaya[72]	--/12/12	D	30	M	Australia	Turkish	–		M						MC
65	Mostafa Mahamad Farag[73]	--/--/12	L	28	M	Egypt	Egyptian	1	1	M	Uni				AQ, JAN	MC
66	Milad Bin Ahmad-Shah Al-Ahmadzai[74]	26/05/13	A	23	M	Australia	Pashtun	–		M		✓		✓		MC
67	Mehmet Biber[75]	01/07/13 03/11/16	L[76] A	21	M	Australia	Turkish	–	2	M		✓			IS, JAN	MC
68	Muhammad Abdul-Karim Musleh[77]	01/07/13 01/09/13	L[78] L	22	M		Palestinian			M	Uni			✓		MC
69	Caner Temel[79]	01/07/13 --/01/14	L D	22	M	Australia	Turkish	–		M					IS	MC
70	Ahmad Naizmand[80]	01/07/13 29/02/16	L A	19	M	Afghanistan	Afghan	9	1	M	<HS	✓		✓	IS	M
71	Mahmoud Abed Aboshi[81]	02/07/13	L	30	M					M						M
72	Abraham Succarieh[82]	10/09/13	L	29	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M		✓			JAN	

[71] Bucci et al., 2016; Calligeros, 2015a; Schliebs, n.d.
[72] Calligeros, 2015a; Schliebs, n.d.
[73] Bergin et al., 2015; Calligeros, 2015a; Owens, 2015; Schliebs, 2015b; Schliebs, 2016b; Schliebs, n.d.; Welch, 2016.
[74] Box & Maley, 2013; Welch, 2011.
[75] Olding, 2016a; Olding & Benny-Morrison, 2016a; *R v Biber*, 2018; Schliebs, n.d.
[76] Left Australia but later returned.
[77] Kembrey, 2016; Olding, 2016h; *R v Alqudsi*, 2016; *R v Musleh*, 2018.
[78] Returned to Australia 10 days later but then left again.
[79] Calligeros, 2015a; Chambers & McClellan, 2014; Hoh, 2014; Schliebs, n.d.
[80] Kembrey, 2017; *R v Naizmand*, 2016.
[81] Olding, 2014e; *R v Alqudsi*, 2016.
[82] Bergin et al., 2015; Calligeros, 2015a; Kos & Bavas, 2016; Schliebs, n.d.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
73	Ahmed Succarieh[83]	11/09/13	D	26	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	HS	✓			IS, JAN	M
74	Neil Prakash[84]	--/09/13 24/10/16	L A	23	M	Australia	Fijian- Indian/ Cambodian	–		C	<HS				IS	
75	Nassim Elbahsa[85]	12/10/13	L		M					M						
76	Hamdi Alqudsi[86]	14/10/13	A	39	M	Palestine	Palestinian	11	1	M	Uni	✓		✓	IS	MC
77	Adam Dahman[87]	10/11/13 17/07/14	L D	17	M	Australia		–		M	<HS	✓			IS	
78	Mounir Raad[88]	10/11/13	L	21	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M		✓			IS	
79	Amin Iman Mohamed[89]	03/12/13	A	23	M	Somalia		22	1	M	Uni					
80	Mohamed Zuhbi[90]	--/--/13 22/08/16	L [91]	25	M	Syria		1	1	M		✓			IS	MC
81	Junaid Thorne[92]	--/--/13 --/--/15	A [93]	24	M	Australia	Indigenous Australian/ Malaysian	–		M	<Uni	✓			IS	
82	Tyler Casey[94]	11/01/14	D	22	M	United States	Caucasian Australian/		1	C		✓			AQ, JAN	M

[83] Bergin et al., 2015; Calligeros, 2015a; O'Brien & Ralston, 2013; Schliebs, n.d.; Stapleton, 2015.

[84] Bergin et al., 2015; Calligeros, 2015a; Chulov, Kenar & Farrell, 2016; *CMHV and Director-General of Security*, 2017; Greene, 2016; Schliebs, n.d.; Welch, 2015a.

[85] *R v Alqudsi*, 2016.

[86] *R v Alqudsi*, 2016.

[87] Bergin et al., 2015; Green, 2014; Roose, 2016; Schliebs, 2015a; Schliebs, n.d.

[88] Houston, 2016; Roose, 2016; Schliebs, 2015a; Schliebs, n.d.

[89] *R v Mohamed*, 2016.

[90] Brockie, 2014; "Heckenberg raid", 2016; Lloyd & Dredge, 2014a; Schliebs, 2015d.

[91] Property raided.

[92] "Australian Shayden Thorne's terrorism case", 2013; Herbert, 2013; "Islamic preacher Junaid Thorne", 2015; Maley, 2016c; *Mostafa Shiddiquzzaman v R*, 2015.

[93] Sentenced for non-terrorism offences however served four months at SuperMax, which exacerbated his radicalisation.

[94] Bergin et al., 2015; Calligeros, 2015a; Olding, 2014a; Rubinsztein-Dunlop, 2014; Schliebs, n.d.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
							African-American									
83	Amira Karroum[95]	11/01/14	D	22	F	Australia	Caucasian Australian-New Zealander/ Lebanese	–		M	Uni	✓			AQ, JAN	M
84	Ahmad Moussalli[96]	--/02/14	D	30	M		Lebanese			M	HS				IS	
85	Ahmed Shaheed[97]	--/02/14	[98]		M	Australia		–		M	Uni				JAN	
86	Tara Nettleton[99]	--/02/14 --/09/15	L D	31	F	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C		✓			IS	MC
87	Agim Kruezi[100]	09/03/14 10/09/14	[101] A	22	M	Australia	Albanian	–		M					IS	
88	RZBV[102]	07/05/14	[103]	27	M	Australia		–		M					IS	
89	Fatima Elomar[104]	--/05/14	A	29	F					M		✓			IS	MC
90	Mohomed Unais Mohamed Ameen[105]	--/05/14	L	41	M	Sri Lanka		28	1	M	TAFE				IS	S

95 Bergin et al., 2015; Calligeros, 2015a; Rubinsztein-Dunlop, 2014; Schliebs, n.d.
96 Olding, 2014b; Schliebs, n.d.
97 Schliebs, 2014a; Schliebs, 2015c; Schliebs, n.d.
98 Identified as being overseas via social media posts.
99 Bearup & Stewart, 2015; Chambers, 2015; Schliebs, n.d.; Silinsky, 2016.
100 Bavas & Edwards, 2014; Schliebs, 2018a; Schliebs, 2018b; Schliebs, n.d.
101 Unsuccessfully attempted to leave Australia.
102 *RZBV and Director-General of Security and Anor*, 2015.
103 Cancellation of passport which prevented him from travelling overseas to engage in terrorist acts.
104 Bergin et al., 2015; Crawford & Bamford, 2015; Ritchie & Buckingham-Jones, 2016.
105 Oakes & Clark, 2016a.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
91	Abu Nour Al-Iraqi[106]	20/06/14	[107]		M		Iraqi/Kurdish			M					IS	
92	Zakaryah Raad[108]	--/06/14	D	22	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M		✓			IS	
93	Abdullah Elmir[109]	--/06/14	L	17	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian/ Lebanese	–		M	<HS				IS	
94	Robert Cerantonio[110]	--/07/14 10/05/16	A A	28	M	Australia	Irish/Italian	–		C	Uni				IS	MC
95	Zia Abdul Haq[111]	--/08/14 03/10/14	L D	33	M	Afghanistan	Afghan		1	M					IS	SC
96	Sharky Jama[112]	--/08/14 --/04/15	L D	25	M	Somalia	Somali			M					IS	
97	Yusuf Yusuf[113]	--/08/14	L		M		Somali			M	<Uni			✓	IS	
98	Jake Bilardi[114]	--/08/14 11/03/15	L D	18	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C	<HS		✓		IS	
99	Omar Succarieh[115]	10/09/14	A	31	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	TAFE	✓			JAN	MC
100	Ahmad Azaddin Rahmany[116]	18/09/14	A	24	M					M						
101	Omarjan Azari[117]	18/09/14	A	22	M	Afghanistan	Afghan	12	1	M	TAFE	✓			IS	

[106] Lloyd, 2014; Schliebs, n.d.
[107] Featured in Daesh recruitment video.
[108] Calligeros, 2015a; Houston, 2016; Levy, 2014a; Schliebs, n.d.
[109] Benny-Morrison, 2014; Benson & Auerbach, 2014; McDonald & Kerin, 2014.
[110] Lee, 2017; Lloyd & Dredge, 2014b; Maley & Schliebs, 2016b; Safran, 2015; *The Queen v Cerantonio*, 2017.
[111] Calligeros, 2015a; Schliebs, 2014d; Schliebs, n.d.; Withey, 2014.
[112] Calligeros, 2015a; Lakey, 2017; Schliebs, 2014f; Schliebs, n.d.
[113] Calligeros, 2015a; Chambers, 2015; Schliebs, 2014f; Schliebs, n.d.
[114] Bergin et al., 2015; Booker, 2015; *CMHV and Director-General of Security*, 2017; Levy, 2015a; Schliebs, 2015a.
[115] Bergin et al., 2015; Elks, 2014; Kos & Bavas, 2016; Schliebs, 2018a.
[116] Partridge, 2014b.
[117] Dale, 2015; Kembrey, 2017; Levy, 2014b; Schliebs, n.d.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
102	Maywand Osman[118]	18/09/14	A	20	M					M		✓		✓		
103	Ali Al-Talebi[119]	18/09/14 15/10/14	A A	25	M					M					IS	
104	Abdul Numan Haider[120]	23/09/14	D	18	M	Afghanistan	Afghan	7	1	M	HS				IS	
105	Hassan el Sabsabi[121]	30/09/14	A	23	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M					IS, JAN	M
106	Mahmoud Abdullatif[122]	--/09/14 19/01/15	L D	23	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	<HS	✓			IS	M
107	Suhan Abdul Rahman[123]	--/09/14 18/03/15	L D	23	M	Australia	Bangladeshi	–		M	<Uni			✓	IS	
108	Kawa Alou[124]	--/09/14	A	21	M		Kurdish/ Syrian			M		✓		✓		
109	Mohammed Ali Baryalei[125]	--/10/14	D	33	M	Afghanistan	Afghan	7	1	M					IS, JAN	
110	Housam Abdul Razzak[126]	--/10/14	D		M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M					IS	MC
111	Taha El Baf[127]	--/11/14	L	17	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	<HS	✓			IS	
112	Hamza El Baf[128]	--/11/14	L	23	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M		✓			IS	

[118] Box & McKenna, 2014; Olding, 2014d; Olding, 2016d; Spicer, 2016.
[119] Kidd, 2016; “Sydney man jailed”, 2017.
[120] Bergin et al., 2015; Davey, 2016; *R v Besim*, 2016.
[121] Cooper & Russell, 2016; Ferguson, J., 2014; *R v El Sabsabi*, 2016.
[122] Bergin et al., 2015; *CMHV and Director-General of Security*, 2017; Fife-Yeomans, 2015; Schliebs, n.d.
[123] Bergin et al., 2015; Calligeros, 2015a; *CMHV and Director-General of Security*, 2017; Hatch, 2015; Schliebs, n.d.
[124] Benson, Benns & Dale, 2014; Khalik, 2015; Partridge, 2014a; *R v Alou*, 2018.
[125] Bergin et al., 2015; Calligeros, 2015a; “Profile: Mohammad Ali Baryalei”, 2014; Rubinsztein-Dunlop, 2014.
[126] Box, 2014; Schliebs, 2014e; Schliebs, n.d.; Stapleton, 2015.
[127] Chambers, 2015; O’Brien, 2014; Olding, 2015b; Schliebs, n.d.
[128] Chambers, 2015; O’Brien, 2014; Schliebs, n.d.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
113	Bilal El Baf[129]	--/11/14	L	25	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M		✓			IS	
114	Omar El Baf[130]	--/11/14	L	28	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M		✓			IS	
115	Zehra Duman[131]	--/11/14	L	21	F	Australia	Turkish	–	2	M		✓			IS	M
116	Man Haron Monis[132]	16/12/14	D	50	M	Iran	Iranian	32	1	M	Uni		✓	✓	IS	SC
117	Ahmed Mohammed Al-Ghazzawi[133]	26/12/14	D		M	Lebanon	Lebanese		1	M					IS	
118	Hodan Abby[134]	--/12/14	L	18	F		Somali			M					IS	
119	Hafsa Mohamed[135]	--/12/14	L	20	F		Somali			M					IS	
120	Dawod Elmir[136]	--/--/14 --/05/16	L D		M					M	<Uni				IS	M
121	Samir Atwani[137]	--/--/14	L		M	Australia	Palestinian	–		M	<Uni				IS	
122	Dullel Kassab[138]	--/--/14	L	28	F	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M					IS	MC
123	Ahmed Merhi[139]	--/--/14 --/04/18	L A	24	M	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M		✓		✓	IS	
124	Adam Brookman[140]	--/--/14 24/07/15	L A	39	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C					IS	MC
125	Abu Ibrahim[141]	--/--/14	L		M	Australia		–		C					IS	MC

[129] Chambers, 2015; O'Brien, 2014; Schliebs, n.d.
[130] Chambers, 2015; O'Brien, 2014; Schliebs, n.d.
[131] *Duman v Transport Accident Commission*, 2018; Kermond, 2015; Schliebs, n.d.
[132] Bergin et al., 2015; Knowles, 2014; "Lindt cafe siege gunman", 2016; *R v Droudis*, 2016; Schliebs, n.d.
[133] Calligeros, 2015a; Schliebs, n.d.
[134] Mullany, 2014; Mullany, 2015; Schliebs, n.d.
[135] Mullany, 2015; Schliebs, n.d.
[136] Schliebs, 2015a; Schliebs, 2016c; Schliebs, n.d.
[137] Higgins, 2014; Schliebs, n.d.
[138] Bergin et al., 2015; Schliebs, n.d.
[139] Clennell et al., 2017; Kissane, 2008a; Maley, 2018a; Maley, 2018b; Maley & Schliebs, 2016a; *R v Benbrika*, 2009; Schliebs, 2015c; Schliebs, 2015f; Schliebs, 2016a.
[140] McKenzie, Bucci & Baker, 2015; Russell, 2015b; Schliebs, n.d.; Worrall, 2015.
[141] Bourke & Calligeros, 2015; Stewart & Maley, 2015.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
126	Mohammad Yosof Keshtyar[142]	--/--/14	L	30	M	Afghanistan			1	M						MC
127	Wissam Haddad[143]	09/01/15[144]			M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M					IS	C
128	Muhammed Sheglabo[145]	--/01/15	L	23	M	Libya		19	1	M	<Uni				IS	
129	Emir Biber[146]	19/01/15[147] 03/11/16	A A	16	M	Australia	Turkish	–		M	<HS	✓			IS	
130	Omar Al-Kutobi[148]	10/02/15	A	24	M	Iraq	Iraqi	18	1	M			✓		IS	
131	Mohammad Kiad[149]	10/02/15	A	26	M	Kuwait	Kuwaiti	23	1	M	College				IS	S
132	Irfaan Hussein[150]	--/03/15	D	19	M	Australia		–		M	HS				IS	
133	Abdul Salam Mahmoud[151]	--/03/15	D		M	Sudan	Sudanese		1	M					IS	MC
134	Tareq Kamleh[152]	--/03/15	L	29	M	Australia	Palestinian/ German	–		M	Uni				IS	
135	Oliver Bridgeman[153]	--/03/15	L	18	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C	HS				JAN	

[142] Oakes & Clark, 2016b.
[143] Chambers & Benson, 2014; Olding, 2015a; Olding, 2015e.
[144] Home raided.
[145] Mullany, 2014; Schliebs, n.d.; Weber, 2015.
[146] *R v EB*, 2018.
[147] Arrested at the airport attempting to leave Australia but was released without charge.
[148] Brown, M., 2016; *R v Al-Kutobi*, 2016.
[149] Brown, M., 2016; *R v Al-Kutobi*, 2016.
[150] Calligeros, 2015b; Schliebs, n.d.
[151] Olding, 2015c; Lloyd, 2015; Schliebs, 2015e; Schliebs, n.d.
[152] Bergin et al., 2015; Puddy, 2015; Schliebs, n.d.; Wahlquist, 2015.
[153] Agius, 2015; "Queensland teenager", 2016; Schliebs, n.d.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
136	Belal Betka[154]	--/03/15 19/12/17	L[155] A	25	M					M					IS	SC
137	Sevdet Ramadan Besim[156]	18/04/15	A	18	M	Australia	Albanian	–		M	HS				IS	
138	Harun Causevic[157]	18/04/15	A	18	M	Australia	Bosnian	–		M					IS	
139	MHK[158]	08/05/15	A	17	M	Australia	Syrian	–		M	<HS				IS	
140	Jasmina Milovanov[159]	--/05/15	L	26	F	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C					IS	SC
141	AH[160]	--/05/15 24/04/16	[161] A	15	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	<HS		✓		IS	
142	Mohamed Elomar[162]	22/06/15	D	30	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M		✓			IS	MC
143	Mustafa Hajjobeid[163]	--/06/15	[164]		M					M					IS	M
144	Masood Atai[165]	--/08/15	[166]	24	M	Iran	Afghan	14	1	M	<HS	✓		✓	IS	
145	Shadi Jabar Khalil Mohammad[167]	01/10/15 22/04/16	L D	21	F		Iraqi/Kurdish			M	<Uni	✓			IS	

[154] “Alleged terror fighter”, 2017; Proudman, 2017.
[155] Travelled to Syria in March 2015 but returned to Australia seven months later.
[156] *R v Besim*, 2016.
[157] *Gaughan v Causevic*, 2016.
[158] *R v MHK*, 2016.
[159] Levy, 2015b; Schliebs, n.d.; Silinsky, 2016.
[160] Maley, 2016b; Olding, 2016c; Owens, 2016; *R v AH*, 2018.
[161] First came to the attention of authorities and referred to a government-funded de-radicalisation program.
[162] Bergin et al., 2015; Schliebs, n.d.
[163] Schliebs, 2015c; Schliebs, 2015f.
[164] Identified as being overseas after travelling to a conflict zone.
[165] Benns, 2015; *R v Masood Atai*, 2011.
[166] Found to be associating with Daesh fighters via Facebook, however was already in prison for a different offence.
[167] Banks, 2015; Fogarty, 2015; Greene, 2016; Lewis, 2015; Rubinsztein-Dunlop, 2016; *R v Alou*, 2018.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
146	Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad[168]	02/10/15	D	15	M	Iran	Iraqi/Kurdish		1	M	<HS	✓				
147	Raban Alou[169]	07/10/15	A	18	M	Australia	Kurdish/ Syrian	–		M	<HS	✓		✓	IS	M
148	Talal Alameddine[170]	07/10/15	A	22	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	<TAFE			✓	IS	
149	N.A. NO.1[171]	07/10/15	A	16	M		Kurdish			M	<HS				IS	
150	Mustafa Dirani[172]	07/10/15	A	22	M		Afghan			M				✓	IS	
151	Sulayman Khalid[173]	10/12/15	A	19	M	Australia	Italian/Iraqi	–	2	M	<TAFE			✓	IS	
152	Isaac Majzoub[174]	10/12/15	A	15	M					M	<HS	✓		✓		
153	Ibrahim Ghazzawy[175]	10/12/15	A	20	M					M					IS	M
154	Jibryl Almaouie[176]	10/12/15	A	22	M					M		✓				
155	CMHV[177]	20/12/15	[178]	27	M	Australia	Turkish	–	2	M	TAFE					
156	Abdullah Salihy[179]	23/12/15	A	24	M					M						
157	Mohamed Almaouie[180]	23/12/15	A	20	M					M		✓		✓		

[168] Fogarty, 2015; Lewis, 2015.
[169] Higgins & Drapalski, 2015; Khalik & Box, 2015; Olding, 2015f; Olding & Benny-Morrison, 2015; Rubinsztein-Dunlop, 2016; Rubinsztein-Dunlop & Fogarty, 2015; *R v Alou*, 2018.
[170] Hall, 2015; Higgins & Drapalski, 2015.
[171] Khalik & Box, 2015; Rubinsztein-Dunlop & Fogarty, 2015.
[172] Khalik & Box, 2015; Olding, 2014d; Rubinsztein-Dunlop, 2016.
[173] Olding, 2015g; *R v Khalid*, 2015; *R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017; Schliebs, n.d.
[174] Begley, 2016; Olding, 2015h; *R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017; Sales, 2015.
[175] Mullany et al., 2015; Olding, 2015h; *R v Ghazzawy*, 2017.
[176] Gardiner, 2015; Olding, 2015h.
[177] *CMHV and Director-General of Security*, 2017.
[178] Passport cancelled.
[179] Olding, 2015h.
[180] Olding, 2015h; *R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017.

Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
158 Guy Staines[181]	--/--/15 --/--/17	L D	43	M	Australia	Caucasian Australian	–		C		✓	✓	✓	IS	M
159 Sameh Bayda[182]	24/01/16	A	18	M	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M	<TAFE	✓			IS	M
160 Alo-Bridget Namoa[183]	23/02/16	A	18	F	Australia	Tongan	–		C	<HS	✓	✓		IS	M
161 Tamim Sahil Khaja[184]	27/02/16 18/05/16	[185] A	18	M	Australia	Afghan	–	2	M	<HS				IS	
162 Nowroz Amin[186]	--/02/16 16/06/18	[187] A	26	M					M						
163 Milad Atai[188]	22/03/16	A	20	M	Iran	Afghan	9		M	HS	✓			IS	MC
164 NK[189]	24/03/16	A	16	F	Australia	Lebanese	–		M	HS	✓	✓		IS	
165 Amin Elmir[190]	07/04/16 22/12/16	L[191] A	27	M					M					IS	
166 Paul Dacre[192]	10/05/16	A	31	M	Australia				C					IS	MC
167 Antonio Granata[193]	10/05/16	A	25	M	Australia	Italian			C					IS	MC
168 Kadir Kaya[194]	10/05/16	A	22	M	Australia	Turkish	–	2	M	HS	✓			IS	M

[181] McLean, 2017; Schliebs, 2016d.
[182] "Alo-Bridget Namoa", 2016; *R v Bayda*, 2019; "Sydney teenager arrested", 2016.
[183] "Alo-Bridget Namoa", 2016; Hall, 2016; *R v Bayda*, 2019.
[184] Maley & Stewart, 2016; *R v Khaja*, 2018.
[185] Unsuccessfully attempted to leave Australia.
[186] Mitchell, 2018; "Police charge Sydney man", 2016.
[187] Unsuccessfully attempted to leave Australia.
[188] Drapalski, 2016; Maley, 2018a; Olding, 2016b; *R v Atai*, 2018, p.7; *R v Masood Atai*, 2011, p.5; Silmalis, 2016.
[189] Maley, 2018a; Maley, 2018b; Olding, 2016b; *R v NK*, 2016; Silmalis, 2016.
[190] Olding, 2016i; Olding & Benny-Morrison, 2016b; *R v EB*, 2018.
[191] Later returned to Australia.
[192] Lee, 2017; *R v Cerantonio*, 2019; *The Queen v Cerantonio*, 2017.
[193] Lee, 2017; *R v Cerantonio*, 2019; *The Queen v Cerantonio*, 2017; Wood, 2017.
[194] *Application for Bail by Kaya*, 2016; Lee, 2017; Morris, 2016; *R v Cerantonio*, 2019; *The Queen v Cerantonio*, 2017.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
169	Farhad Said[195]	26/05/16	A	24	M	Tanzania		12	1	M			✓			
170	Murat Kaya[196]	27/05/16	A	25	M	Australia	Turkish	–	2	M	HS	✓			IS	MC
171	Zainab Abdirahman-Khalif[197]	--/07/16 23/05/17	[198] A	22	F		Somali	14	1	M	<Uni				IS	
172	Hazem Zuhbi[199]	22/08/16	[200]		M					M		✓			IS	
173	Ihsas Khan[201]	10/09/16	A	22	M	Australia	Bangladeshi	–		M	<Uni		✓	✓	IS	
174	Bourhan Hraichie[202]	14/09/16	[203]	19	M		Lebanese			M				✓	IS	
175	N.A. NO.2[204]	12/10/16	A	16	M		Egyptian			M	<HS			✓	IS	
176	HG[205]	12/10/16	A	16	M	Australia		–		M	<HS	✓			IS	
177	Ibrahim Abbas[206]	23/12/16	A	22	M	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M	<Uni	✓			IS	MC
178	Hamza Abbas[207]	23/12/16	A	21	M	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M	TAFE	✓			IS	
179	Ahmed Mohamed[208]	23/12/16	A	24	M	Egypt				M					IS	M
180	Abdullah Chaarani[209]	23/12/16	A	26	M	Australia	Lebanese	–		M		✓			IS	MC
181	D[210]	--/12/16	A	50	M					M			✓			C

[195] *R v Ghazzawy*, 2017; *R v Sulayman Khalid*, 2017.
[196] *Application for Bail by Kaya*, 2016; Lee, 2017; *R v Cerantonio*, 2019.
[197] Australian Federal Police, 2017; Campbell, 2018; Opie, 2018a.
[198] Unsuccessfully attempted to leave Australia.
[199] "Heckenberg raid", 2016; Lloyd & Dredge, 2014a.
[200] Property raided.
[201] Maley & Buckingham-Jones, 2016; Olding, 2016e; Vernon, 2016.
[202] Maley, 2017; Olding, 2016g.
[203] Charged with terrorism offences however was already in prison for a different offence.
[204] Olding, 2017a; Olding & Kembrey, 2016; Thomas & Kidd, 2016.
[205] Maley & Khalik, 2016; Olding, 2017a; Olding & Kembrey, 2016; *R v HG*, 2018; Thomas & Kidd, 2016.
[206] Akerman, T., 2018; Bucci et al., 2016; Le Grand & Stewart, 2016; "Melbourne terrorist plot", 2016; *R v Abbas*, 2018.
[207] Bucci et al., 2016; Le Grand & Stewart, 2016; "Melbourne terrorist plot", 2016; *R v Abbas*, 2018; Schliebs & Butler, 2016.
[208] Le Grand & Stewart, 2016; "Melbourne terrorist plot", 2016; *R v Abbas*, 2018; Schliebs & Butler, 2016.
[209] Bucci et al., 2016; Le Grand & Stewart, 2016; "Melbourne terrorist plot", 2016; Schliebs & Butler, 2016.
[210] *D v Director of Public Prosecutions*, 2018; Opie, 2018b.

	Name	Date		Age	Sex	COB	Ethnicity	AA	IG	R	EDU	S/F	MH	CH	ORG	R/C
182	Haisem Zahab[211]	28/02/17	A	42	M	Australia		–	2	M					IS	MC
183	Moudasser Taleb[212]	15/06/17	A	22	M	Australia		–		M				✓	IS	
184	Hatim Moukhaiber[213]	19/08/17	A	29	M					M					IS	
185	Isa Kocoglu[214]	24/10/17	A	43	M	Australia	Turkish	–		M					IS	MC
186	Ali Khalif Shire Ali[215]	27/11/17	A	20	M	Australia	Somali	–		M	<Uni	✓				
187	Khaled Khayat[216]	29/07/17	A	49	M	Lebanon	Lebanese	18	1	M		✓			IS	
188	Mahmoud Khayat[217]	29/07/17	A	32	M	Lebanon	Lebanese		1	M		✓			IS	
189	Linda Merhi[218]	22/01/18	A	40	F	Australia	Lebanese	–	2	M		✓			IS	
190	Dunn (pseudonym)[219]	20/06/18	[220]	28	M	Pakistan	Pakistani	11	1	M			✓	✓	IS	M
191	Hassan Khalif Shire Ali[221]	09/11/18	D	31	M	Somalia	Somali		1	M		✓		✓	IS	M
192	Samed Eriklioglu[222]	20/11/18	A	26	M	Australia	Turkish	–	2	M		✓			IS	
193	Ertunc Eriklioglu[223]	20/11/18	A	30	M	Australia	Turkish	–	2	M		✓			IS	MC
194	Hanifi Halis[224]	20/11/18	A	21	M		Turkish			M					IS	

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211 Baxendale, 2017; Carroll & Batt, 2017; Klan, 2017; Olding, 2017b.
212 Olding, 2017c; Welch, 2017.
213 “Trio accused”, 2017.
214 Akerman, P., 2018; “Melbourne disability pensioner”, 2017; “Pensioner faces trial”, 2018; *Re Kocoglu*, 2017.
215 Le Grand, Koob & Schliebs, 2017a; Le Grand, Koob & Schliebs, 2017b; “Werribee man charged”, 2017.
216 Harvey & Yazbeck, 2018; Magnay, 2018a; Magnay, 2018b.
217 Harvey & Yazbeck, 2018; Magnay, 2018a; Magnay, 2018b.
218 Magnay, 2018b; Maley, 2018a; *R v Benbrika*, 2009.
219 *State of New South Wales v Dunn*, 2018.
220 Was detained under the *Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017* after serving an unrelated sentence.
221 Baxendale, 2018; Bucci, 2018.
222 Akerman, Ferguson & King, 2018; Hurley et al., 2018.
223 Akerman, Ferguson & King, 2018; Fagan, 2018; Hurley et al., 2018.
224 Akerman, Ferguson & King, 2018.

Appendix 2: Terrorist acts

Note: It must be noted that not all of the terrorist acts outlined below were legally established. Whilst many individuals in the data set were convicted of terrorism offences, some were not charged with an offence (such as owing to having left Australia and thus Australian jurisprudence or having been killed before legal proceedings could commence or be finalised). As such, the terrorist acts listed below have not been legally established in every case.

	Name	Date	Terrorist acts engaged in
1	Mathew Stewart	04/08/01	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
2	David Hicks	09/12/01	• Providing material support for terrorism
3	Abdul Rahim Ayub	15/10/02	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
4	Jack Roche	18/11/02	• Conspiring to intentionally destroy or damage official premises of internationally protected persons with intent to endanger lives
5	Joseph Terrence Thomas	04/01/03	• Receiving funds from a terrorist organisation (al-Qaeda) • Providing support or resources to a terrorist organisation (al-Qaeda)
6	Zaky Mallah	29/09/03	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
7	Rabiah Hutchinson	--/--/03	• Directly supported extremist activities
8	Maher Khazaal	--/--/03	• Finance a Sunni Islamic extremist group
9	Izhar Ul-Haque	15/04/04	• Receive training with respect to combat and the use of arms from a terrorist organisation (Lashkar-e-Taiba)
10	Faheem Khalid Lodhi	22/04/04	• Collected and possessed documents connected with preparation for a terrorist act • Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
11	Saleh Jamal	28/05/04	• Belonging to a terrorist organisation (al-Qaeda) • Planning to carry out terrorist acts
12	Hayssam Melhem	28/05/04	• Belonging to a terrorist organisation (al-Qaeda) • Planning to carry out terrorist acts
13	Belal Saadallah Khazaal	02/06/04	• Making a document connected with a terrorist act
14	Ahmed Jamal	--/--/04	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
15	Hussam Sabbagh	--/--/04 --/--/07 19/07/14	• Belonging to a terrorist organisation
16	Tallaal Adrey	--/05/05	• Belonging to a terrorist organisation (Peninsula Lions)

	Name	Date	Terrorist acts engaged in
17	Abdul Nacer Benbrika	08/11/05	• Directing activities of a terrorist organisation • Being a member of a terrorist organisation • Possession of a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act
18	Aimen Joud	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation • Providing resources to a terrorist organisation • Attempting to make funds available to a terrorist organisation • Possession of a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act
19	Fadl Sayadi	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation • Providing resources to a terrorist organisation
20	Abdullah Merhi	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation
21	Ahmed Raad	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation • Providing resources to a terrorist organisation • Attempting to make funds available to a terrorist organisation
22	Ezzit Raad	08/11/05 --/--/13	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation • Attempting to make funds available to a terrorist organisation
23	Amer Haddara	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation
24	Izzydeen Atik	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation • Providing resources to a terrorist organisation
25	Shane Kent	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation • Making a document connected with a terrorist act
26	Hany Taha	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation
27	Bassam Raad	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation
28	Shoue Hammoud	08/11/05	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation • Making funds available to a terrorist organisation
29	Majed Raad	08/11/05 --/--/13	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation • Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
30	Mohamed Ali Elomar	08/11/05	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
31	Abdul Rakib Hasan	08/11/05	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
32	Khaled Cheikho	08/11/05	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
33	Moustafa Cheikho	08/11/05	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
34	Mohammed Omar Jamal	08/11/05	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act

	Name	Date	Terrorist acts engaged in
35	Mazen Touma	08/11/05	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts • Possession of a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act
36	Mirsad Mulahalilovic	08/11/05	• Possession of a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act
37	Omar Baladjam	08/11/05	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
38	Khaled Sharrouf	08/11/05 --/12/13 11/08/17	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act • Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
39	Zouheir Issa	--/--/05 --/--/07 --/06/14	• Making funds available to a terrorist organisation
40	Feiz Mohammad	--/--/05	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
41	Mohammed Ayub	17/10/06 --/--/13	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
42	Abdullah Ayub	17/10/06	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
43	Marek Samulski	17/10/06	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
44	Ahmed Ali	--/12/06	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
45	Ibrahim Sabouh	20/06/07	• Arrested overseas for involvement in terrorism
46	Omar al-Hadba	20/06/07	• Arrested overseas for involvement in terrorism • Belonging to a terrorist organisation (Fatah al-Islam)
47	Ahmed Elomar	20/06/07	• Arrested overseas for involvement in terrorism
48	Muhammad Basal	20/06/07	• Arrested overseas for involvement in terrorism
49	Hussein Elomar	20/06/07	• Arrested overseas for involvement in terrorism
50	Bassam El Sayed	20/06/07	• Arrested overseas for involvement in terrorism
51	Walid Osman Mohamed	--/--/08	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
52	Saney Edow Aweys	04/08/09	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
53	Wissam Mahmoud Fattal	04/08/09	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
54	Nayev El Sayed	04/08/09	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
55	Yacqub Khayre	04/08/09 05/06/17	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act • Engaging in a terrorist act
56	Abdirahman Mohamud Ahmed	04/08/09	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act

	Name	Date	Terrorist acts engaged in
57	Shyloh Jayne Giddens	14/05/10	• Detained overseas on suspicion of involvement with al-Qaeda
58	Shayden Thorne	--/11/11 10/05/16	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
59	Mustapha Al Majzoub	19/08/12	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
60	Adnan Karabegovic	12/09/12	• Possession of a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act
61	Harun Mehicevic	--/09/12	• Advocating terrorism
62	Sammy Salma	--/09/12 15/04/13	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
63	Roger Abbas	--/10/12	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
64	Yusuf Toprakkaya	--/12/12	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
65	Mostafa Mahamad Farag	--/--/12	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
66	Milad Bin Ahmad-Shah Al-Ahmadzai	26/05/13	• Under surveillance by counter-terrorism agencies for his communications with other known extremists
67	Mehmet Biber	01/07/13 03/11/16	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
68	Muhammad Abdul-Karim Musleh	01/07/13 01/09/13	• Performing services with the intention of supporting a person or persons to engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state
69	Caner Temel	01/07/13 --/01/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
70	Ahmad Naizmand	01/07/13 29/02/16	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
71	Mahmoud Abed Aboshi	02/07/13	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
72	Abraham Succarieh	10/09/13	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
73	Ahmed Succarieh	11/09/13	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
74	Neil Prakash	--/09/13 24/10/16	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
75	Nassim Elbahsa	12/10/13	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
76	Hamdi Alqudsi	14/10/13	• Performing services with the intention of supporting a person or persons to engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state
77	Adam Dahman	10/11/13 17/07/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas

	Name	Date	Terrorist acts engaged in
78	Mounir Raad	10/11/13	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
79	Amin Iman Mohamed	03/12/13	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
80	Mohamed Zuhbi	--/--/13 22/08/16	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
81	Junaid Thorne	--/--/13 --/--/15	• Advocating terrorism
82	Tyler Casey	11/01/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
83	Amira Karroum	11/01/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
84	Ahmad Moussalli	--/02/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
85	Ahmed Shaheed	--/02/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
86	Tara Nettleton	--/02/14 --/09/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
87	Agim Kruezi	09/03/14 10/09/14	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts • Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
88	RZBV	07/05/14	• Passport cancelled on assessment of intention to travel to engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state
89	Fatima Elomar	--/05/14	• Collecting funds with the intention of supporting incursions into a foreign state
90	Mohomed Unais Mohamed Ameen	--/05/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
91	Abu Nour Al-Iraqi	20/06/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
92	Zakaryah Raad	--/06/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
93	Abdullah Elmir	--/06/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
94	Robert Cerantonio	--/07/14 10/05/16	• Advocating terrorism • Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
95	Zia Abdul Haq	--/08/14 03/10/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
96	Sharky Jama	--/08/14 --/04/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
97	Yusuf Yusuf	--/08/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
98	Jake Bilardi	--/08/14 11/03/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
99	Omar Succarieh	10/09/14	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there

	Name	Date	Terrorist acts engaged in
			• Collecting funds with the intention of supporting incursions into a foreign state
100	Ahmad Azaddin Rahmany	18/09/14	• Arrested as part of counter-terrorism raids
101	Omarjan Azari	18/09/14	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts • Attempting to make funds available to a terrorist organisation
102	Maywand Osman	18/09/14	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
103	Ali Al-Talebi	18/09/14 15/10/14	• Attempting to provide support to a terrorist organisation • Attempting to make funds available to a terrorist organisation
104	Abdul Numan Haider	23/09/14	• Engaging in a terrorist act
105	Hassan el Sabsabi	30/09/14	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
106	Mahmoud Abdullatif	--/09/14 19/01/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
107	Suhan Abdul Rahman	--/09/14 18/03/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
108	Kawa Alou	--/09/14	• Arrested as part of counter-terrorism raids
109	Mohammed Ali Baryalei	--/10/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
110	Housam Abdul Razzak	--/10/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
111	Taha El Baf	--/11/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
112	Hamza El Baf	--/11/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
113	Bilal El Baf	--/11/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
114	Omar El Baf	--/11/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
115	Zehra Duman	--/11/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
116	Man Haron Monis	16/12/14	• Engaging in a terrorist act
117	Ahmed Mohammed Al-Ghazzawi	26/12/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
118	Hodan Abby	--/12/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
119	Hafsa Mohamed	--/12/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
120	Dawod Elmir	--/--/14 --/05/16	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
121	Samir Atwani	--/--/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
122	Dullel Kassab	--/--/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
123	Ahmed Merhi	--/--/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas

	Name	Date	Terrorist acts engaged in
		--/04/18	
124	Adam Brookman	--/--/14 24/07/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas • Performing services with the intention of supporting a person or persons to engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state
125	Abu Ibrahim	--/--/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
126	Mohammad Yosof Keshtyar	--/--/14	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
127	Wissam Haddad	09/01/15	• Advocating terrorism
128	Muhammed Sheglabo	--/01/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
129	Emir Biber	19/01/15 03/11/16	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there • Performing services with the intention of supporting a person or persons to engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state
130	Omar Al-Kutobi	10/02/15	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
131	Mohammad Kiad	10/02/15	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
132	Irfaan Hussein	--/03/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
133	Abdul Salam Mahmoud	--/03/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
134	Tareq Kamleh	--/03/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
135	Oliver Bridgeman	--/03/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
136	Belal Betka	--/03/15 19/12/17	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
137	Sevdet Ramadan Besim	18/04/15	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
138	Harun Causevic	18/04/15	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
139	MHK	08/05/15	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
140	Jasmina Milovanov	--/05/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
141	AH	--/05/15 24/04/16	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
142	Mohamed Elomar	22/06/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
143	Mustafa Hajjobeid	--/06/15	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
144	Masood Atai	--/08/15	• Contacting Daesh fighters from inside prison
145	Shadi Jabar Khalil Mohammad	01/10/15 22/04/16	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas

	Name	Date	Terrorist acts engaged in
146	Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad	02/10/15	• Engaging in a terrorist act
147	Raban Alou	07/10/15	• Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a terrorist act
148	Talal Alameddine	07/10/15	• Possession of a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act
149	NA NO1	07/10/15	• Arrested as part of counter-terrorism raids
150	Mustafa Dirani	07/10/15	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
151	Sulayman Khalid	10/12/15	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
152	Isaac Majzoub	10/12/15	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
153	Ibrahim Ghazzawy	10/12/15	• Making a document connected with a terrorist act
154	Jibryl Almaouie	10/12/15	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
155	CMHV	20/12/15	• Passport cancelled on assessment of intention to travel to engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state
156	Abdullah Salihy	23/12/15	• Making a document connected with a terrorist act
157	Mohamed Almaouie	23/12/15	• Making a document connected with a terrorist act
158	Guy Staines	--/--/15 --/--/17	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
159	Sameh Bayda	24/01/16	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
160	Alo-Bridget Namoa	23/02/16	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
161	Tamim Sahil Khaja	27/02/16 18/05/16	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
162	Nowroz Amin	--/02/16 16/06/18	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
163	Milad Atai	22/03/16	• Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a terrorist act • Making funds available to a terrorist organisation • Being a member of a terrorist organisation
164	NK	24/03/16	• Making funds available to a terrorist organisation
165	Amin Elmir	07/04/16 22/12/16	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas • Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
166	Paul Dacre	10/05/16	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
167	Antonio Granata	10/05/16	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
168	Kadir Kaya	10/05/16	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
169	Farhad Said	26/05/16	• Making a document connected with a terrorist act

	Name	Date	Terrorist acts engaged in
170	Murat Kaya	27/05/16	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
171	Zainab Abdirahman-Khalif	--/07/16 23/05/17	• Being a member of a terrorist organisation (Daesh)
172	Hazem Zuhbi	22/08/16	• Left Australia to support or engage in terrorism overseas
173	Ihsas Khan	10/09/16	• Engaging in a terrorist act
174	Bourhan Hraichie	14/09/16	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
175	NA NO2	12/10/16	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
176	HG	12/10/16	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
177	Ibrahim Abbas	23/12/16	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
178	Hamza Abbas	23/12/16	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
179	Ahmed Mohamed	23/12/16	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act • Attempting to engage in a terrorist act and engaging in a terrorist act
180	Abdullah Chaarani	23/12/16	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act • Attempting to engage in a terrorist act and engaging in a terrorist act
181	D	--/12/16	• Advocating terrorism
182	Haisem Zahab	28/02/17	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there • Giving or receiving goods and services to promote the commission of a terrorist offence
183	Moudasser Taleb	15/06/17	• Conduct preparatory to the entering of a foreign state with the intention of engaging in a hostile activity there
184	Hatim Moukhaiber	19/08/17	• Attempting to engage in a terrorist act and engaging in a terrorist act
185	Isa Kocoglu	24/10/17	• Performing services with the intention of supporting a person or persons to engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state
186	Ali Khalif Shire Ali	27/11/17	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
187	Khaled Khayat	29/07/17	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
188	Mahmoud Khayat	29/07/17	• Conspiring to do acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act
189	Linda Merhi	22/01/18	• Making funds available to a terrorist organisation
190	Dunn (pseudonym)	20/06/18	• Advocating terrorism
191	Hassan Khalif Shire Ali	09/11/18	• Engaging in a terrorist act
192	Samed Eriklioglu	20/11/18	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
193	Ertunc Eriklioglu	20/11/18	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts
194	Hanifi Halis	20/11/18	• Doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act or acts

Appendix 3: Counter-terrorism operations in Australia

Name	Date of arrest/death	Operation	Location
Abdul Nacer Benbrika	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Aimen Joud	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Fadl Sayadi	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Abdullah Merhi	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Ahmed Raad	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Ezzit Raad	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Amer Haddara	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Izzydeen Atik	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Shane Kent	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Hany Taha	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Bassam Raad	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Shoue Hammoud	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Majed Raad	08/11/05	Pendennis	Victoria
Mohamed Ali Elomar	08/11/05	Pendennis	New South Wales
Abdul Rakib Hasan	08/11/05	Pendennis	New South Wales
Khaled Cheikho	08/11/05	Pendennis	New South Wales
Moustafa Cheikho	08/11/05	Pendennis	New South Wales
Mohammed Omar Jamal	08/11/05	Pendennis	New South Wales
Mazen Touma	08/11/05	Pendennis	New South Wales
Mirsad Mulahalilovic	08/11/05	Pendennis	New South Wales
Omar Baladjam	08/11/05	Pendennis	New South Wales
Khaled Sharrouf	08/11/05	Pendennis	New South Wales
Saney Edow Aweys	04/08/09	Neath	Victoria
Wissam Mahmoud Fattal	04/08/09	Neath	Victoria
Nayev El Sayed	04/08/09	Neath	Victoria
Yacqub Khayre	04/08/09	Neath	Victoria
Abdirahman Mohamud Ahmed	04/08/09	Neath	Victoria
Adnan Karabegovic	12/09/12	Astley	Victoria
Harun Mehicevic	--/09/12	Astley	Victoria
Ahmad Naizmand	01/07/13	Appleby	New South Wales
Hamdi Alqudsi	14/10/13	Rathlin	New South Wales
Amin Iman Mohamed	03/12/13	Rathlin	New South Wales
Agim Kruezi	09/03/14	Bolton	Queensland
Fatima Elomar	--/05/14	Duntulm	New South Wales
Omar Succarieh	10/09/14	Bolton	Queensland
Omarjan Azari	18/09/14	Appleby	New South Wales
Maywand Osman	18/09/14	Appleby	New South Wales
Ali Al-Talebi	18/09/14	Appleby	New South Wales
Abdul Numan Haider	23/09/14	Goodrich	Victoria

Name	Date of arrest/death	Operation	Location
Hassan el Sabsabi	30/09/14	Hohensalzburg	Victoria
Mohammed Ali Baryalei	--/10/14	Appleby	New South Wales
Omar Al-Kutobi	10/02/15	Castrum	New South Wales
Mohammad Kiad	10/02/15	Castrum	New South Wales
Sevdet Ramadan Besim	18/04/15	Rising	Victoria
Harun Causevic	18/04/15	Rising	Victoria
MHK	08/05/15	Amberd	Victoria
AH	--/05/15	Vianden	New South Wales
Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad	02/10/15	Peqin/Fellows	New South Wales
Raban Alou	07/10/15	Peqin/Fellows	New South Wales
Talal Alameddine	07/10/15	Peqin/Fellows	New South Wales
N.A. NO.1	07/10/15	Peqin/Fellows	New South Wales
Mustafa Dirani	07/10/15	Peqin/Fellows	New South Wales
Sulayman Khalid	10/12/15	Appleby	New South Wales
Isaac Majzoub	10/12/15	Appleby	New South Wales
Ibrahim Ghazzawy	10/12/15	Appleby	New South Wales
Jibryl Almaouie	10/12/15	Appleby	New South Wales
Abdullah Salihy	23/12/15	Appleby	New South Wales
Mohamed Almaouie	23/12/15	Appleby	New South Wales
Sameh Bayda	24/01/16	Chilon	New South Wales
Alo-Bridget Namoa	23/02/16	Chilon	New South Wales
Milad Atai	22/03/16	Appleby Peqin/Fellows	New South Wales
NK	24/03/16	Peqin	New South Wales
Paul Dacre	10/05/16	Middleham	Victoria
Antonio Granata	10/05/16	Middleham	Victoria
Kadir Kaya	10/05/16	Middleham	Victoria
Shayden Thorne	10/05/16	Middleham	Victoria
Robert Cerantonio	10/05/16	Middleham	Victoria
Tamim Sahil Khaja	18/05/16	Sanandres	New South Wales
Farhad Said	26/05/16	Appleby	New South Wales
Murat Kaya	27/05/16	Middleham	Victoria
Ihsas Khan	10/09/16	Tressider	New South Wales
Bourhan Hraichie	14/09/16	Broughton	New South Wales
N.A. NO.2	12/10/16	Restormel	New South Wales
HG	12/10/16	Restormel	New South Wales
Ibrahim Abbas	23/12/16	Kastelholm	Victoria
Hamza Abbas	23/12/16	Kastelholm	Victoria
Ahmed Mohamed	23/12/16	Kastelholm	Victoria
Abdullah Chaarani	23/12/16	Kastelholm	Victoria
Haisem Zahab	28/02/17	Marksburg	New South Wales
Hatim Moukhaiber	19/08/17	Kastelholm	Victoria
Ali Khalif Shire Ali	27/11/17	San Jose	New South Wales
Khaled Khayat	29/07/17	Silves	New South Wales
Mahmoud Khayat	29/07/17	Silves	New South Wales

Name	Date of arrest/death	Operation	Location
Linda Merhi	22/01/18	Peqin	New South Wales
Samed Eriklioglu	20/11/18	Donabate	Victoria
Ertunc Eriklioglu	20/11/18	Donabate	Victoria
Hanifi Halis	20/11/18	Donabate	Victoria