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Abstract

Does electing Islamist parties help or hurt women? Due to Ennahda winning a plurality in the 2011 elections and women obtaining 31% of seats, Tunisia offers an opportunity to test the impact of legislator gender and Islamist orientation on women's representation. Using original 2012 surveys of 40 Tunisian parliamentarians (MPs) and 1,200 citizens, we find that electing female and Islamists MPs of both genders improves women's symbolic and service responsiveness by increasing the likelihood that women are aware of and contact MPs. Electing Islamist female MPs has a positive impact on women's symbolic and service responsiveness, but decreases the likelihood that men will interact with legislators. We argue that Islamist deputies are more responsive to women due to an Islamic mandate effect—that is, Islamist parties' efforts to institutionalize their constituency relations, provide services to the marginalized through direct contact, and respect norms of piety by using female parliamentarians to reach women in sex-segregated spaces. While Islamist parties positively impact some aspects of women's representation, they also reinforce traditional understandings of gender relations. Our results extend literature on Islam, gender, and governance by demonstrating that quotas and party institutionalization improve women's representation in clientelistic contexts.

Keywords: Service provision, symbolic responsiveness, gender equality, women and politics, Islamist parties, Middle East and North Africa, Muslim world

When it comes to political participation, women face an uphill battle in Arab and Muslim countries. Key obstacles include promoting women's rights in authoritarian parliaments (Shalaby, 2016) and accessing constituency service (Benstead, 2016; 2019b). Yet, the rise of women's descriptive representation in Arab legislatures, from less than 5% of seats in 2000 to almost 20% in 2020 (IPU, 2020), and the electoral success of Islamist parties in places like Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, raise an important question: When it comes to service and symbolic responsiveness, does electing more women and Islamist parties help or hurt women?[1]

Existing literature shows women are marginalized from political networks in clientelistic settings (Beck, 2003; Tripp, 2001) and, as a result, face barriers to elected office (Bjarnegård, 2013) and constituency service. Surveys of Moroccan and Algerian parliamentarians and Tunisian and Libyan citizens find that women are significantly less able to request clientelistic services from legislators, but that electing women, especially through quotas, improves their access (Benstead, 2016; 2019b).

Despite the growing role of Islamist parties and studies of how these movements impact legislation on gender issues (Kang, 2015), little is known about how they shape women's ability to ask for services and interact with elected and appointed officials. Conventional wisdom suggests that Islamist successes negatively affect women, and, thus, some pundits see the Arab spring's Islamist victories as a winter for women (Barchrach, 2011). Yet, literature on Islamist parties and governance indicates that Islamist parties improve governance outcomes, such healthcare, for women (Blaydes, 2014), due in part to their efforts to institutionalize service

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[1] We define Islamist parties as those whose ideology is rooted in Islam, and who participate in elections.

provision and reach out to groups that are marginalized from existing patronage networks (Cammett and Jones Luong, 2014). Gender and politics research argues that the chief obstacle to women's advancement may be clientelistic politics, which advantages men, due to their numerical dominance in politics and tendency toward homosocial networks (Sung, 2003; Bjarnegård, 2013).[2] It follows that if Islamist parties seek to bypass existing patronage networks and serve all citizens fairly, then this would benefit marginalized groups, including women, in areas such as service and symbolic responsiveness.

Briefly, service responsiveness, or clientelistic responsiveness, involves providing services, such as healthcare, electricity, or jobs (Benstead, 2016). Symbolic responsiveness includes different modes of interaction with constituents (Eulau and Karps, 1977), which may build trust and facilitate service, allocation (i.e., club goods), and policy (i.e., legislative) responsiveness.[3] Increased connections and interaction between elected officials and women also creates channels to bring women's concerns into the policymaking sphere (Arat, 2005; p. 113).

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[2] Clientelism: an "informal relationship between two actors of asymmetrical socioeconomic power where the patron…controls…resources…clients pursue but often cannot receive otherwise" (Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; p. 953). See Benstead (2016) for a discussion of the distinction between clientelistic responsiveness in a non-democracy and casework in a democracy.

[3] Pitkin (1967) conceptualized representation as responsiveness, while Eulau and Karps (1977) identified four dimensions of responsiveness: symbolic, service, policy, and allocation (i.e., district projects) responsiveness. The dimensions of responsiveness overlap (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005), forming a seamless process of responsiveness to citizens' needs (Celis, Childs, Kantola, & Krook, 2008).

In this paper, we argue that Islamist parties improve some aspects of responsiveness to women due to their institutionalization and strategic use of women. Focusing on service and symbolic responsiveness, we maintain that because Islamist parties serve a broad cross-section of society, including marginalized communities and women, and institutionalize constituency service to avoid corruption and patronage, electing Islamists improves service and symbolic representation of women. This would be particularly true if Islamist parties leverage their female members to mobilize female voters in segregated environments such as homes, mosques, and weddings. Such a positive effect would be counterintuitive, given conventional wisdom with regard to the impact of Islam on women's status, but the hypothesis is untested. This is largely because of the limited number of countries in which a sufficiently large number of female Islamist deputies have been elected and the lack of surveys asking about parliamentarian-citizens interactions.

To test the impact of MP gender and party orientation on symbolic and service responsiveness to women, this paper takes advantage of increased Islamist and female representation following Tunisia's Constituent Assembly elections in which women gained 31% of seats due to a legislated quota and Ennahda won 37% of all seats. We argue that Islamist and Islamist female deputies provide greater symbolic and service responsiveness to women due to an Islamic mandate effect—that is, Islamist parties' efforts to institutionalize their constituency relations, provide services fairly to citizens of all backgrounds, and respect norms of piety and sex segregation by using female parliamentarians to reach women in segregated spaces. The evidence shows that both female MP gender as well as MP Islamist party orientation are directly associated with a higher likelihood that female citizens will know a deputy's name and have asked for a service. Yet Islamist female deputies are also associated with an increased likelihood

of female citizens interacting with deputies while decreasing the extent to which male citizens do so.[4]

Our study is novel in that it is the first to examine the intersectional effect of parliamentarian gender and Islamist party identification on women's responsiveness and one of few to examine symbolic responsiveness to women in developing countries. It contributes to the gender and clientelism literature by showing that electing more women supports better governance by diminishing male advantages in accessing patronage (Sung, 2003). Islamist parties do not promote liberal gender equality and are unlikely to engage in substantive representation of secularly progressive women's issues in the legislature. Indeed, Islamist parties use female members to mobilize women voters in sex-segregated religious contexts, reinforcing conservative gender norms. Yet the data suggest that Islamist movements support responsiveness to women through their efforts to serve citizens regardless of their background and strategic use of women to reach out to female citizens in social contexts in which female citizens feel comfortable making requests.

Our findings with regard to Islamist parties are likely to be broadly applicable to clientelistic societies in the Arab and Muslim world, wherever marginalized populations increase their representation and parties adopt democratically-oriented practices in areas such as service provision.[5] And, the impact of electing women is likely to impact women's representation in a

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[4] The measure of service provision taps whether citizens have asked for help, not whether the service was actually received.

[5] Effects may not generalize where Islamist parties establish authoritarian, theocratic government. Our conclusions do not predict how Ennahda's 2016 move to separate itself from social and religious activities will impact women.

broader swath of countries, given male advantages accessing patronage networks in Africa (Tripp, 2001), Asia (Bjarnegård, 2013), and the Middle East (Benstead, 2016; 2019b). Because Tunisia is the most gender-equal Arab societies (Charrad, 2001), we expect the impact of electing women and Islamists to have a greater impact in other Arab societies, especially in highly gender segregated settings like the Arab Gulf countries.[6]

The Tunisian Case

Members of parliament across the region's authoritarian and transitional regimes devote considerable time to service provision (Abdel-Samad, 2009; Benstead, 2016). In this respect, Tunisia's transitional period is representative of other periods in Tunisian history and of other Arab countries (Blaydes, 2010; Lust, 2009). The role of the Constituent Assembly, which held office from 2011-2013, was to develop, debate, and pass the constitution and to govern (Delmasso & Cavatorta, 2013). However, based on the survey of Tunisian Constituent Assembly members discussed below, 63% indicated that they responded to a minimum of 11-50 service requests per month. This is similar to service provision rates in other Arab countries. Benstead (2008) found Moroccan parliamentarians provided an average of 98 constituency services per month, while Algerian deputies provided 44. Moreover, gender gaps in access to parliamentarians exist not only in Tunisia, as discussed below, but also in Jordan, Libya, and Algeria.

Moreover, since electing Islamists and women is likely to have the greatest impact on responsiveness to females in the most patriarchal and clientelistic settings, Tunisia is a most

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[6] Indeed, Benstead shows that Islamist parties than non-Islamist parties are more responsive to female citizens in Morocco (2021) and Algeria (2020).

difficult case in the Arab world, due to its history of state policies to ensure gender equality and relatively more democratic politics. Tunisia's founding prime minister (and later president) Habib Bourguiba passed by decree a Personal Status Code (PSC) in 1956 that extended many rights to women, including to outlaw polygamy and the guardian system, grant women an equal right to divorce, and give Tunisia the most progressive family law in the Arab world at the time. The PSC fueled social changes that altered women's political and economic status, including in civil society, which helped to spark and sustain the Arab spring. Today, Tunisian women enjoy among the region's highest levels of political representation and labor force participation (Benstead, 2019a).

In 2004, Ben Ali's Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) implemented a 25% party quota in national, regional, and municipal legislative elections, increasing its parliamentary quota to 30% in 2009. On the eve of the revolution, 28% of the parliament was female due to RCD dominance in Tunisia's heavily controlled elections. Elections, held on October 23, 2011 by proportional representation in 24 districts, were widely viewed as clean (Benstead, Kao, & Lust, 2022). While Ennahda was the main winner, its 37% of seats were not sufficient to rule alone. Instead, it formed a troika (coalition) with two non-Islamist parties, the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol (Willis, 2014; Buehler, 2018; Nugent, 2020).

Yet, Ennahda elected more women than any other party, due in part to the type of quota in place for parliamentary elections. In 2011, a legislated quota was implemented which required party lists in the country's proportional representation system to alternate between male and female candidates (that is, a vertical zipper system). Yet without provisions regarding the gender of the first candidate on the list (that is, a horizontal zipper system), most parties chose men to head their party lists. As a result, parties that won two seats in many districts–namely Ennahda–

elected most women. While women won 31% in the 2011 Constituent Assembly (67 of 217

seats), 61% of all female legislators in Tunisia represented Ennahda.

Accordingly, the Assembly was made up as follows: Non-Islamist men (48%), Islamist

men (21%), Islamist women (19%), and non-Islamist women (11%). (Table 1).

[Table 1]

Table 1. Parliamentarians in Constituent Assembly

	Constituent Assembly members
Islamist men	45(21%)
Islamist women	41(19%)
Non-Islamist men	105(48%)
Non-Islamist women	26(11%)
Total seats	217(100%)

Table 1 shows the seats held by the four intersecting identity categories.

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

We expect the strong showing for female candidates in the elections to positively impact

women's service and symbolic representation. Existing literature suggests strongly that female

citizens are marginalized from clientelistic networks, but that elected female officials helps to

narrow this gap.[7] Bjarnegård (2013) argues that clientelistic politics are inherently unequal

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[7] Extant research suggests that while women are marginalized from patronage networks in the

formal political sphere in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (Beck, 2003; Tripp, 2001)—e.g.,

women made 20-29% of requests to Moroccan and Algerian parliamentarians—electing women

improves women's ability to ask for services (Benstead, 2016). Benstead (2019) found that

women were more likely than men to contact female parliamentarians in transitional Libya,

because women face disadvantages accumulating homosocial capital—close relationships with individuals, often of the same gender, who are similar and have resources needed for electoral success. Homosocial capital includes expressive and instrumental resources (Bjarnegård, 2013). Expressive resources are relational similarities (e.g., ease of relating), which stem from traditional norms defining public space as male and private space as female (Sadiqi, 2008) and encourage sex segregation. Instrumental resources are those needed to reach goals, such as winning office or attracting patronage. Expressive and instrumental factors on the supply and demand side diminish women's access to services whenever men are dominant.

Yet the literature has less to say about how electing Islamist parties–at the intersection of MP gender–shapes responsiveness to female citizens. Conventional wisdom and many scholars expect Islamist movements will erode women's rights because they adhere to and reinforce conservative gender norms (Norris and Inglehart, 2001). Since most Islamist parties want to implement Shari'a, it is reasonable to expect that Islamist governments will negatively impact women's status. Islamist parties may incorporate women's rights into their platforms, but they are unlikely to genuinely promote gender equality (Clark & Schwedler, 2003).

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where women contact female deputies 17% of the time, compared to men, who never reported seeking assistance from a female member (p<.05). In Jordan, men and women are equally likely to ask a female for help. This may be due to tribes' political influence, which improves women's service responsiveness because women can leverage an intersecting identity (i.e., co-ethnicity) to access services (Benstead, 2015). The same was true for Tunisia, where citizens more often contacted same-gendered local councilors, particularly when making large requests for club goods, which require a close relationship (Benstead, 2019).

Yet, other researchers find Islamist parties positively impact governance. Meyersson (2014) concludes that the Refah (Welfare) party in Turkey, which won several mayoral elections, improved poor women's access to education. Henderson and Kuncoro (2011) found that Islamist parties decreased corruption (Henderson & Kuncoro, 2011), while Blaydes (2014) showed that women living in Egyptian localities controlled by radical Islamists experienced better health outcomes. For example, Benstead (2021) found that local and national legislators from Islamist parties in Algeria were more likely than legislators from other parties to serve citizens with whom they did not have a personal relationship and to serve women.

Existing literature suggests that Islamist parties are more fully institutionalized than other non-Islamist parties, allowing them to mobilize and serve citizens at the grassroots, including marginalized citizens who lack access to patronage networks with the state (Cammett & Jones Luong, 2014). To implement their party strategy, Islamist, more than other parties, institutionalize service provision by establishing direct contact with citizens through a network of party and local offices, mosques, social service institutions, and schools (Roháč, 2013; p. 256; Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008). This means that they work together, often in party offices where male and female elected officials and staff are present. Direct contact with constituents and this team approach allows Islamist women to interact with female citizens who are practicing Muslims and may be reluctant to approach male legislators (Benstead, 2021). The direct contact also allows women to talk to someone who understands the obstacles they face, which in turn allows female legislators to respond at least symbolically to their needs.

In doing so, Islamists utilize face-to-face connections with constituents to bolster party rather than personal reputation (Wickham, 2002; Clark, 2004b; Arat, 2005; Yadav, 2010). Benstead (2008) found that Islamist deputies in Morocco and Algeria, when asked to rate their

perceived representative role on a spectrum from personal to party-oriented, were more likely to rate their approach as party-centered. In Morocco, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is personal reputation and 5 is the party reputation, non-Islamists scored 3.2 on average, while Islamists scored 1.6 (p<.001). In Algeria, the difference was smaller—3.0 for non-Islamists and 2.8 for Islamists (p<.05).

Islamist parties are also overtly focused on serving the needs of constituents, whether than those in the middle classes (Brooke, 2019) or the needy (Bayat, 2002; Catusse & Zaki, 2009; Ismail, 2001; Troudi, 2011; Walsh, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2002). Islamist parties stress fairness and social responsibility as part of their religious ideology. This clearly distinguishes their efforts from the practices of authoritarian regimes in which they operate (Brumberg, 2002; Esposito, 1999; Wickham, 2002) and opens opportunities for women and members of other marginalized groups to interact with and access services from deputies.

Some theorists claim this constitutes an exchange of favors for votes (Alterman, 2000; Flanigan, 2008; Hamzeh, 2001). Yet Clark (2004b) argues that these activities are different from the traditional clientelistic networks because they are based on "horizontal networks" between group members working toward a common goal: to provide services to citizens in order to promote the party's goals (Roháč, 2013; p. 267). Islamist parties' commitment to fairness and their ability to engage easily in direct contact with observant Muslim women encourages female Islamists legislators to respond to the symbolic and service needs of women in their constituencies.

Cammett and Jones Luong (2014) argue that organizational capacity, social service provision, and ideological values are all elements of the party's reputation and, as such, party reputation is the most important driver of Islamist electoral success (Cammett & Jones Luong,

2014). For Islamist parties to remain credible and have a reputation for delivering public goods, they must offer services to all people, including women.

Accordingly, we posit that Islamist parties will improve symbolic and service responsiveness of women due to an Islamic mandate effect. We adapt this term from Franceschet and Piscopo (2008), who argued that quota-elected women perceive a mandate, or "obligation to act on behalf of women," due to their underrepresentation (p. 394-395).

Our concept of an Islamic mandate has two components, one stemming from the party's institutionalization of service provision which impacts its capacity to reach and serve citizens from different backgrounds (i.e., the party component), and the other from its strategic use of female leaders to reach women specifically, often in sex-segretgated environments (i.e., the gendered-component). We argue that Islamist parties' efforts to institutionalize their constituency relations, provide services to the marginalized through direct contact, and respect norms of piety by using female parliamentarians to reach women, resulting in greater symbolic and service responsiveness to female citzens.

Accordingly, while Islamist parties are not the only ones to utilize female members or have women's sections, they do so in distinctive ways (Arat, 2005; Ayata, 1996). Because of their commitment to Islamic values of piety, Islamist parties see the importance of engaging female members in order to mobilize women. Female members not only reach out to voters, but they also establish new social networks (Clark, 2004a) by meeting women who are not engaged in political networks through social functions like homes, weddings, and social teas (Arat, 2005; Blaydes & Tarouty, 2009). By emphasizing piety, Islamist parties create "sacred" spaces that ensure that women can safely enter political offices and participate in meetings while being free from harassment and negative impacts on their reputation. Islamist parties in several countries

utilize quotas to increase the number of women not only on party lists, but also within their organization (Clark & Schweder, 2003) and often have women's sections in their party offices and women's committees (White, 2002). Crucially, these events allow female Islamist legislators to interact with female constituents. When women constituents are in a separate space, they feel more at ease to engage with female legislators in the absence of patriarchal hierarchy. This is well known in the case of Morocco where religious da'wa groups like Tawhid was Islah, the social movement of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) have women's meetings like prayer groups meant to serve the needs of women, both in terms of religious instruction and service provision (Wegner & Pellicer, 2009; Clark, 2004a).

This grassroots character of Islamist parties—and their female membership—characterized other countries as well. In interviews with Moroccan constituents, Benstead (2021) found that citizens had more day-to-day contact with Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Tangiers, than with deputies representing other parties in the city. White (2002) also found this to be the case in Turkey,

> Secularist activists in Ümraniye used strategies of organization similar to those of the Islamists to mobilize residents…But while they were able to carry out educational and charity activities like the Islamists, the secularist activists were unable to mobilize residents on a sustained basis. They were unwilling to situate their message within local cultural norms that they associated with the "Other" Istanbul, despite living in Ümraniye themselves. Their elitism eventually brought about a lack of rapport with the neighborhood women… (White, 2002; p. 242)

Moreover, Islamist women in Tunisia were highly engaged. While Ennahda men were imprisoned during the Ben Ali era, women in the Tunisian Ennahda party developed political skills and were heads of their households (Wolf, 2015; Marks, 2011). As a result, women remained active in the Ennahda party after 2011. When the party was legalized after the revolution, it found a widespread base of public sympathy and grass-roots support and a

politically-conscious membership. This involvement of female members and the party's practice of maintaining relatively more gender conservative norms of sex segregation while reaching out to other women at the grassroots leads us to expect that the more Islamist women are elected, the more likely women in their districts will be to interact with and request services from parliamentarians.

Hypotheses

Accordingly, we expect that Islamist members will use direct methods such as social gatherings, phone or email, or party and personal district offices more than non-Islamists deputies (H1) and that female Islamist legislators will be even more likely to use these methods than legislators with other identities (H2).

Contact methods hypotheses:

H1: Islamist parties will be more likely to use direct methods of contact with citizens than will non-Islamist legislators.

H2: Female Islamist members will be more likely to use direct methods of contact with citizens than will female non-Islamist, male non-Islamists, and male Islamist legislators.

A theory of homosocial capital suggests that women's symbolic and service responsiveness will improve as more women are elected since female members are more likely to have more female citizens in their network than their male counterparts (H3). We also expect that the higher the proportion of seats in the district held by Islamists, the greater will be women's symbolic and service responsiveness (H4). In addition, due to this gendered strategy,

we hypothesize that as the proportion of Islamist female deputies increases, symbolic and service responsiveness of women will also improve (H5).

Service and symbolic responsiveness hypotheses:

H3: Female citizens in districts with a higher proportion of female legislators will be more likely to know about, interact with, and contact legislators than those with a lower proportion of female legislators.

H4: Female citizens in districts with a higher proportion of Islamist legislators will be more likely to know about, interact with, and contact legislators than those with a lower proportion of Islamist legislators.

H5: Female citizens in districts with a higher proportion of Islamist female legislators will be more likely to know about, interact with, and contact legislators than those with a lower proportion of female Islamist legislators.

Data and Methods

We test these hypotheses with a survey of legislators and citizens in Tunisia.

Parliamentarian Survey

To compare the use of direct methods to contact constituents used by female, Islamist, and female Islamist parliamentarians (H1 and H2), we draw on an original 2012 survey of 40 of the 217 Tunisian Constituent Assembly members elected on October 23, 2011 (Abdel-Samad 2012). We used the following item: "How do you communicate with your district constituents? Do you:: (a) Have an office in the district, b) Use the office of the party, c) Email them, d) Call

them by phone, e) Use the media, f) social events (e.g., weddings, funerals), g) Other." We code all methods as direct, apart from the media, which we code as indirect.

The parliamentarian survey was administered face-to-face in the Constituent Assembly in 2012 using paper-and-pencil interviewing (PAPI) by a trained Tunisian researcher. All members of the Assembly were included in the sample. The response rate was 18% and the survey represented all political parties and independents.

Citizen Survey

To test the impact of parliamentarian gender and party identification on symbolic and service responsiveness to women (H3, H4, and H5), we draw on data from the 2012 Tunisian Post-Election Survey (TPES), a nationally-representative study of 1,200 Tunisians 18 years and older conducted by one of the authors in sixteen electoral districts October-November 2012, one year after the country's 2011 Constituent Assembly elections (Benstead & Lust, 2012).[8]

To measure service responsiveness, respondents were asked whether they had requested help from a member of the Constituent Assembly since 2011. Symbolic responsiveness is

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[8] A multi-stage, probabilistic sampling design was used. A random stratified sample of 12 of 27 electoral districts was selected, with region as stratum. Probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling was used to select 54 mu'tadiyat (urban communes) and 20 immadayat (rural communes), according to the distribution of the urban and rural population in the country. Block size was 15. Systematic methods were used to select a starting address, a random start and walk were used to choose households, and Kish tables were used to select one ault/ household. Interviewers conducted surveys with selected respondents regardless of sex. The response rate was 56%.

measured by two items tapping whether citizens knew the name of or interacted with parliamentarians.

Tunisian Parliamentarian Survey

Data from the Tunisian parliamentarian survey (Abdel-Samad, 2012) support our theoretical expectations that Islamist deputies use direct modes of citizen contact more than non-Islamist members (H1) (Table 2). Such direct interactions build stronger relationships with constituents which in turn improves the party's reputation among potential voters and allows them to reach a broader swath of citizens, including groups that are traditionally marginalized from political networks. This evidence allows us to partially—if imperfectly—demonstrate that Islamist parties institutionalize their constituency relations and provide services to the marginalized through direct methods of interaction and communication.

With the exception of personal district offices, more Islamist deputies use direct forms of contact (i.e., party office, email, phone, and social events) than non-Islamist deputies. Forty-six percent of Ennahda deputies use party offices, compared to only 22% of other parties' deputies, who are more likely to use personal offices (15% of non-Islamist and 8% of Islamist deputies). Sixty-one percent of Ennahda deputies use email, compared to only 48% of MPs from other parties. When it comes to social events, 54% of Ennahda legislators attend these events compared with 33% of other parties. These direct modes and use of party offices are consistent with our expectations (H1) and are likely to increase the impact of electing Islamist deputies on women's symbolic and service responsiveness. In contrast, deputies from other parties (44%) use media more than Ennahda members (15%), illustrating what the literature suggests about how Islamist parties are closer to the grassroots.

[Table 2]

Table 2. Modes of citizen-legislator contact

	Direct contact					Indirect contact
	Personal district office	Party office	Email	Phone	Social events	Media
Islamist versus non-Islamist						
Ennahda members	1(8%)	6(46%)	8(62%)	11(85%)	7(54%)	2(15%)
Non-Islamist members	4(15%)	6(22%)	13(48%)	20(74%)	9(33%)	12(44%)
Intersectional categories						
Female Islamist members	0(0%)	0(0%)	3(60%)	4(80%)	4(80%)	0(0%)
Male Islamist	0(0%)	6(75%)	4(80%)	7(88%)	3(38%)	2(25%)
Female non-Islamist members	2(50%)	0(0%)	2(67%)	3(100%)	0(0%)	2(67%)
Male non-Islamist members	3(13%)	5(21%)	12(50%)	17(71%)	13(54%)	8(33%)

Source: Tunisian Constituent Assembly Survey. *N=40. Too small to detect statistically significant differences.

Female Islamist legislators also differ from even their male Islamist colleagues in their use of direct use of some direct methods (H2). Just as the literature on Islamist parties argues, Islamist females use social events more than any other type of deputy: 80% of female Islamist members, 54% of male non-Islamist members, 38% of male Islamist deputies, and 0% of female non-Islamist deputies do so. Female Islamist members use different modes from even their female non-Islamist colleagues, 0% of whom report using social events, which is consistent with the literature (White 2002) and our expectations. These events allow female Islamist legislators

to interact with female constituents. When women constituents are in a separate space, they feel more at ease to engage with female legislators in the absence of patriarchal hierarchy. In addition, such events provide a higher level of accountability for constituents. When a legislator promises to help constituents in such events, there are witnesses to the interactions which may create social pressure for the legislator to act in order to prevent their reputation from suffering. These events also increase the depth of the relationship between constituents and legislators, which improves female legislators' reelection chances. And, they may explain why electing Islamist female members in Tunisia appears to have a slight negative impact on men's ability to ask for services.

At the same time, Islamist females do not use indirect methods, which may be due to the lack of representation of veiled women on Tunisian television: 0% of female Islamist members, 33% of male non-Islamist members, 25% of male Islamist deputies, and 67% of female non-Islamist deputies.

Tunisian Constituent Survey

Data from the citizen survey (Benstead & Lust, 2012) also support our hypotheses. Even though Tunisia is the most gender-progressive country in the region, women are much less likely than men to interact with parliamentarians (Table 3). The gap is largest for public places, such as cafes or mosques; 30% of men and 13% of women saw a member of the Constituent Assembly in a public place (p<.001), a substantial gender gap of 17% which highlights male citizens' advantages accumulating homosocial capital in the political sphere. There is also a large gender gap for seeing deputies at meetings: 16% of men and 5% of women saw a deputy in this way

(p<.001), an 11% gap. For interactions that are more open to all citizens—hearing a deputy on

TV of the radio—the gender gap is smaller: 66% of men and 60% of women, (p<.05), a 6% gap.

[Table 3]

Table 3. Constituent-parliamentarian interactions in Tunisia, by citizen gender

Saw deputy:	Transitional Tunisia (2011-2012)			
	Male	Female	Total	Gender gap (Male%-female%)
In a public place	183(30.4%)	77(13.0%)	260(21.8%)	17.4%
	$\chi^2(1)=52.21$***			
At meeting	96(15.9%)	31(5.2%)	127(10.6%)	10.7%
	$\chi^2(1)=36.37$***			
On TV or heard on radio[1]	394(65.8%)	353(59.5%)	747(62.7%)	6.3%
	$\chi^2(1)=4.97$*			
Heard about deputy second hand	40(6.7%)	20(3.4%)	60(5.0%)	3.3%
	$\chi^2(1)=6.99$**			
In his/her home or local office	34(5.7%)	14(2.4%)	48(4.0%)	3.3%
	$\chi^2(1)=8.47$**			
Deputy is a friend/family member	25(4.2%)	12(2.0%)	37(3.1%)	2.2%
	$\chi^2(1)=4.56$*			
At party office	16(2.7%)	7(1.2%)	23(1.9%)	1.5%
	$\chi^2(1)=3.51$†			

Source: 2012 TPES. †p<.10/*p<.05/**p<.01/***p<.001. [1]Not included in dependent variable.

In relative terms, other less common interactions show larger gaps. Although gender gaps

are 3% or less, men were twice as likely as women to have heard about a deputy or visited an

office. The same is true for having a parliamentarian as a friend or family member; 6% compared to 2% saw a deputy in his or her home or office (p<.01), a 4% gap.

Dependent Variable

To measure symbolic and service responsiveness, we create three binary dependent variables (yes=1, no=0) indicating whether the individual: (1) knows the name of at least one parliamentarian from the district (symbolic responsiveness); (2) has interacted with a member in at least one way (Table 3; symbolic responsiveness); and, (3) has asked for help with a personal or community problem or to express an opinion (service responsiveness).

Figure 1 shows the percentage of male and female citizens who have done these things. Men are more than twice as likely as women to interact with a deputy: 39% of men and 18% of women have seen a deputy in at least one of six ways, while 32% of men and 19% of women know the name of at least one parliamentarian. Few citizens (4% of men and 6% of women) have asked for services. As noted, gender gaps in these outcomes also exist in Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Jordan (Benstead, 2019b).

[Figure 1]

Figure 1. Symbolic and service responsiveness, by citizen gender (Dependent variables)

2012 TPES (Benstead & Lust, 2012). <u>Knows name:</u> "Please name for me deputies currently elected to the Constituent Assembly from (electoral constituency)?" <u>Interacted with:</u> "Have you ever: (1) Attended a meeting where a Deputy from this district appeared?" (2) "Seen any Deputy from this district in a public place such as in the street, a cafe, or a mosque?" (3) "Visited or seen the local office or home of a deputy from this district?" (4) "Visited any Deputy from this district in their party office?" (5) "Heard about any Deputies from this district second hand?" (6) "Is a Deputy from this district simply a friend or family member and that is how you recognize their name?" <u>Asked for help:</u> "How many times have you or any member of your household living here tried to contact a current member of the Constituent Assembly—that is someone elected October 23, 2011—to seek help with a personal problem, a social, or economic problem your community is facing, or to express an opinion?"

Independent Variables

Since Tunisia has a closed-list proportional representation system and our theory suggests that members' Islamic identity and gender shape service and symbolic responsiveness to women, we include measures of the percentage of seats in the district held by women (H3: Homosociality

hypothesis), Islamist parliamentarians, and Islamist female deputies (H4 and H5: Islamist

mandate hypotheses). The percentage of seats held by women in the district ranges from 13-57%

in the 16 of the 24 districts in the survey (Table 4). The percentage of seats/district held by

Islamist deputies ranges from 25-56%, while the percentage of seats held by Islamist female

deputies in the district from 33-75%.

[Table 4]

Table 4. Explanatory variables in sixteen districts

a. District (District Magnitude)	b. Female parliamentarians (all parties) (H1)	c. Ennahda parliamentarians (all sexes) (H2)	d. Ennahda female parliamentarians (H3)
Ben Arous (10)	(5) 50.0%	(4) 40.0%	(2) 20.0%
Bizerte (9)	(3) 33.3%	(4) 44.4%	(2) 22.22.0%
Mednine (9)	(3) 33.3%	(5) 55.6%	(2) 22.22.0%
Sidi Bouzid (8)	(3) 37.5%	(2) 25.0%	(1) 12.5.0%
Sfax 1 (7)	(3) 42.9%	(3) 42.9%	(2) 28.57%
Sousse (10)	(3) 30.0%	(4) 40.0%	(2) 20.0%
Tunis 1 (9)	(3) 33.33%	(4) 44.4%	(2) 33.33%
Tunis 2 (8)	(3) 37.5%	(3) 37.5%	(2) 22.22%
Beja (6)	(1) 16.67%	(2) 33.3%	(1) 16.67%
Gafsa (7)	(1) 14.3%	(3) 42.9%	(1) 14.28%
Mahdia (8)	(2) 25.0%	(3) 37.5%	(1) 12.5%
Manouba (7)	(1) 14.3%	(3) 42.9%	(1) 14.28%
Ariana (8)	(1) 12.5%	(3) 37.5%	(1) 12.5%
Nabeul 1 (7)	(4) 57.1%	(2) 28.5%	(1) 14.28%
Nabeul 2 (6)	(3) 50.0%	(2) 33.3%	(1) 16.67%
Sfax 2 (9)	(2) 22.22%	(4) 44.4%	(2) 22.22%

Table 3 shows the total number of seats in the electoral district (a) and the number of female, Islamist, and female Islamist MPs (b-d). Note that columns b-d do not sum to the district magnitude in column a.

We control for the developmental level of the electoral district, measured as the percentage of homes with tap water, ranging from 50 to 100% (National Institute of Statistics, 2014; Table 5). We also control for district magnitude, ranging from 6-10 seats, and the proportion of respondents who report co-tribal identity as a factor in their parliamentary vote choice, ranging from 8 to 65% and is based on the TPES survey. Both variables could systematically impact the likelihood that different types of candidates would be placed on lists and elected and are included in similar studies (Benstead, 2016). Benstead (2015) finds higher proportions of citizen parliamentary linkages mediated by tribal connections increase women's ability to ask for services due to homophily—shared identity based on an intersecting identity trait, in this case, tribe.[9]

We also control for several individual-level factors, including age in years, socioeconomic status, urban residence, education, religiosity, attitudes about gender equality, and preference for secular parties, which can affect the likelihood that Ennahda was elected in the first place (Table 4). Socioeconomic status is measured as self-identified class and ranges from lower=1 to upper=5 class. Urban residence is measured according to whether the interview is located in an urban (mutadiya=1) or rural (immada=0) commune. Education is measured in four categories: no schooling=1, primary=2, secondary=3, and college or above=4. Religiosity is measured on a scale of 1 (someone who never prays, goes to mosque, or reads/listens to religious

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[9] It was not possible to estimate the model due to limited n when this variable was measured at the individual-level. However, removing it from the regression also affected the coefficients on Islamist female members. Thus, we have included it, but believe that it is important to study further the relationships between Islamist parties, female members, and use of tribal and other clientelistic linkages.

materials) and 5 as someone who often does. To measure preference for a secular party, we use a

nine-point scale of preferences for a completely religious=1or secular=9 party. Higher support

for gender equality is measured as whether a respondent is more likely to live in an area where

women are elected or to know a female personally, we use whether the respondent believes the

proportion of women in office should decrease=1, stay the same=2, or increase=3.

[Table 5]

Table 5. Question wording for independent variables

Individual-level variables
Higher age: "What is your age?" (years)
Higher class: "What class do you belong to? Lower=1, lower middle=2, middle=3, upper middle=4, and upper=5."
Urban: Census designation.
Higher education: "What is your highest level of education? 1=None, 2=primary, 3=secondary, high or technical school, and 4=university or above."
Higher religiosity: "On a scale of 1-5 which number better represents you if 5 means a person who goes to houses of worship daily, takes religious lessons, listens to religious programs and reads religious books, while the number 1 means a person who rarely does these things?"
Prefers secular party: "On a scale of 1 to 9, please state your personal preferences on the positions below. Prefer a: Religious party=1 or Secular party=9."
Higher support for gender equality: "As you may know, there are presently 58 women elected to the Constituent Assembly (27%). In your opinion, would it be best if this level were to decrease=1, increase=3, or stay the same=2?"
District-level variables
Higher development: Percentage homes with tap water.
District magnitude: 6-10 seats
Greater tribal/family vote: "For each of the following, please tell me whether it is a factor when you consider which party or candidate to vote for in parliamentary elections? List contained a candidate endorsed by your family or tribe." Mean for electoral district.

Source: All variables from the TPES, except for higher development, which comes from the National Institute of Statistics (2014).

Results and Discussion

Drawing on the Tunisian constituent survey, we test the impact of female, Islamist, and female Islamist deputies on women's symbolic and service responsiveness. We use logistic regression with cluster robust standard errors and run separate models for male and female citizens.[10]

We find strong support for our hypotheses. As shown in Model 1 (Table 6 and 9), as the proportion of women elected in the district increases, so does the likelihood that a woman in that district knows the name of a deputy, in support of the homosociality hypothesis (H3). A woman living in the district with the highest proportion of women (57%, Beja) is 26% more likely to know the name of a deputy than a woman living in the district with the fewest females elected (13%, Tunis 1, $p<.001$). Controlling for individual and district-level factors, women are more likely to know the name of a deputy if they are from a higher social class ($p<.05$) and have a higher education ($p<.05$). When all other variables are their median, a woman from the upper class is 32% more likely to know a deputy's name than a less advantaged woman. A woman with a university education or greater is 24% more likely to know the name of a deputy than a woman without education.

[Table 6]

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[10] Sixteen groups is too small to justify a multi-level model. A mixed effects model obtained the same substantive conclusions. Thus we report the simpler, logistic regression model.

Table 6. Determinants of symbolic responsiveness (knowing member's name)

Model	Model 1		Model 2	
Independent variables	Female citizens		Male citizens	
	Logistic coefficients	Marginal effects[1] (Predicted probabilities)	Logistic coefficients	Marginal effects[1] (Predicted probabilities)
Individual-level				
Higher age	.003(.008)	.000(.001)	-.000(.004)	-.000(.001)
Higher class	.421(.138)*	.064(.022)*	.333(.115)*	.064(.028)*
Urban	.046(.351)	.007(.053)	-.582(.298)*	-.126(.062)*
Higher education	.392(.140)*	.060(.020)*	.514(.105)***	.100(.023)***
Higher religiosity	-.199(.134)	-.030(.020)	.025(.085)	.005(.016)
Prefers secular party	.021(.045)	.003(.007)	.025(.040)	.005(.007)
Supports gender equality	.094(.220)	.014(.033)	-.088(.136)	-.017(.028)
District-level				
Higher district magnitude	.138(.220)	.021(.014)	.083(.139)	.016(.027)
Higher % female members	.040(.010)***	.006(.001)***	-.004(.018)	-.001(.004)
Higher % Islamist members	.051(.023)*	.008(.003)*	-.004(.046)	-.001(.009)
Higher % Islamist women	.026(.010)*	.004(.001)**	-.013(.018)	-.003(.004)
Higher development	-.041(.004)***	-.006(.001)***	-.016(.001)	-.003(.002)
Greater tribal/family vote	-.025(.010)**	-.004(.001)*	-.026(.017)	-.005(.003)†
Constant	-4.944(2.172)*		-.400(3.433)	
N	452		483	
χ^2	(13)=754.89***		(13)=79.09***	
Pseudo R^2	.1510		.0633	

†p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. [1] $\partial y/\partial x$ for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0-1. Reference group: Respondent with median level on all independent variables.

Model 1 also shows that electing more Islamists and Islamist women improves symbolic responsiveness to women. In support of H4, a woman living in the district with the highest proportion of Islamist deputies (56%, Mednine) is 25% more likely to know a deputy's name than a woman living in the district with the lowest proportion (25%, Sidi Bouzid, p<.01). In support of H5, a woman living in the district with the highest proportion of Islamist female deputies (75%, Tunis 1) is 17% more likely to know a name than a woman living in the district with the lowest (33%, Ariana, Manouba, Mahdia, and Gafsa, p<.01). Contrary to conventional wisdom, increasing the representation of a grassroots party like Ennahda improves women's

symbolic responsiveness as much as electing women from any party. In contrast, Model 2 shows that electing parliamentarians with different traits does not affect men's interaction with members. We expect this to be the case because while male MPs tend to have homosocial networks, female members have heterosocial networks, due to the need to mobilize support from women and men.[11] Among men, only higher class (p<.05), rural residence (p<.05), and higher education (p<.001) increases the likelihood of knowing a parliamentarian's name.

Model 3 supports the gendered Islamic mandate hypothesis (H5). As the proportion of female Islamists increases, so does the probability of interactions between female citizens and parliamentarians (Table 7). A woman living in the district with the highest proportion of Islamist female deputies (75%, Tunis 1) is 13% more likely to interact with a deputy than a woman living in the district with the lowest proportion (33%, Ariana, Manouba, Mahdia, and Gafsa, p<.10). More educated women are 11% more likely to interact with deputies in at least one way when comparing the most and least educated women (p<.001). Yet for male citizens, a higher proportion of Islamist women elected decreases the likelihood of interacting with deputies (Model 4). This suggests that female Islamist deputies are engaged in sex-gendered constituent interactions involving direct contact methods like social events. A male living in the district with the highest proportion of Islamist female deputies (75%, Tunis 1) is 21% less likely to interact with a deputy than a woman living in the district with the lowest proportion of Islamist females elected (33%, Ariana, Manouba, Mahdia, and Gafsa, p<.001). Education increases the likelihood of having interacted with a deputy (p<.001) by 45% when comparing men with no education to one with a university education.

[Table 7]

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[11] This work did not distinguish Islamist and non-Islamist MPs.

Table 7. Determinants of symbolic responsiveness (interacting with a member)

Model	Model 3		Model 4	
Independent variables	Female citizens		Male citizens	
	Logistic coefficients	Marginal effects[1] (Predicted probabilities)	Logistic coefficients	Marginal effects[1] (Predicted probabilities)
Individual-level				
Higher age	-.004(.009)	-.001(.002)*	-.000(.005)	-.000(.001)
Higher class	.373(.237)***	.062(.037)*	.218(.180)	.050(.042)
Urban	.707(.398)†	.095(.049)†	-.145(.370)	-.034(.087)
Higher education	.496(.129)***	.083(.023)***	.489(.133)***	.112(.027)***
Higher religiosity	-.004(.121)	-.001(.020)	.019(.073)	.004(.017)
Prefers secular party	.033(.041)	.006(.007)	.039(.028)	.009(.006)
Supports gender equality	.225(.217)	.034(.036)	.270(.168)	.062(.038)
District-level				
Higher district magnitude	.040(.114)	.007(.019)	.005(.082)	-.001(.120)
Higher % female members	.011(.011)	.002(.002)	-.002(.006)	-.000(.001)
Higher % Islamist members	-.010(.016)	-.002(.003)	-.001(.017)	-.000(.004)
Higher % Islamist female	.015(.008)†	.003(.002)†	-.021(.005)***	-.005(.001)***
Higher development	.008(.008)	.001(.001)	.022(.003)***	.005(.001)***
Greater tribal/family vote	-.016(.013)	-.003(.002)	-.004(.005)	-.001(.001)
Constant	-6.315(1.850)***		-3.976(1.063)***	
N	451		483	
χ^2	(13)=57.82***		(13)=670.49***	
Pseudo R^2	.0865		.0713	

†p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. [1] $\partial y/\partial x$ for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0-1.

When considering the factors that explain the probability of having asked a parliamentarian for help with a service, the data support the homosociality (H3) and Islamic mandate effect hypotheses (H4-H5, Table 8). As shown in Model 5, as the proportion of women elected in the district increases, so does the service responsiveness of women living there (p<.10). A woman living in the district with the highest proportion of women (57%, Beja) is 9% more likely to know the name of a deputy than a woman living in the district with the lowest proportion (13%, Tunis 1, p<.05). Moreover, as the proportion of Islamist deputies increases, so

does the likelihood that female citizens will as for help with a service (p<.05). When comparing

the district with highest proportion of Islamists deputies (56%) to that with the lowest (25%), the

likelihood that a woman will have asked a deputy for help increases by 6% (p<.01). And, the

greater the proportion of female Islamist deputies is related to a greater likelihood of women

asking for help from a parliamentarian (p<.05). A woman living in the district with the highest

proportion of Islamist female deputies (75%, Tunis 1) is 13% more likely to ask a deputy for

help than a woman living in the district with the lowest proportion (33%, Ariana, Manouba,

Mahdia, and Gafsa, p<.05). Higher age (p<.001), lower class (p<.001), and urban residence

(p<.01) predict a higher likelihood of women contacting a deputy (Table 8).[12]

Among male citizens (Model 6), the proportion of female, Islamist, or Islamist female

deputies elected does not affect the ability to ask for services. Lower class (p<.001), urban

residence (p<.10), and lower developmental levels (p<.10) increase men's service

responsiveness.

[Table 8]

Table 8. Determinants of service responsiveness (contacting a member)

Model	Model 5		Model 6	
Independent variables	Female citizens		Male citizens	
	Logistic coefficients	Marginal effects[1] (Predicted probabilities)	Logistic coefficients	Marginal effects[1] (Predicted probabilities)
Individual-level				
Higher age	.04(.001)***	.002(.001)**	-.008(.017)	-.000(.000)
Higher class	-1.066(.178)***	-.047(.013)***	-1.228(.333)***	-.032(.013)*

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[12] Although we asked whether the respondent was satisfied with the result, the number of cases

of service requests was insufficient for multivariate regression.

Urban	3.039(1.081)**	.044(.014)***	1.039(.585)†	.017(.010)†
Higher education	.292(.285)	.013(.013)	.150(.499)	.004(.008)
Higher religiosity	.128(.161)	.006(.007)	.515(.369)	.014(.008)
Prefers secular party	.005(.144)	.000(.006)	.004(.080)	.000(.002)
Supports gender equality	.004(.427)	.000(.019)	-.022(.380)	-.001(.010)
District-level				
Higher district magnitude	.511(.272)†	.022(.013)†	-.073(.260)	-.002(.007)
Higher % female members	.050(.030)	.002(.001)*	.010(.025)	.000(.001)
Higher % Islamist members	.057(.026)*	.002(.001)**	.007(.038)	.000(.001)
Higher % Islamist female	.073(.036)*	.003(.002)*	.009(.018)	.000(.001)
Higher development	-.005(.007)	-.000(.000)	-.026(.014)†	-.001(.000)*
Greater tribal/family vote	.002(.031)	.000(.001)	.041(.028)	.001(.001)
Constant	-17.013(5.397)**		-2.216(4.428)	
N	437		470	
χ^2	(13)=1061.62***		(13)=365.92***	
Pseudo R^2	.2401		.1548	

†p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. [1] $\partial y/\partial x$ for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0-1.

Table 9 summarizes the results of the multivariate analyses. The models show that symbolic and service responsiveness to women improves the more women, regardless of party, are elected in a district (Homosociality hypothesis, H3). So too, as the proportion of Islamist deputies increases, regardless of the member's gender, so does the likelihood that women in that district will know the name of a deputy and have contacted a deputy (Islamist mandate effect: Party component, H4). Electing female Islamists also positively impacts responsiveness to women on these measures (Islamist mandate effect: Gender component, H5). Yet, it also has an impact on the likelihood that men will interact with deputies. The more Islamist females are elected in a district, the less likely male citizens will be to interact in public and private spaces with members.

[Table 9]

Table 9. Summary of results: Marginal effects and maximum effect size

	Knowing name (Symbolic responsiveness)		Interacting with a member (Symbolic responsiveness)		Contacting a member (Service responsiveness)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Female citizens	Male citizens	Female citizens	Male citizens	Female citizens	Male citizens
Marginal effect for a 1% increase in district's female members	.6%***	Not significant	Not significant	Not significant	.2%*	Not significant
Maximum effect (comparing district with the lowest % female members to the district with the highest % female members)	26.4%				8.8%	
Marginal effect for a 1% increase in district's Islamist members	.8%*	Not significant	Not significant	Not significant	.2%**	Not significant
Maximum effect (comparing district with the lowest % Islamist members to the district with the highest % Islamist members)	24.8%				6.2%	
Marginal effect for a 1% increase in district's female Islamist members	.4%**	Not significant	.3%†	-.5%***	.3%*	Not significant
Maximum effect (comparing district with the lowest % Islamist female members to the district with the highest % Islamist female members)	16.8%		12.6%	21.0%	12.6%	

†p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference group: Respondent with median level on all independent variables. Table 8 summarizes the significant results and the maximum effect size for the results of the 2011 Constituent Assembly election.

Once these three explanatory variables are taken into account, there is no pattern across

models in the impact of citizens' urban residence, higher class, or higher education or any other

factors on their likelihood of symbolic or service responsiveness.

Conclusions and Implications

Our study is the first in a Muslim context to examine the intersectional effect of deputy gender and party identification on women's service and symbolic responsiveness (Crenshaw, 1991). It draws attention to substantial gaps in women's access to public space, which diminishes responsiveness to women's policy priorities (Kudva, 2003) and likely also their political participation (Benstead & Lust, 2015; Bernick & Ciftci, 2014).

We find strong evidence that electing women improves symbolic and service responsiveness to women in Tunisia, consistently with research in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya (Benstead, 2016) and our expectations (H3). When comparing the district with the largest proportion of women elected to the one with the smallest proportion, women are 26% more likely to know the name of a deputy and 9% more likely to have contacted a deputy. This suggests that the Tunisian transitional period is not exceptional with regard to the impact of legislator identity on women's representation. Rather, electing women affects women's symbolic and service responsiveness across Arab countries with different quota laws, political contexts, and degrees of electoral competitiveness, including in Morocco and Algeria (Benstead, 2016; 2019).

Electing women has the largest impact on women's symbolic and service responsiveness, but electing Islamists also increases these outcomes (H4). When comparing the district with the highest proportion of Islamist deputies to the one with the lowest, women are 25% more likely to know the name of a deputy and 6% more likely to have contacted a member. This finding is striking, given that the factors that should increase the likelihood of Islamists being elected, including more conservative social values and religiosity (Wegner, 2017), should also be correlated with less interaction between women and elected officials. Yet, this was not the case.

Electing female Islamists improves symbolic and service responsiveness to women while reducing symbolic responsiveness to men. When comparing the district with the largest proportion of Islamist females to the smallest, men are 21% less likely to have interacted with a member of parliament. In support of H5, this suggests that female Islamists' strategies and practices to reach out to women, often in sex-segregated environments, actually reduce access for men. This runs counter to some work (Benstead, 2019b), which shows that women leaders tend to have heterosocial networks and, therefore, that increasing electing women does not inhibit men's representation.

It is possible that these findings are unique to Tunisia. After all, parties are stronger in Tunisia than in many other MENA countries (Buehler, 2018). Tunisia's unique state formation process under the Ottomans and the French weakened tribal networks more than other MENA countries (Anderson, 1986; Charrad, 2001), leading parties to stand in for familial networks. This process continued under Bourghiba (Moore, 1965) and Ben Ali, when the ruling RCD party became a major source of nepotism and rent distribution (Hibou, 2011).

Yet the findings suggest that Islamist parties similarly shape women's representation in a variety of contexts, regardless of the strength of party-citizen linkages. For instance, Benstead (2021) finds using a survey of 112 Moroccan Members of Parliament (MPs) that female legislators and Islamist deputies are more likely to interact with female citizens than male parliamentarians from non-Islamist parties. And in Algeria, Islamists' more institutionalized constituency service practices allow them to reach a wider range of citizens they do not personally know and who are more likely to be marginalized from patronage networks (e.g., women).

What is common about all of these contexts is the clientelistic context in which Islamist parties operate (Masoud, 2014). Our findings are thus likely broadly applicable to clientelistic societies in the Muslim world—wherever marginalized populations, such as women, increase their representation and parties adopt more democratically-oriented practices (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). Nevertheless, this must be tested, and a comparative framework is needed. Because Tunisia is one of the region's most gender-equal societies (Charrad, 2001), we expect the impact of electing Islamist and non-Islamist female deputies to have a greater impact on improving women's symbolic and service responsiveness in other Arab societies. Moreover, we have tested our theory on only two interrelated outcomes: interactions with members and approaching them for help. Future research should also broaden the outcome variables to consider different measures of symbolic, service, and substantive responsiveness to women, such as how the intersection of candidate gender and Islamist orientation affects citizens' willingness to share their opinions, which we address only tangentially in this paper.[13] Since patriarchy is a multi-dimensional concept (Benstead, 2016), electing Islamist parties could have a positive impact on indicators of responsiveness but not others. It is crucial to remember that Islamist parties may increase women's interaction with legislators as part of an electoral strategy while

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[13] Bush and Prather (2018) found that men and women were more likely to be primed to share their views on legislation when primed to think of legislators as female than as a mixed group, but did not distinguish between Islamist and non-Islamist deputies. Substantive representation has been studied mainly in democracies and thus defined as, "advancing women's interests through…policy making" (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; p. 104; Franceschet, Lena Krook, & Piscopo, 2012). Benstead (2019b) argues that substantive representation should also include service and allocation responsiveness (Eulau & Karps, 1977).

reinforcing conservative gender norms. We also need to know more about whether Christian, Hindu, or other religious parties also use similar strategies and what the impacts are for women's representation.

Our findings have important implications for gender and governance research. They suggest that gender quotas impact women's symbolic and service responsiveness, both through electing women from across the party spectrum, as well as by electing Islamist women. This provides additional evidence that women are not a monolithic group (Hughes, 2011), but rather that women with different intersecting traits can differently impact responsiveness to women. And it adds to existing literature which finds mixed evidence that increasing women's political representation in Africa and Latin America improves women's symbolic responsiveness and political engagement (Barnes & Burchard, 2012; Zetterberg, 2009).

The findings also extend working on gender and government by showing that less clientelistic parties improve responsiveness to women. Islamist parties do not completely reject clientelistic practices, but, when it comes to service provision, they are more internally-democratic than other parties. This positively impacts marginalized groups, including women. Some scholars see electing women as a tool to achieve both women's empowerment and reduce corruption (Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Rivas, 2013). Our findings suggest democratization and party development are pathways to greater corruption control and gender equality (Sung, 2003). Moreover, it offers insights for understanding why Islamist parties are electorally successful (Masoud, 2014; Brooke, 2019).

Future surveys should include questions on citizens' interactions with parliamentarians, and, if possible, surveys of parliamentarians should also be conducted in other countries beyond the MENA region. In critical Muslim-majority cases like Egypt, this is impossible, due to the

banning and repression of the Muslim Brotherhood. It should also consider different types of Islamist parties, including those that are more authoritarian and seek to establish a theocratic state, as these movements may impact women differently, and look at party directorates and party members' service provision, not only that of parliamentarians and collaboration between women and men. Future studies should also assess other intersecting identities of parliamentarian and citizen identity, such as ethnicity, and class and look more closely at the extent to which women and men helped by Islamist and other parties are those who supported them in elections, helping to better understand the extent to which Islamist parties spurn clientelism all together or merely create new patronage networks. Through these extensions, scholars will have a better understanding of how electoral politics impact responsiveness to women and other marginalized citizens.

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