

**Large-scale Attitude Changes toward Immigrants and Refugees:
The Roles of Cohort Affiliation and Threat Perceptions**

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CHAPTER 1

Understanding dynamics of attitudes toward immigrants

1. Introduction

The strong increase in immigration in recent years faced European societies with remarkable challenges. Especially the unplanned arrival of 1.3 million refugees¹ (Eurostat, 2022a) seeking asylum in the European Union in the aftermath of the so-called long summer of migration in 2015 emerged into a prominent societal issue, dominating public discourse. With the war unfolding in Ukraine seven years later, forced migration is again suddenly a most pressing issue for Europeans. In the past, refugee immigration has evoked polarizing standings within societies. Besides broad civil engagement and a pronounced welcoming-culture, it also induces strong rejection, cumulating in anti-immigrant protests that challenge social cohesion (Schaeffer, 2013) and democratic structures (Vaughan, 2021).

Thus, the study of attitudes toward immigrants and refugees is the primary objective of this dissertation. Despite extensive interdisciplinary research, to date, there is still a lack of knowledge regarding the formation of attitudes toward immigrants and their large-scale development over time. In particular, there is limited evidence on the interplay of social-historical changes and present conditions for shifts in the current opinion climate. In other words, we do not know in how far the continuous process of cohort replacement and the more immediate reactions to periodic events affect the long- and short-term development of societies' attitudes toward immigrants.

The cohort question must be understood as a societal syndrome that has the power to continuously disrupt political discourse. A new emerging youth constantly challenges existing norms, hierarchies and social structures. Movements ascribed to the cause of a generation, such as the 1968 student protests or the Fridays for Future activists, may be particularly prominent but should not be considered isolated phenomena. Consequently, through the process of cohort replacement, when younger birth cohorts that potentially differ in their values and worldviews,

¹ The term "refugee" here covers all persons seeking asylum, including those who are not yet recognized as refugees and those whose asylum claims have been rejected but who are tolerated to remain within a host country.

replace preceding cohorts, a society's averaged opinion climate can fundamentally change (Firebaugh, 1992; Inglehart, 1977; Mannheim, 1928; Schuman and Corning, 2012). The "Silent Revolution" (Inglehart 1979) explained such fundamental social change within Western democracies with a more secure upbringing of cohorts born after World War II. As a consequence, Inglehart predicted a shift from materialist to postmaterialist value priorities, that lead, amongst others, to a more tolerant society toward outgroups. In fact, attitudes toward immigrants are positively correlated with postmaterialistic value prioritizations (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012; B Meuleman, 2009; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).

Besides these long-term social changes, periodic events that go beyond cohort associations can shift public opinion² more suddenly. For instance, economic crises or international terrorism can exert such an impact (Brouard et al., 2018; Kiley and Vaisey, 2020; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Yang, 2008), but also large-scale refugee immigration. Exclusionary attitudes toward refugees are heightened with periodic increases in foreigners (Czymara, 2021).

Yet, to date, empirical research rarely combines the two concepts of cohort and period effects simultaneously in order to gain reliable assumptions as to how it comes to large-scale shifts in host populations' evaluation of immigrants and refugees in the long- and short-term (Ross and Rouse, 2015; Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown, 2011). Motivated by these gaps in the literature, this cumulative dissertation's contribution lies in exploring the structural and cultural aspects of

² *Public opinion*: In this dissertation the term "public opinion" functions as reference to averaged attitudes at the aggregate level. It is thus used as an alternative term, not tapping into the academic debate on the preconditions and ideal spaces for public opinion formation, since this would go well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Most briefly, in academia, the term "public opinion" underlies several prerequisites and drives particular outcomes that are defined in a variety of academic disciplines. Jürgen Habermas (1991) conceptualizes public opinion as a product of the public sphere, requiring an ideal space where all citizens are able to discuss matters of common interest. From sociology's perspective of systems theory, Niklas Luhmann (1970) describes public opinion as an own subsystem of society, resulting from politically relevant events, adopting a functional mechanism of its own. Moreover, in the field of media and communication studies, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1980) prominently describes sways in public opinion with the "spiral of silence". She introduces "isolation pressures", and individual's adaptation to "loud opinion expressions" that are perceived as dominant driving mechanisms for public opinion. In this dissertation, however, these particular mechanisms for public opinion formation are not examined. Rather, the term is interchangeable with averaged attitudes at the aggregate level.

social change that lead to large-scale shifts in attitudes toward immigrants. More specifically, in three papers it examines the three research questions:

1. *How do birth cohorts differ in their sentiments toward immigrants and what does this imply for future opinion climates, when younger birth cohorts replace their predecessors?*
2. *How stable are birth cohorts' attitudes toward immigrants, given changing threat perceptions at the country level?*

Finally, the third research question switches focus and aims at the neighborhood-level. It explores how the periodic shock of the 2015 refugee immigration to Germany affected locals who live in close proximity to a refugee shelter. It thus asks:

3. *How does proximity to a refugee accommodation affect locals' attitudes and behavior toward refugees?*

The first paper³ (Chapter 2) analyses the impact of generational turnover on the opinion climate toward immigrants in east and west Germany. The second paper⁴ (Chapter 3) replicates this cohort perspective in a multi-country analysis within the western European context and further investigates the role of immigrant origins on host societies' immigrant attitudes. The third paper⁵ (Chapter 4) focuses on the aftermath of the refugee immigration in 2015 as a periodic event and examines whether attitudes and behavior toward refugees are linked to the local exposure to refugee housing. Each paper fills a research gap that has remained unanswered so far. To examine this dissertation's research questions, the focus lies on the geographic context of Germany primarily, but further expands to western European countries. The data base

³ Schmidt, Katja (*forthcoming*). Eine migrationsfreundlichere Gesellschaft durch den Generationenwandel? Kohortenanalysen für Ost- und Westdeutschland. *Accepted for publication in Soziale Welt*.

⁴ Schmidt, Katja (2021). The dynamics of attitudes toward immigrants: Cohort analyses for Western EU member states. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 62(4): 281-310. doi:[10.1177/00207152211052582](https://doi.org/10.1177/00207152211052582)

⁵ Schmidt, Katja, Jacobsen, Jannes & Iglauer, Theresa (2021). Not in my backyard? Does proximity to refugee accommodations affect locals' attitudes and behavior toward refugees? This article is under revision in *European Sociological Review* published by Oxford University Press.

consists of data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).

Before presenting the empirical chapters (Chapter 2, 3, 4), this introductory chapter (Chapter 1) outlines the current theoretical discourse in sociology and social psychology. It discusses the latest advances in group threat approaches and intergroup contact hypothesis and links them to socialization theory. Intertwining the approaches and drawing linkages allows disentangling the various dynamics of attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. It becomes apparent that there is a gap in the literature as to our understanding of the forces at play when it comes to large-scale shifts in host populations' evaluation of immigration. The concluding chapter (Chapter 5) recaps the findings of this thesis and gives an outlook to potential policy implications and future research potentials.

2. Perspectives on large-scale attitude changes at the population level

The study of social change is one of sociology's key purposes. Thus, examining mechanisms of attitude changes have a long research tradition in the field. Since attitudes are viewed as meaningful predictors for human behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 2005; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Oskamp & Schultz, 2005), other fields of research, such as psychology and political science share the interest in the attitude concept. This dissertation draws mainly on the sociological perspective to identify the multi-layered mechanisms for attitude changes toward immigrants. Thereby, the question of how attitudes form and develop is of particular interest. Although definitions of attitudes somewhat differ, they have one determining factor in common: attitudes always have an evaluating character. They are defined as the tendency to react positively or negatively to an attitude-object, for instance a person, group, idea, institution, or event (Allport, 1954; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Hill, 1981). This dissertation examines the evaluation of the attitude object "immigrants," and more particularly "refugees."

Attitudes represent one component of the broader concept of personal culture, also comprising worldviews, values, and beliefs (Lizardo, 2017). The social sciences follow a long tradition debating the stability of personal culture over the life course. At the core of this debate lies the question whether individuals' personal culture forms during the impressionable years of adolescence and remains relatively stable thereafter, or whether attitudes, worldviews and beliefs change due to continuous adaptation in various ways, particularly through the process of aging and certain periodic events. The former line of argument constitutes the base of the "settled disposition model" (SDM), the latter argument backs the "active updating model" (AUM). The two models emerge from three theoretical perspectives that explain social change at the population level: cohort replacement, intracohort aging, and period effects.

The SDM comprises the sociological perspective of cohort replacement. It assumes a certain stability of attitudes over the life course. Once attitudes are formed during an individuals' formative phase of adolescence, they do not substantially change in later life. Consequently, social change at the population level would occur with the replacement of cohorts over time. This perspective allows some temporal shifts in attitudes, but predicts that individuals will eventually revert to their respective attitude-baseline. This baseline is comparable with Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* that emphasizes the impact of the past conditions of production instead of the effects of the contemporary environment (Bourdieu, 1990). Accordingly, socialization conditions during the formative years of adolescence play a crucial role for contemporary attitudes.

The AUM on the other hand does not support the idea of attitude stability. Instead, across the disciplines of psychology and sociology, scientists argue for variation across the life-course. In fact, developmental psychologists show that personality and with that values and attitudes of individuals are subject to change throughout life (Specht, 2017). Arguably, this is the result of aging and consequently reaching different development stages. Sociologists on the other hand, again emphasize the importance of the construct of cohorts, where socialization exerts effects

on individuals at certain life stages, defined by social structures. Thus, age effects must not be understood as the biological process of aging that leads to individual changes in value priorities, but rather as the result of institutionalized events at certain points in life (Kohli, 1978). For instance, life events determined by social structures such as school enrolment, leaving the parental home, entering the working world, getting married, having children, and entering retirement, signify incisive modifications in a person's everyday life, that naturally lead to adaptations and the re-evaluation of previous stances (Kohli, 1978; Tilley, 2005). Thus, variations in societal structures can lead to varying age effects (for instance changes in the education system).

The theoretical approach of period effects also predicts “active updating” of individuals, but explains shifts in public opinion with incisive events at the macro level that impact all individuals in a society simultaneously. Early research in the field of group conflict theory already argues that events can function as drivers for ethnic prejudice if the event is perceived as threatening (Blumer, 1958, p. 6). Terrorist attacks, for instance, were found to increase threat perceptions, leading to an overall increase in dismissive sentiments toward immigrants (Hopkins, 2010; J. Legewie, 2013).

In summary, the AUM assumes that intracohort aging as well as periodic shocks lead to re-evaluations of an attitude object and thus to consistent adaptation of personal culture. The SDM, conversely, presumes that periodic events do not persist from one time point to the next. Instead, attitudes retreat to the attitude baseline that was set during early year socialization (Vaisey & Kiley, 2021).

Most recent empirical research suggests in line with the SDM that individuals' personal culture settles during the formative phase of adolescence and persists over the life course (Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Kiley & Vaisey, 2020; Vaisey & Kiley, 2021). In their study measuring stability and change in personal culture, Kiley and Vaisey conclude “[...] that real, persistent attitude change is an uncommon phenomenon among adults” (2020, p. 500). Moreover, if attitude

changes do occur, they are likely to be short-term rather than persistent over time. In a follow-up study they provide even stronger evidence for the SDM, arguing that most attitudes and opinions are developed prior to adulthood and remain predominantly stable over the further life course (Vaisey & Kiley, 2021). Consequently, social change would only occur through the process of generational turnover.

This most recent conclusion, however, has two limitations: First, the studies do not differentiate between different age-groups, even though the time of early adulthood is particularly prone to more volatile attitudes. Second, and more crucially, the studies only consider three survey waves over a period of four years (Kiley & Vaisey, 2020; Vaisey & Kiley, 2021). To conclude from this rather short time frame that attitudes remain stable over a lifetime is rather bold. The limited data availability with regard to long time series is a particular issue when aiming at disentangling the three elements of age, period, and cohort. Only slowly are we gaining access to long-term comparative data that was collected since the 1980s (e.g., SOEP in Germany) or in a cross-national manner in Europe since the early 2000s (e.g., ESS).

Thus, this dissertation makes use of the availability of longer time-series and examines the interplay of all perspectives for large-scale attitude changes by focusing on the effects of cohort replacement and period effects, while additionally accounting for intracohort aging. Thereby, the focus clearly lies on the examination of cohort and period effects and somewhat neglects the perspective of intracohort aging. Whereas in other fields of research, particularly in developmental psychology, the mechanism of intracohort aging constitutes an important explanatory approach, it only plays a subordinate role for the academic debate on attitudes toward immigrants and refugees (for an overview, see McLaren and Paterson 2019). Nevertheless, to target the age-period-cohort issue, the empirical models of this dissertation acknowledge the effects of intracohort aging by controlling for age effects. In the following, the perspective of cohort replacement theory as well as period effects is outlined. Further, their interplay is examined with a particular focus on attitudes toward immigrants.

2.1. The impact of socialization and cohort replacement on public opinion

The study of large-scale attitude changes requires the perspective of socialization theory. Accordingly, social change occurs due to the fact that a continuously emerging youth has a new access to culture while challenging old patterns (Mannheim, 1928). Thus, the processes of “demographic metabolism” provides the opportunity for societal transformation (Ryder, 1965). Consequently, cohort replacement only leads to social change if preceding cohorts substantially differ from each other besides the compositional differences (Firebaugh, 1992).

Previous research identifies cohort replacement as key driver of long-term development of prejudice toward immigrants. Thus, the over-time decrease in prejudice against Blacks in the U.S. was explained by the fact that prejudiced, older cohorts are replaced by younger, better educated cohorts who are less xenophobic (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Quillian, 1996). Consequently, it was assumed that the constant process of cohort replacement would eventually lead to a more open, tolerant society. This assumption, however, needs re-evaluation, since cohorts must be considered in their respective historical contexts and cultural spheres that are subject to change (Mannheim, 1928). Instead of constant improvement of society, changing societal conditions during early life socialization can also have the reverse effect. For instance, Coenders and Scheepers (2008) show that cohorts who were confronted with high unemployment during their formative phase are more adverse toward immigrants in later life. Karl Mannheim was first to explore the mechanisms of generational turnover and its effect on societies from a sociological perspective. His essay on the “Problem of Generations” (1928) is a key reference for interdisciplinary generational research as it theoretically links generational and social change at the macro level. Mannheim’s generational order model addresses the characteristics of generations and explains historical change by linking it to the generational affiliation of the actors. He defines the generational phenomenon as one of the fundamental factors in the emergence of historical dynamics and by no means assumes only positive developments with regard to social progress.

Due to the fact that humans are being born and eventually die, Mannheim describes the following phenomena: Societies possess the characteristics that new culture bearers are constantly appearing, while earlier culture bearers continuously disappear. This implies that members of each generation can only participate in a temporally limited part of the historical process. Therefore, it is necessary to continuously transfer the accumulated cultural goods. This transfer from generation to generation is a continuous process (generational change) (1928, p. 292). Mannheim thus explains social change primarily by the fact that a constantly emerging youth has repeatedly new access to culture and thus brings about changes.

More specifically, the phenomenon of generations refers to a certain similarity through experiences typical for one generation. The unity of a generation, thus, is not primarily the result of a social connection that eventually develops into a distinct group, since a generation does neither form an organizational framework nor a community similar to the family (1928, p. 288). Instead, belonging to the same generation determines certain attitudes and behaviors of individuals of the same or neighboring birth cohorts because they occupy a similar position in the social structure. Here, Mannheim introduces the term *Lagerung* (position) to describe common characteristics that individuals exhibit because of their position in the continuum of history. He compares the concept of *generation* to the concept of *class* according to Karl Marx. *Class affiliation* and *generational affiliation* have in common that they share a social and historical position. Accordingly, individuals are limited in their possibilities of experience and behavior.


Particularly important for socialization theory is the assumption that major events affect different age-groups within society differently. Mannheim postulates that such events are most formative for young adults, whereas the effect diminishes for older individuals. Since members of the same birth cohort share the same formative experiences at the same age, they exhibit certain similarities in their attitudes and the phenomenon of a generation emerges (1928, p. 289 f.).

More explicitly, Mannheim distinguishes between three hierarchically structured concepts of a generation: Generational positioning (*Generationslagerung*), generational connection (*Generationszusammenhang*), and generational unit (*Generationseinheit*). Generational positioning is the umbrella term for a group of individuals born around about the same time and in the same historical-social space (1928, p. 298 f.). A generational connection is more narrowly defined and describes the social and intellectual context that connects the members of a generation in the sense of a common participation in the intellectual trends of the time. A generational unit, in turn, represents different subgroups within a generational connection. Its members are strongly connected to each other since they interpret the intellectual trends of the time in the same way and share the same basic intentions and principles for action (1928, p. 302 f.). Generational units can differ greatly in their political attitudes. Especially during social crises, different birth cohorts become polarized and antagonistic generational units emerge. For instance, radical right-wing movements such as the *Identitäre Bewegung*, who deny man-made climate change on one spectrum and left-wing *Fridays for Future* activists, who demand more rigorous climate politics at the other. Thus, it is possible that within a generation a multitude of different, antagonistic generational units exist. Ultimately, however, a dominant trend of a generation usually emerges that gives the specific generation its direction.

In summary, Mannheim's sociological analysis emphasizes the effect of the generation as crucial factor for the social process (1928, p. 320). Mannheim saw the constant introduction of new culture bearers as central explanatory power for social change. A large number of studies in different fields has since confirmed the importance of socialization during adolescence for the explanation of contemporary attitudes (Ebner et al., 2020; Firebaugh, 1992; Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Kiley & Vaisey, 2020; Krosnick & Alwin, 1989; Vaisey & Kiley, 2021). As Figure 1 depicts, past socialization conditions at the context level (same historical-social space) bring forth cohort affiliations that predict certain attitudes that cumulate again in public opinion.

Accordingly, public opinion⁶ toward immigrants changes in the long-term if the emerging cohorts – due to their specific socialization experiences – significantly differ in their sentiments from preceding cohorts.

Figure 1: Socialization affects public opinion.



How does socialization affect attitudes? In acknowledging that early life experiences leave an imprint on individuals, shaping their “natural worldviews” throughout life, political scientist Ronald Inglehart more specifically examined these early life experiences and mainly focused on the formation of value priorities that are closely linked to the attitude concept. He analyzed the factors that are decisive for the formation of values during one’s youth, and delivered empirical evidence for a broad value change in Western societies since World War II.

In his work, “The Silent Revolution” (1977), Inglehart defines values as deeply rooted, unchanging and generalized notions of life goals that are formed during adolescence and tend not to change again in later life. Just like attitudes, values are one component of personal culture as defined earlier. Compared to the attitude concept, however, values are more comprehensive: values precede attitudes, so that attitudes are based on values. At the societal level, value orientations are considered to be decisive influencing factors with regard to behavioral patterns and their justification in a society (Inglehart, 1977).


⁶ For this dissertation’s definition of “public opinion”, see Footnote 2.

If values remain somewhat stable over the life course, it is of crucial relevance to understand how they develop and how they affect attitudes toward immigrants. Inglehart formulates two hypotheses for the formation of value prioritizations: first, the “scarcity hypothesis,” which assumes diminishing marginal utility and states that after basic materialistic needs are satisfied, an urge toward “higher” values develops. Second, the “socialization hypothesis,” which assumes analogous to Mannheim that individuals tend to retain a set of values that were developed in youth in their later life (Inglehart, 1977, p. 23). Inglehart defines macro-economic conditions and existential security in society as particularly formative for individuals' need structures and values (Inglehart, 1977, 1989). He argues that an individual's priorities reflect his or her socioeconomic environment, so that the greatest subjective value is assigned to what is relatively scarce (Inglehart, 1977, p. 23; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009, p. 46).

Whether a change from materialistic to postmaterialistic values takes place depends on the economic development of a society. Thus, Inglehart argues, individuals who live in secure and prosperous societies turn away from materialistic values and the pursuit of greater prosperity. Instead, they increasingly turn toward postmaterialistic values such as self-actualization and civic participation. Here, materialistic values represent the prioritization of meeting basic needs and security, economic stability, as well as peace and order in state and society. Postmaterialistic values, though, place a stronger prioritization on a sense of belonging, a voice in state and society, freedom of expression, nature conservation, and all aspects of self-actualization. Moreover, and of particular relevance for this thesis: Postmaterialistic individuals are more tolerant, open-minded, and positive toward minorities than materialistic individuals (Inglehart, 1977, 1989).

In summary, according to Inglehart, generations that have grown up in existential security and prosperity develop stronger postmaterialistic values than so-called scarcity generations, such as generations that lived through times of crises and war. The respective associations are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Conditions during socialization that affect attitudes.



The connection between value priorities and sentiments toward immigrants is of particular interest to this thesis. Respectively, empirical research shows that individuals with rather conservative value patterns that can be attributed to the value dimension of materialistic values, are more likely to endorse negative positions toward foreign groups (Esses et al., 2001; Raijman & Semyonov, 2004). Moreover, prioritizations of values attributed to postmaterialistic self-transcendence are found to correlate positively with attitudes toward immigrants (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012; B Meuleman, 2009; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Accordingly, one could assume that this increase in postmaterialistic values within Western societies should go along with a decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes.

While this might be true to some extent and for a certain timeframe, there is reason to doubt a linear trend toward continuously more immigrant-friendly attitudes. Most recently, together with Pippa Norris, Inglehart himself pronounces “The Silent Revolution in Reverse” (2017) and a “Cultural Backlash” (2019). In their work, the political scientists describe a cultural backlash and make declining existential security and rising inequality since the 1980s responsible for an increase in support for populist xenophobic parties in the U.S. and Europe.


2.2. The impact of periodic events on public opinion

The mechanisms behind “The Silent Revolution in Reverse” and the “Cultural Backlash” as described by Inglehart and Norris (Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) are twofold. Besides the power of cohort effects, the scientists argue that people respond to current conditions (period effects) as well. Acknowledging the power of period effects does not contradict socialization theory as such. Though socialization theory emphasizes the years of adolescence as particularly formative, it does not exclude the possibility of attitude change in the further life course due to historical events that affect all age groups within a population (Inglehart, 1977; Mannheim, 1928). Thus, certain period effects can change a society’s opportunity structure and interests, leading to large-scale changes in the overall opinion climate. For instance, economic downturns make all birth cohorts less postmaterialist whereas rising prosperity exerts the opposite effect (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 444). More specifically, periodic concerns about international terrorism, or the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 can trigger changes in attitudes toward immigrants in society as a whole (Gorodzeisky, 2021; Kiley & Vaisey, 2020; Klein, 2016, p. 256; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Wilkes & Corrigan-Brown, 2011; Yang, 2008, p. 205).

Moreover, certain societal transformations affect different cohorts differently. Rapid cultural change and an increased immigrant population trigger threat-perceptions and therewith a cultural backlash, that fuels support for Authoritarian Populist Forces with anti-immigrant agendas (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Especially for older cohorts, “[...] the gap between the norms of the world into which they had been born, and the world in which they lived [is growing]” (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 34). To them, the present time increasingly poses a “[...] disorienting departure from the norms they had known since childhood [...].” As a result, they often feel they had become “[...] strangers in their own land.” (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 35). Accordingly, birth cohort effects can certainly coexist with period effects (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 447).

Yet to date, neither theoretical models nor empirical research convincingly combines the two concepts of cohort and period effects simultaneously to gain reliable assumptions about their impact on changes in societies’ opinion climates (Ross & Rouse, 2015; Wilkes & Corrigan-Brown, 2011). Moreover, the first element of the age-period-cohort issue is often left aside. Intracohort aging can additionally predict changes in an individual’s belief system. As outlined earlier, sociologists argue that this updating of beliefs occurs in response to certain life events at certain ages, predominantly defined by social structure (e.g. years of schooling, age when entering the working world, having children) (Kohli, 1978). Consequently, intracohort aging is associated with cohort affiliations since individuals within a birth cohort experience certain life stages at the same age. Additionally, intracohort aging is associated with perceptions of threat in response to periodic events since different age groups react differently to certain events. However, intracohort aging does not play a dominant role theoretically for the explanation of outgroup sentiments (for an overview, see McLaren & Paterson 2019). Therefore, this dissertation includes age only as an explanatory factor in its empirical analyses and does not examine its theoretical pathways in depth. Figure 3 shows the depicted relationships.

Figure 3: Past and Present affecting public opinion.



2.3. Theoretical model: Intertwining cohort and period effects - active updating based on settled dispositions

This dissertation takes the approach of the two concepts of cohort and period effects and combines the assumptions of the settled disposition model and the active updating model at the macro level. Thus, it acknowledges the impact of the impressionable years and the respective mark that this period in life imprints on individuals eventually forming unique generations. At the same time, it allows individuals within generations to adapt their attitudes over the life course when the social environment changes. Thus, this dissertation assumes inter-cohort effects due to similar respectively differing upbringing as well as intracohort changes due to reactions to changes in the environment. It thereby assumes an interplay of the approaches. Accordingly, periodic events may trigger shifts in a cohort's averaged opinion climate, though due to cohort effects, these shifts occur at different levels depending on the cohort and its unique socialization experience. In fact, each event leads to a cohort's re-evaluation of the subject while relying on previous experiences.

3. Attitudes toward outgroups: Interdisciplinary research in sociology and social psychology

Having examined the mechanisms for large scale attitude change at the population level in the previous section, the following specifically analyses the determinants for such changes and poses the question: Which factors in the past and in the present drive cohort and period effects with regard to attitudes toward immigrants?

The study of outgroup attitudes is an interdisciplinary undertaking where primarily sociology and social psychology come together. Subject of research is the relationship between so-called in- and outgroup members mostly focusing on the native population's evaluation of immigrants. Contemporary research offers two broad strands of literature explaining positive and negative

sentiments toward outgroup members. First, group conflict approaches outline several domains that potentially trigger ingroup members' threat perceptions due to outgroup presence. Such threat perceptions include feared competition over economic resources, cultural identity and ethnic homogeneity. Second, intergroup contact theory predicts less conflict between in- and outgroup members with increasing intergroup contacts. Contacts are argued to reduce outgroup prejudice and to enhance familiarization. Relating the acceptance or rejection of an outgroup specifically to the group of immigrants and refugees, conceptually, the question prevails whether new members are welcome in a particular community - in this case, in the defined territory of a nation-state.

3.1. Prejudice and social identity as a theoretical framework for outgroup rejection

This section first examines group conflict approaches that offer explanations for natives' rejection of new members in their community. It is thus important to initially grasp the phenomenon of prejudice which describes an unreflective, negative judgement based on ascribed group characteristics. "We are [...] bundles of prejudice" (Allport, 1954, p. xxii). With this statement in his work "The Nature of Prejudice" (1954), social-psychologist Gordon W. Allport describes the human tendency to ascribe individuals a certain group affiliation while drawing negative conclusions from untested presumptions regarding this group. Prejudices are socially learned and most often it is individuals of other ethnicities that are confronted with prejudice. Defined as antipathies based on faulty and inflexible generalization (Allport, 1954, p. 9), prejudice functions to secure the inherent power position of one's own group as opposed to another ethnic group. Furthermore, racial and ethnic prejudice is characterized by the invention of inferiority, seemingly justifying prejudice by ignoring the complex economic, cultural, political, and psychological relationships that influence relations among groups (Allport, 1954, p. xvii).

Sociologist Blumer supports this position and adds that the particular form of racial prejudice is a defensive reaction to preserve the integrity and position of the dominant group and with that its power and status (Blumer, 1958, p. 5). Racial and ethnic prejudice is particularly widespread since both imply visibility or a “biological stamp” that unifies a particular group in this one characteristic. When examining sentiments toward immigrants it is therefore crucial to account for the immigrant origins since prejudice can vary across different immigrant groups, depending, amongst others, on their ethnicity or race (Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015).

The mechanism underlying such downgrading of individuals that belong to a certain group goes along with the upgrading of the own group. Thus, we can establish a two-way relationship. Sociologist William Sumner was first to describe this complex in the early 20th century with the concept of ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906). Ethnocentrism first incorporates a positive, loyal and uncritical position toward the own group while at the same time internalizing a negative and even hostile view toward an outgroup. Members of another group are put into comparison with the habits, norms and values of the own group. Thereby, ethnocentric individuals believe that the lifestyle and behavior of the own (ethnic) group is superior to those of other groups. With that, the concept of ethnocentrism establishes an ideology of inequality and provides the basis for further socio-psychological and sociological approaches to examine the relationships between in- and outgroups.

In social psychology Tajfel and colleagues (H. Tajfel et al., 1979; H. E. Tajfel, 1978) further developed the idea of ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination. They propose Social Identity Theory, arguing that people’s self-concepts are based on their membership in social groups. Thereby, individuals identify positive characteristics in their own group and project them onto themselves so that their own social identity is evaluated most positive. Moreover, the development of a social identity requires the demarcation from others. As a novel theoretical contribution, the scholars add that individuals have a fundamental need to perceive their own group as superior to an outgroup independent of any other criteria but the group affiliation as

such. In other words: The social group phenomenon alone is sufficient to fuel conflict between groups. In relation to immigrants the social identity approach implies that the mere fact that immigrants are perceived as belonging to an outgroup can be enough for them to experience rejection.

3.2. Group conflict and group threat: social psychological experiments and sociological approaches

Besides the mere existence of groups that can trigger outgroup rejection, group conflict approaches in social psychology and sociology emphasize the role of competition for intergroup conflict. The social psychological approach of realistic group conflict roots in the experimental research of Muzafer Sherif and colleagues (Sherif et al., 1955). In the 1950s the researchers carried out several experiments with schoolboys in an American summer camp known as the Robbers Cave experiment. From this series of experiments three key conclusions were drawn for group conflicts. First, competition for scarce resources leads to increased solidarity within the own group (“ingroup solidarity”). Second, the pursuit of common group goals reduces hostility and social distance between ingroup members and leads to a better evaluation of ingroup characteristics and performance (“ingroup favoritism”). Third, and of particular interest to this dissertation, intergroup conflict leads to the formation of stereotypes and negative attitudes toward members of the other group (Sherif, 1961, 1967; Sherif et al., 1955).

As a further advancement, the sociological approach naturally focuses on societal conditions for competition and introduces a systematic integration of the context into intergroup relations (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Coser, 1956). Thus, the sociological strand of research permits explicit statements about which resources and goods are subject to competition in a society and under which conditions conflicts over them intensify. In this tradition, Lewis Coser was among the first to develop the theoretical concept of group conflicts and more particularly explored how they shape contemporary society. In his work “The Functions of Social Conflict” (1956),

Coser argues that any social system is characterized by competition for scarce resources among different groups. In interactive processes, nations, classes, political parties and ethnic groups compete over material resources, power, and status. Whereas Coser outlines the positive function of group conflicts for societies as they produce process and structure, he further emphasizes their threats. If social structures are rigid, providing little social mobility, group conflicts intensify and seriously threaten social cohesion. Thus, from this perspective the acceptance or rejection of the group of immigrants also depends on the presence of equal opportunities and the possibilities for upward mobility within a society.

With his influential paper "Race prejudice as a sense of group position," Blumer (1958) shifts the discourse to racial and ethnic group relations. He establishes that race prejudice should not be treated as a set of individual feelings but as a collective process by which racial groups form images of themselves and of others (Blumer, 1958, p. 3). When one racial group fears to lose certain entitlements and privileges to another racial group, prejudice is used as a defensive reaction. Moreover, Blumer points toward two societal conditions that intensify racial group conflict. First, certain events that are perceived as threatening within a society are prone to intensify racial prejudice. Second, an increase in a minority group size increases violent clashes since the majority population fears its dominant position under threat. With this, Blumer crucially contributes to the theoretical strand that emphasizes the importance of group threat when explaining outgroup attitudes and brings the dimension of dynamics into the equation.

Blumer's belief that competition between ethnic groups occur mainly in the economic and political domain was shared by Hubert Blalock, who further developed the group theoretical model. In his work "Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations" (1967), he establishes that it is a general human trait to aim at achieving certain objectives, particularly material interests and a respected status in society. Consequently, Blalock identifies economic conditions at the macro level as well as the size of the minority group as important drivers of competition and therewith group conflict.

Moreover, Blalock (1967) makes the important analytical distinction between *actual* and *perceived* competition between groups over society's rewards and resources. Actual competition thereby refers to objective conditions, whereas perceived competition refers to the individual group members' subjective evaluation of these objective conditions. According to Blalock *actual* competition at the macro level thus indirectly impacts discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants via *perceived* competition and threat at the micro level. Consequently, whether founded in fact or merely the perception of competition can shape natives' attitudes. The role of perception is also decisive for the "Theory of Relative Group Deprivation," rooted in Samuel Stouffer and colleagues' observations during World War II. In their work "American Soldier" (1949), they describe two particularly puzzling observations. First, they note, that members in the military police were more satisfied with their slow promotions than members of the air staff who were promoted comparably more rapidly. Second, African American soldiers in southern camps of the US were found to be more satisfied than African American soldiers in the north, even though the south was more racist.

The researchers' explanation for these observations can be traced back to the role of perception and the question of which group actually serves as a reference. Hence, members of the military police did not compare themselves to members of the air force who were promoted more rapidly but to members of their own group. Similarly, African American soldiers in the south did not compare themselves to Black soldiers in the north. Rather, their point of reference was the group of Black civilians in the south who were more tightly segregated by race. Consequently, Stouffer and colleagues reasoned that satisfaction is relative to the available comparisons at the time and place. Thus, in accordance with Blumer's arguing, threat mechanisms are triggered by the perceived relative positioning of social groups (Blumer, 1958; Stouffer et al., 1949).

Since then, the perspective of relative group deprivation was further examined empirically and developed theoretically. Historically and collectively developed expectations and feelings of entitlement among social groups are essential explanatory factors for intergroup hostility (Bobo

& Hutchings, 1996; Sears et al., 2000). Individuals who believe that their own group is disadvantaged and loses status relative to other social groups express increased feelings of threat and prejudice toward outgroups (Pettigrew et al., 2007). For instance, the sense of relative group deprivation offers an explanation for the increased rejection of immigrants by natives with a lower socio-economic status (Dennison & Geddes, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Bart Meuleman et al., 2020). Accordingly, economically more vulnerable groups feel that they are not receiving acknowledgment and respect for their achievements. Moreover, they feel disadvantaged, as they, as members of the alleged ingroup, feel more entitled to and deserving of certain societal goods such as social welfare benefits.

The opinion that welfare benefits should favor natives over foreigners is labeled “welfare chauvinism” (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990) and proves to be a phenomenon that transcends boundaries of different socio-economic groups, although it is particularly outspoken among working-class members (Mewes & Mau, 2012). The antecedents of this sentiment are twofold: First, the issue touches upon a more universal understanding of fairness and equality, raising the question of: Who is deserving of aid from the community? Here, stances depart from the argument that only those who have previously contributed to the welfare system are entitled to receive benefits, and those who demand an unconditional welfare system supporting all those in need irrespective of their previous contribution. This discussion basically roots in the overall question of fairness and solidarity and how social policy replies to this fundamental question. Second, and more important for this dissertation, welfare chauvinism roots in ethnocentrism: The idea that welfare services should be restricted to “our own,” an ethnically defined community (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990, p. 212; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). Accordingly, immigrants are perceived as less entitled to welfare since they belong to an ethnic outgroup that does not deserve the host society’s solidarity to the same degree as natives do.

Furthermore, “Integrated Threat Theory” evolves the concept of group threat by systematically differentiating between realistic and symbolic threat as two distinct concepts (W. S. Stephan &

Stephan, 2013). Realistic threat thereby refers to material competition between groups, comprising collective economic interests. Therefore, realistic threat is often referred to as economic threat. As outlined by previous researchers the realistic threat concept comprises competition over scarce material resources in societies such as jobs, housing and social transfer services (Olzak, 1992). Symbolic threat describes the fear of identity and status loss as outgroups may challenge the cultural identity and political power of the majority group. Symbolic threat is often referred to as cultural threat. It describes the majority population's fear of a conflict over values, norms, traditions and more generally the own "way of life" (W. G. Stephan et al., 1998). These concepts are not mutually exclusive. Outgroups can be perceived as either a realistic threat, a symbolic threat or both. This distinction offers especially strong explanatory power when considering immigrants as outgroups. Migrant groups differ in their economic, cultural, and ethnic composition and thus potentially trigger different threat perceptions in host populations (Bloom, Arikian, & Lahav, 2015; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Kustov, 2019; W. G. Stephan et al., 2005). Consequently, the evaluation of different immigrant groups will vary among the native majority population and thus influence public opinion changes toward immigrants as such.

To date, an enormous amount of empirical research set out to test the approaches of group conflict theory to identify the driving mechanisms of natives' attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. As proposed by theory, scholars assess the impact of macroeconomic conditions (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2006) and the size and composition of the outgroup (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018, 2019; Kunovich, 2004; Newman & Velez, 2014; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002) as decisive for natives' collective threat perceptions. These effects, however, could not always be replicated in this general proposition and static approach (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Kaufmann & Goodwin, 2018; Laurence et al., 2019; Sides & Citrin, 2007). It requires more granular analyses that account for different time and context conditions to disentangle the specific mechanisms of

threat perceptions. Accordingly, studies reveal that instead of the current economic conditions as well as the outgroup population it is the development of these measures that are crucial to account for (Coenders & Scheepers, 2008; Czymara, 2021; Heizmann & Huth, 2021; Hopkins, 2010; Newman & Velez, 2014; Olzak, 1992). Analogous to what Blumer (1958) had proposed, “big events” such as economic crises or sudden and drastic increases in immigration rates show significant effects on natives’ perceived threat levels also because such incidents receive widespread media attention (McLaren et al., 2018; Schlueter & Davidov, 2011).

Furthermore, the degree of welfare chauvinism within a society depends on the institutional structure of its welfare regime (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). In this respect, Van der Waal et al. (2013) prominently show that the native populations of liberal and conservative welfare regimes (according to Esping-Andersen 1990) are less willing to entitle immigrants to benefits than those living under social-democratic regimes (2013, p. 176). This provides evidence for the argument that institutional structures as well as social policy significantly affect a society’s opinion climate toward immigrants.

Additionally, in the tradition of “Integrated Threat Theory” realistic threat perceptions are found to be less influential than symbolic threat perceptions. In their widely cited meta-analysis on mass attitudes on immigration, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) consider about 100 studies conducted in North America and western Europe over a period of 20 years. The scholars come to the conclusion that immigration attitudes are largely shaped by sociotropic concerns about the cultural impacts of immigration on society as a whole - and to a lesser extent by concerns about immigration’s economic impacts. Since then, several further studies support the effect of symbolic threat perceptions on immigrant sentiments as described in conflict theories. Thus, newcomers are perceived to challenge the *status quo* in posing a potential threat to the host societies’ cultural goods, such as religion, traditions, and norms (Bloom, Arikan, & Courtemanche, 2015; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Schneider, 2008). Moreover, and additionally supportive of symbolic threat perceptions,

several empirical findings claim that the fear of a nation's ethnic homogeneity results in racial prejudice toward the non-White minority population (Bloom, Arikan, & Courtemanche, 2015; Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2016). In recent years, these threat perceptions are targeted especially toward refugees mostly originating from the Middle East and Africa, differing culturally and ethnically from the predominantly Christian and White European population. Thus, not only the size and development, but also the composition of the immigrant population within a country is decisive for the opinion climate toward immigrants.

3.3. Intergroup contact theory and mere exposure

The second strand of research that explains sentiments toward outgroup members roots in social psychology and considers the opportunities of outgroup presence instead of their potential for conflict. Though less discussed in the sociological context it provides valuable arguments for the potential effects of intergroup relations and the development of the opinion climate toward immigrants. The so-called contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) is based on the assumption that out-group presence potentially decreases out-group threat perceptions due to increased opportunities for direct positive contact and familiarization. Thereby, the positive experience made through intergroup contacts can reach beyond this individual experience so that more positive attitudes are brought forward to the whole out-group (Pettigrew, 1998).

Originally, contact hypothesis was conceptualized as an individual level phenomenon. Several scholars, however, have applied it to the aggregate level and examined whether a larger immigrant population would have a positive impact on natives' attitudes, assuming that an ethnically more heterogenous society would offer more opportunities for natives to accustom to diversity, establish positive contacts and intergroup relations (e.g. Schneider 2008). In other words, anti-immigrant sentiments are potentially less pronounced in ethnically diverse environments due to increased contact opportunities (McLaren & Paterson, 2019).

Moreover, group threat and contact mechanisms can occur simultaneously within countries (Mewes & Mau, 2013). Thus, the impact of the outgroup size can lead to both, increased threat as well as increased contact opportunities dependent on individual experiences. Members of different socio-economic statuses may experience outgroup presence differently whereby those with higher socio-economic statuses are prone to feel less threatened by newcomers (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003) and at the same time more likely to experience positive intergroup contact than those with lower socio-economic statuses (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2013). It is thereby a common finding that lower socio-economic groups, overall, hold more reluctant attitudes toward immigrants (Dennison & Geddes, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Bart Meuleman et al., 2020).

Overall, studies at the country level provide mixed results, but more often they are supportive of group threat theory rather than contact hypothesis (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018; Quillian, 1995; Schlueter & Wagner, 2008; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2006; Ziller & Heizmann, 2020). Thus, scholars studying the contact hypothesis argue that the country level is not the adequate study unit. Rather than immigrant stocks within a country, they suggest, actual intergroup contact must be measured at lower levels of analyses. Taking this into account, in their prominent “Meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory”, Pettigrew and Troop (2006) conclude that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice. Moreover, certain contact conditions lead to even greater reduction in prejudice, for instance, if contacts occur within a cooperative context and between members of groups with equal status. Also, sustainable contacts and friendships affect overall outgroup attitudes more positively than the mere presence of outgroup members (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Van Laar et al., 2005).


In sum, direct contact reduces outgroup threats but scholars need to pay close attention to the mechanisms that underlie this phenomenon and respectively rely on precise measures to examine its relationship.

4. Socialization, intergroup relations and public opinion

4.1. Theoretical pathways

Integrating insights on intergroup relations into socialization theory uncovers multiple pathways for how and why the opinion climate toward immigrants can be expected to change. Specifically, it can be hypothesized that today’s prejudice toward immigrants and refugees also roots in particular socialization experiences in the past that lead to different birth cohorts varying in their averaged opinions. Moreover, it can be expected that periodic changes in macro-economic conditions as well as in immigration rates and composition are important determinants for changes in contemporary attitudes across cohorts. Finally, intracohort aging may affect both, a cohort’s averaged opinion over time and additionally the way periodic events are perceived by different age groups. Figure 4 summarizes possible pathways.

Figure 4: Past and Present effects on Public Opinion toward immigrants.



During the process of growing up, individuals establish their value system and form a world view that is likely to be relatively persistent over the life course (Kiley & Vaisey, 2020; Mannheim, 1928; Vaisey & Kiley, 2021). Individuals that were born around the same time and location experience similar external conditions shaping their belief systems. Consequently, they show certain similarities in how they perceive the world and thus form a unique cohort. More precisely, if a cohort experiences a sense of existential security during their upbringing we can hypothesize that they express more open and tolerant attitudes and that they are therefore less likely to perceive immigrants as threatening (Davidov et al., 2014; Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). Conversely, if while growing up, a cohort goes through economic hardship or physical insecurities, for instance, because of severe economic crises or war, we can expect them to establish a worldview that is dominated by competitive threat perceptions. A similar outcome can be expected for cohorts growing up in societies shaped by high levels of inequality and low social mobility (Blumer, 1958; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). With increased economic competition, immigrants are likely to become targets of scapegoating which leads to prejudice and rejection. Consequently, considering socialization theory, cohorts that experienced existential insecurities during their upbringing should hold more adverse attitudes toward immigrants throughout their later life whereas the opposite should be true for cohorts that lived through more secure, equal and stable conditions while growing up.

Moreover, we can assume that immigrant presence during cohorts' formative phase leaves a permanent imprint on their sentiments toward immigrants. As group conflict theory posits, a larger immigrant population fuels natives' fears of competition not only in the economic sphere but rather with respect to cultural dominance and ethnic homogeneity. Conversely, according to intergroup contact theory there is a chance that a more heterogeneous society can lead to more positive views regarding immigrants since opportunities for direct contacts are increased and a process of habituation and familiarization may prevail (McLaren et al., 2020). These two theoretical pathways are difficult to disentangle at the country level because contact theory

predominantly works at a more local level of analysis. Yet, we can assume that it is the pace in changes that plays a particularly decisive role. Sudden and large increases in the immigrant population that is conceived as a shock, can be presumed to allow threat perceptions to dominate whereas continuous familiarization can be hypothesized to have a rather positive effect. Overall, the evaluations formed during adolescence still hold in the later course of life (Coenders & Scheepers, 2008; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). Thus, cohort replacement can have a relevant impact on changes in the opinion climate toward immigrants if the conditions under which the successive youths were socialized significantly differ from each other (Firebaugh, 1992; Ryder, 1965).

Yet, as pointed out before, certain periodic events still shape and change cohorts' current evaluation of immigrants. Especially severe economic crises and large and sudden increases in immigration function as drivers of outgroup threat. Besides the intensity and pace of immigration movements we can also expect an effect emanating from the composition of the arriving immigrant group. Immigrants that are perceived as culturally and ethnically different from the native population are more likely to be perceived as competitors for the natives' way of life (Bloom, Arikan, & Courtemanche, 2015; Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2016). Moreover, we can expect that economically more vulnerable groups are perceived as more threatening to the country's economy as a whole, as natives, for instance, fear high costs through social transfers benefits (Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017).

It is therefore conceivable that the particular immigrant group of refugees is subject of heightened threat perceptions since they are predominantly economically inferior from the western European native populations as they flee from economic crises or war. Moreover, before the war in Ukraine, in recent years, refugees mostly originated from countries in Africa and the Middle East where the populations are ethnically and culturally more distant from the White and mostly Christian European populations.

At the local level, however, positive effects of intergroup contact hold the potential to reduce such fears. This is because locals are more likely to interact with refugees at a regular basis, gain personal experiences of private exchange, and thereby familiarize with refugees' presence. Overall, however, the question prevails: Particularly with regard to refugees, how likely is it that positive intergroup contacts between natives and refugees occur? Initially, we must assume that positive intergroup contact is more difficult to acquire for refugees than for other migrant groups. Reasons for this are manifold. For their first months upon arrival, in most European countries, refugees are excluded from the labor market. The chances for a local to make the acquaintance of a refugee who is a co-worker are therefore diminished. Concurrently, refugees are supposedly only staying for rather short amounts of time in an asylum seeker center. Therefore, putting effort into becoming part of the local community is presumably smaller, such that the establishment of sustainable contacts between locals and refugees are less likely. Further, refugee housing is not necessarily a comforting place to call home. Sharing a room with others not only deprives residents of privacy but in many cases leads to conflict. Moreover, refugees have often experienced trauma on their flight and, therefore, are increasingly burdened by mental strains and depression. Yet, mental well-being is a highly relevant factor for social interaction and successful integration (Laban et al., 2004; Phillimore, 2011). Additionally, the average education level of asylum seekers is lower than the average level of the native-born ethnic majority population and that of other migrant groups, a factor also impeding interethnic relationships (Edele et al., 2021) since ties between individuals evolve when they are mostly similar in their characteristics (McPherson et al., 2001) and status (Allport, 1954). While these factors rather hinder positive intergroup interaction there are also advantages for refugees in meeting the local population. With the European refugee reception crisis, state institutions were overwhelmed by the number of people entering some countries, creating a great need for civic engagement. Out of human compassion, volunteers helped refugees in various ways. With this,

sustainable contact to the local population is given, thus somewhat increasing the chances of positive intergroup relations.

4.2. Empirical Evidence

To date, there is limited empirical evidence on the determinants of long- and short-term changes in public opinion toward immigrants. Specifically, the evidence is so far limited to insights into the impact of cohort and period effects and their interconnections. Hereby, cross-sectional (Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Hellwig & Sinno, 2017; Schaub et al., 2020) and cross-national (e.g. Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2016, 2019; Heizmann and Huth 2021; Meuleman 2009; Meuleman et al. 2020; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Schlueter, Meuleman, and Davidov 2013; Sides and Citrin 2007) comparative research on attitudes toward immigrants has grown extensively providing a snapshot of the status quo. By way of contrast, relatively few studies have examined over-time changes in public opinion (Coenders & Scheepers, 2008; Czymara, 2021; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Frey, 2020; Bart Meuleman et al., 2009). And even fewer studies have taken into account the cohort perspective to disentangle short- and long-term predictors for attitude changes within societies (Gorodzeisky, 2021; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018; McLaren & Paterson, 2019; Ross & Rouse, 2015; Wilkes & Corrigall-Brown, 2011).

Thus, the disentanglement of short- and long-term predictions for attitude changes within societies are largely understudied. The few studies examining cohort and period effects simultaneously come to diverging conclusions: First, in their paper, Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown (2011) examine 20 years of data collected in Canada between 1987 and 2008. They conclude that most attitude change toward immigrants is the result of changing macro-economic conditions. This is in line with realistic group threat approaches that posit that deteriorating macro-economic conditions lead to realistic threat perceptions and consequently to the rejection of immigrants. Further, the study finds cohort succession to only exert little

impact. This is in line with Gorodzeisky's (2021) findings for the European context. Her study demonstrates that cross-cohort variations play a negligible role in the over-time changes in attitudes toward the particular group of asylum seekers. Rather, changes can be attributed to period-related effects such as the 2015 European refugee reception crisis. This supports the notion that natives feel threatened by the sudden and high influx of refugees and is in line with both, the realistic and symbolic group threat approaches. Moreover, together, the studies contradict socialization theory and the claims of the settled disposition model.

This is in direct contrast to what other recent studies find. Ross and Rouse (2015) come to the conclusion that even in the face of poor economic conditions, the US Millennial Generation's attitudes about immigrants remain quite resilient. Moreover, Kustov and colleagues (2021) show that immigration attitudes are remarkably stable over time and robust to major economic and political shocks. Drawing on nine paneldata sets, the scholars provide support for theories emphasizing socialization and settled dispositions rather than period effects.

Furthermore, there is only little empirical evidence on the effect of the migrant composition on host populations' attitudes. Since different migrant groups differ in their economic, cultural and ethnic composition, they potentially trigger different threat perceptions among natives. While there are studies examining hypothetical immigration where respondents evaluate different immigrant groups based on their respective backgrounds (Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Kustov, 2019), evidence for the effects of actual demographic changes in the migrants' composition remains scarce (Czymara, 2021).


Moreover, previous empirical research comes to diverging conclusions when it comes to the impact of refugee presence at the local level. To date, it remains unclear, whether proximity to a refugee shelter affects locals' attitudes and which specific conditions lead to a rather positive or negative evaluation. One body of research reports an increase in anti-refugee sentiments and in right-wing vote shares due to local exposure to refugees (Dinas et al., 2019; Stecker & Debus, 2019) as proposed by group threat approaches. Others provide empirical evidence for the

opposite outcome (Lubbers et al., 2006; Steinmayr, 2020) in line with intergroup contact while a third group of researchers report a “null effect” (Deiss-Helbig & Remer, 2021; Schaub et al., 2020), arguing that the presence of refugees does not affect locals’ attitudes.

5. This dissertation: Understanding dynamics of attitudes toward immigrants

This dissertation contributes to resolve the unambiguity in previous findings by advancing theoretical arguments and testing them with a better, more comprehensive database. More specifically, marked in blue, Figure 5 shows the theoretical arguments which this dissertation provides empirical evidence for.

Figure 5: Central research perspectives: Social Change and intergroup relations.



Note: Blue marks the areas in which this dissertation provides evidence for.

Based on the insights from theory and empirical evidence on determinants of attitudes toward immigrants this dissertation looks at the following research puzzles:

1. How do birth cohorts differ in their sentiments toward immigrants and what does this imply for future opinion climates, when younger birth cohorts replace their predecessors?
2. How stable are birth cohorts' attitudes toward immigrants, given changing threat perceptions, due to changing macro-economic conditions and differing immigrant population?
3. How does proximity to a refugee accommodation affect locals' attitudes and behavior toward refugees?

As Figure 5 shows, answering these questions fills significant gaps in the academic literature on patterns of social change and intergroup relations and therefore contributes to the overarching question of the factors that drive public opinion toward immigrants and refugees. These questions are answered in the geographic context of western EU member states and Germany by using data on the autochthonous population from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).

Starting from the idea that both, past and present conditions impact publics' current attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, this dissertation first sets out to study the effects of cohort affiliation as well as current periodic changes with a specific focus on potential threat perceptions and opportunities for familiarization with the immigrant population then and now. *Research questions one and two* are tackled in this dissertation's empirical Chapter 2. It first examines how cohort replacement affects public opinion toward immigrants in east and west Germany. This approach promises particularly insightful findings due to the country's 40 year-long separation which implies cohorts' fundamentally different early years socialization experiences. The formation of different generations is based on theoretic grounds and relies on cohorts' specific contextual conditions while growing up. Multiple linear regression analyses

reveal whether cohort affiliation is directly associated with immigrant sentiments and whether there is a visible east-west division between generations.

Further, this empirical chapter approaches the second research question and examines how periodic changes over time affect immigration attitudes within generations. Group threat approaches have advanced the argument that the dynamics of economic conditions as well as the immigration rates matter for the native majority population's evaluation of immigrants and refugees. By applying a panel analysis with fixed effects at cohort level this particular change is identified while accounting for the impact of socialization and intracohort aging. This contributes to detect the underlying mechanisms of short- and long-term attitude changes at the population level.

Research questions one and two of this dissertation are further approached in the empirical Chapter 3. It expands the scope to a multi-country analysis within the western European context. Different European countries were affected differently by the financial crisis, by economic booms and by immigrant and refugee influxes in recent years and have therefore experienced differing threat scenarios. Accounting for this larger variation in economic conditions and inflows of shares of immigrants within as well as between countries provides a valuable data base.

More importantly, this analysis further investigates the role of immigrant origins on host societies' immigrant attitudes by taking into account the actual demographic change in ethnic composition. It examines how far increasing intra-European migration (mostly from east to west) affects western European attitudes toward immigrants as opposed to immigration from the Global South. While narrative accounts allow us to hypothesize that immigrant groups that are perceived as ethnically, culturally, and economically more distant from the host societies are more prone to be rejected (Bloom, Arikan, & Courtemanche, 2015; Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015), no study has so far proven this to be true by incorporating actual immigration rates from different regions in the world.

Research question three requires a focus shift from the country level to the local level and further illuminates the implications of the periodic event of refugee immigration in 2015. The empirical Chapter 4 examines as to whether the presence of refugee shelters in closer proximity affect locals' attitudes and behavior toward refugees. Group threat approaches have advanced the argument that neighboring refugee accommodations can agitate rejection and violence. Intergroup contact theory, however, suggests that it can also generate friendly sentiments and volunteer support. The question as to when, how, and why sentiments of group threat prevail in such a situation or positive intergroup contact takes place is open for scrutiny. Hence, this analysis takes individual characteristics, the respective neighborhood environments and information on refugee shelters into account to investigate to what extent differences in locals' attitudes are due to individual traits or contextual conditions when living in closer proximity to a refugee accommodation. In applying novel geo-data for all of Germany, the analysis contributes largely to our understanding of proximity effects.


6. Data and context

This dissertation focuses on the geographic context of Germany and expands to further western European countries in one empirical chapter (Chapter 3). Since the end of World War II, western European countries are considered prime destinations for immigrants from all over the world since they offer comparably prosperous, democratic political systems with liberal social welfare states. Overall, as of 1 January 2020, 23 million non-EU citizens live in the European Union accounting for 5.1% of the total population (Eurostat, 2022d). Additionally, in 2020 an all-time high of roughly 18 million EU citizens live in another member state of the EU whereby citizens from new EU member states in the east emigrate at a higher rate and predominantly to old EU member states in the west (Eurostat, 2022b). Historically, Germany is considered a particularly sought-after destination for migrant workers since it is Europe's strongest economy

that demands a large labor force. In 2020, 11.5 million immigrants (non-German citizens) lived in Germany making up 13.7 % of the overall population (Destatis, 2022).

Moreover, Europe and Germany offer a peaceful safe-haven for refugees fleeing war or persecution. From 2015 to 2020 more than two million refugees sought asylum in the European Union. Especially during the long summer of migration in 2015 it was apparent that many refugees' aspiration was to seek asylum in Germany that accounted for most refugee arrivals in Europe (Eurostat, 2022a) (see Figure 6).


Figure 6: Total number of long-term immigrants arriving into the reporting country during 2015.



Source: Eurostat, 2022c
Lowest number: Liechtenstein, 657 immigrants arriving.
Highest number: Germany, 1,571,047 immigrants arriving.

Large refugee movements as we saw in 2015 coincide with the public’s focus on immigration issues as such. As portrayed in Figure 7 the issue of immigration gained increasing importance in the years following the Arab Spring in 2013 when immigration to Europe heightened. Accompanied by large media coverage in 2016 over 80% of respondents named immigration among the most important issues in Germany. In contrast, the global financial crisis in 2008 did not result in any comparable echo in the German public.

Figure 7: Most important issues in Germany (values for January of the respective year, since 1/2000)



Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (Politbarometer, 2022)

To study the majority population’s immigration attitudes within this specific context, this dissertation applies survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). ESS data is linked with administrative data on migration rates and economic developments from the World Bank and the OECD International Migration data

base. SOEP data is further matched with street-level information provided by microm⁷ and data on the geo-positions of refugee housing across Germany that was manually collected within the frame of this dissertation.

The ESS is a repeated cross-sectional representative survey for mostly European countries. Since 2000, in face-to-face interviews, respondents are surveyed biannually on attitudes, opinions and behavior as well as on socio-demographic information. In all rounds, the survey includes items that measures respondents' attitudes towards immigrants.

The ESS comes with three major advantages in studying public opinion toward immigrants in Germany and the broader context of Europe. First, it allows the comparison of a multitude of European countries over time and at the same time a finely grained analyses at the local level such as the east and west of Germany. Second, the data offers a theoretically well-founded item battery regarding questions on the perceived impact of immigrants within respective countries in addition to a wide array of further personal information of respondents. Third, ESS data is widely used across the disciplines and therefore allows to compare findings with previous studies on immigration attitudes.

Moreover, this dissertation relies on survey data provided by the SOEP. The SOEP focuses uniquely on Germany and offers three important advantages in studying attitudes and behavior toward refugees. First, carried out on an annual basis since 1984 the panel study provides an all-purpose household survey and the largest random sample of German households (Goebel et al., 2019). Thus, it offers a large number of observations per year. Moreover, due to its panel nature, SOEP data allows to account for within-individual and household changes over time. Second, respondents are asked to provide details on a wide range of topics including employment, education, as well as worries about different issues, such as immigration. In the years 2016 and 2018 a special module was included that had respondents evaluate the impact

⁷ The dataset of microm contains a variety of characteristics relevant for target group marketing but also information on type of neighborhood and social environment: <https://www.microm.de/>

of refugee immigration to Germany and whether they had engaged in supportive behavior or were planning on doing so. This allows this dissertation's theoretically driven assumptions to be tested empirically. Third, in compliance with data protection regulations, anonymized respondents' data can be located to the street level. This enables a linkage to neighborhood information provided by microm. Further, it allows to connect geo-positions of households participating in the SOEP and manually collected data on the geo-positions of refugee accommodations across Germany between 2016 and 2018. This enables the calculation of the exact distance of all SOEP respondents to the respective nearest refugee accommodation.

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CHAPTER 2

The roles of cohort affiliation and threat perceptions in the east and west
German context

Eine migrationsfreundlichere Gesellschaft durch den Generationenwandel? Kohortenanalysen für Ost- und Westdeutschland.

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Schmidt, Katja (2022)

Abstract

This study analyzes the impact of generational replacement on the opinion climate toward immigrants in east and west Germany. Theoretically, the paper is based on Mannheim's generation theory as well as on group conflict approaches and the contact hypothesis. The empirical basis for the cohort analyses is provided by the theoretically grounded generational classification for the east and west German cohorts born between 1908 and 1999. Based on the data of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2018, the thesis can be rejected that the process of generational replacement in Germany will lead to a steadily more tolerant and open opinion climate toward immigrants. Rather, a generational trend can be observed that is not linear but fluctuating. The youngest generations in west Germany, for instance, again hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants than the generation of early baby boomers socialized in the 1970s. They, in turn are significantly more immigrant-friendly than the oldest wartime generation. In the east, on the other hand, no significant changes in attitudes can be observed throughout the generations compared to the oldest wartime generation. Furthermore, the findings of the panel analysis at the cohort level point to a certain stability of attitudes within generations in the face of changing threat factors at the context level. Neither changes in the unemployment rate nor in the share of persons with a migration background lead to changes in attitudes during the observation period. Only the increase in the number of people seeking asylum leads to somewhat more restrictive attitudes toward immigrants within the generations.

1. Einleitung

Die stark angestiegene Zahl an Zugewanderten, sowohl infolge von globalen Migrations- und Fluchtbewegungen als auch aus der erweiterten Europäischen Union, stellt das gesellschaftliche Zusammenleben sowie das politische System in Deutschland vor neue Herausforderungen (Jacobsen et al., 2017; Zick et al., 2019). Neben breitem ehrenamtlichem Engagement und einer ausgeprägten Willkommenskultur bei Teilen der Bevölkerung, stößt die Entwicklung bei Anderen auf vehemente Ablehnung. Ob das Thema auch in Zukunft die Gesellschaft spaltet, oder ob sich langfristig mehrheitlich tolerantere, offenere Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten etablieren, entscheidet sich auch durch den Prozess der Generationenablösung. Unterscheiden sich die Geburtskohorten, die der Bevölkerung neu hinzutreten in ihren Einstellungen zu Migration und ethnischer Diversität dauerhaft von denen der ausscheidenden Kohorten, verändert sich das Meinungsklima unserer Gesellschaft grundlegend.

Theoretisch wurde das Phänomen der Generationenablösung und dessen Potenzial für sozialen Wandel prominent von Karl Mannheim identifiziert (1928). Benachbarte Geburtskohorten konstituieren eine Generation, wenn sie aufgrund prägender sozialer und politischer Entwicklungen während ihrer formativen Jugendphase dauerhaft Ähnlichkeiten in ihrem Weltbild und ihren Verhaltensweisen aufzeigen. Der im folgenden nachgegangenen Frage, ob potenzielle (Einstellungs-) Unterschiede zwischen den Kohorten in Deutschland auf genau solche Generationeneffekte zurückzuführen sind, oder aber auf Alters- und Periodeneffekte, wird in der soziologischen Forschung mitunter kontrovers diskutiert (Albert et al., 2019; Schröder, 2018, 2019). Dabei argumentiert Schröder, man sitze einem Generationenmythos auf, da es bislang kaum empirische Evidenz für Einstellungsunterschiede zwischen den westdeutschen Nachkriegsgenerationen gäbe (Schröder, 2018, p. 469).

In seiner Studie untersucht Schröder Kohorteneffekte hinsichtlich Lebensziele und Sorgen. Unbeachtet bleiben dabei allerdings einerseits die ostdeutschen Kohorten und andererseits die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten. Dabei zeigen bisherige Studien hier durchaus Anzeichen

eines langfristigen Generationeneffekts. International vergleichende Forschung weist darauf hin, dass europäische Kohorten, die ihre prägenden Jugendjahre in Zeiten höherer Arbeitslosigkeit erlebten stärkere Ressentiments gegen Zugewanderte hegen (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). Außerdem zeigen längsschnittliche nationale Studien, dass Kohorten, die in diverseren kulturellen und ethnischen Kontexten sozialisiert werden, später eher zuwandererfreundlich eingestellt sind (für Großbritannien: McLaren et al., 2020; für die USA: Eger et al., 2021). Für Deutschland sind diese Effekte empirisch nur wenig erforscht (längsschnittliche Studien nur für Westdeutschland 1980-2000: Coenders & Scheepers 2004, 2008). Dabei sind aufgrund der über 40-jährigen Teilung des Landes besonders aufschlussreiche Befunde zu erwarten. Es gilt zu erforschen, ob auch hier ein Generationenmythos besteht, oder aber, ob sich die unterschiedlich sozialisierten Generationen tatsächlich dauerhaft in ihren Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten unterscheiden und somit sozialen Wandel verursachen. Demzufolge lautet die erste Fragestellung dieser Studie: Inwiefern führt der Generationenaustausch in Ost- und Westdeutschland zu einem langfristigen Einstellungswandel zu Zugewanderten?

Empirische Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Einstellungen nach der prägenden Jugendphase zwar relativ persistent bleiben, es im späteren Lebensverlauf jedoch durchaus noch zu feststellbaren, oft kurzfristigen Einstellungsänderungen kommen kann (Kiley & Vaisey, 2020; Yang, 2008). Ein Umstand, den auch Mannheim (1928, p. 180 f.) nicht ausschließt. Damit prägen und verändern neben Generationeneffekten auch bestimmte Periodeneffekte das allgemeine Meinungsklima zu Zugewanderten. Durch einen Anstieg des Zuwandereranteils oder eine stagnierende Wirtschaft verschärft sich, entsprechend der Gruppenkonflikttheorie, die Konkurrenzwahrnehmung durch Zuwanderer und damit die Bedrohungswahrnehmung der Mitglieder der dominanten Mehrheitsgesellschaft gegenüber Migrant*innen und führt zu deren verstärkter Ablehnung (Coenders & Scheepers, 2004, 2008; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018; Hopkins, 2010; Bart Meuleman et al., 2009; Olzak, 1992; Schmidt, 2021). Die zweite

Fragestellung dieser Arbeit befasst sich daher mit den periodischen Wirkkräften auf der Kontextebene, die alle Generationen betreffen: Wie stabil sind die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen, bei sich verändernden Bedrohungswahrnehmungen in Ost- und Westdeutschland?

Damit erweitert dieser Artikel die bisherige Forschung zum Einstellungswandel zu Zugewanderten in Deutschland maßgeblich um drei Aspekte: Erstens, erfolgt die Generationeneinteilung der Geburtskohorten in Ost- und Westdeutschland theoriegeleitet, anstatt wie bisher anhand statistischer Kohorten derselben Spannweite (Coenders & Scheepers, 2004, 2008). In Anlehnung an Mannheims Generationenverständnis werden im Folgenden aufgrund ihrer spezifischen Sozialisationserfahrungen, die ihre Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten prägen, in Ost- und Westdeutschland jeweils neun Generationen gebildet, basierend auf den Geburtsjahrgängen seit 1908. Zweitens, erfolgen anhand gepoolter Daten des European Social Survey (ESS) von 2002 bis 2018 Kohortenanalysen, um systematische Unterschiede zwischen den unterschiedlich sozialisierten Generationen zu identifizieren. Drittens, wird geprüft, inwiefern die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen stabil sind, bei sich verändernden Bedrohungsfaktoren auf der Kontextebene. Hierfür wird eine Panelanalyse mit fixen Generationen-Effekten durchgeführt. Diese Methode der sogenannten Pseudo-Panelanalyse ermöglicht es, anhand von wiederholten Querschnittsdaten gleichwohl längsschnittliche Untersuchungen auf Kohortenebene durchzuführen. Vorteilhaft dabei ist, dass für unbeobachtete zeitkonstante Drittmerkmale kontrolliert werden kann und somit einer Verzerrung der Ergebnisse erheblich entgegengewirkt wird (Brüderl, 2010, p. 967). Zusammen eröffnet dieses Vorgehen ein deutlich umfassenderes Bild auf das derzeitige Meinungsklima zu Zugewanderten in der deutschen Gesellschaft sowie auf dessen potenzielle Entwicklung durch den Prozess der Generationenablösung in Ost- und Westdeutschland.

Die Arbeit gliedert sich folgendermaßen: In Abschnitt 2 und 3 erfolgt anhand theoretischer Überlegungen und bisheriger Forschungsergebnisse die Herleitung der Hypothesen für die Untersuchung. Anschließend wird die Datenbasis (Abschnitt 4) und das methodische Vorgehen (Abschnitt 5) dargelegt. In Abschnitt 6 werden die Ergebnisse der Analysen präsentiert. Die Untersuchung schließt mit Fazit und Diskussion (Abschnitt 7).

2. Die Theorie der Generationenablösung und das Meinungsklima zu Zugewanderten

In Deutschland liegen die Sterbefälle in den Jahren 2000 bis 2018 zwischen ca. 820,000 und 955,000 und die Geburtenzahlen zwischen ca. 663,000 und 792,000 (Destatis, 2020a). Abgesehen von Wanderungsbewegungen, die eine Gesellschaft erfährt, bringt allein dieser naturgegebene Austausch von Individuen zwangsläufig Veränderungen mit sich. Die von Mannheim (1928) geprägte soziologische Theorie der Generationenablösung beschreibt diesen Prozess, bei dem stets neue Kulturträger eingesetzt werden, während frühere kontinuierlich verschwinden. Eine immer wieder neu entstehende Jugend hat dabei einen jeweils neuen Zugang zu Kultur und bewirkt dadurch Veränderungen, die sozialen Wandel erzeugen können (Firebaugh, 1992; Mannheim, 1928; Pilcher, 1994; Ryder, 1965). Von besonderer Bedeutung für die Theorie der Generationenablösung ist die Annahme, dass zwar alle Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft dieselben prägenden Großereignisse erleben, doch deren Effekt zwischen den Altersgruppen variiert: Die Wirkung auf Einstellungsmuster ist in der Jugendzeit am prägendsten und nimmt im Laufe eines Lebens dann wieder ab (Mannheim, 1928, p. 180 f.). Eine Vielzahl an Studien hat die Bedeutung der Sozialisation im Jugendalter seitdem bestätigt (Eger et al., 2021; Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Kiley & Vaisey, 2020; Krosnick & Alwin, 1989; Yang, 2008).

In seinem Aufsatz „Das Problem der Generationen“ (1928) definiert Mannheim eine Generation dadurch, dass Individuen gleicher oder benachbarter Geburtsjahrgänge potentiell dieselben prägenden sozialen und politischen Erfahrungen in ihrer formativen Jugendphase

machen. Aufgrund ihrer spezifischen Lagerung im historischen Kontext („im historischen Strom des gesellschaftlichen Lebens“) bleiben die Erlebnisse der Individuen benachbarter Geburtsjahrgänge jeweils auf einen bestimmten Spielraum möglichen Geschehens beschränkt (Mannheim, 1928, p. 173). Diese Art des Erlebens kann sich in spezifischem Denken, Fühlen und Handeln äußern, das die Individuen einer Generationslagerung eint. 8 Mannheim nennt dies das Phänomen der verwandten Lagerung der Menschen im sozialen Raum. Durchleben Individuen in ihrer Jugendphase gemeinsam besondere historische Ereignisse, können sie ein besonderes soziales Bewusstsein ausbilden, das ihr „natürliches Weltbild“ auf Dauer prägt (Mannheim, 1928, p. 181 f.). Ein geschärfter Blick auf die gesellschaftlichen Kontextbedingungen während der formativen Jugendphasen ist somit unabdingbar, wenn sozialer Wandel analysiert werden soll.

2.1. Gruppenkonflikttheorien und Kontakthypothese

Eine Hauptannahme dieser Arbeit liegt darin, dass gesellschaftliche Veränderungen veränderte Sozialisationsbedingungen schaffen und somit einen generationengetriebenen Wandel von Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten zu fördern vermögen. Zur Überprüfung dieser Annahme werden im folgenden Abschnitt zunächst die theoretischen Mechanismen diskutiert, die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten anhand gesellschaftlicher Kontextbedingungen begründen.

⁸ Spezifisch unterscheidet Mannheim zwischen drei hierarchisch strukturierten Generationsbegriffen: Generationslagerung, Generationszusammenhang und Generationseinheit. Eine Generationslagerung konstituiert sich aus Personen benachbarter Geburtsjahrgänge, die einen „historisch-sozialen Lebensraum“ teilen. Deutsche und chinesische Jugendliche um 1800 gehören damit nicht derselben Generationslagerung an (Mannheim, 1928, p. 180). Ein Generationszusammenhang ist die Jugend innerhalb einer Generationslagerung, die sich der historisch-aktuellen Fragen bewusst ist und sich an dieser Problematik orientiert und dadurch ein gemeinsames soziales Bewusstsein ausbildet. Innerhalb eines Generationszusammenhangs können sich mehrere Generationseinheiten herausbilden. Eine Generationseinheit stellt eine konkrete Verbundenheit der Mitglieder dar, wobei sie sich in ihren Reaktionen auf die prägenden Ereignisse der Zeit durchaus auch oppositionell gegenüberstehen können (Mannheim, 1928, p. 311 f.). Wenn in der vorliegenden Arbeit von Generationen gesprochen wird, sind im Mannheim'schen Sinn Generationslagerungen gemeint.

Gruppenkonflikttheoretische Ansätze aus Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie bieten die wohl prominentesten Erklärungen für antagonistische Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten, indem sie den Wettbewerb um knappe Ressourcen und Identitäten in den Fokus rücken (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1961). Vorurteile gegenüber Zugewanderten sind eine Antwort auf Bedrohungen etablierter Gruppenprivilegien (Quillian, 1995, p. 586). Hierbei dominieren die Sorgen vor ökonomischer und vor kultureller Bedrohung durch Zuwanderer (Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2016; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Lengfeld & Dilger, 2018). Entsprechende Bedrohungsgefühle auf individueller Ebene können durch verschärfte Wettbewerbsbedingungen, wie Rezessionen oder verstärkte Zuwanderungsraten auf der Kontextebene ausgelöst werden (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Bart Meuleman et al., 2009; Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2006). Studien, die die kontextuellen Bedrohungsfaktoren während der formativen Jugendjahre berücksichtigen, bestätigen einen derartigen Kohorteneffekt: Die Akzeptanz ethnischer Diskriminierung ist umso größer, je höher die Arbeitslosigkeit (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998, p. 405, 2004, p. 229, 2008, p. 21; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018, p. 42) in den jeweiligen formativen Jahren war und, bei schwachen Effekten, wenn der Ausländeranteil stärker ansteigt (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998, p. 405).

Die genannten Konfliktpotenziale treten in Hinblick auf Fluchtzuwanderung im Vergleich zu anderen Formen der Immigration potenziert auf. Menschen fliehen überwiegend aus ökonomisch schwachen Krisenregionen aus dem Globalen Süden und damit aus Kulturkreisen mit unterschiedlichen ethnischen Zugehörigkeiten. Damit besteht eine größere ökonomische, kulturelle und ethnische Distanz zwischen Schutzsuchenden und der deutschen Aufnahmegesellschaft, was zu eher ablehnenden Haltungen führt (Czymara, 2021; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Dinas et al., 2019; Hangartner et al., 2019). Andererseits vollzieht sich Fluchtzuwanderung aufgrund von Konflikten im Herkunftsland rasch und meist in großer Anzahl (z.B. Flüchtlingsbewegungen aus Vietnam (1979), dem ehem. Jugoslawien (1994), oder

aus Syrien (2015)). Ausgehend vom dynamischen Ansatz der Gruppenkonflikttheorie (Hopkins, 2010; Olzak, 1992) führt die Zuwanderung von Schutzsuchenden so zu verstärkt wahrgenommener Bedrohung für die Wirtschaftskraft und die Sozialsysteme des Aufnahmelandes, aber auch für die kulturelle und ethnische Homogenität der Gesellschaft (Schmidt, 2021).

Bedrohungsmechanismen begründen auch die These der „Silent Revolution“ und der Ablösung materieller Wertpräferenzen (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). Menschen, die in existenzieller Unsicherheit aufwachsen sind vermehrt autoritär und fremdenfeindlich eingestellt, bilden eine stärkere Solidarität innerhalb der eigenen Gruppe aus und lehnen gleichzeitig Außenseiter eher ab. Menschen hingegen, die in einer existenzgesicherten Gesellschaft aufwachsen, sind offener gegenüber neuen Ideen und toleranter gegenüber Fremdgruppen, da sie ihr Überleben als gesichert ansehen (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 443 f.). Die Theorie der relativen Gruppendeprivation sieht Bedrohungsmechanismen weniger durch die objektiven ökonomischen Bedingungen im Land ausgelöst als vielmehr durch die wahrgenommene relative Positionierung sozialer Gruppen (Blumer, 1958; Stouffer et al., 1949). Historisch und kollektiv entwickelte Erwartungshaltungen und Anspruchsgefühle gesellschaftlicher Gruppen sind essentielle Erklärungsfaktoren für Feindseligkeiten zwischen Gruppen (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Sears et al., 2000). Personen, die der Meinung sind, dass ihre eigene Gruppe im Vergleich zu anderen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen benachteiligt ist und an Status verliert, drücken vermehrt Bedrohungsgefühle und Vorurteile gegenüber Fremdgruppen aus (McLaren et al., 2020; Bart Meuleman et al., 2018; Pettigrew et al., 2007). Unter anderem kann wahrgenommene Ungleichheit, beispielsweise im Einkommen oder durch blockierte Mobilitätschancen, zu einem Gefühl von relativer Deprivation führen, das unabhängig von der Referenzgruppe zur verstärkten Ablehnung von Zugewanderten führen kann, die hier als Sündenböcke fungieren (Dennison & Geddes, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017).

Entsprechend der Konflikttheorien kann somit angenommen werden, dass Geburtskohorten, die in ihren prägenden Jugendjahren Bedrohungsmechanismen wie verschärfte Wettbewerbsbedingungen um knappe Ressourcen und Identitäten erfahren (Massenarbeitslosigkeit, Rezession, erhöhte (Flucht-) Zuwanderung), existenzielle Unsicherheiten (Krieg, Systemumbruch) erleben, oder verstärkte Ungleichheit wahrnehmen (Vermögens- und Einkommensungleichheit, Mobilitätschancen, Status), Zugewanderten gegenüber negativer eingestellt sind, als Kohorten, die in ihren prägenden Jugendjahren keine entsprechenden Erfahrungen machen.

Inwiefern sich Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten positiv verändern können, formuliert die Kontakthypothese. Ihre Grundannahme besteht darin, dass der Kontakt zu anderen ethnischen oder kulturellen Gruppen sowie zu Personen anderer Nationalitäten zu einer Reduktion von Vorurteilen und zu zunehmender Toleranz gegenüber diesen Gruppen führt, was sich in positiveren Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten äußert (Allport, 1954; Kaufmann & Harris, 2015; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Wagner et al., 2003). Damit sind es oft diejenigen Menschen, die kaum Kontakte zu Migrant*innen haben, die häufiger Sorgen um Zuwanderung und fremdenfeindliche Einstellungen artikulieren (Decker et al., 2016; Wagner et al., 2003). Aufgrund des historisch begründet geringeren Migrant*innenanteils ist dieses Phänomen vor allem in ostdeutschen Regionen zu beobachten (Decker et al. 2016). Die Kontaktmöglichkeiten zwischen Einheimischen und Zugewanderten unterscheiden sich jedoch nicht nur abhängig vom Migrant*innenanteil in der Region, sondern auch abhängig von der Zuwanderergruppe (Schmidt, 2021). Die Chancen für Kontaktpunkte zwischen Einheimischen und Geflüchteten sind dabei geringer als beispielsweise für Arbeitsmigrant*innen.⁹ Für den besonderen Fall der

⁹ Kontaktmöglichkeiten entstehen überwiegend bei der Arbeit, in der Nachbarschaft und im Freundeskreis (Schmidt et al., 2020b). Die Chancenzugänge zu diesen Orten sind für unterschiedliche Migrant*innengruppen jedoch ungleich verteilt. Während Einheimische leichter Kontakte zu Arbeitsmigrant*innen aufbauen können, da sie ihnen als KollegInnen begegnen, ist der persönliche Kontakt zu Geflüchteten erschwert, da sie zunächst vom Arbeitsmarkt ausgeschlossen sind. Auch ihre Unterbringung in Gemeinschaftsunterkünften erschwert Kontaktmöglichkeiten zwischen Deutschen und Geflüchteten (Siegert 2021; Schmidt/Jacobsen/Krieger 2020). Hinzu kommt, dass Geflüchtete zunächst größtenteils kein deutsch sprechen und das durchschnittliche

Schutzsuchenden ist somit nicht anzunehmen, dass ihre Zuwanderung anfänglich zu erhöhten Kontaktmöglichkeiten und damit einhergehend verringerten Vorurteilen innerhalb der Gesellschaft führt.

Insgesamt jedoch zeigen aktuelle Studien (Eger et al., 2021, p. 15; McLaren et al., 2020, p. 17 f. McLaren & Paterson, 2019, p. 13 f.), dass Kohorten, die in einem Kontext zunehmender Vielfalt und Diversität sozialisiert werden, später im Leben Zugewanderten gegenüber positiver eingestellt sind. Während verstärkte Zuwanderung während der prägenden Jahre eher als Bedrohung wahrgenommen wird, kann das langsame Anwachsen der Ausländerpopulation zu mehr Vertrautheit und weniger negativen Haltungen führen (Coenders & Scheepers, 2004, p. 229).

Entsprechend der Kontakthypothese kann angenommen werden, dass Kohorten, die in ihren prägenden Jugendjahren die Möglichkeiten haben, Kontakte zu Ausländern aufzubauen und interethnische Freundschaften einzugehen, Zugewanderten gegenüber positiver eingestellt sind, als Kohorten, die keine entsprechenden Erfahrungen machen.

2.2. Die formativen Prägungsphasen der Jugendlichen in Deutschland von 1925 bis 2020 hinsichtlich Bedrohungsfaktoren und Möglichkeiten zu Intergruppenkontakt

Tabelle 1 zeigt, wie sich die Prägungsphasen der Jugendlichen (ca. 15 Jahre alt) hinsichtlich Zuwanderung in Deutschland zwischen 1925 und 2020 entwickelten. Dargestellt sind Geburtskohorten, die sich aufgrund ihrer gemeinsamen spezifischen Sozialisationserfahrungen zu neun Generationen zusammenfassen lassen. Für die Einteilung berücksichtigt sind die Faktoren, die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten soziologisch erklären: Bedrohungsfaktoren und

Bildungsniveau von Schutzsuchenden niedriger ist als das der autochthonen Bevölkerung - Faktoren, die positive interethnische Kontakte erschweren (Edele et al. 2021). Schließlich entstehen Beziehungen zwischen Individuen aus unterschiedlichen Gruppen, wenn sie sich in ihren Eigenschaften und ihrem sozialen Status möglichst ähnlich sind (McPherson/Smith-Lovin/Cook 2001; Allport 1954).

Intergruppenkontakte. Unter den Begriff „Bedrohungsfaktoren“ fallen erstens der Wettbewerb um knappe Ressourcen und Identitäten, zweitens, existenzielle (Un-) Sicherheiten und drittens, die (Un-) Gleichheit zwischen den gesellschaftlichen Gruppen. Mit dem Begriff „Kontaktmöglichkeiten“ werden die Möglichkeiten positiven Kontakts zu Ausländern oder Menschen anderer Herkunft und Kulturkreise evaluiert. Die Generationen sind aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen Sozialisationserfahrungen in zeitweilig zwei verschiedenen politischen Systemen (DDR und BRD), deren Prägungen bis heute wirken, in Ost- und Westdeutschland unterteilt.

Die Konstruktion der Generationen erfolgt ausgehend von historischen Umbrüchen, 15 Jahre zurückgerechnet. Historische Umbrüche für Deutschland sind teilweise klar auf ein Ereignis zurückzuführen (bspw. 1933, 1945). Später sind diese Trennlinien weniger exakt auf ein bestimmtes Jahr festzulegen, sondern vielmehr auf eine Zeit des gesellschaftlichen Umbruchs (bspw. die unmittelbare Nachkriegszeit oder die Babyboomer-Generationen). Gleichzeitig besteht die Herausforderung, für Ost und Westdeutschland Generationen zu konstruieren, die miteinander vergleichbar sind. Dabei gab es in den beiden Landesteilen während der Deutschen Teilung unterschiedliche prägende Entwicklungen, wie zum Beispiel der verknappte Zugang zu höherer Bildung in der DDR ab 1971, bei vermehrten Möglichkeiten zu Fernreisen in der BRD zur selben Zeit. So ist Tabelle 1 der Versuch, die wichtigsten Trennlinien mit Bezug auf die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten zu definieren und dabei eine plausible Vergleichbarkeit zu schaffen.

Tabelle 1: Generationeneinteilung nach formativen Prägungsphasen der Jugendlichen hinsichtlich Bedrohungsfaktoren und Möglichkeiten zu Intergruppenkontakt, unterteilt in Ost- und Westdeutschland.

		<i>Formative Phase (+15 Jahre)</i>	<i>Westdeutschland</i>	<i>Ostdeutschland</i>
1	Generation Jugend-von-Weimar *1900 - 1918	1918-1933	Bedrohungsfaktoren Hyperinflation, Weltwirtschaftskrise	
		Kontaktmöglichkeiten		gering
2	Kriegsgeneration *1919 - 1930	1934-1945	Bedrohungsfaktoren II. Weltkrieg, existenzielle Unsicherheit	
		Kontaktmöglichkeiten		gering
3	Nachkriegsgeneration *1931 - 1940	1946-1955	Bedrohungsfaktoren Nachkriegszeit, Systemumbruch, große Flüchtlingsbewegungen	
		Kontaktmöglichkeiten		gering
4	68-er Generation *1941 - 1954	1956-1969	Bedrohungsfaktoren Kalter Krieg, Kuba-Krise, Mauerbau	
		Kontaktmöglichkeiten	starkes Wirtschaftswachstum, große Nachfrage nach Arbeitskräften erste Fernreisen und Anwesenheit von „Gastarbeitern“	Sozialismus, Arbeitergesellschaft, "Mobilitätssog" nach oben eingeschränkte Reisefreiheit, wenige ausländische „Vertragsarbeiter“
5	Frühe Babyboomer *1955 - 1962	1970-1978	Bedrohungsfaktoren Kalter Krieg, teilweise Entspannungspolitik	
		Kontaktmöglichkeiten	beginnende Globalisierung, erste Ölkrise, steigende Arbeitslosenquoten Fernreisen, vermehrte Anwesenheit von „Gastarbeitern“	Mangel an Konsumgütern, geringe Ungleichheit, verknappter Zugang zu höherer Bildung eingeschränkte Reisefreiheit, wenige Kontaktpunkte mit Ausländern
6	Späte Babyboomer *1963 – 1969	1979-1984	Bedrohungsfaktoren Kalter Krieg, NATO-Doppelbeschluss, Fluchtzuwanderung aus Vietnam	
		Kontaktmöglichkeiten	hohe Arbeitslosenquoten, über vier Mio. Ausländer in der BRD Fernreisen, vermehrte Kontakte zu Migrant*innen durch Familiennachzug der „Gastarbeiter“	Mangel an Konsumgütern, wenige Studienanfänger*innen, geringe Aufstiegschancen eingeschränkte Reisefreiheit, wenige Kontaktpunkte mit Migrant*innen

7	Wendegeneration			Deutsche Wiedervereinigung, Fluchtzuwanderung aus ehem. Jugoslawien
	*1970 - 1982	1985-1997	Bedrohungs- faktoren	Arbeitsmarkt schwankend, fortschreitende Globalisierung, steigende Einkommensungleichheit, starke Migrationsbewegungen nach Westdeutschland vermehrte Fernreisen, steigende Kontaktpunkte zu Ausländern
			Kontakt- möglichkeiten	Auflösung DDR, existentielle Unsicherheiten durch Systemumbruch, Massenarbeitslosigkeit, Abwanderung nach Westdeutschland freie Reisemöglichkeiten
8	Globalisierte Generation		Bedrohungs- faktoren	Globalisierung aller Lebensbereiche, internationaler Terrorismus, globale Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise, wachsender Niedriglohnsektor, steigende soziale Ungleichheit, EU-Osterweiterung
	*1983 - 1999	1998-2014		Relative Ungleichheit: Osten wirtschaftlich schwächer
			Kontakt- möglichkeiten	vereinfachtes Reisen (Billigfluggesellschaften), vermehrte Auslandsaufenthalte (z.B. Schüleraustausche, Erasmus), Internet und soziale Medien eröffnen Kontakte zu anderen Kulturkreisen Anteil Personen mit Migrationshintergrund: 21% (2012)
				Anteil Personen mit Migrationshintergrund: 8% (2012)
9	Krisen- generation		Bedrohungs- faktoren	Globale Unsicherheiten: „Flüchtlingskrise“, „Klimakrise“, „Corona Krise“
	*2000 -	2015 -		gestiegene Kontaktmöglichkeiten zu Menschen aus anderen Sprach- und Kulturkreisen in allen Lebensbereichen
			Kontakt- möglichkeiten	Anteil Personen mit Migrationshintergrund: 28% (2018)
				Anteil Personen mit Migrationshintergrund: 12% (2018)

Anmerkung: Eigene Zusammenstellung.

Generation Jugend-von-Weimar, Kriegsgeneration und Nachkriegsgeneration

Die drei ältesten Generationen (Generation Jugend-von-Weimar, Kriegsgeneration und Nachkriegsgeneration) erlebten in ihren formativen Jugendjahren vielfach selbst oder in ihrem engen familiären Umfeld sowohl verschärften Wettbewerb um knappe Ressourcen, als auch existenzielle Unsicherheiten. Die Generation Jugend-von-Weimar wurde von Massenarbeitslosigkeit und Hyperinflation in Folge der Weltwirtschaftskrise geprägt (Spoerer & Streb, 2014). Die darauffolgende Kriegsgeneration erlebte in ihrer prägenden Jugendphase Krieg und Vertreibung. Und die jungen Erwachsenen der Nachkriegsgeneration wurden

Zeugen eines Systemumbruchs und der Unsicherheiten der Nachkriegszeit, die auch von starken Migrationsbewegungen bestimmt war (Oltmer, 2005).

Die Möglichkeiten für junge Erwachsene positive Kontakterfahrungen zu Menschen anderer Herkunft zu machen, waren äußerst gering. Die Generation Jugend-von-Weimar wuchs in einem nationalistischen und ausländerfeindlichen Klima auf (Oltmer, 2005), ein Umstand, der sich für die Kriegsgeneration durch die Ideologie der "Rassenüberlegenheit" der Nationalsozialisten nur noch verschärfte. Für die Nachkriegsgeneration boten zwar die Besatzungsmächte Möglichkeiten zu positiven Kontakterfahrungen, können aber weiterhin als eher gering bewertet werden (Pollock, 2014).

Aufgrund stark wirkender Bedrohungsfaktoren und geringer Möglichkeiten positiven Intergruppenkontakts kann angenommen werden, dass die Mitglieder der drei ältesten Generationen (Generation Jugend-von-Weimar, Kriegsgeneration und Nachkriegsgeneration) Zugewanderten gegenüber im Generationenvergleich eher negativ eingestellt sind.

68er Generation, Frühe- und Späte Babyboomer in der BRD

Trotz der Gefahr des Kalten Krieges waren existenzielle Unsicherheiten in der Bundesrepublik weitestgehend überwunden, der Wettbewerb um knappe Ressourcen war entschärft und es begann ein Aufschwung absoluter sozialer Mobilität. Obwohl die soziale Ungleichheit in der Gesellschaft bestehen blieb, wurde sie weniger wahrgenommen, da der "Fahrstuhleffekt" dafür sorgte, dass es den Menschen quer durch alle Schichten besserging als zuvor (Beck, 2016). Die Mitglieder der 68er Generation eint das Erlebnis des deutschen Wirtschaftswunders, das sich durch ein starkes Wirtschaftswachstum und eine große Nachfrage nach Arbeitskräften auszeichnete. Die zahlreichen Mitglieder der Frühen Babyboomer wurden als erste Generation in ihrer Jugendphase von der beginnenden Globalisierung geprägt. Die erste Ölkrise führte zu einem Anstieg der Arbeitslosenquote und bei 2,6 Millionen Gastarbeitern im Land zu einem Anwerbestopp (Heilemann, 2019). Die Generation der Späten Babyboomer wuchs unter

verschärften Bedrohungsfaktoren auf, als ihre beiden Vorgängergenerationen. Zwar wurde die Möglichkeit des sozialen Aufstiegs als zentrales Versprechen der BRD weiterhin größtenteils eingelöst, doch war die Arbeitslosigkeit relativ hoch (Heilemann, 2019; N. Legewie & Bohmann, 2018; Nachtwey, 2016).

Die Anwesenheit von Gastarbeitern aus Italien, Spanien, Griechenland, der Türkei, Marokko und Portugal wurde zwar teilweise als Bedrohung wahrgenommen, doch bot sie zusammen mit den neuen und viel genutzten Möglichkeiten des Fernreisens auch vermehrte Möglichkeiten für positive Kontakte zu Menschen anderer Nationalitäten und aus anderen Kulturkreisen (Gehring & Böltken, 1985; Oppermann, 1995).

Aufgrund verringerter Bedrohungsfaktoren und gestiegenen Möglichkeiten des positiven Intergruppenkontakts kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass die Mitglieder der 68er Generation, der Frühen und der Späten Babyboomer in der BRD Zugewanderten gegenüber weniger skeptisch eingestellt sind, als ihre Vorgängergenerationen.

68er Generation, Frühe- und Späte Babyboomer in der DDR

Während des Aufwachsens im real existierenden Sozialismus bestand abgesehen von der Bedrohung des Kalten Krieges zwar keine existenzielle Unsicherheit mehr, der Wettbewerb um Ressourcen war aber aufgrund von Mangelwirtschaft und akuter Versorgungsprobleme mit Konsumgütern in der DDR ausgeprägt. Staatliches Ziel war die Abschaffung von Ungleichheit und die Möglichkeit sozialer Mobilität. Während der Jugendphase der 68er Generation kam es tatsächlich „[...] zu einer Öffnung von Mobilitätskanälen, von der einfache ländliche und städtische Schichten profitierten, deren Kinder nun neue Möglichkeiten erhielten“ (Mau, 2019, p. 53). Diese Möglichkeiten sozialer Mobilität waren für die Frühen Babyboomer im Vergleich zu ihrer Vorgängergeneration jedoch wieder deutlich eingeschränkt, auch weil ab 1971 der Zugang zu höherer Bildung und Qualifikationen verknappt wurde (Mau, 2019; Mayer & Solga, 1994). Für die darauffolgende Generation der Späten Babyboomer sank die Anzahl der

Studienanfänger aufgrund von starker Verknappung und politischer Selektion weiter und die Chancen auf sozialen Aufstieg waren für Arbeiterkinder und Kinder von Akademikern gleichermaßen gering (Mau, 2019).

Kontakte zu Menschen aus anderen Ländern und Kulturen waren für die Generationen, die in der DDR aufwuchsen im Vergleich zu den Generationen in der BRD deutlich geringer und auf Personen aus sozialistischen Bruderstaaten beschränkt (Butterwegge, 2005). Die wenigen ausländischen Vertragsarbeiter (1969: ca. 14.000, 1978: ca. 20.000), hauptsächlich aus Vietnam, Mosambik, Kuba und Polen, lebten überwiegend abgetrennt von der Bevölkerung, da die Regierung darauf achtete, dass es zu keiner Durchmischung zwischen den Gruppen kam (Gruner-Domic, 1999; Poutrus, 2016; Rabenschlag, 2016). Die jeweiligen Jugendlichen wurden in einer ethnisch stark homogenen Gesellschaft geprägt, in der „Umgang mit Fremdheit und Differenz kaum eingeübt“ wurde (Mau, 2019, p. 98).

Aufgrund der bestehenden Bedrohungsmechanismen und den geringen Kontaktmöglichkeiten, kann angenommen werden, dass die Mitglieder der 68er Generation, sowie der Frühen und Späten Babyboomer in der DDR Zugewanderten gegenüber nicht weniger skeptisch eingestellt sind als ihre Vorgängergenerationen.

Wendegeneration, Globalisierte Generation und Krisengeneration

Die Auswirkungen der deutschen Wiedervereinigung und die fortschreitende Globalisierung aller Lebensbereiche definieren maßgeblich die Bedrohungsmechanismen für die drei jüngsten Generationen. Die Wendegeneration in Westdeutschland wurde in ihrer Jugendphase von einem schwankenden Arbeitsmarkt und steigender Einkommensungleichheit geprägt (Bartels, 2019; Heilemann, 2019). Aufgrund des Zusammenbruchs der Sowjetunion und des darauffolgenden „Jugoslawienkriegs“ erlebten sie außerdem erhöhte Zuwanderung durch Spätaussiedler sowie durch Fluchtbewegungen aus Ländern des ehemaligen Jugoslawiens. Zusammen verursachte dies eine verschärfte Wettbewerbssituation. Die Wendegeneration in

Ostdeutschland erlebte zusätzlich durch den Systemumbruch und Massenarbeitslosigkeit nicht nur verschärften Wettbewerb und ein starkes Ungleichheitsbewusstsein im Vergleich zu den westlichen Bundesländern, sondern hatte erneut mit existenzieller Unsicherheit zu kämpfen (Mau, 2019). Für die darauffolgende Globalisierte Generation verschärfte sich der wahrgenommene Wettbewerb um knappe Ressourcen zunächst weiter durch die Hartz-Reformen und anschließend aufgrund der Auswirkungen der globalen Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise 2008. Erhöhte Zuwanderung (auch durch die EU-Osterweiterung), der internationale Terrorismus (mit dem 11. September 2001 als zentralem Ereignis) und das entstehende Feindbild „Islam“ im „War on Terror“ verschärften außerdem den Wettbewerb um kulturelle Identitäten (Ferrín et al., 2020; Hellwig & Sinno, 2017; Huntington, 2015). Ein wachsender Niedriglohnsektor und steigende Einkommens- und Vermögensungleichheiten erhöhten Gefühle relativer Gruppendeprivation, vor allem in Ostdeutschland, wo die Wirtschaftskraft weiter geringer ausgeprägt war (Bartels, 2018, 2019; BMWi, 2020; Grabka, 2014; Grabka & Schröder, 2019; Mau, 2019). Mitglieder der Krisengeneration erfahren mit gleich drei globalen Krisen „Flüchtlingskrise“, „Klimakrise“ und „Corona Krise“ in ihren prägenden Jugendjahren eine unstete Umwelt, die die Bedrohungsmechanismen nicht entschärfen.

Mit den beiden Prozessen der deutschen Wiedervereinigung und der fortschreitenden Globalisierung aller Lebensbereiche, erhöhten sich für die Jugendlichen in Deutschland auch die Möglichkeiten mit Menschen anderer ethnischer Herkunft, Nationalität und Kultur in Kontakt zu treten. Den Mitgliedern der Wendegeneration war es in ihrer Jugendphase möglich frei zu reisen, ob privat oder im Rahmen internationaler Schüler- oder Studierendenaustausche wie Erasmus. Auch der Anteil an Personen mit Migrationshintergrund erhöhte sich stetig, wobei der Osten Deutschlands weiterhin weniger Migrant*innen anzog. Die Globalisierte Generation erlebte während ihrer formativen Jahre eine weitere Diversifizierung der Gesellschaft. Zudem waren Einblicke in bisher fremde Länder und Kulturkreise nun auch

online möglich und physisch war Europa und die Welt durch die Etablierung von Billigfluglinien nie verfügbarer. Doch auch nach der Wiedervereinigung unterschieden sich die Möglichkeiten in Ost- und Westdeutschland Kontakt mit Personen anderer Herkunft aufzubauen und interethnische Freundschaften einzugehen, da der Anteil der Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund in Westdeutschland 2014 mit etwa 22% fast dreimal so hoch lag wie im Osten (etwa 8%) (INKAR, 2020).

Durch die gestiegenen Bedrohungsmechanismen einerseits und die zunehmenden Möglichkeiten des Intergruppenkontakts andererseits kann angenommen werden, dass sich die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten der Wendegeneration, Globalisierten Generation und Krisengeneration in Westdeutschland verstärkt polarisieren, sich im Generationendurchschnitt allerdings nicht maßgeblich von ihren jeweiligen Vorgängergenerationen unterscheiden. Für Ostdeutschland ist anzunehmen, dass die beiden jüngsten Generationen (Globalisierte Generation und Krisengeneration) aufgrund gesteigerter Kontaktmöglichkeiten mit fremden Kulturen insgesamt etwas positiver zu Zugewanderten eingestellt sind als ihre Vorgängergenerationen.

2.3. Hypothesen

Inwiefern also führt der Generationenaustausch in Ost- und Westdeutschland zu einem langfristigen Einstellungswandel zu Zugewanderten? Aufgrund der genannten Veränderungen, die zu jeweils unterschiedlichen Prägungen der Jugend führten, kann im Generationenverlauf von folgenden Entwicklungen der Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten ausgegangen werden: In Westdeutschland sind die Mitglieder der drei ältesten Generationen Generation Jugend-von-Weimar, Kriegsgeneration und Nachkriegsgeneration Zugewanderten gegenüber negativer eingestellt als die Mitglieder der darauffolgenden Generationen (Hypothese 1). In Ostdeutschland sind die beiden jüngsten Generationen Globalisierte Generation und

Krisengeneration Zugewanderten gegenüber positiver eingestellt als ihre Vorgängergenerationen (Hypothese 2).

3. Stabilität der Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen bei sich verändernden Bedrohungsmechanismen

Die Bearbeitung der zweiten Fragestellung dieser Untersuchung soll klären, wie stabil die in der Jugend geprägten Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten, bei sich verändernden Bedrohungssituationen auf der Kontextebene sind. Mannheim (1928) hebt zwar die Jugendphase als besonders prägend für die Einstellungsformation hervor, schließt aber die Möglichkeit eines Einstellungswandels im weiteren Lebensverlauf damit nicht aus. Empirische Überprüfungen zeigen, dass Einstellungen nach der prägenden Jugendphase zwar relativ persistent bleiben, es im späteren Lebensverlauf aufgrund von Periodeneffekten jedoch durchaus noch zu feststellbaren, oft kurzfristigen Einstellungsänderungen kommen kann (intra-Generationalen Effekt). Dabei ist weniger das Life-Cycle Argument ausschlaggebend, das für bestimmte Phasen im Lebenszyklus bestimmte Tendenzen von Einstellungen prognostiziert (Klein, 2016; Sears, 1981). Vielmehr können aktuelle wahrgenommene Bedrohungen, wie die Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise, die Sorgen vor internationalem Terrorismus oder die sogenannte Geflüchtetenkrise Anlass dazu geben, dass sich die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten in der Gesamtgesellschaft verändern (Kiley & Vaisey, 2020; Klein, 2016, p. 256; Yang, 2008, p. 205). Die empirische Literatur hat bereits festgestellt: Verschlechtern sich ökonomische Bedingungen oder erhöht sich die Größe der Zuwanderergruppe abrupt, kommt es zu vermehrt negativen Haltungen gegenüber Zugewanderten (Coenders & Scheepers, 2004, 2008; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018; Hopkins, 2010; Bart Meuleman et al., 2009; Olzak, 1992). Veränderte Bedrohungsmechanismen auf der Makro-Ebene können demnach auch bei Generationen, die bereits ihre prägende Jugendphase abgeschlossen haben, zu (kurzfristigen) intra-generationalen Einstellungsänderungen führen und damit das allgemeine Meinungsklima

beeinflussen. Speziell kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass Verschärfungen der Wirtschaftslage und ein abrupter Anstieg im Anteil der Zuwanderer im Zeitverlauf zu negativeren Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen führen (Hypothese 3).

Darüber hinaus sind Schutzsuchende - besonders seit der sogenannten Geflüchtetenkrise 2015 - in europäischen Gesellschaften besonderer Stigmatisierung ausgeliefert. So werden sie nicht nur häufiger als illegal, arm und kriminell betrachtet (Esses et al., 2017; Holmes & Castañeda, 2016), sondern auch als besonders bedrohlich für die vermeintliche kulturelle Homogenität (Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Lengfeld & Dilger, 2018). Stigmatisierung kann mit erhöhten Bedrohungswahrnehmungen bezüglich Kultur, Wirtschaft und Sicherheit im Land einhergehen. Entsprechend kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass ein bemerkenswerter Anstieg des Anteils der Zuwanderergruppe der Schutzsuchenden im Zeitverlauf zu verstärkter Ablehnung von Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen führt (Hypothese 4).

4. Datenbasis und Operationalisierung

Für die vorliegende Analyse werden sämtliche derzeit verfügbaren neun Wellen (2002 - 2018) des ESS für Deutschland herangezogen. Die sozialwissenschaftliche Studie erhebt seit 2002 im Zweijahrestakt in Face-to-Face Interviews Einstellungen, Meinungen und Verhalten von Bürgerinnen und Bürgern aus europäischen Ländern. Mit den repräsentativen Querschnittsdaten können Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten sowie weitere soziodemografische Merkmale beschrieben werden. Pro Welle liegt für Deutschland ein Datensatz zwischen 2,358 und 3,045 Befragten vor, sodass über neun Wellen die Angaben von 25,700 Befragten analysiert werden können. Es finden ausschließlich in Deutschland geborene, deutsche Staatsbürger, die mindestens 18 Jahre alt sind, Eingang in die Untersuchung, um zu gewährleisten, dass die Befragten die formative Jugendphase in Deutschland erlebten. Außerdem werden die Befragten, die im Jahr 2000 oder später geboren sind, ausgeschlossen,

da sie mit nur 32 Befragten als Untersuchungseinheit zu klein sind, um für die jüngste Generation (Krisengeneration) aussagefähig zu sein. Nach listenweisem Fallausschluss enthält der Datensatz insgesamt 21,800 gültige Fälle (für Ausschlusskriterien und Stichprobenumfang, siehe Tabelle A.1 im Anhang). Diese Fallzahl bietet eine solide Datenbasis und ermöglicht zum einen Untersuchungen auf aggregierter Ebene und zum anderen einen Beobachtungszeitraum von 16 Jahren, anhand dessen Langzeitmessungen möglich sind. Außerdem umfasst die Zeitspanne sowohl Jahre wirtschaftlicher Unsicherheiten als auch wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs, sowie unterschiedliche Zuwanderungsraten nach Deutschland, einschließlich des sogenannten Sommers der Zuwanderung 2015 und bietet damit deutliche Variation. Die Daten für die Variablen auf der Kontextebene stammen vom Statistischen Bundesamt und von INKAR (Indikatoren und Karten für Raum- und Stadtentwicklung), die jeweils spezifische Informationen für Ost- und Westdeutschland bereitstellen. Dies ermöglicht eine differenzierte Analyse der beiden Regionen. Tabelle A.2 im Anhang bietet eine Übersicht zu Fragestellungen und Codierung der verwendeten Variablen. Tabelle A.3 im Anhang zeigt deskriptive Statistiken der Stichprobe.

Die Nutzung des ESS als Datenbasis birgt jedoch einen Nachteil. Die Einteilung der Befragten in Ost- und Westdeutsche erfolgt anhand des aktuellen Befragungsortes und nicht abhängig davon, wo die Befragten ihre formative Jugendphase erlebten. Dies lässt den Umstand der zeitweilig starken Abwanderung von Ost- nach Westdeutschland unberücksichtigt, sodass es vorkommen kann, dass Befragte als Westdeutsche definiert werden, obwohl sie ihre formative Jugendphase in Ostdeutschland (und umgekehrt) durchlebten. Diesem Problem könnte mit den Datensätzen der Sozio-oekonomischen Panelstudie (SOEP) oder dem ALLBUS begegnet werden, die die Mobilität beziehungsweise den Geburtsort der Befragten erfassen. Diese Datensätze bergen für die vorliegende Studie jedoch ebenfalls Einschränkungen, da sie langfristig jeweils keine so konsistente wie umfassende Messung von Einstellungen zu

Zugewanderten bieten wie der ESS¹⁰, sodass der ESS für die vorliegende Untersuchung die überlegene Datenbasis darstellt.

Die abhängige Variable Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten misst die Einschätzung der Befragten bezüglich des Einflusses von Zugewanderten auf das Leben in Deutschland anhand eines Summenindex aus den folgenden drei Items: 1) „Ist es im Allgemeinen gut oder schlecht für die deutsche Wirtschaft, dass Zuwanderer hierher kommen?“; 2) „Würden Sie sagen, dass das kulturelle Leben in Deutschland im Allgemeinen durch Zuwanderer untergraben oder bereichert wird?“; 3) „Wird Deutschland durch Zuwanderer zu einem schlechteren oder besseren Ort zum Leben?“. Die Antwortkategorien sind auf einer 11-Punkte-Skala von null (positive Einstellungen) bis zehn (negative Einstellungen) codiert. Cronbachs Alpha aus den drei Items ergibt eine hohe Skalenreliabilität von 0,84 und die Hauptkomponentenanalyse lädt auf einem einzelnen Faktor, sodass davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass die drei Items dasselbe latente Konstrukt messen. Zudem erwies sich dieser Index auch in früheren Studien als reliables Maß, um die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten zu erfassen (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018; McLaren & Paterson, 2019; Sides & Citrin, 2007).

Um den Generationeneffekten nachzugehen, werden die Befragten in der Untersuchung mit Blick auf ihre Sozialisationserfahrungen in ihren formativen Jugendjahren unterschieden und entsprechend Tabelle 1 im Theorieteil, in sieben Generationen eingeteilt. Die *Generation Jugend-von-Weimar* und die *Kriegsgeneration* werden aufgrund der geringen Fallzahlen zu einer Generation (*Kriegsgeneration*) zusammengefasst. Mitglieder der *Krisengeneration*

¹⁰ Im SOEP wird lediglich das Ausmaß der Sorgen der Befragten um Zuwanderung erfasst, was eine deutlich weniger gute Messung für Einstellungen zu Zuwanderern darstellt. Der ALLBUS bietet zwar umfassendere Einstellungsskizzen, diese werden jedoch selten erhoben. Die für diese Studie interessanten Migrationsitems werden nur 1996, 2006 und 2016 abgefragt. Informationen darüber, wo die Befragten ihre Jugendphase erlebten, werden erst ab 2006 erhoben. Die vorliegende Studie ist jedoch auch am Wandel der Einstellungen interessiert. Für die längsschnittliche Auswertung der Daten (Pseudo-Panel Analyse; siehe Analyse) bedarf es eines möglichst langen Beobachtungszeitraums und vor allem einer ausreichenden Anzahl an Messzeitpunkten. Der ESS bietet diesen Vorteil, da die Migrationsitems von 2002 bis 2018 regelmäßig alle zwei Jahre zur Verfügung stehen und somit anstatt zwei bzw. drei Messzeitpunkten (ALLBUS), neun Messzeitpunkte enthält. Außerdem wird der Aktualität der Studie Rechnung getragen, indem die Jahre nach der sogenannten Geflüchtetenkrise 2016 sowie 2018 analysiert werden können.


können nicht berücksichtigt werden, da sie zu jung sind, um an den Befragungen teilzunehmen. Daraus ergibt sich folgende Generationeneinteilung: 1) Kriegsgeneration (*1908-1930), 2) Nachkriegsgeneration (*1931-1940), 3) 68er Generation (*1941-1954), 4) Frühe Babyboomer (*1955-1962), 5) Späte Babyboomer (*1963-1969), 6) Wendegeneration (*1970-1982), 7) Globalisierte Generation (*1983-1999).

Die erklärenden Kontextvariablen beziehen sich spezifisch auf Ost- (inkl. Berlin) bzw. Westdeutschland und fungieren als periodische Maßzahlen zur Bewertung der Wirtschaftskraft und der Zuwanderung. Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung wird anhand der Arbeitslosenquote (in %) operationalisiert (INKAR 2020; Anteil der Arbeitslosen an den zivilen Erwerbspersonen); Zuwanderung nach Ost- bzw. Westdeutschland wird durch die Variablen Anteil der Personen mit Migrationshintergrund (in %) und Anteil der Schutzsuchenden an der Bevölkerung (in %) abgebildet. Per Definition hat eine Person einen Migrationshintergrund, wenn sie selbst oder mindestens ein Elternteil die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit nicht durch Geburt besitzt (Destatis, 2020b). Aufgrund des Zensus 2011 haben sich die Maßzahlen für den Anteil der Personen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland verändert, sodass die Zahlen für die Jahre vor und nach 2011 nicht vergleichbar sind. Es zeigt sich jedoch, dass sich der Anteil im Untersuchungszeitraum vor 2011 nicht maßgeblich verändert hat (Destatis, 2019), sodass die Werte von 2011 für die Jahre zuvor fortgeschrieben werden und damit eine valide Vergleichbarkeit ermöglicht wird. Der Anteil der Schutzsuchenden an der Bevölkerung wird erst seit 2007 erfasst. Die fehlenden Werte für die Jahre zuvor werden mit den Werten von 2007 fortgeschrieben. Die Fluchtzuwanderung nach Deutschland aufgrund des Kosovo-Kriegs fand überwiegend im Jahr 1999 statt und hielt bis 2004 an, sodass sie den vorliegenden Untersuchungszeitraum nicht maßgeblich beeinflusst (BAMF, 2020). Da es sich beim ESS um eine Erhebung im Zweijahrestakt handelt, werden die Kontextvariablen entsprechend angepasst: So wird jeweils der Durchschnitt aus der Maßzahl des Erhebungsjahres und dessen

Vorjahres berechnet. Abbildung 1 zeigt die Entwicklung der Variablen für Ost- und Westdeutschland zwischen 2002 und 2018.

Auf individueller Ebene wird kontrolliert für Geschlecht, Alter (in Jahren), Alter quadriert, höchster Bildungsabschluss, kategorisiert in 1) *niedriges Bildungsniveau* (kein Abschluss, Volks- oder Hauptschulabschluss), 2) *mittleres Bildungsniveau* (Mittlere Reife/Realschule, abgeschlossene Lehre), 3) *höheres Bildungsniveau* (Fachabitur/-hochschulreife, Abitur/Hochschulreife, Fach-/Hochschule, Promotion), Zufriedenheit mit dem Haushaltseinkommen, kategorisiert in 1) *sehr schweres Zurechtkommen* bis 4) *bequemes Leben*.¹¹

Abbildung 1: Verlauf der Kontextvariablen für Ost- und Westdeutschland (in %).



Anmerkung: Berlin zählt zu Ostdeutschland. Aufgrund fehlender Werte werden für die Variable „Migrationshintergrund“ die Werte für 2002 bis 2010 mit den Werten von 2011 fortgeschrieben und für die Variable „Schutzsuchende“ werden die Werte für 2002 bis 2006 mit den Werten von 2007 fortgeschrieben.

Quellen: INKAR; Statistisches Bundesamt.

¹¹ Im Verlauf der ESS-Befragungen verändert sich die Variable zur objektiven Messung des Haushaltseinkommens und ist damit für den vorliegenden Untersuchungszeitraum nicht vergleichbar. Daher wird hier auf die subjektive Zufriedenheit mit dem Haushaltseinkommen zurückgegriffen.

5. Methodisches Vorgehen

5.1. Multiple lineare Regressionsanalysen (Kohorteneffekte)

In einem ersten Schritt werden die Kohorteneffekte untersucht und somit systematische Unterschiede in den Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten zwischen den Generationen jeweils für Ost- und Westdeutschland. Dazu werden auf Grundlage der gepoolten ESS Daten von 2002 bis 2018 multiple lineare Regressionsanalysen durchgeführt. Analog zu Schröders (2018) Vorgehen werden die Einstellungen der Generationen unter Kontrolle der Variablen Alter, Alter quadriert und Erhebungsjahr statistisch geprüft. Nur unter Kontrolle vom Lebensalter und periodischen Trends, die ebenfalls die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten beeinflussen, kann letztlich der Einfluss der Generationenzugehörigkeit erfasst werden. Die Analyse von Alters-, Kohorten- und Periodeneffekten ist in der Forschungsliteratur viel diskutiert und als APK-Identifikationsproblem (Alter-Periode-Kohorten) bekannt (Glenn, 1976; Luo, 2013; Mason et al., 1973; Ryder, 1965). Die jeweiligen Effekte von Alter, Kohorte und Periode sind aufgrund von perfekter Kollinearität rein statistisch nur schwer zu trennen, da sich die Variablen gegenseitig erklären: die Kohortenzugehörigkeit ergibt sich aus dem Befragungsjahr abzüglich des Lebensalters (Brüderl, 2010, p. 982). Das APK-Identifikationsproblem ist jedoch nur dann problematisch, wenn die Variablen Geburtsjahr, Lebensjahr und Kalenderjahr gleichzeitig als Dummy-Variablen in ein Modell aufgenommen werden, oder wenn für jede Kohorte spezifische Alters- oder Periodeneffekte inkludiert werden (Schröder, 2018, p. 477 f.). Ist man ausschließlich daran interessiert, ob eine Geburtskohorte sich unter Kontrolle von Lebensalter und Messzeitpunkt in ihren Einstellungen von einer anderen Geburtskohorte unterscheidet, ist eine solche Messung jedoch durchaus möglich. Bei diesem Vorgehen wird den Variablen Lebensalter, Lebensalter quadriert und Messzeitpunkt derselbe lineare Effekt auf die Einstellungen aller Kohorten unterstellt (Glenn, 1976; Holford, 1985; Schröder, 2018, p. 477 f.). Um diese Annahme zu prüfen, weist Schröder (2018, p. 477 f.) darauf hin, dass die deskriptiven Ergebnisse mit den Regressionsergebnissen abzugleichen sind. Durch

schrittweises Inkludieren weiterer Kontrollvariablen, lassen sich anhand dieses Verfahrens schließlich die isolierten Unterschiede in den Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten zwischen den Generationen aufzeigen.

5.2. Panelanalyse auf Kohortenebene (intra-Kohorten Effekt)

In einem zweiten Analyseschritt wird untersucht, inwiefern sich periodische Veränderungen im Zeitverlauf auf die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen auswirken. Um diesen Wandel zu identifizieren, wird eine Panelanalyse mit fixen Effekten auf Kohortenbasis angewandt.¹² Dieses Verfahren ermöglicht es, Veränderungen innerhalb der Kohorten zu determinieren. Ein entscheidender Vorteil in der Anwendung eines Panelverfahrens mit fixen Effekten liegt darin, die Gefahr einer Verzerrung der Ergebnisse aufgrund von unbeobachteten zeitkonstanten Unterschieden zu minimieren. Damit wird nicht nur für beobachtbare, sondern auch für unbeobachtbare Heterogenität kontrolliert, was zu präziseren Ergebnissen führt (Brüderl, 2010, p. 967).

In der vorliegenden Panelanalyse bilden die Generationen die zu untersuchenden Einheiten. Somit wird im Gegensatz zur oben beschriebenen linearen Regressionsanalyse, nicht auf individueller, sondern auf aggregierter Ebene gerechnet. Eine solche Kohortenanalyse wird in der Forschungsliteratur häufig als Quasi- oder Pseudo-Panelverfahren definiert. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird hierzu auf den Begriff des Pseudo-Panelverfahrens zurückgegriffen, ein Verfahren das auf Deaton (1985) zurückzuführen ist. Auf Basis aggregierter Kohorten werden anhand der wiederholten Querschnittsdaten des ESS die Vorteile eines Panelverfahrens mit fixen Effekten genutzt und die Veränderung der Einstellungsmuster innerhalb der Generationen über einen Zeitraum von 16 Jahren identifiziert. Das Vorgehen in dieser Untersuchung erfolgt in Anlehnung an Olivera (2015), der ein Pseudo-Panelverfahren

¹² Das Ergebnis des Hausman Tests bietet empirische Unterstützung für die Anwendung eines *Fixed Effects* anstelle eines *Random Effects* Verfahrens, indem die Null-Hypothese signifikant abgelehnt wird.

anwendet, um Einstellungen zu Umverteilung in Europa zu untersuchen. Weitere Beispiele für die Anwendung des Verfahrens liefern Antman und McKenzie (2007), Bourguignon et al. (2004), Jæger (2013), Russell und Fraas (2005). Es wird berichtet, dass die Ergebnisse robust sind auch im Vergleich zu Paneldaten auf der individuellen Ebene (Bourguignon et al., 2004). Vorteilhaft ist außerdem, dass es bei der wiederholten Kohortenanalyse weder durch Panel-Conditioning, noch durch Panel-Attrition zu verzerrten Effekten kommt – Probleme, die bei Wiederholungsbefragungen auf Personenebene auftreten. Es besteht jedoch die Gefahr eines ökologischen Fehlschlusses – entsprechend sind die Ergebnisse strikt auf aggregierter Ebene zu interpretieren. Insgesamt bietet das Pseudo-Panelverfahren einen substantiellen Mehrwert für die bisherige Forschung, die sich entweder auf Querschnittsdaten beschränkt, ohne dabei die Dynamik der Veränderungen ausreichend zu berücksichtigen, oder auf Längsschnittdaten, die in ihrem Angebot an erklärenden oder zu erklärenden Variablen weniger ergiebig sind.¹³

Ein Pseudo-Panel Datensatz wird aus Querschnittszeitreihen erstellt, wobei die Befragten nach identischen, zeitkonstanten Merkmalen in Kohorten eingeteilt werden (Deaton, 1985). Im vorliegenden Fall bieten sich dazu Geburtskohorte (sieben Generationen) und Region (Ost- und Westdeutschland) an. Um die Anzahl der aggregierten Untersuchungseinheiten zu erhöhen und somit für mehr Reliabilität der Ergebnisse zu sorgen, wird außerdem Geschlecht (männlich/weiblich) als zeitkonstante Kategorie hinzugefügt. Insgesamt werden auf diese Weise 28 aggregierte Untersuchungseinheiten gebildet (7 Generationen x 2 Regionen x 2 Geschlecht), die in neun ESS Wellen theoretisch zu 252 synthetischen Beobachtungen führen, die wiederum auf 21,800 individuellen Beobachtungen basieren. Die Einteilung der Individuen in Kohorten soll das Kriterium erfüllen, dass jede Kohorte eine Anzahl an Individuen vertritt, die einen ausreichend validen Durchschnittswert ermöglicht (Verbeek, 2008). Um dies zu

¹³ In der deutschen Panelstudie Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) ist die Variable *Sorgen vor Zuwanderung*, die hier als abhängige Variable fungieren könnte, weniger differenziert und aussagekräftig als im ESS. ESS sowie ALLBUS stellen ausschließlich Querschnittsdaten zur Verfügung.

gewährleisten, werden nur die Kohorten in der Analyse berücksichtigt, die auf einer Mindestgröße von 30 Befragten basieren. Aufgrund von zu kleinen Gruppengrößen bei der jüngsten Generation (zu jung für Befragung) zu Beginn und der ältesten Generation (verstorben) am Ende des Befragungszeitraums, kommt es zu Ausfällen, sodass anstatt der theoretischen 252, nur 225 Beobachtungen vorliegen. Diesen 225 Gruppenwerten liegen jeweils zwischen 30 und 198 individuelle Beobachtungen zugrunde. Die durchschnittlichen Kohortenangaben werden als aggregierte Untersuchungseinheiten behandelt, die über die Zeit beobachtet werden können. Somit wird beispielsweise der Durchschnittswert der Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten aller ostdeutscher Frauen aus der *Globalisierten Generation* im Zeitverlauf analysiert. In Robustness-checks werden die Mindest-Gruppengrößen der aggregierten Untersuchungseinheiten zwischen $n \geq 50$ und $n > 0$ variiert, um die Reliabilität der Ergebnisse zu untersuchen.

Auf Kohortenebene werden dem Modell die Kontrollvariablen hinzugefügt, die auch im ersten Untersuchungsschritt in der linearen Regressionsanalyse Anwendung finden. Zusätzlich werden zur Überprüfung der gruppenkonflikttheoretischen Annahmen weitere Variablen auf der Kontextebene inkludiert. Diese weisen im Modell bei gleichzeitiger Hinzugabe der Erhebungsjahre hohe *variance inflation* Faktoren (*vif*) auf. Um dem Problem von Multikollinearität zu begegnen und einer Verzerrung der Ergebnisse entgegenzuwirken, wird hier der Proxy-Variablen-Ansatz angewandt. Dieser basiert darauf, den Einfluss von Zeitdimensionen durch eine diese Dimension möglichst genau abbildende Variable zu ersetzen (Rodgers, 1982; Winship & Harding, 2008). Im vorliegenden Fall werden anstelle von Perioden-Dummies der Erhebungsjahre, periodische Maßzahlen tatsächlicher sozialer Gegebenheiten auf der Kontextebene eingeführt (jeweils getrennt für Ost- und Westdeutschland), die durch die Gruppenkonflikttheorie begründet die abhängige Variable beeinflussen. Diese vermögen präzise das zu identifizieren, was durch die Perioden-Dummies gemessen werden soll. Analog zu vorherigen Studien (Coenders & Scheepers, 2004, 2008;


Pavalko et al., 2007) werden hierzu die Arbeitslosenquote und der Anteil der Personen mit Migrationshintergrund bzw. der Anteil der Schutzsuchenden an der Bevölkerung herangezogen, um einerseits den Periodeneffekt zu substituieren und andererseits die Wirkkräfte dieser Variablen auf die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen zu messen.

6. Ergebnisse

6.1. Deskriptive Ergebnisse

Abbildung 2 veranschaulicht den Prozess der Generationenablösung in einer Gesellschaft über die Zeit. Während sich der Anteil der Mitglieder der jüngsten *Globalisierten Generation* von 5% in 2002 auf 23% in 2018 fast verfünffacht, verringert sich der Anteil der ältesten Mitglieder der *Kriegsgeneration* an der Stichprobe von 12% auf unter 1%. Insgesamt ist in der vorliegenden Stichprobe zu beobachten, dass sich der Anteil der *Globalisierten Generation*, der *Wendegeneration*, der *Späten Babyboomern* und der *Frühen Babyboomern* vergrößert, während der Anteil der *68er*, der *Nachkriegsgeneration* und der *Kriegsgeneration* schwindet.

Abbildung 2: Verlauf des Anteils der Generationen in der Stichprobe von 2002 bis 2018.




Anmerkung: Deutsches Sample; N=21.800; eigene Berechnungen; gewichtet.

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.

Abbildung 3 verdeutlicht die Differenzen in den Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten zwischen den Generationen in Ost- und Westdeutschland im jeweiligen gepoolten Durchschnitt der Jahre 2002 bis 2018. Grundsätzlich nehmen die negativen Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten über die Generationen ab. Für Westdeutschland ist zu beobachten, dass die Mitglieder der ältesten Generationen (*Kriegsgeneration* und *Nachkriegsgeneration*) Zugewanderten gegenüber signifikant negativer eingestellt sind als die Mitglieder der darauffolgenden Generationen. In Ostdeutschland zeigen sich im Generationenverlauf ebenfalls signifikante Unterschiede in den Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten. Dieser Unterschied tritt jedoch vergleichsweise spät ein: Erst ab den *Späten Babyboomern* weisen die jüngeren Generationen in Ostdeutschland signifikant positivere Haltungen zu Zugewanderten auf als noch die *Kriegs-* oder *Nachkriegsgeneration*. Im Ost- West Vergleich weisen alle Mitglieder der ostdeutschen Generationen, die nach der *Kriegs-* und *Nachkriegsgeneration* geboren sind, jeweils signifikant negativere Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten auf, als die westdeutschen Generationen derselben Geburtskohorten.

Abbildung 3: Inter-Kohorten Differenz in Ost- und Westdeutschland.




Anmerkung: N=21.800; ost- und westdeutsches Sample; eigene Berechnungen; gewichtet; 95%-Konfidenzintervalle.

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.


Betrachtet man alle Generationen im Vergleich, zeigen im westdeutschen Sample (Abb. 4.2) die jüngeren Generationen im Vergleich zu den beiden ältesten Generationen ein überwiegend positiveres Meinungsklima zu Zugewanderten. Im Ostsampl (Abb. 4.1) ist dieser Generationenunterschied weniger deutlich, wobei die Einstellungen insgesamt etwas negativer sind als in Westdeutschland. Sowohl in Ost- als auch in Westdeutschland zeigen die Generationen ähnliche periodische Veränderungen im Meinungsklima zu Zugewanderten. Beispielsweise ist innerhalb fast aller Generationen eine konsequente Abnahme negativer Einstellungen zwischen 2006 und 2008 und eine darauffolgende Zunahme zwischen 2008 und 2010 zu beobachten. Diese Analogien in den Einstellungsverläufen weist auf die Existenz von Periodeneffekten hin.

Abbildung 4: Einstellungsverlauf zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen in Ost- und Westdeutschland zwischen 2002 und 2018.

4.1: Einstellungsverlauf zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generation im ostdeutschen Sample.



4.2: Einstellungsverlauf zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generation im westdeutschen Sample.



Anmerkung: Ost- und westdeutsches Sample; eigene Berechnungen; gewichtet; 95%-Konfidenzintervalle. Die fehlenden Werte bei der Kriegsgeneration sind damit zu erklären, dass hier die Zahl der Befragten unter 30 liegt und somit keinen validen Durchschnittswert ermöglicht.

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.

6.2. Ergebnisse der multivariaten Regressionsanalysen

Tabelle 2 zeigt die Ergebnisse der multivariaten linearen Regressionsanalysen, die die Effekte der Generationenzugehörigkeit unabhängig von Alter und Messzeitpunkt spezifizieren. M1 und M3 zeigen die Ergebnisse des ostdeutschen und M2 und M4 zeigen die Ergebnisse des westdeutschen Samples. Während in den ersten beiden Modellen (M1 und M2), ausschließlich für Alters- und Periodeneffekte kontrolliert wird, sind in den Modellen M3 und M4 weitere Kontrollvariablen enthalten. Die Generation der *Frühen Babyboomer* fungiert jeweils als Referenzkategorie, da sie mittig liegt und eine plausible Vergleichbarkeit mit den ältesten und jüngsten Generationen ermöglicht.¹⁴

Sowohl M1 als auch M3 zeigen, dass sich die *Frühen Babyboomer* in Ostdeutschland in ihren Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten weder zu ihren Vorgänger- noch zu ihren Nachfolge-Generationen unterscheiden. Fungiert die jüngste Generation als Referenz (siehe Tab. A.7) wird jedoch deutlich, dass diese im Vergleich zu ihren direkten Vorgängergenerationen Zuwanderer signifikant stärker ablehnt. Ein anderes Bild zeigt der Generationenvergleich für die BRD. Die beiden ältesten Generationen (*Kriegs-* und *Nachkriegsgeneration*) sind Zugewanderten gegenüber in beiden Modellen (M2 und M4, Tab. 2) höchst signifikant negativer eingestellt als die *Frühen Babyboomer*. Außerdem zeigen auch die beiden jüngsten Generationen (*Wende-* und *Globalisierte Generation*) signifikant negativere Einstellungen als die Referenzgeneration der *Frühen Babyboomer*.

Berlin kann mit den ESS Daten nicht in Ost- und Westdeutschland unterteilt werden. Damit kann der historische Umstand, dass die Stadt jahrzehntlang in DDR und BRD unterteilt war, nicht berücksichtigt werden. Auch aktuell nimmt Berlin eine besondere Rolle ein, da die Stadt einen großen Anteil an Zugezogenen verzeichnet. Somit besteht eine erhöhte Chance, dass viele Berliner Befragte nicht in Ostdeutschland sozialisiert wurden, in der Stichprobe aber zu

¹⁴ Im Appendix sind die Ergebnisse auch jeweils in Referenz zur ältesten (Tabelle A.6) und jüngsten Generation (Tabelle A.7) einsehbar.

Ostdeutschland zählen. Es soll daher getestet werden, ob die Befunde auch unter Ausschluss Berlins robust sind. Tabelle A.4 im Appendix zeigt die entsprechenden Ergebnisse: Ausschließlich unter Kontrolle von Alters- und Periodeneffekten weist die Generation der *Späten Babyboomer* im Vergleich zu ihrer Nachfolgeneration (*Frühe Babyboomer*) leicht signifikant positivere Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten auf (M1). Dieser Effekt verschwindet allerdings unter Hinzunahme der weiteren Kontrollvariablen (M3). Interessanterweise zeigt sich in M3, dass die jüngste Generation (*Globalisierte Generation*) im Vergleich zu den *Frühen Babyboomern* signifikant negativere Einstellungen aufweist, wenn Berliner Befragte nicht berücksichtigt werden.

Insgesamt kann für Westdeutschland ein U-förmiger Trend der Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten in der Generationenabfolge beobachtet werden. So waren, wie in Hypothese 1 angenommen, die *Kriegs-* und *Nachkriegsgenerationen* Zugewanderten gegenüber negativer eingestellt als die in den 1970er Jahren sozialisierten *Frühen Babyboomer*. Von der Hypothese abweichend zeigt sich jedoch auch, dass ablehnende Haltungen gegenüber Zugewanderten im Generationenverlauf mit der *Wende-* und der *Globalisierten Generation* wieder signifikant zunehmen. In Ostdeutschland hingegen zeigt sich, anders als in Hypothese 2 vermutet, für die jüngste im Sample vertretene Generation (*Globalisierte Generation*) keine signifikante Veränderung der Einstellungen im Vergleich zur ältesten *Kriegsgeneration*.

Tabelle 2: Kohorteneffekte in den Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten in Ost- und Westdeutschland.

Referenz: Frühe Babyboomer (*1955-1962).

Ablehnung von Zugewanderten	M1	M2	M3	M4
	Ost	West	Ost	West
Generationen				
Kriegsgeneration (*1919-1930)	0.186 (0.275)	0.685*** (0.201)	0.311 (0.256)	0.843*** (0.190)
Nachkriegsgeneration (*1931-1940)	-0.001 (0.183)	0.441*** (0.132)	0.205 (0.171)	0.474*** (0.125)
68er Generation (*1941-1954)	-0.128 (0.108)	0.053 (0.078)	0.004 (0.101)	0.105 (0.074)
<i>(Ref. Frühe Babyboomer *1955-1962)</i>				
Späte Babyboomer (*1963-1969)	-0.171 (0.102)	0.004 (0.070)	-0.171 (0.095)	0.002 (0.066)
Wendegeneration (*1970-1982)	-0.140 (0.153)	0.252* (0.104)	-0.040 (0.143)	0.271** (0.099)
Globalisierte Generation (*1983-1999)	0.181 (0.245)	0.420* (0.174)	0.291 (0.229)	0.380* (0.164)
Alter	0.037* (0.015)	0.031** (0.011)	0.041** (0.014)	0.045*** (0.010)
Alter ²	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Erhebungsjahr	-0.072*** (0.016)	-0.118*** (0.011)	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.081*** (0.010)
Beobachtungen	8,216	13,584	8,216	13,584
R ²	0.014	0.039	0.144	0.150

Anmerkung: Standardfehler in Klammern, *** p<0,001 ** p<0,01 * p<0,05; ost- und westdeutsches Sample; eigene Berechnungen; gewichtet. In M3 und M4 wird zusätzlich kontrolliert für: Geschlecht, Bildung, Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen.

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.

Tabelle 3 zeigt die Ergebnisse der Pseudo-Panel Analyse mit fixen Effekten auf Kohortenebene. Diese Befunde ermöglichen Aussagen bezüglich der Faktoren, die zwischen 2002 und 2018 zu einem Einstellungswandel zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen führten. M1 und M2 (sowie M3 und M4; M5 und M6) unterscheiden sich jeweils ausschließlich in ihren Variablen auf der Kontextebene. Es wurden jeweils zwei getrennte Modelle gerechnet, da eine Veränderung im Anteil der Schutzsuchenden unwillkürlich mit einer Veränderung im Anteil der Personen mit Migrationshintergrund einhergeht. So schließen M1, M3 und M5 jeweils den Anteil der Personen mit Migrationshintergrund mit ein, während M2, M4 und M6 stattdessen den Anteil der Schutzsuchenden an der Bevölkerung inkludieren. Weiterhin zeigen M1 und M2 die Analyseergebnisse bei einer Mindestgröße von 30 Befragten pro synthetische Beobachtung. Die restlichen Modelle dienen als Robustness Tests, wobei die Mindestgröße der Gruppen variiert (M3 und M4 $n \geq 50$; M5 und M6 $n > 0$). Insgesamt erweisen sich die Modelle hinsichtlich Richtung, Signifikanzniveau und Größe der Koeffizienten als relativ robust. Auf Kontextebene variiert teilweise das Signifikanzniveau.

Tabelle 3: Ergebnisse der Pseudo Panelanalyse mit fixen Effekten: Intra-Kohorten Veränderungen in Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten von 2002 bis 2018.

Ablehnung von Zugewanderten	M1 n \geq 30	M2 n \geq 30	M3 n \geq 50	M4 n \geq 50	M5 n $>$ 0	M6 n $>$ 0
<i>Kontextebene</i>						
Arbeitslosenquote	0.013 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.012)	0.009 (0.017)	0.010 (0.016)
Anteil Personen mit Migrationshintergrund	0.025 (0.018)		0.027 (0.020)		0.020 (0.023)	
Anteil Schutzsuchende		0.148* (0.071)		0.162* (0.077)		0.120 (0.087)
R ²	0.357	0.363	0.431	0.439	0.408	0.411
Gruppen	28	28	27	27	28	28
Beobachtungen	226	226	194	194	252	252

Anmerkung: Standardfehler in Klammern, *** p<0,001 ** p<0,01 * p<0,05; Deutsches Sample; eigene Berechnungen; gewichtet. Kontrolliert für Bildung, Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen, Alter und Alter².

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.

Die Ergebnisse der Pseudo-Panelanalyse verdeutlichen, dass Veränderungen der Arbeitslosenquote im Beobachtungszeitraum zu keinen signifikanten Einstellungsänderungen zu Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen führen (M1-6). Auch eine Veränderung des Anteils der Personen mit Migrationshintergrund übt keinen Effekt auf die durchschnittlichen Haltungen der Generationen aus (M1, M3, M5). Die Modelle 2 und 4 hingegen weisen darauf hin, dass ein Anstieg des Anteils der Schutzsuchenden signifikant negativere Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten mit sich bringt. Dieser Effekt verliert jedoch sowohl in M6 (Modell ohne Mindestgröße bei den synthetischen Beobachtungen) als auch unter Ausschluss Berlins (sowohl Befragte als auch bei den Maßzahlen auf Kontextebene) an Signifikanz (siehe Appendix, Tabelle A.5). Da jedoch die Richtung und die Größe der Koeffizienten jeweils robust bleiben, kann weiterhin von einem Effekt ausgegangen werden. So bleibt insgesamt festzuhalten: Steigt der Anteil der Schutzsuchenden, steigt die Ablehnung von Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen leicht an.

Hypothese 3 kann mit den Ergebnissen nicht bestätigt werden: Verschärfungen der Wirtschaftslage und ein Anstieg im Anteil der Zuwanderer führen im Zeitverlauf zu keinem negativen Einstellungswandel gegenüber Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen. Hypothese 4 hingegen findet (schwache) empirische Bestätigung: Ein Anstieg des Anteils der Zuwanderergruppe der Schutzsuchenden führt zwischen 2002 und 2018 zu etwas verstärkter Ablehnung von Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen.

7. Diskussion und Fazit

Auf Grundlage der vorliegenden Untersuchung kann die These verworfen werden, dass der Prozess der Generationenablösung in Deutschland zu einem stetig toleranter und offener werdenden Meinungsklima gegenüber Zugewanderten führen werde. In Westdeutschland zeigen die beiden jüngsten Generationen wieder negativere Haltungen zu Zugewanderten als ihre direkten Vorgängergenerationen. In Ostdeutschland unterscheidet sich keine der Generationen in ihren Einstellungen signifikant von der ältesten *Kriegsgeneration*. Allerdings vertritt die jüngste Generation im Osten auffallend restriktivere Haltungen als ihre unmittelbaren Vorgänger. Folglich findet in Deutschland durchaus ein Generationenwandel statt. Dieser verläuft allerdings nicht linear, sondern schwankend. Die vorliegenden Befunde relativieren damit die Annahme eines „Generationenmythos“ (Schröder, 2018) in Deutschland. Insbesondere im direkten Vergleich der Generationen, die in unterschiedlichen sozialen und politischen Kontexten sozialisiert wurden, zeigt sich die Bedeutung der Sozialisationserfahrungen im Jugendalter.

In Westdeutschland gibt es bezüglich der Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten eine klare Abgrenzung zwischen den Generationen, die während des Nationalsozialismus und den entbehrungsreichen Nachkriegsjahren sozialisiert wurden und den direkt darauffolgenden Generationen *68er*, *Frühe-* und *Späte Babyboomer*, die deutlich positivere Einstellungen zu

Zugewanderten aufweisen. Letztere erlebten ihre formativen Jugendphasen in einem wohlhabenden, demokratischen Land, in dem Bedrohungsfaktoren, auch aufgrund starker Gewerkschaften, vergleichsweise gering waren und der von Ulrich Beck (2016) proklamierte „Fahrstuhleffekt“ eine positive Wirkung für alle entfaltete. Außerdem konnten durch Fernreisen und Kontakte zu Gastarbeitern Vorurteile gegenüber Menschen anderer Herkunft abgebaut werden. Mit den 1980er Jahren und der fortschreitenden Globalisierung aller Lebensbereiche verstärkte sich jedoch die subjektive Verunsicherung, sodass die beiden jüngsten Generationen (*Wendegeneration* und *Globalisierte Generation*) in Westdeutschland, trotz erhöhter Möglichkeiten des positiven Kontakts zu Menschen anderer Herkunft, wieder restriktivere Haltungen zu Zugewanderten aufweisen.

In Ostdeutschland zeigt sich ein anderes Bild. Hier lassen die empirischen Befunde schlussfolgern, dass die Bedrohungsmechanismen in der DDR, sowie die geringeren Kontaktmöglichkeiten zu Migrant*innen zu einem weniger stark von den *Kriegsgenerationen* abzugrenzenden Meinungsklima führten. Die in den 1970er Jahren in der DDR sozialisierten *Babyboomer* unterscheiden sich in ihren Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten, im Vergleich zu ihren westdeutschen Altersgenossen nicht signifikant von den *Kriegsgenerationen*. Gleichzeitig weisen auch die jüngsten Generationen (*Wendegeneration* und *Globalisierte Generation*) keine signifikanten Einstellungsunterschiede zu den *Babyboomern* auf. Unter Ausschluss der Berliner Befragten im ostdeutschen Sample lässt sich bei der im wiedervereinten Deutschland sozialisierten jüngsten *Globalisierten Generation* sogar ein leichter Anstieg restriktiver Haltungen zu Zugewanderten beobachten. Durch die deutsche Wiedervereinigung und die damit verbundenen Transformationsprozesse waren Bedrohungsfaktoren in der ostdeutschen Bevölkerung omnipräsent. Systemumbruch und Massenarbeitslosigkeit führten zu einem Gefühl existenzieller Unsicherheit und verschärftem Wettbewerb, nicht nur um knappe Ressourcen, sondern auch um Identitäten. Gleichzeitig begünstigten Einkommens- und Vermögensungleichheiten zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschen

Gefühle relativer Gruppendeprivation. Den durch verstärkte Bedrohungswahrnehmungen ausgelösten negativen Effekt auf Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten konnten auch die gewonnene Reisefreiheit und die erhöhten Kontaktmöglichkeiten zu Menschen anderer Herkunft nicht eliminieren. So muss empirisch bestätigt werden, dass sich die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten im Generationenverlauf auch für die im wiedervereinten Deutschland sozialisierten Generationen in Ostdeutschland nicht positiver entwickeln konnten.

Des Weiteren weisen die Befunde auf eine gewisse Stabilität der Einstellungen innerhalb der Generationen hin. Obwohl auch nach Abschluss der prägenden Jugendphase noch Einstellungsänderungen möglich sind, führen in der vorliegenden Untersuchung periodische Verschärfungen der makroökonomischen Lage zwischen 2002 und 2018 zu keinen signifikanten Veränderungen im Meinungsklima innerhalb der Generationen. Auch ein Anstieg des Anteils der Personen mit Migrationshintergrund im entsprechenden Landesteil übt keinen bedeutsamen Effekt aus. Einzig ein Anstieg an Schutzsuchenden führt zu etwas verstärkter Ablehnung von Zugewanderten innerhalb der Generationen. Dieser Befund ist einerseits gruppenkonflikttheoretisch zu erklären: Da geflüchtete Menschen meist plötzlich und in größerer Anzahl aus überwiegend fremden Kulturkreisen im ökonomisch schwachen Globalen Süden stammen, lösen sie verstärkt wirtschaftliche, kulturelle und ethnische Bedrohungsgefühle aus. Da sie andererseits weniger Kontaktmöglichkeiten zu Einheimischen haben, ist der vorurteilsreduzierende Intergruppenkontakt weniger wirksam.

Diese Studie zeigt, dass die Generationenablösung in Deutschland nicht zu einer stetig offeneren und toleranter werdenden Gesellschaft führt. Die Untersuchung macht deutlich, dass verschärfte Bedrohungsmechanismen in der Gesellschaft zu einem Klima beitragen, das die jeweilige Jugend insofern prägt, dass sie verstärkt negative Haltungen zu Zugewanderten aufweist. Ein ähnliches Fazit ziehen auch Inglehart und Norris (2017) für die Vereinigten Staaten: Die abnehmende existenzielle Sicherheit erklärt, warum die Unterstützung für xenophobe Bewegungen heute größer ist als noch vor dreißig Jahren.

Für Großbritannien weist eine aktuelle Studie (McLaren et al., 2020) darauf hin, dass der Generationenwechsel positivere Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten mit sich bringt. Dies mag daran liegen, dass das Meinungsklima zu Zugewanderten in Großbritannien insgesamt aktuell, sowohl im Vergleich zu Ost- als auch zu Westdeutschland, deutlich negativer ausfällt. Dass Großbritannien nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg kein vergleichbares Wirtschaftswunder erfuhr, sondern stattdessen den Zerfall des ehemaligen Empire, mag unter anderen, Grund dafür sein, dass sich die Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten in der Vergangenheit anders entwickelten als in Deutschland. Daraus ergibt sich einmal mehr die Bedeutung der Sozialisationserfahrungen im Jugendalter sowie die daraus entstehende Dringlichkeit, Geburtskohorten jeweils in ihrem sozialen und politischen Kontext zu betrachten (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018; Mannheim, 1928; McLaren & Paterson, 2019).

Eine Beschränkung der vorliegenden Studie liegt in der Annahme, dass in Ost- bzw. in Westdeutschland lebende Befragte, auch dort vollständig ihre formative Jugendphase durchlebten. Dies lässt vor allem den Umstand der zeitweilig starken Abwanderung von Ost- nach Westdeutschland unberücksichtigt. Für das Risiko, dass in Ostdeutschland sozialisierte Befragte nach einem Umzug in der Untersuchung als Westdeutsche (und umgekehrt) definiert sind, kann hier nicht kontrolliert werden. Diesem Problem könnte mit anderen Datensätzen (bspw. der Sozio-oekonomischen Panelstudie oder dem ALLBUS), die die Mobilität und Biographien der Befragten erfassen, begegnet werden. Leider sind diese Datensätze für die vorliegende Forschungsfrage weniger geeignet als der ESS, da langfristig keine so konsistente wie umfassende Messung von Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten vorliegt. Zukünftige Forschung könnte jedoch die biographischen Informationen der Datensätze nutzen, um konkreter den Fragen der Sozialisationserfahrungen nachzuspüren. Gleichwohl vermag die in dieser Arbeit geleistete theoriegeleitete Generationeneinteilung als Blaupause für künftige Forschung zu dienen, die die ost- und westdeutschen Generationen als Untersuchungseinheiten interessiert.

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Anhang

Tabelle A.1: Ausschlusskriterien und Stichprobenumfang

Ausschlusskriterien		Stichprobenumfang
ESS Wellen 1 - 9		25,700
	1	2,919
	2	2,870
	3	2,916
	4	2,751
	5	3,031
	6	2,958
	7	3,045
	8	2,852
	9	2,358
In Deutschland geboren		23,290
Deutsche		23,099
Staatsbürgerschaft		22,076
Mind. 18 Jahre alt		22,044
Vor 2000 geboren		21,800
Keine fehlenden Daten auf Individualebene		
N		21,800

Tabelle A.2: Fragestellungen und Operationalisierung

Variablen	
<i>Abhängige Variable</i>	
Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten	<p>Additiver Index aus drei Items, die messen, wie Befragte den Einfluss von Zuwanderer auf Deutschland einschätzen:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. „Ist es im Allgemeinen gut oder schlecht für die deutsche Wirtschaft, dass Zuwanderer hierherkommen?“ (0=“schlecht für die Wirtschaft“ bis 10=“gut für die Wirtschaft“; umgekehrt codiert) 2. „Würden Sie sagen, dass das kulturelle Leben in Deutschland im Allgemeinen durch Zuwanderer untergraben oder bereichert wird?“ (0=“kulturell untergraben“ bis 10=“kulturell bereichert“; umgekehrt codiert) 3. „Wird Deutschland durch Zuwanderer zu einem schlechteren oder besseren Ort zum Leben?“ (0=“zu einem schlechteren Ort“ bis 10=“zu einem besseren Ort“; umgekehrt codiert)
<i>Erklärende Variablen</i>	
<i>Kontextebene</i>	Jeweils der Durchschnitt von zwei Jahren: z.B.: 2002 = Durchschnitt von 2001 und 2002 jeweils für Ost- und Westdeutschland getrennt
Arbeitslosenquote ¹⁵	Anteil der Arbeitslosen an den zivilen Erwerbspersonen in %
Anteil Personen mit Migrationshintergrund ¹⁶	Anteil der Personen mit Migrationshintergrund in % („Eine Person hat einen Migrationshintergrund, wenn sie selbst oder mindestens ein Elternteil die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit nicht durch Geburt besitzt.“)
Anteil Schutzsuchende ¹⁷	Anteil Schutzsuchender an Bevölkerung in %
<i>Individualebene</i>	
Alter	In Jahren
Alter quadriert	Alter in Jahren quadriert
Bildung	Höchster Bildungsabschluss (ES-ISCED ¹⁸)
Zufriedenheit Haushaltseinkommen	<p>„Mit dem gegenwärtigen Einkommen kann ich / können wir...“</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 = bequem leben 2 = zurechtkommen 3 = nur schwer zurechtkommen 4 = nur sehr schwer zurechtkommen (umgekehrt codiert)

¹⁵ Quelle: INKAR Regionaldatenbank

¹⁶ Quelle: destatis https://www.statistischebibliothek.de/mir/receive/DEHeft_mods_00131402

¹⁷ Quelle: INKAR Regionaldatenbank

¹⁸ Für weitere Informationen zur Kodierung der Bildungsvariable, siehe Schneider (2020):

http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_guidelines_for_the_measurement_of_educational_attainment_ed2.pdf und die ESS Dokumentation:

https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round9/survey/ESS9_appendix_a1_e03_0.pdf.

Tabelle A.3: Merkmale der Stichprobe

		%	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten			1	10	4.63	2.05
Alter			18	102	50.32	17.37
Geschlecht	Weiblich	49.21				
Bildung	Höchster Bildungsabschluss (ES-ISCED)					
	I: (Noch) kein Schulabschluss, Grund- schulabschluss	0.90				
	II: Sekundarbereich I (z.B. Haupt-, Realschulabschluss)	8.84				
	IIIb: Sekundarbereich II (z.B. Lehr- abschluss)	47.58				
	IIIa: Postsekundarbereich (z.B. Abitur)	3.80				
	IV: Höhere Berufsbildung	17.62				
	V1: Tertiäre Bildung (BA-Level)	8.52				
	V2: Tertiäre Bildung (\geq MA-Level)	12.74				
Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen						
	sehr schweres Zurechtkommen	3.21				
	schweres Zurechtkommen	9.96				
	zurechtkommen	52.34				
	bequem leben	34.49				
Region	Ostdeutschland	37.69				

Anmerkung: SD bezieht sich auf die Standardabweichung. N = 21,800, ungewichtete Angaben, deutsches Sample.

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.

Tabelle A.4: Kohorteneffekte in den Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Ohne Berlin. Referenz: Frühe Babyboomer (*1955-1962).

Ablehnung von Zugewanderten	M1	M2	M3	M4
	Ost	West	Ost	West
Generationen				
Kriegsgeneration (*1931-1940)	0.065 (0.288)	0.685*** (0.201)	0.181 (0.272)	0.843*** (0.190)
Nachkriegsgeneration (*1931-1940)	-0.017 (0.191)	0.441*** (0.132)	0.192 (0.181)	0.474*** (0.125)
68er Generation (*1941-1954)	-0.159 (0.112)	0.053 (0.078)	-0.032 (0.106)	0.105 (0.074)
<i>(Ref. Frühe Babyboomer *1955 - 1962)</i>				
Späte Babyboomer (*1963-1969)	-0.222* (0.107)	0.004 (0.070)	-0.190 (0.101)	0.002 (0.066)
Wendegeneration (*1970-1982)	0.079 (0.161)	0.252* (0.104)	0.144 (0.153)	0.271** (0.099)
Globalisierte Generation (*1982-1999)	0.427 (0.259)	0.420* (0.174)	0.492* (0.245)	0.380* (0.164)
Alter	0.053*** (0.016)	0.031** (0.011)	0.050** (0.015)	0.045*** (0.010)
Alter ²	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Erhebungsjahr	-0.059*** (0.017)	-0.118*** (0.011)	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.081*** (0.010)
Beobachtungen	7,104	13,584	7,104	13,584
R ²	0.010	0.039	0.120	0.150

Anmerkung: Standardfehler in Klammern, *** p<0,001 ** p<0,01 * p<0,05. Ost- und westdeutsches Sample; ohne Berlin; eigene Berechnungen; gewichtet. In M3 und M4 wird zusätzlich kontrolliert für: Geschlecht, Bildung, Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen.

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.

Tabelle A.5: Ergebnisse der Pseudo Panelanalyse mit fixen Effekten: Intra-Kohorten Veränderungen in Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten von 2002 bis 2016. Ohne Berlin.

Ablehnung von Zugewanderten	M1 n>=30	M2 n>=30	M3 n>=50	M4 n>=50	M5 n>0	M6 n>0
<i>Kontextebene</i>						
Arbeitslosenquote	0.004 (0.015)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.012)
Anteil Personen mit Migrationshintergrund	0.015 (0.021)		0.017 (0.021)		0.007 (0.023)	
Anteil Schutzsuchende		0.145 (0.075)		0.148 (0.079)		0.106 (0.085)
R ²	0.307	0.316	0.373	0.383	0.351	0.356
Gruppen	28	28	27	27	28	28
Beobachtungen	218	218	182	182	251	251

Anmerkung: Standardfehler in Klammern, *** p<0,001 ** p<0,01 * p<0,05. Deutsches Sample; ohne Berlin; eigene Berechnungen; gewichtet. Kontrolliert für Bildung, Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen, Alter und Alter².

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.

Tabelle A.6: Kohorteneffekte in den Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Referenz: Älteste Generation.

Ablehnung von Zugewanderten	M1	M2	M3	M4
	Ost	West	Ost	West
Generationen				
<i>(Ref. Kriegsgeneration</i>				
<i>*1919-1930)</i>				
Nachkriegsgeneration	-0.187	-0.245*	-0.106	-0.369***
(*1931-1940)	(0.152)	(0.111)	(0.142)	(0.104)
68er Generation	-0.315	-0.632***	-0.307	-0.738***
(*1941-1954)	(0.210)	(0.154)	(0.196)	(0.145)
Frühe Babyboomer	-0.186	-0.685***	-0.311	-0.843***
(*1955-1962)	(0.275)	(0.201)	(0.256)	(0.190)
Späte Babyboomer	-0.357	-0.682**	-0.483	-0.841***
(*1963-1969)	(0.315)	(0.228)	(0.294)	(0.215)
Wendegeneration	-0.326	-0.433	-0.351	-0.572*
(*1970-1982)	(0.369)	(0.264)	(0.345)	(0.249)
Globalisierte Generation	-0.005	-0.265	-0.020	-0.463
(*1983-1999)	(0.444)	(0.319)	(0.414)	(0.301)
Alter	0.037*	0.031**	0.041**	0.045***
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Alter ²	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000**	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Erhebungsjahr	-0.072***	-0.118***	-0.029*	-0.081***
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.010)
Beobachtungen	8,216	13,584	8,216	13,584
R ²	0.014	0.039	0.144	0.150

Anmerkung: Standardfehler in Klammern, *** p<0,001 ** p<0,01 * p<0,05; ost- und westdeutsches Sample; eigene Berechnungen; gewichtet. In M3 und M4 wird zusätzlich kontrolliert für: Geschlecht, Bildung, Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen.

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.

Tabelle A.7: Kohorteneffekte in den Einstellungen zu Zugewanderten in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Referenz: Jüngste Generation.

Ablehnung von Zugewanderten	M1	M2	M3	M4
	Ost	West	Ost	West
Generationen				
Kriegsgeneration (*1919-1930)	0.005 (0.444)	0.265 (0.319)	0.020 (0.414)	0.463 (0.301)
Nachkriegsgeneration (*1931-1940)	-0.181 (0.370)	0.020 (0.263)	-0.086 (0.345)	0.094 (0.249)
68er Generation (*1941-1954)	-0.309 (0.303)	-0.367 (0.215)	-0.287 (0.283)	-0.275 (0.203)
Frühe Babyboomer (* 1955 – 1962)	-0.181 (0.245)	-0.420* (0.174)	-0.291 (0.229)	-0.380* (0.164)
Späte Babyboomer (*1963-1969)	-0.351 (0.204)	-0.417** (0.144)	-0.462* (0.190)	-0.379** (0.136)
Wendegeneration (*1970-1982)	-0.321* (0.135)	-0.168 (0.099)	-0.331** (0.126)	-0.109 (0.093)
<i>(Ref. Globalisierte Generation *1983-1999)</i>				
Alter	0.037* (0.015)	0.031** (0.011)	0.041** (0.014)	0.045*** (0.010)
Alter ²	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Erhebungsjahr	-0.072*** (0.016)	-0.118*** (0.011)	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.081*** (0.010)
Beobachtungen	8,216	13,584	8,216	13,584
R ²	0.014	0.039	0.144	0.150

Anmerkung: Standardfehler in Klammern, *** p<0,001 ** p<0,01 * p<0,05; ost- und westdeutsches Sample; eigene Berechnungen; gewichtet. In M3 und M4 wird zusätzlich kontrolliert für: Geschlecht, Bildung, Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen.

Quelle: ESS Runde 1-9.

CHAPTER 3

Expanding the scope: The roles of cohort affiliation and threat perceptions in the western European context

The Dynamics of Attitudes toward Immigrants: Cohort Analyses for Western EU

Member States

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Abstract

Public opinion climates on immigrants are subject to certain dynamics. This study examines two mechanisms for such dynamics in Western EU member states for the 2002–2018 period. First, the impact of cohort replacement and, second, the impact of periodic threat perceptions, namely, changing macroeconomic conditions and shifts in immigration rates. To date, empirical research on anti-immigrant sentiments rarely combines these two concepts simultaneously to disentangle the interplay of period and cohort effects and determine the factors for long- and short-term attitude changes in societies. Motivated by this gap in the literature, I conduct multiple linear regression analyses of pooled data from all waves of the European Social Survey to show that the process of cohort replacement has led to a substantially more positive opinion climate toward immigrants since the 2000s. However, results indicate that in the future, this positive development is likely to come to a halt since younger cohorts no longer hold significantly more immigrant-friendly attitudes than their immediate predecessors. Furthermore, we observe different period effects to impact cohorts' attitudes. Fixed-effects panel analyses show that the effect of changing macroeconomic conditions on cohorts' attitudes is low. Changes in immigration rates, however, lead to significantly more dismissive attitudes when immigrants originate from the Global South as opposed to when they enter from EU countries. These insights suggest that it is less economic or cultural threat perceptions, but ethnic prejudice that plays a key role for natives to oppose immigration. Overall, findings suggest that it is not either cohort or period effects driving large-scale attitude changes, but rather we observe an interplay of both.

1. Introduction

Globally, more and more people are on the move, and western European countries are among the prime destination countries for immigrants. The topic of immigration is one of the most pressing and contested issues in public discourse, often leading to substantial divide within host societies (Bansak et al., 2016). With ongoing immigration to western Europe, it is crucial to gain a better understanding of how public opinion toward immigrants is evolving and developing.

Previous studies emphasize the impact of two mechanisms of large-scale attitude change: First, cohort replacement and, second, period effects. While cohort replacement can bring about long-term attitude changes (Calahorrano, 2013; Ebner et al., 2020; Eger et al., 2021; Firebaugh, 1992; Inglehart, 1977; Kiley and Vaisey, 2020; Mannheim, 1928; Schotte and Winkler, 2018; Schuman and Corning, 2012), certain period effects are responsible for more immediate changes in societies' current opinion 9climates (Czymara, 2021; Heizmann and Huth, 2021; Meuleman et al., 2009; Newman and Velez, 2014; Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008). To date, empirical research on anti-immigrant sentiments rarely combines these two concepts simultaneously in order to disentangle the interplay of period and cohort effects and determine the factors for long- and short-term attitude changes in societies (Ross and Rouse, 2015; Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown, 2011). This study fills this research gap by investigating both inter-cohort differences and intra-cohort changes. First, I explore how western European birth cohorts differ in their sentiments toward immigrants and what this implies for future opinion climates, when younger birth cohorts replace their predecessors. Second, I address the periodic forces that affect all birth cohorts: How stable are birth cohorts' attitudes toward immigrants, given changing threat perceptions on the country level, due to changing economic conditions and differing immigrant population?

In specifically analyzing periodic changes in the host societies' immigrant populations, this study furthermore contributes to the growing literature investigating whether different types of

immigrants are perceived as more or less threatening (Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche, 2015; Bloom, Arikan and Lahav, 2015; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016, 2019; Kustov, 2019; Stephan et al., 2005). To date, it remains unclear how far increasing intra-European migration (mostly from East to West) affects western European attitudes toward immigrants as compared to immigration from the Global South. Since these migrant groups differ in their economic, cultural, and ethnic composition, according to ethnic competition theory, they potentially trigger different threat perceptions in host populations (Bloom, Arikan and Lahav, 2015; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Kustov, 2019; Stephan et al., 2005). While empirical research indicates that the level of opposition to immigrants varies depending on the immigrant groups in question, these findings predominantly rely on cross-sectional research designs and do not account for the importance of changes over time. Most findings are also based on hypothetical immigration only, where respondents evaluate different immigrant groups based on their socioeconomic, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Evidence for how actual demographic changes in ethnic composition affects the opinion climates in different countries remains scarce (Czymara, 2021). The present study contributes to the current literature in the field of ethnic competition theory in determining the roles of symbolic, realistic, and ethnic threat perceptions and their synergies based on actual migration rates from different regions of the world, while including the cohort perspective.

I use data from nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002 to 2018) and country-level information provided by the OECD and World Bank. I employ a set of multiple linear regression analyses to estimate between-cohort variation. In a second step, I apply a fixed-effects panel analysis at cohort level to identify within-cohort changes over time. Results show that both the process of cohort replacement and specific demographic shifts within the migrant population, particularly when originating from the Global South, impact the overall opinion climate toward immigrants in Western EU member states between 2002 and 2018. This

granular analysis reveals the power of ethnic prejudice over cultural and economic threat perceptions.

2. Theoretical Background and Previous Research

2.1. Long-term attitude changes toward immigrants through cohort replacement

Socialization theory states that early life experiences leave an imprint on individuals, shaping their “natural worldviews” throughout life (Firebaugh, 1992; Inglehart, 1977; Mannheim, 1928). With few exceptions (Schröder, 2018; Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown, 2011), empirical research in several fields supports this line of argumentation (Ebner et al., 2020; Kiley and Vaisey, 2020; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Piotrowski et al., 2019; Ross and Rouse, 2015; Vaisey and Kiley, 2021). With regard to attitudes toward immigrants, cohort effects play a dominant role. Rather than an individual’s biological age, it is their year of birth and experiences during adolescence that predict their sentiments toward immigrants in the present (Calahorrano, 2013; Eger et al., 2021; Jeannet and Dražanová, 2019; Ross and Rouse, 2015; Schotte and Winkler, 2018; Schuman and Corning, 2012). Consequently, changes in societal conditions that occur during people’s formative years bring about large-scale value changes over time, as younger birth cohorts that differ in their values and priorities replace preceding cohorts (Firebaugh, 1992; Inglehart, 1977; Mannheim, 1928; Schuman and Corning, 2012).

According to previous research, two macro-level conditions during the impressionable years of adolescence can have a key impact on sentiments toward immigrants later in life: first, existential security (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Norris, 2017) and, second, a context of high immigrant-origin diversity (Eger et al., 2021; McLaren et al., 2020; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). In other words, cohorts growing up in a secure environment as well as cohorts that are familiar with ethnic diversity should feel less threatened by immigration and thus hold more immigrant-friendly attitudes. Thus, when aiming at drawing conclusions on the effects of cohort replacement on future immigration attitudes, it is of particular interest to examine the different

tempo-spatial contextual environments that affected different birth cohorts in western Europe over time.

After World War II, birth cohorts in western Europe experienced a continuously more secure upbringing. These years of existential security brought an intergenerational shift toward more postmaterialist values, causing a “Silent Revolution” (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Norris, 2017). Several attitude changes accompanied this intergenerational value shift, including increasingly tolerant views on foreigners and immigration (Inglehart, 1997). Some argue that with rising levels of higher education, more recent cohorts hold more positive attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., Hello et al., 2006). Additionally, younger birth cohorts grow up in a society where an existing immigrant population is the norm (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Larger immigrant populations within western European countries enable rising opportunities for intergroup contacts, reducing outgroup prejudice (Pettigrew et al., 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Due to the process of globalization and the growing integration of the European Union, opportunities for prejudice-reducing intergroup contact during cohorts’ formative years was heightened and familiarization with people of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds grew. For instance, while the experience of living a year abroad was considered rather exotic for students born in the 1950s, it almost became the norm for students born in the 1990s (European Commission, 2020). Accordingly, research shows that growing up in an ethnically more diverse society is associated with more positive attitudes toward immigrants (Eger et al., 2021; McLaren et al., 2020). High inequality levels (McLaren et al., 2020) and high unemployment rates at the time of a cohort entering the job market (Coenders and Scheepers, 2008; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018), however, diminish this effect.

Together, these socialization processes are expected to bring about more open and tolerant sentiments toward people of different cultural or ethnical backgrounds. Thus, as previous research indicates (Bazán-Monasterio et al., 2021; Calahorrano, 2013; Ross and Rouse, 2015; Schotte and Winkler, 2018), for the specific case of western European countries, younger birth

cohorts should hold more immigrant-friendly attitudes than older cohorts, who, during their formative years, did not experience intergroup contact to the same degree. Consequently, we can expect that the process of cohort replacement will, in the long term, bring about large-scale attitude changes toward more immigrant-friendly attitudes. This positive development, however, is unlikely to be perfectly linear over the cohorts, due to fluctuating levels of inequality and differing conditions for cohorts when entering the labor markets (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018; Jeannet and Dražanová, 2019; McLaren et al., 2020). Overall, however, for western European societies, we can expect that:

H1) Successive cohorts will have more immigrant-friendly attitudes.

2.2. Short-term attitude changes toward immigrants through periodic threat perceptions

Though socialization theory emphasizes the formative phase as particularly important for value and attitude formation, scholars do not exclude the possibility of attitude change in the further course of life, impacting an entire population due to period effects (Inglehart, 1977; Mannheim, 1928). Current perceived threats, such as economic and financial crises, concerns about international terrorism, or the so-called refugee crisis, give rise to changing attitudes toward immigrants in society as a whole (Brouard et al., 2018; Kiley and Vaisey, 2020; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown, 2011; Yang, 2008). Thus, the second research question of this study investigates how stable previously formed attitudes toward immigrants are in the face of changing threat perceptions at the country level. Besides changing economic conditions, this study's focus hereby lies on the differentiation between immigrant groups, potentially causing more or less perceived threats within western European birth cohorts.

Ethnic competition theory provides one of the most widely accepted explanations for exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants. Accordingly, social groups are competing over scarce resources, believing that the societal position of members of the own social group are

threatened by members of the outgroup (Blumer, 1958). Thus, natives' fears of losing power and privileges due to immigrants' influence drives the potential for exclusionary attitudes, whether the threat is real or perceived (Blalock, 1967). Newcomers are thereby perceived to challenge the status quo in not only posing a potential threat to a country's economic well-being (Heizmann and Huth, 2021), but even more so to the host societies' cultural goods, such as religion, traditions, and norms (Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche, 2015; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Schneider, 2008). A third dimension of perceived threats prevail over a nation's ethnic homogeneity (Bloom, Arikan and Lahav, 2015), resulting in racial prejudice toward the non-white minority population (Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche, 2015; Bloom, Arikan and Lahav, 2015; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016). It is necessary to distinguish between these dimensions of ethnic threat, as they differ in their development and in their consequences.

Comparative research considers economic conditions in a country (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2006) and the size and composition of the outgroup (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018, 2019; Kunovich, 2004; Newman and Velez, 2014; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002) as important drivers of natives' collective threat perceptions, although these effects could not always be replicated in this rather general proposition and static approach (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Kaufmann and Goodwin, 2018; Laurence et al., 2019; Sides and Citrin, 2007).

In fact, immigration scholars highlight the importance of the dynamic developments of both indicators under examination - economic situation as well as immigrant population (Coenders and Scheepers, 2008; Czymara, 2021; Heizmann and Huth, 2021; Hopkins, 2010; Newman and Velez, 2014; Olzak, 1992). Period effects, or as Blumer (1958) argues "big events," such as an economic crisis or a large and sudden influx of immigrants are found to be crucial drivers of perceived threat, since such events also generally receive wide media coverage (McLaren et al., 2018; Schlueter and Davidov, 2011).

Findings on how changing macro conditions particularly impact cohorts' attitudes toward immigrants, however, are not only scarce but also somewhat discordant in their conclusions. For Canada, Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown (2011) find that changes in cohorts' attitudes toward immigrants are a response to changing macro-conditions, such as unemployment rates. Ross and Rouse (Ross and Rouse, 2015) on the other hand emphasize the resilience of the "millennial" generation's attitudes toward immigrants in the face of the 2008 financial crisis in the US, implying a certain stability of a cohort's attitude pattern over time. Although empirical findings are somewhat mixed, the effect will be tested with the hypothesis that:

H2: Deteriorating economic conditions on the country-level lead to a rise in birth cohorts' dismissive attitudes toward immigrants.

2.3. The role of immigrant origin

Concerning the impact of rising levels of immigrants, a more granular analysis is in order. On the one hand, there is a linear association between ethnic change and elevated threat (Kaufmann and Goodwin, 2018). Studies provide evidence that changes in the immigrant group size drive changes in the level of threat perceptions within European host societies (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018, 2019; Meuleman et al., 2009; Newman and Velez, 2014). However, opposition to immigration is not unidimensional. Rather, the level of opposition to immigration varies according to who the immigrants are (Bloom, Arikian and Courtemanche, 2015; Bloom, Arikian and Lahav, 2015; Czymara, 2021; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016, 2019). As outlined above, according to the logic of group conflict theory, three sources of particular outgroup rejection are identified.

First, economic competition poses a source of threat, whereby competition over jobs is one factor and the endangering of the welfare state is another. The latter is increasingly prevalent within western European countries. There, citizens see new immigrants as jeopardizing the welfare state by taking advantage of the benefits it provides (Reeskens and Van Oorschot,

2012). Thus, depending on how members of a host society evaluate the actual or stereotypical socio-economic status of a particular immigrant group, they are perceived as more or less threatening to the material wellbeing of the host society. Second, competition over cultural dominance and national identity are sources of threat, leading to exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Fetzer, 2000; Raijman and Semyonov, 2004; Schneider, 2008; Sniderman et al., 2004). From this perspective, natives fear the national culture will be undermined by immigrants who differ in their cultural background (e.g., religion), potentially triggering changes in the norms and values system of a country (Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche, 2015; Castles et al., 2013; Fetzer, 2000; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Third, ethnic and racial prejudice poses a source for anti-immigrant attitudes within host societies. Here, threat perceptions prevail over the ethnic homogeneity of a nation due to immigration (e.g., Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2016; Pettigrew 1998). As a result, immigrant groups that differ in their ethnic background from the majority population in European countries will face increased opposition. Together, from the perspective of group threat theory, a power struggle prevails over economic resources, cultural dominance, and ethnic homogeneity, differing in intensity depending on the immigrants' background.

Empirical findings lend support for the proposition that the level of opposition to immigrants varies across immigrant groups (Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche, 2015; Bloom, Arikan and Lahav, 2015; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016, 2019). These findings, however, rely on cross-sectional research designs, not accounting for the importance of changes. Furthermore, they are based on hypothetical immigration only, meaning that respondents were asked how they would feel about the immigration of particular groups who are dissimilar to in-group members in socio-economic status, religion, or ethnicity. Though valuable, this leaves open the question of how real-life periodic events, such as large and sudden increases in immigration from particular regions in the world, impact public opinion toward

immigrants in western European host societies. As predicted by the dynamic approach of group conflict theory, there is an initial empirical indication that during times of strong change in a country's ethnic composition, public opinion toward immigrants is more hostile (Czymara, 2021). This study sets out to empirically test this theoretical argument more granularly.

One goal of this study is to examine whether changes in the immigration of different immigrant groups caused increased or reduced perceptions of threat within western European host societies. In accordance with the presented theoretical framework and contemporary immigration patterns for countries under analyses, I use the following classification of major immigrant groups: 1) old EU member states (before 2004); 2) new EU member states (since 2004); 3) countries in the Global South (excluding EU member states); and 4) asylum seekers (in general). I follow this with a discussion of why this particular classification is relevant.

First, within-EU immigration makes up a large part of overall immigration numbers. In 2020, 13.5 million EU citizens are settled in another EU country (Eurostat, 2021a), whereby citizens from new EU member states emigrate at a higher rate and predominantly to old EU member states (Eurostat, 2021a). With the eastern enlargement, beginning in 2004, the EU underwent its largest and fastest expansion to date when 13 countries, mostly in eastern Europe, joined the European Union. Within roughly a decade of the EU's eastern enlargement, about 74 million people from poorer, formerly communist, countries became EU citizens and were progressively granted freedom of movement and the possibility of living and working in all EU countries. Eastern enlargement triggered heated public debates in western EU countries concerning both economic threat perceptions as well as cultural threat perceptions.¹ With immigration from new EU member states in the East, citizens in the old EU member states fear competition on labor markets and the exploitation of their social welfare systems, since immigrants from eastern Europe are stereotyped as economically more vulnerable. Furthermore, even though they are predominantly Christian, eastern Europeans are likely to be perceived as culturally different, having been socialized under communist rule. Immigration from old EU member states,

however, is likely to trigger less pronounced economic and cultural threat perceptions among western European populations since, for decades, these countries underwent a process of economic and cultural integration. Through travels, study exchange programs, and business cooperation, threat-reducing familiarity could be established.

Second, with regard to immigration from outside Europe, a further distinction of immigrant origin needs to be drawn. Independent of their actual economic and cultural characteristics, immigrants from less developed countries face greater rejection (Kustov, 2019). By definition, this implies immigrants from the Global South, who on average hold a lower socio-economic status than European citizens. Additionally, they are stigmatized as culturally distant (Brücker et al., 2002; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hagendoorn, 1995; Schneider, 2008) and predominantly differ in their ethnic background from the majority population in EU member states. Thus, according to the theoretical assumption of ethnic threat theory, immigration from the Global South is likely to trigger a combination of economic, cultural, and ethnic threat perceptions among European citizens. Therefore, an increase in immigration from citizens of the Global South can be expected to lead to more hostile public opinion toward immigrants.

Finally, asylum seekers represent an important immigrant group and are presumably most affected with respect to negative stereotyping on multiple levels. Most asylum seekers originate from countries in the Middle East and Africa (Eurostat, 2021b). Due to their origins, they are exposed to particularly high rates of prejudice in European societies (especially since the refugee “crisis” of 2015/16). Not only are they culturally and ethnically different from the predominantly Christian and White population in Europe, but asylum seekers are also stigmatized as being poor and as having immigrated illegally or under false asylum claims (Esses et al., 2017; Holmes and Castañeda, 2016). Thus, an increasing number of asylum seekers is likely to trigger threat perceptions regarding the economic well-being of a host society, its cultural dominance, and its ethnic homogeneity.

Since opposition to immigration is hierarchical (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2019), varying dependent on who the immigrant is, the reasoning above leads to the following hypothesis with respect to opposition to different immigrant groups to western EU member states:

H3) Increasing immigration from the Global South and from asylum seekers leads to a greater increase in anti-immigrant attitudes than increasing immigration from new EU member states (since 2004), whereas an enlarged share of immigrants from old EU member states (before 2004) will bring the smallest increase in anti-immigrant attitudes.

3. Data

Data for this analysis are drawn from nine waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 through 2018. The ESS is a repeated cross-sectional representative survey of mainly European countries. In face-to-face interviews, respondents are surveyed on attitudes, opinions, and behavior as well as on socio-demographic information. In all rounds, the survey includes items measuring respondents' attitudes toward immigrants.

While many studies that focus on immigration attitudes exploit data for all countries available in the ESS (38 countries as of 2018), in this analysis, the country-sample is restricted to ten western EU countries that were part of the Union before the eastern enlargement in 2004. This restriction of course limits the overall generalizability of this study's results; however, it is necessary in order to answer the research questions posed in this paper. Since this study sets out to examine cohort effects, the analyses require a country-sample in which birth cohorts generally experienced a similar formative phase (for further examples, see Inglehart, 1977; McLaren et al., 2020; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). During the Cold War, but also in its subsequent years, however, young adults' living realities in the "East" significantly differ from those in the "West" in many aspects so that we cannot assume a context of similar experiences. Furthermore, it is this study's goal to examine the impact of particular immigration patterns on

natives' attitudes among the most popular immigration countries. Heated debates resulted from large-scale immigration from eastern to western Europe, following the EU eastern enlargement, focusing on potential economic disadvantages in the receiving societies. Determining whether immigration from eastern Europe triggers different reactions in natives as compared to immigration from other regions of the world is a central objective of this study and further justifies the sample restriction to western EU member states.

Another important reason for the sample restriction lies in this study's focus on longitudinal change and the data requirements that must be met in order to enable reliable estimates. Due to missing data for some western EU member states, I exclude countries from the sample that did not take part in at least seven out of nine ESS waves (Austria, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg). Moreover, I drop Ireland because it is missing substantial information on immigrant shares for the period of analysis. Ignoring this missing data in an analysis focusing on longitudinal change would provide a sample that severely changes in composition over the period of analysis, hampering reliable estimates. Hence, restricting the sample is the superior option with regard to reliability and validity of results. Thus, the focus of this analysis is on the following ten countries: Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Great Britain (GB), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and Sweden (SE).²

On the respondent-level, I exclude those from the analysis who were not born in the respective countries and who do not hold the country's nationality. This restriction is necessary since I aim at evaluating attitudes toward immigrants among citizens (as potential voters) who likely experienced their formative years in the countries under analysis in order to account for the effects of cohort affiliation. The final dataset contains a total of 135,446 observations ranging from 616 to 2,568 per country, per year.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable “attitudes toward immigrants” measures a person’s overall assessment of the impact of immigrants on his or her country. I use the following three questions to compose a summary index for “attitudes toward immigrants:” (1) “Would you say it is generally bad or good for the country’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”; (2) “Would you say that the country’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”; and (3) “Is the country made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”³ The respondents’ answers vary on an 11-point scale, which is recoded so that zero represents support for immigration and ten represents opposition to immigration. Capturing attitudes toward immigrants, this index serves as a dependent variable in several studies (see Sides and Citrin, 2007; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018; McLaren and Paterson, 2019, (reversely coded)).

Independent Variables

I derive the independent variables on the country level (see appendix, Table A1) from World Bank (2021a) and OECD (2021) data, which are internationally comparable across countries for all years. In this analysis, GDP per capita functions as indicator for the objective economic conditions in a country. Immigrants function as indicators measuring the size of the “outgroup” as a percentage of the overall population. In this study, I define immigrants as the foreign-born population: people who were born in a different country from their country of residence. Therefore, I do not consider second-generation immigrants, but do account for different naturalization procedures in different countries.

With OECD data, I can further differentiate immigrants by country of origin and calculate their share of the single country’s overall population per survey year. Based on the assumptions in the theory section, I create four categories. Share of: Immigrants from 1) old EU member states (before 2004); 2) new EU member states (since 2004); 3) countries in the Global South

(excluding EU member states); and 4) asylum seekers (in general). One important distinction requires further explanation: Whereas the categories 1-3 represent the shares, category 4 (asylum seekers) is operationalized with the inflow (in % of overall population). This is because the International Migration Database (OECD) does not provide the overall share of asylum seekers. Furthermore, since the OECD does not provide yearly country-specific information on asylum seekers' nationalities, a person applying for asylum is represented in two categories depending on the migrant's country of origin. Potential correlations deriving from this are reviewed in the subsequent analysis. All other categories are mutually exclusive.

The distinction for Global South derives from the World Bank categorization of income (World Bank 2021b). High-income economies are those with a gross national income (GNI) per capita varying from US\$9,205 or more in 2001 to US\$12,375 or more in 2018 (World Bank 2021c). I categorize all countries with a lower GNI than "high-income economies" as Global South. Hence, it is not the country's geography but its income level that defines its status. While this categorization is somewhat flawed because it cannot sufficiently capture the aspect of cultural distance or ethnic diversity, for analytical reasons, it is the most realizable categorization for this study. Table A1 in the appendix provides further information on the country categorization. Moreover, for some years some countries do not provide data, so I impute any missing values with the closest value available, as proposed by Frank and Hou (2015).⁴

Since previous research strongly suggests that the socio-economic status of a person affects their attitudes toward immigrants, I include ESS information on household income as well as level of education as control variables in the analyses. Unfortunately, the ESS does not offer objective information on household income that is easily comparable across all rounds. Therefore, I use a subjective proxy to measure a respondent's satisfaction with his or her own household income. I recode answers so that they range from finding it "very difficult to cope on present income" (1) to "comfortably living on present income" (4). Hence, higher values indicate higher income satisfaction. The variable "Education" is based on the years of

education: lower level of education (1) = up to nine years; medium level of education (2) = ten to twelve years; and higher level of education (3) = more than twelve years. Furthermore, in the first set of analyses, I control sociotropic economic concerns, namely the variable “satisfaction with the country’s economic situation,” to account for economic conditions at the country level. Answers vary on an 11-point scale from “extremely dissatisfied” (0) to “extremely satisfied” (10). Additionally, in all analyses, I control religiosity (“not at all religious” (0) to “very religious” (10)) as well as political orientation, where respondents place themselves on a political left-right scale (“left” (0) – “right” (10)). Finally, to disentangle the effects of birth cohorts (socialization) from the effects of life cycles (age) and periods (influential events, e.g., refugee immigration to Europe in 2015), it is necessary to circumvent the classic age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem (Glenn, 1976; Luo, 2013; Oppenheim Mason et al., 1973; Ryder, 1965; Winship and Harding, 2008). The problem emerges because, statistically, the effects of age, period, and cohort are difficult to separate due to perfect collinearity, as the variables explain one another: $\text{period} - \text{age} = \text{cohort}$. As a result, models cannot identify separate effects of the three factors.

To circumvent the APC identification problem, Winship and Harding (2008) propose theoretically specifying the models by replacing either age, period, or cohort with an indicator representing the respective social process (e.g., marriage, parenthood, retirement for age effects; and war, party in power, economic boom for period effects). In this study, I follow the common approach to measure age effects indirectly by using underlying indicators of social ageing (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Tilley, 2005; Winship and Harding, 2008). Analogous to Norris and Inglehart (2019), I add the variable whether a respondent is currently, or has ever been, married or lived in a civil partnership (coded as “yes” (0), “no” (1)), as a proxy for the effect of ageing. It lies in the nature of a proxy that this indicator has certain flaws, since not all individuals get married or live in a civil partnership, despite the fact that they age. For such individuals, the analyses naturally miss the effect of ageing. In this sample, however, with

growing age, respondents increasingly report “yes” for marital status. Overall, the value of almost 90% for respondents over the age of 40 ever having been married represents a solid proxy.

Table 1 illustrates the aggregate trends of all included variables. For the ten countries under analysis, the financial crisis of 2008 made its impact evident in a subsequent stagnation of GDP, which, on average, only rose again substantially in 2017/2018. Immigrant shares generally increased from 2002 to 2018. In particular, the share of so-called mobile EU citizens rose. The share of citizens from new EU member states increased substantially from 0.8% to almost 1.9%, as a result of the EU eastern enlargement. Immigration from the Global South also increased steadily and represents the largest share of immigrants within the countries under analysis at 7.4% in 2017/18. Additionally, the inflow of asylum seekers varied over the years, reaching its peak with the refugee immigration of 2015/16. Interestingly, since then, overall attitudes toward immigrants have been most positive in the country sample. The initially assumed variation in country-level indicators in western EU countries during the turbulent period from 2002 to 2018 is clearly reflected in the data.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Aggregate trends of all included variables.

	1		2		3	
	2001/02		2003/04		2005/06	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Attitudes toward immigrants (0-10)	4.70	1.87	4.83	2.01	4.77	2.00
Gender (female = 2)	1.50	0.50	1.50	0.50	1.50	0.50
Age (in years)	46.05	17.82	46.46	17.96	46.90	18.29
Household income (1-4)	3.25	0.74	3.19	0.77	3.22	0.76
Level of education (1-3)	2.18	0.80	2.18	0.80	2.23	0.79
Political orientation (“left” 0 – 10 “right”)	5.11	2.04	5.09	2.04	5.03	2.05
Sociotropic concerns (economy) (0-10)	4.93	2.31	5.01	2.31	5.37	2.30
Religiosity (0-10)	4.58	2.82	4.44	2.82	4.31	2.86
Never married	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.46	0.29	0.45
GDP per capita (in thousand US \$)	40.46	8.21	41.08	8.87	42.44	9.08
Old EU member states (in %)	2.19	1.33	2.24	1.40	2.35	1.31
New EU member states (in %)	0.77	0.68	0.80	0.65	0.82	0.61
Global South (in %)	4.97	1.71	5.19	1.71	5.64	1.69
Inflow asylum seekers (in %)	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.06
Observations	14,329		13,928		16,200	
No. countries	9		9		10	
	4		5		6	
	2007/08		2009/10		2011/12	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Attitudes toward immigrants (0-10)	4.63	1.95	4.80	1.98	4.61	2.03
Gender (female = 1)	1.51	0.50	1.50	0.50	1.50	0.50
Age (in years)	47.21	18.52	47.78	18.53	48.45	18.80
Household income (1-4)	3.20	0.76	3.21	0.79	3.17	0.79
Level of education (1-3)	2.23	0.80	2.25	0.80	2.28	0.79
Political orientation (“left” 0 – 10 “right”)	5.01	2.05	4.99	2.04	5.10	2.16
Sociotropic concerns (economy) (0-10)	4.36	2.34	4.46	2.35	4.59	2.42
Religiosity (0-10)	4.34	2.87	4.13	2.88	4.27	2.98
Never married	0.30	0.46	0.31	0.46	0.32	0.47
GDP per capita (in thousand US \$)	43.79	9.76	41.74	9.63	43.44	9.70
Old EU member states (in %)	2.35	1.29	2.53	1.25	2.39	1.30
New EU member states (in %)	1.02	0.73	1.33	0.84	1.33	0.78
Global South (in %)	5.82	1.83	6.63	1.43	6.41	1.83
Inflow asylum seekers (in %)	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10
Observations	16,995		14,073		16,600	
No. countries	10		9		10	
	7		8		9	
	2013/14		2015/16		2017/18	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Attitudes toward immigrants (0-10)	4.61	2.07	4.38	2.03	4.26	2.02
Gender (female = 1)	1.51	0.50	1.51	0.50	1.50	0.50
Age (in years)	48.65	18.96	48.78	18.90	49.71	18.61
Household income (1-4)	3.23	0.77	3.28	0.75	3.30	0.75
Level of education (1-3)	2.36	0.77	2.39	0.74	2.44	0.73
Political orientation (“left” 0 – 10 “right”)	5.03	2.15	4.96	2.11	4.95	2.13
Sociotropic concerns (economy) (0-10)	4.80	2.36	5.14	2.24	5.62	2.30
Religiosity (0-10)	4.05	2.98	4.09	3.09	3.96	3.04
Never married	0.33	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.34	0.47
GDP per capita (in thousand US \$)	43.83	9.33	43.90	8.07	47.04	9.70
Old EU member states (in %)	2.41	1.27	2.59	1.31	2.58	1.26
New EU member states (in %)	1.53	0.81	1.74	0.95	1.88	1.08
Global South (in %)	6.57	1.80	7.03	1.82	7.37	1.98
Inflow asylum seekers (in %)	0.15	0.18	0.32	0.30	0.12	0.06
Observations	15,898		13,568		13,855	
No. countries	10		9		10	

Data Sources: ESS waves 1-9 (2002-2018); country-level data: OECD (2021), World Bank (2021a).

4. Analytic Strategy

4.1. Multiple linear regression analyses (between cohort effects)

In order to answer the two posed research questions, I divide the analysis into two parts. First, I approach the first question of how western European birth cohorts differ in their sentiments toward immigrants and examine the potential impact of cohort replacement. For this purpose, multiple linear regression analyses are performed based on pooled ESS data from 2002 to 2018. By gradually including additional control variables in the models, this procedure reveals isolated differences in attitudes toward immigrants between birth cohorts.

4.2. Panel analyses at cohort level (within-cohort effects)

In a second step, I examine to what extent periodic changes over time affect attitudes toward immigrants within birth cohorts. To identify the within-cohort change over time, I apply a fixed-effects panel analysis at cohort level.⁵ This technique facilitates the investigation of the dynamic approach of group threat theory and answers the second research question of this study, concerning the stability of cohorts' attitudes.

Individual time-constant effects potentially correlate with the explanatory variables, leading to biased estimates. It is well known that such bias can be avoided by using panel data and the fixed effects model. In this study, panel data on the individual level is not available. Therefore, I construct a pseudo-panel, as proposed in (Deaton, 1985), in which birth cohorts constitute the units of analysis (see below). Thus, in contrast to the linear regression analysis described above, the analysis is not performed at the individual level but at the aggregate level. The approach of pseudo-panel analysis has been applied in a variety of empirical studies. Depending on the research question, they use differing units of analysis (Antman and McKenzie, 2007; Cuesta et al., 2011; Jæger, 2013; Olivera, 2015; Russell and Fraas, 2005).

With the construction of a panel dataset based on cohorts, the present study proposes an alternative model to multilevel approaches, such as hierarchical age-period-cohort models (e.g., Wilkes und Corrigan-Brown 2011) and three-level multilevel models (e.g., Czymara 2021) analyzing time trends in public opinion. In principle, multilevel modeling is an equally valid approach to answer the research question. For example, a linear mixed model with random cohort effects should yield results similar to those of a pseudo panel. The main difference is that the within-estimator of the pseudo panel does not rely on distributional assumptions for the cohort effects.⁶ There is no obvious way of testing one approach against the other. For this reason, I attach results for a linear mixed model to the Appendix (Table A2), showing that the two approaches are similar.

4.3. Application

I use the repeated cross-sectional ESS data to construct a pseudo-panel dataset. Individuals are grouped into synthetic observations based on time-constant characteristics. Besides birth cohorts, I also include the characteristics of gender and country of residence. Ideally, individuals are relatively homogeneous in their characteristics within groups and relatively heterogeneous between groups (Verbeek, 2008). Larger numbers of groups based on more defining characteristics better reflect societal variation, but groups with small numbers of individuals do not provide a basis for reliable estimates. Thus, finding a decent balance between the number and size of the groups is important (Olivera, 2015). I attempt to strike this balance by limiting the size of each group to a minimum of 30 respondents and the number of groups to 200. This number results from forming groups based on ten-year birth cohorts (10), gender (2), and country of residence (10). By adding the time dimension (9 x ESS rounds), a maximum possible number of 1,800 ($10 \times 2 \times 10 \times 9$) synthetic observations is reached based on 135,446 observations. An exemplary synthetic observation representing a unit of analysis is the women belonging to the same birth cohort in Portugal in the survey year 2002. Hence, the approach


allows for identification of mechanisms of attitude changes toward immigrants on the level of birth cohorts, gender, and country of residence. The actual number of synthetic observations in this study is 1,217 based on 164 synthetic groups, as opposed to the theoretical maximum. The number of observations is reduced for several reasons. First, not all ten countries participated in all nine ESS rounds; second, the youngest and oldest birth cohorts are not surveyed at each time point (because they are either too young to be interviewed or are deceased); and third, the synthetic observations entering the regression analysis have to contain at least 30 respondents to represent reliable group estimates. I exclude observations with fewer than 30 individuals. Finally, I conduct three robustness checks. First, I test the robustness of the results by varying the minimum size of respondents in a synthetic observation as well as by varying the cohort classification for the synthetic groups. Second, with a country sensitivity analysis, I exclude single countries from the analysis in order to test whether particular countries drive certain effects. Third, I conduct a period sensitivity analysis assessing whether particular periods impact the results.

5. Results and Interpretation

5.1. Descriptive Overview

Figure 1 illustrates the process of cohort replacement within western EU societies under examination over time. Whereas the share of the two youngest birth cohorts consistently increases from 8.6% in 2002 to almost 30% in 2018, the share of the three oldest birth cohorts decreases from almost 25% to less than 10%. Overall, over the 2002 to 2018 period, the share of birth cohorts born before 1961 shrinks, while the share born thereafter steadily increases.

Figure 1: The process of cohort replacement within western EU member states between 2002 and 2018.




Source: ESS round 1-9; weighted averages; country sample.

Examining time trends in attitudes to immigrants by birth cohort offers additional insights. Figure 2 illustrates the attitudes toward immigrants averaged over the country sample across the 2002 to 2018 period. Over this sixteen-year time period, attitudes shifted with natives becoming more immigrant-friendly in 2018 than in 2002. This positive trend holds for all birth cohorts (with the exception of the oldest cohort, which suffers from a small n in the years 2014 to 2018 due to the old age of respondents and, thus, is excluded). This similar pattern in attitude changes over the years reveals the impact of period effects. Between 2008 and 2010 there is an increase in dismissive attitudes toward immigrants for all birth cohorts, which is likely to be the result of the financial crisis. Furthermore, between 2014 and 2018, western Europeans’ opposition to immigrants decreases to a value below 5 on the 11-point scale for all cohorts. In further analysis, I examine whether this drop in opposition is associated with the gradual recovery of the European economy after the financial crisis or to the so-called long summer of

migration. Whereas patterns in attitude shifts are similar for all birth cohorts over time, these shifts occur on different levels. The three oldest birth cohorts (born between 1912 and 1941) display the highest levels of anti-immigrant sentiments (average values predominantly above 5), while attitudes steadily become more positive among the younger cohorts (average values below 5).

Figure 2: Attitudes toward immigrants among Western EU birth cohorts between 2002 and 2018.



Source: ESS round 1–9; weighted averages; country sample.

5.2. Results multivariate regression analyses (between cohort effects)

Table 2 indicates the results of the multivariate linear regression analyses, specifying cohort-effects irrespective of age and period effects. The cohort born between 1952 and 1961 serves as the reference category, as it is positioned in the middle and permits plausible comparability with the oldest and youngest birth cohorts.

Table 2: Multivariate linear regression analyses predicting between-cohort variation in attitudes toward immigrants.

Attitudes toward immigrants	M1	M2	M3	M4
Birth cohorts (<i>Ref. *1952 - 1961</i>)				
1912-1921	0.719*** (0.063)	0.654*** (0.063)	0.240*** (0.059)	0.226*** (0.059)
1922-1931	0.613*** (0.029)	0.571*** (0.029)	0.181*** (0.027)	0.169*** (0.027)
1932-1941	0.443*** (0.021)	0.426*** (0.021)	0.152*** (0.020)	0.139*** (0.020)
1942-1951	0.114*** (0.019)	0.110*** (0.019)	0.010 (0.018)	0.000 (0.018)
1962-1971	-0.059** (0.018)	-0.054** (0.018)	0.009 (0.017)	0.029 (0.017)
1972-1981	-0.209*** (0.019)	-0.205*** (0.019)	-0.068*** (0.018)	0.002 (0.018)
1982-1991	-0.170*** (0.020)	-0.162*** (0.020)	-0.033 (0.018)	0.112*** (0.021)
1992-2001	-0.383*** (0.026)	-0.284*** (0.026)	-0.191*** (0.024)	-0.006 (0.027)
Year	-	+	+	+
Gender (female = 1)			0.013 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)
Level of education (1-3 low to high)			-0.499*** (0.007)	-0.497*** (0.007)
Household income (1-4 low to high)			-0.234*** (0.007)	-0.238*** (0.007)
Political orientation ("left" 0 – 10 "right")			0.172*** (0.002)	0.171*** (0.002)
Religiosity (0-10 low to high)			-0.030*** (0.002)	-0.031*** (0.002)
Sociotropic concerns (economy) (0-10 low to high)			-0.206*** (0.002)	-0.206*** (0.002)
Never married				-0.204*** (0.014)
Observations	135,446	135,446	135,446	135,446
R ²	0.016	0.020	0.168	0.169

*** p<0,001 ** p<0,01 * p<0,05; unstandardized regression coefficients; M2-M4 also include dummies for survey year. The dependent variable varies from zero (most positive attitudes toward immigrants) to ten (most negative attitudes). Data Sources: ESS waves 1-9 (2002-2018).

The results in the successive models confirm that birth cohort affiliation is an important predictor of attitudes toward immigrants. In model 1, when not controlling any additional factors, all birth cohorts younger than the reference cohort (1952 to 1961) are significantly less disapproving of immigration whereas the opposite is reported for older cohorts. The effect of increasing anti-immigrant sentiment becomes ever stronger in the older cohorts.

Model 2 additionally includes the year of the ESS survey in the analysis, controlling period effects. This does not affect the results in any significant way. In model 3, further control variables are included, accounting for respondents' social background characteristics. After controlling for their political orientation, religiosity, education, household income, and satisfaction with the country's economy, most significant differences between birth cohorts remain stable, although effect sizes shrunk. Including the proxy for age and life-cycle effects in model 4 ("never married"), however, leads to a different pattern. Never having been married (or lived in a civil partnership) is strongly associated with less anti-immigrant sentiments. The underlying mechanism, however, driving this effect, is age, since it is older individuals who are more likely to have experienced a marriage(-like) relationship. In adding this proxy for age, results show that with growing age, respondents become more opposed to immigrants. This finding is consistent with most previous studies, where age shows a significant negative effect on sentiments toward immigrants (for an overview, see McLaren and Paterson, 2019).

Controlling age effects, model 4 reveals that the oldest cohorts, born between 1912 and 1941, continue to hold consistently more negative attitudes toward immigrants than the reference birth cohort (*1952 to 1961). However, the subsequent cohorts (born after 1961) no longer significantly differ in their attitudinal patterns. Strikingly, in their cohort average, individuals born between 1982 and 1991 show even more opposing attitudes, at a statistically significant level. Here, a strong cohort effect prevails.

Generally, as hypothesized earlier, successive cohorts will have more immigrant-friendly attitudes (H1). With this, the process of cohort replacement impacts aggregated population level

attitudes toward immigrants for western European societies. With the three oldest (born between 1912 and 1941) cohorts' shrinking share of the overall population between 2002 and 2018 from almost 25% to less than 8% (see Figure 1), a substantial amount of variation in the overall opinion climate toward immigrants can be accounted for through the process of cohort replacement. Hence, with the complete replacement of these older cohorts, we can expect a more positive evaluation of immigrants within western EU member states. For the future, however, this trend of decreasing anti-immigrant attitudes over birth cohorts is coming to a halt. Western European birth cohorts that were socialized after World War II, predominantly do not significantly differ in their average attitudes toward immigrants. Moreover, a reverse trend might be underway. Independent of additional explanatory factors, such as age, period, and socioeconomic characteristics, the cohort born between 1982 and 1991, on average, holds increased dismissive attitudes toward immigrants when compared to the cohort born between 1952 and 1961. Perceived insecurities, potentially triggered by high unemployment rates (due to the global financial crisis in 2008) when first entering the job market, by the consolidation of neoliberalism, and, by international terrorism, when growing up, might have led to a preference for nationalism and global isolation, explaining why the "millennial" cohort born between 1982 and 1991 is more skeptical about immigration.

5.3. Results longitudinal fixed effect models at cohort level (within cohort effects)

Table 3 displays the results of the pseudo-panel analysis with fixed effects. The regression model predicts the impact of macroeconomic changes and varying immigration rates from different country categories on cohorts' attitudes toward immigrants. A variance inflation factor (vif) analysis does not indicate multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. Values remain below 2. Therefore, I calculate one model including all explanatory macro-variables. Results show that changing economic conditions at the country-level (measured with GDP per capita) do not lead to significant intra-cohort shifts in the evaluation of immigrants.

Immigration from different country categories, however, exerts different effects on public opinion. Whereas an increase in immigration from old EU member states points toward a decrease in cohorts' anti-immigrant attitudes, a rise in the immigrant share from new EU member states tends to increase anti-immigrant attitudes, but not at any level of statistical significance. Rising immigration rates from the Global South, on the other hand, lead to significant opposition to immigrants within native cohorts, as does an increase in the inflow of asylum seekers.

Although variables on the group level mainly function as control variables in this analysis, it is worth mentioning that the results lend support to the majority of previous findings: An increase in a cohort's level of education significantly decreases anti-immigrant attitudes. The same holds for "satisfaction with household income." Rising income satisfaction significantly decreases negative attitudes toward immigrants. The proxy for life-cycle events proves to be insignificant for cohorts' attitudes to change, whereas a cohort's tendency to become more religious leads to a small decrease in opposition to immigrants. A cohort's shift toward the political right on the other hand, significantly increases dismissive attitudes toward immigrants.

Table 3: Fixed-effects regressions predicting within-cohort variation in attitudes toward immigrants.

<i>Country-level</i>	
GDP constant (thousand US\$)	-0.009 (0.012)
Share of immigrants from old EU member states (%)	-0.256 (0.149)
New EU member states (%)	0.099 (0.072)
Global South (%)	0.097*** (0.018)
Inflow asylum seekers (%)	0.229* (0.104)
<i>Group-level</i>	
Level of education (1-3 low to high)	-0.483*** (0.088)
Household income (1-4 low to high)	-0.634*** (0.097)
Political orientation (“left” 0 – 10 “right”)	0.197*** (0.035)
Religiosity (0-10 low to high)	-0.065* (0.029)
Never Married	-0.068 (0.166)
Observations	1,217
N (Pseudo Panels)	164
Adjusted R ² (within)	0.353

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; unstandardized regression coefficients; Robust standard errors are clustered by country and cohort (in parentheses). Model also includes dummies for survey year. The dependent variable varies from zero (most positive attitudes toward immigrants) to ten (most negative attitudes). Data Sources: ESS waves 1-9 (2002-2018); OECD (2021); World Bank (2021a).

5.4. Robustness checks

As outlined above, to answer the research question of how periodic changes over time affect attitudes toward immigrants within birth cohorts, multilevel modeling provides an equally valid approach. Table A2 in the Appendix shows that a linear mixed model with random cohort effects yield results similar to those of the pseudo panel. Only the effect of GDP gains some significance in the multilevel model. The very small effect size of the coefficient, however, does not imply a strong effect that is potentially missed in the pseudo panel approach.

The results remain robust, even when limiting the size of respondents in the synthetic observations (Table A3) to $n \geq 0$ and $n \geq 50$ instead of $n \geq 30$, as administered in the original analysis. Moreover, when varying the cohort categorization to 7-year birth cohorts or 12-year birth cohorts instead of 10-year birth cohorts (Table A4), no significant differences in results are detected.

Furthermore, by excluding single countries (Table A5) and single survey years (Table A6) from the analysis, I test whether effects are largely robust or whether they are driven by particular countries or periods. When excluding single countries from the analysis, the null effect of GDP on anti-immigrant attitudes remains predominantly stable, though changes in estimates directions occur. When excluding Denmark or Portugal from the analysis, an increase in GDP leads to a small and weak but significant decrease in anti-immigrant sentiments (Table A5). When excluding single periods from the analysis, I observe a similar pattern (Table A6). Coefficient sizes for GDP remain small and insignificant. Only when excluding 2018 from the analysis does a rise in GDP exert a small statistically significant decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes. In sum, a tendency of rising GDP leading to less pronounced anti-immigrant attitudes can be observed. However, overall, changes in economic macro-conditions during the observation period do not play a significant role in explaining changes in cohorts' opposition to immigrants. Hence, the hypothesis that deteriorating economic conditions on the country level lead to a rise in birth cohorts' dismissive attitudes toward immigrants (H2) does not find strong support.

Furthermore, sensitivity analyses (Table A5 and A6) confirm the findings of the main analysis with regard to changing immigration rates from old and new EU member states. Whereas the directions of the estimates remain predominantly robust, coefficient sizes vary somewhat and change their levels of significance. The effect of immigration from new EU member states changes direction when Portugal is excluded and when excluding ESS round 9. Additionally, when excluding ESS round 9, the effect of immigration from old EU member states changes

direction, although the effect remains statistically insignificant. Thus, reactions to demographic changes due to rising immigration from old and new EU member states do not prove to be strong at the cohort level.

In contrast, rising immigration shares from the Global South prove to be stable predictors of cohorts' attitude changes toward immigrants. The coefficients for the immigration share from the Global South remain stable in size, direction, and level of significance when excluding single countries and periods. Only when excluding ESS round 9 from the analysis does the coefficient size decrease somewhat, losing some of its statistical significance. Finally, the findings of the sensitivity analysis concerning the inflow of asylum seekers are rather striking. Results are predominantly robust in direction when excluding single countries, although levels of significance vary somewhat. When excluding Germany, Finland, Great Britain, or Portugal from the analyses, the inflow of asylum seekers no longer affects cohorts' attitudes at a significant level. Furthermore, when considering the period sensitivity analysis, it becomes apparent that the effects are mainly driven by the year of the so-called refugee crisis in Europe. Once data from 2015/16 are excluded from the analysis, the estimators change direction.

Hypothesis 3 finds partial support: increasing immigration from the Global South and from asylum seekers leads to a greater increase in anti-immigrant attitudes than increasing immigration from new EU member states (since 2004). At the same time, an enlarged share of immigrants from old EU member states (before 2004) will bring the smallest increase in anti-immigrant attitudes. Overall, the results show that increases in different immigrant groups evoke different reactions in host societies regarding cohorts' attitudes toward immigrants in general. Increasing immigration from the Global South leads to increasing anti-immigrant attitudes among western EU cohorts. However, only a stark increase in asylum applications such as that in 2015/16 leads to a negative effect: This is not observed during other periods of observation. Furthermore, an increase in immigrant shares from new EU member states does not provoke substantially differing attitude changes among western European cohorts than an

increasing number of immigrants from old EU countries. Here, both the country sample and the period of observation play critical roles.

6. Conclusion

6.1. Summary and Discussion

Whereas much is known about the impact of age (Coenders and Scheepers, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2006), early-years socialization conditions (Jeannet and Dražanová, 2019; McLaren et al., 2020), as well as changing macro conditions (Heizmann and Huth, 2021) on contemporary attitudes toward immigrants, the interplay of these factors—age, period, and cohort effects—in large-scale attitude changes remains understudied. This is surprising since most recent studies emphasize the importance of the dynamic approach of ethnic competition theory (e.g., Czymara, 2021). Motivated by this gap in the literature, in a first step, I use pooled ESS data from 2002 to 2018 to examine how western European birth cohorts differ in their sentiments toward immigrants irrespective of age and period, by performing multiple linear regression analyses. In a second step, I combine ESS data with country-level information on economic conditions and immigration rates from different regions in the world to examine to what extent periodic changes over time affect attitudes toward immigrants within birth cohorts. To achieve this, I apply a fixed-effects panel analysis at cohort level. Country and period sensitivity analyses function as robustness checks.

This study is limited to analyses that include ten western EU member states, narrowing the implications of the findings to a particular sample. Keeping this limitation in mind, the study has several key findings: First, demographic changes due to the process of cohort replacement led to a substantially more positive opinion climate toward immigrants within western EU host societies over the 2002 to 2018 period. With the successive replacement of the oldest cohorts, born between 1912 and 1941, overall anti-immigrant attitudes within societies decreased. In the future, however, this positive development is likely to come to a halt, since younger cohorts no

longer significantly differ in their attitudes from those born between 1952 and 1961. Even though the effects are indiscernible in the younger cohorts, these findings ascribe certain explanatory power to cohort affiliation in determining attitudes toward immigrants. This, to some degree, contradicts the findings of Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown (2011), who ascribe no explanatory power to cohort affiliation but rather to period effects. Whether this disparity in findings is rooted in differing time scales or country samples is open to scrutiny.

Second, the expected positive effect for cohorts growing up in a context of higher-immigrant-origin diversity, as proposed by several researchers (Eger et al., 2021; McLaren et al., 2020; Norris and Inglehart, 2019), apparently does not outweigh the negative effects of perceived existential insecurities during the younger cohorts' formative years (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). As previous research stresses, a context of high income inequality, high unemployment rates, and perceived insecurities during a cohort's formative years stimulates the rejection of outsiders, leaving a permanent imprint on individuals throughout life (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018; Inglehart and Norris, 2017; McLaren et al., 2020). If the goal is to ensure social cohesion within European states, these insecurities need to be addressed so that migrants do not become targets of frustration. Future studies should specifically investigate the conditions for perceived threats triggering anti-immigrant sentiments among young adults. Single country studies offer a way of extending previous research (Eger et al., 2021; Jeannot and Dražanová, 2019; McLaren and Paterson, 2019) to gain a better understanding of cohort trends in differing contexts (Coenders and Scheepers, 2008; McLaren et al., 2020; Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown, 2011).

Third, cohorts change their attitudes toward immigrants due to certain period effects, such as changing macro level conditions. In this study, there is indication for rising GDP levels to slightly decrease anti-immigrant attitudes, supporting previous findings for Canada (Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown, 2011), but GDP development only plays a subordinate role in general. More importantly, this study illustrates that certain shifts in the immigrant population function as

periodic events boosting threat perceptions within birth cohorts. A key finding of the study is that increases in immigration from different origin backgrounds evoke dissimilar reactions within western EU host societies. While increases in immigration rates of EU citizens do not play a significant role in changing natives' sentiments, rising immigration from countries in the Global South proves to be a stable predictor of within-cohort attitude changes toward immigrants. Furthermore, increases in asylum seekers only lead to increasing negative sentiments within cohorts when the year of the so-called refugee crisis is included in the analysis. Increased issue salience provides further explanatory power for natives' increased opposition during this particular period (Czymara and Dochow, 2018; Hopkins, 2010).

No previous study has analyzed changing immigration rates in such detail. Thus, this study provides the first empirical evidence based on actual demographic shifts as opposed to previous studies that rely on survey respondents' evaluation of hypothetical immigration of particular immigrant groups only (Bloom, Arikan and Lahav, 2015; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016, 2019). Furthermore, it supports the findings of Czymara (2021), who examines the impact of asylum seeker inflows on attitudes toward refugees, and further expands them, by providing a more granular analysis of several immigrant groups' background-origins and a longer period of observation.

In the light of these findings, the theoretical assumption that it is mainly economic and cultural group threat perceptions that drive periodic changes in anti-immigrant attitudes needs further adaptation (e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). As increased immigration levels from mostly eastern European countries do not significantly impact western European attitudes toward immigrants in general, cultural and economic dimensions of threat perceptions alone prove insufficient for explaining anti-immigrant attitudes. By definition, the Global South comprises lower-income countries, but it also primarily entails countries with ethnic populations that are non-white. Thus, this study's findings rather illustrate that ethnic prejudice plays a key role in western EU populations to oppose immigration. With this, the study lends initial empirical

support to previous research based on actual demographic shifts, suggesting that opposition to immigration is hierarchical (Bloom, Arikan and Lahav, 2015; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2019). Moreover, we learn that immigrant groups that stereotypically represent all three dimensions of perceived threats—economic, cultural, and ethnic—face highest disapproval. Thus, future research should not only distinguish between economic and cultural threat perceptions but also include the specific dimension of ethnic prejudice.

6.2. Concluding remarks

What are the implications of this study for our understanding of shifts in attitudes toward immigrants? Overall findings suggest that it is neither cohort (Ross and Rouse, 2015) nor period effects (Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown, 2011) alone that are driving large-scale attitude changes, but rather an interplay of cohort and period effects. Cohort affiliation is clearly associated with attitudes toward immigrants, especially when comparing the oldest with younger birth cohorts. This does not imply, however, that cohorts' attitudes remain stable over time. Instead, certain period effects can significantly change cohorts' attitudes, whereby increasing immigration rates from the Global South play a decisive role.

While we know from previous research that natives' perceptions of the size and composition of the immigrant population affect public opinion, this study goes beyond sheer perceptions and establishes that it is actual demographic change that acts as an important predictor for attitude changes. More specifically, the acceptance of rising immigration in European societies depends on the immigrants' country of origin. While Europeans largely accept inner-European migration, prejudice prevails as a result of immigration from the Global South. This reveals the power of ethnic prejudice over cultural and economic threat perceptions.

Notes

- 1 Spiegel Online (2005): Eastern European Workers Flood Into Germany "People are Afraid Here"; The Economist (2004): Migration in the European Union: The coming hordes. Fears of migration from east to west.
- 2 ESS data for Denmark (DK) are missing in 2016; for France (FR) data are missing on two important variables ("satisfaction with household income" and "marital status") in 2002 and 2004; for Finland (FI) data are missing on the variable "marital status" in 2010.
- 3 Scale reliability coefficient: 0.84 (Cronbach's alpha) indicates high scalar reliability. In a principal components analysis, the items load onto a single factor. The three items measure the same underlying construct of anti-immigrant sentiments.
- 4 Missing data mainly affects the origins of immigrants. After imputing, I randomly cross-checked whether the overall foreign-born population rate (which is more commonly available) is met with the imputed data. The dataset with imputed missing values seems robust.
- 5 The Hausman test provides empirical support for applying the fixed effects approach instead of a random effects approach by significantly rejecting the null-hypothesis assuming that the difference in coefficients is not systematic.
- 6 The weighting between both approaches is also different. In a linear mixed model on the individual level, cohorts are weighted by their relative size in the total population. In the pseudo panel, all cohorts are weighted equally.

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Appendix

Table A1: Operationalization of country-level variables.

<i>Country-level variables*</i>	Average of survey year and previous year. E.g., 2002 = mean of 2001 and 2002 (ESS round 1)
GDP ^a	Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (constant 2010 US\$). With constant series (instead of current), the effects of price inflation are adjusted for.
Immigration from old EU member states ^b	Change in share of foreign-born population by nationality from old EU member states in % of overall population. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK
Immigration from new EU member states ^b	Change in share of foreign-born population by nationality from new EU member states in % of overall population. Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia
Immigration from countries in the Global South (excluding EU member states) ^{b, c}	Change in share of foreign-born population by nationality from countries considered the Global South in % of overall population. Countries are considered Global South when they belong to the World Bank income categories: “Low income”, “Lower middle income”, “Upper middle income” during the period of analysis: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Côte d’Ivoire, Dem. Peoples Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Swaziland, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Former USSR, Former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro
Asylum seekers	Inflow asylum seekers in % of overall population.

Country categories are mutually exclusive. A country can only belong to one category. The exception are asylum seekers. A person applying for asylum is represented in two categories depending on his or her nationality.

* Since the ESS is a biennial survey, the country variables need adaption. Therefore, the mean value of the ESS survey year and the respective previous year constitute the value for the country variables.

^a Source: World Bank (2021a); ^b Source: OECD (2021); ^c Source: World Bank (2021c), Categorization of income.

Table A2: Linear mixed model with random cohort effects.

<i>Country-level</i>	
GDP constant (thousand US\$)	-0.012* (0.005)
Share of immigrants from old EU member states (%)	-0.015 (0.030)
New EU member states (%)	-0.033 (0.048)
Global South (%)	0.109*** (0.016)
Inflow asylum seekers (%)	0.218* (0.104)
<i>Group-level</i>	
Level of education (1-3 low to high)	-0.601*** (0.016)
Household income (1-4 low to high)	-0.390*** (0.011)
Political orientation ("left" 0 – 10 "right")	0.162*** (0.009)
Religiosity (0-10 low to high)	-0.040*** (0.003)
Never Married	-0.136*** (0.166)
Observations	132,656
N (cohorts)	164

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; unstandardized regression coefficients; Model also includes dummies for survey year. The dependent variable varies from zero (most positive attitudes toward immigrants) to ten (most negative attitudes). Data Sources: ESS waves 1-9 (2002-2018); OECD (2021); World Bank (2021a).

Table A3: Fixed-effects regressions predicting within-cohort variation in attitudes toward immigrants with varied minimum number of synthetic observations

	n>=0	n>=50
<i>Country-level</i>		
GDP constant (thousand US\$)	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.013)
Share of immigrants from old EU member states (%)	-0.266 (0.223)	-0.233 (0.166)
New EU member states (%)	0.100 (0.101)	0.067 (0.080)
Global South (%)	0.096*** (0.021)	0.101*** (0.019)
Inflow asylum seekers (%)	0.238 (0.129)	0.203 (0.107)
<i>Group-level</i>		
Level of education (1-3 low to high)	-0.413*** (0.119)	-0.502*** (0.104)
Household income (1-4 low to high)	-0.358** (0.133)	-0.687*** (0.101)
Political orientation (“left” 0 – 10 “right”)	0.156** (0.056)	0.224*** (0.039)
Religiosity (0-10 low to high)	-0.014 (0.039)	-0.104*** (0.030)
Never Married	0.224 (0.422)	-0.105 (0.159)
Observations	1,451	1,107
N (Pseudo Panels)	180	156
Adjusted R ² (within)	0.210	0.355

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; unstandardized regression coefficients; Robust standard errors are clustered by country and cohort (in parentheses). Model also includes dummies for survey year. The dependent variable varies from zero (most positive attitudes toward immigrants) to ten (most negative attitudes). Data Sources: ESS waves 1-9 (2002-2018); OECD (2021); World Bank (2021a).

Table A4: Fixed-effects regressions predicting within-cohort variation in attitudes toward immigrants with varied birth cohort classification for the synthetic groups

	12-year birth cohorts	7-year birth cohorts
<i>Country-level</i>		
GDP constant (thousand US\$)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.011)
Share of immigrants from old EU member states (%)	-0.203 (0.163)	-0.297* (0.145)
New EU member states (%)	0.042 (0.077)	0.108 (0.070)
Global South (%)	0.104*** (0.020)	0.105*** (0.016)
Inflow asylum seekers (%)	0.225 (0.117)	0.237* (0.099)
<i>Group-level</i>		
Level of education (1-3 low to high)	-0.440*** (0.115)	-0.424*** (0.078)
Household income (1-4 low to high)	-0.681*** (0.119)	-0.604*** (0.082)
Political orientation (“left” 0 – 10 “right”)	0.172*** (0.036)	0.150*** (0.030)
Religiosity (0-10 low to high)	-0.130*** (0.033)	-0.074** (0.024)
Never Married	-0.054 (0.168)	-0.095 (0.126)
Observations	1,045	1,629
N (Pseudo Panels)	146	231
Adjusted R ² (within)	0.374	0.313

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; unstandardized regression coefficients; Robust standard errors are clustered by country and cohort (in parentheses). Minimum size of respondents in synthetic observations n>=30. Model also includes dummies for survey year. The dependent variable varies from zero (most positive attitudes toward immigrants) to ten (most negative attitudes). Data Sources: ESS waves 1-9 (2002-2018); OECD (2021); World Bank (2021a).

Table A5: Country Sensitivity Analysis.

Excluding single countries	1 (BE)	2 (DE)	3 (DK)	4 (ES)	5 (FI)	6 (FR)	7 (GB)	8 (NL)	9 (PT)	10 (SE)
GDP p.c. (in thousand US\$)	-0.015 (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)	-0.026* (0.012)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.013)	0.006 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.030* (0.014)	-0.005 (0.013)
Share of immigrants from: Old EU member states (%)	-0.334* (0.153)	-0.094 (0.148)	-0.479** (0.150)	-0.135 (0.201)	-0.318 (0.162)	-0.218 (0.149)	-0.021 (0.140)	-0.350* (0.161)	-0.086 (0.186)	-0.672** (0.210)
New EU member states (%)	0.117 (0.077)	0.024 (0.077)	0.121 (0.071)	0.073 (0.082)	0.141 (0.074)	0.098 (0.072)	0.224** (0.072)	0.121 (0.071)	-0.083 (0.090)	0.123 (0.071)
Global South (%)	0.097*** (0.018)	0.097*** (0.018)	0.104*** (0.018)	0.122*** (0.024)	0.088*** (0.017)	0.101*** (0.018)	0.059** (0.018)	0.101*** (0.019)	0.107*** (0.019)	0.180*** (0.036)
Inflow asylum seekers (%)	0.239* (0.106)	0.084 (0.115)	0.252* (0.110)	0.276* (0.109)	0.174 (0.104)	0.222* (0.110)	0.018 (0.087)	0.252* (0.107)	0.206 (0.107)	0.580*** (0.127)
Level of education (1-3 low to high)	-0.524*** (0.098)	-0.456*** (0.097)	-0.490*** (0.107)	-0.478*** (0.092)	-0.517*** (0.086)	-0.463*** (0.093)	-0.545*** (0.082)	-0.470*** (0.095)	-0.446*** (0.091)	-0.441*** (0.077)
Household income (1-4 low to high)	-0.662*** (0.109)	-0.587*** (0.102)	-0.620*** (0.101)	-0.691*** (0.104)	-0.680*** (0.097)	-0.609*** (0.099)	-0.649*** (0.104)	-0.673*** (0.100)	-0.477*** (0.097)	-0.578*** (0.104)
Never Married	-0.098 (0.183)	0.085 (0.172)	-0.052 (0.178)	-0.129 (0.180)	0.008 (0.164)	-0.038 (0.182)	-0.216 (0.152)	-0.009 (0.183)	-0.071 (0.157)	-0.097 (0.169)
Political orientation ("left" 0 – 10 "right")	0.200*** (0.036)	0.191*** (0.037)	0.198*** (0.037)	0.180*** (0.035)	0.204*** (0.036)	0.188*** (0.038)	0.171*** (0.035)	0.184*** (0.036)	0.162*** (0.039)	0.168*** (0.037)
Religiosity (0-10 low to high)	-0.062* (0.031)	-0.056 (0.030)	-0.086** (0.030)	-0.064* (0.031)	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.077* (0.035)	-0.074** (0.028)	-0.050 (0.032)	-0.042 (0.029)	-0.088** (0.032)
Observations	1,090	1,088	1,106	1,095	1,103	1,115	1,089	1,093	1,100	1,092
N (Pseudo Panels)	148	147	148	148	148	148	146	147	148	148
Adjusted R ² (within)	0.355	0.347	0.388	0.359	0.388	0.353	0.359	0.352	0.313	0.392

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; unstandardized regression coefficients; Robust standard errors are clustered by country and cohort (in parentheses). Models also include dummies for survey year. The dependent variable varies from zero (most positive attitudes toward immigrants) to ten (most negative attitudes). Data Sources: ESS waves 1-9 (2002-2018); OECD (2021); World Bank (2021a).

Table A6: Period Sensitivity Analysis.

Excluding single periods	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDP p.c. (in thousand US\$)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.012)	-0.034* (0.013)
Share of immigrants from: Old EU member states (%)	-0.064 (0.196)	-0.233 (0.141)	-0.389* (0.160)	-0.332* (0.167)	-0.231 (0.156)	-0.313* (0.152)	-0.208 (0.150)	-0.138 (0.150)	0.057 (0.178)
New EU member states (%)	0.064 (0.082)	0.037 (0.070)	0.178* (0.072)	0.116 (0.080)	0.086 (0.075)	0.120 (0.080)	0.061 (0.075)	0.094 (0.071)	-0.011 (0.077)
Global South (%)	0.137*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.017)	0.098*** (0.018)	0.099*** (0.018)	0.101*** (0.019)	0.091*** (0.018)	0.101*** (0.018)	0.091*** (0.018)	0.045* (0.021)
Inflow asylum seekers (%)	0.198 (0.104)	0.236* (0.103)	0.265* (0.105)	0.221* (0.103)	0.162 (0.108)	0.165 (0.103)	0.360*** (0.103)	-0.531*** (0.152)	0.675*** (0.115)
Level of education (1-3 low to high)	-0.489*** (0.092)	-0.534*** (0.091)	-0.500*** (0.093)	-0.493*** (0.097)	-0.467*** (0.098)	-0.471*** (0.094)	-0.447*** (0.087)	-0.491*** (0.082)	-0.461*** (0.091)
Household income (1-4 low to high)	-0.718*** (0.105)	-0.725*** (0.102)	-0.582*** (0.104)	-0.634*** (0.104)	-0.575*** (0.102)	-0.646*** (0.105)	-0.634*** (0.104)	-0.582*** (0.101)	-0.667*** (0.095)
Never Married	-0.143 (0.209)	0.001 (0.172)	-0.063 (0.170)	-0.080 (0.171)	-0.047 (0.180)	-0.094 (0.170)	-0.063 (0.168)	-0.088 (0.155)	0.001 (0.155)
Political orientation ("left" 0 – 10 "right")	0.185*** (0.039)	0.159*** (0.037)	0.176*** (0.036)	0.210*** (0.036)	0.194*** (0.041)	0.202*** (0.039)	0.176*** (0.038)	0.174*** (0.035)	0.226*** (0.038)
Religiosity (0-10 low to high)	-0.061* (0.030)	-0.050 (0.027)	-0.063* (0.032)	-0.071* (0.030)	-0.065* (0.029)	-0.057 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.033)	-0.058* (0.029)	-0.082* (0.032)
Observations	1,091	1,093	1,079	1,079	1,085	1,073	1,074	1,096	1,082
N (Pseudo Panels)	160	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164
Adjusted R ² (within)	0.370	0.342	0.373	0.380	0.357	0.368	0.373	0.336	0.311

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; unstandardized regression coefficients; Robust standard errors are clustered by country and cohort (in parentheses). Models also include dummies for survey year. The dependent variable varies from zero (most positive attitudes toward immigrants) to ten (most negative attitudes). Data Sources: ESS waves 1-9 (2002-2018); OECD (2021); World Bank (2021a).

CHAPTER 4

The periodic event of the 2015 refugee immigration and its implications at the local level

Not in my backyard? Does Proximity to Refugee Accommodations Affect Locals' Attitudes and Behavior Toward Refugees?

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Abstract

With the so-called long summer of migration of 2015, there was an urgent need to accommodate a large number of refugees in Germany. This situation was considered a “refugee reception crisis” and intensified polarization within German society. Within this debate, anti-refugee sentiment and negative behavior toward refugees is often explained by the placement of nearby refugee reception facilities. Conclusive evidence on this claim is yet missing. Most studies dealing with refugee immigration and sentiments toward refugees lack of appropriate geo-data to test this assumption. We fill this empirical gap by employing novel data on refugee reception facilities in Germany, including exact geo-location, and combine it with the geo-locations of households participating in the German Socio-Economic Panel. Drawing on group threat and contact theory, we report a solid null effect and conclude that the placement of reception facilities neither influences sentiments nor behavior toward refugees.

1. Introduction

With the so-called long summer of migration of 2015, there was an urgent need to accommodate a large number of refugees¹ in Germany. This situation was considered a “refugee reception crisis” (Rea et al., 2019)² and intensified polarization within German society. On the one hand, civil society stepped up and showed an overwhelming willingness to help refugees in immediate need. The large number of people actively engaging on site or donating money and clothes revealed solidarity with refugees (Gricevic et al., 2020; Hinger, 2016; Jacobsen et al., 2017). On the other hand, the number of anti-immigration movements increased. Protests against refugee intake emerged, becoming an omnipresent phenomenon in German society. This development was not only reflected by a stark increase in attacks against refugees and refugee housing (BKA, 2018; Jäckle & König, 2017), but also in emerging neighborhood initiatives that strongly objected to the accommodation of refugees nearby.

Within public discourse, such protests for and against refugees are often conflated with the presence of a refugee accommodation in close proximity.³ Among other things, such as prejudice and xenophobia, this could be the result of the “Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome, which describes the acceptance of certain measures for the greater good, but resistance to these exact same measures once implementation is proposed for one’s “own backyard.” Reasons are the perceived negative consequences emanating from these measures (Dear, 1992; Ferwerda et al., 2017). While the granting of asylum as a human right may be generally accepted, the implementation of this right, thus hosting refugees, may be opposed once it affects one’s own environment. However, conclusive evidence on the claim that attitudes and behavior toward refugees is linked to the nearby provision of refugee housing is still missing. While one body of research reports an increase in anti-refugee sentiments and in right-wing vote shares due to local exposure to refugees (Dinas et al., 2019; Stecker & Debus, 2019), others provide empirical evidence for the opposite outcome (Lubbers et al., 2006;

Steinmayr, 2020), while a third group of researchers report a “null effect” (Deiss-Helbig & Remer, 2021; Schaub et al., 2020).

The inconclusiveness of the above-mentioned studies may, to some degree, derive from a lack of data quality. The existing studies either lack information on the individual level, thus relying on vote shares to determine a shift in anti-refugee sentiment (Dinas et al., 2019; Dustmann et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2020), or they lack information on refugee accommodations, thus relying on shares of refugees within a certain area (Schaub et al., 2020). This leaves unclear, first, the extent to which residents’ individual (and household) characteristics influence reactions to an accommodation in close proximity and, second, to what extent the mere presence of a shelter potentially yields a symbolic effect on attitude formation. In our study, we set out to fill this research gap by using the precise distance between refugee accommodations and private housing in Germany. With this, we expand the findings of Deiss-Helbig and Remer (2021), who examined such geospatial proximity effects for the city of Stuttgart. Hence, our contribution lies in first, enlarging the scope of the study to all of Germany, and second, in additionally investigating different sociostructural contexts, such as rural areas and economically deprived neighborhoods.⁴

Our data consists of the geo-positions of households participating in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and manually collected data on the geo-positions of refugee accommodations across Germany between 2016 and 2018. While the SOEP augments its survey data with information on the street-level for each household as well as social-structural information on the neighborhood level (provided by microm⁵), the data we additionally collected provide us with the exact location of refugee accommodations, along with their type and capacity. With this information, in our analysis, we do not need to rely on shares (e.g., voting shares or refugee shares within certain districts, as in other studies like Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann et al. 2019; Hangartner et al. 2019; Schaub et al. 2020; Stecker and Debus 2019; Steinmayr 2020), but we can calculate the exact distance of all SOEP respondents to the

respective nearest refugee accommodation. In applying multilevel analyses, thereby controlling for in-household homogeneity, and by augmenting the SOEP data with contextual info on district and street level to account for neighborhood heterogeneity, we provide answers to the research question: How does proximity to a refugee accommodation affect locals' attitudes and behavior toward refugees?

Our results show that, in general terms, individuals who live in closer proximity to a refugee accommodation do not significantly differ in their attitudes or behavior toward refugees. We confirm this conclusion with several robustness tests by employing interaction effects with regard to the share of other immigrants in the neighborhood, the socio-economic structure of the neighborhood, and the capacity (size) of the shelter. Other robustness checks include a variation in the definition of what distance can still be considered neighborhood and in varying fixed effects on federal state and county levels. Overall, our “null effect” supports and complements what was previously found on a smaller scale for specific German regions (Deiss-Helbig & Remer, 2021; Schaub et al., 2020).

In the subsequent section we present the theoretical framework of our study and the current state of research, followed by our hypotheses. Next, we describe our analytical strategy and the results. This article closes with a discussion and outlook.

2. Theoretical assumptions and hypotheses

2.1. Group threat approaches and empirical evidence concerning refugee presence

Group threat approaches arguably offer the most prominent explanations for antagonistic attitudes toward immigrants by focusing on competition over scarce resources, group positions, and identities (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1961). In this line of argument, outgroup members are perceived as threatening to the status quo and, therefore, are rejected by members of the host population (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958). The current literature differentiates between symbolic and realistic threat

perceptions. Symbolic threat perceptions occur if values, norms, religion, language, or traditions are perceived to be challenged by newcomers (Schneider, 2008). Thus, the fear of losing cultural dominance is enhanced if outgroup members differ in ethnicity or cultural background (Bloom et al., 2015; Card et al., 2012; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2015). Previous research shows that anti-Muslim feelings are especially intense when compared to general anti-immigrant sentiments (Spruyt & Elchardus, 2012; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). This is particularly relevant for our study, since a large share of the current asylum-seeking population in Germany originated from a Muslim country (BAMF, 2021).

Furthermore, realistic or material threat perceptions can drive the rejection of refugees due to perceived competition over scarce resources, such as housing, jobs, or social welfare benefits, as well as from a fear of crime. Although empirical evidence is somewhat mixed with regard to the relationship of economic threat perceptions and outgroup rejection (Citrin et al., 1997; Dustmann et al., 2019; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), in the current study, we assume a negative association due to two factors framing public debates: First, the settlement of refugees triggered a discussion on potential devaluation of housing prices in affected neighborhoods. Specifically, home-owners would oppose the presence of an accommodation close-by due to fears of personal financial disadvantages (Friedrichs et al., 2019), providing a prime example of NIMBY-syndrome. Second, at the other end of the wealth distribution, economically vulnerable groups are likely to feel disadvantaged compared to refugees with regard to expectations toward the social welfare state. Feelings of deservingness and entitlement among social groups are essential explanatory factors for intergroup hostility (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Sears et al., 2000). Among other things, perceived inequality, for example in income or social welfare benefits, can lead to a feeling of relative deprivation, consequently resulting in the increased rejection of refugees (Blumer, 1958; Dennison & Geddes, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Stouffer et al., 1949). Due to issue salience and direct competition over

governmental transfer benefits, the threat mechanism of relative group deprivation is enhanced when a refugee accommodation is present in the “own backyard.”

In the further realm of realistic threat perceptions, perceived security threats concerning violence, burglary, and terrorist attacks are common arguments put forward by those opposing the accommodation of migrants or refugees close by (Barone et al., 2016, p. 10; Ferwerda et al., 2017; Green et al., 2016, p. 467; Lüdemann, 2006). In Germany, in the aftermath of the 2015/2016 New Year’s Eve in Cologne, where people were harassed by perpetrators allegedly of North African origin, a heated debate evolved around “criminal immigrants.” This sparked anti-immigrant hostility and violence against refugees and their accommodations across Germany, even in previously peaceful communities (Frey, 2020).

Several conditions further intensify the aforementioned threat perceptions among the local population, leading to increased opposition toward refugees. Previous research provides evidence that the outgroup size plays an important role for opposing attitudes, since competition increases with a larger number of competitors (Hopkins, 2010; Newman & Velez, 2014; Olzak, 1992). In this regard, Lubbers et al. (2006) report for the Netherlands that smaller refugee shelters, hosting 50 or 100 refugees are more likely to be accepted by locals than larger shelters, hosting around 500 people. Besides, not only is the size of the outgroup relevant for locals’ evaluations, but also its development over time. Threat perceptions are amplified by certain dynamics, increasing when the size of the out-group suddenly increases (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018; Hopkins, 2010; Meuleman, 2009; Olzak, 1992), as was the case in 2015.

With regard to shifts in anti-refugee sentiments, a study by Schaub and colleagues (2020) examines the question of whether refugee presence in rural regions of eastern Germany affects locals’ attitudes, but reaches a different conclusion from what group threat approaches predict. The researchers show that, on the one hand, anti-immigrant sentiments are widespread in these areas. On the other hand, within these rather hostile contexts, the actual presence of refugees turns out to be irrelevant for explaining locals’ dismissive attitudes. In other words, Schaub et

al. report a solid “null effect.” This “null-effect” is also reported in a very different setting: In a study conducted in the west German city of Stuttgart, Deiss-Helbig and Remer (2021) conclude that the “influence of the actual local presence of asylum seekers [...] is either not present at all or only has a quite modest presence” (2021, p. 11). Schaub and colleagues (2020) explain this finding with the power of sociotropic concerns, arguing along the lines of Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) that individuals are more concerned about the well-being of the nation as a whole than about individual affectedness. As politicians and media outlets predominantly framed refugee immigration in 2015/16 as a “crisis” for Germany, sociotropic concerns may in fact prove to be more powerful in shaping attitudes than individual experiences in the own neighborhood (Hangartner et al., 2019). In our study, we want to contribute to this discussion and investigate the effect of individual experiences.

Hence, in conclusion, from group threat approaches, we set out to test the following hypothesis:

H1a) Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation hold more negative attitudes toward refugees and are less likely to engage in supportive behavior.

Interestingly, previous findings on threat perceptions somewhat differ between rural and urban areas. Stecker and Debus find that the “presence of refugee accommodations in Bavaria results in an increase in right-wing populist vote shares especially in small, rural communities, characterized by economic hardship” (2019, p. 300). Similarly, for Denmark, Dustmann et al. (2019) report that larger refugee shares lead to increases in the vote shares for parties with anti-immigrant agendas - everywhere except for the largest and most urban municipalities. Hence, there is reason to assume an urban-rural divide, where the presence of refugees leads to more pronounced threat perceptions in rural areas. Due to an increased awareness of the presence of a refugee shelter in close proximity and the specific social structural composition of rural areas, we also set out to test the hypothesis 1a) along the urban-rural divide.

As previous research suggests that the effects of proximity might differ between economic groups or neighborhoods, we additionally test this hypothesis with respect to economically more vulnerable groups, and neighborhoods where economic competition is perceived to be fiercer. Furthermore, we test whether with a larger outgroup size in the neighborhood, the chances of a more negative evaluation of the impact of refugees are heightened among the local population.

2.2. Contact theory and empirical evidence concerning refugee presence

A second line of theory relates to intergroup relations. In its most basic assumption, the contact hypothesis postulates that opportunities for contact and mere exposure to different ethnic groups at the neighborhood level may reduce suspicions toward these groups, thus also reducing prejudice and negative attitudes (Allport, 1954; Forbes, 1997; Lubbers et al., 2006; Oliver & Wong, 2003; Wagner et al., 2006; Weins, 2011). Consequently, only once migrants are present within the host society can the mechanisms of contact theory operate. This is in line with the seemingly paradox findings of Decker and colleagues (2014) who report that rejection toward immigrants is especially high in regions where very few immigrants live (e.g., the east of Germany). However, the mere presence of outgroup members is not sufficient for the positive effects of contact theory to come into play. To the contrary, refugees were reported to be perceived as more threatening by locals when they are not essentially settled in a location but only “passing through.” Mere exposure to mass refugee arrivals, as it occurred on Greek islands (Dinas et al., 2019; Hangartner et al., 2019) or at the German border in Austria (Steinmayr, 2020) increases natives’ hostility toward refugees and voting shares for the far right. In these situations, interactions between locals and refugees are sufficiently scarce that threat perceptions prevail. Accordingly, scholars propose several conditions that need to be met for contacts to actually reduce outgroup prejudice (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Van Laar et al., 2005). Among others, contacts have a positive effect when occurring within a cooperative

context and between members of groups with equal status. Furthermore, establishing sustainable contacts rather than mere exposure to “strangers” leads to more friendly outgroup perceptions.

Several previous empirical studies, examining the presence of refugees at the local level, provide general support for the contact hypothesis and, more specifically, enable insights into the conditions under which these positive effects occur. Research conducted in the Netherlands describes the adaptation of attitudes over time. Lubbers et al. (2006) show that in neighborhoods where an asylum seeker center is already established, locals’ general objection against such centers decreases. This finding implies that through contact with the matter formerly perceived as a threat, diffuse and rather vague fears of the unknown can be reduced. The actual presence of an asylum seeker center in the neighborhood apparently turns out to not be as threatening as locals initially expected. Ferwerda and colleagues (2017) reinforce this finding by demonstrating that American citizens in local proximity to previously settled refugees recognize that alleged security threats may be overstated. Furthermore, in hosting municipalities in Austria, sustained contacts between locals and refugees are found to reduce the far-right vote share, whereas mere exposure to refugees who were only passing through on their way to Germany (in 2015) had the opposite effect (Steinmayr, 2020).

For Germany, two recent studies however, do not support intergroup contact theory empirically. Rather, they report a “null effect” for two very different settings: For rural areas in Eastern Germany (Schaub et al., 2020), and for the city of Stuttgart (Deiss-Helbig & Remer, 2021), researchers reveal that local exposure to refugees had no impact on locals’ attitudes or behavior towards them.

Since there is no representative study for Germany, examining the proximity effect of refugee shelters on locals’ attitudes toward refugees, we aim at deepening our understanding of the contact mechanisms and test whether the contact hypothesis is in effect and under which conditions it applies. Hence, we derive the following hypothesis.

H1b) Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation hold more positive attitudes toward refugees and are more likely to engage in supportive behavior.

We also test this hypothesis more granularly, examining whether previous familiarization with the presence of migrants as well as established intergroup contacts are associated with a more positive evaluation of refugees when living in closer proximity to an accommodation.

3. Data

In our study, we set out to gather empirical evidence on the claim that attitudes and behavior toward refugees is linked to the implementation of refugee housing nearby. In order to analyze the effects of living in close proximity to a refugee accommodation, we combine the data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) with unique data on refugee accommodations in Germany. The latter contains information regarding capacity, type, and an exact address of the accommodation.

As no such data on refugee accommodation existed for Germany prior to our study, we compiled the data ourselves using different sources. As previously elaborated, in Germany, the accommodation of refugees is a state level responsibility. Hence, we had to gather information for each state separately. While some federal states publish lists of the accommodations within their area of responsibility on their websites, others provided information upon request or kept them confidential for security reasons. For those states for which we did not receive complete lists on accommodations, we researched the missing information using various sources, namely the government's responses to inquiries made by members of the state parliament ("Kleine Anfragen"), local newspaper articles, and online mapping services. To ensure high data quality, we tried to gather at least two sources indicating the same information. Consequently, as a robustness check, we conduct separate analyses for each federal state in order to account for possible differences in the quality of data (see "Analytic Strategy" for more detailed information on robustness checks). Since the federal states use different terms for the

accommodation types, we condensed the names to five overarching categories: 1. reception center; 2. shared accommodation; 3. decentralized accommodation; 4. apartment block; and 5. emergency accommodation.

For information regarding our dependent variables, attitudes and behavior toward refugees, we employ SOEP data. The SOEP is a representative survey conducted yearly since 1984. It includes nearly 30,000 individuals in 15,000 private households per year and measures a wide variety of social and economic indicators. To allow for spatial analyses, the precise geo-location of the respondents is included in the SOEP dataset since 2000 (Giesselmann et al., 2019). For further information regarding the surroundings of the SOEP households the dataset is combined with the small-scale indicators of microm,⁶ containing a broad variety of characteristics, such as purchasing power, type of neighborhood, and social environment (Goebel et al., 2007). As SOEP households and microm data are matched on the housing block level, this allows a fine-grid analysis of the surroundings and living conditions of the SOEP respondents. In order to use this highly sensitive data, various data protection conditions must be met and any preparation of the data takes place on site at the research data center.

To prepare our final dataset, in a first step, we geocoded the addresses we held regarding refugee accommodations for all of Germany using the open-source programming language Python.⁷ In a second step, we used the obtained coordinates to calculate the respective distances to SOEP respondent households. To assure that found effects are not driven by shelters far away, which cannot be considered direct neighborhood, we restrict the maximum distance between a shelter and SOEP household to a 20-kilometer radius.

In the process, any information that could help identify either the SOEP respondents or the precise location of the refugee accommodation was deleted so that in our final dataset only information crucial for our analyses remained. The baseline sample comprises respondents who live within a 20km radius of an asylum shelter and are not refugees themselves (N = 20,716). Due to missing categories on the shelter level as well as on the dependent and independent

variables ($n = 5,910$) the final analytical sample consists of $N = 14,806$ respondents clustered in $N = 9,454$ distinct households.

4. Analytic Strategy

In order to estimate the effect of the distance to an asylum shelter on anti-refugee sentiments, we employ a multi-level linear regression analysis with a random intercept on the household level. Such a multilevel analysis with individuals (l) clustered in households (j) denotes a function of

$$Y = \zeta_j + x_{1l}\beta_1 + \dots + x_{kl}\beta_k + \varepsilon_l$$

Where x_{1l}, \dots, x_{kl} denote the predictor variables (distance to an accommodation and controls). The parameters β_1, \dots, β_k are the fixed regression coefficients and have to be estimated. ζ_j denotes the random intercept for the household. ε_l denotes the residual. The multilevel approach is justified in order to account for in-household homogeneity in regard to, for instance, political beliefs.

Dependent and independent variables

For our main analyses, we use SOEP version 36 (release 2021) and from that the 2018 survey. We employ two latent variables to observe attitudes toward refugees. The first captures the subjective perception of the impact refugees have on societal domains such as cultural life, the economy, and Germany as a place to live. The wording of the questions is, “Is it generally good or bad for the German economy that refugees are coming here?”; “Will refugees erode or enrich cultural life in Germany?”; and “Will Germany become a better or worse place to live because of the refugees?” Responses were on an 11-point Likert scale, with 11 representing the most positive assessment. We generate an additive index of these three variables (divided by the

number of variables, Cronbach's $\alpha = 0,82$), referred to as "domain" index. The second latent variable captures risk perceptions due to refugee migration ("risk" index). The wording of the two questions is "Does a large influx of refugees mean more risks or more opportunities in the short term?" and "Does a large influx of refugees mean more risks or more opportunities in the long term?", respectively. The scale ranges from 1 "more risks" to 11 "more opportunities" (Pearson's $r = 0.64$). To observe behavioral patterns, we employ two items asking respondents whether they plan to donate money or goods to refugees ("donation") and whether they plan to help refugees on site ("help"), for instance by supporting them during administrative processes or by providing language training (answer options no (0) / yes (1)).

Our dependent variables have different scales, where the indices are considered metric (impact on societal domains and risk perceptions) and the behavioral variables are dichotomous. Thus, the interpretation of coefficients in equation (1) must be adjusted. For linear models with metric dependent variables, the coefficients show the relative change of the dependent variable dependent on one unit change of the independent variables. For the linear probability models, the coefficients show the relative change in probability of the dependent variable due to one unit change of the independent variable.

Our key independent variable is the distance (in km) between a SOEP household and its nearest refugee accommodation. We also employ its squared term to capture non-linear effects. In order to test our two main hypotheses more granularly, we additionally test a set of interaction effects (Table 1).

Table 1: Measures of Hypotheses and Interaction effects.

H1a	Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation hold more negative attitudes toward refugees and are less likely to engage in supportive behavior.
Independent variable	Distance in kilometers.
#Economically vulnerable groups	Interaction of distance to an accommodation and the reception of social welfare benefits.
#Deprived neighborhoods	Interaction of distance to an accommodation and level of economic deprivation. A neighborhood is considered deprived if it is defined as an area with a difficult economic and demographic outlook or as a so-called “drainage-area” (“Entleerungsgebiete”).
#Outgroup size	1. Interaction of distance to an accommodation and capacity of accommodation. An accommodation is considered large when more than 50 individuals can live there. 2. Number of accommodations within a 20km range.
#Rural-urban	Interaction of distance to an accommodation and regional density. A region is considered rural if less than 5,000 individuals live there.
H1b	Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation hold more positive attitudes toward refugees and are more likely to engage in supportive behavior.
Independent variable	Distance in kilometers.
#Foreign friends	Interaction of distance to an accommodation and a variable indicating whether a respondent has non-German friends.
#Ethnically diverse neighborhoods	Interaction of distance to an accommodation and a variable indicating whether more than 10 percent of the inhabitants of a community have a non-German background.

In sum, for each hypothesis we employ four different models in order to test the different dependent variables (index of impact refugees have on different societal domains (“domain”), index of risk perceptions (“risk”), donating for refugees (“donation”), helping out on sight (“help”). This set-up allows for observing shifts in attitudes and behavior. However, employing models to test the hypotheses and several interaction effects results in a total of 24 models. To avoid a multiple testing problem and type I error, we refrain from employing a clear cut-off for significance testing. Instead, we rely on effect size and confidence intervals to determine whether an association is meaningful and significant.

Control variables

For all models, we employ a set of control variables potentially confounding the association between the distance to a shelter and anti-refugee sentiment (for frequencies see Table A.1 in the appendix). First and foremost, to ensure that found effects are not due to the context in which the households and the shelters are placed, we control for the size of the town and employ a fixed effect for NUTS 3 regions (*Kreise*). We additionally control for the share of home ownership and the share of academics (at the zip code level, PLZ8). On individual level, we control for the migration background (1 “none”; 2 “direct” 3 “descendant of direct migrant”), age in groups (1 “16/29”, 2 “30/44”, 3 “45/59”, 4 “60/74”, 5 “75+”), employment status (1 “full and part time”, 2 “training”, 3 “marginal”, 4 “unemployed”), gender, number of friends with a migration background, education (1 “ISCED 0 & 1”, 2 “ISCED 2”, 3 “ISCED 3 & 4”, 4 “ISCED higher 4”, 5 “else”), religious denomination, and whether the person receives social welfare benefits (ALG II). We further employ a fixed effect for the interview month to capture period effects during the SOEP’s field work. On the household level, we control for the adjusted monthly net household income and its squared term. Additionally, all variables employed for testing interaction effects are used as controls.

On the shelter level, we control for its capacity (1 = up to 50 inhabitants; 2 = up to 200 inhabitants; 3 = up to 500 inhabitants; 4 = more than 500 inhabitants) and type of accommodation (1 “reception center;” 2 “shared accommodation;” 3 “apartment block”). We exclude emergency shelters because they are only used for rather short periods and locals are likely aware that these facilities will shut down as soon as possible. We further exclude decentralized living as this does not represent the idea of a shared shelter but is comparable to living in a private apartment.

Robustness checks


To show the robustness of our findings, we provide three robustness checks. First, we restrict the sample of shelters to a radius of 10km, 2km, and 1km from a respective household. With such an approach we assure that found effects are not driven by shelters outside the immediate neighborhood. Second, we test for endogeneity between distance to a refugee shelter and anti-refugee sentiment. To achieve this, for all above mentioned models we estimate the relative intra-individual change of the dependent variables between 2016 and 2018. Assuming that between these two years the asylum shelter was placed in the area rules out any remaining endogeneity between placement of a shelter and, for instance, prior positive opinion climates toward refugees in a certain neighborhood. Third, as mentioned above, the data quality on asylum shelters may vary between federal states. Therefore, we replicate our analyses for each federal state separately and further apply separate analyses for East and West Germany.

5. Results

5.1. Descriptive statistics

Figure 1 describes the distribution of respondents by distance from the nearest refugee accommodation. We observe two peaks in the distribution: The first one at kilometer 1 with almost 2,500 respondents and the second at kilometer 2, with around 1,500 respondents. This indicates that a large proportion of respondents lives within a radius of two kilometers to the next refugee accommodation.

Figure 1: Distribution of respondents' distance to closest refugee accommodation



Source: SOEP v.36, round 2018

5.2. Regression Results

Figure 2.1 presents the effect estimates for attitudes and Figure 2.2 presents the effect estimates for behavior, controlling for the full set of individual, household, and neighborhood covariates.⁸ For full information, Table A.2 in the Appendix reports the regression tables. Due to potential multiple testing problems, we do not solely rely on a classic test of hypothesis to reject or accept a hypothesis with a clear cut-off for significance testing (see Amrhein, Greenland, and McShane 2019). When discussing hypotheses, we refer to effect sizes and confidence intervals in order to determine whether an association is meaningful and significant.

Accounting for variation in individuals' distance to refugee accommodations, we find a null-effect for respondents living closer to a refugee accommodation as opposed to respondents living further away. This finding holds for attitudes as well as behavioral items (see “Hypotheses 1a, 1b Distance in km”, Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Effect sizes are small for all four dependent variables and the estimates lie in the middle of the 95% confidence intervals showing

no tendency toward a certain direction (Table A.2). Hence, living in closer proximity to a refugee accommodation does not affect how refugees are perceived with regard to their impact on Germany's economy, culture, or how Germany is evaluated as a place to live. Furthermore, proximity to a refugee accommodation neither affect locals' risk perceptions nor does it affect locals' intentions to donate for refugees in the future or help on site. These estimation results lead us to reject both our hypotheses: Living closer to a refugee accommodation does not affect attitudes or behavior toward refugees.

Having explored these general associations to rule out the possibility that the null-effect results from polarization effects, we additionally examine potential heterogeneous effects by estimating separate models, employing an interaction term between the distance and sub-groups (see Table A.2). Results of the interaction estimates (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) show that living in closer proximity to an accommodation does not significantly affect either attitudes or behavioral patterns of individuals in different settings. Although some indicators show slightly significant estimates (e.g., capacity of accommodation, rural areas), effect sizes remain small and there is no coherent pattern to be observed that would allow to support either hypothesis.

Figure 2.1: Regression estimates of the impact of the distance to a Refugee accommodation on attitudes toward refugees (linear models)





Figure 2.2: Regression estimates of the impact of the distance to a refugee accommodation on behavior toward refugees (linear probability models)



How reliable are these findings? Examining the results of the control variables, we see the classic patterns for explaining anti-immigrant sentiments. Level of education, employment status, and age all point in the expected direction and reveal the well-known associations. Moreover, the robustness checks we conduct show strikingly consistent results with the findings of the main analysis (see online appendix for both). The few results that deviate should be briefly discussed though. First, when restricting the sample to a radius of one and two kilometers from a respective household, locals who live in closer proximity evaluate refugee immigration as riskier (see Figures A.1 and A.2). Additionally, we find a small negative effect for deprived neighborhoods. Here, locals evaluate refugee immigration as slightly more negative as well as riskier, the closer an accommodation within a 2km radius. These findings indicate that threat perceptions may operate only when refugees are settled in the immediate surroundings. Locals seem to feel slightly more negative about refugees when affected on a daily basis, for example, when sharing the immediate local infrastructure with refugees. Second, there is some variation in results for East and West Germany. East Germans evaluate refugee immigration more negatively on the domain index as well as on the risk index when living in closer proximity to an accommodation, although the effects are small.

Interestingly, however, East Germans living in closer proximity to larger accommodations as well as to several accommodations seem to drive the small effects that we reported in the main analysis. They are more skeptical about the impact of refugee immigration to Germany when living in closer proximity to a larger accommodation, but less skeptical when living in closer proximity to several accommodations. Again, though, effect sizes are small. Third, the sensitivity analysis we conduct with regard to single states overall shows stable results. Although there is a little variation for single counties, we cannot detect serious outliers that would drive any of the results in our main analysis. Finally, the robustness checks show no changes in respondents' attitudes or behavior between 2016 and 2018, reducing the chances of endogeneity between the placement of a refugee accommodation and attitudes toward refugees.

6. Discussion and Conclusions

In this study, we find little evidence that the presence of a refugee accommodation is associated with locals' attitudes or behavioral patterns toward refugees in Germany. This is the result of multi-level linear regression analyses based on novel data of geo-positions of refugee accommodations, information on capacity and type of such accommodations as well as the geo-positions of private households in Germany with respective survey data (SOEP). We employ various model specifications to test for heterogeneous effects and conduct several robustness checks by restricting the sample to a smaller radius surrounding the shelters, employing fixed effects on county and state level and by running separate analyses for each federal state. Moreover, we also estimate the relative change on the dependent variables between 2016 and 2018.

Turning to the results, in the great majority of analyses, a null-effect prevails, indicating that locals' sentiments and behavior are unaffected by the presence of a refugee accommodation in closer proximity. Hence, in support of Lubbers and colleagues (2006), we do not find empirical support for the NIMBY-syndrome to strike once refugees are settled within a neighborhood. The null-effect is slightly challenged by locals' marginally more negative reactions to larger accommodations as opposed to smaller ones. Also, we detect a small positive effect among respondents in rural areas who live in closer proximity to a refugee shelter as opposed to those who live further away. Furthermore, for Eastern Germans, we find a very small negative proximity effect with respect to attitudes, but not behavior. Finally, when living in closer proximity to a shelter within a radius of only two kilometers, refugees are perceived as more negative as compared to the larger radius. This indicates that the immediate proximity to an accommodation may have a slightly negative effect, however, throughout the analyses no coherent pattern is detected, truly supporting this claim.

In light of previous public discussions on this matter, our null-effects come as somewhat surprising, especially when anecdotally recalling the strong reactions among the German population during the so-called long summer of migration in 2015. Germany witnessed a wide array of responses to refugee arrivals, ranging from friendly welcoming scenes at Munich central station to violent protests in other parts of the country. Given this context, how do we explain the null-effect?

When turning to the academic literature, our findings are less puzzling. Although with somewhat different instruments and for different regions, previous research provides empirical evidence for the mere presence of refugees to be unable to explain locals' attitudes or behavior toward refugees (Deiss-Helbig & Remer, 2021; Hangartner et al., 2019; Schaub et al., 2020). Instead, scholars argue that sociotropic concerns over the well-being of society as a whole are more powerful in explaining respondents' evaluation of refugee immigration than individual affectedness, such as hosting refugees in the neighborhood. Accordingly, in our study, we show that neither current threat-perceptions, nor increased contact opportunities due to the presence of a refugee accommodation in close proximity have a lasting effect on locals' attitudes and behavior toward refugees. Thus, the reactions to the refugee immigration we saw in the media and public discourse may be interpreted as the "acting-out" of pre-existing dispositions, but not caused by the presence of refugees in closer proximity. This issue of causality is in line with the findings of Laurence et al (2019), showing that individuals who already view outgroup members as threatening, would rate diverse neighborhoods more negatively.

Overall, it should be noted that the German population is not overstrained by the presence of refugee accommodations in the neighborhoods. Consequently, with regard to practical implications, this general acceptance by locals could be tapped into in deliberately establishing more contact points between refugees and locals, which research consistently finds to be an important driver of successful refugee integration in Germany (Krieger et al., 2020; Schmidt et al., 2020; Walther et al., 2020). More specifically, accommodations should be placed in

neighborhoods with an already immigrant-friendly population. This reduces the chance of protest movements emanating from the local population and, moreover, increases opportunities for refugees to establish positive contacts with open-minded locals. Additionally, and in support of previous research (Lubbers et al., 2006; Siegert, 2021), our findings indicate that refugees should be accommodated in smaller housing, which is likely to be beneficial not only for the refugees' living conditions, but also for social cohesion in the neighborhood.

Ultimately, some limitations of our study should be noted: First, our study cannot provide causal evidence by showing the counterfactual, but only by employing a set of control variables. Counterfactual designs, when treatment and control groups are randomized, have some advantages such as ruling out unobserved heterogeneity. As we are interested in the effect of the distance between shelters and private households on sentiments and behavior, such an approach would not be feasible as the distance cannot be varied randomly within neighborhoods. Besides, assuming a quasi-random design where refugee shelters are placed randomly across states, in our view, is not plausible. Due to the richness of potential control variables, accounting for e.g., neighborhood and household differences, we are confident, that unobserved heterogeneity is only a minor problem and the benefits of employing the exact distance predominate. To tackle this limitation, we employed a robustness check estimating the change of our dependent variables between 2016 and 2018. Such analyses do not estimate differences in level but in change and, thus, are less prone to be affected by self-selection. As the refugee shelters, in most cases, were implemented in the aftermath of the summer of migration between 2016 and 2018, such analyses should allow for a causal explanation of results. Second, the data quality on the refugee shelters differs between federal states. As some analyses on the state level, in contrast to the main analyses, suggest that the distance to a shelter is, in fact, correlated with attitudes and behavior toward refugees, this calls for some further research to disentangle whether this is an artefact due to missing data or whether that is an actual heterogeneous effect between federal states. Despite these two limitations, our analyses

provide valuable insights. Never before were the actual distance between shelters and private households used for all of Germany. This novel data, from our perspective, compensates for the shortcoming from a causal analytic perspective - which are, nevertheless, tackled by robustness checks.

Overall, the findings of our investigation may extend to further European countries and North America, which have also taken in refugees in recent years and face similar questions regarding refugee accommodation and social cohesion. For future research, it would be helpful to have access to an even more detailed dataset, with information on start and end dates of accommodations in order to come closer to testing causal effects. Moreover, with regard to survey instruments, including an item that allows information on whether actual contacts between locals and refugees occur and whether these contacts are positive or negative, would be beneficial in order to be able to test intergroup contact theory more rigorously.

Endnotes

- 1 The term “refugee” here covers all persons seeking asylum, including those who are not yet recognized as refugees and those whose asylum claims have been rejected but who are tolerated to remain in Germany (“Duldung”).
- 2 See: <https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdosiers/217376/verwaltungs-und-infrastrukturkrise>, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Deutschland: Verwaltungs- und Infrastrukturkrise [Germany: administrative and infrastructure crisis], 2015 (in German), accessed 5 July, 2021.
- 3 E.g., “[Blockage of Hamburg refugee home - selfishness with racist side effect]”, Peter Maxwill, <https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/hamburg-blankenese-fluechtlingsheim-blockade-egoismus-mit-nebenwirkung-a-1086166.html>; [Protests against asylum shelter in Saxony "Deeply shameful"] <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-reaktionen-auf-proteste-vor-asylheim-in-sachsen-a-1078325.html>, accessed 10 February, 2021
- 4 See Online appendix for: “The German context: How refugees are accommodated upon initial arrival”
- 5 <https://www.microm.de/>
- 6 The dataset of microm, a micro-marketing provider, contains a broad variety of characteristics relevant for target group marketing such as purchasing power and consumer habits as well as type of neighborhood and social environment (Goebel et al., 2007).
- 7 We used the packages Pandas, NumPy (Harris et al., 2020), GeoPandas (Jordahl, 2014), and GeoPy.
- 8 STATA Graphic scheme for Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 derive from Bischof (2017).

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Appendix

Table A.1: Sample Description

Variable	Percent	Mean	SD	N
Domain Index, 1-11 (negative-positive)		5.35	2.38	14,806
Risk Index, 1-11 (risk-opportunities)		4.57	2.32	14,806
Future donations, 0/1 (no/yes)		0.25	0.43	14,806
Future help on-site, 0/1 (no/yes)		0.10	0.29	14,806
<i>Individual variables</i>				
Highest educational level				
No degree/Basic qualification	25.02			
Intermediate qualification	28.07			
Vocational diploma / A-Levels	12.88			
Tertiary education	27.43			
Other degree	6.6			
Gender				
Male	45.77			
Female	54.23			
Foreign friends				
Almost all	8.72			
Half	7.86			
Approx. 25%	38.91			
Nobody	44.51			
Unemployment benefits				
No	93.03			
Yes	6.97			
Religion				
Christian	42.91			
Other Confession	2.28			
Undenominational	29.31			
Missing	25.51			
Migration background				
No migration background	80.05			
Direct migration background	14.14			
Indirect migration background	5.81			
Age				
16-29	13.7			
30-44	25.15			
45-59	31			
60-74	19.98			
75 and older	10.17			
Employment status				
Full and part time	55.69			
Training	2.09			
Marginal	5.82			
Unemployed	36.41			

Household variables

Monthly household net income (EUR)	3398.62	2308.87	14,806
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Sample Region

West Germany, old federal states	69.65
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East Germany, new federal states	30.35
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Neighborhood variables**Town size**

More than 500,000	19.71
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Less than 500,000	24.42
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Less than 50,000	43.64
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Less than 5,000	12.23
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Number households with home ownership	4445.08	1680.57	14,806
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Number academics older than 25	950.47	745.11	14,806
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Share of migrant households	0.44	0.50	14,806
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Accommodation variables**Type of accommodation**

Reception center	21.15
------------------	-------

Shared accommodation	75.42
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Missing / not specified	3.43
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Capacity

Up to 50	10.78
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Up to 200	37.08
-----------	-------

Up to 500	25.52
-----------	-------

More than 500	26.62
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Time variables**Month of interview**

January	0.25
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February	23.21
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March	22.15
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April	15.97
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May	13.62
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June	6.81
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July	6.17
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August	6.13
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September	1.96
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October	2.03
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November	1.34
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December	0.35
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N	14,806
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Table A.2: Effects of the distance to an asylum shelter on anti-refugee sentiments and behavior. Results of multi-level linear regression analyses.

Main analysis	Coef.	SE	P> z	95% Conf. Interval	
Null-Modell					
Domain Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.046	0.014	0.001	-0.075	-0.018
Risk Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.043	0.014	0.002	-0.070	-0.015
Future Donations					
Distance to accommodation	0.001	0.003	0.701	-0.004	0.006
Future help on-site					
Distance to accommodation	-0.005	0.002	0.002	-0.008	-0.002
Hypothesis 1a/b: Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation hold more negative/positive attitudes toward refugees and are less/more likely to engage in supportive behavior.					
Domain Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.008	0.018	0.668	-0.044	0.028
Risk Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.018	0.018	0.327	-0.053	0.018
Future Donations					
Distance to accommodation	-0.003	0.003	0.431	-0.009	0.004
Future help on-site					
Distance to accommodation	-0.002	0.002	0.317	-0.007	0.002
Economically vulnerable groups: Individuals who receive government transfer payments and living closer to a refugee accommodation hold more negative attitudes toward refugees and are less likely to engage in supportive behavior.					
Domain Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.010	0.018	0.595	-0.046	0.026
Reception of social welfare benefits	-0.631	0.105	0.000	-0.837	-0.425
Interaction effect: social welfare, distance	0.023	0.012	0.050	0.000	0.046
Risk Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.018	0.018	0.311	-0.053	0.017
Reception of social welfare benefits	-0.475	0.106	0.000	-0.681	-0.268
Interaction effect: social welfare, distance	0.007	0.012	0.526	-0.016	0.030
Future Donations					
Distance to accommodation	-0.003	0.003	0.412	-0.009	0.004
Reception of social welfare benefits	-0.045	0.020	0.028	-0.084	-0.005
Interaction effect: social welfare, distance	0.001	0.002	0.540	-0.003	0.006
Future help on-site					
Distance to accommodation	-0.002	0.002	0.334	-0.007	0.002
Reception of social welfare benefits	-0.004	0.014	0.793	-0.032	0.025
Interaction effect: social welfare, distance	0.001	0.002	0.535	-0.004	0.002

Deprived neighborhoods: Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation in more deprived neighborhoods hold more negative attitudes toward refugees and are less likely to engage in supportive behavior.

Domain Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.003	0.020	0.874	-0.041	0.035
Deprived neighborhood	0.017	1.104	0.988	-2.148	2.182
Interaction effect: deprived, distance	-0.009	0.013	0.492	-0.035	0.017
Risk Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.014	0.019	0.481	-0.051	0.024
Deprived neighborhood	0.126	1.094	0.909	-2.019	2.270
Interaction effect: deprived, distance	-0.008	0.013	0.549	-0.033	0.018
Future Donations					
Distance to accommodation	-0.003	0.004	0.399	-0.010	0.004
Deprived neighborhood	0.090	0.208	0.666	-0.318	0.497
Interaction effect: deprived, distance	0.001	0.002	0.765	-0.004	0.006
Future help on-site					
Distance to accommodation	-0.002	0.002	0.397	-0.007	0.003
Deprived neighborhood	-0.059	0.145	0.686	-0.344	0.226
Interaction effect: deprived, distance	0.000	0.002	0.796	-0.004	0.003

Outgroup size: Individuals living closer to a **larger refugee accommodation** hold more negative attitudes toward refugees and are less likely to engage in supportive behavior.

Domain Index					
Distance to accommodation	0.019	0.022	0.386	-0.024	0.063
Size of accommodation	-0.076	0.154	0.620	-0.377	0.225
Interaction effect: size, distance	-0.032	0.015	0.032	-0.060	-0.003
Risk Index					
Distance to accommodation	0.010	0.022	0.647	-0.033	0.053
Size of accommodation	-0.046	0.151	0.761	-0.341	0.249
Interaction effect: size, distance	-0.032	0.014	0.026	-0.061	0.004
Future Donations					
Distance to accommodation	0.005	0.004	0.271	-0.004	0.013
Size of accommodation	0.005	0.028	0.847	-0.050	0.061
Interaction effect: size, distance	-0.008	0.003	0.002	-0.014	-0.003
Future help on-site					
Distance to accommodation	0.002	0.003	0.513	-0.004	0.007
Size of accommodation	0.023	0.019	0.224	-0.014	0.061
Interaction effect: size, distance	-0.005	0.002	0.009	-0.008	-0.001

Outgroup size: Individuals living closer to **several refugee accommodations** hold more negative attitudes toward refugees and are less likely to engage in supportive behavior.

Domain Index					
No. accommodations within 20 km	0.007	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.012
Risk Index					
No. accommodations within 20 km	0.006	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.011
Future Donations					
No. accommodations within 20 km	0.001	0.000	0.073	0.000	0.002
Future help on-site					
No. accommodations within 20 km	0.000	0.000	0.354	-0.001	0.000

Rural-urban: Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation in rural areas hold more negative attitudes toward refugees and are less likely to engage in supportive behavior.

Domain Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.019	0.019	0.301	-0.056	0.017
Rural	-1.032	1.203	0.391	-3.389	1.325
Interaction effect: rural, distance	0.043	0.015	0.006	0.013	0.073
Risk Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.026	0.018	0.160	-0.062	0.010
Rural	0.110	1.189	0.926	-2.221	2.441
Interaction effect: rural, distance	0.031	0.015	0.042	0.001	0.060
Future Donations					
Distance to accommodation	-0.004	0.003	0.236	-0.011	0.003
Rural	-0.231	0.226	0.305	-0.674	0.211
Interaction effect: rural, distance	0.005	0.003	0.058	0.000	0.011
Future help on-site					
Distance to accommodation	-0.003	0.002	0.215	-0.007	0.002
Rural	-0.118	0.157	0.452	-0.426	0.190
Interaction effect: rural, distance	0.002	0.002	0.223	-0.001	0.006

Foreign Friends: Individuals who already hold **close relationships with migrants** and living closer to a refugee accommodation hold more positive attitudes toward refugees and are more likely to engage in supportive behavior.

Domain Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.001	0.020	0.970	-0.037	0.036
Migrant friends	0.452	0.095	0.000	0.265	0.639
Interaction effect: migrant friends, distance	-0.017	0.007	0.010	-0.030	-0.004
Risk Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.012	0.018	0.517	-0.047	0.024
Migrant friends	0.463	0.097	0.000	0.273	0.652
Interaction effect: migrant friends, distance	-0.014	0.007	0.037	-0.027	-0.001
Future Donations					
Distance to accommodation	-0.003	0.003	0.377	-0.009	0.004
Migrant friends	0.088	0.019	0.000	0.051	0.124
Interaction effect: migrant friends, distance	0.001	0.001	0.502	-0.002	0.003
Future help on-site					
Distance to accommodation	-0.002	0.002	0.367	-0.007	0.002
Migrant friends	0.073	0.013	0.000	0.047	0.099
Interaction effect: migrant friends, distance	-0.001	0.001	0.608	-0.002	0.001

Ethnically diverse neighborhood: Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation in a neighborhood with **high-immigrant origin diversity** hold more positive attitudes toward refugees and are more likely to engage in supportive behavior.

Domain Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.008	0.019	0.687	-0.044	0.029
Diverse neighborhood	-0.046	0.105	0.664	-0.252	0.161
Interaction effect: diversity, distance	-0.002	0.010	0.839	-0.021	0.017
Risk Index					
Distance to accommodation	-0.017	0.018	0.337	-0.053	0.018
Diverse neighborhood	0.027	0.103	0.791	-0.175	0.230
Interaction effect: diversity, distance	0.000	0.009	0.973	-0.019	0.018
Future Donations					
Distance to accommodation	-0.003	0.003	0.346	-0.010	0.004
Diverse neighborhood	-0.027	0.020	0.163	-0.065	0.011
Interaction effect: diversity, distance	0.002	0.002	0.306	-0.002	0.005
Future help on-site					
Distance to accommodation	-0.002	0.002	0.295	-0.007	0.002
Diverse neighborhood	0.000	0.013	0.986	-0.026	0.026
Interaction effect: diversity, distance	0.001	0.001	0.673	-0.002	0.003

Sources: SOEP v.36, geo-data on refugee accommodations

SE: Standard Error, weighted results

Controlled for: Size of the city/town/community, amount of home-ownership, amount of academics, migration background, age in groups, employment status, gender, amount of friends with a migration background, education, religiosity, reception of social welfare benefits (ALG II), fixed effect for NUTS 3 regions (Kreise), fixed effect for the interview month, adjusted monthly net household income (and its squared term), capacity of the accommodation, type of accommodation, and all variables employed for testing interaction effects are used as controls.

Figure A.1: Regression estimates of the impact of the distance to a refugee accommodation on attitudes toward refugees with varying radius (linear models)

10 kilometers

2 kilometers

1 kilometer





Figure A.2: Regression estimates of the impact of the distance to a refugee accommodation on behavior toward refugees with varying radius (linear probability models)



Online Appendix

Available at: https://osf.io/wnsje/?view_only=c0f4c0cf219c48e788fc4cd48e0b6cdc

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions on mechanisms of large-scale attitude changes toward immigrants
and refugees

1. Introduction

This dissertation offers a thorough and comprehensive study on the long- and short-term determinants for changes in public opinion centered around the unplanned immigration of large numbers of refugees in 2015/16 in the broader context of Europe and particularly in Germany. Thereby, this dissertation generates knowledge on the significance of cohort affiliation, immigration rates and immigrant composition for shifts in public opinion toward immigrants and refugees. It moreover allows conclusions on the effect of refugee presence at the local level. Findings can help to better understand and finally manage immigration which proves to be of utter importance yet again while millions of Ukrainians seek refuge in European countries. This conclusion first summarizes the findings of the empirical chapters (see Table 1), followed by a discussion of their implications for research and policy. Finally, this dissertation concludes with its limitations and potential for future research avenues.

Table 1: Summary of empirical chapters.

	Chapter 2	Chapter 3	Chapter 4
Research Question	<p>1: How does generational replacement in east and west Germany lead to long-term changes in attitudes toward immigrants?</p> <p>2: How stable are attitudes toward immigrants within generations, given changing threat perceptions in east and west Germany?</p>	<p>1: How do western European birth cohorts differ in their sentiments toward immigrants and what does this imply for future opinion climates, when younger birth cohorts replace their predecessors?</p> <p>2: How stable are birth cohorts' attitudes toward immigrants, given changing threat perceptions on the country level?</p>	<p>1: How does proximity to a refugee accommodation affect locals' attitudes and behavior toward refugees?</p>
Theory	Group conflict theory, Contact hypothesis, Generational replacement	Ethnic competition theory, Cohort replacement	Group conflict theory, Contact hypothesis
Hypotheses	<p>H1: In west Germany, members of the three oldest generations hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants than members of the successive generations.</p> <p>H2: In east Germany, the two youngest generations have more positive attitudes toward immigrants than their predecessor generations.</p> <p>H3: Tightening economic conditions and an abrupt increase in the share of immigrants lead to more negative attitudes toward immigrants within generations.</p> <p>H4: An increase in the share of asylum seekers leads to increased rejection of immigrants within generations.</p>	<p>H1: Successive cohorts will have more immigrant-friendly attitudes.</p> <p>H2. Deteriorating economic conditions on the country level lead to a rise in birth cohorts' dismissive attitudes toward immigrants.</p> <p>H3. Increasing immigration from the Global South and from asylum seekers leads to a greater increase in anti-immigrant attitudes than increasing immigration from EU member states.</p>	<p>H1a: Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation hold more negative attitudes toward refugees and are less likely to engage in supportive behavior.</p> <p>H1b: Individuals living closer to a refugee accommodation hold more positive attitudes toward refugees and are more likely to engage in supportive behavior.</p>
Methods	Multiple linear regression analyses, Panel analyses at cohort-level	Multiple linear regression analyses, Panel analyses at cohort-level	Multi-level linear regression analyses
Key Findings	<p>Generational replacement will not lead to a constantly more open and tolerant opinion climate toward immigrants.</p> <p>Youngest cohorts in east Germany hold equally negative, and in west Germany more negative attitudes than their respective predecessors socialized in the 1970s. Overall, though, eastern German attitudes are more negative than those of their western counterparts.</p> <p>Generations' attitudes remain somewhat stable despite changing threat perceptions at the country level.</p>	<p>Cohort replacement led to more positive attitudes toward immigrants since the 2000s. This development, however, comes to an end since younger cohorts no longer hold more immigrant-friendly attitudes than their immediate predecessors.</p> <p>Macro-economic changes do not substantially affect cohorts' attitudes. Increased immigration from the Global South and asylum seekers leads to cohorts' increased rejection of immigrants.</p> <p>It is less realistic threat but symbolic threat that plays a key role for natives to oppose immigration.</p>	<p>Living in closer proximity to a refugee accommodation does not affect locals' attitudes or behavior toward refugees in Germany.</p> <p>Results provide increased confidence in previous null-findings for different contexts.</p> <p>Pre-existing dispositions and sociotropic concerns are potentially more powerful in explaining reactions to refugee immigration than individual affectedness such as hosting refugees in the neighborhood.</p>

2. Findings

This dissertation finds that cohort affiliation matters for explaining sentiments toward immigrants. Cohort replacement is therefore an important predictor for long-term attitude changes. More specifically, the hypothesis that generational replacement will steadily lead to a more immigrant-friendly opinion climate is rejected for the German and Western European context. Instead of a positive linear trend over cohorts, we witness an oscillating development dependent on cohorts' prior socialization experiences. Additionally, short-term shifts in public opinion are driven less by macro-economic changes but rather by increased immigration from countries in the Global South and asylum seekers. Thus, it is less realistic threat but symbolic threat that plays a key role for natives to oppose immigration. This allows to draw the conclusion that we are not headed toward a world society ("Weltgesellschaft") that transcends national and regional constraints. Finally, this study provides little evidence that the actual presence of a refugee accommodation in the aftermath of the 2015/16 influx of refugees is associated with locals' attitudes or behavioral patterns toward refugees in Germany. Thus, sociotropic concerns at the societal level seem to outweigh actual affectedness at the local level. Together, the findings of the empirical chapters allow to contribute to three important research gaps that were outlined in the introductory chapter of this thesis (Chapter 1). First, results provide new insights regarding the debate between "settled dispositions" and "active updating" on attitudes toward immigrants (Gorodzeisky, 2021; Kustov et al., 2021; Ross & Rouse, 2015; Wilkes & Corrigan-Brown, 2011). Findings show that neither of the two models accurately describe the mechanism of social change. Rather, from a theoretical viewpoint, this thesis' findings lend support to the initially proposed model (Chapter 1, Caption 5) of "active updating" based on "settled dispositions." While there are undoubtedly substantial cohort effects, we also observe certain periodic events to impact cohorts' averaged attitudes toward immigrants. Particularly increased immigration rates from countries in the Global South or asylum seekers

change a cohort's supposedly settled dispositions. Throughout the analyses, however, such context-level effects are rather small. In fact, macro-economic downturns do not show any substantial impact on cohorts' attitudes toward immigrants. An outcome that stands in contrast to findings of an older Canadian study by Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown (2011) who analyzed time trends in attitudes toward immigrants from 1987 to 2008. Conversely to the findings of this thesis, they ascribed most impact to macro-economic changes and only little to cohort replacement. Since the present study shows that it is particularly youngest cohorts that significantly differ from their immediate predecessors, the divergent findings might to some extent be the result of differing time frames. Moreover, other more recent studies also ascribe strong explanatory power to socialization effects (Kustov et al., 2021) and to cohort affiliation (Ross & Rouse, 2015), strengthening confidence in the presented findings. Together, these conclusions show that Inglehart's thesis of the "Silent Revolution" (1977) has come to a halt and the direction ahead is less continuous but staggering.

Second, the findings of Chapter 3 empirically contribute to the claim that immigration of different immigrant groups leads to different reactions among natives. It provides first empirical evidence for the effects of actual demographic changes in the migrants' composition. This thesis thereby lends empirical support to the theoretical claims that immigration from countries with a majority population that is ethnically, culturally, and economically more distant leads to deteriorating public opinion toward immigrants within western European host societies. Previous research based their conclusions on hypothetical immigration only (Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Kustov, 2019).

Third, with uniquely collected and geo-referenced data for all refugee housing in Germany in 2018, findings from empirical Chapter 4 contribute to the complex question whether natives' proximity to a refugee accommodation leads to more positive attitudes due to higher contact opportunities between refugees and locals – or whether it leads to rising anti-refugee sentiments, due to rising potential for competition and conflict. Results show that, in general terms,

individuals who live in closer proximity to a refugee accommodation do not significantly differ in their attitudes or behavior toward refugees. We can now have more confidence in studies' previous null results that were limited to certain regions or single cities as opposed to the whole of Germany as unit of analysis (Deiss-Helbig & Remer, 2021; Schaub et al., 2020).

3. Outlook on academic, political and societal implications

The empirical chapters have three major implications on how we can reflect on public opinion changes toward immigrants and refugees and how to ensure societal cohesion in the face of ongoing immigration.

First, the stability of attitudes within cohorts underlines the importance of the formative youth. Thus, today's social structures affect tomorrow's attitudes toward immigrants. Several societal conditions during a cohort's upbringing potentially impact its members worldviews and with that their sentiments toward immigrants throughout life. As early sociological research already emphasizes: rigid social structures that provide little social mobility intensify group conflicts (Cosser, 1956). Equally, a context of high-income inequality, high unemployment rates, and perceived insecurities during a cohort's upbringing stimulates the rejection of immigrants and leaves a permanent imprint on individuals throughout their life (Coenders & Scheepers, 2008; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018; McLaren et al., 2020). Backed by empirical findings in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this dissertation has a political signal: Insecurities need to be addressed through the provision of equal opportunities, the possibility of upward mobility and the reduction of inequality so that migrants do not become targets of frustration. However, since youngest cohorts feel increasingly threatened by immigration today, neither Germany, nor the broader western European countries are on the right track here.

Second, taking current developments into account this dissertation shows that immigrant composition matters. Since refugees and immigrants from the Global South are perceived as

more threatening than immigrants from within Europe, future theoretical perspectives should include the dimension of ethnic prejudice besides economic and cultural threat perceptions (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). From a policy perspective, the findings imply the need for targeted integration efforts to reduce perceptions of outgroup threat directed at ethnicity. Moreover, and particularly relevant: Although not empirically backed, we can cautiously expect that current immigration from Ukrainian refugees will not lead to a similar outburst of anti-immigrant movements as compared to the long summer of migration in 2015 when refugees mostly originated from the Middle East and Africa. Even though Ukrainian refugees might be perceived as economically inferior and culturally distant, ethnically, they are more similar to the receiving societies and therefore perceived as less threatening. Empirical research conducted in Chapter 3 points toward this conclusion. Despite this more positive outlook, large-scale immigration from Ukraine that goes along with an economic recession can create an unpleasant mixture. Smart and immediate countermeasures to ensure social cohesion are therefore crucial.

Third, it should be noted that in the aftermath of the long summer of migration in 2015, the German population was not overstrained by the presence of refugee accommodations in their neighborhoods. This general acceptance by locals could be tapped into in deliberately establishing more contact points between refugees and locals which research consistently finds to be an important driver of successful refugee integration in Germany (Krieger et al., 2020; Schmidt et al., 2020a; Walther et al., 2020).

4. Limitations and future research

Finally, the limitations of this dissertation should be noted¹⁹ and several future research avenues examined. Most generally, this dissertation's focus is centered around the so-called 2015 "European refugee crisis." Thus, making generalized assumptions about the impacts of future immigration movements would go beyond the scope of the reported empirical findings since immigrants are a most heterogeneous group and every immigration movement is distinct with regard to immigrants' reasons for migration, economic, cultural and ethnic background, legal statuses, age and gender structure (see paragraph 3 for tentative assumptions on current refugee migration from Ukraine above). Moreover, the findings are limited to Germany and ten western EU member states further narrowing the implications of the findings to a particular sample. Nevertheless, hopefully, by granularly laying out the different time and threat components that typically drive large-scale shifts in attitudes toward immigrants, this dissertation can meaningfully place its findings in the realm of the study of outgroup attitudes and serve as a blue-print for other geographical contexts and immigration movements.

More specifically, this dissertation shows that some cohorts significantly differ in their averaged attitudes toward immigrants today. But there is still much more to learn about which factors from the past are responsible for these differences. Some researchers have followed that path and examined whether unemployment rates (Coenders & Scheepers, 2008; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018), political climate (Jeannet & Dražanová, 2019), and level of a society's ethnic diversity (McLaren et al., 2020) during cohorts' impressionable years affect their current attitudes. A more comprehensive study on the impressionable years, however, that includes empirical indicators for threat perceptions and intergroup contacts on the individual level offers a most valuable avenue to study. With more time, this undertaking will be possible at larger scale since long-running panel studies such as the SOEP that reaches back to 1984 will offer

¹⁹ For a more detailed breakdown of limitations, see the limitations sections in each paper.

long enough time series and provide information on the individual and household level that can then easily be combined with contextual data in order to understand the relevant linkages. This will offer a way to theoretically address past and present conditions and rigorously test them empirically.

Lack of data is the reason for another limitation of this dissertation regarding refugee housing. Several researchers share this concern (Deiss-Helbig & Remer, 2021; Schaub et al., 2020). Even though going through great effort to collect information on refugee shelters in Germany, it was impossible to compile a data set that includes not only the addresses of refugee housing but also the dates of their opening and potential closing. Hence, it was impossible to causally test whether respondents were already accustomed to a shelter in their immediate neighborhood at the time of the interview or whether exposure to refugees was new to them. From a theoretical viewpoint this distinction is important since a longer time to get familiarized to an outgroup in close proximity may vary from an initial reaction and thus result in different outcomes. As the refugee shelters under examination, in most cases, were implemented in the aftermath of the summer of migration between 2016 and 2018, this potential bias should be small. Overall, however, this is a call for better data availability with regard to state housing in order to be able to make more precise and empirically backed claims that help policy makers manage immigration.

Finally, simultaneous effects of threat and contact should be further investigated. Whereas a more ethnically diverse environment offers increased positive contact opportunities for some, it triggers threat perceptions for others. Previous research shows that this depends to some degree on individual's socio-economic statuses. For instance, cross-border social contacts only slightly reduce welfare chauvinism in general but diminish exclusionary sentiments among individuals with higher socio-economic statuses (Mewes & Mau, 2013). Further research in this direction should look into these connections with longitudinal data to account for causality.

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SUMMARY

This dissertation offers a thorough and comprehensive study on the determinants for changes in public opinion toward immigrants and refugees. Centered around the unplanned immigration of large numbers of refugees in 2015/16, it focuses on Germany but additionally examines the broader context of Europe. Insights from multilevel analysis, longitudinal data and exclusively collected geo-data contribute to previous research and help to find conclusions on how to best moderate and manage immigration in host societies.

The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) concludes that the process of generational replacement in Germany will not lead to a steadily more tolerant and open climate of opinion toward immigrants. Youngest cohorts in east Germany feel equally, and in west Germany increasingly threatened by immigration in comparison to their immediate predecessors socialized in the 1970s. Moreover, current changes in macro-economic conditions do not lead to substantial changes in a generation's attitudes. An increase in the number of people seeking protection in Germany, however, leads to somewhat more restrictive attitudes toward immigrants.

The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) shows that increases in immigration from different origin-backgrounds evoke dissimilar reactions within western EU host societies. While increases in immigration rates of EU citizens do not play a significant role in changing natives' sentiments, rising immigration from countries in the Global South and refugees proves to be a stable predictor of cohorts' attitudes to become more disapproving.

The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) finally provides little evidence that the presence of a refugee accommodation in close proximity is associated with locals' attitudes or behavioral patterns toward refugees in Germany. Neither current threat-perceptions, nor increased contact opportunities due to the presence of a refugee accommodation nearby have a lasting effect on locals' attitudes. Thus, sociotropic concerns at the societal level seem to outweigh actual affectedness at the local level.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese Dissertation untersucht die Determinanten für Veränderungen in der öffentlichen Meinung zu Zugewanderten und Geflüchteten. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die ungeplante Zuwanderung Geflüchteter in den Jahren 2015/16. Die Untersuchung konzentriert sich auf Deutschland, erforscht aber auch den breiteren europäischen Kontext. Erkenntnisse aus Mehrebenenanalysen, Längsschnittdaten und exklusiv erhobenen Geodaten tragen zur bisherigen Forschung bei und helfen, Schlussfolgerungen zu ziehen, wie Zuwanderung in Aufnahmegesellschaften besser moderiert und gesteuert werden kann.

Das erste empirische Kapitel (Kapitel 2) zeigt, dass der Prozess der Generationenablösung in Deutschland nicht zu einem stetig toleranteren und offeneren Meinungsklima gegenüber Zugewanderten führen wird. Vielmehr ist ein Generationenverlauf zu beobachten, der nicht linear verläuft, sondern schwankend. Darüber hinaus führen die gegenwärtigen Veränderungen der makroökonomischen Bedingungen nicht zu wesentlichen Veränderungen in den Einstellungen einer Generation. Ein Anstieg der Zahl der Schutzsuchenden in Deutschland führt jedoch zu einer etwas restriktiveren Haltung gegenüber Zugewanderten.

Das zweite empirische Kapitel (Kapitel 3) zeigt, dass die Zunahme der Zuwanderung aus verschiedenen Herkunftsländern unterschiedliche Reaktionen in den westlichen EU-Aufnahmegesellschaften hervorruft. Während der Anstieg der Einwanderungsraten von EU-Bürgern keine signifikante Rolle bei der Veränderung der Einstellung der Einheimischen spielt, erweist sich die zunehmende Einwanderung aus Ländern des globalen Südens und von Geflüchteten als stabiler Prädiktor für eine ablehnendere Haltung der Kohorten.

Das dritte empirische Kapitel (Kapitel 4) schließlich liefert kaum Belege dafür, dass eine Geflüchtetenunterkunft in unmittelbarer Nähe mit den Einstellungen oder Verhaltensweisen der Einheimischen verbunden ist. Weder aktuelle Bedrohungswahrnehmungen noch erhöhte Kontaktmöglichkeiten durch die Anwesenheit einer Unterkunft in der Nähe haben einen nachhaltigen Effekt auf die Einstellungen der lokalen Bevölkerung.

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