

DE GRUYTER

Georgios Pachymeres

**COMMENTARY ON
ARISTOTLE,
›NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS‹**

CRITICAL EDITION WITH INTRODUCTION
AND TRANSLATION

Edited by Sophia Xenophontos

Translated by Sophia Xenophontos and Crystal Addey

COMMENTARIA IN ARISTOTELEM
GRAECA ET BYZANTINA / SERIES ACADEMICA

Georgios Pachymeres

Commentary on Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften

**Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca et Byzantina
(CAGB)**



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Preface

The volume before you represents the *editio princeps* of George Pachymeres' Commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is the product of a deep interest in the reception of the classical tradition in late Byzantium, with a special focus on Greek ethics and morality. A series of interpretative studies I have published on this topic have made me acutely aware of the proclivity of Byzantine scholars to transform ancient Greek moral thought, but they have also triggered a march into uncharted territories. One of these was the inclusion of classical ethical philosophy in late Byzantine pedagogy, not merely or necessarily as a school subject in an institutional context, but as a set of practical injunctions leading to the good life by advocating for a habituation to self-discipline. In Pachymeres' text, much of this has been embellished by a religious understanding of ethics based in elements drawn from the social and cultural requirements in Constantinople at the turn of the fourteenth century. Tradition and variation, cognitive learning and moral didacticism, pagan and Christian material are therefore among the themes and dichotomies negotiated or alluded to in this fascinating document. I leave it to readers to reflect on these matters as they leaf through the text for the first time, although a background to it is offered by the Introduction, which aims to spark interest and prompt further investigation.

This book was undertaken in the framework of a major research grant for the project "The reception of Aristotle in Byzantium: The first critical edition of George Pachymeres' Commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*", for which I was the Principal Investigator. The project was generously funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) in the UK (AH/P008887/1), not only allowing me to engage full-time with the edition, translation, introduction, and related impact activities, but also furnishing me with precious collaborators. I am deeply indebted to Crystal Addey (University College Cork) for her hard work and substantial contribution to the English translation of the text during her Research Associateship on the project. Special thanks also go to Anna Marmodoro (Co-Investigator, University of Oxford/University of Durham) and Riccardo Chiaradonna (International Advisor, Roma Tre University) for offering advice, particularly but not exclusively at our scheduled workshops, where editorial and other matters were discussed. I would also like to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for a Research Incentive Grant I was awarded at an early stage of the work, of the Department of Classics and the School of Humanities at the University of Glasgow for supporting various research trips through their Incentivisation Fund, and of the AHRC for covering the Open Access fees for this book. In addition, I am grateful to the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, the Real Biblioteca del Monasterio de El Escorial, and the Biblioteca nazionale Marciana for allowing me to consult *in situ* manuscripts central to the edition. Crystal Addey would also like to

thank the late Sarah Broadie and most especially Michael Griffin for their assistance with the translation.

Most important, I owe a debt of gratitude to the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina* research project (CAGB) at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and in particular to Dieter Harlfinger and Lutz Koch, for entrusting me with the edition and for their helpful editorial guidance during preparation and revision. I would also like to record my thanks to Nikos Agiotis for advising me on the presentation and edition of the diagrams, to Ioannis Polemis for editorial comments, to Georgi Parpulov for palaeographical assistance, to Michele Trizio for commenting on the Introduction, and to Ciro Giacomelli, Pelagia Vera Loungi, and Niccolò Zorzi for informal correspondence and exchange of ideas. At a later stage, Pantelis Golitsis and Diether R. Reinsch went through the entire book and provided invaluable remarks and suggestions. Some of the material treated in the Introduction was delivered at conferences and workshops in Oxford, Vienna and Athens, and I am grateful for feedback received on those occasions. My most profound thanks are due to my husband Petros Bouras-Vallianatos, who has been a constant source of encouragement and inspiration, having read and commented incisively on all parts of the manuscript from its inception on. This book is for him.

Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
September 2022

Sophia A. Xenophontos

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Bibliography

Abbreviations

- CAG* = *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 23 vols. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1882–1909)
- CMG* = *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1908 –).
- GMG* = D. Holton, G. Horrocks, M. Janssen, T. Lendari, I. Manolossou, and N. Toufexis, *The Cambridge Grammar of Medieval and Early Modern Greek*, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019)
- DK* = ed.: H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, vol. 1, 6th edn. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951) [Heraclitus = Heracl.; Zeno = Zen.]
- FCG* = ed.: A. Meineke, *Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum*, vol. 5.1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1857) (repr. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970)
- L* = ed.: E. L. von Leutsch, *Corpus Pseudoepigraphorum Graecorum*, vol. 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1851) (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1958) [Apostolius = Apost.]
- LS* = ed.: F. G. Schneidewin and E. L. von Leutsch, *Corpus Pseudoepigraphorum Graecorum*, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1839) (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1965) [Zenobius = Zenob.]
- LSJ* = *A Greek-English Lexicon*, compiled by H. G. Liddell and R. Scott. Revised and augmented throughout by Sir H. S. Jones, with the assistance of R. McKenzie, and with the co-operation of many scholars. 9th edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). With a Revised Supplement edited by P. G. W. Glare with the assistance of A. A. Thompson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
- OCD* = S. H. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, eds. *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 4th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)
- ODB* = A. Kazhdan et al., eds. *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, 3 vols. (New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
- PG* = ed.: J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca* (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1857–1866)
- RGK* = E. Gamillscheg, D. Harlfinger, H. Hunger, eds. *Repertorium der Griechischen Kopisten, 800–1600*, 3 vols. (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1981–1997)
- PLP* = E. Trapp, ed. *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit*, 12 vols. (Vienna, 1976–1996)
- SVF* = ed.: J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903)

Editions of ancient, late antique, and Byzantine authors

Alexander of Aphrodisias (Alex.)

In Metaph. = *In Metaphysica commentaria* (ed.: M. Hayduck, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria*, CAG 1. Berlin: Reimer, 1891)

In Top. = *In Topica commentaria* (ed.: M. Wallies, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria*, CAG 2.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1891)

Anonymous (Anon.)

In EN = *In Ethica Nicomachea commentaria* (ed.: G. Heylbut, *Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma in ethica Nicomachea commentaria*, CAG 20. Berlin: Reimer, 1892)

Aristotle (Arist.)

De an. = *De anima* (ed.: W. D. Ross, Aristotle. *De anima*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961; repr. 1967)

X — Bibliography

- EN* = *Ethica Nicomachea* (ed.: I. Bywater, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894; repr. 1962)
- Metaph.* = *Metaphysica* (ed.: W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 2 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924; repr. 1970 [of 1953 corr. edn.])
- PA* = *De partibus animalium* (ed.: P. Louis, *Aristote. Les parties des animaux*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1956)
- Phys.* = *Physica* (ed.: W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis Physica*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950; repr. 1966 [1st edn. corr.])
- Post. An.* = *Analytica Posteriora* (ed.: W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis analytica priora et posteriora*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964; repr. 1968)
- Top.* = *Topica* (ed.: W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis topica et sophistic elenchi*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958; repr. 1970 [1st edn. corr.])

Aspasius (Asp.)

- In EN* = *In Ethica Nicomachea commentaria* (ed.: G. Heylbut, *Aspasia in ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt commentaria*, CAG 19.1. Berlin: Reimer, 1889)

Choerilus (Choer.)

- (ed.: H. Lloyd-Jones and P. Parsons, *Supplementum Hellenisticum*, Berlin–New York: De Gruyter, 1983)

Damascius (Dam.)

- In Phaed.* = *In Phaedonem commentarium* (ed.: L. G. Westerink, *The Greek commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, vol. 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1977)

David (Dav.)

- Proleg. Philos.* = *Prolegomena philosophiae* (ed.: A. Busse, *Davidis prolegomena et in Porphyrii isagogen commentarium*, CAG 18.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1904)

[Elias] ([Eli.])

- In Porph. Isag.* = *In Porphyrii isagogen* (ed.: A. Busse, *Eliae in Porphyrii isagogen et Aristotelis categorias commentaria*, CAG 18.1. Berlin: Reimer, 1900)

Etymologicum Gudianum (Etym. Gudian.)

- (ed.: E. L. de Stefani, *Etymologicum Gudianum*, fasc. 1 & 2, Leipzig: Teubner, 1:1909; 2:1920; repr. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1965)

Euclides (Eucl.)

- El.* = *Elementa* (ed.: E. S. Stamatis (post J. L. Heiberg), *Euclidis elementa*, 6 vols., 2nd edn., Leipzig: Teubner, 1969–1977)

Euripides (Eur.)

- Fragm.* = *Fragmenta* (ed.: R. Kannicht, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, vol. 5, Euripides (in two parts). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004)
- Hec.* = *Hecuba* (ed.: J. Diggle, *Euripidis fabulae*, vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)

Eustratius (Eustr.)

- In EN* = *In Ethica Nicomachea commentaria* (ed.: G. Heylbut, *Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma in ethica Nicomachea commentaria*, CAG 20. Berlin: Reimer, 1892)

Evenus (Even.)

Fragm. = *Fragmenta* (ed.: M. L. West, *Iambi et elegi Graeci*, vol. 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972)

Gennadios Scholarios (Genn. Schol.)

Epit. Sum. theol. = *Epitome Primae secundae Summae theologicae Thomae Aquinae* (ed.: M. Jugie, L. Petit, and X. A. Siderides, *Oeuvres complètes de Georges (Gennadios) Scholarios*, vol. 6, Paris: Maison de la bonne presse, 1933)

In De phys. = *Translatio Thomae Aquinae commentarii in Aristotelis De physico audito* (ed.: M. Jugie, L. Petit, and X. A. Siderides, *Oeuvres complètes de Georges (Gennadios) Scholarios*, vol. 8, Paris: Maison de la bonne presse, 1936)

George Pachymeres (Georg. Pachym.)

Quadriv. = *Quadrivium vel Σύνταγμα τῶν τεσσάρων μαθημάτων* (ed.: R. P. E. Stephanou and P. Tannery, *Quadrivium de Georges Pachymère, Studi e Testi 94*. Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1940)

Hist. = *Historia* (ed.: A. Failler, *Georges Pachymères, Relations historiques*, édition, introduction et notes par A. Failler, traduction française par V. Laurent, coll. *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* XXIV 1–5. Paris: Institut français d'études byzantines, 1984–2000)

Paraphr. *In EN* = *Paraphrasis In Ethica Nicomachea* (ed.: K. Oikonomakos, *Βιβλίον ἐνδέκατον: Τὰ ἠθικά, ἥτοι τὰ Νικομάχεια, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina* 3. Athens: Academy of Athens, 2005)

[Heliodorus] ([Heliod.])

In EN = *Paraphrasis In Ethica Nicomachea* (ed.: G. Heylbut, *Heliodori in ethica Nicomachea paraphrasis*, CAG 19.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1889)

Hermias (Herm.)

In Phaedr. = *Scholia In Platonis Phaedrum* (ed.: C. M. Lucarini and C. Moreschini, *Hermias Alexandrinus: In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012)

Herodotus (Herod.)

Hist. = *Historiae* (ed.: N. G. Wilson, *Herodoti Historiae*, 2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)

Hesiod (Hes.)

Fragm. = *Fragmenta* (ed.: R. Merkelbach and M. L. West, *Fragmenta Hesiodica*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967)

Hippocratic corpus (Hipp.)

Aph. = *Aphorismi* (ed W. H. S. Jones, *Hippocrates, Aphorisms – Hippocrates Volume IV*, Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931)

De nat. hom. = *De natura hominis* (ed.: J. Jouanna, *Hippocratis De natura hominis*, edidit, in linguam Francogallicam vertit, commentatus est J. Jouanna, *CMG* I 1,3. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002)

Homer (Hom.)

Il. = *Iliad* (ed.: T. W. Allen, *Homeri Ilias*, vols. 2–3, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931)

XII — Bibliography

John of Damascus (John Damasc.)

Exp. fid. = *Expositio fidei* (ed.: P. B. Kotter, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, vol. 2, *Patristische Texte und Studien* 12. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973)

John Pediasimos (John Pedias.)

In Post. An. = *Scholia in Aristotelis Analytica posteriora* (ed.: V. de Falco, *Ioannis Pediasimi in Aristotelis Analytica scholia selecta*, Naples: Sangiovanni, 1926)

John Philoponus (Philop.)

In De an. = *In De anima commentaria* (ed.: M. Hayduck, *Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria*, CAG 15. Berlin: Reimer, 1897)

In De gener. et corrupt. = *In De generatione et corruptione commentaria* (ed.: H. Vitelli, *Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis libros de generatione et corruptione commentaria*, CAG 14.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1897)

In Prior. An. = *In Analytica priora commentaria* (ed.: M. Wallies, *Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis analytica priora commentaria*, CAG 13.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1905)

John Stobaeus (Stob.)

Anthol. = *Anthologium* (ed.: O. Hense and C. Wachsmuth, *Ioannis Stobaei anthologium*, 5 vols., Berlin: Weidmann, 1–2:1884; 3:1894; 4:1909; 5:1912; repr. 1958)

Michael of Ephesus (Mich.)

In EN = *In Ethica Nicomachea* (ed.: G. Heylbut, *Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma in ethica Nicomachea commentaria*, CAG 20. Berlin: Reimer, 1892)

Michael Psellos (Psel.)

Opusc. = *Opuscula logica, physica, allegorica, alia* (ed.: J. M. Duffy, *Michaelis Pselli philosophica minora*, Leipzig: Teubner, 1992)

In Phys. = *In Physica commentarium* (ed. L. G. Benakis, *Michael Psellos Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles, Corpus philosophorum Medii Aevi. Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina* 5. Athens: Academia Atheniensis, Institutum Litterarum Graecorum et Latinarum, 2008)

Nemesius (Nemes.)

De nat. hom. = *De natura hominis* (ed.: M. Morani, *Nemesii Emeseni de natura hominis, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1987)

Nicephoros Basilaces (Nic. Basil.)

Or. = *Orationes* (ed.: A. Garzya, *Nicephori Basilacae orationes et epistolae, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1984)

Olympiodorus (Olymp.)

In Cat. = *In Aristotelis categorias commentarium* (ed.: A. Busse, *Olympiodori prolegomena et in categorias commentarium*, CAG 12.1. Berlin: Reimer, 1902)

Paul (Paul.)

Ep. Thess. = *Epistulae ad Thessalonicenses* (ed.: K. Aland, M. Black, C. M. Martini, B. M. Metzger, and A. Wikgren, *The Greek New Testament*, 2nd edn., Stuttgart: Württemberg Bible Society, 1968)

Plato (Pl.)

Leg. = *Leges* (ed.: J. Burnet, *Platonis opera*, vol. 5, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907; repr. 1967)

Prot. = *Protagoras* (ed.: J. Burnet, *Platonis opera*, vol. 3, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903; repr. 1968).

Resp. = *Respublica* (ed.: S. R. Slings, *Platonis Rempublicam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)

Proclus (Procl.)

In Plat. Alc. = *In Platonis Alcibiadem i commentarium* (ed.: L. G. Westerink, *Proclus Diadochus:*

Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1954)

[Pythagoras] (Ps.-Pyth.)

Carm. aur. = *Carmen aureum* (ed.: D. Young; post E. Diehl, *Theognis*, Leipzig: Teubner, 1971)

Scholia in Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (scholia vetera et recentiora) (Schol. In EN)

ed.: J. A. Cramer, *Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis bibliothecae regiae Parisiensis*, vol. 1,

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1839 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1967)

Septuaginta (Sept.)

Ex. = *Exodus* (ed.: A. Rahlfs, *Septuaginta*, vol. 1, 9th edn., Stuttgart: Württemberg Bible Society, 1935; repr. 1971)

Psalm. = *Psalmus* (ed.: A. Rahlfs, *Septuaginta*, vol. 2, 9th edn., Stuttgart: Württemberg Bible Society, 1935 (repr. 1971)

Sophocles (Soph.)

Schol. In Ant. = *Scholia vetera in Sophoclis Antigonom* (ed.: Georgios A. Xenis, *Scholia vetera in Sophoclis Antigonom*, Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter, 2021)

Suda

= ed.: A. Adler, *Suda lexicon*, 4 vols., *Lexicographi Graeci* 1.1–1.4. Leipzig: Teubner, 1928–1935

Theognis (Theogn.)

Eleg. = *Elegiae* (ed.: D. Young; post E. Diehl, *Theognis*, 2nd edn., Leipzig: Teubner, 1971)

Note to the reader

Proper names of ancient authors follow LSJ (9th edn, 1940; revised supplement, 1996). For late antique and Byzantine authors, the most well-known Anglicised version of names has been adopted.

Transliteration of Greek terms follows the Library of Congress system (<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpsd/romanization/greek.pdf>, accessed 29 December 2021).

I use the capitalised form ‘Commentary’ only when referring to Pachymeres’ exegesis of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The uncapitalised forms “commentary/-ies” are reserved for other exegetical works or are used with reference to the genre and form specific to traditional commentaries, i.e. as a scholiastic entity and a sequence text, respectively.



Part I Introduction

1 George Pachymeres: His life and work

George Pachymeres, a major figure in the intellectual landscape of the early Palaiologan period (1261–1341),¹ was born in Nicaea in 1242. He received his elementary education there and then moved to Constantinople upon its recapture by the Byzantines in 1261. Although we have scant knowledge of the higher studies he pursued in the capital, since no historical source mentions this period in his life, some critics consider him to have been a student of George Akropolites (1217–1282), who was responsible for the supervision and re-organisation of higher education at the time. Pachymeres' public career was then marked by the assumption of a number of ecclesiastical and civil offices: he was a deacon of the Great Church in the capital (1265) and a notary (1266); he served as *didaskalos tou apostolou* (responsible for commenting on the Epistles and the Acts of the Apostles, 1277) and as *hieromnēmōn* (in charge of religious matters, particularly ordinations, 1285), and held the progressively more important posts of *dikaiophylax* (judge, guardian of the laws) and *prōtekdikos* (head of the ecclesiastical tribunal, shortly after 1285 until his death around 1310).²

1 Detailed treatments of the political history of this period can be found in D. M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453* (London 1972) 39–167, A. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (Cambridge, MA 1972), and A. Laiou, “The Byzantine Empire in the Fourteenth Century”, in M. Jones (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History: Volume VI c. 1300–c. 1415* (Cambridge 2000) 795–824; cf. D. Angelov, *Imperial Ideology and Political Thought in Byzantium 1204–1330* (Cambridge 2006). For a concise discussion, see S. Runciman, *The Last Byzantine Renaissance* (Cambridge 1970) 1–48. For the intellectual setting of the Palaiologan period, see I. Ševčenko, “Society and Intellectual Life in the Fourteenth Century”, in M. Berza and E. Stănescu (eds), *Actes du XIV^e congrès international des études byzantine*, 3 vols (Bucharest 1974–1976) I (1974) 69–92, reprinted in I. Ševčenko, *Society and Intellectual Life in Late Byzantium* (London 1981); I. Ševčenko, “The Decline of Byzantium seen through the Eyes of its Intellectuals”, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 15 (1961) 169–186, reprinted in Ševčenko, “Society and Intellectual Life” (above); see also S. Mergiali, *L'Enseignement et les lettrés pendant l'époque des Paléologues*, Société des Amis du Peuple, Centre d'études byzantines (Athens 1996); A. Riehle, “Rhetorik, Ritual und Repräsentation: Zur Briefliteratur gebildeter Eliten im spätbyzantinischen Konstantinopel (1261–1338)”, in K. Beyer and M. Grünbart (eds), *Urbanitas und Asteiotes: Kulturelle Ausdrucksformen von Status, 10–15. Jahrhundert, Frühmittelalterliche Studien* 45 (Berlin 2011) 259–276; N. Gaul, *Thomas Magistros und die spätbyzantinische Sophistik. Studien zum Humanismus urbaner Eliten der frühen Palaiologenzeit*, Mainzer Veröffentlichungen zur Byzantinistik 10 (Wiesbaden 2011).

2 On Pachymeres' life and work, see P. Golitsis, “Pachymérés Georgios”, in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, t. VII (Paris 2018) 627–632. Cf. *ODB* III, 1550, *PLP* IX, no. 22186; A. Failler, *Georges Pachymérés, Relations historiques*, CFHB XXIV/1–5 (Paris 1984–2000), I, xix–xxiii; S. Lampakis, *Γεώργιος Παχυμέρης, Πρωτεύδικος και δικαιοφύλαξ. Εισαγωγικό δοκίμιο* (Athens 2004) 21–38; G. Zografidis, “George Pachymeres”, in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, I (Dordrecht 2011) 394–397. On his didactic role, see M. Cacouros, “La philosophie et les sciences du Trivium et du Quadrivium à Byzance de 1204 à 1453

Pachymeres' output is vast and wide-ranging, reflecting some of the trends of his era, for example a resurgence of interest in classical texts and a heightened focus on the study of philosophy and science prompted by interaction with prominent individuals and scholarly networks. His comprehensive history (*Συγγραφικαὶ ἱστορίαι*) describes the reigns of Michael VIII and Andronikos II from 1260 to 1308.³ One of its main concerns was to expose the theological controversies that troubled the empire, possibly with a view to giving prominence to current political calamities. In addition to his *History*, Pachymeres wrote on rhetoric (e.g. declamations, *progymnasmata*, letters), religion (e.g. a treatise on the procession of the Holy Spirit, PG 144, 924B–928D), philology (e.g. scholia to Homer), and science (e.g. the *Quadrivium*, an educational manual on arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy).⁴ He also penned a paraphrase of the work of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (PG 3–4 *passim*),⁵ a few poems,⁶ and his *Philosophia*, a compendium of twelve works of the Aristotelian corpus, which takes the hybrid form of a paraphrase intertwined with elements of exegetical analysis.⁷

The last few decades have seen enormous developments in scholarship focusing on Pachymeres' philosophical production, due in particular to the burgeoning edi-

entre tradition et innovation: les textes et l'enseignement, le cas de l'école du Prodrome (Pétra)", in M. Cacouros and M.-H. Congourdeau (eds), *Philosophie et Sciences à Byzance de 1204 à 1453. Les textes, les doctrines et leur transmission* (Leuven 2006) 1–51, at 13–17.

³ On Pachymeres' narrative technique in his *History*, see e.g. V. Stanković, "The Writer Behind the Historian: Observations on George Pachymeres' Narrative on Constantine Tich and Contemporary Events in Bulgaria", *Bulgaria Mediaevalis* 3 (2012) 127–138. On the main themes of the *History*, see e.g. S. Lampakis, "Υπερφυσικὲς δυνάμεις, φυσικὰ φαινόμενα καὶ δεισιδαιμονίες στὴν ἱστορία τοῦ Γεωργίου Παχυμέρη", *Σύμμεικτα* 7 (1987) 77–100. Cf. S. Lampakis, "Some Considerations on the Historiographical Work of George Pachymeris", *Σύμμεικτα* 16 (2003) 133–138.

⁴ See, e.g., A. Megremi and G. Christianides, "Interpreting Tables of the *Arithmetical Introduction* of Nicomachus through Pachymeres' Treatment of Arithmetic: Preliminary Observations", in A. Volkov and V. Freiman (eds), *Computations and Computing Devices in Mathematics Education Before the Advent of Electronic Calculators* (Cham 2018) 65–93.

⁵ Lampakis, *Γεώργιος Παχυμέρης, Πρωτέκδικος και δικαιοφύλαξ* (n. 2), 211–215, argues that this is not a paraphrase *sensu stricto* but also has features of exegesis and interpretative analysis. See C. Terezis and L. Petridou, "Aspects of the Question on Matter in the Byzantine Thinker George Pachymeres", *Akropolis* 1 (2017) 138–157.

⁶ For the first-ever list of all of Pachymeres' works and their editions, the reader is referred to P. Golitsis, "Georges Pachymère comme didascale. Essai pour une reconstitution de son enseignement philosophique", *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 58 (2008) 53–68, at 64–66.

⁷ On Pachymeres' philosophical writings and his role in Byzantine literary culture, see Golitsis, "Georges Pachymère comme didascale" (n. 6), 53–68; P. Golitsis, "A Byzantine Philosopher's Devoutness toward God: George Pachymeres' Poetic Epilogue to his Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*", in B. Bydén and K. Ierodiakonou (eds), *The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy* (Athens 2012) 109–127; C. N. Constantinidis, *Higher Education in Byzantium in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries, 1204–ca. 1310* (Nicosia 1982) 59–65. For late Byzantine education, see, e.g., the study by F. Nousia, *Byzantine Textbooks of the Palaeologan Period* (Vatican City 2016).

torial activity associated with the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina* research project in Berlin (CAGB) and in the Academy of Athens (*Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi / Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina* = CPhMA/CAB).⁸ The *Philosophia* is testimony to Pachymeres' contribution to the increasing importance of Aristotelian studies in late Byzantine education.⁹ But it is also a didactic manual that enjoyed considerable popularity in several other settings from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, as seen in the circulation of numerous manuscripts and a sixteenth-century Latin translation by D. Ph. Becchius (Basel 1560).¹⁰

Pachymeres' interest in philosophy extended beyond the aforementioned Aristotelian abridgment to include a group of individual specialised commentaries: a continuation of Proclus' unfinished commentary on Plato's *Parmenides*,¹¹ as well as commentaries on Aristotle's *Organon*, the *Physics*,¹² the *Metaphysics*,¹³ *On the Parts*

8 Published so far: a) E. Pappa (ed.), *Georgios Pachymeres, Philosophia, Buch 10: Kommentar zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (Athens 2002), b) K. Oikonomakos (ed.), *Γεώργιος Παχυμέρης Φιλοσοφία, Βιβλίον Ἐνδέκατον: Τὰ Ἠθικά, ἤτοι τὰ Νικομάχεια* (Athens 2005), c) E. Pappa (ed.), *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia. Buch 6: Kommentar zu de Partibus Animalium des Aristoteles* (Athens 2008), d) E. Pappa (ed.), *Georgios Pachymeres Scholien und Glossen zu de Partibus Animalium des Aristoteles (cod. Vatic. Gr. 261)* (Athens 2009), e) I. Telelis (ed.), *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia: Book 5, Commentary in Aristotle's Meteorologica* (Athens 2012), f) I. Telelis (ed.), *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia: Book 3, In Aristotelis De Caelo Commentary* (Athens 2016).

9 There is an additional suggestion that the *Philosophia* operated as a polemical work against the Patriarch Athanasios I, who was opposed to the study of secular philosophy and science, considering them detrimental to monastic principles, on which see P. Golitsis, "Un livre reçu par le patriarche Athanase Ier et retourné à l'expéditeur", *Revue des Études Byzantines* 68 (2010) 201–208.

10 For Ermolao Barbaro's use of Pachymeres' commentary on the *EN*, for example, see N. Zorzi, "Per la tradizione manoscritta dell'inedito commento all'*Etica nicomachea* di Giorgio Pachimere: I. Il *Marc. gr.* 212 di Bessarione e i suoi apografi. II. Ermolao Barbaro e il commento di Pachimere (con una proekdosis del cap. 18)", *Νέα Ῥώμη: Rivista di ricerche bizantinistiche* 12 (2015) 245–304, tables 1–8, at 281–296.

11 This is the only extant late Byzantine commentary on Plato. Edition of the text by T. A. Gadra, S. M. Honea, P. M. Stinger, G. Umholtz, Introduction by L. G. Westerink, *George Pachymeres, Commentary on Plato's Parmenides [Anonymous Sequel to Proclus' Commentary]*, *Corpus philosophorum Medii Aevi. Philosophi Byzantini* 4 (Athens, Paris, Brussels 1989). For Pachymeres' interest in Platonism, see Golitsis, "Georges Pachymère comme didascale" (n. 6), 60. Indicative studies on the commentary *per se* include: L. Couloubaritsis, "Georges Pachymère et le Parménide de Platon", in M. Barbanti and F. Romano (eds), *Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione*, CUECM (Catania 2002) 355–370; C. Steel and C. Macé, "Georges Pachymère philologue: Le *Commentaire* de Proclus au *Parménide* dans le manuscrit *Parisinus gr.* 1810", in M. Cacours and M.-H. Congourdeau (eds), *Philosophie et sciences à Byzance de 1204 à 1453. Les textes, les doctrines et leur transmission*, *Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta* 146 (Leuven, Paris, Dudley, MA 2006) 77–99.

12 In one branch of the manuscript tradition the title of the work was changed by a later hand, mistakenly attributing the work to Michael Psellos. For the commentary's authorship, see P. Golitsis, "Un commentaire perpétuel de Georges Pachymère à la *Physique* d'Aristote faussement attribué à Michael Psellos", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 100.2 (2007) 637–676, P. Golitsis, "Georges Pachymère comme didascale" (n. 6), 55, 57–58 and 66–67, and now P. Golitsis, "Nicéphore Calliste

of Animals, and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the latter being the object of the current edition. All these commentaries offer further evidence of Pachymeres' determined efforts as educator to place ancient philosophy and science firmly on the agenda of late Byzantine learning.

Xanthopoulos, élève de Georges Pachymère”, in M. Cronier and B. Mondrain (eds), *Le livre manuscrit grec: écritures, matériaux, histoire* (Paris 2020) 305–315. The work was attributed to Psellos when it was edited by L. Benakis (ed.), *Michael Psellos: Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles* (Athens 2008).

13 This was known as Pseudo-Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Stefan Alexandru's study (S. Alexandru, “A New Manuscript of Pseudo-Philoponus' Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* containing a hitherto unknown ascription of the work”, *Phronesis* 44 [1999] 347–352) has helped assign it to Pachymeres. The commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and the *Organon* are still unedited, while that on the *Physics* awaits a new edition.

2 The Commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*

2.1 A brief history of commentary writing on the *EN* from antiquity to the late Middle Ages

Numerous commentaries on individual books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (henceforth abbreviated *EN*) have come down to us. The earliest surviving are those by Aspasius in the second century AD on Books 1–4 and 7 and 8 of the *EN*.¹⁴ We also have anonymous scholia to Books 2, 3, 4, and 5, probably dating to the final quarter of the second century AD.¹⁵ The next systematic effort to interpret the *EN* occurs, unexpectedly, after a gap of almost ten centuries,¹⁶ when Eustratius (ca. 1050–ca. 1120), metropolitan bishop of Nicaea, commented on Books 1 and 6, and his contemporary Michael of Ephesus (ca. 1060–1130/1135) on Books 5, 9, and 10. Both Eustratius and Michael are thought to have operated in a context of imperial patronage at the behest of the princess Anna Komnene,¹⁷ while their combined efforts

14 Cf. J. Barnes, “Introduction to Aspasius”, in A. Alberti and R. W. Sharples (eds), *Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berlin 1999) 1–50.

15 The scholia seem to have been compiled from various sources, for example Adrastus of Aphrodisias (2nd century AD). See H. P. F. Mercken, “The Greek Commentators on Aristotle's *Ethics*”, in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence* (Ithaca 1990), 407–444, at 408 and 421–429.

16 According to Arabic sources, Porphyry and Themistius produced scholia to the *EN* which are not mentioned in the Greek tradition. The *EN* were translated into Arabic partly by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq and partly by Uṣṭāth. Arabic philosophers who produced commentaries on or scholia to the *EN* include Al-Fārābī (not extant) and Ibn Rushd (Latinised as Averroes; only fragments survive). See the general study by P. Adamson, “Aristotle and the Arabic Commentary Tradition”, in C. Shields (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle* (Oxford 2012) 645–664. Specifically for the *EN*, see J. Hayes, “The Arabic Reception of the *Nicomachean Ethics*”, in A. Alwishah and J. Hayes (eds), *Aristotle and the Arabic Tradition* (Cambridge, MA 2015) 200–213.

17 R. Browning, “An Unpublished Funeral Oration on Anna Comnena”, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 8 (1962) 1–12; P. Frankopan, “The Literary, Cultural and Political Context for the Twelfth-Century Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*”, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds), *Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Leiden–Boston 2009) 45–62; L. Garland, “Mary ‘of Alania’, Anna Komnene, and the Revival of Aristotelianism in Byzantium”, *Byzantinoslavica* 75 (2017) 123–163; and M. Trizio, “Forging Identities between Heaven and Earth: Commentaries on Aristotle and Authorial Practices in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Byzantium”, in P. Marciniak, B. Van der Berg and D. Manolova (eds), *Byzantine Commentaries on Ancient Greek Texts* (forthcoming; I am grateful to the author for sharing this paper with me ahead of publication). Specifically for Michael of Ephesus' activity, see, e.g., G. Arabatzis, “Michel d'Ephèse, commentateur d'Aristote et auteur”, *Peitho: Examina Antiqua* 3 (2012) 199–209. For fresh evidence regarding the transmission process of the Greek commentaries on the *EN* in light of the new Budapest fragments of Eustratius' commentary on *EN*, see A. Németh, “Fragments from the earliest Parchment

influenced the reception of the *EN* in the West, since in the mid-thirteenth century Robert Grosseteste produced a Latin translation of a compilation of Greek commentaries on the *EN* in which the works of Eustratius and Michael played a key role.¹⁸ An anonymous commentary on Book 7, cautiously dated to the thirteenth century, also exists.¹⁹ In addition, a mysterious late paraphrase of the *EN* was copied in 1366 for the emperor John VI Kantakouzenos (monastic name Ioasaph, d. 1383). Its authorship is dubious, although it is sometimes erroneously attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes, Olympiodorus, or Heliodorus of Prusa.²⁰ George Pachymeres himself also wrote a paraphrase of the *EN* as part of his *Philosophia* (Book XI). Finally, *Protheōroumena* (introductory notes) to the *EN* were produced by George-Gennadios Scholarios in the fifteenth century, as well as a *Clarification* (διασάφησης) of the same work by Theodore Gaza.²¹

Manuscript of Eustratius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*", *Revue d'histoire des textes* 9 (2014) 51–78.

18 Grosseteste had access to a manuscript which encompassed the commentaries by Eustratius and Michael alongside the anonymous scholia to Books 2–5, the anonymous commentary on Book 7 and Aspasius' commentary on Book 8. See H. P. F. Mercken, *The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (†1253): Eustratius on Book I and the Anonymous Scholia on Books II, III, and IV*, *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* 6.1 (Leiden 1973) 3*–29*. See also M. Trizio "From Anna Komnene to Dante: The Byzantine Roots of Western Debates on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*", in J. M. Ziolkowski (ed.), *Dante and the Greeks*, *Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Humanities* (Washington, DC 2014) 105–139.

19 It has been suggested that the author is Stephanos Skylitses, bishop of Trebizond, who in his scholia to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* refers to his own (lost) scholia to the *EN*. For a balanced discussion of this possibility, see, e.g. E. A. Fisher, "The Anonymous Commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* VII: Language, Style and Implications", in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds), *Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Leiden–Boston 2009) 145–161, at 155–158.

20 D. M. Nicol, "A Paraphrase of the *Nicomachean Ethics* attributed to the Emperor John VI Cantacuzene", *Byzantinoslavica* 29 (1968) 1–16. See also note 45 below.

21 See also L. Benakis, "Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium", in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds), *Medieval Greek commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Leiden–Boston 2009) 63–69. Cf. H. Baltussen, "Aristotelian Commentary Tradition", in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism* (London–New York 2014) 106–114 and H. Baltussen, "Philosophers, Exegetes, Scholars: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary from Plato to Simplicius", in C. S. Kraus and C. Stray (eds), *Classical Commentaries: Explorations in a Scholarly Genre* (Oxford 2016) 173–194. Also, L. Benakis, "Commentaries and Commentators on the Logical Works of Aristotle in Byzantium," in R. Claussen and R. Daube-Schackat (eds), *Gedankenzeichen: Festschrift für Klaus Oehler* (Tübingen 1988) 3–12; L. Benakis, "Commentaries and Commentators on the Works of Aristotle (except the Logical ones) in Byzantium", in B. Mojsisich, O. Pluta (eds), *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag* (Amsterdam 1991) 45–54. On Theodore Gaza's paraphrase of the *EN*, see J. Monfasani, "Theodore Gaza as a Philosopher. A Preliminary Survey", in R. Maisano and A. Rollo (eds), *Manuele Crisolora e il ritorno del greco in Occidente. Atti del Convegno Internazionale (Napoli, 26–29 giugno 1997)* (Naples 2002) 269–281, at 269, 273, 274, and 275. A critical edition of Theodore Gaza's work is prepared by S. Xenophonotos for the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina* series.

This brief history of commentary writing on the *EN* testifies to a vigorous exegetical effort to make sense of Aristotelian ethics particularly in the Komnenian years. The method and style of the twelfth-century commentaries point to the fact that they were written for a specialised audience, elite readers of philosophy, adapting the form and content of the philosophical commentaries of late antiquity to the requirements of the contemporary cultural context. It has rightly been suggested, for example, that “[t]he twelfth-century philosophical commentators hoped and expected that their texts would help readers not merely to understand Aristotle better but also to become better people by applying his *Ethics* to their lives”.²² The scholarly and practical deployment of Aristotle’s ethics was taken up by later Byzantine scholars such as Nicephoros Blemmydes (1197–1272), Emperor Theodore II Laskaris (1222–1258), Theodore Metochites (1270–1332), and Manuel Palaiologos (1455–1512), all of whom showed an interest in ethics as an academic and practical discipline in self-standing essays, orations, and works in other genres.

2.2 Readership, aims, and chronology of Pachymeres’ Commentary

The same emphasis on moral theory and practice, in this case by a purely exegetical route, is apparent in Pachymeres’ Commentary on the *EN*, which seeks to serve philosophical students (as his other individual commentaries do as well), while at the same time allowing for a hands-on use of ethics by achieving a philosophically-minded life of self-control, as will be seen later on. The composition of the Commentary must thus be understood in the light of Pachymeres’ role as an educator in Constantinople, which in turn helps explain the pervasive didactic and moralising features running through the text.²³

In the Commentary, Pachymeres refers in passing to other parts of the Aristotelian corpus such as *On the Soul*, the *Physics*, and the *Metaphysics*, presupposing familiarity with their main subjects. To that end, he sometimes interjects reminders to students to recall sections from the Aristotelian tradition already examined or discussed on a previous occasion. In addition, he brings in rudimentary school logic to illustrate complex philosophical theorems and to help his students come to grips with the notional niceties of ethical philosophy. This auxiliary material is drawn

²² A. Kaldellis, “Classical Scholarship in Twelfth-Century Byzantium”, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds), *Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Leiden–Boston 2009) 1–43, at 40. See also Benakis “Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium” (n. 21), 64.

²³ See more in S. Xenophontos, “George Pachymeres’ *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*: A New witness to Philosophical Instruction and Moral Didacticism in Late Byzantium”, in S. Xenophontos and A. Marmodoro (eds), *The Reception of Greek Ethics in Late Antiquity and Byzantium* (Cambridge 2021) 226–248.

either directly from Aristotle or from the works of his commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*, and relates, for example, to types of syllogisms, first principles, definition and demonstration, categories, or species, genus, and differentiae. On other occasions, basic arithmetic and geometry (e.g. arithmetical proportion, geometrical proportion, reciprocally related figures) as well as astronomy (e.g. the fact that eclipses prove the circular shape of the moon, and that the proximity of the planets is demonstrated by their failure to twinkle) enter the Commentary to assist comprehension. The above are a safe index of the educational background of Pachymeres' intended addressees, who must have been relatively advanced in their studies and certainly not novices, given that knowledge of these subjects preceded the study of ethics in the curriculum.²⁴

As to the Commentary's other aims, despite its fragmentary state,²⁵ we have enough to suggest that it represents a focused plan to comment on the *EN* as a whole. Unlike its predecessors, which expound separate and (often) widely separated Books of the Aristotelian original, in what survives of the Commentary, Pachymeres offers a sparser and more economical interpretation of the text, opting for analysis of specific Aristotelian lines and not for a line-by-line or word-for-word interpretation, as Eustratius does, for example. To present this in figures, Pachymeres' Commentary on Book 1 contains approximately 8,700 words, whereas Eustratius' commentary on the same Book contains ca. 45,600 words and is thus about six times as long.²⁶ This authorial aim to make a concise analysis of the ancient model aligns with the form and function of Pachymeres' commentaries on the *Physics* or the *Organon*, as is reflected in their titles, according to which the commentaries were meant to be brief explications of the corresponding Aristotelian treatises.²⁷ On the other hand, as the last surviving exegetical commentary on the *EN* in Greek in the strict sense of the term, Pachymeres' work forms a counterpart to the exegetical commentaries of the Alexandrian teaching curriculum, reviving and emulating them. Its augmented pedagogical character presumably evinces an effort to compensate for the lack of a late antique commentary on the text consequent on the decreased interest in ethics in the curriculum, in which Aristotle's logic took centre stage instead.²⁸

²⁴ More on the educational level of Pachymeres' addressees in Xenophon's "George Pachymeres' Commentary" (n. 23), 234–236.

²⁵ The explication ends abruptly after the beginning of Book 6 of the *EN* (expl. "ἀρξάμενοι δ' αὐθις περὶ τούτων λέγωμεν"), with the last exegetical section coinciding with *EN* 1139b14.

²⁶ Similarly, Pachymeres' Commentary on Book 5 is roughly 9,780 words, against Michael of Ephesus' commentary on the same book, which contains ca. 28,750 words.

²⁷ ἐξήγησις σύντομος καὶ σαφειστάτη εἰς τὴν Φυσικὴν ἀκρόασιν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους and ἐξήγησις συντομωτάτη καὶ λίαν λαμπρὰ εἰς ὅλον τὸ Ὅργανον, respectively.

²⁸ G. Karamanolis, "Ἡ γένεση καὶ οἱ φιλοσοφικὲς προϋποθέσεις τοῦ ἀρχαίου φιλοσοφικοῦ υπομνήματος", *Υπόμνημα στη φιλοσοφία* 4 (2006) 109–139, at 125–126.

As for the date of the work, Pachymeres' individual commentaries, including the one on the *EN*, are thought to have been written towards the end of his life, and more specifically after 1307, the year marking his sudden abandonment of his historical work with a view, it has been argued, to launching his philosophical writing.²⁹ It has also been suggested that the commentary on the *Metaphysics* predates that on the *EN*, reflecting the order in which the Aristotelian works are summarised in the *Philosophia* (*Metaphysics* = Book 10, *EN* = Book 11).³⁰ Still, given the absence of any explicit reference to the Commentary on the *EN* in any other work by Pachymeres or any other author, no firm conclusions can be reached regarding its precise chronology. If the first suggestion above has some validity, the segmented form of the work might perhaps be explained in light of Pachymeres' death around 1310, although the possibility that the copyist of the oldest witness (Marcianus Gr. Z. 212 = M), Cardinal Bessarion (1408–1472), lacked a witness to the rest of the text or even have decided – for some unknown reason – not to proceed with copying should not be rejected out of hand.

2.3 Structure, layout, and genre

In line with the standard practice in medieval manuscripts of incorporating commentaries into the same codex as the ancient text, Pachymeres' Commentary as seen in M surrounds, in the form of “frame layout”, the version of the *EN* that occupies the central part of the page, with the base text and Commentary synchronised as far as possible (see Image 1).³¹ In the absence of Pachymeres' autograph, we cannot tell if the same format was used there as well, but there is no reason to think otherwise, given Pachymeres' similar practice in some of his surviving autographs.³²

29 P. Golitsis, “La date de composition de la *Philosophia* de Georges Pachymère et quelques précisions sur la vie de l'auteur”, *Revue des Études Byzantines* 67 (2009) 209–215; cf. Golitsis, “Georges Pachymère comme didascale” (n. 6), 59–60 with n. 37, 63–64.

30 Golitsis, “Georges Pachymère comme didascale” (n. 6), 60, n. 37, where it is also posited that the absence of reference to the *EN* in a letter by Constantine Akropolites supposedly addressed to George Pachymeres suggests that the other running commentaries were composed before the one on the *EN*.

31 For the different types of layout in manuscripts preserving base text and commentary, see the informative study of M. Maniaci, “Words within Words: Layout Strategies in Some Glossed Manuscripts of the *Iliad*”, *Manuscripta* 50 (2006) 241–268.

32 E.g. the Vat. Gr. 261, considered by D. Harlfinger a Pachymereian autograph *lato sensu*, includes Aristotle's *On the Parts of Animals* in the centre of the page, surrounded by Pachymeres' reworking of Michael of Ephesus' commentary on the same work written in Pachymeres' hand; see D. Harlfinger, “Autographa aus der Palaiologenzeit”, in W. Seibt (ed.), *Geschichte und Kultur der Palaiologenzeit: Referate des Internationalen Symposions zu Ehren von Herbert Hunger (Wien, 30. November bis 3. Dezember 1994)* (Vienna 1996) 42–50, at 48. See also P. Golitsis, “Copistes, élèves et érudits: la production de manuscrits philosophiques autour de Georges Pachymère”, in A. Bravo García and I.

The text under discussion is a lemmatic commentary, which consists of individual entries taking the form of short blocks or units explicating a portion of the reference text.³³ Each entry is introduced by a lemma, or heading, indicating the subject of annotation, followed by Pachymeres' exegetical analysis. These blocks are admirably even in extent, taking up roughly 30–40 lines on average, with the exception of the final block of some Books, which is occasionally a bit shorter, ca. 15 lines on average (Book 1 and 3).³⁴

The management of the page reflects a coherent system of cross-reference, in which each entry is introduced by a lower-case letter of the Greek alphabet in red ink, which is also repeated above or before the relevant section of the original to which the entry refers.³⁵ This arrangement significantly enhances the reader-friendliness of the Commentary, as the reader is certain at all times of the section of the base text the commentator is discussing. With the exception of the second entry in Book 1, which quotes the first four words of the Aristotelian lemma (“τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεών”), the other lemmata are not reproduced in this version of Pachymeres' Commentary, probably because the latter was expected to be read in close conjunction with the Aristotelian original. It is interesting, in that respect, that in the other two witnesses preserving the Commentary, both sixteenth-century descendants of

Pérez Martín (eds), *The Legacy of Bernard de Montfaucon: Three Hundred Years of Studies on Greek Handwriting. Proceedings of the Seventh International Colloquium of Greek Palaeography (Madrid–Salamanca, 15–20 September 2008)*, *Bibliologia* 31 (Turnhout 2010) 157–170, 757–768, at 160, n. 16; cf. Golitsis, “Un commentaire perpétuel” (n. 12), 646–647 with reference to the way Pachymeres arranged and presented the commentary of the *Physics* in the autograph Laurentianus 87.5.

33 The Commentary on Book 1 of the *EN* comprises 20 entries, that on Book 2 13 entries, on Book 3 19 entries, on Book 4 19 entries, and on Book 5 again 19 entries.

34 The almost equal length of the exegetical sections might be owed to the fact that Pachymeres added each lemma where page divisions occurred in the version of the Aristotelian text he had in front of him while composing his Commentary. See P. Golitsis' relevant observations with reference to the layout of the commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* in Laurentianus 87.5, “Un commentaire perpétuel” (n. 12), 647–650, which further supports the thesis that the positioning of the lemmata in the Commentary on the *EN* too follows the page divisions of the Aristotelian text consulted by the commentator. Cf. also H. von Staden's view that “[t]he lemmatic fragmentation of the ancient text entails a fragmentation of the commentator's decisions”, adding that the commentator “had his mind on the here and now, on the lemma of the moment.” H. von Staden, “‘A Woman does not become Ambidextrous’: Galen and the Culture of Scientific Commentary”, in R. K. Gibson and C. Kraus (eds), *The Classical Commentary: Histories, Practices, Theory* (Leiden/Boston/Köln 2002) 109–139, at 136.

35 This is the so-called “système alphanumérique” (unlike the “système signalétique”). See M. Cacouras, “Το αριστοτελικό υπόμνημα στο Βυζάντιο και οι μη ευρέως γνωστές πλευρές του: Χαρακτηριστικά, τάσεις και προοπτικές”, *Υπόμνημα στη Φιλοσοφία* 4 (2005) 155–190, at 166. The alphanumerical system also crops up in the commentaries on the *On the Parts of Animals* and on the *Metaphysics*, but not in the commentaries on the *Organon* and the *Physics*. This system is more complex and may represent a development in Pachymeres' presentation of his exegeses, which could suggest that the commentaries on *On the Parts of Animals*, the *Metaphysics* and the *EN* may have been written after the commentaries on the *Organon* and the *Physics*.

M, Scorialensis T. I. 18 (gr. 138), ff. 1r–74v, and Vaticanus gr. 1429, ff. 1r–76v, in which the Commentary stands on its own in the centre of each page, the lemmata are quoted in full, compensating for the absence of the source-text. In these two cases, it seems that the Commentary was expected to be read on its own, saving the reader from having to keep the entire text of the *EN* to hand.

It is also worth mentioning that each of Pachymeres' entries tackles later sections of the reference text than what is actually or supposedly quoted, so that the lemma is merely indicative, whence the editorial decision to add three dots at the end of each entry.³⁶ Despite the presence of individual segments of explication—what has been termed “atomisation” or “lemmatisation”, “the broken-up nature of the commentary”³⁷—Pachymeres' text is permeated by a remarkable degree of unity and cohesion, which makes it tie in nicely with its generic label “running commentary” (“commentaire perpétuel”).³⁸ To that end, a) Various connecting elements or narratives are employed, e.g. “... the human good, which can be found both in an individual person and in the city,” at the start of the second entry of Book 1 (Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 2, 4.13–14) is a throwback to the end of the proem “For there is a concept of happiness for the household and a concept of happiness for the city” (Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 1, 2.14–15); b) Brief internal cross-references guide the reader from one entry to another (“as we said”, “as we have seen”, e.g. Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 20, 48.1); c) Longer summarising sections gather main points from several preceding entries; d) The entries are prefaced by what seems to be a formal proem making the commentary look like a unified whole.

In terms of genre, Pachymeres' Commentary may be placed in the tradition of the typical exegetical commentary as advocated by Alexander of Aphrodisias and emulated by the twelfth-century commentators,³⁹ although it differs from these earlier works in its brevity. We know of a range of possible styles of philosophical commentaries in late antiquity. One involved the division of each entry into a section that offered a general explanation of theoretical notions (*theōria*), followed by comments on specific points, including language and wording (*lexis*). Pachymeres

³⁶ E.g. “πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος...”, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 1, 2.3. See also “Editorial principles”.

³⁷ F. Budelmann, “Classical Commentary in Byzantium: John Tzetzes on Ancient Greek Literature”, in R. K. Gibson and C. S. Kraus (eds), *The Classical Commentary: Histories, Practices, Theory* (Leiden 2002) 141–169, at 153–157.

³⁸ I.e. a “meta-text explicating and expanding on a base text while following its original arrangement”, Baltussen, “Philosophers, Exegetes, Scholars” (n. 21), 186. Apart from running commentaries, there were also paraphrases, essays, and scholia. See, e.g. M. Trizio, “Reading and Commenting on Aristotle”, in A. Kaldellis and N. Siniosoglou (eds), *The Cambridge Intellectual History of Byzantium* (Cambridge 2017) 397–412, at 405–411. On the history of the commentary, see H. Baltussen, “From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary”, *Poetics Today* 28.2 (2007) 247–281.

³⁹ For the ambiguity of the term *hypomnēma* and its basic features, see Karamanolis, “Ἡ γένεσις καὶ οἱ φιλοσοφικὲς προϋποθέσεις” (n. 28), 112–118.

eschews this division, but retains specific emphases within individual sections.⁴⁰ Although the title attached to the text describes it as an “exact paraphrase” (παράφρασις ἡκριβωμένη), there is little doubt that this label is misleading (in all likelihood because it is a later addition), since the work is clearly an exegesis.⁴¹

2.4 Sources and formative influences

2.4.1 Aristotle’s *EN*

Pachymeres’ Commentary, therefore, seeks primarily to explicate Aristotle’s *EN* for the purposes of advanced study by offering a more concise option than the full-scale exegeses on this work by Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus, which would also have been available at the time. It therefore comes as no surprise that the main formative text for the Commentary is the *EN* itself, which the Byzantine educator must have consulted directly, given the abundance of quotations of it. These are either cited verbatim or slightly changed, as the style and syntax of Pachymeres’ text require. The Aristotelian provenance of extracts or concepts is typically signalled by use of the verb “he says” (λέγει or φησί in their various forms), but such signs are not always there to alert the reader, who is accordingly unable to recognise unmarked Aristotelian quotations unless he checks the original text. The Aristotelian borrowings examined in the Commentary are interspersed with Pachymeres’ interpretations, examples, clarifications, and qualitative evaluations, all shaped into a coherent narrative, rendering the final product a helpful intellectual synthesis.

The following passage from entry 2, Book 3 illustrates the point. The general topic here is constraint (κατ’ ἀνάγκην) as a factor that impedes an agent’s voluntary choice (προαίρεσις) under specific circumstances, eventually leading him to perform actions that are against his will. The Aristotelian text in the background is *EN* 1110b1–15, and in what follows direct references to the passage are italicised (as usually throughout) to better demonstrate what is distinctly Aristotelian and how and to what extent Pachymeres taps into it:

Ἀπλῶς δὲ τὰ βίαια τότε εἰσὶν, ὅποταν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ἢ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάληται. πῶς γὰρ ὅς γε καὶ ἀναγκάζεται; ἃ δὲ ἀκούσια μὲν καθ’ αὐτά (οὐδὲ γὰρ προαιροῦνται), ἐκούσια δὲ ἄλλως διὰ τὸ τέλος, ὃ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ προσδοκᾷ λαβεῖν.

Ὁὐ ῥάδιον δὲ ἀποδοῦναι ποῖα ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον καθόλου, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα δοκιμάζονται ταῦτα, ἢ δὲ διδασκαλία καθόλου θέλει διαλαμβάνειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἡδέα ἔξωθεν κινούσι, φαίη ἄν τις, φησί, καὶ ταῦτα βίαια. λύων οὖν τὸν λόγον φησὶν ὅτι ἐκ τούτου καὶ τὰ καλὰ πάντα, ὅτι κινούσι καὶ αὐτὰ ἔξωθεν, βίαια εἴποι· τελικὸν γὰρ αἴτιον τὸ καλόν. τὰ δὲ πρὸς

⁴⁰ See, for example, 2.4. “Sources and formative influences”.

⁴¹ Golitsis, “Georges Pachymère comme didascale” (n. 6), 56 with n. 24, has suggested that the title of the work was deliberately reformulated by Bessarion as a simplification. Note that Pachymeres’ commentary on Plato’s *Parmenides* also lacks an original title.

αὐτὰ οἱ μὲν βίᾳ πράττουσι τῆ παρὰ τῶν παιδαγωγῶν καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἡδονται. γελοῖον οὖν τὸ τὰ ἐκτὸς αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθιήρατον ὄντα. διατοῦτο εἶπον «ὅταν μὴδὲν ὁ πράττων συμβάλληται». ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ καλὰ αἰρούμεθα καὶ αἰσχρά, εὐθιήρατοι μὲν ἔσμεν καὶ ἐπ' ἄμφω, πλὴν τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτοῦς αἰτιατέον τῶν δὲ κακῶν τὰ ἡδέα.

Purely compulsory actions occur when the cause lies in external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing. But how can the agent be put under compulsion? *When actions are intrinsically involuntary* (since they are not freely chosen), *but voluntary* in a different sense, because of the end the agent expects to get due to compulsion.

But it is not easy to lay down general rules for what should be traded for what, because these matters are put to the test *in specific circumstances*, whereas the exposition is inclined to treat the issue in general terms. Since *pleasant objects* move us from without, *one might suppose*, he says, that these [objects] *constrain us by force*. As a way of refuting this argument, therefore, he says that on this basis one could claim that *all noble acts*, since they motivate us and are intrinsically external, are *forced*, because what is noble is a final cause. But *those who perform actions* that have intrinsic ends *because their teachers force them* to do so *feel pain*, whereas *those who undertake a noble action for [nobility's sake] get pleasure*. As a consequence, *it is absurd to blame externalities rather than oneself as easily falling victim to such things*. This is why I said “*when the agent contributes nothing*”. However, since we choose both noble and base [actions and objects], we are easy prey in both cases, except that we ought to attribute responsibility *for our noble deeds to ourselves but for our disgraceful actions to pleasures*.

Pachymeres *In EN* 3, 2, 92.26–94.11

In addition to the fact that the italicised items may sometimes result from a process of condensation, simplification, paraphrastic summary, elision, transposition, or mixing-and-matching of the individual elements of the Aristotelian material, the commentator's intervention is attested by the insertion of: a) apt questions requiring immediate clarification (“But how can the agent be put under compulsion?”), b) parenthetical or side explanations (“since they are not freely chosen”, “since they motivate us and are intrinsically external”, “because what is noble is a final cause”), c) additional elucidation not found in Aristotle (“*voluntary* in a different sense, because of the end the agent expects to get due to compulsion”), d) linguistic improvement of the argument on certain points (“*But it is not easy to lay down general rules...*”), in this case including the use of antithesis to make the point clearer (“because these matters are put to the test *in specific circumstances*, whereas the exposition is inclined to treat the issue in general terms”), e) philosophical guidance tracing Aristotle's sequence of thought and purpose (“As a way of refuting this argument, therefore, he says that on this basis one could claim that...”), and f) exemplification (“*because their teachers force them* to do so...”). All in all, Pachymeres effectively spells out the sense of a dense and convoluted technical passage and translates it into student language.⁴²

⁴² For purposes of comparison, the Aristotelian source text reads as follows: τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὅπουτ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἦ καὶ ὁ πράττων μὴδὲν συμβάλληται; ἢ δὲ καθ'

Interestingly, Pachymeres' representation of the Aristotelian original is so dynamic that he even allows his didactic persona to enter the analysis through the use of the first-person singular, which attributes to the commentator what is clearly an Aristotelian phrase: "This is why I said 'when the agent contributes nothing'". The same practice occurs elsewhere as well,⁴³ and rather than being taken as a clumsy attempt at plagiarism, it should instead be associated with Pachymeres' self-awareness as an exegete and his positioning vis-à-vis his predecessor: the Byzantine scholar envisages the teaching and interpretation of the *EN* as a double duty on the part of the ancient authority, who provides robust raw material, and, perhaps most importantly, of the later commentator, who efficiently expounds it for contemporary purposes. On the other hand, the important role of the exegete in this passage and others also relates to one of the main tensions in the history of commentary writing, which conjures up a "professional affinity" between the ancient author and the later commentator, as well as a critical awareness on the latter's part that he belongs to the exegetical tradition "as a specialist in linguistic interpretation"⁴⁴ and someone who can stand his own ground. Pachymeres often touches on the fact that Aristotle's account requires clarification, a deficit he eagerly remedies, as for example at *In EN* 5, 14, where he declares that more clarity must be added to the exposition (καὶ ἵνα καθαρώτερον διασαφηθῆ ὁ λόγος, Pachymeres *In EN* 5, 14, 216.18), inserting no less than 180 words to do so. These issues are discussed at great length in sections 2.8 and 2.10.

αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιὰ ἐστὶ, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετὰ, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιὰ ἐστὶ, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκούσιοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ δὲ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν βίαια καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτὸν, τῶν δ' αἰσχυρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὲ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὐ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος (*EN* 1110b1–15).

43 Pantelis Golitsis remarked (*per litteras*) that this device does not occur in the other unedited commentaries, which might be a further sign of the later date of the Commentary on *EN*. He also thinks that this is probably also why Bessarion called Pachymeres' Commentary a *παράφρασις*, since the paraphrasts tended to impersonate Aristotle by using the first-person singular. Cf. K. Ierodiakonou, "Psellos' Paraphrasis on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*", in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources* (Oxford 2002) 157–181, at 165–166.

44 Quotes taken from I. Sluiter, "The Dialectics of Genre: Some Aspects of Secondary Literature and Genre in Antiquity", in M. Depew and D. Obbink (eds), *Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons, and Society* (Cambridge, MA 2000) 183–203, at 190. On the self-presentation of exegetes specifically in the Palaiologan period, see K. Ierodiakonou, "The Byzantine Commentator's Task: Transmitting, Transforming or Transcending Aristotle's Text", in A. Speer and P. Steinkrüger (eds), *Knotenpunkt Byzanz: Wissensformen und kulturelle Wechselbeziehungen* (Berlin 2012) 199–209.

2.4.2 Eustratius

Besides Aristotle's *EN*, the other two works on which Pachymeres draws most heavily are Eustratius of Nicaea's commentary on Book 1 of the *EN* for his explication of the same Book, and John of Damascus' *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* for some sections of his Commentary on Book 3. There are also some linguistic parallels with [Heliodorus]' paraphrase of the *EN*,⁴⁵ and some small-scale (verbatim) quotations

⁴⁵ For which see M. Trizio, "Elidoro di Prusa e i commentatori greco-bizantini di Aristotele", in A. Rigo, A. Babuin, and M. Trizio (eds), *Vie per Bisanzio: Atti del VIII Congresso Nazionale dell'Associazione Italiana di Studi Bizantini. Venezia, 25–28 novembre 2009* (Bari 2013) 803–830, who argues that this paraphrase depends on Eustratius and Michael. Although there are no extensive verbatim quotations from Pachymeres' Commentary in [Heliodorus]' paraphrase to support the latter's dependence on Pachymeres, some verbal similarities as well as affinities in the syntax of short passages point in that direction (see the items marked in bold in the examples below). If this hypothesis is valid, [Heliodorus]' paraphrase must be considered an example of the immediate reception of Pachymeres' commentary, and its dating could be safely narrowed down to the years between 1307 and 1366. Examples demonstrating the possible influence of Pachymeres on [Heliodorus] are:

1. λέγουσι δὲ **τοῦτο πάντες εὐδαιμονίαν, καὶ οἱ τυχόντες καὶ οἱ σοφοί**, καὶ ὅσον μὲν κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα συμφωνοῦσιν..., Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 3, 8.9–10 ≈ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ **καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ βέλτιστοι** τῶν ἀνθρώπων συμφωνοῦσιν. εὐδαιμονίαν γὰρ **αὐτὸ** ὀνομάζουσι **πάντες...** περὶ δὲ τοῦ τί ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως **τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ σοφοὶ** λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῆς, [Heliodorus] *In EN* 5.33–37 Heylbut.

2. **ἡ δὲ τιμὴ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσιν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τιμωμένοις**, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 4, 10.24 ≈ **ἡ δὲ τιμὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἐν τῷ τιμῶντι**, [Heliodorus] *In EN* 7.35–36 Heylbut.

3. **περὶ τοῦ καθόλου** ἀγαθοῦ βούλεται διδάσκειν, ὃ **ἐστὶν ἡ ἰδέα τῶν ἀγαθῶν**, *δυσάντη* δὲ νομίζει τὴν *ζήτησιν* διὰ τὸ φίλους **εἶναι** τοὺς εἰπόντας τὰς ἰδέας, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 5, 12.18–19 ≈ **περὶ τοῦ καθόλου** πῶς λέγεται καὶ εἰ **ἔστι** τις **ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ**. καίτοι προσάντης ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἡμῖν **διὰ τὸ φίλους εἶναι** τοὺς εἰσενεγκόντας τὸν περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν λόγον, [Heliodorus] *In EN* 8.33–35 Heylbut.

4. **παραλιμπάνεται ἡ γνώσις τοῦ** ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ ζητητέα ἄλλως, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ ταύταις τὸ **μὴ ζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον**, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 7, 18.23–24 ≈ **τοῦ** καθόλου τούτου ἀγαθοῦ **τὴν γνώσιν παραλιμπάνουσιν**· οὐκ ἂν δὲ **παρελίμπανον**, εἰ βοήθεια τις ἦν αὐταῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. βοήθημα γὰρ τηλικούτον ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ **μὴ ἐπιζητεῖν, οὐκ εὐλογον**, [Heliodorus] *In EN* 11.20–23 Heylbut.

5. ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν *θεραπετικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν*, **εἴτουν τὴν φυτικὴν**, ψυχὴν, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 10, 22.29 ≈ ἐπεὶ δὲ μετὰ **τὴν θεραπετικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν, τὴν φυτικὴν δηλονότι**, [Heliodorus] *In EN* 13.33–34 Heylbut.

6. Φέρει **καὶ τὸν Εὐδοξον εἰς μαρτυρίαν τῶν λεγομένων**, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 18, 40.11 ≈ **τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὁ Εὐδοξος μαρτυρεῖ**, [Heliodorus] *In EN* 22.40–23.1 Heylbut.

See also the occurrences of [Heliodorus]' paraphrase *In EN* in the apparatus of parallel passages. Edoardo Stefani has found additional parallels between Pachymeres and [Heliodorus], the most important of which is the following: ἔστι δὲ καὶ *τοῦτο ἀόριστον*· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλοις ἡδέα καὶ *λυπηρά*, Pachymeres *In EN* 4, 18, 174.30 ≈ ἀλλὰ **ἀόριστός** τις καὶ **οὗτος** ὁ ὀρισμός ἐστὶν δοκεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες μισοῦσιν οὐδὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρουσιν· ἀλλὰ **ἄλλοις ἄλλα** δοκεῖ **ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρά**, [Heliodorus] *In EN* 82.33–35 Heylbut. I thank Edoardo Stefani for supplying me with unpublished material, and I am also grateful to Michele Trizio for alerting me to the possible connection between Pachymeres and [Heliodorus] in the first place.

from Aspasius for Books 1–4⁴⁶ and from the anonymous scholia to Books 2–5. Furthermore, there are occasional verbal resemblances to Pachymeres' paraphrase of the *EN*, although the uncertain relative chronology of this work and the Commentary on the *EN* makes it difficult to determine the direction of influence. A striking absence is Michael of Ephesus' commentary on Book 5, which for reasons that cannot be established does not seem to have been used by Pachymeres.⁴⁷ I discuss below some examples of Pachymeres' use of Eustratius and John to highlight the main reasons which prompted him to make use of the two authors and to show how they served Pachymeres' distinctive emphases in his own exegetical composition.

To start with, Pachymeres seems to have been inspired to some extent by Eustratius' long proem, as he adopts elements from it for his own short preface. These include, e.g., the traditional division of philosophy into a theoretical and a practical part (Eustr. *In EN* proem. 1.3–4), the tripartite subdivision of the practical part into ethics, economics, and politics (Eustr. *In EN* proem. 1.9–10), and an explanation of their differences depending on their subject matter (Eustr. *In EN* proem. 1.27–2.3).⁴⁸ That said, Pachymeres' dependence on Eustratius should not be overestimated, given that his use of his predecessor is never faithful at any great length nor, for that matter, uncreative.⁴⁹

To stick to the proem, although the justification of the title for the *EN* as devoted to a person named Nicomachus features already in Eustratius (Eustr. *In EN* proem. 1.11–12: τὴν πρὸς Νικόμαχόν τινα γενομένην), Pachymeres in his own proem immediately inserts the additional possibility that the addressee of the *EN* might have been Aristotle's own son Nicomachus, a piece of information which in Eustratius is somewhat postponed (Eustr. *In EN* 4.17–19). As will be seen later on, Pachymeres tends to merge passages which stand far apart in their original contexts. In addition,

⁴⁶ One of the most extensive quotations from Aspasius is in Pachymeres *In EN* 2, 1, 52.12–15: ἔτι φησὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ γίνονται ταῦτα καὶ φθείρονται, τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τῷ γένει· αἱ τε γὰρ καλαὶ ἐνεργεῖαι καὶ αἱ μοχθηραὶ τῷ μὲν γένει εἰσὶν αἱ αὐταί, τῷ δὲ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν. προβιβάζει δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν τὸν λόγον· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῷ γένει ἐνεργήματος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κίθαρισταὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι γίνονται...; cf. Asp. *In EN* 39.20–28.

⁴⁷ The only exception is at Pachymeres *In EN* 5, 11, 208.27–210.1: ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ διανεμητικὸν τὸ δὲ διορθωτικὸν (ὧν τὸ μὲν λέγεται κατὰ γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν, τὸ δὲ ἐπανορθωτικὸν κατὰ ἀριθμητικὴν)..., which seems to correspond to Mich. *In EN* 42.27–29 (italics indicate verbal similarities between the two passages). Given that no other such similarities exist, the possibility that the passage may derive from a source that Pachymeres and Michael shared seems more reasonable.

⁴⁸ On Eustratius in general, see the monograph by M. Trizio, *Il neoplatonismo di Eustrazio di Nicea* (Bari 2016).

⁴⁹ Cf. Trizio, "From Anna Komnene to Dante" (n. 18), 108. See e.g. M. Trizio, "On the Byzantine Fortune of Eustratius of Nicaea's Commentary on Books I and VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*", in B. Bydén and K. Ierodiakonou (eds), *The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy* (Athens 2012) 199–224, at 206. Also Zorzi, "Per la tradizione manoscritta" (n. 10), 253–254.

he does not follow Eustratius in inserting meta-commentary, as for instance when Eustratius states that his work aims at “clarifying the first book of Aristotle’s *EN*” (Eustr. *In EN* proem. 1.14–15: ἐκθέσαι σαφήνεια τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων), being in itself “an exegesis” (Eustr. *In EN* 4.9: οὗ καὶ τὴν ἐξήγησιν ἀπητήμεθα). Nor does he offer explicit contemporary nuances at this stage, as Eustratius does when he refers to the combination of pagan and Christian examples as the main components for the study of political philosophy (Eustr. *In EN* 3.35–36: καὶ παραδείγματα τούτων πολλά τις εὐρήσει τὰς βίβλους μετιῶν τὰς τε καθ’ ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰς θύραθεν). Moreover, Pachymeres’ preface is more of a synthetic amalgamation of other sources, especially late antique ones, as some notions in it seem to derive from John Philoponus’ commentary on *On the Soul* (e.g. καὶ τοῦ μὲν τέλος ἔχοντος τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τοῦ δὲ τἀγαθόν, *In EN* 2.4–5, cf. Philop. *In De an.* 194.20–22; διαφέρουσι δὲ αὐταὶ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, ἔχουσαι τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος τὸ ἀγαθόν, *In EN* 2.10–11, cf. Philop. *In De an.* 194.19–22) or [Elias]’ commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγάλα Νικομάχεια, ἃ δὴ εἰς τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ Νικόμαχον, ὡς φασιν, ἀναφέρονται, *In EN* 2.8–9, cf. [Eli.] *In Porphyrii isagogen* 32.34–33.2).

The above, taken together, show that Pachymeres’ interaction with Eustratius, as with other commentators, is critical and selective. This conclusion is supported by the fact that, although Eustratius’ proem is drawn upon for extragenic quotes from classical literature, these are always adjusted to the new narrative setting to meet the needs of Pachymeres’ exposition. In discussing happiness as the end of individual action, for example, Pachymeres stresses that moral agents should consistently act in a moderate fashion and should remain alert to the need to account for their personal actions at all times. To help the reader come to grips with what this means, he adduces a line from Phocylides (Ps.-Pyth. *Carm. aur.* 42) regarding the importance of self-criticism as a means to individual happiness:

ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν καθ’ αὐτὸν πράξεων εὐδαιμονία, ὡς λόγους ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ διδόναι ὀφείλοντι ἐρωτωμένῳ περὶ τῶν πρακτέων· ὅπου γε καὶ μὴ ἐρωτωμένῳ αὐτῷ γε μόνῳ σκοπομένῳ, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Φωκυλλίδου λέγοντι καθ’ ἐκάστην
πῆ παρέβην; τί δ’ ἔρεξα; τί δέ μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη; (Ps.-Pyth. *Carm. aur.* 42)

For the end of the actions an individual personally performs is happiness, so that he ought to [be able to] account for every separate action when asked about them. And when he is not asked [about his actions] but simply contemplates them on his own, he repeats every day the maxim attributed to Phocylides:

Wherein did I transgress? What did I do? What duty did I not accomplish?

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 2, 4.27–31

The same quote by Phocylides features in Eustratius’ proem (Eustr. *In EN* proem. 2.10–11), but in a context in which the concept of moral improvement through self-examination in general plays the key role, with Eustratius going on at length about

the edifying function of Aristotle's *EN* in regard to the control of impulses and desires more broadly (Eustr. *In EN* proem. 2.1–18).

Pachymeres' text proceeds to link individual happiness with political happiness, this time inserting a quote from Euripides' *Hecuba* 306–308:

ἔστι καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος. «ἐν τούτῳ γάρ», φησὶν Εὐριπίδης, «πάσχουσιν αἱ πολλαὶ πόλεις, ὅταν τις χρηστός καὶ πρόθυμος ὦν μηδὲν φέρηται τῶν κακιῶνων πλέον».

The city has the same end. “*For in this*”, says Euripides, “*many cities suffer, when a good man, despite his eagerness, gets no greater honour than his inferiors*”.

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 2, 6.1–2

Again, the same line is found in Eustratius' proem, but in a different context, where the author comments on injustice and relaxation as deleterious to the well-being of the *polis* (Eustr. *In EN* 3.10–12). Pachymeres thus combines two quotations from pagan literature found in different places in his Eustratean source and appropriates them to serve the needs of his own argument, which focuses specifically on personal prosperity.

Pachymeres' critical engagement with Eustratius is also detectable on the level of philosophical beliefs and allegiances. In referring to Aristotle's criticism of Plato's ideal good, Pachymeres describes the former's way of expressing disapproval as relying on his use of plausibility and argument (Ἐνδόξως καὶ σοφιστικῶς, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 6, 14.2). Pachymeres' σοφιστικῶς seems to echo Eustratius' employment of this term three times in his explication of the same Aristotelian passage (i.e. in Eustr. *In EN* 45.38, 46.2, 50.32),⁵⁰ where in all cases it helps Eustratius stress that Aristotle's anti-Platonic arguments are a piece of sophistry, in which σοφιστικῶς has a negative connotation, unlike Pachymeres' use of σοφιστικῶς, which gravitates towards its positive connotation. It is therefore interesting that, while using Eustratius' wording, Pachymeres does not embrace his criticism of Aristotle, both because he thought more highly of Aristotle than Eustratius did and because he did not want to introduce alien elements into his text.

Another level of use of Eustratius as a source for Pachymeres' Commentary is the citation of verbatim passages of no more than 60 words on average, when Pachymeres wants to supplement his explication of Aristotle. The Table below shows that Pachymeres' work involves two strata of textual interpretation, one drawing from and expounding Aristotle directly, the other complementing the Commentary on Aristotle via another commentator, in this case Eustratius.

⁵⁰ I am indebted to Michele Trizio for bringing these passages to my attention and sharing his thoughts on them with me.

Table

Similar or identical passages in Aristotle and Pachymeres are printed in bold; similar or identical passages in Eustratius and Pachymeres are printed in italics; identical passages in all three sources are printed in bold italics.

Aristotle *EN* 1196b5–16

πιθανώτερον δ' εοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχία τὸ ἔν' οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολούθησαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρησθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, **τὰ δὲ ποιητικά** τούτων **ἢ φυλακτικά** πῶς **ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά** διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δηλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰγαθὰ, καὶ **τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά**, θάτερα **δὲ διὰ ταῦτα**. χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν.

Eustratius *In EN* 51.10–15 and 51.20–27 respectively

λέγοι δ' ἂν, ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχία **οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι** τάζαντες παριστῶσι τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ τελειωτικὴν τινα καὶ σωτήριον. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν τούτῳ τελειοῦται καὶ ἀγαθύνεται καὶ τηρεῖται, ἐν τῷ μένειν ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ἀσκεδάστον ὄν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον· σκεδασθὲν δὲ οἴχεται. καὶ τάχα τοῦτο κρίνει Ἀριστοτέλης οἰκειότερον εἶναι λέγειν περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ιδέαν τίθεσθαι αὐτό.

...Ἔοικεν ἑαυτῷ ἀκριβολογίαν τινὰ ὑποβάλλειν περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐξ ἧς εὐρήσει πρόφασιν τοῦ κατεπιχειρήσαι καὶ ἔτι τῆς περὶ ιδεῶν δόξης, ὡς δοκεῖν ἐπιμέμφεσθαι ἑαυτῷ ὡς ἑλλιπῶς ἐν τοῖς ἤδη ῥηθεῖσιν εἰρηκότι περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. κατὰ γὰρ δύο, φησί, τρόπους λεγομένων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, συγκεχυμένως καὶ ἀπλῶς μέχρι νῦν ὁ περὶ τούτων λόγος γεγένηται. λέγεται γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καθ' ἐν μὲν εἶδος ἂ **καθ' αὐτά** ἀγαπᾶται, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὰ τούτων **ποιητικά ἢ φυλακτικά** πῶς **ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά**· ἃ οὐ καθ' αὐτὰ λέγεται ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ **δι' ἐκεῖνα**.

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 6, 14.14–16.8

πιθανώτερον δὲ λέγουσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχία τὸ ἔν'. δύο γὰρ ἐποίουν συστοιχίας, μίαν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἄλλην κακῶν. τιθέντες τοῖσιν τὸ ἐν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχία, παριστῶσι τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ τελειωτικὴν τινα καὶ σωτήριον. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν τούτῳ τελειοῦται καὶ ἀγαθύνεται καὶ τηρεῖται, ἐν τῷ μένειν ἐν τῷ ἐνί ἀσκεδάστον· σκεδασθὲν δὲ καὶ διαίρεθὲν οἴχεται καὶ ἀπόλλυται. οἰκειότερον γοῦν τοῦτο τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καθόλου τίθεσθαι αὐτὸ καὶ ιδέαν. Ἀκριβολογεῖται δὲ ἐπιπλέον περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅθεν εὐρήσει πρόφασιν τοῦ κατεπιχειρήσαι καὶ εἰσέτι τῆς περὶ τῶν ιδεῶν ὑπολήψεως. ἐπιμέμφεται γοῦν ἑαυτῷ, ὡς συγκεχυμένως περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰπόντι. κατὰ γὰρ δύο τρόπους λεγομένου τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αὐτὸς περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον ἀπλῶς ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τὴν ιδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνεσκεύαζεν. εἰσὶ γὰρ **τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά** ἀγαθὰ, **τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτά** ὡς **φυλακτικά ἢ ποιητικά ἢ κωλυτικά τῶν ἐναντίων**. ποῖα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ποῖα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὸς ἐπιφέρει. **τὰ γοῦν ὠφέλιμα χωρίσαντες** (ἅπερ εἰσὶ τὰ χάριν ἄλλων· τὰ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ τελειωτικά), **ζητήσωμεν εἰ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ μόνον ὑπὸ μίαν ιδέαν ἀνάγονται**.

What is worth noting in regard to the Eustratean passages Pachymeres quotes, is that the first chunk (from λέγοι δ' ἄν... up to τίθεσθαι αὐτό) provides Eustratius' perspective on Aristotle's ideas, whereas the second (from Ἔοικεν ἑαυτῷ... to ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκεῖνα) represents his understanding and assessment of Aristotle's methodology and style of argument; this chimes with what was noted earlier about Pachymeres' keen interest in expounding both Aristotle's spirit and his phraseology. The lack of direct acknowledgment of his source shows, I think, Pachymeres' tacit agreement with his twelfth-century precursor.⁵¹

On another level, the peculiar features of Pachymeres' exegetical methodology remain easy to decipher, despite the brevity of the text actually authored by him in the third column (in upright, plain font). First, he invariably maintains his tendency to construct sentences via division (note the sentence “δύο γὰρ ἐποίουν συστοιχίας, μίαν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἄλλην κακῶν”, “they constructed two columns, one of goods and the other of evils”; or “ποῖα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ποῖα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὸς ἐπιφέρει”, “He himself infers what sort the one and the other are”). Second, he clarifies the meaning of individual terms in parenthetical notes (note the clause “ἄπερ εἰσὶ τὰ χάριν ἄλλων· τὰ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ τελειωτικά”, “which are those that happen for the sake of other [goods]; for things [good] in themselves are perfective”, towards the end of the passage).⁵² Along similar lines, when he adopts Eustratius' approach to the text, Pachymeres nonetheless adds his own clarifications to it, enhancing the *EN*'s readability even more through exegetical improvement of what is already an exegetical textual layer. In discussing the definition of happiness with reference to moral approbation, i.e. whether happiness belongs to the things we praise or the things we honour, Pachymeres explicates two lines from the base work as follows:

Arist. *EN* 1101b10–12: Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότρεα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν.

⁵¹ Other examples of Pachymeres quoting Eustratius for supplementation: *ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ τύχαις τὸ εὐδαιμον οὐδὲ τὸ μακάριον ἐπιτρέπομεν ἀλλὰ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσιν αἱ τὸ βέλαιον ἔχουσιν, οὐκ ἀποβαλεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τὴν προσοῦσαν μακαριότητα διὰ τὴν τῆς τύχης μετακλισιν. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα* (italics indicate dependence on Eustr. In *EN* 97.16–19) *τῶν ἄλλων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει ὁ μακάριος τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν· πράξει διὰ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρετὰς, θεωρήσει διὰ τὰς θεωρητικὰς· ἢ πράξει μὲν ὅτι κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐνεργεῖ τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον μεταχειριζόμενος πράγματα, θεωρήσει δὲ ὅτι μετὰ λόγου αὐτῶ καὶ τῆς ἐκ λόγου χρήσεως ἢ πᾶσα κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐνέργεια, ὅς δὲ λόγος καὶ νοῦς πρακτικὸς ὀνομάζεται, ταῖς ζωτικαῖς ἐπιστατῶν ὀρέξεσι καὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν καὶ δι' αὐτῶν καὶ μετ' αὐτῶν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τὰ δέοντα κατορθῶν* (italics indicate dependence on Eustr. In *EN* 97.21–25) (Pachymeres In *EN* 1, 15, 34.24–32).

⁵² See also Section 2.6. Pachymeres' exegetical methodology.

Eustr. *In EN* 104.21–105.3: **Ἐφ’ ἕτερον μεταβαίνει ζήτημα** περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν **τὰ μὲν θεῖα** φαμεν **τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπινα**, καὶ τὰ μὲν θεῖα τίμα λέγομεν ὡς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ὑπὲρ ἔπαινον καὶ τιμῆς διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιούμενα, ἐπαινετὰ δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, ὡς τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι μὲν λειπόμενα, ἐπαίνων δὲ μόνων τυγχάνοντα, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα ἀνθρώπινα μὲν καὶ ταῦτα, **ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα** δὲ ὡς καὶ κατορθοῦν δύνασθαι καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν, **καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυνάμεις λεγόμενα ὡς τινος τῶν τεχνῶν ὑπάρχει** (εὐρεῖν) **οἶον ἰατρικὴν ἢ ῥητορικὴν (ἢ) κυβερνητικὴν**, ζητεῖ **ἐν τίσιν τούτων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τακτέον, εἴτ’ ἐν τοῖς τιμίσις εἴτ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς εἴτ’ ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσι**, καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶναι αὐτὴν τινὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπαγορεύει, ὅτι μὴδ’ ἐπαμφοτερίζει.

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 17, 38.28–40.2: **τούτων διωρισμένων ἐφ’ ἕτερον μεταβαίνει ζήτημα, ὅτι ποῦ τακτέον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων—τιμίων ὡς ἐπὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν θείων, ἐπαινετῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων** πραγμάτων, **δυνάμεων ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρα δυναμένων, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς** (αὗται γὰρ αἱ τέχναι δύνανται καὶ ἐπ’ ἄμφω, καὶ διαταῦτα δυνάμεις λέγονται)—**ζητεῖ ποῦ θετέον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.**⁵³

*Quotes from Aristotle in italics; verbal or conceptual proximity to Eustratius in bold (in both Pachymeres’ and Eustratius’ text); Pachymeres’ interventions underlined.

As is clear from the above, Pachymeres’ exegesis draws to a large extent from Eustratius both verbally and conceptually, but it also contains individual twists that make the passage more compact and more easily digested. Pachymeres usefully adds that there are three possible answers as to where happiness should be placed (τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων), a notion inferred from Eustratius (εἴτ’ ἐν τοῖς τιμίσις εἴτ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς εἴτ’ ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσι), and goes on to list them in line with the method of division. He also complements Eustratius’ first two options, i.e. τῶν θείων and τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, with the additional caveats ἐπὶ θεῶν and ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων respectively, thus making it clearer that the first two areas of happiness include both issues (πράγματα) and agents. Finally, Pachymeres displaces Eustratius’ emphasis on the fact that some human matters are called capacities because they may turn out one way or another (ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα) and applies this notion to the arts instead, so

⁵³ Translation: *After these points have been clarified, he passes on to another issue, specifically where happiness must be placed; since there are three [options]—things that are honoured, as in the case of the gods and divine things, things that are praised, as in the case of human beings and human affairs, and capacities, as in the case of the arts that have the capacity to turn out in one of two ways, as in the case of medicine or rhetoric or piloting a boat (for these skills may turn out one way or another, and for that reason they are termed “capacities”)—he inquires where happiness should be located.*

as to better explain why the latter are called capacities. On occasions, consequently, what Pachymeres actually expounds and reworks is Eustratius' commentary, which shows the high esteem the latter held in Pachymeres' exegetical agenda.

A similar appreciation for Eustratius' commentary on the *EN* on Pachymeres' part is also apparent in instances where Pachymeres relies on Eustratius to provide a valid reference to other Aristotelian works:

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον, φησί· τῆς γὰρ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ταῦτα πραγματείας, ὡς ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ Δ λέγει περὶ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τε τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Μ καὶ τῷ Ν.

But these questions should be set aside, he says; because these topics are in the treatise the "Metaphysics", since he speaks there in Book Delta about much-debated subjects, as also about the form of the good and of other things in Books Beta and Mu and Nu.

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 7, 18.8–10, drawing on Eustratius *In EN* 56.12–16 in the italicised section

Elsewhere, finally, Pachymeres' use of Eustratius serves to abridge and condense. For instance, Pachymeres' αἱ ἀγαθὰ πράξεις καὶ ἐνέργειαι ὑπὸ τὰς ἀπλῶς πράξεις καὶ ἐνεργείας ἀνάγονται, πᾶσαι δὲ πράξεις καὶ ἐνέργειαι τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσι (Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 11, 26.10–12) is a succinct summary of the main points under discussion in Aristotle drawn from Eustratius *In EN* 78.32–34.⁵⁴ Interestingly, although Pachymeres incorporates verbatim quotes from Eustratius into his explication, he elegantly departs from his source when the latter reproduces examples from the Aristotelian original, thus remaining consistent with his *modus operandi* throughout his Commentary of not replicating extensive lists of examples from the arts and sciences.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Another example of summary from Eustratius: *Δείξας ἰκανῶς ὅτι τε ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ χωρεῖ δύο προβλήματα, τίνα τε ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ καὶ διατί ὑπάρχει· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστὶ καὶ διατί ἐστίν. ὑπάρχειν τοίνυν αὐτῇ δι᾽ ἰσχυρίζεται τὸ ἥδιστόν τε καὶ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἀρχαίων περὶ αὐτῆς δόξας. ἔλεγον γὰρ ἢ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, οἷον ἢ ὡς μέρος αὐτῆς εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ ὡς ἐπόμενον τι ἔξωθεν ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονήν.* (Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 12, 26.31–28.4); italics indicate dependence on Eustr. *In EN* 81.29–82.4.

⁵⁵ Ἄναγει δὲ τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ καθολικώτερον καὶ καταφέρει πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον. ἐκάστῳ γὰρ, φησίν, ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιοῦτος, καὶ ἐπαγωγικῶς ἐκτίθησι ταῦτα (Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 12, 28.5–6); italics indicate dependence on Eustr. *In EN* 82.8–19: ἄρχεται ἀπὸ τοῦ καθολικώτερου καὶ κοινοτέρου καὶ καταφέρει τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸ προκείμενον. ἐκάστῳ γὰρ, φησίν, ἐκεῖνο ἡδὺ ἐστὶ πρὸς ὃ φιλοτιοῦτος λέγεται, [οἷον φίλιπος ὁ τοὺς ἵππους φιλῶν καὶ ἡδὺ ὁ ἵππος αὐτῷ, φιλοθέωρος ὁ τὰς θεάς καὶ ἡδὺ τὸ θέαμα αὐτῷ, φίλινος καὶ φιλόσοφος ὁ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὸν οἶνον καὶ ἡδὺ ὁ οἶνος καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτῷ. καὶ οὕτως ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τὸ καθόλου πιστωσάμενος, ἦτοι τὴν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ μείζονα πρότασιν, καταντᾷ ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον φάσκων καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ.] The text included in square brackets encompasses examples which Eustratius takes from Aristotle *EN* 1099a9–13 and which Pachymeres eliminates.

2.4.3 John of Damascus

In Book 3, Pachymeres' use of John of Damascus (d. ca. 750) reveals some points in common with his use of Eustratius. In this case, Pachymeres employs the authority not of an influential peer from the circle of Aristotelian commentators but of a prominent Christian thinker to embellish his Commentary and elaborate on key Aristotelian concepts.⁵⁶ The *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* is an influential text linked to asceticism. It includes *inter alia* a detailed section on the human constitution and psychology relying to a large extent on Nemesius of Emesa's *On the Nature of Man*. Being "a collection of considerations, or meditations, to help Christians understand and articulate their religious identity, over against those amongst whom they live, who maintain different doctrines and ways of devotion",⁵⁷ John's *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* is selectively incorporated into Pachymeres' Commentary, clothing it in notably Christian garb.

At the beginning of Book 3 of the *EN*, Aristotle discusses voluntary and involuntary actions, arguing that people are praised or blamed for voluntary actions, whereas for involuntary ones they are condoned or pitied. This leads him to explain that the legislator too must be aware of the difference between the two sorts of actions, so as to properly assign rewards and punishments (*EN* 1109b30–35). In explicating this portion of the Aristotelian text (verbatim quotes from the *EN* are printed in dotted underlining), Pachymeres makes the following argumentative moves. First, unlike Aristotle, he explicitly connects virtue to prohairesis action by repeating an earlier section of the *EN* that makes this point (see the sentence in bold in the passage below). Second, he elaborates his Commentary on the voluntary and the involuntary with a verbatim section excerpted from the chapter "Concerning what is voluntary and involuntary" in John's *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 38.2–8 (underlined):

Ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς λέγουσιν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἕξις προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσότητι τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς (earlier section of the *NE*, 1106b36–1107a1), λέγειν καὶ περὶ ἔκκουσιου καὶ ἀκουσίου, ὧν ἐν θατέρῳ, τῷ ἔκουσίῳ, ἐμφαίνεται ἡ προαίρεσις, τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀπροαιρέτου λεγομένου. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἐν πράξει τινὶ εἰσι, πολλοὶ δὲ τινες καὶ τὸ ὄντως ἀκούσιον οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πάσχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ πράττειν τίθενται, δεῖ τὴν πράξιν ὀρίζεσθαι, ὅτι ἐνέργεια λογικὴ, ταῖς δὲ πράξεσιν ἔπεται ἢ ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος, καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτῶν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λύπης πράττονται, καὶ αἱ μὲν εἰσιν αὐτῶν τῷ πράττοντι αἰρεταί, αἱ δὲ φευκταί, ὡς ὄντων τῶν αἰρετῶν τῶν μὲν αἰεὶ, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τινα χρόνον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν (John of Damascus, *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 38.2–8). ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι χρήσιμα εἰς τε τιμὰς καὶ κολάσεις.

⁵⁶ John of Damascus' *Dialectic* influenced Pachymeres' paraphrase of and commentary on the *Organon*; see E. Pappa, "Die Kommentare des Georgios Pachymeres zum *Organon*", in I. Vassiss, G. S. Henrich, and D. Reinsch (eds), *Lesarten: Festschrift für Athanasios Kambylis* (Berlin–New York 1998) 198–210, at 207.

⁵⁷ A. Louth, *St John Damascene* (Oxford 2002), 85.

It is necessary for those who discuss virtue, which is a preferred disposition lying in a mean that is relative to us (earlier section of the *EN*, 1106b36–1107a1), *also* to discuss [the concepts] of the voluntary and the involuntary, of which in one case—the voluntary—choice is evident, while the involuntary is said to involve no choice. *Since then these matters [i.e. the voluntary and the involuntary] involve action of some sort, and many people also believe that what is genuinely involuntary involves not only being affected but action as well, we must define action, [asserting] that it is rational activity. Actions attract either praise or blame, and some of them are undertaken with pleasure, others with distress; and some of them are matters of positive choices by the agent, while others are matters of avoidance, and just as of those that are genuinely matters of positive choice some are always so, while others are so at a given time, likewise with those that are matters of avoidance.* (John of Damascus, *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 38.2–8). All of this *will also be useful to the legislators in assigning rewards and punishments.*

Pachymeres *In EN* 3, 1, 90.3–11

Immediately afterward this, Pachymeres quotes also John for the purpose of abridgment, as he cites two short sections from him (nos 1 and 2, in bold below) summarising points from Aristotle which are far apart from one another in the *EN*:

Τοῦ ἀκουσίου τοίνυν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ βίαν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἀγνοίαν· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἡ ποιητικὴ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν εἴη, τότε κατὰ βίαν λέγεται (1. John Damasc. *Exp. fid.* 38.15–16; cf. Arist. *EN* 1109b35–1110a2)· τὸ δὲ δι' ἀγνοίαν, ὅταν μὴ αὐτοὶ παρέχωμεν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀγνοίας, ἀλλ' οὕτω συμβαίη, ὡς εἴ τις μεθύων φόνον ποιήσειε· τότε γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔδωκε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀγνοίας καὶ οὐ συγγινώσκειται ὡς ἀγνοήσας (2. John Damasc. *Exp. fid.* 38.20–24; cf. *EN* 1110b18–19). τοῦ οὖν ἀκουσίου διττοῦ ὄντος, τὸ ἐκούσιον ἀμφοτέροις ἀντίκειται, ὃ μῆτε κατὰ βίαν μῆτε κατ' ἀγνοίαν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ αἰτία ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, εἰδοῖσι τὰ καθέκαστα, ἃ καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ῥήτορσι περιστατικά (3. John Damasc. *Exp. fid.* 38.26–30).

One type of involuntary action, then, involves force, while another [comes about] through ignorance; and when the productive origin [i.e. the initiating or efficient cause] is external, then [the action] is designated as involving compulsion (1. John Damasc. *Exp. fid.* 38.15–16; cf. Arist. *EN* 1109b35–1110a2); **whereas “an [action] through ignorance” [is the designation] whenever we ourselves do not supply a cause for our ignorance, but it occurs contingently in this way, as if someone who is drunk were to commit a murder; for in this case he himself supplied the cause of his own ignorance and so he cannot be pardoned as having acted in ignorance** (2. John Damasc. *Exp. fid.* 38.20–24; cf. *EN* 1110b18–19). **Since the involuntary is twofold, therefore, the voluntary is opposed to both as what happens neither under compulsion nor out of ignorance, and whose origin and cause are found in the agent, who is aware of the particulars, which legal experts term “circumstantial”** (3. John Damasc. *Exp. fid.* 38.26–30).

Pachymeres *In EN* 3, 1, 90.12–18

The wording of the first quote in particular makes it apparent that Pachymeres is referring to Aristotle via John, while the third (no 3) is an abridged version of the main points of the Aristotelian original that Pachymeres also takes from John.

These case-studies show that Pachymeres uses Eustratius and John as ancillary exegetical sources to summarise or unpack Aristotle's original. The extent to which the two sources are employed, however, is neither substantial nor decisive to the formation of Pachymeres' explication in every case, especially when one considers that Pachymeres is already skilled in condensing and supplementing, and has no urgent need to resort to other authorities from the commentary tradition to achieve that. In addition, this kind of continuous word-for-word quotation, with no linguistic modifications, is starkly at odds with what Pachymeres does with Aristotle, as already noted, which is another reason to think that Eustratius and John enter the Commentary cursorily rather than for a truly meaningful purpose. One possible interpretation of this is that the long borrowings from Eustratius (7 in total) consolidate the generic identity of Pachymeres' work as a specimen of an established tradition of commentary writing on the *EN*, while those from John of Damascus (3 in total) add a Christian framework to the interpretation of Aristotle.

2.4.4 Other sources

Finally, Pachymeres' Commentary features quotes from or references to classical literature and philosophy: Homer, Hesiod, Phocylides, Theognis, Choerilus, Euripides, Hippocrates, Heraclitus and Zeno, Plato (*Laws*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*), other parts of the Aristotelian corpus (e.g. *On the Soul*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, *Physics*, *Metaphysics*), and the Stoics (e.g. Ariston). There are also citations from or mentions of other representatives of the commentary tradition in antiquity and late antiquity: Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*, Damascius' commentary on Plato's *Phaedo*, Hermias' commentary on Plato's *Phaedrus*, Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Alcibiades I*, Olympiodorus' commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, and notions which seem to derive from John Philoponus' commentary on *On the Soul* and on the *Prior Analytics*, or [Elias]' commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*. A number of Christian elements punctuate the work, for example a short motto from Paul's *Epistle to the Thessalonians* and a few brief lines from the *Psalms* and *Exodus* from the Old Testament. The Commentary contains proverbs and etymological glosses which betray engagement with known etymological lexica, e.g. the *Etymologicum Gudianum*. Finally, to exemplify philosophical concepts from Book 5 of the *EN*, Pachymeres creates analogies from arithmetic and geometry, drawing on his *Quadrivium*. For precise references to all the above, the reader is referred to the apparatus of parallel passages. In only a few cases does Pachymeres take these sources from other commentaries (see e.g. the Phocylides fragment and the lines from Euripides' *Hecuba* above, excerpted from Eustratius). In most instances he draws directly from the sources listed here.

2.5 Christianisation of a pagan text

Although Pachymeres' Commentary is not as a rule marked by overtly Christian components, a number of instances disclose subtle Christianising of the material. This is achieved in a number of ways. For example, in a passage stressing, as per the Aristotelian base text, the application of moral virtues in the context of social interaction and political involvement, Pachymeres notes that virtues of character cannot be performed against a backdrop of individual insularity, and offers the following parenthetical statement, where he denounces ascetic ideals:⁵⁸

Περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου ἀγαθοῦ προθέμενος διδάσκειν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ τινὶ εὐρηταὶ καὶ ἐν πόλει, ἀπιδὼν πρὸς τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῦ ἥθους, ὡς οὐκ ἐν μονώτῃ συστήναι δύνανται, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τινὰς καὶ πρὸς πλῆθος (αὐτὰ γὰρ κυρίως καὶ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί· τί γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἣν διάγῃ τις ἐν ὄρει, καὶ τί ἡ φιλία, ἣν μονώτης ἦ, καὶ τί ἡ ἀλήθεια, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τινὰ τις διαλέγεται; **νηστεία** δὲ καὶ **σιωπή** καὶ **ἐγκράτεια** καὶ **τὸ τὰ πάντα περιφρονεῖν** μονώτιδες ἀρεταί, μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον καὶ τὸ τοῦτου τέλος συντελοῦσαι, εἰ μὴ γε καὶ αὐτὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἕνεκα τῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ τέλος εἰσίν)...

After setting out to offer instruction concerning the human good, which can be found both in an individual person and in the city, he turns his attention to the virtues of character, since they cannot be found in a solitary existence, but rather with reference to groups of persons or a multitude (for these are properly the moral virtues. Indeed, what is magnificence, if one spends one's time in the mountains? What is friendship, if one is isolated? And what is truth, if one converses with no one? **Fasting, silence, temperance and despising everything** are solitary virtues, which contribute nothing to human life and its end, unless in fact they exist for the sake of the virtues aimed at that end).

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 2, 4.13–19

The terms in bold represent Christian virtues associated with an ascetic lifestyle, all found in close conjunction with one another in Patristic texts such as John Chrysostom (*On Penance* vol. 60, 689.47–49) or Symeon the New Theologian (*Catechesis*, 60–62). What is more, a bit further on in the same entry, Pachymeres refers to moral agents as “human beings, who are liable to change and mutable” (ἄνθρωποι τρεπτοὶ καὶ ἀλλοιωτοί, *In EN* 1, 2, 6.8). This phraseology likely echoes the numerous theological debates about the mutable nature of Christ, since the latter is referred to with similar vocabulary, for instance, in Athanasius' *On the Decisions of the Synod of Nicaea* 35, 8.1–2: διὸ καὶ τρεπτός ἐστι καὶ ἀλλοιωτός τὴν φύσιν ὡς καὶ πάντα τὰ λογικά (cf. Basil, *Epistle* 125, 2.14–16). The same terminology is used with reference to human beings as well in related theological discussions (e.g. Gregory of Nanzianzus, *Apologia to His Father on the Occasion of His Own Ordination* (*Orat.* 9), vol. 35,

⁵⁸ For Pachymeres' opposition to ascetic ideals, see Golitsis, “Un livre reçu par le patriarche Athanase Ier” (n. 9).

821.25–26: διὰ τὸ τρεπτὸν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἕξεώς τε καὶ φύσεως; Didymus Caecus, *Fragments on Psalms* (fr. 895) referring to Psalm. 88,47.48a: Μνήσθητι τίς ἡμῶν τῶν ταῦτα λεγόντων ἢ ὑπόστασις ἐστί. τρεπτοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἀλλοιωτοὶ τυγχάνομεν αὐτεξούσιοι ὄντες).⁵⁹

Christian interpretations are also apparent in the definition of happiness. In a separate section of the Commentary, Pachymeres brings together for his reader's convenience three distinct readings of the concept, the first of which, preceding the definitions by Aristotle and Eustratius, is from the *Psalms*:

μακάριοι γὰρ οἱ ἄμωμοι, πορευόμενοι ἐν νόμῳ Κυρίου, ἐν ὁδῷ τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ. εἰ δ' οὕτως, μακαρίους μὲν ἐροῦμεν ἐκ τῶν ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ὑπάρξει ἀγαθὰ, μακαρίους δὲ ἀνθρώπους οἷς δηλονότι ὑπάρχει ἢ παντοῖα ρύσις καὶ ἢ μεταβολὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐντὸς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐκτός, ἐπεὶ τῇ νοεῖᾳ καὶ θεῖα φύσει ἄλλο εἶδος μακαριότητος, ἐν στάσει τὸ εἶναι ἐχούση καὶ μηδεμίαν ὑπομενούση μεταβολήν.

For *blessed are the blameless, those who walk the law of the Lord, in the path* in this life (μακάριοι γὰρ οἱ ἄμωμοι, πορευόμενοι ἐν νόμῳ Κυρίου, ἐν ὁδῷ τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ, Psalm. 118: 1). *If this is so, we shall pronounce blessed those of the living who possess and are destined to go on possessing good things, and we will also call blessed people* (EN 1101a19–21) for whom, obviously, *there is every sort of dissolution and change* from both internal and external phenomena, *since there is another form of blessedness in their spiritual and divine nature, [that is] being in a state that contains and admits no change at all* (Eustr. In EN 102.12–14).

Pachymeres In EN 1, 16, 38.2–7

Occasional remarks reflecting contemporary religious practice are also introduced to clarify philosophical notions, as when Pachymeres elucidates the close relationship between means and end though an example from fasting (“because things done for the sake of an end are futile without the end for which they are done, just as fasting [is futile] without being humble”; τὰ γὰρ ἔνεκά του δίχα τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα μάταια, ὡσπερ καὶ νηστεία δίχα τοῦ ταπεινοῦσθαι, In EN 2, 2, 54.3–4), resonating with the daily experiences of his Christian audience.

Christianisation of the text through omission of portions of the *EN* that do not align with Christian morality is also possible, as for instance when Pachymeres, at the end of entry 14 of Book 3, does not reproduce Aristotle's reference to adulterers, who are led by lust to undertake daring actions (EN 1117a1–2). In similar fashion, in another section (In EN 3, 16), he omits Aristotle's reference to eating, drinking, and sex (EN 1118a30–32). It is interesting, however, that elsewhere a portion of the *EN* that deals with eating and sexual pleasures does enter the Commentary, although only because it seems integral to the flow and logical cohesion of the argument and

⁵⁹ Cf. Michael Psellos, *Letter to Michael Cerularius*, 1.32–33: Ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ὁμολογῶ, ζῶν ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ τρεπτὸν.

its clarification (*EN* 1118b10–11 in *In EN* 3, 17). In the hierarchy of authorial priorities, explication of Aristotle thus comes before any concern for religious sensibilities.⁶⁰

2.6 Pachymeres' exegetical methodology

In aiming to provide a useful explication of the *EN*, Pachymeres employs the following exegetical techniques, most of which aim at a direct educational effect:

Exegetical method and impact	Example(s) from the Commentary
<p>Presentation of the philosophical material in short, clear sentences, neatly organised in line with the diaretic method prominent in late antique commentaries. The aim is to enhance the reader's ability to recall the information offered without becoming bogged down in unnecessary details or the refinements of complex philosophical analysis.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – "...just as is true of its [i.e. the soul's] division, namely that <i>one part of it is rational, the other non-rational</i>. ... <i>Of the non-rational part [of the soul], one portion is vegetative</i>, and before talking about the other portion, which is the perceptive..." (<i>In EN</i> 1, 19) – <i>If the legal [type of justice] is not enacted, it has no influence</i>, regardless of whether one could act <i>this way or contrarily</i>; but once it is enacted, it is firmly established..." (<i>In EN</i> 5, 12)
<p>Addition or amplification of relevant material not found in the source text, normally quotes from classical philosophy intended to better elucidate the <i>EN</i>.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – "...as Heraclitus [who said] that everything changes and Zeno [who stated] that everything is unchanged" (<i>In EN</i> 1, 5) – "But when we say that 'one must overlook pleasure' in relation to Epicurus or Eudoxus, at that point the difficulty of the injunction becomes conspicuous." (<i>In EN</i> 2, 13)
<p>Clarifications of philosophical and non-philosophical terminology in the main narrative or in parenthetical asides and other sorts of digressions, sometimes introduced with ἤγουν (namely).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – "[Aristotle] says, therefore, that <i>every art</i>, the non-rational handling of things that are subject to rational account, <i>and every inquiry</i>, the preparation in conformity with the rational principle for a good end that either exists or appears to exist, and <i>every practical pursuit</i>, the handling of things that is endowed with reason ..." (<i>In EN</i> 1, 1) – "<i>For some are products</i>, for example a chair or a bench (ἤγουν θρόνος ἢ βᾶθρον), <i>while others are activities</i>." (<i>In EN</i> 1, 1) – "<i>For just as for acraties</i> (those who are not strong enough to control their passions are called 'acraties') learning about these matters is no help once they have been overpowered by their passions, likewise <i>knowledge will bring no profit to persons</i> who lack control over their passions." (<i>In EN</i> 1, 3)

⁶⁰ Cf. Section 2.10 (quote from Paul).

- “just as painters *first draw the outline* when they make a sketch, *then fill in the details afterwards* (‘filling in the details’ refers to the second draft), so we must behave in our discussion of these matters;” (In EN 1, 10)
- “...and we would proclaim that the happy person is in fact a *chameleon* (an animal that changes into every colour).” (In EN 1, 15)

Along similar lines, the commentator frequently explains why Aristotle preferred one term over another (e.g. “this is why he said x, and not y”), paying attention to the precise use of terminology.

- “...he did not say that *the human good ‘is’ an activity of soul in accord with virtue*, but in order to represent the active component of the activity, he says ‘it turns out to be’ [*an activity of soul in accord with virtue*].” (In EN 1, 10)
- “Accordingly, *this sort of virtue*, namely *justice*, is *perfect* and [at the same time it is displayed] *towards another person*. And since it is *perfect*, it is *apparently the greatest of the virtues*, for which reason it has been said that ‘*In justice all virtue is summed up*.’” (In EN 5, 2)

Pithy revisions, personal explanations or clarifications by Pachymeres, often introduced with μάλλον, to enhance understanding of the text.

- “...rather (μάλλον μὲν οὖν), he will receive these subjects as only the crowd would.” (In EN 1, 3)
- “...or rather (ἢ μάλλον) who are stirred in accord with the desire in a rational way and *at the same time also act rationally*, learning would be of great benefit.” (In EN 1, 3)
- “Or rather, in order that I might speak accurately (μάλλον δέ, ἵν’ ἀκριβῶς εἴποιμι) ...” (In EN 1, 3)

Illustration through examples introduced by Pachymeres.

- “for in acting in accord with itself [i.e. as an end], the soul does not yield a product, as the art of construction, for example, might yield a house.” (In EN 1, 11)
- “[The fact is that] it is not the same with regard to dispositions as with regard to sciences and capacities, since sciences and capacities involve contrary activities. For a captain is able to save a ship or to sink it, and one knows simultaneously what is good and what is evil.” (In EN 5, 1)

Rhetorical questions intended to emphasise the meaning of particular terms or ideas and to prompt students to think critically, making the passages relevant and situational.

- “Indeed, what is magnificence, if one spends one’s time in the mountains? What is friendship, if one is isolated? And what is truth, if one converses with no one?” (In EN 1, 2)
- “Also, ‘not about irregular events’ that happen, ‘such as droughts’, he says. What then? Are we not to deliberate about the droughts that will take place, as if we are going to lay aside events driven by necessity? We do not deliberate about droughts in this case,

- however, but about what necessity has in store for us." (*In EN 3, 5*)
- "Albeit *he is not considered foolish, but rather perceptive*. What does the term 'perceptive' (*noeros*) mean? That he understands (*noei*) himself to be somewhat worthy of honour, but rejects receiving honours because of his fairness. This is what the term 'perceptive' (*noeron*) means..." (*In EN 4, 12*)
- Signposting information regarding Aristotle's argumentative methodology.
- "And following his usual practice, as he does in many other works as well, he begins with general statements." (*In EN 1, 1*)
 - "...something [Aristotle] refutes by means of the deductive argument in the second figure." (*In EN 1, 4*)
 - "Since, therefore, there is no synonymy among the good [things] when they might possibly be subsumed under a single form, he inquires into the style of homonymy, according to which they will have the same name." (*In EN 1, 7*)
 - "Since the latter are related to the emotions, therefore, he examines which of the three categories virtue belongs to, and by excluding two of the options, he brings forward the third by way of hypothesis; initially, he removes two via direct reduction [of the syllogisms], since *every hypothetical [syllogism]* is made perfect by means of the *direct reduction* [of syllogisms]." (*In EN 2, 6*)
- Basic categorical oppositions which prioritize or eliminate one possibility or interpretation over another.
- "*The virtue that we must consider is human virtue*, not the one specific to non-rational things or even the one that exists with God and is beyond the human being; because natural science will investigate the former, and theological science the latter." (*In EN 1, 18*)
 - "*Its scale, however*, is not defined in relation to itself, but is *relative to something else* and indefinite in relation to the hypothetical persons [involved]." (*In EN 4, 6*)
 - "At any rate, either it must be stated this way or, given that 'to love' (*philein*) signifies both feeling affection (*agapan*) and bestowing a kiss (*philēma*), the contrary state, namely hatred, does not bear the same name; for it is distinguished from a single species of love." (*In EN 5, 1*)
- Etymological glosses and longer explanations of technical nomenclature not featured in Aristotle, playing on the impact of lexical semantics and pointing to an inter-
- "*For this reason they rightly derive 'the good'* [*agathon*] from 'everyone runs [*theein*] very fast [*agan*] towards it'. Hence it is not called '*agathōtaton*', since *agan* [already] includes the superlative degree." (*In EN 1, 1*)

est in the importance of wording (*lexis*) and metalanguage in exegetical contexts.

– “That is why men of this sort are called ‘greedy-bellies’ (γαστρίμαργοι), in the sense that they are gluttonous in relation to their stomach (οἰονεὶ μάργοι κατὰ τὴν γαστέρα), and they are also termed ‘slavish’ (ἀνδραποδώδεις), since they have the desires of slaves rather than of free persons (ὡς ἡδονὰς ἔχοντες τὰς τῶν δούλων καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων).” (*In EN 3, 17*)
 – “That the liberal man is defined by his donation or acquisition [of money] is established by the name used for ‘money’ (*chrēmata*), since the usefulness (*chrēsīmon*) of money (*chrēmata*) is considerable; for this reason, therefore, it is termed ‘money’ (*chrēmata*).” (*In EN 4, 2*)

Use of proverbs adding to the Commentary’s pragmatic character, especially where this facilitates exemplification.

– “this is [the sense of] the phrase ‘tasteless’ (*paramelos*), which is proverbial and is derived from those who speak discordantly (*ekmelōs*).” (*In EN 4, 8*)

Frequent recapitulations before proceeding to a new topic, and insertion of neat synopses of the main issues discussed at length, mostly but not always at the beginning of individual entries.

– “This is why we must inquire again specifically into the principle of happiness, namely the principle of the fact just as we defined it. For we drew conclusions about it [i.e. the principle of happiness] from many things, first that it is a human product, next that it is rational and not non-rational in accord with some [human] standard. After this, we established that it is an activity, which is greater than a disposition. After this, [we established that it must be possessed] throughout one’s life or throughout most of it.” (*In EN 1, 11*)

Use of appropriate grammatical person:

a) first-person plural forms to create an inclusive and communal learning experience;

b) second-person singular imperatives to draw the student’s attention to key points.

– “And because we are eagerly pursuing (θηρώμεθα) a definition of it as an end, before speaking of the things that lead to the end (for the end is a goal, and by aiming at it we achieve [πράττομεν] other things), we seek more information (ζητοῦμεν) about it [i.e. happiness].” (*In EN 1, 9*)

– “Just as we investigated (ἐζητοῦμεν) the other [dispositions]...” (*In EN 5, 3*)

– “You should also count (σὺ δὲ λέγε) [among the lawgivers] Solon in Athens and Zaleucus among the people of Croton and the rest of them.” (*In EN 1, 18*)

Interrogative expressions and other erotapocritic elements reminiscent of the question-and-answer format conspicuous in antique and late antique pedagogical discourse (e.g. διατί; ὅτι or πῶς δὲ ...; ὅτι),

– “Why is the latter [i.e. stinginess] not a case of going over the top, whereas the former [i.e. vulgarity] is? Because in the latter case ...” (*In EN 2, 9*)

– “What does ‘those at the extremes lay claim to the middle position’ mean? Is it that, since being in the

mostly pointing to the oral nature of teaching.⁶¹

middle has no name—and this is properly speaking the kind of ambition towards the right people [i.e. in the right direction], in the right manner, in the right amount, in the right context, and from the right motives—this [intermediate quality] could *be called* both *unambitious* and *ambitious*, meaning ‘*unambitious*’ by comparison with too much ambition, but ‘*ambitious*’ by comparison with too little?” (In EN 2, 10)

– “Why then is [miserliness] not opposed to wastefulness as well? Because then one thing would be opposed to two things, whereas the logical principle is that one thing is opposed to one. One must therefore say that miserliness is opposed to wastefulness in an absolute sense, as one vice is opposed to another vice.” (In EN 4, 6)

Mnemonic devices to enhance the memorisation abilities of Pachymeres’ students.

– “For we have mentioned (μεμνήμεθα) in the additional specification...” (In EN 2, 9)

– “...one must bear in mind (μεμνήσθαι) the rule that we are investigating the deficiency of the underlying quality...” (In EN 2, 11)

Use of *didaskein* and its cognates, showing the didactic mission of Aristotle’s *EN* and pointing to its canonisation in the curriculum.⁶²

– “After setting out to offer instruction concerning the human good (Περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου ἀγαθοῦ προθέμενος διδάσκειν...)” (In EN 1, 2)

– “He [i.e. Aristotle] tailors his teaching towards what is common [among citizens] (ἀνάγει πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὴν διδασκαλίαν...)” (In EN 1, 2)

2.7 Moralism and social critique

Another overarching feature in the Commentary, which testifies to Pachymeres’ self-depiction as a professional commentator, is the inclusion of moralism and social critique to complement the elucidation of Aristotelian ethics. These examples represent important material for the modern scholarly debate as to whether and, if so, to what extent, the commentary should be seen as a “secondary” text subordinate to

⁶¹ Y. Papadoyiannakis, “Instruction by Question and Answer: The Case of the Late Antique and Byzantine *Erotapokriseis*”, in S. F. Johnson (ed.), *Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: Dynamism, Didacticism, Classicism* (Aldershot 2006) 91–105.

⁶² See e.g. I. Sluiter, “Commentaries and the Didactic Tradition”, in G. Most (ed.), *Commentaries = Kommentare* (Göttingen 1999) 173–205.

the authoritative text to which it is appended;⁶³ this in turn relates to the issue of the power relationship between the ancient authority and the later exegete discussed in the next section. As it will be shown, the commentator's voice, building on the Aristotelian material, is clearly distinguishable in certain sections of the text, especially those that communicate Pachymeres' ethical admonitions.

Moral consideration projected onto the reader, first of all, is a key component of Pachymeres' practical instruction, as for example when he furnishes Aristotle's statements with personal interpretations by means of rhetorical questions, attempting to guide the reader's understanding and subsequent behaviour:

διώκουσι γάρ, φησί, τὴν τιμὴν, ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν φρονιμωτέρων θέλουσι τιμᾶσθαι, ὡς ἀρίστως διακρινόντων. ἐπεὶ γοῦν διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τιμὴν αἰροῦνται, εἴη ἂν μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τέλος, ἢς χάριν καὶ ἡ τιμὴ ζητεῖται. **διατί δὲ οὐχ ὑφ' αὐτῶν πιστεύειν ἔχουσιν ὅτι ἀρεταίνουσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἄλλων τῶν τιμώντων; ἢ διὰ τὸ φιλαύτουσ εἶναι πάντας καὶ τὸ οἰκείον πᾶν ὑποπτέυεται;**

For *they pursue honour*, he says, *in order to have confidence that they themselves are good*. For this reason, they wish *to be honoured by men of greater practical wisdom*, because the latter offer the best judgments. Since, then, they choose honour for the sake of virtue, *virtue would be even more the end [of the political life than honour]*, being that for the sake of which honour in fact is sought. **Why are they unable to believe on their own behalf that they are virtuous, but rely on other people who bestow honour? Is it because everyone is self-centred that everything personal is looked upon with suspicion?**

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 5, 10.27–12.1

Pachymeres also offers direct moral assessment of particular patterns of conduct, again not found in Aristotle, intertwining this with social critique:

δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαπᾶται καὶ ἡ τιμὴ, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ γε τοῖς πολλοῖς. τινὲς γὰρ ὀρέγονται τῆς περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τιμῆς καὶ οὐ μέλει αὐτοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς, **τυράννοις οὖσι καὶ βιαιοῖς**· οἱ δὲ καὶ τοὺς μὴ τιμώντας αὐτοὺς κολάζουσιν, οἷς εἰ ἔμελεν ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ δοκεῖν ἀρεταίνειν, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως ἐκόλαζον.

For pleasure and honour *are both valued for their own sake*, if not by everyone at any rate by many. For some people yearn for the [type of] honour that deals with everything else [i.e. external goods] and do not care about virtue, **since they are tyrants and violent**. They in fact punish those who fail to honour them, whom they would not punish in this manner if they [i.e. the people who yearn for honour] were interested in virtue and in appearing to be virtuous.

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 5, 12.13–17

⁶³ Budelmann, "Classical Commentary in Byzantium" (n. 37), 142; Sluiter, "The Dialectics of Genre" (n. 44). The "secondary" nature of commentaries is also suggested by the modern terms attached to them as "literature of hermeneutics", "secondary literature", or "περί-literature".

The characterisations that describe the attitude of individuals who are fond of honours are negatively loaded, implicitly discouraging readers from embracing similar manners. This is akin to what is termed a “distancing strategy” in post-Hellenistic practical ethics,⁶⁴ which Pachymeres reinvigorates throughout the Commentary as a way of problematising moral issues for his readers and shifting his focus from philosophical explication to moral didacticism.⁶⁵ Although the Commentary is primarily a functional text which serves to explain its canonical antecedent, therefore, it is no less important than the latter in terms of content and outlook, especially in view of the moral benefit it attempts to bestow on its readership.

2.8 Power dynamics between the ancient authority and the Byzantine exegete

As we have seen, Pachymeres is a resourceful exegete, whose Commentary provided his audience with a textbook for philosophical studies and at the same time with an ethical *vade mecum* for their daily behaviour. Modern textbooks are generally intended to be consulted in conjunction with the primary narrative they explicate. Pachymeres’ “textbook”, on the other hand, essentially replaces Aristotle’s *EN* by reproducing its fundamental ideas and formulations and enhancing them with the commentator’s distinctive explications. That is one aspect of the commentator’s contribution to the historical reception of the ancient work. Another involves the special features of the textbook, mainly its didactic and moralising character, which further attest to the commentator’s authority as well as his emphatic claims to infuse the text with his personal outlook. In what follows, I discuss the “power dynamics”⁶⁶ between the Byzantine commentator and his ancient model in the light of direct address or criticism of the latter; the transformation of the source text by the commentator; the addition of inflationary notes not found in the source text, mostly designed to achieve doctrinal elucidation; and creative shifts of emphasis on philosophical notions treated differently in the source text.

I begin with the relationship between Pachymeres and his ancient predecessor. Determining the former’s attitude towards the latter is not a straightforward task,

⁶⁴ Cf. for instance, L. van Hoof, *Plutarch's Practical Ethics: The Social Dynamics of Philosophy* (Oxford 2010) 160–161.

⁶⁵ On other occasions, there are less direct moral admonitions through the application of an exploratory kind of moralism, and introduction of ethical assessment meant to serve Pachymeres’ Christian audience. Full discussion is provided in Xenophontos, “George Pachymeres’ Commentary” (n. 23), 240–246.

⁶⁶ The term is taken from I. Sluiter, “The Violent Scholiast: Power Issues in Ancient Commentaries”, in M. Asper (ed.), *Writing Science: Mathematical and Medical Authorship in Ancient Greece* (Berlin 2013) 191–213.

although we would be on relatively safe ground if we said that his overall approach seems to be one of admiration and approbation.⁶⁷ For one thing, towards the beginning of his Commentary on Book 1, describing Aristotle's choice of topics to discuss, Pachymeres claims that the ancient philosopher was prompted by caution (*In EN 1, 1*) and a desire to avoid labouring in vain (*In EN 1, 1* and *In EN 1, 3*). Both comments are consistent with the traditional appraisal of ancient authors on the part of their later exegetes, as is the use of the verb "he says" throughout, pointing to the ancient philosopher's accepted – almost undisputable – authority.⁶⁸ In addition, in an intriguing passage in the Commentary on Book 3, Pachymeres, in a direct apostrophe, praises Aristotle for his methodology, which he briefly outlines:

Εὐγέ σοι, Ἀριστότελες, τῆς καθέκαστον ἐξετάσεως· ἔθου γὰρ σκοπὸν ζητῆσαι τί ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις· καὶ ἐπεὶ τὰλλα μὲν ἀπερράπισας εὗρες δὲ παρομοιομένην ταύτη ἐξ ἐγγίονος τὴν βούλησιν, περὶ τῶν βουλευτῶν ἐξετάξεις, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἔκουσιόν τι ἡ προαίρεσις φαίνεται, οὐ πᾶν δὲ ἔκουσιον προαιρετὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ βεβουλευμένον, ἀφείς προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν λέγειν περὶ βουλευτοῦ ἐξετάξεις, καὶ τὸ προαιρετὸν ἐντεῦθεν θηρᾶ, ἐκ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ δὲ εὕρισκεις τὴν προαίρεσιν. βουλευτὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος, βουλευτὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

My compliments to you, Aristotle, for this particular insight, since you made it your target to investigate what choice is. And when you rejected the other [options] and discovered that which most closely resembled it, you began to examine the objects of deliberation. And since *choice is manifestly a voluntary [action], although not every voluntary act is chosen but [only the one] preceded by deliberation*, you set aside the discussion of choice and wish, and began to scrutinise the object of deliberation. After this you also search for the object of choice, and you discover choice from [an investigation of] what is chosen. *The end* is thus *what is wished for, while the means to the end are the objects of deliberation*.

Pachymeres *In EN 3, 6*, 104.19–25

This is the first and one of the very few times that Aristotle's name is explicitly cited in the Commentary,⁶⁹ with Pachymeres' outburst of praise soon coming to an end and the explication of the *EN* continuing as before, in its normal form and style.⁷⁰ This brief digression looks like a spontaneous move on Pachymeres' part to highlight Aristotle's philosophical dexterity, a topic he cannot elaborate too much, however, if the Commentary's generally impartial tone is to be retained. According to Sophonias' well-known distinction between commentators and paraphrasts, the former should distance themselves from the base text and by implication from the

⁶⁷ Remember also that in section 2.4.2 above, Pachymeres does not share Eustratius' criticism of Aristotle.

⁶⁸ See, e.g., I. Sluiter, "The Violent Scholiast" (n. 66), 195–196.

⁶⁹ The second and last time Pachymeres refers to Aristotle by name is in *In EN 3, 18*, while in two other cases only, at the beginning of Book 3 and in *In EN 5, 8*, he is mentioned as "the philosopher".

⁷⁰ In Eustratius' commentary, for example, Aristotle's name appears frequently, also in the form of appellations in the vocative.

author they discuss (*In De an.* 1.4–3.9),⁷¹ which might partially account for Pachymeres' quick wrapping up of the exclamatory passage quoted above.⁷²

On the other hand, the Commentary is not free of instances which betray Pachymeres' scepticism towards Aristotelian statements, although these are limited in number and extent. In *In EN* 2, 5, for example, Pachymeres characterises Aristotle's example of sick people who neglect carrying out a doctor's prescriptions (*EN* 1105b14–16) as “not very easily understood” (οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λίαν εὐθικτον τὸ παράδειγμα, *In EN* 2, 5, 62.2–3), going on to explain why he considers this to be so (“But if one were to judge [these two groups] according to their attitude, one would find them to be on a par; for just as the first group do something not because it is noble, but because it is considered noble, and in this manner they are not accounted virtuous, so too the second group”, *In EN* 2, 5). Along similar lines, in another case Pachymeres regards one of Aristotle's statements as “truthful, but not clear (τοῦτο δὲ ἀληθινὸν μὲν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ, *In EN* 6, 1, 236.18–19). Pachymeres' scepticism as to Aristotle's obscurity here seems to be aligned with the classical *topos* in the exegetical tradition of underscoring the lack of clarity in the Stagirite's writings.

There are also less direct cases of deviation from Aristotle's statements: one appears at the beginning of the Commentary on Book 4, where Pachymeres unpacks Aristotle's text on liberality and meanness by supplementing it with his own interpretations:

καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀνελευθερία ἔστι τοῖς εἰς χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ἢ κατέχουσιν ἀσφαλῶς τὰ ἴδια ἢ καὶ προσκτωμένοις ἐξ οἰοδητήριος τρόπου ἢ καὶ ὀλίγα παρὰ τὸ δέον δαπανῶσιν· ἡ δ' ἀσωτία

71 Edition by M. Hayduck (ed.), *Sophoniae in libros Aristotelis de anima paraphrasis*, CAG 23.1 (Berlin 1883).

72 Simplicius' own definition of the “worthy exegete” might also be relevant here: “The worthy exegete of Aristotle's writings must not fall wholly short of the latter's greatness of intellect. He must also have experience (ἐμπειρον) of everything the Philosopher has written, and must be a connoisseur (ἐπιστήμονα) of Aristotle's stylistic habits. His judgement must be impartial (κρίσιν ἀδέκαστον), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, if some point should require attention, should he obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher's school. [The good exegete] must, I believe, not convict the philosophers of discordance by looking only at the letter of what [Aristotle] says against Plato; but he must look towards the spirit, and track down the harmony which reigns between them on the majority of points”, *In Arist. Cat.* 7.23–32; translated in M. Chase, *Simplicius, On Aristotle's “Categories” 1–4* (London 2003) 23. Edition of the text by K. Kalbfleisch (ed.), *Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium*, CAG 8 (Berlin 1907). Pachymeres seems to conform to the formal criteria of a worthy exegete as described by Simplicius, with the exception that he does not try to harmonise Plato and Aristotle. As is obvious from the Commentary, Pachymeres refers to Plato to acquaint learners with some basic Platonic notions or briefly mention the content of a Platonic dialogue. Thus, references to Plato have a propedeutic function, preparing learners for the study of Plato.

συμπλέκεται καὶ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἄσωτος ὁ προϊέμενος τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ εἰς τὰς ἰδίας ὀρέξεις δαπανῶν.

Miserliness is characteristic of those who are devoted to money or steadfastly hold onto their personal funds or even try to make more in any way possible or spend very little in comparison to their needs; whereas *wastefulness* is also intertwined with those who lack self-control, since it is not just the individual who spends his personal resources beyond what is needed who is wasteful, but also the one who spends [money] to satisfy his personal appetites.

Pachymeres *In EN* 4, 1, 138.12–16

In another case, Pachymeres inserts his personal opinion right next to the quoted Aristotelian phrase (“*If there are multiple virtues, as there surely are...*”, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 10), and elsewhere he critiques Socratic views as well: e.g. “And no virtue of character [exists] without practical wisdom, even if Socrates subsumed them all into one, i.e. practical wisdom. Except that this alone does not suffice, and one must also add...”, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 10). Pachymeres’ involvement with the commented text becomes more visible as a result of his habit of refraining from reproducing lines Aristotle cites from ancient poetry (e.g. Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 4 omitting the Hesiodic quote from *EN* 1095b10–14) or, on other occasions, of adding his own ancient quotes to reinforce specific points, as when he inserts Evenus’ “Habit, I say, is a long-term matter,| and ultimately becomes nature” at the beginning of the Commentary on Book 2 to stress the importance of habituation as second nature.⁷³

In connection with this, on a number of occasions Pachymeres’ engagement with classical quotations seems to be more effective compared to the corresponding citation of the same lines by Aristotle. In referring to pleasure and how people approach it, Aristotle says:

“and in everything we must beware above all of pleasure and its sources; for we are already biased in its favour when we come to judge it. Hence we must react to it as the elders reacted to Helen, and on each occasion repeat what they said; for if we do this, and send it off, we shall be less in error.” (*EN* 1109b7–12; transl. T. Irwin)

What Aristotle means is not entirely clear unless one recalls the Iliadic passage to which he refers (*Iliad* 3.156–160). Presenting the extract’s “intended meaning” in a

⁷³ A similar example in which Pachymeres makes productive use of classical quotations is seen in *In EN* 4, 5; in an extensive side-note, Pachymeres uses two lines put in the mouth of Talthybius in Euripides’ *Hecuba* 497–498: “those who are old or frail (since such people are selfish and feel little concern about people other than themselves, perhaps because there is little natural warmth in them; for Talthybius speaks well when he says “*I am an old man, but even so I desired to die*” rather than suffer such terrible things. For if someone were not to speak this way, his speech would be contradictory, because it is more fitting to say “*I am young, but even so I desired to die*”), and [he also says that] miserliness is more appropriate to *human nature than wastefulness* is”. It is interesting that Pachymeres revises the quote.

fuller form, Pachymeres makes the moral injunction more straightforward and to the point:

φυλακτέον δὲ μάλιστα τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἡδὺ κρίνουσι τὴν μεσότητα· δεκάζομεν γὰρ ἐξ ὀρέξεως τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ κρίσιν. ὅπερ γούν πεποιήκασι παρὰ τῷ Ὀμήρῳ οἱ δημογέροντες, ἐπαινήσαντες μὲν τὴν Ἑλένην, ἐπικρίναντες δὲ **καὶ οὕτως ἔχουσαν πρὸς τὰ οἰκεία ἀποπέμπεσθαι, μῆπως σφίσι καὶ πόλει πῆμα γένηται.** τοῦτο καὶ ἡμῖν ποιητέον καὶ ἀποπεμπτέον τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὕτω ποιούντες μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τυγχάνειν τοῦ μέσου. χαλεπὸν δὲ ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μᾶλλον κεκρατημένων τῶν καθέκαστα ταῖς ἡδοναῖς· τὸ γὰρ κοινῶς λέγειν «παροπτέον τὴν ἡδονήν» εὐκόλον διὰ τὸ κοινὸν καταφαίνεται· ὅτε δὲ λέγομεν «παροπτέον» τῷ Ἐπικούρῳ ἢ τῷ Εὐδόξῳ «τὴν ἡδονήν», τότε τὸ τοῦ ἐπιτάγματος χαλεπὸν διαφαίνεται. τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου·

We must be especially on our guard against pleasure, particularly since we judge the mean pleasant, for we are partial judges in our judgement of this, being motivated by desire. [This is precisely] what the elders do in Homer, praising Helen, but recommending that even so she ought to be sent back home, lest there be grief for their city and for them. It is incumbent on us to do the same and banish pleasure, and if we behave this way we shall have our best opportunity to reach the intermediate condition. Perhaps this is difficult, and more so since we are controlled by particular pleasures; for the common saying “one must overlook pleasure” appears easy since it is common. But when we say that “one must overlook pleasure” in relation to Epicurus or Eudoxus, at that point the difficulty of the injunction becomes conspicuous. It is the same in the case of the mean as well.

Pachymeres *In EN* 2, 13, 86.24–33

The addition of the line printed in bold shows that Pachymeres stays closer to the Homeric text than Aristotle does, and in fact that he must have checked it from the original, since the line creatively reproduces the locution in *Iliad* 3.159–160: ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς τοίη περ ἑοῦσ' ἐν νηυσὶ νέεσθω,| μηδ' ἡμῖν τεκέεσσι τ' ὀπίσσω πῆμα λίποιτο (“Yet, lovely as she is, let her sail home,| not stay to be a bane to us and our children”). Pachymeres’ addition of the term πόλει in particular reflects his general tendency to supplement his ancient sources with an emphasis on the notion of the city, which he conceptualises as an organised community comprising morally and socially responsible members. Furthermore, as seen above, Pachymeres goes on to expand on Aristotle’s understandings of pleasure by inserting a proverb which allows him to usher in Epicurus’ and Eudoxus’ related perspectives, thus achieving plurality of philosophical views on the subject.

It goes without saying that Pachymeres’ clarification of the text is only to be expected in the context of an exegetical writing. But the commentator’s creativity in the techniques he applies adds further support to the idea that, although his commentary is in theory a by-product in support of the main text, it is also a work in its own right, with its own *raison d’être*. A case in point comes from a setting in which the connection between involuntary action and ignorance is discussed, drawing on *EN* 1111a3–6. In this passage, Aristotle lists the circumstances that have a bearing on involuntary action, but Pachymeres incorporates Aristotle’s list into a unified sce-

nario which associates the specific circumstances with particular examples to facilitate the reader's understanding:

...κατά τι δὲ ἀγνοεῖ οἷον τίς ἐστίν ὃν τύπτει· πατῆρ ἴσως· τί· ὅτι ἐμπήγνυσι τὴν μάχαιραν· ἐν τίνι καιρῷ· ὅτι χειμῶνα φαρμακεύει· τρόπον· ὅτι σιδήρῳ μὴ εἰδώς· αἰτία· ὅτι σωτηρίας χάριν ὁ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι μὴ θέλων) καὶ ἀπλῶς τι τῶν περιστατικῶν.

...One is ignorant with regard to something, for example, of *who* it is whom he strikes. Perhaps it's his own father! [He may also be ignorant of] *what* [he does], namely that he sticks his dagger [in him]. [He may be ignorant of] the *precise* occasion: that he administers drugs in winter. [He may be ignorant of] the manner, i.e. he is unaware that he stabs him with the knife. [He may be ignorant of] *why* [he acted in this way]: i.e. that [he wanted] *to save* his [father's] *life*, but killed him unintentionally), and simply put [he may be ignorant] of one of the circumstances.

Pachymeres *In EN* 3, 2, 96.2–5

So far we have explored Pachymeres' transformative approach to his ancient prototype as a salient trait of his self-presentation as commentator. The reliability of the material he transmits is another parameter of his dynamic role in the Aristotelian commentary tradition, given that Pachymeres' exegesis is generally respectful of its reference text. There is perhaps only one instance in which Aristotle seems to be misread. This is in *In EN* 5, 5, 188.25–26: Pachymeres' *ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς ἡ διανομὴ γενήσεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ διδόμενα ἔξει* ("since the ratio between the things involved, when the distribution occurs, will be equal to the ratio between the distributed shares") seems to be unreasonably duplicating the same notion and is at odds with the corresponding Aristotelian *ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κάκεῖνα ἔχει* ("since the ratio between the distributed things will be equal to the ratio between the persons", *EN* 1131a21–22), which compares the ratio between things with the ratio between people, and not the ratio between things with the ratio between things! The attribution in *EN* 1131a20–22 (καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς...), in which ἐν οἷς refers to things/shares, whereas simply οἷς to people, is attested in other representatives of the Aristotelian tradition: E.g. Anon. *In EN* 261.21–22: *ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς, δηλονότι ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα; Mich. In EN* 19.25–27: *τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδήλωσε διὰ τοῦ οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς, λέγων οἷς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὰ πράγματα. ὡς γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τὰ σφίσι διδόμενα ἔξει, καὶ ὡς αὐτά, οὕτω κάκεῖνοι.* To avoid duplicating the notion, Pachymeres ought thus to have written "since the ratio between the people involved (οἷς), when the distribution occurs, will be equal to the ratio between the distributed shares", unless we assume that he follows Michael's alternative interpretation of the passage, according to which ἐν οἷς refers to people instead and κάκεῖνα/οἷς to things: *ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς, ἦτοι ὡς γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὕτω κάκεῖνα ἔξουσι, τὰ χρήματα δηλονότι. δύναται τὸ ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς εἰρησθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ δὲ κάκεῖνα ἔχει περὶ τῶν πολιτῶν* (*Mich. In EN* 19.27–31). To my

mind, this is less likely, given that in other exegetical sentences in the same section of the text Pachymeres uses οἷς with reference to people, not things, e.g. ἔστι γὰρ τὰ μὲν δύο ἐν τοῖς διδομένοις, τὰ δὲ δύο ἐν τοῖς λαμβάνουσι· ταῦτα γὰρ λέγει «οἷς καὶ ἄ» (*In EN* 5, 5, 190.9–10). Moreover, Michael's commentary is not a source for Pachymeres' own Commentary, so it would be risky to assume that Pachymeres was actually aware of Michael's *In EN* 19.27–31.

2.9 Pachymeres' Commentary on the *EN* and his paraphrase (Book XI of the *Philosophia*)

As already noted, the Commentary on the *EN* has a sibling work, a paraphrase of the *EN* forming Book XI of Pachymeres' *Philosophia*. The two texts differ in both form and function, since the latter, unlike the Commentary, offers a synopsis of the *EN* as a whole, providing an introduction to Aristotle's ethics and familiarising students with the essential topics and arguments dealt with in the *EN*.⁷⁴ This is reflected, for instance, in the epitomic nature of the paraphrase, and specifically in its division into titles and chapters, for example “Τίτλος α', κεφάλαιον γ': ὅτι διττὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ” or “Τίτλος στ', κεφάλαιον α': περὶ ἡδονῆς”. Put differently, in what can be assumed to be the learning cycle in the educational setting in which Pachymeres was operating, his paraphrase of the *EN* would have catered to tyros with no prior background, whereas his Commentary would have been used at a more advanced stage to help students who already had a basic acquaintance with the subject delve into the more specific, complex, and thorny aspects of the *EN*.

To make better sense of the above points, let us compare the treatment of virtue as an intermediate state between extremes in the two works. This is the main topic of discussion in Title α', chapter ε' of Pachymeres' paraphrase (*Paraphr. In*

⁷⁴ In line with Themistius' programmatic statements in favour of paraphrases as expounded in his own paraphrase of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* 1.2–16; here the emphasis is on brevity, which helps the student easily remember the Aristotelian material in the course of learning: Ἐμοὶ συντάττεσθαι μὲν ἐξηγήσεις τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν βιβλίων μετὰ τοσούτους τε καὶ τοιούτους οὐκ ἐδόκει πόρρωθεν εἶναι φιλοτιμίας ἀνωφελοῦς· οὔτε γὰρ πολλὰ ἔστιν εὐρεῖν ἔλλειπότητας τοῦς πρότερον, τό τε μικρῶν ἔνεκα παρεγχειρήσεων ὀλοκλήρους καταβάλλεσθαι πραγματείας ὅμοιον τῷ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν βουλομένῳ μετακινεῖν τὴν Φειδίου, ὅτι τὰ δεσμὰ τῆς κρηπίδος ᾤετο ἀμείνω ποιήσειν. τὸ μὲντοι ἐκλαμβάνοντα τὰ βουλήματα τῶν ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γεγραμμένων σὺν τάχει τε ἐξαγγέλλειν καὶ τῇ συντομίᾳ τοῦ φιλοσόφου κατὰ δύναμιν παρομαρτεῖν καινόν τε ἐδόκει καὶ τινα ὠφέλειαν παρέξεσθαι· εὐκόλον γὰρ ἔσεσθαι διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου τὴν ἀνάμνησιν ὑπειλήφωμεν τοῖς ἀπαξ μὲν τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους μεμαθηκόσιν ἀναλαμβάνειν δε αὐτὰ συνεχῶς τῷ μήκει τῶν ὑπομνημάτων οὐ δυναμένους, τὸ δὲ πρότερον τῶν Ὑστέρων ἀναλυτικῶν οὕτω σαφηνίσαι προελόμενοι σοὶ πρώτῳ τὸν τύπον κοινούμεθα τῆς συγγραφῆς, παιδείας τε ἔνεκεν ἀκριβοῦς καὶ φιλίας ἀληθινῆς, οὔτε λήσεσθαι τί σε τῶν μὴ δεόντως εἰρημένων οὔτε κατασιωπήσειν πεπιστευκότες. M. Wallies (ed.), *Themistii analyticorum posteriorum paraphrasis*, CAG 5.1 (Berlin 1900).

EN 26.5–29.6), and of entry θ' to the beginning of entry ιγ' of Book 2 (... πλατυκώτερον ἐξετάζουσιν) of the Commentary, both of which cover EN 1107a33–1109b1. In the paraphrastic passage, Pachymeres quotes the relevant section of the EN faithfully, although he leaves out some words, phrases, or sentences as appropriate to create a compressed version of Aristotle: the original contains ca. 1260 words, whereas the reduced paraphrase contains ca. 700. A reading of the paraphrastic passage also brings out its aim of listing, without expansive details, the mean in particular cases (for instance in giving and taking money, generosity is the mean, wastefulness the excess, a lack of generosity the deficiency; in honour and dishonour, magnanimity is the mean, vanity the excess, cowardice the deficiency, etc.), and of advancing the central claim that virtue opposes the extremes, and that human beings should therefore abstain from moral deviation. This is communicated almost verbatim via Aristotle's words rather than through Pachymeres' remarks, and leads easily to the next subject of the paraphrase, which focuses on voluntary and involuntary action.⁷⁵

In the Commentary, on the other hand, the same issues are dealt with in a different way, mainly through scrutinising the philosophical terms and signposting the sequence of Aristotle's argument, and by adding explanatory comments and vivid examples building on the Aristotelian passage, reminders to students of relevant material already digested in the classroom, and questions and answers clarifying abstract notions, to mention only some of Pachymeres' exegetical methods.

There are other portions of the paraphrase which do not consist merely of Aristotelian quotations, but which also include a) summaries in Pachymeres' own words (e.g. Title β', chapter α' *Paraphr. In EN* 29.15–18 ~ EN 1110a1–11), alternating with direct quotations, and b) occasionally some forms of exegesis. In general, the paraphrase pays particular attention to citing large chunks from the *Eudemian Ethics* as well as the *Magna Moralia*, so that the student is made familiar with other witnesses to Aristotle's moral philosophy. This stands in stark contrast to the Commentary,

75 For some of Pachymeres' techniques in his *Philosophia*, see the study of B. Bydén, “Λογοτεχνικές καινοτομίες στα πρώιμα παλαιολόγια υπομνήματα στο *Περί ψυχῆς* του Αριστοτέλη”, *Υπόμνημα στη Φιλοσοφία* 4 (2006) 221–251, at 236–240. For his compositional methodology and role as a paraphrast, see I. Telelis, “Τεχνικός διδάσκαλος: Georgios Pachymeres as Paraphrast of Aristotelian Meteorology”, in A. Cuomo and E. Trapp (eds), *Toward a Historical Sociolinguistic Poetics of Medieval Greek*, BYZANTIOS. Studies in Byzantine History and Civilization 12 (Turnhout 2017), 119–142. Cf. Pappa, “Die Kommentare” (n. 56), esp. 206–210, who compares Pachymeres' authorial practices in the first Book of the *Philosophia* which treats the *Organon*, and in the individual commentary on the same Aristotelian work. See also Oikonomakos, *Γεώργιος Παχυμέρης Φιλοσοφία* (n. 8), 19*–23*; Pappa, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia, Buch 10* (n. 8), 29*–36*; Pappa, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia. Buch 6* (n. 8), 33*–39*; Telelis, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia, Book 5* (n. 8), 37*–48*; Telelis, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia, Book 3* (n. 8), 15*–71*.

which contains no references at all to these works.⁷⁶ In a similar vein, the paraphrase does not make use of Aristotle's commentators, such as Eustratius, although as in the case of the Commentary, there are occasional references to Patristic works that add Christian connotations to a number of passages. There is also a pagan element in the paraphrase, in that there are several quotes from Homer other than those already in the *EN* (indeed, many more than in the Commentary) (e.g. *Paraphr. In EN* 4.27–28 = *Iliad* 1.593–594). This likely points to the centrality of the Homeric epics in the elementary teaching programme, which would have made them resonate with the educational experience of intended audiences and with their appreciation of Homer as a canonical author.⁷⁷ Interestingly, the use of Homeric material in the paraphrase sometimes facilitates Pachymeres' exegetical needs; when discussing the Aristotelian phrase Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν (*EN* 1124a20–21), for example, Pachymeres adds καὶ τὰ προτερήματα (“advantages”) (*Paraphr. In EN* 42.20) and goes on to explain the notion of προτέρημα against a distinctly Homeric backdrop, in which heroes such as Achilles, Ajax, and Meleager take centre-stage:

Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν, καὶ τὰ προτερήματα· Ἀχιλλεύς γάρ διὰ τὰ προτερήματα ἀξιοῖ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ Αἴας καὶ Μελέαγρος, ἀλλ' ἀποτυγχάνοντες, ὁ μὲν ἐμήνιεν, ὁ δὲ ἠϋθέντευσεν ἑαυτόν, ὁ δὲ ἀπόλεμος ἐγίνετο·

Paraphr. In EN 42.19–23

2.10 Independent thinking in the context of exegesis?

In previous sections, we have seen that Pachymeres modifies the text of Aristotle to organically integrate it into the exegetical plot of his Commentary. He achieves this through a variety of devices, some of which operate on the level of form (e.g. reordering, expansion, compression, etc.), others on the level of content (e.g. insertion of moralising and Christian elements). Despite the generic constraints the Commentary imposes – its educational mission is so attentively undertaken that it leaves *prima facie* little room for personal expression – does it provide any opportunity for Pachymeres to present his own philosophical views rather than simply teach? To some extent it does, and what follows will show that some degree of independent thinking is observable, pointing to how Pachymeres sets up a dialogue with Aristotle in probing key philosophical points.

⁷⁶ In the paraphrase, the *On the Soul* is also referenced (e.g. *Paraphr. In EN* 15.17; *Paraphr. In EN* 16.4–5), a work that features in the Commentary on the *EN* too.

⁷⁷ E.g. A. Markopoulos, “Education”, in E. Jeffreys, J. Haldon, and R. Cormack (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies* (Oxford 2008) 785–795, at 788.

The first example centres on the theory of externals and their contribution to happiness, a theme Pachymeres is keen to tackle whenever the opportunity arises. Notwithstanding variations in formulation and context in different sections of the *EN*, this theory in Aristotle emphasises that external goods, such as wealth and honour, play a role in making virtuous activity and therefore happiness possible (e.g. *EN* 1098b23–31). It also stresses that bodily and external goods are essential for *eudaimonia* either as indispensable conditions (τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον) or as auxiliary means that are useful as instruments (τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς) (e.g. *EN* 1099a27–1099b8). Elsewhere, the focus is on how under different circumstances externals differ and might sometimes act as impediments, but overall external apparatus is necessary for human beings to engage in virtuous behaviour and flourish (*EN* 1178a23–1178b7).

When referring to the theory of externals in various parts of the Commentary, Pachymeres repeats the Aristotelian position of the *EN* in his expounding analysis, showing that he is well acquainted with it, as is obvious from the following passage:

Ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ γε δὴ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθῶν, εἰ μὴ ὡς συμπληρωτικῶν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' οὖν ὡς ὀργάνων. πολλὰ γὰρ δι' αὐτῶν πράττεται, ὅθεν καὶ εἰς ταῦτόν τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τυχερὰ τὰ ἐκτός ἀγαθὰ. ἔνιοι δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν ταυτίζουσιν. τίνι τρόπῳ; ἢ ὅτι ἐπεὶ διττὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἡ μὲν ψυχικὴ, ἡ δὲ σωματικὴ (εὐαισθησία γὰρ καὶ ὑγεία καὶ ἰσχὺς σωματικαὶ ἀρεταί). ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν διὰ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία συμπληροῦται, τοῖς δὲ σωματικοῖς ὡς ὀργάνοις χρᾶται (ὑγιαίνων γὰρ ἴσως καὶ εὐεκτικὸς ὢν ψυχικῶς, ἂν ἐνεργήσειεν εὐμαρῶς), διαταῦτα ταυτίζουσιν ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν.

Happiness *seems to require* external goods as well, including even goods related to the body, if not as essential parts in relation to them, at all events as instruments. For many [actions] are accomplished by means of them [i.e. bodily goods], and *this is why some people identify good fortune with happiness*, since the external goods are matters of fortune for the most part. Others, however, identify happiness with virtue. How so? It is because virtue is twofold, one [part] relating to the soul, the other to the body (for keen perception, health and strength are physical virtues). Since therefore happiness is fulfilled by means [of the goods] relating to soul, but uses the bodily goods as instruments (for perhaps when one is healthy and one's soul is in a good condition, one might act readily), it is for these reasons that they identify virtue and happiness.

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 13, 30.4–12

Although Pachymeres aligns with Aristotle's stance in its basics, he draws a clear distinction between what he terms συμπληρωτικά (cf. συμπληροῦται; elsewhere called ἀναπληρωτικά), i.e. prerequisites for happiness (referring to the goods of the soul), and what is an instrument (ὀργάνων, ὀργάνοις) to it (referring to the goods of

the body), a distinction which is not foregrounded this way in Aristotle,⁷⁸ where the nominalised adjectives συμπληρωτικά and ἀναπληρωτικά are absent. Furthermore, the use of the adverb “perhaps” (ἴσως) in the parenthesis might not be without significance, since it hints at the commentator’s modest reluctance to blindly subscribe to the views of his forebear.

This adverbial hesitation ties in well with another section in Pachymeres, which articulates more directly his critical engagement with Aristotelian externalities. In commenting on the section of the *EN* that discusses popular understandings of happiness with a focus on external goods, Pachymeres assumes the authoritative first-person singular (indicated in bold in the passage below) and radically recasts Aristotle’s sequence of ideas and related emphasis by imposing a short moral commentary:

λέγουσι δὲ τοῦτο πάντες εὐδαιμονίαν, καὶ οἱ τυχόντες καὶ οἱ σοφοί, καὶ ὅσον μὲν κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα συμφωνοῦσιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν. καὶ λοιπὸν οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδένα τῶν ἐν κακουχίαις εὐδαιμόνων καὶ ἀγαθῶν μακαρίζουσιν. περὶ γὰρ δὲ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ πλοῦτον, οἱ δὲ τιμὴν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ταύτην τιθέμενοι. **ἔξεστι δέ, λέγω, καὶ εὖ ζῆν καὶ εὖ πράττειν καὶ λυπουμένους καὶ πενομένους καὶ μὴ τιμὴν ἔχοντας, ἀγαθῶς καὶ ὡς δεῖ διάγοντας· μᾶλλον δέ, ἴν’ ἀκριβῶς εἴπωμι, οὐδὲ λύπη τῶν τοιούτων ἄπεται ἀεὶ χαϊρόντων κατὰ τὸ «πάντοτε χαίρετε»· εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἀποβλέψας εἶπε τὸν λόγον ὁ λέξας.**

78 Likewise, in his Paraphrase of the *EN*, Pachymeres calls externals “ἀναπληρωτικά τῆς εὐδαιμονίας” (*Paraphr. In EN* 7.16–18), an expression which he also uses in his Commentary: “Some attribute externalities to a certain satisfaction (εἰς τινα ἀναπλήρωσιν), even if they are contingent events [that function as possible means to an end] and not such [i.e. ends] by themselves” (*In EN* 1, 11). Cf. Aspasius *In EN* 24.3–4: δεῖται δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν ἢ εὐδαιμονία οὐχ ὡς μερῶν οὐδ’ ὡς ἀναπληρωτικῶν αὐτῆς ἀλλ’ ὡς ὀργάνων. Furthermore, Aristotle’s distinction falls into three classes, namely goods of the soul (e.g. intelligence and justice), goods of the body (e.g. strength and beauty), and external goods (e.g. honour and money), with the first class being superior to the other two. Although Pachymeres does seem aware of the three classes elsewhere (ἢ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀκόλαστοί τινες ὄντες καὶ ἀνουθέτητοι ἢ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένοι ὄντες τὰ μέλη εἶτε μὴ κατὰ τὰ ἐκτὸς πενόμενοι καὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι, “or if some of them are undisciplined and stubborn in their hearts, or, in terms of their bodies, have maimed limbs or, in terms of externalities, are poor and suffer dishonour”, *In EN* 1, 8, 20.20–22; τῶν γοῦν ἀγαθῶν τριχῶς λεγομένων—κατὰ ψυχὴν, ὡς φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, εὐφύια· κατὰ σῶμα, ὡς ἰσχύς, κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἐκτὸς, ὡς πλοῦτος, φίλοι καὶ τὰ λοιπά..., “So since the goods are said to be of three kinds—in accord with the soul, such as practical wisdom, temperance, and good-naturedness; in accord with the body, such as strength, beauty, and the like; and in accord with externalities, such as wealth, friendship, and the rest...”, *In EN* 1, 11, 26.6–8; also in *In EN* 4, 9, 154.15–17: τί οὖν τοῦτο ἐστιν; ληπτέον τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἀξία· ψυχικόν, σωματικόν ἢ τῶν ἐκτὸς· ἦγουν περὶ τὰ ψυχικὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὰ σωματικά ἢ περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς, “What then is this? One must understand what sort of a good worthiness is, psychic, physical, or of external phenomena; that is, it involves psychic goods, physical goods, or external goods”), he desists from using it in the passages above. For the complexities of the role of external goods in Aristotle, see T. D. Roche, “Happiness and the External Goods”, in R. Polansky (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge 2014) 34–63.

Everyone says that this is *happiness*, both average people and the wise, and in so far as *they agree on its name, they assume that to live well and fare well is to be happy* (EN 1095a18–20). And furthermore, such persons do not deem happy anyone who seems prosperous and good but is in a miserable situation. For *with regard to living well and faring well, some argue for pleasure, others wealth, and others honour, considering this to be happiness* (EN 1095a21–23). **But it is possible, I say, to both live well and fare well while in grief and poor and lacking honour, so long as one is leading one’s life admirably and as one must. Or rather, in order that I might speak accurately, no distress affects persons of the sort who are always rejoicing in accord with the saying “Rejoice at all times!”** (Paul’s *Epistle to the Thessalonians* 5, 16–18). **For this is what the man who pronounced these words [i.e. Paul] had in mind.**

Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 3, 8.9–17

As it stands, the extract puts on display the focalisation of Pachymeres, who boldly claims that external goods have no bearing on individual happiness. Although Pachymeres understood his source correctly, as noted earlier, he diverges from it here by embracing a more Stoic-oriented thesis that dismisses external goods as being morally indifferent.⁷⁹ In addition, Pachymeres strategically accompanies his understanding of Aristotelian externals with the motto “Rejoice at all times!”, which advocates a positive attitude towards life as a means to prevent distress (full quotation: Πάντοτε χαίρετε, ἀδιαλείπτως προσεύχεσθε, ἐν παντί εὐχαριστεῖτε· τοῦτο γὰρ θέλημα θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ εἰς ὑμᾶς). This was a well-known line from Paul, adding a Christian reading to the notion of happiness, with Pachymeres’ role as a commentator briefly extending to the realm of religious elucidation, this time of the epistolographer (note the final line of the quoted passage). This comment, like the other Christian overtones in the Commentary, is probably connected with Pachymeres’ role as Professor of New Testament exegesis (*didaskalos tou apostolou*) at the Patriarchal School. At any rate, his departure from Aristotle brings him much closer to Christian thinking, which offered equal chances for happiness to all people irrespective of social class (e.g. poor, slave) or physical condition (e.g. sick).⁸⁰ In addition, with this deviation Pachymeres bluntly advocates – not quite as Aristotle does – full self-sufficiency (i.e. complete independence from external resources) and opposes moral luck,⁸¹ again approaching happiness through a Christian lens, as per Paul’s injunction.

⁷⁹ Wealth, honor, power, and friends are what the Stoics classified as “preferred indifferents”.

⁸⁰ D. Bradshaw, “Aristotelianism”, in D. G. Hunter, P. J. J. van Geest, and B. J. L. Peerbolte (eds), *Brill Encyclopedia of Early Christianity Online*, Consulted online on 06 February 2019 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2589-7993_EECO_SIM_00000286>, under Ethics.

⁸¹ See, e.g. M. Gasser-Wingate, “Aristotle on Self-Sufficiency, External Goods, and Contemplation”, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 102.1 (2020) 1–28, who argues that Aristotelian self-sufficiency

This observation is relevant to Pachymeres' repeated focus on the notion of moral agency, which might be explained in the light of Christian anthropology and ethics, which consider man an intellectual being fully equipped with the ability to assent to sense-perceptions and thoughts.⁸² At no less than six points in the Commentary, human agents are referred to as "those who possess the dispositions" (οἱ τὰς ἔξεις ἔχοντες) (Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 1; 1, 4; 1, 20; 2, 1; 5, 1; 5, 2) in the sense that they direct them, an expression never found in this form in the reference text. In addition, Pachymeres depicts human beings as active entities responsible for their moral choices, by introducing elegant twists to the *EN*:

a) In a section dealing with the definition of the small-souled man (μικρόψυχος, *EN* 1125a19–27), Pachymeres follows Aristotle in arguing that this type of man is not considered foolish, but rather "perceptive" (νοερός) (*EN* 1125a24).⁸³ He then goes to some length to provide a semantic clarification of the term (not found in Aristotle), highlighting the moral usefulness perceptiveness brings, but also its risks, such as ethical deterioration, which Pachymeres' readers are implicitly urged to avoid. This is facilitated by the use of the language of moral assessment in the relevant passage:

τί δέ ἐστι τὸ «νοερός»; ὅτι νοεῖ ἑαυτὸν ἔχοντά τι ἄξιον τιμῆς, ἀποπροσποιεῖται δὲ δι' ἐπιείκεια τὸ τιμᾶσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ νοερόν, εἰ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἐστὶν ἐπαινετόν, ὅτι καὶ «γνώθι σαυτὸν» τὸ πρόγραμμα τῆς Πυθίας παρακελεύεται· τὸ γὰρ γινώσκειν ἑαυτὸν πάνυ χρήσιμον, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖ τινας, ὅταν ᾗ καὶ παρὰ τὸ δέον.

What does the term "perceptive" (*noeros*) mean? That he understands (*noei*) himself to be somewhat worthy of honour, but rejects receiving honours because of his fairness. This is what the term "perceptive" (*noeron*) means, if it is praiseworthy, as it should be, given that the injunction of the Pythia advises "Know yourself!"; for knowing oneself is extremely useful, although often it makes certain people worse, when it is applied as it should not be.

Pachymeres *In EN* 4, 12, 162.7–11

Again, Pachymeres places significant emphasis on man's capacity to exercise rational thought by rejecting reprehensible moral options.

b) This relates to another section, which deals with the Aristotelian thesis that we are neither blamed nor praised for our emotions, but for our virtues and vices (*EN* 1105b30–32). Here Pachymeres twice conveniently replaces Aristotle's "in some way" (πῶς in *EN* 1106a1) with his own "inappropriate", as seen below (οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον), to add moral assessment to a specific type of conduct and thus assign moral responsibility:

has more to do with the agent's ability in practical wisdom and contemplation than with non-reliance on external goods.

⁸² G. Karamanolis, *The Philosophy of Early Christianity* (Durham 2013) 216–217.

⁸³ νοεροί is a variant reading in Pachymeres' exemplar (cum L^bM^b), instead of the adopted ὀκνηροί of the standard edition.

οὐ γὰρ καθὸ ὀργίζεται τις ψέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθὸ **οὐχ ὡς δεῖ** ὀργίζεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ θυμούμενος οὐ καθὸ θυμοῦται (πάθος γὰρ ἔμφυτον τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ θυμός), ἀλλὰ καθὸ **ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον** θυμοῦται.

because a person is not blamed simply because he becomes upset, but rather because he **inappropriately** becomes upset (οὐχ ὡς δεῖ; vs. πῶς *EN* 1106a1), just as the person who feels anger is also not [blamed] because he experiences anger (for anger is a natural emotion of the soul), but because he feels anger **beyond what is appropriate**.

Pachymeres *In EN* 2, 6, 64.18–20

c) The same pattern features in Pachymeres' explication of *EN* 1100b7–1101a6, with the connection between fortune and happiness located at the heart of the section. Aristotle's main points here are two: i) that happiness depends on actions undertaken in accord with virtue, not on fortune's favours; ii) that even in misfortunes, nobility can prevail when someone bears them with a good spirit. In his corresponding treatment, Pachymeres echoes Aristotle while introducing two important changes. First, he is explicit that "everything fortune brings us is not in our power, but procuring what brings happiness is" (ὅσα γὰρ ἡ τύχη φέρει οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσι, τὰ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ποριστικὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσι, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 15, 34.13–14), thereby ushering in the notion of "ἐφ' ἡμῖν", which does not appear in Aristotle in this context; he also states that what is not up to us does not account for our happiness (Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 15, 34.14–16: "Because it is for this reason that a happy person is deemed blessed, because that which is not in our power makes us neither blessed nor wretched, but they only contribute to our happiness as instruments of a sort", τὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔτε μακαρίουσιν οὔτε ἀθλίουσιν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται, μόνον δὲ συντελοῦσιν καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡς ὄργανά τινα). Second, unlike Aristotle, he stresses that we are not to be blamed for things that are not in our power, but only for things that are, suggesting that "what is in our power is to preserve and patiently endure our difficulties, especially when there is a means to escape from them through a form of flattery or servility" (καὶ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ καρτερεῖν καὶ διαφέρειν τὰ χαλεπὰ καὶ μάλιστα ὅτε διὰ τινος κολακείας καὶ δουλοπρεπείας ἔστι τούτων ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, Pachymeres *In EN* 1, 16, 36.12–14). Pachymeres' tendency to interpolate Aristotle's understandings of virtuous action with "what is up to us" is evident throughout.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ E.g. Pachymeres' explication "To be treated unjustly is a lesser injustice than to act unjustly, and to act unjustly is a greater injustice than suffering injustice; because acting unjustly is in our own power, and the wickedness involved is evidently our own, whereas suffering injustice is one of the things that is not in our power, but is external" (ἀδικεῖσθαι δὲ ἔλαττον ἀδίκημά ἐστιν ἢ ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν πλεον ἀδίκημα ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία ἡμετέρα φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν, *In EN* 5, 11, 206.22–208.2) brings in his emphasis on the ἐφ' ἡμῖν absent from the corresponding *EN* section, 1134a12–13.

To sum up, human beings are at the very core of the moral world Pachymeres constructs in his Commentary, armed with moral agency due to their rational strength and attracting moral approbation or disapprobation as a result of their choices. It is true, however, that the engagement with the Aristotelian passages considered above does not represent a radical or deconstructive modification of the *EN*, but rather brief remarks and apt interpolations that communicate an idiosyncratic approach to certain aspects of Aristotelian ethics. A study tool of this sort is not the ideal place for innovation or ground-breaking philosophical contributions, although Pachymeres' analytical discourse – even though it is restricted in length and scope – does show something of his identity as a luminary thinker in late Byzantium.

3 The manuscript tradition

3.1 The sources for the text

The Commentary on Aristotle's *EN* is preserved in:⁸⁵

- (a) the margins of Marcianus gr. Z. 212 (= 606), ff. 1r–44v (15th c.), surrounding the version of the *EN* located in the centre of the page.
- (b) Scorialensis T. I. 18 (gr. 138), ff. 1r–74v (16th c.), and
- (c) Vaticanus gr. 1429, ff. 1r–76v (16th c.), where the Commentary occupies the whole of the page.

Their different page layouts (*mise-en-page*) notwithstanding, all three witnesses are consistent in bearing the title inc. “Τοῦ δικαιοφύλακος καὶ πρωτεκδίκου παράφρασις ἠκριβωμένη τοῦ Παχυμέρη”⁸⁶ and in interrupting their explication just after the beginning of the Commentary on Book 6 (expl. “ἀρξάμενοι δ’ αὖθις περὶ τούτων λέγωμεν”).⁸⁷ In addition, they all preserve the same diagrams that lend visual form to philosophical categories and/or notions, as well as a number of supplementary annotations of varying length that accompany the Commentary on Books 2 and 3 and occasionally 4 and 5 (see Appendix of Supplementary Notes). These annotations take the form of quotations (in most instances verbatim or slightly altered) deriving from the anonymous scholia to the *EN* or from other main branches of the Aristotelian commentary tradition, especially Aspasius (see Section 4.2).

No other witnesses for Pachymeres' Commentary are known, although their existence cannot be ruled out, given the shortage of up-to-date library catalogues. N. Zorzi, for example, has recently proposed that the humanist scholar Ermolao Barbaro (1454–1493) may have owned an as yet unidentified copy of Pachymeres' text.⁸⁸ The issue is complicated further by the fact that Pachymeres' Commentary on the *EN* is often erroneously listed in catalogues along with Book XI of his *Philosophia*, with

85 See Golitsis, “Georges Pachymère comme didascale” (n. 6), 66.

86 Although variant readings are in evidence; see the list below, under Section 3.3. On the authenticity of the title, see Section 2.3.

87 See Section 2.2.

88 N. Zorzi, “Per la tradizione manoscritta” (n. 10), 281–287; also 292 for the possibility that Barbaro copied directly from Marcianus gr. Z. 212. On the reception of the *EN* in Renaissance Italy through commentaries and paraphrases, see E. Refini, “Aristotelian Commentaries and the Dialogue Form in Cinquecento Italy”, in L. Bianchi, S. Gilson, and J. Kraye (eds), *Vernacular Aristotelianism in Italy from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Century* (London 2016) 93–107.

the result that witnesses to the latter work are usually reported as preserving the former.⁸⁹

3.2 Description of the manuscripts

Venetus Marcianus gr. Z. 212 (coll. 606) (= M)

M (also known as G^a in Aristotelian editions) first received close scholarly attention from D. Harlfinger and E. Mioni,⁹⁰ and has been studied more recently by M. Rashed, F. Berger, P. Golitsis, N. Zorzi, and V. Lorusso.⁹¹ The manuscript was written in the first half of the fifteenth century⁹² on paper. It is 292 mm. by 218 mm. in size and has 25–39 lines to the page;⁹³ ff. II + VIII, 499, VIII + II. An ownership mark in Latin and Greek reporting possession of the codex by Cardinal Bessarion, and an index of the contents written in his hand, is in evidence on the preliminary f. 8v. The codex contains a large collection of works by Aristotle and other texts included in the Aristotelian corpus in the following order: *Nicomachean Ethics*, framed across roughly its first half by George Pachymeres' Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*

⁸⁹ See, e.g. D. B. Baltas, “Η χειρόγραφη παράδοση των ανέκδοτων φιλοσοφικών έργων του Γεωργίου Παχυμέρη”, *Ἐῶα καὶ Ἑσπέρια* 5 (2001–2003) 63–68, at 66–67, where Par. suppl. gr. 194, containing Book XI of the *Philosophia* (not the individual Commentary on the *EN*), is cited under the vague heading “Παράφρασις καὶ σχόλια εἰς Ἀριστοτέλους Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια” together with Scorialensis T. I. 18 (gr. 138). Likewise, E. Mioni, *Bibliothecae Divi Marci Venetiarum codices graeci manuscripti, Volumen I: Thesaurus antiquus. Codices 1–299* (Rome 1981) 326, mistakenly treats Ph. Beccius' Latin edition of *Philosophia* Book XI published in 1560 as an edition of the individual Commentary on the *EN*.

⁹⁰ D. Harlfinger, *Die Textgeschichte der pseudo-Aristotelischen Schrift Περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν: Ein kodikologisch-kulturgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Klärung der Überlieferungsverhältnisse im Corpus Aristotelicum* (Amsterdam 1971) 174–183; Mioni, *Bibliothecae Divi Marci* (n. 89), 326–327.

⁹¹ M. Rashed, *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der aristotelischen Schrift De generatione et corruptione*, *Serta Graeca* 12 (Wiesbaden 2001) 31, 97, 110–116, 293–295. F. Berger, *Die Textgeschichte der Historia animalium des Aristoteles*, *Serta Graeca* 21 (Wiesbaden 2005) 65, 78–80, 82, 83–87, 100, 110, 201, pl. 4a–b. Golitsis, “Georges Pachymère comme didascale” (n. 6), at 56, 66, 67–68; Zorzi, “Per la tradizione manoscritta” (n. 10), 252–269. V. Lorusso, “Locating Greek Manuscripts through Paratexts: Examples from the Library of Cardinal Bessarion and other Manuscript Collections”, in G. Ciotti and H. Lin (eds), *Tracing Manuscripts in Time and Space through Paratexts*, *Studies in Manuscript Cultures* 7 (Berlin–Boston 2016) 223–268, at 236–245.

⁹² Before 1440, according to E. Mioni, *Bibliothecae Divi Marci* (n. 89), 332. As Berger has noted (*Die Textgeschichte der Historia animalium*, n. 91, 78, 83, the earlier parts of this manuscript have watermarks dating back to the years before 1425. For a useful overview on the dating and the scribes of the different sections of the manuscript, see Zorzi, “Per la tradizione manoscritta” (n. 10), 255–265.

⁹³ An updated description of the manuscript is given in Ciro Giacomelli' study, accessible online through the «Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina» website at <<https://cagb-digital.de/handschriften/diktyon-69683>> (last accessed 24 January 2021), where an extensive bibliography for the codex may also be found.

copied by Bessarion⁹⁴; *On the Heavens*; *On Generation and Corruption*; *Meteorology*; *History of Animals*; *On the Parts of Animals*; *Progression of Animals*; *On the Soul*; *On Sense and the Sensible*; *On Memory and Reminiscence*; *On Sleep and Sleeplessness*; *On Dreams*; *On Divination in Sleep*; *Movement of Animals*; *Generation of Animals*; *On Longevity and Shortness of Life*; *On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death*; *On Respiration*; *On Colours*; *On Indivisible Lines*. Detailed palaeographical and codicological investigation confirms that four copyists operated throughout, i.e. the anonymous copyists A (also known as “Anonymous χ λ”), B, and C, and Bessarion. The minor annotations in the margins of the *History of Animals* have been assigned to George of Trebizond.⁹⁵

M is one of the earliest books in Bessarion’s library⁹⁶ and offers interesting information about his early education, including his acquaintance with Aristotelianism while he was still in Constantinople pursuing his studies under John Chortasmenos and George Chrysokokkes. Throughout the manuscript, Bessarion inserted corrections, notabilia, explanatory comments, and other scholia, attesting to the breadth and depth of his intellectual interests as well as his philological diligence.⁹⁷ M is also a fascinating specimen of Bessarion’s working methods and his sustained collaboration with the scribes who worked for him (e.g. the Anonymous χ λ) in an effort to produce a systematically set-out collection of Aristotle’s writings, initially, it seems, for his personal use but then at a later stage for the benefit of his scholarly network in Italy.⁹⁸

94 E. Mioni, *Bibliothecae Divi Marci* (n. 89), 326. For additional references, see Zorzi, “Per la tradizione manoscritta” (n. 10), 252, n. 20. On Bessarion’s activity as a transcriber, see Harlfinger, “Autographa aus der Palaiologenzeit” (n. 32), 47. Also, *RGK*, I, no. 41; II, no. 61; III, no. 77. On the Aristotelian section of Bessarion’s library, see C. Giacomelli, “Aristotele e i suoi commentatori nella biblioteca di Bessarione: i manoscritti greci”, in A. Rigo and N. Zorzi (eds), *I libri di Bessarione: Studi sui manoscritti del Cardinale a Venezia e in Europa* (Turnhout 2021) 219–275.

95 See succinctly <<https://cagb-digital.de/handschriften/diktyon-69683>>, section “Kopist” (last accessed 24 January 2021).

96 Like the Marcianus gr. 148; see Harlfinger, *Die Textgeschichte* (n. 90), 182. For Bessarion’s library, see e.g. L. Labowski, *Bessarion’s Library and the Biblioteca Marciana: Six Early Inventories* (Rome 1979).

97 See, e.g. Bessarion’s extensive annotation in f. 338r (*Hist. An.* IX): σημείωσαι ὅτι ἐν τῷ Λατινικῷ εὔρομεν καὶ δέκατον βιβλίον τῶν περὶ τὰ ζῶα ἱστοριῶν οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ προϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἢ τοῦ μὴ γεννᾶν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ γυναικὶ συνερχομένοις μετ’ ἀλλήλων αἰτία ποτὲ μὲν ἐν ἀμφοῖν ποτὲ δ’ ἐν θατέρῳ μόνον ἐστίν· οὐκ οἶδα εἰ τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον εὕρισκεται καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ· μέχρι γὰρ τοῦ νῦν οὐκ ἐνέτυχον αὐτῷ. More in Lorusso, “Locating Greek Manuscripts” (n. 91), 236–242.

98 See A. Diller, “Three Greek Scribes working for Bessarion: Trivizias, Callistus, Hermonymus”, *Italia Medioevale e Umanistica* 10 (1967) 403–410; E. Mioni, “Bessarione scriba e alcuni suoi collaboratori”, in *Miscellanea Marciana di studi bessarionei (a coronamento del V Centenario della donazione nicena)* (Padua 1976) 263–318. Bessarion himself produced a compendium of the first books of Aristotle’s physics. See P. Eleuteri, “Una parafrasi di Bessarione alla Fisica di Aristotele”, *Thesaurisamata* 24 (1994) 189–202.

Scorialensis T. I. 18 (gr. 138) (= E)

A paper manuscript of 78 leaves (1–75, 14bis, 15bis, 65bis) plus 5 preliminary, unfoliated leaves and 3 final, unfoliated leaves; it is 328 mm. by 220 mm. in size and has ca. 29 lines to the page. E contains only Pachymeres' Commentary on the *EN*, in full page (1r–74v).⁹⁹ The titles, lemmata, and initial letters of individual entries are given in red ink. The manuscript's watermark is dated to about 1542.¹⁰⁰ E was written by an unknown copyist, who seems to have worked for the owner of the codex, don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza (1504–1575) (see the mark of ownership in the lower margin of f. 1r), a Spanish ambassador to Venice from 1539 to 1546 and an avid collector of Aristotle codices, who often used the manuscript repository of the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana.¹⁰¹ Concrete evidence suggests that Mendoza borrowed a codex of the *EN*, in all likelihood M, on 26 October 1545 and returned it on the last day of February 1546;¹⁰² this likely points to the period in which E was copied. E reproduces all diagrams found in the margins of M (almost always placing them at the centre of the folio) and in most cases it follows the same format (red letters and phrases where M has them).¹⁰³ It also faithfully reproduces folio headers (e.g. E 28v = M 14r) and most exegetical annotations, all good indications of the relationship between the two codices (see below, Section 4.3.3).

V = Vaticanus gr. 1429 (= V)

A paper manuscript of 192 foliated leaves; it is 346 mm. by 240 mm. in size, with 29–30 lines to the page. V is a sixteenth-century codex, which belonged to the Italian cardinal and scholar Guglielmo Sirleto (1514–1585) and is classified as number 4 in his collection of philosophical manuscripts.¹⁰⁴ Pachymeres' Commentary covers

99 A. Revilla, *Catálogo de los Códices Griegos de la Biblioteca de El Escorial: T. I.* (Madrid 1936) 449–450. Available online at: <<http://rbme.patrimonionacional.es/home/Bibliografia/Manuscritos/Griegos.aspx>> (last accessed 3 December 2018)

100 M. L. Sosower, *Signa officinarum chartariorum in codicibus Graecis saeculo sexton decimo fabricatis in bibliothecis Hispaniae* (Amsterdam 2004) 501, *Lettres assemblées* 344, no. 24 (ca. 1542 <Venice>).

101 For don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, see in general E. Spivakovsky, *Son of the Alhambra: Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, 1504–1575* (Austin 1970). Cf. T. Martínez Manzano, “La biblioteca manuscrita griega de Diego Hurtado de Mendoza: problemas y prospectivas”, *Segno e testo* 16 (2018) 317–433.

102 E.g. H. Omont, “Deux registres de prêts de manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de Saint-Marc à Venise (1545–1559)”, in *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 1887, t. 48, 651–686, at 654; C. Castellani, “Il prestito dei codici manoscritti della Biblioteca di San Marco in Venezia ne' suoi primi tempi e le conseguenti perdite de' codici stessi. Ricerche e notizie”, *Atti del R. Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti*, ser. VII, 8 (1896–1897), 311–377, at 328.

103 One exceptional instance of altered format involves the management of the page; see E 22r = M 13v.

104 For a more complete description of V, see Zorzi, “Per la tradizione manoscritta” (n. 10), 272–277.

ff. 1r–27v and then ff. 36r–76v, with an interpolated quire in between written by another hand (“scribe of Brussels”) on ff. 28r–35v and preserving a section of the second letter of Nikolaos Artabasdos (Rabdas) (*PLP* I, no. 1437) on arithmetic. Pachymeres’ Commentary was copied by anonymous A, who collaborated with John Mauromates during the years 1541–1547. If E was copied by February 1546, in line with the suggestion above, and given that V is a direct copy of E, as shown below, the *terminus post quem* for V must be February 1546. The titles, lemmata, and initial letters of individual entries in the Commentary are in red ink. Other scribes working on V were John Mauromates, who copied the *Mechanica* by Heron of Byzantium (ff. 137r–169r; with illuminations of various siege machines in ff. 171r–192r), and Camillo Zanetti, who copied Choricus of Gaza’s *Patrocli ad Achillem declamatio* (Decl. 10) (ff. 77r–113v) and John Pediasimos’ *Geometria* (ff. 115r–135v).¹⁰⁵

3.3 The relationship between the manuscripts

Examination of the manuscripts, including a complete collation, shows that E contains idiosyncratic errors and omissions not found in M, all of which V reproduces alongside its own unique errors and other characteristics. This confirms that V is an apograph of E, and E an apograph of M. This stemmatic relationship agrees with Zorzi’s recent findings, reached independently on the basis of partial evidence gathered from a collation of entry 18 of Book 4 in the three manuscripts.¹⁰⁶ A comprehensive list of shared and individual errors and omissions, along with other evidence for the relationship between the codices, is offered below. E and V have been eliminated on this basis, and the present edition accordingly relies exclusively on M, a high-quality witness with few copying errors or other faults, most likely reflecting Bessarion’s philological rigour as a scribe, and perhaps suggesting that the codex he relied upon was not far removed from the author’s original. I have consulted E by way of exception (*raro memoratur*) only in order to restore a few readings in places where M is lacunose or damaged.

I. Common errors of E and V not found in M

Book 1

2.1 πρωτεκδίκου M : προτεκδίκου E V

4.25 λοιπαί M : λιπαί E V

¹⁰⁵ John Mauromates: *RGK* III, no. 283; Camillo Zanetti: *RGK* III, no. 351. For a brief description of the manuscript and its contents, see S. Lucà, “La silloge manoscritta greca di Guglielmo Sirleto: Un primo saggio di ricostruzione”, in *Miscellanea Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae*, XIX, Studi e Testi 474 (Vatican City 2012) 317–355, at 340.

¹⁰⁶ Zorzi, “Per la tradizione manoscritta” (n. 10), 270 and 300–304.

- 10.21 ἐφύβρισα M : ὑφύβρισα E V
14.19 τῷ ἀγαθῷ M : τὸ ἀγαθῷ E V
18.2 σαφηνισμόν M : ἀφανισμόν E V
18.19 ἐνεχομένας M : ἀνεχομένας E V
18.20 ἐφίεσθαι M : ἐμφίεσθαι E V
22.5–6 συναριθμηθήσεται M : συναριθμήσεται E V
32.7 δυστυχοῦσι M : δυστιχοῦσι E V
32.12 κροῖσον M : κρεῖσον E V
36.4 κακῶς M : καλῶς E V
36.26 εὐδαιμον M : εὐδομον E V
40.29 σκοπῶν ὅπως M : σκοπῶν ὅπερ E V
44.3 παρομοιάζειν M : παραμιάζειν E V

Book 2

- 52.17 οὐ μὴν τῷ εἶδει M : οὐ μὴ E V
58.10 ὠρίσαντο M : ἐρίσαντο E V
58.19 τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ κατορθωτικόν M : τοῦτο δηλοῖ κατορθωτικός E V

Book 3

- 96.10 ἃ δὴ εἰσι τὰ περιστατικά M : ἃ δὴ ἐστί τὰ περιστατικά E V
96.17 λελοχευμένον M : λελοχευμένον E V
100.2 ἐκβάλλοντα M : ἐκβάλλονται E V
100.5 προαιρούμεθα M : προερούμεθα E V
102.27 ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης M : ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τον ἀπὸ τύχης E V
104.20 ταύτη M : πάντη E V
110.26 ἑαυτὸν εἰς M : ἑαυτόνει E V
122.22 περὶ μὲν τὰ ἄλλα M : περὶ μὲν τὰ ἄλλω E V
130.2 ἀκρατεῖς M : ἀκρατοῖς E V
132.1–2 φυσικαὶ καὶ κοιναὶ M : κοινὰς E V
132.6 πιεῖν M : ποιεῖν E V
136.15 τῷ ἄρχοντι M : τὸ ἄρχοντι E V

Book 4

- 142.6 παραλαβόντες M : παραβόντες E V
146.20 οἱ μὲν M : ἡ μὲν E V
148.4 ἀνελευθερία M : ἐλευθερία E V
150.14 οὐ καθὸ προσκτῆσεται τι M : οὐ καθὸ προσκτῆσεται τι, ἀλλὰ καθὸ προσκτῆ-
σεται τι E V
150.23 πρέπειν M : πρέπει E V
150.30 εἰσάπαξ M : ἐσάπαξ E V
162.20 ἐξελέγχονται M : ἐξελέσχονται E V
162.23 πλέον M : καὶ πλέον E V

Book 5

- 180.13 καὶ νοσεῖν M : · σεῖν E V
 180.13 τῆς ὑγείας M : τὴν ὑγείαν E V
 182.8 στοχαζόμενοι M : ἐστοχαζόμενοι E V
 182.13 προστάττει M : προστάττη E V
 198.13 διανεμητικόν M : διανομητικόν E V
 218.26 δεδικαιώσθαι M : δεκαιώσθαι E V
 224.16 σπουδάσαι M : σπουδάσας E V

II. Common omissions of E and V not found in M

Book 1

- 8.12 δὲ τὸ εὖ ζῆν M : δὲ τὸ om. E V
 16.5 ἢ ποιητικά ἢ κωλυτικά M : om. E V
 34.4 ἐν εὐδαιμονία M : ἐν om. E V
 42.10 εἰδέναι πως M : πως om. E V

Book 2

- Scholium iv (vid. Appendix) καὶ ιδιώτη· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λανθάνουσαν ἔχει τὴν πράξιν καὶ οὐ πρὸς ζῆλον κινουῦσαν τινάς, ὁ δὲ τῷ ὑπερέχειν κακὸν πρόκειται τοῖς ὑπὸ χεῖρα ὑπόδειγμα. ἐν ᾧ δὲ τόπω μὴ δεῖ M : om. E V
 66.14–15 κατ' αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ πράγμα, ὅταν ἢ τὸ πλεον τούτου λαμβάνωμεν ἢ τὸ ἔλαττον M : τὸ πράγμα, ὅταν ἢ τὸ πλεον τούτου λαμβάνωμεν om. E V
 70.12 καὶ οὐ τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα M : καὶ οὐ τὸν φρόνιμον om. E V
 80.21 ἑαυτῇ ταυτὴ καὶ ὁμοία M : ταυτὴ om. E V
 82.18–19 οὐ γίνονται ἀλλ' ἐμφαίνονται, μεταταῦτα λέγωμεν M : ἀλλ' ἐμφαίνονται om. E V

Book 3

- 100.22–23 ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις οὐ περὶ πάντα, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ M : ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις, οὐ περὶ πάντα· ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν om. E V
 110.17 νωθρὸς ἢ ἀφυῆς· καὶ λύων M : ἢ ἀφυῆς om. E V
 112.7 εἰσὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος M : εἰσὶ om. E V
 112.8 ἢ ἐκ νόσου M : ἐκ om. E V
 132.14–15 ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς M : ὡς οἱ πολλοί ἢ om. E V
 134.22 τὰς μὴ ἐμποδιζούσας ἢ περὶ τὸ καλὸν ἢ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν M : τὸ καλὸν· ἢ περὶ om. E V

Book 4

- 144.24 βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου M : τοῦ om. E V
 148.13 δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ M : γὰρ om. E V
 156.13 περὶ τοῦτον ἢ ἀτιμία M : ἢ om. E V

- 156.14 πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν M : καὶ ἀτυχίαν om. E V
158.7 εἴρηται καὶ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος M : καὶ om. E V
166.20 ἐπὶ τῇ ὀργῇ ἀρετὴν ἢ καὶ κακίαν M : ὀργῇ om. E V
172.6–7 τοῦ ψεύδους κέρδος, εὐλαβηθήσεται M : κέρδος om. E V

Book 5

- 198.15–16 πολλαχοῦ, φησί, διαφωνεῖ M : πολλαχοῦσι διαφωνεῖ om. E V
198.18 τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον· καὶ τυχὸν M : καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον om. E V

Book 6

- 236.6–7 διαιρεῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ τούτου M : καὶ om. E V
236.22 εἰς ἠθικὰς καὶ διανοητικὰς M : καὶ διανοητικὰς om. E V
236.24 λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον M : καὶ ἄλογον om. E V

III. Readings (errors and omissions) peculiar to V and not found in M E

Book 1

- 2.7–8 τὰ εἰς Εὐδημον ἀναφερόμενα M E : τὰ Εὐδημον ἀναφερόμενα V
2.11 καθ' ἣν ῥυθμισθήσεται M E : καθ' ἣ ῥυθμισθήσεται V
2.22 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄγαν θέειν M E : ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄγαν θέειν V
4.14 μονώτῃ συστήναι M E : μονώτῃ συστήναι V
4.16 καὶ τί ἡ φιλία M E : καὶ τί ἡ φιλίαν V
4.25 τε στρατηγικὴ καὶ αἰ λοιπαὶ M E : τε στρατηγικὴ καὶ αἰ λιπαὶ V
6.1 ἔστι καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος : ἔστι καὶ ρόλει τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος V
6.9–10 ὥστε ἔδοξαν καὶ τὰ δίκαια M E : ὥστε ἔδοξαν καὶ τὰ δίκαιαν V
6.20–21 μήπως ματαίως πονοίη M E : μήπως ματαίως πονοίη V
6.25 οἷος τ' ὦν τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμην M E : οἷος τ' ὦν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμην V
6.29 κενὸν M E : κανὸν V
20.4 ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον M : τοῦτ' ἂν τὸ ἔσχατον εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον E : τοῦ π' ἂν τὸ ἔσχατον εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον V

Book 2

- 92.22–23 ὅθεν καὶ ἔπαινοι, ἂν ὑπομείνωσι· καὶ ψόγοι, ἂν μὴ ὑπομείνωσι, περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας γίνονται M E : καὶ ψόγοι ἂν μὴ ὑπομείνωσι om. V
64.16 σπουδαῖοι M E : δουδαῖοι V
64.22 καὶ αἰ κακίαι M E : καὶ αἰκίαι V
66.5 θηρεύειν M E : θήρσον V
132.14 χαίρουσι M E : χέρουσι V

Book 3

- 102.16–17 προηγουμένως M E : προηγομένως V
102.20 αὐτὰ M E : ἀτὰ V

- 102.23 κωλύει M E : καιλύει V
 136.15 παιδαγωγῶ M E : δαγωγῶ V
 136.20–21 ὅτι καὶ ἀμφοῖν M E : καὶ om. V
 162.19 πολλῶν M E : πολῶν V
 166.20 ποσόν M E : ποσών V

Book 4

- 156.23 ἀγαπωμένων M E : ἀγαπομένων V
 156.28 εὐγενεῖς M E : ἀγενεῖς V
 158.3–4 οὔτε δικαίως τῶν μεγάλων ἑαυτοὺς ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται
 M E : οὔτε δικαίως τῶν μεγάλων ἑαυτοὺς ἀξιοῦσιν bis, οὔτε μεγαλόψυχοι
 λέγονται V

Book 5

- 180.3 Ἴδου δὲ διαλαμβάνει καὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας M E : καὶ ἀδικίας om. V
 180.3–4 ὅθεν ἀπεισιώπησε τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις M E : ὅθεν ἀπεισιώπησε μεθ τὴν ἐπὶ
 τούτοις V
 230.18 δεῖξας δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς καθόλου M E : δεῖξας δὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς καθόλου V

IV. Other evidence that V is copied from E

i. Length of lemmata throughout: e.g. 4.12 τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν M : τίνας γὰρ εἶναι
 χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι E V

ii. V copies *post correctionem* forms in E: e.g. a) ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς *post correctionem* E: ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς V; b) αὐτῷ γε μόνω *post correctionem* E : αὐτῷ γε μόνο V; c) in the dittography καὶ καὶ εἰς τὸ σώζειν, E drops the first καὶ with V copying the correct form καὶ εἰς τὸ σώζειν directly.

iii. Deletions

In V f. 39v–40r, almost two folia were crossed out by the scribe when he realised that, after the οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπογόνοντες τὴν σωτηρίαν τὸν ἐν κύμασι... (*In EN 3, 11, 118.3–4*), he had jumped back to the beginning of the previous entry (ἐν μεσότητι δύο κακιῶν φαίνεται..., *In EN 3, 10, 114.20–21*). That V draws directly from E is shown by the fact that ἐν κύμασι... is the final phrase in f. 36r in E and ἐν μεσότητι δύο κακιῶν the beginning of another folio (not the correct one in sequence), explaining the confusion. The same pattern of V accidentally disturbing the text sequence when moving from one folio in E to another is seen in V f. 63r. Here the scribe deletes a section he mistakenly copied in the move from f. 62r to a new folio in E (καὶ προστεθείσθω τοῖς γγ· καὶ γενέσθω γγδ· τετμήσθω δὲ... is initially erroneously followed by ...εἶεν· εἶτε ἄλλό τι κοινὸν καὶ μερισμὸν instead of by ...καὶ τὸ γγ, ὁμοίως εἰς γζ, *In EN 5, 7, 196.7–8*). A deletion restores the correct sequence of the

text. Similarly, in V f. 69r there is a deletion of nearly a line, which the scribe erroneously copied in the move from E f. 67r to a new page (διασαφηθῆ ὁ λόγος, ἐν μὲν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι, *In EN* 5, 14, 216.18–19).

In sum, it is clear from the above that V is a direct descendant of E, which is in turn a descendant of M.

3.4 Pachymeres' copy of the *Nicomachean Ethics*

Evidence brought to light in the past few years puts us in a position to draw more secure conclusions than was possible earlier with regard to Pachymeres' exemplar for the *EN*. First, research has confirmed that the Aristotelian manuscript preserving the *EN* M^b (= Marcianus gr. Z. 213, dated to ca. 1466–1468), previously employed for collation purposes in editions of Pachymeres, actually depends on M.¹⁰⁷ Second, it has become clear that M and M^b derive from a common ancestor, Vat. gr. 506 (ca. 1300).¹⁰⁸ In addition, we know that the version of the *EN* in Vat. gr. 506 served as an exemplar for the paraphrase of the *EN* in the *Philosophia*,¹⁰⁹ substantiating and updating Oikonomakos' thesis, according to which the Aristotelian working copy Pachymeres consulted for his paraphrase of the *EN* in Book XI of his *Philosophia* was directly related to M^b.¹¹⁰ The stemmatic significance of Vat. gr. 506 has also been supported by historical data, which show that this codex was the copy of the text circulating in and used extensively by Pachymeres' immediate circle.¹¹¹ The above

107 C. Giacomelli's description of M^b in <<https://cagb-digital.de/handschriften/diktyon-69684>> (last accessed 24 January 2022), citing E. Mioni, *Aristotelis codices Graeci qui in bibliothecis Venetis asservantur* (Padova 1958) 85–88. The transmission of the *Nicomachean Ethics* has not yet been studied in a comprehensive fashion. There is a recent PhD thesis by Pelagia Vera Loungi, *Die Manuskripte und die Überlieferung der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles (Buch I)*, University of Hamburg 2017. I would like to thank the author for allowing me to consult the relevant portions of her thesis. For Aristotelian manuscripts in general, see R. D. Argyropoulos and I. Caras, *Inventaire des manuscrits grecs d'Aristote et de ses commentateurs: contribution à l'histoire du texte d'Aristote*, Supplement (Paris 1980).

108 Loungi, *Die Manuskripte und die Überlieferung* (n. 107), 273–280. Vat. gr. 506 was used by John Chortasmenos and his student Bessarion; see Berger, *Die Textgeschichte der Historia animalium* (n. 91), 78 and 80. In connection with this, it has been shown that the version of the *Historia Animalium* in Vat. gr. 506 was the model for the corresponding text Bessarion copied in M, suggesting that he may have done the same with the *EN*; see Loungi, *Die Manuskripte und die Überlieferung* (n. 107), 275.

109 Loungi, *Die Manuskripte und die Überlieferung* (n. 107), 278–280.

110 Oikonomakos, *Γεώργιος Παχυμέρης, Φιλοσοφία* (n. 8), 28*–39*, suggests that Pachymeres' copy of Aristotle was either a vertical ancestor of M^b or a manuscript affiliated with M^b.

111 Berger, *Die Textgeschichte der Historia animalium* (n. 91), 125–126; Loungi, *Die Manuskripte und die Überlieferung* (n. 107), 273–278.

evidence has necessitated a collation of the version of the *EN* in Pachymeres' Commentary with that in Vat. gr. 506 (= W), in order to check whether the conclusions reached in the case of Book XI of the *Philosophia* extend to the Commentary as well.

Some indicative examples of common and variant readings between M and W in relation to the "standard version" of the Aristotelian original (as reconstructed in Bywater's edition) are listed below. Aristotle's reading, as per Bywater's text, is given first.

i. M in agreement with W

- 18.29, 1097a21 τέλος : τέλειον M W
 28.15, 1099a22 ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί : ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλαί M W
 44.1, 1102b3 ἀνθρωπίνη : ἀνθρωπικὴ M W
 82.6, 1108a31 παθήμασι : πάθεισι M W
 92.27, 1110b3 συμβάλληται : συμβάληται M W
 96.20, 1111a14 θῖξαι : δίξαι M W (δεῖξαι)
 106.17, 1113a6 ἀναγάγη : ἀνάγη M W
 112.14, 1114b1 τοιοῦτο : τοιοῦτον M W
 114.15, 1114b21 αὐτὸν : αὐτὸ M W
 114.22, 1114b28 καθ' αὐτάς : κατὰ ταύτας M W
 116.17, 1115a18 αὐτὸν : αὐτῶν M W
 116.20, 1115a20–21 ἐλευθέριοι : ἐλεύθεροι M W
 134.30, 1119a27 ἐθισμοί : ὠθισμοί M W
 154.25, 1123b25 μεγαλοψύχου : μεγάλου M W
 158.11, 1124b7 μικροκίνδυνος : πυκνοκίνδυνος M W
 160.11, 1125a1 ἢ φίλον : ἢ πρὸς φίλον M W
 162.7, 1125a24 ὀκηροί : νοερός M W (νοεροί)
 170.33, 1127b2 ἔξιν : τάξιν M W
 172.24, 1127b27 βαυκοπανούργοι : βαναυσοπανούργους M W
 174.26, 1128a26 ἐλευθερίῳ : ἐλευθέρῳ M W
 186.7, 1130b11 παράνομον Byw. (ex παράνομον πλέον K^bΓ)¹¹² : πλέον M W
 198.26, 1133a3 ἐμποδῶν recte : ἐκποδῶν M W
 208.23, 1134a35 λόγον : νόμος M W
 210.11, 1134b11 χωρισθῆ (ex K^bΓ) : μὴ χωρισθῆ M W
 216.8, 1135b25 μοχθηρός : πονηρός M W

ii. Unique readings of M in disagreement with W

- 10.8, 1195b9 τῶν ἡσιόδου W : τοῦ ἡσιόδου M
 28.22, 1099a29 ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις M : ταῖς ἀρίστοις ἐνεργείαις W

¹¹² K^b = Laurentianus Plut. 81. 11 (9th–10th c.); Γ = antiqua traductio (ed. Paris. a. 1497). See also Section 9 Sigla.

- 30.6, 1099b7 ταῦτό W : ταυτὸν M
 34.5, 1100b1 βούλεσθαι W : κεῖσθαι M
 42.29, 1102a33–34 δύναμιν W : ἔξιν M
 94.22, 1110b32 αἰτία W : ἦτοι M
 100.24, 1111b33 ψευδεῖ W : ψεύδει M
 106.16, 1113a6 ἑαυτὸν M : αὐτὸν W
 112.23, 1114b3 ἔσται W : ἐσεῖται M
 140.4, 1120a16 μὴ λαμβάνοντι W : μὴ om. M

The affinities noted above might at first glance suggest that Pachymeres' Commentary takes Vat. gr. 506 into account. On the other hand, the various unique readings in M not also found in W perhaps point to the possibility that Pachymeres consulted another witness to the *EN*, and the possibility that Pachymeres himself is responsible for at least some of the deviations evident in M in order to meet the needs of his exegesis cannot be excluded. The loss of Pachymeres' autograph leaves these possibilities open.

4 Paratextual elements

4.1 Diagrams

Preserved along with Pachymeres' Commentary are a number of diagrams,¹¹³ which provide conceptual representations of Aristotelian psychology and moral philosophy (e.g. the bipartition of the soul, virtue as a mean between excess and deficiency) or give visual form to arithmetical and geometrical proportions pertaining to ethics. In M, these diagrams are drawn freehand in the margins by Bessarion and take various shapes, mainly branch (or tree) diagrams in the form of divisions (*diairesis*), crescent-shaped diagrams, triangle diagrams with abbreviated quantifiers of the sort typically used for the three syllogistic figures, and tables. On other occasions, they incorporate a variety of geometrical shapes, for example parallelograms, horizontal lines, and semi-circles. To render the visual display more comprehensible and thereby memorable, the diagrams are often prefaced by headlines and/or complemented by succinct descriptive labels (see Images 2 and 3), which are at times largely original (see below).

From late antiquity onwards in particular, diagrams were a fundamental feature of pedagogical settings, playing a key role as heuristic tools to facilitate the study and understanding of philosophy and science.¹¹⁴ Pachymeres tapped into this prac-

113 Referred to as “diagr.”

114 Diagrams are fundamentally important to any study of the transmission and transformation of knowledge, both in giving visual expression to and in interpreting information. On syllogistic diagrams related to the Aristotelian corpus, see e.g. M. Wesoly, “Restoring Aristotle’s Lost Diagrams of the Syllogistic Figures”, *Peitho* 3 (2012) 83–114 (online at <<http://peitho.amu.edu.pl/volume3/wesoly.pdf>>; last accessed 10 January 2022); cf. N. Agiotis “Inventarisierung von Scholien, Glossen und Diagrammen der handschriftlichen Überlieferung zu Aristoteles’ *De interpretatione* (c. 1 – 4)”, Working Paper des SFB 980 *Episteme in Bewegung* 5 (2015) 1–119 (available at <http://www.sfb-episteme.de/Listen_Read_Watch/Working-Papers/>; last accessed 10 January 2022). On diagrams in philosophical works in general, see e.g. J. van Leeuwen, “Thinking and Learning from Diagrams in the Aristotelian Mechanics”, *Nuncius* 29 (2014) 53–87; G. Uhlmann, “The Noise of the Books: Practices of Knowledge Transfer in Damascius’ *Vita Isidori*”, Working Paper des SFB 980 *Episteme in Bewegung* 8 (2016) 1–32, at 6–7 (available at <http://www.sfb-episteme.de/Listen_Read_Watch/Working-Papers/>; last accessed 10 January 2022); M. Cacours, “Les schémas dans les manuscrits grecs de contenu logique: raisons d’être, fonctions et typologie”, *Gazette du livre médiéval* 39 (2001) 21–33. For the use of diagrams in medical commentaries, see O. Temkin, “Studies on Late Alexandrian Medicine, I: Alexandrian Commentaries on Galen’s *De Sectis ad Introducendos*”, *Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine* 3 (1935) 405–430, at 412–420; B. Gundert, “Die Tabulae Vindobonenses als Zeugnis alexandrinischer Lehrtätigkeit”, in K.-D. Fischer, D. Nickel, and P. Potter (eds), *Text and Tradition: Studies in Ancient Medicine and its Transmission* (Leiden 1998), 91–144; O. Overwien, “Medizinische Lehrwerke aus dem spätantiken Alexandria”, *Les Études Classiques* 80 (2012) 157–186, at 169–175. For mathematical diagrams, see the concise entry by C. Roby, “Diagrams, mathematical”, in R. S. Bagnall, K. Brodersen, C. B. Champion, A. Erskine, and S. R. Huebner (eds),

tice in his didactic agenda, producing diagrams in his autographs to lend an iconic element to his main educational texts, the *Philosophia* (e.g. Berolinensis Hamilton 512, gr. 408) and *Quadrivium* (Angelicus gr. 38). The same is true of Pachymeres' Commentary on the *Physics*, which he also accompanied with a vast array of diagrams, as can be seen from his autograph Laurentianus 87.5.

Despite his practice elsewhere, in the case of M it is difficult to be certain whether the diagrams were drafted by Pachymeres himself as appendages to his Commentary. It is similarly unclear if the diagrams were conceptualised by Pachymeres or go back to an earlier period of scholastic dissemination of the *EN*, handed down in older codices, from which the Byzantine scholar got them. There seems to be evidence in favour of both scenarios.¹¹⁵

Having said that, it should be noted that there are remarkable vocabulary affinities between the diagrams and Pachymeres' Commentary. For example, *ὡσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι, ὡς ποτὲ μὲν πειθαρχεῖν, ποτὲ δὲ ἀντιβαίνειν, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς νουθητήσεως* in *diagr. ii* corresponds much better to *ὡσπερ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς φαμεν λόγον ἔχειν, ὡς ποτὲ μὲν πειθαρχεῖν, ποτὲ δ' ἀντιβαίνειν· καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς νουθητήσεως* (*In EN 1, 20, 48.10–12*) of the Commentary than to the relevant section of the *EN* (1102b32–1103a3). Furthermore, the diagrams are sometimes directly linked to the content of the Commentary: e.g. *diagr. i* presents two columns corresponding specifically to Pachymeres' explication *δύο γὰρ ἐποίουν συστοιχίας, μίαν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἄλλην κακῶν* (*In EN 1, 6, 14.15–16*). An intriguing instance is *diagr. vii*, which is an integral supplement to the Commentary, as it comes naturally just after the point where the exegesis of the *EN* has ended (i.e. 1111b11, *συλλογίζεται δὲ ὅτι οὐ θυμός ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμία οὐδὲ βούλησις οὐδὲ δόξα* (*In EN 3, 3, 98.15*); it presents in diagrammatic form the next few lines in the *EN*, i.e. 1111b12–16, which are not verbally explicated in the Commentary, and then moves over to the next exegetical entry, which starts from *EN 1111b16–17*, thus filling the textual gap via visual supplementation of the argumentation. This shows that the diagram was drawn with Pachymeres' narrative in mind, rather than the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Finally, *diagr. xv* (*In EN 5, 10*) contains the exegetical marker *φησί* "he says" (*τὸ οὖν α, φησί, τὸ ἡμῖς τοῦ β ἔχει, τουτέστι τὸ ἡμῖς τῶν ι' μῶν, εἰ πέντε μῶν ἀξία ἐστὶν ἡ οἰκία*), pointing to the fact that the exegete is at work here, commenting on Aristotle's words and ideas, as he does throughout the Commentary. In addition to the above,

The Encyclopedia of Ancient History (Oxford 2013) 2068–2069. See also I. Garipzanov, "The Rise of Graphicacy in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages", *Viator* 46.2 (2015) 1–22.

115 a) Conceptualised by Pachymeres, probably *diagr. ix* and *diagr. xi. b)* Taken from older *EN* manuscripts: e.g. in *L^b* (=Parisinus gr. 1854) bottom right-hand margin, f. 5r, we find a Pythagorean table of opposites nearly identical to that in Pachymeres (*diagr. i*); likewise in the right-hand margin, f. 26r in *L^b* the diagram is nearly identical to *diagr. xiii* in Pachymeres. See also Telelis, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia, Book 3* (n. 8), 116*–117*. Interestingly, there are no common diagrams between M and its cognate manuscripts Vat. gr. 506 or Marc. gr. 213.

there are some stronger notional resemblances between the diagrams and the Commentary as opposed to Aristotle's *EN* (e.g. diagr. x), while it is also noteworthy that diagr. ix, diagr. xi, and diagr. xiii have no textual counterpart within the *EN*. The above considerations show that the diagrams are attached to Pachymeres' exegesis rather than its ancient model. This accounts for the decision here to edit all schematic figures and their explanatory headings and/or accompanying notes at the relevant points in the main text. Diagrams are also translated into English and, where applicable, they are accompanied by information on their relationship to other textual witnesses in an apparatus fontium. Important variant readings are sometimes recorded in a brief apparatus criticus. In a few instances, further remarks are provided to help readers make better sense of them.

Diagrammatic material has its own editorial value, helping the reader get an overview of the full range of information preserved in the earliest surviving witness. The supplementary notes are another such salient paratextual component.

4.2 Supplementary notes

Pachymeres' Commentary on Books 2–5 of the *EN* occasionally alternates with scholiastic notes in the margins.¹¹⁶ These are not introduced by Greek numerals, as is the case with the Commentary's exegetical entries, but are marked with a variety of other symbols designed to link each note to a specific portion of the Aristotelian original (see Image 4).

In the vast majority of instances, the notes take the form of extensive verbatim quotations from Aspasius or the anonymous collection of scholia to the *EN*. Their function is to supplement Pachymeres' text with sources not mentioned or expounded at specific points in the Commentary, ultimately offering an all-encompassing, diachronic exegetical background to the *EN*.¹¹⁷ Apart from a) substantial exegetical quotations, other types of notes include: b) brief scholia explaining keywords often present in both the *EN* and the Commentary, c) notabilia drawing attention to noteworthy passages or ideas in the main text, sometimes also linked to the Commentary entries, d) editorial interventions in the main text, particularly additions of dropped lines,¹¹⁸ e) notabilia clearly appended to the Aristotelian

116 Referred to as “schol.” in the apparatus criticus and elsewhere.

117 For the variety of marginal notes in general, see e.g. C. Brockmann, “Scribal Annotations as Evidence of Learning in Manuscripts from the first Byzantine Humanism: The ‘Philosophical Collection’”, in J. B. Quenzer, D. Bondarev, and J. U. Sobisch (eds), *Manuscript Cultures: Mapping the Field*, Studies in Manuscript Cultures 1 (Berlin 2014), 11–33.

118 Groups a, b, and to some extent c feature in the Appendix of Supplementary Notes; group d does not, since it relates to the textual constitution of the *EN*, not its scholiastic interpretation. An example from group d is the following: αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ’ αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά

text, as they extend well beyond the folios including the exegesis on the *EN* to provide concise, mnemonic-style titles for all the Aristotelian works included in M.

That the supplementary annotations are distinguished from the Commentary by different navigational signs, along with the fact that there is frequently a considerable degree of overlap between Commentary and notes (on the level of both content and phraseology) in the analysis of certain segments of the *EN*,¹¹⁹ suggests that the

έστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα, ταῦτα δὲ (*EN* 1110b4–7) (f. 16v, outer, left-hand margin) is added as a supplement, since it was initially left out of the version of the *EN* located in the centre of the page. The addition is introduced by the word κείμενον in red ink.

Where brief notabilia to the *EN* itself occur (group e), unless they are attached to the scholiastic entries, they are also left out of the Appendix of Supplementary Notes, since they have no exegetical effect. E.g. in f. 39r (right-hand margin), there is a notabilium to the phrase καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ (*EN* 1134a1) introduced with Σημείωσαι ὄρον in red ink. A similar example occurs in the right-hand margin in f. 36r (περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς δικαίου ὄπερ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν). See also right-hand margin in f. 37r and lower left-hand margin in f. 37v. Group e also includes brief headings, sometimes quoted verbatim from the Aristotelian text, which function as mnemonics concerning the subject of the main text:

- f. 9v: τῶν ἀρετῶν, αἱ μὲν διανοητικά· αἱ δὲ ἠθικά·
- f. 9v: ἡ ἠθικὴ οὐ φύσει·
- f. 9v: οὔτε φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν αἱ ἀρεταί·
- f. 10r: αἱ ἔξεις, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν γίνονται·
- f. 10v: ὑπὸ ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐνδείας φθείρονται αἱ ἀρεταί·
- f. 10v: τίς ὁ δειλός· τίς ὁ θρασύς· τίς ὁ ἀκόλαστος· τίς ὁ ἀνάισθητος·
- f. 15r: πῶς ἂν τις τύχοι τοῦ μέσου·
- f. 22v: περὶ σωφροσύνης
- f. 44v: ἡ τέχνη τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου ποιητικῆ·

There are also a few interlinear notes to the *EN* in M and some brief marginalia in the outer margins also related to the reference text. These constitute another body of annotation, which is different from the extensive exegetical notes attached to Pachymeres' Commentary and, of course, from the Commentary itself; hence they are also not edited in the present edition. For example, above the line of the *EN* αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερον, οἷον πλοῦτον ἀλούς (1097a26–27) in f. 4r, an interlinear note provides the clarification διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν εὐδαίμονεσιν; in f. 5r the expression αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει (*EN* 1198b4) is explained by the interlinear phrase αἱ μαθηματικά, while directly next to it αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινί (*EN* 1198b4) is exemplified by means of the interlinear note ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. As regards marginalia, in f. 15v we read ἐν τῷ γάμμα πραγματεύεται περὶ ἐκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου, offering a title to Book 3 of the *EN* (as per the *aide-memoires* listed above for group e). For interlinear and marginal scholia, see the general study by F. Montana, “The Making of Greek Scholiastic Corpora”, in F. Montanari and L. Pagani (eds), *From Scholars to Scholia: Chapters in the History of Ancient Greek Scholarship* (Berlin 2011) 105–161.

119 For example, schol. i from Anon. *In EN* 123.11–18 (Τοῦτο νῦν φύσει λέγει, οὗ ἡ τελειότης ἐκ φύσεως περιγίνεται, ἢ σύμφυτος οὕσα ὡς τῷ λίθῳ ἢ βαρύτης ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιγινόμενη ὡς ὀδόντων βλάστησις ἢ γενεῶν. τὰ γὰρ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέχεσθαι ἐπιγινόμενα, ἔξωθεν δὲ τινος προσδεόμενα πρὸς τελειώσιν οὐ φύσει νῦν λέγει. οὐδὲ γὰρ κυρίως ἂν ταῦτα λέγοιτο φύσει, εἰ καὶ ποτε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων χρώμεθα τῷ φύσει. οὐ γὰρ φύσει τὰς τέχνας ἔχομεν, καίτοι φύσει ὄντες αὐτῶν δεκτικοί. ὅτι δὲ μὴ φύσει τὸ ἐξ ἔθους, δῆλον ποιεῖ διὰ τοῦ μηδὲν τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἢ ἐχόντων τι ἄλλως ἐθισθῆναι

annotations were not originally part of the Commentary. This conclusion is reinforced by the exegetical notes' tendency to offer lengthy quotations without much authorial intervention, which is inconsistent with Pachymeres' technique in the Commentary, where rarely – if ever – does he reproduce his source material faithfully and at length. Finally, neither the anonymous scholia nor Aspasius is a significant source for the Commentary itself, which might explain why they have been added independently.

In view of the above, it seems likely that the notes belong to a later stage of exegetical and editorial revision, which may or may not go back to Pachymeres himself and/or his direct collaborators.¹²⁰ In the absence of any concrete evidence for the authorship of the notes, another possibility is that their addition as a supplement to Pachymeres' Commentary reflects an attempt on Bessarion's part to compile the fullest exegetical entity possible, probably for personal reading. This aligns with the fact that scholars have observed that this is one of the rare cases in which Bessarion copied a long text in a period when he was pursuing his studies in Constantinople under John Chortasmenos.¹²¹

δύνασθαι) and Pachymeres' corresponding explication of the same section of the *EN* (1103a20–28), Πάντα τὰ παρόντα ταῦτα κατασκευαστικά εἰσιν τοῦ ἐξ ἔθους καὶ μὴ ἐκ φύσεως περιγίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὰς ἀρετὰς. οὔτε γὰρ φύσει οὔτε μὴν παρὰ φύσιν ἐπισυμβαίνουσιν, ὡς πολλάκις συμβαίνει τῷ λίθῳ τὸ ἄνω φέρεσθαι ἕκ τινος ἀνάγκης ἰσχυροτέρας, ἀλλὰ πεφύκαμεν μὲν εἰς τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς δεξασθαι (τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ ἡμετέρα φύσις, δεκτικὴ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος εἶδους), τελειούμεθα δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐκ φύσεως ἀλλ' ἐκ διδασκαλίας καὶ ἄλλως ἔθους, *In EN* 2, 1, 50.13–18, give a sense of stilted repetition when read together.

120 In his paraphrase of Aristotle's *Meteorologica*, for example, forming Book 5 of his *Philosophia* (preserved on the autograph codex Berolinensis Hamilton 512, gr. 408 and the partly autograph Parisinus gr. 1930), Pachymeres and his collaborators added marginal annotations when they revised the paraphrase; see Telelis, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia, Book 5* (n. 8), 49*; cf. P. Golitsis, “La date de composition de la *Philosophia*” (n. 29), 215; cf. Golitsis, “Un commentaire perpétuel” (n. 12), 655–663. The same is true for the autograph paraphrase of *De Caelo* (Book 3 of the *Philosophia*), which is also interpolated by marginal notes produced after the completion of the paraphrase, possibly by Pachymeres' collaborators; see Telelis, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia, Book 3* (n. 8), 113*. M. Cacouros briefly refers to the problematic nature of such notes in “Το ἀριστοτελικό υπόμνημα στο Βυζάντιο” (n. 35), at 167–168. For the complexity of the issue in Byzantine editorial practice today, see e.g. S. Wahlgren, “Close to the Author – But how close? Theodorus Metochites”, in E. Göransson, G. Iversen, *et al.* (eds), *The Arts of Editing Medieval Greek and Latin: A Casebook* (Toronto, Ontario 2016) 387–398. Cf. also C. Steel and C. Macé, “Georges Pachymère philologue”, who show that Pachymeres added his own scholia to his commentary on the *Parmenides* with the aim of facilitating study of the Platonic work.

121 Zorzi, “Per la tradizione manoscritta” (n. 10), 252–253 with n. 21. This assumption too has its own precedent in the manuscript culture of late Byzantium: in the margins of Pachymeres' paraphrase of Aristotle's *Meteorologica* (*Philosophia*, Book 5) the knowledgeable and well-educated scribe Matthaios Kamariotes added his own notes, excerpting them from the relevant commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Olympiodorus, and John Philoponus and aiming to use this material

Given that we cannot be sure whether the notes go back to Pachymeres, and taking into account that they generally do not seem to have been an indispensable part of the Commentary for the reasons explained above, they are presented here in an appendix (Appendix of Supplementary Notes), offering readers the opportunity to consult them at their own discretion.

for his teaching activities at the Patriarchal School; see Telelis, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia*, Book 5 (n. 8), 49*–53*.

5 Editorial principles

Recent scholarly work on the editing of Byzantine texts has tended to advocate faithful conformity to manuscript accentuation and punctuation especially in the case of autograph or partly autograph codices.¹²² Although the idiosyncratic character of Byzantine textual situations should be respected,¹²³ this should occur, in my judgment, on levels that do not detract from modern comprehension of the text, e.g. on the level of vocabulary. Consequently, this edition aims to present a version of the text that will serve the needs primarily of a modern readership through normalisation of accents and punctuation, while retaining late Byzantine linguistic and syntactic peculiarities that are not overly distracting.

In establishing the text on the basis of M, the following editorial principles have been adopted:

Book titles and individual entries

As already noted, Pachymeres' Commentary is lemmatic, broken down into shorter units which are numbered consecutively by means of alphabetic numerals; each numeral is followed by a brief heading quoted from the Aristotelian exemplar, which marks the starting point of an individual unit of explication. This structural system is in evidence only in the second entry of Book 1, where it is most likely intended to serve as a prototype, and is repeated nowhere else. To facilitate comprehension of the arrangement of the commentary, in the edition I have always supplied the individual headings (lemmata) (in their briefest possible form) following Bywater's edition (1894, reprint 1962) and providing references consistent with the standard Bekker pagination (based on the 1831 edition). In supplying the Aristotelian lemmata I have decided not to base myself on the version of the *EN* found in the centre of the pages in M; when checked against Pachymeres' verbatim quotations from the *EN*, this version of the text does not seem to correspond to the one used by

122 See recent discussions by D. R. Reinsch, "What should an Editor do with a Text like the 'Chronographia' of Michael Psellos?", in A. Bucossi and E. Kihlman (eds), *Ars Edendi: Lecture Series*, vol. II (Stockholm 2012) 131–154, B. Bydén, "Imprimatur? Unconventional Punctuation and Diacritics in Manuscripts of Medieval Greek Philosophical Works", in A. Bucossi and E. Kihlman (eds), *Ars Edendi: Lecture Series*, vol. II (Stockholm 2012) 155–172, and E. Cullhed, "Editing Byzantine Scholarly Texts in Authorized Manuscripts: The Case of Eustathios of Thessalonike's *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*", in E. Göransson, G. Iversen, B. Crostini (eds), *The Arts of Editing Medieval Greek and Latin: A Casebook* (Toronto 2016) 72–95. The discussion goes further back, e.g. to J. Noret, "Notes de ponctuation et d'accentuation byzantines", *Byzantion* 65 (1995) 69–88. For a succinct diachronic summary of the debate, see Oikonomakos, *Γεώργιος Παχυμέρης Φιλοσοφία* (n. 8), 41*–43*.

123 See, e.g. M. Jeffreys, "Textual Criticism", in E. Jeffreys, J. F. Haldon and R. Cormack (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies* (Oxford 2008) 86–94.

Pachymeres to write his Commentary. In a few cases numerals signalling entries are omitted, while the titles for the individual Books of the *EN* are always absent from the commentary, most likely because they are already indicated in the main text preserved in the manuscript and often in the upper margins as a reminder. I have therefore provided any missing letters or titles in order to present Pachymeres' Commentary as a free-standing textual entity. Subdivision of individual entries into paragraphs is my own, either to mark a transition to a new topic or where there is also a paragraph break in the Aristotelian original.

Quotations and parallel passages

I have italicised verbatim quotations from the *EN* or other major formative sources, including cases in which there is a slight variation in grammatical form (e.g. different number, case, or mood, elision or another speech phenomenon) or where Pachymeres uses a word that has the same root as or is almost synonymous to the wording of his source. Verbatim quotations from philosophers other than Aristotle (e.g. Aspasius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Eustratius) have been italicised only when they are sufficiently extensive (normally more than ca. five words) to suggest direct consultation.

The apparatus of parallel passages includes only passages which belong either to the Aristotelian/ethical tradition on which Pachymeres draws or to another author or work which Pachymeres mentions or alludes to. On some occasions, the apparatus also includes works postdating Pachymeres' Commentary, e.g. [Heliodorus]' paraphrase, to draw the reader's attention to noteworthy parallel passages shared between Pachymeres' Commentary and later sources, without necessarily suggesting direct influence or reception. For non-verbatim citations or verbatim citations that contain additions or omissions, or in which the sequence of the phraseology is somewhat altered, I add "cf." before the reference, inviting readers to cross-check the text at their discretion. The edition of diagrams and the supplementary notes is accompanied by an apparatus diagrammatum and an apparatus scholiorum respectively.

In editing Aristotelian or other quotations in the commentary, I have retained variant readings which offer an alternative form of a word normally found in Pachymeres' works (esp. those surviving in autograph) or in other late Byzantine texts, so long as they do not disturb the meaning (e.g. ὑγείαν for ὑγείαν; ὑπόγυα for ὑπόγυα; δι' ἑαυτό for καθ' αὐτό). I have also retained variant readings supported by the manuscript tradition of the *EN*, provided they conform to Pachymeres' context, grammatical sense, and syntax and simultaneously do not violate or obscure Aristotle's interpretation in the relevant section. An apt example showing that variant readings are not without editorial value is the following: drawing on *EN* 1115a31–32, which reads ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις, Pachymeres writes ἴδε γὰρ ἐν πόλεσί τισιν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ μᾶλλον

τοῖς μονομάχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐν πολέμῳ κινδυνεύουσιν, with μονομάχοις constituting a variant for the μονάρχοις attested, for example, in M^b. μονομάχοις, semantically embedded in Pachymeres' sentence, is not to be replaced by the “standard” reading.

On the other hand, when a quotation presents a variant reading inconsistent with Aristotle, his commentators (including Pachymeres) or the manuscript tradition, and/or does not serve the meaning of the passage, I have altered the text to conform to the closest Aristotelian parallel, e.g. *In EN* 3, 18, 134.30: ἐθισμοί scripsi ex Arist. *EN* 1119a27: ὠθισμοί M (cum M^b). Readings of Aristotle are referenced in the apparatus criticus when they are preferred to the corresponding reading of M (in the form of “Y scripsi/correxī ex Arist.”), or when their reading is (radically) different from the one adopted, sometimes with indications of the Aristotelian witnesses seconding M's reading (e.g. M cum L^b) as taken from the standard Bekker, Bywater, and Susemihl editions. Finally, variant readings in M's quotations of classical sources (e.g. the epigram on the tomb of Sardanapallus in *In EN* 1, 4; the line from Euripides' *Bellerophon* in *In EN* 5, 15) have also been retained, with indications of their form in the most recent standard edition.

Punctuation, accentuation, orthography, and other linguistic remarks

Given that the text is over-punctuated with commas and upper stops, I have intervened extensively here to make the punctuation of the manuscript match its syntax, where appropriate adopting the punctuation of the Aristotelian source in line with the standard edition.

In addition, I have regularised the accentuation. I have added iota subscript, which is never used in the manuscript (e.g. τῶ ὑποκειμένῳ=τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ) and the coronis (e.g. ταῦτόν) throughout. I have tacitly converted the grave accent into an acute when it is followed by punctuation, as is the convention in modern printed editions (e.g. δέ, = δέ,). There is generally no elision in the manuscript, and I have retained that feature. The text sometimes deviates from the rules of accentuation of enclitics (although elsewhere it is respected: e.g. πρὸς τι; ἐνί τινι), so I have accordingly accented them in the conventional manner throughout (e.g. εἰς τε=εἷς τε; ὡς φασίν=ὡς φασιν; ποῖον ἔστι= ποῖόν ἐστι; πράγματα εἰσίν= πράγματά εἰσιν). I have tacitly changed the erroneous acute accents to circumflex accents (e.g. αὔται=αὔται, εὔρες=εὔρες. πολίται=πολίται, ἦττον=ἦττον, κλίνας=κλίνας, πλευρίτιν =πλευρίτιν, σίτος=σίτος). I have tacitly replaced the erroneous rough breathings with smooth breathings (e.g. the manuscript sometimes has ἔνιοι for ἔνιοι, εἰκάσιν for εἰκάσιν; notice also that there is some discrepancy in the use of the personal or definite meaning of the pronoun αὐτοῦ in place of the reflexive pronoun αὐτοῦ=ἑαυτοῦ, which I have also silently changed). I have also tacitly accented unaccented words, as well as letters used as numerals. I have capitalised the initial letters of proper names and of titles of works. I have inserted a question mark in direct questions and

parenthesis marks which may or may not go back to the Aristotelian standard text, in order to clarify the meaning.

Finally, I have retained idiosyncratic deviations such as duplication of consonants (e.g. Φωκυλλίδου, Χοιρίλλου, δηλλον) in line with Pachymeres' practice in his autographs (e.g. Berolinensis Hamilton 512, gr. 408), unless confusion with another grammatical form is possible, in which cases I have stuck to the standard form (e.g. I have changed μέλλει to μέλει). I have also retained the peculiar use of the optative (e.g. εὐδαιμονήσειεν, *In EN* 1, 1, 2.14; ἵνα μὴ ὡς τοξόται σκοπὸν μὴ ἔχοντες ἀποτυγχάνοιμεν, *In EN* 1, 1, 4.9–10), aorist subjunctive combined with future indicative (εἰς θρασύτητα μεταπέση, προσποιήσεται δὲ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, *In EN* 3, 12, 8–9; αἰρήσεται μὲν τοῦτο ὁ ἀρετῆ ἕνασμενίζων, ἐκφύγη δὲ, *In EN* 3, 9, 114.8), combinations of words, usually adverb(s) plus a noun or pronoun written as a single word (e.g. ἐπιτοπολύ, πολλάττα, καταξίαν, καθό, μετέπειτα, ἐξανάγκης, μεταταῦτα, καθέκαστα etc. *modo Pachymerico et more byzantino*), although I have kept their separate forms when the manuscript does so (διὰ ταῦτα and διαταῦτα, μὴ δέ and μηδέ, παρό and παρ' ὅ). I have also kept the Pachymerean use of second-person singular aorist active imperative ἴδε for ἰδέ, ἐκτιθοῦσι (a late form for third-person plural present active indicative ἐκτιθέασι; also διατιθοῦσιν for διατιθέασιν), ἐσεῖται for ἔσται, and the omission of ἄν indicating potentiality (e.g. ἐπιεικῆς δόξειεν εἶναι ὡς φιλαλήθης, *In EN* 4, 16, 172.1–2; ἄτοπον οὖν, φησί, δόξειε, *In EN* 5, 15, 218.20).

In general, I have not standardised irregular moods in subordinate clauses, including conditional sentences. I have, however, regularised orthographic irregularities (Πυθαγόρειοι correxi : Πυθαγόριοι M; δειξαι correxi : δίζαι M; δείξειεν correxi : δίξειεν M; εἰρωνεῖαν correxi : εἰρωνίαν M).

6 Language

In addition to the peculiar features of Pachymeres' text noted above, other linguistic peculiarities include:¹²⁴

Periphrastic verb forms using ἔχω together with adverbs, nouns, or adjectives:

ὀλισθηρῶς ἔχων (6.26)

ἀκρατῶς τῶν παθῶν ἔχοντας (8.1)

τὸ πιθανὸν ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἔχει ἢ ἐπιχείρησις (18.16–17)

τὴν λύπην ἔχει ἀντίθετον (74.15)

εἰ μὴ ψυχῆς διάθεσιν ἔχουσιν (80.11)

ἐναντίωμα ὁ λόγος ἔχει (146.13)

ἐπεὶ ῥάδιον ἔχει συνάξει (154.4)

ἔχω + infinitive, indicating capability:¹²⁵

οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς κατατάττεσθαι (80.11–12)

ἄ τις ἂν ἔχοι πράξει (92.6)

ὀφείλω, μέλλω, θέλω + infinitive mostly as future-equivalents:¹²⁶

θέλουσι τιμᾶσθαι (10.28)

τὸ γὰρ εἶδος τῶν καθέκαστα θέλει εἶναι αἴτιον (16.11–12)

ὀφείλει ζητεῖσθαι (54.9)

Μέλλει γοῦν εἰπεῖν περὶ τοῦ βουλευτοῦ (104.26)

ὀφείλει ἔχειν τὸ μέγεθος (152.8)

Article + conjunction as a noun:

τῇ φύσει τοῦ διότι (8.26)

τοῦ ὅτι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ τὰ αἴτια (8.30–10.1)

Infinitive accompanied by definite article in place of noun:

τὸ τὰ πάντα περιφρονεῖν (4.17–18)

τὸ μαθεῖν περὶ τούτων (6.31)

ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ στίλβειν τὸ ἐγγὺς εἶναι τοὺς πλανήτας (8.30)

διὰ τὸ φιλάτους εἶναι πάντας (12.1)

¹²⁴ Pachymeres' language has been thoroughly examined, for example, by Oikonomakos, *Γεώργιος Παχυμέρης Φιλοσοφία* (n. 8), 41*–63*, Pappa, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia. Buch 6* (n. 8), 103*–116*, and Telelis, *Georgios Pachymeres Philosophia, Book 3* (n. 8), 127*–140* in the Prolegomena of their respective editions of parts of the *Philosophia*.

¹²⁵ Cf. *GMG*, 1867–1868.

¹²⁶ Cf. *GMG*, 1868.

τὸ μὴ ζητεῖν (18.24)
καὶ τὸ διαφωνεῖν (18.25)

Predilection for adverbial adjectives ending in -τέος:

ζητητέον τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (22.14–15)
προσθετέον (96.23)
ἡμῖν ποιητέον (24.16)
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποστατέον (24.16–17)

Alternative forms of the same lexical type placed adjacent to one another in parataxis:

συνδουαζέσθωσαν τὰ διμνιαῖα καὶ γενέσθω τετραμνιαῖον (192.1–2)
ὁ πληγεῖς ὥστε ἀντιπληῖξαι τὸν πληχθέντα (198.24)

Use of a singular verb with neuter plural as subject:

ταῦτα ῥηθήσεται (16.17)
τὰ γὰρ τέλη οὐ συναριθμεῖται (22.1)
But also:
πάντα κινοῦνται (12.5)
ἦσαν πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ (14.5–6)
τὰ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ποριστικὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσι (34.13–14)

Predilection for optative, either to minimise the factual sense of the indicative or to indicate future action:¹²⁷

εἰ βουλοίμεθα, ἐνεργοῦμεν (52.8)
ὥσπερ δῆτα καὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ σιτία ἄλλον ὠφελήσειαν καὶ ἄλλω ἀργὰ μενοῦσιν
(54.15)
ὡς εὐεκτοίη τὸ σῶμα (134.21)
ὁ δὲ παραλαβὼν ἀλλότριον πλοῦτον δαψιλέστερον ἐξαντλοίη (142.9–10)
τὸ μὲν νόμιμον δίκαιον κατακρίνει τοῦτον, τὸ δ' ἐπεικὲς τοῦ κρίνοντος ἀθροῖ
(228.6–7)

Dual forms:

ἐπ' ἄλλοιν (148.11)

I also provide a list of *hapax legomena* and rare words or expressions featured in the Commentary on the *EN*:

Hapax legomena:

¹²⁷ Cf. *GMG*, 1758, 1763.

εὐτριχία (22.7)
 ἀνειρώνευτος (80.23)
 φιλεπιχαιρέκακοι (102.2–3)
 ἔτοιμοκλινές (112.24)
 ὀγκηρότητα (172.25)
 μαχαιροποιητικῆς (238.15)
 μεσοδίκης (194.12)

Rare words:

μονώτιδες (4.18)
 δυσάντη (12.19)
 ἀνεκορύφου>ἀνακορυφόω (24.10)
 ἔνασμενίζουσιν (28.9)
 ἔθισις (52.26)
 ἔκουσιακουσίων (90.19)
 κίμμικος (146.19)
 βυσσοδομεύουσι (166.9)
 κρυφόνοι (166.10)
 διμνιαῖον (192.1), τετραμνιαῖον (192.2)
 ἔλαττονούμενος (192.25)
 ἐξευμαρισθήσεται (200.6)
 δεφενδύει (byz/demotic) (218.8)

7 A note on the translation

The translation that accompanies this edition aims to provide a readable English text, but at the same time to reflect the original Greek as closely as it can, preserving Pachymeres' individual style and diction as far as possible. To maximise readability, long periods have been broken up into shorter, coherent units. The text shows a certain predilection for *hyperbaton* (e.g. διατοῦτο ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι ὑπομένουσι χρήματα ἀποβάλλοντες, κληθήσονται, *In EN* 3, 10, 116.20–21; ἃ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι ἀνθρώπων νοῦν ἐχόντων ἐστί, *In EN* 3, 11, 118.17), which has required reordering to streamline the English. Reordering has been applied elsewhere as well, where syntax demands. Beginnings of periods and semi-periods with “for/since” and repetitions of the same word have been preserved in order to remain faithful to the author's stylistic intricacies, despite the fact that this rendering of the English can sometimes sound stilted. For the sake of clarity and economy, adverbial lexical items that do not affect the meaning (e.g. the overuse of καί or τέως) are occasionally left untranslated. Pachymeres' prose is terse and opaque, so that implied terms have often had to be supplied to render the text more comprehensible. Indefinite or unspecified terms have been reworded to make them more specific and explicit. Long vowels in transliterated Greek words are marked: e. g. *aretē*, *agathōtaton*. The titles of works in translation are placed within quotation marks in regular type; italicisation has been eschewed to avoid confusion with direct quotations. A common term within the Commentary is *logos*, which often refers to “(the faculty of) reason” contrasted to passions; its other meanings include “(rational) principle”, “rationality”, “reasoning”, and “the capacity for rational thought”, or even “account”, “discussion”, and “argument”.

In the translation of quotes from Aristotle in Pachymeres' text, considerable use has been made of T. Irwin, *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics*, 2nd ed., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1999; H. Rackham, *Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: W. Heinemann 1934, Loeb Classical Library 73; Chr. Rowe, *Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002 (with philosophical introduction and commentary by S. Broadie); and D. Ross, *Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics* (revised with an introduction and notes by L. Brown), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009. For specific sections from Aspasius' commentary on the *EN* and [Heliodorus'] paraphrase featured in Pachymeres, account has also been taken of D. Konstan, *On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 1–4, 7–8 Aspasius*, London: Duckworth 2008, and E. Hatch, *The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle: Consisting of a Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, and of the Paraphrase attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes, with an Introductory Analysis of each Book*, London: Murray 1879.

Symbols

[...] = Translator's insertions for the purpose of clarification have been enclosed in square brackets. They are intended only to illuminate particularly tricky passages or to contribute to a better understanding of the intended sense of the Greek.

⟨...⟩ = Angle brackets indicate editorial additions.

(...) = Round brackets are used for ordinary parenthesis and to enclose transliterations of Greek terms.

8 Images



Image 1: Marcianus Gr. Z. 212, f. 1r
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Image 3: Marcianus Gr. Z. 212, f. 37v
© Biblioteca nazionale Marciana

9 Sigla

Codex

M = Venetus Marcianus gr. Z. 212 (a. 1440)

Raro memoratur

E = Scorialensis T. I. 18 (gr. 138) (saec. XVI)

Codices aristotelici, quorum lectiones ex editionibus Bekkeri (I. Bekker, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, Berlin: Reimer, 1831.), Bywateri (I. Bywater, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894, repr. 1962) et Susemihli (F. Susemihl, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. 3; curavit O. Apelt, Leipzig: Teubner, 1912) recepi:

H ^a	Venetus Marcianus gr. Z 214 (saec. XIII–XIV)
K ^b	Florentinus Laurentianus Plut. 81. 11 (saec. IX–X)
L ^b	Parisinus gr. 1854 (saec. XII–XIII)
M ^b	Venetus Marcianus gr. 213 (saec. XV)
N ^b	Venetus Marcianus gr. IV.53 (saec. XII)
O ^b	Florentinus Riccardianus 46 (saec. XII [?])
Γ	antiqua traductio (ed. Paris. a. 1497)
vulg.	codices plerique

Editiones et studia

Asp. Aspasii commentaria (CAG XIX)

Eustr. Eustratii commentaria (CAG XX)

Byw. I. Bywater, *Aristotelis ethica Nicomachea*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894; repr. 1962.

Gol. P. Golitsis, “Georges Pachymère comme didascale. Essai pour une reconstitution de sa carrière et de son enseignement philosophique”, *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 58 (2008) 53–68.

Zor. N. Zorzi, “Per la tradizione manoscritta dell’inedito commento all’*Etica nicomachea* di Giorgio Pachimere: I. Il *Marc. gr.* 212 di Bessarione e i suoi apografi. II. Ermolao Barbaro e il commento di Pachimere (con una proekdosis del cap. 18)”, *Néa Póμη. Rivista di ricerche bizantinistiche* 12 (2015) 245–304, tavv. 1–8.

Cetera

append.	appendix
a. corr.	ante correctionem
add.	addidit
codd.	codices
{...}	addenda
[...]	delenda
corr.	correxit
diagr.	diagramma
f.	folium
fragm.	fragmentum

in marg.	in margine
in ras.	in rasura
lac.	lacunam
litt.	littera, ae etc
lm.	lemma
om.	omisit
p. corr.	post correctionem
schol.	scholium, a
scr.	scripsit
s.l.	supra lineam
superscr.	superscriptum, a
vid.	vide

**Part II Τοῦ δικαιοφύλακος καὶ πρωτεκδίκου
παράφρασις ἠκριβωμένη τοῦ Παχυμέρη**
Text and Translation

⟨Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων ἄλλα⟩

1094a1–1094a28 α' (πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος...)

Τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἰς δύο διαιρουμένης, εἷς τε θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν τέλος ἔχοντος τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τοῦ δὲ τἀγαθόν, ἢ παρούσα πραγματεία ὑπὸ τὸ πρακτικόν (ἀνάγεται). Ἠθικὴ δὲ κέκληται καὶ Νικομάχεια ἢ αὐτῆ· Νικομάχεια μὲν, διότι εἰς Νικόμαχον τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀναφέρεται, ὡσπερ καὶ Εὐδήμεια τὰ εἰς Εὐδήμῳ ἀναφερόμενα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγάλα Νικομάχεια, ἃ δὴ εἰς τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ Νικόμαχον, ὡς φασιν, ἀναφέρονται. ἠθικὴ δὲ πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῆς τε οἰκονομικῆς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς. διαφέρουσι δὲ αὐτὰ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, ἔχουσαι τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἢ μὲν ἠθικὴ περὶ ἓν καταγίνεται πρόσωπον, καθ' ἣν ῥυθμισθήσεται τὰς κινήσεις, δι' ὧν φθάσει τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τέλος, ὃ δὴ εὐδαιμονίαν τίθησιν ὁ φιλόσοφος· ἢ δὲ οἰκονομικὴ περὶ οἶκον, καθ' ἣν οὐ μόνος ἐκεῖνος ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτὸν ἄριστα διάξουσιν· ἢ δὲ πολιτικὴ περὶ πόλιν, καθ' ἣν καὶ πόλις πᾶσα εὐδαιμονήσειεν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς οἴκου καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς πόλεως.

Φησὶ γοῦν ὅτι πᾶσα τέχνη, ἢ τῶν λογικῶν ἄλογος μεταχειρίσις, καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ἢ κατὰ λόγον πρὸς τι τέλος ἀγαθόν ἢ ὄν ἢ φαινόμενον ὁδοποιήσις, καὶ πᾶσα πρᾶξις, ἢ ἔλλογος μεταχειρίσις, καὶ προαίρεσις ὁμοίως, ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ ἢ κατ' εὐλάβειαν φιλόσοφον ἢ οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖ, ἵνα μὴ ὥσι ματαιοπονίαι. ἀκολουθῶς δὲ ἑαυτῷ, ὡς καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἑτέροις ποιεῖ, καὶ καθολικῶς ἄρχεται. ἐφίενται δὲ οὐ καθ' αὐτὰς αὐτὰι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς ἔχοντας τὰς ἕξεις. διὸ καλῶς ὀρίζονται τὸ ἀγαθόν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄγαν θεῖον πρὸς αὐτὸ πάντας· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἀγαθώτατον λέγεται· τὸ γὰρ ἄγαν τὴν ὑπέρθεσιν ἔχει. ἔστιν οὖν καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταίνουσι τέλος ἢ εὐδαιμονία, ἣτις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια καὶ οὐκ ἔργον, ὅτι διαφορὰ τῶν τελῶν ἐστὶ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔργα, ἦγουν θρόνος ἢ βᾶθρον, τὰ δὲ ἐνέργειαι. ἐν οἷς γοῦν εἰσὶ καὶ ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἔργα, βελτίω τὰ ἔργα, ὅτι καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ἐκεῖνα· ἐν οἷς δὲ ἐστὶ προηγούμενα τὰ ἔργα τέλος δὲ ἢ ἐνέργεια, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἢ εὐδαιμονία, βελτίων ἢ ἐνέργεια. εἰσὶ δὲ διάφορα

4 Τῆς...πρακτικόν] cf. Eustr. In EN 1.3–4 4–5 καὶ²...τἀγαθόν] cf. Philop. In De an. 194.20–22; cf. Georg. Pachym. Paraphr. In EN 3.7 6–10 Ἠθικὴ...ὑποκειμένῳ] cf. Eustr. In EN 1.9–15; 1.27–2.1; 4.14–21 8–9 εἰσὶ...ἀναφέρονται] cf. [Eli.] In Porph. Isag. 32.34–33.2 10–11 διαφέρουσι...ἀγαθόν] cf. Philop. In De an. 194.19–22 13–14 ἢ...διάξουσιν] cf. Eustr. In EN 2.27–29 14 ἢ...εὐδαιμονήσειεν] cf. Eustr. In EN 2.29–31 16 πᾶσα τέχνη] Arist. EN 1094a1 16–17 καὶ...μέθοδος] Arist. EN 1094a1 17 μέθοδος...ὁδοποιήσις] cf. Eustr. In EN 7.13 18 πρᾶξις...δοκεῖ] Arist. EN 1094a1–2 21–23 ἐφίενται...ἔχει] cf. [Eli.] In Porph. Isag. 1.3–8; cf. Dav. Proleg. Philos. 8.16–17, Psel. Opusc. 49.57–58 21–22 διὸ...ἀγαθόν] cf. Arist. EN 1094a2–3 22 ἀγαθόν...πάντας] cf. Etym. Gudian. A 6, 9 24–26 διαφορὰ...ἔργα²] cf. Arist. EN 1094a3–6 25 θρόνος...βᾶθρον] cf. Eustr. In EN 9.1 25–27 ἐν...ἐνέργεια²] cf. Eustr. In EN 9.15–19

2 Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων ἄλλα in marg. superiore 3 α' vix legitur | Im. addidi 6 ἀνάγεται add. Gol. | ἠθικὴ M : Ἠθικά scr. Gol

[Book 1 of the “Nicomachean Ethics”]

1094a1–1094a28 1. (Every art and every inquiry...)

Philosophy being divided into two parts, the theoretical and the practical, the first having truth as its end, the other the good, the present treatise (falls under) the practical part. The same work is called both “Ethics” and “Nicomachean”; “Nicomachean” because it is dedicated to his [i.e. Aristotle’s] son Nicomachus or some other person, just as the one dedicated to Eudemus is the “Eudemian”. And there is also the “Great Nicomachean”, which is dedicated to his father Nicomachus, so they say. It is also called “Ethics” as opposed to household management and politics. These [sciences] differ with regard to their subject matter, even though they have the same end, which is the good, because ethics is concerned with one person, who in accord with ethics can organise the activities through which he can attain the human end, which the philosopher defines as happiness. Household management, on the other hand, is concerned with the household, being that in accord with which not only that man but also those subject to him will pass their lives in the best possible fashion. And politics has to do with the city, in accord with which every city may achieve happiness. For there is a concept of happiness for the household and a concept of happiness for the city.

[Aristotle] says, therefore, that *every art*, the non-rational handling of things that are subject to rational account, *and every inquiry*, the preparation in conformity with the rational principle for a good end that either exists or appears to exist, and every *practical pursuit*, the handling of things that is endowed with reason, *and likewise [every] choice appears to aim at a good* [saying this] either out of philosophical caution or because it seems this way to others, in order that there be no labour in vain. And following his usual practice, as he does in many other works as well, he begins with general statements. These matters [i.e. art, practical pursuits and choice] are not aimed at in accord with themselves, but according to the agents that have these dispositions. *For this reason they rightly derive “the good” [agathon] from “everyone runs [theein] very fast [agan] towards it”*. Hence it is not called “*agathōtaton*”, since *agan* [already] includes the superlative degree. So for human beings who choose the path of virtue the end is happiness, which is an activity and not a product, because there is a *variety among ends*. *For some are products*, for example a chair or a bench, *while others are activities*. Thus in those cases where there are both activities and products, *the products are better*, because they are that for the sake of which the effect is produced. But in cases where the products precede and the activity is the end, as here with happiness, the activity is better. The ends are different, because the

τὰ τέλη, ὅτι καὶ αἱ πράξεις διάφοροι. ὄρα δὲ ὅτι, ὅτε ἔλεγε «πᾶσα τέχνη» καὶ ἐφεξῆς, οὐκ εἶπε «καὶ ἐπιστήμη»· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιστήμης τὸ τέλος οὐ τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὅτε δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τελῶν λέγει, καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐμνημόνευσεν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ταύτη τὸ οἰκεῖον τέλος, εἰ καὶ μὴ τάγαθόν. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀρχιτεκτονικαί, αἱ ἔχουσαι ὑφ' ἑαυτὰς ἄλλας, ὧν τὰ τέλη ὑπὸ τὸ τέλος ἐκείνης ἀνάγονται, ὃ καὶ αἰρετώτερόν ἐστι 5 πάντων, ὡς οὗ ἔνεκα.

Εἰ γοῦν εἰσὶ καὶ ἃ δι' αὐτὰ αἰρούμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ δι' ἄλλα (ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν ἢ ὄρεξις καὶ ματαία ἢ ὡς μὴ τοῦ τέλους ἐφικνουμένη), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄριστον. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἡ γνώσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλως ὠφελεῖ, ἵνα μὴ ὡς τοξόται σκοπὸν μὴ ἔχοντες ἀποτυγχάνοιμεν; διατοῦτο πειρατέον λαβεῖν τίνος ἐπιστή- 10 μης τοῦτο τέλος· ἢ μὴν τῆς κυριωτάτης· φαίνεται δὲ τοιαύτη ἡ πολιτικὴ.

1094a28–1095a2 β' τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν...

Περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου ἀγαθοῦ προθέμενος διδάσκειν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ τινι εὐρηται καὶ ἐν πόλει, ἀπιδὼν πρὸς τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῦ ἥθους, ὡς οὐκ ἐν μονώτῃ συστήναι δύνανται, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τινὰς καὶ πρὸς πλῆθος (αὗται γὰρ κυρίως καὶ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί· τί γὰρ ἡ 15 μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἢν διάγη τις ἐν ὄρει, καὶ τί ἡ φιλία, ἢν μονώτης ἦ, καὶ τί ἡ ἀλήθεια, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τινὰ τις διαλέγεται; νηστεία δὲ καὶ σιωπὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ τὸ τὰ πάντα περιφρονεῖν μονώτιδες ἀρεταί, μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον καὶ τὸ τοῦτου τέλος συντελοῦσαι, εἰ μὴ γε καὶ αὗται τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔνεκα τῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ τέλος εἰσίν), [1v] ἀνάγει πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὴν διδασκαλίαν ἢ καὶ πολιτικὴν τίθησι τὴν δύναμιν τὴν 20 ἄγουσαν πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τέλος, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. μεῖζον γὰρ καὶ τελεώτερον, καθὼς φησι, τὸ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει. ἡ γοῦν τοιαύτη πολιτικὴ καὶ τίνας τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἱ ἐν ἐκείναις μετελεύσονται καὶ ποῖοι ἄξιοί εἰσι καὶ μέχρι τίνος μαθεῖν καὶ οἶδε καὶ ἐπιτάξει. ἄλλως τε, φησί, καὶ αἱ ἐντιμότεραι 25 δυνάμεις, ἢ τε στρατηγικὴ καὶ αἱ λοιπαί, ὑπὸ ταύτην ἀνάγονται, ὥστε ἡ τοιαύτη ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιτάξειεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων τέλη πρὸς τὸ ταύτης ἀναχθῆ- σονται τέλος. τὸ γὰρ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ταυτόν ἐστὶν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν πράξεων εὐδαιμονία, ὡς λόγους ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ διδόναι ὀφείλοντι ἐρωτωμένῳ περὶ τῶν πρακτέων· ὅπου γε καὶ μὴ ἐρωτωμένῳ αὐτῷ γε μόνῳ σκοπου- 30 μένῳ, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Φωκυλλίδου λέγοντι καθ' ἐκάστην

πῆ παρέβην; τί δ' ἔρεξα; τί δέ μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη;

3 ὅτε...ἐμνημόνευσεν] cf. Arist. EN 1094a16–18; cf. Eustr. In EN 7.18–19; 7.31–32 4–6 εἰσὶ... ἔνεκα] cf. Arist. EN 1094a14–16 7–11 Εἰ...πολιτικὴ] cf. Arist. EN 1094a18–28 8–11 δῆλον... πολιτικὴ] cf. Arist. EN 1094a21–28; cf. Eustr. In EN 14.9–13 13–15 Περὶ...πλῆθος] cf. Arist. EN 1170a4–6; cf. Mich. In EN 512.24–27 21–22 μεῖζον...πόλει] cf. Arist. EN 1094b7–8 22 ἡ... πολιτικὴ] cf. Arist. EN 1094a27 23–27 καὶ! ...πόλει] cf. Arist. EN 1094a28–1094b8 28–31 ὡς... ἐτελέσθη] cf. Eustr. In EN 2.6–11 31 ...ἐτελέσθη] Ps.-Pyth. Carm. aur. 42; cf. Eustr. In EN 2.10–11

7 αὐτὰ scripsi : αὐτὸ M | ἄλλα scripsi : ἄλλο M 30 Φωκυλλίδου sic M; servavi (vid. Editorial principles)

actions are also different. Observe that when he said “*every art*” etc., he did not say “and scientific knowledge”. For the end of scientific knowledge is not the good but truth. However, when he refers to the differences among the ends, he also mentions knowledge. For knowledge too has its own end, even if it is not the good. There are also *master-sciences*, those that have other [sciences] subordinate to them, *whose ends* are subordinate to the end of knowledge, *which is preferable to anything else, because it is for the sake of this [that effects are produced]*.

If, therefore, there are also things we choose for their own sake and not always for the sake of something else (in order that the desire not result in a process ad infinitum and not become futile on the grounds that it does not attain the end), clearly this must be the chief good of all. Will not the knowledge of it as well, therefore, benefit [us] enormously, so that we might not, like archers who lack a mark to aim at, miss our target? As a consequence, we must try to determine of which science this is the object; surely [it is the object] of the most authoritative [of them], and politics appears to be of this sort.

1094a28–1095a2 2. For which are to exist...

After setting out to offer instruction concerning the human good, which can be found both in an individual person and in the city, he turns his attention to the virtues of character, since they cannot be found in a solitary existence, but rather with reference to groups of persons or a multitude (for these are properly the moral virtues. Indeed, what is magnificence, if one spends one’s time in the mountains? What is friendship, if one is isolated? And what is truth, if one converses with no one? Fasting, silence, temperance and despising everything are solitary virtues, which contribute nothing to human life and its end, unless in fact they exist for the sake of the virtues aimed at that end). He [i.e. Aristotle] tailors his teaching towards what is common [among citizens] || and defines the capacity that leads to the human end, namely happiness, as political. *For the good of the city is greater and more perfect, as he says, even though it is the same for the individual person and the city. And this sort of politics knows and will prescribe which of the sciences in the cities the [persons] within those cities will pursue and how worthy they are and up to what point to learn them.* Furthermore, he says, even *the most highly esteemed capacities, such as military leadership and the rest, are subordinate to that one [i.e. politics], so that a capacity of this sort may impose commands on the practical sciences and their ends will be led to its end. For the human good is the same for the individual and for the city.* For the end of the actions an individual personally performs is happiness, so that he ought to [be able to] account for every separate action when asked about them. And when he is not asked [about his actions] but simply contemplates them on his own, he repeats every day the maxim attributed to Phocylides:

Wherein did I transgress? What did I do? What duty did I not accomplish?

ἔστι καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος. «ἐν τούτῳ γάρ», φησὶν Εὐριπίδης, «πάσχουσιν αἱ πολλαὶ πόλεις, ὅταν τις χρηστός καὶ πρόθυμος ὦν μηδὲν φέρηται τῶν κακίωνων πλέον». τέως δέ γε καὶ εἰς τὸ λαβεῖν καὶ εἰς τὸ σώζειν τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως καὶ θειότερον, εἰ καὶ ἀγαπητὸν καὶ ἐνὶ προσὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον. ἢ γοῦν μέθοδος αὕτη.

Ἐπει δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν πᾶσι τὸ ἀκριβὲς ζητοῦμεν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην 5 (ἄλλως γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐν μολύβῳ τὸν ἀνδριάντα ἀπεργάσεται καὶ ἄλλως ἐν χρυσῷ καὶ ἐλέφαντι), ζητητέον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις κατὰ τὴν ὕλην τὸ ἀκριβὲς. ὕλη δὲ τούτων ἄνθρωποι τρεπτοὶ καὶ ἀλλοιωτοί, καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα, ἃ δοκοῦσι μὲν τινα ἀγαθὰ εἰς βλάβας δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποβαίνουσιν ὡς καὶ κακὰ δοκεῖν, ὥστε ἔδοξαν καὶ τὰ δίκαια νόμῳ μόνον καὶ μὴ φύσει καλὰ καὶ συμφέροντα. τοιαύτην δὴ τὴν πλάνην 10 ἔχουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ περὶ ὧν λέγομεν προβλημάτων τοιαυτὰ εἰσι καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν προτάσεων οὕτως ἔχουσι φύσεώς τε καὶ δόξης, πειρατέον ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὡς τύπῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς περὶ τοιούτων λέγοντας. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιτοπολύ, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ὡς ἐπιτοπολύ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα. πεπαιδευμένου δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, 15 ἐφόσον ἢ φύσις τοῦ πράγματος ἐγχωρεῖ. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ μαθηματικὸς πιθανολογήσεται (ῥήτορος γὰρ τοῦτο) οὔτε ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀποδείξει (ἐπιστήμονος γάρ). διὸ καὶ ταῦτα κρινεῖ καλῶς, ἃ γινώσκει καλῶς.

1095a2–1095b1 γ' (διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκειὸς ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος...)

Τὸν ἀκροατὴν τῶν ἠθικῶν ζητῶν (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἴδιον, μήπως 20 ματαίως πονοίη), ἀποδοκιμάζει μὴ μόνον τὸν κατὰ χρόνον νέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν νεαρὸν τὸ ἥθος· ταυτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν καὶ ὁμοιον ὅσον εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὴν τῶν τοιούτων μάθησιν δέχεσθαι. διατί; ὅτι, φησὶν, ἄπειρος ὁ τοιοῦτος τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πραγμάτων, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἠθικῶν λόγοι ἀπὸ τούτων ὡς ἀπὸ προτάσεων συμπεραίνουσιν. ὁ γοῦν μὴ οἷος τ' ὦν τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν οὐδὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα δέξεται. ἔτι δὲ καὶ 25 πρὸς τὰ πάθη ὀλισθηρῶς ἔχων, καταφρονήσει καὶ ἀνωφελῶς ἀκούσεται. πῶς δὲ ἀνωφελῶς; ὅτι εἰ ἦν τὸ τέλος τῶν τοιούτων γνώσις, τάχα ἂν καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι συνεχόμενος ἐδέχετο ταῦτα καὶ ἐγίνωσκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρᾶξις ἔστι τὸ τέλος, εἰς κενὸν ἀκούσεται [2r] καὶ εἰς κενὸν μαθήσεται· μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ εἰς ὄχλον μόνον ταῦτα δέξεται· ἥ ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἀκρατέσι (ἀκρατεῖς δὲ λέγονται οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι κρατεῖν τῶν παθῶν) οὐκ 30 ἔστιν ὄφελος τὸ μαθεῖν περὶ τούτων ἅπαξ κεκρατημένοις τοῖς πάθεσιν, οὔτως οὐδὲ

1–2 ἐν...πλέον] Eustr. In EN 3.10–12; cf. Eur. Hec. 306–308 3–4 λαβεῖν...ἐν] cf. Arist. EN 1094b7–10 4–5 ἢ...ὕλην] cf. Arist. EN 1094b10–12 6–7 ὁ...ἀκριβὲς] cf. Arist. EN 1094b12–14; cf. Asp. In EN 7.3–5 7 ζητητέον...ἀκριβὲς] cf. Arist. EN 1094b12–13 9–11 εἰς...ἀγαθὰ] cf. Arist. EN 1094b14–18 13 ἐνδείκνυσθαι...λέγοντας] cf. Arist. EN 1094b19–22 14 ὡς¹...συμπέρασμα] cf. Arist. EN 1094b21–22 15–18 πεπαιδευμένου...καλῶς²] cf. Arist. EN 1094b23–28; cf. Eustr. In EN 22.29–23.14 20 Τὸν ἀκροατὴν] cf. Arist. EN 1095a2 21–22 μὴ...ἥθος] cf. Arist. EN 1095a6–7 23–24 ἄπειρος...τούτων] cf. Arist. EN 1095a3–4 25–30 ἔτι...ἀκρατέσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1095a4–9 31–8,2 οὐδὲ...ὀρέξεις] cf. Arist. EN 1095a8–11

19 Im. addidi 28 ἐγίνωσκεν: litt. v¹ fere evanida

The city has the same end. “*For in this*”, says Euripides, “*many cities suffer, when a good man, despite his eagerness, gets no greater honour than his inferiors*”. In the meantime, both *in attaining and preserving it, the [good] of the state is more perfect and more divine*, even if such a thing, when present, is *desirable also for a single person*. This, then, is how the *investigation* stands.

Since *we do not seek precision in a similar manner in all subjects but in accord with the subject matter* (for *the creator* will make his statue out of lead in one way, but out of gold and ivory in a different way), *precision must be sought* in regard to these things as well, in accord with the subject matter. The subject matter of these things is human beings, who are liable to change and mutable, and human affairs, which appear to be goods of some sort, although *they result in harm to many people*, as a consequence of which they also appear to be evil, *with the result that just matters too come to seem fine and helpful by convention only and not by nature*. Human goods in fact *exhibit a fluctuation of this sort*. Since, therefore, matters are such in regard to the issues we have discussed, and in the light of the premises we are attempting to expose they depend in this manner on nature and judgment, we must try *to indicate the truth in outline in discussing such subjects*. For these matters are not necessary, but are *only for the most part*, and so also the *conclusion from such subjects is only for the most part*. It is the mark of an educated man to look for just that amount of exactitude with regard to these subjects and others that the nature of the matter allows. For neither will the mathematician use merely *probable conclusions* (for this is the concern of the rhetorician) nor will the rhetorician prove by demonstration (for this is the task of a scientist). As a consequence, *a man will judge well that which he knows well*.

1095a2–1095b1 3. (Hence a young man is not an appropriate student of politics...)

In his search for *the appropriate student* of ethics (for this is another characteristic of the philosopher, to avoid working in vain), he rejects as unfit *not only a man who is young in years*, but also *the one who is youthful in character*, since they are one and the same thing, to the extent that [neither] studiously accepts instruction in such matters. Why? Because, he says, such a person is *inexperienced with regard to daily affairs, while discussions of ethics draw conclusions from these matters* as if from premises. Thus the person who is unable to acquire the knowledge of first principles will not accept the conclusion either. *Furthermore*, since he is liable to yield *to his passions*, he will pay no attention and *will study to no purpose*. How [will it be] *to no purpose*? Because if *the end* of such subjects were *knowledge*, he would perhaps receive and know them, even though he is hindered by his passions. *But since the end aimed at is action, he will hear* [the lecture] and will learn *in a fruitless manner*; rather, he will receive these subjects as only the crowd would [i.e. as a matter of annoyance]. || *For just as for acraties* (those who are not strong enough to control [2r] their passions are called “acraties”) learning about these matters is no help once

τούτους ἢ γνώσις ὀνήσει ἀκρατῶς τῶν παθῶν ἔχοντας. τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον ποιουμένοις τὰς ὀρέξεις (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ λογικὸν ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ οὐ μόνον ἄλογον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς ἔλεγε) καὶ μὴ μόνον κινουῦσι τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν κινουμένοις οὕτως ἐλλόγως ἀλλὰ καὶ πράττουσι, πολυωφελεὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ μάθημα.

Ἐπει οὖν οὕτω πεπροομιάσται, λέγομεν ἐξαρχῆς. ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνώσις (περιλαμβάνει δὲ διὰ τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν μέθοδον) καὶ πᾶσα προαίρεσις (δι' ἧς καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν περιλαμβάνει) ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται, ποῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐπὲρ ἢ πολιτικῆ—προαίρεσις τις οὕσα καὶ πρᾶξις—ἐφίεται, ὅπερ ἄρα καὶ ἔστιν ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθόν; λέγουσι δὲ τοῦτο πάντες εὐδαιμονίαν, καὶ οἱ τυχόντες καὶ οἱ σοφοί, καὶ ὅσον μὲν κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα συμφωνοῦσιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν. καὶ λοιπὸν οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδένα τῶν ἐν κακουχίαις εὐδαιμόνων καὶ ἀγαθῶν μακαρίζουσιν. περὶ γὰρ δὲ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ πλοῦτον, οἱ δὲ τιμὴν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ταύτην τιθέμενοι. ἔξεστι δέ, λέγω, καὶ εὖ ζῆν καὶ εὖ πράττειν καὶ λυπουμενούς καὶ πενομένους καὶ μὴ τιμὴν ἔχοντας, ἀγαθῶς καὶ ὡς δεῖ διάγοντας· μᾶλλον δέ, ἴν' ἀκριβῶς εἴποιμι, οὐδὲ λύπη τῶν τοιούτων ἄπτεται αἰεὶ χαιρόντων κατὰ τὸ «πάντοτε χαίρετε»· εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἀποβλέψας εἶπε τὸν λόγον ὁ λέξας. οὕτω γοῦν ἀλλήλοις ἀμφισβητοῦσι περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ὥστε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὐκ ἀλλήλοις μόνον διαφέρονται· πολλάκις γάρ, φησί, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἄλλο τι καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς τὸ συμπίπτον τὸ εὖ πράττειν ἀπεφήνατο. Πλάτων δὲ παρὰ τὰ καθέκαστα τὴν ιδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τίθησι. πάντα μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν μάταιον, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς ἐναργεστέρας δόξας ἢ καὶ δοκούσας ἔχειν λόγον τινὰ ἐξετάζειν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ τῆ φύσει πρότερα ἀσαφέστερα τὰ δὲ ἡμῖν σύντροφα μᾶλλον γνωριμώτερα, ἔστι δὲ ἡ ὁδὸς τῆς μαθήσεως ἀπὸ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων. καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει περὶ τούτων ἐκ τίνων ἀρκτέον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι διαπορῶν ἐκλέγει τὸ γνωριμώτερον.

1095b2–1095b26 δ' (ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων...)

Ἀρχὴ μὲν ἀποδείξεως τὰ γνωριμώτερα, εἰ μὲν τῆ φύσει τοῦ διότι (αἷτια γὰρ τὰ καθόλου τῶν κατὰ μέρος· ὥσπερ τῆς ὑπάρξεως, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως· ἢ δὲ τοῦ διότι ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν αἰτίων τὰ αἰτιατὰ ἀποδείκνυσιν), εἰ δὲ ἡμῖν γνωριμωτέρα εἰσιν ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἀπόδειξις γίνεται· ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκλείψεων τὸ κυκλοτερές τῆς σελήνης καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ στίλβειν τὸ ἐγγὺς εἶναι τοὺς πλανήτας, τοῦ ὅτι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ

2–3 ἔστι...ἔλεγε] cf. Arist. De an. 432b3–4 3 καὶ...κινουμένοις] cf. Arist. De an. 433b16–18
3–4 καὶ...μάθημα] cf. Arist. EN 1095a10–11 5 λέγομεν ἐξαρχῆς] cf. Arist. EN 1095a14
5–11 ἐπειδὴ...πράττειν] cf. Arist. EN 1095a14–20 12–13 ἀμφισβητοῦσιν...τιμὴν] cf. Arist. EN 1095a21–23 16 πάντοτε χαίρετε] Paul. Ep. Thess. 5, 16 17 ἀμφισβητοῦσι...εὐδαιμονίας] cf. Arist. EN 1095a20–21 20–21 πάντα...ἐξετάζειν] cf. Arist. EN 1095a28–30 22–24 ἔστι...γνωριμώτερον] cf. Arist. EN 1095a32–1095b2 30–10,1 ἀπὸ...ἀλλήλα] cf. Arist. Post. An. 78a26–30; cf. Eustr. In EN 31.32–32.5

5 πεπροομιά[σται]: lac. supplevi ex E 12 δὲ s.l. 25 Im. addidi

they have been overpowered by their passions, likewise *knowledge will bring no profit to persons* who lack control over their passions. *But for those who make their desires accord with reason* (for there is a rational faculty of desire and not only a non-rational one, as he stated in his work “On the Soul”) and do not merely feel the desire, or rather who are stirred in accord with the desire in a rational way and *at the same time also act rationally, learning would be of great benefit.*

Now that a preface of this sort has been offered, *we start from the beginning.* Since all knowledge (he also includes art and inquiry in the term “knowledge”) and every choice (in which he also includes action) *aims at some good*, what kind of the good is the one at which politics—being a choice and action—aims, which is also the highest good achievable by action? Everyone says that this is *happiness*, both average people and the wise, and in so far as *they agree on its name, they assume that to live well and fare well is to be happy.* And furthermore, such persons do not deem happy anyone who seems prosperous and good but is in a miserable situation. For *with regard to living well and faring well, some argue for pleasure, others wealth, and others honour, considering this to be happiness.* But it is possible, I say, to both live well and fare well while in grief and poor and lacking honour, so long as one is leading one’s life admirably and as one must. Or rather, in order that I might speak accurately, no distress affects persons of the sort who are always rejoicing in accord with the saying “Rejoice at all times!” For this is what the man who pronounced these words [i.e. Paul] had in mind. Thus, then, they *dispute* with one another concerning [the nature of] *happiness*, so that they are in dispute with themselves as well as one another. For [Aristotle] says that *often the same man* declares faring well to be *one thing* and then *another thing*, depending on the circumstances. But Plato sets the form of the good in contrast to the particularities [i.e. specific circumstances]. Now *to scrutinise everything closely is fruitless, but it is sufficient* to examine the most prominent *opinions* or even *those that seem to have some justification.* And since the things that are prior by nature are the most obscure, while those familiar to us are better known, *the road to knowledge begins from what is better known.* Even *Plato was perplexed* as to where one *should begin* in regard to these issues, and he himself [i.e. Aristotle] in the present case, being at a loss, chooses that which is more familiar.

1095b2–1095b26 4. (For we must begin with what is known...)

The starting point of proof is things that are better known, whether [they are better known] due to the nature of their cause (for universals are the causes of particulars, and what is true of our existence holds also for the proof; the proof of cause shows what is produced on the basis of its cause) or whether the things from which proof occurs are better known to us; just as the circular shape of the moon [is proved] from eclipses, and the proximity of the planets from their failure to twinkle, the causes of

αίτιατοῦ τὰ αἴτια δείκνυσιν· καὶ ταῦτα γίνεται ἐπὶ τῶν ἀντιστροφόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα, αἰτίου τε καὶ αἰτιατοῦ.

Ἐπεὶ γοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐκ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων ἐπικρίνει τὴν δεῖξιν τῶν λόγων (ἡμῖν δὲ μᾶλλον γνωρίμοι τῶν ἕξεων οἱ τὰς ἕξεις ἔχοντες) καὶ διαταῦτα τὸν *περὶ τούτων ἀκουσόμενον καλῶς ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἄγεσθαι* ἐπικρίνει, τοῦ ὅτι γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο *ικανῶς, οὐ προσδεήσει*, φησί, *τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἀκροατῆς, ἐπεὶ οὐ χάριν γνώσεως ἀκούσεται ἀλλὰ πράξεως, ἀρχὴν ἂν ῥαδίως λάβοι ἢ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου.* || *ᾧ δὲ μῆδέτερον τούτων ἔσται, τοῦ Ἡσιόδου ἀκούσεται ἀχρεῖος ὢν.* 5

Ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅθεν ἐξέβημεν λέγωμεν, ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ παραλλήλου ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν καθολικὸν ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνουσι. βλέποντες γὰρ τοὺς βίους διαφόρους, διαφορῶς καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀπεφάναντο. *τρεῖς δὲ οἱ βίοι· ὁ ἀπολαυστικός ὁ κατὰ Σαρδανάπαλον (καὶ οἱ τοῦτον αἰρούμενοι τυγχάνουσι λόγου καὶ τιμῆς διὰ τὸ ὁμοιοπαθεῖν τισι τῶν ἐξουσιαίς) καὶ ὁ πολιτικός καὶ ὁ θεωρητικός.* κατὰ γοῦν τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν, ὃς καὶ ἐμπαθῆς λέγεται, τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος τίθενται. φέρεται γὰρ ἐπιγραφὴ ἐν τῷ τάφῳ τοῦ Σαρδαναπάλου· 10

*Εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι θνητὸς ἔφυς, σὸν θυμὸν ἄεξε,
τερπόμενος θαλίαισι· θανόντι τοι οὔτις ὄνησις.
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σποδὸς εἰμι, Νίνου μεγάλης βασιλεύσας.
κεῖν' ἔχων, ὅσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ σὺν ἔρωτι
τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια πάντα λέλυνται.* 20

κατὰ δὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν τὴν τιμὴν, ὅπερ καὶ ἀναιρεῖ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον, ἢ δὲ τιμὴ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσιν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τιμωμένοις.

1095b26–1096a28 ε' (ἔτι δ' εὐόκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν...)

Περὶ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ ἄλλως ἐπιχειρεῖ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη τὸ τέλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου βίου· διώκουσι γὰρ, φησί, *τὴν τιμὴν, ἵνα πιστεῦσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι*· διὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν φρονιμωτέρων θέλουσι *τιμᾶσθαι*, ὡς ἀρίστως διακρινόντων. ἐπεὶ γοῦν διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τιμὴν αἰροῦνται, εἴη ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τέλος, ἧς χάριν καὶ ἡ τιμὴ ζητεῖται. διατὶ δὲ οὐχ ὑφ' αὐτῶν πιστεύειν ἔχουσιν ὅτι ἀρεταίνουσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἄλλων 30

3–9 Ἐπεὶ...ὢν] cf. Arist. EN 1095b3–13 10–15 Ἡμεῖς...θεωρητικός] cf. Arist. EN 1095b14–22 13–16 τρεῖς...τίθενται] cf. Georg. Pachym. Paraphr. In EN 7.6–12 18–22 Εὖ...λέλυνται] cf. Choer., fragm. 335, 1–5 (Lloyd-Jones et Parsons 155) 24 τὸ...τιμωμένοις] cf. Arist. EN 1095b24–26; cf. [Heliod.] In EN 7.35–36 27–28 διώκουσι...διακρινόντων] cf. Arist. EN 1095b26–28 28–29 ἐπεὶ...τέλος] cf. Arist. EN 1095b29–31

5 ἤθεσιν M (cum L^b M^b Asp. In EN) : ἔθεσιν Arist. vulg. (EN 1095b4) 25 Im. addidi

reason are apparent from what is produced. These things occur in reciprocal relation to each other, cause and effect.

Since, therefore, here as well he determines the mode of proof of his arguments *from what is evident to us* (since those who possess the dispositions are better known to us than the dispositions as such) and on this account he determines *that the one who is to listen [to discussions] concerning these matters must be well educated in his qualities of character*, the syllogism of reason occurs. *And if this be sufficiently ascertained, there will be no need also [to know]*, he says, *the cause*. Such a pupil, since he will attend lectures for the sake not of knowledge but of action, *can easily get a starting-point* either from himself or from elsewhere. || *But as for the man who* [2v] *cannot get either of these since he is in a terrible state, he will listen to the words of Hesiod.*

Hence let us resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed, [where we said] that *the good and happiness* are parallel to one another or that [people] *not unreasonably suspect on the basis of their [own] lives* that the good is universal and that the human good is happiness. For seeing that there are different lifestyles, they also offer various opinions as to the end. There are *three lifestyles: the life of pleasure*, which was led by *Sardanapalus* (those who choose this succeed in gaining some renown and honour because they have experiences similar to those of people who occupy high positions) *and the political life and the contemplative life*. In the life of luxury, therefore, which is also called the life subject to passions, they make pleasure their end. For the inscription on the tomb of Sardanapalus runs:

*Knowing well that you were born mortal, feed your soul,
delighting in banquets; after you are dead, nothing will do you any good.
For I too am dust, who once ruled great Nineveh.
What I have is what I ate, my insolent behaviour, and the pleasures
I got in love; but all the many other happy things are gone.*

And in the political life, [they make] honour [their end], something [Aristotle] refutes by means of the deductive argument in the second figure; for *the good is something of one's own*, whereas honour [belongs] *to those who bestow it, not those who receive it*.

1095b26–1096a28 5. (Still they seem to pursue honour...)

With regard to honour he attempts to prove in another way that this is not the end of human life. For *they pursue honour*, he says, *in order to have confidence that they themselves are good*. For this reason, they wish *to be honoured by men of greater practical wisdom*, because the latter offer the best judgments. Since, then, they choose honour for the sake of virtue, *virtue would be even more the end [of the political life than honour]*, being that for the sake of which honour in fact is sought. Why are they unable to believe on their own behalf that they are virtuous, but rely on other people who bestow honour? Is it because everyone is self-centred that everything

τῶν τιμώντων; ἢ διὰ τὸ φιλαύτους εἶναι πάντας καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον πᾶν ὑποπτεύεται; ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ καὶ ταύτην ἀτελεῖ εἶναι ἐν τῷ καθεῦδεν τὸν ἔχοντα ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν οὐ κατὰ χρόνον τινὰ ἀλλὰ διὰ βίου ἢ κακοπαθεῖν. τὸν γοῦν τοιοῦτον τίς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειε, φησίν, εἰ μὴ φυλάττοι θέσιν παράδοξον, ὡς ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα κινοῦνται καὶ Ζήνων ὅτι πάντα ἀκίνητα; εἰπὼν τοίνυν περὶ 5 τῶν δύο βίων, λέγει καὶ περὶ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ, ὃς καὶ ἀπαθὴς λέγεται, τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ὄντος μετριοπαθοῦς, ὡς ἐμπαθοῦς τοῦ ἀπολαυστικοῦ. ἀναβάλλεται δὲ τὴν περὶ τούτου σκέψιν, ὅτι πλατύτερον περὶ τούτου διαλήψεται καὶ ἐκ τούτου θηρεῦσει τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τέλος.

Μέμνηται δὲ καὶ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πλοῦτον εἶπέ τισι νομιζόμενον τὴν 10 εὐδαιμονίαν (ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ οὗτος βίαιος, πᾶν δὲ βίαιον ἀηδὲς καὶ οὐ προσῆκον τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ) καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ καθ' αὐτὸ ὁ πλοῦτος ἀγαθόν, χρησίμων δὲ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ καὶ μάλλον τὰ προρρηθέντα δόξειεν ἂν τέλη ἢ ὁ πλοῦτος, δηλονότι ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαπᾶται καὶ ἡ τιμὴ, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ γε τοῖς πολλοῖς. τινὲς γὰρ ὀρέγονται τῆς περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τιμῆς καὶ οὐ μέλει αὐτοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς, 15 τυράννοις οὔσι καὶ βιαίοις· οἱ δὲ καὶ τοὺς μὴ τιμῶντας αὐτοὺς κολάζουσιν, οἷς εἰ ἔμελεν ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ δοκεῖν ἀρεταίνειν, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως ἐκόλαζον.

[3r] || Ἐντεῦθεν περὶ τοῦ καθόλου ἀγαθοῦ βούλεται διδάσκειν, ὃ ἐστὶν ἡ ἰδέα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δυσάντη δὲ νομίζει τὴν ζήτησιν διὰ τὸ φίλους εἶναι τοὺς εἰπόντας τὰς ἰδέας, 20 καὶ ἔστιν ὁ Πλάτων. τέως δὲ πρέπει, φησί, καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναρεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ μόνον τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ταῦτα φιλοσόφους ὄντας τοὺς τέλος ἔχοντας τῆς αὐτῶν θεωρίας τὴν ἀληθειαν, ἣν δὴ καὶ ὄσιον προτιμᾶν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς φίλους. λοιπὸν ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς δόξης ἐκείνων οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ ἰδέαν λέγειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον οὐκ ἐτίθουν ἰδέας, ὅθεν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐτίθουν ἰδέαν, μᾶλλον 25 δὲ ἀριθμούς· τὰς ἰδέας ἔλεγον. εὐρίσκεται δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις· αὐταὶ ἔχουσι τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον. ἢ γὰρ οὐσία πρῶτον ὄν, πρὸς ἣν τὰ λοιπὰ ἀναφέρεται, ἃ δὴ καὶ παραφυάσι τοῦ ὄντος εὐόκασι· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιχείρημα ἐκ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὕστερου. ἄλλως τε δὲ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁμώνυμόν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ διατοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, πῶς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐν καὶ κοινόν;

2–4 ταύτην...παράδοξον] cf. Arist. EN 1095b31–1096a2 4–5 ὡς...κινοῦνται] Heracl. test. 6 DK 5 Ζήνων...ἀκίνητα] Zen. test. 15, 14–15 DK; cf. Eustr. In EN 37.30 5–7 εἰπὼν...ἀπολαυστικοῦ] cf. Eustr. In EN 34.18–20 5–8 εἰπὼν...διαλήψεται] cf. Arist. EN 1096a4–5 10–14 Μέμνηται...τιμῆ] cf. Arist. EN 1096a5–9; Asp. In EN 10.32–11.4 18–22 Ἐντεῦθεν...φίλους] cf. Arist. EN 1096a11–17 18–20 ὄ...Πλάτων] cf. Pl. Resp. 505a2 sqq 22–25 λοιπὸν...ἔλεγον] cf. Arist. EN 1096a17–19; cf. Arist. Metaph. 1073a17–22 25 εὐρίσκεται...κατηγορίας] cf. Arist. EN 1096a28–29 26–27 ἢ...εὐόκασι] cf. Arist. EN 1096a21–22 29 πῶς...κοινόν] cf. Arist. EN 1096a27–28

personal is looked upon with suspicion? But that virtue is not the end is also apparent from the fact that *this is unaccomplished* while *its bearer is asleep or inactive* not only for a limited period of time but *throughout life*, or while *he is suffering trouble*. Who *would call* [such a person] *happy*, he says, *unless one was holding a paradoxical thesis*, as Heraclitus [who said] that everything changes and Zeno [who stated] that everything is unchanged? Accordingly, after discussing the two [other] lifestyles, he also discusses the contemplative life, which is also described as passion-free, with the political life being one of moderate passions, just as the life of pleasure is subject to passions. He nonetheless delays his *consideration* of the contemplative life, because he will handle this in greater detail and will seek the human end from this [kind of life].

He also mentions the *moneymaker's [life]*, since he stated that happiness is considered by some to be *wealth* (this [life] is also *violent* [i.e. not natural, forced on him], and everything that is violent is distasteful and inappropriate to happiness) and that *wealth is not a good* in itself, but *merely something useful for the sake of another goal*. For this reason, the things mentioned previously—that is to say, pleasure and honour—might be considered *ends* more than wealth might. For pleasure and honour *are both valued for their own sake*, if not by everyone at any rate by many. For some people yearn for the [type of] honour that deals with everything else [i.e. external goods] and do not care about virtue, since they are tyrants and violent. They in fact punish those who fail to honour them, whom they would not punish in this manner if they [i.e. the people who yearn for honour] were interested in virtue and in appearing to be virtuous.

|| Next he wishes to offer instruction concerning *the universal good*, which is the [3r] basic form of good things, but he holds that the *inquiry is made uphill* [or: *is unwelcome*] *because it was his friends* who discussed the forms, which is Plato. But it is at the same time fitting, he says, *to destroy even what is one's own for the purpose of saving only the truth*, and that *because we are philosophers* who possess, as the end of contemplation of these matters, *truth*, which *piety* in fact *requires us to honour first* even before our *friends*. Furthermore, *on the basis of this opinion of theirs* it is not possible to speak of a form of the good. For those men [i.e. Plato and his philosophical followers] *did not set up forms [of classes] that contain the notions of prior and posterior* [i.e. Aristotle's categories], *for which reason they also did not establish a form of number in general*, but rather spoke of forms as numbers. But the good is found *in all the categories*; these include the prior and the posterior. For *substance is the first existent thing* to which the rest of things refer, and these things *resemble offshoots of what is*; this is the dialectical proof from the prior and posterior. And put differently, since what exists has the same name [but different definitions], and hence the good too [has the same name and different senses], how *could the good be one and shared in these cases?*

1096a29–1096b20 στ' ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν...)

Ἐνδόξως καὶ σοφιστικῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ ἄλλως ὅτι οὐ δύναται εἶναι τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν, μία καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. χρωμάτων γὰρ καὶ χυμῶν φέρε μία ιδέα, μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἢ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ οὐσιῶν, ὅτι οὐσιῶν ιδέας ἐτίθουν οἱ τιθέντες ιδέας, ἀνθρώπων πάντων ἢ δελφίνων μία ιδέα, μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη. εἰ ἦσαν πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ὑπὸ μίαν ιδέαν, ἔδει εἶναι καὶ ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην. νῦν δέ, ἴν' ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον δεικνύη τις, οὐδὲ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη, καθὼς ἐπαγωγικῶς δείκνυσιν. ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἀπορίαν ἔνδοξον τίθησι περὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καθόλου—τί δήποτε ἐσεῖται καθόλου, εἴπερ ὁ αὐτὸς ὀρισμὸς ἐστὶν τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τῶν καθέκαστα;—καὶ μεταφέρει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄλλος ὁ λόγος τοῦ αὐλοῦ καὶ ἄλλος τοῦ ἐνύλου.

Εἰ δέ τις, φησὶν, αἰδίων εἴποι τὴν ιδέαν καὶ ἐκ τούτου διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστον ἀποδείξει, τίθησι τὸ λευκόν, ὅτι οὐ λευκότερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐφημέρου τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον. πιθανώτερον δὲ λέγουσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἔν. δύο γὰρ ἐποίουν συστοιχίας, μίαν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἄλλην κακῶν. τιθέντες τοίνυν τὸ ἐν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ, παριστῶσι τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ τελειωτικὴν τινα καὶ σωτήριον. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν τούτῳ τελειοῦται καὶ ἀγαθύνεται καὶ τηρεῖται, ἐν τῷ μένειν ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἀσκέδαστον· σκεδασθὲν δὲ καὶ διαιρεθὲν οἴχεται καὶ ἀπόλλυται. οἰκειότερον γοῦν τοῦτο τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καθόλου τίθεσθαι αὐτὸ καὶ ιδέαν.

3 ἐπεὶ...ἐπιστήμη] cf. Arist. EN 1096a29–30 6–7 νῦν...ἐπιστήμη] cf. Arist. EN 1096a31–32
12–15 Εἰ...ἐν] cf. Arist. EN 1096b3–6; cf. Eustr. In EN 50.3–8 16–20 τὸ...ιδέαν] cf. Eustr. In EN 51.10–15

1 Im. addidi 13 καθέκαστον scripsi : καθέκαστα M 14 πολυχρονιώτερον M (cum L^b Γ) : πολυχρόνιον Arist. vulg. (EN 1096b4) | Πυθαγόρειοι scripsi : Πυθαγόριοι M

1096a29–1096b20 6. (Further, since in relation to the things that correspond to a single basic form...)

He attempts [to prove this] plausibly and via argument also in another way, [by claiming] that it is impossible for the common [i.e. universal] good to exist. And that is *because in relation to things corresponding to a single form, knowledge is also of single kind*. For suppose there is one form for the colours and for the flavours, and also a single kind of knowledge [of them], then more so in the case of substance, because those who introduced forms have set out forms of substance. There is one form of all men or dolphins, and there is a single knowledge [of them]. If all goods were subject to one form, they would necessarily also be subject to a single kind of knowledge. *But as it is*, in order that one might demonstrate this from the greater degree, there is not even the same kind of knowledge *of things that fall under one category*, as he shows inductively. Therefore he sets out a notable difficulty with regard to the absolute universal—what in the world will the universal be, if the same definition holds for the universal and for the particulars?—and he transfers this argument to the good. For it is possible to say in response to these points that there is one account for what is immaterial and another for what is material.

But if someone, he says, were to say that the form is *eternal* and were to demonstrate from this the difference between the thing itself and the particular, he sets out [in reply the example of] “white”, [specifically] that *what is [white and] very long-lasting is not whiter than what is [white and] short-lived*. *But the Pythagoreans say something more persuasive about the good when they place the One in their column of goods*. For they constructed two columns, one of goods and the other of evils. Placing *the One in their column of goods*, then, *they compare its nature to that which perfects and saves*. *For each of the principles is perfected, becomes good and is preserved only when it remains undispersed in the One*. *But if it is dispersed and divided, it disappears and is destroyed*. *This is more closely associated with the good rather than making this a form of the universal*.

Diagramma i

ἀγαθόν		κακόν
πέρας		ἄπειρον
περιττόν		ἄρτιον
ἔν		πλήθος
δεξιόν		ἀριστερόν
ἄρρεν		θῆλυ
ἡρεμοῦν		κινούμενον
εὐθύ		καμπύλον
φῶς		σκότος
τετράγωνον		ἐτερόμηκες
	συστοιχίαι τῶν ἀρχῶν δύο	

cf. Arist. Metaph. 986a23–26; cf. Arist. EN 1096b5–6; cf. Asp. In EN 13.11–17; cf. Eustr. In EN 50.35–51.1; cf. [Heliod.] In EN 9.39–10.3

[3v] Ἄκριβολογεῖται δὲ ἐπιπλέον περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅθεν εὐρήσει πρόφασιν τοῦ κατεπιχειρῆσαι καὶ εἰσέτι τῆς περὶ τῶν ιδεῶν ὑπολήψεως. ἐπιμέμφεται γοῦν ἑαυτῷ, ὡς συγκεχυμένως περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰπόντι. κατὰ γὰρ δύο τρόπους λεγομένου τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αὐτὸς περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον ἀπλῶς ἐποίητο καὶ τὴν ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνεσκεύαζεν. εἰσὶ γὰρ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτὰ ὡς φυλακτικὰ ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων. ποῖα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ποῖα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὸς ἐπιφέρει. τὰ γοῦν ὠφέλιμα χωρίσαντες (ἄπερ εἰσὶ τὰ χάριν ἄλλων· τὰ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ τελειωτικά), ζητήσωμεν εἰ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ μόνον ὑπὸ μίαν ιδέα ἀνάγονται. λέγων δὲ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ οὐ φρόνησιν ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄραν τὰς ἐνεργείας παρὰ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ ἡδονάς—τινάς τὰς τῶν καλῶν καὶ τινὰς τὰς τῶν ἔχεφρόνων—ἐπιφέρει, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ δὴ ταῦτα καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ μὴ δ' ἄλλο μηδὲν πλὴν ἢ ιδέα, μάταιον καὶ οὕτως τὸ εἶδος. τὸ γὰρ εἶδος τῶν καθέκαστα θέλει εἶναι αἴτιον, τῶν οἷα αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν, εἰ μὴ ἄλλα εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτὰ πλὴν ἢ ιδέα. εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλα ἐνταῦθα, τὸν αὐτὸν δέξεται τὰ πάντα λόγον· τούτῳ πάλιν τὸ καθόλου μάταιον.

1096b26–1097a22 ζ (ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται;...)

Ἐπεὶ γοῦν συνωνυμία τις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ μίαν ἴσως ἀνάγεσθαι ιδέα, ζητεῖ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας τοὺς τρόπους, καθ' οὓς ταῦτα ῥηθήσεται. καὶ τέως τὰ ἐκ

1–6 ...ἐναντίων] cf. Eustr. In EN 51.20–27 3 κατὰ...ἀγαθοῦ²] cf. Arist. EN 1096b13 5 εἰσὶ...αὐτὰ] cf. Arist. EN 1096b14 5–6 φυλακτικὰ...ἐναντίων] cf. Arist. EN 1096b11–12 6–8 τὰ...ἀνάγονται] cf. Arist. EN 1096b14–16 8–9 οὐ...ὄραν] cf. Arist. EN 1096b17 11 μὴ...εἶδος¹] cf. Arist. EN 1096b19–20 16–18,1 Ἐπεὶ...ἀποσκευάζεται] cf. Arist. EN 1096b25–27

1 Ἄκριβολογεῖται: litt. ἀ- fere evanida 15 lm. addidi 17 οὓς scripsi : ὄν M

Diagram i

good		bad
limited		unlimited
odd	Two columns of [parallel] principles	even
one		plurality
right		left
male		female
resting		moving
straight		curved
light		darkness
square		oblong

|| *He accurately expands on his views concerning the good even further, for which* [3v] *reason he will devise a pretext to endeavour to discuss in yet greater detail his notion concerning the forms. And indeed he casts blame upon himself, as speaking in a confused way about the good. For while the good is spoken of in two ways, he himself simply took account of this [fact] and did away with the form of the good. For there are some things that are good in accord with themselves, while others [are good] by reason of preserving, producing or preventing their opposites. He himself infers what sort the one and the other are. And accordingly let us distinguish between useful things (which are those that happen for the sake of other [goods]; for things [good] in themselves are perfective) and let us examine whether the things that are only good in accord with themselves fall under a single form. By saying that the things that are good in accord with themselves are not understanding but the act of understanding, he applies to seeing as well the activities rather than their dispositions and pleasures—some those pertaining to noble men and some those pertaining to the prudent— because if these were not goods in accord with themselves, nor anything other than the form, the species would in this way be empty. For the form is naturally disposed to be a cause of the particulars, of things just like it; and this is so, if there are no other things in accord with themselves except the form. But if there are also other things in this case, everything will hold to the same account; and again the universal in this case is empty.*

1096b26–1097a22 7. (But how, then, is [good] spoken of?...)

Since, therefore, there is no synonymy among the good [things] when they might possibly be subsumed under a single form, he inquires into the style of homonymy, according to which they will have the same name. And to begin with he does away

τύχης τινὸς ὁμώνυμα ἀποσκευάζεται. ταῦτα δὲ εἰσιν ἅπερ οὐκ ἔχουσι τινὰ πραγματικὴν κοινωνίαν, εἰ μὴ μόνον εἰς σαφηνισμόν ὄνομα, ὡς ἐλαία τὸ δένδρον καὶ τὸ παίγνιον. τοὺς δὲ ἑτέρους δύο, τὸν τε ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν, καὶ τὸν κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ἐγκρίνει μᾶλλον. καὶ τέως τὸν ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν· πάντα γὰρ πρὸς ἓν ἀφορῶσι, τὸ τέλειον καὶ καλόν. ἔκτοτε δὲ μᾶλλον, φησί, τὸν κατ' ἀναλογίαν· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ 5
πραγματικὴν τινὰ κοινωνίαν ἔχουσι· ἰατρικὸν γὰρ βιβλίον καὶ φάρμακον· καὶ ὁ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, τοῦτο νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, ἢ καὶ ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ. ἢ γὰρ ἀναλογία συγγένειάν τινὰ τούτοις παρέχει. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον, φησί· τῆς γὰρ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ταῦτα πραγματείας, ὡς ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ Δ λέγει περὶ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς 10
ιδέας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἓν τε τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Μ καὶ τῷ Ν.

Τέως δὲ γε εἰ καὶ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἰδέα, φησί δῆλλον ὡς οὔτε πρακτὸν ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο οὔτε κητὸν, ἦγουν οὐ διὰ πράξεως κτώμενον. πότε γὰρ τὴν ἰδέαν τις κτήσεται; ἡμεῖς δὲ τοιοῦτον πρακτὸν καὶ κητὸν ἀγαθὸν ζητοῦμεν. τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ὅτι χρήσιμος ἢ τούτου γνώσις· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς παράδειγμα πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπομεν ἂν τρόπον ζωγράφων καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνομεν. εἴτα λύει τὴν ἔνστασιν 15
ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν, πλήν ἐπεὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἔχει ἢ ἐπιχειρήσις, λέγει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος, ὁ κατασκευάζων ὡς δέον ἔστι τὸ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἴνα καὶ περὶ τοῦ μερικοῦ ἐντεῦθεν εἰδότες ἐπιτυγχάνομεν, πιθανότητα ἔχει· καὶ φέρει τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τέχνας ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐνεχομένας. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι τοῦ κατ' αὐτὰς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐνδεῆς ζητεῖν ἔδει ζητεῖν τὴν τούτου 20
γνώσιν, ἀλλὰ παραλείπουσι. πάλιν δ' αὖθις τὸ τοιοῦτον βοήθημα παραλείπειν καὶ μὴ ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις· παραλείπτεα μὲν ἢ τοῦ καθόλου [4r] γνώσις, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις παραλιμπάνεται ἢ ἢ γνώσις τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ ζητητέα ἄλλως, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ ταύταις τὸ μὴ ζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἔνδοξον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐτέθη καὶ τὸ διαφωνεῖν. 25

Ἐκτοτε δὲ καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν τοῦτο λύει. πῶς γὰρ ὑφάντης ὠφελήθησεται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔχων, ὅπου γε καὶ ἰατρὸς τὴν μερικὴν ὑγίαν ζητεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον τὴν τοῦδε; πάλιν δὲ ἐπανελθὼν, ζητεῖ τί ποτὲ ἔστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ λέγει ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλειον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι καὶ τὸ σκοπιμώτατον, οὗ χάριν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ὡς ἔνεκα τούτου πράττονται. 30

1–7 ταῦτα...ὀφθαλμῷ] cf. Eustr. In EN 55.24–33 3–5 τοὺς...ἀναλογίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1096b27–28
6–7 καὶ²...ὀφθαλμῷ] cf. Arist. EN 1096b28–29 8 ἀλλὰ...ἀφετέον] cf. Arist. EN 1096b30
8–10 ἀλλὰ...N] cf. Eustr. In EN 56.12–16 11–12 Τέως...κτητόν] cf. Arist. EN 1096b32–34
13–14 ἡμεῖς...δόξειεν] cf. Arist. EN 1096b34–35 14–15 ὡς...ἐπιτυγχάνομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1097a1–3
15–19 εἴτα...ἔχει] cf. Arist. EN 1097a3–4 19–22 διὰ...εὐλογον] cf. Arist. EN 1097a5–8
26–28 πῶς...τοῦδε] cf. Arist. EN 1097a8–13 28–30 πάλιν...πράττονται] cf. Arist. EN 1097a15–22

7 ὄψις¹] ψυχῇ ex ὄψις perperam corr. M 11 δῆλλον sic M; servavi (vid. Editorial principles)
29 τέλειον M (cum M^b) : τέλος Arist. vulg. (EN 1097a21) et Eustr. In EN 60.13–14

with *things that bear the same name by mere chance*. These things are those that have no pragmatic connection, except if a name is used for purposes of specification, for example *elaia* the [olive] tree and the game. And he quite accepts the two other [modes of homonymy], [first] the one [*that holds that things are called good because they derive*] from one good and [contribute] to one, and [second] the one *by analogy*. And for the moment [he focuses on] the *from one good and to one*; for everything looks towards one thing, what is perfect and beautiful. But thereafter, he says, [he pays] *more* [attention to] the mode *by analogy*; for these things *have a pragmatic connection* indeed; for a [*medical*] book and a drug have to do with the *medical art*; and that which is *sight in the case of the body*, that is *intelligence in the case of the soul*, or even *sight in the case of the eye*. For the analogy gives these things a certain kinship. *But these questions should be set aside*, he says; because these topics are in the treatise the “Metaphysics”, since he speaks there *in Book Delta about much-debated subjects*, as also *about the form of the good and of other things in Books Beta and Mu and Nu*.

But meanwhile, *even if there is a good capable of independent existence and a form*, he says *it is clear that this is neither achievable nor attainable*, namely it cannot be attained by means of action. For when will anyone attain the form? *We are looking for a good of this sort that is achievable and attainable*. But *perhaps someone might think that knowledge of this is useful*; for we might look to that [i.e. the good itself] as towards a *model*, as painters do, and *we might have better chances of attaining it*. Then he refutes the objection from the [procedures of] the sciences and arts, except when the argument is plausible from both sides. He says even in these cases that *an argument of this type, which establishes that it is necessary to discover the universal in order that we might succeed in gaining knowledge of the particular from that source, has some plausibility*. And he brings forward [the procedures of] the sciences and arts that are implicated in both sides of the argument. For inasmuch as *they aim at the good* in accord with themselves and *seek what is lacking, knowledge of this* [i.e. the good itself] should *have been sought, but they leave this out*. Yet again, to omit a *resource of this sort and fail to look for it is not reasonable*, just as in those cases. Knowledge of the universal must be passed over, just as the knowledge of the particular good is passed over in the sciences, || and one must seek [it] in another way, [4r] because not seeking it even in the sciences is unreasonable. Because of the fixed nature of the opinions on both sides, disagreement was established in those cases as well.

Consequently, this plausibility is also refuted. For *how will a weaver be helped if he possesses [knowledge of] the form of the good itself*, when even a doctor seeks *health* in relation to particulars [i.e. rather than health as a whole] and *especially the [health] of this [particular] individual? But again returning [to the main subject], he seeks what then the good is and he states [that it is] one thing in one matter, another in another by analogy, but in every action and choice [it is] the final [end]*. For this is the ultimate aim, *for the sake of which everything else is done*, as if *on this account*.

1097a22–1097b13 ἢ (ὥστ' εἶ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος...)

Τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ τέλος πρακτῶν ἀγαθόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰ μὲν πλείω, τὰ τέλη τῆς αὐτῆς προαιρέσεως μεταβαίνων ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἀφικνεῖται καὶ τελικώτατον· εἰ δὲ ἔν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δὲ τὸ πρῶτον αἰρούμεθα διὰ τὸ ἔσχατον, καὶ εἰσὶ τὰ πρό τοῦ τέλους ὡς ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς 5 οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τὰ τέλη τέλεια. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄριστον, τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ τέλειον· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον τέλειον, ὥστε πολλῶν ὄντων τὸ τελειότερον ἄριστον. ὀρίζεται δὲ τὸ τελειότερον τὸ μόνως δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν τοῦ δ' ἕτερον κατὰ σύγκρισιν, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τελειότερον τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν αἰρετῶν αἰρετῶν δὲ καὶ διατοῦτο. τὸ τελειότερον καὶ πάντων ἔσχατον καὶ ἀπλῶς τέλειόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ δι' ἕτερον αἰρετὸν, 10 ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτό. τοιοῦτον δὲ εὐρηται ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα δι' αὐτήν καὶ οὐ δι' ἄλλο· οὐ γὰρ θέλομεν εὐδαιμονεῖν διὰ τι ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτό. θέλομεν δὲ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ νοεῖν τὸ συμφέρον καὶ ἀρεταίνειν καὶ δι' αὐτὰ μὲν, τέως δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. ταῦτα γὰρ συναγόμενα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποπληροῦσιν, οὕσαν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. δαίμονα γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὴν τύχην φασίν, οἱ δὲ τὸν νοῦν, 15 ὡς ὁ Πρόκλος τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὁ γοῦν ἔχων εὐ τοῦ νοῦς ἢ τῆς τύχης εὐδαίμων, εὐ δὲ τῆς τύχης καὶ τοῦ νοῦς ἔχει ὁ αὐτάρκως περὶ πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἔχων καὶ μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἐνδεής.

Τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ αὐτῷ μόνῳ περιγραφῆσεται· τί γὰρ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ γονεῖς καὶ φίλοι καὶ τέκνα καὶ πρόγονοι δυστυχοῦσιν ἢ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀκόλαστοί τινες ὄντες 20 καὶ ἀνουθέτητοι ἢ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένοι ὄντες τὰ μέλη εἴτε μὴν κατὰ τὰ ἐκτός [4v] πενόμενοι καὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι; ἐπειδὴ φύσει ἐστὶ πολιτικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ καὶ οὐ μονώτην τὸν βίον ἔχει, καὶ δεῖ συμπολιτευόμενον αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀγαθὰ φέρειν εἰς συγκρότησιν τῆς καθ' αὐτὸν εὐδαιμονίας. ἐς ὅσον δὲ πρόεισι τοῦτο, ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον προέρχεται καὶ κινδυνεύσῃ μηδένα εἶναι εὐδαίμονα, νῦν μὲν εἰπεῖν 25 ἀναβάλλεται· ἐρεῖ δὲ ἐν τῷ Κ', ὅτε περὶ εὐδαιμονίας λέγει. ὀρίζεται δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐταρκες.

1097b16–1098a12 (θ') (ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην...)

Οἰόμεθα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀνενδεῆ καὶ τελειοτάτην καὶ πάντων αἰρετωτέραν, μὴ συναριθμουμένην, δηλονότι τοῖς χάριν αὐτῆς γινομένοις, ἃ δὴ λέγομεν καὶ «ἐνεκά 30

2–3 Τῶν...τελικώτατον] cf. Arist. EN 1097a22–24 3–4 εἰ...ἀγαθόν] cf. Arist. EN 1097a28–29 4–6 ἐπεὶ...τέλεια] cf. Arist. EN 1097a25–28 7 τὸ¹...τέλειον] cf. Arist. EN 1097a28 7–9 ὥστε... αἰρετῶν¹] cf. Arist. EN 1097a30–34 7–9 ὀρίζεται...διατοῦτο] cf. Arist. EN 1097a30–32 10 καὶ²... αἰρετὸν] cf. Arist. EN 1097a32–34 11–12 τοιοῦτον...ἄλλο¹] cf. Arist. EN 1097a34–1097b1 12–14 θέλομεν²...εὐδαιμονίαν¹] cf. Arist. EN 1097b2–4 15–16 δαίμονα...ἐξηγούμενος] cf. Procl. In Plat. Alc. 292.14–293.6 17–19 ἔχει...μόνῳ] cf. Arist. EN 1097b8–9 19–20 εἴπερ...δυστυχοῦσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1097b9–10 19–23 γονεῖς...ἔχει] cf. Asp. In EN 16.10–15 22–23 ἐπειδὴ...ἔχει] cf. Arist. EN 1097b9–11 24–25 ἐς...ἄπειρον] cf. Arist. EN 1097b13 29–30 Οἰόμεθα... συναριθμουμένην] cf. Arist. EN 1097b15–18

1 Im. addidi 21 τὰ² scripsi : τὸ M 28 θ' addidi ex E | Im. addidi

1097a22–1097b13 8. (So that if there is an end for all practical undertakings...)

*The end of practical undertakings is a good achievable by actions, and if there are several [such ends], these are the ends of the choice itself. Thus the argument turns in its course and arrives at its concluding point, which is most connected with final causality. But if there is one [end], this would be the good being sought. Since the ends are evidently several, and we choose the first of these as being the concluding one, and there are also the things prior to the end [which we choose] as instruments, it is clear that not all ends are final. But since happiness is what is best, this would be the final [end]. For the best is final, so that although there are many [ends], the more final one is the best. And the more final is defined as that which is desirable only for itself rather than for something else by comparison; and what is never desirable as a means to anything else is more final than those things that are desirable for themselves and are also chosen on this account. The more final and the highest of all and absolutely final is the one that is not chosen on account of something else [i.e. as a means], but because of itself [i.e. as an end]. And happiness is found to be something of this sort: for we choose this for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; for we do not want to be happy for the sake of something else but for its own sake. And we wish to receive honour and pleasure, to understand what is profitable and to be virtuous for the sake of these goods themselves, but also for the sake of happiness. Because these things combined complete happiness, which is the human good. For some people say that a *daimōn* is good luck, others intelligence, as Proclus explains Socrates' *daimonion*. The happy person (*eudaimōn*) is the one who abounds in intelligence or in good luck, and a person who has good luck and intelligence is the one who is self-sufficient concerning all human affairs and lacks nothing at all.*

But this [i.e. self-sufficiency] will be defined as not [sufficient] for a solitary person by himself; for what is the good for him, if his parents, friends, children and ancestors are unfortunate, or if some of them are undisciplined and stubborn in their hearts, or, in terms of their bodies, have maimed limbs or, in terms of externalities, are poor and suffer dishonour? Since man is by nature a civic being || and does not lead an [4v] isolated life, it is also necessary for him, since he lives with others, to bring forward the goods arising from them in support of his individual happiness. He now delays the discussion of the degree to which this will extend, so that it will not go on to infinity, creating the danger of no one being happy. He will discuss [this issue] in Book 10, when he talks about happiness. He also defines self-sufficiency [there].

1097b16–1098a12 9. (Moreover, most desirable of all things...)

We think that happiness both lacks nothing and is the most final and desirable of all things, not something counted as one good among the rest, as is clear from the things that happen for the sake of happiness, which we also call “the things [that happen]

του». τὰ γὰρ τέλη οὐ συναριθμεῖται ἐκείνοις ὧν ἐστὶ τέλη· οὐ γὰρ συναριθμεῖται οἰκία τοίχοις καὶ ὀρόφοις καὶ τοῖς καθέκαστον (καὶ οὕτως ἔχει τὸ τέλειον καὶ αἰρετὸν ἢ καὶ ἐπαινετὸν μᾶλλον), ἀλλ' αὐτὴ μόνη ἢ οἰκία ἀνευδελῆς ἑαυτῇ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι παρά τινων. λέγει γὰρ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Τοπικῶν ὅτι οὐ συναριθμεῖται τοῖς περιέχουσι τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν. εἰ δέ γε, φησί, συναριθμηθή- 5
σεται αὕτη μετὰ τινος τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, τόσον ἐστὶν αὕτη αὐτάρκης καὶ ἀνευδελῆς, ὅτι μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν (ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἀγαθὰ ποδώκεια τυχὸν καὶ εὐτριχία καὶ εὐστάλεια σώματος) αἰρετωτέρα γίνεται. ἔστω γὰρ μετὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἐλάχιστον κατὰ πρόσθεσιν. τέλειον γὰρ καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτάρκες ἢ εὐδαιμονία, οὐχ ἀπλῶς πάντων καὶ τῶν τῆς θεωρίας ἀλλὰ μόνων τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος. 10

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄριστον ἢ εὐδαιμονία φαίνεται, φησί, ποθεῖται δὲ καὶ ἐναργέστερον λεχθῆναι τί ἐστὶ. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸν ὀρισμὸν αὐτῆς θηρώμεθα ὡς τέλους, πρὶν τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος εἰπεῖν (σκοπὸς γὰρ τὸ τέλος, καὶ ἀφορώντες πρὸς τοῦτο τᾶλλα πράττομεν), ζητοῦμεν ἐπιπλέον περὶ αὐτῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄριστον πάντων τῶν πρακτῶν ἐστὶ, ζητητέον τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τὸ εὖ ζητεῖται, οὕτω 15
καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων. τί γοῦν ἐστὶ; μὴ γὰρ τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως εἰσὶν ἔργα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔργον; ἀλλὰ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ, ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδός. ταῦτα γὰρ ἄψυχα μὲν ὄντα οὔτε ἔργα ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμωνύμως λέγονται, ὥσπερ λίθινοι αὐλοί, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς ἔλεγεν· ἔμψυχα δὲ ἔργα ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἄρα καὶ ὁ πᾶς ζῶν ἄνθρωπος. 20

Ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔργον ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῆν ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ φυτοῖς. ἐκβλητέον γοῦν τὸ ἰδίως προσὸν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ ἐπομένως μὴ αἰσθησίς ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ ἀλόγοις. λείπεται τοίνυν ἢ λογικὴ πράξις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὕτη διττὴ· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἐπιπειθῆς τῷ λόγῳ, εἰ καὶ μὴ λογικὴ ἐστὶν, ἦγουν τὸ οἰκοδομῆσαι· ἢ δὲ ὡς αὐτὴ γε οὕσα ἢ λογικὴ πράξις, οἷον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι. ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὕτη 25
διττῶς· ἢ μὲν καθ' ἑξὶν ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαίου, διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τὸ εὖ, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

[5r] || **1098a12–1098b3** ἰ (εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζώην τινα...)

Ζῆ καὶ τὰ φυτά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν, εἴτουν τὴν φυτικὴν, ψυχὴν· 30
ζῆ καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ βοῦς, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰσθησιν μόνην· ζῆ καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ κατ' ἐκείνας

2 καὶ³...αἰρετὸν] cf. Arist. EN 1097b19–20 4–5 οὐ...αὐτῶν] Alex. In Top. 247.8–9 5–9 εἰ...
πρόσθεσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1097b16–20 9–10 τέλειον...τέλος] cf. Arist. EN 1097b20–21
11–12 Ὅτι...ἐστὶ] cf. Arist. EN 1097b22–24 15 τὸ¹...ἀνθρώπου] Arist. EN 1097b24–25
15–17 ὥσπερ...ποδός] cf. Arist. EN 1097b25–32 18–19 ὥσπερ...ἔλεγεν] cf. Arist. PA 641a2; cf.
Arist. De an. 420b6–8 21 Ἀλλ'...φυτοῖς] cf. Arist. EN 1097b32–34 21–27 ἐκβλητέον...ἄλλων] cf.
Arist. EN 1097b34–1098a15 29–30 Ζῆ...μόνην] cf. Arist. EN 1097b33–1098a3; cf. [Helioid.] In EN
24.9–11

because of something". For the ends are not to be enumerated among the things whose ends they are: a house is not to be included in the count of its walls and thatch and of each of its individual elements (and this is what complete and desirable, or better praiseworthy, means), but only the house per se, lacking nothing in itself with respect to what it is and its desirability for certain people. For Alexander too says in the third book of the "Topics" that *the things contained are not to be counted among the things that contain them*. And if, he says, this [i.e. happiness] were to be counted together with any of the things that are prior to it, to such an extent is happiness self-sufficient and lacking in nothing, that *combined with the least of goods* (the least of goods [are] speed of foot perhaps, beautiful hair, and a nice appearance) becomes *more desirable*. For let this too alongside happiness be the least good *by addition*. For *happiness is complete* by itself *and self-sufficient*, and is *the end* not simply of all things and of issues relating to contemplation but only of *practical undertakings*.

Therefore because *happiness is patently the chief good*, he says, *a clearer account of what it is is also required*. And because we are eagerly pursuing a definition of it as an end, before speaking of the things that lead to the end (for the end is a goal, and by aiming at it we achieve other things), we seek more information about it [i.e. happiness]. And since it is the chief [good] of all practical undertakings, *the function of the human being* must be sought. *For just as* in other matters, *the efficiency of function* is sought, *so also* in this case. What is it then? For, is it the case that *a carpenter and a shoemaker have certain functions, while a human has no function*? But it is clear from his *parts, an eye, a hand, and a foot*, [that he must have a function]. For if these parts are inanimate, they have no function, but are referred to by the same name, like *flutes made of stone*, as he said in his "On the Soul"; whereas if they are animate and have a function, so then does the entire living human being.

Surely *life is a function of the human being, but this is shared with plants as well*. Thus *one must reject* this feature *peculiar* to plants and *next* [judge] that *sense-perception* is not the function of the human being, since *this too is shared* [in this case] *with non-rational beings*. Then *there remains rational action*. And this is two-fold: because one [element possesses reason] *in so far as it is obedient to reason*, even if it is not rational, for example the act of building; the other one in so far as it is itself rational action, such as the act of *reasoning*. This also has *two meanings*: the first is in accord with disposition, the second in accord with *activity*. And the *function of a human being* and of a *good human being is exactly the same*, but differs in respect to its *efficacy*, as also in the other instances.

|| 1098a12–1098b3 10. <If this is the case, we declare the human being's function [5r] to be a particular kind of life...>

Plants are also alive, but this involves *the nutritive* part of the soul *and the one that promotes growth*, namely the vegetative [part of the soul]. *A horse and an ox* are also alive, but *in accord with sense-perception* only. A human being is also alive in accord

τὰς δυνάμεις, ζῆ δὲ καὶ κατὰ ζωὴν τινα τὴν κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἥτις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ πρᾶξις οὐχ οἷα ἢ ἐκ φύσεως, ἀλλὰ μετὰ λόγου. εἰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ζωὴν ζῆ τις εὖ (καθὼς ἐτίθεμεν καὶ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀπλῶς κιθαριστοῦ καὶ τοῦ εὖ κιθαρίζοντος, ὅς ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος κιθαριστής), οὗτος εὐδαίμων, ἕκαστον δὲ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν κρίνεται ἀρετὴν. ἐὰν γοῦν ὄντως καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ παντός λόγου ἢ ἀπόδοσις, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐκ εἶπεν «ἐστίν», ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν παραστήσῃ τὸ ἐνεργητικὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας, «γίνεται», φησίν. εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, καθὼς ἄρα καὶ εἰσὶ, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις (αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἀρετὴ). οὐδεμία δὲ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ δίχα φρονήσεως, εἴπερ καὶ Σωκράτης πάσας ἀνεκορύφου εἰς μίαν, τὴν φρόνησιν. πλὴν δὲ οὐκ ἄρκει τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον καὶ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ, ὡς ἂν εἰ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐν χρόνῳ πλείστῳ καὶ διὰ βίου. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιφερόμενον τῆς παροιμίας τοῦτο δηλοῖ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἔαρ μίᾳ ποιεῖ χελιδῶν οὔτε τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον μίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἢ χρόνος εἷς.

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν τύπῳ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν· ὡς γὰρ οἱ ζωγράφοι πρότερον μὲν περιγράφουσι σκιάζοντες τὸ ἐκτύπωμα, εἴθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράφουσι (ἔστι δὲ ἀναγραφή ἢ δευτέρα γραφή), οὕτω καὶ ἡμῖν ποιητέον περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποστατέον τούτων, εἰ μὴ τὸν ὄρον ἐκπληρώσομεν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. τέως δέ γε τὸ μέγιστον τοῦτο ἦν, καὶ «ἀρχή», φασίν, «ἡμῖς τοῦ παντός»· παντός γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐλλείπον προσθεῖναι καὶ διαρθροῦν τῇ περιγραφῇ τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα, συνεργεῖ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ὁ χρόνος. εἰπὼν γὰρ «εὐρετής» (ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ὁ χρόνος εὐρίσκει, ἀλλ' ἐν χρόνῳ τὰ πάντα εὐρίσκονται), προσέθηκε τὸ «συνεργός». χρὴ δὲ μεμνησθαι καὶ τῶν προειρημένων, ἵνα μὴ ζητῶμεν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως τὴν ἀκρίβειαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην· ἐπεὶ καὶ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης περὶ ὀρθῆς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ διαφερόντως ἕκαστερος· ὁ γὰρ γεωμέτρης θεατὴς τῆς ἀληθείας, ὁ δὲ τέκτων πράκτης τῶν ἔργων. ὡσαύτως ζητητέον καὶ περὶ τῆς αἰτίας. ἄρκετόν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὅτι, εἰ καλῶς ἔχομεν παρὰ τὸ διότι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὸ ὅτι γνωρίζονται, καὶ διατοῦτο τὸ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή.

1098b7–1099a5 ἰα' (δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἡμῖς τοῦ παντός εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή...)

Αἱ ἀρχαὶ μεγάλην ῥοπήν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ παροιμία φησὶν «ἀρχὴ ἡμῖς ἢ καὶ πλεόν τοῦ παντός»· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζητουμένων διὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς γίνεται ἐμφανῆ. διὸ περὶ αὐτῆς σκεπτέον καὶ αὐθις τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀρχῆς, ἥγουν τῆς τοῦ ὅτι καὶ καθὼς αὐτὴν ὠρισάμεθα· συνεπεράναμεν γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀπὸ πολλῶν, πρῶτον μὲν

1–2 ἐστὶ...λόγου] Arist. EN 1098a7 3–5 καθὼς...ἀρετὴν] cf. Arist. EN 1098a9–15 5–8 ἐὰν...
τελειοτάτην] cf. Arist. EN 1098a16–18 10–15 πλὴν...ἀναγράφουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1098a18–22
12 οὔτε¹...χελιδῶν] Zenob. V, 12 (LS I, 120) 14–15 Οὕτω...ἀναγράφουσιν] cf. Asp. In EN 19.14–17
18 ἀρχή...παντός] cf. Arist. EN 1098b7; cf. Apost. XII, 9c (L II, 544) 18–20 παντός...εὐρετής] cf.
Arist. EN 1098a22–26 21–24 συνεργός...ἔργων] cf. Arist. EN 1098a24–32 25–27 ὡσαύτως...
ἀρχή] cf. Arist. EN 1098a33–1098b3 29–32 Αἰ...ὠρισάμεθα] cf. Arist. EN 1098b6–11

11 πλείστῳ scripsi : πλείστου M 28 Im. addidi

with those capacities, but he also lives in accord with a type of life that involves virtue, which is *an activity of the soul* and a practical pursuit that does not come from nature [alone] but is *accompanied by reason*. If one lives this life well (in the way that we established *the function of the cithara-player and of the man who plays the cithara well*, the latter being *the accomplished cithara-player*), this person is happy, and *each thing* is considered *well performed when it is performed in accord with its own proper excellence*. Therefore *if* the treatment of the general discussion is *valid* in this case too, he did not say that *the human good* “is” *an activity of soul in accord with virtue*, but in order to represent the active component of the activity, he says “*it turns out to be*” [*an activity of soul in accord with virtue*]. *If there are multiple virtues*, as there surely are, [*these are performed*] *in accord with the best and most complete* [virtue], which is practical wisdom (for this is a virtue that belongs to the rational [part of the soul]). And no virtue of character [exists] without practical wisdom, even if Socrates subsumed them all into one, i.e. practical wisdom. Except that this alone does not suffice, and one must also add *in a complete life*, as if he were saying that [one must possess it] for most of one’s time and throughout one’s life. For the inference from the proverb demonstrates this: *neither does one swallow make a summer nor does a single day or a single period make a happy life*.

Thus *the human good* is of this sort in outline: just as painters *first draw the outline* when they make a sketch, *then fill in the details afterwards* (“filling in the details” refers to the second draft), so we must behave in our discussion of these matters; for we must not abandon these questions before we fill out our definition of happiness. This is the most important point and “*the beginning*”, they say, “*is half of the whole*”; because *anyone* can *add what is missing and complete the details of something well outlined, and time assists* with this. Because after he said “*a discoverer*” (since time discovers nothing, but in time everything is discovered), he added the term “*assistant*”. *But one must also bear in mind what was said before*, so that *we do not look for precision in the same way in everything, but in accord with the subject matter*; since *both a carpenter and a geometer investigate a right angle*, but each does so *differently*; for the geometer *contemplates the truth*, while the carpenter makes products. *One must investigate the cause* in a similar fashion. For *the fact* is sufficient, if the reason is *well established*. Moreover, first principles are also recognised on the basis of fact, and because of this *the fact is the primary thing and first principle*.

1098b7–1099a5 11. (For the beginning seems to be more than half of the whole...) Principles *are of great importance in relation to what follows*, since the proverb says that “*the beginning is half or even more than half of the whole*”. For *many of the matters under investigation become evident through their beginning*. This is why *we must inquire again specifically into the principle of happiness, namely the principle of the fact just as we defined it*. For we drew conclusions about it [i.e. the principle of happiness] from many things, first that it is a human product, next that it is rational

ὅτι ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν, ἔπειτα λογικὸν καὶ οὐ κατὰ τινα θεσμόν ἄλογον· ἔπειτα ἔθεμεν αὐτὴν εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ἥτις κρείττων τῆς ἑξεώς ἐστίν· ἔπειτα ἐν βίῳ διόλου ἢ διὰ χρόνου πλείστου.

Ταῦτα γὰρ λέγει *συμπεράσματα*, ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος ταύτης συνήχθη. νῦν δὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν *περὶ αὐτῆς λεγομένων* ταύτην συνίστησι· τῷ γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει, τῷ δὲ 5
 [5v] *ψευδεῖ διαφωνεῖ τάληθές*, καὶ διαταῦτα παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐλέγχεται. || τῶν γοῦν ἀγαθῶν τριχῶς λεγομένων—κατὰ ψυχὴν, ὡς φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, εὐφυΐα· κατὰ σῶμα, ὡς ἰσχύς, κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἐκτός, ὡς πλοῦτος, φίλοι καὶ τὰ λοιπά—κυριώτατα λέγομεν τὰ κατὰ ψυχὴν, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς *περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν*, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δυνάμει οὕτω συλλογίζεται· αἱ ἀγαθὰ πράξεις καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι ὑπὸ 10
 τὰς ἀπλῶς πράξεις καὶ ἐνεργείας ἀνάγονται, πᾶσαι δὲ πράξεις καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσι. καλῶς οὖν ἐρρέθη, κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην τὴν *περὶ τούτων δόξαν* ὅτι ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖα ἢ εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐνεργεῖαν εἶπομεν τὸ τέλος καὶ οὐκ ἔργον· καθ' αὐτὴν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνεργοῦσα οὐκ ἀποκαθίστησιν ἔργον, ὡς οἰκοδομικὴ τυχὸν οἰκίαν. 15

Συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὅτι εὖ ζῆν καὶ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα λέγουσιν· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία *εὐζωία τις καὶ εὐπραξία*. ὡς γὰρ ἡ τῶν θείων ζωὴ ἐνεργεῖα, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ζωὴ ἐνεργεῖα· ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖα καθ' αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴ, ὡς φθορᾶς οὐσης ψυχῆς τῆς κακίας, οὐ μὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα *περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας* («ἐπιζητούμενα» δὲ λέγει ὡς ἀμφιβαλλόμενα). πῶς γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἢ φρόνησις ἢ σοφία ἢ εὐδαιμονία 20
 συνιστῶσι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον; ταῦτα γὰρ ἔφασαν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν *μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς*· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐνεργεῖαι. *προσιθέασι δὲ τινες καὶ τὰ ἐκτός* εἰς τινα ἀναπλήρωσιν, εἰ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ οὐ καθ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα. *ταῦτα εἶπον οἱ μὲν καὶ πολλοὶ* ὄντες ἐκ τοῦ χρόνου ἔχοντες τὴν σεμνότητα, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὀλίγοι ὄντες ἐκ τῆς ἐνδοξότητος. ζητεῖ δὲ πῶς ὑποληπτέον τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τούτοις· τὰ γὰρ ἐν κτήσει 25
 καὶ χρῆσει ὀργανικὰ εἰσι, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἔξει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ μόνη. τούτων δὲ πάλιν ἡ μὲν ἔξις οὐκ ἰκανὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν, ἡ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα φέρει τὸ ἄριστον, καθὼς καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι γίνεται· οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἐκτικοὶ *περὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας στεφανοῦνται, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι*.

1099a7–1099b4 ἰβ' (ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς...) 30
Δείξας ἰκανῶς ὅτι τε ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ χωρεῖ δύο προβλήματα, τίνα τε ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ καὶ διατί ὑπάρχει· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστὶ

4–6 Ταῦτα...τάληθές] cf. Arist. EN 1098b9–12 6–10 τῶν...τίθεμεν] cf. Arist. EN 1098b12–16
 10–12 αἱ...εἰσι] Eustr. In EN 78.32–34 12–14 καλῶς...ἔργον¹] cf. Arist. EN 1098b16–19 13 ὅτι¹...
 ἐστίν] Eustr. In EN 78.35–36; cf. Georg. Pachym. Paraphr. In EN 9.19–20 16–17 Συνάδει...
 εὐπραξία] cf. Arist. EN 1098b20–22 19–22 οὐ...ἡδονῆς²] cf. Arist. EN 1098b22–25
 22–25 προσιθέασι...ἐνδοξότητος] cf. Arist. EN 1098b26–28 25–29 ζητεῖ...ἀγωνιζόμενοι] cf. Arist.
 EN 1098b32–1099a5 31–28,4 Δείξας...ἡδονήν] cf. Eustr. In EN 81.29–82.4

and not non-rational in accord with some [human] standard. After this, we established that it is an activity, which is greater than a disposition. After this, [we established that it must be possessed] throughout one's life or throughout most of it.

Because he sets these out as *conclusions, from which the argument* concerning this [principle] was proven. But now he combines this with *what is said on the subject; for all facts are in accord with the truth, while the truth is in discord with the false*, and for these reasons it is tested by it. || So *since the goods are said to be of three kinds—in accord with the soul*, such as practical wisdom, temperance, and good-naturedness; in accord with *the body*, such as strength, beauty, and the like; and in accord with *externalities*, such as wealth, friendship, and the rest—we call those that are in accord with the soul most properly goods, and we assess actions and soul-related activities as relating to soul, and he accordingly syllogises potentially as follows: *good actions and activities are included in the category of unqualified actions and activities, and all actions and activities have to do with the soul. Hence it has been rightly said, in accord with the ancient and agreed-upon opinion* concerning these matters, that happiness is *an activity of the soul*. The following is also correct, namely that we declared that the end is an activity and not a product; for in acting in accord with itself [i.e. as an end], the soul does not yield a product, as the art of construction, for example, might yield a house.

Another belief that harmonises with our account is that they say that *the happy person lives and fares well; because happiness is a sort of living and faring well*. For just as the divine life is an activity, so also the life of the soul is an activity; and the activity of the soul fulfilling its own proper function is good, just as the soul that is corrupted is evil, but surely less so *the characteristics we looked for in happiness* (he says “characteristics” since these are in dispute). For how do *virtue, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom* or happiness combine in this account? For they said that *these are happiness, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure*; and all of these are activities. *Some attribute externalities* to a certain satisfaction, even if they are contingent events [that function as possible means to an end] and not such [i.e. ends] by themselves. *These views were held both by men who are many and retain the dignity [bestowed on them] due to the length of time, and by others who are few [and retain their dignity] due to their high reputation*. He also investigates how *the chief good must be understood* in these cases; for goods *possessed and used* are instruments, whereas the goods *that involve disposition and activity* relate only to the soul. In relation to these matters, again, *disposition* is insufficient to produce the good [result], but *activity* does yield the best [result], just as happens also at the Olympic Games; for it is not those who merely train well who are crowned in the contests, but those who compete.

1099a7–1099b4 12. (Their life, too, is pleasant in itself...)

After demonstrating sufficiently both that happiness exists and what it is, he moves on from there to the remaining two problems, what exists within it [i.e. what its subsist-

καὶ διατί ἐστιν. ὑπάρχειν τοίνυν αὐτῇ διῖσχυρίζεται τὸ ἡδιστόν τε καὶ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἀρχαίων περὶ αὐτῆς δόξας. ἔλεγον γὰρ ἢ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, οἷον ἢ ὡς μέρος αὐτῆς εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ ὡς ἐπόμενον τι ἔξωθεν ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονήν.

Ἀνάγει δὲ τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ καθολικώτερον καὶ καταφέρει πρὸς τὸ προκειμένον. 5
 ἐκάστῳ γάρ, φησὶν, ἡδὺν πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιοῦτος, καὶ ἐπαγωγικῶς ἐκτίθησι ταῦτα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ μὲν καθ' αὐτάς, ὡς ἡ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς, αἱ δὲ οὐ καθ' αὐτάς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς κρίνοντας, ἔστι δὲ σφαλερὸν τὸ κρίνειν. τινὲς γὰρ τῷ οἴνῳ ἐνασμενίζουσιν ἢ τῇ ἀρετῇ, καὶ τῷ πλούτῳ ἢ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, διαστέλλει ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ταῦτα. αἱ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καθ' αὐτάς ἡδέϊαι καὶ οὐ 10
 κατ' ἐκείνας ὅσαι συνίστανται κατὰ τι ἄλογον κριτήριον. οὐ δεῖται γοῦν τῆς ἔξωθεν ἡδονῆς ἢ εὐδαιμονία· ὁ γὰρ εὐδαιμίων βίος ἡδὺς καθ' αὐτόν. καὶ τοῦτο κατασκευάζει
 [6r] οὕτως· πᾶς ὁ χαίρων ἡδέται, οὐδεὶς δ' ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ ταῖς ἀγαθαῖς πράξεσι || χαίρων οὔτε δίκαιος ὁ μὴ ταῖς δικαίαις. οὕτως ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδὺν καθ' αὐτάς αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις δίχα 15
 τοῦ περιάπτου ἡδέος, οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλαί· πλὴν ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος μάλιστα τούτων 15
 ἕκαστον ἔχει, ὡς εἶναι ἄριστος περὶ ταῦτα. κρίνων γὰρ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὡς δεῖ, ἐνστερνίζεται ταῦτα· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ κακὸν ἐγκρινεῖ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν οὔτε τὸ χείριστον παρὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν· συμπληρωτικὰ γοῦν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς καθ' αὐτὰ ὄντα τοῦ κατ' ἀρετὴν βίου, καὶ εἰσιν ὁμοῦ καὶ οὐ διώρισται κατὰ τὸ ἐν Δήλῳ ἐπίγραμμα·

τὸ μὲν ἄριστον τῇ ὑγείᾳ παρέχον, τὸ κάλλιστον τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ· 20
 τὸ ἡδιστον δὲ τῷ τυχεῖν οὐ τις ἔραται·

ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμοῦ εἰσι ταῖς ἀρίσταῖς ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας δέ, ἢ τὴν τελειοτάτην καὶ μίαν 25
 τούτων, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τίθεμεν, ἥτις καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς δεῖσεται ἀγαθῶν, εἰ μὴ γε καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ταῦτα δεῖκνυσθαι. πῶς γὰρ πράττει τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἐνεργήσει ὁ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀχορηγητος; ἔστωσαν γοῦν ταῦτα ὡς ὄργανα· ἵνα μὴ τητωμένων τῶν εὐδαιμό- 25
 νων ἐμποδίζηται ἢ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ ταύτης καταρρυπαίνεται μακάριον, μὴ μόνον δὲ

1–2 ὑπάρχειν...κάλλιστον] cf. Arist. EN 1199a24–25 5–6 Ἀνάγει...ταῦτα] cf. Eustr. In EN 82.8–14
 6 ἐκάστῳ...φιλοτιοῦτος] cf. Arist. EN 1099a8–9 10–12 αἱ...αὐτόν] cf. Arist. EN 1099a14–16
 13–17 πᾶς...ταῦτα] cf. Arist. EN 1099a16–24 19–21 καὶ...ἔραται] cf. Arist. EN 1099a24–28; cf.
 Eustr. In EN 84.18–23; cf. Georg. Pachym. Paraphr. In EN 10.29–11.1 19–22 καὶ...ἐνεργείαις] cf.
 [Heliod.] In EN 17.21–26 20–21 τὸ¹...ἔραται] cf. Theogn. Eleg. 255–256; cf. Stob. Anthol. 4, 39, 8
 22–23 ταῦτα...ἀγαθῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1099a29–32 24–30,1 πῶς...παναίσιχης] cf. Arist. EN
 1099a33–1099b4 26 ἐμποδίζηται...μακάριον] cf. Nic. Basil. Or. B5, 87.5–6

6 ἡδὺν scripsi ex Arist. EN 1099a8 : ἡδὺς M

ence of qualities is] and why it exists; this is the sort of thing it is and why it is [like this]. [Aristotle] therefore will affirm confidently that *what is most pleasant, what is most noble, and what is most beautiful supervene on happiness*, and that *this is in accord with the views of the ancients regarding it*. For they said that it [i.e. happiness] exists either with pleasure or not without pleasure, just as [they said that] either pleasure exists as a part of happiness or pleasure is attached to externality like something that follows [it].

[Aristotle] then refers *the discussion to what is more general and he has recourse to the matter at hand*. For to each individual, he says, *that thing is pleasant in relation to which he is described as “fond of” so-and-so*, and he sets out these points *inductively*. Since some of these pleasures are [pleasant] in themselves, such as that of philosophy, that of scientific knowledge, and that of virtue, while others are not [pleasant] in accord with their own nature but according to those who do the judging, the choice is precarious. And because some people take pleasure in wine rather than in virtue, and in wealth rather than in scientific knowledge, he distinguishes these pursuits from one another. For *virtuous actions are pleasant in themselves* rather than in accord with those [pursuits] that have been organised on a non-rational basis. Happiness accordingly *has no need of external pleasure*; for the happy life is pleasant in itself. This is argued in the following manner: everyone who feels joy has pleasure, but someone *who takes no delight in good actions is not good, nor is anyone just unless he rejoices in just actions*. *Virtuous actions* thus possess [6r] *pleasure in themselves* without [being in need of] pleasure as *an ornamental appendage*, and in this way *they are good and noble*; besides, such a life has *each of these [actions] to the highest degree*, so as to be the best with regard to them. For *if he judges such actions* to be necessary, a person will cherish them with all his heart; because evil will not be admitted alongside what is noble, nor will the worst [be admitted] alongside the good. Such qualities together are complementary, since they are in themselves part of the virtuous life, and they are together and *they are not separated, as the inscription at Delos has it*:

*What is best contributes to health, what is noblest contributes to outmost justice;
but what is most pleasant contributes to getting what one desires.*

These qualities together belong to the best activities; and these, or one of them, the most perfect, we identify as happiness, which will need external goods as well, if not for its own sake, then so that it can make these things [i.e. external goods] known. For how does he who lacks external resources undertake noble acts, and how will he perform them? Therefore, let these [external goods] be established as instruments; and in order that the happiness of happy individuals not be hindered by lack [of externalities], and the blessedness associated with it not take on a stain, [happiness] will be in need not just of externals but also of physical advantages; for an extremely

τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν δεῖσεται· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ παναίσχησ' οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕξει τὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας δύναμιν.

1099b6–1100a4 ἰγ' (ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας...)

Ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς, ἀλλὰ γε δὴ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθῶν, εἰ μὴ ὡς συμπληρωτικῶν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' οὖν ὡς ὀργάνων. πολλὰ γὰρ δι' αὐτῶν 5 πρᾶττεται, ὅθεν καὶ εἰς ταυτὸν τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τυχηρὰ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. ἔνιοι δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν ταυτίζουσιν. τίμη τὴν τρόπον; ἢ ὅτι ἐπεὶ διττὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἡ μὲν ψυχικὴ, ἡ δὲ σωματικὴ (εὐαισθησία γὰρ καὶ ὑγεία καὶ ἰσχύς σωματικαὶ ἀρεταί). ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν διὰ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία συμπληροῦται, τοῖς δὲ σωματικοῖς ὡς ὀργάνοις χρᾶται (ὑγιαίνων γὰρ ἴσως καὶ 10 εὐεκτικὸς ὢν ψυχικῶς, ἂν ἐνεργήσειεν εὐμαρῶς), διαταῦτα ταυτίζουσιν ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν.

Διατοῦτο καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερον μαθητόν ἐστιν ἕξωθεν ἢ ἐθιστόν ἢ ἄλλως διὰ πόνων ἀσκητόν, ἢ θεόθεν ἢ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο 15 τι, φησί, τῶν καλλίστων θεόθεν παραγίνεται, εἰκὸς καὶ μάλιστα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόδοτον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι θεολογικῆς ἐστὶ, καὶ τῶν περὶ προνοίας λόγων ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, φαίνεται δὲ ἄλλως θειότατον ὂν· ἄθλον γὰρ ἀρετῆς πρόκειται κἂν θεόθεν ἢ κἂν ἐξ ἀσκήσεως καὶ σπουδῆς παραγίνηται. εἴη δ' ἂν τέως καὶ [6v] πολύκοινον, ἢ ὡς εἶναι πάντας δυνατοὺς εὐδαίμονας γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ τις ἢ ἐξ ἀκολασίας ἢ διὰ τινα πῆρωσιν σώματος πρὸς ἀρετὴν πεπηρωμένος εἴη· γίνεσθαι δὲ εὐδαίμο- 20 νας διὰ τίνος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ οὕτως βέλτιον οὕτω λέγειν ἢ διὰ τύχην, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην, τὰ μὲν οὕτως ἔχουσι τὴν φύσιν ποιητικὴν εἰς τὸ παρ' αὐτῆς εὖ σχεῖν τοῦ τέλους καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην, τὰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχουσι τὴν τέχνην ποιητικὴν εἰς τὸ ἐκεῖθεν τὸ ἄριστον λαβεῖν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην τινά. τόσον δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχη λίαν πλημμελές. 25

Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τύχης ἡ εὐδαιμονία· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρίστη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ἡδίστη, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐνέργειαν ἀπὸ τύχης εἶναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ κατ' ἀρετὴν προσκειμένου. εἰπὼν δὲ «κατ' ἀρετὴν», ἐπεὶ καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ συνίσταται ἡ εὐδαιμονία, μέμνηται καὶ τῶν 30 ἄλλων πλην ὡς ὀργάνων τινῶν. ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ ἄλλως, ἐκ τῆς ὡς κοινῆς ἐπιστήμης, τῆς

4 Ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι] Arist. EN 1099b6–7 6 ὅθεν...εὐδαιμονία] cf. Arist. EN 1099b7–8
13–14 Διατοῦτο...ἀνθρώποις] cf. Eustr. In EN 86.25–27 13–32,3 Διατοῦτο...μακαρίζεται] cf. Arist. EN 1099b9–1100a4

ugly [person] is not our idea of a happy man, since he will lack the potential for happiness.

1099b6–1100a4 13. ([Happiness] seems also to need this sort of prosperity...)

Happiness *seems to require* external goods as well, including even goods related to the body, if not as essential parts in relation to them, at all events as instruments. For many [actions] are accomplished by means of them [i.e. bodily goods], and *this is why some people identify good fortune with happiness*, since the external goods are matters of fortune for the most part. Others, however, identify happiness with virtue. How so? It is because virtue is twofold, one [part] relating to the soul, the other to the body (for keen perception, health and strength are physical virtues). Since therefore happiness is fulfilled by means [of the goods] relating to the soul, but uses the bodily goods as instruments (for perhaps when one is healthy and one's soul is in a good condition, one might act readily), it is for these reasons that they identify virtue and happiness.

For this reason the question arises as to whether [happiness] is acquired by learning from without or by habituation or cultivated in some other manner by means of work, or whether it comes to human beings by divine dispensation or even by chance. Now if there is anything else, he says, which comes from the most beautiful [gifts] of divine dispensation, it is most especially likely that happiness is god-given. But this question perhaps belongs to the sphere of theology to investigate, and this inquiry also [forms] part of discussions regarding [the nature of] divine providence, but it appears in any case to be the most divine [of human possessions]; for the prize of virtue is proposed whether it is dispensed by god or if it comes from daily practice and effort. But simultaneously it would also be something widely available, || since [6v] everyone is capable of attaining happiness, unless someone were to be maimed as regards their potential for virtue either due to intemperance or because of some physical disability; people thus become happy by means of a type of study and care. For if it is admitted that it is better, so to speak, [to be happy] in this way [i.e. as a result of one's own exertions] than through chance, if in fact matters in the natural world and matters in the realm of artifice [are concerned], the former involve nature in such a way that it acts as an efficient cause for achieving the end from it [i.e. nature] and not through chance, whereas the latter involve craft in such a way that it acts as an efficient cause for reaching the best from there and not through some kind of chance. To hand over to chance, however, what is so much the greatest and most noble [would be] an act of extreme neglect.

It is plain also from our definition that happiness does not arise from chance; for activity of the soul in accord with excellence is said to be the best, noblest, and most pleasurable, and that it is impossible for an activity of soul [to result] from chance; and the same things hold for any determinant of virtue. After saying "in accord with excellence", since happiness is also established in accord with the other goods, he also mentions the other [goods] but only as being instruments. He also attempts to

πολιτικῆς· αὕτη γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖται τὰ πλείστα καὶ οὐ τῇ τύχῃ ἐπιτρέπει τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας, ὥστε ποριζόμεθα ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὔτε ἄλογον ζῶον οὔτε παῖς εὐδαιμονήσειε πώποτε· ὃς δὲ καὶ λέγεται οὕτω παῖς, δι' ἐλπίδα μακαρίζεται.

1100a5–1100a32 ἰδ' (πολλὰ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται...)

Ἄπορεῖ ἐντεῦθεν πότε καὶ ἐς ὅποσον καλέσομεν εὐδαίμονα τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐπεὶ 5
πολλὰ μεταβολαὶ τύχης γίνονται ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ νεότητος εὐτυχοῦντες ἐπὶ
τοῦ γήρως δυστυχοῦσι, καθὼς καὶ περὶ τοῦ Πριάμου οἱ παλαιοὶ ἱστοροῦσι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ
παλαιὸν τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ μύθου λέγει τὰ περὶ ἐκείνου. τίς γοῦν τὸν τοιοῦτον μακαρί-
σει, οὕτως ἀθλίως ἀποθανόντα;

Πότερον γοῦν οὐδένα οὐδ' ἄλλον, φησί, μακαρίσομεν ἔστ' ἂν ζῆ, ἀλλὰ μετὰ 10
θάνατον, εἰ ἐμμεῖνοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς βιώσας ἐν τούτοις, καθὼς ὁ Σόλων ἀπεφήνα-
το; μηδὲν τὸν Κροῖσον εὐδαιμονίσας τῶν χρυσῶν ἔνεκα πλίνθων καὶ τοῦ τοσοῦτου
σωροῦ τῶν χρημάτων, ὅτε παρ' ἐκείνον ἀφίκετο. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο παντελῶς ἄτοπον, τὸ
μετὰ θάνατον καὶ ὅτε μὴ ἔστι τὸν ἄνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα λογίζεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ἡμῖν
τοῖς λέγουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐνέργειαν· ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν πῶς ἂν ἐνεργήσειεν; εἰ δὲ μὴ 15
λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα· μηδὲ γὰρ οὕτω καὶ τὸν Σόλωνα ἀποφῆνασθαι, ἀλλ'
ὅτι τηλικαῦτα ἀσφαλῶς ἐκείνόν τις εὐδαιμονίσειεν ὡς διαβιώσαντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τοῖς
κατὰ τὸν βίον, μὴ οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης ἀσφαλείας καὶ ὅτε ζῆ. διὰ τὸ τῆς τύχης εὐμετά-
βολον ἔχει πάλιν ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι μοῖραν τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ
[7r] καὶ κακοῦ, ὡς καὶ ἄλλω ζῶντι μηδὲν δὲ αἰσθανομένω. ἀπορία δ' ἐντεῦθεν ἢ ἐντίκτεται, 20
μήπως καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀποθανὼν, καὶ εὐδαίμων καλούμενος ὡς ἀσφαλῶς καταλύσας τὸν
βίον ἐν ἀγαθοῖς, διὰ τὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων ἀτυχίας κινδυνεύσειε περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν,
εἴπερ ἐκείνῳ ἀποθανόντι ἀκολουθεῖεν καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι.

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀπογόνων πρὸς ἐκείνον ἀπόστασις πολυειδῆς καὶ ποικίλη·
ἄλλως γὰρ ἂν υἱὸς καὶ ἄλλως ἔκγονος καὶ ἄλλως ἀπόγονος ἔξει πρὸς ἐκείνον τὸν 25
πρῶτον τὴν οἰκειώσιν. κἀντεῦθεν καὶ διαφοραὶ τῶν κωλυμάτων τῆς εὐδαιμονίας
γενήσονται, ὥστε εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν διὰ τοὺς ἐπιγενομένους καὶ εὐδαίμονα καὶ δυσδαί-
μονα, καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον διὰ τὸ τῆς οἰκειώσεως διάφορον. καὶ πάλιν δὲ ἄτοπον μὴ
συνικνεῖσθαι κἂν ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν· ἀκοινώνητον γὰρ
τοῦτο καὶ ἄσπλαγχνον. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος· τάχα 30
γὰρ ἂν λυθείη καὶ τοῦτο ἐξ ἐκείνου.

5–12 Ἄπορεῖ...ἀπεφῆνατο] cf. Arist. EN 1100a5–13 10–12 Πότερον...ἀπεφῆνατο] cf. Herod. Hist. i, 30–33 13–31 τοῦτο...ἐκείνου] cf. Arist. EN 1100a13–32 24 Ἔστι...ποικίλη] cf. Eustr. In EN 94.2–3 29–30 ἀκοινώνητον...ἄσπλαγχνον] cf. Eustr. In EN 94.22–23

prove [this] in another way, from common knowledge, [that is to say] *political science*; for *this [science] is concerned with the greatest matters* and does not entrust *making the citizens virtuous* to chance, so that from these [arguments] we gain [the idea] that *neither a non-rational animal nor a child could ever be counted as happy*; when *the child is spoken of thus* [i.e. as happy], *it is being complimented for its hope for the future*.

1100a5–1100a32 14. (Since many changes take place...)

He then raises a difficulty as to when and to what extent we will call a human being happy, since *many changes resulting from chance occur in life*, and many people, although fortunate in their youth, *suffer misfortune in their old age, just as the ancients record with regard to Priam*; for [Aristotle] talks about the events in his life in the light of the ancient story and myth. Who then would *count* such a man as *happy, when he died so wretchedly*?

Shall we therefore call no one else at all happy, he says, *while he lives*, but [only] after death, if he manages to maintain all the possessions which he enjoyed while he was alive, just as *Solon* declared? [Solon] did not in any way count Croesus as happy on account of his ingots of gold and such an enormous heap of possessions when he came to visit him. But *it is utterly absurd* to hold that a human being is happy only after his death and when he no longer exists, and especially *for us who claim that happiness is an activity*; for how could a dead person be active? *Unless we claim that someone is happy when he is dead*; because we are *not* saying that *Solon's point* was this, *but rather that [when a man has died] one can safely call him happy on the thesis that he outlasted the goods he had during his lifetime, there being no certainty of this while he was alive. Due to the mutability of fortune, the issue again admits of some dispute; for someone who is dead seems to have an allotment of both good and bad, just as much as another man does who is alive but does not perceive what is happening to him. Hence, another point of dispute* || arises, whether the dead man [71] himself, who might even be called happy because he has ended his life in security in possession of his goods, might be in danger with regard to his happiness due to the *misfortunes* of his *descendants*, if both *honours and dishonours* were to follow him after he was dead.

There is also the multifaceted and diversified distance between a man and his ancestors; for a son will have one degree of affinity toward the original person, a descendant another, and an offspring yet another. As a consequence, there will be different hindrances to happiness, with the result that the same man might be both happy and unhappy due to his descendants, to either a greater or lesser extent due to the difference of kinship. And again *it would be odd* if *[the fortunes of the descendants] did not for some time have an effect on their ancestors*; for this is inhuman and heartless. *But we must return to our initial point, the one [raised by] Solon; for perhaps this problem might be solved from [consideration of] that one.*

1100a34–1100b30 *ιέ' (πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον...)*

Ἔθ' ὑπάρχει τὸ πρᾶγμα, εἰ λέγοι τις περὶ ἐκείνου, ἀληθεύσειεν ἄν' καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τῶν ὄντων λέγεται, τὸ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος μὴ ὄν. ἄτοπον οὖν εἰ τοῦ εὐδαιμόνος ὄντος καὶ ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ διάγοντος τὸ περὶ ἐκείνου λέγειν ὡς εὐδαιμών ἐστὶ ψεῦδος εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας 5 εὐδαιμονίζεσθαι διὰ τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολάς· βούλεται γὰρ ἢ εὐδαιμονία μόνιμόν τι εἶναι, αἱ δὲ τύχαι πολλάκις ἐπανακυκλοῦσιν, ὥστε εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων διὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῆς ἐκ τῆς τύχης μεταβολῆς μὴ τούτους εὐδαιμονίζεσθαι ἡμᾶς. εἰ γὰρ συνακολουθεῖμεν ταῖς τύχαις, πολλάκις τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαιμόνα τε καὶ ἄθλιον καλοῖμεν ἄν, καὶ χαμαιλέοντα (ζῶον κατὰ τὰ χρώματα πάντα μορφούμενον) ἀποφαίνομεν ἄν τὸν 10 εὐδαιμόνα.

Καὶ ταῦτα εἰπὼν, ἐπιχειρεῖ τῇ λύσει τῆς ἀντιθέσεως. τὸ γοῦν ἐπακολουθεῖν ταῖς τύχαις, φησὶν, οὐκ ὀρθόν· ὅσα γὰρ ἡ τύχη φέρει οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσι, τὰ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ποριστικὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσι. διατοῦτο γὰρ καὶ μακαρίζεται ὁ εὐδαιμών· τὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔτε μακαρίους οὔτε ἀθλίους ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται, μόνον δὲ συντελοῦσι καὶ ταῦτα 15 πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡς ὄργανά τινα. κύρια δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι, ὡσπερ καὶ τῆς δυσδαιμονίας αἱ κατὰ κακίαν. τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τὸ νῦν ἀπορηθέν, ὅτι οὐ μόνιμος ἄρα ἐσέεται διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῆς τύχης ἢ εὐδαιμονία· δεῖ δὲ γε πάντως. μονιμώτεροι γὰρ, φησὶ, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ μᾶλλον αἱ τιμιώτεροι αὐτῶν μονιμώτεροι, διότι ἐν αὐταῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐνδεδελεχέστατα 20 ζῶσιν οἱ μακάριοι· μᾶλλον δὲ καταζῶσιν, ὡσανεὶ τις εἴποι «ἡ ζωὴ αὐτῶν αὐταῖς συνουσιώται»· αἴτιον δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι λήθην αὐτῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐπιλέλησται ὅ,τι αἰσθάνεται.

Ἐπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον, ἤγουν ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τῷ εὐδαιμόνι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ τύχαις τὸ εὐδαιμον οὐδὲ τὸ μακάριον ἐπιτρέπομεν ἀλλὰ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσιν αἱ τὸ 25 βέβαιοι ἔχουσιν, οὐκ ἀποβαλεῖται ὁ εὐδαιμών τὴν προσοῦσαν μακαριότητα διὰ τὴν τῆς τύχης μετακλίσιν. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἢ πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει ὁ μακάριος τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν· πράξει διὰ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρετάς, θεωρήσει διὰ τὰς θεωρητικὰς· ἢ πράξει μὲν ὅτι κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐνεργεῖ τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον μεταχειριζόμενος πράγματα, θεωρήσει δὲ ὅτι μετὰ λόγου αὐτῷ καὶ τῆς ἐκ λόγου χρήσεως ἢ πᾶσα κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐνέργεια, 30 ὅς δὴ λόγος καὶ νοῦς πρακτικὸς ὀνομάζεται, ταῖς ζωτικαῖς ἐπιστατῶν ὀρέξεσι καὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν καὶ δι' αὐτῶν καὶ μετ' αὐτῶν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τὰ δέοντα κατορθῶν. τό γε «ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς» καὶ «τετράγωνος» (ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν κύβων τῶν ὡς ἄν καὶ

2–13 Ἔθ'...ὀρθόν] cf. Arist. EN 1100a34–1100b8 3 τὸ¹...διαίρεσιν] cf. Arist. Metaph. 1027b18–19 | ὡσπερ...ὄν] cf. Alex. In Metaph. 448.6 12–14 Καὶ...εἰσι] cf. Eustr. In EN 95.30–34 16–21 κύρια...μακάριοι] cf. Arist. EN 1100b8–16 21–22 ἢ...συνουσιώται] cf. Dam. In Phaed. 461.1 22–25 αἴτιον...πράξεσιν] Arist. EN 1100b17–20 24–27 ἐπεὶ...μάλιστα] Eustr. In EN 97.16–19 27–28 αἰεὶ...ἀρετὴν] cf. Arist. EN 1100b19–20 28–32 ἢ...κατορθῶν] Eustr. In EN 97.21–25 33–36,1 τὸ...τύχα] cf. Arist. EN 1100b20–21; cf. Asp. In EN 30.2–3; cf. Eustr. In EN 97.29–31 33 ἀληθῶς...τετράγωνος] cf. Pl. Prot. 339a–b

1 Im. addidi 5 κεῖσθαι M : βούλεσθαι Arist. vulg. (EN 1100b1)

1100a34–1100b30 15. (How is it not strange...)

When the fact *holds*, if someone asserted that about the happy person, *he would predicate truly*; and this is said to be part of how matters are, *namely what exists by a combination or separation of terms*, just as falsity is a way of “not-being.” It is therefore *strange if at the actual time when someone is happy* and living happily the saying concerning that person that “he is happy” is false. But this will happen *because it is not the norm to call anyone who is alive “happy” owing to the vicissitudes of fortune*, because *happiness aims to be something permanent, while the wheel of fortune often turns full circle*, with the result that, even though people are happy, we would not call them happy owing to our expectation that their fortunes could change. *For if we were to track what happens to people, we would often call the same person both happy and miserable, and we would proclaim that the happy person is in fact a chameleon* (an animal that changes into every colour).

After making these arguments, [Aristotle] attempts to refute the opposite case. Thus, *tracking what happens to people*, he says, *is not correct*, given that everything fortune brings us is not in our power, but procuring what brings happiness is. Because it is for this reason that a happy person is deemed blessed, because that which is not in our power makes us neither blessed nor wretched, but they only contribute to our happiness as instruments of a sort. *Rather, it is activities in conformity with virtue that are responsible for our happiness*, just as wicked activities are [responsible for] our misfortune. *The present difficulty bears witness to our account*, since—owing to the vicissitudes of fortune—happiness will not be permanent, though it should be by all means. *For the virtues are more durable*, he says, *than even the various kinds of knowledge themselves*, and in particular *the more honourable of these kinds of activities are the more durable, because the blessed spend their lives most readily and continuously [occupied] with these*; or rather they live in conformity with them, as if someone were to say “their life is united with them”. *For this is the reason we do not forget them*; because no one forgets what he understands.

The attribute that we are looking for, namely happiness, will belong to the happy person. Because *since we do not entrust happiness or blessedness to chance events but rather to virtuous actions which have some durability, the happy person will not lose the attribute of happiness because his fortunes change*. *For always or at least most often compared to other people, the happy individual will do and contemplate what is excellent; he will act through the practical virtues, while he will contemplate by means of the contemplative [virtues]; or he will act because he operates in conformity with the pursuit [of virtue] when he conducts his affairs throughout his life [in this way], and he will contemplate because all of his activity throughout his life, which is called reason and practical intelligence, is owed to his reason and his use of reason, which takes charge of his life-giving impulses and of his sensations themselves, operating by means of these [capacities] and with them and successfully accomplishing what is necessary*. The “truly good” and “foursquare” (from a metaphor of dice which, when

ρίπτουνται ἐδραίως ἰσταμένων) οἷσι κάλλιστα καὶ ἐμμελῶς τὰς τύχας οὔτε ταῖς εὐημερίαις κουφιζόμενος οὔτε ταῖς δυσκληρίαις καταπίπτων. πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην, καὶ μικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸ εὖ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ κακῶς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ μὲν ὄντα συνεπικοσμοῦσι, κακὰ δὲ ἐμποδίζουσι πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθαῖς.

5

1100b30–1101a21 ἰστ' (ὁμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν...)

Εἰπὼν ὡς ἐμποδίζει τὰ μέγιστα ἀτυχήματα πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις ὡς μὴ συμπληροῦσθαι καλῶς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐπιδιορθούμενος λέγει ὅτι μᾶλλον ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ καρτερία τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ὅτι φέρει καὶ ταῦτα ὡς μόνως κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῶν καὶ γεννάδας, καὶ οὐ διὰ τινὰ ἀναισθησίαν καὶ ἀναλγησίαν. εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν τὰ 10 ἀτυχήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τάχ' ἂν εἶχομεν ψόγον ἐν τούτοις, κἂν ἐφέρομεν ταῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ὃ δὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τούτοις, τοῦτο ποιητέον· καὶ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ καρτερεῖν καὶ διαφέρειν τὰ χαλεπὰ καὶ μάλιστα ὅτε διὰ τινος κολακείας καὶ δουλοπρεπείας ἔστι τούτων ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

Εἰ δὲ κύριαί αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι καὶ οὐχὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς τοιαύτης εὐδαίμονος ζωῆς, οὐδεὶς 15 ἂν εἴη τῶν μακαρίων διὰ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀτυχήματα ἄθλιος. τότε γὰρ ἄθλιός τις, ὅτε τὰ μισητὰ πράξει καὶ φαῦλα, οὐχ ὅτε πάθει· τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐνεργεῖαι εἴησαν ἂν τῆς ψυχῆς, νῦν δὲ πάθη, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ὁ γὰρ ὄντως εὐδαίμων εὐσχημόνως ἂν ἐνέγκοι τὰς τύχας καὶ ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν τὰ κάλλιστα διαπράξῃται, ὡσπερ καὶ στρατηγός, ὁποῖον τὸ στρατόπεδον εὐρήσει, καλῶς καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὖ αὐτῷ 20 χρῆσεται, καὶ σκυτοτόμος, ὁποῖον εὐρήσει τὸ σκύτος, ὑπόδημα ποιήσει κάλλιστον. εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδεὶς μὲν εὐδαίμων ἄθλιος πλην οὐδὲ μακάριος ἅπας διὰ τὸν Πρίαμον καὶ τὰ ἐκείνῳ συμβάντα. οὔτε μὴν ποικίλος διὰ τὰς τύχας καὶ εὐμετάβολος ὁ εὐδαίμων· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ μικρῶν ἀτυχημάτων κινήσεται (ἐκ) τοῦ εἶναι ὃ λέγεται, ἀλλ' εἴπερ μεγάλα τινὰ καὶ πολλὰ συμβαίῃ αὐτῷ, κακ τούτων πάλιν τῶν 25 ἀτυχημάτων οὐκ ἂν ἐπανεέλθοι πάλιν εἰς τὸ εὐδαιμον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν πολλῷ καὶ τελείῳ· καὶ τὰ μεγάλα γὰρ δυστυχήματα ἐν τινὶ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ δώσουσιν ἐκείνῳ τὸ μὴ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι. καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ τελείῳ καὶ πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐπήβολος γενόμενος κακῶν μὲν δυσδαίμων, καλῶν δὲ εὐδαίμων.

Τί γοῦν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντα; προσθετέον δὲ καὶ 30 βιωσόμενον καὶ οὕτως τελευτήσοντα καὶ μὴ, ὡς τῷ Σόλωνι δοκεῖ, μετὰ θάνατον. εἰ

2–5 πολλῶν...ἀγαθαῖς] cf. Arist. EN 1100b22–30 7–9 Εἰπὼν...καλόν] cf. Arist. EN 1100b29–31
10 γεννάδας...ἀναλγησίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1100b32 15–27 Εἰ...τελείῳ] cf. Arist. EN 1100b33–1101a13 24–25 οὔτε...αὐτῷ] cf. Eustr. In EN 100.28–30 28–31 καί¹...τελευτήσοντα] cf. Arist. EN 1100a12–17

6 Im. addidi 24 ἐκ addidi ex Arist. EN 1101a9 et Eustr. In EN 100.28

thrown, stand firmly) *will bear the chances of fortune most nobly and altogether decorously*, neither being elevated by his successes nor defeated by his misfortunes. *Many events occur by chance*, both small and great, *and small bits of fortune do not change the whole course of [a person's] life* in either a positive or a negative direction, *while great bits of fortune*, if they are good *add to the pre-existing beauty*, but if they are bad *hinder many good activities* of the soul.

1100b30–1101a21 16. (Nevertheless, even in these circumstances nobility shines through...)

After saying that *the greatest misfortunes hinder many activities*, preventing happiness from being well attained, he revises this point and affirms rather that *even in these circumstances nobility shines through*; for the patient endurance of the happy person is evident in that he bears these [misfortunes] too in one way only, by living life in conformity with virtue and *nobility, rather than by means of* a sort of detachment and *insensibility*. For if misfortunes arose from that which is in our power, we would perhaps be at fault in these circumstances, even if we endured these [misfortunes]. But since they are not in our power, whatever is in our power vis-à-vis these circumstances must be done; and what is in our power is to preserve and patiently endure our difficulties, especially when there is a means to escape from them through a form of flattery or servility.

If activities are what determines the character of the aforementioned happy life and not the sufferings [that occur during its course], *no blessed person would be miserable* due to chance adversities. This is *because* a person is miserable when he *commits hateful, vile acts*, not when he suffers something; for in the former case, activities would originate from the soul, but in the latter case sufferings would; and the former are in our power, whereas the latter are not. *For the genuinely happy person would bear the chances of life with good grace and would act in the best way* from the possibilities [available], *just as a general*, whatever the quality of the army he finds, *will use it well and as is best for himself, and a shoemaker*, whatever the quality of the leather he finds, *will make the best shoes he can*. *If this is the case*, no one *who is happy [would become] miserable, nor [would] every blessed person [become miserable]* if he met with the incidents that befell Priam. *Nor will the happy individual be alterable or liable to change* because of his fortunes; *for neither by his fortunes [in general] nor by small misadventures will he be dislodged (from) being as we stated [i.e. happy], but if any severe and frequent disasters were to befall him, he would not again recover from them back to his state of happiness in a short period of time, but after one that is long and complete*; for the great calamities over a short period of time will make him unhappy. Also, *someone who behaves badly over an extended and complete passage of time is unhappy, whereas someone who behaves well is happy*.

What then prevents us from calling the one who acts in conformity with virtue happy? We should add that he must also be destined to go on living and die in the same

[8r] γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν μακαριστέος, ὁ τῶς καλῶς ἐνεργῶν μακάριος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἔχει
 τὸ τέλος, καὶ ὁ βίος κατὰ τοῦτο τέλειος λέγεται. || μακάριοι γὰρ οἱ ἄωμοι, πορευόμε-
 νοι ἐν νόμῳ Κυρίου, ἐν ὁδῷ τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ. εἰ δ' οὕτως, μακαρίους μὲν ἐροῦμεν ἐκ τῶν
 ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ὑπάρξει ἀγαθὰ, μακαρίους δὲ ἀνθρώπους οἷς δηλονότι
 ὑπάρχει ἢ παντοῖα ρύσις καὶ ἡ μεταβολὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐντὸς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐκτός, ἐπεὶ τῆ 5
 νοερᾶ καὶ θεία φύσει ἄλλο εἶδος μακαριότητος, ἐν στάσει τὸ εἶναι ἐχούση καὶ μηδεμίαν
 ὑπομενούση μεταβολήν. ἄρχεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀπογόνων λέγει ἐς ὅποσον ἐφικνεῖ-
 ται τούτοις ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἢ συνεργία ἢ ἐμπόδις.

1101a28–1101b27 ιζ' (εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων...)

Ἐντεῦθεν μέτρα ταῖς κοινωνίαις τίθησι τῶν συμβαινόντων τοῖς ἀπογόνοις καὶ τοῖς 10
 φίλοις πρὸς τοὺς εὐδαίμονας, καθόλου καὶ τύπῳ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν ἐκτιθέμενος. καὶ
 πρῶτον τὴν κατὰ τὸ μείζον τῶν συμβαινόντων καὶ ἔλαττον· ὡσπερ γάρ, φησί, τῶν περὶ
 αὐτόν, δηλαδὴ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν βαρύτερα ῥοπήν τινα πρὸς ἀλλοίω-
 σιν τῷ βίῳ παρέχεται, τὰ δὲ κοῦφα οὐκ ἰσχυρά εἰσι πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βίου
 μετάρπρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ἔχει, συναϊρῶν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους, 15
 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ τέκνα φίλτατα λέγονται.

Εἴτα τίθησι δευτέραν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν· διαφέρει γάρ, φησί, καὶ τὸ περὶ ζώντας ἢ
 τελευτήσαντας αὐτὰ συμβαίνειν, καὶ πλεον διαφέρει ταῦτα ἢ τὰ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις
 παράνομα καὶ δεινά, εἰ λέγοιντο ἢ περὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν ταῦτ' ἐχόντων ἢ περιόντων
 ἔτι. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα συλλογίζεσθαι ἐν τῷ 20
 διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς τελευτήσαντας εἰ κοινωνοῦσι τοῖς ἀπογόνοις ζῶσι τινος
 ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἐναντίου. ἔοικε γὰρ ἐξ ὧν εἶπομεν περὶ τῶν ἀτυχημάτων, εἰ καὶ διῖκνεῖται
 πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὰ ἐνταῦθα κακὰ ἢ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, ἀφαιρὰ τινα ταῦτ' εἶναι ἢ ἀπλῶς, ὡς ἂν εἰ
 ἔλεγε τῆ αὐτῶν φύσει, ἢ ἐκείνοις, τοῖς τελευτήσασιν. συμβάλλονται μὲν οὖν, φησί, καὶ
 ταῦτα κάκεῖνα τοῖς τελευτήσασιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναφορὰν μόνην, ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δεῖνος 25
 ἀπόγονος τὸ καὶ τὸ πάσχει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φίλος, οὐ μὴν δὲ τηλικαῦτα συμβάλλεται,
 ὥστε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μὴ εὐδαίμονας.

Τούτων διωρισμένων ἐφ' ἕτερον μεταβαίνει ζήτημα, ὅτι ποῦ τακτέον τὴν εὐδαιμο-
 νίαν· τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων—τιμίῳ ὡς ἐπὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν θείων, ἐπαινετῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, δυνάμεων ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν ἐπ' 30
 ἀμφοτέρα δυναμένων, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς

2–3 μακάριοι...ὁδῷ] Sept. Psalm. 118: 1 3–4 εἰ...ἀνθρώπους] cf. Arist. EN 1101a19–21
 4–7 οἷς²...μεταβολήν] Eustr. In EN 102.12–14 10–16 Ἐντεῦθεν...λέγονται] cf. Eustr. In EN
 103.12–20; cf. Arist. EN 1101a22–31 17–19 Εἴτα...δεινά] cf. Arist. EN 1101a31–33 20–22 δεῖ...
 ἐναντίου] cf. Arist. EN 1101a34–1101b1 22–27 ἔοικε...εὐδαίμονας²] cf. Arist. EN 1101b1–9
 25 ἀναφορὰν μόνην] Eustr. In EN 104.16 28–40,2 Τούτων...εὐδαιμονίαν] cf. Eustr. In EN
 104.21–105.3 28–40,9 Τούτων...μακαρίζομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1101b10–25 28 ἐφ'...ζήτημα] Eustr.
 In EN 104.21

9 Im. addidi 15 τὰ περὶ post αὐτοῖς καὶ primum scripsit, deinde erasit M

manner and not, as it seems to Solon, [judge him thus only] after death. For if someone is to be deemed happy on the basis of his activity, the one who acts well up to this point is blessed; for the end is there [i.e. at death], and the life [lived] in conformity with this principle is said to be perfect. || For *blessed are the blameless*, [8r] *those who walk the law of the Lord, in the path* in this life. *If this is so, we shall pronounce blessed those of the living who possess and are destined to go on possessing good things*, and we will also call *blessed people* for whom, obviously, *there is every sort of dissolution and change* from both internal and external phenomena, *since there is another form of blessedness in their spiritual and divine nature*, [that is] *being in a state that contains and admits no change at all*. [Aristotle] then begins [again] and discusses regarding the descendants [of the happy person] to what extent co-operation or obstacles from them will extend to the persons in question.

1101a28–1101b27 17. (If, then, just like the misfortunes that affect oneself...)

After this he sets out the measure of commonality between what happens to their descendants and [their] loved ones in relation to people who are happy, establishing their differences in general terms and in outline. First, [he sets out the difference] according to the greater or lesser scale of the events; for just as, he says, among a person's, namely the happy person's, own misfortunes those that have a greater weight exercise a certain influence with regard to the variation in his life, while slight [misfortunes] have less power to cause a change to the worse in life, the same is true of the events involving our loved ones, including our descendants too in this group, since children are also referred to as dearest.

Then he sets out a second difference between them; for *it is different*, he says, *whether these [i.e. the misfortunes] occur in connection with people who are living or dead*, and this makes more of a difference *than the lawless and terrible events in a tragedy*, whether they are discussed in regard to people who are experiencing them and have departed or still survive. For *this difference concerning the happy person must also be taken into account when doubt is felt regarding whether the dead share any good with their living descendants or the opposite*. For *it seems from the points we have made regarding hardships that, even if any events here, evil or even good, do penetrate to them, they must be weak, either intrinsically*, as if he were speaking of their own nature, *or for them*, namely with regard to the dead. *Therefore both the former and the latter [i.e. both evil and good events], he says, affect the dead*, but by reference only, i.e. [when we say] that the descendant of so-and-so suffers this or that, *and similarly* in the case of his friend. *But it does not have so large [an effect] as to make the happy individuals unhappy.*

After these points have been clarified, he passes on to another issue, specifically where happiness must be placed; since there are three [options]—things that are honoured, as in the case of the gods and divine things, things that are praised, as in the case of human beings and human affairs, and capacities, as in the case of the arts that have the capacity to turn out in one of two ways, as in the case of medicine or

(αὐται γὰρ αἱ τέχνηαι δύνανται καὶ ἐπ' ἄμφω, καὶ διαταῦτα δυνάμεις λέγονται)—ζητεῖ ποῦ θετέον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. καὶ ὅτι μὲν τῶν δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον, φησὶν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐπ' ἄμφω δύνασθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν τὸν ἔχοντα καὶ κακόν. ζητεῖ δὲ περὶ τῶν δύο καὶ φιλοσοφεῖ τέως περὶ ἐπαινοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, ἃ δὴ τῷ ποιά τινα καὶ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινοῦνται, καὶ τίθησι παραδείγματα καὶ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ 5 γὰρ καὶ εἰ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαινοῦμεν, φησί, ἀλλ' οὖν διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφορᾶς οὕτω λέγομεν. εἰ γοῦν ἡμῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἔπαινος, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἂν εἶη οὗτος, ἀλλὰ τι μὴ ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία ἄριστον, διαταῦτα καὶ τίμιον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν θειοτάτους καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν θειότατα ὡς ἐγγίζοντα τοῖς θείοις μακαρίζομεν.

[8v] || **1101b27–1102a19** (η') (δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος καλῶς συνηγορήσαι...) 10

Φέρει καὶ τὸν Εὐδοξον εἰς μαρτυρίαν τῶν λεγομένων. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ δοξάζων τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ ἐγκώμιον ἐπεποίητο παρὰ τῶν ἐγκωμιαζόντων, ἐπιθανολόγει ἐντεῦθεν τὸ ἄριστον αὐτῆς καὶ μακάριον, καὶ ταύτην ἔλεγε κρείττω τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ὡς τι θεϊότερον καὶ μακάριον, τοιοῦτο δὲ εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ταυτίζων τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν θεόν. ὡς γοῦν αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἔπαινον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν 15 ἡδονὴν ὑπὲρ ἔπαινον ἔφρασκεν, ἀναφερομένην καὶ αὐτήν, ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ, εἰς ἐκεῖνα, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸν θεόν.

Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ διαφορὰν ἐπαινοῦ καὶ ἐγκωμίου τίθησιν ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ὁ σοφιστὴς Ἀφθόνιος. ἰδιοποιεῖ γὰρ τὰ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τοῖς σωματικοῖς καὶ τοῖς ψυχικοῖς, τῇ δὲ ἀρετῇ, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔσμεν, τὸν ἔπαινον 20 ἀνατίθησιν ὡς μονώτιδι καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῷ. οὕτω καὶ Ἀφθόνιος λέγει περὶ ἐπαινοῦ, ὅτε ἐπαινοῦμεν μίαν πρᾶξιν ἀνθρώπου καὶ οὐ διεξοδικῶς περὶ πολλῶν λέγομεν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς ῥήτορσιν οἰκειότερα· ἡμῖν δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν δῆλον ὅτι τῶν τιμῶν καὶ τελειῶν ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἔοικε δὲ οὕτως εἶναι διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴν τελικὴν καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα τᾶλλα πράττεσθαι· τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα πανταχοῦ ἀγαθόν, ἢ ὃν ἢ φαινόμενον. 25

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὀριζόμεθα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, δεῖ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἂν ταύτης διακριβωθείσης καὶ τὸ ὀριστὸν (ἢ εὐδαιμονία) ἐξακριβωθήσεται. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός, εἰ μέλλοι γε διασῶζειν τὸν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ὄρον, περὶ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πεπονήσθαι, σκοπῶν ὅπως ἀρεταίνοντες ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ οἱ πολῖται καθιστῶνται καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ὑπείκοιντο. καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἐκάστοις νομοθετῶν, 30

11–17 Φέρει...θεόν] cf. Arist. EN 1101b27–32 11 Εὐδοξον] cf. Arist. EN 1101b27 19–20 τὰ... ἔσμεν] cf. Arist. EN 1101b32–34 22–25 ἀλλὰ...πράττεσθαι] cf. Arist. EN 1101b34–1102a4 26–42,1 Ἐπεὶ...Λυκούργου] cf. Arist. EN 1102a5–11

4 τοιοῦτων post καὶ τῶν primum scripsit, deinde erasit M 10 η' addidi | Im. addidi 12 οὐδεὶς M a. corr. 24 ἀρχὴν τελικὴν M (cum M^b O^b) : ἀρχὴ τελικὴ Arist. vulg. (EN 1102a2)

rhetoric or piloting a boat (for these skills may turn out one way or another, *and for that reason they are termed “capacities”*)—*he inquires where happiness should be located*. And *that it is not included among the capacities is clear*, he says, from the fact that it is not possible for this to go in either direction and to make the agent both good and bad. He inquires into the [remaining] two [possibilities] and at this point he investigates praise and the praiseworthy things, those that *are praised in relation to their qualities and how they stand in relation to something else*, and he sets out examples relating to both the soul and the body. For even *if we praise the gods*, he says, although this is *by means of our standards*, we speak this way. Therefore, *if the praise belongs to us, it is apparent that this would not be one of the best things, but something else*; happiness, however, is what is best, and therefore it is also held in honour; *for we call blessed both the most godlike of men and the most godlike of goods*, since they approach the gods.

|| 1101b27–1102a19 (18.) (Eudoxus was apparently right in advocating...) [8v]

[Aristotle] brings forward *Eudoxus* as well as a witness for his arguments. For the latter, holding that pleasure [is] a good, because [he realised that] no encomium had been produced for it by the encomiasts, argued plausibly on that basis for its supremacy and blessedness, and he used to say that this [i.e. pleasure] [is] *superior to the things we praise*, since [it is] something *more godlike* and blessed, *and that something similar holds for God himself and the good*, thus identifying God with the good. In consequence, just as it [i.e. the good] is beyond praise, so too he affirmed that pleasure is beyond praise, since it too *is referred* to the same standards as the rest of the human goods are, namely *the good and God*.

After this he also establishes a distinction between praise and encomium in a different way from how the sophist Aphonius does. For he specifies that *encomia* pertain to *deeds and actions, be they in the sphere of the body or that of the soul*, while *to virtue, by which we are rendered capable of accomplishing noble deeds*, he assigns praise for being unique and a blessing in an absolute sense. Aphonius also speaks thus about praise, when we praise a single human action and do not speak exhaustively about many [actions]. *However, to develop this subject is perhaps rather the business of rhetoricians; but it is clear to us for many reasons that happiness is among the things that are honourable and perfect. It seems to be thus because it is a first principle* connected with final causality and *other things are done for its sake*; and what is done for its own sake is good in all circumstances, whether it exists or merely appears to exist.

Since we define happiness using virtue [as a starting point], we must also discuss *the nature of virtue*, so that after it is precisely described, the definiendum (namely happiness) will be made precise as well. *It seems that the true statesman*, if he intended to maintain the standard of his political community, *would have invested much effort in virtue itself*, thinking about how *the citizens* could be made *virtuous* in every matter and *obedient to the laws*. This is apparent from [the examples of] the

ἔκ τε τοῦ παρὰ Κρησὶ Μίνωος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ Λάκωσι Λυκούργου· τούτους γὰρ ἐκθειάζει καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις. σὺ δὲ λέγε καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις Σόλωνα καὶ τὸν παρὰ Κροτωνιάταις Ζάλευκον καὶ λοιποὺς ἄλλους. πᾶσι γὰρ σκοπὸς καὶ σπουδὴ τοῦ πολίτας εἰς τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρετὰς καθιστᾶν. λέγομεν δὲ πολιτικὰς, ὅτι ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ τοῦ μονώτου καὶ ἄλλαι τοῦ πολιτευομένου, περὶ ἃς ἐκεῖνοι ἐσπούδασαν.

5

Περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον τῆς ἀνθρώπινης, οὔτε τῆς τῶν ἀλόγων οὔτε μᾶλλον τῆς οὐσιωμένης θεῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἡ φυσικὴ τὴν δὲ ἡ θεολογικὴ ἐπισκέπεται. καὶ αὐθις οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος (οἷον ὑγείαν καὶ εὐδρομίαν), ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι καὶ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν κατ' ἀρετὴν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐτίθεμεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως, δεῖ, φησί, τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, οὐ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἔργων.

10

1102a21–1102b19 ἰθ' (τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες...)

Ὡσπερ οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν χαριέστεροι πολλὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν πραγματεύονται, ὅπως σύνθετον καὶ οὐχ ἓν (ἔλεγε γὰρ καὶ Ἱπποκράτης «εἰ ἐν ἧν ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἂν ἤλγεεν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἤλγεεν, ἐν ἂν ἧν καὶ τὸ θεραπεῦον») καὶ ὅπως τὰ μέρη τούτου κατὰ τινὰ λόγον συνήρηται, καὶ ἄλλα πλεῖστα περὶ σώματος λέγουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν δεῖ τῆς περὶ ψυχὴν γνῶσεως, οὐ πάντως ὅπως αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὅπως φαντάζεται καὶ ὅπως δοξάζει ἢ διανοεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅπως τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπιδέχεται καὶ ὅπως ἔχουσα στέρεται τούτων, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὅσα περὶ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος αἴρεσιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βλαβεροῦ ἀποφυγὴν ἐστὶ ζητεῖν.

15

[9r] || Τὸ γὰρ ἐπιπλέον τούτων ζητεῖν ἔξω μὲν τούτου, οἰκείον δὲ τῇ φυσικῇ, ἣν λέγει καὶ λόγους ἐξωτερικούς, συγκρίνων πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ταῦτα καὶ γε τὴν ἠθικὴν, ὡσπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις αὐτῆς, ὅτι τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον. οὐδὲν δὲ διαφέρει ἐν τῷ παρόντι ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν εἰ διώρισται ταῦτα καὶ τοπικῶς, ὡσπερ τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τῶν λόγων μόνω, ὡς τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ (ἀπλατῆς γὰρ ἢ γραμμῆ τέλεον)· καὶ οὐ διορίζονται ταῦτα τόπῳ, εἰ καὶ τῶν λόγων διορίζονται.

20

Τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν φυτικόν ἐστίν, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ εἰπεῖν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ζητεῖ περὶ τούτου εἰ ἐπιδεκτικόν ἐστίν ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζει αὐτὸ πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν· τούτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐξητικόν καὶ θρεπτικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμβρύοις καὶ τοῖς τελείοις. εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ταύτην θεῖναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, ὅτι αἰεὶ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐνεργεῖ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ ὑπνοῦσι καὶ γρηγο-

25

30

1–2 ἔκ...Νόμοις] cf. Pl. Leg. 630d5–7, 632d2–4 6–10 Περὶ...ψυχῆς] cf. Arist. EN 1102a13–19 13–17 Ὡσπερ...γνώσεως] cf. Arist. EN 1102a21–23 14–15 ἔλεγε...θεραπεῦον] Hipp. De nat. hom. 168.4–6; cf. SVF II, fragm. 420 (138.19–20); cf. Philop. In De gener. et corrupt. 4.33–34 21–23 Τὸ...ἄλογον] cf. Arist. EN 1102a25–28 23–25 οὐδὲν...περιφερείᾳ] cf. Arist. EN 1102a28–32 27–44, 18 Τοῦ...σώματος] cf. Arist. EN 1102a32–1102b19

12 Im. addidi 29 ἔξιν M : δύναμιν Arist. vulg. (EN 1102a33–34)

lawgivers in various places, from Minos among *the Cretans* and Lycurgus among *the Spartans*; for Plato admires these men in the “Laws”. You should also count [among the lawgivers] Solon in Athens and Zaleucus among the people of Croton and the rest of them. For all of them aimed at and seriously engaged in acquainting their citizens with the political virtues. We say “political”, because one set of virtues is appropriate for a solitary person and another for the person who lives in a city, and they [i.e. the above-mentioned lawgivers] were concerned with the latter.

The virtue that we must consider is human virtue, not the one specific to non-rational things or even the one that exists with God and is beyond the human being; because natural science will investigate the former, and theological science the latter. Again, [our interest is in excellence] *not of the body* (such as health and speed), *but of the soul*, because we also established that *happiness is a virtuous activity of the soul*. And if this is so, the statesman, he says, must also have some knowledge about the soul, not about its essential nature but about its functions.

1102a21–1102b19 19. (Physicians of the better class...)

Just as *the more accomplished physicians devote much attention to the study of the human body*, how it is a composite entity rather than a unity (for Hippocrates used to say: “if man were a unity, he would not feel pain. And if he felt pain, the cure too would have to be a unity”) and how its parts have been joined together in conformity with some rational principle, and they discuss many other matters relating to the body, so also *the student of politics* is in need of knowledge regarding *the soul*, not necessarily how it understands or how it perceives or how it forms an opinion or thinks [in an abstract sense], but how it receives the moral virtues and how, despite possessing them, it comes to lack them, and in one word everything one can ask regarding choosing the expedient and avoiding the harmful.

|| For to investigate this subject *in greater detail* than this lies outside the scope of [9r] this inquiry and is instead appropriate to natural science, which *he also calls extraneous discourses*, comparing ethics as well to the current points, just as is true of its [i.e. the soul’s] division, namely that *one part of it is rational, the other non-rational*. It makes no difference for present purposes to investigate with reference to these parts *whether they are also separated* in terms of localisation, *like the parts of the body*, or [they are distinguishable] *in thought only, like the convex and concave sides of a curved surface* (because the edge line without latitude is complete); nor are they separable in relation to place, even if they are separable by definition.

Of the non-rational part [of the soul], one portion is vegetative, and before talking about the other portion, which is the perceptive, he inquires regarding the latter whether it is receptive of excellence and he rejects this [possibility] by virtue of its *mentioned habit*; because this is *the part responsible for growth and nutrition*, which is its role in regard to *both embryos and fully-developed organisms*. For it is *quite reasonable to assign this [faculty]* to fully-grown creatures as well, since nature is always *active* in such [creatures] in connection with it, both *when they are asleep*

ροῦσι. τέως κοινή τις αὐτῆ ἀρετῆ καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἐμβρύοις καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπικὴ τις φαίνεται. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κακός, περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖ ἡ ἠθικὴ, οὐ φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις· ἀπρακτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ ἀμφότεροι, ὡς παρομοιάζειν ἀλλήλοις τούτους ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει τοῦ βίου τῷ ὕπνῳ. ἔλεγε γὰρ καὶ Ἀρίστων ὡς ὁ ὕπνος οἷον τελώνης τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀφαιρεῖται ἡμισυ· ἀργία γὰρ ψυχῆς ὁ ὕπνος, καὶ διαταῦτα ἀργεῖ τότε καὶ ἡ φαύλη καὶ ἡ σπουδαία, πλὴν εἰ μὴ τινες κατὰ μικρὸν φασματώδεις κινήσεις διῶκουσιν ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ὕπνωττόντων ὀνειράσιν, ὡς ἐμφαίνεσθαί τινα ἀπηχήματα τῶν ἐπιβαλλουσῶν πράξεων ἐκατέρῳ τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν· τότε γὰρ βελτίω τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐατέον τὸ τοιοῦτον θεραπευτικόν, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. 5

Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, ἥτις ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φαινομένη μετέχει πως λόγου. καὶ δῆλον ἔκ τε τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς· μάχεται γὰρ ὁ λόγος τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ πολλάκις μὲν περιγίνεται, ὡς ἐγκρατῆ γίνεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, πολλάκις δὲ ἠττάται, ὡς ἀκρατῆ λέγεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἠθικῇ προσήκει, ὅτι καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν, διότι ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἔξω τοῦ λόγου 15
πολλάκις γίνεται καὶ ἐπιφέρει τὸ ἀκρατὲς δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ μαχόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν νικῶν ποτὲ δὲ ἠττώμενον, λόγῳ διοικεῖται. ἔστι δὲ δῆλον τοῦτο ἔκ τῶν παραλελυμένων μερῶν τοῦ σώματος.


4–5 ἔλεγε... ἡμισυ] cf. SVF I, fragm. 403 (90.9–11)

1 ἀνθρωπικὴ M (cum L^b M^b) : ἀνθρωπίνῃ Arist. vulg. (EN 1102b3)

and when they are awake. Therefore, this *excellence appears to be common* to all plants and embryos and *not something specifically human*. *The good person and the bad*, whom ethics focuses on, *cannot be clearly differentiated while they are sleeping*; because neither is doing anything, with the result that these [people] are much alike in *the half of their lives* in which they are asleep. For Ariston also *used to say that sleep, just like the tax-collector, deprives us of half our lives; because sleep is inactivity of the soul*, and for this reason both the *good* and the *bad* [soul] are inactive at this time, *except that in some small degree certain fictitious sense-impressions may penetrate* the dreams of those who are sleeping, so that certain traces of each person's actions that impose themselves daily are reflected [in their dreams]. For at that point *the dreams of the good are better than those of ordinary people*. *This is enough on this subject, however, but we may omit from consideration the aforementioned nutritive [part of the soul], since it has by its nature no share in human excellence*.

But there appears to be another non-rational element in the soul as well, which in the case of a human being appears to *participate somehow in reason*. This is evident from [the behaviour of] both the *uncontrolled and self-controlled person*, since reason fights with desire and often overcomes [it], so that the individual becomes self-controlled, but in many other cases it is defeated [by desire], so that [the individual] is said to be uncontrolled. *Extolling the rational part [of the soul]* is appropriate to ethics, because it [i.e. *the rational part*] *urges people towards what is best*. It is clear, however, that [the non-rational part of the soul] frequently overpowers rationality and engenders incontinence; for *the part that combats rationality*, sometimes triumphing over it but sometimes succumbing to it, is governed by it. This is confirmed by the *palsied portions of the body*.

Diagramma ii



οὐκοῦν τῶν ἀρετῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ διανοητικαί,
αἱ δὲ ἠθικαί.

cf. Arist. EN 1102b32–1103a7, 1102a32–1102b6, 1102b11–31


1102b21–1103a10 κ' (ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὀρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον...)

*Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος παραφερόμενον, ἐπειδὴ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν, ὀρῶμεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς
ψυχῆς οὐχ ὀρῶμεν. τέως, ὡσπερ ἐνταῦθα τῆς φύσεως ἢ τῆς ὀρμῆς αὐτῆς κινούσης
οὐχ ὑπακούει τὸ μέλος ἀλλ' ἀλλαχοῦ φέρεται, οὕτω λογιστέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς
ἀνθρωπίνης τὸ παρὰ τὴν πειθαρχίαν τοῦ λόγου παραφερόμενον. οὐδὲν δὲ διαφέρει 5
κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ζητεῖν εἰ ἕτερον ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ὀρεκτικόν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τό τε τῷ*

3–4 ὡσπερ... φέρεται] cf. Arist. EN 1102b18–21 3–48,1 ἢ... τὸ] cf. Arist. EN 1102b32–1103a7

1 Im. addidi 3 κινούσης scripsi : κινούσας M

Diagram ii



Thus some of the virtues are intellectual, while others are moral.

1102b21–1103a10 20. (But in the case of bodies, we see the part that moves astray...)

We see the part of the body that moves astray, since it is perceptible, but we cannot see the erratic member of the soul. Thus, just as a [palsied] limb disobeys when nature or an independent impulse moves it in one direction and it is carried off in the wrong direction, so too in the case of the human soul one must make sense of the fact that it moves astray in defiance of obedience to reason's command. For the purposes of the present investigation, it is not important whether the faculties of the desire and of appetite are different or identical, the one part being obedient to reason and the other refusing to listen to it. Just as we said, we reiterate this point alone: since in the

λόγω πειθόμενον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπακοῦον. ὥσπερ δὲ εἶπομεν, τοῦτο μόνον λέγομεν καὶ πάλιν· ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄν, ἐπεὶ μάχη γίνεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς πολλάκις μὲν περιγίνεσθαι πολλάκις δὲ ἠττᾶσθαι, εἰκότως λόγου μετέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον· καὶ τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς ἀντιβαίνει. διατοῦτο καὶ ἐπιφέρει «τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου», ὅτι οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν 5 ἀντιβαίνον τῷ λόγῳ ὕστερον ὑπεῖκει, ἀλλ' ἐξαρχῆς τῷ λόγῳ πείθεται· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς ἐστὶ, τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ μὴ ἀγομένου, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν μὴ πασχόντων.

[9v] Ὅλως συνάγεται γοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ ἄλογον διττόν· τὸ μὲν ἀκοινώνητον τοῦ λόγου, ὡς καὶ φυτοῖς προσῆκον, τὸ δὲ μετέχον πως καὶ ἢ λέγεται «ἔχειν λόγον»· οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ μαθηματικά διὰ λόγου θεωρούμενα, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦ πατρός φαμεν 10 λόγον ἔχειν, ὡς ποτὲ μὲν πειθαρχεῖν, ποτὲ δ' ἀντιβαίνειν· καὶ δηλον ἐκ τῆς νοουθητήσεως. εἰ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ χρή φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διατοῦτο καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ διανοητά. διττόν ἄρα καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀκουστικόν μόνον. διορίζονται δὲ καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν· αἱ μὲν διανοητικαὶ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ, αἱ δ' ἠθικαὶ τοῦ λόγον ἀπλῶς ἔχοντος. εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ ἢ σοφία 15 καὶ ἡ σύνεσις, ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ταύτας ἔχοντας κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετάς καὶ οὐ τὰς (ἐκ) κακουργίας καὶ τὰς ἐκ πονηρίας καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τὰς ἐκ φαύλου ἤθους ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

1–2 ὑπακοῦον... τοῦ²] cf. Arist. EN 1102a32–1102b6 15–17 τοῦ... διοικεῖται] cf. Arist. EN 1102b11–31 2–3 Τὸ... ὀρώμεν] cf. Arist. EN 1102b21–23 5–48, 18 οὐδὲν... λέγομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1102b23–1103a10

17 ἐκ¹ addidi

case of the human being there is an element of such a sort that, when a struggle arises between it and reason, it prevails in many cases but is defeated in many others, this *element* can reasonably be said *to participate in reason*; and *in the self-controlled person this element obeys the authority of reason*, but in the case of the unrestrained person it resists. Because of this, he also affirms “*in the case of the moderate and brave person*”, because this part does not initially resist rationality and then later submits to it, but is obedient to reason from the beginning; for the latter [i.e. obedience to reason] is [characteristic] of the self-controlled person, who even when he is suffering is not affected [by his situation], while the former [i.e. initially resisting rationality and later submitting to it] is characteristic of people who do not suffer anything at all.

Therefore it is inferred from these points collectively that *the non-rational part [of the soul] is divided into two subsections: one subsection of it has no share of rationality*, since it is specific to *plants*, but *the other does in a sense participate [in it]* and || is said “*to take account*”; not in the way that in *mathematics* conclusions are drawn [9v] by means of reason, but *in the sense that we speak of taking account of advice from one’s father*, since sometimes one is obedient, but at other times one resists; and this is apparent from our *practice of admonishing people*. Consequently, *if it is [more] correct to speak also of [the appetitive part of the soul] as rational*, it is on that basis [that the point is made] and not as in the sense of the objects of thought. Surely *then [the part of the soul] that possesses reason is also divided into two subsections, one subsection [having rationality] in the proper sense and in itself, the other only in the sense of following [reason]*. *The virtues are also differentiated in correspondence with this division: some virtues are intellectual* and belong to the rational faculty, *while others are moral* and they belong to the part of the soul that is rational in a straightforward way. For *wisdom and practical intelligence* are intellectual virtues, and we praise those who have these virtues *for their disposition*. And we use the term “*virtues*” for *dispositions that are praiseworthy* rather than those that stem (from) wickedness or vice or another bad character trait.

(Ἡθικῶν Νικομαχείων βῆτα)

τοῦ β': διττῆς τοιγαροῦν οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῆς μὲν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τῆς δὲ τοῦ λόγῳ ὑπέικοντος ὀρεκτικοῦ, καὶ τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἢ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν διδασκαλίαις ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν (ἢ γὰρ σοφία τοιαύτη καὶ ἡ σύνεσις), διόπερ χρήζει καὶ χρόνου καὶ ἐμπειρίας πρὸς τὴν μάθησιν, ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὡς καὶ τοῦνομα δηλοῖ. φησὶ γὰρ καὶ Εὐῆνος·

φημί πολυχρόνιον ἔμμεν μελέτην,
καὶ ταύτην δὴ τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

οἰονεὶ φυσιοῦται ἐν ταύτῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ ὅτι οὐ φύσει αἰ τοιαῦταί εἰσιν ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν τῶν ἐν φύσει ἄλλως ἐθίζεσθαι. κατὰ ταύτας δὲ δυνατὸς ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐθίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ.

1103a23–1103b20 α' (οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί...)

Πάντα τὰ παρόντα ταῦτα κατασκευαστικά εἰσιν τοῦ ἐξ ἔθους καὶ μὴ ἐκ φύσεως περιγίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὰς ἀρετάς. οὔτε γὰρ φύσει οὔτε μὴν παρὰ φύσιν ἐπισυμβαίνουσιν, ὡς πολλάκις συμβαίνει τῷ λίθῳ τὸ ἄνω φέρεσθαι ἐκ τινος ἀνάγκης ἰσχυροτέρας, ἀλλὰ πεφύκαμεν μὲν εἰς τὸ τὰς ἀρετάς δέξασθαι (τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ ἡμετέρα φύσις, δεκτικὴ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔστιν, ὡςπερ ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος εἶδους), τελειούμεθα δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐκ φύσεως ἀλλ' ἐκ διδασκαλίας καὶ ἄλλως ἔθους.

Ἔτι καὶ ἐτέρως συλλογίζεται· ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν περιγίνεται, πρότερον ἔχομεν τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ εἶθ' οὕτως τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀποδίδομεν. καὶ ταύτη γὰρ διαφέρει πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ τὰ ἐν γενέσει τῶν θείων, ὅτι ἐκεῖνα αἰεὶ ἐνέργειαί εἰσιν (οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσιν ὕλην τὴν δυναμένην ἐπ' ἄμφω), ταῦτα δὲ προβαίνουσιν ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν. μὴ γοῦν τις λέγοι περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὅτι ἅμα τῇ γενέσει ταύτας ἔχομεν καὶ διαταῦτα δόξειεν ἂν ὅτι δίχα δυνάμεως ἐνεργοῦμεν. καὶ τούτων γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἀποδίδομεν, ὡς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς μεμαθήκαμεν, ὥστε ἢ μὲν αἰσθησις ἅμα τῇ ἡμῶν γενέσει ἔστί, τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐνέργειά τις ἐκ δυνάμεως ἔστι.

Τέως τὸ διάφορον τῶν αἰσθήσεων πρὸς τὰς ἀρετάς ὅτι ἐκεῖσε μὲν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει ὄντες αἰσθητικοὶ ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμε-

2–11 διττῆς...μή] cf. Arist. EN 1103a14–20 6–8 φησὶ...εἶναι] Even. fragm. 9; cf. EN 1152a31–33; cf. Anon. In EN 444.22–24 14–20 οὔτε¹...ἀποδίδομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1103a20–28 23 μή... αἰσθήσεων] cf. Arist. EN 1103a28 24–26 καὶ²...ἔστι] cf. Arist. De an. 417a2–20 27–52,2 ὅτι... ταύτας¹] cf. Arist. EN 1103a28–31

1 Ἡθικῶν Νικομαχείων βῆτα in marg. superiore 11 post μή schol. i (vid. append.) 12 lm. addidi 19 περιγίνεται M (cum L^b M^b) : παραγίνεται Arist. vulg. (EN 1103a26)

[Book 2 of the “Nicomachean Ethics”]

[Beginning] of Book 2: Therefore, *virtue is of two kinds, one intellectual and the other moral*, and the former pertains to the rational faculty, the latter to the appetitive faculty which complies with reason; *intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased while one is engaged in learning* (for wisdom and practical intelligence are examples of this type), *for which reason it has need of both time and experience* for the acquisition of knowledge; *moral virtue, on the other hand, comes about as the result of habit (“ethos”), as its name illustrates*. For *Evenus* states:

*Habit, I say, is a long-term matter,
and ultimately becomes nature.*

as if a human being acquired his nature in the course of it. So he [i.e. Aristotle] attempts [to prove] that moral virtues are *not* engendered *by nature* from the fact that *no natural property can be brought into another condition through habituation*. Therefore a human being is able to form or not form a habit in conformity with these [moral virtues].

1103a23–1103b20 1. (The virtues therefore are engendered [in us] neither by nature nor contrary to nature...)

All the current points are constructive for the argument that the virtues come about in us from habituation rather than from nature. For they come about [for us] *neither by nature nor in fact contrary to nature*, as often happens with *the stone* that has the attribute of *moving upwards* in response to some more powerful necessity, *but we are naturally adapted to receive the virtues* (for such is our nature; it is capable of receiving the virtues, just as bronze [is capable of receiving] the shape of a statue), *while on the other hand we are made perfect* in them not by nature but as a result of teaching and, in another way, by *habituation*.

Again, he infers [this argument] syllogistically in another manner: *in the case of the things that accrue to us from nature*, we possess [them] *first in a potential form* [i.e. as capacities] and *afterwards we exhibit their actual activity* in this manner [i.e. through habit]. Everything human or involved in generation [i.e. everything that is subject to change] differs from divine matters in this respect, that the latter are always actualities (because they lack matter, which makes it possible to be in both states [i.e. potentiality and actuality]), whereas the former [i.e. everything human and involved in generation] transitions from potentiality to actuality. In any case, let no one say in regard to *our senses* that we possess them simultaneously with our generation, and that for these reasons we may seem to exercise them without potentiality. For we refer to our activity for these things [i.e. sensations] as distinct from our capacity, just as we have learned in his “On the Soul”, so that our sense-perception [arises] simultaneously with our creation, whereas the act of sense-perception is an activity that originates from a capacity.

θα καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ἡγάγομεν εἰς ἐνέργειαν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνεργοῦντες λαμβάνομεν ταύτας. ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐχὶ κατὰ ταύτας ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς ἐνέργειαν προβιβαζόμεθα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔχοντες ὕστερον ἐκτῆσάμεθα; ἢ σκοπητέον ἀκριβῶς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας λέγει ἢ τις προβαίνει ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ἀτελοῦς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοιαύτης καθ' ἣν ἐνεργοῦμεν τὴν τελείαν δύναμιν ἔχοντες, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ καθ' ἕξιν. 5
 ὅρα γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων παράδειγμα, αἴτινες εἰ καὶ δυνάμει ἔχουσαι τελειωθῆναι δι' αἰσθητῶν, κατ' ἐνέργειαν γίνονται. ἀλλ' οὖν ἕξεων τούτων οὐσῶν τελείων, καθ' ἃς ἐνεργήσομεν, εἰ βουλοίμεθα, ἐνεργοῦμεν. διατοῦτο γὰρ εἶπε καὶ τὸ «κομιζόμεθα» ἐπὶ τῶν δυνάμεων, καθ' ἕξιν γινόμενοι, καὶ τὸ «ἀποδίδομεν» ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, 10
 ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν βουλόμενοι, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν.

Καὶ εὐθὺς ἐπάγει καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα, καὶ τοὺς νομοθέτας εἰς μαρτυρίαν τῶν [10r] λεγομένων παράγει. Ἔτι φησὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ γίνονται ταῦτα καὶ φθείρονται, τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τῷ γένει· αἴ τε γὰρ καλαὶ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ μοχθηραὶ τῷ μὲν γένει εἰσὶν αἱ αὐταί, τῷ δὲ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν. προβιβάζει δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν τὸν λόγον· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῷ γένει ἐνεργήματος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καθαρισταὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι γίνονται, καὶ 15
 διατοῦτο καὶ τοῦ διδάξοντος δεῖ. τοῦτο νομιστέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τῶν ἀναστροφῶν τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ γένει, οὐ μὴν τῷ εἶδει, γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ μὲν σώφρονες οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι.

1103b21–1104a13 β' (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται...)

Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἕξεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν 20
 καὶ τοῦ πολλάκις ἐνεργεῖν τὰ αὐτά, ἢ καλὰ ἢ φαῦλα, αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται ἢ ἀγαθαὶ ἢ φαῦλαι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει, ὅτι δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιας ἀποδίδοναι, ὅτι κατὰ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀποδίδονται. οὐδὲ γὰρ μικρὸν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως ἐθίζεσθαι. εἰπὼν δὲ «ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ», ἵνα τὸ καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀπαγορεύσῃ, ἐπάγει «μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν» καὶ λίαν εἰκότως· ἐπεὶ γὰρ αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ 25
 ἐκ τοῦ ἐθίζεσθαι γίνονται, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ἕθις ἀναγκαία πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν τελείωσιν· διὰ τοῦ εἰπεῖν «τὸ πᾶν» ἐκβάλλει τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως γίνεσθαι ταύτας.

8–9 διατοῦτο...ἐνεργειῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1103a26–28 11–12 καὶ²...παράγει] cf. Arist. EN 1103b2–3
 12–13 ἔτι...φθείρονται] cf. Arist. EN 1103b6–8 12–15 ἔτι...γίνονται] cf. Asp. In EN 39.20–28
 14–15 ἐκ²...γίνονται] cf. Arist. EN 1103b8–9 16 τοῦ...δεῖ] cf. Arist. EN 1103b12 | καὶ²...ἀρετῶν]
 Arist. EN 1103b13–14 16–18 ἐκ...ἀκόλαστοι] cf. Arist. EN 1103b15–20 20–27 Ἐπὶ...ταύτας] cf.
 Arist. EN 1103b21–25

18 post ἀκόλαστοι schol. ii (vid. append.) 19 lm. addidi

The difference between sense-perception and the virtues, then, lies in the fact that in the former case *we did not acquire the faculty of sight as a result of repeated acts of seeing, but* instead, because we already *had* the faculties of sense-perception by nature, *we used them* and brought what we had through capacity to activity; *whereas in the case of the virtues we acquire them by practising them.* But how is it possible that in the case of the virtues as well we do not advance from what we have through capacity to activity, if we do not have them but only acquired them at a later stage? Surely the dialectical proof must be examined precisely: for he is not speaking of the sort of activity by which one transitions from what is incomplete in capacity, but about the sort in accord with which we act having complete capacity, i.e. that which answers to a formed state. For observe also the example that has to do with our senses: even if these are potentially endowed with the capacity to be completed by means of the sensible objects, they come about via exercise [of that capacity]. Even so, since these dispositions are perfect in conformity with which we will exercise our activity, if we wish to do so, we exercise our activity. For this is why he said in reference to *the capacities* that “*they are bestowed on us*”, since we are born in accord with a formed state, and in reference to *the activities* that “*we exhibit them*”, because we exercise them when we wish to, which is not the case in reference to the virtues.

He also adduces examples immediately and invokes *the law-givers* to witness these claims. || *Again, he states* that the [virtues] both *arise and are destroyed by* [10r] *means of the same activities—the same in genus; for noble and base activities are the same in genus, but differ in species.* He also advances the argument using an analogy from the arts; because both good harp players and bad [ones] are formed from an activity that is the same in genus, and this is why a teacher is needed. One must hold this view in reference to the virtues as well: it is from the *modes of behaviour* that are the same in respect to their genus, but not in respect to their species, that *some of us become brave, others cowardly, and some temperate, others unrestrained.*

1103b21–1104a13 2. (Our moral dispositions are formed as a result of similar activities...)

In the case of our physical qualities, our activities [originate] from [inborn] tendencies, whereas in the case of our moral qualities, *our dispositions become* either good or bad *as a result of our activities* and from engaging many times in *the same* [actions], whether noble or base. For this is what he affirms, namely that *we necessarily produce activities of a certain kind*, because *the settled dispositions* too are produced *corresponding to the differences between these* [repeated actions]. For *it makes no small difference whether we form habits of one kind rather than another.* And after affirming “*on the contrary, it is of very great* [importance]”, in order to prevent any other understanding in regard to these matters, he adds “*rather it makes all the difference*” and reasonably so; because since the moral virtues are developed through habituation, accustomation is surely indispensable for the perfection of the

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ θεωρίας ἔνεκα ἢ παροῦσα σκέψις, ἵνα μόνην τῶν προκειμένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητοῖμεν, ἀλλὰ πράξεως, ἵνα δηλονότι ἀγαθοὶ γινώμεθα, ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ τέλος τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς (τὰ γὰρ ἔνεκά του δίχα τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα μάταια, ὡσπερ καὶ νηστεία δίχα τοῦ ταπεινοῦσθαι), ἀναγκαῖον διαταῦτα τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις θεωρῆσαι, πῶς πρακτέον ταύτας πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τελείωσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κατὰ 5 τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πρακτέον ὑποκείσθω κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσῃ πράξει· εἰ γὰρ μὴπραχθεῖη κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, πάντως φαύλη ἐσειται καὶ οὐχ ἕξει τὸ εὖ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν.

Τέως δὲ ἀναβεβλημένου τούτου, προδιομολογείσθω τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἔλεγεν, ὡς τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει ζητεῖσθαι ὁ ὀρθὸς τῶν πράξεων λόγος, ὅτι οἱ 10 λόγοι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἀπαιτητέοι. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἀπάσῃ καὶ τῇ τυχούσῃ ὕλῃ ὁμοίως τοὺς τῶν ἀνδριάντων λόγους ζητήσομεν οὔτε ἐν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ τυχόντι τὸν ὀρθὸν τῆς πράξεως λόγον· κἄλλως γὰρ ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἄλλως ὁ τυχὼν πράξειεν ἂν τὸ αὐτό. τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν οὐδὲ τὰ συμφέροντα τὸ ἐστηκὸς ἔχει καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· πολλακίς γὰρ τὸ τιμι συμφέρον ἄλλῳ οὐ συνοίσει, καὶ αὐτῷ νῦν μὲν συνοίσει, αὔριον δὲ ἄλλως ἕξει, ὡσπερ δῆτα καὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ σιτία ἄλλον ὠφελήσειαν καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀργὰ μενοῦσιν. 15 τοιοῦτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ ἀβέβαιον ἕξει ὁ λόγος, εἰ ἐν τοῖς [10v] καθέκαστα ἢ ζητηθεῖη· οὐ γὰρ ἢ αὐτὴ τέχνη καὶ ἢ αὐτὴ παραγγελία τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀρμόσει, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς. πειρατέον δὲ ἡμῖν βοηθεῖν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λόγῳ· τοῦτο δὲ θεωρητέον πρῶτον, ὅτι τὰς τοιαύτας ἀγαθὰς πράξεις αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ αἱ ἐνδειαὶ φθείρουσιν. 20

1104a24–1104b18 γ' (ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὡσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι...)

Πᾶσα ἀρετὴ μεσότης οὔσα φθορὰς ἔχει τὰ παρ' ἐκότερα· ἐκκλίνει γὰρ τῆς μεσότητος, ἐν ἣ γε τὴν σωτηρίαν εἶχεν, καὶ παρευθὺς φθείρεται. οὐ μόνον δέ, φησὶν, αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ γένει, ὡς ἐλέγομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς 25 ἔσσονται· καὶ λαμβάνει τὴν ἰσχὺν ὡς παράδειγμα· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὅλως φανερῶν τὰ ἀφανῆ ἀποδεικνυνται. γενέσεις γοῦν ἰσχύος ἢ λήψις τῆς πολλῆς καὶ ἱκανῆς τροφῆς, καὶ αὐξήσις τὸ πολλοὺς ὑπομένειν πόνους· διανεμητέον γὰρ τὸ μὲν «ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν» διὰ τὴν

1–7 Ἐπεὶ...ἀρετῆν] cf. Arist. EN 1103b26–34 8–10 Τέως...ἀπαιτητέοι] cf. Arist. EN 1103b34–1104a3 12–20 τὰ...φθείρουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1104a3–13 22–23 Πᾶσα...φθείρεται] cf. Arist. EN 1104a25–27 23–25 οὐ...ἔσσονται] cf. Arist. EN 1104a27–29 25–56,23 καὶ...ὕγιαζεσθαι] cf. Arist. EN 1104a27–1104b18

13 οὐδὲ in ras. | οὐδὲ ταῦτα post συμφέροντα primum scripsit, deinde erasit M 21 schol. iii in marg. exteriore (vid. append.) | lm. addidi 25 φανερῶν scripsi : φανερόν M

virtues; by saying “*all the difference*”, he rejects the notion that these [virtues] come about in a different manner.

Since then our present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge, in which case we would examine only the truth of the [arguments] proposed, but also has a *practical aim*, evidently *in order that we may become good*, since, if it were not intended for this end, *our investigation would be of no use* (because things done for the sake of an end are futile without the end for which they are done, just as fasting [is futile] without being humble), *it is necessary* for these reasons to consider *the nature of actions*, namely *how one is to perform them* with an eye to accomplishing the good. *Let* the notion that *one ought to act in conformity with correct reason be assumed as a common principle* for every action; for if [an action] is not done in accord with correct reason, it will be thoroughly bad and will lack the property of being done well and in conformity with virtue.

Since discussion of this [issue] has been delayed for a while, *let this be conceded beforehand*, as he also said previously, *that the correct account of matters of conduct ought to be investigated in outline and not precisely*, since *accounts must only be required to match their subject matter*. For we shall neither seek specifications of statues in the same manner in every possible chance material, nor [shall we seek] the correct account of action for every chance individual person; for the wise person and the ordinary person would perform the same action in different ways. And [the point that] *in matters of conduct not even matters of expediency have anything fixed* is also unavoidable, since it is frequently the case that what is beneficial for one person will not be so for another, and that what will be suitable for him at the present time will be otherwise tomorrow, *just as healthy foods* would benefit one person but will remain useless for another. *And if the general theory [of ethics] is such, the account will be even more unreliable*, if *particular cases [of action]* || were investigated; for the [10v] same *expertise* and the same *set of prescriptions* will not apply to the same agents, *but they must also consider the occasion*, just as is the case with the art of medicine or of navigation. But we must try to lend some aid to this discussion, and the first observation that must be made is that *excesses and deficiencies destroy these good actions*.

1104a24–1104b18 3. (The person who shuns all [pleasure], as boors do...)

Since every virtue is intermediate, it is destroyed by the two extremes [i.e. excess and deficiency]; because it inclines away from the intermediary position, in which *it was safe*, and is immediately *destroyed*. *But not only*, he says, *[are the virtues] generated and fostered from actions that are the same* in genus, as we were saying, *but they will also find their full exercise in the same actions*; and he takes *bodily strength* as an example, because invisible things are illustrated from qualities that are generally *visible*. *Strength*, for example, is produced by the intake of *large quantities* of appropriate food, and is increased by *undergoing much exertion*; because one must distinguish “*from the same [actions]*” with reference to the *production*, and “*by the same*

γένεσιν, τὸ δὲ «ὐπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν» διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν. ὄρα γοῦν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς ἰσχύος· ἰσχυρὸς γάρ τις ὦν *δυνήσεται καὶ πολλὰ φαγεῖν καὶ πολλοὺς ὑπομένειν κόπους*· καὶ αὐτὸς φθορὰ ἰσχύος τὸ ὀλίγα τρώγειν καὶ μηδὲν πονεῖν, ὥστε μὴ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ ὀλίγον ὁ προσίεται εἰς πέψιν χρηστὴν ἀναδίδοσθαι. ἢ μέντοι γε τοῦ ἀνισχύρου ἐνέργεια τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μήτε πολλὰ φαγεῖν μήτε πολλὰ πονεῖν. οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 5
ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι ἡμᾶς τῶν ἡδονῶν γεννᾶται ἐν ἡμῖν ἢ σωφροσύνη, καὶ σώφρονες γινόμενοι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. μὴ ταραπτόμεθα δὲ ἡμᾶς ἢ ἀποχή, ὡς μᾶλλον ἀργία τῆς ἀκολασίας οὔσα ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς σωφροσύνης· ἢ γὰρ ἀποχὴ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀργία μὲν ἡμῶν ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, ἐνέργεια δὲ τῆς σωφροσύνης ἀποδιοπομπούσης τὰς ἡδονάς καὶ οἶονεὶ ἀνθισταμένης αὐταῖς· *ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἔχει.* 10

Σημεῖον δέ, φησί, δεῖ τίθεσθαι ὅπως περὶ τὰς ἔξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διακειμέθα (μήπως ὡς βιαζόμενοι καὶ ἀκουσίως ἐμμένομεν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ οὐκ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ταῖς ἔξεσιν ἀσμενίζομεν) *τὴν ἐπιγινόμενὴν τοῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἔργοις ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην,* ὥστε εἰ μὲν χαίρομεν ἐν οἷς τὰ σώφρονα ἐργαζόμεθα, σώφρονας δείκνυσθαι ἡμᾶς, εἰ δὲ 15
λυπούμεθα, δῆλον ὡς ἔξωθέν τις βία καὶ δυναστεία ἡμᾶς πρὸς ταῦτα κινεῖ. καὶ ἦν καιροῦ τινος τύχοιμεν, ἐμφανεῖς ἐσμεν ἀποκλινοῦντες πρὸς τὰναντία· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετῆς οὐδὲ τρόπος ἀνδρὸς φιλαρέτου.

[11r] "Ὅτι δὲ *περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ πᾶσα* δηλοῖ καὶ Πλάτων ἢ παραγέλλων ἄγεσθαι πρὸς ταύτας *ἐκ νέων.* ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ δείκνυται· αἱ γὰρ ἀρεταὶ εἰσὶ *περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις· παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πράξει ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη· αἱ 20* ἀρεταὶ ἄρα *περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶ.* δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις λυπαὶ τινες οὔσαι καὶ *ιατρεῖαι* ἀντίπαλοι τῶν ἡδονῶν· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία *διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασιν* ὑγιάζεσθαι.

1104b18–1105a12 δ' (ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρόην εἶπομεν...)

"Ἐτι λιπαίνει τὸν λόγον καὶ κατασκευάζει πῶς ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας 25
καταγίνεται, ἐντεῦθεν λέγων ὅτι *πᾶσα ἔξις ψυχῆς, ὑφ' οἷων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἢ χείρων ἢ βελτίων, περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει,* ὡς φέρε εἰπεῖν ἐκ νουθημάτων Θεόγνιδος, βελτίων, ἐκ δὲ Χοιρίλλου, χείρων. *περὶ ταῦτα ἄρα καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα τὴν ῥοπήν ἔχει τῆς φύσεως* ὁ μὲν βελτίων γινόμενος περὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεόγνιδος, ὁ δὲ χείρων περὶ τὰ τοῦ Χοιρίλλου. *δι' ἡδονῆς δὲ καὶ λύπης καὶ χείρονες καὶ βελτίους γίνονται ἄνθρωποι·* 30

2 ἰσχυρὸς...κόπους] cf. [Helioid.] In EN 29.24–25

25–60,2 "Ἐτι...πρόβλημα] cf. Arist. EN

1104b18–1105a12

23 post ὑγιάζεσθαι schol. iv et v (vid. append.) 24 Im. addidi

[actions]” with reference to the *growth* [of strength]. Observe e.g. also the activity associated with strength; for if someone is *strong*, *he will be able both to eat much food and to endure much trouble*; and again strength is diminished by eating very little and never working hard, with the result that on account of the latter the small quantity [of food] admitted is not distributed [throughout the body] in service of a proper digestion. Yet the activity of the person who lacks strength is characterised by the inability to eat much or to undertake much exertion. *This is also the case in regard to the virtues: moderation is engendered in us by our abstaining from pleasures, and we abstain from pleasures when we are temperate*. Abstinence should not trouble us, since it is a suspension of self-indulgence rather than an activity of moderation; because abstinence from the pleasures is our inactivity in relation to the pleasures, but is an activity regarding moderation, which dismisses the pleasures and as it were resists them; *it is the same in the case of courage*.

We must, he says, establish a *sign* for ourselves of how we are disposed with respect to *the dispositions* and virtues (lest somehow we persist in the virtues as if we were under compulsion and involuntarily, and are not satisfied with our dispositions from ourselves) towards the *pleasure or pain that supervenes on actions* performed in accord with virtue, so that if we take pleasure in instances in which we act moderately, we are shown to be moderate, whereas if we feel pain, it is apparent that some external constraint or power compels us to these [actions]. And if we were to chance upon some opportunity, we will clearly be moving away [from this] towards the opposite [condition]. But this does not belong to virtue nor [is it] the style of a man who loves virtue.

That *moral virtue is entirely concerned with pleasures and pains* is also shown by Plato || when he urges [the importance of] *being guided to them from childhood*. [11r] Furthermore, [Aristotle] actually proves [this point] by a deductive argument: for *the virtues have to do with feelings and actions; every feeling or action is accompanied by pleasure or pain*; it follows, then, that *the virtues have to do with pleasures and pains*. And this is clear from *punishments too*, since they consist of certain forms of pain and are a kind of *medicine* counteracting the pleasures; because opposites *are naturally suited to be healed by means of their opposites*.

1104b18–1105a12 4. (Again, as we said previously...)

Moreover, he elaborates on the argument and shows how moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains, and after this he states that *every formed disposition of the soul has a nature concerned with the kind of things by which [the soul] tends to be made either better or worse*, better, for instance, from the admonitions of Theognis, but worse from those of Choerilus. So [everyone] *has his natural tendency with regard to and towards these things*, one man becoming better in connection with the writings of Theognis, another worse in connection with the works of Choerilus. It is *by means of pleasures and pains* that people *become worse and better*; better by *pursuing the pleasure of learning while avoiding the pleasure of indulgence*, and

βελτίους μὲν τῷ διώκειν μὲν τὴν τῆς παιδείσεως ἡδονὴν φεύγειν δὲ τὴν τῆς ῥαθυμίας, καὶ αὐθις φεύγειν μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῆς πεττείας διώκειν δὲ τὴν τῆς ἀποχῆς τῶν ἡδέων λύπην· πάλιν δὲ χεῖρους ἀνάπαλιν. εἰπὼν δὲ «διώκειν» καὶ «φεύγειν», ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς βελτίοσι τὸ φεύγειν τίθησιν ἃς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς χεῖροσι τὸ διώκειν ταῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἰκανὸν φεύγειν τὸ ὃ μὴ δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ καὶ 5 κατὰ τρόπον ὀρθὸν καὶ ἐς ὅποσον καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα τὴν πρότασιν ἐξασφαλιζόμενοι.

Εἰπὼν δὲ περὶ τοῦ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ ἀργία τίς ἐστὶ καὶ ἡρεμία ψυχῆς τὸ φεύγειν τὰ βλαβερὰ καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι, ἐπάγει καὶ πῶς τινες ἀπαθείας καὶ ἡρεμίας τὰς ἀρετὰς ὠρίσαντο· οὐ καλῶς δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς εἶπον καὶ οὐ μετὰ τῶν προσδιορισμῶν τῶν οἰκείων· 10 πολλακίς γὰρ τις φευξεῖται τὸ δέ τι ὡς βλάπτον, ἀλλὰ τυχὸν τότε καὶ τόσον καὶ οὕτως συνοίσει, ὃ ἀπλῶς ἐκείνοι ἀλυσιτελὲς ὀρίζονται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ ἠθικῆ ἀρετῆ περὶ ἡδονὰς εἶναι καὶ λύπας, ὥστε ταύτην μὲν τῶν βελτίστων εἶναι πρακτικὴν, τὴν δὲ κακίαν τῶν χειρίστων.

Ἐπιφέρει δὲ καὶ ἕτερον ἐπιχείρημα· ὅτι τριῶν ὄντων ἃ δὴ αἰρούμεθα καὶ τῶν 15 ἐναντίων αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων, ἃ δὴ φεύγομεν, εἰσὶ δὲ ταῦτα· καλὸν συμφέρον ἡδύ, καὶ αὐθις αἰσχρὸν ἀσύμφορον λυπηρόν. περὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτῆς τῷ αἰρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰ κρείττω φεύγειν δὲ τὰ χεῖρω, πλὴν μετὰ τῶν οἰκείων προσδιορισμῶν καὶ ἀμφότερα (τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ κατορθωτικόν)· ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικὸς τῷ αἰρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰ φευκτὰ φεύγειν δὲ τὰ αἰρετά, πλὴν καὶ αὐτὰ μετὰ 20 τῶν οἰκείων προσδιορισμῶν.

Τῶν τριῶν γοῦν αἰρετῶν τὸ ἡδὺ καθολικώτερον καὶ κοινότερον πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ παρακολουθοῦν τοῖς λοιποῖς αἰρετοῖς· ἡδὺ γὰρ καὶ τὸ καλὸν πολλακίς καὶ τὸ συμφέρον, εἰ μὴ αἰεὶ· τὸ γὰρ φάρμακον πίνειν συμφέρον μὲν οὐχ ἡδὺ δέ· καὶ ἄλλοθεν δὲ φαίνεται τὸ ἡδὺ κυριώτερον, ὅτι ἐκ νηπίου σύνεστιν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡμῖν τελειούμενοι ἐγγίνεται. διὸ καὶ ὥσπερ κεχρωσμένον ἡμῖν τὸ ἡδύ, οὐ 25 δυνάμεθα ῥαδίως ἀποτρίψασθαι. πᾶσαν δὲ πρᾶξιν κανονίζομεν, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δὲ ἥττον, ἡδονῆ καὶ λύπῃ. τίσι γὰρ ἥδεται οὗτος καὶ τίσιν ἐκεῖνος λυπεῖται ζητοῦμεν, καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτῶν κανονίζομεν. τόσον δὲ δυσαπόνιπτον τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς πάθος, ὅτι τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν μάχην καὶ Ἡράκλειτος μαρτυρεῖ, δεικνύων τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τοῦ 30 θυμικοῦ δυσκαταγωνιστότερον· περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ τέχνη καὶ ἀρετὴ συνίστα-

moreover by avoiding the pleasure of a board game while pursuing the pain of abstinence from pleasures; and again [they become] worse in the opposite way. After saying “*by pursuing*” and “*by avoiding*”, he specifies in reference to those who [become] better, avoiding *pleasures one ought not [to enjoy]* or [that are enjoyed] *at the wrong time or in the wrong manner*, but in reference to those who [become] worse, [he specifies] the pursuit of those things; for it is not enough to avoid things one ought not [to enjoy], but one must also [avoid them] when one ought not [to enjoy them] and in the right way and to the right extent and in terms of any other determinations we establish in securing the proposition.

After discussing avoidance, given that avoiding harmful things and abstaining from them is a kind of inactivity and rest of the soul, he moves on to the way in which some [thinkers] *defined the virtues as states of impassivity and tranquillity*. *But this is not well [argued], because they used these terms in an absolute sense* and did not add the appropriate specifications; for one will frequently avoid some given thing as harmful, but in some specific circumstance or amount or way it will be useful, the thing those [thinkers] define as absolutely worthless. In line with the other [authorities], *then, moral virtue is assumed to be concerned with pleasures and pains*, so that it involves *the quality of acting in the best way, while vice [involves the quality of acting] in the worst way*.

He infers another dialectical proof: that *there are three objects we choose* and in opposition to these also three in number others we *avoid*, and that these are the following: *the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant*, and on the other hand *the shameful, the non-expedient, and the painful*. *In respect to all these, the good person will succeed* in choosing the better objects and avoiding the worse ones, although with the appropriate specifications in regard to both (because this is what it means to choose successfully); *whereas the bad person is likely to go wrong* by choosing what should be avoided and avoiding what should be chosen, except in these cases as well with the appropriate specifications [in regard to both].

Of the three objects of choice, at any rate, the pleasant is more universal and *common to all living creatures* and is a *concomitant of the remaining objects of choice*; since *both the noble and the expedient* are often *pleasant*, if not always; because drinking medicine is useful but not pleasant. On another ground as well the *pleasant appears to be more dominant*, namely the fact that it is with *us from infancy*, whereas the noble and the expedient develop in us [only] as we are mature. *For this reason* also, as if the pleasant *has been engrained* in us, we are not able *to eradicate* it easily. *We regulate all our actions, some of us more and some less, by the standards of pleasure and pain*. For we want to know which things please this person and which pain that person, and we judge their character by that standard. The feeling of pleasure is so hard to wash out that even *Heraclitus* bears witness to the *fight* against it, showing the faculty of the appetites to be harder to overcome than the *faculty of anger*; but *virtue, like art, is always associated with what is harder, since a good result*

ται· τὸ γὰρ εὖ ἐν τῷ χαλεπωτέρῳ βέλτιον ὡς μὴ ῥάδιον. ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτου κατασκευάζεται τὸ πρόβλημα.

[11v] || 1105a17–1105b18 ε' (ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν...)

Εἰπὼν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ δίκαια γινόμεθα δίκαιοι καὶ οὐ πρόεισιν αἱ ἕξεις ἵνα κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνεργήσωμεν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἔχει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αἱ ἕξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν γίνονται, ἐκτίθησιν ἀπορίαν πρὸς ταῦτα· ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ γινόμενον οὐκ ἔστι, διατί λέγομεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν τὰ δίκαια γινόμεθα δίκαιοι; οἱ γὰρ ποιοῦντες τὰ δίκαια μᾶλλον δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δίκαιοι ἢ γίνεσθαι, ὡσπερ, φησί, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔχει· οἱ γὰρ τὰ γραμματικά ποιοῦντες οὐ γίνονται γραμματικοί, ἀλλὰ γραμματικοί εἰσι. καὶ λύων τὴν ἀπορίαν πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ ἔνστασιν φησιν «ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως», οὐδὲ πᾶς ὁ τὰ γραμματικὰ ποιήσας γραμματικός, ὡσπερ οὐδ' ὁ κλέπτων κλέπτης οὐδ' ὁ τρέχων δρομεύς; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ποιῆσαι τι γραμματικὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀπὸ εἰσηγήσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ τὸ γραμματικὸν τι ποιῆσαι εἰς τὸ εἶναι γραμματικός καὶ λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ γραμματικῶς, οἷον κατὰ τοὺς κανόνας τῆς γραμματικῆς καὶ ὡς δεῖ.

Ἔπειτα ἐπιχειρεῖ ἀντιπεριστατικῶς ὅτι ἄλλως ἔχει ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ἄλλως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχει τὸ εὖ ὡς, εἰ καλῶς ἔχοιεν, ἐπαινετὰ εἶναι κἂν ὅπως ἔχοι τῆς τέχνης ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐκείνων κἂν ὅπως διάκειται πρὸς τὸ ποίημα. τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἀρκεῖ, ἐὰν ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχοι καὶ δίκαια φέρε εἶναι καὶ σώφρονα, πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὸν ποιοῦντα δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ σώφρονα· πολλοὶ γὰρ δίκαια πράττουσι τοὺς νόμους φοβούμενοι, χωλεύοντες περὶ τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ἕξιν, καὶ πολλοὶ σωφρονοῦσιν τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἀγαπῶντες, εἰ καὶ ταύτης ἀπέχονται διὰ φόβον. ἀλλὰ δεῖ, φησίν, ἐπιτηρεῖν καὶ τὸν πράττοντα, ὅπως πράττει καὶ ὅπως περὶ τὸ πραττόμενον διάκειται· ταῦτα γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τὰς τέχνας οὐ ζητοῦνται, μόνον δὲ ἐκ τῶν προσδιορισμένων τὸ εἰδέναι θέλει εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ ἀσκόπως καὶ ὡς μὴ εἰδὼς ὁ πράττει πράττοι. ἐπὶ δὲ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι τί ἐστι σωφροσύνη καὶ τί τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν συντελεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ δὴ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν πολλάκις καὶ τούτοις ἐθίζεσθαι περιγίνεται.

Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ βιαίως ἐπιχειρεῖ ὅτι οὐδὲ δίκαια λέγονται τὰ ἀπλῶς πραττόμενα, εἰ καὶ δίκαια δοκοῦσιν ὅσον κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον, ἀλλ' ὅταν πραχθεῖ ταῦτα ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ γοῦν εἴπομεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν δίκαιος γίνεται, ὁμοίως καὶ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν μὴ μόνον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μελλήσει γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν τὰ δίκαια οὐκ ἐνδιαθέτως

4–62,8 Εἰπὼν... κρεῖττον] cf. Arist. EN 1105a17–1105b18

3 Im. addidi 33 μελλήσει scripsi : μελήσει M

is even better when it is more difficult, because it is not easy. Hence, for this reason too the problem is constructed.

|| 1105a17–1105b18 5. (One might be at a loss as to what we mean...)

[11v]


After saying that *we become just by behaving justly* and that our dispositions do not pre-exist, so that we might behave in accord with them, as holds true in the case of the senses, but rather our dispositions arise from our actions, he sets out a *difficulty* in relation to these matters; given that [virtue] does not exist on the day of our birth, why do we say that we become just by behaving justly? For those who behave justly seem to be just already rather than becoming so, just as, he says, also *holds true in the case of the arts*; for those who can *read and write* do not become *literate*, but they are scholars. As a way of resolving this difficulty, he first raises the objection “*Or is it not this way in the case of the arts?*”, and is it not the case that every individual *who reads and writes is literate*, just as he who steals is not a thief and he who runs is not a runner? *Because it is possible to write a word correctly both by chance and by instruction* [i.e. because you have been taught]; for spelling correctly is not sufficient for being or being called a scholar, but one must [do so] *as a literate person does*, i.e. in accord with the rules of grammar and as is proper.

Then he argues dialectically, putting the case the other way around, that matters are different *in regard to the arts* and in regard to *the virtues*; *because works of art have their merit in themselves*, so that if they are good, they are praiseworthy regardless of the artistic ability of their creator or how he is disposed towards his work. *Whereas in the case of [acts of] virtues, it is not enough if they are good*, and are considered, for instance, *just and moderate*, to make the agent just and moderate; because many people act justly out of fear of the laws, becoming defective in regard to their disposition to justice, and many behave moderately although they are fond of self-indulgence, even if they abstain from it out of fear. But one must observe the agent as well, he says, how he acts and what his attitude is towards the action undertaken; because these questions are not raised in relation to works of art, but [Aristotle] wants the only one of the additional determinants to be that [the agent] acts knowledgably, so that he does not act aimlessly and do what he does in ignorance. *Whereas in the case of the virtues, knowing what moderation is and how it benefits the one who practises it contributes little or nothing, but the other [two] conditions are all-important, and they rather result from repeated performance* and from becoming habituated to them.

In consequence, he argues vehemently that mere *deeds are not said to be just*, even if they seem to be just to the extent that they conform to the account of these, but [only] *when they are performed as just and moderate people do them. We are correct, at any rate, to say that someone becomes just by behaving justly*, and so too in regard to being *moderate*. *But as a consequence of not acting*, not only is one not good but *one will not become good either. But most people act justly not spontaneously, but simply because [people] speak of these as good [actions], and they*

δέ, ἀλλ' ὅτι μόνον λέγουσιν ἀγαθὰ· καὶ ὅμοιον ποιοῦσι τοῖς νοσοῦσι· καὶ ἀκούουσι μὲν τῶν ἰατρῶν, μὴ ποιοῦσι δὲ τὰ προσταττόμενα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λίαν εὐθικτον τὸ παράδειγμα. τέως δ' εἰ κατὰ τὴν διάθεσιν κρίνει τις, ἐξισιάζοι· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πράττουσι μὲν οὐχ ὡς καλὸν δὲ ἀλλ' ὅτι καλὸν νομίζεται καὶ οὕτω τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκπίπτουσι, οὕτω καὶ οὗτοι· ἀκούουσι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιοῦσιν ἐπιμελῶς καὶ ἀγαπητικῶς τὸ προσταττόμενον 5 καὶ οὕτω τῆς ὑγείας ἐκπίπτουσι· εἰ δὲ οὐ πράττουσι, γράφεται οἰκείον τὸ παράδειγμα, ὅτι ὡς περ ἐκεῖνοι φιλοσοφοῦσι περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ οὐ πράττουσιν οἴονται δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν, οὕτως καὶ οὗτοι ἀκούουσι καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν· ὁ καὶ κρεῖττον.

[12r] || Diagramma iii



cf. Arist. EN 1105b20–27


ποιητικοὶ Georg. Pachym. Paraph. In EN 22.19 (cum M^b): παθητικοὶ Arist. vulg. (EN 1105b24)

behave like sick people: they listen carefully to the doctors, but they do not do what is prescribed. The example, however, is not very easily understood. But if one were to judge [these two groups] according to their attitude, one would find them to be on a par; for just as the first group do something not because it is noble, but because it is considered noble, and in this manner they are not accounted virtuous, so too the second group; *they listen but do not carry out the prescription carefully* and gladly, and so they are not accounted healthy; and if they do not act, the example is [still] fitting as written, because *just as the first group philosophise* about virtue and do not act [in conformity with it] but [still] *think they are pursuing philosophy*, so also the second group listen but do not act, which [i.e. acting] would have been better.

|| Diagram iii

[12r]

There are three states that arise in the soul:



1105b19–1106a26 στ' (Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον...)

Ζητεῖ ἐντεῦθεν περὶ ἀρετῆς τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκφέρει τὸν λόγον κατὰ διαίρεσιν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ τὴν σωματικὴν ἀρετὴν ζητεῖ, ἥτις ἐστὶν ὑγεία καὶ εὐαισθησία καὶ εὐδρομία καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχικὴν, τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, φησί, γινόμενα τρία εἰσὶ, πάθη, δυνάμεις καὶ ἕξεις. πάθη ὄργαι καὶ φόβοι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ἐσμεν 5 τούτων τι παθεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχει δύναμιν ὁ λίθος ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι, ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ λέγει περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων τῆς δυνάμει· ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς ἔχομεν, ὥστε ὅπου τὰ πάθη, ἐκεῖ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις. ἐπεὶ οὖν πρὸς τὰ πάθη αὐταὶ εἰσι, ζητεῖ τί ἐκ τῶν τριῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, καὶ τῇ τῶν δύο ἀναιρέσει ὑποθετικῶς εἰσάγει τὸ τρίτον· τέως δέ γε καὶ δεικτικῶς τὰ δύο ἀνασκευάζει, ἐπεὶ καὶ πᾶς ὑποθετικὸς διὰ δεικτικοῦ τελειοῦται. 10

Καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ πάθη αἱ ἀρεταὶ διὰ τεσσάρων συλλογισμῶν ἀποδείκνυσι. προσέθηκε δὲ ὅτι οὐδ' αἱ κακίαι πάθη αἱ δοκοῦσαι καὶ μᾶλλον πάθη, ὅτι ὅπου τὸ ἐνάντιον, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐνάντιον. πρῶτος τοίνυν συλλογισμὸς ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἢ σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰ πάθη οὐ λεγόμεθα οὕτως· 15 ἀλλ' ὀργίλοι μὲν ἐξ ὀργῆς ἐλεήμονες δὲ ἐξ ἐλέους λεγόμεθα, φαῦλοι δὲ καὶ σπουδαῖοι οὐ λεγόμεθα. δεύτερος ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτε ψεγόμεθα οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα. ἔνστασιν δὲ λύων, τίθησι τὸ «ἀπλῶς»· οὐ γὰρ καθὼς ὀργίζεται τις ψέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθὼς οὐχ ὡς δεῖ ὀργίζεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ θυμούμενος οὐ καθὼς θυμοῦται (πάθος γὰρ ἔμφυτον τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ θυμός), ἀλλὰ καθὼς ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον θυμοῦται. κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπαινούμεθα 20 καὶ κατὰ τὰς κακίας ψεγόμεθα. τρίτος ὅτι τὰ πάθη ἀπροαιρέτως ἐγγίνονται ἅτε τῇ ψυχῇ ὄντα ἔμφυτα, αἱ δὲ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκ προαιρέσεως. τέταρτος ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινούμεθα, κατὰ δὲ ταύτας οὐ κινούμεθα ἀλλὰ διακείμεθά πως.

Διαταῦτα καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ διὰ τριῶν συλλογισμῶν μεθοδεύει· κατὰ ταύτας γὰρ οὔτε ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα οὔτε κακοί, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τὰς 25 κακίας κακοί· καὶ ὅτι κατ' ἐκείνας οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ ταύτας

2 Ζητεῖ...ἐστὶ] cf. Arist. EN 1105b19 4–8 τὰ...ἔχομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1105b19–26 7–8 καθὼς... δυνάμει] cf. Arist. Metaph. 1043a14–16 11 ἐπεὶ...τελειοῦται] cf. Philop. In Prior. An. 248.1–5 12–66,2 Καὶ...εἴρηται] cf. Arist. EN 1105b28–1106a13

1105b19–1106a26 6. (After this, we must consider what virtue is...)

Next he investigates *what virtue is*, and advances the discourse in accord with the diairetic style [i.e. the method of division]. Since he does not examine physical virtue, which consists of health, keen perception, speed, and the rest, but rather that which has to do with the soul, *the characteristics of the soul*, he says, *are of three kinds: emotions, capacities, and dispositions*. *Emotions* [are] *states of anger, fears, and the like*, while *capacities are [the faculties] in virtue of which we are capable of feeling any of those [emotions]*; for a stone lacks *the capacity for feeling anger or pain*, but a human being [has it], just as he says in the “Metaphysics” with regard to the possible meanings of “capacity”. *And dispositions are [the faculties] in accord with which we are either well or ill disposed in relation to the emotions*, so that where there are emotions, there are both capacities and dispositions as well. Since the latter are related to the emotions, therefore, he examines which of the three categories virtue belongs to, and by excluding two of the options, he brings forward the third by way of hypothesis; initially, he removes two via direct reduction [of the syllogisms], since *every hypothetical [syllogism] is made perfect by means of the direct reduction [of syllogisms]*.


First, he demonstrates that *the virtues are not emotions* by means of four deductive arguments. He added that *the vices are also not emotions* although they certainly seem quite like emotions, because where the contrary is, there also is its opposite. The first deductive argument, then, is that *we are called good or bad on the basis of our virtues and our vices*, but that *we are not said to be such on the basis of our emotions*; instead, we are said to be inclined to anger on the basis of our anger, and merciful because of our pity, but we are not called good or bad [on this basis]. The second [deduction] is *that we are neither blamed nor praised for our emotions*. Refuting an objection to this argument, he inserts “*merely*”, because a person is not blamed simply because he becomes upset, but rather because he inappropriately becomes upset, just as the person who feels anger is also not [blamed] because he experiences anger (for anger is a natural emotion of the soul), but because he feels anger beyond what is appropriate. [So] *we are praised in accord with our virtues and blamed in accord with our vices*. The third [deductive argument] is that emotions arise *involuntarily*, inasmuch as they are innate within the soul, *whereas virtues and vices [arise] from free choice*. The fourth [deductive argument] is that *we are moved in accord with our emotions, whereas in accord with these [i.e. virtues and vices] we are not moved but are disposed in a certain way*.

This is why he also attempts to show that [virtues and vices] *are also not capacities* by means of three deductive arguments: *for we are said to be neither good nor bad in accord with these [i.e. our capacities for virtue or vice], but [we are called] good in accord with our virtues and bad in accord with our vices; and [he also says] that we are neither praised nor blamed by reason of the latter [i.e. our capacities] but in accord with the former [i.e. our virtues and vices], indeed; and [he claims that] our*

ναί· καὶ ὅτι αἱ μὲν δυνάμεις φύσει, ἀρεταὶ δὲ καὶ κακίαι οὐ φύσει. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καθόλου ἢ ἀρετῆ, εἴρηται.

Τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν εἴ ἐστι περιττόν, οὐχ ἰκανόν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστὶ γινώσκειν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὀποῖόν τί ἐστίν. *ρήτέον οὖν ἐπεξεργαζομένους καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῆ ἀρετῆ· οὕτω γὰρ εἴθιστο τοὺς ὄρους θηρεῦειν. πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀρετῆ τινός ἐστιν, ὃ δὴ* 5 *καὶ αὐτὸ εὖ ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ· καὶ ἐπιφέρει τὴν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴν καὶ αὐθις τὴν τοῦ ἵππου· κατὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν* || *καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετῆ ἂν εἴη, φησίν, ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς ἀποδώσει τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον εὖ. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διὰ πολλῶν ἄλλων ὧν εἰρήκαμεν λέλεκται, ἔτι δὲ φανερόν γενήσεται, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστίν ἢ τῆς ἀρετῆς φύσις, ὃ καὶ ἐπιφέρει καθολικῶς, ὡς ποιεῖν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς* 10 *εἴθισται.*

Diagramma iv



cf. Arist. EN 1106a33–36

1106a26–1106b27 ζ (ἐν παντί δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν...)

Ἐν παντί, φησί, διαιρετῷ, αἰσθητῷ τε καὶ νοητῷ, συνεχεῖ ὄντι, ἔστι λαβεῖν καὶ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ μέσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· κατ' αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅταν ἢ τὸ πλεόν τούτου λαμβάνωμεν ἢ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἢ ἐπίσης διαιροῦμεν τὸ πᾶν· πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐ πάντως ἐὰν πολὺ λογιώμεθα τὸ ληφθέν, ἤδη τὸ ἐναπολειφθέν ὀλίγον· ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ ὀλίγον ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς λαβεῖν καὶ πολὺ λογίσασθαι, πλὴν προηγουμένως περὶ τοῦ μέσου προθέμενος διδάξαι, ὅπου ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν θήσεται, ἰδίως περὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐκλαμβάνει καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. εὐρεθήσεται γὰρ ἢ ἀρετῆ μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπεὶ δεῖ θαρρη- 20 *σαι ὅσον δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς καὶ τᾶλλα ἃ προσδιωρισάμεθα· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ μέσον τούτω μὲν καὶ ἐλλείπον δόξει, τούτω δὲ ὑπερβάλλον, ἄλλω δὲ τινι μέτριον καὶ ὄντως μέσον. διατοῦτο τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς λογίζεται καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα.*


3–11 Τὸ...εἴθισται] cf. Arist. EN 1106a14–26 12–14 παντί...πρᾶγμα] cf. Arist. EN 1106a33–36
13–16 Ἐν...ληφθέν] cf. Arist. EN 1106a26–28 19 καὶ¹...ἡμᾶς] cf. Arist. EN 1106a28

11 post εἴθισται schol. viii et ix (vid. append.) 12 lm. addidi

capacities are by nature, while virtues and vices are not by nature. The general definition of virtue has thus been given.

Examining whether [virtue] exists is thus superfluous, but knowing what it is [generically] is insufficient, and [we must also discuss] *what species* [of thing] it is. We must then specify this too by defining it fully on the basis of its features; because it is customary to search for definitions in this manner. Every virtue, then, is a quality of something that makes *the thing itself good and the performance of it good as well*; and he adduces as examples *the virtue of the eye and furthermore of the horse*. In conformity with these same examples, then, || he says, *the virtue of a human being* [12v] *will also be a disposition that renders him a good person and will cause him to perform his function well*. This topic has been discussed by means of many alternative [arguments] *we have articulated, but it will become even more evident if we consider what constitutes the specific nature of virtue*, which he also infers in general terms, as he is accustomed to do in many cases.

Diagram iv



arithmetical proportion

1106a26–1106b27 7. (Now in everything that is continuous and divisible, it is possible to take...)

Now in everything, he says, *that is divisible*, both what is perceptible and what is intelligible, provided it is *continuous, it is possible to take a larger part, a smaller part, or an amount intermediate [between them], and these parts [may be larger, smaller, or intermediate] either in terms of the thing itself or relative to us*. “In terms of the thing itself” [means] whenever we take the greater part of the thing or the smaller part, or we divide the whole into equal amounts. “Relative to us”, *on the other hand*, [means that] it is not always the case that if we consider what has been taken as much, what is left behind is necessarily small; because it is possible to take away a small amount from the whole and consider it much unless, prompted by his primary aim of teaching about the intermediate position [between them], where he will include virtue as well, he idiosyncratically understands the intermediate to mean both “relative to the object” and “relative to us”. Because virtue will be found to be the mean relative to us rather than relative to the object, since one must have confidence as to the proper measure, time, and manner, as well as the other conditions we specified in addition; for one and the same mean will appear to one person to be deficient, to another person to be excessive, but to a third person moderate and truly

Οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι μέσον, ὡσπερ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος, καθὼς καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῖ· β' γὰρ καὶ στ' καὶ ι' ἀριθμητικὴ ἐστὶν ἀναλογία· τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀριθμῷ ὑπερέχει ὁ μείζων τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὁ μέσος τοῦ ἐλάττωτος. τὸ γοῦν ἐξ μῆκος φαγεῖν κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα μέγα ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ διάφορα πρόσωπα καὶ ἐλλείπον καὶ ὑπερβάλλον εὐρεθήσεται· Μίλωνι γὰρ τῷ ὀγδώκοντα μάζας ἐσθίοντι 5 ὀλίγα λογισθήσεται, τῷ δὲ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι ἀρχομένῳ πολὺ. οὕτω καὶ πᾶς τεχνίτης καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἐκφευξέεται μὲν τὰ παρ' ἐκάτερα, στοχάζεται δὲ τοῦ μέσου (καθὼς καὶ εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσι τῶν ἔργων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ προσθεῖναι τι τούτοις ἢ ἀφελεῖν τι ἐξ αὐτῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τοῖς παρ' ἐκάτερα φθείρεται, τῷ δὲ μέσῳ σώζεται).

Ἐπεὶ γοῦν πᾶσα τέχνη τοῦ μέσου στοχάζεται, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέ- 10 ρα καὶ ἀμείνων (οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν τεχνῶν μὴ ὅτι ψυχὴν ῥυθμίσει οὐ δύναται ἀλλ' οὐδέ τι φυσικὸν ἀπεργάσασθαι), στοχαστικὴ ἂν εἴη καὶ αὐτὴ τοῦ μέσου, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ φύσις τοῦ μέσου στοχάζεται καὶ οὔτε ὑπὲρ ὃ δεῖ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πλάττει μόρια οὔτε παρ' ὃ δεῖ. λέγω δὲ ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν διανοητικὴν, ἣτις ἐστὶ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δέχεται τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν καὶ τὸ μέσον. 15 δύναται γὰρ τις καὶ μᾶλλον καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν παθῶν ἐνεργῆσαι, ἂν τέως τὰ πάθη ἐνέργεια, κείσθω δὲ ὁμωνύμως καὶ ἤττον, καὶ ἀμφοτέρα οὐκ εὖ. ἔστι γὰρ περὶ μὲν τὸ μᾶλλον ἀμαρτία, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἤττον ψόγος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον δόξειεν ἂν καὶ εἰς ἔπαινον τοῦ μετιόντος, τέως ὅμως ἀμαρτάνει περὶ τὴν ἔξιν, τὸ δὲ ἤττον ψέγεται εἰκότως ὡς μὴ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος ἐφικνούμενον, τὸ μέσον δὲ ἐπαινέεται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ἔπαινος 20 δὲ καὶ κατόρθωσις ἀρετῆς ἐστίν.

[13r] || **1106b29–1107a32** ἡ' (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου...)

Λέγει ἐνταῦθα πῶς τὰ κακὰ πολύχρα καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μόνως, ἐν μεσότητι, διότι, φησί, τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου ἐστὶ, καθὼς εἴκαζον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τιθέντες τὸ ἄπειρον ἐν 25 τῇ τῶν κακῶν συστοιχίᾳ, τὸ δὲ πέρασ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν κακὸν ῥάδιον· πολυσιχιδὲς γάρ, καὶ ἐνί τινι τῶν δύο ἐστὶ περιπίπτειν· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν, ὅτι μόνως ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐπιτυγχάνεται).

2–21 β'...ἐστίν] cf. Arist. EN 1106a33–1106b27 23–70,27 Λέγει...λέγειν] cf. Arist. EN 1106b28–1107a32 25–26 οἱ...ἀγαθῶν] cf. Anon. In EN 133.1–3

22 ante Im. ἡ' schol. x (vid. append.) | Im. addidi 23 κακὰ correxi : κά M

a mean. For this reason, the mean is calculated relative to us rather than relative to the object.

Because the mean is *not the same for everyone*, as the [mean] of the object is, as the example from arithmetic illustrates: for 2 and 6 and 10 comprise the *arithmetical proportion*; because the greater number [i.e. 10] *exceeds* the mean [i.e. 6] and the mean [exceeds] the lesser number [i.e. 2] by the same amount [i.e. 4]. *Consuming six pounds of food*, for example, is a large amount in relation to the object, but in relation to various persons it will be found to be both *deficient* and *excessive*; *because for Milo*, who eats eighty barley-cakes, it will be counted as a small amount, *but for the beginner in athletic exercises as a large one*. Likewise, *every craftsman and expert will avoid the two opposite [extremes] and will aim at the mean* (just as *they are accustomed to say in reference to good works of art that it is impossible either to add anything to them or to take anything away from them*; because the *perfection* [of these works of art] *is destroyed by each of the two [extremes], but is preserved by adherence to the mean*).

Hence, since every art *aims at the mean, and virtue is more accurate and better than any art* (since none of the arts can educate the soul nor even bring to perfection anything innate [within it]), [it follows that virtue] itself also *has the quality of aiming at the mean*, since *nature* too aims at *the mean* and fashions the body parts without going beyond or contrary to what is needed. *I do not refer* to intellectual virtue, which is part of the rational faculty, but rather to *moral virtue, since this pertains to* [states] that are subject to *excess, deficiency, or a mean*. For one can be *too* active in respect to each of the emotions, if the emotions are activities, so let it be assumed that in the same sense one can be *less* [active than desirable], *and that neither case is good*. Because an *error* is involved in the case of [experiencing feelings] *too much*, while a *fault* is involved in the case of [experiencing them] *too little*, since excess [i.e. feeling too much] would seem to contribute to the *praise* of the one who pursues [the object], but nonetheless it involves a failure with regard to his disposition; while deficiency is reasonably faulted since it does not attain the mean. *The mean, however, is praised and constitutes success. And praise and success are characteristic of virtue.*

|| 1106b29–1107a32 8. (For evil is a form of the unlimited...)

[13r]

After this he discusses how evils are manifold and how *one can go wrong in many ways*, since it is possible [to do so] in accord with both excess and deficiency, *whereas success [is possible] in only one way*, namely in relation to the mean, because, he says, *evil is a form of the unlimited, just as the Pythagoreans pictured it* by placing the unlimited in the column of evils, and the limited in the column of goods (*which is why evil [i.e. to fail] is easier*, since it is multiform and it is possible to fall in with one of the two forms [i.e. one of the two extremes]; *whereas the good is difficult*, because it involves one way only and must be hit on accurately).

Συνάγεται τοιγαροῦν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῆ ἀρετῆ ὁ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὀρισμός, ὅτι ἕξι οὔτε πάθος οὔτε δύναμις, ὡς ἔλεγε, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστὶν ὡς γένος. «*προαιρετική*» δὲ εἶπε πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῆς φυσικῆς, «*ἐν μεσότητι*» δὲ διὰ τὰ παρ' ἐκάτερα ἀμαρτήματα· «*τῆ*» δὲ «*πρὸς ἡμᾶς*» προσέθηκε διὰ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος μεσότητα, ἥτις μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ πᾶσιν· «*ὠρισμένη*» δὲ «*λόγω*», ὅτι τὰ παρ' ἐκάτερα ἀόριστα· τὸ γὰρ 5 ἐξεληθὸν τοῦ ὠρισμένου κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἀορισταίνει, καὶ διαταῦτα πολύχρα τὰ κακά. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὴν δὴ τὴν μεσότητά ἐστὶν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ὀρισθῆναι κατὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα πρόσωπα καὶ τοὺς τεθέντας προσδιορισμούς, ὡς ἐλέγομεν, προστίθησι τούτοις καὶ τὸ «*ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν*»· ὀρίσει δὲ ὁ φρόνιμος φρονίμως κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐστὶ μέτρον τῆς μεσότητος ὁ φρόνιμος ἄνθρωπος, καθὼς καὶ ἐν 10 τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόραν ἀντέλεγεν εἰπόντα «*πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον*» καὶ οὐ τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα καθ' ἕκαστον ὑποκείμενον· ὥστε τὰς μὲν ὑπερβολὰς ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος, τὰς δ' ἐλλείψεις ἐλλείπειν, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι.

Καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον μεσότης, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον 15 ἀκρότης. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες πράξεις καὶ πάθη, ἅτινα καὶ συνουσιωμένην ἔχουσι τὴν φαυλότητα, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι περὶ αὐτὰ ποτὲ κατορθοῦν οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους προσδιορισμούς ποτὲ μὲν φαῦλα δόξουσι ποτὲ δὲ ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ φαῦλα. καὶ ὅμοιον ἀξιοῦν ἐν τούτοις τὴν μεσότητα εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἡξίου τις εἶναι μεσότητα ὑπερβολῆς καὶ μεσότητα ἐλλείψεως· ὡς γὰρ ταῦτα αἰεὶ 20 φαῦλα, οὕτω κάκεῖνα αἰεὶ φαῦλα. ὅς δὲ ἀξιοῖ τοῦτο καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴν εἶναι ἀξιώσειεν· ἐπεὶ καὶ μεσότητα τίθησι καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐλλείψιν, ἀξιώσει δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μεσότητος εἶναι ἄλλην μεσότητα καὶ ἄλλην ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἐλλείψιν.

[13v] || Τὸ γοῦν λέγειν περὶ ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως καθόλου ἐστί, καὶ οἱ καθόλου 25 λόγοι κοινότεροι, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ πράξεις περὶ τὰ καθέκαστα δέον γοῦν μᾶλλον τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. διαταῦτα καὶ ἄρχεται περὶ τῶν καθέκαστα λέγειν.

10–12 καθὼς... ἄνθρωπον] cf. Arist. Metaph. 1053a35–36

9 ὡς M (cum codd) : ᾗ Arist. EN 1107a1 12 καὶ οὐ τὸν φρόνιμον bis M 27 post λέγειν schol. xi et xii (vid. append.)


For that reason, the definition of virtue is put together from the predicates attributed to virtue, that it is a *disposition* rather than an emotion or a capacity, as he said previously, and this is [the definition of it] in terms of its genus. He also said that it is “*concerned with choice*” to distinguish it from physical [i.e. bodily] virtue, and “*located in a mean*” by virtue of its two extreme flaws [i.e. excess and deficiency]. He added that “*it is relative to us*” due to the mean of the object, which is one and the same for everyone, and that “*it is determined by reason*”, since the opposing extremes are indeterminate [evils]; this is because departing from what is determined is unlimited in terms of excess and deficiency, and for these reasons the evils are manifold. Since the mean itself is likely to be determined differently in relation to the relevant persons and in the context of [varying] determinants which have been established, as we discussed [previously], he adds to these [conditions] “*as the person of prudent wisdom would determine it*”; because the person of prudent wisdom will determine [the mean] prudently in accord with his disposition; and the person of prudent wisdom is the measure of the mean, just as in the “*Metaphysics*” as well he contradicted Protagoras, who said “*man is the measure of all things*” without [specifying] the person of prudent wisdom and the expert in relation to each of the existing subjects and conditions. In consequence, *the excesses exceed what is right, while the deficiencies fall short, whereas virtue ascertains and adopts the mean.*

In respect to its substance and its definition, virtue is the mean, but in respect to what is best, it is an extreme. There are some actions and emotions, however, that are intrinsically associated with badness, and these characteristics [i.e. excess, deficiency, and the mean] are not inherent in them, because *it is impossible ever to go right in regard to them.* This is because in regard to their additional determinants they will not sometimes seem bad, at other times good, but will always seem bad. *Thinking that the mean is applicable in the above cases is like thinking that there is a mean of excess or a mean of deficiency;* because just as the former are always bad, so too the latter are always bad. But someone who thinks this would also think there is *an excess of excess;* and since he posits a mean of it [i.e. of excess] and *a deficiency of deficiency,* he will think that there is another “mean” of this very mean, and another excess and deficiency.



|| *The discussion of excess and deficiency, at any rate, is couched in general terms, [13v] and universal principles have a wider application, while those that are particular possess a higher degree of truth, because conduct is concerned with particular cases;* as a consequence, our theories *must rather accord with these.* For these reasons, [Aristotle] begins to discuss particular cases.

Diagramma v

Περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη



Περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας



Περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν



Καὶ αὕτη περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν· διαφέρει δὲ τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος τῶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι περὶ μικρὰ ἀναλώματα, περὶ μεγάλα δὲ τὴν μεγαλοπρέπεια.




cf. Arist. EN 1107a33–1107b26




¹ ἀπειροκαλλία sic M; servavi (vid. Editorial principles)

Diagram v


Concerning feelings of fear and confidence




Concerning pleasures and pains



Concerning the donation and acquisition of money



This [mean, i.e. magnificence] too is concerned with the donation and acquisition of money, but it differs from open-handedness, in that the former [i.e. open-handedness] involves small monetary expenses, whereas magnificence involves large amounts.



1107a33–1107b31 θ' (περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης...)

Εἰπὼν περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη τὴν μεσότητα ὅτι ἔστιν ἀνδρεία, ζητεῖ καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐκάτε-
ρα, ἤγουν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων
λέγει· ἔστι γὰρ δύο ὑπερβάλλοντα ἐνταῦθα (εἰ καὶ ἡ μεσότης μία, ἡ ἀνδρεία)· ἐν τὸ
κατὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν ὑπερβολικόν, καὶ ἕτερον τὸ κατὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν. καὶ ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβία, 5
φησὶν, ὑπερβάλλων, δηλονότι ὁ ἀφοβος, παντελῶς ἀνώνυμος ἔστιν, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ
θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς. ὡσπερ δὲ ἡ ἀφοβία πέφυκεν ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλον ὅμως δὲ
οὐκ ὀνομάζεται, οὕτω καὶ ὁ φόβος ἔχει ὑπερβάλλον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πάντως κατ' ἔλλειψιν
τοῦ θαρρεῖν. λέγεται δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος δειλός· ἡ γὰρ δειλία ἔλλειψις τῆς ἀνδρείας, ὡσπερ
καὶ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή. μεμνήμεθα γὰρ ἐν τῷ προσδιορισμῷ, ὅθεν εἰ καὶ θαρρεῖ 10
ὁ θρασύς ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πρὸς οὓς δεῖ καὶ ἐγκαίρως, ἀλλ' ἐκκλίνει τῶν τοιούτων,
καὶ διαταῦτα κακίζεται.

Ὡσπερ οὖν ἦσαν ταῦτα περὶ τὰ θάρρη καὶ τοὺς φόβους, οὕτως εἰσὶν ἕτερα περὶ
ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, οὐ πάσας δὲ τὰς ἡδονὰς· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν
θεωρημάτων, ἧτις οὐδὲ τὴν λύπην ἔχει ἀντίθετον, καὶ διαταῦτα ὁμώνυμος ἡ ἡδονή, 15
ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐνάντιον ἔχει, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει. οὐ περὶ πάσας οὖν τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰ τοιαῦτα
ζητοῦνται, ἦττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· σπανίως γὰρ περὶ ταύτας εὔρηται ἡ μεσότης
καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐκάτερα· ὡσπερ γὰρ ἔλεγε πρότερον ὅτι ἔνια εἰσὶ συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς
φαιλότητος καὶ αἰεὶ φαυλά εἰσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν λυπῶν αἰεὶ ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν
μεσότητι, πλὴν ἴσως τινῶν. 20

Ἔστιν οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἡ σωφροσύνη μεσότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἡ ἀκολασία· οὐ
γὰρ ζητοῦμεν τῆς σωφροσύνης τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὡσπερ καὶ τὴν
τοῦ θάρρους ὑπερβολὴν, οὐ τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας. ἡ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς, φησὶν, ἔλλειψις
ἀνώνυμος, ἔστω δὲ ἡ ἀναισθησία, ἣν καὶ ἠλιθιότητα λέγουσιν. εἰσὶν ἄλλαι μεσότητες
περὶ δόσεις καὶ λήψεις χρημάτων, ὡσπερ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης, ἧς ὑπερβολὴ ἀσωτία καὶ 25
ἔλλειψις ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δὲ κατὰ τὴν δόσιν καὶ λήψιν αὐταὶ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ
ἐλλείπουσι τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος ἐν μέσῳ κειμένης αἰεὶ, περὶ ἧς διελεύσεται καὶ ἀκριβέ-
στερον ὕστερον.

Περὶ χρήματα δὲ εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλαι μεσότητες ὡς ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια (διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ
ἐλευθερίου ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, ὅτι περὶ τὰ μεγάλα κτίσματα τε καὶ περιβλήματα ὁ 30
μεγαλοπρεπής καταγίνεται, ὁ δὲ ἐλευθέριος περὶ ἐξόδους μικράς), ἧς ἡ ὑπερβολὴ

1–6 περὶ...ἐν] cf. Arist. EN 1107a33–1107b26 2–9 Εἰπὼν...δειλός] cf. Arist. EN 1107a33–1107b4
13–14 Ὡσπερ...ἡδονὰς] cf. Arist. EN 1107b4–5 16–17 οὐ...λύπας] cf. Arist. EN 1107b4–5
18–19 ὡσπερ...εἰσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1107a9–13 21–76,8 Ἔστιν...ἀφιλότητι] cf. Arist. EN
1107b5–1107b31

1107a33–1107b31 9. (With regard to feelings of fear and confidence, courage is the mean...)

After saying that the *mean with regard to feelings of fear and confidence* is *courage*, he also investigates the two extremes, namely *excess* and *deficiency*. He first discusses *those that exceed*, for there are two ways of exceeding in this case (even if there is one mean, namely courage): one type of excess involves fearlessness, another the feeling of confidence. *The man who exceeds in fearlessness*, he says, that is to say the fearless individual, is utterly *nameless*, while *the individual who exceeds in feeling confident* is *rash*. Just as fearlessness naturally has an excessive component, which nonetheless has not been assigned a special name, so too fear has an excessive component, which patently corresponds to a deficiency *in confidence*. Such a person is said to be *cowardly*, since cowardice is a deficiency in courage, just as rashness is an excess [of it]. For we have mentioned in the additional specification, from which [we concluded that] even if the rash person is confident but is not so in the right way or in relation to the right people or in a timely manner but rather turns away from such conditions, on these accounts he is reproached.

Just as these [extremes] concern feelings of confidence or of fear, therefore, so also there are others *that concern pleasures and pains, although not all pleasures*; for the study of geometrical theorems is a pleasure that is not antithetical to pain, and for these reasons “pleasure” is a word with two meanings, because the former type [i.e. pleasure in general] has an opposite, whereas the latter [i.e. pleasure deriving from geometry] does not. Consequently, these [extremes] are *not* investigated in relation *to all pleasures and only to a lesser degree in relation to pains*, because the mean and the opposite extremes will seldom be found in connection with these [i.e. pains]; because just as he said previously that *some* are *inherently combined with evil* and are always *bad*, so too the [extremes] of pains are always implicated in vice and are not in a mean, save perhaps those of some of them.

The mean in relation to the pleasures, then, is *moderation, while the excess is self-indulgence*; since we do not examine the excess of moderation but that of pleasure, just as [we investigated] the excess of confidence rather than that of courage. *The deficiency in respect to the pleasures*, he says, *has not been given a name, but let it be [called] insensibility*, which they also refer to as folly. There are other *means relating to the donation and acquisition of money*, such as *open-handedness*, of which *the excess is wastefulness and the deficiency is meanness*. With respect to donation and acquisition, these *exceed and fall short* of open-handedness—which always lies in a mean and which will be discussed in detail and *with greater precision later—in opposite ways from one another*.


In relation to money, there are other intermediate states, such as *magnificence* (the *magnificent man differs from the open-handed one*, in that the magnificent man is concerned *with large* buildings and fine garments, whereas the open-handed man is concerned *with small* monetary expenditures), *the excess* of which is *vulgarity*, “going over the top” (*chydaiotēs*), as it were, and *tastelessness, while its deficiency is*

βαναυσία, οίονει χυδαιότης, καὶ ἀπειροκαλία, ἢ δ' ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια. διατί δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀλλ' ἐκείνη χυδαιότης; ὅτι ἐνταῦθα δυνάμενός τις οὐ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἐργάζεται, ἐκεῖσε δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀξίαν πράττει, καὶ διαταῦτα, ὡς μὴ ὄλως ἄξιός καὶ ἐπεκτεινόμενος, βάνουσος κέκληται.


Ἔστι μεσότης καὶ περὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν ἢ μεγαλοψυχία, ἧς παρ' ἑκάτερα χαυνότης καὶ μικροψυχία· διαφέρει δὲ αὕτη πρὸς τινὰ ἄλλην ὁμοίως ὡς διέφερον ἢ μεγαλοπρέπεια πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα τῷ μεγέθει· ἔστι δὲ ἢ μὲν μεσότης ἀνώνυμος, καθ' ἣν θέλει τις τιμᾶσθαι κατὰ τὸ δέον· παρ' ἑκάτερα δὲ ταύτης φιλοτιμία καὶ ἀφιλοτιμία.

[14r] || Diagramma vi

Περὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν ἀμφότεραι· διαφέρει δὲ ἢ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας τῷ ἐκείνην μὲν περὶ μεγάλην εἶναι τιμὴν, ταύτην δὲ περὶ μικράν·



Περὶ ὀργὴν





stinginess. Why is the latter [i.e. stinginess] not a case of going over the top, whereas the former [i.e. vulgarity] is? Because in the latter case, someone who has a capacity does not act according to his capacity, but in the former case, someone who lacks a capacity acts beyond what is appropriate to him, and for these reasons, since he is not being wholly proper and is overextending himself, he is called “vulgar”.

The mean in respect to honour and dishonour is *greatness of soul*, of which the two extremes are *vanity* and *smallness of soul*; and this differs from another quality in the same way that *magnificence* was different from *open-handedness* in respect to magnitude; no specific name has been assigned to the mean [of this quality], in conformity with which one wishes to attain appropriate honours; the two extremes of it are *ambition* and *lack of ambition*.


|| Diagram vi

[14r]

Both [means] concern *ambition* and *lack of ambition*; the *ambition of the ambitious man* differs from *greatness of soul*, in that the latter is concerned with *great honour*, whereas the former relates to *minor honour*:




Concerning anger




Περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν καὶ αἱ τρεῖς αὐταὶ κοινῶς·


Περὶ τὸ ἀληθές





Περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν παιδιᾷ



Περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν βίῳ



Περὶ τὰ πάθη ἄμφω αὐταὶ·



cf. Arist. EN 1107b21–1108b5

1107b31–1108a30 ἰ' (ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας...)


Τί ἐστὶ τὸ «ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας»; ἢ ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέσον ἀνώνυμον—καὶ ἔστι κυρίως τοῦτο ἢ πρὸς οὓς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ἐς ὅποσον καὶ ἐφ' ὧν καὶ ἀφ' ὧν φιλοτιμία—τοῦτο δὲ κληθεῖν ἂν καὶ ἀφιλότιμον καὶ φιλότιμον, ἀφιλότιμον μὲν

1 ἰ' cf. Arist. EN 1107b21–1108b5 2–80,12 Τί...πράξεων] cf. Arist. EN 1107b31–1108a11

1 lm. addidi 4 δὲ s.l.

Concerning intercourse in conversations and actions; all three of these are in common:


Concerning truth




Concerning pleasantness in social amusement



Concerning pleasantness in the general affairs of life



The following two [means] concern the emotions:



1107b31–1108a30 10. (For which reason those at the extremes lay claim to the middle position...)

What does “*those at the extremes lay claim to the middle position*” mean? Is it that, since being in the middle has no name—and this is properly speaking the kind of ambition towards the right people [i.e. in the right direction], in the right manner, in the right amount, in the right context, and from the right motives—this [intermediate quality] could be called both *unambitious* and *ambitious*, meaning “*unambitious*” by

πρὸς τὸ ἐπιπλέον φιλότιμον, *φιλότιμον* δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἀφιλότιμον; διαταῦτα *ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι* πρὸς τὸ μέσον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔστιν ὅτε ὡς μέσον ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον, ὥστε ὁ μέσος φιλότιμος καὶ ὁ μέσος ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν, ἐπίσης ἐπαινεῖται. πῶς δὲ τοῦτο γίνεται, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται.

Ἔστι τοίνυν καὶ *περὶ ὀργῆν* ὡς *περὶ ὕλην* τινὰ (ὡσπερ *περὶ τιμῆν* καὶ *περὶ τὸ ἀληθές* καὶ *περὶ χρήματα* καὶ *περὶ τὰ ἄλλα*) τὰ τρία ταῦτα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέσον *πραότης* λέγεται, τὰ δὲ παρ' ἐκάτερα ἀνώνυμα μὲν ὥστε λέγεσθαι ἰδίως, πλὴν ἐκ τοῦ *περὶ ὁ ὑποκείμενον* ταῦτα λέγονται τὴν ὀνομασίαν σχόντα· *ἀοργησία* γὰρ καὶ *ὀργιλότης* ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς τὰ τούτων ὀνόματα.

Εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς περὶ κοινωνίαν τινὰ *λόγων* καὶ *πράξεων*, οὐχ ἀπλῶς λόγων· οἱ γὰρ λόγοι ἐξωτερικοὶ ὄντες, εἰ μὴ ψυχῆς διάθεσιν ἔχουσιν πρὸς ὃ λέγονται, οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς κατατάττεσθαι. διαταῦτα τίθησι «*καὶ πράξεων*». ἔχουσι δὲ *διαφορὰν* ὅτι ἡ μὲν μίαν ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ ἀληθές, οὐ λόγον μόνον ἐπιφερομένη ἀλλὰ καὶ ἦθος· διατοῦτο λέγει «*τὸ ἀληθές τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς*», ἤγουν τοῖς λόγοις· τὸ γὰρ *περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων ἀληθινὸν* ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων συνίσταται· οὐδὲ γὰρ καθὸ λέγομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν τὰ πράγματά εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ τὰ πράγματά εἰσιν ἀληθεύομεν. αἱ μὲντοι γε ἕτεροι δύο μεσότητες *περὶ τὸ ἡδύ*, ἔχουσι δὲ καὶ αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας *διαφορὰν*· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν *παιδιᾷ*, ἡ δὲ ἐν *βίῳ*, πλὴν ἐν *πᾶσι τοῖς κατ' αὐτὸν* καὶ οὐ περιορίζεται ἐν τινι μέρει τῶν *κατὰ τὸν βίον*.

Ῥητέον δὲ καὶ *περὶ τούτων*, φησίν, ἵνα ἀπὸ πάντων μάθωμεν τὴν μεσότητα ἐπαινετὸν καὶ φανῆ ἢ ἀλήθεια τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων αὐτῇ ἑαυτῇ ταυτῇ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως *εὐπαρακολούθητον* ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ λεγόμενον. λέγει γοῦν πρῶτον *περὶ τῆς μεσότητος* τῆς ἐχούσης ὡς ὕλιον τὸ ἀληθές, ἧτις ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνειρώνευτος ἀλήθεια, παρ' ἐκάτερα δὲ ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας *προσποίησις* ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ *μεῖζον* (ἧτις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς) *ἀλαζονεία*, ἢ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον *εἰρωνεία* καὶ ὁ ἔχων ταύτην *εἴρων*. *περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ* λεγέσθω πρῶτον ἢ ἐν *παιδιᾷ* μεσότης, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ *εὐτραπελία*· παρ' ἐκάτερα δὲ ἡ μὲν *ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία* ἐκ τῶν βωμολοχούντων ὀνομασθεῖσα, ἢ δ' *ἔλλειψις ἀγροικία*. ἢ δ' ἐν *τῷ βίῳ* ἕτερα μεσότης *φιλία* (οὐχ ἡ *στοργή*), *περὶ ἧς*

12–14 ἔχουσι...αὐτοῖς] cf. Arist. EN 1108a12 16–82,4 αἰ...λέγεται] cf. Arist. EN 1108a13–30

23 ὕλιον: an ἴδιον scribendum?

comparison with too much ambition, but “*ambitious*” by comparison with too little? For these reasons *those at the extremes lay claim to the mean*; and in fact *we ourselves sometimes praise the ambitious person as attaining the mean and sometimes the unambitious person*, with the result that the moderately ambitious person and the moderately unambitious person are praised equally, since they are the same [in their attainment of the mean]. How *this happens will be discussed in what follows*.

These three states [i.e. excess, deficiency, and the observance of the mean], then, also *hold with respect to anger* as a subject matter (just as with respect to honour, truthfulness, money, and the other subjects), *the mean* of which is designated *gentleness*, while the two extremes have not been assigned a name, as a consequence of which they are rarely discussed, except in cases when they are discussed on the basis of the underlying subject [i.e. anger] and get their name from it: because *spiritlessness* (*aorgēsia*) and *irascibility* (*orgilotēs*) derive their names from anger (*orgē*).

There are also three other [modes of observing the mean] related to some sort of intercourse in conversation and action, rather than merely in conversation; since discourses that are extraneous, unless they have a disposition of the soul with reference to the subject to which they are addressed, cannot be ranked among the ethical [treatises]. For these reasons, he writes “*and action*”. [The three modes] *differ, however, in that one of them has a single subject, truthfulness*, and has to do not simply with speech but also with character; because of this, he says “*truth in this sphere*”, i.e. in speech, since the quality of truth in regard to other matters arises from conduct; for actions do not exist in so far as we speak of them and tell the truth about them, but in so far as actions exist, we speak the truth about them. *The other two means, then, concern what is pleasant*, and these too differ from one another, since *one kind [relates to what is pleasant] in social amusement, while the other sort [is concerned with what is pleasant] in daily life, but in all circumstances pertaining to daily life without being limited to any specific part of life-activities*.

We must discuss these qualities as well, he says, *in order that we may learn* from all of them that *the mean is to be praised* and so that the truth of our discussion may appear consistent and coherent; for nothing is so *easy to follow* as a truthful statement. He accordingly discusses first *the mean* that has as its subject *what is true*, which is truth without pretence, while at the opposed extremes is the *pretence* of truth, *in the one case in the form of exaggeration* (which is an excess of truth), that is *boastfulness*, but *in the other case in the form of understatement, that is self-depreciation*, while *the man who has this [form of truth] is the self-deprecator*. In respect to *what is pleasant*, let the mean *in relation to social amusement* be discussed first, and it is *wittiness*; at the opposed extremes, *the excess is buffoonery*, which has its name from those who “*make stupid jokes*” (*bōmolochoountōn*), while *the deficiency is boorishness*. The other mean *in the general affairs of life* is *friendliness* (not affection), which he is about to discuss, although [discussion takes place] from the extremes, because, since he praises the quality in the one case more than usual, and

μέλλει εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἄκρων· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔνθα μὲν πλεόν τοῦ εἰκότος ἐπαινεῖ, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς· ἢ οὐ χάριν ὠφελείας τινὸς καὶ ἄρεσκος λέγεται ἢ ὠφελείας χάριν τῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ κόλαξ λέγεται· ἔνθα δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀγαθὸν δυσκολαίνει καὶ δύσκολος λέγεται, ἢ μεσότης κατὰ τρόπον φιλίας· ὅσον δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ λέγει.

1108a30–1108b33 ἰά' (εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες...) 5
 Εἰσὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι μεσότητες, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ αἰδῶς, ἥς παρ' ἐκάτερα ὁ καταπλήξ ὁ
 [14v] ὑπερβάλλον κατὰ τὸ πάθος οὐ κατὰ τὴν αἰδῶ, || ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ ὁ μηδὲν αἰσχυρόμε-
 νος ἀναίσχυτος, ἐπειδήπερ ὁ μετρίως ἐλλείπων οὐκ ἂν ταχθεῖ ἀκριβῶς ἐν τῇ τῆς
 ἐλλείψεως μοίρᾳ· ὁ δὲ τὴν μεσότητα ἔχων αἰδῶ αἰδήμων λέγεται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ νέμεσις
 μεσότης παρ' ἐκάτερα ἔχουσα, κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν τὸν φθόνον—τῶ τὸν ἔχοντα 10
 ἐν πᾶσι λυπεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ διακρίνειν τὸν ἄξιον παθεῖν καὶ τὸν μὴ ἄξιον—κατὰ δὲ τὴν
 ἔλλειψιν τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν· ἐπιχαίρει γὰρ ταῖς δυσκληρίαις τῶν πέλας. διατοῦτο δὲ
 τάττεται αὕτη καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ὅτι τοσοῦτον τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ἐλλείπει ὅτι καὶ
 χαίρει. εἰ δὲ τις ἀποροίη καὶ πῶς αὕτη ἔλλειψις νεμέσεως, ὅπου γε καὶ ὑπερβάλλει
 κατὰ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ νεμεσητικοῦ λυπουμένου ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὐπραγοῦσι, μεμνησθαι 15
 χρεῶν τοῦ κανόνος ὅτι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τὴν ἔλλειψιν ζητοῦμεν· ὑποκείμενον δὲ
 ἐνταῦθα ἡ λύπη, καὶ διαταῦτα ἐπὶ ἐλλείψεως τάττεται. περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ
 ἀπλῶς λέγεται αὕτη (ὁμοίως καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν, αἵτινες ἐν λόγοις οὐ
 γίνονται ἀλλ' ἐμφαίνονται), μεταταῦτα λέγωμεν.

Τριῶν τοίνυν καθ' ἕκαστον ὑποκείμενον οὐσῶν διαθέσεων, δύο μὲν κακιῶν παρ' 20
 ἐκάτερα, μιᾶς δὲ (ἀρετῆς) τῆς μεσότητος, πάσαι ἀντίκεινται πᾶσαις οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ
 κατὰ τὸ στοιχοῦν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμφαίνει τὸ πῶς προσκείμενον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄκρα καὶ τῶ
 μέσῳ καὶ ἀλλήλοισ ἐστὶν ἐναντία (ἢ γὰρ κακία μάχεται καὶ ἑαυτῇ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ), τὸ δὲ
 μέσον τοῖς ἄκροις μάχεται ἀνά μέρος· ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μέγα
 λέγεται πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἔλαττον, οὕτω καὶ αἱ μέσαι ἔξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις 25
 ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσι, κἂν περὶ πράξεις γίνωνται κἂν περὶ
 πάθη.

Καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκτίθησι τὰς ἐπαγωγὰς, οἷον «ὁ ἀνδρεῖος» λέγων «πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν
 θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν

6–19 Εἰσὶ...λέγωμεν] cf. Arist. EN 1108a30–1108b10 20–84,7 Τριῶν...οὐδαμῶς] cf. Arist. EN 1108b11–33

5 Im. addidi 6 πάθεσι M (cum vulg.) : παθήμασι Arist. EN 1108a31 (cum K^b) 21 ἀρετῆς addidi ex Arist. EN 1108b12 24 μέγα M (cum M^b O^b) : μείζον Arist. vulg. (EN 1108b16)

he does so in two ways, i.e. either *it is not for the sake* of some advantage, and the man is designated *obsequious*, or it is for the sake *of their personal advantage*, and the man is called *a flatterer*, whereas in the other case the person is discontented with something apparently good *and* is called *peevish*, the mean [is described] in the way customary friendship [functions]. [Aristotle] pursues his discussion only to the extent that this seems to be the case.

1108a30–1108b33 11. (There are also means in the sphere of and in relation to the emotions...)

There are also means in the sphere of the emotions, such as *modesty*, the opposed extremes of which are *the bashful man, who is excessive* in relation to this emotion and not as modesty requires, || and *on the other hand the person who is deficient* [in shame] or abashed at *nothing whatsoever*, *the shameless man*, inasmuch as the individual who is moderately deficient could not be ranked precisely in the degree of his deficiency; and *the person who has attained the mean* of modesty is called *modest*. Again, *righteous indignation* is a mean with opposed extremes, in respect of excess, *envy*—by whose action the envious man derives *pain from everyone* and fails to distinguish between the person who deserves to suffer and the one who *does not*—but in respect of deficiency, *spitefulness*, for [the spiteful individual] takes pleasure in the misfortunes of his *neighbours*. For this reason, this [quality] is assigned to the deficiency, because [the spiteful person] *falls so far short of feeling pain that he actually feels pleasure*. If one were to have difficulty understanding how spitefulness is a deficiency of righteous indignation, in cases where the [spiteful person] feels more pleasure than *the indignant man who suffers pain when [others] prosper undeservedly*, one must bear in mind the rule that we are investigating the deficiency of the underlying quality; and in this case *pain* is the underlying subject, and for these reasons it is assigned to deficiency. *With regard to justice*, since it is said to have more than one meaning (and similarly with regard to the rational virtues, which are not produced but are manifested in principles), *let us discuss this afterwards*.

There are accordingly three dispositions with regard to each quality, *two vices* which are opposed extremes, and *one (virtue)*, which is *the mean*; and they are all opposed to all the others not in the same manner but in conformity with their sequence; because this makes clear *how they are aligned*, *for the extremes are the opposite both of the middle state and of each other* (since vice combats both itself and virtue), *while the mean combats the extremes* in turn; *since just as what is equal* is said to be *great in comparison with less*, but *less in comparison with more*, so also *the middle states of character are in excess as compared with the deficiencies and deficient as compared with the excesses*, whether they have to do with *actions or feelings*.

And immediately [after this] he sets out the arguments by induction, saying that “*the brave man*”, for example, “*appears rash in contrast with the coward*, but

ἀναίσθητον»—δηλονότι ἠλίθιον—«ἀκόλαστος φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος». διὸ οἱ ἄκροι ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, οἷόν ἐστιν ἐλευθέριος ἀνελεύθερος καὶ ἄσωτος, μέσον ἐλευθέριος· τοῦτον ὁ μὲν ἀνελεύθερος πρὸς τὸν ἄσωτον ἀπωθεῖται ἠγούμενος τοῦτον ἄσωτον, ὁ δὲ ἄσωτος πρὸς τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἠγούμενος τοῦτον τοιοῦτον. πλείστη δὲ ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τῶν ἄκρων πρὸς 5 ἀλλήλους ἢ πρὸς τὸν μέσον· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ πορρωτέρω ἀφεστήκασιν ἢ ὁ μέσος. καὶ ἔτι ὅτι ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται πρὸς τὸ μέσον ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς, τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις οὐδαμῶς.

[15r] || **1108b33–1109a31** ιβ' (πλείστη ἀνομοιότης...)

Τῶν ἄκρων πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ ἐναντιότης πλείστη ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον. ὅρος δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ πλείστον ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν, ὥστε μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα, καὶ καλῶς 10 ἐλέγομεν ὅτι τὰ ἄκρα πλείστον ἀλλήλων ἀπέχουσιν ἢ τοῦ μέσου. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον τὰ ἄκρα ἀντίκεινται οὐχ ἅμα τὰ δύο, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν ἢ ἔλλειψις ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ ἢ ὑπερβολή· οἷον τῇ ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἢ θρασύτης ἀντίκειται (ἐλέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν, τὰ δὲ ποσῶς ὁμοιούμενα οὐκ ἀρίδηλον 15 ἔχουσι τὴν ἀντίθεσιν), ἀλλ' ἢ δειλία, ἣτις ἐστὶν ἔλλειψις, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνη ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον οὐχ ἢ ἀναισθησία ἢ ἔλλειψις (ὁμοιοῦται γὰρ ταύτη πλεον ἢ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ ἢ σωφροσύνη), ἀλλ' ἢ ἀκολασία.

Λέγει δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καὶ δύο αἰτίας, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἐτέραν δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν τῶν διακειμένων πως πρὸς αὐτάς. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος 20 ἔστιν αὕτη ἣν καὶ ἐλέγομεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ δύο ἄκρα εἰσὶν ἐκάστη μεσότητι καὶ παρομοιάζει ἢ μεσότης θατέρω τῶν δύο, εἰκὸς τοῦτο μὲν μὴ εἶναι ἀντίπαλον τῇ μεσότητι, θάτερον δέ. τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα τίθεμεν, ἀπέχει δὲ πλεον τὸ μὴ παρομοιούμενον τῇ μεσότητι. καὶ αὕτη μὲν ἢ μία αἰτία, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος· ἐτέρα δὲ ἢ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὕτη· πρὸς ἃ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πως, ἐκεῖνα τοῦ μέσου ἐναντία τίθεμεν. οἷον τί λέγω; ὅτι μᾶλλον πρὸς ἡδονὰς πεφύκαμεν ἢ πρὸς τὴν σωφροσύνην, καὶ διατοῦ 25 το ταύτη δὴ τῇ σωφροσύνη δόξει πως ἐναντία ἢ ἀκολασία κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐπίκρισιν. τῷ γὰρ πεφυκέναι πρὸς ἡδονὰς ἀποκναίομεν μὲν πρὸς τὴν σωφροσύνην, ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτη θεῖναι ἐναντίαν, οὐ τὴν ἀναισθησίαν θήσομεν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πρὸς τὴν

9 Τῶν...μέσον] cf. Arist. EN 1108b27–28 9–26 ὅρος...ἀκολασία] cf. Arist. EN 1108b33–1109a19 13–14 ὁμοιότης...ἀνδρείαν] cf. Arist. EN 1108b31–32

cowardly in contrast with the rash man; and similarly the prudent man self-indulgent in contrast with the man who is insensible [to pleasure and pain]”—namely, the person without sense—“but insensible in contrast with the self-indulgent individual”. Hence the extreme characters push the intermediate man towards an extreme, as for instance an open-handed man, a mean man, and a wasteful man, with open-handed the intermediate term: the mean man pushes the intermediate man towards the wasteful person, since he thinks this individual is wasteful, while the wasteful man [pushes] the intermediate man towards the mean individual, since he holds him to be such. The greatest degree of contrariety, however, is that of the extremes to one another rather than to the mean; for these [extremes] are further apart [from one another] than the mean [is from them]. And again [it is the case] that the excesses bear a resemblance to the mean, but the extremes in no way [resemble one another].

|| 1108b33–1109a31 12. (The greatest unlikeness...)

[15r]

The greatest degree of contrariety is that of the extremes to one another rather than to the mean. The definition of opposites is that they are the furthest removed from another, so that the further apart things are, the more contrary they are, and we stated correctly that the extremes are further apart from each other than from the mean. The two extremes are not opposed to the mean at the same time, but in some cases the deficiency [is opposed to the mean], while in others the excess is; for example it is not rashness that is opposed to courage (for we said that rashness bears a certain resemblance to courage, and qualities that resemble each other somewhat do not have a clear antithesis), but cowardice, which is a deficiency; whereas what is more opposed to moderation is not the deficient state of insensibility (since moderation resembles this more closely than it resembles self-indulgence) but self-indulgence.

He says that *there are two causes for this, one which arises from the thing itself, while the other has its origin in us*, resulting from our being disposed towards them in some way. The first cause—the one arising from the thing itself—is that which we already specified; for since there are two extremes for each mean, and *the mean is more similar to one of the two [extremes]*, it is reasonable that one of the two extremes not be opposed to the mean, whereas the other [extreme] is. For we establish that *those extremes that are more remote from the mean are more contrary to it*, while that which is dissimilar to the mean is more remote from it. And *this then is the one cause, the one that arises out of the thing itself. The other cause has its origin in us* and is as follows: we establish that *those things toward which we are somehow more inclined by nature are contrary to the mean*. Precisely what do I mean? That *we are more inclined to pleasures than to moderation*, and for this reason *self-indulgence* will somehow seem contrary to this moderation, in accord with our current judgement. Because since we are well-disposed towards pleasures, we shrink from temperance, and if we seek to set an extreme to this [i.e. self-indulgence], we will not set insensibility [as the contrary]. For even if we were to shrink from temperance due to our fondness for

σωφροσύνην ἀποκναίμεν τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀγαπῶντες, πολλῶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ἀναισθησίαν ἀποκναίσομεν· καὶ διαταῦτα τὴν ἀκολασίαν παραλαμβάνομεν ἐναντίαν τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν, φησί, μεσότης ἢ ἀρετὴ εἴρηται, διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ μέσου καταστοχάζεσθαι· παντὸς γὰρ τὸ δαπανᾶν ἀργύριον, πόσον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι καὶ ὅτου 5 ἔνεκα ὀλίγων πάνυ· ὥσπερ ἔργον καὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ κύκλου λαβεῖν· εἰ μὴ γε τῷ γεωμέτρῃ δι' ἀποδείξεως, πῶς δὲ ἐπιτευξόμεθα τοῦ μέσου; δεῖ πρῶτον ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, κἂν ἔνδεια ἢ κἂν ὑπερβολή, ὡς φανερώς ἐναντίου, καὶ ἔκτοτε ζητεῖν ἐκτραπήναι καὶ θατέρου.

1109a30–1109b23 ἰγ' (ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου...)

10

Πρῶτον οὖν, φησὶν, ἀφεκτέον τῶν φανερωτάτων κακῶν καὶ τῶν μᾶλλον ἀμαρτωλοτέρων, ἔπειτα τοῦ ἥττον, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ οὕτω χαλεπὸν τοῦ ἄκρως μέσου τυχεῖν· κατὰ 15 δεύτερον, φασὶ, πλοῦν τὸν τῆς παροιμίας τὰ τῶν κακῶν ληπτέον ἐλάχιστα, ἃ δὴ, φησί, καὶ δόξειεν ἢ μεσότης. γενήσεται δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν κατὰ τοὺς τὰ μέταλλα διακρίνοντας καὶ αὐτοὶ ποιῶμεν· πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φανώτατα τῶν κακῶν ἐκβάλλοντες καὶ ὅπερ ἂν 15 δόξη ἐναντίον τοῦ μέσου, ἐκ τοῦ τοῦτο ἐξορίζειν καὶ ἐκκρίνειν ἀρχόμενοι· μετέπειτα δὲ τὰ τούτων ἐλάχιστα, ἕως οὔ δυνηθέντες τὸ μέσον ἐγκρινοῦμεν, ὅποιον ἂν καὶ φανεῖη ἡμῖν πλατυκώτερον ἐξετάζουσιν.

[15v] || Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ καὶ πρὸς ἃ αὐτοὶ ἐσμὲν εὐκατάφοροι, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῇ συνηθείᾳ τῆς 20 γνώμης καὶ τῇ ὀρέξει κρατώμεθα καὶ ἐμποδιζώμεθα πρὸς τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῆς μεσότητος· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται γνώριμον οὐκ αἰσθήσει καὶ δείξει τινί, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἢν περὶ ταῦτα ἔχομεν, ὡς ἤδεσθαι μὲν ἢν ἔχωμεν ταῦτα, λυπεῖσθαι δὲ εἰ στεροίμεθα. ἀφέλκοντες οὖν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τούτου καὶ πολὺ τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν ἀπάγοντες, μόλις ἤξομεν εἰς τὸ μέσον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα ὀρθοῦντες ξύλα. φυλακτέον 25 δὲ μάλιστα τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἡδὺ κρίνουσι τὴν μεσότητα· δεκάζομεν γὰρ ἐξ ὀρέξεως τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ κρίσιν. ὅπερ γοῦν πεποιήκασι παρὰ τῷ Ὀμήρῳ οἱ δημογέροντες, ἐπαινήσαντες μὲν τὴν Ἑλένην, ἐπικρίναντες δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἔχουσαν πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀποπέμπεσθαι, μήπως σφίσι καὶ πόλει πῆμα γένηται. τοῦτο καὶ ἡμῖν ποιητέον καὶ ἀποπεμπτέον τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὕτω ποιοῦντες μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τυγχάνειν τοῦ μέσου. χαλεπὸν 30 δὲ ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μᾶλλον κεκρατημένων τῶν καθέκαστα ταῖς ἡδοναῖς· τὸ γὰρ κοινῶς λέγειν «παροπτέον τὴν ἡδονήν» εὐκολον διὰ τὸ κοινὸν καταφαίνεται· ὅτε δὲ λέγομεν «παροπτέον» τῷ Ἐπικούρῳ ἢ τῷ Εὐδόξῳ «τὴν ἡδονήν», τότε τὸ τοῦ ἐπιτάγματος χαλεπὸν διαφαίνεται. τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου· χαλεπὸν γὰρ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ὀργιστέον τῷ ἄρχοντι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς ποτὲ μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας

4–9 Ὅτι...θατέρου] cf. Arist. EN 1109a20–31 11–14 Πρῶτον...μεσότης] cf. Arist. EN 1109a33–35 19–30 Σκοπεῖν...ἡδοναῖς] cf. Arist. EN 1109b1–14 26–28 ἐπαινήσαντες...ἀποπέμπεσθαι] cf. [Heliod.] In EN 40.20–23 29–88,6 χαλεπὸν...γίνεται] cf. Arist. EN 1109b14–23

pleasures, we would shrink much more from insensibility, *and for these reasons* we apprehend that *self-indulgence is the contrary of temperance*.

Since it has been stated then, he says, *that virtue is a mean, this is why* precisely attaining the mean *is a difficult task; because anyone can spend money*, but only a very few [can spend it] *in the right amount and on the right person and for the right purpose*; just as it is *a difficult task to find the centre of a circle*; for unless this is demonstrated by the geometer, how will we find the intermediate point [i.e. the centre]? *The first rule is that one must avoid the [extreme] that is more opposed [to the mean]*, whether a deficiency or an excess is in question, since this is clearly contrary, and thereafter seek to avoid the other extreme as well.

1109a30–1109b23 13. (To avoid the more opposed [extreme]...)

In the first place, therefore, he says, one must abstain from the most conspicuous and more *serious* evils, then from *the lesser* one, *since to hit the mean precisely is similarly difficult. The second best way to sail, as they say, is that one must accept the least of the evils*, as the proverb goes, which, he says, seem to be identical with the mean. This will happen if we act on the model of those people who distinguish different kinds of metals. The first rule is to reject the most obvious evils and whatever might seem to be contrary to the mean, beginning with banishing and excluding this; then afterwards [to reject] the least of these [evils], until we are in a position to assess the mean, [judging] what sort it might appear to us as we scrutinise it more broadly.

|| *We should also notice what the errors are to which we are ourselves most prone*, [15v] in order that we not be controlled by our inclination to habit and by our appetite and be hindered in relation to our choice of the mean. *And this will be discovered* not by our understanding or by some demonstrative proof, but *from the pleasure and pain* we experience in relation to these, so that we feel pleasure if we have these things, but pain if we should be deprived [of them]. *By dragging ourselves away from this and by pulling far back from error, we shall reach the intermediate state* with difficulty, *just as men do when they straighten out warped pieces of wood. We must be especially on our guard against pleasure*, particularly since we judge the mean *pleasant*, for we are *partial judges in our judgement* of this, being motivated by desire. [This is precisely] what *the elders* do in Homer, praising *Helen*, but recommending that even so she ought *to be sent* back home, lest there be grief for their city and for them. It is incumbent on us to do the same and *banish* pleasure, and *if we behave* this way we shall have our *best opportunity to reach the intermediate condition. Perhaps this is difficult, and more so* since we are controlled by *particular* pleasures; for the common saying “one must overlook pleasure” appears easy since it is common. But when we say that “one must overlook pleasure” in relation to Epicurus or Eudoxus, at that point the difficulty of the injunction becomes conspicuous. It is the same in the case of the mean as well; because it is *difficult [to define] in what manner and with what people and for how long one ought to be angry* with one’s ruler, since *we sometimes*

ἐπαινοῦμεν, ποτὲ δὲ τοὺς ὑπερβάλλοντας, οὐχ ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντας καὶ ἐλλείποντας ἀλλ' ὡς τινὰς ἐπηβόλους καὶ ἐπιτυχεῖς τοῦ μέσου δοκοῦντας.

Τέως ὁ παρεκβαίνων ἐφ' ἑκάτερα μικρὸν τοῦ μέσου οὐ ψέγεται, ὁ δὲ πλέον ψέγεται· διαφανῶς γὰρ παρεκβαίνει καὶ οὐ λανθάνει παρεκβαίνων. ὅποσον δὲ τοῦτο οὐ ράδιον ἀφορίσαι τῷ λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις γίνεται.

6 post γίνεται schol. xiv (vid. append.)

praise people who err on the side of deficiency [in this matter], and at other times those who tend towards excess, not as excessive or deficient but as people who seem to have reached and attained the mean.

Finally, *no censure is directed at someone who diverges a bit from the mean towards one of the two extremes, but it is directed at someone who diverges more widely, because he diverges conspicuously and his error does not go unnoticed. Yet to what degree [the individual] errs in this case is not easy to define on principle, nor is any other object of perception, since the decision depends not on the principle but on the perception.*

1109b30–1110a29 α' (Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης...)

Ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς λέγουσιν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἕξις προαιρετικῆ ἐν μεσότητι τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, λέγειν καὶ περὶ ἔκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου, ὧν ἐν θατέρῳ, τῷ ἔκουσίῳ, ἐμφαίνεται ἢ προαίρεσις, τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀπροαιρέτου λεγομένου. ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν ταῦτα ἐν πράξει 5
τινὶ εἶσι, πολλοὶ δὲ τινες καὶ τὸ ὄντως ἀκούσιον οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πάσχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ
πράττειν τίθενται, δεῖ τὴν πράξιν ὀρίζεσθαι, ὅτι ἐνέργεια λογικῆ. ταῖς δὲ πράξεσιν
ἔπεται ἢ ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος, καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτῶν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λύπης πράττονται,
καὶ αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν αὐτῶν τῷ πράττοντι αἰρεταί, αἱ δὲ φευκταί, ὡς ὄντων τῶν αἰρετῶν
τῶν μὲν αἰεὶ, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τινα χρόνον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν. ταῦτα πάντα καὶ 10
τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι χρήσιμα εἰς τε τιμὰς καὶ κολάσεις.

[16r] || Τοῦ ἀκουσίου τοῖνυν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ βίαν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἡ
ποιητικὴ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν εἴη, τότε κατὰ βίαν λέγεται· τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ὅταν μὴ αὐτοὶ
παρέχωμεν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀγνοίας, ἀλλ' οὕτω συμβαίη, ὡς εἴ τις μεθύων φόνον ποιήσειε·
τότε γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔδωκε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀγνοίας καὶ οὐ συγγινώσκεται ὡς ἀγνοήσας. τοῦ 15
οὔν ἀκουσίου διττοῦ ὄντος, τὸ ἐκούσιον ἀμφοτέροις ἀντίκειται, ὃ μῆτε κατὰ βίαν μῆτε
κατ' ἄγνοιαν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ αἰτία ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, εἰδοῖται τὰ καθέκαστα, ἃ
καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ῥήτορσι περιστατικά.

Ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος ζητεῖ καὶ περὶ τῶν μεταξὺ αὐτῶν, τῶν ἔκουσιακουσίων λεγομέ-
νων, πότερον ἐν τοῖς ἔκουσίοις ταῦτα θετέον ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις, ὡς ὁ ῥίπτων ἐν 20
χειμῶνι τὰ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ, καὶ ἐπικρίνων λέγει ὅτι μᾶλλον εὐόκασιν ἔκουσίους πράξεσιν.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰρετὸν διττὸν εἶπομεν, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ποτε καὶ διὰ τι, τὰ
τοιαῦτα ὅτε πράττονται αἰρετὰ εἰσὶν· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῷ πράττοντι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς
πράξεως, προαιρεθέντι οὕτω ποιῆσαι· κανονίζει δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ τέλους, οὗ χάριν 25
τᾶλλα πράττονται. πράττει γοῦν κάκεινος τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ τέλους ἔνεκα, τῆς
σωτηρίας δηλαδὴ τῆς νηός, καθὼς ὁ καιρὸς τότε δίδωσιν· οὐ γὰρ παρέχει τότε
σωθῆναι διὰ μόνης κυβερνήσεως, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀποβαλοῦσιν τινὰ τῶν φορτίων. καὶ τὸ

3 Ἀναγκαῖον...λέγουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1109b33–34 3–4 ἐστὶν...ἡμᾶς] Arist. EN 1106b36–1107a1
4 περὶ...ἀκουσίου] cf. Arist. EN 1109b32–33 5–10 ἐπειδὴ...φευκτῶν] cf. Nemes. De nat. hom.
93.24–94.7 ; cf. John Damasc. Exp. fid. 38.2–8 7–8 ταῖς...ψόγος] cf. Arist. EN 1109b31
10–11 ταῦτα...κολάσεις] cf. Arist. EN 1109b34–35 12–13 Τοῦ...λέγεται] cf. Arist. EN
1109b35–1110a2; cf. John Damasc. Exp. fid. 38.15–16 13–14 τὸ...ἀγνοίας] cf. Arist. EN
1110b18–19 13–15 τὸ...ἀγνοίας] cf. John Damasc. Exp. fid. 38.20–24 15–18 τοῦ...περιστατικά] cf. John Damasc. Exp. fid. 38.26–30 19–20 ζητεῖ...λεγομένων] cf. Arist. EN 1110a11–12
20–23 πότερον...εἰσὶν] cf. Arist. EN 1110a7–13 23–24 ἐν...πράξεως] cf. Arist. EN 1110a17
25–26 πράττει...δίδωσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1110a13–14 25 ἐκβολὴν] cf. Arist. EN 1110a9
27–92,1 καὶ²...ὀριστέον] cf. Arist. EN 1110a13–15

1 Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων γάμμα in marg. superiore 2 ante lm. α' schol. xv (vid. append.) | lm. addidi
8 πράττονται scripsi ex Nemes. De nat. hom. 94.5 et John Damasc. Exp. fid. 38.6 : πράττεται M
9 αἰρετῶν scripsi ex Nemes. De nat. hom. 94.6 et John Damasc. Exp. fid. 38.7 : ἀρετῶν M
20 ἔκουσίους; litt. ἐ- p. corr. M

1109b30–1110a29 1. (Since virtue is concerned with emotions and actions...)

It is necessary for those who discuss virtue, which is a preferred disposition lying in a mean that is relative to us, also to discuss [the concepts] of the voluntary and the involuntary, of which in one case—the voluntary—choice is evident, while the involuntary is said to involve no choice. Since then these matters [i.e. the voluntary and the involuntary] involve action of some sort, and many people also believe that what is genuinely involuntary involves not only being affected but action as well, we must define action, [asserting] that it is rational activity. Actions attract either praise or blame, and some of them are undertaken with pleasure, others with distress; and some of them are matters of positive choices by the agent, while others are matters of avoidance, and just as of those that are genuinely matters of positive choice some are always so, while others are so at a given time, likewise with those that are matters of avoidance. All of this will also be useful to the legislators in assigning rewards and punishments.

|| One type of involuntary action, then, involves force, while another [comes about] [16r] through ignorance; and when the productive origin [i.e. the initiating or efficient cause] is external, then [the action] is designated as involving compulsion; whereas “an [action] through ignorance” [is the designation] whenever we ourselves do not supply a cause for our ignorance, but it occurs contingently in this way, as if someone who is drunk were to commit a murder; for in this case he himself supplied the cause of his own ignorance, so that he cannot be pardoned as having acted in ignorance. Since the involuntary is twofold, therefore, the voluntary is opposed to both as what happens neither under compulsion nor out of ignorance, and whose origin and cause are found in the agent, who is aware of the particulars, which legal experts term “circumstantial”.

The Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle] also investigates the [actions] intermediary between these [i.e. the voluntary and the involuntary], namely those designated “voluntary-involuntary” [i.e. mixed or composite actions which are partially voluntary and partially involuntary], [considering] whether one must place these [actions] among the *voluntary* or the *involuntary*, as when one jettisons a ship’s cargo in a storm, and in determining [this issue], he states that *such actions seem closer to the voluntary class*. For since we said that matters of voluntary choice are twofold, some being always [desirable] and occurring for their own sake, while others [are desirable] at a given time and for a reason, such things *are chosen when they are done*; for the origin of the action is in the agent *himself*, who has deliberately chosen to act thus; he assesses this [choice] on the basis of its end, for the sake of which other things are done. The person [mentioned previously], then, jettisons his cargo for the sake of the end, that is the safety of his ship, as the occasion [i.e. the critical circumstances] allows at the time; for it does not allow for the ship to be saved through pilotage alone, unless they [i.e. the captain and crew] throw some of their

ἐκούσιον τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν, ὅτε πράττει τις, ὀριστέον, καὶ χάριν τίνος πράττονται. τὰ γοῦν τοιαῦτα παρ' ἐκόντος πράττονται χάριν σωτηρίας, ὡς ὁ καιρὸς εἰσηγεῖται.

Ἐπικρίνων γοῦν φησὶ περὶ τούτων ὅτι ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐχ ἐκούσια. καὶ ἄλλως δὲ τοῦτο κατασκευάζει, ὅτι ἐκούσια ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἔπαινος. 5 ἐνίστε δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐπαινοῦνται ὡς καλῶς πράξαντες ἃ τις ἂν ἔχοι πράξει καὶ ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῶ ἢ καὶ μετρίῳ φαύλῳ καὶ ψεχθῆναι κατὰ τὸ εἶκος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν φαύλων πράξεων αἱ μὲν ἐλεοῦνται, αἱ δὲ συγγνώμης ἀξιοῦνται, αἱ δὲ μισοῦνται καὶ κολάζονται, φιλοσοφεῖ καὶ περὶ συγγνώμης, ὅταν οὐ προηγήται προαίρεσις. δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀναγκάζον ἱκανὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀναγκάσαν τὸν Ἀλκμαίωνα. 10

1110a29–1111a5 β' (ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίστε διακρίναι...)

Ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀνάγκην, ἐπεὶ οὐ προηγείται ἐκεῖσε ἢ προαίρεσις πέφυκε δὲ πράττειν πολλὰ καὶ παρὰ προαίρεσιν (ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παιδιά καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ποιεῖ μὲν ἐκουσίως, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ προαιρούμενα, καὶ ὅσα διὰ θυμὸν πράττομεν μὴ προβουλευσάμενοι), ἀνάγκη ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν· καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ἀνάγκη. τότε δὲ ἀντὶ ἄλλου νομιζομένου 15 καλοῦ ἄλλο ποιοῦμεν. χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ κρῖναι, φησὶ, ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον· ἢ τὸ τὸ προσταττόμενον ποιῆσαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆσαι ἢ μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖν ὡς τούτου ὄντος καλλίονος. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον καὶ τὸ τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν ἐμμεῖναι (πολλοὶ γὰρ οἶδασιν τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ πεισθῆναι τελευτήν κρείττω τοῦ πεισθῆναι καὶ ζῆν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμμένουσι 20 τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν)· ἐπιτοπολὸν γὰρ τὰ προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά εἰσιν, ἅπερ μέλλουσι παθεῖν εἰ μὴ πεισθεῖεν, ἃ δ' ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχροῦ· καὶ διὰ τὸ λυπηρὰ εἶναι ἐκεῖνα φεύγουσιν, ὅθεν καὶ ἔπαινοι, ἂν ὑπομείνωσι, καὶ ψόγοι, ἂν μὴ ὑπομείνωσι, περὶ τοῦς ἀναγκασθέντας γίνονται παρὰ ἐπὶ τοῦς μὴ ἀναγκασθέντας. τοῦτο δὲ λέγει οὐχ ὅτι οἱ μὴ ἀναγκασθέντες ἀνεύθυνοι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ποιήσαντες μὲν ἔπαινον οὐκ ἔχουσι 25 (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἡ ἀνάγκη), ποιήσαντες δὲ οὐ ψέγονται ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ κολάζονται.

Ἀπλῶς δὲ τὰ βίαια τότε εἰσίν, ὁπόταν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ἤ καὶ ὁ πράττων ἥ 25
[16v] μὴδὲν συμβάληται. πῶς γὰρ ὅς γε καὶ ἀναγκάζεται; ἃ δὲ ἀκούσια μὲν καθ' αὐτά (οὐδὲ

4–7 ἐκούσια...εἶκος] cf. Arist. EN 1110a18–23 7–8 τῶν...κολάζονται] cf. John Damasc. Exp. fid. 38.8–10 9 περὶ συγγνώμης] cf. Arist. EN 1110a24 9–10 δεῖ...Ἀλκμαίωνα] cf. Arist. EN 1110a26–29 13–14 ὥσπερ...προβουλευσάμενοι] cf. Nemes. De nat. hom. 99.15–16, John Damasc. Exp. fid. 38.38–39; cf. Genn. Schol. Epit. Sum. theol. ch. 6. 10–12 16 χαλεπὸν...αἰρετέον] cf. Arist. EN 1110a29–30 18 ἔτι...ἐμμεῖναι] cf. Arist. EN 1110a30–31 20 ἐπιτοπολὸν...εἰσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1110a31–32 21 ἃ...αἰσχροῦ] Arist. EN 1110a32–33 22–23 ὅθεν...ἀναγκασθέντας²] cf. Arist. EN 1110a33–1110b1 26–94,1 Ἀπλῶς...δὲ] cf. Arist. EN 1110b1–5

10 post Ἀλκμαίωνα schol. xvi et xvii (vid. append.) 11 lm. addidi 17 τοῦ s.l. 21 -ονται scripsi (-ov-s.l.): -εται M

freight overboard. *Both the voluntary, then, and the involuntary must be determined on the basis of the occasion, [namely] when one acts, and [on the basis of] why the actions are performed.* Such [actions] are thus undertaken by a willing agent for the sake of safety, as the occasion demands.

Consequently, when assessing these questions, he says that *such acts are voluntary, but simpliciter* [i.e. when considered apart from the specific circumstances] they are *involuntary*. This is also proven in a different way, because *praise* is bestowed on those who voluntarily undertake voluntary acts. *Sometimes* such people *are actually praised* for having performed well deeds one might have the power to do *for no noble end or even for a trivial one* and might easily *be blamed for*. Since therefore *some bad actions are pitied, while others are deemed worthy of pardon, and yet others are hated and punished*, he also investigates *forgiveness*, [in cases] where free choice does not precede. There must be a sufficient degree of compulsion [in this case], although not like the manner in which *Alcmaeon was constrained*.

1110a29–1111a5 2. (But it is sometimes difficult to decide...)

In cases that involve constraint, since voluntary choice is not the guiding principle in those circumstances and it is natural to commit many acts contrary to one's own choice (just as *little children and non-rational animals both act voluntarily but do not also choose [what to do], and [similarly] whatever we do through anger without forethought*), it must be something else that motivates [us], and this is constraint. In that case, instead of doing something considered noble, we do something else. *It is difficult to decide*, he says, *what should be chosen in preference to what*: either to do what we are commanded in return for our life or instead to die in the belief that this is the most noble [course]. *It is still more difficult actually to abide by our decision after it has been made* (for many people recognise that death as the price of refusing to obey is better than obeying and living, but they do not abide by their decisions); *for by and large the anticipated results*, what people are likely to suffer if they disobey, *are painful, whereas the actions they are compelled [to undertake] are [merely] dishonourable*; and so they avoid the former due to the pain involved, *for which reason both praise*, if they abide by [their decisions], and *blame*, if they do not abide by them, *are bestowed on those who are under compulsion*, in contrast to those who are *not* under compulsion. He says this not because those who are not under compulsion are free from accountability, but because if they did not act, they get no praise (for no compulsion was involved), whereas if they did act, they are not merely blamed but actually punished.

Purely compulsory actions occur when the cause lies in external circumstances and the agent || contributes nothing. But how can the agent be put under compulsion? [16v] *When actions are intrinsically involuntary* (since they are not freely chosen), *but voluntary* in a different sense, because of the end the agent expects to get due to compulsion.

γάρ προαιρούνται), *έκούσια* δέ ἄλλως διὰ τὸ τέλος, ὃ δὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ προσδοκᾷ λαβεῖν.

Ὁ *ῥάδιον* δὲ ἀποδοῦναι *ποιᾶ* ἀντὶ *ποιῶν* αἰρετέον καθόλου, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα δοκιμάζονται ταῦτα, ἢ δὲ διδασκαλία καθόλου θέλει διαλαμβάνειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ *ἡδέα* ἔξωθεν κινουσι, *φαίη* ἄν τις, φησί, καὶ ταῦτα *βίαια*. λύων οὖν τὸν λόγον φησὶν 5 ὅτι ἐκ τούτου καὶ τὰ καλὰ πάντα, ὅτι κινουσι καὶ αὐτὰ ἔξωθεν, *βίαια* εἴποι· τελικὸν γάρ αἴτιον τὸ καλόν. τὰ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οἱ μὲν *βία* πράττουσι τῇ παρὰ τῶν παιδαγωγῶν καὶ *λυποῦνται*, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἡδονταί. *γελοῖον* οὖν τὸ τὰ ἐκτὸς αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθῆρατον ὄντα. διατοῦτο εἶπον «ὅταν μηδὲν ὁ πράττων συμβάληται». ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ καλὰ αἰρούμεθα καὶ αἰσχροῖ, εὐθῆρατοι μὲν ἔσμεν καὶ ἐπ’ ἄμφω, πλὴν τῶν μὲν 10 *καλῶν* ἑαυτοῦς αἰτιατέον τῶν δὲ *κακῶν* τὰ *ἡδέα*.

Ἐντεῦθεν περὶ τῶν δι’ ἄγνοιαν διαλαμβάνει· ὃ οὐχ *έκούσιον* μὲν λέγει ὡς ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ μὴ προαιρουμένου τοῦ πράγματος· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ *ἐπίλυπὸν* ἐστὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ *μεταμέλεται* ἢ οὐ, ἐκεῖνο μὲν *ἀκούσιον*, φησί, καὶ ἄκων ἐκεῖνος πράττειν λέγεται, τοῦτο δὲ οὐθ’ *έκούσιον* λέγει οὐτ’ *ἀκούσιον*. τὸν μέντοι πράξαντα οὐθ’ *έκόντα* λέγει, 15 ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἡδὲ τί πράττει, οὐτ’ *ἄκοντα*, ἐπεὶ οὐ *μεταμέλεται* ὡς ἴσως μὴ θέλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕτερος οὗτος ἐκεῖνου, ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἄκων κληθεῖ, οὗτος δὲ ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ μὴ κληθεῖ, οὐχ *έκων* δέ, ὅπερ μέσον τοῦ ἄκοντος καὶ τοῦ ἐκόντος ἐστίν.

Ἐτερον δέ, φησί, καὶ τὸ δι’ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος· ὁ γὰρ *μεθύων* οὐ δι’ ἄγνοιαν πράττει ἀλλὰ διὰ μέθη, καὶ ὁ *ὀργιζόμενος* διὰ τὴν ὀργὴν οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι 20 κακὸν ὃ πράττει. κυρίως δὲ ἡ *ἄγνοια* ἐπὶ τῶν *μοχθηρῶν* τὸν τρόπον ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, δόξαντος τοῦ κακοῦ καλοῦ, αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς *μοχθηρίας*, οὐδ’ ἢ καθόλου ἄγνοια, ἣν ὁ μωρὸς καὶ ἀνόητος ἔχει, καθ’ ἣν καὶ *ψέγεται* καὶ οὐ συγγινώσκειται ἢ *έλεεῖται*.

Εἰπὼν δὲ τὴν καθέκαστα ἄγνοιαν, τίθησι ταῦτα· εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ ῥήτορας 25 περιστατικά. ἐπεὶ γὰρ διττῶς τὸ ἀκούσιον, τὸ μὲν βίαιον τὸ δὲ δι’ ἄγνοιαν, εἰπὼν περὶ ἐκεῖνου λέγει καὶ περὶ τοῦ δι’ ἄγνοιαν. ἕτερον γοῦν τὸ πράττειν δι’ ἄγνοιαν καὶ ὁ ἀγνοῶν· ἀγνοεῖ γάρ τις καὶ ἐκουσίως κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἀκούσιον,

3–11 Οὐ...ἡδέα] cf. Arist. EN 1110b7–15
1110b18–1111a2

12–24 Ἐντεῦθεν...έλεεῖται] cf. Arist. EN

11 ἑαυτοῦς; litt. -έ- in ras. 22 αἰτία scripsi ex Arist. EN 1110b32 : ἦτοι M

But it is not easy to lay down general rules for what should be traded for what, because these matters are put to the test in specific circumstances, whereas the exposition is inclined to treat the issue in general terms. Since pleasant objects move us from without, one might suppose, he says, that these [objects] constrain us by force. As a way of refuting this argument, therefore, he says that on this basis one could claim that all noble acts, since they motivate us and are intrinsically external, are forced, because what is noble is a final cause. But those who perform actions that have intrinsic ends because their teachers force them to do so feel pain, whereas those who undertake a noble action for [nobility's sake] get pleasure. As a consequence, it is absurd to blame externalities rather than oneself as easily falling victim to such things. This is why I said "when the agent contributes nothing". However, since we choose both noble and base [actions and objects], we are easy prey in both cases, except that we ought to attribute responsibility for our noble deeds to ourselves but for our disgraceful actions to pleasures.

After this, he deals with acts performed *through ignorance*; as for what is *not voluntary*, he says that it is done by someone acting in ignorance and the thing is not deliberately chosen; but on the other hand, when the act either is *painful and a cause for regret* [for the agent], or not, the former [i.e. an act that causes the agent pain and regret] is *involuntary*, he says, and that person is said to act *unwillingly*, whereas he calls the latter [i.e. an act that involves no pain or regret for the agent] neither voluntary nor involuntary. Yet he states that the agent is *neither willing*, since *he was unaware of what he was doing, nor unwilling*, since *he does not regret* [the act] presumably because he did not act voluntarily. *Since the one individual is different from the other, the former may be designated "involuntary", whereas the latter can certainly not be called "voluntary" but rather "non-voluntary", which is intermediate between "involuntary" and "voluntary".*

Acting through ignorance, however, he says, [is] different from being ignorant; because a drunk person does not act out of ignorance but out of inebriation, and an enraged individual [acts] because of his anger, not out of a lack of awareness that his action is base. But ignorance is properly what is involved in the case of people with a wicked disposition; for ignorance in matters of [moral] choice, i.e. when the bad is taken to be the good, is not the cause of involuntary action but of ugly behaviour, nor [is the cause] general ignorance, which is characteristic of the dullard and fool, on the basis of which he is blamed and neither excused nor pitied.

After discussing ignorance in particulars, he spells these [particulars] out: they are what legal experts call the circumstances [of the action]. Because since the involuntary is twofold—one kind involves compulsion, while the other is due to ignorance—after examining the former, he also discusses involuntary action due to ignorance. Acting out of ignorance, at any rate, is different from being ignorant, because a person is liable to ignore something voluntarily in line with his decision, something that does not involve a lack of volition but rather vice; and general ignorance does not involve the involuntary, but rather being ignorant with regard to

ἀλλὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν· οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια τὸ ἀκούσιον ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ τι ἀγνοεῖν (ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ψέγεται, τοῦτο δὲ ἐλεεῖται ἢ συγγινώσκειται. κατὰ τι δὲ ἀγνοεῖ οἷον τίς ἐστιν ὃν τύπτει· πατήρ ἴσως· τί' ὅτι ἐμπήγνυσι τὴν μάχαιραν· ἐν τίνι καιρῷ· ὅτι χειμῶνα φαρμακεύει· τρόπῳ· ὅτι σιδήρῳ μὴ εἰδώς· αἰτία· ὅτι σωτηρίας χάριν ὃ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι μὴ θέλων) καὶ ἀπλῶς τι τῶν περιστατικῶν.

5

1111a7–1111b12 γ' (δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα...)

Περὶ τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος φιλοσοφεῖ, ὃν εἰς τὸ μέρος τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἐτίθεμεν. τὰ γοῦν περιστατικά ὃ ἐκουσίως πράττων οἶδεν· ὠριζόμεθα γὰρ τὸ ἐκούσιον κατ' ἀπόφασιν τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ὃ μῆτε κατὰ βίαν ἔστι μῆτε κατ' ἄγνοιαν, προστιθέντες καὶ οὗ «ἡ ἀρχὴ» καὶ ἡ αἰτία «ἐν τῷ πράττοντι» εἰδότεί τὰ καθέκαστα, ἃ δὴ εἰσι τὰ περιστατικά.

10

Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ περιστατικά τίς ἂν, φησίν, ἀγνοήσειεν ὁμοῦ πάντα πράττων, εἰ μὴ μαίνοιτο; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα ἀγνοήσει, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐκ οἶδα, εἰ μὴ, ὥσπερ ὁ Αἰσχύλος, τὸν μουόμενον εἰσάγει ἐκστάντα ἑαυτοῦ· ἢ δῆλον ὅτι οἶδε τὰ περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἠγνόησε· δείξει γὰρ βουλόμενος ἀφῆκε τὸν καταπέλτην καὶ οἶδε πάντα τότε, πλὴν ἠγνόησε τίνα καὶ δείξειεν ἂν· ἄλλος οἶδε πάντα, ἀλλ' 15
 [17r] *οἰηθεὶς πολέμιον τὸν υἱὸν ἔτρωσε, ἢ καὶ ἄλλος λόγην μὲν οἶδε καὶ ὅτι κατὰ τινος ὀρμᾶ, ἀλλ' ὥηθη ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ δόρυ καὶ ἠγνόησεν ὅτι ἐστὶ λελογχευμένον καὶ διαταῦτα καιρίαν ἔπληξεν· ἄλλος ἀγνόησας τὸν λίθον καὶ κίσσηριν ὑπολαβῶν, τᾶλλα εἰδώς, βαλὼν εἰς θάνατον ἔτρωσεν· ἄλλος ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ σπεύσας ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀγνόησας τὸ τέλος· καὶ ἄλλος βουλόμενος θῆξαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιστροῖς ἀκροχειρίζο-* 20
μενοι, ἐπάταξεν εἰς θάνατον. περὶ γοῦν ταῦτα δὴ τὰ τῆς περιστάσεως τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις), ὃ τούτων τι ἀγνόησας ἀκούσιον ἔδοξε πράξας· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πάντα ἀγνοεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἀναίσθητος. προσθετέον δὲ τούτοις «εἶναι καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ». τί γοῦν; ἐάν τις δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀγαθόν τι ἐργάσεται, οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσιον; ἢ ῥητέον, ὡς λόγος οὐδεὶς τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτε καὶ 25
ὀπωσδήποτεπραχθῆ; οὔτε γὰρ ὃ πράξας ἐπαινεθήσεται, ἐπεὶ μὴ θέλων εἰργάσατο, οὔτε μὴν κολασθήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ πραχθέν. διαταῦτα καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἐκούσιον ἐλέγομεν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀποφάσεως.

2–4 κατὰ...χάριν] cf. Arist. EN 1111a3–5 4 χειμῶνα φαρμακεύει] cf. Hipp. Aph. 4, 6 (Jones 134) 8–9 ὠριζόμεθα...ἄγνοιαν] cf. John Damasc. Exp. fid. 38.27–28 9–10 οὗ...πράττοντι] cf. Arist. EN 1110b4 11–24 Ταῦτα...μεταμελεία] cf. Arist. EN 1111a6–21 14–20 δείξει...τέλος] cf. [Heliod.] In EN 44.14–18

5 post περιστατικῶν schol. xviii, xix et xx (vid. append.) 6 lm. addidi 14 δείξει correxi : δίξει M 15 δείξειεν correxi : δίξειεν M 20 θῆξαι scripsi ex Arist. EN 1111a14 : δίξει M (cum vulg. δείξει) 23 ἀναίσθητος; litt. -ά¹- in ras.

something (because the former is blamed, whereas the latter is pitied or excused. One is ignorant with regard to something, for example, of *who* it is whom he strikes. Perhaps it's his own father! [He may also be ignorant of] *what* [he does], namely that he sticks his dagger [in him]. [He may be ignorant of] the *precise* occasion: that he administers drugs in winter. [He may be ignorant of] the manner, i.e. he is unaware that he stabs him with the knife. [He may be ignorant of] *why* [he acted in this way]: i.e. that [he wanted] *to save his [father's] life*, but killed him unintentionally), and simply put [he may be ignorant] of one of the circumstances.

1111a7–1111b12 3. (Evidently, he could not [be ignorant] of the agent...)


He investigates the concept of acting in ignorance, which we classified as a part of the involuntary. An agent who acts voluntarily thus knows the circumstances [of the action]; for we defined *the voluntary* according to a negation of the involuntary as that which is *undertaken neither due to force nor out of ignorance*, adding that its “*origin*” and cause [i.e. of the voluntary act] are located “*in the agent*” who knows the particulars, which are the circumstances.

Who *could be ignorant*, he says, of *all these* circumstances together when he acted, *unless he were mad*? Surely he will *not* be ignorant of *the agent*, which is *himself*, I believe, unless, *like Aeschylus*, he brings the initiate onstage out of his senses; otherwise it is evident that he knows the circumstances of the action, but was ignorant of some element of them. For *the man who wanted to show off the catapult shot if off*, and he knew all [the circumstances] at the time, but was ignorant of exactly what he could show off; another person knew all [the relevant circumstances], but injured *his son when he thought he was an enemy*, || while another individual knew what a *sharp spear* is and that it rushes headlong against a person, but he nonetheless thought *the spear had a blunt end* and did not realise that it was *sharp*, with the result that he delivered a serious wound; another person failed to recognise *a stone* and mistook it for *a pumice-stone*, although he was aware of the other [circumstances], and when he threw it, he killed someone; another individual *killed [a man]* when striving to *save his life*, without knowing the end [of his action]; while another *intended to tap [his adversary]*, *as people do when sparring* in the wrestling-schools, *but punched* and killed him. Consequently, *since ignorance is possible in relation to [all] these aspects of a situation* (because *the action is actually located within these [circumstantial factors]*), *one who has acted in ignorance of any of them seems to have acted involuntarily*; for it is not necessary to be ignorant of everything; because in that case one would be devoid of all perception. One must add to these [conditions] that “*the action produces sorrow and involves repentance*”. What then? If someone were to achieve something good through ignorance, [would] this not also be involuntary? Or must we specify [as an additional condition], since there is no discussion of the noble [action], when and how it should be accomplished? For the agent will not be praised [in this case], since he did not do this voluntarily, but neither will he be punished, of course; because what was done is

Οὐ καλῶς δὲ λέγεται καὶ ὅτι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν γινόμενα ἀκούσια· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, ἐπεὶ κατὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οὐδὲν ἐκούσιον πράξει, ἀλλ' οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ κατὰ λόγον ἐνεργοῦσιν. εἴτα ἐπειδὴ διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ καλὰ πράττομεν, πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκούσιον τούτων, ἢ τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐκούσια τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἀκούσια; ἀλλὰ γελοῖον τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ αἰτιῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέ- 5
ρων, ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν «ἀκούσια ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι»· δεῖ γὰρ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὀρεγόμεθα τούτων, καὶ αὐθις ἐπιθυμεῖν ὑγείας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκουσίως. συλλογίζεται καὶ οὕτως· ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρά, τὰ δὲ ἐπιθυμητὰ οὐ λυπηρά ἀλλ' ἡδέα, ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀκούσιον ἐν οἷς ἐπιθυμοῦμεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ λογισμὸν τινὰ ἀμαρτάνονται καὶ οὐ μόνον κατὰ θυμὸν 10
καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· τί γοῦν διαφέρει τῶν καὶ ἄμφω εἶναι ἀκούσια; ἀληθῶς φευκτὰ καὶ ἀμφοτέρα, πλεον δὲ ἀνθρωπικὰ τὰ κατὰ τὰ ἄλογα πάθη, ἐν οἷς πλεονάζει τὸ ἀκούσιον, καὶ οὐκ ἐν μόνοις αὐτοῖς.

Ἐντεῦθεν ἀκολούθως καὶ περὶ προαιρέσεως λέγει, ἥς τὸ ἐκούσιον ἐπιπλέον ἐστὶν· συλλογίζεται δὲ ὅτι οὐ θυμὸς ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμία οὐδὲ βούλησις οὐδὲ δόξα. 15

Diagramma vii



1–3 Οὐ...παῖδες] cf. Arist. EN 1111a24–26 3–13 εἴτα...αὐτοῖς] cf. Arist. EN 1111a27–1111b3

14–15 Ἐντεῦθεν...δόξα] cf. Arist. EN 1111b4–12

15 post δόξα schol. xxi et xxii (vid. append.)


noble. For these reasons we were correct to say that the voluntary is [ascertained] from a negation of the involuntary.

It is a mistake to say that acts produced by anger and desire are involuntary, because, in the first place, non-rational animals will not act voluntarily, given that they act out of anger and desire, nor will children, since they do not act in accordance with reason either. Next, since we also act nobly out of anger and desire, will none of these actions be voluntary, or are the noble ones voluntary and the base ones involuntary? But this is ridiculous, since one and the same thing is the cause of both cases, namely anger and desire. It would also be absurd to say that “things we ought to desire are involuntary”, since we ought to feel angry in response to certain things, but we do not desire them, and again [we ought] to desire health, but not involuntarily. And he draws the following syllogism: since involuntary actions are painful, whereas desirable actions are not painful but pleasant, it follows that there is no involuntary motivation in the things we desire. Moreover, errors are made in accord with some rational calculation and not merely out of anger or desire. So how is this different from both being involuntary? In reality, both are to be avoided, and even more so human feelings that resemble those of non-rational creatures, in which the involuntary abounds, and not in them only.


After this, he goes on to discuss choice, which the voluntary is full of. He concludes syllogistically that [choice] is not anger [i.e. a passion] or desire or wanting or opinion.

Diagram vii


of non-rational animals




immoderate



moderate





cf. Arist. EN 1111b12–16; cf. Asp. In EN 67.34–68.5; cf. [Heliod.] In EN 45.18–24

Note: π = παντί / οὐδ = οὐδενί

[17v] || **1111b16–1112a14** δ' (καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου...)

Τίθησι καὶ ἄλλον συλλογισμόν ἐκβάλλοντα ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου. καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἡδέος φανερόν· πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐπιλύπου; ἢ ὅταν ἐπιθυμῶ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἀλλ' ἑτέρῳ κακοῦ; ἢ προαίρεσις δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων. διατί οὐκ ἔστιν; ἢ γὰρ οὐ προαιρούμεθα μὲν τὸ ἡδὺ προαιρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι, ἢ ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ προαιρούμεθα, ἅπερ οὔτε ἡδέα εἰσὶν οὔτε ἐπίλυπα· ἄλλωστε καὶ λυπηρὰ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις, οὐ προαιροῦνται δέ. ἔδει δέ, εἴπερ ἦν τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἢ προαίρεσις. 5


Μέλλων δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ λέγειν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι θυμὸς ἢ προαίρεσις, ἠρκέσθη ἐνὶ ἐπιχειρήματι διαλεκτικῶ τῷ λέγοντι «εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον δοκοῦν τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττον πάντως δοκοῦν»· ἔστι δ' οὗτος τρόπος εἰς τῶν τεσσάρων ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπιχειρημάτων. 10

Ἐκβάλλει δὲ καὶ τὴν βούλησιν διὰ πολλῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων, ὃ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγγίζει τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ φησὶ «προαίρεσις μὲν τῶν ἀδυνάτων οὐκ ἔστιν» (προαιρεῖται γὰρ τις τὰ δυνατά), «βούλησις δ' ἔστι». καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἃ δὴ δι' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστι πραχθῆναι, οἷον ὁ ὑποκριτῆς βούλεται τινα νικᾶν· οὐδεὶς δὲ προαιρεῖται ὅσα ἂν μὴ δι' αὐτοῦ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν βούλησις μᾶλλον τοῦ τέλους ἔστι. τοῦτο δὲ λέγει διὰ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ὅτι βούλησις ἔστι καὶ τινων τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν ταῦτα ὡς τέλη λογίζονται· διατοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον λέγεται τελικώτατον. ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος· ὅλως δὲ περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἢ προαίρεσις. 15 20

Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἀποβουκολεῖ τῆς προαιρέσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα περὶ πάντα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ αἰδία (δοξάζομεν γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων) καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις οὐ περὶ πάντα, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστι, καὶ διὰ τι τέλος γίνεται. ἔτι ἡ μὲν δόξα τῷ ψεύδει καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ

2 ἐκβάλλοντα...ἐπιθυμίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1111b15–16 2–4 ὅτι...τούτων] cf. Arist. EN 1111b16–18 7–8 ἄλλωστε...δέ¹] cf. Arist. EN 1111b12–13 10–11 ἐνὶ...δοκοῦν] cf. Psel. In Phys. 5, 17.29–30 10 εἰ...ἔστιν] cf. Arist. Top. 127b26, 127b34–35 13–17 Ἐκβάλλει...ἔστι] cf. Arist. EN 1111b19–26 19–20 ἢ...τέλος] Arist. EN 1111b26–27 20 ὅλως...προαίρεσις²] cf. Arist. EN 1111b29–30 21–22 ἢ...αἰδία] cf. Arist. EN 1111b31–32 22–23 καὶ³...ἡμῖν¹] cf. Arist. EN 1111b32–33 23 ἢ...ἔστι] cf. Arist. EN 1111b30 24–102,1 τῷ¹...κακῷ] cf. Arist. EN 1111b33–34

1 Im. addidi 22 τὰ³ s.l. 24 ψεύδει M (cum M^b): ψευδεῖ Arist. vulg. (EN 1111b33)



Note: a = of every/every; e = of no/no

|| **1111b16–1112a14** 4. (And desire relates to the pleasant and the painful...) [17v]

He also puts forward another deductive argument that separates desire from choice, because *desire relates to the pleasant and the painful*. That *it relates to the pleasant* is obvious, but how can it also [relate to] *the painful*? Or [is this the case] whenever I desire something bad not for myself but for another person? *But choice is not concerned with these* [i.e. the pleasant or the painful]. Why is it not? Either because we do not deliberately choose the pleasant but we choose to abstain from the painful, or because we choose many other [objects], which are neither pleasant nor painful. Furthermore, non-rational animals and children feel both pleasure and pain, but *they do not make deliberate choices*. This would have been necessary, if choice were related to the pleasant and the painful.

Although he intended to say with regard to anger [i.e. passion] that choice is not [equivalent to] anger, [Aristotle] was satisfied with a single dialectical proof that states “*if what is more generally held to be* [i.e. the superior line of proof or argument] *is not the case*, then *neither is clearly held to be the lesser argument*”. This is one mode of syllogism among the four arguments from probability.

He also used several dialectical proofs to set apart the *wish*, which is even more closely *akin* to the other [options, i.e. choice and passion], and he says: “*A choice cannot have impossibilities for its object*” (since one chooses things that are possible), “*but a wish can*”. *And a wish can also involve those objects one cannot secure oneself, as for example an actor wishes for a particular victory. But no one chooses things that cannot naturally happen through his own efforts. Furthermore, a wish is rather for an end* [sc. *than for a means to an end*]. And he discusses this to make the matter certain, because a wish is also concerned with certain things that are means to the end, when these are regarded as ends; because this is why the final end is also said to be most connected with final causality. *A choice, however, is for the means to our end; and in general, choice is concerned with things within our own control.*

After this, he distinguishes opinion from choice. *For opinion is concerned with everything, including what is eternal* (for we also form opinions about such issues) *and impossible things just as much as with what is within our power*, whereas choice is not concerned with everything but only with *what is in our power*, and it exists for the sake of an end. Furthermore, *opinion is divided by true and false, but choice by good*

κακῶ. ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι πᾶσα δόξα προαίρεσις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ταυτὸν προαίρεσίς τινι δόξη· τῷ μὲν γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι ποιοί τινες λεγόμεθα (φιλόκαλοι γὰρ καὶ φιλεπιχαιρέκακοι), τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ.

Καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἢ λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ τί τι συμφέρει· οὐ δὲ πῶς δεῖ λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ταῦτα δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται, εἰ προαιρούμεθα ὀρθῶς καὶ ὁ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ δόξα, εἰ κατ' αὐτὴν ἀληθεύομεν. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ὅσα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ αὐτὸς εἷς καὶ δοξάζει καὶ προαιρεῖται τὰ ἄριστα, ἀλλὰ δοξάζει μὲν τις τὸ ἄμεινον, αἰρεῖται δὲ διὰ κακίαν τὸ χεῖρον. ὅτι δὲ προγίνεται πολλάκις δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως (δοξάσαντες γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ προαιρούμεθα) ἢ παρακολουθεῖ (προαιρούμεθα γὰρ περὶ οὗ πολλάκις καὶ σκεψάμενοι εὐρίσκομεν συμφέρον), οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ζητοῦμεν. τί τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἢ προαίρεσις; ἐκούσιον μὲν, ἀλλ' ἐπιπλέον ταύτης τοῦτο, ὡς εἴρηται.

[18r] || 1112a19–1112b20 ε' (λεκτέον δ' ἴσως βουλευτὸν...)

Περὶ βουλῆς διαλαμβάνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ προαίρεσις βουλή, εἰσβάλλει εἰς ἀπορίαν, εἰ καὶ περὶ πάντων βουλευτέον καὶ εἰ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστὶν· καὶ λύων τὴν ἀπορίαν 15 φησὶν «ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή;»· τίνα δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ μικρὸν ἐπιφέρει, προηγούμενως βουλευτὸν τιθεὶς ὑπὲρ οὗ οὐκ ἂν τις βουλεύσαιτο ἢ ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος (οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι πολλάκις βουλεύσαιντ' ἂν, καὶ εἰ κατὰ βυθῶν ἑαυτοὺς ῥιπτέον, καὶ τοῦτο συνοῖσει σφίσις ἀποπνιγεῖσιν). τίνα δὲ περὶ ὧν οὐ πέφυκε βουλεύεσθαι; τὰ αἶδια καὶ 20 ἄλλως μὴ ἔχοντα, τὰ μαθηματικά· τὰ ἐν κινήσει μὲν, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως γινόμενα, εἴτε φύσει (ὡς τὸ ἄνω φέρεσθαι τῷ πυρὶ) εἴτε ἀνάγκη (ὡς τὸ ὄμβρουσ γίνεσθαι ἐν χειμῶνι) εἴτε τινὶ ἐτέρα ἀκολουθίᾳ (ὡσπερ ἂν τις ἔχοι συνήθειαν ἀπαράβατον καθημέραν τῆς οἰκίας ἐξέρχεσθαι, εἰ μὴ νόσος κωλύει).

Ἄλλ' «οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως» γινομένων, «οἷον αὐχμῶν», φησί. τί γοῦν; οὐ βουλευτέον περὶ τῶν αὐχμῶν τῶν γενησομένων, ὡς ἂν ἀποθήσομεν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα; 25 ἀλλ' οὐ βουλευόμεθα τότε περὶ τῶν αὐχμῶν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἀποθήκης τῶν ἀναγκαίων. περὶ δὲ τῶν αὐχμῶν οὐδεὶς βουλεύσεται, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἂν ἡμῖν προσήκει καὶ δι' ἡμῶν καὶ ὡς

1–12 ὅλως...εἴρηται] cf. Arist. EN 1111b34–1112a14 14–17 Περί...μαινόμενος] cf. Arist. EN 1112a18–20 19–22 τίνα...ἀκολουθίᾳ] cf. Arist. EN 1112a21–25 21 τὸ¹...πυρὶ] Arist. Phys. 255a9 24–104,2 Ἄλλ'...νοῦ] cf. Arist. EN 1112a26–33

and bad. In general, then, not every opinion is a choice, but choice is not the same as an opinion; because it is by making choices that we get a reputation for having a particular character (for [we can come to be known] as lovers of the good or as taking pleasure in vice), not by holding opinions.

And we choose either to take or to avoid [any given object], but we have opinions about what a thing is or for whom it is advantageous; but we do not form an opinion as to how we ought to take or avoid these things. And choice is praised if we choose rightly and the right object, while opinion [is praised] if we arrive at truth by means of it. Moreover, we choose the things we know to be good, whereas we hold opinions about things we do not know for certain; but the same individual does not [necessarily] simultaneously have the best opinions and make the best decisions, but someone may have better opinions but choose the worse [option] due to wickedness. That an opinion frequently precedes choice (because after we form an opinion that something is good, we also choose it) or accompanies it (since we choose what we frequently considered and found to be advantageous), is irrelevant; for this is not the issue we are investigating. What then is choice? It is voluntary, but this [i.e. the voluntary] is full of choice, as has been stated.

|| 1112a19–1112b20 5. (The term “object of deliberation” presumably must be [18r] defined...)

In treating *the subject of deliberation*, [arguing] that choice is not deliberation, he encounters a problem, [which is] whether *one must deliberate about everything and whether everything is open to deliberation*; and, in resolving the difficulty, he says “*or is there no deliberation about some matters?*”. He explains what these matters are shortly afterward, after previously establishing *the object of deliberation a fool or a madman might not deliberate about* (for such people might deliberate often, and if they must cast themselves down into the depths of the sea, [they think that] even this will be of use to them when they are drowned). What matters are not naturally disposed to being deliberated? *Eternal matters* and matters that cannot be otherwise, namely scientific phenomena; *the things that are in motion but are always identical and occur in a similar manner, be it by nature* (like *moving upwards, in the case of fire*) or *out of necessity* (such as the occurrence of *thunderstorms* in winter) or *some other regular procedure* (for instance, a person might have a fixed habit of leaving his household every day, unless illness prevents him from doing so).

Also, “*not about irregular events*” that happen, “*such as droughts*”, he says. What then? Are we not to deliberate about the droughts that will take place, as if we are going to lay aside events driven by necessity? We do not deliberate about droughts in this case, however, but about what necessity has in store for us. No one will deliberate about droughts, just as [we do] *not [deliberate about] events that result from chance. Nor [do we even deliberate] about all human affairs*, but about whatever matters are related to us and are affected *by our own agency*, for the most part, and

ἐπιτοπολὺ γίνονται καὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς αἴτιοι, ὑπεξηρημένων τῶν ἄλλων αἰτιῶν, φύσεως καὶ ἀνάγκης καὶ τύχης, καὶ λαμβανομένου μόνου τοῦ νοῦ.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀκριβῶν ἐπιστημῶν, φησί, οὐ βουλευτέον (αὗται γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἔχουσι καὶ οὐ χρεία βουλῆς εἰς τὸ ἀκριβεστέρας γενέσθαι), ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἔχουσῶν ἀμφισβητήσεις τεχνῶν, ὡσπερ ἔχει ἡ κυβερνητικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ (ἦττον γὰρ 5 *διηκριβῶνται αὗται ἢ ἡ γυμναστικὴ*). οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπιτοπολὺ βουλευτέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀδελία ἐστὶ πῶς ἀποβήσεται καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀδιόριστον τὸ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίσης. συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ πιστεύοντες ἑαυτοῖς (δεινὸν γὰρ δεκάσαι τὰς κρίσεις τοῦ πράγματος τὸ αὐτάρεσκον καὶ αὐτόγνωμον· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ μόνος ποιήσας τι, ὃ δὴ καὶ κακῶς ἀπέβη, οὐκ ἔχει 10 λέγειν ὅτι «οὕτω μοι ἔδοξε καλόν»· ἀκούσεται γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο ἂν εἶποι καὶ καταποντιστῆς νηός)· ἀλλ' ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἐγκεχείρισται τις μεγάλα, τόσῳ χρεία καὶ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων βουλευτῶν.

Βουλευόμεθα δὲ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη, πῶς καὶ τί ποιητέον, ἵνα τὸ τέλος ἀπαντήσῃ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τελῶν τὰ μὲν διὰ πολλῶν πέφυκεν 15 εὐοδοῦσθαι, βουλευτέον ἐν τούτοις διὰ ποίου ῥᾶστα· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ δι' ἐνὸς ἄλλα, πῶς διὰ τούτου. καὶ ἀρκτέον κάτωθεν, ἵν' ἔσχατον γένηται τὸ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει.

[18v] || **1112b21–1113a22** στ' (φαίνεται δ' ἢ μὲν ζητησις...)

Εὐγέ σοι, Ἀριστότελες, τῆς καθέκαστον ἐξετάσεως· ἔθου γὰρ σκοπὸν ζητῆσαι τί ἐστὶν ἢ προαίρεσις· καὶ ἐπεὶ τᾶλλα μὲν ἀπερράπισας εὗρες δὲ παρομοιουμένην ταύτη ἐξ 20 ἐγγίονος τὴν βούλησιν, περὶ τῶν βουλευτῶν ἐξετάσεις. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκουσίον τι ἢ προαίρεσις φαίνεται, οὐ πᾶν δὲ ἐκούσιον προαιρετὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ βεβουλευμένον, ἀφείς προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν λέγειν περὶ βουλευτοῦ ἐξετάσεις. καὶ τὸ προαιρετὸν ἐντεῦθεν θηρᾶ, ἐκ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ δὲ εὐρίσκεις τὴν προαίρεσιν. βουλευτὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ 25 τέλος, βουλευτὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

Μέλλει γοῦν εἰπεῖν περὶ τοῦ βουλευτοῦ, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ βουλευτοῦ· ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς γεωμετρικοῖς διαγράμμασιν τὸ παρὸν ἐξ ἄλλου προηγουμένου δείκνυται ἀκαίνο ἐξ ἄλλου καὶ τοῦτο ἐξ ἄλλου ἕως οὗ καταντήσομεν εἰς τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα τὸ τέλος θέντες βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ προηγουμέ-

3–9 Καὶ...ἑαυτοῖς] cf. Arist. EN 1112a34–1112b11 9–12 δεινὸν...νηός] cf. Georg. Pachym. Hist. VIII, 24 197.2–6 14 Βουλευόμεθα...τέλη] Arist. EN 1112b11–12 15–17 ἐπεὶ...εὐρέσει] cf. Arist. EN 1112b16–20 21–22 καὶ...φαίνεται] cf. Arist. EN 1111b6–7 22 οὐ...βεβουλευμένον] cf. Arist. EN 1112a14–15 24–25 βουλευτὸν...τέλος?] cf. Nemes. De nat. hom. 100.16–17; cf. Georg. Pachym. Paraphr. In EN 30.17–18 26–27 ὡσπερ...διαγράμμασιν] cf. Arist. EN 1112b21

for which we are responsible, when the other *causes* are excluded, namely *nature*, *necessity*, and *chance*, and only *intelligence* is admitted [as a cause].

In addition, one must not deliberate, he says, *about precise sciences* (for these have an innate exactitude and there is no need of deliberation to make them more accurate), but about crafts that inspire doubts [as to our ability to deliberate them], such as *navigation* and *medicine* (because these *have been less completely reduced to a science than athletic training has*). And not only *must we deliberate about rules that generally apply*, but also about matters where *the outcome is obscure and in those where it is indeterminate* whether something will happen or not, which refers to “the equally possible”. *We call in others to help us deliberate on the most important questions, since we lack confidence in ourselves* (for self-satisfaction and self-judgment dangerously corrupt one’s verdicts on the matter, for which reason an individual who did something alone that turned out badly cannot say “It seemed good to me this way”; for he will be told that a person who sinks a ship could also say this). And to the extent that one has been entrusted with important matters, to that same extent one needs many important councillors.

We deliberate not about ends but about the means to our ends, how and what must be done, in order that our end be attained. Since some ends by their nature are achieved *by a number of means*, one must deliberate in these cases *by what kind of [means] [they will be achieved] most easily*; whereas since other [ends can be achieved] *through only one means*, [one must deliberate] *how [it can be achieved] by that one*. And one must begin from below, in order that *what is being sought can be last*.

|| 1112b21–1113a22 6. (It appears that investigation...)

[18v]

My compliments to you, Aristotle, for this particular insight, since you made it your target to investigate what choice is. And when you rejected the other [options] and discovered that which most closely resembled it, you began to examine the objects of deliberation. And since *choice is manifestly a voluntary [action]*, *although not every voluntary act is chosen but [only the one] preceded by deliberation*, you set aside the discussion of choice and wish, and began to scrutinise the object of deliberation. After this you also search for the object of choice, and you discover choice from [an investigation of] what is chosen. *The end* is thus *what is wished for, while the means to the end are the objects of deliberation*.

He is about to discuss the object of the wish, therefore, but first [he discusses] the object of deliberation; for *just as* in geometrical *diagrams* the present [figure] is demonstrated from a different, preceding [figure], and that [figure] from another, and this [figure] from yet another, until the point when we arrive at the first principles, so too in this case, after establishing the end, we deliberate about the means leading to it and in the first place those that are close [to the end], then what comes before that, and in a similar manner what is before it, and in a similar manner what is first, *and the last step in this analysis is the first step in the order of coming into being. And if we*

νως τὰ ἐγγύς, εἶτα τὸ πρὸ τούτου καὶ οὕτω τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὕτω τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ γίνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀναλύσει τὸ ἔσχατον πρῶτον κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνατῶ ἐντύχωμεν ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος κατὰ τάξιν, ἀφιστάμεθα· εἰ δὲ δυνατῶ, ἐγχειροῦμεν. δυνατὰ δὲ εἰσιν ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν ἢ διὰ τῶν φίλων ἡμῶν· ἐγγύς γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἡμῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ζητοῦμεν τὰ ἀπλῶς δυνατὰ, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡμῖν· τί γὰρ ἡμῖν 5 μέλοι εἰ πλουσιῶ ταῦτα καὶ βασιλεῖ δυνατὰ, ἡμῖν δὲ ἀδύνατα; καὶ πολλάκις βουλευόμεθα περὶ φίλων ἢ χρημάτων ὁπόθεν περιγενήσονται· ταῦτα γὰρ ὄργανα. πολλάκις περὶ τῆς χρείας αὐτῶν, εἰ ἕξομεν, πῶς χρῆσόμεθα τούτοις;

Συνάγεται τοίνυν ἐντεῦθεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς τὰ δι' αὐτοῦ πρακτὰ βουλεύεται, μὴ διαφερέτω δὲ εἰ καὶ τὰ διὰ τῶν φίλων. 10 πᾶσα δὲ πράξις ἔνεκα τέλους, καλῶς οὖν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὐ βουλευτέον περὶ τοῦ τέλους· τὸ γὰρ τέλος οὐκ ἄλλου χάριν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα. οὐ βουλευτέον δὲ περὶ ἃ καταγίνεται αἴσθησις οὐδὲ αἰεὶ ἄλλο χάριν ἄλλου βουλευτέον· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ οὕτως ἤξει.

Συνήχθη τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ βουλευτὸν καὶ προαιρετὸν, πλην τὸ προαιρετὸν μέρος τοῦ βουλευτοῦ· ἀφωρισμένον γὰρ βουλευτὸν προαιρετὸν· τὸ προκριθὲν 15 γὰρ. ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰς ἄπειρον ἢ ζητήσις οὐ πρόεισι, παύσεται ὁ ζητῶν, ὅταν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνάγῃ τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ αὐτοῦ πάλιν εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ παρ' Ὀμήρω· ὅτε γὰρ οἱ βασιλεῖς προείλοντό τι καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ πράξαι καθίστων ἑαυτούς, τότε τῷ δήμῳ ἀνήγγελον, ὥστε τὸ προαιρετὸν βουλευτὸν τι, ἦγουν ὀρεκτὸν, πλην ὀρεκτὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ὅσα πέφυκεν εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν 20 τοῦ γενέσθαι. ἔστι τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ἢ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτικὴ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. τύπῳ οὖν ἐρρέθη τί ἐστὶν ἢ προαίρεσις, καὶ περὶ ποῖά ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ, εἶπεν, ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν, ζητεῖ καὶ περὶ ταύτης.

Καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ τέλους ἢ βούλησις, τέλος δὲ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γοῦν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, πῶς ἂν εἶη ἀγαθὸν ὃ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρεῖταιί τις; εἰ δὲ φαινόμενον, 25 οὐ φύσει ἔσται τὸ βουλητὸν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν δόξοι. διορίζει δὲ τοῦτο ἀρίστως.

1–2 καὶ³...γένεσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1112b23–24 2–5 κἂν...ἡμῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1112b24–28
 7–8 ταῦτα...τούτοις] cf. Arist. EN 1112b28–29 9–10 ἄνθρωπος...βουλεύεται] cf. Arist. EN 1112b31–32 11 πᾶσα...τέλους¹] cf. Arist. EN 1112b33 | οὐ...τέλους²] cf. Arist. EN 1112b33–34
 12–13 οὐ...ἤξει] cf. Arist. EN 1113a1–2 14–16 τὸ¹...γάρ] cf. Arist. EN 1113a2–5; cf. Asp. In EN 74.25–27 16–20 παύσεται...ἡμῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1113a5–10 21 ἢ...ἡμῖν] Arist. EN 1113a10–11
 22 τύπῳ...ἐστίν²] cf. Arist. EN 1113a12–13 22–23 ὀρεγόμεθα...βούλησιν] Arist. EN 1113a12
 24–26 Καὶ...δόξοι] cf. Arist. EN 1113a15–22

encounter an impossibility in our investigation of the means to the end in sequence, *we desist; but if [we encounter] something possible, we undertake it. Possible things are those we could achieve through our own agency or by means of our friends,* because the latter [i.e. what our friends achieve] are akin [to being accomplished] *through our efforts;* for we do not investigate what is possible in an unqualified sense, but what is possible for us. For why should we care if these things are possible for a rich man or a king, but impossible for us? We often deliberate with regard to friends or money the source from which they will be secured, because these things are *instruments*. At other times [we deliberate] about *their use*; if we possess [them], [we deliberate] how will we make use of them.

It is inferred, then, on this basis that *a human being is the origin of his actions;* for he himself *deliberates the actions* that are *within his own power*, and let it be no different if [he deliberates] also the actions [accomplished] by means of his friends. Every *action* is [undertaken] *for the sake of* an end. Consequently, we were right to say that *one must not deliberate about the end*, because the end is not for the sake of something else, but rather the other [things] are [undertaken] for its sake. One must not deliberate about matters that involve *direct perception*, and one must not *be always deliberating* about one thing that is for the sake of another, because in this manner [the deliberation] *will embark on a process ad infinitum*.

It was therefore inferred from these points that *the object of deliberation and the object of choice are the same, except that the object of choice* comprises a part of the object of deliberation; for a *determined* object of deliberation *is an object of choice*, because the latter *has been selected*. Since our investigation will not be endless, *the person investigating [how he should act] will cease as soon as he has brought the origin of action to himself and back to the ruling part of himself, for this is the part that decides. This is also evident from the work of Homer, because when the kings chose something and established themselves as a principle for action [i.e. as an authority on which to decide action], at that point they proclaimed [the measures they had chosen] to the people, with the result that the object of choice is a specific object of deliberation, namely an object of desire, although an object of desire from among the things in our power, and whatever it produces contributes to our capacity for coming into being. In the light of the above, therefore, choice is a deliberate desire for things in our power. Thus the nature of choice has been described in outline, as well as the nature of its objects. But since, he said, we feel desire in accord with our wish, he also investigates this.*

A wish is for the end, and an end is either *the good or what appears good*. Accordingly, if [it is] the absolute good, how could *what one can choose wrongly* be good? But if it [merely] *appears [good], the good that is wished for will not [be wished for] by nature, but as it might appear [to someone to be good]*. He defines this excellently.

[19r] || **1113a22–1113b25** ζ (εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει...)

Ὅτι μὲν βουλευτὸν ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος βουλευτόν, καὶ ὅτι πᾶν τέλος ἀγαθόν, ἢ ὄν ἢ φαινόμενον (ᾔθεν καὶ γελοῖον τὸ τοῦ *Εὐριπίδου*, εἶπεν, εἰπόντος «ἔχει τελευτήν, ἧς ἔνεκ' ἐγένετο»), φανερόν ἐκ πολλῶν· ὅτι δ' ἀμφισβήτησις ἐστὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τούτου, εἰ ὄντως ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν ἢ φαινόμενον, καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐπεχείρησεν. 5 ἐπικρίνει ἀρίστως εἰκότως εἶναι τὸ βουλευτὸν ὡς τέλος ἀγαθόν, πλὴν τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὸν ἀγαθόν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ σπουδαῖος τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ζητήσει, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς σωματικοῖς· τοῖς γὰρ εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινὰ τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα δόξει, τοῖς δ' ἐπίνοσις ἄλλοια ἢ ὑγιεινά. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλιτος· τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις γλυκὺ φανήσεται, 10 τοῖς δὲ ἰκτεριῶσι πικρόν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενέσι καὶ τὰ κοῦφα βαρέα, τοῖς δ' ἰσχυροῖς καὶ τὰ βαρέα κοῦφα. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἔξιν ἰδιά ἐστὶ καλά, καὶ τῶν ἐπικρινόντων ταῦτα μυρία διαφορὰ ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ ἀπάτη γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐξ ὀρέξεως· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ δοκεῖ ἀγαθὸν μὴ οὐσα ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ λύπη πᾶσα κακόν.

Ἐπει δὲ βουλευτὸν μὲν τὸ τέλος βουλευτὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ διαταῦτα καὶ 15 προαιρετά, αἱ περὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος πράξεις ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν. περὶ ταῦτα δὲ εἰσι καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία, ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθοῖς ἢ μοχθηροῖς εἶναι.

Διαταῦτα καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν «οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος» συμβαίνει τὸ μὲν ψευδὲς εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ «οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς» ψεῦδος· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ 20 μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον· εἰ μὴ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἀμφισβητητέον λοιπὸν τοῖς εἰρημένους, καὶ οὐ φατέον εἶναι τῶν πράξεων πασῶν ἀρχὴν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὡς αὐτὸν προαιρούμενον· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ γεννᾷ τὰς πράξεις ἐκ προαιρέσεως οἰκείας καὶ ὀρμῆς καὶ θελήσεως, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὰ τέκνα.

Εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔχομεν ἄλλας ἀρχάς, ἐφ' ἃς ἀνάξομεν τὰς πράξεις, εἰ μὴ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὴν 25 ἡμετέραν προαίρεσιν, ἄρα ταῦτα ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. καὶ κακῶς λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι «οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς» ὡς ἐξανάγκης οὐσης ἴσως τῆς πονηρίας· ἵνα τί γὰρ καὶ οἱ νόμοι τοὺς πονηροὺς κολάζουσιν, εἰ μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν τὸ κακὸν πράττοιεν; τότε γὰρ ἴσως καὶ συγγνωσθήσονται. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὴν ὀρεξιν εἴποι τις αἰτίαν τῆς αἰσχροῦς

2–3 Ὅτι...φαινόμενον] cf. Georg. Pachym. Paraphr. In EN 30.17–19 3–4 ᾔθεν...ἐγένετο] cf. Arist. Phys. 194a30–32; FCG fragm. 395; cf. Genn. Schol. In De phys. 2, 224.26–28 6–10 κατ'...ὑγιεινά] cf. Arist. EN 1113a23–28 10–11 ὁμοίως...βαρέα] cf. Arist. EN 1113a28–29 10–11 τοῖς...πικρόν] cf. Olymp. In Cat. 98.24–25 12 καθ'...καλά] Arist. EN 1113a31 12–13 καὶ²...ἐστίν] cf. Arist. EN 1113a31–33 13–14 ἢ...κακόν] cf. Arist. EN 1113a33–1113b2 15–18 Ἐπει...πράττειν²] cf. Arist. EN 1113b3–8 18 τοῦτο...εἶναι] cf. Arist. EN 1113b13 19–26 Διαταῦτα...ἐκούσια] cf. Arist. EN 1113b14–21 27 οὐδεὶς...πονηρὸς] Arist. EN 1113b14–15 27–28 ἵνα...πράττοιεν] cf. Arist. EN 1113b23–25

|| 1113a22–1113b25 7. (If therefore these views are not satisfactory...)

[19r]

That the end is what is wished for and the means to the end is the object of deliberation, and that every end is good either in actuality or in appearance (for which reason, [Aristotle] said, the *Euripidean* line is *amusing*, when he said “*He has reached his end, for the sake of which he was born*”) is apparent from many aspects. That there is dispute concerning this good, whether it is genuinely good or merely so in appearance, he argued dialectically from both sides [of the question]. He determines extremely well that it is reasonable that what is wished for as an end is good, except that *what is wished for in reality is good, but for each person what is in appearance [good is good]*. For *the excellent man will seek what is [wished for] in reality, whereas the base man [will seek] whatever it turns out to be, as also in the other cases, those relating to bodily constitutions; because truly healthy food will seem best for health to men of a sound constitution, while to those who are sickly some sort of diet other than what is best for health [will seem healthy]. And similarly in the case of honey; it will appear sweet to those in sound health, but bitter to those who are jaundiced. And light objects will appear heavy to those who are sickly, while heavy objects will seem light to those who are strong. For noble things are specific to each disposition, and there are countless differences among those who judge these things. But deception occurs due to pleasure [arising] from desire; for the latter [i.e. pleasure] appears to be a good even though it is not actually one, just as every type of pain [seems to be] an evil.*

Since *the end is what is wished for, whereas the matters of deliberation are the means to the end and are matters of choice* on this account, *the actions associated with the means to the end are voluntary and a matter of choice. The activities in which the virtues are exercised are also associated with these means. Virtue and vice are in our own power, because it is in our power to act, as is not acting, and this is what being good or wicked means.*

For these reasons as well, *when people say “no one is voluntarily wicked or involuntarily blessed”, this happens to be partly false and partly true; because the statement that “no one is voluntarily wicked” is false, since wickedness is voluntary. Because if this were not the case, we would as a result have to dispute what was already asserted, and we would have to deny that a human being is the origin of all his actions, since he chose them; for the agent engenders his actions by his own choice, effort, and faculty of will to the same extent that [he engenders] his children.*

But if we have no other origins back to which we can trace our actions except ourselves and our own choice, surely these [actions depend] on us and are voluntary. And those who say “no one is wicked voluntarily”, on the ground that wickedness [arises] perhaps from necessity, are wrong; for why do the laws punish the wicked, except if they do evil under compulsion or out of ignorance? For in that case, they will perhaps be pardoned. But if someone were to call desire the cause of the shameful behaviour, there is an opposing argument from the other side, and we maintain a balanced approach to both.

πράξεως, ἀλλ' ἔστι λόγος ὁ ἀντιτείνων ἐτέρωθεν, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπίσης πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα ἔχομεν.

[19v] || **1113b26–1114a25** ἡ' (καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ...)

Ἔτι κατασκευάζει ὅτι πᾶσα κακία ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκουσία, καὶ δηλον ἐκ τῆς τῶν παιδαγωγῶν καὶ φίλων καὶ οἰκείων προτροπῆς· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πρὸ ἔργου ἦν τὸ πεισθῆναι 5 τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰ πάθη, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐξανάγκης εἶχον αὐτὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν παραίνεσιν, τίς ὁ λόγος προτρέπεσθαι καὶ παραινεῖν ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνυεῖν; καὶ τί λέγω ταῦτα; ὅπου γε καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῶ τῶ ἀγνοεῖν, ἔνθα καὶ ἡ συγγνώμη χώραν ἔχει, κολάζονται τινες καὶ δικαίως δοκοῦσι κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν ἐκεῖνοι τῆς ἀγνοίας αἴτιοι εἶναι δεῖξωσι· οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες, ἐπειδὰν ἐκ τῆς ἀγνοίας διὰ τὴν μέθην πράξωσι τι κακόν, διπλᾶ τὰ 10 ἐπιτίμια δέχονται· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς· ἦσαν γὰρ κύριοι τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τὸ δὲ μεθυσθῆναι αἴτιον γέγονε τῆς ἀγνοίας.

Καὶ τί λέγω ταῦτα; καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπὰ μαθεῖν ἐστίν, οἱ νομοθέται κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν πράττονται· ἐπ' αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀμελεῖσαι καὶ μὴ· ἐνίσταται λοιπὸν 15 πρὸς τοῦτο, «ἀλλ' ἴσως» λέγων «τοιούτος ἐστὶν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι» (ἦγουν νωθρὸς ἢ ἀφυῆς), καὶ λύων λέγει «ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτου αἴτιοι εἰσὶν αὐτοὶ διάγοντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς»· διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἐν τῶ πράττειν τὰ δίκαια δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῶ πράττειν τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα καὶ ἐνεργεῖν τὰ κακὰ κακοὶ γινόμεθα. 20

Κομιδῆ γὰρ ἀναίσθητος ὁ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται, οὐχ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ αἰσθητῶν· ἐκεῖσε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἔξεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι προχωροῦσι. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα συστατικά εἰσιν, ὡς ἐκὼν τις ἀμαρτάνει· ἄλογον γὰρ λέγειν ὅτι ὁ ἀδικῶν οὐ βούλεται ἀδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀγνοοίη τίνα εἰσὶν ἃ πράττει ἐξ ὧν προσγίνεται αὐτῶ ἡ κακία, ἄρα ἐκὼν κακός ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐδόλως τότε, εἰ βούλεται μὴ εἶναι ἀδικος, 25 παύσαιτο ἄν, καὶ εἴη ἄν δίκαιος ἅπαξ δούς ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἀδικίαν.

Ἐπιχειρεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς νόσου τῆς δοκούσης μᾶλλον ἀκουσίως προσγίνεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ πολλακίς ἐκόντων ἡμῶν γίνεται· ἄν γὰρ ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύωμεν καὶ ἀπειθῶμεν τοῖς ἰατροῖς, ἐκόντες νοσοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐξῆν ἡμῖν μὴ νοσεῖν· προεμένοις δὲ ἡμῖν τὰ τῆς 30 ὑγείας οὐκ ἔξεστι μὴ νοσεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς βολῆς τοῦ λίθου ἀφεῖναι μὲν καὶ μὴ

4–7 ἐφ'...προτρέπεσθαι] cf. Arist. EN 1113b26–30
13–15 καὶ²...μὴ] cf. Arist. EN 1113b33–1114a2
18 διατελοῦσι...ἐνεργοῦντες] cf. Arist. EN 1114a9
23–24 ἄλογον...ἀδικεῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1114a11
27–28 Ἐπιχειρεῖ...γίνεται] cf. Arist. EN 1114a15

8–12 καὶ¹...ἀγνοίας] cf. Arist. EN 1113b30–33
16–18 ἀλλ'...ὀρθῶς] cf. Arist. EN 1114a3–5
21 Κομιδῆ...γίνονται] cf. Arist. EN 1114a9–10
24–26 εἰ...ἀδικίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1114a12–14
28–112,5 ἄν...μάλα] cf. Arist. EN 1114a15–25

|| 1113b26–1114a25 8. (But what does not depend on us...)

[19v]

Then he maintains that every vice *depends on us* and is *voluntary*, and this is evident from the *encouragement* of our teachers, friends, and relatives; because if *there were no gain* for people who experience emotions in *being persuaded* [not to feel them], but they necessarily had *these [emotions] nonetheless* even after exhortation, what would the point be in *persuading* and exhorting [them] to things they would be unlikely to accomplish? Why do I say this? Where *an offence was committed in ignorance*, there forgiveness has a place; some people *are punished* and seem to be punished justly, *if they should demonstrate that they are responsible for their own ignorance*; for *people who are drunk*, when they do something wrong unawares due to their drunkenness, receive *double penalties*; *because the origin of the ignorance is in them*, since they had *the power not to get drunk*, and their intoxication was *the cause of their not knowing [what they were doing]*.

And why do I say this? Because the lawgivers *also punish those who [commit an offence] through ignorance of a provision of the law they ought to have known and could have learned without difficulty, and so too in other cases where [offences] are committed through negligence*, because *they [i.e. the offenders] have the option of whether to be negligent or not*. He then raises an objection to this point, saying “*But perhaps he is not the sort of person to take care*” (i.e. [he is] sluggish or dull), and as a way of refuting [this objection] he says “*but they themselves are responsible for this [carelessness] by spending their time in the wrong way*”; *because they are continually engaged* in inappropriate behaviour, and just as in the case of virtue we discussed the fact that we become just by behaving justly, so also we become wicked by engaging in inappropriate behaviour and acting wickedly.

Because anyone *who fails to realise that our dispositions arise from our activities in every kind of matter is altogether stupid*, this being different from what happens with our senses; for in the latter case our activities seem to proceed from our dispositions. All these [activities] are confirmatory [of our dispositions], since one acts wrongly voluntarily; for *it is unreasonable to say that a person who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust*. Because *if someone is aware of the sort of acts by which wickedness is attached to him, then he is wicked voluntarily*, and *he would not stop [being unjust] at all were he [merely] to wish not to be unjust, or be just once he has handed himself over to injustice*.

[Aristotle] attempts to prove this by drawing an analogy with an *illness* that seems to occur quite involuntarily, because this too often arises as a result of our *voluntary [behaviour]*; because *if we live in an intemperate manner and neglect the doctors, we become ill voluntarily*, since *it was possible for us to avoid the illness*. And when we *have thrown away the means to be healthy*, it is *not possible to avoid illness, just as in the case of throwing a stone, to send [it forth]* or to avoid doing so is our own

ἀφείναι παρ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ἀφέντας δὲ ἀναλαβεῖν οὐ παρ' ἡμῖν· τοῦ γὰρ βαλεῖν ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν· οὕτως ἄρα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νόσων τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐξαρχῆς ἐξῆν μὴ γενέσθαι κακοῖς, γενομένοις δὲ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι· οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου νόσων· τοῖς γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως καὶ ἀσθενείας συμβαίνουσιν οὐκ ἐπιτιμῶμεν, τοῖς δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ μάλα.

5

1114a27–1114b24 θ' (τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας...)

Ὅτι τοίνυν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν παθῶν ἐκούσια εἰσι τῶν σώματος δηλοῖ ἢ ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας τύφλωσις (οὐ μὴν ἢ ἐκ φύσεως ἢ ἐκ νόσου), καθ' ἣν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν, οὐκ ἐλεοῦμεν, τὸν πάσχοντα. οὕτως ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς.

Ἐντεῦθεν ἐνίσταται ὡς ἀπὸ τινος λέγων· εἰ δέ τις λέγει ὅτι «πάντες τοῦ φαινομένου ἐκείνοις ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίενται» (οὐ τοῦ ἀντιδιαστελλομένου πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθὸν καὶ μόνον φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν τι φαινοίτο ἀγαθόν, κἂν ἀληθινόν καὶ τὸ ὄντως ἢ ἀγαθὸν κἂν τὸ μόνον φαινόμενον), «οὐ || κύριοι δέ ἐσμεν τῆς φαντασίας», ἀλλ' ὁ λέγων ἴστω ὅτι ὁποῖός ἐστιν ἕκαστος ἐκ προαιρέσεως, τοιοῦτον φαίνεται καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐκείνῳ τὸ φαινόμενον. ἔστι γὰρ τις ἴσως γύννης καὶ λάγνος ἐκ τινος κράσεως, καὶ διατοῦτο φαίνεται αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ πορνεία, καὶ ἐκ τούτου θέλει κατασκευάζειν οὐχ ἐκούσιον τὴν κακίαν, εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκούσιον τίθησιν· ἔφη γὰρ «οὐδεὶς ἄκων μακάριος», τὸ δὲ «οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς» πρόκειται αὐτῷ ἀνασκευάζειν. εἰ γοῦν τις ταῦτα λέγων ἀκούσιον τὴν κακίαν ἐρεῖ, φησίν, λεκτέον, οὕτως ὡς αὐτὸς διὰ μακροῦ τὸν λόγον ἐκφέρει τῆς λύσεως ὑποθετικῶς λέγων. ἔστι γὰρ ἕξις τυχὸν ἢ ἀκολασία, ἔστι καὶ φαντασία περὶ ταύτην, ὅτι τυχὸν ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν.

Εἰ γοῦν τῆς ἐξεώς ἐστὶ πως ὁ ἄνθρωπος αἴτιος, ὡς κακῶς καὶ μὴ ὡς δεῖ ἀναγόμενος, ἐσεῖται πως καὶ τῆς φαντασίας αἴτιος, τοῦ νομίζεσθαι τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν. τὸ γὰρ ἐτοιμοκλινὲς πρὸς τὰ πάθη αὐτό γε τὴν τῆς ἀκολασίας φαντασίαν ἀγαθόν τι προστήσεται. καὶ ἔστι πάλιν αἰτιός πως καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης φαντασίας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν πάλιν ἢ κακία ἐκούσιος δείκνυται. εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, καθὼς ὑπόκειται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἐξ ἀγνοίας τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, οἰόμενος τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι ἑαυτῷ, εἰ ταῦτα πράξει. ἢ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ ἀυθαίρετος καὶ φύσει ἐκούσια, ὁποῖον ἂν καὶ εἴη ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ὡς περ ὄψιν ἔχοντα φῦναι καὶ εὐφύϊαν ἔχειν τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰρεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν καὶ ἔχειν τὸ

7–9 ἢ...πάσχοντα] cf. Arist. EN 1114a26–29 10–11 εἰ...ἐφίενται] cf. Arist. EN 1114a31–32
13 οὐ...φαντασίας] cf. Arist. EN 1114a32 13–15 ἀλλ'...φαινόμενον] cf. Arist. EN 1114a32–1114b1
17–18 οὐδεὶς...πονηρὸς] cf. Arist. EN 1113b14–15 22–23 εἰ...αἴτιος] cf. Arist. EN 1114b1–3
26–114,2 εἰ...εἴη] cf. Arist. EN 1114b3–12

6 Im. addidi 26 μὴ, οὐδεὶς scripsi (cum Arist. vulg.) : μηδεὶς M (cum L^b M^b Γ)

decision, but *after we have thrown it*, we have no power to *bring it back*, because the *origin of the act of throwing is dependent on ourselves only*. So too then in the case of illnesses of the soul, *at the outset it was possible [for us] to avoid becoming wicked, but after becoming so, it is no longer possible [for us] not to be so*. So too in the case of the body and its diseases; because *we do not find fault with states that are congenital or a result of disease*, but vigorously [find fault] with those that result from choice.

1114a27–1114b24 9. (the one from heavy drinking...)

That many of the sufferings that affect the body are voluntary, then, is shown by the blindness *caused by drunkenness* (not the blindness that is *congenital or a result of illness*), in accord with which we would *reproach* rather than *pity* the sufferer. The same point is also true with reference to the soul.

On that basis, he raises an objection by a hypothetical interlocutor: *if someone says “Everyone seeks what seems good to them”* (not the good that stands in contrast to the genuinely good and only appears [to be such], but what might appear to someone to be the good, be it genuine and really good or only an apparent good), || *“but we are not responsible for its appearance* [i.e. for it seeming good], let the interlocutor, *however*, acknowledge that *the sort of character each of us is* is a matter of choice, *and the end too seems to each person to be such* as it appears to be [i.e. since each man is responsible for his moral disposition, he will somehow be responsible for his conception of the good]. For someone might be effeminate or lecherous from a particular mixture, and for this reason sexual impurity seems good to him, and on the basis of this argument [the hypothetical interlocutor] wants to prove that vice is not voluntary, even if he grants that virtue is voluntary; for [Aristotle] said “*no one is involuntarily happy*”, but the proposition “*no one is voluntarily wicked*” is set out by him to discredit. Consequently, if someone expressing these views will say that vice is involuntary, [Aristotle] says, [this thesis] must be discussed, just as he extends the argument for the solution [to the difficulty] at length, speaking hypothetically. For self-indulgence happens to be a disposition, but there is also an appearance involving this that supposedly reckons it to be good. [20r]

Well, *if a human being is somehow responsible for his disposition*, since he was raised badly and not as he should have been, *he will somehow be responsible for the appearance [of our ends] as well*, for example, for reckoning what is not good to be good. For the very inclination to the passions will itself foreground the appearance of self-indulgence as a kind of good. And it is once again the human being who is somehow responsible for such an appearance, and on that basis vice is again shown to be voluntary. *If this is not the case, then no one is responsible for his own wrongdoing*, as suggested, *but because of the seeming good he performs these actions out of ignorance of the [right] end, thinking that the situation will be best for himself* if he acts this way. *And his aiming at the end is not self-chosen* or naturally voluntary, whatever sort that might actually be; *rather a person needs to be born with moral vision, so to speak, and to have the ability to choose what is truly good as a matter of natural*

μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ὡς αὐτῷ νοεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡς ἔχει φύσεως· τοῦτο δὲ ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφυΐα ἂν εἴη.

Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα (ὅτι πεφύκαμέν πως καὶ τὸ τέλος γινώσκειν, εἰ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὄντως ἢ φαίνεται μόνον ἀγαθόν), τί μᾶλλον διαταῦτα εἴη ἂν [μᾶλλον] ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἡ κακία; εὐφυῶς γὰρ ἔχων γινώσεται τὸ τέλος ὁποῖον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄντος μὲν ἐκείνου 5 κυρίως ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ μὲν ἀρετὴ οὐ πράξει δι' ἐκεῖνο ἀποδιοπομπουμένη τὸ κακόν, ἢ δὲ κακία διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν πράξει, προσχοῦσα τῷ φαινομένῳ· ὄντος δὲ κυρίως ἀγαθοῦ, αἰρήσεται μὲν τοῦτο ὁ ἀρετῆ ἕνασμενίζων, ἐκφύγη δὲ ὁ προτιμῶν τὴν κακίαν τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, λέγω, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, φαίνεται ποτε τὸ 10 τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε ἄλλως ἐθισμῶ, καὶ κεῖται τοιοῦτον ὄν, πράττουσι δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο.

Εἴτε δὲ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρὰ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔστιν ὡς συνεργοῦντι, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φύσει, ἐν δὲ τῷ τὰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο πράττειν ἐκούσιως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετῆ ἐκούσιον, οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἐκούσιον· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, ὥσπερ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει (ἐκεῖνο γὰρ καὶ λίαν κατεγνωσμέ- 15 νον), ἀλλ' οὖν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο πράξεσιν. εἰ δ', ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ συναίτιοί πως ἐκ τῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐσμεν τῶν ἔξεων, καὶ τῷ φιλόκαλοι εἶναι καὶ τὸ τέλος καλὸν τίθεμεν), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἄρα ἐκούσiai.

1114b26–1115a33 ἰ (Κοινῆ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται...)

Εἴρηται περὶ ἀρετῆς τί τέ ἐστι κατὰ τὸ γένος (ὅτι ἕξις καὶ ὅτι ἐν μεσότητι δύο κακιῶν 20 φαίνεται), ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνεται (ὅτι ὑφ' ἡμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως ἡμῶν), καὶ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πρακτικοὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ταύτας (πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ δίκαια δίκαιοι ἐσμεν· οὐ γὰρ ταύτης μὲν τῆς ἀρετῆς πρακτικοὶ ἐσμεν, κατ' ἄλλην δὲ τελειούμεθα), καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιος (ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλως κρίνει ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ ἄλλως ὁ διστραμμένος ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ μανίας ἢ ἐξ ἡδονῆς πρόσκειται), καὶ 25 ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς προστάξειε λόγος.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἐκούσιοι, καὶ αἱ ἕξεις, οἷον αἱ ἀρεταί, ἐκούσιοι ὡς τέλη αὐθαίρετα, διαιρεῖ καὶ ταύτας πῶς τὸ ἐκούσιον ἔχουσιν. τῶν γὰρ 30 πράξεων, φησί, τὸ ἐκούσιον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους· πράττομεν γὰρ μὴ τινος ἀναγκάζοντος. εἰ δὲ τι ἀναγκάζει, οἷον ὁ νόμος ἢ ὁ δικαστής, τὸ κατὰ τι ἀκούσιον οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ τίθεται. εἰ γὰρ μὴ φιλοῦμεν τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἔννομοι μὲν ἐσμεν, ἐνάρετοι δ' οὐκ

3–5 Εἰ...κακία] cf. Arist. EN 1114b12–13 9–18 ἀμφοῖν...ἐκούσiai] cf. Arist. EN 1114b13–24
20–22 Εἴρηται...ταύτας] cf. Arist. EN 1114b26–28 24 καὶ¹...ἐκούσιος] cf. Arist. EN 1114b28–29
26 ὡς...λόγος] cf. Arist. EN 1114b29–30 28–29 τῶν...τέλους] cf. Arist. EN 1114b31

4 μᾶλλον² seclusi 15 αὐτὸν scripsi ex Arist. EN 1114b21 : αὐτὸ M 19 Im. addidi 21 γίνεται scripsi : γίνονται M

disposition, and to possess what is greatest and finest so as to realise that he possesses this thing from birth. This will constitute a naturally good disposition in the full and true meaning of the term.

If this is indeed the case (that we are in some sense naturally endowed to know the end, whether it is truly good or only appears to be good), how in consequence will virtue be any more voluntary than vice? For since he has a good natural disposition, he will recognise the quality of the end, but when it is not properly good, virtue will not act through it by setting aside the bad, whereas vice will act through pleasure, surpassing the appearance [of the end]; but when [the end] is truly good, the man who takes pleasure in virtue will choose it, whereas the man who prefers vice to virtue will flee [from this end]. Because both for the good man and the bad alike, I say, the end appears at a given time by nature or however it may be in another way by habituation, and it remains like this, and they do everything else with reference to that [end].

Whether the end is not determined by nature but depends in part on the person, because he co-operates [with nature], or whether the end is determined by nature, but virtue is voluntary because the good man acts voluntarily to gain his end, vice too will be no less voluntary; because in the case of the bad man, just as in that of the good one, there is equally present that which depends on the man himself even if not on [his choice of] an end (for that is very much despised), but still on the actions [he has adopted to attain] that end. But if, as we said, virtues are voluntary (and in fact we are in a sense ourselves partly responsible for our moral dispositions on the basis of our way of life, and by being persons who love what is good we define the end as good), then our vices are surely voluntary as well.

1114b26–1115a33 10. (We have then discussed the virtues in outline...)

We have discussed virtue, both what it is in its genus (namely that it is a disposition and that it seems to lie in a mean between two vices), and what it is produced from (namely that [it is produced] by us and our conduct and our own choice), and that we are able to accomplish the virtues, but in conformity with them (because we are just by acting justly; for we are unable to accomplish this virtue, but we are perfected in accord with another), and that it depends on us and is voluntary (since right reason decides in one way in these circumstances, while the reason that is perverted by illness, madness, or pleasure takes a different position), and as right reason would prescribe.

And since the actions which are a means to virtue are voluntary, and the dispositions, like the virtues, are voluntary as self-chosen ends, he distinguishes them according to the manner in which they are voluntary. For the voluntary character of our actions, he says, is from beginning to end, because we do not act under any kind of compulsion. But if something were to compel us, such as the law or a judge, what is involuntary in some respect would not be part of virtue. For if we do not like what we do, we are law-abiding, but we are not virtuous, and our conduct is not the

έσμεν· οὐδὲ ἢ πρᾶξις ἢ τοιαύτη ἀρετή, ἀλλ' ἐκ βίας καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καλή. διὸ οὐδὲ πάνυ ἐπαίνους ἔχει καὶ ἀμοιβάς· ἀφήρηται γὰρ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς ἀρετῆς ὅσα ἐκ φόβου καὶ βιαζόμενος πράττει, εἰ μὴ πως ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μὴ προστασόμενος πράττοι. καὶ αἱ μὲν πράξεις οὕτως ἐκούσιοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, αἱ δὲ ἔξεις χάριν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκούσιοι (πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ δίκαια δίκαιοι γινόμεθα)· ἢ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ πρόσθεσις τῶν 5 καθέκαστα οὐ γνώριμος· ἄλλος γὰρ ἦττον ἄλλος δὲ πλεον ἐπιδίδωσιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πολλάκις αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἡμῶν, ἢ δὲ ἐπίδοσις τούτων ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα διάφορος. κατὰ τοῦτο δέ, διότι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τὸ χρῆσασθαι τῇ ἀρχῇ ἢ μὴ, ἐκούσιοι καὶ αἱ ἔξεις λέγονται.

Ἀναλαβῶν δὲ πάλιν περὶ αὐτῶν, λέγει πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας, ἣτις ἐλέγετο 10 μεσότης περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη· φοβούμεθα δὲ τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' εἰσὶ τὰ κακά, ἃ καὶ [20ν] ἀπαριθμεῖται. || ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ, φησὶν, ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· θαρρεῖν γὰρ ἔνια αἰσχρόν, ὥσπερ αὐθις φοβεῖσθαι καλόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· κρείττων γὰρ ὁ περὶ ταύτην φοβούμενος ἢ ὁ θαρρῶν. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος οὐκ ἐν πᾶσι κυριολεκτεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς λέγεται· καθὼ γὰρ ἄφοβός ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖος λέγεται· τὶς γὰρ 15 ἄφοβος καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, ὥστε τὸ «ἄφοβος» καθολικώτερον.

Ἔσα δὲ μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μὴ δὲ δι' αὐτὸν πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι οὐ χρὴ φοβεῖσθαι. ὁ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγεται ἀνδρεῖος· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς κινδύνοις τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἐκφαίνεται· ἔνιοι γοῦν περὶ τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους μὴ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες ἀλλὰ δειλοὶ ἐλεύθεροὶ εἰσι πρὸς ἀποβολὴν χρημάτων. τί γοῦν; διατοῦτο ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι ὑπομένουσι 20 χρήματα ἀποβάλλοντες, κληθήσονται. οὐδ' εἴ τις τὴν περὶ τοὺς οἰκείους ὕβριν φοβεῖται, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδὲ εἴ τις μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι θαρρεῖ, ἀνδρεῖος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οἰκότεριψ καὶ μαστιγίας κληθήσεται. περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; φοβερώτατον δὲ ὁ θάνατος, ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις τῶν πολέμων, ἐπιφέρων τὸ ἀνδρεῖον· ἴδε γὰρ ἐν πόλεσι τισὶν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ μᾶλλον 25 τοῖς μονομάχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐν πολέμῳ κινδυνεύουσιν· ὅθεν καὶ ὀρισθεῖη ἂν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεῆς.

1115a34–1115b29 αἰ' (καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα...)

Ὅρισάμενος τὸν ἀνδρεῖον (ὅτι ἀνδρεῖός ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεῆς), προστίθησι «καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα»· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πόλεμον βέβαιά 30 εἰσιν εἰς τὸ ἐγγὺς ἐπενεγκεῖν θάνατον· διαταῦτα ἀνδρεῖος ὁ ἐν ἐκείνοις τὰ φοβερά ὑπομένων λέγεται. φοβερά δὲ εἰσιν αἱ πληγαί, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ διὰ τῶν πληγῶν θάνατος.

3–4 αἰ...ἀρχῆς²] cf. Arist. EN 1114b30–1115a1 5–9 ἢ...λέγονται] cf. Arist. EN 1115a1–3 10–11 Ἀναλαβῶν...κακά] cf. Arist. EN 1115a4–9 12–14 ἀλλ'...θαρρῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1115a11–14 14–20 κατὰ...χρημάτων] cf. Arist. EN 1115a14–22 21–22 οὐδ'...ἀνδρεῖος] cf. Arist. EN 1115a22–24 23–24 περὶ!...μέγιστα] Arist. EN 1115a24–25 24–25 φοβερώτατον...ἀνδρεῖον] cf. Arist. EN 1115a26–31 25–26 ἐν...κινδυνεύουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1115a30–32 26–27 ἀνδρεῖος...ἀδεῆς] Arist. EN 1115a33 30 καὶ...ὄντα] Arist. EN 1115a34 | τὰ...πόλεμον] cf. Arist. EN 1115a35

aforementioned virtue, but is noble by force or necessity. Because of this it does not get much praise or rewards; because the slave is deprived of virtue in respect to whatever he does out of fear and under compulsion, unless he acts somehow independently and not in response to orders. And *our actions are thus voluntary from beginning to end, whereas our dispositions are voluntary thanks to their beginning* (since we become just by acting justly); but *each separate addition to the beginning is imperceptible*, because one person may improve less, another person more, *just as in the case of illnesses the beginnings often depend on us, but their progress differs in individual cases. And in this respect, because we are free to use the beginning or not, our dispositions are designated voluntary.*

Resuming again his account of the virtues, he first discusses courage, which was said to be *a mean lying between fear and confidence; we fear frightening things, and these are evils*, which are also listed. || *But the courageous person, he says, seems not to be concerned with all of them, for there are some evils which it is base to have courage in, just as on the other hand it is right to fear [some things], for instance disgrace; because the man who fears this is better than the one who feels courage regarding it. The courageous man is not designated by a literal name in all cases, but in many cases he is called “courageous” in a metaphorical sense, for example in so far as a fearless man is termed “courageous”; because a courageous man is also fearless, so that “fearless” is more universal.* [20v]

However, *we ought not to fear those [evils] which are not naturally caused by vice or due to the person himself. The person who is fearless with regard to these things is termed “courageous” by analogy, since courage is revealed in the face of dangers. At any rate, some men who are not courageous but cowardly with regard to the dangers of war are open-handed in spending money. Why is this? They will be called “courageous” for the following reason: they stand their ground in throwing away money. Nor is someone a coward if he fears insult to his relatives, nor if he is confident when he is about to be flogged will he be called “courageous”, but rather “a house-born slave” and a “rogue” [lit. “one who wants whipping”]. Then in regard to what sort of frightening matters is the brave man [brave]? Is it [not] in regard to the greatest? What is most frightening of all is death, but there is also the kind of death that occurs amidst the dangers of wars, producing courage. For note that in certain cities honours are bestowed in particular on those who fight in single combat and those who face dangers in war; whence it might be determined that the courageous man is the one who has no fear of a noble death.*

1115a34–1115b29 11. (And some sudden peril that involves death...)

After defining who the courageous man is (namely that *a courageous man is one who has no fear of a noble death*), he adds *“and some sudden peril that involves death”*; for, *the perils of war* are certain to bring death close. For these reasons, the man who endures fearful things in those situations is called “courageous”. The blows [of war] are fearful, and so too the death caused by the blows. *Certainly the courageous man*

οὐ μὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάσῃ, ὅτε κλυδωνίζεται, καὶ ἐν νόσοις, ὅτε ἀπαγορεύεται, ἀδεῆς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος φαίνεται.

Ἔπειτα ἐκβάλλει τοὺς ἀνδρεῖους ἐκ τῶν θαλαττίων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπογνόντες τὴν σωτηρίαν τὸν ἐν κύμασι θάνατον δυσχεραίνουσιν (ἡ γὰρ ἀπόγνωσις φέρει τὸ μηδὲν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀποβησόμενον· καὶ εἴπερ ὑπομένουσι μὴ ἔχοντες τι 5 πρᾶξαι, ἀπογνόντες τέλεον ὑπομένουσι), οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ εὐέλπιδες εἰσι περιγενέσθαι *περὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν*, οὐ τὴν ἐν θαλάσῃ ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον τῆς ἀνδρείας. ἐμπειρίαν δὲ λέγει ταύτην, διότι ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἐγκύρσαι τοῖς χαλεποῖς καὶ ὑπομείναντας περιγενέσθαι ἐντίκτεται ἢ τοιαύτη ἐμπειρία. ἔλεγε γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ὅτι ἐκ 10 τοῦ πολλάκις τὰ δίκαια πράττειν δίκαιοι γίνονται. ἐλπίζουσι γοῦν οὗτοι περιγενέσθαι διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν αὐτοῖς ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ ἀνδρίζονται μὲν ἐν οἷς δύνανται ὡς ἂν τοῦ κλύδωνος περιγένηνται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου ὡς ἂν νικήσωσιν· εἰ δὲ τύχοι πεσεῖν, ὡς εὐκλεῶς πέσωσιν. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς τοιαύταις φθοραῖς οὐδὲν ἕτερον ὑπάρχει τὸ τούτους ἀνδρίζεσθαι ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ τοῦ τέλους καλόν.

Οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ φοβερὸν· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἄλλο καὶ ἔνιοι ἄλλο ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πᾶν 15 τὸ φοβερὸν κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν οὐ φοβητέον. εἰσι γάρ τινα καὶ φοβερὰ τὰ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων (ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς θείοις), ἃ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι ἀνθρώπων νοῦν ἐχόντων ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀνθρώπων φοβερὸν διαφέρει κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ὡσαύτως. ὀφείλει δὲ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκκλητος μὲν εἶναι, πλήν κατὰ τὸ ἀνήκον τῷ 20 [21r] ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων· ἢ φοβήσεται γὰρ καὶ αὐτός, ἀλλ' ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς λόγος ὑποθήσεται ὑπομενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τοῦτο.

Ἔστι δὲ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ κίνδυνος μὴ ἐν τῷ μᾶλλον φοβεῖσθαι δειλὸς εὐρεθήσεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἥττον παρὰ τὸ ὡς δεῖ θρασύς. ὑπερβάλλουσι δὲ τινες τῷ μᾶλλον φοβεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι. περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ ἀμαρτίαι 25 διάφοροι συμβαίνουσιν· ἡ μὲν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ φοβοῦνται, οἱ δὲ φοβοῦνται τὰ φοβερὰ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐ φοβερὸν ὃ φοβοῦνται, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅτι φοβερὸν. ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα· καὶ ὡσπερ ἐκεῖσε ὁ δειλὸς δείκνυται, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα ὁ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ φοβούμενος ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὑπομένων ὡς δεῖ καὶ ἐς ὅσον δεῖ, ἀνδρεῖος. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει ὀρίζεται, ὀρισθήσεται καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἐνέργεια τῷ καλῷ· 30 καλοῦ γὰρ ἔνεκα ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει καὶ πάσχει. ἡ γοῦν ὡς δεῖ ἀφοβία τὸν ἀνδρεῖον παρίστησιν, ἡ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσα ἀνωθυμὸν τινα, οἷον μαινόμενον καὶ ἀνάλητον· ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβολὴ τὸν θρασύν.

1–2 οὐ...ἀνδρεῖος] cf. Arist. EN 1115a35–1115b1 3–7 θαλαττίων...ἐμπειρίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1115b1–4 11 καὶ...δύνανται] cf. Arist. EN 1115b4 13 ἐν...ὑπάρχει] cf. Arist. EN 1115b5–6 15 Οὐ...φοβερὸν] cf. Arist. EN 1115b7 16–19 ὑπὲρ...ἀνέκκλητος] cf. Arist. EN 1115b8–11 20–22 φοβήσεται...ἥττον] cf. Arist. EN 1115b11–14 22–23 καὶ?...θρασύς] cf. Arist. EN 1115b15–16 24–32 καὶ...θρασύν] cf. Arist. EN 1115b14–29

1 κλυδωνίζεται scripsi : κλυδωνίζονται M | ἀπαγορεύεται scripsi : ἀπαγορεύονται M 13 οὐδὲν ἕτερον M (cum M^b) : οὐδέτερον Arist. vulg. (EN 1115b5–6) 22 τὸ in ras.

also appears *fearless* both *at sea*, when he is buffeted by waves, and *in illness*, when he is on the verge of death.

Then he distinguishes courageous men from *sailors*, for when the former despair of survival, they feel distress at the idea of drowning in waves (since despair produces an inability to act, but what is coming [brings about] a feeling of distress, and if they endure being unable to do anything, they wait most patiently in their despair), whereas sailors are brave and *hopeful* of surviving due to their experience, not their experience at sea but their implanted experience of courage. He refers to this as experience, because such experience is produced by frequently encountering difficulties and surviving them by bearing them patiently. For he said concerning just men that they become just by frequently behaving justly. These men, at any rate, are optimistic about their chances of survival because of the experience they have within them, and they display courage in situations where they are strong enough to escape from the sea, and in the case of war to be victorious; but if they happen to fall in battle, they [are strong enough] to fall gloriously. For in such deaths there is nothing else that makes these men display their bravery than the nobility of their end.

The same thing does not frighten everyone, because some men fear one thing, others another, but one must not fear everything that is frightening in accord with courage. For there are some terrors beyond the human (which belong to the divine sphere), which it is a mark of sensible men to fear, but terror on a human scale differs in degree, as do the situations inspiring confidence. The courageous man is bound to be intrepid, albeit up to the point that is appropriate for a human being and does not exceed the human scale, || since even he will experience fear, but he will endure it in the right way and as reason will instruct, for the sake of what is noble; because this is the end [at which virtue aims]. [21r]

It is possible to experience too much or too little fear, and there is a risk that one will be found a coward in relation to fearing excessively, and rash [in fearing] too little, contrary to how one should. Some men exaggerate with regard to fearing too much, with the result that they even fear things that are not frightening. Various errors occur in connection with the latter: one is that they ought not to feel fear but they do, while other men fear frightening objects but in the wrong manner; a second [error] is that what they fear is not frightening, while men [fear objects] as if they were frightening. The situation is similar with regard to occasions for confidence, and just as the coward is revealed in the former case, so the rash man is in the latter; whereas the man who feels fear as he should and endures it as he should and to the extent he should is courageous. Since everything is defined by its end, the activity of the courageous man will be defined by its nobility, because he endures, acts, and feels for the sake of what is noble. Appropriate fearlessness will thus identify the courageous man, whereas excessive fearlessness identifies someone for whom there is no term, along the lines of “mad” or “insensitive to pain”; but an excess of confidence [identifies] the rash man.

1115b29–1116a33 ιβ' (δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζῶν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς...)

Ὅτι μὲν ἀλαζονεῖα ἐν λόγοις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ τις τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντιδιαστελλομένη πρὸς τὴν παρ' ἐκάτερα εἰρωνεῖαν εἶρηται πρότερον. νῦν δέ, φησί, *δοκεῖ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ἀλαζῶν εἶναι* (θρασὺς μὲν τὴν ἕξιν, ἀλαζῶν δὲ τοῖς λόγοις), *καὶ προσποιήσεται* τὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἐκκλίνων ὡς οἷόν τε τὴν δειλίαν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ δόξαι πολλακίς δειλὸς οὐ 5 τόσον ἐκστήσεται ταύτης ὅσον δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν προσπαισῇ τῇ ἀνδρεία, ἀλλὰ τρόπον τῶν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν φευγόντων τὰ σκληρὰ ἤθη καὶ εἰς μαλακότητα πιπτόντων. οὕτω καὶ οὗτος, φεύγων τὴν δειλίαν οὐχ ὅσον δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, εἰς θρασύτητα μεταπέσῃ, προσποιήσεται δὲ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὅτι *ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομονητικός ἐστίν*, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα *φανήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος*. 10

Ὅτι δὲ φαίνεσθαι μόνον τοιοῦτος θέλει, ἐπελθόντων τῶν χαλεπῶν ὑποχαλᾶ καὶ πλέον τοῦ εἰκότος καὶ θρασύδειλος γίνεται. τότε γὰρ καὶ ἡ φαινομένη ὑπομονὴ διὰ τὴν προτέραν θρασύτητα δειλία φαίνεται. καὶ μέμικται ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἐκ δύο κακιῶν· ἕκ τε τῆς προτέρας θρασύτητος καὶ τῆς ὑστέρας ὑποστολής· οὐ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κατ' ἔλλογον φόβον ὑποστέλλεται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ κακίαν δι' ἔκπτωσιν τῆς θρασυτήτος, 15 πλὴν οὐκ ἀποστάς ταύτης ἀλλὰ μένων ἐν ταύτῃ προσλαμβάνει καὶ θατέραν. δειλία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἔλλειψις· πάντα γὰρ ὑποπτῆσαι καὶ διαταῦτα ὁ δειλὸς ὑπερβάλλει τῷ φοβεῖσθαι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν ταῖς λύπαις καταφανής ἐστίν, ὅτι *δύσελπίς τις ὁ τοιοῦτος*.

Ἐπειτα κοινὰ τῶν τριῶν λέγει τὰ ὑποκείμενα, *πρὸς ἃ δὴ καὶ διαφόρως ἔχουσι* καὶ 20 οὐχ ὡσαύτως (ἧ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἕξεις αἱ αὐταὶ ἦσαν)· *οἱ μὲν οὖν θρασεῖς*, πρὸ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀλαζονευόμενοι, *ἐν αὐτοῖς* (ἦγουν ἐπιστάντων ἐκεῖνων) *ἀφίστανται*· εἰ γὰρ ὑπέμενον, τάχ' ἂν ἐν ἀρετῇ ἦσαν, εἰ καὶ ὑπερβαλλόντως, ἀλλὰ διότι ἀφίστανται, θρασύδειλοί εἰσιν. *οἱ δ' ἀνδρεῖοι πρότερόν* εἰσιν *ἡσύχιοι*, θαρροῦντες τῇ ἕξει, *ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις* δὲ ἐπιστάντων τῶν φοβερῶν *ὀξεῖς* εἰσιν. *αἰροῦνται* γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ δι' αὐτὸ *ὑπομένου-* 25 *σιν*· ἢ γὰρ διότι καλὸν τὸ ὑπομένειν ἢ διότι αἰσχροὺς τὸ μῆ, ὑπομένουσι. τὸ δὲ *φεύγειν* [21v] διὰ τὰ λυπηρὰ τὰ ἐπίτονα καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν || *δειλοῦ* πάντως καὶ *μαλακοῦ* καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντος ἰκανῶς πρὸς ὑπομονήν· *ὑπομένει* γοῦν τὸν δι' ἀγχόνης φέρε θάνατον οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ἠγούμενος τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ *φεύγων κακόν*.

Εἰπὼν γοῦν περὶ ἀνδρείας, ἧτις οὐκ ἕξωθέν ποθεν ἔχει τὰς παρακινήσεις ἀλλ' 30 ἔνδοθεν καὶ ἐκ μόνης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ἐκείνης ἕξεως, ἀπαριθμεῖται καὶ ἄλλους πέντε τρόπους τῆς ἀνδρείας, ἧτις καὶ ἕξωθεν ἔχει τὴν παρακίνησιν. καὶ *πρῶτον ἡ*

3–4 *δοκεῖ...εἶναι*] cf. Arist. EN 1115b29 4–5 *καὶ...ἀνδρείας*] cf. Arist. EN 1115b29–30
9–10 *ὥσπερ... τοιοῦτος*] cf. Arist. EN 1115b30–31 17–18 *ὁ...φοβεῖσθαι*] cf. Arist. EN 1115b33–34
18–19 *μᾶλλον... τοιοῦτος*] cf. Arist. EN 1116a1–3 20–29 *Ἐπειτα...κακόν*] cf. Arist. EN 1116a4–15
26 ἢ!...μῆ] cf. Anon. In EN 168.21 26–27 *τὸ...μαλακοῦ*] cf. Asp. In EN 83.27–29
31–122,9 *ἀπαριθμεῖται...ἀπειλεῖσθαι*] cf. Arist. EN 1116a16–33

1115b29–1116a33 12. (The rash man seems to be a boaster...)

It has been stated previously that boastfulness in speech is a kind of overshooting the truth opposed to the pretence at the [other] extreme. Now, he says, *the rash man also seems to be a boaster* ([he is] rash as regards his disposition, but a boaster in terms of his speech), *and he will pretend to acts of courage* while avoiding cowardice to the extent this is possible; because due to the fact that [the rash man] does not often appear cowardly, he will not shrink from it [i.e. cowardice] to the right extent and in the right manner, since in this way he would make fun of courage, but in a manner appropriate to people who avoid excessively obstinate attitudes and fall into weakness. So too this man, in seeking to avoid cowardice to the wrong extent and in the wrong manner, will undergo a change to rashness and pretend to courage, since *just as the courageous individual* is disposed to endure *fearful things*, so in this case [*the rash man*] *will appear* [to do so].

But since the latter [i.e. the rash man] wishes only to appear [to be courageous], when difficulties arise he is even more slack than one might expect and becomes a boastful coward. For at that point [i.e. when he faces difficulties], his apparent perseverance is shown to be cowardice due to his previous rashness. This disposition is a mix of two forms of vice: his previous rashness and his subsequent timidity; because [his disposition] is not reduced in conformity with virtue or with a rational fear, but in conformity with vice via a loss of his rashness, although it is not by shrinking from rashness but by remaining in it that he acquires the latter [quality, i.e. courage]. The deficiency of courage is cowardice; for *the coward* flees from everything and on this account *he is excessively afraid*, and *this is more conspicuous in painful situations*, because *the coward is a despondent sort of person*.

Next he says that the objects are in common in the three [dispositions], *towards which* [the agents] are surely *differently disposed* and not in a similar manner (for the dispositions are also the same). Therefore, *rash people*, although they boast in advance of frightening situations, *draw back when they confront them* (namely, when those situations occur); for if they stood their ground, they would perhaps be in the realm of virtue, even if excessively so, but because they draw back, they are boastful cowards. *Whereas courageous men* are *calm beforehand*, since they have confidence due to their disposition, and are *keen at the time of action*, when frightening situations confront them. For *they choose what is noble* and *they stand their ground* for its sake; for they endure *either because standing one's ground is noble or because not doing so is base*. But *to try to escape troubles* because they are painful and *to seek death* || is the act of a thoroughly *cowardly* and *weak man* and of one who has an insufficient ability to endure. At all events, *he endures*, for example, death by hanging *not because* he considers this type of death *noble, but to avoid an evil*. [21v]

After discussing courage, then, which does not involve determinants from some outside source but from within, from the soul alone and its disposition, he enumerates *five other kinds of courage* involving external catalysts. *First the civic* type of courage, which is evident in cities; *because citizens withstand dangers on account of*

πολιτική ἀνδρεία, ἥτις ἐν πόλεσι φαίνεται. ὑπομένουσι γὰρ κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰς κολάσεις καὶ τὰς τιμὰς· διατοῦτο καὶ ἄτιμοι οἱ δειλοί, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. καὶ μαρτυρεῖ Ὅμηρος εἰσάγων καὶ Διομήδην καὶ Ἔκτορα δι' αἰδῶ τινὰ ὑφισταμένους τὰ χαλεπά (τιμῆς γὰρ ἐφίενται), καὶ παρομοιάζεται αὐτῇ τῇ προτέρᾳ, ἥτις διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἦν· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη γίνεται καὶ ὄρεξιν καλοῦ καὶ φυγὴν αἰσχροῦ. ταχθεῖσαν δ' ἂν τούτοις καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζόμενοι χεῖρους δ' οὔτοι ἐκείνων, ὅτι οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον δρώσιν· οὐ γὰρ φεύγουσι τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν, τὰς κολάσεις, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἔκτωρ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, λέγων ἀπειλεῖσθαι. 5

1116a36–1116b33 ἰγ' (καὶ οἱ προστάσσοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι...)

10

Τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν τῶν περὶ Ἔκτορος συνιστᾷ· καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν λέγων ἠπέλει, τέως δὲ καὶ οἱ προστάσσοντες καὶ τύπτοντες ἂν ἀναχωρῶσι, καὶ οἱ παρατάττοντες πρὸ τάφρων καὶ ὀχυρωμάτων τινῶν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῖς ἀντιπάλοις μάχεσθαι οὐκ ἄλλο τι δρώσιν ἢ τοῦτο· πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνους ἢ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀνάγκη ἐπίκειται. δεῖ δὲ οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον (οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀκούσιος), ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα, φησίν, ἐμπειρία ἀνδρεία εἶναι—ἕκαστα δὴ, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἂν διὰ τοιαύτης ἀποτελοῦνται ἕξεως (πολέμους φημί καὶ μάχας καὶ καρτερίας τῶν λυπηρῶν), ἐπεὶ οὐ τῆς γραμματικῆς ἐμπειρία ἀνδρεῖον ἀποκαθίστησιν, εἰ μήπως κατὰ μεταφορὰν· κάκεινος γὰρ ὁ κατὰ ταύτην ἔμπειρος ἀνδρείως τὸν κανόνα ἀποδώσει—διαταῦτα καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, 20 φησίν, ὥθη τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμην ὡς ἐξ ἐμπειρίας γινομένην.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἄλλα ἄλλοι, περὶ δὲ γε τοὺς πολέμους οἱ στρατιῶται· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων οἱ στρατιῶται συνεωράκασιν· τὸ γὰρ κινδυνώδες τῆς μάχης οἶδασι πάντες, τὸ δ' ὅπως δεῖ παραττομένους μάχεσθαι καὶ ἐς ὅσον καὶ ὅπως νικᾶν οἱ στρατιῶται μόνον ἐπίστανται. φαίνονται γοῦν ἐκεῖνοι ἀνδρεῖοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι μηδὲν εἰδότες οἷά εἰσι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου οὐδ' ἐν ὄνειροις βούλονται πόλεμον ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ εἰ ἀκούσειαν πόλεμον, φρίττουσι. εἶτα δύνανται καὶ ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν ἐκεῖνοι ἦσαν ἄνοπλοι καὶ οὔτοι ὀπλισμένοι, οὕτω μάχονται τοῖς μὴ ἐμπείροις οἱ στρατιῶται· ἔχουσι γὰρ ὄπλον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. καὶ δηλον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ὅτι οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρείοτατοι ἐν ἐκείνοις μάχονται, ἀλλ' οἱ μαχιμώτατοι. τί τοῦτο λέγων; ὅτι ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας οὐ 30

12–17 τέως...εἶναι] cf. Arist. EN 1116a36–1116b4 20–23 διαταῦτα...συνεωράκασιν] cf. Arist. EN 1116b4–7 25–26 φαίνονται...πολέμου] cf. Arist. EN 1116b8 27–28 εἶτα...ἐμπειρίας] cf. Arist. EN 1116b9–12 28–31 ὥσπερ...μαχιμώτατοι] cf. Arist. EN 1116b12–14

the legal penalties, the punishments, and the honours [awarded for bravery]; this is why cowards too are held in disgrace, while courageous men are held in honour. Homer bears witness to this by introducing Diomedes and Hector, who stood firm against difficulties because of their sense of shame (since they aimed at acquiring honour), and this type of courage closely resembles the one described earlier, which was prompted by virtue, since this too [i.e. civic courage] arises from a sense of shame and from a desire for what is noble and the wish to avoid what is shameful. Those who are compelled by their superiors may also be placed in this class, although they are inferior to the others [i.e. those motivated by a desire for what is noble etc.], since they do not act out of a sense of shame but out of fear; for they do not try to avoid what is shameful, like them, but pain, namely punishments, just as Hector does in Homer, when he says they will face danger.

1116a36–1116b33 13. (And the commanders, even if they retreat...)

[Aristotle] puts together the civic form of courage from the verses about Hector, who threatened [his troops] when addressing them, while *also commanders who post [their troops] and strike them if they give ground, or who line them up in front of ditches* or strongholds of some sort to fight against their adversaries, *do nothing other than this; because compulsion* from their commanders is placed upon *all those* under their authority. *But the courageous man should not be courageous because he is compelled to be so* (for no virtue is involuntary), *but because of the good itself and the end. Experience regarding particular situations also seems, he says, to be a form of courage*—particular situations, not all, but only those realised by this disposition (I refer to wars, battles, and the endurance of painful situations), since experience in grammar does not produce courage, except metaphorically, given that someone who is experienced in grammar would courageously give an account of a paradigm—and *for these reasons Socrates, he states, thought that courage was knowledge*, because it is a product of experience.

Different people [have this sort of courage] in regard to different matters, [for example] professional soldiers in regard to wars, since there are some aspects of war, which soldiers have observed more than others have; because everyone knows the dangerous nature of battle, but only soldiers know how troops should be drawn up to fight, and in what numbers, and how to win. At any rate, those [soldiers] appear courageous compared to others, because the others are entirely ignorant of the kinds of dangers associated with war, nor do they wish to hear of war even in their dreams, and if they do hear of war, they shudder with terror. Moreover, their experience makes them capable of acting [i.e. of inflicting loss on the enemy] without suffering themselves. As if one side were unarmed and the others armed, this is how soldiers fight against those who lack experience, because they have experience with their weaponry. And it is evident from athletic contests that it is not the bravest men who compete in these, but the best fighters. Why does [Aristotle] say this? Because in the

ζητοῦμεν τὰ ἔργα τῆς νίκης, ἀλλὰ μόνην τὴν ὑπομονὴν τὴν περὶ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον.

[22r] Οἱ γὰρ στρατιῶται καὶ μαχόμενοι ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ἢ ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος, ὥστε ἐμπειρίαν μὲν ἔχουσιν, ἀνδρείαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οἱ δὲ πολιτικὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔχοντες, δηλονότι οἱ χάριν τιμῶν θέλοντες πράττειν, μένοντες ἀποθνήσκου- 5 σιν οὐκ ἰσχύοντες πολλακίς τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ψυχικαῖς ἀνδρείαις ὀπλισμένοι, ὅπερ συνέβη, φησί, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρείοις αἰσχροὺν ἐνομίσθη τὸ φεύγειν, καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φεύγειν σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος ἔδοξεν· οἱ δὲ ἐμπειρικοὶ καὶ ἰσχύοντες μόνον σώμασι καὶ ἐξαρχῆς ἐκινδύνουν κρείττους ὄντες, καὶ γνόντες καταπονούμενοι ἔφευγον, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι. 10 ἀναφέρουσι δὲ τινες καὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι· τέλος θέντες τὸ καλὸν πράττουσι δι' ἐκεῖνο, καὶ θυμὸς συνεργός ἐστι σφίσι· τὰ δὲ θηρία πῶς ἀνδρεία, εἰ διὰ λύπην ἢ φόβον τοῦ πληγῆναι ἀνδρίζονται;

1116b30–1117a28 ἰδ' (ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν...)

Πέντε ἀνδρείας τρόπους παρὰ τὴν τῷ ὄντι ἀνδρείαν (ἧς τέλος τὸ καλόν), τὴν ἐξ 15 ἀρετῆς ἢ μᾶλλον τὴν οὖσαν ἀρετὴν, τέθεικε. καὶ εἰσιν αὗται· πρώτη ἢ πολιτικὴ, ἧτις δι' αἰδῶ καὶ τὰς τιμάς ἐστι· δευτέρα ἢ κατ' ἀνάγκην τῶν ἀρχόντων· διαφέρουσα ταύτης ὅτι ἢ μὲν διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστι καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, ἢ δὲ διὰ φόβον τῶν κολάσεων· τρίτη ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐμπειρία· τετάρτη ἢ ἐκ θυμοῦ καὶ ὀργῆς, ἧς δὴ καὶ τὰ θηρία μετέχουσι· πέμπτη ἢ τῶν εὐελπίδων, σὺν οἷς καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ἀγνοίας θαρροῦντας τακτέ- 20 ον· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων διὰ τὴν ἄγνοϊαν.

Καὶ τέως τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ διορίζεται ἀνδρείαν πολὺ ἀπεικουῖαν πρὸς τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνδρείαν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνη μὲν διὰ τὸ καλόν, αὕτη δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς θηρίοις συμβαίνει, ἢ καὶ διὰ φόβον τοῦ μὴ πληγῆναι. ἐπεὶ, φησίν, εἰ καὶ τὰ θηρία ἀνδρεία εἴπομεν διὰ ταῦτα, εἴπομεν ἂν καὶ τοὺς ὄνους ἀνδρείους εἰ πεινῶεν, ὅτι καὶ τυπτόμε- 25 νοι οὐκ ἀφίστανται. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῶς ἀνδρεία τὰ δι' ἀληθόνοσ καὶ θυμοῦ ὁρμῶντα πρὸς κίνδυνον. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ἀνδρεία φυσικώτατον εἶναι ἔοικεν, ὅτι καὶ συνεργίαν ἔχει ἐκ θυμοῦ ἢ ἀνδρεία· προσλαβοῦσα γὰρ αὕτη προαίρεσιν (ὅτι ἀπροαιρέτως θύει σχεδὸν ὁ θυμούμενος) καὶ τὸ οὖ ἕνεκα, ἀνδρεία ἂν γένοιτο.

Καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅτι ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ὡς ἄκοντες ἐκφερόμενοι καὶ οὐ 30 χάριν τέλους χρηστοῦ ἀλογοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δὲ ἡδονταὶ ὡς ἂν ὑπομένοντες τὰς

3–11 Οἱ...ἀνδρείαν] cf. Arist. EN 1116b15–24 11–13 πλὴν...ἀνδρίζονται] cf. Arist. EN 1116b30–33 15–17 Πέντε...ἐστι] cf. Arist. EN 1116a15–19 17–18 δευτέρα...κολάσεων] cf. Arist. EN 1116a29–33 19 τρίτη...ἐμπειρία] cf. Arist. EN 1116b3–4 19–20 τετάρτη...μετέχουσι] cf. Arist. EN 1116b23–25 20–21 πέμπτη...τακτέον] cf. Arist. EN 1117a9–11 23–27 ὅτι...κίνδυνον] cf. Arist. EN 1116b30–1117a3 27–31 οὖν...ἡδοντα] cf. Arist. EN 1117a4–7 28 ὅτι...ἀνδρεία] cf. Arist. EN 1116b31

case of courage we do not seek victorious accomplishments, but only endurance in the face of terrors and confidence.

For there is a point where *professional soldiers*, although they fight, *prove cowards*, || *which is when the danger becomes too intense*, so that although they have [22r] experience, they do not have courage; whereas those who possess *civic* courage, namely those who wish to act for the sake of honours, *stand their ground and die fighting* even though they often lack *bodily strength* but are armed with courage in their soul, *as happened*, he states, *at the temple of Hermes*. For courageous people considered it *disgraceful to try to run away*, and death was held *preferable to safety procured by flight* [from the battlefield]. Whereas those who were experienced [in warfare] and possessed only physical strength *faced the danger from the outset in a superior position*, but *when they discovered* that they were being defeated, *they ran away*, since they *feared death more than disgrace*. Some people *refer anger to courage*, except for *courageous individuals*, who make *the noble* an end and *act for its own sake*, and *anger is their assistant*; whereas how are *wild animals* courageous, if they act courageously only *out of pain or the fear of being wounded*?

1116b30–1117a28 14. (Courageous people for the sake of the noble...)

He established *five types of courage* alongside genuine courage (whose end is the noble), which comes from virtue or rather true virtue. They are the following: *first the civic* [type of courage], which is *motivated by* a sense of shame and *honours*. The second [type] is that which occurs *in response to the compulsion imposed by one's commanders*. It differs from the first type in that the former is for the sake of honour and praise, whereas the latter is *motivated by fear* of punishments. The third [type] is *experience regarding a particular situation*. The fourth [type] comes from *wrath* and anger; even *wild animals* have a share in it. The fifth [type] is that of *hopeful people*, with whom we should also place those who are *confident* due to ignorance, because the former are not far from those who are hopeful due to their ignorance.

Up to this point, he defines the type of courage caused by wrath as quite unlike the genuine type of courage, since the latter is *for the sake of the noble*, while this [type] is *due to pain*, as happens in the case of *wild animals*, or *due to the fear of being wounded*. Since, he says, if we were to describe wild animals as brave due to these [motivations], we might also call *asses brave when they are hungry*, because *they do not stop [feeding] even when they are beaten*. Surely, then, animals *that rush headlong into danger due to pain or anger* are not genuinely *brave*. Rather, therefore, the form of courage *that is due to wrath seems to be what is most natural*, since courage *gets assistance from wrath*; because *when courage is reinforced by deliberate choice* (because the person motivated by wrath kills almost without deliberation) *and purpose, it becomes [true] courage*.

It is apparent from [the behaviour] of *human beings* that *they feel pain when they are angry* because they are carried away unwillingly rather than for the sake of a worthy end, *and they take pleasure in exacting revenge* since they seem to endure

κολάσεις καὶ τοῦτο τέλος ἔχοντες καὶ ἀκουσίως πάσχοντες τὴν ὑπομονὴν καὶ τὸ δόξα ὑπομένειν τὰ δεινά. οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι διὰ τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν μάχιμοί μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ μάχονται ἐξ ὀργῆς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν λύπην ἀντιπλήττειν θέλουσι· μάχονται γὰρ οὐ διὰ τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δέ τι ἔχουσιν ἄμφω, τὸ κινεῖν πάθος αὐτοὺς τῆς ὀργῆς. οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες κυρίως ἀνδρεῖοι 5
 θαρροῦσι γὰρ νενικηκέναι ὡς πολλάκις νικήσαντες. ἔχουσι δὲ τὸ θάρρος κοινὸν καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ εὐέλπις, εἰ καὶ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων κατὰ τοῦτο (ἄλλως γὰρ θαρρεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ἄλλως ὁ εὐέλπις)· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ εὐέλπιδος θάρρος ἔοικε τῷ θάρρει τῶν μεθυσκομένων, τοῦ δὲ ἀνδρείου ἔστι τὸ ὑπομένειν διὰ τὸ καλόν. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου [22v] δοκεῖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις δεινοῖς ἄφοβον ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδηλοῖς· ἢ μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐξ ἕξεως 10
 καὶ ἐκ παρασκευῆς δὲ ἦττον ὁ τοιοῦτος φοβηθήσεται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκ λογισμοῦ τότε πράττει ὁ πράττει, παρὸ ἐξ ἕξεως.

Συντάττοιτο δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες τοῖς εὐέλπισιν, χείρους δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν ἀξίωμα, ἐκείνων ἐχόντων· θαρροῦσι γὰρ τὰ δεινά καὶ ὅτι περιέσσονται, καὶ χρόνον τινὰ μένουσιν· οἱ δὲ οὐδόλως θαρροῦσιν· εἰ δ' ἐπιστῶσιν, ἀφίστανται ὡς ἠπατημένοι. 15
 εἴρηται οὖν τίνες οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τίνες οἱ φαινόμενοι.

1117a29–1117b28 *ιε'* (Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους...)

Περὶ θάρρη μὲν οὖν ἔστι καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, πλην οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἢ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἀνδρεῖος. διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπίλυπον καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὸ τὰ 20
 λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ ἀπεχέσθαι τῶν ἡδέων, πλην οὕτως ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπίλυπον· ὑπομένων γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην τὰ φοβερὰ λυπεῖται, οὕτως ἔχει τὸ τέλος ἡδύ. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τοῦ τέλους ἡδὺ ὑπὸ τῶν κυκλοῦντων κακῶν ἀφανίζεται, ὅπερ γίνεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ τέλος ἡδὺ διὰ τὰ ἐπακολουθοῦντα τῷ τέλει, 25
 τοὺς στεφάνους καὶ τὰς τιμάς, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι σαρκίνοις οὖσιν ἀλγεινὸν πάντως, πᾶς δὲ πόνος λυπηρόν. ὅθεν καὶ πολλῶν τούτων ὄντων τὸ τέλος, ἡδὺ ὄν καὶ μὴ ἐξαρκεῖν πρὸς ταῦτα, οὐχ ἡδὺ φαίνεται· ἐπικαλύπτεται γὰρ διὰ τῶν παραυτικά ἀλγεινῶν.

Τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, τὸ τέλος καλόν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος λυπηρὰ, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ θάνατος, ἀλλ' ὅμως ὑπομένει ταῦτα, ὅτι καλόν ἢ ὑπομονὴ καὶ ὅτι

2–16 οἱ...φαινόμενοι] cf. Arist. EN 1117a7–28
 1117a29–1117b13

18–128,4 Περὶ...ἀποθανεῖται] cf. Arist. EN

terrible things when they endure these punishments and have this end and experience this endurance involuntarily. *But those whose fight when motivated by anger and vengeance are effective in fighting but not courageous*; because some fight as a result of anger, while others wish to retaliate because of their pain. *In consequence*, they do not fight for the sake of what is noble, but due to their feeling. Yet both have something in common, which is the feeling that drives them to anger. *Nor are hopeful men brave* in the proper sense, for they are confident about winning because they have often been victorious [on previous occasions]. The courageous man and the hopeful man possess a common kind of confidence, even if they differ from one another in this respect (since the courageous man is confident in one way and the hopeful man in another); for the hopeful man's confidence resembles the boldness of those who are getting drunk, whereas that of the courageous man is the power of enduring for the sake of the noble. This is why a person appears more courageous if he is fearless in the face of sudden terrors rather than in dangers that are foreseen; || because such a man [22v] will be afraid more as a result of his disposition and less from preparation, because it is from calculation that he does what he does at a given time, since it results from his disposition.

Those who are ignorant [when they face danger] would be placed in the same category as hopeful men, but they are inferior because they lack self-confidence, whereas those men [i.e. the hopeful] have it; because [hopeful men] are confident regarding frightening situations and [are sure] they will survive, and they stand their ground for a time, but [the ignorant] are not confident at all, and if they learn [the true state of affairs], they depart as if they had been deceived. Who courageous men are and who those who [merely] appear to be so are has thus been discussed.

1117a29–1117b28 15. <With respect to confidence and fear...>

The courageous man, therefore, is concerned with confidence and objects of fear, albeit not with respect to both equally, but more in respect to fearful objects than those that inspire confidence, since the man who is able to endure painful things is courageous. Courage thus involves pain and is rightly praised, since enduring pain is more difficult than abstaining from pleasure, except in so far as courage involves pain. For although standing one's ground courageously when confronting frightening situations is painful, even so it has an end that is pleasant. But this pleasant character of the end is obscured by the attendant bad circumstances, something that also happens in athletic contests; since the end boxers aim for is pleasant because of what accompanies that end, the wreaths and honours, but being struck must undoubtedly be painful for them, given that they are made of flesh, and every sort of exertion brings pain with it. As a consequence of which, because the blows and exertions are so numerous, the end, being pleasant but insufficient in comparison to them, appears not to be pleasant, since it is obscured by what is momentarily painful.

The situation involving courage is somewhat similar: the end is noble, but the means to the end are painful, as is death itself as well, but nevertheless [the

αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ ὑπομένειν. ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν εἴῃ εὐδαιμονέστερος καὶ τὰς πάσας ἀρετὰς ἔχει ὁ διαθλῶν, (μᾶλλον) ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπεῖται· τῷ γὰρ τοιοῦτῳ καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπιψηφίσονται τὸ ζῆν καὶ εἰσέτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ, λυπηρὸν δὲ ἐὰν οὕτως ἔχων ὡς ἄξιον ζῆν ἐκεῖνον ἀποθανεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ οὕτω δικαίως λυπούμενος· ἐλέγομεν γὰρ χαρακτηρίζεσθαι τὸν ἔχοντα ἀρετὴν ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἣν περὶ ταύτην ἔχει, ὡς εἰ μὴ 5
χαίροι τῇ ἀρετῇ, μὴ δ' ἐνάρετον εἶναι. ἀλλ' αὐτὸς δικαίως λυπούμενος οὐδὲν ἤττον ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴῃ καὶ καλοῖτο, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον διατοῦτο ἀνδρεῖος, ὅτι, καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχων ἀγαθὰ ὧν χάριν καὶ ἐπικρίνων ἄξιον αὐτὸν εἶναι ζῆν καὶ διαταῦτα κινδυνεύων λυπεῖται, τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν αἰρεῖται· ὥστε συνακτέον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρεταῖς πάσας τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ἐστὶ, πλην εἰ μὴ γε διὰ τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἡδύ. 10

Ὅτι καὶ καλόν, στρατιώτας δ' ἀρίστους οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας πολλάττα τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλ' ἀριστοὶ ἐσοῦνται στρατιῶται καὶ οἱ ἤττον ἀνδρεῖοι, ἄλλο δὲ μηδὲν ἔχοντες ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἤττον ἔχοντες, καὶ μάλα εἰκότως. εἰ γὰρ λυποῦνται διὰ τὰ προσόντα ἀγαθὰ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὡς μὴ χρεῶν ἀποθανεῖσθαι τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ καὶ τοσαῦτα, οἱ ἤττον ἀνδρεῖοι, εἰ εἶχον τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ, πάντες ἂν εὐχερῶς εἶχον 15
κατὰ τοιοῦτον σκοπὸν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ μὴ καλὸν τούτους εἶναι ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλοῦ κατεφρόνουν. ἀλλὰ στερούμενοι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἤττον ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες, ἀνταλλάξαιτο ἂν τοὺς βίους αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη, πόσῳ γε μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸν ἐν πολέμῳ εὐκλεᾶ θάνατον.

Μεταταῦτα λέγει καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης, ὅτι ἢ μὲν ἀνδρεία πλέον περὶ τὴν ὑπομονὴν τῶν λυπηρῶν ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὴν ἀποχὴν τῶν ἡδέων· ἢ δὲ σωφροσύνη περὶ μὲν ἡδονὰς ἐστὶν, ἤττον δὲ περὶ λύπας καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ. διαιρεῖ τοιγαροῦν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ζητεῖ περὶ ποίας ἐστὶν ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη. 20

[23r] || **1117b28–1118b5** ἰστ' (διηρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ ψυχικαί...)

Διαιρεῖ τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τε ψυχικὰς καὶ σωματικὰς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωματικῶν τίθησι τὴν 25
σωφροσύνην, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ πασῶν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινων. καὶ ἐπεὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ δι' αἰσθήσεων, πρῶτον τὴν δι' ὀράσεως ἀποδοκιμάζει· οἱ γὰρ τοῖς χρώμασι καὶ ταῖς γραφαῖς χαίροντες οὔτε σώφρονες λέγονται, εἰ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅσον δεῖ χαίρουσιν, οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι οἱ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα χαίροντες· καίτοι γε πέφυκε καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ παρ' ἑκατέρου τό τε ὑπὲρ ὃ δεῖ καὶ τὸ παρ' ὃ δεῖ. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς χαίρουσιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν 30
ἀκοὴν ἐστὶ τὸ «σώφροσιν» ἢ «ἀκόλαστοις» ἀκούειν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβολικῶς τοῖς μέλεσι

6–13 ἀλλ'...ἀγαθὸν] cf. Arist. EN 1117b13–19 18 ὄντες...κέρδη] cf. Arist. EN 1117b19–20

20–23 Μεταταῦτα...σωφροσύνη] cf. Arist. EN 1117b23–28 25 Διαιρεῖ...σωματικὰς] cf. Arist. EN 1117b28–29 25–26 ἐπὶ...πασῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1118a1–3 27–130,9 δι'...βρωμάτων] cf. Arist. EN 1118a3–15 31 σώφροσιν...ἀκόλαστοις] cf. Arist. EN 1118a4–5

2 μᾶλλον addidi ex Arist. EN 1117b11 24 lm. addidi

courageous man] endures this, because endurance is a noble thing and because a failure to endure is base. The result is that *the more* the sufferer is happy and possesses virtue in its entirety, *(the more)* pain death causes him; for others will vote for such a man to live, and even more will he [vote] so for himself, and it is painful if someone who possesses this disposition, that *he is worthy of life*, will die, but nevertheless in this sense he will be justly distressed. For we said that the virtuous man is characterised by the pleasure he has in connection with virtue, so that if he does not take pleasure in virtue, he is not really virtuous. *But* this man, although rightly distressed, would *nonetheless* be *no less courageous* and be called so, and *perhaps indeed he is more* courageous on the following account, *that*, although he possesses these goods on account of which he judges himself worthy of life and on account of them feels distress when he faces these dangers, *he prefers the nobility found in war*. As a result, one must conclude that it is *not the case with all the virtues that the exercise of them is pleasant*, except with reference to *the end*, since this is both noble and pleasant.

Because [the end] is noble, *nothing prevents* those who lack many goods *from being the best soldiers*, and those who are less courageous will be the best soldiers, since they possess *nothing else of value* or possess less [of value], and reasonably so. For if courageous men feel pain on account of the goods which belong to them, since it seems to them that they ought not to have to die when they possess such great goods and so many of them, those who are less courageous, if they possessed the remaining goods, would all be comfortable with this aim [i.e. to avoid dying] and the judgement that it is not noble [for courageous men] to die, and they would despise the nobility found in war. But since they lack the other goods and are less courageous, *they would barter their lives for small profits*, and even more for a noble death in warfare.

After this he discusses moderation, to the effect that courage is much more concerned with enduring pain than with avoiding pleasures, whereas *moderation is concerned with pleasures*, but with pain only to a lesser degree and differently than courage is. For that reason *he distinguishes* among the pleasures and examines *what sort of pleasures* moderation is concerned with.

|| 1117b28–1118b5 16. (Let there be a distinction between [pleasures] of the soul...) [23r]

He distinguishes between pleasures of the soul and those of the body, and he refers moderation to *bodily pleasures*, but only some rather than all of them. And since pleasures [are experienced] by means of sense-perception, he first rejects [pleasure achieved] *by means of sight*, since *those who delight in colours and pictures are not termed “moderate”*, if they delight [in them] in the right manner and to the right extent, *nor* are those who take more pleasure than this [termed] “*self-indulgent*”; in fact, it is natural to take pleasure in these [i.e. objects of vision] in the right manner or to one extreme or the other, sometimes exceeding what is appropriate and sometimes falling short of it. *Similarly*, those who enjoy the objects of hearing are unlikely to be

χαίροντας ἀκολάστους οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅταν προσέχῃσι τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς ὅσα λέγουσι
 μετά τινος ἡδονῆς καὶ υπερβαλλόντως. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἀκρατεῖς λέγομεν
 ἀκολάστους, πλὴν εἰ μὴ γε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες μῆλων ἴσως ὀσμαῖς οὐκ
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο διὰ τὴν ὀσμὴν τὴν ὀπώραν ἀγαπῶσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τροφήν· οἱ δὲ καὶ ταῖς
 ὀσμαῖς τῶν ῥόδων καὶ τῶν θυμιαμάτων ἐνασμενίζοντες οὐδ' οὗτοι κληθεῖεν ἂν κυρίως
 ἀκόλαστοι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἀναφορὰν πρὸς τινὰ ἐπιθυμίαν· εἰ δέ γε χairoien μύρων
 καὶ ὄψων ὀσμαῖς, ἀκόλαστοι κληθεῖεν ἂν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, διότι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνη-
 σις γίνεται ἐπιθυμίας, τοῖς μὲν ἀκολασίας, τοῖς δὲ ἀκρατείας καὶ τοῦ φαγεῖν. καὶ
 δῆλον ἐκ τῶν πεινώντων, ὅτι χairoουσι ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν βρωμάτων.

᾿Ωσπερ γοῦν οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς ζῴοις ἔστι κατὰ ταύτας τὰς
 αἰσθήσεις, τὴν τε ὄρασιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοήν, πρόσθετες δὲ καὶ τὴν ὀσμὴν, ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός. λέων γὰρ αἶγα βλέπει καὶ βοὸς ἀκούει, καὶ κύων λαγωῦ ὄσφραίνεται, καὶ
 χairoουσι ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν θήραν καὶ τὴν βοράν. περὶ τίνος τοίνυν ἡδονὰς ἢ
 σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀκολασία, ἢ ἐπεὶ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ἔστιν ἢ ἐπιθυμία,
 ζητητέον τὴν κοινωτάτην πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις· καὶ ἔστιν ἢ ἀφή· αὕτη γὰρ ἢ κυριωτάτη, ὡς
 ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς ἔλεγε, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας συναναίρουσα, οὐ μὴν δὲ ἐκείναις συνανα-
 ρουμένη.

᾿Υπὸ δὲ τὴν ἀφήν καὶ ἢ γεῦσις ἔστιν· αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἀνδραποδώδεις
 καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· οἱ [μὴ] ὄντες τοίνυν ἀκόλαστοι οὐ πάνυ χairoουσι τούτοις,
 [23v] ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει τούτων ἢ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι χairoουσι, ἥτις γίνεται δι' ἀπτικῆς αἰσθήσε-
 ως, ἐν ἣ καὶ ἢ γεῦσις ἐμφαίνεται. ἐπεὶ γοῦν κοινωτάτη ἢ ἀφή καὶ ἄλογος περὶ τὰς
 λοιπὰς, καὶ ἔστι κατ' αὐτὴν τὸ ἀκρατῶς χairoειν ἐπὶ τισιν, εἰκότως καὶ ἐπονείδιστος
 δόξειεν ἂν ἢ τοιαύτη χαρά· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶον χairoει ταύτην. οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ
 ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν δι' ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν αὐτοῖς προσλογίζονται.

1118b4–1119a7 ιζ' (καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται...)

Οὐ πάσας, φησί, τὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ ἀκόλαστοι προσποιοῦνται, αὐτίκα τὰς ἐλευθεριωτά-
 τας, αἱ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ θερμασίας γινόμεναι, οὐ προσίεν-
 ται πολλακίς· οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν σῶμα, φησί, τοῦ ἀκόλαστου ἢ ἀφή ἡδεῖα, ἀλλὰ περὶ
 τινὰ μέρη σωματικά.

᾿Εκτοτε, ἐπεὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αἱ ἡδοναὶ τὴν ἔδραν ἔχουσιν, περὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν
 διαλαμβάνει καὶ διττὰς αὐτὰς λέγει· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοινὰ δοκοῦσι καὶ τῆς φύσεως

10–19 ᾿Ωσπερ...φαίνονται] cf. Arist. EN 1118a16–26 15–17 τὴν...συναναίρουμένη] cf. Arist. De
 an. 413b4–10, 414a3, 414b3, 435a12–435b3 15–16 αὕτη...ἔλεγε] cf. Arist. De an. 413b1–10
 19–21 οἱ...αἰσθήσεως] cf. Arist. EN 1118a29–31 21–24 ἐπεὶ...προσλογίζονται] cf. Arist. EN
 1118b1–5 26–132,29 Οὐ...ἀνασθησίας] cf. Arist. EN 1118b4–1119a7

called “moderate” or “self-indulgent”, since we do not refer to those who take an excessive pleasure in music as self-indulgent, nor [do we do so] when they pay attention to what the actors [in the theatre] say with pleasure and excessively. Nor do we describe those who are immoderately concerned with smells self-indulgent, unless by accident; for those who delight in the scent of apples perhaps are not fond of the fruit because of its scent alone, but instead because of the nourishment [it supplies]; and those who take pleasure in the scent of roses or incense would also not be called self-indulgent in the proper sense, because they do not relate to a type of desire. But if they were to take pleasure in the smell of perfumes or of tasty dishes, they might be called accidentally “self-indulgent”, because these [odours] remind them of the objects of their desire, the former of debauchery, while the latter of self-indulgence and consuming food. This is evident from people who are hungry, because they take pleasure in the smell of food.

Like human beings, at any rate, the other animals as well get no pleasure from these senses, namely sight, hearing, and add smell too, except accidentally. For a lion sees a goat and hears an ox, and a dog catches the scent of a hare, and they take pleasure in these [objects of sense-perception], but [they do so] because they are prey and food. [To find out] which pleasures moderation and self-indulgence are concerned with, or because desire is a non-rational part of the soul, we must investigate the [kind of pleasure] that is most common in all living creatures, and this is [the pleasure of] touch, because this is the most powerful [sense], as he said in “On the Soul”, given that it obliterates the other [senses], without being obliterated along with them.

The sense of taste too is subordinate to the sense of touch, for these kinds of sense-perception appear servile and bestial. Consequently, those who are self-indulgent do not take much pleasure in these [senses], but what self-indulgent people take pleasure in is [rather] the enjoyment of these [objects], || which comes about by [23v] the sense of touch, in which taste is manifest. Since touch is the most widely shared, therefore, and is more irrational than the remaining [senses], and the intemperate enjoyment of some pleasures relates to touch, this sort of enjoyment would reasonably be regarded as a matter of reproach, because one takes pleasure in it not in the way a human being would, but in the way an animal does. For the most refined of the pleasures of touch are not reckoned among these.

1118b4–1119a7 17. (Moreover, the most refined...)

Self-indulgent people, he says, are not attached to every type of pleasure, for example they often do not accept the most refined [pleasures], which are those produced in gymnasia by rubbing and warm baths. Because the pleasure of touch of the self-indulgent person, he says, does not involve the entire body, but only certain bodily parts.

After this, since pleasures have their place among the desires, he distinguishes among the desires and maintains that they are of two sorts: one kind seem to be

μᾶλλον, αἱ δὲ ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· καὶ αἱ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς πόσεως φυσικαὶ καὶ κοιναί, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν εὐνῶν, ὡς φησιν Ὅμηρος, πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀκμάζουσιν· τῆς τοιαῦδε δὲ τροφῆς ἢ τοιαῦδε αἱ ἐπιθυμιαὶ οὐ πᾶσι κοιναί· ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ ἡδύ. τέως δέ γε καὶ αὐτὸ φυσικὸν καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς σωματικῆς κράσεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγη ἡ ἁμαρτία (πάντες γὰρ πεινήσαντες, ἐπιθυμοῦμεν φαγεῖν, 5 καὶ πιεῖν, διψήσαντες) καὶ ἐφ' ἔν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, πάντες ἔχομεν τοῦτο. «ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον» δὲ λέγει διὰ τό τινας ἐσθίειν ὑπερβαλλόντως ἢ τὰ τυχόντα ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῶσι, καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν τῷ πλήθει τὴν φυσικὴν ἀκολουθίαν· ἢ γὰρ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία ἀναπλήρωσις τῆς ἐνδείας ἐστί, τὸ δ' ἐπέκεινα ὑπερβολή τις καὶ ἁμαρτία. διὸ καὶ λέγονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι γαστρίμαργοι, οἷονεὶ μάργοι κατὰ τὴν γαστέρα, οἵτινες καὶ 10 ἀνδραποδώδεις λέγονται, ὡς ἡδονὰς ἔχοντες τὰς τῶν δούλων καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων.

Περὶ γοῦν τὰς φυσικὰς ὀλίγη ἡ ἁμαρτία, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσι. φιλοτοιοῦτοι γὰρ ἰδίως εἰσὶ (φιλογλύκεις τυχόν καὶ φίλοινοι καὶ φίλοψοι) καὶ χαίρουσι πολλακίς τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσι· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ οὐχ 15 ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλ' ὑπερβαλλόντως. καὶ ὅτι ἢ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, [24r] δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας ἀντιστρόφως ἔχει τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἢ ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος μᾶλλον τοιοῦτος τῷ ὑπομένειν τὰ λυπηρὰ ἢ τῷ μὴ χαίρειν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐ τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων καὶ ἀκόλαστος τῷ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὰ λυπηρὰ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἐν τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐ τυχάνει τῶν ἡδέων (τὴν δὲ τοιαύτην λύπην ἢ 20 ἡδονὴ ἐμποιεῖ, καὶ καθὼς ἂν ἦδεται ἐπιτυχάνων, κατὰ τοσοῦτον λυπεῖται ἀποτυγχάνων)· ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ τε μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀπειῖναι τὰ ἡδέα καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι ἐν τῷ παρεῖναι.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίθησι προὔργου τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ ὅτε ἀποτυγχάνει, 25 λυπεῖται, καὶ ὅτε ἐπιθυμεῖ, τὸ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ οἷος τ' εἶναι ἐπιτυχεῖν, τὸ δὲ ὑποπτεύων τὴν ἀποτυχίαν. ἀτόπῳ δέ τινι ἔοικε τὸ λυπεῖσθαι δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἐν τούτοις τὸ τοιοῦτον· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων, ὀλίγοι δὲ οἱ ἐλλείποντες· οὐ γὰρ προσήκει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸ ἐγγυὲς εἶναι τοιαύτης ἀναισθησίας.

2 καὶ...“Ὅμηρος] cf. Hom. Il. 24.130

6 ἐφ' ἔν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον scripsi ex Arist. EN 1118b16 : ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ὑφ' ἔν M

universal and more a matter of nature, while the other are peculiar to individuals and acquired. The desires for food and drink are natural and universal, as are sexual desires, as Homer says, except that it is not [desired] by all but by those who are in their physical prime; whereas appetites for this or that specific food are not universal to everybody, because different foods are pleasant to different people. To a certain extent, this [preference] is natural and derives from our bodily mixture. In the case of our natural desires, then, any error is minor (given that when we are hungry, we all desire to eat, and when we are thirsty, to drink) and we all do this in one way only, that of excess in quantity. He speaks of “excess in quantity” because of the fact that some men eat in excess or [eat] whatever is at hand until they are too full, and so they exceed the natural order in terms of amount, since the natural desire is to satisfy one’s needs, and what is beyond this is a kind of excess and error. That is why men of this sort are called “greedy-bellies”, in the sense that they are gluttonous in relation to their stomach, and they are also termed “slavish”, since they have the desires of slaves rather than of free persons.

With regard to the natural [desires], at any rate, any error is slight, but in regard to pleasures peculiar to individual persons many people go wrong and in many ways. For they are personally fond of such-and-such (perhaps they like sweets, or wine, or dainties) and often enjoy the kind of things one should not, or more than most people do, or as one should not, and self-indulgent men outdo them, since they like some things one should not or [enjoy them] in a way one should not, but [they do so] excessively. It is also apparent that excess in relation to pleasures is a kind of self-indulgence and that it is blameworthy. With regard to pains, on the other hand, [the self-indulgent man] has a converse relationship to the courageous man; || for the courageous man is more prone to be such in enduring pains than in not enjoying pleasures; whereas, in this case [i.e. moderation] a person is not called moderate for enduring pains, and self-indulgent for not enduring pains, but rather the self-indulgent person [is so called] for feeling more pain than he should, because he fails to get pleasures (and pleasure produces this pain, and just as he is pleased when he gets them, to the same extent he is distressed when he fails to get them); whereas the moderate individual [is so called] because he does not feel pain at the absence of pleasures or in abstaining from them when they are present. [24r]

The self-indulgent man thus desires all pleasures or those that are most pleasant, and he is led by his desire, and he places pleasure above everything else. Hence, when he fails [to get pleasure], he feels pain, as also when he desires something, because he is unable to attain it, and something else because he suspects he will fail [to get it]. Feeling pain because of pleasure seems almost absurd, but it arises in these situations; these attributes are characteristic of those who excessively [seek pleasure], whereas those [who err] on the side of deficiency [with regard to pleasure] are few, because being akin to such insensibility is not typical of human beings.

1119a9–1119b6 ἢ (εἰ δὲ τῷ μηδὲν ἔστιν ἡδὺ...)

Περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς μὲν ἔστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, καὶ τούτων οὐ τὰς ψυχικὰς (πῶς γὰρ ἐνέσται αὕτη ταῖς διανοητικαῖς ἡδοναῖς, ταῖς ἐν τοῖς θεωρήμασι τοῖς γεωμετρικοῖς; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὗται ἡδοναὶ δηλοῖ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, ἐν οἷς δεικνύει ὁμῶνυμον τὴν ἡδονήν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θεωρήμασιν ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἔχει ἀντικειμένην 5 τὴν λύπην, ἢ δὲ προκειμένη ἡδονὴ τῇ λύπῃ ἀντιδιέσταλται). ἔστιν οὖν οὐ περὶ ψυχικὰς ἡδονὰς ἀλλὰ περὶ σωματικὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ταύτας οὐ πάσας, ἀλλὰ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως. ἢ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ποιεῖ· δεῖ γὰρ ζητεῖν τὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὑπερβολὴν καὶ οὐ τῆς μεσότητος ταύτης δὴ τῆς σωφροσύνης. ἔπει αὕτη γε ἔλλειψις μᾶλλον καλεῖται περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς, καὶ ὅτι ὀλίγη γίνεται 10 αὕτη καὶ ὀλίγοις, οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετύχηκεν· ἐξίσταται γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ὁ ἔχων, τινὲς δὲ καλοῦσιν αὐτὴν ἡλιθιότητα.

Τούτων τῶν δύο ὁ σώφρων μέσως ἔστιν, ὃς οὔτε ἡδεται οὕτως οἷς ἡδεται ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὔτε λυπεῖται τῇ ἐκείνων ἀπουσίᾳ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀπόντων. πῶς γὰρ οἷς παροῦσιν οὐ θέλει χρᾶσθαι; ἵνα δὲ μὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας 15 τελέως ἐκλυομένης εἰς τὴν παρ' ἐκάτερα κακίαν πέση, τίθησι τὸ «ἢ μετρίως»· ἔπει δὲ καὶ τινῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἔστι τὸν σώφρονα ἡδέων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἡδέα, ἀλλ' ἢ τυχὸν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ εὐεκτικὰ, διαλαμβάνει καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέξεται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων τῶν μὴ ἐμποδίων τοῖς ὑγιεινοῖς ὄντων. τῇ γὰρ ἔξει καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις 20 χρῆσεται ὡς μὴ ἀκολασταίνειν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸν ποικίλως ἰατρευόμενον ὡς εὐεκτοῖη τὸ σῶμα ψέγομεν. ἀγαπήσει γοῦν ὁ σώφρων τὰς ἡδονὰς μετρίως, τὰς μὴ ἐμποδιζούσας ἢ περὶ τὸ καλὸν ἢ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς μᾶλλον τῆς ἀξίας ἀγαπᾷ· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὕτως ἀγαπήσει, ὡς ὀρθὸς ὑποθήσεται λόγος.

Μᾶλλον δὲ ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῷ ἐκουσίῳ ἢ ἡ δειλία, ὅτι ἢ μὲν δι' ἡδονήν, ἢν 25 ἐκουσίως διώκομεν, ἢ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ἣτις ἔπεισιν ἄκουσιν, ἢν καὶ φεύγομεν. καὶ ἢ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἔχοντος, ἢ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ. ὅσον δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκούσιον τὸ ἀκόλαστον, μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπονείδιστον τῆς δειλίας· καὶ γὰρ ῥᾶον τὸ ἐθισθῆναι πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα (προηγεῖται γὰρ ἢ προαίρεσις), καὶ οἱ πρὸς ταῦτα ἐθισμοὶ οὐκ ἐπάγουσι κίνδυνον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐθισθῆναι ῥαδίως τὸν 30

4–6 ὅτι...ἀντιδιέσταλται] cf. Arist. Top. 106a36–106b4 8 δι'...γεύσεως] cf. Arist. EN 1118a26
11–12 οὐδ'...ἔχων] cf. Arist. EN 1119a10 13–15 ὁ'...ἀπόντων] cf. Arist. EN 1119a11–14 16 ἢ
μετρίως] Arist. EN 1119a14 16–19 ἐπεὶ...ὄντων] cf. Arist. EN 1119a16–18 21–24 ἀγαπήσει...
λόγος] cf. Arist. EN 1119a17–20 25–136,1 μᾶλλον...δειλόν] cf. Arist. EN 1119a21–27

1 Im. addidi 30 ἐθισμοὶ scripsi ex Arist. EN 1119a27 : ὠθισμοὶ M (cum M^b)

1119a9–1119b6 18. (If he takes no pleasure at all...)

Moderation has to do with pleasures, but not those connected to the soul (for how would moderation be involved in the intellectual pleasures, such as those evident in investigations of geometry? Because Aristotle in the “Topics” makes it clear that these too are pleasures, where he shows that pleasure has the same name [in different situations], since the pleasure involved in investigations [of the arts and sciences] is not opposed to pain, whereas the form of pleasure discussed above is opposed to pain). Consequently, moderation has to do not with pleasures of the soul but with those of the body, and not with all of these but only with those got through *touch* or *taste*. An excess of [such] pleasures produces self-indulgence; because it is crucial to investigate the excess of our subjects rather than the intermediate state of this moderation. Since this is rather called a deficiency with regard to the pleasures, and because this deficiency is rare and affects a limited number of individuals, *it has no specific name*; for in accord with this, the man who possesses [this deficiency] is removed *from humanity*, while some refer to it as folly.

The moderate man stands in the middle between these two [extremes], and he *neither takes pleasure* in the same way in the things the self-indulgent man enjoys, but *instead dislikes them, nor does he feel pain at their absence or desire them when they are not there*. For how is it that he not want to enjoy [pleasures that are] at hand? In order that he not fall into the vice at one of the opposite extremes, when desire is completely set free, [Aristotle] inserts the expression “*or in a moderate degree*”. Because it is likely that even the moderate individual desires some pleasures, not insofar as they are pleasant but as they are perhaps *conducive to health or fitness*, he also discusses them, to the effect that [*the moderate man*] *will desire them in a moderate degree and in the proper manner, as also other pleasures not detrimental to health*. For [the moderate man] will make habitual use [of these pleasures] in these circumstances as well, so as to not be self-indulgent concerning them. In fact we reproach the patient undergoing several medical treatments for wishing to keep his body in a good condition. *The moderate man, at any rate, will care for pleasures in a moderate fashion, for those not detrimental to either his nobility or his means*. The man who exceeds these limits *cares for such pleasures more than they are worth, whereas the moderate man will care for them just as right reason will suggest*.

Self-indulgence seems to be more voluntary than cowardice is, because *the former is caused by pleasure*, which we pursue voluntarily, *the latter by pain*, which comes upon us against our will and which we avoid. *Also pain upsets us and destroys the nature of the person who feels it, while pleasure does nothing of the sort*. Inasmuch as the act of self-indulgence is *more voluntary*, it is also *more reprehensible* than cowardice. *And in fact it is easier to train oneself to resist such things [i.e. the temptations of pleasure] (for choice precedes [self-indulgence]), and being accustomed to them does not bring danger, whereas in the case of objects of fear, the coward cannot easily become accustomed [to them], but fearful situations often produce danger when they are mentioned or set before one*.

δειλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κίνδυνον ἐπάγουσι πολλακίς τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομνησκόμενα καὶ προβαλλόμενα.

Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ δειλία· ὡσπερ τοῖς καθέκαστον, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἄλυπος, τὰ δὲ καθέκαστα δειλαινόμενα διὰ τὴν λύπην τοῦ εἰκότως 5
 [24v] *ἐξίστανται. τῷ δὲ ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθέκαστον ἢ ἐκούσια καὶ αἰρετά, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄλον ἦττον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας φέρεται μὲν περὶ τὰ παιδιά τὰ κολάσεως δεόμενα ἐν οἷς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. πότερον δὲ παρὰ ποτέρου, ἢ ἐκ τῶν παίδων ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὰ παιδιά, οὐ διαφέρει σκοπεῖν. τέως δὲ ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ παιδιά κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ζῶσιν, ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνα, οὕτω καὶ οὔτοι κολάσεως δέονται.* 10

1119b11–1119b18 *ἰθ' (διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι...)*

Ὡσπερ ἀκόλαστος ὁ ἀνουθέτητος, κἂν παῖς ἢ κἂν ἐπιθυμία ἐνοχλῇ (ἀκαθάρτους γὰρ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τοὺς μὴ νοουητέτους (παρὰ) τῶν ἀρχόντων), οὕτως αὐτὸς τὸν εὐπειθῆ κεκολασμένον λέγομεν. εἰ γοῦν τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθεῖ, παρ' ἐκείνων ἔχει καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι, κἂν τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ παιδαγωγῷ, παρ' ἐκείνων· κόλασις γὰρ οὐχ ἢ 15 τιμωρία κυρίως, ἀλλ' ἢ τῆς ὀρέξεως κώλυσις. δεῖ γοῦν τῷ σώφρονι μετρίας εἶναι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῷ λόγῳ. ὡς γὰρ ὁ παῖς κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν ὀφείλει, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον· παιδαγωγὸς γὰρ καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ὡς ἡγεμονικός τε καὶ ἄρχων. δεῖ τοίνυν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τοῦ σώφρονος, ὅτι καὶ ἀμφοῖν, τῷ τε λόγῳ καὶ 20 τῷ σώφρονι, τέλος ἔν, τὸ καλόν· καὶ ὅπερ ὁ λόγος τάξει, τοῦθ' ὁ σώφρων κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἑαυτοῦ διαπράττειται.

3–9 Οὐχ...σκοπεῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1119a28–1119b2 9 τέως...ζῶσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1119b5–6
 13–14 οὕτως...λέγομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1119b12–13 16–17 δεῖ...λόγῳ] cf. Arist. EN 1119b11–12
 17–18 ὡς...λόγον] cf. Arist. EN 1119b13–15 19–22 δεῖ...διαπράττειται] cf. Arist. EN 1119b15–18

8 ποτέρου scripsi : πότερον M 11 lm. addidi 13 παρὰ addidi

But cowardice cannot be avoided in the same way. The same thing holds for cowardice per se as for its specific manifestations, because cowardice itself is painless, but specific acts of cowardice depart from what is reasonable because of the pain. But for the self-indulgent person, to the contrary, specific acts [of self-indulgence] are || [24v] voluntary and chosen, but with reference to [his character] in general less so, since no one desires to be self-indulgent. The term “self-indulgence” is also applied to children, who need to be punished for naughty things they have done. Which of the two gets its name from the other, whether it is from children but applied here or applied from here to children, is not important to consider. In any case, since children live at the prompting of desire, so too these men [i.e. the self-indulgent] need punishment just as they do.

1119b11–1119b18 19. (This is why they must be moderate...)

Just as the unadmonished person is self-indulgent, whether he be a child or if an appetite causes him trouble (for Plato used to say that those who are not admonished (by) their rulers are morally impure), so in turn *we describe the man who is ready to obey as “chastened”*. If one obeys the laws, at any rate, one can also be corrected by them, and if one [obeys] one’s ruler or tutor, [one will be corrected] by them, since punishment is not correction in the proper sense but the prevention of desire. Therefore, *the indulgences of the moderate person must be moderate and few, and should never oppose reason*. For *just as a child is obliged to live according to the direction of his tutor, so too the appetitive part of us [is obliged to live] by the direction of reason*; for reason is the tutor of the appetitive element [of the soul], since it is authoritative and the ruler. *The appetitive element in the moderate man, therefore, must be in harmony with reason, because both reason and temperance have a single end, the noble; and what reason will prescribe, the temperate man will accomplish in accord with his individual desire.*

1119b22–1120a7 α' (Λέγωμεν δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος...)

Μεταταῦτα *περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος* διεξέρχεται, ζητεῖ δὲ καὶ ταύτης τό τε ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐκάτερα, ἃ καὶ εἰς κακίας τάττονται ὡς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης ἀρετὴ οὕσα ἐν *μεσότητί ἐστίν*. οὕτε γοῦν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος, ὡς περὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, οὕτ' αὖθις ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων (ὅτι περὶ ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος), οὐδ' αὖ ἐν κρίσεσί τισιν, ὡς τὸν νεμεσητικὸν ἔλεγε (κρίνει γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸ τῶν ἐπιτυγχανόντων οἷον ἀνάξιον, καὶ νεμεσητικὸς περὶ τοῦτο γίνεται), ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος *περὶ λήψιν καὶ δόσιν τῶν χρημάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ τὴν δόσιν*.

Ὅριζεται δὲ καὶ τὰ χρήματα, ὅτι ἐκεῖνα λέγομεν *χρήματα ὅσων τὸ ἄξιον διὰ νομίσματος μετρεῖται*, ὡς τόσου εἶναι ἐκεῖνο ἄξιον. παρ' ἐκάτερα δὲ τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος ἐστὶν *ἄσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία*· ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολή, ἡ δὲ ἔλλειψις. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀνελευθερία ἐστὶ τοῖς εἰς χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ἢ κατέχουσιν ἀσφαλῶς τὰ ἴδια ἢ καὶ προσκτωμένοις ἐξ οἰουδήτινος τρόπου ἢ καὶ ὀλίγα παρὰ τὸ δέον δαπανῶσιν· ἡ δ' ἄσωτία συμπλέκεται καὶ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἄσωτος ὁ προεἰμένος τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ εἰς τὰς ἰδίας ὀρέξεις δαπανῶν. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπτοημένους [25r] *περὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον, κἂν μὴ πολλὰ δαπανῶεν, ἄσώτους καλοῦμεν*. διὸ καὶ ἢ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οἱ ἄσωτοι· συμπλέκονται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ῥαδίας τῶν χρημάτων δαπάνης πολλαῖς κακίαις, πλὴν οὐκ οἰκείως οἱ τοιοῦτοι *προσαγορεύονται*. ἄσωτος γὰρ κυρίως ὁ φθειρῶν τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμενος. ἀπώλεια γὰρ τις (αὐτοῦ) ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τῶν χρημάτων ὄντος. ἐφ' οἷς δὲ ἐστὶ χρεία δόσεως, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῦτοις καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ κακῶς· ὁ δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετὴν ἔχων τῷ χρησίμῳ πλούτῳ καλῶς χρῆσεται.

1120a8–1120b6 β' (χρήσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ...)

Ὅτι δὲ περὶ δόσεις ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος ἢ περὶ λήψεις ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος τῶν χρημάτων συνίστησιν· πολὺ γὰρ τῶν χρημάτων τὸ χρήσιμον· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ χρήματα λέγονται. *χρήσις δὲ περὶ δαπάνην καὶ δόσιν ἐστίν*, ἡ δὲ λήψις καὶ τὸ κατέχειν τὰ χρήματα *κτῆσις μᾶλλον*. διὸ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ *διδόναι ἢ λαμβάνειν*, τὸ μὲν οἷς δεῖ, τὸ δὲ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ, ὡς τὸ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ. τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν κατασκευάζει ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀρετῆς

3–11 Μεταταῦτα...μετρεῖται] cf. Arist. EN 1119b22–27 12–13 ἐστὶν...σπουδάζουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1119b27–30 14–23 ἢ...χρήσεται] cf. Arist. EN 1119b30–1120a7 27–29 χρήσις...δεῖ] cf. Arist. EN 1120a8–10 29 ὅθεν¹...δεῖ²] Arist. EN 1120a10–11 30–140,6 ἀρετῆς²...ἀλλότριον] cf. Arist. EN 1120a11–18

1 Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων δέλτα in marg. superiore 2 lm. addidi 20 αὐτοῦ addidi ex Arist. EN 1120a2 24 lm. addidi 27 τὰ s.l.

1119b22–1120a7 1. (Next let us discuss liberality...)

After this, [Aristotle] examines *liberality* in detail, and he investigates both its substance and each of its opposite extremes, which are classified as vice seeing as they are types of excess and deficiency, since liberality being a virtue *lies in the mean position*. At any rate, *the liberal man is not such in conditions of war*, as the courageous man is, *nor*, on the other hand, *in matters in which the temperate person [is defined]* (given that these involve bodily pleasures), *nor in certain judicial decisions*, as he said with regard to the man inclined to just indignation (for he sees what happens to lucky people as undeserved and feels indignant about this), *but rather the liberal individual is defined by the acquisition and donation of wealth, and especially by the donation*.

Wealth is also defined, since we use “wealth” to refer to those things whose value is measured by money, so that a given object is worth a certain amount. The opposite extremes of liberality are *wastefulness and miserliness*; the former is the *excess*, while the latter is the *deficiency*. *Miserliness* is characteristic of those who are devoted to money or steadfastly hold onto their personal funds or even try to make more in any way possible or spend very little in comparison to their needs; *whereas wastefulness* is also intertwined with those who lack self-control, since it is not just the individual who spends his personal resources beyond what is needed who is wasteful, but also the one who spends [money] to satisfy his personal appetites. This is why we use the term “wasteful” for those who are passionately excited about self-indulgence, even if they do not spend large sums. This is also why || wasteful people are regarded as [25r] *extremely bad*; because they are implicated in many vices as a result of their reckless spending of money, although such people are not correctly referred to [thus]. For the man who ruins his estate is “wasteful” in the proper sense of the term, as is the man who ruins himself. For the ruining of one’s own property is a sort of (self-)destruction, inasmuch as wealth is the means of life. In cases where there is need for giving, the question of “well” or “badly” arises; and the person who possesses the virtue related to wealth will make good use of useful riches.

1120a8–1120b6 2. (But the use seems to be...)

That the liberal man is defined by his donation or acquisition [of money] is established by the name used for “money” (*chrēmata*), since the usefulness (*chrēsimon*) of money (*chrēmata*) is considerable; for this reason, therefore, it is termed “money” (*chrēmata*). *The use [of wealth] has to do with spending and giving, whereas acquisition and having of money are modes of the possession rather [than of the use]*. This is why giving [money] rather than getting it is characteristic of the liberal man, with the former [i.e. giving] being concerned with *to whom one ought to give*, the latter [i.e. getting] with *whence one ought and whence one ought not to get it*. For this seems to be virtue, namely, getting [money] from the right sources. But he

γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ μᾶλλον πράττειν τὰ καλὰ ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν. οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν δόσις ἔχει τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν, ἡ δὲ λήψις τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, ἐξ οὗ γενήσεται τούτῳ καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν.

Χάρις δ' ἔπεται μᾶλλον τῷ διδόντι ἢ τῷ (μὴ) λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ἔπαινος διατοῦτο· ὁ δὲ δυσεργότερον, ἐκεῖνο ἀρετῆ· ῥᾶον οὖν τὸ μὴ λαμβάνειν ἢ τὸ διδόναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον 5
μᾶλλον οὐ θέλουσι προῖεσθαι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. εἰ γοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ λαμβάνειν νικᾷ τὸ διδόναι κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς λόγον, πόσω γε μᾶλλον τὸ λαμβάνειν νικήσει. ὅθεν οἱ μὲν διδόντες ἐλευθέριοι λέγονται, οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐχ ἤττον δίκαιοι· κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅτι οὐ λαμβάνουσιν, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδὲ ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ, κἂν τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἅ αὐτοῖς διαφέρωσι λήψωνται. φιλοῦνται δὲ 10
διὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναρέτων πλέον.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα δώσει, μόνον εἰ ὀρθῶς καὶ κατὰ τοὺς προσδιορισμένους διδῶ καὶ ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ πραττόμενον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ δὴ ἢ ἄλυπον ἢ ὀλίγον τι λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ ἄλλων αἰτιῶν ἔνεκα διδοὺς οὐκ ἐλευθέριος, ἀλλὰ πολυσιδῆς ἐσειται πρὸς τὰς δόσεις 15
καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν δόσεων αἰτίαν τὸ ὄνομα. οὐδ' ὁ διδοὺς λυπηρῶς ἐλευθέριος· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἵνα τί λυπεῖται ἢ ὅτι προτιμᾶται τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς δόσεως, εἰ καὶ διὰ τινὰ περίστασιν δέδωκεν;

[25v] Οὐδὲ ἢ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ· πῶς γάρ; ἐπεὶ οὐ τίμα ἡγῆται τὰ χρήματα μᾶλλον τῆς 20
καλῆς δόσεως, διατοῦτο οὐδ' αἰτητικὸς ἂν εἴη· ὁ γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν αἰρούμενος πῶς τὸ εὖ πάσχειν καταδέξαιτο; λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν δικαίων αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ λαμβάνειν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίου, ἵν' ἔχοι διδόναι. διαταῦτα οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκειῶν οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα διδόναι ἔχοι οἷς δεῖ. ἐλευθερίου δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰ πλείω διδόναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἐγκατέλειπεν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον ὀρᾷ ὡς τὸ τοῦ τέλους.

8–10 οἱ! ...πάνυ] cf. Arist. EN 1120a18–21 10–13 φιλοῦνται...δώσει] cf. Arist. EN 1120a21–24
13–16 ὀρθῶς...ἐλευθέριος] cf. Arist. EN 1120a25–30 19 Οὐδὲ...δεῖ] cf. Arist. EN 1120a31–32
20 οὐδ'...εἴη] cf. Arist. EN 1120a33 | ὁ...ποιεῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1120a33–34 21–24 λήψεται...τέλους] cf. Arist. EN 1120a34–1120b6

4 μὴ addidi ex Arist. EN 1120a16 19 ὅθεν ante οὐδὲ primum scripsit, deinde erasit M

establishes this anew on the basis of personal virtue, *since it is more characteristic of virtue to do good than to receive good, and to perform noble deeds than to not perform base ones. It is evident that donation involves doing good, whereas acquisition [involves] being treated well*, and this will become a cause of the recipient's not behaving shamefully.

Gratitude is felt more towards the giver rather than towards the person who <refrains from> taking, and praise [also goes to the giver] for the following reason: whatever is harder to accomplish, that is virtue. It is easier, then, to refrain from taking than to give, since people are more reluctant to surrender what belongs to them than to refrain from taking what belongs to someone else. At any rate, if refraining from receiving surpasses giving on our calculation of virtue, by how much more it will surpass receiving [from others]! That is why those who give are called "generous", whereas those who refrain from taking are nonetheless just; and the former are praised because they refrain from taking, while those who take are not praised at all, even if they receive what they deserve and what belongs to them. They [i.e. generous people] are more beloved than other types of virtuous people because they are beneficial [to others].

Since virtuous acts are noble and aim at what is good, the generous man will also aim at what is good in his giving, but only if he gives in the proper way and in accord with the additional conditions [specified for right giving, i.e. at the right time, to the right people, etc.] and with pleasure or [at least] without pain, because what is done in accord with virtue is pleasant or [at any rate] painless or only slightly painful. The man who gives out of different motives [i.e. other than for nobility's sake], however, will not be [called] "generous", but will be called someone who is extremely conflicted with regard to his gifts and his motive for giving. Nor is the man who feels pain when he gives generous; since why would that man feel distress, other than because he prefers money to making a noble gift, even if he has made his gift due to some other circumstantial cause?

Nor || will [the generous man] take money whence he should not. How can this be? [25v] It is because he does not regard money as more valuable than making a noble gift. For this reason *he would not be fond of asking for favours; for how could someone who chooses to confer benefits accept receiving benefits? He will acquire wealth whence he ought, but from his own justly-acquired [possessions], not because acquiring [money] is noble but since it is necessary, in order to be able to give. For these reasons, he will not be careless of his property, nor will he give indiscriminately to any random person, in order that he may be able to give to the proper persons. But the generous person is certainly prone to give much rather than to leave it behind for himself, since he does not regard his own interest as leading to the end [at which he aims].*

1120b7–1121a7 γ' (οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον...)

Οὐ χαρακτηρίζεται ὁ ἐλευθέριος ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους τῆς δόσεως, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἕξει τοῦ διδόντος· ἢ γὰρ ἕξις καθὼς δύναται ἢ οὐσία δίδωσιν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ κωλύει τὸν ἐλάττω διδόντα εἶναι ἐλευθεριώτερον, ἐὰν ὀλίγα ἔχων πλουσιῶς ἀπὸ τούτων διδῶν κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν. τίνες δὲ εἶναι πεφύκασιν ἐλευθεριώτεροι ἐπιπλέον; οἱ μὴ πόνοις τὸν 5 πλοῦτον κτησάμενοι, ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες ἐκ πατέρων. τοῦτο μὲν διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄπειροι τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ὅπως ἐκεῖνα τοῖς πατράσιν αὐτῶν προσεκλήθησαν· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ὅτι πεφύκαμεν ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἀγαπᾶν ἢ τὰ ἀλλότρια. ὅθεν ὁ πόνοις οἰκειῶς κτώμενος φείσεται μᾶλλον, ὁ δὲ παραλαβὼν ἀλλότριον πλοῦτον σαφιλέστερον ἐξαντλοίη. 10

Οὐ ῥάδιον δὲ πλουτεῖν τὸν ἐλευθέριον, ὅτι ἐλλείπει περὶ τὰς λήψεις καὶ τὰ κτηθέντα οὐ φυλάττει, ἀλλὰ καὶ προετικός ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τιμᾷ δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλὰ χάριν τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ παρὰ τινων ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ, ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα δίκαιοι πλουτεῖν, ἵνα διδώσιν, ἤκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ λόγον γίνεται· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματα 15 ἔχειν τὸν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχοι. οὐ μὴν ὁ ἐλευθέριος ὡς ἔτυχε δώσει δίχα τῶν προεκτεθέντων προσδιορισμῶν, ἵνα μὴ διακενῆς ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι ἐγκαίρως ἀναλίσκειν. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν πράττειν καὶ δαπανᾶν, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς δόσει καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ἄσματος. διὸ οἱ τύραννοι οὐκ ἐλευθέριοι (τυράννους δὲ κλητέον καὶ τοὺς βασιλεῖς), διότι πολὺ μὲν τὸ πλήθος τῆς κτήσεως, οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ ῥάδιον εἶναι ὑπερβάλλειν κατὰ τὰς δαπάνας καὶ τὰς δόσεις· ὅθεν οὐδ' ἄσματοι οἱ αὐτοὶ κυρίως. 20

[26r] Μεσότητος τοιγαροῦν οὔσης τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος ἐπὶ χρημάτων δώσει καὶ λήψει, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ λήψεται κατὰ || τοὺς προεκτεθέντας προσδιορισμοῦς· ποιήσει γὰρ καὶ ἀμφοτέρω ὡς δεῖ· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ὡς δεῖ δώσει ἢ ὡς δεῖ λήψις. εἰ δὲ οὐκ 25 ἔστι τοιαύτη ἢ λήψις κατὰ τὴν δόσιν ἐπιεικής, αἰτία τίς ἐστὶν ἰδίως περὶ τὴν λήψιν, ὡς εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐλευθέριον κατὰ τὴν δόσιν καὶ ἄλλο τι κατὰ τὴν λήψιν. 25

Ἄν γοῦν ἔπωνται ἄμφο ἀλλήλαις, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα γίνονται· αἱ δ' ἐναντία δῆλον ὡς οὐ γίνονται ἐν τῇ μιᾷ καὶ αὐτῇ ἕξει, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τις ἄλλη αἰτία περὶ τὴν λήψιν, ὡς δοκεῖν αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐναντιοῦσθαι διὰ τὰς ἕξεις ἐναντίας οὔσας. ἐὰν δὲ συμβαίῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν παρὸ δεῖ, λυπηθήσεται, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἕξει μένων τῆς ἀρετῆς μετρίως 30 διαταῦτα καὶ ὡς δεῖ λυπήσεται. ἔστι γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ ἠδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὡς 30

2–8 Οὐ...ἀγαπᾶν] cf. Arist. EN 1120b7–13 11–20 Οὐ...κυρίως] cf. Arist. EN 1120b14–27
18–20 τυράννους...δόσεις] cf. Asp. In EN 100.11–14 21–22 Μεσότητος...λήψεται] cf. Arist. EN 1120b27–31 23–144,3 ποιήσει...ἀνάλωσεν] cf. Arist. EN 1120b32–1121a7

1 Im. addidi 5 ἀπὸ τούτων ante ἐλευθεριώτεροι primum scripsit, deinde erasit M

1120b7–1121a7 3. (For what is generous does not depend on the quantity of what is given...)

The generous man is not characterised *by the quantity of his giving, but by the disposition of the giver*, since *the disposition gives in accord with the power of its substance*. For this reason, *nothing prevents the person who gives less from being more generous, if he is less wealthy but gives abundantly from his means* in accord with his own choice. Who are naturally disposed *to be more broadly generous? Those who have not acquired* their wealth by means of hard work, *but inherited it* from their fathers. This is because *they have no experience of poverty* and of how their resources were obtained by their fathers, and also because, as human beings, we are naturally disposed *to be fonder of our own [creations]* than of those of others. For this reason, the man who acquires [wealth] by his own efforts will be quite sparing with it, whereas the man who has inherited wealth that belonged to others would draw on it more liberally.

But it is not easy for a generous man to grow rich, because he falls short in *getting [money]* and *does not keep* what he has acquired, but also [because] he spends *profusely and does not value wealth for its own sake but as a means of giving*. Indeed, *that is why some people denounce fortune, because those who have the most right to be wealthy, in order that they might give, are the least wealthy. This occurs reasonably, however, because it is impossible for a man to have money unless he takes pains to have it*. The generous man, *however, will not make gifts* at random apart from the conditions previously outlined, so that he might not *spend money in vain and be unable to spend* at the right time. *Because one must act and spend in proportion to one's means, whereas he who gives too much and beyond his means is wasteful. This is why tyrants are not generous (and kings too must be called tyrants), because the amount they possess is large, but it does not seem easy for them to spend or give in excess; for which reason, the same people [i.e. rulers] are not wasteful in the proper sense of the term.*

Therefore, *since generosity is a mean in relation to giving and acquiring of money, the generous man will both give and get in conformity with || the conditions specified* [26r] previously; *for he will do both in the right way, since proper acquisition goes along with proper giving*. But if *this acquisition is not fair in the way giving is*, that is a cause having to do specifically with acquisition, so that the same man would be both generous with respect to giving and otherwise with respect to acquisition.

At any rate, then, if both [practices] [i.e. giving and acquiring in the right manner] *accompany one another, they are found in the same man* at the same time, *whereas it is clear that the contrary states are not found in one and the same disposition, but there is another cause in regard to acquisition, so that this man [i.e. the one who acquires wrongly but gives rightly] seems to be opposed to himself, because his dispositions are opposed. If [the generous man] happens to spend in a manner contrary to what is right, he will feel pain*, but by maintaining his virtue in line with his disposition, *he will for these reasons feel pain to a moderate degree and in the*

δεῖ καὶ ἀμφοτέρω. εὐκοινωνήτος δ' ἔσται ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ ἐν τῷ δανείζειν καὶ κυχρᾶν καὶ προῖκα διδόναι, καὶ πλέον ἀχθεσθήσεται εἴ τι δέον ὄν μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ εἰ μὴ δέον ὄν ἀνάλωσεν.

1121a10–1121b11 δ' (εἴρηται δὴ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαί...)

Τὰ παρ' ἐκάτερα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος τίθησιν. ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀσωτία ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ἐν 5
 δόσει ἕξεως, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ δόσις ἰδιολεκτεῖται εἰς τὴν κατὰ τινα χάριν παροχήν, φησὶν
 ὅτι καὶ τὴν δαπάνην εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ὑπερβάλλει τοίνυν ἡ ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ
 μὴ λαμβάνειν, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει. διατοῦτο τὸ λαμβάνειν εἰς τὴν παρ' ἐκάτερα
 ἕξιν, τὴν ἀνελευθερίαν, τακτέον· αὕτη γὰρ τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ'
 ὑπερβάλλει. καὶ ἐπεὶ περὶ τὰς δόσεις τῶν χρημάτων μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰς λήψεις ἢ 10
 ἐλευθεριότης εὐρηται, διαταῦτα ἢ τῆς δόσεως πῆ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ἕξεως
 ἐστί, πῆ δὲ ἡ ἔλλειψις ἔλλειψις τῆς ἕξεως ἐστί.

Τὸ δὲ «πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς» προστέθειται, ὅτι οὐχὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν μεγάλα ἀνελευθερία
 ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μικρά. τὸ γὰρ μεγάλα λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ὁ ἄσωτος ἕξει· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ
 μεγάλα δαπανῶν τὸ μικρὰ λαμβάνειν οὐ καταδέξεται. εἰ δ' ἄρα μὴ μεγάλα λήψεται, οὐ 15
 πάνυ δὴ τὰ τῆς ἀσωτίας συναύξεται εἰς τὸ γίνεσθαι ἐπιπλέον καὶ ἐπιπλέον ἄσωτον·
 οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείψει ἢ οὐσία τοὺς διδόντας ἰδιώτας ὄντας, ὑπεξηρημέ-
 νου τοῦ βασιλέως· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ βελτίων κατὰ πολὺ ὁ
 ἄσωτος τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει. ὑπόκειται δὲ εἰς ἰατρείαν καὶ
 διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν· αὐξηθεὶς γὰρ φρονήσεως ἐπιβήσεται, καὶ ἀπορή- 20
 σας νοῦν οἴσει, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον καταβήσεται ταχέως· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου,
 εἰ καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν.

Εἰ δὲ μεταβάλοι πως ἐξ ἔθισμοῦ, τὸ μέσον φθάσειεν ἄν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι
 [26v] φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος· ἢ ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος πολὺ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου καὶ διὰ τὰ προειρημέ- 25
 να καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐδένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἑαυτόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς ἰδίας
 χρείας δαπανᾷ. οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν ἀσώτων καὶ λαμβάνουσιν, ἵν' ἔχωσι δαπανᾶν, καὶ εἰσὶ
 κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. τέως διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι διδόναι καὶ μὴ δύνασθαι ληπτικοὶ
 γίνονται· καὶ διὰ τὸν πορισμὸν οὖν τοῦτο πράξει. καὶ ἅμα μὴ φροντίζων τοῦ καλοῦ,
 εὐχερῶς ἀπὸ πάντων λήψεται. διόπερ ἐπεὶ οὐ φροντίζουσι πόθεν ἂν λήψαιτο, διὰ δὲ 30
 τὸ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν πράττειν οὐδὲ ἐλευθέριοι αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔνεκα τοῦ

5–10 Τὰ...ὑπερβάλλει] cf. Arist. EN 1121a10–15 13 πλὴν...μικροῖς] Arist. EN 1121a15
 15–16 οὐ²...ἀσωτίας] cf. Arist. EN 1121a16 17 οὐ...ῥάδιον] Arist. EN 1121a16 | ταχέως...ιδιώτας] cf. Arist. EN 1121a17–18 18 οὗτοι...εἶναι] cf. Arist. EN 1121a18–19 18–19 ἐπεὶ...ἀνελευθέρου] cf. Arist. EN 1121a19–20 19 καὶ¹...λαμβάνει] Arist. EN 1121a22–23 19–20 ὑπόκειται...ἀπορίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1121a20–21 21 καὶ¹...ἐλευθερίου] cf. Arist. EN 1121a21–22 23 Εἰ...ἄν] cf. Arist. EN 1121a23–24 23–24 διὸ...ἦθος] Arist. EN 1121a25–26 24–25 ὁ...ἑαυτόν] cf. Arist. EN 1121a27–30 26–146,4 οἱ...ἀπαιδαγωγητον] cf. Arist. EN 1121a30–1121b11

proper manner. For it is a mark of virtue to feel both pleasure and pain, but in the right manner in both cases. The generous man will be easy to deal with in his lending and his borrowing and in his giving a dowry, and he will be more distressed if he did not spend what he should have than if he spent what he should not have.

1121a10–1121b11 4. (We have said then that they are excesses...)

[Aristotle] sets out the opposite extremes of liberality. *Wastefulness is an excess of the disposition in giving*, and since giving is defined in relation to the bestowal of a certain gratitude, he says that *we also count spending as giving*. *Wastefulness, then, is excessive in giving and in not acquiring, but deficient in acquiring*. For this reason, acquiring must be assigned to the disposition of the opposite extreme, namely *miserliness, since the latter is deficient in giving, but excessive in acquiring*. And since liberality has been found to involve giving money rather than acquiring it, for these reasons an excess of giving is in one way an excess of the disposition [i.e. of liberality], but in another way the deficiency [of giving] is a deficiency of the disposition.

He has added “*but only on a small scale*” because miserliness is not concerned with acquiring large amounts [only], but small ones too. For it is rather the wasteful man that will be engaged in acquiring large amounts, since that type of person, since he is spending large sums [of money], will not put up with acquiring small amounts. If, then, he does not acquire great sums of money, *the characteristics of wastefulness* [i.e. *excessive giving and falling short in acquiring*] will *scarcely* be increased as [the man] becomes progressively more and more wasteful; *for this is not easy, because the givers’ resources will soon be exhausted* if they are *private citizens*, the emperor excepted. For *these people* [i.e. *private citizens*] *actually appear to be wasteful; since the wasteful man is much superior to the miserly man, because he gives [money] and does not acquire*. And *he can be subject to cure both by growing older and by poverty*, because he will advance after he strengthens his practical wisdom, and after experiencing poverty he will come to his senses, and he will immediately *attain the mean*; *for in fact he possesses the characteristics of the generous man*, even if in an excessive manner.

But if he changes in any way through habituation, he would attain the mean [i.e. generosity], *for which reason [the wasteful man] does not seem bad in character; || but* [26v] *this type of man is much better than the miser both due to the reasons stated previously and because he benefits many people, whereas [the miser] benefits no one, not even himself*, because he does not even spend [money] on his personal needs. *Most wasteful people, however, also acquire [money] in order to have it to spend, and in this respect they are miserly. They accordingly become disposed to taking because of their wish to give and their inability to do so*, and so [the wasteful man] will accomplish this [i.e. acquisition] by *procuring resources [from others]*. *At the same time, because he cares nothing for what is noble, he will acquire [money] recklessly from every available source. On this account*, since they do not care *where they could acquire money from*, because they do not act for the sake of nobility, *their actions are not*

καλοῦ διδοῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐνίστε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουτίζουσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἤθη οὐ διδοῦσι, τοῖς δὲ παρασίτοις καὶ κόλαξι μᾶλλον. διὸ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων ἀκόλαστοί εἰσιν· καὶ διαταῦτα ἐν συμπεπλεγμέναις κακίαις τὸν ἄσωτον ἐτίθεμεν, ἀπαιδαγωγῆτον μένοντα.

1121b11–1122a9 ε' (τυχῶν δ' ἐπιμελείας...)

5

Ἡ ἀσωτία, φησί, κρείττων τῆς ἀνελευθερίας, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἄσωτος τυχῶν ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ δέον ἐφίκοιτ' ἄν, ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτος ἐστι· καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἐκείνον γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι καθυφεῖναι τοῦ πολλοῦ, τοῦτον δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερναβῆναι πρὸς τὸ μέσον. ὁ γὰρ πολὺ δαπανῶν δυνατὸς καὶ ὀλίγον δαπανῆσαι, ὁ δὲ ὀλίγον οὐ δυνατὸς πολὺ. λέγει δέ, κἄν τισι πλεονάζει ἢ ἀνελευθερία, ὅτι τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ ἀδυνάτοις (φίλαυτοι 10 γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἐκτὸς ὀλίγα φροντίζουσι, ἴσως διὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὀλίγον ἔμφυτον τοῦ θερμοῦ· εὗ γὰρ καὶ Ταλθύβιος λέγει «γέρων μὲν εἶμι, ἀλλ' ὅμως θανεῖν ἔχρηζον» ἢ τοιαῦτα παθεῖν κακά. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἴποι τις, ἐναντίωμα ὁ λόγος ἔχει· ἀρμόζει γὰρ μᾶλλον λέγειν «νέος μὲν εἶμι, ἀλλ' ὅμως θανεῖν ἔχρηζον»), καὶ τῇ φύσει δὲ οἰκεῖον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀσωτίας ἢ ἀνελευθερία.

15

Καὶ διατείνει μᾶλλον ἐπιπολύ, καὶ πολυειδὲς ἐστίν, ὡς αὐτὸς διαιρεῖ. οὔσα γὰρ ἐν δυσί, τῇ λήψει τε καὶ τῇ δόσει, οὐκ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις πολλάκις ἅμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ χωρίζονται ταῦτα, ὥστε εἶναι τινὰς τοὺς μόνον θέλοντας λαμβάνειν, τινὰς δὲ τοὺς διδόναι ὀλίγα καὶ παρὸ δεῖ· φειδωλοὶ γὰρ καὶ γλίσχροι καὶ κίμμικες. ἀπὸ τίνος κίμμικος ἐλλείπουσι τῇ δόσει, οὐ βούλονται δὲ λαμβάνειν διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας, οἱ μὲν δι' ἐπιείκει- 20 [27r] αν, ὡς φασιν· ἢ οἱ δὲ διὰ φόβον, φοβούμενοι μήπως ἀναγκασθῶσι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὅμοια πάσχειν καὶ αὐτοὺς διὰ τινὰ τύχην καὶ ἀνάγκην. ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε διδόναι μήτε λαμβάνειν, καὶ οὗτοι [μὲν] ἐλλείπουσι μὲν κατὰ τὴν δόσιν, οὐ λαμβάνουσι δέ.

Οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἐν τῷ θέλειν λαμβάνειν πανταχόθεν, οἷον οἱ 25 ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς ἀνελευθέρους καὶ αἰσχροκερδεῖς ἐργασίας, καὶ οἱ πορνοβοσκοῦντες καὶ οἱ τοκογλυφοῦντες· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἔνεκα κέρδους πραγματεύονται, εἰ καὶ τὸ κέρδος αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ὅθεν καὶ αἰσχροκερδεῖς λέγονται· ἔνεκα γὰρ κέρδους αἰσχροῦ καὶ μικροῦ καὶ οὐδαμινοῦ ὄνειδη ὑπομένουσι. προσαπτέον γὰρ τοῖς ἀνελευθέροις τὰ μικρὰ κέρδη, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι ἐφίενται. τοὺς γὰρ μὴ ὅθεν δεῖ 30 λαμβάνοντας τὰ μεγάλα, μὴ δὲ ἂ δεῖ, ὡς τοὺς ληστεύοντας καὶ ἱεροσυλοῦντας, οὐ

6–7 ὅτι...ἐστι] cf. Arist. EN 1121b10–13

10 τοῖς...ἀδυνάτοις] cf. Arist. EN 1121b13–14

12–13 εὗ...ἔχρηζον] cf. Eur. Hec. 497–498; cf. Herm. In Phaedr. 1, 25.21–24

14–15 καὶ... ἀνελευθερία] cf. Arist. EN 1121b14–15

16–21 Καὶ...φασιν] cf. Arist. EN 1121b16–25

19–20 φειδωλοὶ...δόσει] cf. Georg. Pachym. Paraphr. In EN 38.11–13

21–22 οἱ...ἀνάγκην] cf. Arist. EN 1121b28–30

23–148,2 ἀρέσκει...πραγματεύονται] cf. Arist. EN 1121b30–1122a9

generous, since they do not give for the sake of nobility. Instead, sometimes they enrich people who ought to be poor, and give nothing to people with sound characters, but to parasites and flatterers instead. As a consequence, many wasteful people are self-indulgent, and for these reasons we established that the wasteful man is entangled in vice, since he remains undisciplined.

1121b11–1122a9 5. (But if he is treated with care...)

Wastefulness, he says, is better than miserliness, because *if the wasteful man gets care he might attain the right scale [of open-handedness], whereas miserliness is incurable*; and this is reasonably so, given that it is likely that [the wasteful man] might desist from excess, whereas it is unlikely that the miser would rise above [his faults] to attain the mean. This is because the man who spends much [money] is also capable of spending little, but he who spends very little is incapable [of spending] much. He also says that, if in some people miserliness is more prevalent, [this is] in *those who are old or frail* (since such people are selfish and feel little concern about people other than themselves, perhaps because there is little natural warmth in them; for Talhybius speaks well when he says “*I am an old man, but even so I desired to die*” rather than suffer such terrible things. For if someone were not to speak this way, his speech would be contradictory, because it is more fitting to say “*I am young, but even so I desired to die*”), and [he also says that] miserliness is more appropriate to *human nature than wastefulness is*.

Furthermore, [miserliness] extends rather wide and has many species, as he determines. For although it consists in two things, in taking and acquiring, it is not often found in both cases simultaneously, but these acts [i.e. of acquiring and giving] occur separately, with the result that it is possible that some people only want to acquire [money], whereas others want to give little and in the wrong manner, because they are cheap and grasping and stingy. As a result of a certain stinginess they fall short in giving, but they do not wish to acquire [from others] for many reasons, some due to a sense of fairness, so they say, || but others out of fear, being afraid that, [27r] because they take from others, they themselves might be forced to endure similar things [i.e. having their own resources taken away] due to some chance or necessity. Therefore they prefer neither to take nor to give, and these people fall short in giving, but they do not acquire.

Others exceed in acquiring, in that they want to acquire all they can from every source, for example those who work in degraded and sordidly acquisitive occupations, such as pimps and money-lenders, since all these acquire from inappropriate sources and do business for the sake of profit, even though the profit is shameful, for which reason they are called “sordidly acquisitive”, because they endure reproach for gain that is shameful, minor, and worthless. One must attribute to miserly persons gain on a small scale, which they aim for. Because we refer to those who acquire large sums from improper sources, or sums one ought not to acquire, such as bandits and temple-robbers, not as miserly but as wicked, impious, and unjust. One must assign

λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. σὺν οἷς τακτέον καὶ τὸν κυβερτην καὶ λωποδύτην· καὶ αὐτοὶ γὰρ κέρδους ἔνεκα πραγματεύονται.

1122a13–1122b8 στ' (εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι...)

Εἰκότερον, φησί, τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνελευθερία τῆς ἀσωτίας ἀντίκειται· 5
 μεῖζον γὰρ κακὸν αὕτη τῆς ἀσωτίας (τὰ δὲ κατὰ πολὺ ἀλλήλων διεστῶτα ἐναντία ὀρίζονται). τί γοῦν οὐ καὶ τῇ ἀσωτία ἀντίκειται; ὥστε ἐν δυσὶν ἐναντίον, ἀλλ' ἀξίωμα ἔστιν ἐν ἐνὶ ἐναντίον. λεκτέον οὖν ὅτι ἀπλῶς μὲν τῇ ἀσωτία ἐναντίον ἢ ἀνελευθερία, ὡς κακία κακία. κατὰ σύγκρισιν δὲ τοῦ τίς ἂν τῶν κακιῶν ἀμφοτέρων ἀντικείτο τῇ 10
 ἐλευθεριότητι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνελευθερία ἢ ἡ ἀσωτία κριθήσεται· ὅτι καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσωτία εὐίατος, ὡς ἐλέγομεν, ἡ δὲ ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατος. διατί δὲ οὐκ ἐλευθερία λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἐλευθεριότης; ἢ ἔφθασε τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐπ' ἄλλοιν ἰδιοποιηθῆναι ἢ 15
 δὴ καὶ ἡ δουλεία ἀντίκειται.

*Ἀκολούθως καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας λέγει. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη εἶναι ἀρετὴ περὶ 20
 χρήματα· οὐχ ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς πολλὰς τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις διατείνει, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη· ἀλλ' ἰδιάζεται περὶ μόνων τὰς δαπανηράς, οὐ περὶ τὰς δόσεις ἀπλῶς. ||* 15
 [27v] *ὑπερέχει δὲ μεγέθει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος, ὡς καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὑποσημαίνει· μεγαλοπρέπεια γάρ. τὸ μέγεθος δὲ οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὠρισμένον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ ἀόριστον πρὸς τὰ ὑποκείμενα πρόσωπα. ἄλλως γὰρ δαπανήσει ὁ τριήραρχος ἄρχων νηὸς καὶ πολλῶν ἐν 20
 πράξει πολεμικῇ καὶ ἄλλως ὁ ἀρχιθεωρὸς ἄρχων καὶ αὐτὸς ἀλλ' εἰς θεωρεῖα καὶ οὐκ ἐν μάχαις, ὥστε περὶ μεγάλα τινὰ ὅτε δαπανῶνται καὶ πολλὰ ἀξίως αὐτῶν ἢ μεγαλοπρέπεια.*

*Ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς καταξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ μεγαλοπρεπής, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλευθέριος. ὁ 25
 μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, οὐ πᾶς δὲ ἐλευθέριος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπής, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις μεγάλα ἀξίως δαπανῶν. ταύτης δὲ τῆς μεσότητος ἢ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια, ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία, οἰονεὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ χυδαιότης.* 25

*Ἔοικε δὲ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμων· ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐπιστήμων τὸ πρέπον ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις αὐτῷ θεωρεῖ, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος τὸ πρέπον ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεωρήσει καὶ μεγάλως 30
 περὶ τὰ μεγάλα δαπανήσει. οὕτω καθὼς ἔχουσιν αἱ δαπάναι, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἔργα ἔξουσι. καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ πολλάκις καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν τὴν δαπάνην διὰ τὴν τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς ἕξιν. δαπανήσει δὲ καὶ* 30

4–9 Εἰκότερον... κριθήσεται] cf. Arist. EN 1122a13–17 9–10 ὅτι... ἀνίατος] cf. Asp. In EN 102.2–4
 10 ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατος] Arist. EN 1121b12–13 13–25 Ἀκολούθως... χυδαιότης] cf. Arist. EN
 1122a18–31 26–28 Ἔοικε... δαπανήσει] cf. Arist. EN 1122a34–35 28–150,1 οὕτω¹... προετικῶς]
 cf. Arist. EN 1122b2–8

3 Im. addidi 14 πράξεις: litt. δι- primum scripsit, deinde π- correxit M 27 οὔτος scripsi : αὕτη M

the gambler and brigand to the same category as them, since they too do their business for the sake of gain.

1122a13–1122b8 6. (Naturally in relation to generosity...)

It is quite natural, he says, that miserliness is more opposed to generosity than wastefulness is, since it is a greater evil than wastefulness (things very much at variance from one another are defined as opposites). Why then is [miserliness] not opposed to wastefulness as well? Because then one thing would be opposed to two things, whereas the logical principle is that one thing is opposed to one. One must therefore say that miserliness is opposed to wastefulness in an absolute sense, as one vice is opposed to another vice. In regard to the comparison of which of the two vices would be opposed to generosity, miserliness will be judged to be more so than wastefulness is; because wastefulness is easy to cure, as we said, whereas miserliness is incurable. Why is [this disposition] not called “*eleutheria*” (freedom) but “*eleutheriotēs*” (generosity) instead? This term “*eleutheria*” (freedom) was borrowed for two other things as slavery is opposed [to freedom].

Following this, he also discusses magnificence. For this too seems to be a virtue concerned with wealth. But this does not extend to many actions involving money, as generosity does, but it is specifically concerned only with heavy expenditures, not with giving generally. || It surpasses generosity in scale, as its name in fact suggests, [27v] because it is [called] “*megaloprepeia*” (magnificence). Its scale, however, is not defined in relation to itself, but is relative to something else and indefinite in relation to the hypothetical persons [involved]. For the captain of a trireme will spend [money] in one way while commanding a ship and many people in a military action, whereas the chief of a sacred embassy [will spend it] in another way, although he too leads [people], but on a pilgrimage to a festival rather than into battle, with the result that magnificence concerns occasions when money is spent on a great scale and in an amount worthy of them.

The man who spends adequate sums on matters of trivial importance is not magnificent but generous instead. For the magnificent man is generous, but not every generous person is also magnificent, but only the man who spends a great deal in an appropriate manner on matters of great importance. The deficiency that corresponds to this mean [i.e. magnificence] is stinginess, whereas the excess is vulgarity, that is to say, tastelessness and coarseness.

The magnificent man is like a scientific expert, for just as the expert discerns the appropriate amount for him in his current circumstances, so too he [i.e. the magnificent man] will discern the appropriate amount in all circumstances and will spend great sums on matters of great importance. Just as his expenditures are [i.e. large and fitting], so too will the results be. And the result must be worthy of the expense, and the expense worthy of the result, or often the expense may even exceed [the result] due to the disposition of the magnificent person. He [i.e. the magnificent man] will spend,

αὐτός, ὡς ὁ ἔλευθέριος δώσει, καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς, οὐ λυπούμενος.

1122b8–1123a9 ζ' (ἢ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές...)

Ἦ μικρολογία, φησίν, ἀνοίκειον τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ. μάλλον μὲν οὖν σκέψαιτο ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον γενήσεται ἢ πόσον, <οὐ> σκέψαιτο 5 δὲ καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου τὸ κάλλιστον γενήσεται. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἔλευθερίου μετεῖναι ἦθους τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ· ὁ γὰρ μὴ γλίσχρος πρὸς δόσεις ἢ δαπάνας ἔλευθέριος.

Τὸ γοῦν ἐν τῷ ἔλευθερίῳ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς ἐστὶ μέγεθος· ὁ γὰρ ἔλευθέριος καὶ μικρὰ δώσει προετικῶς καὶ ἡδέως μόνον ἐὰν ὀλίγα καὶ μέτρια ἔχοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ 10 μεγάλα παρέξει ὁμοιοτρόπως, ἐὰν πολλὰ ἔχοι. τὸ γοῦν ἐν τούτῳ μέγα μέγεθος ἐσεῖται τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ. καταστάς τοίνυν ὁ ἔλευθέριος εἰς τὸ ποιήσασθαι τι ἔργον, ἀπὸ μεγάλης δαπάνης ποιήσει τὸ ἔργον καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐξομοιωθήσεται πως τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ, οὐ καθὸ προσκτιήσεται τι, ἀλλὰ καθὸ ἐργάσεται.

Ἄλλη γὰρ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἄλλη ἔργου· κτήματος γὰρ τὸ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον, 15 ἔργου δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν. κατὰ τὸ ἔργον γοῦν ἐξισάσουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον ἐπιφέρει τὸ μέγα, ἐξ οὗ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς παρονομάζεται. ὁ δ' ἔλευθέριος ἰδίως καὶ περὶ τινα κτήσιν σπεύσει καὶ ἀξίως πολλὰ τινα δώσει ὑπὲρ τοῦ κτήσασθαι. τοῦ ἔργου γὰρ καὶ ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστὸν διὰ τὸ τῆς δαπάνης μέγεθος.

[28r] || Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ δαπανήματα τίμα, τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἃ δὴ καὶ 20 αὐτὰ θαυμαστά ἔργα εἰσίν, καὶ πέφυκεν ἐξανάγκης ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναγκησονται, τίς ὢν τοιαῦτα πράττει· οὐ γὰρ παντὸς τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν· δεῖ γὰρ πρέπειν τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ τῷ ποιῶντι. διὸ ἀνοίκειον τῷ πένητι ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, κἂν ἐπιχειρήσῃ τις, ἡλίθιος, ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν τὸ ὀρθῶς 25 ἐπιφέρει. μὴ μόνον δὲ τῷ ποιῶντι πρέπειν δεῖ τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις καὶ οἷς προσήκει· τὰ γὰρ μέγεθος ἔχοντα πρόσωπα καὶ ἀξίωμα ἐκεῖνα ποιήσει καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς.

Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐν κοινοῖς καὶ δημωφελέσι· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐντιμότερα· ταῦτα 30

4–7 μάλλον...μεγαλοπρεπεῖ] cf. Arist. EN 1122b8–11 9 Τὸ...μέγεθος] cf. Arist. EN 1122b12 9–14 ὁ...μεγαλοπρεπεῖ] cf. Arist. EN 1122b11–14 10 προετικῶς...ἡδέως] cf. Arist. EN 1122b7–8 15–16 ἀρετὴ...καλόν] cf. Arist. EN 1122b14–16 18–19 τοῦ...θαυμαστὸν] cf. Arist. EN 1122b16–18 20–152,4 Εἰσὶ...πλούτῳ] cf. Arist. EN 1122b19–1123a9

3 Im. addidi 5 μεγαλοπρεπὴς scripsi ex Arist. EN 1122b6 ff. : μικρολόγος M | πρεπωδέστατον correxi : πρεποδέστατον M | οὐ addidi (cf. Arist. EN 1122b9-10) 13 μεγάλης M : ἴσης Arist. vulg. (EN 1122b13)

just as the generous man will give, *for the sake of what is noble, and gladly and readily*, feeling no distress.

1122b8–1123a9 7. (For niggardliness is shabby...)

Miserliness, he says, is alien to the magnificent man. Therefore, the magnificent man *would examine how* [his result] *will be most noble and splendid more closely than how much it will cost*, and he would <not> consider not *even how* the most noble project would be executed *for the least expense*. For these reasons, then, *the magnificent individual must share the character of the liberal person*, since the man who is not grasping in regard to gifts or expenditures is liberal.

The element “great” (*mega*) in the liberal man is the “magnitude” (*megethos*) of the magnificent man; *for the liberal man will give small gifts lavishly and gladly only if he has limited, moderate resources, but he will also provide great gifts in like manner* [i.e. lavishly and gladly], if he has abundant wealth. Therefore, the “greatness” (*mega*) evident in this type of man [i.e. the liberal man] will be “magnitude” (*megethos*) in the magnificent man. When the liberal man, then, is confronted with *the undertaking of a specific project, he will perform the task by means of a great expenditure* and in this respect he will be like the magnificent man in a way, not in so far as he possesses something, but in so far as he does [something].

For there is one kind of *excellence that involves possession and another that involves achievement, because [the excellence] of a possession is that it is of some great worth, whereas [the excellence] of an achievement is that it is great and noble*. With respect to the achievement, at any rate, they will be equal, because the achievement confers the quality of “greatness” (*mega*), from which the “magnificent” (*megalo-loprepēs*) man gets his name. The liberal individual will both make eager efforts, in his own way, with regard to a certain acquisition and will make many gifts in an appropriate manner beyond what he has acquired. *For the spectacle of the achievement inspires admiration, and magnificence is admirable* due to the magnitude of the expenditure.

|| *There are expenditures that bring honour, those connected with the gods and any form of divine generally, which are in fact admirable undertakings in themselves, and magnificence is naturally and necessarily part of these [types of benefaction], as also in benefactions to the community. All these types of expenditure will be calculated with reference to the person who performs them, namely who it is that carries out such benefactions; because not everyone can do such things, since magnificence must be appropriate to both the project and the producer. Magnificence is accordingly not fitting for the poor man, and if someone [of this sort] should attempt [expenditure on a magnificent scale], [he would be] foolish, because it is beyond his means, since acting properly implies acting virtuously. The project must be appropriate not only for the producer, but also for his ancestors and relatives, since persons who possess great resources and an honourable reputation will undertake these [benefactions] magnificently.* [28r]

γὰρ εἰσάπαξ γίνονται καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀφορᾷ. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν ἢ μεγαλοπρέπεια γίνεται περὶ ἐκεῖνα, περὶ ὅσα ἢ πόλις σπουδάζει· εἰς τὰ κοινὰ γὰρ δαπανηρός, οὐκ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, δῶρα δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀναθήματα εἰς θεοὺς παρομοιάζουσι. μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ τὸ οἶκον κατασκευάσαι ἀναλόγως τῷ πλούτῳ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀφορᾷ, ἀλλ' οὖν καὶ ὡς οἰκοδόμημα ἐν πόλει κοινὸν καὶ αὐτὸ φαίνεται. 5

1123a9–1123b13 ἢ (οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀρμόζει θεοῖς...)

Ἐπεὶ οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲ ἱερῶ καὶ τάφῳ. ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν δαπανημάτων ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὀφείλει ἔχειν τὸ μέγεθος, καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν μεγάλῳ τὸ μέγα· ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δέ, τοῖς τε θείοις καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους, τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα. ἄλλο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἔργῳ μέγα καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἐν δαπανήματι· ἐστὶ γὰρ 10 τὸ μέγα καὶ ἐν σφαίρᾳ καὶ ἐν ληκύθῳ, καλλίστοις οὖσιν ἐν παιδικοῖς δώροις, ἀλλ' ἢ [28v] τιμῇ τούτων ἢ μικρὰ τις καὶ ἀνελεύθερος. διατοῦτο τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς ἐστὶ στοχάζεσθαι τὸ γένος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῶ καὶ τὸ καταξίαν ἀναλίσκειν· τὸ γὰρ γένος ἀπαιτήσῃ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ δαπανήματος, καὶ διαταῦτα οὐκ ἄλλος ὑπερβαλεῖται ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ἔχοντι τὸ ἄξιον δαπάνημα. 15

Ἄλλ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον ταῖς δαπάναις βάνουσος, ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκων. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ ἐλλαμπρύνεται παρὰ τὸ εἶκόσ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ «παρὰ μέλος», ὅπερ παρομιώδες ἐκ τῶν ἐκμελῶς φωνούντων εἴληπται. λέγει δὲ καὶ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ βαναύσου· τὸ γαμικῶς ἐστιᾶν τοὺς ἐξ ἐράνου καὶ κατὰ συμβολὰς συλλεγομένους· τὸ χορηγεῖν κωμωδοῖς· τὸ ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ 20 πορφύραν ἀναβάλλεσθαι. ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ, φησὶν, ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' ἀκαίρως ἐπιδεικνύμενος· δαπανᾷ γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ δέον, οὐ μὲν πολλὰ δεῖ, ὀλίγα, οὐ δὲ ὀλίγα, πολλά.

Ὁ δὲ ἀντικείμενος τούτῳ μικροπρεπής· καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν τινὶ μικρῷ ὑποκειμένῳ (ἐπεὶ μικροπρεπῶς ἀναλίσκει) καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ὀλίγα ἀναλώσοι, εἰ καὶ 25 ἀπ' ἀνάγκης τινὸς καὶ βίας πολλὰ ἀνάλωσεν, ἀπολεῖ, φησὶ, τὸ καλόν, ὅτι ὀδύρεται καὶ μεῖζω οἶεται ποιεῖν ὧν δεῖ. αὐταὶ γοῦν αἱ παρ' ἑκάτερα ἕξεις ὄνειδη οὐκ ἐπιφέρουσιν, εἰ

7–154,2 Ἐπεὶ...ἀσχήμονες] cf. Arist. EN 1123a9–33

The magnificent man is therefore especially concerned with communal benefactions that are useful to the population at large; but [magnificence is also shown on] whatever private occasions happen only once, such as a marriage or the like. These [events] are valued highly, because they happen only once and focus on one's own needs. Magnificence therefore occurs mostly in relation to matters which attract the interest of the whole city. For the magnificent man [spends money] on public affairs rather than himself, and gifts to humanity and votive-offerings to the gods are similar. It is also characteristic of a magnificent man to furnish his house in a manner that suits his wealth; for even though he focuses on himself, at all events [his house] is evidently public, since it is a building in the city.

1123a9–1123b13 8. (For the same gifts are not suitable for the gods...)

Since *the same [gifts] are not suitable for the gods and for human beings, nor [is the same expenditure appropriate] for a temple and a tomb. Every expenditure ought to have the magnitude that is in its subject and conforms to its subject, and in an absolute sense, greatness [is found] in a “great” object. In cases such as these, both divine and human, the greatness [particular] to them [is what is appropriate]. The greatness of the result achieved is not the same as the greatness of the expenditure. For there is a kind of “greatness” in a ball or an oil-flask, which are the finest presents for children, but their price || is a small and insignificant amount. For this reason it is characteristic of the magnificent man to aim at the result he would like to produce and to spend the proportionate amount; because the result will determine the scale of the expenditure, and for these reasons no one else will surpass [the magnificent man] in achieving such a result, namely one that is proportionate to the cost.* [28v]

So *this is the magnificent man. By contrast, the man who exceeds in his expenditures is vulgar, because he spends beyond what is necessary; for he spends a great deal and makes an inappropriate display on unimportant occasions; this is [the sense of] the phrase “tasteless” (para melos), which is proverbial and is derived from those who speak discordantly (ekmelōs). [Aristotle] also discusses the actions of the vulgar man: to give a dinner party in the style of a wedding banquet for those who gather at joint expense and on the basis of individual payment; to sponsor choruses for comedies; to bring the chorus [on stage] dressed in purple at its first entrance. He does all of this not from a noble motive, he says, but to show off inappropriately, because he spends money in violation of what is necessary, [spending] little where much is necessary, and much where little is necessary.*

The petty man, on the other hand, is the opposite of this one [i.e. the vulgar man]; even when he is spending very large amounts on some trivial undertaking (since he spends in a petty fashion) and considering how he may spend a limited amount, even if he spent a great deal due to some obligation or necessity, he will spoil the fine result, [Aristotle] states, because he is grudging and thinks that he is doing more than is necessary. These, then, are the dispositions at the opposite extremes, but they do not bring disgrace, even if it is the mean [i.e. magnificence] that is commended. Why

καὶ τὸ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται. διατί δὲ οὐκ ἐπιφέρουσιν ὀνειδίη; διότι οὔτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας οὔτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ περὶ μεγαλοψυχίας διαλαμβάνει, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ μέγεθος τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχει, ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ τοῦνομα. ζητεῖ δὲ περὶ ποῖα· καὶ ἐπεὶ ῥάδιον ἔχει συνάξει ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἐχόντων τὴν ἔξιν, ἀφείς τὴν ἔξιν τοὺς ἔχοντας παραλαμβάνει. ὁ γοῦν 5
 μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν μεγαλόψυχος, ὁ δὲ παρ' ἀξίαν ἠλίθιος· πῶς δὲ ἐν ἀρετῇ ὁ ἠλίθιος καὶ ἀνόητος; ὅς δὲ ἐστὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν σώφρων, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγαλόψυχος· ἢ γὰρ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μέγεθός τι, ὡσπερ καὶ κάλλος περὶ μέγα σῶμα· οἱ γὰρ μικροὶ εὐειδεῖς καὶ ἀστεῖοι μὲν κληθεῖεν, καλοὶ δ' οὔ. ὁ δὲ ὢν ἀνάξιος καὶ 10
 μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ὢν ἄξιος ἢ μετρίων ἢ μικρῶν, ἀξιῶν δὲ ἐλαττόνων μικρόψυχος, καὶ μάλιστα ἐὰν μεγάλων ὢν ἄξιος· ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος, εἰ [τὸ] μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν ἀλλὰ ἄξιος μικρῶν, τί ἂν ἐποίει φεύγων τὴν τιμὴν;

[29r] || **1123b15–1124a15** θ' (εἰ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν...)

Ὅριζεται τίνων μεγάλων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· καὶ ἐπεὶ, φησί, τοῦ μεγίστου ἀξιῶν, ἐν τὸ μέγιστον· καὶ περὶ ἐν ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸς ἂν εἶη ἄξιος. τί οὖν τοῦτο ἐστίν; ληπτέ- 15
 ον τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἀξία· ψυχικόν, σωματικόν ἢ τῶν ἐκτός· ἦγουν περὶ τὰ ψυχικὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν ἢ περὶ τὰ σωματικὰ ἢ περὶ τὰ ἐκτός. ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ τὰ ἐκτός ἐστὶ μέγιστον ἂν εἶη ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἄθλον τὸ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ τιμὴ. εἴ τι γὰρ ἕτερον ἐπακολουθεῖ ταύτης προηγουμέ- 20
 νης, ἐκεῖνο γίνεται.

Περὶ τιμὰς ἄρα καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχος καταγίνεται· περὶ τιμὰς, ἃς δέξεται, καὶ περὶ ἀτιμίας, ἃς οὐχ ὑπομενεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνεται ὅτι περὶ τιμὴν οἱ μεγαλόψυ- 25
 χοι καταγίνονται· τιμῆς γὰρ οἱ μεγάλοι μάλιστα ἑαυτοὺς ἀξιῶσι, πλην καταξίαν· ὁ γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος τὸ καταξίαν ζητήσει, ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς μὴ ἔχων τὰ τῆς τιμῆς ἀξία, καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγάλου ἀξίωμα, τὴν τιμὴν.

Ὁ δὲ χαῦνος, ὅς ἐστὶν ὑπερβάλλων πρὸς τὸν μεγαλόψυχον, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, ὅτι τὰ τῆς τιμῆς ἀξία ἔχει καὶ διατοῦτο ἦν ἂν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν τὴν τιμὴν τιμᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐλλείπει πρὸς τὸν μεγαλόψυχον εἰς τοῦτο· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ

3–12 Ἐντεῦθεν...τιμὴν] cf. Arist. EN 1123a34–1123b13 14–15 Ὅριζεται...ἀξιος] cf. Arist. EN 1123b15–117 17–19 ἐπεὶ...τιμῆ] cf. Arist. EN 1123b17–20 21–156,4 Περὶ...μεγαλόψυχος] cf. Arist. EN 1123b21–29

9 οἱ γὰρ μικροὶ εὐειδεῖς καὶ ἀστεῖοι scripsi ex Arist. EN 1123b7–8 : οἱ γὰρ μικροὶ καὶ εὐειδεῖς ἀστεῖοι M 11 εἰ τὸ in ras. M; τὸ seclusi 13 lm. addidi 25 μεγάλου M (cum L^bM^b) : μεγαλοψύχου Arist. vulg. (EN 1123b25)

do they not bring disgrace? Because they are neither harmful to one's neighbour nor excessively unseemly.

After this, [Aristotle] also treats *greatness of soul*, because this also involves an eagerness for what is “great”, as *its name* already makes clear. He investigates *what sort of objects it involves*; and since it is easier to infer these from those who have the disposition, he passes over the disposition itself and uses as a substitute those who have [the disposition]. At any rate, *the man who thinks himself worthy of great things and is in fact worthy of them is great-souled*, whereas *the man [who claims this] without deserving it is foolish*. But how could *the foolish and senseless person be virtuous? He who deserves little and considers himself worthy only of this is modest but not great-souled, since greatness of soul involves a certain scale, just as beauty involves a large body*; for *small people* might be called *good-looking or cute, but not beautiful*. On the other hand, *someone who is unworthy but thinks himself worthy of much is vain, while someone who deserves great things or moderate or limited things, but regards himself as deserving less [than this] is small-souled, and especially if he deserves great things*. For *what would this type of person have done in seeking to avoid the esteem, if he was not such a character [i.e. someone who deserves much] but deserved little?*

|| 1123b15–1124a15 9. (If, then, he thinks himself worthy of great things...)

[29r]

The issue of what *great things* the great-souled man *considers himself to deserve* is determined. And since, [Aristotle] says, he claims *what is greatest*, what is greatest is *a single object*, and he *would be deserving in regard to that single object*. What then is this? One must understand what sort of a good worthiness is, psychic, physical, or of external phenomena; that is, it involves psychic goods, physical goods, or external goods. Since, then, [worthiness] involves *external goods*, *the greatest good* would be *what we render to the gods and what eminent people seek, and the prize for the finest deeds—and this is honour*. For if some other [good] results when honour leads the way, the latter becomes [the greatest good].

The great-souled man is therefore concerned *with honours and dishonours: with honours*, those he will receive, and *with dishonours*, those he will not endure. *And even without argument it is apparent that great-souled people are concerned with honour; for it is honour above all else that great individuals think themselves worthy of, although in accord with their worth*; for the great-souled man will seek what he thinks himself worthy of, *but the small-souled man is deficient both in regard to his personal worth*, since he does not have that which is worthy of honour, *and in relation to his estimate of what is greatest, namely honour*.

The vain man, however, who is excessive in comparison to the great-souled man [in terms of the means and its extremes, i.e. small-souled man, great-souled man, vain], *excels by his own standard*, because he has [the qualities] that deserve honour and on this account it would be possible for him to be honoured just when he seeks this; but *he falls short compared to the great-souled man* for the following reason: the

ἄριστος· ὁ δὲ βελτίων μείζονος ἄξιος τιμῆς. οὐ γὰρ υπερβάλλει ὁ χαῦνος πρὸς τοῦτον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ζητεῖν τιμὴν· ἐκεῖνος δ' υπερβάλλων τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς βελτίων ἄξιος μειζόνων.

Ἀγαθὸς ἄρα ὁ μεγαλόψυχος καὶ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν πράξει, ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι τι μέγα. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀγαθὸς ἐστί, πάμπαν γελοῖος ἂν εἴη ὁ μεγαλόψυχος ζητῶν τιμαῖσθαι· ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ τιμὴν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷόν τι τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐπικόσημα. διατοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι τὸν μὴ ἀρετὰς ἔχοντα καὶ ἀρεταῖς κοσμούμενον. ἐπαναλαμβάνει δ' αὐθις λέγων ὅτι *περὶ τιμᾶς ἐστί καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχος*, πλὴν οὐ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων, ἀλλὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων· τῶν οἰκειῶν γὰρ παρ' ὧν δεῖ ἐπιτεύξεσθαι, ἢ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐλαττόντων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄξια τιμὴ, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεται, διὸ οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ τιμῶντες μείζω διδόναι τιμὴν· || [29ν] ὀλιγορήσει δὲ τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων τιμῆς καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς ὡς ἀναξίας αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ ὀλιγορήσει καὶ ἀτιμίας μεγαλοψύχως· οὐ γὰρ δικαία ὄλως περὶ τοῦτον ἢ ἀτιμία. μετρίως δὲ ἔξει καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται.

1124a13–1124b15 ἰ' (οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον...)

Ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μετρίως οἶσει καὶ τὰς εὐτυχίας καὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας (περὶ γὰρ τιμὴν καταγινόμενος, εἰδὼς οὔτε τὴν τύχην οἶαν τ' οὔσαν ἐμποιεῖν τιμὴν· πολλοὶ γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντες, ὅμως τιμὴν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ τῶν μετρίων· τὴν δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων πάλιν οὐ προσποιεῖται τιμὴν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· οὔτε τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς τύχης κακὰ δυνατὰ ὄντα τὴν τιμὴν ἀφανίζειν, ἢν ἀγαθὸς ὢν παρὰ τῶν ὀρθῶς κρινόντων κέκτηται) οὗτ' εὐτυχῶν ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον *χαρήσεται οὗτ' ἀτυχῶν* παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς *λυπηθήσεται*. καὶ γὰρ καὶ *περὶ τὴν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μὴ μέγιστον* αὐτὸ ὄν, καίπερ ὄν μείζον πλούτου καὶ δυναστείας τῶν διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἀγαπωμένων· οὐδὲ γὰρ φιλότιμος ἀπλῶς ἐστίν ἀλλὰ φιλόκαλος, ἐν δὲ τῶν καλῶν καὶ μείζον καὶ τὴν τιμὴν οἶδε. διὸ καὶ *ὑπερόπται* δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.

Τέως δέ γε καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα, φησί, *συμβάλλονται πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν*. εἰ γὰρ τῶν ἀξίων βούλεται τυγχάνειν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος ἄξιος ὢν, οὐκ ὀλίγον πρὸς τοῦτο συμβαλεῖται κατὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. εἰ γὰρ οἱ εὐγενεῖς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς διὰ ταῦτα, ὁ τὸ μείζον σχῶν ἀγαθὸν τῶν τοιοῦτων πῶς οὐ τιμήσεται

4 καὶ...μέγα] cf. Arist. EN 1123b32 5–6 μὴ...τιμῆ] cf. Arist. EN 1123b33–35 6 ἔστι...ἐπικόσημα] cf. Arist. EN 1124a1–2; cf. Asp. In EN 109.14–15 6–13 διατοῦτο...ἀτιμία] cf. Arist. EN 1124a3–12 14 μετρίως...γίνηται] cf. Arist. EN 1124a14–15 16 μετρίως...ἀτυχίας] cf. Arist. EN 1124a14–15 21–22 οὗτ'...ὄν] cf. Arist. EN 1124a15–17 22–23 καίπερ...ἀγαπωμένων] cf. Arist. EN 1124a17–18 24–25 διὸ...εἶναι] cf. Arist. EN 1124a20 26 καὶ...μεγαλοψυχίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1124a20–21 28–29 εἰ...τιμῆς] cf. Arist. EN 1124a21–22

latter is the best, and the better man deserves more honour. For the vain man does not excel in comparison with this man [i.e. the great-souled man] in the goods [he has], but only in his search for honour. But if that man [i.e. the vain man] excelled in the goods [he had], he would be the best, and as the better man he would deserve more.

Therefore, the great-souled person is good and will do nothing base that does not involve something great. For if he were not good, the great-souled man would seem quite ridiculous in seeking to receive honour, since honour is the prize of virtue. Consequently, greatness of soul is, as it were, a sort of crowning adornment of the virtues. This is why it is difficult for someone who has no virtues and is not adorned with them to be truly great-souled. But [Aristotle] revises [this point] afterwards, saying that the great-souled man is concerned with honours and dishonours, not with those awarded by common people, however, but with those awarded by persons of worth. This is because he will gain only those that belong to him from those it is appropriate [to receive them from], or rather even less, since no honour can be adequate to perfect virtue, but still he will accept them, because those who honour him have no greater tribute to offer him. || But he will despise the honour rendered by [29v] common people and on trivial grounds on the ground that it is unworthy of them. Similarly, he will also despise dishonour in a great-souled manner, since the dishonour attached to him cannot be just at all. He will also have a moderate attitude towards every sort of good or bad fortune, however it turns out.

1124a13–1124b15 10. (But he will also be concerned with wealth...)

The great-souled man will endure both his successes and his misfortunes with moderation (for since he is concerned with honour, he knows that fortune is unlikely to produce honour; for many people who are fortunate nevertheless possess no honour as a consequence of their moderate actions; on the other hand, the great-souled man does not lay claim to the honour awarded by ordinary people; and [the great-souled man also knows] that evil events resulting from fortune are not powerful enough to extinguish the honour, which, being himself a good man, he has acquired from people who judge the matter rightly) and he will not rejoice when he is fortunate beyond what is appropriate, nor will he be disproportionately distressed when he is unfortunate. For his attitude towards honour is that it is not the greatest good, although it is greater than wealth and power, which are desired for the honour they bring, since he is eager not merely for distinction but for nobility, and he knows that honour is one of the noble qualities and something better. This is why [great-souled people] appear haughty.

Meanwhile, the gifts of fortune, he says, also contribute to greatness of soul. Because if the great-souled man wishes to get what he deserves and deserves it, he will make a substantial contribution to this in accord with his good fortune. For if the well-born and powerful are thought worthy of honour for these reasons, how will the man who possesses more goodness than they do not be honoured more? And further-

μᾶλλον; καὶ λοιπὸν συμβαλοῦνται καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀρετὴν καὶ ἕξιν.

Ἄνευ δὲ ἀρετῆς οἱ ἔχοντες ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὔτε δικαίως τῶν μεγάλων ἑαυτοὺς ἀξιούσιν οὔτε μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπεροπτικούς τοὺς ἔχοντας καὶ ὑβριστὰς ἀπεργάζονται· καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἐμμελῶς 5 φέρουσιν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ εὐτυχήματα· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν οἰόμενοι καταφρονοῦσιν ἐκείνων καὶ αὐτονόμως πράττουσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπερόπτης εἴρηται καὶ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος καὶ καταφρονητικῶς διὰ ταῦτα πρὸς πολλὰ διάκειται, πράττει δὲ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρετῆς, τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δίχα ἀρετῆς πράττοντας τίθησιν ὅτι δικαίως (αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀληθῶς δοξάζει), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. 10

Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ πικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος, ἀλλὰ μεγαλοκίνδυνος· τῶν γὰρ περὶ τὴν τιμὴν ἀπάντων καταφρονῶν, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τούτων ποτὲ κινδυνεύσει· ὑπὲρ οὗ δὲ καὶ κινδυνεύσει (τοῦ προξένου τῆς ἀληθῶς τιμῆς δηλαδὴ), καὶ μεγάλως κινδυνεύσει, καὶ τότε τοῦ βίου ἀφειδήσει ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν ζῆν οὕτως ἔχων. εὐεργετούμενος δὲ αἰσχυνεῖται, εὖ δὲ ποιῶν μᾶλλον ἀποδέξεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερεχομένου, τὸ δὲ 15 ὑπερέχοντος, καὶ διαταῦτα σπεύδει ἀντεεργετεῖν, ὡς πάσχειν ἐκείνον παρ' αὐτοῦ τὰ [30r] τῆς εὐεργεσίας ὃς προὔπηρξε. ἢ μνημονεύουσι δὲ μᾶλλον ὧν ποιήσωσιν εὖ ἢ ὧν εὖ πάθωσιν· βούλονται γὰρ ὑπερέχειν, ὃ δὲ παθῶν ἐλάττων τοῦ ποιήσαντος· καὶ ἄπερ ἔφθασαν προπαθόντες εὖ οὐκ ἀκούειν ἡδέως βούλονται.

1124b17–1125a22 ια' (μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι...) 20
Μεγαλοψύχου καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις διὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην δεῖσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ προθύμως ὑπηρετεῖν (οὐ γὰρ εὖ πάσχειν ἀλλ' εὖ ποιεῖν βούλεται, εἰδῶς τὸ μὲν πάσχειν ὑπερεχομένου τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ὑπερέχοντος), καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας μέγαν εἶναι δοκεῖν (ἀπροσποίητος γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ὁ μεγαλόψυχος), πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μετρίους μέτριον. ὅπου γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ ὑπερέχειν, ἀγωνιστέον ἐκείνω· ὅπου δὲ 25 ῥάδιον, καταφρονητέον· ἐκεῖ γὰρ τὸ σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν τοῖς ταπεινοῖς δὲ φορτικὸν τὸ σεμνύνεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἰσχυρίζεσθαι εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς.

Καὶ τὸ μὴ ἰέναι εἰς τὰ ἐντιμα (ἵνα μὴ πλεονεκτηθεῖς ἀποπεσεῖν δόξοι τῆς ἕξεως) καὶ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν μᾶλλον ἢ τυρβαζόμενον, ἄλλοις οὐχ ἑαυτῷ τὴν τιμὴν περιάπτειν, εἰ μήπως μεγάλη πρόκειται τιμὴ καὶ μέγα ἔργον, 30

3–19 Ἄνευ...βούλονται] cf. Arist. EN 1124a26–1124b15 21–160,24 Μεγαλοψύχου...ἀγαθῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1124b17–1125a22

11 πικροκίνδυνος M (cum L^bM^b, Asp. In EN 112.28) : μικροκίνδυνος Arist. vulg. (EN 1124b7) 14 post βίου ras. fere duarum litt. in M | ἔχων scripsi : ἔχοντας M 20 Im. addidi 29 τυρβαζόμενον cortexi : τυρβόμενον M

more, the gifts of fortune will contribute to the virtue and disposition of the great-souled man.

But those who possess the goods of fortune without virtue are unjustified in thinking themselves worthy of great things and are not to be designated “great-souled”; for such goods without virtue render those who possess them haughty and insolent, especially since without virtue they do not bear fortune’s gifts becomingly, because in thinking themselves superior to others they despise them and act with regard to no one else. Since the great-souled individual is also said to be haughty and despises many things for these reasons, but he acts this way out of virtue, [Aristotle] defines the difference between him and those who act without virtue as the fact that he is justified [in his conduct] (because his estimation is correct), whereas most lack grounds [for their pride].

[The great-souled man] is not often in danger nor keen on danger, but he will face danger for a great cause; for because he places little value on anything having to do with honour, he will never face danger for such matters, but when it comes to something for which he will face danger ([this is] the guardian of true honour, obviously), he will run great risks, and at that point he will be unsparing of his life, since it is not worth living if his life is thus. He is ashamed of receiving benefits, but more approving of conferring them, since the former is a mark of an inferior person, whereas the latter is a mark of a superior one. On this account he is eager to return a favour, so that the original benefactor receives the results of the good deed he initiated from him. || [Great-souled men] have a better memory for benefits they have conferred [30r] than for those which they have received, because they wish to be superior, whereas the recipient of a benefit is inferior to the man who performed it. And they find no pleasure in being praised for benefactions they first got from another.

1124b17–1125a22 11. (It is also characteristic of the great-souled man to ask for nothing...)

It is also characteristic of the great-souled man to ask for nothing or only to ask when driven by necessity, and instead to willingly offer assistance (because he wishes not to receive benefits but to bestow them, knowing that receiving benefits is a mark of inferiority, while conferring them is a mark of superiority) and to consider it appropriate to be grand towards the eminent (since the great-souled man is unimpressed by such people), but to be moderate towards those of a moderate status. Because when superiority is difficult, one must contend with that person [i.e. the grand], whereas when it is easy, one must show contempt, since in the former case behaving loftily is not ignoble, but it is vulgar to adopt a lofty manner towards humble people, on the model of not displaying strength against the weak.

Again, [it is characteristic of the great-souled man] not to pursue things commonly held in honour (in order that he might not seem to have fallen away from his disposition when outdone) or go where others excel; and also to be idle and slow to act rather than actively engaged, and to attach honour to other people rather than himself,

ὥστε καὶ τοῖς συνεργούσι τὴν τιμὴν ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὴν ἐκ τούτου. καὶ πράξει μὲν ὀλίγα ὁ μεγαλόψυχος, ἀλλ' ὀνομαστά· οὐδὲ γὰρ ζητεῖ τὸ τυχὸν καλὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔν καὶ πρῶτιστον, τὴν ἀληθινὴν τιμὴν, ἧς καὶ τὸ θεῖον μετέχειν φαίνεται. καὶ ὄν μισεῖ φανερώς μισήσει, καὶ ὄν φιλεῖ φανερώς φιλήσει (φιλήσει γὰρ οὐχ ὡς ἄρεσκος ἀλλ' ὡς φιλόκαλος, καὶ μισήσει οὐχ ὡς φθονερός ἀλλ' ὡς μισόκακος). ταῦτα δὲ φανερώς 5
 διαπράζεται θαρρῶν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἔξει, ὡς πιστευθήσεται ὅτι οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τοιαύτης αἰτίας τὰ μὲν φιλεῖ τὰ δὲ μισεῖ (πᾶς γὰρ ὁ λάθρα ταῦτα ποιῶν φόβῳ ἐργάζεται, τούτῳ δὲ ἀληθείας μέλει ἢ δοκίσεως). διαταῦτα καὶ φανερώς καὶ λέξει καὶ πράξει (ὅτι καὶ παρρησιάσεται· διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός καὶ καταφρονητικός, πλὴν εἰ μήπως δι' εἰρωνείαν, ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἴσως χρήσεται, καταφρονῶν τῆς ἐκεῖθεν τιμῆς). οὐδὲ πρὸς 10
 ἄλλον δύναται ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικὸν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο· διὸ καὶ οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ ταπεινοί.

Οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός ἐστὶ· τί γὰρ θαυμάσεται ὅπερ οὐκ ἔχει μέγα; οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· ἀναξιοπαθήσει γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ὅστις καὶ εὖ παθῶν ἀμνημονήσει διὰ τὴν ἔξιν. οὐδὲ λέγων περὶ τινων λόγους, ψέγων ἢ καὶ ἐπαινῶν· οὔτε μὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπαινῶν· οὔτ' 15
 ἐπαινετικός ἐστὶν οὔτε κακολόγος καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, εἰ μὴ πολλάκις διὰ τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνων ὕβριν (εἰδῶς διαταῦτα ζημιούμενος περὶ ὃ σπεύδει). οὐδὲ ὀλοφυρτικός καὶ δεητικός ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ μικρῶν, καὶ δόξει βούλεσθαι μάλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα (δηλονότι εἰ μὴ τις ἐπαινοίη· καρπὸς γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ὁ ἔπαινος) ἢ τὰ ὠφελούντα καὶ κάρπιμα· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτόθεν ἀγαπᾷ τὴν τιμὴν, θέλει δ' ἐκείνην τοῖς 20
 [30v] ἔργοις ἔπεσθαι. καὶ βραδέως κινηθήσεται καὶ οὐκ ὀξυφωνήσει· ἢ περὶ ὀλίγα γὰρ σπεύδει καὶ οὐδὲν μέγα οἶεται. τοιοῦτος μὲν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· οἱ δὲ παρ' ἐκάτερα οὐ κακοὶ μὲν, ἀμαρτητικοὶ δέ. καὶ εὐθύς τὰ τοῦ μικροψύχου παρατίθησιν, οὗ κακὸν τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ὀπωσοῦν ἀγαθῶν.

Diagramma viii




cf. Arist. EN 1125a16–18

except when a *high honour* or great *achievement* lies ahead, so that the honour gained from this undertaking is also extended to those who assist [with the project]. The great-souled man will *engage in few undertakings but distinguished ones*, since he does not seek an ordinary kind of nobility but instead the single and foremost one, namely genuine honour, of which the divine evidently has a share. And anyone he hates, *he will hate openly*, and anyone he loves, *he will love openly* (since he will love not like a flatterer but like someone fond of nobility, and he will hate not as someone who is jealous but like someone who hates wickedness). *He will do* these things *openly* out of confidence in his own personal disposition, so that it will be thought of him that he loves one type of thing and hates another in this way and for this cause (*because* he who does such things *in secret* acts *out of fear*, whereas he cares more *for the truth* than *for what people will think*). For these reasons *he will speak and act openly* (*because he will also speak freely; this is why he is frank and disdainful, except perhaps when he resorts to irony*, which he may use *in conversation with ordinary people*, since he despises honour from that source). *He is unable to live at the will of another, unless that of a friend, because that form is slavish; hence, flatterers are servile and degraded.*

Nor is he prone to admiration, for why would he admire what is *not great*? *He does not bear a grudge*, because anyone who due to his disposition *overlooks the fact* that he has received a benefit will be indignant at this. *Nor does he engage in gossip about others*, either *blaming* them or even *praising* them. *Nor does he praise himself; he is neither lavish of praise nor abusive even of his enemies, except perhaps often because of their insolence* (understanding that for these reasons he would be deprived of what he is eager to achieve). He is not *inclined to lamentation or to asking for help* with respect to *problems that are unnecessary for life and minor*, and he will seem to wish *rather for things that are beautiful and unprofitable* (except, clearly, if someone were to praise him; because praise is the profit that comes from noble actions) *rather than for those that are profitable and useful*; because he is not fond of honour for its own sake, but he wants it to accompany his works. Furthermore, *he will walk slowly and will not speak in a shrill voice, || because he strives for few things* [30v] and *has no pretensions*. *Such is the character of the great-souled man*. The opposite extremes [of greatness of soul, i.e. being small-souled and the vain] *are not vicious but mistaken*. Immediately after this, [Aristotle] juxtaposes the characteristics of the *small-souled man*, whose *fault is that he does not consider himself deserving of good things* in any way.

Diagram viii



1125a20–1125b18 β' (καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι...)

Ἐτίθει τὸν τε χαῦνον καὶ τὸν μικρόψυχον, τοὺς παρ' ἐκάτερα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου κειμένους, τὸν μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τὸν δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσι κακοποιοί, ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. καὶ πρώτως περὶ τοῦ μικροψύχου λέγει ὅτι ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ὀπωσοῦν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δὲ ἑαυτόν· εἰ γὰρ ἐγίνωσκεν, ὡρέγετο ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἀπεστέρει ἑαυτὸν αὐτῶν· πλην οὐκ ἠλίθιος δοκεῖ εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ νοερός. τί δέ ἐστι τὸ «νοερός»; ὅτι νοεῖ ἑαυτὸν ἔχοντά τι ἄξιον τιμῆς, ἀποπροσποιεῖται δὲ δι' ἐπιείκειαν τὸ τιμᾶσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ νοερόν, εἰ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἐστὶν ἐπαινετόν, ὅτι καὶ «γνώθι σαυτὸν» τὸ πρόγραμμα τῆς Πυθίας παρακελεύεται· τὸ γὰρ γινώσκεν ἑαυτὸν πάνυ χρήσιμον, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ χεῖρους ποιεῖ τινας, ὅταν ἦ καὶ 5
10
15
παρὰ τὸ δέον. πολλοὶ γὰρ νοεροὶ ὄντες ὑποστέλλονται καὶ παρὰ τὸ δέον ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ δόξαι αὐθάδεις, καὶ ζημιοῦνται ἐν τῷ χεῖρους καὶ πλέον ἢ ὡς ἔδει ταπεινοῦς φαίνεσθαι· ἅπαντες γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν καταξίαν, χεῖρων δὲ ὁ μὴ ἐφιέμενος τῶν καταξίαν, ὡς τὸ κοινὸν ὑπερβαίνων ἔθος. διαταῦτα οἱ τοιοῦτοι μικρόψυχοι καὶ ἐν οἷς δύνανται ὑποστέλλονται, καὶ ἀφίστανται ὡς δῆθεν ἀνάξιοι ὄντες καὶ πράξεων καλῶν καὶ 15
ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.

Οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι μᾶλλον ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες· οὐ γὰρ οἶδασι τὸ αὐτῶν μέτρον καὶ ἐς ὅσον πεφθάκασιν, καὶ εἰσὶν ἐπιφανεῖς εἰς τοῦτο χάριν τοῦ δοξάζεσθαι παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν. τοῖς γὰρ ἐντίμοις καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον χαίρουσιν, εἶτα, ἐπεὶ ἐπιφανῶς 20
20
πράττουσι, ἐξελέγχονται καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον τιμῆς ὀρεγόμενοι. διαταῦτα καὶ κοσμοῦμενοι βούλονται εἶναι τὰ εὐτυχήματα δῆλα εἰς τὸ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ περιαιτίζονται ὡς τιμῶνται.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀντίκεινται μὲν ταῦτα τῇ μεσότητι ἑτερορρεπεῖ δὲ πλέον τὸ ἐν περιθάτερον, μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεται ἢ μικροψυχία τῇ μεσότητι ἢ ἡ χαυνότης· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον 25
25
αὕτη ἐκεῖνης γίνεται καὶ χεῖρων ἐκεῖνης ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον χεῖρον τῷ μᾶλλον κρεῖττονι ἀντιτίθεται· ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον κρεῖττον τὸ μέσον· ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τιμῆν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μεγάλην ἐστὶ, περὶ τῆς φιλοτιμίας διαλαμβάνει.

Καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὡς μερικώτερον πρὸς καθολικόν, ὡσπερ ἢ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἅμφω γὰρ ὡς μεσότητες ἀφεστᾶσι μὲν τοῦ λίαν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ὡς δεῖ ἡμᾶς διατιθοῦσιν. ἔστιν οὖν ὡς ἐκεῖ, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ 30
30
μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ) καὶ τὸ ἦττον (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔλλειψις) καὶ τὸ ὡς δεῖ [31r] (ὅπερ ἐστὶ μεσότης). || διατοῦτο ὁ μὲν φιλότιμος εἰς ὑπερβολὴν τάττεται, ὁ δ' ἀφιλότι-

2–7 Ἐτίθει...δὲ] cf. Arist. EN 1125a16–24 12–19 χεῖρους...πολλῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1125a24–28
19–27 τοῖς...ἐστὶ] cf. Arist. EN 1125a28–35 28–164,1 ὡσπερ...ἔλλειψιν] cf. Arist. EN 1125b2–11

1 Im. addidi 7 νοερός¹ M (cum L^bM^b νοεροί) : ὀκνηροί Arist. vulg. (EN 1125a24) 30 διατιθοῦσιν sic M; servavi (vid. Editorial principles)

1125a20–1125b18 12. (He seems to have something bad [about him]...)

[Aristotle] stated with regard to the *vain man* and the *small-souled man*, who are situated at the opposite extremes *from the magnificent man, the former on the side of excess, the latter on the side of deficiency*, that they are not evil-doers but mistaken. First he says that the *small-souled man seems to have something bad about him, in that he does not think himself worthy of good things in any way, and he does not know himself, since if he knew [himself], he would have aimed for the things he was worthy of and would not have deprived himself of them. Albeit he is not considered foolish, but rather perceptive*. What does the term “perceptive” (*noeros*) mean? That he understands (*noei*) himself to be somewhat worthy of honour, but rejects receiving honours because of his fairness. This is what the term “perceptive” (*noeron*) means, if it is praiseworthy, as it should be, given that the injunction of the Pythia advises “Know yourself!”; for knowing oneself is extremely useful, although often it makes certain people worse, when it is applied as it should not be. Because many perceptive people restrict themselves more than is necessary, so as not to seem stubborn, and they suffer loss in *appearing to be worse and more humble than necessary; for everyone aims for what they deserve*, but the man who fails to aim for what he deserves is worse, because he transgresses common custom. For those reasons, these small-souled individuals place restrictions on themselves even in situations where they can perform well, and *they stand back from noble actions and pursuits and from external goods, because they are supposedly unworthy of them*.

Vain people, on the other hand, are more foolish and deficient in self-knowledge, since they do not know their own limit and the extent to which they have accomplished something, and they are conspicuous in this because they have been extolled by many people. For they take more pleasure than is appropriate in honourable activities, and then, because they undertake them in a conspicuous manner, they are found out as desiring honour beyond what is appropriate. On account of this, they embellish themselves and they want their good fortune to be conspicuous for the purpose of receiving honour, and they boast about them so as to be held in esteem.

Since these [dispositions] are opposed to the mean and one is inclined more towards the mean than the other, *smallness of soul is more opposed to the mean than vanity is, for it is more prevalent than the other and worse than it, and that which is much worse is opposed to what is much better; and what is much better is the mean*. Since *the great-souled man is concerned with great honours*, [Aristotle] examines ambition.

This is related to greatness of soul as the more partial relates to the general, *in the same way that open-handedness relates to magnificence. For both, as intermediate states, have nothing to do with excess, but dispose us towards appropriate objects. Just as in that case [i.e. in getting and giving money] [there is a mean, but also excess and deficiency], then, so too in the appetite for honour there is that which exceeds propriety (which is an excess) and that which is less [than appropriate] (which is a deficiency) and that which is appropriate (which is the mean). || On this account, the ambitious* [31r]

μος εἰς ἔλλειψιν. τοῦ μέσου δ' ἀνωνύμου ὄντος, ἀμφισβητοῦσι τούτου τὰ παρ' ἑκατέρω. διαταυτά που μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν, ποὺ δὲ ψέγομεν τὸν φιλότιμον· τὸ μὲν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸ δὲ ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον. καὶ πάλιν τὸν ἀφιλότιμον καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν· τὸ μὲν ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, τὸ δὲ ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς τιμᾶσθαι προαιρούμενον.

5

1125b20–1126a18 ἰγ' (ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη...)

Ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς τε φιλοτιμίας καὶ τῆς ἀφιλοτιμίας ἀνώνυμόν ἐστι καὶ τούτου ἀμφισβητοῦσι τὰ παρ' ἑκάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ ψέγεσθαι, φησὶν ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἄλλως οὐκ ὀνομασθήσεται εἰ μὴ τῇ παρ' ἑκάτερα μάχη ὡς εἶναι πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλότιμόν τι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλότιμον, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα δὲ πως ἀμφοτέρα ὡς λέγεσθαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ἀφιλοτιμίαν. τὸ δὲ «πως» πρόσκειται, ὅτι εἴ τι ἄρα ἐκ τῶν δύο κληθεῖη, κατὰ τὸ ἐπαινούμενον μέρος ἕξει ταύτην τὴν ὀνομασίαν, οὐ κατὰ τὸ ψεγόμενον. ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄκροις φαίνεται ἡ ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἀντικεῖσθαι τῷ φιλοτίμῳ τὸν ἀφιλότιμον διὰ τὸ τοῦ μέσου ἀνυπόστατον καὶ ἀνώνυμον.

15

Μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ πραότητος διαλέγεται· καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη, φησί, περὶ ὀργᾶς ὑποκειμένον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὕτη σχεδὸν ἀνώνυμος, ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄκρα. καίτοι γε ταύτης λεγομένης πραότητος τῆς δὲ ὑπερβολῆς ὀργιλότητος, τὸ σχεδὸν δὲ προσκείμενον θεραπεύει τὸν λόγον· ἢ, ὡς αὐτὸς φήσει, οὐδὲ κυρίως ἔστι μεσότης ἢ πραότης. βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ὀργίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν μέσον θέλει ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς ταραχὴν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ὅσον δεῖ, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐπαινούμενόν ἐστιν. ἀποκλίνει τοίνυν περὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἢ πραότητος· ἢ δ' ἔλλειψις, καθὸ κακία, κακίζεται καὶ ψέγεται· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος συγγνωμονικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ τιμωρητικὸς. ὡσπερ δὲ αὕτη οὐχ ἕξει τὸ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν μέσον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀοργησία λεγομένη, οὐδὲν ἕξει πρὸς τὴν ὀργὴν· ἔδει γὰρ εἶναι μετρία ὀργὴ παρ' ὃ δεῖ.

25

Ὁ δὲ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος δοκεῖ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι μὴ δ' ἀμυντικὸς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνέχεσθαι προπηλακιζόμενον καὶ περιορᾶν τοὺς οἰκείους ὑβριζομένους κακία· καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες τὸ πάθος ὡς δουλοπρέπεια. ἢ δ' ὑπερβολή, ἣτις ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργιλότης, περὶ πάντα μὲν τὰ παρὰ τὸ δεῖ γίνεται, πλὴν οὐ συμβαίνουσι πάντα ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐνί· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἐαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσιν· ἢ ὀλόκληρον δὲ εἰ γένηται, ἀφόρητόν ἐστι. καὶ λέγει περὶ ὀργίλων ὅτι

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1–2 τοῦ...ἐκατέρω] cf. Arist. EN 1125b17–18 2–5 διαταυτά...προαιρούμενον] cf. Arist. EN 1125b10–17 7–11 Ἐπεὶ...ἀμφοτέρα] cf. Arist. EN 1125b17–23 13–15 ἐνταῦθα...ἀνώνυμον] cf. Arist. EN 1125b24–25 16–18 Μετὰ...δέ²] cf. Arist. EN 1125b26–29 20–22 βούλεται...ἔστιν] cf. Arist. EN 1125b31–35 22–25 ἀποκλίνει...ἀοργησία] cf. Arist. EN 1126a1–4 26–166,3 Ὁ...ὀξεῖς] cf. Arist. EN 1126a4–18

man is assigned to excess, the unambitious man to deficiency. *As the mean has no name, the extremes stand apart* from it. For these reasons, in some cases we *praise the ambitious man*, while in others we *reproach him*: we [praise him] *as manly and as a lover of what is noble*, but [we reproach him] *as seeking honour more than is appropriate*. And, on the other hand, we both praise and blame *the unambitious man*, in the former case *as modest and temperate*, in the latter *for not caring about being honoured even on noble grounds*.

1125b20–1126a18 13. ⟨Therefore, this disposition is praised...⟩

Since *the mean* between ambition and lack of ambition is *nameless* and *the opposite extremes stand apart* from it because the same [dispositions] are both praised and reproached, he says that *the mean* will not be named in any way except in relation to the struggle between the opposite extremes, so that *compared with lack of honour [it is] a fondness of honour, and compared with fondness of honour [it is] indifference to honour, and compared with both [it appears] in a sense to be both*, so as to be designated both “ambition” and “lack of ambition”. “*In a sense*” is added, because if it is called something [derived] from the two [extremes], it will get this designation in line with the praiseworthy element [of the disposition], not the blameworthy one. *But in the present case* the opposition is *evident* in relation to the extremes, so that the unambitious man is *opposed* to the ambitious man *because the intermediate [character] is unsubstantial and nameless*.

After this he discusses *gentleness*; this, he says, is *related to anger* as an underlying subject. It too is *more or less nameless*, just as *its extremes are*. Although the excess of this so-called “gentleness” is “*irascibility*”, the designation “*more or less*” serves the purposes of the current discussion; or, as he himself will say, gentleness is not a mean in the proper sense. *For the gentle person tends to be calm and not irritated at all*, but the mean with respect to anger also tends to involve the irritation from being angry *at the appropriate objects, at the appropriate time, and to the appropriate extent*, which is in fact *praised*. Gentleness thus *inclines to the side of the deficiency; deficiency, however*, in so far as it is a vice, is reproached and *blamed*, since *the gentle man is inclined to make allowances rather than seek revenge*. Just as this [disposition, i.e. gentleness] will not maintain the mean with respect to anger, so too *the deficiency*, which is designated as “*spiritlessness*”, will not maintain [the mean] with respect to anger; for anger must necessarily be in proportion to what is appropriate.

The man who does not get angry seems not to feel an injury or to be inclined to defend himself; to put up with it when he is insulted and to allow his friends to be treated abusively [seems to be a condition of] vice; and this passion is servile, like a slavish spirit. On the other hand, the excess, which is irascibility, involves everything that exceeds what is appropriate, albeit all [these excesses] are not characteristic of one and the same man; since evil destroys even itself, || and if it becomes full-blown, it [31v] is unbearable. [Aristotle] also says with respect to *irascible people* that *they get angry*

ταχέως ὀργίζονται καὶ βέλτιστον διακείμενοι ταχέως παύονται, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀποπιπλῶσι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ εὐθύς παύονται τοιοῦτοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ ὀξεῖς.

1126a19–1126b18 ἰδ' (οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι...)

Τῶν ὀργιζομένων οἱ μὲν ἀκρόχολοι λέγονται, οἱ δὲ πικροί, οἱ δὲ χαλεποί. εἰπὼν οὖν 5
τὰς ιδιότητας τῶν ἀκροχόλων, ὅτι ὀξέως ὀργίζονται καὶ ταχέως μεταβάλλονται, λέγει καὶ τὰς τῶν πικρῶν. οἱ δέ εἰσι δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται καὶ κατέχουσι τὸν θυμόν, μόγις δὲ παύονται, ὅταν ἰκανῶς ἀποδιδῶσι· λυποῦνται γὰρ ἔως οὗ διαδέξεται τὴν τῆς ὀργῆς λύπην ἢ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως ἡδονή. διότι δὲ βυσσοδομεύουσι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ κρυφόνου διαταυτὰ εἰσιν, οὐδὲ συμπίθει τις αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ μεταβληθῆ- 10
ναι, τὸ δὲ μόνους αὐτοὺς συμπέσαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. διὸ εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ὄχληροὶ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· ἑαυτοῖς μὲν, ὡς τὴν ὀργὴν κατέχουσι, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις, ὡς ὄχληροὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ πάθους ὑπομνήσκουσιν.

Λέγει καὶ περὶ τῶν τρίτων, τῶν χαλεπῶν, λέγων τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἐφ' οἷς μὴ δεῖ ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰκότος καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ δὲ διαλαττομένους, εἰ μὴ 15
τιμωρία γένηται. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκ τῶν δύο ἄκρων ἐζήτει τὸ μᾶλλον ἀντικείμενον τῇ μεσότητι, τίθησι καὶ ἐνταῦθα τῇ πραότητι ὡς μεσότητι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐναντίον· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικώτερον τὸ ζητεῖν λαμβάνειν παρὰ τῶν λυπησάντων τιμωρίαν· καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν τισι χεῖρους οἱ χαλεποί. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὀρίσασθαι ἐπὶ τι ὠρισμένον ποσὸν τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὀργῇ ἀρετὴν ἢ καὶ κακίαν. ὁ γὰρ κατὰ τι τοῦ εἰκότως 20
παρεκβαίνων οὐκ εὐθύς ψόγον ἔχει, ὡς κακίας οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ παρεκβολὴ διττὴ ἐστίν, ἢ τε ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον, καὶ τοῦτο προστίθησιν· ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ τοὺς τοῦ εἰκότος ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν, ὡς ἐγγὺς πράους ὄντας, καὶ αὐθις τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἡγούμενοι, ὡς μὴ εὐκαταφρονήτους, ἐπαινοῦμεν. οἱ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ εἰς ἀρχὴν χρήσιμοι, οἱ μηδενὸς καταφρονοῦντες τῶν συμβαι- 25
νόντων.

Πόσον γοῦν ὁ παρεκβαίνων εἴτε ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον εἴτε ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον ψεκτός, οὐ ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν· ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον δοκιμάζεται. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἐπαινετόν, ψεκταὶ δὲ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ αἱ ἐλλείψεις. ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ ψεκταί, ἐφ'

7–9 οἱ...ἡδονή] cf. Arist. EN 1126a19–22 9–13 διότι...ὑπομνήσκουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1126a23–26 14–19 χαλεπῶν...χαλεποί] cf. Arist. EN 1126a26–31 19–20 οὐκ...κακίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1126a32–35 20–24 ὁ...ἀνδρώδεις] cf. Arist. EN 1126a35–1126b2 25–168,6 εἰς...ἐπαινετόν] cf. Arist. EN 1126b2–18

4 Im. addidi 13 ὄχληροὶ scripsi : ὄχληροῖς M

very quickly, and since they have the best disposition, they cease [being angry] quickly, because they do not restrain their anger but satisfy their desire [for it] due to their quickness of temper and immediately stop [being angry]. Such are irascible people, and they are the quick-tempered.

1126a19–1126b18 14. (Bitter people are hard to reconcile...)

Of those who are prone to anger, some are called “irascible”, others “bitter”, and others “difficult.” After speaking, then, of the characteristics of irascible people, that they grow extremely angry and swiftly change their mood, he discusses the characteristics of bitter people as well. They are hard to appease, remain angry for a long time and hold their temper in; they stop being angry only with difficulty, when they have retaliated sufficiently, since they feel pain until the pleasure of getting redress replaces the pain of their resentment. Because they brood over their anger and conceal their feelings for these reasons, no one can persuade them to change [their behaviour], and digesting their anger by themselves takes a long time. On this account, such people are troublesome both to themselves and to their friends—to themselves, because they hold their temper in, and to their friends, because they seem to be annoying, since they always recall their resentment.

He also discusses the third type [of angry persons], the “difficult” ones, saying that harsh-tempered people get angry at the inappropriate things, more than one should and for a longer time, and they are not reconciled unless there is redress. Since [Aristotle] also investigated in regard to the other [dispositions] which of the two extremes is more opposed to the mean, he establishes in this case as well that excess is opposed to gentleness as a mean; since it is more characteristic of human beings to try to exact a penalty from offenders, and the harsh-tempered are worse at living with other people. But it is impossible to define to some specific degree the virtue or the vice related to anger. For the person who deviates slightly from what is suitable is not blamed directly, as if this disposition were a vice. But since the transgression is twofold, one on the side of excess and the other on the side of defect, [Aristotle] adds the following point: we sometimes praise those who fall short of what is reasonable [in anger], thinking that they are almost gentle, and again we regard those who behave harshly as manly, because they were not contemptible, and commend them. For such people [i.e. the harsh-tempered] are useful for ruling [others], since they disregard nothing that happens.

Consequently, the extent to which a person who deviates, be it on the side of excess or the side of defect, is blameworthy is not easy to say, since this is determined on the basis of specific circumstances. But it is clear that the mean is praiseworthy, whereas excesses and deficiencies are blameworthy. The extent to which they are blameworthy [depends on] how far they deviate: if a little way, minimally; if a moderate amount, moderately; if greatly, very much. || The characteristics of the dispositions [32r] relating to anger have thus been discussed.

ὅσον καὶ παρεκβαίνουσιν· εἰ μὲν ὀλίγον, ἡρέμα· εἰ δὲ μέτριον, μετρίως· εἰ δὲ μεγάλως,
 [32r] σφόδρα. ἢ τὰ γοῦν περὶ τῶν ἕξεων περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν εἴρηται.

Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὁμοίαι ἕξεις ἐν ὁμιλίαις καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῆν, ἃς ἐλέγομεν ἐν βίῳ. καὶ τὰ
 περὶ τούτων διαιρεῖ· οἱ γοῦν πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες, εἰ μὲν κέρδους ἑαυτῶν
 χάριν, κόλακες ἐλέγοντο· οἱ δὲ δίχα κέρδους, ἄρεσκοι· οἱ δὲ ἐξεναντίας τούτοις, 5
 δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες. ἔστιν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὸ μέσον ἐπαινετόν.

1126b19–1127a12 *ιε'* (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ...)

Τὴν μέσον τοῦ τε ἀρέσκου καὶ τοῦ κόλακος καὶ τοῦ δυσκόλου καὶ δυσέριδος ἕξιν
 ἀνώνυμον μὲν λέγει, ὁμοιοῦται δὲ μάλιστα τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ τοίνυν κατὰ ταύτην φίλος ἂν
 κληθεῖ, ὃς εἰ καὶ τὸ στέργειν προσλάβῃ, ὁ συνήθης τοῖς πᾶσι φίλος κληθήσεται. αὕτη 10
 δὲ ἡ φιλία ἄνευ προσπαθείας τινός ἐστι καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· ἀποδέχεται γὰρ τὰ
 ἀποδοχῆς ἄξια καὶ δυσχεραίνει τὰ δυσχερείας· πλὴν οὐτ' ἐκεῖνα ἐν τῷ φίλως πως
 διακεῖσθαι ἀποδέχεται οὔτε ταῦτα ἐν τῷ ἐχθρωδῶς πως διακεῖσθαι ἀποστρέφεται,
 ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶναι τοιοῦτος, κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν ἀποδέχεσθαι μὲν τὸ καλόν, εἰ καὶ διάφορός
 ἐστὶν ὁ ὁμιλῶν, δυσχεραίνειν δὲ τὸ ἄλλως ἔχον, εἰ καὶ φίλος καὶ γνώριμός ἐστιν ὁ 15
 ὁμιλῶν. καὶ διαταῦτα τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν καὶ πρὸς γνωρίμους καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ
 συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις ἐνδείξεται.

Καὶ λοιπὸν ὁμώνυμον καὶ ἡ φιλία ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. καὶ ταύτης γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἔχει
 ἀντικείμενον τὴν ἐχθραν, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει τι ἀντικείμενον. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἔχων τὴν
 τοιαύτην ἕξιν καὶ πρὸς ἰδίους καὶ πρὸς ὀθνεῖους, ὅμως φυλάξει τὸ πρέπον καὶ 20
 ἀμφοτέροις φροντίζει γὰρ μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνεῖων (ἢ) τῶν οἰκείων εἰς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖν.
 πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον ἀναφέρων στοχάζεται ἰκανῶς ποῦ μὲν τοῦ μὴ
 λυπεῖν ποῦ δὲ καὶ τοῦ συνήδειν· καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ συνήδειν ἢ βλαβερὸν ἢ οὐ καλόν, μᾶλλον
 δυσχερανεῖ καὶ λυπεῖν προαιρήσεται, κἂν ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ τῷ ποιοῦντι ἢ λέγοντι. εἰ
 δὲ οὐ βλάπτει τι τὸ συνήδειν, ἀποδέχεται. διαφερόντως δὲ ταῦτα ποιήσει ἔν γε τοῖς ἐν 25
 ἀξιώμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ ἐκάστῳ τὸ πρέπον ἀπονείμῃ, προαιρούμενος μὲν τὸ
 συνήδειν προηγουμένως, καὶ λυπεῖν εὐλαβοῦμενος· τέως δὲ τοῖς ἀποβαίνουσι καὶ
 ταῦτα ἐὰν μείζῳ ἢ, ἅπερ εἰσὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ συμφέροντα ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀσύμφορα,
 συνεπόμενος, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα κρίνων ἢ ἀποδέχεται ἢ δυσχερανεῖ τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ
 πραττόμενα. χάριν γὰρ τῆς ἐσαυθὶς ἡδονῆς καὶ μικρὰ λυπήσει. 30

9–12 ἀνώνυμον...ἄξια] cf. Arist. EN 1126b19–24 12–14 πλὴν...τοιοῦτος] cf. Arist. EN 1126b23–25 16–17 καὶ? ...ἐνδείξεται] cf. Arist. EN 1126b25–26 19–21 ὁμοίως...λυπεῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1126b27–28 22–170,1 δὲ...ὅτι] cf. Arist. EN 1126b29–1127a7

7 Im. addidi 21 ἢ addidi 23 συνήδειν¹ M (cum K^bL^b): συνηδύνειν Arist. vulg. (EN 1129b30)

There are also other, similar dispositions *in relation to conversation and social life*, which we discussed in relation to a mode of life. He also distinguishes the characteristics of these [dispositions]: *those who praise everything in order to please*, if they do so for their own advantage, are termed “flatterers”, while those who do so for reasons other than advantage are termed “obsequious”. *Those who are the opposite of these persons [are termed] “contentious” and “quarrelsome”*. *The mean between them, then, is laudable*.

1126b19–1127a12 15. (Similarly, he will even disapprove...)

He says that the intermediate disposition between obsequiousness and flattery, on the one hand, and contentiousness and quarrelsomeness, on the other, is *nameless, although it closely resembles friendship*. The man who *conforms* to this [disposition] might accordingly *be called “a friend”*, and if *an element of affection is attached* to him, he will be called “a sociable friend to everyone”. This friendship *lacks any emotional factor or any element of affection for those he associates with; for he accepts gestures that deserve to be accepted and disapproves of those that deserve disapproval, except that he does not accept the former out of being somehow disposed toward friendship nor does he dispose of the latter out of being somehow disposed toward hostility, but because this is his character*, namely to accept what is noble in line with his disposition, even if his associate is at variance [with him], and to disapprove of anything different [from the noble], even if his associate is a dear friend and familiar to him. For these reasons, he will display this disposition *to acquaintances and strangers alike, to people with whom he is familiar and those with whom he is not*.

Friendship therefore has the same name as pleasure does. For one part of this [i.e. friendship] has hatred as its opposite, but the other has no opposite. Accordingly, although he has the *same* disposition towards both *intimates and strangers*, he will maintain fitting behaviour in both cases; because he *will show more regard for strangers (than) for friends so as not to cause them pain. By referring everything to the fine and the beneficial, he will give sufficient consideration to where to avoid causing pain and where to share pleasure*. And if [it is an occasion for] *sharing pleasure in what is either harmful or dishonourable, he will rather disapprove and will decide to cause pain instead, even if this brings disgrace to the person who acts or speaks*. But if sharing pleasure *does not cause any harm, he will approve [of it]*. He will behave *differently with persons of high position and with ordinary people, and would impart to each the appropriate degree of deference, preferring to join in the pleasures of his companions as a guiding principle, and being reluctant to give pain*. After this, *guided by the outcomes and if these things are greater, which are the fine and the expedient or the base and inexpedient, and judging by these [criteria], he will either approve or reject what is said or done. For he will inflict limited pain for the sake of pleasure in the future*.

[32v] Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μέσος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἴσονται, ὅτι μεταφορικῶς λέγεται φίλος καὶ οὐ κυρίως. ὡς γὰρ ὁ φίλος τῷ φιλουμένῳ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἦθος ἐνδείξεται, φίλος ὢν ἀληθινός, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος· φίλον καὶ ἀποδέξεται καὶ δυσχερανεῖ οὐ διὰ τι πάθος, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὸ τε λεγόμενον καὶ τὸ πραττόμενον. τούτων δὲ ὁ παρ' ἑκάτερα ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων χάριν τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ δίχα ὠφελείας τινὸς ἄρεσκος· ὁ δ' ἔλλειπών δυσκόλος τε καὶ δύσερις. ἀντίκεινται δὲ τὰ ἄκρα διὰ τὸ μὴ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ μέσον ὧς δὴ καὶ μάχονται. 5

1127a16–1127b12 ἰστ' (καὶ μεσότητος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς...)

Ἡ ἀλήθεια αὐτῆ ἑαυτῇ ὁμοία καὶ ὁμόφωτος, εἰ γοῦν ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αὐτὸ εὐρεθήσεται ἔχον, εὐδηλον ὅτι πανταχοῦ αἱ ἀρεταὶ μεσότητες. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἐν τῷ συζῆν μεσότητος 10 καὶ τὰ παρ' ἑκάτερα εἰληφθαι συνέβη (ὅτε περὶ τῶν ἀρέσκων τε καὶ κολάκων περὶ τῶν δυσκόλων καὶ δυσερίδων καὶ τῆς μεσότητος αὐτῶν, τῆς δίχα στοργῆς φιλίας, ἐλέγομεν καὶ τῆς τοῦ πάθους τῆς ἀγαπήσεως· ἐκείσε γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις ἢ τε ἡδονῇ καὶ ἢ λύπῃ συνίσταντο), εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ αὐτῶν ἀληθεύοντων, οἵτινες τὸ μέσον ἔχουσι, καὶ τῶν ψευδομένων τῶν παρ' ἑκάτερα, κατὰ τε ὑπερβολὴν 15 καὶ ἔλλειψιν. ἔστι δὲ τὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἕξων, τῆς τε ἀληθείας καὶ τῶν παρ' ἑκάτερα—ἀλαζονείας τέ φημι καὶ εἰρωνείας—καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν πράξεσι καὶ ἐν τῷ μόνον προσποιεῖσθαι, μήτε λέγοντας τοὺς προσποιούμενους μήτε πράττοντας.

Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀλαζόνος, ὅς ἐστι προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων μὲν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων δὲ καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν εἴρων 20 ἀνάπαλιν τούτου εὐρηται· ἀρνεῖται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἐλάττω ποιεῖ προσποιούμενος τὸ ταπεινόν· ὁ δὲ μέσος, ἀληθευτικὸς ὢν καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ὁμολογεῖ τὰ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτε ἐξογκῶν ταῦτα οὕτε ἐλαττῶν. ταῦτα γοῦν τὰ τῶν τριῶν ἕξων· ἔστι καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηθενός.

Ὅτε αὐτὸς οἶός ἐστιν ἕκαστος κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, καὶ πράττει καὶ λέγει τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐν 25 τούτοις ζῆ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ ψεκτὸν ὅπερ τὰ παρ' ἑκάτερα ἔχουσιν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐπαινετόν, ὅπερ τὸ μέσον ἔχει καὶ ἀληθές. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ καθ' ἑκάτερα τῶν ψευδομένων ἕξεις ψεκταὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέραι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ ἀλαζών, ὁ καὶ τὰ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα προσποιούμενος.

Εἴπωμεν δὲ πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ μέσου· καὶ ἐπεὶ ὁ ἀληθευτικὸς διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐν ταῖς 30 ὁμολογίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν, ὅπου καὶ δικαιοσύνην μὲν εἰ κατὰ τὰ ὁμολογημένα ποιοίη, ἀδικίαν δὲ εἰ μή γε ποιοίη κατὰ ταῦτα, ἐπιφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἐν οἷς μηθενὸς τοιούτου προσήκοντος ἀληθεύων καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἕξιν, περὶ

4–7 τούτων...μέσον] cf. Arist. EN 1127a8–12 10 αἰ...μεσότητες] cf. Arist. EN 1127a16–17 | ἐπεὶ... μεσότητος] cf. Arist. EN 1127a17–18 11–12 ὅτε...δυσερίδων] cf. Arist. EN 1127a8–12 12–13 τῆς...ἀγαπήσεως] cf. Arist. EN 1126b22–23 13–14 ἐκείσε...συνίσταντο] cf. Arist. EN 1126b11–16 14–18 εἴπωμεν...προσποιεῖσθαι] cf. Arist. EN 1127a17–20 19–23 ἀλαζόνος... ἐλαττῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1127a21–26 24–172,2 ἔστι...φιλαλήθης] cf. Arist. EN 1127a26–1127b4

8 Im. addidi 32 ἐπιφέρει scripsi : ἐπιφέρουσι M 33 προσήκοντος M : διαφέροντος Arist. vulg. (EN 1127b1–2) | ἕξιν scripsi ex Arist. EN 1127b2 : τάξιν M

This is the intermediate man, although he has no || name, because he is called a [32v] “friend” metaphorically rather than in the proper sense of the term. For just as a friend will show his true character to someone he likes, if he is a genuine friend, so also this man: he will approve or disapprove of his friend not because of some affection, but in conformity with the truth as regards what is said or done. Of these characters, the man at the opposite extreme who is excessive for the sake of personal advantage is a flatterer, while the one who does so for no ulterior motive is obsequious; but the man who is deficient is surly and quarrelsome. The extremes are opposed to one another because the mean with which they struggle is unclear.

1127a16–1127b12 16. (That the virtues are a mean...)

Truth itself resembles and agrees with itself. If, then, the same thing will be found to apply in every instance, it is clear that the *virtues are modes of observing the mean* in every case. And since it happened that the intermediate states in social life and the opposite extremes have been determined (when we discussed *obsequious people and flatterers*, on the one hand, and *surly and quarrelsome people*, on the other, as well as the mean between them, *friendship without love*, and the *feeling* of affection; for both *pleasure* and *pain* were implicated in social relations in that case), let us also discuss those who are truthful in social life, who hold to the mean, and those who are false at the opposite extremes, to excess and deficiency. The characteristics of these dispositions, namely of truth and of its opposite extremes—I mean boastfulness and self-deprecation—occur in words, in actions and mere pretence, since those who pretend to something neither talk nor act.

First [he discusses] the excessive boaster, who claims qualities that are creditable but do not exist [in him] or are supposedly greater than they really are; whereas the deficient self-deprecator will be found [located] opposite him, since he disclaims or belittles the qualities he possesses, pretending to humility. The man who attains the mean, since he is sincere in both behaviour and speech, acknowledges the qualities he has without exaggerating or understating them. These, then, are the characteristics of the three dispositions; one can act thus with or without an ulterior motive.

As a person is in his disposition, so he could act and speak, and in this manner he could live, even with no ulterior motive. What the opposite extremes possess is in itself blameworthy, whereas truth, which possesses the mean and reality, is praiseworthy. The dispositions of those who speak falsely at the opposite extremes are both blameworthy, but more so the boaster, who actually pretends to qualities that are absent [from him].

Let us first discuss the mean: since the truthful man is twofold, and one kind [is truthful] in the context of [business] agreements and dealings, where he brings about justice, should he act in accord with his agreements, or injustice, should he not act in accord with them, whereas the other kind is truthful in situations where none of this is involved, in both speech and conduct in conformity with his own rank, more ought to be said about the second type. This type of truthful man, then, would seem to be

τοῦ δευτέρου μᾶλλον ῥητέον. ὁ γοῦν τοιοῦτος ἀληθευτικός ἐπεικῆς δόξειεν εἶναι ὡς φιλαλήθης, καὶ ὅσος ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖος ἔνι ἀληθῶς ἐκ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ζωῆς γνωριζόμενος. ὁ γὰρ ἀληθεύων ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι τι ἀναγκαῖον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ «διαφέρειν», ὅτι τότε προσήκει αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθεύειν, ἐν συμφωνίαις καὶ 5
 [33r] συναλλάγμασιν. ἢ ὁ γὰρ ἠύλαβεῖτο καθ' αὐτὸ ψεῦδος, καὶ ὅπου αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους κέρδος, εὐλαβηθήσεται. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀποκλινεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον, τὸ τὰ ἴδια ἐλαττοῦν, διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθῆς τοῦ δοκεῖν καυχᾶσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ τὰ μείζω προσποιούμενος ἢ ἔνεκά τινος ἢ οὐχ ἔνεκά τινος πράττει καὶ λέγει, καὶ περὶ 10
 τούτου διαλαμβάνει.

1127b14–1128a12 ιζ' (οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών...)

Οὐ δεῖ, φησί, τὸν δυνάμενον ἐφ' οἷς ἐγκαυχᾶται λέγειν ἀλαζόνα, τὸν δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον μὴ λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει, κἂν δύνηται κἂν μὴ δύνηται· ἢ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξις καὶ ποιότης τίκτει τὴν ἀλαζονείαν, οὐχ ἡ δύναμις. ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ψεύστης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, κἂν δύνηται λανθάνειν ψευδόμενος κἂν 15
 μὴ δύνηται. οἱ δόξης οὖν χάριν ἀλαζονεύομενοι τὰ μεγάλα προσποιῶνται, ἐξ ὧν ἐπαινεθήσονται, οἱ δὲ χάριν κέρδους τοιαῦτα τερθρεύονται, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ δι' ἃ διαθλοῦσι πολλοὶ λαβεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον εἰς μαντείαν ἢ εἰς ἐπιστήμην ἰατρικῆς· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἔστι τὰ εἰρημένα.

Λέγει λοιπὸν καὶ περὶ τῶν εἰρώνων ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι χαριέστεροι τὰ ἦθη φαίνονται 20
 παρὰ τοὺς ἀλαζόνας· οὐ γὰρ διὰ κέρδος ἐλαττοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἔνδοξα, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὰ ὄγκηρά, ὥσπερ καὶ Σωκράτης ἀπρηνεῖτο τὰ ἔνδοξα κατὰ τινὰ εἰρωνείαν, καθὼς καὶ Πλάτων εἰσάγει τοῦτον πολλακίς οὕτω διαλεγόμενον. τὸ δὲ ἐπιπλέον εἰρωνεύεσθαι καὶ προσποιεῖσθαι μὴ ἔχειν τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ βαναυσοπανούργους ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ τὰ μικρὰ προσποιεῖσθαι μὴ ἔχειν ἀγεννῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἔχον ὄγκηρότητα ὑπονο- 25
 ουμένην, τὸ δὲ τὰ φανερὰ ἀναίσχυντον καὶ φανερόν ψευδές, ἐνίοτε δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονείαν ἐμφαίνει· θέλοντες γὰρ ἐπὶ μεγίστοις δοξάζεσθαι ἀπαρνοῦνται τὰ μικρὰ ἃ ἔχουσι καὶ φαινόμενα, οἰόμενοι συναρπάζειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ τῷ οἶεσθαι ἔχειν ἐκείνους καὶ μέγιστα, καὶ ὥσπερ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποπροσποιῶνται διὰ τινὰ τοῦ ἦθους ἕξιν ἐπαινετήν, οὕτως ἀποπροσποιεῖσθαι ἂν κάκεῖνα. οἱ δὲ μετρίως τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ 30
 χρώμενοι καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν φανερὰ (ταῦτα γὰρ λέγει τὰ ἐμποδῶν, ὡς πρὸ τῶν

3–9 ἀληθεύων...τινος¹] cf. Arist. EN 1127b4–12 13–22 οὐδὲ...ἀπρηνεῖτο] cf. Arist. EN 1127b14–26 24 προσποιεῖσθαι...βαναυσοπανούργους] cf. Arist. EN 1127b26–27 26–27 ἐνίοτε... ἐμφαίνει] cf. Arist. EN 1127b27–28 30–174,2 οἱ...ἀντικείμεται] cf. Arist. EN 1127b29–32

2 ὅσος ἐστὶν correxi : ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐστὶν M 8 δὲ s.l. 11 lm. addidi 24 βαναυσοπανούργους M (cum Mb βαναυσοπανούργοι) : βαυκοπανούργοι Arist. vulg. (EN 1127b27)

decent because he is *a lover of truth*, and the extent and quality of his actual [character] is known from his speech and how he lives. For the *man who speaks the truth when it is not obligatory will be even more truthful* when it is obligatory, as happens in business dealings; for this is what “*to make a difference*” means, i.e. that at that time is when he must necessarily be truthful, [namely] in the context of business agreements and dealings. || For *he avoided falsehood for its own sake*, and where the advantage to be gained from *falsehood is morally base, he will avoid it*. A man of this type [i.e. *a sincere man*] will *diverge [from the truth] rather in the direction of understatement*, namely of understating his personal qualities, *because it is burdensome* to seem to be boasting. And since the man *who pretends to more merit [than he has]* acts or speaks *either for an ulterior purpose* or for no such purpose, [Aristotle] treats this [individual] next. [33r]

1127b14–1128a12 17. (It is not capacity that makes the boaster...)

We should not, [Aristotle] says, refer to the person who is able to achieve what he brings about as a “boaster”, nor should we avoid the name for the person who is unable [to achieve this]; since *it is not his capacity that defines the boaster, but his choice*, regardless of whether or not he can act on it; for the *disposition* and quality of the soul, not its capacity, produces boastfulness. *Similarly the liar* [is such] by disposition, whether he is able or unable to escape detection when he lies. *Those, then, who boast for the sake of reputation pretend to possess great qualities for which they will be praised, while those who do so for profit* use such rhetorical artifice [about their accomplishments], *which gives enjoyment to their neighbours* and on account of which many people struggle to detect such pretensions, *for example in regard to proficiency in divination or in medical science, since the qualities mentioned are found in these [arts]*.

[Aristotle] then says about *self-deprecators* that they *seem to be of a more refined character* than boasters are, *since they understate their own fine qualities not for the sake of profit, but to avoid ostentation, just as Socrates also used to deny* his notable qualities via a form of dissimulation, in the way that Plato frequently depicts him as conversing. Dissimulating at length or *pretending to lack minor or obvious qualities* makes people *crafty and silly*, since pretending to lack minor qualities is sordid and has no expectation of ostentatiousness, while [disclaiming] obvious qualities is shameful and patently false. *Sometimes* such cases *create the impression of boastfulness*, because in wishing to be honoured for their greatest [achievements] they deny utterly the minor and apparent qualities they have, their intention being to lead their audience to think that they have the greatest distinctions as well and that just as they reject these [minor distinctions] because of some praiseworthy disposition of their character, they would likewise reject those [i.e. the major distinctions] too. *But those who are moderate in their self-depreciation and in relation to things that are not overly obvious* (for he refers to these as “*commonplace objects*” (*ta empodōn*), since they lie at our feet (*podōn*)) are more *attractive*. Although, of the two forms of vice, the

ποδῶν οἷον κείμενα) *χαρίεντες* μᾶλλον· πλὴν ἐκ τῶν δύο κακιῶν ὁ ἀλαζῶν ὡς *χειρῶν* θατέρου τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ ἀντικείμεται.

Λοιπὸν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν παιδιᾷς τρόπων λεγομένων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς κατ' ἀνάπαισιν διαλαμβάνει μὴ μόνον περὶ τῶν λεγόντων τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκούοντων. ἔχει δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλην διαφορὰν, τὴν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀκούοντων· εἰ ἐν πολλοῖς 5 λέγοι τις ἢ ἐν ὀλίγοις. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ μεσότης *εὐτραπελία*, *εὐτροπία* τις οὔσα ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ ἤθους. τὰ δὲ παρ' ἐκάτερα καθ' ὑπερβολὴν μὲν *βωμολοχία* κατ' ἔλλειψιν δὲ *ἀγριότης*, τὸ δὲ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς *γέλως*.

[33v] || **1128a11–1128b10** *ἡ* (ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται...)

Ἐκ ταύτου καὶ ὁμοίου σημείου τῶν κινήσεων κρίνονται καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ ἤθη. εἰ 10 μὲν γὰρ εὐρώστως καὶ ἰσχυρῶς κινοῖντο, εὐρωστα φαίνονται καὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰ δὲ ἡμελημένως καὶ ἀσθενῶς, ἀσθενῆ καὶ τὰ σώματα. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἤθη ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνονται· ἄλλως γὰρ ὁ πραῦς κινήσεται καὶ ἄλλως ὁ θρασύς, καὶ ἄλλως ὁ αἰδήμων καὶ ἄλλως ὁ ἀναιδής. διὸ δέ, φησί, πολὺ τὸ γελοῖον ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ φανερόν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ *ἐπιπολάζον*· χάριν γὰρ ἐμφαίνει κατὰ τὸ πρόδηλον τοῖς τῶν λεγόντων 15 τὰ γελοῖα ἦθεσι. διατοῦτο καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι, οὓς ἐλέγομεν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν *χαρίεντας* καὶ εἰς κακίαν ἐτάττομεν, *εὐτράπελοι* λέγονται καὶ *χαρίεντες*· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἐξ ὧν εἶπομεν, φησίν, *εὐδηλον*.

Ταύτην δὲ τὴν μέσην ἔξιν καὶ *εὐτραπελίαν* καὶ *ἐπιδεξιότητα* λέγουσιν· τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἀκούσεται καὶ λέξει ὁ τοιοῦτος, οἷα πρέπει τῷ *ἐλευθέρῳ*, ὥστε καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ 20 τοῦ *ἐλευθερίου* διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους παιδιᾶς, καὶ ἡ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου τῆς τοῦ ἀπαιδευτού. καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν τε παλαιότερων καὶ τῶν νέων· ἐκεῖνοις γὰρ καὶ τὸ *αἰσχρολογεῖν γελοῖον ἦν*, τοῖς δὲ νέοις μόνῃ ἢ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ὑπόνοια διαβαλλομένη ἐκίνει τοῖς θεωμένοις τὸν γέλωτα.

Τὸν οὖν εὖ σκώπτοντα θέλων ὀρίζεσθαι, ἀπορεῖ πῶς αὐτὸν ὀρίσεται, οἷον ἐν τῷ 25 λέγειν ἃ πρέπει τῷ *ἐλευθέρῳ* ἢ ἐν τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα· ἔξεστι γὰρ καὶ οὕτως κάκεινως εὖ σκώπτειν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ λέγοι ἃ πρέπει τῷ *ἐλευθέρῳ*, λυπήσει πάντως τὸν πρὸς ὃν οἱ λόγοι· *ἐλευθερίως* γὰρ ἐξελέγξει καὶ ἀστείως τὸ πάθος. εἰ δὲ λέγοι πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖν, οὐκ ἐμφανῆς ἐσεῖται πρὸς τὸ σκῶμμα, εἰ δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ *τέρπειν* ἔτι πλεόν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀόριστον· ἄλλα γὰρ ἄλλοις ἡδέα καὶ *λυπηρά*, ὥστε οὐ πᾶν 30 πρὸς τὸ σκώπτειν ποιήσει (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγλευκοῦς ἦθους), καὶ *λοιδότημα* ἐστὶ τὸ

3–4 τῶν...ἀκούοντων] cf. Arist. EN 1127b33–1128a2 6–8 ἢ...γέλως] cf. Arist. EN 1128a3–12 10–24 Ἐκ...ὑπόνοια] cf. Arist. EN 1128a11–24 25–26 Τὸν...ἀκούοντα] cf. Arist. EN 1128a25–26 29–176,9 *τέρπειν*...διορίζεται] cf. Arist. EN 1128a27–1128b10

8 post γέλως (in marg. exteriore) schol. xxiii (vid. append.) 9 *lm*. addidi 13 κρίνο- M : δείκνυ-superscr. 25 ἀπορεῖ scr. Zor. : εὐπορεῖ M

boaster will be the opposite of the sincere man, since he is worse than the other [i.e. the self-deprecator].

Furthermore, he also treats conversation that has a *playful* character, and *relaxed social behaviour*, [considering] not only *those who engage* in this sort of conversation, but also *those who listen*. These matters involve another distinction, that which has to do with the size of the audience; if one were to speak in the presence of many people or a few. The mean therefore is *wittiness*, which is a kind of “*versatility*” (*eutropia*), since it comes from *the movement of one’s character*. As for the opposite extremes, the *excess* is *buffoonery*, while the *deficiency* is *boorishness*, and the underlying subject they pertain to is *laughter*.

|| 1128a11–1128b10 18. (As bodies are judged by their movements...)

[33v]

Both *bodies and characters are judged on the basis* of an identical, equal standard *having to do with their movements*. For if they move with strength and vigour, bodies appear strong, whereas if [they move] carelessly and feebly, bodies [appear] weak. *In the same way, people’s characters are also judged from their movements*; for the gentle man will move in one way, the rash man in another, and the modest man will move in one way, the intemperate man in another. On which account, he says, it is evident that there are *many occasions for laughter* in life, and this is what “*prevalent*” means: for it offers delight, as is clear from the characters of those who tell jokes. For this reason *buffoons*, whom we described as excessively *elegant* and classed under vice, *are called “witty” or “elegant”*; and that [these two types] *are different*, he says, *is quite clear from what we said*.

They call this *intermediate disposition* both *wittiness* and *tactfulness*, since a witty man *will hear and say such things as are appropriate for a civilised man*, with the result that *the civilised man’s jesting is different* from the *jesting of a man of servile nature*, as is that of an *educated man* from that of an *uneducated man*. This is also clear *from a comparison of the old and the new comedies*, since in the former *obscenity was a source of humour*, whereas in the new comedies it was only the *innuendo* of shamefulness that was thrown about that moved the spectators to laughter.

Wanting to *define the kind of person who jokes well*, then, he raises a difficulty as to how he will define him, for example, [whether] *by making the kind of jokes that are appropriate for a gentleman or by his not giving pain to his auditor*; for it is possible to joke well in both ways. Because if he were to say things appropriate to a gentleman, he would in any case cause pain to the person to whom the words were addressed, since he would scrutinise the feeling in a civilised and witty fashion. But if he were to speak with a view to not causing distress, he would evidently not be [speaking] for the purpose of the joke, or if rather for the purpose of *giving pleasure*, even more so. But this is *impossible to define*, since *different things are pleasant or painful to different people*, with the result that *he will not do anything to make a joke* (since this is a mark of a harsh character), and such jesting is *a sort of abuse*, which the

τοιούτον, ὃ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται κωλύουσι γίνεσθαι ἐπὶ πᾶσι· πάλιν δὲ σκώπτειν δεῖ καὶ μὴ ἀφανίζεῖν τελέως τὴν ὑπόνοιαν.

Τίθησι γοῦν αὐτὸν τὸν *χαρίεντα νόμον* *ἐαυτῶ*, λέγοντι ἐπὶ τῷ *ἐπιδεξίως* ὡς οἶόν τε λέγειν. ὁ δὲ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς τοιαύτης μεσότητος *βωμολόχος ἡττᾶται* πάντως τοῦ *γελοίου* καὶ οὐκ ἀπέχεται οὔτε *ἐαυτὸν* οὔτε ἄλλους προθεῖς εἰς *γέλωτα*. οἰοί εἰσιν οἱ 5
 ἰδίως λεγόμενοι *παιγνιῶται*· *τοιαῦτα* γὰρ *λέγουσιν*, ἅπερ ὁ *χαρίεις* οὐ καταδέξεται *εἰπεῖν*, *τινὰ* δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκοῦσαι. ὁ δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν τῆς μεσότητος ἄγριος *ἀχρεῖος* τῷ βίῳ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ *παιδιά ἀναγκαῖον τῷ βίῳ*. εἰπὼν δὲ περὶ τῶν *τριῶν* τούτων τῶν *κατὰ τὸν βίον* καὶ τὰς *ὀμιλίας*, καὶ τὴν *αἰδῶ* διορίζεται.

1128b11–1128b35 ἰθ' (πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει...)

[34r] || Αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ ἔξεις ἐλέγοντο καὶ ἐνέργεια, τὴν δ' αἰδῶ οὐ θετέον ἐν ἔξει πάθος οὔσαν. ὅτι δὲ πάθος ἐστὶν ἡ αἰδῶς ἐξ ὁμοιότητος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φόβου συνιστᾶ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἐπὶ τοῖς *δεινοῖς φοβούμενος* *ὠχρηᾶ* καὶ γίνεται κοινὸν πάθος σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ ὁ *αἰδούμενος ἐρυθραίνεται*. καὶ εἰσιν ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα πάθη *σωματικώτερα*· 15
 συμμεταβάλλει γὰρ ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τὰ σώματα, ὅθεν οὐκ ἐν ἀρεταῖς τὴν αἰδῶ θετέον. εἰ δεῖ δὲ λέγειν καὶ περὶ ταύτης διττῆς τινος οὔσης (κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ αὐθις τὸν Ἡσίοδον καὶ ἐπαινετῆς καὶ ψεκτῆς), οὐχ ἀρμόζει αὕτη *ἡλικία πάση*, ἀλλὰ μόνη *τῇ νέᾳ*. τούτους γὰρ καὶ *αἰδήμονας* *δέον εἶναι*, διότι *συζῶντας* πάθει πολλά μὲν *ἀμαρτάνειν* ἔχουσιν, ὅμως δὲ *ὑπ' αἰδοῦς κωλύονται*· καὶ τὸν μὲν *νέον* διὰ ταῦτα τὸν *αἰδήμονα* 20
ἐπαινοῦμεν, ὡς κωλύομενον ὑπ' αἰδοῦς τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπογούου αὐτῷ ὄντος τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, τὸν δὲ *πρεσβύτερον* οὐδεὶς *ἐπαινεσειεν* ὡς *αἰσχυντηλόν*· οὐδὲ γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸν ὑπ' *αἰσχύνης* κωλύεσθαι τὰ *φαῦλα πράσσειν*, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ὀρθῆς μᾶλλον καὶ κρίσεως καὶ ἔξεως.

Εἰ δ' εἰσὶ διττὰ τὰ *αἰσχρά*, τὰ μὲν *ἀληθῶς αἰσχρά* τὰ δὲ *δοκοῦντα*, οὐδὲν τὸ παρὸν *διαφέρει*· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ *ἀμφοτέρων ἀπέχεσθαι* τὸν *πρεσβύτερον*. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τῷ οὕτως 25
ἔχειν τινὰ ὥστε ἐὰν *πράξειε* τὰ *φαῦλα αἰσχύνεσθαι* ἐπαινοῦμεν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ὅσα ἐκόντες *πράττομεν ἢ αἰδῶς*, *ἐπιεικῆς* δέ τις οὐκ ἂν ἐκὼν τὰ *φαῦλα πράξειεν*. τί δέ; καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὐκ *ἐπιεικῆς ἢ αἰδῶς* τῆς ἀναιδεΐας οὔσης κακίας ἀντικρυς; ἔστω τοίνυν *ἐπιεικῆς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διττόν (τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, τὸ τινων ὄντων ἐκεῖνο ἀνάγκη εἶναι), οὕτω καὶ ἡ 30
αἰδῶς οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἐπιεικῆς, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. ὑποκειμένης γὰρ τῆς *πράξεως* ἐφ' ἣ αἰσχύνῃ ἀκολουθεῖ, εἴ τις *αἰσχύνοιτο*, ἐπιεικῆς καὶ ἐπαινετὸς κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον τὸ

11–22 ἐν...πράσσειν] cf. Arist. EN 1128b11–21
 1128b23–35

24–178,5 Εἰ...μεθύστερον] cf. Arist. EN

lawgivers forbid in all cases. On the other hand, *one ought to joke* and not do away with innuendo completely.

[Aristotle] therefore establishes that *the gracious man is a law unto himself* [i.e. he regulates and controls his own wit], because *when he speaks* he does so as *tactfully* as possible. *The buffoon, on the other hand*, who conforms to the excess of this mean [i.e. of wittiness], absolutely *cannot resist a joke and spares neither himself nor others*, since he is determined to raise *a laugh*. Those specifically called “mimes” (*paigniōtai*) are like this; for *they say the sort of things the cultivated man will never allow himself to say, and some of that he would not even be willing to hear*. The man who is uncultivated in accord with a deficiency of the intermediate state is *useless in life; for amusement is a necessary element in life*. After discussing these *three modes having to do with life and social interaction*, he defines *modesty* as well.

1128b11–1128b35 19. (For it seems to be an emotion rather than a disposition...)

|| The virtues were described as dispositions and activities, but modesty should not be included among the *dispositions*, since it is an *emotion*. He establishes that modesty is an emotion from a similarity drawn from *fear*. For just as the man *who fears dangers turns pale* and a common *emotion of body and soul* occurs, so also *the man who feels disgraced blushes*. Both of these emotions are *quite corporeal*, since they change bodies along with souls, which is why modesty should not be classified among the virtues. But if one must discuss this [i.e. modesty], which is twofold (according to the poet [i.e. Homer] and Hesiod as well, it is both praiseworthy and blameworthy), this [i.e. modesty] is *not suitable to every age but only to the youth*. For *it is proper* for young people *to be modest, because as they live in an emotional fashion they have the capacity to commit many errors, but nevertheless they are held back by a sense of modesty*. On this basis, *we praise a young man who he is modest*, since he has been prevented by modesty from making mistakes, because committing errors threatens him due to his youth; *whereas no one would praise an older man for being shamefaced; for he ought to be prevented from undertaking base actions not by modesty, but rather by a correct judgement and disposition*. [34r]

But if shameful actions are twofold, some genuinely shameful, others merely reputed to be so, the present [distinction] *makes no difference*, since the older man should *refrain from both*. For we also extend no praise in the case of someone who is *of such a nature that he is ashamed if he acts shamefully, since shame is felt in relation to what is in our power and what we do voluntarily*. No one *virtuous would willingly behave shamefully*. What then? On this account is *modesty not virtuous* as opposed to shamelessness, which is a vice? *Let [modesty], then, be conditionally [lit. on an assumption] virtuous* since, just as constraint is twofold (one is the absolute constraint, the other is the conditional constraint, and the constraint must necessarily belong to one of the two options), so modesty is also not simply virtuous per se, but conditionally. For when the underlying form of *conduct* on which shame is consequent [occurs], *if a man were to feel ashamed*, he would be virtuous and praise-

μεταμέλεσθαι καὶ μετανοεῖν, ὥστε οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀρετὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον. οὐδὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον ἢ εἰς τὸ πράττειν τὰ αἰσχρά, ἢ αἰδῶς ἢ περὶ ταῦτα προβαίνοντος τοῦ πράττειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως πως συσταθήσεται ἀρετὴ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν ἀπλῶς ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ μικτὴ πως, καθὼς καὶ περὶ ταύτης ἐρεῖ μεθύστερον.

worthy only if he were to repent and change his mind, with the result that *this* [i.e. *modesty*] is *not a virtue* in an absolute sense. Nor, *if shamelessness* is *base* with regard to committing shameful acts, is shame that relates to these deeds when the deed occurs beforehand [*a virtue* in an absolute sense]. For virtue will not be established in any other way, just as *self-restraint* arising from modesty is *not a virtue* per se, but somehow *mixed*, as he will say later on in relation to this.

1129a3–1129b10 α' (Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον...)

Ἴδου δὲ διαλαμβάνει καὶ *περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας*· αὐταὶ γὰρ φανεραί, ὅθεν ἀπεσι-
ώπησε τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπερβολὴν, ἦν διὰ τῆς κοινῆς ἀδικίας ἐδήλωσε. *μεθοδευτέον*
δὲ καὶ *περὶ αὐτῆς*, ὡς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐκ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰς ἕξεις καὶ ἐκ τῶν 5
αὐτοῖς παρακολουθούντων. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῷ *πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰ*
δίκαια λέγεται δίκαιος, οὕτως ἐν τῷ πράττειν τὰ ἄδικα καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικός
[34v] *ἔστι. ταῦτα γοῦν ὑποκείσθω πρῶτον. οὐκ ἔχει δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν*
ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων· αἱ γὰρ *ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν*
ἐναντίων εἰσὶ. δύναται γὰρ ὁ κυβερνήτης νῆα σῶσαι καὶ δύναται καταδῦσαι, καὶ 10
ἐπίσταται τις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἅμα ἐπίσταται τὸ κακόν. αἱ δὲ ἕξεις οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὕτως·
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἕξις ἔστι *τὰ ἐναντία*· τὸ *ὑποκείμενον* ὡς δυνάμενον καὶ ἀμφοτέρα
δύναται *καὶ νοσεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν*, πλὴν οὐχ ἅμα. ἡ δὲ *τῆς ὑγείας ἕξις οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ*
τῆ τῆς νόσου.

Πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῆς 15
ὑγείας ἡ νόσος καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ κακόν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτό· *πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ*
τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἕξεσιν αἱ ἕξεις γνωρίζονται· *εὐδηλότερα γὰρ τὰ τὰς ἕξεις*
ἔχοντα ἢ αἱ ἕξεις. ἐναντίων γοῦν τῶν ἕξεων οὐσῶν, *ἐὰν θατέρα πλεοναχῶς, καὶ*
θατέρα ὡς ἐπιτοπολύ.

Τοῦτο δὲ εἶρηκε διὰ τὰς μεσότητας τῶν ἀρετῶν· *πολλάκις γὰρ ἡ τῆς μεσότητος 20*
ἀρετῆ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμώνυμος, τῶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ ταύτην κακία ὁμώνυμος πάντως κατὰ τε
τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν. ἡ γοῦν οὕτω ῥητέον ἦ, τοῦ φιλεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν
δηλοῦντος καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τὸ φίλημα, τὸ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμώνυμον, ἦγουν τὸ
μισεῖν· πρὸς ἓν γὰρ εἶδος τοῦ φιλεῖν ἀντιδιέσταλται. *αἱ γοῦν ὁμωνυμίαι, εἰ σύνεγγυς*
εἶεν, λανθάνουσιν, εἰ δὲ πορρώτερον, ἐκδηλοῖ εἰσι. καὶ τῶν μὲν *ἐκδήλων ἡ κλείς ἔστω 25*
παραδείγμα, τῶν δὲ μὴ τοιούτων καὶ ἄλλα μὲν πολλά.

Τέως δὲ γε καὶ ἡ *δικαιοσύνη*· μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκδηλότερα ἡ ὁμωνυμία ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου
ταύτη, *τῆς ἀδικίας*· καὶ αὐθις ἐκδηλότερα τὰ τὰς ἕξεις ἔχοντα ἢ αἱ ἕξεις. *λέγεται γοῦν*
ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος, ὡς ἀδικῶν τὸν κοινὸν νόμον· *λέγεται καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ*
ἄνιστος, ὥστε καὶ ὁ δίκαιος διττῶς ἂν λέγοιτο, ὃ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. 30

Ἐπεὶ δὲ *πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, οὐ περὶ πάντα πλεονεκτῆσει τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ*
ἐκτὸς καὶ ἐπίκτητα· τὰ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ὡς ἔχουσιν. τὰ γοῦν ἐκτὸς

3–18 Ἴδου...ἕξεις] cf. Arist. EN 1129a3–20 18–19 ἐὰν...ἐπιτοπολύ] cf. Arist. EN 1129a24–25
24–26 αἱ...παραδείγμα] cf. Arist. EN 1129a27–31 27–28 Τέως...ἀδικίας] cf. Arist. EN 1129a26–27
28–30 λέγεται...ἴσος] cf. Arist. EN 1129a32–34 31–182,5 Ἐπει...κληθεῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1129b1–10

1 Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων ἔψιλον in marg. superiore 2 lm. addidi 13 καὶ¹ s.l. 22 τὸ: litt. -ὸ in ras.
26 μὲν s.l.

1129a3–1129b10 1. (In regard to justice and injustice we must examine...)

Note that [Aristotle] treats both *justice and injustice*; for these are evident, which is why he did not speak of the excess relating to them, which he revealed through the common form of injustice. *One must conduct [the investigation] into this [disposition], as well as into the other [dispositions], on the basis of those who possess the dispositions and those who understand them. Just as one is designated “just” by engaging in just actions and wanting what is just, similarly one is “unjust” by engaging in unjust actions and wanting what is unjust. Let these points accordingly be assumed first. [The fact is that] it is not || the same with regard to dispositions as with regard to sciences* [34v] *and capacities, since sciences and capacities involve contrary activities. For a captain is able to save a ship or to sink it, and one knows simultaneously what is good and what is evil. The dispositions, however, do not work this way, because the same disposition does not deal with contraries: their subject, as a capacity, is capable of providing both illness and health, but not simultaneously. The disposition of health, however, is not the same as that of illness.*

One of a pair of contrary dispositions, then, is often recognised from its contrary, just as illness [is recognised] from health and what is base from what is noble; but it is not the same [disposition]. And dispositions are frequently recognised from the subjects that exhibit them, since the things that possess the dispositions are more easily distinguishable than the dispositions themselves. Given that the dispositions are contrary states, therefore, if one is [spoken of] in more than one way, the other is too, for the most part.

He discusses this point by means of the intermediate states of the virtues, because often the virtue of the mean does not have the same name [i.e. it is equivocal], whereas the vice conforming to it does so in all cases in regard to both excess and deficiency. At any rate, either it must be stated this way or, given that “to love” (*philein*) signifies both feeling affection (*agapan*) and bestowing a kiss (*philēma*), the contrary state, namely hatred, does not bear the same name; for it is distinguished from a single species of love. *The equivocal uses [of a word], therefore, are not detected, if they are closely connected, whereas if they are more distant [i.e. in meaning but called by the same name], they are obvious. And among the obvious [different meanings of a term], let “kleis” (key) be an example [i.e. it can refer either to the collar bone or the door key], whereas of equivocations of a different sort [there are] many other examples.*

The same holds for *justice*: the ambiguity is much more apparent from [the use of] its opposite, *injustice*; and in turn, things that possess the dispositions are much more apparent than the dispositions [themselves]. *The man who breaks the law is accordingly called “unjust”, since he violates communal law, but the one who takes more than his due and is unfair is also called this, with the result that “the just man” can also have two meanings, namely “the law-abiding man” and “the fair man.”*

ταῦτα ἀπλῶ μὲν λόγῳ ἀγαθὰ, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ αἰεί. πλοῦτος γάρ τινι προσγενόμενος ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ ἀνδρείας ἐπιστήμη βλάπτει. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὐχονται ἀδιορίστως· δεῖ δὲ εὐχεσθαι τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἀγαθὰ, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ' ἄδικος πολλάκις αἰρεῖται καὶ τὸ μείον κακόν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ δοκοῦν ἀγαθὸν κατὰ σύγκρισιν τοῦ ἀπλῶς κακοῦ· ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο πλεονέκτης ἂν κληθεῖη.

5

[35r] || 1129b12–1130a13 β' (ἐστὶ πως δίκαια...)

Τὰ νόμιμα πάντα ἔσται πως δίκαια, φησί, κατὰ τὴν δοκοῦσαν δικαιοσύνην, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῆ. ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται, φησί, δίκαιου τινὸς στοχαζόμενοι, ἢ πόλει κοινῶς ἢ ἀριστεύσιν ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις ἢ κατὰ τινὰ ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἐκτιθοῦσι τοὺς νόμους· ὥστε τοῦ δίκαιου ὁμωνύμου ὄντος τὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἢ 10 ποιητικὰ ἢ φυλακτικὰ καθ' ἓνα τρόπον λέγομεν δίκαια. μόρια δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἰ κατέκαστον ἀρεταί, ἐξ ὧν αὕτη συνίσταται, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐπιφέρει.

Καὶ γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης προστάττει καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα, μὴ φυγοπόλεμον εἶναι μὴ ρίψασπιν, ἀλλὰ θαρραλέον εἰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνους, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, μὴ μοιχεύειν μὴ ἐφίεσθαι τῶν μὴ αὐτῷ διαφερόντων, ἀλλὰ κόσμιον εἶναι 15 καὶ σώφρονα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, μὴ τύπτειν καὶ λοιδορεῖν, μὴ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι μὴ κατηγορεῖν, καὶ ἐξῆς τῶν ἐτέρων. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα τῶν σπουδαίων, ἐφ' ἃ προτρέπονται καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἀποτρέπονται, ἐναντίων ὄντων τῇ ἀγαθῇ ἕξει· ὅπου γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον. καὶ ὀρθὸς μὲν νόμος ὁ ὀρθῶς περὶ τούτων κείμενος, χείρων δὲ ὁ ὠβελισμένος· τοῦτον γὰρ φησι τὸν ἀπεσχεδιασμένον. 20

Ἡ γοῦν τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ, ἡ γοῦν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τελεία καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ ὡς μὲν τελεία, κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ, καθὸ καὶ λέλεκται «ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετὴ ἐστίν»· ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, καθὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς καθ' αὐτοὺς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δύνανται χρᾶσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀδυνατοῦσι μὴ ἔχοντες τελείαν τὴν ἕξιν. εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Βίας εἶπεν «ἀρχὰ ἄνδρα δεῖξει», ὡς τῆς 25 δικαιοσύνης πρὸς ἕτερον οὔσης καὶ ἀρχῆς πάσης ἐν κοινωσίᾳ. πάσης οὖν ἀρετῆς ἰκανῆς λογιζομένης, καὶ εἰ καθ' αὐτόν τις κατ' ἐκείνην ἐνεργεῖ, ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐν τοῖς

7–18 Τὰ...ἀποτρέπονται] cf. Arist. EN 1129b12–24 19–23 ὀρθὸς...ἐστίν] cf. Arist. EN 1129b12–24 22–23 ἐν...ἐστίν] Theogn. Eleg. 147; cf. Anon. In EN 210.11–18 23 ὡς...ἀγαθόν] cf. Arist. EN 1130a2–4 23–26 πολλοὶ...κοινωνίᾳ] cf. Arist. EN 1129b33–1130a2 25 εὖ...δείξει] cf. Soph. Schol. In Ant. 175; cf. [Heliod.] In EN 87.40

But since the unjust man is an overreacher, he will not be covetous of all good things, but of external and acquired [goods]; for the [goods] of the soul and the body are such. These external goods, at any rate, are [always] good in the absolute sense of the term, but they are not always good for a particular person. For the wealth an individual accrues ruins him, and knowledge hinders bravery. Yet people pray for these [goods] indiscriminately, whereas they ought to pray that what is good in an absolute sense also be good for them, and choose the things that are good for them. The unjust man frequently chooses the lesser evil, in fact, because this appears good by comparison with what is bad in an absolute sense; so that he might be called “greedy” in accord with this.

|| 1129b12–1130a13 2. (Are just in one sense...)

[35r]

All lawful things will be just in one sense, he says, in accord with what is apparently “justice”, not in accord with what is genuinely and truly so. Because the lawgivers, he says, since they aim for some type of justice, set out their laws either in the common interest of the city or in the interest of an aristocracy or in the interest of rulers determined either by some standard of excellence or in another way. As a result, since “justice” is ambiguous, we designate as “just” in one sense of the term anything which produces or preserves happiness. The particular virtues are constituent parts of happiness, on the basis of which it is established, which [i.e. constituent parts] he then infers as well.

For the lawgiver prescribes what the brave man is to do, i.e. to not shun war or throw away his shield, but to be courageous when facing dangers for the sake of his city; and the deeds of the moderate man, i.e. to not commit adultery or aim at things that do not belong to him, but rather to be well-behaved and moderate; and the deeds of the gentle man, i.e. to not strike or verbally abuse [anyone], to not boast or denounce [anyone]; and then [characteristics] of the other [dispositions]. Because these are the typical actions of virtuous people, the sort of actions towards which they are inclined and from which they shrink, since they are contrary to the good disposition; for where one pole is implied, the other pole is there as well. And a law is correct if it is framed rightly with regard to these [actions and dispositions], but worse if it is corrupt; for he describes this as “[the law] that has been made off-hand”.

Accordingly, this sort of virtue, namely justice, is perfect and [at the same time it is displayed] towards another person. And since it is perfect, it is apparently the greatest of the virtues, for which reason it has been said that “In justice all virtue is summed up”. Inasmuch as [it is displayed] towards another person, for this reason it is thought to be a good for others. For there are many people who can practise justice in relation to their own affairs, but cannot do so in their relations with others, since they lack a perfect disposition. Bias was therefore right to say that “ruling will reveal the man”, since justice and every form of ruling relate to another person within the context of a community. Therefore, every virtue is reckoned sufficient, and if one acts self-consistently in accord with it, justice is composed and demonstrated in respect

πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν καὶ τὴν δεῖξιν· ἄλλω γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ὁ δίκαιος, ἐκείνος οὖν κράτιστος, ὁ πρὸς ἄλλον τῆ ἀρετῆ ταύτη χρώμενος, πλὴν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν· ὁ γὰρ δικάϊως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχων, πόσω γε μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ.

Κάκιστος δὲ ὁ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν καὶ πρὸς ἑτέρους τῆ μοχθηρία χρώμενος. αὐτὴ γοῦν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος τῆς ἀπλῶς ἀρετῆς, ὡς αἱ λοιπαὶ ἀρεταὶ εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὅλη τις ἀρετὴ· καὶ ἡ ἀδικία ὡσαύτως οὐ μέρος κακίας, ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὅτι ὡς μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ θατέρα τῆ λοιπῆ. 5

[35v] || 1130a12–1130b11 γ' (ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον...)

Ἐπεὶ καθολικὴν εἶπε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τῆ καθόλου ἀρετῆ πλησιάζουσαν, ἐζήτησεν εἰ ταυτόν ἐστὶ ταύτη ἢ ἕτερον. καὶ λύων λέγει «ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ἡ αὐτή», ἡγοῦν κατὰ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ἡ αὐτή· ἢ δὲ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἕτερον ἀποτείνεται, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ τοιάδε τις ἕξις ψυχῆς καθ' αὐτήν, οὐ ταύτη ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆ ἀρετῆ. 10

Ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς γε τῷ τέως οὐ τὴν καθόλου δικαιοσύνην ζητοῦμεν, ἦν ὁ ὀρθὸς νόμος—ὁ γραπτὸς τε καὶ ὁ φυσικὸς—προβάλλεται, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς. ὡσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐζητοῦμεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος, ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τοιαύτη μερικὴ τις δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία. σημεῖον ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐ. 15

Καὶ εὐθὺς ἐπαγωγικῶς τίθησιν· ἡμεῖς γοῦν τὴν κατὰ πλεονεξίαν ἀδικίαν ζητοῦμεν, οὐ τὴν διήκουσαν εἰς πολλὰς κακίας· ὡστε ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικία μερικὴ, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ κατὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι ὁ μὲν ἔνεκα τοῦ κερδαίνειν τι ἐκ τῆς μοιχαλίδος μοιχεύει, οὐ τοῦ πάθους ἠττώμενος· ὁ δὲ προστίθησι καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ ζημιοῦται διὰ ταύτην πολλακίς ἐξοδιάζων καὶ δαπανῶν· λοιπὸν καὶ οἱ δύο ἄδικοι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος ὅτι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἠττᾶται, ἐκείνος δὲ κυρίως ἄδικος ὡς πλεονέκτης· ζητεῖ γὰρ κερδαίνειν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου πάθους. 20

Ἔτι περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα ἀδικήματα ἐπαναφορά τίς ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄλλην μοχθηρίαν· καὶ εὐθὺς ἐπαγωγικῶς· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπὶ οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην μοχθηρίαν εἰ μὴ ἐπ' αὐτήν καὶ μόνην τὴν ἀδικίαν ἀνάγεται· τὸ πλεόν γὰρ ἔσχηκε καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν φαίνεται, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀδικία τις παρὰ τὴν ὅλην, συνώνυμος, ἔχουσα τὸν αὐτὸν ὀρισμόν· 25

1 ἄλλω...πράττει] Arist. EN 1130a4–5 4 Κάκιστος...χρώμενος] cf. Arist. EN 1130a5–8 4–7 αὐτὴ...
λοιπῆ] cf. Arist. EN 1130a8–13 10 ἐστὶ...αὐτή] cf. Arist. EN 1130a12 11–12 ἢ¹...ἕξις] cf. Arist. EN
1130a12–13 14–18 οὐ...οὐ] cf. Arist. EN 1130a14–17 20 ἐστὶ...μερικὴ] cf. Arist. EN 1130a22
20–21 καὶ²...νόμον] cf. Arist. EN 1130a23–24 21–26 ἔτι...μοχθηρίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1130a24–29
27–28 εἰ¹...ἀνάγεται] cf. Arist. EN 1130a31–32 28–186,7 ὡστε...ταυτόν] cf. Arist. EN
1130a32–1130b11

to things relating to another person, *since* the just man *acts for the advantage of another* rather than for himself. Consequently, that man is the greatest, that is to say, the one who exercises this kind of virtue towards another, and to himself as well. For how much more would the man who acts justly towards others do so towards himself!

The worst man is the one who practises vice towards his friends as well as himself. Consequently, justice in this sense is not a part of virtue in an absolute sense, as the rest of the virtues are, but some virtue as a whole. And injustice is likewise not a part of vice, but the whole of vice. But virtue differs from justice in that it is the same as justice [as a quality of mind], but in its essence one of the two is not the same as the other.

|| 1130a12–1130b11 3. (But what is displayed as relation to others...)

[35v]

Since he said that justice is universal and approaches the general form of virtue, he investigated whether it is the same as or different from the latter. He resolves [the question] by saying “*It is exactly the same*”, i.e. *the same* in that it refers to the whole and in that it extends to many. But *in that justice is extended to another, whereas virtue is a kind of disposition* of the soul in itself, justice is not the same as virtue.

In the meantime, however, we *are not investigating universal justice*, which the correct law—both the written and natural—propounds, but *the justice which is a part of virtue*. Just as we investigated the other [dispositions], *so too [we are investigating] injustice in the particular sense*, because this too is a kind of specific justice and injustice. *Proof [of this] is that someone who acts in accord with the other vices [i.e. throws away the shield, reviles someone, or refuses the help someone with money] behaves unjustly, but does not overreach.*

And straightaway he establishes this inductively: we are investigating, then, the type of injustice which relates to greed, not the kind that extends to many vices, with the result that *there is a form of injustice that is particular [i.e. a part of vice], and there is something unjust that is part of the whole that is against the law. Further, A commits adultery in order to get some profit from the woman he seduces rather than yielding to his feelings, while B adds desire to the equation and is penalised for this while frequently spending money until he fritters it away; so it follows that both are unjust persons, but the latter is self-indulgent, because he yields to his desire, whereas the former is unjust in the proper sense of the term, because he is overreaching, since he seeks to profit from this emotion.*

Further, in connection with other unjust actions there is a reference to another form of wickedness. And he immediately [infers] inductively: if he profited [from an unjust act], he is referred to no other form of wickedness but the one and the same injustice. For he has attained more and seems to be overreaching, so that it is evident that there is a sort of injustice besides injustice as a whole that is synonymous [with it], since it has the same definition; for they are reduced to a single genus. For both the universal and the particular justice have their area of competence in relation to another

ἀνάγονται γὰρ ὡς εἰς γένος ἔν. πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ ἔχουσι καὶ ἡ καθόλου καὶ ἡ μερικὴ δικαιοσύνη τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν καταγίνεται περὶ τε τιμὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ τινα ἄλλα, ἃ οὐ δυνατὸν περιλαβεῖν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι, ἡ δὲ περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.

Καὶ εἰσὶ μὴ μόνον δύο, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείους, ὡς φαίνεται κατὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα· τὴν δὲ παρὰ τὴν ὄλην μερικὴν ληπτέον τί ἐστὶ καὶ ποία τις. καὶ εἰλήφθω ἡ ἀδικία ὡς εὐδηλο- 5
τέρα. διώριστα δὴ τὸ ἄδικον, τὸ παράνομον καὶ ἄνισον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλεον οὐ ταυτόν, δοκιμάζει καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, ἵνα εὖρη τὸ ζητούμενον.

1130b8–1131a12 δ' (διώριστα δὴ τὸ ἄδικον...)

[36r] || Μέλλων περὶ τῆς μερικῆς δικαιοσύνης εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τῆς μερικῆς ἀδικίας, καθολι- 10
κώτερον τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται. καὶ φησὶν ὅτι διώριστα τὸ ἄδικον τῷ παρανόμῳ καὶ ἄνισῳ· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀδίκου ποιεῖται τὴν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου δοκιμασίαν, ὅτι προϋργι-
αίτερον τὸ ἄδικον τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συνηθέστερον. ἐπεὶ γοῦν δύο τινα ἔχει τὸ ἄδικον, τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ παράνομον, φησὶ, διώριστα 15
ἢ εἰρημένῃ ἀδικία, ἤγουν ἢ καθολικώτερα· πᾶσαν γὰρ σχεδὸν δικαιοσύνην τὰ νόμιμα περιέχουσι. τὰ γοῦν παρὰ ταῦτα παράνομα, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἄδικα. κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον
δοκιμάζει εὐρεῖν τὴν μερικὴν ἀδικίαν, καὶ πρότερον δείκνυσιν ὅτι τὸ ἄνισον τοῦ πλείονος καθολικώτερον· πᾶν γὰρ πλεον ἄνισον, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ πᾶν ἄνισον πλεον· ἔστι
γὰρ καὶ ἔλαττον· καὶ αὖθις πᾶν ἄνισον παράνομον, ἐπεὶ ὁ νόμος σταθμὸς τίς ἐστὶ καὶ 20
ἰσότης, οὐ μὴν δὲ πᾶν παράνομον ἄνισον· οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶς νόμος ἐν διανομαῖς ἐστὶ καὶ συναλλάγμασιν, ὅπου τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον χώραν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ περιέχουσι τὰ νόμιμα
καὶ ἄλλα διάφορα περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ οὐ πᾶν παράνομον ἄνισον, πᾶν δὲ ἄνισον παράνομον, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἄδικον οὐ ταυτόν ἐκείνοις,
ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων. εἰσὶ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα ταῦτα τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δὲ ὡς ὅλα, ὡσαύτως καὶ 25
ἡ δικαιοσύνη. περὶ γοῦν τῶν ἐν μέρει τούτων λεκτέον· ἀφέσθωσαν δὲ αἱ καθόλου φανερόν γὰρ ὅπως ἐκείνας διοριστέον· κατὰ τὰ νόμιμα γὰρ διορισθήσονται. περὶ γὰρ
τῆς καθόλου παιδείας τῆς κατ' ἀνθρώπον ἐκεῖνα διαλαμβάνουσι, περὶ ἣν συνίσταται καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ. περὶ δὲ τῆς καθέκαστον παιδείας, πῶς ἂν εἴς τις ἀγαθὸς γένοιτο,

11–12 διώριστα...ἀνίσω] cf. Arist. EN 1130b8–9 14–15 κατὰ...ἀδικία] cf. Arist. EN 1130b9–10
18–19 πᾶν¹...παράνομον] cf. Arist. EN 1130b10–13 20 οὐ...ἄνισον] cf. Arist. EN 1130b12–13
23–25 καὶ¹...λεκτέον] cf. Arist. EN 1130b13–17 25–26 ἀφέσθωσαν...διοριστέον] cf. Arist. EN
1130b18–22 26 κατὰ...διορισθήσονται] cf. Arist. EN 1130b22–25 26–188,6 περὶ...ἀκούσια] cf.
Arist. EN 1130b26–1131a6

7 πλεον M (cum L^bM^b) : παράνομον Arist. vulg. (EN 1130b11) 9 Im. addidi 18 πλεον¹ M (cum K^bL^b) :
παράνομον Arist. vulg. (EN 1130b12) | πλεον² M (cum K^bL^b) : παράνομον Arist. vulg. (EN
1130b12–13)

er [person], but *the latter* [i.e. *injustice in the particular sense*] is concerned with honour, pleasure and other such matters, which cannot be described with a single name, whereas the former [i.e. *the universal kind of justice*] is concerned with the areas the virtuous individual is engaged in.

Furthermore, *there are* not only two [kinds of justice], but *many* [types], as is evident in relation to the underlying subjects; and *we must grasp what* the partial kind [that exists] *besides the type that is the whole* [of justice] *is and what its character is*. Let injustice be taken [as the focus of our examination], since it is much more apparent. “*The unjust*” *has been defined as what is unlawful and unfair*. [Injustice] *in the sense previously mentioned, then, corresponds to the meaning “unlawful”*. But *since the unfair is not the same* as overreaching, he also examines the unfair [as one kind of injustice] in order to discover the object of his inquiry.

1130b8–1131a12 4. (Now “the unjust” has been defined...)

|| Since he is about to discuss justice and injustice as particulars, he bases his discussion on the more general sense. And he says that “*the unjust*” *has been defined by the unlawful and unfair*, because examination of the just is always undertaken on the basis of the unjust, since the unjust is more convenient than the just and more prevalent among human beings. Since, then, “the unjust” has two meanings, the unlawful and the unfair, *the type of injustice already mentioned*, he says, *corresponds to “the unlawful”*, i.e. the more general type, given that lawful acts encompass more or less all justice. And opposed to these are unlawful [actions] that are at the same time unjust. He attempts to discover the particular type of injustice on the basis of the unfair, and he demonstrates first that the unequal is more general than the concept “too much”; *for everything that is “too much” is unfair, but not everything that is unfair is “too much”*, since it can also be “too little”. And again, *everything unfair is unlawful*, since the law is a reference point for equality, but *not everything unlawful is unfair*; this is because not every law relates to distribution and to business transactions, where the equal and the unequal are relevant, but these include lawful actions and other matters, which do not involve a calculation of equal and unequal. For these reasons, not everything unlawful is unfair, but everything unfair is unlawful, so that *injustice and the unjust are not the same* as these [i.e. injustice and the unjust in the universal sense], *but different from them*. And *some of these unjust actions are like parts, while others are like wholes, and so too in the case of justice*. As a consequence, *we must discuss these* [i.e. justice and injustice] *in the particular sense*. But let the universal types [of justice and injustice] *be set aside*, since *it is clear* how they *should be defined*, given that they will be defined in conformity to *legal prescriptions*. For those [rules] deal with the general *human education*, according to which *political science* is established. *As for the education of the individual as such*, [that is] how a person can become good, *whether this is the business of political science or some other science*, i.e. ethics, *must be determined later*; for the latter [i.e. ethics]

πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας, ἤγουν τῆς ἠθικῆς, ὕστερον διοριστέον· αὕτη γὰρ ἓνα τινὰ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνη δὲ πάντα πολίτην.

Τῆς γοῦν κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης ἐν μὲν εἶδος τὸ ἐν διανομαῖς τιμῆς, χρημάτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ συμφωνίαις διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη εἰσὶ δύο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα διττά· τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια, ἃ καὶ ἀπαριθμεῖται, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια, ἃ καὶ αὐτὰ καθέκαστον λέγει, πλην ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐκουσίων ὅσα αὐτὸς τις ποιῆσεται λέγει, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀκουσίων ὅσα ἂν αὐτὸς πάθοι· κάκεῖνα γὰρ ἀδικήματά εἰσιν ἐν συναλλάγμασιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἕτερον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ἄδικος ἄνιστος κατὰ τε τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐν τούτοις ἔσται πάντως καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἤγουν τὸ ἴσον.

[36ν] || 1131a13–1131b13 ε' (εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνιστον...) 10

Ἐτέθη τὸ ἄδικον παράνομον καὶ ἄνιστον. τὸ γοῦν παράνομον τὴν καθόλου ἀδικίαν συνίστησιν, ὅτι καὶ ὁ νόμος τὴν καθόλου δικαιοσύνην καθιστᾷ, τὸ δ' ἄνιστον τὴν μερικὴν, τὴν ἐν διανομαῖς καὶ συναλλάγμασιν. εἰ γοῦν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνιστον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· τὸ ἴσον δὲ δέδεικται μέσον πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα μέσον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς· τὸ γὰρ ἴσον καὶ ἴσῳ ἴσον καὶ ἴσοις, ὥστε τὸ δίκαιον καὶ μέσον καὶ ἴσον. ἔστι τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον ὄν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους· τισὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ τῷ ἔχοντι τὴν δικαιοσύνην. πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ τοιαύτη συνίσταται ἀρετή.

Συνάγεται γοῦν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μέσον καὶ ἴσον καὶ δίκαιον· ἢ μὲν μέσον, πάντως τινῶν· ἀορίστως, οὐ τόσων, ἀλλὰ τινῶν. εὐρηται γὰρ τὸ μέσον καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς τοῖς παρ' ἐκάτερα. ἢ δὲ ἴσον, οὐ πλεόν δυσὶν· ἢ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν, οἷς ἂν ἡ διανομὴ δικαία κατὰ τὸ πρόσωπον γενήσεται. καὶ διαταῦτα ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις τὸ δίκαιον· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ζητεῖται καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν διδομένων παροχῇ ἢ ἰσότης, ἔστι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῖς λαμβάνουσιν· ἴσοι γὰρ ὄντες, τῶν ἴσων ἀξιωθήσονται. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι τὸ «οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς»· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς ἡ διανομὴ γενήσεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ διδόμενα ἔξει. οὐ πάντως δὲ ἐὰν ἴσως ἔχωσιν ἐκεῖνοι, ἴσα καὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἴσως ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ τὸν διπλάσιον τυχὸν λόγον, ἄνισα καὶ ταῦτα κατὰ τὸν διπλάσιον· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ἰσότης τίς ἐστὶ, τὸ τοῖς ἀνίσοις κατ' ἀναλογίαν τὰ ἄνισα δίδοσθαι.

Τὸ καταξίαν γὰρ ποιῆσει τὸ ἴσον· τὸ δὲ καταξίαν διάφορόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰ εἶδη τῶν πολιτειῶν· δημοκρατικοὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἴσον ζητήσουσιν, ὀλιγαρχικοὶ δὲ οἱ

8–9 ἐπεὶ...ἴσον] cf. Arist. EN 1131a10–12 13–15 εἰ...δυσὶν] cf. Arist. EN 1131a13–15
15–16 τὸ²...ἴσον¹] cf. Arist. EN 1131a15–16 19–22 Συνάγεται...δίκαιον] cf. Arist. EN 1131a15–19
25–27 οἷς¹...διπλάσιον²] cf. Arist. EN 1131a19–24 29–190,1 Τὸ...εὐγένειαν] cf. Arist. EN 1131a24–28

makes *an individual person good*, whereas the former [i.e. political science] [improves] *every citizen*.

One kind of particular justice accordingly involves the distribution of honour, wealth and the like, while another supplies a corrective principle in private transactions and agreements. The latter has two sub-divisions, since injustices are also twofold: *some are voluntary*, which are enumerated, while *others are involuntary*, which he discusses individually, except that with respect to voluntary actions he discusses those a person will do himself, while with respect to involuntary actions [he discusses] those that an individual might experience, since these too are injustices in the transactions of one person with another. Now since an unjust man is *unfair* in matters which admit of both *more and less*, there will necessarily be in these contexts *the intermediate state as well, namely the equal*.

|| 1131a13–1131b13 5. (If, then, the unjust is unequal...)

[36v]


The unjust was affirmed as being unlawful and unequal. The unlawful, then, incorporates the universal type of injustice, since the law establishes universal justice, whereas the unequal [incorporates] the particular kind of injustice, the one related to distributions and transactions. *If, then, the unjust is unequal, the just is equal*. The *equal*, on the other hand, has been shown *to be intermediate* between “too much” and “less”, and *the just* is therefore also *intermediate*. *The equal implies at least two things*, and it is also [used] in many contexts: for what is equal is equal in relation to something else that is equal and for equal people, with the result that the *just* is both *a mean and equal*. The *just*, since it is equal, is also relative to human beings, since this [type of justice] relates to certain persons rather than to the person who possesses justice. For this kind of virtue is relative to another [person].

As a consequence, the intermediate, the equal, and the just are inferred to be identical; *insofar as it is intermediate*, it undoubtedly [implies] *certain [extremes between which it lies]*; and this is indeterminately so, not between “that much and that much”, but between “*certain*” [extremes]. For the mean has been found in many locations between opposite extremes. *Insofar as it is equal, it involves no more than two things; and insofar as it is just, [it is so] for certain persons* for whom the distribution will be just according to each individual. For these reasons, *the just involves at least four terms*, since equality exists and is investigated in relation to the supply of what is offered and in relation to the human beings who receive [these shares]; because since they are equal, they will be deemed worthy of equal shares. This is [the meaning] of “[*two persons*] for whom [it is just] and [*two shares*] in which [there is justice]”, since the ratio between the things involved [sic; see Introduction 2.8, p. LV-LVI], when the distribution occurs, *will be equal to the ratio* between the distributed shares. But it is not necessarily [the case that] *if the persons are equal*, these shares [will be] *equal* as well, *but* if those [persons] [are equal] by perhaps a multiple of two, then the [shares] will also be unequal by a multiple of two; for this too is a kind of equality, that unequal things are proportionately bestowed upon unequal persons.

μὲν πλοῦτον οἱ δὲ εὐγένειαν (τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὀλίγοις ὄν, ἐξ οὗ καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες παρ' ἐκείνοις δοκιμάζονται, τοῖς μὲν ἐν πλούτῳ τοῖς δὲ ἐν εὐγενείᾳ φαίνεται· ἐκείνοι γὰρ οὐ τὸ ἄριστον ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγοις φαινόμενον· φαίνεται δὲ ἐν ὀλίγοις ὁ τε πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ εὐγένεια)· ἀριστοκρατικοὶ δὲ ἀρετήν.

Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι ἐν δυσὶ δύο· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐπὶ μονάδι καὶ ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἀναλογόν ἐστίν (ἅπας γὰρ ἑαυτῶ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ἴσος), ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ παντός. ἔστι γοῦν ἡ ἀναλογία καὶ διηρημένη ἐν τέτταρσι καὶ συνεχῆς ἐν τρισίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τότε ἐν τέτταρσι γίνεται· τῶ γὰρ ἐνί, τῶ μέσῳ, διττῶς χρώμεθα. διαταῦτα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις· ἔστι γὰρ τὰ μὲν δύο ἐν τοῖς διδομένοις, τὰ δὲ δύο ἐν τοῖς λαμβάνουσι· ταῦτα γὰρ λέγει «οἷς καὶ ἄ». ἔστω γοῦν ὁ α καὶ ὁ β τὰ δύο μέρη τῶν διδομένων, καὶ ὁ γ καὶ ὁ δ οἱ δύο οἱ λαμβάνοντες, ὥστε συνδυαζομένη ἡ διανομὴ τοῖς δυσὶν ὅλον τι γίνεται πρὸς ὅλον, καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἄρα· ὡσαύτως κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν, ὡς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τοῦ διδομένου πρὸς τοῦτον, οὕτω θάτερον μέρος πρὸς θάτερον τὸν λαμβάνοντα.

Diagramma ix



1131b14–1132a12 στ' (καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον...)

Εἰ συνδυασθῶσι, φησί, καὶ τὰ διδόμενα πρὸς τοὺς λαμβάνοντας καὶ ἔπειτα δοθῆ ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, τὴν αὐτὴν σώσει ἀναλογίαν, ἣν εἶχε τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ μέρος κατὰ τὴν ἐναλλάξ ἀναλογίαν. τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ ἔχει ἀναλογίαν, ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον. ἔστω γὰρ ἕξ καὶ τρία, καὶ αὖθις δ' καὶ β'. ἐκάτερον γοῦν πρὸς ἐκάτερον τὴν διπλασίονα ἀναλογίαν σώζει, καὶ συνδυασθέντα τὰ στ' καὶ τὰ δ' πρὸς τὰ γ' καὶ β' συνδυαζόμενα καὶ αὐτὰ τὴν ἴσην ἀναλογίαν διατηρήσουσιν. ἔστω γοῦν ἀπονενεμημένον διμνιαῖ-


4–13 ἀριστοκρατικοὶ...ἀναλογίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1131a28–1131b13 17–18 ὅλον...ὅλον] cf. Arist. EN 1131b14 19 ὅπερ...ἐκάτερον²] Arist. EN 1131b14–15

16 Im. addidi

For the principle “*according to merit*” will produce equality; and this principle “*according to merit*” differs depending on the form of the political community involved: since *democrats* will require equality *relating to free birth*, while *supporters of oligarchy* [will require equality relating] sometimes to *wealth*, in other cases to *noble birth* (for that which is found among few people, on the basis of which ruling officials are also approved among them [i.e. the few], is apparent in those who are rich or are of noble birth; the latter require not what is best, but what appears [to be so] among a few persons; and both wealth and nobility are apparent among a few persons); and *supporters of aristocracy* [require equality relating] to *excellence*.

Justice, then, is a sort of proportion in two double senses, because *proportion is not a property of numerical quantity only* (for every man is equal in proportion to himself), but of quantity *generally*. Thus, a *divided proportion* involves *four terms and a continuous* [proportion has] three terms, but even then it comprises four terms, since we use *one term*, the mean, as *two*. For these reasons, *the just involves four terms at least*, since two of these relate to the shares distributed, and two relate to those who receive [those shares]; and he refers to these as “*for whom and which*” [i.e. *the persons and the shares*]. In accord with this, let *A* and *B* represent the two shares of what is distributed, and *C* and *D* the two people who receive [these shares], so that when the distribution is combined for the two, a whole results [in the same ratio] to the whole, and thus in alternation; and in like manner in accord with geometrical proportion: as one share of what is bestowed is relative to one person, so the other share corresponds to the other person who receives [the share].

Diagram ix



1131b14-1132a12 6. (The whole to the whole...)

If the shares bestowed are combined, he says, in relation to the people who receive them, and a whole is then assigned to a whole, the same proportion will be maintained, which one part had in relation to the corresponding part in accord with the alternate proportion. For it maintains the same proportion, *that of one term to the other*. For let there be six and three, and again four and two. Each term then maintains the double proportion to the other, and when the combined six and four [relate to] three and two combined, they will maintain the equal proportion. Let the worth of two minae therefore be given to one person and the worth of two minae to another person: that is equality of ratios. Let the two values of two minae be

ον τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ διμνιαῖον τῷ ἐνὶ ἰδοῦ ἰσότης. συνδυαζέσθωσαν τὰ διμνιαῖα καὶ γενέσθω τετραμνιαῖον· συνδυαζέσθωσαν καὶ οἱ λαμβάνοντες, ἄρα καὶ αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑκατέρου ἀναλογίαν ἀπέλαβον. ἰσότης δὲ ἐκεῖ τοῖς δυσὶν ἀνὰ μέρος, ἰσότης καὶ ἐνταῦθα συνδυασθεῖσι τῷ τὸ ὅλον λαβεῖν.

Οὐ δύναται δὲ ἐνταῦθα γενέσθαι *συνεχῆς ἢ ἀναλογία*· οὐ γὰρ εἷς ἀριθμῶ ὄρος, καὶ 5
 ὁ αὐτὸς γίνεται καὶ ἐπόμενος, ὃ δηλοῖ τὸ ᾧ, γίνεται καὶ ἡγούμενος, ὃ δηλοῖ τὸ ὄ. ἔχεις
 [37r] *τοιγαροῦν τὸ κατὰ τὴν διανομὴν δίκαιον*, οὗ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν γινομένου ἢ *παρὰ τὴν*
ἀναλογίαν συστήσεται τὸ ἄδικον, ὡς τὸν μὲν πλεόν λαβεῖν τῆς ἀξίας, τὸν δ' ἔλαττον
 καὶ αὐτὸν τῆς ἰδίας ἀξίας, ὡςπερ φαίνεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· καὶ λαμβάνει ὁ ἀδικῶν
 τὸ πλεόν, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος τὸ ἔλαττον, ἂν ἀγαθὸν ἦ τὸ διανεμόμενον. εἰ δὲ κακόν, 10
ἀνάπαλιν· ὁ μὲν ἀδικῶν τὸ ἔλαττον, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος τὸ πλεόν. τέως δὲ καὶ τοῦτο
 κατ' ἐκεῖνο κρίνεται· τὸ γὰρ ἔλαττον κακὸν κατὰ σύγκρισιν τοῦ μείζονος κακοῦ
ἀγαθόν, διὸ καὶ *αἰρεῖται* τοῦτο· καὶ ὡς *αἰρετὸν* πάντως ἀγαθόν ἐστίν, ὡςπερ καὶ τὸ
μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν μείζον ἀγαθόν. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν τοῦ δικαίου εἶδος καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου
 ὡσαύτως. 15

Τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικὸν ἄλλο ἐστίν. ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν
 εὐρίσκεται, εἴτε *χρήματα* εἶεν εἴτε ἄλλο τι κοινόν, καὶ μερισμὸν δέχεται. τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς
συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον μὲν καὶ αὐτὸ ἴσον, ἄδικον δὲ ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν
 τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἐκείνην τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν. ἐκείνη γὰρ
 τὸ ποῖον ἐζήτει, οὐ τὸ ποσόν· αὕτη δὲ τὸ ποσόν, οὐ τὸ ποῖον. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀμάρτημα 20
ζητήσῃ ὁ δικαστῆς διορθώσασθαι καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσῃ τὸ τῶν ἀμαρτησάντων
 ποῖον, ὅτι τυχόν ὁ μὲν *μοιχεύσας* μέγας καὶ ἔνδοξος, οὗ δὲ ἡ γυνὴ ἐμοιχεύθη μικρὸς
 καὶ ὁ τυχῶν· ἀλλὰ τὸ ποσόν ζητήσῃ τοῦ πλημμελήματος καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνδόξῳ καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῷ ἀδόξῳ. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον ὃν ἐξισάζειν *πειράται* ὁ δικαστῆς διὰ τῆς ἀξίας
 ποινῆς, ὡς ἂν μὴ ὁ μὲν κερδαίνῃ ὁ δὲ ζημιῶται ἐλαττονούμενος. ὁ μὲν *ἀπέκτεινε*, 25
φησὶν, ὁ δὲ *ἀπέθανε*, καὶ ὁ μὲν *ἐπάταξεν*, ὁ δὲ *ἐπλήγη*. *κερδαίνειν* γὰρ λέγεται ὁ
πατάξας, εἰ καὶ μὴ οἰκεῖον ὄνομα τούτῳ τέθειται.

5–15 Οὐ...ὡσαύτως] cf. Arist. EN 1131b15–24

16–19 Τὸ...ἀριθμητικὴν] cf. Arist. EN


1131b25–1132a2 20–27 τὸ...τέθειται] cf. Arist. EN 1132a3–12

combined and let them become the value of four minae; and let the people receiving the minae also be combined, then they themselves received [what they were due] in accord with the proportion of each. In that case, there is equality for the two people according to their share, but equality also exists in the other case for the two who are combined by their receiving the whole.

But here *the proportion cannot be continuous, since there is not one numerical term*, and the same [term] follows, which is what “*the recipient*” refers to, but it also leads, which is what the “*share*” refers to. *Therefore*, you have *the just* in the distributive sense of the word, and when this takes place in accord with *proportion*, || *the unjust* will be shown to be *what violates proportion*, because *one person* receives [37r] *more than he deserves, whereas the other person has less than he personally deserves, as appears to actually occur in practice: the person who acts unjustly takes too much, whereas the person who suffers injustice [gets] too little*, if what is distributed is a *good*. But if it is an *evil*, then *the reverse is true*: the person who acts unjustly [gets] less, whereas the person who suffers injustice [gets] more. Finally, he also judges this point in accord with the former one: for *the lesser evil* compared to the *greater evil counts as a good*, and it is therefore *preferable*; and *what is desirable* is altogether good, just as *the more desirable it is, the greater good it is*. *This then is one kind of justice* and likewise [one kind of] *injustice*.

The corrective kind of justice in relation to private transactions is different. For the previous type [i.e. the just in distribution] is found in *common matters*, whether these are *funds* or some other sort of common stock, and it admits of distribution. But [*the just*] *involved in private transactions*, although it is *just* to the extent it is *equal*, and *unjust* to the extent it is *unequal*, *nonetheless* the equality and inequality is *not in accord with the geometrical proportion discussed earlier, but in accord with the arithmetical one*. Because the former was concerned with quality rather than quantity, whereas the latter is concerned with quantity rather than the quality. For *the judge will endeavour* to correct the wrong itself and he will not trouble himself over the nature of those who acted wrongly, i.e. that *the adulterer* happens to be an important man with a good reputation, whereas the man whose wife was seduced is an average, unimportant person; instead [the judge] will seek the extent of the damage in the case of the highly-respected and the disreputable man alike. *The judge attempts to equalise this type of unequal injustice, then*, by means of the appropriate penalty, to prevent one man from making a profit while the other is penalised and suffers loss. *The one man killed, he says, and the other died; the one man struck a blow, and the other received one*. For *the person who struck a blow* is said to have *gained an advantage, even if the name* [i.e. “an advantage”] that has been assigned to this [action] is *inappropriate*.

Diagramma x



1132a13–1132b9 ζ' (ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος...)

Ὅταν μετρηθῇ, φησί, τὸ πάθος, ὃ ὁ μὲν ἐποίησεν ἄτερος δὲ πέπονθε, τῷ μὲν ποιήσαντι κέρδος λογίζεται, τῷ δὲ παθόντι ζημία. κέρδος γὰρ ὁ ἀδικῶν ἕξει, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ ἐπιφέρων τῷ πλησίον κακόν, ὃ μέντοι γε ἀδικούμενος ὃ ἂν πάθοι ζημίαν λογίζεται. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἐντεῦθεν μὲν πλεόν ὡς κέρδος ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἔλαττον ὡς ζημία, τὸ δίκαιον καὶ μέσον 5 τούτων ἴσον τι φανεῖται. τὸ κέρδος δὲ καὶ ἡ ζημία πρὸς τὰ πράγματα κρίνεται, ὃ κερδαίνει καὶ ὃ ζημιούται· εἰ καλόν, τὸ πλεόν κέρδος τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ζημία, εἰ δὲ κακόν, τὸ μὲν πλεόν ζημία τὸ δ' ἔλαττον κέρδος. τὸ δὲ μέσον τούτων τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον, ὃ καὶ δίκαιον καλοῦμεν· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικόν αὐτὸ τοῦ κριτοῦ, αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος· ἐξισοῖ γὰρ ταῦτα ὁ δικαστής. 10

Διὸ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ὡς ἐξισωτὴν ἐσόμενον καταφεύγουσιν.

[37v] || διατοῦτο καὶ μεσοδίκης λέγεται, ὡς τὸ μέσον κατέχων, καὶ μεσολαβηταὶ οἱ διαλλάσσοντες καλοῦνται. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ γραμμῆς ἐστίν, εἰ εἰς ἄνισα τμηθεῖ ἀφαιρουμένου τοῦ πλέονος—οὐ παντός, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἂν προστεθὲν τῷ ἐλάττονι—τὸ ἴσον ἀπονείμῃ κάκεινῳ πρὸς τοῦτο, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἔχει· καὶ τότε γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται τὸ 15 μέσον κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν· τὸ γὰρ μέσον ὅσῳ ὑπερέχει τοῦ ἐσχάτου, τοσοῦτῳ ὑπερέχεται παρὰ τοῦ μείζονος. οἷον στ' δ' β'· καὶ τοῦ στ' τὸ πλεόν ἔχοντος τοῦ δὲ β' τὸ ἔλαττον, ὃ μέσος ἀφελῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ στ', τὸ β', καὶ προσθεῖς τῷ β', αὐτοῖς τὲ καὶ ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἴσον εἰσεποίησε· τὰ γὰρ πάντα ἰβ' ἐγένοντο ἀνά τεσσάρων· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μέσος οὔτε πλεόν ἔχων τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος ἑαυτῷ οὔτ' ἔλαττον· δ' γάρ. 20

Τίθησι καὶ ἕτερον ὑπόδειγμα, δεικνύς ὅποσον ὀφείλει ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸ πλεόν ἔχοντος· οὐ πᾶν, καθ' ὅσον ὑπερβάλλει τοῦ ἐλάττονος· εἰ γὰρ μὴ προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν τῷ ἐλάττονι, τότε τὸ πᾶν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ προστεθῆναι μέλλει τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκ τοῦ πλέονος τῷ ἐλάττονι, εἰ τόσον ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι προστεθῆ,

2–11 Ὅταν...καταφεύγουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1132a13–25 13–16 ὥσπερ...ἀναλογίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1132a25–30 21–196,1 δεικνύς...ἀνάπαλιν] cf. Arist. EN 1132b2–6

1 Im. addidi 16 diag. x repetitum in marg. superiore (leviter mutatum) 18 τὸ² scripsi : τὰ M

Diagram x



arithmetical [proportion]

1132a13–1132b9 7. (But when what was suffered is measured...)

When *what was suffered is measured*, he says, that is, what one man did and another endured, it is reckoned as a *gain for the man* who performed the action and a *loss for the man* who endured it. For the man who acted unjustly will achieve a gain, because he unjustly inflicted damage on his neighbour, while the victim will regard what he suffers a loss. As a *consequence*, since there is *more* on the one side, in the form of *gain*, while there is *less* on the other side, in the form of *loss*, what is just would appear to be a sort of *equality intermediate* between these. Gain and loss are judged by reference to the [pertinent] objects, that is, what one gains and what one is deprived of; if [the object] is *good*, there is *mostly gain and less loss*, whereas if it is *harmful*, there is *mostly loss and less gain*. What is *intermediate* between these, namely “*more*” and “*less*”, is *the equal*, which we also refer to as “*just*”. Hence, *restorative justice* is what is pertinent to the arbiter, and this is the *mean* between more and less, since *the judge apportions these equally*.

This is why, when people have a dispute, they have recourse to a judge, because he will restore equality. || This is also why [a judge] is also called “a mediator of justice”, [37v] since he effects the mean, and why the reconciled parties are referred to as “those who have received mediation” (*mesolabētai*). For *just as* in the case of a line, if it is divided into [two] unequal parts and the larger one is subtracted—not all of it, but [only] as much as should be added to the smaller segment [i.e. to make it equal in length to the longer one]—one would make the segments equal in comparison to one another, so too in the case of these [i.e. the loss and gain as equalised by a judge]. For then the mean is produced in relation to these [i.e. the greater and the less] according to arithmetical proportion, since the mean exceeds the lesser [lit. the last] by the amount it is exceeded by the greater. For instance, [take] 6, 4, and 2; since 6 is the greater amount, whereas 2 is the lesser amount, by subtracting the excess from 6, that is 2, and adding it to 2 [i.e. the lesser amount], the mean incorporated the equal to these and to itself; for all these numbers [i.e. 6, 4, and 2] become 12 in groups of four [i.e. their total is 12 and their average is 4]; and the mean contains neither more via the addition to itself, nor less, because it is 4.



[Aristotle] sets out another example as well, demonstrating how much one must subtract from that which has more: not the whole [amount], but the amount by which it exceeds the lesser [amount]; for if the subtracted amount is not added to the lesser [amount], then let the whole amount be subtracted. But if the amount subtracted from the one that has more is going to be added to the one that has less, if so much is

taken away and added to the one that has less, inequality has occurred on the opposite side. But since *the larger sum exceeds by twice*, let one [of these parts] be taken away and added to the lesser, and in this manner both will be equalised. For when [the same amount] is subtracted from one of two [equals] and added to the other, provided that they are equal, one part is in excess in relation to the other by these two; but compared to the mean, [it exceeds] by one [part], and the mean, again compared to that from which [a part] was taken, [will exceed] that part by one.

The following example is set out: let there be equal lines, he says, AA' , BB' , CC' . Let a segment AE be taken away from the line $A(A)'$, and let it be added to the line CC' , so as to produce CCD' . Let CC' be similarly divided into segment CF . Segment CCD' will exceed segment EA by CD and CF , being two equal parts, and line BB by one of these segments [i.e. either CD or CF].


Diagram xi

Let it be divided into 2 and 8



12 [=CCD]
exceeds 8
[=EA] by these
two [i.e. CF and
CD = 4], just
like [it exceeds]
line BB by one
of these parts

All together produce 12



Let the two be
added to 10

Note: m = middle

1132b11–1133a10 ἢ (ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα...)

Μετηνέχθη τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα, ἢ ζημία φημι καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς, τῆς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς λεγομένης πραγματείας· τότε γὰρ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, εἴ τις πλέον προσπορίζοιτο ἢ περ τὸ πρότερον εἶχεν, εἴ τις δὲ ἔλαττον ἔσχε τῶν ἐξαρχῆς, ζημιουῖσθαι λέγεται. ὁ μόντοι γε μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον 5 ἔχων ἢ πρότερον, τοῦτον ἔχοντα τὰ ἑαυτῶν λέγουσιν. ὥστε τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους τὸ ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν τῷ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἐν τῷ ἐκουσίως καὶ μὴ τινος ἀναγκάσαντος πράττειν.

Τισὶ δ' ἄλλοις δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, καθὼς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι [38r] ἔλεγον· καὶ οὕτως ἐτίθουν || καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ῥαδαμάνθους δίκαιον προκομίζοντες καὶ ἔπος· 10

εἴ κε πάθοι τὰ κ' ἔρεξε, δίκη δ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο·

τοῦτο τὸ κατὰ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός δίκαιον ἀποδοκιμάζειν βούλεται ὁ φιλόσοφος. οὐκ ἐφαρμόττειν γὰρ φησιν οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικόν (τί γὰρ κοινὸν ἔχει εἰς τό τισι δικαίως αὐτὸ διανεμέσθαι;) οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν (καίτοι γε τοῦτο βούλονταί τινες λέγειν διόρθωσίν τινα τὴν ἀντιπεπόνθησιν ἐκλαμβανόμενοι). ἀλλὰ πολλαχοῦ, φησί, 15 διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον· καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δίκαιον ὅλως ἀντιπαταχθῆναι παρὰ τοῦ παταχθέντος, καὶ εἴ τις ἐπάταξεν ἄρχοντα, οὐ δίκαιον παταχθῆναι τοῦτον μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι πολὺ διαφέρει τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον· καὶ τυχὸν ὁ πρῶτος πατάξας ἀκουσίως καὶ μὴ θέλων ἐπάταξεν. πῶς γοῦν εἴ τις ἐκουσίως ἐκεῖνον αὖθις πατάξει, ἐξισωθήσεται τὸ πλημμέλημα; 20

Ἄλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι, φησί, τοῦτο δοθήσεται, πλὴν καὶ τότε κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οὐ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον· ἀναλόγως γὰρ παθῶν τις ἀντιποιήσεται· τούτῳ γὰρ ἐμμένει καὶ ἡ πόλις κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἢ γὰρ πόλις ἢ τὸ κακῶς ἀντιδοῦναι ζητεῖ, ὡς μὴ δόξοι δοῦλος ὁ πληγεὶς ὥστε ἀντιπληξῆσαι τὸν πληχθέντα, ἢ τὸ εὖ, ὥστε τῷ χάριτός τινος κατάρξαντι ἀντιδίδοσθαι παρὰ τοῦ τὴν χάριν λαμβάνοντος. καὶ διαταῦτα τὸ τῶν 25 Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδῶν ἐποίουν, ἵνα γίνηται ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις.

Ἡ δὲ ἀντίδοσις κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ζητηθήσεται, οὐ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον. οἷον ἔστω σκυτεύς, ἔστω οἰκοδόμος· καὶ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ μὲν σκυτέως ὑπόδημα, τοῦ δὲ οἰκοδόμου

2–5 Μετηνέχθη...λέγεται] cf. Arist. EN 1132b11–14 5–8 ὁ...πράττειν] cf. Arist. EN 1132b16–20 9–10 Τισὶ...ἔλεγον] cf. Arist. EN 1132b21–22 10 καὶ²...δίκαιον] cf. Arist. EN 1132b25–26 11 εἴ... γένοιτο] Hes. fragm. 286, 2; cf. Arist. EN 1132b27; Anon. In EN 222.26 12–13 οὐκ...διανεμητικόν] cf. Arist. EN 1132b23–24 14 οὔτε...διορθωτικόν] cf. Arist. EN 1132b24–25 15–18 πολλαχοῦ... ἀκούσιον] cf. Arist. EN 1132b28–31 21–200,2 Ἄλλ'...οἰκοδομήσει] cf. Arist. EN 1132b31–1133a10

1 Im. addidi 6 ἔχοντα scripsi : ἔχον M 26 ἐμποδῶν scripsi ex Arist. EN 1133a3 : ἐκποδῶν M (cum M^b)

1132b11–1133a10 8. (The terms have come...)

These terms, by which I mean “loss” and “gain”, were transferred to these contexts from voluntary exchange, which many people refer to as “business”; because in that context it is called “gaining”, if one procures more than one had previously, whereas if one had less than at the outset, it is termed “losing”. Yet, when a man has neither more nor less than he had previously, they say that he “has his own”. As a result, the mean between loss and gain is the equal and the just, in the sense of having an equal amount before and after [the transaction], in the context of voluntary transactions when no one forces one to act.

Some other people, however, hold the view that reciprocity is just without qualification, as the Pythagoreans used to say; and they similarly introduced || Rhadam- [38r] anthys’ conception of justice by bringing forward the line:

If he suffered what he did, upright justice would be done.

The Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle] wants to reject this notion of the just, which is based on the model of reciprocity. For he says that *it does not fit either with distributive justice* (for what does it have in common with [the type of justice where] the same [amount] is distributed justly to certain people?) *or with corrective justice* (although some want to claim this, understanding reciprocal proportion to be a kind of corrective [justice]). But *in many cases*, he says, this [i.e. reciprocity] *conflicts* with [corrective justice]. For *if an office-holder struck [someone], it would not be* at all just *that he be struck in retaliation* by the person he struck; *but if someone struck a magistrate, it would not be* just that the offender *merely be wounded, but that he be punished as well. Moreover, there is a great difference between what is done voluntarily and involuntarily*; for example, the first person struck the blow involuntarily and did so unwillingly. How then will the offence be equalised, if one voluntarily struck that person [i.e. the original perpetrator] in retaliation?

But in [business] transactions, he says, *this [type of justice] will be allowed*, with the caveat that even in that case it will be *on the basis of proportion*, not on the basis of due measure, *since* when one suffers, *one will respond proportionately*. For this [i.e. reciprocal action based on proportion] *holds the city together* in conformity with the due human measure. *For the city seeks either to return evil for evil*, so that the one who was struck *will not seem to be in the position of a slave*, with the result that he retaliates against receiving a blow, *or good for good*, so that a *favour be given reciprocally* to the person who originally bestowed it by the person who received it. *For these reasons, they set up the temple of the Graces in a prominent public place, to encourage reciprocal giving.*

Reciprocal exchange will be sought on the basis of proportion, not in relation to due measure. For example, let there be a *shoemaker*, and let there be a *builder*; and the shoemaker’s *product is a shoe*, while the builder’s product is a *house*. What then? In light of the above, if the former produces a shoe for the latter, the latter will build

οἰκία. τί γοῦν; διαταῦτα εἴπερ ἐκεῖνος τούτῳ ὑπόδημα ἐργάσεται, καὶ οὗτος ἐκείνῳ οἰκίαν οἰκοδομήσει.

Diagramma xii

α	β	γ	δ
οἰκοδόμος	σκυτοτόμος	οἰκία	ὑπόδημα

cf. Arist. EN 1133a7–10

Diagramma xiii

<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; width: 50%; border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">στ'</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 50%; border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">δ'</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">β'</td> <td style="text-align: center; border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">γ'</td> </tr> </table>	στ'	δ'	β'	γ'	
στ'	δ'				
β'	γ'				

1133a10–1133b8 θ' (ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ἦ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον...)

Ζητητέον πρῶτον τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, πόσῳ τινὶ διαφέρει οὗτος πρὸς τοῦτον καὶ πόσῳ αὐθις τὸ ἔργον τούτου πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου· καὶ τότε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τὴν 5 ἀντιπεπόνθησιν καὶ οὕτως ἡ κοινωνία ἐξευμαρισθήσεται. μετηνέχθη δὲ τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ἀντιπεπονθήσεως ἐκ τῶν ἀντιπεπονθότων παραλληλογράμμων τῶν κατὰ γεωμέτρως· ἀντιπεπονθότα γάρ, φασὶν ἐκεῖνοι, σχήματά εἰσιν, ὅταν ἐν ἐκατέρῳ τῶν σχημάτων ἡγούμενοί τε καὶ ἐπόμενοι ὄροι ᾖσιν. ἔστωσαν γὰρ δύο ἴσα παραλληλόγραμμα β' 10 μονάδων ἢ σπιθαμῶν· τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ δις ἕξ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ τρίς δ'. ὄν οὖν λόγον ἔχει ὁ στ' πρὸς τὸν δ', ἢ μείζων πλευρὰ πρὸς τὴν μείζονα, τοῦτον ὁ γ' πρὸς τὸν β', ἢ ἐλάττων πλευρὰ τοῦ δευτέρου πρὸς τὴν ἐλάττονα πλευρὰν τὴν τοῦ πρώτου.

Τὸ δὲ συμμένει ἀντὶ τοῦ συνίσταται· ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία, φησὶν, οὐ γίνεται ἐξ ἰατροῦ πρὸς ἰατρόν, ἀλλ' ἐκ διαφόρων τεχνιτῶν. γενέσθω γοῦν ἡ ἀντιπεπόνθησις τὸν μὲν ἡγούμενον τῶν τεχνιτῶν, τὸν δὲ ἐπόμενον· καὶ αὐθις τὸ τοῦ δευτέρου ἔργον ἡγούμε- 15 νον πρὸς τὸ τοῦ προτέρου ἔργον ὡς ἐπόμενον. οὕτως γὰρ ἐξισασθήσονται· ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ αἱ κοινωναί, εἰ μὴ τό τε ποιῶν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐποίει, τὸ δὲ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον ἔπασχεν, οἷον καὶ ἀμφοτέρα ἐχῶρει εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι τὴν κοινωνίαν ἴσην.

Ἐπεὶ γοῦν οὐκ ἦν ἀληθῶς ἰσασθῆναι ταῦτα εἰ μὴ ἐμετροῦντο, παρεσιήχθη τὸ 20 νόμισμα. δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο κληθὲν νόμισμα, ἵνα μετρήσῃ καὶ ἀμφοτέρα. πάντα γὰρ τὰ

6–8 οὕτως...σχήματά] cf. Arist. EN 1133a10–12 8–9 ἀντιπεπονθότα...ᾧσιν] cf. Eucl. El. 6, 2; cf. Georg. Pachym. Quadriv. 221.12–13; 286.14–15; cf. John Pedias. In Post. An. 115.12–14 13 Τὸ... συνίσταται] cf. Arist. EN 1133a12 13–20, 19 ἢ...ἀντισηκώσουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1133a12–1133b8

a house for the former [in a diagonal combination that produces proportionate exchange].

Diagram xii

A	B	C	D
<i>builder</i>	<i>shoemaker</i>	<i>house</i>	<i>shoe</i>

Diagram xiii

	6		4
2	12	3	12

1133a10–1133b8 9. (If, then, first of all, proportionate equality is found...)

One must investigate *first proportionate equality*, namely, how much one man differs from another, and again how much one man's product [differs from] the other man's. And *then one must make the reciprocal proportion* in accord with the proportion [between them] and in this way their partnership will be made easy. The term "reciprocal proportion" is derived from the reciprocally proportional parallelograms used by geometers; because they assert that *figures are reciprocally related when there are antecedent and consequent ratios in each of two figures*. For let there be two equal parallelograms of 12 units or spans; one parallelogram is two times six, while the other is three times 4. Thus the ratio that 6 has to 4, i.e. the longer side [of the first figure] in relation to the longer [side of the second figure], is the ratio that 3 has to 2, which is the shorter side of the second [figure] in relation to the shorter side of the first [figure].

And the term "*keep together*" [is used] instead of "bring into union". For the *partnership [for the interchange of services]*, he says, is *not between doctor and doctor*, but between different craftsmen. So let the reciprocal proportion be between an antecedent craftsman, on the one hand, and a consequent one, on the other; and again [let] the second craftsman's product be antecedent compared to the first craftsman's product, as consequent. For in this way *they will be made equal; because the associations [for exchange of goods and services] would be ruined, if there were not both an active element [i.e. the producer] and a passive element [i.e. the consumer]*, since the active element *produces a certain quality and quantity, and the passive element receives a certain quality and quantity*, such that both parties move so that the association [of exchange] is equal.

Since, then, these [products or services] could not be genuinely equalised unless they were measured, *money was introduced*. It was for this very reason that it was called "money", namely so that both [sets of goods or services] could be measured.

μετρούμενα ἐνί τινι μετροῦνται, καθὼς πολλάκις καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς εἶπε· μοναῖ μὲν μονᾶ, μέλη δὲ διέσει, συλλογισμὸς δὲ ὄρω, χρήματα δὲ καὶ πράγματα νομίσματα, ὃ δὴ καὶ μέσον πως γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων τῶν διαφόρων καὶ μετρήσει καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῶν πραγμάτων.

Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐλλείπει τὸ ὑπόδημα πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν, πῶς γενήσεται κοινωνία μέσον 5
σκυτοτόμου καὶ οἰκοδόμου, εἰ μὴ μετρήσει τὸ νόμισμα πόσα ὑποδήματα πρὸς μίαν οἰκίαν καὶ τοιαύτην; ἢ χρειαῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἐποίησεν· εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐδέοντο ὅπως οὖν ἢ εἰ μὴ
[38v] ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων ἐδέοντο ἀμφοτέροι, ἢ οὐκ ἦν ἀπλῶς ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτῆ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδίδεται πρὸς τὴν ἀπλῶς χρειαῖν, ἢς ὅπως οὖν δέονται, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ δέεσθαι ἀλλήλους ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως. ἐγένετο γοῦν οἶον ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρειαῖς τὸ νόμισμα, 10
ἰκανὸν ὃν πορίσαι καὶ ἀμφοτέροις τὸ εἰς χρειαῖν. νόμισμα δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἢ χρᾶσθαι τούτῳ ἢ ἀχρηστον ποιῆσαι.

Διδάσκει δὲ καὶ πῶς ἢ ἀντιπεπόνθησις γενήσεται ὡς περ οὗτος πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, οὕτω τὸ ἐκεῖνου ἔργον πρὸς τὸ τούτου ἔργον. οὐδὲ γὰρ δεῖ διόλου φυλάττειν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἀναλογίας κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, ὡς λέγειν ὡς οὗτος πρὸς τοῦτον οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἔργον 15
τούτου πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τούτου. πέφυκε γὰρ οὕτως τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γενέσθαι πολλὴν εἰς τὸ ἔτερον ἄκρον, ὡς εἶναι καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔργον μεῖζον πρὸς θάτερον. ἔστω γὰρ γεωργὸς καὶ σίτος καὶ σκυτοτόμος καὶ ὑπόδημα· ὃ δὴ ἐλλιπές ὃν δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ τόσα λαβεῖν ὑποδήματα ὅσα τὴν τροφὴν ἀντισηκώσουσιν.

Diagramma xiv

α β γ δ
γεωργός σκυτοτόμος τροφή· σίτος τὸ ἔργον τοῦ σκυτοτόμου, τὸ ὑπόδημα

cf. Arist. EN 1133b4–5

1133b8–1134a7 ι' (ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται...)
Τότε γίνεται ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλλαγὴ, ὅταν ἐν χρειαῖ ὧσιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἀλλήλων ἢ ἄτερος θατέρου, ὥστε ἂν τις ἔχη μὲν οἶνον δέηται δὲ σίτου ἑτέρου ἔχοντος σίτον καὶ δεομένου οἶνου. τότε γὰρ κοινωνίας γινομένης ὁ μὲν ἔχων οἶνον δίδωσι τῷ δεομένῳ ἔχοντι σίτον, ὁ δὲ λαμβάνων οἶνον δίδωσι σίτον ἐκεῖνω· ὁ γὰρ οἶνος ἐξαγωγὸς τοῦ σίτου γίνεται. δεῖ γοῦν ἐξισασθῆναι ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ ἐν τῷ πλέονα οἶνον 20
δοθῆναι ἢ ἐν τῷ πλέονα σίτον. εἰ δὲ γε ἄτερος μὲν χρήζει ἄτερος δὲ οὐ χρήζει, τυχὸν δὲ δεηθῆσεται εἰς τὸ ἐπιόν, ὑπὲρ τῆς τοιαύτης μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς ὡς ἐγγυητής τις

21–204,5 Τότε...πραγμάτων] cf. Arist. EN 1133b7–14

8 ἢ αὐτῆ post ἀπλῶς primum scripsit, deinde erasit M 20 Im. addidi

For everything that is measured is measured by a single standard, as [Aristotle] stated frequently in many contexts; minae [are measured] by a mina, songs by the smallest interval in the scale, a syllogism by a premise, and property and goods by money, which in fact *constitutes in a way a middle term* between two different things and will measure *both the superior and inferior value* of goods.

And since a shoe is inferior compared to a house, how will there be a partnership [for the exchange of services] midway between *a shoemaker* and *a builder*, unless money measures *how many shoes are equivalent to one house* and such? Necessity produced *these [standards of measurement]*, since if people needed nothing at all or if both parties *did not* have a similar need of both sets of goods, || *there would simply be* [38v] *no exchange or not the same exchange*; for the former is connected with simple demand, which the parties need in some way or other, while the latter [is connected with] different parties having a similar need for both sets of goods. Money thus *became a sort of means of exchange of need*, since it is adequate to provide both parties with what they need. And it is called “money” (*nomisma*, [i.e. “customary currency”]) *because it is up to us to use it or to render it useless*.

[Aristotle] also explains how *reciprocal proportion will occur*: as this [craftsman or producer] stands in relation to that [craftsman or producer], so the one man’s product stands in relation to the other man’s product. Because it is not altogether necessary to maintain the *form of a proportion* in relation to the same [goods or services], so as to say that as this craftsman is to that one, so also this man’s product is to that man’s product. For it is natural that great *excess* be produced to *one of the two opposite extremes*, so that one person is greater and one product greater compared with the other. For let there be *a farmer, grain, a shoemaker, and a shoe*: what is deficient needs to be *equalised* by receiving whatever quantity of shoes counterbalances the quantity of food.

Diagram xiv

A	B	C	D
<i>farmer</i>	<i>shoemaker</i>	food: <i>grain</i>	the shoemaker’s product, the <i>shoe</i> .

1133b8–1134a7 10. (Or one of the parties, they do not exchange...)

The exchange of products occurs *at the point when either both parties are in need of each other or one needs the other*, so that [for example] *when someone has wine but needs grain*, and the other party has grain but needs wine. For that is when a partnership [for the purposes of exchange] takes place, namely when the man who has wine gives it to the one who needs it and has grain, and the man who receives wine gives grain to the other party; because the *wine* allows *the export of grain*. Therefore, each commodity *must be made equal* to the other either by more wine being offered or more grain. But *if one party needs [one of the commodities in question]*, but the other does not, although perhaps he will need it at a later time, *money enters as a kind of*

εἰσέρχεται τὸ νόμισμα· τῷ γὰρ φέροντι ἐκεῖνο ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ κατὰ χρεῖαν, ὅτε βούλεται· καὶ τότε πάλιν τὸ νόμισμα τοῦτο παράσχη, ὅπερ ἐδίδου καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀνταλλαγὴν· ἐξισασθήσεται γὰρ πρὸς τὸ πωλούμενον, ὥστε ἢ τόσον δοθῆναι ἢ πλέον ἢ ἕλαττον. οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ μᾶλλον βούλεται μένειν τοῦτο ὡς ἀδάπανον τῶν δαπανηρῶν ἐκείνων πραγμάτων.

5

Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δεῖ πάντα εἰς τίμημα ἄγεσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι αἰεὶ ἀλλαγὴν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ νόμισμα πάντα σύμμετρα ποιεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄνισα ἐξισάζειν δύναται διὰ τῆς ἀναλογίας· καὶ ἐπεὶ σύμμετρα πάντα ποιεῖ, ἢ συμμετρία ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσότητα, ἢ ἰσότης τὴν ἀλλαγὴν, ἢ ἀλλαγὴ τὴν κοινωνίαν. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ, φησὶν, οὐ γίνεται κατὰ ἀκρίβειαν σύμμετρα τὰ πολὺ διαφέροντα, ὅμως δὲ γε ἢ χρεῖα ταῦτα ποιεῖ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμφωνίας τῶν συναλλαττόντων δι' ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐνὸς νομίσματος ἢ ἄλλου του, ὅπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως νόμισμα καλεῖται. ἐκτίθησι τοίνυν· ἦγουν ἔστω οἰκία καὶ μναῖ ἰ'. ἔστω δὲ τὸ ἦμισυ τῶν μνῶν ἄξιον τίμημα τῆς οἰκίας· ἔστω δὲ καὶ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος τῶν ἰ' μνῶν, ἦγουν ἀξία μναῖς· δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι πέντε κλίνας τὴν οἰκίαν ἀντισώσουσιν. ὅτι δὲ οἱ παλαιοὶ οὕτως τὴν ἀνταλλαγὴν ἐποίουν πρὸ τοῦ τὸ νόμισμα εὑρεθῆναι, δῆλον, φησὶν· 10
[39r] οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει πέντε κλίνας δίδοσθαι εἰς ὠνήν οἰκίας τοιαύτης ἢ ὅσον || τιμήματος αἰ πέντε κλίναί εἰσιν. 15


Diagramma xv

α οἰκία

β μναῖ ἰ'

γ κλίνη

τὸ οὖν α, φησὶ, τὸ ἦμισυ τοῦ β ἔχει, τουτέστι τὸ ἦμισυ τῶν ἰ' μνῶν, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἐστὶν ἡ οἰκία.



cf. Arist. EN 1133b23–28

6–17 Καὶ...εἰσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1133b14–28

16 post ὅσον diagr. xv

guarantor in support of such an exchange in the future; for the person who pays can take what he needs when he wishes; and again in that case he will provide this money, which he offered in the exchange [of goods], because [the amount of money] will be equalised in relation to the object sold, so that the amount given is either that much or more or less. *For money does not always have the same value, yet it tends to be more stable*, because it is without the expense of those expensive goods.

This is why all goods must be subject to a price and there must always be exchange [of goods]. This currency, then, is capable of making all goods commensurate and of equalising unequal things by means of proportion. And since it makes all goods commensurate, commensurability produces equality, equality [produces] exchange, and exchange [produces] association. Thus, although in truth things which are very different, he says, do not become commensurate in a precise sense, nevertheless need makes them so via the mutual agreement of the contracted parties by means of that one standard unit of currency or another, which by stipulation is called “currency” (nomisma). He accordingly sets out [the following]: for example, let there be a house and ten minae. Let half of the minae [i.e. five minae] be the assessed value of the house. Let there also be a bed which is [equivalent to] a tenth of the ten minae, i.e. worth one mina. It is now evident that five beds are equivalent to the house. It is clear, he says, that this is how the ancients used to exchange goods before money was invented; for there is no real difference between giving five beds for the purchase of such a house or as much currency as || five beds are worth.

[39r]


Diagram xv

A house

B 10 minae


C bed

Hence A, he says, is [equivalent] to half of B, i.e. half of 10 minae, if the house is worth five minae.



Εἴρηται τοιγαροῦν τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου. φησὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς δικαιοπραγίας (δικαιοπραγία δέ ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ δικαίου ἐνέργεια) καὶ τίθησι καὶ αὐτὴν μεσότητα τοῦ τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη, φησὶ, μεσότης ἐστίν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότεροις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἴσον ἔστι μέσον τοῦ πλέονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος. ἔστι δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ μέσου ἴσου, ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. δίκαιος δὲ 5 λέγεται ὁ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, οὐ κατ' ἀνάγκην, πρακτικὸς τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικός, εἴτε συμμερίζοι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ εἴτε συμμερίζοι ἑτέροις οὐχ ὥστε ἔχειν τὸν μὲν τὸ πλεόν τὸν δὲ τὸ ἐλάττον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε κακόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον πλὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν· ἄδικος δὲ ὁ κατὰ προαίρεσιν πρακτικὸς τοῦ ἀδίκου.

Diagramma xvi



cf. Arist. EN 1133b29–1134a1

1134a6–1134b8 ια' (ἡ δ' ἀδικία τὸναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου...)


Ἀδικία ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου καὶ βλαβεροῦ· καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐδεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐκὼν βλάπτει, ὡς ἐρεῖ παρακατιῶν, διαιρεῖ καὶ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς μὲν ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ὠφελίμον ἐλλείπει δὲ τὸ βλαβερόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνίσως μὲν καὶ οὕτω διανέμεται τὸ διδόμενον (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ «ὁμοίως»), πρὸς τὸ ἀνάλογον δέ, οἷον ὅτε κρίνεται ἡ διανεμησις πρὸς τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἐπεὶ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστι τὸ 15 ἄδικον· εἰ μὲν φυλαχθῆ τὸ ἀνάλογον, δίκαιον ἂν εἴη καὶ τῷ τὸ πλεόν ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ τὸ ἐλάττον· εἰ δὲ μὴ φυλαχθῆ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρῳ προσνεμηθήσεται τὸ πλεόν καὶ ὁποτέρῳ τὸ ἐλάττον οὐ δῆλον. γράφεται δὲ καὶ «παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον» καὶ ἔστιν σαφεστέρα ἢ γραφὴ· «παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον» γὰρ τὸ ἄδικον λέγει. ὧ γοῦν τὸ ἐλάττον δοθήσεται ὡς ἀδικηθῆναι (ὁ γὰρ τὸ πλεόν λαβὼν οὐκ ἠδίκηται), ἄδηλον· καὶ οὐχ 20 ὡσπερ ἦν ἐπὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τὸ πλεόν ἀπένευμε καὶ τὸν μερίτην ἠδίκη ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀδικεῖσθαι δὲ ἐλάττον ἀδίκημά ἐστιν ἢ ἀδικεῖν,

1–9 Εἴρηται...ἀδίκου] cf. Arist. EN 1133b29–1134a7 11–19 Ἀδικία...ἀνάλογον] cf. Arist. EN 1134a7–12 22–208,1 ἀδικεῖσθαι...ἀδικεῖσθαι] cf. Arist. EN 1134a12–13

10 Im. addidi 12 ἑαυτοῖς M (cum M^b): αὐτοῦ Arist. vulg. (EN 1134a10)

Well then, the issues concerning the *unjust* and the *just* have been discussed. He also discusses *just action* (just action is the activity of the just man) and he establishes it too as a *mean between acting unjustly and suffering injustice*. Justice, he says, is a *mean*, not in the same way as the virtues previously discussed are, but because equality is a mean between more and less. Justice, then, involves an intermediate equality, whereas injustice [involves] the extremes. A just man is defined as one who effects that which is just by deliberate choice, not by being forced to do so, and when he distributes things, whether he doles them out between himself and another or he doles them out among others, [and he does so] not in such a way that one person has more and the other less, whether [what is shared] is good or harmful, but an equal share, although according to proportion; whereas the unjust man is the one who deliberately chooses to do what is unjust.

Diagram xvi



1134a6–1134b8 11. (Injustice, on the other hand, is related to the unjust...)

Injustice is an excess or deficiency of what is beneficial or harmful. And since no one injures himself voluntarily, as [Aristotle] will discuss below, he also distinguishes these [notions], because *in the offenders' own case*, what is beneficial is excessive and what is harmful is deficient. *In the case of other people*, the object offered is thus distributed in an unequal manner (for this is [what Aristotle means by] “similarly”), but with reference to due proportion, for example when the distribution is judged in relation to due proportion, since what is unjust is *disproportionate*. If due proportion is maintained, it would be just both for the person who has more and for the person who has less. Whereas if due proportion is not maintained, *to which of the two parties* the greater share will be assigned and to which of the two parties the smaller share [will be assigned] is unclear. The text reads “*disproportionate*” and the reading is more comprehensible, since he refers to what is unjust as “*disproportionate*”. At any rate, it is unclear to whom the smaller share will be given so that he suffers injustice (for the man who gets more has not suffered injustice); and not as it was in his own case, since he awarded the greater share to himself and treated the man he was sharing with unjustly in regard to goods, but the other way around in relation to evils. *To be treated unjustly is a lesser injustice than to act unjustly*, and *to act unjustly*

καὶ ἀδικεῖν πλέον ἀδικήμα ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία ἡμετέρα φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξωθεν.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἢ ἕξις ἄλλο δὲ ἢ ἐνέργεια (καὶ ὁ μὲν δρομεὺς τρέχει, οὐ πᾶς δὲ ὁ τρέχων δρομεύς· καὶ ὁ ἄδικος δὲ ἀδικεῖ, οὐ μὴν δὲ ὁ ἀδικήσας ἄδικος, εἰ μὴ ἐνδελεχῶς τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐνεργεῖ· διατοῦτο γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἶπε τὸ «μῆπω»), ἐρωτᾷ ὅποια 5
ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν τις ἤδη καὶ ἄδικος κληθήσεται κατὰ ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν. καὶ λύων φησὶν «οὐδὲν διοίσει τοῦτο», ὥστε κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἄδικον λέγεσθαι· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν κακίαν προαιρέσεως καὶ συνηθείας ἢ ἕξις καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν κρίνεται, καὶ οὐκ εἴ τις μέγα τι πέπραχεν ἐγκλημα. ὁ γὰρ δι' ἀρχὴν προαιρέσεως 10
γυναικὶ συγγενόμενος, μοιχός· ὁ δὲ διὰ πάθος μόνον ἠττηθεὶς τοῦ πάθους, ἀδικεῖ μὲν, 10
ἄδικος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι.

Δεῖ δὲ μὴ δὲ τοῦτο λανθάνειν, φησὶν, ὅτι ζητεῖται ἡμῖν ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ βίου πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκως ἔχειν τοὺς πολίτας τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς ἰσότητος· ἰσότητα δὲ διχῶς· ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν (καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ἰσότης ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ ἐν ἀνισότητι γίνεται) ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν 15
[39v] (τῷ λαβεῖν τόσον τοῦτον, ὅσον κάκεῖνον). ἢ εἰ γοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦτο (ὥσπερ 15
λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς Κύκλωψιν εἶναι· ἕκαστος γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐθεμίστευε, καὶ νόμου χρεία οὐκ ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰρηκῶς ἔχουσι), λείπει ἐκ τούτων τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, περὶ οὗ οἱ νόμοι διαγορεύουσι τὰς ἀδικίας, ὡς ἐλέγομεν, ἐξισάζοντες. τί δὲ δίκαιον λέγεται καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. ἐκείνοις γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 20
πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐ πρὸς τινὰς τῶν ἐξωθεν. νόμος δέ, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἀδικία· εἰ μὴ γὰρ 20
ἀνισοῖντο, πῶς ἂν ὁ νόμος ἐξισάζειν πέφυκε; καὶ ὅπου ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀντιστρέφοι. τί δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πολλακίς ἐρρήθη.

Διὸ οὐκ ἄρχει ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ὁ νόμος, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τὸ πλέον παρέχει τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ γίνεται ἄδικος. εἰ δ' ἐξέχεται τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὐ πλέον παρέχει (εἰ μὴ γε 25
πολλακίς κατ' ἀναλογίαν τινά· καὶ διαταῦτα οὐχ ἑαυτῷ πονεῖ, ἀλλ' ἑτέρῳ· ὅτι καὶ 25
ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν ἢ δικαιοσύνη ἐλέγετο), δοτέος μισθὸς τῷ ἄρχοντι, τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἰκανὰ ταῦτα, τύραννος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ διανεμητικὸν τὸ δὲ διορθωτικὸν (ὧν τὸ μὲν λέγεται κατὰ γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν, τὸ δὲ ἐπανορ-

5–7 μῆπω...τοῦτο] cf. Arist. EN 1134a17–19 9–11 ὁ...ἔστι] cf. Arist. EN 1134a19–21
12–14 Δεῖ...ἀριθμὸν] cf. Arist. EN 1134a24–28 15 εἰ...τοῦτο] cf. Arist. EN 1134a28 17 λείπει...
δίκαιον] cf. Arist. EN 1134a28–29 18–20 τί...ἀδικία] cf. Arist. EN 1134a29–31 21 καὶ¹...ἀδικεῖν]
cf. Arist. EN 1134a32 23–24 Διὸ...ἄδικος] cf. Arist. EN 1134a35–1134b1 24–27 εἰ¹...τύραννος]
cf. Arist. EN 1134b2–8 27–210,1 τοῦ...ἀριθμητικὴν] cf. Mich. In EN 42.27–29

20 αὐτοὺς scripsi ex Arist. EN 1134a30 : αὐτὸν M 23 νόμος M (cum M^b νόμον) : λόγον Arist. vulg. (EN 1134a35) 24 ἄδικος M : τύραννος Arist. vulg. (EN 1134b1)

is a *greater* injustice than suffering injustice; because acting unjustly is in our own power, and the wickedness involved is evidently our own, whereas suffering injustice is one of the things that is not in our power, but is external.

Since a disposition is one thing, an activity another (the runner runs, but not every man who runs is a runner; and the unjust man acts unjustly, but a man who acted unjustly is certainly not unjust, unless he commits the injustice continuously; because this is why he [i.e. Aristotle] said “*not necessarily*”), he asks *what sort of unjust acts someone must have done already* in order to be called *unjust* in regard to *every type of injustice*. And in resolving this [issue] he says “This [i.e. the type of action] *will make no difference*”, with the result that an act is called “unjust” in relation to the scale of the unjust act; for the disposition and the person who acts in accord with the disposition are judged on the basis of the deliberate choice regarding the vice and on the basis of habit, and not [depending on] whether someone has committed a great crime. *For the man who has intercourse with a woman in the first instance because of a deliberate choice is an adulterer*, whereas the man who does so only *under the influence of passion*, since he has been defeated by his passion, *commits an injustice, but he is not unjust*.

But we must not forget the fact, he says, *that we are investigating a common life aimed at allowing our citizens to enjoy freedom and equality in a self-sufficient fashion*, and the *equality* [they enjoy] is twofold: *either according to proportion* (for this is equality, even if it arises in inequality) *or according to an arithmetic standard* (by one person getting the same amount as the other person). || If then *this [feature] does not* [39v] *exist among those [who are free and equal]* (as they say it was for the Cyclopes; because each of them managed his private affairs, and there was no need for law among them, since they lived peacefully), they lack *the political justice* discussed by the laws which, as we were saying, equalise inequalities. But *what is just* is defined *by analogy*. *For political justice belongs only to those who are governed by law*, especially *in their mutual relations* rather than in their relations to people from outside [the community]. *But law exists among those between whom there is injustice*; for unless they act without regard for equity, how would the law’s nature be to produce equity? And where there is *injustice*, *there is also unjust action*, even though the relation might not be reciprocal. What unjust action is has been discussed many times.

This is why it is not a human being that rules, but the law, *because [the human being] provides himself with a greater share of the goods and becomes unjust*. If, however, he clings to *the just* and *does not supply himself with a greater share [of the goods]* (except that this is often somehow *proportionate [to his merits]*), and *for these reasons one labours not for oneself, but for another*; since *justice was said to be another person’s good*, *a reward must be given to the ruler*, [that is] *honour and privilege*. *But he for whom such rewards are insufficient is a tyrant*. Since one part of *political justice is distributive*, whereas *the other part is corrective* (the former of these is defined in accord with *geometrical proportion*, while the corrective conforms to

θωτικὸν κατὰ ἀριθμητικὴν), διατοῦτο καὶ λέγει τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀναλογίαν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, δηλῶν τὰ δύο εἶδη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου.

1134b8–1135a9 ἰβ' (τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον...)

Λέγει καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ μὴ πολιτικοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ καθ' ὁμοίτητα τούτου, δηλονότι τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ (ὅπερ δεσπότης εἰς κτήματα ἔχει καὶ δούλους) καὶ τοῦ 5
 πατρικοῦ (ὅπερ εἰς παῖδας ἔχει). καὶ λέγει ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον οὐ ταῦτόν τοις
 προειρημένοις ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίον τι. διατί; ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ· οὐδεὶς
 γὰρ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ. εἰ δ' ἀδικία οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δίκαιον πάντως· τῆς γὰρ ἀδικίας τοῦτο
 μεσότης, πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία ἐν τούτοις; καίτοι γε μεμερισμένως κατανοουμέ-
 νων καὶ τῶν κτημάτων καὶ τῶν τέκνων, φησὶν ὅτι τὸ κτήμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ἦ 10
 πηλίκον (οἰοῖναι ὑπεξούσιον καὶ ἀτελὲς διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ μὴ χωρισθῆ), μέρος αὐτοῦ
 λογίζονται· καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδεὶς ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ τέκνα ἢ τὰ κτήματα
 ἀδικήσει. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πολλοῦ δικαίου ἐν τούτοις ἐστίν ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ τὸ
 βλάπτεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ, οὐ· μέρη γὰρ τὰ τέκνα καὶ οἱ δούλοι τοῦ ὄλου
 καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδεὶς βλάπτει ἑαυτὸν ἢ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ ταῦτα πάντως, ὥστε ἐπὶ 15
 τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οὔτε ἀδικόν ἐστίν οὔτε τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον· τὸ γὰρ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον
 νόμῳ συνίσταται ἐν ἐκείνοις ἐν οἷς πέφυκεν εἶναι νόμος. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον
 πολιτικὸν δίκαιον πρὸς τὴν γυναϊκά ἐστι· νόμῳ γὰρ εἴργεται τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀθετεῖν
 φίλτρα καὶ προσκολλᾶσθαι ἑτέρας. τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τέκνοις καὶ κτήμασι δίκαιον οἰκονομικόν
 ἐστίν· ἕτερον δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ. 20

Τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ νομικόν· φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ
 πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν· δοκεῖ γὰρ πᾶσιν ἐσθίειν πεινάσαντας καὶ μὴ
 ἑαυτοὺς αὐθεντεῖν καὶ φονεῦειν, τὸν πατέρα τιμᾶν, τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσι, τὸ
 τὸν θεὸν σέβειν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· τὸ δὲ νομικὸν μὴ τεθὲν μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει, κἂν οὕτω 25
 πράξοι τις κἂν ἄλλως· τεθὲν δὲ βέβαιόν ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ λυτροῦσθαι μὴ ἐπέκεινα μνᾶς τὸν
 ἐαλωκότα, καὶ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ πρόβατα, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ἐπὶ τοῖς κατέκαστα.
 ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλως διαιροῦσιν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν ἀκίνητον, κινεῖται δὲ τὸ νόμιμον.
 τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ φυσικὸν κινήτόν· οὐ πᾶν δέ.

[40r] || Ἔπειτα δὲ ἐρωτᾷ ὅτι, εἴπερ καὶ ἄμφω κινήτά, ποῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ 30
 ἐνδεχόμενον κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖον οὐ. εὔρηται γοῦν φύσει κρείττων ἢ δεξιά, ἀλλὰ

4–13 Λέγει...ἀδικήσει] cf. Arist. EN 1134b8–12 16–17 οὔτε¹...νόμος] cf. Arist. EN 1134b13–14
 17–18 μᾶλλον...ἐστὶ] cf. Arist. EN 1134b15–16 19–20 τὸ...πολιτικοῦ] cf. Arist. EN 1134b16–18
 21–22 Τοῦ...δύναμιν] Arist. EN 1134b18–19 23 τὸ²...ἐνδεέσι] Arist. EN 1163a34 24–28 τὸ...δέ]
 cf. Arist. EN 1134b20–28 29–30 εἴπερ...οὐ] Arist. EN 1134b30–32 30–212,12 φύσει...διαφορᾶν]
 cf. Arist. EN 1134b33–1135a9

3 Im. addidi 4 μὴ s.l. 17 τοιοῦτον s.l. 22 πεινάσαντας correcti : πινάσαντα M

arithmetical proportion), for this reason he also says that the former accords with due proportion, the latter with arithmetical [proportion], demonstrating the two forms of political justice.

1134b8–1135a9 12. (Justice for a master...)

He also discusses the kind of *justice* that is not political, *but is analogous* to this, namely that of a *master* (that which a master has in relation to his *property* and slaves) *and that of a father* (that which he has in relation to his *children*). And he says that this *justice is not the same as those discussed previously* [i.e. *absolute and political justice*], *but [is] something similar*. Why is this so? Because *there can be no injustice towards what is one's own*, since no one treats himself unjustly. And if *there is no injustice, there is certainly nothing just*, since the latter is the mean of injustice. But how can there be no injustice in these contexts? In fact, if *one's property and one's children* are conceived as parts [of oneself], he says that *one's possession or one's child, until it is old enough* (as long as [the child] is subject to the authority of another and is incomplete because of its youth *and does not assume a separate status*), is counted *as part of oneself*. And *just as no one will injure himself*, so too no one will treat his children or property unjustly. Most forms of just action are matters of who injures and who is injured, but just action involving a master is not [of this sort], because his children and slaves are parts of the whole [household]; and just as no one will injure himself or a part of himself, he will surely not injure these [i.e. his children or slaves], with the result that in these cases *neither justice nor injustice in the political sense* exists. *For the political form of justice has been established by law among persons whose relations are naturally regulated by law*. This political justice thus *exists in a fuller degree in one's relation to one's wife*, since it is prohibited by law to dissolve one's affection towards her and attach oneself to other women. But the *just action that relates to one's children and property is domestic justice, and this is different from political justice*.

One part of political justice is natural, the other legal. The natural has the same validity everywhere, since everyone considers it good to eat when they feel hungry and not to commit suicide or murder, to honour one's father, *to help those in need*, to worship God, and the like. *If the legal [type of justice] is not enacted, it has no influence*, regardless of whether one could act *this way or contrarily*; but once it is enacted, it is firmly established, *for example that the ransom of a prisoner should not exceed one mina, or that the sacrifice should consist of a goat rather than sheep*, and countless other [regulations] *enacted for particular cases*. But others determine differently, *because a law of nature is immutable*, whereas legal prescription can be altered. *This is not [entirely] so, however, but there is also the natural that is liable to alteration, although not in every case*.

|| Next, he asks, *if both [the natural and the legal] are changeable, in the case of* [40r] *natural [types of justice] what sort of object is liable to alteration, and what sort is not*. It has been found, for example, that *the right hand is naturally stronger*, but this is

πολλοῖς παρακεκίνηται τοῦτο, καί εἰσιν ἢ ἀμφιδέξιοι ἢ ἀριστερόχειρες· καί εἴ τινές εἰσιν, ἐνδέχεται καί πάντας τοιούτους γίνεσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην τῶν δικαίων, ἐπεὶ πρὸς τὸ συνοῖσον μετατίθενται, ὅμοιά εἰσι τοῖς μέτροις, ᾧ πωλοῦσι καὶ ᾧ ἐξωνοῦνται τινες, ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς μείζω μὲν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι, ἐλάττω δὲ ἐν τῷ πωλεῖν.

5

Ὅμοίως καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτά εἰσι (μὴ) φυσικὰ ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ οὐ διήκοντα καὶ εἰς ἄλλα ζῶα· οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι μόνοι πολιτεύονται, καὶ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τούτων διάφοροι, ὧν μία ὡσανεὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη. τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθέκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλὰ καὶ καθέκαστα, τὸ δὲ ἔν· καθόλου γάρ· δημοκρατία ἴσως ἢ ἀριστοκρατία ἢ βασιλεία· τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστον 10 ἔν· καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἐκάστης πολιτείας ἔν, πολλὰ δὲ κατ' αὐτὸ τὰ συμπίπτοντα. ἐντεῦθεν λέγει καὶ ἀδικήματος καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ δικαίωματος καὶ δικαίου διαφορὰν.

1135a8–1135b8 ἰγ' (διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον...)

Κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν κρίνεται τὸ ἀδίκημα· πρὶν γὰρ πραχθῆναι, ἄδικον λέγεται, μετὰ δὲ τὸ πραχθῆναι ἀδίκημα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιον πρὶν πραχθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τὸ πραχθῆναι 15 δικαίωμα· μᾶλλον δὲ κοινῶς καὶ καθολικῶς δικαιοπράγημα λέγεται, δικαίωμα δὲ ἰδίως τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ τρόπος τούτου δικαιοπράγης. πόσα δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἀδικημάτων τε καὶ δικαιωμάτων εἶδη καὶ περὶ ποῖά εἰσιν ὑποκείμενα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεψόμεθα.

Τούτων ὄντων τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, ἀδικεῖ τις καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ κατὰ 20 συμβεβηκός· συμβέβηκε γὰρ τῷ ὄντι ἀδίκῳ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖν, καὶ τῷ ὄντι δικαίῳ δικαιοπραγεῖν· τοῖς γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχουσιν ἔπεται καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια. «κατὰ συμβεβηκός» δὲ λέγει, ὅτι συμβαίνει δικαίῳ ὄντι ἀδικεῖν ἐκ βίας καὶ ἀδίκῳ δικαιοπραγεῖν ἐκ βίας, ἢ ὅτι ἡ κατὰ δικαιοσύνην πρᾶξις ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον. συμβαίνει γοῦν τοῖς οὖσι τὴν ἕξιν δικαίοις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια, καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός δικαίων ὄντων ἐκείνων κατὰ 25 συμβεβηκός εἶναι καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν δικαίαν, ἀδίκων δὲ ἄδικον. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν οὐ ζητεῖται τοιαύτη πρᾶξις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ πολλακῶς ἐνεργεῖν ἢ ἕξις συνίσταται. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶξιν ζητεῖ, καὶ οἱ ὄντες δίκαιοι δικαιοπραγήσουσιν καὶ οἱ ὄντες ἄδικοι ἀδικήσουσι· καὶ ἔστι ταῦτα κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

14–23 πρὶν...λέγει] cf. Arist. EN 1135a9–19 29 καὶ...συμβεβηκός] cf. Arist. EN 1135a18

6 μὴ addidi ex Arist. EN 1135a3 13 Im. addidi

different for many people, and some are either *ambidextrous* or left-handed; and if some are [ambidextrous], *it is possible for everyone to become this way. The rules of justice based on convention, since they can be changed to match what will be expedient, are like measures*, and some people *sell* with one and *buy* with another, so that the same individuals use *larger measures* when they buy, but *smaller* when they sell.

Similarly, there are many such laws (not) *ordained by nature but by human [enactment]* and which do not extend to other living creatures. For only human beings have a form of government, and their *political constitutions* vary, one of which, that *by nature*, as it were, [is] *the best*. Each [type of] *just and lawful [action]* is related as a universal to the [corresponding] *particulars*; for the actions performed are many and particular, whereas each [type] is one, since it is universal; perhaps [it is] a democracy or an aristocracy or a monarchy; for each of these is one; and what is just for each political constitution is one, while the events included in it [i.e. the constitution and thus the area it governs] are many. After this, he also discusses the difference between “an act of injustice” and “what is unjust”, and between “an act of justice” and “what is just”.

1135a8–1135b8 13. (An act of injustice and what is unjust are different...)

An unjust act is judged in relation to activity [i.e. performance], since *before it is done*, it is called “unjust”, but *after it has been done* [it is termed] “an unjust act”. And similarly, *before [a just act] is done* [it is called] “just”, but *after it has been done*, it is designated “a just act”; however, it is more commonly and generally called “just behaviour”, since “a just act” strictly speaking is the rectification of an act of injustice, and the manner in which this is done is corrective. We will consider later how many kinds of these unjust and just actions there are, as well as the nature of the things to which they relate.

Assuming that just and unjust actions are as described, a person behaves unjustly or justly by coincidence, in the sense that a person who is truly unjust coincidentally behaves in accord with this and acts unjustly, while the person who is truly just [coincidentally] behaves justly; because the activity follows those who possess the disposition [in question]. He says “coincidentally”, because it can happen that a just person is forced to act unjustly or an unjust person is forced to act justly, rather than because what is just coincides with conduct which conforms to justice. At any rate, it falls to the lot of those who are just by disposition to do what is just; and if they are just coincidentally, their conduct is also just in a coincidental sense, while the conduct of those who are unjust [coincidentally] is unjust [coincidentally as well]. In relation to the other virtues, however, this conduct is not what is asked after, but the disposition is established by the frequent exercise [of the virtue in question]. Justice, on the other hand, requires [expression in] action, and genuinely just persons will act justly, while genuinely unjust persons will act unjustly; and these are matters of coincidence.

Τὸ δὲ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ δικαιοπράγημα ὄρισται τῷ ἔκουσίῳ, ὡς λέγεσθαι μὲν τοιαῦτα ἂν ἔκουσίως γίνωνται, μὴ λέγεσθαι δὲ τοιαῦτα εἰ ἀκουσίως· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄδικα μὲν εἰσι καὶ ἀδίκως πράττονται, οὐπω δὲ ἀδικήματά εἰσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ἔκουσίως πράττωνται. ὀρίζεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔκούσιον, ὃ ἂν τις τῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὄντων εἰδῶς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν μήτε ὄν τύπτει μήτε ᾧ ὀργάνῳ τύπτει μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα τύπτει πράττει. προσκείσθω δὲ 5 καὶ τὸ «μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός»· πέφυκε γὰρ ἀπειναί μὲν πᾶσαν τῶν τοιούτων ἄγνοιαν, μὴ εἶναι δ' αὖθις ἔκουσίαν τὴν πρᾶξιν. ἐχρήσατο γὰρ τις τῇ τούτου χειρὶ καὶ ἕτερον ἔτυψεν εἰδότης ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ ὄν τύπτει καὶ ᾧ. προστίθει δὲ καὶ τὸ «οὐ ἔνεκα», ἵν' ὑβρίσῃ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι καὶ πατέρα τὸν τυπτόμενον καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ταῦτα πάντα διωρίσθωσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τελῶν, καὶ περὶ ὅλην τὴν πρᾶξιν. 10

[40v] Τὸ δὲ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον ἢ βίᾳ δὲ γινόμενον, ἀκούσιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἢ εἰδῆσις ποιεῖ πανταχοῦ τὸ ἔκούσιον· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ἀλλ' ἀκουσίως· δήλου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἐγγηρᾶν καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐτε ἀκουσίως οὐθ' ἔκουσίως ταῦτα πάσχομεν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον ἔχουσι· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παρακαταθήκην, 15 ἀλλ' ὅμως τινὸς ἄκοντος ἀποδόντος, οὐ φατέον δίκαια πρᾶξαι ἐκεῖνον, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀνάγκην μὴ ἀποδοῦς ἀδικεῖ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

1135b8–1135b33 ἰδ' (τῶν δὲ ἔκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν...)

Ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς προβουλεύσεως καὶ τῶν ὅσα ἐκ ταύτης πράττομεν «προελόμενοι» λέγει, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων «οὐ προαιρούμενοι» φησί, λίαν ἀσφαλῶς ταῖς λέξεσι χρώμενος. ὅπου γὰρ προβούλευσις καὶ προαίρεσις τοῦ τάδε πρᾶξαι, τέλος ἔλαβεν ἢ προαίρεσις, καὶ οἰκεῖον ἐν τούτοις τὸ «προελόμενοι». ὅταν δὲ ἀπροβουλεύτως πράττωμεν, οὐδὲ χώραν ἔσχηκεν ἢ προαίρεσις, καὶ οἰκεῖον τούτοις τὸ «μὴ προαιρούμενοι». οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ μὴ προελέσθαι· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν προβουλευμάτων ἢ προείλετό τις ἢ οὐ προείλετο, τὰ δὲ ἀπροβούλευτα οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐσκέφθη μὴ ὅτι γε προαιρεθῆ- 25 ναι ἀνάγκη.

Τριῶν οὖν οὐσῶν τῶν ἐν τούτοις βλαβῶν, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτηματά ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὄν ἔτυψε μήτε ὁ πράττει μήτε ᾧ τινι πράττει μήτε χάριν τίνος ὑπέλαβε

1–17 Τὸ...συμβεβηκός? cf. Arist. EN 1135a19–1135b8 19–26 Ἐπὶ...ἀνάγκη] cf. Arist. EN 1135b8–11 27–216,1 Τριῶν...πρᾶξιν] cf. Arist. EN 1135b11–13

18 Im. addidi 21 ἔλαβεν scripsi : ἔλαβον M

An unjust behaviour and a just behaviour are defined by what is voluntary, so that they are denoted such [i.e. as “acts of injustice or of justice”] when they take place voluntarily, but are not denoted such if [they take place] involuntarily. For many things are unjust and are done unjustly, but they are not yet acts of injustice, unless they are performed voluntarily. A “voluntary action” is defined as any action within the agent’s own control which he performs knowingly and not in ignorance, be it of whom he strikes, or of the instrument with which he strikes, or of the goal for which he strikes. Let “that which is not coincidental” be added [to the definition]; since every kind of ignorance of these [factors] is naturally excluded, and [this means that] the action is again not voluntary. For A used the hand of B and struck C [with it], although B knew all these factors, namely, both whom he was striking and with what. And [Aristotle] also adds “the goal for which”, in order to insult the person [i.e. C]. Or again, it is possible that his father might be the person struck, without him being aware of this; all these [types of ignorance] may be defined in relation both to the goal and ends attained, and to the action as a whole.

An act committed in ignorance, or one that is not done in ignorance || but is [40v] performed under compulsion, is thus involuntary; for knowledge does not make the action voluntary in every case, since there are many natural processes that we perform or endure knowingly but involuntarily; because growing old and dying are obvious examples, but nevertheless we experience these [processes] neither voluntarily nor involuntarily. All these [types of actions] are just or unjust in a coincidental sense; because it is just to return a deposit, but nonetheless when one returns it unwillingly, one should not say that that person acted justly, except coincidentally. Similarly, the person who under compulsion fails to return [a deposit] acts unjustly in a coincidental sense.

1135b8–1135b33 14. (We perform some voluntary actions by choice...)

With regard to *antecedent deliberation* and *whatever acts we undertake* on that basis, he says [we do these] “*on the basis of a previous decision*”, whereas in the case of *acts done without antecedent deliberation*, “*we [act] not on the basis of a previous decision*”, he says, choosing his words very carefully. For where there is antecedent deliberation and a previous choice to undertake these actions, our previous choice comes to fruition, and in these circumstances the expression “*we [act] on a previous decision*” is appropriate. But when we act without forethought, choice has no part, and the expression “*we [act] on the basis of no previous decision*” is appropriate in these circumstances. For acting without choice is not the same in these contexts; for in regard to cases of forethought, either one chose ahead of time or one did not, whereas actions undertaken without deliberation do not involve initial consideration, nor even when previous choice is necessary.

Of the three ways of inflicting harms in these [sorts of interactions], therefore, actions done out of ignorance are errors, if someone performs them [while unaware of] the person whom he struck, or what he does, or the instrument with which he acts, or

ταῦτα πράξει. ταῦτα οὖν τὰ ἐν τῷ καθόλου ἀμαρτήματα, ἂν ἡ βλάβη παραλόγως γένηται, ἀτύχημα λέγεται, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα (ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀτυχήματος ἔξωθεν· διατοῦτο καὶ παραλόγως γίνεται τότε τὸ πλημμεληθέν). ἀδικήματα δὲ εἰσιν ὅσα εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ προβουλευσας δὲ πέπραχεν, οἷον 5
διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φυσικὰ πάθη. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀδικήματα μὲν λέγονται, οὐ μέντοι οἱ πράττοντες ἄδικοι δι' αὐτὰ τὰ ἄδικα, διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη γίνεται (παρωξύνθησαν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πάθους)· ὅτε δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, τότε ἄδικος ὁ πράξας καὶ πονηρός.

Διὸ τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ πράττων, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσις. ἔτι δὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ οὐκ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἐπισηπεσοῦσης τῆς ὀργῆς 10
καὶ διακοπούσης τὸ προβουλευέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ μόνου, κρίνοντος ἐξαίφνης δίκαιον τὸ ἀμύνασθαι· ἐπιπόλαιος γὰρ ἀδικία ἢ ὀργή ἐστι, καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς πράξεως κατακρατούσης τῆς ὀργῆς οὐκ ἀμφισβητεῖται, τὸ δίκαιον δέ, πότερος ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν δύο.

Τὸ ἀνάπαλιν δὲ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι· περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, 15
ἂν ὁ ἕτερος πονηρός ἐστιν ὡς μὴ ποιῶν τὰς συνθήκας, εἰ μὴ διὰ λήθην ἠθέτησε τὰ συμπεφωνημένα· ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα περὶ μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ὁμολογοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρως τὸ δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσι. καὶ ἵνα καθαρώτερον διασαφηθῇ ὁ λόγος, ἐν μὲν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι συμφωνία ἐστί, καὶ τὸ συντεθὲν δίκαιον καὶ δῆλον, καὶ πονηρός ὁ μὴ ποιῶν κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας. τὸ γοῦν γενέσθαι τὸ συμφωνηθὲν καὶ ὅτι ὁ ποιήσας 20
δίκαιος, ἀναμφιβόλως· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον ἔστι τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖται τὸ γενέσθαι εἰ καὶ οὕτω συμπεφωνῶνται. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐκ συναρπαγῆς ὀργῇ τὸ μὲν ἢ οὕτω χρὴ γενέσθαι ἢ οὕτως οὐκ ἀμφισβητεῖται διὰ τὴν ὀργὴν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ τὸ δίκαιον, ὡς ἐκεῖσε ἢ πρᾶξις, τοῦ δικαίου φανεροῦ ὄντος διὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν. εἰ δὲ γε ἐπιβουλεύει, τὰ τῆς συμφωνίας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ· καὶ ἔστι τότε αὐτὸς ἄδικος, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἀδικεῖται· καὶ οὐκ ἀμφισβητεῖται ἀληθῶς τὸ δίκαιον. 25

[41r] || 1136a5–1136a35 *ιε'* (τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν ἐστί συγγνωμονικά...)

Τῶν ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων, ὅσα ἀγνοοῦντες πράττουσι ἄνθρωποι, διττὴ ἢ διαφορὰ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττουσι, καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ λέγονται συγγνωμονικά. ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ τις τὸν νόμον ὅτι κολάζει τὸν ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ μιγνύμενον· δι' 30

1–18 ἂν...ἀμφισβητοῦσι] cf. Arist. EN 1135b16–33 28–30 Τῶν...συγγνωμονικά] cf. Arist. EN 1136a5–7

8 πονηρός M (cum M^b) : μοχθηρός Arist. vulg. (EN 1135b25) 27 Im. addidi

why he undertook [the action]. In regard to these errors in the general sense of the term, if the harm is inflicted contrary to reasonable expectation, it is called “a misfortune”; and when it is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but is done without malice, [it is called] “an error” (for the origin is from the agent, whereas in the case of a misfortune it is from outside; this is why in the former case the offence occurs contrary to reasonable expectation). *Unjust acts* are whatever someone has done knowingly but without advance deliberation, for example due to anger, wrath, grief or natural passions of this sort. For these [acts] are referred to as “unjust deeds”, but the agents are not unjust on account of the unjust acts in themselves, nor are they wicked on account of them; because the harm does not occur due to wickedness (because [the agents] were spurred on by passion). On the other hand, when [an injury is done] with premeditation, then the agent is unjust and wicked.

As a consequence, acts driven by anger do not result from premeditation, because it is not the man who acted out of passion who initiated the situation, but the man who provoked him. Moreover, the matter in dispute is not whether the event occurred or not, since the anger burst in and disrupted [the agent’s] ability to think ahead, but whether it was just and nothing more, since in the heat of the moment [the agent] considers self-defence just. For anger is a superficial injustice, and there is no dispute about whether anger takes control of the action, but about the justice [of the situation], meaning which of the two parties has justice on his side.

The opposite occurs in commercial transactions, because the fact of the injury is disputed, and one of the two parties is [supposedly] wicked, since he does not act in accord with their agreement, unless he neglected what had been contracted due to forgetfulness. But in the case under consideration, they agree about the matter itself, but are in dispute about which side justice lies on. In order to add further clarity to this account, in business transactions there is an agreement, and what has been covenanted to is [defined as] just and is clear, and the party who does not behave according to the agreement is [defined as] wicked. That the agreement took place, at any rate, and that the person who acts [in accord with it] is just, is [regarded as] beyond dispute; what is in dispute is which side is in the right; and it is also disputed whether what happened is what was agreed to. But in the case of impulsive anger, whether it should have happened this way or that is not in dispute, because of the anger [involved]; but what is just is in dispute, as is the action there, since justice is apparent due to the agreement. And if one party plots against the other, he is not unaware of the terms of their agreement; and in that case he is unjust, while the other party is treated unjustly. But what is just is not truly a matter of dispute.

|| 1136a5–1136a35 15. (Some involuntary actions are pardonable...)

[41r]

Of the involuntary offences that human beings commit in ignorance, there are two sorts: because they do some in ignorance and out of ignorance, and these are said to be pardonable. For example, someone is unaware that the law punishes the man who has intercourse with another man’s wife; he acts out of ignorance, because

ἄγνοιαν δὴ πράττει, εἰδὼς μὲν τοῦτο, ἀγνοῶν δὲ ὅτι αὕτη συνοικεῖ ἀνδρὶ. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τούτοις συγγνωμονικά· ὅσα δὲ ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως διὰ προαίρεσιν ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὡς μὴ γινώσκειν τὸ καθέκαστον· οἶδασι γὰρ ἴσως ὅτι αὕτη ἀνδρὶ συνοικεῖ), ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διὰ πάθος τι πράττουσιν ἢ φυσικόν, ὡς διὰ πείναν, ἢ ἀνθρωπικόν, ὡς δι' ὀργὴν καὶ λύπην, οὐ συγγνωμονικά. οἱ γὰρ συναρπασθέντες ἀπὸ τινος παραλό- 5
γου ὀρμῆς καὶ πάθους ἢ γοῦν φυσικοῦ ἢ μὲν ἀνθρώποις πρέποντος (ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ πάλιν συγγνώμην φέρουσι) συγγνώμης ἄξιοι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐ συγγνωμονικά· τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτοὺς οὐ δεφενδεύει τὸ μὴ ψέγεσθαι—μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τὸ πάθος ἔχει δεφενδεύειν—καὶ διατοῦτο οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

Μεταταῦτα ἀπορεῖ περὶ οὗ εἶπεν ὁ Εὐριπίδης ἐν τῷ Βελεροφόντῃ, εἰ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ 10
καὶ ἔστιν ἐκόντα τινὰ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐπεὶ λέγει ὁ ποιητής·

ἐκὼν ἐκούσαν κατέκτα· ἢ θέλουσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν.

Πότερον οὖν πᾶν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἀκούσιον, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἅπαν ἐκούσιον; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι εἶπερ πᾶν ἐκούσιον ἢ 15
καὶ ἀκούσιον διαπορητέον· τὸ γὰρ ἐνεργητικόν, οἶονεὶ τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν, πᾶν ἐκούσιον. ἐκούσιον δὲ λέγω τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως· εἰ γὰρ ἔξωθεν βιασθεὶς ἐδικαιοπράγησε, πῶς ἐκούσιον; εὐλογον γάρ, ἐπεὶ ἀντικείμενα τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι· εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἀπλῶς, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον, καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι καὶ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον.

Ἄτοπον οὖν, φησί, δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔστι καὶ ἀκουσίως 20
δικαιοῦσθαι· πολλοὶ γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἐκόντες, ὅτε τινὲς μὴ εἰδότες μὴ δὲ ζητοῦντες τὸ ἐπιβάλλον αὐτοῖς δίκαιον λαμβάνουσι τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν κρινόντων. ἢ καὶ ἄλλως, ὅταν τις ἀδικῶν πλεονεκτικῶς ἀφαιρεῖται τὸ πλεονέκτημα· τότε γὰρ δικαιοῦσθαι λέγεται ἀκουσίως, ὥσπερ ὁ λαβὼν ὁ ἡδίκηθη δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκουσίως· δεδικαιῶσθαι γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ὁ κολαζόμενος παρὰ τοῦ κριτοῦ, καὶ δικαιοπήρια αἰ κολάσεις· 25
δεδικαιῶσθαι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐκδικούμενος κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον αὐτοῦ.

2–5 ὅσα...συγγνωμονικά] cf. Arist. EN 1136a6–9 10–16 Μεταταῦτα...ἐκούσιον] cf. Arist. EN 1136a10–19 12 ἐκὼν...ἐκὼν] Eur. fragm. 304a Kannicht; cf. EN 1136a13–14; cf. [Heliod.] In EN 105.10–11; cf. Eustr. In EN 240.30–35 17–21 εὐλογον...ἐκόντες] cf. Arist. EN 1136a19–23

4 ἀνθρωπικόν M (cum L^bM^bO^b) : ἀνθρώπινον Arist. vulg. (EN 1136a9) 10 Βελεροφόντῃ sic M; servani 20 εἰ μὴ bis M

although he knows this [i.e. that he is sleeping with a woman], he does not know that the woman is living with a man. These errors are thus pardonable in these cases. *Whereas those committed in ignorance* of the law, but are nonetheless done by choice *and not out of ignorance* (so as not to know a particular [circumstantial] detail; for people [generally] perhaps know that she is living with a man), *nor* do they commit them *in response to a physical drive*, e.g. in response to hunger, *or a human emotion*, e.g. in response to anger or pain, [*these errors*] *are not to be pardoned*. Because people who are carried away by an unexpected impulse or passion, be it natural, for example, or fitting for humans (because these [errors], again can be pardoned), they are deserving of forgiveness. Whereas the contrary errors [i.e. those committed in ignorance, but not due to some natural or human passion] do not deserve forgiveness; for, the fact that the agents are ignorant does not justify their being excused from blame—it is rather the passion that can be defended—and for this reason they do not deserve forgiveness.

After this, *he raises a difficulty* in regard to what *Euripides said* in his “*Bellerophon*”, *whether* it is true that someone *can suffer injustice* voluntarily. Since the poet says:

*He willingly killed her who was willing;
or against his will, although she wanted it.*

Is, then, suffering injustice always involuntary, just as acting unjustly is always voluntary? Or is it sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary? And similarly with regard to being treated justly, one must question whether it is always voluntary or if it can be involuntary as well. *For active behaviour, such as behaving justly, is always voluntary*. I mean that behaving justly is voluntary, because it includes the initiation of the movement; for if someone behaved justly under compulsion from an external [catalyst], how is that voluntary? *For this is reasonable, since being treated unjustly and being treated justly are opposites*: if one is to be taken in an absolute sense, the other is also to be taken in an absolute sense, whereas if being treated unjustly can be both voluntary and involuntary, then being treated justly too can be both *voluntary and involuntary*.

It would accordingly appear strange, he says, [if this were true] *in the case of being treated justly, unless* it is also possible to be involuntarily treated justly. *Because many people are treated justly against their will*, as when people unawares and without seeking a penalty that is appropriate to them get this from the judges. Or in a different case, when an individual acting with unjust greed is deprived of his ill-gotten gains; because in that case he is said to be treated justly involuntarily, just as the person who received the wrong he was done [is said to be] voluntarily treated justly, since a man who is punished by the judge is also said to have been treated justly, and punishments [are called] just treatment. So too the man who has suffered vengeance has been treated justly in conformity with what he deserves.

Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο διαπορεῖται, πότερον πᾶς ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται, ἢ ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ πράττων τὰ δίκαια δικαιοπραγεῖ· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ διὰ φόβον πράττειν τὰ δίκαια ἀκουσίως· ὥστε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται τότε μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων· τοῦτο ἐκληπτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μεταλαμβάνει τις, τοῦ μὲν τῶν 5 δικαίων, εἰ ἀκουσίως καὶ διὰ φόβον δικαιοπραγεῖ, τοῦ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκων, εἰ πάσχει τὰ ἄδικα κατὰ τινα τρόπον προσηκόντως· τότε γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πάσχων οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργητικῶν· οὐ γὰρ ταυτόν, φησί, τὸ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν. τυχὸν γὰρ δοῦλος ὢν ὀρισθεὶς ἄδικα μὲν ἔπραξεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· ὁμοίως καὶ μὴ ὢν δίκαιος δικαιοπραγεῖ, δοῦλος ὢν καὶ ὀρισθεὶς, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ· 10 ὡσπερ γὰρ οὐ πᾶς ὁ τὰ ἄδικα πάσχων ἀδικεῖται, οὕτως οὐ πᾶς ὁ τὰ δίκαια πάσχων δικαίως τῶν δικαίων τυγχάνει· ὁ γὰρ ἀπὸ ἀκρατοποσίας ἄδικα πάσχων οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντός τινος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν οὐδεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ, ὥστε ἐπεὶ οὐ πέφυκεν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸν τὸν ἄκρατον πίνοντα, μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅλως συμβαίνει καὶ ἄδικα πάσχοντα, μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἀδικοῦντος. αὐτὸς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν πῶς 15 ἂν ἀδικοῖη ποτέ; ὁμοίως καὶ οὐδεὶς δικαιούται μὴ δικαιοῦντός τινος, δίκαια δέ τις πάσχει καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ δικαιούται· ὁ γὰρ δικαιοπραγῶν οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δ' εἴποι τις ὅτι αὐτός, οὐδὲν ἔρει· αὐτὸς γὰρ τελειοῦται κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀτελεῆς ὢν· οὐ τελειοῖ δὲ ἀτελεῆς ὢν.

1136a31–1137a4 ἰστί' (εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν...)

Ἔτι τοῦ Εὐρυπίδου δοκιμάζει διευθετῆσαι καὶ φέρει τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς, ὅτι ἐκὼν ἔβλαψεν ἑαυτόν· καὶ ὅτι τὸ βλαβερὸν καὶ ὡς βλαβήσεται [41v] οἶδε, συνάγει ὅτι ἐκὼν τις [οὐ] βλάπτεται, ὥστε καὶ ἐκὼν ἢ ἀδικεῖται. εἰ καὶ ἀπορεῖται καὶ τοῦτο, φησὶν «εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν». κἂν τοῦτο μὴ δοίημεν, φησί, 25 τέως ἄλλος ὑπὸ ἄλλου ἐκὼν βλάπτοιο, ὥστε καὶ ἐκὼν ἀδικεῖται τις.

Καὶ λύων ἐπιφέρει ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁ διορισμὸς τοῦ ἀδικεῖν προσθετέον γὰρ καὶ τὸ «παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν». τὸ δὲ «παρὰ» τοῦτο διττὴν ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν καὶ δηλοῦν καὶ τὸ ἔξω (ὡς τὸ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἔξω τοῦ δικαίου) καὶ τὸ διὰ (ὡς τὸ παρὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι μνήματα ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ), δύναται ἐκλαμβάνεσθαι διττῶς, ἐπὶ τε τοῦ ἀδικοῦντος καὶ τοῦ ἀδικουμένου. ὁ γὰρ ἀδικῶν κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν βούλησιν πράττει, καὶ ὁ 30

1–2 Ἐπεὶ...ἐστίν] cf. Arist. EN 1136a23–25 3–8 κατὰ...ἀδικεῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1136a25–28
13–16 ἀδύνατον...ποτέ] cf. Arist. EN 1136a29–1136a35 22–27 ἐκ...παρὰ?] cf. Arist. EN 1136a31–1136b5 28–29 παρὰ²...Αἰγύπτῳ] cf. Sept. Exod. 14.11

For this further difficulty might be raised, whether everyone who has suffered something unjust is treated unjustly, or whether it is the same in the case of acting as it is in the case of suffering; because not everyone who performs just deeds behaves justly, since it is possible to do just deeds involuntarily out of fear. As a consequence, in that case one may have a share in just acts coincidentally; and one must understand this point also in relation to unjust acts, because one has a share in both kinds of acts coincidentally, in just acts, if one behaves justly involuntarily and out of fear, and in unjust acts, if one endures injustice as if it were somehow appropriate, because in that case, although he suffers injustice, he is not treated unjustly; and this is evident from the active senses [of the verb], since doing unjust deeds is not the same, he says, as acting unjustly. For perhaps a slave under orders did unjust things, but he is not unjust. And similarly a person who is not just behaves justly, because he is a slave and is under orders. So too in regard to the passive sense [of the verb]; because in the same way that not everyone who suffers injustice is treated unjustly, so too not everyone who is treated justly gets his just deserts in a just fashion; for the man who suffers unjust things as a result of drinking neat wine is not treated unjustly. Because it is impossible to be treated unjustly if no one acts unjustly, but also again no one treats himself unjustly, so that since it is contrary to nature for the man who drinks unmixed wine to be treated unjustly by himself, it follows that he is not treated unjustly at all, although he suffers unjust things, since there is no one who treats him unjustly. For how would he treat himself unjustly in that case? Similarly, no one is treated justly, unless someone else acts justly. An individual who cultivates virtue for himself also experiences just things, but he is not treated justly, because no one is behaving justly. And if one were to say that it is the man himself, he would be talking nonsense; for that man is complete in virtue, despite being incomplete himself, but he could not bring something to completion while being incomplete.

1136a3–1137a4 16. (But if to act unjustly is simply...)

Moreover, [Aristotle] attempts to straighten out the quotation from Euripides and he offers the definition of unjust action on the basis of *the intemperate man*, because he [i.e. *the intemperate man*] *harms himself voluntarily*; and given that he recognises what is harmful and how he will be harmed, [Aristotle] concludes that *one is harmed voluntarily, with the result that one can voluntarily || be treated unjustly*. Although this [41v] is a debated question, he says “whether it is possible for a person to act unjustly towards himself”. And if we fail to grant this, he says, then one person may voluntarily submit to being harmed by another, so that a person can also be treated unjustly voluntarily.

In resolving [this difficulty], he concludes that *this definition* of unjust action is incorrect; for we must also add “against that person’s [i.e. *the victim’s*] wish”. Since this term “*para*” (“*against*”) has two senses, meaning both “outside” (for example, what is “*para*” the just is outside of the just) and “because” (as in “*because* [“*para*”] *there are no graves in Egypt*”), it can be understood in two ways, with regard to

ἀδικούμενος παρά τὴν οἰκείαν βούλησιν πάσχει. διατοῦτο τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τὸν διορισμὸν λέγων, προστιθεὶς τὸ «παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν» τὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι πάθος ἐμφαίνει· ἀδικεῖται γὰρ παρά τὴν οἰκείαν βούλησιν, παρά τοῦ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν βούλησιν πράττοντος.

Ἐπει τοίνυν ζητοῦμεν τὸν ἀκρατῆ, εἰ ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτὸν ὥστε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι παρ' 5 αὐτοῦ, καὶ εὐρίσκομεν τοῦτον ὅτι ἐκὼν οὐ πράττει, ἀλλὰ παρὰ βούλησιν (βουλόμεθα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σπουδαῖα), ἄρα οὐκ ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτὸν, ὅτι παρὰ τὴν οἰκείαν βούλησιν πράττει· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀδικεῖται, βλάπτεται δέ· ἐκὼν γὰρ βλάπτεται τις, ἐκὼν δ' οὐκ ἀδικεῖται. ἀπὸ γοῦν τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτὸν (παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν γὰρ τὴν ἰδίαν πράττει) συνιστᾶ ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδικεῖται παρ' ἑαυτοῦ (μὴ γὰρ ὄντος 10 τοῦ ἀδικοῦντος οὐδὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδοῦς οὐκ ἀδικεῖται παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶ τὸ δίδοναι) καὶ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸν ἀδικοῦντα.

Ἔτι περὶ τινων δύο λέγει· ἐνὸς μὲν εἰ ἀδικεῖ ὁ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν νεύμας ἢ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλεόν λαβῶν ἐξ ἐκείνου· δευτέρου δὲ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἀλλ' εἴποι τις ὅτι 15 τούτῳ χρησάμενος κατεσκεύασε τὸ μηδένα ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πῶς γοῦν πάλιν προτίθεται περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἀλλ' οὐδὲν καινόν; βούλεται γὰρ ἀκριβῶς τὰ περὶ τούτου διορίσασθαι· ἔλεγε γὰρ καὶ ἄνω ἔν τῶν ἀπορουμένων ὑπάρχειν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ λαβῶν τὸ πλεόν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς μετρίοις ἔστιν ἰδεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆς τὸ ἔλαττον ἑαυτῷ νέμει.

Λύων δὲ λέγει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπλοῦν· τυχὸν γὰρ εἰ ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἔλαττον 20 δίδωσι καὶ νομίζεται ὅτι ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον πλεονεκτεῖ, τῷ πλείονα δόξαν ἐντεῦθεν λαβεῖν ἢ τῷ φιλόκαλος δόξα. ἔτι καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν, ἐπεὶ οὐ πάσχει παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀδικεῖται, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖ. τέως δὲ ὁ τὸ πλεόν ἔχων οὐκ αἰεὶ ἀδικεῖ, εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐ γὰρ ἔνθα τὸ ἄδικον, ἐκεῖ αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἐν 25 τῷ διανέμοντι.

2 προστιθεὶς...βούλησιν] cf. Arist. EN 1136b3–5 5–8 Ἐπει...πράττει] cf. Arist. EN 1136b6–9
8–9 ἐκὼν...ἀδικεῖται] cf. Arist. EN 1136b5–6 11–12 ὁ...ἀδικοῦντα] cf. Arist. EN 1136b9–13
13–14 Ἔτι...ἀδικεῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1136b15–17 17–18 εἰ...ἀδικεῖν] Arist. EN 1136b1 18 εἰ...πλέον]
cf. Arist. EN 1136b17–18 19–224,10 ὅπερ...ἀγρόν] cf. Arist. EN 1136b20–1137a4

someone who acts unjustly and someone who is treated unjustly. Because the person who commits an injustice acts in accord with his own wish, and the person who is treated unjustly suffers contrary to his own wish. For this reason, when discussing the definition of “acting unjustly”, *he adds “against that person’s wish”* as a way of indicating the passive character of being treated unjustly, since one is treated unjustly “against” one’s own wish, “because” of the agent who acts in accord with his own wish.

Since then we are investigating the *intemperate man*, whether he acts unjustly towards himself with the result that he is treated unjustly by himself, and we find that this person does not *act* voluntarily, *but contrary to his wish* (for we only wish for *good things*), he consequently does not treat himself unjustly, given that *he acts contrary to his own wish*. But if he does not treat himself unjustly nor is he treated unjustly by himself, he is still harmed, since *a person can be harmed voluntarily, but he cannot suffer injustice voluntarily*. Accordingly, on the basis of the fact that one cannot act unjustly towards oneself (because he acts contrary to his personal wish), [Aristotle] establishes that a person cannot be treated unjustly by himself (because when no one is acting unjustly, there can be no suffering injustice; *and someone who gives away his own property does not suffer injustice at his own hands, because the giving is up to him*) and *there must be someone to do him injustice*.

He discusses two further questions: one is whether it is the person who assigns another more than his share that acts unjustly or the one who has the larger share after getting it from the other. The second is whether it is possible to treat oneself unjustly. But one may say that when he made this [argument] he established that no one suffers injustice voluntarily. How then does he propose to discuss it again rather than something new? This is because he wants the facts regarding this issue to be determined accurately, since *he also said above* that one of the questions was *whether it is possible for a person to treat himself unjustly. For if this is the case, the distributor acts unjustly, but the man who receives a larger share [than he should] does not, something one can observe in the case of moderate people, since the descent person allots the smaller share to himself.*

In resolving [this question], he says that *the situation is not straightforward, for perhaps if he gives himself the smaller share and is thought to treat himself unjustly, he might nonetheless get the larger share in another way, by getting a better reputation as a consequence or by appearing to be a lover of goodness. Furthermore, in line with the definition of doing injustice, since [the distributor] has nothing done to himself contrary to his wish, he suffers no injustice; and if he suffers no injustice, he also does not act unjustly. Then the man who has the larger share does not always act unjustly, even if there is injustice in his case; because the injustice is not located here [i.e. in the recipient], but acting unjustly is always there [i.e. in the agent]. Nor does the origin of the action lie in him [i.e. the recipient], but in the distributor [of the unduly large share].*

Ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν (τὰ γὰρ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ, ὅτι οὗτος ἐκ μέρους, καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος τοῦ δεσπότη), ποιεῖ καὶ οὗτος ὁ τὸ πλεόν ἔχων τὰ ἄδικα μὴ ἀδικῶν. τὰ γὰρ ἄψυχα καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης μὴ ἀδικοῦντα ποιοῦσι τὰ ἄδικα· ἔξωθεν γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ὁ διανεμῶν. ἔτι περὶ τοῦ διανεμόντος λέγει ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινε κατὰ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον, οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθές, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων 5
 παρέκρινε, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸ πλεόν λαβόντος ἢ τιμωρίας, ἦν μέλλει σχεῖν ἐν τῷ κρίναι κακῶς, ψόγον δηλαδή. εἰ δὲ κοινωνῶν καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς πλεονεξίας τῷ τὸ πλεόν λαβόντι οὐ λαμβάνει μέρος ἐκ τοῦ διανεμηθέντος, οὐ θαυμαστόν. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ κατὰ πλεονεξίαν τινὰ κρίνας περὶ ἀγροῦ ἀδίκως οὐκ ἀγρὸν λαμβάνει· ἀλλ' εἰ ἐδωροδόκησεν, ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν, οὐ συνεμερίσατο τὸν ἀγρὸν. 10

[42r] || 1137a4–1137b6 ιζ' (οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται...)

Οἷησίν τινα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀναιρεῖ ἐνταῦθα· δοξάζουσι γὰρ, φησίν, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ εἶναι ῥάδιοι ὅτε βουλόμεθα. καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἔν τι τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστὶν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσῃ. πῶς δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν λέγει ἢ πάντως πρὸς τὴν τῆς πράξεως μεταχείρισιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐκ ὀλίγα, δυσχερεῖς 15
 τοὺς τρόπους ἔχουσι, ἦγουν τὸ ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι, τὸ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάσαι; οὕτως λέγει ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τρόπον· ὃ καὶ ἀνασκευάζει· συγγενέσθαι γὰρ πῶς τῇ τοῦ γείτονος γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι τινὰ καὶ ἐν χειρὶ δοῦναι τῷ δωροδοκοῦντι τὸ ἀργύριον ἀληθῶς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος οὐ ῥάδιος καὶ οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. πῶς γὰρ, εἰ φυλάσσειται 20
 ἀσφαλῶς τὸ γύναιον;

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἑτέραν οἷησιν διαλύει· οἴονται γὰρ οὐδὲν σοφὸν εἶναι τὸ γινῶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, ἐπεὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ ὁ νόμος διαλαμβάνει· ἀλλὰ φησὶ λύων οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ δίκαια, ἦγουν ἢ τοῦ δικαίου γνώσις· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἶδασι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' οὐ ποιοῦσι ταῦτα διὰ πάθη τινά· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰκανὸν τὸ ἀπλῶς εἰδέναί, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πῶς 25
 πραττομένων τούτων ἐπαινεθῆσονται· πράξουσι γὰρ καὶ τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως παριδόντες ἢ καὶ μὴ εἰδότες, οὐ ποιοῦσι τὰ δίκαια. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ πολλοὶ εἰδήσονται καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο οἶνος καὶ τοῦτο ἔλαιον καὶ τοῦτο ἐλλέβορος καὶ ὅτι τυχὸν ὠφελεῖ τὸδε εἰς τήνδε τὴν νόσον· ἀλλὰ πῶς σκευασθήσεται τὸ φάρμακον καὶ πότε καὶ τίνι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντι δοθήσεται, οὐ τοῦ παντὸς εἰδέναί, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ. 30

12–13 Οἷησίν...ῥάδιοι] cf. Arist. EN 1137a4–6 14 πῶς...λέγει] cf. Arist. EN 1137a6 17 οὕτως...ἀδικεῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1137a6 18–20 συγγενέσθαι...αὐτοῖς²] cf. Arist. EN 1137a6–9 22–24 Ὅμοίως...δίκαια¹] cf. Arist. EN 1137a9–12 25–26 ἀλλὰ...τούτων] cf. Arist. EN 1137a12–13 27–226,15 ἐπεὶ...διαλαμβάνομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1137a14–30

11 Im. addidi 28 ἐλλέβορος scripsi : ἐλέβορον M

Again, since “to do” [is used] in a variety of ways (because *inanimate objects can kill, as can a hand*, given that he [i.e. the killer] [acts] by means of his body part, or a slave acting on the orders of his master), this person who has the larger share *does something unjust without acting unjustly*. For the inanimate instruments and the hand and the slave do unjust things but are not acting unjustly, since something external impels them, as in this case the distributor does. Furthermore, with regard to the distributor he says that *if out of ignorance he made judgment of what seems legally correct* rather than what is really [correct], *he does no injustice*. Yet *if on the other hand he knowingly offered a false judgment, he is greedy either for gratitude* from the recipient of the unduly large share *or for the penalty*, which he is likely to get for judging falsely, namely blame. But if this man is a fellow-participant in greed with the man who got more than his due, but he does not get a share of what is distributed, this is nothing to be amazed about. For even the man who out of greed *judges unjustly* about land *does not receive land*; but if he takes a bribe, *he gets money*, but does not *get a share* of the land.

|| 1137a4–1137b6 17. (People think it is up to them...)

[42r]

Here he refutes an *opinion people have*; since *they think*, he says, *that acting unjustly is up to them, and that is why we are ready [to act in a certain way]* when we so wish. No one will dispute that acting unjustly is one of the things in our power. How then does he claim that this is *not in our power*, but rather that it contributes in various ways to how we manage our conduct, since the other things that are in our power are not few and they involve contradictory manners, i.e. becoming skilled [or] making efforts to earn money? He thus says at this point that *acting unjustly is not in our power*, not on account of the nature of the matter but on account of its manner; which question he reverses: *for, in some sense, to have intercourse with the wife of one’s neighbour or to strike someone or slip money into the hand* of the person who takes a bribe are genuinely *in our power*, but the manner of doing so is not *easy* and is *not in our power*. For how [is it possible], if the wife is securely guarded?

Similarly, he dismisses another opinion: for [people] *think that it requires no wisdom to know what is just and what is unjust, since the law deals with these matters*. But in resolving [this point] he says that *this*, namely the knowledge of what is just, *is not just action*; because many people know what actions are just, but they fail to perform them due to certain passions; because it is not sufficient simply to know [this], *but also how they will be commended, if these actions are performed*. Because some people will act, but if they misunderstand the proper style of conduct or do not know it, they do not act justly. *Because many people will also know what is healthy, and that this is wine, and that olive oil, and that is hellebore, and perhaps that this is of benefit in the case of a particular disease. But how the medicine will be prepared and when and for whom and how it will be administered to the patient is not for everyone to know, but for the doctor.*

Διὰ δὲ τὴν γνῶσιν ταύτην τοῦ ἀδίκου οἴονται καὶ τὸν δίκαιον οὐδὲν ἤττον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι καὶ μᾶλλον δύναται ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐκείνου πράξει ὅσα καὶ ὑγιαίνων τὸν νοῦν τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πάθους παρακεκινημένου· ὥστε εὐμαρῶς ἔξει μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος πρὸς τὸ μοιχεῦσαι καὶ πατάξει, ὡσπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς τὸ ρίψαι τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὁπότερα φεύγειν. ἀλλὰ λύων λέγει ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ 5
προτέρου παραδείγματος, οὔτε τὸ δειλαίνειν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ δευτέρου, τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. δύναται γὰρ καὶ ὁ σώφρων οὐ διὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ δι' ἄλλο τι (τὸ κερδαίνειν τυχὸν ἐκ τῆς γυναικός) συγγενέσθαι τῷ γυναιῶ, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ρίπτειν τὴν ἀσπίδα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔλαβε τοὺς μισθοὺς. ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰατροῦ οὐ τὸ τέμνειν καὶ καίειν ἀπλῶς ἰατροῦ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ καὶ κατὰ τρόπον, οὕτω κάνταῦθα, 10
εἰ κατὰ τρόπον ποιοῖεν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐλκόμενοι.

Τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις εἰσίν, ἐν οἷς ἔστι καὶ μετοχὴ τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν· μὴ ἀγαθοὺς γὰρ ὄντας, οὐκ ἔστι δικαίους εἶναι. καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπερβολὴ δικαίου οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φανύλοις ὅλως οὐδὲ μόριόν ἐστι δικαίου, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μετρίοις μέχρι 15
του· καὶ διατοῦτο οὐ περὶ δικαιοσύνης θείας ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀνθρωπίνης διαλαμβάνομεν.

Λοιπὸν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ ἐπιεικείας, πῶς ἔχει πρὸς δικαιοσύνην (ὅτι ἡ ἐπιεικεία περὶ τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιόν ἐστὶν, οὐ περὶ τὸ διανεμητικόν), καὶ περὶ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει πρὸς δίκαιον. οὔτε γὰρ ἀπλῶς ταῦτόν ἐστὶν οὔτε τῷ γένει ἕτερον φαίνεται 20
τόσον δὲ ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταφέροντες τοῦτο λέγομεν. διὸ καὶ ἀποροῦμεν εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν πως ἐπαινετόν· ἢ γὰρ ταῦτόν ἐστὶν ἢ, εἰ ἄλλο, οὐκ ἐπαινετόν· ἢ αὐτοῦ σπουδαίου ὄντος ἢ δικαιοσύνη οὐ σπουδαῖον, εἰ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον.

[42v] || 1137b7–1138a11 ἢ' (ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον...)

Ἄπερ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς εἶπε, διαφορῶν ταῦτα πάντα ἐπικρίνει τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα· ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνη ἢ ἄλλο· καὶ εἰ ἄλλο ἐπαινετόν δέ, τὸ δίκαιον 25
οὐκ ἂν εἶη σπουδαῖον, ἐπεὶ αὐτὸ σπουδαῖόν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν εἶη τῇ δικαιοσύνη. ἴνα τί δὲ εἰ ἐπαινετόν καὶ σπουδαῖον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἂν εἶη σπουδαῖον καὶ ἐπαινετόν, ὡσπερ εἰ μὴ ἐνεχώρει εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινετόν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπαινετόν; ὡσπερ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ σώφρον ἐπαινετόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπαινετόν. ἢ ῥητέον ὅτι ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον περὶ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιόν 30
ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ τοῦ νόμου οἷον ἀπότομον διορθοῦται, καὶ διατοῦτο οὕτω περὶ

16–22 Λοιπὸν...δίκαιον] cf. Arist. EN 1137a31–1137b6 24–25 Ἄπερ...ἔχοντα] cf. Arist. EN 1137b6–7 25–27 ἢ¹...δικαιοσύνη] cf. Arist. EN 1137b3–5 30–31 ἢ...διορθοῦται] cf. Arist. EN 1137b11–13

12 ἀπλῶς scripsi ex Arist. EN 1137a26 : ἄλλως M 22 post δίκαιον schol. xxiv (vid. append.) 23 Im. addidi

Because of this knowledge of the unjust [people] think that the just man acts no less unjustly than the unjust man, because this man [i.e. the just man] is more capable than the unjust of doing the things that the person of sound mind [is able to do] compared to the person who has been incited by passion. As a result, the just man will be more easily capable of committing adultery or striking a blow, just as the brave man [will be] of throwing away his shield and turning to run this way or that. But in resolving [this issue], he says that neither being unjust, as in the former example, nor being coward, as in the second [example], consists in doing these things, except coincidentally. For the person of sound mind is able, not through passion but for another reason (perhaps because he wants to get some advantage from the woman), to have sex with her, and the brave man [is able] to throw his shield, because he did not receive his pay. But just as in the case of practising medicine it is not merely cutting or cauterising that makes one a doctor, but doing this in a certain manner and in conformity with a specific style, similarly in this case as well, if people were to act in a certain manner when driven by their passions.

Just actions belong to people who have a share in things that are good without qualification, because if people are not good, they cannot be just. In the gods there is no excess of what is just, whereas in morally bad people there is no share at all of what is just, and in moderate individuals [there is a share of the just] up to a point. For this reason, we are not concerned with divine justice but with the human variety.

It remains to discuss equity as well, how it relates to justice (since equity is concerned with corrective rather than distributive justice), and also the equitable and how it relates to the just. For they are not the same without qualification, nor do they appear to be different in kind. We praise equity so much that we transfer the term and apply it to the other goods as well. We are accordingly unsure if what is equitable should somehow be praised in contrast to what is just; because it is either the same thing [as the just] or, if it is different, it is not praiseworthy; alternatively [the equitable] is excellent in itself, but justice is not excellent, if the equitable is different in contrast to what is just.

|| 1137b7–1138a11 18. (They are all in a manner...)

[42v]

As for the points he made about the equitable, posing a puzzle he determines that they are all correct in some manner. For either [the equitable] is the same as justice or it is different; and if it is something else but still praiseworthy, the just would not be excellent, because [the equitable] is excellent. But if both are excellent, [the equitable] would be the same thing as justice. Why, then, if the equitable is praiseworthy and excellent, would the just not be excellent and praiseworthy, as if it were not admitted that both the equitable and the just are praiseworthy? It is, then, as if the temperate is praiseworthy, but the just is also praiseworthy. Or should one say that both the equitable and the just are concerned with the legally just, and the equitable rectifies the pronouncements of the law relentlessly, as it were, and for this reason he discusses them in this manner? For equity is a better form of justice than one kind of

τούτων λέγει· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιόν ἐστι βέλτιον δικαίου τινός, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καθ' αὐτὸ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος βέλτιον τοῦ δικαίου. καὶ ἔστι τρόπον τινὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ δίκαιον· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ κατὰ νόμους γραπτοῦ δικαίου.

Ὅπως δὲ ἐροῦμεν ὑπόδειγμα· ἔστιν νόμος τὸν κλέπτην φονεῦσθαι· ἐάλω τις κλέψας οὐ κλέπτης ὢν ἀλλὰ βιασθεὶς ἐκ λιμοῦ· κρίνεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν νόμιμον δίκαιον κατακρίνει τοῦτον, τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς τοῦ κρίνοντος ἀθωοῖ διὰ τὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ συγκαταβαίνοντος βίαιον· καὶ γίνεται τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ νομίμου δικαίου. καὶ ταῦτα λέγει ἄπερ ἂν καὶ εἰ παρῆν ὁ νομοθετήσας εἴρηκε.

Λέγει δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τούτου, ὅτι ὁ νόμος καθόλου περὶ κλοπῆς καὶ κλέπτου διατάσσεται οὐ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε καὶ τοῦ κατὰ περίστασιν. περὶ ἐνίων δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου· τὸ ὡς ἐπιτοπλεῖστον δὲ λαμβάνει καὶ οὐθὲν ἥττον ἐστὶν ὀρθός. τὸ τοιοῦτον δὲ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ἢ τῷ νομοθέτῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ πράγματος φύσει. τότε δὲ κατὰ τὸ καθόλου ὁ νόμος ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ δὲ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης ἡμαρτεν· ἐπανορθοῖ τοίνυν τὸ ἐλλειφθὲν ἢ ἐπιείκεια.

Διὸ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου ἐστί, τοιοῦτου δικαίου τοῦ ἔχοντος ἔλλειμμά τι διὰ τὸ καθόλου τῆς ἀποφάσεως. καὶ τοῦτο λέγει ὁ ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς εἰ παρῆν ὁ νομοθέτης εἴρηκεν, εἰ καὶ ἐνομοθέτησε περὶ τούτων. τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ περὶ πάντων νομοθετεῖσθαι· περὶ γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστην συμβαινόντων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε δεῖ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ψηφίσματος. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου καὶ ὁ κανὼν ἀόριστος. ἀόριστα τοίνυν τὰ συμβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα οἷον ἀόριστα πρὸς τὰ ἐμπίπτοντα ὀριζόμενα κατὰ τὸν τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς μολίβδινον κανόνα, ὃς ἐφήρμοξε παντὶ σχήματι λίθου μετακινούμενος. τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ τίς ἢ ἐπιείκεια, καὶ ὅτι βέλτιον δικαίου τινός, ἦγουν τοῦ νομίμου οὐ τοῦ φύσει, ᾧ τινι συνέβη ἐκ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ὕλης τὸ ἔλλειμμα, εἴρηται.

Ἡ δ' ἐπιείκεια ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς δήλη· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιοῦτων προαιρετικός, εἰ προαιρεθεῖ μόνον, καὶ πρακτικός, εἰ καὶ ὡς κριτῆς διαπράξεται, καὶ μὴ ἀκριβολογούμενος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, ἢ καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, εἴπερ ἐβούλετο πικρὰν καὶ ἀπηνῆ τὴν κρίσιν ἐκφέρειν· ἔστι γοῦν καὶ αὕτη δικαιοσύνη τις, καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἐπαινετή.

Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἡ ἀπορία λύεται εἰ δύναται τις ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν. καὶ πρῶτον ἐπιχειρεῖ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὅτι ἐπεὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν (πάντα γὰρ τὰ νόμια δίκαια λέγονται· περὶ πάντων γὰρ ὁ νόμος φησίν), τὰ δὲ ἰδίαν (ὡςπερ ἐλέγετο

1–4 τὸ...δικαίου] cf. Arist. EN 1137b8–13 10–12 Λέγει...καθόλου] cf. Arist. EN 1137b13–14
12 τὸ¹...λαμβάνει] cf. Arist. EN 1137b15–16 12–14 καὶ...φύσει] cf. Arist. EN 1137b17–18
14–18 τότε...τούτων] cf. Arist. EN 1137b20–27 18–23 τοῦτό...μετακινούμενος] cf. Arist. EN
1137b27–32 23–30 τί...ἐπαινετή] cf. Arist. EN 1137b33–1138a3 31–32 Ἐντεῦθεν...ἀρετήν] cf.
Arist. EN 1138a4–6

9 παρῆν scripsi; cf. Arist. EN 1137b23, [Helioid.] In EN 109.33, Mich. In EN 68.1, Schol. In EN 205.14–15 : περιῆν M 17 παρῆν scripsi; cf. Arist. EN 1137b23, [Helioid.] In EN 109.33, Mich. In EN 68.1, Schol. In EN 205.14–15 : περιῆν M 24 post νομίμου una litt. rasa in M

justice, and it is not per se better than the just as a different class of thing. So in a certain way equity is the same as justice, since equity is just, although not in a strictly legal way, but as a rectification of the justice embodied in legal precepts.

We will discuss an example of how [this functions]: there is a law that a thief should be killed. Suppose a person who has stolen something is caught, although he is not a thief but was compelled [to steal] due to hunger. He is brought to trial, and the legal form of justice condemns him, but the equitable character of judgement holds him guiltless because of the compulsion his hunger generated, and the equitable serves as a correction of legal justice. [Aristotle] says precisely these things that the legislator would have said, if he were present.

He discusses *the reason* for this, namely *that the law concerning theft is universal* and is not arranged for this or that thief [in particular] or one who is so merely by circumstance. *Yet in some cases it is impossible to make a statement that is universally correct, but [the law] takes the most general view and is no the less correct [on this account].* For this kind of error is not in the law or in the legislator, but in the nature of the case. *In that case the law is right in general, but where it fails us, the legislator has erred, and equity then rectifies the defect.*

This is why the equitable is superior to one sort of justice, since this type of justice possesses a kind of defect due to the generality of its judgement. And [Aristotle] says the same thing that the legislator would himself have said, if he were present, if he had framed his law for these [specific cases]. This is why not all matters are subject to legislation, because it is impossible to lay down a law about what happens on a daily basis, with the result that a special ordinance is needed for such [cases]. For the standard applied to the indefinite is [itself] indefinite. So chance events are indefinite, and special ordinances are indefinite, as it were, since they are determined with reference to the circumstances that occur, in accord with *the leaden rule of Lesbian construction, which adapts itself to every shape of the stone as it moves. What the equitable is, therefore, and what equity is, and that it is superior to one sort of justice, i.e. to the legal form rather than the natural one, in which the deficiency occurred on the basis of the subject matter of the events, has been stated.*

Equity, on the other hand, is *clear from the character of the equitable person: for he is one who prefers what is equitable, if it is merely a matter of preference, and who makes it happen, if he is to act as a judge, and who is not a stickler for justice in the bad sense but tends to take less than his share, || even though he has the law on his side, even if it wanted to pronounce a bitter and harsh judgement. This [i.e. equity] is then a kind of justice, and this disposition is praiseworthy.* [43r]

After this, the dilemma is resolved as to *whether* someone can *treat himself unjustly*. First he attempts [to make the case] from the opposite, that since *some just actions are in accord with every virtue* (because all lawful actions are deemed just, since the law pronounces on all of them), while others [are in accord with] one particular [virtue] (just as justice was said to be both universal and particular), he attempts to prove that in relation to neither form of injustice, namely the universal or

καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κοινὴ καὶ ἰδία), ἐπιχειρεῖ δεῖξαι ὅτι κατὰ μηδετέραν ἀδικίαν, ἢ τὴν καθόλου ἢ τὴν μερικὴν, ἑαυτὸν τις ἀδικεῖ. καὶ πρῶτον κατὰ τὴν καθόλου, ἐπιχειρεῖ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· οὐ κελεύει τὴν ἀυθεντίαν, φησίν, ὁ νόμος, ὁ δὲ ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύων ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτὸν παρανομῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸν. ἑαυτὸν δὲ πάντως βλάπτει οὐχὶ κατὰ ἀντιλύπησιν· τί γὰρ βλαβεῖς παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει; ἐκὼν ἄρα ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ· ἐκὼν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν οἶδεν ὃν μέλλει φονεύειν καὶ ὡς μέλλει φονεύειν μηδὲν παθῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἵνα ἀντιβλάβῃ. ἀλλὰ λύων φησίν ὅτι οὐχ ἑαυτὸν τότε ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔχουσαν πόλιν· καὶ ἀναιρεῖ διὰ τούτου τὸν συνάγοντα λόγον ὅτι ἑαυτὸν τις ἀδικεῖ. 5

1138a9–1138b13 ἰθ' (ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων...)

10

Ἴδου εὐρίσκεται ὁ σφάττων ἑαυτὸν ὅτι ἀδικεῖ ἐκὼν κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἐκόντος ἀδικούντος· οἶδε γὰρ καὶ ὃν ἀπόλλυσι καὶ καθ' ὃν τινα τρόπον. ἐπεὶ γοῦν ἀδικεῖ τινα, πάντως ἀδικεῖ· εἰ γὰρ μηδένα, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖ ὅλως· ἑαυτὸν ἄρα ἀδικεῖ. ἀλλὰ λύων οὐ, φησίν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐκποδῶν τὸν πολίτην αὐτῆς ποιούμενος. αὐτὸς δὲ ἐκὼν μὲν πάσχει, ἐκὼν δὲ οὐκ ἀδικεῖται οὔτε αὐτὸς οὔτε ἄλλος τις. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ πόλις ἀδικεῖται, ἐπιφέρει καὶ τὴν ζημίαν τῷ ἀδικήσαντι· οὐ θάπτει γὰρ ἴσως τὸν αὐτοφόντην οὐδὲ τὴν ὀσίαν αὐτῷ ἀποδίδωσι. καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ τὴν ἀδικίαν πάσχον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνος. 15

Δείξας δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς καθόλου ἀδικίας ὅτι οὐχ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ, μέτεισι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν, τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῇ μερικῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, ἣτις ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη μᾶλλον ἀντίκειται τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ἢ ἡ μειονεξία. ἔτι γοῦν, φησίν, καθὸ ἄδικος (ἔστι δὲ ὁ πλεονέκτης), ὃς οὐδὲ φαῦλός ἐστι κατ' ἐκεῖνον ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀδικεῖ, ἢ παρέχει ἑαυτῷ τὸ πλέον ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς. τοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ἕτερόν φησι τοῦ καθόλου ἀδίκου· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἄδικος οὗτος πονηρὸς ὡσπερ ὁ δειλός· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ δειλὸς καθολικὸς πονηρὸς οὔτε οὗτος καθολικὸς ἄδικος ἀλλὰ πλεονέκτης· καὶ ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνος φυγοπόλεμος γενόμενος οὐ καθολικῶς ἀλλὰ μερικῶς ἀδικεῖ καὶ πονηρῶς ἰδικῶς περὶ τὴν πόλιν γίνεται, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην πονηρίαν οὔτε ὁ δειλὸς ἀδικεῖ οὔτε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄδικος, ὁ πλεονέκτης δηλονότι καὶ ἀντικείμενος τῷ μερικῷ δικαίῳ καθολικὸς πονηρὸς. ὁ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην πονηρίαν ἀδικῶν πονηρὸς 20 25

3–8 οὐ...πόλιν] cf. Arist. EN 1138a6–11 11–16 Ἴδου...ἀδικήσαντι] cf. Arist. EN 1138a8–14

20–24 ἔτι...ἄδικος] cf. Arist. EN 1138a14–18 26–27 οὐδὲ...ἀδικεῖ] cf. Arist. EN 1138a16–18

9 post ἀδικεῖ schol. xxv (vid. append.) 10 lm. addidi

the particular kind, does a person commit injustice against himself. First, in regard to the universal type of justice, he attempts to [make the case] from the opposite: *the law*, he says, *does not sanction* suicide, and the person who *kills himself* commits injustice against himself by acting unlawfully in relation to himself. But *he* assuredly *harms* himself not to cause *vexation in return* [for something else]; for what injury could someone get from himself that would make him injure himself? Therefore *he voluntarily treats himself unjustly*; [the action] is *voluntary* because *he knew* that it was himself he intended to murder, and because he intends to commit the murder despite having suffered nothing at his own hands that would *render this harm in return*. But [Aristotle] solves [the problem] by saying that the man does not *act unjustly towards himself* in that case, but towards *the city* he inhabits, and by this [argument] he refutes the claim which asserts that someone can treat himself unjustly.

1138a9–1138b13 19. (But he who kills himself out of anger...)

Observe that it is discovered that *the person who kills himself voluntarily acts unjustly*, in conformity with the definition that one who acts unjustly does so voluntarily; because *he knows the person whom* he is killing and *in what way*. Since, then, he acts unjustly towards someone, he certainly acts unjustly, because if [he acts unjustly towards] no one, he does not act unjustly at all; so he acts unjustly towards himself. But in resolving [this problem], [Aristotle] says *it is not [against himself] but against the city*, by eliminating its citizen. The man in question *suffers voluntarily*, but neither he himself nor anyone else *suffers injustice voluntarily*. But since *the city is treated unjustly*, [Aristotle] also adduces the *penalty* [exactd] from the one who has acted unjustly; for [the city] does not allow the suicide victim to be buried, perhaps, nor does it provide him a funeral service. It is in the penalty paid that suffering injustice consists, not in the wrong-doer.

After demonstrating on the basis of the universal form of injustice that one does not treat oneself unjustly, he turns to the other [form], the one that opposes the particular form of justice, which is greed. For in fact, greed is more opposed to justice than taking less than one's due is. *Moreover*, at any rate, he says, [*it is impossible to act unjustly towards oneself*] *in the sense in which a person is unjust* (this is the greedy person), who is *not wicked* in himself but merely acts unjustly to the extent that he gets the unduly large share for himself in respect to goods and the smaller share in respect to evils. *For* he says that *this person differs from the one who is unjust in a universal sense*, because *this unjust person is wicked in the same way as the coward is*; for a coward is *not universally wicked*, nor is this person *universally unjust*, but [merely] greedy. And just as the coward, by shunning war, acts unjustly not in a universal but in a particular sense, and is wicked with regard to the city in only a specific sense, so too this person [acts unjustly in only a specific sense]. *For the coward does not act unjustly* in conformity with *complete wickedness*, nor does this type of unjust person, that is to say the greedy man and utter villain who stands

πάμπαν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις ὀλέθριος, τῶν ὁδῶν ἀπασῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐξεναντίας πορευόμενος. οὗτος δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην πονηρίαν ἀδικεῖ, ὥστε οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν μερικὴν ἀδικίαν ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ, καθὼς διὰ πολλῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων δεῖξει.

Καὶ πρῶτον ἐστὶν ὅτι ἅμα γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· ὅτι γὰρ οὐδὲ 5 κατὰ τὴν μερικὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀδικεῖ τις ἑαυτὸν ἐντεῦθεν δηλόν· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὁ πλεονέκτης ἄδικος, ἄνισός ἐστιν, ὡς λέλεκται, καὶ τὸ πλεόν ἔχει. ἄρα εἴ τις τοιοῦτος ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτόν, ἅμα ὡς ἀδικῶν τὸ πλεόν ἔξει καὶ ὡς ἀδικούμενος τὸ ἔλαττον· καὶ ἀφαιρεῖται τοῦ πλέονος ὡς ἀδικούμενος καὶ πρόσκειται τῷ πλεόνι ὡς ἀδικῶν· ὅπερ 10 ἀδύνατον. τὸ δὲ αἰεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κατασκευαστικά εἰσι τοῦ μὴ οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ πλεονέκτου ἄλλος ὁ τὸ πλεόν λαμβάνων καὶ ἄλλος ὁ τὸ ἔλαττον, ὥστε ἐν πλείοσι καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἐνί, τῷ τε ἀδικοῦντι τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ.

Ἔτι τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον, εἰ γοῦν ἀδικεῖσθαι ὠμολόγηται τὸ ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι· αὐτὸς δὲ ἐκουσίως ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ, βλάπτεται 15 ἄρα θέλων καὶ ἐκουσίως, ὅπερ οὐχ ὑπόκειται. τὸ δὲ «πρότερον» προστέθεται, ἵνα μὴ ἀντιποιῶν τις οὐ δοκῆ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ γὰρ καὶ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως τὸ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἄδικον. καὶ πρότερον συναχθήσεται ὅτι ἐκουσίως τις ἀδικεῖται καὶ βλάπτεται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπέκειτο οὕτως· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν ἀδικεῖται. ἔτι ἐν τοῖς ἀνὰ μέρος ἢ ἀδικία 20 συνίσταται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίῳ, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα ἴδιος αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἀνευ τῶν ἀνὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐθεὶς ἀδικεῖ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίῳ ἀδικίαν διαπράττειται. αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ἀνεύθυνά εἰσι καὶ οὐκ ἀδικήματα, ἀλλὰ νόμιμα δίκαια, εἴ τι δίκαιον οἰκεῖον ἐν τούτοις ἔχομεν.

Ἔτι περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἑαυτόν τις οὐκ ἀδικεῖ καὶ τοῦτο ῥητέον· τὸν διορισμὸν φημι τὸν 25 περὶ τοῦ ἐκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ ὄν καὶ ὄ καὶ ὡς βλάπτει, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον καὶ τὸ «παρὰ τὴν οἰκείαν βούλησιν», ὅπερ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἑαυτὸν οὐχ ἔπεται· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν οἰκείαν βούλησιν γίνεται. καὶ οὕτω λύεται τὸ τοιοῦτον. φευκτῶν γοῦν ὄντων καὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, φευκτότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι

2–3 οὐδὲ...ἀδικεῖ] cf. Arist. EN 1138a17–18 5 ἅμα...εἴη] cf. Arist. EN 1138a18 8–10 καὶ²...ἄδικον] cf. Arist. EN 1138a18–20 14 Ἔτι...πρότερον] cf. Arist. EN 1138a20–21 16 τὸ...προστέθεται] cf. Arist. EN 1138a21 17 ἀντιποιῶν...ἀδικεῖν] cf. Arist. EN 1138a22 20–21 ἀνευ...ἀδικεῖ] cf. Arist. EN 1138a24–25 24–25 Ἔτι...ἀδικεῖσθαι] cf. Arist. EN 1138a25–28 26 παρὰ...βούλησιν] cf. Arist. EN 1136b4–5 27 οὕτω...τοιοῦτον] cf. Arist. EN 1138a27 28–234,1 φευκτῶν...ἀπλῶς²] cf. Arist. EN 1138a28–33

5 τῷ αὐτῷ scripsi ex Arist. EN 1138a18 : τοῦ αὐτοῦ M 20 ante ἀνευ primum ὡς scripsit, deinde delevit M

opposed to the partially just man. Because the man who acts unjustly out of complete wickedness is completely wicked and destructive to both himself and his fellow citizens, since he conducts his life in ways opposed to all possible paths of virtue. But this person is not the one who *acts unjustly out of universal wickedness, so that not even in accord with this partial form of injustice does he wrong himself*, as [Aristotle] will show through many dialectical proofs.

First is [the fact] that *it would then be the case [that the same thing be taken away and added] to the same thing simultaneously*. The [argument] is as follows; for, that someone cannot act unjustly towards himself in conformity with the particular type of justice is clear in consequence. For since the greedy person is unjust, he is inequitable, as has been stated, and he possesses an unduly large share. Therefore, if this type of person commits injustice towards himself, then at the same time that he acts unjustly, he will possess the undue share, and at the same time that he is treated unjustly, [he will possess] the smaller share; and *he is deprived* of the larger share inasmuch as he is treated unjustly and he is *attached* to the larger share inasmuch as he acts unjustly, *which is impossible*. But the fact is that *justice and injustice always imply more than one person*, and the remaining [arguments] serve to provide evidence that it is impossible to treat oneself unjustly. For in the case of the greedy person, there is one person who receives more than his share, and another who receives less, with the result that more than one person is involved rather than one, both the person who acts unjustly and the person who is treated unjustly.

Furthermore, an act of injustice *is voluntary and is committed by choice and comes first*. At any rate if it is acknowledged that to be treated unjustly is to be harmed involuntarily; and he who voluntarily treats himself unjustly is then harmed willingly and voluntarily, which is not established [as a hypothesis]. And “*comes first*” is also included, so that someone *who retaliates is not thought to act unjustly*; for which reason treating oneself unjustly is both voluntary and [undertaken] by choice. And foremost, it will be inferred that one is voluntarily treated unjustly and injured, but this is not established in this manner, because no one is voluntarily treated unjustly. In addition, injustice involves matters of division, not private matters, but in this case a private person is [unjust] to himself; for *no one does injustice except in matters of unjust division*, because one will not accomplish injustice in relation to personal matters. Those acts which do not involve matters of division are irreproachable and are not injustices, but are instead just in the legal sense, if we have some personal point of justice in these matters.

Again, with respect to the point that *one cannot treat himself unjustly*, the following should also be discussed: I mean the *definition regarding being voluntarily treated unjustly*, because knowledge regards the person affected, the act, and how the victim is harmed, but one must add the qualification “against that person’s own wish”, which does not follow for someone who treats himself unjustly, because this happens in accord with his own wish. *This problem is resolved* in the following manner. Although both *doing and suffering injustice* are reprehensible, *doing injustice*

καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως γίνεται καὶ ἐκ κακίας ἢ τῆς ἀπλῶς ἢ τῆς ἐγγύς ἀπλῶς, τῆς ἐχούσης προαίρεσιν ἐγγύς τῆς ἀπροαιρέτου. διατοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐπιφέρει «οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας», διὰ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα.

[43v] Τέως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἦττον φαῦλον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, συμβαίη ἂν ποτε μεῖζον γενέσθαι, 5
εἰ ἀδικεῖται τις τὰ μείζω. ἀλλ' οὐ μέλει, φησί, τῇ τέχνῃ· ἐπεὶ ἢ καὶ ἰατρὸς μεῖζονα νόσον
τὴν πλευρίτιν φησι τοῦ προσπταίσματος, ἀλλ' ὅμως πολλάκις καὶ τοῦτο θάνατον
προεξένησεν ἐκ τοῦ καταληφθῆναι ἐντεῦθεν τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ ἀποθανεῖν, τῆς
πλευρίτιδος ἰατρευθείσης. ὅταν δὲ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν δίκαιοι, κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγεται ἐν
τῷ τισὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ συμβῆναι τὸ δίκαιον· τὸ δεσποτικόν φημι καὶ οἰκονομικόν, οὐ τὸ
πολιτικόν. ἀδικία δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν γίνεται, ὅταν πλεονεκτήσῃ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογον· ὃ 10
ἔστι τὸ ἀρχόμενον, τοῦ λόγου ταττομένου εἰς ἄρχοντα.

2–3 οὐ...ἀδικίας] cf. Arist. EN 1138a33–34 4 Τέως...γενέσθαι] cf. Arist. EN 1138a35–1138b1
5 ἀλλ'...τέχνῃ] cf. Arist. EN 1138b2 5–9 καὶ...οἰκονομικόν] cf. Arist. EN 1138b2–8 10–11 ἀδικία...
ἄρχοντα] cf. Arist. EN 1138b8–13

11 post ἄρχοντα schol. xxvi (vid. append.)

is more reprehensible, because it occurs by choice and *implies vice that is either unqualified or nearly unqualified*, since it involves a choice that is almost not a choice. For on this account he also asserts “*since not every voluntary [act of injustice] is combined with [actual] injustice*”, because of actions committed with no deliberate purpose.

So *the less bad*, which is *suffering injustice*, may turn out to be a greater [evil] at some time, if a person suffers greater injustices. *But science*, he says, *is not concerned with this*, since || a doctor *declares pleurisy to be a more serious illness than a sprain*, [43v] but nevertheless in many cases this sort of sprain causes death *when a man is seized by the enemy* as a consequence *and killed*, even though his pleurisy got medical treatment. When *one is just towards oneself*, this is said *metaphorically* in relation to the idea of the *just* occurring *between different parts of oneself*; I mean [*the kind of justice*] *that exists between a master and slave, or within a household*, not the political type. *Injustice towards oneself* arises when *the non-rational part of the soul* becomes greedy; this is the part *properly subject to authority*, with the rational part being assigned to the position of ruler.

1138b18–1139a16 α' (ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες...)

Περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν εἰπὼν καὶ ὅτι μεσότητές τινές εἰσι τῶν παρ' ἐκάτερα, ἐκάστη κακιῶν δύο (ὑπερβολῆς φημι καὶ ἐλλείψεως), καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο δὴ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον (μέσον δὲ ἐστὶ καθὼς ὁ ὀρθὸς βούλεται λόγος), 5 βούλεται λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν διανοητικῶν, ἧτοι θεωρητικῶν, ἀρετῶν. καὶ πρῶτον ἄρχεται διαιρεῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ τούτου, πῶς λέγομεν «ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς βούλεται λόγος» καὶ τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἐς ὅποσον ὁ «ὁ ὀρθὸς βούλεται λόγος». πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς ἔξεισι ταῖς πρακτικαῖς, καθάπερ καὶ πάσῃ πράξει, ἔπεται τις σκοπὸς καὶ τέλος πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ ὀρθῶς 10 πράττων ἢ ἐπιτείνει ἢ ἀνίησιν, ὡσὰν ἐπιτύχη τοῦ μέσου, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς μελωδίας τῆς μουσικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῶν χορδῶν· ἢ γὰρ ἐπιτείνονται ἐκεῖνοι εἰς ὀξύτητα ἢ ἀνίηται εἰς βαρύτητα, ἵνα τὸ καθεστῶς μέλος γένηται καὶ τὸ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς πρόσφορον. καὶ ἐστὶ τις ὄρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, καθ' ὃν μέσον τῆς τε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστήκασιν.

Τὸ γοῦν οὕτω λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει, ἐστὶ μὲν ἀληθινόν, οὐδὲν δὲ σαφὲς ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις 15 τοῦτ' ἐρεῖ τις· δεῖ γὰρ πονεῖν οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω, ἀλλ' ὅσον βούλεται ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. τοῦτο γοῦν τις ἔχων οὐδὲν πλεόν ἐπίσταται. καὶ τίθησι τὸ ὑπόδειγμα ἐκ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· τίνα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι; ὅσα εἴποι ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος τῆς ἰατρικῆς. τοῦτο δὲ ἀληθινόν μὲν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ. ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔξεις· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀληθὲς δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τίς ὁ ὄρος τούτου, ὡς ἂν 20 πρὸς ἐκεῖνον τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὸ βούλημα ἀπευθύνομεν.

Πρότερον μὲν οὖν διείλομεν τὰς ἀρετὰς τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἠθικὰς καὶ διανοητικὰς. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἠθικῶν εἵπομεν ἤδη, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, πρότερον εἰπόντες περὶ τῆς 25 [44r] ψυχῆς, οὕτω λέγομεν. ἐλέχθη οὖν δύο || εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη, λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον· τοῦ δὲ λόγον ἔχοντος, ἐν μὲν ἔστω τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, ἐν δὲ τὸ λογιστικόν. καὶ ἐπιστημονικόν μὲν ἐστὶν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἃ οὐκ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως εἶναι ἀρχάς, λογιστικὸν δὲ ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. ἄλλα γὰρ εἰσι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἄλλα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἕτερα εἰσὶν ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἔξεις τῆς ψυχῆς διάφοραί εἰσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας, αἷς ταῦτα καταλαμβάνεσθαι 30 πέφυκεν, εἴπερ κατὰ τίνα οἰκειότητά τε καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἢ γνώσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. ὡς γὰρ αἱ αἰσθήσεις κατὰ τίνα οἰκειότητα ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν <ἢ>

3–8 Περὶ...λόγος] cf. Schol. In EN 206.16–25 4–5 ὑπερβολῆς...λόγος] cf. Arist. EN 1138b18–20
7 διαιρεῖν...τούτου] cf. Arist. EN 1138b20 | ὡς...λόγος] cf. Arist. EN 1138b20 8–10 πάσαις...
ἀνίησιν] cf. Arist. EN 1138b21–23 12–20 καί²...τούτου] cf. Arist. EN 1138b23–34
22–238,5 Πρότερον...τούτων] cf. Arist. EN 1138b35–1139a16

1 Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων ζήτα in marg. superiore 2 Im. addidi 31 ἢ supplevi

1138b18–1139a16 1. (Since we have previously said...)

After saying that the moral virtues are intermediate states of a sort between the opposite extremes, with two vices apiece (I mean *excess* and *deficiency*), and that the person who wants to conduct his life correctly *must choose the mean* (*it is a mean as the correct reason prescribes*), [Aristotle] also wishes to discuss the intellectual, i.e. the contemplative, virtues. And first he begins to *distinguish* the characteristics of *this* [i.e. *correct reason*], that is what we mean by “*as the correct reason prescribes*”, and what it is, and what “what correct reason prescribes” extends to. *For all the practical moral dispositions, like every type of conduct, are followed by a certain mark or target upon which the agent who adheres to right conduct fixes his gaze and increases or relaxes the tension* so as to attain the mean, just as holds true in the case of a musical tune or the strings [of a lyre]; because either the strings are tightened to a higher pitch or they are relaxed to a lower pitch, so that the tune produced becomes the one that is good to hear. *There is also a standard for the mean states, according to which they identify an intermediate position between excess and deficiency.*

Accordingly, *to put it this way*, that the intermediate state between excess and deficiency is virtue in every form of conduct, *is true, but offers no clarity. For in other pursuits as well, one can make this statement; because one ought to exert neither too much nor too little, but as much as the rational principle prescribes.* At any rate, *a person who has this [knowledge] is no wiser.* And [Aristotle] provides the example of the *medical art: what [medicines] must be applied? Those which the rational principle of the medical art prescribes.* This statement is truthful, but not clear. The same holds true *with regard to the dispositions of the soul, because not only should this [judgment] be true, but it should also be determinative of what the rational principle is and what the standard that it determines is*, so that we can direct our actions and our purpose towards that.

Previously, then, *we divided the virtues of the soul into moral and intellectual ones. And we have now completed our discussion of the moral virtues, but about the rest of them we say the following, after discussing the soul. It was said, then, that there are two || parts of the soul, a rational and a non-rational. Of the rational part, let one* [44r] *portion be the scientific faculty, another the calculative [faculty]. The scientific faculty is what we use to contemplate the first principles [or: originative causes] of the things that must be and cannot be otherwise [i.e. are invariable]; whereas the calculative faculty is what we use to contemplate what variably exists and could be otherwise.* For some things are necessary, while others admit of variation; and just as these *differ* from one another, likewise the dispositions *of the soul*, by which these [things] *can be comprehended*, are different from one another, *assuming that knowledge is based on some kind of likeness or affinity between [subject and object].* For just as the sense-organs apprehend sensible objects through a kind of affinity [with them], and sight

ὄψις τοῦ χυμοῦ ἀντιλάβοιτο οὐδὲ φθόγγων ἢ γεῦσις, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις διαφόρως τὰ διάφορα κρίνουσιν. ὅτι δὲ καλῶς εἶπομεν *θάτερον λογιστικόν*, τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, δηλόν· *περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων* καὶ ἡ βούλησις, οὐ περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα. τὸ δὲ *βουλευέσθαι τῷ λογιζέσθαι ταυτόν*. *ληπτέον ἄρα τὰ περὶ τούτων*.

5

1139a15–1139b14 (β') (ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἢ βελτίστη ἕξις...)

Ἐπεὶ τὰ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος *μέρη*, τὸ μὲν ἦν *ἐπιστημονικόν*, τὸ περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δὲ ἦν *λογιστικόν*, τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα περὶ ἃ καὶ βουλή ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ *βουλευέσθαι καὶ λογιζέσθαι ταυτόν*, *ληπτέον*, φησί, *τίς ἢ βελτίστη ἕξις ἐστίν*· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνεται, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν οὗ καὶ ἀμαρτάνεται. *ζητητέον οὖν τὴν βελτίστην ἕξιν· αὕτη* 10 *γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρας ἔργον*· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ ἀρετὴν ἐνδείξεται τὴν ἰδίαν περὶ τὸ τῆς λογιστικῆς ἔργον, ὅπερ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα διαπράττεται, οὔτε ἡ λογιστικὴ τὴν οἰκεῖαν ἀρετὴν ἕξει περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, καὶ τὸ τούτων ἔργον, ὡσπερ δητὰ οὔτε ἡ σκυτοτομικὴ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἐνδείξεται περὶ τὸ ἔργον τῆς μαχαιοποιητικῆς οὔτε αὕτη τὴν ἀρετὴν εἰς τὸ 15 ἔργον ἐκείνης, ἀλλ' ἑκατέρα εἰς τὸ ἴδιον.

Ἔστι δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας *τρία*· ὧν ἡ αἴσθησις, εἰ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐστὶν ἀρχή, ἀλλ' ὡς δηλόν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν θηρίων περὶ ἃ οὐχ εὔρηται πράξις, οὐ πράξεως. ὡσπερ τοίνυν ἐν διανοητικῶν ᾧ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις (οὐκ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ᾧ τοὺς ὅρους γινώσκομεν), οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ ὀρέξει διώξις καὶ φυγή. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἠθικὴ 20 ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, προαίρεσις δὲ ὄρεξις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄλογος, ἦν καὶ τὰ θηρία ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ βουλευτικὴ, δεῖ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ νοός τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὀρέξεως τὸ ὀρθόν, εἰ ἔστιν ἀγαθὴ ἢ προαίρεσις, ὥστε τὸν μὲν λόγον λέγειν τὸ ἀληθές, τὴν δὲ ὄρεξιν τὸ ὀρθὸν διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοιά ἐστὶ πρακτικὴ, ὅτι συνδυάζεται τῇ ὀρέξει, καὶ ὁ ταύτη καλὸν καταφαίνεται τοῦτ' ἐκείνη ὡς ὀρθὸν διώκει. διατοῦτο καὶ 25 *πρακτικὴ ἢ ἀλήθεια*. ἡ δὲ θεωρητικὴ διάνοια, ὡσπερ τι εὖ καὶ κακῶς ἄπερ ἐκείνη εἶχεν, οὕτως αὕτη τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· *τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ ἔργον ἢ πρακτικοῦ*· τοῦ δὲ ἅμα διανοητικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ τὸ ἀληθές τῷ τῆς ὀρέξεως ὀρθῷ συμφῶνως.

7–11 Ἐπεὶ...ἔργον] cf. Arist. EN 1139a11–17
1139a17–1139b14

17–24,15 Ἔστι...λέγωμεν] cf. Arist. EN

6 β' addidi; vid. Zor. 253, n. 24. | Im. addidi 7 Ἐπεὶ correxi : πεὶ M 24 ὄρεξιν scripsi ex Arist. EN 1139a23–24 : πράξιν M 27–28 πρακτικοῦ scripsi : διανοητικοῦ M

could not lay hold of flavour, nor could taste [apprehend] sounds, so too the dispositions of the soul judge various objects in various manners. That we rightly called *the one faculty*, the one that concerns possible objects, *calculative*, is obvious; because *deliberation concerns things that admit of variation*, not things that are always as they are. *Deliberation is the same as calculation. We must therefore ascertain the qualities of these [faculties].*

1139a15–1139b14 (2.) (We must therefore ascertain what the best disposition of each of these faculties...)

Since *one* of the *rational faculties* [of the soul] was *scientific*, meaning the one concerned with things that are necessary, *while the other* was *calculative*, meaning the one concerned with variable objects about which there is deliberation, and *deliberation is the same as calculation, we must ascertain*, he says, *which is the best disposition*; because the goals of these [dispositions] are not always attained, but the mark is sometimes missed. We must therefore investigate the *best disposition*; for *this is the special virtue of each of the two, and the virtue [of a faculty] is relevant to the special function* of each [virtue] individually; for scientific [art] will not exhibit the particular virtue that is relevant to the task of the calculative art, which takes place with regard to variable objects, nor will the calculative [art] possess the particular virtue relevant to objects that are eternal and invariable, and the task connected with these, just as in fact the art of shoemaking will not exhibit the particular virtue relevant to the work of knife-manufacturing, nor will this [i.e. the art of knife-manufacturing] [exhibit] the virtue needed for the work [of shoemaking], but each of the two [will exhibit the virtue needed] for its own particular [business].

There are three elements in the soul which control action and truth; one of which is sense-perception, even if it is a cause of truth, but as is *apparent from animals*, in the case of which no action is involved, *not of action. Just as*, therefore, *in the sphere of the intellect*, where *affirmation and negation* [are involved] (not in the primary sense by which we recognise definitions), so too *are pursuit and avoidance in regard to desire. Since, then, moral virtue is a disposition concerned with choice, and choice is desire*, but not the non-rational kind, which even animals possess, but instead the *deliberate kind*, *it must be the case that truth involves the mind*, whereas what is *correct involves the sphere of the appetite, if the choice is to be good*, so that *reasoning must speak the truth*, and *desire must pursue what is correct. This reasoning, then, is concerned with action*, because it combines with desire, and it pursues what appears noble to the latter because it is correct. For this reason *truth is in fact practical. But contemplative thought*, just as what is in *good and bad state* are the things [practical reasoning] pertains to, so contemplative reasoning [pertains to] *truth and falsehood; for this* [i.e. *the attainment of truth*] *is the function of the intellect* rather than of practical thinking. *But [the function of] what is simultaneously contemplative and practical is truth in accord with what is correct as defined by desire.*

Πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ἐξ ἧς ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τέλος—προαιρέσεως δὲ αὐθις ἀρχὴ ἢ ἔνεκά τινος μετὰ λόγου ὄρεξις. ἔστι δὲ ἡ προαίρεσις οὗτ' ἄνευ διανοητικοῦ νοὸς οὔτε ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἕξεως· ἡ εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ταύτη, ἡ κακοπραξία, ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἠθους οὐκ ἔστιν. αὕτη δὲ ἡ διάνοια οὐθὲν κινεῖ τὸ ἀληθὲς καταφαίνουσα, ἀλλ' ἡ συνδυαζομένη τῇ ὀρέξει καὶ πρακτικῇ. ὅτι καὶ πᾶς 5 ποιῶν ἔνεκά του ποιεῖ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ πρακτικὴ ἔνεκά του ἔστι, συνδυάζεται δὲ ταύτη καὶ ἡ διάνοια, κινεῖ καὶ αὕτη διαταῦτα συνάμα ταύτη. καὶ τὸ ποιητὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς τέλος, ἀλλὰ τινος καὶ πρὸς τι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ πρακτὸν, οὔτινος καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις.

Διὸ καὶ εἴ τις βούλεται τὴν προαίρεσιν ὀρίζεσθαι, ἢ ὀρεκτικὸν νοῦν εἴποι ταύτην ἢ 10 [44v] ὄρεξιν διανοητικοῦ, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἢ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐ προαιρετὸν ἔστιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ βουλευτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐσόμενον καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον. δύο οὖν ὄντων μορίων τοῦ διανοητικοῦ, αὐτῆς μόνης τῆς διανοίας καὶ αὐτῆς σὺν ὀρέξει, τὸ ἔργον ἀληθές. καθ' ἃς οὖν ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκατέρω, αὗται αἱ ἕξεις καὶ ἀρεταί εἰσιν. ἀρξάμενοι 15 δ' αὐθις περὶ τούτων λέγωμεν.

Now the cause of action—the source of the motion, but not as a goal—is choice, and again the cause of choice is desire combined with reasoning directed to an end. Choice is devoid of neither rationality nor an ethical disposition, because good conduct and its opposite, bad conduct, do not exist without rationality or moral character. Rationality by itself, although it reveals the truth, produces no movement, but only [rationality] that is combined with desire and is practical. Given that everyone who does something does it for an end, and since practical action is for the sake of an end, rationality is combined with the latter, and for these reasons it is an efficient cause along with it. And that which is done is not an end in the unqualified sense, but belongs to and is a means to one of the goods, and likewise with whatever is done that desire aims for.

Hence if one wishes to define choice, [one] may either call it thought combined with desire or desire coloured by thought, and it is || an originator [of action] for a [44v] human being. What has happened already is unconnected with choice, because it is not a matter for deliberation, but what lies in the future and is contingent [is connected with choice]. Although there are two parts of the intellectual faculty, then, rationality operating alone and rationality co-operating with desire, what they accomplish is truth. The dispositions according to which either of the two will attain to truth are virtues and the relevant dispositions. Let us begin again and discuss these.

Appendix of Supplementary Notes

I provide below an edition of the supplementary notes running alongside Pachymeres' Commentary. Important variant readings between M and the standard editions of the anonymous scholia and Aspasius are recorded in the apparatus criticus. The same is true for corrections necessitated by the context.

Scholium i

Location in the printed Commentary: 50.11

Location in the codex: f. 9v, left-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1103a19 “οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίγεται”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 123.11–18

Τοῦτο νῦν φύσει λέγει, οὗ ἢ τελειότης ἐκ φύσεως περιγίνεται, ἢ σύμφυτος οὔσα ὡς τῷ λίθῳ ἢ βαρύτης ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιγινόμενη ὡς ὀδόντων βλάστησις ἢ γενείων. τὰ γὰρ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέχεσθαι ἐπιγινόμενα, ἔξωθεν δέ τινος προσδεόμενα πρὸς 5
τελείωσιν οὐ φύσει νῦν λέγει. οὐδὲ γὰρ κυρίως ἂν ταῦτα λέγοιτο φύσει, εἰ καὶ ποτε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων χρώμεθα τῷ φύσει. οὐ γὰρ φύσει τὰς τέχνας ἔχομεν, καίτοι φύσει ὄντες αὐτῶν δεκτικοί. ὅτι δὲ μὴ φύσει τὸ ἐξ ἔθους, δῆλον ποιεῖ διὰ τοῦ μηδὲν τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἢ ἐχόντων τι ἄλλως ἐθισθῆναι δύνασθαι.

1 σύμφυτος correxi ex Anon. In EN 123.11 : σύμφυτος M | post schol. haec nota sequitur: Σημείωσαι· εἰκότως δὲ περὶ ἀρετῶν μέλλων τὸν λόγον ποιείσθαι, πρῶτον δείκνυσιν ὅτι μὴ φύσει. εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν φύσει, οὐκέτ' ἂν ἦν τοῦ ἠθικοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ φυσικοῦ περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ὀρώμεν.

Scholium ii

Location in the printed Commentary: 52.18

Location in the codex: f. 10r, upper margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1103b6–7 “ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: “Συνελόντι τὸ πᾶν...τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναί” (l. 1–4) is a verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 125.18–22. For “τουτέστι ποιὰς πράξεις...ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις.” (l. 4–6), cf. Asp. In EN 39.32–34

Συνελόντι τὸ πᾶν οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι ἢ ἐπιχειρήσις· εἰ ὁμοίως ταῖς τέχναις αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται καὶ φθείρονται, αἱ δὲ τέχναι διὰ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν γινόμεναι οὐ φύσει, οὐδ' ἂν αἱ ἀρεταὶ φύσει ἐγγίγνοιτο διὰ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν γινόμεναι. εἰ οὖν μὴ φύσει ἀλλ' ἐξ ἔθους, δεῖ δηλονότι τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναί, 5
τουτέστι ποιὰς πράξεις δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι καλῶς· ὅτι καλὰς δηλονότι ἀλλὰ μὴ φαύλας, ἐπεὶ περ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις.

4 μὴ s.l.

Scholium iii

Location in the printed commentary: 54.21

Location in the codex: f. 10v, outer left-hand margin (written vertically)

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1104b7–8 “ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρείος”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 126.21–23

Πάνυ ἀνθρωπίνως τὸ ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε προσέθηκεν· ἴσως γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐνίων ἐνεργειῶν τοῦ ἀνδρείου αὐταρκες τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, οἷον ἂν τιτρώσκηται προμαχόμενος.

Scholium iv

Location in the printed Commentary: 56.23

Location in the codex: f. 11r, upper margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1104b22 “ἢ ἄς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: with some slight alterations indicated below, this is a quotation from Anon. In EN 127.29–128.2

Διώκουσι, φησί, τινές τὰς ἡδονὰς ὡς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ (καὶ ἄς οὐ δεῖ) καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ τόπω μὴ δεῖ καὶ οὐχ ὡς δεῖ. ὡς οὐ δεῖ μὲν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ φιλοσόφῳ τρυφᾶν ἢ ἀπλῶς πεπαιδευμένῳ. ὅτε δὲ οὐ δεῖ, οἷον γηραιῷ καὶ παρήλικι γαμεῖν. ἄς δὲ οὐ δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἀπηγορευμένη χρῆσθαι τροφῇ, οἷον ἦπαρ πολεμίου λαβόντας. οἷς δὲ οὐ δεῖ, οἷον βασιλεῖ παρανομεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὸν βασιλεῖ καὶ ιδιώτῃ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λανθάνουσιν 5 ἔχει τὴν πράξιν καὶ οὐ πρὸς ζῆλον κινουῦσάν τινας, ὁ δὲ τῷ ὑπερέχειν κακὸν πρόκειται τοῖς ὑπὸ χεῖρα ὑπόδειγμα. ἐν ᾧ δὲ τόπω μὴ δεῖ, οἷον ἐν ἱερῷ νομίμως ἀφροδισιάζειν πειρᾶσθαι. καὶ οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ὡς εἴ τις παρανόμως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν βιάζοιτο τὴν ὁμόζυγον κοίτην.

1 καὶ ἄς οὐ δεῖ addidi ex Anon. In EN 127.29 3 παρήλικι correxi ex Anon. In EN 127.32 : προήλικι M | ἄς scripsi ex Anon. In EN 127.32 : ἄ M 4 οἷον ἦπαρ πολεμίου M : οἰονεῖ παρὰ πολεμίων Anon. In EN 127.33 7 νομίμως M : νομίμης Anon. In EN 128.1

Scholium v

Location in the printed Commentary: 56.23

Location in the codex: f. 11r, right-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1105a9 “γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 128.21–129.3

Ἡ ἐπιχείρησις φανερά. ὡς αἱ τέχναι περὶ τὰ χαλεπώτερα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὑποκειμένων μᾶλλον ἐξετάζονται (ὅσα γὰρ δυσαρμοστότερα τῶν ξύλων, περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἢ τεκτονική κρίνεται· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις εὖ βέλτιστον καὶ τεχνικώτερον· καὶ ὅσα δυσιατότερα τῶν παθῶν ἢ ἰατρικὴ ἐπισκέψεται), οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὰ χαλεπώτερα ἂν εἶεν· χαλεπώτερον δὲ καὶ δυσμαχώτερον πάθος ἢ ἡδονή· ὥστε περὶ 5 ταύτην ἂν εὐλόγως θεήμεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν. οὗ γὰρ χαλεπώτερόν ἐστι κρατεῖν, ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα ἀρετῆς χρεῖα, ἡδονῆς δὲ χαλεπώτερον κρατεῖν. ἄλλη αὕτη ἢ

- ἐπιχείρησις τῆς ἄνω· ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ λέγει διὰ τὸ σύντροφον εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῖν, διατοῦτο δυσασπότητον αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἔθει, αὕτη δὲ διὰ τὸ δύσμαχον εἶναι
 10 κατὰ τὴν ἰσχύν. τοῦ δὲ χαλεπὸν καὶ δύσμαχον εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν δεικτικῶς προσ-
 εχρήσατο τῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου εἰρημένω, ὃς λέγει χαλεπώτερον εἶναι ἡδονῇ
 μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, ἐπεὶ καὶ οὗτος δυσμαχώτερος τότε, ἂν ἅμα ἡδονῇ γένοιτο, ὡς
 αὐτὸς οὗτός φησιν Ἡράκλειτος·
 ὃς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
 15 ἀνδρῶν ἐνὶ στήθεσιν ἀέξεται ἢ ὕτε καπνός.

1–2 ὑποκειμένων scripsi ex Anon. In EN 128.22 : ὑποκειμένω M 3 βέλτιστον M : βέλτιον Anon. In EN 128.24 10 δεικτικῶς correxi ex Anon. In EN 128.32 : δεικτικῶ M 12 ἡδονῇ γένοιτο M : ἡ ἡδονὴ γίνοιτο Anon. In EN 129.1

Scholium vi

Location in the printed Commentary: 62.8

Location in the codex: f. 11v, left-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1105b2 “τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 129.21–26

- Μικρὸν εἶπε τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ οὐδὲν συντελεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ὅτι τὰ ἤθη τὴν πλείστην ἰσχύν ἔχει ἐν τῇ κτήσει τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἕξεων καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πράττειν τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτῶν ἔχειν. οὐ μὴν παντάπασι τοῖς καλῶς εἰθισμένοις ἀσύμβολος ἢ γνῶσις αὐτῶν· λογικοῦ γὰρ τὸ τῶν
 5 πραττομένων ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τὰς αἰτίας εἰδέναι καὶ ἀποδιδόναι δύνασθαι.

Scholium vii

Location in the printed Commentary: 64.1

Location in the codex: f. 12r, upper margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1105b19 “Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: the vast majority of the extract draws in an almost unchanged form on Anon. In EN 130. 13–131.2

- Ἐπεὶ ὁ ὀριζόμενος πρῶτον λαμβάνει τὸ γένος τοῦ ὀριζομένου, ζητεῖ τί γένος χρὴ τῶν ἀρετῶν τίθεσθαι. καὶ ἐπεὶ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρεταὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, λαμβάνει τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα· ἐν γὰρ τινι τούτων εἶεν ἂν καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί. τὰ δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία φησὶν εἶναι· πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις· πάθος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ κίνησις τῆς ὀρεκτικῆς
 5 δυνάμειος αἰσθητῆ ἐπὶ φαντασίᾳ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ. αὐτὸς δὲ ἐναργῶς ἐδήλωσεν, ὅτι ποτέ ἐστὶ τὸ πάθος τῇ τε παθῶν τινων παραθέσει καὶ τῷ ἐπενεγκεῖν τὸ ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη. εἶπε γὰρ καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἔπεται. καὶ ταῖς ὀρέξεσι δὲ ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καθόσον μετὰ πάθους γίνονται. ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τῶν πράξεων τὰ πάθη. δυνάμεις δὲ φησι, καθ’ ὅς παθη-
 10 τικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, τουτέστι καθ’ ὅς δεκτικοὶ τῶν παθῶν ἐσμεν (ἀπαθεῖς γὰρ ἂν

ἤμεν, εἰ μὴ δύναμιν εἶχομεν τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὰ πάθη), ἕξεις δέ, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς· εὖ μὲν, εἰ μέσως ἔχομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀρετῆς, κακῶς δέ, εἰ ὑπερβάλλομεν περὶ αὐτὰ ἢ ἐλλείπομεν, ὃ καὶ κακία. ἀνελὼν οὖν τὰ δύο δι' ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐν τῇ ἕξει αὐτὰς εἶναι ἀπεφήνατο ὡς ἐν γένει ἕξεις αὐτὰς λέγων, καὶ ἕξεις βελτίστας.

15

10 δεκτικοὶ M : ἐπιδεκτικοὶ Anon. In EN 130.26 14 καὶ in ras.

Scholium viii

Location in the printed Commentary: 66.11

Location in the codex: f. 12v, upper and left-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1106b17 “ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context. The section is introduced by the word “ἀπορία”, followed by “λύσις”, both in red ink and abbreviated.

Form and Source: a long quotation from Anon. In EN 131.19–20; In EN 131.25–132.12

ἀπορία· πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν, εἰ ἐν διαιρετῶ καὶ συνεχεῖ, ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλείον, τὸ δ' ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον; ἤδη καὶ ἐν πάθει καὶ ἐν πράξει, περὶ ἃ κεῖται ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ πάθη οὔτε αἱ πράξεις ποσά, ὡς τὸ διαιρετὸν καὶ συνεχές· τὰ τε γὰρ πάθη ποιότητες, καὶ αἱ πράξεις ὑπὸ τὸ ποιὸν ἂν εἶεν. ἔτι ἡ ἡδονὴ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ποσὸν καὶ ἀχρόνως γίνεται, ὡσπερ τὸ ὄραν.

5

λύσις· ἡ ἢ μὲν ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ, ὅτι οὐ συμπληροῦται αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅλη καὶ τελεία ἐν ὄτω οὖν μορίῳ τοῦ ληφθέντος χρόνου. τῷ μέντοι εἶναι τελειότης καὶ τέλος ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίας εἴη ἂν ταύτη οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου. ἔτι πρόδηλον, ὅτι πάση πράξει παρακολουθεῖ χρόνος. οὐκ ἔλαττον δὲ περὶ πράξεις ἢ πάθη ἢ ἀρετὴ. καθὸ οὖν ἐν χρόνῳ, ὃ δὲ χρόνος ἐν συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὴ τὴν διαίρεσιν λήψεται. ἔτι ἐπεὶ εἶπεν ὅτι κατὰ τὰ πάθη κινούμεθα, ἡ δὲ κίνησις διαιρετὴ (ἐν χρόνῳ γάρ), εἴη ἂν κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτὰ διαιρούμενα, κινούμεθα δὲ κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ αἱ πράξεις κινήσεις τινὲς ἢ διὰ κινήσεων. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, ταῦτα δὲ μετὰ κινήσεως καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ, οὗτος δὲ ποσὸν καὶ διαιρετὸν ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἐν αὐτῶ. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ πλεόν καὶ ἴττον καὶ ἴσον. εἴη ἂν οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράξεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ προειρημένη διαίρεσις.

10

15

4 τὸ² scripsi ex Anon. In EN 131.29 : τῶ M 8 ἀκολουθίας M : ἀκολουθούσης Anon. In EN 132.2 10 ἡ in ras.

Scholium ix

Location in the printed Commentary: 66.11

Location in the codex: f. 12v, left-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1106b16 “λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: quotation (slightly altered) from Anon. In EN 132.29–31

Τοῦτο πάνυ ἀκριβῶς προσέθηκεν εἰπὼν «λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν»· αἱ γὰρ θεωρητικαὶ οὐ τῷ μέσῳ χαρακτηρίζονται, τῷ ὑπερβάλλοντι δέ, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰ μαθήματα ἐντρεχειας καὶ ὀξύτητος.

Scholium x

Location in the printed Commentary: 68.22

Location in the codex: f. 13r, upper and right-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1107a25–26 “ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ’ ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἔστιν”

Function: exegetical notes on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: a cluster of notes comprising three extracts from a) Asp. In EN 50.15–33, b) Asp. In EN 52.20–25, c) Asp. In EN 53.23–54.2 respectively. The first extract is introduced by the word “ἀπορία” followed by “λύσις”

a) ἀπορία· ζητεῖται πῶς εἶπε περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν μὴ εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· εἰ γὰρ εἰσιν ἀνέσεις καὶ ἐπιτάσεις ταῖς κακίαις, εἴη ἂν καὶ ἐπίτασις καὶ ἀνεσις ἐν τῇ δειλίᾳ, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ, ὥστε οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴν εἶναι ἄλλην ἄλλης μᾶλλον καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἔλλειψιν.

- 5 λύσις· ἢ διχῶς λέγεται ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ἢ ἐν ταῖς κακίαις, ἢ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κακίᾳ ὥστε ἄλλην ἄλλης ὑπερβάλλειν μᾶλλον καὶ ἄλλην ἄλλης μᾶλλον ἐνδεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ λέγεται ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ὡς πρὸς τὴν μεσότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ πρότερον τῶν ῥηθέντων ἐνδέχεται ὑπερβάλλειν τινὰ κακίαν ἄλλως ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἐπιτείνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν μεσότητα σκοποῦντι οὐκ ἔστι
- 10 τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τὸ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ τὸ δ’ ἔλλειψις. ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω, φησί, μεσότης καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κακίᾳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. κατὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐτε ὑπερβολὴ ὑπερβολῆς ἔσται οὐτε ἐλλείψεως ἔλλειψις, ἵνα μὴ μεσότητες ὦσιν ἐν ταῖς κακίαις. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρετῶν δῆλον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ ὅλως τῆς ἀρετῆς μεσότητος οὔσης οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ μεσότητι τὸ
- 15 μὲν ὑπερβολὴ τὸ δ’ ἔλλειψις τὸ δὲ μέσον, διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι ἄκρον κατὰ τὸ εὔ καὶ ὠρίσθαι, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῶν κακιῶν ἔστι μεσότης οὐδ’ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν πρᾶττηται τὰ κατὰ τὴν κακίαν, ἀμαρτάνεται.

2 καὶ ἐπιτάσεις scripsi ex Asp. In EN 50.16–17 : ἐπὶ ταύταις M 6 ἄλλης¹ scripsi ex Asp. In EN 50.20 : ἄλλως M | ἄλλης² scripsi ex Asp. In EN 50.21 : ἄλλως M

- b) Τὴν σωφροσύνην περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φησὶν εἶναι μεσότητα, οὐ περὶ πάσας ἀλλὰ τὰς σωματικὰς, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας ἀπάσας ἀλλὰ τὰς δι’ ἀφῆς, οἷον τὰς διὰ βρώσεως καὶ πόσεως καὶ ἀφροδισίων· ἦττον δὲ περὶ λύπας, ἢ γὰρ ἐνέργεια τοῦ σώφρονος περὶ ἡδονὰς ἔστιν αἰρουμένου τὸ ἐν αὐταῖς μέσον. τοσοῦτον δὲ λέγεται
- 5 περὶ τὰς λύπας εἶναι ὅσον οὐ λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τῶν ἡδονῶν.

c) Σχεδὸν τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀπασῶν περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχουσῶν ἰδίως ταῖς προκειμέναις τρισὶ τοῦτ’ ἀπονέμει διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰς συστήναι δύνασθαι· αὐτίκα γὰρ ὁ σώφρων οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλλον κοινωνίᾳ

μόνον χρήται τῷ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν διαίτη ἐν ἀμπεχόνῃ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν πράξεσιν ἄνευ τοῦ λέγειν δυνατὸν χρῆσθαι τῇ 5
 σωφροσύνη· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.
 καὶ γὰρ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλευθέριος (ὁ) ὡς δεῖ ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἀνδρείος ὁ μὴ
 φοβούμενος μηδὲ παραττόμενος ῥαδίως ὑπὸ τῶν προσδοκωμένων δεινῶν. ἡ δὲ
 δικαιοσύνη ἔστι μὲν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ μὴ λέγοντα μηδὲ πράττοντα 10
 πρὸς τοὺς ἕξω καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ταύτη χρῆσθαι. αἱ δὲ λεγόμενα νῦν τρεῖς ἕξεις
 πάντως ἐν κοινωνίᾳ λόγων εἰσὶ καὶ πράξεων· δῆλον δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν.

5 ἔστι scripsi ex Asp. In EN 53.30 : ἔτι M 7 ὁ inserui ex Asp. In EN 53.32 8 μηδὲ scripsi ex Asp. In
 EN 53.33 : μὴ δὲ M 9 μηδὲ scripsi : μὴ δὲ M 10 ἀλλὰ post ἕξω primum scripsit, deinde erasi M |
 νῦν s.l.

Scholium xi

Location in the printed Commentary: 70.27

Location in the codex: f. 13v, upper margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1107a30 “οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροι εἰσιν”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 134.26–135.2

Ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις οὐκ ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστον αἱ πίστεις· αἱ γὰρ ἀποδείξεις διὰ τῶν
 καθόλου καὶ δι' αὐτῶν τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ καθόλου δείκνυται καὶ πίστιν λαμβάνει. τὸ γὰρ
 σκαληνὸν δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας ἴσας, ὅτι καὶ πᾶν τρίγωνον. διὸ οὐ κενὸν
 ἐν ἐκείνοις τὸ καθόλου καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ χωρὶς τῶν καθέκαστα λαμβάνειν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν 5
 πρακτῶν τὸ πιστὸν τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν λόγων ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστα· περὶ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν
 τούτοις αἱ πράξεις. ὅτι γὰρ ὁ ἐλλέβορος καθαίρει οὐ πιστόν, ἂν μὴ τοῖς καθέκαστα
 ἐφαρμόσοι· οὐδὲ (γὰρ) τὸ θερμὸν χαλᾶ ἢ τὸ ψυχρὸν πυκνοῖ. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν καθέκαστα
 καθαυρομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐλλεβόρου ἢ πίστις τοῦ πάντα ἐλλέβορον καθαίρειν. καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.

3 οὐ κενὸν scripsi ex Anon. In EN 134.29 : οὐκ ἐνὸν M 7 γὰρ inserui ex Anon. In EN 134.33

Scholium xii

Location in the printed Commentary: 70.27

Location in the codex: f. 13v, upper margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1107a32–33 “ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: an almost entirely faithful quotation of Anon. In EN 135.10–13

Διάγραμμά τι βούλεται ὑποτετάχθαι ἔχον τὰ πάθη τὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν ὑποκείμενα καὶ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν καθέκαστόν τε αὐτῶν τὴν οἰκείαν καὶ τὰς κακίας, τὴν τε ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν
 ἔλλειψιν· ὧ διαγράμματι ἐφαρμόσει τὰ ἐξῆς τιθέμενα, δι' ὧν δείκνυσιν ὅτι μεσότητες
 αἱ ἀρεταί, ὡς κατεγράφησαν.

3 ἔλλειψιν M : ἔνδειαν Anon. In EN 135.12

Scholium xiii

Location in the printed Commentary: 86.9

Location in the codex: f. 15r, right-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1109a32 “καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: an almost verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 139.20–24

Τὰ ἔπη ταῦτα ἢ Κίρκη δοκεῖ λέγειν παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, οὐχ ἢ Καλυψώ. καπνῶ δὲ καὶ κύματι ἀπέικασε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἄκρον, τὸ φευκτὸν αὐτοῦ δεικνὺς ὁ φιλόσοφος. ἀμαρτωλότερον δὲ φησι τὸ μᾶλλον ἐναντίον τῷ μέσῳ καὶ ἀνομοιότερον καὶ ἀρνούμενον τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον συγγένειαν, ἥττον δὲ τούτου τὸ ὁμοιάζειν.

4 ὁμοιάζειν: litt. -ει- vix leguntur in M

Scholium xiv

Location in the printed Commentary: 88.6

Location in the codex: f. 15v, left-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1109b9 “οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: a verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 139.28–140.1

Διὰ σοφοῦ τούτου ὑποδείγματος ἔδειξεν Ἀριστοτέλης ὡς χρῆ τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐχ ὡς αἰσchrὰν εἰδότας τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀποπέμπεσθαι ἡμᾶς (ποία γὰρ χάρις τοῦ τῶν αἰσchrῶν ἀποστροφῆν ἔχειν, αὐτόθεν τοῦ πράγματος στυγητοῦ ὄντος;), ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ταύτης εἰδότας καὶ τὸ καλόν, ὥσπερ τὸ κάλλος Ἑλένης οἱ δημογέροντες, ὅμως
5 τῶν ἀποβαιόντων ἔνεκα φαύλων παραιτεῖσθαι καὶ παρεκκλίνειν τὸ ἡδον καὶ καταγοητεῦν ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἂν μὴ διὰ μικρὰν ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ πρόσκαιρον ῥαστώνην λάθωμεν τὰ αἰσχίστα ἑαυτοῖς περιποιησάμενοι.

Scholium xv

Location in the printed Commentary: 90.2

Location in the codex: f. 15v, lower left-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1109b33 “ἴσως διορίσαι”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 141.5–7

Τὸ ἴσως οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ αὐτὸ διαλαβεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσως πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον διορίσαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐλλείπει).

Scholium xvi

Location in the printed Commentary: 92.10

Location in the codex: f. 16r, right-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1110a28 “τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 142.24–30

Παρατίθεται τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα ὡς δι' εὐτελεῖ τινὰ ὑπομείναντα μητροκτονή-
σαι. λέγει γὰρ παρ' αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀλκμαίων «μάλιστα μὲν μ' ἐπῆρεν ἐπισκήψας πατήρ, ὅθ'
ἄρμα εἰσέβαινεν εἰς Θήβας ἰών». διὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐντολὰς τοῦ πατρὸς διηγείτο, ὡς
ἐντειλαμένου ἀποκτεῖναι τὴν μητέρα, καὶ καταρασαμένου αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι,
ἀκαρπῖαν γῆς καὶ ἀτεκνίαν, καὶ διαβολὰς τινὰς τῆς μητρὸς λέγει, ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν ἄξιον 5
τηλικούτου κακὸν ἀναγκάσαι τινὰ ποιῆσαι.

Scholium xvii

Location in the printed Commentary: 92.10

Location in the codex: f. 16r, right-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1110a31 “ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐστι”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 143.7–14

Τοῦτο δόξαι ἂν οὐ πρὸς τὸ «ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον (τὸ) ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν»,
εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ «ἔστι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐνίστε τὸ κρίναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποῖου
αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον». διατοῦτο γὰρ χαλεπὸν, ὅτι ἔστιν ἃ μὲν
ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχροῖ, ἃ δὲ, εἰ μὴ πεισθεῖεν, προσδοκῶσι λυπηρά. χαλεπὴ δ' ἡ τούτων
διάκρισις. διὰ δὲ τὰ ταῦτα τοιαῦτα εἶναι, περὶ ὧν κρίνουσιν, ἐπαινοῦνται ἢ ψέγονται. 5
ἐπαινοῦνται μὲν οἱ τὰ λυπηρὰ πρὸ τοῦ παθεῖν τὰ αἰσχροῖ ἐλόμενοι, ψέγονται δὲ οἱ
φύβω τῶν λυπηρῶν ὑπομένοντες τὰ αἰσχροῖ.

1 τὸ supplevi ex Anon. In EN 143.7

Scholium xviii

Location in the printed Commentary: 96.5

Location in the codex: f. 16v, upper left-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1110b23 “ἔστω οὐχ ἐκῶν”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 144.9–12

“Ὅσα γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν γίνεται, μὴ μέντοι δυσχεραίνεται πραχθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν πραξάν-
των, ἐκουσίως μὲν οὐ γίνεσθαι φησι (πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε τὰ ἀγνοούμενα;), οὐ μὴν ἤδη
καὶ ἀκουσίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τούτων ἀπόφασις ἀρμόζει μόνη τοῦ ἐκουσίου.

3 ἐκουσίου correxi ex Anon. In EN 144.12 : ἀκουσίου M

Scholium xix

Location in the printed Commentary: 96.5

Location in the codex: f. 16v, left-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1110b32 “οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 144.25–28

ἡ τῶν καθόλου ἄγνοια, οἷον τίνα μὲν τὰ καλὰ, τίνα δ' αἰσχροὶ ἐστί, καὶ τίνα μὲν ἀγαθὰ, τίνα δὲ κακὰ, καὶ τίνα μὲν αἰρετὰ, τίνα δὲ φευκτὰ. οὐ γὰρ διὰ ταύτην, ἀλλὰ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀμαρτάνομεν.

1 οἷον M : τοῦ Anon. In EN 144.26

Scholium xx

Location in the printed Commentary: 96.5

Location in the codex: f. 16v, left-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1110b33 “ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 144.28–145.3

Ἡ τῶν καθέκαστα ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου. καὶ ὅτι οὕτω, δηλον ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν «ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ (ἔλεος καὶ) συγγνώμη»· τῇ γὰρ τῶν καθόλου ἀγνοίᾳ μοχθηροὶ γινόμεθα, ἀγνοοῦντες τίνα τὰ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροὶ καθόλου ἐστί, καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ, καὶ φευκτὰ καὶ αἰρετὰ, ὧν ἡ ἄγνοια ἐφ' ἡμῖν. διὸ καὶ ψόγος ἐν τούτοις παρέπεται τῷ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ταῦτα ἀγνοεῖν. διὸ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐκούσιον ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀκούσια. οὗ σημεῖον τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν πραττομένοις ψόγον ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλεον ἔπεσθαι.

2 ἔλεος καὶ inserui ex Arist. EN 1111a1–2 et Anon. In EN 144.30

Scholium xxi

Location in the printed Commentary: 98.15

Location in the codex: f. 17r, right-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1111a20 “ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context. In this note, the Aristotelian lemma “ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ” (l. 1) is quoted to introduce the exegetical passage that follows. “ἐπιζητήσαι” (l. 3) is linked to the word “ἀπορία” (in red ink) in the right-hand margin, which in turn is followed by “λύσις” further below.

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 146.25–147.4

ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ: οὕτω γὰρ ἀκούσιον ἔσται· εἰ γὰρ χωρὶς τούτων, εἴη ἂν οὐκ ἐκούσιον, οὐκέτι μέντοι καὶ ἀκούσιον.

ἀπορία· ἐπιζητήσαι δ' ἂν τις, πῶς ὄντος ἀκουσίου τοῦ δι' ἄγνοιαν, οὐ πᾶν γίνεται τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀκούσιον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ γένος ἀκούσιον, καὶ αὐτὸ ἀκούσιον.

5 λύσις· ἢ ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν κοινότερον εἶπεν ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν. διὸ καὶ ἐπιπλέον προσέθηκε τὸ «δοκεῖν» ὕστερον, καὶ προσδιωρίσατο· οὐ γὰρ τὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀπλῶς ἀκούσια, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τῷ δι' ἄγνοιαν γεγονέναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ὄντα. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἐκούσια μὲν, οὐ μὴν ἤδη καὶ ἀκούσια.

1 ἀκούσιον M : ἀκούσιος Anon. In EN 146.29 2 ἐκούσιον M : ἐκούσιος Anon. In EN 146.29 | ἀκούσιον M : ἀκούσιος Anon. In EN 146.30 4 εἰ M : οὗ Anon. In EN 146.31

Scholium xxii

Location in the printed Commentary: 98.15

Location in the codex: f. 17r, right-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1111a22–23 “τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: verbatim quotation from Anon. In EN 147.6–17

Τοῦτο ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀντίκειται τοῖς βία γινομένοις. ἐκείνων γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένων τοῦ πάσχοντος ἢ πράττοντος, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἀναιρετικὸν τὸ «οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ». ἦς γὰρ πράξεως ἢ οὗ πάθους ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἐν αὐτῷ, αὕτη οὐ βία. οὗ γὰρ τις αὐτὸς κύριος, οὗτος οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔξωθεν. τὸ δὲ «εἰδότεί τὰ καθέκαστα» τοῖς δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίους ἀντίκειται. ἐν γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἡ διαμαρτία περὶ τὴν τῶν καθέκαστά τινος ἢ τινῶν ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις ἄγνοιαν. ἀμφοτέρων δ' ἅμα χρεια πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον· ὅτι μήτε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι αὐταρκες πρὸς αὐτό. καὶ γὰρ οἱ δι' ἄγνοιάν τι ποιοῦντες ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντες τῶν γινομένων τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐχ ἐκουσίως ποιοῦσι. πάλιν δὲ δύνανται τινες εἰδότες τὰ καθέκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις ἢ τὸ πάθος αἰτίαν ἔχειν τὴν βίαν.

9 δὲ M : τε Anon. In EN 147.16

Scholium xxiii

Location in the printed Commentary: 174.8

Location in the codex: f. 33r, lower margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1127b28 “οἶον ἡ τῶν Λακῶνων ἐσθής”

Function: brief explanatory comment on the phrase above

Form and Source: slightly altered in Georg. Pachym. *Paraph.* In EN 49.2–4

Λάκωνες γὰρ ἐσθῆσιν ἐρχῶντο διηκούσαις ἄχρισ ἀγκῶνων καὶ γονάτων· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἦσαν γεγυμνωμένοι.

Scholium xxiv

Location in the printed Commentary: 226.22

Location in the codex: f. 42r, lower right-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1137a26–27 “οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν”

Function: brief explanatory comment on the term “ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν”

Ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ τὰς ἀρετάς φησιν· ὀργανικὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, οἷον χρήματα ὑγείαν φίλους. ἐν τούτοις οὖν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν τὰς κακίας τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἅπερ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν.

Scholium xxv

Location in the printed Commentary: 230.9

Location in the codex: f. 43r, right-hand margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1136b6 “ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν”

Function: brief explanatory comment on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: the note draws from Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 64.2–4

Ἐν Κύπρῳ Δημόνασσα τρεῖς ἔθηκε νόμους· τὴν μοιχευθεῖσαν κειραμένην πορνεύεσθαι, τὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτείναντα μὴ θάπτειν, καὶ τρίτον, τὸν ἀρότην βουὴν σφάττοντα πορνεύειν. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ τέκνα αὐτῆς πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων πεπόνθασιν.

Scholium xxvi

Location in the printed Commentary: 234.11

Location in the codex: f. 43v, upper margin

Cross-reference marked in the codex: EN 1138b5–6 “κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν”

Function: exegetical note on the phrase above and its immediate context

Form and Source: some linguistic affiliation with Anon. In EN 254.22–255.13 is apparent; cf. also Mich. In EN 72.5–27. For “τοῦ δὲ Πλάτωνος ὀρίζοντος τὴν δικαιοσύνην ... ἄρχεται δὲ τὸ ἄλογον” (l. 4-6), see Georg. Pachym. *Paraph.* In EN 59.6–9

Ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης πολιτικὴν δικαιοσύνην λέγει, ἦν καὶ καθόλου λέγει ὡς τινα νομιμότητα (περὶ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἐν νόμῳ ἢ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἡ ἀδικία θεωρεῖται) καὶ μερικὴν, τὴν τε διανεμητικὴν τὴν κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπανορθωτικὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν, ἥτις ἐκ τοῦ κριτοῦ γίνεται. τοῦ δὲ Πλάτωνος

5 ὀρίζοντος τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἐν τῇ ἰδιοπραγίᾳ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν, ὅταν ἄρχῃ μὲν ὁ λόγος ἄρχεται δὲ τὸ ἄλογον, μνημονεῖ οὗ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτου δικαίου, ὃ καὶ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγει καὶ οὐ κυρίως, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον λεχθεῖ ἄν τις δικαίων ἑαυτὸν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἄδικον λεχθεῖ ἀδικῶν ἑαυτὸν. ἐδείχθη γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τέ τινα ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν, καὶ διατοῦτο οὐδὲ δικαιοῦν.

10 οὐκοῦν τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν τοῦτο δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τῇ ἰδιοπραγίᾳ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν ἔστι τισὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἦγουν τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς ψυχῆς. τὸ γοῦν πολιτικὸν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστι τισὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ξένοις. τὸ δὲ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἔστι τισὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ· δούλοις γὰρ καὶ υἱέσι καὶ γυναικί. διατοῦτο λέγει καὶ τὸ «οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον», δηλονότι τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικόν, ὅπερ οὐ κυρίως ἐν τοῖς

15 δικαίοις καὶ πρότερον ἠριθμεῖτο. ὡσπερ οὖν ἐν τούτοις, ἐὰν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἄρχωνται ὁ δὲ κύριος ἄρχῃ, τὸ δίκαιον τηρεῖται, ἐὰν δὲ ἀνάπαλιν, τὸ ἄδικον γίνεται, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἂν ὁ λόγος ἄρχῃ ὁ δὲ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἄρχωνται, τὸ δίκαιον γίνεται ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄρχωσιν ὁ δὲ λόγος ἄρχεται, ἐξανάγκης τὸ ἄδικον.



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