The Journal of Ethics
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-022-09410-9

How Final and Non-Final Valuing Differ

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Received: 12 April 2022 / Accepted: 22 October 2022

Abstract
How does valuing something for its own sake differ from valuing an entity for the sake of other things? Although numerous answers come to mind, many of them rule out substantive views about what is valuable for its own sake. I therefore seek to provide a more neutral way to distinguish the two valuing attitudes. Drawing from existing accounts of valuing, I argue that the two can be distinguished in terms of a conative-volitional feature. Focusing first on "non-final valuing"—i.e. valuing *x* for the sake of something else—I argue that it involves adopting certain reasons on account of a desire for *x* to contribute to other things. I then show how this contrasts final valuing. The result, I argue, is a plausible account of how the two modes of valuing differ that leaves open substantive views about what all can be valued for its own sake. This is helpful because it develops a popular methodology used to explore the value of a wide range of things, including natural entities, family heirlooms, and artworks, as well as, more broadly, entities that might have "extrinsic final value."

Keywords Valuing · Instrumental and intrinsic value · Extrinsic final value · Irreplaceability

1 Introduction

It is standard fare to distinguish between two general modes of valuing: valuing an entity for its own sake and valuing an entity for the sake of other things.[1] How, though, do these two modes of valuing differ from one another? While there has been much discussion of what valuing in general involves, and also of what it is to value something for its own sake, there has been less discussion of this question.[2]

[1] And of course, one can value the same thing in both ways.

[2] For accounts of valuing, see Lewis (1989) and Smith (1992). Samuel Scheffler (2010) has recently provided an account of "noninstrumental" valuing. Gerald Gaus (1990) provides an account of both modes of valuing. I discuss each of these views below.

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Published online: 09 November 2022

This may be because their differences seem both numerous and straightforward. For instance, valuing an entity for the sake of other things is a *conditional* form of valuing. When one values in this way, one does so under the condition that the entity can contribute to a certain end or exist for the good of something else. It is also a *derivative* form of valuing: one's reason for valuing the entity has its source in the presumed value of the end to be brought about or the entity for which it is good. Given both things, one might suggest that valuing something for its *own* sake is non-derivative and unconditional.

Yet this last part may not be right. Family heirlooms are valued conditionally—under the condition that they are related to a certain family member—and they are also valued derivatively—one's reason for valuing an heirloom often stems from, and is in that sense derivative of, the special value that the beloved family member has for oneself. Even so, a number of writers argue that people value heirlooms partly for their own sakes (Fletcher 2009; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000; Tenen 2020). The thought is, people *cherish* their family heirlooms. They do not value them in the same way they do, say, a digital photograph of the beloved, even though both remind them of their family members. So, if these authors are correct, then appealing to derivativeness and conditionality, at least as specified above, does not adequately distinguish the two modes of valuing.[3] *Both* modes of valuing can be derivative and conditional.

Of course, it may be that these authors are simply wrong and that people do not actually value heirlooms for their own sakes (Tucker 2015; Zimmerman 2001). However, rather than take this route, I would like to see whether we can develop a plausible account of how the two modes of valuing differ that leaves open this, and other, substantive views about what all can be valued for its own sake. If we can do so, we will be able to refine a popular methodology used in value theory. According to it, one can show that an entity is *valuable* for its own sake by showing that there is a *normative reason* for someone *to value* it in that way.[4] To utilize this approach, one must have a grasp of how valuing something for its own sake differs from valuing an entity for the sake of other things. This, again, is what I seek to provide, and by doing so in a relatively neutral manner, I will be able to offer a shared version of the methodology that writers can use to develop arguments for their respective positions about what kinds of things are (or are not) valuable for their own sakes. This can help advance on-going debates about the value of a wide range of things.

[3] There is a different way to specify conditionality that I consider below.

[4] The methodology is consonant with a fitting-attitude analysis of value—roughly, the view that something is valuable just in case it is fitting to value it—but the methodology is still different from this view. A fitting-attitude analysis analyzes what value *is*, whereas the methodology in question just describes one way to *determine* whether something has (a particular kind of) value. There is a large literature on fitting-attitude analyses of value and the "wrong kind of reason" problem, which I briefly discuss later. For examples of the methodology in use, see: Anderson 1993; Fletcher 2009; Kagan 1998: 285; Korsgaard 1996b: 263; McShane 2007; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000, p. 41 and pp. 46–7; and Tenen 2020. Contrasting the approach is a Moorean isolation test, which involves seeing whether an object would have value were it to exist "in absolute isolation," alone in a universe (Moore 1922 [1903]: 53, 119, 125).

So, after a few clarifications, I consider various ways one might distinguish the two modes of valuing. Some of them maintain that the two attitudes involve different beliefs. Others maintain that they involve different emotional dispositions. None of them, I argue, yield a satisfactory account of how the two valuing attitudes differ. They rule out substantive views about what can be valued for its own sake. So, in the second half of my discussion, I develop a better way of distinguishing the two valuing attitudes. Drawing from existing accounts of valuing, I argue that the two attitudes involve different *conative-volitional* features. To specify this, I focus first on developing an account of the conative-volitional element involved with valuing an entity for the sake of other things—a species of valuing that has received comparatively little attention in the literature. I then show how this account yields a plausible way of distinguishing the two valuing attitudes, and one that leaves open a wide range of possibilities about what can be valued for its own sake. I close by developing the above-mentioned methodology and showing how my discussion advances debates about what has final value, including particularly the debate over extrinsic final value.

2 Terms and Conditions

The locutions "valuing x for its own sake" and "valuing x for the sake of another thing" are clunky. No other terms, however, capture the meaning behind them precisely. "Noninstrumental" and "instrumental" get close, but they also have a narrower connotation. An entity is sometimes said to be valuable instrumentally only if it is a *causal means* to some end. I, however, mean to use the "for the sake of something else" locution to include both instrumental valuing in this narrow sense, as well as other things too. For instance, in some cases, a person might value an entity for the sake of something of which it is a part, such as when one values a cup of sugar for the sake of having a cake.[5] In other cases, one might value an entity as a sign of something, such as when a miner values a canary for the sake of signifying safe levels of carbon monoxide.[6] To bring these cases under the heading of "instrumental valuing" threatens to mislead. So, I will stick to using "instrumental" in its narrow sense.

Instead, as shorthand for the clunky "for the sake of" locutions, I opt to use terms from the debate over so-called "extrinsic final value" (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000). An object is said to have such value if it is valuable for its own sake on account of its extrinsic features (i.e. its relation to other things), rather than merely its internal qualities. Family heirlooms are one of the main examples offered of such value, as are some of the other objects I discuss below. So, because I seek to provide an account that, in effect, leaves open the possibility that objects might have extrinsic final value, it makes sense to borrow terms from that debate.[7] Thus, I will

5 Robert Audi (2015: 46) speaks of "constitutive means" to describe this sort of thing.

6 This is an example of what Zimmerman (2001: 257) calls "signatory value."

7 It makes less sense, by contrast, to speak in terms of "intrinsic valuing" given that this connotes that one values the entity on account of its intrinsic properties.

speak of valuing something "finally" (i.e. for its own sake) and valuing something "non-finally" (i.e. for the sake of other things).[8] I do not take these terms to match ordinary parlance. Indeed, this is partly what allows me to use them as technical terms while eliciting minimal background connotations. When not too awkward, I will resort to the longer expressions as I believe that they most clearly convey the distinction I am interested in.

With this said, however, a worry arises: Given their very structure, "final" and "non-final" seem to exhaust the range of possibilities. Things are valued either non-finally or finally (or in both ways), but not in some third way. One might wonder whether this is true. Are there not *lots* of ways to value? For instance, one can love, admire, honor, respect, or cherish something, to name just a few (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000: 46). So, to clarify: I treat the 'non-final' and 'final' labels as picking out two, broad families of more particular valuing attitudes. The attitudes I just mentioned (love, admiration, and so forth) usually fall under the "final" heading.[9] Non-final valuing also has typical sub-varieties of its own (e.g. valuing instrumentally, as a constituent, and so on). Thus, there *are* more than two valuing attitudes. However, I will be assuming that the non-final and final categories are exhaustive at their level of generality. On the view I will develop, there will not be room for a third family of valuing that acts as a species in the same way these other two do. This is not uncontroversial (Dancy 2004: 175; Tucker 2015). So, by way of brief defense, let me say that I think it is best to approach the question of whether we should make room for a third, general, category of valuing only once we have determined that a bipartite distinction is impoverished or unsuccessful. It is best to start, then, by first trying to characterize the bipartite distinction as best we can, and this is what I aim to do.

3 Initial Accounts

There are many ideas one might have about how the two valuing attitudes differ. As a first pass, one might suggest that valuing something for its own sake involves a belief that the entity has a "sake" for which one can act, such as by it having an interest or a well-being, whereas non-final valuing does not. Yet while this is true of some cases of final valuing—interpersonal love, for instance, can presumably involve the belief that the beloved has interests—the idea does not generalize fully. Pleasures are thought to be valued for their own sakes, but pleasures do not have a "sake" for which one can act. The person who experiences the pleasure has a "sake," but one might also value the pleasure, too, for its own sake and not just the person.

[8] Rae Langton (2007: 163–4 n.10) also links the notion of "final value" and "final valuing" to the notion of valuing something for its own sake.

[9] I leave open whether they always do. Supporting such a claim would require an analysis of these particular attitudes, as well as a full analysis of what final valuing in general involves. Both are beyond the scope of my discussion here, and it is sufficient for my purposes that I group the particular attitudes only loosely under the final heading. Thank you to an anonymous referee for helping me to see this.

This is one reason that the views I mentioned at the outset—that valuing something for its own sake is non-derivative and unconditional—is appealing. They leave open the possibility that pleasures might be valued for their own sakes. However, as we saw, they rule out the idea that an heirloom could be valued, *qua* heirloom, in this way. So, consider, now, a refinement on one of those earlier ideas that can accommodate the case of heirlooms: perhaps when one values something non-finally, one values it under the condition that one believes the object *serves some purpose* or *can bring about a given state of affairs*. By contrast, any case in which one values something for its own sake, one would not value it under this particular condition—namely, a belief about its functionality—even if there are other conditions under which one might value the entity, such as its relation to a loved one.

This is an improvement, but a different kind of case raises an issue. Numerous writers have argued that people can value an object for its own sake precisely on account of its functionality. For instance, a cyclist might desire to go fast and win races, valuing their bike for the sake of doing so. Yet, they may not merely value it in this way. Rather, the bike might be something that they, and other cyclists, are prone to appreciate for its sleek and aerodynamic design—the same features that make the bike incredibly fast.[10] In terms used by aestheticians, such an object can be appreciated for its "functional beauty" (Parsons and Carlson 2008). Assuming that this sort of appreciation counts as a form of final valuing, the cyclist would value the bike partly for its own sake on account of a belief that it has certain functional properties.

Reflecting on this sort of case, Gerald Gaus offers a different way to distinguish final from non-final valuing. He holds that one values something for its own sake "if and only if [one has] a positive dispositional emotion toward *X*" (Gaus 1990: 111). By contrast, "we (purely) instrumentally value *Y* if we judge that it is an efficient or necessary instrument to produce some intrinsically valued object, *X*" (Gaus 1990: 127).[11] Both modes of valuing, on his view, can make reference to the entity's usefulness. One can value something for its *own* sake for its instrumental features if one has a dispositional emotion towards it on account of its functionality (Gaus 1990: 129). On the other hand, non-final valuing, or at least the cases in which a person values something *merely* for the sake of other things, will need to lack a dispositional emotion towards the entity. After all, such a disposition is *sufficient* for final valuing, and valuing something merely for the sake of other things means that one does not value it finally.

Is it true, however, that, in valuing something merely instrumentally, one always lacks a dispositional emotion? I think not. As soon as one's car breaks down, one's

[10] Other examples of this sort in the literature include a set of tools prized by a craftsperson (Gaus 1990: 129), a pen used by Abraham Lincoln (Kagan 1998: 285), and a mink coat (Korsgaard 1996b: 263).

[11] Clarifying the notion of "purely," Gaus says "A pure attitude (or valuing) occurs when a person has either a purely positive or a purely negative affective response to an object" as opposed to ambivalent responses in which one responds both positively and negatively (Gaus 1990: 115). For my purposes, this distinction is not crucial because I am trying to distinguish two valuing attitudes rather than valuing attitudes from non-valuing (or dis-valuing) attitudes. Everything I say below could be put in terms of "pure final" and "pure non-final" valuing. Also, note that he speaks in terms of "intrinsic valuing" but seems to have in mind what I do when I talk of final valuing.

refrigerator stops cooling, or one's computer malfunctions—where, I assume, each is valued merely for the sake of other things—one might very well be prone to feel emotions such as frustration, disappointment, or anger. On behalf of Gaus, one might push back and suggest that such emotions are aimed, not at the instrumental object, but rather at the loss of whatever it is that these things bring about. However, I am skeptical that this is always the case. Imagine that one just had one's car repaired and it breaks down shortly thereafter (due to no fault of the mechanic). Even if one has other modes of transportation readily available—another car in the family—one might still scowl at their car, slam the hood shut, and feel frustrated *at it*. In such a case, it seems that one's emotion is directed partly at the car itself. The frustration is not a reactive attitude, no doubt—an attitude taken towards the expressed good or ill will of another person—but not all negative emotions are reactive (Strawson 1962).

Consider, though, a related suggestion: maybe the two valuing attitudes involve different *kinds* of emotion. Final valuing might involve dispositions to experience reactive attitudes or other special emotions, whereas non-final valuing would not. Indeed, some emotions *do* seem characteristic of only final valuing. Grief is one example: people grieve the loss of a loved one and perhaps even heirlooms, but not the loss of a mere tool. The same might be true of pride or adoration. Yet while certain emotions may be special to some instances of final valuing, the case of pleasure once again presents a problem. One might value a certain pleasure for its own sake but not *grieve* when one ceases to experience it.[12] Likewise, people do not typically feel pride or adoration, or adopt reactive attitudes, towards pleasures. More generally, I am skeptical that there will be any emotion, or even some suite of emotions, that completely distinguishes the two valuing attitudes. The only emotions that one might be prone to experience regarding a particular pleasure could be excitement before experiencing it and disappointment were it not to materialize. These emotions, however, seem present in some cases of non-final valuing, too.

The case of pleasure also casts doubt on a different idea. Often, things valued non-finally are thought to be fungible, while things valued for their own sakes are thought to be irreplaceable. This comports well with many of the cases I mentioned above, such as family heirlooms. However, some versions of consequentialism hold that a sensation of pleasure is good for its own sake but replaceable by another, qualitatively-indistinguishable pleasure without a loss of value. We certainly should not rule this possibility out when giving an account of how final and non-final valuing differ. Other cases also cast doubt on using irreplaceability as a *differentia specifica.* Christopher Grau (2004: 125) has suggested that memorabilia may sometimes be valued for their own sakes but considered replaceable. The same seems true of certain artworks. A person might value hearing a song play over the radio, valuing that particular instance seemingly for its own sake. Yet insofar as the same sounds can

[12] Michael Cholbi's (2019) account of grief sheds light on why this might be the case. On his view, the object of grief is "the loss of the relationship with the deceased as it was…" (2019: 497). Although Cholbi focuses on the grief experienced when losing a loved one, we can extend this idea to other things: arguably, grief is occasioned by the loss of things that figured prominently in one's life such that one had a sort of relationship with them. The idea in the main text, then, is that not everything one values for its own sake figures prominently within one's life in this sense.

be replayed just a few minutes after, they may take that particular instance to be replaceable.[13]

Even more surprising, and going now the other direction, I think that some cases of *non-final* valuing can involve the belief that the object is *ir*replaceable. Consider: Candace is moving houses. In the process, she loses the ring that her partner's grandmother gave to her partner. Although her partner might value the ring for its own sake, Candace does not. She may only value the ring for her partner's sake because her partner gets a special sense of joy when they hold the ring and feel a material connection with their past.[14] Yet, even though Candace only values the ring for her partner's sake, she might still take there to be no suitable replacement for it. To right the situation—to provide a genuine way for her partner to feel connected with the past—Candace must find *that very ring*.

In sum, we are still without a neutral way of distinguishing non-final and final valuing.[15] This might lead some to think that the category of final valuing is too varied to be one in which all members have a shared feature, distinguishing them from all instances of non-final valuing. Yet I think this conclusion is premature. For the remainder of my discussion, I will develop a way to distinguish them.

4 The Conative-Volitional Dimension of Non-final Valuing

My jumping off point are accounts about how valuing differs from other, non-valuing attitudes. Many writers have suggested that valuing involves features that I have not yet considered in the foregoing, and though these authors do not consider how the two species of valuing differ, their views can nonetheless shed light on this. A brief overview is in order.

Some writers have suggested that valuing amounts to having a certain sort of desire. David Lewis (1989: 115–6), for instance, argues that valuing is a second-order desire: "valuing is just desiring to desire." Other writers have suggested that valuing involves something tied more closely to rationality. Michael Smith (1992: 344), for instance, suggests that "valuing is to believe that the thing is valuable, and believing valuable is believing that we have a normative reason." Scanlon (1998: 95) says that "To value something is to take oneself to have reasons for holding certain positive attitudes towards it and for acting in certain ways in regard to it." And more recently, in his account of "noninstrumental valuing," Samuel Scheffler (2010: 29) holds that such valuing involves "[a] disposition to treat certain kinds of X-related

[13] Some aestheticians might identify the artwork with the musical score and not the particular instances of it being played. Even so, certain instances of it being played are replaceable and perhaps still valued for their own sakes. This point seems to apply widely to repeatable artworks.

[14] This is a case of what Rønnow-Rasmussen would call instrumental personal value (2011: 58). I discuss his view and so-called *final* personal value below.

[15] I am also skeptical that a disjunctive approach developed from the above will provide an adequate way of doing this. I do not have space to consider different permutations of this, however.

considerations as reasons for action in relevant deliberative contexts."[16] The general idea underlying these views, then, is that valuing involves some sort of conative or volitional element.[17]

I believe that such an element, with further specification and refinement, can distinguish the two modes of valuing. The rough idea is that valuing something for its own sake is characterized partly in terms of taking there to be reasons or having certain desires (leaving open for the moment which it is), to be near the entity, to enjoy or appreciate or honor it, to promote it, to share it with others, to preserve or protect it, to emulate it, or to do other things of this sort. Corresponding to, and stemming from, these reasons or desires are other reasons or desires that characterize *non-final* valuing. Insofar as one desires or takes there to be good reason to protect, produce, admire, share, promote, or emulate something, one will also likely desire or take there to be a reason to do things that help one in these regards, and some of the entities involved in such endeavors will be valued for the sake of the former.[18] Work needs to be done, however, to specify details of this rough idea and evaluate more carefully whether it successfully distinguishes the two valuing attitudes.

The first thing to see, echoing some of what I argued in the previous section, is that responding in many of the above ways can characterize both final and non-final valuing. Regardless of whether one values an entity for its own sake or for the sake of other things, one might want to protect it, take there to be good reasons to acquire or produce it, share it, and so forth. Similarly, as the case of functional beauty suggests, there may be instances of *final* valuing that involve using the object, such as when one uses a tool to admire its deft movement. So, to provide an account of how the two attitudes differ, I think we should focus on *why* these responses are taken, rather than on the kind of responses involved.

My initial thought is this: non-final valuing involves a desire or an adopted reason (the latter being the term I use to refer to a consideration an agent takes as a reason) for responding in value-related ways in order for the entity to contribute to something else. The contribution relation captures a sort of directionality built into the "for the sake of something else" attitude. It captures the sense in which that mode of valuing is ultimately directed towards something valued for its own sake (but more on the contribution relation in the next section). By contrast, final valuing involves wanting or taking there to be a reason for responding in the above value-characteristic ways, albeit not in order for the entity to contribute to something else.

In the remainder of this section, as well as over the course of the next two, I will refine this idea. What I want to do, here, is provide more detail about the kind

[16] In addition, Scheffler (2010: 29) holds that non-instrumental valuing involves "a belief that X is good or valuable or worthy," "a susceptibility to experience a range of context-dependent emotions regarding X," and "a disposition to experience these emotions as being merited or appropriate."

[17] Indeed, with the exception of Scheffler, they seem to hold that valuing *just is* to have a certain desire or to take there to be certain reasons. For my purposes, however, I seek only to focus on the more minimal claim that valuing involves, as a necessary but not sufficient component, some sort of conative or volitional element.

[18] What if, due to some sort of irrationality, one does not desire or take there to be a reason for pursuing the means to their desired or reasoned ends? Then my view implies that they do not value such things for the sake of pursuing that end. That seems right.

of conative-volitional element in non-final valuing. I suggest adopting a hybrid view: non-final valuing is characterized partly by a kind of desire: when one values something for the sake of other things, one *wants* the given entity to contribute to other things.[19] Yet the conative element is not sufficient on its own. Rather, to value something non-finally, one must also *take there to be a reason* to respond in value-characteristic ways *on account of* one's desire for the entity to contribute to other things.[20] This is why the view is hybrid: it involves a desire-adopted reason pair. Let me explain why I think both are necessary.

The adopted reason is crucial because it limits the scope of what all is valued non-finally. Without it, I worry that the account would imply that too many things are valued non-finally. Consider: when people go window shopping, they often dream and fantasize of possessing and making use of certain products on display. In many cases, however, they window shop simply for fun. Were the products destroyed, they might be bummed because they could no longer peruse the objects, but not because they could no longer use them. Indeed, they may not even *have* a use for them—one sometimes hears people say things like "If only I had a use for it!" Moreover, in many cases the objects are so expensive as to make their purchase unrealistic. In either case, the window shopper may not take themselves to have a reason for purchasing and using the product, even though they would love to use it, and in that sense desire to do so. Indeed, they may even have a second-order desire, *wanting* to feel tantalized and desirous, which may lead them to go window shopping in the first place. Even so, the person does not value those things for the sake of using them. What changes things is if they take their desires seriously enough to adopt them as reasons for purchasing the objects or doing other things to make it likely that they will use them in the future.

So, in this way, my account of non-final valuing is reflective, requiring agents to endorse a desire.[21] There may be a non-reflective, proto-version of non-final valuing that other animals and very young children can manifest—namely, an attitude that simply involves a desire that the entity contribute to other things—but I think we should see such an attitude as just that: an early, incomplete form of non-final

[19] I follow Scanlon (1998: 39) in holding that desires are "unreflective elements in our practical thinking," whereas adopted reasons are reflective and under greater control by the agent. Scanlon further distinguishes "directed-attention desires" from "urges." As Scanlon (1998: 39) puts it, one has a directed-attention desire for something if the thought of that thing will keep appearing to oneself in a "favorable light." By contrast, urges do not stem from an evaluation (i.e. the sort of evaluation implicit in something appearing to oneself in a *favorable* light). In what follows, I think of desires more as directed-attention desires than as urges.

[20] One detail worth pointing out is that value-characteristic responses can include both actions and attitudes—an idea I take from Scanlon (1998: 95). This is important because it avoids a potential counterexample: let us say that I value my grandmother's wisdom for the sake of deciding what I should do regarding a life decision. She is long dead, however. Do I take there to be a reason to call her up and ask what to do? No. Adopting such a reason would be in vain, and this is something I know. Yet I *do* value my grandmother's wisdom partly for the sake of making life decisions such as this, even if I do not know what her advice would be. On the view I develop, this can be true because I take there to be a reason *to be sad* that I cannot call her, and I adopt this reason on account of a desire for her advice to guide my decision. Thank you to an anonymous referee for prompting me to consider this sort of case.

[21] I echo Christine Korsgaard's (1996a) notion of "reflective endorsement."

valuing. It is the reflective notion that better describes valuing exhibited in robust rational agents.[22]

Why, though, require that a *desire* be part of non-final valuing? Why not hold, instead, that non-final valuing can just involve taking there to be a reason to respond in value-related ways on account of *judging* that it would be good for the entity to contribute to something?[23] Indeed, such a view handles a challenging case quite well: a person needs to put down their pet. They do not seem to *desire* using the syringe, but they nonetheless take there to be a reason to use it because they judge doing so to be best. On a judgment-adopted reason view, they would value the syringe instrumentally, but on the hybrid view I favor, they seem not to.

This is a place for continued debate, but my reason for requiring a conative element has to do with akratic cases: imagine a student who judges that it would be best for them to visit the library this evening to study for an exam. They want to do no such thing, however, and plan to attend a birthday bash instead. Moreover, they do not even plan to visit the library, were the party called off: they are determined to do nearly anything other than study tonight. Do they value the library for the sake of studying for this exam? I think not. They might *wish* they valued the library for the sake of studying for the exam, but they do not, in fact, value it for this purpose. Rather, the student values the party goods non-finally, which they *want* and take themselves to have some reason to use (the party will, after all, be quite fun), rather than the quiet atmosphere of the library, which they do not want but still take there to be reason to utilize given that they judge it best for them to do so. This is what leads me to think that a conative element is essential.

What, though, about the case in which one needs to euthanize a pet? I think much depends on how the case is described. For instance, does the person value *killing their pet*? Surely not. It is no wonder, then, that the person does not *value* using the syringe in order to kill their pet. However, they may value putting their pet out of its misery and doing so with little pain. If we stick to this latter way of describing the case, then presumably the person *would* desire using the syringe for this purpose: after all, the syringe relieves the pet of its misery with less pain than alternatives. So, the sense in which the person values the syringe *is* one in which they desire using it.

Thus, the conative element helps handle akratic cases and the adopted reason limits the scope of what all is valued non-finally. Before discussing the content of the desire in more detail, there is one last modification I would like to make at this stage: If we accept the foregoing view as stated, then to value something, right now, for the sake of other things, one must also, right now, take there to be a reason to respond in various ways on account of a desire one has. I worry that this yields an overly-restricted account of non-final valuing. Depending on what all is involved

[22] For similar reasons, I do not think that we should distinguish the two modes of valuing simply in terms of dispositions to act or respond. Infants and animals are all prone to act and respond, but I am reluctant to say that they thereby *value* things non-finally. Thank you to Kirk Ludwig for discussion of this point.

[23] Scanlon (1998) and Scheffler (2010), for instance, de-emphasize the role of desire in their accounts of valuing.

with "taking there to be a reason" and "desiring something," it may be that non-final valuing would require at least knowing and occasionally thinking about the entity.[24] In many cases, however, one hardly thinks about the things one makes use of in one's day-to-day life, and in some instances one does not even know about them. Most people, I assume, rarely think about the electrical wiring in their refrigerator and many do not know about sundry parts of their car. Nonetheless, I want to leave open that one might, right now, still value these things non-finally. So, I suggest following Scheffler's lead and introducing a dispositional element. Recall: he says that noninstrumental valuing involves "[a] disposition to treat certain kinds of X-related considerations as reasons for action in relevant deliberative contexts" (Scheffler 2010: 29). Adapting this, my thought is that it is sufficient for capturing the conative-volitional element of non-final valuing that one be *prone* to take there to be a reason to respond in various ways towards an object on account of a desire for it to contribute to something else. To be more precise, the disposition ranges over both the adopted reason and the desire: one is prone to have such a desire and then prone to take that desire as a reason.

Something must be said, however, to spell out the range of "relevant contexts." I think that there are a few restrictions we should put in place: first, one must keep fixed the agent's final valuing attitudes. After all, non-final valuing remains derivative, stemming from final valuing attitudes. Thus, to determine what a person values non-finally at a given time, one must only consider counterfactual cases that keep fixed their final valuing attitudes from that time. Second, I also think that one must consider counterfactual scenarios that keep fixed certain of the agent's plans. This is a place where more is needed to specify the details, but a few tentative thoughts: a person values the electrical wiring and unknown parts of their refrigerator non-finally because they currently plan to continue using the refrigerator and, keeping this plan fixed, they would desire and take there to be a reason to repair the wires upon learning of their need for repair. By contrast, a window shopper may not have any plan to wear, say, a wedding dress if they plan never to marry, or are already married, or do not like wearing dresses. Thus, even though they might desire and take there to be a reason to purchase a wedding dress were these things to change, and were they to form such a plan, this is not relevant to determining what they currently value. If this is on the right track, then a person can value something for the sake of other things even if they do not know about it or rarely think about it, provided that they would take there to be relevant reasons for responding to it on account of a certain desire in cases where their current final valuing attitudes, and certain relevant plans, are kept fixed.

[24] Scanlon (1998: 47) does not think that adopting a reason, or even having an intention, requires a "conscious process." So, depending on how the details of his view get filled out, it may render what I discuss next in the main text unnecessary.

5 The Content of the Desire and the Metaphysics of My View

To summarize: I have argued that non-final valuing involves being prone to take there to be a reason to respond in value-characteristic ways towards the entity on account of a desire one has for it to contribute to other things. I now want to discuss the content of this desire in more detail.[25]

The first thing to clarify, captured by my reference to "other things," is that non-final valuing always involves wanting the entity to contribute to something non-identical to itself. If something is valued with a desire that it contribute to itself, where "it" and "itself" refer to numerically the same thing, then this does not characterize it being valued for the sake of *other* things. The idea is closely connected to the thought that non-final valuing is a derivative form of valuing. This leaves open the possibility that one might value an entity for the sake of a whole of which it is a part, as well as the possibility that a complex whole might be valued for the sake of a proper part, given that a whole is not identical to a proper part.[26]

I also allow that one can value an entity for the sake of something that is, itself, only valued non-finally. Indeed, this seems quite common. There can be a chain of non-final valuing attitudes: one might value an entity x on account of a desire that it contribute to some y, where one values y merely on account of a desire that it contribute to some z.[27] What happens if a loop forms such that z is identical to x? I go back and forth on this but, tentatively, I think that the person can still value x for the sake of y and y for the sake of z, assuming that y is not identical to x (or of course to z). A farmer might value themselves partly for the sake of tending their fields, and then value the tending of their fields partly for the sake of themselves, for instance because it provides them food or income.[28] For now, then, I just hold that non-final valuing requires x to be non-identical to the next element in the chain, y. As a more minor detail, I also do not require that any element in a chain be valued for its own sake. It might be irrational for someone to value things for the sake of other stuff without this ever bottoming out in something valued for its own sake, but I am describing a kind of valuing attitude and not the conditions for its aptness. So I leave the possibility open.

What about the notion of "contribution," to which I have also made reference? In making notion more precise, I wade into more contentious territory. There is ongoing debate about the kinds of metaphysical entities that can bear final value. Some

[25] The content of the adopted reason—to respond in value-related ways on account of the desire—can be filled in only once the content of the desire is. Moreover, describing the value-related responses seems to be a substantive issue best left for other work.

[26] But see note 30, below, for complications.

[27] Is the "for the sake of" attitude transitive? If one values x for the sake of y, and y for the sake of z, does one also value x for the sake of z? Tentatively, I think not necessarily. One values x for the sake of z only if one is prone to desire that x contribute to z. Even if one is prone to desire that x contribute to y and, separately, that y contribute to z, it may not follow that one is thereby prone to desire that x contribute to z. A full discussion of this, however, will require getting clearer on the conditions under which one counts as being prone to desire that x contribute to something.

[28] Those who wish to resist the possibility of such loops might say that the farmer values themselves at one time for the sake of themselves at a later time, where the two are not identical.

writers hold that abstract entities, such as states of affairs or properties, bear final value (Butchvarov 1989: 14 and 117–118). Others hold that obtaining or "concrete" states of affairs bear final value (Lemos 1994: 20 and 23; Zimmerman 2001: 46–52). A yet different view holds that concrete particulars—material objects, persons, and so forth—bear final value (Anderson 1993 20; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000: 49). While other writers suggest that abstract particulars—tropes—bear final value (Olson 2003). Moreover, one can be a pluralist on the matter (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000). To remain neutral, I need to describe the contribution relation in such a way that leaves open the kinds of entities that can bear final value.

For starters, I will hold that *x* can contribute to *y* either by playing a causal role in bringing *y* about or by partly constituting *y*. With these two notions, we can accommodate many of the above possibilities about what might be valued for its own sake. It allows that material objects can be valued for their own sakes because it captures cases of material constitution, such as when a person values a cup of sugar for the sake of the cake, as well as cases in which one values a tool with a desire that it play a causal role in producing some material object.[29] Similarly, given that tropes are "qualities-at-a-place-at-a-time," I assume that an entity can play a causal role in bringing about a certain trope (Olson 2003: 413). The contribution relation, so understood, can also accommodate the popular view that obtaining states of affairs bear final value: given that states are complex wholes consisting (roughly) of an entity having a certain quality at a certain time, any one of these elements can be valued for the sake of the obtaining state insofar as they partly constitute the state (Zimmerman 2001: 53). Moreover, given that there can be chains of valuing attitudes, one could value things for causally or constitutively contributing to something that is, itself, valued non-finally as a constituent of some obtaining state. The notion of constitutive contribution may even capture the possibility of a person valuing some *abstract* entities for their own sakes. If abstract states of affairs can be said to have conceptual parts, then one could value an element of the abstract state for the sake of conceptually constituting the whole.

Yet are causal and constitutive relations sufficient for characterizing the contribution relation in a neutral way? It may seem not. Consider the possibility that abstract properties are valued for their own sakes. Some of these properties might be simple, containing no parts. Because of this, and because abstract entities cannot be causally influenced, nothing could contribute to them in causal or constitutive ways. Of course, one might value some *x* for the sake of instantiating such a property, and this can be put in terms of constitutive contribution by saying that *x* contributes to the obtaining of *x instantiating the property* (Butchvarov 1989: 83). But this is different from saying that one desires that *x* contribute to the abstract property itself. So it may seem that the contribution relation, thus far defined, does not allow an abstract, simple property to be the thing the sake for which one values other stuff, thereby putting pressure on the possibility that such properties can be valued for their own sakes.

[29] One might insist that the valuer wants a certain state of affairs regarding the cake or material object to obtain. I believe my account can allow for this reframing. I discuss the relation between obtaining states and other entities below.

However, this possibility presents less of a challenge than it might appear. Notice that it *does* sound odd to say that one values something for the sake of an abstract property. It is more likely that one values things for the sake of *instantiating* the property, or contributing to the state wherein it is instantiated. Some theorists will take this to suggest that it is really just the obtaining states that bear final value, not the abstract property, yet this conclusion is not forced. It is possible that abstract properties have final value and are also the source of all value: various obtaining states regarding the properties could be valued *derivatively* in virtue of their relation to the property. Moreover, because it is odd to say that an obtaining state is valued for the sake of the abstract property, the obtaining state would be valued *for its own sake*. In other words, an abstract property could be valued for its own sake *non*-derivatively, and a person might value obtaining states for their own sakes, derivatively, on account of their relation to the property. One could then value things for the sake of contributing to those obtaining states, but do so, ultimately, because one values the abstract property for its own sake.

In fact, the same possibility arises for other views. In valuing a material object, one will likely want many states regarding it to obtain—a person might want to own it, enjoy it, and so forth. Rather than conclude that it is just the states that are valued for their own sakes, it is possible to say that the material objects are valued finally and that the obtaining states are valued for their own sakes too, albeit derivatively, on account of *involving* the objects. As Elizabeth Anderson (1993: 20) puts it,

> [According to] the rational attitude theory of value, states of affairs, whether they be final aims or mere means, are for the most part only extrinsically valuable. It makes sense for a person to value most of them only because it makes sense for a person to care about the people, animals, communities, and things concerned with them.

So, though it is a substantive view that obtaining states can be valued finally but derivatively, it is a claim that theorists such as Anderson are prepared to make when arguing that things other than obtaining states bear final (non-derivative) value. What is important for my purposes is that, with recourse to this idea, the causal-constitutive notion of contribution can accommodate the various possibilities about what sort of metaphysical entities bear final value.

Moreover, this way of developing the contribution relation has independent appeal: even if material objects, tropes, and so forth bear final value, peoples' non-final attitudes *are* often directed towards making certain states involving these things obtain. Very often, those states seem to be valued for their own sakes rather than for the sake of the objects they involve. Thus, we do not need to see how the state would contribute to the object, trope, or so on, that it involves (and which, again, might be the ultimate reason for one to value the obtaining state in the first place). When this is not the case and the state *is* valued for the sake of something involved in it, then causal and constitutive contribution once again seem apt: One might value the obtaining of *Sammy being pleased* for the sake of Sammy. However, if this is so, it will be because Sammy is the sort of entity to which an obtaining state could causally or constitutively contribute. For instance, we might conceive of a person partly in terms of a set of psychological states extending through time. An obtaining state that shapes Sammy's experience on any given occasion could then be valued on the grounds that it partly constitutes him, and does so in a sought-after way.[30] In short, then, defining "contribution" in terms of causal and constitutive relations seems plausible, and it can still allow for the wide range of possibilities about what metaphysical entities bear final (and non-derivative) value.

6 Drawing the Contrast to Final Valuing

I have now argued that non-final valuing involves a particular cognitive element—an adopted reason-desire pair—and I have sought to clarify the content of the desire. Drawing from this, I now want to show how we can distinguish final from non-final valuing. To put it simply, I suggest that someone who values an entity for its *own* sake will be prone to take there to be reasons to respond in value-related ways, but not always on account of a desire that it causally- or constitutively-contribute to other things. Final and non-final valuing, in other words, might have the same "value-related responses"—the emotional responses, certain beliefs or judgments about the entity, certain actions, and so on—but they differ in *why* one takes there to be a reason to respond in such ways. Non-final valuing always involves a desire that the object contribute to something else, whereas final valuing does not.

This provides a merely negative description of final valuing, which allows for many different, positive specifications of it. Even a negative account, however, is not entirely neutral. Consider a worry raised by a referee for this journal. On my view, a person will value their beloved for the beloved's sake only if they are prone to adopt reasons for responding in value-related ways—seeking the beloved out, spending time with them, and so on—where their reasons for doing these things will not always involve a desire for the beloved to contribute to something else. The worry is that a person *will* want their beloved to contribute to certain states—such as the state wherein one spends time with the beloved—and such desires will be part of their adopted reasons. More generally, as we saw in the previous section, people very often want various states to obtain regarding things that they value finally. So, perhaps all of one's adopted reasons characteristic of final valuing can involve a desire for the entity to contribute to such states.

There are a few things to say by way of response. First, I assume that one can take there to be many different reasons to respond in the same value-related way towards an entity. So, there can be multiple lines of justification one might take for

[30] There is a technical worry about how my view makes sense of the idea that a whole, such as an obtaining state, might be valued for the sake of one of its parts: Something, x, existing at T1 cannot cause or constitute something required for x to exist at T1. Yet a constituent of x at T1 does seem necessary for x to exist as it was at T1. So, on my view, one cannot value x at T1 for the sake of one of its parts at T1. My thought, then, is that when we say that we value a whole for the sake of a part, we really value the whole for the sake of something related, but not identical, to the given part. For instance: If I value *Sammy being pleased* for the sake of Sammy, then 'Sammy' refers to two different things: in the first use of the name, it refers to a timeslice of the person at T1; in the second use, 'Sammy' would refer to something else, such as a part of his life extending beyond just that very moment, or a conception of Sammy that is different in some other way from Sammy *qua* the entity being pleased at T1.

seeking out the beloved. I also assume, second, that an adopted reason can have a fine-grained intentional content. In particular, it is possible to take there to be a reason to seek someone out simply because of who that person is, *period*, without always connecting this in one's mind to a desire for the beloved to contribute to an obtaining state, even if one does have such a desire. In light of these two points, I am prepared to bite the bullet: in order to value something for its own sake, one must be prone to adopt at least some reasons for responding in value-related ways towards the entity on account of considerations other than a desire for it to contribute to something else. In the literature on "the reasons for love," for instance, writers hold that certain qualities of the person, the person's overall character, or the person's history are reasons for loving them (Abramson and Leite 2018; Kolodny 2003). I echo this in saying that the reasons for loving *responses* will sometimes be based simply on features of the beloved and not always on desires for the beloved to contribute to something else.[31] Moreover, even when it comes to the desires one has for the beloved to contribute to various states, we can ask what reasons the person takes for having such desires. For, such desires seem to be, themselves, a kind of value-related response. If the only answer would be that, by contributing to states like *the valuer spending time with the beloved*, the beloved contributes to other desired things, such as the valuer's own happiness, the betterment of the world, and so on, then it does seem that the valuer only values the beloved for the sake of these other things. By contrast, if one were to value the beloved for their own sake, one might indeed want them to be part of certain events but take as a reason for this desire the simple fact that the beloved is who they are. Again, final valuing seems to involve at least some adopted reasons of this sort.

Consider, then, how this view applies to other cases I have mentioned throughout my discussion. For instance, think of the cyclist. My view needs to leave open the possibility that one might value the bike for its own sake on account of its instrumental properties. I think it does: there is a difference between responding in value-related ways to the bike simply on account of its functional properties, and responding to the bike on account of one's desire that the bike contribute to winning a race, or some other obtaining state. Insofar as the cyclist takes the latter sort of desire as a reason for responding in value-related ways towards the bike, they will count as valuing it non-finally. They will be focused ultimately on things other than the bike itself—such as winning races—and will seek to bring those states about. By contrast, in different permutations of their final valuing response, the cyclist remains focused centrally on the bike. They will take there to be a reason to protect the bike and maintain its functional excellence, simply because it is a fine piece of engineering, or because it has such a sleek, aerodynamic design. My account keeps open, then, the possibility that one might value something for its own sake on account of its functionality.

[31] My view could even, with modification, accommodate the so-called "no reasons" view of love (Kolodny 2003: 142). A no-reasons advocate could hold that final valuing involves being prone to respond in value-related ways on account of no reasons at all. They could contrast this to non-final valuing, which *does* involve taking there to be certain desire-based reasons for responding in value-related ways. I will continue with my earlier negative claim about final valuing, however, because I think that final valuing involves a reflective component just as non-final valuing does (see Sect. 4 above).

The account also keeps open the relevant possibility regarding heirlooms: it remains possible that one might take there to be reasons to respond in value-characteristic ways given the heirloom's relation to a family member and not always on account of a desire for it to contribute to, say, one's being reminded of them, or one's respecting their wishes. Of course, one may have these desires too, but such desires need not be the sole reason for responding in positive ways towards the object. One may take there to be reasons to protect the heirloom and cherish it simply because it was made by one's deceased grandmother.

Contrast this to the case involving Candace. As I described it earlier, Candace values the ring for her partner's sake and does not value it for its own sake. My account allows me to restate this more precisely: if Candace takes there to be a reason to find the lost ring only because the ring contributes to her partner's happiness, then Candace values the ring non-finally for her partner's sake (or for the sake of her partner's happiness). The point, earlier, was that Candace may still think that the ring is irreplaceable, being the only thing that will, for whatever reason, contribute in the relevant way to her partner's happiness.

There is a variation on this case that is worth considering too. Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007: 418) has suggested in this journal that a person can value an object, *O*, for its *own* sake *for* someone's sake. When it is reasonable for the person to do so, *O* has *personal final value*. In the case of Candace, the idea would be that she (let us now call her 'Landace' to keep the two cases separate) values the ring for its own sake for her partner's sake. One might wonder whether my view allows for this: if Landace values the ring for its own sake for her partner's sake, does she not value the ring for its own sake *with* a desire that it contribute to her partner's sake?[32] The answer, actually, is no. Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007: 419) says that the latter person's sake is not to be understood in the sense of "an objective" or "end." Thus, *O*'s value would not be due to it being "conducive to something else that is valuable" (Rønnow-Rasumussen 2007: 419). So, if Landace values the ring for its own sake for her partner's sake, then she does not merely take there to be reasons to value the ring with a desire for it to contribute to, say, her partner's happiness. This is consistent with my view.

Now, the reason Rønnow-Rasumussen introduces the locution "valuing *O* for its own sake *for* a person's sake" is to distinguish cases such as those involving Landace from traditional examples of extrinsic final value. Rønnow-Rasumussen (2007: 415) notes that a hat worn by Napoleon might have extrinsic final value even if Napoleon did not, himself, care about it. In the case of Landace, by contrast, the ring has value partly because Landace *does* have a reason to value it herself, given that it is related to someone she *loves*—her partner (Rønnow-Rasumussen 2007: 419). What makes personal final value *personal*, in other words, is that it is bound up with the valuer's attitudes towards the things to which the given object is related. Importantly, my discussion allows for this, too: it remains possible that one can value something for its own sake on account of its relation to someone one loves without always wanting the entity to *contribute* to the person. The content of one's adopted reason, in other words, can make reference not just to the object's relation to other things, but also

[32] Thank you to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.

to one's existing attitudes towards those things to which it is related. In this way, my view can distinguish personal from impersonal value.

So, consider one final issue: the idea that pleasure can be valued for its own sake. Think, for instance, of person who values the pleasure of drinking coffee for its own sake. They will do things to experience this pleasure. What reasons do they take for doing so? Presumably it is just the pleasurable experience itself. At the very least, it will not only be a desire for the pleasurable experience to contribute to something else, such as the uplifting of their general mood. To put it more generally, my account preserves the idea that things valued merely for what they are intrinsically are valued for their own sakes. In valuing something in this way, one does not take there to be reasons to respond in value-related ways on account of a desire for it to contribute to something non-identical to itself.

It is worth noting that this leaves open the on-going debate between intrinsicalism and conditionalism, which partly centers around the value of pleasure.[33] The debate can be explained by reference to cases such as *Schadenfreude*, or the pleasure a person takes in another's suffering (Lemos 1994: 37). Those who accept intrinsicalism about this hold that the state *the person experiencing pleasure* is good for its own sake but that the broader state, *the person feeling pleasure at another's suffering*, is bad. The thought is, Schadenfreude is bad because it involves an undeserved good: the person experiencing pleasure *is* good, but it is inapt (Lemos 1994: 44). The conditionalist says something different. They say that *the person experiencing the pleasure* is bad. The overall state might also be bad, but that is because it involves a bad part. One reason for adopting conditionalism is that the focus of our condemning attitudes is *the person experiencing pleasure*, not the broader state of affairs (Olson 2004: 41).

What is important for my discussion is that I keep both views open. By taking Schadenfreude as my example, I can also show how my discussion suggests an account of final and nonfinal *dis*valuing. Tentatively, I hold that when a person disvalues something, they take there to be a reason to respond in disvalue-related ways towards it, such as by seeking to eradicate it, avoid it, and so on. If a person takes there to be reasons for such responses only on account of a desire to avoid having the entity contribute to something else, then that person disvalues it non-finally; they disvalue it for the sake of other things. By contrast, one might take there to be a reason to respond in disvaluing ways toward something, but not only on account of a desire to avoid having it contribute to something else. One might simply think that the entity is bad in itself and not merely for what it results in.

Returning to Schadenfreude, my account allows for both the intrinsicalist's and the conditionalist's views. Regarding the former: it is possible for someone to take there to be reasons for responding in value-related ways towards *the individual experiencing pleasure* simply because of what it is in itself—someone experiencing pleasure—but then to adopt reasons for responding in *dis*value-related ways towards the overall obtaining state on account of a judgment that it is bad for someone to have an undeserved good. Relatedly, it is possible to *dis*value the pleasure for the sake of the broader whole: one can respond in negative ways towards *the individual*

[33] Thank you to an anonymous referee for prompting me to consider this debate.

experiencing pleasure on account of a desire that it not contribute to the broader state. Thus, my view allows that pleasure might be of final (and intrinsic) value, that a complex whole can have a (dis)value different from the sum of the (dis)value of its parts, and that pleasure can be disvalued for the sake of how it contributes to a broader state.

When it comes to the conditionalist's view, my account allows that a person might take there to be a reason to respond in disvaluing ways towards the pleasure itself but do so on account of how that pleasure relates to other things—namely, how it relates to the suffering of another person. The pleasure, to put it differently, would have a sort of extrinsic final *dis*value. My account, then, seems neutral on the debate between conditionalism and intrinsicalism. The locus of that debate is not whether it is *possible* to value or disvalue the pleasure in Schadenfreude. Rather, my account rightly places the locus of the debate on whether the pleasure is *valuable*, or whether it is *apt* to value it.

7 Advancing Debates About Value

In sum, the foregoing offers a way to distinguish final and non-final valuing that leaves open numerous views about what bears final value. I want to end, then, by returning to a debate I mentioned earlier regarding extrinsic final value. Writers have argued that many different things can have such value, including heirlooms, memorabilia, artworks, heritage sites, wildernesses, and other natural entities (Fletcher 2009; Korsgaard 1996b: 264; McShane 2007; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000; Tenen 2020). Not everyone is convinced, however.[34] So, to explore whether a certain entity has extrinsic final value, many value theorists use the methodology I mentioned at the outset: they look at whether there is a normative reason for a person *to value* a given entity for its own sake on account of its extrinsic relations. If there is such a reason, then that is taken as evidence that the entity *has* extrinsic final value. If not, then it suggests that the entity is valuable merely for the sake of other things.

A well-known issue with this methodology is the "wrong kind of reason" problem. It involves cases where a person seems to have good reason to value something for its own sake, but where the entity does not have real value, such as if an evil demon threatens harm unless one values a worthless entity (Hieronymi 2005; Olson 2004, 2009; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004; Stratton-Lake 2005; Way 2012). Many of these writers have taken steps to address this problem. However, there remains a different problem that has received less attention: If we are to use the foregoing methodology, we must be able to figure out whether there is a reason to value something for its own sake or whether, instead, there is merely reason to value it for the sake of other things. And to figure *this* out, we need to understand how the two valuing attitudes differ. In the first part of my discussion, I argued that many

[34] For skepticism regarding the final value of natural entities, see Sinnott-Armstrong (2005). Regarding artworks, see Stang (2012) and Stecker (2019). Regarding heirlooms and memorabilia, see Tucker (2015).

of the ways one might try to distinguish them are problematic, and I now want to illustrate how this can have ripple effects for certain uses of the above methodology.

So, consider an example of the methodology as used by Guy Fletcher. To support the idea that heirlooms are valuable for their own sakes, he says that it is "reasonable" for people to "refuse to exchange" them for other things, even if other things could bring about everything the heirlooms bring about, such as "pleasure, or comfort, or pleasurable memories" (Fletcher 2009: 61; Korsgaard 1996b: 263 offers a similar idea). The background assumption is that, if heirlooms were merely valuable for the sake of other things, then they would be seen as fungible and people would be fine exchanging them for anything else that served the relevant purposes. So, given that heirlooms are aptly seen as irreplaceable, they are valuable for their own sakes.

I argued earlier, however, that some cases of final valuing can involve the belief that the object is fungible, and that some cases of non-final valuing can involve the belief that the object is irreplaceable. Thus, Fletcher's use of the methodology will yield both false negatives and false positives. Critics of extrinsic final value are likely to hone in on the issue of false positives: they can grant Fletcher's example, saying that it *is* apt for the person to take some of their heirlooms to be irreplaceable, but maintain that such people only value those heirlooms for the sake of other things. We saw this play out in the case of Candace, and there will be others like it—for instance, any case where an heirloom is the only thing that can contribute to the obtaining of a certain state because the state is defined narrowly enough. Regarding false negatives, we have seen that a person might value something for its own sake but be fine with a replacement. This may be the case for certain pleasures and repeatable artworks. It may also apply to the cyclist example. The bike's final value stems from its aerodynamic qualities—something that other bikes of the same model will have. Defenders of extrinsic final value will want a methodology that allows them to explore the full range of things that have final value.

The second half of my discussion points towards such an account: to show that something is valuable merely for the sake of other things, we should look at the volitional and conative responses it is apt or reasonable to take towards the object. If it is only apt for a person to be prone to take there to be reasons for responding in value-related ways on account of a desire that the entity causally- or constitutively-contribute to something else, then that is evidence that the entity is only valuable for the sake of other things. On the other hand, if it is apt to respond in value-related ways for reasons other than a desire for it to so contribute, then that is evidence that it is valuable for its own sake. This refinement on the methodology is more complicated than Fletcher's, but it will yield more accurate results in a wider range of cases.

As I hope is clear, this refinement of the methodology leaves open the possibility that a wide range of things are valuable for their own sakes, and more particularly that objects might have extrinsic final value. It remains at least possible that it could be *apt* for someone to adopt reasons for responding in value-related ways towards an entity on account of its relation to other things but not on account of a desire for it to contribute to other things. Of course, it remains to be seen whether this *is* ever normatively apt, but defenders of extrinsic final value now have a refined method for supporting their view.[35] The foregoing also, however, opens the door to a powerful counterargument from critics of extrinsic final value. If they can show that it is *not* apt to value heirlooms and other such things for their own sakes—even once the two modes of valuing are distinguished in a way specifically designed to leave open the possibility that they are—then that would cast significant doubt on the idea that objects really do have such value. Thus, my discussion helps develop a methodology that interlocutors can share for determining what has final value.[36]

Funding The authors did not receive support from any organization for the submitted work. No funding was received to assist with the preparation of this manuscript. No funding was received for conducting this study. No funds, Grants, or other support was received.

Declarations

Conflict of interest There are no conflicts of interest. The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose. The authors have no competing interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article. All authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript. The authors have no financial or proprietary interests in any material discussed in this article.

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[35] In my (2020), I seek to show how there can be such a reason, and therefore show how objects can have extrinsic final value.

[36] I am grateful to many others for their help on this project. In addition to anonymous referees, I thank, in particular, Marcia Baron, Kirk Ludwig, Sandra Shapshay, Allen Wood, Kevin Mills, Wade Munroe, Daniel Buckley, David Fisher, and Ivan Verano.

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