Introduction

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I Conflict and contest in Nietzsche's philosophy

I.1 The centrality of conflict and contest in Nietzsche's thought

The importance of struggle, war and rivalry in Nietzsche's thought has been noticed by many philosophers and commentators. This is unsurprising, given the ubiquity of the theme of conflict in his writings; the word '*Kampf*' (in its various word forms and compounds) occurs over 1,400 times across his writings, not to mention all the other terms for conflict in his vocabulary. What *is* surprising is that most commentators have failed to recognize the integral role of conflict in Nietzsche's philosophy not only as a theme, but as a dynamic and structural principle that cuts across the different domains of his thought and acts as a moving centre of gravity throughout his philosophical development. Gilles Deleuze goes so far as to deny a significant, constructive role to conflict in Nietzsche's thought when he writes:

> One cannot over-emphasise *the extent to which the notions of struggle, war, rivalry or even comparison are foreign to Nietzsche and to his conception of the will to power*. It is not that he denies the existence of struggle: but he does not see it as in any way creative of values. At least the only values that it creates are those of the triumphant slave. Struggle is not the principle or motor of hierarchy but the means by which the slave reverses hierarchy. Struggle is never the active expression of forces, nor the manifestation of a will to power that affirms – any more than its result expresses the triumph of the master or the strong. Struggle, on the contrary, is the means by which the weak prevail over the strong, because they are the greatest number. (Deleuze 1983: 82)

Deleuze's mistake here is to identify all manner of conflict with the slave revolt in morality from the *Genealogy of Morals*. But unlike Deleuze, Nietzsche has a highly differentiated understanding of conflict and struggle, and a rich vocabulary to match it (*Agon, Auseinandersetzung, Concurrenz, Dissonanz, Gegensätzlichkeit, Kampf, Konflikt, Krieg, Streit, Wettkampf, Wettspiel, Wettstreit, Widerspruch, Wiederstreit, Zwist, Zwietracht, Zwiespalt, i.a.*). Among the various forms of conflict thematized by him, two paradigmatic cases or types stand out as distinct historical formations that have shaped European civilization. On the one hand, there is the 'slave-revolt in morality' (GM I 7, 10) at the heart of Christian morality, a reactive struggle of one class or caste

in the face of an overpowering caste of 'masters'. Born of passive, impotent hatred or *ressentiment*, it seeks revenge in absolute victory, the annihilation (*Vernichtung*) of the other, but can only manage an 'imaginary revenge' that degrades the masters in order to accuse them, and overturns their values. As Deleuze points out, Nietzsche sees the slave revolt as the genetic blueprint for the reactive systems that have come to dominate European morality and thought – Darwinism, Dühring's theory of justice, utilitarianism and democracy, to name a few.

But there is also the active struggle *inter pares* of the contest or agon (*Wettkampf*) in archaic Greek culture, explored by Nietzsche as well as by Jacob Burckhardt, his colleague at Basel, in his famous lectures on *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*.[1] Nietzsche's most concentrated reflections on the agon are to be found in the short, early text *Homer's Contest* (1872) and surrounding notes.[2] Here, *pace* Deleuze, struggle is an active expression of forces: agonal rivalry is, to use Nietzsche's words, a 'competitive play of forces' (*Wettspiel der Kräfte*) set in motion by a plurality of forces or geniuses playing at war.[3] This dynamic is, moreover, profoundly creative: as the institution governing all areas of life, from education to poetry and politics, the agon is the master key to archaic Greek culture, its 'impulses, deeds and works' (HC, KSA 1.783). From a dynamic point of view, agonal culture effects an affirmative displacement (*Übertagung*) or transformation of powerful, destructive impulses into constructive cultural forces. Agonal struggle (*Wett-kampf*) is thus inseparable from the struggle for annihilation (*Vernichtungs-kampf*) as a form of *Kampf*, but also distinguished from it, as a regime of limited aggression oriented towards temporary, inconclusive victory or mastery, not the absolute victory of annihilation.

I.2 Nietzsche's conception of conflict: Two paradigmatic cases

In conceptual terms, these two cases of struggle or conflict can be aligned with two types that cut across Nietzsche's oeuvre. In broad terms, his concept of struggle involves the self-assertion (*Selbstbehauptung*) or empowerment of A through antagonism (*Gegnerschaft*) with B, which undergoes disempowerment. This general schema can be divided into two types, one marked by limits or measure, the other by excess. The first, measured type involves the *relative* self-assertion or empowerment of A through *measured* antagonism (*mässige Gegnerschaft*) with B, which undergoes *relative* disempowerment. In more concrete terms, the relative self-assertion or empowerment of A can mean strengthening,[4] healing (*Heilung*), intensification (*Steigerung*), while the relative disempowerment of B signifies its containment within boundaries (*in der Grenze des Maaßes*), limitation or restraint (*Bändigung*).[5] Characteristic of Nietzsche's concept of struggle is not just its use in this dynamic-energetic register, but also in the symbolic or interpretative register, where relative self-assertion can take the form of limited, perspectival truth or value claims, and the relative disempowerment of B can take the form a limited negation, critique or devaluation of B.

The second type of struggle is really just an extreme case of the first marked by excess (*Übermaass*) or the absence of measure, but is often sharply distinguished in Nietzsche by a specific vocabulary (*Vernichtungskampf*, bellum omnium contra omnes, *Todkrieg,* etc.). This involves the *absolute* (i.e. unmeasured) self-assertion of A

through *unmeasured* antagonism with B, which undergoes *absolute* disempowerment. Most simply, the latter involves the (attempted) annihilation of B (*Vernichtung*), its destruction or death (*Todkrieg*), or in symbolic terms, the absolute negation, exclusion or critique of B, aimed at emptying it of value (*Entwertung*): its designation as lie, illusion, falsehood, evil, etc. Absolute self-assertion in turn can take the form of tyrannical or imperialist claims to power, or in symbolic terms, totalizing claims to goodness (to the exclusion of B as evil), or absolute truth concerning what really is (*das wahrhaft Seiende*) to the exclusion of B (as lie, error, illusion, etc.).

In these terms, the slave revolt of morality falls within the extreme case of an absolute claim to the good through antagonism with the masters, denigrated as evil; a conflictual dynamic of self-empowerment through the absolute disempowerment of the other that led to the hegemony of Christian over Roman values in European civilization. The Greek agon, in turn, falls under the type of struggle marked by measure. Relative self-assertion (I can do better than B) is coupled with relative disempowerment (B is not good enough, worth less than is thought) in a dynamic that Nietzsche describes as one of 'reciprocal stimulation [or provocation: *reizen*] to deeds and reciprocal holding within the bounds of measure' (HC, KSA 1.789). The crucial difference between measured and unmeasured struggle lies in this moment of reciprocal stimulation. In unmeasured conflict, the opponent is and remains an obstacle that inhibits or disempowers A, which must therefore be removed or reduced to nothing (absolute disempowerment) if A is to assert itself absolutely. It is because the slave cannot annihilate the master's power in reality so as to assert himself that he must destroy the master in imaginary revenge by degrading him as evil; he remains captive to the same logic of absolute empowerment–disempowerment. In measured antagonism, by contrast, the antagonist B acts not just as an obstacle that inhibits or limits what A can do, but first and foremost as a stimulant that provokes A to overcome it. Measured conflict becomes possible when the resistance offered by the antagonist is no longer an inhibiting force that must be removed, but acts as a positive stimulus, empowering me to overcome it while also acting as a limit on what I can do.

Clearly, this analysis leaves open a number of questions. Whence the measure in measured antagonism? Is it a function of the antagonists' attitudes, dispositions or goals, such as self-control? Or is it a quality of the relations *between* antagonists, each bent on superiority? What are the conditions under which measured antagonism comes into play and resistance takes on the double significance of stimulant and limit? And perhaps most importantly, what is the nature and status of struggle in Nietzsche's ontology of becoming and the will to power?

I.3 Struggle and the will to power

The will to power is best understood as a manner of speaking or picture-language (*Sprechart, Bildsprache*)[6] that attempts (*Versuch*) to describe the dynamic character of reality as becoming (*Werden*), occurrence (*Geschehen*), process (a) in the light of Nietzsche's critique of the metaphysics of being and substance ontology, and (b) in a way that acknowledges the limits of human knowledge.

a. The critique of metaphysics, sustained across Nietzsche's writings from PHG on, issues in the claims that there is no underlying ground of beings (*arche*, first substance, God) and that there are no substances, that is, self-caused, self-identical, enduring beings.[7] The negative result of this critique is the designation of reality or life as pure process, continuum, occurrence, chaos. These cannot, however, be thought or formulated. Nietzsche's counter-ontology of becoming therefore takes as its presuppositions a series of negations of *Seinsmetaphysik* and substance ontology. They include 'the relational character of occurrence' or the 'in-one-another' (*Ineindander*)[8]; diversity, difference (*Verschiedenheit*), originary multiplicity[9]; entities without substance (drives, affects, forces, powers, quanta)[10] in unceasing transformation; and opposition (*Gegensatz*), real contradiction (*Widerspruch*), struggle, conflict.[11] Will to power names the *Ineinander* of a plurality of powers without substance in ever-changing relations of conflict.

The centrality of conflict in Nietzsche's ontology of becoming is most succinctly expressed in the following lines from the last *Nachlass*:

> All occurrence, all movement, all Becoming as
> a fixing [making fast] of relations of degree and power, as a
> *struggle* …
>
> Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als
> ein Feststellen von Grad- und Kraftverhältnissen, als ein
> *Kampf* … (NL 1887 9[91], KSA 12.385)

In this excerpt we can make out three key moments of Nietzsche's ontology: dynamism (*Geschehen, Bewegung, Werden*); pluralism or relations of difference (*Grad- und Kraftverhältnissen*); and struggle or conflict (*Kampf*). Against the ontological priority and greater reality given to *being* over *becoming* in traditional metaphysics (substance ontology), Nietzsche posits the primacy of occurrence, movement, becoming. The reality of occurrence consists not of beings or substances (self-supporting, unified and enduring entities), but of relations of difference among a plurality of forces or powers without substance.[12] And since power can only act (increase power) in relation to the resistance of other powers, these relations are relations of struggle, conflict, tension (*Kampf, Streit, Spannung*), of reciprocal action or overpowering-and-resistance.

b. In the first instance, this language or *Bildsprache* intends a *de-anthropomorphization* of reality that strips it of all human qualities and values we have projected onto it, including laws of nature (GS 109), and of all qualitative differences and oppositions (good vs evil, right vs wrong, true vs false, real vs illusion, beautiful vs ugly, etc.) (BGE 2). In the second instance, however, reality must be *re-anthropomorphized* if we are to make sense of (*verdeutlichen*)[13] change, for we can only make sense of or understand (*sich vorstellen*) change and dynamism in terms of our personal self-understanding as willing, purposive agents.[14] The only quality there is is activity as willing more power, since all human motivations and affects can be reduced to will to power in this sense.[15] But willing more power can only be more power than... Power is intrinsically relational (the *Ineinander*), and power as activity, the activity of increasing power, can only be

an *overpowering*, because power as activity can only act in relation to the resistance offered by other counter-powers,[16] so that Nietzsche can write: 'The degree of resistance and the degree of power-over [*Übermacht*] – that is what it is about in all occurrence' (NL 1888 14[79] 13.257). If willing more power is the only quality there is, it is an immanent (non-metaphysical) quality, since it can act only in and through relations of antagonism (*Gegeneinander*).[17] Nietzsche's ontology of occurrence is a radically immanent ontology of conflict.

I.4 Conflict and domains of conflict across Nietzsche's oeuvre

It would, however, be wrong to limit the question of conflict to Nietzsche's ontology of power from the mid-1880s on. The question is one that preoccupies him from the very beginning of his philosophical development, and which plays an important role in every domain of his thought. Aside from *Homer's Contest*, we find the leitmotif of conflict running through almost all of his key early writings. For instance, in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Nietzsche seeks to amalgamate the Schopenhauerian and Heraclitean visions of existence as being constituted through struggle in a way that foreshadows his later theory of the will to power (PTG 5, KSA 1.826). Then, in *The Greek State*, he contends that war functions as a *sine qua non* of the flourishing society. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, we find that conflict is once again integral to Nietzsche's *Weltanschauung*. On the one hand, opposition is fundamental to the artistic metaphysics that he builds around the Apollinian–Dionysian distinction; but what is more, we find that tragedy, which brings these two natural drives (*Naturtriebe*) into healthy equilibrium, is celebrated for having imbued the Greeks with a 'male lust for struggle', as well as for having endowed them with the psychological vigour needed to fight the Persian wars (BT 21, KSA 1.133). Moving on to *The Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche draws up a campaign map for his 'struggle for culture' (*Kampf für die Kultur*; SE 6, KSA 1.386) – that is, a struggle to construct a socio-cultural matrix able to consistently generate geniuses after the model of Schopenhauer.

Given that the early Nietzsche's interest in the theme of conflict is strongly associated with his adherence to Schopenhauer, it is notable that when he repudiates Schopenhauer's metaphysics in *Human, All Too Human*, conflict persists as a focal topic throughout his middle and late writings. In HH, for example, he proffers an extended apology for war (HH 477), but also considers the positive value of intellectual contention, or what he calls 'the personal strife [*der persönliche Kampf*] of thinkers' (HH 634). Finally, we bear witness to Nietzsche developing his conflict-based theory of character in *Daybreak*, which construes the self as a contingent complex of drives (*Triebe*) struggling for control of the human organism (D 109). He then draws a stronger connection between knowledge and the conflict of drives in *The Gay Science* (GS 333), as well as examining the relation between political contention and the emergence of strong individuals, who according to Nietzsche are replete with tension (GS 23; cf. BGE 200).

From this schematic cross-section of the early and middle Nietzsche, we can conclude that conflict represents a widespread concern both prior to the development of his will to power thesis and during its gestation period, which is usually said to have commenced around 1883.[18] Yet what is further brought into relief by this précis

is that his thoughts on the subject of strife stretch across a heterogeneity of ontological domains – a fact that goes for his entire oeuvre. Thus, Nietzsche discusses physical conflict, not just at the level of martial international or inter-poleis relations (e.g. HH 477; TI Ancients 3 6.157), but also in the context of civil strife (GSt; BGE 229), duels (*Duellen*, *Zweikämpfe*) (FEI 1 1.655ff.; HH 365; NL 1883 8[9], KSA 10.331; GM I 5, KSA 5.264), and non-destructive forms of physical conflict, such as wrestling and pugilism (*Ringen*, *Faustkämpfe*) (D 195). It should be underscored, however, that when Nietzsche speaks of war, his use is frequently ambiguous, and arguably often metaphorical (i.e. he is using the language of physical war to refer to struggles of a *cultural* ilk, as in for example Z I War).[19]

We also bear witness to Nietzsche reflecting on the nature of strife within the specifically *political* sphere (which can be both physical and non-physical – that is a contest of speeches, or a murderous struggle to seize power). His treatment of such conflict focuses on both liberal democratic politics (HH 472; TI Skirmishes 38, KSA 6.139-40) and quasi-aristocratic struggles directed towards the exploitation (*Ausbeutung*) of the weak (BGE 259). Echoing the problems associated with his war-rhetoric, it is often difficult to determine exactly what kind of exploitative struggle Nietzsche is promoting – whether this is a matter of the physical oppression and chattel enslavement of others, or whether Nietzsche is appropriating the force of this register to speak metaphorically about a struggle for *self*-discipline (see for example BGE 257).

Another domain within which Nietzsche repeatedly deploys the vocabulary of struggle is that of the psychological. First and foremost, this manifests itself in Nietzsche's drive psychology, as we have just seen above with reference to the middle period. However, this discussion continues in later texts as well (BGE 36, TI Morality 1-2, KSA 6.82f.). Aside from this, Nietzsche also refers to a whole gamut of struggles that are of a conspicuously psychological type, such as the struggle against depression (*der Kampf mit der Depression*) (GM III 18 5.383). We find struggles that are at once psychological and philosophical, such as the struggle for truth (*Kampf um die Wahrheit*; SE 6 1.395). And there is then a range of forms of conflict that, while definitely psychological, arguably have a stronger cultural dimension. To name just two, there is the struggle against nihilism (*der Kampf gegen Nihilismus*) (NL 1886 7[31], KSA 12.306) and the struggle against the church (GS 370; BGE Preface). Occupying a similarly non-physical ontological space, and not strictly separable from those forms of conflict just enumerated, there is then the struggle of *values (Kampf der Werthe*; NL 1883 12[14], KSA 10.402; NL 1888 16[86], KSA 13.516), that is to say, conflict taking place on the axiological plane: 'The two opposing values "good and bad", "good and evil" have fought a terrible battle for thousands of years on earth' (GM I 16, KSA 5.285).

In line with the Darwinistic thinkers of his day, Nietzsche also devotes significant attention to biological struggle. He critically examines this theme in terms of both a conventionally Darwinian or Spencerian 'struggle for survival' (*Kampf um's Dasein*; *Kampf um Existenz*) between organisms (HH 224; GS 349), and, under the influence of the work of Wilhelm Roux, a struggle *within* organisms – that is, between the parts (organs, tissues, cells) of the organism (NL 1886 7[25], KSA 12.304).[20] Without doubt, Nietzsche's engagement – both intensive and critical – with the biological struggles

described by Roux and other scientists like William Rolph played a cardinal role in the development of his ontology of will to power. His hypothesis that nature and individual organisms are characterized by a ubiquitous 'struggle […] for supremacy, for growth and extension' (GS 349) is most famously expressed in the statement that '[t]his world is the will to power – and nothing besides' (NL 1885 38[12], KSA 11.610). However, Heidegger's famous accusation of 'biologism' fails to do justice to the complexity of his engagement with the natural sciences, not to mention the non-metaphysical character of Nietzsche's radically immanent, pluralistic ontology of conflict (there are only *wills* to power). The thought of will to power is better understood as the culmination of his lifelong preoccupation with the question of conflict in all areas of his thought, as we have tried to indicate.

I.5 Structural analogies between forms of conflict in multiple domains

Between the forms of conflict that Nietzsche describes across the various ontological domains, we then find certain structural analogies. While this kind of isomorphism is far more conspicuous in his later thought, in which all worldly phenomena are said to embody the oppositional structure and dynamic of the will to power – hence, he calls psychology a mere 'morphology and evolutionary teaching [*Entwicklungslehre*] of the will to power' (BGE 23) – it can likewise be identified within his early and middle phases. In M 507, for example, he criticizes the epistemological tyranny of particular truths in favour of a productive form of opposition between our convictions in a manner that unmistakably reprises his conception of the agon in HC and HH. Moreover, struggles to eliminate particular drives or cultural phenomena (such as Christianity) are criticized in a way that resonates with his early characterization of violent conflict or *Vernichtungskampf* in HC (see EH Wise 7; TI Morality 1–2). In BGE 36, Nietzsche also quite explicitly draws a parallel between the ostensibly biological modes of struggle in which organisms are engaged (i.e. for nutrition and excretion) and the kinds of struggle that characterize the economy of our psycho-physiological drives, subsuming both under the dynamics of will to power.

Another remarkable feature of Nietzsche's thoughts on conflict and opposition is that, *prima facie*, he often equivocates regarding the *value* of many of these key paradigmatic forms of conflict. The most salient example of this, and the instance that has doubtless sparked the most intense critical debate, concerns his evaluation of actual (physical) war. Thus, we have already seen that Nietzsche positively appraises this type of discord in texts such as GSt and HH (444, 477), primarily on the grounds that it promotes cultural flourishing and the propagation of 'manly' virtues; yet, notwithstanding, we also find him lamenting such violent opposition on account of its wastefulness and culturally counterproductive effects (HC; NL 1888 25[19], KSA 13.646). In WS 284, he goes so far as to advocate 'making oneself defenceless' as 'the means to real peace'. His evaluation of agonism is similarly ambiguous. While in texts such as HC he univocally praises such contest, elsewhere he expresses serious reservations about its universal benefits – particularly with reference to the political sphere (WS 226).

I.6 The theme of conflict in the secondary literature and the present volume

Given the range of philosophical domains across which Nietzsche thematizes conflict, the structural analogies that exist between the species of conflict we find in these, and the ambiguities surrounding the forms of conflict that he himself endorses, it is surprising that a volume focused on Nietzsche's conceptions of conflict and contest has not yet appeared. Our volume is intended to make good this deficit. In Europe, the work of Wolfgang Müller-Lauter (1971, 1978) and Paul van Tongeren (1989) established a critical approach to Nietzsche's writings that prioritized conflict or struggle (*Kampf*) as the hermeneutic key to understanding Nietzsche's political and moral philosophy, his views on psychology, biology, metaphysics, and even his own philosophical practice. Müller-Lauter opens his seminal book, *Nietzsche. Seine Philosophie der Gegensätze und die Gegensätze seiner Philosophie*, by tackling the apparent contradictions in Nietzsche's views on the nature and status of oppositions. He distinguishes oppositions as they figure in Nietzsche's critique of logic and metaphysics from the real oppositions that characterize relations of power in his ontology, and argues that for Nietzsche it is the antagonism (*Gegeneinander*) of powers that underpins all occurrences. This account was then extended into the domain of practical philosophy by Paul van Tongeren in his important work on *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Die Moral von Nietzsche's Moralkritik*. Drawing on the centrality of conflict to the will to power, he argues that the moral 'ideal' driving Nietzsche's critique of morality in BGE lies not in the master morality (as is often supposed to be the case), but in the struggle between master and slave moralities in each of us; an ideal – he argues – that is impracticable.

In the Anglophone world, the notion of the agon has been used as an interpretive lens for Nietzsche's ontology of power (Hatab 2005) and his promotion of a pluralized, conflictual self (Richardson 1996; Gemes 2009). Undeniably, however, the question of conflict has predominantly been taken up in political interpretations and appropriations of Nietzsche's thought. On one side are those who have read Nietzsche as a ruthless warmonger inciting his readers to a proto-Fascist war of eradication and oppression – this view is defended by Fascist appropriators of his thought (Bäumler 1931), liberal critics (Russell 2004) and contemporary commentators alike (Appel 1999; Detwiler 1990; Dombowsky 2004; Warren 1991). On the other side are left-leaning, democratic interpreters who have drawn on Nietzsche's concept of measured, non-violent agon in order to construct a revitalized conception of democracy (Hatab 1995; Acampora 2013; Siemens 2013; Connolly 1991; Owen 1995; Ansell-Pearson 1994; Schrift 2000). This lack of consensus in the critical literature regarding the political leaning and applicability of Nietzsche's writings is yet another motivation for the following volume.

We have chosen a number of thematic foci for the volume that address unresolved or under-researched issues in the literature. Nietzsche's ontology of conflict (Part 1) seeks to provide the background to the heterogeneous forms of conflict and positions that appear in Nietzsche's oeuvre by examining his engagements with the conflictual metaphysics of Heraclitus and Schopenhauer and the development of his own ontology of conflict. These are of fundamental importance for Nietzsche, but are often ignored or misconstrued in discussions of specific issues, such as Nietzsche's psychology or the agon. At the same time, the question of his ontology of conflict has been separated

from the agon, so as to correct the one-sided tendencies within the literature *either* to collapse the agon into a 'hard' reading of the will to power as domination and subjection, *or* to assimilate a 'soft' reading of the will to power as form-giving force to the agon. In our view, it is essential to distinguish Nietzsche's ontology of power, and the forms of conflict therein, from the agon, understood as a cultural institution, while keeping the background assumptions of the former in mind.

No treatment of Nietzsche's thought on conflict and culture (Part 2) can ignore the cardinal importance of archaic Greek culture for him, yet there are conspicuous lacunae on this topic in the literature: for one, his relation to Homeric agon and war (Hatab, Müller), but also his relation to Burckhardt on the nature and value of the agon. While it is well known that Nietzsche's views on Greek agonal culture were formed in intensive exchanges with his colleague at Basel, Jacob Burckhardt, this topic is under-researched in the Anglophone literature; we have therefore dedicated two chapters to their relation (Robertson, Müller) and one (in Part 4) to the place of the agon in Nietzsche's contemporaneous lectures in Basel on rhetoric (Lema).

Part 3 is devoted to the ethos of conflict in the broad sense of the character, desires (McNeal), values (Häubi) and practices (Métayer) Nietzsche ascribes to the warrior and in particular, the self-referential figure of the warrior–philosopher. Again, while Nietzsche's martial conception of philosophy (Häubi, Wienand) and the self-referential implications of his views on conflict and agon for his own practice are broadly acknowledged in the philosophical literature, they remain under-researched. This emphasis on Nietzsche's philosophical practice and the performative implications of his views on conflict is continued in the last part (4) on language, rhetoric and style, with studies of his own style and use of language by Germanists – his war imagery (Agins), and his aphorisms understood as sites of conflict (Sattler). The constitutive role of rhetoric for language is also explored here with studies of the agonal tensions in language set out in Nietzsche's rhetoric lectures (Lema) and the rhetoric of hyperbole (Chouraqui), understood as a key weapon in one of the best-known conflicts in Nietzsche's oeuvre, the slave revolt in morality.

This volume was inspired by the 2014 *Friedrich Nietzsche Society* conference on 'Nietzsche, Love and War', and many of the chapters are revised versions of selected papers given there. We also solicited other articles from well-known specialists (Robertson, Müller, Métayer) and promising younger scholars (Lema, Chouraqui). In this way, we believe we have found a good balance between philosophers and Germanists, established senior scholars and emerging younger scholars from within the Anglophone and the European traditions.

II Chapters of the volume

II.1

The first part of the volume, which focuses on conflict at an ontological level, opens with a chapter by Herman Siemens entitled 'Nietzsche on Productive Resistance'. Siemens argues that Nietzsche's transvaluation (*Umwertung*) of 'love' and 'war' turns on the notion of productive resistance: the claim that resistance can be a stimulant,

not just a restriction or limit on agency, making for constructive forms of conflict. This chapter examines the main meanings of the term 'resistance' in the context of his ontology of power with a view towards understanding better this concept of productive resistance. The first part of the chapter focuses on Nietzsche's affirmative uses of the term. 'Resistance' is first and foremost the analytic correlate of Nietzsche's dynamic-relational concept of power as growth and intensification (*Wachsen*, *Steigerung*). But in the 1880s, we also see Nietzsche trying to formulate an *active concept of resistance* in the context of his ontology of power, and the concept of *productive resistance* is part of this project: as the will to resist and overcome the resistance of counter-powers for the sake of growth and intensification; and as a source of power in the dynamic of growth and intensification of power–pleasure, as exemplified by the act of coitus.

Yet the concept of resistance also exposes a tension in Nietzsche's ontology between the *primary principle* of activity, growth, intensification and the *derivative* or *secondary* status of conflict and resistance. The second part of the chapter focuses on this derivative status of conflict, which culminates in Nietzsche's critique of resistance as a *reactive* concept of power over and against the *active* power of growth or intensification that precedes it. This critique is examined first in the context of Nietzsche's critique of mechanism and then of his critique of décadence. In both cases, it is argued, Nietzsche *disconnects* active power from resistance altogether, as a form of non-resistance, and points towards non-coercive forms of power that precede the entire domain of conflict. The overall thesis of the chapter is that Nietzsche develops an active concept of resistance, but also 'deconstructs' it by showing that it depends on non-resistance.

In the following chapter, James Pearson then examines how Nietzsche's conception of unity stands in relation to the concepts of unity that Nietzsche identifies in Heraclitus and Schopenhauer. Since there has hitherto been no focused comparative study examining the impact of these two thinkers on Nietzsche's thought, one of the primary intentions of this chapter is thus to fill this lacuna in the critical literature. In the first two sections, Pearson shows how Nietzsche locates two remarkably similar conceptions of unity in the metaphysics of Heraclitus and Schopenhauer. This symmetry hinges on the fact that both develop conceptions of unity within which conflict is given a constitutive role – that is, they both formulate notions of what Pearson calls *conflictual* unity. This is counter-intuitive, since conflict is ordinarily associated with disunity and disaggregation. In the final section, Pearson then shows how, following in their footsteps, Nietzsche develops his own notion of conflictual unity. However, he also elucidates why Nietzsche must reject the pre-existing versions of this notion found in Heraclitus and Schopenhauer – namely, on account of the fact that (in different ways) they both conceive of conflictual unity as universal and metaphysically guaranteed; by contrast, Pearson concludes that it is a local, contingent and hard-won phenomenon for Nietzsche.

II.2

Part 2 of the volume examines conflict as a cultural phenomenon and practice, with a special emphasis on Nietzsche's concept of the agon and its source in the Greeks. Ritchie Robertson begins this section with a chapter (Chapter 3) examining the

relation of Jacob Burckhardt and Nietzsche. In their highly influential studies of ancient Greece, both Burckhardt and Nietzsche maintain that Greek life and culture centred on competition and conflict. Competition was institutionalized in a variety of contests for which the general term was agon. Robertson frames their accounts of Greek life in the context of the German graecophilia that can be traced back to the mid-eighteenth century, showing how an idealized view of Greek civilization yielded in the course of the nineteenth century to a more sober, grim and unappealing picture. For both Burckhardt and Nietzsche, the Greeks provided material for a harsh critique of modern democratic society. After surveying what they have to say about competition in Greek culture, with two texts inevitably in the foreground – Burckhardt's *History of Greek Civilization* (published posthumously in 1898–1902) and Nietzsche's short essay of 1872, *Homer's Contest* – Robertson argues that Nietzsche moved beyond his mentor Burckhardt in not only identifying the repugnant aspects of Greek society, but also, in his later writings, arguing that the very qualities that moderns find hardest to accept in the Greeks are potentially the most valuable for the alternatives he imagines to modern democracy. Finally, Robertson takes Adam Smith as a spokesman for modern economic competition and discusses a passage in which Nietzsche criticizes such competition by the implicit standard of the Greek agon.

Nietzsche's relation to Jacob Burckhardt, and their respective reconstructions of Greek culture, is further explored by Enrico Müller in Chapter 4. Focusing on their respective conceptions of the agon, Müller discusses five central themes. First, he examines the cultural heterogeneity promoted by the agon: Burckhardt and Nietzsche both refuse the humanist and classicist narratives of Greek culture (the so-called Greek miracle) as the 'unfolding' of a racially and culturally pure formation. Instead they reconstruct it as a hybrid culture, which formed itself through agonal learning, that is to say, through the struggle to incorporate foreign influences. Second, Müller enquires into the political pluralism associated with the agonal Greeks: the absence of an imperial centre of power is the precondition of a political macrostructure that for Burckhardt and Nietzsche attains its apotheosis in the archaic period. According to both, autonomous *poleis* interact and compete with one another without consolidating into a state unity. Against this background, semi-imperial structures eventually established by Athens and Sparta already represent forms of decline. The third focal point of Müller's study of the agon is the theme of *difference*. He argues that although the competitive ethos can be said to bind the Greeks together as a whole within Burckhardt's and Nietzsche's analyses, it is also figured as dividing them against one another at an individual level. This latter dynamic, Müller contends, issues in a proliferation of individual difference. In the unstable conditions of early Greek civilization, agonism thus operates as a catalyst, continuously engendering cultural experiments, and in this way making possible new forms of political organization (e.g. oligarchy, tyranny, democracy) and intellectual life (e.g. science, philosophy).

Having considered the closely related concepts of heterogeneity, pluralism and difference, the fourth topic that Müller investigates is the way in which the agon is institutionally *regulated*. Forms of equality are a necessary precondition for the inequalities engendered by the agon. According to Nietzsche, agonal society is intrinsically characterized by a dialectic of transgression and limitation. The striving

of the aristocratic elites for distinction (*aristeia*) and ownership (i.e. property) is felt to be morally corrupt (*hubris*) and destructive of order (*dysnomia*) from the perspective of the community. The emergence of political institutions thus serves to integrate elites within the polis on the one hand and, on the other, to make equal participation (*eunomia* and *isonomia*) possible for the community. The forms of equality that emerge in this process are not abstract and normative, but are rather conceived as *equilibria*. The agon now takes place within institutionalized spaces, and the equality established therein makes possible new forms of contest (Olympiads, musical agons, campaigns for political office). Müller subsequently analyses agonal individuality, the fifth and final theme of his inquiry. According to Müller, the individual's competitive orientation engenders a state in which he constantly compares himself with his peers, and, moreover, it cultivates a heightened psychological awareness of difference. The psychic internalization of differences, together with the diversity of models of life, further fosters individuation. At the same time, Müller concludes, every contest produces but one victor and many losers, with the corresponding experiences of loss being treated by Burckhardt and Nietzsche under the rubric of 'Greek pessimism'.

Despite its title, *Homer's Contest* is, in Müller's view, largely an engagement with Hesiod's culturally productive concept of the agon, rather than its bloody precedent in Homer. In the next chapter (Chapter 5), Lawrence J. Hatab focuses on Homer as the principal point of comparison. This chapter is a comparative study of Nietzsche's and Homer's views on love and its relation to conflict. This involves an investigation into how, as both the philosopher and poet demonstrate, conflict can generate positive dispositions towards life. Hatab begins by taking up Nietzsche's thought in the light of the following themes: how will to power can be described as a field concept of conflicted relations; how the meaning of a practice is inseparable from what resists it; Nietzsche's agonistic conception of friendship; *amor fati*, or love of fate, as Nietzsche's preferred disposition towards the global network of forces, within which particular moments of meaning and conflict find their place; eternal recurrence as the consummation of *amor fati* and the measure of full life affirmation; and the important qualification that affirming the recurrence of conflicted relations does not entail approving of every event in life.

The second part of Hatab's study then considers Nietzsche's appropriation of early Greek thought and how Homer embodies a precedent for Nietzsche's positive posture towards a life of conflict. In order to do so, Hatab examines an extensive range of themes. They include Nietzsche's admiration for the Greeks' love of life in the midst of limits and strife; Nietzsche's critique of the history of Western thought as a departure from Greek tragic wisdom, and how this critique functions in his *Genealogy of Morality*, particularly regarding the distinction between the dyads good–bad and good–evil. He also considers Nietzsche's agonistic conception of love in the expression 'love your enemies' and the question of history summed up in the formula 'Homer versus Plato'. Homer's poetry, he argues, shows how love and care are also a part of the heroic life of conflict, as epitomized in the encounter between Achilles and Priam at the end of the *Iliad*. Hatab concludes that the positive sense of love evident in Homer is lacking or diminished in Nietzsche.

In Chapter 6, Christa Davis Acampora offers a detailed study of Nietzsche's early writings on the ancient Greek agon, in order to focus on the social dimensions of agonistic organizations, more generally conceived. To this end, Acampora interrogates the general structure of the relationships that emerge and evolve in these contexts, and assesses whether such relations can generate the social and cultural products that Nietzsche associates with them if they have the structures that he suggests. Against the emphasis on dyadic structures (two opposing individuals) in Nietzsche and the critical literature, Acampora examines how Nietzsche perceives the broader social benefits of agonistic exchange. Her critical question is whether they can accrue if relations remain chiefly dyadic or whether a broader context of spheres of activity is needed to understand them.

II.3

Part 3 of the volume is devoted to the ethos of conflict, examined through the prism of the warrior and warrior–philosopher: figures that not only inform Nietzsche's philosophy of war, but also his warrior–philosophy; that is, his practice or performance as a philosopher. By ethos is meant character in the broadest sense – desires, values, habitual practices and forms of (critical) engagement. Michael J. McNeal (Chapter 7) commences the section with an examination of Nietzsche's conception of pleasure and displeasure, and how it evolves across his oeuvre to inform his critique of, and *war* upon, the signature values of modernity. The central thesis of this chapter is that pleasure *in* struggle and contest plays a central role in Nietzsche's interrelated conceptions of genius, beauty, freedom, science and knowledge, artistic creation, and both declining and ascending cultures. McNeal also argues that the libidinal economy of Nietzsche's vitalist politics implies a dispositional hedonic praxis demanding the cultivation of style, various forms of contest and the pleasures that accompany them – all as a means to wage war upon and revalue the nihilistic values of modernity.

McNeal situates Nietzsche's qualified celebration of war (including both conventional warfare and myriad forms of contestation and conflict) and his recurrent use of martial imagery in the context of his project to re-naturalize the human by promoting life-affirming pleasures and joyfulness in existence. Yet his position on war remains complex. In his middle period, he criticizes conventional warfare and the intellectual impoverishment engendered by great politics. Yet, by his late works, Nietzsche connects the pleasure (or displeasure) elicited by experiences of cruelty and war with health, indicative of the rank order of one individual relative to others. Nietzsche's contrasts between pleasure and joy and displeasure/*ressentiment* are analysed by McNeal in connection with the need to combat the nihilistic-ascetic denial of the drives that impel becoming. Nietzsche opposes modernity's debasement of man and war on the passions, calling for the spiritualization of sensuality as a healthy response to man's degradation. Whereas modernity fosters the nihilistic desire for security, equality, peace and the abolition of suffering, war increases the strength of individuals and peoples. For Nietzsche, McNeal concludes, happiness grows through difficulties overcome, and pleasure in struggle, in overcoming resistance.

In Chapter 8, '*Aidōs*, the warrior-pathos of Nietzsche's noble philosopher', Florian Häubi considers the crucial role that the notions of war, struggle and contest play in Nietzsche's philosophy, and how they play *into* his philosophy. Why does Nietzsche consider it a philosopher's task to be a warrior? While the importance of contest (i.e. agon) within Nietzsche's thought is widely recognized, this chapter focuses on the neglected notion of *aidōs* (shame/reverence) as an essential characteristic of Nietzsche's warrior–philosopher. The Greek understanding of *aidōs* is referred by Häubi, on the one hand, to the martial pathos of the philosopher, and to the 'pathos of distance' on the other, understood as a condition and mark of nobility.

In the first part of the chapter, Häubi examines the concept of *aidōs* in relation to some central elements of Nietzsche's philosophy. Häubi's central claim is that Nietzsche's characterization of nobility and, in particular, the pathos of distance refer to *aidōs* as an 'instinct of reverence', which he then examines in epistemological terms as the central feature of Nietzsche's noble philosopher. In the second part, the warrior–philosopher's *aidōs qua* reverence is then examined as a constituent element of three different relations: the relation of the noble philosopher to himself; the warrior–philosopher's relation to others, to his enemies in particular; and his relation to truth and knowledge. In each of the three cases, Häubi shows that Nietzsche attacks Socrates in part for his lack of the noble pathos of *aidōs*. Nietzsche, he contends, advances the warrior–philosopher's pathos of *aidōs* over and against the shamelessness and impudence of Socrates, understood as the epitome of the theoretical type of man.

Isabelle Wienand's study (Chapter 9) involves a close reading and interpretation of Section 285 of *The Gay Science*. She focuses on Nietzsche's statement in the middle of the aphorism: 'du willst die ewige Wiederkunft von Krieg und Frieden', which Kaufmann translates as 'you will the eternal recurrence of war and peace'. This chapter attempts to clarify Nietzsche's contentious conceptions of both war and the philosopher *qua* warrior. GS 285 (entitled 'Excelsior') is especially valuable for exploring Nietzsche's martialism for three main reasons. For one, the idea of war is central to Nietzsche's psychological philosophy. Indeed, for Nietzsche, war offers a dynamic counter-balance to the immobility implied by the desire for 'ultimate' peace. Second, in GS 285 Nietzsche articulates the ideal that a life of renunciation is a life in which opposite tendencies such as war and peace can be controlled in an optimal manner. Third, the image of war is also present in Nietzsche's conception of the philosopher as a warrior fighting for knowledge. Wienand concludes by highlighting how GS 285, when read in tandem with GS 283, proffers a definition of the philosopher *qua* truth seeker, which connects to the early modern conception of the philosopher as conqueror.

A much broader survey of the violent aspects of Nietzsche's writings is offered by Guillaume Métayer's study of Nietzsche's philosophy as a form of attack or 'Attentat' (Chapter 10). There has been, Métayer maintains, a scholarly tendency to understate the violence inherent to Nietzsche's thought. A good example of this trend can be found in the understanding of the metaphor of dynamite as a merely constructive image referring to the explosive means by which miners open up new galleries. But as this chapter makes clear, this is only one of the ways in which Nietzsche deploys the dynamite trope, quite specifically in the context of his series of epistolary reactions to an article in the Swiss newspaper *Der Bund* in 1886. This chapter explicates how

Nietzsche's use of the notions of 'dynamite', 'explosive charge' (*Sprengstoff*) and 'discharge' (*Entladung*) form an integral part of his philosophical assault on the Judeo-Christian moral tradition.

Métayer's analysis centres on a cluster of key questions: what is the significance of the metaphor of a philosophical 'Attentat' beyond the emotional shock it causes? That is, what is its *philosophical* significance? Can philosophy be terroristic? And if so, how? Métayer addresses these questions by bringing into relief how Nietzsche conceives of philosophy *qua* terrorism in his later writings. And in this vein, he suggests that there is a contradiction between Nietzsche's celebration of measured contest (i.e. under the heading of the agon) and this praise and practice of a destruction that appears so total in nature.

II.4

The final Part of the volume looks at how Nietzsche's philosophy of conflict specifically expresses itself in his use of, and thoughts concerning, language. In Chapter 11, Nicolas Lema Habash focuses on a set of texts and philology lectures on language and rhetoric penned by the young Nietzsche between 1869 and 1873. Lema argues that Nietzsche's ideas regarding language entail a reconsideration of the political sphere as a realm intimately related to the human's animal life. Partially following Herder, Nietzsche considers language to be instinctual. As such, it is the development of language that leads to the development of conceptual schemata and consciousness, and not vice versa. Lema thus interprets Nietzsche as conceiving of language as a human animal power exhibiting different layers or modes of expression; modes of expression that are in constant struggle and mutually undermining each other, but also building on one another. Besides conscious human language – what we may properly term logos, in its dual meaning of 'speech' and 'rationality' – Nietzsche proposes another layer of linguistic expression, one that, from the point of view of an animal economy of life, he considers to be instinctual. Lema calls this layer of instinctual language a 'language without logos', conceiving it as a mode of expression that is in constant competition with that of human logos.

Lema goes on to show how Nietzsche's lectures on rhetoric restage this struggle between modes or layers of linguistic expression in a political context. These lectures establish a distinction between a language of *epistēmē* (knowledge) or truth and a language of doxa (opinion). According to Nietzsche, Greek political culture was based on a form of language that creates public discussions of a distinctly agonal kind – that is, disputational exchanges of doxai. Lema determines how such a context fosters a politics founded not on a language of truth (philosophy), but on opinions advanced through a species of language that is not fully transparent.

Whereas Lema focuses on the early Nietzsche, Frank Chouraqui (Chapter 12) examines the later Nietzsche's stance towards the linguistic phenomenon of hyperbole. Taking the slave revolt in morality (GM I 8-10) as one of the paradigmatic cases of conflict in Nietzsche's corpus, he asks how Nietzsche accounts for the overcoming of the strong by the weak. The slaves, Chouraqui argues, introduce entirely new forms of conflict by seeking to overwhelm the actual force of their warrior-opponents with

symbolic force. This pushes Nietzsche into an exploration of the ways in which symbolic force can be properly called force, and can effectively counteract and eventually overwhelm physical force. The short answer is through hyperbole, a form of speech in which force exceeds semantic content and can therefore produce psychological effects independently of its truth value. The chapter pays close attention to the ways by which the faculty of imagination was both instituted and reinforced thanks to this symbolic revolt, leading to an anthropological transformation which, famously, Nietzsche claims made the human animal 'more interesting'.

In Chapter 13, Jonathan Agins explores the way that war imagery plays a fundamental role in Nietzsche's reinterpretation and revaluation of knowledge and truth in *The Gay Science*. In this text, the language of war presents a vision of the pursuit of knowledge that is free from 'erroneous' moral justifications and then affirms this reinterpretation by attacking these established values. Drawing on this bellicose register, Nietzsche also constructs a perspective that can embrace – and even *love* – the suffering and danger that arise from confronting a fundamentally purposeless existence.

Agins addresses these three interrelated motifs by comparing the 'experiment of the knowledge-seeker' (*Experiment des Erkennenden*) of GS 324 with the 'experiment' of 'incorporation' (*Einverleibung*) in GS 110. Agins argues that the association of *Erkenntniss* with war, gaiety and liberation in the former aphorism can be interpreted in the context of the struggle (*Kampf*) between the 'drive to truth' and 'life-preserving errors' in the latter aphorism. GS 110 questions the value of the 'drive to truth' (*Trieb zur Wahrheit*) by portraying it as dangerously destructive of life-preserving errors – including universal values – a drive that is motivated by 'evil' (*böse*) instincts such as 'mistrust' (*Misstrauen*) and the lust for power (*Machtgelüst*). However, GS 324 provides a perspective that can affirm this experiment of incorporating truth into life as a way of life more loveable than any other. Through the use of war imagery, this aphorism portrays knowledge (*Erkenntniss*) as a world of dangers, victories and heroic feelings. Moreover, Nietzsche emphasizes the cheerfulness elicited by the discharge of these combative tendencies and the joy that can be taken in the courageous and victorious affects that accompany this discharge. While the destruction of moral values as a kind of 'life-preserving error' is dangerous and painful, Agins shows how, from a Nietzschean perspective, it can be affirmed as a liberating act of self-overcoming that can affirm life without supersensible deceptions. Thus, Nietzsche's war imagery shows the immanent desirability of the relentless search for knowledge by revaluing this self-inflicted cruelty as a courageous struggle for liberation.

While this argument is confined to *The Gay Science*, these three interrelated motifs for portraying the pursuit of knowledge through war imagery have implications beyond this text. According to Agins, this strong connection between war imagery and knowledge suggests an account of Nietzsche's thinking that opposes literal war as an obstruction to this figurative form of war: the former threatens the physical and psychical presuppositions of the latter and cannot suffer the self-questioning demanded by Nietzsche's 'experimental' life. Conversely, Agins submits, this positive association of the drive to truth with the language of war can also provide an account of the relative lack of explicit anti-war sentiment in Nietzsche's texts.

In the book's final chapter (Chapter 14), Alexandra Sattler examines the conflictual nature of the aphorism in Nietzsche and Ludwig Hohl. She begins with a general analysis that depicts the aphorism as a battlefield staging the struggles of literature against philosophy, the individual against the system and the conceptual against the non-conceptual. Sattler invokes Stephan Fedler's definition of the aphorism as a *Begriffsspiel* ('conceptual game') in order to elucidate its nature. She contends that Blumenberg and the tradition of *Begriffsgeschichte* ('conceptual history') offers a good background for understanding the problems surrounding the aphorism, especially in view of Blumenberg's explorations of the non-conceptual, metaphorical and generally non-logocentric elements of philosophy. The aphorism is not, Sattler argues, just a stylistic feature or polemical device used by people incapable of systematic thought. For both Nietzsche and Hohl, it is rather fundamental to the nature of life conceived as being at war with itself, insofar as the aphorism is capable of expressing the irresolvable tensions of life. In its very structure, the Nietzschean aphorism, she argues, enacts the conflict between concept and metaphor. Sattler then considers the problem of the brevity of his aphorisms, which she again interprets in conflictual terms: according to Nietzsche, aphorisms are to be understood as individual links in long chains of thought, and this connectivity, she submits, is a key characteristic of the aphorism. These long secret chains of thoughts inform the structure of aphoristic writing – in sharp contrast to a logocentric system. Sattler then treats the conflict between the aphorism and systematic thought as an accepted form of philosophizing. Aphoristic writers are known to be highly critical of rationality and concepts, Ludwig Hohl being a case in point. Like Nietzsche, who has a concept of fluid sense, Hohl speaks of the complex concept, and both dissolve the boundaries of the clearly defined concept. Hohl's complex concept of *Phantasie* (imagination) enables Sattler to explore the use of imagination by aphoristic writers. While critical of rationality and concepts in favour of imagination, she concludes, aphoristic writers do not discard or wholly jettison the former rather they reinvent them for their own purposes.

Notes

1 In Burckhardt 1929–34, volumes 8–11.
2 Together with the notebook PII8b (=16[ ], KSA vol. 7), *Homer's Contest* is the most important source for Nietzsche's thought on the agon. As one of *Five Prefaces to five Unwritten Books* given to Cosima Wagner, it was 'finished on 29 December 1872' (KSA 1.792). But the drafts in notebook 16[ ] show that Nietzsche was working on it in the period from summer 1871 to early 1872, i.e. during the later stages of BT. The folder MpXII 3 (=20[ ], KSA 7), containing the first draft, is dated summer '72.
3 HC, KSA 1.789. See also NL 1871–2 16[26], KSA 7.404: 'The contest emerges from war? As an artistic game and mimesis [*künstlerisches Spiel und Nachahmung*]?'
4 See for example UB III 3, KSA 1.359 on Schopenhauer.
5 See NL 1871–2 16[22], KSA 7.402: 'The contest unleashes [*entfesselt*] the individual: and at the same time restrains [*bändigt*] it according to eternal laws.' 'The love for the maternal city encloses and restrains [*umschließt und bändigt*] the agonal drive'

(NL 1872–3 21[14], KSA 7.526). But also for example 'Restraint [*Bändigung*] of the knowledge drive through art' (NL 1872-4 19[72], KSA 7.443).

6   See NL 1881 11[128], KSA 9.487, where Nietzsche reflects critically on the language of conflict used in contemporary physiology and biology, characterizing it as a 'manner of speaking' (*Sprechart*) or imagistic discourse (*Bilderrede*) that serves to elucidate or make sense (*verdeutlichen*) in human terms of natural processes. The same status can, in our view, be ascribed to the conflictual character of the will to power.

7   For a detailed exposition of the will to power as Nietzsche's response to his critique of substance ontology, see Aydin 2003. Substance is what gives things their unity and identity over time by virtue of three features ascribed to it in different ways by different philosophers: substance represents identity (durability over time), unity and independence (self-sufficiency). See Aydin 2003: 13–46, 205–6.

8   'The unchanging sequence of certain appearances does not demonstrate a "law," but rather a power relation between two or more forces. To say "But exactly this relation remains the same!" means nothing other than "One and the same force cannot also be another force."—It is not about a *sequence* [lit. after-one-another: Nacheinander],— but rather an *interconnectedness* [lit. in-one-another: Ineinander], a process in which the single moments that follow one another condition one another *not* as causes and effects. …' (NL 1885–6 2[139] KSA 12.135f.).

9   For example NL 1870–71 7[110], KSA 7.163: 'In logic the principle of contradiction rules, which perhaps is not valid for things, which are different, opposed [*Verschiedenes, Entgegengesetztes*]'; NL 1884 25[427], KSA 11.125: '– Preservation of the individual: i.e. to assume that a multiplicity [*Vielheit*] with the most manifold [*mannichfaltigsten*] activities wants to "preserve" itself, not as identical-with-itself, but "living" – ruling – obeying – nourishing itself – growing – […]'; NL 1885–87 1[58], KSA 12.25: 'The human as a multiplicity of "wills to power" […]'.

10   On drives, see NL 1883 7[25], KSA 10.250: '"drive [*Trieb*]" is only a translation into the language of feeling from non-feeling [*aus dem Nichtfühlendem*] […]'. On force: NL 1885–6 2[159], KSA 12.143: 'Has a force [*Kraft*] ever been detected yet? No, rather effects, translated into an entirely alien language.'

11   NL 1884 26[276], KSA 11.222: 'There must be struggle [*Kampf*] for the sake of struggle: and *mastering* [Herrschen] is to bear the counter-weight of the weaker force, so a kind of *continuation* of the struggle. *Obeying* equally a *struggle*: precisely as much force as *remains* to [be able to] resist.'

12   For a more detailed account of Nietzsche's critique of substance ontology, see Chapter 1.

13   NL 1881 11[128], KSA 9.487 (note 6).

14   'We cannot think an attraction without a purpose. – The will to get something into one's power or to defend oneself against its power and to repel it – that: we "understand": that would be an interpretation we could use. / In short: the psychological need for a belief in causality lies in the unrepresentability [*Unvorstellbarkeit*] of an occurrence without purposes […]' (NL 1885–6 2[83], KSA 12.102f.); 'Either one must take all effects as an illusion (for we have formed our representation [*Vorstellung*] of cause and effect from the example of our will as cause!) and then nothing at all is comprehensible: or one must attempt to think all effects as of the same kind, as acts of will […]' (NL 1885 40[37], KSA 11.647).

15   'All occurrence from purposes is reducible to the purpose of increasing power' (NL 1885–6 2[88], KSA 12.105).

16 On Nietzsche's dynamic, relational concept of force (*Kraft*) and its sources, see: Abel 1984: 6–27; Mittasch 1952: 102–13. On Nietzsche's concept of power (*Macht*), see also Gerhardt 1996: 155–61; 203–45; 285–309.
17 See Müller-Lauter 1971, Chapter 1: 'Der Schein der Gegensätze und die wirkliche Gegensätzlichkeit der Willen zur Macht'.
18 See Nietzsche's comments on the 'feeling of power' (*Machtsgefühl*) in D 23, 65 and 113.
19 As Kaufmann 1974: 386.
20 See Roux 1881.

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