

What to expect when you're electing: the relationship between far-right strength and citizenship policy in Europe

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Abstract The analysis builds on previous research exploring the impact of far-right support on citizenship policy. Using Bayesian analyses, this research evaluates the impact of far-right success on citizenship policy restrictiveness and citizenship policy outcomes per year across 29 European countries between 2003–2014. Results reveal that far-right success is a statistically and substantively significant factor in determining citizenship policy restrictiveness as well as rates of naturalization. However, differential levels of impact suggest that far-right influence is not uniform throughout the policy process.

Keywords Far right parties · Radical right parties · Citizenship policy · Populist radical right parties · Immigration

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reveal that far-right success is a statistically and substantively significant factor in determining citizenship policy restrictiveness as well as rates of naturalization. However, differential levels of impact suggest that far-right influence is not uniform throughout the policy process.

What is the impact of far-right party success on citizenship policy? In the last few decades, citizenship policy has been one of the largest sources of divergence among European countries (Givens and Luedtke 2005); ranked as one of the top four problems confronting Europe by 82% of European Parliament (EP) members in the 1990s (Lahav 2004). Today, citizenship policy remains one of Europe's most pressing policy challenges (Lahav 2004; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Downs 2011). Despite a resurgence in research, scholars struggle to explain changing trends in citizenship policy restrictiveness (Akkerman 2012a, b; Janoski 2010; Hollifield 1992; Money 1999; Guiraudon 2000; Joppke 1999, 2003, 2008; Aleinikorr and Klusmeyer 2000, 2001, 2002; Baubock et al 2006; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Hansen and Weil 2001, 2002; Schonwalder and Triadafilopoulos 2012; Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Koopmans et al. 2012a, b; Howard 2005, 2006, 2010; Sredanovic 2016; Givens and Luedtke 2004, 2005; Goodman 2014; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006). In address, this article contributes innovations in theory and measurement to fill gaps in the literature exploring the impact of far-right parties on citizenship policy.

What explains changes in citizenship policy? Highlighting the role of domestic actors, Koopmans et al. (2012a, b) point out that the strength of far-right parties has increased continuously since 2008 and suggest that this increase may help explain the rise in citizenship policy restrictiveness. Still, research in this area fails to reach consensus. While Howard (2010) finds that the far-right is the single strongest predictor of citizenship policy restrictiveness, others offer the mainstream right as an explanation (Sredanovic 2016; Akkerman 2012a, b). Additional literature recognizes that while mainstream parties may lose control of the policy agenda due to electoral competition from the far-right, it is possible that far-right impact is mitigated by the proportion of foreign-born nationals in the electorate (Koopmans et al. 2012a, b, 1207; Soysal 1997; Howard 2009; Perlmutter 1996; Schain 2006). Addressing these nebulous results, this article examines far-right party influence on 'on the books' citizenship policy as well as citizenship policy outcomes (vis-a-vis naturalization).

The purpose of this research agenda is not just to understand far-right influence in creating policy, but also to evaluate the extent to which far-right influence impacts policy outcomes. To this end, the approach presented here offers five innovations. First, a naturalization measure is included to capture the impact of the far-right on citizenship policy outcomes. The inclusion of naturalization as an outcome of citizenship policy is theoretically supported by research that finds left and green parties have a liberalizing effect on naturalization rates, but have very little effect on the 'on the -books' policies (Janoski 2010, 236–237). Working on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, this research investigates the extent to which far-right impact on policy outcomes differs from the impact on the policies themselves. Statistical analyses confirm that while far-right success has a statistically significant



relationship with both policy passage and policy outcomes, the impact is greater on naturalization rates than on 'on the books' policy.

Additionally, this article offers four contributions relative to data and measurement. First, building Howard's (2010) citizenship policy index (CPI), a more developed, robust, indexed measure of citizenship policy is constructed using factor analysis to aggregate individual measures of citizenship policy restrictiveness into a single value. The advancement of a single measure over the use of separate dependent variables allows for a more comprehensive picture of each country's citizenship policy portfolio. In addition, data include yearly variation in the primary independent variable and dependent variables in order to provide a more well-rounded analysis without the assumption of linearity. Third, measurement of anti-immigrant sentiment is reconceived using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to more directly reflect the sentiments of the electorate. Finally, these nuanced measures are leveraged using a new, quantitative methodology to evaluate citizenship policy trends across an expanded dataset that includes policy data on 29 European states from 2003 to 2014. The major finding is that far-right success impacts both 'on the books' citizenship policy and empirical citizenship policy outcomes, such as naturalization.

Citizenship policy: from whence it came

Extant citizenship policy literature can be thought of as a Venn diagram in which economic explanations exist in one sphere and political explanations exist in the other.¹ However, strictly economic theories fail to explain variation in citizenship policy restrictiveness between European Union (EU) countries (Howard 2010; Givens and Luedtke 2004; Koopmans et al. 2012a, b). In fact, evaluating citizenship policy through a series of bivariate regressions, Howard (2010) finds no statistically significant relationship between his indexed measure of citizenship policy restrictiveness and GDP per capita, economic growth, or unemployment (747). Koopmans et al. (2012a, b) corroborate Howard's (2009, 2010) results, finding no significant relationship between economic growth and citizenship policy restrictiveness.

While economic variables are recognized as having a potential indirect impact on citizenship policy and policy outcomes, this article argues political explanations offer the most comprehensive theory of the policy process. Early efforts to establish political explanations are evident in client politics literature, which argues that the interests of organized groups and businesses, particularly those benefitting from immigration, exert influence on policy-makers to shape immigration policy (Freeman 1992, 2002; Givens and Luedtke 2004). However, if client politics alone determined citizenship policy, then businesses standing to gain from the free movement of cheap labor would be able to push through a liberal 'harmonizing' of policy across EU states (Givens and Luedtke 2004, 149). In fact, Givens and

¹ For an overview of economic literature, see Sassen (1996, 1998), Soysal (1994), Philip (1994), Fitzgerald et al. (2014) and Givens and Luedtke (2005).



Luedtke (2004) point out that the diffuse costs of policy passage mean that the client politics model recognizes no obstacles to the expansive liberalization of citizenship policy. Yet, interstate variation persists (Howard 2006, 2009, 2010; Koopmans et al. 2012a, b; Givens and Luedtke 2004, 2005; Dronkers and Vink 2012).

Addressing this puzzle, a burgeoning body of work focuses on the interrelationship between institutions and agency. For instance, Fitzgerald et al. (2014), Koopmans et al. (2012a, b), Goodman (2014) and others note that while all parties face institutional legacies and constraints, far-right parties become particularly influential in halting or altering the policy trajectory. In support of Howard's (2009) work, Koopmans et al. (2012a, b) find that a high far-right vote share reduces subsequent levels of immigration rights by increasing citizenship policy restrictiveness. Moreover, Goodman (2014) determines that institutions express a state's prerogative of inclusion and exclusion, leading state actors to different understandings of how to perceive and address state membership. In this way, policies are crafted strategically, defined by inherited citizenship policies and extant political preferences of the party in power. In fact, Goodman (2014) concludes that policy output is a product of the interaction between politics and institutionally ingrained starting positions. Thus, citizenship policy explanations do not end with path dependent arguments. Rather, political parties are agents of change and can maneuver within an institutional framework, outlining the conversation about immigration in a ways that creates a more or less receptive public (Goodman 2014). In this way, far-right parties and their symbiotic relationship with their constituent base become integral to explanations of citizenship policy.

Still, the relative impact of partisanship on citizenship policy restrictiveness continues to spark debate. To date, partisanship has been on both sides of the immigration equation (Howard 2006, 2010; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Knigge 1998; Van Der Brug et al. 2005). Where some treat the flow of migrants as an exogenous factor, others argue that immigration is a process that is shaped by internal politics (Anderson 1996; Arzheimer 2009; Fitzgerald et al. 2014). For instance, scholars contend that mainstream parties are not often able to control the political agenda over issues of immigration and citizenship because of electoral competition from far-right populist parties (Koopmans et al. 2012a, b, 1207; Howard 2009; Schain 2006; Perlmutter 1996).² In fact, Koopmans et al. (2012a, b) suggest that government incumbency of the right or left is not systematically associated with lower or higher levels of immigrant rights. Furthermore, noting the significant and substantively large effect of the far-right on immigration flows, Fitzgerald et al. (2014) contend that far-right vote share and citizenship policy restrictions are empirically and theoretically correlated. In addition to finding a statistically significant relationship between far-right vote share and immigrant flows, the authors point out that electoral support for far-right parties is a visible and effective signal regarding the treatment of immigrants and the probability of restrictive citizenship policies (Fitzgerald et al. 2014, 413). These results underscore

² The question of how far right a party has to be in order to impact citizenship policy is outside the scope of this paper. However, these analyses provide counter-arguments to Akkerman (2012a, b) assertion that centre-right parties are primarily responsible for, and may even make more restrictive changes than the far-right in immigration and citizenship policy legislation (Akkerman 2012b).



Howard's (2010) finding that far-right support 'trumps' other (often more systemic) pressures for liberalization (736), as 'far-right parties' is the only statistically significant bivariate relationship predicting citizenship liberalization.

Adding further nuance to this relationship, Sredanovic (2016) examines the role of cabinet coalition composition in determining the direction of changes to citizenship legislation between 1992 and 2013 (2). Seeking to differentiate far-right influence on creating more restrictive reforms (Koopmans et al. 2012a, b) from far-right influence on halting inclusive reforms (Howard 2009, 2010), Sredanovic (2016) concludes that while the far-right may not be essential for limiting the number of inclusive reforms, the xenophobic parties are influential in facilitating restrictive reforms (10). Yet, despite widespread agreement that elites pursue conscious strategies that are decisive in shaping citizenship policy (Howard 2010, 741), the effect of those elites on citizenship policy, distinct from forms of elite support, remains inexplicit. If far-right influence does not equally permeate citizenship policy reforms (i.e., if it cannot impact the limiting of inclusive reforms in the same way it can facilitate restrictive reforms), then perhaps intervening forces interrupt far-right influence throughout the policy process. In turn, this analysis seeks to understand whether the far-right influence on 'on the books' policy is the same as its influence on the implementation of those policies. Relative to intervening factors, how might the salience of immigration or presence of xenophobia impact citizenship policy when controlling for other far-right presence and other factors? Summarily asked, where are the strengths and weaknesses of far-right influence on the citizenship policy process, and what factors affect the relative strength of that influence?

Naturalization: a measurable outcome of citizenship policy

The case for including naturalization as a logical outcome of citizenship policy is strong, but underrepresented. Already scholars use naturalization policies as evidence of integration policy convergence or divergence across Europe (Huddleston and Vink 2015, 2; Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Koopmans et al. 2012a, b). Within immigration and policy research, a developed literature debates two contrasting views on how European states use naturalization and other citizenship policies to determine their broader agenda of immigrant integration. Advocates of the 'complementary view,' Huddleston and Vink (2015) argue that naturalization policy is the crux of a state's national integration agenda, such that naturalization, citizenship policies, and political participation (among other related factors) conform and represent the state's underlying approach to immigrant integration (1–2). As evidence, the authors use bivariate correlations and principal component analysis (PCA) to measure whether a single underlying dimension underscores citizenship (integration) policies and naturalization policies across 29 European states. Based on the results, Huddleston and Vink (2015) confirm the presence and internal consistency of a singular dimension and find a strong coherence across Europe between citizenship and naturalization policies (11–12), with naturalization



policies as the strongest predictor of these states' overall approach to integration (13–14).

Further support for the inclusion of naturalization as an outcome of citizenship policy comes from Koopmans et al. (2012a, b) who point out that immigrant rights were becoming more inclusive until 2002, but stagnated afterward. In fact, after 2002, naturalization rights became considerably more restrictive, particularly with respect to language requirements and citizenship tests (Koopmans et al. 2012a, b; Joppke 1998). At the same time, Koopmans et al. (2012a, b) show that the strength of right-wing populist parties increased continuously from 4.4% of the vote in 1980–1989 to 12.1% in 2002–2008. More directly, Dronkers and Vink (2012, 391) and Franchino (2009) note that the link between citizenship policy output and outcome is a particularly important consideration for those researching agency because politicians adopt the former but are concerned with the latter. In fact, Janoski (2010) finds that left and green parties have a liberalizing effect on naturalization rates, but have very little effect on the 'on the books' policies (236–237), highlighting that forces affecting policy choice may not be the same as those impacting the practice of those policies. As suggested by Koopmans et al. (2012a, b), the broad implication is that party power in government may impact the implementation of policies more so than the policies themselves, and more specifically, that the impact of the far-right may have differential effects across the citizenship policy process (1229).

Differential party influence on various parts of the policy process is a logical assumption given the number of intervening factors present in questions of citizenship policy. After all, the choice of country and the act of being naturalized are voluntary. While this makes naturalization a crude measure of policy outcome, the choice to be naturalized is conditioned by the political environment. To that end, Fitzgerald et al. (2014) find that dimensions of a destination country's political environment, and specifically the configuration of citizenship policies and the strength of the radical right parties, drive migration patterns. Similarly, Dronkers and Vink (2012) find that for second-generation immigrants, regulations that imply automatic or facilitated access to citizenship for persons born on state territory may be expected to increase the chance of having destination country citizenship (4). Additionally, the authors find a significant and positive effect of the variable 'access to nationality' on citizenship acquisition across European countries (Dronkers and Vink 2012, 16). Still, the picture is far from clear. Germany remains one of the top destinations for migrants in the world (Fitzgerald et al. 2014, 406), despite heavily biased German laws against (if not in direct opposition to) *jus soli* provisions (Schonwalder and Triadafilopoulos 2012). Why are the naturalization rates in Germany so low while migration remains so high? What intervening factors explain this contradiction?

The logic presented here argues that states with liberalized citizenship policies should be associated with higher rates of naturalization. Similarly, where anti-immigrant sentiment motivates actions toward citizenship policy restrictiveness, foreign-nationals in the electorate are expected motivate citizenship policy liberalization, with a greater proportion seeking naturalization (Koopmans et al. 2012a, b; Soysal 1997; Howard 2009). Already Koopmans et al. (2005) note that



pro-immigrant and anti-racist mobilization are strongest in states with inclusive citizenship policies. Certainly it is unreasonable to assume that the influence of a mobilized electorate or salience of immigration ceases to be important after parties have taken office. Insofar as global and regional influences pressure governments to eliminate unequal treatment of foreigners (De Schutter 2009; Huddleston and Vink 2015), domestic pressures from the far-right constituent base can be expected to impact the far-right party. Furthermore, Koopmans et al. (2012a, b) argue that while growth of the immigrant electorate leads to a liberalization of citizenship policies, counter-mobilization by right-wing parties slowed or reversed liberalization (1229). How much power do far-right parties have to halt, reverse or prevent the integration of immigrants? Under what conditions is that power exercised? How might far-right influence change from policy passage to policy implementation?

Discussion of previous approaches/methodological strategies

This research aims to fill four methodological deficiencies present in current work on citizenship policy and the far-right. First, we offer a large-N statistical analysis of the effect of far-right parties on citizenship policy restrictiveness. The dataset builds on previous quantitative research to assess annual citizenship policy variation across 29 European countries between 2003 and 2014. Next, we introduce yearly variation into both the independent and dependent variables in order to better isolate the relationship between those variables. While averaged measures over time point to possible trends (Howard 2010; Koopmans et al. 2012a, b), the argument here is that introduction of annual variation in the independent and dependent variables allows for better isolation of the relationship between far-right influence and citizenship policy output and practice.

With respect to measurement, there is considerable debate over the use of indices to capture and compare legislation across states (Helbling 2013; Sredanovic 2016). However, as Sredanovic (2016) notes, it is not that the use of indices is inappropriate; it is rather that we gain much from disaggregated measures of citizenship policy restrictiveness such that new and modified criteria may be added to future indices. In this way, the work of Koopmans et al. (2012a, b), Goodman (2014), and Sredanovic (2016) goes a great distance in evaluating the multidimensionality of citizenship policy. In fact, combining insights from these works with Howard's (2009, 2010) analyses, our third contribution posits use of two dependent variables that seek to differentiate between passed policy and implemented policy.

Currently, citizenship policy literature fails to assess whether the same influences that affect policy writing also affect policy implementation. To date, research has either evaluated the impact of the far-right on policy output (only naturalization), policy legislation (only 'on the books policy'), or tried to summarize the impact of the far-right by amalgamating measures that include both policy legislation and implementation. In response, we differentiate between stages of the policy process in order to determine whether the far-right has a uniform impact on citizenship policy, or whether the influence of these radical parties is limited to certain stages of policy determination. In this way, we hope to gain a better understanding about



where in the policy process the far-right may have the greatest impact. Having born witness to the benefits of both indexed and disaggregated measures of citizenship policy measurement, we seek to make a valuable distinction between policy adoption (operationalized as ‘on the books’ policy) and policy implementation (operationalized as the change in the number of naturalized citizens). In order to clarify the location of far-right influence, we test the impact of radical right parties on separate measures of citizenship policy legislation and legislation outcome. We implement this change in order to respond to arguments suggesting that elites strategize citizenship policies differently, plausibly resulting in differences between what is written and what is practiced.

For instance, Giddens (2004) argues that social democrats must respond to populism without succumbing to it. Highlighted by Downs (2011), this prescription demands the center-left be tough on immigration and on the causes of hostility to immigrants, without becoming what they profess to oppose. With respect to leftist parties, Bruenig and Luedtke (2008) suggest the left parties seek to avert challenges from far-right parties by restricting immigration where possible.³ In turn, it is possible that ‘on the books’ policies do not necessarily result in proportional outcomes. Furthermore, we accept that the effect of the far-right may be limited to written policy as negotiation between the right and left may usurp the far-right’s ability to impact policy outcomes.

Finally, while newer research is beginning to incorporate OLS regression, the predominant approach to the evaluation of citizenship policy restrictiveness has been qualitative. In this work, we move beyond OLS regression to introduce a Bayesian approach to citizenship policy analysis. To date, statistical evaluations have been restricted to OLS regression in bivariate (or, in rare cases, multivariate) analyses (Howard 2010; Givens and Luedtke 2005). Here, we use Bayesian analyses as an alternate way to evaluate the complexity of citizenship policy. Specifically, OLS regression assumes data come from some infinitely repeatable generating process with constant, fixed parameters, an assumption that may not be realistic with country-level data. Given that real-world phenomena do not permit us the luxury of infinite repeatability, Bayesian modeling allows us to leverage prior knowledge to produce a more realistic set of results.

Empirical testing

In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of far-right impact on citizenship policy and policy outcomes, the analysis is divided into two parts using two dependent variables: citizenship policy restrictiveness and naturalization. First, the analysis exploring whether the far-right has a substantial effect on citizenship policy in European countries is conducted using a new measure of citizenship policy restrictiveness. The second dependent variable, naturalization, explores whether the same variables impacting policy also impact citizenship policy implementation. The

³ This is contiguous with Meguid’s (2005) argument that mainstream parties might co-opt radical right policies in order to reduce their vote share.



data used to address these questions comprise an original dataset that includes country and yearly data for 29 European countries between 2003 and 2014.⁴ The inclusion of all countries where data are available limits the amount of bias that may be introduced into the statistical analysis during the case selection process. The approach further contrasts with previous studies in that those works utilized only one measure to represent each independent and dependent variable for an entire time period. As previously discussed, this approach is susceptible to the loss of valuable information since yearly variation is ignored. In addition, the choice of having only one measure for each of the dependent and independent variables over a significantly large time period means that the statistical analyses are susceptible to small-N problems. In short, estimated bivariate correlation tests or linear regression tests cannot provide the robust findings necessary to confidently extrapolate substantive information. To address these challenges, the dependent and independent variables in this analysis were collected for each year in order to leverage this variation and obtain more precise results.

Dependent variable: citizenship policy

The citizenship policy restrictiveness variable was constructed by estimating factor analysis scores based on citizenship policies for a given country (i), for a given year (t). It merits note that there has been a valuable debate about the use of indices to compare legislation across states. Given that the use of indices has become the most common approach to this research, there is concern that too many variations pose challenges to the reliability of the results (Sredanovic 2016; Helbling 2013). Addressing this concern, Sredanovic (2016) focuses on cabinet coalition composition as a single independent variable and disaggregates citizenship policy data for analysis.

Following the guidelines set forth by Howard's (2010) Citizenship Policy Index (CPI), each country was coded based on the aggregation of three citizenship policy factors. The first factor is based on the concept of *jus soli*, which refers to whether children of non-citizens who are born in a country's territory can acquire that country's citizenship. The acquisition process could occur either immediately at birth, or automatically after a certain number of years as a resident. The variable was coded so that a value of 2 indicates that the country does not grant automatic citizenship, a value of 1 indicates that the country grants citizenship after a

⁴ The dataset includes at least two years of complete data for each country. However, due to the unavailability of census and survey data for some years, all 12 years are not represented for each country. The countries and years available in the dataset include Austria (2003–2009), Belgium (2003–2014), Bulgaria (2007–2012), Croatia (2009–2010), Cyprus (2007–2012), Czech Republic (2003–2014), Denmark (2003–2014), Estonia (2003–2014), Finland (2003–2014), France (2003–2014), Germany (2003–2014), Greece (2003–2010), Hungary (2003–2014), Ireland (2003–2014), Italy (2003–2004), Latvia (2003–2012), Lithuania (2009–2014), Luxembourg (2003–2004), the Netherlands (2003–2014), Norway (2003–2014), Poland (2003–2014), Portugal (2003–2014), Romania (2007–2008), Slovakia (2005–2014), Slovenia (2003–2014), Spain (2003–2014), Sweden (2003–2014), Switzerland (2003–2014), and the United Kingdom (2003–2014).



residency period or only if a parent is a citizen, and a 0 indicates that citizenship is granted immediately.⁵

The second factor deals with a country's residency requirements for naturalization. A residency requirement is the minimum length of residency for naturalization. When exploring this factor, it is important to explore the residency requirement for both immigrants themselves and immigrant spouses who are married to citizens in order to capture variation in citizenship policy. Residency requirements were coded based on three criteria: The first criterion is the number of years of residency required for naturalization.⁶ The second criterion is the number of years of residency required for naturalization of a citizen's spouse.⁷ Finally, the number of years a person must be married to a citizen in order to be considered for naturalization was taken into account.⁸

The third citizenship policy factor used to estimate the factor analysis addresses dual citizenship. Dual citizenship refers to a circumstance in which a person is able to hold the citizenship of two countries simultaneously. For instance, a person born in one country could be granted citizenship through *jus soli* and could also be considered a citizen of another country based on *jus sanguinis* (i.e., citizenship through blood). The variable was coded so that a value of 2 indicates that the country does not allow their citizens to hold dual citizenship with another country. A coded value of 1 indicates that dual citizenship is restricted to certain countries or situations, such as a parent must have been born in another country. Finally, a coded value of 0 indicates that there are no restrictions on dual citizenship.⁹

The citizenship policy restrictiveness variable utilized in the statistical modeling is a value estimated by taking into account these three aggregated factors. The single score was estimated through the factor analysis statistical technique. The factor scores were estimated so that there would be a single value representing the restrictiveness of citizenship policy, rather than dependent variables in multiple models.¹⁰ The factor score is estimated such that larger values indicate more

⁵ In the dataset, 27.76% of the observations indicate that countries grant citizenship automatically, 68.57% of the observations suggest that citizenship is granted based on some criteria, and 3.67% of observations do not grant citizenship based on birth (i.e., Switzerland).

⁶ The number of years of residency required for naturalization ranges from 3 (Poland) to 15 (Austria) years. The mean number of years was 7.07.

⁷ The number of years of residency required for naturalization of a citizen's spouse ranges from 0 (Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden) to 6 (Austria) years. The mean number of years was 3.04.

⁸ The number of years a person must be married to a citizen in order to be considered for naturalization ranged from 0 (Czech Republic and United Kingdom) to 22 (Estonia) years. The mean number of years was 3.64. There was one empirical observation that deserves attention here. In Estonia, in order to be granted citizenship through marriage the couple must have been married prior to 1992. Therefore, the number of years a couple must be married in Estonia increases every year. This is the only situation where a specific numeric value was not given.

⁹ In the dataset, 53.11% of the observations have no restrictions on dual citizenship, 37.36% of the observations allow dual citizenship with some conditions, and 9.52% of the observations do not allow dual citizenship at all.

¹⁰ Similarly, Howard's (2010) CPI index aggregates these three factors into one value for each observation.



restrictive citizenship policies and smaller values indicate more liberal policies. The directionality of the variable was done in this way for the purpose of easily viewing whether increased far-right success leads to more restrictive citizenship policies.

Independent variables

The statistical analyses performed in this study include all of the independent variables explored in previous research. However, it is important to note that the analysis conducted here does not rely on one measure for each independent variable to account for a single time period. In addition, there is inclusion of relevant control variables to account for potential variation on the dependent variable that is not otherwise accounted for by the theories tested here. First, the change in population from one year to the next is included as a control in order to account for changes in the composition of the electorate. More specifically, as changes in the population occur, changes to the pool of supporters for any political party will also be effected.

Second, a lagged variable capturing the proportion of the population that is foreign-born was included in the statistical analysis because it would make sense, theoretically, that a larger pool of applicants might have an effect on citizenship laws and outcomes in a given year.¹¹ Both of these controls attempt to account for the fact that there is variation by country with respect to the size of the applicant pool. A third control variable is European Union (EU) membership. Since EU countries differ from their European counterparts in a number of ways, this variable attempts to capture any systematic differences between EU and non-EU countries that could affect citizenship policy. The variable lagged and is coded a 0 for non-members and a 1 for EU members.¹²

There are three economic variables included in the statistical analysis. These three variables are similar to the three economic variables included in Howard's (2010) study. First, the change in GDP per capita from one year to the next is included for each country and year.¹³ Second, economic growth measured as the change in GDP growth rate by country for each year is included.¹⁴ Finally, the statistical analysis includes a measure for the change in the unemployment rate for

¹¹ The foreign-born measure was collected from the The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2017). The smallest foreign-born proportion of the population was .0042 (Romania—2006), the mean was .0988, and the largest proportion was .343 (Luxembourg—2002). It is important to note that a calculated change variable was included in previous statistical modeling. The results were substantively the same. For ease of interpretation and model convergence concerns, the variable was left as a simple proportion in the final results discussion.

¹² In the dataset, 86.81% of the countries are members of the European Union in a particular year (lagged).

¹³ The minimum GDP per capita change was a decrease of \$16,730 (Norway—2009), the mean was an increase of \$1,779, and the maximum GDP per capita change was an increase of \$13,950 (Luxembourg—2003).

¹⁴ The worst GDP growth rate change was -17.67 (Lithuania—2009), the mean rate of change was -0.176 , and the largest growth rate change was 16.66 (Lithuania—2010).



each country and year.¹⁵ Positive economic growth and GDP per capita changes are theorized to have a negative relationship, while increases in unemployment are theorized to have a positive relationship with strict citizenship policies.

Anti-immigrant sentiment is included in the analysis in order to account for the effect that public opinion may have on citizenship policy. Here, using responses to questions in the European Social Survey (ESS) allowed for the creation of a variable measuring anti-immigrant sentiment. In particular, three questions were explored between 2002 and 2014 (ESS 2014). The first question asks whether immigration is good or bad for the economy. The second asks whether a country's culture is undermined or enriched by immigration. Finally, the third question asks whether immigrants make the respondent's country a worse or better place to live. The respondent could choose where to place their response on a 0–10 feeling scale with 0 representing the most anti-immigrant response. Each variable was recoded so that negative responses were a 1 (responses 0–4) and neutral or positive responses were 0 (responses 5–10).¹⁶ The three new recoded variables were checked to ensure that they were highly correlated.¹⁷ Then, the three new variables representing anti-immigrant sentiment were averaged, which gave a single score for each country and for each year.¹⁸ In the models, the variable is lagged. The theorized relationship is that as anti-immigrant sentiment increases, citizenship policies will be more restrictive.

The main independent variable of interest is the success of far-right parties. Here, two different measures are utilized to capture success for the far-right in each individual country. The first measure is the proportion of the vote the far-right received in the most recent legislative election for each year. The second measure is the proportion of seats held by the far-right. To evaluate how each variable performs, two separate models are estimated in which the only difference is the use of one support variable or the other.¹⁹ Since the goal of this paper does not involve the creation of a far-right typology, far-right parties were chosen based on two criteria. First, cases recognized by either Golder (2003), Givens (2004), Norris

¹⁵ The lowest unemployment rate change was -4.4 (Estonia—2011), the mean change in rate was $.21$, and the highest change in the unemployment rate was 8.3 (Estonia—2009).

¹⁶ It is important to note that these variables were recoded multiple ways. The most applicable alternative would be to leave the variables on a 0–10 scale and then average them. However, no substantive difference in the findings occurred when coding the variable in this manner. In addition, the average correlation between the variables was slightly higher with the final coding presented in this paper.

¹⁷ This process involved the use of factor analysis and simple correlation tests in order to test the relationship between these variables for each round of the ESS survey. The correlations between the three variables averaged a correlation of $.661$ over all waves of the study. Correlations were quite high. Further, previous statistical testing utilized a change variable of the anti-immigrant variable. For ease of interpretation and model convergence, the variable was left as a simple lagged proportion.

¹⁸ In some instances, the use of the ESS in creating this variable involved the use of individual country files when countries were left out of the cumulative datasets in particular years. In addition, since the survey is only implemented in even number years, the odd years were calculated by averaging the immigrant sentiment variable for the year before and the year after the particular odd number year.

¹⁹ In the relatively small number of cases where there are two far-right parties, the combined vote share for these parties was calculated (ex. Germany's National Democratic (NPD) and Republikaner (REP) parties). Further, if there were two national elections (upper house and lower house) in a given year, the average vote share and seat share for the lower house were utilized.



(2005) or Mudde (2007) as far-right parties were included here. Second, where a newer party arose, if there was no doubt in the media that a party was considered far (extreme) right, it was included.²⁰ The lags of both of these variables are utilized in the statistical analysis. The theorized relationship is that increased far-right success will lead to more restrictive citizenship policies.²¹

Method

The models are estimated using Bayesian linear regression.²² The main difference between frequentist and Bayesian inference is that Bayesian analyses assume data are fixed and parameters are variable, whereas frequentist analyses assume that data come from some infinitely repeatable generating process with constant, fixed parameters. Since data are country-level data, the frequentist assumption of an infinitely repeatable generating process may not be realistic. Therefore, Bayesian statistics allow us to assess the stability of the coefficients given the data without appealing to the dubious thought experiment of infinite repeatability. In addition, the Bayesian approach allows the researcher to leverage information regarding prior beliefs about the effects of independent variables when estimating models (Jackman 2009; Hansen 2015).

It is important to note that all of the variables in the dataset were scaled to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in order to be on comparable scales prior to model estimation. All variables were also scaled due to the fact that large variance on some of the variables negatively impacted model convergence. Before estimating the Bayesian models, frequentist OLS linear regression models were estimated. The results from the frequentist models were utilized as prior information for the Bayesian models. In particular, the coefficients for the intercept and each independent variable were set as the prior mean for the intercept and independent

²⁰ The list of far-right parties by country is as follows: Austria—Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Belgium—Vlaams Belang (VB); Bulgaria—Attack; Croatia—Croatian Pure Party of Rights (HCSP); Cyprus—National Popular Front (ELAM); Czech Republic—Worker's Party of Social Justice (DS); Denmark—Danish People's Party (DPP); Estonia—Estonian Independence Party (EIP); Finland—Finns Party (True Finns); France—National Front (NF); Germany—Germany's National Democratic (NPD) and Republikaner (REP); Greece—Golden Dawn; Hungary—Jobbik; Ireland—none; Italy—Forza Nuova and Northern League (NL); Latvia—National Alliance (NA); Lithuania—none; Luxembourg—none; Netherlands—List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and Party for Freedom and Democracy (PVV); Norway—Progress Party (FrP); Poland—none; Portugal—National Renovator Party (PNR); Romania—Greater Romania Party (PRM); Slovakia—Slovak National Party (SNS); Slovenia—Slovenian National Party (SNS); Spain—none; Sweden—Sweden Democrats (SD); Switzerland—Swiss People's Party (SVP); United Kingdom—British National Party (BNP).

²¹ The mean vote share for far-right parties was 5.64%, and the highest was 28.9% (Switzerland). The mean seat share was 5.37%, and the highest was 36.07% (Austria).

²² Bayesian vector auto-regressive models, which should be utilized to estimate whether one variable does a better job at explaining the other variable in situations of endogeneity, could not be estimated here. The problem is that far-right vote share and seat share do not contain enough variation for accurate estimation in this dataset. The fact that some countries have a single vote share percentage representing multiple years creates a problem for model convergence. The collection of more data in the future may allow the utilization of Bayesian vector auto-regressive models in determining whether the lag of one variable is better at predicting another variable's outcomes, rather than the reverse situation.



variables in the Bayesian models. In addition, the standard errors for the intercept and independent variables were set as the prior variance in the Bayesian models.²³ The Bayesian models discussed here were estimated in JAGS version 3.4.0. All models presented here were estimated by using a burnin of 10,000 iterations of Markov Chains, and a sample of 20,000 that was thinned by 15.²⁴ The model equation containing far-right vote share as an independent variable is presented below²⁵:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CitizenshipPolicy} &= \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta \text{Population} + \beta_2 \text{EuropeanUnionMember}_{t-1} \\ &+ \beta_3 \Delta \text{UnemploymentRate} + \beta_4 \Delta \text{GDPpercapita} \\ &+ \beta_5 \Delta \text{GDPGrowthRate} + \beta_6 \text{ForeignPopulation} \hat{\pi}_{t-1} \\ &+ \beta_7 \text{Anti-ImmigrantSentiment} \hat{\pi}_{t-1} \\ &+ \beta_8 \text{FarRightVoteShare}_{t-1} + \epsilon \\ \epsilon &\sim N(0, \theta_\epsilon^2) \\ b_j &\sim N(\mu_j, \tau_j) \\ \mu &= (-.091, -.097, .105, .049, .026, -.03, .255, .175, .505) \\ \tau &= (.152, .05, .055, .055, .051, .054, .052, .058) \end{aligned}$$

Results

The model results from the Bayesian statistical analyses are presented in Table 1. It is important to note that the two models are statistically indistinguishable from one another. The calculated credible bounds for the measures of fit and independent variables overlap with one another across the two models. Therefore, the models explain the same variance in the dependent variable, and the independent variables have the same statistical effect across models (except for the population variable, which has a weak relationship in Model 1 with citizenship policy). Model fit scores (i.e., adjusted R^2) indicate that each model explains around 35% of the variance in

²³ Therefore, readers interested in the results from frequentist models can simply look at the prior means and variances presented here.

²⁴ It is important to discuss model convergence for all models in this article. First, each parameter, for both chains, passed Gelman and Rubin, Geweke, and Heidelberger and Welch tests. The Gelman and Rubin test statistics give a potential scale reduction factor of one for all parameters. These test statistics indicate that there is no need to run the chains longer in order to improve convergence of the stationarity distribution, since statistics of 1.2 or higher are the cutoff. The Geweke diagnostic test statistics indicate that the means of the parameters from two different locations in the chains have converged to a standard normal distribution. Finally, all parameters passed the stationarity and half-width tests of the Heidelberger and Welch test. In addition, trace plots of the Markov chains indicated that there was no trending present for the chains, or the individual parameters for each chain. Lastly, density plots conveyed that the distribution of the posterior parameters was normally distributed.

²⁵ The model that estimates citizenship policy and includes far-right seat share instead of vote share differs in that the vote share variable is replaced with seat share in the model equation. Further, prior means and prior variance values are different [$\mu = -.186, -.063, .214, -.053, .017, -.029, .277, .175, .531$]; ($\tau = .153, .049, .167, .054, .055, .051, .053, .052, .053$].



Table 1 DV—citizenship policy

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	- 0.015 (- 0.107, 0.076)	- 0.031 (- 0.123, 0.059)
Δ Population	- 0.096 (- 0.172, - 0.020)*	- 0.062 (- 0.137, 0.014)
EU member _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.029 (- 0.071, 0.130)	0.058 (- 0.043, 0.159)
Δ Unemployment rate	- 0.049 (- 0.133, 0.035)	- 0.053 (- 0.136, 0.030)
Δ GDP per capita	0.027 (- 0.057, 0.112)	0.015 (- 0.070, 0.100)
Δ GDP growth rate	- 0.030 (- 0.108, 0.048)	- 0.030 (- 0.108, 0.048)
Foreign-born population $\hat{\pi}_{t-1}$	0.254 (0.172, 0.336)*	0.273 (0.192, 0.355)*
Anti-immigrant sentiment $\hat{\pi}_{t-1}$	0.172 (0.092, 0.252)*	0.179 (0.098, 0.258)*
Far-right <i>Vote</i> share _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.498 (0.413, 0.584)*	
Far-right <i>Seat</i> share _{<i>t-1</i>}		0.515 (0.429, 0.600)*
<i>N</i>	273	273
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.359 (0.343, 0.367)	0.362 (0.349, 0.368)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

*indicates that the coefficients are 'statistically significant'

$\hat{\pi}$ indicates the measure is a proportion

the dependent variable, which is substantial given data constraints. Since all variables have been scaled in order to be directly comparable, there is ease of interpretation when comparing independent variable importance relative to one another.

There are three variables beyond far-right success in the models that have a statistical relationship with citizenship policy restrictiveness. First, a positive change in population size from one year to the next is negatively correlated with citizenship policy restrictiveness. In other words, as population increases from one year to the next, citizenship policy becomes more liberal. The relationship with the control variable aligns nicely with the literature's hypothesized direction.

On the other hand, an increase in the foreign-born population has the opposite effect on citizenship policy. An increase in the foreign-born population is positively correlated with citizenship policy restrictiveness. The result provides some evidence for the narrative that restrictive citizenship policies are the product of a backlash, or response, to the influx of immigrants. The model results indicate that a larger foreign-born population might lead countries to make citizenship policies more strict in order to make settling, and thus entry into the country less appealing. Similarly, anti-immigrant sentiment is significantly related to citizenship policy restrictiveness. Where anti-immigrant sentiment is larger, citizenship policies tend to be more restrictive. The result indicates that government might be responsive to a segment of the population's anti-immigrant sentiment and that this sentiment is independent of the effect of far-right support. Previous models attempted to estimate whether there was an interaction effect between anti-immigrant sentiment and far-right success on citizenship policy, but the results indicated that this was not the case.



The main focus of the analyses, the effect of far-right success on citizenship policy, is very clear after model estimation. The model results confirm the findings of previous research; namely, far-right success the prior year is a significant determinant of citizenship policy in a given year (i), in a given country (t). As far-right vote and seat share increase, citizenship policy restrictiveness increases. In comparison with other variables in the models, the relationship between these two variables is the largest. In fact, the effect of far-right success, in both vote and seat shares, is twice as large as the next most substantively important variable (i.e., foreign-born population). The results make it very clear that far-right success plays a crucial role in impacting ‘on the books’ citizenship policy. Clearly, there is some relationship between the success of these far-right parties and citizenship policy adoption from decision makers in the government.

These results are consistent with the logic behind Koopmans et al. (2012a, b) argument that path dependence, mechanisms of immigrant voter power, and populist party strength are interrelated. Specifically, the authors suggest that countries’ initial policies on immigrant rights are significantly correlated with the likelihood that these countries will develop sizable immigrant electorates or strong right-wing populist parties; noting that this is most strongly the case for far-right parties. Countries that had restrictive policies were more likely to be the countries where right-wing populist parties would later be successful. In turn, the strength of these parties later effects the extension of immigrant rights and thus kept these countries on restrictive paths. Conversely, countries scoring higher on immigrant rights were more likely to have immigrant origin voters make up a large share of the electorate.

Citizenship policy outcomes: empirical testing

Dependent variable: naturalization

While previous authors explore whether far-right parties impact ‘on the books’ policy (Howard 2010), the findings do not address far-right impact on citizenship policy outcomes. Here, we seek to extend the literature by evaluating whether the same variables that impact policy passage also impact citizenship policy outcomes. Addressing the outcomes of citizenship policy will provide a more complete view of far-right impact at multiple stages of the policy process.

For instance, a country may have a short residency-length requirement, but may also have other stringent naturalization laws, such as strict language requirements. Language requirements go beyond basic citizenship criteria and would make naturalization more difficult than the basic criteria. In addition, laws ‘on the books’ do not necessarily mean that the current government enforces these laws. Thus, for understanding the real implications of far-right success vis-a-vis citizenship, it may be better to look at the change in the number of citizens naturalized in a given year while controlling for important differences between countries. Namely, the naturalization measure would more accurately depict the ease of acquiring, or the propensity for a country to grant, citizenship. In turn, the dependent variable for this



analysis is the proportion of the foreign-born population that was naturalized in a given country (i), in a given year (t). The equation for calculating the dependent variable is provided below:

$$\left(\frac{\# \text{Naturalized Citizens}_{it}}{\text{Population}_{it} \times \text{Proportion Foreign}_{it}} \right)$$

Method and independent variables

The method utilized to test the variables that effect naturalization is the same as was utilized in the prior empirical testing. Bayesian linear regression is utilized, and prior means and variance were set based on the results of frequentist models. The same independent variables used in the previous models were also included here. However, the citizenship policy variable that was created through the use of factor analysis scores is now included here as an additional independent variable in order to explain actual citizenship policy outcomes. The model equation containing far-right vote share as an independent variable is presented below²⁶:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \text{Naturalization} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta \text{Population} + \beta_2 \text{EuropeanUnionMember}_{t-1} \\ & + \beta_3 \Delta \text{UnemploymentRate} + \beta_4 \Delta \text{GDPpercapita} \\ & + \beta_5 \Delta \text{GDPGrowthRate} + \beta_6 \text{ForeignPopulation} \hat{\pi}_{t-1} \\ & + \beta_7 \text{Anti-ImmigrantSentiment} \hat{\pi}_{t-1} \\ & + \beta_8 \text{FarRightVoteShare}_{t-1} + \beta_9 \text{CitizenshipPolicy}_{t-1} + \epsilon \\ & \epsilon \sim N(0, \theta_\epsilon^2) \end{aligned}$$

$$b_j \sim N(\mu_j, \tau_j)$$

$$\mu = (.114, -.01, -.132, .06, -.0, .004, .643, .018, .261, -.148)$$

$$\tau = (.14, .049, .154, .052, .053, .048, .053, .051, .064, .06)$$

Results

Model output for the two Bayesian models is presented in Table 2. Again, it is important to note that the two models are statistically indistinguishable from one another. The calculated credible bounds for the measures of fit and independent variables overlap with one another across the two models. Equally important, model convergence tests indicated the same level of convergence as the previous sections models (see, Footnote 27). The first aspect of the model results to point out is that the models estimated for explaining citizenship policy outcomes (i.e., proportion naturalized) perform much better than the models predicting ‘on the books’

²⁶ The model that estimates the proportion naturalized and includes far-right seat share instead of vote share differs in that the vote share variable is replaced with seat share in the model equation. Further, prior means and prior variance values are different $[(\mu = .119, .048, -.138, -.067, -.012, .002, .651, -.025, .234, -.137); (\tau = .143, .048, .157, .052, .053, .048, .054, .051, .065, .061)]$.



Table 2 DV—proportion naturalized

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	0.023 (– 0.074, 0.119)	0.023 (– 0.073, 0.120)
Δ Population	0.006 (– 0.072, 0.083)	0.045 (– 0.031, 0.121)
EU member $_{t-1}$	– 0.039 (– 0.144, 0.066)	– 0.040 (– 0.145, 0.066)
Δ Unemployment rate	– 0.059 (– 0.143, 0.024)	– 0.067 (– 0.150, 0.018)
Δ GDP per capita	0.002 (– 0.082, 0.087)	– 0.008 (– 0.094, 0.077)
Δ GDP growth rate	0.004 (– 0.072, 0.081)	0.003 (– 0.075, 0.080)
Foreign-born population $\hat{\pi}_{t-1}$	0.645 (0.559, 0.730)*	0.653 (0.567, 0.739)*
Anti-immigrant sentiment $\hat{\pi}_{t-1}$	– 0.020 (– 0.101, 0.061)	– 0.027 (– 0.109, 0.055)
Far-right <i>Vote</i> share $_{t-1}$	0.272 (0.172, 0.372)*	
Far-right <i>Seat</i> share $_{t-1}$		0.246 (0.145, 0.347)*
Citizenship policy restrictiveness $_{t-1}$	– 0.151 (– 0.247, – 0.054)*	– 0.140 (– 0.237, – 0.042)*
<i>N</i>	234	234
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.513 (0.499, 0.520)	0.505 (0.491, 0.511)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

*indicates that the coefficients are ‘statistically significant’

$\hat{\pi}$ indicates the measure is a proportion

citizenship policy. On average, model fit scores indicate that the models explain just over half of the variance in the dependent variable. The models explain, on average, around 15% more variance in the dependent variable than the models exploring ‘on the books’ policy.

As far as the impact of control variables, the only control variable that has a statistical relationship with naturalization is the proportion of the population that is foreign-born. As the foreign-born population rises, the proportion of the population naturalized also increases. In fact, the foreign-born variable explains over two times the variance in the dependent variable when compared to far-right success, and over four times the variance when compared to the citizen policy restrictiveness variable.

The main variables of interest in the statistical models convey straightforward and interesting results. First, citizenship policy restrictiveness is correlated with actual citizenship policy outcomes. Obviously, it makes sense that ‘on the books’ policy would have some empirical relationship with the carrying out of specific, concrete citizenship policy outcomes. Here, as citizenship policy restrictiveness increases, the proportion of the population naturalized decreases. However, it should be noted that the strength of the relationship is not as strong as the foreign-born variable, or surprisingly, the far-right success variables.

A rather surprising result from the statistical modeling presented in this section is that far-right success is a greater determinant of naturalization rates than it has on ‘on the books’ citizenship policies in a country. In fact, far-right success measured in both vote share and seat share is almost twice as strong a determinant of naturalization rates than is the measure of citizenship policy restrictiveness. The results confirm previous literature arguing that the far-right has the ability to guide



the direction in which citizenship policy translates into citizenship outcomes. The result could be interpreted one of two ways. First, the fact that policy outcomes are determined by the results of democratic elections could be viewed positively. For example, a scholar could point out that the process transforming democratic institutional outcomes into policy making is effective in these instances. Alternately, the result could be viewed in a negative light. There is evidence here that a wave of populism could have substantial impacts on the liberal values a country previously espoused. The democratic process of translating election results into concrete policy making could have undemocratic consequences in the end if the policy making results in restrictive policies directed at specific populations.

Conclusion

Situated firmly in the political approach to understanding citizenship policy, this article examined the impact of the far-right on 'on the books' citizenship policy as well as citizenship policy implementation across 29 European states from 2003 to 2014. Results indicate that far-right party success, measured as either seat share or vote share, has a statistically and substantively significant relationship with both the restrictiveness of citizenship policies within a country and the consequences of those policies, as seen through naturalization rates. Confirming previous analyses (Howard 2009, 2010; Koopmans et al. 2012a, b; Goodman 2014), the results here provide tangible evidence that far-right influence is the most important factor explaining citizenship policy restrictiveness within a country in a given year. In fact, the effect of the far-right on citizenship policy restrictiveness was twice as large as the next most substantively important variable, foreign-born population. In no uncertain terms, these results confirm that the greater is the far-right presence in government, the more restrictive the citizenship policies become.

To that end, this work suggests a unique middle ground between the complementary (convergence) view (Huddleston and Vink 2015) and the gap hypothesis (Cornelius et al. 2004). Namely, this analysis finds that while citizenship policies and naturalization policies among democracies share a general trajectory (as one would expect under the convergence hypothesis), results suggest that those trends in citizenship policy restrictiveness are partly determined by the strength of far-right parties. Given the relationship between the saturation of immigrants and resultant support for far-right parties, results indicate some support for the logic of gap hypothesis in that increasing policy restrictiveness may a product of backlash from increased inflows of immigrants, which puts pressure on political parties to adopt more restrictive policies (Cornelius et al. 2004). More directly, the findings presented here reveal that these two 'competing' viewpoints may not be mutually exclusive. Developed democracies, and particularly those in Europe (sharing porous borders and pressure for policy convergence), are similarly effected by the ebbs and flows of immigrant inflows and the salience of issues relating to immigration. Thus, these countries are also likely to share similar trends in political support for the far-right. So, while overall trends in policy restrictiveness among European democracies follow in similar trajectories, those trends are conditioned by parallel trends



in far-right support. Furthermore, within countries, the noticeable ‘gap’ between citizenship policy and policy outcome is a more specific reflection of the strength of the far-right party in (and immigration issues specific to) that state.

In turn, beyond ‘on the books’ citizenship policies, this research extends the literature on citizenship policy and the far-right by providing a statistical assessment of the impact of far-right success on the implementation of citizenship policy, naturalization rates. In fact, improved model fit scores indicate that models explaining citizenship policy outcomes perform much better than the models predicting ‘on the books’ citizenship policy, accounting for just over 50% the variance in naturalization rates. Here, results reveal that increases in foreign-born population have the greatest impact on naturalization rates, explaining twice the variance of far-right success and over four times the variance of citizenship policies. Nevertheless, far-right success, measured as either vote share or seat share, has greater influence than does citizenship policy and has twice the explanatory power over naturalization rates when compared to far-right impact on citizenship policy. Thus, this article suggests that while the presence of far-right influence is consistent throughout the policy process, the level of influence (i.e., capacity to be impactful) may not be uniform.

In turn, this research provides a basis for a bargaining theory of citizenship policy. In particular, this work posits that citizenship policy and policy outcomes are best explained as products of an elite-level bargaining theory. Building on the work of Hammar (1985, 1990), Money (1999), Gibney (2004), Givens and Luedtke (2005), Howard (2010), Downs (2011) and Sredanovic (2016), the argument here is that citizenship policies are the products of strategic negotiations between political parties, given a context of institutional constraints. In this way, it may be possible to understand how the political extremes confound the natural policy preferences of the left by mapping the strategic options available to mainstream social democratic parties confronted by anti-immigrant populist parties (Downs 2011). Moreover, this article contends that immigration integration policy and practice are used as bargaining chips by far-right parties to achieve more restrictive immigration control policies. Plausibly, where the far-right concedes to a more liberal written policy to appease the left, the populist party negotiates greater enforcement of existing policies vis-à-vis naturalization. In turn, the argument is that the institutional starting point of the negotiations conditions the degree of policy movement achieved by far-right parties, while the composition and sentiments of the electorate help determine the extent to which those policies are implemented.

In sum, these results suggest that future research concentrates on the development of three specific areas. First, this work propounds that party influence may not be uniform across the policy process. Thus, future work should focus on measurements that distinguish between immigration control and immigration integration in order to better assess how party impact may change at different stages of the policy process. Second, new measures must better account for the initial position of a country’s social provisions. Specifically, newer measures must control for the extent to which social provisions are predicated on citizenship so as to better account for the role of immigrant incentives for naturalization (i.e., policy outcomes). Third, this article offers itself as a first step in building a complete



explanation of citizenship policy, and policy practice, through a bargaining theory of citizenship policy. This approach not only accounts for the institutional legacies that define the status quo, but also uses the interaction between political parties in government as a factor explaining divergence between written policy and policy implementation. Here, the notion is that strategic interactions between agents, as well as those between structure and agents, offer the most promising results for understanding citizenship policy.

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