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
**Unrealized expectations and political violence in Peru's Sendero
Luminoso insurgency**

Michael J. Harrington

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**Unrealized Expectations and Political Violence
in Peru's Sendero Luminoso Insurgency**

Thesis submitted to
The Graduate School of
Marshall University

In partial fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
Political Science

by

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Marshall University

Huntington, West Virginia

December 1996

The first day of the month of February 1870

at the office of the undersigned by the death of the

of John W. Smith

deceased John W. Smith

John W. Smith
of the County of ... State of ...

This thesis was accepted on November 6, 1976
Month Day Year

as meeting the research requirement for the master's degree.

Advisor Clis W. Math

Department of Political Science

Ronald Deutsch
Dean of Graduate School

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Introduction*

The persistence of Sendero Luminoso's² insurgency since 1980 has produced a number of outstanding works on the history and politics of the movement. Nevertheless, the role of unrealized expectations and the ideological attraction of SL's political violence, while often insinuated, has received less than thorough attention. Although several works examine Sendero's ideology,³ none have yet considered the correlation between incongruent expectations and the ideological appeal of armed struggle. A possible reason for this neglect could be the perceived simplicity and remoteness of Sendero's Gonzalo Thought ideology. Yet, Senderismo continues to inspire a small group of extremely violent guerrillas.

* Field research for this work was carried out in Peru during the first two weeks of July, 1996. The investigation was conducted in Lima at the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* (IEP), the *Centro de Promoción y Desarrollo Poblacional* (CEPRODEP), the U.S. Embassy, U.S. Information Service (USIS) library, and various other institutions.

² The name "Sendero Luminoso" comes from a party newspaper published by PCP-SL Chairman Abimael Guzmán. The masthead of this paper referred to the Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of the thought of José Carlos Mariátegui (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 323). When referring to PCP-SL, the names Sendero Luminoso, Sendero, PCP, SL, and others are typically used interchangeably. Incidentally, the word "Senderismo" can be translated as "Senderoism."

³ For example, G.L. Vásquez, "Peruvian Radicalism and the Sendero Luminoso," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 21 (Number 2, 1993), 197; Manuel Jesús Granados, "El PCP Sendero Luminoso: aproximaciones a una ideología," in *Juicio a Abimael, ideología y realidad*, ed. Raúl Vento García, 35-148 (Lima: Pueblo Libre, Agenda 2000 Editores, 1993); Michael Robertson, "Latin American Revolutionaries in the Post-Soviet Era: The Case of Sendero Luminoso," *Strategic Review* 20 (Number 1, 1993), 42-49; James M. Greene, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso: Ideology and Practice" (Honors paper, Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy, 1990); Carlos Iván Degregori, *Qué difícil es ser Dios: Ideología y violencia política en Sendero Luminoso* (Lima: El Zorro de Abajo Ediciones, 1990).

This paper argues that Sendero Luminoso's ideological promotion of political violence is attractive to some disenfranchised individuals whose aspirations are unsatisfied by their achievements. However, it does not assert that achievement discrepancy alone has automatically translated into political violence. The presence of a relatively well organized revolutionary organization capable of channeling frustration into action has been a decisive ingredient in Peru's insurgency. The combination of these two elements has contributed significantly to the growth of armed subversion in Peru.⁴

This work is novel because it goes beyond the prototypical analysis of political, economic and statistical factors. Sendero's ideology will be theoretically and empirically evaluated through the movement's proclamations, propaganda, and behavior. The relation between the Andean legacy of violence and Peru's profound lack of equity will be linked to the ideological appeal of Sendero's ultra-egalitarian

⁴ It is important to remember that "... insurgency is a syncretic phenomenon—one that joins diverse elements in an explosive mix. It combines . . . the ideology and organization of modern 'revolution'; and . . . the operational doctrines of guerrilla warfare" (Desai and Eckstein 1990, 442). Similarly, Sendero's "... [armed] struggle came about because of a conjunction of two factors: the index of misery and frustration in rural Peru was high, and a remarkable movement stood ready to take advantage of that anger. In some ways Peru does conform to the classic theory of the 'j-curve'" (Stern, P. 1995, xviii). A considerable portion of those convicted of terrorism in Peru come from relatively well-off backgrounds, with expectations that frequently contrast sharply with their occupations [Trans.] (unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Spanish are mine) (Chávez de Paz 1989, 57). Many Senderistas "... are not the poorest peasants. They are provincial intellectuals, a group which felt its mobility was frustrated" (Mauceri 1996). At the same time, a revolutionary organization was developing that could channel this frustration into political violence.

communist ideology. The essay will focus on the years 1990 to 1995; however, it also examines events outside this time for greater understanding of the movement.

Chapter one outlines Sendero Luminoso as a contemporary guerrilla movement. It then examines the influence of Andean historical factors on the Peruvian revolutionary situation. Long-term causes of rebellion are linked with PCP-SL's formation as a guerrilla movement. Chapter two is a theoretical and historical evaluation of the insurgents as a revolutionary political party. Various theories of revolution are examined to determine if any explain the rise of SL. Chapter three discusses the relation between incongruent aspirations and achievements with Sendero's growth as a subversive organization. Peruvian equity, or a lack of it, is considered to ascertain its contribution to Senderismo's ideological appeal. Chapter four evaluates the pragmatic application of political violence in Peru. It describes and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of PCP-SL's strategy of protracted people's war. Chapter five concludes this essay by postulating on the relationship between unfulfilled expectations, ideology and insurgency in Peru.

Chapter I

Sendero Luminoso and the Andean History of Insurrection

When the residents of Lima awoke early on December 26, 1980 “. . . to find dead dogs adorned with signs reading ‘Deng Xiao-Ping, son of a bitch’ hanging from the lampposts of their ancient city, they could not possibly have known that they were standing on the edge of an abyss which would plunge their country into the most savage, prolonged, and bitter struggle it has ever known” (Stern, P. 1995). By 1990 it was estimated that an insurrection by a Maoist splinter group of the Peruvian Communist Party, the *Partido Comunista del Perú por el Sendero Luminoso del Pensamiento de José Carlos Mariátegui*, and the Peruvian Government had cost the lives of more than 25,000 noncombatants (United States Congress 1992a, 1).¹ The estimated \$20 billion in property damage caused by PCP-SL is roughly equal to Peru’s foreign debt, and more than equal to its GNP (Radu 1992, 17). In this context, the analysis of Peru’s insurgency has become an increasingly popular topic among political

¹ According to Amnesty International, “[a]ccurate statistics on the total number of people killed by security forces and the armed opposition during the internal conflict in Peru are not available. . . . [The] *Instituto Constitución y Sociedad* . . . puts the number of dead in the ongoing conflict at 25,544. . . . The *Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos* . . . claimed that 26,149 people had been killed in the period 1980-1992” (Amnesty International 1993, 2). It is important to remember that “[t]he best statistics on the war come from the respected research center DESCO (Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo) and the Peruvian Senate’s *Comisión Especial sobre Violencia Política y Pacificación*. It should be noted, however, that these two groups base many of their calculations on a pair of unreliable sources: newspaper reports and military communiques” (Starn 1992, 212).

scientists. Many scholars would agree that the best understanding of Sendero Luminoso comes from an examination of the guerrillas themselves.

Analysis of a Contemporary Guerrilla Movement

To understand the nature of Sendero Luminoso as a revolutionary political party, it is necessary to know the history of communist organizations in Peru which led up to the formation of SL. The *Partido Comunista Peruana* (PCP), founded in 1928, never achieved a mass following with its pro-Moscow party line. A reason for this was the popularity of its main ideological rival, the nationalist *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA). Another reason for the failure of the PCP to gain support, was their compromising with the government. For example, the PCP supported the leftist military government of General Valesco Alvarado (1968-1974) (Berrios and Blasier 1991, 378).

The split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions seriously weakened the PCP in 1964. Several pro-Chinese groups splintered, with the Maoist faction calling itself *Bandera Roja*. This party split again in 1970, becoming the militant PCP-*Patria Roja*.² Other Maoist splinter groups included the *Partido Revolucionario—Trinchera Roja*,

² *Patria Roja* is currently an enemy of PCP-SL because of its “. . . [s]upport for the Peruvian government’s genocidal war against the PCP-led Peoples War (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 1995a, 48).”

and the PCP Sendero Luminoso (Berrios and Blasier, 378). Abimael Guzmán was the leader of the Ayacucho (Quechua for “Corner of the Dead”) chapter of *Bandera Roja*. In 1970 PCP-BR expelled Guzmán for “leftist opportunism.” Guzmán then formed his own Maoist faction of the PCP, which became later known as Sendero Luminoso.

Guzmán, known to his followers as “Chairman Gonzalo,” is the illegitimate son of a middle-class family in Arequipa. An exceptional student, he earned two degrees, one in philosophy, one in law from the University of Arequipa. In 1962, Guzmán was appointed as an instructor, and later an administrator, at the *Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga* (UNSCH), in the impoverished Andean Department of Ayacucho. Sometime between 1965 to 1967 Guzmán traveled to China during the Cultural Revolution where he received political and military training. Upon returning to Peru, he resumed teaching at UNSCH. This university environment allowed Guzmán the opportunity to indoctrinate students in his political views, or Gonzalo Thought. After graduation, a number of former students went to live in desperately poor Andean communities where they inculcated peasants with the “scientific ideology of Gonzalo Thought.”

Between 1970 and 1980 Sendero was relatively successful in building its mass base, especially in the impoverished departments that the government in Lima has

traditionally neglected.³ In May of 1980 the movement announced its initiation of the armed struggle by burning ballot boxes in Chuschi, Cangallo province, Ayacucho [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 809). In many ways, the immoderate level of violence which occurred over the ensuing sixteen years has been the product of centuries of oppression. Like many issues in Peru, a thorough understanding of PCP-SL begins in the past.

The Andean Historical Contribution

Historical factors have played a decisive role in the formation of Andean insurgencies.⁴ From the very beginning of the Spanish conquest, the indigenous Andean peoples have been the recipients of the structural violence and inequality endemic in Spain's conquest and subsequent colonialism. Because the Incas and their predecessors lacked a written language, what is known of Peru's history of violence begins on the plains of

³ Sendero's success at building base areas has been far more successful in regions with no tradition of democracy. The vertical and authoritarian characteristics of Sendero, and their recourse to terror, have been more acceptable to those who had historical experience with this type of violence. The political traditions of the Andean world and their experiences with the structural violence of *gamonalismo* (the rule of semi-feudal land owners) provided the historical basis for the support of SL [Trans.] (Manrique 1990, 54).

⁴ While long term history is a factor in the Andes, ". . . social scientists and theoreticians are somewhat disposed to look at the shorter time frames alone and to restrict 'history' to decades rather than centuries. If long-term phenomena are mentioned, they may be presented as mere historical 'background' to orient the reader, not as a source of explanatory tools incorporated into the analysis" (Stern S. 1987, 12).

Cajamarca in the sixteenth century.

Atahualpa

Shortly after arriving in Peru, the Spanish conquistadores arranged a meeting with the Inca ruler Atahualpa in Cajamarca. Here, one of the most definitive events in the history of the Americas played itself out in only a few hours. Narrated by generations of historians, with many varying accounts, a Spanish friar with a bible met Atahualpa:

In Guaman Poma's version of the encounter . . . Atahualpa . . . [played] the role of ruler by issuing a challenge to the friar's authority for having asserted that Atahualpa's gods were frauds and his God the true one: "Fray Vicente responded that his gospel, his book, had told him. And Atahualpa said: 'Give me the book so that it may speak to me.' And so he gave it to him, and . . . [Atahualpa] took it in his hands and began to flip through the leaves of the book. And the Inca said 'What? How is it that it does not tell me? It does not tell me? It does not even talk to me, that book!' Speaking with great majesty, seated on his throne, the Inca Atahualpa flung the book from his hands. . . ." (Seed 1991, 28)

Few historians debate what occurred shortly afterwards; hidden Spaniards ". . . launched the ambush with the prearranged signal. . . . The Spaniards fell upon them and began to kill [Indians]. . . . And since the Indians were unarmed they were routed without danger to any Christian" (Hemming 1970, 41-42). Atahualpa was captured and subsequently executed due to ". . . the crude political maneuvering of Pizarro . . . [which was] dressed up with religious reasons and made to appear as the first sentence passed by the Inquisition in Peru" (Mariátegui 1971, 131).

Atahualpa's dropping of the Bible symbolized the rejection of Christianity, the written word, and European culture which justified Spain's conquest. The meeting between Atahualpa and Pizarro laid the groundwork for an intensely bifurcated social system. The impetus for subsequent political violence arises from this unjust social system, and its accompanying structural violence.⁵

The Duality of Andean Existence

In conquering the Incas, "[t]he Spanish conquistadors destroyed . . . [the Inca's] impressive productive machine without being able to replace it. The indigenous society and the Inca economy were wholly disrupted and annihilated by the shock of the conquest" (Mariátegui 1971, 4). Conquest formed the basis for the two souls of Peru that developed in the colonial period, and linger on in more subtle ways even today.

While many indigenous Andeans fatalistically accepted the Spanish domination of the viceroyalty, many of the oppressed actively rebelled against the yoke of imperialist repression. Between 1720-1790 there were more than one hundred insurrections

⁵ Violent revolt is a common theme throughout Andean history; indeed, ". . . the Andean image of history included also a vision of the future. Twentieth-century versions of this history are commonly known as the Inkarrí myth. The Inca will come back to reorder the world and to put everything in its proper place. The Inca's return is associated with a moral cleansing, the destruction of Spaniards and sinners. In . . . Cotabambas, an insurrection to restore Tawantinsuyu started with the news that the Inca had appeared. Everyone knew what should be done: the *misti* and *wiraqucha* (mestizos and Spaniards) should be killed" (Stern S. 1987, 179).

against the Spanish Government (Stern, S. 1987, 34). In a sense, these rebellions served as an expression of cultural identity:

In Andean rebel eyes, the extermination of "Spaniards," vital to the "moral cleansing" that would usher in a new era, enjoyed the approval of the king of Spain and the Christian God! The insurrectionists placed the Spaniards in the Andean category of *ñak'aq*, a Quechua term for humanoid beings considered criminal, beastly, and demonic. The human status of such beings was ambiguous, for they stood apart from normal humanity as parasitic antisocials whose own wellbeing was predicated on destroying human life. . . . In the eyes of the insurrectionists, these Spaniards had rebelled against the king of Spain and the Christian God. Indeed, the mythical "Spain" situated "across the sea," a powerful and distinctive realm distant from the world of humans in America, had no necessary connection to, and in no way legitimized, the colonial "Spain" of Spaniards in Peru. In killing "Spaniards," the insurrectionists killed traitors and heretics. (Stern, S. 1987, 145)

Stern's description of the dichotomy between the colonial Spaniard and the "mythical" Spain typifies the duality of Andean existence. Paradoxically, the imperialists were fought in the name of the imperialist power. The Spanish responded to indigenous revolts with extreme violence. "In Peru, the legacy included an assault on the memory of the Inca past, a reorganization of late colonial mechanisms of social control, a bitter hardening of social fears and tensions, and a strong creole tendency toward royalism during the Wars of Independence" (Stern, S. 1987, 35).⁶

⁶ Following independence from Spain, the "... 'Aristocratic Republic' reinscribed the familiar logic of control by a white elite, and the divorce between brown and white, mountains and coast, and poor and rich remained a dominant feature of the topography of the nation" (Stern, Degregori and Kirk 1995, 215). An example of these divisions occurred during the War of the Pacific when rich Peruvian land owners collaborated with the Chilean invaders, rather than join the peasants who were fighting the Chileans. "The elite viewed all action by the peasant guerrillas as race—or class—motivated pillage, whereas the peasants perceived elite attempts to protect their property as treachery to the national resistance" (Mallon 1995, 183).

The continuing presence of a large oppressed population throughout the Andean region amplified the probability of revolt. Subsequent Andean rebellions take on an almost bipolar character, which:

. . . swings between two idealized extremes: on the one hand there is a turning in upon itself of Andean culture, and a rejection of the West, and on the other, the appropriation of the conquerors' instruments of domination. Both variants can be traced back to the sixteenth century. . . . What is of interest, however, is that in the twentieth century the second pole of rebellion predominates: that which seeks to appropriate for itself the instruments of power of the dominant. . . . (Degregori 1991, 236)

Degregori later postulates that Andeans subsequently developed an intense desire for education as a way of overcoming this domination. Written language became a method of social control forced onto the indigenous population through conquest. Thus, “. . . mastery of the Spanish language, reading and writing . . . [became] the instruments of domination” (Degregori 1991, 235). Thus, education became a means of taking the instruments of domination (reading and writing the Spanish language) and using them against the dominator.⁷

As students flooded Peru's universities during the 1960's, many were searching for an accessible form of the “truth.” During the 1970's, PCP-SL provided this “truth”

⁷ One could argue that attempts at using the invader's technology can be seen today in Sendero's stealing of dynamite and firearms. The insurgents repeatedly cite the captured weapons in their propaganda, “. . . a Maoist commando ambushed a police vehicle. . . . The . . . attack was deadly for the police, four of them were eliminated in the action by submachinegun fire. Before withdrawing, the guerrillas confiscated four AKM long-range assault rifles” (Arce Borja 1992e, 14). Similarly, Senderistas urge army conscripts to shoot their officers and desert with their weapons.

through its simplified Marxist analysis of Peruvian society (Degregori 1991, 235). Education by Senderista instructors and militants amounted to ideological indoctrination in Gonzalo Thought. Senderismo has continued to offer an easily digestible form of reality in which Andean history is simplified to fit an ideological conception of reality.

The Revision of History: Insurgent Voices

The coloration of history for propaganda is not unique to SL; however, the movement appears to take its ideological interpretations more literally than other similar organizations. Because of the self-seriousness of Gonzalo Thought, Senderistas shoehorn reality into a ridged ideological framework. The dogmatic revision of history provides the guerrillas with a fulcrum for continuing their armed struggle.

According to the propaganda voice of PCP-SL, *El Diario Internacional*, “[s]topping this war, led by the Communist Party of Peru, is a political and military objective of the Peruvian tyranny and the United States government. To achieve this, they are using—like the Spanish conquistadors before them—massive crimes and the extermination of the population” (Arce Borja 1992b, 5). Similarly, the pro-Sendero magazine, *A World to Win* has argued that:

For 500 years the people of Peru have been forced to dig the riches from their own

land to hand them over to rich and powerful foreign countries—first Spain, later Great Britain, and then the US. . . . By the early 1970s Peru's government had become more and more dependent on the imperialists. . . .

During the same period the Communist Party of Peru (PCP), led by Chairman Gonzalo, was training and preparing itself politically, ideologically, and organizationally to wage a Maoist People's War aimed at overcoming . . . imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 1995b, 18)

This argument is characteristic of the pro-Sendero genre of literature which presents armed struggle as the only solution to a valid problem. SL self-importantly ascribes itself the role as the vanguard of global revolution, overcoming the evils of a history of capitalist exploitation. This worldview is reflective of Sendero's totalitarian ideology, which continues to be the inspiration for numerous acts of political violence.

Sendero Luminoso developed as a revolutionary organization within the context of Andean history. At the same time, the movement has revised history in an effort to justify its protracted people's war. For example, "[t]he history of Peru in this century . . . is actually a history of domination by imperialism, principally Yankee imperialism, in league with the Peruvian big bourgeoisie and feudal landlords; this exploitation and oppression are the cause of the present crisis. . ." (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1986, 49). Militants, supporters and admirers all rationalize the use of terror as a means of political expression. Violence becomes an end in itself, with some Senderistas undoubtedly enjoying the empowerment which accompanies the use of force. Far more than a political party, Sendero has become a virtual death cult waging

a jihad to purify an iniquitous world.

The Religion of Political Violence

Although PCP-SL claims that religion is exploitative of the masses, Senderistas devote themselves to a party which has several traits in common with ultra-fundamentalist religions. Indeed, “. . . Sendero exhibits many of the qualities of a religious cult. It is founded, in a sense, on the revelations of Comrade Gonzalo, has divided the world sharply between good and evil, maintains a highly rigid belief system, and demands absolute commitment on the part of its membership” (McCormick 1987, 16-17).

The argument can be made that there is a relation between Sendero's religious-like fervor and the elitist origins of the movement. Lipset argued that “. . . elites of rapidly developing societies require a political myth which will bind the masses suffering the dislocations of industrialization and modernization. What religious belief did for the Western countries . . . ‘political religion’ must do for the currently emerging nations” (Lipset 1968, 208). For Sendero, political religion takes on authoritarian characteristics that led to a violently simplified worldview. This is confirmable by any examination of pro-PCP-SL documents, which typically resonate with violent themes and

characterizations.⁸

Senderismo promulgates the words of the infallible President Gonzalo as absolute truth.⁹ The guerrillas violently impose their political ideology/religion on the groups they claim to represent (i.e. the masses). A problem with this approach is that “. . . whenever revolutionaries begin from a thesis that peasants and workers suffer from false or lowered levels of consciousness, there will be elements of arrogance in their attempts to effect change” (Wickham-Crowley 1991, 108). PCP-SL views peasants

⁸ Sendero's semi-official party newspaper, *El Diario Internacional*, has stated “. . . The battle has already begun. The war of liberation, with . . . the sacrifice of millions of the oppressed, is advancing. . .” (Arce Borja 1992b, 4, 5). For other examples of Sendero's attitude towards violence one can acquire *El Diario Internacional* from the publisher (a pro-PCP-SL Peruvian in exile) in Brussels, Belgium. Another interesting source, fairly easily acquired from Revolution Books in New York City, is the Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement's *A World to Win*, which reprints many PCP-SL documents in English. The Revolutionary Communist Party-USA's *Revolutionary Worker* and *The Bulletin of the International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán* are available from Revolution Books as well. Interestingly, conflicts have arisen between these publications and the pro-Sendero *The New Flag*, published by the Movimiento Popular Perú (MPP) in New York City. The MPP has stated that “. . . the RCP/Co-RIM [Revolutionary Communist Party-USA, and Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement] throws up a smokescreen by claiming that President Gonzalo's views on the People's War and World Revolution are unknown. This political position is consistent with its decision to censor all PCP documents published after August 1992 in its 'Revolution Books' stores and outlets” (Peru People's Movement 1996a, 38). The MPP operates an Internet site on the World Wide Web (<http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp>) which offers a range of Sendero propaganda.

⁹ SL's political religion is typified by the intense personality cult which has formed around Guzmán. Unlike Lenin or Mao, Guzmán's cult of personality developed before a successful revolution. An example of the reverence which was ascribed to Chairman Gonzalo is found in party documents. “The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru fervently greets our beloved, heroic and magisterial leader, Chairman Gonzalo; the greatest living Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, great political and military strategist, philosopher, teacher of communists, center of party unification, who creatively applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete conditions of the Peruvian revolution has generated Gonzalo Thought, guarantee of the revolutions [*sic*] triumph” (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1992, 1).

and workers as clay to be molded in the party image by the “scientific ideology” of “Gonzalo Thought Marxism”:

If we start from this expressed need to have a guide from outside, it becomes clear why a university professor should emerge as the leader of SL. The moral stand of SL is also more understandable, as exemplified by their punishment of adulterers and drunkards. And it explains why manuals of Marxism were so popular in Peruvian universities in the 1970s. Students were . . . presented with a simplified and therefore more accessible version of a theory—that of Marxism—Leninism—which claimed to be the only “scientific truth,” legitimated by references to the classics of Marxism, its source of authority. This ‘scientific’ theory proclaimed a new, but strictly hierarchical, order which they, on joining the party and its truth, could pass from the bottom to the pinnacle of the social pyramid of knowledge, for we must not forget that they were university students. (Degregori 1991, 239)

Sendero’s ideology presents itself as an accessible form of absolute truth. Life for the believer is simplified into clear instructions, “. . . those who are already waging people’s war should develop it more . . . and through this process we will demolish imperialist domination, the domination of reaction. And we will wipe them off the face of the earth” (Guzmán 1988, 53). It is apparent that these views have perpetuated the armed struggle.

Sendero Luminoso’s cult-like worship of violence as a means for overcoming oppression is derived from the “scientific ideology of Gonzalo Thought.” In an effort to mold reality around ideology, destruction of that which does not conform to party dogma becomes necessary. Because Peruvian society is infinitely more complicated than Senderismo, a high level of violence has been applied by the insurgents.

Chapter Summary

The attraction of Sendero's ideology to those with unfulfilled aspirations involves many complex historical reasons. An amalgamation of these factors appears to have contributed to the development of SL. Among these are the colonial experience, Peru's cultural dualism, and the history of Andean insurrection. Trying to further its political ideology, Sendero propaganda has oversimplified Andean history. This is characteristic of "Gonzalo Thought," which presents itself as a religious-like ideology with a monopoly on "truth." The political religion of SL offered a concrete solution for those who perceive frustrations in their upward mobility, the "universal law of violence." Still, why are some individuals attracted to political violence while others pursue less destructive solutions? To answer this question, the next chapter will examine political theory in the Peruvian context.

Chapter II

Theoretical Analysis of the Developmental History of Senderismo

Political theory contributes a plethora of works relevant to any investigation of Sendero Luminoso. Thus, this chapter examines a diverse cross section of theoretical works to provide a balanced view of the developmental history of Senderismo. Nevertheless, not every relevant theory is discussed in this section. Instead, a sample of the literature is linked with Peruvian reality to explore the evolution of PCP-SL as a contemporary revolutionary movement. Because this essay concentrates on the concept of aspirational deprivation, a good starting point is found in the writings of political scientist Ted Gurr.

Ted Gurr and Relative Deprivation

Succinctly, Gurr asserts that relative deprivation that touches both elite aspirants and the masses is likely to produce political violence. Gurr's argument "... is derived from psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one innate response to perceived deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a motivating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response" (Gurr 1972, 185).¹ Gurr goes on to

¹ It is useful to remember that violence is satisfying to a minority of individuals. "Not that terrorist violence is inherently appealing to Peruvians. On the contrary, such attacks have been made not only on state property or private luxury facilities frequented by elites, but also on movie theaters

postulate that “. . . the primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors” (Gurr 1970, 12-13).

Gurr’s work is applicable to Sendero in a number of ways. A study by the respected *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* found that those convicted for armed subversion exhibited certain similar characteristics. The prototypical Senderista’s “. . . achievement in the formation of technical and professional [skills] is discrepant with his or her precarious economic situation, which results in economic and occupational marginality [Trans.]” (Chávez de Paz 1989, 16).² The inconsistency between aspirations and reality leads to the development of discontent.

In many ways, Gurr’s work is in concordance with the view that the greater “. . . discrepancy between a person’s goals or desired level of achievement and his actual level of achievement the greater the achievement discrepancy, [and] the greater the potential for political violence. This Achievement Discrepancy (AD) hypothesis has

and similar establishments visited by average citizens” (Kay 1989, 56). Regardless, the individuals who do find violence satisfying are highly committed to their beliefs and capable of justifying attacks against “reactionary” institutions. Gonzalo Thought rationalizes the most brutal assassinations. For example, the party’s semi-official newspaper, *El Diario Internacional* boasted that “Maoist forces have executed three priests. . . . Italian priest Alessandro Dordi was found riddled with bullets” (Arce Borja 1991, 3).

² When I spoke with Carlos Iván Degregori’s assistant, Juan Carlos Guerrero in Lima, he noted that this work uses less than reliable Peruvian Government statistics (Guerrero 1996).

been labeled variously, 'relative deprivation,' 'systematic frustration,' [and] '*J* curve. . .'" (Grofman and Muller 1973, 514). Concordantly, of those convicted of terrorism in Peru, 29.5 percent had attended a university, compared with 2.5 percent of those convicted of assault and robbery and 6.6 percent of those convicted of narcotrafficking (Chávez de Paz 1989, 41). Aspirations have typically been incongruent with the expectations of many who became Senderistas. "Most ordinary Senderistas are . . . students and peasants, mostly from Andean areas. The students realize that, with their poor professional qualifications . . . and Indian backgrounds, they have no hope for a job fitting their expectations" (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 332). PCP-SL's party structure easily politicalized this discontent, eventually encouraging armed actions.

Gurr asserts that "[t]he fundamental cause of civil strife is deprivation-induced discontent: the greater the discrepancy between what men believe they deserve and what they think they are capable of attaining, the greater the discontent" (Gurr and Graham 1969, 620). On the other hand, Douglas Hibbs argues that ". . . the imbalance of education and economic development appears to have little value for explaining actual variation . . . of mass political violence" (Hibbs 1973, 48). At the same time, Gurr's work does not fully consider the importance of a well-developed party organization. One can argue that the discontent of some Peruvians would never have translated into action without Sendero's exceptional political organization. To explain

this component of Sendero's growth, we need to examine a work which considers the role of organization in political violence.

Charles Tilly and PCP-SL Party Organization

In contrast to Gurr, Tilly argues that even intensive discontent cannot translate into political violence without some level of organization. Tilly says “. . . that revolutions . . . tend to flow directly out of a population's central political processes, instead of expressing diffuse strains and discontents of the population; . . . claims and counterclaims . . . made on the existing government by various mobilized groups are more important than the general satisfaction or discontent of those groups. . .” (Tilly 1973, 436). We can easily apply Tilly's work to PCP-SL's approach to revolution:

Although the appalling economic conditions and the increasing restrictions mentioned by Sendero are both real, hunger in itself has never been sufficient to create a revolutionary consciousness or a revolutionary situation. When pressed on this point Sendero falls back on the voluntaristic Guevarist maxim that even if all the conditions are not ripe for launching of armed struggle, the struggle itself will create them. (Taylor 1983, 24)

Sendero Luminoso's party organization has been vital to the movement's growth. Without a lens to focus the discontent of certain groups, there would be no prolonged insurgency. Yet, a combination of other political, social and historical factors have contributed to the growth of PCP-SL. In this context, one must consider socioeconomic reality, modernization, and the contribution of revolutionary

intellectuals in the development and attraction of Sendero.

Samuel Huntington, Peruvian Reality and the Appeal of PCP-SL

In his cross-national comparative study of democracy, political scientist Samuel Huntington linked Sendero's insurgency with severe socioeconomic inequality, extensive state involvement in the economy, and foreign debt as “. . . major contextual problems. . .” (Huntington 1993, 254). Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* looks at the effects of modernization on revolutionary activities; he believes that:

The revolutionary intellectual is a virtually universal phenomena in modernizing societies. . . . The ability of the intellectuals to carry out a revolutionary role depends upon their relations with other social groups. Initially they are likely to be the dominant middle-class group; their ability to instigate a revolution at this time depends upon their ability to arouse mass support from other elements in the population, such as the peasants. . . . The role of the dominant groups in the countryside hence becomes the critical factor determining the stability or fragility of the government. (Huntington 1969, 290-291)

Huntington's theory can be superimposed onto Peruvian reality in a number of ways. For example, the notion of the revolutionary intellectual can be applied to Dr. Abimael Guzmán.³ This view was supported during a telephone interview with David Scott

³ Another notable Senderista filling this description was Janet Talevara, who is credited along with Luis Arce Borja in the 1988 interview of Abimael Guzman. Following her death in a prison uprising in 1992, *El Diario Internacional* noted that “[t]he assistant editor of *El Diario* was, without a doubt, a revolutionary intellectual” (Arce Borja 1992d, 9).

Palmer,⁴ who described his experience of sharing an office with Dr. Guzmán at the *Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga* (UNSCH) in the early sixties:

He was considered to be a good professor, he taught philosophy in the education program. The University had roughly 400 students. It was a pluralistic place. . . . I never saw him as the leader of a people's war. The thing that did it was his time in China during the cultural revolution. Mao's line lost to Deng's, and Guzmán thought that the only thing to do was to start an insurgency in Peru. (Palmer 1996)

Before beginning its armed struggle, PCP-SL concentrated on party building among the impoverished Indians and *mestizos* of Ayacucho and other provinces. This was made easier by the University of Humanga's unique outreach program that PCP-SL used to build its presence in rural peasant communities. However, "Sendero is derived from the university, not from the peasantry. This means that its perspective on the armed struggle is fundamentally intellectual and ideological rather than practical and developmental" (Palmer 1994, 262). Thus, a considerable portion of the most committed Senderistas come from a university environment.

Peasants and intellectuals play a key role in Huntington's views on developing a successful revolution. Yet, it is the peasantry which makes up the backbone of a successful revolution:

⁴ David Scott Palmer is professor of international relations and political science at Boston University and director of the Latin American Studies Program there. He was a Peace Corps volunteer at the University of Humanga where he shared an office with Abimael Guzmán for a year. He has written several books on Peru, including *Peru the Authoritarian Tradition, Shining Path of Peru* and several influential journal articles on SL.

Efforts by intellectuals to arouse peasants almost invariably fail unless the social and economic conditions of the peasantry are such as to give them concrete motives for revolt. The intelligentsia can ally themselves with a revolutionary peasantry but they can not create a revolutionary peasantry. . . . [In China] Mao and those who followed him, acting on Mao's own observation of the revolutionary character of the peasantry, moved out to reconstitute the Communist movement in the countryside after their defeat in the cities. At that point, for the first time in history, the peasant uprising which accompanies every revolution became organized, disciplined, and led by a group of highly conscious and articulate professional revolutionary intellectuals. (Huntington 1968, 303)

Huntington's view of the importance of the peasantry can be viewed through the Maoist lens of the PCP-SL's protracted people's war:

[T]aking the concrete conditions of the country into account, the . . . [Party] sanctioned the "Outline of the Armed Struggle." In essence this plan held that people's war in Peru must develop as a single revolutionary war in the countryside and cities, with the countryside the principal theater of armed actions, following the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside. (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1986, 19-20)

The PCP-SL has adapted Mao to fit the Peru's urban reality, while Sendero "... self-consciously retained its original rural orientation, the cities have played an increasing, contributory role in Shining Path planning" (McCormick 1992, 2). Huntington could not have foreseen the importance of an urban guerrilla campaign in Lima; however, "[t]he Shining Path's campaign within the capital has been and will continue to be guided by the movement's larger rural-based theory of victory" (McCormick 1992, 22).⁵ In this context, the PCP-SL is close to Huntington's belief in the importance of

⁵ U.S. intelligence from the 1980's confirms Sendero's urban trend. "Police arrested 13 guerrillas in Peru Friday [in January 1987?] after numerous bombs exploded throughout Lima . . .

rural groups, especially peasants.

Huntington believes that a history of “. . . [c]olonialism and ethnic heterogeneity would seem to be much better predictors of violence than poverty [alone]” (Huntington 1969, 42). This corresponds with Peru’s history of colonialism and atavistic racial divisions, characterized by “. . . discrimination by Peru’s whites against . . . dark skinned individuals . . . [which] became channeled into support for the Shining Path” (McClintock 1993, 222). Sendero has drawn from the misery of the masses in the formation of its guerrilla war. The unrealized expectations which accompanied Peru’s failed agrarian reforms have played an especially important role for SL.

Revolution and the Failure of Peru’s Agrarian Reforms

Many of Peru’s rural poor experienced rising expectations during the country’s land reforms of the 1960’s, only to realize subsequently the inappropriateness of these programs. The frustration and displacement which accompanied these land reforms were a decisive factor in the attraction of subsequent armed subversion. To understand the reasons for the implementation, and failures of these government policies, one must

with several destroying power facilities and blacking out electricity for more than half the population of Peru. Press reports that one bomb went off in front of the National Penitentiary, not far from the U.S. Embassy. These attacks reflect the continued emphasis of Sendero Luminoso terrorists on urban violence in an attempt to embarrass the government” (Central Intelligence Agency 1987, 1).

consider the relations between dominant-classes and the state.

Political scientist Theda Skocpol's neo-Marxist approach to revolution is presented in her highly influential work *States and Social Revolutions*. Her thesis is that the state's interests can conflict with the dominant-class when the state perceives the necessity of pacifying the masses at the expense of the upper-class; indeed:

. . . the use of state power to support dominant class interests is not inevitable. Indeed, attempts of state rulers merely to perform the state's "own" functions may create conflicts of interest with the dominant class. . . . [T]he state has its own distinct interests vis-a-vis the subordinate classes. Although both the state and the dominant class(es) share a broad interest in keeping the subordinate class in place in society and at work in the existing economy, the state's own fundamental interest in maintaining sheer physical order and political peace may lead it—especially in periods of crisis—to enforce concessions to subordinate-class demands. (Skocpol 1993, 30)

Skocpol's thesis can be juxtaposed onto Peru's insurgents of the 1960's and the land reforms of General Juan Velasco's "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces" (1968-1975). Under this government, the state overlooked the interests of the dominant-class (i.e., large land owners) in an effort to pacify the masses. At the same time, Velasco's reforms raised aspirations which the regime did not fulfill.

Before Velasco's reforms, insurgents of the *Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario* (FIR)⁶ played on the fact that ". . . Peru was deeply divided economically, particularly

⁶ The FIR was a Trotskyist party active primarily in the department of Cusco from 1959-1963, "Blanco opposed the idea that revolutionary nuclei (*focos*) were capable of carrying out a revolution. He maintained instead that the FIR shares the Trotskyite views on revolutionary violence and stressed the need for a worker-peasant alliance. Blanco assumed in 1962 that political agitation

in rural areas. . . . [Revolutionaries] were therefore motivated by their desire to overthrow the established order and impose a socialist regime” (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 310). Velasco was aware that regimes which do not undertake reforms to diminish the privileges of dominant classes are often unable to undertake the reforms necessary to prevent a revolution. This is illustrated in Velasco’s 1968 description of his “. . . adversaries and detractors. They . . . come from a privileged group of political elites and economic monopolies. This is the traditional oligarchy, which will see its antipatriotic dominance of Peru in jeopardy” (Velasco 1995, 268). In many ways, pressures exerted by the masses motivated the leftist military government to make reforms that benefited the regime at the expense of the dominant social class.

Velasco’s reforms “. . . unleashed growing conflict. . . . Sharp increases in labor and peasant strikes . . . led by radical Maoist unions, increased social tensions and were a clear demonstration that the military’s mobilization of lower-class sectors had not resulted in the hoped for creation of a support base for the regime” (Mauceri 1991, 86).

would encourage the peasants to claim the land; this in turn would lead to armed struggle. Criticizing Guevara’s *foco* theory, he pointed out main weaknesses in Castroism. As he viewed it, Castroism underestimated the importance of ‘isolated heroic acts’” (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 309-310). During the 1960's, the FIR, *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) (formed by a rebel Aprista), and the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) “. . . were short lived, reflecting a fatal miscalculation by these mostly light-skinned intellectuals, who wrongly assumed that peasants and Indians would rally around them to overthrow the old order” (Starn, Degregori and Kirk 1995, 293). Interestingly, Blanco went on to become a candidate for the Presidency of Peru in 1980, winning 3.9 percent of the vote (Gorriti 1990, 37).

Regardless, Velasco's reforms did delay revolutionary actions, 'beginning reforms in the country and the city significantly delayed the possibilities of new action against the system [Trans.]' (Mercado 1982, 8). Still, the unfulfilled expectations of the Velasco era led to a certain receptivity to radical ideas. At the same time, the experience of the *foco* guerrillas of the 1960's provided a lesson to those who wish to launch armed actions against the Peruvian State.

The Guerrillas of the 1960's and the Development of Senderismo

The inadequacy of Peru's *foco* style movements of the 1960's led potential revolutionaries to question the tactics and ideology used by these guerrillas. Thus, while Sendero was still in its formative stages it learned from the mistakes of the *foco* movements. Consequently, an understanding of the *foco* theory is necessary to begin to comprehend Sendero Luminoso.

The *foco* theory is typically associated with the Cuban-Argentine revolutionary Dr. Ernesto "Ché" Guevara. Ché believed that the guerrillas were the focus of the revolution. This differs from Leninist theory which stressed a "revolutionary situation," and the need for ". . . the broadest political agitation, and consequently the organization of all-sided political exposure, is an absolutely necessary, and the *most urgently* necessary. . ." (Lenin 1978, 97-98). On the other hand, Guevara asserted that:

The guerrilla is the combat vanguard of the people, situated in a specified place in a certain region, armed and willing to carry out a series of warlike actions for the one possible strategic end—the seizure of power. . . . We consider that the Cuban Revolution made . . . fundamental contributions to the laws of the revolutionary movement in the current situation in America. First, people's forces can win a war against the army. Second, one need not always wait for all conditions favorable to revolution to be present; the insurrection itself can create them. (Guevara 1969, 90)

Thus, Guevarism's central tenant is that "[t]he actions and motivations of a handful of individuals, completely unrepresentative of the majority of the population, are thus considered to be sufficient causes for bringing about a revolution" (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 45). However, many Leninists ". . . disagree with . . . [Guevara] on its being possible to . . . [initiate revolution] through the actions of a small group that decides in a selected country that it will precipitate a Vietnam [style conflict] there" (Hansen 1989, 65).⁷

While Guevara concentrated on the spontaneity of revolution, PCP-SL slowly developed its political support before the initiation of the armed struggle. Sendero learned from the failures of MIR, ELN and "Ché" Guevara that revolution requires more than a band of armed guerillas wandering the countryside.⁸ Intense pre-armed

⁷ As early as the 1920's, José Carlos Mariátegui discussed the problem of imagining ". . . that a feeling of nationalism will develop . . . similar to the kind that was a factor in the anti-imperialist struggles in Asian nations subjugated by imperialism . . ." (Mariátegui 1995, 231).

⁸ In a sense, ". . . Sendero implicitly accepts certain Castroite rural warfare premises, including the replacement of the party with the guerrilla nucleus. However, this acceptance should not be construed as an indication of Sendero's willingness to mitigate what it considers 'true' Maoist theory and practice" (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 327).

struggle party-building activities have been a hallmark of SL:

[W]hen Sendero's founder and leader, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso . . . began planning for a revolutionary takeover of Peru in 1971, he allocated nine years for secret, underground mobilization before the start of the revolutionary war. Indeed, Sendero only began its vicious campaign of violence in 1980, according to a plan rather than in reaction to changing Peruvian realities. (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 11)

In contrast to Guevarism, and similar to Leninist theories, Sendero does not attempt to produce a revolutionary situation by itself. According to party ideology, PCP-SL began its war by “. . . taking the concrete conditions of the country into account. . .” (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1986, 19).

Guevarism views the “. . . the peasantry . . . [as] a class, which because of the ignorance in which it has been kept . . . cannot alone launch the struggle and achieve victory” (Guevara 1969, 91). Contrastingly, in the PCP-SL's ideological conception of protracted people's war “[t]he peasantry, especially the poor peasants, are the main participants, as fighters and commanders at different levels in the People's Guerrilla Army. The workers participate in the same ways, although the percentage of workers at this time [1988] is insufficient” (Guzmán 1988, 21).

While Guevara's theories were applicable to prerevolutionary Cuba, their juxtaposition onto other regions often had less than the desired effect.⁹ In Peru, the

⁹ Throughout the world, “[t]he Cuban experience spawned over 200 subsequent imitative revolutionary attempts patterned on it, principally in Latin America and Africa. They all failed. This does not discredit the *foco* theory; it does emphasize the importance of a particular set of

unreceptiveness of the indigenous Quechua and Aymara speaking mountain populations to the mostly Castellano speaking coastal guerrillas of the 1960's made forming mass support much different than in Cuba.¹⁰ Contrastingly, Sendero spent years indoctrinating peasants with its Maoist ideology. The message which Sendero has delivered is one of equality, with a vision for an ultra-egalitarian utopian world in the distant future. In this context, the issue of inequality in Peruvian society has taken on profound importance.

Inequality and Political Violence

When discussing inequality, an especially good starting point is found in Manus Midlarsky's concept of "patterned inequality." This theory, which analyses the relations between social classes, is especially relevant for an investigation of aspirational deprivation and Sendero Luminoso.

Midlarsky hypothesized that, "[i]f the absence of identification along with continued emiseration of the population relative to the ruling sector continues for long, then large-

circumstances to this model. Legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The *foco* must mature at the same time as the government loses legitimacy, and before any alternative appears" (U.S. Department of the Army and the Air Force 1990, 2-6).

¹⁰ This is similar to the problem Guevara encountered in Bolivia with Indians who were suspicious of outsiders and saw no reason to join the armed struggle. For Guevara this was one of the contributing factors which led to his death at the hands of the U.S. supported Bolivian Government.

scale political violence becomes more likely” (Midlarsky 1988, 493). Similarly, he has observed that “. . . in Peru, there is an ongoing rural guerrilla insurrection suggested in part by . . . patterned inequality . . . wherein Peru is found in the highest inequality category, perhaps not sufficiently equalized by the later redistributive policies” (Midlarsky 1988, 504). Gonzalo Thought takes advantage of this inequality by promising an equitable distribution of resources.¹¹ The “Glorious People’s War” would not have achieved such a high level of effectiveness without being able to feed off the aspirational deprivation of some Peruvians. Concordantly, Midlarsky asserts that the:

. . . theory of patterned inequality between rulers and ruled provides a valuable analytic approach to the relationship between inequality and political violence. Under conditions of a bifurcated pattern of inequality, the probability of political violence is likely to be greater than under a more generalized inequality typically measured by the Gini index. A strong systematic relationship between patterned inequality in Latin American landholding and deaths from political violence was discovered. . . . This degree of association was far stronger than that found between the Gini index of land inequality in Latin America and deaths from political violence. (Midlarsky 1988, 491)

Even the casual observer can attest to the profound inequality which is readily apparent in Peru. Yet, many other nations have inequality as great as or greater than Peru, but do not experience intensive political violence. Here a weakness of Midlarsky’s thesis becomes apparent. Why should revolution occur in Peru and not in other countries with

¹¹ Sendero often recruits “. . . a cross section of Peru’s dispossessed, from poor highland peasants to the large mass of urban unemployed” (McCormick 1990, 11). However, it is in educated, single, young people that the movement has achieved a significant level of support [Trans.] (Chávez de Paz 1989, 56).

the same level of inequity?

In Peru, a highly organized political party stood ready to take advantage of popular discontent and channel it toward violent activities. This combination of inequality with a disciplined political party helps to explain Sendero's rise as a movement. Assertions that misery automatically translates into collective violence fail to consider the significance of organized political parties. These organizations can use ideology to take advantage of misery in the furtherance of a political agenda.

Revolutionary Ideology, State and Political Violence

Ideology is an important and often overlooked component of revolutionary movements. Seymour Martin Lipset has argued that “. . . extreme ideologies initially emerged with the rise of new strata . . . as they sought their rights of citizenship, that is, the right fully to participate socially and politically. As long as they were denied such rights sizable segments of these strata endorsed revolutionary ideologies” (Lipset 1968, 214). Following Lipset's thesis, the ideological extremity of Gonzalo Thought could be linked to the disenfranchisement of segments of the population (i.e., underemployed university graduates, impoverished Indians, disgruntled intellectuals, etc.).

Much of Peru's aspiring middle-class has not found that reality matches its expectations. Senderismo emerged as Peru's aspiring elites found their personal goals

virtually unachievable. Similarly, many terrorists see their opportunities for participation in the country's conventional political system as minimal. A number of guerrillas were undoubtedly attracted to a movement which promises upward mobility, power and a chance to succeed. In this context, political violence has become a vehicle of personal empowerment.

Chapter Summary

Do any of the political theories examined in this chapter adequately explain the ideological attraction of SL? While Gurr's theory of relative deprivation appears applicable to Peru, it does not address the importance of party structure. On the other hand, Charles Tilly's emphasis on the importance of party structure appears somewhat valid, yet a myriad of other social and political factors merit examination. For example, Samuel Huntington linked several factors in modernizing societies which lead to political violence. Similarly, Theda Skocpol's model of the relations between dominant classes and governments has some applicability in relation to Peru's agrarian reforms. These reforms were sparked, in part by Peru's *foco* style guerrillas of the 1960's. At the same time, Manis Midlarsky's concept of "patterned inequality" partially explains the role of revolutionary ideology in political violence.

None of the theories examined in this work appear to provide an explanation for

every aspect of the ideological attraction of SL. While theory is certainly relevant, the realities of Peru's equity (or the lack of it) merit extensive discussion. Consequently, the next chapter defines the relationships between aspirational deprivation and support for Sendero Luminoso.

Chapter III

Incongruent Aspirations and Achievements

The discrepancy between aspirations and achievements in Peru has been a decisive factor in the growth of PCP-SL as an armed movement. Anger arising from unfulfilled expectations has translated into violence through a party and ideology which capitalizes on these sentiments. Indeed, Peruvian “. . . subversion . . . arises from social motivations . . . and constitutes a form of especially violent reaction by specific sectors [of the population] intent on undermining the foundations of . . . the state [Trans.] (Chávez de Paz 1989, 12). To understand the role played by these social motivations, one must examine the distribution of resources in Peruvian society.

Equity and Revolutionary Appeal

Although Senderismo focuses on social class, typically defining Peru as “semi-feudal,” it would not have achieved such spectacular success (by the standards of insurgencies) without the appeal of its ideological egalitarianism. Indeed, the movement has typically fed off the chronic inequities of an “Aristocratic Republic.”

Among Andean scholars, “. . . there is a broad consensus that ethnic cleavage has been one of the factors in . . . [Sendero's] rebellion” (McClintock 1993, 219). Profound inequality in the distribution of resources based on racial characteristics

(among other factors), is clearly visible in Peru. This can be linked to theoretical works “[f]rom Aristotle to Marx and Tocqueville, . . . [which viewed the] nexus between inequality and political violence [as] strong and direct, with little quibbling as to the ultimate outcome—in most cases revolution” (Midlarsky 1988, 491-492).¹

It is important to remember that there is no evidence which suggests that inequality automatically transfers into political action. Any examination of Third-World countries will find many with the same economic and social problems as Peru, but without concordant levels of political violence. Sendero’s development results from the combination of Peru’s lack of equity with a party organization capable of taking advantage of the angst of Peru’s marginalized classes. This marginality is often demarcated along ethnic lines.² However, it is through the Peruvian economic structure that we find the greatest actualization of inequality.

Economic Angst

The failure of the Peruvian economy to provide adequate employment and wages has

¹ Most scholars and U.S. Government analysis concur on Sendero’s high level of violence. The guerrillas have been “. . . implicated in the slaughters of uncooperative peasants and murders of village officials. . .” (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 40).

² Peru’s ethnic polarization was illustrated “. . . in the early 1940s, [when] President Manuel Prado considered a curious proposal for ‘improving the race’ which involved encouraging the migration of Scandinavians to the country’s cities” (de Soto 1989, 10).

been an important factor in the attraction of Sendero as a revolutionary movement.³

A study funded in part by the Ford Foundation found that 29 percent of convicted terrorists had no income [Trans.] (Chávez de Paz 1989, 53). Even those who do find employment Peru must confront a highly problematic economy:

Inflation in 1989 reached a record 2,775 percent, and nearly triple that figure in 1990 at 7,650 percent. Conservative estimates indicate that cumulative inflation during Alan García's five years in office was 1 million percent! In January [1991] . . . the minimum, legal monthly wage was raised more than 50 percent to the equivalent of 76 U.S. dollars. Inflation since then, however, has increased between 6 and 9 percent a month. Government statistics show GDP declined by 13.6 percent in 1989 and fell another 6 percent in 1990.

Terrorist incidents have kept pace with the deteriorating economy. Deaths owing to the violence reached alarming levels last year. . . . And if "pobre Peru" has not been beaten enough while lying prostrate, a cholera epidemic hit in January and has caused the deaths of 1,300 people and untold economic loss. (Saba 1993, 35)

More recently, President Fujimori's economic austerity measures, known as "Fujishock," have had mixed economic results. Peru's inflation rate for March 1996 was only 1.38 percent with a yearly projected rate of 9 or 10 percent [Trans.] (DESCO 1996b). Simultaneously, funds have been diverted from some government programs to service Peru's considerable foreign debt.

³ Indeed, "[i]n the 1980s the already severely impoverished departments of . . . [Peru] were hit hard by the most serious national economic crisis in a century. Wages fell, inflation rates spiraled, and 60 percent or more of the nation's industrial capacity was idled. Therefore, the traditional escape route for peasants as urban wage laborers was closed. In addition, peasants suffered a crisis of subsistence in the countryside; potato production in the southern Andes fell by 40 to 50 percent. This crisis followed years of rising peasant expectations to the promises of government reforms. Nevertheless, the state continued to be unresponsive (Palmer 1994, 82)."

Peru's economic conditions have limited the upward mobility of many talented people. An effect of this is underemployment and unemployment. In these circumstances, people are sometimes attracted to revolutionary movements. At the same time, the economic policies implemented by the Peruvian Government have less than their desired effect.

Government Unresponsiveness, Aggression and the Other Path

How should the Peruvian Government remedy the economic conditions which breed terrorism? Peruvian entrepreneur, and President of the *Instituto Libertad y Democracia*, Hernando de Soto⁴ proposes that "[t]he real remedy for violence and poverty is to recognize the property and labor of those whom . . . [the Government] formality today excludes. . . . When people develop a taste for independence . . . they

⁴ De Soto comes from an atypical Peruvian background. "He completed his post graduate studies at the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études in Geneva, Switzerland. He has worked as an economist for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as managing director of one of Europe's leading firms of consulting engineers, and as a director of Peru's Central Reserve Bank. He is currently chairman of a Peruvian mining firm. . ." (de Soto 1989, 272). De Soto has been politically active as ". . . Fujimori's diplomatic advisor . . . [he] was put in charge of drug policy in Peru. . . . But he finally reached real power as Fujimori's link to the U.S. administration as well as international polite society. Fujimori and his Cambio 90 people needed advice on all sorts of things, like not wearing white socks with black shoes. . . . He began to loose influence and in January [1992], was finally forced to break with Fujimori in a bitter letter" (Kerr 1992, 20). Perhaps de Soto's political activity led the pro-Sendero newspaper *El Diario Internacional* to boast that ". . . a car bomb armed with 500 kilos of dynamite completely destroyed the offices of the Freedom and Democracy Institute . . . headed by U.S. agent Hernando de Soto" (Arce Borja 1992c, 7).

will be able to believe in themselves and in economic freedom” (de Soto 1989, 258).

De Soto concentrates on the role excessive government has on retarding the prosperity of Peruvians. In his influential book, *El Otro Sendero (The Other Path)*,⁵ de Soto links frustration with aggression in Peruvian society:

The poorest and most discontented members of the population are not prepared to accept a society in which opportunities, property, and power are distributed arbitrarily. People realize that the country's legal institutions do not allow them to fulfill rational expectations or afford them minimum facilities and protection. The frustration engendered can easily result in violence, either in complicity or relative indifference to it. After all, if the main reason for the existence of legal institutions is to protect individual rights and property from third parties, permit orderly access to productive activity, and facilitate harmonious interaction with other individuals, it is understandable that, when people are discriminated against, many will rebel. (de Soto 1989, 233-234)

The initiation of the reforms suggested by de Soto would probably ameliorate a certain level of discontent among some people. Nevertheless, the problems of Peru's economy are so deep as to make virtually any reforms exceedingly difficult to implement. One might question whether improvements in Peru's economy⁶ would pacify subversives

⁵ Notably, *El Otro Sendero* outlined the 207 step bureaucratic process a Peruvian would need to follow in order to have legal title to land. De Soto argues that this process would take almost seven years, and discourages Peruvians from obtaining legal title to land from the State.

⁶ Overall, “Peru's economy continued improving in 1994, achieving a GDP growth of 13 percent (versus 6.5 percent in 1993), the highest growth rate in the world for that year. Inflation has dropped from 7,650 percent in 1990 to 15.4 percent in 1994 as a result of tight monetary and fiscal policies. For the first five months of 1995, GDP was up 10 percent compared with the same period of 1994, and indications suggest overall 1995 growth could exceed 8 percent. The IMF letter of intent calls for 1995 economic growth of 6-7 percent. The Fujimori Administration hopes to achieve single-digit inflation in 1995, but if trends for the first five months of the year continue, the result could be around 12 percent. The IMF letter of intent calls for a CPI increase of 9-11 percent in 1995”

determined to wage a Maoist People's War. Yet, SL's promise of an egalitarian world in the distant future would certainly lose a considerable amount of its appeal if substantial reforms were implemented in Peru. In a sense, Sendero's political power grows out of poverty and despair. The party claims to act on behalf of Peru's oppressed, declaring itself an armed representative of the people.

The "People's New Democracy": The Stalinist Tradition

Interestingly, Sendero Luminoso claims to be a democratic organization. In this context, democracy is defined as the dictatorship of the proletariat, as opposed to the democracy of the bourgeoisie. In the "People's Republic of New Democracy," cares about personal freedoms and individual rights are rejected for their subversive class character. Much of the basis for this outlook is found in the Stalinist structure of PCP-SL as a political party.

Sendero is fundamentally an elitist political entity, and should not be confused with a popular movement (i.e., peasant revolt). "... [T]he Party is not a mass party, though the Party has a mass character. It has a mass character in the sense that while being a select organization—a selection of the best, of the proven, of those, as Stalin said, who

(U.S. Department of State 1996, 1). Insurgent propaganda has responded to this economic growth by declaring that "[a]ll this talk of 'economic recovery' is but an overinflated balloon about to blow up" (Peru People's Movement 1996b, 6).

have what it takes. . .” (Guzmán 1988, 28).⁷ Guzmán’s reference to Stalin is quite significant:

In the 1970's a body of texts invaded the national universities. These manuals were on historical materialism, dialectical materialism and political economy. They were produced for the Soviet Academy of Sciences during the rule of Joseph Stalin. . . . These texts contributed to the creation of a common sentiment . . . [which viewed] the social sciences as a closed system of universal truths . . . [and] which appealed to the “principal of authority” for legitimization. . . . [T]he existence of this common sentiment contributed to . . . the base for the expansion of the Peruvian Communist Party, widely known as “Shining Path” [Trans.]. (Degregori 1990, 103)

The Stalinist origins of the manuals of revolution which were popular in Peru during the PCP-SL’s formative stages should not be forgotten. Before the beginning of the armed struggle, “. . . the Shining Path had discussed the struggle’s social costs. The essential tension . . . between philanthropic intention and objectives and brutal means had been resolved according to Bolshevik and Stalinist tradition” (Gorriti 1995, 317).

Sendero’s Stalinist tendencies can be interpreted as a means for providing the movement with an ideological order absent in much of Peruvian politics. Although

⁷ This interview with Abimael Guzmán was originally published in the Lima newspaper *El Diario*, “[t]wo printings . . . were snapped up by a curious public, but . . . police confiscated all 100,000 copies of the third printing on the slim justification that they didn’t carry the name of the printer, a requirement that had not previously been enforced. Four days later [the editor] Arce [Borja] was detained, resulting in protests from the Peruvian Journalist’s Guild. He was released [over a month later]. . .” (Collett 1988, 16). Furthermore, “*El Diario* was published during the early 1980's as *El Diario de Marka*, a daily of the legal left. It was taken over by Sendero in the late 1980's. Degregori told me in May 1991 that he believes that Sendero’s new interest in public pronouncements had partly to do with the need to compete in Lima with the publicity-minded insurgency of the MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru)” (Starn 1992, 213).

individuals may lack economic or career stability, Gonzalo Thought provides the “scientific ideology” to simplify all issues and provides concrete answers.

Chapter Summary

What role do incongruent aspirations and achievements play in the development of Sendero Luminoso? Peru’s lack of equity combined with economic angst to make Senderismo an attractive ideology. At the same time, the Peruvian Government has complicated matters by inappropriately responding to the needs of the masses. Sendero has presented itself as a Stalinist-like political entity, capable of imposing order and discipline.

The factors cited in this chapter have all been enabling mechanisms in Sendero’s insurgency. Yet, the guerrillas express themselves most directly through violence. Thus, to understand the connection between aspirational deprivation and the appeal of Senderismo, one must examine the armed struggle itself.

Chapter IV

Application of Revolutionary Political Violence

Unhampered by the collapse of what it labels “revisionism” in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, PCP-SL considers itself the vanguard of world communist revolution. Consequently, Sendero Luminoso has had post-cold war appeal by offering violent political empowerment to a small group of politically alienated individuals.¹

This is illustrated in party literature which extols armed struggle as a means of attaining:

. . . communism, the only unsurpassable new society, without exploited or exploiters, without oppressed or oppressors, without classes, without a state, without parties . . . the society of “great harmony,” the radical and definitive new society towards which 15 billion years of matter in motion—that part of eternal matter which we know, has been inevitably and irresistibly heading, but only by propelling the class struggle forward until it reaches the epic heights of people’s war, with guns in the hands of the armed classes and masses of people, and counter-revolutionary war is destroyed forever, imperialism and reaction are overthrown and swept off the face of the earth, and in the shadow of the guns of invincible people’s war . . . society is transformed in all spheres. . . . (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 1987, 13)

For Sendero, all human existence occurs through a party-led people’s war, and its corresponding Chinese Cultural Revolution style communism. Violence facilitates Sendero’s utopia, destroying the perceived injustices of capitalism. Death becomes a

¹ Political alienation has played an important role in the attraction of Sendero Luminoso’s armed struggle. As those with unfulfilled expectations failed to find self-expression through conventional political activities, political alienation has developed. Yet, it is important to note that “. . . the concept is not alienation in general, but a specifically political variant. . .” (Muller and Jukam 1977, 1561).

purification ritual where nonbelievers are purged from the “new state” with Khmer Rouge-like zeal.² Yet, the “Glorious People’s War” has not been a spontaneous event. Years of meticulous party building were invested before the beginning of the armed struggle.

Development of the Mass-Based Insurgency

Sendero has followed many of the organizational doctrines of Maoist mass-based guerrilla warfare developed in the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionary models. Succinctly, the mass-based insurrection is characterized by extensive pre-armed struggle indoctrination of the masses, combined with intensive party development. Theoretically, this is a difficult revolutionary model to organize, although once successfully initiated it is extremely difficult to counter.³ Following the U.S. encounter with the Vietnamese model, American military doctrine declared the mass-based insurrection:

... the most sophisticated insurgency in terms of organization and methods of

² Abimael Guzmán has compared Maoist revolution to Beethoven’s “. . . Ninth Symphony . . . which rises into a crescendo until bursting into a musical explosion. . . . Never before was this pitch reached, but in this century, after many efforts, what was nearly impossible to attain was finally achieved. There is nothing that man cannot accomplish!” (Guzmán 1980a, 2).

³ This point is resonated in PCP-SL propaganda which quoted Senderologist Gordon McCormick’s interview with *Caretas* where he stated “. . . even with the death of Guzmán, SL would still be the best organized political force in Peru” (Arce Borja 1993, 12).

operation. It is difficult to organize, but once under way, it has a high probability of success and is the type of insurgency most likely to require external assistance to defeat. . . . This type of insurgency originated in China under Mao Tse-Tung. Mass-oriented insurgency relies on mobilization of very large numbers of people into an alternative government with many highly specialized political and military agencies. It bases its mobilization on a clear identification of social dysfunctions and an appealing program for social change. (U.S. Department of the Army and the Air force 1990, D-0)

From around 1970 to the 1980 initiation of the armed struggle, Senderistas indoctrinated a number of Peruvians in Gonzalo thought. After sixteen years of insurgency, the movement continues to retain an interest in building a mass base. Still, the guerrillas have failed to persuade large numbers of people to support Senderismo nationwide. In the areas where Sendero was most active, Ayacucho, Apurímac and Huancavelica, propaganda attempted to identify Peru's social dysfunctions. Subsequently, the guerrillas proclaim the virtues of political violence as a means of overcoming social inequalities.

Initiation of the Armed Struggle

After years of extensive party building, Sendero commenced its armed struggle on April 19, 1980. The ceremonious initiation of the people's war occurred as Abimael Guzmán delivered a speech entitled "We Are the Initiators" to graduates of Sendero's First Military School:

As Chairman Mao said: "The storm draws near and the wind roars in the tower."
Thus, the vortex draws near, the vortex begins, and the invincible flame of revolution

grows, converting itself into . . . steel. And from the din of battle along its inextinguishable fires will come forth the light. From the darkness a light will appear and a new world will be born. The old order of reaction crackles, its old boat leaks and sinks in desperation. But comrades, nobody can expect reaction to retire gently. Marx warned us: Even while drowning, the reactionaries were capable of inflicting asphyxiating choke holds and desperate blows in order to see us sink. This is impossible. The reaction has the hyena's dreams of blood. Convulsive dreams shake their somber nights. Their hearts scheme sinister hecatombs. They arm themselves to the teeth but they cannot prevail. Their destiny is weighted and measured. The time has come for the settling of accounts. (Guzmán 1980b, 2)

Guzmán's apocalyptic summons set the stage for the development of an extremely brutal insurrection in the name of "true" communism. Yet, the idea of a provincial college professor leading university-based Maoists along the luminescent path of Mariátegui towards an Andean communist utopia, appeared absurd to many Peruvians;⁴ indeed:

There was, indeed, general scepticism among the rest of the left in 1980, when Sendero launched a campaign of armed actions in the highland department of Ayacucho, a full two years after the last of its supporters had disappeared from the local state university, San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH). The proverbially sectarian *senderistas* had finally been vanquished by other left-wing groups within the university, had lost control of the few mass organizations they had dominated, and were apparently irrelevant to the development of the left in Peru. . . . Sendero Luminoso has nevertheless survived, and even expanded beyond the narrow confines

⁴ Peruvians were not the only ones to underestimate PCP-SL. U.S. intelligence analysis from this period negates the importance of Sendero. One declassified CIA report, entitled "Keeping Terrorism in Check," is typical ". . . recent [terrorist] incidents are not part of a concerted campaign. Some result from violence traditionally associated with the isolated central highlands; others are the acts of small, fanatical, extremist-left groups. . . . The most active of these . . . [is] known as the Shining Path. . . . Despite its announced intention to wage widespread guerrilla warfare, the group has so far confined its activities primarily to attacking isolated police stations, electricity towers, and waterworks. The Shining Path . . . continues to rely heavily on dynamite--which is readily available in Peru's mining regions--rather than weapons. The police have arrested many of the group's cadre, further hindering the group's efforts to expand operations" (Central Intelligence Agency 1981, 25-27).

of the three Andean departments where it launched its 'protracted people's war' in 1980. . . . Its appeal, or at least its effectiveness, is clearly greater than it appeared. . . . (Harding 1988, 65)

What explains SL's improbable growth as a revolutionary movement? The resiliency of this guerrilla movement results from a series of complex social, economic and political factors combined with meticulous party development. One could argue that violence empowers those who perceive themselves as politically and economically impotent. In this way, Sendero can address the needs of a significant minority of the Peruvian population. For some insurgents, the bomb is not only the weapon of the revolution, but a means of personal gratification for the individual bomb thrower.

Senderismo and the *Lucha Armada*

PCP-SL's protracted people's war is not just about establishing control of the Peruvian government, but about changing the way people think, their morals, and characters.

Through the *lucha armada* (armed struggle)⁵ the guerrillas have zealously attempted

⁵ Partially because of government ineptitude, the armed struggle developed into an intense campaign of subversive political violence. "Following Peru's return to civilian rule in 1980, the SL launched increasingly violent attacks against various facilities and persons throughout the country, prompting President Belaunde to declare an emergency zone in SL's major area of operations and eventually to authorize military involvement in counterterrorist operations in December 1982. Since then, despite suffering significant losses, the SL has managed to stage dramatic attacks against police and military facilities, electrical towers, government ministries, foreign embassies, and various businesses. The group has also assassinated increasing numbers of local officials and suspected informants" (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.a, 76).

to mold reality around ideology. One expression of this is that all political articulation outside the party is automatically labeled revisionist, or counterrevolutionary.

Because opposing political parties undermine the legitimacy of SL as the vanguard of social change, their annihilation becomes necessary. Other leftist parties have been labeled "parliamentary cretins," while SL has threatened to kill 40 APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) members "... to mark the seventh anniversary of the beginning of its armed struggle" (U.S. Department of State 1987, 1). Political violence becomes the quintessential means for expressing grievances (real or imagined) against the state.

Peasants who fail to cooperate with the guerrillas, or who form *ronda* self-defense patrols typically become targets of violence and repression. Perceptions of indiscriminate violence by the guerrillas has impeded recruitment among many of Peru's poor. Still, Sendero has been moderately successful at attracting some disenfranchised groups throughout different regions of the country.⁶ An important factor in the continuing draw of SL has been the movement's ideological promise of order. This has been actualized through the organizational ideology and doctrines of

⁶ SL's attraction has varied in concordance with regional levels of political violence. "Between 1980 and 1993 deaths attributable to political violence averaged 3.68 per-hundred inhabitants in Huanta; in Cangallo 2.86 and in La Mar 2.66. . . . If the proportion of victims on the national level had been similar to that of Huanta, there would have been 800,000 Peruvians killed by political violence during these years [Trans.]" (Degregori 1996, 16).

guerra popular (popular war, or people's war).

Organizational Principles

Ideology has dictated many of the organizational doctrines of Sendero Luminoso's protracted people's war.⁷ Nevertheless, ideology has not impeded the party from acting pragmatically in situations that benefit the revolutionaries themselves. At the same time, the guerrillas still remain "ideologically pure" enough to consider themselves above realpolitik.

The strength of Peru's Maoist subversives lies beyond conventional military-style assessments of arms.⁸ Meticulous social development has provided SL with a level of effectiveness unrivaled by many contemporary Latin American insurgencies. Sendero ". . . has sought to work within and 'on' society to create an organizational base that is closely integrated with its constituency" (McCormick 1993, 20). This is in glaring contrast to the *foco* styled *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru* (MRTA), which ". . . measures its own strength and that of its adversaries in conventional military terms

⁷ Party ideology stresses that "[t]he decisive thing is to go to the masses and act together with them. We base ourselves on our ideology, weapons are not principal. Let ideas arm hands, our ideology is the arm that will win victory. That is what we have learned from the great teachers of Marxism" (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 1992, 35).

⁸ According to computer disks kept by Abimael Guzmán, by 1990 Sendero had 23,430 members, but only ". . . 300 combat arms, 500 carbines and 235 revolvers [Trans.]" (*Caretas* 1996a, 38).

and shows little talent for social organization” (McCormick 1993, 20).⁹ Sendero’s emphasis on the importance of social organization is displayed through party documents. “The armed forces [of PCP-SL] started out as armed detachments without arms, because as Lenin taught the lack of arms cannot be used as a pretext for not organizing an armed apparatus. . .” (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1986, 33-34).

While ideology has guided much of the formation of SL, there are instances of guerrillas deviating from the luminescent path of Gonzalo Thought. In the coca rich *Alto Huallaga Valle* (Upper Huallaga Valley) it is widely believed that Senderistas are involved with capitalistic narcotrafficers. The guerrillas allow narcotrafficers to operate in Sendero controlled regions in exchange for a “war tax.” Thus, the quest for world communism has led an anti-capitalistic movement to profit from a lucrative market economy.¹⁰

⁹ Like Sendero, MRTA argues that the Peruvian people “. . . are heirs to a very ancient and glorious past.’ This past is said to encompass more than four centuries of struggle and national resistance’ [*sic*] spanning the ‘heroic resistance of Manco Inca to the Spanish conquest,’ the ‘glorious anticolonial struggle of Túpac Amaru in 1780,’ [and] Peru’s struggle for independence. . .” (McCormick 1993, 8). Recently, MRTA is perhaps most notable to many North Americans because of the arrest of Lori Berenson, of New York, who was sentenced to 20 to 30 years for collaboration with MRTA [Trans.] (*Caretas* 1995a, 30).

¹⁰ For a thorough discussion of this see Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano’s *Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990).

Gonzalo Thought has provided a guideline for the organization and implementation of Sendero's insurgency. At the same time, the ideological "purity" of PCP-SL has not impeded pragmatic dealings to further the people's war. Yet, for the party to be successful in its goals, it must effectively channel the frustrations of the masses.

Mass Support

Senderismo boldly proclaims that "the people's war is a peasant's war or it is nothing [Trans.]" (Mercado 1982, 27). Nonetheless, SL's use of "selective annihilations"¹¹ against peasants has made extensive party building among the masses somewhat problematic. In the words of Abimael Guzmán, "[w]e began to prepare for the bloodbath in 1981 because it had to come" (Guzmán 1988, 45).

Senderista militants often come from the economically frustrated rural middle class.

¹¹ The PCP-SL's newspeak-like euphemism for murder is "selective annihilation." This is demonstrated in *El Diario Internacional's* coverage of: "September Actions. . . . A Maoist annihilation squad killed two police effectives . . . Juan Moisés Ramírez . . . and his chauffeur were annihilated in a Maoist ambush" (Arce Borja 1992a, 8). The insurgents realize that "[b]y focusing their attacks on the police . . . the guerrillas can create significant political problems for . . . [the President] by further souring relations between the President and the police. . ." (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.b, 1). The insurgents have worked for an ". . . escalation of . . . [the] selective assassination campaign aimed at police [and] military" (Central Intelligence Agency 1986, 1). While assassination certainly takes place, there is some question over the degree of selectivity; for example ". . . a PCP-SL unit attacked the community of Huayllao. . . . The massacre resulted in the killing of 47 peasants, including 14 children aged four to 15 [emphasis in original text]" (Amnesty International 1993, 40). This type of action tends to alienate the masses, thus hindering the guerrillas' long term effectiveness.

SL's penetration of several provincial universities facilitated mobilization of this group. At the same time, Peru's lower class masses have circumvented mobilization by PCP-SL or government forces. Indeed, many peasants call Senderistas "... demons or anti-Christis and the armed forces . . . as foreign mercenaries or *pishtacos* [Trans.]" (Degregori 1996, 19).¹²

If Sendero's leadership assumed that widespread misery automatically translates into a receptivity to radicalism, they have been incorrect in their analysis of Peru's revolutionary situation. Sendero Luminoso does not appear to have the support of the nation's poor masses.¹³ Yet, those committed to SL have compensated for their relatively small numbers by an intense devotion to the revolution. This group of extremists has managed to provoke a number of inappropriate reactions from government forces.

¹² A *pishtaco* is mythological Andean vampire-like creature which kills Indians and sells their fat, often to foreigners, to pay off Peru's foreign debt. See Raúl González's "Ayacucho: Sendero y pistacos. Shakespeare en Ayacucho," *Quehacer*, no. 49 (November-December 1987): 63-66; Raúl González, "Ayacucho: de nuevo los degolladores," *Quehacer*, no. 49 (November-December 1987): 67-71. (Because Quechua has no written language, Spanish has attempted to approximate Quechua words using Spanish pronunciations. This seems to be the case with *pishtaco* and *pistaco*, both of which appear to be acceptable spellings).

¹³ In an effort to escape the violence of the "Glorious Armed Struggle" over 570,000 Peruvians have been displaced by political violence (CEPRODEP 1993, 7). Known as *desplazados* (displaced ones), many live in desperate poverty, often begging with their children in cities.

The Peruvian State's Response

Abuses by the Peruvian military's counterinsurgency have aided the insurgents more than virtually any other government action. Unable to differentiate between Senderistas and civilians, the military has responded with a campaign of dirty war. Alienated by government repression, otherwise pacified segments of the population developed a susceptibility to Senderismo.

SL has pursued a relatively successful campaign of high visibility, low risk insurrectional activities. The goal is to undermine popular confidence in the state. CIA analysis confirmed that "... attacks ... by the Sendero Luminoso insurgent group will increase public, military, and opposition criticism of President Belaunde's handling of the problem" (Central Intelligence Agency 1983, 1).¹⁴ This is precisely the desired effect of the guerrilla's armed actions.

While the brutality of the security forces has driven some peasants towards SL, the insurgency has failed to live up to its potential because of its liberal use of violence. Many of the victims of this violence have not been nefarious imperialists, but the

¹⁴ The release date for this information was February 1996, as opposed to 1990 for most other documents of this period. A possible reason for the belated release this text is its implication that insurgent attacks were effectively weakening the Peruvian Government. The report went on to state that "[a]ccording to press reports, the insurgents attacked police headquarters in Ayacucho City and struck several isolated villages throughout the department. Security forces have increased patrols, rounded up suspects-including students from Ayacucho's Huamanga University-and reinforced police units. The press has begun to dispute the government's claim that it has been regaining control of Ayacucho Department in recent months" (Central Intelligence Agency 1983, 1).

masses of Peru's peasantry. Indeed, "... the first ... to be executed (in 1981) were cattle thieves. . . . However, Sendero . . . met with resistance when its cadres attempted to assassinate people whose infractions were deemed minor" (Isbell, in Palmer 1994, 79). Much of Sendero's propensity towards violence comes from its Maoist ideological underpinnings. Molding reality to fit its doctrines of social and political reality, the movement has destroyed that which deviates from Senderismo.

Political Violence and Ideology

One of the most easily overlooked, yet crucial facets of PCP-SL, is its dogmatic ideology of "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism," known as Gonzalo Thought. Party founder Abimael Guzmán developed an ideology which romanticizes political violence as the ultimate expression of proletarian class consciousness.¹⁵ A cardinal dictum of Senderismo is that protracted people's war is used "[t]o advance the democratic

¹⁵ Abimael Guzman claims that "[t]he application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete conditions of Peruvian society leads to the conclusion that revolutionary violence or violent revolution, the only way to seize state power and transform the world, must take the form of people's war and more specifically a peasant war led by the Communist Party of Peru as the representative of the proletariat, a war which develops as a single whole waged principally in the countryside and complementary in the cities, following the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside whose essence is the establishment of a People's Republic, a great victory which much be followed by continuing the revolution through socialism and cultural revolutions, under the dictatorship of the proletariat with the firm exercise of its class violence, until achieving, together with all humanity, glorious communism, the realm of true freedom" (Guzmán 1988, 14).

revolution—to overthrow the exploitation and oppression of imperialism (principally Yankee), bureaucrat capitalism and subsequent semifeudalism—in order to seize state power for the proletariat and the people. . . . A people's war, in essence a peasant war led by the Communist Party" (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1986, 1). The guidance of Gonzalo Thought is actualized through the party's monopoly on leadership of the proletarian revolution.

One could argue that Sendero's claim that it offers the only true path to revolution is an ideologically effective means for suppressing dissent. The party's utopian aspirations are preceded by the need to use violence in a purification ritual which exterminates capitalistic apostates. Party organization and ideological purity combine to improve group effectiveness:

Ideology serves a number of important functions for the revolutionary organization. Perhaps the most significant of these is the role it plays within the organization itself, both as a guide to action and as an instrument of organizational solidarity. Ideology, in this sense, is the conceptual counterpart of the central party. It provides a benchmark for determining the "correct" political line and an objective aid in forging a common position within the group. In the absence of a central party, a common, clearly articulated ideological frame of reference is an essential component of group cohesion. Ideological purity, under these conditions, will confer authority, which can be used in turn to build group unity, establish a hierarchy of command, and, ultimately, employ the movement as a revolutionary force. (McCormick 1993, 54)

Senderismo has an ideological certitude that appeals to those who have little sense of political efficacy. Gonzalo Thought promises an authoritarian utopia to the minority of Peruvians who participate in political violence. At the same time, those who are not

politically correct are labeled counter-revolutionaries, and are often the recipients of the most severe revolutionary justice.

The “Two-Line Struggle”

Following Abimael Guzmán’s 1992 arrest by DINCOTE (National Counter-Terrorism Directorate), he subsequently called for talks with the government. Consequently, the party split along two ideological lines (the “two-line struggle”) over continuance of the guerrilla war. One group, Sendero *Negro* followed Guzmán’s belief in negotiations with the government. Another faction, referred to as Sendero *Rojo*, vowed to continue fighting until the end.¹⁶

Formed under the leadership Oscar Ramírez Durand, (“Comrade Feliciano”), Sendero *Rojo* has continued (as of July 1996) to inflict limited damage on the Peruvian State. During March and April 1996, Sendero *Rojo* participated in seventeen armed actions. Notably, a follower of Guzmán was assassinated in Lima for pursuing peace accords with the government [Trans.] (*Caretas* 1996b, 34).¹⁷ The Emergency Central

¹⁶ Sendero *Rojo*’s position, like that of most revolutionaries and terrorists, is that it is fighting injustice by continuing the armed struggle. “Does the necessity for holding peace talks exist in . . . [Peru]? No basis or necessity exists for this, much less with a government that never tires of submitting the people to hunger and misery” (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1994, 2).

¹⁷ The Senderista murdered, “*Negro José*,” was shot once in the head, twice in the upper-body, and his body dynamited. This was done to encourage others to abandon the “revisionist line”

Committee of Sendero *Rojo* has asserted that those who wish to pursue peace accords are working to undermine the party and the revolution:

The individuals that persist in the slander are a handful of friends of Yankee imperialism and the treacherous and genocidal dictatorship, spreading propaganda that the intelligence service has been circulating since . . . July [1993] as part of the psychological war and today they sinisterly ascribe it to Chairman Gonzalo who is in the most complete isolation and cut off from communication, persisting in their wicked and insane plan of assassinating him and calling in desperation to hold back the 4th military plan and exchange the just and correct slogan we have established "In defense of the leadership, against the genocidal dictatorship!" for one of a "peace accord" by which they show their concentrated hate against Chairman Gonzalo, the Party, the people's war and the people. (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1993, 2)

The pursuance of peace accords by Guzmán and Sendero *Negro* has presented Sendero *Rojo* with the challenge of reinvigorating the revolution. The prospects for PCP-SL overcoming the "two-line struggle" and resuming its revolution appears difficult to gage at this point.¹⁸

Chapter Summary

Despite recent worldwide trends, SL is continuing the struggle for worldwide Marxist

and participate in the armed struggle [Trans.] (*Caretas* 1996, 34).

¹⁸ Attempting to analyze the future of SL is extremely difficult. During the 1980's few people took the movement seriously until they ". . . demonstrated . . . that they . . . [could] carry out dramatic actions even under maximum security conditions" (Central Intelligence Agency [1985?], 1). By the early 1990's many people were concerned over a Sendero victory. Following the capture of Guzmán, many predicted an end to the movement. However, in the four years following the capture of Guzmán, Sendero Luminoso has continued a limited guerrilla campaign.

revolution. Following principles developed in previous mass-based insurgencies, SL developed as a social force before beginning its armed struggle. The movement has concentrated on organizing mass support for its people's war. Nevertheless, widespread backing of the guerrillas has been less than expected (at least by SL). Much of Sendero's support has been generated by the inadequate response fielded by the Peruvian armed forces, which has, consistently brutalized the masses. Does the capture of Guzmán and the ensuing "two line struggle" spell the end of SL? Only time will answer this perplexing question.

Chapter V

Conclusion

One of the issues most frequently raised, explicitly or implicitly, in studies which deal with SL is the relation between unrealized aspirations and the ideological attraction of the movement. Yet, few works postulate at length on this issue. This study has provided a brief foray into the various factors which link aspirational deprivation and the ideological appeal of Sendero Luminoso.

The evidence presented here bolsters the argument that a combination of disenfranchised individuals¹ with a disciplined party organization capable of focusing discontent contributed to the growth of Sendero Luminoso. Without this unique amalgamation of factors it is unlikely that SL would have progressed as a mass-based insurgency; concordantly:

The potency of ideological innovations . . . [have] been reinforced by organizational devices that mobilize followings, keep them in being, and allow thoughtful strategic actions instead of impulsive mob violence. That is not to say that conspiratorial organizations alone can make insurgencies—nor the converse, that insurgencies can be suppressed by calculated force. Organization harnesses the grievances and fantasies of the oppressed, as revolutionary ideology gives them expression. (Desai and Eckstein 1990, 458)

¹ Disenfranchisement is particularly acute for moderately educated provincial Peruvians. "Young people find themselves in a no-man's land between two worlds: on the one hand, the traditional Andean world of their parents whose myths, rites, customs they no longer fully share, and on the other hand, the Western world, or more precisely the urban, criollo one, a world which rejects them as provincials, mestizos, speakers of Quechua" (Degregori 1991, 241).

Senderismo dictates that social grievances are best addressed through the use of party directed political violence. The “scientific ideology” of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo Thought asserts that political violence without the dictatorship of the party is reactionary. Similarly, the utopia of a communist world becomes achievable only through the party and its politically correct ideology.

Senderismo’s violence appeals to those who perceive their goals as unattainable through conventional channels. Under the right circumstances, the frustration which arises from incongruent aspirations and achievements is translatable to political violence. One may hypothesize that individuals with expectations of success which is unfulfilled perceive a greater loss, and concordantly higher level of frustration, than those with lower expectations:

... we may postulate that perception of increasing relative gratification will produce a greater readiness for political violence than perception of no change because the person who sees himself as doing better now or in the future will desire to insure that such increased satisfaction actually is maintained or attained. And if a person believes that his gains could turn out to be ephemeral, than the desire to insure that one gets what one expects, by those who expect to have more to loose, will be as much as an impetus to political violence as will dissatisfaction generated by perception of decreasing relative gratification on the part of those who expect to have less and less to loose. (Grofman and Muller 1973, 538)

One study found that 29 percent of those convicted as terrorists in Peru have attended

a university without obtaining a degree (Chávez de Paz 1989, 41).² Sendero's beginnings as a university movement undoubtedly contributed to this high percentage. Yet, the movement's attraction long after it was marginalized at UNSCH suggests that there could be more complex factors at work here. These factors include a combination of social and political determinants which combined in the formation of an extremely violent political movement.

This essay offers no solutions for the complex problems of Peru. Instead, it has highlighted a correlation between cause and effect. Future investigation of the relationship between aspirational deprivation and the ideological appeal of PCP-SL is unequivocally warranted. For example, research of SL as a vehicle of empowerment for women,³ the underemployed and traditionally oppressed racial groups would make a substantial contribution to the literature. A weakness in some previous works has been the tendency to prescribe simplistic solutions for Peru's complex problems. Uninsightful analysis only compounds the problem of Sendero Luminoso.

² Interestingly, almost five percent of convicted terrorists held professional titles or post-graduate studies. Contrastingly, only one point five percent of narcotraffickers have attained this level of education (Chávez de Paz 1989, 41).

³ This is not meant to suggest that the role of women in SL has been completely unexplored. See, Carol Andreas, "Women at War," in *Fatal Attraction: Peru's Shining Path* (NACLA: Report on the Americas, vol. XXIV, No. 4, December/January, 1990-1991); Robin Kirk, *Grabado en piedra: Las mujeres de Sendero Luminoso* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1993).

Appendix A

Glossary

APRA: *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*, (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) former President Alán García's Political party. It was founded in the 1930's by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre.

Campeño: Peasant (lacks much of the negativity associated with the English translation).

FIR: *Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Front of the Left). A Trotskyist guerrilla movement led by Hugo Blanco in the 1960's.

Foco: Cuban inspired revolutionary theory where the guerrillas are the "focus" of revolution.

Gonzalo Thought: Abimael Guzmán's (a.k.a. "President Gonzalo") blend of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, principally Maoism and the writings of José Carlos Mariátegui. Gonzalo Thought is the ideology PCP-SL.

MIR: *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left). A militant splinter group of the APRA party.

Movimiento Popular Perú: A pro-Sendero organization which opposes RCP-USA and the RIM. In the U.S. it is based in Queens, NY and publishes a magazine called *The New Flag*.

MRTA: *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru* (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement).

PCP: *Partido Comunista del Perú* (Communist Party of Peru), a.k.a. Sendero Luminoso. Peruvian Marxist-Leninist-Maoist largely rural-based insurgents.

RCP-USA: Revolutionary Communist Party, USA. A minuscule Maoist political party led by Chairman Bob Avakian that publishes *Revolutionary Worker* and various other publications. RCP-USA is united with Sendero in the RIM.

RIM: Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. A loose grouping of Maoist revolutionary communist parties, including the PCP. It publishes *A World to Win* in various languages, and appears to be based in London.

UNSCH: Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga. The university where Abimael Guzmán began Sendero Luminoso. It is located in the impoverished Andean Department of Ayacucho.

Appendix B

Peruvian Political History

1532

Spanish colonialism begins in Peru with Pizarro's ambush of the Inca Atahualpa.

1560s

Indians who believe themselves possessed by spirits predict the expulsion of the Spanish and the Christian God during the *Taki Onqoy* (dancing sickness) movement.

1720-1790

Over one-hundred Indian rebellions are launched against Spanish rule. Perceived as a threat to white supremacy, they all are violently suppressed.

1742

Juan Santos Atahualpa launches a messianic insurrection against Spanish rule. This rebellion serves as a forerunner for Túpac Amaru's insurrection a half century later.

1820-1824

Despite Peru's War of Independence, little changes for the Indian masses.

1881

Peru and Bolivia are defeated by Chile in the War of the Pacific. Some whites collaborate with the Chilean invaders in the suppression of Indians.

1895-1899

The Piérola government launches a campaign to build schools, hospitals and improve the infrastructure of Peru. Still, racial stratification remains a feature of Peruvian society.

1924

Peruvian Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre founds the Popular Revolutionary Alliance of America (APRA) in Mexico. APRA calls for an "anti-imperialist front" throughout Latin America.

1919-1930

The Leguía government works to end the exploitation of peasant communities by recognizing their legal rights. Nonetheless, a fear of communism prevents fundamental change. Following the stock market crash in 1929, Leguía is replaced by strongmen Luís Sánchez Cerro and Oscar Benavides.

1932

APRA initiates an insurrection in an attempt to overthrow populist dictator Luis Sánchez Cerro. The insurrectionists are suppressed as hundreds of APRA members are executed.

1956-1964

Peru witnesses the largest peasant movements in South America. While the peasant's motto is "land or death," few are actually killed.

1961

Hugo Blanco establishes the Trotskyist *Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Front of the Left, or FIR). The FIR seeks to create peasant unrest and begin armed struggle. Most of FIR's activities are limited to the department of Cusco.

1962

Héctor Béjar Rivera and other former members of the Peruvian Communist Party found the *foco* style *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (Army of National Liberation or ELN). The guerrillas are mostly intellectuals and students who never gain the support of the rural masses. Around the same time, a splinter group of the APRA Party, the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, or MIR) begins a guerrilla war under the direction of Luis de la Puente Uceda.

1963

Hugo Blanco is arrested by Peruvian police, leaving the FIR largely ineffective.

1965

Héctor Béjar Rivera is arrested by police and held until 1970. The ELN's lack of mass support plays an important role in its 1965 defeat. With roughly 100 cadre, the MIR is easily pacified by the government's counterinsurgency. The small *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* (Revolutionary Vanguard, or VR) is founded by dissident members (mostly intellectuals) of the APRA party. VR advocates a mass movement against the

government, which it fails to organize.

1968

Obstructed by conservatives in Parliament, President Fernando Belaúnde is unable to fully implement his promised nationalization of the oil wells of International Petroleum Company (IPC).

October 3: General Juan Velasco stages a coup, declaring the rule of the "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces." Velasco undertakes the nationalization of IPC and extensive agricultural reforms. He also begins the restriction of political parties and freedom of expression.

1975

A military *junta* deposes Velasco and begins a series of counter-reforms. Elements of the MIR establish the *foco* styled *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru*, which advocates a combination of parliamentary and armed actions.

1977-1978

In response to the military government's counter-reforms, several teacher and student walkouts cumulate in Peru's first national strikes.

1980

The return to the civilian government of President Fernando Belaúnde is marred by Sendero Luminoso's initiation of the armed struggle. As debates over the reinstatement of the death penalty for subversives rage in congress, former guerrilla Hugo Blanco runs as a candidate for president.

1985

The APRA candidate, populist Alan García wins the presidential election. Subsequently, the government is mired by corruption and links to the right-wing Rodrigo Franco death squad.

1988

Inflation reaches 1,800 percent.

1990

Alberto Fujimori of the *Cambio 90* party wins the presidential election.

1992

April 5: Fujimori suspends the constitution and abolishes congress in a bloodless coup supported by the military.¹

1993

Time magazine declares Fujimori its “Man of the Year in Latin America” [Trans.] (DESCO 1994e).

¹ “Máximo San Román . . . was Fujimori’s vice president until the coup, at which time the disbanded Congress elected him president. . .” (Americas Watch 1993, 1).

Appendix C

Pre-Armed Struggle Chronology of Senderismo¹

1894 or 1895

José Carlos Mariátegui is born in Lima.

1914

With little formal schooling, Mariátegui begins writing under the pen name of "Juan Croniqueur."

1917

The socialist newspaper *La Razón* is founded by Mariátegui.

1919

Peruvian President Augusto B. Leguia shuts down *La Razón*, and suggests that Mariátegui take a sabbatical in Europe.

1923

Mariátegui returns to Peru.

1926

Mariátegui founds and edits the Marxist journal *Amauta*.

1928

Mariátegui publishes *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, and founds the Communist Party of Peru.

1930

Death of Mariátegui.

¹ Sources for this section come from Peter Stern, *Sendero Luminoso: An Annotated bibliography of the Shining Path Guerrilla Movement, 1980-1993* (New Mexico: SALALM Secretariat, 1995); Peter Johnson, "The Consistency of a Revolutionary Movement: Peru's Sendero Luminoso and Its Texts, 1965-1986," in Michael T. Martin and Terry R. Kandal's *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

1934

Abimael Guzmán Reynoso (“Chairman Gonzalo”) is born in Mollendo.

1953

Guzmán completes his two theses, one on Kant’s philosophy of space, the other on the bourgeois democratic state, and graduates from *Universidad Nacional San Agustín* in Arequipa.

1962

Guzmán begins teaching the philosophy of education at the *Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga* (UNSCH).

1964

Mirroring the Sino-Soviet Split, Guzmán’s pro-Chinese faction splits from the pro-Moscow PCP leadership, and forms the *Partido Comunista Peruano-Bandera Roja* (PCP-BR).

1965-1967?

Guzmán travels to China during the Cultural Revolution to study Marxism, politics, and military tactics.

1970

PCP-BR expels Guzmán for “leftist opportunism.” Guzmán then forms the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path.

1970-1977

Guzmán’s position in the UNSCH administration combines with the college’s unique outreach programs to aid in recruitment of future guerrillas.

1975

Peoples’ schools for political education are established in the department of Ayacucho.

1978

PCP-SL party leadership goes underground.

1979

The *Partido Comunista del Perú—Sendero Luminoso* holds its First Conference.

Appendix D

Chronology of Political Violence

1980

March-April: *Inicio de lucha armada-ILA* or beginning of armed struggle (Stern, P. 1995, xxiii).

May: Sendero's first violent action, the burning of ballot boxes in Chuschi, Cangallo province, Ayacucho. The political objective is to boycott the general elections of 1980 [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 809).

November: Minister of the Interior José María de la Jara declares that Peru is encountering acts of sabotage, not a wave of terrorism [Trans.] (ibid., 370).

December: A state of emergency is declared in Ayacucho (Stern, P. 1995, xxiii).

Yearly Summary: Three people are estimated to have been killed in political violence during 1980 [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 36, 37).

1981

January: In Huamanga, Ayacucho there are fifteen explosions targeted at public buildings [Trans.] (ibid., 815). Sinchis (anti-terrorist para-military police) go to Ayacucho to combat Sendero (Stern, P. 1995, xxiii).

March: Guerrillas burn a church library in Lima. The office of ElectroPeru is dynamited [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 817).

October: Sendero attacks police posts in Tambo (Stern, P. 1995, xxiii). A State of Emergency is declared in Ayacucho (Johnson 1989, 291).

Yearly Summary: During 1981 there are between four to seven deaths related to political violence [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 36, 37).

1982

March: A prison break frees 247 Sendero Luminoso suspects, including nineteen year old Edith Largos from an Ayacucho prison. Sendero dynamites Lima power lines, and

blacks out Lima for the first time (Johnson 1989, 291).

July: Sendero begins public executions of government officials, merchants, peasant and labor leaders (ibid.). The U.S. Embassy, the offices of Coca-Cola, and the home of the British Ambassador are dynamited [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 834, 835).

August: An experimental farm at Allpachaca is destroyed by guerrillas (Johnson 1989, 291). In Jaén province, Senderistas take over a high school and teach classes [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 837).

September: A college professor in Cangallo is assassinated for refusing to read a pro-PCP-SL proclamation to his students [Trans.] (ibid., 841). There is a major public funeral procession in Ayacucho for Senderista Edith Largos, killed by government forces (Stern, P. 1995, xxiv).

December: The execution of twenty-one civilian and government officials in Ayacucho results in the declaration of martial law and entry of the army (Johnson 1989, 291).

Yearly Summary: There are between 128 to 170 deaths related to political violence during 1982 [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 36, 37).

1983

January: Eight journalists are murdered by government supported villagers in Uchuraccay (Stern, P. 1995, xxiv).

April: In the province of Víctor Fajardo, sixty-seven peasants from Lucanamarca are murdered. In the same province, forty-five peasants, including ten children from various districts are killed by PCP-SL [Trans.] (DESCO, 856).

August: Twenty-seven members of the Senderista leadership are captured (Johnson 1989, 292).

November: Senderistas murder mayor Victor Arias in Cerro de Pasco (ibid., 292). The headquarters of Acción Popular is bombed to intimidate voters. Insurgents attempt to bomb the barracks of the U.S. Marines stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Lima. Newspapers in Bolivia are dynamited by "Sendero Luminoso, Bolivia." [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 876, 877).

Yearly Summary: Various estimates place the number of casualties between 2,807 to 3,177 for 1983. Most victims are unarmed noncombatants [Trans.] (ibid., 36, 37).

1983-84: *Roundas campesinas* (peasant "self defense" patrols) are established in the sierra (Stern, P. 1995, xxiv).

1984

January: Presumed insurgents murder forty peasants in Urancancha [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 883).

April: Antonio Díaz Martínez, head of the *comando político-militar* of Sendero Luminoso, is arrested (Johnson 1989, 292). The home of the U.S. Ambassador is bombed in Lima [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 888).

June: MRTA begins its guerilla war (Stern, P. 1995, xxiv). There is a question over whether MRTA is responsible for bombs thrown at the Bank of La Victoria in Lima. [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 892).

July: The Peruvian Army is given direct control over combating internal subversion (Johnson 1989, 292). Forty peasants are murdered for collaborating with the police in La Mar province [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 894).

August: In Cangallo, Víctor Fajardo and Huanta fifty-one peasants, including fifteen children are murdered. In Huanta province, fifty civilians are killed, some corpses show marks from torture. A confrontation with the armed forces leaves thirty-five peasants dead [Trans.] (ibid., 901, 903).

Yearly Summary: Estimates place the number of people killed in political violence during 1984 between 3,704 to 4,319 [Trans.] (ibid., 36, 37).

1985

February: A confrontation in Lima leaves sixty-five civilians dead. Senderistas or paramilitaries kill thirty-five noncombatants in Leoncio Prado [Trans.] (ibid., 921).

March: In the province of Leoncio Prado, thirty-five mutilated corpses are discovered [Trans.] (ibid., 922).

July: The lieutenant governor in Ayacucho is decapitated after a public trial (Johnson 1989, 294).

August: Peruvian Army troops murders sixty-nine peasants from the town of Accomarca. In the same area, thirty corpses are found shortly later [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 937, 938).

Yearly Summary: During 1985 there are between 1,200 to 1,359 deaths related to political violence in Peru [Trans.] (ibid., 36, 37).

1986

March: Four professors in Santiago de Chuco receive summary executions from a Senderista "people's court" [Trans.] (ibid., 955).

June: Sendero destroys associated agricultural enterprises in Puno. PCP-SL inmates in Lima and Callao prisons (Lurigancho, "El Frontón" and "Santa Bárbara") riot; large numbers of prisoners (124, 115? and two respectively) are killed by the military [Trans.] (ibid., 956). Senderista propaganda later refers to the riots as the "Day of Heroism." (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 1986, 32).¹

July: The Embassy of the USSR is bombed in Lima. In Huanta province, a "burro bomb" explodes [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 969, 971).

September: A government patrol of Sinchis open fire on a peasant family celebrating a birthday party, killing twelve civilians [Trans.] (ibid., 976).

Yearly Summary: By the end of 1986, between 1,268 to 1,274 people have been murdered in acts of political violence. Most victims are noncombatants [Trans.] (ibid., 36, 37).

¹ The subversive ideological line asserts that "[t]he reaction took sinister aim against the prisoners of war and planned their genocidal annihilation. . . . [T]he prisoners of war rose up in rebellion against the new genocide under way" (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 1986, 33). This style of rationalization is typical of PCP-SL propaganda which has used the riots as a rallying point in their insurrection.

1987

January: The mayor of the district of Hongos, province of Yauyos, is captured by twenty Senderistas and later traded for food (Johnson 1989, 295). The Indian Embassy in Lima is bombed. In Lima, César López Silva, national director of PAP (Peruvian Aprista Party) is assassinated in front of his home [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 986, 987).

April: The secretary general of the PAP for the district of Corpangui is shot to death by Senderistas. Government forces murder ninety-seven peasants, including forty-two children, in Hierbabuena, Huamanga province [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 996).

Yearly Summary: Between 697 and 941 casualties of mostly civilians are estimated for 1987 [Trans.] (ibid., 36, 37).

1988

May: Sendero stages its Labor Day parade in Lima to celebrate the "Day of the Worker" (Stern, P. 1995, xxiv).

June: Two U.S. AID employees are assassinated in Huancayo [Trans.] (DESCO, 1045). PCP-SL's "number two," Osmán Morote is captured (Stern, P. 1995, xxiv).

July: *El Diario* publishes the "Interview of the century" with "President Gonzalo." The *Comando Rodrigo Franco* death squad assassinates Morote's defense lawyer (ibid.).

November-December: Sendero sacks and destroys the SAIS [*Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social*] Cahuide farms (Stern, P. 1995, xxiv).

Human Cost of Political Violence: The death toll for 1988 is estimated at 1,986 mostly noncombatants [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 37).

1989

January: Sendero "generated organisms" call for armed strikes in Lima's industrial zones (Stern, P. 1995 xxiv).

March: The Uchiza police post, in the Upper Huallaga Valley is overrun by PCP-SL (ibid.).

November: Víctor Taype, president of the National Federation of Metallurgical Workers, is detained and tortured by police (Americas Watch 1990, 72-73). Sendero's newspaper *El Diario* is shut down because it calls for the assassination of several public figures and glorifies Sendero's execution of municipal candidates (ibid., 71).

Yearly Summary: During 1989 Sendero has murdered 1,526, MRTA has killed 161, *Comando Rodrigo Franco* eleven, unidentified terrorist groups 153, "narcotrafficers" 127, police forces 342, armed forces 886 (Americas Watch 1990, 22).

1990

March: An "armed strike" is called by Sendero in Lima (Stern, P. 1995, xxiv).

April: There is an assault launched on the Santa Lucía antinarcotics base (U.S. operated Vietnam style base) in the Upper Huallaga Valley (ibid.).

July: Forty-five MRTA guerrillas escape from prison (ibid.).

August: Economic austerity measures ("Fujishock") are announced (ibid.).

Yearly Summary: Sendero is responsible for slightly less than half the estimated 3,452 deaths related to political violence in 1990 (Americas Watch 1991, 6). According to government statistics, there are 1,429 insurgents captured in 1990 (*El Peruano* 1995, A3).

1991

February: A raid on a safe house in Lima yields video tape of a tipsy Guzmán dancing like a Peruvian "Zorba the Greek." (Stern, P. 1995, xxv).

May-June: "Red Month": Senderistas launch waves of urban bombings and blackouts (ibid.).

May: Thirty men, women and children are killed by PCP-SL in the Unión Alto Saniveri settlement. San Ramón de Pangoa community, in the district of San Martín de Pangoa (Amnesty International 1993, 39).

June: Sendero declares "strategic equilibrium" (Stern, P. 1995, xxv). Senderistas assassinate the leader of the *Federación Departamental de Campesinos de Puno* [Puno

Departmental Federation of Peasants] (Americas Watch 1991, 27).

August: Sixteen men, women and children from the community of Iquicha, near Uchuraccay, Huanta province, are murdered by government forces (Amnesty International 1992, 34).

Yearly Summary: One estimate places the total number of deaths for 1991 at 3,106. Between 1981 and 1991 roughly 5,419 people are "disappeared." By January 1992, over 4,000 of these remain unresolved (*ibid.*, 1). Mostly because of political violence, Peru's internally displaced population is estimated to be around 200,000 (Kirk 1993, 1). The Peruvian Government claims that 696 subversives are captured during the year (*El Peruano* 1995, A3).

1992

February 15: Sendero murders community activist María Elena Moyano. (Stern, P. 1995, xxv).

March: The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs holds hearings on PCP-SL (United States Congress 1992a, 1).

April-October: At least twenty-six people are "disappeared" by government security forces. Of these, twenty-two are later found dead and four remain "disappeared" (Amnesty International 1993, 22).

May: Senderistas battle police in Canto Grande; fifty prisoners die (Stern, P. 1995, xxv).

July: Hooded soldiers "disappear" a number of university students at La Cantuta. Following the trial, a Peruvian court questions the very existence of the "disappeared" (Americas Watch 1993, 2). A large car bomb devastates Miraflores, a wealthy Lima suburb (Stern, P. 1995, xxv).

September: Abimael Guzmán is arrested in his safe house above a ballet studio in Lima. Shortly thereafter, he delivers an unrepentant speech before the press. Sendero is now headed by Oscar Alberto Ramírez Durand, known as "Comrade Feliciano" [Trans.] (*La República* 1992b, 2). The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, again holds hearings on Sendero

Luminoso (United States Congress 1992b, 1).

October: Guzmán is sentenced to life imprisonment on the island of San Lorenzo [Trans.] (*La República* 1992a, 2).

Yearly Summary: Amnesty International estimates that eighty-five percent of Peru's human rights violations are committed by government forces (Amnesty International 1992, 1). The overall death toll for 1992 is approximately 2,756. About sixty percent are killed in armed clashes, while thirty percent are murdered in cold blood (Americas Watch 1993, 9). Official estimates claim that 2,861 insurgents are captured during 1992 (*El Peruano* 1995, A3).

1993

October: Guzmán offers to negotiate with the Peruvian government, causing PCP-SL to split into two factions (the "two-line struggle"). A group of pro-Sendero agitators attempts to interrupt a presentation being given by Fujimori in New York [Trans.] (*ibid.* 1993b). North Americans from the Revolutionary Communist Party-USA contact Senderistas in Ayacucho to offer political and economic support [Trans.] (*Expreso* 1994, A3)

November: A law of repentance has encouraged 1,300 terrorists to cease insurgent activities [Trans.] (*ibid.* 1993a).

December: Two-hundred Senderistas imprisoned in Chorrillos write a letter to Fujimori accepting the orders of Abimael Guzmán to cease belligerence [Trans.] (*ibid.*).

Yearly Summary: Insurgent and government forces continue to violate the laws of war. Of the 443 persons judged by military tribunals, 420 are found guilty, with sixty-five percent receiving the maximum penalty, life imprisonment [Trans.] (*ibid.* 1994f). There are supposedly 5,413 insurgents captured by government forces during the year [Trans.] (*El Peruano* 1995, A3).

1994

April: Their armed forces are alleged to have used dirty war (i.e. widespread torture and rape) during Operation "Aries" in the coca rich Upper Huallaga Valley [Trans.] (DESCO 1994d).

May: The military declares that Operation "Aries" has effected 40 percent of SL forces in the Upper Huallaga Valley [Trans.] (ibid. 1994c).

July: There is some question over whether Abimael Guzmán has changed his mind on the renouncement of armed struggle [Trans.] (ibid. 1994b).

Yearly Summary: There were 1,200 trials for the crime of terrorism in Peruvian courts in 1994, of these, 1,083 were sentenced. Despite setbacks, Feliciano's Sendero *Rojo* continues the armed struggle [Trans.] (ibid. 1994a). The Peruvian Government alleges that 4,631 insurgents were captured during the year, bringing the total to 15,030 since 1990 (*El Peruano* 1995, A3).

1995

March: Margie Clavo Peralta, "Comrade Nancy," an important leader of the Emergency Central Committee of Sendero Luminoso, is captured by DINCOTE. Several other "comrades" are arrested as well [Trans.] (*Expreso* 1995, A12).

May: Sendero detonates a car bomb with between 70 to 100 kilos of dynamite in front of the Hotel María Angola in Lima's upscale district of Miraflores, killing five people [Trans.] (*El Comercio* 1995, A8).

July: President Fujimori states that "... sooner or later ... [Oscar Ramírez Durand] will be captured dead or alive [Trans.]" (DESCO 1995a).

1996

May: In the Villa El Salvador section of Lima, Senderistas from Feliciano's faction assassinate a follower of Guzmán who favors the peace process [Trans.] (*Caretas* 1996b).

June: One of the "ambassadors" of Sendero Luminoso abroad, Julián Salazar Calero is detained by the FBI in New York City to be extradited to Peru for the crime of terrorism [Trans.] (DESCO 1996a).

July: Two car bombs explode in Lima, one 200 meters from the *Palacio de Gobierno* [Trans.] (*Caretas* 1996c).

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