

President Clinton's Crisis Rhetoric and the Post-Cold War World:
A Dramatistic Perspective

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Chapter 1:

Introduction, Problem and Method

Presidential rhetoric has become an important field of study for scholars. Political scientists as well as communication researchers have long been interested in the role of presidential speech. Particularly in the mass media age, what presidents say has a great influence on our nation's domestic and foreign affairs (Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, & Bessette, 1981). Presidents can communicate directly with the public using radio and television, and their words can be carried via journalists to the public through a variety of newspapers, magazines and other media outlets. The purposes of this presidential rhetoric are many: to inform the public of policy initiatives, to persuade the public to support these policies, and often to engender support for military action in foreign lands (Bostdorff, 1994; Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986; Stuckey, 1995; Stuckey & Antczak, 1998; Windt, 1983). Presidents use the mass media to appeal directly to the American public in order to announce or justify military action in times of crisis – so much so that scholars have labeled “crisis rhetoric” as a specific genre of presidential discourse. From the end of World War II until the 1990's, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union served as an important factor in presidential crisis rhetoric (Ivie, 1997; Kane, 1991; Medhurst, 1997; Scott, 1997; Wander, 1984/1997).

Bill Clinton is the first president since World War II who has not had the Cold War as a backdrop against which to paint his vision of foreign policy and military involvement. The fall of the Soviet Union brought about many economic, social and political changes around the world (Cole, 1999; LaFeber, 1994; Stuckey, 1995), and it is therefore important to ask several questions regarding presidential crisis rhetoric. Without the Soviet Union as our arch-rival, how

justified military action in times of crisis? Are there other metaphors or ideological justifications besides the Cold War or the “fight” between communism and democracy? As Clinton’s presidency winds down, scholars can begin to look at his rhetoric and to begin to answer these and other questions. This study looks at President Clinton’s crisis rhetoric from a dramatic/metaphoric perspective in order to determine what justifications for military action he uses (and other presidents might use in the future) now that the Cold War has ended.

Literature Review

Rhetoric and the Presidency

Presidential Rhetoric has been studied from several different perspectives. Medhurst (1996) categorizes these perspectives into two main categories. One perspective looks at the presidency as an arena in which rhetoric takes place; this is typically the domain of communication scholars. The other looks at the institution of the presidency and how it has been changed by the use of rhetoric; this, he says, has typically been the focus of political scientists. Stuckey and Antczak (1998) agree that scholars from different disciplines have tended to focus on different aspects of presidential discourse, with communication scholars focusing on persuasion while political scientists focus on the impact of each president on the office of the presidency itself. Medhurst (1996) labels the first perspective “presidential rhetoric” and the second “the rhetorical presidency.” They are by no means mutually exclusive, as we shall see, and scholars from different fields do not always limit themselves to one or the other, but they serve to delineate the different lines of research.

Presidential rhetoric. The study of presidential rhetoric, according to Medhurst (1996), is concerned with the dynamics of human persuasion. The principal area of study is rhetoric; the presidency provides the situation within which the rhetoric takes place. Thus, scholars who

approach presidential discourse from this perspective will investigate and explain certain phenomena rather than others. Studies from this perspective typically focus on the strategies used by presidents to communicate with the public.

Stuckey and Antczak (1998) point out that presidential communication has increased dramatically in the twentieth century, particularly since World War II and the popularization of the electronic media. Prior to the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, presidents' roles as public speakers consisted mainly of ceremonial duties and the articulation of American values (Fairbanks, 1981; Hart, 1977). These two presidents assumed more aggressive roles as public speakers and campaigners, thus altering the public persona of the presidency (Tulis, 1987). With the invention of radio and television, presidents began to communicate directly with the public as never before (Stuckey, 1991). The change in the persona of the presidency and changes in the mass media have contributed to a different kind of rhetoric and different rhetorical strategies (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Hart, 1987; Stuckey, 1991). Thus, in the last half of this century, presidents have had more opportunities and more reasons for addressing the American public.

Campbell and Jamieson (1990) say that the rhetoric of presidents is strongly influenced by precedent. The lines of argument available to presidents and the timing of their speeches, they say, are narrowed by the expectations of the public based on what other presidents have done. Thus, the rhetorical situation creates certain acceptable parameters for presidential rhetoric. If reliance on precedent is one strategy, so too is reliance on the office itself. Zernicke (1990) says that presidents use their office and its various roles strategically as a means of persuasion. By reminding the public of their responsibility as leader of the nation, presidents are able to generate credibility and establish themselves as symbols of national unity, thereby

In other words, in order to accomplish domestic or foreign policy goals, presidents can “invoke” their title in an effort to appear more like statesmen and less like politicians. Invoking precedent and invoking the office, then, are two important rhetorical strategies used by presidents today.

While at times presidents use their prominence as a source of credibility, at other times they use the strategy of anonymity. Presidents often covertly disseminate information by attributing rhetoric to unidentified sources, thereby circumventing the public forum and communicating untoward or self-serving messages (Erickson & Fleuriet, 1991). By attributing information to anonymous sources, Erickson and Fleuriet say, journalists help presidents to avoid taking responsibility for their rhetoric and, by extension, their actions.

We have only discussed a few of the strategies used by modern presidents to persuade the public. Since the time of FDR, presidents have sought to use these strategies, and others, for political gain; they have sought the public via the mass media not simply as an audience with which to share their ideas, but as a tool for governance (Stuckey & Antczak, 1998). In order to understand this, we turn to the concept of the rhetorical presidency.

The rhetorical presidency. According to Medhurst (1996), the primary concern of those working with the construct of the rhetorical presidency has been largely institutional. Studies of the rhetorical presidency typically seek to explain how presidential rhetoric has changed our system of government. The “rhetorical presidency” is a term coined by Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, and Bessette (1981) which describes the modern presidency as one in which rhetoric is used as a principal tool of governance. Presidents appeal directly to the people in order to create support for various policies and actions, thereby putting pressure on the legislative branch (and sometimes the judicial branch) to support presidential initiatives and actions (Ceaser et al., 1981; Medhurst, 1996; Tulis, 1996; Stuckey & Antczak, 1998). In the words of Tulis (1996),

Medhurst, 1996; Tulis, 1996; Stuckey & Antczak, 1998). In the words of Tulis (1996),
Nineteenth-century presidents directed their rhetoric principally toward Congress
in written messages that framed their partisan preferences in self-consciously
constitutional language. By contrast, twentieth-century presidents regularly
appeal over the heads of Congress in oral performance designed for popular
appeal. (p. 4)

Ceaser et al. (1981) say that the rise of the rhetorical presidency came about due to three
factors: (a) a change in the doctrine of leadership, (b) the mass media, and (c) modern
campaigns. As mentioned previously, Woodrow Wilson was one of the first presidents to use
public speaking aggressively in an attempt to generate public opinion (Ceaser et al., 1981; Tulis,
1987). This new style of leadership, facilitated by the mass media, led to the prominence of
presidential rhetoric and the idea that words, not power or action, constitute presidential
leadership (Ceaser et al., 1981; Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Medhurst, 1996; Stuckey &
Antczak, 1998; Tulis, 1987). Finally, a third factor in the rise of the rhetorical presidency was
the campaign style pioneered by Wilson and the Progressives who believed that the candidates,
not the parties, should be the main rhetorical instruments of elections; thus, politics became
more personal and presidents and presidential candidates were endowed with greater rhetorical
power (Ceaser et al., 1981; Jamieson, 1988).

Scholars who approach the rhetoric of presidents from this paradigm are concerned with
how presidents have used rhetoric to achieve specific political goals. The focus is on the
institution of the presidency and how its occupants have changed its nature. Specific aspects of
the presidency which have been studied from this perspective include the president's ceremonial
role (Kellerman, 1984), the role of the mass media in presidential rhetoric (Denton, 1989;

Gronbeck, 1995; Jamieson, 1988), and the president's relationship with Congress (Chester, 1981).

In short, the rhetorical presidency is a concept which has been used to explain the nature of presidential rhetoric from the perspective that presidents appeal to the public in order to gain support with Congress that they otherwise might not have. By "going public," presidents often succeed in generating favorable public opinion on a variety of issues. One specific area in which presidents appeal directly to the public in an attempt to influence Congress to support executive activities is in the arena of what communication scholars have labeled "crisis rhetoric."

Crisis Rhetoric

Kiewe (1994) defines crisis rhetoric as "the discourse initiated by decision makers in an attempt to communicate to various constituents that a certain development is critical and to suggest a certain course of action to remedy the critical situation" (p. xvii). Presidential crisis rhetoric, Kiewe says, consists of the discourse created between the president, the press and the public that serves to legitimize or delegitimize a situation as critical. The definition of what constitutes a crisis is determined by the president – political or international crises, therefore, are primarily rhetorical in nature (Bostdorff, 1991, 1994; Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986; Kiewe, 1994; Windt, 1983). In other words, certain situations may or may not exist in the world, but they do not become crises until presidents describe them as such. Finally, the "action" taken to remedy the "critical situation" is often military in nature; thus, crisis rhetoric is used by presidents to justify military action. The literature on crisis rhetoric typically focuses on this aspect (see, for example, Bostdorff, 1991, 1994; Cherwitz and Zagacki, 1986; Dow, 1989; Heisey, 1986; Kiewe, 1994; Windt, 1983).

As Campbell and Jamieson (1990) point out, rhetorical forms follow institutional conventions and the precedents set by other presidents. Specific genres of presidential discourse (including State of the Union Addresses, Inaugural Addresses, etc.) are important to study because these forms become ritualized, and through them presidents enact the role of symbolic and real head of state (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). Crisis rhetoric – or what Campbell and Jamieson call war rhetoric – is one genre of presidential rhetoric. Several scholars have described the characteristics of crisis rhetoric as a genre, thereby explaining and interpreting patterns in presidential discourse.

Windt (1983) describes presidential crisis rhetoric as having three defining characteristics. First, he says, presidents make authoritative statements in which they assert a control over “new facts” which constitute a crisis. A given situation has changed in such a way, presidents argue, as to constitute a critical situation demanding decisive action. Second, Windt says, presidents relate the new situation to a larger ongoing battle between good and evil. Presidents portray the enemy as evil and amoral through a melodramatic comparison between the pure motives of the United States and the evil motives of the enemy. Third, presidents call for the public to understand that enactment of a specific policy and public support for that policy are moral acts. By elevating crisis situations to ideological levels, Windt says, presidents make them tests of character, will, and moral strength.

Bostdorff (1991) finds four characteristics common to crisis rhetoric. First, she says, presidents personify an enemy, which serves as a condensation symbol of evil. This enemy is portrayed as threatening victims whom our military must protect. Second, presidents express a sense of urgent direction. If the situation is portrayed as desperate, Congress of course has no time to deliberate military action and the president must act immediately. Thus, the

announcement of military action is made after the fact. Third, presidents must document the evil deeds of the enemy. This documentation serves to support presidential assertions as well as to justify presidential actions after the crisis has been resolved. Lastly, Bostdorff says, crisis rhetoric uses intervention – the dramatization of action taken against the enemy. Through intervention, presidents emphasize symbolic and tangible gains while downplaying or ignoring negative aspects. This serves to reassure the public that the president is in control and acting appropriately.

Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) have delineated two types of crisis rhetoric. The first they call consummatory crisis rhetoric, which consists of presidential responses to foreign crises that do not include military action by the United States. The second – justificatory crisis rhetoric – they define as rhetoric designed to justify the use of military action on the part of the United States. There are several similarities between the two types of crisis rhetoric: both attempt to create crisis atmospheres while seeking resolution, both underscore the importance of American ideals and values, and both make use of “deliberate, hard-hitting, offensive language” (p. 309) to dramatize the crisis. Cherwitz and Zagacki say that both forms of crisis rhetoric are epideictic in nature – they are concerned with placing blame for crisis situations on America’s enemies. However, they say, consummatory crisis rhetoric is also forensic – seeking to put perpetrators of hostile actions on mock trial by presenting evidence to prove their guilt – while justificatory crisis rhetoric has deliberative dimensions – with United States military actions being explicated and defended.

Cherwitz and Zagacki’s (1986) justificatory crisis rhetoric is similar to what Campbell and Jamieson (1990) call war rhetoric – the rhetoric used by presidents to justify to the American public the use of military force. Campbell and Jamieson (1990) say that presidential war

rhetoric has five characteristics: (a) the decision to use force is portrayed as a last resort that has been deliberated at great length, (b) it is justified through a narrative of events from which argumentative claims are drawn, (c) the audience is exhorted to unanimity of purpose and total commitment, (d) the rhetoric justifies the legitimacy of the president as commander in chief as well as the use of military force, and (e) the misrepresentation of facts plays a strategic role.

Campbell and Jamieson apply the term war rhetoric to speeches announcing military action that has already occurred as well as to speeches requesting Congress to declare war officially. While the study of crisis rhetoric typically focuses on the first of these distinctions, it must be noted, as Campbell and Jamieson point out, that no war has been officially declared since World War II. It is significant to note this fact for several reasons.

First, presidents have all but usurped the power to declare war from Congress. Each time a president exercises his role as commander in chief by ordering forces into combat without prior approval of Congress, he legitimizes future occurrences of similar actions by other presidents (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). Second, by taking military action and then seeking the support of the public, presidents stifle debate and further consideration of their announced policy (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Dow, 1989; Windt, 1983). They also put pressure on Congress to support these actions, since presidents who use crisis rhetoric can typically be expected to receive the support of the public and to increase their credibility (Bostdorff, 1991, 1994; Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Windt, 1983).

The use of crisis rhetoric – particularly crisis rhetoric intended to justify and gain popular support for military action – has changed the nature of the presidency. While in the past presidents were more likely to seek formal declarations of war before using military force, they now use the military in situations they deem critical, then appeal to the American people in order

to generate popular and Congressional support for their actions (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Windt, 1983). The powers of war have shifted from the legislative to the executive branch (Bostdorff, 1991). This phenomenon did not exist before the rise of the rhetorical presidency – the rhetorical presidency has created an atmosphere in which crisis rhetoric thrives.

Cold War Rhetoric

A major factor in the political atmosphere of crisis rhetoric for over 40 years was the concept known as the Cold War. The Cold War has been defined as a state of tension and rivalry between nations which stops short of actual full-scale war (Scott, 1997). The term was first used by Bernard Baruch on April 16, 1947; the phrase was repeated by journalist Walter Lippmann and was readily accepted by the public as an accurate description of the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union (Kane, 1991). Though allies during World War II, friendly relations between the two nations began to dissolve after Joseph Stalin used the Soviet army to control much of Eastern Europe, and president Harry S. Truman moved to unite Western Europe under American leadership (LaFeber, 1994). The result was a situation of intense political and ideological tension so aptly described as the Cold War.

It has been argued that the Cold War was fundamentally a rhetorical creation and ultimately a non-event (Kane, 1991; Messer, 1982). However, as Scott (1997) points out, the Cold War was not entirely a war of words; actions (such as the U. S. boycott of the 1980 summer Olympics and the embargo of grain shipments to the Soviet Union) also played an important part in the Cold War. And the Cold War “heated up” from time to time – most notably during the Korean and Vietnam wars. However, the majority of Cold War actions were rhetorical in nature and the Cold War itself was primarily created through the rhetoric of the two rival nations (Kane, 1991; Scott, 1997).

The origins of Cold War rhetoric – and the Cold War itself – can be traced to the Truman administration. According to Kane (1991), during Truman's term

differences between the United States and the Soviet Union would be cast in a harsh rhetoric characterized by magnified and expansive terms; a divisive and uncompromising tone which exaggerated differences and minimized common interests; and an active narrative which redefined events and claimed the superiority of the American experience. (p. 81)

This characterization of the two rivals blossomed in the Truman years and was adapted over time (Parry-Giles, 1994). According to Parry-Giles, rhetorical strategies under Truman first focused on communicating the superiority of the American way of life. When this was found to be ineffective, rhetorical strategies switched to an emphasis on denouncing the evils of communism and literalizing the savagery and brutality of the Soviets. This strategy was also ineffective, according to Parry-Giles, because it created fear of communism and empowered America's Cold War enemy. Finally, Parry-Giles says that Eisenhower was able to overcome the flaws in these strategies by establishing the United States as a scientific superpower determined to achieve peace, in comparison with the Soviet enemy bent on conquest and oppression. Though Eisenhower modified the previous administration's rhetorical strategies, the die was clearly cast during the Truman administration.

Of primary importance to this paper is the idea that the rhetorical creation known as the Cold War guided American foreign policy for over 40 years (Cole, 1999; Kane, 1991; Medhurst, 1997; Scott, 1997; Stuckey, 1992, 1995; Wander, 1984/1997). The Cold War, as shaped by Truman and modified by Eisenhower and the presidents to follow, became a frame of reference "through which to view, understand and explain all the historical events that occurred during its

lengthy life span" (Kane, 1991, p. 80). It became a way of interpreting events as well as a justification and rationale for American foreign policy and action (Scott, 1997; Stuckey, 1992, 1995). As a lens through which to view the world, the Cold War focused on certain acceptable policies and courses of action while ignoring others. For example, by looking at relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as in a state of constant political and ideological warfare, American foreign policy demanded containment rather than appeasement, competition rather than cooperation (Wander, 1984/1997). There are several ways in which the Cold War guided American foreign policy.

According to Wander (1984/1997), Cold War rhetoric consisted of three controlling ideologies. He labels these "prophetic dualism," "technocratic realism," and "nationalism." Wander says that the ideology of prophetic dualism portrays a world in which one side (the United States) "acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God's will" (p. 157), while the other side (the Soviet Union) acts in direct opposition. Thus, everything the United States did was good and just, while Soviet actions were evil; American moral and spiritual superiority were official aspects of foreign policy. Wander says that technocratic realism takes a more humanistic and scientific approach, focusing on American interests rather than on American values. Under this ideology, negotiation becomes possible, but competition over scientific, military and economic matters remains of utmost importance. Finally, the ideology of nationalism, Wander says, personifies nations, portraying the United States as the embodiment of truth, justice and freedom and the Soviet Union as the embodiment of opposite qualities. These ideologies are capable of existing simultaneously, even occurring within the same speech. The point is that Cold War rhetoric promoted these ideologies, thus limiting discourse and foreign policy to particular aspects of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet

Union (Wander, 1984/1997).

Another way the Cold War influenced United States foreign policy is through metaphor. The Cold War can be considered a master metaphor – a controlling metaphor that generates other metaphors (Ivie, 1987, 1997). The Cold War metaphor, Ivie (1997) says, equated Soviets with “barbarians,” portrayed freedom as “fragile,” and proclaimed the “price of freedom” to be high. These metaphors translated to motives for foreign policy and action (Ivie, 1987, 1997); military action in particular was justified because of the need to protect our “fragile freedom” against the “savage” enemy. Motives for policy and action come from metaphor, and metaphor points to motive (Ivie, 1987, 1997). Thus, by analyzing the metaphors used in Cold War rhetoric, Ivie (1997) says, we can understand the motives for policy and action.

The Cold War, in addition to generating metaphors, generated myths which helped to guide foreign policy. Several myths arising from Cold War rhetoric, according to Klope (1986), are the myths of progress (which America strives to achieve and the Soviets seek to stifle), freedom (in which America plays the protector and the Soviet Union the destroyer), mission (America’s mission is to protect the world against communism), and self-interest (in which it is in our best interest to promote democracy and stop the spread of communism around the world).

Klope (1986) says that Reagan, for example, used the myths of progress, freedom, mission, and national self-interest to shift blame for the invasion of Grenada from the United States to the Soviet Union. He points out that myths function to signify beliefs held in common by large groups of people and that they give meaning to events.

Whether through ideology, metaphor, or myth, the Cold War served to define many ambiguous situations (Klope, 1986; Ivie, 1997; Scott, 1997). It helped to define the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union for over 40 years. The rhetoric of the Cold War

limited debate and defined discourse in such a way as to limit foreign policy options (Cole, 1999; Hollihan, 1986; Ivie, 1987; Kane, 1991; Medhurst, 1997; Parry-Giles, 1994; Scott, 1997; Stuckey, 1995; Wander, 1984/1997).

Summary of the Literature

As we have seen, the rhetorical presidency arose out of changes in leadership, the mass media and campaign styles and led to the public perception that words, rather than actions, constitute leadership. The rhetorical presidency created a climate in which presidents can appeal directly to the public in order to generate support for policies and actions. Presidents have used this ability to usurp powers of war from Congress to the degree that they can order armed forces into combat, then explain their actions to the public and gain the support of the people and the legislative branch. Crisis rhetoric is the term scholars typically give to presidential rhetoric that serves to define the importance of particular policies or recommend courses of action – including military action – in situations deemed critical. And until the presidency of George Bush, the Cold War served as the dominant paradigm of crisis rhetoric. The Cold War and the types of arguments it generated served to justify the use of military force in times of international crisis. The question undertaken by this study is this: now that the Cold War is over, how has the crisis rhetoric of presidents changed?

As Bill Clinton's presidency comes to an end, scholars will no doubt begin to examine his rhetoric. Research thus far has examined Clinton's leadership style (Greenstein, 1995; Wendt & Fairhurst, 1994), his use of rhetorical invention (Murphy, 1997), the political orientation of his rhetoric (Brenders & Fabj, 1993), his level of cognitive complexity (Suedfeld, 1994), his anti-drug rhetoric (Gordon, 1994), and media coverage of the president (Heuvel, 1994;

Meyers, 1994; Miller & Pavlik, 1994; Owen, 1997). However, as of yet, little has been done to determine how Clinton's discourse fits into the literature of crisis rhetoric and how his rhetoric differs from that of the Cold War presidents. Two studies bear mention at this point. Stuckey (1995) examined the rhetoric of George Bush and Bill Clinton and says that foreign policy events are now interpreted individually rather than as a part of a larger pattern. She says that this has made crisis rhetoric less persuasive. Cole (1999) says that no policy has yet replaced containment as the rationale for why the United States should resort to military force. In comparing the rhetoric of Bush and Clinton concerning military involvement in Bosnia, Cole says Bush continued to center on Cold War themes after the Cold War ended while Clinton essentially abandoned them. According to these studies, the end of the Cold War has left presidents searching for new justifications for military action. This study will show that President Clinton has found a new overriding theme that justifies military action in the post-Cold War world while still relying on the old themes established by his predecessors.

Purposes and Objectives

The purpose of this study was to determine how presidential crisis rhetoric justifying the use of military action has changed since the end of the Cold War. In the past, presidents drew on the Cold War paradigm as justification for using military force around the world. As we have seen, the Cold War paradigm generated specific ideologies, metaphors and myths. These became ways of interpreting world events as well as arguments that justified presidential policies and actions during times of international crisis. Several scholars have pointed out that since the Cold War is over, presidents will necessarily search for new arguments to justify their use of military force (Cole, 1999; Kane, 1991; Stuckey, 1995). A new rhetoric will be created to replace the rhetoric that drew so much from the Cold War representation of the world. The

purpose of this study was to determine what, if any, paradigm has replaced the Cold War as the justification for international military involvement. Are crisis situations interpreted individually, as Stuckey (1995) suggests, or is there a larger pattern that has replaced the patterns of discourse generated by the Cold War view of the world? Answering this question was the primary concern of this study.

Methodology

In order to determine exactly how presidential crisis rhetoric has changed since the end of the Cold War, I have analyzed speeches by President Bill Clinton announcing military action to the American public. Although the exact date marking the end of the Cold War has been disputed, it is generally accepted that the Cold War ended under the watch of George Bush – around the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the election of non-communist governments in Eastern Europe (LaFeber, 1994). Therefore, Bill Clinton is the first president to be elected in the post-Cold War world. For this reason I have concentrated solely on the rhetoric of Bill Clinton.

Texts

In order to determine how Bill Clinton justifies military action, I analyzed all televised speeches given by Bill Clinton announcing the use of military force. I chose to focus only on televised speeches for several reasons. First, television is the most accessible medium for most Americans and is generally the medium of choice for presidents seeking to communicate with the public regarding urgent situations (Dow, 1989). As we have seen, one of the goals of crisis rhetoric is to obtain Congressional support for military action by generating a favorable public opinion. The most effective way for presidents to reach the largest population possible is through television. Thus, presidents can be reasonably expected to use their strongest arguments

when addressing a television audience. Since this study is concerned with the arguments advanced in crisis rhetoric, it seems prudent to look at the speeches in which President Clinton presents his strongest case for each “crisis” situation. Television represents the greatest use of the presidential power to persuade since it reaches the largest audience. While Clinton could be expected to provide a rationale for military involvement in situations other than televised speeches – such as radio addresses, commencement addresses, political fundraisers, etc. – these speeches are not directly witnessed by the American public at large and often only mention the use of military force briefly.

Clinton has ordered the use of military force on several occasions. On June 26, 1993, he ordered U. S. forces to fire cruise missiles at Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad as retaliation for what the Central Intelligence Agency described as a plot to assassinate former president George Bush (Weiner, 1993). Clinton addressed the nation later that evening to announce this attack.

On October 7, 1993, Clinton announced to the nation that he would send over 15,000 troops into the African nation of Somalia; these troops would support the 4,700 sent in as part of a United Nations force by president George Bush ten months earlier. Although this particular use of military force could be interpreted as a continuation of a previous action, Clinton made it clear that events had taken a turn for the worse and that the new situation constituted a crisis which did not previously exist – 14 Americans had been killed in recent outbreaks of violence (Jehl, 1993). Therefore, this address constitutes an example of crisis rhetoric as defined earlier.

A third speech announcing military action came on September 15, 1994. Clinton announced to the nation that he was sending troops into Haiti in order to restore its democratic government (Apple, 1994). Haiti’s president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, had been ousted by Haiti’s

military, led by General Raoul Cédras, and Clinton presented the use of military force as the final solution to ending the atrocities committed by the Cédras regime (Jehl, 1994).

In October of 1994, Iraq began massing forces along the Kuwaiti border. On October 10, 1994, Clinton ordered aircraft carriers and warplanes to be sent to the Persian Gulf to "defend Kuwait" from Iraqi aggression (Gordon, 1994, p. A1). Later that evening he announced this action to the nation in a televised speech.

By the end of 1995, violence and civil war had been raging in Bosnia for nearly three and a half years. Interpreting this violence as a threat to European security, NATO forces, led by the United States, made the decision to intervene militarily (Mitchell, 1995). On November 27, 1995, Clinton announced to the American public that 20,000 United States troops would be sent to Bosnia as part of a peace-keeping force (Mitchell, 1995).

On August 20, 1998, Clinton delivered his sixth televised speech announcing military action in foreign lands. Earlier that month, terrorists had bombed two U. S. Embassies in Africa; United States intelligence agencies claimed that Osama bin Laden, a terrorist leader, was responsible for the attacks (Risen, 1998). Acting on this information, Clinton ordered bombing attacks on two of bin Laden's suspected military training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan, then announced the action to the public later that day (Risen, 1998).

In December of 1998, tensions once more arose between the United States and Iraq. Iraq had refused to allow United Nations investigators to search suspected chemical weapons labs. After warning Iraq of impending military action if it did not comply with inspectors, Clinton ordered air strikes on Baghdad on December 16 (Clines & Myers, 1998). Later that evening, he announced this action in a televised speech.

Clinton's eighth speech to the nation announcing military intervention came on March 24, 1999. Like the military intervention in Bosnia, this action was undertaken in conjunction with NATO; Serbian forces, led by Slobodan Milosevic, stood accused of military aggression and genocide in the region of Kosovo, which, according to NATO, threatened to spill over into other European nations (Clines, 1999). NATO and United States forces began air attacks against Serbia on March 24, and Clinton addressed the nation once again.

In summary, the specific speeches that were analyzed were Clinton's address to the nation on Iraq, televised June 26, 1993; his address to the nation on military involvement in Somalia, televised October 7, 1993; his address to the nation on moving ground troops into Haiti, televised September 15, 1994; his address to the nation on sending military forces to the Persian Gulf, televised October 10, 1994; his address to the nation on sending a peace-keeping force to Bosnia, televised November 27, 1995; his address to the nation on retaliation against terrorists in Sudan, televised August 20, 1998; his address to the nation concerning the bombing of Iraq on December 16, 1998; and his address to the nation concerning air strikes against Serbia, televised March 24, 1999. Texts of the first five speeches were obtained from the Public Papers of the Presidents, while the three most recent texts were obtained via the White House web site. These speeches represent all televised addresses given by President Clinton justifying the use of military force in crisis situations.

Method of Analysis

The goal of this study was to determine what, if any, worldview has come to replace the Cold War as justification for military intervention. In order to achieve this goal I have analyzed the arguments presented by Bill Clinton that justify military action. As we have seen, the Cold War generated arguments for the use of military force in several ways. It was a controlling

worldview that generated ideologies and metaphors that served as arguments justifying presidential action in crisis situations.

Stuckey (1995) says that metaphors order political realities and that a dramatic perspective is useful for revealing relationships between rhetorical acts and societal values. Hollihan (1986) says that in addition to the Cold War, the New World Order and Power Politics dramas are important paradigms that can help us to understand foreign policy. The Cold War drama, Hollihan (1986) says, revolves around Wander's (1984/1997) prophetic dualism, while the New World Order drama rejects the idea of pure good versus pure evil (Hollihan, 1986; Stuckey, 1995). The New World Order drama posits that potentially equal moral actors attempt to avoid confrontation and work together to see beyond narrow self-interests. Finally, Hollihan's (1986) Power Politics drama is based on Wander's (1984/1997) technocratic realism ideology — in this drama the nation's self-interest is the guiding principle of foreign policy. As Campbell and Jamieson (1990) have pointed out, presidential speeches announcing military action justify that action through narratives from which arguments are drawn. I therefore analyzed Clinton's crisis rhetoric from the perspective of these three dramas (or narratives) in order to determine what ideological patterns are prevalent in his discourse and what his justifications for military intervention are.

These dramas also generate metaphors. As Ivie (1987) points out, "metaphors are routinely elaborated into motivating perspectives" (p. 165-167); by analyzing metaphor, one can understand a speaker's motives. An understanding of Clinton's motives for using the military in crisis situations will help to illuminate the paradigm from which he draws his arguments. Hart (1997) says that patterns of metaphorical usage create underlying thematic unity. Thus, it would appear to be fruitful to look for patterns in Clinton's use of metaphor that would reveal his

underlying justifications for military intervention. As discussed previously, the Cold War served as an orientational metaphor – now that it is over we would benefit from determining if a new master metaphor has taken its place or if presidential crisis rhetoric is left without a larger frame of reference. I undertook this study with that specific goal in mind.

This study is designed to add to our understanding of presidential rhetoric by illuminating ways in which crisis rhetoric has changed (or not changed) since the end of the Cold War. This will now be done via analysis of the patterns that emerge from Bill Clinton's speeches announcing military intervention. By analyzing these speeches using the dramas outlined and by searching for metaphors embedded within these dramas, this study will examine whether or not new themes have arisen to take the place of the Cold War as justification for military intervention.

Chapter 2:

The Power Politics, New World Order and Cold War Dramas

Scholars have described three dramas that serve to justify foreign policy and military action – these are the Power Politics, New World Order and Cold War dramas (Hollihan, 1986; Stuckey, 1995). I analyzed Clinton's crisis rhetoric from the perspective of these three dramas in order to determine what ideological patterns are prevalent in his discourse and what his justifications for military intervention are. I also looked for meaningful patterns of metaphor that might be illustrative of Clinton's justifications for foreign intervention. It is clear from this analysis that Clinton uses all three of these dramas in his speeches announcing military action, although the Cold War drama has been significantly altered now that the Cold War itself is over; it is also clear that several of these dramas (particularly the New World Order drama) rely on the use of metaphor to be effective. This chapter details that analysis. Perhaps more significantly, in performing this analysis I discovered a separate drama used by President Clinton as justification for military intervention. I argue for the recognition of this drama, which I have labeled the "World's Policeman" drama, in Chapter 3.

Power Politics and the National Interest

The Power Politics drama, according to Hollihan (1986), is based on the idea of technocratic realism developed by Wander (1984/1997). In this drama, leaders act in accordance with what is "best" for America; the nation's self-interest is the guiding principle of foreign policy. The Power Politics drama does not rely on moral claims (Stuckey, 1995; Wander, 1984/1997). Rather, it relies on scientific principles of decision making and secular and humanistic justifications for action (Wander, 1984/1997). The Power Politics drama is not

rooted in the idea of good versus evil as it finds the modern world “much too complex for old-time religion” (Wander, 1984/1997, p. 165). The world of the Power Politics drama is one of “equally self-interested pragmatists” (Stuckey, 1995, p. 217). In other words, technocratic realism does not stand on principle (as prophetic dualism does) – it stands on the idea of doing what is *technically* best for America, with efficiency being stressed over morality (Wander, 1984/1997). Heroes in this drama are those who secure the best position for the United States, while the villains are those who cause or create problems for the U. S., including open conflict (Stuckey, 1995). The objective of foreign policy is to secure benefits for the United States, and when possible, to avoid conflict (Hollihan, 1986). That military action might be justified as a way of avoiding conflict may seem paradoxical, but as we shall see, present action is often portrayed as necessary to preventing future problems, including large-scale war.

Clinton relies on the Power Politics drama for justification of military actions, repeatedly pointing out to the public just how these actions are directly related to American interests. There are several themes that recur within Clinton’s use of the Power Politics drama – these themes might also be conceptualized as dimensions of the national interest. One of these dimensions is national security, or the prevention or ending of conflicts that might affect American lives and the safety of our very nation. A second theme mixes national security with geographic location, arguing that certain areas of the world (specifically Central Europe) are more likely to affect America’s security. A third theme suggests that our economic security is threatened when conflicts take place close to our borders.

National Security

Arguments for military involvement based on national security come in two forms: one defines the actions of another entity (nation, group or individual) as a direct attack against Americans; the other defines a situation as one that could potentially result in a large-scale war or future conflict into which America would inevitably be drawn. In both cases military intervention is justified as a way of securing the best position for the United States while avoiding future problems.

Direct Attack on Americans. One speech that relies on what I have described as the first element of national security is Clinton's first speech concerning Iraq. In this address, he details a plot by Saddam Hussein to assassinate former President George Bush (1993a). He says that "the attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans" (p. 938). Such an act "against our Nation" (p. 938) cannot go unanswered, Clinton says. He says that for the past 200 years, "America's security has depended on the clarity of this message: Don't tread on us" (p. 938). We cannot allow other nations to threaten our security or the lives of Americans. Thus, Clinton says, we have launched cruise missile attacks against Iraq. This is necessary "to protect our sovereignty . . . [and] to deter further violence against our people" (p. 938). Clinton goes on to say that "we will protect our people" (p. 939) and that he personally is "determined to take the steps necessary to keep our Nation secure" (p. 939). The plot by Iraq to assassinate former President Bush is portrayed by Clinton as a direct attack against an American – and an important American at that. We cannot allow another nation to assault our citizens, Clinton is saying, especially when that citizen is a symbol of our very way of life.

Clinton also portrays the situation in Somalia as one in which Americans have been directly attacked. He first details the situation, in which American troops have been sent to the

African nation to “end the starvation of the Somali people” (1993b, p. 1703). Troops were originally sent in as a part of a “United Nations humanitarian mission” (p. 1704) to end this starvation, which Clinton describes as “one of the great human tragedies of this time” (p. 1704). Recently, however, these troops have been attacked by “armed Somali gang[s],” who have “desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot” (p. 1703). Action is called for in this situation in order to protect the troops in Somalia from further violence. Clinton says he is “determined to work for the security of those Americans missing or held captive” (p. 1704). To this end, he says he has “ordered 1,700 additional Army troops and 104 additional armored vehicles to Somalia to protect our troops and to complete our mission” (p. 1704). Thus, the purpose of sending additional troops to Somalia is to help protect the troops who are already there. It is in the nation’s best interest to protect our troops while they finish their mission.

In Clinton’s speech concerning terrorism, he says that he has ordered American armed forces to strike terrorist-related facilities “because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security” (1998a, par. 1). He goes on to say that these terrorists have “killed American, Belgian and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia” and have “planned to bomb six United States 747s over the Pacific” (par. 5). This use of military force is most directly related to the bombing of two United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, where “12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives, and another 5,000 were wounded” (par. 6). Thus, the current military action is in direct response to very real threats to American national security in which American lives have been lost. As Clinton says, there are times “when our very national security is challenged, and when we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens” (par. 8). He says that with further evidence that Osama bin Laden and his

terrorist group were “planning to mount further attacks against Americans,” action had to be taken (par. 8). Under “unanimous recommendation from my national security team,” Clinton says, “I ordered our Armed Forces to take action to counter an immediate threat from the bin Laden network” (par. 9).

The Threat of Future Conflict. Clinton’s address to the nation concerning the bin Laden network provides an opportunity to segue into the second element of national security – the threat of future conflict – as this speech also appeals to this theme. In addition to the immediate threat of violence against Americans, Clinton says that it is in the United States’ best interest to act against Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group because of the threat that terrorism in general poses to America. He says that America “is and will remain a target of terrorists” (par. 15) and that despite this, “we will defend our people, our interests and our values” (par. 17).

Clinton summarizes our national interest in fighting terrorism when he says:

Our battle against terrorism did not begin with the bombing of our embassies in Africa; nor will it end with today’s strike. It will require strength, courage and endurance. We will not yield to this threat. We will meet it, no matter how long it may take. This will be a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism; between the rule of law and terrorism. We must be prepared to do all that we can for as long as we must. (par. 14)

Terrorism threatens the lives of Americans and the national security of the United States.

Clinton argues that military action against bin Laden and his terrorist network is justified because of this. If we did not act, Clinton says, we would be open to further attacks, for inaction “would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact” (par. 17). It is in America’s best interest, Clinton suggests, to take military action against Osama bin

Laden as well as to take action against future terrorist threats to the United States. The current bombing is portrayed as a reaction to a very real assault against Americans as well as a deterrent against future terrorist actions

Other addresses focus on this second element of national security as well, including Clinton's second and third speeches concerning Iraq. In his second address on Iraq, Clinton announces the movement of troops to the Persian Gulf in response to Saddam Hussein's massing of the Iraqi army along the Kuwaiti border (1994b). Clinton says that "three and a half years ago, the men and women of our Armed Forces . . . fought to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to protect our interests in that vital region" (p. 1726). Clinton does not say exactly what those interests were, but he goes on to say:

In 1990, Saddam Hussein assembled a force on the border of Kuwait and then invaded. Last week, he moved another force toward the same border. Because of what happened in 1990, this provocation requires a strong response from the United States and the international community. (p. 1726)

Thus, we must act now to prevent what happened in 1990 from happening again – it is in our national interest to avoid another Gulf War. As Clinton says, our troops who are now en route to the Gulf region are "protecting our security" (p. 1726).

Clinton's third speech on Iraq involves the announcement of air strikes. Clinton opens the address by stating that our military's purpose "is to protect the national interest of the United States and, indeed, the interest of people throughout the Middle East and around the world" (1998b, par. 1). Specifically, it is in our national interest that Hussein "not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons" (par. 1). Clinton then goes on to detail how United Nations weapons inspectors have been expelled

from Iraq without being able to do their job of verifying whether it is complying with provisions of the Gulf War treaty that forbid it from developing weapons of mass destruction. As Clinton says, “the inspectors undertook this mission . . . at the end of the Gulf War, when Iraq agreed to declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the cease-fire” (par. 3). The reason for this ban on weapons of mass destruction is that Hussein “has used them, not once but repeatedly — unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops . . . not only against soldiers, but against civilians; firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iran” (par. 4). Therefore, it is in our national interest to force Iraq to comply with weapons inspectors so that Hussein does not use these weapons again; much like his second speech concerning Iraq, this speech suggests that by acting with military force *now*, we can avoid costlier confrontations in the future. It is in our national interest to use military force today in order to avoid a full-scale war some time later. In Clinton’s words, “the United States has proven that, although we are never eager to use force, when we must act in America’s vital interests, we will do so” (par. 33).

These examples clearly illustrate the arguments for national security put forward within the context of the Power Politics drama. Several justify military action because of real attacks against American citizens, while others justify this action as a way of preventing conflict in the future:

National Security/Geographic Location

The addresses mentioned above rely almost exclusively on security arguments for military intervention. In several speeches, however, Clinton augments the “potential for future conflict” argument with arguments that describe the geographic location of current conflicts as particularly troublesome. Because of the location of these problems, he argues, our security (and therefore our best interest) is jeopardized even further.

For example, military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina is described as beneficial to our national interest because the potential for war is made greater by its location within Central Europe. Clinton says that by sending troops to the region to implement the peace agreement, we will help to “bring stability to Central Europe, a region of the world that is vital to our national interests” (1995, p. 1784). The conflict in Bosnia is important to our national interests, Clinton says, because “problems that start beyond our borders can quickly become problems within them” (p. 1784). These problems include “the organized forces of intolerance and destruction; terrorism; ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries” (p. 1784). These forces “threaten freedom and democracy, peace and prosperity” and therefore “demand American leadership” (p. 1784). This leadership is called for in Bosnia, where “for nearly 4 years a terrible war has torn [the area] apart” (p. 1784-1785). As Clinton says,

Nowhere has the argument for our leadership been more clearly justified than in the struggle to stop or prevent war and civil violence. From Iraq to Haiti, from South Africa to Korea, from the Middle East to Northern Ireland, we have stood up for peace and freedom because it’s in our interest to do so and because it is the right thing to do. (p. 1784).

It is in our national interest, Clinton says, to prevent wars when possible. We cannot stop every war, but we can stop some. As he puts it, “my duty as President is to match the demands for American leadership to our strategic interest and to our ability to make a difference” (p. 1784). Bosnia is one such case, where “our interests and values demand” that we act (p. 1787). It is a place where “we can defend our fundamental values as a people and serve our most basic, strategic interests” (p. 1784).

These interests include “securing a free and stable Europe” (p. 1785). Clinton says that it is in our best interest to

build a peace and stop the suffering. Securing peace in Bosnia will also help to build a free and stable Europe. Bosnia lies at the very heart of Europe, next-door to many of its fragile new democracies and some of our closest allies.

Generations of Americans have understood that Europe’s freedom and Europe’s stability is [sic] vital to our own national security. That’s why we fought two wars in Europe. That’s why we created NATO and waged the cold war. And that’s why we must help the nations of Europe to end their worst nightmare since World War II, now. (p. 1785)

It is in our national interest to help bring peace to Bosnia for several reasons. Bosnia is near several democracies that are our allies, and it is therefore in our interest to protect those allies. More importantly, instability in Europe caused two World Wars; if we act now, Clinton suggests, we can avoid a third. This argument powerfully portrays our need to get involved, for it suggests that if we do not act now, things could get out of hand and America could eventually be drawn into an even larger conflict. The reference to the Cold War is also important. It serves as a reminder to Americans of what can happen if democracies are not allowed to peacefully flourish. Thus, in his speech on Bosnia, Clinton portrays military action as essential because of the threat to our national security; this threat is increased because Bosnia is located near several of our “closest allies” and is in an area central to World Wars I and II. Clinton implies that the geographic location of Central Europe is one of historic instability, and therefore one more likely to see large-scale conflicts.

Clinton returns to the idea that intervention *in Europe* is in America's best interest when he announces the bombing of Serbia. "We act to prevent a wider war," he says, "to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results" (1999, par. 2). He specifically refers to "protecting our interests" (par. 2), "America's national interest" (par. 8), "dangers to . . . our national interests" (par. 17), and dealing with "problems such as this before they do permanent harm to our national interests" (par. 21). The problem Clinton refers to is the ethnic warfare perpetrated by the Serbians against the people of Kosovo. Clinton says that Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, has "stripped Kosovo of [its] constitutional autonomy" and "sent . . . troops and police to crush them" when they have peacefully resisted (par. 4). Serbians have "started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their houses" (par. 7). This violence is described by Clinton as "an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people" (par. 7). This problem affects America's national interest because

Kosovo . . . sits on a major fault line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity. To the south are our allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north, our new democratic allies in Central Europe. And all around Kosovo there are other small countries . . . that could be overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo. (par. 8)

In other words, there is a great possibility that this war will spread if it is not stopped, largely because of the delicate nature of Central Europe.

Clinton furthers this argument when he says that this very region is where World War I started and that the "Holocaust engulfed this region" (par. 9). He says that

In both wars Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die. (par. 9)

Though perceptive audience members might question the validity of this comparison made in perfect hindsight, it serves to show how conflicts such as the one in Kosovo can spread if they are not stopped. Thus, it is in the United States' best interest to intervene *now* in order to avoid becoming involved in a larger war *later on*. As Clinton says, "we have acted now . . . because we have an interest in avoiding an even crueler and costlier war" (par. 24). Thus, this military action serves America's national interest.

Clinton's speeches on Bosnia and Kosovo both rely on arguments designed to gain support by detailing how current situations could result in larger wars in the future. These arguments are bolstered by the geographic location of these regions: because Bosnia and Kosovo are located in Central Europe, they are less stable and any conflicts that spill outside their borders will create large problems that could potentially result in full-scale wars involving many nations, including the United States.

Economic Security/Geographic Location

Military intervention in Haiti is portrayed a bit differently as it takes place very close to American borders. Clinton begins his speech on Haiti by stating that "the United States must protect our interests" (1994a, p. 1558). Specifically, we need to "secure our borders, and . . . preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere" (p. 1558). Clinton goes on to say:

I want the American people to understand the background of the situation in Haiti, how what has happened there affects our national security interests and

why I believe we must act now. Nearly 200 years ago, the Haitian people rose up out of slavery and declared their independence. Unfortunately, the promise of liberty was quickly snuffed out, and ever since, Haiti has known more suffering and repression than freedom. In our time, as democracy has spread throughout our hemisphere, Haiti has been left behind. (p. 1558)

It is in our best interest, Clinton says, to help Haiti to become free and democratic. He goes on to say that four years ago, “the Haitian people held the first free and fair elections since their independence” (p. 1558). This election, however, was overturned by General Raoul Cédras in a military coup. Since this time, Haitians have been “beaten and murdered” and intimidated with “a horrible . . . campaign of rape, torture, and mutilation” (p. 1558). People “starved; children died; thousands of Haitians fled their country, heading to the United States across dangerous seas” (p. 1558). The coup and dictatorship of Cédras has resulted in people being brutally mistreated, and in terms of our own national interest, has resulted in a flood of refugees heading to America. Clinton quotes former President Bush, who reportedly described the situation as “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States” (p. 1558). Thus, Clinton’s claim that the situation in Haiti affects our national interest is bolstered by his citing of Bush – not one, but *two* presidents have determined that this case affects our national interest.

Clinton elaborates on this argument by saying that “when brutality occurs close to our shores, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act” (p. 1559). He says that

This year, in less than 2 months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our Coast Guard and Navy. Today, more than 14,000 refugees are living at our

naval base in Guantanamo. The American people have already expended almost \$200 million to support them, to maintain the economic embargo. And the prospect of millions and millions more being spent every month for an indefinite period of time loom ahead unless we act. (p. 1559)

This argument portrays our national interest in human as well as financial terms; unless we want a flood of refugees in our nation at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars more in aid, we must act to restore Haiti's democratically elected government. As Clinton says, "preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America's security and prosperity" (p. 1559). And in this case, he says, "our own interests are plain" (p. 1560). Military intervention in Haiti will "protect our national security interests" (p. 1560). These security interests appear to be largely economic in nature. We must preserve Democracy within our hemisphere while protecting our borders, Clinton says, not because nearby nations pose a direct threat to our security per se, but because conflicts in our part of the world ultimately affect our economic well-being. We must preserve democracies in the Western hemisphere because they benefit our economy and because the refugees who flee conflict-engulfed nations often head to America, costing taxpayers large amounts of money.

Summary

Clinton uses the Power Politics drama to varying degrees in each of his speeches announcing military action in crisis situations. He directly references America's "national interest(s)" and details specific ways that crisis situations threaten the United States directly. Several dimensions of the national interest can be identified in Clinton's crisis rhetoric – these include national security, geographic and economic dimensions. The security dimension is seen in arguments that describe direct assaults on Americans as well as the threat of future conflicts

that might involve the loss of many lives. These arguments are often combined with arguments highlighting the geographic dimension of our national interest – those areas closer to our borders or those areas located within “trouble-spots” (namely Central Europe) are more likely to create threats to America’s national security. Finally, conflicts within our hemisphere threaten our security economically, thereby combining the geographic and economic elements of our national interest.

Clinton uses the Power Politics drama as a way of justifying military action. Intervention is warranted when situations threaten to obstruct America’s ability to keep its citizens safe and to prosper economically. Within this drama, Clinton is the hero, as he seeks to secure the best position for the United States, both immediately and in the future. The villains are those, such as Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, Slobodan Milosevic and Raoul Cédras, who threaten the acquiring of beneficial positions. These positions include peace and security for Americans as well as economic prosperity. The Power Politics drama is presented as a way of justifying military action; however, there are other dramas that Clinton refers to during his addresses announcing military involvement.

The New World Order: Drama and Metaphor

Unlike the Power Politics drama, the New World Order drama seeks to go beyond narrow self-interests in order that potentially equal moral actors might avoid confrontation and work together (Hollihan, 1986; Stuckey, 1995). Conflict can be avoided “if nations learned how to interact in accordance with high moral standards” (Hollihan, 1986, p. 373). According to the New World Order drama, then, nations should *interact* with the good of all in mind. People are generally characterized as moral and good, and nations should work together to solve problems without conflict. Thus, Hollihan points out, “heroes” in the New World Order drama are those

who are willing to see beyond narrow self-interests to make “humane and moral decisions,” while “villains” are those who are not (p. 374). Like the Cold War drama, the New World Order drama relies on moral claims. However, it portrays other nations as potential equals, and so American foreign policy is not always a case of America being right while our enemies are wrong. This is a much “more complicated moral universe” in which the United States is “challenged to prove its morality” by doing what is right and just for all nations involved (Stuckey, 1995, p. 216).

Clinton uses the New World Order drama within his addresses announcing military action. He uses this drama not only by suggesting that American intervention goes beyond narrow self-interests, but by relying on the metaphor of the “community of nations.” He also uses the international organizations of the United Nations and NATO to argue that American military action is taken for the good of all involved, rather than for the sole gain of the United States. It might seem that the Power Politics drama and the New World Order drama are incompatible, since the Power Politics drama relies on America’s best interests alone, but as we will see, Clinton uses both as justifications for military intervention.

The Community of Nations

Clinton develops the New World Order drama by referring to the “community of nations,” the “international community” and the “neighborhood.” These references serve to underscore the idea that all nations are potentially moral equals who must work toward a common good; the actions of one affect all others. At times, Clinton specifically mentions the “community of nations,” but at other times, his references to the international community are more indirect, relying on the suggestion that there are many nations, not just the United States, who have a stake in the given military action. And, in many instances, Clinton portrays an

“enemy” or “villain” as one who has refused to cooperate with the high moral standards of this community.

In his first address to the nation announcing military action (concerning the alleged plot of Iraq to assassinate former President Bush), Clinton says that Saddam Hussein has “repeatedly violated the will and conscience of the international community” (1993a, p. 938). This latest action has resulted in the bombing of Iraq, which Clinton says is designed to “affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations” (p. 938). The irony of this statement is interesting; Clinton is saying that America has bombed Iraq in order to make it behave more peacefully. Finally, he says that “the world has repeatedly made clear what Iraq must do to return to the community of nations. And Iraq has repeatedly refused” (p. 939). The “community of nations” theme is present, as is the idea of all nations involved acting with high moral standards – Iraq has violated these standards and must be brought in line with the rest of the world.

In Clinton’s second address concerning Iraq, he says that “the United States and the international community have given their word that Iraq must respect the borders of its neighbors” (1994b, p. 1726). Iraq has violated this respect through “troop movements and threatening statements” toward Kuwait (p. 1726). Clinton says that “because of what happened in 1990 [the Gulf War], this provocation requires a strong response from the United States and the international community” (p. 1726). Furthermore, he says that “we will not allow Saddam Hussein to defy the will of the United States and the international community” (p. 1726). Iraq will not be allowed to “threaten its neighbors” (p. 1726). Thus, troops are being sent to the Persian Gulf in order to deter another invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Clinton’s overt references to the “international community” as well as his use of the “neighborhood” metaphor serve to

dramatize this use of military action in terms of the New World Order.

Clinton's third speech on Iraq also relies on mention of the international community and the metaphor of the neighborhood. He says "the international community had good reason" to demand inspection of Iraq's potential weapons facilities considering its past record of using such weapons (1998b, par. 4), and that "the international community had little doubt" that such weapons would be used against others (par. 5). He also points out that "the international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation" (par. 17), and should Iraq be allowed to get away with its defiance of the weapons inspectors, Hussein "would conclude that the international community, led by the United States, has simply lost its will" (par. 20). Finally, Clinton says that "so long as Iraq remains out of compliance, we will work with the international community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions" (par. 28). Hussein and Iraq are portrayed as the villains in this drama because they refuse to cooperate with the rest of the world and are not acting in accordance with what is good for all involved (i.e., peacefully).

Clinton relies on the neighborhood metaphor when he states that "Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons" (1998b, par. 1). Thus, Clinton has "ordered America's armed forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq" (par. 1). And the United States must be ready to use force in the future should Hussein continue "threatening his neighbors" (par. 27). If we do not, Clinton warns, "Saddam will strike again at his neighbors" (par. 32). By using the word "neighbor" in this way, Clinton further solidifies the idea of the community of nations that must work together rather than in each nation's narrow self-interest – a key tenet of the New World Order drama.

Finally, in his third speech on Iraq, Clinton uses several other strategies to show that the military action being taken is in the best interest of all involved. He says the purpose of

American and British military units is to “protect . . . the interest of people throughout the Middle East and around the world” (par. 1). Not only is the United States looking beyond its own narrow self-interests, it is working with Great Britain under the authority of the United Nations (as detailed above). In another, perhaps more interesting argument, Clinton seeks to justify the timing of the air strikes, which occurred the day before the House of Representatives was scheduled to vote on whether to impeach him:

The Muslim holy month of Ramadan begins this weekend. For us to initiate military action during Ramadan would be profoundly offensive to the Muslim world, and therefore, would damage our relations with Arab countries and the progress we have made in the Middle East. That is something we wanted very much to avoid (par. 24)

Clinton bolsters this statement with other arguments designed to support the timing of the attacks. He says that “in the judgement of my military advisors, a swift response would provide the most surprise and the least opportunity for Saddam to prepare” by “protect[ing] his weapons” (par. 23). He also says that “our allies, including Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, concurred that now is the time to strike” (par. 25). Perhaps this line of argument is designed to deflect criticism that the strikes against Iraq might be intended to delay the House vote — criticisms which did occur (see, for example, Apple, 1998; Mitchell, 1998; Schmitt, 1998). One cannot tell for sure. It is apparent, however, that in no other speech does Clinton seek to justify the timing of military action in this way. In every speech he is careful to justify the action itself, but this speech is unique in its justification of the *precise timing* of the action. Within the current framework, however, it is most useful to point out that these arguments make sense within the New World Order drama — Clinton says we must act immediately in order to do what

is best for all involved, including Muslims, Arabs, the British and Americans.

Clinton's speech on the bombing of terrorist facilities makes use of the New World Order drama as well. Clinton outlines the ways in which the terrorist groups in question have threatened, and continue to threaten, the international community, not just the United States. He says that these terrorists have

killed American, Belgian and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the President of Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747s over the Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. They gunned down German tourists in Egypt. (1998a, par. 5)

These terrorists have most recently bombed two American embassies in which "12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives" (par. 6). There is "compelling evidence that the bin Laden network of terrorist groups was planning to mount further attacks against Americans and other freedom-loving people" (par. 8). These terrorists are therefore a threat to all civilized people, not just Americans. And so America must act.

Within this speech, Clinton takes the time to illustrate the ways in which this action benefits the entire world, particularly those who might interpret American bombings as threatening actions. He appeals to Muslims around the world when he says "I want the world to understand, that our actions today were not aimed against Islam, the faith of hundreds of millions of good, peace-loving people all around the world" (1998a, par. 13). These actions, he says, "were aimed at fanatics and killers who wrap murder in the cloak of righteousness; and in so doing, profane the great religion in whose name they claim to act" (par. 13). These actions are not aimed at Muslims, Clinton is saying. They are aimed at terrorists who commit horrible acts in the name of Islam; American military action is not harmful to Muslims but is helpful in

that it shows the world that bin Laden and his terrorist group for what they are – evildoers who falsely profess to be true believers in what is a peaceful and good religion.

Clinton also mentions Afghanistan and Sudan, where the bombings took place.

“Afghanistan and Sudan have been warned for years to stop harboring and supporting these terrorist groups,” he says (par. 11). “But countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens” (par. 11). These two nations have not lived up to the high moral standards demanded by the New World Order and thus are villains within this drama. Clinton sums up his New World Order argument when he says:

I want to reiterate: The United States wants peace, not conflict. We want to lift lives around the world, not take them. We have worked for peace – in Bosnia, in Northern Ireland, in Haiti, in the Middle East and elsewhere. But in this day, no campaign for peace can succeed without a determination to fight terrorism. (par. 17)

Terrorism threatens the very fabric of the New World Order in that random acts of violence threaten all nations. There cannot be true world peace with groups like the bin Laden terrorist network operating to undermine the efforts of peace-loving people. Clinton mentions specific places in which America has worked for peace in order to relate terrorism to the overall theme of “working for the good of all.” America has championed peace, he says, while terrorists have tried to undermine our efforts. Those terrorists are clearly the villains in the New World Order drama while the United States, which seeks to do what is best for all involved, is the hero.

The United Nations and NATO – Symbols of the New World Order

In addition to the idea of the community of nations as a neighborhood in which each neighbor or state must work for the good of all, Clinton uses the United Nations and NATO as

symbols of the New World Order. Both organizations consist of nations from different parts of the world, and as such, references to them create an implicit understanding that these organizations exist in order to further the interests of all nations involved. Thus, the United Nations is a symbol of world cooperation (as the name itself suggests), and NATO is a symbol of the cooperation of the North Atlantic nations (specifically the United States, Canada and Western Europe). Both the United Nations and NATO are symbolic of the community of nations (although the U. N. "neighborhood" is much larger), and Clinton's references to these organizations further the New World Order drama. Functionally, the United Nations and NATO are quite similar within Clinton's speeches. The primary difference is in the geographic location of the conflict in question. NATO is referred to, not surprisingly, when Clinton speaks about Bosnia and Kosovo, which are located within Europe. The United Nations is used as a symbol of the community of nations when conflicts occur in other parts of the world, including Iraq, Haiti and Somalia.

In his third speech concerning Iraq, Clinton reminds the audience that the weapons inspectors who have been expelled from Iraq work for the United Nations, rather than the United States, when he says:

Six weeks ago, Saddam Hussein announced that he would no longer cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors, called UNSCOM. They are highly professional experts from dozens of countries. Their job is to oversee the elimination of Iraq's capability to retain, create and use weapons of mass destruction The inspectors undertook this mission . . . at the end of the Gulf War, when Iraq agreed to declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the cease-fire. (1998b, par. 3)

The United Nations has been defied by Iraq's actions; Iraq has gone back on an agreement which was made to end the Gulf War, and as such is threatening the safety of the community of nations.

Clinton says

the U. N. Security Council voted 15 to zero to condemn Saddam's actions and to demand that he immediately come into compliance. Eight Arab nations . . . warned that Iraq alone would bear the responsibility for the consequences of defying the U. N. (par. 6)

Iraq later "pledged to the U. N." (par. 7) that it would comply with UNSCOM, but "failed to cooperate" (par. 11): Iraq has "blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites" (par. 12), "restricted UNSCOM's ability to obtain . . . evidence" (par.13), and "obstructed UNSCOM's effort to photograph bombs" (par. 13). Clinton says he hopes Iraq will "comply with the relevant U. N. Security Council resolutions," but that we "have to be prepared that he [Hussein] will not" (par. 26). Through these statements, Clinton portrays the United Nations as the governing body of the community of nations – the U. N. determines what behaviors are acceptable to the community of nations and UNSCOM ensures that these behaviors are followed. These statements also serve to further isolate Iraq from the community of nations; by defying the U. N. and UNSCOM, Iraq has separated itself from its immediate neighbors (the Arab world) as well as the larger world community.

In his speech on Haiti, Clinton says that "the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean community, the six Central American Presidents all have sought a peaceful end to this crisis" (1994a, p. 1559). Since General Raoul Cédras has refused to cooperate by returning power to the rightfully elected leader of Haiti, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the United States and other nations must take action. Clinton says

In the face of this continued defiance and with atrocities rising, the United States has agreed to lead a multinational force to carry out the will of the United Nations. More than 20 countries from around the globe, including almost all the Caribbean community . . . have all agreed to join us because they think this problem in our neighborhood is important to their future interests. (p. 1559)

The United States, therefore, is not acting out of its own narrow self-interests, but is acting out of the interests of other nations. Clinton implies that America has reluctantly agreed to help – we have agreed to lead this fight even though it is in the best interests of many others to do so.

The New World Order drama will not end once American troops have ousted Cédra and restored democracy to Haiti. Clinton says that after this is done, “the international community, working together, must provide that economic, humanitarian, and technical assistance necessary to help the Haitians rebuild” (p. 1560). In doing so, a “much smaller U. S. force will join forces from other members of the United Nations” (p. 1560). This is an important part of this mission, in which “the nations of the world stand with us” (p. 1560). By mentioning the United Nations and other world powers, Clinton reinforces the idea that potentially equal moral actors must do what is best for all involved.

Clinton’s address on Somalia also relies on the United Nations as a symbol of the international community. He says that 28,000 American troops were originally sent to Somalia “as a part of a United Nations humanitarian mission” to end starvation and gang warfare (1993b, p. 1704). These troops were “reduced . . . from 28,000 down to less than 5,000, with other nations picking up where we left off” (p. 1704). However, at this time, “the people who caused much of the problem in the beginning started attacking American, Pakistani, and other troops who were there just to keep the peace” (p. 1704). So American troops were originally sent to

Somalia as part of a United Nations force; this force has now come under attack, with American as well as other soldiers being attacked by "gangs." Clinton says that the job of these forces is not to solve all of Somalia's problems, but that "the United Nations and many African states are more than willing to help" (p. 1704). Toward that end, more American troops are needed to

keep open and secure the roads, the port, and the lines of communication that are essential for the United Nations and the relief workers to keep the flow of food and supplies and people moving freely throughout the country so that starvation and anarchy do not return. (p. 1705)

It is America's job to assist the world community, led by the United Nations, in making Somalia a safer place and in ending starvation in anarchy. Clinton says that we are "taking military steps to protect our own people and to help the U. N. maintain a secure environment" (p. 1705), and that eventually, other nations will take our place. "Neighboring African states," he says, "have offered to take the lead" in these efforts (p. 1705). We are not acting in our self-interests alone, but are acting in accordance with what is best for everyone, particularly the Somalis.

Clinton clearly uses references to the United Nations as a part of the New World Order drama. These references serve to demonstrate that the United States is taking military action, not simply to further its own self-interests, but to do what is best for the world community. When these military actions take place in Europe, NATO is the symbolic representation of the community of nations. Much as the United Nations decides what is morally appropriate behavior for its member nations, NATO decides what is morally appropriate for its members.

Clinton's speeches on Bosnia and Serbia repeatedly mention NATO. In his speech on Bosnia, for example, he reminds listeners that in response to Bosnian Serb violence, "the United States led NATO's heavy and continuous air strikes" which helped force the Serbs to consider

“making peace” (1995, p. 1785). The speech then focuses on the implementation of that peace agreement, which will be enforced by NATO. Clinton says that “troops from our country and around the world would go into Bosnia to give them the confidence and support they need to implement their peace plan” (p. 1785). He says that

the only force capable of getting this job done is NATO, the powerful military alliance of democracies that has guaranteed our security for half a century now. And as NATO’s leader and the primary broker of the peace agreement, the United States must be an essential part of the mission. If we’re not there, NATO will not be there. (p. 1785)

The United States has led NATO throughout the unfolding of events in Bosnia, Clinton says, and therefore must send our military to enforce this peace agreement. This will be an international effort that will benefit all involved, he suggests, but it must be led by America. Clinton says that even now,

NATO is completing its planning for IFOR, an international force for peace in Bosnia of about 60,000 troops. Already more than 25 other nations, including our major NATO allies, have pledged to take part. They will contribute about two-thirds of the total implementation force The United States would contribute the rest (p. 1786)

These troops will not be sent to Bosnia in order to achieve the narrow self-interests of the United States, but will be sent in order to ensure a peace that will benefit all involved. Clinton says that the international community will help to implement arms control provisions of the agreement so that future hostilities are less likely and armaments are limited, while the world community, the United States and others, will also make sure that

the Bosnian Federation has the means to defend itself (p. 1786)

This mission will enable the Bosnian factions (Serbs, Muslims and Croats) to live together in peace. By undertaking this action, the world community will ensure that its members live up to high moral standards.

Clinton says that “later this week, the final NATO plan will be submitted to me for review and approval” (1995, p. 1786), and that “if the NATO plan meets with my approval, I will immediately send it to Congress and request its support” (p. 1786). This plan is clearly contingent upon United States – specifically Clinton’s – approval. He also points out that “American troops will take their orders from the American general who commands NATO” (p. 1786). This is an international effort in the interest of the world community, but the United States will lead. As Clinton says, “the people of Bosnia, our NATO allies, and people all around the world are now looking to America for leadership. So let us lead” (p. 1787). This speech is interesting because in it, Clinton makes use of the New World Order drama through specific reference to NATO while clearly establishing the prominence of the United States. So this speech utilizes the benefits of the New World Order drama (the persuasiveness of the “we’re doing what’s right for everyone” appeal) while clearly pointing out that American troops will remain under American command. Perhaps this argument is designed to show that America is not being dragged into another European conflict; America is the leader – not the follower – in this drama.

In his speech on the bombing of Serbia, Clinton also uses NATO to represent the international community. He says that NATO has been involved in the effort to bring peace to the Kosovo region for some time – “our diplomacy, backed by the threat of force from our NATO Alliance, stopped the fighting for a while” (1999, par. 5). He also says that “with our

allies and Russia, we proposed a peace agreement to end the fighting for good” (par. 5). This fighting has not ended, however, and so Clinton says that

on Sunday I sent Ambassador Dick Holbrooke to Serbia to make clear to him [President Milosevic] again, on behalf of the United States and our NATO allies, that he must honor his own commitments and stop his repression, or face military action. Again he refused. (par. 13)

The Serbs have refused to make peace, so “we and our 18 NATO allies agreed to do what we said we would do, what we must do to restore the peace” (par. 14). The international community, as represented by NATO, has been attempting to bring peace to this troubled region, and Milosevic and the Serbs have refused to live up to the moral standards of the New World Order. Therefore, they must be dealt with militarily.

Clinton says that if Milosevic realizes that “his present course is self-destructive and unsustainable . . . NATO has agreed to help to implement [the peace agreement] with a peace-keeping force” (par. 16). He reminds the audience that this will be a “mission to keep the peace” (par. 16) and that “the United States and the other 18 nations of NATO” have pledged to help the people of Kosovo if they “did the right thing” (par. 18). The “right thing,” of course, is to solve problems peacefully in a manner that reaches beyond narrow self-interests. Kosovo has agreed to do so – they have “struggled peacefully to get their rights back” (par. 4) – while Serbia has not, making the distinction between the heroes and the villains in this drama quite clear.

NATO and the United States are also portrayed as heroes in this drama. Clinton asks the audience to “imagine what would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way, as these people were massacred on NATO’s doorstep. That would discredit NATO” (par. 19). NATO and the United States must look beyond their own self-interests in order to do

what is right for others, namely the people of Kosovo. Clinton further develops this argument by illustrating what might happen if we do not take action.

Already, this movement [of Kosovar refugees] is threatening the young

democracy in Macedonia Already, Serbian forces have made forays into

Albania from which Kosovars have drawn support. Albania is a Greek minority.

Let a fire burn here and the flames will spread. Eventually, key U. S. allies could

be drawn into a wider conflict (par. 20)

America must get take this military action against Serbia because if we do not, the conflict in Kosovo will spread, eventually involving many members of the world community. The United States and NATO are heroes in this drama because they are willing to look beyond their own sacrifices and do what is right for all involved!

Summary

Clinton uses the New World Order drama in several different ways. He refers to the “international community,” the “community of nations” and the world “neighborhood” as a way of referencing the ideals of the New World Order. These ideals posit that nations should work together for the good of all; those who do so are heroes, those who do not are villains.

Therefore, Clinton and the United States are portrayed as heroes while Saddam Hussein, Raoul Cédras, Osama bin Laden and Slobodan Milosevic are portrayed as selfish villains. Clinton also uses the United Nations and NATO as symbols of this “world community.” The very titles themselves connote a cooperation of nations, but Clinton does not stop there. He shows how the United Nations and NATO operate with a concern for the good of all involved. Thus, the New World Order drama serves as justification for military intervention – Clinton has ordered various military actions in order to serve the best interests of the world community.

The Cold War Drama and Prophetic Dualism

Though the Cold War is over, Clinton still relies upon themes common to the Cold War drama. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this drama revolves around Wander's (1984/1997) idea of prophetic dualism. This drama contends that the United States is morally superior to its enemies and that conflicts and military actions are most often cases of right versus wrong. During the Cold War, Soviet actions could easily be portrayed as evil, while the United States' were good and pure, because our enemy was institutionalized and by its nature opposed to our way of life and our national interests. Our moral superiority demanded that we stand up against the evils of communism wherever they were present. Now that the Cold War is over, Clinton cannot rely on simple mention of the "Soviet menace" or communism in order to contrast our righteousness with our enemy's villainy. Yet he still uses the idea of prophetic dualism, contrasting the good of our actions and policies with the evil of other nations and groups who oppose us.

Moral Superiority and Opposition to Forces of Evil

Clinton illustrates the villainy and evil of the United States' enemies in a variety of ways. He points out that "armed Somali gang[s have] desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers" (1993b, p. 1703), soldiers who went to Somalia not to fight, but to "stop one of the great human tragedies of this time" (1993b, p. 1703) by helping to end starvation and gang warfare. Raoul Cédras, the dictator of Haiti, who controls "the most violent regime in our hemisphere" (1994a, p. 1559), has committed "human rights atrocities" (1994a, p. 1559) and has "conducted a reign of terror, executing children, raping women, killing priests" (1994a, p. 1559). Haitians have been "slain and mutilated, with body parts left as warnings to terrify others" and children have been "forced to watch as their mothers' faces are slashed with machetes" (1994a, p. 1558).

Terrorist groups led by Osama bin Laden would become the targets of United States air strikes in 1998. Clinton describes these groups in a particularly evil way. He says they practice “a fanatical glorification of violence, and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents” (1998a, par. 3). These same groups

killed American, Belgian and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the President of Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747s over the Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. They gunned down German tourists in Egypt. (1998a, par. 5)

Anyone who would plan to assassinate the Pope (a symbol of holiness to millions around the world) and murder innocent civilians must surely be evil. These terrorist groups are described by Clinton as “fanatics and killers” (1998a, par. 13) who promote evil and are therefore our enemies.

Saddam Hussein, a recurrent figure in Clinton’s crisis rhetoric (three of the eight speeches analyzed involve military action against Iraq), is also portrayed in a particularly heinous fashion. Clinton says that Hussein’s regime has “ruled by atrocity, slaughtered its own people, invaded two neighbors, attacked others, and engaged in chemical and environmental warfare” (1993a, p. 938), and that “with his acts of aggression and his weapons of mass destruction . . . he cannot be trusted” (1994b, p. 1726). Hussein will “resort to terrorism or aggression if left unchecked” (1993a, p. 938) and has demonstrated through his actions that he is “particularly loathsome and cowardly” (1993a, p. 938). We cannot allow Iraq to “threaten its neighbors or to intimidate the United Nations” (1994b, p. 1726) or to “rebuild its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs” (1998b, par. 19) and thereby threaten “the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world” (1998b, par. 29).

One of Clinton's most damning statements about Saddam Hussein is made during his December 16, 1998 speech on Iraq, in which he states:

Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there's one big difference: he has used them, not once but repeatedly – unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decade-long war, not only against soldiers, but against civilians; firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iran – not only against a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq. (1998b, par. 4)

Hussein is painted as an evil, cruel leader intent on wreaking havoc with his military might. He has no qualms about using weapons that the rest of the world denounces and has even used them against his own people. A leader who would gas his own civilians and who rules by a policy of intimidation and brutality must surely be evil.

Another leader that Clinton portrays as a wicked tyrant is Slobodan Milosevic. In announcing NATO air strikes against Serbia (designed to protect the people of Kosovo from the Serbian army), Clinton describes Milosevic and his followers as particularly brutal.

They've started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their houses. We've seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. (1999, par. 7)

Clinton reminds us of what Milosevic is capable of, reflecting on the war in Bosnia several years earlier where there were

innocent people herded into concentration camps, children gunned down by snipers on their way to school, soccer fields and parks turned into cemeteries; a quarter of a million people killed This was genocide in the heart of Europe, not in 1945, but in 1995 (par. 10)

Furthermore, Milosevic and the Serbians have refused to honor their own peace agreements; Clinton says that as Kosovo has agreed to the terms of peace, Serbia has “stationed 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo in preparation for a major offensive – and in clear violation of the commitments they had made” (par. 6). Milosevic is described as a genocidal maniac on a par with Adolph Hitler who cannot be trusted to honor his own agreements.

Clinton’s reference to the war in Bosnia and Milosevic’s involvement there during his 1999 address is especially interesting when one notices that in the 1995 speech announcing America’s intervention in that conflict, Milosevic is not mentioned by name even once. Indeed, it is hard to tell exactly who America’s enemy is supposed to be. Clinton says that by intervening, America will “help stop the killing of innocent civilians, especially children” (p. 1784). He describes the “warring ethnic groups, the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims” (1995, p. 1785) who have been involved in horrible acts:

Horrors we prayed had been banished from Europe forever have been seared into our minds again: skeletal prisoners caged behind barbed-wire fences; women and girls raped as a tool of war; defenseless men and boys shot down into mass graves, evoking visions of World War II concentration camps; and endless lines of refugees marching toward a future of despair. (p. 1785)

Clinton does not explain exactly who is responsible for these acts. He does, however, say that the United States has helped make peace between “two of the three warring parties, the Muslims

and the Croats” (p. 1785), and informs us that we have “imposed tough economic sanctions on Serbia” (p. 1785). Serbian shelling is said to have “once again turned Bosnia’s playgrounds and market-places into killing fields” (p. 1785) before NATO intervention “convinced the Serbs, finally, to start thinking about making peace” (p. 1785). Thus, the three parties have come to make a peace agreement that the United States must enforce. Serbia is described as the last of the three ethnic groups to agree to peace, but it is unclear whether Clinton is referring to Serbia when he mentions the “concentration camps,” “refugees” and the murder of innocent women and children.

Clinton’s speech on Bosnia is unique. Though the enemy is not as clearly defined as in other crisis situations, the United States is still portrayed as on the side of right, opposing wrongs that exist in the world – an essential tenet of the prophetic dualism model. We oppose the killing of innocent people and support peaceful solutions to conflicts whenever possible. We are committed to peace and are therefore opposed to war, although, ironically, we will use warlike methods to ensure that same peace. Prophetic dualism works by setting up two opposing sides – right versus wrong – and in this case, right versus wrong exists even though our enemy remains ambiguous. In a way, one might say that our enemy in this case is war itself – or chaos and disorder. (This idea will be discussed in depth a bit later on.)

Extolling the Virtues of America

In addition to describing the evil characteristics of our foes, Clinton calls upon the virtues of the American way of life so as to persuade Americans that we are intervening for a righteous cause rather than for some less noble motive. Words such as those detailed thus far serve to place the United States in a position of moral superiority by virtue of our opposition to those who practice evil deeds. Clinton further elaborates on this superiority by extolling the virtues of

the American way of life and American ideas of morality. For example, we must act in Haiti in order to “promote democracy in our hemisphere” (1994a, p. 1558). Clinton says that by forcing Haitian dictator Raoul Cédras from power, we can restore the “promise of liberty” that Cédras and his regime have “snuffed out” (1994a, p. 1558). We are opposed to Osama bin Laden and are targets of his terrorist activities “because we are leaders; because we act to advance peace, democracy and basic human values; because we’re the most open society on Earth” (1998a, par. 15). Acting against Serbia with air strikes is described as “a moral imperative” (1999, par. 8) which will stop the oppression of innocent Kosovars.

Clinton often closes his addresses to the nation with comments about American beliefs and values. In his address on Somalia (1993b), Clinton says “Let us demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us, that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right” (p. 1705). He then expresses his “thanks and . . . gratitude and . . . profound sympathy to the families of the young Americans who were killed in Somalia” (p. 1706). By doing so, Clinton extols the virtues of hard work and sacrifice, two staples of the American value system.

In closing his speech on Haiti (1994a), Clinton compares the Haitian people to early Americans, who more than 200 years ago took up arms against a tyrant whose forces occupied their land. But they were a stubborn bunch, a people who fought for their freedoms and appealed to all those who believed in democracy to help their cause. And their cries were answered, and a new nation was born, a nation that ever since has believed that the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness should be denied to none. (p. 1561)

By comparing the current situation in Haiti to the situation faced by our founders, Clinton elevates the struggle of the Haitians to a mythical level. Just as Washington, Franklin, Jefferson and others fought against tyranny, so to do the Haitians. And the Haitians need our help. Clinton appeals to our obligation to help Haiti by mentioning that our founders “appealed to all those who believed in democracy to help their cause” – if we truly believe in democracy, we must come to the aid of the Haitians. And he says, our founders’ “cries were answered, and a new nation was born” – Washington, Franklin and Jefferson couldn’t have created the greatest nation on earth without help. It would be unacceptable, therefore, to turn our backs on neighbors who are so much like our revered founding fathers. Our superior moral character demands action.

In other closing remarks, Clinton refers to our “progress in building a world of greater security, peace, and democracy” (1994b, p. 1726) and our “responsibility as Americans” to lead the world (1995, p. 1787). He talks about our armed men and women who are acting “for the sake of our values and our children’s future” (1999, par. 26). And, in his address on the bombing of terrorist targets, Clinton says that “we will defend our people, our interests and our values. We will help people of all faiths, in all parts of the world, who want to live free of fear and violence” (1998a, par. 17). These comments emphasize American beliefs in world leadership, democracy and freedom. They also show that we are indeed acting because of our values, rather than out of the desire for some tangible reward like land or resources (this, of course, is what motivates our morally inferior enemies). These comments also suggest that we will help others who share our beliefs.

It should also be noted that Clinton closes all of his speeches with some form of the phrase “God bless America.” The only two variations are “may God bless the people of the

United States and the cause of freedom” (1994a, p. 1561), and “may God bless our country” (1998a, par. 18). With God on our side, we must be right, so these words help show the superior moral character of Americans. They also serve the important function of legitimizing the idea of a foreign policy based on morality – when the President of the United States invokes God during a speech on foreign military intervention, he appeals to and furthers the idea that we are acting in accordance with God’s will, an important concept in the ideology of prophetic dualism (Wander, 1984/1997).

Conclusions are not the only instances in which Clinton uses appeals to American values. In other instances, he mentions the Cold War directly as he talks about the superiority of the American experience. In his speech on Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, Clinton says:

America has embodied an idea that has become the ideal for billions of people throughout the world. Our Founders said it best: America is about life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In this century especially, America has done more than simply stand for these ideals. We have acted on them and sacrificed for them. Our people fought two World Wars so that freedom could triumph over tyranny We made the commitments that kept the peace, that helped to spread democracy, that created unparalleled prosperity, and that brought victory in the Cold War. (1995, p. 1784)

Clinton’s mention of the Cold War is important; indeed, he mentions the Cold War specifically in five of his speeches announcing military action. A look at the other ways in which Clinton refers to the Cold War will provide further insight.

In his address on Haiti, Clinton says that “in the Post-Cold war world, we will assure the security and prosperity of the United States with our military strength, our economic power, our

constant efforts to promote peace and growth” (1994a, p. 1560). Democracy brings peace, prosperity and security; we must continue to stand up for democracy, just as we did during the Cold War, because it is ultimately a superior way of life. As the greatest example of democracy in the modern world, the United States has a moral obligation to encourage its expansion. This idea is also present when Clinton refers to the Cold War in his speech on Somalia. He states that if we do not act to preserve the peace in Somalia, “our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold War world” (1993b, p. 1705). Clinton seems to be suggesting that our leadership role in the world is even greater now that the Cold War is over – as victors of the Cold War we have an obligation to the causes of freedom and democracy. Clinton endorses our role in expanding democracy once more as he describes the importance of sending troops back to the Persian Gulf. He says that these troops are “protecting our security as we work for a post-Cold War world of democracy and prosperity” (1994b, p. 1726).

One major role of the United States in the post-Cold War world, then, has not changed dramatically. We must still work toward a peaceful democratic world. However, the ideology espoused by Clinton seems to be wary of declaring the world “safer” than it was 15 years ago. Take, for example, Clinton’s description of Slobodan Milosevic, “a dictator who has done nothing since the Cold War ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious division” (1999, par. 9). Evil still exists in the world, and it is still our job as a morally superior nation to oppose it. Clinton most clearly states this belief when, in his first address on Iraq, he says that “while the Cold War has ended, the world is not free of danger” (1993a, p. 939). He elaborates on this idea in his address on Bosnia when he states that

We're all vulnerable to the organized forces of intolerance and destruction; terrorism; ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries; the spread of organized crime and weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking. *Just as surely as fascism and communism*, these forces also threaten freedom and democracy, peace and prosperity. (1995, p. 1784 – italics mine)

Thus, according to the ideology expressed by Clinton, the Cold War is over and the Soviet threat has abated, but America still has enemies. One major enemy has been defeated, but other lesser enemies have sprung up to take its place. These enemies are just as evil – as we have seen, Clinton spares no words in describing how heinous these new enemies are in contrast to the moral righteousness of America.

This view of America's role in the *post-Cold War* world is not too different from that espoused by our leaders *during* the Cold War in that the United States must still defend and promote democracy and the American way of life. However, the Cold War drama does not exist in the way that it used to. The arguments in support of military action that we have looked at thus far are based on America's moral superiority and clearly illustrate Wander's (1984/1997) idea of prophetic dualism. However, no mention is made of communism or the Soviet Union (except to remind listeners that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat). The United States is still positioned as an agent of good and our enemies as agents of evil, but we are no longer opposed to the *institutionalized* evil of communism. The evils faced by the United States have various faces – dictators, genocidal maniacs, terrorists, etc. – and democracy is certainly portrayed as the force of righteousness. In this way, morality is still an official part of United States foreign policy, as it was during the Cold War.

Scholars have pointed out that the Cold War drama is based on the idea of prophetic dualism (Hollihan, 1986, Stuckey, 1995). But is prophetic dualism a valid ideology outside of the Cold War drama? Without the Cold War as an ongoing world event, President Clinton obviously cannot portray democratic America as a force of righteousness in comparison to the evils of the communist Soviet Union. It should be clear thus far that Clinton does in fact use the strategy of comparing the good America to its evil enemies, but our enemy is no longer institutionalized – each case for military intervention must be made on its own merits. Prophetic dualism still exists, but the Cold War drama per se is clearly no longer useful as a way of motivating the public to support military intervention in foreign lands. When Clinton does mention the Cold War directly, it is primarily to remind Americans that the fundamental values we “fought” for during the Cold War must still be adhered to. However, when using the concept of prophetic dualism to illustrate differences between America and its enemies, Clinton must do so without the trappings of the Cold War. Thus, the ideology of prophetic dualism has in a way been reborn, or perhaps more appropriately has shed the skin of the Cold War and has continued on in a different form.

If our primary enemy is no longer the communist way of life, do we have an enemy common to all of the crisis situations Clinton is responding to? Prophetic dualism requires that American righteousness be contrasted with the evil of our enemies. In the post-Cold War world, chaos and instability are those enemies.

The Fight Against Instability

Clinton cannot portray communism as a threat to America in the way that former presidents have. The Cold War is no longer an overriding theme that influences presidential crisis rhetoric. However, there is another common theme in Clinton’s crisis rhetoric that is

worthy of attention. Clinton suggests that instability and disorder are enemies we must defeat in order to give other people a chance at democracy and in order to make the world a safer place. No one leader or group or institution is responsible for all of this chaos, but by looking at Clinton's references to it, we can see how this is an important part of his crisis rhetoric.

In announcing military action in Somalia, Clinton refers to the "anarchy that . . . prevailed in that country" (1993b, p. 1703) when American troops were originally sent to the country one year earlier. This anarchy caused the "agonizing death of starvation" (p. 1703) for millions of people. By reinforcing these troops now, Clinton says, we will "keep the flow of food and supplies and people moving freely throughout the country so that starvation and anarchy do not return" (p. 1705). Ours is a primarily a peacekeeping mission — as Clinton says, "we did not go to Somalia with a military purpose" (p. 1704-1705). After this mission of peacekeeping is complete, African nations will be able to help "build a settlement among the Somali people that can preserve order and security" (p. 1705).

Another nation which is enveloped in chaos, according to Clinton, is Haiti. He says that one of the goals of our intervention here is "to secure our borders, and to preserve stability" (1994a, p. 1558). Specifically, Clinton refers to the "atrocities" occurring in Haiti — the "terrifying pattern of soldiers and policemen raping the wives and daughters of suspected political dissidents . . . people slain and mutilated, with body parts left as warnings to terrify others" (p. 1558). "The terror, the desperation, and the instability will not end," Clinton says, until the Cédras regime is removed from power (p. 1560). Violence is rampant in Haiti, and it has caused great instability. Children, for example, have "fled the orphanages for the streets" and "can't even sleep there because they're so afraid" (p. 1558). If we do not act to end this violence and instability, we could see a "wave of refugees at our door" (p. 1559). Clinton says

that there may even be a “mass exodus of refugees” which will create a “constant threat to stability in our region and control of our borders” (p. 1559). Clinton elaborates on this idea that instability in Haiti could create instability in America:

History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America’s security and prosperity. Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace and to stabilize our region . . . Restoring Haiti’s democratic government will help lead to more stability and prosperity in our region, just as our actions in Panama and Grenada did. (p. 1560)

As if these appeals were not enough, Clinton suggests that we should be mindful of this situation because even countries from the other side of the world are concerned. “More than 20 countries from around the world,” including Poland, Israel, Jordan, Bangladesh, Belgium and Great Britain have “agreed to join us because they think this problem in our neighborhood is important to their future interests and their security” (p. 1559). The situation in Haiti affects not only the stability of Haiti and the United States, but the stability of the world.

Interestingly, less than one month later, in his speech on October 10, 1994 on Iraq, Clinton begins by updating listeners on the situation in Haiti. He says that the dictators who brought so much instability to Haiti have resigned and that “President Aristide will return home to resume his rightful place” soon (1994b, p. 1725). All this is because of the hard work of our troops who are “keeping America’s commitment to restore democracy” (p. 1726). “The level of violence is down,” Clinton says, “the Parliament is back, refugees are returning from Guantanamo” (p. 1725). Order has been restored.

Clinton speaks of the need for stability in Europe in his two addresses on the region formerly known as Yugoslavia. In his address on implementing the peace agreement in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, he says that we must act to “bring stability to Central Europe” (1995, p. 1784). For the past four years, he says, “a terrible war has torn Bosnia apart” (p. 1784-1785). As in other speeches, Clinton describes the chaos of war, with shelling turning civilian marketplaces and playgrounds into “killing fields” (p. 1785). “Two million people,” he says, “half the population, were forced from their homes and into a miserable life as refugees” (p. 1785). Ending this bloodshed will secure peace in Bosnia, and it will help make Europe more stable as well. As Clinton puts it,

Securing peace in Bosnia will also help to build a free and stable Europe. Bosnia lies at the very heart of Europe, next-door to many of its fragile new democracies and some of our closest allies. Generations of Americans have understood that Europe’s freedom and Europe’s stability is [sic] vital to our own national security.

We must act with our NATO partners, Clinton says, or the chaos of war will resume — “the peace will collapse; the war will reignite, the slaughter of innocents will begin again” (p. 1785). And, the conflict “could spread like poison throughout the region, [and] eat away at Europe’s stability” (p. 1786). By acting, we will stop the spread of instability and allow “the people of Bosnia . . . [to] return to their homes, vote in free elections, and begin to rebuild their lives” (p. 1786).

In his second address concerning the former Yugoslavia, Clinton again refers to the idea of acting in order to preserve the stability of Europe. We are acting, he says, against the Serbian army which is “responsible for the brutality in Kosovo” (1999, par. 1). This brutality has caused “tens of thousands of people” to flee to the hills (par. 5). Without our intervention, Clinton says, the people of Kosovo will not be able to live in their own homes “without having to fear for their own lives” (par. 18). “This is not a war in the traditional sense,” he says, but it is rather “an

attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people” (par. 7). And it may spread, if we do not act now: “we act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results” (par. 2). Kosovo “sits on a major fault line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East,” and “all around Kosovo there are other small countries, struggling with their own economic and political challenges – countries that could be overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo” (par. 8). Clinton reminds us that a few years earlier, “two million Bosnians became refugees” (par. 10) when a similar war broke out in that region.

There is great instability in Kosovo, Clinton is saying, and it will spread if we do not stop it. If we do not act to put an end to this instability, “there will be many more massacres, tens of thousands more refugees, more victims crying out for revenge” (par. 17). These refugees are already spreading to neighboring countries, Clinton says, and “already, this movement is threatening the young democracy in Macedonia” (par. 20). Clinton claims that the instability that follows these refugees into other lands could eventually draw “key U. S. allies” into “a wider conflict” (par. 20). Clinton summarizes this argument when he says:

If we’ve learned anything from the century drawing to a close, it is that if America is going to be prosperous and secure, we need a Europe that is prosperous, secure, undivided and free. We need a Europe that is coming together, not falling apart; a Europe that shares our values and shares the burdens or leadership. That is the foundation on which the security of our children will depend. (par. 22)

This “vision of a peaceful, secure, united, stable Europe” involves “ending instability in the Balkans so that these bitter ethnic problems in Europe are resolved [with] the force of argument,

not the force of arms” (par. 24). Clinton reminds us that instability in this region led to World War I and that “World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region” (par. 9). This vision of a stable and secure Europe is therefore necessary in order to keep our own nation stable. In short, “our children need and deserve a peaceful, stable, free Europe” (par. 25).

Clinton further addresses the issue of stability in his speech to the nation on the bombing of suspected terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. He portrays the group led by Osama bin Laden as promoting chaos, fear and destruction throughout the world. “Our target was terror,” Clinton (1998a, par. 2) says. We have undertaken military action against bin Laden, “the preeminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today” (par. 2). Bin Laden and his followers practice “a distortion of their religion” and “justify the murder of innocents” (par. 3). These terrorists have

killed . . . peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the President of Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747s over the Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. They gunned down tourists in Egypt. (par. 5)

And recently, these terrorists have bombed two United States embassies, where “12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives” (par. 6). These acts, according to Clinton, were designed to undermine the rule of law and to create fear and chaos. The very mention of specific terrorist activities suggests chaos and instability – what if innocent peacekeepers lived in fear for their lives? What if world leaders were assassinated? What if airline passengers and international tourists had to constantly look over their shoulders for fear of being murdered? If bin Laden and his associates had their way, Clinton suggests, the world would be a much less stable place. The mere mention of terrorism conjures up images of chaos

and destruction – by mentioning these specific (planned) acts, Clinton conjures up images of instability by reminding listeners that people live in fear when they are constantly on the lookout for terrorist violence.

Clinton elaborates on this idea when he says that our battle against terrorism is a “long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism; between the rule of law and terrorism” (par. 14). It will continue to be a struggle which will help those “who want to live free of fear and violence” (par. 17). In this struggle, we have taken steps already which are designed to promote stability around the world. We have “quietly disrupted terrorist groups and foiled their plots. We have isolated countries that practice terrorism. We’ve worked to build an international coalition against terror” (par. 7). American “law enforcement” has been used to “bring to trial those guilty of attacks” on American soil (par. 7). Clinton says he ordered air strikes against these terrorist facilities because not doing so “would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact” (par. 16) – we have acted in order to stop bin Laden’s ability to create chaos around the world.

Saddam Hussein, a recurring figure in Clinton’s crisis rhetoric, is portrayed as a rogue leader and the creator of great instability in the Persian Gulf. Evidence of this is given by Clinton in three separate speeches concerning military action against Iraq.

The first of these occurred in 1993 when Clinton announced that he had ordered air strikes against Iraq because of a plot by Hussein to assassinate former President George Bush. Clinton says that Hussein has “demonstrated repeatedly that he will resort to terrorism or aggression if left unchecked,” and has supported “outlaw behavior” over the years (1993a, p. 938). Iraq has “repeatedly refused” to “return to the community of nations,” and Clinton warns Hussein not to “contemplate further illegal actions” (p. 939). The “illegal actions” Clinton is

referring to include an alleged plot by Iraqi intelligence to “assassinate former President George Bush” (p. 938). This plot, Clinton says, is nothing less than terrorism; we must oppose such terrorism clearly and forcefully, not only to “deter further violence against our people,” but to “affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations” (p. 938). A leader like Saddam Hussein, Clinton suggests, is dangerous because he refuses to cooperate with the rest of the world and will even resort to “loathsome and cowardly” terrorist acts (p. 938), acts which create instability by their very nature. As he points out, “America’s security has depended on the clarity of this message: Don’t tread on us” p. 938). We must keep order in the world, especially when it concerns our own citizens, because our national security depends on it.

Clinton’s second speech concerning Iraq and Saddam Hussein begins with a direct reference to stability and order. He says that America is taking actions “to preserve stability in the Persian Gulf in the face of Saddam Hussein’s provocative actions” (1994b, p. 1725). Iraq has been massing troops along the Kuwaiti border, Clinton says, and “the United States and the international community have given their word that Iraq must respect the borders of its neighbors” (p. 1726). He reminds us of the Gulf War and says that our mission to keep the region stable continues:

Three and a half years ago, the men and women of our armed forces, under the strong leadership of President Bush, General Powell, and General Schwarzkopf, fought to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to protect our interests in that vital region. Today we remain committed to defending the integrity of that nation and to protecting the stability of Gulf region. (p. 1726).

Clinton says that Hussein’s recent actions – assembling troops along the Kuwaiti border – are similar to his actions in 1990 when he “assembled a force on the border . . . and then invaded”

(p. 1726). Because Hussein “cannot be trusted” (p. 1726), we must assume that his intention is to violate the sanctity of Kuwait’s borders and once again bring war and instability to the Persian Gulf. “We will not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors,” Clinton says (p. 1726). Iraq’s only option is “full compliance, not reckless provocation” (p. 1726). This compliance will help to preserve “Kuwait’s freedom and the security of the Gulf” (p. 1726). By sending troops to the Gulf now, America is working to “make the world a safer place” and is “making progress in building a world of greater security, peace, and democracy” (p. 1726).

In his third speech on Iraq, Clinton again states that Hussein “must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world” (1998b, par. 1). This time Hussein is creating potential instability not with troop movements, but with his refusal to allow United Nations inspectors to search for weapons of mass destruction, including “nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons” (par. 1). Hussein’s “deception has defeated their [the inspectors’] effectiveness” (par. 16). By hiding evidence and now by refusing to allow inspections, he is presenting “a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere” (par. 17). He is behaving recklessly, and Clinton tells Hussein “if you act recklessly, you will pay a heavy price” (par. 22). The United States will fight instability and has undertaken military action in order to “degrade his [Hussein’s] ability to threaten his neighbors” (par. 22). Clinton sums up the idea that America is a force for stability while Hussein is an agent of chaos when he says

In the century we’re leaving, America has often made the difference between chaos and community; fear and hope. Now, in a new century, we’ll have a remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past – but only if we stand strong against the enemies of peace. (par . 34)

One of those enemies of peace – and stability – is clearly Saddam Hussein.

In each of the eight speeches detailed above, Clinton describes instability and chaos as “enemies” that must be defeated. Whether that instability takes place because of anarchy (Somalia), political and ethnic atrocities and the resulting flood of refugees (Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo), terrorism (the bin Laden “network”), or rogue nations threatening war (Saddam Hussein and Iraq), it is a force to be reckoned with. Instability has replaced communism as the theme against which foreign policy is explained within the prophetic dualism model. The idea of prophetic dualism no longer focuses on communism as America’s evil enemy; it now focuses on instability and disorder as the forces of evil. America is still the force of righteousness – democracy is promoted through military intervention designed to counteract the forces of instability rather than the forces of communism.

Evaluation of the Power Politics, New World Order, and Cold War Dramas

In each of his eight speeches to the nation announcing military action, Clinton draws on three distinct dramatic forms to construct arguments justifying the use of that action. He provides arguments based on America’s best interests (technocratic realism and Power Politics) and arguments based on the best interests of the world community (the New World Order). The Cold War drama obviously cannot be used in exactly the same way as it was in that past, since the Cold War is now over. However, Clinton draws on the idea of prophetic dualism, a key to the Cold War drama. And, as we have seen, instability and chaos have replaced communism as our enemy in the prophetic dualism model. Clinton’s crisis rhetoric therefore contains elements of the Power Politics drama, the New World Order drama and a modified version of the Cold War drama.

The major goal of this study is to determine what, if any, worldview has come to replace the Cold War as justification for military intervention. It is clear that the Cold War drama has been significantly modified now that institutionalized communism is no longer a perceived – or expressed – threat. So, according to the rhetoric of Bill Clinton, the fight against communism is not an overriding theme in foreign policy. Clinton does rely on the New World Order and Power Politics dramas, however. These two appear contradictory at first, but Clinton does indeed provide arguments for military intervention based on America's self-interests as well as arguments based on the subversion of our own interests to the interests of the "world community." One might conclude, as Stuckey (1995) has, that post-Cold War presidents are left searching for a world view that can justify foreign policy in a variety of circumstances and that as a result, each case must be justified on its own merits. However, there does appear to be one overriding theme to Clinton's crisis rhetoric.

Chapter 3:

The Search for a New Foreign Policy; the United States as the "World's Policeman"

This study was undertaken to determine how Clinton uses the Power Politics, New World Order and Cold War dramas. In undertaking this analysis, another drama unexpectedly emerged. This narrative or theme is that of the "world's policemen" or "policeman." This drama is specifically referenced by Clinton when he says "I know that the United States cannot, indeed we should not, be the world's policemen" (Clinton, 1994a, p. 1559), and "America cannot and must not be the world's policeman" (Clinton, 1995, p. 1784). Clinton makes these statements as if to suggest that American military involvement should not be thought of as police-like action; however, it is clear by looking at the dramatic and metaphorical elements in his addresses that police action is an appropriate frame through which to view American foreign policy.

In this Chapter, I argue that the World's Policeman drama ought to be considered a fourth paradigm that can help us to understand American foreign policy. The World's Policeman drama serves to characterize the United States as a hero working to bring peace throughout the world through police-type actions. Villains in this drama are those who bring instability, chaos, violence and unrest. These villains are compared to criminals in that they have no respect for law and order and the sanctity of human life. The World's Policeman model serves as a master metaphor, much in the way that the Cold War served as a master metaphor for roughly forty years: it generates other metaphors and guides our view of the world. By relying on this drama and the metaphors it generates, Clinton reveals an ideology that justifies the use of military force – this ideology is present in each and every address in which he announces military action. As we shall see, this drama subsumes the other three dramas thus far analyzed.

Clinton relies on the Power Politics, New World Order and modified Cold War dramas; all three of these dramas can be seen as part of the World's Policeman drama.

Analysis

Clinton's first address to the nation on military intervention easily fits the mold of a police action. He describes a crime (the plot to assassinate former President Bush) which has been investigated by police agencies (intelligence and law enforcement), the verdict (guilty), and the punishment that has been meted out (bombing of Iraqi intelligence headquarters). Clinton says that a "car bombing plot to assassinate former President George Bush" has been uncovered (1993a, p. 938). Kuwaiti authorities, who discovered this plot, "arrested 16 suspects" (p. 938). At this time, Clinton says,

I ordered our own intelligence and law enforcement agencies to conduct a thorough and independent investigation. Over the past several weeks, officials from those agencies reviewed a range of intelligence information, traveled to Kuwait and elsewhere, extensively interviewed the suspects, and thoroughly examined the forensic evidence. (p. 938)

Clinton specifically mentions "law enforcement" and also uses police terminology like "investigation," the "interviewing" of "suspects" and "forensic evidence." These words serve to compare American actions to the actions of police who investigate crimes by interviewing witnesses and searching through forensic evidence. "Based on their investigation," he says, "there is compelling evidence" that this plot did indeed exist (p. 938). This compelling evidence has led Clinton to conclude that this plot was real and to order cruise missile attacks on Iraq (p. 938). Clinton later refers to "Iraq's crime" (p. 938), Saddam Hussein's support of "outlaw behavior" (p. 938) and his regime's contemplation of "further illegal provocative actions" (p.

939). He says that our “law enforcement agencies who carried out the investigation” are worthy of praise for their work (p. 939). By describing the events in Iraq and Kuwait in this manner, Clinton portrays the situation as one in which police-type agencies have investigated a crime, Clinton himself has declared Iraq guilty, and has ordered Iraq to be punished. Thus, the United States is an agent of law enforcement – investigating crimes and responding with swift action when necessary.

Another case that clearly fits the police drama is Clinton’s speech announcing the bombing of suspected terrorist facilities. Clinton begins by detailing the crimes that have been committed. He says that terrorist groups, led by Osama bin Laden, have “killed . . . peacekeepers,” “plotted to assassinate the President of Egypt and the Pope,” “planned to bomb six United States 747s,” “bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan” and “gunned down German tourists in Egypt” (1998a, par. 5). More recently, they have bombed American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, where “12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives, and another 5,000 were wounded” (par. 6). The perpetrators of this crime have been uncovered by “law enforcement”(par. 7) and “intelligence” (par. 6) sources. As Clinton says,

There is convincing information from our intelligence community that the bin Laden terrorist network was responsible for these bombings. Based on this information, we have high confidence that these bombings were planned, financed, and carried out by the organization bin Laden leads. (par. 6)

This passage suggests that an investigation was carried out and that from this investigation, bin Laden and his followers have been identified as suspects.

Further suggestion of the role of police-type agencies in tracking terrorists comes when Clinton reminds listeners that

America has battled terrorism for many years. Where possible, we've used law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight. The long arm of American law has reached out around the world and brought to trial those guilty of attacks in New York and Virginia and in the Pacific. We have quietly disrupted terrorist groups and foiled their plots. (par. 7).

According to Clinton, America has long acted as a police-agent as it has investigated crimes by terrorists – this practice continues today. Particularly important are Clinton's mention of "law enforcement . . . tools," the "long arm of the law," and bringing "to trial" the guilty parties. By using these types of phrases, Clinton compares United States foreign policy against terrorism to police action. This use of metaphor suggests that Government agencies act as police do: investigating crimes, tracking down criminals, and bringing them before the courts.

Clinton further invokes police-like images by mentioning "law enforcement" several times. He expresses "gratitude to our intelligence and law enforcement agencies" (par. 12) and says that this is "a long, ongoing struggle between . . . the rule of law and terrorism" (par. 14). Clinton also says that "there have been, and will be, times when law enforcement . . . tools are simply not enough" (par. 8). He says that with "compelling evidence" that the bin Laden network "was planning to mount further attacks" (par. 8), the time for military intervention has come. In order to "defend our people," as well as people "in all parts of the world, who want to live free of fear and violence" (par. 17), Clinton says he has ordered air strikes against suspected facilities run by bin Laden and his followers. This speech is similar to Clinton's first speech in that a crime (terrorist bombings) has been investigated (by law enforcement), a verdict has been rendered, and punishment has been delivered (bombing of terrorist facilities). In this case, Clinton points out that normally, government's role in this police action would result in a trial,

but because of the imminent threat of further terrorist acts, air strikes will serve as punishment.

Clinton's address on Haiti also contains elements of the police drama. Clinton details the crimes committed by Haiti's dictator, including "executing children, raping women, killing priests" (1994a, p. 1558). In describing these acts he says that reporters have "documented the slaying of Haitian orphans," and that a priest "was murdered" – "executed on the doorstep of his home" (p. 1558). "International observers," he says, have uncovered a pattern of Haitian soldiers "raping the wives and daughters of suspected political dissidents" (p. 1558). Clinton says that in light of these crimes, "the United Nations Security Council [has] approved a resolution that authorizes the use of all necessary means, including force, to remove the Haitian dictators from power" (p. 1559). The United States will be joined, he says, by nations who understand that "this problem in our neighborhood is important to their future interests and their security" (p. 1559). At this point in the speech, Clinton makes an interesting statement. He says:

The United States cannot, indeed we should not, be the world's policemen. And I know that this is a time with the Cold War over that so many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our borders. But when brutality occurs close to our shores, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act. (p. 1559)

This statement appears to be designed as a counter-argument to those who would call this a police action. Clinton concedes that we should not try to be the world's policemen, *but*, considering the proximity of Haiti to the United States, we really have no choice. So his counter-argument really serves to legitimize this as a police action. It is almost as if Clinton has said "I know we cannot be the world's policemen *all the time*, but in *this case*, we must be."

Clinton goes on to say that our military intervention will have two parts. First, we will “remove [the] dictators from power” (p. 1560) and restore Haiti’s rightful government. Then, he says,

We will train a civilian-controlled Haitian security force that will protect the people rather than repress them. During this period, police monitors from all around the world will work with the authorities to maximize basic security and civil order and minimize retribution. (p. 1560)

This statement is filled with references to police action – “security forces” will “protect” citizens, “police monitors” and “the authorities” will make Haiti safe and keep it civilized. The dramatic elements of this speech and Clinton’s choice of words serve to portray this particular use of military force as a police action. Cédras and his “thugs” (p. 1558) are out-of-control criminals; American military intervention is the police action that will bring them to justice and restore peace and order to Haiti.

Clinton describes our mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a peacekeeping mission. He says that our role will be not about fighting a war, but about “helping the people of Bosnia to secure their own peace agreement” (1995, p. 1784). We have the opportunity, Clinton says, to “help stop the killing of innocent civilians, especially children” (p. 1784). Specifically, he says, we have already used our military to “enforce a no-fly zone” and have “helped to make peace between two of the three warring parties” (p. 1785). A new peace agreement has been made, Clinton says, in which the three ethnic groups in Bosnia have “agreed to put down their guns, to preserve Bosnia as a single state, to investigate and prosecute war criminals, to protect the human rights of all citizens, to try to build a peaceful, democratic future” (p. 1785). Our role in Bosnia, in other words, is to stop the killing of civilians by “enforcing” the agreement that

Bosnians have made, which includes the investigation and prosecution of criminals as well as keeping the peace. The Bosnian factions have already said they will “put down their guns,” it is up to us to make sure they do so. We must “help to secure the Bosnian peace”; we have the chance to “build a peace and stop the suffering” in Bosnia (p. 1785). In order to do this, American troops will “maintain the cease-fire” and “help create a secure environment” (p. 1786).

Thus, American military involvement in Bosnia can be seen as another police action. Our role is described as upholding the peace agreement, much as the police uphold the law. Again, Clinton portrays our actions as police-like while arguing against our becoming the “world’s policeman.”

America cannot and must not be the world’s policeman. We cannot stop all war for all time, but we can stop some wars. We cannot save all women and all children, but we can save many of them. We can’t do everything, but we must do what we can. (p. 1784)

This seems to be an argument for *limited* police-like involvement around the world. Much like his similar comments in his address concerning Haiti, Clinton seems to be arguing that while we should not see ourselves as the world’s policeman (or *policemen*), certain circumstances demand that we act in just such a capacity; at times we must enforce peace, investigate criminals, quell unrest and uphold the rule of law. This view of America’s role in the world is necessary and has certain benefits, according to Clinton. We are vulnerable to “ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries; the spread of organized crime and weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking” (p. 1784). Note Clinton’s use of the phrases “organized crime” and “drug trafficking.” These forces, as well as the others mentioned, “threaten freedom and democracy” (p. 1784), thereby

demanding our attention. Police-like intervention creates “a chance to build a peace and stop the suffering” (p. 1785) and “is the right thing to do” (p. 1784). By acting in this way in Bosnia – and by extension, in other similar circumstances – “we can defend our fundamental values as a people and serve our most basic, strategic interests” (p. 1784).

Clinton’s speech on Kosovo is similar to his speech on Bosnia, in that both instances of military involvement are portrayed as actions that will help to make the world safer through the “enforcement” of peace. Clinton says that the people of Kosovo have been “stripped of their constitutional autonomy” and denied the right to “speak their language, run their schools, shape their daily lives” (1999, par. 4). The Kosovars have “struggled peacefully to get their rights back” (par. 4), but the Serbians, led by Slobodan Milosevic, have responded violently by “shelling civilians” and shooting “innocent people” in “cold blood” (par. 7). Milosevic has “sent his troops and police to crush” the Kosovars. To make matters worse, Clinton implies, America and its allies have recently proposed a peace agreement, which Serbia has “refused even to discuss” (par. 6). Kosovo wants peace, but Serbia wants war. Therefore, Clinton says, America and its NATO allies have “agreed to do what we said we would do, what we must do to restore the peace” (par. 14). America and NATO will enforce the peace if Serbia will not agree to do so willingly. As Clinton says, “if President Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit his ability to make war” (par. 14).

The use of military force in Kosovo is likened to police action in that it is described as a peace-keeping mission. Clinton says we will do “what we must do to restore the peace” (par. 14). He explains that he does not “intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war,” but that these troops will be a “peace-keeping force” (par. 16). By acting now we are “advancing the cause for peace” (par. 2). This action is also one designed to protect the people of Kosovo; we

must act to help “defenseless people” (par. 17) who are in “fear for their own lives” (par. 18). Clinton also uses the word “security” many times: our actions will help make Europe “secure” (par. 22); a stable Europe is essential for “the security of our children” (par. 22); we must meet the challenge of a “peaceful, secure, united, stable Europe” (par. 23). Thus, as in Bosnia, American military force is needed in order to restore peace and order in an unstable region of the world. This action can be seen as a police drama because of the elements of peace-keeping and protection for the population against those who have been described as oppressive and even criminal.

Two of Clinton’s addresses contain less detailed and lengthy use of the World’s Policeman drama and use of police-type metaphors. However, these speeches also add to the overall image of the United States as police officer or police agency.

In Clinton’s second address to the nation concerning military action, he details the “anarchy” in Somalia that has drawn American involvement. These images of anarchy are contrasted with images of American troops who have “created a secure environment” (1993b, p. 1704). These troops are in Somalia to “keep the peace” (p. 1704). “We did not go to Somalia with a military purpose” Clinton says (p. 1704-1705), but to “keep open and secure the roads, the port, and the lines of communication” (p. 1705). American troops are in Somalia to “prevent a return to anarchy” (p. 1705). Clinton points out that our role will be supplemented with efforts of other nations who will “deploy more troops to Somalia to assure that security will remain when we’re gone” and will “preserve order and security” (p. 1705). The situation in Somalia is one in which anarchy has created the need for military intervention, much in the same way that police would intervene in a riot in order to “keep the peace.” Clinton’s narrative of the situation creates images of police action; so too do his repeated references to “anarchy,” “order” and

“security.”

In his second address to the nation concerning Iraq, Clinton says we must “preserve stability in the Persian Gulf” (1994b, p. 1725). We must “remain committed to defending the integrity of that nation [Kuwait] and to protecting the stability of the Gulf region” (p. 1726). Saddam Hussein has been caught in the act of massing troops along Kuwait’s border, much as he did in 1990 before invading the country. Clinton says that “this provocation requires a strong response” (p. 1726). “We will not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors or to intimidate the United Nations” (p. 1726). Thus, Iraq’s crime is threatening its neighbors and preparing for what looks like an invasion. Our response will help to “make the world a safer place” by protecting “Kuwait’s freedom and the security of the Gulf” (p. 1726). Overall, Clinton says, by acting in this way we are “making progress in building a world of greater security, peace, and democracy” (p. 1726). The emphasis in these statements is on protection, security, safety and peace. The role of America, much like the role of the police, is one of keeping the peace and keeping people safe from harm. We must protect Kuwait from Iraq much as the police protect citizens from criminals.

Clinton’s third speech on Iraq involves a more lengthy comparison of American military intervention to police action. This speech involves the role of United Nations weapons inspectors who have recently been expelled from the nation. These investigators/inspectors are “highly professional experts” whose job is “to oversee the elimination of Iraq’s capability to retain, create and use weapons of mass destruction” (1998b, par. 3). These weapons have been used by Saddam Hussein in various ways in the past – including “unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops,” “firing Scud missiles” at the citizens of neighboring countries, and “gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq” (par. 4). Hussein’s use of such “terrible weapons”

(par. 5) has made it necessary for weapons inspectors to ensure that he “not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons” (par. 1). Thus, the background for the current police action is a police action itself – because of his breaking of international “laws” by using these types of weapons, Hussein is now under constant investigation by United Nations weapons inspectors. One might say that he is “on parole.” And he has violated that parole.

Saddam Hussein, Clinton says, announced “six weeks ago” that he would “no longer cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors” (par. 3). “The U. N. Security Council,” he says, “voted 15 to zero to condemn Saddam’s actions and to demand that he immediately come into compliance” (par. 6). “U. N. weapons inspectors” were sent back to Iraq to carry “out their plan for testing Iraq’s cooperation” (par. 10). At this point, “Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM [the inspectors] from inspecting suspect sites” (par. 12). Clinton details this obstruction by saying that

Iraq repeatedly restricted UNSCOM’s ability to obtain necessary evidence. For example, Iraq obstructed UNSCOM’s effort to photograph bombs related to its chemical weapons program. It tried to stop an UNSCOM biological weapons team from videotaping a site and photocopying documents, and prevented Iraqi personnel from answering UNSCOM’s questions. (par. 13)

Furthermore, Iraq has “emptied out . . . building[s],” “failed to turn over . . . documents,” and “ordered the destruction of weapons related documents” (par. 14). In short, Iraq’s crime is likened to obstruction of justice – Saddam Hussein has attempted to thwart a legitimate investigation. As Clinton puts it, “instead of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors” (par. 16).

Thus, military action is required. The situation, Clinton says, “presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere” (par. 17). The use of force and the threat of the use of force, he says, are “the surest way to contain Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction program, curtail his aggression and prevent another Gulf War” (par. 27). We must strike against Iraq in order to force Saddam Hussein to comply with the weapons inspectors. The investigation must continue in order for the world to be assured that Iraq will not use chemical or biological weapons or attack its neighbors in the future. The military action that Clinton announces in this speech is different from other military actions that fit the police drama. America is not intervening in order to restore the peace as much as we are intervening in order to keep the peace in the future. And in order to achieve that goal, we must first restore the system of weapons inspection, which is a police action in itself. In order to keep the peace, Iraq must be made to understand the importance of letting these investigations continue unobstructed.

Interpretation

Clinton’s rhetoric announcing military intervention contains elements of what can be described as the World’s Policeman drama. Of course, images of the police mean different things to different people. But by looking at Clinton’s word choice and the unfolding of his narratives describing military intervention, one can see various police-type actions at work. Clinton describes the goals of various actions as investigating and solving crimes (Iraqi plot to assassinate President Bush, terrorist activities), protecting innocent people from lawless villains (Haiti, Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq), maintaining the peace (Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia), and even enforcing conditions of “parole” (Iraq weapons inspection). Thus, a common theme to Clinton’s crisis rhetoric is that of the police drama; just as the police have different roles, so too does the

United States military as it plays out this drama.

Importance of the World's Policeman Drama

One especially important point needs to be made – the World's Policeman drama incorporates the Power Politics, New World Order and modified Cold War dramas. It is in America's best interest to keep the world stable and secure. It is in the world community's best interest that America keep the peace as well. And police action is the "right" solution to the "wrongs" – including instability and chaos – being perpetrated by America's enemies. The view of America as the "world's policeman" can be seen as the dominant theme through which American military intervention is portrayed. It subsumes the other dramas mentioned; doing what is right for America (Power Politics/technocratic realism) is a part of police action, doing what is best for all parties involved (the New World Order) is a part of police action, and acting as an agent of good fighting agents of evil (prophetic dualism) is naturally a part of all police actions. Finally, as we shall see, the police drama fits as an overriding theme of foreign policy as it allows for the idea that America must be the standard of liberty and freedom that all other nations can strive for – by being the world's policeman, America can provide the opportunity for stability and democracy, much as the police provide stability and freedom by protecting law abiding citizens from the instability of crime and anarchy.

Providing the Opportunity for Stability

Clinton describes instability in different ways, as we have seen. He also describes different solutions for the problems caused by this instability. The most immediate solution is, of course, military intervention, but beyond that, Clinton specifically references freedom and democracy as the cure to these problems. It is the duty of the United States, he suggests, to provide stability throughout the world by providing nations with the "opportunity" to experience

freedom and democracy.

In Somalia, for example, Clinton says that when we have achieved our mission goals, “we will have given Somalia a reasonable chance” to “find a political solution to their problems” (1993b, p. 1705). Clinton says that it is not our job to tell the Somalis what to do, but it is our responsibility to give them the chance to experience stability.

It is not our job to rebuild Somalia’s society or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia’s clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for themselves. The United Nations and many African states are more than willing to help. But we, we in the United States must decide whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance to succeed. (p. 1704)

We are not enforcing peace, rather, we are providing “opportunity” which will ultimately “preserve order and security” (p. 1705). We will be giving the Somalis “a decent chance to survive” (p. 1704).

In his speech on Haiti, Clinton says we must “promote democracy in our hemisphere” by intervening in that nation (1994a, p. 1558). He points out that Cuba and Haiti are the only countries in the Western Hemisphere where “dictators have managed to hold back the wave of democracy and progress . . . that our own Government has so actively promoted and supported for years” (p. 1559). Clinton says that “there’s no question that the Haitian people want to embrace democracy” (p. 1559); they have gone “to the ballot box and told the world” (p. 1559). Haiti is a nation in which “the people actually elected their own government and chose democracy, only to have tyrants steal it away” (p. 1559). This is why we must intervene. We must act in order to “give democracy a chance, not to guarantee it; to remove stubborn and cruel dictators, not to impose a future” (p. 1560). Clinton says that we should “help the Haitian people

recover their democracy and find their hard-won freedoms" (p. 1560).

In Bosnia, Clinton also portrays our role as one of providing opportunity. America's military role in the region, he says, is "about helping the people of Bosnia to secure their own peace agreement" (1995, p. 1784). Therefore, our role has not been to "fight a war in Bosnia," but has been a role of "searching for peace, stopping the war from spreading, and easing the suffering of the Bosnian people" (p. 1785). This work has led to a peace agreement, Clinton says, in which Bosnians of all ethnic backgrounds will "try to build a peaceful, democratic future" (p. 1785). Bosnians have "asked for America's help" (p. 1785), and in order to give them this help,

troops from our country and around the world would go into Bosnia to give them the confidence and support they need to implement their peace plan. I refuse to send American troops to fight a war in Bosnia, but I believe we must help to secure the Bosnian peace. (p. 1785)

As he orders American troops into Bosnia, Clinton is careful to point out that they are not there "to fight," but are there to provide the opportunity for Bosnians to experience stability and democracy. As he puts it, "American leadership created the chance to build a peace and stop the suffering" (p. 1785). The presence of our troops will allow Bosnians to "return to their homes [and] vote in free elections" (p. 1786). Because of American military intervention, Clinton says, "the people of Bosnia can have the chance to decide their future in peace" (p. 1787).

Clinton also describes our role as providing opportunity in his address announcing air strikes against Serbia, although his argument is a bit more complex and his choice of words is a bit different. He says that Serbia's leader, Slobodan Milosevic, has "stripped Kosovo of the constitutional autonomy its people enjoyed; thus denying them their right to speak their

language, run their schools, shape their daily lives” (1999, par. 4). America, Clinton says, “has proposed a peace agreement to end the fighting for good” (par. 5). The people of Kosovo have accepted this agreement, but Serbia has “refused even to discuss key elements of the peace agreement” and has instead moved troops into the region “in preparation for a major offensive” (par. 6). This major offensive, according to Clinton, has included “shelling civilians” and killing “innocent people” (par. 7). We must intervene in order to “restore the peace” (par. 14) and help ensure that Europe will be “undivided and free” (par. 22). Clinton again is careful to point out that American troops are being sent to foreign lands not to wage war, but to provide peace and opportunity. “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war,” he says (par. 16). This action is intended to make Milosevic “accept the peace agreement and demilitarize Kosovo” (par. 16). Ultimately, Clinton says, peace and stability in Kosovo will lead to a “Europe that is prosperous, secure, undivided and free” (par. 22). Thus, our intervention against Serbia will provide the people of Kosovo the opportunity to experience the freedom to “shape their daily lives” and to enjoy their own “constitutional autonomy,” and will ultimately help to make Europe more free.

Clinton does not use this strategy in all of his speeches announcing military intervention, but it is noteworthy because of its frequency. He is careful in the instances described above to portray the role of America as providing opportunities for democracy and freedom rather than forcing other people to accept our way of life. As he says in his second speech on Iraq, we are working “for a post-cold-war world of democracy and prosperity” (1994b, p. 1726). This approach to foreign policy is perhaps best illustrated when Clinton discusses America’s role as he sees it:

America has always been freedom's greatest champion. If we continue to do everything we can to share these blessings with people around the world, if we continue to be leaders for peace, then the next century can be the greatest time our Nation has ever known. (1995, p. 1787)

Summary

The Cold War is over – in a time of “peace,” we do not engage in battles against institutionalized evil, but in police actions against particular criminals or crimes against humanity. Rather than fighting a war we are concerned with keeping the peace. The prophetic dualism ideology is now a part of the World's Policeman drama where the United States enforces peace and “provides the opportunity” for stability. Technocratic realism and the Power Politics drama are also a part of the World's Policeman drama in which America's best interests are grounded in a peaceful world – a world in which America must often be the keeper of that peace. And by protecting others from instability and chaos, America is setting aside its own narrow self-interests for the good of others.

America provides the opportunity for democracy through its police actions. Thus, democracy is the alternative to instability, much as democracy was the alternative to communism in the past. And this democracy, in many instances, can only be experienced through the peace provided by police action. Thus, Clinton proposes an alternative to instability that can only be achieved through police action whereby the United States and other nations step in to keep order. This action gives other people a chance for a more democratic form of government that can only thrive in a stable environment. Both of these alternatives are described not as imposing our form of government or order on disruptive peoples, but as the providing of opportunity for the disadvantaged or abused.

It must be noted once more that Clinton often denies the World's Policeman drama even as he relies on it for justification of military action. He says "I know that the United States cannot, indeed we should not, be the world's policemen" (1994a, p. 1559), and "America cannot and must not be the world's policeman" (1995, p. 1784). Clinton denies the metaphor even as he uses it to bolster his arguments. Reasons for this may vary, and although it is perhaps beyond the scope of this study to determine these reasons, others might follow up and attempt to determine what role these denials play.

Perhaps Clinton is attempting to blunt criticisms of his actions. Anticipating that there may not be widespread public support for police-like use of the military, Clinton may be acknowledging his detractors in an attempt to head off criticism. By saying "I know we *shouldn't* be the world's policeman, but this case is different," he may be trying to convince skeptics of the validity of his use of military force. Perhaps realizing that there is no consensus among the American population as to our post-Cold War use of military strength, Clinton might be attempting to carefully justify the use of that strength in police-like ways in particular circumstances. Certainly, in post-Vietnam America, actions that portray our nation as the "world's policeman" may have lost a large part of their appeal. Indeed, when Clinton uses the term "world's policeman," it is almost in a pejorative sense: he seems to suggest that no one wants us to be thought of as the world's policeman.

Perhaps these denials point to the fact that the World's Policeman drama/master metaphor does not hold the persuasive power that the Cold War once did. In any case, it most certainly exists. As much as he tries to deny it, Clinton's rhetoric clearly shows that he sees the United States as the "world's policeman": he relies on the World's Policeman drama and the metaphors it creates as justification for military intervention in times of international crisis.

Chapter 4:

Summary and Conclusion

The Cold War drama no longer exists in the form it once did. With the Cold War over, it is no surprise that President Clinton cannot rely on it as a means of justifying military action. However, the prophetic dualism element of the Cold War drama still exists. Within his crisis rhetoric, Clinton portrays the United States as an agent of good fighting the forces of evil. The difference is that the evil Americans must fight against is not communism, but instability and chaos.

The Power Politics and New World Order dramas are also used by Clinton to justify military intervention. He justifies military action based on the self-interests of America using the technocratic realism of the Power Politics drama. This drama is not concerned with moral virtue, but focuses on positioning America in the most favorable way possible. Clinton is careful to demonstrate that our actions will also benefit others by referencing the New World Order drama. The New World Order drama draws on the use of metaphor for its effectiveness. The “community of nations,” the “world community” and other metaphors serve to illustrate ideals of the New World Order drama – particularly the notion that nations must do what is morally right for all involved. What may appear on the surface to be contradicting dramas are woven together in order to justify military action.

All three of these dramas are used by Clinton to justify military intervention. It has been argued that post-Cold War presidents are left searching for an overriding theme to their crisis rhetoric, and therefore attempt to combine these dramas as they make a case for each military action independently (Stuckey, 1995). However, Clinton’s use of these differing dramas makes

sense when one considers the World's Policeman drama that appears throughout his crisis rhetoric.

The World's Policeman drama is one in which the hero – the United States – acts as the “world's policeman,” stepping in to keep the peace, quell unrest and violence and provide the stability that civilized people desire. The villains in this drama are riotous mobs, anarchists, dictators who rule ruthlessly, rogue leaders who pick fights with other nations, terrorists, and others who disregard the rule of law and the sanctity of life. The United States military is compared with a police force, travelling around the world to stop “unlawful” behavior when duty calls. This drama subsumes the other dramas mentioned in the following ways: it is in America's best interest to keep the peace and provide the opportunity for democracy; it is in the world community's best interest to allow America to help them keep the peace and to create their own democratic forms of government, and; the police force – America – is a force of good that fights the instability created by evil leaders, peoples and nations. Thus, Clinton's use of the Power Politics, New World Order and modified Cold War dramas, dramas which sometimes have conflicting premises, makes sense when one looks at the overriding theme provided by the World's Policeman drama. Clinton is not searching for a replacement for the Cold War as an ideological backdrop against which to paint his foreign policy: he has found it and he uses it.

This paper set out to determine if post-Cold War presidents would be left without an overriding theme or ideology that can be used to justify military intervention. The crisis rhetoric of Bill Clinton was analyzed using the Power Politics, New World Order and Cold War dramas. Clinton was found to have used each of these dramas in his addresses to the nation announcing military action. The Cold War drama, however, has been significantly altered now that the Cold War itself is over. These speeches were also analyzed in terms of the metaphors used by

Clinton. The New World Order drama was found to rely on the use of metaphor for its effectiveness.

What is perhaps the most important finding of this paper came about unexpectedly: Clinton was found to have relied on comparisons between military action and police action, thereby establishing the basis for the World's Policeman drama, which he has used to justify American involvement in foreign lands. The World's Policeman drama was found to contain a rationale for each of the other three dramas. It has been further argued that the World's Policeman drama represents Clinton's post-Cold War ideology; American military intervention is justified by reliance on this drama, in which the United States acts as a law enforcement agent striving to keep world peace.

Future studies ought to look for the origins of the World's Policeman drama. Though this study argues that this drama should be recognized as an overriding rationale for foreign policy, it by no means assumes that the idea of the United States acting as the world's policeman is a new one. The Korean and Vietnam wars have been referred to as "police actions" – perhaps other studies could look at the rhetoric surrounding these wars with an eye toward determining the origins of the World's Policeman as a drama that justifies the use of military force.

Future studies might also re-examine Cold War era rhetoric using the other dramas outlined in this study. For example, scholars might find that dimensions of the Power Politics drama – economic and geographic, for example – have been important parts of Cold War rhetoric. The World's Policeman drama ought to also be analyzed within Cold War era rhetoric.

Finally, future studies ought to further explore the use of the World's Policeman drama by Clinton and future presidents. It will be interesting to see if and how our next president relies on this drama as justification for military action.

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