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## **Governance and Conflict in Pakistan**

Developing a Conflict Prevention and Reduction (CPR) Model to Promote  
Peace in Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)

A thesis

submitted in fulfilment

of the requirements for the degree

of

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## **Abstract**

Pakistan is an unstable country, home to a single religious nation made up of four major regional ethnic sub-nations. The inability of the political leadership of Pakistan to successfully connect and merge the interests of the nation and sub-nations with the interests of the state has been a long-standing issue. This has weakened the central political institution and allowed the military and civil bureaucracies, feudal elites and oligarch families to dominate the central government, preventing it from delivering good governance to the nation and sub-nations. These key central stakeholders allow the tribal chiefs, and religious and ethnic elites to dominate the regional political institutions and to become key regional stakeholders, triggering religious and ethnic conflict. Out of the four major sub-nation regions in Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan are hotbeds of religious terrorism and ethnic insurgency, generating a conflict that affects the rest of the country.

Through a mix of secondary data and primary information (that includes field interviews and surveys) gathered from Baluchistan, FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), this thesis reveals the existence of sub-states that operate as discrete regional systems of socio-political governance. The study provides empirical evidence that the religious and ethnic conflicts in Pakistan are produced and sustained by these socio-political structures and their governance mechanisms. These conflicts exist in FATA and Baluchistan but not in KP – this difference between the regions offers an opportunity to consider why KP has been more successful than FATA and Baluchistan. This, in turn, provides an opportunity to consider why the governance structures and mechanisms in KP have been successful, and in the process to develop a new Conflict Prevention and Reduction (CPR) model focused on improving governance in FATA and Baluchistan. This could reduce violence and terrorism in Pakistan, while the model has potential relevance for fractured nations beyond Pakistan.

## **Dedication**

To the State of Pakistan

To the people of Baluchistan and FATA

To the nationalists struggling for the rights of their people in Baluchistan and FATA

To the martyrs and their families who have suffered from the violent situation in the country.

To my parents who instilled in me the value of education and courage to pursue a doctoral degree.

## **Acknowledgements**

While the following doctoral thesis is an individual work, it does not complete itself without the insights, directions and support from several people.

At the frontline is my chief supervisor Dr. Reuben Steff for his persistent belief in my abilities and for tirelessly reading my work, sometimes with my poor grammar mistakes and editing skills. I would not have made it through without your guidance and the queries and comments you had in each of the chapters that made the work more interesting.

Next, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Mark Rolls for proposing that I take a course paper on 'International Relations: The Security Agenda'. This paper provided the base from where I investigated the state and sub-state structures which is the core foundation of my thesis and the framework used for this study. This paper that you taught helped me to understand the security aspect of a state from a perspective I had never thought about. That opened more horizons for me to investigate and use in my research.

I would like to acknowledge Mr. Waqar Khan Bazai, Dr. Kamran Durrani, Dr. Usman Shah Bukhari, Mr. Zilqurnain Abbasi, and Mr. Syed Ahmed Fahad for their unconditional friendship, care and support throughout my life since childhood, especially during the phase of my PhD. I would also like to thank my peers, Dr. Khusrow Akkas Abbasi, Dr. Taimur Khan and Dr. Frances Okpaleke. Through all the ups and downs, you helped me know I was not in this alone.

To my lovely daughter and son and my wife and siblings, for their support, love and smiling faces that helped keep me sane throughout my study.

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## Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b> .....	i
<b>Dedication</b> .....	ii
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	iii
<b>List of Maps</b> .....	vi
<b>List of Tables</b> .....	vii
<b>List of Figures</b> .....	viii
<b>Acronyms and Abbreviations</b> .....	xi
<b>Chapter One</b> <b>Introduction</b> .....	1
1.1. <b>Pakistan’s Transformation towards a State-Nation</b> .....	7
1.2. <b>The Structural Problems of Conflict in Baluchistan and FATA</b> .....	10
1.3. <b>Research Study</b> .....	16
1.4. <b>Methodology</b> .....	22
1.5. <b>Chapter Outline</b> .....	24
<b>Chapter Two</b> <b>The Security Nexus between the Pakistani State and People</b> .....	27
<b>Introduction</b> .....	27
2.1. <b>The State and the People of Pakistan</b> .....	28
2.2. <b>The Security of the State and the People</b> .....	41
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	58
<b>Chapter Three</b> <b>Developing a Sub-structural Framework (SFV) for Violence</b> .....	60
<b>Introduction</b> .....	60
3.1. <b>The Simple Descriptive Model (SDM)</b> .....	61
3.2. <b>Establishing the Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM)</b> .....	70
3.3. <b>The Sub-Structural Framework for Violence (SFV)</b> .....	88
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	91
<b>Chapter Four</b> <b>The State of Pakistan and the People of Baluchistan and FATA</b> .....	93
<b>Introduction</b> .....	93
4.1. <b>The Institutions that Establish the Structural Domination of the State</b> .....	94
4.2. <b>The Institutions that Resist Structural Domination and Initiate Social Movements</b> .....	110
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	121
<b>Chapter Five</b> <b>Radicalization of the Religious Nation and Ethnic Sub-nations</b> .....	123
<b>Introduction</b> .....	123

5.1.	The Political Opportunities of the Key Stakeholder Institutions.....	123
5.2.	Extending the Political Opportunities of the State in Baluchistan and FATA.....	130
5.3.	The Resistance to the Political Opportunities of the State.....	138
5.4.	Establishment of Religious and Ethnic Vulnerable Mobilizing Structures.....	142
	Conclusion .....	154
<b>Chapter Six</b>	<b>Grievances of the Religious Nation and Ethnic Sub-nations .....</b>	<b>155</b>
	Introduction.....	155
6.1.	The Institutional Expression of the Sub-state: Baluchistan and FATA .....	155
6.2.	The Institutional Expression as Source of Grievance .....	162
6.3.	Politicizing the Grievances.....	172
6.4.	The Framing Process of Grievances to Expand VMSs .....	177
	Conclusion .....	187
<b>Chapter Seven</b>	<b>The Conflict Prevention and Reduction in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.....</b>	<b>189</b>
	Introduction.....	189
7.1.	The State of Pakistan and the People of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.....	190
7.2.	The Vulnerable Mobilizing Structures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa .....	202
	Conclusion .....	215
<b>Chapter Eight</b>	<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>217</b>
8.1.	The Conflict Prevention and Reduction Model.....	217
8.2.	Research Significance .....	224
8.3.	Limitations and Suggested Areas for Future Research .....	225
8.4.	Epilogue.....	228
<b>Bibliography</b> .....		<b>230</b>

## **List of Maps**

Map 1. The Muslim Majority Regions in the Sub-continent at the time of Partition in 1947 .....	1
Map 2. Pakistan map showing Provincial Regions, the Durand line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Kashmir Region separated by the Line of Control .....	3
Map 3. FATA and KP (Previously NWFP) Regions of Pakistan along the Afghanistan Border...	4
Map 4. Baluchistan Province of Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Iran Border showing the Pre-partition distribution of British Baluchistan and State of Kalat.....	5
Map 5. The Major Ethnic Sub-nations of Pakistan and their Existence in Neighboring Countries	8



## List of Tables

Table 1. Gender breakdown of the Research Sample by Region. ....	23
Table 2. The Economic and Defense Balance of Power between Pakistan and India.....	48
Table 3. Economic and Military Aid Received by Pakistan from US (1947-2019).....	50
Table 4. Economic and Military Aid received by Pakistan from China (1947-20121).....	52
Table 5. Theories of Radicalization (Social and Political Dimensions).....	73
Table 6. The Dominating and Resisting Elites that represented the Constituencies of Baluchistan in the National Assembly of Pakistan (1947-1969).....	131
Table 7. Trend of TTP Violent Attacks on the State and Non-state Institutions in Pakistan 2007-2018.....	180
Table 8. Trend of Violent Ethnic Insurgent Attacks on the State and Non-State Institutions in Pakistan 2004-2018.....	186
Table 9. The Vulnerability of the People to Radicalization in the Regions .....	214

## List of Figures

Figure 1. Poor Governance reflected through comparison of Development Indicators in Regions of Pakistan from 2000 to 2019.....	17
Figure 2. CPR Model Development.....	20
Figure 3. Key Institutions that shape the Socio-Political Structure of Pakistan .....	39
Figure 4. The Components of a State.....	61
Figure 5. The SDM and the State of Pakistan.....	67
Figure 6. Component Parts of a Sub-state in a Larger State .....	69
Figure 7. Disaster Crunch Model.....	71
Figure 8. The Factors that establish the Hazard component of the DCM for Violence .....	79
Figure 9. The Factors that establish the Vulnerability component of the DCM for Violence.....	87
Figure 10. Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM) for Violence .....	88
Figure 11. The Sub-structural Framework for Violence.....	90
Figure 12. The Structure/Bureaucracy of FATA compared with the rest of Pakistan (prior to 2018-19).....	95
Figure 13. Level of influence of the State in resolving conflicts and maintaining rule of law (in percentage).....	117
Figure 14. Level of Satisfaction of research participants with the Government Departments ...	118
Figure 15. Level of Corruptness of the Institutions of Government.....	119
Figure 16. Percentage of Political Representation in the National Assembly (NA) of Pakistan from Baluchistan (1972-2018).....	132
Figure 17. Percentage of Political Representation in the Provincial Assembly of Baluchistan .	133
Figure 18. Percentage of Political Representation in the National Assembly (NA) of Pakistan from FATA (1972-2018) .....	136
Figure 19. Percentage of Political Representation in the Provincial Assembly of KP from FATA in the (2018-19) by-elections.....	137
Figure 20. Share of Seats in the NA of the Religious Political Institution .....	144
Figure 21. Rise of Religious Seminaries in Pakistan 1947-2011 .....	144
Figure 22. Trends in the number of Terrorist Attacks by Religious Militant Groups in Pakistan before and after 2001 .....	147

Figure 23. Agendas of the Political Parties in the Regions.....	156
Figure 24. Source of Socio-Political linkage between the State, Nation and the Sub-nation in the Sub-state.....	158
Figure 25. Percentage of Survey Participants Identifying the Influential Agents of Social Control .....	160
Figure 26. Preferable Institutional Expression in the Society for Conflict or Problem Resolution .....	161
Figure 27. Percentage of Survey Participants determining the Corruptness of the Institutional Expression of the Sub-State .....	164
Figure 28. Level of Patron-Based Recruitment by Elites experienced by the Percentage of Survey Participants in the Regions.....	165
Figure 29. Percentage of Research Participants satisfied with Government Departments.....	166
Figure 30. Participants' Access to Quality Public Health Care .....	167
Figure 31. Participants' Access to Quality Public Maternal Health Clinics.....	167
Figure 32. Number of Deaths the Participants recall due to Unavailability of Doctor or Urgent Medical Services.....	167
Figure 33. Percentage of Participants Experiencing Judicial Injustice Perpetuated by the State and Non-state systems.....	168
Figure 34. Number of Deaths in FATA and Baluchistan as a result of Political Violence .....	169
Figure 35. Trends in the HDI and Educations Index of Pakistan, Baluchistan and FATA .....	170
Figure 36. Incidence of Poverty (IOP) trend .....	171
Figure 37. Percentage of Political Representation in the National Assembly (NA) of Pakistan from KP (1972-2018).....	199
Figure 38. Percentage of Political Representation in the Provincial Assembly of KP .....	200
Figure 39. Total attacks, number of villages / cities targeted and the number and type of militants .....	201
Figure 40. Number of political parties that contested in the general elections of 2013 and 2018 from KP.....	204
Figure 41. Social Status of the heads of Political Parties in KP compared with Baluchistan and FATA .....	205
Figure 42. Institutions or Agents of Social control as Influential in KP (% of Survey Participants) .....	206

Figure 43. (Preferred Institutional Expression by the people in KP for Conflict or Problem Resolution (% of Survey Participants).....	206
Figure 44 .Comparison of the Percentage of Survey Participants in KP and Baluchistan and FATA who consider the Existing Institutional Expression in their regions to be Corrupt.....	207
Figure 45. Comparison (as %) of Survey Participants in KP and Baluchistan and FATA who consider Patron-Client Relationships to be promoted by the Actors and Institutions .....	208
Figure 46. Percentage of Survey Participants satisfied with Government Departments (comparison) .....	208
Figure 47. Percentage of Survey Participants who have experienced Judicial Injustice from the State and the Agents of Social Control (comparison).....	208
Figure 48. Participant’s Access to Quality Public Health Care (comparison).....	209
Figure 49. Deaths recalled by Percentage of Survey Participants due to Unavailability of Doctor or Medical Services.....	209
Figure 50. The Sub-structural Framework for Violence.....	210
Figure 51. Number of Deaths in KP, FATA and Baluchistan as a result of Political Violence .	212
Figure 52. Comparison of trends of the HDI and Educations Index of KP, Baluchistan and FATA .....	212
Figure 53. Comparison of Incidence of poverty (IOP) trend.....	213
Figure 54. The Sub-structural Framework for Violence.....	218
Figure 55. The Manmade Disaster Crunch Model.....	220
Figure 56. The Conflict Prevention and Reduction (CPR) Model.....	223


## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>AIML</b>	All India Muslim League	<b>KSA</b>	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
<b>AL</b>	Awami League	<b>KSNP</b>	Kalat State National Party
<b>ANP</b>	Awami National Party	<b>MDCM</b>	Manmade Disaster Crunch Model
<b>ART</b>	Agrarian Revolt Theory	<b>MPA</b>	Member Provincial Assembly
<b>BLA</b>	Baluchistan Liberation Army	<b>MMA</b>	Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal
<b>BLF</b>	Baluchistan Liberation Front	<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>BMM</b>	Baluchistan National Movement	<b>NA</b>	National Assembly
<b>BNP</b>	Baluchistan National Party	<b>NAP</b>	National Awami Party
<b>BRA</b>	Baluchistan Republican Army	<b>NDS</b>	National Directorate of Security
<b>BRAS</b>	Baluchistan Raji Ajoi Sangar (Baloch National Freedom Movement)	<b>NP</b>	National Party
<b>BSU</b>	Baluchistan States Union	<b>NWFP</b>	North-West Frontier Province
<b>CENTO</b>	Central Treaty Organization	<b>PA(s)</b>	Political Agent(s)
<b>CII</b>	Council of Islamic Ideology	<b>PCO</b>	Provisional Constitutional Order
<b>CPEC</b>	China Pakistan Economic Corridor	<b>PK-MAP</b>	Pakhtunkhwa – Mili Awami Party
<b>CPR</b>	Conflict Prevention and Reduction	<b>PML-N</b>	Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz
		<b>PML-Q</b>	Pakistan Muslim League – Quid-e-Azam
<b>DCM</b>	Disaster Crunch Model	<b>PNA</b>	Pakistan National Alliance
<b>ECP</b>	Election Commission of Pakistan	<b>PPP</b>	Pakistan People’s Party
<b>FATA</b>	Federally Administered Tribal Area	<b>PTI</b>	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
<b>FCR</b>	Frontier Crimes Regulation	<b>PTM</b>	Pashtun Tahafuz Movement
<b>GTB</b>	Global Terrorism Database	<b>RAW</b>	Research and Analysis Wing
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index	<b>SDM</b>	Simple Descriptive Model
<b>IJI</b>	Islami Jamhoori Itihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance)	<b>SEATO</b>	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
<b>IJT</b>	Islami Jamiat-e-Tulba	<b>SFV</b>	Sub-Structural Framework for Violence
<b>INC</b>	Indian National Congress	<b>SMT</b>	Social Movement Theory
<b>IoK</b>	Indian Occupied Kashmir	<b>SPSS</b>	Statistical package for Social Science
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria	<b>TTP</b>	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
<b>JI</b>	Jamaat-e-Islami	<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>JWP</b>	Jamhoori Watan Party	<b>US</b>	United states
<b>JUI</b>	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam	<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>KK</b>	Khudai Khidmatgar	<b>PTI</b>	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
<b>KP</b>	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	<b>VMSs</b>	Vulnerable Mobilizing Structures

## Chapter One Introduction

Pakistan has been prone to instability and internal and external conflict since its independence as an independent Muslim Nation-State in 1947 when the Indian subcontinent was partitioned on the basis of religion (prior to independence from the British Empire the same year). A major issue for the founders of the new state, like the founders of any new country, was how to forge a Pakistani nation where one had not truly existed beforehand. As such, the founders utilized what is now known in academic parlance as the *Nation-State* model. This model suggests that the nation(s) of a state should have a common cultural identity, language and shared memory of history and cultural factors, such as sports, literature, media, political parties, social organization, and educational system<sup>1</sup>. To begin this thesis, let us start by understanding and breaking down the nation and state of Pakistan, as it helps to look at the country from the perspective of religious homogeneity in Map 1 below.

**Map 1. The Muslim Majority Regions in the Sub-continent at the time of Partition in 1947<sup>2</sup>**



<sup>1</sup> Anthony Pick, "The Nation State: An Essay." p 05. <http://www.thenationstate.co.uk/TheNationState.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Tariq Amir, *India Demographic: 1947*, October 23, 2014, Pakistan Geotagging: Partition of Punjab in 1947, October 23, 2014, <http://pakgeotagging.blogspot.com/2014/10/partition-of-punjab-in-1947.html>.

The map above shows British India at the time of its partition in 1947 when the British Raj (direct British rule over India) was dissolved. What the map shows is a country comprised of two broad religious groups – a Hindu-dominated sub-continent (the future India) and a Muslim-dominated Northwest territory and separated territory in the Northeast (the future east and west Pakistan).

Territorial disputes emerged between the two new states soon after partition. One of the most significant stems from the issue of the rightful accession of former princely states. These existed as sovereign territorial entities not ruled directly by the British but by an Indian prince or ruler. One of the princely states was Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter referred to as Kashmir), a Muslim majority state ruled by a Hindu prince. The dispute between Pakistan and India over the accession of Kashmir at the time of partition forced Pakistan to annex Kashmir which compelled the Hindu prince to accede Kashmir to India and allowed Indian forces to initiate annexation of Kashmir. This situation led to the first war between the two countries in October 1947 which ended in December 1948 with the demarcation of the line of control (cease fire line by the United Nations) dividing Kashmir into Pakistan administered Kashmir and Indian administered Kashmir (Map 2). Since then, India and Pakistan have fought three wars and have been engaged in an arms and missile race to strengthen defense and deterrence against each other<sup>3</sup>.

Today, Pakistan considers its most significant external security threat to come from India on its south-eastern border where the Punjab, Sindh and Pakistan-administered Kashmir meet the Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujrat and Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistan faces another threat, as on the opposite side of the border to India, there is Afghanistan to Pakistan's north-west. Afghanistan fails to recognize the border line called 'the Durand Line' (Map 2) between Pakistan and Afghanistan, because, most of Pakistan's north-west regions were once part of Afghanistan and were lost to the British Empire as a result of various wars in the nineteenth century<sup>4</sup>. The people of this border region on both sides are predominantly Muslim (religiously) and Pashtuns (ethnically). Therefore, a tense relationship has existed between Pakistan and Afghanistan since 1947.

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<sup>3</sup> Rafi Amir-ud-Din, Fatima Waqi Sajjad, and Shazia Aziz, "Revisiting Arms Race between India and Pakistan: A Case of Asymmetric Causal Relationship of Military Expenditures," *Defence and Peace Economics* 31, no. 6 (June 4, 2019): 721–41, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1624334>.

<sup>4</sup> Faridullah Bezhani, "The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947-1952," *Middle East Journal* 68, no. 2 (2014): 197–209, p. 198. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698155>.

**Map 2. Pakistan map showing Provincial Regions, the Durand line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Kashmir Region separated by the Line of Control<sup>5</sup>**




The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is a region on the Pakistan side of the border with Afghanistan, which is home to a strong and relatively closed tribal Pashtun population. The British Empire was able to install its bureaucratic and military structure in all the Pashtun dominated regions of Pakistan (Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), except for FATA. FATA's Pashtun population did not allow the social, economic and political functions of the empire to be established in their region, as they wanted to function according to their own codes and traditions. However, they allowed a British umbrella administrative structure over their region. Pakistan, after independence, inherited FATA from the British with the same British umbrella administrative structure intact. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Union of Soviet Socialist

<sup>5</sup> Muhammad Shoab Khan, *Map Showing the 4 Provinces of Pakistan and Its Neighboring Countries with Their Respective Female to Male Ratios (F:M) of Smear-Positive Tuberculosis Notifications, Unusual Sex Differences in Tuberculosis Notifications across Pakistan and the Role of Environmental Factors* (ResearchGate, September 2013), [https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-showing-the-4-provinces-of-Pakistan-and-its-neighbouring-countries-with-their\\_fig1\\_259209472](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-showing-the-4-provinces-of-Pakistan-and-its-neighbouring-countries-with-their_fig1_259209472). The journal article was used to extract the map. The map was then reproduced by the author of this research by adding the Red color to the Durand Line, dividing the region of Kashmir into the Indian and Pakistan Administered Kashmir with the Line of Control and erasing the tuberculosis ratios for the provinces.



Republic (USSR) in 1979 and the United States (US) intervention in Afghanistan after 2001 amidst the ‘war on terror’, turned FATA into a hotbed of religious militants who sought to create chaos in FATA and Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan.


**Map 3. FATA and KP (Previously NWFP) Regions of Pakistan along the Afghanistan Border<sup>6</sup>**



Similarly, the British Empire controlled an important princely state, *Kalat*, in the Baluchistan region of its Indian empire bordering Iran, through indirect interventions. Kalat was a tribal confederation based on the support of the chiefs of different ethnic Baloch tribes and their pledge of loyalty to their confederate leader, the Khan of Kalat. The tribal population of this state, being predominantly Muslim, is ethnically Baloch (Map 5). The areas of Baluchistan where the British installed their military and bureaucratic structure was termed British Baluchistan. However, the areas of the state of Kalat, where the British could not establish direct control, were run through an administrative structure similar to FATA. Baloch insurgents demanding independence from Pakistan emerged from the state of Kalat when the British left in 1947. Over the last seven decades, the Baloch insurgency has ebbed and flowed at different times and has evolved from a tribal to ethnic insurgency. The current insurgency is the longest, now entering its twentieth year.

<sup>6</sup> Pahari Sahib, *Map Showing the Districts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan.*, June 6, 2007, Based on Maps from [Http://Www.nwfp.gov.pk](http://www.nwfp.gov.pk), June 6, 2007, [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NWFP\\_FATA.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NWFP_FATA.svg). The map has been extracted from the source and changes have been made by replacing the word NWFP with KP in the map legend and erasing the names of the smaller regions in the map.

**Map 4. Baluchistan Province of Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Iran Border showing the Pre-partition distribution of British Baluchistan and State of Kalat<sup>7</sup>**



When Pakistan was founded in 1947, it had only two provinces (as shown in Map 1). These were East Pakistan province (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan province (Map 2). The attempt to force the two provinces and the regions into a Nation-State, in line with the assumption of the Nation-State model, was unsuccessful. The two provinces did not unite their separate ethnic identities on the basis of religion; instead, Pakistan in 1971 lost its eastern province due to ethnic division and conflict. In response, the state of Pakistan changed its Nation-State policy and adopted the *State-Nation* model in 1972 for its survival.

The State-Nation model considers the state to play a central role in creating a nation through a top-down approach. This model differs from the Nation-State model – whereby, the nation attempts via a bottom-up approach to form a state<sup>8</sup>. The State-Nation model has been adopted by many

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<sup>7</sup> Tariq Amir, *Balochistan - Administrative*, November 23, 2020, Pakistan Geotagging: 133 - Demographics of Balochistan Province According the Census of 1941 (Religions), November 23, 2020, <http://pakgeotagging.blogspot.com/2020/11/>. This source was used to extract the map and changes were made which include erasing the regional names and revising the legend

<sup>8</sup> Barry Buzan and Paul Magnette, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2016). p. 76

post-colonial states who faced complex divisions on ethnic, tribal and religious grounds<sup>9</sup>. The State-Nation model also differs from the Nation-State version in that it seeks to develop and proliferate uniform cultural elements such as language, arts, custom and law<sup>10</sup>. This model is one of four models proposed by Barry Buzan that examines the relationship between the state and nation. Two of these models are discussed above (the Nation-State and State-Nation models), and the other two are the *Part Nation-State* model and the *Multination-State* model, which are discussed in chapters two and three.

In short, the State-Nation model exacerbated external and internal security threats to Pakistan from neighboring India and Afghanistan, as well as from Baluchistan and FATA. These threats have impacted on the foreign and domestic policy of the Pakistani state<sup>11</sup> and worsened the internal security situation by exacerbating social fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines. It is important to note that this thesis considers the people of Pakistan to be a *nation* when it refers to their religious identity. However, when referring to their different ethnic identities, i.e. Baloch, Pashtun etc., they will be referred to as *sub-nation(s)* (see Map 5 below). When referring to both identities (religious and ethnic combined), they are termed *people* in this study. This thesis asserts that the foreign and domestic policy of the state of Pakistan, based on the State-Nation model, has contributed to:

- The rise of religious movements throughout the country, especially in Baluchistan and FATA, giving rise to religious terrorism;
- The rise of an ethnic movement in Baluchistan that has transformed and grown into an ethnic insurgency;
- Poor socio-political governance structures and mechanisms which increase the vulnerability of Baloch and Pashtun sub-nations in Baluchistan and FATA, making them prone to religious and ethnic radicalization; and
- Widening the social and political gap between the state and the people of both FATA and Baluchistan.

The remainder of this introductory chapter does five things. First, it provides a brief overview of Pakistan's social and political evolution after change from a nation-state to a state-nation. Secondly, it explains the type and background of violence in Pakistan and specifically in FATA and Baluchistan. Thirdly, it defines the research objective. Fourthly, it provides a statement of the research question and a detailed methodology for this research. Finally, it provides an outline for each chapter of the thesis.

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<sup>9</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 76-77

<sup>10</sup> Daechsel, "Military Islamization in Pakistan and the Spectre of Colonial Perceptions," p.76

<sup>11</sup> Muqarrab Akbar, "Pakistan: An Islamic State or a State for Muslims? A Critical Appraisal of Islam's Role in Pakistan." *Pakistan Journal of Islamic Research*, Vol 15 25-38 (2015). p. 32

## 1.1. Pakistan's Transformation towards a State-Nation

Pakistan was born as an attempted Nation-State. In theory, the Nation-State model creates a strong bond between the nation and the state<sup>12</sup>. This model fits the early period of Pakistan because it was only after being under British rule (since the 1760s) that the Muslims of the subcontinent realized that they faced economic, political and social discrimination on the basis of their religion. The realization of discrimination is derived from the fact that the Muslims of India not only had lost their power and identity, but had also lost their kingdom, ruler, empire, language, culture and sense of identity after British rule was established in the sub-continent<sup>13</sup>. The feeling of discrimination brought a majority of Muslims onto a single political platform to demand and stand up for their rights, ultimately leading them to call for a separate homeland for the first time in 1930<sup>14</sup>.

The idea behind the call for a separate homeland was so that the Muslims of the subcontinent could practice their culture and religion free from discrimination, as well as seek improved socio-economic opportunities which would be impossible in a Hindu-dominated India after British rule ended<sup>15</sup>. The Lahore resolution in 1940 was passed by the All India Muslim League, whose leader, Quid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, with his two-nation theory, proclaimed that Hindus and Muslims belonged to two different religious philosophies, social customs and religions who neither inter-marry nor dine with one another, and had different civilizations based on conflicting ideas<sup>16</sup>.

While the Muslim community in present day Pakistan is split into Shia and Sunni sects within Islam, the other divide is along ethno-nationalist lines (see Map 5 below), including the Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun and Baloch as major ethnic sub-nation groups<sup>17</sup>. It can be argued that the newborn country of Pakistan contained a built-in system of social divisions that could be exacerbated if the state was not governed in an effective way that ensured equality within and among the ethnic and sectarian groups. It was important to foster a national Pakistani identity and mainstream Pakistani culture<sup>18</sup> that smoothed over the existing ethno-national divide. It was hoped that religious identity would prevent and suppress ethno-nationalist factors from playing a prominent role in undermining the emergence of a national identity and help to counter issues related to ethno-

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<sup>12</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 76

<sup>13</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 23

<sup>14</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, p. 23-27

<sup>15</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (September 2002): 109–22, p. 109. <https://doi.org/10.1162/01636600260046271>.

<sup>16</sup> Stephen P Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). p. 28

<sup>17</sup> Peter R Blood, *Pakistan: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995). p. 77

<sup>18</sup> Christopher S Browning, *International Security: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). p. 99

nationalist identity which included the demand of the Bengali nation to consider the Bengali language as the national language of the country at par with the Urdu language<sup>19</sup>.

**Map 5. The Major Ethnic Sub-nations of Pakistan and their Existence in Neighboring Countries<sup>20</sup>**



The state managed to instill and foster a religiously-oriented national identity in its citizens by highlighting the threat posed by India as a non-Muslim state on the other side of the border that had still not accepted Pakistan’s right to exist as a separate Muslim state, and was intent on strangling it. Regional disputes over territory, such as Kashmir, and the threat of communist Russia

<sup>19</sup> Ijaz Khan, “Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State?,” *European Yearbook of Minority Issues* Vol 8, 2009 (2018), p. 388 <https://doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000139>

<sup>20</sup> Perry Castañeda, *Major Ethnic Groups in Pakistan*, Library Map Collection. As reproduced by Public Broadcasting Service, October 3, 2006), <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/tribal/map.html>. This map is extracted from the website above and changes were made which include erasing the regional names from the map and revising the legend.

from the north, helped to foster Pakistan's religious national identity and made it easier to counter other issues related to ethno-nationalist identity<sup>21</sup>.

Even though Pakistan was idealized on the basis of Islam, when the question of how to frame the constitution along Islamic lines arose from 1947 to 1969, institutional chaos ensued due to the inability to adjust Islamic principles into a formal code of conduct which could become the law or basis of the constitution<sup>22</sup>. The ethnic political elite that represented each major ethnic sub-nation in the country demanded ethnic equality in the constitution, whereas elites of the religious political sects preferred their individual religious laws to take precedence. Meanwhile, the bureaucratic, military and feudal political elite and oligarchs sought more powers for themselves and their respective institutions. The struggle for power, authority and influence between these ethnic, religious and political elites, and bureaucratic and military institutions has a strong connection with the situation of conflict and violence in Pakistan. A detailed insight into the structure of these groups and their interests and their conflict to consolidate socio-political power is provided in chapters two, four, five and six to establish their connection with conflict and violence.

Pakistan experienced two periods of martial law and lengths of time of crippled democracy before the constitution of 1972 was codified. Despite having a constitution approved by a wide consensus, the country again faced two more decades of martial law (1977-1988 and 1999-2007). Stephen Cohen suggests that the on and off periods of military rule were part of an effort by the military to define the state on the lines of the founding father's model for Pakistan; that is, for a unified Nation-State. Cohen also asserts that the military believed it had to intervene given that Pakistani politicians were apparently unable to reach political solutions to the problems the country was facing<sup>23</sup>.

The struggle for power, control, authority and resources of the groups and institutions mentioned above became the biggest challenge in forging a Nation-State and in creating a constitution before 1972. Indeed, the ethnic disputes would eventually pave the way for the breakup of the country in 1971 with the creation of Bangladesh<sup>24</sup>. Thereafter, Pakistan was able to frame a constitution in 1972 based upon a wide consensus of all political parties, Islamic clergy, and the National Assembly (which is still intact today). The 1972 constitution resolved the three major issues of the time: the role of Islam in the socio-political spectrum; how power would be shared between the federal and provincial governments; and the division of power between the president and prime minister<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> Khan, "Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State," p. 388-89

<sup>22</sup> Cohen, *The Nation and the State of Pakistan*, p. 113

<sup>23</sup> Cohen, *The Nation and the State of Pakistan*, p. 112

<sup>24</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 34

<sup>25</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 34

In the course of trying to manage the problems between its two wings, Pakistan attempted to become a state-nation and the eventual loss of its east wing accelerated this process. It was then that the state decided to play an instrumental role in trying to create a Pakistani identity. The west wing was subsequently divided up into provinces - each referring to its ethno-nationalist boundary - while provincial level state institutions were established including courts, police forces, parliaments, and bureaucracies etc. The 1972 constitution remained in place in all provinces as an umbrella over their provincial and regional institutions. The State-Nation model plays an important role in giving rise to conflicts in Baluchistan and FATA which are discussed below.

## **1.2. The Structural Problems of Conflict in Baluchistan and FATA**

Before explaining the problems that caused conflict in Baluchistan and the FATA regions of Pakistan, it is important to understand the concept of conflict. A number of authors have provided their articulations of the concept:

Coser E. Lewis states that:

Conflict is a struggle between opponents over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources<sup>26</sup>.

Morton Deutsch writes:

Conflict takes place whenever incompatible activities occur. One party is interfering, disrupting, obstructing, or in some other way making another party's actions less effective<sup>27</sup>.

James A. Wall has said that:

Conflict is a process in which two or more parties attempt to frustrate the attainment of the other's goals. The factors underlying conflict are threefold: interdependence, differences in goals, and differences in perceptions<sup>28</sup>.

The thesis adopts Lyamouri-Bajja's definition of conflict as a:

Disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> Coser E. Lewis, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Illinois: The Free Press, 1956). p. 08

<sup>27</sup> Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). p. 10

<sup>28</sup> James A. Wall, *Negotiation, Theory and Practice* (California: Scott, Foresman, 1985). p. 35

<sup>29</sup> Nadine Lyamouri-Bajja et al., *T-Kit No. 12: Youth Transforming Conflict* (Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe, 2013). p. 56



The definition by Bajja asserts that a conflict requires there to be a disagreement between parties involved over their perceived threat and needs, and that competing interests and concerns are the basic elements and factors of conflict (regardless of its type)<sup>30</sup>.

The previous section outlined the existence of the sectarian and ethno-nationalist divide in Pakistan, and explained the shift of the state from pursuing a Nation-State to pursuing a State-Nation model, and the dynamics at work during that shift. Even though allowing provincial autonomy was part of the 1972 constitution which fragmented Pakistan into four provinces, the problems of underdevelopment and centralized state authority structures that played an authoritative role over the provinces continued<sup>31</sup>.

The areas that were merged to form Pakistan in 1947 were relatively underdeveloped compared to India and, added to this, the tribal, feudal and landlord elites continued to maintain a strong political and economic hold and resisted the emergence of a middle class comprised of professionals and persons engaged in commerce<sup>32</sup>. The underdeveloped institutions and economy, coupled with strong tribal and elitist socio-political structures, posed a challenge to national integration, especially in the regions of FATA and Baluchistan<sup>33</sup>.

## **Baluchistan**

It is important to shed light on the history of Baluchistan to understand the problems of integrating the Baloch ethnic sub-nation into the Pakistani state structure in order to forge a State-Nation. Baluchistan was only used as a travel route by the British and no attention was given to the socio-economic development of the area and its people. A part of Baluchistan was then given to Iran in 1871 and the rest was divided into British Baluchistan and the princely state of Kalat formed by joining the states of Lasbela, Kalat, Makran and Kharan under the rule of the confederate leader – the Khan of Kalat. The British completely annexed Baluchistan in 1884 and used it as a buffer zone between their empire and the Russian one<sup>34</sup>. British Baluchistan was ruled directly by the British through a chief commissioner, or political agent, who was the head of the administration appointed by the Governor-General. Since British rule in the Baluchistan region was primarily of strategic importance, very little attention was given to building economic or social structures. The few public facilities that were developed in British Baluchistan, including post offices, railway lines, roads, rest houses, and cantonments, were intended for British troops.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Nadine Lyamouri-Bajja et al., *T-Kit No. 12: Youth Transforming Conflict*. P. 56

<sup>31</sup> Mohammad Waseem, "Political Development and Conflict Resolution in Pakistan," *The Pakistan Development Review* 36, no. 4II (December 1, 1997): 715–42, p. 715 <https://doi.org/10.30541/v36i4iipp.715-742>

<sup>32</sup> Mohammad Waseem, "Political Development and Conflict Resolution in Pakistan," p. 720

<sup>33</sup> Mohammad Waseem, "Political Development and Conflict Resolution in Pakistan," p. 720

<sup>34</sup> Selig S Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981). p. 16

<sup>35</sup> Selig S Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p.16



British Baluchistan was eventually handed over to Pakistan at the time of partition in 1947, while the state of Kalat was supposedly free to decide its fate – to choose to join either India or Pakistan. The state of Kalat, though, being headed by the confederate leader, the Khan of Kalat at the higher tier and by Baloch tribal chiefs at the state level, instead announced their outright independence right after the end of British rule. This act of the Khan and tribal chiefs was swiftly curtailed and the states were annexed by Pakistan in 1948<sup>36</sup> sowing the seed for its conflict with the Baloch sub-nation.

The Baloch tribal chiefs in the ethnic Baloch society have extraordinary powers and greater influence than any other tribal leaders in Pakistan. Baloch society is stratified but characterized as ‘feudal militarism’ and its tribal chiefs enjoy power given to them through their tribal structure<sup>37</sup>. The state of Pakistan exploited (and continues to exploit) the Baloch tribal social structure by granting autonomy and semi-autonomy to the tribal chiefs on different occasions after 1948 in governing their areas without any interference from the central government. Baluchistan thus remained an administrative unit of Pakistan and the tribal chiefs, known as Nawabs and Sardars in the local language, were exploited by the central government which adopted the British method of maintaining an unwritten agreement that allowed the chiefs to be the de facto rulers of their area as long as they did not challenge the state of Pakistan<sup>38</sup>.

Granting autonomy to the Baloch tribal chiefs by the state of Pakistan helped to suppress revolts and the independence movement in Baluchistan that emerged in different phases between 1948 and 1979. However, the autonomy granted did not help with the emerging problem of socio-economic inequality. The state of Pakistan also ignored the fact that Baloch society is hierarchical, where the tribal leader is reluctant to share power with their subjects and, to ensure the sustainability of their elite rule, the tribal chiefs oppose the opening of schools in their areas so as to keep their subjects illiterate, backward and unaware of the modern world<sup>39</sup>. The tribal chiefs did not even allow the state to develop state institutions or services in their areas of influence that could deliver welfare to the communities as well as cater to their legal, infrastructural and socio-economic needs. Hence, while other provinces of the country embarked on the road to socio-economic development, Baluchistan, especially in the areas comprising the state of Kalat, remained stagnant to such socio-economic development.

In the 1970s, the state of Pakistan redirected itself towards a State-Nation model and efforts were made by the state to establish its monopoly of authority and rulemaking and develop institutions that govern the province. The provincial region of Baluchistan was divided into districts like the

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<sup>36</sup> Adeel Khan, “Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation,” *Asian Survey* 49, no. 6 (November 2009): 1071–91, p.1074  
<https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2009.49.6.1071>

<sup>37</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study* p. 115-116

<sup>38</sup> Rabia Aslam, “Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of Balochistan,” *Contemporary South Asia* 19, no. 2 (June 2011): 189–203, p. 193 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2011.560654>

<sup>39</sup> Aslam, “Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of Balochistan,” p. 193-194

rest of Pakistan, an administrative system was established and communication networks improved<sup>40</sup>. To protect their vested tribal and ethnic interests, several Baloch ethno-nationalist parties were established by the Baloch tribal chiefs and ethno-nationalists to take part in elections and keep the power, authority and rule-making in the region confined to themselves. Hence, this situation allowed tribal and political leaders, ethnic elites and their offspring to become a part of the civil bureaucracy and attain top positions in Baluchistan and the Federal capital and become more powerful and wealthy than before<sup>41</sup>.

These wealthy and powerful Baloch elites still exercise influence and authority over their tribes and the ethnic populations in their regions at the present time. By holding powerful positions in the state's key institutions, they exercise control over other state institutions in their areas such as the civil bureaucracy, judiciary and police<sup>42</sup>, keeping development within their hands and ensuring their de facto rule over their tribe in their respective areas where corruption plays an important role. These Baloch leaders and powerful figures employ their own people, either in provincial or district level public services and institutions that come under their control, thus keeping their people loyal to them and establishing patronage over them. One of the best examples, among many others, is the high number of so-called ghost schools in Baluchistan, especially in Baloch-dominated areas, where the whole school salary goes into the hands of patrons who remain loyal to their leaders who got them the job, while administrative and operational expenses end up mostly in the leader's pocket: a win-win situation for the leader and patron<sup>43</sup>.

Looking at the example of Baluchistan and in reference to the definition of conflict outlined at the beginning of this section, the conflict is between the Pakistani state and tribal chiefs in Baluchistan: each trying to gain and exercise authority and control of the region and perceiving each other as a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. The conflict has kept the people of Baluchistan in a poor socio-economic condition which adds to their grievances. The parts of the Baloch ethnification that are most resentful are those members of the population that remain cut off from the benefits and services provided by the state. They have the potential to be used against the state because of their attachment to ethnic sentiment. During analysis of the conflict in Baluchistan in chapters five and six, it is pointed out that greed and grievances give rise to conflict and both are a product of poor socio-political governance<sup>44</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> Aslam, "Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of Balochistan," p. 194

<sup>41</sup> Aslam, "Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of Balochistan," p. 194

<sup>42</sup> Human Rights Watch, "'This Crooked System' Police Abuse and Reform in Pakistan" (USA: Human Rights Watch, September 2016). p. 2-6

<sup>43</sup> Ayaz Ahmed, "The Triumph of Corruption in Balochistan," *Defense Journal* 20, no. 6 (2017). p. 29-30

<sup>44</sup> Aslam, "Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of Balochistan," p. 198

## **Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP)**

The socio-political history of FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) has played an important role in conflict that has affected Pakistan's internal and external security. The KP province and the areas of Pakistan connected with the Afghanistan border have high concentrations of people from the Pashtun ethnicity. The areas inhabited by the Pashtun and Punjabi ethnic nations before 1901 were part of a single province called Punjab Province. Later in 1901, the Pashtun dominated area was separated from the Punjab province and was divided into two regions: 'the settled districts' and 'tribal areas' through the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). The FCR aimed to serve the interests of the British Empire against the Russian empire by making the areas under the FCR buffer zones and it also helped to counter Pashtun opposition to British rule<sup>45</sup> and acted as an instrument for subjugating and disciplining the Pashtun tribes<sup>46</sup>. The FCR transformed the settled districts into a province named the *North-West Frontier Province* (now known as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province) while the tribal areas came under the control of the British Viceroy's central government and was named *Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)*.

It is important to understand the structure of Pashtun society in order to understand how the FCR was adjusted to be more in keeping with their traditional customs and laws. The identity of being ethnically Pashtun revolves around the male-centered code of conduct called the *Pakhtunwali* and the most important factor of this code is the notion of *honor* followed by the notion of *revenge*. A Pashtun would consider his life worthless without honor and the offenses to a Pashtun's honor must be avenged otherwise there is no honor. In the case of murder, the revenge would also be murder. Yet, two other important codes of *Pakhtunwali*, very closely related to honor, are *hospitality* as a means of showing respect or creating alliances (thereby both parties gain honor) and *refuge* which is the means of attaining honor by giving refuge to someone weak, even the enemy<sup>47</sup>.

The socio-political problems and disputes in Pashtun society are resolved through negotiations for which they already have a system of council in place called *Jirga* in the local language. The Pashtun society is organized into segments of clans to which they can trace their ancestry. Among the men there exists an intensive egalitarian code where the tribal leader is considered the first among equals and this sense of equality is also found among the council of elders who deal with all sorts of disputes within and among clans and tribes, as well as make decisions on the

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<sup>45</sup> Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, *Leaving Terrorism behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* (London: Routledge, 2009). p. 290-320

<sup>46</sup> Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, *Understanding FATA: Attitudes towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 5 2011* (Islamabad] Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme, 2012). p. 1-3

<sup>47</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 109-110

relationships between tribes and decide how to interact with other ethnicities and governments alien to them<sup>48</sup>.

The 1901 FCR did not legally institutionalize a Jirga system in KP province and with the passage of time the modern legal system was overwhelmingly accepted there. However, in FATA, the FCR legally institutionalized the Jirga system in 1901 by dividing FATA into tribal agencies and each agency had a political agent (PA) appointed by the government<sup>49</sup>. The PA looked after the local and administrative affairs of his agency as well as acting as executive, judge and revenue collector<sup>50</sup>. Each PA had assistants known as ‘Maliks’ who were traditional power bearers in Pashtun society and acted as representatives to and for their tribe, thereby acting as an intermediary between the central government and the society. They had strong representation in social matters and resolved conflicts and issues between and among tribes through Jirga of the tribal chiefs, thus adjusting the FCR along the lines of the very core structure of Pashtun society<sup>51</sup>.

Similar to the case in Baluchistan, the British paid no attention to development of the areas that constituted FATA. When the British left, the tribal chiefs of all FATA agencies acceded to the Pakistani state. In return, they retained FATA’s semi-autonomous status granted through the FCR. The final constitution of Pakistan adopted in 1972 also retained the same arrangement<sup>52</sup>. During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, the state of Pakistan and its allies (the US and Saudi Arabia) benefitted from the *Pakhtunwali* code that motivated the Pashtuns in FATA to help their brother Pashtuns (also Muslims) in Afghanistan who were under attack by a non-Muslim empire, thereby instigating the idea of Jihad in line with the *Pakhtunwali* code.

The American war on terror which began in Afghanistan in 2001 again activated the *Pakhtunwali* code and Jihad in FATA. The Taliban, who are mostly Pashtuns of Afghanistan, moved to the FATA region to flee the US attacks, with members of Al-Qaeda also shifting to FATA. As per the ethnic and religious code, it can be assumed that the people of FATA welcomed them as guests or refugees but many also joined them to yet again fight the holy war: this time against the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and limiting the fight only to Afghanistan. When the US and NATO forces started to target the Taliban and Al-Qaeda members in FATA through drone strikes from 2005 onwards, the *Pakhtunwali* code again came into action. The notion of honor and revenge was instigated because the collateral damage killed their women and children as well as their innocent Pashtun brothers along with the real targets who were guests or

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<sup>48</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 111

<sup>49</sup> Shinwari, *Understanding FATA: Attitudes towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas*, p. 04

<sup>50</sup> Shinwari, *Understanding FATA: Attitudes towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas*, p. 22

<sup>51</sup> Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud and Qayum Khan, *The Evolution of Conflict in FATA* (Oslo: Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, 2013). p. 3-4

<sup>52</sup> Shinwari, *Understanding FATA: Attitudes towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas*, p. 17

taking refuge. Pakistan was an ally of the US in the war on terrorism and the increasing number of drone attacks by the US forces in FATA were later found to be controlled by the US forces from air bases in the territory of Pakistan<sup>53</sup>. Hence, some FATA Pashtuns and a Taliban faction turned against the state of Pakistan to seek revenge for the blood of their family members. There are other important and stronger structural reasons for FATA becoming the den for religious militants and attracting religious militants from all over the country to gather in FATA. Those structural reasons emerged out of the policy of the state of Pakistan to forge a state-nation. This policy and its impact will be examined in chapters three and five.

### 1.3. Research Study

#### Research Objective and Question

In the case of Baluchistan and FATA, the structure of social and political governance by the state has either been weak (in Baluchistan) or absent (in FATA), thus creating vacuums for other ideological and anti-state movements to fill. The vacuum has also provided an opportunity and a safe haven for many state (India and Afghanistan) and non-state actors in Baluchistan and FATA who have utilized the state's absence and the porous borders of these areas to their advantage. In addition, social injustices create (and continue to create) a sense of inequality, while the state's mechanisms of monitoring its subjects through policing, local government systems and accountability has remained largely absent, reflecting poor governance strategies.

*Governance* is a key concept in this research. It explains the ways a country is governed and covers all aspects of economic, foreign and state policies and frameworks that, ideally, are underpinned by the rule of law.<sup>54</sup> The World Bank also offers a definition: "Governance refers to the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and service"<sup>55</sup>. Referring to this definition in the case of Baluchistan and FATA, the public policy and level of effective governance could be described as poor and, in some cases, entirely absent.

In addition, Pakistan ranked between 117 to 144 out of 180 countries<sup>56</sup>, from 2005 to 2021 on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and it ranked 130 out of 139 countries on the rule of law index in 2021<sup>57</sup>. Poor planning, control and accountability have also contributed to corruption and social injustice at the micro-level which has injected and rooted itself deeply throughout the society,

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<sup>53</sup> Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, "Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 4 (2011): 12–18, p. 13. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23039602>.

<sup>54</sup> Alvi Nabeel Ahmed and Ansari Basit, "Good Governance in Pakistan: Problems and Possible Solutions," *The International Journal of History and Social Sciences* 3, no. 2 (2012). p. 114


<sup>55</sup> Ahmed and Basit, "Good Governance in Pakistan: Problems and Possible Solutions,". p. 114

<sup>56</sup> Trading Economic, "Pakistan Corruption Rank: 2021 Data - 2022 Forecast - 1995-2020 Historical - Chart," Trading Economics, 2021, <https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/corruption-rank>.

<sup>57</sup> World Justice Project, "WJP Rule of Law Index," worldjusticeproject.org, accessed April 21, 2022, <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2021/Pakistan>.

especially in Baluchistan and FATA. Corruption involves public office holders abusing public authority or trust for private benefit. In a poor governance structure, there are more opportunities for corruption and thus the incentives to engage in corrupt conduct are high<sup>58</sup>. Corruption is endemic in Pakistan with no public office or structure being immune<sup>59</sup>. Spreading systematically downwards from central public offices to provincial/regional and district level public offices, corruption has also polluted the judiciary and legislature making the whole state body contaminated with this malaise<sup>60</sup>. Figure 1 below draws upon data from a range of indexes to show the relatively poor condition of Baluchistan and FATA compared to other provinces/regions of Pakistan.

**Figure 1. Poor Governance reflected through comparison of Development Indicators in Regions of Pakistan from 2000 to 2019<sup>61</sup>**



The predominance of corruption, combined with a class of elites and rulers in the socio-political system of Pakistan who engage in it, fuels feelings of social injustice among the citizens of the country.

*Social injustice* includes the absence of important elements that satisfy the needs and desires of the general public such as access to education, health, livelihoods and justice. The absence, weak, inconsistent, or discriminatory provision of any of these elements demeans life and develops

<sup>58</sup> Ahmed and Basit, “Good Governance in Pakistan: Problems and Possible Solutions,” p. 114

<sup>59</sup> Umbreen Javaid, “Corruption and its Deep Impact on Good Governance in Pakistan,” *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* 48, no. 1 (2010): 123–34, p. 123. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41762417>

<sup>60</sup> Javaid, “Corruption and its Deep Impact on Good Governance in Pakistan,” p. 123

<sup>61</sup> Institute of Management Research, “Subnational Human Development Index (4.0)”, Global Data Lab, Radboud University. Accessed on January 14, 2021. [https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/shdi/PAK/?levels=1%2B4&interpolation=0&extrapolation=0&nearest\\_real=0&color\\_scales=national](https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/shdi/PAK/?levels=1%2B4&interpolation=0&extrapolation=0&nearest_real=0&color_scales=national)

anxiety among people who may adopt anti-social behaviors to attain these elements or to fight structures that do not provide them with those desired elements<sup>62</sup>. In Pakistan, law and order are not implemented equally for everyone, the system of justice is considered biased and dishonest; poor policies for ensuring that people have access to employment, health and education are abundant, and the idea of collective benefit does not exist<sup>63</sup>. In the Baluchistan and FATA regions of Pakistan, the absence of these elements has created impetus for the people to indulge in violence against the state.

It is important to develop a conceptual understanding of how poor governance in a country coupled with institutions and groups of self-interested feudal, ethnic, religious and tribal elites reduces the ability of the state to connect with its citizens to deliver essential services and generate trust and loyalty amongst the people. Understanding the power struggle between the state institutions and these elites that leads to poor governance and creates an environment of violence will help to achieve the primary objective of this research which is to develop a *Conflict Prevention and Reduction Model (CPR)*. The CPR model will be developed through the three stages explained below and also shown in Figure 2 below.

**Stage I:** This stage involves an extensive literature review to elaborate key concepts used in the research, understand the distinct interests of the state and the people, and identify the key stakeholder institutions that play an important role in protecting those interests. The research then moves on to develop the Sub-Structural Framework for Violence (SFV). The SFV theoretically explains the structural factors and their processes that give rise to religious and ethnic conflicts of a nation or sub-nations with their own state. The SFV is derived by combining two models in chapter three: a) Simple Descriptive Model (SDM), and b) Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM).

a) *Simple Descriptive Model (SDM)*. This is an existing model developed by Barry Buzan that explains the social and political factors that establish the core underlying components of a state to develop a strong relationship with its citizens. The core underlying components of a state according to the SDM are i) the idea of a state, ii) the physical base of a state, and iii) the institutional expression (the institutions that govern) of the state. This model is combined with the Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM)

b) *Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM)*: This is a new model developed in this research and is built on the foundations of the original Disaster Crunch Model (DCM) developed and

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<sup>62</sup> Ivan Gyzosomlai, "Weather the Shadow: Social Justice within Cultural Relativism in Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of Criminology* 4, no. 2 (2012): 81–103, p. 82  
<http://www.pjcriminology.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/5-40.pdf>.

<sup>63</sup> Shagufta Begum, Chairperson, and Aneeqa Batoool Awan, "Plato's Concept of Justice and Current Political Scenario in Pakistan," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 3, no. 11 (2013), p. 83  
[http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol\\_3\\_No\\_11\\_June\\_2013/9.pdf](http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_11_June_2013/9.pdf)

proposed by Bob Hansford<sup>64</sup>. The focus of the DCM is on natural hazards and it explains that when a vulnerable population is exposed to natural hazards there is likely to be a disaster. The three factors of the DCM are i) natural hazards, ii) the vulnerability of the people to hazards, and iii) disasters. Conflicts and violence are products of the actions of human beings, therefore, the new model established is named the *Manmade Disaster Crunch Model* (MDCM). The new MDCM states that when *radicalization* (as hazard) is exposed to a *grieving* (vulnerable) population, it produces *vulnerable mobilizing structures (VMSs)* (characterized as disasters). The VMSs are the financial, human, material, intelligence and physical resources required to inflict violence (terrorism and insurgency). These three factors of the MDCM, if operative to a sufficient degree, damage the core underlying components of a state identified by Buzan in the SDM. In turn, the factors of the MDCM can aggravate the relationship between the state and its citizens.

**Stage II:** This stage includes two case studies and the application of the SFV in chapters four, five, six and seven. The first case study involves the regions of Baluchistan and FATA. The second involves the region of KP. The application of the SFV aims to examine and identify the factors that give rise to religious and ethnic radicalization and that make the people vulnerable to radicalization. When applied, the framework gives a logical explanation of the differences found in the outcome of the application of the SFV in Baluchistan and FATA to the outcomes found in KP. The CPR model is derived from the basis of the findings from both case studies.


**Stage III:** The findings from stage II of this research lead to the development of the CPR in Chapter Eight. This stage also includes the conclusion of the research study where the research question is answered and the prerequisites and limitations for the application of the CPR model are explained.

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<sup>64</sup> Bob Hansford, *Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities*. (Tearfund, 2011). p. 18



**Figure 2. CPR Model Development**



### **Research Question**

Can a Conflict Prevention and Reduction (CPR) Model be created that facilitates good socio-political governance and peace in the Baluchistan and FATA regions of Pakistan?

### **Research Significance**

This study is unique in that it is the first-ever empirical research specifically on conflict in Baluchistan and FATA that identifies the social and political structural causes and catalysts of terrorism and insurgency in these areas. The study is timely and significant to the current political situation of Pakistan and especially Baluchistan and FATA. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, the country has not witnessed a period of martial law after 14 years of successive elected democratic governments since 2008. The last fourteen years of democratic rule have given Pakistan and its political institutions the opportunity to strengthen democracy, improve governance as well as the resolve to suppress terrorism through military action.

In addition, the state abolished the FCR law in FATA and merged the region with the KP province in 2018-19. As FATA will now experience the administrative, social and political systems of the state, there is potential for religious and ethnic conflict in FATA along the same lines as in Baluchistan, which is also briefly elaborated on in this research. The study seeks to help the state of Pakistan to understand the socio-political vulnerabilities of the Pashtun ethnic-nation in FATA that need to be addressed to prevent an ethnic insurgency similar to that which has existed in Baluchistan since 1947. This study will also highlight gaps and weaknesses in the state structure and governance mechanisms that provide opportunities for militants (or potential insurgents) to radicalize the people, gather support by exploiting ethno-religious sentiments, and carry out their activities against the state.

The study intends to help shift the lens of the state, its political institutions, civil service and policy makers and refocus their attention on the often overlooked structural causes of conflict in Baluchistan and FATA focused on socio-political governance. The study will enable these actors, as well as academia and civil society to examine the problems of terrorism and insurgency through the lens of socio-political governance and identify the role of poor, or a total lack of governance, in generating and sustaining violence in both areas. The research will also contribute by shifting the focus of the international community, including academics, to the governance dynamics that fuel the conflict in the region. One of the most important aspects of this research is that the SFV will enable the understanding of the socio-political reasons that continuously contribute to the conditions out of which terrorists and insurgents emerge. As such, this framework, while based upon and tailored to Pakistan, has wider potential: it could help other states to focus their attention on the socio-political structures that act as the catalysts for terrorism, violence and conflict.

Secondly, the significance of the study is that it focuses on the State-Nation policy in Pakistan first adopted in the 1970s to try to address internal security problems. The study will thus contribute to an understanding of the political economy of Baluchistan, FATA and the Pakistani state to formulate policies and develop structures that address societal vulnerabilities in the country. Improved understanding will advance the prospects for state institutions to create good governance in the poor and socio-economically deprived regions of Baluchistan and FATA. Ideally, the state and the provincial governments will be able to increase their control throughout FATA and Baluchistan and establish institutions that initiate changes in the socio-political conditions of the province according to the wishes of the people; ultimately enabling the state of Pakistan to stop and/or reduce the use of military and paramilitary forces for security in Baluchistan and FATA that involve significant costs and resources. The role of ensuring security can be transferred to the provincial governments, civil service and the political forces and could also help to address unemployment (a grievance factor for the Baloch and Pashtun ethnic groups).

## 1.4. Methodology

### Data Collection and Sampling

Primary data collection for this study involved two phases. Phase one took place throughout June and July 2018 and involved conducting one-on-one in-person interviews with members of the key stakeholder institutions (noted below) in Baluchistan, FATA and KP regions. The second phase took place throughout August and September of 2018 and involved surveying a sample of the people of the three regions. It is important to note here that for the interviews with institutional representatives, some respondents preferred to remain anonymous. As a consequence, the anonymity of all respondents is maintained to ensure consistency in the research document and to ensure the personal security of participants.

#### *Phase One*

The first phase of primary data-gathering involved interviews with senior and experienced members from the following key governmental and societal stakeholder institutions and organizations. These included:

- The civil bureaucracy (including Political Agents – PAs in FATA). This included a retired senior member of the federal and provincial (Baluchistan) public service and another senior member of the provincial (KP) public service who has also served as a PA in FATA;
- The military (a Colonel and a Brigadier);
- The tribal chiefs, including two prominent Pashtun tribal chiefs from FATA and one prominent Baloch tribal chief from Baluchistan;
- The mainstream political institution is comprised of political parties that have an ideological orientation for the people of the whole country and the state and which can be categorized on the right-left political spectrum. The institution is analysed through information gathered from a member of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party and a former member of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP);
- The ethnic political institution is analysed through information gathered from three senior members of ethnic political parties (a Pashtun senator, an existing ethnic Baloch Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA) of Baluchistan (2018-23) and a senior Baloch nationalist who was a member of the first provincial government formed in Baluchistan in 1972); and
- The religious political institution is analysed through information gathered from two members of the religious political parties (one being an ex-senator).

Because there is a possibility of bias in the responses from the representatives noted above, due to each having their individual, political or institutional interests to protect, secondary and primary survey data were gathered to help mediate biased responses.

## *Phase Two*

The second phase of primary data-gathering involved a survey. The sampling size of the survey is 144 survey participants, 105 (73%) of which are male and 39 (27%) female. The sample was divided among the regions of Baluchistan, FATA and KP. For further sampling, the Baluchistan region was divided into two sample sets: The Baluchistan Princely States (representing the areas that comprised the state of Kalat); and Quetta (representing the areas that came under British Baluchistan). A breakdown of the participants by gender against the sample sets is displayed in Table 1 below

**Table 1. Gender breakdown of the Research Sample by Region<sup>65</sup>.**

<b>Regions</b>	<b>Gender</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	
Baluchistan Princely States	27	9	36
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)	35	1	36
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	25	11	36
Quetta	18	18	36
<b>Total</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>144</b>

The data collection was made through random selection of research participants from the sample regions but was controlled in a way that ensured the data was attained from a broad swath of society. As such, the survey participants came from various occupational backgrounds such as professors, teachers, lawyers, doctors, bankers, political and social activists, social workers, students, entrepreneurs, councilors, privately employed drivers, and unemployed people. These occupational groups interact with people from all fields and levels of socio-economic and demographic backgrounds in their daily lives. They face, and see others facing, serious societal problems, corruption and social injustice and are, therefore, considered to be a representative sample that can be used for the purposes of this research.

### **Security of the Data and the Safety of the Participants and the Researcher**

The interviews were conducted one-on-one and took approximately one hour per participant. The surveys were also conducted one-on-one and took about 20 minutes per participant. The interview respondents were given the option to record their responses against the questions on a piece of paper themselves, have the researcher note down their responses, or record the conversation on a recording device for later transcription. Almost all respondents agreed to record the conversation for later transcription. The conversation recording and the transcription of each respondent also abides by the University of Waikato's ethics guidelines.

<sup>65</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Personal survey of the community", Unpublished raw data, 2018.

Due to security concerns in Baluchistan and FATA, activities like surveys only require that the local administration is aware of the date and time for the activity (this was not necessary for KP since there are no conflict zones in the province). The situation in FATA was much safer when the interviews were conducted compared to the situation in 2014-15<sup>66</sup>. Asking for direct security from the government or military was avoided because it would highlight the research and could have compromised the researcher's security and the security of the participants. It is hoped that this approach alleviated the concerns of respondents that sharing their free and frank views would compromise their security or be held against them by institutions of the state. Moreover, the questions were structured in a way to ensure participants were not worried or feel threatened as a result of the information they provided.

### **Structure and Data Processing**

The questionnaire for interviews is divided into two parts. The first part helps to understand the objectives, internal structure and administration of each key stakeholder institution. The second part helps to elaborate the conflict of interests between these institutions and the politicization of grievances of the people of Baluchistan, FATA, and KP.

The questionnaire for the surveys is divided into three parts. Part one is focused on the socio-demographic information of the survey participants. Part two includes questions that focus on the structure of socio-political conflicts. Part three focuses on the vulnerability component and reveals the control level of state or key stakeholder institutions in the regions of FATA, Baluchistan and KP.

The interview and survey questionnaires were formulated on the basis of the SFV outlined in chapter three. The questions in the interviews are open-ended while the survey questions are closed-ended and include dichotomous, nominal or ordinal variables. The statistical package for Social Science (SPSS) software has been used to analyze the survey data for descriptive analysis in the research<sup>67</sup>.

### **1.5. Chapter Outline**

The research starts with chapter two. This provides an in-depth analysis of the history of political discourse and the foreign and domestic policy of Pakistan in the face of its external security challenges. The chapter helps to identify the key stakeholder elite institutions that represent the state and the people of Pakistan at the central and regional level and to study their role in

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<sup>66</sup> South Asia Terrorism Portal, "FATA Assessment - 2017," [www.satp.org](http://www.satp.org), accessed May 11, 2021, <http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan>.

<sup>67</sup> Julie Pallant, *SPSS Survival Manual: A Step by Step Guide to Data Analysis Using SPSS* (Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 2011).

establishing the social and political structures that impact the security of the state and the people in the country and in the regions of Baluchistan and FATA.

Chapter three analyzes the SDM for the state of Pakistan and the regional sub-states of Baluchistan and FATA. The chapter then establishes the MDCM (explained above). Both models are then combined to develop a theoretical framework that explains the structural factors that lead to violence in the form of religious terrorism and ethnic insurgency. The framework is called the 'Sub-structural Framework for Violence' (SFV). The framework identifies and explains 'radicalization' and the 'vulnerability' of the people to radicalization as two important factors that give rise to VMSs which lead to violence. It also identifies the concepts and theories that explain radicalization and vulnerability and the actors and institutions that operate or are responsible for creating the structural factors that generate violence. Chapter three marks the end of stage I in the development of the CPR model.

Stage II then applies the SFV to Baluchistan, FATA and the KP regions of Pakistan by drawing upon secondary data and the primary data collected through the interviews with the representatives of the key stakeholder institutions and the survey of the people of three regions.

Initially in this stage, chapter four studies the key stakeholder central institutions and regional institutions that represent the political identity of the nation and sub-nations and are responsible for establishing the institutional expression of the state and the sub-state. The chapter also studies the institutional expression of the state of Pakistan in Baluchistan and FATA regions to reveal a weak relationship between the state and the sub-nations of both regions.

Chapter five outlines the 'radicalization' component of the MDCM in Baluchistan and FATA. The chapter studies the political interests of the key stakeholder institutions to elaborate on their ideological and political interests and conflicts with each other. The chapter focuses on the structural domination concept to elaborate on how the key stakeholder central institutions establish indirect domination of the state through agents of social control. These agents of social control (tribal, ethnic and religious elites) help or resist the key stakeholder central institutions in pursuing their political interests. In both situations, social movements emerge that radicalize the nation and the sub-nations and give rise to religious and ethnic VMSs that inflict religious terrorism and ethnic insurgency. This chapter identifies and divides the agents of social control in the regions of Baluchistan and FATA into two groups: the *dominating elites* (who help the key stakeholder central institutions to establish structural domination of the state in both the regions and pursue their political interests); and the other group, *resisting elites* (those in opposition to the dominating elites).

Chapter six applies the 'Vulnerability' component of the MDCM in Baluchistan and FATA. The chapter explains the process of how grievances develop and enhance the vulnerability of the population to religious and ethnic radicalization; allowing them to expand the VMSs and become

involved in violent religious or ethnic conflict with the state. The chapter explains this process by examining the socio-political dynamics that established the existing institutional expression in Baluchistan and FATA. It then elaborates on the grievances of the people in both the regions that are generated by the existing institutional expression. How those grievances are politicized by the key stakeholder institutions and the process through which the state is framed to be responsible for those grievances to incite grievances of the people towards the state are examined.

Chapter seven applies the SFV to the province of KP to study the political identities that establish the institutional expression in KP and elaborate on their political interests that weakened the structure of dominating and resisting elites in the province. This elite structure establishes or resists the structural domination of the state in Baluchistan and FATA and radicalizes the people with the rise in social movements (explained in chapter five). On the other hand, the vulnerability of the population of KP to radicalization is explored by analysing the grievances of the people that arise from the existing institutional expression of the state in KP which is found to be low. This is also proven by empirically calculating the vulnerability to radicalization ratio in KP, Baluchistan, and FATA and comparing them to show that the vulnerability to radicalization in Baluchistan and FATA is higher than in KP.

The thesis concludes in chapter eight by elaborating on the findings in the previous chapters to develop and propose the CPR model and answer the research question. On the basis of the conclusions reached after the application of the SFV to Baluchistan, FATA, and KP regions in the research, it is concluded that a CPR model, focused on reducing the structural domination of the state and political control, authority and power of the agents of social control and improving the existing institutional expression of the state, could evidently facilitate good socio-political governance and peace in the Baluchistan and FATA regions of Pakistan. The chapter also highlights the thesis's unique research contribution, its significance and limitations, and suggests potential future research efforts that are necessary to address gaps and to maximise the security of the Pakistani state and its people. The chapter ends with an epilogue that briefly outlines contemporary political developments in Pakistan in March 2022 and its significance to this research.

## **Chapter Two**

### **The Security Nexus between the Pakistani State and People**

#### **Introduction**

The previous chapter suggests that conflict between the FATA and Baluchistan regions with the state of Pakistan hinders the ability of the state to create a meaningful State-Nation in both regions. The chapter also made the case that the political institution (in this thesis the ‘political institution’ refers to the mainstream, religious and ethnic political parties) has become weak due to elite capture. This situation undermines the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms in the country, a reality that continues today. Such governance mechanisms give rise to corruption and social injustices, and reinforce and intensify the existing conflict in Baluchistan and FATA. It is, therefore, necessary to investigate the relationship between the state and the people of Pakistan through the relevant institutions regulating this relationship to advance understanding of the weakness of the state-to-nation linkages in Baluchistan and FATA. A number of key concepts will be elaborated on in this chapter, the state, nation, institutions, security, conflict and violence (terrorism and insurgency). The four models of Barry Buzan that consider nation to state linkages are also outlined to help investigate and identify key stakeholder institutions that represent the state and the people.

This chapter is divided into two sections.

- i) The chapter starts by discussing the state, drawing upon the traditional militaristic approach, the reductionist approach and a combination of these: the institutional approach. The chapter then introduces the key concept of the state, nation and institutions, and builds on this to discuss the historical relationship between the state and the nation through their representative institutions.
- ii) Secondly, the chapter discusses the security of the state and the nation through a historical lens. It then examines the roles played by India, Afghanistan and USSR (and Russia) in fostering Pakistan’s external and internal security threats. It also studies the relationship of Pakistan with the US, China and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to counter those external threats. The impact of the policies that countered the external threats and compromised the internal security of the people of Baluchistan and FATA, which resulted in ethnic insurgency and religious terrorism is also investigated.

This chapter, and the concepts discussed therein, lay down the foundation for Chapter Three to help understand the Simple Descriptive Model (SDM) and develop the Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM). The chapter will now unpack the first section mentioned above.



## 2.1. The State and the People of Pakistan

*State:* Three definitions are used here to understand the *state* as a concept. The first includes reductionist definitions put forward by Marxists, liberal democrats and functionalists; the second is the militaristic view put forward by Ludwig Gumplowicz, Gustav Ratzenhofer and Carl Schmitt. The reductionist approach considers the state to be a platform that expresses and institutionalizes the struggle of classes, interest groups, and individuals. The idea behind the reductionist theory is to deny significant autonomous power to the state and considers provision of economic welfare and instilling a national ideology to be the core base structure of the state. On the contrary, the militaristic idea considers the state to be a physical force underpinned by the state, having a monopoly on the use of force and thus relevant police and military forces. These forces enable social order in society and are more significant than the economic and ideological structures that are the fundamental elements of the state's core. According to the militaristic approach, security, order and authority take precedence over everything else<sup>68</sup>.

Thirdly, there is the institutional concept of state. Michael Mann proposes a definition of the state through an institutional lens. He says:

A state contains a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a center to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence<sup>69</sup>.

This thesis adopts Mann's definition to analyze the state of Pakistan and its relationship with its people. The definition enables the identification of the institutions that represent the state and the people and that have 'centrality' and who seek to maintain authoritative rule across the country. As this chapter progresses, these institutions are outlined and identified in the context of Pakistan. We now turn to considering the concepts of nation and ethnicity.

*Nation and Ethnicity:* When a *nation* is discussed, it usually refers to the people of a particular country. One of the oldest definitions asserts that the nation is a political and societal body of humans united to promote their mutual safety and advantage by using the joint efforts of their combined strengths<sup>70</sup>. Another, and not mutually exclusive, definition holds that a nation is a definite community of people: not racial and tribal or a conglomeration, it is historically constituted, stable and can be a multi-lingual community having an established territory, economic life and

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<sup>68</sup> Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 (November 1984): 185–213, p. 186 <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003975600004239>.

<sup>69</sup> Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," p. 188

<sup>70</sup> Emer De Vattel, Joseph Chitty, and Edward D Ingraham, *The Law of Nations; Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. From the French of Monsieur de Vattel ... From the New Edition of Joseph Chitty-- with Additional Notes and References, by Edward D. Ingraham.* (Philadelphia: T & J.W. Johnson, 1852). p. 01

social cohesion<sup>71</sup>. Nation is an inherently limited and sovereign imagined political community whose members will never get to know, hear, or meet most of their nation's members, but they imagine that each of them lives in a single communion<sup>72</sup>.

According to the definitions above, the people of a nation can belong to different ethnic backgrounds. *Ethnicity* refers to a group of people identified on the basis of their common race, colour, language and territory<sup>73</sup>. Ethnicity is also categorized as a group which holds common traditions not shared by others and such traditions can include customs, beliefs, language, historical continuity and having common ancestors<sup>74</sup>.

The introduction chapter of the thesis explained that the people of Pakistan come from different ethnic backgrounds. These ethnic nations identify themselves as separate from each other, with religion being their common denominator. Therefore, to develop a sense of Pakistani nationhood, such as it is, and that arguably veils over the ethnic divides, the religious State-Nation model was considered the best option for the state to develop with the Islamic idea of a Pakistani nationhood over the people by the founding fathers and later by the state institutions. However, the State-Nation model challenges the distinct culture, tradition and language of these ethnic nations. It seeks to blend them with each other and compel them to share their resources and land. Thus, the State-Nation approach exists in a paradox with the reality of the multiple ethnic nations in Pakistan. We now focus on studying the complexity of the state-to-nation relationship in Pakistan.

#### *The Complex Relationship between the State, Nation and Sub-Nations*

The relationship between the nation and the state is complex, as some nations (like the Kurds that occupy portions of territory in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) exist without a state while others are divided across more than one state or join together to form a state<sup>75</sup>. Applying certain identity characteristics to the people of Pakistan changes the relationship between the state and the nation. If applying the identity of Muslims of India under British rule who joined together to seek an independent homeland for themselves, Pakistan can be termed a Muslim Nation-State – the nation is the predominant *entity* above the state; the state is secondary. However, Pakistan suffers from an identity crisis and the factors relevant to understanding this can be revealed by considering Buzan's four models of the state and nation relationship<sup>76</sup>.

The first model, the *primal Nation-State*, exists when a nation gives rise to a state. Japan is one such example. The second model is the *State-Nation*, where the state plays an important role in

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<sup>71</sup> J. V. Stalin, "What Is a Nation?," *Pakistan Forum* 2, no. 12 (September 1972): 4, p. 01  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2569097>

<sup>72</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London; New York: Verso, 1983). p. 49

<sup>73</sup> Ernest Ellis Cashmore, *Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations 2nd Ed.* (London: Routledge, 1988). p. 97

<sup>74</sup> David Crystal, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia* (Cambridge Etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1992). p. 421

<sup>75</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 75

<sup>76</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 76-78

giving rise to a nation, like the United States. The third model is the *Part Nation-State* where a nation stretches across two or more states, like Germany during the Cold War, or the South and North Korea situation today. The fourth model is the *Multi-nation State* in which a state either consists of two or more nations to become a *federative state* if it does not try to enforce an artificial State-Nation over the existing nations (like Canada) or becomes an *imperial state* if one nation, against the others, dominates the state structure to its own advantage, like the Punjabi nation in Pakistan<sup>77</sup>.

These models provide some insight to understand the complexities that the state of Pakistan faces as it struggles to establish a strong relationship between the state and its people. At the same time, while Pakistan could be considered to have been a Muslim Primal Nation-State in 1947 (see Map 1, p. 1), it can also be identified as a Part Nation-State, because three of the four major ethnic sub-nations of Pakistan are part-nations (Map 5, p. 8). However, the Pashtun, Punjabi and Baloch sub-nations do not politically demand unification with their ethnic brethren on the other side of the borders. Therefore, in the current scenario, the federative state of the multi-nation State model would most closely fit Pakistan if the state stopped enforcing an artificial religious State-Nation over the various ethnic sub-nations within Pakistani territory to regulate the complex relationship between the state and the citizens. So, in the contemporary context, Pakistan can be considered an *artificial religious Multi-nation State*. This name is suggested because Buzan neither elaborated nor specified a name for a Multi-nation state where the state enforces an artificial State-Nation over the existing nations. This research will elaborate on the impact of the enforcement of the artificial State-Nation in Pakistan.

It is understood that the state-to-nation relationship in Pakistan is complex. Therefore, the chapter now explains the political evolution of Pakistan to identify the key stakeholder institutions of the state and the people that regulate this complex relationship.

## **The Institutions of the State, Nation and the Sub-nations**

### *Types of Institutions*

An *institution* can be defined as a system that establishes or has a prevalent set of rules that structure human behaviour<sup>78</sup>. Institutions are constraints devised by human beings to structure political and socio-economic order and consist of both formal elements (constitutions, laws, and property rights) and informal rules (sanctions, taboos, customs, norms, traditions, and codes of conduct)<sup>79</sup>. Institutions are divided into formal and informal, where the *formal institutions* are state-societal and their purpose is to ensure socio-economic order and collective gain and services

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<sup>77</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 76-78

<sup>78</sup> Jack Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict* (Cambridge England; New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1992). p. 02

<sup>79</sup> Douglass C. North, "Institutions," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112, p. 97  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/1942704>

to the people through state-enforced rules<sup>80</sup>. The formal rules include the constitution and rule of law as they contribute to political stability, efforts to prevent corruption, enhance public sector efficiency and protect private property rights from being embezzled by private or government actors<sup>81</sup>. To be more specific, formal institutions include legislation and regulations that are enforced through government, law enforcement, and the judiciary<sup>82</sup>. On the other hand, *informal institutions* consist of civic, religious and kinship ties, and other societal rules and organizations<sup>83</sup>. In Pakistan, the weakness of the formal and informal institution in the context of socio-political dynamics needs to be explained and elaborated on, which is done below.

### *Institutional Weakness in Pakistan*

For most countries, formal institutions exist on three levels. The first level is the *constitution*, which lays down a set of fundamental rules derived from basic human rights (although some nations differ in terms of how they view human rights and what rights should be protected). The second is the *legal system* which is based on the fundamental rules reflecting the structure of the state, political decision-making process and property and contract laws. The third level is the *institutional environment* that is formed together by the legal system and the fundamental rules. The third level allows individuals and organizations to form institutional arrangements to coordinate their activities<sup>84</sup>. In theory, for a highly-functioning state, the three levels of institutions discussed above should enjoy a strong level of independence from the institutions representing the state (military and bureaucracy) and the people (tribal and political)<sup>85</sup>. The three levels of formal institutions should also be viewed as legitimate by the state and its citizens.

Pakistan has been facing problems at all three of the aforementioned levels of institutions because its military and political leaders, before 2007-08, made continuous changes to the constitution and the legal system to prolong their rule, to gain more power or pursue their self-interest, thus weakening the constitution, legal system and the institutional environment of the state. In addition, politicians in Pakistan after 2007 (when the military rule ended and democracy prevailed – a situation that continues through to today) have rarely shown a level of maturity to strive for the welfare of the citizens while in power or opposition, therefore, either under a military leader or a political leadership, the formal institutions have remained weak. The reason for them being weak

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<sup>80</sup> Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,” *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 04 (December 2004): 725–40, p.727. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592704040472>

<sup>81</sup> Janine Aron, “Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence,” *The World Bank Research Observer* 15, no. 1 (February 1, 2000): 99–135, p. 103. <https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/15.1.99>.

<sup>82</sup> Jane Frances, “Institutions, Firms and Economic Growth.” *Working Paper 04/19 September 2004*, (Wellington: New Zealand Treasury, 2004), p. 06 <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6804141.pdf>

<sup>83</sup> Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,” p. 727

<sup>84</sup> Lance E Davis, Douglass C North, and Calla Smorodin, *Institutional Change and American Economic Growth*, (Cambridge [England] University Press, 1971). p. 6-8

<sup>85</sup> Silvio Borner et al., *Institutional Efficiency and Its Determinants: The Role of Political Factors in Economic Growth* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation And Development, 2004). p. 29

lies in the fact that the rules simply do not exist, or are poorly enforced because the existing rules provide room for unlawful personal gains, benefits and corruption<sup>86</sup>.

The *political institution* of the country can be considered responsible for this situation by the people of the country. This is because a political institution consists of organizations and institutions with political roles and having the authority to allocate material and non-material societal values by establishing governments, creating and enforcing laws, and mediating socio-political conflicts<sup>87</sup>. The political institution in Pakistan includes the *parliament, legislature and the political parties*. These have remained weak in Pakistan and have been overpowered by the influence of the military, the civil bureaucracy and feudal, tribal and oligarch elites, ultimately establishing a weak political base for the country. The origin of this weak political base is discussed next.

### *Weak Political Base*

Ideally, politics is steered by political parties who not only mobilize the state and act as instruments of change but also serve as a transmission route for the nation's interests, thereby regulating the state-to-nation relationship. Unfortunately, the politics and the political parties in Pakistan have never been able to fully and effectively achieve this function since partition in 1947. The All India Muslim League (AIML) influenced and mobilized the Muslims of India to strive for freedom and a separate Muslim Nation-State. After partition, the AIML renamed itself as Pakistan Muslim league (PML) and its rival, the Indian National Congress (INC), remained confined to India. This left the PML to become the first and most significant political party in newly-formed Pakistan. However, the PML could not sustain itself as a political force in Pakistan after independence in 1947<sup>88</sup> because of the death of two of their prominent leaders (Jinnah's natural death in 1948, and Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination in 1951) in the early years of independence.

Pakistan became politically unstable in 1951 and was on a trajectory towards conflict between two different ideological visions for the country. Such fragility of the political system was recognized by the founding father, Jinnah, before independence. He, therefore, rose above the parliamentary responsibility and tried to make structural changes to the political institution by creating and occupying the position of Governor General of Pakistan, a position with the same roles and powers as the British viceroy of India<sup>89</sup>. Jinnah's attempt to structure the Pakistani state in a way to provide long-term political stability failed as he died a year after independence in 1947.

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<sup>86</sup> Aron, "Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence," p. 104; North, "Institutions," p. 110

<sup>87</sup> Klaus Armingeon, "Political Institutions," in *Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Political Science*, ed. Hans Keman and Jaap Woldendorp (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 234–47.

<sup>88</sup> Shahid Javed Burki, "The State and the Political Economy of Redistribution in Pakistan," in *The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994). p. 282

<sup>89</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, "State Building in Pakistan," in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988). p. 307

The nascent political structure failed to develop a sense of individual and institutional loyalty, party organization and public responsibility towards the country while, on the other hand, the individual ambition of some politicians surpassed collective and progressive ambition<sup>90</sup>. No other national political force replaced the Pakistan Muslim League, which resulted in a political system dominated by elite interest groups and local leaders, or what was effectively a feudal system<sup>91</sup>. Karl V. Vorvys states that “holding office became the highest goal” of political actors after Jinnah’s death, which reflected the fact that individual self-interest had become the guiding principle by default<sup>92</sup>. Ultimately, the idea of political parties existing as permanent institutions, of seeking consensus on important issues, and of a legitimate opposition never existed. So, politics came to revolve around individual power and interests<sup>93</sup>.

### *The Rise of the Military, Civil Service and Feudal Elites*

During the 1948-58 period, the political institution of Pakistan failed to forge a cohesive constitution. The problem lay at the heart of the political system which remained immature, fragmented and fragile. To fill this gap, and contrary to the ideology of Jinnah, another group that inserted itself into the political vacuum were the *civil services* of Pakistan. For this group, there was no obstacle to gaining political power after the death of Jinnah and it gave them, rather than the official political parties, the opportunity to frame policies<sup>94</sup>. This group was (and remains) comprised of civil bureaucrats and civil servants who served under the British Empire in India before partition. Their aim then, and today, is to concentrate power in the executive branch instead of the legislative branch and promulgate policies that strengthen their image as the providers of security, authority and patronage to the people and the political elites<sup>95</sup>. This image of the civil bureaucracy was inherited from the colonial time of British India where a patron-client relationship between the civil bureaucracy institution and the local elites existed and it continued to exist in Pakistan with the local elites becoming the political elites<sup>96</sup>. Therefore, the politicians (local elites) did not become an obstacle to the civil servants to frame policies after partition.

These civil servants and bureaucrats developed further institutions and policies that lacked political legitimacy to provide collective goods and services. In addition, the problems of unresolved conflict between the east and west wings of Pakistan further hampered the political and social order emerging throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Through the lens of security, the vulnerability of a state is closely associated with a weak state structure and is a product of political instability

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<sup>90</sup> Karl Von Vorvys, *Political Development in Pakistan*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016). p. 124

<sup>91</sup> Jochen Hippler, “Basic Problems of Pakistani Society and Politics,” in *Understanding Pakistan*, ed. Hermann Kreutzmann and Talat Mahmood (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin, 2012). p. 23-26

<sup>92</sup> Cohen, “State Building in Pakistan,” p. 307

<sup>93</sup> Cohen, “State Building in Pakistan,” p. 307

<sup>94</sup> James Wynbrandt, *A Brief History of Pakistan* (New York: Facts on File, Cop, 2009). p. 169

<sup>95</sup> Andrew Wilder, “The Politics of Civil Service Reform in Pakistan,” *Journal of International Affairs* No. 1 (2009): 19–37. p. 19-24

<sup>96</sup> Wilder, “The Politics of Civil Service Reform in Pakistan,” p. 19-24

which exposes the state to domestic disruption and/or foreign intervention<sup>97</sup>. This security lens arguably makes it understandable why the military also chose to intervene in political affairs in 1958 through a coup. The new dictator, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, described the objective of the military rule as an attempt to “return the country to sanity”<sup>98</sup>. Published opinions on the matter suggest that the military rule was to bring order to the political system as it had failed and resulted in the collapse of the government<sup>99</sup>. Another factor was the military’s organizational discipline that, when compared to the domestic political institution’s inefficacy, was seen as justification for the takeover<sup>100</sup>.

### *The Military and Political Nexus*

When the military came to power in 1958 under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, it sought to reduce the state’s external vulnerabilities and developed strong ties with the US who wanted to have a base and an ally against the USSR in the subcontinent. The foreign aid in terms of economic and military assistance received by the military government in Pakistan (detailed in Table 3 in the next section) at that time established strong links between the US and Pakistan’s military and civil bureaucratic institutions in contrast to the formal political institution. During the 1958 to 1971 period, the military government was able to stabilize the country, facilitate economic growth, build institutions and create a civil-military alliance<sup>101</sup>. Consequently, the civil bureaucracy became one of the key government institutions in Pakistan that overshadowed the political institution, keeping the parliament mostly marginalized, and was considered powerful enough to resist military intervention in its affairs even through the 1958 to 1971 period of martial law<sup>102</sup>. From the perspective of the US, they preferred the better capacity of the military regime rather than the weaker political institution, as the military could serve US strategic objectives; US support helped pave the way for prolonged military rule<sup>103</sup>.

The political institution in the country reorganized during the period of military rule 1958 to 1971 and became stronger, giving rise to two new mainstream political parties: the *Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP)* and *Awami League (AL)*. The PPP adopted a militaristic approach for the state while the AL adopted the reductionist approach of the state. The PPP managed to gather strong support throughout most of West Pakistan by focusing on religio-socialist ideology, reflected by the slogan and manifesto revolving around Bread, Clothing and Shelter ‘*roti, kapra and makaan*’ for the

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<sup>97</sup> Buzan and Magonette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 105

<sup>98</sup> Wayne A. Wilcox, “The Pakistan Coup d’Etat of 1958,” *Pacific Affairs* 38, no. 2 (1965): 142-163, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2753785>. p. 142

<sup>99</sup> Wilcox, “The Pakistan Coup d’Etat of 1958,” p. 142

<sup>100</sup> Ayesha Siddiq, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007). p. 65

<sup>101</sup> Cohen, “State Building in Pakistan,” p. 307

<sup>102</sup> Hamza Alavi, “Politics of Ethnicity in India and Pakistan,” in *Perspectives on Modern South Asia: A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation* (Malden, Mass.; Oxford; Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, Cop, 2011). p. 97

<sup>103</sup> Siddiq, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy*, p. 66



people<sup>104</sup>. On the other side, AL promoted an ideology that emphasized equality among the sub-nations in Pakistan, which motivated even the ethno-nationalist politicians, tribal chiefs and ethnic elites of Baluchistan and KP to become their coalition partners<sup>105</sup>.

These two mainstream political parties seemed mature, institutionally strong and to have the ideological belief that they were nation-builders. This reason led the army to ensure that the elections of 1970 were the fairest elections in the history of Pakistan, hoping their success would allow strong political institutions to take over the country<sup>106</sup>. However, it proved to be in vain as a deadlock over the transfer of power from the military to AL (winner of the general elections) in the eastern wing was created by the elites of the political class, military and civil service of the western wing of Pakistan. The result of the deadlock was unrest, civil war in the east wing, and finally the states fragmentation, as a Bengali Nation-State (Bangladesh) was established in March 1971.

### *Return of Feudal Elites and Ethnic Nationalism in Politics*

The military relinquished power after the state lost its eastern part, which became Bangladesh. Power was handed over to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) that was victorious in the western wing of the country (Pakistan) as a result of the general elections of 1970<sup>107</sup>. The influential leader of PPP and new President, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto introduced a religio-socialist ideology into the state structure, initiated land reforms, nationalized industries and developed a constitution supported by a wide political consensus<sup>108</sup>. However, during the entire Bhutto government from 1971-1977, the sense of Pakistani nationalism could not surpass the sense of ethnic nationalism among the sub-nations in Pakistan.

*Nationalism* is defined as “fusion of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality”<sup>109</sup> or:

condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, professing a literature in which the aspirations of a nation are addressed, being attached to the common traditions, and, in some cases, having a common origin<sup>110</sup>.

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<sup>104</sup> Siddiqi, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, p. 76

<sup>105</sup> Cohen, “State Building in Pakistan,” p. 308

<sup>106</sup> Muhammad Rizwan, “The Elections 1970: From Ballot to Nowhere,” *Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities* 3, no. 4 (2014): 28–36, p. 32-34 <http://lcwu.edu.pk/ocd/cfiles/History/Maj/Hist/201/election1970.pdf>.

<sup>107</sup> Naumana Kiran, “Z. A. Bhutto's Cabinet: A Study of Its Role in Formulation of Economic and Foreign Policy, 1971-1977,” *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 52, no. 2 (2015): 133–52, p. 133

<sup>108</sup> Kiran, “Z. A. Bhutto's Cabinet: A Study of Its Role in Formulation of Economic and Foreign Policy, 1971-1977,” p. 133-52

<sup>109</sup> Carlton J H Hayes, John P Rossi, and Von Geusau, *Nationalism a Religion* (New Brunswick (U.S.A.): Transaction Publishers, Routledge, 2016). p. 02

<sup>110</sup> Louis L Snyder, *Dynamics of Nationalism*, First Edition (New Jersey: Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1964). p. 02



Some authors consider nationalism to be a sentiment (opinion based on feelings), for some it is a doctrine, and for some it is politics<sup>111</sup>. As a sentiment, nationalism may be strong but too individualized and personalized to be judged, as a doctrine it suffers from its own philosophical poverty, but as politics its presence and power are real and undeniable<sup>112</sup>.

The ethno-nationalist parties used ethnic nationalism among their relevant ethnic groups during the first military rule in 1958 which allowed them to take part in the country's political course and deal with doctrinal and sentimental approaches relevant to their respective ethno-nationalism. Ethno-nationalism was seen as essential to ensure some level of stability and order in Baluchistan and KP regions because of the existence of sentiments of anger and resentment, as the Pashtun and Baloch sub-nations considered themselves to be marginalized in the state structure, which was dominated by Punjabi and Muhajir ethnic groups<sup>113</sup>. This was the reason that the National Awami Party – NAP (the coalition partner of AL in the western wing before 1970 with its reductionist ideology of state comprising Pashtun and Baloch ethno-nationalist and tribal chiefs) - were victorious in the provincial assemblies of Baluchistan and KP in the general elections of 1970.

The Baloch ethno-nationalists and tribal chiefs demanded provincial autonomy and control over their territorial resources after forming the government in the province in 1972<sup>114</sup>. FATA remained an administrative unit after partition in 1947, and continued the system of FCR<sup>115</sup> and hence, the political structure and public institutions were neither provided by the state<sup>116</sup> nor demanded by the tribal Pashtun leaders of the sub-nation of FATA<sup>117</sup>. There was a sense of satisfaction among the Baloch because the democratic provincial government of Baluchistan in 1972 was made up by

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<sup>111</sup> John Breuilly, "Approaches to Nationalism," in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 146–74. p. 146-148

<sup>112</sup> Adeel Khan, *Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005). p. 38

<sup>113</sup> Maryam Shahid Khan, "Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan: Federal Design, Construction of Ethno-Linguistic Identity, and Group Conflict," *Harvard Journal on Racial and Ethnic Justice* 30 (2014): 77–129, p. 98-101. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185435>.

<sup>114</sup> Syed Aqbal Ahmad, *Balochistan : Its Strategic Importance* (Karachi, Pakistan: Royal Book Co, 1992). p. 154

<sup>115</sup> Altaf Ullah, "Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan: Study of a Special Model of Governance," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 34, no. 2 (2013): 65–94, p. 65 [http://www.niher.edu.pk/Downloads/Dr%20Altaf%20sb/5.%20Federally%20Administered%20Tribal%20Areas%20\(FATA\)%20of%20Pakistan%20\(1947-2013\)%20Study%20of%20a%20Special%20Model%20of%20Governance.pdf](http://www.niher.edu.pk/Downloads/Dr%20Altaf%20sb/5.%20Federally%20Administered%20Tribal%20Areas%20(FATA)%20of%20Pakistan%20(1947-2013)%20Study%20of%20a%20Special%20Model%20of%20Governance.pdf).

<sup>116</sup> Mazhar Ali Khan, "Social, Political and Economic Implications of Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901, in FATA, Pakistan," *Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities* 3, no. 1 (2014): 249–60, p. 253 [http://www.ajssh.leena-luna.co.jp/AJSSHPDFs/Vol.3\(1\)/AJSSH2014\(3.1-24\).pdf](http://www.ajssh.leena-luna.co.jp/AJSSHPDFs/Vol.3(1)/AJSSH2014(3.1-24).pdf)

<sup>117</sup> Brian R. Kerr, "A Progressive Understanding of Pashtun Social Structures amidst Current Conflict in FATA," *Conflict and Peace Studies, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies Journal* 3, no. 4 (2010): 91–110 p. 96-98, <http://pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/207.pdf>

the ethno-nationalists and tribal chiefs of the province who were perceived as protecting the interests of the sub-nations<sup>118</sup>.

Bhutto brought feudal methods of rule with him to power during his government. This method allowed him to retain power in his own hands, disregarding the parliament and the constitution and using the state institutions to repress the opposition<sup>119</sup>. He dissolved the NAP governments in KP and Baluchistan in 1973 with the support of the opposition groups and put the NAP leaders behind bars. He then tried to make a one-party state by gaining total control of the national assembly with a surprising call for elections in 1977 without any consensus from the parliament and the opposition, as their leaders were still in captivity. When NAP was subjected to repressive actions, it caused agitation, random acts of violence and organized protests, bringing the economic life of the country to a standstill. The situation became worse, which prompted the military to intervene to establish law and order in July 1977<sup>120</sup>.

### *The Military and Islamization*

The new army dictator who deposed Bhutto in 1977, General Zia-Ul-Haq, took the opportunity to make Pakistan an Islamic state through policies that perpetuated the idea that the survival and progress of the country could only be achieved through a state underpinned by Islamic values<sup>121</sup>. Some authors assert that Islam identifies religion as the key factor forming the roots of social and political institutions, including the state and government, while other authors subscribe to the notion that Islam is at once a religion and a nation, and the political system without either would fall<sup>122</sup>. Zia failed to realize that Islam is considered an important part of the sub-nations that live in Pakistan, but it does not help to unify them<sup>123</sup>.

Zia managed to instill Islamic structures and ideology within the state and society of Pakistan through the institutions of the state, religious political institution and state-sanctioned religious clerics<sup>124</sup>. Such efforts to apply Islamic laws in a modern political context have had a direct impact on Pakistan's political history and have also complicated the constitutional evolution of the country<sup>125</sup>. The Islamization of society in Pakistan, initiated by Zia in 1979, started to change the societal structure of the Pashtuns, especially in FATA and Pashtun-dominated areas of

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<sup>118</sup> Gulshan Majeed and Rehana Saeed Hashmi, "Baloch Resistance during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Era: Causes and Consequences," *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* 29, no. 1 (2014): 321–31, p. 322  
[http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/24%20Ghulshan%20Majeed\\_29\\_1.pdf](http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/24%20Ghulshan%20Majeed_29_1.pdf).

<sup>119</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 205-208

<sup>120</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 207

<sup>121</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 208

<sup>122</sup> Lukman Thaib, "Concept of Political Authority in the Islamic Political Thought," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention* 1, no. 2 (2012): 12–19, p. 13  
[http://www.ijhssi.org/papers/v1\(1\)/Version-2/C111219.pdf](http://www.ijhssi.org/papers/v1(1)/Version-2/C111219.pdf).

<sup>123</sup> Akbar, "Pakistan: An Islamic State or a State for Muslims?", p. 26

<sup>124</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 208

<sup>125</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 201

Baluchistan<sup>126</sup>. Muslim religious clerics started to replace the tribal chiefs in the matters of socio-economic and family issues and disputes<sup>127</sup>. The overall impacts of Zia's Islamic policies were felt by the whole country and generated polarization along religious lines giving rise to religious elites and religious-focused political support bases<sup>128</sup>. However, the Baloch nationalism resisted the opening of religious seminaries and the authority of religious scholars and Zia compromised in this aspect with the Baloch nationalist leaders so that they could keep the insurgency under control.

Zia's death in 1988 (in a controversial plane crash that also killed the US ambassador to Pakistan and chief of the US military mission in Pakistan) turned the state again towards democratic political institutions. Zia and the military had already strengthened the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and forged a religious political base to resist and balance the influence of PPP (under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto – daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) and the ethno-nationalists in the country<sup>129</sup>. These two mainstream political parties (PML and PPP) took part in elections and formed four governments over a period of ten years (1989-1999) by toppling each other's governments through various means. They also established alliances with other provincial ethno-nationalist and religious parties to topple each other. This tug-of-war between political actors continued until 1999 when the military again intervened and took over and exiled the political leaders and most members of both mainstream parties<sup>130</sup>.

The decade-long military rule that followed was a political–military partnership where the Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf, became president. While power remained in his hands, he allowed elections to be contested among political parties under military supervision. The PML split into PML – N (a 'dynastic political party' under the leadership of Nawaz Shareef who was deposed by Musharraf) and the PML – Q (which included political leaders and actors who showed allegiance to the military dictator).

### *Return to Democracy*

Throughout his tenure (1999 to 2007-08) Musharraf made constitutional changes, established various state and public institutions, and strengthened civil society, hoping that these efforts would keep the politicians focused on the development of the state and the nation<sup>131</sup>. It is now more than thirteen years since 2008 (when Musharraf stepped down after the 2008 general elections and the PPP came to power) and the country has not faced another imposition of martial law. The PPP and

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<sup>126</sup> Khan, "Social, Political and Economic Implications of Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901, in FATA, Pakistan," p. 256

<sup>127</sup> Mehsud and Khan, *The Evolution of Conflict in FATA*, p. 05

<sup>128</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A country study*, p. 128-129

<sup>129</sup> Masood Akhtar Zahid, "Dictatorship in Pakistan: A Study of the Zia Era," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 32, no. 1 (2011): 1–27, p. 05 [http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest\\_English\\_Journal/1.pdf](http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/1.pdf)

<sup>130</sup> Hina Jilani, *Human Rights and Democratic Development in Pakistan* (Lahore: Human Rights Commission Of Pakistan, 1998). p. 59

<sup>131</sup> IAN TALBOT, "General Pervez Musharraf: Saviour or Destroyer of Pakistan's Democracy?" *Contemporary South Asia* 11, no. 3 (November 2002): 311–28, p. 317-319. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0958493032000057726>

PML – N have come into power through general elections and finished their tenures of five years (PPP from 2008-2013 and PML from 2013-2018). PTI came into power in 2018 with a political platform against corruption, enforcement of rule of law and justice, and an end to dynastic politics and political parties. The PTI government, however, was toppled in April 2022 by an alliance of PPP, PML and religious and ethnic political parties. These parties in alliance have opposing political ideologies and have remained at daggers with each other throughout their history.

The three political parties (the PPP, PTI and PML-N) are now mainstreamed in the political institutions of Pakistan and have adopted a State-Nation approach but have struggled to establish a political base in Baluchistan and FATA to be able to connect the state with these sub-nations. The clash of the state institutions with the tribal institutions is a key factor – as mentioned earlier, the tribal institutions can exercise authority and socio-economic and political control in the regions through traditional mechanisms, which ultimately perpetuate the tribal and ethnic identity of the Baloch and FATA Pashtuns<sup>132</sup>.

Figure 3 below helps to provide an overview of the important elite institutions that shape the socio-political structure of Pakistan identified through the discussion in this section and will remain the focus throughout the research.

**Figure 3. Key Institutions that shape the Socio-Political Structure of Pakistan**

State Institutions
<p><b>Military</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Believes in the militaristic idea of the state.</li> <li>- Enjoys strong influence over the mainstream and religious political institutions.</li> <li>- Enjoys a good relationship with the civil bureaucracy.</li> <li>- Has poor relationship with the ethnic political institution in Baluchistan, FATA and KP and with certain groups in the mainstream political institution.</li> </ul> <p><b>Bureaucracy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Believes in the militaristic idea of the state.</li> <li>- Constrains the political institutions to shape state institutions and policies.</li> <li>- Enjoys mutually beneficial relationship with the political Institution</li> </ul>
Societal institutions
<p><b>Tribal Institution</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Exists in the entire country in different forms</li> <li>- Enjoys strong authority and power over the people of their tribe and ethnicity</li> </ul>

<sup>132</sup> N. Sambavisa Rao, “Interface of Tribal Self-Governance Institutions and Statutory Panchayats: A Study in the Scheduled Areas of Andhra Pradesh,” *National Institute of Rural Development & Panchayati Raj* (Hyderabad: Center for Development Documentation and Communication NIRDPR, 2017), p. 01.  
[http://nirdpr.org.in/nird\\_docs/srsc/srsc230217-19.pdf](http://nirdpr.org.in/nird_docs/srsc/srsc230217-19.pdf)

- A group of power seeking and self-interested tribal chiefs within the institution enjoys the support of the military and the civil bureaucracy
- Has strong influence and authority over the mainstream and ethnic political institutions due to its power and authority over a large swath of ethnic populations across the country
- Restricts the involvement of the state laws and religion into its jurisdictions due to having its own laws and customs followed, and adhered to by the people

## **State-Societal Institutions**

### **Mainstream Political Institution**

- Constituted of interest groups, businessmen, elites, landlords and tribal chiefs.
- Strongly influenced by the military.
- Believes in the militaristic idea of the state.
- Internal power struggles leave it divided from within.
- Power seeking groups of the institution have supported military coups to remain powerful and strong.

### **Religious Political Institution**

- Believes in the religious idea of the state.
- Enjoys strong support from the military.
- Partners with the mainstream political institution because of its strong religious base throughout the country.
- Enjoys authority and power over the people at the grass-root level throughout the country through vast numbers of religious seminaries and mosques controlled by religious clerics and priests.
- Clashes with the tribal and ethnic political institutions when it comes to practicing religious laws over tribal / ethnic laws, traditions and customs.
- Restricts the mainstream and ethnic political institution from establishing its political base in its areas of control.

### **Ethnic Political Institution**

- Believes in the reductionist idea of the state.
- Has poor relationships with the military, civil bureaucracy, religious political institution and the dominating elites at the regional and central level.
- Strongly influenced by the tribal chiefs: who mostly head the ethnic political parties and hardly provide opportunity to ethnic political personalities to become leaders of those parties.
- Enjoys strong support of the ethnic and tribal population due to the ideology of ethnic nationalism and control of the tribal chiefs.
- Restricts the mainstream and religious political institutions from establishing their political base in its areas of control.

Since the military and the civil bureaucracy enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship and influence over the political institution (especially over the mainstream and religious political parties), they have been able to keep the security of the state as the topmost priority of the central political class. In the course of ensuring security of the state, they have often overlooked the security of the people, especially in Baluchistan and FATA, and left these regions in the hands of the powerful tribal institutions to exercise control over the regional political institutions and people in the region. The next section elaborates on the security dynamics of the state and the people and their political and economic interests.

## 2.2. The Security of the State and the People

This section investigates the impact of Pakistan's foreign policy in relation to the security of the state. The section also shows how it has undermined the security of the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations of Pakistan. It is important to first discuss important concepts in relation to security and conflict and that will be used later in the chapter.

### *Conflict and Peace*

Research has shown that all human societies experience conflict<sup>133</sup> but how to resolve the conflict differs. Most of the time, conflict is resolved in a constructive way when two or more parties/actors find themselves in real or perceived incompatibility over a specific resource or issue<sup>134</sup>. Although conflict is necessary for societies to identify a path leading towards growth for individuals and communities, sometimes it can lead to loss of human life, and impede human development<sup>135</sup>. Some social scientists have been working to define conflict through understanding of causes that relate to power, values and feelings. These causes are also known as causative agents. Other scientists tend to assert that conflict results from the nature of the actors that are party to a conflict, such as individuals, organizations or states<sup>136</sup>.

The causes of conflict can be described as structural, proximate and trigger. *Structural causes* are persistent factors that are, or have been, a part of the policies, structure and fabric of a society, manifesting unequal power relationships between national or sub-national socio-political groups thus creating underlying conditions for conflict to turn violent. An example of this is provided by Buzan when he explains Pakistan is an imperial state where one (Punjabi) sub-nation is against the others and seeks to dominate the state structure to its own advantage<sup>137</sup>. *Proximate causes* are

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<sup>133</sup> Friedrich Glasl, *Konfliktmanagement. Ein Handbuch Zur Diagnose Und Behandlung von Konflikten Für Organisationen Und Ihre Berater.* (Bern: Paul Haupt Verlag, 1994) p. 01-02

<sup>134</sup> Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution : War, Peace and the Global System* (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2007). p. 15

<sup>135</sup> Adewale Olubunmi Tinuade and Bamise Olasehinde Fadekemi, "Conflict Resolution in Nigeria: The Role of Academic Library," *International Journal of Library Science* 4, no. 1 (2015): 13–20, p. 14  
<http://www.sapub.org/global/showpaperpdf.aspx?doi=10.5923/j.library.20150401.03>.

<sup>136</sup> Nadine Lyamouri-Bajja et al., *T-Kit No. 12 : Youth Transforming Conflict*, p. 56

<sup>137</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 76-78

factors that contribute to a climate that encourages conflicts to become violent or escalates the conflict. These causes involve factors that harm people when they have unequal life chances, i.e. prevented from meeting their basic needs due to socio-economic inequality and deprivation, and injustice<sup>138</sup>. *Trigger factors* are more immediate; they are the key acts, events or their anticipation, that set off or escalate conflicts into violence<sup>139</sup>. An example of this is the beginning of the First World War which was triggered by the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in June 1914.

### *Violence*

Violence is the expression of an extreme, consistent and intense level of conflict; a conflict may not necessarily result in destruction or harm but violence does in most cases<sup>140</sup>. Violence can be direct, which involves identifiable perpetrators who are intentionally motivated to cause harm to another's body through acts against the other in a violent event. For example, war between two groups on the battlefield. However, violence can be structural, involving no obvious perpetrators that cause harm to another human's mental and physical condition, and occurs as a result of a process rather than an event<sup>141</sup>. For example, the death of a person in a road accident due to unavailability of ambulances, lack of health facilities or first aid is a form of structural violence.

### *Terrorism and Insurgency as types of Violence*

On terrorism, Walter Laqueur stated that:

Terrorism is the use or the threat of the use of violence, a method of combat, or a strategy to achieve certain targets. Its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim and is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian rules. Publicity is an essential factor in the terrorist strategy<sup>142</sup>.

Bruce Hoffman offers another definition, stating that:

Terrorism is ineluctably political in aims and motives, violent or, equally important, threatens violence, designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target, conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of

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<sup>138</sup> Pádraig McAuliffe, "Structural Causes of Conflict and the Superficiality of Transition," in *Theorizing Transitional Justice*, ed. Claudio Corradetti, Nir Eisikovits, and Jack V. Rotondi (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2015), 93–108.

<sup>139</sup> APFO et al., "Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding," January 2004, p. 03 [https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Training\\_DevelopmentHumanitarianAssistancePeacebuilding\\_EN\\_2004\\_0.pdf](https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Training_DevelopmentHumanitarianAssistancePeacebuilding_EN_2004_0.pdf).

<sup>140</sup> Willian OO Idowu, "Citizenship, Alienation and Conflict in Nigeria," *Africa Development* 24, no. 1 (January 1, 1999), p. 34. <https://doi.org/10.4314/ad.v24i1.22116>.

<sup>141</sup> Lee Jarvis and Jack Holland, *Security: A Critical Introduction* (London: Palgrave, 2015). p. 152

<sup>142</sup> Walter Laqueur, "Reflections on Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 1 (1986): 86–100, p. 88 <https://doi.org/10.2307/20042863>..



command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia), and perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity<sup>143</sup>.

For its part, the US Department of State uses the following definition:

Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents<sup>144</sup>.

This thesis adopts the Hoffman definition of terrorism to elaborate on the structure of terrorism in Pakistan.

*Insurgency* is an armed conflict characterized by small, lightly armed groups operating through guerrilla warfare, often from rural areas<sup>145</sup>. It is also referred to as a lingering political-military activity with the aim to control the resources of a country through illegal political organizations or military forces<sup>146</sup>. For insurgency to initiate and gain momentum and sustain support from the population, ethnic or class solidarity and grievances are necessary<sup>147</sup>. Analysts of communist insurgencies argue that if grievances and ethnic solidarity exist, they can perpetuate insurgencies. One key factor that can keep the local population from turning against the rebels is the rebel's local knowledge, which can be used to threaten and cause harm to those who denounce them<sup>148</sup>.

Contrary to conflict and violence, *peace*, is considered to be an umbrella concept which expresses the human desire for something good and since mankind is goal-oriented (goals being concrete or abstract and diffuse) peace refers to generalized goals<sup>149</sup>. The goal of peace is to reduce conflict and eradicate violence from societies and human interaction, therefore, peace is more than the absence of war and aims to maintain order and justice in the society. *Orderly* means to be protected from the violence or extortion of aggressors, and *Justice* is to be protected against exploitation and abuse by the more powerful groups and from conflict and being able to secure justice if crime/violence is committed<sup>150</sup>.

There are two separate concepts of peace: *positive peace* and *negative peace*. Negative peace means the absence of war or conflict and can be temporary, such as a ceasefire, which is achieved

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<sup>143</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York, N.Y.; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2006). p. 43

<sup>144</sup> Department Of State Washington Dc, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996*. (United States: Dept. Of State Washington Dc, 1996). p. 04

<sup>145</sup> James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 01 (February 2003): 75–90, p. 79. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055403000534>.

<sup>146</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency," 2009, p. 02 <https://fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf>.

<sup>147</sup> Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," p. 80

<sup>148</sup> Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," p. 80

<sup>149</sup> Johan Galtung, "THEORIES of PEACE: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking" (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1967), p. 06

<sup>150</sup> Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace* (Hampshire, England: Gregg Revivals In Association With Dept. Of War Studies, King's College, London; Brookfield, Vt, 1991). p. 226



mostly through no complete resolution of hostilities or grievances between two or more parties. Positive peace addresses structural and direct violence through the creation of social harmony and justice, and can be enduring<sup>151</sup>.

Having elaborated on some important concepts that will be used later in this chapter, the focus of research will now shift towards analysing the security interest of the state of Pakistan from the perspective of Buzan's Simple Descriptive Model (SDM).

### **The Security of the State and Buzan's Simple Descriptive Model (SDM)**

Key aspects of a state's domestic and foreign policy are designed to ensure security of the state and its citizens in the face of the threats and challenges it faces. Social scientists describe security as the absence of *objective* dangers (threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks) and *subjective* fears<sup>152</sup>. Objective dangers refer to the direct threats to the values of a state that can involve confrontation between material forces. Subjective fears refer to fear of potential attacks against the values of the state and its individuals. An individual's subjective feeling that they are unsafe or threatened can occur even if they are not physically threatened. Feelings of insecurity can also manifest as a result of economic or social deficiency<sup>153</sup>.

The values of a state highlighted above can be described through Buzan's Simple Descriptive Model (SDM). The model outlines three important primary elements of a state: (a) the *idea* of a state; (b) *physical base*: its territory and population; and (c) *institutional expression*: the institutions that govern the people. A direct threat or fear of attack to any one of these three elements can be considered a national security issue for a state<sup>154</sup>.

The physical base is the primary element of the state that requires objective and subjective security because it is the citizens in a particular territory over which the state attempts to establish its idea and create an institutional expression. However, the interests of the state and its citizens should be generally aligned, otherwise it can result in policies that ignore the interests of either the state or the citizens. The security of the interests of the state are elaborated below to reveal how the policy adopted by Pakistan to protect the state reduced the ability of the state to protect the interests of its religious and ethnic populations.

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<sup>151</sup> Jarvis and Holland, *Security: A Critical Introduction*, p. 152

<sup>152</sup> Hans Günter Brauch, "Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks," in *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security*, ed. Hans Günter Brauch et al. (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2011). p. 61

<sup>153</sup> Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration; Essays on International Politics*. (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962). p. 150.

<sup>154</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 70-71

### *Objective Threats and Subjective Fears of the Pakistani State*

In the previous chapter it was shown that Pakistan was created to ensure socio-economic and political security of the Muslims of India in an environment safe from the Hindu majority. Important figures like Allama Muhammad Iqbal envisioned a separate homeland for Indian Muslims, which he laid down the foundations for at the memorable address of Allahabad in 1930<sup>155</sup>. The foundation laid down in Allahabad was later transformed into the Lahore Resolution of 1940, where Jinnah presented his two-nation theory. However, what is most important here is that the idea of Pakistan was sown in Indian soil by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan when he, in 1875, laid the basis for what would become the Aligarh Muslim University, which produced scholars and professionals who later led the movement for the creation of a Pakistani state<sup>156</sup>. It was Khan who foresaw that only through education could the Muslims of India resist the larger Hindu community and the encroachment of Christians, and he was also dedicated to the idea of Muslim Modernization and the creation of a Pan-Islamic identity<sup>157</sup>.

The *Idea of Pakistan* was for a state of Muslims of British India who wished to have an identity based on their religion, culture and civilization and who resisted Hindu dominance. Many Indian scholars also believe that religion and anti-Hinduism remain the two master narrative frames for Pakistan to this day<sup>158</sup>. They also believe that whenever these two master frames are threatened in Pakistan, it enhances the subjective fears of the state over its nation. The state needs these master frames because the anti-Hinduism narrative establishes patriotism among the people of Pakistan for the state and religion keeps the sub-nations united under the single state umbrella.

Resisting the dominance of Hindus in India before partition transformed into anti-Hinduism or anti-Indian sentiment after partition. The bloody migration which witnessed the migration of 15 million people with religious identities on both sides of the border at the time of partition, killing around 2 million of them further sowed the seed for hatred and revenge against each other (Hindus in India and Muslims in Pakistan)<sup>159</sup>. In addition, the dispute between the countries over the territory of Kashmir which started in October 1947 led to full-fledged wars in 1965 and 1971 between them, the Kargil war in 1998-99, and a more recent short conflict in February 2019<sup>160</sup>.

Added to the anti-Indian sentiment is the feeling that Pakistan is a security threat to India. This security threat narrative was examined and articulated by Jaswant Singh, India's Foreign Minister

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<sup>155</sup> Latif A Sherwani, *Speeches, Writings and Statements of Muhammad Iqbal* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1977), p. 3-29

<sup>156</sup> Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, p. 25

<sup>157</sup> Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, p.25

<sup>158</sup> Ashutosh Varshney, "The Idea of Pakistan," *India International Centre Quarterly* 35, no. 3/4 (2008): 2–21, p. 05 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23059402>

<sup>159</sup> Alex Shashkevich, "Stanford Scholar Explains the History of India's Partition, Its Ongoing Effects Today," *Stanford News*, March 8, 2019, <https://news.stanford.edu/2019/03/08/partition-1947-continues-haunt-india-pakistan-stanford-scholar-says/>.

<sup>160</sup> Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, p. 44-46

from 1998 to 2002. In his book he considered the partition and the creation of Pakistan as a blow to India's security<sup>161</sup>. He also cites India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who wrote on 9 July 1948, that "Ultimately, I have no doubt that India and Pakistan will come close together... some kind of federal link.... There is no other way to peace"<sup>162</sup>. Pakistan's continued stance of being the rightful inheritor of Kashmir and occupying a certain portion of it under its control since 1947 also presents a threat to the Indian security. India considers the idea of Pakistan and its population that prefers Muslim identity over ethnic identity as potential threats.

Of more concern for India was the spread of an extremist Jihadist Ideology in Pakistan that started around 1979. Shishir Gupta suggests that the rise of such an ideology greatly impacted the security situation in the Indian Kashmir region as the independence movement turned increasingly violent<sup>163</sup>. This ideology continues to result in violent events; for example, Pakistan's short conflict with India in the month of February of 2019 was a result of a violent suicide attack on the Indian Paramilitary Forces by a Kashmiri man who killed 42 Indian soldiers and was supported by a Jihadist organization<sup>164</sup>. Such a violent attack on the Indian soldiers is one of the 608 attacks that have been conducted and claimed by insurgents in Indian Kashmir between 1990 to 2019 on the Indian military, police and government offices killing 631 people<sup>165</sup>.

Apart from Kashmir, ethnic Baloch insurgents demanding independence from Pakistan is another security concern for Pakistan which India exploits. The ideology presented by Allama Iqbal in his Allahabad Address of 1930 and the Lahore resolution in 1940 demanded that the areas of British India with Muslim populations join to form a state with Pakistan<sup>166</sup>. In addition, before the partition, the British proposed that the heads of the princely states of British India were to choose whether to accede to Pakistan or India of their own accord, keeping in mind the opinions and welfare of their population. Of the many princely states, five significant ones had not acceded to either Pakistan or India by the end of partition for the reasons discussed below<sup>167</sup>. These states were the Kashmir and the Princely states of Baluchistan (Kalat, Lasbela, Kharan and Makran).

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<sup>161</sup> Jaswant Singh, *India at Risk: Mistakes, Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy* (New Delhi: Rainlight, 2013). p. 5

<sup>162</sup> Singh, *India at Risk: Mistakes, Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy*, p. 18

<sup>163</sup> Shishir Gupta, "Islamic Radicalisation in South Asia," in *India's National Security Annual Review 2016-17*, ed. Satish Kumar (Routledge India, 2017), 309-19. p. 310-314

<sup>164</sup> ALJAZEERA, "India-Pakistan Tensions: All the Latest Updates," [www.aljazeera.com](http://www.aljazeera.com), March 10, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/10/india-pakistan-tensions-all-the-latest-updates>.

<sup>165</sup> Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, GTD 1970-2019, September 17, 2019. Distributed by the Global Terrorism Data Base, University of Maryland, [https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/\\_mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb\\_0221dist.xlsx](https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/_mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb_0221dist.xlsx)

<sup>166</sup> Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, p. 28-29

<sup>167</sup> Attiya Khanam, "An Historical Overview of the Accession of Princely States," *Journal of Historical Studies* 2, no. 1 (2016): 84-103, p. 90-95 <https://www.bzu.edu.pk/jhs/vol2-1/4.%20Accession%20of%20Princely.pdf>.

The Baluchistan princely states were dominated by the ethnic and tribal Muslim Baloch population headed by their confederate chief, the Khan of Kalat<sup>168</sup>. Kashmir had a majority Muslim Kashmiri ethnic population headed by a Hindu Prince. As the British left, the Baloch states announced that they were independent and did not need to accede to either Pakistan or India,<sup>169</sup> while the Hindu prince of Kashmir acceded to India<sup>170</sup>.

The idea of Pakistan presented at the Allahabad Address and through the Lahore Resolution envisions a Pakistani physical base on the basis of religious (Muslim) orientation of the people in the sub-continent, as depicted in Map 1 (on p.1). Therefore, the population and territory of Kashmir and Baluchistan, being Muslim majority states, establish the Physical Base element of the state of Pakistan according to Buzan's Simple Descriptive Model. The Idea of a State for the physical base of Baluchistan and Kashmir require subjective security in the Pakistani context in order to keep Baluchistan part of the Pakistani state and the freedom movement in Kashmir as a legitimate ideological conflict between India and Pakistan. The idea of an independent Baluchistan exposes the fragility of the Idea of a State and Physical Base component of the SDM in the context of Pakistan and threatens the security of the state. The rise of a Baloch insurgency and the occupation of Kashmir by India results in a direct threat to the Physical Base component of the state in the Pakistani context and was perceived to constitute an objective danger to the Pakistani state.

India got the opportunity to increase the subjective fears and objective danger facing Pakistan after the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001. In 2005, Pakistan, being concerned over the involvement of Indian consulates in Afghanistan in fueling violence in Baluchistan, took up the matter with the Afghan government<sup>171</sup>. The role of the Indian intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in Afghanistan, was protested against by Pakistan due to RAW's apparent support for insurgent rebels in Baluchistan and for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists in FATA<sup>172</sup>. A high ranked TTP commander, Ahsan Ullah Ehsan, voluntarily surrendered in April 2017 and openly confessed that TTP is based in Afghanistan and has been funded by RAW and NDS (National Directorate of Security: Afghan Intelligence Service)<sup>173</sup>. Another Indian involvement in Pakistan was uncovered when a serving officer of the Indian navy commissioned by RAW, Mr. Kulbhushan Jadhav, was caught by the Pakistani security services in June 2017. In his video statement, he revealed his identity and that he had been directing various activities in Baluchistan

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<sup>168</sup> Khanam, "An Historical Overview of the Accession of Princely States," p. 93

<sup>169</sup> Khanam, "An Historical Overview of the Accession of Princely States," p. 93-99

<sup>170</sup> Rashmi Sehgal, "Kashmir Conflict: Solutions and Demand for Self-Determination," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 1, no. 6 (2011): 188–95. p. 01

<sup>171</sup> Rizwan Zeb, "Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (2006): 69–74, p. 70

<sup>172</sup> Frederic Grare, "Pakistan," in *Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan?* ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Aroop Mukharji (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 17–26. p. 18

<sup>173</sup> Dawn.com, "Former TTP, JuA Spox Claims Terrorist Organisations Being 'Used' by India, Afghanistan," DAWN.COM, April 26, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1329364/former-ttp-ju-a-spox-claims-terrorist-organisations-being-used-by-india-afghanistan>.

and the Sindh regions of Pakistan on the instructions of RAW, and also had a hand in the deteriorating law and order situation<sup>174</sup>. He also confessed to funding many Baloch rebels for their insurgency<sup>175</sup>.

Apart from India, the state of Afghanistan on the north-west border of Pakistan, also increased Pakistan’s subjective fears. Afghanistan claimed the Pashtun physical base in the northwest of Pakistan (where Pakistan borders Afghanistan) it once lost to the British and was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s membership in the United Nations<sup>176</sup>. Afghanistan also supported the demand for the creation of an independent Pashtunistan (comprised of the Pashtun lands in Pakistan) in 1947, giving rise to ethnic tensions and a sense of ethnic chaos in Pakistan<sup>177</sup>. The demand for Pashtunistan also came from the ethno-nationalist leader of the Pashtuns in KP province but today the Pashtuns of KP, unlike the Pashtun and Baloch in Baluchistan, are neither a subjective fear (whose ethnic sentiments cannot be further exploited against the idea of the state since 1970s) nor an objective danger (given the absence of a Pashtun ethnic insurgency). The reasons for such a favorable situation in KP will be explored when the SFV is applied to KP’s socio-political situation in chapter seven to suggest the components of the CPR Model. The chapter will now focus on the strategies adopted by Pakistan to counter its subjective fears and objective dangers.

#### *Countering Objective Threats and Subjective Fears*

Pakistan lacked enough financial resources to purchase military assets in the immediate years’ post-independence to counter an Indian or an Afghan threat. Table 2 below reflects the economic and defense balance of power between India and Pakistan through the GDP figures of both countries and their defense spending since 1960.

**Table 2. The Economic and Defense Balance of Power between Pakistan and India**

Year	GDP (in billion \$)		Defense Budget (in billion \$)		Defense Budget (% of GDP)	
	Pakistan	India	Pakistan	India	Pakistan	India
1960	3.749	37.030	0.21	0.68	4.31%	2.00%
1970	10.028	62.422	0.64	1.83	6.16%	3.09%
1980	23.654	186.352	1.43	5.42	5.52%	3.13%
1990	40.010	320.979	2.81	10.54	6.52%	3.15%
2000	82.018	468.395	2.97	14.29	4.17%	2.95%

<sup>174</sup> Abbtakk, “Kulbhushan Yadav’s Second Video of Confessional Statement,” YouTube Video, YouTube, June 22, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nhP0YixTZi8>

<sup>175</sup> Dawn.com, “What Did Indian Spy Kulbhushan Jadhav Say in His Latest Confessional Video?,” DAWN.COM, June 22, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1341090>.

<sup>176</sup> Carol C. Fair, “Pakistan’s Deadly Grip on Afghanistan,” *Current History* 116, no. 789 (April 1, 2017): 136–41. p. 137, <https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2017.116.789.136>

<sup>177</sup> Fair, “Pakistan’s Deadly Grip on Afghanistan,” p.137

2010	177.166	1676	5.97	46.09	3.42%	2.71%
2019	278.222	2871	10.26	71.12	3.98%	2.40%

Source: Macrotrends LLC, and World Bank

Table 2 illustrates that Pakistan needed (and continues to need) financial and military support to be able to counter India, given India's stronger economy and military. Therefore, Pakistan's foreign policy after partition was focused on identifying allies who could provide it with aid in monetary and/or material terms to strengthen its defense and security in case of an attack. Pakistan was born in the immediate aftermath of World War II as the world was entering the Cold War. In this new conflict, Pakistan's geostrategic location attracted the attention of the two new superpowers, the US and Soviet Union, and of the regional players like China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran. Pakistan's relationship with these major and regional powers is discussed below.

### *Pakistan's Relationship with External Powers*

In late 1947, Pakistan did not get a positive response from the US, from whom it had requested arms, aid and security. In fact, the US imposed an arms embargo on both Pakistan and India on March 12, 1948 as a result of their conflict in Kashmir which started in October 1947<sup>178</sup>. However, in March 1949, the US, after analyzing its national interests in South Asia, lifted the arms embargo on both Pakistan and India and from then initiated formalized Pakistan-US relations. Peter R. Blood, from the US Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, stated in a Congress Research Service report that "US-Pakistan cooperation began in the mid-1950s as a security arrangement based on US concern over Soviet expansion and Pakistan's fear of neighboring India"<sup>179</sup>. While Kayleigh Rijnbeek believes that Pakistan sought out the relationship with US for financial gain,<sup>180</sup> Feroz Ahmad states that "the primary objective of the US in Pakistan has been strategic (to resist Soviet expansion)"<sup>181</sup>. The partnership helped Pakistan to secure bilateral and collective security arrangements from the US and further strengthened relations through the Baghdad pact/CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) and SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization)<sup>182</sup>. Table 3 below shows the aid given to Pakistan by the US from 1947 to 2019.

<sup>178</sup> Husain, "Pakistan-U.S. Security Relations: Arms Sales, Bases, and Nuclear Issues," p. 02

<sup>179</sup> Peter R. Blood, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations," *Congressional Research Service: CRS Issue Brief for Congress* (The Library of Congress, February 12, 2002), p. 01 <https://fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/crs-IB94041.pdf>.

<sup>180</sup> Kayleigh Rijnbeek, "The United States and Pakistan: A Relationship Tainted by U.S. Polarized Interests" (Bachelor Degree Thesis, 2016), p. 14  
[https://theses.uhn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/123456789/3707/Rijnbeek%2c\\_K.J.H.F.\\_1.pdf?sequence=1](https://theses.uhn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/123456789/3707/Rijnbeek%2c_K.J.H.F._1.pdf?sequence=1)

<sup>181</sup> <sup>181</sup> Feroz Ahmed, "Pakistan Forum: Partners in Underdevelopment: Pakistan and the US," *MERIP Reports* 26, no. 26 (March 1974): 23–27, p. 23 <https://doi.org/10.2307/3012413>

<sup>182</sup> Husain, "Pakistan-U.S. Security Relations: Arms Sales, Bases, and Nuclear Issues," p. 3-44

**Table 3. Economic and Military Aid Received by Pakistan from US (1947-2019)<sup>183</sup>**

Year	Economic Assistance (in Billion \$)	Military Assistance (in Billion \$)
1947-1950	0.0009	0.00
1951-1960	9.01	3.33
1961-1970	16.68	1.63
1971-1980	5.19	0.011
1981-1990	6.21	4.39
1991-2000	0.68	0.009
2000-2010	7.29	3.99
2011-2019	7.16	2.48
Total	52.22	15.84

The fall in both economic and military aid to Pakistan during the 1971-1980 period was a time when the military government ended and Bhutto's government was formed. Bhutto's government did not receive as much aid from the US because of Pakistan's initiation of a nuclear program<sup>184</sup>. A sharp rise in military assistance during the 1981-90 period signaled the start of the resistance to the USSR presence in Afghanistan and the drop during the 1991-2000 period was due to the end of that resistance, with the USSR leaving Afghanistan in 1988.

Pakistan's support for the resistance to the USSR also signaled its troubled relationship with the Soviets. Despite USSR's invitation to Liaqat Ali Khan, the successor of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to visit Moscow in 1949, Khan chose to go to the United States. While in the US, he repeatedly mentioned the future prospect of Pakistan's relationship with USSR which also reflects Pakistan's neutrality in the earlier Cold War period<sup>185</sup>. But subsequent rulers of Pakistan and pro-west religious and other political forces succeeded in creating an impression that communism was anti-Islamic as it opposes the involvement of religion in the matters of the state and politics,<sup>186</sup> and therefore threatens the Islamic idea of Pakistan. On the other hand, the soviet support for Kabul's stance on the Durand Line and support for India's stance on Kashmir, as well as military support to India, kept the USSR-Pakistan bilateral relations unfriendly<sup>187</sup>.

<sup>183</sup> U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2019," ForeignAssistance.gov, July 14, 2021, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html>. Note: Figures are represented in 2019 constant US dollars

<sup>184</sup> Muhammad Arshad Khan and Ayaz Ahmed, "Foreign Aid—Blessing or Curse: Evidence from Pakistan," *The Pakistan Development Review* 46, no. 3 (2007): 215–40, p. 220. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41261157>.

<sup>185</sup> Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 493.

<sup>186</sup> Khan and Amin, "An Overview of Pak - Soviet/Russia Relations," p. 02.

<sup>187</sup> Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 494



The USSR also considered Pakistan to be a supporter of western efforts to create an anti-socialist bloc when Pakistan hosted two sessions of international economic conferences of Muslim countries in 1949, promulgated and passed the Public Safety Act in 1951 that led to the arrest of many left-leaning leaders in East Pakistan, became a member of CENTO and SEATO, and allowed US U2 spy planes to operate from its territory, one of which was destroyed by the USSR in 1960<sup>188</sup>.

In search of allies, Pakistan found another powerful strategic ally with whom ties have continued to grow stronger in the post-Cold War period. That ally is China; the only neighbor with which Pakistan enjoys a strong political, economic, military and strategic relationship<sup>189</sup>. The alliance started when Pakistan became the first Islamic country to recognize communist China in 1950<sup>190</sup>. Both the countries recognize the other's security interests, which are viewed as complementary. As such, China did not criticize Pakistan's pacts with Western-blocs, like SEATO and CENTO, in part because Pakistan supports China on the issue of Taiwan, Xinjian and did not oppose China's role in the 1950-1953 Korean War<sup>191</sup>. When China faced a western diplomatic isolation in the 60s and 70s, Pakistan provided an air corridor to China, facilitating the normalization of the US-China relationship (cemented by US President Nixon's trip to Beijing in 1972) and strongly supported and lobbied for China's right to its permanent seat restoration in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1971<sup>192</sup>.

China has taken a very different approach to Pakistan when compared to the US. China's foreign policy towards Pakistan is based on mutual trust, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty and confidence and understanding<sup>193</sup>. In fact, China continues to make Pakistan objectively and subjectively secure by heavily aiding Pakistan in terms of defense technology, military support and economic aid which has surpassed the total aid Pakistan has received from US in the last two decades<sup>194</sup>.

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<sup>188</sup> Khan and Amin, "An Overview of Pak - Soviet/Russia Relations," p. 04

<sup>189</sup> Jafar Riaz Kataria and Anum Naveed, "Pakistan-China Social and Economic Relations," *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* 29, no. 2 (2014): 395-410, p. 396  
<http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/3. Jafar Riaz v29 no2 2014.pdf>

<sup>190</sup> Asma Rashid, "PAK-CHINA PARTNERSHIP: US and INDIA'S RESPONSE," *MARGALLA PAPERS*, 2017, 247-58, p. 247 [https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra\\_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Paper-2017/18-Pak-China-Partnership-Asma-Rashid.pdf](https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Paper-2017/18-Pak-China-Partnership-Asma-Rashid.pdf).

<sup>191</sup> Rashid, "PAK-CHINA PARTNERSHIP: US and INDIA'S RESPONSE," p. 247-248

<sup>192</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, "Pak-China Strategic Cooperative Partnership Critical for Regional, Global Peace: PM Gilani," May 21, 2011, <http://pk.china-embassy.org/eng/jlnfanghua2011/t824230.htm>.

<sup>193</sup> Kataria and Naveed, "Pakistan-China Social and Economic Relations," p. 396.

<sup>194</sup> Rashid, "PAK-CHINA PARTNERSHIP: US and INDIA'S RESPONSE," p. 249.



**Table 4. Economic and Military Aid received by Pakistan from China (1947-20121)<sup>195</sup>**

Year	Economic Assistance (in Billion \$)	Military Assistance (in Billion \$)
1947-1950		0.00
1951-1960		0.00
1961-1970	0.620	1.24
1971-1980		1.96
1981-1990		2.37
1991-2000		2.12
2000-2010	65.58	2.99
2011-2021		7.12
Total	66.10	17.80

Pakistan and China initiated the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2001. This provides China with overland access to the Indian Ocean, an important outlet for China in its strategic competition with India and the US. This route allows China the shortest access to its markets in Europe, Africa and Asia by reducing the distance of about 12,500 km from the Arabian Sea to China and saving billions of dollars. CPEC will also reduce the oil (energy) transport time to China from the Middle east from 30 days to two days, as the shipments will not have to pass through the Strait of Malacca to reach China. This route gives China an important hedge against economic over-reliance on the Strait given that any confrontation or crisis with the US Navy could shut down China's seaborne trade.

China is not the only regional player to pursue its interests through Pakistan. The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan gave Pakistan another opportunity to improve its objective and subjective security through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA): a strong US ally. In 1979, Iran underwent a revolution, emerging as a strong theocratic Shia state opposed to US and USSR superpower influence and to the Sunni states of the Persian Gulf, such as KSA. At this time, KSA was spreading its Wahhabi doctrine, an extreme Sunni religious doctrine and a rival to Shia doctrine, throughout the region. To defeat the USSR in Afghanistan, the US and KSA mobilized the

<sup>195</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "IMPORTER/EXPORTER TIV TABLES: TIV of Arms Exports to Pakistan, 1950-2021," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ((SIPRI), 2017), <https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php>.

Iqtidar Hussain, Israr Hussain, and Iqrar Hussain Qambari, "History of Pakistan–China Relations: The Complex Interdependence Theory," *The Chinese Historical Review* 27, no. 2 (July 2, 2020): 146–64, p. 156 <https://doi.org/10.1080/1547402x.2020.1831176>

The American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation, "China Global Investment Tracker," AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (The American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation, 2022), <https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>.

Pakistani people and provided arms and ammunition support, with the support of Pakistan's military and religious (political and social) institutions to fight an Islamic war for their Muslim brothers in Afghanistan<sup>196</sup>. These fighters came to be known as the Mujahedeen or Holy Warriors. For Pakistan, the sporadic spread of the Wahhabi or Sunni doctrine throughout its population was viewed positively, as it further strengthened the religious idea of the state and suppressed ethnic sentiments among the sub-nations. Another important national interest that was secured for Pakistan through this war was that it reduced the prospects of Afghan attacks or attempts to take disputed territories from Pakistan<sup>197</sup>. As such, Pakistan's objective and subjective security was bolstered with the strengthening of religious ideology of the state and the military aid and support provided by China and US.

The section above has discussed the foreign policy of Pakistan. The impact of such foreign policy on the domestic policy of the state to govern its people and ensure the socio-economic, political, human and judicial security of the people will be elaborated on in the next section.

### **The Security of the People (Religious Nation and Ethnic Sub-nations)**

This section will describe how the third element of the SDM, the *institutional expression of the state* (laws that govern the physical base and its population) became exposed to threats as a result of the aforementioned foreign policy.

The impact of the foreign policy measures discussed above and adopted by Pakistan have a role to play in stimulating objective dangers (direct confrontation and conflict) within the country which will be discussed below.

#### *Non-democratic Constitutional Engineering: Structural Cause of Internal Conflict*

Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act 1935 as its constitution at the time of partition in 1947 and it was envisioned that the political forces of the new country would develop a new constitution once the elected representatives took charge of the country through the political institution. The political institution was weak and has always remained in the hands to the status quo elites (oligarchs, tribal and feudal, military and bureaucracy) since the time of independence in 1947. This has been discussed in detail in the previous section. From 1947 to 1973, the country did not have any constitution that was developed by the elected representatives through the assembly/parliament and with a wide consensus of all the political parties. Therefore, there was no uniform and formal institutional expression of the state to be developed throughout its territory and population at the grass-roots level to govern the people. The national assembly of Pakistan through the elected representatives and wider consensus of all political parties adopted a

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<sup>196</sup> Guido Steinberg and Nils Woermer, "Exploring Iran & Saudi Arabia's Interests in Afghanistan & Pakistan," p. 09

<sup>197</sup> John Jack Rooney, "An Inconvenient Truth: Pakistan's ISI and the Afghan Taliban," *The New Presence (Online)*, 2010, 37–40. p. 39

constitution in 1973; however, many amendments were made by the military dictators and political elites.

Pakistani dictators have managed to get political backing to sustain their rule and power by breaking up political parties and forming new ones, then getting them elected in the parliament<sup>198</sup>. The political parties who came into power at the national and provincial levels throughout Pakistan's history came from oligarch families that are made up of rich feudal, religious, tribal, and ethnic elites who sought power for their own socio-political and elitist interests, while ignoring the interests of the nation or sub-nations they represented<sup>199</sup>. They made changes to the constitution to either consolidate power at the level of the central or the provincial legislature, benefit their class and businesses and establish and sustain their own social authority in their areas over the population<sup>200</sup>. The legislators were able to achieve the objectives above by infusing a culture of nepotism and corruption into the political system. The system trickled down as institutional heads and employees, bureaucrats, civil servants (who are employed out of nepotism by the dictator-politician nexus) practiced nepotism and corruption in their own institutions and societies to keep their positions of power, to give themselves 'legitimacy' and access to public resources<sup>201</sup>.

The consistent constitutional engineering resulted in uneven laws, policies and rules for institutions like the parliament, ministries and departments responsible for delivering socio-economic and judicial services to the people. This dimension gives an impression that the ordinary citizens of the country have been ignored and left with an institutional expression of the powerful people in their areas, rather than the institutional expression of the state. Post-1970s, corruption and social injustice became the new norm at the grass-roots level of society. In the case of Baluchistan and FATA, the institutional expression remains confined to the tribal laws and traditions and therefore does not provide the people the opportunity to connect with the state and vice versa. The non-democratic and consistent constitutional engineering for self-interest and power has led to proximate causes of conflict (corruption and social injustice) spreading throughout the country. These are discussed below.

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<sup>198</sup> Priyanka Singh, "Army: The Be-All or End-All of Pakistan Politics?," *Strategic Analysis* 39, no. 3 (April 2, 2015): 319–25, p. 321. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1022323>.

<sup>199</sup> Asaf Hussain, "Elites and Political Development in Pakistan," *The Developing Economies* 14, no. 3 (September 1976): 224–38, p. 224–238. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1976.tb00980.x>.

<sup>200</sup> Furqan Mohammed, "Exploring Power Politics and Constitutional Subversions in Pakistan: A Political and Constitutional Assessment of Instability in Pakistan," *Loyola University Chicago International Law Review* 7, no. 229 (March 7, 2011): 101–12, p. 101–112. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1779842>.

<sup>201</sup> Hassan Javid, "Democracy and Patronage in Pakistan," in *New Perspectives on Pakistan's Political Economy*, ed. Matthew McCartney and Syed A. H. Zaidi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, n.d.), 216–40. p. 218–225

### *Corruption and Social Injustice as Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict*

The presence of various ethnic groups in a country can provide a basis for significant corruption because bureaucrats, politicians and socio-economic groups may shower members of their group with financial, material and social benefits<sup>202</sup>. An Indonesian study of anti-poverty programs found that areas or villages where communities were ethnically fragmented had a greater likelihood of experiencing corruption<sup>203</sup>. On occasion, corruption is also linked with greater levels of ethnic inequality along socio-economic lines<sup>204</sup>. However, in Pakistan, there can be other socio-political reasons for corruption than ethnic diversity. Particularly in the case of Baluchistan, the officials belonging to Pashtun and Baloch sub-nations dominate the provincial institutions, government and bureaucratic structure yet their ethnic groups and their communities in Baluchistan suffer from a lack of basic necessities as well as quality healthcare, education and socio-economic structures to facilitate them (elaborated on in chapter six).

Therefore, the definition of corruption in the context of Pakistan can be defined as the unjust use or misuse of power to gain social and economic benefits for one individual or their elite group<sup>205</sup>. Corruption is referred to as a dishonest or illegal behaviour by an individual or elite group having power in the socio-economic, political and institutional fabric of the society where, as a result of that behaviour, the individual or their elite group further maximizes financial, social and political power<sup>206</sup>. This type of corruption explains why ethnicities remain poor and socio-economically marginalized in their own areas, while those who represent these ethnicities in the political, provincial or state structure continue to maximize and misuse power for their personal gain rather than for the benefit of their ethnicities, resulting in extreme social inequality and injustice throughout the country.

Social justice, on the other hand, means that people have access to all elements of general public social services which include education, legal justice, health, nutrition, water, shelter and employment<sup>207</sup>. When any of these elements is absent in a human life, it can develop anxiety (intrapersonal conflict) and increase the potential for anti-social and illegal behaviour<sup>208</sup> which can also foster more corruption. The elements of social justice above are a part of human development,

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<sup>202</sup> Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110, no. 3 (August 1, 1995): 681–712, p. 693. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2946696>.

<sup>203</sup> Benjamin A. Olken, "Corruption and the Costs of Redistribution: Micro Evidence from Indonesia," *Journal of Public Economics* 90, no. 4–5 (May 2006): 853–70, p. 867. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.05.004>.

<sup>204</sup> Victor Ginsburgh and Shlomo Weber, *The Palgrave Handbook of Economics and Language* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, Ny: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). p. 160-161

<sup>205</sup> Vito Tanzi, *Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures*. (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1998). p. 7-9

<sup>206</sup> Ahmad Mashal, "Corruption and Resource Allocation Distortion for 'Escwa' Countries," *International Journal of Economics and Management Sciences* 1, no. 4 (2011): 71–83, p. 71-72

<sup>207</sup> Gyozosomlai, "Weather the Shadow: Social Justice within Cultural Relativism in Pakistan," p. 05

<sup>208</sup> Gyozosomlai, "Weather the Shadow: Social Justice within Cultural Relativism in Pakistan," p. 05

which include capabilities that enable a person to pursue a valuable life<sup>209</sup>. Therefore, corruption, at the level of government and institutions leads to underdevelopment or social injustice in the society, which again reinforces corruption at the societal level. Corruption and social injustice in Baluchistan and FATA create a conflict cycle which enriches the conflicting parties and prevents economic and social stability since the networks of corruption strengthen inequality and divisions in society<sup>210</sup>. The United States Institute of Peace states that “Corrupt networks themselves can reinforce the very divisions along lines of ethnicity, religion or class which feed the conflict cycle”<sup>211</sup>. Widespread corruption and social injustice coupled with the proximate causes of the conflict create potential for certain trigger factors of conflict and violence which are detailed below.

### *Trigger Causes of Internal Conflict*

The connection between the constitutional engineering initiated by the central and regional elites and who also strengthen social injustice and corruption in the social fabric, keeps the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations in the country marginalized and blocks their group interests from being addressed and therefore, violence becomes inevitable. For instance, both terrorism and insurgency are examples of direct violence carried out through a series of acts which themselves are criminal offences, such as a bombing incident that involves unlawful possession of explosives, the will to cause destruction to property, and reckless injury to or killing of persons<sup>212</sup>. Each act is a criminal offence in most countries, and can be dealt with, through proper governance systems, checks and social order, or they may not emerge in the first place given these systems are in place<sup>213</sup>. The dynamics that work to give rise to this direct violence is elaborated on to develop the MDCM and establish the Sub-Structural Framework for Violence (SFV) in chapter three. For Pakistan, the following trigger factors, occurrence or anticipation of certain events and acts that can set off or escalate conflicts into violence, have resulted in direct violence.

*Islamization of the Social Fabric:* The Mujahedeen (holy warriors) in the Afghan war against the USSR were supported and backed by the religious political parties, mosques, and religious seminaries. These institutions preached and spread the notion of holy war and jihadism<sup>214</sup> and the agents of these institutions grew and became stronger over time in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan was left on its own to manage the situation in Afghanistan when the Soviet Union collapsed and the US withdrew its support to the Mujahideen<sup>215</sup>. Pakistan used the situation to

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<sup>209</sup> Jong-Sung You, “Corruption as Injustice,” in *Midwest Political Science Association (Annual Meeting of Midwest Political Science Association: 2006)*, p. 26. <http://www.wikileaks.org/WKL/March14.pdf>.

<sup>210</sup> United States Institute Of Peace, *Governance, Corruption, and Conflict*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace, 2010). p. 16

<sup>211</sup> United States Institute Of Peace, *Governance, Corruption, and Conflict*. p. 16

<sup>212</sup> Alex Conte, *Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism* (Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010). p. 08

<sup>213</sup> Conte, *Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism*, p. 08

<sup>214</sup> Moonis Ahmar, “Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,” *Pakistan Vision* 9, no. 1 (2014): 1–19, p. 1-3 <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Moonis%20Ahmar-1.pdf>.

<sup>215</sup> Rooney, “An Inconvenient Truth: Pakistan’s ISI and the Afghan Taliban,” p. 39-40

secure/improve its objective and subjective security and kept supporting the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, who then came to be known as the Taliban. The presence of an anti-Indian sentiment, coupled with the new extreme religious and conservative faction in Pakistani society as result of the spread of the extreme Sunni (Wahabi) doctrine by KSA (as discussed previously), posed a new problem for the state which is discussed below.

At the start of the American war in Afghanistan after 9/11, it was generally overlooked that in Pakistan there were many who had been polarized by the spread of Wahhabism and extreme Sunni doctrine since 1979. With porous borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a terrain difficult to maneuver across the Durand line, extremists opposed to the American invasion entered Afghanistan to once again fight a holy war<sup>216</sup>. As the Americans and the Northern Alliance (Taliban's rival in Afghanistan) continued to increase their foothold in Afghanistan, many Taliban, with the leaders of Al-Qaeda, as well as those Pakistanis who had gone to fight the holy war, entered Pakistan through the same porous borders and gathered in FATA<sup>217</sup>. The situation was peaceful in Pakistan until 2004-05, when the US started to target the Taliban and Al-Qaeda groups hiding in the FATA region of Pakistan through drone strikes that caused collateral damage in the form of innocent human lives<sup>218</sup>.

This was the moment when there was a split in the Taliban between those who also considered the state of Pakistan to be their enemy and those who supported it. Those who considered Pakistan their enemy named themselves the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and they started to attack the state and its institutions as well as civilians in many regions of Pakistan<sup>219</sup>. The religiously polarized groups in Pakistan not only provided financial and other support to both the Taliban factions but also joined them, using their own religious ideology to make their struggle in Pakistan or Afghanistan a legitimate holy war. This holy war and its dynamics are further elaborated on in chapter five.

*Annexation of the State of Kalat in Baluchistan in 1948:* The Baloch insurgency, as discussed in chapter one and in the previous section, is also a product of the policy of the Pakistani state and the triggers mentioned below. Since 1948, the Pakistani State has maintained a militaristic approach towards the Baloch sub-nation. The first three phases of insurgencies in Baluchistan were tribal insurgencies when the state captured and imprisoned the confederate chief (1948-1950), abolished the status of Baluchistan States Union as a separate princely state of Pakistan (1958-

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<sup>216</sup> Mansur Khan Mahsud, "The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in South Waziristan," (Washington DC: New America Foundation, 2010), p. 03 <http://frc.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/5southwaziristan1.pdf>.

<sup>217</sup> Sharafat Ali Chaudhry and Mehran Ali Khan Wazir, "Peacebuilding in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan: Conflict Management at State Level," *TIGAH, a JOURNAL of PEACE and DEVELOPMENT* 2 (2012): 124-48, p. 126. <https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/02/81.pdf>.

<sup>218</sup> C. Christine Fair, Karl Kaltenthaler, and William J. Miller, "Pakistani Opposition to American Drone Strikes," *Political Science Quarterly* 129, no. 1 (March 2014): 1-33, p. 4-9. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12145>.

<sup>219</sup> Mahsud, "The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in South Waziristan," p. 03-04

1960) and imprisoned prominent Baloch tribal chiefs (1960-1968). The fourth phase of the insurgency (1972-1977) was ethno-tribal, as Bhutto and the state did not allow the NAP party to run the provincial government in Baluchistan comprising Baloch tribal chiefs and ethnic political leaders. The current phase (2002 to date) of the insurgency in Baluchistan is also ethno-tribal, as the state is seen as suppressing the right of the Baloch sub-nation to attain provincial autonomy, and to have control over their province and the resources<sup>220</sup>. The way these insurgencies were aggressively countered by the state created distrust and hostility between the state and the Baloch sub-nation. This is discussed in detail in chapters five and six in order to study and analyze the structural factors underlying these insurgencies by applying the SFV.

This section of the chapter has studied that the elitist institutional expression of the state gives rise to structural, proximate and trigger causes of conflict in Pakistan, especially in Baluchistan and FATA, and has exposed the population of these regions to threats of terrorist and insurgent attacks. The section also suggests that the environment of corruption and social injustice and the power in the hands of the regional and central elites, rather than the state, encourages people to join terrorist and insurgent groups (this phenomenon is further explored and elaborated on in chapter six).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter provides evidence that the key stakeholder of central and regional institutions is responsible for the weak or absent relationship between the state and the people in Pakistan, especially in Baluchistan and FATA, as they adopt foreign and domestic policies that develop and sustain internal conflict in Pakistan. The US showed a preference for the military and civil bureaucracy of Pakistan over what could have been democratic political institutions. This helped to sustain feudal elitism and gave strength to oligarchic and dynastic political families. These elites and families, with the civil bureaucracy and military, induced the structural and proximate causes of the conflict to grab, sustain, and expand their power and control. They adopted foreign policies to ensure the security of the Pakistani state (from India and Afghanistan) by fostering US interests (against USSR) and KSA interests (against Iran) in the region that triggered and strengthened religious terrorism in FATA. They have also strengthened the Baloch ethnic insurgency that was triggered in 1948 by expanding their elitist interests in Baluchistan through the same structural and proximate causes. The economic partnership of the state with China in Baluchistan which benefits these elites and ignores the interests of the Baloch sub-nation to reap the fruits of the partnership, also adds strength to the ethnic insurgency.

That such a situation exists is due to the prevalence of a weak political institution in Pakistan that is in control of the key stakeholder state and societal elite institutions that establish the status quo. Through the lens of Buzan's SDM, the weak or absent institutional expression of the state in the regions of Baluchistan and FATA could not successfully strengthen the idea of Pakistan in the

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<sup>220</sup> Tiffany Tanner, "Explaining the Resilience of the Balochistan Insurgency" (2019), 49-54  
<https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/honors/533>.



minds of the population and develop a Pakistani national identity. While Dyson asserts that the concept of the idea of the state cannot be linked with the institutions<sup>221</sup>, Buzan suggests that institutions are closely tied to the idea of a state which lies at the heart of its political identity, and should be able to explain “What does the state exist to do? Why is it there? What is its relation to the society it contains?”<sup>222</sup>

The weak and absent institutional expression of the state is the primary factor that prevents the State-Nation model from working in Baluchistan and FATA. When national security is narrowly defined, the nation is the key factor to be secured. National security in the case of Pakistan also requires a strong and meaningful link between the state, nation, and the sub-nations<sup>223</sup>. Without this link, internal stability and security cannot be ensured. Therefore, the nation and sub-nations need to be secured from both objective dangers and subjective fears. The elements of security for the state and the citizens need to be the cohesive.

Many nations and sub-nations are closely attached to their political identities, their physical base and the laws which govern them (institutional expression) and can consider other nations with which they have clashing interests and a history of hostile relations, as a security threat to their existence. The investigation of the theoretical aspects of the Buzan’s SDM in the next chapter helps to further understand the elements of security important to the nations in general and ethnic sub-nations in Baluchistan and FATA that ultimately create an environment propitious to terrorism and insurgency. Identifying the elements of security further helps in developing the components of the MDCM. The SDM and MDCM are merged in the next chapter to develop the SFV. The SFV explains the socio-political structural factors that lead to violence in the form of religious terrorism and ethnic insurgency.

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<sup>221</sup> Kenneth H F Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). p. 205–6

<sup>222</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 74

<sup>223</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 74



## **Chapter Three**

### **Developing a Sub-structural Framework (SFV) for Violence**

#### **Introduction**

The previous chapter helps us to understand that the political institution of Pakistan, that is meant to represent the political identity of all the citizens (religious and ethnic) in the country, is weak and heavily influenced by the elite key stakeholder institutions. These institutions include the military and civil bureaucracy, tribal institutions and mainstream, religious and ethnic political institutions. The chapter also considered the foreign policy and domestic policy adopted by the state to deter external security threats but argued that instead, they exacerbated internal security challenges. The previous chapters have also highlighted the proximate, structural and trigger factors of conflict in Pakistan that have given rise to terrorism and insurgency and have caused extreme human and physical loss to both the state and its people.

Chapter two therefore, establishes the foundation for this chapter to assist and theoretically understand the relationship of the state of Pakistan with the people of Baluchistan and FATA through the elements of the Simple Descriptive Model (SDM). In addition, both terrorism and insurgency are analyzed in this chapter from the theoretical perspective of the Disaster Crunch Model (DCM), as proposed by Bob Hansford, to establish a Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM). The purpose of this chapter is to develop the Sub-structural Framework for Violence (SFV) to identify and explain the link between the weak or absent state-to-nation relationship and violence (terrorism and insurgency): The SFV is developed by combining the SDM and MDCM to create a Sub-structural Framework for Violence (SFV). The SFV will help to identify the structural socio-political factors that weaken the state-to-nation relationship and give rise to religious terrorism and ethnic insurgency in FATA and Baluchistan. Concluding this chapter will mark the end of stage I in the development of the Conflict Prevention and Reduction (CPR) model.

The chapter is an addition to the literature on structural violence (terrorism and insurgency) in general, and has special relevance for countries like Pakistan consumed by internal fragmentation and conflict. It first investigates the basic elements that theoretically establish the relationship of the state with its nations and sub-nations to shed light on the relationship of the state of Pakistan with its religious nation and ethnic sub-nations. This relationship is explored by elaborating the elements of the SDM: (1) the idea of a state, (2) the physical base, and (3) institutional expression of the state. Secondly, the chapter identifies and analyzes the elements of terrorism and insurgency through the lens of the DCM to develop the MDCM. Thirdly, the SDM and MDCM are merged to establish the SFV and explain how the state is restricted in effectively connecting to its nation and sub-nations. The chapter now explores the theoretical aspects of the state-to-nation relationship according to the SDM.

### 3.1. The Simple Descriptive Model (SDM)


A state is established to protect its people from domestic strife and from foreign invasion in an anarchic international environment (where there is no international sovereign authority and a ‘state of nature’ exists), and to (ideally) provide security, liberty and the rule of law so people can live and nurture themselves through their own will and resources<sup>224</sup>. The state of nature is a situation of vulnerability and uncertainty: a primal anarchy where there is unacceptable high-levels of societal threats to people, therefore, people in a state seek refuge from the societal threats through the mechanisms of the state<sup>225</sup>. Buzan suggests that the three components of the state described in the SDM do not stand independent of one another, but are interlinked in myriad ways and are distinguishable from each other to an extent so they can be discussed as the objects of security.

According to Buzan, the components of a state are<sup>226</sup>:

- i) The Idea of a State;
- ii) The Physical base of the state; and
- iii) The Institutional expression of the state.

A graphic representation of the SDM is suggested by Buzan in Figure 4 below.

**Figure 4. The Components of a State<sup>227</sup>**



According to the SDM, units (states) can be categorized as states if they meet certain criteria. The criteria are that they (states) must have:

<sup>224</sup> Carl Cohen, *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy; the Theoretical Foundations*. (New York, Random House, 1972). p. 275.

<sup>225</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 51

<sup>226</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 71

<sup>227</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 71

- an idea of the state in the minds of the people that legitimizes the existence of the state;
- a physical base of population and territory; and
- some sorts of institutions that govern the physical base.

A sub-nation (identified on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion) from among the nations in a particular territory of a state that may behave differently to the state and the rest of the nation if it develops or has its own institutional expression that governs the sub-nation. In such a situation, a sub-state may arise with its own sub-physical base in a larger state and will be represented by its own institution that governs the sub-physical base. Hence, this situation prompts the development of an idea of the sub-state which may be opposed to the idea of the larger state. Therefore, it is important to look into the components of the state in terms of Pakistan which are theoretically explained below.

### *The Idea of a State*

The idea of the state is the central component of the SDM and is established by the political identity that gives rise to the state and answers the following questions: Why does the state exist? And what is its relations to society (the people) contained in it?<sup>228</sup> Even democratic and reductionist states (defined in the previous chapter) can grow their power during conflicts to repress their nation(s) in order to ensure peace and order in the country<sup>229</sup>. A state carries out acts of repression when it subjectively fears that the idea that established the state and developed its legitimacy over the nation(s), is under threat. The nation that the state suppresses to secure its idea can be a part of its own nation (civil war) or a nation in a different state (in war between states).

The nation(s) and their organizing ideologies are two main sources for the idea of a state. The idea of national security is strongly linked with the nation and strongly implies that the object of security is the nation and its political identity that gives rise to the idea of the state. Therefore, a sub-nation or part of a nation may not be the object of security for the state, if:

- Their organizing ideology is opposed to the organizing ideology of the state; and
- Their political identity does not agree to the idea of the state.

Hence, the relationship between the state and the nation or sub-nations is significant in whether the idea of the state is commonly held and legitimate or is a source of tension. While Buzan outlines four models for the relationship between the state and nation, he places Pakistan into the model of the multi-nation imperial states where one sub-nation, the Punjabis, among others, dominates the state structure to its own advantage<sup>230</sup>. This placement of Pakistan by Buzan may be true if the organizing ideology of the state revolves around ethno-nationalism. On the contrary, the

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<sup>228</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 74

<sup>229</sup> Haskell Fain, "The Idea of the State," *Noûs* 6, no. 1 (March 1972): 15–26, p. 16 <https://doi.org/10.2307/2214510>.

<sup>230</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 78

organizing ideology of Pakistan revolves around Islam. Therefore, the link between the state of Pakistan and its Punjabi sub-nation that has a strong ethnic identity rather than an Islamic identity, is a weak and vulnerable point for the state. In that context, can a part of the nation not agree to the idea of the state? What happens when the idea of the state is artificially enforced over a nation or sub-nation (as Buzan suggests in the multi-nation state model)? This dimension is discussed in this chapter, but first the theoretical understanding of nation formation needs elaboration, which is done below.

The state and the nation are not identical. The state is the political representation of a society and the jurisdiction of a state is defined by a territorial boundary. A nation is formed by the community of people who have a common history, language or descent and that inhabit a specific territory (although ‘nationals’ from that nation may reside outside the boundaries of that territory, in some instances a nation may exist, like the Kurds, but not have their own nation-state)<sup>231</sup>. Nations can be of all shapes and sizes and can stretch across time zones and regions and exist in homogeneous forms, such as Japan, or heterogeneous forms, such as India. Nations have existed, transformed, evolved and submerged into each other throughout the history of humankind. Theories regarding the formation of a nation differ over whether to consider them as either *natural* or a *modern phenomenon*<sup>232</sup>.

Those theorists who consider the nation to be a modern phenomenon believe that nations continue to evolve and exist due to social cohesion or as a consequence of a historic accident<sup>233</sup>. One of the most unambiguous theories of nation formation considers the nation as a product of nationalism. The theory states that when a high culture agro-literate (agrarian) nation transforms into a high culture industrial society, it experiences nationalism: which results in a new homogeneous culture on the basis of division of labor and social mobility. This new culture develops its own ideology, which reflects its nationalism<sup>234</sup>. Many scholars consider that the waves of nationalism were initiated first in a number of western European core states and spread into their peripheries. The waves of nationalism rose with the establishment of parliamentary democracies in England and Europe (13<sup>th</sup> & 14<sup>th</sup> centuries), then as a result of the invention of the printing press (15<sup>th</sup> century), and following that, the age of enlightenment and industrial revolution (17<sup>th</sup> & 18<sup>th</sup> centuries)<sup>235</sup>.

Theorists who consider nations to be a natural phenomenon, consider them as a historical necessity and categorize them from either a sociobiological or sociological perspective. The sociobiological

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<sup>231</sup> Frederick Steiner, “Nation, State, and Nation-State,” in *Human Ecology: How Nature and Culture Shape Our World* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002), 125–42. p. 126

<sup>232</sup> Vojin Rakic, “Theories of Nation Formation and Case Selection: The Meaning of an Alternative Model,” *Nationalities Papers* 26, no. 4 (December 1998): 599–613, p. 599. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905999808408590>.

<sup>233</sup> Rakic, “Theories of Nation Formation and Case Selection: The Meaning of an Alternative Model,” p. 599

<sup>234</sup> Rakic, “Theories of Nation Formation and Case Selection: The Meaning of an Alternative Model,” p. 600

<sup>235</sup> Rakic, “Theories of Nation Formation and Case Selection: The Meaning of an Alternative Model,” p. 600

perspective considers nations as a product emerging from ethnicity where a sense of family extends beyond immediate kinship to form a broader ethnic community via extended family and tribes<sup>236</sup>.

These two approaches to considering nation formation change the way the idea of a state may generate from within a nation. Two nations will emerge out of two nationalisms in a single state if one nation adopts industrialization and urbanization later than the other, and if both nations have distinctive cultures and resist assimilation with each other<sup>237</sup>. This assimilation process suggests that nations that have similar cultures (such as ethnic or religious nations) may not resist assimilation when they adopt industrialization and will become one nation with a single nationalism after some time. Hence, having or developing cultural similarities between nations is an important aspect to ensure assimilation and development of a single nationalism. For example, the soviets between the 1920s and 1950s attempted to Russify the Ukrainians in the Northern Caucasus (that are not part of the Russian Federation and not part of present-day Ukraine) and the Tsakhurs in the Daghestan region (also in the Northern Caucasus). The soviets succeeded with the Ukrainians but failed with the Tsakhurs due to a major difference in the cultural frameworks: although the Ukrainians were Orthodox Christians like Russians, the Tsakhurs were a Muslim ethnic nation<sup>238</sup>. The current Ukraine – Russia conflict in 2022 has not invoked any protest from these Russified Ukrainians in the northern Caucasus.

In light of the above, if the religious idea of Pakistan is removed it will expose the distinct ethnic cultural framework of each sub-nation in the country compelling them to resist assimilation with each other. Currently, the religious cultural framework binds these sub-nations into a single Muslim Nation-State. Therefore, for Pakistan, keeping the religious idea of the state is a core element to cohere the sub-nations into a single religious nation. On the other hand, it is important to note that the role of Muslim nationalism in British India had served its purpose with the birth of the state of Pakistan in 1947. Therefore, the religious cultural framework became weak and exposed the ethno-national divide among the sub-nations in Pakistan after partition, giving rise to ethno-nationalism among the Baloch, Pashtun and Sindhi sub-nations.

In the context of the discussion above, ethnicity and tribal identity rather than religion establish a major portion of the cultural framework of both the sub-nations (FATA Pashtuns and Baloch). It is plausible, then, that assimilating both the sub-nations with the rest of the sub-nations in Pakistan to give rise to a single Pakistani nation would require that the state initiates Pakistanization of the Baloch and the Pashtun instead of further injecting a religious cultural framework, which has made the situation volatile in both the regions (discussed in chapter five).

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<sup>236</sup> Rakic, “Theories of Nation Formation and Case Selection: The Meaning of an Alternative Model,” p. 601

<sup>237</sup> Rakic, “Theories of Nation Formation and Case Selection: The Meaning of an Alternative Model,” p. 600

<sup>238</sup> Rakic, “Theories of Nation Formation and Case Selection: The Meaning of an Alternative Model,” p. 600-603

### *The Physical Base of the State*

According to Buzan, the physical base includes the territory and the population of the state as well as all the wealth (natural and manmade) within its borders<sup>239</sup>. A state cannot exist without a territory because for a state to exist, it needs to have a connection with its population that covers a certain territory. Buzan attaches the quality of being physical objects of security to the territory and the population of the state<sup>240</sup>. The territory is an important physical element of the state which is difficult to change in the contemporary international system; territorial integrity carries immense importance as an object of security for a state. Similar importance can be attached to the population of a state but to analyze whether the population is the object of security for a state like Pakistan, it is important to study the nation in conjunction with its varying identities and their relationship with the state.

The population of Pakistan can be categorized on the basis of religion (Islam) and therefore can be termed a single nation, or if on the basis of ethnicity, it can be termed a state comprised of many sub-nations. Since Islam is the idea of the state of Pakistan, the object of security for the state, in theory, is the Muslim population which includes all the sub-nations. However, when analyzing the population as the object of security on the basis of ethnic-nations, the situation changes dramatically. The primary object of security is the sub-nation and its political identity that gave rise to the state. The Muslim League was victorious in the general elections of 1945 (before partition) in the province of Sindh and Punjab areas of British India (current Pakistan) whose political leadership and the people at the time of partition joined in to establish the state of Pakistan. Hence, the population and political identity of both these provinces has become the primary object of security for the state of Pakistan.

KP (another Muslim majority province) was the third province to join Pakistan despite the fact that the government there in power as a result of the 1945 elections was the Khudai khitmatgar Party (a party opposed to the idea of Pakistan and coalition partner of the Indian National Congress (INC)). A plebiscite was held in KP in the month of July 1947 by the British before partition where 99 percent of the people who voted wanted to join Pakistan. Hence, the population of KP is equally important to the state as an object of security. This entire socio-political context of KP in regards to its relationship with the state of Pakistan is discussed in detail in chapter seven to help establish the CPR model.

The situation is different when light is shed over FATA and Baluchistan in the context above. The tribal chiefs of FATA acceded to Pakistan right after independence on the condition that Pakistan would keep the FCR system intact. Hence the FCR, which is a source of sovereignty for the population and the tribal identity of FATA, is the primary object of security for the state to determine the state to sub-nation relationship for the population in FATA. The FCR, which did not

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<sup>239</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 88

<sup>240</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 89

allow direct socio-political and economic intervention of the state, became the source that blocked a direct relationship between the state and the sub-nation of FATA from developing as explained in chapter one and two.

Baluchistan also presents a similar situation but with a change of some historical circumstances which were discussed in chapter two. The confederation of Kalat in the region of Baluchistan remained independent until 1948, when it was annexed by Pakistan, giving birth to the first of the five insurgencies. While there was no FCR in Baluchistan, the tribal chiefs still continued to remain loyal to the state of Pakistan and control the province politically and socially, which is also discussed in detail in chapter five.

If the state controls the regions of FATA and Baluchistan through the tribal status quo and its institutional expression (both of which restrict a direct connection of the state with the people of these regions), a sub-state structure may exist in both the regions, where the state is not able to effectively intervene and establish its own organizing ideology and institutional expression. Both FATA and Baluchistan, as physical territories, are objects of security for the state. However, when it comes to the population of both regions, they become secondary objects of security while the tribal status quo and its institutional expression becomes the primary object of security. The state of Pakistan should recall that since the creation of the UN, the territorial integrity of many states remains preserved and secure from a direct threat from another state, except for some states in conflict<sup>241</sup>. As a result, Buzan suggests that for most states, internal secessionist movements are the major threat which becomes a subjective fear and objective danger to the state<sup>242</sup>. Therefore, the population of both Baluchistan and FATA should be the primary objects of security for the state.

### *The Institutional Expression of the State*

The Institutional Expression of the State refers to the entire apparatus and bureaucracy of the government: the executive, legislative, administrative and judicial bodies of the state including the procedures, norms and laws through which they operate<sup>243</sup>. The idea of the state helps to establish the mechanisms of the government that persuade the citizens to subordinate themselves to the authority of the state<sup>244</sup>. However, in a situation where the idea of a state is weak or absent, but the government mechanism is present, the state is considered a *maximal state*: where the elites from among the nation command the apparatus of the government, especially the armed forces and use it for their own interests<sup>245</sup>. According to Buzan, the idea of such a state will be determined by the interest of the ruling elite. In the case of Pakistan and as identified in the previous chapter, this

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<sup>241</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 89

<sup>242</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 89

<sup>243</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 83

<sup>244</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 83


<sup>245</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 83

ruling elite includes the civil bureaucracy, military and political feudal elite and dynasties in the center and the tribal chiefs and the ethnic and religious elites at the regional level.

Buzan explains that the institutional expression in a maximal state has to compensate for the weak idea of the state; and therefore, the government and institutions under the command of the elites demand obedience of the people to ensure coherence and unity. However, in FATA and Baluchistan, the institutions of the state are either absent or weak and cannot compensate for the weak idea of the state. Hence, the tribal institutional expression takes precedence over the institutional expression of the state and commands obedience among the people. Thereby, the tribal apparatus of government, which includes the tribal chief and tribal judicial system including the tribal norms and traditions (tribal administration) becomes stronger in both the regions and therefore resists attempts by the state to develop and strengthen its own institutional expression.

The crux of the SDM is presented in Figure 5 below. It depicts that a nation, its organizing ideology and political identity give rise to the idea of the state. The organizing ideology and the political identity also give rise to the institutional expression of the state. The institutional expression legitimizes the idea of the state and commands obedience and control over the territory and the population of the state through the institutions that govern the physical base.

**Figure 5. The SDM and the State of Pakistan**



The state of Pakistan used the religious (Islamic) Institutional expression in 1979 as the best alternative to the institutional expression of the state. The purpose of the religious institutional expression was to strengthen the religious idea of the state at the grass-root level, especially among the sub-nations in FATA and Baluchistan and/or to reduce the power of the tribal chiefs and their apparatus of government. To the state's disappointment, the religious institutional expression led



to the creation of a religious sub-state structure: co-existing with the tribal sub-state structure in both the regions. This is briefly discussed below and is elaborated on in detail in chapter five.

*The Religious Sub-State Structure in FATA according to the SDM*

The Islamization policies of the state that started in 1972 (discussed in chapter two) and that established and strengthened the Islamic institutional expression in Pakistan also had an enormous impact on the geo-political situation of the region post-1979. That Pakistan was established for the Muslims of the subcontinent sets the legitimate ground for the Islamization policy to develop Islamic social and political structures to govern the people of Pakistan. The new idea of the state that started to generate as a result of the Islamization policy led to radicalization of the population (physical base) in the entire country. Therefore, the new idea of the state introduced in 1972 can be termed as an artificial ideology enforced on the population as suggested by Buzan in his multi-nation State model and explained in the previous chapter.

The artificial religious idea of the state was governed through the Islamic institutional expression: this included religious seminaries, mosques, priests and scholars and other social and political religious institutions. These grew rapidly after 1972 and proliferated sporadically throughout the country with more concentration in Baluchistan, FATA and KP due to their proximity with Afghanistan that faced the USSR's invasion post-1979. Pakistan, therefore, witnessed the rise of a state sponsored informal 'Islamic radical force': a religiously radicalized population and a secondary/subordinate force, or a sub-military force that was used to fight various proxy wars, in Kashmir with India and in Afghanistan against the USSR. Discussion in the previous chapter and in chapter five suggests this was the case.

The Islamic radical force, also known as Mujahedeen (holy warriors), were utilized by US and KSA to fight the USSR in Afghanistan. The Mujahedeen continued to gain control of Afghanistan when the USSR left in 1989 and installed the same institutional expression which gave rise to them in Pakistan. Afghanistan was renamed the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996 when the Mujahedeen gained control of Kabul and its new rulers came to be known as the Taliban. Buzan explains that this silent invasion was facilitated through an institutional expression that was initiated in Pakistan and ended up gaining control of Afghanistan. He suggests that institutions can replace the Idea of the State in the overall structure of the state to a considerable extent and suggests that governments installed by foreign occupying powers can also fit this model<sup>246</sup>. Therefore, the institutional expression element of the SDM carries an important and significant share in establishing control and dominance over a physical base and injecting its own Idea of the State which is missing in Baluchistan and FATA.

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
<sup>246</sup> Buzan and Magnette, *People, States and Fear*, p. 83-84

### *The Sub-State Structure in Baluchistan and FATA*

The analysis in chapter two and the theoretical analysis of the SDM for Pakistan, Baluchistan and FATA in this section shows that the state of Pakistan has a very weak link with the sub-nations of Baluchistan and FATA. The link is weakened by the policy of the state that uses the traditional regional status quo of tribal chiefs and religious and ethnic elites in Baluchistan and FATA to govern the population and the region, giving prominence to tribal and religious institutional expression rather than the institutional expression of the state. Such dynamics suggest that if the population of Baluchistan and FATA remains disconnected from the state's institutional expression, they may be oblivious to the idea of the state of Pakistan and develop a strong affiliation with the existing institutional expression that governs them, tribal or religious. This situation will lead to the development of the idea of a tribal sub-state or a religious sub-state in the minds of the population.

Considering the elements of the SDM and the discussion above regarding the sub-state in Baluchistan and FATA, it is revealed that a sub-state structure can exist within the physical base of a larger state and resist attempts by the larger state to establish its own institutional expression: ultimately, resisting the establishment of a State-Nation. The components of the sub-state in Baluchistan and FATA - in terms of their real-world manifestation - will be the same as the components of the central state. The components of the sub-state will include their tribal or religious institutional expression governing the population and territory (sub-physical base) in both the regions and giving rise to the idea of their sub-states. Figure 6 below, therefore, is a slight adjustment of Figure 5 above to capture how the sub-state takes on the features and role of the central state.

**Figure 6. Component Parts of a Sub-state in a Larger State**



In an ideal situation, the institutional expression of the state and the sub-state should be coherent so that the sub-nations develop a sense of being equal in the eyes of the state and the nation. In such an ideal situation, nationalism that divides on the basis of identity will be reduced and allow the components of the sub-state to assimilate with the components of the state. The structural reasons that restrict the existence of this ideal situation in Baluchistan and FATA are explained through establishing the MDCM in the next section.

### **3.2. Establishing the Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM)**

In order to establish a link between the weak state-to-nation relationship and violence (terrorism and insurgency), this section seeks to advance the Disaster Crunch Model and transform it into a Manmade Disaster Crunch Model. It does this by transforming the concept of *natural disaster* (that is a product of a *natural hazard* and a *population that is vulnerable to the natural hazard*) to adjust to the concept of violence as *manmade disaster* (a product of *radicalization* as hazard and a *grieving population* as a population vulnerable to radicalization).

The idea of *disaster* is associated with the suffering of human beings that is caused by either natural hazards, such as tsunamis and floods, or manmade hazards such as wars or social policies<sup>247</sup>. A situation of human suffering in a country, caused by an external force or the state's policy itself, can be termed a *manmade disaster*. Bob Hansford has put forward the Disaster Crunch Model (DCM) and argues that disasters are not events that are random or isolated, but occur as a result of natural or manmade hazards which impact on a vulnerable population<sup>248</sup>. He further explains that a *hazard* can be manmade (like drought) or a natural phenomenon (like earthquake), while *vulnerability is usually a long-term weakness* in a community or nation, hence, when a hazard impacts a vulnerable community there can, over a short or long-term time-horizon, eventually be a disaster<sup>249</sup>.

Definitions of the important terms used in this model are drawn from Hansford's own words are listed below.

*Hazard*: "An extreme event or occurrence which has the potential to cause injury to life and damage to property and the environment."<sup>250</sup>

*Vulnerability*: "A condition or set of conditions which reduces people's ability to prepare for, withstand, or respond to a particular hazard."<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> Scott Harding, "Man-Made Disaster and Development," *International Social Work* 50, no. 3 (May 2007): 295–306, p. 295. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020872807076041>.

<sup>248</sup> Bob Hansford, *Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities*. (Tearfund, 2011). p. 18

<sup>249</sup> Bob Hansford, *Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities*, p.18

<sup>250</sup> Bob Hansford, *Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities*, p.18

<sup>251</sup> Bob Hansford, *Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities*, p. 16

*Disaster*: “The result of a hazard’s impact on a vulnerable community, causing damage to life, assets or livelihoods in a way which exceeds the community’s capacity to cope.”<sup>252</sup>

*Risk*: “The probability of something negative happening in the future which will cause suffering, harm and loss.”<sup>253</sup>

The elements of the DCM and how it works is explained by Hansford through Figure 7 below.

**Figure 7. Disaster Crunch Model**<sup>254</sup>



According to Hanford, “Hazard and vulnerability combine to squeeze or ‘crunch’ a population, causing a disaster”<sup>255</sup>.

In the context of Baluchistan and FATA, terrorism and insurgency have resulted in loss of life, damage to state and private infrastructures, forced migration and negative effects on the economic and livelihood of the people in both regions. In chapter two, both terrorism and insurgency are termed as forms of political violence and both require a set of steps to become a disaster; this will be explored below.

The first part discusses the theoretical factors that develop the hazard component of the DCM for violence and give rise to ‘disaster risk’. The second part discusses the theoretical factors that develop the vulnerability component of the DCM violence and that also contribute to ‘disaster risk’. Hazard and vulnerability are analysed independently of each other.

### **Incorporating the Concept of Hazard into the DCM**

The concept of hazard is associated with natural hazards in both social work and general literature. There are other definitions that focus on manmade hazards but are mostly confined to technological, industrial or chemical hazards at work places or in the physical environment. The

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<sup>252</sup> Bob Hansford, *Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities*, p. 15

<sup>253</sup> Bob Hansford, *Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities*, p. 16

<sup>254</sup> Bob Hansford, *Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities*, p.18

<sup>255</sup> Bob Hansford, *Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities*, p. 18

International Labour Organization (ILO) defines hazard as the “inherent potential to cause injury or damage to people’s health”<sup>256</sup>. There are also examples of natural hazards that are induced by nature, such as earthquakes and there are certain interventions by humankind in the natural environment that result in manmade natural hazards such as global warming (through greenhouse gas emissions) and flooding (through deforestation). To understand the connection between natural hazards and manmade hazards we need to first note that nature itself, like the nature of a new-born human being, is not innately malevolent (causing destruction or having or showing a wish to do evil to others)<sup>257</sup>.

Hazard should not be confused with terms like ‘risk’ and ‘threat’. Hazard is a *potential or even dormant harmless state*, while threat is an *obvious or manifest harmful one*<sup>258</sup>. This means that hazard does no harm unless it converts or transforms into a threat<sup>259</sup>. *Risk, on the other hand, is the probability of potential damage* in case the hazard is activated as a threat<sup>260</sup>. The literature does not relate hazard to an event or specific agent or an actor but rather considers it as a state or a situation. Derek Vinner defines hazards as “sources of potentially damaging energy which either exist naturally or as a result of humankind’s modification of the naturally occurring world”<sup>261</sup>.

The focus of this research is confined to the disasters of terrorism and insurgency, which are the products of socio-political conflicts. A conflict does not necessarily result in violence but has the potential to turn into violence if it reaches an extreme, consistent and intense level where the result may be destruction<sup>262</sup>. Therefore, the *socio-political environment can be referred to as hazard underpinning terrorism and insurgency* when it becomes the source of energy among individuals or group of citizens that leads them to commit an act of terrorism or insurgency and inflicts injury, loss of lives and collateral damage to the state and the people. At times, once the energy is released and the disaster has been inflicted, hostilities may end. The level of this energy is influenced by the level of socio-political conflict in the environment. This is the reason that hostilities do not cease to exist in the cases of insurgency and terrorism if, at the individual and group level, a sufficient intense energy remains at a level that inevitably produces further violent conflict. The *energy* in this context can be understood as *radicalization*. While radicalization does not always lead to conflict or violence, it can be termed as a hazard awaiting to be activated as a threat.

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<sup>256</sup> ILO (International Labour Organisation), “ILO CONSTRUCTION OS&H: A free, comprehensive, international, digital training package in occupational safety and health for the construction industry: Theme Summary 1: Fundamental Principles, ILO p. 15. Retrieved February 15, 2019. [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_dialogue/---sector/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms\\_161768.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---sector/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_161768.pdf)

<sup>257</sup> Williams M. Adams and George D. Curtis, “The Importance of Similarities among Multiple Hazard Phenomena,” in *Natural and Man-Made Hazards: Proceedings of the International Symposium Held at Rimouski, Quebec, Canada, 3-9 August, 1986* (Dordrecht ; Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co, 1988). p. 03

<sup>258</sup> Bruce Newsome, *A Practical Introduction to Security and Risk Management* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014). p. 55-57

<sup>259</sup> Newsome, *A Practical Introduction to Security and Risk Management*, p. 55-57

<sup>260</sup> Newsome, *A Practical Introduction to Security and Risk Management*, p. 55-57

<sup>261</sup> Derek Viner, *Accident Analysis and Risk Control*. (Carlton, Vic: Vrij Delphi, 1991). p. 42

<sup>262</sup> Idowu, “Citizenship, Alienation and Conflict in Nigeria,” p. 34

Radicalization has the potential to maintain the level of conflict by drawing more people from the population into an existing conflict, which this section intends to explore.

Radicalization is defined in a general sense as:

What goes on before the bomb goes off<sup>263</sup>

but a more specific definition considers it as:

Development of belief, feelings and action in support of any group or cause in a conflict<sup>264</sup>.

In the field of policymaking it is also defined as:

A pathway to terrorism, gradual slide into extremism, fundamentalism or, even more generally, a movement towards justifying violence, and finally personally engaging in it<sup>265</sup>.

Therefore, the *hazard of violence* in the DCM model is an environment of socio-political conflict that is the source of radicalization (*energy*) with the risk of converting non-violent humans into violent ones (*disaster risk*).

It is important to understand the process of radicalization that first gives birth to radical violent groups and then enables them to mobilize physical, financial and human assets and strike a particular target. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko provide detailed insight into the process of radicalization drawing upon individual and group examples. They view the process of radicalization among individuals and groups through two broad terms, ‘social conflict’ and ‘political conflict’. They theorize that radicalization can transform social conflict into political conflict depending on certain triggers or policies of a country that enhance the level of conflict between individuals or groups in conflict.

These theories can be grouped together as shown in Table 5

**Table 5. Theories of Radicalization (Social and Political Dimensions)**

	Social Conflict	Political Conflict
Individuals	Aggression Theory	Identity Expansion Theory
Groups	Interest Aggregation Theory	Polarization Theory

<sup>263</sup> Peter Neumann, “Introduction,” in *Perspectives on Radicalization and Political Violence* (International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2008), p. 04. <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Perspectives-on-Radicalisation-Political-Violence.pdf>.

<sup>264</sup> Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). p. 4-5

<sup>265</sup> Asta Maskaliūnaitė, “Exploring the Theories of Radicalization,” *International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* 17, no. 1 (December 1, 2015): 9–26, p. 12. <https://doi.org/10.1515/ipcj-2015-0002>.

*Aggression* theory contends that any painful experience, faced by an individual, leads to manifestation of anger and an increased probability of aggression<sup>266</sup>. This theory articulates that “when someone wrongs us, we want justice, often we want revenge”<sup>267</sup>. McCauley and Moskalenko argue that there is a subtle difference between justice and revenge by explaining that justice means that the one who mistreats us should be punished while revenge means that the mistreated should be the ones who do the punishment. They also claim that aggression and anger produce a reflexive response of the victim against the perceived perpetrator, who can be an individual or a whole category of individuals in the social dimension<sup>268</sup>.

This theory is, however, less specific about the identification of the radicalized victim. Either the one suffering direct victimization can become radicalized or someone associated with the category of the direct victim becomes radicalized. McCauley and Moskalenko give examples of Chechen Black Widows seeking revenge against Russia for their own experiences of rape or for the deaths of their brothers, husbands and sons<sup>269</sup>.

*Identity expansion* theory articulates that when the victims of individual radicalization cannot punish or identify the specific perpetrator of their pain or grievance, the anger or aggression manifests and grows which leads to expansion of perpetrator or victim identification<sup>270</sup>. This situation is the trajectory of transformation of the victim’s personal grievances into political grievance. Personal and political grievances are rarely apart and an individual might become subjected to political grievance before individual grievance emerges, but in all cases the political and personal soon become cohesive<sup>271</sup>. McCauley and Moskalenko provide case studies of the transformation of social individual conflict into political individual conflict via identity expansion theory. The early stages of life of Andrei Zhelyabov (of Land and Freedom movement in Russia) and Ayman Al Zawahiri (of Jamaat Al Jihad in Egypt) are important examples of this individual political radicalization.

Zhelyabov “wanted revenge against the landowner who had raped his aunt; later, when local landowners blocked the case against the rapist, he wanted revenge against the landowners as a class. His life as a terrorist can be understood as motivated by a powerful confluence of personal revenge with abstract ideas of justice for serfs that were held by many university students”<sup>272</sup>. Zawahiri wanted revenge against the secular Egyptian government for the death sentence of his uncle; who was known for his anti-government activities and publishing a book that still inspires

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<sup>266</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 17

<sup>267</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 16

<sup>268</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 16

<sup>269</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 16

<sup>270</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 31-33

<sup>271</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 31

<sup>272</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 13-17

Muslims to replace secular government with an Islamic State. Zawahiri later became the enemy of all secular governments in the Muslim world and became a world known global terrorist.<sup>273</sup>

Identity expansion theory is driven by the concepts of *positive identification* and *negative identification*. Positive identification means caring about the welfare of someone or feeling bad when they are failing, diminishing or in danger<sup>274</sup>. Negative identification means feeling good when someone is in pain, trouble, or not prospering<sup>275</sup>. Identity expansion is when positive (or negative) identification extends from a specific victim (or perpetrator) to the whole category or class of the victim (or the perpetrator). Both Zhelyabov and Zawahiri suffered individual pain and personal grievances at an early stage of their lives, so considered the perpetrators as unjust, expanded their victim (positive) and perpetrator (negative) identification and got involved in activism for radical change for the plight of the victim category and to punish the perpetrator category.

The process involved in the transformation of individual conflict into group conflict comes from involvement in activism where individuals seeking revenge against the same perpetrator or justice from a particular class, identify and connect with each other and start activism. For example, Zhelyabov in the Land and Freedom Movement (founded in 1861) in Russia to support the plight of peasants against Landowners or Zawahiri in Jamaat Al Jihad (founded in 1979) who supported the plight of devout Muslims against a secular system of justice. This situation is where the *Interest Aggregation* theory explains activism or mobilization at the societal level for social change. The theory suggests that when a group faces a common danger or threat to its interests, certain individuals from the group develop interdependence throughout the group and they establish boundaries around themselves, and therefore become a psychological group defined by opposition to those outside the group<sup>276</sup>.

Such interdependence can happen in small face-to-face groups as well as within a large group or nation, and in the modern digital environment can be facilitated, accelerated and/or depended by virtual interactions<sup>277</sup>. An example for small face-to-face group radicalization is again drawn from the Land and Freedom movement in Russia. The group initiated the process of activism or mobilization at the societal level in the 1860s to educate and mobilize people in their struggle to protect their interests or avert a perceived impending danger. For large group radicalization, McCauley and Moskalenko introduce the concept of *average opinion* (opinion of individual members) and *meta-opinion* (opinion about opinion of other members) to explain radicalization in large social groups, such as religious, ethnic, racial and national groups. In small groups the

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<sup>273</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 29-31

<sup>274</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 28

<sup>275</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 28

<sup>276</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 91

<sup>277</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 91



average opinion and meta-opinion are likely to be similar<sup>278</sup>. Large group radicalization also expands with activism and discussions at the societal level to reduce the difference between the meta-opinion and average opinion, aggregate interests, and radicalize the society. The sub-sects within Sunni and Shia Islamic groups can be attributed to large group interest aggregation at the social level. The closeness of the meta-opinion to average opinion explains why the perpetrators of political violence depend on a much larger group in a particular society who sympathize or support their cause or grievance.

*Polarization* theory explains the process whereby a group, according to interest aggregation theory gives birth to a violent group that deviates from civil activism and mobilization in the society and shifts to focus on radical political change by turning to arms and political violence. This theory states that some members of the group decide to engage in political violence when they feel blocked from further activism, observe no further room or opportunity for interest aggregation and face repression and attack by state or non-state groups. The tactic adopted by the violent group is termed as *propaganda by fact* where the group demonstrates (specifically to its much larger mobilized social base or general citizens) the irrelevance and vulnerability of the state and the political system<sup>279</sup>. As such, the violent group that emerges is drastically different from the group that started the initial activism process, even though it includes many of the same people<sup>280</sup>.

According to the concepts of radicalization elaborated above, the existence of religious and ethnic interest aggregated groups is a prerequisite for polarization to happen within them. The conflict of these groups with the state can be understood through the Social Movement Theory (SMT), explained by Heather S. Gregg, which contends that mass social movements that are aimed at bringing about social and political change are a result of plentiful grievances<sup>281</sup>. Three variables for the (SMT) are identified as *political opportunities*, *mobilizing structures* and *framing process*<sup>282</sup>.

*Political Opportunity*: Gregg explains that the political opportunity variable is influenced by the institutionalized politics of the country, which influences the emergence and success of social movements depending on the political constraints and opportunities that exist<sup>283</sup>. Political opportunity is the “consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the

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<sup>278</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 146

<sup>279</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 103

<sup>280</sup> McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 103

<sup>281</sup> Heather Selma Gregg, “Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements, Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28, no. 2 (August 8, 2014): 338–60, p. 342 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.918879>.

<sup>282</sup> Mayer N. Zald, John D. McCarthy, and Doug McAdam, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). p. 2-3

<sup>283</sup> Gregg, “Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements, Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors,” p. 342

political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics”<sup>284</sup>. Political opportunity suggests that if a political system is weak, it presents opportunity for various interest groups to push for social change.

*Mobilizing structures*: involves the structure/forces that drive mobilization and engagement of people for collective action<sup>285</sup>. These structures include legitimate and trained leaders, pre-existing networks, communication channels and organizational structures including material resources such as money, schools, buildings and hospitals<sup>286</sup>.

*Framing Process*: focuses on the role of narratives and a sense of common purpose in the emergence and success of social movements<sup>287</sup>. The process revolves around a moral framework to which the supporters can relate. This framework includes religious, ethnic or any other identity, scriptures and symbols to justify the cause, and stories of oppression and resistance to establish solidarity<sup>288</sup>.

The SMT also states that movements, specifically religious, *turn violent if the political opportunities for them are blocked* (through existing or changed policy of the state) or they become frustrated, want to push for negotiations or draw attention to a certain cause<sup>289</sup>. According to recent research on the resilience of the Baloch insurgency, the current phase of the insurgency is supported by the social movement where the political opportunity variable is stronger than before through identity expansion and interest aggregation but remains blocked by the state. As such, resource mobilization has increased and the framing process encompasses the larger Baloch sub-nation<sup>290</sup>. The previous section also reveals that the state does not control the sub-state physical base and institutional expression in Baluchistan; and therefore, it is important to theoretically identify the process through which the state is able (intentionally or unintentionally) to block the political opportunity of the Baloch sub-nation. That process can be explained through the concept of *structural domination*.

*Structural domination* is a concept suggesting that domination is structural in nature, and involves a triadic relationship between the powerful agent (dominator), the disempowered agent (the

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<sup>284</sup> Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). p. 19-20

<sup>285</sup> Zald, McCarthy, and McAdam, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, p. 03

<sup>286</sup> Christian S. Smith, “Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back,” in *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism* (London: Routledge, 1997). p. 1–28. See also: John A. Hannigan, “Social Movement Theory and the Sociology of Religion: Toward a New Synthesis,” *Sociological Analysis* 52, no. 4 (1991): 311–31, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3710849>.

<sup>287</sup> Gregg, “Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements, Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors,” p. 343

<sup>288</sup> Christian S. Smith, “Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back,” p. 17

<sup>289</sup> Gregg, “Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements, Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors,” p. 343

<sup>290</sup> Tanner, “Explaining the Resilience of the Balochistan Insurgency” p. 44

dominated) and the regulator that regulates the domination of the powerful agent over the disempowered agent<sup>291</sup>. The process of structural domination can be explained through *Agrarian Revolt Theory* (ART). This theory states that structural domination in an agrarian society allows landowners to dominate the farmers and the peasants. The theory also asserts that farmers who derive their income from wages develop cooperative relations with each other, become independent of elites and are more likely to rebel through collective action than the cultivators who derive their income from land and will have low solidarity and may engage in individual acts of rebellion<sup>292</sup>. Hence, in this era of industrialization and semi-agrarian societies, if elites enjoy enough social and political power and control of land, such as through the wage structure or holding agricultural land, they control the socio-economic opportunities of the people, who they may not empower directly. Therefore, the chances of individual and group rebellion are enhanced but controlled because the elites, through their socio-political power, have the authority to deny them material wealth to support their cause.

In the context of the structural domination, an important aspect of radicalization is explained by Karl Marx through the idea of *relative and absolute deprivation*. *Absolute deprivation* refers to the condition where life is dictated by uncertainty over the essentials of food, shelter and clothing and people in such a condition have neither the will nor the resources to be involved in conflict or social change. *Relative deprivation* refers to a sense of being underprivileged compared to some other groups, and in this condition a sense of realization develops that the other group or others are doing better or ‘we’ are losing out on something. These people or groups have the emotional and material resources to become involved in conflict or social change<sup>293</sup>. In such a situation, Gurr suggests that there are inhibiting conditions, termed *coercive potential* that the regime can use to mediate the rebellion. He suggests utilizing social control agents (regulators) and increasing their size<sup>294</sup>. Recall the discussion in the previous section regarding the institutional expression in a situation where there is only a weak idea of the state. The social control agents are those elites or people in the society, group or nation and sub-nation that command obedience over their populations through their religious, ethnic and tribal institutional expression and can regulate the relationship between the state and the people. These agents of social control in the case of FATA and Baluchistan are the tribal chiefs, and religious and ethnic elites.

So far, this part of the section has outlined the concept of hazard for violence (terrorism and insurgency). It considers that religious and ethnic sub-nations are structurally dominated through

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<sup>291</sup> Nicholas Vrousalis, “The Capitalist Cage: Structural Domination and Collective Agency in the Market,” *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, February 3, 2020, p. 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12414>.


<sup>292</sup> Jeffery M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York: Free Press; London, 1978). p. 21

<sup>293</sup> Kenneth Allan, *The Social Lens: An Invitation to Social and Sociological Theory* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2007). p. 213

<sup>294</sup> Anthony Oberschall, “Theories of Social Conflict,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 4, no. 1 (August 1978): 291–315, p. 300. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.04.080178.001451>.

agents of social control, to exist in a larger frame of a nation. The agents are elites with socio-political power who command obedience of the sub-nation and have authority and power over socio-economic and political dynamics. These agents establish and maintain an environment of relative and absolute deprivation, and this gives rise to radicalization. Figure 8 below helps to explain the process of radicalization as the Hazard of Violence in the DCM.

**Figure 8. The Factors that establish the Hazard component of the DCM for Violence**



The concept of hazard in terms of violence has been incorporated into the DCM in this section. According to the DCM, disaster happens when a vulnerable population experiences hazard and therefore the vulnerability of the hazard, radicalization, needs to be developed and incorporated into the DCM to make the MDCM.

### **Incorporating the Concept of Vulnerability into the DCM**

This section explores the vulnerability of the people to radicalization through the analysis of their proneness to, or ability to cope with, radicalization that takes place in the social environment around them. Generally, vulnerability plays a more important role than hazard in reducing or raising the level of risk, and thus the chances of disaster (violence). In general terms, a hazard

alone cannot produce disasters unless it interacts with a population that is vulnerable<sup>295</sup>. For instance, a high-intensity earthquake will not cause human deaths or collateral damage if it occurs in an uninhabited region.

The focus of vulnerability in this research are the state and the nation and it becomes important to introduce the additional concepts of *social vulnerability* and *state vulnerability*. Scholars and practitioners have defined vulnerability in a number of ways. Susan Cutter defines it as:

The likelihood that an individual or group will be exposed to and adversely affected by a hazard<sup>296</sup>.

Mustafa argues that:

Vulnerability is a state of defenselessness which renders a community powerless to withstand the debilitating effects of events commonly perceived as disaster or natural hazards<sup>297</sup>.

In addition, vulnerability is suggested by Timmerman as:

The degree to which a system or part of a system may react adversely to the occurrence of a hazardous event<sup>298</sup>.

The level of vulnerability is determined by the proneness of a population to be hurt and its capacity to cope with the hazard<sup>299</sup>. The proneness of the population to become radicalized depends on their level of sensitivity to the methods and messaging radicalizers used to ignite individual or group grievances. For example, the religious (or ethnic) population is vulnerable to the exposure of religious (or ethnic) radicalization if the radicalizers focus on things the religious (or ethnic) group is especially sensitive to or aggrieved by.

Radicalization can work on individuals and community groups. It works when it reduces the difference between the average opinion and meta-opinion of its target population class. Once the process has been initiated, and if it is successful, the number of radicalized people increases in cases where social vulnerability (explained below) is high. The vulnerability of an individual or

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<sup>295</sup> Terry Cannon, "Vulnerability, 'Innocent' Disasters and the Imperative of Cultural Understanding," ed. Jean Christophe-Gaillard, *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal* 17, no. 3 (June 20, 2008): 350–57, p. 350. <https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560810887275>.

<sup>296</sup> Susan L. Cutter, "Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards," *Progress in Human Geography* 20, no. 4 (December 1996): 529–39, p. 532. <https://doi.org/10.1177/030913259602000407>.

<sup>297</sup> Daanish Mustafa, "Structural Causes of Vulnerability to Flood Hazard in Pakistan," *Economic Geography* 74, no. 3 (July 1998): 289–305, p. 290. <https://doi.org/10.2307/144378>.

<sup>298</sup> Peter Timmerman, *Vulnerability, Resilience and the Collapse of Society: A Review of Models and Possible Climatic Applications* (Toronto, Canada: Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Toronto, 1981). p. 21

<sup>299</sup> David McEntire, "Understanding and Reducing Vulnerability: From the Approach of Liabilities and Capabilities," *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal* 20, no. 3 (June 21, 2011): 294–313, p. 295 <https://doi.org/10.1108/09653561111141736>.

nation to be radicalized is determined by the social dynamics that allow exposure to radicalization. Therefore, *social vulnerability*, is defined as “the degree to which societies and socio-economic groups are affected by stresses and hazards, whether brought about by external forces or intrinsic factors – internal and external – that negatively impact the social cohesion of a country”<sup>300</sup>.

According to this definition, increased social vulnerability leads to a greater likelihood of conflicts and violence, leaving the state vulnerable to conflict and fragmentation. At worst, it can lead to the political disintegration of the state. Therefore, the *state vulnerability* can be defined as the degree to which the state is affected by hazards brought about by internal or external forces that negatively impact the basic components of the state; the idea, physical base and institutional expression of the state. Just as individuals and societies are sensitive to the attributes of their socio-political environment, states are sensitive to their basic components.

The concept of the framing process, as a variable of the SMT in the study of radicalization as a hazard above, establishes the vulnerability of the state and the nations and reduces the difference between average opinion and meta-opinion of the people. The framing process is the variable of the SMT that is defined as “the conscious strategic effort by groups of people to fashion shared understanding of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action”<sup>301</sup>. The framing process below will help to explain the dynamics that give rise to religious or ethnic radicalization and conflict at the societal level.

#### *The Framing Process by Religious and Ethnic Social Movements*

A religiously-oriented population is the potential primary resource for the religious social movement. Similarly, the potential resource for the ethnic social movement is the relevant ethnic population. The potential secondary resources for both the movements are individuals, communities and states who hold *positive identification* with these social movements and/or their religious and ethnic groups, or *negative identification* with the state where the movement arises. Exploring the factors that strengthen the religious and ethnic social movements in Pakistan will help to identify the variables that contribute to vulnerability components of the society and the state. This exploration includes analyzing the dynamics of social injustice and corruption that ignite aggression at the individual level and interest aggregation at the group level.

#### *The Religious Social Movement*

The goal of the religious social movement in Pakistan is to transform the country into a state that practices Sharia law. Parts of this movement are not involved directly in politics while others are led by the religious political parties in the country. If their goal is to implement Sharia law in

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<sup>300</sup> Mohammad J. Kuna, “Social Vulnerability and Conflicts: Elements for Regional Conflict Vulnerability Analysis,” in *ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peace-Building* (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 2011). p. 65

<sup>301</sup> Zald, McCarthy, and McAdam, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, p. 21

Pakistan, it means that they consider the existing law implemented in Pakistan to be either non-compliant with, or opposed to, or insufficiently reflective of Sharia. Many common citizens of Pakistan believe that the laws in the country are based on Sharia but the radicals believe that the country is not a true Islamic state: an idea generated and disseminated through the framing process by the religious political parties and presenting an Islamic political opportunity to the religious movement and their political and social leaders<sup>302</sup>.

What will happen if a religiously radicalized individual experiences injustice by the state that is being framed by the radicalizers as not complaint with Sharia, a system that promises justice? This section will help us answer this question.

The radicalized individuals and groups demand that the institutional expression of the state or any non-state systems should be able to channel their interests or political opportunities. The Crisis Group Asia Report on Islamic parties in Pakistan provides insights as to how the religious political parties are able to mobilize human resources from the grass-root level communities in order to advance their political agendas<sup>303</sup>. The report also identifies a network of religious seminaries in rural and urban areas, and the religious student wings in colleges and universities as mobilizing structures of the religious political parties. The report references not only the two major religious political parties (Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamat-e-Islami (JI)) in Pakistan but notes there are other sectarian religious political groups that act as pressure groups in their local regions and are involved in sectarian interest aggregation. The students of the religious seminaries grow up to become clerics in mosques or religious teachers/lecturers in schools, colleges and universities. The members of the student wings finish their university degrees and get employed in their respective field or join the religious political party. These members of the political parties, pressure groups, seminaries and student groups are drivers of religious radicalization in Pakistani society at the grass-root level, an example of which is provided below. They can also be termed as framers in the context of social movement theory.

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), one former member of the student wing of JI said that “when I was introduced to JI literature at a young age and became active in the IJT (Islami Jamiat-e-Tulba - student wing of JI), I was told to elevate my concerns to a higher level and, as a result, was persuaded to distance myself from the petty concerns of my family, studies and social life”<sup>304</sup>. The elevation of concerns to a higher level involves emphasizing the religious anxieties in the social realm and striving to fix them. The state apparatus through its Islamization policy post-1979 has exacerbated the drivers of radicalization and strengthened the mobilizing infrastructure

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<sup>302</sup> Khalid Aziz, *Country Paper on “Drivers of Radicalism and Extremism in Pakistan”* (Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015). p. 16

<sup>303</sup> International Crisis Group, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan*. (Kabul ; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/135504/216%20Islamic%20Parties%20in%20Pakistan.pdf>.

<sup>304</sup> International Crisis Group, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan*, p. 09



for decades as one of its key pillars of national security,<sup>305</sup> ultimately strengthening religious social movements in Pakistan.

### *The Ethnic Social Movement*

The ethno-nationalist political parties strive to safeguard the rights of their ethnicities, stop the exploitation of the resources of their land, and ensure that their ethnicities have access to the basic needs of life as well as share in the economic growth produced in the province and the country. The analysis of chapter two and the previous section suggests that the state would not support ethnic ideologies as much as it would support the Islamic religious ideology. In the context of Baloch political parties, their mobilizing structure depends on their Baloch sub-nation, not the entire population of the country. The Baloch ethnic social movement is, therefore, not strengthened by the state but by the ethno-nationalist political parties that utilize their mobilizing structure to obtain the political opportunities by focusing on ethnic sentiments to come and remain in power. The Baloch Student Organization (BSO) remains an important organ in driving the Baloch social movement. Harrison considers BSO as an important player in the political landscape of the region of Baluchistan by filling the void due to the absence of a significant middle-class<sup>306</sup>. The BSO aggregates the interest of the Baloch population by bringing forth lower middle-class Baloch political activists who challenge the control of powerful tribal chiefs and ethnic elites in provincial politics<sup>307</sup>.

The BSO has produced many rebels who participated in the insurgency of the 1970s and has helped to revive guerilla groups from past insurgencies<sup>308</sup>. In addition, Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch (leader of the insurgent group - Baloch Liberation Front) formed his own BSO-A (Azad) in 2002: (which has no affiliation with any political party) after he became discontented with the politics of the BSO due to its affiliation with the ethno-nationalist Baloch political parties<sup>309</sup>. In an article by Dr. Allah Nazar published in 2013, he mentions the pro-Pakistani Baloch group as a small privileged group of individuals who have betrayed Baluchistan and its resources in return for a small share of the power in the state<sup>310</sup>. He idealizes and advocates for an independent, secular and justice-

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<sup>305</sup> Moeed Yusuf, *Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 10

<sup>306</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 16

<sup>307</sup> Shakoor Ahmad Wani, "The Changing Dynamics of the Baloch Nationalist Movement in Pakistan: From Autonomy toward Secession," *Asian Survey* 56, no. 5 (2016): 807–32, p. 821-824. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26364389>.

<sup>308</sup> Wani, "The Changing Dynamics of the Baloch Nationalist Movement in Pakistan: From Autonomy toward Secession," p. 821-824

<sup>309</sup> Wani, "The Changing Dynamics of the Baloch Nationalist Movement in Pakistan: From Autonomy toward Secession," p. 822

<sup>310</sup> Allah Nazar Baloch, "Why Do the Baloch Reject the 2013 Election? | Voices | Tanqeed," [www.tanqeed.org](http://www.tanqeed.org), 2013, <http://www.tanqeed.org/2013/05/why-the-baloch-boycott-elections/>.



based Pakistan state that would allow Baluchistan to utilize its own resources for the benefit and welfare of its people<sup>311</sup>.

Allah Nazar revealed from an undisclosed location, the events leading to his radicalization in an interview with a local news agency in Baluchistan. He mentions listening to the elders of his family discussing the past atrocities of the state against the Baloch people and provided a detailed account of his abduction and torture in 2005 by the state and security forces when he was the chairman of BSO-Azad<sup>312</sup>. He states that after his release he went to his hometown of Mashkay, and stayed at home for 17 days and on the 18th day he went to the mountains to revolt and says “In the Baloch national struggle, ‘taking to the mountain’ is a euphemism for joining the ranks of the freedom fighters, who mostly hide in mountains”<sup>313</sup>.

The statement by Dr. Nazar provides context for considering the previous section’s discussion regarding the agents of social control and the process of radicalization. Unlike the religious social movement that is strengthening at the societal level but gets its strength via the top-down policy of the state, the Baloch national movement strengthens through a bottom-up approach via the sub-nation. The ethnic movement carries the potential to widen the scope of the Baloch ethnic insurgency and become a larger security issue for the state as more and more Baloch youth enter the middle-class category and become opposed to the power of tribal chiefs, ethnic elites, and the state<sup>314</sup>.

### *The Framing of the State*

The reason for the strength and success of both the religious and ethnic social movement lies in the framing process of radicalization against the state. The state becomes vulnerable because the framing process exploits the weakness or absence of the state’s institutional expression. The institutional expression of the state gives meaning to the existence of the state, which is to ensure the security of its people so that they are able to prosper and thrive. The state can also be a source of threat for the citizens, but it is important for the citizens to understand that the threats that come from the state will be less and of lower magnitude than those which may result in the absence of the state<sup>315</sup>. It is assumed that with the existence of a religious or tribal sub-state structure in Baluchistan and FATA, and a weak or absent institutional expression of the state in both the regions, the threats that come from the state can be framed as of higher magnitude.

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<sup>311</sup> Allah Nazar Baloch, “Why Do the Baloch Reject the 2013 Election?”

<sup>312</sup> bolanvoice, “Dr. Nazar Baloch’s Perspective on Balochistan Situation.,” Monthly Bolan Voice (Monthly Bolan Voice, May 17, 2011), <https://bolanvoice.wordpress.com/2011/05/17/dr-nazar-baloch%E2%80%99s-perspective-on-balochistan-situation/>.

<sup>313</sup> bolanvoice, “Dr. Nazar Baloch’s Perspective on Balochistan Situation.,”

<sup>314</sup> Tiffany Tanner, “Explaining the Resilience of the Balochistan Insurgency” p. 59-60

<sup>315</sup> bolanvoice, “Dr. Nazar Baloch’s Perspective on Balochistan Situation.,”

The framing of the state of Pakistan that it is a threat to, rather than the protector of, religious interests of Muslims and ethnic interests of the Baloch population has been effectively utilized by the religious militants and ethnic insurgents to ignite religious or ethnic grievances among them. There is a video of a Baloch student of a university in which he directs a question to the Federal Minister of Interior Mr. Ahsan Iqbal (also member of National Assembly of Pakistan) during a TV show in 2018:

There was a Saindak gold and copper project, there was a Rekodik gold and copper project, natural gas had also been discovered in the early 1950s in the Sui and Dera Bugti areas of Baluchistan. However, those huge projects could not change the fate of the Baloch people, then how can you claim that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will change our fate?<sup>316</sup>

The minister responded by addressing the show host and other attendees, saying:

The young boy has reminded us of a harsh reality of the past. No doubt Baluchistan has been ignored and violated, however, the prime minister of the country envisions that all such political wishes can be fulfilled by socio-economic development in Baluchistan<sup>317</sup>

The question of the Baloch student, who later became an insurgent and was killed in 2020 in skirmishes between the Pakistan forces and Baloch insurgents<sup>318</sup>, reveals the frame through which many Baloch students and citizens perceive the state as a threat to the interests of the Baloch sub-nation. They view their ethnic Baloch population as suffering, despite the many mega-projects by the state in Baluchistan because the income and taxes received from these projects are not re-invested in Baluchistan or not channeled towards the grass-root level for the socio-economic uplift of the people. The radicalizers use the framing opportunity to establish the idea that the state is in conflict with the individual or group interests of their target population group. If the state is considered to be a source of emotional pain and grievance to the people (individual or a group), it results in manifesting a conflict between the state and the population. On the other hand, if the state is a source of security to the people, the framing by radicalizers will find it difficult to take hold and thereby the institutional expression of the state will work to reduce the vulnerability of an individual or a group to be prone to radicalization.

The focus here is to also identify if the framing process of the ethnic and religious social movements accounts for the production of social conflict. The theory relevant in this that can explain social conflict is the *model of civil strife* by Gurr. He proposes that “relative deprivation,

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<sup>316</sup> Geo News, “Capital Talk | Hamid Mir | 7th May 2020 | Part 03,” [www.youtube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkwcnMqzlv4), May 7, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkwcnMqzlv4>. Translation by the researcher.

<sup>317</sup> Geo News, “Capital Talk | Hamid Mir | 7th May 2020 | Part 03,” [www.youtube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkwcnMqzlv4), May 7, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkwcnMqzlv4>. Translation by the researcher.

<sup>318</sup> The Balochistan Post, “Tributes Pour in for Two QAU Alumnus Killed in Balochistan,” The Balochistan Post, May 4, 2020, <https://thebalochistanpost.net/2020/05/tributes-pour-in-for-two-qau-alumnus-killed-in-balochistan/>.

is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form”<sup>319</sup>. *Relative deprivation* is the difference between value expectations and value capabilities of an individual<sup>320</sup>. *Political violence theory* further outlines that these values refer to the socio-economic and political conditions (interpersonal values, welfare values, and power values) desired by many people and not by a particular individual<sup>321</sup>. Hence, value expectations are the socio-economic and political conditions the masses believe they are entitled to<sup>322</sup>. On the other hand, value capabilities are the existing socio-economic and political conditions<sup>323</sup>.

According to Gurr, any condition of relative deprivation is considered as a causal factor for political violence where the gap between value expectation and value capabilities remains constant or continues to widen<sup>324</sup>. Both the religious and ethnic value expectations are used to further frame the institutional expression of the state and sub-state to ignite grievances over the religious and ethnic population base. The religious and ethnic relative deprivation leads to the accumulation of stress and grievances that spark the demand for social change. The grievances from the institutional expression will continue to multiply individual and group aggression and religious and ethnic interest aggregation, resulting in identity-expansion (through framing) and polarization of ethnic and religious movements into religious militant and ethnic insurgent groups. This process leads to the continued availability of a vulnerable population for militant or insurgent recruitment.

Figure 9 below illustrates the vulnerability components of the DCM concept more clearly.

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<sup>319</sup> Ted Gurr, “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices,” *American Political Science Review* 62, no. 04 (1968): 1104–24, p. 1104. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1953907>.

<sup>320</sup> Ted Gurr, “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices,” p. 1104


<sup>321</sup> Ted Robin Gur, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1970). p. 25-26

<sup>322</sup> Ted Robin Gur, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1970). p. 27

<sup>323</sup> Ted Robin Gur, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1970). p. 27

<sup>324</sup> Ted Robin Gur, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1970). p. 46

**Figure 9. The Factors that establish the Vulnerability component of the DCM for Violence**



The concept of vulnerability in terms of violence has been incorporated into the DCM in this section. The concept of vulnerability, for violence such as terrorism and insurgency, is the existence of a grieving population, whose source of grievance is the institutional expression of the state or the sub-state. The section now moves on to transforming the DCM into the MDCM.


### **The Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM)**

The introduction of this section of the chapter suggests that the Disaster Crunch Model (DCM) is relevant to natural disasters and suggests that natural disasters happen when a hazard is exposed to a vulnerable population. In the context of terrorism and insurgency as disasters, this section has investigated the hazard and vulnerability components for violence and suggests that when radicalization (as hazard) is exposed to a grieving nation or sub-nations (as vulnerability) it results in a Manmade disaster risk which transforms non-malevolent people into violent individuals. Since radicalization and vulnerability are both produced by human developed policies and the socio-political environment, the model can be called the *Manmade Disaster Crunch Model*.

The disaster risk part of the MDCM is where aggression and interest aggregation multiply to give rise to a group focused on rapid social change while identity expansion and polarization multiply to develop and expand a group determined to inflict violence. Together, both the groups form systems of finance, material, intelligence and other support and involve themselves in violent activities in the form of religious terrorism and ethnic insurgency, as explained in the case studies of Zhelyabov and Zawahiri. In addition, violence directed towards the state further reinforces

structural domination as the state identifies and places new, or allows the existing, agents of social control to enhance dominance over the people and control both the groups. Figure 10 below is a diagram to represent the MDCM for violence.

**Figure 10. Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM) for Violence**



The first section of this chapter discusses the important components of the state and the sub-state (idea, physical base and institutional expression - see Figures 5 & 6) which establish the SDM. The second section develops the MDCM, to explain the factors that produce conflict resulting in insecurity threats for the state and the sub-state and a situation of violence throughout the territory of the state. Combining the MDCM and SDM is now possible and through merging them, leads to the development of the Sub-Structural Framework for Violence (SFV) which is explained in the next section.

### 3.3. The Sub-Structural Framework for Violence (SFV)

The SFV is developed by incorporating the MDCM into the SDM. Radicalization happens because of the structural domination produced and exacerbated by the institutional expression of the state over the sub-state through the agents of social control. Grievances of the people also arise from the institutional expression of the state which is a result of the framing process initiated by institutional expression of the sub-state. Therefore, the radicalization component of the MDCM will be merged with the institutional expression component of the sub-state (see Figure 6) while the grievance component of the MDCM will be merged with the institutional expression

component of the state (see Figure 5). The VMS component of the MDCM does not merge with any of the components of the SDM.


The combination of the MDCM and SDM creates a new framework, titled the SFV in Figure 11 below.

The following actors are involved in the SFV.

*State:* A state is supposed to establish its *idea* over a population living in its territory through its *institutional expression* by providing socio-economic and political benefits and security to its people. However, the institutional expression of the state can be a source of radicalization of the people by creating agents of social control, establishing structural domination over the people and leading to social movements. The *state institutions* involved in the SFV are the military and civil bureaucracy and the parliament in control of the mainstream political institution. The structural domination also aims to protect the interests of the agents of social control, thereby keeping the social and political authority, power and influence of the dominator (state institutions) and regulator (agents of social control) strong.

*Agents of Social Control:* They are the elites of the nation or sub-nations who command authority and influence over their people. They are the tribal, feudal, ethnic, religious or racial elites. In circumstances where the idea of a state is weak over the nations that are divided on the basis of identities (race, religion, ethnicity), the state uses these elites to prevent its disintegration. The state, therefore, strengthens the institutional expression of the elites instead of the state leading to the development of a sub-state in command of those elites and keeping the people subservient to the elites and not the state. These agents of social control succeed in revealing to the people that they are the only source through which the people can channel their political opportunities (value expectations) towards the state and get socio-economic, political and security benefits. In this situation the agents expose their identity group to the difference between their value capabilities and value expectation which develops the group's sense of inequality and being discriminated against, giving rise to their respective social movements. The elites however, protect their interests rather than the interests of the people, ignite grievances and direct the grievances of the people towards the institutional expression of the state. This cycle keeps the social movement sustained and the people subservient to the agents and continues to radicalize more people.

**Figure 11. The Sub-structural Framework for Violence**



## Conclusion

This chapter marks the completion of stage I in the development of the CPR model. The purpose of this chapter was to establish a new framework by combining the SDM and MDCM to study the structure of violence in the Baluchistan and FATA regions of Pakistan (it may also be of use for other states facing terrorism and insurgencies). The new framework, called the SFV, has been established and is ready to be tested for the purpose of this research. It is proposed that it may work in divided societies and nations on the basis of large groups. These groups can be religious, ethnic, racial, and/or national; any form of group that creates political opportunities for the leaders of the groups in the political structure of the state that gives rise to social movements. In such circumstances, the leaders of the group should also enjoy social authority, power and influence over their people. When the leaders feel that by channeling the political opportunity of their groups towards the state, they will lose their social status, power and influence, they block the political opportunity of their group. This situation is where they (the leaders) also get the opportunity to become agents of social control. They then start to create their own physical base by weakening the relationship between the state and the people through a system of socio-political patronage. The political mobilizing structures of their social movement keeps the political opportunities and the level of interest aggregation of the group high.

The state therefore, becomes incapable of adequately reflecting the political opportunity of the religious, ethnic, racial, and/or national group in its institutional expression because it is blocked by the agents of social control. Individuals from the group become aggrieved and potential targets of the radicalizers. These individuals experience grievances from the institutional expression of the state and become part of the vulnerable mobilizing structure that is ready to directly inflict damage on the state or indirectly by providing support to those who intend to inflicting damage on the state.

The framework suggests that violence is the result of the policy of the state towards its people that leads to the MDCM becoming operational. To substantiate these claims, there is a need to test the framework for Pakistan, specifically FATA, Baluchistan and KP, to determine if it broadly reflects the reality in these regions. For that purpose, the research now moves towards stage II in the process of developing the CPR model, which involves two case studies. The first case study involves application of the SFV to the sub-state of Baluchistan and FATA in three phases:

- Phase I: Studying the key stakeholder Institutions that represent the political identity of the state and sub-state, and the level of relationship between the state and the sub-nations through the institutional expression of the state in chapter four. Refer to Figure 11 shows political identity as an important factor in the development of the institutional expression of the state;
- Phase II: Elaborating on the political opportunities of the central key stakeholder state institution that gives rise to structural domination and studying the dynamics that give rise to



religious and ethnic social movements that lead to ethnic and religious radicalization and producing VMS in the sub-state in chapter five; and

- Phase III: Elaborating on the political grievances of the sub-state key stakeholder institutions and studying the dynamics of the framing process through which the central key stakeholder institutions are considered responsible for those grievances resulting in expansion of the religious and ethnic VMSs to target the state. This is discussed in chapter six

The second case study involves the application of the SFV to the KP region in chapter seven, and concludes stage II in the development of the CPR model.

## **Chapter Four**

### **The State of Pakistan and the People of Baluchistan and FATA**

#### **Introduction**

The previous chapter outlined the theoretical concepts to understand the process and dynamics that lead to structural violence (terrorism and insurgency) by developing the Sub-structural Framework for Violence (SFV). The SFV is developed by combining the Simple Descriptive Model (SDM) and the Manmade Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM). The SDM explains the type and level of state-to-nation relationships while the MDCM explains the factors and dynamics that develop an environment leading to conflict and violence between the state, and the nation and sub-nations.

The study now moves on to examine the first case study in stage II to derive the CPR model by applying the SFV to Baluchistan and FATA. The SFV suggests that the institutional expression of the state and the sub-state are responsible for the establishment of structural domination. This leads to social movements that can be radicalized and a framing process that can incite the grievances of the people. The SFV also suggests that the institutional expression is established by the political identity and organizing ideology of the nation and the sub-nations. In this chapter, firstly, the key stakeholder institutions that make up the political identity of the state and sub-state, and that are responsible for the establishment of their respective institutional expression are elaborated on. Secondly, this chapter explores the level of state-to-nation relationship in Baluchistan and FATA developed by the institutional expression of the state in both regions.

The purpose of this chapter is to understand the key stakeholder institutions' level of strength within the structure of the entire state and sub-state which enables them to practically deliver their respective institutional expressions, foster or resist structural domination of the state through social movements, and frame the institutional expression of the state. As identified in chapters two and three, the key stakeholder institutions are the political identity of the state (which is the mainstream political institution under the control and influence of the feudal elites, dynastic political families and oligarchs, military and the civil bureaucracy) and the political identity of the sub-states (religious and ethnic political institutions under control of the tribal, religious and ethnic elites). It is important to note here that the process and dynamics through which these institutions establish the structural domination of the state over the sub-state is elaborated on in chapter five.

The study of the political identity of the state and the sub-state was made possible by in-person interviews with senior and experienced members from the key stakeholder institutions by the author of this thesis. The in-person interviews were conducted from June to August 2018 and provide a picture of the state-to-nation relationship in Pakistan and both the regions based upon new primary research. The details of the interview participants, with their title and position in the institution that they represent, are included in section 1.4 of chapter one.

The elaboration on the institutional expression of the state in Baluchistan and FATA is made through analysing the data received from the primary survey of the people of Baluchistan and FATA that was carried out between August to September 2018.

The chapter shall now discuss the key stakeholder institutions that establish the structural domination in Baluchistan and FATA through the institutional expression of the state.

#### **4.1. The Institutions that Establish the Structural Domination of the State**

A state exercises its authority and power over its nation through institutions that shape its political, security, social, and economic landscape. The most important element of the state is the government consisting of the legislature, executive and judiciary as three critical organs. The state commands obedience of the people through these. According to the definition of the maximal state, the institutional expression has to compensate for the weak idea of the state over its population. Elite institutions of the state and the nation take charge of the government apparatus and use it to their advantage as suggested in the maximal state structure, thereby, granting them the power to control the critical organs of the state. The analysis of the institutions below will help to identify the strengths and capacity of the institutions which allow them to become a part of the institutional arrangement of the state to establish structural domination over the sub-nations of Baluchistan and FATA.

##### **4.1.1. Insights from the Representatives of the Institutions of the State**

###### *Government Bureaucracy*

*Aims and Objectives:* The structure of the bureaucracy was totally different in FATA before 2019 compared to that of the rest of the country, and hence a deep insight of both is provided here. According to the *ex-Political Agent* interviewed for this research, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) allowed the Political Agents (PAs) and their offices to be the only bureaucratic system in FATA to represent the state as an umbrella over the Pashtun tribal institution<sup>325</sup>. The role of the PAs was to serve as the ‘hands, eyes and ears’ of the state to manage administrative, strategic and financial affairs<sup>326</sup>. The PAs regulate and ensure the implementation of the FCR law in the region and protect the interest of the state just as they used to for the British Empire before 1947. An important difference between the bureaucracy in FATA and the rest of the country is that the bureaucracy in the rest of the country works for and under the political institution, which did not exist in FATA prior to 2018-19 due to the FCR<sup>327</sup>.

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
<sup>325</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, Peshawar, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>326</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>327</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, 2018

Figure 12 below shows the general structure of the bureaucracy in Pakistan and FATA (before 2019). This figure has been prepared as a result of the information gathered from the representatives of the civil bureaucracy interviewed for this research.

**Figure 12. The Structure/Bureaucracy of FATA compared with the rest of Pakistan (prior to 2018-19)**



*Ethnic diversity:* The ex-PA interviewed explained that the political agents are chosen from a pool of officers available with the government bureaucracy who have passed the exams of the Public Service Commission and have received training from the Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS). Considering the complexity of the FCR and the social conditions in FATA, PAs chosen from the

pool of officers are Pashtuns either from FATA or KP who understand the language and the social and cultural aspects of the people of FATA<sup>328</sup>.

On the question of ethnic diversity in the government bureaucratic structure, the retired *senior bureaucrat* first pointed to the history of the Punjab region of the British Empire and claimed that it had a higher percentage of educated people than the Sindh, KP, and Baluchistan regions. He sheds light on the post-partition federal bureaucratic structure in his explanation of the grievances of non-representation of the Baloch nation in the state structure and civil bureaucracy.

He stated:

The Muslims who migrated to Pakistan at the time of partition and those already in Punjab were much more educated than the Muslims in other areas of Pakistan and many had been serving with the British Bureaucracy. Karachi was the first capital of Pakistan and it is the hub of the people called the ‘Muhajir’: those who migrated from India to Pakistan. They were the majority ethnic group running the bureaucracy in Pakistan until the Capital was shifted to Islamabad in 1967 in the Punjab Province, making the bureaucracy predominantly from the Punjab Province afterwards. This is the reason why the federal and provincial bureaucracy in Baluchistan belonged from Punjab or Karachi and did not have officers belonging from Baluchistan<sup>329</sup>.

He then expresses his dismay regarding the 1973 administrative reforms that set a provincial quota for appointing civil service officers to the federal bureaucracy which started to hamper ethnic diversity and the progress of smaller provinces, because the majority portion of the quota went to, and continues going to, the people of Punjab<sup>330</sup>. In the process, the reforms reduced the ability of indigenous people of Baluchistan to join the federal bureaucracy and thus they are still unable to benefit from it. The retired senior bureaucrat, however, reveals that for the provincial bureaucracy in Baluchistan, there is a 10 percent merit quota and 90 percent divisional quota, which ensures representation of people from all parts of Baluchistan<sup>331</sup>. Therefore, currently, in contrast to the federal bureaucracy (who work at the positions of chief secretary and secretaries of departments), the provincial bureaucracy (Provincial to grass-root level bureaucratic, administrative, and executive structure) in Baluchistan has a majority of people from its territory.

*Training:* The retired senior bureaucrat explained that training of the officers for the government bureaucracy in the federal or provincial bureaucratic structure adds to the administrative strength of this institution but also brings about discipline and ability to command obedience of their subordinates. All officers have to pass the Civil Superior Services (CSS) examinations for

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<sup>328</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>329</sup> The Retired Senior Bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, Quetta, Pakistan, July 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>330</sup> The Retired Senior Bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>331</sup> The Retired Senior Bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

induction into federal bureaucracy or the provincial Public Service Commission (PSC) examinations for the provincial bureaucracy<sup>332</sup>. According to the retired senior bureaucrat, after passing the examinations, the selected candidates go through general training – a five to six-month pre-service training at the secretariat training institute at the Pakistan Academic Services (PAS) depending on the cadre. Afterwards, all occupational groups go through specialized training relating to their designated service<sup>333</sup>.

*Achievements:* From the perspective of the ex-PA interviewed, FATA remained a peaceful region before the start of militancy (that followed the American ‘war on terror’ and invasion of Afghanistan in 2001) which he considers to be a significant achievement of the PAs. On the other hand, the senior bureaucrat took a different stance, saying that the areas given to Pakistan after independence, except for some parts of Sindh and Punjab, were the backyard of the British Empire and had no socio-economic and physical infrastructure. What happened next, he regretfully explained:

Institutional building in Baluchistan was of no importance even to the state of Pakistan that also treated Baluchistan as its backyard up till 1970. The Bureaucracy terms this period ‘the Black Period of Baluchistan’s History’<sup>334</sup>.

He stated that the civil bureaucracy acquired legitimate responsibility for Baluchistan after the first provincial assembly was established in 1972. At that time, the neglect of Baluchistan’s development was indicated by having only a 22-kilometre metalled road, one college, and no university or industrial hub throughout the province<sup>335</sup>. Despite a repressive law and order situation for much of Baluchistan’s history, the retired senior bureaucrat proudly considers the current network of metalled roads linking many rural and urban areas of Baluchistan with the rest of the country, as well as the provision of education, agriculture, irrigation and health infrastructure and economic hubs, as providing benefits to the people of the region as an achievement of the civil bureaucracy.

*Administrative Structure:* The head of the bureaucratic institution in every province is the Chief Secretary, who is the representative of the federation in every province and has the task of managing the entire provincial civil bureaucratic structure and supervising the secretaries and subordinate offices<sup>336</sup>. The retired senior bureaucrat asserts that the chief secretary of every province reports to the governor of the province. Each governor is the head of their province representing the state but is not the head of the provincial government. The governor of every province reports to the president of the country. The president is the head of the state but not the

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<sup>332</sup> The Retired Senior Bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>333</sup> The Retired Senior Bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>334</sup> The Retired Senior Bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>335</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>336</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, 2018

central government. The retired senior bureaucrat shares that the civil bureaucracy works at the behest of the state, which determines the rules or procedure of working for each civil servant<sup>337</sup>.

The PAs in FATA belong to the bureaucratic structure of Pakistan (as illustrated in Figure 12) representing the state in the region. Therefore, the administrative structure of civil bureaucracy is different in FATA to the rest of the country. The Governor of KP was charged with supervising the FATA region in 1970 through the chief secretary of KP and the secretary of home and tribal affairs of the KP province,<sup>338</sup> but with the establishment of the FATA secretariat in 2003 based in KP, the PAs became accountable to the commissioner of the FATA secretariat who then reported to the chief secretary<sup>339</sup>.

Considering the discussion above and the discussion in chapter two regarding the civil bureaucracy's quest for power and their role in dictating policies to politicians, it can be said that the civil bureaucracy is a strong institution of the state that has clear aims and goals, regular training at all levels of the bureaucratic structure and properly defined rules of business that they learn during the training and then when they take up their duties. As such, the civil bureaucracy structure has outreach extending from the center to the district level in all provinces without directly reporting to the provincial or central government, making it independent and having the ability to resist intervention of government ministers (if it decides to do so).

### *The Military*

*Aims and Objectives:* The military is the training institution for the future commanders of the Pakistan Army<sup>340</sup>. The *colonel rank officer* interviewed defines the military as playing an important role in the development of a competent stream of officers for the Pakistan armed forces. The *brigadier rank officer*, also interviewed, asserts that the geographical location of Pakistan and the kind of relationship it has with its neighbouring countries defines the level and type of training of its officers to reflect the strength of the military institution. In that context, he noted that Pakistan has India to its south-east, a neighbour who it considers an enemy, Afghanistan in the north-west which is hostile towards it, and Iran on the south-west, with which it has uneasy relations. Hence, he concludes, that since the military is a state institution that protects the borders and deters any threats to the state, it must have the capability to project its power into any area of the country<sup>341</sup>.

*Ethnic diversity:* The internal strength of the military as an institution is based on ethnic and religious diversity in the Pakistan army<sup>342</sup>. The colonel said that people from all walks, creeds,

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<sup>337</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>338</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>339</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>340</sup> The Colonel level officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, Quetta, Pakistan, July 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand.

<sup>341</sup> The Brigadier and Colonel Rank Officers of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, Quetta, Pakistan, 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>342</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

religions, status and ethnicity are serving in all tiers of the military hierarchy. To keep it this way, the brigadier further added that the military has a set quota for employment from every district of each province. This system, according to him, ensures that people from all ethnicities are incorporated into this institution. Additionally, promotion and benefits in the military are provided without any distinction between class, ethnicity and religion<sup>343</sup>.

*Selection and Training:* Another important aspect of the military's internal strength is the process of inclusion and training of its officers<sup>344</sup>, which is detailed by the brigadier:

To become a part of the military institution, the applicant goes through an assessment of their academic achievements depending on the cadre the applicant wishes to be a part of. The traditional level cadre of military grade starts from 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant and goes on up to the Chief of Army staff. The applicant then has to go through the Inter Service Selection Board (ISSB) which is a psychological recruitment centre that evaluates the academic qualification, minimal level of intelligence and medical fitness of the candidate. If the applicants are able to go beyond this level of the selection procedure, they are then put through a three to four-day selection camp at the army major bases where they undergo further psychological tests and evaluation regarding their planning and leadership abilities.

The colonel, adding more about the selection procedure, strongly considers that selection is made totally on a merit and no candidate is selected out of nepotism<sup>345</sup>. After the initial selection, every army officer in the military goes through a two-year training camp at the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad<sup>346</sup>. On this, the brigadier further adds:

After the two-year training in Abbottabad, specialized training and courses are necessary depending on the career path chosen by the officer himself or as suggested by his superiors during this period, where his potential to serve at a certain level and in a certain military wing or department is assessed. Assessment of the officer is done at all levels and are also offered further trainings for which they have to qualify for to get promotions.

Therefore, to reach the top brass or to reach the position of the chief of the army staff, the officer has to go through many levels of training and courses in a time span of thirty-five to forty years. It seems that the officers have to maintain a high level of achievement and evaluation throughout their careers to be nominated for being the head of the army institution. A comparative analysis of the achievements of the stakeholder institutions on the basis of internal and external strengths helps to realize the power and authority they exercise within the state.

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<sup>343</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>344</sup> The Colonel level officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>345</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>346</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018



*Achievements:* Three major objectives of the Pakistan military are to conduct diplomacy, fight against terrorism, and ensure state unity<sup>347</sup>. Conducting diplomacy is considered an achievement of the Pakistani military by the brigadier as it has been able to contribute towards UN peace keeping missions throughout the globe and in conflict areas, including Africa and East Europe. Pakistan has been one of the largest and most consistent contributors to UN peace keeping operations since 1990 and by 2010 it had contributed more than 100,000 uniformed personnel in 41 UN peace keeping missions<sup>348</sup>. As of March 2014, Pakistan was ranked the no.1 contributor to UN peace keeping operation with 8,257 uniformed personnel, placing it above Bangladesh with 7,950 and India with 7,923<sup>349</sup>.

In addition, it is the only military, in the brigadier's opinion, to have successfully battled with Taliban and Al-Qaeda groups through guerrilla warfare and driven them out of the cities and towns that were kept hostage<sup>350</sup>. To consider the third achievement, it is important to understand the concept of the State-Nation model (previously discussed), which involves the structural domination concept. The Pakistani military is a binding force across the ethno-sectarian divided society of Pakistan. Both the officers proudly assert that despite the country being ethnically and sectarian wise diverse, the military is able to reduce these differences through the training provided to the officers and the state ultimately becomes their priority rather than their ethnic or sectarian compulsions.

According to the interviewees, the military institution is considered stronger than the civil bureaucracy. This is due to its ethnic diversity and unified structure throughout the country, unlike the civil bureaucracy which is not ethnically diverse at the federal and provincial levels. Furthermore, the civil bureaucracy at the provincial levels has two separate structures (provincial and federal) with different induction and selection criteria and training. The civil bureaucracy does work with the political institution at federal, provincial and district levels, and therefore, political interference in its work is expected at all these levels. The military faces no political interference at these three levels and the command of the entire military institution remains under the authority of the chief of the army staff. He is the only point of contact for political and other institutions to have influence within the military institution. The history of relationship between military and political institution suggests that military enjoys more influence than the political.

The section now shifts its focus to the mainstream political institution which is weak and is heavily influenced by the Military and Civil Bureaucracy. It is comprised of the dynastic political families,

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<sup>347</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>348</sup> Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams, *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2013). p. 204

<sup>349</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Department Of Public Information, *Background Note: United Nations Peace Keeping* (New York: United Nations, 2014), <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/backgroundnote.pdf>.

<sup>350</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

and feudal, oligarchical and tribal elites. The mainstream political institution utilizes the parliament, constitution and legislature to establish and expand structural domination.

#### **4.1.2. Insights from the Representatives of the Mainstream Political Institution**

The mainstream political institution in Pakistan is comprised of political parties that have considerable support and political base in all parts of the country. In the words of Anthony Down, an American political scientist, “A political party is a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election”<sup>351</sup>. This means that nations and people select individuals who will translate their political opportunities through the government and into the state structure. The important element of any political party is its ability to participate in elections and to gain public offices and mandates,<sup>352</sup> which, in an ideal situation, empowers the political parties to strengthen the democratic institution. In theory, the political parties channel the voice of citizens to the government, legislators and the assemblies but that is not the case for the political parties in Pakistan which is explained below and is discussed further in chapter five.

Ideally, the political institution exists to ensure stability in the society of the country and the consistent functioning of its political system. It also shapes the willingness of the citizens to cooperate in achieving collective goals and financing of public services. In theory, this is the direction that every political institution exists and strives for and is determined by those (political parties or entities) who make up this institution, hence, the existence and direction of the state in Pakistan is driven by the direction of the mainstream political parties that make up a huge component of this institution.

The respondents for the mainstream political parties in this research are two *constituent level party workers*. One of them has previously held the position of district mayor and is currently the member of the council of Peshawar Sadar region. In the recent general elections of 2018, he contested elections as an independent candidate and not from the platform of any political party. In this research he will be referred to as *Respondent S*. The other respondent is a senior level political party representative who has been involved with the political institution of Pakistan for thirty years. He is the regional president of the one of the mainstream political parties, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), in Peshawar. In this research he will be referred to as *Respondent M*. Both the respondents had strong affiliation in the past with one of the strongest ethno-nationalist political parties in KP province, Awami National Party (ANP).

*Aims and Objectives:* In response to the questions on the objectives and goals of the mainstream political institution, both the *party workers* identified the acquisition of power, pursuing self-interest and monetary benefits as the primary reasons for the existence of this institution on the

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<sup>351</sup> Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957). p. 25.

<sup>352</sup> Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, *Political Parties: Functions and Organisation in Democratic Societies* (Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011). p. 11

national stage. It was also referred to as the ‘club of the riches’ by Respondent M who also asserts that only the people with status from the outset usually come to power and generally by promising micro- and macro-level socio-economic benefits to the citizens and their constituency. Most of these rich elites, who are continuously re-elected, switch from one party to another in anticipation of power shifts. They are feudal lords in their constituencies where they have power over a defined territory and the people are loyal to them<sup>353</sup>. Such a political figure is referred to as an *electable* in Pakistan. Therefore, the political party that absorbs these electables, when they switch from one party to the other, benefits by winning more seats in the general elections than other political parties and has no objection to these switches taking place; switching has become part of the political culture.

Respondent M also revealed that it is hard for a normal citizen, for example a middle-class person, to enter into mainstream Pakistani politics. He provides an insight to this:

Firstly, to campaign for elections and getting a ticket to contest in general elections from the party platform requires huge finances. Secondly, the contestant should avoid contesting elections from the constituency of an electable, otherwise they will be forced to step down or will lose because the population does not consider a normal middle-class person worthy to be their leader. Their mentality is that only a powerful and influential person can be their leader and has the better capacity to do something for them and the constituency rather than a middle-class person<sup>354</sup>.

Dominance of influential and established political families within the political institution is another problem that ensures the weakness of the mainstream political institution. Some scholars have documented the existence of political dynasties in Pakistan dating back to the first election in 1970<sup>355</sup>. These political dynasties originated from the rural areas where families had large land ownerships, giving them prominence in administering local affairs and controlling development. Business families from the urban areas gained prominence in the 1980s<sup>356</sup>. These rich families that come from the rural and urban areas established their positions using money, patronage and connections, and successfully secured power through clan affiliations<sup>357</sup>.

*Achievements:* There are hardly any achievements which the mainstream political system is able to own (due to its history of internal divisions and conflicts to grab power and martial laws)

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<sup>353</sup> Respondent ‘S’ of the Mainstream Political Party, interviewed by the author, Peshawar, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>354</sup> Respondent ‘M’ of the Mainstream Political Party, interviewed by the author, Peshawar, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>355</sup> Ali Cheema, Javid Hasan, and Naseer Farooq, “Dynastic Politics in Punjab: Facts, Myths and Their Implications,” *IDEAS Pakistan* (IDEAS Working Paper No. 01-13, 2013), p. 01

<sup>356</sup> Ayesha Ali, “Do Political Dynasties Hinder Development? Evidence from a Natural Disaster,” *International Growth Center* (International Growth Center Working Paper S-89207-PAK-1, 2016). p. 03

<sup>357</sup> Ali, “Do Political Dynasties Hinder Development? Evidence from a Natural Disaster,” p. 03

compared to the powerful institutions of the state and the sub-state (analysed above) that have strengthened themselves (internally and within the state structure) since independence. The political institution strengthened itself in 1970-71 when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the founder of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) swept across West Pakistan in the 1970-71 general elections, initiated Pakistan's nuclear program, and inspired the people of the country with his famous slogan, "we will eat grass but will build the bomb"<sup>358</sup>. Both the respondents contend that it was Bhutto who brought together the political institutions to frame and agree on the first ever constitution of the country after 25 years of its existence. Another achievement of the political institution is that it has been able to sustain democracy in Pakistan after the military dictator General Pervez Musharraf stepped down in 2008<sup>359</sup>.

*Inclusion and Ethnic Diversity:* Ethnic diversity within the mainstream political parties is a complex matter. From a general perspective, the mainstream political parties seem to have a physical base throughout the country. Every mainstream political party also has a certain ethnic attachment. Both the respondents agree that this complexity exists and further reveal that the PML-N, despite being mainstream, is a Punjab-based political party and has a strong hold in the province of Punjab, while PPP is a Sindh-based political party and is always victorious in Sindh. To win elections in other provinces, these parties have member candidates who are electable and belong to the ethnicity of their respective province. Even the PTI party, whose leaders come from different ethnic backgrounds, had to bend towards these electables to penetrate not only into Punjab and Sindh but also into KP and Baluchistan<sup>360</sup>.

*Administrative Structure:* Respondent M further reveals that there are two levels when it comes to becoming a member of a political party. One is the worker level, which is confined to the grass-root level of Pakistani society. To become a political party worker, you have to fill out an application form and pay a minimal amount of money for membership which goes into the party fund<sup>361</sup>. According to both respondents, membership allows the individual to work at different party level positions, campaigning and working for the party as directed by the party's core committee or leadership. The respondents noted that the intention of the party worker at this level is to learn gradually and promote themselves to reach the top level comprised of the provincial and central core committees of the party.

At the top you not only become one of the leaders but are given priority to contest elections. The problem at this level, with which both concurred, is that most of the leadership in the mainstream political party system is powerful and belongs to rich oligarch families, and feudal and tribal elites. They rarely allow anyone to join their ranks from the level of the political party worker.

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<sup>358</sup> Respondent 'M' of the Mainstream Political Party, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>359</sup> Respondent 'M' of the Mainstream Political Party, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>360</sup> Respondent 'M' of the Mainstream Political Party, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>361</sup> Respondent 'M' and 'S' of the National Political Party, interviewed by the author, 2018

The law of the country dictates that each party is supposed to have intra-party elections for every important position in the party, even for the position of chairman. To give the reader an insight into how parties use loopholes in their nominations process, original comments from both the respondents are quoted below.

Respondent M stated:

For the 2018 general election, there were twenty-six people who applied for a single party ticket in a constituency through an online system which records information regarding the applicant's education, experience in politics, asset declaration and tax payer status. It is like a postmortem and you apply online for the party ticket. Education is said to be given preference and among the members who applied were educated people, lawyers and professors. Everyone was interviewed and at the end the richest among the twenty-six members was selected by the parliamentary board of the party.

Respondent S said:

In the recent past, I had witnessed in the intra-party election that there were about 400 people who vote for electing a member for a certain party position. The party announced a powerful and senior member as a candidate for a certain position. The party also announced that if someone wants to contest against the announced person, they should come up. How will someone dare to stand against a powerful member? There is never a ballot system.

This is how the powerful in the political parties remain in the top positions. All political parties in Pakistan, whether they are religious, ethnic or mainstream, use these loopholes. For example:

- PML – N chief Mr. Nawaz Sharif remained the party chief from 1989 through to 2017, until he was forcefully disqualified as a result of a Supreme Court ruling<sup>362</sup>; and
- The PPP chairmanship was transferred from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1972) to Benazir Bhutto, who remained the chairman until she was assassinated in 2007. This chairmanship was then transferred to her husband and now to her son<sup>363</sup>.

It is unusual in most democracies for leaders to be the chairmen of their parties for such long periods of time. This suggests the Pakistani democratic system is not working as intended, and the PPP party is a case study of this. All senior political persons of PPP now have to consult and take orders from a chairman, who was not even born when they started their political careers.

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<sup>362</sup> Asad Hashim, "Pakistan PM Steps down after Court Disqualifies Him," [www.aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/28/pakistan-supreme-court-disqualifies-nawaz-sharif), July 28, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/28/pakistan-supreme-court-disqualifies-nawaz-sharif>.

<sup>363</sup> Asma Faiz, "The Peculiar Case of the Pakistan People's Party as an Opposition Party," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 7, 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/07/peculiar-case-of-pakistan-peoples-party-as-opposition-party-pub-86568>.

Again, one of the respondents explained how this system is manipulated:

The law dictates all parties to have intra-party elections. Two panels are nominated for such elections in every party. One panel is of the Chairman and his team. The other panel is artificially created within the party that participates in the elections for the chairmanship and top positions. How can anyone vote against the party chairman and his team because the chairman is the leader? This is the situation and procedure in all parties.

The mainstream political institution represents an elitist and self-centered structure that provides the opportunity to the civil bureaucracy and military to command influence over it. Together, the military and civil bureaucracy utilize the parliament and legislature through the mainstream political institution to pursue their own interests and allow the political elites to protect their elitist interests. Among the mainstream political elites are the tribal chiefs from Baluchistan and FATA who help the state to establish and strengthen the structural domination in both the sub-states. There are also many tribal chiefs in both the regions who resist the structural domination of the state and establish the framing process against the institutional expression of the state through the ethnic political institution (which will be discussed later). The two types of tribal chiefs in each of the sub-states belong to their respective tribal institutions which the section will now explore.

#### **4.1.3. Insights from the Representatives of the Tribal Institution of the Sub-states**

A state exercises its authority and power over its people through institutions that shape the political, security, social and economic landscape of the state. Similarly, a sub-state should exercise its authority and power through an institution that provides political, social, and economic security to the people in its own physical base. Like the state, the important element of the sub-state is its laws, and a system of executive and judiciary as its three critical organs. These critical organs are determined and controlled by the tribal institution in both regions. Among the most prominent and powerful government systems identified through the analysis in chapter two and three, the tribal institutions of FATA and Baluchistan have been identified as the key sub-state institutions that provide power and authority to the sub-state structure in both regions. The chapter now turns to consider the responses from personnel from these institutions.

##### *The Tribal Institution in FATA*

*Origin and Organizing Ideology of the Tribal Institution:* According to the responses from the two *Pashtun tribal chiefs* of FATA interviewed for this research, the tribal institution provides the system of governance to the Pashtuns in FATA<sup>364</sup>. It can also be considered as an informal Nation-State because they have a defined physical base, ancestral heritage and tribal code of conduct as their ideological bonds. For the affairs of such a Nation-State, which, centuries ago, needed no

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<sup>364</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, Peshawar, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

modern system of ministries or departments, they originally elected tribal chiefs through a democratic system. There was no cadre like the prime minister or the president but a Parliament did exist which is still called the Jirga. The academic literature on Pashtun Jirga can be traced back to when Elphinstone in 1842 acknowledged the presence of Jirga to decide on crimes in Afghanistan<sup>365</sup>. The Pashtun Jirga system was also mentioned to be active in the fifteenth century when Afghan kings ruled over India and maintained Jirga as their advisors on matters of great importance<sup>366</sup>. The first Pashtun Jirga was formed by electing the elders of each main tribe centuries ago when the sub-tribes within the main tribes did exist. At that time there hardly existed any further clans within the sub-tribes as there exist today<sup>367</sup>. The origin of the institution was also seconded by the other tribal chief who hails from Waziristan.

After the first selection the tribal chief, the leadership of main tribe, sub-tribe and clan (if any) remained confined to the original leader's blood line and passed down to the leader's eldest son and so on<sup>368</sup>. The institutional expression of the tribal institution is very important to understand how the system prevailed for centuries without any further election or internal anarchy.

*Institutional Expression in FATA:* The Jirga, which functions as a parliament, has three levels with the highest one representing the whole Pashtun community. The other is the sub-tribe level where a particular problem within a sub-tribe is resolved by its clan leaders. The last is the clan level where a particular problem is resolved by the oldest members in a clan. The Pashtun land is also divided among tribes, sub-tribes and clans. Each clan is responsible for maintaining peace and justice as per the laws and customs of the Pashtuns set by the Jirga in their territory<sup>369</sup>.

The tribal chiefs view the existence of the Jirga system as a means to ensure peace, law and order and to make decisions on dealing with foreign stakeholders. There were, and are, no written agreements or judgements and the verbal decisions made were implemented and adhered to by everyone<sup>370</sup>. Both the tribal chiefs view the tribal institution as guarantor of ready justice, even for the poor against the rich<sup>371</sup>. The tribal chiefs are the first among equals and act as the shepherd who knows each member and looks after the herd<sup>372</sup>. Both the tribal chiefs concur that the system of gain and loss was collective and if anyone broke the code of conduct or the law, the punishment is collective as announced by the Jirga. The tribal chiefs view this as a compliance mechanism that

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<sup>365</sup> Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Farooq Yousaf, "Pashtun Jirgas, Their Potential in Pak-Afghan Reconciliation and National Reconstruction," *South Asia Research* 38, no. 1 (January 22, 2018): 57–74, p. 61 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0262728017748382>.

<sup>366</sup> Sherzaman Taizi, *Jirga System in Tribal Life* (Williamsburg: Area Study Centre (Russia, China and Central Asia) University of Peshawar, 2007), p. 02

<sup>367</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Waziristan, interviewed by the author, Peshawar, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>368</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>369</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>370</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>371</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>372</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Waziristan, interviewed by the author, 2018

ensured that everyone followed the law as no one would put his entire family or clan on trial for his own actions. They also concur that there have been instances when the code of conduct was violated and collective punishments have been given, making the system stronger and ensuring justice. In the event of rivalry between tribes, sub-tribes or clans, the leaders intervene to put a halt to fighting<sup>373</sup>. Allegiances are passed on by clan leaders to sub-tribes and then to tribal leaders that give them authority to settle disputes<sup>374</sup>.

The FCR implemented by the British in FATA was not any different to the Pashtun code of conduct. It was developed after consultation with the leaders of the Pashtun tribes and it did not change any original tribal law<sup>375</sup>. It can also be termed as the written form of Pashtun Tribal Law: a binding law for proper administration and empowering the people of FATA to govern their own areas<sup>376</sup>. The only addition from the FCR were the PAs who represented the British Empire and, afterwards, the state of Pakistan.

*Administrative Structure:* The tribal chiefs at all levels in the FATA region are called *Maliks*. According to both the *tribal chiefs*

This name was given to the leaders centuries ago. They can be referred to as Malik of the ‘so and so tribe, sub-tribe or clan’, automatically reflecting his level of authority over a certain physical base and population of FATA<sup>377</sup>.

The platform for this institution to exercise micro-level authority, power and maintain strength is a certain place managed by the Malik called *Hujra*. It is usually a large sitting place that comes to life every day in the afternoon after the men of the community finish their daily routine work<sup>378</sup>. This is the place where men meet, greet, share the news of the day, discuss problems, and identify solutions. The Malik chairs these meetings on a daily basis and even when he is absent, the *Hujra* remains open and the male members of the Malik’s family host everyone<sup>379</sup>.

It is the duty of every Malik, according to both the tribal chiefs, to ensure that his oldest son (or the successor of the Malik) is present most of the time in the *Hujra* and in tribal *Jirga*, so that he can learn to exercise his authority when he becomes the Malik. This system of training starts at a very early age and, upon reaching a mature age, he is delegated by his predecessor as the Malik to solve minor community problems<sup>380</sup>. This ensures a soft transition of power to the successor when the Malik passes away. If the Malik has no son or his eldest son passes away the successor of the

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<sup>373</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Waziristan, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>374</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>375</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>376</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chief of Waziristan, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>377</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chiefs of Waziristan and Khyber Agency, Interviewed by the author, Peshawar, Pakistan, 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>378</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chiefs of Waziristan and Khyber Agency, Interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>379</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chiefs of Waziristan and Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>380</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chiefs of Waziristan and Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, 2018



Malik is the next male member of the paternal family: Malik's brother or his eldest male cousin (in case the Malik has no brother) or the second son of the Malik. The people visiting Hujra or Jirga are supposed to bring along their male family members no matter how young they are<sup>381</sup>. This is how the system has prevailed and remained strong for centuries.

The FATA tribal institution is embedded deep into FATA society and in most cases, it is part of the society's identity and therefore, establishes a sub-state structure within the state of Pakistan.

#### *The Tribal Institution in Baluchistan*

*Origin and Organizing Ideology of the Tribal Institution:* In contrast to the Pashtun tribal institution, the Baloch tribal institution provides a totally different frame of reference. Whereas the Pashtuns trace their lineage to a single blood line, the Baloch is a nation that is comprised of an amalgamation of different tribal groups who have different origins, are nomadic and have settled for centuries in the area between Sindh and Punjab Provinces of Pakistan, Kemran and Khorasan Provinces of Iran and Southern Afghanistan<sup>382</sup>. The Baloch nation was once a tribal federation without an official boundary and whose borders kept changing with the neighbouring dynasties<sup>383</sup>. Each tribe of the federation had a Chieftain, who still exist and control a certain area under their jurisdiction which they also used to control when the federation existed. The Chieftain is called *Sardar* in the local language and is all powerful. The Sardars had been fighting with each other long before the advent of the British in South Asia<sup>384</sup>.

In the fourteenth century, under the leadership of a single man, Mir Chakar Khan, the differences between the chieftains were settled and the Baloch tribal confederacy was established<sup>385</sup>. It is also termed as a kingdom that stretched between southeast Persia, present Baluchistan, Southern Afghanistan and some adjacent parts of Sindh and Punjab<sup>386</sup>. This was the first time that the Baloch nation was politically united but after the death of Khan, the confederacy fell apart due to longstanding rivalries and differences between the Sardars. Then again in the seventeenth century, the Ahmadzai Baloch tribe established the Kalat Confederacy. The kingdom, then called *Khanate*, became a confederacy even bigger than the one before. The king of the Khanate is known as Khan with the chieftains assuming the same role as before.

*Institutional Expression:* The *Baloch tribal chief* further added that by the mid-eighteenth century, the Khanate established an army and legislative councils but did not interfere in the social,

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<sup>381</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chiefs of Waziristan and Khyber Agency, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>382</sup> The Baloch Tribal Chief, interviewed by the author, Quetta, Pakistan, September 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>383</sup> Pavla Kokaislová and Petr Kokaisl, "Ethnic Identity of the Baloch People," *Journal of Social and Political Studies, Central Asia and the Caucasus* 13, no. 2 (2012): 45–55, p. 49

<sup>384</sup> Kokaislová and Kokaisl, "Ethnic Identity of the Baloch People," p. 49

<sup>385</sup> Fred Scholz, *Nomadism & Colonialism: A Hundred Years of Baluchistan, 1872-1972* (Karachi; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). p. 22

<sup>386</sup> Scholz, *Nomadism & Colonialism: A Hundred Years of Baluchistan, 1872-1972*, p. 22

economic and political matters of the chieftains and their jurisdiction. The Khanate, as an institution, was also a source of power to the already powerful Chieftains in the confederation<sup>387</sup>. Discussing the system of transfer of power at the level of Khanate or the Chieftains, the Baloch tribal chief puts forward the similar arrangement that was shared by the Pashtun Tribal chiefs:

The oldest son (or the closest and oldest paternal male family member) of the Khan or the Chieftain is the next in line to rule the Khanate or to become the Chieftain. The first ever Chieftain of the tribes was chosen centuries ago. The initial system of this selection is not clear since their tribal power structure is different from the Pashtun<sup>388</sup>

The institution is based on material power rather than on the suitability of the tribal leader to hold that position: it is not a meritocracy. The Chieftain does not need to consult other Chieftains or the oldest people in his tribe before making a certain decision in his land. In fact, his decision, whatever it may be, is considered final and is honoured by his people. Any animosity between tribes is also decided by the tribe's Chieftain and his subjects are his army.

According to the Baloch tribal chief, the institution of khanate existed to ensure unity and peace among the Baloch tribes but was short-lived after independence. He considers the tribal law to take precedence over the law of the state. The chieftain dictates the tribal law and establishes order as per his will in his jurisdiction which is honoured by his people and was empowered by the Khanate<sup>389</sup>. Prior to independence in 1947, the British were able to penetrate the Khanate and take over certain areas where they established direct rule (recall British Baluchistan)<sup>390</sup>. The remaining areas remained in the Khanate (recall Princely state of Kalat) but agreements were reached, where initially, the Khanate guaranteed the British colonial power the freedom of military movement and unimpeded trade and afterwards, pledged loyalty to the British Empire and acknowledged their superiority<sup>391</sup>. Hence, the Khanate and the Chieftainship survived. The British needed uninterrupted access to Afghanistan, hence they bypassed the Khan and arrangements were made with the Chieftains who were provided with financial support, decorated with fine titles, administrative functions, privileges, and guarantee of succession in line of chieftainship of a tribe<sup>392</sup>.

*Administrative Structure:* The Chieftainship still exists as it survived after the formation of Pakistan, whose responsibility lies on the state of Pakistan. The Khanate does not exist anymore but the successors of the Khan are in exile in London and have not been a part of the Khanate institution or played the role of the leader of the Chieftains. The chieftains on the other hand,

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<sup>387</sup> The Baloch Tribal Chief, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>388</sup> The Baloch Tribal Chief, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>389</sup> The Baloch Tribal Chief, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>390</sup> Abdul Basit Khan and Ayaz Muhammad, "Evolution of the Baloch Nationalism (Origin to 1947): A Historical Disclosure", Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan – Vol. 55, No. 1, January - July, 2018, p. 8-9

<sup>391</sup> Khan and Muhammad, "Evolution of the Baloch Nationalism (Origin to 1947): A Historical Disclosure", p. 8-9

<sup>392</sup> Khan and Muhammad, "Evolution of the Baloch Nationalism (Origin to 1947): A Historical Disclosure", p. 9-10

passed on their chieftainships to their successors. According to the tribal chief, the next in line for chieftainship is trained from an early age by the chief similarly to the Pashtuns.

The Baloch tribal institution, as compared to that of Pashtuns, is based on a monarchic structure. The chieftainship desires power for self-interest and ensures that the institution of the chieftainship survives which was also a source of many feuds between the Khan and the Chieftain<sup>393</sup>. Both the Baloch and Pashtun tribal systems are strong within their domains, have specific physical bases, values, traditions and culture which are still intact and both have a solid base of existence. An absence of ethnic diversity in the tribal systems makes them strong because it gives them a sense of being significant ‘sub-nations in Pakistan’ each having shared language, history, traditions and cultures.

According to the findings and discussion above and Buzan’s model that outlines the state-to-nation relationship, the tribal institution and the Pashtun nation in FATA represents a tribal Nation-State; the tribal institution and the Baluch nation represents a Federative Tribal Multination-State. Upon comparison, both the tribal systems are not equal in power and strength because the Pashtun tribal system commands unity of its people and governs them through defined coherent laws applied to all tribes of the sub-nation in FATA. On the other hand, the Baloch tribal system consists of a divided Baloch sub-nation due to rivalries between the tribal chiefs and the laws are not coherent and consistent. In addition, the Pashtun tribal chiefs are considered first among equals in their relationship with their sub-nation in FATA, while the Baloch tribal chiefs establish their autocratic rule over their people.

In a nutshell, the institutions (military, civil bureaucracy and tribal and mainstream political institutions) represent the state and the sub-state. The military and bureaucracy at the central level and tribal institution at the regional level are strong and regulate the relationship of the state with the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations through the religious and ethnic political institutions. The religious and ethnic political institutions, according to the SFV, resist the structural domination of the state and frame the institutional expression of the state, and are elaborated on below.

#### **4.2. The Institutions that Resist Structural Domination and Initiate Social Movements**

The political institution in Pakistan is a complex state-societal institution and is comprised of the mainstream religious and ethnic political parties. Together, these parties form coalitions in the national and provincial assemblies, and the senate (upper house of the parliament) to run the government, create legislation, and regulate the state-to-people relationship. The religious political parties are similar to the mainstream political parties in regards to their physical base and population support but are analysed separately due to their ideology that is separate from the

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<sup>393</sup> Javed Haider Syed, “The British Advent in Balochistan,” *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 28, no. 2 (2007): 53–76, p. 70-72

mainstream and ethno-nationalist political parties. The ethno-nationalist political parties are generally confined to the physical base of the relevant ethnicities they represent, and hardly stretch beyond their regions unless they find considerable support from their own ethnic population living elsewhere in the country.

### *The Ethno-nationalist Political Institution*

As already mentioned in chapter two, two ethnicities in West Pakistan were already privileged because of their education, status, and service during the period of British Empire rule. These ethnicities, Punjabi and the Muhajir, started to dominate the central state structure (military, politics, and civil bureaucracy). The other ethnicities, such as the Pashtuns, Baloch and Sindhi, felt threatened and excluded. This provided political space and opportunity for ethno-nationalist sentiment as an ethno-nationalist political institution emerged. The Pashtunkhawah Milli Awami Party (PKMAP), Awami National Party (ANP), National Party (NP), Jamhuri Watan Party (JWP) and Baluchistan National Party (BNP) are the most prominent ethno-nationalist parties from among many that exist in Baluchistan and KP. The respondents for the ethno-nationalist political institution in this research come from Pashtun and Baloch ethnicities and their details are mentioned in chapter one.

*Aims and Objectives:* All of these respondents explained that the core reason for the existence of their ethno-nationalist parties is to safeguard the rights of their ethnicities and to secure and use the resources of their land. The senior *Baloch nationalist* stated, “Our mission has always been to struggle for the rights of Baluchistan, its resources, provincial autonomy and self-government”<sup>394</sup>.

The *Pashtun senator* puts forward his party ideology:

My party wants to make Pakistan a real federation because it is a multinational, multi-cultural and multi-lingual federation which currently is under the rule of the Punjabi ethnicity while all other provinces and ethnicities are subservient to them. We want to preserve our language, culture and resources. We want to have access to schools and hospitals for our children. We want the parliament (upper and lower houses) to be in total control of the country’s policies and do not want the military to intervene in the political affairs.

The same respondent said:

We want to make the senate of Pakistan more powerful than the parliament because provinces have equal representation in the senate but Punjab has more power than other provinces because it has more representation in the parliament than the other provinces. We also want introduction of land reforms in the country to snatch power of these feudal

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<sup>394</sup> The senior Baloch Nationalist Leader, Interviewed by the author, Islamabad, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

and rich elites sitting in the parliament. And we want to establish our own Pashtun province by combining Pashtun land in KP and Baluchistan and FATA.

*Achievements:* The mission, vision and the values for which the ethnic political institution exists can also be gauged by their achievements. All the respondents from the ethno-nationalist political parties claimed that the ethno-nationalists have always campaigned against dictatorships, kept the people politically motivated for their cause and have ensured that their voices reach down to the grass-root level communities. They believe that they have been successful in keeping their language, history, geography, and traditions alive. Their workers have sacrificed their lives in jails while always struggling for the supremacy of the parliament and strengthening of democracy<sup>395</sup>. It is because of this struggle that their ethnicities are aware of their rights, problems, and challenges which have made them politically strong<sup>396</sup>. Due to their political struggle the One Unit of West Pakistan was dismantled into provinces and people from other provinces who were settled in Baluchistan were sent back to their respective provinces, giving the Baloch and Pashtun youth the opportunity to enter the provincial and central state structure<sup>397</sup>. Establishment of universities and medical colleges for their youth is also an achievement of the ethnic political parties in Baluchistan according to these respondents.

*Ethnic Diversity:* The respondents further claimed that their political parties are ethnically diverse. The *Pashtun senator* lauded the fact that PKMAP has candidates belonging to Baloch, Pashtun, Hazara and Punjabi ethnicities and so do the other two Baloch respondents for their parties. The senior Baloch nationalist also claims that people wishing to join the party shall have the same goals and values for which the party strives and exists for. Here is the real irony; the goals and values that these parties represent are themselves ethnically confined which prevents people from other ethnicities joining them. The senior Baloch nationalist states that the democratic process creates space for people from the grass-root level to enter politics. A common citizen having knowledge about the country and politics can become a member of the ethnic political party<sup>398</sup>. The Pashtun senator explains that roles are delegated to a person depending on their achievements, skills, and commitment. This is true for the overall ethnic political parties. However, things change dramatically when the general elections are near. Chapter five in this research will reveal and explain that these parties never contest elections to form a central government. Their focus is always to contest and establish government at the provincial level and to play the role of opposition or partner to central government at the provincial or federal level.

*Administrative Structure:* What is most important and distinct between the mainstream, and ethnic and religious political parties is the capacity for development of their workers. The ethnic political

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<sup>395</sup> The Pashtun Senator, Interviewed by the author, Islamabad, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>396</sup> The Pashtun Senator, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>397</sup> The Pashtun Senator, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>398</sup> The Pashtun Senator, interviewed by the author, 2018

institution starts informal training of its workers from the start of their career which normally initiates when they become members of the party's student branch in colleges and universities<sup>399</sup>. The members then reach the party's team at council level and go up to district, *tehsil*, and provincial level. At all these levels, informal training is a part of their routine<sup>400</sup>.

The Pashtun Senator claims that:

We are the only party whose members are well trained on our political ideology. We have study circles and regular meetings where legal, financial and village level matters of the province are discussed<sup>401</sup>

According to the Baloch respondents there is no training for the members on local bodies to help them identify solutions to the problems of their societies and constituencies. Speaking on the training of the political party workers, both the Baloch respondents stated:

(Quote from the *Baloch Member of Provincial Assembly - MPA*)

A politician needs to have an ideology and a development agenda. For that, political parties play an important role and act as an institution that builds the capacity of its members; however, there is no formalized democratic process in Pakistan that trains members in local bodies to get them affiliated with grass-root societal problems. Money and corruption in politics creates problems for which we need to change the election model and bring certain reforms that negate the importance of money in Politics. We need to have political schools and academics that refine leadership and strengthen the political institution.

(Quote from the senior *Baloch Nationalist*)

There are certain informal trainings that a member is continuously going through from the council level to the provincial party committee. However, the corrupt mafia has hijacked the whole system of democracy in the current situation. And therefore, you need to have money to become a politician, reach the higher brass and then be elected as a minister in the provincial or national assembly

Hence, it affirms that the mobilizing structures of the ethnic political parties are strong among their ethnic population base and therefore the ethnic social movement is expected to be strong; however, under the control of the agents of social control. These agents occupy the top leadership positions of both ethnic political parties, who hardly change and are the tribal chiefs or ethnic elites. It is because of this situation that both the ethnic and mainstream political parties form governments or

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<sup>399</sup> The Baloch MPA, interviewed by the author, Islamabad, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>400</sup> The senior Baloch Nationalist Leader, interviewed by the author, Islamabad, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>401</sup> The Pashtun Senator, interviewed by the author, 2018

opposition coalitions in the provincial and the central assemblies. The best recent example can be seen after the 2008-09 general elections when ANP (a Pashtun ethnic party) formed the provincial government in KP but was also a coalition partner of the PPP's government in the center. Another example is when PKMAP, a hardline Pashtun ethnic party opposed to Punjabi hegemony (as explained by its senator above) formed a coalition government with NP (Baloch ethnic party) in the Baluchistan province as a result of general elections of 2013. Both of these ethno-nationalist parties were also part of the PML-N's (a Punjab-oriented party) government formed in the center as a result of those elections.

### *The Religious Political Institution*

Among the most prominent parties in the religious political institution are the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).

*Aims and Objectives:* The respondents from both the parties interviewed for this thesis assert that their reason for existence is the enforcement of Sharia law in Pakistan. They mention that it is their rightful duty to strive for the implementation of Islamic laws in Pakistan as it was created on the basis of Islam.

*Achievements:* So far, according to them, their parties have been successful in their political mission. They have been able to prevent the socialists (referring to the ethno-nationalists) and secular (referring to the mainstream parties) from approving any un-Islamic law in the parliament<sup>402</sup>. That is their political motivation. They also have an agenda for Pakistani society; to ensure that society is free from the evils (like social injustices, corruption etc.) that Islam prohibits. This is how they mobilize the population of their physical base, create a pan-Islamic atmosphere (interest aggregation), and identify party workers and prospective leaders (mobilizing structures).

*Administrative Structure:* Both parties have different structures to reach out to the people. The JI, as explained by their representative interviewed for this research, has a strict system of Dars-e-Quran (a gathering to learn the Quran) throughout the country, especially in big cities. Every city has a central committee or central point which is divided into sub-central points and then into localities. The *JI Representative* describes the dynamics of this structure; "The party members are called 'Arkaans' who form community groups in their localities and meet regularly several times during a month to learn Quran and the party Ideology". He takes pride in claiming that JI's social wing was first to penetrate into FATA through this social structure and was able to organize people of FATA against FCR. It is because of JI's struggle that the Political Party Act was formalized by the national assembly in 1996 to be enforced in FATA that gave the people of FATA the right to vote<sup>403</sup>.

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<sup>402</sup> The respondent from JI religious party, Interviewed by the author, Peshawar, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>403</sup> The respondent from JI religious party, interviewed by the author, 2018

The *JI respondent* claims his party to be ethnically diverse across its senior leadership as well as through the provincial and district level committees. It is the only party at the national stage that changes its top leadership through a system of voting; even the chief of party is changed after every five years<sup>404</sup>. This statement was also supported by the senior Baloch nationalist when he claimed that the NAP and JI are the only political parties who change their top leadership every five years. The internal election in JI is somewhat like the presidential system where two or three candidates run to become the party chief. The JI respondent explains that the elections are carried out through ballot papers in every locality where there is a presence of Arkaans. He mentions that the Arkaans are party workers and the political representatives are chosen and selected from among the Arkaans on the basis of their hard work and volunteerism for the party objective<sup>405</sup>.

The JUI party, which is an assembly of the religious clergy, penetrates Pakistani society through its Madrassa Islamic Schools system. These schools take in children as young as five years old as well as young adults, revealed the *JUI Party Respondent*, where they memorize the Quran and pass several stages of the school to reach the level of priesthood<sup>406</sup>. Ultimately these religious schools enable the students to become imams in mosques, take many religious roles in the social structure and become Muftis (those who can declare or pass Islamic / religious rulings). As time passes, they become mature enough to represent the party as candidates in the elections<sup>407</sup>.

The madrassas usually attract poor families because they take in students ‘free of cost’ and are responsible for their shelter and food throughout their student years in the Madrassa. At the political level, the JUI is controlled by those who can be called religious elites. JUI also follows the traditional national level structure of intra-party elections similar to the mainstream political parties mentioned above. That is the direction its chief, Maulana Fazl Ur Rehman, has been heading the party in since 1980, replacing his father, Mufti Mehmood, who was also the head of JUI.

The ethnic and religious political institutions at the regional level are well connected with their political base and have a strong social movement potential. They develop their legitimate mandate and have the capacity and resources to initiate interest aggregation of their ethnic and religious population base by presenting them with the political opportunities which are clearly revealed in their aims and objectives. At the top level they also have an elitist structure which is controlled by agents of social control (religious, ethnic, and tribal elites). The religious and ethnic political institutions spark social movements and interest aggregation by framing the institutional expression of the state as non-Islamic according to the representatives of the religious political institution, and corrupt, unjust, and against the interests of the ethnicities according to the

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<sup>404</sup> The respondent from JI religious party, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>405</sup> The respondent from JI religious party, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>406</sup> The respondent from JUI religious party, interviewed by the author, Quetta, Pakistan, August 2018, transcript, Department of Political Science, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand

<sup>407</sup> The respondent from JUI religious party, interviewed by the author, 2018



representative of the ethnic political institution. However, the agents of social control usually become elected members in the upper and lower house of the parliament, exploit the public mandate to gain power, become corrupt and generate widespread problems for Pakistani society<sup>408</sup>. These problems are also revealed in the weak institutional expression of the state, which is explained below.

The institutions elaborated in this section are the key stakeholders in defining the state-to-nation relationship. The impact of having the elements of the government in control of such stakeholder institutions is elaborated on in the next section by revealing the condition of the institutional expression of the state in Baluchistan and FATA.

### **4.3. The Institutional Expression of the State in Baluchistan and FATA**

According to the constitution of Pakistan, the national assembly and the assemblies of its four provinces give the political institution authority to take over the elements of the government (legislature, executive and judiciary) after the political parties contest the general elections every five years. It is of equal importance to mention here that the military and the civil bureaucracy cannot intervene directly in the parliament and therefore are considered to exert their desires through the political institution and play a very important role in structuring the power of the political class in the socio-political spectrum. Their de facto influence and power within the political institution has been outlined in chapter two. On the other hand, the elites, which include feudal and oligarch families, and tribal, religious and ethnic elites, also have influence, authority, and power within the political institution to ensure their own socio-political interests.

The elements of the government (legislature, executive, and judiciary) establish the power of the state, in theory, and develop a connection with the physical base through the institutional expression. The institutional expression of the state is responsible for ensuring basic human needs (social, economic, judicial and security) and in order for the citizens to realize their value, capabilities are being met or relative deprivation is being reduced. Strong elements of the government represent the power of the state and therefore play a pivotal role in establishing its institutional expression. As revealed above, the elements of the government are controlled by a political class of elites and therefore, according to Buzan's idea of the maximal state, such elements of the government establish and strengthen the power of the elites rather than the power of the state. According to the SFV, the institutional expression of such states becomes a source of grievance rather than security for the people. Therefore, analysis is required on the ability and power of the state to provide socio-economic and judicial benefits, and security to its people and exercise its authority, influence, and rule of law through its institutional expression.

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<sup>408</sup> Mubeen Adnan and Bushra Fatima, "Political Economic and Social Governance in Pakistan: Its Practices and Issues," *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan* 55, no. 1 (2018), p. 160

### Power of the State

This section explores the ability of the state to establish a relationship with the people in a situation where the elite institutions have control over the institutional expression of the state. Information gathered from the survey participants from FATA and Baluchistan is presented in the following figures by combining their response to suggest the level and quality of the state-to-nation relationship throughout both regions.

The survey questions were designed to find out the level of authority enjoyed by the state through its institutional expression. The 108 participants surveyed for this section were asked about the level of influence of the institutions that represent the state in resolving daily individual or group conflicts, and to maintain rule of law in the social spectrum. These institutions include the police and judiciary as well as the commissioner/PAs.

**Figure 13. Level of influence of the State in resolving conflicts and maintaining rule of law (in percentage)<sup>409</sup>**





Figure 13 above shows that the rule of law and justice mechanism of the state in FATA and Baluchistan does not exercise as much influence as the executive (PAs/commissioner). Even though the latter is a small component of the local government in both the regions, it still enjoys more influence among the people than other actors and institutions.

This figure does not suggest if the state is identified by the people as a positive source of social, economic, and judicial privileges to give the impression of a strong or weak relationship between

<sup>409</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", 2018.

the state and the people. To identify this quality of the state-to-nation relationship, the survey participants were asked a series of questions. The initial query was to identify if certain government departments relevant to socio-economic development, security, and justice exist, and if the people are satisfied with their performance. This is depicted in Figure 14.

**Figure 14. Level of Satisfaction of research participants with the Government Departments<sup>410</sup>**



Approximately 70 percent of the survey participants indicated that the government institutions responsible for providing socio-economic and judicial services, and security to the people are either non-existent or they are not, or less, satisfied with their performance. As such, they may believe the ability of these institutions to deliver social justice to be poor. In some cases, the respondents felt that the government institutions did not even exist where they lived. It can be understood that most of the research participants from FATA, being under the FCR law, would not have access to police and judiciary (please refer to discussion on the promulgation of FCR in chapter two and the responses of tribal chiefs in the previous section suggesting that the state cannot directly intervene in FATA and have its institutional expression).


The *military respondent* elaborated on this low level of satisfaction of the people by pointing to the lack of ownership on the part of the political institution to plan and execute civil service projects and ensure health, education, security, and infrastructure for the public<sup>411</sup>.

<sup>410</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, 2018.

<sup>411</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

Level of corruption in the government departments is another variable that results in poor performance of the government departments and leads to low satisfaction among the people, as shown in Figure 15 below. Corruption has been identified in chapter two as rampant in the government departments. Therefore, the survey participants were asked if the elements of the governments, which include the executive, legislature, and judiciary, were corrupt and what level of corruptness corresponded to them. The responses are shown in Figure 15.

**Figure 15. Level of Corruptness of the Institutions of Government<sup>412</sup>**



About 50 percent of the respondents believe that the legislature (politicians) and the executive (civil bureaucracy and police) are very corrupt, and approximately 25 percent believe them to be corrupt. Only around 5 percent of the respondents believe that these institutions are not very corrupt. The judiciary, however, is considered to be not very corrupt to less corrupt by 50 percent of the participants and only around 8 percent of the people believe that the judiciary is very corrupt.

The weak power of the state due to corrupt practices and inability to provide social justice to its people can also be gauged from the responses of the interview participants. The respondents from the bureaucracy contend that the politicians compensate for their relative weakness in controlling the affairs of the government, as compared to the civil bureaucrats, by securing good working relationships with the civil bureaucracy. They do this, according to the retired *senior bureaucrat*, by politicizing the civil bureaucracy. This is the single largest hurdle the politicians have created for the bureaucracy to fulfil its role of serving the state<sup>413</sup>. Such effort leads to an incompetent lower and middle level civil bureaucracy loyal to its respective political patrons. The politicians also partnered with civil bureaucrats to plunder public resources, motivating the civil bureaucrats

<sup>412</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, 2018.

<sup>413</sup> The Retired Senior Bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018.

\* During the survey with the people of FATA, the police were referred to as the law enforcement agencies like “local militias” and the bureaucrats were referred to as “political agents”

to serve the political and personal interests of the politicians rather than the state<sup>414</sup>. This assertion of the PA is also supported by the views of the retired senior bureaucrat, who states that:

I was a member of the last commission for civil services which recommended that to improve the competitiveness of the civil bureaucracy, depoliticization, merit-based induction and continuous training was required<sup>415</sup>.

### *State as the Source of Grievance of the People*

The poor situation of the institutional expression of the state has an impact on how individuals view the effectiveness of the state. For example, doctors or teachers are usually recruited on the basis of their patronage to a corrupt politician or bureaucrat (Figure 15) through the formal state process of induction. Most of the time they become ghost doctors or teachers because of an inefficient system<sup>416</sup>. In addition, health units and schools exist on paper but not physically to provide emergency medical treatment or education services which is the result of the corrupt legislator, bureaucracy and executive<sup>417</sup>. Not having enough finances to get medical or emergency treatment or education results in a feeling of relative deprivation (see Gurr's model of Civil Strife in chapter three) among the people who start to consider the state as responsible for this type of structural violence over the people and as hostile towards them.

It is also the responsibility of the state to provide security to its citizens. Insecurity, coupled with a situation where the state is considered to be corrupt and socially unjust (as discussed above), results in feelings of anger and aggression by the people as discussed in chapter three. Data estimates suggest that around 48,504 Pakistani civilians have been killed between 2004 and 2013 due to terrorist and insurgent attacks and sectarian conflicts in Pakistan, with a large proportion of the attacks taking place in the areas of Baluchistan, KP, and FATA<sup>418</sup>.

The data and discussions in this section confirm that many people in Baluchistan and FATA experience a poor institutional expression of the state. The institutions discussed and elaborated on in the previous section fail to deliver socio-economic and security benefits to the masses despite them being in control of the elements of the government in the center or the regions. Chapter two has already explained that corruption and social injustice have implications for the Pakistani nation

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<sup>414</sup> The ex-Political Agent in FATA, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>415</sup> The retired senior bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>416</sup> Zahid Hasnain, "The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999," p. 137-138

<sup>417</sup> Zahid Hasnain, "The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999," p. 137-138

<sup>418</sup> International Physicians For The Prevention Of Nuclear War, Physicians For Social Responsibility (U.S), and Physicians For Global Survival, *Body Count : Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the "War on Terror" : Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Physicians For Social Responsibility ; Berlin, 2015). p. 83-86

and that includes developing anti-social and anti-state behavior among the people that can lead to violence.

## Conclusion

The chapter has outlined and examined the key stakeholder institutions that are either involved in the structural domination of the state in Baluchistan and FATA or resist the structural domination and establish the framing process of the institutional expression of the state. These key stakeholder institutions also make up the state and sub-state structures in Pakistan, Baluchistan and FATA. They exercise their authority, power, and influence to regulate the relationship between the state and the nation and sub-nations.

The tribal, military and bureaucracy institutions are strong in regards to their institutional ideology, purpose of existence, internal strength, values, and functions. The political institution as a whole represents a strong elitist structure at the highest tier. The lower tier (at the level of the society) of the religious and ethnic political institution is strong too. This consists of the social mobilizing structure where their political ideologies aggregate and channel towards their ethnic sub-nation and religious nation.

The *Ji respondent* sees the bureaucrats and tribal chiefs, especially in FATA, as a hurdle that restricts the political institution from strengthening, while the respondents from the ethno-nationalist parties point towards the military and bureaucracy nexus for keeping the political institution weak. It seems clear that the political institution needs to reform itself into a strong institution that can actually deliver its services to the people of the country. All the interview respondents place importance on the need for reforms of the political system to liberate itself from the rich oligarchs and feudal families who control the political parties and weaken the political system.

On the other hand, the civil bureaucracy, which is considered to be a strong institution of the state, has enjoyed a high standard of competence, integrity and commitment in the past, but while the military held on to these standards and principles, the bureaucracy did not<sup>419</sup>. The bureaucracy has abandoned the principles of merit-based inductions, performance-based promotions, weeding out the officers who do not keep up to the standards and rigorous training of officers for the next level<sup>420</sup>. Dr. Ishrat Hussain explains the impact of adherence to such principles on both the state institutions, saying:

Continued upgradation and rejuvenation of the armed forces was part of their strategy to transform the armed forces into a highly professional, efficient, and effective institution of the state. On the other hand, the sloth, inertia, preservation of the status quo, and alignments

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<sup>419</sup> Ishrat Husain, *GOVERNING the UNGOVERNABLE: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance*. (Oxford University Press, 2019). p. 19

<sup>420</sup> Husain, *GOVERNING the UNGOVERNABLE: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance*. p. 19

with the parochial interests of the ruling parties made the civil services, and thus the institutions they man, quite unresponsive, inefficient and ineffective<sup>421</sup>.

This is how the political class has used the elements of the government to weaken one of the strong state institutions which, in theory, is responsible for enhancing and strengthening the institutional expression of the state.

It has become clear that the institutional expression, as per the SDM in the context of the state of Pakistan, is weak in Baluchistan and FATA which suggests that while the state establishes structural domination in the regions of Baluchistan and FATA, it is unable to establish a direct and strong relationship with the people. The reason for this weak relationship is the institutional expression of the sub-state which resists the structural domination through radicalization and fosters the framing process to incite grievances against the institutional expression of the state. The SFV suggests that the reasons for the weak state-to-nation relationship are the elements of the MDCM: existence of the vulnerable mobilizing structures that are established because of radicalization of the citizens and their grievances towards the institutional expression of the state. Chapter five will explain the dynamics through which the key institutions of the state are involved in structural domination of Baluchistan and FATA which has become the main cause for radicalization and violence in both regions.

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<sup>421</sup> Husain, *GOVERNING the UNGOVERNABLE: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance*. p. 19

## **Chapter Five**

### **Radicalization of the Religious Nation and Ethnic Sub-nations**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter continues the inquiry into the first case study in Stage II and advances development of the CPR model. The case study in the previous chapter revealed the internal dynamics of the key stakeholder institutions and the level of relationship between the state of Pakistan with the sub-nations of Baluchistan and FATA. This relationship was found to be weak, which can be attributed to the radicalization and grievance factors of the MDCM, according to the Sub-Structural Framework for Violence (SFV) explained in chapter three. The SFV suggests that the radicalization component of the MDCM is based on the concepts of structural domination and social movement, where the agents of social control and the conditions of absolute and relative deprivation play an important role.

This chapter, to identify the agents of social control and their role in establishing or resisting structural domination and giving rise to social movements, focuses on the concepts of structural domination and social movements and actors in Baluchistan and FATA to reveal the process that leads to ethnic and religious radicalization of the sub-nations in both regions. The chapter firstly discusses the core political conflicts between the key stakeholder institutions elaborated on in the previous chapter to reflect their organizing ideology. This provides a solid base for their institutional expression in the state or sub-state to exist and strengthen. The first part of the chapter helps to understand the political opportunity of these institutions in FATA and Baluchistan to reveal alignment of their interest with each other to either support or resist the structural domination of the state. Secondly, the chapter moves on to reveal the dynamics of structural domination of the state in Baluchistan and FATA and identify the regulators of this domination in both regions who come from the group of tribal, ethnic, and religious elites (dominating elites) in both regions. Thirdly, the focus then moves to investigate the other group of tribal, ethnic, and religious political elites (resisting elites) in FATA and Baluchistan that have been resisting the structural domination of the state. Finally, the chapter explains how the Structural Domination dynamics lead to social movements and a process of interest aggregation of radicalization and the emergence of religious VMSs in FATA and ethnic VMSs in Baluchistan.

#### **5.1. The Political Opportunities of the Key Stakeholder Institutions**

This section deepens our understanding of the structures from which the conflicts between the state of Pakistan and its religious and ethnic population emerge. The SDM suggests that the ideology is the core component of the state. The differences of opinion over this ideology among the key stakeholder institutions can be a core element that gives rise to further conflicts and disrupts socio-political cohesion. The representatives of these key stakeholder institutions who were interviewed



for this research and mentioned in chapter one, were asked a series of questions to identify the core reasons that form the basis for conflict between their institutions.

### **The Institutions that establish Structural Domination of the State**

The institutions that establish the structural domination of the state include the military, civil bureaucracy, and the mainstream political institution at the level of the state. The political opportunity that establishes their core ideology to dominate the state structure and further expand this domination across the regions of Baluchistan and FATA is their idea of the state. The respondents from the bureaucratic institution champion the idea that creating Pakistan was an economic necessity for the Muslims of India.

The retired *senior bureaucrat* adds a compelling comparison:

The biblical term of the 'Promised Land' has been used to charge the Jews into formation of Israel, similarly, the Muslim leadership of the subcontinent needed Islam as a unifying force that binds the ethnically different people and motivates them to struggle for a Muslim homeland. So, in order to mobilize the mass for the new country they used Islam and Islamic Ideology to emotionally charge the people to join the rallies for the creation of Pakistan<sup>422</sup>.

From the perspective of the *respondents from the military*, the two-nation theory is the core idea upon which Pakistan was established and which is embedded into the minds of the citizens through the education system in Pakistan<sup>423</sup>. They said they strongly believe that Islam is the core fundamental belief behind the two-nation theory and therefore, it is the core uniting force of the country. However, anti-Indian sentiment has also been a driving force for unity and that has its own history. The *brigadier* rank officer explains that it is not only the history of the subcontinent but the history of Islam:

The Pakistani Muslims suffered a lot at the hands of Indian 'Idol worshipers' before and at the time of partition and, similarly, Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and his companions also suffered a lot from the hands of the 'Idol worshipers' in the early days of Islam. Hence, it is the idea of the 'idol worshipers' and the sufferings mentioned above that charges much of the anti-Indian sentiment of the Pakistani Muslims.<sup>424</sup>

The *respondents from the mainstream political parties* also uphold the two-nation theory as the ideology behind the creation of Pakistan. A thought-provoking argument they presented for the unity of the country was that the feudal, tribal, and ethnic elites that benefit from the system of injustice and corruption in the country consider Pakistan to be a platform through which they can

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<sup>422</sup> The retired senior bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>423</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>424</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

exercise their power, manipulate law and order and justice, and plunder the country's finances for their own means. The disintegration of Pakistan would be a serious loss to the power, status and the businesses of the elites.

The *respondents from the military and civil bureaucracy* consider the people and the current borders of the country to be the idealized physical base and go further to consider Kashmir (Indian administered region) and the Kashmiri ethnic population as a part of Pakistan. However, when asked about the reasons for unity (past and future) of the ethnic-sub-nations in the country, the members of the bureaucratic institution explain and conceptualize the unifying factors in a different way than the military. The *respondent for the civil bureaucracy* noted that it will take time to form a Pakistani identity out of its ethnic identities and that Pakistan has never experienced long periods of tranquility; therefore, the concept of a Pakistani nationhood has been ignored in the past while religion has been used as a unifying tool rather than a unifying factor of the ethnic sub-nations<sup>425</sup>. The respondents from the civil bureaucracy suggest that more unifying factors for the country will emerge in the future.

The retired *senior bureaucrat*, however, said:

Economics is either the unifying or the dividing factor. If you provide enough to everyone, there will be no chaos. You will find that dissection or uprising is always correlated with economics<sup>426</sup>.

Furthermore, the respondents from the military argue that the road ahead for Pakistan to become a strong state requires a strong political institution to keep the country united. A strong political institution, said the brigadier, will be able to focus on the economy, ensure that foreign debt is reduced and that citizens have access to quality education, health and employment.

Hence, religion and anti-Indian sentiment establishes the core narrative of the institutions that establish the structural domination of the state. In the maximal state situation, where the military, civil bureaucracy and the elites in the political institution define the institutional expression of the state, the religious interest aggregation coupled with anti-Indian sentiment would become the organizing ideology of the political identity to establish the institutional expression of the state over the sub-nations. Both narratives are also necessary because they still legitimize Pakistan's claim over the IOK and keep the interest aggregation of the Kashmiri ethnic group charged through religion and anti-Indian sentiment.

It was already shown in chapter four that the mainstream political institution is made up of feudal and tribal elites, and oligarch families and therefore, it becomes easy for the state institutions to engineer the central political system or political parties and allow them to form central

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<sup>425</sup> The retired senior bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>426</sup> The retired senior bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

governments so that the political opportunity of structural domination of the state can extend from the center to the provinces. In return, the state institutions protect the interests of these elite groups. Hence, the mainstream political institution provides the platform to those tribal chiefs in FATA and Baluchistan who wish to partner with the state institutions for the purpose of extending the political opportunity of the state and also to strengthen their tribal sub-state structure.

### **The Institution of the Sub-state and the Structural Domination of the State**

The *FATA tribal chiefs* interviewed for this research proclaimed that Pakistan was formed on the basis of Islam and to create a separate homeland for the Muslims. In addition, in response to a query over the unity of the sub-nations, the tribal chiefs of FATA, when discussing the specific factors beyond the constitution, mentioned the armed forces and the nuclear status of Pakistan as factors responsible for keeping the country united against internal and external threats. Both the tribal chiefs mentioned the need for sincere political leadership, eradication of corruption and implementation of a strong judicial system throughout the country for the purpose of keeping the sub-nations united in the future. The tribal chiefs consider FATA and its people and the current borders of Pakistan to be the idealized physical base of the state and go further to consider Kashmir (Indian occupied) and Kashmiri ethnic population as a part of Pakistan.

In contrast to the tribal chiefs of FATA, the *Baloch tribal chief* tends not to agree with the two-nation theory. He asserts that the state of Kalat (in Baluchistan) was an independent state at the time of partition and upholds the view that “Kalat was already a free entity and therefore required neither independence nor accession to either India or Pakistan”. The tribal chief reiterated that the Baloch people and their land are a separate entity from Pakistan’s idealized territory and population.

The Baloch tribal chief explains that the Pashtuns and Baloch sub-nations want to keep the federation of Pakistan united because they understand that if the state disintegrates, there will be anarchy, bloodshed, and chaos which will be very difficult to contain.

The similarity between the visions of the central state institutions and the tribal institution in the sub-state of FATA over the idea and physical base of the state gives an impression that there is little friction between them and the structural domination of the state over the people of FATA would create no resistance or framing process against the state. However, friction between the institutions of the state and the sub-state of Baluchistan is to be expected, considering the responses given above by the Baloch tribal chief over the same question. The responses of the tribal chiefs of both sub-states above suggest that the central state institutions would find it easy to extend their political opportunity in FATA, but difficult in Baluchistan. The sub-state tribal institution of both FATA and Baluchistan may have other tribal chiefs who would think the opposite to the response of their counterparts above on the idea and physical of the state. Hence, the tribal chiefs from both

regions become part of the political institution to either support or hinder the political opportunity (structural domination) of the state institutions.

In the scenario where the sub-state institution of FATA supports the political opportunity of the state institutions, the people of FATA will experience the components of the SMT: where the absence of the political institution and support of tribal chiefs would allow the political opportunity of the state institutions (religious idea of the state and anti-Indian narrative) to be extended over the people and establish religious mobilizing structures through the framing processes. Hence, the Islamization policy of the state is expected to thrive in FATA and evidence for this is provided later in this chapter.

In Baluchistan, the tribal chiefs extend or hinder the political opportunity of the state through the political institution. The state is expected to utilize tribal chiefs as agents of social control to keep the political institution in the region within their hands and keep the Baloch sub-nation obedient to the sub-state institutions (tribal) which will further strengthen the tribal institution in Baluchistan. The state would also utilize religious political institutions to serve the purpose of its Islamization policy and give rise to religious agents of social control. The evidence of such dynamics in Baluchistan are evident and discussed later in this chapter.

### **The Institutions that resist Structural Domination and establish the Framing Process**

#### *Religious Political Institution*

The *respondent from the religious political party JI*, holds views similar to those of the mainstream political parties on the ideology of the state and the territory of Kashmir, but the *JUI respondent*, who hails from Baluchistan, holds a totally different view. He considers Pakistan to be a “western conspiracy”: a state created by the west to control and monitor the geopolitics of the region. His interpretation of western interests and policy as it relates to Pakistan’s foreign policy is understandable and is discussed in detail in chapter two. The *respondent from JI* is adamant in his belief that Islam is the only factor that keeps Pakistan united and claims this unity is an achievement of the religious political parties. He believes that the religious parties seek to strengthen the Islamic ideology of Pakistan, which is considered to be an important factor that will help keep the country united in the future. The *JUI respondent* abstained from providing any views on this or any further question.

#### *Ethnic Political Institution*

The *Baloch MPA* upholds the idea that Pakistan was created out of the economic need for a Muslim homeland in the sub-continent and religion was only a tool to achieve this. He referenced speeches where Jinnah openly spoke about the socio-economic threat to the Muslims of the sub-continent under a united India. Contrary to the Baloch MPA, the other *ethno-nationalist respondents* consider Pakistan to be a conspiracy of the international community.

The *Pashtun Senator* said:

Pakistan was established for the dominancy of the Punjabi sub-nation. Other sub-nations and Islam are both oppressed in Pakistan and the Punjabi hegemony benefits from still proclaiming Islam as the reason behind the idea of Pakistan which is not correct.

The senior *Baloch nationalist* goes a bit further:

Islam did not have any role in establishing Pakistan, Baluchistan was never a part of the sub-continent and, at the time of the British Empire, the state of Kalat was a separate entity.

The *respondents from the ethnic political parties* have a different view on the issues that foster unity in the country. The Baloch MPA lauds the social and cultural links between the ethnicities that reside in Pakistan as factors that create unity. The other two members presented similar views. “Let democracy prevail in the country”, both of them said. Emphasis was laid on creating a real democracy that will allow nationhood and harmony to be established in the country through provision of judicial and social justice, freedom, and rights to every citizen<sup>427</sup>. The *Pashtun senator* also added that:

This is not a real federation but a forced unity and oppression.

Aqil Shah studies the political interests of the central state institutions and considers the military and bureaucracy interference in the political institution responsible for this forced unity to protect their interests. He presents a detailed and convincing study on the covert and direct intimidation of the military to control the political institution, engineer political parties that suit its interests and influence Pakistan’s governments since the first martial law of 1958<sup>428</sup>. In addition, Muhammad Hassan provides a deep insight into the partnership between the military and civil bureaucracy through which they controlled, fragmented, and utilized the political institution and the political parties for their own interests<sup>429</sup>.

Both Shah and Hassan help to understand that the conflict is between the unified interests and efforts of the military and bureaucracy as partnering institutions and the interests of the individual political elites. The fragmented, factionalized, and multi-polarized weak political institutions serve the petty interests of the central political class and the interests of the military and the bureaucracy. Aqil Shah also explains how the fragmented and factionalized political institution helped the

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<sup>427</sup> The senior Baloch nationalist, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>428</sup> Aqil Shah, “Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan (2007–2013),” *Democratization* 21, no. 6 (April 29, 2013): 1007–33, p. 1007– 1033  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.781586>.

<sup>429</sup> Muhammad Hassan, “Causes of Military Intervention in Pakistan: A Revisionist Discourse,” *Journal of Pakistan Vision* 12, no. 2 (2011): 66–100, p. 66-93

military to engineer political parties like PML-Q and MMA in 2001 to support the interests of the military, bureaucracy and political class of dominating elites<sup>430</sup>. This helps to realize that the sub-state political institution in Baluchistan and FATA, including other regions of the country, are not safe from military and bureaucratic intervention.

The *tribal chiefs* interviewed from FATA term the relationship between the military and bureaucracy as “strong” and also view the bureaucracy as a mediator between the political and the military institution to keep the socio-economic and political system intact.

The *respondents from the military* consider the inability of the political institution to create a sense of nationhood and bring about a strong state with robust socio-economic institutions to cover its territory to be a security threat to a state like Pakistan. The *brigadier* expresses his concern and directly mentions that “The military cannot be a spectator to such situations and has to intervene”<sup>431</sup>.

The bureaucracy, according to its representatives interviewed, will not bow down to orders that negatively affect the state or its interests<sup>432</sup>. However, both the bureaucrats term the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political institution as poor.

To strengthen or consolidate power against the dominating elites, the senior *Baloch nationalist* predicts that:

When the non-democratic forces within the parties are eliminated and democracy is left to rule and evolve in Pakistan, it will make the political institution stronger<sup>433</sup>.

The religious political institution, which includes the JI and JUI political parties, is useful for the state institutions to extend the political opportunity of the Islamization policy of the state. This policy acts as a bait to attract both religious parties to help the state in fostering and strengthening its religious idea which is also the core objective of both parties, even though, the JUI representative provides a different view of how his party would interpret the idea and physical base of the state. The state, therefore, creates opportunities for the rise of religious social movements in Baluchistan and FATA according to the SMT (development of political opportunities, establishment of mobilizing structures and utilization of framing process to expand the mobilizing structures). FATA will experience strong religious radicalization as a result of the religious social movement because of the existence and proliferation of informal mobilizing structures (religious seminaries, priests, and scholars) of the religious political institution in the

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<sup>430</sup> Shah, “Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan (2007–2013),” p. 1013

<sup>431</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>432</sup> The retired senior bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>433</sup> The senior Baloch nationalist, interviewed by the author, Islamabad, Pakistan, August 2018

absence of the formal political institutions. In reality, this is what FATA witnessed and evidence for it is provided later in the chapter.

The ethnic political institution remains the only platform that can provide opportunity to the tribal chiefs, ethnic and other elites who wish to counter the political opportunity of the state institution and their partners, i.e. religious and mainstream political institution and tribal chiefs who support the structural domination of the state institutions in return for their personal interests. According to the responses of the representatives of the ethnic political institutions from Baluchistan, the political opportunity of the state will be countered by the mobilization of the people by the ethnic political institution. Hence, the state institutions need to rely on the structural domination concept to ensure the interest of the state (dominator) remain protected in Baluchistan. The extension of the political opportunities of the central state institutions in Baluchistan and FATA through structural domination is explained in the next section.

## **5.2. Extending the Political Opportunities of the State in Baluchistan and FATA**

The extension of the political opportunity of the state through the concepts of structural domination and social movement theory is the focus of analysis in this section. The previous section has helped to identify two separate groups from among the key stakeholder institutions. The group whose interests lie with the political opportunity of the central state institutions and allow the structural domination in Baluchistan and FATA will be referred to as *dominating elites*. The other group that counters the political opportunity of the state in both the regions will be referred to as *resisting elites*. Both the groups either support or hinder the political opportunity of the state to protect their own interests in both regions. This section contributes in explaining how these two groups of elites establish or resist structural domination of the state in both the regions through the political institution as agents of social control, that is, tribal chiefs and ethnic and religious elites.

In the context of Baluchistan, the stakeholders that became members of the political class from 1947 to 1969 belonged to the class of tribal chiefs and ethnic elites. From 1947 to 1969, the region of Baluchistan went through many administrative changes. It went from being an independent state (1947-48) towards acceding to Pakistan (1948-52), became a princely state of Pakistan as the 'Baluchistan States Union (1952-55)', disintegrated and became a part of west-Pakistan province (1955-70) to finally becoming a province of the state of Pakistan (1971)<sup>434</sup>. In the course of this process, the central state institutions and the sub-nations of Baluchistan were able to identify and create linkage with their respective elites who would serve the interests of either through the political institution. The importance of these elites could be gauged from their social status as being tribal chiefs, ethno-nationalists, or ethnic elites. These elites are shown in Table 6 below.

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<sup>434</sup> Syed Fakhar Uddin Shah, "State Elites' Policies Towards-Balochistan (1947-70). Its Dynamics and Impacts," *Global Journal of Human-Social Science: F Political Science* 16, no. 2 (2016), p. 70-78.

**Table 6. The Dominating and Resisting Elites that represented the Constituencies of Baluchistan in the National Assembly of Pakistan (1947-1969)<sup>435</sup>**

S#	Names	Social Status	Elected from the Constituency	Elite Group
1	Nawab Mohammad Khan Jomezai (1947-1954)	Tribal Chief of the Pashtun nation in British Baluchistan	Zhob	Dominating Elite
2	Jam Ghulam Qadir Khan (1947-1954)	Baloch Tribal Chief (Jam of Lasbela State of the Kalat Confederacy)	Baloch States	Dominating Elite
3	Dr. Khan Sahib (1955-1958)	Middle Class Pashtun ethno-nationalist from KP province	Lasbela cum Karachi	Resisting Elite
4	Nawab Mir. Bai Khan (1955-1958)	Baloch Tribal Chief (The Nawab of Makran State of the Kalat Confederacy)	Makran	Dominating Elite
5	Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti (1955-1958)	Baloch Tribal Chief (The Nawab of Bugti State in British Baluchistan)	Quetta	Resisting Elite
6	Sardar Attaullah Khan Mengal (1962-1964)	Baloch Tribal Chief (The chief of Mengal Tribe in the Khuzdar region of the Kalat Confederacy)	Kalat-Makran-Kharan	Resisting Elite
7	Nawab Khair Bux Marri (1962-1964)	Baloch Tribal Chief (The Nawab of Marri State in British Baluchistan)	Quetta-Sibi-Loralai-Chaghi	Resisting Elite
8	Mir Nabi Bux Zehri (1965-1969)	Ethnic Elite	Quetta	Dominating Elite
9	Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai (1965-1969)	Baloch Tribal Chief (The Chief of Jhalwan region of the Kalat Confederacy)	Kalat	Dominating Elite
10	Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo (1965-1969)	Ethnic Elite	Lasbela cum Karachi	Resisting Elite

The dominating elites (highlighted green) are those that founded or became members of the Baluchistan chapter of the Pakistan Muslim League in Baluchistan before the partition in 1947<sup>436</sup>. Those highlighted blue are the tribal chiefs of the states that came under the confederation of Khan of Kalat. These chiefs acceded their states to Pakistan after partition without taking the Khan of


<sup>435</sup> The “Names” and the “Elected from the region” details are compiled by gathering the data from the official gazette notifications by the National Assembly of Pakistan on its website. <http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=121>. The link provides access to the list of members in the national assembly of Pakistan from 1947 to date. The social status and the elite group they belong to has been gauged from historical political literature in the forms of books “In Search of Solution: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo”, “A Journey to Disillusionment” and “In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations”. More details from these books have been referenced in the previous and coming chapters.

<sup>436</sup> Inamul Haq Kausar, *Pakistan Movement in Baluchistan*. (Karachi: Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1980). p. 1-69



Kalat into their confidence<sup>437</sup>. Those highlighted yellow have remained moderate in their views towards the structural domination of the state over the sub-nations. While they have always voiced support for the plight of their ethnic sub-nations, they have represented the state as governors or state ministers during their political careers and developed frictions with the other resisting elites due to differences between their political ideologies and discourse for resisting the structural domination of the state<sup>438</sup>. Those highlighted (red) are the right-wing tribal chiefs who have always opposed the extension of political opportunity and structural domination of the state over the sub-nations of Pakistan. Moving ahead into 1972 and onwards allows us to examine the dynamics of the extension of political opportunity of the state through the green, blue and yellow highlighted elites (Table 6) in Baluchistan through the political institution.

**Figure 16. Percentage of Political Representation in the National Assembly (NA) of Pakistan from Baluchistan (1972-2018)<sup>439</sup>**



Except for the outcomes of the general elections of 1977 and 2008 shown in Figure 16 above, all other general election data shows that the mainstream political parties secured less than 50 percent of the seats in the national assembly from Baluchistan. Figure 16 also shows that religious and ethno-nationalist parties from Baluchistan have experienced success in multiple elections, and

<sup>437</sup> Syed Fakhar Uddin Shah, “Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakening and Merger,” *Global Journal of Human Social Science: Political Science* 13, no. 6 (2013): 22–30, p. 29 [https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS\\_Volume13/3-Baluchistan-British-Rule.pdf](https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_Volume13/3-Baluchistan-British-Rule.pdf).

<sup>438</sup> Shah, “Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakening and Merger,” p. 29


<sup>439</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/fmGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3051>. The figure is compiled by gathering the data from the official gazette notifications by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) for the general elections of 1972 – 2018. Also see Free and Fair Election Network, “ElectionPakistan | Pakistan’s Premier Election Portal | Elections Pakistan,” Election Pakistan (Free and Fair Election Network), accessed May 23, 2021, <https://electionpakistan.com>.

independent candidates typically have also been represented. In most elections, the data shows that the voters from the sub-nations in Baluchistan mostly prefer ethnic and religious elites to protect their interests. The dominance of both the elite groups in the central state institution of the parliament can also be identified by identifying the members who have represented Baluchistan in the NA since 1972. Thirteen members have been identified as tribal, religious, and ethnic elites who have represented Baluchistan multiple times in the national assembly. Among the most prominent are Mr. Mehmood Khan Achakzai (4 times), Sardar Yaqoob Khan Nasir (4 times), Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani (4 times), Sardar Yaar Muhammad Rind (4 times), Mr. Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali (5 times) and members of the Nawab Akbar Bugti family (7 times)<sup>440</sup>.

After the provincial assemblies were established in 1970, the above-mentioned members had the opportunity to structure their socio-political power in the sub-state of Baluchistan by controlling its provincial assembly and political institution. This point is also echoed by the ethno-nationalists during the interviews. The *Pashtun senator* said:

Current politicians are test tube babies prepared in drawing rooms of elites: who convert their kin into politicians and get them elected as party leaders and in the parliament. This means there are no politicians coming up from grass-root level.

**Figure 17. Percentage of Political Representation in the Provincial Assembly of Baluchistan<sup>441</sup>**



<sup>440</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frnGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3051>. The data is retrieved from the official gazette notifications by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) for the general elections of 1972 – 2018.

<sup>441</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frnGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3051>. The figure is compiled by gathering the data from the official gazette notifications by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) for the general elections of 1972 – 2018. Also see Free and Fair Election Network, “ElectionPakistan | Pakistan’s Premier Election Portal | Elections Pakistan,” Election Pakistan (Free and Fair Election Network), accessed May 23, 2021, <https://electionpakistan.com>.

This source was used in some instances where further insight as comparison was necessary for accuracy and to verify more information. This source keeps a comprehensive electoral database of Pakistan since 1972.

An overview of the list of political elites of Baluchistan provided below further supports the idea that the central government preferred dynastic and feudal elitism at the regional level by partnering with the dominating elites in the sub-state of Baluchistan to exert influence across the socio-political environment of the province<sup>442</sup>.

- The Chief Minister of Baluchistan in 1972 was the resisting elite Sardar Attaullah Mengal (see Table 5) whose government was toppled by the central government and a dominating elite Jam Ghulam Qadir (see Table 5) took his place. Sardar Mengal's son gained this position in 1997 and was again toppled with the implementation of Martial Law in the country in 1999.
- Jam Ghulam Qadir enjoyed the position of Chief Minister again in 1985, followed by his son (Jam Yousaf) in 2002 and again by his grandson (Jam Qamal) in 2018.
- Sardar Muhammad Khan Barozai, another dominating-elite who supported Pakistan at the time of independence in 1947, became the Chief Minister in 1976.
- The Jamali Family has dominated the Chief Minister Position by being close allies with the state institutions. Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali (son of a land lord dominating elite at the time of Partition) became the Chief Minister in 1988, followed by his cousins: Mir Taj Muhammad Khan Jamali in 1990 and Mir Jan Muhammad Khan Jamali in 1997.
- Nawab Akbar Bugti, a moderate resisting elite was the Chief Minister in 1998 but he also served as the Governor of Baluchistan in 1973 replacing another moderate resisting elite, Bizenjo, when the government of Attaullah Mengal was toppled. His father Nawab Mehrab Khan Bugti was one of the founding members of Baluchistan Muslim League in the 1930s.
- The sons of prominent tribal chiefs who allied with the interests of the state institutions during 1947-1969 have also remained Chief Ministers of the province. These include Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magsi (son of Saifullah Magsi), Nawab Muhammad Aslam Khan Raisani (son of Nawab Ghaus Bakhsh Raisani), and Nawab Sanaullah Zehri, (son of Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai)

The discussion in chapter three explained that the Sindh, KP, and Punjab polity and nation underpin the state under the SDM. The elites highlighted green and the blue in Table 6 are the tribal and ethnic elites that gave rise to the state of Pakistan and are considered partners of the state institutions in extending its political opportunity in Baluchistan. Their importance to the state institutions is also signaled by the fact the governments formed after 1972 may appear to have been a coalition of ethno-nationalists but have always had the support, backing, and influence, or faced the wrath, of these dominating elite families. After partition, these tribal and ethnic elites and members of their families remained part of the national and provincial political fabric<sup>443</sup>. They have also served the interests of the central state institutions by becoming federal ministers, chief

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<sup>442</sup> Shah Miraan, "Of Clan and Kin," *Newsline Magazine*, 2018, <https://newslinemagazine.com/magazine/of-clan-and-kin/>.

<sup>443</sup> Balochistan Provincial Assembly, "Former Chief Minister," Provincial Assembly of Balochistan (Balochistan Provincial Assembly), accessed December 5, 2020, <http://pabalochistan.gov.pk/new/former-chief-minister/>.

ministers, governors, federal and provincial legislators, and members of the mainstream political parties.

A similar relationship between the state and the elites in FATA also appears to exist. That a list similar to that above is not available for FATA is because of the structural restrictions imposed by the FCR law that restricted direct administrative and political interaction between the state and the sub-state in FATA. Therefore, FATA was not officially represented in the national assembly of Pakistan from 1949 to 1970. While preparing Table 6 for Baluchistan, three members of the national assembly were identified as being elected from regions of KP adjacent to FATA but were the tribal chiefs (Maliks) belonging to FATA. They are Malik Darya Khan from Waziristan as member of the NA in 1962 and then again in 1965; Malik Wali Khan from Khyber Agency in 1962; and Malik Ali Man Shah from Khyber Agency in 1965<sup>444</sup>. The names starting with Malik have their own history which goes back to the introduction of the Maliki system in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The Maliki system changed the power dynamics of the tribal chiefs in FATA. While it is argued in chapter four by the tribal chief of FATA that the FCR institutionalized the FATA tribal system, a look deep into the FCR law has identified that some of the tribal chiefs were paid handsome amounts of money and were given privileges by the British through the PAs to become Maliks and ensure the FATA sub-nation subjugation to the FCR<sup>445</sup>.

The tribal chiefs of FATA interviewed for this research were angered over the policy of the Pakistani state which provided elite powers to some tribal chiefs and raised them to the title of Malik<sup>446</sup>. It is also revealed by research in 2018 that 13 tribes of Khyber Agency having 2,637 tribal chiefs are connected with the PAs through 58 Maliks<sup>447</sup>. This research also reveals a parallel power structure which brought in the Maliki system as an institution over the tribal chiefs<sup>448</sup>. The Maliki system is also considered to be a policy of the British (continued by Pakistan) to create a dominating elite structure in FATA<sup>449</sup>. It also reveals that the Maliki system did not intervene in the internal matters of the FATA sub-state structure but was there to support the PAs in administering the FCR and as state representatives from within the social fabric of FATA and become social elites<sup>450</sup>. Another power granted to these Maliks was their ability to elect members

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<sup>444</sup> National Assembly of Pakistan, "National Assembly of Pakistan," [www.na.gov.pk](http://www.na.gov.pk) (Library National Assembly), accessed May 23, 2021, <http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=121>. The "Names" and their address details are available on official gazette notifications by the National Assembly of Pakistan on its website for the relevant period of their membership in NA.

<sup>445</sup> Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans 550 B.C. - 1957 A.D.* (London: MacMillan & Company Limited, 1958). p. 349

<sup>446</sup> The FATA Pashtun Tribal Chiefs of Khyber Agency and Waziristan, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>447</sup> Mian A. Shah, "Political Reforms, Local Elites and Power: A Study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan" (PhD Dissertation, 2018), p. 159


<sup>448</sup> Shah, "Political Reforms, Local Elites and Power: A Study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan", p. 69-72.

<sup>449</sup> Muhammad Akbar Malik, "Role of Malik in Tribal Society: A Dynamic Change after 9/11," *Pakistan Annual Research Journal* 49 (2013): 103–12, p. 104.

<sup>450</sup> Shah, "Political Reforms, Local Elites and Power: A Study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan", p. 81

from within FATA (from 1972 to 2008 in the Figure below) to represent the region in the national assembly of Pakistan as independent candidates (without any political party affiliation)<sup>451</sup>.

**Figure 18. Percentage of Political Representation in the National Assembly (NA) of Pakistan from FATA (1972-2018)<sup>452</sup>**



In FATA, the four-decade long hold of the independent candidates (Figure 18) in the national assembly being elected by the Maliks was a constitutional compulsion because the FCR law did not allow political parties to contest elections in FATA. Scrutiny of the candidates that represented the people of FATA in the NA revealed an elitist trend. There are three members who have represented the people of FATA four times in the national assembly<sup>453</sup>. Another member has represented the people three times in the NA, and four other members have done so twice<sup>454</sup>. Six of these members have been part of those national assemblies from 2008 to 2018<sup>455</sup>.

<sup>451</sup> Shah, “Political Reforms, Local Elites and Power: A Study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan”, p. 81

<sup>452</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frnGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3051>. The figure is compiled by gathering the data from the official gazette notifications by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) for the general elections of 1972 – 2018.

Free and Fair Election Network, “ElectionPakistan | Pakistan’s Premier Election Portal | Elections Pakistan,” Election Pakistan (Free and Fair Election Network), accessed May 23, 2021, <https://electionpakistan.com>. This source was used in some instances for further insight as comparison was necessary for accuracy and to verify more information. This source keeps a comprehensive electoral database of Pakistan since 1972.

Pakistan Institute Of Legislative Development And Transparency, *The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan’s Transition from Democracy above Rule of Law to Democracy under Rule of Law: 1970-2013*. (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2013). This Book was also used to check for accuracy and comparison


<sup>453</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frnGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3051>.

<sup>454</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frnGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3051>.

<sup>455</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frnGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3051>.

While FATA did not have a provincial assembly, what is important to note is that the members elected by the Maliks to represent FATA in the NA could take part in legislation for the entire country except FATA. This dynamic provides enough evidence to suggest that an elite structure in FATA had already established its base before the FCR law was abrogated in 2018 that merged FATA into KP province. The merger resulted in by-elections in FATA in August 2019 where sixteen members were elected by the people of FATA to represent them in the provincial assembly of KP. The recent by-election data for FATA shows that the people chose six members from the mainstream parties, five members from the religious parties, two members from the ethno-nationalist political parties, and six independent candidates.

**Figure 19. Percentage of Political Representation in the Provincial Assembly of KP from FATA in the (2018-19) by-elections<sup>456</sup>**



An important fact to notice in the figures above for Baluchistan and FATA is the existence of independent candidates who (like in all other provinces of the country) contest elections without any political affiliation and are mentioned nowhere before in this research. Scrutiny of the official gazette of the election commission of Pakistan for the elected members of the provincial and national assemblies from 1970 to date reveals that these independent candidates later became dominating elites and usually sided with the mainstream party that forms the government in the centre or remained independent for the next general election<sup>457</sup>. By contesting as independent candidates from FATA and Baluchistan in the national assembly, they gain some leverage over the political party that forms the central or provincial governments. Therefore, it is hard to refute

<sup>456</sup> Election Pakistani, “FATA Bye Elections 2019 KPK Assembly: KPK Assembly By-Election 2019 FATA Details,” [www.electionpakistani.com](http://www.electionpakistani.com/ge2018/bye-elections/fata.html), 2019, <http://www.electionpakistani.com/ge2018/bye-elections/fata.html>.

<sup>457</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frnGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3051>.

that these independent candidates pledge loyalty to the government benches and in return get financial gains, decorated positions in the government and/or administrative functions, and privileges.

Baluchistan also presents a similar case for the independent candidates. The scrutiny of the data of the election commission of Pakistan reveals that a member of the Jamali family contested and won the general elections as an independent candidate in the national assembly in 1993, 1997 and 2013<sup>458</sup>. In addition are the dominating elites who belong to the ethnic elite category; these are:

- Ms. Zubaida Jalal in 2002;
- Mr. Humayun Aziz Kurd, Muhammad Usman Advocate and Maulvi Asmatullah in 2008;
- Mr. Dostain Domki, Khalid Hussain Magsi and Jam Kamal in 2013; and
- Mr. Muhammad Aslam Bhootani in 2018.

The extension of the political opportunities of the central state institutions through the structural domination process resulted in conflicts between the dominating and resisting elites within the sub-state structures. The conflict and its dynamics originate from the conflict between dominating and resisting elites at the central state level prior to the dismemberment of the country in 1971 which later shifted to the sub-state. The conflict is explained in the next chapter and shows that the political opportunity of the resisting elites remained blocked by the dominating elites.

### **5.3. The Resistance to the Political Opportunities of the State**

#### *Conflict at the State Level*

The conflict between the dominating elites and the resisting elites emerged after the rise of the political ethno-nationalist movement that resulted in the separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) from West Pakistan in 1971-72. An analysis of the collaborating partners from Baluchistan and FATA with the state institutions, military regimes, then the civilian governments controlled by the mainstream political institution helps to understand the conflict between both groups on the basis of their political opportunities.

The political contest between the PPP and NAP in 1971-72 was a struggle for power between dominating elites (PPP) and resisting elites (NAP). In 1977, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) became a coalition of nine political parties (central, ethnic, and religious resisting elites) against the PPP led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his ideology. The PPP's win resulted in political chaos forcing the military to step in. The reader may wonder why data from the general election of 1985 are not included in any of the figures above. The 1985 general elections were non-partisan (candidates contesting without political party affiliation) under military rule which allowed new

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<sup>458</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, "General Elections," Election Commission of Pakistan, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frnGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3051>.



dominating and resisting elites to grab and consolidate power in the state or sub-state structure. These elites established varying levels of socio-political influence and power and entered national and regional level politics in the 1988 general elections, enabling the state institutions (military and bureaucracy) to engineer a two-party system at the national level (mainstream political parties) that fostered political opportunity of the central state. It also led to disintegration of NAP (resisting elites) due to internal conflict between the leaders forcing them to confine their politics to the regional level rather than the state level.

In the new two-party system at the state level, one party was the PPP, with the legacy and vision of Bhutto, now under the leadership of his daughter 'Benazir Bhutto'. The other party was the PML, a group of feudal lords who were victims of Bhutto's socialist policies, that included nationalization of industries that weakened the industrialists, land reforms in Punjab that gave more powers and rights to the peasants over their feudal land lords and administrative reforms that reduced the power of the bureaucrats<sup>459</sup>. The reformation of PML in 1988 was in fact the regrouping of these bourgeoisie to safeguard and pursue their interests<sup>460</sup>. By 1988 these two mainstream parties had also realized the need to engage regional stakeholders, create alliances and form coalition governments to acquire and sustain power in central government as well as in the provinces<sup>461</sup>. This feature of alliance politics started in 1988 and remains a feature of Pakistan's national and provincial politics to date. The sub-state dominating and resisting elites exploited this opportunity but it also fostered political conflicts in the sub-states between the elites.

#### *The Conflict at the Sub-state Level between Pashtun Elites*

All the current ethno-nationalist political parties in KP and Baluchistan are the offshoots of the NAP. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (from KP) and Abdul Samad Achakzai (from Baluchistan) were both influential Pashtun political personalities representing their Pashtun ethnicities and were part of the NAP in the 1972 general elections<sup>462</sup>. They later defected from the NAP party together and then parted ways due to their difference of political views.

The party of Khan from KP became NAP (Wali), under the leadership of his son Wali Khan, and then transformed into ANP, under the leadership of his grandson Asfandyar Wali Khan (son of Wali Khan)<sup>463</sup>. The Party of Achakzai was the PKMAP which is currently under the leadership of his son Mehmood Khan Achakzai in Baluchistan<sup>464</sup>. These parties have not faced any further fragmentation since then. ANP became (and is currently) the largest Pashtun ethnic political party

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<sup>459</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A Country Study*, p. 220

<sup>460</sup> Blood, *Pakistan: A Country Study*, p. 228

<sup>461</sup> Amna Mahmood, "Regional Political Parties: Challenge to Political Stability of Pakistan," *Journal of Pakistan Vision* 15, no. 2 (2014): 1–39, p. 15-16.

<sup>462</sup> Adil Zaman Kasi and Fazli Subhan, "Regional Political Parties & Democracy: A Case Study of Balochistan," *Journal of Education & Humanities Research* 5, no. 1 (2018): 219–31, p. 223

<sup>463</sup> Kasi and Subhan, "Regional Political Parties & Democracy: A Case Study of Balochistan," p. 223

<sup>464</sup> Kasi and Subhan, "Regional Political Parties & Democracy: A Case Study of Balochistan," p. 224



in KP province. The PKMAP became (and is currently) the largest Pashtun ethnic political party in Baluchistan province.

The Pashtun political ethno-nationalism divides the Pashtun physical base in Pakistan into three political territories or physical bases. The first physical base is the KP province where there was already a civil-military rule before partition. Afterwards, from 1972 the ethnic movement led by Ghaffar Khan resulted in delivering socio-economic and political rights for his ethnic population through conciliatory and less confrontational politics<sup>465</sup>. His success and its impact are discussed in chapter seven to help finalize the development of the CPR model. Alternatively, before partition, the Pashtun areas in Baluchistan (the second Pashtun physical base) were controlled through the tribal chiefs by the British civil administration and later transformed into ethnic elites (Achakzai and his accomplices) who still enjoy support from the Pashtun physical base in Baluchistan through ethnic politics. They have not yet been able to deliver for their ethnic communities and hence a striking difference in the socio-economic environment between the Pashtuns in both physical bases can be observed. This also developed into a feeling of relative deprivation among the Pashtun sub-nation in Baluchistan.

The third Pashtun physical base is the region of FATA. This region was controlled by tribal chiefs but has recently allowed the state structure to inseminate the region. The optimistic fact about this region is that the tribal ideology, including the tribal chiefs, ethnic oligarchs and majority of the population, are indifferent and not in conflict with the political opportunity of the state as well as the state institutions (as revealed in chapter four). The impact of this is visible in the 2019 by-election (Figure 19) results where mainstream and religious political parties won the majority of seats. In addition, the region was merged into KP province a year before the by-elections and there was no conflict or uprising against this merger. Rather, it was supported by the sub-state elites. However, the absence of resisting elites in FATA since the 1970s allowed the structural domination of the state and the successful extension of the political opportunity of central key stakeholder institutions in the region. The impact of this situation is studied in the next section.

#### *The Conflict at Sub-state Level between Baloch elites*

The Baloch ethno-political landscape has been controlled and shaped by the tribal chiefs (Nawabs and Sardars) and influential Baloch political personalities since 1972. Among the most prominent tribal chiefs are Sardar Attaullah Mengal and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti (both resisting elites)<sup>466</sup>. The influential Baloch ethno-nationalist political personalities are Mir Ghous Baksh Bizenjo and Dr. Abdul Hayee (both resisting elites)<sup>467</sup>.

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<sup>465</sup> Khan, "Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerrilla War to Nowhere?" p. 292

<sup>466</sup> Muhammad Mushtaq, "Ethno-Regional Political Party Success in Pakistan (1970-2013): An Analysis," *ISSRA Papers* 10, no. 1 (2018): 97-116, p. 109-110

<sup>467</sup> Mushtaq, "Ethno-Regional Political Party Success in Pakistan (1970-2013): An Analysis," p. 109-110

The NAP provincial government of Baluchistan in 1972 encompassed Sardar Mengal as the chief minister and Mir Bizenjo as the governor appointed by the state<sup>468</sup>. Nawab Bugti, who, apart from being a Baloch resisting elite and having rifts with the members of NAP in Baluchistan, became the governor of the province when the provincial government of Sardar Mengal was dissolved by the dominating elites in 1973<sup>469</sup>. The political landscape of Baluchistan changed between 1977 to 1988, due to martial law and the non-partisan general elections of 1985, which gave rise to many dominating elites in the sub-state structure who became visible in the general election of 1988.

In 1988, the Baluchistan National Alliance (BNA)(a coalition of Nawab Bugti and Sardar Mengal) and Pakistan National Party (PNP)(of Mir Bizenjo) contested the general elections<sup>470</sup>. Even though BNA was victorious, the differences between Nawab Bugti and Sardar Mengal widened, leading both to breaking with the BNA and forming their individual political parties. Thereafter, Bugti's JWP and Mengal's BNM, along with PNP contested the general elections of 1990 and in the general elections of 1993 another ethno-nationalist party BNM-Hayee (H) emerged<sup>471</sup>. BNM-H was an offshoot of the Mengal's BNM party. A merger of BNM and PNP gave birth to BNP prior to the general election of 1997, leading to its victory and forming government in Baluchistan. It is assumed that his differences with Sardar Mengal led Mir Bizenjo to establish the Baluchistan National Democratic Party (BNDP), which later merged into BNM-H leading to the establishment of National Party (NP). The BNP also suffered a division in 1997 when differences emerged over the question of party leadership as a result of inter-party elections. The problem went unaddressed, leading to a faction separating from the party and establishing its own BNP; Awami (A)<sup>472</sup>. This party is led by the son of the dominating elite Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai.

The Baloch population in Pakistan is also divided into two physical bases within the Baluchistan region. One physical base includes the regions of the former British Baluchistan: the other is controlled by the Baloch tribal chiefs the Sardars which was formerly the princely state of Kalat. The most prominent tribal chief in this region is Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal (already mentioned above). His physical base has also been diminishing with the emergence of other tribal chiefs in the region which signals the increase the influence of the agents of social control (dominating elites) against the resisting elites. The political power of the Baloch areas of former British Baluchistan remains in the hands of influential dominating elites, Baloch royals, and Nawabs. The former Princely state of Kalat is where the dominating and resisting elites struggle for power. The impact of this will also be examined in the next section.

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<sup>468</sup> Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, *The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan the Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements* (New York: Routledge, 2012). p. 65

<sup>469</sup> Siddiqi, *The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan the Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements*, p. 67-72

<sup>470</sup> Mushtaq, "Ethno-Regional Political Party Success in Pakistan (1970-2013): An Analysis," p. 109

<sup>471</sup> Mushtaq, "Ethno-Regional Political Party Success in Pakistan (1970-2013): An Analysis," p. 109

<sup>472</sup> Mahmood, "Regional Political Parties: Challenge to Political Stability of Pakistan," p. 225

The impact of the policy of the structural domination of the central state institutions to pursue their political interests in Baluchistan and FATA through the dominating state elites is expected to initiate an interest aggregation process of radicalization according to the SFV. In addition, the social movement theory which further drives radicalization adds fuel to the radicalization process. In both situations, if the political opportunity of the radicalized becomes blocked, a violent conflict is triggered which later gives birth to polarized religious and ethnic groups determined to target the institutions responsible for their blocked political opportunities. This is elaborated on in the next section.

#### **5.4. Establishment of Religious and Ethnic Vulnerable Mobilizing Structures**

This section extends from the knowledge gained from the previous sections on the interests of the dominating elites and the resisting elites. As proposed in the SFV in chapter three, denied political opportunities play a very important role in creating an environment out of which radicalization and violence emerge. It has been revealed in this chapter that the political opportunity of the state revolves around creating a religious socio-political identity of the citizens that provides a basis for the two-nation theory as the idea of the state. On the other hand, the resisting elites are not against religion but are resistant to the structural domination of the state.

This section will show how the state enforced a policy of a religious State-Nation over its people to amass political influence against the resisting elites in the physical base of Baluchistan and FATA. It will also explain how this policy was later blocked by the state itself that initiated the SMT concept in FATA and resulted in the creation of religious VMSs leading to religious terrorism. Since the sections above have already identified the resisting elites and their conflict with the dominating elites in Baluchistan, this section will also explain how denying interest aggregation and social change (political opportunity) to resisting elites in Baluchistan results in radicalization and polarization of the ethnic Baloch sub-nation, giving rise to ethnic insurgency.

##### **5.4.1. The Hazard of Religious Interest Aggregation for Social Change**

The religious political institution has had an enormous impact on the socio-political conditions of Pakistan. The religious political institution struggled from 1947 to 1972 to channel its entire pan-Islamic struggle (political opportunity) towards the state and reflect it in the institutional expression. Farooq Tanwir explains that the constitutions that came before 1972 struggled to comprehensively adopt Islamic principles of sharia because of the ideological difference over the idea of the state between state institutions and the religious political institution<sup>473</sup>. The JUI party, which is currently comprised of the religious clergy in Pakistan, is the offshoot of the religious political party from united India that was opposed to the creation of Pakistan before 1947. The key stakeholder central institutions later adopted the policy of religious interest aggregation at the

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<sup>473</sup> Farooq Tanwir, "Religious Parties and Politics in Pakistan," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43, no. 3–5 (October 2002): 250–68, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002071520204300303>.

grass-root social level. This new policy was adopted when the policy of creating a religious State-Nation with a top-down approach backfired in the 1970s when the country's east wing (Bangladesh) broke away. Therefore, the state institutions' decision to establish a religious nation through religious interest aggregation became the new policy to establish a religious socio-political identity for the entire nation.

### *Religious Social Movements and Interest Aggregation*

The final constitution (1972-73) of Pakistan by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave birth to the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the institutions and laws that came with it were the first step towards the formal Islamization process of the state and the different ethnic sub-nations to forge a single religious nation<sup>474</sup>. The Islamization process involved the Islamization of the curriculum of the public schools and setting up a broad network of religious seminaries throughout the country<sup>475</sup>. The religious clergy and priests were nominated as the agents of social change (through heads of religious seminaries, clergy leading the religious political institution and their involvement in the state and educational institutions, like schools and universities) giving them authority and power to Islamize the Pakistani society. During the regime of General Zia, the clergy received financial incentives and official recognition; the religious seminaries received unconditional and direct government financial assistance while the degrees of the religious seminaries were given legitimacy by issuing equivalence certificates to the graduates<sup>476</sup>.

Examining the involvement of the religious political institution in the country after 1972 (Figure 20) and the rise of the religious seminaries (Figure 21) helps to reveal the social and political religious interest aggregation of both: the state and the religious nation. Despite the religious political parties not being part of the central government in 1972, the manifesto of the government was dubbed Islamic Socialism<sup>477</sup>. The political religious interest aggregation to counter the USSR and strengthen the Islamic idea of the state has been discussed in chapter two. However, to gauge the societal religious interest aggregation, the location and proliferation of religious seminaries throughout the country can be considered a benchmark for this.

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
<sup>474</sup> Fazal Rabbi Habib Nawaz, "Islamization in the Islamic Republic Pakistan: A Historical Analysis," *Al-Azhaar Research Journal* 3, no. 2 (2017): 47–63.

<sup>475</sup> Nasim Ashraf, *The Islamization of Pakistan's Education System: 1979-1989* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 2009), p. 25


<sup>476</sup> Ashraf, *The Islamization of Pakistan's Education System: 1979-1989*, p. 25

<sup>477</sup> Tanwir, "Religious Parties and Politics in Pakistan," p. 252

**Figure 20. Share of Seats in the NA of the Religious Political Institution<sup>478</sup>**



**Figure 21. Rise of Religious Seminaries in Pakistan 1947-2011<sup>479</sup>**



<sup>478</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan, Free and Fair Election Network, “ElectionPakistan | Pakistan’s Premier Election Portal | Elections Pakistan,” Election Pakistan (Free and Fair Election Network).

Pakistan Institute Of Legislative Development And Transparency, *The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan’s Transition from Democracy above Rule of Law to Democracy under Rule of Law: 1970-2013*.

<sup>479</sup> Mumtaz Ahmad, “Madrassa Education in Pakistan,” in *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 107

James D. Templin, “Religious Education of Pakistan’s Deobandi Madaris and Radicalisation,” *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 7, no. 5 (2015): 15–21, p. 17. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351354>.

\* This represents the general election years after which the religious political institution became part of the central government. In 1977, JI was part of PNA coalition and later partnered with the military elites to form Islami Jamhoori Itehad – IJI (‘Islamic Democratic Alliance) that derailed the government in 1988 and formed government in 1990. In 2002, the religious political institution again partnered with the military dictator. What is important is that 2008 and onward marks the reversal of state policy and parting of ways with the religious political institution. From there on, the religious political institution struggles to capture seats in the NA.

The figures above are not intended to indicate the rise of religious extremism and in no way indicates that religious seminaries provide mobilizing structures to terrorists. It only indicates a benchmark to understand how religious interest aggregation expanded in Pakistani society. Between the years 1950-1971, the population that was already members of the clergy or religious teachers, professors and politicians, initiated the socio-political interest aggregation with the support of the state's structure giving them the base to rapidly increase the number of religious seminaries (1971-2001)<sup>480</sup>. The teachers, professors, politicians and students who pass through these religious seminaries can act as individuals and groups in society that further expand religious interest aggregation within schools, colleges, universities and society. Empirical research in relation to the religious seminaries strongly suggests that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted an increase in the enrolment of children in the religious seminaries and that was further increased with the rise of the Taliban<sup>481</sup>. The research also confirms a rise in the enrolment in the religious seminaries was witnessed in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan bordering the Afghanistan and suggests that events in Afghanistan as revealed below, influence this enrolment<sup>482</sup>. Therefore, the Pashtun areas in Baluchistan and FATA can be considered to become the largest base camps for the religious interest aggregation within the society of these regions.

#### *Establishment of Religious VMSs*

The political events of the year 1979 could be regarded as triggers for polarization within the interest aggregated groups by providing them with new political opportunities. The rise of Shia Islam (empowered by the Iranian revolution in 1979) on the other side of the border and the rapid Islamization policies of General Zia (focused on a conservative Saudi version of Islam called Wahhabism within Sunni Islam) initiated religious sub-sect activism in Pakistani society which explains the rise of Shia-Sunni conflicts in the country (see chapter two). The focus from this inter-religious conflict shifted when the soviets invaded Afghanistan. This provided another political opportunity to the religious interest aggregated groups and triggered polarization, this time targeting a non-Muslim state (the Soviet Union) that had invaded a Muslim state (Afghanistan). The rise in the religious seminaries can be explained by the VMSs requiring human, physical and financial mobilizing structures to develop, according to the theory of radicalization and social movement suggested in chapter three.

Individual and group examples reveal that polarization did actually occur within the religious mobilizing structures available in Pakistan that were expanded by the state after its shift in policy in 1970. Religious clerics like Maulana Irshad, a student of the religious seminary Darul Uloom Binori Town in Karachi, decided to participate in Jihad in Afghanistan in February 1980 with three

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<sup>480</sup> Khan, "Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State?," p. 388

<sup>481</sup> Tahir Andrabi et al., "Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data," *Comparative Education Review* 50, no. 3 (August 2006): 446-77, p. 464. <https://doi.org/10.1086/503885>.

<sup>482</sup> Andrabi et al., "Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data," p. 464

of his fellow students<sup>483</sup>. Other examples, such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and Molvi Younis Khalis (both students) and Maulana Abdul Haq (Principal) from Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary in the KP province, became prominent commanders and holy warriors in the war<sup>484</sup>. Maulana Masud Alvi from Jamia Khairul Uloom seminary in Multan first joined the Haqqanis and then established his own militant organization, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen<sup>485</sup>. The head of the religious political party JI, Maulana Maudodi, announced support for the Jihad in Afghanistan<sup>486</sup> and one of his party's activists and an executive member of the student wing of JI, Bakht Zaman, formed the militant organization Ansarul Mujahideen<sup>487</sup>. Another important religious figure was Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, the principal of religious seminary Darul Uloom Binori Town in Karachi (the birth place of JUI political party) who was respected and held in high esteem by the militants for his remarks supporting violent Jihad, the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda<sup>488</sup>.

The religious VMSs required continuous human, physical and financial resources for which there already existed religious bodies, institutions and religious student groups in universities and colleges involved in religious interest aggregation. It is also a reality that not all Pakistani Jihadists in Afghanistan came from the religious seminaries in Pakistan. This can be supported by the statement of Shamzai when he praises the polarized groups (Jihadists organizations) for remaining steadfast in their mission and enabling an environment of Jihad in every corner of the country despite being initially banned from entering the religious seminaries at the start of the Soviet War<sup>489</sup>.

To prove that religious interest aggregation is still present throughout the country, empirical research by Saba Hanif, Majid Hasan Ali and Faiza Shaheen in 2019 focused on the students in the religious seminaries as well as those studying in schools in one of the well-developed and modern cities of Pakistan (Lahore). The statistical correlations of the study reveal that the students of both sides show sympathy towards the Taliban and reveal a moderate correlation of extremism among school students and a higher correlation of extremism among students of religious

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<sup>483</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, Safdar Sial, and Abdul Basit, *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA* (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2010), p. 42

<sup>484</sup> Rana, Sial and Basit, *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA*, p. 43

<sup>485</sup> Rana, Sial and Basit, *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA*, p. 44

<sup>486</sup> Rana, Sial and Basit, *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA*, p. 43

<sup>487</sup> Rana, Sial and Basit, *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA*, p. 58-59

<sup>488</sup> Farhan Zahid, "Deconstructing Thoughts and Worldviews of Militant Ideologue Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 10, no. 7 (2018): 8–11, p. 09


<sup>489</sup> Maulana Qutbuddin Abid, *Khutbaat-e-Shamzai*, vol. 1 (Karachi: Mufti Mehmood Academy, 2003), p. 132

seminaries<sup>490</sup>. It also reveals that the level of religiosity of students is a predictor of extremism in schools<sup>491</sup>.

The section will now study the trends of the religious terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the change of situation of their political opportunities in both countries.

Analysing the attacks in conjunction with Figures 16, 17 and 20 reveals that there exists a relationship between the religious political struggle of the religious mobilizing structures and the number of terrorist attacks carried out by religious militant groups in Pakistan. The data was obtained from the Global Terrorism Database and reveals the trends of terrorist attacks in Pakistan after 1971. The data was filtered to include only the terrorist attacks claimed by the religious militant groups. All other types of attacks, including those marked as carried out by 'unknown' entities, were excluded from the data.

**Figure 22. Trends in the number of Terrorist Attacks by Religious Militant Groups in Pakistan before and after 2001<sup>492</sup>**



Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland

<sup>490</sup> Saba Hanif, Majid Hassan Ali, and Faiza Shaheen, “Religious Extremism, Religiosity and Sympathy toward the Taliban among Students across Madrassas and Worldly Education Schools in Pakistan,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 33, no. 3 (April 15, 2019): 1–16, p. 12. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1548354>.

<sup>491</sup> Hanif, Ali, and Shaheen, “Religious Extremism, Religiosity and Sympathy toward the Taliban among Students across Madrassas and Worldly Education Schools in Pakistan,” p. 12

<sup>492</sup> Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, GTD 1970-2019, September 17, 2019. Distributed by the Global Terrorism Data Base, University of Maryland, [https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb\\_0221dist.xlsx](https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb_0221dist.xlsx)



The number of seats of the religious political institution in the central and provincial government of Pakistan started to decline after 1993: however, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan led them to shift their focus towards social and political change in Afghanistan. Therefore, their mobilizing structures continued to rise in Pakistan (see Figure 21). The turning point came when their political opportunity was blocked in Afghanistan (with the US war on terror in 2001) but opened up again in Pakistan in 2002. Then in 2002, the religious political institution formed an alliance with the government in the centre (with 20% share of seats), Baluchistan (with 25% share of seats), and in KP (with 49% share of seats) until 2007-08. The rise in the number of mobilizing structures steeply increased between 2001-2007 (see Figure 21) but the number of terrorist attacks in Figure 22 is not as high.

However, an important policy shift by the government of Pakistan after 2001 was to bring the religious seminaries under its control and reform them through acts and ordinances<sup>493</sup>. This threat to the mobilizing structures of terrorist groups explains the rapid rise of religious seminaries after 2001 and a slow rise of terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2005. In addition, the government of Pakistan (under US pressure) conducted military operations in FATA in 2002 to flush out foreign militants linked to Al-Qaeda, banned many local sectarian and religious militant organizations it once supported, and started cracking down on their activists in the rest of the country<sup>494</sup>. While it became difficult to flush out all of the foreign militants due to the state's lack of influence and FATA's rugged terrain, local Pakistani militants started pouring into FATA to avoid the onslaught in the rest of the country<sup>495</sup>. The networking of these local militants and banned organizations brought them together under one umbrella organization, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in 2007. Hence 2002 to 2007 also marks another process of *interest aggregation* and *polarization* among the local militant groups (those who were already in FATA and those who escaped from the rest of Pakistan) in FATA and their mobilizing structures scattered throughout the country. This time they became polarized against, and hostile towards, the state of Pakistan. The rise in the number of terrorist attacks is visible from 2007 onwards in Figure 22. The year 2009 (and afterwards) also include strong military operations by the state of Pakistan against all the militants and terrorist organization throughout FATA and against all the mobilizing structures throughout the country.

It is, therefore, understood that the political opportunity of the state initially gave rise to the SMT concept in society that established the religious political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. The SMT concept led to strong religious interest aggregation that helped the polarized groups to fight against the Soviets after 1979 and then the US after 2001 in Afghanistan. The shift in the state policy to block the religious political opportunity of the interest aggregated

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<sup>493</sup> Abdul Rauf Iqbal and Sobia Raza, "Madrasa Reforms in Pakistan: A Historical Analysis," *ISSRA Papers*, 2015, 27-50, p. 38-44

<sup>494</sup> Rana, Sial and Basit, *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA*, p. 13-39

<sup>495</sup> Rana, Sial and Basit, *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA*, p. 13-39

groups in Pakistan again triggered the SMT concept among the polarized groups and their mobilizing structures in Pakistan, leading to the rise of religious terrorism in Pakistan.

The case of the Baloch ethnic insurgency and a potential rise of an ethnic insurgency in FATA also results from the structural domination and SMT concepts but the dynamics at play are different and are discussed below.

#### **5.4.2. The Hazard of Tribal and Ethnic Social Movement and Interest Aggregation for Social Change**

In reference to the context of the religious political opportunity explained above, it can be assumed that the obstruction of ethnic political struggle of the Baloch sub-nation might result in establishment of ethnic vulnerable mobilizing structures. This requires revisiting the historical context.

In terms of Baluchistan, the first three phases of insurgencies suggest that they were tribal- induced insurgencies and were led by the resisting elites of the Kalat state. The first threat to the Baloch (Kalat) state and sub-nation came near the departure of the British from India. According to Shah, Harrison and Bizenjo, the short-lived (September 1947 – April 1948) independent Baloch Kalat state (with the Khan of Kalat as its confederate leader over a parliamentary structure that has an upper house comprising tribal chiefs and lower house comprising elected ethno-nationalists) had a standstill agreement with Pakistan and voted for independence and against accession to either Pakistan or India. Here lies an important dilemma. The Khan of Kalat acceded to Pakistan (by force according to Shah and Harrison: by will according to Bizenjo). However, the revolt over the accession also came from the confederation as the brother of the Khan resisted and established the insurgent group Baloch National Liberation Committee<sup>496</sup>. This was the first phase of the insurgency which ended in June 1948 when the brother of the Khan Abdul Karim surrendered. However, none of the tribal chiefs (members of the upper house of the parliament of Kalat state) were part of the revolt.

Bizenjo, (an ethno-nationalist and a member of the lower house of the parliament of the Kalat sate) writes:

It should not be forgotten that the Baloch tribes were yet to evolve and mature into conscious components of a nation. They still remained quarantined within the bounds of tribal, regional and clan-based factionalism. They mistook tribal separatism and ethno-centrism as the symbol of freedom and independence. They were not prepared to merge their separate identities into the larger framework of a Baloch Nation<sup>497</sup>.

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<sup>496</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 26

<sup>497</sup> Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, ed. Biyyathil M. Kutty (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre University of Karachi, 2009). p. 73

The second political struggle for the Baloch elites came in 1952 when the Baloch States Union (BSU), comprising the territories of Kalat, Makran, Labela and Kharan, was formed with the Khan as its president. It was officially notified as BSU (a princely state of Pakistan) in April 1952 by the government of Pakistan<sup>498</sup>. However, in 1958 when the Pakistani state assembled all the regions of west-Pakistan to forge One-Unit (a single province), the BSU was merged into the One-Unit. Bizenjo and Harrison state that the politically conscious Baloch nationalists demanded that Baluchistan be made a separate province<sup>499</sup>. The Khan and the tribal chiefs organized tribal activism for a unified Baloch state<sup>500</sup>. As a result, the Khan along with his supporters was arrested and martial law was imposed in the country the very next day. The presence of the military in the khanate resulted in some skirmishes with local people that triggered the second tribal revolt with a force of approximately 750 to 1000 Baloch guerrilla fighters<sup>501</sup>. On the other hand, the Baloch nationalists including Bizenjo initiated an anti-martial law movement; as Bizenjo mentions, their movement gave the tribe-centred revolt a political dimension leading to agitations and violence throughout Baluchistan<sup>502</sup>.

There were also some political developments that led to the third phase of the insurgency in 1960 and triggered the *Parari* movement. The political struggle of Baloch ethno-nationalists and three notable Baloch tribal chiefs against the One-Unit landed them in jail. Among them were the tribal chiefs of the Marri tribe Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, Mengal tribe, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, and Bugti tribe Nawab Akbar Bugti. The removal of these chiefs from the chieftainship of their tribes by the state and their replacement with the state sponsored chiefs was enough to infuriate the already angry tribesmen and initiated the movement. *Parari* is a Balochi word used to describe an individual with grievances<sup>503</sup>. Mazari calls this guerrilla organization “loosely based”<sup>504</sup>. Harrison reveals that the *Pararis* were able to set up approximately 22 camps spread over the areas of Mengal, Marri and Bugti tribal areas<sup>505</sup>.

The unconstitutional political arrests of tribal chiefs and Baloch nationalists and the physical and mental torture they faced behind bars are described in detail by Bizenjo and Mazari and are very much in line with the theory of aggression and identity expansion<sup>506</sup>. It seems that while the aggression and identity expansion theories of radicalization were working on the Baloch tribal chiefs, the polarization theory of radicalization was working on their tribesmen. That does not mean that the interest aggregation theory of radicalization had lost its power. All the three phases

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<sup>498</sup> Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 67

<sup>499</sup> Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 83, also see Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 27

<sup>500</sup> Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 98

<sup>501</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 28

<sup>502</sup> Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 100-101

<sup>503</sup> Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 30

<sup>504</sup> Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). p. 112

<sup>505</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 30

<sup>506</sup> Sherbaz k. Mazari, “A Journey to Disillusionment”, (Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 101-102

of the insurgencies were tribal revolts but ended up radicalizing the tribesmen who started to develop positive identification among themselves. On the other hand, the Baloch nationalists used the tribal revolts to initiate interest aggregation that brought the Baloch tribes close and with every action of the state to deal with the insurgents, tribal chiefs and Baloch ethno-nationalists, the interest aggregation grew and manifested positive identification among the tribally divided Baloch sub-nation. The *parari* movement ended in 1969 when the state announced the withdrawal of the One Unit, elevation of Baluchistan to the status of a separate provincial region (giving the Baloch sub-nation the opportunity to set up their own provincial government for the first time in the coming 1970 general elections<sup>507</sup>), and release of the Baloch nationalists and the tribal chiefs<sup>508</sup>.

The evidence that the three tribal revolts brought the tribally divided Baloch sub-nation closer was revealed at the outcome of the general elections of 1972 and gave the Baloch resisting elites (see Table 6) the power to control the elements of the government of the Baluchistan sub-state. This political opportunity of the resisting elites was obstructed after nine months when their government was toppled. In his book, Mazari explains that not only was the formation of the provincial government by resisting elites disliked by the state, but efforts were made by dominating elites, with the support of the central government, to demonstrate that the resisting elites were making efforts to seek an independent Baluchistan and that they were also incompetent to run the provincial government. Mazari, Harrison and Bizenjo name the dominating elites, Jam Ghulam Qadir and Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai, with the support of the central government, and point to their efforts that led to the dissolution of the provincial government in Baluchistan<sup>509</sup>.

There is another important political aspect to this situation. The resisting elite leadership of the NAP provincial government was eager to abolish the tribal system in Baluchistan and bring land reforms to redistribute land among farmers and peasants. Mengal and Marri (leaders of the NAP government in Baluchistan) are called progressive tribal chiefs with socialist ideals who were opposed to the dominating elite tribal chiefs. Marri had abolished many of the taxes that were imposed on his tribe by the previous chiefs, while Mengal is said to have divested half of his inherited lands and parcelled them to his tenants<sup>510</sup>. The reforms and bills that the NAP Baluchistan government passed (or was in the process of passing) are outlined by Bizenjo in his book<sup>511</sup>. The objective was to abolish the elite structure in the sub-state and therefore, this landed the nationalists and the progressive tribal chiefs (resisting elites) in jail.

This prompted the *pararis* to emerge again with full force to create an organization called the Baloch People's Liberation Front<sup>512</sup>. Again, the skirmishes with the Pakistan Army were confined

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<sup>507</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 34

<sup>508</sup> Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, p. 148

<sup>509</sup> Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, p. 148

<sup>510</sup> Siddiqi, *The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan the Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements*, p. 65

<sup>511</sup> Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 173

<sup>512</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 34

to the areas of the Marri and Mengal tribes but the participation of Baloch nationalists from other areas could not be ruled out as Selig S. Harrison mentions “The fighting was more widespread than it had been during the conflicts of the fifties and sixties and touched most of the Baloch population at one time or another. Every area had its legend of Pakistani villains and Baloch heroes”<sup>513</sup>. The war ended when Bhutto was ousted by the military general Zia-Ul-Haq who released about 6000 political prisoners, declared amnesty for the *pararis* (which was accepted by some as Harrison notes) and brokered a truce with the detained leaders of NAP Baluchistan.

Additional evidence that suggests that the Baloch nationalists were also part of the fourth insurgency by this time, the vulnerable mobilizing structure had been established in Baluchistan. The mobilizing structure that serves as a platform for creating an ethnically radicalized social environment is the Baloch student Organization (BSO). The BSO formed in 1967 was, (and is still), the entry point of the middle-class Baloch youth into the nationalist movement and still comprises many factions within, each supporting either a political party or an insurgent group<sup>514</sup>. The organization has always played an active part for the rights of the Baloch sub-nation and has had the backing of the Baloch political parties and political figures. Many of the current and previous middle-class Baloch nationalist leaders have remained active members of the organization, including Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch and Bizenjo. The circumstances that led to the establishment of this mobilizing structure will be elaborated on and discussed below and in the next chapter. The BSO has continued to grow and channels ethno-nationalists interest aggregation within the Baloch sub-nation.

The dictatorship of General Zia, including the formal Islamization process of the state and the war in Afghanistan, impacted the political situation in Baluchistan allowing the dominating elites to remain part of the provincial government of Baluchistan from then onwards<sup>515</sup>. In addition to them was the rising power of the clergy in the social and political realm of Baluchistan, which was another obstacle for the Baloch sub-nation in their political struggle for the rights of the people of Baluchistan<sup>516</sup>. The conflict between the state and Baloch sub-nation had lost its intensity and there were hardly any incidents of skirmishes between them from 1978 onwards. The number of attacks claimed by any Baloch insurgent group from 1979 to 2001 was 18<sup>517</sup>. A sharp increase in the number of insurgent attacks was also observed in Baluchistan after 2001. According to research in 2019 on the resilience of the Baluchistan Insurgency, fifteen insurgent groups have taken part in the Baloch insurgency since 2004 and have been responsible for 877 insurgent attacks since

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<sup>513</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 36

<sup>514</sup> Fredric Gare, *Balochistan: The State versus the Nation*, vol. The Carnegie Papers: South Asia (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), p. 6

<sup>515</sup> Alok Bansal, “Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 182–200, p. 184. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310802061356>.

<sup>516</sup> Bansal, “Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan,” p. 188

<sup>517</sup> Tanner, “Explaining the Resilience of the Balochistan Insurgency”, p. 44

then<sup>518</sup>. The research also finds that the current phase of the insurgency (in its sixteenth year) has been able to survive due to popular support from the physical base in Baluchistan and for the following reasons<sup>519</sup>:

- i) This phase of the insurgency is led by the educated Baloch middle class;
- ii) There are no inter-group conflicts between the insurgent groups which reveals a sense of cohesion of sentiments among the insurgent groups;
- iii) The insurgency has gained massive support through the internet and via strong social media movements;
- iv) The Gwadar port project (CPEC) by the state has added fuel to the insurgency where the Baloch sub-nation see it as enhanced structural domination over the resources of Baluchistan by the state of Pakistan with the influx of foreigners, particularly Chinese workers; and
- v) The past grievances of the Baloch sub-nation have not been resolved and the animosity of the Baloch towards the central government has not yet been alleviated.

These reasons point to a decline in the difference between the meta-opinion and the average opinion of the Baloch population regarding the state of Pakistan and a convergence of their political opportunities. The Gwadar port project and the government policy of not recruiting the local Baloch people in the project is a justified grievance and is the triggering factor for the insurgency. Another important trigger of the insurgency is the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 at the hands of the state. However, the fact still remains that the radicalization process did not end after 1979, and as a result, the current insurgency is led by the Baloch middle class instead of the tribal chiefs as in the past. This provides evidence that the vulnerable mobilizing structure (VMSs) BSO has played an active role in keeping the interest aggregation of the Baloch sub-nation sustained. However, the events, circumstances, and socio-economic conditions leading to the establishment, sustenance, and growth of the VMSs will be elaborated on in detail in the next chapter.

The entire case of blocked political opportunity of the Baloch resisting elites can be also attributed to the Pashtun resisting elites of FATA. The political, administrative and social merger of FATA with the rest of the country was expected to spark nationalism among the tribal Pashtuns of FATA, as suggested in chapter three in theoretical terms that with the departure of tribal activism, ethnic nationalism was the next logical step for the Pashtuns of FATA.

Right at the onset of the FATA merger with the state, a movement known as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) (Pashtun Protection Movement) appeared in FATA. While the movement was sparked by the judicial killing of a FATA Pashtun in another corner of the country, it soon realized the opportunity of Pashtun ethnic nationalism as it gained massive prominence throughout the

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<sup>518</sup> Tanner, "Explaining the Resilience of the Balochistan Insurgency", p. 40

<sup>519</sup> Tanner, "Explaining the Resilience of the Balochistan Insurgency", p. 7-8

country and the world<sup>520</sup>. The movement, like BSO in 1967, is a potential vulnerable mobilizing structure and also has two of its representatives in the National Assembly. The PTM and their social and political representatives are being treated the same way as the Baloch resisting elites were by the state in the 1960s and 70s. There have been events that could have caused the conflict to turn violent. Although it has not done so far, the threat of the movement becoming violent cannot be ruled out, given the history of the tribal FATA Pashtuns and the approach towards them by the state and dominating elites.

## Conclusion

This chapter has confirmed that the process of radicalization in Baluchistan and FATA exists, as suggested by the SFV. The chapter reveals that the institutional expression of the state is the source of structural domination that gives rise to agents of social control and initiates social movements that turn to violence against the state by developing VMSs. In Pakistan, the state used the religious socio-political institutions to give rise to religious agents of social control, establishing a situation of structural domination to extend the policy of Islamization of society and give rise to religious social movement. The religious agents of social control were later blocked in their political opportunities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which triggered the rise of VMSs against Pakistan. However, in Baluchistan, the political opportunities of the state give rise to ethnic, tribal, and religious agents of social control (dominating and resisting elites). These agents, through the structural domination concept, give rise to social movements that radicalize the Baloch sub-nation, transforming them into insurgents and triggering ethnic insurgent groups to surface. The political opportunities of the Baloch sub-nation also remain continuously blocked by both groups of elites.

The political grievances of the religious, ethnic and tribal agents of social control against the key stakeholder central institutions produce conditions for the framing process. The framing process points to the key stakeholder central institutions being responsible for those grievances. The political grievances are channelled towards the religious and ethnic social diaspora in the country, making them vulnerable to radicalization and resulting in expansion of the religious and ethnic VMSs targeting the state. This dynamic creates a vulnerability to radicalization of the religious and ethnic people in Baluchistan and FATA and will be explained and discussed in detail in the next chapter.

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<sup>520</sup> Abdur Rehman Shah, "The Rise of Pashtun Protection Movement (PTM): Polemics and Conspiracy Theories," *Asian Affairs* 51, no. 2 (March 14, 2020): 265–85, p. 270-273. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2020.1752568>.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Grievances of the Religious Nation and Ethnic Sub-nations**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter will conclude the first case study of stage II in the development of the CPR model. So far, the first case study, which focuses on applying the SFV in Baluchistan and FATA has revealed the internal dynamics of the key stakeholder institutions and the poor level of relationship between the state of Pakistan with the sub-nations of Baluchistan and FATA, which is regulated by these institutions (examined in chapter four). The case study has also revealed that the institutional expression of the state is the source of structural domination that initiates social movements and gives rise to religious and ethnic radicalization and develops VMSs to target the state (explained in chapter five). In this chapter, the research elaborates on the socio-political grievances of the people towards the state that makes them vulnerable to ethnic and religious radicalization and expands the VMSs against the state.

This chapter firstly elaborates on the socio-political factors that give strength to the existing institutional expression of the sub-state structure in Baluchistan and FATA. Secondly, it outlines the grievances of the religious nation and the ethnic sub-nations that arise from the existing institutional expression of the sub-state. Thirdly, the politicization of those grievances by the stakeholder institutions is investigated through the responses of the representatives of the institutions and primary data gathered during the interviews. Lastly, the framing of those political grievances over the religious and ethnic grieving population to expand the religious and ethnic VMSs is analyzed and studied. This chapter draws on secondary data as well as primary data received from the survey sample and the respondents interviewed (as explained in chapter one). The survey sample for this chapter is divided into, and draws upon responses from, three regions (elaborated on in section 1.4): the Baluchistan Princely States (representing the areas comprised of the state of Kalat), Quetta (representing the areas that came under British Baluchistan), and FATA.

#### **6.1. The Institutional Expression of the Sub-state: Baluchistan and FATA**

Analysis of the dimensions of engagement of the sub-state (dominating and resisting) elites with the people and the political institution helps to understand the dynamics that help them to establish the institutional expression of the sub-state.


##### *The Dimensions of Engagement*

The political institution in Pakistan provides a platform to the key stakeholder central and regional institutions to structure the elements of the central and regional governments (legislature, rule of law, and constitution) according to their own interests. The political institution comprises the ethnic, religious, and mainstream political parties. The research participants from the survey



sample were asked various questions to determine and understand the dimension of the political engagement used by political parties to project their influence across the societies in Baluchistan and FATA. The agendas of the political parties in Figure 23 below will help to determine the political engagement in both the regions according to the responses of the survey participants.

**Figure 23. Agendas of the Political Parties in the Regions<sup>521</sup>**



The responses of participants in FATA and Quetta show that their population faces somewhat equal engagement with religious, mainstream and ethno-nationalist political parties. The situation changes in the Princely States of the Baluchistan region where participants are actively engaged by ethno-nationalists followed by religious political parties and few participants are engaged by mainstream political parties. Comparing the data in the Figure 23 with the actual number of political parties and their agendas in the regions will help to support the analysis above. This can be done by retrieving the number of political parties that actually took part in the general elections of 2013 and 2018 in the three regions from the sources mentioned in the footnotes for 2013<sup>522</sup> and 2018<sup>523</sup>. According to the data:

<sup>521</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

<sup>522</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections 2013: Report Volume II,”. p. 7-478.

<sup>523</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections 2018-Form-33- Final List of Contesting Candidates,” Please see KP (National Assembly / Provincial Assembly) and Baluchistan (National Assembly and Provincial Assembly).

- The number of political parties that contested the general elections from the Princely States of Baluchistan in 2013 increased from 21 to 29 in 2018; Mainstream political parties increased from 7 to 11; Religious political parties remained at 7 and ethno-nationalist political parties increased from 7 to 11;
- The number of political parties that contested the general elections from Quetta in 2013 increased from 25 to 30 in 2018; Mainstream political parties increased from 10 to 14; Religious political parties increased from 7 to 8; and ethno-nationalist political parties remained 8 in both elections and
- The number of political parties that contested the general elections from FATA\* in 2013 declined from 16 to 9 in 2018; Mainstream political parties declined from 8 to 4; Religious political parties declined from 4 to 3; and ethno-nationalist political parties declined from 4 to 2.

The understanding here is that the higher the degree of fragmentation (based on a higher number of political parties in a given constituency or region) of the party system, the more the people are engaged by the political parties<sup>524</sup>. A higher degree of fragmentation increases the informational demand on voters because there are more electoral candidates and therefore, the voters have to evaluate more political messages, especially during election time<sup>525</sup>. However, the political messages are created and established by the top leadership of the political parties who are the agents of social control and establish the institutional expression of the sub-state according to their interests, as in maximal state situation. Figure 24 below shows the social status of the chairman or head of the political parties who are a source of linkage between the state and the people in the three regions. For this study, we will still assume FATA is a separate region from KP province.


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<sup>524</sup> Zahid Hasnain, "The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999," p. 130

<sup>525</sup> Hasnain, "The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999," p. 130

\* It is important to note that up till the general elections of 2013, FATA was considered an administrative unit according to the constitution of Pakistan. The constitution only allowed candidates from FATA to contest seats in the national assembly. This gave the opportunity to the all the political parties in the rest of Pakistan to inject into FATA to nominate their candidates for the general assembly and become the voice for the people of FATA. However, a constitutional amendment was brought in by the national assembly by the end of the term of the government that was formed as a result of general elections of 2013. This constitutional amendment merged FATA into the KP province and converted the tribal agencies into tribal districts. The general elections of 2018 again saw mainstream political parties nominating their candidates from the tribal districts for the national assembly. But elections for the representation of the people of tribal districts in the provincial assembly of KP were conducted in 2019, after the KP assembly passed the bill to increase the number of seats for the constituencies of the tribal districts. The bullet point for year 2018 above for FATA represents the parties that nominated their candidates for national and provincial assembly.

**Figure 24. Source of Socio-Political linkage between the State, Nation and the Sub-nation in the Sub-state<sup>526</sup>**



The tribal chiefs are highly active in the political institution of the Princely States of Baluchistan region, followed by Quetta and then FATA. Figure 24 also shows that the ethnic elites, on the other hand, are most active in the political institution of FATA followed by Quetta and the Princely States of Baluchistan. The religious elites have a high level of involvement in the political institution of Quetta, followed by the FATA region, then the Princely States of Baluchistan. Considering the hold of these agents of social control in FATA and Baluchistan, it is not a surprise that the involvement of political personalities in the political institution of these regions is very low. The section now explores the dynamics used by the political leaders to establish linkages with the key stakeholder central institutions and the people of Baluchistan and FATA.

#### *Linking the Sub-state Elites with the Central Political Class and the People*

The linkage of the political parties with the nation of the state is closely related to the functioning of the political parties in a political system. These functions come under the umbrella of the ‘political linkage’ function of each political party and can be divided into two dimensions. One dimension is the *Internal Linkage*, how members within the party link and interact with one another; and the other dimension is the *External Linkage*, how members of the party link and interact with citizens outside the party<sup>527</sup>. Developing the internal or external linkage is as important as maintaining that particular linkage so that members become and remain important stakeholders within the party. To establish and maintain linkage with citizens outside the party it

<sup>526</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

<sup>527</sup> Qazi, Khan, and Khan, “Liberal Ideals & Extremism-Terrorism in the Name of Islam in Pakistan,” p. 18

becomes important to identify a) the kind of activities the party undertakes to establish and maintain linkage, b) the groups the party targets, and c) what part of the party establishes and maintains that link<sup>528</sup>. Similarly, an analysis of the openness of the party to new members, specifically the party policy and criteria for becoming a member, is necessary to understand how the party ties its individual members to the party organization<sup>529</sup>.

As analysed in chapters four and five, the internal linkage in the political institution of Pakistan is based on dynastic politics, nepotism and feudalism where there is no specific formal rule to recruit party members except the requirement of coming from the influential religious, tribal or ethnic elite group, and relationship with party leaders and favouritism of the elites<sup>530</sup>. The ability of an individual party member to procure a high number of votes from their constituency is key to this linkage with the political party. This reality makes the agents of social control in Baluchistan and FATA regions enticing prospective members because they have the ability to win the constituency for the party due to their existing social power, influence, and status. This situation also helps these agents to establish leverage within the party structure to exploit, reach the level of top leadership, and gain influential positions within the party. It is through this system that the dominant feudal elite in rural areas get to share power with influential urban groups. Dr. Maleeha Lodhi names this internal linkage within political parties *Clientelism* and considers it the hallmark of Pakistani politics<sup>531</sup> while the political parties in Pakistan fall into the “Clientelistic Party” category. Clientelistic political parties aim to secure a maximum number of votes through different types of vote-buying activities, where they make clientelistic deals to maximize their number of votes and during this process they ignore the party ideology or its stance<sup>532</sup>.

On the other hand, developing the *internal linkage* in the party system is as important as maintaining it, and depends on the ability of the client to again procure the highest number of votes for the party in the next general elections. The client therefore remains motivated to not only maintain external linkages at their power base (constituents) but also widen it. Therefore, the maintenance of internal linkages in a clientelistic party structure depends on the client’s ability to maintain and widen his external linkages with the population. However, there still remains the identification of the target population groups that the elites or their party target through what activities.

The agents of social control, whether dominating or resisting elites, transform their influence and authority over their supporters into a system of patronage as they exercise authority over the people through the political institution or their social elitist status. The image of the tribal, ethnic or

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<sup>528</sup> Qazi, Khan, and Khan, “Liberal Ideals & Extremism-Terrorism in the Name of Islam in Pakistan,” p. 19

<sup>529</sup> Qazi, Khan, and Khan, “Liberal Ideals & Extremism-Terrorism in the Name of Islam in Pakistan,” p. 19

<sup>530</sup> Nadeem Akhtar, “Role of Political Parties in the Democratic System of Pakistan” (Master Thesis (Dissertation), 2011), p. 23 [https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/33025/1/gupea\\_2077\\_33025\\_1.pdf](https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/33025/1/gupea_2077_33025_1.pdf)


<sup>531</sup> Maleeha Lodhi, *Pakistan : Beyond the “Crisis State”* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). p. 55

<sup>532</sup> Ann-Kristin Jonasson, *At the Command of God?: On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties* (Göteborg, Sweden: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Göteborg University, 2004). p. 22

religious elite as providers of *socio-economic or security benefits* to the people, independently or through the state institutions is what drives this patron system. It is considered as the credible communication between the elites and the people. The elite presents his influence and power to prove that he/she is personally responsible for certain socio-economic and security improvements by providing certain targeted benefits that are patron-oriented rather than public-oriented to the citizen<sup>533</sup>. For the purpose of this research, consider the patron-based recruitment as an important indicator to reveal the patron-client relationship.

Patronage-based recruitment of staff will benefit a narrow segment of the population (the recruited and his family) who will be well informed about who was responsible for hiring them, yet the quality of the department and the public good may suffer. Take the employment of patron-based teachers in the government schools as an example. The quality of education will improve if qualified teachers are recruited who are regularly present in the school but the population will then often assign this improvement in the quality of education to the state rather than the client<sup>534</sup>. Access of patron-oriented services to the patrons by the agents of social control reveals to the people that the agents are not only influential and powerful in the society but also in the government institutions (bureaucracy). To prove the existence of such a situation prevalent in the regions of this research, the survey participants were asked a series of questions. The initial query was to identify the percentage of the survey population who consider the agents powerful through their level of influence as depicted in Figure 25.

**Figure 25. Percentage of Survey Participants Identifying the Influential Agents of Social Control<sup>535</sup>**



<sup>533</sup> Hasnain, “The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999,” p. 130

<sup>534</sup> Hasnain, “The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999,” p. 130

<sup>535</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

The figure above has been prepared by combining the percentage of people who recorded ‘somewhat influential’, ‘influential’, and ‘highly influential’ for each agent of social control. The figure reveals that the tribal, ethnic, and religious agents of social control enjoy approximately equal influence but their level of influence cannot be properly judged unless it can be identified as a preferred source of privileges by the people themselves. The participants were asked to identify the institutional expression that people in the society consider legitimate in order to resolve problems, conflict or issues in society revealed in Figure 26. They were given the options to select either one or more than one option from the tribal, religious and ethnic elites (which are added to the sub-state institutional expression). In FATA, the sub-state system also had the option of FCR; adding the PAs in the sub-state system. For the institutional expression of the state the participants were given the option of the police and court. The numbers in the figure represent the percentage of survey participants who responded to the type of institutional expression preferred by the people in their areas.

**Figure 26. Preferable Institutional Expression in the Society for Conflict or Problem Resolution<sup>536</sup>**



A higher preference of the people of Baluchistan (Quetta and Princely States of Baluchistan combined) for the sub-state system confirms the strength and legitimacy of the agents of social control and the institutional expression of the sub-state. On the other hand, the sub-state system is the most influential in FATA and may become a problem for the state after the merger of FATA

<sup>536</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

in KP. FATA may present a situation similar to Baluchistan rather than KP, unless the power of the agents of social control is minimized.

Corruption in the state system, especially the state bureaucracy and executive, is one of the prior reasons the people give legitimacy to the non-state system. The more the state system is deemed corrupt, the higher, we can speculate, are the chances of the state system becoming patron to the most influential sub-state system identified in Figure 26. This works both ways in favour of the agents of social control. On one side they promote corruption in the state system that pushes the people away from the state towards the sub-state system controlled by themselves. It reinforces the reliance of the people on the institutional expression of the sub-state which is the traditional one and legitimizes it. On the other side, these agents enjoy power in the state system and enforce their authority through the bureaucracy and executive, creating an environment of nepotism, corruption, and patronage<sup>537</sup>.

While previous chapters have given the impression that the key stakeholder central institutions have been able to achieve structural domination of the sub-states through the dominating elites in FATA and Baluchistan, this section reveals that even in that case, the institutional expression that exists in these two regions is not entirely of the state. Therefore, legitimacy of the state is in conflict with the legitimacy of the sub-state and provides enough evidence that there is a sub-state elitist structure within the state that restricts a strong relationship between the state and the people. The focus of the chapter now shifts to considering whether the existing institutional expression of the sub-state or the state is a source of grievance for the nation and sub-nations in Baluchistan and FATA.

## **6.2. The Institutional Expression as Source of Grievance**

The SFV in chapter three identifies the model of civil strife by Gurr which explains a strong connection between grievance and political violence. The model introduces the concept of relative deprivation which is the difference between the value expectation and value capabilities of a nation. Value expectations are the political ambitions or the political opportunities and interests that are desired by a group, which include their interpersonal, welfare and power values<sup>538</sup>. The political opportunities of the state and the citizens in Baluchistan and FATA have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the value capabilities determine the actual condition of interpersonal, welfare, and power values of the group<sup>539</sup>. While Gurr suggests that constant or widening relative deprivation is a structural cause of political violence<sup>540</sup>, the concept of social injustice also suggests that rebellious and anti-social behaviours by citizens and people

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<sup>537</sup> Hoshang Noraiee, "The Modern Roots of Social and Political Fragmentations in Baluchistan in Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian Studies* 3, no. 1 (2015): 12–27. p. 19-20

<sup>538</sup> Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, p. 25-26

<sup>539</sup> Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, p. 25-26

<sup>540</sup> Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, p. 25-26

are a result of non-fulfilment of their basic human needs<sup>541</sup> which also points to relative deprivation.

The previous chapter suggests that the structural causes of conflict already exist in the sub-state and are policy related and create a climate for conflict to turn violent through structural domination and social movement. The proximate causes, which are factors that contribute to a climate that encourages conflicts to become violent or escalates the conflict, involves the grieving or revengeful population. The institutional expression as a source of grievance constructs and widens the proximate causes in the social fabric for the conflict to turn violent. To understand this, the representatives of institutions interviewed for this research were asked about the ways through which the people of Baluchistan and FATA can be stopped from joining the religious and ethnic conflict with the state. Every individual representative presented a similar argument that development of a strong relationship between the state and the people is necessary.

The institutional expression of the state is considered the core factor for establishing this strong relationship. The institutional expression of the state is generated by its institution of law and government, and while they may not necessarily constitute the essence of the state, they are a vital part of its being, expressing the essence of the state<sup>542</sup>. This responsibility of expressing a strong essence of the state lies in the hands of the political identity that governs the state and the sub-state (see Figures 5 and 6). The discussion above reveals that the agents of social control in Baluchistan and FATA (Figure 24) tend to corrupt and patronize the state institutions by controlling the elements of the sub-state government. In doing so, they are not only destroying the essence of the state but are also depicting it as corrupt and unable to provide socio-economic benefits and security to the people. Such a widespread and deeply rooted essence of a state among the population weakens the legitimacy of the state institutions to function and survive<sup>543</sup>.

To study corruption and patronization by the institutional expression of the sub-state in control of these agents of social control, the research participants were asked to determine the level of corruptness of the agents of social control and their institutional expression (Figure 27) and also identify the level of patrons being recruited by these elites in the government (Figure 28). The level of corruptness in each region was calculated by combining the percentage of participants who selected “moderately corrupt”, “corrupt” or “highly corrupt” against a particular client.

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
<sup>541</sup> Gyoosomlai, “Weather the Shadow: Social Justice within Cultural Relativism in Pakistan,” p. 05

<sup>542</sup> Barry Buzan and Paul Magette, *People, States*, p. 70

<sup>543</sup> Barry Buzan and Paul Magette, *People, States*, p. 70



**Figure 27. Percentage of Survey Participants determining the Corruptness of the Institutional Expression of the Sub-State<sup>544</sup>**



In Baluchistan (the Quetta and Princely States of Baluchistan combined) the agents of social control (Jirga and Tribal Chief) are considered less corrupt than the state system (police, bureaucracy, and judiciary) which is controlled by these agents but represents the state. The only difference is seen in FATA where the population have yet to experience the state judiciary system but consider the entire system to be corrupt whether state or sub-state. During the survey with the people of FATA, the police was referred to as law enforcement agencies that act like ‘local militias’ and the bureaucrats were referred to as ‘PAs’, both controlled by the FCR law. Together the PAs, Jirga and tribal chief form the judicial system of FATA under the FCR.


The level of corruptness of the state and sub-state systems can also be gauged through their patron-based recruitments. In the beginning, the people may see nepotism as a negative factor but prevalence of such a system in the society for long periods converts the non-patrons into patrons. This conversion is mostly focused on achieving certain socio-economic gains, which is the duty of the state to provide. The level of patronage-based recruitment in each region was calculated by combining the percentage of participants who selected recruitments done by the clients as “few” and “many” when answering how many people they know were appointed in government jobs based on their relationship with a particular client.

<sup>544</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

\* During the survey with the people of FATA, the police were referred to as the law enforcement agencies like “local militias” and the bureaucrats were referred to as “political agents”

\*\* The Judiciary as a state institution did not exist in FATA at the time of this research due to FCR and was represented by the Jirga

**Figure 28. Level of Patron-Based Recruitment by Elites experienced by the Percentage of Survey Participants in the Regions<sup>545</sup>**



Of the different groups, the politicians, bureaucrats and tribal Chiefs are considered to recruit the most patrons. That the Jirga members in FATA are considered equally corrupt (see Figure 27) but highly influential (see Figure 25), is likely to give them the ability to recruit patrons.

It is now evident that the agents of social control, as political clients of the central political class, create and widen the external linkage with the voters through activities that include patronage and corruption. There is a high probability of the institutional expression of the state widening in FATA after its merger with KP but it also depends on how the state tries to control the influence of the agents of social control after the merger from acting as alternate sources of power in case the state fails to develop a link with the people in FATA. This is the situation that Baluchistan is suffering from because the state is still hampered in establishing its institutional expression. The tribal institution and the ethno-nationalist political parties (both Pashtun and Baloch) and religious party (JUI) see the state as oppressors or hegemon by treating them unequally (identified in chapter five). When such an idea regarding the institutional expression of the state exists and widens through the social power structures of the tribal chiefs, ethnic and religious elites, it seeds and spreads their ideologies among the population that is facing relative deprivation. This is where the social injustice part that describes rebellious or anti-social behaviour injects the idea of structural violence.


To realize the level of relative deprivation, the participants of the research were asked a series of questions. The initial query was to identify if certain government departments relevant to socio-economic development, security, and justice exist and if the people are satisfied with the

<sup>545</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

\* The politicians in figure 29 narrates to local politicians or political parties. Such recruitments are termed as political recruitments by the political institution.

performance of the departments. The departments to be evaluated are those that focus on improving the living conditions of the citizens by improving civic, health, and education standards and providing an environment of law and order. According to the data gathered, the departments mentioned in Figure 29 and their offices exist in all parts of the regions. FATA was the only region where the departments for law and order were completely absent as already assumed due to the dynamics of FCR. The important aspect to note is the performance level of these departments in the eyes of the participants which is depicted in Figure 29.


**Figure 29. Percentage of Research Participants satisfied with Government Departments<sup>546</sup>**




It was expected that since the Quetta region represents the British Baluchistan part that had an established state structure before partition, its respondents would be somewhat satisfied but this was found not to be the case. The princely states, on the other hand, have a more satisfied group of respondents than Quetta. FATA, as already assumed, has the least satisfied citizens. However, people’s satisfaction is not the only way to determine the level of social justice or relative deprivation in these regions. The research questionnaire was designed so as to ask the research participants multiple questions on a similar issue, allowing the researcher to re-evaluate their previous response to confirm their view. For instance, while the participants may seem satisfied or dissatisfied with a specific department’s performance, a more direct question would help to look at the performance of the state from another viewpoint. Starting with the performance of the health department, the participants’ access to quality government hospital care (Figure 30), and maternal clinic care (Figure 31), and the number of people they are aware of who died due to unavailability of a doctor or absence of urgent medical services (Figure 32), reveals a poor relationship between the people and the state.

<sup>546</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.


**Figure 30. Participants' Access to Quality Public Health Care<sup>547</sup>**



**Figure 31. Participants' Access to Quality Public Maternal Health Clinics<sup>548</sup>**



**Figure 32. Number of Deaths the Participants recall due to Unavailability of Doctor or Urgent Medical Services<sup>549</sup>**




<sup>547</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

<sup>548</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

<sup>549</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

Such a poor state of the public health system has an impact on the way the citizens see the effectiveness of the state. In addition to the health department, the police and judiciary are the sole executives of the state for maintaining law and order and justice in the country. Figure 27 has already revealed the level of their corruptness in the eyes of the research participants. The participants were asked if they, or someone they know, was a victim of judicial injustice from the state-system (police or court) or the sub-state system (rulings by the tribal chief, Jirga or religious scholar) (Figure 33). For FATA, the police and court were referred to as the Jirga and the PA under the FCR.

**Figure 33. Percentage of Participants Experiencing Judicial Injustice Perpetuated by the State and Non-state systems<sup>550</sup>**




The state is yet again viewed as the biggest perpetrator of injustice in all the regions. In Baluchistan and FATA, the prevalent view that injustice is rampant in the state and sub-state system creates an environment of grievance. The victims of injustice by the state in Baluchistan and FATA turn to the sub-state system as a potential patron (if provided justice) or divert the victim towards rebellion (if anger multiplies and justice is not served in any way) where aggression and identity expansion takes place. The radicalizers adopt the framing process to frame the state and / or the sub-state as a threat to their (the victim's) religious or ethnic sentiments. Especially on the issue of security, it is the responsibility of the state to provide security to its citizens. An insecure environment looms over the people when they see or believe people around them are suffering or passing away due to violent attacks (terrorism, insurgency, target killing and kidnapping) (see Figure 34). This insecure environment results in grievances and a feeling of anger in a situation where the state, as well as the sub-state, system is considered to be corrupt and unjust. The Global Terrorism Database keeps records of the number of deaths which have taken place as a result of violent attacks (including

<sup>550</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

targeted killing and kidnappings) since the 1970s. Figure 34 below reveals the number of deaths in Baluchistan and FATA as a result of political or social violence started in the 1980s.

**Figure 34. Number of Deaths in FATA and Baluchistan as a result of Political Violence**



Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland

Despite the primary quantitative research description above, there are many other indicators that can reveal the level of relative deprivation to show the state to people linkage. Before doing so, consider these quotes from the representatives of the political and bureaucratic institutions regarding the rebellious attitude of the people. The *Baloch MPA* says:

Human security is the missing link in Baluchistan and FATA;

while the retired *senior bureaucrat* also suggests the same:

Insurgency and terrorism appeal [to] empty stomachs;


These quotes suggest that the quality of the linkage between the state and the people should consider some important social indices: the Incidence of Poverty (IoP), Human Development Index (HDI) and Education Index.

The IoP is a component of a multidimensional poverty index and is the percentage of people who are identified as poor across a range of levels<sup>551</sup>. The IoP is calculated on the basis of deprivation

<sup>551</sup> Planning Commission of Pakistan (PCP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), “Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan,” *UNDP* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2016), p. 10.

resulting from a lack of access to education and health and low standards of living\*. The HDI is also a multidimensional index based on education (Education Index), health (life expectancy) and standard of living (Gross National Income – GNI per capita) but contrary to IoP, it is calculated around the dimensions of possession of knowledge, health and standard of living by an individual in comparison to the maximum anyone could enjoy at that place and time<sup>552</sup>. The education index is a component of the HDI and if taken separately, and compared with HDI, can suggest the elitist trend in the region where income increases but where access to social services remain stagnant or poor. The Education Index and HDI trends in the regions from 1990 to 2018 can be seen in Figure 35 below.

**Figure 35. Trends in the HDI and Educations Index of Pakistan, Baluchistan and FATA<sup>553</sup>**



<sup>552</sup> Adil Najam and Faisal Bari, “Pakistan Human Development Index Report,” UNDP (United Nations Development Program, 2017), p. 01


<sup>553</sup> Institute of Management Research, “Subnational Human Development Index (4.0)”, Global Data Lab, Radboud University. Accessed on January 14, 2021.

[https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/shdi/PAK/?levels=1%2B4&interpolation=0&extrapolation=0&nearest\\_real=0&color\\_scales=national](https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/shdi/PAK/?levels=1%2B4&interpolation=0&extrapolation=0&nearest_real=0&color_scales=national)

\* The indicators for Education are “years of schooling”, “child school attendance” and “school quality”. For health, the indicators are “access to health facilities”, “immunization”, “ante-natal care” and “assisted delivery”. The indicators for standard of living are “water”, “sanitation”, “walls”, “household overcrowding”, “electricity”, “cooking fuel”, “assets” and “Land and Livestock”.

In terms of education, the value expectation of the nations in FATA and Baluchistan would be to attain the same level on the Education Index – Pakistan to have a sense of parity with the sub-nations in the rest of the country. The Education Index of Pakistan continues the upward trend after 2007. Unfortunately, the Education Index of FATA and Baluchistan take a steady downward trend. Similarly, Pakistan’s HDI continues to improve whereas the HDI for Baluchistan and FATA remain steady. The actual situation of deprivation at the grass-root level in Baluchistan and FATA compared with the rest of the country can be seen by looking at the IOP values (explained below) for Pakistan, Baluchistan and FATA.

**Figure 36. Incidence of Poverty (IOP) trend<sup>554</sup>**



The IOP also shows the poor conditions of the sub-nations in Baluchistan and FATA as compared to the rest of the sub-nation in Pakistan. It also shows that despite the increase in HDI or Education Index, the deprivations of the people in FATA and Baluchistan as explained by the IOP are still very high. Here it is important to point back to the concept of absolute and relative deprivation of Karl Marx which has already been discussed in chapter three. According to that concept, the reduction in the absolute deprivation of the nation and its entry into the phase of relative deprivation is the point where the nation develops the sense of being underprivileged in comparison to other nations around it in a state structure. This sense leads the people’s emotional and material resources to become involved in conflict or social change<sup>555</sup>. The combination of grievance and aggression that comes from judicial and social injustice, corruption, and relative

<sup>554</sup> PCP, UNDP and OHIP, “Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan,” p. 72-73

<sup>555</sup> Kenneth Allan, *The Social Lens: An Invitation to Social and Sociological Theory*, p. 213

\*\* Proper and formal data accumulation for FATA has not been done in the past. The latest official data for FATA in case of IoP and HDI is available from 2015 and onwards. Therefore, in the figures above, the IoP and HDI for FATA in all the years before 2015 is considered the same



deprivation define the vulnerabilities of the population to radicalization against the state. This vulnerability creates space for radicalizers to exploit.

One of the important examples of this is the case study of the Pakistani Taliban's suicide bomber Qari Hussain Mehsud. The study mentions Mehsud's art of exploitation of the sufferings of the people, especially young boys, to join their ranks and become suicide bombers. He clearly blames the State of Pakistan for the sufferings of the people of FATA and the country altogether (appealing to the sentiments of the grieving people) <sup>556</sup>.

This section has identified the social dynamics that produce the grievances that arise from the institutional expression of the sub-state. Such an institutional expression in the three regions is considered as a vulnerable element of the state (in the SDM by Buzan) and is the source of grievance for the sub-nations in Baluchistan and FATA. The next section looks into the dynamics through which these grievances are politicized and the state is framed as responsible for the poor institutional expression.

### **6.3. Politicizing the Grievances**

The SFV in chapter three suggests that high vulnerability of the people to radicalization leads to increased aggression and interest aggregation (for social change), and identity expansion and polarization (for political conflict). The case studies of Andrei Zhelyabov<sup>557</sup> and Ayman Al Zawahiri<sup>558</sup> elaborated on by Clarke and Sophia in chapter three are excellent examples to further understand the politicization of grievances. In the case of Zhelyabov, his grievance led to aggression, and further injustice led to identity expansion but the radicalization process remained confined to the individual level. Access to higher education allowed him to connect with other students having the same individual level of radicalization. That developed their sense of being underprivileged and having a positive identification with the peasant class and negative identification with landlords leading to interest aggregation and activism for social change. Blocking their political opportunity polarized the group and led to political violence.

However, the case study of Zawahiri is different and starts from identity expansion. His indoctrination by his uncle who struggled against the secular government of Egypt established his sense of individual negative identification with secularism and positive identification with a pan-Islamic system of government that follows Sharia. This political religious radicalization at the individual level ignited aggression against secularism and the Egyptian government when his uncle was hanged by the government. His choice to initiate religious interest aggregation (for social change) over others also suggests that he held positive identification with pan-Islamism against

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<sup>556</sup> Brian Wolfe, "The Pakistani Taliban's Suicide Bomber Trainer: A Profile of Qari Hussain Mehsud," *Critical Threats*, May 21, 2010, <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-pakistani-talibans-suicide-bomber-trainer-a-profile-of-qari-hussain-mehsud>.

<sup>557</sup> Mccauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 13-17

<sup>558</sup> Mccauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 29-31

secularism. In his case, the political opportunity was already blocked at the level of identity expansion which led to creation of an interest aggregated group acting as a polarized group when it had the opportunity. This was hinted at when some of his group members (who were also members of the Egyptian military) assassinated the president of Egypt Anwar Sadat in 1981<sup>559</sup>.

A trend similar to the Zhelyabov case can be seen in the ethnic Baloch radicalization. Similarly, the religious radicalization in Pakistan follows the trend of radicalization as in the case of Zawahiri. However, in all the cases identity expansion, which is a result of indoctrination, is important and starts with the politicization of the grievances and results in establishing a sense of positive and negative identification with a particular religious, ethnic, economic, and or racial group. The result of identity expansion is that it creates political and social division and conflict among groups. Positive or negative identification reduces the difference between the average opinion and meta-opinion among the members of the nation or sub-nations and therefore a group from among the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations supports the resisting elites or the militants and insurgents, and the other supports the dominating elites or the key stakeholder central institutions.

The politicization of the grievances of the religious nation and ethnic sub-nation that arises from the existing institutional expression will reveal the positive and negative identities that become targets of radicalizers as part of their radicalization process.

#### *The Politicization of Grievances by the Key Stakeholder Central Institutions*

In the response to the question of the grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression in the regions of Baluchistan and FATA as explained above, the bureaucracy and the military respondents blame poor governance principles of the central government comprised of feudal and rich oligarch elites, and dynastic political families. Respondents from both the institutions said that the central political and elite class kept the FCR law and the tribal structure in FATA alive and made Baluchistan a victim of political instability and poor governance which ensured economic growth would proceed at a low pace<sup>560</sup>.

The *ex-PA* further criticized the central government and mentions that the funds for FATA channel through the bureaucracy but the absence of a political or an effective implementing institution to monitor or account for the allocated funds creates potential for corruption. He also said that the tribal chiefs were once sincere in their desire to help development of their areas but with time they became corrupt. For Baluchistan, the major hurdle is the lack of a competent bureaucratic structure in the province<sup>561</sup>. Since socio-economic development is not the domain of the military, its respondents remained silent on the hurdles faced. The *brigadier* did mention that an absent or weak

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<sup>559</sup> Mccauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 29-31

<sup>560</sup> The retired senior bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>561</sup> The retired senior bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

political and civil structure in both regions places a strain on the military's own resources when it is forced to do the job of the civil and political administration<sup>562</sup>.

The *respondents from the civil bureaucracy* stated that strong political involvement of the people in both regions will help to create a strong linkage with the state of Pakistan. The retired *senior bureaucrat* said:

It is important to have four pronged policies for Baluchistan and FATA: a) politically involve the people and leadership of Baluchistan and FATA, b) consolidate them economically, and c) build strong institutions. It is after ensuring these three objectives that the fourth objective should be implemented, d) strong compliance mechanism in place for anyone against the state and its interests<sup>563</sup>.

The military officials agree with this statement but focused on two main problems that restrict development of strong linkages between the people and the state; absence of a middle class and prevalence of the sub-state system. The military realizes that the people look towards their feudal / tribal and influential leaders for socio-economic opportunities, keeping themselves subservient to them and their authority<sup>564</sup>.

The analysis of the responses above gives an idea that the grievances are targeted towards the central and sub-state political class and elites; the entire political institution of the country including the agents of social control. The political institution itself has realized the existence of corrupt interest groups. The chapter now shifts the focus to analyze the response of the political institution and the agents of social control in regards to the grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression in Baluchistan and FATA.

#### *The Politicization of Grievances by the Political Institutions and the Agents of Social Control*

All the *respondents from the political institution* are on the same page when it comes to realizing that the source of grievances in both regions is the existing institutional expression of the sub-state. The mainstream political party respondents stress that widespread corruption leads to embezzlement of funds aimed for socio-economic development by the bureaucracy and the agents of social control slows down the pace of development in both regions. The ethno-nationalist respondents point to the key stakeholder central institutions for treating Baluchistan and FATA like its colonies, which suggests that structural domination occurs through the agents of social control, as discussed in chapter five. While the mainstream and religious political party respondents directly point towards the tribal elites for supporting the interests of the central

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<sup>562</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

\* The NFC award is meant to distribute financial resources between the federal government (vertical distribution), and the provinces (horizontal distribution).

<sup>563</sup> The retired senior bureaucrat, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>564</sup> The Brigadier Rank officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, interviewed by the author, 2018

political class and for keeping these areas underdeveloped, the ethno-nationalists reject this view. The reason for such a view again points to the fact that most of the ethno-nationalist political parties are headed by the tribal chiefs.

In addition, all the respondents from the political institution have divergent views when it comes to identifying the biggest hurdle to establishing the legitimacy of the state in Baluchistan and FATA. *Respondent M* from the mainstream political party mentions corruption by the bureaucracy and tribal chiefs as the biggest hurdle. The respondent of the religious political party (JI) and the Baloch MPA regard the foreign policy and interests of the key central stakeholder institutions (discussed in chapter two and five) as the biggest hurdle to development in both Baluchistan and FATA regions which is also signaled by the Baloch MPA when he says:

The kind of relations Pakistan has with its neighbors and its foreign policy both contribute to a retaliation from the neighbors which affects Baluchistan and FATA. The involvement in Afghanistan and the Kashmir issue damage Pak-Afghan-India relations and that impacts development in Baluchistan and FATA.

On the other hand, the remaining two respondents of the ethno-nationalist parties point towards the dominating elites as nationwide politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and military personnel who benefit from keeping power in their hands. The senior Baloch nationalist comments:

We are not allowed to govern ourselves, develop our own policies and have rights on our own mineral resources. The rulers or the corrupt mafia want to keep us backward and therefore do not allow democracy to flourish in Baluchistan and overall Pakistan.

The respondents from the mainstream political parties and the Baloch MPA view the socio-economic and political engagement of the people of FATA and Baluchistan with the state as the only way to create strong linkages between them. Respondent M suggests: “Let them have infrastructure in FATA and Baluchistan. There shall be some industry, economic activity and access to education and livelihood. This is how state can develop linkages with the people”. The *Baloch MPA* adds more detail to this and comments:

The people of Baluchistan and FATA need physical and human security. Human security includes ensuring people’s access to quality health, education and employment. These measures will empower people to reject any other agendas and hence security and defense within the borders will not be necessary – Human security is the missing link in Baluchistan and FATA.

The religious and remaining two ethno-nationalist respondents have a different stance. They want the right to self-government and autonomy in Baluchistan and FATA. The senior Baloch nationalist suggests:

We should abolish this relationship of slave and master between Baluchistan and Pakistan. Once we are given the right to self-govern and decide what to do with our own resources or the right to our resources, then we can believe that the state can create a strong link with the people of Baluchistan.

The tribal chiefs of FATA also stressed that corruption is the major factor that leads to underdevelopment. The tribal chiefs also point to the PAs (bureaucracy) and corrupt tribal chiefs for introducing and sustaining corruption in FATA and creating hurdles to the socio-economic development of the region. In contrast, the Baloch tribal chief stressed that it is the poor law and order situation created by insurgents, corruption by bureaucrats and politicians, and manipulation by the military as being the reasons for poor socio-economic development of Baluchistan. The public sector is prevented by insurgent groups from implementing development projects and even the government officials feel insecure, preventing them from visiting certain sites or from carrying out development interventions<sup>565</sup>. On the other hand, the private sector is not interested in investing in a region with almost no law and order<sup>566</sup>. The Baloch tribal chief reveals the reason:

The insurgents demand right to self-determination before establishment of economic hubs in the province.

However, corruption in Baluchistan is also prevalent and restricts quality development projects in areas where there are no security problems<sup>567</sup>. Of all of the reasons above for underdevelopment, the Baloch tribal chief points towards the structural domination by the key stakeholder central institutions in Baluchistan as the biggest hurdle in the way of socio-economic development. The Baloch tribal chief puts forward a solution centered on addressing the needs and grievances of the people of Baluchistan which reflects the vulnerability of the people of Baluchistan to radicalization:

The state should provide the people of Baluchistan with their historical rights and power. The conflict is between the state and insurgent group but we forget that in the middle is a big population of young and old, and poor and rich Baloch people who want harmony and have not yet taken any side. These people should be taken care of by the state and should not be poked. This is the only way the state can create a positive link with the people of Baluchistan.

In a nutshell, the institutional expression of the state and the policies of the key stakeholder central institutions are considered responsible for the grievances of the population which have been discussed in the previous section. The narrative of the political identity of the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations and the tribal chiefs carries important weightage as they have strong mobilizing

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<sup>565</sup> The Baloch Tribal Chief, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>566</sup> The Baloch Tribal Chief, interviewed by the author, 2018

<sup>567</sup> The Baloch Tribal Chief, interviewed by the author, 2018

structures and influence at the grass-root level, as revealed in chapter four. The narrative developed by these political identities is that the institutional expression of the state is responsible for the social, economic and judicial injustice. According to the survey participants, people become vulnerable to radicalization when their socio-economic and judicial grievances are exploited or due to an incident that moves them towards radicalization. About 78 percent of the research participants believe this to be true for people joining the Baloch insurgents, and 70 percent of them hold the same views regarding the people joining the religious militant groups<sup>568</sup>.

The lack of state governance is a result of policy and a source of the conflict in Baluchistan and FATA. It is, therefore, termed as a key factor for establishing the vulnerability of the people to radicalization. These poor governance mechanisms are used by the radicalizers to frame the state as unjust, corrupt, and unable to provide economic social and physical security to ignite conflict of individual and groups with the state at the grass-root level, which will be explained in detail in the next section.

#### **6.4. The Framing Process of Grievances to Expand VMSs**

The variables of the SMT explain the requirements to channel political grievances into activism<sup>569</sup> but are also considered necessary for the emergence of social movements<sup>570</sup> from where the VMSs expand. Social movements rely on the framing process to develop narratives and a sense of common purpose<sup>571</sup>. This takes the reader back to the concept of positive and negative identification outlined in chapter three to establish a connection between the VMSs and how they expand through the framing process.

The framing process is based on the concept of *frame*. A frame is a strategy to interpret that allows people to discover, observe, recognize and label incidents or occurrences and is established and maintained for votes, rivals and observers by movement actors called signifying agents<sup>572</sup>. It is important that frame not be confused with ideologies. Ideologies are a set of coherent broad beliefs and values that have staying power, affect everyday life of an individual and are not confined only to politics<sup>573</sup>. Frames act as ideas that extend from the ideologies themselves or provide reasons for ideologies to exist<sup>574</sup>. Scholarship on framing suggests that mobilization of grievances does not

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<sup>568</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

<sup>569</sup> Gregg, "Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements, Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors," p. 343

<sup>570</sup> Gregg, "Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements, Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors," p. 342

<sup>571</sup> Gregg, "Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements, Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors," 343

<sup>572</sup> Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," p. 613-614

<sup>573</sup> Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, no. 1 (August 2000): 611–39, p. 613  
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611>.

<sup>574</sup> Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," p. 613

happen naturally but happens through interaction, which is based on interpretation of grievances, carried out by radicalizers (termed as signifying agents in the context of framing process)<sup>575</sup>. When grievances are mobilized, *collective action frames* begin to emerge that provide legitimacy and inspiration to the social movement<sup>576</sup>. These collective action frames are based on the *core framing task* (relevant to the identity expansion theory of radicalization) and involve the following phases<sup>577</sup>:

- Diagnostic Framing – Identifying the problem and the agency / agent responsible for the problem;
- Prognostic Framing – Proposing a solution or a plan of action that is a refutation of the solution proposed by the opponent; and
- Motivational Framing – The call to arms or another justified action that focuses on a much larger goal that bypasses the two phases above.

In a conflict between the state and the religious militants and ethnic insurgents, master frames work best for collective action as they represent a broad idea or belief about the core framing task and point to a bigger problem and can even absorb other small movements<sup>578</sup>. An important and unfortunate aspect in the initial phases of the religious and Baloch ethnic social movements (elaborated on in chapter five) in Pakistan has been that the motivational framing was triggered without allowing the diagnostic and prognostic framing to sustain and evolve into the motivational framing. The immediate call to arms by the brother of the Baloch confederate leader, right after the accession of Baluchistan into Pakistan, triggered ethnic motivational framing against the state. In addition, sudden strategic changes along the Iran and Afghanistan borders with Pakistan in 1979 diverted the religious social movement towards sectarian motivational framing against the Shia sect in Pakistan and religious motivational farming against the soviets in Afghanistan.

An important question to be addressed from the diagnostic and prognostic framing is Who is responsible for such problems? According to the religious and ethno-nationalist respondents in the previous section, the state, which is represented by the key stakeholder central institutions, is responsible for such problems. Therefore, the target of any anti-state radicalizer will be to develop anti-state narratives as the framing and a sense of common purpose against the state among a population. Therefore, the goal of the radicalizers is to develop positive identification (with their

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<sup>575</sup> David A Snow, Rens Vliegthart, and Pauline Ketelaars, “The Framing Perspective on Social Movements: Its Conceptual Roots and Architecture,” in *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Hoboken, Nj: Wiley Blackwell, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2019), 392–410. p. 393

<sup>576</sup> Snow, Vliegthart, and Ketelaars, “The Framing Perspective on Social Movements: Its Conceptual Roots and Architecture,” p. 395

<sup>577</sup> Snow, Vliegthart, and Ketelaars, “The Framing Perspective on Social Movements: Its Conceptual Roots and Architecture,” p. 396-397

<sup>578</sup> Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” p. 618-619

religious or ethnic movement) or negative identification (with their enemies) in the minds of the grieving population vulnerable to radicalization.

In the case of Pakistan, the Muslim population is the primary potential human resource to develop positive identification with the religious social movement. Similarly, the primary potential human resource for the ethnic social movement is the relevant ethnic population, which in the case of this research, is the ethnic Baloch and Pashtun population. Individuals, groups and communities who hold *positive identification* with these social movements and / or their religious and ethnic groups or *negative identification* with the state of Pakistan (discussed in detail in chapter two) are the secondary potential human resource for both the movements. The section now moves on to explore the framing process of the religious social movement to mobilize grievances.

### *The Framing Process by the Religious Social Movement*

The religious militants in Pakistan grouped together under the umbrella of the TTP in 2007 with the following objectives after which they initiated a series of attacks on the government that continued with full force until 2015-16<sup>579</sup>:

- Enforcement of Sharia;
- Uniting against NATO forces in Afghanistan;
- Performing “defensive jihad against the Pakistan army;”
- Halting the military operations in Swat and North Waziristan;
- Abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area;
- Release of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Imam Abdul Aziz; and
- Refusing future peace deals with the government of Pakistan.

Certain frames can be attached to these objectives by the TTP.

- The diagnostic framing includes the NATO forces in Afghanistan and the Pakistani Military in FATA.
- The prognostics framing is to unite against the NATO forces in Afghanistan and stop Pakistani military intervention in FATA that would allow them freedom to move and implement Sharia in Afghanistan and in FATA.
- The motivational framing is to attack the NATO forces in Afghanistan and carry out defensive Jihad in Pakistan.

The successful mobilization of the religious social movement focused on people from across the country who wanted to fight the NATO forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military in FATA or the Pakistani state (including the military) in the country. Such a situation suggests that the religious militants in Pakistan would prioritize military and state institutions throughout the country as their

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<sup>579</sup> Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” *Combating Terrorism Center* 1, no. 2 (2008): 1–3, p. 02



primary targets (as NATO forces were based in Afghanistan). According to data from the Global Terrorism Database (contained in Table 7 below), the dimensions of TTP's violent tactics against the state institutions in FATA compared to the rest of the country speaks of its mobilizing capacity against the primary targets through the framing process.

**Table 7. Trend of TTP Violent Attacks on the State and Non-state Institutions in Pakistan 2007-2018<sup>580</sup>**

Region / Province	FATA	Baluchistan	KP	Sindh	Punjab
<b>Priority Target (State Institutions)</b>	Military & Educational Institutions	Police & Military	Police & Educational Institutions	Police & Military	Police & Military
<b>Grenade Attacks</b>	3	2	8	14	4
<b>Explosive (Fuse &amp; Trigger)</b>	116	11	100	17	3
<b>Gun/Rifle/Shotgun</b>	63	17	79	27	8
<b>Suicide</b>	9	13	35	4	9
<b>Vehicle Explosive</b>	6	9	32	10	5
<b>Total</b>	187	52	254	72	29
<b>%age of attacks in Provincial Capital Priority Target (Non-State Institutions)</b>	Not Applicable	69%	27%	96%	34%
<b>Total Attacks</b>	123	06	173	56	33
<b>%age of attacks in Provincial Capital</b>	N/A	66%	28%	89.2%	48%

Source: Global Terrorism Database

The table above suggests the TTP targeted the state and the citizens equally except in Baluchistan where only six attacks were carried out on non-state institutions. The city of Peshawar, the capital of KP province and surrounded by FATA region from its three sides, has faced the lowest percentage of the total attacks on the state and the nation when compared to the rest of the province and other capital cities of other provinces. This indicates that the TTP was not able to get comparable human, material and financial support from within the city to carry out the above-mentioned attacks despite the fact that KP has witnessed the same level of religious interest

<sup>580</sup> Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, GTD 1970-2019, September 17, 2019. Distributed by the Global Terrorism Data Base, University of Maryland, [https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb\\_0221dist.xlsx](https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb_0221dist.xlsx)

aggregation as the rest of the country since the 1970s. The reason for this will be explored in the second case study of stage II (chapter seven) of this research in the development of the CPR model.

The attacks in FATA were spread throughout the region and a specific target regional trend is not visible which reflects the fact that the mobilizing structures of TTP were spread throughout FATA because the military was conducting operations in FATA from 2007 to 2017 and was also spread across the entire region. What is also relevant is that the province of Sindh, like Punjab, does not share any borders with FATA but its provincial capital provides the most vulnerable mobilizing structures to TTP to carry out terrorist attacks on the state and the citizens.

There is an important reason for the trend of attacks by TTP on the state institutions as revealed in Table 7. Most of the capital cities are the center of power for the state. They are the center from where the provincial and central government offices, military garrisons and bureaucracy operate. Therefore, provincial capitals are most significant regional targets where the TTP will be able to maximize achieving its objectives; to hurt the state and reveal the vulnerability of the government and the state to the people.

The religious social movement has gone through many motivational framing processes. As already explained in chapter five, it started with a frame of Iranian and Shia threat to the Sunni nation in 1979. It then shifted against a socialist (non-Muslim) country invading a Muslim country (Afghanistan). In the 1990s, it transformed into imposition of Sharia and the desire to control the entire Afghanistan through a Pan-Islamic identity. By 2001, the narrative shifted to fighting the non-Muslim and secular US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. In 2007, the movement in Pakistan shifted towards framing the state as partner of the US in their struggle in Afghanistan along with the frame of the state cracking down on their religious mobilizing structures in the country. By 2011-12 the movement was involved in war with the state of Pakistan. By 2020, the movement survived in Afghanistan by entering negotiations with US and the Afghan government to become stakeholders in the future of Afghanistan<sup>581</sup>. By mid-2021, the movement again resurfaced with the objective of capturing the entire physical base of Afghanistan and establishing an Islamic government after the US left Afghanistan<sup>582</sup>.

This is a new phase of religious interest aggregation which seeks political opportunity in Pakistan after Afghanistan, while those in both countries who still follow the previous motivational frame, as established in 2001 and 2007, have shifted into global religious movements like Al-Qaeda and ISIS to become regional chapters of these organizations. This phase of religious interest

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<sup>581</sup> Ahmad Mashal, "Corruption and Resource Allocation Distortion for 'Escwa' Countries," *International Journal of Economics and Management Sciences* 1, no. 4 (2011): 71–83, <https://www.hilarispublisher.com/open-access/corruption-and-resource-allocation-distortion-for-escwa-countries-2162-6359-1-033.pdf>.

<sup>582</sup> Scott Reinhard and David Zucchini, "20 Years of Defense, Erased by the Taliban in a Few Months," *The New York Times*, August 14, 2021, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/08/14/world/asia/afghanistan-maps-taliban.html>.

aggregation in Pakistan is a threat to Pakistan itself and to the neighbors and awaits a shift to another motivational framing in the region.

### *The Ethnic Framing and Mobilization*

The movement that sustains the Baloch ethno-tribal insurgency has been evolving ever since the accession of Pakistan. Unlike the religious movement that clashed with the state of Pakistan only in 2006-07, the current Baloch ethnic insurgency is a result of ethnic interest aggregation that started in the 1920s. It has evolved into a more ‘coherent’ and ‘strong’ movement over time. It is a combination of what initially were four tribal insurgencies (motivational framing) against the state and the situation of relative deprivation and injustice (diagnostic framing) that engulfed Baluchistan for decades. It established its first diagnostic frame in 1920 with a political awakening in Baluchistan against the tribal chiefs<sup>583</sup>.

Syed F. Shah explains the political awakening among educated middle-class Baloch youth of the 1920s. His article provides details of their constitutional, social and political diagnostic frame suggesting a prognostic frame that focused on uniting the Baloch nation, gaining independence from the British and joining their lost territories (in Afghanistan and Iran) with their territory in current Pakistan to form an independent Baluchistan<sup>584</sup>. Selig S. Harrison identifies the struggle of educated middle class Baloch nationalist youth as a motivation for uniting the Baloch and to become independent and sovereign and initiate political reforms in the state of Kalat through political organizations like the Kalat State National Party, Baloch League and Anjuaman-e-Itihad Baluchistan<sup>585</sup>.

A senior and well-respected Baloch ethno-nationalist involved in this social movement explains the depth and the intensity of the social movement and mentions rallies (most notably the Dhadar Rally in 1939 to force the Khan of Kalat to employ local Baloch people in government offices<sup>586</sup>), newspapers and conferences (most notably the Mastung conference in 1939 for the abolishment of tribal system<sup>587</sup>) aimed at preserving the Baloch identity and uniting the Baloch people against the British rule as well as the tribal system<sup>588</sup>. The frame of the movement shifted towards a master frame of the Baloch sub-nation against the state in 1967 (in-between the third tribal insurgency) and is currently divided into three factions. One faction is the BSO itself, that frames the tribal chiefs as the leaders and saviors of the Baloch sub-nation against the unjust state by participating in the socio-political fabric of Pakistan. The second faction, the BSO Pijaar, is against the tribal chiefs and frames the middle-class Baloch ethno-nationalists as being the leaders of the Baloch sub-nation against the unjust state, by also participating in the socio-political fabric of Pakistan.

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<sup>583</sup> Shah, “Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakening and Merger,” p. 23-30

<sup>584</sup> Shah, “Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakening and Merger,” p. 23-30

<sup>585</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 21-26

<sup>586</sup> Bizanjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 43

<sup>587</sup> Bizanjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 45

<sup>588</sup> Bizanjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 33-50

The third faction, BSO – Azaad, frames Baluchistan as an occupied territory and the ethnic Baloch sub-nation as underprivileged and suffering injustice at the hands of the state of Pakistan. The ideological base of all three movements is the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist model as suggested by Harrison<sup>589</sup>.

The state against the Baloch sub-nation master frame took time to establish over time and has its reasons for the way the state has handled the tribal insurgencies. Mazari mentions that the tribal rebellion of Nauroz Khan and its insensitive conclusion inflamed the emotions of the Baloch and to this day, Nauroz Khan and his men are lauded in poems that rally the Baloch against the injustice they are still facing<sup>590</sup>. Harrison himself witnessed a giant montage on an entire wall praising the sacrifice of Nauroz Khan and his fighters on one of his visits to Baluchistan in the 1970s<sup>591</sup>. Among many incidents that led to developing an anti-state frame among the Baloch sub-nation, two are outlined by Harrison and Mazari as the worst cases of state brutality over the Baloch sub-nation.

- i) The search for weapons by the military on 7<sup>th</sup> August 1974 in the Mali village (close to the city of Kalat) is said to have violated Baloch customs and traditions of the privacy and sanctity of their women that provoked the men to pick up arms which led to heavy fighting between the Baloch and the military. The Baloch men led by Mir Laung Khan, the brother of Baloch nationalist leader Gul Khan Naseer, fought the military until he was killed. The Baloch bitterly acknowledge that innocent women and children were also killed by heavy machine guns and compare Mir Laung Khan to Nauroz Khan: the leader of the 1958 uprising<sup>592</sup>. Mazari notes that the incident and the Mali village became part of Baloch folklore<sup>593</sup>.
- ii) A cruel tactic of the military to force the *parari* guerrillas out of their hideouts from the mountains involved attacking their families settled in the area of Chamalang. The operation, which started in September 1974, involved ground and air force and it is estimated by sources on both sides that about 15,000 Baloch belonging to the Marri tribe were killed<sup>594</sup>.

Harrison considers the Chamalang massacre as the turning point of the Baloch social movement that strengthened the master frame of state against the Baloch sub-nation. He narrates that there were 178 major recorded army encounters with the tribal Baloch rebels through 1973-1977<sup>595</sup>. Harrison also claims to have met the *pararis* in the camps in Afghanistan after they fled to southern Afghanistan in 1975 to keep the movement running by broadening their membership base and publishing their monthly magazine, *Jabal (Mountain)*<sup>596</sup>. An analysis of the literature presented by Mazari, Harrison and Bizenjo in their books tends to give a strong impression that the NAP

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<sup>589</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 21-26

<sup>590</sup> Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, p. 85

<sup>591</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 29

<sup>592</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 37

<sup>593</sup> Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, p. 317

<sup>594</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 38

<sup>595</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 39

<sup>596</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 39

Baluchistan government, the tribal chiefs and even the pararis did not seek liberation or succession from Pakistan. Their struggle is to gain equal rights for their people and were involved in diplomatic talks with the regimes in power in the center during and after the four phases of insurgency explained above. To the reader's surprise, even the leader of the parari movement informed Harrison in an interview that the 1970s war was thrust upon them because of the stubbornness of the central powers<sup>597</sup>.

Two decades of calm followed after the 1979 insurgency ended. Yet the framing process did not stop in Baloch society. As more and more Baloch youth entered the middle class and moved from absolute to relative deprivation, they entered the diagnostic and prognostic framing process. The history above of confrontations between the state and the Baloch sub-nation, coupled with certain triggers<sup>598</sup> provides strong reasons to shift the frames of Baloch activists towards motivational framing and activates the polarization aspect of the radicalization theory.

With an outright conflict between the state and the insurgent group, plus the abduction of many Baloch youth who go missing for months with the bodies of some found dumped and mutilated<sup>599</sup>, keeps the sentiments of the Baloch on the verge of retaliation and continues the process of motivational framing. Tiffany Tanner suggests that it may be the result of the weak counter insurgency intelligence by the state that results in the abduction of even some innocent Baloch youth who have no connection with the insurgent group<sup>600</sup>. Instead, social scientists that research insurgencies tend to put the blame on both: the government for using violence to get information or to punish the rebel supporters, and the insurgents for using violence to punish alleged informants or government sympathizers<sup>601</sup>.

The current phase of the Baloch insurgency and the triggering factors described above are being documented by the Baloch sub-nation and the radicalizers to keep diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames operative and to motivate many young Baloch men to join the insurgent group. Recently, in May 2020, two young Baloch men, believed to be members of the insurgent group Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) were killed in Kalat (Baluchistan) by the security forces. Upon identification, it was realized that both of them were student alumni of one of the best universities of Pakistan. One had recently graduated with a Masters in Defence and Strategic Studies and the other with a Masters in Gender Studies<sup>602</sup>. A professor of the university also came forward and wrote on social media about the talks she used to have with one of these students and

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<sup>597</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p. 40

<sup>598</sup> Shakoor Ahmad Wani, "The Changing Dynamics of the Baloch Nationalist Movement in Pakistan: From Autonomy toward Secession," p. 812

<sup>599</sup> Tiffany Tanner, "Explaining the Resilience of the Balochistan Insurgency" p. 11-12

<sup>600</sup> Tiffany Tanner, "Explaining the Resilience of the Balochistan Insurgency" p. 11-12

<sup>601</sup> Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," p. 79

<sup>602</sup> Rahim Baloch, "Why Shahdad Baloch Chose Armed Struggle? Ask Pak Journalists. Well, Here's the Answer," News Intervention, May 14, 2020, <https://www.newsintervention.com/why-shahdad-baloch-chose-armed-struggle-ask-pak-journalists-well-heres-the-answer/>. Assessed on June 17, 2020.

it seems that the deceased had already been radicalized through aggression and gone through diagnostic and prognostic framing before entering the motivational frame<sup>603</sup>. The grievances of the Baloch sub-nation stand still and very little is being done by the state to work for a slightest change in the frame while experiencing an increase in the attacks from the rebel forces.

Among the many Baloch insurgent groups in Baluchistan, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Army (BRA) and United Baloch Army (UBA) have remained the most dangerous since 2004-2018. According to the Global Terrorism Database, out of 888 total attacks by all the Baloch insurgent groups, BLA accounts for 22 percent, BLF 22 percent, BRA 35 percent and UBA 10 percent<sup>604</sup>. The BLA is headed by the son of the resisting elite, Khair Bux Marri, and the group is a combination of ethnic rebels and tribal forces against the state<sup>605</sup>. The BLF is headed by Dr. Allah Nazar and comprised mostly of ethnic rebels. The BRA is headed by the grandson of another resisting elite, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, and is also made up of ethnic rebels and tribal forces<sup>606</sup>. The UBA is a splinter group of the BLA and was established after some internal division between the sons of Marri after his death in 2014. Both BLA and BRA are the evolved faces of the tribal insurgencies and the activation of motivational framing on the members of BSO motivates them to join this insurgent group as ethnic rebels since they idealize the tribal status quo. On the other hand, BLF is purely an ethno-nationalist insurgency and the activation of motivational framing on the members of BSO-Pajaar and BSO-Azaad motivates their members to join this insurgent group. Like the religious militants, the primary target of the ethnic insurgents is considered to be the government and the state institutions, especially the military. Table 8 below shows the trends of the attacks by the insurgents from 2004 to 2018.

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<sup>603</sup> The Balochistan Post, "Tributes Pour in for Two QAU Alumnus Killed in Balochistan," The Balochistan Post, May 4, 2020, <https://thebalochistanpost.net/2020/05/tributes-pour-in-for-two-qau-alumnus-killed-in-balochistan/>.

<sup>604</sup> Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, GTD 1970-2019, September 17, 2019. Distributed by the Global Terrorism Data Base, University of Maryland, [https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb\\_0221dist.xlsx](https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb_0221dist.xlsx)

<sup>605</sup> Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, "Balochistan Liberation Army," [cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/) (Stanford University, 2019), <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/balochistan-liberation-army>.

<sup>606</sup> Stanford University, "Balochistan Republican Army | Mapping Militant Organizations," [web.stanford.edu](http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/571?highlight=BRA) (Stanford University, 2015), <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/571?highlight=BRA>.

**Table 8. Trend of Violent Ethnic Insurgent Attacks on the State and Non-State Institutions in Pakistan 2004-2018<sup>607</sup>**

Group	Priority Source of Attack	Priority Target (State)	Priority Target (non-state)	Primary Target Province / Region	% of Attacks in Provincial Capital	Total
<b>Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)</b>	Gun/Rifle (36%)	Government (26%)	Business, Citizens & Property (35%)	Baluchistan (95%)	Quetta (18%)	193
	Explosives (41%)	Military (24%)		Sindh (4%)	Karachi (3.6%)	
	Projectiles (14.5%)	Police (11%)		Punjab (1%)	Lahore (0.5%)	
<b>Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)</b>	Gun/Rifle (51%)	Government (14%)	Business, Citizens & Property (33%)	Baluchistan (100%)	Quetta (3%)	198
	Explosives (24%)	Military (40%)				
	Projectiles (19%)	Police (5%)				
<b>Baloch Republican Army (BRA)</b>	Gun/Rifle (13%)	Government (64%)	Business, Citizens & Property (12%)	Baluchistan (91%)	Quetta (3%)	316
	Explosives (74%)	Military (19%)		Sindh (6%)	Karachi (0.6%)	
	Projectiles (8%)	Police (7%)		Punjab (3%)	Lahore (0%)	
<b>United Baloch Army (UBA)</b>	Gun/Rifle (11%)	Government (37%)	Business, Citizens & Property (26%)	Baluchistan (92%)	Quetta (44%)	89
	Explosives (79%)	Military (12%)		Punjab (6%)	Lahore (2%)	
	Projectiles (10%)	Police (19%)		KP (2%)	Peshawar (2%)	

Like the religious militants, the ethnic insurgents also use explosives as their preferred primary source of attack while their primary target is the state and government institutions. However, unlike the religious militants who generally attack the state and non-state institutions outside their base region FATA, the Baloch insurgents primary target locations are in their base region of Baluchistan. This suggests that the region of Baluchistan cater for the largest mobilization structures for the ethnic insurgents. However, what is amusing is that the provincial capital of Baluchistan received the least number of attacks in the region. Out of 888 total insurgent attacks

<sup>607</sup> Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, GTD 1970-2019, September 17, 2019. Distributed by the Global Terrorism Data Base, University of Maryland, [https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb\\_0221dist.xlsx](https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb_0221dist.xlsx)

from 2004 to 2018 in Baluchistan, the provincial capital received only 12 percent<sup>608</sup>. This is because the government institutions, military, police, judiciary and offices of bureaucrats are cordoned off and heavily secured in the provincial capital.

By the end of 2018, the BLA, BRA and BLF merged to form the Baloch Raji Ajohi Sangar – BRAS (Baloch National Freedom Movement). After this alliance, the insurgents were able to pool their resources, attract new recruits and carry out robust and strategic attacks on the state institutions<sup>609</sup>. From its birth, the BRAS has strategically targeted the military, security forces and government institutions, especially those involved in the entire management and protection of the Chinese investments in CPEC<sup>610</sup>. In addition, according to the global terrorism database, the government institutions for all insurgent groups mentioned in the table above include government services like energy sources (gas, coal, oil source units or pipelines), telecommunications, and railroads which are sources of revenue generation for the state<sup>611</sup>.

## Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the social injustices (socio-economic and judicial) coupled with corruption is a source of grievance for the people of FATA and Baluchistan which is established by the agents of social control through the linkage between the central political institution and the people of both regions. The survey findings and the interviews with the respondents clearly point to the institutional expression of the state as responsible for those grievances. The politicization of these grievances gives rise to social movements which continue to grow through the framing process and which is adopted by the movement to exploit the grievances of the people. The framing process, therefore, provides a frame through which the state is considered a threat to the religious and ethnic population which motivates the population to join the movement and expand the VMSs that provide religious militants and ethnic insurgents financial, material, human and intelligence support to attack the state.

The first case study of stage II in the development of the CPR model has concluded. This has involved the application of SFV to Baluchistan and FATA. This case study affirms that the Sub-structural Framework for Violence is applicable to Baluchistan and FATA and helps to understand that the religious and ethnic conflict in Pakistan exist due to structural, proximate, and trigger

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<sup>608</sup> Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, GTD 1970-2019, September 17, 2019. Distributed by the Global Terrorism Data Base, University of Maryland,

[https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb\\_0221dist.xlsx](https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb_0221dist.xlsx)

<sup>609</sup> Farhan Zahid, "Baluch Raji Ajohi Sangar: Emergence of a New Baluch Separatist Alliance," *Terrorism Monitor* 17, no. 18 (2019). <https://jamestown.org/program/bras-emergence-of-a-new-baluch-separatist-alliance/>

<sup>610</sup> Zahid, "Baluch Raji Ajohi Sangar: Emergence of a New Baluch Separatist Alliance," *Terrorism Monitor* 17, no. 18 (2019).

<sup>611</sup> Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, GTD 1970-2019, September 17, 2019. Distributed by the Global Terrorism Data Base, University of Maryland,

[https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb\\_0221dist.xlsx](https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb_0221dist.xlsx)



factors, all contributing to religious and ethnic radicalization of the people and framing the state as a threat to the interests of the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations. The first case study has shown that the institutional expression of the state is the source of structural domination in Baluchistan and FATA that gives rise to social movements and radicalization and development of vulnerable mobilizing structures (VMSs) (explored in chapter five). The institutional expression of the sub-state is the source of the framing process against the institutional expression of the state which ignites grievances of the people targeted towards the state making them vulnerable to radicalization and later expanding the VMSs. The agents of social control, as dominating and resisting elites, play the most important roles in the entire framework of the SFV in Baluchistan and FATA by establishing the structural domination of the state and igniting the grievances of the people through the framing process.

The research now moves towards the second case study of stage II in the development of the CPR model. This involves application of the SFV to the KP region of Pakistan.

## **Chapter Seven**

### **The Conflict Prevention and Reduction in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

#### **Introduction**

The focus of the research now shifts to the second case study of stage II of this research to develop the CPR model. The second case study involves the application of the SFV to the socio-political dynamics of the KP region of Pakistan which is explored in this chapter. The first case study of stage II concluded in the last chapter, through the application of the SFV to the socio-political dynamics of Baluchistan and FATA. It showed that the institutional expression of the state of Pakistan radicalizes its religious nation and ethnic sub-nations by structurally dominating the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations to pursue its political interests. In such circumstances, vulnerable mobilizing structures (VMSs) are established that give rise to religious and ethnic militant groups. The first case study also reveals that these VMSs continue to be sustained and expand due to the vulnerability of the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations to radicalization that is established due to their grievances directed towards the state through the framing process adopted by the radicalizer.

The application of the SFV to the KP region in this chapter will help to explain the socio-political factors that do not contribute to the establishment and expansion of the religious and ethnic VMSs in KP despite that fact that the region has faced both religious and ethnic social movements. This chapter draws on a mix of secondary as well as primary data retrieved from the survey participants as explained in section 1.4 of chapter one. Considering the SFV diagram in chapter three (Figure 11), this chapter firstly elaborates on the political identity and the organizing ideology of the Pashtun sub-nation in KP (before and after partition in 1947) to determine the institutional expression of the sub-state. The chapter studies the rise of an ethno-religious social movement before and after partition, and elaborates on its political interests that contributed to development of socio-political conditions that restricted the rise of ethnic VMSs in KP. However, it will also elaborate on the religious social movement in the province (post-partition) that led to the expansion of the religious VMSs from FATA into the province after 2001.

Secondly, the chapter investigates and compares the level of grievances of the citizens in KP with that in the Baluchistan and FATA regions that arise from their existing institutional expression. This section will also reveal the level of vulnerability to radicalization of the sub-nation in KP which enabled a small portion of the populace to contribute to the expansion of the FATA-based religious VMSs in the province. Finally, the chapter ends by empirically calculating and comparing the vulnerability to radicalization of the people of Baluchistan, FATA and KP. This comparison is made through empirical analysis of the total number of violent attacks carried out by the total number of violent groups in the total number of cities in each region between 2001 and 2018.

According to the MDCM, VMSs, as disaster risk, exist when radicalization (as hazard) is exposed to a population vulnerable to radicalization. Therefore, we can develop the following equation for VMS, which is a product of radicalization and vulnerability of the population to radicalization in the region:

$$VMS = R \times V_r, \text{-----(Equation 1)}$$

Where,

VMSs = Vulnerable Mobilizing Structures

R = Radicalization ratio

V<sub>r</sub> = Number of people who became vulnerable to radicalization in a region

The equation will be elaborated on and used in the last section of this chapter to find the value of V<sub>r</sub> for Baluchistan, FATA and KP separately.

The chapter now unpacks the institutional expression of the sub-nation in KP by studying its political identity and organizing ideology and analyzing its relationship with the state of Pakistan.

### **7.1. The State of Pakistan and the People of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

The KP province and the FATA region (both dominated by the Pashtun sub-nation) were once part of the larger Punjab province in the era of British rule. The larger Punjab province was later divided in 1901 into three regions, FATA, NWFP (now KP) and smaller Punjab (current Punjab areas in Pakistan and India). Before 1901, the British administration was based in the smaller Punjab areas and used to control both the FATA and KP regions indirectly. However, after 1901, the FCR law was adopted for FATA as discussed in the previous chapters, while British administration was established in the KP region, where the bureaucracy became functional and the military was present to look after the interests of the empire.

From 1901 onwards, the KP province went through many social and political movements until the time of independence and partition in 1947. Those movements developed the institutional expression (political identity and the organizing ideology) of the Pashtun sub-nation of KP and is elaborated on in this chapter. The relationship between the state that became Pakistan and the Pashtun sub-nation in KP needs to be studied by analyzing the institutional expressions (political identity and organizing ideology of each). The institutional expression of the state of Pakistan and its political interests have already been discussed and explained in chapters three, four and five.

The following movements (discussed in more detail as the chapter progresses) in chronological order below have significant impact on the process of developing the political interests and the institutional expression of the Pashtun sub-nation of KP before and after partition.

- The *Social Reformation Movement* (1890): Aimed at promoting Islamic religious and modern education among the Pashtun sub-nation in KP.
- The *Khilafat Movement* (1919-1924): An Islamic religious movement throughout the Sub-continent aimed to contend the British Empire's move to break the Ottoman caliphate after the end of World War I in 1918.
- The *Hijrat (Migration) Movement* (1920): A retaliation to the failure of the Khilafat Movement throughout the sub-continent inspired by the Islamic religious decree of migrating from sub-continent (the land where Muslims feel oppressed or threatened) to Afghanistan (where there was Muslim rule).
- The *Khudai Khitmatgar (servants of God) Movement* (1929): A non-violent pro-independence, anti-colonialism and anti-partition social cum political movement of the ethnic Pashtuns (sub-nation) in KP.
- The *Muslim League Movement* (1930s): A movement initiated by Jinnah throughout the sub-continent under the banner of AIML that transformed from seeking independence from the British (in 1906) to demanding the partition of India on the basis of religion in 1930 afterwards.

#### *The Organizing Ideology and Political Identity of the Pashtun Sub-nation in KP*

The social reformation movement was initially planned as a counter strategy to the education provided in the missionary schools that were established by the British empire in KP from 1853 onwards<sup>612</sup>. Historical context suggests that the British missionary schools existed in the province well before the social reformation process started in 1890. Many students, who would later become the political representatives of the KP province and Pakistan had studied in these schools. Among those were Dr. Khan Sahib (who later became the chief minister of the KP province in 1937 and 1945, also see Table 6), General Yahya Khan (became the president of Pakistan as a dictator military general in 1958), Sahibzada Abdul Qayum Khan (the first ever chief minister of KP in 1937), and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, alias Bacha Khan (a famous Pashtun political activist and founder of the Khudai Khitmatgar Movement in KP)<sup>613</sup>.

The social reformation movement was focused on educating the Pashtuns of the KP province and establishing religious seminaries. The objective of the movement was to impart modern education and develop a sense of religious struggle (Jihad) for freedom from the British. This movement was

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<sup>612</sup> Mazher Hussain et al., "Politics of Social Reformation in NWFP (KPK) - an Estimate of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988)'S Educational Philosophy," *International Journal of Social Science Studies* 4, no. 6 (April 19, 2016): 37–44, p. 38. <https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v4i6.1466>.

<sup>613</sup> Hussain et al., "Politics of Social Reformation in NWFP (KPK) - an Estimate of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988)'S Educational Philosophy," p. 38

initiated by Haji Sahib of Turangzai (a social reformer, religious activist and teacher) with the help of many of his supporters, including Bacha Khan<sup>614</sup>

The British retaliated by closing down these seminaries and imprisoning the teachers, religious preachers and the leader of the movement. Later those religious seminaries were transformed into schools where modern education was given priority, religious education was also imparted but without the focus on religious struggle for freedom from the British. Instead, the focus of religious education was to eradicate social evils. This transformation was made by Bacha Khan<sup>615</sup>. Bacha Khan also established a volunteer trust, Anjuman-e-Islah Afghania, in 1921: A society for the reformation of the Pashtun society with the aim of uplifting their socio-economic and education conditions<sup>616</sup>. The objective of the trust was to propagate the religious cause against Christian missionaries, impart religious and modern education<sup>617</sup> and strive against laws and traditions that are against the Sharia<sup>618</sup>. Like Jinnah who strived to reform the Muslims of India into a movement through a combination of religion and modern education, Khan strived to reform the Pashtun society of KP through the same. A similar movement inspired by the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (which later became the Aligarh Muslim University from where Jinnah and many of his Muslim league colleagues had studied) also started in the KP province. This movement also focused on uplifting the Muslims through modern education, giving rise to many local organizations throughout the province for this purpose<sup>619</sup>.

The reformation process in KP started to reveal its impact within thirty years of its inception. The educated people of the KP province took interest in the political developments throughout India and the world, allowing them to observe and experience the changes taking place in the Muslim world and strive for a pan-Islamic movement by championing unification with other Muslims of India<sup>620</sup>. This social and religious interest aggregation became strong when KP faced mobilization of the people on a religious-political basis to support the Khilafat movement and then the province became the first springboard for the Hijrat Movement in 1920<sup>621</sup>. From the perspective of nationalism discussed in chapter three, coupled with the direct involvement of the bureaucracy to look after the region, social division among the Pashtuns of KP and FATA was created. The

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<sup>614</sup> The News, "The Haji of Turangzai," [www.thenews.com.pk](http://www.thenews.com.pk), October 18, 2020, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/730784-the-haji-of-turangzai>

<sup>615</sup> Hussain et al., "Politics of Social Reformation in NWFP (KPK) - an Estimate of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988)'S Educational Philosophy," p. 40

<sup>616</sup> Hussain et al., "Politics of Social Reformation in NWFP (KPK) - an Estimate of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988)'S Educational Philosophy," p. 41

<sup>617</sup> Hussain et al., "Politics of Social Reformation in NWFP (KPK) - an Estimate of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988)'S Educational Philosophy," p. 41

<sup>618</sup> Abdul Rauf, "Socio-Educational Reform Movements in NWFP – a Case Study of Anjuman – I – Islahul Afghania," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 27, no. 2 (2006), p. 37

<sup>619</sup> Rauf, "Socio-Educational Reform Movements in NWFP – a Case Study of Anjuman – I – Islahul Afghania," p. 34

<sup>620</sup> Syed W. A. Shah, *Muslim League in N.W.F.P.* (Karachi, Pakistan: Royal Book Company, 1992), p. 05

<sup>621</sup> Shah, *Muslim League in N.W.F.P.*, p. 06-07

Pashtun society of KP transformed into a high culture industrial society and experienced nationalism. However, the base of the social transformation movement in KP was religion rather than ethnicity and therefore, this suggests that the nationalism experienced by the Pashtuns of KP will be religious and not ethnic. The reformation process can also be connected with the rise of the movement of Deobandi Islam in the KP province in the late nineteenth century. The struggle of the religious clerics for socio-political revival and to protect the interests of the Muslims of India from 1914 until partition also provides concrete evidence of religious interest aggregation in the Pashtun-dominated province of KP<sup>622</sup>.

Therefore, the organizing ideology of the Pashtun political identity of KP was focused on uplifting their ethnic nation and for that they utilized religion and modern education. Hence, the formation of a non-violent quasi military movement by Bacha Khan, Khudai Khitmatgar, in the province is considered to be more religious than ethnic as it comprises a population that has been religiously reformed. The reformation movement helped the ethnic Pashtuns to adjust their movement to the larger frame of the struggle of the Muslims of India. While the objectives of the reformation process are described above, the nationalism context discussed in chapter three also suggests that the transformation to a high culture industrial society would change the social structure of the society. This situation holds to be true for the Pashtun sub-nation in KP as they ceased to hold on to their intra-nation feuds and established new forms of loyalties and hierarchy<sup>623</sup>. The socio-political change experienced by the KP province due to reasons discussed above helped to define the political interests of the Pashtun sub-nation in KP which are discussed below.

#### *The Political Interests of the Pashtun Sub-nation in KP*

The British empire's relationship with the religiously reformed rising Pashtun sub-nation in KP opened avenues for political partnership between their political identity and other movements in the rest of the British Raj. It should come as a surprise that the political identity of an ethnic sub-nation of KP with Islamic organizing ideology would establish ties with the Indian National Congress (INC) instead of the All India Muslim League (AIML). While historians criticize Bacha Khan and his Khudai Khitmatgar (KK) movement for such a move, it is worth noting that Bacha Khan and his movement were compelled to align with the INC after AIML's refusal to support them against British repression<sup>624</sup>. Another reason for this alignment was their ideological

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<sup>622</sup> Sana Haroon, "The Rise of Deobandi Islam in the North-West Frontier Province and Its Implications in Colonial India and Pakistan 1914–1996," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland* 18, no. 1 (January 2008): 47–70, p. 47-58. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1356186307007778>.

<sup>623</sup> Mukulika Banerje, "Partition and the North West Frontier Province: Memories of Some Khudai Khidmatgars," in *The Partitions of Memory: The Afterlife of the Division of India* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). p. 31

<sup>624</sup> Safoora Arbab, "Nonviolence, Pakhtunwali and Decolonization: Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Politics of Friendship," in *Muslims against the Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan* (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, Ny, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2017). p. 222-223

coherence. Both INC and the KK movement were pro-independence and championed the idea of a united India while AIML was focused on partition of India before independence.

Since the reformation process had initiated social change in KP, where the traditional status quo of the tribal and landlord elites was broken and a new social hierarchy was established, it had caused serious defects in the way the British empire used to administer the province. Before 1920, they used to rely on local influential elements confined to chiefs and landed elites in order to maintain a bureaucratic hold in the province but the situation started to change as the reformation process brought the sub-nation of KP face to face with its elites<sup>625</sup>. Such a situation compelled the empire to initiate constitutional reforms in the province, which finally led the province towards electoral politics through the Government of India Act of 1935. Elections were held in 1937 and the results reveal that the INC had been able to make inroads in KP and became the largest party in the province by winning 19 seats<sup>626</sup>. Shah, in his book, writes in detail about the effort put in by AIML and Jinnah to establish their political base in KP province. He discusses the rise of the Muslim League in KP from 1912 and mentions many elite personalities and their efforts to establish the AIML KP chapter, the Khyber Union London of Pashtun Muslim Students in 1929, and the visit of Jinnah to KP in 1936<sup>627</sup>. While the 1937 election results do show that the Muslim Independent candidates won two more seats than the INC in KP<sup>628</sup>, it does not show whether this victory of the candidates was because of their own elite status in their constituencies or because of their leaning towards the AIML.

The non-violent KK movement had its role to play in leading the social transformation and creating new hierarchies in the Pashtun society of KP. The role of the KK movement cannot be ignored when discussing the social and political development of KP province throughout the twentieth century<sup>629</sup>. Many people interpret the objective of the movement in their own way, as discussed by Bashir,<sup>630</sup> but its non-violent and democratic nature has remained the focus of all. Evolved out of a series of social and political experiences faced by the reformed people in the KP province, the movement had people who finally decided to follow Bacha Khan in his mission to reform the Pashtun society and rejected other calls for nationalism on the basis of ethnicity or religion<sup>631</sup>. The structure and politics of the movement were of a unique nature previously unknown to the people of the KP and established a base that would become a threat to a future imperialist or nationalist

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<sup>625</sup> Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad, Amanullah Memon, and Fazal Rabbi, "Electoral Politics in the North West Frontier Province of Colonial India 1946–47," *History and Sociology of South Asia* 8, no. 1 (January 2014): 1–19, p. 03-04 <https://doi.org/10.1177/2230807513506625>.

<sup>626</sup> Shah, *Muslim League in N.W.F.P.*, p. 29

<sup>627</sup> Shah, *Muslim League in N.W.F.P.*, p. 20-28

<sup>628</sup> Shah, *Muslim League in N.W.F.P.*, p. 29

<sup>629</sup> Nadia Bashir, "A Review of Political Awakening in NWFP (1901-1947)," *Pakistan Annual Research Journal* 49 (2013): 59–75, p. 64

<sup>630</sup> Bashir, "A Review of Political Awakening in NWFP (1901-1947)," p. 64

<sup>631</sup> Mukulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed : Opposition & Memory in the North West Frontier* (Santa Fe, N.M.: School of American Research Press, 2000). p. 47-60

state<sup>632</sup>. The base from which this non-violent movement emerged can be traced back to the reformation process, and therefore, after four decades it had become educated and democratic, where religious and ethnic identity remained confined to the individual self and had no impact on the political interest of the sub-nation.

After the 1937 election, the formation of the INC government and the acts and laws passed by them led by the Chief Minister Dr. Khan Sahib (brother of Bacha Khan), threatened the interests of the elite landlords, made them feel repressed by the INC government and motivated them to join any platform that would free them of their miseries<sup>633</sup>. A similar situation existed in Baluchistan when the NAP 1972-73 government angered the local elites (the dominating elites) there. The only difference is that the NAP government was overthrown while the INC government succeeded in passing laws and acts that reduced the power of the elites, nobles and chiefs. The tug of political war for power between the INC and AIML in KP from 1937 to 1946 created division among the sub-nation not on the basis of ethnicity or religion, but on the basis of ideology and party.

Despite hard work by Jinnah to establish a political base in KP, the results of the 1946 general election were again in favor of INC. In fact, this time the congress won 30 seats out of 50, enabling it to form its own government in the province while the AIML won only 17 seats - 5 seats less than the independent Muslims (tribal and landlord elites) won in 1937<sup>634</sup>. An analysis of the seats won in the election reveals that INC won the majority of seats in areas where the KK movement was strong (which includes Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan) and the league won seats in the Hazara district where the KK movement was weak<sup>635</sup>.

Things dramatically changed when the British empire decided to hold a referendum in June 1947 in the KP province for the people to decide whether they wished to remain part of India or become a part of Pakistan. The results were that 289,244 (99%) votes out of 292,118 votes cast in KP were in favor of joining Pakistan, which was the political objective of AIML<sup>636</sup>. The result is surprising because only a year prior in the 1946 general elections, the same people voted to install a government in KP that was against partition and aligned with the INC against the political objective of AIML. The plebiscite was held under the British control and monitored by both INC and AIML and was therefore considered legitimate and the results were accepted by both parties. Rittenberg connects the outcome of the referendum with the demographic changes that had taken place before the referendum (Hindus and Sikhs in KP had left for territories that were to become

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<sup>632</sup> Arbab, "Nonviolence, Pakhtunwali and Decolonization: Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Politics of Friendship," p. 221-222.

<sup>633</sup> Shah, *Muslim League in N.W.F.P.*, p. 29-39

<sup>634</sup> Ahmad, Memon and Rabbi, "Electoral Politics in the North West Frontier Province of Colonial India 1946-47," p. 06

<sup>635</sup> Ahmad, Memon and Rabbi, "Electoral Politics in the North West Frontier Province of Colonial India 1946-47," p. 07

<sup>636</sup> Ahmad, Memon and Rabbi, "Electoral Politics in the North West Frontier Province of Colonial India 1946-47," p. 16



India)<sup>637</sup>. Shah explains the referendum results by suggesting a change in the perspective of the Muslim Pashtun sub-nation occurred for two reasons. These are that the religious meaning attached to Pakistan became the focus of the sub-nation for which they were asked to vote and join. The other reason was the already existing environment of conflict in India where some Muslims (ethnic Pashtuns) were killed by Hindus<sup>638</sup>.

While these reasons may have had an impact on the results of the referendum, it is worth mentioning that the educated, democratically experienced and reformed ethnic Pashtun sub-nation of KP was able to realize a shift in their socio-economic, political and religious interest. Their goal of gaining independence was being achieved and the objective of Hindu Muslim unity had died with the announcement of partition. What was only left was the uplift of the Muslim Pashtuns that was envisaged as being achievable by voting to join Pakistan through the referendum, rather than voting to join India where they would have to struggle to get their rights and resources from a pool of many other ethnicities and religious populations. The referendum result is evidence that the Pashtun sub-nation of KP gave rise to the state of Pakistan. Unlike FATA and Baluchistan, it was the Pashtun population of KP that connected itself with the state and not the tribal chiefs, nobles or elites (agents of social control). Hence, the evidence suggests that unlike in FATA and Baluchistan, the province of KP did not have the socio-political dimensions that can define it as a sub-state at the time of Partition and therefore, according to the SFV, the Pashtun sub-nation lacked agents of social control (reducing the need for the state to establish structural domination), was able to directly channel their political interests towards the state and enjoy a good state-to-nation relationship. The section now moves to explore the socio-political dynamics in KP after partition in 1947 to investigate the existence of the factors of radicalization according to the SFV: structural domination, agents of social control, and religious and ethnic social movements.

#### *Ethnic Radicalization of the Sub-nation in KP*

After the 1947 referendum in KP, there was a series of communications between Bacha Khan and Gandhi, and the INC. Analyzing the communications reveals that the KK movement and Bacha Khan had become politically vulnerable in the KP province. Bacha Khan and his movement felt betrayed after sacrificing much for Indian Nationalism and going against the Muslim league (who Bacha Khan used to call the pack of wolves)<sup>639</sup>. That was the first time when Bacha Khan talked about a separate state for the Pashtuns by the name Pashtunistan but it is suggested that it was too late for the following reasons.

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<sup>637</sup> Stephen Alan Rittenberg, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1988). p. 393

<sup>638</sup> Syed W. A. Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). p. 174-175

<sup>639</sup> Dinanath G. Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith Is a Battle*. (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1967). p. 424-427

1. The failure of KK movement and its leaders to obtain the objective of a united India, which worked as a factor that created distrust between the people and the leaders of the KK movement.
2. The reformation process had changed the social structure of the Pashtun society and therefore the call for Pashtunistan would lead to ethnic nationalism which meant creating a socio-economic and political border around the Pashtun sub-nation and radicalizing them on ethnic grounds. Such a situation would have meant that the movement would lose all that it had strived for since it started in 1920.
3. It also meant motivating some, not all, to pick up arms and initiate an ethnic insurgency which would be against the essence of the KK movement and the non-violent ideology of Bacha Khan.

It is also suggested that the call for Pashtunistan at the time of partition or any future similar calls were aimed at getting maximum political and provincial leverage aimed at ethnic-nationalism from the state so that the KK movement and leaders could become legitimate protectors of the Pashtuns<sup>640</sup>. The only political opportunity left for Bacha Khan and his KK movement was to strive for the socio-economic and political rights of the Pashtun people through establishing a political and diplomatic relationship with the state of Pakistan. However, things had changed on the AIML's side which was victorious in its political objective. There was a series of talks and negotiations between AIML, INC and leader of the KK movement on the issue of the relationship of the Pashtun sub-nation (represented by KK movement and Bacha Khan) with the future state of Pakistan. The demands Bacha Khan made to Jinnah on different occasions in return for pledging loyalty to the new state were:<sup>641</sup>

- Complete provincial autonomy for KP;
- The right of the province to secede from Pakistan if it decided to do so; and
- The adjacent Pashtun dominated territories would have the right to join the province of KP.

Jinnah suggested that he had no power to decide such a state-to-nation relationship and it was best if the constituent assembly of Pakistan were to decide on these demands. Bacha Khan, then shifted his allegiance to Pakistan and became a member of its constituent assembly for constitutional framing where he accepted the reality of Pakistan and elaborated that Pashtunistan only refers to an autonomous unit of the federation on par with other provinces<sup>642</sup>. Unlike Baluchistan and FATA, the KP province took a socio-economic development road through the political identity and leadership.

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<sup>640</sup> Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Pakistan's North-West Frontier: Under a New Name," *Strategic Analysis* 22, no. 5 (August 1998): 761–81, p.770. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700169808458851>.

<sup>641</sup> Mohammad R. Afzal, "Dismissal of the NWFP Congress Ministry, August 22, 1947," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 24, no. 2 (2003), p. 1-17

<sup>642</sup> Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith Is a Battle*, p. 451

Since then, instead of confining their socio-economic and political interests to KP, the Pashtun sub-nation has participated in the nation-building process by spreading their economic interests throughout the country, especially in the financial capital of Karachi<sup>643</sup>. Political instability arose in the province with the promulgation of the first martial law in the country in 1958. Bacha Khan and the Pashtun leadership of KP rallied to uphold the constitution and democracy against the military dictator. In fact, it was Bacha Khan's idea to bring forth and rally support for the sister of Jinnah, Fatima Jinnah, to contest presidential elections against the dictator in 1965. Bacha Khan and other leaders of the KK movement faced years in jail and detentions over their activism against the brutalities of the dictators towards all other sub-nations of the country. The KK movement also aligned their goal of genuine federation with East Pakistan's political ambition of provincial autonomy throughout the 1950s and 1960s<sup>644</sup>. In regard to their share in the state structure, the Pashtuns of KP were adjusted into the federal and provincial bureaucracy and the security forces, including the military<sup>645</sup>.

Other ethnic political interests of the Pashtuns were achieved which involved joining some adjacent tribal Pashtun states into the KP province. This included the princely states of Dir and Swat and a non-Pashtun princely state of Chitral<sup>646</sup>. The KP provincial parliamentary system was established after 1972, as in other provinces allowing the KK movement and Bacha Khan to gather and form their political party and base confined to the KP province. Recall the discussion in chapter five regarding the NAP party that established nationalist governments in KP and Baluchistan in 1972. When the Baloch ethno-nationalist political parties broke away from NAP and faced fragmentation and factionalism, the NAP transformed into the Awami National Party (ANP) led by Bacha Khan and confined its political base to KP province. It then controlled the elements of the government in KP by forming alliances with the mainstream political party (the PPP) after the general elections of 1988. PPP and ANP again formed an alliance and controlled the elements of the government in KP province after the general elections of 2008<sup>647</sup>.

The discussion above suggests that the ethnic social movement in KP exists but is not controlled by agents of social control. The discussion also suggests that the ethnic movement is not the result of the structural domination of the state. In fact, the structure of dominating and resisting elites seems to be absent when it comes to discussing the Pashtun sub-nation of KP and the nation of the state of Pakistan on the basis of the ethnic sub-state. Therefore, there has never been a Pashtun ethnic insurgency rising from KP in Pakistan.

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<sup>643</sup> Pattanaik, "Pakistan's North-West Frontier: Under a New Name," p. 773

<sup>644</sup> Pattanaik, "Pakistan's North-West Frontier: Under a New Name," p. 773

<sup>645</sup> Pattanaik, "Pakistan's North-West Frontier: Under a New Name," p. 773


<sup>646</sup> Charles Lindholm, "Contemporary Politics in a Tribal Society: Swat District, NWFP, Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 19, no. 5 (May 1, 1979): 485–505, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644040>.

<sup>647</sup> Mushtaq, "Ethno-Regional Political Party Success in Pakistan (1970-2013): An Analysis," p. 102-105

Analyzing the percentage of seats won by political institutions contesting from KP province in the National Assembly from 1972-2018 (see Figure 37 below) also indicates that the Pashtun sub-nation of KP is more inclined towards the mainstream and religious political opportunity in the country than their own ethnic political interests. In addition, at the level of the provincial assembly, the ethno-nationalism of the Pashtun sub-nation is reflected a little more than in the National Assembly as shown in Figure 38 below which shows the percentage of seats won by the type of political institution in the provincial assembly of KP since 1972. This ethno-nationalist engagement is, however, developed by the KK movement and based on the ideology of Bacha Khan. Unlike Baluchistan, the ethno-nationalist engagement is not in the hands of ethnic agents of social control in KP and is not considered a threat that can give rise to ethnic VMS in KP.


Both the figures below show that the religious political parties have been able to consolidate their position in KP, although their share of the votes fluctuates greatly over time. Irrespective of their turbulent electoral fortunes, the fact they now regularly receive votes in elections can be derived from the religious social movement in the country that began in the 1970s. The chapter now moves to unpack the religious social movement that led to religious radicalization of the Pashtun sub-nation in KP.

**Figure 37. Percentage of Political Representation in the National Assembly (NA) of Pakistan from KP (1972-2018)<sup>648</sup>**



<sup>648</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan Free and Fair Election Network, “ElectionPakistan | Pakistan’s Premier Election Portal | Elections Pakistan,” Election Pakistan (Free and Fair Election Network).  
 Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, *The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan’s Transition from Democracy above Rule of Law to Democracy under Rule of Law: 1970-2013*. The information in the above figure does not contain the reserved seats for women and minorities and therefore only reflects representation of the political parties in the national assembly of Pakistan from KP’s mainstream, ethnic and religious political institutions.

**Figure 38. Percentage of Political Representation in the Provincial Assembly of KP<sup>649</sup>**



*Religious Radicalization of the Sub-nation in KP*

The religious social movement that arose due to the Islamization policy of the state that started in the 1970s could be expected to have religiously radicalized the Pashtun sub-nation in KP throughout 1979 to 2001 as it did in the rest of the country. The study of the religious political institution in chapter four includes the two major religious political parties in the country – JI and JUI. Both the parties enjoy considerable public support in KP which is reflected in Figures 37 and 38 above. These religious political parties have their effective social mobilizing structures (also explained in chapter four) that help them to establish and expand their socio-political base.

It was the religious social movement that was polarized and gave rise to the holy warriors in Pakistan who emerged to help their Muslim Pashtun brothers in Afghanistan (post-1979) and then in FATA (post-2001). These events were discussed in detail in Chapter Five, where it is also explained that the religious social movement in Pakistan that arose in the 1970s used religious institutions (scholars, priests, mosques and seminaries) as agents of social change who later became agents of social control (evident in Figure 24 for FATA and Baluchistan). Hence, like the


<sup>649</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections,” Election Commission of Pakistan Free and Fair Election Network, “ElectionPakistan | Pakistan’s Premier Election Portal | Elections Pakistan,” Election Pakistan (Free and Fair Election Network).  
 Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, *The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan’s Transition from Democracy above Rule of Law to Democracy under Rule of Law: 1970-2013*. The information in the above figure does not contain the reserved seats for women and minorities and therefore only reflects representation of the political parties in the provincial assemblies of KP from the platform of National, Ethnic and Religious political institutions.

rest of the country, KP also experienced the rise of religious elites as agents of social change in the 1970s who later became agents of social control (shown in the next section in Figure 41)

The rise of religious terrorism in Pakistan, when the religious political opportunity of the polarized groups was blocked in the country after 2001, suggests that the religious agents of social control in KP would also respond by attacking the state. Figure 39 below shows the post-2001 data of the religious and ethnic terrorist attacks in Baluchistan, FATA and KP, the number of terrorist organization involved in those attacks, and the number of cities where these attacks have taken place.

The data in Figure 39 makes the radicalization components of the SFV evident for KP too, as any social movement under the control of agents of social control leads to violence when the political opportunity of the movement is blocked. In comparison to Baluchistan, where the resisting elites as agents of social control resisted the religious social movement, the KP province was expected to comply with the policy of the state because there were no resisting elites among the agents of social control in KP. Figure 39 below has been prepared by gathering data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and includes violent attacks from ethnic insurgents and religious militants in KP, Baluchistan, and FATA after 2001 when the political opportunity of the polarized groups was blocked.

**Figure 39. Total attacks, number of villages / cities targeted and the number and type of militants<sup>650</sup>**



Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland

<sup>650</sup> It is important to note that the above data has been obtained from the global terrorism data base and the data was filtered to include only the attacks that were claimed by the religious or ethnic militant outfits. Nearby villages have been counted under the umbrella of a single city.

Data in Figure 39 is an indication of the access that the religious terrorist groups have been able to create in the three regions. According to the GTD, all the religious terrorist attacks in Baluchistan, FATA and KP were claimed by militant organizations that were based in FATA. The strength of these religious terrorist groups based in FATA can be seen in Figure 39 where they are able to expand outside of FATA. This includes the 48 cities of Baluchistan and 213 cities of KP. A reason for low expansion of these religious terrorist groups from FATA in Baluchistan is that the grievances towards the state are already being channeled through the 16 Baloch ethnic militant groups based in Baluchistan, who had been able to carry out attacks in 219 cities.

Hence the evidence in this section suggests that even when there were no resisting elites (agents of social control) in the region of KP before 1970, the political identity and the organizing ideology (institutional expression) of the key stakeholder central institutions of state gave rise to religious agents of social control in KP through their Islamization policy. The religious social movement contributed to the creation of religious VMSs whose political opportunity kept multiplying in Pakistan and Afghanistan through 1979 to 2001. These VMSs turned against the state and the key stakeholder central institutions when their political opportunity was blocked in both Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2001. FATA faced the same SFV process where there were no resisting elites (agents of social control). In Baluchistan, however, the agents of social control had already led to the rise of an ethnic insurgency after 1947 in the absence of religious agents of social control. After the Islamization policy and the rise of religious agents of social control in the 1970s, the religious social movement contributed to the rise of religious terrorism in Baluchistan when the political opportunity of the religious movement was blocked after 2001.

Referring back to the MDCM, the hazard (radicalization) has been pressed upon the people of KP, FATA and Baluchistan through the policies of the state, i.e. the Islamization policy leading to religious terrorism (in KP and FATA) and the policy of structural domination leading to ethnic insurgency (in Baluchistan). The study of the vulnerability of the people to radicalization (grievances of the people towards the state) will help to suggest (in the next section) whether the MDCM has been successful in exposing the people of KP to radicalization and expanding the VMSs from FATA into KP.

## **7.2. The Vulnerable Mobilizing Structures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

The proposed SFV suggests that the vulnerability of the people to being radicalized is defined by its population's proneness to, or ability to cope with the social and political conflicts around them. Chapter six discussed this in detail and explained that the grievances of the people towards the existing institutional expression (political identity and organizing ideology) of the state is a sign of vulnerability of the people to radicalization in Baluchistan and FATA. The institutional expression of the state that develops a relationship between the state and the people of KP establishes the core base for this section to answer whether the religious VMSs that expanded from FATA in the province of KP succeeded in exploiting the grievances of the population towards the

state and radicalizing the people as they did in Baluchistan and FATA. Therefore, the vulnerability of the sub-nation in KP will be explained through:

- i) The socio-political dynamics and the existing institutional expression in KP that establishes the relationship of the people of KP with the state;
- ii) The grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression; and
- iii) The politicization and framing of the grievances directed towards the existing institutional expression.


### *The Socio-Political dynamics of KP*

The political institution is the platform where the people of the nation are represented through their political identity and is responsible for developing the state-to-nation relationship. Figures 37 and 38 reveal that the political identity of the people from KP belongs to the mainstream political parties followed by religious and then ethnic political parties. The engagement of political parties with the people of KP determines what parties are trying to maintain their external linkage with the people. For that, it is important to analyze the number of political parties in the province of KP that engage with the population. Figure 40 shows the actual number and type of political parties that engaged with the people of KP in the general elections of 2013 and 2018. Figure 40 below and Figures 37 and 38 above provide convincing evidence for 2013 and 2018 that the mainstream parties were more successful in engaging the people of KP than the ethnic and religious political parties.

Figures 37, 38 and 40 provide evidence of the approach of the Pashtun sub-nation in KP towards the political opportunity of the key stakeholder central institutions and the religious and ethnic political institutions. The figures provide evidence of their voting pattern in the general elections of 2013 and 2018 and suggest that people of KP prefer engagement with political messages that are concerned with the political opportunities of the key stakeholder central institutions. They seem to be less engaged with the ethnic political messages than the religious ones, as is revealed in Figures 37, 38 and 40.



**Figure 40. Number of political parties that contested in the general elections of 2013<sup>651</sup> and 2018<sup>652</sup> from KP**



It was revealed in chapter six that the linkage between the people and the political parties in Pakistan is established through a patron-client relationship. In that situation, the agents of social control command the obedience of the people because of their social status, and therefore, they are able to win the greatest number of votes. In reference to KP, it is important to analyse the social status of the heads of political parties to reveal the source of the socio-political linkage between the state of Pakistan and the sub-nation of KP. Such information will also reveal whether the political parties are under control of the agents of social control that were identified for Baluchistan and FATA. Figure 41 reflects the social status of the heads of political parties according to the survey participants and is compared with the responses of the sample for Baluchistan and FATA (combined) on the same question which is also outlined in chapter six (see Figure 24).

Figure 41 below suggests that the religious agents of social control do exist in KP. However, the social status of most of the heads of the political parties in KP is considered to be political, i.e. they do not enjoy any other social status that gives them power and authority over the people like the tribal chiefs and religious and ethnic elites in Baluchistan and FATA do.

<sup>651</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections 2013: Report Volume II,” *Election Commission of Pakistan* (Islamabad: ECP, Government of Pakistan, 2013), p. 7-478.

<sup>652</sup> Election Commission of Pakistan, “General Elections 2018-Form-33- Final List of Contesting Candidates,” [www.ecp.gov.pk](http://www.ecp.gov.pk) (ECP, Government of Pakistan, 2018), <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frnGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3160>. Please see KP (National Assembly / Provincial Assembly) and Balochistan (National Assembly and Provincial Assembly).

**Figure 41. Social Status of the heads of Political Parties in KP compared with Baluchistan and FATA<sup>653</sup>**



With such a situation existing in KP, it becomes important to explore below the existing institutional expression that exists in KP and commands obedience of the people.

#### *The Existing Institutional Expression in KP*


The discussion above shows that the political elites are the major group from KP who represent the political identity of the people and are responsible for developing the existing institutional expression in KP. The political personalities do not belong to the group of the agents of social control as they do not enjoy any social status over the people of the region outside the political dimension. Therefore, it is expected that the level of influence of the institutions that represent the state would have more influence in society than the non-state or the sub-state system that was preferred in Baluchistan and FATA. The survey participants were asked directly about the level of influence of each of the agents of social control and the state institutions in KP (Figure 42). This level of influence was also asked of the survey participants of FATA and Baluchistan in chapter six. Figure 42 below is prepared by adding the percentage of people who recorded ‘moderately influential’, ‘influential’, and ‘highly influential’ for each agent of social control or institution.

<sup>653</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.


Figure 42 reveals that 83.3 percent of the research participants consider the state (police and judiciary) as highly influential in KP, followed by the other state actor, the commissioner, who is considered by 61.1 percent of the research participants to be highly influential. The tribal chiefs are considered highly influential by only 25 percent of the research participants, so 75 percent of the participants consider them as not influential, making the tribal institution and tribal chiefs the least influential institution and agents of social control.

Another query to the participants was to identify the preferred system of conflict resolution by the people in KP in order to resolve a conflict among members in society. This is noted, in Figure 43.

**Figure 42. Institutions or Agents of Social control as Influential in KP (% of Survey Participants)**



**Figure 43. (Preferred Institutional Expression by the people in KP for Conflict or Problem Resolution (% of Survey Participants))**



The survey participants reveal (in both the figures above) that the agents of social control who do exist in the social spectrum of KP, have considerable influence and are also preferred by the people for conflict and problem resolution. However, the same survey participants did not indicate these agents to be the leaders of the political parties in KP. This indication suggests that while the agents do exist in the province, they do not control the political institution and the political institution in KP is unable to establish a patron-client relationship with the people.


In addition, the figures above also suggest that the influence and power of the agents of social control to settle disputes and social problems exists at a considerable level, but it is less than the influence of the state. With such a situation prevailing in KP between the state and the agents of social control, it remains to be identified whether the existing institutional expression of the state

and the agents is a source of grievances for the people of KP to make them vulnerable to radicalization. This is discussed below.

*Grievances that arise from the Existing Institutional Expression*


For Baluchistan and FATA, corruption, patron-based recruitment and the inability of the state to ensure justice, health and human security for the people are factors that have the potential to incite grievances. Figures 44 and 45 compare the percentage of survey participants in Baluchistan, FATA and the percentage of survey participants in KP who consider the existing institutional expression in their regions to be corrupt and responsible for establishing patron-client relationship between the people and the political institution. The level of corruption in Figure 44 for each region was calculated by combining the percentage of participants who selected “moderately corrupt”, “corrupt” or “highly corrupt” related to a particular agent or institution. Similarly, the volume of patronage-based recruitment in Figure 45 for each region was calculated by combining the percentage of participants who selected recruitments done by the clients as “few” and “many” when asked about the people they know that were appointed to government jobs based on their relationship with a particular client.

**Figure 44 .Comparison of the Percentage of Survey Participants in KP and Baluchistan and FATA who consider the Existing Institutional Expression in their regions to be Corrupt<sup>654</sup>**




<sup>654</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

**Figure 45. Comparison (as %) of Survey Participants in KP and Baluchistan and FATA who consider Patron-Client Relationships to be promoted by the Actors and Institutions<sup>655</sup>**




As a whole, the two figures above suggest that the existing institutional expression in KP is considered less corrupt and less involved in patron-based recruitments. As such, the people of KP would appear to be more satisfied with the government departments than the people in Baluchistan and FATA, which generate less grievances for them when compared to Baluchistan and FATA. This can also be suggested by Figures 46, 47, 48 and 49.

**Figure 46. Percentage of Survey Participants satisfied with Government Departments (comparison)<sup>656</sup>**



**Figure 47. Percentage of Survey Participants who have experienced Judicial Injustice from the State and the Agents of Social Control (comparison)<sup>657</sup>**




<sup>655</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.


<sup>656</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

<sup>657</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, "Survey of Baluchistan and FATA", Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

**Figure 48. Participant’s Access to Quality Public Health Care (comparison)<sup>658</sup>**



**Figure 49. Deaths recalled by Percentage of Survey Participants due to Unavailability of Doctor or Medical Services<sup>659</sup>**



Analysing the figures above shows that the survey participants in KP are more connected and satisfied with the existing institutional expression in KP than the survey participants in Baluchistan and FATA. However, the existing institutional expression does appear to generate fewer grievances than it does in Baluchistan and FATA. According to the SFV, the social movements that exist in KP would utilize this situation to frame the state as responsible for the grievances generated by the institutional expression. This process is elaborated on below.


The framing process is carried out by politicizing the grievances of the people, and according to the SFV, the state is framed as responsible for those grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression. Looking back at the SFV diagram in chapter three (inserted below for reference), the social movement is responsible for channelling the grievances from the political to the social spectrum of society. Chapter five has revealed that the religious agents of social control utilize the religious social movement in the country and give rise to religious VMSs. The chapter has also explained that the ethnic and tribal agents of social control utilize the ethnic social movement in Baluchistan, giving rise to ethnic VMSs. Chapter six concluded that the grievances generated by the existing institutional expression in FATA and Baluchistan are politicized by the existing social movements in Pakistan to expose the vulnerable population to radicalization. The

<sup>658</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

<sup>659</sup> Muhammad A. Karim, “Survey of Baluchistan and FATA”, Unpublished raw data, 2018. Processed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software.

vulnerability of the people to radicalization is therefore based on the level of grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression.

**Figure 50. The Sub-structural Framework for Violence**



*Framing of the Existing Institutional Expression in KP by Politicizing the Grievances*

This chapter has revealed the following:

- The social reformation movement in KP that was initiated in 1890 was led by the ethnic political identity of the Pashtun sub-nation in KP who belonged to the social change group. The frame of the movement was to protect the socio-political interests of the religious Pashtun sub-nation in KP from the interests of the British Raj;
- The ethnic social movement in KP that was initiated after independence in 1947 has not been able to engage the Pashtun sub-nation in KP as revealed in Figures 37, 38 and 40. In addition, the small number of ethnic agents of social control (Figure 41) has not utilized the grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression and framed them as ethnic grievances of the sub-nation. This framing is done effectively by the ethnic movement in Baluchistan as elaborated in chapter four (see interviews with the research participants), chapter five and six. Figure 39 in this chapter shows that 16 ethnic insurgent groups in Baluchistan have been able to establish VMSs in 219 cities and carried out 888 insurgent attacks; and


- The religious social movement that arose in the 1970s through the Islamization policy has been able to connect more with the Pashtun sub-nation than the ethnic social movement, as illustrated in Figures 37 and 38. As in Baluchistan and FATA, the religious agents of social control emerged in KP after 1971 (see Figures 41 and 42) and have been able to religiously politicize the grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression which is suggested by the information in Figure 39. The figure suggests that out of 17 terrorist groups based in FATA, 11 were able to expand into KP and establish VMSs in 213 cities by politicizing the grievances that are generated by the exiting institutional expression in KP. They carried out 749 terrorist attacks

The absence of ethnic insurgency in FATA and KP suggests that the religious frame has been able to channel the grievances of the people of both the regions into the religious social movement. In Baluchistan, the ethnic social movement has been able to channel the grievances of the people more than the religious social movement. This is seen in Figure 39 where 14 religious terrorist groups were able to expand in Baluchistan but could only establish VMSs in 48 cities and carried out 247 terrorist attacks.


Therefore, the type of frame (religious or ethnic) attached to the level of grievances generated from the existing institutional expression is an important factor in determining the vulnerability to radicalization of the people. The level of grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression gives credibility to the framing process and the figures and discussions in the previous section suggest that the people of KP are still less vulnerable to radicalization than the people of FATA and Baluchistan. This is despite the fact that the religious frame has been able to successfully establish VMSs in KP. To show this phenomenon, let us first examine at the macro-level, the grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression. The inability of the state to provide human security for the population is an important factor that can be used to frame the existing institutional expression in a manner considered corrupt and unjust. Human security not only refers to survival, but it extends the scope of security to include security of health, education and livelihood. The comparison of human security in KP with human security in Baluchistan and FATA is presented in Figures 51, 52 and 53.



**Figure 51. Number of Deaths in KP, FATA and Baluchistan as a result of Political Violence<sup>660</sup>**



**Figure 52. Comparison of trends of the HDI and Educations Index of KP, Baluchistan and FATA<sup>661</sup>**




<sup>660</sup> Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, GTD 1970-2019, September 17, 2019. The figure shows the deaths recorded as a result of the attacks carried out by terrorist and insurgent groups.

<sup>661</sup> Institute of Management Research, “Subnational Human Development Index (4.0)”, Global Data Lab, Radboud University. Accessed on January 14, 2021.

[https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/shdi/PAK/?levels=1%2B4&interpolation=0&extrapolation=0&nearest\\_real=0&colour\\_scales=national](https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/shdi/PAK/?levels=1%2B4&interpolation=0&extrapolation=0&nearest_real=0&colour_scales=national)

**Figure 53. Comparison of Incidence of poverty (IOP) trend<sup>662</sup>**



Analysing the figures above shows that the current situation of human security (in terms of deaths from political violence, human development and poverty incidence) is a lesser source of threat to the sub-nation in KP than in Baluchistan and FATA. This situation of human security is being framed as a threat for the sub-nation in Baluchistan and FATA by the radicalizers but has reduced chances to be framed as a threat to the sub-nation in KP by the radicalizers. While the state has struggled to provide security for the people in the past two decades, it has done better in KP than in Baluchistan and FATA in regards to HDI, EI and IOP. The existing institutional expression in KP is therefore suggested to reduce the vulnerability of the people to radicalization compared to FATA and Baluchistan.

The chapter now begins to calculate the number of people radicalized in Baluchistan, FATA and KP through the equation developed at the beginning of this chapter using the data in Figure 39 (keeping in consideration the discussions and findings of this chapter as elaborated on above).

Equation 1 developed at the beginning of this chapter was based on the DCM that considers *Disaster* as a product of *hazard* and *vulnerability* of the people to hazard:

$$\text{Disaster} = \text{Hazard} \times \text{Vulnerability}$$

This thesis, in chapter three has established Manmade Disaster Crunch Model and considers that

$$\text{Vulnerable Mobilizing Structures (Disaster)} = \text{Radicalization (Hazard)} \times \text{Vulnerability of the people to radicalization (Vulnerability)}$$

<sup>662</sup> PCP, UNDP, and OPHI, “Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan,” p. 72-73

\*\* Proper and formal data accumulation for FATA has not been done in the past. The latest official data for FATA in case of IoP and HDI is available from 2015 and onwards. Therefore, in the figures above, the IoP and HDI for FATA in all the years before 2015 is considered the same.

So, equation 1 is:

$$\text{VMSs} = R \times V_r$$

Where,

- VMSs is the sum of the total number of terrorist / insurgent groups in a region, the number of cities these groups were able to expand, and the number of terrorist / insurgent attacks they were able to carry out in the region. (see Figure 39)
- R is the radicalization ratio. It is the number of terrorist / insurgent organizations active in the region (Ra), out of the total number of terrorist / insurgent organizations that exist in the country (Rt). The value of R will range from 0.1 to 1 (value 0.1 refers to low level of radicalization in the region: value 1 refers to highest level of radicalization). Hence,  $R = R_a / R_t$
- (Vr) is the number of people who became vulnerable to radicalization in a region. The Vr is calculated when vulnerability to radicalization in a region (V) is applied to the total population of the region. Hence,  $V_r = V \times (P)$

Merging the details in equation 1 above, creates equation 2.

$$\text{VMS} = (R_a/R_t) \times (V \times P)$$

The focus of this section is to calculate the value of V, which is the vulnerability to radicalization of the people in the each of the region (Baluchistan, FATA and KP) using the data available in Figure 39 and the population figures for these regions according to the 1998 population census in Pakistan. The reason for using the population census of 1998 is that it was the only census done by the end of last century and the latest available census was carried out in 2017-18 which does not apply to the period of analysis.

Therefore, equation 2 will transform into equation 3 as:

$$V = (\text{VMS} \times R_t) / (R_a \times P)$$

The following table provides the values of equation and calculates the value of V for each region.

**Table 9. The Vulnerability of the People to Radicalization in the Regions**

	Region		
	KP	FATA	Baluchistan
VMSs	973	886	1432
Ra	11	17	30

Rt	17	17	33
P (Total Population – 1998 Census)	17,743,645	3,176,331	6,565,885
(V) Vulnerability to Radicalization in the Region	0.000085	0.00028	0.00024
Number of people expected to become vulnerable to radicalization out of 100,000 People	8.5	28	24

The table above indicates that the vulnerability of the population to radicalization in KP is less than that of FATA and Baluchistan. Both the FATA and Baluchistan regions have approximately the same vulnerability to (100,000) people ratio despite a major difference in their population size in 1998 and the total number of terrorist groups involved in both regions. The data in the table also strongly suggests that the politicization of the grievances generated by the existing institutional expression in KP is less than the politicization of grievances generated by the existing institutional expression in FATA and Baluchistan.

## Conclusion

This chapter has concluded stage II of the research in the development of the CPR model. The chapter has contributed to our understanding that the institutional expression of the sub-nation in KP (developed by their political identity and organizing ideology) was able to break the hold of powerful elites, tribal chiefs and landlords after the social reformation movement initiated in 1890. The social reformation in KP was focused on the religious and socio-economic interests of the Pashtun sub-nation. In the midst of this process, the agents of social control were neutralized by the movement which later allowed the Pashtun sub-nation of KP to give rise to the state of Pakistan directly by participating in the plebiscite that was held in KP to decide their fate at the time of partition. This was not the case in Baluchistan and FATA at the time of partition.

The religious agents of social control emerged in KP, as in the rest of the country, after the religious social movement began in Pakistan through the Islamization policy of the state in the 1970s. The religious social movement has contributed to the rise of religious vulnerable mobilizing structures in KP, but the vulnerability of the people in KP to be radicalized was found to be very low compared to Baluchistan and FATA. The reason is that the grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression in KP are lower. This reduces the ability for the religious social movement and the religious agents of social control in KP to effectively politicize citizens' grievances and to frame the state as responsible for those grievances and expand their VMSs by radicalizing the people of KP.

In a nutshell, stage II of this research has concluded that the agents of social control are a source of radicalization (as the hazard component of the MDCM). These agents of social control initiate social movements and control the political institution to further damage the institutional expression of the state, to generate grievances and frame the state as responsible for those grievances leading to a rise in the vulnerability of people to radicalization (as the vulnerability component of the MDCM). The rise of VMSs through radicalization and their expansion through the vulnerability of the people to radicalization ignites and fuels the religious and ethnic violent conflict with the state.

The research now moves towards stage III of the research which is the conclusion chapter of this study where the Conflict Prevention and Reduction (CPR) model is proposed based on the learnings from stage II of this research.

## **Chapter Eight**

### **Conclusion**

The research now enters stage III in the development of the CPR model. This stage consists of only one chapter focused on proposing the CPR model based on the findings of stage II where the SFV was applied to the Baluchistan, FATA and KP regions of Pakistan. The chapter firstly does a recapitulation of stage I and then discusses the findings of stage II to propose the CPR model and answer the research question. Secondly, it elaborates on the research significance and highlights the novel concepts prepared and developed in this research. Thirdly, it discusses the limitation of this research study and lists key future research avenues that flow out of this research. The chapter ends with an epilogue section that briefly explains the recent political developments in Pakistan that will impact the state-to-nation relationship in the future and that have exposed the existing vulnerability of the sub-nations in Baluchistan and FATA with the state of Pakistan.


#### **8.1. The Conflict Prevention and Reduction Model**

This study is the first ever research into the relationship between the state and the people of Pakistan, specifically the people of Baluchistan, FATA and KP. The research was divided into three stages. The first stage took place throughout chapters two and three and was based purely on secondary data analysis. It introduced key concepts and relationships between the state, nation and ethnicities and institutions, and discussed the socio-political history of Pakistan. The analysis in this stage helped to identify the key stakeholder central institutions of Pakistan (the military, civil bureaucracy and mainstream political institution made up of feudal and dynastic elites and oligarch families) and the key stakeholder regional institutions of Baluchistan and FATA (the religious and ethnic political institution made up of tribal, ethnic and religious elites). Together, these institutions regulate the relationship between the state and the people of the regions. In addition, the elaboration of the security of the state and the interests of the key stakeholder central institutions through the theoretical concepts and historical analysis helped to show that the central institutions represent and protect the interests of the state and the regional institutions represent and protect the interests of the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations in Pakistan.

The Simple Descriptive Model (SDM) was used in this stage to unpack the state-to-nation relationship and theoretically suggest i) the existence of a sub-state in a larger frame of the state, and ii) the core components that establish the sub-state and the state. The chapter then moved on to establish a Man-made Disaster Crunch Model (MDCM). The MDCM reveals that i) radicalization in a sub-state is generated through the structural domination, social movements and situation of relative deprivation experienced by the people; and ii) vulnerability to radicalization of the people is developed by politicizing the grievances of the nation or sub-nation and framing the state as responsible for them. The chapter concluded by developing and elaborating on a Sub-structural Framework for Violence (SFV) by combining the core components of the state and the

sub-state (identified by applying the SDM) with the components of the MDCM. The institutional expression, as one of the components of the state and sub-state, (as suggested by the SDM) is considered to be the source that generates radicalization and increases the vulnerability of the people to being radicalized. The SFV is again shown below in Figure 54.

**Figure 54. The Sub-structural Framework for Violence**



The research then moved on to stage II in chapters four, five, six and seven. In these chapters, the SFV was applied to the regions of Baluchistan, FATA and KP. Chapter four studied the political identity and organizing ideology of the state and the sub-state (refer to the diagram of SFV above). The key stakeholder central and regional institutions (as political identities) that were identified in chapter two were analyzed to reveal the internal dynamics that allow them to develop their respective state (or sub-state) institutional expression. The existing institutional expression in Baluchistan and FATA, which is established by the central and regional institutions, was also elaborated on in the chapter to suggest that a weak state relationship with the sub-nations in FATA and Baluchistan exists.

In chapter five, the SFV was applied to the Baluchistan and FATA regions to reveal that religious and ethnic radicalization in both these regions is a product of structural domination (of the state over the people) and social movements (as a consequence of the structural domination). It was found that agents of social control (who belong to the key stakeholder regional institutions) are responsible for establishing the structural domination of the state over their people – this, in turn, leads to social movements opposed to the state.

In chapter six, the SFV was applied to the Baluchistan and FATA regions and it was concluded that the vulnerability of the people to radicalization is developed by politicizing the grievances of the people. This is generated from the existing institutional expression in both the regions and the state is framed as responsible for those grievances. It was again revealed that the agents of social control are a key factor that increases the people's vulnerability to radicalization.

In chapter seven, the SFV was applied to the KP region. The political identity and organizing ideology of the Pashtun sub-nation was explained. It was found that the situation of structural domination of the state by using the tribal and ethnic agents of social control is absent in KP. The ethnic social movement in KP is neither as strong, nor a source of ethnic radicalization when compared to the ethnic social movements in Baluchistan and FATA; indeed, there is no ethnic insurgency in KP. However, structural domination of the state through the religious agents of social control was found to exist in KP since 1971 because of the Islamization policy of the state throughout the country. The religious social movement that arose in response allowed the religious VMSs to expand from FATA into KP when its political opportunity was blocked in Pakistan and Afghanistan after 2001. The chapter, however, confirms that the vulnerability of the people to radicalization in KP was very low relative to that of the people in FATA and Baluchistan. The reasons for this are:

- i) absence of ethnic and tribal agents of social control and few religious agents of social control; and
- ii) the grievances that arise from the existing institutional expression were fewer than those in FATA and Baluchistan, which restricts the religious agents of social control from effectively politicizing the grievances and framing the state as responsible for them.

Based on the findings in the chapters above, it was confirmed that:

- i) Religious violent groups exist in FATA, expand into other regions of the country and keep the religious conflict with the state charged by establishing religious VMSs;
- ii) Ethnic violent groups exist only in Baluchistan and keep the ethnic conflict with the state charged by establishing ethnic VMSs; and
- iii) Ethnic violent groups do not exist in any significant degree in FATA; however, ethnic VMSs do exist there and can trigger ethnic conflict. Therefore, the emergence of ethnic violent groups in FATA in the future cannot be ruled out.


The concept of *conflict prevention and reduction* in the CPR model signals an intent to prevent conflicts from emerging and significantly reducing them where they exist. Therefore, the objective of the CPR model is to reduce the religious and ethnic VMSs in FATA and Baluchistan so as to:

- i) Prevent any new ethnic or religious violent groups from emerging in both regions; and
- ii) Resist the expansion of the existing violent groups leading to a reduction in violence in existing conflicts.



Hence, the CPR model focuses on the factors of the MDCM that produce ethnic and religious VMSs. According to the MDCM and the findings of this research, radicalization against the state happens when the state structurally dominates a nation or sub-nation through agents of social control, leading to the rise of social movements in response. The political opportunity of the social movement when blocked, radicalizes members of the social movement and enables the development of VMSs that can transform into a violent militant group. The process and factors involved in the MDCM are again retrieved from chapter three and provided below in Figure 55.

**Figure 55. The Manmade Disaster Crunch Model**



In the process described above, the agents of social control are the source that helps the state to establish structural domination and gives rise to social movements through the people. The social influence and authority of these agents must be reduced in order for the state to create a better and more direct relationship with the people. This cannot happen through violent counter movements because countering the religious social movements, especially in Pakistan, is considered blasphemy – accusing someone of this will endanger people’s lives and the state’s legitimacy. On the other hand, countering ethnic social movements in Baluchistan has always exacerbated the existing ethnic conflict.

In addition, the MDCM and the findings in this research also confirm that the existing institutional expression in Baluchistan and FATA is a source of grievance for the people who are again politicized by the agents of social control and expand the VMSs of religious and ethnic violent groups.

Therefore, the proposed CPR model (shown in Figure 56 below) is focused on reversing the process and factors of the MDCM and is made up of two important factors that are focused on policy level structural changes in the socio-political dynamics of Baluchistan and FATA. They are a) The Social Reformation Movement in Baluchistan and FATA focused on improving political governance, and b) The Policy of Social Justice for Baluchistan and FATA focused on improving social governance. Both factors are described below.

*a. The Social Reformation Movement in Baluchistan and FATA (Political Governance)*

A movement that was successful in Pakistan was the social reformation movement in KP in 1890, which was outlined in chapter seven. This movement was initiated by the agents of social change and the political opportunity of the movement stemmed from the protection of the socio-economic interests of the Pashtun Sub-nation in KP. The movement was slowly and successfully able to break the traditional social power structures and reduced the hold of agents of social control over the Pashtun Sub-nation of KP. The movement emphasized modern education that later gave rise to middle class Pashtuns who joined the non-violent KK movement, promoted socio-economic and political rights, and ultimately led to the state of Pakistan in 1947. Therefore, the CPR model proposes to replace the agents of social control with agents of social change through a social reformation movement that aims to protect the socio-economic and political interests of the people of Baluchistan and FATA.

It will be beneficial if the agents of social change arise from the category of the agents of social control. For example, Bacha Khan belonged to a landlord family in KP and his status enabled him to resist the efforts of other landlord families (agents of social control) to fail and sabotage the social reformation movement. The Agrarian Revolt Theory, outlined in chapter three also suggests that when farmers derive their income from wages instead of land, they can easily and freely join social movements against the agents of social control. Once the social reformation process gives rise to an income-generating middle class that derives its income from wages and not land owned by landlords and agents of social control, many people may join the movement and break the sub-state structure in Baluchistan and FATA.

Fortunately, Baluchistan already has agents of social change (the resisting elites described in chapter five). These resisting elites include ethnic and tribal agents of social change who are currently part of the agents of the social control group. In FATA, the PTM movement has gained momentum and support, even in the Pashtun dominated regions of Baluchistan. The movement

and its leader do not belong to the category of agents of social control but have mass followings to lead the social reformation in FATA.

The social reformation movement that is necessary in FATA and Baluchistan should seek to:

- i) Slowly diminish the structural domination of the state;
- ii) Raise political movements that protect the socio-economic interests of the people (religious and ethnic) in Baluchistan and FATA (as in KP after 1890);
- iii) Renegotiate the relationship between the state and the nation and sub-nations by channeling their political opportunities towards the state; and
- iv) Diminish the VMSs by channeling their aggression and interest aggregation into the political movements to protect their socio-economic and political interests.

*b. The Policy of Social Justice for Baluchistan and FATA (Social Governance)*

Social justice has been explained in chapters two and three. Social justice seeks to ensure that people have access to all elements of general public social services: education, legal justice, health, nutrition, water, shelter and employment. In case any of these elements is absent for citizens, it can develop anxiety (intrapersonal conflict) and increase the potential for anti-social and illegal behavior. The elements of social justice above are a part of human development which include capabilities that enable a person to pursue a full and prosperous life. The agents of social control and the radicalizers utilize the absence or poor condition of public services in FATA and Baluchistan to their advantage. These agents generate and politicize the grievances of the people that arise and frame the state as being against the interests of the people and responsible for their grievances.

The state in this situation should focus on providing effective social justice to the people. Corruption is one of the most important factors that contributes to social injustice and is endemic in Pakistan. Serious efforts should be made to make the socio-economic and legal justice situation better in FATA and Baluchistan. The social reformation movement and the agents of social change can be very helpful to improve the conditions of the people and can counter the framing process and politicization done by the agents of social control against the state. The state, however, should become the lead provider of social justice so that people start to consider it as responsible for those benefits instead of the agents of social change. Otherwise, the agents of social change could become agents of social control. Therefore, social justice should emerge from the institutional expression of the state.

Among the most crucial factors that give rise to social injustice are widespread corruption, political and social patronage and the absence, or weak delivery, of effective social, economic, education and health services to the people, and ongoing security threats and violence. The theoretical link between the elements of social injustice and violence, especially in the case of ethnic insurgency in Baluchistan and religious terrorism in FATA, is also explained and tested in this research. The


study of this relationship between social injustice and violence allowed the analysis of FATA from the perspective of a prospective Pashtun ethnic insurgency and suggested that there is a significant chance for ethnic VMSs emerging from FATA in the future. It was concluded that the threat of ethnic insurgency in FATA exists if the state keeps FATA structurally dominated, strengthens structural domination by using ethnic elites and tribal chiefs, and does not provide human security to the people of FATA resulting in relative deprivation.

The policy of social justice is expected to:

- i) Reduce the grievances of the people towards the institutional expression of the state;
- ii) Reduce the ability of the agents of social control to politicize grievances;
- iii) Reduce the vulnerability of the people to radicalization; and
- iv) Reduce the ability of the agents of social control to initiate and sustain their social movements that radicalize and expand VMSs leading to reduced identity expansion and reduced polarization.

Based upon the analysis throughout the preceding chapters and the two factors identified above, the full CPR model is offered in the figure below.

**Figure 56. The Conflict Prevention and Reduction (CPR) Model**



Both the structural policy factors that are proposed as factors for the CPR model have proven to work in KP and therefore provide a solid foundation to answer the primary research question in the affirmative:

Yes, a Conflict Prevention and Reduction (CPR) Model can be created that facilitates good Socio-Political governance and Peace in the Baluchistan and FATA regions of Pakistan.

## **8.2. Research Significance**

The research identifies new dimensions that could bind the people of Baluchistan and FATA with the state.

Starting with FATA, it is fortunate that when the state merged FATA with KP in 2018 and held by-elections in FATA in 2019, there was no ethnic uprising or conflict but a new ethnic movement (PTM) did start in FATA (for the reasons already explained in chapters three, five and six). The PTM has been able to attract huge crowds of Pashtuns in FATA and Baluchistan, and considerable crowds in KP and also in other provinces that contain a sizeable Pashtun sub-nation<sup>663</sup>. The state has been presented with an opportunity in the shape of this movement to initiate social transformation in FATA and the Pashtun areas of Baluchistan. Instead, however, the state has framed this movement as anti-state<sup>664</sup>, as it did with the Baloch movements. It is important here to note that the nation in KP had already transformed itself long before partition in 1947 and therefore did not initiate ethnic conflict with the state. However, the case of FATA is similar to that in Baluchistan and therefore the state needs to be cautious. This thesis will help the state and policy-makers to understand the socio-political vulnerabilities of the sub-nation in FATA that need to be addressed as a priority in order to avoid a situation similar to that in Baluchistan.

The study also helps to shift the view of the state and the political class towards the structural causes of conflicts in Baluchistan and FATA focused on governance, and allows them to look at the problems of terrorism and insurgency through the lens of socio-political governance and how it generates and promotes violence in these areas. The study also assists the international community and donors, including academics, to understand the governance dynamics that fuel conflicts in Pakistan.

The SFV enables us to understand the socio-political reasons that continuously contribute to the conditions out of which terrorists and insurgents emerge and, while based upon and tailored to Pakistan, it has wider potential to help many other states focus their attention on the socio-political mobilizing structures that act as the catalysts for terrorism, violence and conflict. The study also showed that enforcing an artificial State-Nation policy to prevent or reduce internal security problems can result in extreme internal violence.

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<sup>663</sup> Shah, "The Rise of Pashtun Protection Movement (PTM): Polemics and Conspiracy Theories," p. 270-273.

<sup>664</sup> Shah, "The Rise of Pashtun Protection Movement (PTM): Polemics and Conspiracy Theories," p. 270-273

Another aspect of the research's significance is that it has looked at the internal conflicts within Pakistan, and this may provide lessons for other states experiencing terrorism and ethnic insurgencies through the lens of the Simple Descriptive Model (SDM) and the state-to-nation relationship. The research has elaborated on the internal and external structural threats to the state, nation and the sub-nation through a combination of theory and historical analysis. In regards to FATA and Baluchistan, the identification of a sub-state and further analysis of the factors that develop the sub-state is an important addition to the literature available on these regions. The international community and many donor organizations can focus on development projects in Pakistan that help to bridge the gap between the state and the people in Baluchistan and FATA, and advocacy programs that help to neutralize or lessen the influence and power of the agents of social control, or support the social reformation movement, if initiated.

### **Novel Theoretical Concepts and Ideas**

The development of the MDCM and the SFV is a novel contribution to the theoretical literature on intra-state violence. The research combines the elements that define the state-to-nation relationship with the structural socio-political factors of violence and explains the transformation of non-violent conflicts into violent conflicts.

In addition, poor governance has been associated with conflicts in the past, but identifying the socio-political theoretical factors that fuel the governance-related factors transforming conflicts into violence and their application to Baluchistan and FATA regions has not been previously explored. In fact, the province of KP has never been investigated from the perspective of the SFV and the historical and existing relationship between its people with the state.

The findings in this thesis are based upon a combination of primary research (interviews and surveys) and secondary data, and it is hoped they provide a balanced narrative of the key stakeholder institutions and the parties involved in structuring the religious and ethnic conflict in Pakistan. Primary information sourced directly from the key stakeholder institutions that structure these conflicts is rare. Therefore, the research has contributed significantly to the empirical and theoretical literature on terrorism and insurgency, radicalization and the state-to-nation relationships. The research has also contributed to the literature available on the social and political evolution of Pakistan, Baluchistan and FATA and their power structures; the internal and external security aspects of Pakistan; its religious identity and the ethnic identities of its sub-nations; and the ethnic Baloch insurgency and ongoing religious-inspired terrorism and extremism in the country.

### **8.3. Limitations and Suggested Areas for Future Research**

The purpose of this study was to explore the structural causes of terrorism and insurgency in Baluchistan and FATA and therefore the focus was primarily confined to internal structural dynamics. While chapter two does touch upon the external security environment of the state and

its impact on internal socio-political governance structures, the thesis did not examine the external structural dynamics contributing to violence in Pakistan in depth. These external dynamics include the geopolitical situation and the interests of other states in Pakistan and the region such as the US, Russia and China. In addition, regional players like Saudi Arabia, India, Iran and Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have their own economic and security interests to protect which impede peace in Pakistan, Baluchistan, and FATA. The role and impact of these states in supporting political parties and movements and violent militant groups in Pakistan to maximize their interests has not been explored in detail in the literature and presents an opportunity for future research on this topic.

The theoretical approach used for this research aimed to provide a macro-analysis of the components of the state and the MDCM for Baluchistan and FATA and to identify and explore socio-political governance factors for violence. Literature that explores Baluchistan and FATA according to the components of the SDM and MDCM was not available. While the key stakeholder central and regional institutions were investigated in the research, it could not focus on investigating the structures of the militant groups and violent groups due to security concerns and the inability of the researcher to connect with the militant groups; therefore, this could be a focus for future research. The interviews and the surveys provided the primary data that was applied to, and allowed analysis of, Baluchistan and FATA through the SDM.

Another important research avenue can be the application of the SFV to the Punjab and Sindh provinces to identify the socio-political governance factors that exist there and contribute to peace or conflict. Furthermore, the SFV can be applied to other countries facing violence against the state to study the underlying structures that lead to violent conflict. Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen could be candidates.

The concept of relative deprivation and its impact on violence can be applied to Baluchistan and FATA, and empirical research can be done to gauge the difference between value expectations and value capabilities of the sub-nations, then correlate them with the level of violence in both regions. The study of ethnic social movements in Baluchistan (BSO) and FATA (PTM) and their structure and impact on establishing peace or conflict is another important way to study the concept of ethnic radicalization.

This research has also identified the agents of social control in Baluchistan and FATA, and therefore a detailed study of their structures to identify options and factors that could neutralize or evolve them through peaceful means can contribute to the existing socio-political literature for peace in Baluchistan and FATA.

A good outcome of the democratic process, before the political turmoil in March 2022 (explained in the epilogue), is that Pakistan had reassessed its foreign policy goals and created healthy relationships with some of its neighbors (Iran and China) and other states in the region (Azerbaijan,

Russia, Turkey and the Gulf States) while renegotiating its strategic partnership with the US (during the late Obama-Trump period) and KSA. This was a positive achievement of the still weak but evolving political institution. Such a relationship has helped to reduce external support for religious and ethnic extremism in the country and has allowed the country to focus on its long-standing issues with India over Kashmir, and with Afghanistan over the issue of support for the Taliban. In fact, Pakistan played a key role in bringing the Taliban, the Afghan Government, and the US to the negotiating table with the support of its new friends in the region<sup>665</sup>.

Such a foreign policy has helped the state of Pakistan to focus on its domestic policy. The state realized that Baluchistan and FATA cannot remain neglected where the social, economic administrative, bureaucratic, political and security needs of the sub-nations are largely ignored. The merger of FATA with KP and the election of political representatives from FATA is a big achievement for the institutional expression of the state. However, breaking the structure of agents of social control in Baluchistan and restricting its rise in FATA is a challenge that the state needs to focus on. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiated in 2001, and that runs through Baluchistan, is a game changer but comes with new risks (from those states who feel economically threatened by the rise of China and the strengthening of its ties to Pakistan) and opportunities (from those states that will benefit from this corridor)<sup>666</sup>. This situation brings in new players to the chess board with new interests and alignments.

Therefore, further exploitation of religious and ethnic sentiments to destabilize Pakistan, especially in Baluchistan and FATA regions, cannot be dismissed or ignored, and demands that Pakistan initiate political and strategic dialogue with all key regional stake holders, including the military and the violent groups, is necessary. The purpose should be to ensure that the grievances of the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations towards the state are reduced; a decline in religious terrorism and ethnic insurgency can only be achieved when the state adopts a policy that reduces religious and ethnic radicalization of the religious nation and ethnic sub-nations. The adoption of such a policy that delivers improved socio-political governance where the state succeeds in developing a sense of Pakistani nationhood amongst the people of FATA and Baluchistan has yet to be achieved. The CPR model provides the base to develop that policy by developing a socio-political structure that produces good governance mechanisms in both the regions and thus helps to connect the ethnic sub-nations of FATA and Baluchistan with the other sub-nations of the country under the umbrella of the state of Pakistan.

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<sup>665</sup> Munir Ahmed, "US Envoy Lauds Pakistan's Role in Afghan Peace Talks Process," *Washington Post*, September 14, 2020, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle\\_east/us-envoy-lauds-pakistans-role-in-afghan-peace-talks-process/2020/09/14/b5813586-f6b1-11ea-85f7-5941188a98cd\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-envoy-lauds-pakistans-role-in-afghan-peace-talks-process/2020/09/14/b5813586-f6b1-11ea-85f7-5941188a98cd_story.html).

<sup>666</sup> Muhammad Kashan Surahio et al., "China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: Macro Environmental Factors and Security Challenges," *SAGE Open* 12, no. 1 (January 2022): 215824402210798, <https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440221079821>.



## 8.4. Epilogue

The present state of Pakistani politics has taken a remarkable turn in recent months (as of June 2022). Pakistan was poised at the junction of a historical achievement at the time this research was initiated in 2017 as a period of democracy which began in 2008, and has completed a second successful, and relatively peaceful, transition between different democratically elected governments. The third transition is expected as a result of the general election in 2023. However, in March 2022, political turmoil emerged in Pakistan when the internal conflict between the key stakeholder central institutions over the interests of the state resulted in the ousting of the democratically elected government of Imran Khan through a vote of no confidence<sup>667</sup>. The vote of no confidence was initially rejected by the speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of April 2022, after which Imran Khan dissolved it so that the country could move towards early general elections<sup>668</sup>. The Supreme Court of Pakistan took a Suo-moto action the same day and intervened in this parliamentary conflict by overruling the decision of the speaker, nullifying the dissolution of the National Assembly and directing the speaker to conduct the vote of no confidence on the 10<sup>th</sup> of April 2022<sup>669</sup>.

The vote of no confidence to oust Mr. Khan was passed with 174 votes (two more than the requisite simple majority)<sup>670</sup>. The treasury (government) benches boycotted the vote and stormed out of the parliament. The success of the vote of no confidence allowed the opposition to topple the government and form their own government. The military has claimed that it has remained neutral in this situation by not intervening directly in the political and constitutional turmoil, toppling the government and imposing martial law (as it has done previously in similar situations)<sup>671</sup>. The history and the master narrative that currently exists among the majority of the people suggests the opposite. Among the hard evidence is that Khan lost his majority in parliament (leading to the success of the vote of no confidence), when members of other political parties who were assembled by the military to support Khan's coalition government in 2018 sided with the opposition<sup>672</sup>. Among these parties are the JWP and the Baluchistan Awami Party (BAP) from Baluchistan (the members of these parties are the dominating elites).

The intervention of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the parliamentary matters has prevented the political institution from resolving their political conflicts through parliament. The entire situation

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<sup>667</sup> Christina Goldbaum and Salman Masood, "Pakistan Parliament Ousts Imran Khan as Prime Minister," *The New York Times*, April 9, 2022, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/09/world/asia/imran-khan-pakistan-ousted.html>.

<sup>668</sup> Goldbaum and Masood, "Pakistan Parliament Ousts Imran Khan as Prime Minister," *The New York Times*

<sup>669</sup> Goldbaum and Masood, "Pakistan Parliament Ousts Imran Khan as Prime Minister," *The New York Times*

<sup>670</sup> Goldbaum and Masood, "Pakistan Parliament Ousts Imran Khan as Prime Minister," *The New York Times*

<sup>671</sup> Abdul Basit, "Pakistan's Military Ends Its Experiment with Hybrid Democracy," *Foreign Policy*, April 25, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/25/pakistan-military-imran-khan-hybrid-democracy/>.

<sup>672</sup> Nadeem Malik, "Imran Khan's Failure Exposes Pakistan's Military Problem," *Pursuit* (University of Melbourne, April 21, 2022), <https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/imran-khan-s-failure-exposes-pakistan-s-military-problem>.

has reversed the process of positive evolution of Pakistan's politics, weakened the political institution of the country and has threatened the legitimacy of parliament and the separation of powers granted by the constitution. The situation signals that the military, bureaucracy, and the executive still enjoy power and influence over the political institutions and shape the policies and interests of the country.

This crisis started when the government of Imran Khan abstained from voting in the UN against the Russian aggression on Ukraine (held on 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2022). To some observers, this suggested Pakistan was getting closer to Russia and China<sup>673</sup>. The situation gained international attention when the Khan government accused the US of plotting regime change against his government by using the opposition parties to table the vote of no confidence in response to his desire to shift Pakistan closer to Russia and China or, at least to not criticize them to the degree Washington desired<sup>674</sup>.

After his government was ousted, Imran Khan called for mass political protests and movements throughout the country<sup>675</sup>. Massive crowds protested in response to the call of Khan in the major cities of Pakistan. He held mass political protests in Karachi (Sindh Province), Lahore (Punjab province) and Peshawar (KP Province). However, there were hardly any protests in Baluchistan and FATA<sup>676</sup>. The people in Baluchistan and FATA seemed indifferent to what is happening in the rest of the country and it provides compelling, as well as alarming, evidence that effort is required to improve the connection between FATA and Baluchistan and the state, irrespective of their support for the government in power or opposition.

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<sup>673</sup> Goldbaum and Masood, "Pakistan Parliament Ousts Imran Khan as Prime Minister," *The New York Times*

<sup>674</sup> Goldbaum and Masood, "Pakistan Parliament Ousts Imran Khan as Prime Minister," *The New York Times*

<sup>675</sup> Christina Goldbaum, Salman Masood, and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, "Days after Ouster, Imran Khan Is Back on the Trail in Pakistan," *The New York Times*, April 15, 2022, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/15/world/asia/imran-khan-rally-pakistan.html>.

<sup>676</sup> Dawn, "Imran Khan's Rallies," DAWN.COM, April 23, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1686378>.

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