

# Author Query Form

---

**Journal : Geopolitics**

**Articleid: 176751**

Dear Author,

During the copy-editing of your paper, the following queries arose. Please respond to these by marking up your proofs with the necessary changes/additions. Please write your answers on the query sheet if there is insufficient space on the page proofs. If returning the proof by fax do not write too close to the paper's edge. Please remember that illegible mark-ups may delay publication.

Many thanks for your assistance.

---

<b>Ref. no:</b>	<b>Query</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
1	AU: OK?	
2	AU: Special Usage of word "imaginary" (not a noun) intended? (otherwise use "imagery" or "imagination") throughout text.	

---

## One Stereotype, Many Representations: Turkey in Italian Geopolitics

EDOARDO BORIA

*Department of Economic Theory, Università 'La Sapienza', Rome, Italy*

*A recent re-assessment of the role that cultural factors play in geopolitics has resulted in a profound reconceptualisation of the field. This new approach affords representations special importance, since they reveal a great deal about those who propose them. National stereotypes, a specific kind of representation, provide valuable insight into popular readings of the world, and shape the collective geopolitical subconscious. But are the representations and views espoused by the elites also affected by stereotypes? And to what extent can national stereotypes and the counter-representations to which they give rise, withstand the representations imposed by the elites? The article takes a close look at past and present representations of Turkey in Italy in an attempt to answer these questions, and to explore the ways in which national stereotypes can enter geopolitical discursive practice.*

### NATIONAL STEREOTYPES AND GEOPOLITICS

When analysing relations between two states, the aspects generally taken into consideration are primarily of an economic-financial or political-institutional nature (e.g., trade or financial flow, meetings between heads of state, visits of official delegations, or active bilateral agreements). Cultural elements, such as the images and representations each national collective has of the other, are far less likely to be employed. The role of cultural factors has recently been re-examined however, resulting in a profound reconceptualisation of geopolitics, skilfully summarised by O'Tuathail and Dalby<sup>1</sup>. Those who subscribe to this view, recognise the fact that the body of knowledge provided by cultural geography can prove very useful in understanding geopolitical

---

Address correspondence to Edoardo Boria, Department of Economic Theory, Università La Sapienza, Rome, Italy. E-mail: e.boria@dte.uniroma1.it

dynamics – as Giacomo Corna Pellegrini maintained: ‘The understanding of a great many geopolitical phenomena begins with nothing more than an in-depth analysis of cultural geography’.<sup>2</sup>

In this context, representations assume special importance, since – as Said<sup>3</sup> taught – they reveal more about those who produce them than about the people and places they represent. From a post-structuralist and deconstructionist viewpoint, geopolitical representations, rather than providing new insight, merely recycle old metaphors, inevitably based on models already widespread in the popular imaginary. With regard to national stereotypes, it is well known that the population of any given state is recognised and identified by the populations of other states through preconceived representations, for example, the clichés about austere and hard-working Germans, English gentlemen or refined Frenchmen. These stereotypes satisfy a basic human need to ‘know the world’, providing appropriate cognitive categories to that end.

Such labels help define the image of a population in the eyes of others, leading to perceptions based on expected rather than actual behaviour. As early as the 1920s, Walter Lippman pointed out that: ‘we can best understand the furies of war and politics by remembering that almost the whole of each party believes absolutely in its picture of the opposition, that it takes as fact, not what is, but what it supposes to be the fact’.<sup>4</sup> Such prejudices are often deeply rooted, persisting regardless of the state of official relations between countries at a given time. Furthermore, such labels can remain in the collective imaginary for a very long time, unaffected by political change. For example, the abolition of physical borders within the European Union has clearly not been accompanied by an analogous removal of the mental boundaries separating its peoples, who continue to perceive their neighbours in terms of the representational schemes retained in the collective imaginary.

The national stereotype thus shapes the collective geopolitical subconscious, in turn an integral part of the national geopolitical vision,<sup>5</sup> and therefore of particular interest in the study of relations between national collectives. The concept of national geopolitical vision is based on the observation that, in their interpretations of international political dynamics, the elites of any given country share certain cognitive mechanisms with their co-nationals, mechanisms that are the outcome of that country’s historical experience and geographical circumstances. There are thus, no separate sets of geopolitical codes, distinguishing between ‘high’ geopolitics – that of political leaders – and ‘low’ geopolitics – that of other citizens. There is, rather, a heritage common to the entire national community (geopolitical culture), which favours the elaboration of a geopolitical discourse sensitive to shared values and perceptions.<sup>6</sup> This underscores the role of popular culture in geopolitics: ‘The scripting of global geopolitics in popular culture – popular geopolitics – is also significant, in that it is within the sphere of

popular culture that national cultures are formed and reinforced'.<sup>7</sup> These concepts are a far cry from the principles underlying classical geopolitics, whereby political elites are seen to behave in a rational and logical fashion, while public opinion is perceived as emotional and rather muddled. Despite the thorough revision prompted by critical geopolitics, the neo-realist perception of dominant geopolitical actors as virtually independent primary agents in the process of collective geopolitical interpretation is, all too often, still accepted uncritically. In other words, since control of the context in which interpretations are elaborated is crucial in practical geopolitics, the representations put forward by the elite and disseminated by the media would necessarily be imposed on the rest of society 'from above'. To accept this however, would be to underestimate the role of prevailing social norms. Ever since Max Weber, sociology has shown that human actions are related to prevailing cultural models within social structures. Elite representations and readings of the world are therefore bound to be affected by the cultural models rooted in society, and their views on foreign politics by preconceived images, such as stereotypes.

The possible influence of popular stereotypes on the choices politicians make was the focus of a study by Arianna Montanari on the behaviour of European politicians during World War II.<sup>8</sup> The study abounds with striking examples of the influence of stereotypes on the mindsets of politicians and statesmen. A comparison of the mutual representations, found in the respective diaries of Galeazzo Ciano, foreign minister of fascist Italy, and Joseph Goebbels, minister of propaganda of Nazi Germany, provide an emblematic example. Ciano, following a meeting with Nazi leaders, writes: 'Their wish to fight is relentless. I am sure that even if one were to give the Germans more than they have asked, they would attack all the same, as they are possessed by the demon of destruction'.<sup>9</sup> This clearly reflects the classic stereotype of the warrior German. Goebbels, in turn, refers to Italy's supposed lack of reliability: 'Our allies are certainly the worst in the world! . . . The Italians are abandoning us at the most critical moment. . . . Treason such as that committed by the Italian generals against Mussolini would be impossible here, if one considers the mentality of German generals, especially the Prussians'.<sup>10</sup> The power of the stereotype becomes unequivocal when Goebbels writes: 'Old Hindenburg was certainly right when he said that even Mussolini would never be able to turn Italians into anything but Italians . . . Mussolini's entire political conception lacks clarity, since he is too tied to family. He is undoubtedly an outstanding thinker and a first-rate politician, but after all, he is only an Italian, and cannot escape that legacy'.<sup>11</sup> Even the ways in which they portray themselves reflect a perception of national character as remaining unchanged over the course of time. Goebbels writes: 'For ideological, reasons we have always been too accommodating with the Italians. Once again, our old Germanic heritage, our sentimentalism, has a detrimental effect when it is applied to politics'.<sup>12</sup>

Using a specific example, this article will show how national stereotypes can enter geopolitical discursive practice. We will examine past and present representations of Turkey in Italy, who created them, and the interests they serve. The article further aims to analyse the role played by the dominant stereotype of the Turk within such representations, in order to determine whether and how Italian geopolitics has employed, or rather been affected by the original image proposed by this stereotype.

## GEOPOLITICAL USE OF THE STEREOTYPE OF THE TURK IN ITALIAN HISTORY

Mass psychology can make an important contribution to a study aiming to analyse the geopolitical representation of a foreign country. All the more so in this case, inasmuch as the intense debate surrounding the work of Edward Said has confirmed the consistent presence in contemporary Western culture, of prejudices toward the Muslim world.<sup>13</sup>

But how did the current Italian stereotype of the Turk develop? National stereotypes are related to the process of national identity building. In fact, the period in which they began to take root in popular belief coincides with that of the development and establishment of national states.<sup>14</sup> Representing one's own community and distinguishing it from others is indeed an essential element in the plainly pedagogical process of the construction of nationalist rhetoric. Depicting other nations by means of labels and images simplifies the task of interpreting the world and establishes the subjective and hierarchical framework that enables one to tell friend-nations from foe-nations, subsequently enshrined in political practice.

Nevertheless, when discussing the popular image of Turks in Europe, one must bear in mind that this image, rather than referring to a specific national group, has tended to be confused with an entire civilisation: Islam, 'From the later fourteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, Europeans tended to identify Islam with the Ottoman Empire'.<sup>15</sup> As we shall see below, the Catholic Church played a key role in disseminating this view. It is worth noting however, that Islam – due to its overt cultural otherness – has made a substantial contribution to the construction of Europe's identity and self-representation, associating these with its religious roots. Both Islam and the Turk – again, the two images tend to be confused with one another – have provided European identity with a perfect image of the 'other'.

In light of the current debate over Turkey's accession to the European Union – so closely related to the issue of European identity – the question arises as to whether the arduous process of European identity building must necessarily follow the same path as it did centuries ago. In other words, is the problem presenting itself in the very same terms as in the past: the same mechanism (identity defined by way of contrast), the same instrument

(religion), and same 'other' (Islam as embodied by Turkey). This article does not purport to provide an in-depth analysis of European identity, an issue 'as old as attempts to envisage the unity of the continent',<sup>16</sup> to quote Thomas Meyer. The article does intend however, through a specific case study, to contribute to a deeper understanding of the principles underlying the representations of the 'other' – in this case Turkey. Clearly, any assessment of Turkey's 'Europeanness' ultimately derives from one's perception of the process of European integration, that is, whether it is viewed as an endeavour largely based on cultural bonds, or as an essentially political and economic one. The former implies a moralistic view of international relations, and membership criteria rooted in history. The latter however, suggests a more pragmatic outlook, and criteria based on opportunities and circumstances – perceiving identity as a process of social design rather than a legacy or possession.<sup>17</sup> But now let us return to historical matters.

There is no doubt that for centuries, those parts of Europe subject to Ottoman incursions maintained a profound sense of anxiety and fear of the Turk. In Italy, this sentiment was so strong in the popular imaginary, that it persisted not only beyond the short historical period in which such incursions actually occurred, but long after the demise of the Ottoman Empire itself, surviving to this day in certain colloquial expressions. For example, the expression '*mamma li turchi!*' ('mother! the Turks!') is still widely used to express fear and a need to flee; '*fumare come un turco*' ('smoke like a Turk') evokes an unwholesome custom typical of foreigners; '*parlare turco*' ('speak turkish') refers to an unknown and utterly incomprehensible language. The Devoto-Oli dictionary of the Italian language remarks: 'In certain popular expressions the term [Turk] is laden with connotations associated with the Ottomans and the religious conflicts between Christianity and Islam, thereby acquiring emblematic value when applied to periods of religious laxity or blasphemous affront'.<sup>18</sup>

Fear and the distorted equation of Turk with Muslim, were fostered by apocalyptic pronouncements that tended to characterise the Turkish advance as a clash between light and darkness, between the forces of good and evil. But while Ottoman incursions in Italy did not persist past the sixteenth century, the fear they inspired impressed itself on the mental superstructures of the population for a much longer time, significantly exaggerating a phenomenon which, all things considered, was rather limited in time and space. Fear however, is a powerful emotion, and the cruel character of the Turk was to imprint itself indelibly and permanently upon the Western psyche. Above all, this fear would later amplify – in a disproportionate and unjustifiable fashion – a sense of mistrust of Turks, eventually becoming pathological, lying in wait for every possible opportunity to re-emerge.

That is not to say that the fear was unfounded, but that it was undoubtedly also knowingly cultivated by the political and religious authorities of

the time. Many studies<sup>19</sup> clearly demonstrate a deep-seated connection 205  
 between the perpetuation of this fear and the interests of the authorities.  
 Maintaining a heightened sense of fear among the populace would  
 strengthen the social and spiritual cohesion of the masses, as well as their  
 obedience and submission to the ruling political and ecclesiastical classes,  
 thereby affording them further legitimation. 210

Let us now take a closer look at the Catholic Church and its fundamen-  
 tal contribution to the construction of the negative representation of the  
 Turk so profoundly ingrained in the collective imaginary of European peo-  
 ples in general, but especially – and this is no coincidence – in the imagi-  
 nary of those societies subject to greater Church influence. We will also take 215  
 a look at a counter-representation developed by the political elites of the  
 Republic of Venice when, at the height of its power, its foreign policies  
 would substantially depart from those of the Vatican.

### Instrumentalisations of the Past: Rome versus Venice

At first glance one is impressed by the sheer volume of literature produced in 220  
 Italy between the end of the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries concern-  
 ing the Turks. Considering the times, the material published is rich and  
 diverse (books, manuscripts, pamphlets, travel stories). This is especially  
 noteworthy because, at least until 1700, few authors had first-hand acquaint-  
 ance with the Turkish world, and such works were often simply plagiarised. 225

The Catholic Church was without a doubt a leading agent in the pro-  
 duction and dissemination of literary works in Europe at the time, and – as  
 early as the fifteenth century – it was very active in propagating a negative  
 image of the Turk. Pius II, who was pope from 1458 to 1464, that is, imme-  
 diately following the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans, presents a typ- 230  
 ical image of the Turk, equated with the Moslem, both in his *Epistola ad*  
*Mahumetem* (Letter to Mehmet) and in his book *La Description de l'Asia et*  
*Europa di Papa Pio II* (Pope Pius II's Description of Asia and Europe)<sup>20</sup>.

The most salient feature of the Turk in all of the works published during  
 this period was his brutality, typically constituting the leitmotif of the entire 235  
 treatise. The representation was invariably one-sided, and regularly featured  
 the ruthlessness of Turks, in contrast to supposedly civilised Europe.<sup>21</sup>

Following the upheaval of the Protestant Reformation, descriptions of  
 the rough-mannered Turk were frequently accompanied by calls for Chris-  
 tian unity and renewed crusades, widely considered to be the only way to 240  
 counter the menace posed by the infidel. In this context it should be noted  
 that in the decades following the Reformation, the Catholic Church was in  
 great difficulty, yet had not completely relinquished the idea of re-establishing  
 its political hegemony throughout the Christian World.

Despite the fact that the Church, through its rhetoric, left an indelible 245  
 mark on the image of the Turk throughout Europe, there were alternative

views as well, such as that of Erasmus of Rotterdam, as expressed in his authoritative *Consultatio de bello Turcis inferendo* (1530) (Inquiry on Whether War Should be Made against the Turks): ‘When the ignorant masses hear the Turks mentioned, they immediately become incensed and bloodthirsty, labelling them as dogs and the enemies of the Christian name. They forget that [the Turks] are human beings, and secondly that they are half-Christian’.<sup>22</sup>

Rome was fully aware of the importance of promoting its cause, to the extent that in 1622, it established an apparatus specifically for this purpose: the *Congregatio De Propaganda Fide* (Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith). It was intended to serve as the executive arm of the Catholic re-evangelisation, and to challenge the control exercised by the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs over missions to the New World. The *Congregatio* was the primary agent of the development and dissemination of the negative image of the Turk.

The period was not without competing strategies however, such as that of the Republic of Venice. In fact, the image produced by Venetian diplomats is an especially important counter-representation. Venice made commerce the instrument of its prosperity. Inevitably, as a political entity carrying considerable weight in the international arena, Venice fought many wars, but did so only when it deemed military conflict to be the most effective way of defending its commercial interests. Like any major trading power, its diplomatic tendency was to maintain peaceful relations with other countries. With few exceptions (such as Lepanto), this attitude characterised the long history of relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire.

The geopolitical importance of Constantinople in the eyes of Venice was always great – so great that *La Serenissima* was the only European state to have had a diplomatic mission in Constantinople centuries before the city fell into Ottoman hands (1453). Moreover, it was considered an extremely prestigious post among Venetian aristocrats. ‘Embassies – ordinary as well as extraordinary – were part of the *cursus honorum*, among which the position of *bailo* in Istanbul was the most prestigious and most important that a [Venetian] patrician could hope for’.<sup>23</sup> In time, the Venetians came to realise that maintaining excellent trade relations with the rulers of the Levant was a question of survival for Venice. ‘It made little difference to them whether the ruler of Constantinople was Greek or a Turk. Their concern was business; they could deal with anyone who allowed them to pursue their commercial interests in the East’.<sup>24</sup>

We owe the Venetians one of the most famous accounts of the Turks of the Middle Ages (in Marco Polo’s *Il Milione*, written ca. 1260), but above all we owe them the first serious, ground-breaking, nonconformist attempt – beginning in the late seventeenth century – to study Islam and Ottoman culture with the goal of trying to understand them; to study – without prejudice or dominant stereotypes – a civilisation worthy not only of attention, but of



appreciation. It was the dawn of modern Turkology.<sup>25</sup> ‘At the end of the [seventeenth] century, Donà<sup>26</sup> and his circle effected far-reaching change in Venetian public opinion, offering a new and original approach to Turkish civilisation, judging it for the first time, in terms of its own values – as yet unknown in the West’.<sup>27</sup>

295

If this change is largely attributable to the traditionally open-minded Venetian cultural environment as opposed to the conservatism of the Vatican, the different representations of the Turk produced in Rome and in Venice are also undoubtedly the result of divergent geopolitical interests. The Venetian counter-representation however, failed to leave traces in the popular imaginary, which continued to be dominated by the image of the Turk as rough, tough and violent, and above all: Muslim. A possible explanation of the Venetian representation’s failure to penetrate the popular imaginary can be found in its original purpose. Unlike that of the Catholic Church, it was never intended to legitimise the authority of the ruling class in the eyes of the people by identifying an enemy. The Venetian ambassadors to Constantinople fostered diplomatic relations, sending dispatches back to Venice at least once a month, for purely pragmatic reasons: to provide the leadership of the Republic with tools for objective evaluation on which to base their foreign policy. The aims of Rome’s representation were quite different. The call for a crusade against the infidel was not directed solely at the rulers of Christian lands, but at the people as well, in order to prepare the ideological groundwork necessary for such an ambitious undertaking. Also worth noting is the enormous power of persuasion the Catholic Church exercised over the lower classes, guaranteed by its all-pervasive organisational structure.

315

One might say however, that although the radical changes proposed by the Venetian representation of the Turks never penetrated the popular imaginary, they did play a fundamental role in the evolution of that image among Europe’s educated classes. It set the intellectual stage for later developments, such as the exotic, orientalisng image of the Turk during the Enlightenment, and later, the Romantic idea of Turkey as the ‘Sick man of Europe’.

320

In fact, the vogue of the *turqueries* (art evocative of ‘the East’), mostly originating in Venice,<sup>28</sup> may be considered the herald of a change in attitude, with curiosity – both intellectual and purely aesthetic – prevailing over prejudice. Later on, in a European cultural atmosphere inspired by relativism and tolerance, the foundations of cultural anthropology – the scientific study of the ‘other’ – would be laid, and the same attitude observed in Venice would be seen again in many works of art, portraying a different Turkey – magical, charming and alluring.

330

Let us not forget however, that Voltaire’s love for the Turks, Lamartine’s impassioned descriptions of Istanbul, Lessing and Scott’s reinterpretations of the legend of Saladin, and Pasha Selim’s magnanimity in Mozart’s opera, nonetheless concealed a very specific political message. Attitudes toward

**TABLE 1** Representations and counter-representations in seventeenth century Italy: the image of the Turk in Rome and in Venice

	Main characteristics of the Turk	Agents of dissemination of the representation	Main geopolitical and geo-economic interests
Roman Catholic Church	Infidel, barbarous, uncivilised	Missionaries, especially of the <i>Congregatio De Propaganda Fide</i>	Mobilise the Christian World against the infidels so as to reunite it and lead it.
Republic of Venice	Endowed with a culture of his own	Ambassadors	Maintain good relations to protect Venetian trade.

**TABLE 2** Multiple Representations of Turkey

Source	Image of Turkey	Image of the Turk
Collective memory	Ottoman Empire	Warrior
Berlusconi Government	Ally	Friend
Northern League Party	Menace	Immigrant
Confederation of Italian Industry	Economic opportunity	Cheap labour
Vatican	Alien culture	Muslim
Tour Operators	Exotic destination	Host

the Turk in eighteenth and nineteenth century European culture casually 335 combined cosmopolitan and colonialist approaches, that is, a wish to escape one's own environment and at the same time a desire to appropriate the resources of the 'other'.

These two historical Italian images of the Turk are cited here (Table 1), because they bear a remarkable resemblance to the images that colour the 340 current debate regarding Turkey's accession to the European Union. The controversy surrounding the Turkish bid for Union membership also comprises multiple representations, presented by different geopolitical actors (Table 2). The image of the Turk would thus appear especially prone to exploitation for political ends. This assertion calls for a closer examination 345 of today's images of the Turk and the interests they serve.

#### INSTRUMENTALISATIONS OF THE PRESENT: BERLUSCONI VERSUS THE NORTHERN LEAGUE

The information and messages about Turkey, conveyed by different political groups during the recent debate over that country's accession to the Euro- 350 pean Union has generated as many different representations of Turkey as there are political views on the subject.

Before taking a closer look at some of these representations however, we must take note of that powerful filter which stands between the political system and the public – the media. The importance of the media in every aspect of social life imposes certain principles of public communication on political discourse. Increasingly, the pull towards the theatrical and the sensational reduces political information to powerful messages readily assimilated by the public: short announcements and quips dominate the world of political information, slogans prevail over serious political debate. Geopolitical representations too are filtered by the media and vulgarised by it, giving rise to a sort of ‘geopolitical-show’, that is, geopolitics as a phenomenon of mass consumption. It is in this form – rather than as learned, albeit at times tedious, expert dissertations – that geopolitical representations normally reach the average citizen.<sup>29</sup>

Obviously, the descriptions’ apparent objectivity conceals the intentions of their authors: to give an impression that corresponds to the interests of their respective political groups. In Italy, as in other European countries, the debate sparked by Turkey’s request to begin negotiations for accession to the European Union was very polarised, with the opposing camps presenting very different and irreconcilable views of the country. We will show that there is a close link between recent representations proposed by political leaders to serve political ends and win consensus, and traditional representations, already present in the popular imaginary, and the product of long-standing collective processes.

### The Representation Presented by the Berlusconi Government

The representation of Turkey proposed by the Italian government, headed by Silvio Berlusconi, has had a considerable impact on Turkey’s image in Italy, inasmuch as this government was in office during a crucial period for Turkey’s accession to the European Union – late 2004 – when the decision to open negotiations was taken. At the time, the national media devoted much attention to political debate on the matter, leaving ample opportunity for the government to present its opinion and its perception of Turkey in general.

The image evoked by this representation is that of a friendly country and people, which Italy should consider an ally in the international arena and an opportunity for its economy. In fact, Berlusconi’s view of Europe in the context of international politics is a Eurasian view, in which Moscow and Ankara are favoured allies, very different from the hardcore European view espoused by the Franco-German axis. Political interests combine with economic interests: ‘[Our support for Turkish candidacy] should be seen in light of Italy’s efforts to gain the friendship of eastern countries, that beyond friendship, represent important markets for our business enterprises and our products’.<sup>30</sup>

This enthusiastic attitude to Turkey is strongly influenced by Berlusconi's 395 personality, as it reflects not only his view of foreign policy, but also his intensely personal approach to political life: 'I spent much time cultivating friendly and cordial relations [with political leaders], extending a network from Turkey . . . to all of the Balkan countries and to Russia, which used to look unfavourably upon Italy and our products'.<sup>31</sup> Throughout his political 400 career, following his success as an entrepreneur, Berlusconi's interpretation of politics has always been very personal, and Italian foreign policy has therefore often coincided with Berlusconi's personal friendships with leaders of allied countries. It is thus not surprising that the Italian government's vigorous efforts in support of Turkey's candidacy have coincided with a 405 personal friendship between the Italian prime minister and his Turkish counterpart, at the wedding of whose son, Bilal Erdogan, Berlusconi even served as a witness.

Regarding the motives of other members of the government, it is also worth noting that Italian foreign minister Gianfranco Fini's strong support 410 for Turkish candidacy goes hand in hand with his personal and party need to promote – both in Italy and abroad – a mature and moderate image, in order to sever any remaining ties with the party's past in the extreme nationalist right.

#### The Representation Presented by the Northern League 415

Compared to other European countries (France, Germany and others) that have witnessed strong resistance to Turkey's accession to the EU, the Turkish bid has enjoyed broad support among Italy's politicians, with the notable exception of the Northern League.

The Northern League is a relatively new party in the Italian political 420 landscape. Yet, it has won wide support in the northern parts of the country, playing a pivotal role in Berlusconi's coalition (holding a number of portfolios), and in local government throughout the north. Unlike all of the other parties, both in the coalition and the opposition, the Northern League has openly opposed Turkey's accession to the European Union, a position it 425 has expressed in parliamentary motions and public demonstrations. This is an altogether isolated position among Italian political parties, shared only by the small movements of the extreme right. To understand such unusual political behaviour, whereby an influential party in Berlusconi's government chooses to oppose Turkey's accession to the EU, one must bear in mind 430 that the Northern League's objections mainly concern identity. They focus on the religious dissimilarity between Turkey, a Muslim country, and Europe, a Christian stronghold in which the electorate of Padania (northern Italy) is called upon to recognise its own roots. This view sees religion not as a promoter of mutual understanding through encounter, but rather as 435 grounds for a clash between civilisations. Christian identity and tradition are

thus rediscovered in the capacity of bastion against Islam, a religion with which even dialogue is impossible. The emphasis on Christian roots is thus a means to gain the support of citizens who are sensitive to the issue, and oppose immigration. The issue of immigration is an old warhorse of the Northern League, and its anti-Turkish position meets an atavistic need in a protest party essentially devoid of ideological points of reference: that of creating an imaginary enemy on which the party electorate can focus its discontent. Hence the obsession with 'Padania's enemy'.

The official poster of the League's campaign against Turkey depicts Alberto da Giussano, hero and symbol of resistance against foreign invaders (albeit in the historical context the invaders were Christian!), accompanied by the text 'No to Turkey in Europe. Yes to Christian roots'. The message is clear: Europe's identity is Christian, and Turkey – a Muslim country – threatens it.

The Northern League's geopolitical reading of Turkey thus closely resembles its geopolitical reading of Islam. Analysis of the material published by the Northern League in an attempt to thwart Turkey's accession to the European Union (not only platforms and official speeches, but also propaganda material such as posters and fliers) shows that the main target is, indeed, Islam and not Turkey as such, seeing that the two often implicitly coincide. Hence, the aversion to Turkey is to a large extent a variant – clearly instrumental for the party, but instinctive and irrational for its electorate – of the common aversion to the Muslim immigrant.

A further argument against Turkey appears in another of the Northern League's posters, and expresses concerns regarding the labour market: 'First the Chinese and now the Turks. Small and medium-sized businesses are at risk. Turkish businesses are more competitive than ours. If Turkey enters Europe, Padania's small and medium-sized businesses will die of competition.' By purposely confounding Chinese and Turkish products, the poster evokes the weapons of unfair competition: cheap labour, no environmental or labour safeguards, unregistered labour and tax evasion. These are in fact the very same elements that the Northern League uses in its one-sided representation of southern Italy. In the case of southern Italy, the League does not fear economic competition, but high public expenditures. The essence of the message however, remains unchanged. A 'foreign' territory poses a threat to the economic prosperity of northern Italy, while immigration from that same territory undermines its cultural identity. In the case of Turkey however, the League's rhetoric can play another card – religious differences – and it does so extensively.

Behind these allusions to Turkish competition and Christian identity lies a clear political calculation. The Northern League tries to maintain, and if possible increase its power in Italy's northeastern areas, where industry comprises mainly small and medium-sized businesses – once very successful but experiencing difficulties in recent years as a result of foreign competition. Historically, these areas were strongholds of the Christian Democrats,

who could rely on a traditional Catholic and conservative subculture. With the definitive demise of the Christian Democratic party in the early 1990s, this subculture was left without a party with which to identify. The Northern League deftly filled this representational vacuum. It was in fact mainly an outgrowth of the *Liga Veneta*, a movement for local autonomy that had 485 gained momentum in the early 1980s precisely at the expense of the Christian Democrats. The Northern League offered this 'orphaned' electorate concrete answers regarding sensitive issues such as local tensions between the autochthonous population and Muslim immigrants.

On such issues, the Northern League has no significant political rivals 490 today, as Italy has no strong and organised political movement representing the extreme nationalist xenophobic right, as in other European countries. Hence, the Northern League has a potential pool of voters it can attract by touching the exposed nerve of xenophobia. That is why on the issue of Turkey, Italy's Northern League, essentially shares the positions of other Euro- 495 pean extreme right-wing parties, such as Le Pen's *Front National* in France, the *Vlaams Belang* (former *Vlaams Blok*) in Flanders, or Haider's FPÖ in Austria.

#### THE VATICAN, INDUSTRIALISTS AND TOUR OPERATORS: FURTHER REPRESENTATIONS OF TURKEY

500

##### The Representation Presented by the Vatican

Certainly not an institutional part of national life *per se*, the Vatican has nevertheless always exerted a significant and direct influence on Italian society. The Vatican's opinion is therefore worth considering with regard to the debate over Turkey as well, more so because the much-discussed accession of the Euro- 505 pean Union's first non-Christian member cannot but give rise to reflections within the body that represents and exemplifies the unity of the Catholic world.

In keeping with its reserved style of diplomacy, the Vatican has never openly declared its position in this matter, but has employed its usual discretion. Very few of its representatives have issued public statements, with 510 the unexpected exception of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, who was to become, a few months later, Pope Benedict XVI. In light of the essential silence of the Roman Catholic Church, the future pope's explicit criticism created an uproar. The then prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith declared: 515

Europe is a cultural and not only a geographical continent. It is its culture that provides a common identity. The roots that have produced and enabled the formation of this continent are those of Christianity. . . . In this sense Turkey, over the course of history, has always represented another continent, in perpetual contrast to Europe. There were wars 520

with the Byzantine Empire, the fall of Constantinople also comes to mind, as well as the Balkan wars and the threat to Vienna and Austria. I believe therefore, that it would be a mistake to equate the two continents. It would represent a loss of [cultural] riches, the disappearance of Europe's cultural dimension in favour of economics. Turkey, which considers itself a secular state, but is founded upon Islam, could try to effect cultural integration with neighbouring Arab countries, thereby playing a leading role in a culture with an identity of its own.<sup>32</sup> 525

Can Ratzinger's remarks be considered an official Vatican position? Following the previous awkwardness, the official line presented by the Secretariat of State today is one of caution. While in 2002 the Vatican sent the heads of state of the then 15 member countries of the European Union two confidential memoranda extremely critical of Turkey, recent statements by a number of prelates have been marked by calls for a return to neutrality. This change is also due to a few concrete conciliatory moves both on the part of the Vatican and the Turkish government. 530 535

It is impossible not to address the consequences of Cardinal Ratzinger's election to the Holy See, and the apprehension it has aroused in Turkey. Will the Vatican's position, prudent until now, shift toward greater intransigence? For the moment, one can only speculate. It seems unlikely that the new pope, now burdened with much greater responsibilities than before, and therefore constrained to maintain a more diplomatic tone, would be determined to pursue an issue that risks bringing the Vatican into open contradiction with its frequent public invitations to interfaith dialogue. Openly opposing Turkey's entry into the European Union would run counter to the image the Vatican strives to project, that of an open and broadminded institution. 540 545

Nevertheless, the intentions of the new pope seem clear on one point: the need to push for the reclamation of Catholic traditions in a continent that appears to have lost touch with its own religious roots, that is, the need for the unconditional acknowledgement of Europe's Christian roots, or in a word, the 're-Catholicisation' of Europe. For years Joseph Ratzinger has been insisting on the issue of Europe's spiritual roots and the moral foundations of European Union policy<sup>33</sup>; perhaps also for this reason, once elected pope, he chose the name Benedict XVI, after Benedict of Norcia, patron saint of Europe. If this project is successful, Turkey will be subjected to rigorous and uncompromising tests on the issue of religious freedom on the road to European Union membership. 550 555

### The Representation Presented by the Confederation of Italian Industry (*Confindustria*)

The image of Turkey that Italy's entrepreneurial class has recently striven to present is that of a country with heightened economic potential. Reports 560

issued by the information media closest to the industrialists refer to a country with a decisively recovered economy relative to past instability, possessing a very marked entrepreneurial vitality, inflation finally under control, and contained public debt. Such reports often underscore the substantial investments Italian firms have already made in various sectors. Italy has everything to gain from a further strengthening of economic ties with Turkey, thanks to intended steps by the Turkish government to promote investment in Turkey (VAT and import tariff exemptions, credit subsidies, etc.). Furthermore, a period of accelerated liberalisation is expected, that will provide the large Italian concerns with attractive business opportunities.

In December 2004 and November 2005, the Confederation of Italian Industry sponsored official visits to Turkey, in which the highest ranking representatives of the Italian state (the president and the foreign minister) took part. These purely entrepreneurial missions enjoyed ample coverage in the national media. The journalists' accounts were filled with declarations by potential investors bent on wasting no time, urged by those who had already invested, not to fall victim to prejudice. This aspect of prejudice is particularly interesting in the context of our discussion. In an article on Turkey published in a popular news magazine,<sup>34</sup> one manager declares: 'In our imaginations, we see the Blue Mosque, the *caiques*, and the fabulous coasts, but it is time to look at this country's immense economic and industrial wealth.' Another says: 'Turkey is no longer a high-risk country. . . . In recent months the number of contacts, visits and inquiries has grown exponentially. But investments could be much greater: many must still overcome their prejudices'. The same need to overcome stereotypes is expressed by the author of the article: 'Veiled women and *muezzins* are only one side of the Turkish coin. On the other are state-of-the-art university campuses, excellent and widespread command of English, a million young people joining the labour market every year with a great desire to rise above anonymity'.

For large-scale Italian industry therefore, Turkey today is a market to be exploited, and the Turks a more docile and less unionised labour force than their Italian counterparts. The article concludes with the words of an entrepreneur already operating in Turkey: 'I don't know whether Turkey will join Europe in ten years' time or further down the road. I know that Turkey is already Europe'. A clear call to invest now, for economics – so they say – move faster than politics.

### The Image Presented by Tour Operators

Despite the substantial flow of Italian tourism into Turkey, this phenomenon does not seem to help convey an exhaustive and faithful image of Turkish society to the Italian public. Indeed, this tourism focuses on the more exotic features of the country: its bazaars, mosques, and Turkish baths. That is because the tour operators' marketing policies tend to emphasise the country's



exotic traits: the further a destination appears, the more attractive it becomes. The result is a stereotyped and superficial image, and the glimpse offered to the fleeting tourist does not fully correspond to the country's reality. 605

Travel brochures are emblematic of the representation that mass tourism tends to convey. The texts are dominated by the ritual image of a country frozen in time, unchanged and unchangeable. The following are but a few examples of the eloquent expressions employed to promote an exotic vision of Turkey. The brochures speak of a 'mysterious country', or better yet, 'mythical'. They invite the reader to discover its yet (!) unknown beauty ('to the Orient, towards unexplored lands'; 'Turkey, discover the treasures of the Orient'), and promise alluring sensations of a distant reality ('a caravanserai of emotions'; 'Turkey: allure and tradition')<sup>35</sup> – as if there really were anything 'mysterious' and 'unexplored' in a country that's a mere two hours flight from Italy, and has long been on the circuit of international tourism! To a westerner, who may find it difficult to grasp the complexities of this country, the image proposed by travel brochures and magazines is that of a 'mysterious geographical destination', essentially oriental in character, and in any case, very far from home. Such an image affects individual geopolitical understanding, and thus public opinion, in that it introduces a prejudice, a superficial view that tends to present Turkey as a monolithic entity, entertaining no other options. The many different 'souls' that inevitably make up such a large and populous country (political opposition, social and regional differences, etc.) are thus swept aside. The photographs in travel agents' brochures do reflect a certain reality – they depict real places which actually exist in Turkey, but the point is that they do not reflect Turkey, that is, they present only those features most likely to appeal to escapist fantasies, all the better satisfied the more culturally and visually remote the holiday destination. This simplified and trivialised portrayal of Turkey leads people to disregard the processes of change occurring within the country, and plays against Turkey when the public is required to form an opinion regarding its bid for European Union membership – which is in essence an evaluation of the country's European character and cultural norms. 610 615 620 625 630 635

Mass tourism therefore proves unhelpful in understanding today's Turkish society, for the image presented to the tourist is inevitably filtered through the opportunistic and superficial medium of the tour operator, whose slogan seems to be 'look, but don't touch!' Unable to 'touch' Turkey (its social reality, the cultural horizons of its inhabitants, their aspirations), the tourist settles for 'looking' (that is, enjoying his or her holiday). 640

## CONCLUSIONS: ONE STEREOTYPE, MANY REPRESENTATIONS

It is not our intention, in this brief review of representations of Turkey in Italy, to conclude with a personal opinion as to which of these representations is

the more objective or accurate. We do intend however to shed some light on 645  
the underlying causes of the existence of such a variety of disparate views,  
the relationship between the representations of Turkey put forward by differ-  
ent political forces, and the traditional stereotype of the warrior Turk. The  
conclusions that emerge will be employed to gain insight into the relationship  
between stereotypes and geopolitical representations in general. 650

The freedom to express different opinions is a pillar of democracy, a  
fundamental and unshakeable principle. Ostensibly, one should welcome  
the multitude of images of Turkey that Italy has recently produced. Yet, one  
is inevitably struck by the considerable heterogeneity of these images,  
depicting Turkey first as an exotic destination, then as an ally, a foreign 655  
country, an economic opportunity or a threat; where a Turk may assume  
the guise of an immigrant, a Muslim, or a cheap labourer for some, a friend  
or a welcoming host for others. As we have seen above, each representa-  
tion reflects a specific subjective view linked to the interests and values of  
its authors. In this case however the differences are so vast as to deny the 660  
public the basic information it requires if it is to exercise its judgment on  
Turkish accession to the European Union: Is the Turkish economy in good  
shape or in crisis? Is the governing party moderate or radical? Are Turkey's  
borders a barrier against illegal trafficking or a gaping point of entry? What  
is in fact the situation in terms of human rights and the separation of reli- 665  
gion and state? In the absence of basic public familiarity with the subject,  
anyone with access to the media is free to create and disseminate his or her  
own representation at will, selecting those characteristics of Turkey that suit  
him or her best: *Ataturk's* modernisation or the obscurantism of some dis-  
tant past, the recent development in some of Turkey's economic sectors, or 670  
the backwardness of Turkey's eastern regions, and so forth.

An analysis of the representations of Turkey in Italian society clearly  
demonstrates that the basis of such geopolitical representations is markedly  
and fundamentally ideological. All of the geopolitical narratives presented  
here, from that of the Northern League to that of the Confederation of Ital- 675  
ian Industry, are constructed as a function of their logical conclusions, that  
is, the interests of the promoter of the particular representation. Turkey  
itself has little to do with it. Its history, comprising both periods of obscu-  
rantism and of modernisation, has little to do with it. Its demographic  
weight, considered by some to be the cause of uncontrollable emigration, 680  
by others a resource for an aging Europe, has little to do with it. Every issue  
can be viewed in either a positive or a negative light. How did such a diver-  
sity of images ever come about, especially considering the fact that these  
images frequently have little to do with Turkish society?

The question in fact, goes well beyond the narrow scope of the image of 685  
the Turk in Italy. It relates to a general phenomenon of our times – the  
proliferation of representations and interpretations of international political  
reality. Every issue, situation or international political event gives rise to a

multitude of comments and observations. Two factors would appear to explain this phenomenon: first, the current state of geopolitical flux that undermines previously accepted interpretive models; and second, the increasing heterogeneity of national communities. Let us begin with the first of these factors. 690

During the Cold War, the rigid division of the world into spheres of influence, and the clear-cut association of every political entity with one of the two camps, gave less room for the co-existence of diverse plausible representations. Interpretive models derived ‘naturally’ so to speak, from the rigid international order. Each national political leadership developed its own geopolitical codes, which it used to interpret each and every international political event.<sup>36</sup> The public opinion of every nation perceived events in terms of well-established and widely accepted models. Today however, this no longer holds true. Ours is a period of considerable international flux, and political leaders must continuously and carefully revise the codes they employ. Public opinion finds the old paradigms outdated and useless. There is more room for alternative interpretations, and so diverse representations abound. 700

The second factor which may explain the proliferation of representations in contemporary society is the growing internal heterogeneity of national communities: 705

The more internally homogeneous is the composition of a state’s population and its alternative identities, the less diverse the geopolitical imaginations. The more heterogeneous a population, the more diverse the various forms of local, national and regional identities and, hence, the positioning within the global system. This becomes all the more diverse as boundaries – both social and spatial – are opened up, as information is disseminated through cyberspace and satellites, as travel restrictions are eased, as diaspora populations become closely linked to ‘homeland’ populations, and as increasing numbers of migrant workers arrive to take their place within the socio-economic system.<sup>37</sup> 710 715

With the conclusion of the long historical phase characterised by a drive for internal cohesion in the name of nation building and the defence of the nation state, many societies today seem to be experiencing a reversal of the process, with a clear proliferation of identity markers and diverse views of one’s own and others’ geopolitical realities. Consequently, national communities no longer expresses a single, but many geopolitical imaginations. Externally, such heterogeneity may not be fully evident, and the perceptions of other national communities may retain the traditional stereotypical image alongside many diverse representations put forward by different interest groups. This is in fact what emerges from our case study on the image of Turkey in present-day Italy. The stereotype of the warrior Turk persists alongside other, more recent representations, some of which even contradict the stereotype. We thus have one stereotype and many representations. 720 725 730

This burgeoning of representations is also afforded greater visibility today, by virtue of the fact that communications have undergone a process of ‘democratisation’, extending access to a broad range of individuals and groups. This renders the construction and dissemination of alternative geopolitical representations by minority groups much simpler today than ever before. Among the most remarkable examples of this in recent years are the media skills exhibited by Zapatista and Iraqi rebels, who were able to publicise their actions and their respective worldviews via the Internet. 735

These representations, clearly subjective and ideological, are expressions of the form of counter-power that Routledge calls anti-geopolitics.<sup>38</sup> Our case study of Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union however, reveals yet another kind of popular resistance to institutional discourse, revealed in the discrepancy between the innermost convictions of large portions of Italian public opinion (predominantly against<sup>39</sup>) and the positions adopted by the government and the majority of Italian political parties (predominantly in favour). This opposition may simply be the result of an instinctive tendency, free of political intent – widespread anti-Turkish feelings, for example. Its spontaneity suggests the existence of a collective geopolitical subconscious, that is, widely accepted cognitive categories employed in the reading of political dynamics. 740 745

The absence of any intentional or pre-arranged strategy in such representations, calls for the introduction of a conceptual distinction between representations of stereotypical origin, and representations of, shall we say, instrumental origin. Both exert an influence on the ways in which events are perceived, but while the first stems from a preconceived and generalised image (i.e., a stereotype), the second derives from a careful and deliberate assessment of the interests it is intended to further. 750 755

Moreover, while stereotypical representations are very long-lived, due to the fact that they are socially rooted, instrumental representations last only as long as the interests that generate them. When these dissipate, so do their corresponding representations – unless specific circumstances ensure the survival of a particular representation. In fact, rather than constituting two distinct categories, one (stereotypical representations) can be said to be an outgrowth of the other (instrumental representations). Stereotypical representations may thus be engendered and fuelled by specific unilateral interests (as in the case of the Catholic Church’s influence on the image of the Turk, discussed above), but later lose their original instrumental force and take on a self-justifying life of their own. 760 765

The aforementioned abundance of representations has frequently resulted in the presence of a single stereotypical representation alongside a multitude of instrumental representations. It is noteworthy that often, as in our case study, stereotypical representations constitute a form of resistance ‘from below’ to attempts to impose a specific reading of a given situation ‘from above’ – all the more reason to pay attention to the more popular forms of social communication. 770

Recent studies in popular geopolitics have indeed contributed to the delineation of geopolitical representations in cinema and in the popular press, considered very efficient channels for the representation of specific simplified readings of international political reality and its actors. These representations have been very useful in studies aiming to explore mechanisms for the manipulation of consensus. If we acknowledge the importance of a collective geopolitical subconscious however, these are not the representations that can help us in our investigation of national stereotypes, because – as Adorno and Horkheimer pointed out, the culture industry tends to absorb dissent, neutralise it and turn it into consent. Clearly, these representations are largely conformist and hegemonic, due to the close ties between the political system and the media. In such cases, the powerful consumerist system appropriates the stereotype and offers the public a revised version following its own standards and interests. As a matter of fact, these products can be considered popular only to the extent that they avail themselves of language and discursive modalities intended to facilitate access to them by the public at large. Yet essentially, they are still conceived and produced in a context that reflects elite interests and models.

Popular in form yet elitist in origin, the representations disseminated by the media propose images that do not necessarily correspond to popular stereotypes in that their objective is not one of reproducing existing images, but of imposing images, other images perhaps, in order to create a context conducive to the desired interpretation.

Forms of popular expression that are more representative of collective perceptions include: traditional forms, such as proverbs, popular songs, slang expressions, stereotyped jokes, and written graffiti, as well as more recent forms, such as Internet sites or painted urban graffiti. These constitute genuine collective products, affected neither by the author's cultural filters (film director, writer, cartoonist), nor – more importantly – by the pressures of dominant geopolitical actors. It is mainly in these cases that the representation can become anti-conformist and counter-hegemonic. It may therefore be worthwhile to accompany the study of films, newspapers, cartoons and magazines – helpful in elucidating strategies used to manipulate public opinion 'from above' – with an analysis of popular cultural forms, that constitute both the deep underlying reasons and the most spontaneous manifestations of 'geopolitics from below'.<sup>40</sup>

Another consideration raised by our case study is the need for a critical re-evaluation of the commonly accepted notion that the national stereotype favours the cultural legitimisation of the more traditional geopolitical representations: 'Popular geopolitics are crucial to the cultural legitimisation of more traditionally conceived geopolitics of statecraft'.<sup>41</sup> The case of Turkey's multiple representations in Italy shows however, that the negative bias against the Turk contained within the stereotype is used not only by those opposed to Turkey, but also by those in favour – in the latter case,

obviously in order to deride the stereotype itself. Such are statements made by Berlusconi, Fini or the industrialists, who make fun of the stereotype, as if to say: 'In such a rapidly changing world, how can one still believe the images of the past? People need [N.B. not "we have an interest in"] more modern representations, suitable to the times!' Their opponents however, seem to be saying: 'Those Turks have always been this way, and they will never change. Popular wisdom is never wrong!' If the national stereotype is in line with the interests of the political movement in question (e.g., the Northern League), then it lends itself to the representation preferred by that movement, and can be used directly. If not (as in Berlusconi's case), the movement will tend to present the stereotype as the legacy of an uncouth, obsolete culture. In such cases, the stereotype is used by way of contrast. The movement's 'prejudice-free' position thus gains legitimacy as the wiser and more mature approach. In short, the national stereotype may or may not be in line with the interests of political actors, but one way or another, they will evoke it in support of their own interpretations of reality.

These two ways of using the stereotype correspond to two different modalities of self-representation adopted by political forces vis-à-vis the electorate. On the one hand, there is the conservative modality, which portrays the political movement as sensitive to popular sentiment and champion of traditional mindsets. On the other hand, there is the innovative modality, which tends to depict the political movement as modern and up-to-date, as the force that will liberate society from all the worthless psychological ballast it has internalised over the course of time. Looking at the Italian representations of Turkey cited above, the first modality would apply to the Northern League and to the Vatican (both in the present and in the past); the second would apply to Berlusconi, Fini and the industrialists, as well as to seventeenth century Venice. Thus, at least in our case, the position adopted in relation to the stereotype would appear to be a distinguishing factor between a geopolitical view of continuity and one of departure from the interpretive models of the collective imaginary.

A political group or individual that decides to address public opinion, adopting a position which openly contradicts the national stereotype, will undoubtedly rely on powerful arguments and media tools. Above all however, such a move would require an appropriate political climate – a context of change, a society in the process of reconsidering its own identity and that of others. Such is the situation described by Sharp, with regard to the crisis of moral geography presented by the popular American magazine *Reader's Digest*: The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the disappearance of the United States' traditional enemy (at least as perceived by the readers of the magazine), and an entire interpretation of the world needed to be reformulated.<sup>42</sup>

We have gone from a dominant and irrefutable stereotype to the chaos of multiple geopolitical representations, some of them highly improvised,

implausible, and *ad hoc*. The former is the mark of a conformist, almost anaesthetised society, while the latter suggests a society that is confused, disoriented and frightened. There is certainly a middle ground, but we must get to know the society in which we live if we are ever to achieve the society in which we would like to live.

## NOTES

1. G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby, 'Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics: Towards a Critical Geopolitics', in G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics* (London: Routledge 1998) p. 5. 870
2. G. Corna Pellegrini, *Geografia dei valori culturali* (Rom: Carocci 2004) p. 153.
3. E. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Press 1979).
4. W. Lippman, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co. 1922) p. 7.
5. G. Dijkink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions. Maps of Pride and Pain* (London: Routledge 1996). 875
6. G. Dijkink, 'Geopolitical Codes and Popular Representations', in *GeoJournal* 46 (December 1998) pp. 293–299.
7. J. Sharp, 'Refiguring Geopolitics: The Reader's Digest and Popular Geographies of Danger at the End of the Cold War', in K. Dodds and D. Atkinson (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000) p. 334. 880
8. A. Montanari, *Stereotipi nazionali. Modelli di comportamento e relazioni in Europa* (Naples: Liguori 2002).
9. *Ibid.* p. 147.
10. *Ibid.* p. 200–212.
11. *Ibid.* p. 204. 885
12. *Ibid.* p. 205.
13. Edward W. Said's writings are numerous. Among his most important publications on this topic, we would mention the following: *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Press 1979); *Covering Islam* (New York: Pantheon Books 1981); *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf 1993); *Power, Politics and Culture* (New York: Pantheon Books 2001). 890
14. Montanari (note 8) p. 11.
15. K. M. Setton, *Western Hostility to Islam and Prophecies of Turkish Doom* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society 1992) p. 17.
16. T. Meyer, *Die Identität Europas: der EU eine Seele?* (Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag 2004) p. 11.
17. *Ibid.* 895
18. G. Devoto and G. C. Oli, *Dizionario della Lingua Italiana* (Florence: Le Monnier 2002–2003) p. 2214.
19. G. Castellan, *Histoire des Balkans (XVI-XX siècle)* (Paris: Fayard 1991); E. G. Fuller and O. I. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder: Westview Press 1995); G. Schreiber, *Auf den Spuren der Türken* (Munich: Paul List Verlag 1980). 900
20. A detailed account of the authors closest to the Roman Curia who wrote of the Turks can be found in M. Soykut, *Image of the "Turk". A History of the "Other" in Early Modern Europe: 1453–1683* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag 2001).
21. K. Fleet, 'Italian Perceptions of the Turks in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries', in *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 52 (1995). 905
22. Soykut (note 20) p. 40.
23. L. Valensi, 'The Making of a Political Paradigm: The Ottoman State and Oriental Despotism', in Anthony Grafton and Ann Blair (eds.), *The Transmission of Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1990) pp. 176–177.
24. C. A. Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans. The Church and the Ottoman Empire. 1453–1923* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1983) p. 5. 910
25. Soykut (note 20) pp. 146–147; P. Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi* (Florence: Sansoni 1975) pp. 340–351, & 506–524.

26. Giovanni Battista Donado (known as Donà) was bailo in Constantinople and author of a seminal work on Turkish culture: *Della Letteratura de' Turchi* [On the Literature of the Turks] (Venice: Andrea Poletti 1688). 915
27. P. Preto (note 25) pp. 350–351.
28. A. Tenenti, G. Bellingeri, G. Morelli, et al., *Venezia e i turchi* (Milan: Electa 1985).
29. E. Boria, *L'interpretazione in geopolitica. L'adesione della Turchia all'Unione Europea e le sue rappresentazioni* (Rome: Nuova Cultura 2004) pp. 79–86. 920
30. "Il Cavaliere diventa ambasciatore e apre le braccia dell'Ue a 4 paesi", *Il Giornale* (18 December 2004) p. 6.
31. "Berlusconi all'attacco della stampa straniera", *Il Corriere della Sera* (25 October 2004) p. 6.
32. "Cardinal Ratzinger: Identifier la Turquie à l'Europe serait une erreur", *Le Figaro*, (13 August 2004) pp. 32–34. 925
33. J. Ratzinger, *Europa. I suoi fondamenti oggi e domani* (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo 2004); J. Ratzinger, *Svolta per l'Europa?* (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo 1992).
34. "Turchia. Una Cina più vicina" ["Turkey. A Closer China"], *Panorama* (February 2005) pp. 96–98.
35. Catalogues on Turkey for the year 2005, by the following tour operators: King Holidays, Entour, Inviaggi and Courtesy Travel. 930
36. J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Post-war American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press 1982).
37. D. Newman, 'Citizenship, Identity and Location. The Changing Discourse of Israeli Geopolitics', in K. Dodds and D. Atkinson (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000) p. 302. 935
38. P. Routledge, 'Anti-Geopolitics', in J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal (eds.), *A Companion to Political Geography* (London and New York: Blackwell 2003) pp. 234–248.
39. See the results of the following surveys: Eurobarometer 63, p. 162 (fieldwork May–June 2005, publication: September 2005); Transatlantic Trends, p. 11 (fieldwork May–June 2005, publication: September 2005); Cercom (fieldwork February 2005, publication: February 2005). 940
40. Routledge (note 38) p. 236.
41. Sharp (note 7) p. 348.
42. J. Sharp, *Condensing the Cold World. Reader's Digest and American Identity* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press 2000). 946