

Preferences Activism of Islamic Spiritual (Rohis) in Schools and Madrasas in Yogyakarta: From Narrative Islamism to Popular Culture

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ABSTRACT

Purpose – The existence of Rohis in schools and madrasas is often imaged as a movement for Islamization and school da'wah. However, globalization and modernization inevitably bring new directions for the next Rohis movement and is evident in its various activism. This study aims to determine the preferences of Rohis activism in schools and madrasas that have experienced a shift from Islamism "right" towards popular culture.

Design/methods/approach – This research method is a qualitative case study. The subjects of this research are Rohis activists in MAN 1 Yogyakarta and SMAN 5 Yogyakarta. This study collects data through in-depth interviews, participant observation, and documentation. Data analysis uses the Miles and Huberman model with interactive analysis through data reduction, data presentation, and conclusions.

Findings – The results of this study indicate that the Rohis' activism preferences appear in the spaces they create as a form of negotiation between obedience and modernity, including manifesting in the form of religious events, the theme of the study, and the name of the program/division.

Research implications/limitations – The implications of this research in the world of education provide insight and views that modernization and globalization cannot be avoided, especially for Muslim youth who are members of Rohis.

Practical implications – This research shows that school policies are more progressive and responsive to changing times.

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1. Introduction

The history of Islamic activism in Indonesia, driven by Muslim youth, cannot be separated from the events of "*jilbabisation*" in public schools. The extraordinary pressure of the New Order meant that veiled students in public schools could not find room for compromise. There is only one option for "*jilbabers*": continue to go to school without wearing a headscarf or continue to wear a headscarf by moving to a private school. However, the New Order government's repressive actions against the "*jilbabers*" did not make their struggles recede but instead raised the spirit of the campus Islamism movement to fight from below. Several large and well-known campuses in Indonesia, such as Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), Universitas Indonesia (UI), and Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), have become fertile breeding grounds for this movement. The climax was when the Mujahid Da'wah Exercise /*Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* (LMD) was held in 1974 which was initiated by a prominent figure from the Bandung Islamic Student Association/*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI) named Imaduddin Abdurrachim with a focus on teaching the Qur'an and Hadith, and more specifically related to the obligations of Muslim women wearing a headscarf. Since then, more and more Islamic activism has sprung up on several campuses in Java, such as IPB, by establishing the Islamic Spiritual Board/*Badan*



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Kerohanian Islam (BKI). In Jakarta, the Arief Rahman Hakim Mosque is used as a study base for UI students. Likewise, the Jamaah Salahuddin emerged in Yogyakarta, which UGM students drove. In the end, the spirit of Islamic activism extends to campuses in various areas, such as in Surabaya and Semarang (Latif, 2012, pp. 581–582).

It began to hit Islamic students. Since then, LMD alumni have spread to state university campuses, in line with the issuance of SK.No.100/C/Kep/D/1991 on February 16, 1991, which allowed students to wear clothes based on their beliefs, there was a fever of headscarves. This fever also intensified after a change in the political situation that was more inclined to the “right” marked by this condition which eventually led to the uproar over the jilbab identity -which later became known as the “jilbab revolution” movement (HS et al., 2011, pp. 21–22) — which not only emerged at the tertiary level but also in state high schools. Headscarves are increasingly widespread in various regions; even now, it has become an identity that dominates the school’s public space.

The phenomenon that occurred in one of the State Senior High Schools (SMAN) in Yogyakarta, for example (HS et al., 2011, pp. 21–22), requires students to wear jilbab and long skirts in the school environment. Most female students also wear a large jilbab with a combination of long skirts up to the ankles, while the boys wear “*congklang*” (above the ankles) pants. Islamic practices in schools are also increasingly prominent, such as the separation of men and women in student council (OSIS) and extracurricular meetings, and an Islamic orientation in the form of MABIT (Malam Bina Iman Takwa/Faith Building Night) for new members in certain extracurricular activities. This illustration indicates that the Islamist movement has colored the spaces in public secondary schools with Muslim youth as the main actors.

The influence of the Islamist movement on Muslim youth in public high schools is increasingly visible with the emergence of Rohis (Islamic Spirituality) activism, student organizations that are intense in religious studies, and school activities. The emergence of Rohis in Najib Kailani’s study is allegedly not only a school da’wah movement and a political movement. However, it is more closely related to the “moral panics” phenomenon that hit Indonesian society after this country invaded Western and East Asian pop culture (Kailani, 2011). There is a sense of concern for the “ghost” of pop culture among teenagers who are trying to find their identity and identity. Efforts to ward off this are by intensifying Islamic da’wah among students and establishing school da’wah pockets. The slogan “Islam is the right solution” became the foundation for Muslim youth to get out of the “worry” over the hegemony of Western culture. Based on these slogans, they eventually metamorphosed into an Islamic movement that manifests in symbols, language, slogans, and other Islamic activities.

The presence of Rohis in Indonesia in the 1980s started from the desire and effort to provide answers and solutions to problems related to the perceived lack of Islamic insight for Muslim students because religious education lessons in schools were considered very limited. This spiritual activity is based on the Decree of the Minister of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia Number 0204/4/1984 concerning the Improvement of the Curriculum for Senior High Schools. Regulation of the Minister of Religion Number 211 of 2011 concerning Guidelines for the Development of National Standards for Islamic Religious Education in Schools states that one type of PAI (Islamic Education) extracurricular activity is a spiritual activity that functions as a mentoring and sharing forum to strengthen and deepen Islamic material in schools (Nurdin, 2018, p. 24). Therefore, the presence of Rohis is essential to serve as a forum for deepening Islam through extracurricular activities at school. The primary purpose of Rohis being formed is more based on establishing a forum for teaching, preaching, and sharing Islamic knowledge. Rohis also has a management structure similar to that of various organizations, such as a student council consisting of a chairman, deputy, treasurer, secretary, divisions according to the needs of each organization, work programs, articles of association, and by-laws. (Noer et al., 2017). Rohis has a very strategic and massive role in constructing the Islamic identity of Muslim

youth. It is shown by the many activities, programs, symbols, and styles and behaviors of the Rohis activists, who are always based on Islamic values, such as the emergence of the da'wah club movement, *tadarus* activities, Islamic Activity Community/Civitas Aktivitas Islam (SAI), Muslim alumni communication forums, systematic studies, and sisterhood/girlhood (interview with Mr. TH (deputy head of curriculum at MAN 3), and Mrs. NR (teacher at SMAN)).

The Rohis movement is part of the school's extracurricular activities and an arena for the school's da'wah movement. Rohis activists are the driving force, known as School Da'wah Activists/*Aktivis Dakwah Sekolah* (ADS). Besides, there are also roles from various other agencies, such as teachers, alumni, and partners (Koesmarwanti, 2002, p. 47). The strategy of the Rohis da'wah movement is outlined in the dual function of the Rohis by using two coaching methods, namely; first, fostering "*syakhsiyah Islamiyyah*" or Islamic individuals who direct their agenda to foster a cadre of Muslim students to become superior individuals in the fields of science and faith. Second, the formation of *jami'ah al-Muslimin* or associations of Muslims. In this case, Rohis is a gathering place for Muslim students in an Islamic community. It aims to internalize further Islamic school teachings (Mahmud, 1997, p. 15).

Rohis' success in building an ideal image as a Muslim youth with "piety" has become an inseparable part of this community. A Muslim teenager who is intelligent, accomplished, has social concerns, and Rohis activists represent the religious. This image of "piety" is not without reason but is supported by facts showing that the subjects asked to carry out this mandate are Rohis activists in almost all religious affairs in schools and madrasas. As happened in MAN 1 Yogyakarta, not all of which are members of the Rohis activists, it is clear that Rohis is involved in every agenda of activities with religious nuances. In this way, Rohis activists are considered to have a high enough power of influence to color schools and madrasas. It is supported by an Islamist culture built in the spirit of interacting with one another. Arabic terms thick with Rohis activism have become identities easily recognizable in the public sphere. The terms *Ikhwan*, *Akhwat*, *Halaqah*, *Daurah*, and *Mabit*, are terms that are not foreign to them. As Rohis did at SMA 5 and MAN 1 Yogyakarta, the call for *Ikhwan* and *Akhwat* is always used in study forums.

The piety shown by the Rohis activists in the school's public space shows that the Islamism that develops in Rohis activism is still quite thick with the understanding that Islam is identical to Arabic, both in the way of dressing, customs, and the use of language in communicating and interacting such as *Ikhwan*, *Akhwat*, *Akhi*, *Ana*, *Antum*, *Afwan*, *Annisa'*, *Adab Syuro*, *Hijrah*, *Jilbab*, dan *Jamaah* (Miftahuddin et al., 2017). The use of Arabic is also evident in Rohis' most typical program, namely mentoring or *Halaqah*, which is a place for internalization and regeneration, and other supporting programs such as *Mabit* (stay), *Ta'lim* (study), and *Daurah* (training). In addition to the program, the symbols in the Rohis logo are the same. Both MAN 1 and SMAN 5 Yogyakarta use Arabic. In addition, the name Rohis is also synonymous with the mosque's name in schools and madrasas. In MAN 1, for example, associating the name Rohis with Masjid al-Hakim, it becomes "*Rohis el-Hakim*." At SMAN 5, the name Rohis was also attached to the Darussalam Mosque, thus becoming "Rohis Darussalam."

This attachment of Rohis' piety to Islamic activism is often considered to lead to forms of exclusivism, even to the seeds of understanding radicalism. On the other hand, Rohis activists, as urban Muslim youth moving towards the middle class, want to show their piety with Islamic religious symbols, such as jilbab, decker, and social services. Beta says everything the middle-class Muslim community does is a form of expression. They want to show freedom amid the stereotype that Rohis activists tend to be exclusive and radical, or in Manuel Castells' language, they are called "resistance identity." They are trying to build identity politics amid discrimination in public spaces that tend to legitimize the identity of Rohis' "active piety" to perpetuate the Islamism movement among Muslim youth in schools and madrasas.

Rohis cannot be separated from the actors born from the new Muslim generation as Islamic activism, which is the driving force of da'wah in secondary schools. Becoming a Muslim teenager growing up and developing a "Muslim lifestyle is the new cool" cannot be separated from the essential everyday formative experiences experienced by this generation, such as the socio-political climate conducive to Muslims since the early 1990s and the fall of Suharto in 1998. Democratic elections in 1999, where Islamic parties got a breath of fresh air, the Bali bombings 1 and 2, the rise of racially motivated social conflicts, the digital revolution, and social media, and the rise of Islamic pop culture as a factor in its formation and development (Yuswohady et al., 2017).

Therefore, Naafs's studies presented Islam as the antithesis of westernization (Naafs & White, 2012). However, subsequent studies show how 'contemporary Indonesian Islam is synthesized with the lifestyle characteristics of modernity, which ultimately gives birth to a hybrid Muslim youth culture. Rohis as an arena for the Islamization of Muslim youth indeed cannot be separated from the perspective, attitude, and behavior of Muslim youth who are growing as a generation of middle-class Muslims. So, the right term to describe Muslim Youth activism in Rohis is "Muslim, Young, and Modern."

The development of Indonesian Muslim youth towards religiosity is increasingly visible when entering 2010, along with the growing trend of jilbab on the national fashion stage. This phenomenon was followed by a wave of *Hijrah* trends among artists and other young people. Undoubtedly, *Hijrah*, interpreted as a change for the better, has become a lifestyle. The Rohis context, for example, is not only a forum for gathering Muslim youth in religious activities at school. Rohis also has the main target of da'wah, which targets the logic of the Muslim "market," especially among Muslim youth. The market logic of Muslims targeting the segmentation of Muslim youth is not just a market, numbers, numbers, and merely carrying out economic principles, but what is more important is how to incorporate sharia values and religious spirit as well as global culture in every dimension of da'wah that Rohis drive in schools and madrasas.

According to Noorhaidi Hasan, Muslim youth's Islamic activism is not only related to issues of religious and moral ideals. Socio-economic factors also color this movement. The lack of job opportunities makes them frustrated, and they look at the future with "gloom" and "murk." Amid these conditions, they are easily carried away by the "religious utopia" by joining Islamist groups such as FPI, HTI, and the Salafi movement. However, the character and characteristics of teenagers who want to be open, dynamic, and responsive are challenging for Muslim youth activism. The presence of popular culture and globalization makes them unable to escape from the space of Western hegemony, which they often criticize.

A real example is that they still wear the jilbab but drink Coca-Cola, listen to pop music, play gadgets, and go to the mall (Hasan, 2016). This condition illustrates the desire of Muslim youth to maintain their Islamic identity, but at the same time without abandoning their modern identity. Thus, it can be said that Muslim youth activism has developed and changed. They seem to be trying to negotiate Islamism and modernism.

Rohis activism does not only exist in the political sphere, which seeks to Islamize Muslim youth in schools and madrasas. His activism also points to the rise of a generation of urban Muslims as a middle-class generation that Jason Burke describes as "educated professionals with a modern outlook." They are also pious and socially conservative and have the view that Islam plays an important role not only as a personal belief but also in public life, where Islam is articulated as a form of moral guidance, a marker of identity, political ideology, and urban lifestyle (Weng, 2017).

It is where the uniqueness of Muslim youth-style Islamism is. Identity hybridity becomes inevitable. Pam Nilan sees this current Islamic condition in Indonesia as a form of synthesis with several characteristics of a modern lifestyle, urbanization, consumption for consumption purposes, dependence on technology, extended periods of education and training, longer marriages, and expansion of the

middle class. Quickly form youth following the market and birth to specific Islamic cultural products and trends (Bamualim & Latief, 2018).

Islamism is not a static concept but dynamic. Islamism in Indonesia today is driven by urban Muslims from big cities such as Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Solo. They do not simply want to return to classical Islam and oppose modernity. However, it seemed like he wanted to embrace both of them. One of the essential agents of Islamism is young Muslims, who actively organize religious activities, and political mobility and use religious symbols in public spaces (Hasan, 2018).

Rohis Islamic activism is not just a school proselytizing movement that is always associated with issues of Islamism, fundamentalism, radicalism, or even terrorism. More than that, a shift leads to efforts to negotiate religion with modernity as another form of dynamics shown by the younger generation of Muslim Rohis. This shift occurs because of its contact with modernization and globalization, which is inevitable. As a result, Rohis created its uniqueness with Muslim youth-style Islamic practices, which tend to be more fluid, slang, and trendy.

The results of Noorhaidi's research in mid-January 2018 also show that the millennial generation generally accesses Islamic literature based on five styles, namely "literature with *jihadi*, *tahriri*, *salafi*, *tarbawi*, and popular Islamism patterns." Popular Islamism-style literature attracts the most readers, while *jihadi* literature has the slightest interest. Why is that? Because millennial Muslims need an illustration of how to become Islamic amid technological developments, such as fashion needs and lifestyles. It is accommodated through popular Islamism literature (Azizy, 2019).

Yasraf Amir Piliang said this widespread imagination phenomenon is built on at least four domains. First, the popular way of thinking is characterized by quick thinking to get pleasure. Second, widespread communication is characterized by the phenomenon of da'wah decorated with popular culture, language, actions, and appearances, as da'wah often appears on television screens accompanied by comedy and jokes. Third, popular rituals are generally carried out by following the paradigm of commodity-motivated popular culture by considering social differences, prestige, class, and status principles. Fourth, popular symbols are characterized by appearance, whether clothing or accessories, that emphasize the effect of fun, symbols, status, themes, prestige, charm, and various other popular tastes. For example, following the styles and models of *ustaz/ah*, *Kiai*, and *Dai*, who become "trendsetters" and create a new lifestyle (Piliang, 2011, p. 349).

Thus, the lives of Muslim youth, as seen from Rohis' activism today, show a reasonably strong intersection between religion (read: Islam) and popular culture. This intersection gave birth to not only the phenomenon of the inclusion of mass cultural values in Islam but also the emergence of Islamic da'wah in popular media and new styles. It proves that something considered separate and contradictory is finding a way to negotiate and collaborate between pop culture and Islam. It represents changes in Islamic culture among Muslim youths who form hybrid Islamism by negotiating between popular culture and Islamic observance in earnest without having anyone dominate each other.

2. Methods

This research method uses a qualitative case study. The subjects of this research are Rohis activists in MAN 1 Yogyakarta and SMAN 5 Yogyakarta. This study collects data through in-depth interviews, participant observation, and documentation. Data analysis uses the Miles and Huberman model with interactive analysis through data reduction, data presentation, and conclusions. This study uses a sociological approach with symbolic interactionism. One of the basic premises of this school is that humans are conscious and self-reflecting beings who actively shape their behavior (Cohen et al., 2017). In addition, humans are purposive beings who act in and against situations where they want to reflect the identity embedded in them and want that identity to respond to the chaos that occurs (Ritzer

& Smart, 2011). This research is also guided by the theory of the Muslim generation, as well as theories of political sociology such as identity politics and post-Islamism.

3. Results

Rohis Islamic activism at the senior high school (SMA) level is quite interesting. Two educational institutions in Yogyakarta, SMAN 5 and MAN 1, are representatives of schools and madrasas that have religious activities driven by Rohis activists and are both under the auspices of the Student Council (OSIS). However, the pattern of Rohis recruitment in the two institutions is different. SMAN 1 applies the obligation for all students of class X to become members of Rohis, while for students of MAN 1, entering into Rohis members is only an option. However, the uniqueness of both of them has the characteristics of activities that characterize the style and style of young people, which is more fluid and slang. The age of students in high school who are in the process of finding their identity, including in matters of religion and belief, also influences the Islamic identity that appears on the surface, which is unique to the youth style.

As a community driven by Muslim youth, several activities carry the identity of the Rohis as a school da'wah movement and, at the same time, become teenagers who want to show modernity and remain "slang" teenagers, some of which appear in the realms below.

3.1. Religious Events

Rohis Muslim youth infatuated with Islamic activism are generally an urban community growing into a middle-class society. Most have affluent family backgrounds, adequate purchasing power, decent investment ability, and a high spirit of giving (zakat and alms). Especially for the spirit of giving can be seen from the current Rohis activism, which organizes religious, and social events such as Social Service. This activity is carried out by SMAN 5 at the end of Ramadan. They sent zakat fitrah assistance from students and teachers to residents around SMA Negeri 5 and other areas deemed in need. Other social activities are sharing sacrificial animals in several areas in Yogyakarta during Eid al-Adha, such as the Gunungkidul and Kulon Progo areas, and some underprivileged residents around the school. This activity is usually not just a social activity, but there is a "recitation" agenda at the location where the Social Service takes place by presenting a local cleric.

Not inferior to SMAN 5, religious events are also lively and carried out by the Rohis MAN 1 Yogyakarta activists. The social service, which is held for 3 (three) days, is carried out in the month of *Dzulhijjah* (on *Tasyrik* day) and takes place outside the school (in areas that still need a helping hand for social assistance such as in Kulon Progo, and Gunung Kidul). Among the activities are the distribution of sacrificial meat, cheap basic food packages, free medical treatment, and a cheap bazaar (Interview with Ustaz KHF, MAN 1 Yogyakarta Rohis coach).

To organize these activities, Rohis MAN 1 raises funds only from internal circles, not asking for donations from outside parties. The enthusiasm of the parents is evident by giving donations in large amounts. According to Mr. NWL's narrative; "Even from this activity, we can leave funds to be included as community funds which can be used at any time for other activities, so all of it is from the parents' donations ma'am" (Interview with Mas NWL, head of ROHIS MAN 1 Yogyakarta). The remaining community funds are then used for the "we can we share" activity, a social activity in the Rohis program that aims to develop the habit of social behavior and social care, among others.

The charity and giving activism shown by Rohis MAN 1 was also seen at the annual event led by the sisterhood, namely the study of sisterhood and the donation of 1001 deckers. This activity is carried out once a period by inviting all members of the DIY Rohis (joined in the FAROHIS association) accompanied by the agenda of distributing deckers for participants on the streets. When the writer asked the reason why he had to "deckker," Ms. NBL, as the head of the *akhwat*, answered; "Yes,

because the *decker* is a symbol to cover the genitals for women, *ma'am*, so yes, we hope that by distributing this *decker* later, many Muslim women will want to cover their genitals." (Interview with NBL, head of the *akhwat*). Thus, the symbol of "alms *decker*," which is part of fashion for Muslim women, is not only a symbol of Islam to cover the genitals but also becomes part of the lifestyle of modern Muslim women who are slang and trendy.

3.2. Theme of Study

The same trend also occurs in selecting the study theme raised in the Islamic activities of the Rohis. These themes are thick with Islamic nuances such as the themes of moral creed, Islamic history, and Islamic youth lifestyles around the world of love, dating, fashion, almsgiving, and how teenagers prepare themselves in the face of modernization and globalization. Such themes are evident in the study of sisterhood. One example is the study conducted by Rohis MAN 1 Yogyakarta, on Sunday, February 18, 2018, in the 2nd-floor hall. More than 200 young women attended the study program from 09.00 WIB to 12.00 WIB (read: *akhwat*). The study took the theme "my slang does not hinder my hijrah" by presenting two resource persons from the Advisor for the Muslimah Smart with Islam Yogyakarta Youth Community, Ahsani Rahmi, and the Chairperson of PC Djdzman Al-Kindi, Yogyakarta City, Repa Sepnita.

According to NA, a class XI Language student assigned as the head of the organizing committee, today's young women have faced the times' challenges. Model, lifestyle, and fashion trends have demanded that Muslim women be wise. He says a wise attitude does not lag behind the new trend. He said, "There are many models of clothing and styles of dress that are in great demand by young women but are not *syar'i*. So, the solution is yes, we are slang but still Islamic".

It was also confirmed by AM, a class XI IPS 3 student who serves as the head of Rohis. He said, "so that young Muslim women are good at choosing trends, and not just following along. Let us slowly become a real Muslimah" (Interview with NBL and AM).

Almost the same as Rohis MAN 1, the themes raised at SMAN 5 are also not far from the problems of youth's life, such as "kids nowadays" and "where do I put my love?" although there are also themes related to "the doom of the grave" and "the best women for Jannah" (ROHIS SMAN 5 Yogyakarta work program) This was also confirmed by GN, one of the students of SMAN 5 Yogyakarta. He said his favorite themes were youth life, Islamic history, and not forgetting the Muslim lifestyle. By looking at the themes of the study raised in Rohis activism, it can be said that the nuances of the lives of Muslim youth remain visible, despite efforts to maintain Islamic values.

3.3. Program/Division

As a Muslim teenager who wants to show his modernity, "slang" is powerful among Rohis activists at school and in madrasas. At MAN 1 Yogyakarta, for example, the term "slang" is widely used for work programs such as "Jubba" (Friday Barakah with Sunnah), which schedules activities every Friday by reading the Koran Surah al-Kahf. There is also a "lotis party" program used as a forum for gathering and sharing among the sisters, while for the Ikhwan, the agenda for this kind of activity is included in the "futsal fun" program. Meanwhile, for the study of mentoring, MAN 1 Yogyakarta packages its program with the term "coffee" or Talking about Faith, which contains studies filled out by alumni and several teachers or dormitory supervisors (the ROHIS MAN 1 Yogyakarta work program).

Meanwhile, SMAN 5 Yogyakarta prefers to use terms close to the Palestinian state. This term can be seen from the names of program divisions such as the "Gaza" (Social Movement) Division, the "Hamas" (Mosque Children Association) Division (SMAN 5 Work Program and an interview with Mrs. GHN). In addition, the activities Rohis does to fill the boredom of the "*Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*" da'wah activities are *lutisan*, playing ping pong, futsal, cycling, and many more. Rohis of SMAN 5 Yogyakarta

later knew this cycling activity by the term “DBS,” or an abbreviation of *Darussalam Bicycle-an Sareng-Sareng*, which was attended by Rohis members, alumni, and teachers. Although the theme is DBS, its activities cannot be separated from the built Islamic nuances. It can be seen from a series of events that include a “training motivation” agenda whose theme is related to “*ukhuwah*” (Admin, 2011).

From this, it is clear that Rohis’ activism preference, on the one hand, maintains Islamic values and faith that is firmly held as a form of “*Amar ma’ruf nahi munkar*,” but on the other hand, his activism cannot be avoided from the lifestyle of teenagers who are identical with modernity and fun.

According to Bennett, the hybridity of contemporary Islamic youth culture in Indonesia is not the result of an arbitrary and unintentional process. On the other hand, resistance to the hegemony of globalized western culture and the simultaneous desire not to ‘get behind, but to create something of their own, in the end, gave birth to a uniqueness that is different from the others. Nine years of Nilan’s research is increasingly convincing that young Indonesian Muslims who are religiously devout want to be recognized as modern. Middle-class youth have free time, money, and cell phones and are internet savvy. They know much about global youth culture and glimpses of the ‘possibility of life’ that such things offer. They hate Western values but do not see themselves as backward or old-fashioned. They frame their identity not only about the products and trends of global youth culture handed down from the West but also about the influence of global progressive Islam in all Muslim countries. Therefore, it can be said that identity formation is local, but the shaping factors that influence this local process can come from sources in other parts of the world (Nilan, 2006).

The presence of Rohis as a forum for Islamic activism for generations of devout Muslims in schools and madrasas is finding the momentum of freedom and celebrating faith confidently in the school’s public space. A new identity emerged as “Hybrid Islamism” by presenting a “third space” as a form of negotiation between maintaining an identity as a generation of devout Muslims and not leaving modernity.

4. Discussion

Supporting the previous findings, Rifki Rosyad that the Islamic Awakening is a global phenomenon throughout the Muslim world but has a unique form in each place. Unlike the Islamic revival in the Middle East, the Islamic revival in Indonesia has not yet manifested itself in radical political activism and revolutionary actions. There is a tendency towards revolutionary political activism, but its strength is small. The general tendency is to make Islam the basis of ethics, morals, culture, and color and fill established social and cultural structures with Islamic spiritual and moral content (Rosyad, 2006). The birth of Rohis as a phenomenon of Islamic activism in schools that moves Muslim youth in Indonesia is allegedly closely related to the phenomenon of “moral panics” and as a form of resistance to Western pop culture that invades and attacks this country, especially among young Muslims. Therefore, the existence of Rohis is expected to be able to fend off the onslaught by intensifying da’wah among students and even becoming a political movement in schools (Kailani, 2011). Najib said that Rohis, as The school’s da’wah movement, is not only considered a pure form of Islamic symbols but is also alleged to be an agent of the transmission of certain ideologies. This view is reinforced by a study conducted by the Research Team of the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies/*Yayasan Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial* (LKiS) and the Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies/ Pusat Studi Sosial Asia Tenggara (PSSAT) in collaboration with the Center for Religious & Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS) UGM Yogyakarta. Through Rohis mentoring activities. One example is Rajawali High School, a public school in the Yogyakarta area. This high school is allegedly adopting the thoughts and studies of Rohis mentoring from Egyptian Islamist ideologies such as Hasan al-Bana and Sayyid Qutb, as well as several Islamic readings that lead to popular youth Islamic magazines such as *El Fata* and *Annida* (HS et al., 2011).

However, in the development of Rohis, which is thick with the lives of teenagers who are fond of change, the Islamism that developed later no longer had the nuances of “right” Islamism but led to a more fluid and slang Islamism. It cannot be separated from the existence of Muslim youth, who are identified as a network society that is spun in the advancement of information technology. Muslim Rohis youth cannot avoid conditions where society has a reasonably high dependence on technology. Even it has become a part of their lives. The information technology revolution that is quite massive (television, computers, gadgets) has given rise to a new society, culture, and economy. In order to survive in a climate of increasingly fierce global competition, as Castell said (Castells, 2009), the public must have access to and the ability to manage and utilize information and information technology. The generation of Muslim Rohis teenagers who are pretty thick with the world of information technology inevitably has to “negotiate” with modernity and experience a shift from activism that leads to a dogmatic form of Islamism towards Islam that is more flexible and slang, combining obedience and modernity.

5. Conclusion

The identity of piety displayed socially by Rohis is an interesting phenomenon because it is in Indonesian urban communities’ development and economic establishment. However, as a generation of Muslim youth who cannot escape the currents of modernization and globalization, Rohis activists also own and use cell phones, go to malls, and like to listen to Western songs. They also like to listen to lectures via YouTube and Instagram. The topics of the lectures that are loved include Islamic themes, morals, stories of friends, and Muslim lifestyles. That way, between the piety that is raised socially and lifestyle becomes a practical need for Rohis youth to show their self-perception as Muslim and to become a growing middle generation to represent the younger generation, slang, and religion. This intersection gave birth to the phenomenon of mass cultural values in Islam and the emergence of Islamic da’wah in popular media and new styles. It proves that something considered separate and contradictory is finding a way to negotiate and collaborate between pop culture and Islam, pleasure, and piety.

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The author contributed to this work at each stage of research and wrote research reports.

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Data availability statement

The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Declaration of interest statement

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have influenced the work reported in this paper.

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