
AUTHOR QUERIES

Journal id: CMIT_A_457858

Corresponding author: Piero Ignazi

Title: Party organisational change in Italy (1991–2006)

Dear Author

Please address all the numbered queries on this page which are clearly identified on the proof for your convenience.

Thank you for your cooperation

Query number	Query
1	There is no ref for Katz et al. 1992 – do you mean Katz and Mair 1992b? Please check and amend accordingly
2	What is the relevance of the italics used for two of the 2001 figures please
3	Please explain what you mean by the word “statarchisation”
4	Would this always be a man, or might a woman be elected?
5	De Rosa 2007 not found – please add to refs list
6	Please supply brief biographical details on each author for Notes on contributors

Party organisational change in Italy (1991–2006)

Piero Ignazi^{a*}, Luciano Bardi^b and Oreste Massari^c

^aUniversity of Bologna, Italy; ^bUniversity of Pisa, Italy; ^cUniversity of Roma La Sapienza, Italy

(Received 2 December 2008; final version accepted 16 October 2009)

5 This article analyses the organisational change in Italian political parties since
1990 with the aim of finding evidence in favour or against the widespread view
in the literature that organisational resources, and hence power, are becoming
more and more concentrated in the hands of party and/or parliamentary leaders,
and that there is a corresponding decline in the territorial presence of parties.
10 The account made here of the evolution of Italian parties follows quite closely
Katz and Mair's approach by analysing separately their three organisational faces
and observing their characteristics and change over time face by face. Trends
in membership, finances, staff and party statutes confirm to a large extent the
overall research hypothesis.

15 **Keywords:** membership; basic units; party finances; party executives; parliamen-
tary groups; Italian parties

Introduction

This article analyses the organizational change in Italian political parties from the early
1990s until the mid-2000s.¹ Analysis of party organisation has old and noble origins:
20 one thinks of Robert Michels's classic treatise (1911) on German social-democracy in the
early twentieth century. After prolonged slumbers broken only by the masterly study
by Maurice Duverger (1951), the tradition gained new life and a variety of insights from
the works, among others, of Kenneth Janda (1980, 1983), Angelo Panebianco (1982),
Michel Offerlé (1991, 2002), Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda (1994), Kenneth Carty
25 (2004), Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995). Studies of European
parties (Gunther et al. 2002; Luther and Müller-Rommell 2002; Webb et al. 2002;
Mair et al. 2004) agree that we are witnessing a concentration of organisational resources,
and hence power, in the hands of party and/or parliamentary leaders, and a corresponding
decline in the territorial presence of parties. In particular, following Katz and Mair's
30 (1994) typology, the prominence of the *party in public office* is attributed to its party
leaders' sharing of high parliamentary responsibilities while, at the same time, controlling
financial resources coming from the rank and file, as well as from public state financing.
The *party in central office* is also seen as increasingly centralising power in the hands of the
leadership at the expense of the central collective organs' ability to have a role and 'say'
35 in the decision-making process; it also seems to have broadened the moat dividing it from

*Corresponding author. Email: piero.ignazi@unibo.it

the *party on the ground*, and in so doing has centralised and verticalised resources, functions and prerogatives to the detriment of the party rank and file.

Our research on Italian parties attempts to provide an empirical validation of these hypotheses thanks to the wealth of information we have gathered. This account of the organisational evolution of Italian parties will follow quite rigorously Katz and Mair's (1992b, 1994, 1995) approach, disentangling the parties in their three faces and analysing their characteristics and change over time face by face.

With reference to the first face, the *party on the ground*, we analyse the membership and peripheral structure for each party. We trace the size and growth of the membership in time, the statutory role of members and especially their power of nominating leadership and candidates, the mechanisms for paying enrolment fees and transferring these to head offices, their weight in relation to the overall budget, the existence of ancillary organisations (youth sections, usually) and their role. We also follow the development of grass-roots branches, their status within the overall organisational fabric, and any innovations imparted to their profile or functions.

The *party in central office* is analysed from different angles. One angle regards its 'strength', that is the resources of which it avails itself, especially in terms of staff. A second one concerns the *locus* of internal power. This implies an assessment of 'who appoints whom' and 'who controls whom'. This feature sheds light on the existence (or not) of a process concentrating power in the hands of ever-smaller organs (or even in one pair of hands). Should this be so, it would mean an increasing impoverishment of decision-making and of political 'say', and control by representative collective bodies such as central committees or national councils/assemblies. The composition of central bodies, in particular the ratio of ex-officio or co-opted members to elected ones, provides insights into leadership control over decision-making.

The third face, the *party in public office*, shows evident overlapping between MPs and members of parties' central bodies. This process is validated by the number of key positions acquired by MPs in the party hierarchy and by the growing amount of resources that MPs – and other elected bodies at lower levels such as regions, provinces and big cities – monopolistically control.

Italian political parties have undergone a profound transformation in the period under consideration (1991–2006). This transformation has various and different origins (see Bardi and Ignazi 1998; Bardi and Morlino 1994; Ignazi 2002, 2008; Morlino 2006). The magnitude of the change inspired a great number of works with particular emphasis on parties' internal workings and structures. (Ignazi 1992, 1998; Diamanti 1993; Tarchi 1997; Baccetti 1997, 2007; Biorcio 1997; Hopkin and Paolucci 1999; Poli 2001; Bertolino 2004; Mulè 2007). These works analyse in depth organisational transformations of single political parties but, in general, do not offer cross-party views of organisational change in Italy.²

75 The party on the ground

For a long time the mass party and the catch-all party were the reference models of party organization (Mair and van Biezen 2001). In theory at least, the emergence of the *cartel party* (Katz and Mair 1995) brought with it a change of direction. As parties have progressively distanced themselves from society and penetrated the State, there has been

80 less need for rooting in the militant masses. One early empirical study based on postwar
European party membership data produced conflicting evidence and failed to detect
appreciable effects of the new model (Katz, Mair et al. 1992). In absolute terms if not in
relation to the expansion of electorates, the number of card-carrying party members
seemed not to be falling significantly. Though a later analysis found a marked decrease in
85 membership (this time in absolute terms), it did not put this down to the rise of the
cartel-party model, but preferred to connect it to trends towards more individualistic
political and social preferences exhibited by European citizens (Mair and van Biezen
2001: 14).

How does this pattern fit the case of Italy? Of the main European countries Italy
90 has always recorded the highest M/E indexes.³ This leading position strengthened during
the peak of organisational expansion by the two main historical parties, the DC and the
PCI. Via nation-wide ancillary organisations and systematic connections with the unions
and other supporting organisations, their members played an active role of marked
practical, if not necessarily political, utility. In 1980, with some 4,000,000 card-carriers
95 in all, including the PSI and minor parties, the Italian parties were able to attract nearly
10% of the electorate (Bardi and Morlino 1994). The percentage was lower only than
much smaller countries such as Austria, Finland, Norway and Switzerland, but was
distinctly higher than in the big countries: France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

By the end of the 1980s Italy was showing less of a drop in M/E than this latter group
100 of nations and was still above 9% (Mair and van Biezen 2001: 15–16). Even that slight
decrease was entirely due to a rise in the electorate. The total number of Italian
party members actually grew by 80,000 (Bardi and Morlino 1994). This ability to maintain
a solid anchorage in society was attributed to the traditional parties continuing to
maintain broad control of the State and hence needing to legitimise that control by
105 electoral consensus and closer forms of participation such as party membership.
The situation was evidently recognised by the citizenry, who responded positively and
saw advantages in belonging to a party. The process was helped by the fact that, unlike
in the past, party enrolment no longer carried a heavy financial obligation (Bardi and
Morlino 1994).

110 One might have expected this situation to be undermined by the crisis engulfing
Italian parties from the early 1990s onwards. It is true that by the end of the decade the
disappearance of most of the traditional parties had more than halved the absolute
number of card-carriers (to about 2,000,000) and the M/E (not much over 4%). And yet
Italy's M/E was still the highest of all the big countries and the total pool of members was
115 the absolute highest of all European political systems (Mair and van Biezen 2001).

For all the general decline of parties in Europe and the radical restructuring of what
Italy had to offer on that front, the country can claim to have kept a comparatively high
level of party membership. This trait was confirmed and even strengthened in the early
2000s: the overall number of members went up in 2003, the last year for which data are
120 available from all the main Italian parties, reaching roughly 2,400,000, with a rise in the
M/E to around 4.7⁴ (Table 1).

The trend is not uniformly felt across all Italian parties, which follow fairly different
patterns. While the post-DC area and AN increased their enrolments, there were ups and
downs in FI, the Radicals and the Greens, and a drop in membership for the heirs to the
125 PCI and the LN – though the recent trend in this last case shows it is holding its ground.
The DS, RC and PdCI still boast some 700,000 enrolments every year (see Table 2).

Table 1. Membership/electorate ratio 2003.

Total membership (2003)	Total electorate (2003) estimate	M/E (%)
2.376.285	50.200.000	4.73

Source: Based on official Italian Ministry of Interior data.

Yet these figures do show a slow decline in little more than 10 years, amounting to an overall loss of 400,000 members by these three parties as compared with the PDS and RC totals for 1991. The upshot is that the heirs to the PCI have been overtaken by their
130 post-Dc counterparts in overall membership, and the DS, which bears full responsibility for the overall decline since 1991, has lost the largest-membership primacy to AN.

There has been an equally marked drop for all three parties in the number of basic units: these amount to 10,000 in all in 2004–2005, almost 4000 less than the combined level (14,000) reached by the PDS and RC in 1991 (see Table 3). Considering that the three
135 parties all have their main roots in the same geographical areas, we can only conclude that their overall presence in certain parts of the country must have fallen off dramatically.

The other party retaining a clear organisational link with the past is AN. Here the trend is reversed: there has been a steady increase in enrolments from little more than 450,000 in 1995 to nearly 600,000 by 2004, which, as mentioned, makes AN officially the
140 Italian party with the largest membership. Contrary to what has happened to the offshoots of the PCI, the pattern in this case shows a marked increase from the level reached by its predecessor, the MSI, which had slightly over 320,000 members in 1994, the last year of its life. The call for a broadening of the party social and political basis made at the watershed Fiuggi Congress by Secretary General Gianfranco Fini clearly had immediate effect.
145 In fact, there has been marked expansion in the party's grass-roots organisation: by 2500 sections between 1995 and the peak of 13,259 in 2002. AN also displays the most highly developed rank-and-file organisation.

The other parties displaying a growing trend are the offshoots of the DC. With their frequent splits and mergers their membership records have fluctuated considerably.
150 The PPI has regularly maintained from 170,000 to 190,000 members, the number it probably bequeathed to DL when that formation emerged from the merger with other centre parties. DL took off in 2002 with 260,000 members on its roll and by 2006 numbered as many as 430,000, though the figure has been revised more than once and is regarded with suspicion even by some of its own leadership. A similar trend with
155 even greater gains in absolute numbers can be seen with the Catholic centre-right parties. When the UDC formed out of a CCD–CDU merger, it produced a sharp increase over the two original parties, with a surprising explosion between 2002 and 2003 in which it leapt from 171,000 to 456,000. Here again, as with DL, the sudden change prompted suspicions that it might be due to manoeuvring by groups angling to build up their standing within
160 the party by artificially multiplying the membership cards in their control.

Of the parties dating back in some form to the First Republic, we may leave the Greens and the Radicals out of the discussion as they both seem to favour quality over quantity of membership (Vannucci 2007).

That leaves the two parties whose electoral ascent dates from 1992: LN and FI. LN
165 actually has roots in various regional leagues that sprang up during the 1980s, but it only

Modern Italy

Table 2. Membership of Italian parties 1991–2006.

Membership													
Parties	PPI	CDU	DL	UDEUR	UDC	PDS-DS	RC	PdCI	FI	LN	AN	Radicals	Greens
Year													
1991						989,708	112,278			112,400			
1992						769,944	117,511			147,297		5312	
1993						690,414	120,911			167,650		5411	8100
1994	233,377					698,287	113,495			123,031	467,539	11,410	8100
1995	180,000	205,923				682,290	115,984			112,970	486,911	47,407	15,992
1996	172,701	125,000				640,838	130,509		139,546	136,503	479,300	6581	22,903
1997	192,381	125,000				613,412	117,137		161,319	121,777	485,657	4605	16,788
1998	188,897	89,000				656,146	96,125	29,388	190,398	123,352	532,014	5145	20,979
1999	188,303	89,000				555,171	90,422	25,614	312,863	120,897	536,018	6325	20,979
2000		64,000		40,000		598,085	91,993	26,184	271,751	124,310	549,236	7203	15,956
2001			260,000		171,000	534,358	89,124	23,747	222,631	119,753	560,861	8460	19,917
2002			260,000		456,000	549,372	85,770	30,932	249,824	131,423	573,312	6563	31,038
2003						561,193	97,300		190,000		593,951	6404	33,248
2004												5638	39,440
2005			448,567									5647	15,956
2006													

Sources: Official party data for all parties except DL 2006 (Baccetti 2007).

Table 3. Basic units 1991–2006.

Basic units													
Parties	PPI	CDU	DL	UDEUR	UDC	PDS-DS	RC	PdCI	FI	Lega	AN	Radicals	Greens
YEAR													
1991						10,548	3127						
1992						8000 est.							688
1993						7200 est.	2340						
1994						7000 est.			6840				
1995	5630					7600 est.	2355		6500		10,824		
1996						8400	2652		3500		10,490		
1997	5138	5860				8000 est.	2812				10,827		
1998						7300 est.	2805				11,539		
1999						6500 est.	2434				11,720		
2000						5860	2177				11,969		
2001						6000 est.	2234				12,335		
2002						5500 est.	2010				13,259		
2003						5998		1200 est.			13,023		
2004						5216	2200	1500 est.			12,812		
2005						6861		1642					
2006									2300	500 est.			

Sources: Official party data for all parties except Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) (Baccetti 2007).

formed as a single entity in 1991. LN itself has undergone a drop in membership, but the trend looks different from the PCI heirs. LN membership numbers have held firm in the last few years at around 120,000–130,000, the number on which the party seems to have settled after an early peak at nearly 170,000 in 1994. LN's subsequent electoral
170 downscaling was far greater than its membership adjustment, which may thus be seen as more than satisfactory for a party with such regional roots. By contrast, enrolments to FI have swung up and down, with a peak of over 310,000 in 2000 falling via a couple of oscillations to 190,000 by 2005, which is close to the 1990s figure. What is reflected here is not so much the party's electoral fortunes as the management's strategies concerning
175 party organisation and the role of its members – partly but not entirely in response to fluctuating electoral results. With FI it is not so much the quantitative as the qualitative features of the membership that hold interest.

In general, quantitative analysis of party on the ground organisation in Italy suggests that the slight rise observed over the last few years is not due to general factors – such as
180 the prevalence of a specific organisational model in the party system, or the emergence of particular changes in society or political culture – but to individual party strategies and the dynamics these trigger in their supporters.

The clearest evidence that the party on the ground is losing importance, so that party models attentive to its role are on the way out, derives from a qualitative type of analysis.
185 The first important factor is that all parties owe their main source of revenue to public funding. This does not only apply to election years when membership drives are known to swell finances (this goes for the radicals and Greens as well). Clearly, such a factor has tended to diminish the importance of the members still further. Another fairly widespread feature is the virtual disappearance of systematic links between the party and organisations
190 with economic, social or cultural aims. The only ancillary organisations connected with nearly all parties are gender- and age-related groups, which amount to mere divisions of the party membership into sections for women, the young and the elderly. That there is an exception for LN and its close bond with professional, entrepreneurial and union organisations again only proves the rule.

Greater differentiation seems to be found in the nature of the basic units, the
195 independence and intricacy of organisation on the ground, and the effect this may have on candidature and national party policy. The devastation wrought by *Tangentopoli* (the corruption scandals of the early 1990s) inclined many to think it would sweep away not only the parties directly involved in the scandal but even the party form as a central
200 feature of representative democracy in Italy. At the time that prospects could only be surmised, but the fact is that all politicians and parties springing up in the aftermath of 1992 hastened to deny any formal connection between the new and the old political formations except in terms of political or ideological tradition. The new parties featured changes in the basic units of organisation from territorial sections to environmental or
205 theme-based clubs (as with AN and DL) as mechanisms to organise interest groups across the territory. In some cases the formula adopted was even more nebulous and detached from the party, as with the FI clubs and the radical associations. Far from improving relations with society (the official intention of their creators), these ventures nearly always proved to be mere cosmetic operations – one thinks of the RC clubs that were
210 full-blooded territorial sections in disguise – or more often ways of severing the grass-roots organisations from party leaders who were no longer conditioned by visible and costly ground units. Even their basic financial autonomy had a different effect from

the official intention. Thus RC and PdCI delegated fee collection to the clubs and allowed them to keep most of the proceeds. Besides the greater freedom of management and decision-making that this conferred on the clubs, it also marked for them a lesser ability (perhaps less right too) to control the central party apparatus.

The upshot is that even statutory changes apparently designed to increase the influence rank and file may wield over basic party decisions, from candidature to general policy, have often proved completely ineffective. Independent, lightweight and non-hierarchical peripheral structures are proving extremely hard to manage or coordinate. This makes it unlikely that there can be any effective bottom-up control over the leaders, let alone the ability to censure or quash them. At the same time leaders justify themselves for turning a deaf ear to requests struggling to get through from the bottom to the top. This is so among the Greens, a party that theoretically gives its members full powers of control over the central body. To exert this would require all the lower echelons to be involved, which is virtually impossible given the party's federal structure: a complex horizontal and vertical communication and coordination network would have to be set up. Similarly, the absence of any real grass-roots organisation in the Radical party makes the powers of the President, Secretary and Treasurer well-nigh unassailable. In other cases, like FI, LN and UDEUR, power of decision is directly exercised, or strictly delegated, from the top down, applying to all levels or at least those above the provincial (as with the UDC). In the other parties, too, coordination and filter systems make bottom-up action difficult. In AN it is the provincial federation that controls the theme-based clubs, while the regional coordinator is set over the territorial clubs. Even the federal network set up by the DS can be seen as a filter between ground and central office. Although designed for ad hoc forms of participation, so-called topical autonomy (*autonomie tematiche*), at least five regions and a high number of members need to take part for it to be accorded national relevance. Again with the DS, candidate selection may start from the bottom via primary elections; but that is not a hard-and-fast procedure: it is an option to be decided every time an election occurs.

In conclusion, though one should not perhaps talk of a formal separation between parties and society in Italy's case, one may certainly claim that a separation does exist in the bottom-up process joining up those parts of the party that belong to society with those making up the central organisation and the parliamentary/governmental expression of the party. Above all the *party in central office* seems in nearly all Italian parties to have profited from organisational changes enabling it to escape even more from conditioning by the *party on the ground*.

The party in central office

Despite certain adjustments to statutes, apparently designed to delegate functions to the party rank and file (Scarrow 2004), the *party on the ground* is no longer the fulcrum of party organisation. Even more so than in the past, therefore, the centre of gravity of internal power appears to be anchored in the central structures, both in the *party in central office* and in the *party in public office*.

The *party in central office* can be analysed either by measuring its *strength*, or by assessing how *internal power* is distributed. The first point, concerning the party's structural strength, can be quantified by data on financial resources, staff and other assets

such as party headquarters, equipment, etc. It is hard to find accurate and reliable information on all these elements for every party; therefore we concentrate here on party staff and financial resources only.

260 On the second point we seek to identify the *locus* of central power: what is/are the body/ies that take authoritative decisions over policy issues, and control access to the higher echelons of the party hierarchy. Is it a broad collective body or a narrow one, or one leader alone? That is to say, is the power of deciding policy and nominations concentrated in one, few or many hands? And, finally, how much freedom do the
265 decision-makers enjoy?

Strength

Parties whose matrix lies in the pre-1994 party system, such as the PDS-DS, AN and the DC, show a marked reduction in the staff used in central office. Likewise, the new formations, Forza Italia and the RC especially, employ smaller numbers of staff.

270 In 1990, the PCI's last year, there were 451 staff working in the central party office. The following year they were divided between its two offshoots, PDS and RC. Though the PDS took the lion's share, in that only 10 central officials went over to RC, it nonetheless made a significant cut in its staff: 289 in 1991, that is 162 fewer than the year before. This negative trend touched its lowest point with 91 members in 1996. In the years
275 thereafter the ranks swelled again and then settled at between 150 and 200. A similar contraction was recorded in local staff, which went from around 2000 for the PCI down to 400/500 for the PDS-DS in 1994.

Of the post-DC parties, the PPI, which descends directly from the Christian Democrats, kept little more than a hundred officials (118, according to Baccetti 2007)
280 compared with the 463 of the last DC line-up (1993). The figure fell still further in 1995 when the party split, and the CDU was born: the PPI kept around one-third, while two-thirds went with the CDU. Later the PPI increased its strength to 45, evenly divided between the centre and the periphery. When the PPI merged with other formations into the Margherita in 2004, the staff increased to 77 in the new party's central office and 30 in the
285 local branches.

The two 'post-materialist' parties – Greens and Radicals – have always been reluctant to engage permanent staff, to avoid the risk of much-despised bureaucracy; in fact the Greens report a dozen staff. As for the Radicals, the staff employed by the galaxy of organisations gravitating around that party (Vannucci 2007) amounted to 80 people
290 (in 2000), mostly on-and-off helpers (Suttora 2001). Similarly quite limited is the staff employed by the PdCI: around 15 people.⁵ All other parties, regardless of size, currently employ a markedly lower number of personnel, ranging from around 50 in central office (FI, AN and RC) to 150/200 in the local organisation. In relation to their memberships and electorates, FI and AN operate on the smallest amount of staff.

295 In summary, then: the strength of the party in central office in terms of staff sees the PDS-DS clearly in the lead, as was the tradition, employing around 200 people. Then comes the Margherita with around 100. The other parties all report much lower figures: around 50 for FI, AN and RC, while the Greens and the PdCI oscillate around the 10–15 mark; the Radicals' rather high figure is in reality due to volunteer part-time help.

300 These data are consistent with personnel expenses. PDS-DS, Margherita and RC, in this order, spend between 25% and 30% of their revenue on staff. Then comes the Lega with around 15%, Forza Italia with slightly more than 10%, and AN, which is well below 10%.⁶

305 As far as financial resources are concerned, parties get the vast majority of their revenues from state subsidies. The only party which is constantly below the 50% threshold is the *Lega* which, consistent with its emphasis on local territorial anchoring and militant mobilisation, extracts most of the money from private donations and political activities specifically finalised for fundraising. The parties of the left, RC and PDS-DS, come next, although they also collect more money from the state than from other sources: the
310 PDS-DS around 55%, the RC more than 60% with a tendency, in the latter case, to avail of state funds more and more in recent years. All the other parties usually profit even more from state financing.

Power

315 The power of the party in central office can be gauged on two counts: power of political decision (who has a say in deciding party policy); power to nominate or choose (who appoints/chooses whom). The two partially overlap but should be kept distinct for analysis. The former concerns the process through which political decisions are concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, or even in one pair alone, thus impoverishing the *deliberative*, *policy-shaping* and *control* functions of collective bodies like central
320 committees, national councils or national assemblies; the latter entails removing the power of nomination from the other central and sub-national territorial/functional organs (thus preventing or limiting party statarchisation).

In general, a centralising trend in the power of shaping policy is plain to see in nearly all parties. On the other hand, the power of nomination varies considerably: those
325 who hold out against the centralising trend are the post-materialist parties modelled on the *basis-demokratie*, and the heirs to the mass parties – Communists and (in part) the Christian Democrats.

The real watershed runs between parties whose decision-making and central executive bodies are elected by lower levels, and those whose leaders intervene in the appointment
330 process. The new parties like *Forza Italia* and *Lega*, and also *AN*, are those with more marked centralisation, freedom from control by collective bodies and direct intervention by the leader in the decision-making process.

Policy-shaping and decision-making

335 The die-hard parties of the communist tradition (RC and PdCI) faithfully follow the traditional mass party model in the workings of their central organs and relations between these. That entails bottom-up selection, accountability by the leader and executive to the representative and policy-shaping bodies, a very restricted number of ex-officio members and still limited powers of cooption. The only significant departure from this model was introduced by the RC in 2005 when it created an intermediate executive body (*Esecutivo*)
340 between the traditional Executive (*Direzione*) and the Secretariat in order to undermine the role of the *Direzione*. It was a classic case of tension bred by internal factions leading to a political redressing of the leadership in favour of a purely executive body under the

leader's control since the *Direzione* toed the Secretariat's line when it came to appointing the *Esecutivo*.

345 Amid the troubled history of the last 15 years (including organisational difficulties) the PDS-DS has undergone a sequence of changes to the pyramid structure inherited from the PCI when it was transformed into the PDS in 1991. The changes have been numerous and at times short-lived. The aim was to ease the transition, not so much from PCI to PDS, as from PDS to DS, a less ideologically traumatic but organisationally difficult step.
350 Organisation has also felt the effect of the frequent changes of leadership – four in the space of 15 years – when all the other main parties (Forza Italia, AN and Lega) have had none, and RC only one in its very first years. The Secretary's limited scope for centralising policy-shaping and nominations partly depends on the frequent changes of leader and the rules for electing him: up to 2000, election by the National Council, thereafter election by
355 the Congress, directly or indirectly. Despite the upheavals, the party has become highly centralised and remains fairly close to the mass party principles of organisation: *bottom-up, responsive and accountable*.

The parties descending from the Christian-Democrat tradition (PPI, CCD, CDU, UDC and Udeur) bear the original DC stamp on their general set-up. But the continuity
360 with the past in terms of composition and functions of the decision-making bodies somewhat abates when one comes to the executive bodies. With the exception of the PPI, whose Executive has maintained the primacy it had in the DC, in general the party Secretary and its directly controlled bodies (Political Office and/or Political Secretariat) have greater powers than the national Executive. Where a change comes from the other
365 post-DC parties is with the Margherita. Based on secular-liberal ideology as well as Catholic tradition, this formation has abandoned the post-DC pattern of organisation and granted considerable powers of discretion to its leader. Partly owing to its federal set-up, the locus of organisational power does not lie in a collective body but in the leader – called the Federal President – who is directly elected by the party Congress.

370 In evolving out of the MSI, AN made certain organisational changes, though largely in line with how the party had been moving ever since the leadership of Giorgio Almirante (1969–1987). The AN party leader (now called President) has strengthened the already ample powers (especially powers of nomination) enjoyed by the MSI party Secretary; above all he has shaken free of political control by the Executive and Central Committee;
375 in the past these bodies had power to remove the Secretary by withdrawing confidence, while now the AN President is accountable only to the Congress. By his acquisition of 'gate-keeping' powers in nominations for the Executive and the broad-based national Assembly, the President has made any real control over him by collective bodies a highly remote possibility.

380 The two newest parties in the Italian system – the Lega and Forza Italia – are similar in the powers of policy-shaping (and nomination), despite hailing from opposite models: the Lega stems from a classic mass party, Forza Italia from an electoral-professional model. The Lega presents itself as an exacerbated case of centralisation. Alone of Italian parties, it lacks any deliberative body elected by the Federal Congress. Second, the
385 25/30-strong Federal Council, which can be likened to a rather undersize executive, is non-elective, that is exclusively composed of ex-officio members. The Federal Secretary, flanked by a tiny Secretariat (6–12 members), thus enjoys the broadest of powers and is subject only to the Federal Congress.

In Forza Italia, too, the power of the party leader (called President) dominates. The leader, Silvio Berlusconi, was instrumental in the peculiar names of the party's birth: it was created by his own initiative, and on the basis of his personal resources (money, media, networking). After an initial phase of fluid unstructured organisation, the 1997 statute brought Forza Italia into line with more traditional models of party organisation. In fact, the organisational chart displays a number of national bodies higher than in many a party. For instance, only Forza Italia has a national coordination body and a regional coordinators' conference. But none of these bodies has any say in decisions taken by the President, who charismatically leads the party, without any internal rule of accountability (Paolucci 2007).

The post-materialist parties of the libertarian left still partly reflect their original *basis-demokratie* principles of political organisation: bottom-up control, direct democracy, limited bureaucratisation and a responsive, accountable leadership. In fact, the Greens' organisation has been experiencing a transition from a weak political structure supporting and serving the sovereign Federation and local branches (Vannucci 2007) to a more traditional model with all the difficulties concerning institutionalisation. Centralisation of power through a broad mandate in the party leader's name, and overlapping between institutional and party appointments are 'tempered by widespread persisting powers of proxy from the grass roots' (Vannucci 2007). The situation is accentuated by lack of powers of nomination in both the centre and the periphery. The Radicals are far from a new party yet have always practised *basis-demokratie*. Thanks to their limited membership (in which they resemble the Greens), the Radicals have adopted direct bottom-up nomination procedures for collective and individual national appointments. Though outside collective control, the Secretary cannot condition nomination, having no significant powers in that area, except as concerns the so-called Executive, which actually functions as a Secretariat.

415 *Power of nomination*

One key attribute of leadership is the ability to influence the decision as to which non-elected members – co-opted or ex-officio – have access to central bodies. Both these kinds of members usually owe their position to backing by the party leader (with the exception of highly factionalised parties where the members' careers are owed to their ties with faction-leaders). Hence a high ratio of ex-officio members to elected members serves to give the leader greater control over decisions the collective bodies may take.

In Forza Italia centralising power in the President's hands is formally framed in his almost monarchical power of nomination over collective bodies. In the National Council only 20% of the members are elected by the Congress, whereas the President has free rein to appoint more than half the number, and the remainder are ex-officio members. The Presidency Committee – which lies halfway between the Executive and the Secretariat of more traditional parties – is very largely (84%) composed of ex-officio members or direct presidential co-optees. The National Coordination which links the centre to peripheral units is entirely nominated by the President in agreement with the Presidency Committee. Lastly, the Congress is almost half composed of either ex-officio members or presidential nominees. As a consequence there are very few appointees by the Congress: only 50 out of 400 for the National Council, and six out of 38 (from 1998 onwards) for the Presidency Committee.

In AN the President ‘proposes’ members of the Executive for ratification by the representative body, the extremely broad-based National Assembly (more than 500 members). A large percentage of the National Assembly are ex-officio members, in addition to whom the President may co-opt up to 150.

In the Lega Nord’s Federal Council – which could be likened to a fairly small Executive of 25/30 people – there are no elected members, one and all being ex-officio members.

In the post-DC parties there has been a growing tendency to increase the number of ex-officio members (especially in the Udeur), a clear break with Christian Democrat tradition. In the PPI National Council the number of co-optees rose progressively with a marked shift in the balance with elected members, arriving at 120 co-optees out of 162 (74%). In the Executive we can observe an even higher proportion of such members (79%): 30 ex-officio members and five co-opted, with the remaining 12 elected by the National Council. The CDU follows the mother party (PPI) in its elected/ex officio ratio, both in the National Council and in the Executive. In the former body it is elected members who predominate, in the latter it is nominees, plus a further 20% co-opted by the Secretary. The Udeur and UDC broadly follow the same pattern. In the Margherita the whole basis changes: elected members are more numerous in executive bodies than on political boards. Only 25% of Federal Assembly members are elected by the Congress, while half the Executive are elected by the Federal Assembly. The leader has considerable powers of nomination: in designating the members of the Executive she/he actually conditions the Federal Executive as well. However, the leader’s powers are limited in that co-opted members do not have the right to vote.

In the PDS-DS there are very few ex-officio members in central bodies. The National Council has about 10% and the Executive a maximum of one-third of its strength. There are extremely few co-optees. That means the leader’s discretion is fairly contained. The same pattern is found in the two radical offspring of the communist tradition, RC and PdCI. Both the reformist and the radical lineage of the old PCI have maintained its formal homage to a bottom-up chain of election. But whereas in the past this mechanism, potentially favourable to open contestation of the leadership, was kept at bay by the practice and ideology of democratic centralism, these days this internal liberalisation has favoured the growth of factionalism. The post-materialist Greens and Radicals fully conform to their original organisational principles.

In summary, contrary to other European countries, in Italy the party central office’s *strength* has shrunk in the last two decades. All parties have reduced their staff or kept it to a minimum. Forza Italia, in particular, displays an impressive imbalance between its very basic staff and its large membership, and even larger electorate.

Moreover, as for the internal distribution of *power*, the data shows a division into broadly top-down parties (Forza Italia and An) with vertical power to the fore, and bottom-up parties (Greens, Radicals, PDS-DS, RC, PdCI and post-DC) which limits the widespread tendency to grant greater freedom of action to the leader and have an uninterrupted decision-making process from bottom to top, free of intervention by the leader. The Lega and Margherita stand about midway in terms of the leader’s freedom of decision (in both cases) and the absence of elected members (in the Lega’s). Thus, by co-option the leader exerts a direct influence over the composition of collective national bodies. Again, the presence of ex-officio members restricts the number of members elected by lower levels and limits their influence, leading to centralisation of the decision-making

process. In this way the leaders centralise not only the power of shaping policy but that of nomination. Both decision and selection end up in their hands.

The party in public office

As mentioned earlier, analyses of the changes in party organisation concur on the growth
485 in importance and political weight of the *party in public office*, paralleling the decline of the
party on the ground. Also the *party in public office* has acquired more and more power
because it now represents both the main route of access to institutional roles, and the place
where various kinds of resources are controlled. Such resources are available not only at
490 the national parliament and government levels, but also at European and sub-national
levels of representation and government. Moreover the *party in public office* is responsible
for all direct political appointments to public roles (on various public bodies) including
'staff' and consultancy expertise. Taking the *party in public office* in its broad sense, one
sees the face of the party that has developed most and counts for most.

Some decades ago Maurice Duverger maintained it was possible to distinguish three
495 phases in relations between the extra-parliamentary organisation and the party as returned
by the electors: 'the superiority of parliamentarians over the party, relative equilibrium
between parliamentarians and leaders in the party, and lastly superiority of the party over
the parliamentarians'. He concluded that 'the three phases each correspond to a certain
kind of party' (Duverger 1961: 227). Duverger's third phase corresponds to the mass party,
500 the very form which has now succumbed to the return of the original model, that is, the
superiority of parliamentarians over the party.

At least until 1993 Italy's three main parties were organised according to the mass
party model. For all their more or less binding procedural differences, the DC, PCI and
PSI gave priority to the party leadership rather than to the parliamentary leadership. But
505 with the de-structuring of the traditional party system between 1989 and 1993 the whole
picture was altered, though not in any clear consistent pattern. But how exactly did this
also alter the relationship to the *party in public office*? Are the MPs the real party leaders?
What powers have they gained compared with the past?

The picture we are presented with from 1993 onwards is actually a mixed and
510 contradictory one, even though the ascendancy of the *party in public office* over the
other two party faces is clear for all to see. To assess that ascendancy, one can look at:
(1) the presence of parliamentarians (the only elected figure we consider here) in the
various decision-making bodies and in the executives of the *party in central office*; (2) the
resources the *party in public office* enjoys, in terms of finance and staff.

515 In general, but with some significant differences, there has been a progressive
penetration by the parliamentary party into the *party in central office*. At the same time the
parliamentary party has increased its relative share of party resources.

The trend towards the parliamentarisation of executive bodies was most visible in
Alleanza Nazionale. In its relations between central and parliamentary offices, one notes a
520 close integration between party and parliamentary elite. The latter comprises more than
one-third of the national leadership.

A similar tendency was visible among parties whose ideological background ought to
make them exempt, like *Rifondazione Comunista* and *Comunisti italiani*. For example,
although the statute of *Rifondazione* makes party executive offices incompatible with

525 institutional appointments, the percentage of parliamentarians in the National Secretariat was extremely high, between 1992 and 1999 (reaching 87.5% at one point), before settling at 33.3% in 2006. In the case of the PdCI, in 2006 10 out of the 12 Secretariat members were MPs.

530 In post-Christian Democratic parties there is considerable overlap between parliamentary parties and executive organs, albeit to different degrees, as defined by the various statutes. This pattern is particularly significant in terms of the relationship between party in public office and party in central office because many of the MPs who sat in the executives bodies were also members of government.

535 In the case of the PDS/DS, besides a considerable degree of overlap between parliamentary party and executive bodies (MPs accounted for 53% of the Secretariat, 65% of the Presidency Secretariat, and 39% of the National executive in 2001–2006), there was a visible shift in functions. Most notably, the parliamentary party replaced the central office's departments and work groups in elaborating legislative proposals. This transfer of functions and powers reflects the whittling down of the traditional internal mass party
540 power bases. With time the parliamentary groups acquired authority, competence, political and legislative ability, skills that are often put to use in a direct relationship with local party organisation. In this the DS evolved into an MP-run party, despite the size of the membership. Part of this trend was probably due to the party's long quest for governmental and institutional positions after decades spent in opposition.

545 In the case of *Forza Italia*, in all party bodies, from the Conference to the National Council and Presidency Committee, either all (in the National Conference and National Council) or the overwhelming majority of parliamentarians are ex-officio members. In the Presidential Committee they amount to two-thirds of the total (40 MPs out of 58 in 2001). If one considers other elective offices, like local appointments, elected representatives
550 form almost the totality. But that does not imply supremacy by the parliamentary leadership over *the party on the ground* and *party in central office*, since *Forza Italia* is a charismatic party. The result is that 'the centre of gravity and power lies not in the parliamentary group but in the founder-leader and his close entourage of *fedelissimi*' (Paolucci 2007: 126).

555 A similar situation is to be found in another charismatic party, the *Lega Nord*. Here again, MP overlap in executive bodies is extensive. In 2006 the number of national MPs in the National Secretariat was 30%. But all major political decisions, from choosing allies to drawing up the policy agenda, have been Umberto Bossi's personal domain.

560 Charismatic characteristics thus appear to limit the parliamentarisation of *Forza Italia* and *Lega Nord*. The same limitation, but for different reasons, goes for the libertarian left, the Greens and the Radicals. In this last case the causes are the low number of MPs (they were out of the national parliament from 1996 to 2006) or their limited institutionalisation. On the contrary, low parliamentarisation levels have not prevented the Greens from forming a select parliamentary and even governing political elite
565 (in 1996 one minister and four under-secretaries; in 2006, one minister and two under-secretaries).

In gauging the weight of the parliamentary-elective component one should not overlook the question of resources. Although the data are not complete or uniform for all parties, the staff of the parliamentary groups form an important index of their weight.
570 For AN, the parliamentary staff is far bigger than the central staff (130 versus 49 members in 2003). In the DS, occasionally, the number of parliamentary staff exceeds that of the

central staff (from 1993 to 1999 that is the case; from 2000 onwards, the latter slightly exceed the former) (De Rosa 2007: 80). But where the resources of the *party in public office* are clearly seen is in public funding. Here, although they flow towards the central party and are handled there, it is clear that funding goes to the party's public functions (from 2001 in the form of electoral refunds) and is hence attributable to the *party in public office*. The public funding quota is an extremely large part of total revenue for all parties, reaching sometimes 90%. Among the parties that, properly speaking, were less dependent on public funding, the DS stood out with around 36% in 2002 and 2003.⁷ This may be a sign that members' fees and other voluntary contributions were still important. But one should also note that under the item 'non-public funding' in the parties' budget goes the contribution paid into party coffers by individual MPs and other elected officers, which is an indirect way of transferring public money from the *party in public office* to the central and peripheral party. Thus if we observe the item 'contributions from MPs' for parties where they can be separately noted, we find that for parties like RC and PdCI, for instance, which have always stressed the need for 'self-funding' as the basis of their political autonomy, the contribution from MPs is constantly higher than membership fees. In the first years of RC's life it was even higher than state subsidies. Such parties apply the iron rule (and relative control) of large contributions from MPs, as a way of limiting their autonomy and also to hammer home the principle of centralised organisation. These are parties where the elected owe first their candidacy and then their election exclusively to the party. From this standpoint the *party in public office* is important for funding the party but this, as we have seen, does not translate into institutional supremacy.

Though itemised data are lacking, one can conjecture that in *Forza Italia* the contribution from MPs is not so high. This may be due to the fact that candidates are required to give a certain amount of money in order to be included in the party slate. All the other parties lie somewhere between those two extremes, with the DS (whose MPs are expected to give over 40% of their salary), AN and LN lying closer to the post-communist party pole, as parties that have kept some tradition of mass party and central organisation.

Another component of the resources of the parliamentary party is direct funding to parliamentary groups, owing to which they enjoy a relative economic and hence political independence. The availability of such sums enables groups to cover certain economic burdens of the central party, like hiring staff. Even a fairly small party with relatively few MPs, like the UDC for example, received about 100,000 euros a year in the 14th legislature for its groups in the *Camera* and *Senato* – whereas a larger party such as the *Margherita* received some 200,000.

Broadly speaking, the *party in public office* may thus be said to be growing in Italy too, justifying the description of parties as MP-centred organisations. There is above all an increase in the number of parliamentarians (as indeed of all those in elected office) throughout the top echelons of party bodies. Given the increasing relevance of the parliamentary party, election to representative positions is the final point of arrival for any internal party career. From a financial angle, moreover, it is now the *party in public office* (under various guises) that funds or shoulders most of the expenditure of the central party.

The two factors analysed here – parliamentarisation of executive bodies and increasing financial resources for parliamentary groups – show the increasing importance of the *party in public office*. At the same time the prominence of the *party in public office* is constrained by certain organisational features such as the charismatic nature of the party and the

viscosity of the traditional organisational imprint of the mass party; the latter is especially true for those parties which renewed themselves in the 1990s.

Conclusions

Our analysis of the Italian case is consistent with the trends revealed by the literature as briefly outlined in the introduction. In the last 15 years a decline of the *party on the ground* has been matched by a parallel increase in the relevance of the *party in public office* and, to a lesser extent, of the *party in central office*. These tendencies emerge from the evolution of all three faces.

In the *party on the ground* there is an overall decline in the size of membership. In a first phase there was a clear downturn, almost entirely due to the crisis of the old parties which had already begun in the late 1980s. This phase ended with the 1994 collapse of the old Italian party system. A second phase started with the reorganisation of old parties and the birth of new ones; this produced a series of ups and downs in individual parties' strength and no clear effect on total party membership. For example, Forza Italia membership's fluctuations, mostly due to alternating and contrasting strategic decisions by the leadership, are indicative of the instability of this pattern. In terms of the role and prerogatives of members, new parties such as Forza Italia and the Lega do not offer significant incentives (except for some symbolic incentives for the Lega's supporters), in, for example, greater leadership selection and policy-making powers. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the post-material and the new radical left parties, at least on a formal level, allow their members a more active and participatory role. In between these extremes, the more traditional parties (post-DC, post-MSI and post-PCI) have maintained the limited prerogatives which have always been provided for their members. All in all, although the recent creation of new parties and the transformation of old ones do not properly allow us to talk about a decline, it is reasonable to affirm that currently the role of the party on the ground is not very prominent.

The *party in central office* has undergone a dramatic reduction of staff. The sheer numbers show, even for large parties, a minimal number of people employed: these data suggest the hypothesis of an extensive resort to short-term professional experts. The numerical decline may not necessarily imply an organisational decline, rather a transformation along more flexible and professional lines, similarly to what was observed by Fisher and Webb (2003) in the case of the Labour party. Another general tendency common to every party concerns the centralisation of the decision- and policy-making powers in the hands of parties' executive committees and leaders. This general tendency presents different nuances going from a high level of concentration in Forza Italia, Lega and AN, to progressively less extreme manifestations for PPI, PDS-DS, new radical left, Greens and the Radicals, in that order. This concentration has been favoured by the extensive resort to co-optees and ex-officio members in the collective bodies by the leadership.

Our analysis of the *party in public office* has shown a tendency towards extensive parliamentarisation; such a trend is clearly evidenced by the growing numbers of MPs in the executive bodies, as well as by the parliamentary groups' access to state financing and staff. In some parties the parliamentarisation does not imply full power by the parliamentary elite in the decision-making process. In Forza Italia and Lega Nord, for

example, the MPs' prominence over the parties' bodies is constrained by the charismatic traits of their leaderships. In the post-DC, post-MSI and post-PCI parties, instead, the centrality of the parliamentary elite is limited by the resilience of rules and traditions of the old organisational, mass-party model. In conclusion, the *party in public office* augments its resources and gains more power vis-à-vis the *party on the ground* and, to a certain extent, the *party in central office*, but its role is constrained by the individual parties' internal organisational characteristics.

In conclusion, the general trend in the organisational evolution of political parties is largely confirmed by our analysis of the Italian case since 1991. The dominant quota of state financing in spite of members' revenues, the centralisation of powers in the hand of the executives and leaderships, the parliamentarisation and increase of staff and resources in the hands of the parliamentary groups, and the persisting irrelevance of the membership role are all common features of contemporary Italian parties. However, some specificities stand out such as: Forza Italia's disdain for party membership and impressive concentration of power in the hands of the leadership; and the new radical left (RC and PdCI) and the post-materialist (Greens and Radicals) parties' display of a more limited importance of the *party in public office* as opposed to a relatively greater relevance of the rank-and-file.

Notes

1. The data presented here were collected by the research group coordinated by Luciano Bardi (University of Pisa), Piero Ignazi (University of Bologna) and Oreste Massari (University of Rome1), and consisting of Enrico Calossi, Lorella Cedroni, Roberto De Rosa, Mara Morini, Caterina Paolucci, Eugenio Pizzimenti, Roberto Scalise and Alberto Vannucci. We wish also to thank Simona Iacopetti for her collaboration.
2. More extensive, party by party analysis can be found in the volume: Bardi, L. P. Ignazi, and O. Massari, eds. 2007. *I partiti italiani. Iscritti, dirigenti, eletti*, Milan: Università Bocconi Editore.
3. M/E (membership/electorate) is the ratio between the total number of party members and the number of electors. It is used in the literature as an index of overall party penetration of society.
4. The exact enrolment figure is 2,376,285. Rounding up is justified if one takes account of members enrolled in the post-socialist galaxy parties, from whom no data are to be had, and those in the Unione democratici per l'Europa (UDEUR) where the last available datum refers to 2000. The M/E was calculated from the numbers on the electoral roll as of 31 December 2003.
5. No official figure is available for the Lega Nord.
6. PdCI, Greens and Radicals are not included in this analysis of financial resources.
7. From the financial point of view 1999 sees the presentation of the last budget from the PDS. Afterwards the convening of the States General of the left, held in Florence in February 1998, starts the process that will lead the PDS towards a new name and, as a result, a new corporate identity. In 1999, the PDS does not offer any records concerning enlisted members presenting, as a result, a value equal to zero in the income statement for that peculiar heading. At the same time the newborn DS starts its own enrolment campaign that will record 656,146 subscribers (with a slight increase over the previous year).

705

6 Notes on contributor



References

- Baccetti, Carlo. 1997. *Il PDS*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Baccetti, Carlo. 2007. *I postdemocristiani*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- 710 Bardi, Luciano and Piero Ignazi. 1998. 'the Italian party system: The effective magnitude of an earthquake'. In *The organization of political parties in southern Europe*, ed. Piero Ignazi and Ysmal Colette, Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Bardi, Luciano and Leonardo Morlino. 1994. 'Italy: Tracing the roots of the great transformation'. In *How parties organize: Adaptation and change in party organizations in western democracies*, ed. Richard Katz and Peter Mair, London: Sage Publications.
- 715 Bertolino, Simone 2004. *Rifondazione Comunista. Storia e organizzazione*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Biorcio, Roberto 1997. *La Padania promessa. La storia, le idee e la logica d'azione della Lega Nord*. Milano: Il Saggiatore.
- Carty, Kenneth 2004. 'Parties as franchise systems: The stratarchical organizational imperative'. *Party Politics* 1: 5–24.
- 720 Diamanti, Ilvo 1993. *La Lega. Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo soggetto politico*. Roma: Donzelli.
- Duverger, Maurice 1951/1961. *Les partis politiques*. Paris: Seuil.
- Fisher, Justin and Paul Webb. 2003. 'Party work as political participation: The vocational motivations of Labour Party employees'. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 5: 166–87.
- 725 Gunther, Richard, Juan Linz, and José Ramón Montero, eds. 2002. *Political parties: Old concepts and new challenges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harmel, Robert and Kenneth Janda. 1994. 'An integrated theory of party goals and party change'. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6: 259–88.
- 730 Hopkin, Jonathan and Caterina Paolucci. 1999. 'The business firm model of party organization: Cases from Spain and Italy'. *European Journal of Political Research* 3: 307–39.
- Ignazi, Piero 1992. *Dal PCI al PDS*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Ignazi, Piero 1998. *Il polo escluso. Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- 735 Ignazi, Piero 2002. *Il potere dei partiti*. Rome and Bari: Laterza.
- Ignazi, Piero 2008. *Partiti politici in Italia*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Janda, Kenneth 1980. *Political parties: A cross-national survey*. New York: Free Press.
- Janda, Kenneth 1983. 'Cross-national measures of party organizations and organizational theory'. *European Journal of Political Research* 11: 319–32.
- 740 Katz, Richard and Peter Mair. 1992a. 'The membership of political parties in European democracies, 1960–1990'. *European Journal of Political Research* 3: 329–45.
- Katz, Richard, and Peter Mair, eds. 1992b. *Party organization 1960–1990: A data handbook*. London: Sage.
- Katz, Richard, and Peter Mair, eds. 1994. *How parties organize: Adaptation and change in party organizations in western democracies*. London: Sage Publications.
- 745 Katz, Richard and Peter Mair. 1995. 'Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of party cartel'. *Party Politics* 1: 5–28.
- Luther, Kurt Richard, and Ferdinand Müller Rommell, eds. 2002. *Political parties in the new Europe: Political and analytical challenges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 750 Mair, Peter and Ingrid van Biezen. 2001. 'Party membership in twenty European democracies, 1980–2000'. *Party Politics* 7: 5–21.
- Mair, Peter, Wolfgang Müller, and Fritz Plasser, eds. 2004. *Political parties and electoral change: Party responses to electoral markets*. London: Sage Publications.
- Morlino, Leonardo 2006. 'Le tre fasi dei partiti italiani'. In *Partiti e caso italiano*, ed. Leonardo Morlino and Marco Tarchi, Bologna: Il Mulino.
- 755

- Michels, Robert 1911. *Zur Soziologie des parteienwesens in der moderner Demokratie*. Leipzig: Klinkhardt.
- Mulè, Rosa 2007. *Dentro i DS*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Offerlé, Michel 1991. *Les partis politiques*. Paris: PUF.
- 760 Offerlé, Michel 2002. *Les partis politiques*. 2nd ed. rev. Paris: PUF.
- Panebianco, Angelo 1982. *Modelli di partito*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Paolucci, Caterina 2007. 'Forza Italia'. In *I partiti italiani. Iscritti, dirigenti, eletti*, ed. Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi and Oreste Massari, Milan: Università Bocconi Editore.
- Pizzimenti, Eugenio 2007. 'La galassia postdemocristiana'. In *I partiti italiani. Iscritti, dirigenti, eletti*, ed. Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi and Oreste Massari, Milan: Università Bocconi Editore.
- 765 Poli, Emanuela 2001. *Forza Italia. Strutture, leadership e radicamento territoriale*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Scarrow, Susan 2004. 'Explaining political finance reforms: Competition and context'. *Party Politics* 10: 653–75.
- 770 Suttora, Mauro 2001. *Pannella and Bonino Spa*. Milano: Kaos.
- Tarchi, Marco 1997. *Dal MSI ad AN*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Vannucci, Alberto 2007. 'Federazioni di Verdi e Partito Radicale'. In *I partiti italiani. Iscritti, dirigenti, eletti*, ed. Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi and Oreste Massari, Milan: Università Bocconi Editore.
- 775 Webb, Paul, David Farrell, and Ian Holliday, eds. 2002. *Political parties in advanced industrial democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Appendix 1. Italian political parties acronyms: abbreviations

	AN	Alleanza nazionale – National Alliance
780	CDU	Cristiano democratici uniti – United Christian Democrats
	CCD	Centro cristiano democratico – Christian Democratic Centre
	Dc	Democrazia cristiana – Christian Democracy
	DL	La Margherita – Daisy
	DS	Democratici di sinistra – Left Democrats
785	FI	Forza Italia – Go Italy!
	LN	Lega nord – Northern League
	MSI	Movimento sociale italiano – Italian Social Movement
	PCI	Partito comunista italiano – Italian Communist Party
	PD	Partito democratico – Democratic Party
790	PdCI	Partito dei comunisti italiani – Party of the Italian Communists
	PDS	Partito democratico della sinistra – Democratic Party of the Left
	Pdium	Partito democratico di unità monarchica – Party of Monarchical Unity
	PLI	Partito liberale italiano – Italian Liberal Party
	PPI	Partito popolare italiano – Italian Popular Party
795	PR	Partito Radicale – Radical party
	PRI	Partito repubblicano italiano – Italian Republican Party
	PSDI	Partito socialista democratico italiano – Italian Social-Democratic Party
	PSI	Partito socialista italiano – Italian Socialist Party
	RC	Rifondazione comunista – Communist Refoundation
800	UDC	Uninone democratica cristiana – Christian Democratic Union
	UDEUR	Unione democratici per l'Europa – Union of Democrats for Europe
	Verdi	Verdi – Greens