

ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE
DOMINICAN CRISIS OF 1965: COHESION OR DISSENSION
AMONG THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
AND THE SECONDARY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
ON SELECTED ISSUES

by

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A THESIS

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A Thesis

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by

Norman L. Greenberg

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ABSTRACT

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Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze the hypothesis advanced by numerous political scientists that the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secondary State Department officials usually agree on the basic fundamental foreign policy questions. There has been an analysis of the positions taken by the three actors over a period of time to ascertain whether or not they changed their positions on fundamental issues during the Dominican Crisis of 1965. Another purpose is to determine whether or not United States foreign policy in the crisis was a typical or an atypical exercise in United States foreign policy.

Methods

The method of investigation in this thesis is content analysis. It is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the content of communications. United States government documents were analyzed to quantify a possible cohesion or dissension in the diplomatic orientations among the three actors on certain questions: (1) United States perception of the nature of the Dominican revolution; (2) Attitude of the United States government toward the Dominican government forces and guerrilla forces.

Findings

1. President Johnson apparently viewed unfavorably the Dominican crisis as a communist revolution and was consistent in his viewpoint over the long run.

2. Apparently, President Johnson was balanced in his viewpoint toward the guerrilla and government forces in the Dominican crisis and his viewpoint was consistent over a long period of time.

3. The Secretary of State apparently viewed unfavorably the Dominican revolution as communistic and was consistent in his viewpoint over a long period of time.

4. The Secretary of State's viewpoint was apparently balanced toward the Dominican guerrilla and government forces and was consistent over the long run.

5. The secondary State Department officials apparently viewed unfavorably the Dominican revolution as communistic and were consistent in their viewpoint over a long period of time.

6. The secondary State Department officials were balanced in their viewpoint toward the Dominican guerrilla and government forces and were consistent in their viewpoint over a long period of time.

Approved:

Clifford Landers
Supervising Professor

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

This thesis is an analysis of United States foreign policy during American intervention in the Dominican crisis of 1965.¹ United States Government documents were utilized for research material; moreover, this study is an analysis of the hypothesis advanced by numerous political scientists that the President, the Secretary of State, and the secondary State Department officials usually have homogeneous attitudes or viewpoints on the basic foreign policy questions.² The United States

¹While generically speaking the noun America refers to the Western Hemisphere, for the purpose of this thesis it will be used as a synonym for the United States.

²The following students of international relations contend that the President, the Secretary of State, and the secondary State Department officials usually are in basic accord on the fundamental foreign policy issues:

Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, An Analysis of Decision-Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 22; Kurt London, The Making of Foreign Policy, East and West (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965), pp. 144-149; Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 102; Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), pp. 5-7; Don D. Price (ed.), The Secretary of State (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960), pp. 45-46; Philip W. Buck and Martin B. Travis, Control of Foreign Relations in Modern Nations (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 92-100.

The formation of United States foreign policy takes place in a pluralistic environment. Numerous pressure groups, sometimes operating

involvement in the crisis was utilized as the basis for a case study to analyze this hypothesis. The positions taken by the three actors on four basic questions relating to the United States military intervention in the Dominican Republic were utilized as the basis to test the enunciated hypothesis; moreover, an analysis was made on the positions taken by the three participants over a period of time to ascertain whether or not their positions changed on the fundamental foreign policy issues.

in conjunction and sometimes in opposition to one another, represent various views on almost any critical foreign policy question. The top echelon of policy makers within the administration should present the various alternative strategies to the President in a lucid and cogent manner. Apparently, there are probably considerable disagreements and debates (polemics) among the policy makers on the important issues as to the virtues and the liabilities of the alternative strategies discussed (e.g., hawkish and dovish polemics over United States military incursion into Cambodia). After the policy has been formulated, the policy makers usually toe the line, at least publicly, on the basic policy decisions.

If there is dissension among the three actors on a basic foreign policy question, the formulation and execution of United States foreign policy may possibly be confronted with several problems. There may be a short-circuit in the flow of communications among the three participants.

Apparently, there may be inefficiency within the foreign policy sector if there is disagreement among the hierarchy of foreign policy makers. The President apparently has more difficulty in the formulation and execution of foreign policy if one or more of his top advisers (i.e., the Secretary of State or secondary State Department officials) attempt, overtly or covertly, to thwart or impede foreign policy objectives. This may result in one or more of the following: half-hearted execution of policy, cognizant misinterpretation or maladministration of policy, intransigence or unresponsiveness to policy directives, and possibly personality conflict. These are just a few of the numerous problems that might beset United States foreign policy makers if basic discord exists among them on basic policy.

Content analysis, the systematic quantitative description of the meaning of communications, is the methodology utilized to collect the data so that the hypothesis can be tested.

Another purpose of this thesis is to determine whether or not United States foreign policy in the Dominican crisis was a typical or an atypical exercise in United States foreign policy. This paper has analyzed the procedure by which United States foreign policy was formulated. The state of model building in international relations was discussed and eventually one of the widely used models was adopted to evaluate the results of this study.

Scope

In researching this topic, United States government documents have been analyzed. Since the Dominican civil disturbance lasted from April 25, 1965 through August 31, 1965, the investigation of governmental documents has been limited to this period of time.

The method of investigation is content analysis. A later chapter on methodology has been devoted to the explanation of this topic; moreover, a detailed description of the directional categories of favorable, neutral, unfavorable, and balanced was presented in the same chapter.

In line with the purpose of this thesis, the following criteria were individually tested.

I. What was the United States perception of the nature of the revolution? This criterion was predicated on the basis of a communist or non-communist revolution. By a communist revolution, the author meant that communist elements, domestic or foreign, played a substantial role in either planning, execution, or implementation of the civil disturbance (revolution). On the other hand, a non-communist revolution was meant to be one in which the communists had an inconsequential influence, if any, in the revolution.

1. Did President Johnson perceive the revolution as a communist revolution?

- a. favorable
- b. neutral
- c. unfavorable
- d. balanced

2. Did President Johnson perceive the revolution as a non-communist revolution?

- a. favorable
- b. neutral
- c. unfavorable
- d. balanced

3. Did the Secretary of State perceive the revolution as a communist revolution?

- a. favorable
- b. neutral
- c. unfavorable
- d. balanced

4. Did the Secretary of State perceive the revolution as a non-communist revolution?

- a. favorable
- b. neutral
- c. unfavorable
- d. balanced

5. Did the secondary State Department officials perceive the revolution as a communist revolution?

- a. favorable
- b. neutral
- c. unfavorable
- d. balanced

6. Did the secondary State Department officials perceive the revolution as a non-communist revolution?

- a. favorable
- b. neutral
- c. unfavorable
- d. balanced

II. What was the attitude of the United States government toward the Dominican government forces and the guerrilla forces?

1. What was the attitude of President Johnson toward the Dominican government forces?

- a. favorable
- b. neutral
- c. unfavorable
- d. balanced

2. What was the attitude of President Johnson toward the guerrilla forces?

- a. favorable
- b. neutral
- c. unfavorable
- d. balanced

3. What was the attitude of the Secretary of State toward the Dominican government forces?
- favorable
 - neutral
 - unfavorable
 - balanced
4. What was the attitude of the Secretary of State toward the guerrilla forces?
- favorable
 - neutral
 - unfavorable
 - balanced
5. What was the attitude of secondary State Department officials toward the Dominican government forces?
- favorable
 - neutral
 - unfavorable
 - balanced
6. What was the attitude of secondary State Department officials toward the guerrilla forces?
- favorable
 - neutral
 - unfavorable
 - balanced

CHAPTER II

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES

AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Dominican Republic has never developed a history of stability and constitutional government. In the first 122 years of its existence, it had twenty-seven constitutions. Although thirty-two national elections were held as of 1965, during this period, only four elections were considered free and honest. The country has never experienced an extended period of democracy; on the contrary, its political evolution has been characterized by numerous coups, dictatorships, and periods of anarchy and chaos.¹

The initial significant historical event of relevance to this study was the Monroe Doctrine. As originally stated by President James Monroe in 1823:

... The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers...

In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. ... We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the

¹Henry Wells (ed.), Dominican Republic Election Factbook, June 1, 1966 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 8.

existing colonies or dependencies of the European powers we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.²

The ideas enunciated in the Monroe Doctrine were nothing new. Prevalent concepts about existing conditions were summed up in the document. It announced a policy of self-interest for the new nation and was basically concerned with three principles: nonintervention, which warned European nations against interfering with the Latin Republics; noncolonization, meaning that Latin America was closed to further colonization by European powers; and noninterference in European affairs by the United States.³

While most of the European nations except England basically opposed or ignored the Monroe Doctrine, the Latin American reaction was even less enthusiastic. Conservative leaders and even some liberals had second thoughts about it. They knew if it ever came to backing up the principles with force, it would be the British Royal Navy, and not empty rhetoric of the Monroe Doctrine which would protect them from European intervention. When countries -- e.g., Mexico, Brazil,

²As presented to Congress by President James Monroe in his speech on the state of the union in 1823.

³Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), p. 140.

Columbia, and others -- approached the United States for assistance or alliance based upon the Monroe Doctrine, they discovered the inadequacy of the proposition.⁴

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Dominican Republic was indebted to European creditors to the extent of \$22,000,000. In 1904, the Dominican government made arrangements to pay its debt to the Santo Domingo Improvement Company, an American concern, in monthly installments guaranteed by port duties. The United States acted as an agent in the collection of the customs, an action bitterly protested by the European creditors. As an alternative to what appeared to be an imminent threat of European intervention, the Dominican President looked to the United States for relief. The United States agreed to accept the responsibility for collecting Dominican customs and paying the creditors. In 1905 the two countries concluded a protocol agreement in which the United States took over the collection of import duties throughout the island. Of the revenue collected by the United States, fifty-five per cent was turned over to the creditors and the remaining forty-five per cent was given to the Dominican government.⁵

The original protocol contained a guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic. The President submitted this

⁴William S. Robertson, "South America and the Monroe Doctrine, 1824-1828," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. III, March 1915, pp. 82-105.

⁵Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt Co., 1942), pp. 196-203.

agreement to the Senate in 1905 for its advice and consent, and for two years the Senate refused to act on it. Undaunted by senatorial inaction, President Roosevelt collected the customs of the republic according to an executive agreement under the protection of United States war ships. Under the cover of United States protection, the Dominican Republic was spared European intervention but was confronted with United States domination.⁶

In the face of potential European intervention in the Caribbean and as a means of collecting their debt from the Dominican Republic, President Roosevelt was compelled to take a stand. In May of 1904, Roosevelt announced that any nation which paid its debt and kept its house in order need not fear interference from the United States, but extreme wrongdoing could require intervention by the United States.⁷

Confirmed by a treaty in 1907, the arrangement lasted for six years. During the Presidency of General Ramón Cáceres (1906-1911), public finance was adequately managed; most of the foreign debt was paid, and surplus revenue was spent on public projects, i.e., educational systems, highways, ports, and other public improvements. During his regime, political stability prevailed; constitutional reforms were introduced, and the economy began to improve. Cáceres was assassinated in 1911, and anarchy soon returned.⁸

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 386-387.

⁸Wells, Dominican Election Republic Factbook, p. 9.

Cáceres' successors were incompetent in managing the politics and economy of the country. In the midst of political anarchy, President Wilson sent Franklin Port and Charles C. Smith as commissioners to the Dominican Republic. The so-called Wilson Plan called for retirement of President Diego Bordas, appointment of a provisional president whom the United States could support, and free and fair congressional and presidential elections under U. S. supervision. President Juan Isidro Jiménez refused to accept United States supervision of all revenue collections and distributions, but a revolt against Jiménez resulted in his impeachment by the Dominican Congress and his subsequent resignation on May 7, 1916. After the Dominican Republic refused to accede to a United States ultimatum, U. S. troops occupied the capitol and eventually the entire island. While the United States announced it had no intention of undertaking any territorial conquest, United States forces were to be stationed there until such reforms had been implemented which would insure the future welfare of the country.⁹

As a condition of extending diplomatic recognition to the new Dominican government, the United States coerced it into signing a treaty with Washington which made the Dominican Republic a protectorate of the United States. Admiral Harry S. Knapp, U. S. military commander in the Dominican Republic, issued a proclamation on November 29, 1916,

⁹Rayford W. Logan, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 56-61.

in which the United States took over complete military occupation of the island; moreover, he declared Santo Domingo to be in a state of military occupation and subject to military control. He declared that he intended to bring about order and not to destroy the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic. Since the United States entered World War I, America had been too busy with the war to worry about anything else. Little news reached the United States about the Dominican situation except glowing reports of public improvements, economic stability, and prevention of graft. The rumors that trickled out were not so rosy. Serious complaints and charges became common.¹⁰

The Wilson administration proposed a plan for the withdrawal of United States marines in December, 1920, and the Harding administration proposed a similar plan in June of 1921. Under this plan, the military governor became the provisional Dominican executive and had the power to call elections. The Dominicans were to conclude an agreement with United States officials that ratified all the actions taken by the military occupation government, and the command and organization of Dominican forces were to be under United States control. These proposals were rejected by the Dominicans; they vigorously opposed the loans that had been floated by the U. S. military government under which the Dominicans paid interest rates ranging from nine to nineteen per cent. On June 26, 1924, the Dominicans ratified a

¹⁰ Thomas, David. One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923), pp. 226-227.

treaty with the United States that terminated U. S. occupation and eventually evacuated United States military forces from the Dominican Republic. General Horacio Vásquez and Federico Velásquez were formally inaugurated as President and Vice-President, respectively, of the Dominican Republic on July 12, 1924. The treaty terminated United States military occupation of the island, but the accord actually made the Republic a protectorate of the United States.¹¹

A treaty was implemented between the Dominican Republic and the United States in October of 1926. It provided for the United States to collect the customs, to apply some of the revenue toward the payment of the Dominican national debt, and to pay the balance to the Dominican government.¹²

With the inception of Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, there began a change in the relationship between the United States and Latin America. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy facilitated the improvement of relations among the people of the Americas. The Latins seemed to favor his New Deal programs of domestic, social, and economic reforms and his emphasis upon anti-imperialism in foreign policy. This policy apparently projected Roosevelt's image as a champion of the oppressed people at home and abroad.

¹¹Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy, A Study in American Imperialism (New York: The Viking Press, 1925), pp. 132-133.

¹²The New York Times, February 25, 1930, p. 23.

As a result of the Seventh Pan-American Conference held at Montevideo in 1933, the concept of unilateral non-intervention was sanctioned by the United States government. F.D.R.'s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, considered the Montevideo Conference to be the inception of a new era in the diplomatic relations of the Western Hemisphere. At Montevideo, Roosevelt's approach toward foreign policy became the impetus for a new Latin American foreign policy. This concept was characterized by the precepts of non-intervention, equality, and partnership among the American republics.¹³ This policy involved the recognition of *de facto* governments in Latin America. The right to intervene in Cuba was eliminated by the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934, and the remaining troops in Haiti were to be withdrawn in the same year. A new treaty with Panama in 1936 reduced United States rights in the Canal Zone, and control of the Dominican customs was surrendered in 1941. The principle of non-intervention became the cornerstone of the Good Neighbor policy; moreover, the real essence of the new policy was the institutionalization of the principle of absolute equality among sovereign states. It meant the negation of the concept of unilateral United States military intervention and acceptance of the principle of collaboration and consultation among states.¹⁴

¹³ DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 540-541.

¹⁴ George Pope Atkins, The United States and the Dominican Republic During the Era of Trujillo (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1966), pp. 30-31.

Prior to the establishment of the Good Neighbor Policy, the Dominican Republic was entering into the threshold of the Trujillo era. During the United States occupation of the Dominican Republic, from 1916 through 1924, United States marines organized the Dominican National Guard. Rafael Trujillo became a captain in 1922 and was a major by the time United States marines withdrew in 1924. He was appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Army in 1928, and by 1930 he became President and undisputed leader of the Dominican Republic, a position he would hold until 1961.¹⁵

The Dominican revolution of 1930 centered around the decision of President Horacio Vásquez to seek re-election on May 25, 1930. The President had already served two terms. He assumed command of soldiers in a fortress in Santo Domingo in the face of disturbances that emanated from his decision.¹⁶

While revolutionary forces occupied the entire capital by February 25, 1930, Ozama was the lone fort held by General Trujillo, Chief-of-the-Army and a government supporter. It was here that a small band of men held out against the rebels. Meanwhile President Vásquez took refuge in the United States legation.¹⁷ Reportedly, United States

¹⁵ Hubert Herring, "Scandal of the Caribbean: The Dominican Republic," Current History, Vol. 38, (March, 1960), pp.38-39.

¹⁶ The New York Times. February 25, 1930, p. 1.

¹⁷ The New York Times, February 27, 1930, p. 1.

businessmen in Santo Domingo requested American military intervention to settle the dispute among the rival political groups.¹⁸

On February 28, 1930, Rafael Estrella Ureña, one of the rebel leaders, was named provisional President, and he was to hold office until elections were held in May, 1930. It was interesting to note that the revolution was relatively bloodless. The United States announced she could not extend *de facto* recognition to the Dominican government unless the government was constitutionally established. Partially as a result of the United States stand, President Vásquez signed a decree appointing General Estrella Ureña Secretary of the Interior. According to the Constitution, upon the resignation of the President and Vice-President, the Secretary of the Interior became the new President. After the resignation of the President and the Vice-President, General Ureña became the *de jure* President of the Dominican Republic.¹⁹

On May 16, 1930, General Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina became President of the Dominican Republic at the age of thirty-seven, and General Rafael Estrella Ureña was elected Vice-President. The opposition candidates, Federico Velásquez and Angel Morales, withdrew on Wednesday, May 13, 1930, and consequently Trujillo had an open field to the presidency.²⁰

¹⁸The New York Times, February 26, 1930, p. 11.

¹⁹The New York Times, March 1, 1930, p. 1.

²⁰The New York Times, May 17, 1930, p. 8.

In the early part of the twentieth century, the Dominican Republic defaulted on the debt it owed European creditors. These creditors demanded payment and threatened to intervene as a method of collecting their money. As may be recalled, in the face of potential European intervention, as a method of collecting their debt, the Dominican government had entrusted the collection of duties to the United States. The Custom Receivership was subsequently continued in modified form until 1941. Basically, under this agreement, the United States collected the custom duties in the Dominican ports and paid a portion of the duties to the creditors while paying the balance to the Dominican government. The arrangement, as modified by subsequent treaties, was finally terminated by a 1941 treaty. Under this accord, a provision was made for closing the General Receivership of Customs and for the Dominican government's collecting the duties, while a provision was made for protecting the creditors' interest. Thus, the United States substantially modified its interventionist foreign policy in Latin America with ratification of this agreement and adherence to Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy.²¹

Trujillo began as a typical caudillo in Latin America, but over his thirty-one years in power, he became more totalitarian. His power eventually extended from the armed forces, to the governmental process, to the communications media, and to the economy. It was virtually

²¹ Atkins, The United States and The Dominican Republic During the Era of Trujillo, pp. 117-142.

impossible to criticize, much less defy, Trujillo because of his unscrupulous exercise of power and the brutality of his secret police. Several constitutions existed during the Trujillo Era (1930-1961) proclaiming a civil, a republican, a democratic, and a representative government with a tripartite arrangement. In reality Trujillo controlled and manipulated the executive, the legislature, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. Since real political opposition and real civil liberties did not exist, the regularity of elections was superfluous. During the Trujillo Era, the Dominican Republic experienced relative political stability. There was a slight improvement in the economic situation in the country. While the country experienced a degree of economic improvement and political stability, the price was extremely high when one considered the extent of Trujillo's brutality and the loss of civil liberties. Moreover, it was estimated that the Trujillo family had procured a family estate valued in the neighborhood of \$800,000,000.²²

While Trujillo was assassinated in May of 1961, he had ruled the Dominican Republic since 1930 with an iron hand, brooking no opposition. His regime was characterized by brutality and by liquidation of opposition. With Trujillo's assassination, President Joaquin Balaguer, who became President in August of 1960 under the influence of the dictator, controlled the entire country for Trujillo's interest with the backing

²²Wells, Dominican Republic Election Factbook, p. 10.

of the army.²³ Lieutenant General Rafael Trujillo, Jr. (Ramfis), thirty-two-year old son of the assassinated dictator, was named as head of the Dominican armed forces in a move to preserve the Trujillo empire in the Dominican Republic.²⁴

Opposition increased to the point that President Balaguer was forced to grant some basic concessions. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said the United States would not allow any member of the Trujillo family to remain in power. Ramfis resigned and went into exile in Europe along with the other members of the Trujillo family. Meanwhile, President Balaguer on January 1, 1962, yielding to pressure from a general strike in December of 1961, appointed a seven-man Council of State in which he remained President. During 1962, there were several changes in the government and several uprisings by the right and left in an attempt to assume power. The first free and honest election since before Trujillo's assumption of power in 1930 was held on December 20, 1962. Dr. Juan Bosch, who had been in exile and who was a leader of the leftist anticommunist Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) won a clear majority over his opposition, Dr. Viriato A. Fiallo and his National Civic Union.²⁵

²³The New York Times, June 1, 1961, p. 1

²⁴The New York Times, June 2, 1961, p. 1

²⁵Logan, Haiti and The Dominican Republic, pp. 76-78.

Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party, which campaigned on a platform of social and economic reform, won the Dominican presidential election. His election was apparently a victory for the urban dwellers and for the rural poor and a defeat for the upper and middle classes. While Bosch and his PRD government was inaugurated on February 27, 1963, he remained in office only seven months. During this period of time, Bosch enacted measures designed to bring about social and economic reform; moreover, a new progressive constitution was promulgated by his regime in 1963. Apparently, the Bosch administration had the support of the Kennedy administration which provided assistance through the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, and other programs. Bosch was able to accomplish little during his seven-month tenure. While opinions vary about the reasons for his government's lack of accomplishments, the government was handicapped by a lack of time and by a lack of a sufficient number of trained personnel; Bosch's oratory far exceeded his capacity as an administrator and as a politician. Democratic and anti-democratic opposition to his regime increased greatly. On September 25, 1963, Bosch was overthrown by a military coup led by Colonel Elías Wessin y Wessin. The reason given by his opponents for Bosch's dismissal was his soft line on communism. As President, he permitted communist leaders to return from exile and did nothing to prevent a steady increase in communist activities. Bosch defended his policies as libertarian rather than pro-communist. It appeared

that his policies alienated the church, the armed forces, and sections of the business community.²⁶

On September 25, 1963, the United States government suspended diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and announced that economic aid would be terminated as a result of the coup's action against Bosch.²⁷

Political power in the Dominican Republic was turned over to a junta on September 26, 1963. It was headed by Dr. Emilio de los Santos, who was a former President of the Electoral College. This junta was expected to rule for two years, after which it promised to hold free elections and to return the government to civilian hands. Colonel Elías Wessin y Wessin, a die-hard opponent of the left in the Dominican Republic and one of the most powerful men in the new regime, was promoted to Brigadier General. Other important military leaders behind the new regime were General Antonio Imbert Barrera and General Luis Amiana Tío. Both men were survivors of the plot against General Trujillo.²⁸

To replace the ousted Bosch, a coalition cabinet was sworn in on September 27, 1963. The cabinet was headed by Dr. Emilio de los Santos, and Mr. Donald Reid Cabral was appointed as the new Foreign Minister. In essence, the new government was a coalition of anti-Bosch party

²⁶Wells, Dominican Election Factbook, pp. 11-12.

²⁷The New York Times, September 26, 1963, p. 1.

²⁸The New York Times, September 27, 1963, p. 1

members. President Bosch and his cabinet were eventually exiled from the Dominican Republic.²⁹

As Secretary of State Dean Rusk indicated on October 4, 1963, the United States was withdrawing all military and economic personnel from the Dominican Republic. This policy announcement signified that the United States would terminate her Alliance for Progress aid and other assistance to countries that overthrew democratic regimes by unconstitutional means. United States Ambassador John Barlow Martin had been recalled from the Dominican Republic, but diplomatic personnel below the ambassadorial level remained in the country.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk viewed the Dominican Revolution with the utmost gravity. The establishment and maintenance of a representative government was an essential element if the Alliance for Progress was to operate adequately; moreover, an effective and responsible government was an essential factor in the advancement of economic and social justice. As long as the existing conditions persisted in the Dominican Republic, there was only a slight chance of effective collaboration and normalization of relations between the two governments.³⁰ President Kennedy, in a news conference on October 9, 1963, restated the position of the United States government toward the Dominican Republic. It was a reaffirmation of the policy statement by Secretary of State Rusk on October 4, 1963.³¹

²⁹The New York Times, September 28, 1963, p. 1.

³⁰The New York Times, October 5, 1963, p. 1.

³¹The New York Times, October 10, 1963, p. 18.

The United States believed that little influence could be exerted toward the goal of developing democratic processes in the Dominican Republic by withholding diplomatic recognition. After the Dominican government promised that elections would be held by the end of 1965, the United States granted *de facto* recognition to the Dominican military junta on December 14, 1963. The implementation of this policy emerged after a top-level policy re-appraisal completed prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.³²

Emilio de los Santos, leader of the three-man junta, resigned unexpectedly on December 22, 1963, giving no explanation for his sudden action. Dr. Donald Reid Cabral, the Foreign Minister, was named to replace him as President of the junta. With this sudden and unexpected action, the Dominican stage was set for the next turn of events which eventually culminated with the revolution of 1963.³³

The United States announced on January 26, 1964, the resumption of economic aid to the Dominican Republic, which had been discontinued since the overthrow of President Bosch in 1963. Aid was resumed with the shipment of fourteen million dollars' worth of rice, wheat, and tobacco to the Dominican Republic;³⁴ moreover, Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. announced on March 30, 1964, that the United States government released

³²The New York Times, December 15, 1963, p. 2.

³³The New York Times, December 23, 1963, p. 6.

³⁴The New York Times, January 27, 1964, p. 2.

\$885,000 in aid funds for public works and education in the Dominican Republic.³⁵

The Dominican Republic received the credentials of Bennett, the new United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, on March 28, 1964. The resumption of aid and the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations were scheduled with the arrival of the new ambassador. The triumvirate under Donald Reid Cabral was endeavoring to maintain peace and stability while planning for economic progress; moreover, his government was laying the foundations for elections that might be held within eighteen months. His government had taken the necessary preliminary steps for elections. Ten political parties were competing in the forthcoming elections, and it appeared that Dr. Balaguer was the leading presidential candidate.³⁶

In the face of increasing opposition from the left and right, Cabral's government was overthrown by youthful army elements on April 26, 1965. The exact cause of the revolution was difficult to determine, but the revolution culminated in a movement to recall deposed President Juan Bosch to power and to re-establish constitutional authority. Military units, eventually army, air, and naval elements, under the nominal command of Brigadier General Wessin y Wessin, attacked the rebel units which the previous day had occupied downtown Santo Domingo. General

³⁵The New York Times, March 31, 1964, p. 7.

³⁶The New York Times, March 29, 1964, p. 19.

Wessin, who had led the movement that deposed President Bosch in 1963, ordered air units to attack the rebel units in the heart of Santo Domingo; with this, the revolt turned into a civil war.

There were evidently several reasons for the revolution. Reid's austerity program and his attempt to deprive the old-line military men of their special privileges apparently turned numerous elements within the Dominican society against his government. Also, young army elements and civilians claimed corruption in government and contended it was necessary to return to constitutional government under Bosch.

José Molina Ureña, President of the Chamber of Deputies under the Bosch regime, was named by the rebels as President of the revolutionary government. In turn, he asked Dr. Juan Bosch to resume power. In the midst of the fighting, the United States government announced plans to evacuate American nationals and other nationals who wanted to extricate themselves from the Dominican civil war.³⁷

With Ambassador Bennett acting as an intermediary between the rebels and the government forces, a tacit agreement was concluded between the two groups which called for the formation of a military junta and the holding of free elections. Molina sought asylum in the Colombian Embassy. It appeared that General Wessin was initially successful in thwarting the guerrilla movement as a coalition of air force, navy, and

³⁷The New York Times, April 27, 1965, p. 1.

army elements declared martial law in Santo Domingo and attacked the rebels in the capital.³⁸

After the Dominican military notified the United States government that the protection of U. S. nationals in Santo Domingo could no longer be guaranteed, President Johnson announced the landing of United States troops to rescue American nationals from the Dominican crisis. It was announced that United States troops would remain neutral in the conflict. President Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Under Secretary of State George Ball were to confer as reports indicated that communist elements had infiltrated the rebel forces. The guerrilla movement appeared to be growing stronger as they consolidated their forces in Santo Domingo.³⁹

While the President apparently claimed that the communist elements had gained control of the revolution, President Johnson sent United States troops into the Dominican Republic on April 28, 1965, to prevent what he perceived to be the establishment of another communist regime in the Western Hemisphere. United States forces were to maintain strict neutrality between the belligerents. One might ask the question how could the United States forces be neutral and impartial if the President thought "communist elements had taken over control of the rebel forces"?

³⁸ The New York Times, April 28, 1965, p. 1

³⁹ The New York Times, April 29, 1965, p. 1

In addition to unilateral United States military intervention in the Dominican Republic, President Johnson instructed Ellsworth Bunker, U. S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, to present his country's case before the O.A.S. Council.⁴⁰ The President claimed that communist elements trained outside of the Dominican Republic had taken over what began as a popular front movement. Johnson acknowledged that the United States was going to take unilateral action, if necessary, to prevent the establishment of another communist regime in the Western Hemisphere; this statement became known as the "Johnson Doctrine." Meanwhile, United States forces expanded the safety zone in Santo Domingo to include other embassies.⁴¹

On May 4, 1965, Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó, one of the rebel leaders, took office as President of guerrilla forces. He claimed to represent 47,000 military men and civilians among his supporters, a figure vastly superior to the U. S. estimate of his actual support. The number consisted of 20,000 armed force reserves, 20,000 armed civilians, and 7,000 army regulars. Colonel Deñó urged the United States to withdraw so that the Dominicans could resolve their own problems.⁴²

After much soul-searching and ambivalence, the Organization of American States agreed by a vote of fourteen to five to create the

⁴⁰The New York Times, April 30, 1965, p. 1.

⁴¹The New York Times, May 3, 1965, p. 1.

⁴²The New York Times, May 5, 1965, p. 1.

Inter-American Peace Force to help restore peace and constitutional government in the Dominican Republic. The O.A.S. peace force was to man the designated peace zones between the guerrilla and the government forces in an endeavor to facilitate a peaceful settlement and return to constitutional government, and the existing United States forces in the Dominican Republic were placed under its supervision. This was the first Inter-American force to be established in the Western Hemisphere. The Latin American countries were cognizant of former United States military intervention in South America and were intransigent in resisting what some consider to be a return to Roosevelt's Big Stick policy.⁴³

On May 5, 1965, a formal truce was signed by the Dominican government forces and guerrilla forces. The accord was negotiated by the O.A.S., and the agreement included a ceasefire based on demarcation zones held by the two antagonists in the capital, guarantee of foreign embassies, asylum for the asking, and a general measure of safety for the city.⁴⁴

In a bid to widen its base for popular support against the rebels (guerrillas), the military junta resigned on May 7, 1965, but was replaced with a five-man civilian-military junta who called themselves the "Government of National Reconstruction." Heading the new government was Brigadier General Antonio Imbert Barrera, a career military man

⁴³ The New York Times, May 6, 1965, p. 1.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

and one of two survivors of the 1961 assassination of Generalissimo Trujillo. Although he was a friend of Juan Bosch, he had assisted in ousting him as President in 1963.⁴⁵

By a vote of fourteen to three, the Organization of American States Foreign Ministers expanded the responsibility of the special O.A.S. committee in Santo Domingo, which was composed of representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama. This committee was responsible for assisting Dominican factions in restoring a governmental process in the Dominican Republic which could lay the foundations for free elections. The committee was the counterpart of the Inter-American Military Force.⁴⁶

After confronting persistent and profound difficulties, the rebel forces (guerrillas) under Caamaño and the government forces under General Imbert finally signed the Dominican Reconstruction Act on August 31, 1965. It established a provisional government which would rule the country until free elections were held in 1966. This document became the organic law from which emanated the legal authority of the provisional government. Dr. Héctor García Godoy was the recognized sovereign and sole ruler of the Dominican Republic.

Under this agreement, the contending elements were to withdraw their forces from their respective military zones. Also, the

⁴⁵The New York Times, May 8, 1965, p. 8.

⁴⁶The New York Times, May 11, 1965, p. 1.

demilitarization and disarmament of civilians would start immediately. All civilian arms were to be turned over to the new government; military units were to return to their bases, and the military units that fought with the rebels were to be integrated into the regular military establishment under the command of the new Provisional President. A general amnesty was provided for the people who participated in the revolution.⁴⁷

Prior to the inauguration of Héctor García Godoy, the resignation of Imbert's junta partially removed one obstacle to the assumption of power by the new provisional government. The last major obstacle to the new provisional government was removed with the resignation of Colonel Caamaño. The rebels represented the entire Left in the Dominican Republic, from moderate reformist to three rival communist parties. The rebels deplored as "criminal action" the United States' unilateral military intervention in the Dominican Republic. They claimed that United States forces prevented the establishment of a non-communist, left wing government in the Dominican Republic.⁴⁸

(This question will be discussed in a latter section of this study.)

Héctor García Godoy, whose government was composed of non-political figures agreeable to both Caamaño and Imbert supporters, assumed office as Provisional President of the Dominican Republic on September 3,

⁴⁷ The New York Times, September 1, 1965, p. 10.

⁴⁸ The New York Times, September 4, 1965, p. 1.

1966. The new government was sponsored and aided by the Organization of American States and the United States. The provisional government was to reconcile differences between the two factions in the civil war and to lay the foundation for general elections to be held in 1966. Dr. García Godoy was a forty-four-year-old former business executive, ambassador, and foreign minister under Bosch. He was acceptable to all the major factions, but was prohibited by the organic law from seeking the presidency in his own behalf in the forthcoming election.⁴⁹ President Johnson promised to extend diplomatic recognition to the Godoy regime and promised \$20,000,000 as a down payment on future aid. Johnson also pledged full support in preparing for Dominican elections in 1966 and full support in restoring the economy. Subsequently, the Godoy regime was recognized by other Latin states.⁵⁰

In the Dominican Presidential election on June 2, 1966, Joaquín Balaguer, a resilient politician who had served twenty-six years under the Trujillo dictatorship, emerged as the victor. A right-of-center candidate, Dr. Balaguer was considered to be preferred by the United States over moderate leftist Juan Bosch. Balaguer's campaign swept the countryside and made considerable inroads into Bosch's urban masses. He polled nearly 650,000 votes, while Bosch tallied only slightly over 400,000 votes.⁵¹

⁴⁹The New York Times, September 4, 1965, p. 1.

⁵⁰The New York Times, September 6, 1965, p. 1.

⁵¹The New York Times, June 3, 1966, p. 1.

After serving nearly seventeen months in the Dominican Republic, the six-nation O.A.S. Inter-American Peace Force was finally terminated on September 20, 1966. It reached a maximum strength of nearly 30,000 men at the height of the Dominican crisis. With the final withdrawal of O.A.S. forces, the Dominican Republic was left to face the trials and tribulations of the uncharted future.⁵²

⁵²The New York Times, September 21, 1966, p. 12.

CHAPTER III

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR ACTORS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE FORMULATION AND EXECUTION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY FUNCTION

With the shrinkage of our planet as a result of scientific and technological advances, each nation in its foreign policy has to take into consideration its immediate neighbors and also the foreign policy of every nation in the world. No state or continent can remain isolated in the contemporary world. The interdependence of states, manifested by the very nature and complexity of modern society, is reinforced by the strategic necessities of a technological society which requires commercial, economical, military, and political intercourse among nations.¹

In the international arena, the responsibility of the policy makers was to formulate their country's foreign policy. Quincy Wright, defines foreign relations as

¹This structural and functional model of United States foreign policy is intended to be only an overview of the major actors who participate in American foreign policy. The purpose of this model is to give only a cursory analysis of the structure and function of the major actors who participate in foreign policy formulation and execution. It is not designed to be a detailed explanatory model of the actual operations of United States foreign policy, but is merely a brief overview of some of the senior actors who may or may not have participated in foreign policy deliberations in any given crisis.

... the art by which a government ascertains the state's rights, obligations, interests, and responsibilities in international relations, and makes decisions in order to protect those rights, observe those obligations, promote those interests, and discharge those responsibilities.²

John G. Stoessinger defines foreign relations as "the expression of its (a nation's) national interest *vis-à-vis* other nations."³

What is national interest? Stoessinger argues that a nation provides its own definition of its national interest. Quincy Wright also indicates:

The conduct of foreign relations includes the instruction of negotiators and the conclusion of treaties ... the utilization of armed forces and resort to war ... the recognition of states and governments; and declarations of national policy; the participation in international institutions and submission of controversies to pacific settlement; and the fulfillment of international obligations and making of reparation for failure to do so.⁴

Affecting the policy makers during the cold war was the psychological syndrome which resulted from the rigidity of the United States foreign policy. Policy formulated in the midst of doubt became sacrosanct when it was officially adopted because, as Henry Kissinger argues, psychologically the status quo had the advantage of familiarity. The thought of deviation from established policy involved the prospect

²Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p. 1968.

³John Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, World Politics in Our Time (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 31.

⁴Wright, The Study of International Relations, p. 173.

of implementing the decision-making process again. When the stress of frustration became too great, there arose a demand for innovation. Crisis conditions are not conducive to calm consideration. Policy formulated during crisis conditions permit little but reliance on a defensive posture.⁵

In the traditional concept, international relations is conducted by political entities (states) which were almost considered as personalities. This approach was appropriate only to stable periods in international relations when the various components fundamentally agreed on the rules of the game. But difficulties were introduced in the conduct of international relations when nations differed greatly in social and political systems. Kissinger has argued that a need existed for the development of a new concept in conducting international relations to reflect a political, polycentral world dominated militarily by bipolarity.⁶ It was within this conceptualization that United States foreign policy was analyzed in the Dominican Republic by this writer.

Under the United States Constitution, the President makes central or fundamental policy in the foreign affairs of our government. He is ultimately responsible for the conduct of foreign relations and for

⁵Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 346-347.

⁶Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York: Norton & Company, 1969), p. 91.

the defense of the country as commander-in-chief. The founding fathers granted the executive broad discretionary and residual powers to enable the President to respond properly in any emergency. He has the power to make treaties with the two-thirds consent of the Senate and to nominate ambassadors, public officials, and consuls with the advice and consent of the Senate. Through the prerogative of entering into diplomatic relations with other nations by treaties, executive agreements, and the exchange of envoys, the President developed the ability to extend diplomatic recognition or to recall foreign diplomats even without consulting Congress.⁷

While Quincy Wright argues that the President lacked a clear conception of his goals and objectives in foreign policy, he realized the President and Secretary of State face national laws, opinions, and traditions on the one hand and, on the other, foreign threats and demands supported to varying degrees by public opinions, international laws, and force. Thus, the President is often confronted with pressures and forced to adopt a policy of action or restraint in the national interest; this type of policy is difficult to evaluate. To compound the problem, he is confronted with changing or developing international situations which are influenced by the following: the condition of the economy, diplomacy, power, world opinion, hunger, communism, and international law. Under these difficult circumstances, he ultimately makes

⁷Constitution of the United States, Article II.

policy applicable to each situation while taking into consideration the aggregate world situation over the long run.⁸

In some of the above activities, the executive might seek approval from either one or both houses of Congress; in some activities, however, he can perform independently. Even in the latter situation, he must take moral, technical, and legal factors into consideration in the formulation of policy. Consequently, he is required to obtain advice and counsel from numerous functionaries. The president is at the apex of a large bureaucracy of civil and military servants divided into departments and agencies which are eventually subdivided into innumerable offices, divisions, bureaus, and services.⁹

From the standpoint of objective, formulation, and execution, Kenneth W. Thompson contends that foreign policy is forced into the interdepartmental process. Diplomatic goals and techniques must be considered in light of economic aid, military aid, scientific aid, technical assistance, information programs, educational programs, and food distribution. The Department of State shares foreign policy formation with a number of governmental agencies which includes the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture, and a whole host of sister agencies. Representatives

⁸Wright, The Study of International Relations, pp. 169-170.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 173.

from these and other departments, with their own distinct missions, take part in foreign policy decision making but without assuming a commensurate share of responsibility for the policy.¹⁰

In foreign affairs, the decision making is concentrated in the hands of the Secretary of State, who is ultimately under the chief executive of the United States. The relationship between the Secretary of State and the President is the fundamental basis of foreign policy. Therefore, foreign policy is the sum of the decisions taken by the foreign policy formulators and the head of government.¹¹

While the President should not delegate his ultimate responsibility for conducting foreign policy to the Department of State, it is essential that some functions in the formulation and execution of foreign policy be delegated to the Secretary. Partially, the President could do this because the Secretary occupies an appointive position which is ultimately under the President and not potentially a rival in foreign policy. The strength of the Secretary stems in part from his intimate contact with the daily functioning of foreign affairs. He is in a good position to provide the President with information and recommendations on the monumental decisions which he must make. While the Secretary's primary

¹⁰Thompson, American Diplomatic and Emergent Patterns, pp. 123-124.

¹¹Steve Kertesz, Diplomacy In A Changing World (Illinois: Notre Dame University Press, 1959), p. 79.

function is to execute policy, the formulation of policy is indivisible from its execution.¹²

Within the State Department there are found the Agency for International Development (AID) and the United States Information Agency (USIA). While both are subordinate to the Secretary of State, each agency has its own head, hierarchy, and functional and geographical subdivisions. As of 1962, AID employed 15,000 people and the USIA about 11,000. A third agency located within the State Department was the Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which had a smaller staff. During the mid-1960's, the State Department, with these agencies, employed over 50,000 persons, divided about half-and-half between United States citizens and foreign nationals, most of whom were employed abroad.¹³

The image of an ambassador is one of a public servant with wide experience and a profound awareness of international problems, capable of administering the multiplicity of complex problems which confront an embassy or mission abroad. To apply this concept, Secretary of State Dean Rusk on February 20, 1965, said "The Ambassador is to take charge overseas."¹⁴ Basically, through a bureaucratic position, he should take over in an active, operational, and responsible fashion.

¹²Thompson, American Diplomacy and Emergent Patterns, pp. 121-122.

¹³Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, p. 95.

¹⁴Thompson, American Diplomacy and Emergent Patterns, p. 87.

He needs to know what is going on among the representative agencies stationed in the country, and, in addition to diplomatic knowledge of a given area, he has to exhibit over-all diplomatic and administrative skills which are transferable from one area to another. These two companion principles, knowledge of a particular area and understanding of diplomacy, are two criteria of a good ambassador.¹⁵

In a foreign capital, the ambassador must be the main source of information, i.e., the interpreter of political conditions, trends, and opinions in the country in which he resides. In every state, the locus of political power is concentrated at any moment in one or a few individuals and only the resident ambassador has the opportunity to know these individuals intimately or the ability to assess the indigenous political situation. The government perforce bases its foreign policy upon news sent by its ambassador. Moreover, the ambassador remains the chief medium of communications between the government to which he is accredited and his own government. Ultimately, he is the best source to execute his instructions because he is present in the host country and has varying degrees of influence on the indigenous political situation. Ultimately, he alone remains the intermediary who has the ability to explicate the motives and purposes between the two governments. Relations between the two governments depend, to some degree, on his ability to cultivate and maintain good relations, the degree of confidence in

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

which he is held, his own skills, and his ability to negotiate. The ambassador needs to possess sufficient authority to dissuade his home government from a course of action which he knows would be detrimental. In essence, Harold Nicholson contends, modern communications should not diminish the stature of the country's ambassador.¹⁶

While on the organizational level, the foreign office is a combination of functional and geographical divisions, many of these departments must be consulted before action can be taken on foreign affairs. Most international problems include legal, military, financial, labor, commercial, and other elements which require expert advice external to the foreign office. Consequently, the opinion of other governmental functionaries outside of the Department of State has to be co-ordinated, requiring an elaborate system of interdepartmental communications within the political system.¹⁷

The Department of Defense was created by the National Security Act of 1947, which placed the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps under a civilian Secretary of Defense with cabinet ranking. As modified by subsequent acts, the Secretary of Defense was given direct authority over the unified commands, e.g., North American Air Defense Command, and authority to provide for overall direct control for research and

¹⁶ Harold Nicholson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (New York: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 82-83

¹⁷ Wright, The Story of International Relations, p. 173.

development. Essentially, the Secretary of Defense had obtained the power to provide the basis for centralized direction of the American defense apparatus. As a result of evolution within the defense establishment, the Secretary of Defense gradually became almost second-in-command to the President. Immediately below the Secretary of Defense are the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, who are basically in charge of their respective services, but are subordinated to the Secretary of Defense. Though the National Security Act of 1947 placed all the military services under civilian control, the rivalry within the military organizations still persisted. While the Secretary of Defense is basically concerned with the security of the United States, he has an influential voice in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. For example, the United States military involvement in the Dominican Crisis of 1965 required the use of naval, army, and marine units, in which the Secretary had a voice in the deployment of these units.¹⁸

The National Security Act of 1947 was the legislation that established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The staff was composed of a chairman, selected from within the military service, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The Marine Corps commandant attended as a co-equal

¹⁸U. S. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, Part 7, 8295, 8315, 9398, 9399 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947).

member of the Joint Chiefs when a matter that pertained to the Marine Corps was under consideration. The chairman was appointed by the President with senate approval. The Joint Chiefs, who reported to the Secretary of Defense, had two primary functions: first, to exercise operational control over the joint and specified commands, and secondly, to plan for all possible military contingencies.¹⁹

While the paramount forum for foreign policy deliberation is the National Security Council, the general statutory responsibility of the National Security Council is to assist and advise the President on the integration of military and domestic politics as related to foreign affairs. This process enables the various functionaries who are responsible for or related to foreign policy to cooperate effectively in the decision making process. The duties of the council as officially stated are to assess and appraise objectives, commitments, and actual potential military risks, and make recommendations to the President regarding those plans. In actuality, the Council has become the forum in which the important decisions affecting United States foreign policy are made.²⁰

As established by statutory amendment of 1949, the National Security Council is composed of the President, who is chairman of the council, and

¹⁹U. S. Congressional Record, 14278 National security act amendments of 1949, hearing, 81st Congress, 1st session on S 1269 and S 1843, March 24 - May 6, 1949. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), 299 pp.

²⁰Elmer Plischke, Conduct of American Diplomacy (Princeton: Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 137-138.

the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. The latter are all statutory advisers. With Senate confirmation, the President may appoint other officials to participate in the Council deliberations. The Council reports directly to the President and is responsible for the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency.²¹

With the National Security Council serving as a board of directors, the CIA's primary function is to coordinate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence which affects national security. While the CIA's budget and staff are a highly classified secret, it has been estimated that the Washington staff numbers around 10,000, with additional thousands in the field. The main function of the CIA is to aid policy makers by estimating the strengths, weaknesses, and trends in other countries and the investigation of probable consequences of changes in foreign policy and of probable consequences of new developments in foreign countries. While it was difficult, the CIA attempts to separate fact finding and analysis from policy making.²²

Within the Executive Office of the President, the presidential Adviser for National Security Affairs has an influential voice in foreign affairs. This man, appointed by the President and serving at his discretion, is the personal adviser of the President in foreign affairs.

²¹Sheldon Appleton, United States Foreign Policy: An Introduction with Cases (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1968), pp. 163-164.

²²Claudius Johnson, American National Government (New York: Crowell Publisher, 1960), pp. 845-846.

The magnitude and the extent of his duties basically depend upon the tasks delegated to him by the President, and ultimately his influence in foreign affairs depends upon his personal relationship with the President.

In recent years, there has been a growth in the influence and stature of the presidential Advisor for National Security Affairs. Since he occupies a position unencumbered by formal bureaucracy, he is able to monitor daily diplomatic developments. In a crisis situation, he is able to state the pros and cons of the various alternative strategies to the President in a concise and lucid manner; therefore, the presidential decision making process has probably been greatly facilitated by the work of a man like Henry Kissinger. However, in the final analysis, it is the President who ultimately has to make the final decision.²³

Exerting significant influence on the direction of United States foreign policy is the Congress, which has considerable influence in foreign policy by its powers to scrutinize treaties and to consider presidential appointments and appropriations. Congress has the power to make treaties, appointments, and appropriation bills; on the other hand, Congress places stipulations on treaties and on appropriation bills, thus influencing foreign policy. Congress can pass a law which could further restrict or give direction to U. S. foreign policy.

²³"Who's Making Foreign Policy For the United States?" U.S. News and World Report, April 7, 1969, pp. 45-46.

Although Congress cannot govern, it exerts a profound effect on foreign policy by its power to investigate, criticize, and advocate. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has the ability to question, review, modify, or even reject policies of the executive.

If they choose to exercise their option, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees have the ability to exert influence on U. S. foreign policy by their Congressional supervision of the United States armed forces. Thus, by scrutinizing the defense establishment, the Armed Service Committees have a voice in giving direction to the United States foreign policy. While the executive bears the primary responsibility in the field of foreign affairs, this does not negate the responsibility of Congress to work for responsible and realistic goals in foreign affairs.²⁴

Within a pluralistic environment with numerous pressure groups and individuals participating in the decision making process, United States foreign policy is formulated by the interaction of many actors. Many potent pressure groups outside of government exert significant influence on U. S. foreign policy. Not all of the actors and groups who were mentioned take part in any given international crisis, but over the long run many of them exert influence, to varying degrees, on the formation and execution of American foreign policy.

²⁴Johnson, American National Government, pp. 839-842.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEUTSCHIAN COMMUNICATIONS MODEL

In order to place the findings of this study in proper perspective, it is desirable to discuss the state of model building in international relations (foreign policy). David V. Edwards states in International Political Analysis that a comprehensive theory for foreign relations has yet to be evolved. The art of international relations is too inexact at this time to develop a valid and accurate comprehensive theory of international relations.¹

While the present state of empiricism in international relations is too inadequate to support a general theory of international relations, a general theory must integrate a multiplicity of factors into some logical relationship or matrix. Richard C. Snyder, in Foreign Policy Decision Making, said, "The basis for a general theory of international politics does not exist at this time ... we do not know enough about international politics to construct such a theory."²

While a general theory of international relations has yet to be developed, the writer would like to turn to a brief discussion of the

¹David V. Edwards, International Political Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Co., 1969), pp. 1-49.

²Richard C. Snyder *et al.* Editors, Foreign Policy Decision Making (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962), p. 25.

Deutschian communications model.³ In The Nerves of Government and in The Analysis of International Relations, Karl Deutsch constructed a communications model of international relations. Deutsch adopted cybernetics, the systematic study of communications and controls in all types of organizations, as the conceptual scheme for the analysis of relations among nations. In essence, this approach represented a shift in interest from drives to steering and from instincts to systems of decisions, regulations, and controls in diplomacy among states. Cybernetics suggested that all social organizations, including political systems, have similar characteristics and that, moreover, every social organization is held together by communication. These systems transmit messages containing quantities of information between or among organisms allowing them to interact with their environment. If one looks upon states and governments as communication systems, impersonal and verifiable evidence can be obtained to check the validity of qualitative assertions about the Dominican revolution. This methodology is a by-product of the development of modern communication engineering.

Deutsch contends that the primary goals of every country's foreign policy are to preserve its independence and security and, secondly,

³The balance of this chapter is taken from the following books: Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, Models of Political Communications and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1966), and Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).

to pursue and to protect its economic interest. Further, a country's foreign policy should oppose any manipulation and penetration by an alien power and ideology while attempting to achieve some manipulation and penetration (of its own national interest) on its own. The following objectives are closely linked to the foreign policy goals of major powers: economic aid to foreign nations, efforts to spread one's own brand of national and ideological propaganda to foreign countries, and support of scientific and cultural exchange missions favorable to one's own foreign policy objectives. Since the last war, an example of one of the fundamental objectives of United States foreign policy has been the containment of communism while simultaneously expanding American influence.

While thinking of the United States government as a single decision system, one should also think of smaller sub-systems within the governmental process -- such as the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the major political parties, and the congressional groups -- each making its own decisions based upon individual memories and information. Fundamental foreign policy decisions are made through a process requiring the interaction of several contending domestic actors, a system which is eventually both competitive and pluralistic.

According to the Deutschian hypothesis, decision making is a combination of new information and old memories. The state's perceptions were stored (more or less as memories) in the heads of the state's elite and in the hierarchy of decision makers, i.e., in the brains of

the state's politically relevant social strata. The most important memories were ultimately stored in the heads of the entire population and in its culture and language. This large amount of data was stored in papers, books, files, pictures, maps, libraries, diplomatic reports, and policy memorandums. If a message about a sudden political crisis in a foreign country comes to the United States government, the responsible officer in the State Department has to recall from memory pertinent facts about the message: the location of the country; the prevailing political, economic, social, and military conditions; and the vital political, economic, and military interests of the United States in that area (if any). As an illustration of this hypothesis, memories of appeasement in Munich were stored in the minds of the Kennedy administrators who formulated foreign policy. Inevitably, these memories possibly had some influence on limiting Kennedy's latitude of response in Vietnam, since he perhaps felt that he had to take a firm stand against communism there. This idea was reflected in his 1961 inaugural speech in which he indicated that the United States would bear any burden and meet any challenge in the confrontation with communism.

Returning to the Deutschian model, the technology of self-controlling systems has produced a general system of control, i.e., the study of communications. In the viewpoint of cybernetics, all organizations share certain fundamental characteristics, and all organizations are held together by communications.

In this context, a political system is viewed as a system that reacts with its environment. Under normal conditions, any organism or social organization has a tendency to remain in a consistent state while interacting with its environment; this is referred to as a state of equilibrium.

Deutsch contends that political systems are goal seeking, defining goal seeking as "that state of affairs, particularly in relationship to the outside world, where its inner disequilibrium (its drive) has been reduced to a minimum."⁴ If a state is in a condition of disequilibrium, it tends to change its behavior until its inner disequilibrium had been reduced, and likewise, it has a propensity to avoid conditions which might increase its inner state of disequilibrium. The North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 disturbed the inner equilibrium of the U. S. foreign policy system. Since its inner equilibrium within the system had been changed, the United States adopted an aggressive policy in Korea. The repetition of an aggressive policy against the communists culminated in the signing of the armistice in 1953, which eventually restored equilibrium within the political system. Any political system which behaves in this manner has a tendency to approach its goal state in this procedure.

To augment his own memory, the official who is a member of the decision making process must rely upon files containing reports and

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 79.

written sources, i.e., memoranda on current policy. He must consult with other officials and with other agencies, civilian and military. If the decision is important enough, the President must also eventually be notified. A combination of memories, remembered images, and preferences have an effect on the decision. These officials who eventually participate in the decision making process are some of the men who represent the effective memories of the United States government.

Deutsch contends that political systems utilize information obtained from the feedback process to guide their behavior toward their goals. The feedback process, the heart of any goal-seeking behavior, consists in feeding back to the political system information about the results of its preceding behavior; it utilizes this information to modify its subsequent activities. The feedback process apparently works in a cycle, i.e., from the return of the message about the result and then either to a repetition of the original action or to action that is somewhat different from the original behavior.

In a more complex system, one can characterize the system as having specific components and subsystems called effectors, through which it acts on the outside world. Diplomats, policemen, soldiers, and administrators of foreign economic aid programs all act as effectors for their government in carrying out the orders of their government.

The feedback process informs the government of the activities of its subordinates and of the results of their behavior. In light of the results of their behavior, the political system sends

instructions to modify the behavior of its representatives. Simultaneously, a short feedback process brings back to the effector (himself) the results of his preceding action, and he can take corrective action without relying on an order from his native capital.

As the United States built up its military presence in Vietnam during the sixties, the decision making process relied upon information provided by its effectors, state department, defense department, and other functionaries. These effectors provided information which subsequently resulted in the modification of earlier U. S. policy. The effectors fed back information to the political system about the results of its preceding behavior, e.g., what were the results of committing additional men, material, and logistical support to South Vietnam? The information that effectors fed back to the political system resulted in the escalation of the American presence in Vietnam; moreover, the feedback program informed the government of the activities of its subordinates in Vietnam. In this vein, the functionaries in the higher echelon of command relied upon information provided by their subordinates and other sources to modify the succeeding activities of their subordinates.

Feedback signals are used to bring an increase or a decrease in the intensity and/or frequency of the original behavior in a positive or an amplifying feedback. A positive feedback stimulates the original behavior of the system higher and higher until some element in the system or environment breaks down, or until depletion of some essential

resource in the system. Escalation of the feedback system is characteristic of a runaway situation. If the situation persists, regardless of the moderate intentions of the actors who initiated it, the decision making process gets out of control. If political actors are to remain in control of their destiny, positive feedback must be terminated, or decreased so as to keep the system within tolerable limits.

Positive feedback must be removed or replaced with negative feedback to keep the system within tolerable limits. Negative feedback is the steering process which establishes the limits and the pursuit of goals. It has two components: first, the location of the goal and secondly, the distance between the actor and the goal. The feedback of the results of the actor's past behavior directs the system toward its goal.

Essentially, negative feedback is the control of behavior at each stage of the process by the actual results of its preceding behavior. Negative feedback implies information encouraging the continuation of governmental policies that appear to be bringing the system closer to its implicitly defined target, but which signal a modification or a reversal of action if the political system is moving away from its goal. The information that the effectors fed back to the political system on December 7, 1941, an example of positive feedback, indicated that it had been attacked by the Japanese. The reception of this information increased the frequency and activity of the political system. In this case, the negative feedback, i.e., the steering process, had set the

objectives of the political system, which was the winning of the war with the complete capitulation of the enemy. The location of the goal, i.e., the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers, was ultimately to take three and one half years to complete. Thus, it was not until the cessation of hostilities that the inner equilibrium within the political system was restored.

While Deutsch presumably recognizes that particular decisions are arrived at partially by the interaction of the goal seeking process and the feedback process, the predictability of decisions remains combinational and problematic in nature. Deutsch has indicated that "policy is an explicit set of preferences and plans drawn up in order to make the outcome of a series of future decisions more nearly predictable and consistent."⁵ Consistency in foreign policy reduces the probability that contemporary and future decisions undo valid decisions made in the past. It gives the other side a better chance to estimate the probable response of country "B" to an action taken by country "A."

Deutsch assumes that a political system is a self-modifying communications network. The patterns of information are measured in qualitative terms. Information is the stimulus that motivates the political system.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 77.

While Deutsch appears to be cognizant of the complexity of international relations, he contends that the fundamental process of a communications model can illuminate the enigmatic propensities of international relations. With this goal in mind, Deutsch's communications model has been adopted here in an attempt to place the findings of this study in proper perspective.

CHAPTER V

METHODOLOGY

The methodology adopted for this study was content analysis. Since Ithiel de Sola Pool, in his book Trends in Content Analysis, referred to Bernard Berelson's Content Analysis as the standard in the field,¹ Berelson's definition of content analysis as "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication,"² is used in this paper.

Another writer, Irving L. Janis, has also defined content analysis as:

referring to any technique a) for the classification of the sign-vehicles, b) which relies solely upon the judgments (which, theoretically, may range from perceptual discrimination to sheer guesses) of an analyst or group of analysts as to which sign-vehicles fall into which categories, c) on the basis of explicitly formulated rules, d) provided that the analysts' judgments are regarded as the reports of a scientific observer.³

On the operational level, in a book entitled Content Analysis, by Robert C. North, the author wrote that "content analysis can be used

¹Ithiel de Sola Pool, Work Conference on Content Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 1

²Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), p. 1.

³Irving L. Janis, "The Problem of Validating Content," In Language of Politics, Harold D. Lasswell (ed.), (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965), p. 55.

to gain systematic information concerning the cognition and evaluation of effective states of those persons whose decisions are binding upon the states they represent."⁴ North also has indicated that "the study of international conflict is the analysis of decision-making in crisis, to ascertain the individual's images and perceptions of reality."⁵ It is in line with North's conception of the purpose and function of content analysis that this study is based.

In this thesis, content analysis is applied exclusively to expressed attitudes without any attempt to draw inferences. This limitation is incorporated into the study as a method of increasing its objectivity and reliability. This restriction should not be considered a denial of the possibility of making valid inferences in quantitative research, but is felt to be beyond the scope of this thesis.

Content analysis is, in the first place, a method for "reading on the lines" and for reporting the results which can be verified. Some of the results may be surprising and reveal things about the test whose presence we did not expect. But these results are obtained by looking at the words that are there rather than by guessing at meanings that are not recorded.⁶

Quantitative content analysis has been used as a statistical technique for obtaining descriptive data about certain symbols. One of the values of this system is that it offers the possibility of

⁴Robert North, Content Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 38.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶Harold Lasswell, *et al.*, The Comparative Study of Symbols (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 32.

obtaining more precision, objectivity, and reliability in observations about the frequency with which given characteristics of symbols appeared. Thus, the quantitative approach of content analysis substituted controlled observation and systematic counting for impressionistic methods of conducting research in political science.

Therefore, quantitative content analysis has permitted a vigorous, systematic content analysis for the purpose of testing hypotheses. Moreover, this system is conducive to systematic procedures for obtaining precision, reliability, and objectivity. The material under study has been measured by applying the techniques of content analysis, i.e., true quantitative variables.

By the term direction, this writer means the direction of the content was determined by "the attitude expressed toward any symbol by its user."⁷ Analysis of direction was usually studied on the basis of "favorable," "neutral," "unfavorable," and "balanced." These basic categories are employed in this study to quantify the expressed attitude of officials of the United States Government toward the two subject categories.⁸

In this study, the recording unit is the sentence or any other specified content. Harold D. Lasswell has stated that a recording unit is "the range of text for which the occurrence of a symbol is tabulated

⁷Lasswell, *et al.*, The Comparative Study of Symbols, p. 37.

⁸Harold Dwight Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and Associates, Language of Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965), pp. 154-155.

with the unit of one, even if it occurs more than once in the specified text."⁹ Since the sentence was the recording unit, one unit has been logged for the enunciated symbol regardless of the number of times that it appeared in the sentence.

In the characterization or presentation of a listed symbol, the recording unit was the range of the text which was to be considered. Thus, it was the portion of text to be recorded in determining the categorization of a symbol as favorable, neutral, unfavorable, and balanced. In determining the nature of a symbol, it is essential that one read the entire article to maximize objectivity.

Favorable: The following criteria determined a favorable content. (The word "indication" was used by the writer in reference to the recording unit to mean that the content reflected, entirely or in part, what the recording unit was supposed to manifest.) A favorable content (symbol) was any one or a combination of the following: 1. There appeared to be an indication that a communist takeover could have been an improvement over the previous regime. 2. There appeared to be an indication that a United States government functionary liked one of the elements in the subject categories. 3. There appeared to be an indication that United States personnel worked in harmony with the Dominican government forces. 4. There appeared to be an indication that the United States functionaries extended aid (financial or contraband) to the

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 114.

Dominican government forces. 5. There appeared to be an indication that United States government functionaries extended aid (financial or contraband) to the guerrilla forces. 6. There appeared to be an indication that United States government functionaries worked in harmony with the guerrilla forces. 7. There appeared to be an indication that the perpetuation of the Dominican government would have been an improvement over the turmoil of the civil war.

Unfavorable: The following criteria determined an unfavorable attitude. An unfavorable attitude was any one or a combination of the following: 1. There appeared to be an indication that United States government functionaries disliked one or more of the elements in the subject categories. 2. There appeared to be an indication that a communist takeover could have been a deterioration over the previous regime. 3. There appeared to be an indication that the United States officials worked in disharmony, if at all, with the Dominican government forces. 4. There appeared to be an indication that United States officials worked in disharmony with the guerrilla forces. 5. There appeared to be an indication that United States government functionaries extended aid (financial or contraband) to the Dominican government forces. 6. There appeared to be an indication that the United States government functionaries extended aid (financial or contraband) to guerrilla forces. 7. There appeared to be an indication that the perpetuation of the government regime could have been an improvement over a potential communist regime.

Neutral: A neutral content was neither favorable nor unfavorable but was non-directional. Although it would have been possible to conduct a content analysis without a neutral category, in which only the categories of favorable and unfavorable would have been used, this type of analysis would have been limited to quantifying the subject category which received the greater amount of content. Therefore, in order to increase the objectivity of the research, the author has incorporated the neutral category containing both objective and interpretative content. A neutral category contained the following criterion: 1. There appeared to be an indication that none of the enunciated criteria of favorable and unfavorable were present.

Balanced. Balanced was used when there was a combination of favorable and unfavorable material. Thus, the balanced category was necessary to differentiate among the expressed attitudes of favorable, neutral, and unfavorable material, and therefore appraised material which was neither favorable, neutral, nor unfavorable. It represented a further degree in the categorization of content to increase the objectivity of the study. Since many articles contained a combination of favorable, neutral, and unfavorable material, it was essential to have a balance category to more accurately quantify expressed attitude. To quantify material as balanced, one must look at the entire meaning of the expressed attitude in the article.

The balanced category was incorporated in this paper to increase the validity of the findings. It further refined the methodology of

the study by providing for more than the mere categorization of material as favorable, neutral, or unfavorable. One of the speakers (actors) could have taken a position on a subject category that was neither favorable, neutral, nor unfavorable. A balanced category contained the following criteria: 1. There appeared to be an indication that the content contained an equilibrium among favorable, neutral, and unfavorable material. 2. A combination favorable to the guerrilla forces, favorable to the government forces, or unfavorable to the government forces, unfavorable to the guerrilla forces, or favorable or unfavorable to the government forces, or favorable or unfavorable to the guerrilla forces were in the balanced category.

The following are the subject categories which have been used in this study:

1. Did President Johnson look upon the revolt as (1) a communist, or (2) a non-communist revolution?
2. Did the Secretary of State look upon the revolt as (1) a communist, or (2) a non-communist revolution?
3. Did the secondary State Department officials look upon the revolt as (1) a communist, or (2) a non-communist revolution?
4. Did President Johnson tend to support the Dominican (1) guerrilla forces, or (2) government forces?
5. Did the Secretary of State tend to support the Dominican (1) guerrilla forces, or (2) the government forces?

6. Did the secondary State Department officials tend to support the Dominican (1) guerrilla forces, or (2) the government forces?

Thus, the preceding subject categories have been adopted so that quantitative inference as a result of analyzing a wealth of primary sources with content analysis could be made. The next chapter in this study has been allocated to the findings quantified as a result of applying content analysis to a body of primary government sources so that inferences could be made on the positions taken by certain governmental functionaries on selected foreign policy questions.

CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS

It was within the Deutschian conceptualization that the findings of this study have been analyzed. At the onset of the Dominican revolution, United States Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, an effector, informed the Secretary of State about the deteriorating conditions within the Dominican Republic. His communications indicated ferocious fighting between guerrilla forces and regular military forces, primarily in the city of Santo Domingo. Ambassador Bennett was asked by the guerrilla forces to intercede in the civil war.

However, Ambassador Bennett was unsuccessful in his endeavor to reconcile the guerrillas and government forces. The political situation deteriorated to such a point that it threatened United States nationals in the Dominican Republic. After receiving word from the Dominican government forces that they could no longer guarantee the protection of United States nationals in Santo Domingo, Ambassador Bennett requested U. S. troops in order to evacuate American nationals from the capital.

Upon receiving the communications, the Secretary of State and ultimately the President had to recall from their memories important facts about the situation; the location of the Dominican Republic; what were the probable international consequences of Dominican political

instability; and what were the vital United States political, economic, and military interests in the crisis.

Prior to the Dominican civil war, United States foreign policy in this area had been in a state of equilibrium. The inner equilibrium of the political system was disturbed by receiving a stimulus, positive feedback, indicating that deteriorating political conditions in the Dominican Republic posed a danger to U. S. nationals. Counteraction had to be taken if the behavior of the political system was to be constrained within tolerable limits.

Apparently, consultation with his top advisers enabled the President to arrive at a decision. This decision had evolved from decision makers relying on old memories (e.g., of the danger that confronted U. S. nationals in the midst of past civil wars) and new information (e.g., new data in that American nationals were endangered). The decision to use United States troops to evacuate our nationals from the Dominican Republic was the negative feedback (inhibitory feedback) that set limits on the goal (i.e., evacuation of United States nationals from the Dominican Republic); moreover, it was the counteraction that constrained the behavior of the political system within tolerable limits. As a result of this negative feedback (inhibitory feedback), the inner disequilibrium of the political system was substantially reduced, and the system finally returned to a state of equilibrium.

At some point after United States troops had landed in the Dominican Republic to rescue American nationals, the Department of State, and eventually the President, received communications from the American effector, Ambassador Bennett, indicating that Communist elements, trained outside of the country, were threatening to take over control and direction of the guerrilla forces in Santo Domingo. The inner equilibrium of the political system was again disturbed as a result of receiving this disquieting information. Again the positive feedback had to be countered if the behavior of the political system was to be kept within tolerable limits. The President and his advisors were confronted with a fundamental problem: what should be the policy of the United States in face of what its leaders perceived as a communist threat to take over a second country in Latin America? Based on the information given the President, it apparently seemed that communism posed a serious threat by exerting significant influence on the Dominican guerrilla forces.

The President, apparently after consulting with his top advisers, decided that the best and possibly the only way to prevent the establishment of a second communist state in Latin America was to utilize direct United States military force in the Dominican Republic. The President decided unilaterally to intervene militarily in the Dominican crisis. This decision was a combination of old memories and new information. In regard to old memories, the President was cognizant of the establishment of Castro's communist Cuba. Apparently, the

possibility of creating another communist regime in Latin America was repugnant to the President and an important enough reason to justify the deployment of United States troops in Santo Domingo.

The old memories could have included contemplating the danger of another communist regime in Latin America and all the adversities that could have come from it, e.g., possible increased subversion in South America. The negative feedback -- the decision to land troops and prevent communist domination of the Dominican Republic -- countered the positive feedback in the political system. The goal seeking process that established the goal -- stopping communism in Santo Domingo -- was successful in reducing the inner disequilibrium of the system, and the behavior of the system was retained within tolerable limits. Since the United States action in Santo Domingo basically fits within the periphery of the Deutschian model as previously discussed, the U. S. action in the Dominican Republic was basically a typical exercise in United States foreign policy.

In regard to the question of the degree of communist influence in the Dominican revolution, some people argued that President Johnson overreacted to the crisis. Senator J. William Fulbright, Arkansas Democrat and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the most articulate critics of President Johnson's Dominican policy. The Senator contended that Johnson's policy was initially characterized by "overtimidity and subsequently by overreaction."¹

¹U. S. Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, III, Part 18, 23855.

Moreover, according to Fulbright, the United States military intervention was designed primarily to prevent the establishment of a so-called communist revolution and not primarily to save United States nationals as public officials originally stated.

Fulbright believed that the apprehension of a communist coup was based on fragmentary and inadequate evidence. He claimed there was little evidence for the hypothesis that the rebels were communist dominated; on the contrary, the evidence suggested the existence of a chaotic situation in which no single actor was dominant. Fulbright contended that the United States policy was characterized by insufficient candor and by misinformation. The failure of information, according to Fulbright, was due principally to the misinformation supplied to the President by his top advisers. These officials sent the President exaggerated reports on the extent of communist danger in Santo Domingo, on the basis of which President Johnson ordered unilateral military intervention.²

President Johnson made public a list of fifty-eight alleged communists purported to have participated in the revolution. Draper argues that the extent of communist influence in the Dominican crisis was extremely exaggerated, stating that many of the alleged communists were in reality noncommunists, and some were even out of the country during the initial stages of the revolution. Given the rapid progression

²*Ibid.*, 23855-23858.

of events in late April of 1965, and a fear of the success of communism as in Cuba, President Johnson could quite possibly have overreacted to the threat of communism in the Dominican crisis.³

Based on the evidence presented in twenty-six citations, President Johnson, 100% of the time, viewed unfavorably the Dominican crisis as a communist revolution. His position in regard to a communist or non-communist revolution was consistent and did not change over a period of time. Since President Johnson was unfavorable on this point, he was neither favorable, neutral, nor balanced in his conception of a communist or non-communist revolution in the Dominican crisis.

In relation to the extent of communist influence in the Dominican crisis, Johnson said on May 2, 1965:

The revolutionary movement took a tragic turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold joined the revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of communist conspirators.⁴

He likewise said on May 3, 1965:

The people that intervened in the Dominican Republic were the people who had been trained outside of the Dominican Republic in guerrilla warfare and came in there to help overthrow that government and to have a Communist seizure of that country. We are there to protect those people, and we propose to protect them.⁵

³T. Draper, "The Dominican Crisis" Commentary, Vol. XL (December 1, 1965), pp. 33-70.

⁴U. S. Department of State Publication 7971, May 2, 1965.

⁵Public Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, May 3, 1965), p. 480.

The President said on June 1, 1965:

The Communists did not, in our judgment originate this revolution, but they joined and they participated in it. They were active in it, and in a good many places they were in charge of it.⁶

The President said on May 28, 1965, "A well-trained, disciplined band of Communists was prevented from destroying the hopes of Dominican democracy."⁷ President Johnson apparently conceived the Dominican government and the guerrilla forces as balanced in twenty-two citations and 100% of the time. His position on this question was consistent and did not change over the long run. Since President Johnson was balanced on this point, he was neither favorable, neutral, nor unfavorable in his conception of the Dominican government forces and the guerrilla forces. In regard to the President's view of the Dominican guerrilla and government forces, Johnson said on May 2, 1965, "Let me also make clear tonight that we support no single man or any single group of men in the Dominican Republic."⁸

Johnson said on June 1, 1965 that one of our goals was:

... to talk to all groups and all factions and leadership, to try to find a government that would appear to all the Dominican people; we now think that there are two essential things that are left to be done: One is to find a broadly based government under the leadership of the OAS that will be acceptable and approved by the Dominican people: ...⁹

⁶Public Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, June 1, 1965, p. 613.

⁷Public Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, May 28, 1965, p. 594.

⁸Public Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, May 2, 1965, p. 473.

⁹Public Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, June 1, 1965, p. 617.

Johnson also said on June 1, 1965:

... we have sent some of the best people in this Government to maintain contacts with the broad base of leadership in the Dominican Republic in the hope that there would, in due time, evolve a broadly based government that would meet with the approval of the Dominican people.¹⁰

Johnson said on June 17, 1965, "The second goal was to have a government broadly based to be acceptable to the people of the Dominican Republic."¹¹

Turning to the Secretary of State, from the evidence presented, apparently he viewed the Dominican civil war as a communist revolution in nine citations and 100% of the time. The Secretary apparently looked unfavorably on what he conceived to be a communist revolution in the Dominican Republic, and his viewpoint was consistent and did not change over a period of time. Since the Secretary of State was unfavorable on this point, he was neither favorable, neutral, nor balanced in his conception of a communist or non-communist revolution in the Dominican crisis.

In regard to the question of communist influence in the Dominican crisis of 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said on May 8, 1965:

What began in the Dominican Republic as a democratic revolution was taken over by Communist conspirators who had been trained for and had carefully planned that operation. Had they succeeded in establishing a government, the Communist seizure of power would in all likelihood have been irreversible, thus frustrating the declared principles of the OAS. We acted to preserve the freedom of choice of the

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 612.

¹¹Public Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, June 17, 1965, p. 679.

Dominican people until the OAS could take charge and insure that its principles were carried out.¹²

Rusk also said on May 8, 1965:

... the evidence was mounting that the Communists had captured the revolution according to plan, and the danger of a Communist take over was established beyond question.¹³

Rusk said on May 6, 1965:

And I am not impressed by the remark that there were several dozen known Communist leaders and that therefore this was not a very serious matter. There was a time when Hitler sat in a beer hall in Munich with seven people. And I just don't believe that one underestimates what can be done in chaos, in a situation of violence and chaos, by a few highly organized, highly trained people who know what they are about and know what they want to bring about.¹⁴

Rusk apparently conceived the Dominican government and the guerrilla forces as balanced in ten citations and 90.9% of the time. In one citation and 9.1% of the time, the Secretary apparently favored the government forces. Rusk said on May 26, 1965:

As far as the civilian military group under General Imbert's leadership is concerned, we did encourage them to form a group which could try to assume the normal processes of the country side which was not involved in downtown Santo Domingo.¹⁵

¹²U.S. Department of State Publication 7971, May 8, 1965.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴U. S. Department of State Publication 7971, May 6, 1965.

¹⁵U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, p. 941, May 26, 1965.

From the evidence presented, basically, the Secretary apparently was consistent over the long run in his balanced viewpoint toward the Dominican government and the guerrilla forces, with only one citation that could have been considered favorable to the government forces. Since the Secretary of State was balanced on this point except in one case in which he was favorable to the government forces, he apparently was not favorable, neutral, nor unfavorable in his conception of the Dominican government and guerrilla forces.

In regard to Secretary of State Dean Rusk's views toward the Dominican guerrilla and government forces, the Secretary said, "... the Dominican people ought to have their own chance to make their own decisions to get themselves firmly on the road of democratic government."¹⁶ He also said on May 26, 1965, "... there were strenuous efforts made on all sides ... to get the elements on both sides together to halt the fighting and to work out a pattern for a peaceful settlement ..."¹⁷

Rusk said on May 26, 1965:

The principal piece of unfinished business is that of constituting among the Dominicans and by the Dominicans a broadly based provisional government which can accept responsibility for the affairs of that country pending elections and pending full return to the democratic and constitutional process.¹⁸

¹⁶U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, p. 1018, June 2, 1965.

¹⁷U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, pp. 940-941, May 26, 1965.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 939.

Rusk also said on May 26, 1965:

He (Martin) was asked to go down to establish contact with many of the people that he knew during that period (Martin was U. S. Ambassador to Dominican Republic during Bosch's presidency), a good number of whom were in the downtown area of Santo Domingo.¹⁹

Based on the evidence presented in twenty-three citations, secondary State Department officials, 100% of the time, viewed unfavorably the Dominican crisis as a communist revolution. Their positions in regard to a communist or non-communist revolution were consistent and did not change over a long period of time. Since the secondary State Department officials were unfavorable on this point, they apparently were neither favorable, neutral, nor balanced in their conception of a communist or non-communist revolution in the Dominican crisis.

In regard to the question of communist influence in the Dominican crisis, the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Ellsworth Bunker, said on May 20, 1965, that one of the U. S. aims was "... to help eliminate the threat of present or future subversion of the Government of the Dominican Republic by Communists ..."²⁰

The United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, W. Tapley Bennett, said on September 20, 1965 that:

The Communists were prevented from taking over in a chaotic situation and pushing aside democratic elements involved in the revolt. Communist tactics contributed to the long delay

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 946.

²⁰ U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, p. 910, May 20, 1965.

in reaching a settlement, but at the same time made their presence more publicly apparent than had been the case at the beginning. Their leadership has not changed.²¹

The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai

Stevenson, said on May 3, 1965, that:

But while the PRD planned, and during its first hours led the revolutionary movement against the government of (Donald) Reid Cabral, a small group of well-known communists, consistent with their usual tactics quickly attempted to seize control of the revolution and of the armed bands in the street.²²

The secondary State Department officials apparently conceived the Dominican government and the guerrilla forces as being balanced in forty citations and 100% of the time. Their positions on this question were apparently consistent and did not change over a long period of time. Since the secondary State Department Officials were balanced on this point, they apparently were neither favorable, neutral, nor unfavorable in their conception of the Dominican government and guerrilla forces.

In regard to the position of the secondary State Department officials' view of the Dominican government and guerrilla forces, U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson said on May 19, 1965, "... we believe that the people of the Dominican Republic should have a government of their own choosing."²³ Stevenson said in the United

²¹U. S. Congressional Record, Vol. III, Part 18, September 21, 1965, p. 24559.

²²U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, p. 871, May 3, 1965.

²³U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, p. 915, May 19, 1965.

Nations on May 19, 1965, "Let me repeat, Mr. President, that United States forces are not taking sides in this conflict ..."²⁴

Addressing himself to the same questions, United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States Ellsworth Bunker said on May 20, 1965 that in regard to the two contending forces "The United States forces in the Dominican Republic are not there to support either side against the other."²⁵

Ambassador Bunker also said on April 30, 1965 that:

The United States obviously has no candidate for the Government of the Dominican Republic; this is a matter for the Dominican people themselves. It is for the OAS to find the means to assist the Dominican people to constitute a government which reflects their wishes and a government which can undertake the international obligations of the hemisphere.²⁶

In regard to the nature of the revolution, the three actors apparently all perceived the Dominican civil war as a communist revolution which they viewed unfavorably; moreover, their viewpoints were consistent and did not change over time. Johnson was consistent over the long run in viewing unfavorably in twenty-six citations and 100% of the time the Dominican civil war as a communist revolution. The Secretary of State was consistent over the long run in nine citations and 100% of the time in viewing unfavorably the Dominican civil war

²⁴ U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, p. 914, May 19, 1965.

²⁵ U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, p. 909, May 20, 1965.

²⁶ U. S. Department of State Publication 7971, April 30, 1965.

as communist dominated. The secondary State Department officials were consistent over the long run in viewing unfavorably the Dominican civil war as communist dominated in twenty-three citations and 100% of the time.

In regard to the disposition of the three actors, the evidence indicates that the President, the Secretary of State, and the secondary State Department officials were in essential agreement on their viewpoints toward the Dominican guerrilla forces and Dominican government forces. Johnson was consistent over the long run in viewing the Dominican government forces and the Dominican guerrilla forces as balanced in twenty-two citations and 100% of the time. With one exception in which the Secretary of State was favorable to the government forces, Rusk was consistent over the long run in viewing the Dominican government forces and the guerrilla forces as balanced in ten citations and 90.9% of the time. The secondary State Department officials were consistent in viewing the Dominican government forces and the Dominican guerrilla forces as balanced in forty citations and 100% of the time.

With one exception in which the Secretary was favorable toward the Dominican government forces, all three actors were basically balanced in their respective viewpoints toward the Dominican guerrilla forces and the Dominican government forces; moreover, they were apparently consistent in their viewpoints toward the two contending antagonists over the long run. Based on the quantified evidence, the basic

hypothesis that the President, the Secretary of State, and the secondary State Department officials usually had homogeneous views on basic foreign policy questions is substantiated by the evidence.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As seen in the previous chapter, the United States took a strong stand against what its leaders perceived as a communist threat in the Dominican Republic. The question that normally follows is whether or not the United States action in the Dominican Republic was precipitous. Senator J. William Fulbright, Arkansas Democrat and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has been one of the most eloquent critics of the President's Dominican policy. Fulbright contended that Johnson's Dominican policy was characterized initially by "over-timidity and subsequently by overreaction."¹ He also argued that the President's military intervention was designed primarily to prevent the establishment of a so-called communist government and not primarily to save American nationals as originally was publicly stated.

The Senator, claiming that there was little evidence to support the thesis that the rebels were communist-dominated, also believed that the apprehension was predicated on inadequate and fragmentary data. On the contrary, the evidence indicated that a chaotic situation existed in which no single actor was dominant. He also argued that

¹U. S. Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, III, Part 18, 23855.

United States policy was characterized by insufficient candor and misinformation. The primary reason for the failure of U. S. policy in the Dominican Republic, according to Fulbright, was misinformation supplied the President by his top advisers. Because of reports exaggerating the extent of communist danger in Santo Domingo, he argued, United States unilateral military intervention resulted.

Theodore Draper, as discussed in the previous chapter, was critical of the President's claim as to the degree of communist influence on the rebel movement during the 1965 crisis. President Johnson announced a list of fifty-eight alleged communists purported to have participated in the revolution; Draper believes that the actual extent of communist influence during the crisis was highly exaggerated. He contends that a large number of so-called communists were in reality noncommunists, and some were out of the country during the early stages of the revolution.²

Senator Fulbright and author Theodore Draper contend that the President overreacted to the communist threat in the Dominican Republic. Regardless of whether one accepts this opinion, the President was faced with a perplexing problem. He was informed by his advisers that the communists posed a real threat of taking over control and direction of the guerrilla movement in the Dominican Republic. Based upon this advice, it is quite understandable how the decision to commit U. S.

²Draper, "The Dominican Crisis," pp. 33-70.

troops was made. Because of the exaggerated degree of communist influence in the Dominican crisis of 1965, this writer agrees with Senator Fulbright and Theodore Draper that the United States decision was precipitous.

This study may be summarized as follows: United States Government documents from April 25, 1965 through August 31, 1965 were selected for investigation to determine the validity of the thesis advanced by numerous political scientists that the President, the Secretary of State, and secondary State Department officials usually agree on basic foreign policy questions. An analysis of the positions held by the President, the Secretary of State, and secondary State Department officials was undertaken to ascertain whether or not they changed their stand on basic issues during the Dominican crisis of 1965. Another purpose of the research was to determine whether or not this foreign policy decision was a typical or an atypical exercise in United States foreign policy.

The directional categories of favorable, unfavorable, neutral, and balanced were selected to determine the attitude that the three actors took on selected topics. Criteria were established for each of the directional categories so that the data could be analyzed and tabulated according to its respective position (direction or meaning). Content was then analyzed to determine whether it was relevant.

The subject categories of (1) attitude of the United States government toward the Dominican revolution, communist or noncommunist,

and (2) attitude of the United States government -- i.e., the President, the Secretary of State, and the secondary State Department officials -- toward the Dominican guerrilla and Dominican government forces. The subject categories were selected exclusively from government sources published between April 25, 1965 and August 31, 1965.

The data were examined first to determine the content and secondly to ascertain its direction. The content was then recorded (tabulated) according to the sentence or any other specified content. The methodology utilized to reduce the large quantity of data to a more comprehensible or manageable size is "content analysis," a procedure which substantially reduces data and eventually determines tendencies or facts.

In order to place the findings in proper perspective, the Deutschian model was utilized to determine whether or not the 1965 intervention was a typical exercise in United States foreign policy. Deutschian communications model adopted cybernetics, the systematic study of communications and controls in all types of organizations, as the conceptual scheme for the analysis of relations among nations. Cybernetics suggest that all social organizations, including political systems, have similar characteristics and that, moreover, every social organization is held together by communications. These systems transmit messages containing quantities of information between or among organisms allowing them to interact with their environment. The feedback process is utilized by the political system as its guidance mechanism. As seen in the previous chapter, the foreign policy decision to intervene

militarily in the Dominican crisis basically fits within the Deutschian model and was therefore essentially a typical exercise in United States foreign policy decision making.

Because of the need to place this study in chronological order, a chapter of this thesis was devoted to a discussion of the major historical events between the two countries. As illustrated by U. S. military interventions in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic, the United States historically has shown special interest in the Dominican Republic.

In regard to the results of the quantification of the three actors' attitudes toward the selected questions, the evidence indicated that the President, the Secretary of State, and the secondary State Department officials were in essential agreement on their viewpoints toward the Dominican guerrilla forces and Dominican government forces. Johnson was consistent over the long run in viewing the Dominican government forces and the Dominican guerrilla forces as balanced in forty citations (100% of the time).

With one exception in which the Secretary was favorable toward the Dominican government forces (9.1% of the time), all three actors were basically balanced in their respective viewpoints toward the Dominican guerrilla forces and the Dominican government forces; moreover, they were apparently consistent in their viewpoints toward the two contending antagonists over the long run. Based on the quantified evidence, the basic hypothesis that the President, the Secretary of State, and

secondary State Department officials usually have homogeneous views on basic foreign policy questions was substantiated by the evidence.

Turning to diplomacy among the American republics, the United States has apparently taken a less belligerent stand against communism in the Western Hemisphere since 1965.³ In this relatively short time span, the United States has not taken an overtly belligerent stand against the establishment of the first constitutional (legitimate) Marxist regime in Latin America. While the United States government did not accept with open arms the Chilian election which empowered the Salvador Allende regime in 1970, it did not dispatch marines to overthrow this newest Marxist regime in Latin America.⁴ The U. S. phobia against communism in Latin America, as exemplified by Castro's Cuba, apparently has receded to some degree since 1965.

At the time of this writing, and with the possible exception of Vietnam and its adjacent states, unilateral U. S. military action in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was the last time that the United States took such a course of overt, military intervention against another

³The New York Times, May 3, 1965, p. 1. This is an article in which President Johnson indicated on May 2, 1965, that the United States would use unilateral military action, if necessary, to prevent the establishment of another communist regime in Latin America. This statement of policy became known as the "Johnson Doctrine."

⁴"The Square Scourge of Washington," Time, April 3, 1972, p. 40-44. This article is an exposé of the alleged complicity between the United States government and I.T.T. (International Telephone and Telegraph) to overthrow the Allende regime, as depicted by columnist Jack Anderson.

sovereign state. Apparently, the enunciated objective for the commitment of U. S. troops in the Dominican Republic was to prevent the spread of communism. This, along with the experience of the debacle in Vietnam, may indicate a need for a reevaluation of American foreign policy.

On the global level, one need only gauge the widespread public dissatisfaction with American involvement in Vietnam during the middle and late 60's to detect a growing opposition to U. S. foreign policy. These policies may have been a partial cause of the so-called Nixon Doctrine, which basically indicates a lower United States military profile in Asia and throughout the world. This new American policy in Southeast Asia, which the writer thinks reflects global U. S. policy, encourages other countries to take a greater hand in their own defense and rely less on the United States. This new policy is echoed in Europe where the President has been trying to get the NATO countries to take a greater share of the burden of their own defense.

To illustrate the recent change in U. S. foreign policy toward communism since 1965, one only needs to mention Nixon's trip to China, an amelioration in Sino-American relations engineered by a man once considered to be a fervent anti-communist in the earlier post-war period. Thus, there appears to be a thaw, if only temporarily, in United States foreign policy as we pass from a period of confrontation to one of more consultation and co-operation among nations. This might be considered a transition from the old days of the Cold War and so-called monolithic communism to a new era in world politics.

Given the reality of the present state of politics, there are certain signs, mentioned previously, that the United States is possibly moving in the direction of a new era in foreign policy. This new era will probably be characterized by an awareness of the limitations of American power. While the United States will continue for the foreseeable future to be the most powerful country in the free world, America can no longer consider itself the world's policeman. There will probably be less reliance on overt U. S. military action and more reliance on diplomacy to obtain foreign policy objectives. Nixon has placed more emphasis on encouraging our allies to carry a greater share of their own defense while emphasizing the need for a strong U. S. military deterrent, both nuclear and conventional, to ultimately meet any potential threat.

While the United States foreign policy has apparently been undergoing a transition in recent years, there appears to be certain propensities in foreign affairs that remain fairly consistent. In a small way, this thesis has validated the idea that has been advanced by numerous political scientists that the president and his top advisers usually arrive at a consensus on the basic foreign policy questions.

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
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APPENDIX


Secondary State Department Officials' Positions on Alleged Communist Revolution



MAJOR EVENTS DURING THIS PERIOD

- May 4 Col. Francisco Caamaño, President of "constitutionalist" force
- May 5 Act of Santo Domingo gave the OAS supervision of the cease-fire
- May 6 Creation of an Inter-American Peace Force to establish Constitutional Government in the Dominican Republic
- May 7 End of Col. Pedro Bartolomé Benoit as President of the Military Junta
- May 7 "Government of National Reconstruction" headed by Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera
- May 14 Security Council Authorizes U. N. representative in Dominican Republic
- August 9 Popular Socialist Party (PSP) changed its name to Dominican Communist Party
- August 30 End of "Government of National Reconstruction"
- August 31 End of "constitutionalist" force -- Caamaño Pres.
- August 31 End of Civil War
- September 3 Provisional Government -- Héctor García Godoy, Provisional President
- September Juan Bosch returned to the Dominican Republic


Secretary of State Dean Rusk's Positions on Alleged Communist Revolution



MAJOR EVENTS DURING THIS PERIOD

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|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| May 4-August 31 | Col. Francisco Caamaño, President of "constitutionalist" force |
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
Secondary State Department Officials' Positions on Alleged Contending Force



MAJOR EVENTS DURING THIS PERIOD

- April 25 Triumvirate Overthrown by coup d'etat
- April 25 through August 31 Civil War
- April 25 "Constitutional Government" Jose Rafael Molina Ureña, Acting President
- April 27 Military Junta -- Col. Pedro Bartolomé Benoit, President
- May 4 Col. Francisco Caamaño, President of "constitutionalist" force
- May 5 Act of Santo Domingo gave the OAS supervision of the cease-fire
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
SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK'S POSITIONS ON CONTENDING FORCE



MAJOR EVENTS DURING THIS PERIOD

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|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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President Lyndon B. Johnson's Position on Alleged Contending Force



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September 3 Provisional Government -- Héctor García Godoy,
Provisional President

September Juan Bosch returned to the Dominican Republic

Vita was removed during scanning