Trust and Distrust
in Rebel-Held Côte d'Ivoire

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Abstract

This thesis offers a unique view of everyday life during the war and rebel rule in the town of Man in the West of Côte d'Ivoire between 2002 and 2010. It compellingly shows how the rebel-civilian relationship was transformed in the course of the conflict from a war-like situation to a more stable governance situation. Drawing on the author's own experience of living in the rebel-controlled town of Man, the ethnography develops the argument that those who stayed in the rebel-held areas developed attitudes and practices of trust and distrust that allowed them to continue living along with the rebels.

From a theoretical point of view, the thesis uses the analytical lens of 'trust' to look at how local people dealt with the massive transformation induced by the violent conflict. It adopts a Simmelian notion of trust, describing trust as a state between knowing and not-knowing. Trust may be defined as a confident expectation that others will act in a benevolent way. As misplaced trust may have fatal consequences, particularly in violent conflicts, people seek signs of trustworthiness before they trust. Nevertheless, trust always contains an element of uncertainty. In order to experience the fulfilment of trust, we have to risk disappointment, as well. Based on these different qualities of trust, I argue that trust may be re-established not only *after* the political situation has improved, but also prior to political transformations since actors who are willing to trust are crucial for the initiation of political transformations. This forward-pushing dimension of trust has been largely neglected by rational choice-based theories of trust, but proved salient in my study for the return of a new normality in everyday life and for peace.

Trust has become established as a recognized object of social science research over the last three decades, although anthropology has only made minor contributions to this field so far. The major contribution of the thesis to trust research is its theorisation of negative forms of trust, proposing a distinction between 'distrust' and 'mistrust' on the basis of predictability.

Résumé

Cette thèse offre une vision unique du vécu quotidien sous le régime rebelle pendant la période de guerre entre 2002 et 2010 dans la ville de Man à l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire. Elle met en évidence le processus de transformation de la relation entre rebelles et civils qui est passée d'une situation de guerre à une situation de gouvernance plus stable au cours du conflit. En s'appuyant sur l'expérience de l'auteur qui a vécu dans la ville de Man, contrôlée à cette période par les rebelles, cette étude ethnographique développe l'argument selon lequel ceux qui sont restés dans les zones tenues par les rebelles ont développé des attitudes et des pratiques de confiance et de méfiance qui leur ont permis de continuer à vivre avec les rebelles.

D'un point de vue théorique, la thèse utilise le prisme analytique de la 'confiance' pour étudier comment la population locale a fait face à la transformation massive induite par le conflit violent. Elle adopte la notion de confiance selon Simmel, décrivant ainsi la confiance comme un état entre savoir et ne pas savoir/ignorer. La confiance peut être définie comme une attente confiante que les autres agissent de manière bienveillante. Ainsi, une confiance mal placée peut avoir des conséquences fatales surtout dans les conflits violents où les gens cherchent des signes de confiance avant de faire confiance. Néanmoins, la confiance contient toujours un élément d'incertitude. Pour vivre l'expérience de la confiance, nous devons également prendre le risque d'être déçus. Sur la base de ces différentes qualités de la confiance, je soutiens que la confiance peut être rétablie non seulement *après* l'amélioration de la situation politique, mais aussi avant les transformations politiques, car les acteurs qui sont prêts à faire confiance sont essentiellement pour le lancement des transformations politiques. Cette dimension de la confiance qui pousse vers l'avant a été largement négligée par les théories de la confiance fondées sur les choix rationnels. Mais elle s'est révélée essentielle dans mon étude pour le retour d'une nouvelle normalité dans la vie quotidienne et pour la paix.

La confiance est devenue au cours de ces trois dernières décennies un objet de recherche des sciences sociales, bien que jusqu'à présent l'anthropologie n'ait apporté que des contributions mineures à ce domaine. La contribution majeure de la thèse à la recherche sur la confiance est sa conceptualisation des formes négatives de la confiance, proposant une distinction entre '*distrust*' et '*mistrust*' sur la base de la prévisibilité.

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Notes on Style and Transcription conventions

I use different quotation marks to distinguish between different sources. I use double quotation marks only when I quote a specific speaker from an interview transcript or written text (also academic literature), i.e. sources that are verifiable. Long quotes are marked by a new paragraph in the text and are without quotation marks. I use single quotation marks in each of the following four cases: A) for quotations within quotations, B) for figurative and conceptual meaning and C) when I imitate local discourse in order to show how locals make sense of a situation and express themselves quoting no one specific. These half- or quasi-quotes are based on sedimented knowledge acquired during field research and from re-listening to interviews. I also use single quotation marks in a fourth case when: D) quoting from field notes (hence from my memory) and not from an interview transcription.

I used a transcription convention that is easily understandable, but a few notes should help clarification.

@   Laughter: one @ corresponds to "ha", @@ to "haha"

…   Speaker's pause

[…]   Author's deletion of speech segments to shorten the excerpt

[ ]   Insertion of extra information by the author, as in [to the chief]

NON   Capitals mark loudness

*   Name changed, particularly used when names are mentioned in quotations

I restricted editing the excerpts to a minimum to maintain the original style of expression. As we know from sociolinguistics, vernacular speech does not respect standardised grammar rules or vocabulary, which is why I have not marked deviations from standard French language conventions by adding [sic.]. If someone's statement immediately follows a question from me, the researcher, I include the question. Often however, after I had explained my research topic in a few sentences, people talked without me interrupting with questions.

Abbreviations

APO	Accord Politique de Ouagadougou
CAV	Centre audio-visuel, the multi-use hall of the Catholic Church Centre in Man
CCI	Centre de Commandement Intégré
CEI	Commission Indépendante Électorale
CIE	La Compagnie Ivoirienne de l'électricité
CNSP	Comité National de Salut Public
C.O.	Commandant d'opérations
Com-zone	Commandant de zone, New Forces' local commander-in-chief
Dir-cab	Directeur du cabinet civil of the New Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FN	Forces Nouvelles, New Forces
FANCI	National Armed Forces of the Côte d'Ivoire
FDS	Forces de Défenses et de Sécurité
FPI	Front Populaire Ivoirien
FRCI	Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
LMP	La Majorité Présidentielle
MACA	Maison d'arrêt et de correction d'Abengourou/Abidjan
MILOCI	Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MJP	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix
MPCI	Mouvement Patriotique pour la Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO	Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ONUCI	Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire
PCO	Poste de Commandement Opérationnel
PDCI	Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire
RDR	Rassemblement des Républicains
RHDP	Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix
UDPCI	Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire
UDPCI-VG	Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire-Vision Guéï Robert

Foreword and Acknowledgements

In 2020, Côte d'Ivoire is still struggeling with a democratic change of power, with an election process that is rule-governed, inclusive, transparent and trustful. Rivalries between the three big party leaders Henri Konan Bédié, Alassane Ouattara, Laurent Gbagbo are reminiscent of scenes in 1995, 2000 and 2010. There is an urgent need to address the root causes and change the country's political culture. The announcement of Alassane Ouattara's third term in office has produced its first victims. Will the conflict turn violent again? We all hope not.

In 2008, I was given a great opportunity: to become part of a comparative research project on "Regaining Trust in Post-Conflict Societies" with experienced scholars, Prof. Dr. Till Förster, Prof. Dr. Gregor Dobler and Dr. Kerstin Bauer. This project allowed me to spend time with people living along with rebels and to conduct field research for my PhD. It was a privilege to work empirically and theoretically in such a stimulating environment in Côte d'Ivoire and in Switzerland, and I am very grateful for the support I received.

Particularly, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Till Förster, who introduced me to the pleasure of fieldwork in Bamenda, Cameroon in 2003, in my fourth year at university. He has played a crucial role in the development and design of the study and has made numerous theoretical and methodological contributions. He has been a marvellous companion during fieldwork and provided great support throughout this project.

Special thanks also to Prof. Dr. Mirjam de Bruijn, who was so kind as to accept becoming involved in this thesis at an advanced stage of the project. She has encouraged me to 'listen' to my data and to develop my own ideas. Her fresh view from the outside helped me to clarify my approach and perspective. For all this, and her generosity in accepting certain time constraints, I am deeply indebted to her.

Kerstin Bauer has been an invaluable mentor and friend who contributed to this project from its beginnings. During the last stage of my thesis, she commented on some of my chapters, provided me with decisive suggestions and asked the right questions that kept me searching for better answers. I am most indebted to her for thinking through findings with me, as well as for

giving me guidance and confidence. Gregor Dobler offered directive comments at a few critical points during my PhD that pushed me to sharpen my ideas for which I am very grateful.

I would like to thank Michelle Engeler and Andrea Kaufmann, who were working on their dissertations at the same time as me, for sharing the ups and downs of the analysis and writing process: Special thanks to Andrea for her support, comments on first drafts, the exchange of ideas about post-conflict contexts, as well as the opportunity to visit her in Monrovia, Liberia which allowed me to discover another post-war society. Special thanks to Michelle for her constant calls, for our discussions about youth and for visiting me in Man. Many thanks also to Divine Fuh, Rita Kesselring, Lucy Koechlin, and Peter Lindenmann for their encouragement and comments on several occasions.

I am deeply grateful to my husband, Gerome Tokpa, for being both the hardest critic of my work and an unconditional fan, and for having taken me to Man in September 2008. I am full of gratitude for his astonishing ability to cheer me up and lift my spirits at moments when I was almost giving up. Heartfelt thanks to my parents, Dr. Annekäthi Heitz-Weniger and Dr. Christian Heitz for all they have done for me, including understanding my desire to head off to pastures new. Special thanks to my mother for proofreading the German summary, and for sharing the joys and sorrows of this long project with me. I also owe a substantial debt to my sister Caroline Heitz, who with great intellectual skill has always put my reasoning back on track and masterfully produced the maps. I am grateful to Hani El Suede for compiling the findings from the questionnaires. Many thanks also to Franziska Jenni, *sama magg*, for substantively editing the German summary, for her incessant support and the many profound discussions – may it always be thus.

I am full of gratitude to the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) for having funded this research project. Furthermore, I gratefully acknowledge the State of Côte d'Ivoire and the military authorities of the New Forces' zone six for granting me authorisation to do research in Man. During my stay in Côte d'Ivoire, I was supported by the Centre Suisse des Recherches Scientifiques (CSRS) and the Alassane-Ouattara-University of Bouaké for which I am most grateful.

I am also greatly indebted to the following people for critical and encouraging feedback on my work and support in various ways in relation to this PhD project on different occasions:

Adrienne Mannov, Agnes Hess, Alexander Keese, Alfred Babo, Alice Hills, Andrea Kaiser-Grolimund, Andreas Mehler, Alemmaya Mulugeta Abebe, Anne Mentzel, Balz Alter, Barbara

All views and mistakes herein are my own. If this endeavour can make a contribution to our knowledge about trust and social life during violent conflict and serve as a resource for further research, I will be well satisfied.

I have had a wonderful time doing field work in Man thanks to many people. Heartfelt thanks go to my in-laws, *les Tokpa*, and to the entire Chérif family, who have given me a home in Man and Abidjan. *Jërajëf* to Fama and her family for their friendship and the delicious Senegalese meals. Thanks also to Monsieur and Madame Gbe, Maméry Soumahoro and many, many more. Due to the sensitivity of the topic and for reasons of confidentiality, I am unable to put down the names of my research participants who generously told me their stories, patiently answered my questions and spent time with me. I owe a substantial debt to everyone who shared their experiences and views – the backbone of this dissertation. These gifts of trust cannot be easily reciprocated. Rather than list their names here, I have tried to give research participants a hand in their own (life) projects. Last but not least, I especially acknowledge the constant support of my research assistant Richard Gonty Dan for his work as a driver, companion, translator and fearless middleman.

When, in mid-2011, rebel rule came to an end in Man with the removal of their taxation system, a chapter closed in the history of Côte d'Ivoire's mountainous west. Times of war and rebel rule had brought a lot of distress to this region, saddening and impoverishing many families. It is with extraordinary perseverance and patience that people in this region, first- and latecomers, militarised or not, have endured these times together. Knowing that the following text cannot

do justice to actually lived experience, I dedicate this ethnography to the residents of the region of Man.

Basel, in October 2013

In the 2020 version, minor changes requested from the referees have been integrated, but otherwise the text corresponds to the version submitted in 2013. I am most indebted to Dr. Silvia Dingwall, who agreed to read through the manuscript for language review. I am also grateful to Catherine Matter and George Pitcher for proofreading parts of my text in 2013. I also acknowledge the journal Social Anthropology for allowing me to publish the first empirical chaper (chapter 7) here. It was first published in 2016 in volume 24, number 4, pages 419–432 under the title "The onset of war as a novel experience: Dislocation and familiarisation in Côte d'Ivoire, late 2002".

Abidjan/Basel, in October 2020

1 Introduction

At one point during rebel rule, a young man quit his job at one of the local sawmills and was given one million as a gratuity. Somehow a rebel got wind of it and came, the same evening, to demand 'his share'. The youth of the village resisted and beat the rebel badly. The following night, the rebel came back with his comrades as reinforcement. Many villagers were brutally attacked, including the village chief. The young man who had received the one million died from his injuries.[1]

Incidences like this were frequent in the region of Man in western Côte d'Ivoire during this period. A seemingly 'trivial' situation could cause exaggerated reactions from other young men, turn violent and come to a sorry end. Often such incidents were about money or women. Most of the time, low or mid-ranking rebel soldiers were involved.

People in Man generally ascribed such tragic events to the socio-political crisis. One could no longer trust people to respect the basic social rules of how to relate to one another. Assessing who to trust – or rather who to distrust – in particular situations proved critical. During the crisis, misplaced trust could have not just harmful but fatal outcomes. The ability to assess other actors' trustworthiness and predict their actions was vital, particularly in interactions with rebels.

But a 'rebel' was a new type of actor, and war a new condition, for people in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002.[2] It was unclear to what extent norms from pre-war days were still applicable and whether social actors could still be trusted. What the rebellion meant for daily social life had yet to be discovered; how best to deal with rebels had first to be ascertained. The assessment of others' trustfulness turned out to be crucial for the management of social life in times of violent

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[1] I will come back to this ethnographic example at the very end of my dissertation.
[2] In Chapter 6, I will distinguish between 'new' and 'novel'.

conflict.[3] Understanding how actors distinguished between trustful and less trustful situations in the Ivorian conflict is therefore the topic of this ethnography.

This research theme speaks to a larger question that this dissertation attempts to address: How is trust transformed in violent conflict? Is social trust in insecure settings lost completely or to what extent may trust still persist? And how can trust be built and re-built after social divisions?

These are the leading questions that stood at the outset of this research project *Regaining trust and civil security after conflict* (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007b). This overall research objective is geared at the study of trust in a context where conditions for trust are first and foremost precarious. Violent conflict has to do with political divisions, persecution, insecurity and uncertainty. In short, it is a social context that warrants distrust first. Misplaced trust and misjudgements of security situations may have fatal consequences, as in the example above. In line with the focus of the research project (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007c), trust is examined in relation to security and insecurity. Therefore, I will use trust in this study in close relationship to questions of actors' assessment of safety: How do actors evaluate their safety in relation to other people? Can they trust them not to cause harm? The ethnography analyses trust situations taking a diachronic perspective and involving military and civilian actors. The initial thesis is that trust and distrust must be patterned – to a certain extent at least – and be discernible to actors familiar with the political and social context. I want to find out how actors distinguished between trustful and distrustful situations and suggest some reasons why they made these distinctions.

Drawing on existing analytical frameworks, this study is thoroughly grounded in an ethnographic case-study based on the rebel-held region of Man in western Côte d'Ivoire during the violent conflict in the time between 2002 and 2010. Although frequently mentioned in passing, little systematic empirical research on trust has been made in societies that experience violent conflict.[4] The investigation has therefore an explorative character. It sheds light on various facets of trust and distrust hitherto neglected. With an analytical lens on trust, my objective is to contribute to our knowledge of social life and agency in violent conflict. Based on a micro-analysis of trust situations, this ethnography develops a conceptual framework of trust, distrust and mistrust for contexts of violent political conflict.

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[3] Contrary to 'trustworthiness' the term 'trustfulness' stresses nuances of trustworthiness. The term will be explained in Chapter 4.

[4] Trust has been studied intensively in post-socialist societies (from a social anthropologist point of view see: Torsello 2003).

Trust – fashionable yet elusive

Many of the academic texts about trust introduce the theme with expressions of fascination and frustration (Lyon, Möllering, and Saunders 2012b). Trust fascinates and is fashionable, yet it has remained (almost) frustratingly difficult to capture. In public discourse and across various disciplines, trust has attracted attention in current debates on how societies are organised, prosper and change, as well as on how actors make choices about future action. Trust has been described as a salient variable for explaining the functioning of social life. It is considered to be indispensable for tying relationships, knitting the social fabric and linking the individual to society at large.

Despite burgeoning scholarship on the topic,[5] trust is still an elusive phenomenon, meaning different things in different contexts, which makes it hard to describe (Endress 2002). Disciplines ranging from philosophy, theology and sociology, over economics to political science and psychology have tried to address trust in their respective fields. This has led to a plethora of conceptions. Offering a neat description of trust therefore remains a difficult task. If there is agreement in the literature, it is that trust is an extremely multifaceted phenomenon (Yamagishi 2004, 847–48). Some of these facets shift between seemingly opposing poles of conscious and unconscious, emotional and rational, referring to different objects ranging from the particular to the abstract.

Trust is said to comprise at least three qualitative dimensions: social, affective and cognitive (Ross 2010, 1811–12). Trust has a social dimension as it connects us to our environment.[6] It has an affective dimension involving complex, non-basic emotions such as anxiety, pride, shame or envy (Engelen et al. 2009, 40), and it has a cognitive dimension in that trust is sensitive

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[5] At the beginning of the 1980s, academic studies focusing on trust were rare (Deutsch 1958; Luhmann 1968). Trust only became of increasing interest in the following two decades (Lewis and Weigert 1985; Baier 1986; Gambetta 1988b; Giddens 1990; Hardin 1991; Jones 1996; Fukuyama 1995; Govier 1997; Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999; Warren 1999b). Since then, trust has been a burgeoning field of study (Lahno 2002; Möllering 2006; Salaj 2006; Zaheer and Bachmann 2006; Marty 2010; Grøn 2010). Over the last decade, the Russell Sage Foundation series on trust has published over a dozen of edited volumes, including: Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Cook 2001b; Hardin 2002; Hardin 2004b; Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005, 2009; Habyarimana et al. 2009.

[6] Social trust and self-trust: There is a point where trust as social trust and self-trust merge. (Note that Govier and Giddens, for instance, have published works on both social trust and self-trust (Giddens 1991, Govier 1993). This is due to the fact that the experience of trust from the actor's point of view oscillates between both the evaluation of the social context and the subjective self (Grøn and Welz 2010). I will adopt a sociological approach rather than focussing on individual, psychological aspects.

to evidence based on more rational assessments of trustworthiness (Govier 1997, Hardin 2006). None of these components, however, can stand alone; trust must be where they intersect (Lewis and Weigert 1985).[7] No definition of trust has so far become generally accepted, even though most definitions share a few common features. Perhaps no single master definition can cover all aspects and fit every context due to the variety of situations where trust is relevant (Stanton 2011, 1).[8]

Defining trust

Let me start with a minimal definition that describes trust in a very broad or general sense: Trust may be understood as the confident assessment or expectation about how others will act (Giddens 1991; Offe 2001, 249; Endress 2002, 15; Förster 2007b; Fuchs-Heinritz 2011, 735).[9] This conception stresses aspects of predictability that are centre stage in this ethnography. In this sense, trust means the opposite of uncertainty, namely feeling confident about anticipating others' actions in everyday situations.

When formulated in such an open sense, trust may, however, also include the expectation of harmful acts. For the empirical context of this study – that is trust in relation to security/insecurity in violent conflict – I will clearly distinguish between non-harmful (safe) and harmful expectations (unsafe). Consequently, trust refers to a *benevolent* expectation, whereas distrust refers to a *malevolent* expectation. Favourable, benign or 'positive'

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[7] The components can be stronger or weaker depending on e.g. its referent object (friends or an institution). For anthropological studies on emotions, see (Lutz and White 1986; Röttger-Rössler 2004; Röttger-Rössler and Markowitsch 2009).

[8] The closest term to trust (in German *Vertrauen*) is probably confidence (in German *Zuversicht, Zutrauen*). Some texts treat confidence and trust interchangeably (Blind 2007, 3) and others distinguish them. Authors who link trust to risk analysis often follow Luhmann, who speaks of trust in the case of risks and of confidence in relation to dangers (Luhmann 1968, 1990; Offe 1999, 44). My ethnography uses the term trust as defined below.

[9] Govier uses expectation and assumption interchangeably; her understanding was taken as a basis for the research project (Govier 1997, 4): "In its most general sense, trust is the assumption that others will act in a particular way." (Förster 2007b, 2) In scholarship that does not follow rational choice theory, this broad conceptionalisation finds many corresponding expressions: for instance: "Vertrauen ist eine Überzeugung über das Handeln des anderen." (Offe 2001, 249) "Vertrauen als Hypothese künftigen Verhaltens" (Endress 2002, 15). "Vertrauen heisst die mit Risiken belastete Zuversicht, dass sich die Personen und Objekte in meinem Umfeld gemäss meinen Vorstellungen verhalten." (Fuchs-Heinritz 2011, 735)

expectations regarding how others will act are a frequent element in trust definitions (Möllering 2001, 404; Ross 2010, 1810; Rousseau et al. 1998, 395).[10]

In Chapter 4, I will further elaborate on different facets of the notion and explain the approach to trust and distrust adopted in this study. In the remainder of the introduction, I will link trust to the study of order and (in)security, and situate this research project in existing scholarship of violent conflicts. I will end this chapter by presenting the outline of the thesis.

Social life and the omnipresence of trust

Social order, predictability and trust

A large part of everyday social life is patterned according to ascribed roles and routine sets of interactions. These socially normed ways of relating to one another provide us a sense of predictability in social life (Garfinkel 1967). By predictability I mean "the ability […] to formulate more or less safe expectations concerning the actions of others" (Macamo 2017 [2008], 64). Thanks to habitualised practices, we feel confident about what kind of actions to expect from other people, at least within a certain range.[11]

By acting according to social norms, each of us contributes to the co-construction and maintenance of an ordered social life. We can never know for sure though whether others will also adhere to the same basic rules of social life. The future remains inherently open and our capability to predict or anticipate others' actions is limited (Förster 2007b, 2). This is where trust comes in. According to Lewis and Weigert (1985), "trust begins where prediction ends." (Lewis and Weigert 1985, 976) No matter how we reason or calculate, we will never be able to make absolutely certain predictions about future outcomes. Therefore, trust is conceived as an omnipresent element of social life, and hence embedded in practices and examinable in social interactions.[12]

Usually, we can and do trust that other people, too, will act according to social norms. If we did not trust others in this respect, our lives would be extremely complicated, exhausting and also

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[10] Some conceptions include a moral assessment, in relation to such concepts as integrity, of the kind of person that the other is (Govier 1997, 6).

[11] Predictabilities, certainties and knowledge are, of course, subjectively constructed (Dewey [1929] 1990). For further discussion, see the theoretical chapter on trust.

[12] This epistemological aspect will be addressed in Chapter 5.

somewhat threatening. We would have to be constantly alert to everything that is happening around us, checking for deviant actions. Theoretically, the possibilities for what could happen to us at any moment in time are potentially infinite. Someone could approach and embarrass us in public with a bunch of roses. A loose tile could fall from a roof and hit us. Or the falling pieces from a collapsing sky-scraper someone deliberately crashed into with a hijacked airplane could bury us. From this perspective, social life is full of uncertainties that are always dependent on other people's actions, with surprises that may be wonderful, but also unpleasant and nasty.

The way trust functions is that it pushes fear and uncertainty out of daily life (Miztal 1996), allowing us to banish from our consciousness the open-ended list of eventualities that may or may not happen (Govier 1997, 128). To trust means that we do not (have to) reckon with particular things. This form of trust is based on the predictability of social order, which can be described as an "arrangement of omissions" of what will not happen (Popitz 1999, 88). Thereby, trust reduces the social complexity of daily life (Luhmann 1968) and provides us with a sense of "ontological security"[13], predictability and stability (Giddens 1990, 98).

Uncertainty, security and insecurity

The onset of violent conflict constitutes a situation in which we can no longer take the social order we are used to for granted. This diminishes the predictability of social life, hence creating uncertainty. We are required to re-evaluate whether we can still trust that others will not do us harm. Furthermore, the use of violence creates physical insecurity so that we have to re-evaluate whether we are still safe. This distinction between uncertainty, in the sense of unpredictability, and (predictable) insecurity will be important for my analysis (Dewey [1929] 1990; Beck 1992).

This study uses security in its "classic" sense of whether [actors] "feel safe" or not (Hills 2009b, 80).[14] As "security cannot exist in isolation, it is always defined in relation to something or

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[13] Ontological security will be further explained in Chapter 4.

[14] In the twenty-first century, security has turned into a "political obsession" (Bubandt 2005, 278). The questions we ask about security and what we mean by it have radically changed over the last twenty years, and what security means is contested today (Smith 2000). Furthermore, the classic referent of security, the nation-state has given way to a whole range of security recipients, as is also the case with human security (Paris 2001). The Copenhagen school of security studies has done a lot of work on securitisation, which in a constructivist sense is geared to making something a security issue in order to legitimise special measures (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). Many anthropological studies on security can be said to focus on (discursive) practices of securitisation (Goldstein 2010, 492). The concept of trust in my research is related to issues of physical security and social order. In a context of war, rebel rule and post-conflict settings, both might be precarious or even absent at least temporarily.

someone" (ibid., 81).[15] Consequently, one of the central questions will always be: "security from what or whom?" (Amouyel 2006, 10), or put the other way round: who produces insecurity for whom?

Obviously, trust in its unconscious form is diminished if we start thinking about security in such a way. Therefore, the research project focuses on offering insights into how 'more or less consciously evaluated' forms of trust and assessments of security are replaced by more non-reflective forms of trust (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007b).

Trust and order in violent conflict

To describe transformations of trust, we have to know the context we are dealing with. Consequently, literature that helps us to understand dynamics of civil wars, violent actor groups, insurgent rule and social agency will be reviewed. However, to review all the literature from the field of political science and history, for instance, is beyond the scope of this ethnography. Therefore, with a few exceptions, I will focus on literature from social anthropology and African studies.

The discussion of the different literature will explore what it can possibly tell us about social trust in the context of violent conflict. I will begin this review with the political science literature in which we find the earliest references to trust in relation to civil wars.

No state, no trust

The topic of trust in political violent conflicts has received the most scholarly attention in the political sciences (Kasfir 2003; Widner 2003; Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005). At least since Hobbes' *Leviathan* (Hobbes [1651]), the prevailing opinion has been that trust fades in parallel with state failure (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007c).[16] Such a view is largely informed by the Hobbesian view of a war of all against all: "It was a classic conviction (going back to Thomas Hobbes) that a 'primitive' or 'natural' state of society would be characterised by omnipresent

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[15] In my ethnography I will stress relational and physical aspects of security, and look less at territorial ones (Hills 2009, 81).

[16] This strand of research produced a plethora of labels qualifying the state, e.g. "weak state" (Migdal 1988), "quasi-state" (Jackson 1990), "shadow state" (Cruise O'Brien 1991; Reno 2000), "vampire state" (Frimpong-Ansah 1991), "collapsed state" (Zartman 1995), "failed state" (Rotberg 2003b) and "warlord state" (Reno 1998), to name but a few.

violence." (Elwert 2001, 2542) The state was seen as the only locus of order and scholars presumed that societies without a state inevitably descended into nightmarish "chaos" (Rotberg 2003a).[17] In political science research, this view has dominated many studies. Areas in which the state has lost its monopoly of force have been described as shaped by insecurity, predation and even "de-civilisation" (Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005, 148–50).[18]

In this account, state failure goes hand in hand with *social* decay (Kasfir 2003, 71). In line with this argument, political scientists assumed that social trust must diminish as well (Kasfir 2003).[19] All that was imaginable was that "intersubjective trust would replace the general validity of rules and laws" (Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005, 142).[20] In other words, the only form of trust 'left' would be between individuals who knew each other personally. Social life under conditions of war was seen as reduced to dyadic relationships. Consequently, the social became unimaginable beyond the intersubjective.

The major problem of this rather dominant 'no state, no trust'-argument is that it began with false presumptions of what wars are like, grounded in inappropriate understandings of social-conflict dynamics (Kalyvas 2006). Civil wars and violent conflicts are not exclusively about chaos. Without denying that disorder is an integral part of violent conflicts, there is a need to look more carefully at variants of (dis-)orderliness and (in)security. In short, the question of how societies and trust are transformed by war requires empirical research. Having participated in the everyday of a society under rebel control, I came to realise that it is the grey areas – the variants between societal chaos and a well-functioning state – that matter in people's lives in such areas. Consequently, before focusing on trust, we will first have to revise our

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[17] That societies do not need a state to be ordered was an early observation in (British) Social Anthropology (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1950).

[18] Although the narrative of the dehumanised stateless society has been recalibrated, as the discussion below will show, it is still widespread particularly in discussions of "youth violence" (Chabal 2009, 159; Kurtenbach, Blumör, and Huhn 2011). Young violent actors seem to offer the ideal group on which to project images of a chaotic, violent and dehumanised social life.

[19] Due to the chaos, it became impossible to "assess each other's intentions" resulting in a climate of suspicion and distrust (Kasfir 2003, 58). The literature on state failure that paid at least some attention to social trust has many other shortcomings. The debate has been criticised for its limited descriptive approach, which at the end of the day had little to say about socio-political organisations and empirical statehood in general and Africa in particular (Förster 2007a; Hagmann and Hoehne 2009).

[20] "Intersubjektives Vertrauen erstetzt die allgemeine Gültigkeit von Regeln und Gesetzen." (Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005, 142)

understanding of violent conflicts, which is why I will review research on political orders and non-state security governance next, even though it has shown little interest in the topic of trust.

Political order beyond the state

The shortcomings in early texts on the subject mentioned above were soon redressed in a wave of publications that was grounded in empirical research on political order(s) beyond the state and/or in times of crisis (Arnaut and Højbjerg 2008; Bellagamba and Klute 2008). These studies showed that even if the state's bureaucracy was absent in a certain area, statehood as an image and practice continued to inform people's social practices and imaginations (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Förster 2004, 2012b, 2012a; Kaufmann 2013). Different notions were proposed to capture the various political orders actually found on the ground. Ethnographic field research identified "hybrid political orders" (Boege et al. 2009) or "concentric political orders"[21] (von Trotha 2001, 266). For example, in northern Mali, non-state local actors ("intermediate rulers") in what Klute and von Trotha termed a "para-sovereign" political order have taken over both rights and administrative functions formally attributed to the state (Klute and von Trotha 2000; Klute and von Trotha 2004, 110).

Basically, what fieldwork-based research has revealed "beside the state" (Bellagamba and Klute 2008) are "strong societies" (Migdal 1988). A major achievement of this strand of research has been to brush aside the gloomy picture of chaos and disintegration and point to some forms of order. Some of the patterns of order observed can be traced back to pre-colonial forms of authority, while others were either creations of colonial rule or strongly shaped by it. A third group includes more recent actors such as international NGOs or other ephemeral strongmen (de Bruijn 2008; Förster 2009, 2010). Even if questions of social trust are not in the foreground of this strand of research, it still suggests that, in areas beyond state control, there is order and consequently also social trust (in the sense of predictability).

Various security actors

The strand of research presented so far framed its findings largely in relation to the state, contributing to a particular field in the anthropology of the state.[22] What became clear from

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[21] According to von Trotha, "concentric political orders" are less concerned with territorial rule than with the domination of people and communities (von Trotha 2001, 266).

[22] For extensive reviews of other major fields of study in relation to the anthropology of the state, see e.g. Sharma and Gupta 2006. As a matter of fact, the causes of internal wars have been seen as "inextricably linked" to the crisis and weakness of the African state (Jackson 2002, 48).

these ethnographies was that a whole range of so-called non-state actors[23] played a significant role in many societies undergoing conflicts, particularly in the field of security, and they had to be taken more serious as governance providers.

These ethnographic studies followed the classical Weberian conception of the state as the key protector and gave security a particular focus. They identified a plethora of security actors, ranging from community-watch teams or vigilantes to 'neo-traditional' hunters or clan-based groups, as well as to political militias, state armed forces and international peace-keepers (Klute and von Trotha 2004, 110; Hoehne 2006; Pratten and Sen 2007; Hills 2009a; Mehler 2009a; Baker 2010; Förster 2010, 703; Kirsch and Grätz 2010).

One of the key questions is, of course, who provides security for whom (Mehler 2009a). Based on extensive comparative research, Bruce Baker argues that, in post-conflict Africa, non-state actors are the preferred security providers at the neighbourhood-level and for everyday policing (Baker 2010). We may interpret this as a sign of trust in non-state actors but also as a sign of their availability in large states that simply lack the capacity to be 'everywhere' (Herbst 2000). Having said that, it has also to be stressed that so-called legitimate state actors have far too often also used their force illegitimately (Baker 2010, 12–13), which has undermined trust in state security providers and state institutions as a whole, e.g. in Côte d'Ivoire (Förster 2004; Bassett 2003; Hellweg 2004).

The security situation sketched out so far has been conceptualised as an "oligopoly of violence" (Mehler 2004)[24], where one of these violent actors or security forces is the most powerful and leads the "market of violence" (Elwert 2001). However, as Förster has rightly criticised, it is not violence but security that people require (Förster 2009, 333). In his work on Niger, Göpfert therefore suggested adopting an inclusive approach to security grounded in the social fabric:

State or non-state, organised or non-organised, these institutions, groups and actors should be explored as equal parts in a complex field of security delivery. One way to do so is, I suggest, to acknowledge the inseparability of security and sociality, the fragile balance of trust and acceptable risk. (Göpfert 2012, 68)

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[23] See Chapter 3 with the sub-heading "Rebels with a military background" for a critique of the state versus non-state distinction.

[24] Oligopolies of violence are comprised of "a fluctuating number of partly competing, partly cooperating actors of violence of different quality" (Mehler 2009a, 60).

Insurgent governance

The insight that other actors beside the state crucially shaped public authority and provided a large part of public services led to a shift of perspective (Lund 2007). The opinion took root that there are various governance providers at work without minimising the role of the state (Olivier de Sardan 2004, Förster and Koechlin 2011). As a matter of fact, it makes sense to distinguish between different 'governance figurations' closely linked to different security arrangements. Förster has distinguished the following four governance figurations that I will use to characterise different phases in Man (Förster and Koechlin 2011, 13–14):

    1. Contingent polycentric figurations,

    2. Segmentary figurations,

    3. Contractual figurations,

    4. Figurations with one dominant actor.

A contingent polycentric figuration refers to a "confusing war-like setting" with several powerful actors, some of them stronger than others (ibid. 13). It can be described as an "oligopoly of violence", as mentioned above (Mehler 2004). Societal trust is reduced to intersubjective trust with familiar actors (Förster and Koechlin 2011, 13). In the figuration with "one dominant actor", one actor clearly dominates. This may be a state, but other dominant actors may also prevail. A figuration with one dominant actor generally produces an ordered social life and thereby creates trust in the sense of predictability. The dominant actor may draw on different sources of legitimacy, cultural, religious, performance/output (e.g. in the case of large companies) (ibid., 14).

Segmentary governance is based on trust in shared norms and values, and governance actors are related by a more "complementary" than a competing character (ibid., 13–14; Förster 2015b). Lastly, in a contractual figuration, governance actors are "contracting partners" and do not necessarily share the same cultural background. Consequently, trust is more institutional and based on what has been agreed on in negotiations (ibid. 14).

Other studies on "insurgent governance" have analysed variations in the civilian-military nexus (Weinstein 2007; Mampilly 2011). Whereas Weinstein's approach is almost exclusively grounded in economics, Mampilly argues more on the basis of socio-political dynamics. The relationship between rulers and ruled, he observes, are shaped by: 1) civilians, 2) dynamics among the insurgents and 3) transnational actors. All three elements influence how rebels treat

the civilian populations (Mampilly 2007). Whereas Mampilly's research is certainly a mile stone in research on insurgent groups and their role as governors, the civilian side in his argument remains largely unspecified (Mampilly 2011, 234).[25] In order to analyse what links civilians have with insurgents and to what extent they are able to influence insurgent governance, I think we need to know more about different social groups and individual actors in local societies. To shed more light on these dynamics, the next section of the literature I review adopts an actor-centred prespective.

Trust and agency in violent conflict

From the outside, it is easy to have the impression that, in areas of violent conflict, everyday life is suspended and solely determined by violence. But for inhabitants of crisis-ridden societies, everyday life continues despite the crises (Fuh 2009). Ethnographic field research conducted in areas of violent conflict has revealed this time and again. To name but a few such studies, see: Nordstrom (1997); Jackson (2005); Vigh (2008); Lubkemann (2008); de Bruijn and van Dijk (2007); Macamo (2017 [2008]); Förster (2009); McGovern (2010b); Oldenburg (2010); Shepler (2011). The fact that everyday social life does not come to a halt at the onset of war raises the intricate question of how people act in insecure circumstances, individually and at a social level.

Various perspectives have been proposed to tackle this question: concepts of tactical and strategic agency (Utas 2005; Honwana 2006), "social navigation" (Vigh 2006; Utas 2005), "routinisation" (Vigh 2006; Oldenburg 2011), "good and bad surroundings" (Finnström 2008), as well as creative responses of countering war and "undoing violence" (Nordstrom 1997). The anthropology of war has produced insights at the actor-level that are of direct relevance to this ethnography. The next section reviews those that focus on West Africa, even though I am not aware of any that pay much attention to the notion of trust.

The critical anthropology of war

The (critical) anthropology of war, or more precisely, the "anthropology of people and communities in times of war" (Richards 2012, 164), is a burgeoning field of research. Over the last two decades, ethnographic field studies have produced fine-grained analyses of various

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[25] This is probably due to the fact that his analysis has a strong comparative focus and deals with three different cases. Mampilly compares three cases: Sudan, Congo and Sri Lanka.

aspects. Their major concern has been to look at war from an emic perspective, and most adopt an actor-centred approach (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 74).

Following popular descriptions of the "anarchy" in West African war zones (Kaplan 2000 [1994]), several anthropologists have come to stress the continuities of socio-cultural characteristics during times of war, moving away from the image of war as a counter-reality (Richards 1996; Ferme 2001; Coulter 2006; Peters 2011). These ethnographies have suggested a perspective in which societies shift back and forth within a "war-peace continuum" (Richards 2005, 2012), alternating between periods of "integration and conflict" (Schlee 1996). Places that have been labelled "*post*-conflict" may fall back into more violent and even war-like situations, as happened in Côte d'Ivoire after the presidential elections in late 2010.[26] Other authors, most prominently perhaps Henrik Vigh, have pointed out that the shifting, uncertain social terrain becomes "routinised", so that crisis turns into "context" (Vigh 2006, 2008; see also Oldenburg (2010)).

Civilians and combatants

Several anthropologists have provided ethnographies about the impact of violence on war-ridden societies (Nordstrom 1997; Jackson 2004, 2005; Vigh 2006). Nordstrom's seminal book told us *A different kind of war story* (Nordstrom 1997). It offered us insights into "average" people's lives on the frontlines and how they craft peace and normalcy in the midst of war (Nordstrom 2004, 180). Since Nordstrom's powerful depictions of the lives of "average people", our knowledge about social life under violent conflict conditions has been further expanded.

The category of armed actors has been fleshed out with nuanced portrayals of various actor groups, men and women alike, in various violent conflicts from different angles, e.g.: militarised youths in Liberia (Utas 2003; Bøås and Hatløy 2008), Sierra Leone (Peters and Richards 1998; Peters 2011a; Bürge and Peters 2011; Hoffman 2011a; Hoffman 2011b), Guinea-Bissau (Vigh 2006), Côte d'Ivoire (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011), Uganda (Finnström 2008), female combatants (Utas 2005; Coulter 2009), child soldiers (Honwana 2006; Chelpi-den Hamer 2010; Denov 2010). The term "militarised" captures nicely the way the distinction between civilians and combatants must be seen as blurred and situational. This is particularly true in times of violent strife, but also more generally in the sense of the shifting social roles of

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[26] 'Post-conflict' can range from rebel rule in Man – commonly referred to as no-war-no-peace-situation – to an elected government as in Côte d'Ivoire in 2012.

men and women in arms, on and off duty. Nevertheless, the strong focus on violent actors and armed groups, particularly along the Upper Guinea Coast, over the last decade calls for a recalibration of the analytical lens towards the lives and experiences of the non-militarised population. The bulk of ethnographic data that will be presented and analysed in this thesis looks at a range of actors that we may designate here as 'the non-protagonists' for lack of a better term. Those whose stories build the backbone of this ethnography were by no means passive, but neither were they at the forefront on either side of the political conflict. They are 'ordinary' people who had to deal with extraordinary circumstances that often required them to do remarkable things.

War and wars

A major concern in anthropology has been to describe and explain actors' agency in contexts of violent conflict.[27] Based on Michel de Certeau's work on *The practice of everyday life,* social action under constraining circumstances has been looked at by distinguishing (short-term) tactics from (long-term) strategies (Certeau 1988), a distinction rooted in Clausewitzian military vocabulary (Clausewitz 1994).[28] Several anthropological studies have used this analytical lens (Honwana 2005, 32–33; Utas 2005; Bøås and Hatløy 2008, 38–39). Lubkeman rightly argues that actor's agency in conditions of war is not just restricted to tactical agency. In his study he describes how Mozambicans have pursued their life projects (e.g. getting married) even under the "social condition of war" (Lubkeman 2008, 10–15).[29] He criticises Nordstrom for stressing phoenix-like creativity and for downplaying cultural and social continuities.

A problem in this debate is that the researchers seem to think that they are telling us something about 'war', as if war existed in a universal singular, taking the same form everywhere. That

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[27] The discussion of agency in African studies has two roots (Chabal 2009, 7). The notion of agency has become popular in African studies as a way to counter Afro-pessimism and the victimisation of African subjects (de Bruijn, Dijk, and Gewald 2007). Research with a focus on agency has revealed that people and societies in Africa have responded to structural constraints and predicaments not only 'in reaction-to' but also 'in a more pro-active way'. Agency, however, is also linked to more general debates in social theory "about the respective importance of structure and individual action in social change." (Chabal 2009, 7) Scholars with diverse theoretical backgrounds generally agree that agency is a human universal, which is shaped at the same time by cultural and historical circumstances (Ortner 2006, 136).

[28] "[Tactic] operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It takes advantage of 'opportunities' and depends on them […]" (Certeau 1988, 37).

[29] Drawing on Ortner's concept of the pursuit of "(cultural) projects", I use the term 'life project' to refer to culturally-meaningful personal long-term goals (Ortner 2006, 139).

war is the same for everyone is a very powerful trope in western thinking. As Keen wrote: "[…] the label war is one that often conceals as much as it reveals. We think we know what a war is, but this in itself is a source of difficulty." (Keen 2000, 19) As a matter of fact, there are many different wars. Whether rebels hide in the bush and attack at night or whether they live side by side with the population in the towns, as was the case for the people in Man, leads to rather different kinds of experience of what "war" actually means.

In their text on the civil war in Chad, Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk emphasise "multiple experiences of civil war" (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007). They describe the patchiness of regional war histories and pinpoint the way that villages develop different strategies to deal with the war, rebels, and so on. They stress the need to study "varying degrees of accommodation" rather than "collaboration [versus] resistance" (van Walraven and Abbink 2003, 2). In a recent project, Mirjam de Bruijn continues drawing our attention to variations in experiences of individuals and societies undergoing more long-going crises – conditions that might be better framed as "duress" (de Bruijn 2011).

These deliberations make clear that a thorough analysis of conflict at the local level is necessary. The local context will be addressed in Chapter 3.

Agency and social navigation

One concept now commonly used is (social) navigation (Vigh 2006; Utas 2005; Lubkemann 2008). In *A second look at the concept of social navigation* Henrik Vigh sharpens the analytical optic of navigation as a tool that pays particular attention to the structural surroundings of action (Vigh 2010, 419). Vigh criticises how other concepts of agency often neglect the context of action and how they implicitly take a stable environment for granted. The concept of navigation helps us to pay attention to "how the environment itself moves [actors], before, after and during an act." (Vigh 2010, 425) This nautical term highlights the fact that agency in violent conflict is about "motion within motion" (Vigh 2010, 420). Emic expressions for 'to get by', 'make do' or 'hustle' are for instance *'débrouiller'*[30] in Côte d'Ivoire (and other Francophone areas) and with the same root *'dubriagem'* in Guinea-Bissau (Vigh 2006, 2010). These expressions are common everywhere in urban centres of West and Central Africa. They refer to modes of fending for oneself that are characterised by taking on small casual jobs in an unstable situation (Makhulu, Buggenhagen, and Jackson 2010).

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[30] *Brouillard* means fog in French.

Life in politically volatile contexts requires agility. To illustrate how one had to act in crisis-ridden Guinea-Bissau, one of Vigh's research participants once moved "his upper body back and forth as [if he was] "shadowboxing", "dodging invisible pulls and pushes" (Vigh 2010, 423). This performative explanation of *'dubriagem'* or social navigation – like shadowboxing – illustrates the mental and bodily motion of actors in volatile, violent settings nicely. Therefore, I will use the terms 'navigation' and 'social navigator' as metaphors, but not as concepts.[31]

Due to his focus on unemployed youth, Vigh's study mainly looks at hardship and economic uncertainty rather than war-induced insecurity in Guinea-Bissau. My ethnography will have a stronger focus on conflict-related physical insecurity or on the "logic" of war-time violence (Kalyvas 2006). As the term "logics" already suggests, someone with local knowledge is able to orient him- or herself in the social terrain of the Ivorian violent conflict. The context I will describe is not only about the "certainty of uncertainty" (Hoffman and Lubkemann 2005, 318) or "predictable instability" (Vigh 2010, 422), but rather about the predictability of insecurity – and security. My focus on social trust allows me to see what works despite instabilities and intricacies. Therefore, the theoretical perspective taken in my research is a further contribution to the study of agency and social navigation in the context of violent conflicts.

Although the metaphor 'social navigation' aptly circumscribes the motion of an actor steering their plot for action or 'life project' through troubled waters, the image does not allow us to explain how the actor makes the choices they do[32], takes particular decisions – or why they cannot.

To use Vigh's nautical image, why does the social navigator steer southwards and not eastwards? 'Reading' the social landscape or scanning the horizon, he or she must make an assessment and decide to navigate southwards rather than somewhere else. I want to know what made the social navigator go south. I want to position myself in his head and see what he sees and understand how he makes sense of the social world, interprets and anticipates situations

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[31] I will sometimes use the designation "social navigator" (Lubkemann 2008, 249) to refer to an actor in a context of violent conflict. At different scales and in different temporalities, we may all be social navigators (Vigh 2010). As Carol Greenhouse rhetorically asked (and answered): "What does crisis teach us that we must not unlearn in more ordinary times? The answer implied by [her] volume is 'very little' […]" (Greenhouse 2002, 9). In this respect, the findings of this ethnography may have implications elsewhere.

[32] I do not mean choice in the sense of rational choice theory, but in the sense of judgment and decision theorised by Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische (Emirbayer and Mische 1998).

ahead. Where does he locate insecurities and where does he make out trustworthy paths through the stormy waters of the Ivorian violent conflict? And if the social navigator were a she, how would she evaluate situations? Would it be the same? If he or she supported the government in the south, what would his or her mental map[33] of trust and distrust look like?

I agree with Vigh that a reconceptualisation of social agency that captures the 'motion' of the 'social terrain' is necessary. Nevertheless, as a reader I get the impression that in the conceptual metaphor of social navigation, everything is in flux and motion. I have the impression that the social navigator is drifting. Whereas this is certainly true for some social situations, I think that for the Ivorian violent conflict at least, it seems necessary to bring back in a more stable element into our theorisation of agency in volatile political contexts. Applied to the contexts of Côte d'Ivoire's violent conflict, I argue that the social navigator is able to discriminate between more trustful and less trustful situations. Based on the analysis of my empirical data, I propose therefore, to look for orientations, for trust and distrust, security and insecurity.

My findings seem to suggest that a good deal of social life in violent political conflicts is predictable in relation to security/insecurity and that people develop a dynamic model (frames and figurations)[34] that allows them to orient themselves. The combinations of frames and figurations of trustfulness retains the dynamism that Vigh urged for, but provides also a model that allows us to see more clearly how actors orient themselves in insecure circumstances.

Outline of the thesis

The thesis is organised into two main parts. After this introduction, which includes a literature review (Chapter 1), the reader is introduced to the Ivorian conflict (Chapter 2), the research site Man (Chapter 3), as well as to theories of trust (Chapter 4) and methodologies of how to study trust (Chapter 5). In the second part, empirical findings are presented in six chronologically and thematically ordered chapters (Chapters 6 to 11), followed by the conclusions (Chapter 12).

Chapter 2 offers an introduction to the background of the Ivorian crisis. It is kept deliberately short due to the plethora of discussions in the literature. The focus is on aspects salient for the understanding of the conflict in the western part of the country.

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[33] The term mental map was coined by geographers (Gould and White 1992 [1974]).

[34] Frames and figurations will be further explained in Chapter 5 on methodology.

Chapter 3 presents an ethnographic outline of the region of Man. It contextualises the region ethnographically and links it to the Upper Guinea Coast. The main part of the chapter, though, outlines the history of the local war and describes the rebel movement *Les Forces Nouvelles*[35] in Man. The main focus is on their composition. To get away from a monolithic view of this armed actor group, I distinguish several sub-groups with different motives, which ultimately had an impact on the trust relationship in the rebel/civilian nexus. The chapter also describes the different phases of the conflict, from the failed coup on 19 September 2002 until 2010/2011. These are relevant for the empirical part, which is structured according to these phases.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to describing theories and concepts of trust, and is quite extensive because there are hardly any studies of trust in the literature in social anthropology (Fardon et al. 2012). In the first section, I review different theoretical approaches, highlight key aspects and elaborate my general understanding of the term according to the Simmelian notion of trust. The second section develops a sequential approach to trust based on Emirbayer and Mische's theory of agency (1998), and introduces a typology of trust for post-conflict contexts developed by the project team.

In Chapter 5, I develop and explain my research strategy and rationale, which are based on the theoretical part and the empirical situation I found in the 'field'. The first section grapples with epistemological challenges from which I deduce methodological consequences that shaped how I could examine trust with ethnographic methods. Key research strategies were participation and an approach based on memory narratives.

To present my findings and describe transformations of trust, I have maintained a chronological order in the arrangement of the empirical chapters. Notwithstanding this, each chapter makes an independent argument about a particular aspect of trust.

Chapter 6 analyses the transformation of trust at the 'onset of war' – that is shorthand for the first day the rebellion and combats reached the town of Man. The aim was to explore the moment when people realised 'the rebels are here'. It looks at this moment as an unprecedented event, for which the population lacked experience-based knowledge of how to deal with this unfamiliar and new – or as I shall argue *novel* – situation. Mainly based on the retrospective

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[35] Les *Forces Nouvelles*, New Forces or FN hereafter, is the term used to refer to the three groups the *Mouvement Patriotique pour la Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI), *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MJP) and the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO), since they merged after the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement in January 2003. I will also use rebels/ex-rebels or insurgents to refer to the same violent non-state actor or insurgent group.

account of a twenty-year old student, the chapter minutely traces the transformation of trust on that day from his perspective, highlighting subjectivities and suggesting commonalities. As I argue, this experience is best described as a dislocation of trust.

Chapter 7 takes a step back and sheds light on the time between the failed coup on 19 September and the occupation of the west by the rebellion on 28 November 2002. It looks at patterns and transformations of trust during the time when the country was at war but the region was still under government control. My data shows that threats against political activists were particularly prevalent in these two months on both sides of the conflict. Through the accounts of government supporters and government opponents, this chapter shows that insecurity and distrust were patterned along political cleavages. With the onset of the war in the west, political violence became more generalised. Nevertheless, the chapter firmly grounds war-time trust and distrust in pre-war socio-political patterns. Furthermore, it focuses on personal relationships and gives popular opinions revolving around personal trust a thorough review.

Chapter 8 explores trust situations through examining more-or-less coincidental encounters between rebels and civilians. It analyses interactions (figurations) between different rebels (high and low ranks, Ivorians and Anglophone foreigners, etc.) and civilians with very different social identities. My argument is that the trustfulness of situations was socially patterned and that the local population acquired practical knowledge of the safety and trustfulness of different situations over time. Interactions were shaped along social identities – a dynamic that reverberates with pre-war social life. Drawing on case studies between 2002 and roughly 2005, the chapter looks at political orientation, ethnic background, gender, social class, age and to a lesser extent religion, in an exemplary fashion.

Chapter 9 delves into social life during the first period of rebel control (2002/2003), popularly referred to as *le temps sauvage.* On average, locals remember this as an insecure time that was shaped by the presence of different rebel groups. The main objective of this chapter is to examine the general trust and security situation of that period and to describe how social life was organised and governed by the first leadership of the rebels. Ethnographic examples deal mainly with the provision of security, but look also at electricity, health, school and media services. The focus of the chapter is on institutional trust and the role of personal trust in precarious settings of political change. Moreover, the chapter provides an in-depth analysis of a memory account by the chief of Kandopleu, examining how people may make sense of their experiences and what such narratives tell us about cultural ideals about trust.

Chapter 10 picks up chronologically from the previous one and deals with the period during which Man was governed by Losséni Fofana. As the title suggests, it was a period during which a single chain of command was established as well as order and security created that resulted in more predictability in everyday life. Furthermore, security and predictability were gradually enhanced – conditions that warrant trust. It asks what made this change possible and to what extent we can talk about trust in this context and why.

Chapter 11 delves into the time after the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (2007) and describes the last period of rebel rule. It is the time the ethnographer experienced herself. Although some aspects of social life resembled 'normal times', figurations among young men, for instance, were still particularly sensitive. The chapter describes what kind of proximity was perceived as the most trustful and what attitude towards the rebels was seen as the safest. The main purpose of the chapter is to further develop the idea of different time frames and to show how locals had become socialised into life under rebel rule in comparison to latecomers who had not lived through the wild times with the rebels.

Chapter 12 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main points and revisits theoretical gaps encountered in the analysis.

2 Côte d'Ivoire's political conflict

In general, ordinary people lacked detailed knowledge about politics and the political history of the conflict. Their knowledge was often limited to a few prominent people and events. The uneven distribution of knowledge in society is something that needs particular scholarly attention in a setting where information is almost always cast into discursive formations of interests. As an ethnography about the transformations of trust and distrust requires intimate knowledge about the causes and dynamics of the conflict, the aim of this chapter is to provide background information on the violent political conflict at the national level, and to look at how the rebel group *Les Forces Nouvelles* was formed. Based on an extensive body of literature that will be reviewed at the end of this chapter, I will describe what I think are key aspects for the understanding of the Ivorian crisis with a focus on the time leading up to the rebellion in 2002.

The time during which the country was divided into a rebel-held north and a loyalist south (2002–2010) will be dealt with in the following chapter with a focus on the history of the war in the region of Man. I will keep the overview short in order to allow more space for the local context relevant for this ethnography.

Many have wondered how the most prosperous 'young nation' in the sub-region, renowned for its economic wealth and political stability could be plunged into such a deep crisis. Analysts generally relate the causes of the crisis to several historically grown political and economic inequalities that, in combination, came to a head in a difficult economic environment. Since the beginning of the century, scholars of various disciplines have identified key points for understanding Côte d'Ivoire's violent conflict (Akindès 2004; Bouquet 2002; Poamé and Ahouma 2007; Bamba and Adou 2008; Dozon 2011; McGovern 2011). Among these, the following figure most prominently:

a) An unequal economic development between the forested south and the semi-arid savannah north lead to massive migrations to the cash-crop-rich south that turned the first settlers into a minority.

b) Social tensions were further exacerbated due to a harsh economic environment. The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 halved people's purchasing power.

c) Ethno-nationalistic ideologies of citizenship *(ivoirité)* were introduced and electoral rules manipulated so that governments came to power that lacked legitimacy.

Houphouët-Boigny's era: From miracle to mirage

Côte d'Ivoire's history and the post-colonial era are intimately linked with the name Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Morgenthau 1964; Yacono 1984; Weiskel 1988; Chafer 2002).[36] As a deputy of Côte d'Ivoire under French rule, Houphouët-Boigny committed himself to the abolishment of forced labour, resulting in the so-called Houphouët-Boigny law (Chafer 2002, 55). This laid the foundation for his political career and popularity. After his break with the Communist party in 1951, he campaigned for a sustained amicable relationship with France. In 1960, Houphouët-Boigny became Côte d'Ivoire's first president. During the following three decades he shaped the Ivorian post-colonial state until he died in office in 1993.

The country that Houphouët-Boigny inherited from French colonialism accommodates four language families. To this day, each of these language groups is ascribed to a particular region, which for the sake of clarity may be conceived as four quadrants (McGovern 2011): the Kru in the southwestern quadrant and the Mande in the northwestern quadrant – these two make up the western part of the country that I am primarily concerned with (see also below and Chapter 3); the Kwa or Akan-group in the southeastern quadrant and the Gur in the northeast.[37]

Colonial ethnography had identified a task for each of the major linguistic groups in the colonial project and *mise en valeur* of the territories. The Akan-speaking groups[38], Houphouët's group,

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[36] The son of a Baule canton chief, he was trained as a physician in Dakar, the capital of the *Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF)*, and later worked as a planter. He became politically active as the founder of the *Syndicat Agricole Africain (SAA)*, which advocated equal rights with European planters. The settlers had historically enjoyed the undue advantage of drawing on manpower recruited through forced labour to work on their plantations as opposed to local entrepreneurial planters like Houphouët-Boigny.

[37] In the following I will only list the larger groups and groups mentioned in the monograph: the Kru (Wè, Bete, Dida, Bakwe, Neyo) and Kwa or Akan-subgroup (Anyin, Baule, Abron, Alladian, Avikam, Nzema) in the southern half and the Mande (sub-group northern-Mande: Manding, Wojeneka (around the town Odienné), Jula, Koyaga (around the towns Séguéla, Mankono), southern-Mande: Dan, Tura, Guro) and Gur (Senufo, Kulango, Lobi) in the north (Akindès 2007, 13; Eberhard, Simons, Fennig 2019).

[38] Akan belongs to the Kwa-language family.

were identified as the most suitable for administrative services due to their hierarchical social organisation, which was in neighbouring Ghana even state-like. The Kru speakers, natives in the southwestern forests, today's cocoa belt, had land, seemingly in abundance, but were perceived as "savage, backward, ill-suited for productive economic activity" (Marshall-Fratani 2006, 14–15). The Manding speakers, particularly those who engaged in trade, the *Jula*[39], were conceived as ideal salesmen to distribute and sell consumer products in the colonial empire (Dozon 1989, 144; Arnaut 2004, 202–64). Part of this ideology was perpetuated in Houphouët's post-colonial state in that his own group, the Baule (Akan), were privileged as civil servants and high officials (Dozon 2000). They came to dominate the administration of Côte d'Ivoire, which resulted in a neo-patrimonial system.

The plantation economy in the western forest belt

Like other countries along the West African coast, Côte d'Ivoire is divided into a northern savannah and a southern forest zone. Houphouët's key strategy for development was the promotion of cash-crops in the historically sparsely populated forested areas of the southwestern quadrant, bordering Liberia.[40] So-called unused forests were turned into arable land. The government's open policy attracted many labour migrants from within Côte d'Ivoire and from abroad to work on cocoa and coffee plantations. These patterns of migration can be traced back to French colonial times. The northern savannah areas served as a labour reservoir for the cash-crop industry. The consequence of this policy was a shift of populations; the south experienced a massive influx of people, while the northern areas were neglected and increasingly abandoned (Chauveau and Colin 2010).

Although the plantation economy was once one of the government's key strategies for development, the Ivorian state has since disengaged itself from regulating the allocation of land. This is why the settlement of migrants was indirectly delegated to the local level of the *tutorat*, from the French world for tutor, *tuteur* (Chauveau and Colin 2010, 87). The *tutorat* is an institutionalized patron-client-type relationship that regulates host-stranger relationships, as in other parts of the Upper Guinea Coast (Knörr and Filho 2010b). There are many expressions to refer to the 'hosts', reflecting different notions used in different contexts: firstcomers, first

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[39] Jula is spelled Dioula in French. I will use the French spelling Dioulabougou for the neighbourhood inhabited mainly by Jula. See more details about the group further down.

[40] Man is located at the northern end of the forested south-western quadrant, where coffee is more prevalent than cocoa.

settlers, landowners, *tuteurs* and most prominently in the last decade *autochthones*. For the strangers, the following expressions are used: new- or latecomers, *étrangers* (F)/strangers), (im)migrants and in the Ivorian context so-called *allochtones* (F, migrants of Ivorian origin) and *allogènes* (F, migrants of non-Ivorian origin).[41] From the point of view of the autochthons, the *tutorat* is based on the moral principle that one is compelled to concede 'free' land to anybody in need of it for his or her family's subsistence. In return, the migrant family owes gratitude to its landlords (Chauveau and Colin 2010, 87). The tutorat relationship implied that the latecomers kept out of local politics, a realm reserved for the autochthons.

Two groups were particularly active migrant farmers: the *Baule*[42], from central Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët's own group, and people from Burkina Faso. Part of Burkina Faso's territory (two thirds) was administratively linked to the colony of Côte d'Ivoire between 1933 and 1947 and has been perceived as a labour reserve since colonial times. In the 1990s, more than a quarter of the population in Côte d'Ivoire was of foreign origin (26%). Citizens from Burkina Faso are by far the largest group of foreign nationals in Côte d'Ivoire, comprising 15% of the population (Bouquet 2011; Zongo 2003).

Foreigners were welcome in Houphouët's nation and the main export products, cocoa and coffee, needed labour to boom. As Houphouët himself famously said in 1963: *"'la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur'* (the land belongs to those who cultivate it or 'put it to use')" (Chauveau and Colin 2010, 90). This is how the western agricultural frontier gradually made way for the plantation economy, the country's main source of income. Côte d'Ivoire was regarded as a 'model country' in former French West Africa and was an attractive destination for migrants in the sub-region. The first period of Houphouët's presidency (the 1960s and 70s) went down in history as the "Ivorian miracle" because it was accompanied by a wave of economic success.

The massive influx of migrant labourers meant that they soon outnumbered the autochthons in their 'homeland', which had an impact on the political power distribution – particularly in the context of a multi-party democracy (Boone 2009; Bah 2010). When generations later the strangers' children claimed the *tuteur*'s place as their home and harboured ambitions to enter local politics, conflict was no longer far-off because the *tuteurs* risked losing political power in their home territory. As McGovern writes: "In contemporary Côte d'Ivoire, the evolution of

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[41] 'F' refers to French.

[42] The Baule are an Akan-speaking group who migrated from Ghana to their present location in central Côte d'Ivoire in the 18th/19th century.

events has been such that each side began to renege on its side of the deal: host tried to reclaim the economic field while 'strangers' began to claim the political." (McGovern 2011, 65)

The host-stranger relationship had worked well during the boom years, but progressively deteriorated with the economic crisis and increasing numbers of migrants arriving in search of land. With the fall in cash-crop prices in the late 1980s, the country slid into a series of economic crises. Well-educated young people could no longer find jobs in the cities and some returned to the countryside. Upon arrival in their villages, they often found that relatives had leased, sold or temporarily given their land to migrant labourers and their descendants[43], rendering it unavailable to the returnees (Chauveau and Bobo 2003).

Hence, this economic boom had its downsides. The rapid growth was only possible due to the availability of arable lands and the massive labour migration from the central and northern regions (Chauveau and Colin 2010). In the context of weak state regulation and property regimes, the agrarian colonisation of the western forest belt has created not just national wealth, but also a conflict-ridden political context between first settlers and latecomers (Boone 2009; Mitchel 2011). The Ivorian economic boom was not so much a "miracle" but a short-lived gain obtained through the state-encouraged colonisation of the western forest areas (Chauveau 2007). However, after this period of relative prosperity and stability, the country's economy was hard hit by a dramatic drop in the prices of the cash-crops. The Ivorian miracle gradually faded into a mirage (Amin 1967; Dozon 1989, 136). Widespread impoverishment and rivalries between leading political figures, as well as constitutional and legal arbitrariness, all contributed to a major crisis in the early 1990s.

The 1990s: Three candidates, the presidency and *ivoirité*

Côte d'Ivoire has been analysed as a case that vividly shows how war is actively 'made' by politicians (McGovern 2011; Théroux-Bénoni 2009). Both authors take issue with the fact that war has to be organised, is man-made and, consequently, can be unmade as well (Nordstrom 1997, 216–17). Of course, no one in Côte d'Ivoire wanted a war in the first place, but some

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[43] As we know from other contexts, the second generation of migrants often feels at home in the new place and hardly knows the place of origin of their parents. Although the communities may have their separate neighbourhoods, as some designations such as Dioula-bougou (Jula-bougou) or Dao-kro indicate, mixed marriages are frequent (Lewis 1971).

nonetheless wanted power. In the following, I will introduce some of the protagonists in this drama.

1990 was the year in which Côte d'Ivoire held its first multi-party election. Houphouët was re-elected with 81% of the votes for the sixth time (Bouquet 2011, 22). Second came Laurent Gbagbo, a historian from the south-west (Bete). He can be viewed as Houphouët's historic opponent. At a time when opposition parties were not allowed by the single-party government, Laurent Gbagbo created the *Front Populaire Ivoirien,* the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) in France in 1982, after he had been sent into exile (1982-1988) (Yéré 2013, 162). As an opposition party, the FPI had leftist leanings and was attractive to many intellectuals and students, but remained a marginal party until the year 2000, when its leader came to power.[44]

Also in 1990, the then President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who was more than 80 years old, called upon Alassane Dramane Ouattara, an internationally experienced economist to support the government during a severe financial crisis. A Jula speaker from Kong,[45] Ouattara came to serve as Côte d'Ivoire's Prime Minister until Houphouët's death in office in 1993. In his professional career – during which he also held positions as a citizen of Burkina Faso – he was appointed deputy head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Governor of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).

The economic reforms caused social protests, and the government reacted with repression.[46] States surely always contain an element of violence, in the sense that states are *per definitionem* linked to violence or force, be it in the classic definition of Weber or in more recent definitions (Weber 1964; Giddens 1992; Migdal 2001). But there are different degrees of violence. Côte d'Ivoire experienced a gradual brutalisation of politics and a banalisation of violence in the 1990s that introduced levels of violence that seemed to foreshadow the civil war at the end of the decade (Vidal 2003; Akindès 2007). In *"entre fragilisation de l'état et continuum de*

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[44] In 2000, when Gbagbo came to power, it was a marginal party that would probably not have won the presidential election if the RDR and the PDCI had participated, as later elections that year revealed (Bouquet 2002).

[45] The Ouattara in Kong are descendants of the rulers of the Empire of Kong, which stretched beyond the boundaries of Côte d'Ivoire's north in the 18th/19th century (Bauer 2007, 93–98).

[46] To generate public funds, Ouattara introduced the *carte de séjour* (residence permit) for foreign residents in 1991. Permits had been in use already for various nationalities (i.e. neighbouring Anglophone countries). The regulation was new for Francophone countries, particularly the *Entente* states, of which Burkina Faso is one (Yéré 2012, 163). They had the right to vote under Houphouët-Boigny since 1980, but this was suppressed in the revision of the electoral code in 1994 (ibid. 162).

violence politique", Akindès traces the brutalisation of political life back to the economic crisis (Akindès 2007, 16).[47] Frustrated with an autocratic regime and unable to find employment, students took the streets in the early 1990s. The government responded with repression, leading to more protests and more violence.

In May 1991, the military entered the national university's Yopougon dormitories in a punitive mission. Students were attacked and sexually assaulted.[48] As a reaction against government-sponsored thugs and informers, students killed Thierry Zébié on 17 June 1991. After that, the government banned the student union *Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI)* created in 1990, which had close links to Gbagbo's opposition party FPI. Soro Kigbafori Guillaume, the secretary general of the rebel movement *Les Forces Nouvelles,* headed the student union between 1995 and 1998, and Charles Blé Goudé, the future major political youth leader of the *Jeunes Patriotes* in the south, succeeded him at the top of FESCI between 1998 and 2001. Under severe state repression during the 1990s, the FESCI was forged into a powerful, highly competitive movement whose members did not shrink from the use of violence. Machete attacks on fellow students and on political rivals on university campuses became frequent and went unpunished. They were referred to in Abidjan as "machettages" (Konaté 2003), and were the forerunners of the politics of violence that led to the civil war.

When Houphouët died on 7 December 1993, Ouattara seems to have toyed with the idea of becoming the interim president. But in accordance with the constitution, Henri Konan Bédié, the President of the National Assembly, became the interim head of state. Nevertheless, Ouattara's brief power play cemented the rivalry between these political giants. Like his predecessor, Bédié had a Baule ethnic background and was a member of the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (PDCI-RDA),* or the

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[47] Violence was not a wholly unprecedented element in Ivorian public life. Even though it goes beyond the scope of this study to minutely trace the violent aspect of the Houphouëtist post-colonial state, a couple of events are worth mentioning. In 1964, Boka Ernest the first President of the Ivorian Supreme Court died in custody under dubious circumstances. An outspoken critic of the neo-colonialist politics of Houphouët-Boigny and France, he had resigned in 1963 to protest against the arbitrary arrests of people linked to alleged conspiracies (communist) in 1963 to overthrow the president (Brou 2011). These conspiracies went down in history as the *fauts complots* (false plots) (Diarra 1997). In 1970, a local demonstration for autonomy in which a badly armed group proclaimed the *République d'Eburnie* was severely repressed by the army (the number of casualties is disputed: between several hundred and a few thousand). This uprising was led by Nragbé Kragbé, a student and challenger to the one-party regime, and is remembered in Bete country as the *"Guébié massacre"* (Dozon 1985, 345; Marshall-Fratani 2006; McGovern 2011, 83).

[48] The army's Chief of Staff at the time was General Robert Guéï (see also below).

Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) for short. The PDCI is the oldest and formerly the only party in Côte d'Ivoire. Historically, the party was dominated by the large plantation owners and civil servants, many of whom shared the Akan ethno-regional background of Houphouët-Boigny.

With the presidential elections scheduled for 1995, fierce competition erupted among the likely candidates for Houphouët's succession, particularly within the PDCI. The old single party remained gerontocratic and undemocratic under Bédié (Toungara 1995). During an extraordinary party meeting in 1994, the party's reform-oriented faction, led by Djéni Kobina, was booed and denied speaking time.[49] Struggles concerning leadership, partly between the younger and older generations, that used to be argued out within the folds of the single party, were no longer thrashed out behind closed doors as multi-party democracy meant these struggles took place more openly. Only a year after his death, Houphouët's party split and lost its 'renovators' and a part of its electorate to the *Rassemblement des Républicains* (Rally of Republicans, RDR). The RDR was created in 1994 by Djéni Kobina (mentioned above), a Nzema speaker (Akan) from the south-east (Toungara 1995, 12). Houphouët's former Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara, was nominated as presidential candidate for the RDR in 1995.

The electoral code and Ivoirité

With the elections of 1995 approaching, the electoral code was changed. The code passed in 1994 required the father and mother of any candidate for the presidency to both be of Ivorian origin.[50] Furthermore, according to Article 49, a presidential candidate should never have renounced Ivorian nationality and was required to have resided continuously in Côte d'Ivoire for five years prior to his candidacy. With the adoption of the new electoral code and its infamous Article 49, Ouattara was unable to stand for election (ibid.). It was obvious that Ouattara, Houphouët's former Prime Minister, did not fulfil these criteria.

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[49] Maméry, 30s, Jula-speaking, political activist, 27/03/2009.

[50] The secondary sources at my disposal are not clear on this point. Yéré quotes the following from the archives of the National Assembly: *"Nul ne peut être élu Président de la République [...], s'il n'est ivorien de naissance, de père et de mère eux-mêmes ivoiriens"* (128 H, Projet de Code Electoral p. 9) from October 1994. Bouquet however quotes: *"de père et de mère eux-mêmes ivoiriens de naissance"* without providing his source (Bouquet 2011, 24). The second would mean that the generation of the grand-parents must have acquired Ivorian citizenship already, whereas for the first quote the parents of the presidential candidate may have gained citizenship during their youth. Taking into consideration that Bédié was born in 1934 and Ouattara in 1942, the second version becomes slightly absurd as Côte d'Ivoire was only created in 1893 (with changing boundaries in 1933-1947). However, as we will see below, the second version of the electoral code was written into the constitution under Guéï in 2000.

The opposition bloc, consisting of Ouattara's RDR and Gbagbo's FPI, boycotted the polls in 1995. Thus, the PDCI retained power, but with little legitimacy.

Scholars have widely acknowledged that these were strategically selected criteria and laws, passed in the National Assembly in order to exclude Ouattara from running for the presidency (Dozon 2000; Cutolo 2010; McGovern 2011*).* The opposition organised protest marches, and Bédié asked the army to intervene. The army's Chief of Staff General Robert Guéï (1990-1995), however, refused to send the army into the streets. Shortly thereafter, Guéï, of Dan origin from the north of Man, was removed from his post.

In Augsut 1995, during the presidential campaign, President Bédié pulled *ivoirité* out of the hat.[51] "*Ivoirité*" (Ivority or Ivorianness) was developed into and used as an ethno-nationalistic ideology of Ivorian citizenship in the second-half of the 1990s (Dozon 2000; Losch 2000; Marshall-Fratani 2006). Basically, *ivoirité* defined 'pure' Ivorians as opposed to a second category of 'latecomers', 'stranger' or 'immigrants' who due to their 'true' origins elsewhere could not expect the same rights in Côte d'Ivoire as the first group, the *autochthones*. A circle of scholars developed pseudo-scientific, essentialist criteria to define 'pure' Ivorians (McGovern 2011, 17).[52] For instance, 1893, the year the colony of Côte d'Ivoire was 'created' by the French, was taken as a yardstick: those who lived on Ivorian soil (colonially defined) at that time could be considered 'real' Ivorians, and everyone who came later, not (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 61).[53]

As in other countries during the 1990s (Geschiere 2009), ideas of autochthony were not restricted to the group around Bédié. The FPI under Gbagbo had promoted such ideas since at least the early 1990s (Chelpi-denHamer 2011, 59). In response to discriminatory practices of the party and administration in power, a similar 'us versus them' project was outlined in the

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[51] In his historical analysis, Henri-Michel Yéré says a speech held by Bédié in August 1995 was the first time the term *ivoirité* was mentioned in a political context (Yéré 2012, 179). Previously the term had only been used in intellectual circles and in the context of arts and literature since the 1970s. Yéré dates its first appearance back to an newspaper article by Pierre Niava about the playwright Niangoran Porquet, published in *Fraternité-Matin* on 21 November 1974 (ibid., 154).

[52] A group frequently mentioned is the *Cellule universitaire de recherche et de diffusion des idées et actions du Président Bédié* (CURDIPHE) with Niangoran-Bouah (Arnaut and Blimmaert 2009; Chelpi-den Hamer 2011). For a historical analysis of different discourses on nationality and citizenship in Côte d'Ivoire between the late 1920s and 1999, see (Yéré 2012).

[53] However, as mentioned above, two thirds of today's Burkina Faso belonged to the colony of Côte d'Ivoire between 1933 and 1947 (Bouquet 2007).

anonymous *Charte du Nord* that was circulated among northern populations around that time (Yéré 2012, 166).

As the ideological construct of *ivoirité* has been extensively discussed elsewhere (Dozon 2000; Losch 2000; Cutolo 2010: Chelpi-den Hamer 2011), I will just focus on two instrumental aspects: the way the ideology was used to manipulate the eligibility of candidates (Bouquet 2007), and how ideas revolving around *ivoirité* introduced divisions into the multi-ethnic social fabric (Dembele 2003). I will now turn to the gradual ethnic polarisation that was fuelled by the ideology *ivoirité*.

Ethnic polarisation

As described above, over the course of the 1990s, the political landscape came to be dominated by three main political leaders and their parties: Bédié (PDCI), Ouattara (RDR) and Gbagbo (FPI), all of whom tried to rally their different followers behind them. In this process, the ethno-nationalist ideology *ivoirité* came to play an important role, so that political parties in Côte d'Ivoire can largely be attributed to a specific ethno-regional base (McGovern 2011, 13).[54] Although the factions in the parties might be more ethnically mixed, elections have repeatedly demonstrated their ethno-regional electoral bases.[55] In the 1990s, the local tensions between immigrant and firstcomer communities described above were mirrored on a national level in the political rivalry between Laurent Gbagbo (FPI), a native Kru speaker from the forest belt *(autochthone)*, Henri Konan Bédié (PDCI), of Baule origin representing the classic planter bourgeoisie *allochtones*, and Alassane Ouattara (RDR), from a long-distance trading Jula-speaking family in northern Côte d'Ivoire with ties to Burkina Faso. Due to his Burkinabe citizenship on his father's side, Alassane Ouattara also represents the largest *allogènes* community, the Burkinabe.[56] Mike McGovern has shown that it is precisely this "alignment" of local and national-level politics and actors that produced the organisational power to fuel the political conflict and to turn it eventually violent (McGovern 2011, 190–194).

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[54] Although considered a sensitive issue, one cannot deny that "there is a broad congruence between the ethno-linguistic partitions described above and political party affiliation" (McGovern 2011, 13).

[55] This also explains why Bas-Sassandra voted for Bédié, the PDCI candidate, in the first round of presidential elections in late 2010: although a "Kruan"-area that is oriented towards Gbagbo's FPI, the strong Baule migration to this area in the 20th century tipped the balance for Bédié.

[56] NB: the setting of today's state boundaries is of recent date, cutting through pre-colonial empires in the north and ascribing separate nationalities to one and the same family along the route of long-distance trade.

In the context of economic hardship, *ivoirié* had an empowering appeal for unemployed autochthone youths, who seemed unable to reach social adulthood (Banégas 2006; Fokwang 2008; Gnangadjomon 2011). As in other parts of the world, autochthony[57] became a seemingly powerful tool, not least due to its fuzziness, to exclude 'foreigners' or 'strangers' of all kinds, many of whom are actually "citizens of the same country", as Geschiere emphasises (Geschiere 2009, 2–4). Citizens whose citizenship was seen as 'doubtful' were ascribed social identities such as 'northerners', 'Jula' and 'Muslim'. These three identity facets were often lumped together.

During this process of ethnic polarisation, citizens or non-citizens with 'northern-sounding' names, or displaying so-called social markers as Muslim became more and more the target of discrimination in the south and from state agents throughout the country. 'Jula' was used as equivalent to 'foreigner' to insult someone in this context.[58] Jula originally means trader in Manding, but the term has multiple context-dependent meanings today. Jula also stands for a lingua franca and refers to a social-ethnic group of varying inclusiveness, depending on the context (Bauer 2007, 29; Lewis 1971).[59]

Since Islamisation originally spread from the north, Muslims were treated as northerners/ Jula.[60] Islam, however, is no longer a religion relegated to the savannah region of Côte d'Ivoire's north, as some scholars still maintain, but an equally prominent religion in southern urban centres (Miran 2006). The so-called "widening rift between the country's predominantly Muslim north and mainly Christian south" (Woods 2003, 641) does not accurately portray the present situation: *Islam has been presented as a religion of foreigners and […] to this date, the religious public image of Côte d'Ivoire is dominated by Christianity, thereby forgetting that Islam has now become Côte d'Ivoire's first religion from a demographic standpoint. (Miran 2006, 82)*

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[57] Autochthony is a term that comes from Ancient Greek and means "to be born of the soil" (Geschiere 2009, 2).

[58] In 2011, after Gbagbo's fall, he heard people in Abidjan use the term "Russian", as they no longer dared to use the term "Jula" as an insult.

[59] "Der Begriff Dioula dient als Sprachbezeichnung, als Berufsbezeichnung und als Ethnonym. […] heute [werden] mit Dioula auch westafrikanische Muslime oder Immigranten aus dem Norden im Allgemeinen bezeichnet." (Bauer 2007, 29)

[60] The 'Mandingo-question' in Liberia largely corresponds to the discrimination against Jula, also a northern Mande group. The dispute in Liberia revolves around whether the Manding are part of Liberia's 'original' ethno-linguistic groups and whether they are entitled to own land (A. Kaufmann, personal communication, 28/04/2013).

With exclusivist ideologies of citizenship directed against 'northerners', discrimination against Muslims also increased. *Ivoirité* in everyday social life meant that Ivorian citizens (and foreigners) with so-called northern names were harassed by public authorities. From the mid-1990s onwards, people increasingly said that their identity papers were declared invalid and ripped apart by the gendarmerie at checkpoints. Others met artificial obstacles when they tried to renew their identity papers. State officials often justified such practices by casting doubt on people's "real origin" or nationality (Fofana 2011; Förster 2012b).

The group that became the *Forces Nouvelles*

With the upcoming presidential elections in 2000, tensions rose again in 1999. Djéni Kobina, the founder of the RDR died in 1998 and Ouattara became the party head in mid-1999. He declared his intention to run for the presidency, backing up his claim with documents that proved his Ivorian citizenship. However, the government issued an arrest warrant against Alassane Ouattara for using false and fraudulent nationality papers, and Ouattara went into exile.[61]

It was during this tense political climate that Côte d'Ivoire experienced its first coup d'état on Christmas Eve in 1999. There seem to have been no casualties. Surrounded by soldiers, General Robert Guéï announced on the national TV that Bédié had been removed from office. Institutions were dissolved and Guéï created the *Conseil National de Salut Public* (CNSP) and built an interim government with opposition forces. He promised to do away with divisionary politics *('balayer')* and announced elections for Ocotober 2000 (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 63). By and large, most people in Côte d'Ivoire expressed relief.

To understand the further course of Côte d'Ivoire's history, however, we have to look at the soldiers who were behind General Robert Guéï.

1999: Bloodless coup d'état

For quite some time, the group that organised the coup of 1999 has been presented as a few non-commissioned officers demanding their pay who then, more or less spontaneously, removed Bédié from power, as everyone was tired of the regime (Kieffer 2000). However, in a

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[61] Alassane's mother's family (Cissé) is from the region of Odienné. In order to stop the controversy over his origins, Alassane Ouattara had a DNA-test to prove he is his mother's son and therefore has a right to Ivoirian citizenship, at least on his mother's side (Beugré 2011).

2011 publication, the journalist Joachim Beugré[62] revealed that the coup had been planned well in advance, but had to be carried out a few days earlier than planned because of a leak occurring when the insurgent group was enlarged. The initial group was rather small, consisting of not more than about five individuals, with Ibrahim Coulibaly alias IB or Major, born in 1964, as the best known of the group.[63] Only one of them, Jah Gao survived the decade-long conflict (Beugré 2011).

The core group consisted of Manding speakers from the northern parts of Côte d'Ivoire, so-called Jula. Their grievances were those of their communities' of origin, the struggle for inclusive citizenship exemplified by the fate of Alassane Ouattara, as previously explained.[64] Their social milieus expected and wanted them to become more active, as civilian activism seemed to have reached a dead end (Beugré 2011).

Another assumption about the coup organisers that has to be clarified is that the instigators were particularly young (Kieffer 2000). In fact, all of them were aged between 30 and 45 (Beugré 2011). *'Les jeunes gens'* was a relational expression from Guéï's perspective as he was their senior military. Most of them were, however, quite experienced servicemen and knew very well what they were doing. They took control of the airport, for instance, and made sure others would not have access to weapons.

In putting together a conspiracy, the choice of comrades is crucial. Personal identification with their struggle offered a good foundation on which to build trust and loyalty. Those who shared the humiliation and disadvantage their social group was experiencing best encapsulated their interests.[65] Hence, their group mainly consisted of colleagues with the same ethnic affiliation. Gaoussou Kone explained in an interview: *"J'avoue qu'on n'avait plus confiance dans les jeunes Jula, on se méfiait beaucoup des autres ethnies, de crainte que le secret ne soit dévoilé."*

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[62] In the following, I shall draw on the work of the journalist Joachim Beugré, whose recent books have focused on the ex-servicemen who – exiled in Burkina Faso – prepared the rebellion. Although not a northerner, he was approached by the group in October 1999 and confidentially told about their plans to organise the first coup. He interviewed these sources extensively in the days following the coup in December (Beugré 2011). In 1996, Beugré won the Ebony prize as the best political journalist in Côte d'ivoire.

[63] Members of the core group were Diomandé Souleymane alias 'La Grenade', Aboudramani Ouattara alias 'L'enfant de Kong', Gaousou Koné alias 'Jah Gao' and Ibrahim Coulibaly alias IB or Major, born in 1964 and killed in 2011 by his former brothers in arms.

[64] One of them said they found, for instance, the manner humiliating in which Alassane Ouattara's mother was questioned about whether she really was his mother (Beugré 2011).

[65] Encapsulated interest as a basis for trust is explained further in the conceptual chapter on trust.

(Beugré 2011, 133) Anyone else they considered had to be someone they "knew well", according to with Beugré's interviews with them, and with whom they had a long personal history. Maintaining confidentiality was essential.[66]

From the start, it seems they wanted Guéï to take the presidential seat, but only ad interim until a fair election could been held, which should include Alassane Ouattara. The group chose Guéï as he was a person with authority who still enjoyed widespread support in the army. One of the conspirators, Diomandé Souleymane, had worked closely for Guéï and described him as someone who cared about the well-being of his soldiers (Beugré 2011). However, Guéï was afraid when they first informed him about their plan and did not want to have anything to do with it. It is said they had to take his wife Rose hostage before General Guéï accepted.

Guéï surrounded himself in the CNSP with high-ranking officers from the army. For instance, General Lassana Palenfo became the number two and Abdoulaye Coulibaly and the number three, so that the initial low-ranking instigators were marginalised. One of them commented: *"Quand un chef vient au pouvoir, il travaille avec ses hommes de confiance." (Beugré 2011, 139)* Unfortunately, Guéï came to like the interim position more than expected.

2000: The plot of the white horse

Soon Guéï no longer regarded his position as temporary and harboured ideas of running for the presidency. The commission in charge of revising the electoral code in a Houphouëtist sense sharpened the law. Presidential candidates had to have parents who *both* had been born as Ivorians. In summer 2000, the country voted in favour of the infamous Article 35 of the Ivorian Constitution, which defines the elegibility of presidential candidate: *"pour être candidat, il faudrait être né de père et de mère ivoiriens d'origine." (Bouquet 2011, 50).* Again, this time under Guéï, Ouattara was banned from standing for election. Again, elections were not avoided per se, but 'well prepared' in advance, so that elections became a farce (Bouquet 2007).

In Man, many local Big Men saw their chance with Guéï and sent the population out on the streets on 21 June, 2000, intent on making Guéï their candidate (Beugré 2011, 169; Bouquet 2011). When he failed to get accepted by the PDCI, Guéï later created a new party, the *Union*

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[66] At a later stage, they offered Boka Yapi from the south a leading position. He later headed the infamous *brigade rouge,* which spread terror in Abidjan under Guéï and went against the group of 1999.

pour la Démocratie et pour la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire / Union for Democracy and peace in Côte d'Ivoire (UPDCI).[67]

With Guéï's decision to run for the presidency, mistrust gained currency between Guéï and the *'jeunes gens'* from the north. As 'northerners', the original conspirators could no longer be trusted and were persecuted by Guéï's *brigade rouge* a month before the election date set for 22 October 2000. As one of the original conspirators, IB who served as Guéï's *garde rapproché,* was released. Although assigned to the Ivorian embassy in Canada, IB never arrived there and went into exile in Burkina Faso. Dissatisfied with the leadership of the CNSP, about a dozen men formed around the core group of the 'Christmas Coup' and tried to remove Guéï from office in May and again in September 2000 (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 63). In the night of the 17 to 18 September, 2000, the group that had installed Guéï, attacked his residence. Two later commanders of the New Forces, Tuo Fozié and Ousmane Coulibaly, came to the fore in this attempt. They were part of the conspiracy that became known as the '*complot du cheval blanc*', in which Robert Guéï allegedly shape-shifted into a white horse. The coup attempt failed and the conspirators were repressed.

One of the 1999 conspirators, Ouattara, *l'enfant de Kong*, was severely wounded and later removed from the clinic and executed. Diomandé, *la Grenade*, was beaten, wrapped in barbed wire and burnt, and his body sprinkled with acid. Several servicemen must have been killed rather gruesomely during that time by the Brigade Rouge led by Laurent Boka Yapi. What followed the Christmas coup was designated a "terrible year" in popular expression (Le Pape and Vidal 2002a) due to the levels of violence that seemed to have become 'everyday' and which largely remained unpunished. The military gradually fragmented into "semi-autonomous paramilitary groups" (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 63), such as the PC-Crise, Red Brigade and Camora (Bouquet 2011).

With the election date approaching, the sitting President of the Supreme Court, a Dan speaker named Tia Koné from the same ethno-linguistic group as Guéï, had to make sure that no other powerful candidate was allowed to stand for the presidency. On 6 October 2000, the Supreme Court published the list with the presidential candidates, rejecting 14 out of 19 of the candidates. Promising candidates with the support of big political parties were excluded, most prominently

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[67] *"L'UDP-CI a été créée le 25 février 2001 sous la présidence de Paul Akoto Yao, et officiellement autorisée le 16 juillet 2001."* (Bouquet 2002, 321).

Alassane Ouattara (RDR) and Henri Konan Bédié (PDCI)[68]. Apart from some candidates with small electorates, such as Prof. Francis Wodié (PIT)[69], only Robert Guéï and Laurent Gbagbo were accepted as candidates.

An estimated half of the population entitled to vote saw their candidate excluded prior to Election Day for clearly strategic formal reasons. The elections had become a farce. Notwithstanding this, Côte d'Ivoire voted on 22 October 2000. Gbagbo (FPI) presented himself as the 'civil president' and was soon in the lead. When General Guéï realised he was losing, he forcefully stopped the counting of votes and proclaimed himself President.

Gbagbo claimed victory for himself and immediately called upon 'the people' to take to the streets. Part of the gendarmerie, most notably Dogbo Blé Bruno, commander of the Batallion Blindé d'Akouédo, aligned himself with Laurent Gbagbo. Other high-ranking army officers followed. Faced with this popular uproar, Guéï escaped by helicopter and Laurent Gbagbo took over power.

2001: The plot of the black Mercedes

Gbagbo has often been said to have admitted publicly that the elections were held in 'calamitous' circumstances (Dozon 2011, 53) – an assessment that could have justified new elections. But protests by supporters of Alassane Ouattara were stifled in violence. In Yopougon, the largest neighbourhood of Abidjan, 57 bodies were found (Le Pape and Vidal 2002b). The *Charnier de Yopougon* introduced a new dimension of violence in political strife at the time.

With the elections grossly manipulated in advance, Laurent Gbagbo headed a government that lacked democratic legitimacy. What was propagated as the victory of "the people" by the FPI leadership, may also be interpreted as a 'military-civil coup d'Etat in disguise' (Beugré 2011, 179), perhaps particularly in the light of the constitutional-coup that Gbagbo would attempt in 2010.

With this outcome of the elections, the goals of the group who had planned the Christmas Coup in 1999 had yet to be achieved. Côte d'Ivoire was still waiting for elections allowing all the

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[68] Bédié was unable to provide the required medical certificate demanded by the constitution.

[69] The Ivorian Workers Party (PIT) led by Francis Wodié, a law professor and President of the Supreme Court under the present government of Ouattara (elected in 2010).

candidates of the large parties to participate.[70] Evidently, many feared for their lives under Gbagbo's regime and went into exile. A reward was fixed for the capture of some of them. Many joined IB in Burkina Faso.

In the night between the 7 and 8 January, 2001, this group attempted yet another coup dubbed "the plot of the black Mercedes" by opposition newspapers after the limousine in the military cortege heading south from the northern border with Burkina Faso (Beugré 2012, 50). However, the group in Abidjan failed and the cortege returned to Burkina Faso. This failed attack unleashed repressions once more and another wave of Ivorians found their way to neighbouring Burkina Faso.

In early 2001, Vidal interviewed and juxtaposed the statements of two FPI sympathisers in Abidjan from two different social milieus, one of them an elderly northerner, 65 years of age, the other a man in his late thirties from the south. The northerner, described how he received incomprehensible and angry looks from his own family/community for supporting Gbagbo when the conflict escalated between FPI and RDR after Gbagbo (FPI) had come to power in the 2000-elections. At the same time, youngsters in his neighbourhood, who supported the same party as him (FPI), stereotypically classified him as someone who could *not* be on their side because he came from the north. In their eyes, he was Jula, and hence a supporter of Ouattara's RDR (Vidal 2002). Confronted with 'strange looks' and other forms of social pressure from both sides, he began to consider, as a northerner, leaving the FPI. Such processes contribute to followers of a party becoming more homogeneous and harden politicised ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969; Eriksen 1993; Lentz 1995). The very creation of northerners and southerners can be seen as a process of ethnicisation, a creation of a group that had not previously existed in this form (Banégas 2006).[71]

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[70] Gossip has it that Alassane Ouattara is the real instigator of all the rebellions the country has seen. It would certainly be interesting to know more about the people behind the group who have supported them financially. However, it was not Ouattara but Guéï who was offered the transitional presidency by the coup leaders.

[71] The process of ascribing someone's political camp to their ethnic background began in the army at the latest under Guéï. The trend against northerners continued under Laurent Gbagbo, particularly with the *charnier de Yopougon,* where survivals have testified that those with non-northern names were spared.

2002: The coup-turned-rebellion

The groups that gathered in Burkina Faso formed the core group of the 2002 rebellion. They became known as the *Mouvement Patriotique pour la Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI). On 19 September 2002, this group of mid-ranking soldiers attacked without IB; they numbered about one hundred, from the army and political opposition (Beugré 2012, 18–19).[72] Once more, the coup was doomed. But this time, the insurgents managed to occupy the northern part of the country, including the second largest town Bouaké in the centre, where the country's second garrison was located and the largest town of the north, Korhogo. Other towns followed later, whereas the south remained under the rule of Gbagbo.

This time, it was not a bloodless coup. The situation escalated into a full-blown war, which would cost roughly more than 7,000 people their lives and force hundreds of thousands to flee. The short war was followed by a long-drawn-out *'sortie de crise'* that the country has not yet managed to achieve.

On the first morning of the coup, on 19 September 2002, General Robert Guéï was found dead in the streets of Abidjan. To understand the political climate in Man in 2002, the fate of Robert Guéï plays an important role. To this day, the circumstances of his death remain unclear. He was said to have tried to take refuge in the *Cathédrale Saint Paul*. It is certain he was killed along with other members of his household, among them his wife Rose. His dead body was found and filmed at the roadside at Corniche, a street linking the neighbourhoods of Plateau and Cocody. The way he was dressed when he was found raises questions. He had on a green-beige T-shirt and dark jogging trousers, i.e. clothes for casual wear, and was not in uniform. The fact that he was inappropriately dressed for a (supposed) public appearance has since raised suspicions about the government party's claim made in the wake of his death: namely, that Guéï was about to make a speech on national TV and assume power, as he had done in 1999.

Since he was obviously not accompanied by rebel soldiers, this hypothesis defies all logic. The rebel movement, which came to be known as the MPCI in the days that followed, was formed with people from the same group who had organised the coup in 1999: mid-ranking soldiers of northern origin. Clearly, the year 2000 had not delivered what the young mutineers had hoped

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[72] Tuo Foie, Issiaka Ouattara (Wattao), Koné Gaoussou (Jah Gao), Coulibaly Ousmane (Ben Laden, now Ben le sage), Chérif Ousmane (Papa Guépard), Touré Hervé (Vetcho), Oumar Diarrassouba (Zaga Zaga), Coulibaly Adama (Adams), Morou Ouattara, Koné Messamba, Losséni Fofana (Loss or Papa Cobra), Fofié Kouakou, Koné Zakaria, N'dri N'guessan (Félix Doh) (Beugré 2012, 18–19, 50).

for when calling on Guéï to take over in the Christmas Coup. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the same group would choose Guéï as a leader again in 2002, after Guéï's first 'betrayal'. Rather, Guéï seemed to have been taken by surprise.[73] Be this as it may, what is important to note is that the Dan in the region of Man thought that armed men from Gbagbo's government had killed Guéï. This widespread belief, or at least strong suspicion in the region of Man prepared the grounds for accommodating and collaborating with the rebellion. Only under the assumption that the government had assassinated Guéï was this alliance between the insurgent group, some of whom had been persecuted by General Guéï, and his home region a convincing discursive strategy. As the history of the MPCI-core group has shown, the alliance was not so obvious, after all.

A divided country (2002–2010/11)

With the occupation of the northern towns in late 2002, Côte d'Ivoire became a divided country. The territory was halved and separated by a green line called *zone de confiance,* which was controlled by international peace-keepers (first French and ECOWAS, later UN soldiers). The South remained controlled by forces loyal to the incumbent President, Laurent Gbagbo, while the northern parts of the country remained under the control of the insurgent movement, *Les Forces Nouvelles,* for eight subsequent years.

From 2003 onwards, various peace treaties were reached and barely implemented (Mehler 2009b; Heitz 2009). Citizenship issues remained a particular source of contention. With assistance from the United Nations, citizens were identified and voters were registered for presidential elections that were postponed in each year, and a no-war-no-peace situation prevailed. Following the *Accord Politique de Ouagadougou* (APO) in 2007, a fragile power-sharing agreement was brokered: the (political) rebel leader Guillaume Soro became Prime Minister in Gbagbo's government and took up his post. Although fraught with difficulties, headway was finally being made.[74]

Party politics went through several transformations and re-positionings during that time. In 2005, the old rivals Bédié (PDCI) and Ouattara (RDR) created an electoral alliance consisting

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[73] This reading does not exclude the possibility that soldiers loyal to Guéï were also plotting for something to happen at a later point in time (HRW 2003). Neither does this reading exclude a possible revenge act by the rebel group MPCI, as Guéï's Brigade Rouge had gruesomely killed some of their colleagues.

[74] See Chapter 11.

of the opposition *Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix* / Houphouëtiste Rally for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), comprised of the PDCI, the RDR, the UDPCI and another small party. Other parties gathered around Laurent Gbagbo and launched *La Majorité Présidentielle* / The Presidential Majority Party (LMP) in support of his bid. These two party alliances played a major role in the pre-election time and shaped the perception of political life in the region of Man.

Despite teetering on the brink of disaster several times, the factions represented in the government and even on the election committee survived. For the first time in over ten years, Côte d'Ivoire had called an election and for the first time since multi-party democracy had been introduced, all three political giants were allowed to take part. The country voted on 31 October, 2010. These elections were not the end, sadly, of 'a military-political crisis', but rather launched the beginning of a new war. An analysis of the period following these elections is, however, beyond the scope of this ethnography.

State of research on Côte d'Ivoire's violent conflict

Which themes in the Ivorian violent conflict attracted the attention of the academic world? In addition to general outlines of the conflict (Akindès 2004; Bouquet 2002; Poamé and Ahouma 2007; Bamba and Adou 2008; Dozon 2011; McGovern 2011), the following aspects seem to have been of interest: citizenship, land conflicts linked to migration, religion, the relationship to the former colonial power France, the politicisation and militarisation of youths, violence and politics, as well as rebel rule. In this section, I will briefly review and refer to each aspect in turn and situate my own study within it.

The most prominent aspect highlighted in nearly every discussion of the crisis is the instrumentalisation of citizenship and nationhood in the struggle for power (Losch 2000; Dozon 2000; Banégas 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Yéré 2007; Akokpari 2008; Arnaut 2004; Arnaut and Blimmaert 2009; Cutolo 2010; Bah 2010; Akindès 2011; Bøås and Dunn 2013).

Some have criticised this constant focus on citizenship, pointing out that much more concrete issues are at the heart of the conflict. According to Banégas: "it is a conflict about the rights – political, economic, educational, cultural, matrimonial, concerning property etc. – that are conferred by possession of a national identity document." (Banégas 2006, 536) In this reading, citizenship becomes one instrument among others in the struggle for power (McGovern 2011, 5). Citizenship and autochthony have also been highlighted by researchers studying land

conflicts in western Côte d'Ivoire, where migrant communities often outnumber the firstcomer communities and are sometimes outvoted in their 'homelands' (Dembele 2003; Chauveau and Bobo 2003; Woods 2003; Chauveau and Richards 2008; Mitchel 2011; Strozeski 2006).

In Côte d'Ivoire, two different explanations dominate the public discourse as to why there is a crisis (Yéré 2007). One emphasises that the Ivorian crisis is an inner-Ivorian struggle for state control, whereas the second portrays the conflict as a form of classic neo-colonial interference, in which France is trying to install a political puppet. The relationship with France and the international community has been looked at in connection to the conflict (see e.g. Banégas 2006; Yéré 2007; Charbonneau 2008), and also in relation to the 50th Anniversary of Independence (N'Guessan 2013; Heitz 2013b).

The relationship to France gained greater prominence after the disastrous presidential elections in late 2010, in which, for the first time in its history, the UN itself certified the election results (Bassett 2011; Banégas 2011; Straus 2011; Piccolino 2012). Aspects of international interference are likely to attract more scholarly attention in future. Linked to the subject of international interference is also the question of the international involvement in brokering peace. Several studies have addressed power-sharing during the peace negotiations, the role of France and questions of ownership (Mehler 2009b; Heitz 2009; de Bruijn and Osaghae 2011). This period, though, will not be addressed in this study as my focus is on rebel rule in Man before the election in 2010. It should be stressed, though, that the political landscape changed drastically after the 2010 presidential election and opened a new chapter in Ivorian history.

Investigations of the connections between religion and politics in the violent crisis have found that "religion is not the true source of division in Ivorian politics" (McGovern 2012, 251). According to one expert on Islamic studies and specialist on Côte d'Ivoire: "the present conflict is not even remotely a religious one" (Miran 2006, 83). Notwithstanding attempts to play the religious card and cruel treatment of actors with religious functions, religious issues have not fuelled the conflict so far (Miran 2011); quite the contrary, apart from some radical evangelical churches, religious leaders' public statements have often helped calm the situation (Miran 2006; Vüllers 2011; McGovern 2012, 251). My observations in the region of Man[75] support this view.

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[75] 'L'ouest montagneux' is a term often used to group the regions of the 'extrême-ouest': Cavally, Tonkpi (Man), Bafing and Guémon.

The social category of youth is a topic of tremendous regional and international interest.[76] One youth group in the south of Côte d'Ivoire, the *Jeunes Patriotes* (Young Patriots), have in particular attracted public interest beyond the national sphere because their mass protests against "French interference" were effectively staged for the media. The Young Patriots' origins can be traced back to the student's movement in universities, when they entered onto the national political scene and were involved in the struggle for leadership within the various groups. It has been seen as an example of the empowerment of a marginalised group, but its radical and violent dimensions as a political militia have also been addressed (Chauveau and Bobo 2003; Konaté 2003; Arnaut 2005, 2012; Rompel 2008; Banégas 2007; Babo 2009; Gnangadjomon 2011b).

The participation of youth among the insurgents side has attracted significantly less scholarly attention, probably because it is more difficult to access the 'hinterland' than the city of Abidjan, where large parts of the research on the pro-government side were conducted. Studies on insurgent youths have tended to focus on their motives, social backgrounds and mobility (Fofana 2011b; Chelpi-den Hamer 2010, 2011; Engels 2009, 2012), all have focused on armed insurgents, leaving the experiences of non-armed youth underexplored.

Little literature on the political situation in the rebel-held part of the country's north was available in 2013, when this manuscript was submitted. Since then, several new publications have come out from political scientists on rebel governance, some of which draw on this thesis: Martin, Piccolino, Speight (forthcoming), van Baalen (forthcoming).[77] Published articles include those of Till Förster on the region of Korhogo (Förster 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2018), Kerstin Bauer on Ferkessédougou (Bauer 2011), Jeremy Speight on Bouna (Speight 2013), and mine on Man (Heitz 2009; Heitz Tokpa 2016, Heitz Tokpa 2018). Most studies on the rebel-held north focused on violent actors, the New Forces (Balint-Kurti 2007; Engels 2009, 2012; Chelpi-den Hamer 2010, 2011; Beugré 2011; Fofana 2011b; Speight 2013). Förster's research, however, includes rebel governance, the negotiation of political order, statehood, security issues (particularly the *dozow*[78]) and transformations of trust and social norms, which are all aspects central to this ethnography. An interesting body of literature addresses the gradual brutalisation of the public sphere and the increasing insecurity in the

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[76] A book that deals with youth culture and this milieu in Abidjan is (Newell 2012). For an analysis of popular culture and the political crisis see (Schumann 2009).

[77] As mentioned in the preface, the

[78] A *dozo* is a hunter in Mande language. The origin of the *dozow* (plural) and the hunters' association lies in the culture of the Mande Empires, even if there is no continuous iteration.

1990s (Vidal 2003; Le Pape and Vidal 2002a; Konaté 2003; Förster 2004; Akindès 2007; Hellweg 2011; Gnangadjomon 2011a). I will refer to these texts throughout this study.

When I started this project in 2008, thorough descriptions of the conflict in the country's western region were lacking, particularly for an English-speaking audience. Since then, two excellent studies with detailed ethnographic information and chronologies of the conflict have been published. The anthropologist Mike McGovern became familiar with the Upper Guinea Coast region through his extensive fieldwork in Guinea and is an expert on the Mano River wars. He compiled a thorough analysis of the political conflict, providing insights into the ethno-social history of the region, economic aspects and the dynamics between the local, national and international levels (McGovern 2011). For the region of Man, Magali Chelpi-den Hamer, a political scientist with experience in humanitarian work, produced a detailed account of the conflict that encompasses both warring factions in western Côte d'Ivoire between 2002 and 2007, with a particular focus on armed groups and militarised youths (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011). Both books provide a useful reference for understanding life during the conflict in western Côte d'Ivoire. I have also studied social life and political order in the rebel-held mountainous west (Heitz 2009, 2011). Despite the scholarly interest in the Ivorian conflict, only Förster's articles address social life and trust under rebel rule. Analyses of social life focusing on the non-military populations in the rebel-held regions are largely lacking.

Summary and outlook

This chapter describes the history of the Ivorian conflict. At the heart of the violent conflict is a crisis in the legitimacy of power (International Crisis Group 2009, 19) arising from the "preventive eliminations" that preceded the presidential elections (Bouquet 2011). Institutions no longer operated according to the rules, so people withdrew their trust (Rotberg 2003a, 9): "When the rulers are perceived to be working for themselves and their kin and not for the state, their legitimacy, and the state's legitimacy, plummets. […] Various sets of citizens cease trusting the state." (Rotberg 2003a, 9) In other words, the state was no longer considered trustworthy. The manipulative practices made peaceful election campaigning nearly impossible.[79]

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[79] Politics is notorious for the corruptibility and hypocrisy of its actors, including in Côte d'Ivoire. "The world of the political parties is universally perceived as a world of intrigues, endless reversals of

Presidential power rested increasingly on unsound footing due to its lack of legitimacy. Not surprisingly, this meant power had to be backed up by force. This had become all too common during Houphouët-Boigny's presidency and was repeated and intensified under his successors. The militarisation of politics was the corollary of the lack of legitimacy and manipulated elections. The use of force by both state and non-state actors increased in the public sphere. The banalisation of violence progressed continuously and took new forms (Vidal 2003).

To understand why a rebellion took place in the northern parts of Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, we first discuss the first coup in 1999, which had its roots in the struggle for Houphouët's succession in the 1990s (Le Pape and Vidal 2002b; Engels 2009, 2012). Those who instigated the coup in 1999 against Bédié only half succeeded and consequently repeated their attempt in the 2000 (against Guéï), 2001 and 2002 against Gbagbo. But none of these politicians was prepared to organise elections that included Alassane Ouattara. Each of the failed attempts by the group was followed by renewed repressive acts by the incumbent regimes targeting the families and social milieus of those close to the suspected instigators. This led to even more people going into exile in Burkina Faso, from where the rebellion was launched. Although the coup failed again in 2002, the instigators no longer went back into exile but stayed. What their 'stay' meant for the populations under their control is the topic of the following chapters.

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alliances, arm wrestling and blows 'below the belt', betrayals and shifting allegiances (or 'transhumance')." (Olivier Sardan 2009, 46) Someone active in a civil society organisation, told me: *"La démarcation entre la société civil et le politique est très difficile. Parce que la politique veut toujours avoir la société civile à sa sonne. Si tu veux te démarquer du politique tu deviens l'ennemie du politique."* Maméry, 30s, Jula-speaking, 04/08/2009.

3 Man during the rebellion

This chapter describes the town and region of Man, situated in the Upper Guinea Coast,[80] with its distinct ethno-linguistic groups. Like most of the urban areas in the region, the history and politics in the town of Man is primarily framed by two communities: firstcomers and newcomers. After distinguishing different phases in the violent conflict, I will conclude the chapter with a description of an 'ordinary' morning in Man in 2008.

The beginnings of Man

The town of Man with its about 150,000 inhabitants is surrounded by rocky, forested hills. It is the capital of the region *Montagnes/Tonkpi*, and its beginnings are usually traced back to the colonial conquest by the French and to the capture of Samory Touré in Guélémou/Géoulé north of Man in 1898 (Person and Ligier 1976, 148–51). Some of his mounted warriors, the *sofas,* settled in this area of farmers, close to the Dan villages of Gbêpleu[81] and Gbapleu (Reed 2003, 36).[82] According to the elders in Gbêpleu, the ancient village is located in the nearby sacred forest. When the colonialists arrived, they asked the villagers to move their settlement from the mountain and to its foot.[83] Today, Gbêpleu and Gbapleu are districts in Man.

The people in the region have traded, e.g. kola nuts, with the drier north for centuries. French settlers, and particularly immigrants from the Sahel region, started growing coffee and cocoa as cash-crops. This led to a new dynamic and the creation of a small town. Until the 1920s, Côte d'Ivoire was considered to be among France's least advanced or developed colonies, a fact that is often forgotten due to the economic miracle in the 1960s/70s. By 1924, Man had a

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[80] How the term is used here is explained in the section "The region of Man", below.

[81] To my knowledge, the spelling varies between "Gbeypleu", "Gbêpleu" and "Gbépleu". I follow Reed 2003 in this article. *Pleu* means village in Dan (Vydrine and Kességbeu 2008, 361).

[82] One of the neighbourhoods in Man still carries the name *sofa* in Dioulabougou today Touré, Féréboué, 70s, Jula-speaking, elder of Dioulabougou (Man), 05/04/2009.

[83] Chef de terre of Gbê-pleu, 60s, Dan-speaking, Man, 10/04/2009.

village school and a *dispensaire*[84]*,* as was normal in towns in the western parts of Côte d'Ivoire (Kipre and Tirefort 1992, 305). In the 1950s Man became the administrative centre of the colonial administration for the entire region. By 1960, the town's population had risen to almost 50,000 people (Bonnal 1986, 24), but the literacy rate was below 20% (Kipre and Tirefort 1992, 334). Catholics, known as the White Fathers, founded the school *Paroisse Saint Michel,* which celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2010.

As in other towns of the Upper Guinea forest belt, the city of Man consists of two main communities that are of nearly equal size today; the firstcomers (Dan speakers) and newcomers, particularly immigrants from the drier north (mostly from Côte d'Ivoire, but also from Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea).[85] The firstcomers and newcomers are linked by the host-stranger-relationship prevalent throughout Upper Guinea Coast societies (Brooks 1993). Latecomers are meant to keep out of regional politics and defer to their hosting *tuteurs* (McGovern 2011).[86] National political struggles, poverty and increased immigration from the Sahel region have sometimes led to tensions in the otherwise good relationships between the groups.

The population groups are very heterogeneous, as Reed describes: "Conflict, cohabitation, and mixing are all words that describe the interactions taking place [in Man]." (Reed 2003, 43) The Dan and Wè practise characteristically a variety of religions. Many local beliefs combine aspects of Christianity and Islam (Reed 2005; van Gijsegem 2006, 196). In Man, a majority of the northern Mande speakers are Muslim, whereas the Akan-groups (Baule and Agni etc.) are often Christians (Roman Catholics). Many of the Akan-speakers resident in Man in the 1990s were civil servants or high-ranking state agents, forming a distinct social class. Most of them left the region at the outbreak of the war.

The region of Man

If we set aside the national perspective for a moment, we see that the region of Man is situated at the easternmost fringe of the Upper Guinea Coast. This primarily geographical term has historically been used to refer to the stretch of land between the mouth of the Gambia River and Cape Mount, close to today's border with Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, the research

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[84] A *dispensaire* is a clinic to dispense medicine and basic medical care.

[85] Lebanese traders and shop owners also played an important role. Man also had a small tourist economy until the late 1990s.

[86] See also chapter on *Côte d'Ivoire's* conflict.

group 'Integration and Conflict along the Upper Guinea Coast' in Halle/Germany uses the term more broadly to refer to adjacent societies along the Upper Guinea Coast that share ecological, historical, linguistic, cultural and socio-political characteristics with those (Knörr and Filho 2010a). In this dissertation, I will use the term in this sense, including regions from the Atlantic coastline to the mountainous hinterland of the Futa-Jalon and the Nimba Mountain massif. This stretch of land is comprised of areas from the following states (from west to east): The Gambia, the Casamance region of southern Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and also western Côte d'Ivoire. This region not only has similar ecological characteristics, but is also historically linked from a linguistic, cultural and socio-political point of view (Knörr and Filho 2010a).

The Dan and other Mande-speaking groups

Two large language groups can be distinguished in western Côte d'Ivoire, the Kru in the southwestern quadrant on the Coast and the Mande further north. The ethno-linguistic group in the region of Man are the Dan, commonly called Yacouba in Côte d'Ivoire and Gio in Liberia (Holsoe and Lauer 1976). The language, also called Dan (monosyllabic and tonal) is classified as belonging to the southeastern Mande-speaking group (Mande), whose roots lie further north and reach back to the historic Mande empires.[87] They are patrilineal, patrilocal and polygamous, and grow rice and cassava as staple crops. Their farms and farm hamlets are usually located at a considerable distance away from the villages.[88]

Although the circulation of people and goods must have been constant, several waves of Mande-speaking groups penetrating the forest belt are usually distinguished. The first groups are presumed to have been farmers and blacksmiths. Later came Muslim traders, followed by a last wave of warriors. Whereas the first two encounters seem to have been peaceful, the latest wave of migration took the form of an incursion.[89] Knörr and Filho conclude that: "The expansion of Mande-speaking groups along the Upper Guinea Coast was a complex process

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[87] The Mande heartland was located at the source of the Niger River in today's Guinea. Due to longer drought periods and dynamics in and among the Mande states in the Sudanese zone, Mande groups expanded further south from approximately the thirteenth century onwards.

[88] For more information concerning the Dan, see for instance: Himmelheber and Himmelheber 1958, Fischer 1967, Reed 2003, Vydrine and Késségbeu 2008.

[89] Starting in French colonial times, labour migration from the Voltaic region (Burkina Faso) was fostered. This could be considered the fourth wave of migration, which started in the early 20th century. It is a root cause of today's conflict and a wave that has yet to diminish – if you believe the claims that new 'immigrants' are arriving 'every week' in search of new land.

involving conquest and assimilation, resistance, and accommodation." (Knörr and Filho 2010a, 4)

Probably the group that we refer to as the Dan today is made up of migrant Mande groups who mixed with the people they came across. With new waves of migrants from the north, the Dan also moved further south and found their present homes in today's region of Man (Loucou 1984). Another important group of firstcomers *(autochthones)* in the region are the Tura, who are also southeastern Mande speakers with lands north of Man (Holas 1962).[90] It is important to note that although the Dan (Tura and Guro) are Mande speakers, their southeastern Mande varaieties are neither mutually intelligible with the languages of the northern Mande groups, such as the Manding, Jula and Koyaga varieties, nor do they share feelings of belonging to the same historical group. (Mande) languages have to be understood as a continuum of different varieties that become less mutually intelligible, the further they are away from each other (Kastenholz 1988). Linguistic reconstructions suggest a common descent of the various Mande varieties, but the classification of Mande language groups has been revised serveral times (Kastenholz 1988; Vydrine and Késségbeu 2008). The Dan in Man perceive the Manding groups, such as the Odienneka (people from Odienné), Koyaga (from the region of Séguéla/Mankono) and Jula, as stranger-guests. Unlike with the Senufo and Guro, the Dan do not have a joking relationship with the Manding-speaking groups.[91] Knowing how the different ethno-linguistic groups are related helps in understanding how relationships could work or be managed during the rebellion. Whereas the Senufo rebels could joke with the Dan and use the joking relationship to ease tensions, the Koyaga, the ethno-linguistic group of the commander in Man between 2003 and 2011, could not fall back on a joking relationship with the first settlers.

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[90] A language variety similar to Dan and Tura called Goo has a few thousand speakers living close to Man (Harter 1987).

[91] Joking relationships (here between ethnic groups) allow or even require members of these groups to exchange jokes. Often these jokes challenge social norms, but the joking partners have to play along and cannot 'get angry' at their counterpart. Between the Dan and Senufo, for instance, the most frequent 'joke' was calling the other one a 'slave'. Should there be conflict, the joking partner has to accept the apologies of the other (Radcliffe-Brown 1952; Canut and Smith 2006).

Many societies in the Upper Guinea Forest belt share the *poro* secret society and have therefore been referred to as the "*poro* cluster" (Murphy 1980, 194).[92] However, neither the western nor the eastern Dan in Liberia are part of the trans-ethnic poro society (Fischer 1967; Reed 2003).[93]

Kru-speaking groups

In the region of Man, the Dan are in contact with groups from the Kru language family, another constitutive group of the Upper Guinea Coast, as mentioned above. The Dan groups pushed the Wè, a subgroup of the Kru language group, further to the west and south. To this day, the southernmost Dan-speaking villages remember skirmishes with their Wè neighbours.[94] Just after the first big crossroad east of Man (the village Voungbe), the first Wobé or northern Wè villages, are found. The Wobé are an important minority group in Man today (Reed 2003, 36). The neighbouring towns to the east of Semien, Facobly[95] and Kouibly are all Wè-speaking areas. From an ethno-linguistic perspective, they are part of the Kru language group, to which Laurent Gbagbo belongs as a Bete speaker.

The following shift in political alliances occurred between 2000 and 2002. In the presidential elections with the coup leader Guéï (Dan) opposing Gbagbo (Bete) in October 2000, the departments with a Wè-speaking population (Wobe and Guere) voted for Guéï as 'the man from the West' and not for Gbagbo from 'their' linguistic group (Bouquet 2002, 322). In December 2000, when Guéï was no longer in office and Laurent Gbagbo had become the new President,

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[92] As a rite of passage to adulthood, all young men are initiated into the *poro*. Often there is also a comparable society for women (*sande* along the Upper Guinea Coast). The Dan women's society in the region of Man in called *kong* (Vydrine and Kességbeu 2008).

[93] Personal communication, Maarten Bedert, October 2012. This misunderstanding has been reiterated in some Anglophone literature on the region, for instance, in Warren d'Azevedo (Azevedo 1959), whose work was cited by William Murphy (Murphy 1980, 194), and recently by Mike McGovern on Côte d'Ivoire (McGovern 2011, 10). Daniel Reed (2003), who has studied the Dan in Man, takes a different view. The initiation ceremonies for boys are called *gbannë* (Reed 2003, 94–95), and for girls *kong* (Reed 2003, 78). The region and group associated most in Côte d'Ivoire with the poro are the Senufo (Förster 1993, 1997).

[94] Chef de terre, Podiagouiné, 14/01/2009; Chef de canton, Logoualé, 26/03/2009; Chef de terre, Dompleu, 08/2012. During an attack in 2005, a hamlet or seasonal dwelling of the Dan was destroyed by a milita group *Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire* (MILOCI) from Abidjan, with both reference to the present conflict and the ancient past (McGovern 2011). The Dan dwellings were destroyed, according to people who had lived there, because they were on land belonging to the Wè territory (group interview with Dan speakers, Logoualé, 19/03/2009).

[95] Facobly, a thirty minute drive from Man, is a large town in the region with a Wobe-speaking population (see figure 1 below).

the Wè voted for Gbagbo's party, the FPI.[96] Within two months, between October and December 2000, the Wè-speaking population shifted their allegiance from Guéï to Gbagbo (Bouquet 2002, 322–29), floating with the tide of the national power holder. This is how the Wè and the Dan found themselves on opposing sides of the conflict. We may interpret the shift as a strategic political alliance sought by "*les cadres de la région*", the region's opinion leaders, in order to position 'their' people and region with the winning side in a patrimonial state. To make this point clear, the change of alliance was a political choice and not determined by ethno-linguistic belonging.[97] The belief that the Wobe sided with the loyalists was further enforced at a local level by the fact that the 'Wobe villages' towards Facobly allegedly gave the rebels poisoned or bad water so they could hand them over to the loyalists, as I heard on several occasions. Even if just a few individuals rather than 'a whole village' had served bad water, the effect was far-reaching for the entire Wobe-population, as it confirmed already existing mistrust and suspicion.

The Wobe were the only Kru-speaking group who remained under rebel control. After the establishment of the *zone de confiance*, the green line separating the two belligerent groups, the Wè-speaking areas south of Man, the southern Wè or Guere[98] around the town of Bangolo were no longer under rebel control. Hence, politics and discourse located Kru and Mande on different sides of the political conflict. As one research participant remembered: *"Au début, de façon stratégique, chaque groupe ethnique, c'était retrouvé dans un coin ou un autre. Nous qui sommes du Nord que tu le sois ou pas, on te taxait automatiquement de rebelle."*[99] In this geopolitics of the Ivorian conflict, the Dan speakers, the autochthonous or firstcomers of the region of Man, were considered 'rebels', a group supporting the rebellion. The onset of armed conflict, therefore, hardened ethnic boundaries and identities, and exacerbated stereotypical ascriptions of people's political camp on the basis of ethnic belonging (Apter 1997). During the

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[96] Before 2000, the FPI was a rather marginal opposition party nationally.

[97] The Wobe in Facobly have long been closely linked to the Dan speakers of Man. Many are bilingual. The way they use masks is closer to that of the Dan than the Wè (Gérard, 50s, Wè-speaking, Facobly, 11/11/2008). In political terms, although many are FPI voters, they have an UDPCI branch in the region. Hence, language and culture should not be seen as determining ethnic groups. However in politics, which is about the struggle for power, cultural-linguistic or religious belonging can be instrumentalised.

[98] Although linguists distinguish the northern and southern Wè-varieties) (see www.ethnologue.com), the differentiation between Wobe and Guere from colonial times has been criticised (van Gijsegem 2006, 192).

[99] Diabaté, in his 40s, Jula-speaking, employee in a leading position (SODECI), Man, 30/12/2008.

time we are concerned with here, the Wè as a group were identified as a group that organised armed counter-insurgent resistance in contact with Abidjan.[100]

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[100] At the onset of the rebellion, several pro-government militias formed in the Guiglo area, most of which had ties to Abidjan. Chelpi-den Hamer, who has studied these armed groups, notes that there was a particular "craze for defending Wè territory" (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 128).

Figure 1: The region of Man: Ethno-linguistic groups

Political organisation

The social structure of Dan society has been described as segmentary, as in other Upper Guinea forest societies (Murphy 1980; Knörr and Filho 2010b), with a particular emphasis on individual competition (Fischer 1967; Fischer and Himmelheber 1984). The colonial and post-colonial state, however, introduced a more hierarchical organisation. This political transformation has been described for other regions in Côte d'Ivoire (e.g. Förster 1997). It is beyond the scope of this work to elaborate on the historical and regional nuances of the Dan-speaking areas. Instead, I will describe the political organisation I observed 'at work' during my research and how actors explained it to me.

Throughout the region I observed, for instance, a buttom-up (governance) procedure on serveral occasions, which the canton chief of Logoualé explained as follows.[101] If an individual encounters a 'problem' that he or she feels unable to resolve him- or herself, the person will address the "head of the family" (/*kwendhe*/ in Dan, from *kwen* house). If the household head feels unable to resolve the issue at hand, the "chef de quartier" or "chef de village" will be involved, then the "chef de group" and eventually the "chef de canton".[102] These (elected) authorities have generally an entourage or committee with several deputies, councillors and representatives of the population, representing youth, women, young women, and the different religious and latecomer communities.[103] The youth representative of a neighbourhood usually has a small committee with a deputy and secretary.[104] These structures are usually mobilised should there be an issue. This organisation of neighbourhoods and villages allows quite an effective flow and exchange of communication.

During the war, individuals who felt particularly threatened fled the region, while others stayed or came back again shortly after the combats had ceased. Absent chiefs were easily replaced by thier deputies, which guaranteed the functioning of what I actually think is best termed as governance at the neighbourhood-level. Sometimes this resulted in conflicts over leadership. What is important to highlight is that this political organisation and the impressively skilful way

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[101] Nearly every time I passed to greet the canton chief in Logoualé, the trained educationalist with experience in law had visitors who had come to see him for various issues. When asked what the most frequent 'problems' are he said: adultery, theft, murder, and land issues (Canton chief in Logoualé, 60s, Dan-speaking, 26/03/2009).

[102] Bamba, 26/03/2009.

[103] Dion, 50s, Dan-speaking, elder of neighbourhood Lycée, Man, 03/11/2008. Elder in Grandgbapleu, 60s, Dan-speaking, 17/10/2008.

[104] Tia, 30s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, A-levels, planter, Lycée, 27/02/2009.

some of these representatives manage(d) their daily affairs was crucial for the continuation of social life during the rebellion. The representatives operated as interlocutors and mediators, and helped to reassure the population.[105] Thus, even after the state administration left, the local society continued functioning and was not completely 'ruptured'. When trying to understand the change that took place, I was told that some of the rebels did not respect the judgment of the local authorities or some civilians went to see the rebels if they were unhappy with the way the authorities had handled affairs.[106]

Party politics in Man

The Ivorian conflict is rooted in a politicisation of ethnic identities. Although political alliances are not the key focus of this study, I will briefly summerise general political tendencies and party politics in the region of Man from 2007 to 2010 because these help to explain the different factions and opinions dominant at the time.

According to the maps in Bouquet (2002, 2011) showing election results from 2000/2001 and 2010, the ethno-regional groups in Côte d'Ivoire show a clear voting pattern: those in the north, mostly either northern Mande or Senufo, largely support Ouattara's RDR; the Akan-speaking groups generally support the old single-party PDCI and the Wè have become primarily FPI voters since Laurent Gbagbo came to power. The ethno-regional basis of the parties is also apparent at local public gatherings with their supporters.[107]

Dan speakers have been very divided politically since 2000.[108] Whereas most left the old single party (PDCI) in 2001 to support their 'son' Guéï in the UDPCI, this unity did not survive the decade-long conflict. During the pre-election phase (2009/2010), the UDPCI split into two rival camps. Under the leadership of the *conseil général*[109], Sriki Blon Blaise, called Bulldozer due to his successful development projects throughout the region, one group decided to side with Laurent Gbagbo, creating the UDPCI-VG (*vision* Guéï Robert), meaning led by Guéï. This group was strongly represented in Man. The majority of UDPCI voters, however, remained

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[105] See more in Chapter 10.

[106] Canton chief in Logoualé, 60s, Dan-speaking, 26/03/2009.

[107] It is true that the political elite in Abidjan is more mixed. The party bases, however, all show clear ethno-regional preferences, as shown on the maps indicating the voter distribution in the 2010 presidential elections.

[108] Whether this urge for the Dan to distinguish themselves can be linked to the long-standing thesis that the Dan favour individual competition would be interesting to explore (Fischer and Himmelheber 1984).

[109] The *conseil général* is responsible for a department in Côte d'Ivoire. The president of the council is elected.

loyal to Albert Mabri Toikeusse (UDPCI), a native of Zouan Hounien, who supported Alassane Ouattara in the electoral alliance RHDP. This branch of the UDPCI was represented in Man by its mayor Albert Flindé. In addition to the UDPCI-VG branch supporting Laurent Gbagbo, other influential politicians in Man belonged to the FPI.

Multiple experiences of violent conflict in the west

The region with the towns of Man-Duékoué-Guiglo-Toulépleu-Danané has been referred to as "The Wild West" by international observers (International Crisis Group 2003, 18; BBC News 2005). This alludes to the fact that the west has experienced more violence than other part of the country. However, there are "many wests", as Chelpi-den-Hamer notes (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 88), and different places within this area have experienced very different forms of violence. To my present knowledge, the Human Rights Watch Report from 2003 *Trapped between two wars: Violence against civilians in western Côte d'Ivoire*, is still the most reliable source of information on the war and the first year of the violent crisis that is publicly available. However, it hardly mentions the Wobe region with the towns Facobly and Sémien, and I, unfortunately, am not able to fill the gap.

The war was experienced very differently in different parts of the west (see de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007 about Chad). Towns and villages such as Mahapleu, Krikouma near Man and Zouan-Houien, for example, were close to the frontline and exposed to air raids, whereas rural areas in the triangle Toulépleu, Guiglo, Bangolo, suffered more from inter-community violence between first- and latecomers. In contrast, Man and Daloa suffered 'cleansing' operations conducted by the government at the beginning of the war. The presence of Liberian and other regional mercenaries caused further suffering in the form of looting and sexual violence in the region of Man, and even more so along the Liberian border between Danané and Bloléquin (Human Rights Watch 2003).

After the end of direct fighting in mid-2003, different factions in the west controlled different areas. The towns of Man, Danané, Logoualé and Facobly became part of the New Forces western zone, later zone six, controlled by the rebels. Bangolo and Zou were part of the buffer zone patrolled by the UN, while the southernmost part of the 'Wild West' quadrant, which includes Duékoué, Guiglo, Bloléquin, Toulépleu and Zouen-Houien, were in loyalist hands, i.e. in a government-controlled zone. Violence with an ethnic dimension, which is often considered to have been widespread in that the west, occurs when ethnic groups are stereotypically treated

as belonging to particular political camps. Tit-for-tat intercommunity violence played, however, a much bigger role in the demilitarised zone and in the south than in the rebel-held, northern part of the west.

Temporalities of the war experiences also varied within the region: Whereas frontline combat had ended in Man by the end of December 2002, it reached another peak along the Liberian border near Danané in April 2003. By then the population in Man were already dealing with the first phase of rebel rule.

THE REGION OF MAN (WESTERN CÔTE D' IVOIRE)
Boundaries and spheres of control

Touba

GUINÉE

Séguéla

Sipilou

ZONE 7

Biankouma

Gbapleu

Kandopleu

Sémien

FORCES NOUVELLES
ZONE 6

Gbonné

Zagoué

Douagué

Voungoué

Man

Krikouma

Facobly

Danané

Sangouiné

Kouibly

Mahapleu

Podiagouiné

Logoualé

LIBÉRIA

Yapleu

Zeo

ZONE DE CONFIANCE

Zou

Bangolo

(MONTAGNES)

Zouan Hounien

(MOYEN CAVALY)

Daloa

Guéyébly

Bin Houye

ZONE LOYALISTE

Duékoué

Toulépleu

Bloléquin

Péhé

Guiglo

Tiobly

0 5 10 15 20 Km   N

Localities

◎ Region capital

◯ Department capital

○ Sub-department capital (sous-préfectures)

∘ Village

Administrative Boundaries

━━ Country boundary

── Region boundary (state administration)

⋯⋯ Boundary of confidence zone

⋯⋯ Boundary between New Forces' zone 6 and 7

Road Network

── Tarred road

── Non-tarred road

Territorial Delimitations

ZONE 6   Designation of New Forces' zones (2006-2010)

(MONTAGNES)   Delimitation of region (state administration)

▨ Confidence zone

▨ Government-controlled zone

▨ Rebel-controlled zone (New Forces)

Figure 2: The region of Man: Spheres of control

Phases in the violent conflict in Man

For simplicity, I have distinguished different phases in the conflict in the town and region of Man:

A) Time before the rebellion reached the west (19 September–28 November 2002)

B) War and the era of the rebel groups MPCI, MJP, MPIGO (28 November 2002–mid-2003)

      B) First take-over of Man by rebel groups (28 Nov.–1 Dec. 2002)

      A) Troops loyal to the government regain control over Man (1 Dec.–18 Dec. 2002)

      B) Recapture of Man by rebel groups (19 Dec. 2002)

C) Man under Commander Losséni Fofana, or Loss for short, from *Les Forces Nouvelles* (2003–2011)

      Loss phase I (2003–2005), *Zone Ouest*

      Loss phase II (2006–2007), reformed rebel governance, zone six

      Loss phase III (2007–2011), territorial power-sharing with the government

A) Time before the rebellion reached the west (19 Sept.–28 Nov. 2002)

Man remained under government control after the failed coup in Abidjan until the onset of the war in the west. During this time, people were very suspicious of each other. The death of General Robert Guéï on the first day of the coup, seemingly hastened by pro-government forces, had created a social climate that tended to side with the insurgents, whose aim was to oust the government. Moreover, the government actively repressed UDPCI and RDR activists. The rebels first seized the town at the end of November 2002, but troops loyal to the government regained controlled over Man between 1 and 18 December 2002. Chapter 7 is dedicated to these two periods of government control in Man.

B) War and the era of the rebel groups MPCI, MJP, MPIGO (28 Nov. 2002–mid-2003)

This phase was characterised by combat-linked violence, high levels of insecurity and the presence of Anglophone supplementary combatants. The first year of the violent conflict is when we can actually speak of a "war"[110] in Man. Western Côte d'Ivoire experienced intense

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[110] War has been defined as an armed combat that takes a range of different empirical forms in practice. According to the classic definition of a war, about 1000 casualties occur per year, which implies a certain magnitude of the violence and number of people involved. Other definitions stress structural aspects such as a certain degree of organisation on both sides, as well as a certain magnitude and frequency of fighting (Waldmann 2002, 368).

levels of violence[111], which correspond more to a "civil war"[112] than to a 'merely' "violent crisis", which is often used to refer to the entire decade (1999–2010) (Akindès 2007). Despite the prevailing insecurity, this period was also shaped by astounding efforts to rekindle social life despite the violence and destruction taking place.

During this phase, which started in late November 2002, battles between the warring parties and shifting frontlines were initially frequent. Mixed rebel groups took control of Man on 28th November 2002, but the town changed hands three times within a few weeks. In addition to the rebel group *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI), two new groups emerged at the front in the west: the *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MJP) and the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO), which was dominated by foreign mercenaries (HRW 2003, 12). When the failed coup turned into a military rebellion, the MPCI were in need of fighters and called on the long-standing relationships established in Liberia when the Liberian president, Charles Taylor, was preparing his military intervention in Man/Danané (i.e. on Ivorian soil) in 1989 (Ero and Marshall 2003).[113] One of the mercenaries was the Sierra Leonean fighter Sam Boukarie, alias "Mosquito" or "Masta" (Master), who was internationally sought. He commanded a 'highly nervous and vigilant *garde rapprochée'* (Badouel 2004), some of whom were very young. Boukarie was killed in early 2003, while entering Liberia. Numbers are difficult to establish, but Bøås thought that about 1,800 Liberians fought on the government's side and about 900 on the insurgents' side (Bøås and Dunn 2013) (see below).

With the recruitment of Liberian fighters, an ethnic dimension from the Liberian war was transferred to the Ivorian west, which had a similar ethnic-linguistic composition. The massacres and atrocities that took place were similar to those that occurred during the Mano River war in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Ero and Marshall 2003).

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[111] Violence is defined here as "the deliberate infliction of harm on people" (Kalyvas 2006, 19).

[112] A civil war is an internal war. Kalyvas defines it as follows: "Civil war is defined […] as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities." (Kalyvas 2006, 17).

[113] The violent relationship between the Krahn, a subgroup of the Kruan in Liberia's Grand Gedeh country, and the Gio (the Liberian Dan) in Nimba country, goes back to the rivalry between the Krahn coup-leader and former President Samuel Doe and the army sergeant Thomas Quiwonkpa, a Dan from Nimba county. Doe and Quiwonkpa led the coup against William Tolbert's regime in 1980 that made Doe president. In 1985, Quiwonkpa tried to topple Doe, but failed and was killed. Thereafter, Doe ordered reprisal attacks on Nimba country, targeting people from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. When Charles Taylor, who had kinship ties in Nimba country, crossed the border from Danané on his way to Monrovia in 1989, he recruited among the Gio youths, many of whom had suffered from Doe's reprisal (Bøås 2010). Doe was killed in 1990 by a breakaway faction from Taylor's troops.

All three rebel groups came together as one group under the name *Forces Nouvelles*/New Forces (FN) in February 2003. Representatives of the FN today say that these two groups, MPIGO and MJP, had been created to continue the territorial conquest towards the south without breaching the cessation of hostilities which the MPCI had agreed to in negotiations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in October 2002. Even though there were three rebel movements at the beginning of the conflict, this had little influence on the rebel structure in the west later on.

Dély Gaspard was the official chief and spokesman of the MJP, and considered a "son of Man", as his parental villages are situated in the sub-prefecture of Man. He was the one who informed the public that the MJP had been created to avenge General Robert Guéï's death. Another military-man native to the Man region who joined MJP was Maméry Thomas Tia alias Tia Yéyé. He served as the *Commandant d'opérations* (C.O.) of Gbonné from late 2002 to early 2003 (Doumbia 2003b). However, the C.O. of MJP was Adama Coulibaly, or Adams for short, a former military-man in his forties nicknamed *"le tombeur"* – lady-killer in French (Doumbia 2003a). He belonged to the core group of the MPCI that had prepared the coup in exile. MJP has also been considered a satellite of the MPCI. When Adams went on to continue the battles towards Duékoué, San Pedro and Abidjan, his 'elder' Ousmane Coulibaly alias Ben Laden or 'Ben le sage' (today), took over as C.O. for administrative matters some time in January 2003.[114]

The chief of military operations and MPIGO spokesman was Doh Félix, whose name was allegedly from the west. The bulk of MPIGO's combatants were foreign mercenaries, mostly from Liberia. But Doh was in actual fact a young Baule from the centre with the name Sinclair N'Dri N'Guessan Germain (Badouel 2004, 75). Doh Félix was killed during the attack on the Liberians on 25 April 2003 under unclear circumstances (Doumbia 2003c, 7).

A) Just two days after the rebel's capture of Man on 28 November 2002, the town was re-conquered by the government, the so-called loyalists. The loyalist troops, who had Angolan reinforcements, were only able to keep the town for two weeks until mid-December.[115] During that time, politically active, young or wealthy northerners and Dan were persecuted and some of their homes looted. As a consequence, the population allegedly helped the rebels to recapture the town.

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[114] Adams was later killed in Korhogo in the fight between the pro-IB and pro-Soro factions.
[115] 1-18 December, 2002: government forces recaptured Man (Human Rights Watch 2003, 18).

B) On 19 December 2002, after severe fighting with the government forces, Man fell into rebel hands again and remained under their control for nine years until 2011.

On 20 December, the MPIGO rebel group moved further south and were able to enter the town of Logoualé without resistance. Logoualé is the last Dan-speaking town before the Wè-speaking areas further south, where the rebels met resistance (Bangolo and Duékoué). The occupation phase following the rebels' recapture of Man was marked by the presence of foreign mercenaries, who the Ivorian rebel leaders failed to control. During this period, Ousmane Coulibaly served as C.O. in Man. The name of Inspector A.B., a *Manois* and allegedly a bandit freed from prison in Man, also became known during this time.

The umbrella term for the three rebel groups, *Forces Nouvelles,* was first used in February 2003, but the different groups persisted for a while. The period came to an end with the expulsion of the Anglophone supplementary forces (mainly MPIGO), led by Chérif Ousmane, who grew up in Danané. Another milestone was the declaration of the end of war on 4 July 2003. Despite the ongoing battles to the south and west of Man, the municipal office (local council) reopened to issue birth certificates and other official documents on 24 February (Bleu 2003). The first classes to be held again were at the primary school in the district of Libreville in Man at the beginning of April 2003 (Troh 2003).[116] During the post-electoral violence, Losséni Fofana was in command of the west for the *Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire* (FRCI) (Fofana 2011a).[117]

C) Man under Commander Losséni Fofana (Forces Nouvelles) mid-2003–2011

A new period began for Man in the second half of 2003 after the Anglophone mercenaries had largely been chased out of Ivorian territory, at least from the region of Man (I am not sure about Danané). Losséni Fofana and his men took command in the west, which they held until President Alassane Ouattara took power in 2011. The new commander, a tall, slim man in his late twenties, originally from Mankono (b. 1974), was formally instated on 21 July 2003. He had served as a corporal in the Ivorian army, which is a common background for leaders of irregular forces (Schlichte 2009). At the beginning of the rebellion, he was responsible for the southern corridor in Bouaké, where, in the first days of the open conflict, a group of men formed

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[116] Tounkara, 60s, Jula-speaking, head teacher, primary school Libreville, Man, 16/12/2008. See also Chapter 9.

[117] This ethnography does not deal with the time after the presidential elections in 2010. Losséni Fofana was in charge of the territory in which human rights violations were committed (among other places, in Duékoué) (Straus 2011).

around him, who have remained loyal to this day. He was one of the men who fought under the command of Chérif Ousmane against the foreign mercenaries in the west and was made commander of the zone in mid-2003. He remained zone commander until 23 August, 2010, when he became Commander of the first *Groupement d'instruction* of the new army, consisting of the former FN-zones Man, Touba and Odienné.

Loss phase I (2003–2005), Zone Ouest

Five main zones were created in the rebel-held region: Bouaké, Korhogo, Odienné, Bouna and Man. Man was the administrative centre of *Zone Ouest*, which comprised Man, Danané, Biankouma and the Wobe areas (Sémien, Facobly and Kouibly). At the time self-proclaimed commanders (C.O.s) were still roaming the streets with their personal troops without necessarily feeling they were part of a chain of command. A.B. le lion became the acting commander-in-chief after Loss.[118] During this period the UN set up their base in Man to support the local population and provide order and security. The New Forces tried to reorganise the zone in order to *"redonner confiance aux éléments afin de les organiser à sécuriser la population"* (Lamko 2003b). From what I gathered, it took some time to consolidate control. As commanders from the first period still remained in leading positions, people did not immediately notice the commander-in-chief had changed.

Loss phase II (2006–2007), reformed rebel rule, zone six

By 2006, some of the most notorious rebels had been side-lined, and gendarmes and police had been organised with the help of the UN police. The administration of the New Forces had their headquarters in Bouaké under the command of General Soumahoro Bakayoko. The economic administration was also centrally based in Bouaké, where it developed into a technical structure called "the central" (Soro and Daniel 2005). Although the central undertook great efforts to get a tighter grip on the finances in the different zones, it seemed they still managed to keep a considerable space for manoeuvring. The New Forces' administration system was reformed again after a meeting at the headquarters in Bouaké in November 2006 (Tiagbeu 2007 01, 3):

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[118] Corporal Diabaté Adama served as commander of the southern sector in Man. He had previously been the second-in-command of Chérif Ousmane's Compagnie Guépard. Corporal, Yeo Dramane, who was better known as "Yeo cimetière" because one of his first positions in the rebellion was close to a graveyard in Bouaké, became the new "Com-secteur nord" and was responsible for the security of the *Zone Ouest* (Lamko 2003a, 8). He remained in office until at least 2005. Touba was under the command of Koné Gaoussou alias Jah Gao, who had participated in the 1999 coup, and Danané under sergeant Coulibaly Abou Fama (Doumbia 2003d, 8).

the rebel-held north was divided into ten quasi-autonomous zones (International Crisis Group 2009), each headed by a zone commander (Com-zone) or military governor:

> Zone 1 Bouna (Ouattara Mourou)
>
> Zone 2 Katiola (Touré Pelikan Hervé)
>
> Zone 3 Bouaké (Cherif Ousmane)
>
> Zone 4 Mankono (Ouattara Zoumana)
>
> Zone 5 Séguéla (Kone Zakaria);
>
> Zone 6 Man (Fofana Losséni)
>
> Zone 7 Touba (Doumbia Daouda)
>
> Zone 8 Odienné (Coulibaly Ousmane)
>
> Zone 9 Boundiali (Kone Gaoussou)
>
> Zone 10 Korhogo (Fofié Kouakou Martin)[119]

Man became the capital of the New Forces' zone six under Loss's command. Zone six stretched from the Liberian and Guinean borders to Sémien and Kouibly in the east, as well as from the northern border of the former confidence zone Logoualé to villages in the north of Man below Kandopleu (see Map 2 above). Biankouma was no longer part of the zone commanded by Loss because Biankouma and Sipilou became part of zone seven. The zones differed remarkably in respect to their security provisions, administrations and taxation systems (Förster 2009, 331–45) – see Chapter 10 for a description of the administrative structure in Man.

Loss phase III (2007–2011), territorial power-sharing with the government
Following the Ouagadougou peace treaty (signed in March 2007), a third phase began. From the second half of 2007 on the state administration was gradually redeployed to Man. Territorial power-sharing and a cohabitation scheme involving the rebel commander (Loss) and the state Prefect (Michel Amani) were introduced at the local level (Heitz 2009). In May 2009, the administrative authority of the region was handed over to the Prefect in Man and was further consolidated in mid-2010, when the zone commander was given an official position in the new army. Despite the gradual reinstallation of state officials, Loss, the former Com-zone, remained the most powerful figure as he controlled security and taxes until the installation of Alassane Ouattara as President in mid-2011.

The different phases are described more or less chronologically with Chapter 6 dealing with phase B, Chapter 7 phase A, the time under government control, Chapter 8 mainly with phases

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[119] Source: (Doumbia 2007b).

B and CI, Chapter 9 with phase B, Chapter 10 phases CI and II, and Chapter 11 phase CIII. The last phase was when I did my field research, after the prefects had already been redeployed.

Les Forces Nouvelles: Combatants and motives

The New Forces were not one monolithic group of 'rebels'. Rather we can distinguish different sub-groups, each with their own motives. The focus of this section is on what influenced local people's perceptions of their (un-)trustworthiness.

Although my empirical research was not chiefly about the rebels, I wanted to understand who they were, how they were organised and how they went about daily life. I made contact with about fifty combatants of the New Forces, ten of them in leading positions (mid to high level ranks). I also refer to the work on the New Forces of Bettina Engels Chelpi-den Hamer and Moussa Fofana, who examined the New Forces in their PhD theses.

Motives and motivations

What does 'motive' mean? Motives and motivations have the same Latin root (*motus*, English: movement), and are often both used in the literature without further explanations. Bettina Engels used the term according to Schütz et al. (1989) to explore the motives of the New Forces' members for joining the rebellion, and reserved the term 'motivation' for psychological analyses (Engels 2009, 72). Kalyvas, a political scientist like Engels, uses the term motivation in exactly the same debate about greed or grievance to refer to motivation for participation in civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Kalyvas 2001). In the trust literature, the term motivation is employed more frequently. In psychology it seems to refer to someone's deep-seated general orientations and attitudes towards something or someone. When evaluating the trustworthiness of a person, we often assess them generally, weighing up their integrity and the kind of person they are (Govier 1997, 6). Here I use both terms without conceptual implications and stick to motives to refer to "in-order-to-" and "because"-motives, based on a Schützian understanding (Schütz et al. 1989, 84).[120]

When considering people's motives and motivations for participating in conflict, we encounter a long-standing debate about whether wars in the post-Cold-War period were chiefly about "greed" or "grievance", in other words about private economic goals, or about the political projects of a collective group (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Much ink has been shed in different

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[120] For discussion of motives and motivations, see (Ryan 2012).

disciplines on debating whether wars like the Mano River wars fit the classic definition of a Clausewitzian war or whether we are dealing with a "new" type of war (Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas 2001). Are these civil wars 'still' motivated by political grievances or are they more about selfish greed? Motives cannot, however, be usefully conceived in such binary terms (Richards 1996; Jackson 2005, 54–55; Bøås and Hatløy 2008; Engels 2009; Chelpi-den Hamer 2011).

People's motives for joining an insurgent movement are multiple most of the literature agrees. Some motives may be circumstantial and differ from motives for sustaining a movement (Engels 2012). For instance, when the MPCI-core group's coup d'état plan failed, they decided to focus on gaining territorial control instead.

Kalyvas argues for distinguishing between the causes of a violent conflict and the reasons for targeting and using violence against a particular person or village in a violent conflict. It thus makes sense to distinguish analytically between motives for joining an armed insurgency and motivations for acting violently towards individuals and groups.[121]

Social structure of combatants

What kind of rebel group were the New Forces? Were they 'mere' warlords without a political programme as some maintain (Reno 2011), or were they an exceptional group in the Mano River warzone with a largely political agenda that addressed popular grievances (Bøås and Dunn 2007)? Probably there is some truth in both assessments. The New Forces were an amalgam of three rebel groups, two of which seem to have been responsible for most of the more brutal violence in the west at the outbreak of the war (MPIGO, MJP). For the third group, the MPCI, political grievances of exclusion and repression were their main motives.

The New Forces numbered between 20,000 and 40,000 fighters. Exact figures are difficult to establish. About 1,000 dozow supported the rebels, but remained an independent group (Engels 2012, 122). An estimated 1,000 Liberian Gio fighters are said to have constituted the bulk of MPIGO's force (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Human Rights Watch 2003, 30). Unlike in the neighbouring countries Liberia and Sierra Leone, the number of female combatants in the New

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[121] Obviously, the motives and motivations of the various participants cannot be described in detail throughout the entire period. Furthermore, focusing only on the rebels will not allow us to understand the social practices I observed between the insurgents and the wider society. To understand what affects trust between the military and civilian population, we analyse in Chapter 8 interactions between different rebel sub-groups and various segments of the civilian population

Forces was remarkably low (Engels 2012, 120–21), as it was in the Ivorian conflict generally (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 211).[122]

There were no female commanders in Man even of middle rank. I never met any lower-rank women at any of the smaller check-points that I often visited at the entrance to town. Two or maybe three women were part of the elite corps, the Cobras, in 2010, among a total of 50 men. The New Forces consisted of the following sub-categories[123]:

- Ivorian military men (MPCI-core group exiled in Burkina Faso; non-exiled, joined after 19 September 2002)

- militarised civilians (mainly young men, nationals and non-nationals)

- the dozow (some joined the New Forces; others remained deliberately separate)[124]

- supplementary troops (Anglophone and other foreign combatants)

- former prisoners (people with a criminal past, liberated by the rebels)

Below I describe a few of the characteristics of each sub-group with a focus on their motives.

Rebels with a military background

The military core group of the New Forces (and their grievances) have been discussed at length in Chapter 2 on the Ivorian conflict. They are generally Ivorian military men who experienced career stagnation, exclusion and prosecution in the army, especially under the political regimes of Guéï and then Gbagbo. Most were not able to continue their military careers in Côte d'Ivoire because of officially sanctioned persecutions and ethno-regional mis- and distrust (Engels 2012). This group, however, amounted to just a few hundred. After the rebellion began in September 2002, others joined them, including many who were also military men with a northern background.

The armed conflict has been extensively analysed in terms of state versus non-state actors (Mulaj 2010; Engels 2012). The problem with this approach is that it suggests that there are only civilians who are taking up arms against state armies, whereas in fact many non-state armed actors are recruited from state actors or have previously worked for the state (Schlichte

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[122] Only 16 of Chelpi-den Hamer's 237 respondents were women, from both Man and the counter-insurgent militias in the Guiglo area (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 11).

[123] I have listed men only – see the comment on female combatants above. The two groups that certainly contained female combatants are the foreign combatants and militarised civilians.

[124] I describe the dozow in Man in Chapter 11.

2009).[125] The core-group of the Ivorian rebellion consisted of military men (exiled and non-exiled), who later filled the leading positions as Com-zones and Com-secteurs. Some of those I talked to said that they hoped to get better positions in the new army, while others preferred to make themselves independent. In this respect, this group certainly had a motivation to avoid excessive violence and human rights violations and respect social norms.

Rebels in Côte d'Ivoire knew their roles as interim administrators of rebel rule were temporary. The motive for the group's participation in the rebellion came from the times of Guéï, and did not include a vision for an "alternative society" (Chabal 2009). Nor did they want to live under conditions of war and terror in a bush camp. On the contrary, the coup-turned-rebellion was a means to an end, to allow the RDR candidate to stand for elections – hence, political inclusion. When the 'quick' coup failed, the New Forces had to create administrative structures to raise funds to achieve their political aim. They set up a temporary administration to sustain their movement, but always with the aim of getting rid of the sitting President who had come to power through a fraudulent election process.

Although some of the violent actors tried to benefit as much as possible from the financial opportunities arising during this phase of uncertainty, they continued to aspire to return to a 'peaceful state', in which – of course – they would be in better positions than before. They hoped to be able to earn a living and sustain their extended families. As rebel rule was transient and temporary in their eyes, many opted to profit as much as they could while it lasted within the bounds of what would allow them to save face and find state employment in peace time. This attitude shaped their relationships with the wider population and the international community.

The 'Anglophone' combatant
Stories, real and exaggerated, circled in Man about "les Libériens", the Liberians,[126] who people considered the main Anglophone fighters, although some had also heard about Sierra Leonean combatants as well. My research informants normally referred to the Liberians as a group in the samples I have, whereas they often used personal names for Ivorian commanders.

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[125] This approach is grounded in a classic view that the state is apart from the wider society. This is not the case in a neo-patrimonial state where public and private realms are blurred, and clientelistic networks compete with one another in order to get access to the state resources (Bayart 1993).

[126] Both sides of the conflict employed foreign mercenaries. Whereas Liberians fought on both sides of the conflict, Angolans (and South Africans) combatants supported on the loyalist troops.

In the Sierra Leonean civil war, it was the Gio, the Liberian Dan, who, according to Peters, had a particularly cruel reputation as foreign combatants. They would kill "straight away" one of Peters' informants said (Peters 2011b, 159). Human Rights Watch, too, writes that most MPIGO's fighters were Liberian Gio (Human Rights Watch 2003, 30). My own and Peters' ethnographic material also indicates that local Ivorian recruits engaged in brutal acts of violence (Peters 2011b, 146–59). Mike McGovern suggests that "in Côte d'Ivoire, many atrocities have been blamed by both sides on Liberians, as if there were a consensus that Ivorians would have been incapable of such 'barbarity'." (McGovern 2010a, 85)

Even some Ivorians combatants complained about the mercenaries. Camara, a militarized youngster from Man who was in MPIGO with Félix Doh, described the beginning of the rebellion as a very difficult time in Man due to the presence of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. The distinction he draws between the Ivorian and the foreign combatant was that: "*Eux, ils ne connaissent pas la famille de quelqu'un. Tous ceux qui bougent-là, ils peuvent faire tous ce qu'ils veulent à la famille.*"[127] As mercenaries and strangers without local connections they seem to have been particularly dangerous for local civilians. Magali Chelpi-den Hamer suggests: "The promise of Ivorian richness was perhaps the main driving force for many of those Liberian fighters, after all they were all coming from a devastated country." (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 102)

Militarised youths

Moussa Fofana stresses that collective political grievances revolving around exclusionary practices of *'ivoirité'* provided a key motive for young people to mobilise in support of the rebellion in the north: *"L'identité commune des jeunes combattants du Nord a joué un rôle très important dans le processus de la mobilisation. Tous les jeunes interviewés dénoncent les stigmatisations identitaires et l'idéologie d'exclusion dont ils estiment avoir été au moins une fois victimes." (Fofana 2011b, 55)*

In the west, political and economic grievances also played an important role, when youngsters from Man with both Dan and Jula backgrounds joined the rebels (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011). Some legitimised their adherence by stressing that they wanted to take revenge for the death of General Guéï (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 160). A woman in her forties, whose village is near Man told me: "One day you would see your neighbour, cousin or an acquaintance in military

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[127] FN, low-ranked, Camara, 20s, Jula/Dan-speaking from Man, 02/12/2008.

gear – even your partner! … You would ask in surprise 'You too, have taken up arms?' and get a reply: *'O-o-o-o, laisse ça, je suis trop faché!'*"[128]. In many families in Man, one member entered the rebellion at one point during the crisis in the hope to get out of a dead end.

Some families were extremely mixed in their political orientations. They might have an uncle in Abidjan who actively supported the government's party, and another who joined the rebellion. Despite their political differences, when they met as a family in Man political affiliation was secondary most of the time according to my observations. As long as family members managed to support themselves, different viewpoints were fine. Why should an older brother complain if his younger brother stopped asking him for money after having entering politics or joining the rebellion?

One long-standing debate in the literature is whether the militarised young men were particularly marginalised as an urban "lumpenproletariat" and "loose molecules" (Kaplan 2000 [1994]). The discussion has been controversial.

According to the militarised young men I met during my research, they had many different reasons for joining the rebels. The youngest I got to know fairly well was 15 years old when he joined the rebellion in Korhogo in 2002. He signed up with a friend and did not tell his parents until one day his mother saw him in military gear with a Kalashnikov. *"On fallait voir claire dedans"*[129], he explained – suggesting he joined just out of curiosity. Soon their superiors told them to take their uniforms off to avoid that the French military said they had recruited child soldiers. Another young man from Odienné had to join because his father wanted to send one of his sons. When his mother refused to let her son go, her husband threatened to divorce her. The family was summoned and asked the father for forgiveness, and the son went to the war. Other young men had lost their pre-war source of income due to the conflict and had joined the rebellion to obtain a livelihood. One young man I met frequently had worked for an insurance company in *Katiola, but he lost his job when the war broke out.[130]

Bakary is another young local recruit I interviewed several times.[131] Of Dan origin, he worked as a mechanic in Duékoué before the war. After 28 November 2002, when the Dan sided with the rebellion, pro-government supporters increasingly harassed him, so he had to flee one morning in his work clothes, leaving everything behind. At a notorious check-point in Kouibly,

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[128] Marie, 40s, Dan-speaking, Catholic, market woman, Man, 02/12/2008.
[129] FN, low-ranked, Amara, 20s, Senufo-speaking, 06/11/2008.
[130] FN, low-ranked, Rodrigue, 20s, Jula-speaking, 06/11/2008.
[131] FN, low-ranked, Bakary, 30s, Dan-speaking, 07/11/2008.

called *"maison blanche"*, a mixed group consisting of Ivorians, Liberians, Sierra Leoneans, Guineans and others stopped him and recruited him as a mechanic and driver. Another local recruit from Logoualé I met while he was going through insertion training said he joined in order to protect his family – a common motive in warring contexts: "being part of the group developed into a way to survive in the general security vacuum of the war zone" (Utas and Jörgel 2008, 489). Non-combatants in Logoualé stressed during an interview that this was a legitimate reason and a way to resist and "spare their families violence".[132] According to Chelpi-den Hamer, who interviewed roughly 100 locally-recruited youths from the insurgent side, forced conscription became "rather common" (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 101), probably during the time when the rebels still hoped to conquer the south, starting in late December 2002.

Chelpi-den Hamer's study of militarised youths in the Ivorian west explores their motives and motivations, and "firmly dismisses the loose molecule hypothesis, stressing they were not jobless, uneducated, and dissocialised youths with few alternative prospects other than to resort to violence to make ends meet." (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 162) In a similar vein, Morten Bøås and Anne Hatløy interviewed almost 500 ex-combatants in Monrovia using standardised questionnaires, and found out that there was little to nothing in the social background of their interviewees that distinguished them from any other youngster in Liberia: "They went to school, worked, and lived with either their parents or other close relatives. The ex-combatants' background is therefore surprisingly normal." (Bøås and Hatløy 2008, 41–42)

These findings reveal little about the trust relationship between combatants and civilians. As Magali Chelpi-den Hamer aptly notes: "The relationships between militarized recruits and local populations in western Côte d'Ivoire have generally been based on a combination of solidarity and coercion, and were all the more complex when they involved family ties." (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 176) In her study, she stresses the crucial role of circumstantial and emotional factors in recruitment. My findings support this conclusion. Furthermore, she shows that in western Côte d'Ivoire, combatants kept in contact and engaged with civilian life and economic activities. Her findings show us that the rebellion was embedded in social life and was not taking place in a world apart (for more on this, see Chapter 8). Clearly, the rebels engaged with the non-military population in a way that went beyond a violent rapport. To learn more about the trust relationship in the civilian-military nexus, practices and interactions involving both sides need to be considered.

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[132] Amadou and a group of young men, Dan-speaking, Logoualé, 19/03/2009.

Social upward mobility

Some civilian recruits benefited from social upward mobility during the rebellion while others did not. My interviews and observations – which are, of course, not based on a systematic, representative sample – suggest your 'star' could rise if you managed to 'get behind' a MPCI-core group member, who survived the crisis, to gain his trust. Camara, for instance, worked at a car repair shop in Man; "*coller pneus*" (glueing/repairing tyres), was what he called his activity. He was 'behind' (local form of expression) Doh Félix, who died in April 2003, and then Adams in Korhogho, who died in 2004. He eventually ended up as the porter-in-chief at the entrance of État-major in Man. The quality of his work was appreciated, but other hard-working trusted men had already taken the 'better' positions by the time he became established under Loss in Man.

Other militarised youngsters were luckier. They came across Loss during the early days of the rebellion in Bouaké, when Loss was in charge of the southern entry point. The MPCI-core group leaders needed sober, reliable, well-built men whom they could trust. Youngsters willing to join were looking for a leader they thought they could serve and rise in the world. Loss would take one or the other of them along and check him out to see how he did. Later, he would entrust them with small tasks and check how well they did them. If he was satisfied, he took them along on missions. It was a gradual process of mutual familiarisation and trust building. They would undertake a few things together and go through difficult times fighting near Danané. When Loss was badly injured and unable to walk, his men carried him out of the battle zone on their shoulders and told Chérif Ousmane, who had the command, to wait. That was during the mission to expel the Anglophone supplementary troops. Loss appreciated his soldiers' loyalty and competence. When he became comzone in Man, he gave them good positions. There was no need to suspect these militarised youngsters, as they could not take over his position because he was one of the MPCI-core group members. The New Forces' military command in Bouaké would never have accepted one of them as Com-zone of Man, and would have instead appointed one of their own men there. Without their *patron* Loss, these militarised youths had hardly chance of joining the new army. This interdependence enhanced trust, as I will argue in Chapter 10. Betrayal, however, would always remain a possibility as long as some members of the New Forces still believed in the comeback of IB, Guillaume Soro's rival and initiator of the MPCI-core group, as described above.[133]

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[133] See Karel Arnaut on social mobility of militias in the southern part of Côte d'Ivoire (Arnaut 2012).

Former convicts and illicit social practices

The New Forces liberated prisoners, allegedly because they could no longer maintain the prisons. Several former convicts then joined their ranks, which sometimes caused difficulties. From conversations with civilians and from my own observations, some of the combatants who made life difficult for others were former convicts.[134]

Other youngsters who also caused problems may not have been guilty of criminal acts in pre-war days, but they knew how to assert themselves and impose their company on others *('s'imposer')*. Someone who could get what he wanted like this was called 'bandit', *'il est bandit'*.[135] In normal times, such youngsters would be known perhaps as queue-jumpers, who would sometimes take something without asking and who would not hesitate to attack others with fists flying. In times of war, fists could be replaced by guns, and such types might strut around, line up their weaker comrades and make them call them 'commander'. On their ('shopping') list would be motorbikes, cars, a decent house and women.

The clever ones know how to show respect to a commander stronger than they are, whereas they might be violent towards rivals, even 'eliminating' them if they could not make them their 'little ones'. The key to moving up as a self-proclaimed commander was to gain the trust of a 'legitimate' high-ranking commander, who had a military past and who would be able to change their status from an irregular to regular position during discussions at the negotiation table for the new army.

Those who aspired to acquire power and wealth and who could assert themselves were not the ones who joined the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes of the German society for international cooperation (GIZ). In the GIZ courses, former rebels received training in such skills as tailoring, welding, mechanics, agriculture (e.g. rice farming), husbandry (e.g. pigs, poultry) and running a boutique (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 188). The 'loud ones' considered such jobs to have too low prestige. People would say *'il est tombé'*, and they would lose face. It would be preferable to 'hide' in Abidjan, any other town or 'cross the sea'.

Despite their individual differences (subjectivities), the different types of rebels distinguished above tended to show distinct patterns in their relationships with the civilian population that will be further explored in Chapter 8.

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[134] Of course, some former convicts may change and comply to social norms.

[135] This expression is used for anyone in everyday speech. It has nothing to do with being a criminal. It means the person is clever/devious.

The town of Man in 2008

I awoke at 4:00am to the first phrase of the call to prayer coursing from the tower of a nearby mosque. [...] Dogs barked, roosters crowed [...] Soon I heard the sound of early morning women's work: the 'swish, swish' of their brooms sweeping cement floors and compound grounds; the earth-shaking rhythmic pounding of their huge wooden mortars and pestles grinding grain. (Reed 2003, 31–32)

It has always been difficult for me to imagine social life in Man before the town became a theatre of war. People, who knew Man before the war and rebel rule, were often shocked and expressed sadness upon their first return to the city in the post-conflict, power-sharing phase. The town had lost its former glamour as the city of eighteen mountains, a major tourist destination in the west. The asphalt in the city centre had vanished, buildings were run-down and people had become poor.

In his book on the masks and masquerades of the Dan in Man, Daniel Reed describes the awakening of the town on an early morning in the 1990s. At the beginning of his field research in ethnomusicology, he stayed in Air France in the same neighbourhood I was later to work in as well. I will use his audio-sensory ethnographic description of urban life in Man as a foil, in order to work out differences between pre- and post-war life in Man in 2008/2009. It is during the last phase of rebel rule before the presidential elections, when power-sharing in Man was still dominated by the rebels.

The "craggy green mountains" (ibid., 31) surrounding Man still give the town a special character, although the flourishing and hardly regulated logging industry during rebel rule means they must be much barer today. The "road-worn green taxis", too, still chug along the roads (ibid., 31). Reed writes:

[at 6am] the streets were already filled with activity, as they were on any typical morning in Man. Balancing loads on their heads, streams of women made their way to the market. Street merchants laid out their wares – bananas, imported plastic-wrapped cookies, millet fritter. On charcoal burners, immigrants from the savannah boiled green tea, which they poured in long streams from pots held high above small clear glasses. Open-air bars served coffee and omelettes. Kiosk windows opened, displaying rows of cassettes or cigarettes. Groups of uniformed children on their way to school stopped by a street merchant for a hot gateau (similar to a donut). (ibid., 32)

So far this all sounds familiar. I have also seen the many *gbarkas* competing for passengers, the herders looking for places to graze their cattle and even the Lebanese and Mauritanians opening their shops along the main streets in the morning (ibid., 32).

But no "banks opened" on mornings in late-2008 and nor did "government ministry offices" (Reed 2003, 31). With the outbreak of war, high-ranking civil servants working in well-paid government positions left the town. The elegantly dressed men and women heading towards offices Reed noticed in the 1990s were no longer present in the streets in 2008. This is why the Prefect's secretary, a woman with shoulder-long extensions, big sunglasses and a fancy handbag, stood out when riding her motorbike – there were not many like her.

Here and there, two young rebels on a motorbike would pass, coming home to get some rest after their night watch on the outskirts of town. Some of their colleagues had set up work as tax collectors at one of the bigger crossroads where it was difficult to pass them. As the roads have remained notoriously bad and seem to resist any attempts at fixing them, many drivers moan about the tax. Not everything that is run down, however, can be attributed to the war. The market, for instance, burnt down in 1997, before the war.

A little later in the morning, around 10 o'clock, the white, four-wheel UN cars would catch one's eye on Man's streets: the UN representatives were going out on their daily mission, as were a few French army lieutenants, the Red-Cross and other international NGO staff. Cobra, the chief of security, would sit on 'his' bench at one of the central petrol stations in town, observing the passers-by, listening to queries from the population and talking to his wife and children.

Residents and rebels: Co-habitation in Man

The visitors from abroad were no longer tourists as in the pre-war years, but international peace-keepers, who had come in quite large numbers. The bungalows of the "Beau séjour" hotel at the entrance of Man were surrounded by barbed-wire and a UN soldier was on guard. Where tourists had used to go out for dinner and spend their holidays, international military personnel and relief workers filled the chairs and beds. The Rotary-supported Club-Hippique, which had given one of the neighbourhoods the name 'Club' and which was where expats and the middle class had met on weekends to play sports and read books, was deserted. The bar and swimming pool had been taken over by one of the commanders, but hardly anyone came – perhaps out of caution, but more likely because of poverty. The hot spots for the local youth were down town, one run by a maths teacher, and another by the elder brother of a rebel chief.

The gutted, empty building of the BCAO bank towered above the town centre with its dark window squares reminding everybody that these were still not "normal days". This was not the time of the mask, the emblem of the west (Reed quoting his informant Gueu Gbe 1997) – Man was in the hands of armed men, the *Cobras*.

Their headquarters were no longer at the prefecture, which is where the first rebel group that captured the town in November 2002 based themselves. In 2008 the headquarters of the New Forces' military command of zone 6 was located at the *peleton mobile*, the first large intersection along the main road when coming from Abidjan. In one of the offices at headquarters, my permit to do research was stamped signed. Once in a while I had to produce it at the checkpoints when travelling through their zone.

People in Man still talk about those eerie days in 2002/2003, when it was better to stay indoors and only go out when necessary. When I started my fieldwork in September 2008, this era had come to an end. The city enjoyed a comfortable degree of security under Losséni Fofana, *Papa Cobra*, the father of the Cobras, who was often simply called Loss or 'Com-zone', which stands for *commandant de zone*.

His residence with a signpost "Residence Cobra" was a fortified, well-furnished compound at the foot of the hill, belonging to the large catholic centre (Centre Béthanie) in the Domoraud-Béthanie neighbourhood, a residential area which had formerly housed many civil servants. Large parts of the area had been transformed into something like a military camp. Most of the emptied houses were taken over by combatants of the New Forces. The *chef de quartier*, however, has stayed in his house in the neighbourhood, not far from his stronghold throughout the crisis. He said the young combatants in the neighbourhood treated elderly people with respect.

The *quartier Domoraud* is considered the safest area in town, according to the security section of the UN.[136] All neighbourhoods behind the bumpy roads of the town centre, where access in case of an evacuation is difficult, are not recommended or even strongly discouraged as residential areas for UN personnel for security reasons. Not just the UN staff, but also staff from other international NGO's had taken up residence along the tarred main road leading to the Domoraud neighbourhood. It was not quite clear whether security was high due to the presence of the rebel chiefs or whether it was rather due to the presence of the international community.

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[136] UN, head of security section, Man, 29/10/2008; staff security section 20/10/2008.

Other high-ranking commanders, such as second and third in command, as well as several sector commanders, lived in different neighbourhoods throughout town, in the *quartier commerce*, near the hospital, in *Air-France* or *Lycée*. Anyone who was interested knew where the homes of the different chiefs were. In military gear, armed and driving big cars – it was hard not to notice them. Only a few people had big cars, and identifying which car belonged to which chief was an integral part of boys' gossip. Long cortèges, however, were rare in zone six; according to the *Directeur du Cabinet,* Dir-cab for short: *"c'est des choses banies".*[137]

When I arrived in 2008, non-combatants and combatants lived together, side-by-side and intermixed. Most of the time, families had adopted an attitude of not 'having any problems with anyone' – the local expression for maintaining good relationships with everyone. Some local women got married to men who had come with the war.

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[137] FN, Dir-cab, 10/08/2010. Indeed, those who travelled in large convoys, particularly during the presidential election campaign in 2009/2010, were politicians and ministers from Abidjan.

4 Theoretical approaches to trust and distrust

Generally speaking, we probably know what we mean when we say we trust someone, but we find it difficult to explain and might not have ever reflected on it. We may have experienced trust or a breach of trust and subsequent distrust. For instance, we may have confided personal information about ourselves to a friend and only later to find out that the friend has shared it with others. School playgrounds and, later in life, offices often provide the competitive environment for such betrayals. We may long remember a particular incident involving a breach of trust because it was painful.

Experiences like these teach us lessons, and we may think twice about, for instance, confiding in someone again. Storybooks, literature and History[138] are full of such betrayals. In popular thinking, this is usually what we have learnt to associate with the notions of 'trust' and 'distrust'. Confiding in someone is perhaps the most classic type of trust situation as it comes closest to the everyday notion of trust. Such notions of personal trust lead us to consider trust as something positive, imbued with the thickly warm feeling of our western culturally-constructed ideal of a close friendship.

When we want to think about trust in a scientific context, however, we have to abstain from such popular notions of trust and the exclusively positive ideas we associate with it. As the opening example in the introduction has shown, misplaced trust is harmful (Hardin 2006, 67). Trust is a multifaceted concept, and opinions differ in the literature about how to define it. Whereas some prefer a broad understanding of the term, others feel they cannot work with what for them is an indistinct concept. My work also grapples with this nebulosity and I have not found an easy way out.

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[138] By History with a capital "H", I mean so-called great events in (political) history: war and peace, changes of power, etc. (Armitage and Mercier 2009, 1–5).

My ethnography is largely based on the Simmelian notion of trust, which was further developed by Guido Möllering (Möllering 2006) and which has been introduced in social anthropology by Peter Geschiere (2013). I also draw on Trudy Govier's book *Social Trust and Human Communities* (Govier 1997), as well as on insights gained from reading about Martin Endress' phenomenological approach (Endress 2001). Mark Warren's discussion of trust is in a context that often warrants distrust (Warren 1999c), not unlike a violent conflict.

The aim of this chapter is to explain and situate my use of the terms 'trust' and 'distrust' with reference to the literature. I first describe trust as a social process that I analyse further in the course of this chapter, before discussing some of the more influential theories of trust used in sociology. Lastly, I analyse the process of trust as smaller sequential acts and outline a heuristic typology of trust developed by the project team to describe transformations of trust in post-conflict societies.

Trust as a social process

Trust is best described as a process, consisting of several smaller acts. It can be described as a social interaction or even an 'exchange'. In the literature, the following steps are frequently distinguished (Baier 1986; Hardin 2002, 9; Eriksen 2007; Govier 2012):

Part 1: A trusts B to do X.

Who trusts? (A, the truster-giver)

Whom or what is trusted? (B, the trust-receiver)

To do what? (in relation to a certain action X)

Part 2:

a) A's trust is reciprocated by B (confirmation of A's trust in B)

or

b) A's trust is not honoured by B (deception of A's trust in B)

Although this model is somewhat formalistic and mechanical, it is an attempt to clarify the nebulosity of the concept and to give trust relations a basic direction. Several terms are used in the literature to refer to A and B: 'A' corresponds to the terms 'trust-giver', 'truster' or 'trustor' and 'B' to 'trust-receiver', 'trustee', 'trusted' or 'referent object/subject'. I will use these terms interchangeably.

A major concern in trust research is to find out *why* A trusts B – the reasons or "bases" for trust (Cook 2001a), also referred to as "foundations" (Sztompka 1999), which corresponds with Part 1. In other words: Why and on what basis does A trust B? This question builds the backbone of how I approach my ethnography on trust transformations. It is also at the heart of the typology presented below. It requires us to learn more about what happened *before* A placed trust in B – so-called "antecedents" of trust (Möllering 2006, 129), where the relevant questions are: How come A 'decided' to trust B? In other words, why did A consider B trustworthy?

These questions raise the issue of how to assess trustworthiness (Hardin 2006, 1).[139] Researchers largely agree that trust is sensitive to evidence and rationality as otherwise we would have to act on blind faith with the potential for gullibility (Govier 1997). As misplaced trust is harmful (Hardin 2004b, 9), it is best for trust to be warranted (Warren 1999). To argue that trust must be warranted, however, does not mean that guarantees are required. Trust is not about having guarantees, but about having reasonable evidence that justify trust (Govier 1997; O'Neill 2007).

Theories in trust research

What has unleashed thinking and publishing about trust in western academia is not trust itself but its alleged decline. Voluntary associations and particular forms of social connectedness and sociability seem to be waning – as Putnam's book title *Bowling Alone* (Putnam 2000) sums up. Large-scale research has revealed that trust in government has been declining worldwide (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2007), and many have referred to a 'crisis of trust'. Whether this diagnosis is right or wrong is not at issue here,[140] but it is

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[139] Hardin adds: "You might not be trustworthy toward others and you might not be trustworthy toward me in other contexts." (Hardin 2006, 1) I will come back to the aspect of specificity later when I conceptualise trust situations as figurations.

[140] According to Möllering (2006, 2), the present loss of trust is either attributed to people's lack of trustworthiness and reliability (Cook 2001) or to the increasing need for trust in modern societies with

important to note that many of today's theories of trust were developed in affluent western societies in order to address this demise.

According to Geschiere, "it has become impossible to give even a provisional survey of the vast recent literature on trust" (Geschiere 2013, 231). Nevertheless, I have identified three different theoretical strands that recur in the social sciences and are important for this ethnography. I will briefly discuss Simmelian, neo-conservative and rational choice approaches, the first because it continues to be influential (also for this study), the second because it takes issue with so-called 'pre-modern' societies, and the last because it is currently the most dominant theoretical strand in trust research (Endress 2002, 28). Finally, I will look at how trust is approached in social anthropology.

Simmelian-based concepts of 'trust'

The German philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel produced some of the earliest descriptions of trust (Simmel 1992 [1908], 2011 [1900]). His texts are still cited today and shape theoretical approaches to trust. Guido Möllering, a German with a background in business administration, organisation and management, traced in (Möllering 2001) the use of the Simmelian notion of trust in many works that I refer to in my study, namely: Luhmann (1968), Lewis and Weigert (1985), Giddens (1990, 1991) and Misztal (1996). Recently, the Simmelian notion has also been used in social anthropology by Peter Geschiere in his book on *Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust* (Geschiere 2013).

Since Simmel, trust has been defined as a "middle state between knowing and not-knowing": If we knew 'everything', there would be no need for trust; but in a situation where we 'know nothing' at all, we have no reasonable basis for trust either (Simmel 1992 [1908], 393).[141] Consequently, trust requires a certain amount of information or knowledge (Simmel 1992 [1908]). How this knowledge has been acquired is an open question. It may be acquired through experience, or by induction – a distinction made in the Project's typology introduced below (Förster 2007b). A particular challenge for actors who face political change is that they might

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the use of expert systems (Giddens 1991, Misztal 1996). Scholars of trust research who are critical about claims that trust is decreasing are Hardin (2006), O'Neill (2007) and Eriksen (2007).

[141] "Vertrauen, als die Hypothese künftigen Verhaltens, die sicher genug ist, um praktisches Handeln darauf zu gründen, ist als Hypothese ein mittlerer Zustand zwischen Wissen und Nichtwissen um den Menschen. Der völlig Wissende braucht nicht zu vertrauen, der völlig Nichtwissende kann vernünftigerweise nicht einmal vertrauen." (Simmel 1992 [1908], 393)

lack the necessary knowledge to adequately assess or judge the trustworthiness of a situation at hand.[142]

Combining good reasons with a leap of faith

What is important for the understanding of trust is that trustors need a basis for trust, "good reasons for trust", as misplaced trust is harmful: "[W]hether our bases for trust are more calculative or more intuitive, more abstract or more idiosyncratic, what matters in the end is that they represent 'good reasons' for trust." (Möllering 2001, 413) Simmel's conceptualisation does not end with that. To have good reasons for trust does not equal the act of trust itself; it is only an "antecedent" to trust (Möllering 2006, 129).[143]

Simmel locates a "further element" in trust that has preoccupied many scholars such as Giddens: "Trust presumes a leap to commitment, a quality of 'faith' which is irreducible." (Giddens 1991, 18) Möllering argues that the good reasons constitute a mere interpretation of a future situation, but the actor has to make another step for trust to become true, namely from the "land of interpretation" to the "land of expectation". These separate lands have to be bridged (Möllering 2001, 413–14). This is where the Simmelian "leap of faith" comes in. Giddens interpreted this leap as a suspension of uncertainty (Giddens 1991, 3). Drawing on Giddens, Möllering describes suspension as a "mechanism that brackets out uncertainty and ignorance, thus making interpretative knowledge momentarily 'certain'" (Möllering 2001, 414).

As Möllering vehemently argues, the "suspension of uncertainty" is what sets trust apart from other concepts and might be considered the core of trust. The act of suspension has a key function in social life. In Till Förster's words: "[Trust] facilitates life as interactions become predictable. They may not be predictable *per se*, it is trust that renders them predictable from the actor's point of view." (Förster 2007b)

The Simmelian notion of trust may be summarised in the formula "trust combines good reasons with faith" (Möllering 2001, 411). According to Möllering, one of the most urgent research

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[142] My understanding of "knowledge" is located in Schützian phenomenology (Schütz 1967; Schütz and Luckmann 1973, 135–46). Knowledge is of course a construction. In the context of my study, it is information that actors subjectively have accepted as 'certain' in contrast to the remaining 'uncertainties'. However, "in real life situations, the boundary between certitude and uncertainty is of course seldom razor-sharp, and vagueness and ambiguity tend to be the rule rather than the exception." (Boholm 2003, 168)

[143] Möllering distinguishes between pre-conditions, antecedents, manifestations and consequences of trust (Möllering 2006, 129).

desiderata in trust research is "to find out how the leap is made" (Möllering 2006, 192). I think part of the answer will be found in the willingness to trust, in the forward-pushing strand of trust, where imagination plays a salient role (see below). My study's focus, however, is on the 'good reasons' for trust and trustworthiness.

Neo-conservative approaches

Several researchers take what can be considered a neo-conservative approach[144], most prominently Fukuyama (1995). In Warren's words: "For Fukuyama, trust is primarily cultural in nature and is inherited from pre-existing communities of shared moral norms or values." (Warren 1999c, 319). This view, however, is not so dissimilar from Giddens' dichotomy, for instance, between trust in pre-modern and in modern societies. His ideas about social relationships and cultural beliefs in pre-modern societies, however, are not backed up by careful historical research. Rather they are influenced by a typically 'modern' romantic idea about kinship relations and familiarity in small rural communities (Giddens 1990, 101). This conception was generated over a hundred years ago in Tönnies' *Community and Society* (Tönnies 1988 [or in the German original *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* 1887]) in which he contrasts a sense of community and familiarity in a society with the notion of trust.

This dichotomy appears to be rather tenacious, and is iterated in more recent works (see also Berman (2004, 40–41)). It is true that, in contrast to Gidden's idea of the modern disembedded life, the number of people that actors in rural communities generally have to deal with is smaller and they are familiar with most of them (Hardin 2006, 1–15). However, as Parker Shipton points out for East Africa: "Trust among kin needn't be warmer than trust between friends or even strangers." (Shipton 2007, 36). Therefore, it would be presumptuous to jump to the conclusion that familiarity goes hand in hand with higher levels of trust and a strong sense of ontological security (Giddens 1990, 103). Quite the contrary, distrust may be particularly high in kinship relations in some societies because of local cultural beliefs (Brown 2004; Geschiere 2012, 2013).[145]

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[144] The term is from Warren (Warren 1999c, 318).

[145] Suspicions of witchcraft may be particularly high in relation to kinship ties in some societies (Geschiere 2012, 2013). Even today, many Dan believe that deaths are not natural and must be attributed to someone, for example, a wife may be suspected of killing her husband in order to enjoy the wealth of her children on her own. Or to give another example, when the wife of a research participant informed me about the sudden death of her husband, she said that his mother must have poisoned him. Ethnographers who have worked along the Upper Guinean Coast have long grappled with issues of

From my experience of travelling in (West) African small town settings, trust in strangers is a particular strength, which stands in striking contrast to the widespread image of a "low-trust society" for Africa (Fukuyama 1995), particularly in relation to business and politics. This spontaneous sociability, solidarity and hospitality, which turns a stranger into a friend, contrasts with many urban milieus and residential areas in, for example, Europe and North America.

Rational choice theories

In the field of trust research, rational choice theorists have been most active. To date, the Russell Sage Foundation Trust Project has published more than fifteen volumes on trust. The entire series is influenced by an understanding of trust as encapsulated interest, which is why rational choice theory is relevant. In *Trust and Trustworthiness,* Hardin writes that his approach is an account of "a particular but important class of trust relations" (Hardin 2002, xvi). Warren maintains that conceptualising trust as encapsulated interest highlights important *aspects* of trust (Warren 1999): "Hardin's important contribution, it seems to me, is that he establishes precisely what is at risk in trust relations, and has identified the conditions that must be met for trust to be warranted." (Warren 1999a, 350) Although my own approach does not follow rational choice theory, several aspects are relevant for the conflict context in my study, which is why I refer to this impressive work below.

Rational choice theory conceives of trust as encapsulated interest. The basic idea is that, if it is also in the trustee's own interest to perform an action, I can safely consider him or her trustworthy to perform it. The converse also applies: if it is in the trustee's own interest *not* to perform an action, I can safely consider him trustworthy in that he will refrain from that action (Hardin 2006, 18-20).[146]

In *Whom can we trust?,* one of their later volumes, the editor team lists the following three key findings of the series: 1) the need to focus on trustworthiness [or warranted trust] rather than trust in many empirical situations; 2) the finding that trust is but one source of cooperation and

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secrecy, suspicion or mistrust, deceit and the frequent accusations of witchcraft among people familiar to each other (for Upper Guinea Coast societies: Jackson 2004; Ferme 2001; Murphy 1980). Such beliefs put a great strain on close relationships that are beyond the scope of this study.

[146] In the series *Key concepts in the social sciences*, Russell Hardin distinguishes three main conceptions of trust that explain trustworthy behaviour on the basis of: a) encapsulated interest, b) moral commitment and c) character disposition (Hardin 2006, 16–26). His own work is based on rational choice theory, as is his literature review. Several researchers I consider to have made valuable contributions to understanding trust in post-conflict societies are not mentioned, such as Govier (1997) and Misztal (1996).

3) the shift in focus from trust to distrust as the critical factor in many strategic situations (Cook, Levi, and Hardin 2009).

The basic premise of rational choice theories is that people are first and foremost driven by the maximisation of their own interests – a premise I do not share. Nevertheless, the rational choice approach offers important insights for so-called 'strategic situations', which violent conflicts in competitive and highly politicised settings clearly are. In rival social relationships or fields in which interests diverge, trust-giving may take highly reflective forms (Warren 1999; Hardin 2006). In situations where the distribution of power was so unequal, knowing that it was also in the armed actors' personal interest *not* to harm me (because they feared sanctions), was comforting and helped me feel I could extend trust. Therefore, we can say regarding trust as an encapsulated personal interest captures one aspect of trust, but the idea of interdependency I use in my analysis captures more.

Trust in social anthropology

Social and cultural anthropology have not, as far as I know, yet developed theories of trust, and no substantial ethnographic or comparative research on trust has been carried out. Anthropologists have rarely placed trust at the centre of their analyses – perhaps because it is an etic analytic concept rather than an emic one. Those ethnographies that do refer to trust only focus on functional aspects. These include studies of political transformations of post-socialist societies (Torsello 2003; Roth 2007; Roth 2008), economic anthropology (Ensminger 2001), distrust among kin from a rational choice perspective (Brown 2004), friendship (Grätz, Pelican, and Meier 2004),[147] trade-networks (Grätz 2004) as an emic concept of tutorship in Mandinka societies (Bellagamba 2000), tourist-host encounters (Simoni 2005), transnational networks (Eriksen 2007), accountability in corporate ethics of neo-liberalist societies (Corsin Jimenez 2011) and trust in relation to witchcraft (Geschiere 2013)[148]. They cover a very broad range of topics, which is not surprising, as trust is an omnipresent phenomenon. The focus of most authors is on trust in interpersonal and intragroup relationships, where people know each other personally, corresponding to personal trust in the typology used in this study.

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[147] See below, where I describe personal trust.

[148] In his theoretical article "Trust in anthropology", Corsin Jimenez is concerned with a critique of the obsession with trust (audit culture) in neo-liberalist societies. He addresses the need for secrecy, the concealment of knowledge and the demand for transparency in today's corporate ethics (Corsin Jimenez 2011).

Where we may come across the notion of trust in anthropological literature is in the methodological chapters on ethnographic fieldwork (Norman 2009). There researchers frequently refer to trust when discussing access to informants or to what extent information gathered in an interview situation, for instance, can be trusted (Fokwang 2008, 38; Chelpi-den Hamer 2011).[149]

Trust as a social connecting device

I found Erikson's emphasis on the reciprocal aspects of trust and its 'glue'-like, social character insightful (Eriksen 2007, 7). He draws on Mauss's work of *The Gift* (Mauss 1954) in describing how the truster gives or lends trust to someone, which will then either be reciprocated or, in case of a disappointment of trust, not reciprocated (Eriksen 2007, 7). By placing trust in someone, we are basically reaching out and connecting ourselves to an individual or to a more diffuse social group or sphere. Hence, trust has the capacity to link people, to reach out to our fellow human beings and to build social bonds: "Trust links individuals to the society" (Förster 2007c).

This resonates with Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk's recent ethnography on linking and connecting. They argue that we should "put the connection at the centre of the analysis" and shift our focus from the single actor to the in-between of social life, and to the connections or linkages themselves (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2012a). After we realised we have misplaced our trust, we are probably disappointed and come to see an actor in a different light. We may withdraw our trust, thereby altering the quality of the connection, which is then no longer a relation of trust. The way we are connected thus changes. This analysis of the "work of connections" helps us to understand social processes and transformations in rapidly changing environments (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2012a).

Analytical framework for the analysis of trust

In this section, my aim is to develop an analytical framework with which to investigate and explain trust situations from the trustors' point of view. I will divide trust into sequences of actions by linking the Simmelian concept of trust to Emirbayer and Mische's theory of

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[149] Textbooks on how to conduct fieldwork in conflict situations often devote entire sections to issues of trust (Sriram et al. 2009).

agency.[150] This procedure should allow me to not only appreciate different (temporal) facets of this equivocal phenomenon but also make it more epistemologically tangible for social analysis.

Familiarisation with a situation

In the opening scene of his book *The presentation of self in everyday life*, Goffman provides us with a minute analytical description of what happens "[w]hen an individual enters the presence of others" (Goffman 1959, 1). Following Goffman, everyone present will seek to "bring into play information about" other participants in the situation. This may chiefly include a person's "general socio-economic status, his conception of self, his attitude toward them, his competence, his trustworthiness, etc." (Goffman 1959, 1)[151]

Goffman seems to be describing the moment we familiarise ourselves with a new person, and assess the trustfulness of the situation and our position in it. It is basically a description of role identification, of 'who is who' (Förster 2002) and to what extent actors can trust each other in the situation at hand.[152] This process is part and partial of any trust situation, and has been dealt with in the literature as familiarisation (Luhmann 1988, 2001; Endress 2001, 2002). Some researchers maintain that people need to engage in familiarisation in order to develop either a trustful or distrustful attitude (Luhmann 1988, Endress 2001, Möllering 2006).[153] Familiarity is, in this sense, a precondition for trust, which is not the same as saying, as Tönnies does, that trust is only possible if there is confidentiality (Tönnies 1988 [1887]). Nevertheless some degree of acquaintance and a certain amount of information, which subjectively should corroborate with 'knowledge', seems necessary for trust. If we lacked knowledge about the trustee, we could be "gullible" and misplace our trust (Govier 1997).

The confusion over familiarity arises from to the fact that familiarity (in German *Vertrautheit)* has two semantic fields in the sense either: a) of a close relationship with a high level of

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[150] Dmitry Khodyakov has already highlighted the three-dimensionality of trust and has linked trust to Emirbayer and Mische's concept of agency, but without further developing the concept (Khodyakov 2007, 126). I will focus only on this strand of agency, whereas Khodyakov included all three strands.

[151] Apart from the actor's "trustworthiness", Goffman mentions "competence", elements of motivation, "self" and "attitude towards" the trustor, which are key terms in the trust literature (Govier 1997).

[152] Goffman describes the mutuality of the process wonderfully, with both parties as trusters and trustees, which means it can be called a figuration (Elias 1983). For more about the use of figuration in this ethnography, see the methodology chapter.

[153] "Vertrauen [muss] in einer vertrauten Welt erlangt werden […] denn wir können nur in vertrauten Begriffen agieren." (Luhmann 2001, 144–45) Hence, the life-world is familiar to us and everything unfamiliar will be familiarised (Möllering 2006, 94–98).

confidentiality (in German *Vertraulichkeit)* that has grown over a certain time; or b) of being well acquainted with something, a subject matter, a field or situation. In sense b) familiarity means that we have enough information to say we feel conversant with a situation (Endress 2001, 166–67).[154] This results in a distinction between a) familiarity/confidentiality *(Vertrautheitswissen)* and b) familiarity/acquaintance *(Bekanntheitswissen)* (Endress 2001, 166–67; Schütz and Luckmann 2003).

Goffman takes to pieces in the scene described above the highly complex process of familiarisation that we generally do implicitly in a fraction of a second. It is the beginning of a "trust situation" (Gambetta and Hamill 2005, 3; Förster 2007b, 2) in the sense that we interact with other actors, accept being vulnerable to them and trust them in relation to the situation at hand. In the following section, I propose a microscopic view of trust in a Goffmanian fashion, in which I divide the process leading to trust into sequential acts, which I shall refer to as a Goffmanian perspective on trust.

Agency and trust in sequences

Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische have theorised agency as a combination of three temporal strands (Emirbayer and Mische 1998): A) an iteration of practices acquired in the past; B) a future-oriented imagination of where one wants to go; and lastly C) the present in which actors make a "judgement" that they "execute" (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 970).[155] I will be most concerned with the present strand of agency, which brings together the past- and future-oriented strands and which they refer to as "judgement" or "practical evaluation"[156] The act of trusting, or the moment we extend trust, is located in the practical evaluation strand of the present.

However, trust also has a future-oriented component that drives actors forward. Furthermore, trust is embedded in routines and thus has a habitual aspect as well. Notwithstanding this, the evaluation of trustworthiness, and deciding to adopt a trustful attitude and extend trust are located in the present strand of agency. When actors are confronted with a new situation that does not generally allow for an iteration of past practices, such as happened in the Ivorian conflict, they often have to take action on the spur of the moment. Despite my focus on practical evaluation, I agree with Emirbayer and Mische that "all three elements iteration/habits (from

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[154] The process of familiarisation is close to the idea of typification described by Schütz (Schütz and Luckmann 1973).

[155] I am grateful to Till Förster and Lucy Koechlin for introducing me to this text.

[156] Agency, or the capacity to act, requires (most of the time at least) us to decide what to do and what not to do, however implicit this might be.

the past), imagination/projectivity (into the future) still play a role and are represented with a component each in the present strand of agency" (Emirbayer and Mische 1998).

Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische distinguish the following analytical sequential components in their analysis of present judgement: 1) "problematisation", which involves 1a) "characterisation" and 1b) "deliberation", followed by 2) "decision", which leads to 3) "execution".

Sequential acts of agency (practical evaluation)	Sequential acts of trust
Entering a situation	Encounter with a yet unfamiliar situation

1) Problematisation
   a) Characterisation (drawing on past)
   b) Deliberation (future-oriented)
	1) Problematisation: 'good reasons' for trust?
	   a) Assessment of trustfulness
	   b) Willingness to accept vulnerability

2) Decision	2) Attitude of trust (state of mind)
3) Execution	3) Enactment of trust (embedded in practices)

Figure 3: Sequential acts of trust (adapted from the theory of agency by Emirbayer and Mische 1998)

Emirbayer and Mische argue that initially, every concrete situation has something "ambiguous, unsettled, or unresolved" that needs to be clarified. Hence, a certain "problematisation" takes place that corresponds to the process of familiarisation in trust research. Actors will ask themselves whether there are 'good reasons' for trust.

According to Schütz, (good) reasons for doing something may be either based on a) "because-motives" from the past, or b) "in-order-to motives" that are directed to the future (Schütz et al. 1989, 84). Correspondingly, Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische distinguish between a) "characterisation" based on knowledge from the past, and b) future-directed projectivity, that they call "deliberation" (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 999) in the temporal strand of the present.

Actors will try to make sense of and disambiguate the (trust) situation by drawing on existing typifications in their "stock of knowledge at hand" (*Wissensvorrat*) (Schütz 1967, 10), which I discuss further in Chapter 6. This is the sequence in which knowledge acquired in the past is used to deal with the situation. It is at this point that actors search their memories for past

experiences or induction-based knowledge that may allow them to assess the (future) trustworthiness of a situation (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007a).

Before deciding whether there are enough 'good reasons' for trust from the subject's point of view, actors consider the situation on the basis of their present motives, intentions and longer-term life projects and deliberate on their willingness to extend trust.

By drawing on past experiences (typification) and taking future projects into consideration, the actor has reached the stage of "decision" (or choice) where the social navigator has to "act here and now in a particular way" (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 999). In the case of trust, this seems to be the moment in which the social actor has to decide whether he or she will trust or not trust. If the decision to trust is taken, it is the moment in which actors adopt an attitude of trust, as a state of mind. In the next sequence, the decision will be enacted, which is called "execution" in Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische's theory. In the Simmelian notion of trust, this is the moment we suspend uncertainty and become vulnerable, because we now extend trust or make a leap of faith.

Introspection: Trusting a rebel chief

The best way I can illustrate the different sequences of trust is with a personal experience I had in the field. In the first months of my research, one of the rebel chiefs suggested taking me along to his village over the weekend so that I could visit a rural community. Enthusiastically, I said yes. We had met several times to talk about my research. On second thoughts, it dawned on me that this was imprudent. Was it safe for me to accompany a rebel commander to a remote place? It crossed my mind that I actually knew very little about him and what he had done during the war. How stupid of me to have been so spontaneous, I thought. Could I still trust him? After all, I considered he would be a valuable contact for my research in the months to come.

I remembered that I had come across his picture and a short interview in one of the newspapers dating from earlier in the war – the savage times. I searched for the page and reread the article carefully and scrutinized his photograph next to it. Unlike the other articles portraying rebels, there was no violent vocabulary in the interview and he looked quite ordinary. He had no headband, sunglasses or display of guns – which were signs that I judged as untrustworthy. He made a 'trustworthy' impression on me and as I was willing to make the trip, I quite consciously

decided to trust him and to block out the nagging questions about 'but what if?' I eventually accompanied him with some of his soldiers to the village and my trust was fully honoured.[157]

Interesting for me was to realise that my 'gut feeling' had told me to go and make the leap of faith, jumping directly to the 'decision' sequence without hesitation, as if leaving out all in-between stages of assessment and deliberation. Cognitively, there were many reasons to doubt. My intellectual curiousity had to be satisfied as well. Intuitive (affective) dimensions alone did not suffice; trust has a cognitive dimension too. After having scrutinised his interview and portrait, the reflective assessment of his past was 'trustful enough'. Before reaching the decision to actually extend trust, a projective future-oriented dimension came into play: I was, for research reasons, highly motivated to visit a village and to have contact with the commander, as such a milieu can be rather diffcult to access. Hence, I was already feeling a kind of inner willingness to accept the invitation despite the remaining uncertainty, and to take risks (Govier 1997, 6). This predisposed me to adopt a trustful attitude and I decided to bracket out my doubts. In the execution-mode of agency, I accepted my vulnerability and trusted.

My ethnographic introspection helped me appreciate the value of such a sequential approach. I will now discuss some aspects of these sequences that are of particular relevance for my research.

Assessment of Trustfulness (1a)

Motivations and Competence

The two aspects in trust research that have received most attention in relation to the assessment of trustworthiness are motivations and competence (Govier 1997, 6; Hardin 2006, 18).[158] Others people's motivations for treating us in a particular way are of critical relevance in violent political conflicts in which the others are fighting for causes that oppose ours and are prepared to use violence against us. Whereas we might feel safe surrounded by people who share our

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[157] It turned out that I had nothing to worry. Although I had travelled with a rebel and his entourage, it was Ivorians who received me. His brothers and sisters took good care of me. I slept in a house with clay brick walls, a thatched roof and no electricity. Early next morning, when it was light, I heard something rustling and creeping around the house, and the sound of a bell. When I peeped though the window hole I discovered someone in a mask with a raffia skirt. It was the first time for me to see mask dancing. During the two days, I observed how 'the rebel chief', now in casual wear, listened to the pleas of his younger siblings, and showed deference towards his parents. I had trusted a rebel and was discovering him in a different social role.

[158] "Trust also involves a sense of the other's competence." (Govier 1997, 4)

political convictions, they might lack the competence or capacity to protect us. Security providers therefore need to fulfil both criteria in order to merit our trust, i.e. to have benign motivations towards us and the competence to protect us from hostile attacks.

Bases for trust in post-conflict settings

Different types of trust are frequently distinguished in empirical trust research (Möllering 2006, 129–35; Blind 2007).[159] The specifications and subcategories generally reflect the research issues in question and the empirical cases at hand.[160] The Project team distinguished, on the basis of empirical findings and theory, four types of trust that shape trust situations in post-conflict societies.[161] As a heuristic instrument for the description and analysis of trust transformations, the four types were conceived as ideal types, in the sense of Max Weber. They are: basic social trust, personal trust, institutional trust and normative trust (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007a; Heitz Tokpa 2018).

The four types of trust are based on different modes of interaction: individual versus collective, and experience versus induction. Trust can be based on different kinds of knowledge from the *Wissensvorrat*, which refers to knowledge acquired either discursively (indirectly by hearsay) or through experiences that involved the actor directly. Trust based on past experience has diachronic and experiential depth (Förster 2007b). With the second case (induction), where trust is based on what others have told us, the basis for trust would be thinner. Such knowledge may be crucial in a new situation, especially as otherwise everyone would have to have the relevant experience themselves.

The four types are based on different bases or reasons for trust. They are grounded in different answers to the following question: Why does a trust-giver assume that trust is warranted in a certain situation? Hence, we ask how the trust-giver judges the trustworthiness of other actors

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[159] Miller and Listhaug, for instance, defined "political trust" as trust in political systems, its institutions and individual incumbents, adding further sub-categories that I will not refer to in detail here. As many others, they also refer to a more diffuse and a more specific form of trust (Miller and Listhaug 1990).

[160] Sztompka, for instance, distinguishes about eight types of trust in his study of the transformation of post-socialist societies. These types are based on the reference objects to which actors' trust is directed (Sztompka 1995, 257–59). Sztompka distinguishes general trust, institutional trust, technological trust, organisational trust, commercial trust, positional trust or trust in professional roles, and personal trust (Sztompka 1995, 257–59). A typology of trust that is based on its trustees, though, does not perform more than a list of referent objects.

[161] The typology was developed before my study was added to the project as an additional case for comparison. The credit for development of the typology goes therefore solely to Till Förster, Gregor Dobler and Kerstin Bauer. See Heitz Tokpa (2018) for a short summary of the typology.

in a particular situation. Working with the typology, we have to ask ourselves what constitutes the basis for trust in a given situation:

1) Is it the fact that the trust-giver knows a particular individual *personally* (personal trust)?

2) Or is trust based on what the trustor knows about a certain institution (institutional trust)?

3) Does the trust-giver feel safe with and trust unknown others in a shared societal sphere or social space (basic social trust)?

4) Or lastly, are the trust-giver's reasons for trust in a certain situation based on his or her conviction that certain social norms are valid (normative trust)?

	experience	induction
individual	personal trust	institutional trust
collective	basic social trust	normative trust

Figure 4: Types of trust

The four types are discussed in more detail at the end of the chapter. First I will continue the sequential analysis of trust.

Actors try to predict the trustworthiness of actors and situations on the bases of either experience- or induction-based knowledge. Actors draw on prior knowledge acquired in the past in assessing the trust situation.

Willingness to accept vulnerability (1b)

In her rich book on social trust, Trudy Govier lists willingness as a defining feature of trust: "willingness to rely or depend on the trusted person, an acceptance of risk and vulnerability" (Govier 1997, 6). The English term used in this context 'willingness' has a slightly more active and intended connotation than the German *Bereitschaft* as an inner preparedness/readiness. Willingness has to be understood as an attitude, based on motivations.

The willingness to accept vulnerability, risks and any remaining uncertainty is central for the notion of trust and prepares the actor for the leap of faith.

Some approaches to trust are embedded in routines of social practices iterated from the past, while I focus on the assessment of trustworthiness and the decision to trust. Another perspective puts all emphasis on the future-oriented willingness to trust: "Trust laughs at dangers. […] Trust

is courageous, giddy, and lustful." (Lingis 2004, xii)[162] The philosopher, Al Lingis, explored trust in the context of travel and sexual adventures. He pleasurably writes that "the act of trust is a leap into the unknown" (Lingis 2004, 65), thereby stressing aspects of trust located with the trustor, such as a willingness for trust. The social navigator is here an adventurer who is willing to make a step into the unknown and accept vulnerability – and to take risks.

Depending on how one looks at it, risk can be viewed as the other side of trust. By taking risks, we know that we leave certitude behind us. Taking risks means to reach out to new shores and to accept the vagaries of life. Similarly, by trusting we leave terrains of certainty and place trust where only the future will tell whether it will be rewarded. Taking this into consideration, we can infer that to trust means to take risks, and when we take risks, we trust and are confident that we will achieve what we are aiming for – but we can never be absolutely certain. In the context of violent conflict, such deliberations are perhaps less far-fetched than in other situations. People have to go out to get food and simultaneously risk getting into a harmful situation.

Al Lingis stresses affective, forward-pushing and bonding facets of trust when he writes: "one feels trust, like a river released from a lock, swelling one's mind and launching one on the way […] Trust binds one ever more deeply to another; it is an energy that becomes ever stronger and more intoxicated." (Lingis 2004, 65) These fascinating facets of trust are not, though, at the centre of this ethnography.

Decision: Trust as an attitude (2)

Trust has cognitive and emotional facets, and has been conceptualised trust as an attitude in trust research (Misztal 1996, Govier 1997, Hartmann and Offe 2001, Lahno 2002, Grøn and Welz 2010, Förster 2007). An attitude is an orientation of action, informed by certain feelings, conceptions and imaginations (Fuchs-Heinritz 2011, 159). It is, of course, not possible to simply "take on an attitude" of trust as opposed to distrust (Govier 1997, 47), but it is useful to consider trust as an attitude because actors can voluntarily choose "to act in a trusting way" (Govier 1997, 45).[163]

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[162] I am grateful to Emily Lynch for drawing my attention to this author.

[163] Karen Jones highlights the attitudinal aspect of trust and argues for conceptualising trust as an attitude that can be cultivated. She gives an example in which a rape victim manages to maintain an attitude of trust in other people despite the breach of trust she had experienced (Jones 1996, 23). The victim decides to abstract from that instance and "does not wish […] her horrible experience to lead to a change in

Thick and thin forms of trust

Trust clearly manifests itself in different forms. Drawing on Govier, I distinguish mainly between thin and thick forms of trust (Govier 2006, 13). Consequently, I will not speak of high and low trust, because it is epistemologically and methodologically difficult to measure trust. Nevertheless, I will use broad relational descriptions such as 'more trust than before' in some cases.

Thin trust corresponds more-or-less to the minimal definition of trust presented in the introduction. Its reach does not go far beyond predictability and often refers to a particular action at a particular moment. For instance, if we trust the rebels merely to refrain from doing us harm at road-blocks, this is a rather thin form of trust.[164] But once our expectations are no longer bound to a single activity, trust gradually takes on more generalised forms and we can talk about a thick, as opposed to thin form of trust. This thickness may mean that breadth and depth have been added, encompassing a broader range of activities and/or a greater diachronic dimension (temporal thickness); or that trust takes on an 'open-ended' character (Govier 1997). Thicker forms of trust may also involve greater emotional tonality. For instance, we may confidently expect that other actors will act in our favour if the need arises (Jones 1996, 6–7). In short, we trust that others will 'do the right thing for us'.[165]

Degrees of implicity or reflectivity of trust

Trust also exists in different degrees of reflectivity (Govier 1997, 6; Yamagishi 2004, 847). Govier distinguishes three forms: innocent, implicit and explicit forms of trust: "innocent trust", i.e. uncritical, almost child-like acceptance; "implicit trust", i.e. "automatic trust granted when there is no indication that anything might be wrong, by a mature thinker capable of doubt and scepticism"; and "explicit trust" for cases in which trust is only granted after mature reflection (Govier 1997, 68). This last form, explicit trust, is a reflective, conscious form of trust. If trust is talked about, it is conscious. The reason for talking about trust is often a sign that it has become precarious rather than the other way round. In a context of rapid political change, as in this study, the distinction between explicit and implicit allows us to differentiate between

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herself [and] to be the kind of person who is timid, protective of the self, and on the lookout for betrayal." (Jones 1996, 23).

[164] If we trust that someone will risk harm in order to protect us, this is a thicker form of trust.

[165] I am grateful to Gregor Dobler for having pointed out this aspect to me in distinction to forms of trust closer to pedictability. I have drawn on this distinction and developed it further in my work.

different degrees of sedimentation according to how embedded trust is in routines and habits of social practice.

The leap of faith (3)

I introduced the Simmelian notion of the leap of faith earlier. It refers to the moment we extend trust, the act of trusting. When we 'switch' into this mode of trusting and act, we become vulnerable and take risks.[166] But we do not really 'feel' these risks or pay attention to our vulnerability, *because* we trust. By trusting we suspend uncertainty or bracket out things that might happen. A remaining uncertainty is always part of trust because the future is contingent. In contrast to an attitude of trust, the leap of faith is trust enacted. When it is embedded in our actions, trust becomes externalised and manifest.

Distrust and mistrust

Distrust has been treated like a Cinderella in the study of trust. Hardin, for instance, looks at distrust mainly to confirm his ideas about trust (Hardin 2004a, 9). This is unfortunate because distrust is just as important as trust for self-hood and orientation in social life. Distrust is generally used to mean the opposite of trust, or the absence of trust (Jones 1996). In Hardin's model, "A distrusts B with respect to X", if B seems "untrustworthy" to A in respect to X (Hardin 2004b, 3). Although they are almost antonyms, trust and distrust have quite different manifestations: "Distrust is *not* just a mirror image of trust." (Shipton 2007, 36) If doubts arise, trust can be destroyed in the blink of an eye, before corroboration. But it takes time to eliminate distrust. Consequently, doubts and mistrust may persist tenaciously, despite arduous efforts to rebuild trust.

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[166] Although trust would be inappropriately defined as a calculated strategy to reduce risks (Luhmann 1988), most theories of trust agree that, by trusting, we accept having to potentially face unpleasant, negative consequences in the case of disappointment (Simmel 2011 [1900]; Clases and Wehner 2000-2002, 419): "When we trust, we take risks and are vulnerable. There are no guarantees, and it would be an indication of lack of trust to look for them." (Govier 1997, 4) The balancing of risks and possible gains in trust have been particularly highlighted in rational-choice-inspired views of trust situations. Thus if we place trust in someone and it is honoured, it allows us to advance from the status-quo, but if our trust is betrayed, we suffer damage to the extent that we would have been better off now if we had not trusted (Deutsch 1958, 266; Yamagishi 2004, 847–48; Gambetta and Hamill 2005). "[T]he trusting individual perceives that he will be worse off if he trusts and his trust is not fulfilled than if he does not trust." (Deutsch 1958, 266)

The terms "suspicion" and even "fear" have often been treated as similar to distrust (Govier 1997, 19 or 35, Giddens 1990).[167] Giddens writes: "In its most profound sense, the antithesis of trust is thus a state of mind which could best be summed up as existential *angst* or *dread.*" (Giddens 1990, 100) Giddens brings up angst in juxtaposition to Erikson's basic trust, which is acquired in early childhood, and which Giddens links to the notion of ontological security. Distrust may, in extreme form, attain a quality close to existential insecurity, and hence angst.

Ontological security or insecurity has been defined by Giddens as forms of (in)security that have strong emotional dimensions, linked to the "continuity" of a person's "self-identity": "Ontological security has to do with 'being' or, in the terms of phenomenology, 'being-in-the-world.' But it is an emotional, rather than a cognitive, phenomenon, and it is rooted in the unconscious." (Giddens 1990, 92) These psychological states are important theoretically[168], but I will not be using them explicitly in my analysis.

Unlike distrust, mistrust does not mean the complete absence of trust. Mistrust can be defined as "a doubtful, sceptical, uncertain [and] war[y]" attitude of trust with "a tendency towards distrust" (Isaacs, Alexander, and Haggard 1963, 463; see also Torsello 2003, 10). Mistrust can be seen as on a continuum between trust and distrust. It does not reach the point of distrust and, despite suspicion, it still retains an element of trust. Distrust is worth studying for its own sake, as it is a very different experience for actors and is an attitude that generates different plots for action *(Handlungsentwürfe)*.

Dispositional aspects of trust and distrust

Trust and distrust have dispositional qualities in that they function analogously to a filter and shape how we perceive things (Govier 1997, 4). If our trust in a person or thing is strong, we are inclined to perceive and interpret them in a positive light. Hence trust and distrust have amplifying effects. Trust breeds even more trust. The same is true for distrust, which also guides our perceptions. If we are distrustful, our perception is selective and focuses on negative aspects, so that we tend to see everything in a negative light. Consequently, if we lack trust, we are likely to overlook positive signs and unfairly judge someone or something in negative terms.

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[167] "Distrust involves negative emotions about others and fears that they may harm us." (Govier 1997: 19) In violent conflict contexts, such harms are chiefly insecurity, both physical and material. In a business context, such harms may, for instance, involve cheating, while in friendships where confidentiality is high, a drastic harm would be public shame.

[168] Bubandt uses ontological uncertainty to refer to strong anxieties/fears in relation to the social existence of a community (Bubandt 2005, 277).

Govier points out that misplaced distrust might also have negative implications: "When we distrust, we regard with suspicion behaviour that might otherwise have struck us as benign or helpful." (Govier 1997, 35) Hence, we refrain from trusting, where it could have been granted, we keep to ourselves where connecting might have helped us to advance. By being too suspicious, we may inhibit the realisation of our life projects. But again, to place trust where it is not warranted may have harmful consequences, too.

Therefore, the 'balancing' of trust and distrust remains a key feature in social life in general and in volatile settings even more so. Balancing the two – choosing whether to adopt an attitude of either trust or distrust – has a rather active connotation. And certainly in its explicit reflective form, trust does have something active about it. Trust can be cultivated and doubts may be actively cast aside (Jones 1996).

The continuum of trustfulness

Trust and distrust are subject to degrees (Govier 1997; Hardin 2004a). "Trust is not an all-or-nothing thing." (Govier 1997, 5) Therefore, adopting an analytical perspective on trust means asking how actors evaluate the trustfulness of their social environment, i.e. the degree of others' trustworthiness towards the trustor in a particular situation (Yamagishi 2004, 847). Contrary to "trustworthiness", the term "trustfulness" conveys nuances of trustworthiness; the "degree to which individuals expect others to be trustworthy" (Yamagishi 2004, 847). Therefore, my understanding of trust and distrust or of trustfulness and distrustfulness can be conceived as a continuum.

Figure 5: The continuum of trustfulness

Trust building processes

Only if A extends trust, will B be offered the chance to reveal, show or prove his or her trustworthiness. To experience trust or the trustworthiness of a trustee, the trust-giver has to extend trust in a first step. Only in a subsequent step is the trust-taker able to demonstrate his trustworthiness. This is a crucial feature of trust and trust situations. A positive experience may constitute the beginning of further positive experiences that then eventually lead to thicker forms of trust, often referred to as a chain of trust (Möllering 2006).

Signalling trustworthiness

Theorisations of trust have been more common from the trustor's vantage point, but there is much to learn from the trustee's perspective (Gambetta and Hamill 2005). Usually theories presume that the trustor A wants to do something X, for which he needs to place trust in a trustee B. But let us turn the situation around and presume that B wants to achieve something X for which he needs A to trust him. In other words, B wants to receive A's trust. This is the common situation for marketing situations, where customers need to be attracted in order to give their trust to the company B, so that B can sell and generate income. This is a different perspective from the familiar way of looking at trust situations, which focuses on the trustee.

In order to gain A's trust, B will make considerable efforts to appear trustworthy. Impression management becomes an important strategy (Goffman 1959). No matter how trustworthy B is, B needs to be perceived as such by Gambetta and Hamill investigated this aspect of trust situations among taxi drivers in New York City and Belfast, who need to decide whether to take a passenger on board or not. Death rates among taxi drivers are high and the question of whether the passenger is trustworthy or not is crucial (Gambetta and Hamill 2005). Obviously, drivers do not normally have much time to decide whether to trust a potential passenger or not, and their assessment of trustworthiness has to be done within seconds. Since drivers want to generate income, they will perhaps sometimes take more risks and accept 'doubtful candidates', operating with a future-directed 'in-order-to'-motive (Schütz et al. 1989, 84).

In such situations we resort, according to Govier, to rough and often stereotypical generalisations based on such things as gender, age, social class, context of the interaction, self-presentation of the person, his or her voice and even smell (Govier 1997, 122–123).[169] This involves drawing inferences on the basis of external clues, many of which are insignificant or only marginally relevant to judging someone's trustworthiness (Govier 1997, 124). Clothes and dress practices, for instance, are examples of more accessible cues (Govier 1997, 123; Bauer 2008, 71). As Bauer argues: "As clothing both expresses and impresses, it can be exploited to manipulate social relationships." (Bauer 2008, 71) Hence, there is no easy solution to the judgement of trustworthiness. Signs of trustworthiness may be manipulated, and someone untrustworthy may use signs of trustworthiness to appear trustworthy and thereby trick the trustor.

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[169] Context is an important source of information actors use to decide whether to trust or not. Taxi drivers took into consideration where in town someone wanted to be picked up, their destination and the time of day (Gambetta and Hamill 2005).

In my study, I was particularly interested in how actors managed to 'read' and 'interpret' the terrains of war. What were signs of trustworthiness? How did they distinguish between safer and less safe situations? What allowed them to find their orientation in a time of violent conflict that was new to them? My central question was therefore how actors evaluate the trustfulness of other actors and situations. I wanted to unearth and decipher the practical knowledge that people had and I as a newcomer lacked.

Types of trust in post-conflict societies

Above, I introduced a typology for analysing the trust process. In this section, I discuss the different types of trust in relation to the relevant literature and the context of western Côte d'Ivoire.

Personal trust

Personal trust refers to trust in an individual we know personally, who may be a family member, friend, colleague, a neighbour, the market woman we buy our fish from every day and so on. We trust a particular person because we are familiar with them and linked with them through a personal relationship and shared history of personal interaction.

This type of trust resembles perhaps most closely the way trust is used in everyday language, which I described at the beginning of this chapter. We link this type of trust with familiarity, closeness and confidentiality. However, it is important to note that, despite a certain universality of intersubjective relationships, the characteristics of these relations (kinship, friendship, and so on) are subject to cultural variations (Carsten 2000; Bell and Coleman 1999; Grätz, Pelican, and Meier 2004). There is agreement in the extensive body of research on kinship, patronage and friendship and so on, that these social relationships are full of ambiguities, despite being linked by a bond of personal trust.[170] Personal relationships include often both solidarity *and* rivalry, and thereby defy easy generalisations. We are particularly vulnerable in relationships involving proximity, where we expose personal details (Grätz, Pelican, and Meier 2004, 27–29). As in the case of betrayal, too much trust in friends or family members who do not deserve it renders trust unwarranted.

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[170] See (Grätz, Pelican, and Meier 2004) for an extensive review of the anthropological literature on friendship, kinship and patronage.

Studying trust in kinship and friendship relations requires having intimate knowledge of cultural beliefs, practices and norms in relation, for instance, to expectations of solidarity.[171] This core field in social anthropology has received considerable attention since the beginnings of the discipline. Here I am more interested in the political dimension of the relationship between the insurgents and society, and I will not provide a detailed ethnography of social relationships. A comprehensive description of personal trust in these relationships would also require looking at: a) economic exchange relationships (issues of trust related to borrowing, for example), as well as b) issues of suspicion and distrust among members of the (extended) family. Cultural beliefs about witchcraft affect kinship relationships in the region around Man, and largely shape trust relations (van Gijsegem 2006, 199). While my study is not a holistic ethnography of close personal trust relationships, in contexts of political violence and looting, the people we know personally may constitute the only ones we trust. At the same time, they may also be particularly threatening because they know so much about us.

Personal trust also plays an important role in patron-client types of relationship. These have a strongly institutionalised character, but are largely built on special personal relationships (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Govier 1997, 146–50). Along the Upper Guinea Coast, the patron-client-type relationship, like the host-stranger relationship (*tutorat* in Côte d'Ivoire),[172] have been described as a pivotal institution shaping social and political life not only in these forest societies, but also further north (Launay 1979).[173] In Ivorian social practice and parlance, personal relationships are often translated into an idiom of hierarchical relationships: father-son, *'grand-frère et petit-frère'* or patron-client. As we will see, patrimonial dimensions played a crucial role in the post-conflict society around Man, particularly within the rebel group (Murphy 2003).

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[171] Meyer Fortes has described prescriptive altruism in unilineal descent groups as "amity". It is an example of the institutionalised norms of solidarity that shape confident expectations (trust) in these relationships and therefore go beyond personal trust. As so often, real-life involves a mixture of ideal types.

[172] See the introductory chapter on Côte d'Ivoire's violent conflict for further explanations.

[173] In a region where it was historically not land, but rather access to labour that determined wealth and status, the number of people who worked in a household was what made a man a Big Man. This is why men tried to bind women through polygynous marriage, as well as young men and slaves, to their households (Bledsoe 1980; Leach 1994). Only by having 'wealth in people' could Big Men gain economic and political power.

Institutional trust

Institutional trust refers to trust in institutions and their representatives. Unlike with personal trust, it is not necessary to know the individual representative of an institution personally to trust him when he or she is on duty. In the case of institutional trust, I trust to be served or get the treatment that I expect from such an institution irrespective of the person on duty. Hence, trust in an impersonal office bearer is a sign of trust in the institution he represents. Whether institutional trust applies, depends on how a situation is framed (in the sense of Goffman, 1974), and how these frames are made relevant in the situation at hand. Trusting an institution in everyday life means to link a particular situation to a particular framework (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007a).

I will use a phenomenological conception of institutions that has been broadly defined as the situation when social interactions, relationships and roles have been iterated into more durable expectations (Grathoff 1989). An example of an institutionalised relationship in West Africa is the "joking relationship" (Radcliffe-Brown 1952; Canut and Smith 2006; Förster 2007b, 6).[174]

What does it actually means to 'trust' an institution (Hardin 1991; Lepsius 1997, 283–93; Govier 1997; Warren 1999a, 348); especially in West Africa (Daloz 2005, 161)?[175] It could be said that this is not trust or that it only constitutes a very thin kind of trust. According to Warren, scholars all stress at the outset that "the *core* trust relation is interpersonal [and] whatever it means to trust an institution is somehow scaled up from the domain of socially thick, face-to-face relations." (Warren 1999a, 348). Although institutional trust involves an impersonal connection with less emotional depth than a relationship with a friend or colleague, it is "fundamentally similar in involving open-ended expectations of positive action, dependence, and vulnerability" (Govier 1997, 110–11). According to Govier, institutional trust means that we have strong positive expectations about our interactions with an institution, its representatives and services (Govier 1997, 33–34).

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[174] See Chapter 3 for a brief explanation of joking relationships.

[175] Although both Giddens (1990) and Luhmann (1968) refer to modern institutions or systems, I don't refer to them here because I think their works have more to do with the condition of modernity as a complex sphere that people have to deal with in their social lives. "Institutional trust", however, refers to interactions with specific institutions and their representatives, rather than the complex sphere they refer to, which has aspects that are more closely related to and covered by what I call "basic social trust".

Lepsius[176] stresses that trust in institutions is based on both the basic idea of an institution *("Leitidee"*, central theme), and the way in which this idea is expressed in its institutionalised form (Lepsius 1997, 283–93). If we take the example of the state as an idea or image of political order, we must also deal with the practical side of this state, which usually deviates from the image (Lepsius 1997, 283–93).[177] Lepsius notes that as long as people trust the basic idea of an institution, they may continue to trust it even when it performs in an unsatisfactory way. How long it takes for trust to turn into mistrust and distrust is an empirically open question and probably varies both from culture to cutlture and from person to person. The basic idea of rebel rule was deeply unsettling for most people. Whatever the rebels did, people remained cautious in their assessments.

Research on state bureaucracies in Africa in practice suggests many institutions are rather untrustworthy (Olivier Sardan 2004). Generally people seem to mistrust or place trust only very carefully in institutions, societies and groups in general in the current socio-cultural environment in (West) Africa. It is not just state institutions that are perceived as untrustworthy, but stories also abound about rotating saving associations (ROSCAS or tontines) that did not work well. The hunter association, however, seems to have a good reputation as an institution in the north and also elsewhere, that was particularly strong during the 1990s (Hellweg 2011,

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[176] Rainer Lepsius, a German sociologist, begins his text on trust in institutions with the tragic story of a Jewish lawyer in Nazi Germany (his father). Despite the fact that the regime and party had sacked the lawyer on the grounds of his communist activities and their own anti-Semitic sentiments, the Jewish lawyer continued to trust the state's institutions and the principles of the rule of law. Repeatedly, he sent requests to the public authorities, the local police and even the director of a concentration camp, for instance, for the anti-Jewish signs in his neighbourhood to be removed.

His – in this case tragic – unbroken trust in legal procedures and the state as an institution is the starting point of Lepsius's deliberations. Whereas in Nazi Germany, institutions changed in the 1930s and people began to follow a charismatic leader, the context in West Africa is radically different. Citizens of these states are used to relying on personal relations rather than institutions. In Olivier Sardan's insightful comparison between European (French) and Francophone West African bureaucracies, he also finds interesting parallels. Office bearers on both continents have a doubtful reputation due to their "indifference" towards those who require services, but for different reasons. Whereas in Europe, citizens feel reduced to a simple number in a dehumanised system that rigidly applies rules, citizens in Africa complain about the unproductiveness of state institutions and the arbitrary way they are treated (Olivier Sardan 2009, 58).

[177] Lepsius's distinction, which he relates to state institutions, mostly corresponds to Migdal's definition of the state: "The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organisation in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts." (Migdal 2001, 15–16) The state is, of course, only one example of an institution.

17–18; Bassett 2003; Förster 2004). They stepped in when state security forces provided insufficient or only very partial security. Whether this respect continued after 2002 is not, according to Hellweg, clear (Hellweg 2011, 17–18). However, particularly in rural areas of the Manding north, they continue to be held in great respect (Heitz Tokpa 2019).

Basic social trust

Unlike the other two types of trust, basic social trust is trust in unknown others who we do not know personally and nor do they represent an institution. It addresses the very basics of social life, namely trust in the unknown other on whose actions we also depend even if we are unaware of it sometimes. Basic social trust is about our general sense of trust in the social world and is linked to societal spheres[178], for instance how well acquainted we are with a certain neighbourhood. We might feel safe in one part of town, but find ourselves carefully looking left and right and over our shoulders in another neighbourhood.

Basic social trust has been the subject of much study, particularly among sociologists and philosophers. Similar or related terms referring to roughly the same phenomenon are habitual trust (Misztal 1996) or generalised trust. Basic social trust is an interpersonal type of trust (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007a), which has been further subcategorised in the literature.

Trusting unknown actors: scatter and anonymous interpersonal trust

Two kinds of trust situations in which we relate to strangers have been distinguished (Govier 1997). In the first case, strangers take no particular notice of us and go about their business, just as we are going about our business within the same social space. Govier gives the example of driving to town, for instance, which she considers to require scatter trust, i.e. trust scattered over and directed at a whole range of unknown people. We trust them to act in an appropriate way in the situation at hand (Govier 1997, 112).

In the second case, a specific stranger interacts with or involves us in a more direct exchange. This is a trust situation in which we must decide whether to trust a particular unknown stranger who emerges from the anonymous crowd. To use Govier's example, you may be walking through an unfamiliar neighbourhood when a stranger offers you a lift home. Although this is

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[178] I will use societal sphere, in order to avoid the term public sphere, that which was coined by Habermas (Habermas 1993 [1962]). It would be wrong to reproduce the His public – private dichotomy cannot be reproduced one-to-one to in an African setting. If we use the term public sphere inOne of the problems is that African societies , it is important to note that they are so diffuse (Comaroff and Comaroff 2005), and that it makes little sense to refer to there is not just one. I will therefore use the terms societal sphere or social space of when referring to people in the town of Man (Lefebvre 1993).

a situation of interpersonal or intersubjective trust, it is not a case of personal trust in our typology because personal trust is defined as founded on a personal relationship with a history of interactions characterised by familiarity. This newly initiated contact in the neighbourhood is not based on kinship, collegiality, friendship or any other social contacts that have grown up over the years. "The other who is a stranger is a person with whom we have an *impersonal* yet *interpersonal* relationship." (Govier 1997, 127) Although we may only have a superficial impression of the stranger's trustworthiness, we may just need a low level of trust in strangers to master the situation at hand (Govier 1997, 126).

Normative trust

Normative trust is the most abstract type of trust. Simmel gives the example of money (Simmel 2011 [1900]). Its use presupposes trust in its future validity. We would not accept coins for goods if we did not trust these same coins to have the same value tomorrow so that we can use them to buy other goods. We also have to trust that other people will be ready to accept money in exchange for real goods. Examples of normative trust are: a) trust in justice, and that someone will be punished after wrongdoing, and b) cultural norms of reciprocity in a relationship.[179]

Norms[180] are generally understood to refer to agreed ways of how things are done in a social group and what is considered an acceptable social practice. In short, norms are rules of social practice.[181] Unlike values, norms are linked to sanctions (Popitz 2006), which may be either positive, in the case of conforming actions, or negative, in the case of norm-diverging actions. If social norms are not respected, others may have recourse to implicit or more explicit ways of showing their disapproval. Negative sanctions may take the form of gossip and avoidance, a simple verbal rebuke or forms of punishment or legal measures. Social norms are usually acquired through socialisation as a child (Popitz 2006, 73). Many norms that guide our daily practices and interactions with others are internalised to the extent that they are not conscious (Popitz 2006, 70).

Normative trust is not, however, "exclusively linked to the presence of the state or state-like institutions" (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007a). In a conflict situation, official or formal norms that had previously been sanctioned by the state, as well as more informal norms, still serve as reference points for people's actions. However, not everyone will continue to respect all of

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[179] Personal communication, Till Förster and Gregor Dobler, 06/10/2012.

[180] This paragraph is based on discussions of Popitz's *Soziale Normen* with project members and during a research group meeting in 2007 (Popitz 2006).

[181] Norms could also be considered as standards of social practice (Peters et al. 2009).

them. The practical knowledge of the validity and invalidity of certain norms is decisive for people's own safety. It is not clear to what extent informal or legally formalised norms persist under conditions of precarious statehood, and thereby render normative trust warranted.

Drawing on a distinction made by social anthropologists, I distinguish between a) practical norms or everyday standards, and b) normative assumptions about how social life should be organised (Olivier Sardan 2008; Förster 2009).[182] Impunity, for instance, largely became under rebel rule the practical norm, but people still wished for wrongdoing to be punished.

Summary and outlook

The major challenges in trust research seem to be: a) not to reduce trust to something that can be easily handled and that no longer resembles trust, and b) not to get lost in the multifacetedness of trust, and the difficulty of describing it precisely and clearly. I have found it helpful to breakdown trust into sequential acts.

Trust is somewhat paradoxical. It becomes relevant in situations where we knowledge certain things but ignore others. The way social actors 'handle' such a situation is with trust, a phenomenon consisting of a "complex mixture of knowledge and uncertainty" (Geschiere 2013, 69–70).[183]

Trust is the outcome of three sequential but intertwined processes: familiarisation with the situation at hand, an assessment of the trustfulness of the situation (the establishment of knowledge), and the willingness to suspend any remaining uncertainty about it.

Möllering has criticised trust studies for always coming back to a list of "good reasons" that justify trust (Möllering 2006, 192). Nevertheless, I will try to explain the bases for trust in the seemingly insecure contexts of violent conflict. In other words, my goal is to understand how actors assess the trustworthiness of the situation they confronted during the conflict. In the next chapter on methodology, I will explore actors' assessments of trustworthiness in violent conflict situations in relation to security.

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[182] The notion of norms, of course, entails both the idea of a normative expectation of how things are meant to be done in a rightful way, as well as the idea of habitual, usual ways of doing things in daily practice.

[183] Geschiere uses a Simmelian notion of trust and draws on the works of Giddens and Möllering (Geschiere 2013, 69–70).

5 Methodology:
Trust and ethnographic research

This study follows an interpretive research design. Therefore, this chapter on methodology is much more than a mere description of what methods I used. An interpretive research design develops an argument in an iterative process between "both empirical material and theoretical literature", the emic and the etic (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 34). It was a long circular process in which I brought both aspects together and developed my approach and argument. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to a greater clarity of how I approached the study of trust, what choices I made and how I received my data. The findings of this approach and the argument I developed will be presented in the empirical chapters of the main part.

My methodology is informed by both the theoretical framework and etic concept of trust and the empirical circumstances I have encountered in the field. In a circular process of data collection/generation and analysis (grounded theory), I further refined my approach and interpretation (Glaser and Strauss 1967). The way I have conceptualised trust in the previous chapter has epistemological and methodological implications that need to be addressed, here. The challenge is how to get access to something that is unconscious, when it is most predominant; shapeless and yet omnipresent.

A strength of ethnographic research is that it orients itself, partially at least, on an inductive approach that allows taking up emic concerns. I will therefore present here initial findings that shaped my further research perspective and the outcome of this project.

In the second part I will show how I conducted field research in order to give the reader some background about the information presented in this thesis and to discuss the possibilities and constraints I encountered.

Trust: Epistemological challenges and methodological consequences

We often say that we *collect* data, as if data were lying around, waiting to be picked like ripe fruits. Such language reflects the beginnings of ethnographic research that is rooted in the natural sciences with a positivist epistemology (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). Today's methodologies, however, are more and more based on an understanding that social life-worlds are not "know-able" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012) independent from the researcher's perspective and therefore talk about data *generation* (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Ortner 2006, 42–43; O'Reilly 2009) .[184]

Perhaps more obviously than with other research subjects, trust can definitely not just be 'collected', particularly in its implicit form. Neither can it be directly observed due to its shapelessness. How can trust be studied and accessed, if it is not just 'lying around'? What theories of existence (ontology) do we have about trust? What is the 'know-ability' or epistemology of trust? Preliminary conceptual reflections are needed that further define the object of study. Hence we *generate* our data.

In the conceptual chapter, I described trust as a cognitive and affective phenomenon with a social dimension that 'invisibly' links people together. Furthermore, trust has pre-reflective (implicit) and discursive (explicit) dimensions. Therefore, trust raises particular methodological challenges.

Explicit trust in daily speech and interviews

I will first address trust in its explicit form, when it is talked about in everyday situations. People talk among themselves about any news in town and share information about all sorts of things: disputes, politics, bandits, business, safety, etc. It is in conversations that people share their assessments and discursively establish safer and less safer places, the reliability and trustworthiness of security providers, moneylenders and rebels to be shunned, etc. (Barker 2009, 267).[185] Often it is the absence of trust that is verbalised and shared in daily talk.

As mentioned previously, trust is often talked about when it is fading. Following an internal attack against the Com-zone, trust and distrust became common subjects and many people in Man commented upon the event and the breach of trust. This incident allowed me to follow

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[184] Although a plural word in Latin, 'data' may take a singular verb in English today, as I do in this text.

[185] In his introduction to the thematic section on ethnographic approaches to the study of fear, Joshua Baker notes that "discourse provides people with a means of ordering a frightening world and making it more intelligible" (Barker 2009, 267).

naturally occurring talk about trust, as people initiated the subject in conversations with me (Silverman 2010). Apart from that, it was difficult for me to follow everyday speech, due to my lack of knowledge in local languages (Dan, Jula, Wè, etc.). Only when they switched to French was I able to learn about how people discursively made sense about certain events.[186] Hence, under normal circumstances, everyday speech among locals was inaccessible to me.

The most common method of trust research are different forms of questioning, in which people are directly asked whether they trust public-service providers, the government, etc. (Hardin 2006, 35; Möllering 2006, 141; Lyon, Möllering, and Saunders 2012a). However, a frequent point of criticism is that questions are too general and respondents find it hard to differentiate, particularly in opinion polls (O'Neill 2007). Furthermore, survey research has the problem that it only asks for consciously available information, whereas trust has an important non-reflective dimension. Research based on game experiments is another common approach. It has been criticised for its artificiality and reductionist understanding of trust. Hardin concludes that standard methods of trust research, survey polls and the trust game, fail to produce accurate results on the phenomenon (Hardin 2006, 74).

The project team had similar experiences with a questionnaire about security and whom people trust for their safety. I will present the findings of two open questions and first insights below. Let me add some remarks on the intricacies of data gained from interviews. Even if open interviews may generate a lot of interesting insights, the interview situation is a peculiar speech situation, in which the interviewee generally reflects on 'unfamiliar' questions of the researcher and verbalises his or her thoughts (Förster 2012c).[187] Clearly, these are explicit forms of trust constructed in an interview situation, rather than in naturally occurring speech situations. Despite that many of my research participants came up with very interesting observations, so that I came to explore the subject together with them. Nevertheless, as I will show below, explorative interviews allow us to gain insights into emic notions, ways of sense-making practices, as well as to reconstrust past situations. Throughout the ethnography, I have tried to convey the very tone of voice of local actors in sometimes extensive quotes. However, the main focus of my study is implicit forms of trust.

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[186] Code-switching, of course, marks the fact that people address an outsider now (Romaine 2000). My status as an outsider diminished in households where people were more familiar with me.

[187] Generally-speaking, the information we receive is shaped by discursive social conventions (Landwehr 2001) and is bound to sense-making practices.

Implicit trust and social practice analysis

Non-reflective, implicit forms of trust are part of an actor's pre-predicative knowledge. If implicit forms of trust are not at the surface of consciousness, we cannot simply ask people questions. Actors may have practical knowledge about how they go about their everyday life, but this knowledge might not be discursively available (Förster 2012c). As a consequence, such a research interest requires a social practice analysis.

In the project, we understood trust as an element of social interaction, embedded in social practice (Förster 2007b, 3). Trust as a state of mind is not accessible, except from its 'externalisation' in interaction (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 49–51).[188] It is in social interaction and social practice that trust becomes manifest, is objectified and indirectly 'observable' in a figurative sense of the term.[189] Hence, by analysing social practices as part of social situations, we can indirectly deduce actors' trust. Consequently, I had to find a method to study social practices or to describe social interactions.

A common way of approaching social practice is by observation (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002; Silverman 2010). However, observation alone was not very revealing at the beginning. I basically saw people moving in front of my eyes: A young man without uniform approached a man in uniform and left again. What did it mean? I had to know who they were, how they were linked to each other and what they talked about. Who was the man in uniform? A rebel who works at a checkpoint or the chief of security? Who was the one without uniform? Perhaps he was just a rebel off duty, the rebel's brother, his tailor, a civilian seeking help, an RDR activist or a Wè speaker? Such knowledge was necessary to make sense of situations I observed. I first had to build that knowledge. So, I embarked on a long learning process on who was who in town.

Information on basic social trust and the security situation in general was observable, though. I was able to appreciate that people were out in town, that there was no gun shooting, etc. However, any close-up observation of face-to-face interaction was difficult due to the observer's paradox. How would people (e.g., rebels with civilians) interact, if I were around? It is quite clear that I would only be able to observe more 'positive' interactions, whereas the 'negative' ones would have caused insecurity for me in the long run.

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[188] Althtough trust can mean merely a trustor's state of expectation (Möllering 2006, 7) or state of mind (Giddens 1990, 100), I am interested in its enacted aspect, its linking function in a social context.

[189] It is not a direct observation, but an indirect or mediated one. Luhmann speaks of *"Beobachtung zweiter Ordnung"* (a second-order observation) (Bohnsack, Marotzki, and Meuser 2006, 138).

Most importantly, any further conclusions were difficult to draw from mere observation. It did not allow me to get access to the actor's point of view of what people did and why. (Perhaps the man who approached the rebel in the example above only went to see the rebel reluctantly, but smiled to make the interaction successful for him.) Hence, it was difficult to interpret what I saw. Observation alone would not allow me to understand how people perceived and assessed situations at hand and whom they trusted. To learn more about the intentionality of social practices, we needed to add the actor's point of view, which is difficult to access for pre-verbal practical knowledge (Förster 2001).

To address this challenge of intentional aspects of social practices, as well as to illuminate different dimensions of social trust (implicit and explicit), the project developed a methodological framework that combined social practice analysis and discourse analysis and linked both of them to different emic points of view. This approach, the Emic Evaluation Approach (EEA), will be outlined next.

The Emic Evaluation Approach

The Emic Evaluation Approach (EEA) is a methodological framework of research that was chiefly developed by Till Förster in order to describe the methodological approach used at the Institute of Social Anthropology in Basel (Förster et al. 2011). The Emic Evaluation Approach (EEA) aims to "overcome the one-dimensional conception of 'the' emic perspective by incorporating the full range of how actors relate to each other in social life" (Förster 2011, 3). The EEA also stresses the salience of sensory experience in participation and intersubjectivity. The EEA consists of three components: practice analysis, social discourse analysis, mapping of the social actors (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007b, 1).

practice analysis

mapping of the
social actors

social
discourse analysis

Figure 6: The three elements of the Emic Evaluation Approach

There is no privileged starting point and, usually, one constantly acquires new information for all three components. It is a circular process. The mapping or identification of actors, for instance, is never "completed". Actors may shift in violent crisis from violent to non-violent from non-state to state actors, etc. (Bauer 2011).

Mapping of the social actors is a technique frequently used in conflict analysis (Englebert 2000; Kassimir and Latham 2001). In conflict situations, the ascription of identities needs to be given special attention, as well as social markers and categories such as ethnicity, social status, age, gender and religion (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007b, 13). Furthermore, the internal organisation of armed groups needs to be taken into account to distinguish different actors within the group.

Discourse analysis is a very broad field in social-sciences research and the humanities alike (Gee 1999). Contrary to a Foucauldian discourse analysis, the project was explicitly interested in linking discourse to social actors to grasp their point of view. Although our project adopted a broad understanding of discourse that included different media and performances, my main source for discourse analysis is verbal statements. However, several of my interviewees who have representative functions in their communities were very eloquent, so that I added a narrative analysis to my text (Klapproth 2009). Despite the risk of repeating myself, I would like to highlight that social discourse analysis provides us information about "cognitive attitudes […] that already surfaced at the consciousness" of social actors (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007b, 14).

Practice analysis is a core competence of ethnographic research. This last component of the EEA allows us to access pre-predicative practical knowledge that has not been translated into words. Routines of everyday life, for instance, may never be verbalised but we pursue them daily (Certeau 1988). Our understanding of practice analysis is informed by the extended case method as developed by Max Gluckman and the Manchester School (Epstein 1967; Evens 2006). I will pay special attention to events that may have an impact on trust relationships and how actors interact and perceive each other.

We probably all have experienced that what we say and what we do are sometimes two different things. Practice analysis is interested in social action, in what people actually do. It is important, however, to note that the aim of the EEA is not simply to cross-check the results of the other method of analysis, as is frequently meant by triangulation (Flick 2011). To think that actions speak louder than words and to conclude that what people say is wrong misses the point of the methodological framework. Discursive formations and social practices are based on different

epistemologies, hence – for heuristic reasons – they may be perceived as apples and pears, different realms or dimensions of social reality.[190] In a constructivist perspective, each method contributes to the construction of its own data and each method of analysis produces its own results. The different components of the EEA shed light on different aspects of the same research object and can therefore be conceived as complementary (Lamnek 1988).

Preliminary findings and further questions

Findings of the survey

To compare findings in our different research sites in northern and western Côte d'Ivoire as well as Namibia, the research project used a standardised questionnaire based on a model designed for Liberia by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg. The objective was to get a first idea of different actors' security perception, as well as to map the security actors in place and to identify who affected the security situation positively and negatively (insecurity). Together with my research assistant Richard Gonty Dan, 45 persons were questioned in the town of Man.[191] The survey poll does not claim to be representative; but it raised further, more precise questions.

My assistant and I asked respondents to name the most important actor for their personal safety, as well as to name the biggest threat for their personal safety.[192] We accepted multiple responses. The New Forces were indicated as both the biggest threat to and the most important provider of (personal) security. Hence the New Forces, the rebels, received a completely ambiguous evaluation, doing both 'good' and 'bad', were trusted to provide security and were simultaneously rated highest as a cause for insecurity.

A question that comes to one's mind is probably: Were those who caused insecurity the same ones as those who provided security or were they different sub-groups within the New Forces?

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[190] Whereas we think that for heuristic reasons it is fruitful to keep these two realms apart, it is also clear that they constantly refer to each other (Förster 2011, 9).

[191] The sample consisted of 27 males, 18 females; they were born between 1946 and 1985; represented different religions and professions; the majority indicated Dan as their ethnicity, but the sample also included many Mauka, Wobe, Manding, some with Tura and Senufo backgrounds, as well as one Guro and Baule each.

[192] To the open question "who or which group is the most important one for your personal safety", 18 named the New Forces, 12 God and 4 no one, 7 the dozow and 6 the impartial forces. For the opposite question "who or which group constitutes the biggest threat to your personal safety", 37 said the New Forces and 30 bandits. 12 respondents listed the rebels on the positive and the negative side.

I will come back to that question later in my study. But a finding that shaped the course of my research was that I had to focus on the rebels if I wanted to examine trust in the field of (in)security in Man – and I had to look at distrust, too. The New Forces were clearly perceived as the dominant security provider, the hunters and the impartial forces were not mentioned prominently. Two respondents even mentioned "Cobra", the chief of security, as the most important security provider. This is a major difference to the northern towns of Korhogo and Ferkessédougou, where the dozow are perceived as the most important security provider. In Man, the dozow and impartial forces were rated lower than God.

As the rebels were perceived in the questionnaires to be the biggest threat to people's safety,[193] I also tried to understand how people saw the rebels and what relationship they established with them. As already mentioned, the people's perception of the rebels was ambiguous, defying any easy patterning. I 'collected' the whole spectrum of possible answers; for instance, I would get opinions about the rebels such as that of Kamal, a Lebanese man in his fifties who works for an NGO: *"Tu peux dire, c'est des rebelles…, mais en générale, leur comportement c'est comme si c'est une armée régulière, c'est comme une armée vrai vrai. […] On a jamais eu un problème avec eux."*[194] But another Lebanese man in his 30s, who works in business said that basically, they were 'robbers'.[195]

Hence, I received opposing views, even by informants from the same social milie; the major and decisive difference between the Lebanese men was their profession that linked them in different ways to the rebels. INGO's received privileged treatment, they were co-opted as service providers, whereas businessmen had to pay taxes to the rebels. Comparisons of statements like these from the same social milieu showed me that I had to distinguish carefully between different social markers of actors' identities. A mapping of the social actors had to include their different social identities, as outlined in the EEA.

As I will show in Chapter 8, these two Lebanese men had very different experiences with the rebellion at the onset of the violent conflict. Another issue that became clear was that I had to delve into the past and study different emic experiences of the war to understand present evaluations (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007).

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[193] E.g.: *"La cause d'insécurité sont ceux qui sont sensés nous protéger."* (Dion, 50s, Dan-speaking, elder of neighbourhood Lycée, Man, 03/11/2008)
[194] Kamal, 50s, Lebanese, NGO worker, Man, 25/02/2009.
[195] Reza, 30s, Lebanese, businessman, Man, 27/12/2008.

Emic notions and etic concepts – 'sleep'

In trust research it is rather common that the researcher's understanding of trust does not correspond to the research participants' emic notion of trust (Möllering 2006, 135). This is not unusual; emic and etic understandings of topics often differ. In his study on risk, Macamo argues, for instance, that risk is an important part of any social action anywhere; the same, I think, holds true for trust (Macamo 2017 [2008]). I conceive of trust as a human universal embedded in social practice, even though it is an etic understanding and concept.

As mentioned in the chapter on trust, in French there is a single word which conveys meanings for both trust and confidence, which is *confiance*. In all three of the most dominant local languages in the region of my research (Dan, Wè and Manding), there are no separate terms for either trust or security. Nearly all interviews were held in French all interviewees had some command of French, even if it was mere listening competence. In the rather few cases where questions and answers had to be translated, I heard the translators use the French terms '*confiance*' and '*sécurité*'. When analysing translation possibilities with locals *'A qui est-ce que vous faites confiance pour votre sécurité?'* they circumscribed it in Dan with: 'When war breaks out, where do you put your heart?' or in Jula: 'In times of war, who do you believe in?[196] In Dan, the heart counts as the place were thoughts and emotions are located (Erman and Loh 2008).[197]

Due to the fact that emic understandings placed confiance with the heart or with faith, people found it rather strange to use the phrases *'faire confiance à qn'* or *'se confier à qn'* in a security context – often circumscribed ex negativo with 'war'.[198] Trust was a term laden with more positive, emotional qualities for many. For some, trust, *'confiance'* was a term they used in a religious context, in relation to God. In scientific understanding of trust, however, we distinguished trust from faith (Govier 1997). Faith in God does not change with evidence and

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[196] Variants: 'In case of misfortune, who is the one with whom you put your heart?' or 'in whom do you put your faith?'

[197] Bible translations use a word whose stem means heaven for faith and '*confiance*' (Vydrine and Kességbeu 2008).

[198] For some people it was a bit like asking 'would you entrust your briefcase to a robber?' One of my informants snorted at me and said *"depuis septembre vous êtes dans la région, hein!"*, as if I was blind to the situation or lacked empathy (Amadou, 30s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, Logoualé, 19/03/2009). My assistant and I used circumscriptions in interviews, such as *'à qui vous vous adressez'*. Questions such as 'Do you trust the rebels for security provision?' I tried to rephrase in the following way 'Would you address the rebels for a security problem?' However, to study trust by asking people questions remained challenging.

real-life experience, as for instance in the expression of *'tout ce que Dieu fait est bon'*.[199] Scientific understandings of trust are evidence-sensitive and what we call trust is withdrawn if it is no longer warranted. For the leap of trust, however, fait was central.[200]

My study hopes to show that actors in Man *practiced* trust or enacted trustful attitudes in multifaceted ways, even if they did not always *express* it as 'trust'. As described in the EEA and as Jackson put it nicely: "The knowledge whereby one lives is not necessarily identical with the knowledge whereby one explains life." (Jackson 1996, 2) I will come back to ways of describing trust in terms of closeness in relationships in Chapter 11. For now, let me turn to emic notions of security.

In the analysis process I realised that people in Man used a particular way to describe their sense of safety. To enquire about security, I formulated questions of this sort: *'Quelle est la situation sécuritaire dans votre quartier?'* I received the following answers: *"on dort pas"*[201], *"on dort bien"*[202] and interestingly, I also found the middle-position in my data: *"quand on dort, on a toujours l'oreille à l'écoute"*[203]. Hence, their perception of security and sense of safety were expressed by saying how they slept. To my question 'How is the security situation in the neighbourhood?' they either said they slept well, did not sleep or slept but had one ear listening.[204]

If we can fall asleep and stop looking after our physical integrity, well-being, our loved ones and personal belonging, this seems to be an expression of extraordinary trust to me. Sleeping, I suppose, means to give up control and trust. If in an emic perspective, safety is linked to sleep, then an etic concept that links trust with safety seems to be justified.

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[199] To have faith was without doubt crucial in the context I investigated, but it was not my research topic. I will come back to the notion in the conclusions.

[200] See Chapter 12.

[201] Paul, 30s, Dan-speaking, (Doyagouiné) Man, 12/10/2008.

[202] Traoré, 30s, Jula-speaking, youth representative, Dioulabougou, 21/10/2008.

[203] Gueu, 60s, Dan-speaking, planter, (Fraternité) Man, 17/10/2008. I will come back to the different assessments in the last empirical chapter. Here I am more concerned about emic expressions of safety.

[204] Following up this lead, I also had statements in my data where people said they made sure that the rebels nearby knew where they slept: *"Les éléments des Forces Nouvelles savent c'est ici que *Diabaté dort. Quand ils passent tous les jours, ils me voient. Souvent ils demandent: 'C'est là-bas tu dors?' C'est une façon pour assurer ma sécurité."* (Diabaté, man, Jula-speaking, 40s, employee in leading position, Man, 2009) Diabaté entrusted the rebels where he slept. Where one lives, or at least spends the night, was also expressed with sleeping. In colloquial Ivorian French, they did not say *'c'est là-bas tu habites?'* but *'c'est là-bas tu dors'*.

Approaching practical knowledge with participation

After the questionnaires it seemed that empirics defied any easy explanations. But generally, social actors made quite a confident impression on me in their daily life. Based on knowledge that I obviously lacked, locals were quite sure about how to evaluate a situation at hand. It became clear to me that people had an understanding of situations that I did not have. Their judgements about the trustfulness and safety of a situation differed from mine. How did local actors orient themselves? What was their practical knowledge?

The methodological framework I worked with (EEA) lays emphasis on the method of participation and introspection (Riesman 1977, 1–2). By participating as a resident in social life under rebel rule, there were several experiences that sharpened my conception of trust and distrust in everyday life and decisively contributed to identify further pieces in this puzzle.[205] In the following section, I will describe two key experiences.

Figurations

My research assistant and one of my sisters-in-law with whom I spent a lot of time during my research told me that they were scared of certain rebel chiefs and would give them a wide berth. But when they were with me, they suggested we should go and greet them. When I showed surprise, they said: *'Non, avec toi, il n'y a pas de problèmes, on peut les approcher.'* I had similar experiences, with the rebels' headquarters or health institutions. People wanted to take me along because with me around they expected to receive better services from institutions – and it was not because I knew anyone there in person.

I discovered that my research assistant and sister-in-law trusted rebels more when I was around. Having me with them had an impact on the way rebels and other representatives of institutions related to them. Hence, they anticipated and assessed rebels' actions differently (see definition of trust) in a situation with me. Such experiences taught me that institutional trust depended less on an 'abstract' trustworthiness of an institution or its representative than on who was part of the interaction. The truster had an influence on the trustworthiness of the trustee in a concrete situation. Hence, my working thesis is that actors are neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy, as is often presumed in the trust literature. Having realised that the trustfulness of a situation was somehow subjected to the individuals present in an interaction, I had to come up with a more

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[205] See also (Heitz 2011) on participation and ethnographic insights. I was without previous knowledge about the region and I felt like learning tremendously about the local dynamics in Man.

dynamic model. My argument is that trustworthiness is not located in actors, it is shaped by what I have called a figuration.

The term figuration refers to a complex set of interdependent relationships, in which two or more people or groups are linked to each other in unequal power differentials. The move of one element in the 'mobile' of the figuration causes a change for all others, too, resulting in a change of relationships. The term figuration, coming close to the idea of constellation, was introduced by Norbert Elias to sociology developed in his study on the court society (Elias 1983). The concept has since been used to capture the dynamics of relationships in various fields, for instance to describe power differentials (Sofsky and Paris 1991) and internal dynamics of armed groups (Schlichte 2009). Figurations of trust will be further analysed along ethnographic data in Chapter 8.

Frames

The knowledge about figurations alone was not sufficient to evaluate situations and assess other people's actions and trustworthiness. One also had to take the general condition of a situation into account. People had developed a sense for overall trust and security situations. As I will argue, they oriented themselves by distinguishing different "frames", a term further explained below (Goffman 1974, 10–11). Let me first describe a second experience that decisively shaped the development of this idea.

The provisional voters' list for the presidential elections caused a political crisis in early 2010.[206] President Gbagbo's government suspected that the lists were fraudulent, because there were too many 'northern names' on the list.[207] *Ivoirité* was back again in public discourse. At a local level in Man, agents of the Court of Justice were suspected to be working in favour of the President's camp in the south, when they asked for renewed proofs of nationality for 'northerners' on an already verified list.

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[206] The Ivorian peace process and preparations for the presidential elections entered a crisis in 2009/2010, following the publication of the provisional voters' list. At this stage, Côte d'Ivoire had gone through a complex process of identification of Ivorian citizens and voters' registration, concerning a root cause of the Ivorian conflict. The presidential elections were postponed for the sixth time since 2005 and President Gbagbo dissolved the power-shared government, as well as the Independent Election Commission (UN, electoral department, man, 20s, 03/03/2010).

[207] Gbagbo's government claimed that these voters were of 'foreign origin' and suspected that they would rather vote for Gbagbo's rival, Alassane Ouattara.

As a reaction to that, an angry crowd fuelled by militant opposition forces of the RDR attacked the Court of Justice in Man in the early morning of 5 February 2010. Rioting youngsters vandalised and plundered the court and put up road blocks throughout town.[208] When I wanted to pass one such roadblock with my assistant on the motorbike, we were stopped and encircled by a group of vandalising youths. We were separated and they tried to grab my bag, picked Richard's phone and started to pull on my clothes and hair. Fortunately, the rebels and civil society leaders arrived quickly to take us out of the crowd.

Despite the aggression, I continued to feel safe in town, even though I looked at groups of youngsters with a slight unease for a while. I was here, the youngsters were here and nothing happened. Interactions – figurations – between them and me as a white person were 'back to normal'. It was quite strange. I was the same, they were the same, but they were no longer aggressive towards me. Why should I trust them now? The frame had changed! We were back to 'ordinary' social life of late rebel rule, in which they would usually not attack me. The town was no longer under the condition of a protest; or to say it with this study's conceptual terminology, the figuration between them and me was no longer framed by a protest situation. Basic social trust in anonymous youngsters was warranted again.

I learnt that day that my immunity as a white is lifted, when dynamics turned from political protest into the direction of generalised pillage. Although I had known in theory before, I was now aware of the fact that I instantly became a target in such situations of 'political' upheaval, due to my identity as a whealthy person. In Côte d'Ivoire's crisis, protest was not far from opportunistic looting, as others have noted before me (McGovern 2010b, 88). One of my Lebanese research participants told (and showed) me that he had always a gun in his car. This day he asked to be escorted home by soldiers of the acting commander. He was already familiar with that frame – I was not.

A female friend about my age, who worked for the UN election department, had a similar experience as I had. Whereas I continued to feel safe and remained trustful in unknown others, my colleague did not. She did not feel safe any longer in town and preferred to remain indoors. In our terminology, she had lost basic social trust in anonymous 'ordinary' citizens in the societal sphere of the town. Whereas I distinguished the exceptional situation (frame) from others, in her perspective, the political climate had changed for good.[209]

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[208] The magistrates had received warnings and had left the town a day before, so that nobody got hurt.
[209] UN, electoral section, woman 20s, UN headquarter Man, 20/02/2010.

Frames do not equal time periods. Frames can change on a single day, as during the upheaval described above. I have chosen the term "frame" from Goffman's work *Frame analysis*, in which he defines frame as follows:

I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organisation which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify. (Goffman 1974, 10–11)

Hence, frames define what situations are 'all about'. By identifying how a situation is framed, actors usually know what to expect from an interaction. In other words, frames condition or shape figurations. I will further elaborate on these concepts in the course of the ethnographic study, on frames in Chapter 11.

Reconstructive research strategy

What I have just described is central to my approach, analysis and the argument I will put forward in this ethnography. I will chiefly investigate trust situations and try to explain them on the basis of different frames and figurations of trustfulness between 2002 and 2010. This means that the focus of my analysis is on explaining trustworthiness of security situations.

An operationalised research question reads now as: How do people identify the trustfulness of situations? My working thesis is that people have practical knowledge about situations, in which they identify the trustfulness of a figuration and its frame.

From a methodological point of view, the question that posed itself was: How could I get access to people's practical knowledge, their *"Orientierungswissen"* (Bohnsack, Marotzki, and Meuser 2006, 40), "knowledge that guides conduct in everyday life" (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 33)?

As pointed out in the examples above, my easily identifiable social identity as a white expat woman, quite literally changed trust situations. Hence, social markers seemed to have an impact on the experience of trust and safety. As a consequence, I had to 'collect' more such situations to understand patterns shaping the trustfulness for different participants. Only this would allow me to describe transformations of trust from the actors' point of view (see sampling below).

Due to the fact that my presence strongly shaped the course of interactions and due to the fact that (trust) relationships were shaped by what had happened in the past, I had to rely on oral

accounts by actors who had experienced such situations. I found myself in the rather paradoxical situation, because emic experiences of trust situations were hardly accessible to me by mere observation or my own introspection nor by direct questioning or listening to casual conversations, which would all be standard ethnographic methods. As a consequence, interviews became an important source for my research.

Critical events as trust situations

To explain me what social life in these times of crisis were like, people narrated particular experiences in a critical event. A glance into the literature revealed that the analysis of events was a defining feature of warscape ethnographies (Hoffman and Lubkemann 2005; Jackson 2005, xxvii; Boyden 2004, 244).[210] Drawing on this strand of research, I looked at events as situations. In the words of Michael Jackson:

An anthropology of events is a strategy for exploring such critical moments. By event I mean a situation, in the existential sense of the term – an occasion, a happening, where something vital is at play and at risk, when something memorable or momentous is undergone, and where questions of right and wrongful conduct are felt to be matters of life and death. (Jackson 2005, xxix–xxx)

Generally speaking, an event involves other actors and therefore has to do with the assessmemnet of others' actions, hence trust. Furthermore, an event can be described as constitutive of several sequences, or actions by the participants involved in a situation.

Hence, by listening to the course of an event (or a trust situation), we can get an idea of the actions undertaken by each participant. In a figurative sense, we are 'looking at' actors' social practices in a trust situation – and this is precisely what we need for an anlysis of implicit forms of trust. In other words, with a sequence analysis of narrated situations, we can access social practices in retrospect and reconstruct forms of implicit trust. Such a use of 'interviews' is grounded in a reflexive-realist research perspective (Aull Davies 2008).

With this methodology of generating data on trust on the basis of verbalised remembered interactions, implicit trust remains non-verbal. Even if drawing on an oral source, trust is not talked about or verbalised and this is what makes this research strategy appealing. The narrator

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[210] As Boyden notes: "One of the defining features of war research is the reporting of events – social, political, criminal and personal – generally conceived of as major transgressions against individuals and/or society." (Boyden 2004, 244)

only verbalises the remembered event. The researcher has to make the deductive work 'to access trust'.

With this research strategy, I could resolve the problem I had with observation described at the beginning of this chapter; namely, that it was nearly impossible to learn about an actor's intentions and feelings (Förster 2001). Listening to an actors' account, however, allowed me to get access to the actor's point of view – in retrospect, of course. Sequence analyses of a narrated situation comes quite close to that; the actor describes what he and others did and how he or she understood the situation, including his or her intentions.[211]

Reconstructing trust situations on the basis of memory narratives

As just described, I will 'take' verbal accounts as documents of past trust situations, meaning that I use memory narratives *(Erinnerungserzählung)* as a source of 'what happened' in the past (Rosenthal 1995). Therefore to a certain extent, I bracket off that memory narratives are not just accounts of the past, but present constructions, too. In this section, I will reflect on and take seriously this criticism uttered from a constructivist perspective.

Data from oral history interviews differs considerably from data retrieved from written documents that are stored in a box in an archive and whose content does not change if stored correctly (Jureit 1999, 10). Data based on recollections, has been subjected to several selection processes. In order to access memory contents, another medium is necessary to externalise memories, such as verbalisations and other artistic or bodily ways of expressions (Connerton 1989). The externalisation of memories is a construction process in the here and now. Memories are modified and adjusted to the present self whenever they are remembered (Vansina 1985). Consequently, they cannot be viewed as 'the past', neither as representing the past 'as it happened'.

With regards to the question of what 'really happened' (empirical events) and how events are remembered, literature on oral history and memory studies usually distinguishes between three theoretical positions (Heitz and Schüep 2011, 42–45): The most classical position, the realist approach, aims at bringing up the (empirical) past; a constructivistic approach believes that the retrieving of the (empirical) past is unachievable and conceives of memory narratives as

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[211] Contrary to objectivist approaches the documentary method of ethnomethodology does not look for meaning 'behind the actor's back' and "does not leave the empirical basis of the actor's knowledge" (Bohnsack, Marotzki, and Meuser 2006, 40) – just that actors will not be able to formulate this knowledge explicitly. Actors have this knowledge, just that it is implicit; the role of the researcher is to make it explicit.

(complete) situational constructions; last but not least, there is a middle position that presumes that there is a continuum between 'irrefutable facts' and 'subjective present constructions' that can be termed memories have to be treated as subjective reconstructions of the past (Rosenthal 1988, 10, 1995). This thesis orients itself on the middle position. Most of the time, my objective is to study "the actual" trust situation and not its discursive and other representations about the event (Kalyvas 2006, 409).

It is certainly necessary to keep constructivist objections into account. Nevertheless, important aspects of social life would remain inaccessible to social science research, if we did not accept methodological difficulties linked to the work with oral data.

De Bruijn and Van Dijk rightly point out that we often lack information about war histories from the regional/local level (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 74). It is crucial therefore, to understand "what this period of war meant for the people on the ground" (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 74) and oral narratives are often the only source to convey this.[212] As Carolyn Nordstrom stresses narratives may not be mistaken for "the actual experience" of violent events (Nordstrom 1997, 21; Assmann 2001). Rather, their accounts show how people translate these experiences into talk and discursive knowledge.[213] I shall offer one close reading of a memory narrative from a constructivist point of view to show how actors create coherence for themselves "out of the raw material of [their] experiences" (Klapproth 2009, 3). Despite their "inevitable subjectivity" (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 75) memory narratives are always *social* memories shaped by the discourse of a social group we belong to or participate in. Consequently, the way people talk about things reflect sense-making practices of experiences of a social group or discursive community. This is how a single narrative allows us to glimpse at a more shared experience.

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[212] The period I am dealing with here (2002 to 2010), does not reach back very far. Therefore, the sources along which the recent past of the region has been reconstructed are newspaper articles and INGO reports. It is on the basis of these documents that Chelpi-den Hamer has compiled the major event for western Côte d'Ivoire on the axes between the Guiglo area to Man (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 237–51).

[213] The way people interpret the war is not fixed; these meaning productions may change over time and get updated to present needs and self-narratives (Jureit 1999, 10).

Field research, access and sampling

The situation I encountered in Man between 2008 and 2010 was not one that resembled what we imagine as "war-like" (Boyden 2004; Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Richards 2012). For instance, there were no combats taking place between the warring parties during my research period, even though there was an internal insurgency in Man in February 2009 (see Chapter 11).[214] But it was rather a short rivalry among the rebels themselves and did not affect the security situation in town in general. Several times, though, the New Forces were in alert, particularly during the first months in 2010, when President Gbagbo had resolved the government and the Independent Election Commission. Of course, one or the other emergency situation could possibly have moved towards the war-end of the war-peace-continuum, but luckily it wasn't the case.[215]

I looked at war from a re-constructive perspective (Bohnsack, Marotzki, and Meuser 2006). The idea to conduct research in a rebel-controlled area might by scary for some, therefore, I want to stress here that it was less extraordinary that many might think. Although it was research in a rebel-controlled area, it is more accurate to imagine a militarised governance situation rather than a war-like, insecure setting.

What was challenging during my field research period, though, was the increased politicisation of the population due to the up-coming presidential elections. Tensions among different population groups grew and were instrumentalised to meet political ends. The politicised climate was challenging, also in terms of how certain informants responded to my questions.[216] Despite these diverging tensions, it was possible to build trust to both sides of the conflict (Norman 2009, 72–73), a key element for any ethnographic research (O'Reilly 2009, 175). I repeatedly communicated that I shall talk to "all sides". I tried to explain this to my informants

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[214] I visited the region in June 2011 after the post-electoral violence, when Côte d'Ivoire was formally under the control of a single authority. The situation was much more instable than I had experienced during the advanced peace process and under power-shared rebel rule.

[215] The term post-conflict is imprecise and problematic due to the fact that it refers to very diverse political situations (Brown, Langer, and Stewart 2008; Chetail 2009; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2007). The time following the official end of war in 2003 may be referred to as post-conflict, also the stabilized period after 2007. Man was still under rebel-control at that time. But the same term applies today, too, in which Man and the northern parts are under government control. Furthermore, the security situation was more instable reunited under one government during 2012 than it was in 2010 as a divided country. Therefore, scholars have suggested to speak of a war-peace-continuum (Richards 2005a).

[216] Some FPI supporters views were strongly influenced by party discourses from the South saying how 'bad' the rebels were, whereas drinking beer later in the day with the rebel chief (see Chapter 11).

by saying that it was my *job* to talk to all sides; hence, I tried to lead the discussion away from what I personally thought. Most people have accepted that and remained open to me. I participated and did research in both pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara sympathiser communities, and spent time with rebels and people who have had negative experiences with them. This leads us to questions of qualitative sampling.

Qualitative sampling of different social identities

As argued in this chapter, it was important to talk to people with different backgrounds, roles, etc., to elaborate different emic experiences of trustfulness. Consequently, I made a qualitative sampling covering a broad spectrum of social categories, as mentioned in the mapping of actors above. Thereby I collected different views and experiences, until I felt I could guess someone's social background and political orientations, when they talked about security and their relationship to the rebels.

I made sustained efforts throughout my research to combine both "breadth and depth" in my data (Fielding and Fielding 1986, 33).[217] On the thick end, I participated closely in the daily lives of two families: one of them first settlers, Dan-speaking and FPI voters,[218] the other Jula-speaking from the north of Côte d'Ivoire and RDR voters. On the thin end, I have met and taken down notes from over three hundred people during my research. Some of these people I met just once and had a short chat with; others gave me one lengthy interview, whereas a third group became close research participants.[219] Even if some encounters were short, this breadth allowed

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[217] Qualitative sampling is conscious choice with which researchers aim at a qualitative representation that covers a wide range of variations.

[218] I had the chance to find a room in the main house of a compound of fifteen people of all ages, from 1 to over 70, in a residential area, in polygamous, lower middle-class Dan-speaking family with different religious affiliations. They earned their living from small jobs at the market. Sharing the everyday life with this family, allowed me to get a holistic view of their lives and gave me access to many milieus; young hair stylists, elderly neighbourhood chiefs, craftsmen and market women, etc..

[219] I often initiated research relationships by arriving somewhere new, explaining who I was and what I did and asking people to provide me for an (unstructured) interview. The advantage of such an approach is that research participants were instantly informed about my purpose of being here. Based on a guide of themes prepared in advance, I generally had a list of topics in mind that I wanted to explore. In some interviews, I began with the security situation in the present; in others I asked about actors' war experiences and relationship with the rebels. Apart from high-ranking state and insurgent actors, most people were ready to have the conversations taped for faster and more precise note-taking. People came up with different ways of responding to my request, some wanted one question after the other; others talked freely after my introductory outline of the topic. Important was to me to be open and let the participant come up with issues relevant to him or her. Often such encounters were the starting-point of a longer research partnership, I passed by time and again and called from Switzerland.

me to make a mapping of different, actors, milieus and categories. On that basis, I was able to infer category- and milieu-specific views and to choose statements from taped interviews or field notes that offered syntheses of more general observations.

The core of my data comes from key research participants who cover a range of emic views (EEA), actors and social categories, inductively identified with a qualitative sampling. I met, talked and called key research participants regularly over the time of this project. As the political environment changed quickly, these contacts allowed me to follow actors' trajectories in new situations.

The major research participants mentioned in the text are listed at the back, as well as other individuals frequently mentioned.[220]

Depending on the issues at hand, I drew on these research participants in terms of their identity markers of ethnicity, armed or non-armed, political orientation, gender, age, first-/latecomer, high or low income, educational background etc. My sampling included actors with the following identities and social markers:

- Firstcomers (Dan, Wè, (Tura))
- Latecomers (heterogeneous group; mainly Jula, Senufo; other Ivorian language groups; non-Ivorian nationals from the sub-region (particularly Guineans, Burkinabès, Malians, Senegalese, Liberians)
- Overseas' minority residents (Lebanese, missionaries of European descent)
- Economic sector (craftsmen, union leaders, local and West African businessmen, water and electricity companies)
- Neighbourhood or village chiefs (apolitical function)
- Youth (some of them formal youth representatives, various backgrounds and political orientations)
- Gender (men and women, gender-specific experiences)
- Religion (local, Muslim and Christian denominations)
- Residents in remoter areas outside Man (firstcomer communities: particularly Dan and Wè)
- State actors (administration: Prefect, (Sub-)prefect, mayors)
- Political orientations (UDPCI/RHDP voters, UDPCI/pro-Gbagbo voters, FPI voters, RDR/RHDP voters)

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[220] A lot of the observations made and conversations had, however, will not be mentioned in the text.

- High-ranking members of the New Forces (with and without army-background; Dan-, Manding- and Senufo-speaking)
- Low-ranking members of the New Forces (Dan-, Manding- and Senufo-speaking)[221]
- Dozow (hunter association)
- Peace-keepers and INGOs (ONUCI, Licorne, ICRC, IRC)[222]

Summary of research questions

This chapter on methodology wanted to clarify how trust can be studied and how this particular ethnography has examined trust in the context of violent conflict. Despite the fact that the main focus in this chapter was on practical knowledge and implicit trust, many interesting findings alco came up in interviews, when I asked research participants reflected directly on and expressed themselves spontaneously about trust.

In the table below, the main questions guiding each of the following empirical chapters are restated on the basis of the perspective developed in this chapter. It may serve the reader as an overview of the next part of this work.

	Main questions
Chapter 6	How did trust transform, when Man was attacked by the rebels? Can we say that trust was lost? How can we characterise this vehement shift of frame?
Chapter 7	What was decisive for trust and distrust in the Ivorian violent conflict? Are personal relationships *per se* the most 'secure' forms of trust in times of

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[221] Many studies on combatants are linked to a DDR-programme (Bøås and Hatløy 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Hoffman 2011b; Chelpi-den Hamer 2011). This is certainly an efficient way to get access to a lot of respondents in a somehow secured environment. As any other groups of research participants, I built my contacts with the rebels on a one-to-one basis, from the high-ranks to the low-ranks, except from a couple of participants of the GTZ's DDR-programme. I was in contact with about 40 armed members of the New Forces' zone six, about ten of them have leading positions. I had different entry points to contact them, officially when I received my research authorisation, via the French Liaison officer, my research assistant's contacts and those who made contacts with me at the road-blocks. After the formal access, personal trust was much more important, particularly with the rebels who were more mistrustful towards me as a researcher than other parts of the populations (Norman 2009, 72–73).

[222] Officially, the UN-staff in Man found I needed a special research authorisation and therefore, I was not allowed to attend the weekly security meeting. Unofficially, they took me on patrol. Off records, most of them were happy to share their knowledge. The French peacekeepers introduced me to the ONUCI local staff, but otherwise plaid their cards close to their chest.

	violent conflict, as some of the literature suggests? What distinguishes an informer from a protector?
Chapter 8	How do actors with different social identities assess the trustfulness and safety of figurations with rebels in daily life? Who is trustworthy for whom in daily interactions?
Chapter 9	What was characteristic for social life during the period referred to as *le temps sauvage* (2002/2003)? Whom did people trust and address for security provision? Did trust have a personal, institutional or normative base in relation to the rebels? What was the trust relationship like between the population and the first rebel leadership?
Chapter 10	How can we describe the trust relationship between rulers and ruled under the commander Losséni Fofana (mid-2003-2010)? What kind of trust was built in this period of seven years?
Chapter 11	What was the trust and security situation like in the latest phase of rebel rule (2007-2010)? What characterises a trustful relationship to the rebels? How do locals (in comparison to visitors) ensure their safety and distinguish frames and figurations of trustfulness?

Figure 7: Main research questions

6 The onset of war as a dislocation of trust

On 28 November 2002, the population of Man faced an unprecedented event. The town was attacked by rebel groups. It was the first time for inhabitants to experience direct fighting and to encounter armed rebels. This chapter asks how trust transformed at the onset of the war and what the constitutive elements of this first-time experience were. What did people do at this moment, when they realised 'the rebels are here'? Where did they go to seek shelter? What gave them a sense of security and whom did they trust? Or was it all about chaos and the complete erosion of trust, as the literature reviewed suggested (Kasfir 2003)? Hence, blank terror and angst?

These and other questions are at the core of this chapter. My objective is to explore the impact of the arrival of the war as an unprecedented, novel[223] event and to examine how people comprehended, dealt with and accommodated this massive change in their lives. By referring to different types of trust with a particular focus on basic social trust and personal trust, I will describe the 'rupture' of daily life and trace transformations of trust that took place on the first day. Centre stage in this chapter are civilians who did not feel particularly targeted by the political conflict. Notwithstanding politicised violence, which I analyse in subsequent chapters, this one deals with the experience of the onset of the war as a situation of existential crisis of insecurity and uncertainty.

Côte d'Ivoire had been 'at war' since the failed coup of 19 September 2002. But there had been no combat in the region of Man until 28 November. Despite curfews and politically-motivated repressive acts from the government, a large part of the population in Man attended to their businesses more or less as usual.

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[223] The distinction between new and novel goes back to Schützian phenomenology, in which "new" is linked to an already existing type, for which we create further sub-types or -category in contrast to a situation that is "novel" (*neuartig*), in the sense that a new type has to be created due to the lack of an already existing appropriate type (Schütz and Luckmann 1973, 135–46).

The reinforcement of the government troops (the loyalists) and the ceasefire reached in October reassured the population. They trusted and felt protected by the state's armed forces, popularly called the *corps habillés*[224]. A man, who worked in the neighbourhood where most of the *corps habillés* resided, remembered that he bought them some drinks when passing, telling them that: *"'Notre sécurité est dans votre main.'"*[225] Many were confident that the rebellion was not going to reach the west and continued to travel in and out of town more or less as usual.

Therefore, when Man was attacked by rebel troops, two months after the failed coup, on 28 November 2002, the majority of the population was taken by surprise. In retrospect, there are a few residents who recall that there had been tensions and unusual movements among the *corps habillés* the evening before. Others remember having heard of movements in the region of Sémien, in the east of Man. But somehow people did not pay enough attention, they trusted the armed forces would inform them in time if it was serious. Hence, people went about their business as usual on the morning of the 28. An employee of the electricity services had just reached the jobsite near Guiglo in the south, when his wife called to tell him the rebels had reached Man. For the family head, who was far out of town, this was painful. The team ceased working and decided to try and join their families. In Duékoué, however, the major town between Guiglo and Man, they were stopped. It was too dangerous to cross the front lines due to the fighting. Cut off from their families, they were forced to wait.

In Man, people were faced with an unprecedented situation. They were experiencing combat for the first time. The moment in which the war arrived engraved itself on people's memories. It caught everybody at a certain point in town and interrupted what he or she was doing and by extension habitual daily life. Many say they remember 'exactly' where they were, what day of the week it was – a Thursday – and what they were doing. Some were able to produce seemingly pin sharp scenes of these first moments. If I asked about later events of the conflict, they were often unable to locate them in time. The beginning had imprinted itself on the memories of my interlocutors in a way that later events – if not subjectively more traumatising – did not.[226]

The only way I could get access to people's experiences of these first moments of the war was through conversations. I invited people to tell me how they had experienced the arrival of the rebellion in Man. This short and open question prompted lengthy narratives. Apart from their

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[224] In Côte d'Ivoire, the *corps habillés,* literally meaning 'dressed-up corps', refers to uniformed, armed public servants, such as personnel of the army, *gendarmerie*, the police, rangers and custom officers.
[225] Robert, 40s, employee of electricity company (CIE), Man, 05/04/2009.
[226] Other studies share this observation (Kalyvas 2006, 409).

performativity stemming from the interview situation with me,[227] they offer first and foremost subjective accounts of the war. As recollections, however, they have a social dimension, too (see also the methodology chapter). From a critical realist perspective, the recollections therefore provide us with insights into the outbreak of the war, a new situation and first encounters and interactions with armed men.

I have organised this chapter along the narrative of a twenty-year old youngster from a firstcomer family, here referred to as Martin, who was fourteen years of age at the outbreak of the war.[228] His family is not actively involved in local politics and therefore, his account is suitable for this chapter's main interest, which is a phenomenological anthropology of the first day of war as an unprecedented, novel event. I will stress human experience and suggest commmonatilies, rather than varieties based on the socio-political background of respondents, which are the topic of later chapters. Martin's scenic and almost film-like account with the insertion of quoted direct speech of different voices (his mother, sisters, rebels etc.) offer us a graphic depiction of these first moments. I am well aware that this is a reconstruction in the here and now of the interview situation and not the actual event "as it happened" in the past. In order to distinguish the two time levels, the experience in the past and the time of the recollection, I will for instance say "the mother in Martin's account said", rather than "the mother said". Despite its methodological difficulties, such an approach constitutes the closest way I can get to this crucial moment at the onset, in order understand how trust was transformed at the beginning of the crisis.[229] Throughout his narrative, I will try to work out more general patterns of how the outbreak of violence was experienced. The account will be complemented with interview extracts from other respondents unrelated to Martin, most notably from: the chief of Kandopleu, a village halfway north between Man and Biankouma; Robert who works for the local electricity company and Macla, a youth representative from Logoualé, a town along the main road to Abidjan in the south of Man, which was captured a couple of weeks later than

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[227] In the context of the interview situation, some actors performed "victimcy" (Utas 2005, 408–09). Mats Utas describes "victimcy" as agentic self-presentations under constraining circumstances in which speakers intend to establish themselves as (legitimate) victims in the eyes of the listener (Utas 2005, 408–09).

[228] Whenever Martin is quoted in this chapter, it is from this interview: Martin, 20s, Dan-speaking, student, Man, 03/10/2008.

[229] Kalyvas also highlights that oral sources have been used due to their accessibility to study rebellions (Kalyvas 2006, 410).

Man (20 December 2002).[230] Further information will be added from background knowledge acquired in other conversations to substantiate my observations and argument.

Seeking safety, reaching 'home'

Martin was a 14-year-old pupil in November 2002. That Thursday, Martin had gone to school as usual. His former schoolyard on the outskirts of Man, in Grand Gbapleu, is situated next to the compound of Tia Koné. While the pupils were playing football during break time, they heard gunshots. They saw that the loyalist forces were retreating, and after having talked to the teachers, the students were asked to go inside: *"'Rentrez en classe!'"*, they were told. But the students could not be fooled. They could tell something was wrong from the way the adults acted; they were frightened. When they saw blood on the military trucks of the loyalists, it dawned on them that the rebels would unmistakably capture the town. Although the teachers told them to come inside, they went straight home.[231]

As soon as Martin was home, there was another massive bomb blast. Clinging to their mother, his younger siblings began crying. The mother was the eldest person in the household that day, as their father was out of town for work. Martin remembered that "the city of Man started moving all of a sudden" and that everybody was screaming. Everywhere in their neighbourhood, people began closing up their houses.

That day, the chief of Kandopleu, whose narrative will be analysed in detail in chapter 9, happened to be in town, as well.[232] He had come to make a withdrawal from his bank account. He found himself at the market with a younger man from the village, when they heard the warning shouts by the gendarmes to go home and seek shelter; *"'Rentrez, rentrez! La guerre arrive!'"* It was not the war itself or the rebels, but mediated information that indicated the arrival of the war. This alone was reason enough to cause fear and panic: *"On se trouvait au marché. Et les gens courraient dans tous les sens: Les uns allaient du Nord au Sud, des autres de l'Est à l'Ouest et on ne savait pas où aller exactement."*

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[230] See the list of research participants in the appendix.

[231] On the other side of town, where there are many Manding speakers, Moussa and his classmates, too, went straight "à la maison" (home) when they heard the first shots and the teachers retreated to the staff room to commune (14/10/2008).

[232] Chief of Kandopleu, 03/08/2010.

According to both accounts, the town was seized with a sudden panic. But there was not complete perplexity. The most obvious thing to do was to go home as quickly as possible. An elderly man I talked to also mentioned that during the attack of Man, his wife took the children and went to her brother's, as he, her husband was out of town.[233] Obviously, there was not much time to deliberate on where to go, anyway. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that people aimed to reach their home or if nearby, the major compound of the extended family.

For the chief of Kandopleu, home was not around the corner and the presence of a (younger) person from the village was comforting and created companionship in handling the situation together. He said:

Ceux qui avaient leur moto, véhicule, ils s'en allaient, accompagnés de leurs propres frères. Mon petit frère et moi nous avons fait notre chemin à pied et nous avons gagné la gare de Biankouma. Au tour de nous, le chauffeur même avait fui. Le véhicule qui devait nous transporter était là. Nous l'avons rempli, mais qui pour démarrer? [laughter] Déjà des détonations au niveau de Grand Gbapleu, on se sentait MORT, quand le chauffeur est venu pour aller jusqu'à Kandopleu. De Man à Kandopleu [c'était à peu près] 400, 500 francs. Mais, ce jour-là, même de Man à 1 km, c'était 1000 francs ! Même chose pour Biankouma. Alors, nous sommes rentrés.

At the beginning of his account, the chief never mentioned that someone else from the village had come to town with him. Now, that the environment around him was changing – one might say getting hostile – the presence of someone familiar suddenly gained relevance. He refers to that person as a "younger brother". It doesn't necessarily mean that it was his younger brother. In local parlance, anyone from the village becomes a "brother from the village" in the social context of the nearby town. The designation "younger brother" merely indicates that it was a younger man from the village. By using the term, he *creates* closeness, emphasising familiarity and trust (Endress 2001, 170). In his retrospective account, the two of them teamed up and faced the difficulties together.[234]

Both of them wanted to find a means of transport to return to their village Kandopleu as soon as possible. The chief mentions how people seemed to help their "close-ones" or "brothers" first. In- and out-groups were created, it seems, strengthening the solidarity of the in-group by simultaneously hardening group boundaries towards out-groups (Schlee 1996). Experiences of

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[233] Old Fofana, 70s, Jula-speaking, civil servant in retirement, Man, 15/06/2011.

[234] I am not telling anything new, when pointing out that context matters for the cohesion of social groups and their segmentation (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1950).

strong personal trust and ("brotherly") solidarity seemed to alternate with experiences of low levels of basic social trust and profiteering by generalized others, the driver, for instance. Instead of francs CFA 500, they paid double for transportation that day. Nevertheless, they managed to get out of Man and eventually reached their village, their home.

If there was one moment of chaos triggering a state of disorder and confusion at the onset of the war, it was the moment the first bomb blast reached Man and the town was seized with panic. It must have seemed people were rushing in all directions. On closer inspection however, everyone's primary aim was to regroup with family members and to reach 'home'. For some, this meant taking a bus and getting back to the village. Others sought refuge in the large family compound in town or hid with family in the nearby bush.[235] Consequently, the 'chaos' was subjectively patterned.

Remarkably enough, people did not seem to be concerned about which area in town would be the safest from a security point of view. Martin's family's house was situated at the roadside, a very exposed location that one would avoid on second thought or from a more objective and strategic point of view. Indeed, during the second battle of Man, their house was hit and burnt in their absence, when they had fled to their nearby village. When they came back in early 2003, they moved their residence to the top of one of the hills, away from the road, where they felt safer.[236] In the first moment of the war, however, these types of questions were not yet being considered, it seems. 'Home' was where people grouped, hid and observed the situation. The safety of any place was defined by trustful, familiar people, not by objective criteria. Surrounded by individuals with whom they shared close personal relationships, people experienced a sense of safety and solidarity.[237] As Geschiere put it "close (in whatever sense)"

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[235] Field notes, group conversation with Dan-speaking women, 04/11/2008. During the Liberian civil war, people fled into town to hide in the anonymity of the big city Monrovia rather than into the 'bush' (A. Kaufmann, personal communication, 28/04/2013).

[236] This is where the interview was recorded in 2008.

[237] This does by no means suggest that trust in 'the family' – which of course has to be specified and is subject to cultural variations (Alber and Bochow 2006) – is a 'deterministic' given. As extensive research on the anthropology of kinship has argued, we have to distinguish between kinship as an abstract structure and kinship that is actually lived and practiced (Carsten 2000). Relatives may be the referent-subjects of particular mistrust in the context of witchcraft (Geschiere 2013). This aspect of personal trust will be further differentiated in the next chapter. The emic term, my research participant used was 'aller à la maison', going home. 'Home', of course, is not just a physical place, but a social space where we expect *familiar people*, socially defined 'family members' in a broad sense of the term. Whether e.g. maids left the household and 'family' where they work to go 'home' and seek safety with

(Geschiere 2013, xv), probably less in a localist sense than in an emotional sense. Perhaps we can say that drawing on existing forms, closeness was further being created at that very moment.

Reflective trust: Is trust warranted?

Meanwhile in Martin's family, the mother asked everyone to lie down on the floor for protection, a recurrent element in other accounts, too. They risked getting hit by stray bullets from the massive shooting. Not without boasting, Martin said that his elder brother and he were curious little rascals [bandits] and wanted to peep outside. They heard the rebel shouting: "'Where are they? Where are they? [the loyalists and supposed enemies][238] We don't want civilians!'"[239] As soon as Martin and his older brother heard that the rebels did not want civilians, they felt reassured and wanted to sneak outside to watch: *"On a dit à notre maman: 'Ils veulent pas les civils, laissez-nous sortir.'"* The youngsters' fear and cautiousness seemed dispelled. In a kind of youthful abandon and curiosity, they were ready to take the rebels' words on trust. But the mother in Martin's account cautioned: *"'Vous allez sortir pourquoi? Est-ce qu'ils vous ont bien affirmé qu'ils veulent pas les civils? Restez dans la maison ici!'"* and dispelled their innocent trust.

They stayed cowering inside the house for a few hours, when a rebel entered their compound yard and shot into the air: *"booloolooloo!"*, Martin imitated the shooting. This time the boys were scared, too. In Martin's account, the mother saw herself confirmed: *"'Vous avez vu, non? On vous a dit de ne pas sortir. Est-ce que ceux-là ils connaissent bien les gens!?'"*

The mother was evidently concerned about the insecurity caused by the shooting. She dispelled the naïve idea of her sons that the rebels would distinguish civilians in the heat of the moment. Furthermore, would the rebels be able to tell a civilian from a gendarme in plainclothes, given the fact that they were strangers in this town? Indeed, Martin said, there were all sorts of figures among them. Martin remembered that one of the fighters did not even recognise a school as a

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their family is beyond my knowledge. It probably is a mixture of social belonging, subjective emotional and situational criteria (also physical distance) that must have shaped actors' decisions.

[238] This is an indication for a selective use of violence (Kalyvas 2006), see the following chapter.

[239] The following quote from a Human Richts Watch Report confirms that: "In Man, for instance, the rebels told civilians after the fighting was over, 'Come out, we have liberated Man for you, do not be afraid of us,' and they 'broke into the storehouse where the loyalist military had stored their food, which they had just been supplied. The rebels took the tins of sardines and gave them out to the people.' (Human Rights Watch 2003, 24–25).

school. Pointing at a primary school, the rebel soldier asked: *"'Ici-là, c'est quel coin?'"* and was told off by his superior: 'was he not able to read?' Others again, did not even speak French, Martin recalled.[240]

What is fascinating about this scene-by-scene narrative is the dialogue between mother and sons. It is one of the rare scenes in my data that allows us to reconstruct – retrospectively at least – a decision-making process of whether to trust or not. It is fundamentally an argument about security and trust. Mother and sons reflected whether it was safe to go outside, whether those who came could be trusted in general and for what they said. Who were these armed men? What did they want and what intentions did they have? Were they particularly dangerous for them?

It becomes quite clear from Martin's account that his family did not feel targeted by the rebels *per se*. Nevertheless, the rebels inspired a sense of fear and mistrust. It was not clear whether they could tell one person from another. Was basic social trust warranted? When was it safe to go outside? Even if not targeted directly, the effects and side-effects of the rebels' arrival posed severe threats to their lives, too, as they risked getting unintentionally killed in crossfire. The family consciously deliberated whether basic social trust was warranted or not, whether there were good enough reasons to suspend uncertainty and to trust.

The scenic dialogue also shows how different actors respond to the same situation. The youngsters evaluated the situation more positively than their mother and found the rebels' call trustworthy enough to quiet their fears. The mother, however, with her experience and sense of responsibility distrusted the general security situation, and deeply mistrusted those who had caused it, the armed fighters who were shooting around. The rebels first had to prove that they deserved her trust. Unable to predict how things would evolve, it was better to err on the side of caution. Hence, she demanded prudence from her children. To be on the safe side, she asked her sons to stay inside and not to listen to the encouraging but in her eyes deceiving calls of the rebels to come out of hiding. For the time being, the sons refrained from extending trust, even though they were more trustful. Something held them back and it probably was not just their mother. They too sensed the danger of the situation, despite their curiosity. To dispel doubts

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[240] They had just begun with English at school and he said the phrase that they picked up from the fighters was: "*Wapi wapi, I fire you!*" This phrase somehow became their new slogan, later, when they went out and about in the neighbourhood. Not having entered the rebellion themselves, they could still be rebels in the world of make-believe.

carelessly could have been fatal in this case. Adopting an attitude of mistrust towards the situation in general and the fighters in particular was the better or literally safer option.

Let me insert a constructivist note at this point, after the rather positivistic analysis I have pursued so far. Martin's retrospective account must also be interpreted as a performative act in the here and now. I was not his only audience; his younger siblings (male and female) were sitting nearby and listening, too. Now and again, Martin worked some dramatising emphasis into his account, for instance, when he made his younger sisters plead with him and his elder brother: "'Don't go out! Don't go out!'" Hence, his account also shows a good portion of displaying masculinity, courage and strength (Fuh 2009).

Despite this note of caution, the two youngsters seemed to have shown an attitude of higher risk-taking than the mother and female sisters. Quite a few youngsters shared their assessment of the situation. Several of their neighbourhood friends joined, some of whom Martin sometimes refers to as *'petits Dioula',*[241] when he wanted to distinguish himself from them. Also Martin's *petit oncle* had joined the rebels at the beginning for a short period of time. Perhaps it would not have taken much, and Martin and his brother, too, had become *'petits treillis'* that day.[242]

First encounters with the rebels

Eventually, after several hours, the shooting calmed down to the extent that Martin's family was able to peep out. The combatants started talking to the civilians or rather the youngsters in the neighbourhood, asking them where the loyalists had gone (the enemies of the rebels), as has been observed elsewhere in civil wars, too (Kalyvas 2006). Contrary to those people who served as informers, Martin and his brother answered that they neither knew anything about what was going on nor where the rebels' targets had gone: *"'Ah, ce qui est sûr, nous on n'est au courant de rien-o(n), on sait pas où ils sont partis ... Faites vos combats. Nous seulement, on veut la paix.'"* In tune with probably the majority of the population, they communicated their non-

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[241] In other contexts, he would boast with his contacts and proudly say, *ce sont des amis*. The term *petits Dioula* is frequently used in urban centres (Bauer 2007, 33–34, 35). Often youngsters of mixed origin speak *"dioula véhiculaire"* these days and are situationally ascribed the term *petits Dioula*. Bauer points out that one has to analyse carefully in what kind of situation the term is used by whom (ibid., 35).

[242] Moussa said that during the first days, they observed how the rebels acted. There were some civilians who entered into the rebellion, in order to resolve a personal conflict with acquaintances.

involvement with the whole 'thing' to the combatants and did not share other people's political affiliation with the rebels.

A further noteworthy point is that the mother in Martin's account never normatively judged the rebels in these first moments. During these initial moments of getting information and acquainting themselves with the new situation, the family remained quite open. It was a friend of the father who told them the next day to stay away from the rebels: *"'Ils sont mauvais. Ne cherchez même pas d'être amis avec eux.'"* After the friend's assessment, the rebels entered a more fixed normative category in the perception of the family. In this case, distrust was conferred through personal trust relationships with a close family friend. The family trusted the judgement of this friend of theirs and after that adopted a clearer attitude towards the rebels, which was more negative, suspicious and distrustful than before.

The dispositional quality of trust, or distrust in this case, further shaped their perception of what they experienced and perpetuated the negative impression. This attitude of distrust shaped their strategy towards them. Based on this evaluation and due to the fact that they felt too exposed in their house at the roadside, they left for the village. The family took only a few things with them. But they were soon stopped by the rebels whose gist of what they said is remembered by Martin as follows: *"'Où vous partez?! N'allez pas! C'est pour vous qu'on est venu nous battre! Restez!'"* This statement indicates that the rebels understood their mission as one *for* 'the population', at least for those who shared their political grievances. In Martin's memory, the rebels did not shoot at their group; quite the contrary, they wanted everyone to stay.

However, what the family saw (combatant's outfit) and experienced (shooting around them) was not reassuring. Martin described a convoy of rebels. Some had attached hair in a strange manner and swarms of bees were following them: *"Lorsqu'ils passent ..., tout un tas d'abeilles les suit – comme un être humain – tout un tas d'abeilles les suit; oh non, franchement, nous mêmes, on a eu, on a eu beaucoup ... la chance, franchement!"* During these first direct encounters, people were left with superficial information to make judgements about the rebels' trustworthiness, information that was largely dependent on how the new actors presented themselves. Given that this was an unprecedented event in which people encountered the rebels for the first time, an important source of information was the fighter's self-presentation. People had to draw on superficial cues, such as "dress, voice, deportment, and demeanour" (Govier

1997, 33). The sight of bees (also mentioned by other informants)[243], strangely attached hair and blood stains on their clothes produced fear, rather than trust. Furthermore, Martin felt that all the shooting of bullets into the ground around them did not reassure them, so efforts were made to placate the rebels: *"Lorsqu'on prenait la route de G., ça nous tirait dessus, comme si nous, on était des treillis, des loyalistes."* So they told the rebels who stopped them on their way to the village: *"'On va déposer les bagages au village, après on va s'asseoir auprès de vous ici,'"* and they continued on the road towards the village.

Dislocation of trust

The accounts presented demonstrate that the onset of the war found everyone in pursuit of their habitual daily activities: The pupils were at school, the electrician had gone out of town for work and the chief of Kandopleu had come to town to make a withdrawal from his bank account. The arrival of the rebellion radically interrupted people in their everyday lives and put their social world out of joint. Something unprecedented was happening. What now? At the practical level, going home and staying with trusted people was the immediate answer that people found. Social life had come to a halt:

When the routines that connect us to a place are disrupted, or when we can no longer trust or manage the macrocosm in which we locate ourselves, we are thrown. Typically, we retreat into a microcosm that we can trust and manage. And so, when a city is bombed we seek refuge in our homes, or with those we can trust, laying up provisions as though for a long siege, and desist from travelling out into the open space of the world. Public life becomes untenable. (Jackson 2005, 18)

But what comes next? Armed men were flocking into town and there were combats going on, the consequences of which were still unclear. It was a situation of insecurity and great dangers,

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[243] Another informant, too, said that bees came out of their mouths (Thomas). In the cultural setting of West Africa, the use of *gris-gris* (amulets) is a common sight, particularly on the hunter's gown (Leach 1994; Ferme 2001a, 2001b; Ferme 2004; Hellweg 2011; McNaughton 1988; Jackson 2004). Attaching hair, wigs etc. and showing off caused misunderstandings, particularly in the western media and has been described many times regarding the Mano river wars (Richards 1996; Utas and Jörgel 2008). Such gadgets are used to produce fear and to deter resistance in their enemies as a strategy in battle (Straus 2011). One informant also said they had blood stains on their clothes for days. In more extreme cases, by breaking social norms (e.g. by wearing women's clothes), they communicated that they were beyond the rules of society and that they were in a position to make rules now (Richards 1996; Jackson 2005; Coulter 2009).

due to the shooting. Staying in the wrong place or fleeing at the wrong moment could be detrimental. Hence, people experienced a situation of insecurity, in the sense of exterior physical threats (Beck 1992).

However, people could not hide forever. Soon they would have to go outside and move in the societal sphere of the town, where they could possibly encounter "assailants", the first designation used for the rebels in Côte d'Ivoire. It was fair enough that people relied on personal trust when hiding during combat, but to go outside and get food from the market, they needed a minimum of basic social trust. As Govier notes: "not to trust also poses risks and imposes costs" (Govier 1997, 18). Those who are too scared to go out will have to rely on others who feed them.

What I think we can observe in this moment, is a withdrawal of trust in anonymous others and normative trust in the societal sphere of the town. Social life beyond the familiar home was no longer predictable, neither was it safe to move around town. Hence, links to the outside were temporarily "disconnected" (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2012b). Hidden and observing, trust in the societal sphere of the town was put 'on hold' until further notice. This condition of trust 'on hold' can be described as a dislocation in a post-Marxist sense (Laclau 1996; Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis 2000). Dislocation here means a kind of juncture at which habitual social life was suspended and could not be continued as before (Förster 2012a, 43). Hence, trust transformed from a non-reflective to a reflective form. Perhaps more for adults than for children, social life with its social roles, interdependencies and power differentials had to be reconfigured.[244] In order to extend trust to the societal sphere of the town, information was required first (de Bruijn 2011). Only then would people be in a position to assess the new situation and to judge the trustfulness at hand.

As just mentioned, the principal question people faced during the dislocation was whether – when the shooting died down – it would be safe to go outside despite the presence of armed rebels. People lacked knowledge about and personal experience with these armed men as a type of actor. This unfamiliarity with the rebels constituted the major challenge for trusting. In the following parts, I will analyse this challenge for trust by referring to Simmel (1992 [1908]) and Schütz (1967). Furthermore, based on my data, I will develop an argument in the remainder of

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[244] Reconfiguration is used here in the sense "Figuration" termed by Norbert Elias. The term stresses social interdependencies between actors (Elias 1970).

this chapter that suggests not knowing what war would be like caused as much distress and fear as the physical insecurity caused by the arrival of the fighters.

Processes of familiarisation

As I argued at the beginning of the chapter, the outbreak of the war was an unprecedented event for most people in Man. Drawing on Möllering, I will further analyse the onset as an unfamiliar situation which people had to familiarise themselves with (Möllering 2006, 94–98).

People repeatedly said that they did not "know war": *"On connaissait pas la guerre."*[245] But what does it mean to know war? And what knowledge did people have at their disposal to deal with the onset of the war and to re-extend trust in the first place?

As mentioned in Chapter 4, trusting requires knowledge (Simmel 1992 [1908]). Those who lack grounds for trust cannot reasonably extend trust (Simmel 1992 [1908], 393). Initially in Man, people lacked knowledge that allowed them to make an informed judgement about their actions.[246] On what base could they found their trust? What information could they have recourse to?

In order to analyse this point more deeply, I will use insights from phenomenological theory. Schütz says that each person has what he calls "a stock of knowledge at hand" (*Wissensvorrat*), acquired over the course of his or her life (Schütz 1967, 10). The stock of knowledge is made up of different kinds of knowing. Different forms of knowing may refer to more superficial forms (knowledge of acquaintance, *Bekanntheitswissen*) and more experienced-based in-depth forms ("knowledge about", *Vertrautheitswissen*) (Schütz 1967, 14).[247] Knowledge of acquaintance refers to mediated knowledge, knowledge that is not based on first-hand bodily

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[245] Oulaï, 50s, Dan-speaking, elder of neighbourhood Doyagounié, Man, 12/10/2008.

[246] Moussa in Dioulabougou from the other end of town also emphasized the need or thirst for information. The example he used was when the loyalists had reconquered Man during the short period between 1 and 18 December. When they called people to come for a meeting at the prefecture for an exchange of information, people showed much interest, for there was a "lack of communication and a lack of information". He said that the population required information about who you are and what is happening, probably particularly those who felt targeted. In his account people were tricked into coming to the prefecture by the loyalists and some were killed (Moussa, 20s, Jula-speaking, student, Dioulabougou, 14/10/2008).

[247] The distinction between "knowledge of acquaintance" and "knowledge about" goes back to the work of the psychologist William James (Schütz 1967, 14).

experience. In our empirical case, for instance, people might have had a general knowledge about the existence of wars. Perhaps they had heard about wars in stories or they had seen pictures on the news that shaped their imagination about wars; but they had never lived through such an immediate state of war. For most people I met during my research, the war in 2002 was their first experience with war. Some mentioned in talks that now, in 2008, they 'knew war and that in a further violent crisis they would do certain things differently.[248] Someone who has experienced war bodily has a different knowledge about war than someone who has indirect or mediated knowledge about it, even if wars may take different forms.[249] In the following, I would like to think about what stock of knowledge at hand, people might have had to make sense of the situation.

In most societies, there are general ideas of 'war' and 'fighters' based on cultural knowledge from all kinds of sources (local and global). Often, and I think it is true for Côte d'Ivoire, two rather contradicting images prevail. There is the one of the heroic warrior or soldier that inspires awe and admiration and a second image that, by contrast, associates war with danger, fear and disaster. Oral histories in the villages where I asked had stories to tell about pre-colonial war heroes.[250] Many villages were located on mountaintops due to the strategic advantage in violent conflicts and were only moved down by order of the colonial masters.[251]

In the village of Sipilou,[252] one of the elders compared the rebellion with the war of Samori Touré (Person and Ligier 1976). Samori's mounted warriors, the *sofas*, devastated settlements throughout the Savannah regions down to the north of Man a century ago.[253] For this informant, it was the closest comparable existing type of action in the social memory of the village to

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[248] Oulaï, 12/10/2008.

[249] In Liberia for instance, people have acquired a sense of what direction to take in case of shootings coming from behind in a town like Monrovia. One should not flee by going straight, but rather turn right or left, rectangular to the presumed shooting line (A. Kaufmann, personal communication, 15/04/2013).

[250] For the figure of the warrior in Dan culture, see (Himmelheber and Himmelheber 1958; Fischer 1967; Fischer and Himmelheber 1984). For the region of Man: Dan K.A. personal communication, 08/08/2010. In Podiagouiné, for instance, where the *chef de terre* asked me to tape the oral history of the village, he named several ancient warriors, 14/01/2009. For the Manding, see the epic of Sunjata (Austen 1999) or Samori's mounted warriors (Person and Ligier 1976).

[251] Prof. Lou Bamba Mathieu, personal communication, Abidjan, 08/09/2008.

[252] Sipilou is north of Man, close to the Guinean border.

[253] To account for the fact that Samori's warriors are still remembered for their devastation, I will name but a few examples (for Sierra Leone: Jackson 2004: 193; for northern Côte d'Ivoire, Senufo region (Förster 1997), Tura region, Thomas Bearth personal communication, 08/2010.

which he related the present experience of war.[254] However, Samori's warriors had come to the region a hundred years ago, so the current villagers only 'knew' the condition of war from hearsay. It is not so far-fetched to think about pre-colonial warriors here. In the first months of the conflict a local journalist produced a newspaper that appeared irregularly in Man.[255] In its first issues, the names of ancient warriors from the region figured in several interviews and obviously were a referent point (Doumbia 2003b). Another stock of knowledge, particularly relevant to the younger generation, were images from the film industry, hence fiction (Richards 1996). Nevertheless, knowledge about wars and fighting in general, and knowing by experience are two different things. People in Man lacked experience-based knowledge of what war was like and of how best to deal with *this* particular violent conflict. Therefore, at an experiential, life-worldly or first-hand level, the rebels constituted a novel (*neuartig*) type of actor who did not correspond to any experienced type in the stock of knowledge at hand.

Let us come back to Robert, the man working for the electricity company, who was stuck in the south at the beginning of the war. While he was waiting in Duékoué for the roads to reopen, he heard about the rebels, but did not see or encounter them. Rumours came from the north that it was too dangerous to travel on the main axis and that people had been killed, etc. But he could no longer stay inactive without any news of his family. The future-oriented strand of trust gave him confidence enough, pushing him to go forward. Shortly after the rebels took Man in mid-December 2002 for the second time, the non-tarred road leading over Kouibly was reopened. By producing his badge from the electricity company, he was allowed to climb into a big animal transport vehicle that was already crammed with people.[256] They arrived in Man without incidence. Nevertheless, it was his first time entering rebel-held territory and since he had heard that the rebels strip passengers of their money, he hid it: *...bon, moi, parce que j'avais peur, – les rebelles, je les avais jamais vus, tout ça, – donc pour venir même, j'ai caché un peu mon argent, parce qu'on dit, on arrache.*[257]

By way of explanation as to why he was afraid he inserted "the rebels, I had never seen them". Encountering the rebels marks the watershed in Robert's experience. He makes a clear distinction between before and after the first direct contact with the rebels. His statement would

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[254] Chérif, 50s, Dan-speaking, entourage of village chief, Sipilou, 28/07/2010.
[255] See Chapter 3 and 9.
[256] This means that many wanted to cross the front and head into the rebel-held zones despite the dangers. As in the previous accounts, normally they would pay about CFA 2,000 for the distance, on this day it was CFA 10,000.
[257] Robert, 05/04/2009.

suggest that at the outset, he was afraid of the rebels, but after he had "seen" or encountered them, it was different. After having "seen" them, he obviously felt he could handle them, for he remained in Man throughout the rebellion.

I have stressed the need for knowledge in relation to trust. Minimal knowledge is, according to Simmel the pre-condition for trust. Only then may the act of trusting bridge a gap of knowledge and suspend uncertainty (Möllering 2006). Another important insight of Schützian phenomenology is the idea of types (Schütz et al. 1989). Following Schütz, people can quite readily deal with new things, as long as something they encounter can be fitted into one of their typified schemes. However, if people fail to refer subjects or objects that they encounter into one of their existing schemes, they are challenged and have to build up a new type with which they identify major characteristics. I think that the lack of such a type which corresponded to the situation and fighters constituted one of the main difficulties of this first day. The process of typification is close to the idea of familiarisation (Schütz et al. 1989; Luhmann 1988; Endress 2001; Möllering 2006).[258] The lack of familiarity with the rebels and the lack of a type that encompassed the combatants constituted a difficulty for people when trying to approach them and develop basic social trust.

If we follow Schütz and Möllering, we can say that people constantly engage in a process of familiarising the unfamiliar. When someone or something comes towards us, we identify its type and rank it as familiar or unfamiliar in the sense that it needs more or less special attention (Schütz et al. 1989). As Möllering writes: "unfamiliarity only renders trust impossible when the actor fails to engage in familiarisation" (Möllering 2006, 96).

As elaborated in the conceptual part, familiarity has two semantic fields and just one of them is appropriate in the context here. It is familiarity in the sense of acquaintance. In that sense, familiarity means we have enough knowledge in the problematisation sequence in order to say that we are 'familiar' with something or someone, in order to judge his or her trustfulness (Endress 2001, 166–67). To be able to assess the trustfulness, though, does not mean to trust per se. Familiarisation may reveal reasons for distrust, as we have seen for Martin's family who eventually took their belongings and fled to the village (Endress 2001) also (Luhmann 1988).

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[258] What Schütz terms 'typifying', corresponds more or less to categorising and comparing in Garfinkel's ethnomethodology: "It is commonplace for a person to search his experience for a situation with which to compare the one he addresses." (Garfinkel 1967, 263)

A double crisis: Insecurity and uncertainty

During the dislocation of trust, when basic social trust was withdrawn and the combats were raging, people must have experienced fear for their lives, but also an ontological uncertainty or angst about what was happening to the social world they had been familiar with. In the sequential flow of Martin's account, I think we can make out a moment of crisis[259], in which social basic trust was lost and people experienced both fear and a strong reduction of their agency. Drawing on Emirbayer and Mische's model of agency allows to us to explain what the situation was and why it was difficult (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). We can argue that actors were unable to build on past experiences and that it was hard to imagine what social life in a state of war was going to be like, due to the novelty of the situation. Therefore, the strand of agency most prevalent in this moment was the one that is temporarily located in the present, in which the element of judgement dominates. The fact that people were left with ad-hoc judgements for which they could neither draw on routinised models nor on a well-founded imagination of what was coming afterwards, reduced people's agency drastically and was experienced as a crisis.

In addition to the physical insecurity of the situation, people experienced an ontological crisis in the sense that the stock of knowledge at hand was insufficient to fully comprehend and deal with the situation. I distinguish here between insecurity and uncertainty (Beck 1992). It was a moment of extreme physical insecurity (ontological insecurity) due to the combats, meaning that people were certain it was unsafe in the here and now. There was an extreme experience of uncertainty about the continuity of social life, too. The point I want to stress here is that the onset of the war constituted a double crisis in which physical insecurity (external) and ontological uncertainty (internal) about the continuity of social life coincided. Although intertwined in the experience, I hope to have shown that it makes sense to separate them heuristically in this empirical situation, as it allows us to distinguish two different sources that constituted a threat to the self.

The point I am making is that actors perceive a difference between a) being taken by complete surprise and b) being prepared to embrace the new or novel.[260] This argument will be further

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[259] Etymologically, "crisis" refers to a critical moment, requiring actors to make a decision or judgement. For a critical re-situation of the term crisis see (Roitman 2011).

[260] I am aware that there are many ways of being taken by surprise. One might be aware for instance of the possibility of an attack and then be taken by surprise one day. Or one might not consider this a possibility at all and is then taken by surprise all the more.

illustrated by the following account of the capture of the town of Logoualé. After the first villages had fallen into rebel hands, the inhabitants informed other villagers on how best to deal with arrival of the rebels. People from other towns and villages, whose recommendations were trusted, provided information on how to receive the rebels. This seems to have had a reassuring effect, according to my interlocutor, Macla, a youth representative from Logoualé.[261]

Logoualé was captured by rebel forces on 20 December 2002, one day after the recapture of Man by rebel forces. He remembered the arrival of the rebel group MPIGO at 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning. He stressed that information had reached them in advance of how best to receive them. Just like the population of Man, they adopted the strategy of receiving them "with open arms" and did not offer resistance (Macla, 19/03/2009). Hence, the community leaders seem to have taken on an "accommodating" attitude (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 87–89). Nevertheless, the population panicked at the arrival of the rebels and most people went to hide in their *campement* next to the fields.[262]

Il faut dire qu'à leur arrivée ici, aux environs de 9 ou 10 heures, quand ils ont pris la ville, c'était la débandade totale. Chaque population cherchait à se cacher. Mais la particularité qu'il y a eu c'est qu'avant que la guerre arrive ici, on avait déjà l'écho de ce que nous devions faire. Donc on a accueilli à bras ouvert les forces d'occupation, c'est à dire les Forces Nouvelles, qui sont arrivées. (Macla, Logoualé, 19/03/2009)

There are several points I would like to highlight in this statement. First, the word "echo" conveys nicely the quality of the knowledge and preparedness they had. An echo is *per definitionem* not the thing itself, but its reverberation that people receive indirectly. They had begun familiarising themselves already with what was coming. Perhaps, we can compare it with a hazardous operation on our body: we are informed that it will hurt, but that the best thing we can do is to endure it. Whatever circumscription we use, the inhabitants of Logoualé were not taken by surprise in the way people in Man were. It seems that people imaginatively had begun

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[261] Amadou, my interlocutor was trained as an accountant and returned to his native village in the early 1990s 'to work on the fields', as he put it. He shares the lot of many other young well-educated men who migrated back to the rural areas due to a lack of jobs in urban centres after the economic downfall (Arnaut 2005).

[262] The equivalent for *campement* is "farm" in adjacent Anglophone-speaking Liberia. It is a seasonal dwelling, shelter or little house next to the fields that can often be far from the village. In the past and today, they serve as shelters during violent conflicts (Ferme 2001a).

engaging in the typification of the rebels, before their arrival. Hence in phenomenological terms, the experience in Logoualé was definitely new, but perhaps no longer novel.

Again, the knowledge about a potential event and the actual experience were two things. People ran in groups and hid in their dwellings. Incoming rebels are a fearful experience, but the village retained more agency because people had already imagined what they were going to do. Following the advice given by those who had already come under rebel control, they did not offer resistance. Their strategy was to submit to the rebels or to use Macla's terms "receive them with open arms".[263]

Summary and discussion

In this chapter, I focused on the moment the rebels reached Man. I analysed the transformations of trust at the first instances of the arrival of the rebellion as a dislocation. Alongside Martin's recollections, I described how the onset of war broke into people's everyday lives and how people engaged in first attempts of familiarisation with this unprecedented, novel event.

The analytical strategy of tracing transformations of trust showed how trust in the societal sphere of the town faded quickly and that personal trust in familiar people played an important role, something often described in the literature. When the societal space of the town became unsafe, everyone sought social spaces where they expected people with whom they shared personal trust, be it with the closest person from the village at the market, or with people at home. Different circles of closeness, familiarity and solidarity were drawn that created in- and out-groups. Prices rose quickly, revealing profiteering attitudes towards people with whom one did not share personal trust relationships. The panic-driven rush home explains the seeming chaos in the societal sphere of the town. Despite the dangers of combat, people managed to create a sense of safety by grouping with other people.

The issue of closeness or proximity is a delicate one in social anthropology. As Geschiere notes: "Both inside and outside anthropology, the general idea that intimacy breeds trust remains very influential: trust in the inner circle as a prepolitical, even ontological given." (Geschiere 2013, 28) As already noted in the text, this is not what I have wanted to imply here. However, we cannot study ranges of proximity without taking context into consideration. The proximity has

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[263] I have explored the sense of making strategies and ambiguity of the situation in Chapter 10.

to be studied as a situational construction, having both an in- and outside that is actively created. In the next chapter, I will further analyse the role of personal relationships and 'close' people.

The optic through the lens of trust highlighted how trust was virtually withdrawn and connections to the social world outside the familiar circle were put on hold. In what I have referred to as a moment of dislocation, social life and its routines were suspended and had to be carefully reconfigured. I stressed the crisis-laden quality of that moment by arguing that in addition to existential threats due to the physical insecurity, particularly adult people also experienced a strong sense of ontological or basic social uncertainty about the continuation of their social world. The combination of the two, the experience of physical insecurity and uncertainty constituted a double crisis that reduced people's agency to the practical-evaluative strand (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), "short-term strategies" (Spittler 2004, 446–49) or "tactics" (Certeau 1988; Utas 2005), depending on the preferred conceptual terminology of the author.

As described, the dislocation of basic social trust was caused by the interruption of the everyday and was put on hold due to the lack of knowledge surrounding the new condition. People first had to gather information about the situation, i.e. people had to try and familiarise themselves with the circumstances, get acquainted with the new context. The rebels tried to reach out to the population by communicating with them and externalising or objectivising their intentions (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 49–51). By shouting that they were not after civilians, they tried to create linkages to the population. For the two youngsters this information was sufficient to judge the situation and the armed actors as trustworthy enough to step out of the house. However, as the attitude of the mother – a figure representing an adult person – has shown, mistrust and caution dominated at first. In the long run, though, people needed to go out. After the fighting had ceased and encouraged by the messages sent by the rebels, the population seems to have developed a minimum level of basic social trust, again. This allowed them to venture into the societal sphere of the neighbourhood, still a rather familiar social space. Going to the market, passing less familiar neighbourhoods and their residents required even more basic social trust.[264]

The rebels as a novel (in contrast to new) type of actor overstrained people's capability of immediately familiarising themselves with the newcomers by typification (Schütz and Luckmann 1973, 143). It took people a moment to gauge the novel situation, to get the necessary

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[264] Those who felt politically targeted, of course, did not go out; this is the topic of the next chapter, though.

information to form a knowledge base to assess the trustfulness (1a). Quite obviously the situation was judged as trustful enough to go out after fighting had ceased, the rebels were perceived as humane enough to be approached and exchange a word or two with. Indeed, it is a very thin form of trust, but it was necessary to take those first steps after the battle had ceased. People showed remarkable skills in familiarising and developing thin trust within a short time, part of which must be attributed to practical questions such as the provision of food, etc.

In other words, what happened that 'first day of the war' for the Manois was that habitualised daily practices shifted into a more reflective mode. The trustworthiness of actors/societal spheres had to be reconsidered. Trust-giving shifted from a non-reflective to a reflective form. Trust could no longer be placed habitually. The need to reflect and double check on the safety of routines added complexity to social action and resulted in the slowdown of social processes in quotidian life (Luhmann 1968).

Perhaps during a shorter period than one might think, the town was paralysed and basic social trust withdrawn. Almost simultaneously, the process of mutual familiarisation was initiated, in the sense of mutual acquaintance rather than confidentiality, getting to know one another.[265] Whereas the first day constituted only a first encounter and initial step, the process of mutual familiarisation continued in the following weeks and months, as we now know looking back. The co-construction of the relationship between the rebels and the population shall be further developed in the following chapters. People further engaged in the typification of the rebels. With time, I argue, people developed a more nuanced image of this type of actor, so that the monolithic view of that first day was further refined. For instance, the population had to acquire knowledge of how broadly the rebels defined their category of 'enemies'. Who would be included and targeted? And who would be safe in figurations with them? What circles of security and insecurity would they draw? Such patterns of political violence and generalisations will be explored in the following chapter. Along with the population of Man, we shall further discover what it meant to live in this region during times of war and rebel control.

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[265] This process of familiarisation should not be imagined as teleological; soon after this day, Man was reconquered by the government groups, rebel groups changed etc.

7 Informers and protectors in times of political violence

A Time of great suspicion and mutual denunciation

After the coup failed in Abidjan on 19 September 2002, the rebels retreated to the second largest city, Bouaké, in the centre of the country. Korhogo, too, was under their control; Odiénné, Séguéla and Vavoua followed; not so Daloa.[266] The rebellion was about one hundred kilometres away from Man when a ceasefire was reached on 17 October.

After the coup attempt, the government reinforced its troops in the towns under its control. The region of Man was given special attention as it was the 'homeland' of the late General Guéï, a Dan from Biankouma. Robert Guéï, the leader of the 1999 coup and loser of the Presidential elections in 2000, was found dead in the street not far from his house on the first day of the coup.[267] The population in Man believed that government troops loyal to President Gbagbo shot him and his wife/family in the early hours of the coup, as they suspected that Guéï was involved. Consequently, the government perceived the population of Man as being particularly receptive to the rebellion.

Many Ivorians were appalled to see their former head of state, Guéï, lying in the street shot dead in his pyjamas.[268] But in his native region, the loss of a leader, grief and outrage gave this death an additional significance with implications for the continuation of the conflict. It strengthened the sense of common belonging among the Dan communities and by doing so constituted a moment of social cohesion, solidarity and integration (Schlee 1996). Many Dan backed Guéï's party, the UDPCI. People in the region shared the disappointment of shattered

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[266] Daloa was subject to heavy fighting and the loyalist forces managed to keep Daloa under their control.

[267] On the morning of 19 September, General Robert Guéï was killed as well as the Minister of Interior Boga Doudou, one of FPI's strongest supporters of the ultra-nationalist ideology (Marshall-Fratani 2006, 42).

[268] Seemingly unaware of the renewed military insurgency, Guéï was in his pyjamas, obviously fleeing to the nearby church.

hopes that through him, although no longer in power, their region would get a piece of the (national) pie and their children would have jobs. The regime that beat their leader in the elections was now suspected of having killed their 'son'.

As described by way of introduction, the town of Man is a socially and politically heterogeneous community, with almost equal numbers of firstcomers (Dan) and latecomers, the majority of whom are northern Manding. The latter were quite consistent in their support for the RDR during the decade-long crisis, a tendency that increased when the conflict turned violent (Vidal 2002). The Dan are less homogenous and steady in their political orientation. For the time we are concerned with in this chapter, the majority supported the Guéï's party, particularly now that their leader had been killed.[269]

Government supporters faced a difficult time in Man after the beginning of the rebellion. Those Dan personalities in Man who did not join in this discourse of outrage of the Guéï mourning community were ostracized by neighbours, relatives and friends.[270] Many saw the rebellion as an opportunity to take revenge; tensions were running high, one was either with or against them.

Old Bamba, a man aged over 70, did not hide his continued support for President Laurent Gbagbo. Himself a man of strong character and native Dan of Man, he has been one of the earliest FPI supporters in the region. His continued support of the alleged Guéï-murderers made him very unpopular in his own social milieu. But the old man reiterated what he had said in 1999, when Guéï had become the transitional head of state; namely, that to take power in a military coup was not right. By voicing such unpopular views in Man, he got many on their bad side. Consequently, old Bamba was a declared 'enemy' and thus a target for the rebels who wanted to oust Laurent Gbagbo.

Furthermore, he alienated the RDR supporters as he saw no fault with Gbagbo's election victory and seizure of power in 2000. He iterated the FPI position by saying: *'Je ne sais pas pourquoi la guerre est venue ici!'* RDR activists, by contrast, have a very different opinion. If they have to explain the war, they will refer you back to one of the *Patriote's* newspaper editions (in late 2000) where Côte d'Ivoire is depicted as a divided country on the title page.[271] The divide is almost congruent with the demarcation line of the violent conflict. For some RDR supporters,

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[269] The support for the UDPCI by the majority of the region's population is documented for this time thanks to the legislative and municipal elections held in 2000/2001 (Bouquet 2002).

[270] Old Bamba, 70s, Dan-speaking, Muslim, FPI activist, Man, 29/09/2008.

[271] The *Patriote* is a newspaper close to the RDR. It was the edition of 4 December 2000, after the renewed rejection of Alassane's candidature, this time under the Gbagbo regime and on the occasion of the legislative elections (Yapi-Diahou 2002, 191).

the war was but a matter of time. As a consequence, they were seen as primary allies of the rebels and prosecuted by the regime.

Distrust grew by leaps and bounds in Man between the two opposing camps. As the stakes were high, 'mere information' turned into intelligence, so that distrust became rampant and took hold of social life in town to the extent that it poisoned social relationships. As has been observed in comparable political situations, denunciation marked social life.

This chapter argues that the major lines of trust and distrust in the Ivorian civil war can be attributed to the political conflict. A second aim of the chapter is to analyse the role of personal trust relationships.

Political violence in Man

In a first part, I will look at patterns of security and insecurity, trust and distrust that can largely be attributed to the political conflict. Distrust, threats and eventually violence, followed the fault lines of the political conflict described in the chapter explaining the roots of the Ivorian crisis. Hence, the first part of this chapter deals with politically-motivated forms of violence, so-called political violence[272] based on the politics of belonging. Political conflict was continued with violent means and progressed into open warfare (Clausewitz 1994). This approach will allow us to understand a good deal of trust and distrust in social life during the Ivorian crisis and to show how the social fabric was affected.

The patterns of who (dis)trusted whom in this violent conflict has been aptly referred to as the "war of who is who", in local parlance *"savoir qui est qui"* (Marshall-Fratani 2006; Förster 2002, 2010). For active party members, such as the old man Bamba, their preferred camp was not much of a secret. But what about other people who could not directly be affiliated to party

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[272] Rebellions and civil wars are forms of political violence. Characteristic of political violence is that actors want to attain a political objective. Hence, the term "political violence" is used for violent acts that are used to achieve a political goal. Consequently, it has been stressed that violence has a political meaning (Imbusch 2002, 47). However, this does not mean we conceive of violence as either (politically) meaningful or meaningless; neither does it mean to suggest that we should look at motives of violent actors in binary terms of "greed versus grievance" (Collier 2000). Taking this into consideration, I prefer to speak of "violence that can be attributed to the political conflict", rather than "political violence". Drawing on Kalyvas, I will show throughout the chapter there is often a personal issue involved in acts that at first sight seem to be indisputably linked to the political conflict (Kalyvas 2006).

politics? Would they 'automatically' be lumped into the camp of the political leader with whom they most likely shared ethno-regional belonging; and worse, be "collectively punished for the violence of their co-ethnics"? (Straus 2011, 482)[273]

In other words, to what degree was the political conflict generalised? These questions indirectly drive at the ethnicisation of the political conflict, but also at other patterns of violence, such as privatisation, looting or deterrence. In this chapter, I want to explore where the limits of "who is who" were set in practice and how the boundaries of violence were drawn in the region of Man. In the following section, I will describe politically-motivated violence against government opponents, focusing on interviews with RDR supporters. After that, I will describe violence against government supporters (FPI) based on conversations with the old Bamba and his family. In the second part, I will show how "political violence" was generalised.[274]

Political violence against government opponents

In the Dan, UDPCI-community close to the deceased General, I learnt that young men in particular were targeted. My informants insisted that "they" picked up youngsters with (white) plastic sandals.[275] Perhaps this is an emic version of the "loose molecule"-hypothesis of young jobless men as ideal recruits. Only youngsters in precarious situations would wear such sandals. Some youths simply disappeared. A human rights watch report documents summary executions for the time prior and during the 18 days in which the loyalists controlled Man (Human Rights Watch 2003).

Before the rebellion reached Man, the government arrested local RDR activists and deported them to Abidjan for allegedly supporting the rebellion. In an interview that took longer than two hours, Maméry, a key research participant, told me about how he got engaged in politics early in the 1990s, how he was a political prisoner in Abidjan in 2002/2003 and the ordeals he went through in Duékoué on the way back to Man.[276]

Maméry had been part of the renovators' movement in the single party (PDCI) since the early 1990s and part of those who campaigned for the RDR since its split from the PDCI. He has

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[273] Straus's quotation is taken from a briefing about the post-electoral violence from 2011. For a critical reflection of the term coethnicity, see discussion at the end of this chapter.

[274] A reconstruction of the period based on written documents was compiled by Chelpi-den Hamer "Chronology of violent events in the west (2002-2007)" (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 237–51).

[275] Family of a Dan-speaking low-ranked rebel, Bakary, 07/11/2008.

[276] His account is in line with what other reports have described (Human Rights Watch 2003, 46).

worked in different functions at the municipal office in Man since 1996, serving different mayors. Hence, he was well known and had clashed with the local law enforcement forces several times due to their one-sided interference in political manifestations. Due to his political struggle for the RDR, he was automatically identified as an ally of the rebels. He openly states that he shares the political aims of the rebellion but not their means. Consequently, he was arrested or rather abducted at home during curfew.[277] Together with other political opponents, he was taken to Abidjan. On the way, militias demanded their execution at nearly every checkpoint. In Abidjan, after having been brought to several places, they were eventually taken to *La MACA* (*Maison d'arrêt et de correction d'Abengourou/Abidjan*), a prison with armoured cells in the capital.

The news of their arrest spread like wildfire in Man. The atmosphere was very tense in town, as Doumbia Balla Moïse, a local journalist, remembers.[278] Together with colleagues from newspapers of different political orientations, they sat in their common *maison de la presse* (press centre) in town and discussed whether to write about the nightly arrests or not. Whoever decided to do so, would probably risk similar reprisals. The journalist working for the RDR newspaper, *Patriote*, felt too exposed. Eventually, Doumbia, a journalist writing for a different newspaper and who shared the sense of outrage, said he would do it. The news was published incognito the next day, reportedly on the front page of the pro-RDR newspapers (*Patriote and Libéral*). Actions from the other side were not a long time coming. Although Doumbia was not around when the *commissaire* passed at the *maison de la presse*, the journalist had visitors from the security forces, the police, in the evening. Doumbia's house had been identified by one of his colleagues at the *maison de la presse* whose family held leading positions in the government – actually, one of Doumbia's *petits,* whom he had given a job. When the policeman who entered the compound saw the sticker of a newspaper that had not published the article Doumbia was not arrested and the police left again. In the morning, when the curfew was lifted, a delegation from the neighbourhood came to the house and asked about his whereabouts. In relief, they gave thanks together. Doumbia said: "*Quand ta vie n'est pas terminée, tu vas pas mourir.*" A month later, the rebels attacked Man.

Meanwhile, Maméry had spent a month without clothes and communication in a dark overpopulated prison cell in Abidjan, together with over a hundred other political prisoners.

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[277] The government imposed a curfew on the country after the failed coup in September; it was lifted in May 2003 (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 237–51).

[278] Doumbia, 30s, Jula-speaking, journalist, 20/12/2008.

They had been arrested – unarmed – in their homes, but were constantly called assailants, as if *they* were the rebels. Thanks to the cooperativeness of a prison guard, he managed to pass out messages to journalists about their conditions in prison, so that their situation received public attention allowing them a more dignified detention.

Sometime in August 2003 – nine months later and after the end of war – he was released together with other political prisoners and received official clearance to go back to Man. But worse was still to come. Together with a fellow prisoner, he had to spend the night in Duékoué as the passage of the confidence zone between Duékoué and Logoualé was still insecure due to the *coupeurs de routes*. The next morning, his fellow prisoner was recognised by a member of the Young Patriots (radicalised pro-government militias) and the mob threatened to lynch him. Maméry managed to call someone in a high position in Abidjan, who informed the Minister of Security, S. Fofana, so that the local authorities, including the French forces Licorne, became aware of the incident. The National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) managed to save Maméry's friend from the mob in time.

Though, at first, saved by the FANCI and the gendarmerie,[279] their ordeal continued in the camp of the state security forces. The FANCI insulted them and searched their personal belongings, taking about 600,000 CFA (a thousand Euros) from them. When they found Maméry's prison diary, they did not want to let go of him. He had written down executions he had witnessed and the testimonies he had collected from other prisoners. However, thanks to the call Maméry had made to Abidjan, the chief of staff passed an order to let them go. Hence, they were brought to the gendarmerie, from where they were supposed to be picked up by the Licorne to be escorted to Logoualé. But the French did not come. In the evening, the gendarmes said they would be locked up again, as they did not have a nightly guard in this camp. Together with two other former political prisoners, he was put into a prison cell with a heap of excrements. Again, in the hands of the 'state', their fate was uncertain.

In the morning, the prison dairy caused problems again; the *Commandant de Brigade* was angry. In Maméry's memory the *Commandant* asked: *"'Pourquoi vous les Dioulas, vous êtes comme ça?'"*, and Maméry asked back: *"'On est comment?'"*, etc. Again, the conversation was geared towards ethnicity and eventually, they were returned to the dirty cell. When a friend who lives in Duékoué came to see them, Maméry told him to call the Minister of Security immediately.

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[279] Due to the state of emergency, both gendarmes and FANCI were present.

A little later, the Licorne turned up with several cars at speed. The gendarme who was on guard told the Licorne that they had no one detained with the name Maméry. Maméry promptly shouted: "*Je suis là!*" This brought about their release, they were once more in the hands of the Licorne and ready to leave. But suddenly, the entire gendarmerie was encircled by gendarmes who made it clear they were not ready to let go of these three prisoners. The Licorne, too, stated their case, said they had received orders and could not leave without these three men. The French peace keepers were face to face with the gendarmes, both sides armed, the gendarmes in the majority. The French senior officer exclaimed what kind of country this was where the subordinates did not follow the instructions of their hierarchy, and that he had received orders from his superiors to escort these three men to Logoualé, hence he could not move without them. Maméry said the French were courageous ("*avoir coeur*").

The situation cooled down when the *Commandant de Brigade* gave in and invited them to sit down inside. The cause of the gendarmes' fervour turned out to be a wish to broker a deal. Three of the gendarmes' comrades were still in custody with the New Forces in the north (Ferké, Bouna, Korhogo) and the gendarmes felt that since the Licorne had not helped them liberate their people, they therefore wanted to keep the three as hostages for a potential prisoner swap. The French soldiers told the gendarmes to file a complaint to be transmitted to their hierarchy; but that for now they had an order which was to take these three men to Logoualé. And finally, this time, Maméry and his companions were taken to the rebel-controlled area escorted by the French peace-keepers. Hence, for this actor and others sharing his social identity, the rebel-held zone was a safe haven where they were safe from political prosecution. Maméry finished this part of his account with the following words:

Ce calvaire j'ai vécu. Donc, on a vécu toutes ces choses-là. On ne peut pas avoir confiance en cette armée. … Dans les autres pays il y a peut-être armée, mais ici là, il n'y avait pas d'armée. Il y avait des miliciens à la solde d'un pouvoir. Quand tu es au pouvoir, les militaires sont pour toi, ils tuent les autres que tu ne veux pas voir. Mais une armée est là pour protéger toute les populations. (Maméry, 27/03/2009)

Maméry repeatedly insisted that in his experience Côte d'Ivoire did not have a republican army. Experiences such as these created deep mistrust in the regime and the entire state apparatus on the side of the political opposition, distrust that could not be removed with a half-hearted gesture.

The topic of the following section is political persecution that actors positioned at the other side of the conflict suffered from.

Political violence against government supporters

Old Bamba asked whether I saw the dried-up tree on the hill nearby and pointed in its direction. We were sitting on the veranda of his house at the beginning of my field research. The compound was quiet in the afternoon; most people had left for the day to go about their business activities. Following his pointing hand, I searched the rather bare steep hill behind the roof tops of the adjacent neighbourhood. There, I discovered a blasted, dead tree next to leafy ones. 'Nobody knows just why this one has fallen ill and not the other ones next to it', the old man continued. 'Only God gives and takes life', he explained. This statement had also been his reply to the soldier who had come to tell him he would be killed once the rebellion reached Man.[280]

The exchange between the old man, Mr Bamba, an FPI activist[281], and Mr Dosso, a regular soldier of the Ivorian armed forces, took place a couple of days before the rebels attacked Man. The exchange demonstrates the singling out of particular actors due to their political affiliation. The soldier who sided with the rebels came to utter threats against a long-standing FPI-supporter, telling the old man they would target him once the rebellion reached Man. Perhaps supporters of the rebellion feared that he might inform the loyalists, the government side, about who in Man could 'help' the rebels capture the town from the inside. Ever since the failure of the coup on 19 September, people likely to support the rebellion had been targeted by the government's repression, as we have just seen in Maméry's account. Locals' knowledge of 'who was who' made them important informants and their familiarity with the town was strategic in the conflict.

Remarkable is that Old Bamba knew M. Dosso, the man who came to threaten him personally; he was a Dan from the same cluster of villages near Man. When the rebellion came in 2002, this man reportedly looted and acted in such a manner that he was no longer able to set foot in the region for quite a while. Hence, it was not a well-meant warning, but rather a formidable threat that this man had come to deliver at the FPI supporter's house. In this situation, Bamba distrusted the man; when time had passed and the frame had changed again, he no longer had to fear this man. He said that he saw him once or twice in Abidjan later on.

When, on 28 November 2002, the rebels captured the town of Man, Bamba's family pleaded with him to flee. Sitting together in their compound, they cried long into the night, full of

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[280] Data for this section is based on field notes, particularly, Old Bamba, 70s, Dan-speaking, Muslim, FPI activist, 29/09/2008; further conversations with Bamba's youngest wife Auntie and some of his children Sabine, Létitia, Hélène field notes 02/10/2008, 24/10/2008 and 15/02/2010.

[281] The FPI is President Laurent Gbagbo's party.

sorrows for their family head, sharing emotions and strategising, until they sent off the family head at dawn. The old man set off at 6 o'clock in the morning together with two female members of the family. One of them had a two-month-old baby to carry, the other a little boy. Auntie, his youngest wife, gave him CFA 100,000 for the journey. There were many people on the road aiming to reach the loyalist area. They marched 80 to 100 km to Duekoué and then found transportation to Abidjan.

The family members who stayed in Man burnt objects that could reveal their FPI-leanings: photographs, newspapers and clothes. Valuable belongings, such as expensive clothes, were entrusted to neighbouring families for safekeeping. Thanks to their good relationship with their neighbours, political affiliation and sympathies came second. They chose those neighbours with whom they had the close personal contacts and from whom they thought that they were less threatened by the coming rebels. A woman from Guinea, for instance, was likely to stay in Man. Having left their belongings with neighbours who were less exposed than themselves, the Bamba family locked their compound and went to the wives' nearby villages of origin, where they stayed with their children until well into the new year.

During their absence, their house was pointed out to the rebels as an FPI-house by some young men. The neighbour from Guinea, a tall and outspoken Muslim woman, happened to become aware of the scene and reportedly defended the Bambas. She told the group that the family had not fled to the south, which would have been considered a sign of opposition. Other neighbours joined in and agreed that they had gone to a funeral in the village and after all, they were good Muslims. This is how the house was saved from looting. By pointing out Bambas religious affiliation as a Muslim, an identity marker that stressed commonality with the majority of the rebels, the Guinean neighbour managed to divert attention from the fact that the family head was an active FPI supporter.

Several points in this scene are worth commenting upon; for instance, the fact that the Guinean neighbour could build her defence on pointing out Bamba's religious affiliation. Contrary to the hardened discourse at the national level where the FPI became increasingly equalled with Christianity, Hajji Bamba is indeed Muslim and FPI supporter, as in Vidal's example mentioned earlier. Furthermore, one of Bamba's daughters explained that this was a residential area where many families own the houses they occupy. People would always return here, a fact she felt contributed to the strengthened neighbourhood solidarity and mutual trust. There was just one house, occupied by a gendarme, who had recently arrived, which was looted.

In addition to defending the house in their absence, the Guinean neighbour had taken the left-behind plantains from the courtyard to sell at the market. When Bamba's family came back from the villages, she gave the returns to the family and informed them that she had taken 10,000 when there had been no other money left to buy food. She proposed to reimburse them later, but was told to keep it. The Guinean woman had been introduced to me as 'my best friend' by auntie, the junior wife and I now began to appreciate why. Not only had she taken certain risks by defending a family who politically supported the 'enemy' and kept her clothes; she also appeared honest in money matters.

Weeks later, I discovered something that threw my initial understanding of this neighbourly relationship into question again. Auntie, who was part of her rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA), had been denied her savings. She "lost" more than 200,000, but was later given part of it back. Auntie assumes that her friend had used the money to help her own son leave for America. This is widely perceived as a worthwhile investment and goal to aspire to. Her response to my disbelief was a shrug with a smile: '*Je vais faire palabre pourquoi? Ça sert à rien; on est ensemble ici.*' Evidently, she rated the chances of getting any kind of compensation higher if she hid her disappointment. She saw no possibility of getting the money back then and there, so she had to employ another strategy. Not making a fuss about the abuse of trust was the better strategy for her. This allowed her to save the relationship and thus the chance to be paid back in one way or another, sooner or later. If need arose, auntie would not hesitate to ask her neighbour for a contribution, after all she owed her. The disappointment over the *tontine* did not signal a complete change in the relationship. The family is still believes that their neighbour would again speak up for them if occasion arose and trust her in this respect. Vice-versa, auntie and her family, would not hesitate to help her neighbour in return in similar political difficulties.

I now realised that the friendship between these unequal women was rather asymmetrical, but not without solidarity and trust. This seemingly "unfair" treatment, which in the middle-income milieu of western Europe would probably have led to a breakdown of the relationship, did not mean the end of neighbourly solidarity and a certain degree of friendship. I saw them talking many times from house to house or on the way to the market. It dawned on me that when the auntie had introduced me to her neighbour and said she was her best friend, she had been flattering her neighbour and therewith maintained her efforts to recuperate her losses. By presenting me to her neighbour, auntie was also displaying her new, comparably well-off contact. In the context of the subtle power balances I observed among women on several

occasions, female friends with social status were important as intercessors. The logic here is that people do not dear to trick you, if you are friends with women of higher who are able to intervene on your behalf and make sure that you get your share.[282] During my stay in Man, I met other people who were also part of the same savings association that same year. They had received their money. It became clear to me that the Guinean neighbour had taken the money where she expected the least trouble.

This example demonstrates several issues worth bearing in mind. First, people's trustworthiness depends on their vis-a-vis and the situation they find themselves in. It is due to such observations that I have come to conceptualise trust situations as figurations. Furthermore, power is part and parcel of relationships and a component to reckon with when we look at trust situations. Secondly, we have to bid adieu to some romantic ideas about cosy, thick and comprehensive forms of friendship (Grätz, Pelican, and Meier 2004). The context we are dealing with requires us to take the sometimes harsh social reality into consideration. In this particular ethnographic example, expectations in relation to trust were first surpassed and then disappointed. The example also points to the fact that sometimes, we cannot explain everything right down to the last detail and perhaps we have to accept such ambivalences (de Bruijn 1998, 70).

The critical position of semi-personal relationships

In popular imaginations, war is often conceived as indiscriminate violence against 'everyone'. However, research over the last decades has revealed that violence in civil wars is rarely completely random but rather selective (Kalyvas 2006).[283] In this chapter, I have presented ethnographic material that showed that people were targeted according to their supposed political belonging. Hence, violence and insecurity followed the logic of the political conflict that intensified in the 1990s. Consequently, politically-motivated violence could be partially anticipated. This allows people to avoid certain sites and actors and to discriminate insecure from more secure social spaces, hence between less trustful and more trustful figurations.

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[282] Obsevation and participation in weekly *tontine* meetings, with Rama Sangaré, field notes March 2010.

[283] Explanations provided for discriminate patterns of violence are that indiscriminate violence would be too costly and also counterproductive in forging cooperation with one part of the population (Kalyvas 2006).

Explanations of violent patterns along socio-political criteria are standard procedure for many analyses of violence (Human Rights Watch 2003, 26). On closer inspection, however, the ethnographic examples presented also hint at a more complex pattern of violence, one that has to do with more personal dimensions. I will now take a second look at the ethnographic examples presented and uncover a different logic hidden "underneath of things" (Ferme 2001b, 1–13).

The RDR activist Maméry was well-known in town and had a personal enmity with an agent of the security forces; the journalist Doumbia was denounced by a colleague from work and those who indicated Bamba's house also seem to have known the family privately. To be more explicit about this: Even if Bamba was approached by the (future) rebel due to his *political* leanings as an FPI activist, Bamba was singled out by Mr Dosso because they know each other *personally*. Kalyvas has therefore asked rhetorically: "Is it correct to describe and analyse all violence in civil wars as 'political violence'?", and goes on to explain that "[such] questions force us to rethink the role of cleavages in civil wars and challenge the neat split between political and private violence" (Kalyvas 2003, 476).

To add an example from another source than mine, a journalist from the Lebanese-owned newspaper Soir-Info who had lived and worked in Man before the war, travelled twice to Man to make a reportage in 2003. After having done the first visit as a correspondent without raising suspicion, he was arrested the second time for possible espionage. His former neighbour-turned-rebel indicated him at one of the check-points (Gnohité 2004, 252).

Furthermore, in the following parts, in which I describe more generalised forms of violence including looting, informers also had personal rivalries about women, status etc. with those they indexed. For instance, a friend's father was shot by one of the rebels, allegedly for having kept the uniform of his gendarme neighbour. But actually, a woman with whom he had had a quarrel after an affair, had gone to the rebels to denounce him in the first place.[284] This was at a time when the actual combats with changing frontlines had ceased. Hence, an act of personal vengeance, disguised as political motives.

Therefore, there seems to be a personal element in many of these cases that at first sight seem to follow 'political' reasons. Taking this into consideration, Kalyvas has argued that violence labelled as political violence often has "other motives behind, far more private or personal ones" (Kalyvas 2003, 476). So, who are these '*indicateurs*', informers? What relationship do they

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[284] Richard (research assistant), 30/09/2008.

have with their victim? And what distinguishes them from those who helped and could be trusted?

Informers and protectors

In the ethnographic examples above, informers are colleagues at work, neighbours or someone from a neighbouring village. This is by no means a representative list. However, we can still examine the trust figurations and come up with some tentative suggestions. If we look at those who helped and lent support (even accepted personal risks as Doumbia), we can first name close family members (accompanying Bamba), people from the same social milieu who share grievances (Doumbia, who published Maméry's arrest), friends (the one who came to see Maméry when he was imprisoned in Duékoué), but also neighbours (such as the Guinean woman).

Those who helped are people we can say are emotionally close to the victim in one way or another (Geschiere 2013, xv), either by sharing political orientation or have a close personal relationship in private. However, we have to abstain from drawing easy conclusions. Intimacy does not "breed" trust (Geschiere 2013, 28), neither is familiarity an absolutely imperative to speak out for someone. The journalist Doumbia, for instance, once protected a supposed policeman from harm with normative arguments without knowing the man personally.[285]

What I am interested in here is to think about the role of neighbours or colleagues and their position towards us. Current research is concerned with the "exact form of proximity" in personal trust relationships (Geschiere 2013, xvi). Whereas Bamba's Guinean neighbour helped to protect his house against looters, it is also a neighbour, a former neighbour, who gave his fellow rebels the idea to suspect and arrest the journalist from Soir-Info. Hence, neighbours figure in both categories, either as informers or protectors.

In our typology 'neighbours' are people to whom we are connected with a personal relationship, who are familiar to us as individuals. The same is true for colleagues at work. We know them as particular individuals, as 'Mireille' and 'Pierre', even if it is in a professional rather than a private context. From time to time, we may share personal things about ourselves at work, but one day, our ways may separate, so that we may no longer keep in touch. Generally, as in the case of the two journalists, colleagues at work may not have a strong sense of obligation towards us. We may assume that a work relationship differs from a family relationship. Depending on the cultural setting, these relationships may differ in the way of what one may expect from each

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[285] Doumbia, 20/12/2008.

other, what moral obligations are attached to it and also to what extent we may trust such a relationship. Hence situations in which we can 'count' on that person vary accordingly.

What neighbours and colleagues have in common is that they have selective personal knowledge about a person without being engaged in a morally binding relationship to that person. They have the insights of a friend, but lack the morally-binding and thicker link of a family member. Neighbour and colleague are rather 'unrelated' to us, not unlike an anonymous person. It is a relationship that is often referred to as an acquaintance. If we have to characterise an acquaintance, it may be a person who is less close to us than a friend, but knows more about us than a stranger.

As Endress said, we distinguish people around us by attributing to them different statuses of closeness towards us, not unlike concentric-circles of proximity (Endress 2001, 170; Geschiere 2013, 232). Although the neighbour and colleague in our example did not have a close personal relationship, they had personal information about the victim. Hence, they know something about us that makes us vulnerable towards them, whereas we are not mutually dependent or linked by a more lasting encapsulated interest (Hardin 2006). As Govier put it, greater vulnerability requires thicker forms of trust (Govier 1997, 4). Domestic servants, for instance, would also fall into this category half-in-half-out position in the circle of proximity: housemaids, nannies, and drivers, any craftsman or technician coming to the house regularly etc. In a transformed political context, our respective milieus may place us in opposing camps. If a neighbour or colleague wants to harm us for a passed dispute (because-motive) or if they want to distinguish themselves in their group (in-order-to-motive) (Schütz et al. 1989, 84), they can indicate us to their political camp often without risking social sanctions from anyone.

It is not surprising that the Guinean neighbour who helped was in a residential neighbourhood where people own houses and stay, whereas in the case of denunciation the informer and his victim were former neighbours who had separated already. Acquaintances seem to occupy a half-in-half-out position, in which they have insights about us but lack a durable, interdependent relationship, in which they feel bound to confidentiality and secrecy – at least in this setting. Therefore, one may say that acquaintances are linked to us by what I have termed a semi-personal relationship.

Of course, not everyone will decide in the same way and at the end of the day, it depends on every 'neighbour' as to how he or she will act. As Geschiere reminds: "trust is never self-evident [and] has to be studied as a product of specific historical circumstances, as a continuously new 'event' (Geschiere 2013, 32). Moreover, neighbourly relations and

colleagues at work may turn into friends, intimate friends. In local parlance, *'la soeur du quartier'*[286] designates precisely that, namely that the neighbour can be the best friend and is therefore called "sister", expressed in the idiom of kinship. With other neighbours, however, we may just be on nodding terms, know their name, perhaps their profession and where they come from.[287]

As mentioned, these colleagues, neighbours, etc. may be people who, in the conflict situation, belong to the 'other camp'. Apart from reporting to 'their side', they can also protect us from harm – perhaps even better than those from our own camp. By sharing belonging with the other camp they are better placed to convince activists from their own camp to spare us. In such figurations, people from our own political camp risk persecution themselves and therefore lack the capacity to speak up for us and protect us. As outlined in the theoretical chapter, motivation *and* capacity are necessary for trust.

To mention another interesting aspect, morally-laden[288] and interdependent social relationships may also be used for social control and to exert pressure on an informer. With origins in the same cluster of villages, Mr Dosso knew full well about Bamba's political orientation and perhaps thought to use this knowledge to position himself as an ardent supporter of the rebellion to become an important person in this new group and time. Luckily, Bamba escaped in time. Others were less lucky. I was told that Mr Dosso behaved recklessly against those he knew supported the party in power in his home region. Due to the maltreatment he caused, he now suffers social exclusion and even had to stay away from Man for a while.

In yet another situation, people were forced to point out regime-supporters in their neighbourhood. Not all denunciations were 'voluntary' and for personal advancement. Some people were also forced at gun-point to indicate FPI activists (Human Rights Watch 2003, 26). Perhaps in such a figuration, people indicated an acquaintance, in order to divert the attention from a closer person or friend (Endress 2001, 169). Old Bamba's sister, for instance, was indicated by the population in her husband's village. Her husband, also a member of the FPI, had fled into the bush. She had to give a sheep, 50'000 CFA (approximately a 100 Euros) and

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[286] *'Frère/soeur du quartier'* refers to someone whom one shares everything with, *'tes problèmes sont ses problèmes; vous faites tout ensemble'* (Aissata, 20s, Abidjan, field notes 15/06/2012).

[287] As we will see in a later chapter, neighbours' children are said to be often involved in robberies, they have come into the compound as children and know the house.

[288] Of course, moral values may refer to different things. Here 'morally-laden' refers to protection, secrecy and solidarity in the contexts of political conflict.

rice to be spared by the rebels. The villagers were there and watched without saying much. In her account, she alluded to the fact that if the villagers had to point to someone, she was always going to be the one to bite the dust in that figuration, which she seemed to accept. The leader of the rebel group told her to flee and that she might not get off so lightly with the next group.[289]

My data does not claim to be representative. Nevertheless, it shows that semi-personal relationships played a key role in the social setting of Côte d'Ivoire, in which denunciations were frequent.[290] My analysis has shown that personal relationships defy easy categorising into either trustworthy or untrustworthy. Personal and to a much higher degree, semi-personal relationships, are touch and go, half-in-half-out in the circle of proximity. What people close to us who support the opposing side decide is salient in a conflict, where armed troops deployed from the centre lack local knowledge and rely on informers.

Having described how single individuals are targeted, resulting from a combination of political and personal motives, I shall now turn to the second phase of the battle for Man.

Generalisation of political violence

In the following part, I will show that, the political violence further escalated and reached another scale with the loyalist recapture of Man, only three days after the rebels' first conquest. Whereas the policeman refrained from arresting the journalist Doumbia at home due to doubts whether he really was the right person, such hesitations were less likely in the time after the loyalists returned on 1 December 2002. My argument is that the conflict got radicalised and violence more generalised, in the sense that targeting was broadened and no longer just aimed at activists, but also at possible sympathisers from social milieus thought to have affiliations with one or the other camp.[291] The lines between friend and foe were redrawn again; the enemy group was broadened, the group of people who were 'neutral' decreased and those who wanted to be counted to the friendly group had to show commitment.

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[289] Old Bamba's sister, 50s, Dan-speaking, 30/09/2008.

[290] Kalyvas' quantitative findings have revealed that perhaps counter-intuitively, intimate interpersonal trust relationships are prone to denunciation (Kalyvas 2006, 351): "Interpersonal conflict, such as professional rivalry, feuds between neighbours, family quarrels, disputes between spouses, and romantic rivalries, are the other major cause of malicious denunciation." (Kalyvas 2006, 346)

[291] In the process of generalisation, the singling out of a particular person, e.g. a political activist shifts to targeting anyone who is merely "suspected" of having a political affiliation with the opposing camp (Human Rights Watch 2003, 14).

State repression in Man

The eighteen days that the loyalists were back in Man after the rebels' first capture are remembered by most population groups who stayed in Man during rebel rule, as a difficult.[292] The loyalists were supported by Angolan mercenaries, at least they were the ones particularly remembered. Anew, northerners and youths from the UDPCI milieu in particular were targeted. In an exemplary fashion, I will describe the escalation and generalisation of the violent conflict for Dioulabougou, a neighbourhood that stands out in Man due to its grid-like tarred street network, closely spaced rows of houses that leave no space for trees.

Dioulabougou is not simply a neighbourhood where many northern migrants live. It is one of the oldest settlements of Man. Dioulabougou is the neighbourhood where influential Manding families have lived for generations, since they settled there after the Samori wars. Dioulabougou is their 'cradle', as one of my contacts from that neighbourhood said, where these families still have their main compound of the patrilineal decent group and where the *Grande Mosquée* is located. These families have a say in social and economic life in Man, as transporters and traders, at the market and as heads of large labour unions strong in members. Today, representatives of this established Manding community argue that they have built this town. Therefore, they claim something like an urban version of firstcomer status and thereby legitimate claims for political leadership in the town of Man, a position generally reserved for the region's first settlers, the Dan. In the 1990s, Dioulabougou became the stronghold of the local RDR. For some, Dioulabougou is Man.[293]

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[292] Research participants who particularly stressed the insecurity during the loyalists' return: Football coach, 30s, Jula-speaking, quarter Koko, 12/12/2008; Bakary, 30s Dan speaker, 07/11/2008; Tea, 30s Dan speaker, 07/11/2008; Moussa, 20s, Jula-speaking, Dioulabougou, 14/10/2008; Seydou, 30s, transporter family, Dioulabougou, 31/07/2009; Doumbia, 30s, Jula-speaking, 20/12/2008; Chief of Kandopleu, 03/08/2010; Peter, 60s, missionary, European decent, 17/03/2009.
For people who felt targeted by the rebels, the return of the loyalist was a relief of course. Also for people who had left goods and cars behind, it was the moment to go and get them (Gnohité 2004, 241–54).

[293] In the eyes, of the Dan, this social space is often perceived as a unified block from the outside. Actually some Dan have never been physically to that neighbourhood, because social life and their networks have never taken them there. Some Dan sometimes seem to perceive Dioulabougou as a threat to their interests. However, from the inside, Dioulabougou looks much more fragmented, full of different alliances and rivalries, just like in any such collective group (like the among the Dan). However, if their lifestyle as Muslim Ivorians with long-distant trade livelihoods is threatened by national exclusion – because history has drawn a boundary straight through the middle of their socio-economic sphere (Ivory Coast's northern border) – they will stand together and fight. Furthermore, in each of these large

Translated into the political struggle of the last two decades, Dioulabougou is where one will find the highest density of RDR sympathisers and RDR activists. The entire neighbourhood was under general suspicion to support, accommodate or simply be the rebels. Therefore, the loyalists concentrated a large part of their war efforts on that neighbourhood. Due to the dispositional character of distrust, suspicion grew and mere assumptions were turned into hard evidence. If someone was indicated or merely suspected of supporting the rebellion, it was soon taken for certain and required action.

During that time, social life was difficult for members of this neighbourhood. Men in particular better stayed inside also during day time. Only women dared going out to seek food for the family. The market seemed to have been open just for a short time in the morning and people ate what they could get hold of. Often families stayed without food. When they sat together in the *grin*,[294] it helped them to *"enlever la peur"*.[295] But the loyalists are remembered to have shot on these small gatherings. People felt no longer safe and virtually victim of political persecution. Some, who lost family members, entered the rebellion to take revenge after the loyalists' defeat.[296]

Information was provided at the Great Mosque that if ever somebody was seen outside during curfew, he would be arrested. As people had been abducted at home during curfew already, as Maméry, the male family members particularly, stayed away from their homes. Doumbia's nephew who was eager to rebel was picked up and never came back, when his girlfriend's neighbours indicated him. Another young man with a Jula background told me he was picked up but later released, when he showed his card as a watchman.[297]

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families, there is at least one Dan wife, as the elderly would stress (field notes 28/02/2010) and there are Muslim Manding RDR section chiefs who work on the land of nearby local villages as farmers, the stereotypical Dan activity for work (field notes 22/10/2008). Hence, the common history always provides both, aspects that stress division and others that point to commonalities and cohesion. It depends on the present and in-order-to-motives (Schütz et al. 1989, 84) that lie in the future what aspects will be stressed.

[294] The *grins* is a habitualised gathering of usually men in front of a compound, possibly with a view on the street to sit, chat and socialise on a daily basis (Roth 1998; Kieffer 2006; Göpfert 2012, 57; Masquelier 2013). Some authors refer to the grins as social institutions (Banégas 2011, 462). Usually they prepare a strong sugared tea, served in small glasses, a practice found throughout the social milieu of Muslim West Africans from Senegal to Niger, at least and among migrant communities in urban centres such as Monrovia, Abidjan etc.

[295] Moussa, 14/10/2008.

[296] Moussa, 14/10/2008.

[297] Traoré, 30s, Jula-speaking, youth representative, Dioulabougou, 21/10/2008.

Seydou, the son of a well-known Muslim Jula family active in transportation and resident in Dioulabougou told me that his father was 'too well known' in town.[298] He said that someone, with whom his father had a *'problème de femme'*[299] must have indexed their compound to the loyalists. The father fled by foot via the north to Touba, Odienné to Mali. Thanks to the long-distance business, this milieu has extended family members and *tuteurs* or *jatigi* all along the road to Mali who offered him shelter and could help him finding transportation. When in Mali, the family sent money by Western Union so that Seydou's father could fly back to Abidjan.[300]

A teacher at retirement age, Tounkara, with the ethno-linguistic profile of the 'typical' RDR sympathiser stayed in Dioulabougou during the entire conflict. Neither politically active nor rich, his compound was not attacked, either by loyalists or by rebels. According to him, one had to be indexed.[301] Again, informers seem to have provided information about certain people's whereabouts with a tendency this time of wealthy ones – adding greed to personal rivalries and politics.

Institutional distrust and ethno-political solidarity

Let us look at the situations just described through the lens of the trust typology. Most interactions are between representatives of the state's armed forces and stereotypically identified population groups. For northern populations these are situations of institutional distrust – but how about margins for clemency, hope or trust? Were there none, at all?

Seydou's brother was stopped by the loyalists, when driving one of their cars out of Man during that time and was taken to the prefecture. The loyalists shouted at him: ' *'Tu es rebelle, non?*

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[298] Seydou, 30s, transporter family, Dioulabougou, field notes 31/07/2009.

[299] It is probably a dispute due to an affair with a woman that raised the other's jealousy.

[300] Kerstin Bauer who conducted research on the Muslim Jula (below Dyula) milieu during the violent crisis in northern Côte d'Ivoire describes the kind of trust relationships that the long-distant traders could draw on for instance for fleeing as in the case just described: "*As a trading people characterised by mobility, they are always concerned with maintaining predictable relationships of trust and translocal networks providing security for people on the move. On the one hand, they possess kinship relations along their trade routes. On the other hand, the Dyula rely on institutionalized relationships like the jàtìgìya, an institutionalized host-stranger-relationship that reaches beyond kinship and ethnic boundaries. Our findings show that despite the maintenance of such forms of institutional trust, it is personal trust that seems to be of central importance during times of crisis. For example, travelling in northern Côte d'Ivoire is safest in areas, where a person is well-known and personal networks could provide protection. [...] But as the example of the jàtìgìya shows, personal trust is not substituting or displacing institutional trust.*" (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007a, 6–7)

[301] Tounkara, 60s, Jula-speaking, head teacher, primary school Libreville, Man, 16/12/2008.

Vous les Dioula [Jula], vous financez la rébellion, n'est-ce pas!' '[302] They put chloroform on his skin and asked him to creep naked around the prefecture. He has still scars from that. One of the military men[303] was also Jula and told him in a quiet moment: ' *'Tu es garçon, non?'* ' ('To be a boy' means to be brave.) He should support the pains but never say that he is a rebel, because this was what they wanted to hear. To be a rebel meant to be a dead man at that time.[304]

This case is interesting, because it engages different foundations of trust: trust based on ethno-political belonging/ascription and trust based on institutions. From an institutional perspective, it is a trust situation between state armed forces and a civilian; if we look at the politics of belonging of both subjects involved, they have the same ethno-linguistic background, but do not know each other personally. As a FANCI-soldier on duty, the soldier had to follow orders from above, but he had space for manoeuvre that allowed him to give 'his Jula brother' advice how to best handle the situation. Institutional distrust is here mitigated by trust, solidarity and loyalty based on shared ethno-political belonging.

When the rebels announced their return – the part of the population that was targeted by the loyalists (UDPCI and RDR sympathisers, the neighbourhood Dioulabougou, etc.) were relieved. Although the combats were heavier than the first time, the rebels were acclaimed as saviours, as protectors from state repression. At the same time, those civilians who had helped the loyalists and indexed their co-citizens had to flee, because they had to fear for reprisal attacks, now.

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[302] Seydou, field notes 31/07/2009.

[303] Although I do not have exact numbers about the ethno-regional composition of the Ivorian army (FANCI), the gendarmerie or police, not everyone from the north or the west joined the rebellion after the coup. Those with permanent residence and families to feed in Abidjan and had strong reasons to continue their job as either gendarme or soldier. It is an open secret, however, that the army's average age was rather high and that the motivation was rather low, explaining the facility with which the rebels were able to take control of the countries' second garrison in Bouaké (Gnangadjomon 2011b, 4). Following the failed coup, the regime massively recruited and enrolled young people willing to fight (Gnangadjomon 2011b, 4), including mercenaries from Angola, South Africa and the Ukraine (Human Rights Watch 2003, 19–30). According to Badouel, a FANCI soldier told them in Logoualé that they had come to fight against the rebels, but that if the local population wanted to hide the rebels' in their mountains, they [the FANCI-soldiers] no longer consider it as their problem, as they had their own families in Abidjan to take care of (Badouel 2004).

[304] Another social memory is that two men in a *boubou* (stereotypical marker for Muslim Jula) went to the prefecture to ask permission from the loyalist to burry a family member at the cemetery. Both were shot when approaching the prefecture. This is how the family had three corpses to burry. Eventually, they buried them in their courtyard (Seydou, field notes 31/07/2009). A similar version of the story has it that a man went to the prefecture to ask for permission to burry a corps and then his wife went to look for him and found him dead (Badouel 2004).

Summary and discussion

This chapter set out to analyse the transformation of trust and distrust at the beginning of the violent conflict, starting with the failed coup on 19 September 2002. The ethnographic material presented in the first section of the chapter dealt with phase A, before the rebellion reached Man. It showed the targeting of political opponents by both sides and underlined distrust expressed by political actors. The second part of the chapter analysed how distrust was generalised and violence escalated.

If we think back how Martin remembered the beginning of the violent conflict in the previous chapter, it is noticeable that his family did not feel particularly insecure, apart from the risks of the fighting in general. The situation presents itself quite differently for the people introduced in this chapter. For them, the 'war' (insecurity and violence) started even before combat reached Man. Political activists were targeted by violent supporters of the opposing political camp. As I have tried to show, trust and distrust spread along the lines of the political conflict which turned into a more violent iteration of political tensions that preceded the failed coup d'état in September. Political disagreement and conflict had turned into political enmity and now open hostility.

Hence, this politically-motivated form of violence can be perceived as a prolongation of a political conflict with other means (Clausewitz 1994). It is a form of violence that follows the logic of friend and foe which people *were familiar with* from pre-existing political disputes that had occurred during election periods (Human Rights Watch 2003, 26). Therefore, I argue, this form of politically-motivated violence was to a certain degree predictable for social actors. The group of journalists, for instance, expected repression and therefore took precautions – a clear sign of distrust and a form of *predictable insecurity*. One of them, who would be difficult to identify, wrote the article. He did not reveal his name and thereby knew how to protect himself. Insecurity and repressive acts were predictable to an extent that allowed him to navigate his personal project around the obstacles and pass along his message. As long as violence has something predictable, people can deal with it and 'ensure their own safety'.

The ethnographic examples presented give evidence that the Ivorian civil war began as a political conflict which turned violent. Consequently, it is a war first and foremost rooted in political grievances. In line with the geopolitics of the Ivorian crisis (Bouquet 2011), trust and distrust have revealed that government-supporters left the north for the south (Bamba); and political opponents hurried back to the north where they felt protected (Maméry) (Marshall-Fratani 2006, 28). This logic of political violence that is based on political affinities and ethno-

linguistic belonging provides us with the broad grid and logic of trust and distrust as well as secure and insecure social spaces for the actors ascribed to both camps.

In the trust literature, this form of trust has been referred to as trust based on "coethnicity" (Habyarimana et al. 2009). In political science literature, the term has gained currency as in the briefing by Straus (2011) on Côte d'Ivoire quoted above. I have chosen not to use the term "coethnicity" as an abbreviation to convey the idea of a solidarity grounded in ethno-political belonging. I think that this seemingly comprehensibe term, may conjure up primordial notions of ethnicity that anthropologists have been trying to throw overboard for the last few decades (Barth 1969; Eriksen 1993; Lentz 1995). If we look for instance at gender or religious belonging, we will notice solidarity in some but not in all situations; the same can be said about ethno-regional belonging, I think. Notwithstanding this, actors sharing ethno-political background often acted as protectors and could be trusted at this ethnicised moment of the poltical conflict.

Unfortunately, the war did not end with the generalisation of political violence described in this chapter and there are further dynamics that we need to take into consideration for a more comprehensive understanding of insecurity and trust throughout the violent crisis. Before addressing further social factors that shaped experiences of trust and distrust in the following chapters, this chapter has pinpointed an underlying dynamic that runs counter to the argument of political violence.

A close analysis of the examples pointed to quite a personal element in the politics of targeting. Local informers, *indicateurs*, were at the forefront when it came to denunciations. Vulnerability seems greatest where people we have a personal or semi-personal relationship with are members of the other opposing party. How they decide is critical for our security and insecurity. Hence, these trust relationships turn precarious in conflict situations. One cannot be sure any longer whether they still warrant trust. As 38-year-old Konaté of mixed background (Jula/Dan/Wè) who was accused of being a gendarme said, when we talked about mistrust during that time: "*Quand on est en guerre, là, il n'y a pas d'amitié; on ne fait confiance à personne. Tu sais pas qui va te tuer. Tu sais pas qui est ton ennemie. Tu sais pas qui est avec toi, qui n'est pas avec toi. Toi tu sais pas!*"[305] This latent mistrust in relationships with so-called friends was omnipresent in 2008 during my research. In a taxi I read: *"J'ai peur de mes amis – même toi."* "I am afraid of my friends – even you." These statements reminds us that there is

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[305] Konaté, 30s, Jula-speaking, Jula and Dan/Wè background, football coach, youth representative, Man, 12/12/2008.

no certainty, no guarantee that someone we consider a friend, still warrants trust on a new day and in a different frame. The Guinean neighbour once protected and then took advantage of the Bamba family. Trust remains precarious no matter past experiences, familiarity, intimacy and personal trust (Govier 1997; Geschiere 2013). During violent conflict, stakes are particularly high and misplaced trust may have fatal consequences. Lastly, the uneasiness such deliberations cause can only be bracketed off by trust (Möllering 2006).

8 Figurations between rebels and civilians

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how actors with a specific profile of political belonging – first activists, then a broader range of people – were targeted, revealing patterns of distrust and insecurity grounded in "the war of who is who" (Marshall-Fratani 2006). Whereas this politically-patterned logic was crucial for the assessment of trustworthiness, it is still not enough to explain experiences of trust and distrust comprehensively for rebel-held Côte d'Ivoire. In order to assess the trustfulness[306] of a situation at hand, further aspects have to be taken into consideration, one of which I shall approach as a figuration.

The last chapter looked at ethnographic case-studies from both sides of the conflict, looking at violence committed by loyalist and rebel forces alike. With the rebels' re-take of the town Man on 18 December 2002, the loyalist forces vanish from the region and consequently move out of the ethnographic spotlight of this study. As a consequence, apart from the air raids, social life in the region of Man became exclusively shaped by the presence of the rebel forces.

Consequently, the goal in this chapter is to understand situational dynamics of the combatant-civilian nexus. The main focus is therefore on institutional forms of trust between rebels and civilians with different identity markers. In the following ethnographic examples, people do not know the combatants personally, as would be the case for personal trust. Combatants are identifiable as rebels, as members or representatives ofthe rebellion. The focus is therefore on interactions involving 'anonymous' rebels with whom civilian actors have no personal relationship at their first encounter. Built on case-studies, the approach suggested is to elaborate a set of ideal-typical figurations of combatant-civilian interactions that allowed actors to assess the trustfulness and safety of a situation at hand.

The majority of the ethnographic examples can be located in phase B, a phase of combats and subsequent rebel rule shaped by the violent occupation and pillage of the west by the rebellion. During this period, people refined their typifications[307] of who the rebels are, what they do and

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[306] See Chapter 4, figure 3.
[307] See (Schütz 1967).

do not do and what it meant to share everyday life with them. Whoever I asked about social life under rebel rule referred me back to experiences made during this early period. Therefore, we can say that this was a formative period for the insurgent-society relationship. However, my concern here is not to describe features of a period, but to characterise interactions between rebels and civilians. Therefore, some examples are also from the first phase under Loss CI, when I found them exemplary for a certain category of civilians. I argue that the patterns that can be observed in extremes during the times of fighting in the first year have continued to shape trust relationships under consolidated rebel rule.

Let me briefly repeat what I mean, when I speak of figurations of trust (which is short for trustfulness, including trust and distrust) between rebels and civilians. I generally mean (face-to-face) interactions between one or more rebels and one or more civilians. Interactions are always shaped by both sides, rebels and civilians. In Chapter 3, I provided a short description of different combatant groups composing the New Forces, from which we can broadly deduced possible motivations towards different segments of the population. Here, I will focus on different social aspects within the civilian population, proposing an ethnography of trust and distrust that takes social markers in interactions with the rebels into consideration. I will offer descriptions of experiences that are shaped by actors' social categories, including ethnicity, income-based status, gender and age.

I am interested here in working out tendencies, what the determining social markers in interactions were. For instance, which is the stronger social marker, age or ethnicity? Did Wè-ethnicity have triggering effects for a young man in a dispute with rebels? Was a Muslim identity possibly a de-escalating factor in figurations where someone was categorised as an FPI supporter?

It goes without saying that which social marker is going to dominate an interaction is subject to bargaining. To use Goffman's terminology of role theory, all actors in a figuration will try to 'play' a particular role in a situation at hand, and foreground a certain aspect of their self, whereas downplaying others in order to position themselves to their advantage (Goffman 1959). Whether they will succeed is subject to their social skills, resources, the dynamics of the moment and the other persons present (direct interaction partners and bystanders alike).

Zooming into the micro-dynamics of the civilian-military nexus, I will discuss some of these figurations by means of examples and not cover 'all possible combinations of social markers' in exhaustive detail.

'Enemies' of the rebellion

During the first months of the rebels' occupation, any actor with real or alleged relations to the regime in power was targeted. The following social markers made actors particularly vulnerable: first and foremost, members of the FPI, as the example of the Bamba family has shown; also the *corps habillés* (FANCI, gendarmes, policemen and rangers) who did not side with the rebellion; government officials particularly in combination of a southern identity marker; people from the President's ethnic group or any ethnic group close to the Bete (Human Rights Watch 2003, 25). Anyone identified with one – or worse two – of these social markers was categorised as an enemy of the rebellion. In a figuration with Ivorian rebels, a person with such identity markers risked to get killed. As Chelpi-den Hamer observes: "In December 2002, being a gendarme and a FPI-sympathizer was a double offence, and there was usually no mercy. These markers were much more pronounced in the beginning than in the later stages of conflict." (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 155)

Old Bamba the FPI-activist mentioned in the previous chapter was Muslim, a religious marker stereotypically ranged on the pro-rebel side of the conflict. As I described, this was a social marker that allowed de-escalating the situation when youngsters wanted to loot his house at the beginning of the rebellion. Religious identity, his Muslim social marker, was made significant in the figuration by the Guinean neighbour and saved the house. Hence, such individual social markers were able to decisively shape the outcome of figurations. A Muslim identity of an FPI-supporter was a marker that could be made to ease a figuration between a civilian and rebels – not always, however.

In Man, there were rumours circulating accusing the Catholic Church of keeping weapons for the loyalists (Badouel 2004, 77), an allegation emphasized if the church hierarchy were from certain southern ethno-linguistic groups or were known to share ethno-political belonging with the President.

Noteworthy is what barkeeper with an Akan background said. At the onset of the rebellion, many of his co-ethnics left, but it was "easy" for them to leave in comparison to him. Most of them were civil servants, wage earners, who would also receive their salaries in Abidjan. As a *débrouilleur* with a *maquis* (bar and restaurant),[308] he would find himself without income if he fled. He decided to stay and to trust on the social network of customers he had built in the region

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[308] Ivorian French terms.

– locals would not flee either. When I asked him whether he had not been afraid to stay, his response was:

KATHRIN: *Mais qu'est-ce qui vous a donné la confiance que les rebelles qui vont arriver vont pas vous tuer?*

AKA: *Ah ça c'est important. Bon, ces gens-là, ce sont des hommes. C'est le pouvoir eux ils cherchent. Mais une fois ils arrivent, qu'ils tuent la population, ils vont commander qui? Ils peuvent pas commander quelqu'un. Voilà.*

KATHRIN: *Une guerre est quand même dangereuse ... balles perdues ...*

AKA: *En tout cas, je n'ai pas pensé à ça du tout du tout.*

The image of insecurity that was kept up in Abidjan throughout the crisis even during calmer periods about the rebel-held parts of the country is probably also linked to this dynamic. To explain why one received a salary without working had to be legitimised by maintaining a fear of the west.[309]

Everyone concerned: The pillage of the region of Man

In humanitarian circles, the MPCI has been hailed as exceptional due to the fact that they discouraged civilian abuses and undertook efforts to put a stop to looting (with executions) at the beginning of their occupation (International Crisis Group 2003, 15). It was possible to find one's house untouched in Bouaké after return (du Parge 2003). However, as the war dragged on, the situation deteriorated, the availability of financial means at the disposal of the combatants seemed depleted (Human Rights Watch 2003, 24–25).

During their first days in Man, the rebels set an example to the population as a warning for thieves, as it has been done in other towns they had taken before (Gnohité 2004, 242). The rebels told the population that those who will steal in their name will be killed. This is how one morning the rebels called on people to come and they set an example by executing publicly two young men in front of the population or the crowd of people. A crowd of people gathered at the

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[309] A segment of the population from which I lack data are civil servants from the south, *corps habillés* (FANCI, gendarmes, policemen and rangers) and other people in high offices who left the region at the outbreak of violence. Many of those actors who left the region were either assigned elsewhere or did not come back to Man during the time of my research. Other sources, however, point to the fact that their relationship with the rebels was shaped by great mistrust due to the fact that some of these identity markers were declared to be the MPCI's enemies.

station to Facobly, at Place de la Paix, a crossroads near the cathedral where the execution took place. Several informants have told me about this incident at the beginning of the rebel domination in Man, however, such public executions seem not to have been repeated.

This act to create order and rule with an iron fist was evaluated as hypocritical, at least in the light of what happened in the weeks following this show trial or rather public execution. Gba, a retired teacher in Man judged this act with the following words: *"Nous avons vu que c'était une manière d'effrayer la population, d'effrayer les jeunes qui pouvaient prendre dans les maisons, tout ce que eux ils avaient besoin. Alors, c'est ça, ils ont fait ça et tout le monde avaient eu peur, personne n'osaient prendre quelque chose sauf eux."*[310]

The rebels needed food and shelter. In Man they took residence in the prefecture. Officially, government offices were a legitimate target for looting. A rebel commander in Logoualé said: *"Nous n'apprécions pas les pillages de civils. Le seul pillage accepté est celui de l'Etat."* (Badouel 2004, 67). But a broad interpretation would certainly include private residences of corps habillés, too. As Moussa Fofana describes for the north: *"Évidemment, la hiérarchie militaire des FN n'a pas officiellement encouragé les actes de pillage des combattants, mais les cibles 'licites' du pillage étaient plus ou moins connues."* (Fofana 2011b, 66) During *"la phase du pillage"*[311] houses of those who had fled, like the family compound of the old Bamba were targeted. As described before, saying that those who left were enemies was a legitimising strategy. Wealthy foreigners, as the Senegalese man in the account of the chief of Kandopleu in the next chapter, were another particularly vulnerable group, as they had no one to speak up for them (Human Rights Watch 2003, 35).

Many experiences of looting were linked to the Liberian combatants. A planter at retirement age who had a herd of goats told me how a Liberian combatant counted in English all goats in front of him by pointing at each of them. Then, he turned towards him and gesticulated something and said: fire! It was quite clear to the old man that no goat should be missing, at the fighters return. The man was robbed off his goats until all were gone.[312]

Martin whom we have met in Chapter 6 said about this time in Man:

Si tu n'as pas la chance, tu peux croiser un Libérien, il sait pas parler français comme toi, donc lorsqu'il va s'exprimer d'une manière, tu vas lui répondre d'une manière, il peut te frapper,

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[310] Gba, 60s, retired teacher, Dan-speaking, Man, 26/02/2009.
[311] Amadou, 30s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, Logoualé, 19/03/2009.
[312] Elderly man, 70s, Wè-speaking, planter, Man, 21/10/2008.

jusqu'à il va te tuer même. Il y avait même un autre ami ici, ils l'ont tué, ils l'ont tué froidement, il a failli discuter avec un Libérien, directement il a donné une balle, son cadavre était là même; il est mort comme ça.[313]

In Podiagouiné, people pleaded with the rebels not to destroy their houses, when they had finished looting the inside.[314] In Man, however, even bricks were removed and much of the loot taken to Liberia.

Most people have such stories about the Liberian fighters. Most of the time, they include scenes with communication difficulties,[315] a lack of interest to understand on the side of the armed actor and exceeding levels of violence involved.

Whereas nearly every social class fell victim to looting, social groups who could easily be identified as wealthy, such as white minorities, had a particular position in figurations. The following two case studies from the Lebanese community may illustrate this, the figurations include rebels of the MPCI and Liberians.

Social class: Experiences of the Lebanese community

Trustful experiences with Ivorian rebel leaders

In the following part, I will focus on two accounts by two Lebanese men who experienced the beginning of the war in Man before they left and who came back when the situation had calmed down. The Lebanese (and others from the Middle East) are the most important foreign community apart from the French expatriate community. During my research, there were hardly any European (permanent) residents in Man, apart from the long-term residents of the Focolari-Movement (European and foreign African nationals). Most other Europeans I met in 2008 were involved in post-conflict peace-building missions. I have interviewed both missionaries and Lebanese who experienced the outbreak of the war and the following years of rebel rule. Many

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[313] Martin, 20s, Dan-speaking, student, 03/10/2008.

[314] Chief of Podiagouiné, Dan-speaking, 14/01/2009.

[315] Communication difficulties were also highlighted by Tia, a youth representative resident in a neighbourhood in Man that served as a base for one Liberian group. My interlocutor was called several times by the population to mediate in such cases, sometimes it was too late (Tia, 30s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, A-levels, planter, Lycée, 27/02/2009).

overseas resident minorities experienced 'visits' from rebels who allegedly searched for weapons and whose cars were taken.[316]

A middle-aged Lebanese man, Kamal, had come to Man in the mid-1990s. Those of the Lebanese community, who had spent a large part of their lives in Man and went home for good when the war began, had a very hard time and some of them fell ill, Kamal said.[317]

In 2002, Kamal and other members of his extended family lived in the *quartier Air France*, a middle-class neighbourhood with civil servants, traders and other well-situated families. Those who first arrived at their house "did not speak French". They searched the house and took things with them. Later, "des rebelles ivoiriens", Ivorian rebels arrived and asked them if somebody had come and whether they needed anything. Kamal said: *"Eux ils étaient très gentils et ils ne nous ont rien demandé si c'était pas de l'eau à boire."* He insisted on the kindness of armed Ivorians, "des rebelles ivoiriens".

To give me an example of their kindness, he told me the following. One of the early rebel chiefs in Man, let's call him Ouattara, asked the Lebanese if anyone had come or whether they needed anything. Kamal explained to the Ivorians that a group of armed men who did not speak French had left with Kamal's all-wheel drive vehicle. The rebel chief asked Kamal to come to town with them and to show them his car, so that they could get it back.

Kamal did not want to go around town in this volatile situation. Hence, the family sent their watchman with Ouattara who eventually they came back with Kamal's car! This positive experience – beyond expectation – seems to have raised the level of trust in this particular chief and his men, but also in the group that he represented, the Ivorian rebels who already controlled Bouaké.

In order to prevent other armed groups from doing any harm, the same rebel chief gave them some soldiers to guard their house. I did not ask, but probably the Lebanese also showed their gratitude towards the Ivorian rebels with the same generosity that I have experienced in encounters with them.

Notwithstanding the possible return favour for this service, it is noteworthy that the offer to help came from the insurgents' side. The insurgents came to inquire about their state of affairs.

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[316] Due to the fact that the regime in power and the majority of its followers were perceived as Christians, there was a possibility that regime supporters would use these edifices to hide weapons. Not that the overseas minorities themselves were perceived to be implicated directly.

[317] For more information on the Lebanese community in Côte d'Ivoire, which is by no means homogeneous, see (Bierwirth 1999).

Hence, the insurgents who according to Kamal were identifiable as Ivorian servicemen showed concern about their security. Rather than being singled out for harm, it seems that they were singled out for special treatment due to the fact that they were wealthy, possibly a voice that would be heard at the diplomatic level in Abidjan. One of my observations is that how one was treated depended decisively on who one was, particularly in situations of institutional trust. Before discussing what kind of trust was at stake in the exchange just described, I first want to continue Kamal's account.

The European and Lebanese communities in Man were informed by their embassies to go to the centre of the Focolare-Movement, if they wanted to be evacuated by the French army.[318] Kamal went there, first. After having talked to other overseas minority residents, a dozen of other "whites" decided to stay. The overseas missionaries from the Focolare-Movement had already decided to stay and serve the needy throughout the crisis. The rebel chief Ouattara assured Kamal that Man was going to be secured like Bouaké and encouraged them to stay. Eventually, over a dozen of them stayed, Kamal remembered.

Perhaps with some astonishment in my voice, I asked Kamal in the interview whether they trusted the rebel chief:

KATHRIN: *Et vous lui avez fait confiance?*

Kamal: Bien sûr, parce que c'est un vrai militaire, c'est des FANCI. C'est des FANCI, c'est des vrais militaires.

Kamal answered: "Of course, because this is a real military man, these are FANCI [the national armed forces of Côte d'Ivoire]. These are FANCI, these are real military men." What accounts for Kamal's decision to stay in the first place? Even though we only have his account in retrospect, several factors seem to have reassured him and others in the same boat.[319] However, the situation in Bouaké, a town that had already been under rebel control for two months, seems to have served as a reference point. Rebel rule in that town was evaluated positively, at least in relation to the security situation. The group that controlled Bouaké had a reputation to be trustworthy enough to provide security for those uninvolved in the violent political conflict. Furthermore, this impression corresponded to his own experience upon the first encounter with

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[318] The centre of the Focolare-Movement, originally a Roman Catholic international organisation, has a small congregation, church, education facilities, a health centre and a printing shop based in a southern neighbourhood of Man.

[319] Obviously the security situation after the combats with the government was comparably calm in town, otherwise it had been too dangerous to cross the town and meet at the Focolare centre.

representatives of that group, "des rebelles ivoiriens", as he referred to them repeatedly, before introducing the leader of the group, Ouattara. The situation in Bouaké, therefore, had a positive impact on his decision to stay. Hence, his trust was founded on their belonging to the group that controlled Bouaké, which corresponds to institutional trust. First his account distinguished between non-Ivorian and Ivorian combatants; only with my question did the conversation shift to militarized civilian combatants versus professional military man. In the case of the first pair of opposites, Ivorian serviceman versus foreign mercenary, the basis for trust can be linked to motivations; the second, unprofessional versus profession can additionally be linked to competence and professional ethics. Only when I asked explicitly, he explained his trust in the Ivorian rebels as one that was founded on their professional role as members of the Ivorian army, the FANCI.

With the continuation of the crisis, Kamal continued to make positive experiences with other Ivorian rebels and commanders, also with militarised civilians. As a later employee of an international NGO, he was also exempt from taxes and harassments at check-points. However, their house was looted after they left. Contrary to someone with a clearly negative attitude, he attributed the pillage to "the war", rather the "rebels": "Tu sais dans une guerre, forcément tu vas perdre, tout le monde va perdre, personne ne gagne."

To sum up, Kamal's initial encounter with Ouattara's group was based on mixed sources of trust, all of which were linked to positively-perceived group membership, nationality, MPCI and professional membership in the army, a state institution. However, such – in this case positive – ascriptions do not suffice; they have to be translated into social practice and experience. I would argue that the way they were approached by the group played a decisive role. From Kamal's account we learn that Ouattara and Kamal were soon linked by a particular relationship and no longer by a mere institutional one. Ouattara became his preferred interlocutor of the Ivorian rebel group, hence institutional trust was overlapped and strengthened by personal trust.

Kamal soon trusted commander Ouattara personally, due to the history of the car theft that mainly showed Kamal two things: first, Ouattara had provided evidence of his well-meant intentions or motivations towards the Lebanese. Ouattara's act of bringing back the car was extraordinary in the very sense of the word, in that this act not simply managed to build trust, but to *restore* trust, which is more difficult. Starting from a situation of mistrust due to the negative experience of the car theft, Ouattara managed to repair the damage of trust that their Liberian supplementary fighters had caused by coming back with the car. Hence, from a

perspective of reciprocal relationships, the imbalance caused by the theft, was "undone".[320] Moreover, Ouattara's act proved to the Lebanese two things that are crucial for trust: first, a benign motivation that in this particular case was linked to special personal effort of Ouattara for he certainly risked trouble by taking the car from the Liberians. Second, the fact that Ouattara managed to take the car from the Liberians also gave evidence of his competence and capability to win out over the Liberian combatant group and to assert his authority and control. This was certainly crucial, for it did not suffice to display benign motivations in order to provide effective security, the competence to actually provide it was crucial. Hence, this proof of motivation and competence, I think, must have been crucial for the Lebanese's trust and decision to stay in Man.

However, the battle of Man continued with the ousting of the rebels and their recapture of the town.[321] When the rebels had taken Man for the second time, Kamal was again in contact with Ouattara. After some time, Ouattara informed the Lebanese that he was no longer able to guarantee their security, because the rebellion would progress towards the south. Furthermore, the security situation had decreased in general due to the war. In the second half of December 2002, the bank BCEAO in Man was emptied (partially) and the south flew helicopter gunship attacks on Mahapleu, 50km from Man (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 237–51).[322] The insurgents offered to escort a dozen French, Lebanese and Italian nationals who had stayed after the first capture to Séguéla and Bouaké, where they spent a night in each town, before they reached Abidjan.

Pillage and distrust in figurations with Liberian combatants

Let me turn to a different experience by another Lebanese family. Again, it is an experience with Liberian fighters targeting their wealth. Contrary to Kamal, Reza was evacuated together with his family by the French. One evening he asked me over dinner: "Do you know that I could have been killed?"

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[320] "Part of [the MPCI's] generally favourable image in the first weeks came from the fact that they paid for purchases, reimbursed traders and shop-keepers for damage, and avoided looting. […] many of those returning to Bouaké in November 2002 were amazed to find their houses and belongings intact." (International Crisis Group 2003, 15).

[321] In his account, Kamal did not mention the eighteen days under the loyalists in-between, which might be due to the fact that from his point of there was nothing noteworthy.

[322] Further attacks targeted Danané, Vavoua, Bin-Houin and Zouan-Hounien. (Human Rights Watch 2003, 22) until April 2003.

Due to their hasty evacuation by the French they had left their trucks behind. As soon as the government troops were in control of the town, they tried to go back to Man to release their trucks and other valuable belongings. They were four and went by car. Shortly before Man, they saw smoke from afar and then a burning car at the roadside. Reza said that he felt like turning back for a moment, but as soon as he realised the danger of the situation, there was already gunfire around them. Nobody was hurt, but they found themselves encircled by half a dozen Liberian fighters. They had to leave the car and were taken to the bush, where they were stripped of their clothes to their shorts and tied to trees. The group of fighters took all the money they had on them, several million francs CFA.

In English they were discussing whether to kill them or not. One of the fighters wanted to let go of them and eventually they were released. They had to go back by foot, four whites in their shorts. Reza said they looked like mad people and nobody wanted to have anything to do with them. At a petrol station, they got some credit to call their families in Abidjan to come and pick them up.

The two Lebanese families were not perceived as part of the political conflict. Therefore, they do not seem to have been singled out as a target by the politically-motivated violence of either the rebels or the loyalists. Their experience was shaped by the fact that they belonged to a social class that was perceived as particularly wealthy. Easy to identify as whites, they could fall prey easily to those who were out for booty. From this optic, the Lebanese had to distrust those rebel groups who saw fighting as a means of income, particularly the mercenaries.

If we look at the way the Anglophone mercenaries dealt with the Lebanese, we get the impression that appropriation of goods was part of their mission, but killing was debatable, as the account of the younger informant showed. In the first case, they did not seem to have harmed the family at the *quartier Air France*; in the second account, it seems that the sequence of events could also have turned out deadly. So although the reputation of the Anglophones was and is bad due to cruel acts, they were not inscribed in a mission of "no living thing", to use the terrible phrase that the RUF (Sam Bockary) used for one of its operations that targeted civilians.

Young women in sexualised figurations

Gendered and sexualised aspects are important dimensions of interactions between armed groups and civilian populations. Macla, for instance, said during the time of the Liberians (MPIGO) in Logoualé women were abused in front of their husband without him standing any

chance of doing something about it. I think these aspects merit in-depth analysis and special attention and an expertise that are beyond the scope of this study.[323]

Women and young women have many different subjectivities and positions in wars (Coulter 2009, 9) and the sub-title does not want to suggest that interactions between rebels and young women were unavoidably about sexual abuse. Nevertheless, young women seem to have been more exposed than other women or men from sexual exploitation in figurations with particular rebels and during the period at the beginning. In several accounts, for instance in Marie's it became clear that locals soon knew about the difficulties and took their precautions. In this section, I will look at mainly two figurations with young women. Both took place at the beginning of the war. Both are "stories of near-misses" (Adichie 2012), or 'escapes at the last nick of time' that allow us to appreciate both the severity and constraint of a situation, but also successful escape routes. One situation is with Liberian combatants, the other with an Ivorian rebel chief.

Jeanne's flight from Danané

'J'ai échappé viole,' Jeanne said with a firm voice.[324] It was Easter Sunday and we were walking up a nearby hill together. Before the war, she emphasised, she lived well, not like today. She ran a small business in the region of Danané. Her goods worth 400,000 CFA had just arrived from Ghana when the war began on a Thursday. That day, she had 55,000 at hand. She knotted 25,000 into the tail of her *pagne* and put 30,000 into a plastic bag that she hid in the nappy of her first child, a four-month-old baby girl. With her brother and a brother-in-law they set off on foot for Man.

Liberian rebels stopped them at the road side and demanded money or they would take her in front of her family. She pleaded with them, said she had just given birth and that she didn't have the strength. Then she gave them all she had in her pagne, the 25,000 CFA, ca. 40 Euros, and the rebels let them go.

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[323] The reader may consult Chris Coulter's sensitive and comprehensive monograph on women's lives in the Sierra Leonean civil war (Coulter 2009). Cutting-edge research distinguishes between strategic and opportunistic sexual violence, asks whom the armed actors target and establish the frequency of violent acts (Wood 2012). A major finding of these studies is that rape is not inevitable companion of wars and that we are able to account for variation (Wood 2012, 393). Time and again, it has been pointed out how imprecise rape estimates are due to the shame, social stigma attached it (Peterman et al. 2011).
[324] Jeanne, 20s, Dan-speaking, farmer, illiterate, local religion, 12/04/2009.

They avoided the main roads, walked on trails in the bush. Other people, too, took the same paths as them. Due to this long trek, the baby got bruises and the soft skin was wounded with blisters. They stopped in dwellings (*campements*) for a short rest and to eat. For 700 CFA they bought rice and prepared rice pudding (*baka*), before they continued. She remembered stepping over dead bodies at the crossroads at the entrance of Man.

'J'ai pas la force', was what she had said to her threatening tormentors. She does not seem to have questioned or opposed their 'request', but asked to be spared without actually doing so. She handled the situation on her own, without her male relatives. Pretended to have handed over "all her money" and approximately the money they expected, she was able to go.

Thomas and Nicole – a young couple on New Year's Eve 2002

It happened on 31 December 2002. Together with his wife[325], Thomas was on his way to the village to celebrate New Year's Eve. He was in his early twenties; they have a child together and intended to celebrate their wedding in due course.

Thomas and Nicole were in a public minibus and behind them, the rebel chief Touré was travelling with his entourage in a vehicle full of drinks for the party. At the second checkpoint, he discovered Nicole and asked her to get out of the minibus. Thomas said no. Touré insisted and threatened that if she did not get out he was going to do what he wanted to do.

Some passengers, who had heard of Touré before, chimed in and said she should get out, so that he can talk to her a bit while the check was taking place and get back on the bus afterwards. Touré asked Nicole to get into his car and asked Thomas to step off the bus as well. Thomas refused. Touré shot into the air '*papapa*' and Thomas stepped off of the bus.

One of Touré's soldiers now decided to intervene and asked what was happening. Thomas explained that Nicole was not just his girlfriend, but his wife and that he could not accept someone taking his wife away from him and leaving with her. Touré's soldier said that he understood and would explain matters to Touré. He advised Thomas that for the time being, the best thing to do was 'let' his wife stay with them, that Touré would not do anything and that

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[325] The word Thomas used in French was "ma femme", "my wife". It is a term frequently used for relationships we would refer to as girlfriends, *copine* (in French). Sometimes it just indicates that the man considers this a serious relationship, even if the woman has not been presented to the man's parents and no marriage steps for the marriage have been undertaken, yet. In this case, both families were informed and had agreed to the marriage.

she would be getting out again at one of the checkpoints up ahead.[326] Thomas acquiesced and got back on the bus without Nicole. The journey continued.

At the next checkpoint, Touré had to settle an issue between his soldiers and a driver. Thomas told me the driver had to lie on the ground and that Touré shot him twice into his hands and made him carry wood afterwards.

While all this was going on, Nicole was still in the rebel's car. *"Elle va faire quoi, elle va dire quoi, moi je vais dire quoi. J'ai quel pouvoir?"* Again, the journey continued.

When, at the following checkpoint, Touré got out of the car to check on his soldiers, Nicole managed to sneak out of the car completely unnoticed. Not even Thomas saw her leaving the car. When Touré came back and discovered that she had slipped out of his car, he assumed she had gone back to the minibus and demanded that all the passengers get off. He searched the entire bus, but could not find her. Therefore, he concluded she must be hiding in the bush.

He turned to Thomas and told him to call his wife and tell her to come out or otherwise, he would order his soldiers to shoot randomly into the bush ("spray the bush with bullets"). In a panic Thomas shouted: "Nicole, come out, otherwise they will shoot you! Come out!" She did not come. It was not clear whether she had managed to flee through the bush. Suddenly, Thomas did not see why, Touré got into his car and left.

The passengers got back on the bus and left. Thomas remained at the checkpoint with the couple's luggage. For what seemed to him a very long time, he waited, until finally Nicole came out of the bush trembling, clinging to him and crying.

She changed into different clothes, so that she could not be easily recognised at the next checkpoints, for they feared Touré had given orders to look out for her. With one of the next minibuses, they continued their journey. The rebels only checked their ID-cards, but did not ask about a girl. They finally reached their destination.

That evening, they could not celebrate New Year's Eve. They stayed inside the house. People from the village told them that picking up young women "was Touré's job". This is a local expression to say that someone is doing something – most often something negative – consistently, as if it was his job.

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[326] At the beginning of 2003, 34 checkpoints have been counted between Man and Biankouma (on 40 km (Troh 2003, 7).

Thomas stated that it was the only time he had had a problem with any of the rebels. Nicole's mother had heard of Touré and knew of a married man who had been killed in a comparable situation. Thomas was well aware that he could have been killed that day:

Peut-être, s'ils allaient me tuer ce jour-là, ils allaient dire qu'ils ont tué *Thomas, à cause de sa femme ! [@@ chuckling] Souvent c'est un truc comme ça. C'est une manière de se foutre de l'homme, quoi. Quelqu'un va venir prendre ta propre femme, parce que tu as arme. – NON, ça c'est trop foutaise! On peut pas accepter ça. Je lui ai dit ça [to the rebel chief]: 'Moi, je préfère mourir pour ma raison.' 'Ils l'ont tué.' - On sait pourquoi - 'Ils l'ont tué'. C'est comme ça. [sic.]

Thomas did not come face-to-face with Touré again, although he saw his *cortège* passing. At the time of the interview in 2009, it had already been a couple of years since Touré's departure from Man. "He was not loved among his people", Thomas said and I learnt later that Touré had eventually gone too far when he killed a popular rebel soldier.

Firstly, one may notice that Thomas was trustful at the outset. Indeed, he was astonished to see someone talking to other people like Touré. His reaction was somehow perplexed, as if in disbelief that someone could have the audacity and impudence to take his wife from him. His agency seemed to have been informed by habitual social norms. He was steadfast and trusted in the validity of certain norms and basic rules of interaction. But Thomas and Nicole had to learn that these were different times, times in which men carry guns and try to use violence to have their way.

He obviously hadn't heard about Touré and judged it safe for himself and his wife to travel that late afternoon. Caught in what turned out to be distrustful possibly fatal figuration, passengers who already knew Touré, gave advice how to handle the situation. Furthermore, one of the rebels, too, chimed in and tried to intervene and de-escalate the situation.[327] I have come across situations time and again in which bystanders take over, come in as a third actor and calm situations when two are in conflict. It is something one can rely on; people can trust other people, strangers, and bystanders etc. to become active and help. Even on the side of the 'bad guys', this schema was valid. This is why I think it is wrong to call such societies as low-trust societies (Fukuyama 1995).

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[327] Some little ones were trapped with a bad superior. Sometimes they managed to intervene like the one did in the case of Thomas; others tried to leave such superiors at the first possible moment. Of course, it was risky for them to oppose their commanders, but many had their own way of dealing with them.

Noteworthy is that Thomas' verbal strategy was to present himself as a husband. As a husband, he argued, he could not accept that another man take what is rightly his. It seems to have had weight as a valuable argument; at least the rebel mediator showed understanding. In a conversation in Podiagouiné, too, I was told that sometimes, married women were spared.[328]

Touré could have ordered his men to shoot randomly into the bush, but he did not. In the interview, Thomas did not say much about how he came to drop the issue, he merely said: *"Quand [Touré] a vu que c'était devenu manière, il a dit bon, faut laisser, allons-y."*[329] Obviously, this is Thomas' phrasing and not Touré's original statement, but it is the closest we can get. When he left without Nicole, he suffered a defeat in front of his soldiers and the bystanders. His power was not omnipotent and it was shameful to be outwitted. To save face, Touré acted as if he had lost interest.

From the account one gets the impression that it was a conflict between men, in which a woman was pushed around, some might think 'like an object'. Nevertheless, it was the woman who saved herself. While she had been quiet (but not inactive!) and the 'conflict' was being argued out between the men, Touré's attention was taken off from her. Without anyone noticing, she was able to slip out of the car and hide.

At the beginning of the conflict, Man went through a time, when some rebels were notorious for picking girls from the street to keep them for a week or longer. In this extreme form, however, it was no longer practiced at the time I conducted research in 2008; and the military leadership would intervene, if they got wind of it or were approached by the victim's family or friends. Hence, women were not systematically abducted throughout their rule for or for sex and other 'female chores' in the way Coulter described it for Sierra Leone (Coulter 2009).

Wè-speaking groups: Mutual suspicion

When after the failed coup, Wè cadres in Abidjan and in the west increasingly took sides with the regime in power, mutual distrust was to be expected. At the group-level, the relationship between the Wè and the rebellion was shaped by opposition. I have been told on several occasions that the Wobe villages towards Facobly have served the rebels poisoned or bad water

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[328] Charlaine, women representative, 40s, Dan-speaking, Podiagouiné, 14/01/2009.

[329] The expression *"devenu manière"* is a circumscription meaning here that the situation had become unclear.

and the Guere further south have mounted armed resistance.[330] Generally-speaking people in Man, whether civilian or military men, would agree that there was more mistrust between the Wè and the rebels than between the Manding or Dan due to the politics of belonging described in the introductory chapter to the region.[331]

My informant, Isabelle, with a Guere background, knew about two cases in which someone was killed, due to the fact that they were Guere in her eyes. According to her, at the beginning, it was more difficult as Guere with the New Forces:

ISABELLE: *Eux, ils veulent même pas voir les Guéré du tout ici; c'est maintenant que, ça s'est calmé. Sinon avant tu dis tu es Guéré - pour nous les femmes c'est un peu mieux – mais les garçons, tu dis tu es Guéré, ..*

Woman in the background: on te tue!

ISABELLE: *..tu as problème, on te tue.[332]*

However, the Wè as a group were not systematically perpetrated by the rebels on an ethnic basis. It was their frequent closeness to the party in power (FPI) that caused problems. Quite a few Wè served on the rebels' side but individuals had to make extra efforts to prove their support. The following scene between two rebels (not a civilian with a rebel) observed by Isabelle, Guere woman cooking in the rebels' camp exemplifies this.

The examples below will show that there were both Wobe and Guere combatants fighting for the rebellion. The incidence below probably happened in 2003. After the fighting stopped, Isabelle could no longer go back to her pre-war activity, as her shop had been looted. She had children to provide for and was looking for a new income. She knew a young man, a Wobe, who was with the rebels. As they needed someone to prepare food for them, she went there to cook."

There was a young rebel of Guere origin with them. One day, for what Isabelle designated a *"problème de cigarettes"*, he had a quarrel with his rebel friends. They said they would kill him, hence he was hiding for a while for things to calm down. They caught his "younger

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[330] See introductory chapter to the region of Man.

[331] In the following part, I shall use emic Ivorian French terms of ethnic sub-groups of the Wè (Guere and Wobe). The reason is that I refer to ethnicised group identities in the conflict closer to the emic speech of the interviewee. Even if the distinction is said to be a "colonial misconception", modern processes of ethnicity have led to the perception of Guere and Wobe as two different 'groups'.

[332] Isabelle, 40s, Wè-speaking (Guere), market woman, 05/11/2008.

brother", the rebel with Wobe origins, and threatened to kill him instead if the Guere did not come out soon. When the Guere heard about the threat, he decided to go to see them.[333] As soon as he reached the camp, he was shot.

Isabelle remembered: *"ça s'est passé devant moi."* The rebels in the camp said that as a Guere, he could betray them, "il peut les trahir". That was the general explanation provided after the fact. So what role did ethnic identity play in this figuration? The simple fact that as a Guere the young man was part of the rebels shows that the man's ethnic identity had not caused a problem so far. Therefore, the 'ethnic' explanation does not seem to be satisfactory on its own for the understanding of the figuration.

When Isabelle described what happened, she first mentioned the personal dispute about "cigarettes". Hence, the combination of these two elements seems critical. Triggered by a personal quarrel, ethnic identity surfaced as a cheap legitimation to kill. At the same time, Isabelle as a Guere *woman* and bystander was not involved. Neither did the Wobe friend's ethnic identity raise suspicion. Nevertheless, the fact that he was Guere made him particularly vulnerable in that moment.

This Achilles' heel led to the fact that youths with a Wè ethnicity were much more reluctant to join or to seek a close relationship with the rebels than their Dan male peers. According to Aka: *"Les jeunes Wobé se méfient beaucoup."*[334] However, this ethnic aspect was more often made significant in interactions with young men and not women. As Isabelle put it: *"C'était dangereux pour nous [les femmes Guéré], mais, [...] comme femme, quand il y a un problème devant toi, [...] s'ils te posent question, si tu réponds de ta manière, on te laisse."* By responding *"de ta manière"* she refers to a deferential or even submissive way of addressing men of higher status, which corresponds to respectful social and gender norms.

In what was described to me as a local dispute between a group of rebels and a particular Wobe neighbourhood a dozen of civilians were killed in early January 2003. A woman from the village remained standing at the door of her house where her husband was hiding behind the sofa. She did not move hoping to protect him and watched how her uncle was slaughtered in

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[333] Isabelle said that the Guere said to himself: *"Faut pas qu'ils vont tuer enfants des gens à cause de moi."*

[334] Aka is the above mentioned barkeeper, an Akan speaker married to a Wobe wife and resident in Facobly throughout the crisis.

front of her eyes.[335] The rebels saw her, but again, as a woman, she was not targeted in the conflict at hand.

The fact that the Wè were generally perceived as a pro-Gbagbo group introduced an element of distrust among them and the rebellion. In figurations with women and elderlies/old Wè people, however, gender and age markers seemed to have pushed ethnic identity into the background. In the following example, a Wobe pensioner summarises his experiences with the rebels and describes several interactions with them.

Age relations

Old age: Intergenerational and ethnic aspects

My assistant Richard talked to an old Wobe man born in 1937 resident in Man in June 2011.[336] The man from a nearby Wobe village was and had worked as a civil servant as at different schools as a warden. My assistant asked him at the end of the interview whether he had stayed in the region during the war and he confirmed. As Isabelle, he said that "everything had happened before him" and he remembered that the first word that was used for the rebels was "assailants". Despite the fact that his French is not always easy to follow, I shall quote extensively from the passage in which he talks about his experience with the rebels. It illustrates in vernacular speech how the old man made sense of the condition of war and the position he had as an old man in figurations with rebels.

SABLY: *Moi je suis un vieux retraité, moi je connais ce qu'on appelle 'rébellion'. [...] Quand [le rebelle] vient avec 4x4, les voitures, devant ma porte, il gare. Il dit: 'Vieux, c'est chez toi?' On dit: 'Bon, faut rester tranquille, parce que quand tu sors, on sait pas qui est qui.*

RICHARD: *Ce sont les assaillants qui disaient ça?*

SABLY: *Oui oui, [...] faut rester devant ta porte. Et effectivement, je reste devant ma porte. Et depuis ce jour jusqu'à aujourd'hui où je suis en train de parler-là, je sors plus la nuit. Quand il fait 17 heures, je suis devant ma porte, [...]. Depuis rébellion a commencé jusqu'à aujourd'hui, je sors plus la nuit.*

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[335] Group of middle-aged women, Wobe speakers, Facobly, 22/01/2009.
[336] Sably, 70s, Wè-speaking, warden in retirement, Man, 15/06/2011.

RICHARD: Vous ou vos parents vous avez eu des problèmes avec quelqu'un? À qui vous faites confiance pour expliquer ces problèmes?

SABLY: Non, bien sûr, pendant la crise, je n'ai pas eu problème avec quelqu'un. Parce que je n'ai pas touché quelqu'un, quelqu'un m'a pas touché. Faut dire vérité. On passe ici, par Kouibly, pour aller prendre nos salaires au trésor de Daloa. Mais aucun des rebelles m'a jamais touché, ils m'ont jamais fait du mal. ça il faut dire vérité. Ils m'ont jamais fait du mal.

Au contraire, quand il me voit: 'Tu es dans quelle voiture ?', il me prend, on me met devant le chef, on me donne place, fauteuil, bonne place. Quand ils ont fini faire contrôle, on dit: 'Montez !', et puis on monte.

Au contraire, j'ai lutté [pour] d'autres personnes. Des fois on dit: 'Celui-là, c'est un gendarme, on va le tuer', 'c'est un policier, on va le tuer.' […] Je dis: 'Chef, pardon, celui-là, il est comme ça, il est comme ça.' J'interviens ! Au nom de Dieu, au nom de la terre, au nom de Dieu, c'est par là, j'interviens beaucoup ! Des fois on dit: 'Vieux, si tu vas pas aller t'asseoir tranquille, tu vas trouver tache pour toi.' Et les gens m'ont dit: 'Bon papa, va t'asseoir !'... Bon, ils ont des fusils, toi tu n'as rien. On dit: 'Va t'asseoir', je reviens, je m'assoie.

Donc, dans rébellion jusqu'à aujourd'hui là, aucun m'a pas fait du mal. Et je n'ai pas insulté quelqu'un.

Au contraire, quand ils me voient, dans la journée au cabaret quelque part, au nom de Dieu, ils me respectent. Des fois même d'autres me paient à boire, d'autres même paient sauce claire pour manger. Je ne peux pas gâter leur nom. Ils n'ont pas touché mes familles, ça il faut dire vérité devant Dieu.[337]

Sably was not the only one who talked like that, there were others too who said that they greeted them respectfully in the neighbourhood.[338] In the relationship between the rebels and the old generation, there was no "conflict of generations", as is so often described for the Mano River wars along the Upper Guinea Coast (Richards 2005b, 588; Ellis 1999, 286), but also for the Young Patriot and militia movements in southern Côte d'Ivoire (Arnaut 2005; Banégas 2006; Galy 2005; Konaté 2003; Marshall-Fratani 2004; McGovern 2011; Peters and Richards 1998; Peters 2011b, 2011a; Rompel 2008).

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[337] Sably, 15/06/2011.
[338] Gba, 60s, retired teacher, Dan-speaking, Man, 26/02/2009.

My data cannot support such conclusions. In northern Côte d'Ivoire, armed youngsters did not "cease paying respect to their elders and discard authority" (Chabal 2009, 156), quite the contrary, rebels showed respect and offered Sably their chief's sofa during the controls at the check-point. Furthermore, elders were able to oppose the rebels and intervene on behalf of others, because they were less exposed due to their age. This contradicts statements like this one from Liberia: "[Younger Liberians] had no respect for age." (Ellis 1999, 285)

If there was violent against elder people, it was not because of their age, but due to their political affiliation with the party in power. Sably, as a Wè speaker, had one social marker that made him vulnerable; but age was the dominant marker in interactions with the rebels – no one asked about his ethnicity. But as he said himself, he had never insulted the rebels and showed them respect by calling them 'chief'. I have met other old men who called such youngsters '*petit*', 'little one', whenever they could, which then created them problems with the rebels despite their age.

Middle-aged women: Auntie and the transformation of theft into gift

The following ethnographic example takes issue with the idea that "Since [militarized youth] no longer 'believe', they can no longer be sanctioned. Deprived of cultural and moral foundations, they cease to belong." (Chabal 2009, 156) As people have to trade to eat, the market has never been really closed in Man. It is there where people come together and where in interpersonal interactions small changes happen.

The following story was related to me by old Bamba's junior wife auntie. Talking about how she managed to feed the family during the hard times after the war, we sat together after lunch on a Sunday afternoon. When the war came and her family lacked basic foodstuff – which is rice in that part of the country – she therefore bought rice on credit and started preparing and selling cooked rice with sauce on the market. 'Doing restaurant' was a new business for her; she had sold plantains before the war. The idea was that by preparing food to sell, the family as well would have something to eat. One day, four rebels came to her selling stall asking for food and left without paying. They came again and again, auntie served them food and they left without paying. Sometimes, they demanded extra meat. She did not hesitate to serve them well and did not say anything. Other market women around her expressed their discontent. They told her to ask the rebels for money next time. But auntie said: 'No, let's leave it'. One day, after about three weeks of eating without pay, the rebels said all of a sudden: *'La vieille*, you are tough! We have been provoking you for so long, but you haven't said anything. You have always given us food to eat, you are kind, you are a good person.' From then on, they paid her.

Moreover, she added that some weeks later, when she walked towards them in the market, they immediately stood up and shouted 'Is there something wrong? Are you in trouble?', because they thought she had come to see them for help. She laughed and gestured that she was just going to ease herself.[339]

This incident was the answer to my question of whether she has ever had any problems with the rebels. From her account we can infer that yes, she has had 'difficulties' with them; but things have taken a positive turn after a while. In the following, I want to analyse the slow transformation that took place in the figuration, focusing on power differentials, interdependency and social norms. What has brought the turnabout?

The story begins with a breach of social norms by the four rebels. They used their position to get served for free, by basically stealing food. Such practices earned the rebels the reputation to be mere thieves. It happened in open daylight, surrounded by other market dwellers without direct physical force or 'violence'. In Popitz's term their instrumental power, the mere threat of their actual force was deterrence enough for the dwellers to comply (Popitz 1999).

That rebels acted in such a way (now and again), did not surprise anybody in Man at that point of time, roughly in 2004. I heard many times similar stories, of low- and high-ranks who did not pay and put off business people, small retailers again and again.

Let us explore the sequence of events where she served food without getting paid for it. First of all, she did not refuse their demand and complied. As described, due to her husband's political activities in the party in power (FPI), they had to flee from the rebels at the beginning of the war. Being pro-Gbagbo could nearly always be made a cause for mistreatment. Therefore, in the figuration and frame at hand, it was safest to simply comply.

The way auntie dealt with their demand was that she handed over the forced gift without complaining. However, there are many ways of serving food. She could do it very slowly, reluctantly, putting but little on their plates, choosing but the bony pieces of meat and giving them an evil look, etc. Such practices have been described as the weapons of the weak (Scott 1985). But this is not like auntie. Many times, youngsters from the neighbourhood have approached her and asked for food, telling her that they were '*moisi*', 'blank' that day. If she can afford it, she serves them food.

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[339] Auntie, 40s, Dan-speaking, Man, field notes, 23/02/2009.

It is important to know something about the culture of food and hospitality in Man. Whenever Ivorians are eating without you, they invite you to come and join them. Furthermore, to receive and serve visitors well, to cook well are qualities that lend Dan woman high esteem (Fischer and Himmelheber 1984). Every woman who provides you food to eat, you should call respectfully '*maman*'.[340]

The rebels continued with their demand for food for free and took it to a degree where the fellow market women found they overstepped the level of acceptability and felt that auntie should no longer put up with it. Auntie, however, is known for her kindness, cheerful temper, and generous and hospitable attitude. In this vein, auntie continued to serve them food until it even surprised her tormentors. Her way of acting managed to transform the meaning of the interaction, to transform the figuration, so to speak. I would push the argument to the limit and say that she managed to reposition herself in the figuration from a victim of theft to a generous provider of food, thereby redefining the figuration and transforming the meaning of their exchange.

By doing so, she turned the figuration upside-down, empowering her as a virtuous woman who in this social context is respectfully called *'la vieille'* (the old one). Her generosity in giving good pieces of meat and enough sauce had in the long run a disarming effect that filled the rebels with shame, so that they started to pay. Even though they did not apologise nor compensate her for past abuse, they found a way of speaking and acting that allowed them to save face and adhered to social norms again.

This twist of the story requires two sides and the bystanders in this figuration. After auntie's obedience/subservience, perseverance and generosity, the rebels followed suit and changed their relationship to her, ceased to be thieves and became customers. They began to pay for their food.

The bystanders, too, have played their role in this transformation. The course of the interaction shows that the rebels' embeddedness in society played an important role in respecting social norms and in bringing about the change in the figuration. Despite the rebels' initial abusive actions, they did not lack sensitivity for social norms and a morality. Due to the fact that the rebels saw themselves as part of the society, they sensed disapproval from the other market dwellers and subsequently changed.

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[340] Furthermore, the grain crops of your enemy may not be destroyed, even if it was planted on your land (personal communication, Thomas Bearth, 08/2010).

But it does not end here. In auntie's description they went a step further and offered her privileged treatment. They showed concern for her well-being and were 'ready to help' in a domain that they mastered. She was not in trouble (e.g. dispute with a market dweller) this time, but any time she might be, she can trust that they know her and her manners and that they might intervene on her behalf. With her subservient but friendly action, she managed to create a personal relationship with them, transforming institutional distrust into personal trust. In the more powerful position, it was they who eventually offered her this personal relationship with them as institutional representatives.

To ease tensions and resolve disputes, people condone certain things and say 'on est ensemble ici à Man'. Today you help me, tomorrow it will be the other way round. You scratch my back and I will scratch yours. Such arrangements are common in town and knit people together with personal trust relationships. She could entrust them with a small service, but the trust relationship is certainly not deep enough for a bigger problem that holds risks for themselves.

Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk also describe a relationship between a woman preparing food for the rebels that resonates with Auntie's story:

A migrant woman in N'Djamena remembered how her mother coped with this situation. She had to cook for the rebels at that time, which she did with a smile. She preferred to please the rebels so that they would be kind to her. They rewarded her with small gifts of money. (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 82)[341]

Interesting is that in both examples, women are in the role of preparing and providing food. It shaped the interaction and the trustfulness of the figuration at hand.[342] Although these ethnographic case-studies are too few to be generalised, they show that gender was decisive for the dynamics of figurations. In some figurations women were particularly vulnerable; in others they were safer and were able to put more trust in rebels than their male peers. Till Förster observes similar social dynamics in Korhogo during the rebellion: "The first trucks that left for Abidjan, the drivers remember, were full of market-women and their goods while no man yet dared to go." (Förster 2009, 342) Hence, the experience of trust and safety was gendered.

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[341] The citation continutes: "Other women living today in Baro told us that women were forced to marry the rebels. The rebels simply asked for the most beautiful women and took them away. Most of these women did not return to Baro and their present whereabouts are not known." (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 82)

[342] It would be interesting to look more into the role of food and its 'agency', from a gender perspective but also as a materiality. In humain daily activities revolving around food other social roles and topicalities may be pushed into the background (Shepler 2011).

The Boutiquier: Young and male

He was wearing jeans, flip-flops and a baseball cap, had a strong build and was likely in his early thirties. I was just about to leave the house, when Jean showed up with him in tow. Jean had indeed told me about a man in his neighbourhood who was ill-treated by the rebels, but I had not expected them that day. At first, it was a bit awkward. The man, who works at one of the *boutiques in town, had not been briefed by Jean and was a bit surprised and unsure of whether he should tell his story here or not. Given the situation, I decided not to mention the possibility of taping.

It happened in 2005, during the long summer break. He had come home from work and was in the Belle Ville neighbourhood[343] at night fall, around 7pm, when he went to buy water at the boutique at the crossroads.

An apparently notorious *Citroën with four rebel soldiers inside pulled up and he remembered that other young men decamped upon their arrival. The women with their small boutiques at the crossroads stayed; they were not the target of these 'patrols'. As he had not done anything wrong, the boutiquier continued to go about his business and paid for the water.

They grabbed him and put him into the boot of the car. The women pleaded for him: *'Celui-là, il n'a rien fait. Laissez les enfants des gens!'* And in case they did not come back with him: *'ça va chauffer sur vous!'*

They cruised around several neighbourhoods in town (Libreville, Blokoss, Lycée, Capem, Doyagouiné) until about 2 o'clock in the morning. At this point, they stopped behind the *Lycée Professionnel de Man* and got him out of the car.

They said there were bones there and that he would join them soon. They hit him, threw him into a puddle of water and told him to take off his clothes. One of them pointed an AK-47 at him and placed the tip of the barrel on his chest. *'Fusillez-moi'*, he said, yielding to destiny. He was thrown on his knees in the dirt. They wanted the names of bandits in Belle Ville. He told them he did not know any and that he was not friends with such people. He told them about working in a boutique in town and mostly staying in after work, not hanging out with strange people. They did not want to let go of him and he recalled they had to ease themselves.

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[343] Belle Ville is a popular neighbourhood, with one road for cars and otherwise footpaths leading up the nearby stony hill. It is badly lit and inhabited by people with a low income.

Then, this questioning and hitting must have continued for a while, until they suddenly said: *'Il faut partir, où t'es quitté!'* He replied: 'But how, you have brought me here and Belle Ville is far.' They only repeated: *'Il faut partir où t'es quitté!'* They told him not to look back, otherwise they would shoot him.

He walked to Gbêpleu. On the road he heard a 'vrai, vrai' patrol of the rebels; those who do the real raids, *'vrai, vrai rafle'*. He jumped into the thicket and lay on the ground. If they saw him here at this time of night, things would not look too good for him. Only bandits are outside in the early morning hours.

Luckily, his cousin lived in Gbêpleu and he decided to knock on their door. First they were scared and confused, unsure whether it was really him or a robber. But they recognised his voice and let him in. By now, it was just before dawn.

That day, he did not go to work. His cousin's husband wanted to lodge a complaint but the boutiquier declined. He said: *'c'est bon, c'est pas grave, il faut laisser comme ça. J'étais sauvé de leurs mains, tout ce que Dieu fait c'est bon.'*

When I was trying to understand why those rebels would do anything like this, he mentioned that they took some money off him, not that he had had much on him. If you are not killed, you can count yourself lucky, Jean and the boutiquier explained to me. To be in good health is the most important thing.

When the boutiquier first told the story, he neglected to mention that he actually knew the rebels by sight, namely as customers of his boutique. He said they always give them cigarettes and are paid when the tally reaches 1000 CFA. He saw them again at the boutique and they received their cigarettes as always. The boutiquier reported they had a short exchange in which he asked them why they had taken him to the forest: They responded: *'Faut laisser ça! C'est parce qu'on te connait qu'on t'a laissé.'* So they went back to being relative strangers, as before.

There were several aspects that struck me in this account: first the arbitrariness and the sheer terror of their act; but then also the fact that such things happen(ed) and life goes on as if nothing had happened. What does it mean for basic social trust and social life to know that you might be picked up at random and end up dead? Such arbitrary acts of violence make it extremely difficult to ensure one's safety, but they were not standard in Man, this is exceptional, particularly in such a late period in mid-2005. However, as we shall see in the last empirical chapter, it is often young men who continued to be victims of abusive acts until the past phase of the crisis.

When the rebels abduct the boutiquier in the middle of the neighbourhood, it was women who protested. Although there is little they could do, they threatened the rebels verbally, according to the boutiquier. It is anonymous others from the neighbourhood, who try to intervene on his behalf, as Mohammed anticipated and trusted.[344]

Fatal figuration in Bonpleu

In mid-2003, one of the cruellest and saddest incidents happened of those which have been recounted to me during field research. As in other villages, the medical staff left the *Bonpleu at the onset of the war. Only the auxiliary nurse, a local, stayed behind. The young man collected all remaining drugs and stored them away in his house to protect them probably from looters, so that he could provide the village with drugs if needed (diarrhoea, headaches, and fever).

One day in August 2003, three rebels arrived in the village. They were in search of drugs at the dispensary (dispensaire). The villagers told them they needed the medicine for themselves.

The rebels insisted that they were acting on orders from their superiors and had to bring these drugs to town. Reluctant to hand out the medicine, the villagers asked to see the written orders, which the three obviously did not have. The discussion became more and more heated and degenerated into a real fight between the rebels and the youngsters of the village, who were in the majority.

The three rebels did not hesitate and called for reinforcements from Man. They claimed that the village was preventing them from passing through on the grounds that they were defending Gbagbo. When Man received this news, troops were dispatched immediately.

Upon arrival, these troops gave the village chief a severe beating. When the chief's son saw how his father was being brutalised, he surrendered, offering to take the beating in his father's place. So the son, too, was badly beaten, as was the auxiliary nurse. Together with over thirty inhabitants, they were taken to Man.[345] The people from Bonpleu were incarcerated and severely beaten on consecutive days. The village chief and his son both died of their injuries soon after their release.

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[344] See Chapter 11.

[345] The remaining population of the village spent two weeks in the bush. Everything was looted – including all livestock.

People originally from the village but living in Man now got word of their relatives' difficulties. At that time, in such a figuration, men were afraid of approaching the rebels. Only women could go and ask their pardon or complain without the risk of being beaten and even imprisoned. So, two women in their forties were sent to enquire about the whereabouts of their kin.

The rebel in charge, a mid-rank commander, asked to talk to a spokesperson for the villagers. Only then, an elderly man from Bonpleu came forward to negotiate their release. The village paid fines of between 10,000 and 15,000 per person, amounting to about 400,000 in total. The mid-rank claimed the village had been lucky. Had he been sent as part of the reinforcements that day, the village would have been razed to the ground, wiped out.[346]

Many times Liberians have been blamed as perpetrators of cruel acts; but in this case, they were members of an early group in Man. From what I gathered, the three rebels who initially came into the village were low-ranks. They operated under the command of a mid-rank rebel soldier of the first rebel group; in all probability without an order from the top, I assume even deliberately concealed from the top. Probably, it has been kept within the range of the mid-rank commander mentioned above.

The confiscation of drugs probably was a way to get booty to sell, as the request of drugs does not seem to have come out of need by the soldiers. The idea of 'making money' also becomes clear in the ransom they had to pay to be released. The allegation that the village defended Gbagbo and blocked their way was a 'killer argument' and mean way of legitimising their action and getting support from Man. Being labelled Gbagbo-supporter in the rebel-held north was as dangerous as being labelled "assailant" in the south, as we saw in Maméry's case. What is also quite certain: it was not any longer about the drugs only. The three rebels must have felt personally humiliated and took personal revenge. It had become a personal issue and they used the 'mistake' of the villagers triumphantly to press money out of them. They showed the village youth that they are more powerful than them that they can 'create them problems' *('créer des problèmes')*. The Gbagbo-sympathiser was a created problem.

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[346] To protect my sources of information, I have left out further details, including the manner in which I learnt about this case, the name of the village or where in Man the villagers were imprisoned. I always did my best to cross-check information carefully, but I also found it important not to confuse my role as a researcher with that of a detective. With the benefit of experience, I felt able to assess what was within the range of the possible and when people were exaggerating or abusing the interview situation. Doubts notwithstanding, in this case, the probability of such a course of action was corroborated on several occasions. Those involved have been cited negatively more than once.

The incident happened in the very first months after the Loss, the new commander-in-chief had assumed command, in the autumn 2003. If I understand the dynamics at the time correctly from the many conversations I have had with members of the New Forces and civilians, it was a period during which the new commanding staff still lacked control and also knowledge about the physical and social terrain they had come to command. They were still about to discover who was who among those rebels they had 'inherited' from the first phase. From what I gathered, Loss' arrival is not remembered as a caesura that had an immediate impact on the security situation. They still moved carefully at that time, as they were less in numbers.

It is instructive for an understanding of the logic of violence and civilians' possible strategies for action to determine the point where the situation could have been calmed and deescalated in the above example; rather than escalated. Had the village handed out the drugs, it probably wouldn't have become what it later did. I met a man who left the car keys on his car during the post-electoral crisis in Abidjan: 'If they come', he said, 'I would tell them: 'The key is on the car. Take it!' Most of the time it was enough to satisfy them, make them leave and stay alive. However, the village had already anticipated this possibility and hidden the drugs. They did not want to put up with everything and resisted. The price they paid for it was high. With time, people got more familiar with this regime. They would say *'si tu es vivant, faut remercier Dieu'*. For some, to mount resistance was *'chercher palabre pour rien'*.

Discussion: Figurations of trust and distrust

Some readers will perhaps think that this chapter was about difficult experiences, violence and abuse. This is not wrong, as my research strategy was to analyse critical events to learn more about the predictability of trust and distrust in figurations. However, apart from violence, there were also experiences of near-misses, fairytale-like transformations (theft into gift) and miraculous disappearances (Nicole), resistance and courage.

In the analysis of figurations I was concerned with civilians that identified their insurgent counterparts as anonymous representatives of the armed rebellion with whom they generally did not share a personal history of previous interactions, hence institutional trust in our typology. Civilians were generally able to make distinctions, whether it was a Liberian combatant, an Ivorian rebel chief or a low-rank. Liberians were easily recognised by their speech. A rebel who wanted to be treated as a chief performed his status by moving in a (stolen) car and with an armed entourage, rather than military insignia.

On the part of the civilians, we can also distinguish different categories that shaped such interactions. Although all of us have multiple identities, gender, age, social class and ethnicity, not all of these aspects were in the foreground of interactions with rebels. Some social markers gained salience or were made significant in interactions whereas others were not. How come?

All actors in a social figuration have power and there is a certain dynamic that results from the resources each actor can draw on and make relevant in such interactions. Rebels' potential for making use of physical power had a deterring effect on civilians, which often allowed them to dominate interactions. Not always, though! Some civilians were not easily impressed by fire power (e.g. examples of Aka, Thomas and Nicole).

The aspect of physical power is often overemphasised in the literature and by international actors in particular. I do not want to belittle the 'power' of arms, their fast and detrimental way to kill, their deterring effect, etc.; but there are other resources of power and even more so vulnerabilities that have not been emphasised enough. Whereas several anthropological studies have elaborated on the agency of actors frequently categorised as "victims" in humanitarian discourse (Utas 2005; Honwana 2006), there is room to explore the vulnerabilities of the seemingly powerful part in these interactions.[347]

In actual practice, interactions can take many forms and figurations different outcomes, as this chapter has ethnographically demonstrated. With time and after painful experiences, actors acquired and shared knowledge about the trustfulness and dynamics of situations. People from Bonpleu sensed more danger for men than for women in the case where the village was accused of supporting the FPI. A man could not trust that he would be listened to, he might just be brutalised, as well. However, they assessed the situation trustful enough for middle-aged women to go forward and to ask pardon *('demander pardon')*. They did not expect brutal acts (beating or sexual abuse) in that moment. By going there, the women made the leap of faith, accepted their vulnerability and suspend the remaining uncertainty. This is a thin form of trust, but important none the less. Insecurity was predictable to a certain extent and greater safety, too.

The combination of social markers and the course a figuration takes must not be understood in a deterministic way. There is nothing mechanic about such figurations – for which reason I have termed them figurations – quite the contrary, they are highly dynamic and contingent. Ultimately, figurations remain subject to the social agency of actors' involved. Doumbia, the

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[347] See more about this aspect in Chapter 11.

journalist from the previous chapter told me a rather astonishing case in this respect that I want to mention here. Due to his social identity and active engagement for victims of government repression, Doumbia was positioned in a way that allowed him 'to speak out' sometimes, when rebels overstepped the mark (see also in the following chapter). In the first phase of rebel control, he came across a situation in which rebels had located a 'suspect'. The man was obviously a policeman about to leave or flee from the rebel-held parts and to go southwards to Abidjan. Surrounded by a crowd of people, the serving rebel chief, a militarised civilian, asked Doumbia for his opinion of what to do with the policeman. Doumbia advised him to let go of the policeman, as he was about to leave anyway. The policeman (he had a card on him that identified him as such) was released and left Man safely.[348]

As this example illustrates, the pendulum may swing either way in a figuration, take a more positive or negative direction for the persons involved. Furthermore, it is degrees that matter, a reason for which I have chosen the clumsy term 'trustfulness'. Not every interaction ended deadly if taxed as a regime supporter (i.e. policeman), for instance.

In this chapter it was important to work out figurations of trust and distrust. The experience of trust and distrust and the resulting mental map of trustfulness of each of these actors depended on political belonging, ethnicity, gender, age and social status. Reflecting on war rapes in Sierra Leone, Chris Coulter observes that patterns of vulnerability and insecurity resonated with peacetime social structures, which were "magnified by the war" (Coulter 2009, 127). I find this an interesting interpretation; for it means that local actors are not completely lost in war. By stressing "social and cultural continuities of war" (Coulter 2009, 7), we can argue that actors have a peacetime mental map of figurations of trustfulness that shifted and was exaggerated in times of war, rather than completely new. Similiarly to the generalised forms of political violence during combat time, we can say that the case-studies presented have their milder versions in peacetimes, too. For rebel-held Man, gender-patterns were magnified at the beginning of the war (Coulter 2009), as well as rivalries among young men (Newell 2012; Konaté 2003). Practices of looting seem to be rooted in cultural ideas of appropriation, too (Newell 2006). Noteworthy is that contrary to other Mano River wars (Peters 2011a), intergenerational tensions that also exist in Côte d'Ivoire (Chauveau 2006) seem to have been pushed into the background by the *ivoirité*-based political divide and collective grievance in the rebellion (Richards 2010).

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[348] Doumbia, 20/12/2008.

I had my place in that landscape, too. Social status outweighed my risks as a young woman. My range of margins was broad compared to my sisters-in-law. I could enter certain figurations that they better avoided from the outset. My curiosity led me far, but I was lucky to come across trustworthy interaction partners. In a changed frame, I was not so sure I had been safe. In 2004 in the south, French women were raped during a political upheaval, but killing was maintained as a taboo (McGovern 2010b); the dynamics against the "French", "expats", "whites" was different in the south, due to the 'anti-colonial' rhetoric of second independence of the regime in power. It was an open secret that to work for humanitarian agencies and the UN was easier in Man, the rebel-held west, than in the Guiglo area further south.

This feel for moments, situations and dynamics that no one could explain to me in full was a crucial 'tool' of how people managed social life under rebel rule. To ability to assess the trustfulness of situations, to discriminate between trustful and distrustful situations was critical, particularly in figurations with rebels. It was not just about whether the particular rebel in front of you was trustworthy or not; it was more complex. Who you were in that moment, to be precise, who you managed to be in that moment, decided how far you could go without risking harm. For instance, in some more informal encounters with rebels and other (big) men, I kept on performing my professional role as a researcher, communicating with a factual-sounding voice, about a formal topic to create distance and to divert from my gender identity – skills we all have men and women alike.

The chapter revealed that experiences of trustworthiness are socially differentiated and that accounts about trust have to take social figurations into consideration. Its focus was on assessments of trustworthiness (antecedents of trust), rather than on the act of trusting itself. With the concept of figurations I tried to shed light on one of the ways of knowing that allowed locals to orient themselves to judge the trustfulness of situations. Thereby, the sole focus on trust would not be helpful. To build knowledge about and locate distrust and insecurity was of equal importance for social agency. Not all social relationships changed with the arrival of the rebels. The social fabric is more robust than that. To find out where, when and with whom distrust as an attitude was more warranted than trust was therefore crucial.

9 Governance during *le temps sauvage:* Insecurity and uncertainty

By ousting armed state actors in the first and second take of Man, the rebels became the most powerful actor in the region with coercive means at their disposal. Rebels had the power to decide which social practices were acceptable and what would be punished, whether efforts would be made to secure public spaces, whether schools were opened or not, etc..

In this respect, rebels constituted the most dominant actors in situ. But the rebels were divided among themselves about what was right. In the words of a later rebel commander Diabaté: "*Il y avait beaucoup d'anarchie dans les nominations de C.O. parce que certaines personnes s'installaient dans les localités pour se faire appeler C.O.*"[349] (Doumbia 2003d) Hence, there were too many 'chiefs' in the "governance figuration" (Förster and Koechlin 2011).[350] This created a polycentric order[351] that introduced uncertainty into social life.

At the heart of governance processes are regulatory problems of social life, as well as the provision of basic public goods (Mampilly 2007, 3). Of particular interest for the analysis of trust is whether people addressed the rebels for security provision and other issues concerning the governance of everyday life.

In this chapter I will turn to the analysis of the first period of rebel control, a time generally referred to as *le temps sauvage.* The aspect of the rebel-society nexus that interests me here is how the rebel organisation performed in its 'leadership role', positioned as the most dominant actor in the governance figuration. Were the rebels as an organisation/institution or as personal acquaintances a trustworthy, reliable 'partner', motivated and competent to govern civilian

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[349] Caporal Diabaté Adama Com-secteur south in Man.

[350] By governance I mean "processes of coordinated action between actors to resolve complex societal problems" (Förster and Koechlin 2011, 9).

[351] I have taken the term from Förster's figurations of governance (Förster and Koechlin 2011). As I use the term "figuration" for (face-to-face) interactions and aim at describing social and political order rather than governance, I have chosen the term "order" instead.

social life? Or were they disinterested in regulating public life and only concerned about the well-being of their own troops? Was the population either mistreated by the rebels or left to fend for itself? In other words, was social life in these early times of rebel control, when the state had left, a case of dog eat dog, as the literature on 'failed states' suggests, namely disorderly and chaotic?

To explore trust and distrust in these early times of rebel control, I shall describe how social life was organised and then analyse different case-studies in depth, in which the population addressed the rebel leadership for security provision, focusing on institutional and personal trust.

Changed routines in everday life

After the occupation of the towns by the rebels, *"la peur s'est installée un peu partout"*[352], fear spread. People could not go to their fields to get food for fear of being shot at directly or being caught in the crossfire. Foodstuffs became more and more expensive and rare on the market and people had no money to pay anyway. There was hardly enough to eat.

Eventually, with time, the villagers learnt how to best deal with the condition of war. As Macla described:

Nos habitudes avaient changé. Chez nous ici à Logoualé, un homme libre pouvait se lever à 4h du matin pour aller au champ et revenir à 22 heures, 23 heures, s'il le veut. Mais nos habitudes avaient changé. Il fallait attendre peut-être 9 heures, 10 heures avant d'aller au champ et revenir plus tôt, peut-être 14 heures. Parce que là, si vous revenez à 19 heures, on vous demande pourquoi vous venez à 19 heures. Donc on avait plus de programme. ... Et même quand vous êtes au champ, dans le campement, vous dites mais tiens, il ne faudrait pas qu'on nous attaque ici. On travaillait la peur au ventre, c'était pas facile.[353]

In Macla's words, habitual routines could no longer be maintained. Due to the gradual familiarisation with the condition of war, however, everyday life became subject to new routines (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 70–71). Contrary to violent crises elsewhere, the violent conflict in Côte d'Ivoire has 'only' lasted for a decade so far. The times during which daily practices had to be adapted to the condition of severe crisis had been over already at the time

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[352] Amadou, 30s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, Logoualé, 19/03/2009.
[353] Amadou, 19/03/2009.

of the conversation in 2008. My research participant expressed himself in the past tense. The fact that he verbalised the shifts in social practices reveals us that we are looking at explicit social practices that are reflected upon. Drawing on Vigh's conceptualisation in which he distinguishes between routinisation as a more conscious process and habituation (pre-predicative), we can infer that Macla describes processes of routinisation (Vigh 2006, 151–55).[354]

The war brought poverty and encouraged prostitution which then caused illnesses. Certain households were no longer able to eat two or three times per day. Many ate once a day now. I was told that certain 'chef de famille', fathers responsible for the livelihoods of the household, no longer came home out of shame as they had nothing to provide for their families.[355] Women left their men and moved to those who had something to give, the new powerful men, the rebels. For a short time, some of them had money like hay, as they had looted the local banks.

In Man, some neighbourhoods were empty, others were crowded as people felt safer there (e.g. Dioulabougou). On 22 January 2003, a big rally in support of the rebellion was organised (Doumbia 2003a). On 27 January the Dan notables, including representatives from the mayor gave a ceremony to honour, thank and encourage the rebels (Doumbia 2003b). A month later, on 24 February, the municipal council was reopened (Bleu 2003, 6). According to three mayors in situ, the New Forces asked them to reopen their services for the registration of births and deaths and the issuing of birth and other certificates.[356]

Despite the reopening of the municipality and several of its services, which might foster the impression of times going back to normal, there was a lot of insecurity in Man and throughout the entire region. A long-time resident and Frenchman aged 78 was attacked three times by Liberians and gradually looted (Bleu 2003, 6). For some rebels, if they set their sights on a girl, car etc. it was theirs, in their mind. Some ate without paying in restaurants (Badouel 2004). There were rapes that were publicised in the newspaper (Bleu 2003, 6). Several police stations had been opened but authorities told people: "we cannot resolve all problems in times of a rebellion" (Badouel 2004).

Movement was severely resticted: between Man and Biankouma (on 40 km), there were 34 checkpoints and between Man and Logoualé 16 on 35 km (Troh 2003, 7). Each town had to

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[354] On processes of routinisation, see also Oldenburg (2010); on normalisation Koloma Beck (2012).
[355] Conversation in Danané, field notes 6-8 April 2009.
[356] Mayors in situ, Man, field notes 30/03/2009.

struggle with its own group of combatants and the effects of the war. In Logoualé at least, life resembled being stuck in a hole for some time:

Ceux qui avaient l'habitude de venir avec des marchandises pendant des jours de marché, n'avaient pas de véhicules. On n'avait pas de communication, pas de journaux; il n'y avait rien et on vivait comme ça, comme dans un trou…. C'est comme ça la guerre a occupé la ville de Logoualé.[357]

There was no information, no traveller or merchants from elsewhere to bring news from Abidjan. Only international radio was available. Despite the insecurity, astounding efforts were soon made to rekindle social life in parallel to the violent acts.

Media, connecting and the fostering of trust

The MPCI in Bouaké had already created its newspaper called *Liberté*, as well as a TV channel *Notre Patrie* (Badouel 2004). The journalist Doumbia, who had written the text denouncing the wave of politically-motivated arrests in Man, approached the C.O. Coulibaly about producing a newspaper for MJP in Man, similar to the one he had seen in Bouaké. *Le Tambour* published its first edition on 5 February 2003. Local photographs found eager customers in the rebels. Editions of *Le Tambour* were often full of short profiles with portraits of who is who in the rebellion, even beyond the zone of Man. Many rebels wanted a picture next to a short interview or text with their '*nom de guerre*'.[358]

At the same time, an independent journalist, Jeannette Oulaï Badouel[359], a woman from Logoualé married to a Frenchman, found herself stuck in Man due to the war. She proposed initiating a TV channel and became the general director of Grand Ouest TV, authorised by the C.O.[360] Apart from programmes for children and traditional music, there was a programme *"A*

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[357] Amadou, 19/03/2009.

[358] The media also gave the youth something to do; even if they were not paid there were many volunteers doing some form of work.

[359] Amadou introduced me to her in 2011. She has an NGO "Association Internationale Métissage" and has many projects since the 1990s. In 2013, she was elected mayor of Logoualé for the UDPCI.

[360] In the book she wrote about her experience in the rebellion during these first months, she asks rhetorically: *"Mais est-ce notre faute si l'effort d'accès à l'information profitait aux rebelles?"* (Badouel 2004, 83)

la découverte des corridors", in which she also showed instances of abuse of the population by rebel *"éléments incontrôlés"* (Badouel 2004, 76–86).

Her collaborator Touré Daye Mamadou alias Kader, who had worked at the radio in Man before the war eventually directed the radio programme MJP FM using the Catholic radio station that had been pillaged by the rebels. The radio was opened on 18 January 2003, according to Doumbia.[361] Commander Coulibaly paid for the necessary material. They had programmes between 7 a.m. and 8 p.m.. Several people remember the reopening of schools and the radio programmes as positive signs during times of hardship that came with the first rebel leadership. In the word of Marie, active in the Catholic Church:

Coulibaly, c'était un rebelle, il était bien, parce que c'est lui d'abord qui a décidé qu'on ouvre les écoles. C'est lui qui a encouragé qu'on ouvre les petites radios, pour dire beaucoup de message de paix ..., pour encourager les gens qui étaient en brousse, qui avaient peur: 'Revenez en ville, de faire vos activités!' ... C'était un homme en arme, mais il a incité un peu l'envie de vivre, parce qu'on était angoissé, on avait peur, mais il encourageait un peu la population.[362]

Declarations of peace and acts such as the reopening of schools and the municipality gave people hope that even if times were difficult, the rebel leadership was trying to maintain the basics and work towards the return of a certain normality in daily life. Hence, the radio facilitated the creation of first tender bonds of trust toward the leadership and brought back a sense of basic social trust.

Electricity provision: Working under conditions of mistrust

In terms of service provision the following account illustrates how civilians worked under difficult circumstances to maintain public goods under rebel governance despite insecurity, mistrust and threats by the rebels.

Basically, as soon as combat had ceased and one could sit down for a moment and relax, a TV, fan, running water and light were nice to have. When Robert, the employee of the power supply company, *La Compagnie Ivoirienne de l'électricité (CIE)*, was spotted upon his return in mid-January, locals went to the rebels to inform them. The next morning, the rebels turned up at

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[361] Doumbia, 30s, Jula-speaking, journalist, 20/12/2008.
[362] Marie, 40s, Dan-speaking, Catholic, market woman, Man, 02/12/2008.

Robert's house and told him to come and work.[363] They wanted power at the prefecture, their headquarters. When Robert said that he worked on the big power supply nodes outside town, they said that this was all the same company and that he better get working. He went to see whether any of his colleagues were around and soon a few of them began working. The International Red Cross who needed their service as electricians for the water supply system provided them with basic foodstuff and said that they would guarantee their safety. The electricians received a stolen car from the rebels with MPIGO written on it to do their work. As this was during the time when the south was bombing western towns, they asked for a car that would distinguish them from the rebels, so they got one of their own stolen CIE cars back. They received a stamped and signed mission statement from the rebel headquarters and were able to move without difficulties within their zone of command.

One day, one of the notorious early chiefs discovered Robert sitting in a maquis (restaurant). They knew each other from Man. Without further ado, the chief asked his soldiers to arrest him. They put him into the booth of the chief's car. Robert remembered that they were driving around with him the whole after-noon going from *maquis* to *maquis* and nearly forgot about him in the booth. Eventually, one of the soldiers reminded the chief of the prisoner in the booth. The chief asked Robert to pay him a bottle of liqueur, but he did not have any money on him. Nevertheless, he was allowed to go. This was a traumatising experience. Family and friends encouraged him to stay in Man, which he did together with his wife.

The battles had destroyed several circuits and mains. In Man, they lacked the equipment to do the work that was required. Therefore, they put together a team in the south to come and do the job. They went to ask for permission from the C.O. Ousmane Coulibaly, and he gave them his authorisation. My informant went to Duékoué to wait for the delegation that was roughly a hundred people and 25 vehicles. When they entered Man, it was like a big celebration. People were applauding at the roadside, thinking if the CIE had returned, the war must be over. But they had only come to do some work.

While they were working, rumours began circulating that some of the CIE agents were military men in disguise. A group of rebels encircled them. Those from Man were somewhat familiar

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[363] An employee of the electricity company in Ferkéssedougou experienced forms of coercion by the rebels who made sure he stayed in the region and made sure power supply was running (K. Bauer, personal communication, May 2, 2013).

with the rebels, but those who had come from the loyalist zone were worried and asked their local colleagues what was going on. Robert approached the rebels to ask them.

A small young rebel hit him and commandeered him into the car. They were shooting into the air and imprisoned all the CIE workers in an emptied bank, where the notorious rebel chief Touré had taken residence. The colleagues from the south were trembling.

There was a problem of mistrust, because so many CIE agents had come. Touré suspected that they had spies among them. Robert talked to the chief and said: *"'Non chef, il n y a pas de militaires, ils sont tous des agents; ils ont tous leur badge.'"* Robert was not sure about the entire group, but he told the chief that if he found a military man among them, he should kill him.

After having looked at their badges and mission statements, Touré said if he found a single military man among them, he would first kill Robert as their spokesperson and then all the others. Then, they were released. They resumed their work, but the work they were meant to do well was done in a hurry because everybody was afraid. The colleagues from the south did only the absolute minimum so that they could leave the day after.

Before the war, there were about 300 employees working for the Ivorian electricity company (CIE) in the region, as Man was the main power station in the west. Only five of the employees stayed (four from the region and one from Katiola), all those who did not have family in the region left. They had one car for the entire zone. Eventually, the technicians decided to concentrate on the larger towns and the smaller villages remained in the dark.[364]

Thanks to his skills, Robert was capable to also take care of the telephone service between January 2003 and June 2004. Only with the deployment of the UN mission, employees of the national telephone service came back to Man. The fact that as an employee of the electricity company, he also did work for the telephone service raised suspicion, once more. This confusion of professional roles led him yet into another situation of suspicion, in which the loyalists came close to using violence, when he was doing repair work Duékoué. Both sides made their investigations as to whether he was trustworthy. Often it was a lack of understanding

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[364] When times got better, those of the CIE who had stayed talked to some of their colleagues to persuade them to return and join them: "We told them that we had been here for two years and we hadn't been killed. Some understood and began to come back." (Robert, 05/04/2009).

of how electricity and telephone services worked that caused additional mistrust, of whether he did not transmit information to the other side etc.

If rebel-held towns and towns in the western south had electricity that depended on Man as a main power station as well as access to communication services during the violent crisis, it was thanks to people like Robert who stayed in the region and worked under difficult circumstances. Robert's experiences have also shown that cooperation becomes extremely difficult in a climate of mistrust.

Mistrust in schools and health services

A woman who works for the state's vaccination service told me that people mistrusted their institution when they reopened under rebel control in 2003. As described before, residents of Man, particularly the young, had been picked up by state armed forces on government orders and never came back. This means that people had experienced malevolent intentions and motivations against their children by the government, which lead to deep-seated mistrust towards the regime in power. Some people feared and suspected the government to send people to poison their children with injections by the vaccination service. Mistrust in the state at this point has less to do with the inappropriate function of institutions but more with the politics of belonging that manifested itself in the neo-patrimonial institutions of the state. Only at the point when people recognised my interlocutor, Madame Kouakou, as someone who had worked for the service before the war, would they allow their children to be vaccinated. In this case, familiarity with a particular representative was critical to overcoming institutional mistrust. Personal trust in Madame Kouakou was able to foster trust in the vaccination service and to extend trust to the institution as a whole. If Madame Kouakou was there, the service she worked for could not have harmful intentions against them.[365]

A similar, yet slightly different case was related to me by the school director, Tounkara, in Man.[366] Sometime in March 2003, they were approached by the C.O. Ousmane Coulibaly and asked to reopen their school for remedial courses, at least in the neighbourhood Libreville. He promised them he would do everything possible to avoid shootings in the neighbourhood and around school. On 31 March 2003, the first classes reopened in Man (Troh 2003, 7). There were regular teachers and they took every child. My interlocutor, who was born and raised in Man,

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[365] Madame Kouakou, Akan-speaking, government health service, Man, 03/04/2009.
[366] Tounkara, 60s, Jula-speaking, head teacher, primary school Libreville, Man, 16/12/2008.

said that it was also good for them as adults to have something to do. He emphasised that due to his age his colleagues first suggested he sit in the office, but my interlocutor said: *"Non, si je suis au bureau, les parents n'auront pas confiance. Il faut que les parents voient quelqu'un qui était là avant la guerre, pour qu'ils soient rassurés que c'est vraiment une affaire sérieuse. On a commencé petit à petit."*[367] Again, it was important to fill positions with familiar faces, with professionals that people knew and trusted from before the war, as a way to foster trust in an institution under rebel governance.

At the beginning, the teachers were worried that the regime in the south might not appreciate their initiative, regard it as support for the rebellion and, as a consequence, stop their salaries.[368] But a UNESCO representative assured them that they were teaching Ivorian children, after all, and indeed, the south has not stopped paying a single salary in Man, Tounkara emphasised.

Au départ les gens pensaient on est venu soutenir les rebelles. Mais après ils ont vu que ça n'a rien à voir avec les rebelles, au contraire, nous, avec les rebelles, on s'entendait pas! Voilà, parce que quand on dit la rébellion, c'est pas tous des militaires. Ils n'avaient aucune formation! [Les forces de l'ordre au Sud] nous appréciaient, [when they went to take their salaries]: 'Voilà les vrais patriotes, des gens qui luttent pour sauver les enfants pendant la guerre.' Parce que tout le monde ne pouvait pas aller là-bas [to the south]. On s'est débrouillé un peu un peu. On a tenu.[369]

Both ethnographic examples show that a lack of knowledge and uncertainty caused scepticism at the beginning, an attitude I have defined as mistrust.

Credit of trust in rebel institutions

I have chosen the following example from the first months of 2003 to examine inductive trust in the rebel authorities and their ability to provide security. Were the rebels exclusively perceived as a threat and a group with selfish interests or did people expect and trust the rebels in security matters? Were rebels addressed on the basis of personal trust only or also as representatives of the rebellion? To reflect on that, I would like to analyse a sequence of events

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[367] Tounkara, 16/12/2008.

[368] As mentioned in a previous chapter, civil servants regularly went to Daloa to pick up their salaries if they did not go to Mali.

[369] Tounkara, 16/12/2008.

that happened in *Dhéobly, a Wè (Wobe) village that is situated about a half-day's journey from Man by motorbike.

One of the elders told me their village had been looted and burnt by a group of rebels.[370] The population fled into the bush, where they stayed for some time for safety reasons. Just as I have been told in other villages, too, these inhabitants were hurt to see the rebels occupying their village while they had to sleep in the bush. In the words of the elder from Dhéobly, the village did not want to live 'like animals' in the bush any longer and decided to do something about it. The elder smiled and said: 'We thought that where there are children, there must be parents, too.' In other words, they expected to find those able to control the rebels who were threatening them in the regional centre, Man.

At a point in time when the state had abandoned the region and only a couple of international peacekeepers were in place, the most promising strategy for them was to address the commander-in-chief or somebody from the rebel leadership in Man.

The choice of their strategy, I argue, was based on normative and institutional trust. The people from Dhéobly had no personal relationship with the chief in Man, but they had heard of *a* chief in Man. The use of the family idiom (parent-child) suggests that the village perceived the rebellion as an armed group with a certain degree of organisation, with authority over their subordinates. The combatants who were harassing them in their village were perceived as a subordinate rebel group, most likely staffed by young men. The use of the parent-child idiom can be viewed as an expression of trust in local social and cultural norms, namely, that elders or big-brothers would still have authority over younger ones, even in times of crisis and among armed actors. The fact that they went to see a superior in Man, also accounts for the fact that the rebellion was perceived as an institution from which they could expect help.

Based on cultural practices, they prepared themselves with a gift deemed appropriate to go and see a person of authority.[371] A delegation of four rented one of the few cars left, took a bag of rice and a ram along as gifts, and travelled to Man, where they asked for the rebel chief. The rebel leader they came across was pleased to see the gifts and received them well. The gifts objectified or visualised the villagers' intention to show respect and acknowledge the rebels' rule. One could look at the scene as a performance of deference.

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[370] Elder in Dhéobly, 50s, Wè-speaking, field notes 15/03/2009.
[371] According to local cultural beliefs, one should neither make a visit nor demand a service empty-handed.

The delegation asked for protection and was given twenty armed men. The village had to accommodate and feed them, which is not an unusual request in the region in labour relations. With a *griot* and a drummer they toured the bush and dwellings to call people back to their houses in the village.

However, the elder said there were renewed attacks by yet another armed group that caused three casualties despite the special rebel guards. Hence, although the rebels' hierarchy was motivated to help civilian populations, they failed to provide security to them. In this case, it was not a lack of motivation from the top, but a lack of competence that did not allow the rebel leadership to reciprocate the institutional trust bestowed upon them.[372]

The same rebel chief who at least had tried to be of help to the people from Dhéobly was the one who had been after Nicole. When he saw my informant's girlfriend and her friend passing at his house, he called them to come up. When the two girls continued their walk, he sent his soldiers to get them. They spent one week in *Touré's house until they were free to go.

Personal trust in the rebel leadership

In a village near Man allegedly with the reputation of being pro-Gbagbo, the population experienced different abuses by the rebels, as well as sexual violence. The chief of the village had to flee to the bush for some time and village elders were forced to eat pepper and raw fish; a Muslim woman was allegedly even forced to drink liquor at gunpoint. I have heard versions of such abuses in other villages, too. The reason why I would like to describe Rachelle's case is that it shows the perils of approaching higher ranked commanders for help, when low-ranks have committed abuses.[373]

In early 2003, Rachelle was about thirty; throughout her village there were checkpoints and people were forced to 'give something' when passing. After a long night of partying, in the early morning hours, it seems that the rebels went from door to door to round up *"jeunes"*, young men: *"...tu ouvres, tu es femme, on te laisse, mais si tu es jeune, on te fait sortir."*

These youngsters, about two dozen, were brought together and badly beaten by the rebels without the families knowing about it. When her 15-year-old brother came home covered with bruises, the family was appalled. Rachelle seems to have exclaimed that the *chef du village*

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[372] Elder in Dhéobly, 50s, Wè-speaking, field notes 15/03/2009.
[373] Rachelle, 30s, Dan-speaking, market woman, 13/10/2008.

should go and see the rebel leadership in Man and complain, because in town such things were not allowed:

Le chef de village devait aller voir les chefs qui sont en ville. En ville même c'est pas ce que les gens-là font. On ne frappe pas les civils comme ça. C'est pas possible.

An elderly neighbour, originally from a nearby village, who had lived with them for a long time, must have informed the rebels that there was a woman who wanted to complain. Shortly after, two rebels entered their compound. She remembered: *"Et ils sont venus sans demander … sans demander, parce que c'est comme ça ils faisaient: Ils ne demandent pas. Ils sont venus directement: 'Faut te lever!'"* When she did not get up immediately one of them threatened: *"'Si tu te lèves pas, je tire.'"* She began arguing with them and then they started beating her. Two other rebels joined and they were hitting her with sticks. *"En tout cas, ma famille, tout le monde a fui pour me laisser, parce qu'ils étaient armés!"*, she added at this point. Covered with bruises, the group, a Dan, two young Senufo and a Wobe, took her to one of the checkpoints. Their superior told them off, saying that they had not come to harm civilians and that they should stop and let her go home.

She was walking home. Suddenly, people began screaming behind her: "Run!" When she turned, the knife of one of the rebels cut her leg. It was the one she had caused to fall in the fight. His comrades came to calm him, saying he should leave her be, as they had been told by their chief. With a bleeding leg she walked to Man on small footpaths. A stranger who saw her helped her reach the Red Cross where she got treatment.

In broad daylight, both of her homes, the one in the village and the one in Man, were emptied down to the last thing. The same youngsters told her neighbours in Man that anyone who would oppose them would be killed: *"'C'est à cause d'elle que les chefs veulent nous dégrader.'"* They had come to take revenge. Her younger sister who was in the house was raped.

Rachelle's uncle Théodore, who lives in Man, went to see his uncle, who at that time was a reconised chief in Man. First, they did not want to let him in, but he insisted. The uncle, whose paternal relatives lived in this same village, gave him some of his men to accompany him to the village. But Théodore was afraid to venture out alone with them. The chief seems to have sanctioned his men eventually. Théodore said that he did not keep in touch with this uncle and that they tried to shun anyone in the rebellion.

Rachelle declared the loss of her goods so the rebels were imprisoned, but she got none of her goods back and soon after, the young soldiers were out in the street again and threatening her.

They told people who knew her: "If we see her, we will kill her." Therefore, she went into hiding in a village known for its anti-rebel leanings near Man for one year, from January 2003 until the first of January 2004. Every morning, she got up and spent the day in the fields working.[374]

Apart from other aspects, what is striking about this example, is that personal trust – in this case based on kinship relationships to top-ranks – did not suffice to be protected. This experience had long-term effects on Rachelle's sense of security and basic social trust. Although the worst part happened in 2003, she said that there was no security yet in 2008. Until this day, she is too scared to go back to her village, even if these rebels are no longer there. She had to send her two children away to other family members, as she was no longer able to support them, feed them, dress them and send them to school. She is no longer the person she used to be before the violent conflict.

Sense-making practices and the creation of coherence

In this section of the chapter, I will present the account of the crisis as narrated in an interview by the village chief of Kandopleu, a teacher in retirement, whom we have already encountered in Chapter 6 at the onset of the war.[375] He is the village chief who had come to make a withdrawal from his bank account and struggled to get out of Man to reach his village when the war broke out. The chief's account aptly demonstrates the perception of the violent crisis in different intensities and phases: It shows the confusion at the beginning of the war, the sometimes agonising situation with the rebels and the somewhat more decent mode of cohabitation that was achieved after the first, savage time period had passed.

The account was recorded in the summer of 2010 on the occasion of the *cinquantenaire.* I was looking for elderly people who were willing to share their memories of the times of independence with me for a small oral history project (Heitz 2013a). The daughter of the village head is a good friend of mine and suggested taking me to her father, due to his good memory. She called him and informed him about our arrival in two days. When we got there with her husband,[376] chairs were lined up in a semi-circle in front of her father's house and a number of

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[374] When I commented that she was brave, she said she was forced to endure what she had gone through.
[375] Whenever the chief is quoted in this chapter, it is from this interview: Chief of Kandopleu, 70s, Dan-speaking, village between Man and Biankouma, 03/08/2010.
[376] M. et Mme. Gbe, 30s, Dan-speaking, active in local NGOs, 01/04/2010.

elders dressed in their gowns had gathered to receive the guests from town. Soon, younger men joined as well as children and a few women.

After almost an hour of talk and more questions, also from my side, we had somehow reached the present.[377] It is in this context that the husband (Gbe below), who was from the neighbouring village, asked his father-in-law about the recent violent crisis. The simple question "and what about the crisis" evoked a synthesis about life under rebel rule.

Contrary to other passages of the dissertation, I will underline the contructedness of the discursive data this time. According to Nordstrom's research on war, the narratives that people produce serve to "domesticate" experience and to make sense of the violence "after the fact". A narrative is "not the actual experience" of that incidence, but constitutes "a meaningful way … to deal with it […] and changes over time, circumstance, and speaker, is a cultural production." (Nordstrom 1997, 21–22)

I will reproduce the chief's account in full here for several reasons. Firstly, it offers the reader insights into sense-making practices, of how experiences of the crisis were discursively dealt with. Secondly, although linked to a specific village, the chief makes comparisons with neighbouring villages, revealing multiple experiences (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007). Although a subjective account by an elderly man, the village chief spoke in front of and as a representative of the village elders assembled. Hence, his account has if not a collective then at least a social dimension, too. As I will show further down, his account carries a message for the community and reveals to us discursive and other strategies of how they dealt and deal with coercive situations. Last but not least, I think it is telling in its form and structure.

It is a multi-layered speech situation and has several addressees: Apart from the unknown listeners of the recording and apart from addressees I am unaware of, there was the village community, the white guest as a possible fund-raiser and a neighbouring community represented by the husband.[378]

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[377] After my deliberately open formulated question that would leave ample space to elaborate on what was important to *him*, the old man produced a history book-like account of decolonisation which he thought was perhaps relevant to *me*. From the interviews I had done with the couple about the violent crisis, they knew that I was more interested in the man's personal experiences and in this case local history rather than received wisdom of grand-scale History. Hence, the husband intervened and told his father-in-law to start with his childhood, what life had been like in the 1950s and how independence was celebrated under Houphouët-Boigny.

[378] After the interview, the son-in-law discussed a problem concerning the border between the two villages with the headman.

Transcription: Narrative by the Chief of Kandopleu

A preliminary note in advance: I have hardly done any editing, except from the omission due to its citation in Chapter 6. However, I divided the narrative into acts, highlighting its drama-like structured form. I introduced a new line for sentences summarising experiences and recurrent encouraging 'refrains'.

00:54:12-3

GBE: *Et la période de la crise?*

CHIEF: *Oui, la période de la crise, Monsieur André, je vais vous dire que nous avons connu beaucoup, beaucoup de bousculade dans cette crise.*
La crise est un souvenir très malheureux que nous avons vécu.
Elle est venue à Man le 28 novembre 2002.

KATHRIN: *Il connaît les dates, ehn! [talking to M. Gbe]*

GBE: *Oui, ça c'est ...*

CHIEF: *C'est là les rebelles ont fait leurs entré à Man. [...]*[379]

I: *The battle of Man and the rebels' victory*

Il y a eu trois jours de guerre à Man. [slowly]. Trois jours de guerre.

Au cours des deux premières journées, les loyalistes l'ont presque emporté. Et ils se décidaient d'aller prendre Biankouma. Nous avons eu une chance, les rebelles ont eu encore des renforts et ont affronté une troisième fois [...] c'est les loyalistes qui ont PERDU la bataille. Si non, mon village resterait en péril, parce que c'est cette opération qu'on appelait le ratissage, d'abord à Man, après qui...les loyalistes devraient aller prendre Biankouma. Et c'est mon village qu'on devait traverser pour aller prendre. On allait mourir.

Quand les rebelles ont gagné cette bataille, nous avons soufflé un ouf de bonheur.

Mais, maintenant, quand ceux-ci, les rebelles, ont eu le pouvoir sur Man, Biankouma, Danané tout ça, nous avons connu maintenant des déboires.

IIa: *Donation of food*

D'abord pour leur installation, ils nous ont demandé de produire des vivriers, de produire des vivriers de la nourriture. Mon village a donné 100 kg de riz blanc, plus que 500 kg de banane.

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[379] See Chapter 6 for this part of the account.

Mais Kandopleu étant toujours un village vigilant, la chose n'a pas trop duré.

IIb: Taxes

Les rebelles ont installé à chaque carrefour d'ici jusqu'à Man, tous les carrefours des villages étaient des barrages. Un de ces barrages existait là, devant notre village.

IIc: Pillage

Et ce qu'il faut remarquer, c'est que la nuit, [in slightly hushed tones] ils venaient piller dans nos cases, les rebelles venaient nous voler. C'est ainsi que le chef de ce barrage-là a détruit … a détruit les portes de notre dispensaire, et a emporté tout [high pitch] ce qu'il y a de matériel de travail: réfrigérateur, pèse-bébé, pèse-homme, les registres, les ciseaux, les bistouris, tout ce que le dispensaire contenait est parti. Actuellement mon dispensaire est vide. Le logement de l'infirmier était aussi dévasté; l'infirmier avait fui. Et ce qu'il a dû laisser comme vêtements était parti.

Donc, aujourd'hui nous sommes sans dispensaire. Nous n'avons pas d'infirmier, notre maternité qui n'a jamais était équipée est vide.

Et nous sommes là, à la merci de Dieu.

Cette guerre-là, nous a apporté pas mal de malheurs.

III: Murder

Un camp, un barrage existait à Mangouin. C'était le barrage de la mort. C'est un barrage, auquel tous les passagers étaient fouillés, ils étaient dépouillés de leurs biens: argent, bijou, vêtements. Et maintenant on vous laissait partir les mains nues. On a tué même des riches.

Un Sénégalais qui rentrait au Sénégal, mais qui voulait passer vers le Mali, a été tué à ce barrage-là. Et comment!? Dans sa famille, il était avec sa famille, ces enfants dans une Dina.[380] Et dans leur fouille, les rebelles ont découvert, que le monsieur avait 7 millions de francs dans une bourse. Alors, ils prennent d'abord les 7 millions et ils laissent le véhicule partir. À mi-chemin on dépêche des motos plus rapides que la Dina pour aller barrer la route à la même Dina. Et on prend le titulaire, le chef de famille. On le ramène au barrage et on propose de le tuer. Malgré tout, il a été tué, pour ne pas avoir à faire des déclarations quelque part. Et puis sa famille est rentrée malheureuse.

Il y a eu des évènements très atroces. Mais que mon village n'a pas connu.

IV: Climax

Un jour nous avons organisé une fête.

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[380] *Dina* means a communal taxi.

C'était une fête nocturne, c'était, cette fête-là regroupait plusieurs danses de notre contrée, et on cherchait la meilleure danse parmi ces groupes-là.

Quand le petit chef de barrage-là a organisé une équipe pour venir nous attaquer.

Nos jeunes très vigilants ont désarmé quelques-uns et le rebelle a regretté d'être auteur de cette opération-là. Nous, nous l'avons malmené, nous l'avons battu, on a déchiré son corps ! Mais leur chef voulant riposter, a été intercepté par Soro Guillaume, parce que nous avons aussi des tentacules qui vont loin. @ [Audience @] @ au moment où @ ... nous aussi on bagarre ! ... Soro Guillaume le savait il a donné l'ordre à Bouaké, il a dépêché les soldats sur place [fast], des gens sont venus de Korhogo eux tous se sont rencontrés ici.
Et nous sommes restés en paix depuis lors.

IV: Message

Kandopleu est un village où les rebelles n'entrent pas n'importe comment.

[KATHRIN: Hm]

Voilà! Mais les villages d'à côté, actuellement même, des rebelles sont à Gbonbélo. Ils sont là, implantés. Lorsque vous venez avec votre café des champs, vous devez leur payer un impôt, avant d'entrer avec votre café de l'autre côté. Ceux-ci sont encore là.
Mais à Kandopleu non. Kandopleu, nous, rebelle il n'est pas ici. @@@

KATHRIN: C'est par rapport aux relations?

CHIEF: @ ..

GBE: Oui, c'est par rapport à une petite historique.

CHIEF: ... aux relations, oui @@

GBE: Oui

CHIEF: Ici nous sommes vraiment entre des bonnes mains!

KATHRIN: Soro Guillaume!?

GBE: Oui.

KATHRIN: Ah, comment on arrive de Kandopleu à Soro Guillaume?!

CHIEF: Ici quelqu'un [ne] fait pas malin sur lui. @

GBE: @@

KATHRIN: @@@ d'accord!

In the coming analysis, the aim is to learn how people in the first settler milieu made sense of their wartime experience, social life under rebel rule and what this tells us about social trust. I will deliberately use literary techniques to allude to the constructiveness of the narrative, for instance, I will make use of contextualisation, literary devices of narrative techniques as well as a sequence analysis used in oral history/memory research. Furthermore, I will try to look beyond the seemingly coherent form of the narrative and listen for the "unsayable" (Landwehr 2001). The fact that this passage in the interview resembles a story, should not surprise us as particularly unusual. In her wonderful work on narratology, the sociolinguist Danièle Klapproth writes the following:

Storytelling [...] is a profoundly human activity [...] in probably all human cultures. Casting experience into narrative form is one of the most central ways by which human beings attempt to make sense of their lives. By creating stories out of the raw material of our experience we manage not only to establish coherence for ourselves, but also to create meaningful discursive structures that may be communicated and shared. (Klapproth 2009, 3)

Interpretation: Hymn on personal trust

As already said, the account begins in Man, where the chief happened to be the moment the rebels reached Man. This first passage that I omitted here, described a panic-ridden scene at the market that ended with the successful, though expensive, journey home to the village.[381] In the next episode of the account, he described the fear they felt that the front would move further north and turn their village into a battle field. In the account, the village was not so much scared of the rebels, it seems, but of fighting as such and the technique of "ratissage", combing a place for suspects and the probability of arbitrary violence and arrests.[382] The village chief showed relief when the rebels prevailed. However, relief was soon replaced by disenchantment when dealing with the rebels came to mean a great deal of annoyance and coercion.

He presents life under rebel domination in several episodes along the recurring theme of resource extraction (Tilly 1985; Weinstein 2007, 164; Popitz 1999). On the one hand, his account follows a chronological order, but it is also structured in an increasingly climactic way that culminates in a reassuring message. First, the village had to furnish the rebels with foodstuff, which they did. My friend and daughter of the village chief commented on this

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[381] See Chapter 6.
[382] See Chapter 7.

period: "*Au début tout le monde cotisait; parce que tout le monde avait peur.*"[383] Such "donations", however, were soon no longer possible, as the population had soon been stripped of their surplus and livestock.[384]

A more enduring nuisance the chief mentions were the roadblocks, at which the rebels practiced a more coercive manner of extraction than the experience with the "donation". In a next step, the rebels came to the village steal, particularly by breaking into locked-up houses of inhabitants who had left. This is how the village dispensary (*dispensaire*) was emptied,[385] which left people "at the mercy of God", as he put it.

While the houses were being emptied and the infirmary plundered, the chief mentions no action on the part of the villagers to prevent it from happening. In a figurative sense, it is as if they watched in silence. We get the impression that they had to let it happen. Probably, they felt they would be taking other risks if they were to mount opposition or resist, as I have previously described in the case of the village *Bonpleu where the chief and the young man died as a consequence of their resistance. The loss of their health centre increased their vulnerability, as medications for treatment had been taken. It was obviously perceived as a threat to their well-being. Whereas the rural areas were impoverished during the crisis and the population put up with smaller meals or even hunger, the rebellion also claimed many victims from the lack of health care.[386] In that sense, exhaustive extraction was another way of waging war. The loss of the pharmacy was greatly deplored, even though the relating of this particular episode was certainly also a silent invitation for the ethnographer to become active and help.

His narrative of increasing extraction and coercion culminates in the predation and subsequent murder of the Senegalese businessman who was on the way home with his family. In the chief's narrative, the incident with the Senegalese represents an example of atrocities committed by the rebels. This episode is additionally dramatised first by the presence of the Senegalese's family, thereby adding emotional depth and raising compassion with his audience. The fact that the businessman had already left the roadblock and was only killed on second thought, further

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[383] Mme. Gbe, 01/04/2010.

[384] As the old man mentioned earlier whose goats were all taken away by an Anglophone fighter (elderly man, 70s, Wè-speaking, planter, Man, 21/10/2008).

[385] The interviewee mentions that the nurse had fled the region. Deserted buildings were often the first to be looted.

[386] In Ivorian parlance often referred to as des *morts gratuits*. The same is true for the frequent road accidents. For more information on health provisions in the region of Man see Cissé and Tanner (2007).

added drama. This case of extraction, the second down-right theft, got out of hand and ends in murder. For the first time in the chief's account, somebody lost his life.

It is at this point that the story turns. We do not learn how exactly it came about that the "chef de barrage", who in this episode turned into a "*petit* chef de barrage", came to attack them. We only know that people from the region had gathered for a nightly dance competition. If this was an all-night dance event such as I have experienced myself, as an outsider you had better not disturb the community at such a moment or you risk the assembled energy turning against you. Certainly, the villagers had had *bangui* (palmwine), perhaps beer and liquor. They must have felt strong as a group, as they outnumbered the rebels by large number and knew they could master their own terrain at night. This is how in the story, a rather under-explained attack by the rebels is followed by the community's outburst of anger. Perhaps a minor provocation was the final straw which led to aggressions, we don't know. In the chief's account, the population vented their built-up fury on the rebel's body.

This action is clearly more than a mere defensive reaction. It seems to be payback for past transgressions. It triggered a series of subsequent actions that led to a lasting change in the relationship between the rebels at the roadblock and the village. It was not settled with a beating; they had to pull out all the stops to handle the situation. Such moments of cumulative revenge are a great risk for civilian populations. They had to expect retaliation from the rebels afterwards, as is evident from the tale of Bonpleu. This is the moment the unarmed party plays its trump card, a badly-needed game-changer in this situation. Almost miraculously, the local rebels' revenge was prevented by their hierarchy and men were deployed from as far as Korhogo to come to their rescue. The village headman concludes the sequence of events with an almost fairy tale-like happy ending, ready for press: *Et nous sommes restés en paix depuis lors*. In a literary translation: And we lived in peace and quiet ever after.

Every rebel transgression, from the foodstuff, to the burglary to the ripping off at roadblocks was concluded with a reassuring phrase (or shall I say refrain?). In a variety of ways, the refrain said that the (very) bad times did not last long, that people were spared or that they were lucky compared to what other villages went through. The structure of the chief's account was suffused by a meta-narration, which showed that despite the difficulties and deprivations of the past, the village has and will always find a way out. Since this particular account depicted a public act in the central open social space of the village, it was also an inspirational message for the future, namely, that the village of Kandopleu will always overcome difficulties, no matter what. The story was accompanied by laughter from the narrator and the audience alike. It had an

empowering mood and message. In his coda, he synthesises their sagacity, and not without pride: Kandopleu was a village in which rebels could not behave any way they pleased, the villagers had managed to keep the rebels out of the village and their village is in good hands.

Seduced by the narrative, I naïvely asked who that contact person within the top-ranks of the rebellion was. Of course, they did not give away their prized possession. This personal connection is their insurance, a resource and trump card they will never activate without just cause – perhaps only used this one time and never again. From a literal or realistic point of view, it appears preposterous that a detachment from Korhogo, a town which is about a day's journey from Man, would come to the rescue of the village. In a figurative sense, however, this episode takes on a different meaning. It expresses the deep trust in personal connections – trust that a person to whom one has a relationship will intervene and save the subject in his darkest hour. The confident conviction that a personal contact at the highest level will come to the rescue of the village and take control is impressive. In this light, the narrative transforms into a hymn on trust in personal bonds to those who hold power.

The village chief is definitely a gifted narrator. I was impressed by how he remembered the exact dates of the onset of the war and produced seemingly pin sharp scenes of Man at the beginning of the war. Furthermore, the well-crafted form of the account, I think, shows a high level of control and mastery of the situation, at least discursively.

But let us take a moment to pause and listen for silences. The episode in which a character was killed featured a Senegalese – a foreigner and guest[387], but not somebody from their local community. Neither did the murder – or as the chief would say – killing happen at their own roadblock, but elsewhere. Hence, the worst incidences in the account are presented to have taken place outside the village and community. Sequentially, however, this murder-episode prepared and somehow justified the molesting of the rebel in their own village. The account lacks any other explanations as to why the relationship between the rebels at the roadblock and the village turned so sour that night. The sequential analysis shows that the climax, in which the silent victims turn into actors who decide about life and death, followed the murder of a businessman unrelated to the village. The distance created between the most devastating, tragic episode in the account and the village community is therefore perhaps negated through silence

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[387] A foreigner in the cultural understanding is simultaneously their guest, for whose well-being they were responsible in a symbolic way. To give an example, when I stumbled due to my own clumsiness, my host mother looked worried and carefully examined the little graze on my foot: 'What will people say at home, when they see your wound?'

as a means of protection. It is possible that the village really was lucky; but it is equally possible that there were difficult and painful memories concerning the village itself that the village chief did not want to revive in public and to an outsider (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 74).

Summary and discussion

What was social life like during the first period of rebel rule and what can we say about trust and distrust in the rebel-society relationship between ruler and ruled?

What is puzzling about the first period of rebel rule is that even if violence and breaches of social norms were further committed (by the rebels themselves and to a lesser extent others), the same rebels simultaneously engaged in endeavours to provide security and create order. The case of Touré is perhaps the most antagonistic case; helping a village to protect its inhabitants and simultaneously threatening, abusing and killing people. Personally speaking, I find this the hardest period of social life to understand – not because of its destructiveness or its sheer creativity, but because of the simultaneousness of seemingly antagonistic tendencies. Destruction, reconstruction and construction all happened at the same time and in parallel.

Whereas I had a narrative or trajectory in mind that was: destruction, perhaps a period of despair and then reconstruction, or to say it in terms of trust loss of trust, paralysation from distrust and gradual rebuilding of trust, these phases overlapped.

Social memory and sense-making practices may remember this time in a 'drama'-like fashion, in which different, successive acts are neatly organised into a coherent narrative as exemplified in the powerful oral performance by the chief of Kandopleu. But reality seems to be different. Destructive and reconstructive acts overlapped not just because there were rebels with different motives, but because the same person overstepped certain norms (in relation to women, killing other men) and helped to establish security and protect others from harm (providing them with armed men for security). Whereas culture and society want to distinguish clearly between good and evil, in 'actual fact' contradictions merge:

Conventional wisdom posits that war must first be ended, and then the developments of peace can be attended to, as people are able to turn their energies to creating a future. But my data does not support this conclusion. It would seem peace begins – indeed must begin – in the thick of battle, among those least armed and often most violated. (Nordstrom 2004, 180)

It is also noteworthy that what determines what social life will be like and which norms will be respected is co-constructed by rebels and civilians. Civilians are much more active than one might think. Civilians do not just hide or flee, they also confront violent actors, hence they "limit violence" (Förster 2009). People have testified several times to how they – when things had gone very bad – decided to build a small delegation, carry a gift with them and talk to the rebels. They did not speak of resistance. The way they put it was usually in very simple terms: They refused to continue in this way (living in the bush etc.), hence, they had to do something about it.

If they hadn't taken the risk of facing a rebel somewhere, if they hadn't had a small grain of trust that they would be heard or believed in the success of their action, they would not have brought their problems to the rebels. However, in Robert's case it becomes clear that social actors do not act and only "place trust where it is warranted", as is often suggested in theories of trust (Warren 1999b). Although I admit that these are liminal cases of trust, Thomas, Nicole and Robert acted with minimal trust and much hope – despite distrust and danger.

It was an ambiguous time in which some people were robbed, the material basis of their existence destroyed, men easily shot, women sexually abused. At the same time, electricity was brought back to the town of Man, the municipal office was officially reopened, the first children went back to class and a local TV chain, newspaper and radio station were created. It is this initial period of the civil war that comes closest to Nordstrom's war stories (Nordstrom 1997), where civilians defy war and violence by doing what they have always done, work as an electrician, a teacher, a journalist, a health practitioner etc. As Nordstrom put it by people's "sheer act of remaining in the face of danger, they defy danger … [and] reestablished a disordered world." (Nordstrom 1997, 14–15)

Contrary to what I first expected, the rebels – or their leadership in particular – had a credit of trust (*Vertrauensvorschuss*) in advance from various social groups within the population. They were not exclusively perceived as a threat, as criminals who had come solely for private gains. They were expected and trusted to provide general security and were indeed approached by a broad range of actors with Dan and Wè backgrounds, men and women, rich and poor, with and without personal acquaintances among the rebels (village Dhéobly). Despite the fact that the rebels were irregular actors, there were people from different social milieus who placed their trust in them – without having previously experienced their trustworthiness. Hence, as described

in our project's typology, institutional trust was based on induction (Förster, Dobler, and Bauer 2007b).[388]

Only when the leadership of the rebels failed to control their soldiers did people lose trust. The loss of trust in this case was based on a lack of competence in the first place. As one of these early chiefs put it:

Vous savez qu'être chef des opérations dans un état-major est un honneur, une récompense de la compétence d'un homme. C'est pourquoi je veux garder ce sérieux et cette confiance qui m'a été faite. (Doumbia 2003b, 5)

However the trust placed in the rebels' competence to provide security during this time was disappointed and raised questions about their priorities and motivations, too. The feeling that civilians were not the rebels' priority also created doubts about the rebels' motivations in their role of leadership. As we can learn from Kamal's account, basic social trust and general security was low, personal efforts by the MPCI-core group were necessary to protect people and goods. Such special treatment could only be provided to people with higher status, such as the Lebanese, whereas this was 'beyond the leadership's capacities' for a young woman from a poor neighbourhood.

But what was most damaging for trust in the rebellion was when the rebel leadership itself was directly involved in civilian abuses. Whereas abuses by a subordinate could more easily be seen as a deviation, abuses by 'rebel chiefs' cast doubt on the intentions and goals of the insurgents as an institution. In case of abuses by a low-rank, trust in the rebellion as an institution could be partially restored by proper punishment.

The failure to provide security to the population was characteristic for *Le temps sauvage*. Moreover, the failure to protect victims when they asked for help, even with personal relationships as in the case of Rachelle, had a decisive impact on the trust relationship between the population and the rebels in their role of the authorities. It created distrust and shaped people's social practices and everyday life during these wild times.

Whereas the first leadership managed to communicate and show they had benign motivations, they did not have the capacity and competence to protect the population from abuse and harm.

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[388] Although I will not explore possible explanations here, I would like to point to the fact that during the military transition in 1999/2000, similar social practices were observed. A newspaper article by J.B. Boti in "Le Jeune Démocrate" in February 2000 titled : 'Incroyable: les militaires sollicités pour régler même des divorces' (N'Guessan 2002, 62).

They failed to provide security. Insecurity and arbitrary abuse by foreign supplementary mercenaries, low-ranks and self-proclaimed chiefs cast a shadow of violence on their rule which created deep mistrust and delegitimised their rule (Schlichte 2009).

10 Consolidating rebel rule and building trust

In June/July 2003, the locally produced newspaper *Tambour* was still full of reports of nightly armed robberies, abusive acts against civilians, rapes, etc.. There were lots of stolen goods on the market for resale. Only rarely, they found their way back to their original proprietors. Often members of the New Forces or their former members were involved, which damaged the image of the rebel movement as a whole and created distrust.

When I arrived in 2008, however, the town had left these times behind. There was order in the sense that goods usually stayed with their owner and streets remained populated long after nightfall. There was a degree of security that allowed people like the old Bamba to return – despite the presence of the rebels from whom he had fled in 2002. Hence, there was an appeasement of the general political situation and there was enough trust and security that enabled such returns.

What had made this change possible? How can we explain the enhanced security situation and – let me call it – the thin but consolidated trust relationship between the population and the rebel rulers?

This chapter will explore these questions and look at several intertwined aspects that may account for this gradual transformation. The difficulty of this chapter is to describe a process that involved several parallel developments. I will examine the process of trust building by directing the analytical lens at economic relationships, security and the consolidation of rule that are all intertwined and discuss these elements in turn.

I will start by discussing a thesis that can be summarised as 'security in exchange for taxation'. This question will lead us to the war economy of the rebellion that I will only address to the point where it is relevant for the understanding of the trust relationship between rulers and ruled. In a next step, I will summarise what some of the rebels told me about the production of security and order in the zone that lead to the consolidation of their rule under one chain of command. At this point, I will describe the administrative structure of the New Forces in zone six that I

observed in 2008/2009 during the time of my field research. Furthermore, the role of the UN for security and trust has to be addressed, as the deployment of the ONUCI fell into that period (2004). Last but not least, I will describe how thicker forms of trust were generated by connecting, building relationships and establishing lines of communication mediated by representatives of the population.

Interdependency: Security for taxation

When in July 2003, the newly assigned leadership of the New Forces under commander Loss took office in Man, his crew met a population that was deeply affected by the war. The Directeur du Cabinet, Inza Fofana, said they were shocked, and that their first task was to restore trust: *"Il fallait ramener la confiance au sein de ces populations."*[389] The new leadership with Losséni Fofana at its head faced an enormous task to create order and to provide security, in order to (re)build trust, when the first military leadership had shot their bolt. To gain trust and to be perceived as trustworthy, Loss and his crew had to work hard and perform well.

I have put the question of how the security situation was made possible to military and civilian actors at different occasions during my research, each of them providing explanations from his or her point of view. One person to whom I addressed the question was a teacher in retirement. His observation can be summarised as 'security in exchange for taxation'. Here is how he explained it:

KATHRIN: *Pourquoi la violence des Forces Nouvelles envers la population a diminué? Comment vous croyez que ça a changé?*

GBA: *Parce que … pour vous dire exactement comment ça a changé … Mais nous les vieux on pense qu'ils ont opté sur les recettes qu'ils ramassent ici. C'est ça qu'ils se sont dits. Si on commence à faire trop de violence sur la population, si la population se révolte contre nous, ça [ne] va pas rester seulement à Man, ça va aller très loin et on va perdre. Donc il faut qu'on aille molo-molo [doucement, doucement] avec la population, que d'être très violent pour les pousser à la révolte. Voilà la raison que nous, on se dit.*[390]

My question was about violence and security and his answer was about taxation. His statement points at an interdependency in the relationship between the rebels and the population that was

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[389] Directeur du cabinet civil (Dir-cab), Inza Fofana, Forces Nouvelles, Man, 10/08/2010.
[390] Gba, 60s, Dan-speaking, retired teacher, 26/02/2009.

based on the rebels' need for financial resources. By mid-2003, most goods, banks and livestock had been pillaged. There was little left to steal. Hence, someone had to produce. In the words of the old man, the rebels "opted" to take the receipts. This made the rebels dependent on the population. Taxation gave the population leverage and a counterbalance in their power relationship. If there was too much insecurity, people would not be able to go about their productive activities. If the New Forces asked for too much, this would scare business away. According to the teacher, the New Forces realised that they would only lose in case of a revolt: It had resulted in a loss of taxation revenue and, perhaps even in a loss of their own hierarchies' blessings due to the international attention it may cause, etc.

Indeed, the new command under Loss was very aware of the interconnections between business, security – *and* trust! Only ten days after their official installation, on 30 July 2003, the Directeur de cabinet du Com-zone (Dir-cab), organised a meeting between the new military authorities and the representatives of the economic sector at the CAV (centre culturel audio-visuel), part of the Catholic Church Centre St Michel. In his first interview he gave the local newspaper *Le Tambour*, he said:

Je suis chargé de réglementer l'administration qui n'existe pratiquement pas. Mettre sur pied une politique qui puisse inciter les opérateurs à revenir à Man. Car qui parle de politique économique parle de politique sécuritaire. Et tout cela sous le commandement du Com-zone Loss, qui fait mains et pieds afin d'instaurer un climat de confiance entre les habitants de la vaste région des 18 montagnes. (Lamko 2003b, 7)

Associations of business sectors were represented and were given the opportunity to raise difficulties that they encountered in day-to-day business. Their main concern, according to newspaper reports, was banditry, hence security (Lamko 2003c, 6). For the "frank collaboration" that the authorities wished to engage in with the business sector, it was crucial that the latter could trust that despite the taxes, they would still be able to make ends meet, possibly make profits and not be robbed at night.

Explanations from political economists have described such "mechanisms", as they like to term them, between security and business, for a long time, either for states or for rebel groups. Drawing on previous scholarship, Weinstein, for instance, argued that rebel groups can "reap greater rewards in the long term if they constrain their behaviour today" (Weinstein 2007, 168).

Business and taxation

According to a representative of a large labour union, each of the military commands had come to see them, after assuming power.[391] One of the largest and wealthiest unions is the trader's union with about 2,000 members, many of whom sell their goods at the central market in Man or the adjacent, central main roads. Several of these large labour unions, such as the traders' and transporters' are in the hands of Jula. Trade and transportation is their preferred métier. Hence, the heads of these unions as well as the majority of their members shared cultural and political belonging with the rebels, which offered both sides an initial basis for trust and facilitated talks.

My interlocutors said that the rebels did not know much about how much they usually had to pay to the state; neither did they check their account books. Therefore, a trader said that they paid less under rebel rule than under state control. [392] However, low-income businesses had a more difficult time under rebel rule, as the rebels taxed them, too; for instance youngsters offering their phones for people to call, the so-called 'cabine' or 'mobile phone booth' had to pay a weekly tax, about 500 (not quite a Euro). Furthermore, the subsistence farmers, too, if coming from the field they had to give something until 2009/2010. Their experience with taxation under rebel rule was close to extortion. A man active in the FPI said that: *"L'ivoirien qui fait pas de commerce ne sent pas qu'il paye les impôts. Peut-être pour son ticket pour aller à Abidjan, il paye son impôt dedans, mais il sent pas."[393]* Transportation prices had risen tremendously: Before the war, from Facobly to Man, people paid about 300 to 500; in 2008/2009, they paid up to 1,000.[394]

Whereas the first commands during the times of war, when they still hoped to reach San Pedro, have not had tax receipts, the administration under Loss produced printed tax receipts for nearly every business branch.[395]

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[391] Union representative, 60s, Jula-speaking, 09/12/2012.

[392] In the coming paragraphs, I will not always provide my source of information due to the sensitivity of the topic and if I feel that informants may be easily identified despite a pseudonym.

[393] Jacques, 30s, Wè-speaking, Facobly, 06/11/2008.

[394] Jacques, 06/11/2008.

[395] Marie, 40s, market woman, Man, 02/12/2008.

Rebels and civilians alike needed to keep business running to gain their living. Hence, both sides had an interest in making things work.[396] Although we have seen in the previous chapter that transporters continued their trade under constraining circumstances with roadblocks at every little hamlet along the road, they demanded more security and predictability. To flourish, business needs a predictable framework, otherwise the risk of financial and material loss is too high. As the rebels were interested in skimming off as much as they could gain, it was in their own interest to organise their soldiers. Also other service providers, such as the Ivorian water supplier (SODECI) told the New Forces' leadership that it "would be interesting", if they had security for their employees, which would allow them to deploy more agents to Man.[397]

Côte d'Ivoire had a running economy with economic actors specialised in their fields. Many were eager to come back after the short war and launch themselves into business again. The timber industry is a business sector where you can hardly hide. The huge heavy logs can only be moved with special equipment. Each businessman who engaged in logging had to pay over 500,000 CFA per month to the military authorities as an authorisation to operate. There were over 20 independent business operators engaged in logging in Man.[398] In addition to the authorisation, there were taxes at the roadblocks per log and load.[399] The amount demanded by the sawmills was higher and paid on a weekly basis.[400] Many different actors observed that there was an abusive exploitation of the forests and forest reserves. I was told by civilians that it probably was '*terrain glissant*', a sensitive topic and that it might raise suspicion if I further investigated.

As far as the rebels' own businesses are concerned, in timber exploitation, for instance, I have far less frequently heard that the rebels had their own machines. It was less work to skim off what others produced. The rebels in zone six were less armed business entrepreneurs with a mafia boss allure than meticulous administrators skimming off surplus as much as possible. In

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[396] In Korhogo, the transporters' spokesman who addressed the rebels to negotiate reliable taxes was a "Kassoum Coulibaly, who, among many other enterprises, also owned TCK, the biggest bus company in the North. […] these negotiations led to the establishment of reliable standards atmost checkpoints in the North. […] Every bus and lorry driver then knew approximately show much he was expected to pay" (Förster 2009, 342–43).

[397] Diabaté, 40s, employee in leading position (SODECI), Man, 30/12/2008.

[398] Reza, 30s, Lebanese, businessman, Man, 27/12/2008.

[399] FN, mid-ranked, Commandant Say-say, 30s Jula-speaking from Man, 07/11/2008.

[400] Zahlé, 40s, Lebanese, businessman, Man, 13/11/2008.

timber exploitation, they milked private entrepreneurs to the extent that one or the other said the rebels were 'robbers', but it still seems to have been worth doing business in Man.

Where they were directly involved in business was in the petrol distribution. They made private investments with the taxes they received, ran hotels and bought property or constructed elsewhere. The petrol stations were all run by the New Forces and petrol was sold at a higher price to the population. However, the population hardly complained, for they paid neither electricity nor water bills during rebel rule.[401]

It is in the domain of taxation that they developed much creativity, inventing different taxes, rather than becoming businessmen themselves. Some started to sell their own tax receipts instead of the ones for the zone or central to make some money for their own pockets. Others sent their 'little ones' to intimidate businessmen by telling them that they owned them taxes (CFA 150,000).[402]

Despite the bleeding, business remained worthwhile. A beverage distributor, for instance, said that they had no problems in zone 6, after they had made initial donations first in Bouaké and then in Man. In Séguéla, however, the Com-zone asked them an exorbitant sum of money only to open a business branch, so that the company abandoned its plan to open a branch in this zone. By brushing aside the company's concern, zone 5 lost the possibility to tax the company.[403] In Man, the top-ranks made sure these business people were exempt from 'demands' from the low-ranks. Business people could call the high-ranks if in trouble and would usually also 'get served', because of the work they did for the rebels' income.[404]

A big nuisance for many businesses in town was when the rebels did not pay or only were reluctant when business operators came to collect their debts. I have heard stories about debts of high-ranking rebels in restaurants, slaughterhouses and garages, etc. where they had only paid part of it.[405] However, local practices around "*encaissement*" are frequently tiring. The consequence was that when rebel chiefs sent their 'little ones' again, businessmen told them that the required item was lacking this day. In 2008, it was no longer possible to take things by force, so now one had to resort to manipulation of another sort. Oftentimes, those who felt intimidated paid; others resisted in one way or another. In one case, for instance, the zone

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[401] I do not have information about the exploitation of soils etc.

[402] Romano, 50s, European decent, missionary, 17/03/2009.

[403] Lass, 30s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (beverage distributor), Man, 08/03/2009.

[404] Zahlé, 13/11/2008.

[405] M. Sangaré, 40s, Jula-speaking, businessman, Man, 20/10/2008.

commander had given the money to pay for a good, but the middleman wanted to keep it for himself. The businessman, however, was not ready to hand out the goods without pay and called the zone commander, so that the middleman had to hand out the money.[406]

The trust that grew between the New Forces and the business operators, gave the transport union confidence enough to go on strike. In November 2006, they went on strike for three days. To talk about the grievances, the commander and his entourage, notably his Directeur de cabinet (Dir-cab), organised a meeting to discuss with the transport union at one of the local hotels (Monsia 2007, 3). The latter complained about the many taxes and the flow of traffic that was still hampered due to the many roadblocks. The military authorities managed to come to a mutual agreement with them. As the rebels had used non-violent means to resolve the conflict, civilian business felt their power and gained confidence. This experience unleashed yet another boost of trust. In the words of Dir-cab commenting on this episode: *"Dans notre zone, tellement que les gens étaient en confiance que les transporteurs ont osé faire des grèves ici, ce qui les a réellement remis en confiance."*[407]

The interdependency that was created in the economic sector was a decisive shift in the power balance. In the interview with me the Dir-cab stressed that he was responsible for bringing back trust and social cohesion. He observed the following: *"C'est ... cette mise en confiance, cette indépendance, cette interdépendance des différentes groupes qui fait que la cohésion est revenu au niveau de la ville de Man."*[408] Somehow the leadership in Man realised that they gained so much more by cooperation, talk, taking views' of their "tax payers" into consideration than by showing force.

Débrouillage for low-ranks

It is obvious that taxation in exchange for security can only work if the money is re-distributed down to the low-ranks. Therefore, I will briefly look at the situation of the low-ranks. I met several local low-ranks who self-demobilised themselves after the first period in 2003 and went back to civil life: one became a voluntary teacher, another worked for a Lebanese. Chelpi-den Hamer describes that around 2006/2007, the commanders in Man were reluctant to see their low-ranks being demobilised by humanitarian agencies. They rather tried to keep their foot soldiers together in order to have them available if need be (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 168).

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[406] Romano, 17/03/2009.
[407] Dir-cab, 10/08/2010.
[408] Dir-cab, 10/08/2010.

However, many were struggling to get by. They received rice at the camp and were allowed to work at one of the check-points every two to three weeks. Administrative responsibilities were split: one was responsible for timber trucks, one for coffee and cocoa, one for public transport, yet another for motorbikes, etc.[409] Each tax collector was expected to deposit a fixed sum every day at the headquarters. Whatever they made as surplus, they could share among themselves.[410]

Every time their turn came, they received 2,000 from the headquarters and could keep whatever else they managed to 'extort' from civilians (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 169). Supervisors at one of the major entry points to Man told me that they received 5,000 per day.[411] When roadblocks were gradually removed and for instance, the motorbike tax was stopped, the income of low-ranks diminished and caused new problems. Not everyone would be prepared to put up with it. *'Tout le monde n'est pas même chose'*, military and non-military people agreed.[412] However, some of them turned up in burglaries, hence creating new insecurity.

In 2008, many low-ranks complained that they had to share taxes with several youths who had never fought, but had come to '*se débrouiller aux corridors*', to get by at the check-points.[413] Those who managed to impose themselves had a close relationship with the *patrons* and generally were from the Com-zone's region of origin, hence Koyaga. Without jobs, they travelled to Man and asked their grand-frères to 'find' or 'create' a job for them, as one of them described in an interview with me.[414] This practice created discontent among the senior ones, particularly among those who had fought the battles of Man before Loss had become commander-in-chief in Man. They felt marginalised and excluded from the privileged positioning particularly the Koyaga received in the patrimonial network. Those who shared this grievance formed a group, developed a shared discourse about their fate: Had they not taken arms because the Baule had only employed Baule, they asked rhetorically in conversations and

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[409] One of my low-rank informers literally said, that each of them had his "*branche*", one of them "played the role of customs, another one the role of *Eaux et forêts …*" (FN, low-ranked, Bakary, 30s, Dan-speaking, 07/11/2008).

[410] Commandant Say-say, 07/11/2008.

[411] FN, low-ranked, Amara, 20s, 06/11/2008.

[412] Gueu junior, 30s, Dan-speaking, planter, (Fraternité) Man, 17/10/2008; FN, low-ranked, Camara, 20s, Jula/Dan background, 02/12/2008.

[413] Commandant Say-say, 07/11/2008; FN, low-ranked, Little cowboy, 20s, Jula-speaking, 06/11/2008.

[414] FN, low-ranked, Fof, 30s, Jula-speaking, 11/11/2008.

complained about 'xenophobia'.[415] Several from this group participated in the coup attempt against the Com-zone Loss at the beginning of February 2009 (more in the next chapter).[416]

Displaying trustworthiness

Apart from creating trustworthy conditions described above that allowed a range of positive experiences that fostered trust, the rebels had further ways to encourage trust on the truster's side. The New Forces tried to display their trustworthiness, so that businesspeople felt encouraged to do business and consequently pay taxes in their zone (Gambetta and Hamill 2005; Beckert 2006). More people meant more taxes. Taking this into consideration, it becomes clear that impression management became key (Goffman 1959, 1969).

The chief of security for instance mentioned in a conversation that to show people that they have changed and that their territories were no longer as in 2003 the leadership made sure that their foot soldiers were dressed in conventional military manner. The rebels drew on familiar signs to perform their change, such as 'proper uniforms', berets, etc. Foot-soldiers were told to wear boots, not flip-flops at the road blocks. Particularly at the entry-points to Man, they attempted to signal trustworthiness and professionalism to newcomers.[417] Impression management with clothes was crucial and is actually borrowed from everyday life: "Actors try to retain control over the impression they make on others through their choice of dress. As clothing both expresses and impresses, it can be exploited to manipulate social relationships." (Bauer 2008, 71) As the quotation highlights, it is not always easy for observers to detect whether signs of trustworthiness can be trusted – an aspect discussed by Gambetta (Gambetta 1988a; Gambetta and Hamill 2005, 9).

In proper military wear, the New Forces 'looked like real ones', as a visitors commented who came to see me from abroad. They had an interest to be seen as professional because they wanted to be recognised and respected as governors so that later they could (re-)integrate into the national armed forces. Hence, they had to get rid of their rebel-allure and perform their selves and their structure as a professional army. Signboards in town and on walls used neat lettering to indicate headquarters, police stations, etc. quite similar to institutions in government-held towns. The rebels no longer wanted to be feared, but respected. Their power

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[415] Commandant Say-say, 07/11/2008; Bakary, 30s, Dan-speaking, 07/11/2008, 16/02/2009.

[416] According to several sources, IB, Soro Guillaume's rival, was part of the plot.

[417] Cobra, chief of security, 30s, Jula-speaking, FN, high-ranked, 24/11/2008.

no longer rested singularly on coercion, they depended on the populations revenues and therefore sought compliance with their authority. But now and again they made use of their rebel past and performed threat. The name tags on their uniforms still showed their nicknames and not their surnames – remnants of the rebellion.[418] The rebels no longer intended to scare people, as they did at the onset of the war, when Martin observed their entry into Man. In 2008/2009, they wanted to appear professional and trustworthy.

Even if the display of trustworthiness was an externalisation of their motivations and intentions, for the evidence-based aspect of trust the competence to create trustworthy conditions remained critical for encouraging trust giving and eventually trust building. In the following part, I will describe how the New Forces in Man created trustworthy conditions.

Security and order: Creating trustworthy conditions

Establishing a single chain of command

How did they create order and security among themselves? At a military level, they had to establish control and fight dissidents not ready to comply with the rules of the new regime. Self-proclaimed rebel leaders with their entourage had to be subjected, eliminated, or pushed into exile. To facilitate that, Bouaké rotated personnel so that people could start anew at a different locality, when entering a new phase in the peace process. Gradually, the new team under Loss established their monopoly on the use of force.[419]

As low- and high-ranks explained to me, their strategy has always been to mix staff from the old and the new leadership. The reason for mixed patrols is that the new ones who are actually brought to create order do not know the terrain, yet. The old ones knew about where arms were hidden, etc. Therefore the new crew was dependent on the previous one: *"C'est [eux] qui connaissent mieux la zone",* as Diabaté says (Doumbia 2003d, 8). A low-rank who, in the position of the new ones helped securing Danané, said they called this "cleaning" their zones, namely by fighting groups and individuals among them who did not want to comply with the

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[418] Transformed into Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) in 2011, Cobra was still presented as 'chief Cobra' to a UN military observer in June 2011. It was only when he entered the French 43rd battalion in Abidjan in 2012 for training that Cobra became 'trainee *Ouattara'.

[419] The account from the village Bonpleu presented in Chapter 8 falls exactly into the time when commanders like Adams and Coulibaly had been assigned to the north and the new leadership under Loss did not really master the terrain in Man, yet.

new leadership. Access to weapons and ammunition was centralised as well as possible, even if several hid their arms. It goes without saying that the collaboration between the new and old rebels in a locality is a very delicate task. Both sides are extremely vulnerable, as they all carry arms. *'Il faut faire doucement'*, I was told by soldiers several times.

Yéo cimetière is quoted to have said: *"Des patrouilles qui ne sont pas des rafles sont organisées chaque soir pour dissuader d'éventuelles attaques de la population."* (Lamko 2003a, 8) However, patrols have remained an equivalent for raids for young men for a long time. They feared to be taken off randomly from the streets, allegedly for being outside at a certain time in the evening and being up to something.

In August 2003, there were five police stations: in the quartier 13, Libreville, Grand Gbapleu, Camp Séa and Domoraud (Lamko 2003b). A rebel who served as a policeman in the unit at Grand Gbapleu said that as they "knew each other", it was not so difficult for them to identify and hunt down the robbers. A new *"préfet de police"*, police commissioner, Vassiriki Keita took office, recruited those with a certain level of education among the foot soldiers to support him (Mames 2003, 7). If those responsible for actions such as in Bonpleu held posts in various services such as the command a patrols or of police stations, this would not inspire trust.

The leadership established radio programmes to send their messages to the population. In 2003, they initiated a programme called *"le grognon"*, "the grumbler", in which people from the zone could call and complain about mistreatment from certain soldiers even in distant places. The Dir-Cab said that they received a lot of information also from those who have the phone booth in certain villages, where there is hardly network and people did not have their own phones. This was also a means of protecting those who provided information. As we have seen with Rachelle, it could be dangerous to complain. According to the Dir-cab the effect of publicising such abuses already had a deterring effect, and they also sent detachments to arrest those who committed such acts: *"balayer ceux qui étaient à la base de ces irrégularités"*.[420] Chelpi-den Hamer quotes an INGO situational report from Man, dating from November 2003, in which Loss appealed to the parents on the local radio that they should talk to their youngsters to respect the internal rules and should not engage in robberies (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 178).

Another key technique was to identify and train their fighters, combatants of the new and old guard alike. During that time they introduced new grades and assigning everyone a function

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[420] Sensitisation in terms of the military-civil nexus was also promoted on the part of the UN bodies when they arrived in 2004. I lack information about concrete programmes and their effect.

and unit. They organised training for their militarised civilians, taught them military discipline and produced ID cards. I have documented two such ID cards from October 2003. They carry the name, personal code, function, service and unit of the soldier, and have a picture and stamp of the *"zone ouest"*. One of the cards indicated that my informant was as a policeman, and his posting was to the third police station. The other one indicated the name of his superior in order to identify the unit. Another possibility that the soldiers' identification card offered was to monitor their movements. Each armed member of the New Forces who wanted to travel to another zone needed an *"ordre de mission"*, an authorisation. Furthermore, they tried to centralise access to weaponry.

After 2004, the presence of the UN further enhanced the security situation. In 2005 and 2006 policemen and gendarmes were recruited and trained with the support of the UN police to take over dispute settlements among civilians. They were released in late December 2006 and began working in the region of Man in early 2007 (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011, 119). I have met a young gendarme who worked in one of the smaller towns in zone six and he said that he had been in Abidjan, had applied and was recruited during this process.[421]

Although it remained difficult for me to understand how the leadership eventually brought about more security, key elements seem to have been preventive measures by setting up rules and punishment in case of violation. The reorganisation of the rebellion into a hierarchical structure under one chain of command has to be seen as a key achievement. It was a long process to bring about order and security *(Ordnungssicherheit)* that would eventually foster trust (Popitz 1999). In a next step, I will describe the administrative structure in Man in the way I observed it in 2008/2009.

The military-patrimonial rule in Man (2008/2009)

The following description is based on conversations with military and civilian actors, commanders and low-ranks, as well as political activists, youth representatives, service providers and business people. Even civilians who were critical acknowledged that they were well organised. The aim of the following description is to show an order that was achieved *in practice* and that I observed on several occasions. However, the description is my interpretation after having pieced together information from various sources. It might therefore be incomplete and does not represent an authoritative organogram of the zone.

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[421] FN-gendarme, 30s, Jula-speaking, 06/08/2009.

The commander-in-chief is the *commandant de zone*, Loss, "Papa Cobra". He was a corporal in the Ivorian army, became a commander in the rebellion and was appointed *Commandant du Groupement d'instruction militaire (1 de Man)* including zones 7 and 8, Touba and Odienné in the new army in August 2010. He had a second and a third in command, Tuo Adama Diarrassouba,[422] and Eloy Zouaty (Zoulou[423]), both of whom had an army background. Zoulou served as the head of the PCO (*poste de commandement opérationnel*), the operational office that served as military police station with a small prison cell. Loss' right hand for rapid interventions, or 'muscle', was the chief of security, called *Cobra*, who as a tall man stood out among Loss' men during the early days in Bouaké, so that his pre-war name was given to the military unit as a whole. Further commanders were in charge of the prison, gendarmerie and police.[424] The zone was divided into a northern and southern sector, headed by commanders of different battalions, the Com-secteur nord (Tuo) and the Com-secteur sud (Koné), whose adjoint was Malick whom I will mention in the text by name during the internal insurgency. For communication, the zone commander had a *Chargé de Communication*, popularly called *Lass communication*, who also served as an interlocutor for the peace-keepers' liaison officer. Lass had a university background, spoke French and English fluently, as well as some Spanish and German. There was a financial section with an *intendant*. Furthermore, they had also a *Responsable des Affaires Sociales* who was in charge of social projects with youths from the neighbourhoods, for instance. However, the key person for civilians who wanted to contact the military authorities was the 'Dir-cab' (short for *Directeur de cabinet du Com-zone*) Inza Fofana, the director of the zone commander's cabinet. He was trained as bailiff before the crisis and was in charge of the zone's civil administration. As a close relative of the zone commander he somehow was considered the number two in the organisation.[425]

Basically, every business branch, service or population group had its interlocutor, a person assigned to receive the queries of the corresponding actor group. Commander Tuo, the com-secteur nord, for instance, was in charge of questions concerning the CIE, SODECI and Côte

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[422] Corporal Chief Tuo Adama Diarrassouba was persecuted by Guéï's men following the *"complot du cheval blanc"* and subsequently went into exile. He served as com-secteur sud in Séguéla from where he was promoted "commandant de zone adjoint", second in command to Loss in July 2005 (Doumbia 2007a, 3).

[423] Zoulou is not a war name, but an army name, I was told. Zoulou signifies Z in the Morse alphabet and is the first letter of Zouaty.

[424] On Mondays they had their weekly meeting with the UN and French peacekeepers and Thursday morning they had the assembly (*rassemblement*).

[425] He signed my research authorisation.

d'Ivoire Télécom, as well as the dozow. As a Dan speaker, Zoulou would receive the neighbourhood and village chiefs; another one was responsible for the religious communities, etc. Despite this division of labour, many also went directly to the headquarters to see the Com-zone or one of his acting commanders for any queries.

Although this is not a study on the institutionalisation of power, I will point out one or the other aspect. Drawing on Popitz's institutionalisation of power (Popitz 1999), Schlichte identifies two forms of institutionalisation that are crucial in his study on armed groups: patrimonialisation and formalisation. In the case of patrimonialisation, decisions and power are dependent on the person at the top, the *patron*. If power congeals into positions, it becomes institutionalised and consequently power is turned into domination (Popitz 1999, 244–55). Incumbents no longer only act according to their personal discretion, but orient their actions on positional procedures and more formalised norms (Schlichte 2009, 145).

The military administration in Man had elements of both, patrimonialisation and formalisation, due to the fact that it was part of a yet larger structure with its headquarters in Bouaké. Whereas some positions were filled by the centre in Bouaké, as the second and third in command and the Com-secteurs, the chief of security, for instance, was assigned by the Com-zone himself. Cobra, the man he put in charge of the security of the zone in roughly 2006 was a militarised civilian he had met in Bouaké at the beginning in 2002 and who gained his trust by both merit and loyalty.[426] Loss had several such men; the Com-secteurs of Mahapleu and Facobly in 2008/2009, for instance, were further such cases. Hence, there is an element of merit and friendship that constituted another decisive factor of the structure in place.

In terms of patrimonial elements, two aspects can be pointed out: The first is that in the region's patron-client logic the Com-zone was "papa Cobra" to all his subordinates, described also elsewhere for armed groups along the Upper-Guinea Coast (Murphy 2003; Peters 2011a). Apart from that, the fact that one of Loss' cousins headed the civil administration, much of which dealt with money matters, introduced yet another further powerful patrimonial element into the zone's political order. This again, had the effect that young Koyaga came to Man in the hope that they would find jobs with their *grand-frères*, as admitted in an interview with me by one of them who worked at a checkpoint but had never fought during the war.

To sum up, during Loss' rule between 2003 and 2006, we can observe a political order that shifted from a polycentric to a homocentric one, with one dominant actor (Förster and Koechlin

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[426] See also the description of the New Forces in the Chapter on Man.

2011). Man was governed by a military-patrimonial administration until the state's gradual return starting in 2007.

Institutional trust in the New Forces' security provision

I will provide one example here, in which a man addressed the New Forces for a problem of theft in which he was helped, without having known the representatives in person. The account is from Konaté, the football coach in his late thirties of Manding and Dan parents, who spent the entire crisis in Man but travels a lot to the southern parts in relation to his job.[427] In about 2006, he had given his girlfriend a pair of jeans he had bought in Abidjan that you could not find on the market in Man. She lived in one of the nearby villages and her room was burgled shortly after she had received the gift.

A couple of weeks later, he discovered the pair of jeans on another young woman. When he asked her who had given her the jeans, she showed Konaté her boyfriend. The man was a notorious bandit from a neighbouring village who had been sentenced to several years of imprisonment but was released at the onset of the war. This criminal was known to collaborate with rebels and to be armed. Therefore, the football coach did not dare to approach him.

He did not have any personal contacts with the New Forces, therefore he went to the PCO, as there was not yet gendarmerie at the time. The commander of the PCO, Zoulou, told him to address the chief of security, Cobra, for his problem, as this was the person in charge for such a case. Cobra came and the coach showed him to the person in question and Cobra arrested and put the man in prison. Cobra gave his number to the coach, just in any case he needed help. The football coach did not engage in making particular efforts to sustain the relationship with the chief of security. Only for a "real problem" would he bother Cobra, who had told him not to pass on his number to anyone else.

It goes without saying that not everyone had the same positive experience after 2006, as Konaté in the example. Nevertheless, other research participant also said that with the rebels' security it was like with the state's police in normal times: *"C'est comme loterie,"* sometimes you call the police and they come, another time they say there is no petrol in their car.[428]

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[427] Konaté, 30s, Jula and Dan/Wè background, youth representative, Man, 12/12/2008.
[428] Gueu (junior), 30s, Dan-speaking, (Fraternité) Man, 17/10/2008.

Relationships between local authorities and the New Forces

Thin and thick forms of trust

It is crucial to note what kind of transformation has been described so far. I started this chapter in mid-2003 with the last stage of the wild times described as insecure and uncertain in Chapter 9. The consolidation of rule and the creation of security described have lead to predictable, trustworthy conditions that encouraged many Manois to extend their trust and re-engage in daily life in town. However, there seems to be a difference between trust in the sense of predictability, basically knowing how to avoid harm and yet a different quality of trust, in which we trust that our point of view, our plots for action will be taken into consideration by the other side. To assess others' actions – as in the minimal definition of trust – is one thing. But if we believe and 'trust' that others will act in a benign way towards us, it engenders yet a thicker form of trust.[429] In this section, I will look at the military-civilian nexus as a bond between rulers and ruled and ask what kind of trust relationship they had.

The arrival of the armed groups went hand in hand with the expulsion of the centralised state administration, the Prefects, Sub-prefects and regional directors of various services. Decentralised authority structures whose representatives originate from the region, however, often remained in the region as described in Chapter 3. In Man, for instance, although the mayor himself was based in Abidjan as in pre-war years, his *adjoints*, deputy mayors of the local council remained in situ, as they did not feel targeted by the rebellion.[430] "Customary authorities", as Ivorians would sometimes refer to them, neighbourhood, village or canton chief did not flee, unless they happened to be strong supporters of the government party. The same is true for youth representatives or women leaders.

These civilian authorities had to share their usual authority with those in arms. Some rebels did whatever they wanted. They breached social norms by taking food from fields, goods from houses, used violence against women and in disputes, etc. In other cases, the village chief or youth representatives were important intermediaries between the New Forces and the population alike. Having talked to many youth representatives and village or neighbourhood

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[429] This is not to say that the trustee has to encapsulate our interest, for in the context we look at this is often not the case due to the conflict situation.

[430] The *Mairie* handed out certificates and served as an interface between the population and the military authorities of the New Forces (conversation with three deputy mayors, Man, 30/03/2009).

chiefs, it seems to me that the personality of the representatives was quite decisive if it comes to the question of how the relationship was with the New Forces.

In the Lycée neighbourhood of Man, for instance, most of the youths' *bureau* had left at the onset of the crisis, only the secretary, Tia, stayed. He became an important interlocutor between the population and the New Forces who were largely staffed with Liberians at that time.

The second military leadership under Loss made efforts to communicate with the former state-structure of the *Jeunesse Communale*. I was told that in about 2005 – but perhaps it was earlier – the Dir-cab organised a meeting together with the local council. Two youth representatives mentioned this as a significant move, Tia and Konaté.[431] As both of them put it: There was a certain mistrust *('méfiance')* between them. They were not sure what the rebels had come for and the rebels were seen as part of a political camp. In the words of one of them called here Tia: "*On ne les approchait pas; parce que notre structure est apolitique.*"[432]

According to Tia, the New Forces presented themselves as an interim administration rather than a new political authority that made claims to local leadership. In Tia's eyes, the fact that the New Forces local crew dissociated themselves from wanting to take up the position of political leaders strengthened the credibility of their role as provisional authorities and fostered collaboration. Similarly, the New Forces tried to position themselves as "arbiters" at the national level, until elections would be held and the country reunited. When I had generally asked about the relationship with the rebels, both interlocutors stressed that trust was created by communication. Tia said:

Parce que nous on avait une méfiance; ils sont venus pour une mission. Nous, nous sommes des représentants des communautés et il n'y a pas de lien entre nous et ils ont remarqué ça. Ils nous ont convié à une réunion à la salle de CAV[433]; avec des représentants de la mairie et ils ont demandé qu'on renouvelle les structures de la jeunesse pour qu'on collabore avec eux.

Konaté also evaluated this event positively and said it created trust:

KATHRIN: Il y avait un cas où vous êtes allés les voir les autorités militaires [the military authorities]?

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[431] Tia, 30s, Dan-speaking, A-levels, planter, youth representative, neighbourhood Lycée and Konaté, the football coach resident near the market.
[432] Tia, 27/02/2009.
[433] Centre audio-visuel; the multi-use hall of the Cathorlic Chruch Centre.

KONATÉ: Il faut dire que quand la crise a éclaté l'Union de la Jeunesse n'existait plus. Non, ça il faut rendre à César ce qui est à César. C'est le Directeur de Cabinet du Com-zone, M. Inza qui est venu nous voir pour que nous nous retrouvions et mettions sur pied l'UJCM. C'est là ou je lui tire le chapeau. Ce Monsieur, vraiment il faut lui dire merci. C'est grâce à lui que nous, on a commencé reprendre le goût de la vie et les jeunes ont commencé à avoir confiance. Bon, il n'y a plus de peur, parce qu'on allait vers eux maintenant.[434]

The New Forces organised mask races, football tournaments for reconciliation, etc. He said: *"Ça nous a permis de nous retrouver, parce qu'il y avait une méfiance. Le Malinké avait peur d'approcher le Yacouba, le Yacouba avait peur d'approcher le Guéré ainsi de suite; il y avait une méfiance en tout cas."*[435]

Both statements emphasise the social aspect of trust, namely the creation of a relationship between trustor and trustee. It seems that mistrust was reduced and trust was built by coming together, getting to know each other and connecting. The situation Tia describes as *"méfiance"* was when there was no "connection between them". By creating a link, trust was fostered and the relationship consolidated with common projects in the neighbourhood. Thereafter, collaboration became smoother.Tia even described the sociality between them and the rebels with the following words: *"Donc on est ensemble, on vit en parfaite symbiose, il n'y a pas de grands problèmes entre nous."*[436] This means that the rebels succeeded in creating trust with certain youth representatives no matter their backround, so that the quality of the relationship was described as one of 'symbiosis' rather than 'cadger'. An indicator that trust was relatively thick is also that despite the fact that Tia obviously notices that there are problems, he does not *see* them as big problems – revealing the dispositional side of trust.[437] Thereby he displays a willingness to extend trust.

Although a relationship between ruler and ruled, trust-building was not a one-way vector in this situation, it allowed both sides to familiarise and get a sense of each other. As the Dir-cab said in the interview with me, due to the fact that the leadership involved those concerned before taking decisions, by communication, they "easily mastered" the situation.[438] Now that there was an active relationship or line of communication between them, the Dir-cab could trust that the youth representatives would communicate difficulties before staging a public protest, if they

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[434] Konaté, 12/12/2008.
[435] Konaté, 12/12/2008.
[436] Tia, 27/02/2009.
[437] Tia is not politically active and did not participate in the rebel's civil society.
[438] Dir-cab, FN, 10/08/2010.

had a problem with some of their staff. Both sides could expect communication rather than violence in case of disagreement.

The ambiguity of domination

Despite the fact that my focus is on trust *building* in this chapter that might be interpreted as a gradual betterment of the situation, I want to stress here, that the trust relationship was ambiguous, as highlighted in this statement by Macla about the arrival of the rebels:

Nous, nous avons commencé à les accueillir à bras ouverts, pour dire bon, c'est une force d'occupation, mais ce sont nos frères qui sont venus revendiquer le droit, parce que Guéï a été tué, donc on les a applaudi. Mais il faut savoir que la rébellion telle que nous la connaissons ceux qui composent la rébellion, ce sont des gens qui sont fâchés. Ils revendiquent quelque chose, ils sont en armes. C'est pas tout le monde qui peut avoir le même tempérament. [...] Donc c'est tout ce monde-là que nous avons accueilli dans la peur, dans la fureur et c'est comme ça qu'ils sont arrivés chez nous.[439]

The ambiguity stems from the fact that many locals found the aim of the rebellion legitimate, but suffered from its means. The rebellion did not only 'demand' what was considered 'right', but also trampled on locals' 'rights', expressed here as an experience of occupation. Therefore, I would like to highlight that rebel rule was an experience of domination in the first place.

There is considerable ambiguity in the process described in this chapter, in which I somehow paralleled the consolidation of rule with the enhancement of trustworthiness. The relationship between rule, order and trust I think is painfully well captured by Georg Klute and Trutz von Trotha: "We consider the road to peace as a process of establishing power. The road to peace is a road to rule. The theory of peace is part of the theory of domination." (Klute and von Trotha 2004, 110)[440] It is clear that this discussion leads us into a field of political order that is beyond the scope of this ethnography on trust. Therefore, what do domination and order mean for the transformation of trust described in this chapter? My data suggests that the establishment of one chain of command and the consolidation of rule allowed reducing insecurity so that trustworthiness and predictability were enhanced, so that those willing were able to extend thin

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[439] Amadou, 30s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, Logoualé, 19/03/2009.

[440] The interrelatedness between peace and power, institutionalised in domination or rule, may also be illustrated with the following pun. In the English language, those who make the rules are the rulers and those who give orders create order, pointing to the correlation between order and rule.

forms of trust.[441] But the new order also meant submission for local authorities and in daily interactions in general.

Therefore, domination and physical force remained defining elements of the civil-military nexus. In the words of a village chief: *"Eux, ils ont la force, nous on n'a pas la force. Ce qu'ils nous disent, on se soumet. C'est une soumission qu'on fait, parce qu'il y a la peur. Ils nous disent aujourd'hui: 'Donnez poulet!', on va dire: 'Oui', puisqu'ils ont fusil. 'Il y a poulet, prenez!'"[442]*

Submission was a key experiences for the population, particularly for those who had authority and leadership in 'normal times', as this village chief who no longer collected taxes from his market. Or according to the planter Gueu, Man was in the rebels' hands and the rebel's had all means and power to tell right from wrong: If the rebels put you in prison and you cry no one will help you (if you do not help yourself in advance). Several times, civilians expressed frustration about talk in the south that postulated that people in Man 'agreed with the rebels'. But to "gain longevity", people like Gueu felt forced to make friends with the rebels and to accommodate their rule. As he put it: *"C'est forcé qu'ils deviennent nos amis. Sans ça, tu as mille problèmes."[443]*

Gueu's statement highlights the ambiguity of the situation that locals found themselves in. "Force" or constraint and "friend" do usually not go together, but 'good' relationships were central for safety.

The role of the UN for basic social trust

Trust literature has shown time and again that a strong institutional framework or a third party are able to enhance trust between two actors (Möllering 2006, 134). The French peacekeepers and to a greater extent the UN who had larger numbers deployed were such a third party, a factor also explored in research one peace negotiations (Sriram 2008). I do not claim to provide a representative assessment of the UN as a security provider in Man, even less about the impact of the UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire in general. However, based on statements by a range of

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[441] Trustworthiness must not be equalled with trust, though. To be precise, those who were willing to accept a remaining vulnerability found trustworthy conditions now to extend trust – thin trust, at first.

[442] Chief of *Deugoulé, 60s, Dan-speaking, 18/01/2009.

[443] Due to the fact that Gueu had no relatives in Abidjan, he was obliged to stay in Man, no matter how the conflict rages (Gueu, 60s, Dan-speaking, planter, Man, 17/10/2008).

informants and from the observations I made, I think that the following tendencies can be suggested.

Whereas the assumption of the command by Loss in mid-2003 has not been mentioned in any of the accounts, the arrival of the UN was mentioned a few times at least. In retrospect, the arrival of the UN figured in some accounts as the time when a slow change towards more security set in, for instance in the account by Macla, a youth representative in Logoualé or Gérard, a *chef de terre* in Facobly. In both of their accounts, one can sense that the UN had a certain credit of trust in advance and expectations locals had were quite high. Whereas both actors link the improvement of the overall security situation to the presence of the UN, ONUCI seems to have had an even greater signalling effect. The mere presence of the UN made the situation in general appear more trustworthy and reassuring.

From this vantage point, the UN was a trust booster without them having done much in practice, yet. However, as expectations were high and boosted trust beyond evidence at first, disenchantment followed soon after. The more experience-based assessments that came in a second step were slightly less enthusiastic. People soon noticed that "the UN had but limited authority over the rebels" (youth representative, Logoualé, 2009). Several informants had hoped and expected more from their presence, as the following conversation in Facobly shows. Gérard is the community representative mentioned before and André and Jacques are both in their late thirties and active in the political party FPI. After having explained a violent incident between a rebel and a man in a bar, André said that the first authority to address in such a case was the neighbourhood chief or the UN. I wanted more information about the idea to call the UN and therefore came back to the topic and asked:

KATHRIN: *Et si on appelle l'ONUCI?*

ANDRÉ: *Eux, ils ne font qu'écrire! Ils constatent, on va faire le rapport. C'est tout.*

JACQUES: *C'est tout.*

ANDRÉ [imitating the voice of a UN representative]: *'c'est vrai, on a compris, on va faire des rapports, on va saisir qui de droit pour donner des conseils.'*

GÉRARD: *Il faut dire aussi, qu'ils n'arrivent pas à temps.*

ANDRÉ: *Voilà!*

GÉRARD: *Moi, je suis sur le terrain ici, j'ai tous les contacts de l'ONU; moi, je les appelle. Quand il y a une anomalie, je les appelle. Mais ils ne peuvent pas arriver à temps. Souvent je*

n'arrive pas à les joindre. Parce que bon, par … coupure, machin, déplacement, tout ça. Donc, pour un truc qui se passe maintenant-là, où ils sont en train de faire quelque chose, bon, j'appelle, ils ne peuvent pas arriver. Donc c'est ce que moi je déplore.[444]

As the discussion shows, the UN did not intervene and 'help' immediately in a situation at hand – for obvious reasons, I think. It was not their mission to intervene in such cases, but to observe, report and provide general training.[445] This had the effect that the role of international actors was evaluated as close to insignificant at the interactional level in the community. This assessment suggests that the presence of the UN had a positive effect on the security situation in general – on the frame and on basic social trust in our terminology, their impact at the figurational level, however, was less significant.

This notwithstanding, it remains difficult to establish the extent of the impact that the UN had (McGovern 2010a). To say that the UN had an impact on the security situation may mean that those who used violence against the civilian population stopped or that those who were held responsible for acts committed in the zone, the superiors, improved their grip on their subordinates and punished them. Mike McGovern, who explored the question of whether this change can be attributed to the threat of international justice and persecution, argues that the UN had an impact only because Ivorian armed actors were motivated to keep up certain social norms themselves:

[...] the main causes can be located in Ivorian conceptions of justice and their ability to influence political actors' behavior, rather than the external threats [...] The commitment of Ivorians on both sides of the civil conflict to see themselves and be seen as legitimate political actors has helped to condition the forms of violence that have emerged in the Ivorian conflict at the same time that they have added to the efficacy of the threat of international prosecution for war crimes/crimes against humanity. (McGovern 2010a, 67)

Having spent time with and talked to a couple of local rebel commanders and low-ranks, I share this assessment. One commander I often spoke to repeatedly expressed his wish to distinguish himself from the "barbaric Anglophone neighbours" (comsec, northerner, Man, 2008).

From a perspective of trust that takes the interdependency of a figuration of actors into consideration, the UN constituted a counterbalance, an independent actor to complain to. As I

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[444] Gérard, 50s; Jacques, 30s; André, 40s; Wè speakers, group interview, Facobly 06/11/2008.

[445] The more international actors do, the less resources and relationships are strengthened to settle disputes locally, making the retreat of international actors more difficult. UN, 40s, military observer, 28/10/2008; UN, 30s, police section, 26/10/2008.

noticed in one or the other remark high-ranks made this was not always easy for them. They were sensitive to the presence of the international community; they made sure they did not socialise with the expats too closely in bars, to dissociate themselves from them. Only this would allow them to maintain respect, as an informant close to the rebels once commented.

Summary and discussion

In this chapter, I have described and reflected on processes of trust building, suggesting various entry points that may account for the gradual change towards more trust and security. In politically volatile contexts, misplaced trust may have fatal consequences. Therefore, at the beginning of trust building processes lie signs of trustworthiness and conditions that warrant trust, in the first place. Whereas trust always entails an element of risk, people need some assurances that norms, the security situation in general, institutions or particular persons really merit trust. Hence, possible trust-givers have to be able to detect some signs of trustworthiness, first. Benign motivations may be communicated, but they must be followed by action.

From a theoretical point of view on trust, I have looked at the rebels so far like a group who is likely to disappoint the population's trust, as an untrustworthy trustee. In this chapter, however, I have tried to argue that the New Forces wanted to receive trust in their role as an authority. In a way, the New Forces wanted to appear trustworthy and 'attractive' as security providers and administrators under whose rule it was worthwhile to do business, as I have argued.

The new leadership with Losséni Fofana had to encourage people to trust the New Forces anew. According to the statements people made, the first leadership had managed to communicate benign motivations under Adams and Ousmane Coulibaly, but failed to provide security. The new crew could build on that but they had to perform well. They had to perform well, in order to avoid disappointment and doubt in their capacity and ultimately motivations for civilian security.

A strong incentive for the New Forces to enhance the security situation was that they relied on the taxes that they could levy from the population. The proverbial logic of 'don't bite the hand that feeds you' has clearly played a big role. The interdependency between the profits economic actors can make and the taxes the New Forces can levy gave economic actors a stronger position and leverage in the figuration with the rebels. Security in exchange for taxation is certainly a case where "encapsulated interest" plays a role (Hardin 2002). Basically, calculations and self-interests made the trustee trustworthier, here. It was in the New Forces' own interest to enhance

security and to provide a predictable order which would allow economic actors to operate so that the military authorities could levy taxes and have their income.[446]

But the chain of trust did not end there. By having created trustworthy conditions for business, they laid the basis for more trust to grow. An even thicker form of trust developed when the New Forces established communication between them and community representatives elected before the war. By positioning themselves as a temporal administrative authority, apolitical representatives of local communities felt encouraged to 'accept' the New Forces as governors for the time being. At least in the eyes of the youth representatives (UJCM), this was a major boost of trust and resulted in a shift in the perception of their relationship from a co-habitation apart to a robust, trustful collaboration. Coming together and common projects seem to have allowed to overcome feelings of mistrust, some of which had been caused by not-knowing (uncertainty) rather than by negative experiences. For Tia and Konaté, their relationship made a shift and leaped beyond thin trust to thicker forms of trust.

My observation is that in Man, the building of trust in the sense of predictability was parallel to and/or a result of the consolidation of rule. The leadership managed to overcome mistrust and the "shadow of violence" and gained thin trust in the sense of predictability (Schlichte 2009). This finding can be linked to closely related aspects prevalent in the literature. We can therefore tentatively try to link the consolidation of rule and trust building processes with basic legitimacy (Popitz 1999; Schlichte 2009). Basic legitimacy here does not mean legitimacy in the sense of 'the right to rule', but a performance-based acknowledgment for the provision of order.

Furthermore, the examination of the 'security for taxation'-thesis leads us to the heart of the "greed not grievance"-debate that often labels greedy violent non-state actors as "warlords" (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Berdal and Malone 2000; Reno 2011). The persistence of the problematic term 'warlord' in scholarship calls for a short comment on the basis of the data presented.

Com-zones as military governors

Many times, the term warlord has been used to refer to the Com-zones of the New Forces (Kunz 2006; Reno 2011; Speight 2012). It is a term very much in vogue beyond the African context and has been applied to various contexts over the last decade (Jackson 2003; Marten 2012; Utas 2012; Young 2004, 45). Although an authoritative definition of warlords is lacking, there seem

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[446] Many FNs were also pride in doing a good job.

to be a couple of characteristics that are shared by most authors who use the term. According to a common understanding, warlords are said to care less about collective grievances than about their own shadowy business interests and seem to prefer force to talk and rarely institutionalise power. Territorially based, they are established power holders; the term of warlord also suggests an end rather than a temporary position. However we turn it, warlord has a negative connotation. Whereas some rebel leaders are seen as possible future state-holders, the term warlord does not imply that. As Hills has argued, the use of the term tells us more about the way the researcher sees a violent actor than what the characteristics of warlords actually are (Hills 1997).

For the Com-zone and his entourage that I observed in Man, 'warlord' would be but a partial description.[447] Exaggerated shows and violence was seen as counter-productive. Relationships to local business and the population were cultivated and conflicts resolved in talks. Labour unions had a say under their rule. If they found taxes were too heavy on them, they marched to the Com-zone's representative and they sat and talked. They followed a strategy that can be summarised as follows adopted from the teacher in retirement quoted earlier: *'Si on commence à faire trop de [bruit], si la population se révolte [...], ça va aller très loin et on va perdre.'*

In comparison to other Com-zones, Losséni Fofana was one of the low-profile commanders with a relatively modest appearance. This had the advantage that the spotlight of the national and international media was turned on others, whereas financial flows quietly found their way into the pockets of the leadership. But enrichment was kept in a form that would allow them to launch into a new life in Côte d'Ivoire in the time after. If one looks at them as armed actors, they were closer to an army than to a mafia. Part of the (ex)rebels plan in the post-APO time was to appear neat, professional, state-like, in order to extract money from the population – perhaps better than a state (Mampilly 2011). But it is the temporal aspect that is important here. If I have to choose between the terms "military governor" (International Crisis Group 2009, 12), stressing administrative powers and rule and the term "warlord" that has stronger connotations with business and violence, I would go for the former term.

What is noteworthy is that in Man at least, the primary goals or personal aspirations were not to remain stuck in this no-war-no-peace situation, like the popular image of the eternal mafia or warlord would suggest – but to make personal use of this interim period and what it offered to be better off in an new/old Republic of Côte d'Ivoire.

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[447] As Reno states, the definition of warlords is about degrees (Reno 2011, 12).

11 Social life in the post-APO time frame

We have met Old Bamba in the second empirical chapter, when he fled the region in the early morning after the rebel had captured the town in November 2002. In early 2008, he came back to Man. The town had become safe enough for him, even as an activist for the president's party (FPI). The rebels, whom he fled in 2002, were now in the role of an interim military governor and provided security – not without a certain pride.[448] Their primary concern was to appear as professional security providers, so that they could integrate into the new army later.

Radical 'civilian' activists from the opposing political camp were now the bigger threat for FPI sympathisers in case of a "protest-frame"[449]. FPI politicians could expect help from the rebels' security staff in such situations, as I observed in early 2010. The fact that many FPI politicians returned, organised political rallies in the stadium in Man (e.g. in August 2010) and re-built their houses must be seen as a sign of trust in the security provision of the rebels. Perhaps people trusted even more the political balance reached that shaped this period after the peace agreement, *Accord politique de Ouagadougou*, short APO, a period I shall therefore call, "post-APO frame".[450] It was this agreement that finally brought about the long awaited political rapprochement, made possible by a direct dialogue between President Laurent Gbagbo and rebel leader Guillaume Soro. To assure the safety of politicians from the south was in the rebels' own interest, as long as they wanted to support the peace process and hold elections. Hence, even if they did not 'like each other', they could build on thin encapsulated interest, as both sides seemed convinced to be able to win the elections.

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[448] This assessment is based on participation, observations and personal communication with several armed members of the New Forces, particularly, FN low-ranked, Almamy, 30s, Jula speaker, 14/11/2008, also chief of security, high-ranked, 24/11/2008.

[449] See Chapter 5 on methodology.

[450] The APO was signed in March 2007 between Soro Guillaume and Laurent Gbagbo under the auspices of Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso.

In this last empirical chapter, I would like to resume different threads. In the methodology chapter, I have started the presentation of ethnographic material with security perceptions in 2008/2009, the time of my field research. This last chapter brings us back to this period or frame. It is the time of power-shared rebel rule during which state agents who had fled the region at the onset of the war, gradually returned to Man. Territorial power-sharing required mutual trust in order to be translated into action. In the first part of the chapter, I will provide a short analysis of power-sharing through the lens of trust.

Based on the description of the changed political environment, I will further elaborate the specificities of social life during this period However, the post-APO frame was not only characterised by political rapprochement, quite the contrary, the pre-electoral atmosphere and campaigning introduced new divisions into social life in Man. What was social trust like under the post-APO frame? Was it like "normal times" (Greenhouse 2002, 9)? If not, what was different?

The core of the chapter is dedicated to a central finding of this dissertation, to different frames and figurations of trust. This chapter argues that the Manois, the resident population of Man, have gone through a process that comes close to a "secondary socialisation" into social life under rebel rule (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 150).[451] They have acquired practical knowledge and tacitly agree on assessments of 'special' situations, such as during an internal coup attempt against Loss provided as an example in the chapter. So-called "post-APO comers", people who have only come to the region in recent times, assess situations differently. It is in comparison with people new to the zone – like me – that the residents' practical knowledge of trust and distrust comes out with astonishing clarity.

Political rapprochement and mutual trust

With the advance of the peace process and the signing of the *Accord politique de Ouagadougou* (APO) in 2007, parts of the state administration were gradually redeployed to the rebel-held north.[452] The Prefect and Sub-prefect had returned to the region in October 2007 and worked

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[451] Berger and Luckmann distinguish different forms of socialisation. Individuals become members of a society during a primary socialisation process when growing up. Any later processes of internalisation into "sub-worlds" are referred to as secondary socialisation (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 158).

[452] For further information on power-sharing elements in the peace agreements see Mehler (2009b) and their implementation in the local arena in Man see Heitz (2009).

side by side with the rebel administration.[453] Similar to the local council, their main work was the issuing of certificates as part of the identification process.[454]

On 26 May 2009, the Com-zones officially handed over their administrative functions to government-appointed Prefects (International Crisis Group 2009, 12).[455] The Com-zones, however, retained their security powers and taxation system, hence their power base. There was no power-sharing device with which to counterbalance the New Forces' loss of territorial, military and economic powers, had they accepted to give up their security and taxation sovereignty. It would have introduced a marked power differential, a gap that could only be bridged by a lot of trust. But trust seemed not warranted in this case. The New Forces had to fully trust that the Gbagbo-camp would organise fair elections or rely on the third-party guarantor, mainly the UN. Both were not certain enough, so that the leap of trust was too large and the uncertainties that remained could not be "suspended" by trust (Möllering 2006, 105–21).

Evidently, the Prefects were interested in having good relations with the FN commanders, for it was the ex-rebels who offered the Prefects and Sub-prefects protection – and not the state – in the case of insecurity. Consequently, it required a good deal of trust on the side of the Prefects to offer themselves without a protection force *in situ* to the (ex)rebels, the former opponents.

However, if we give power-sharing a second look, the actual step made between the two former belligerents is not so big, after all. The state versus non-state perspective 'blinds' observers once more and veils what is really going on. As a matter of fact, the Ivorian crisis was less about the idea of the state, state institutions per se, than about the exclusionary politics of a particular clan and regime, as I have argued in the introduction to the conflict. The war of 'who is who', was about an identity politics that discriminated 'northerners' against 'southerners' with the

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[453] Sub-prefect, Man, 25/03/2009; Prefect, Man, 01/04/2010.

[454] In March 2009, the Court of Justice in Man was re-opened, in late December 2009, less than a hundred gendarmes and police officers from the mixed unit, the Integrated Command Centre (CCI) followed. However, only part of the personnel, including a magistrate, was deployed, meaning that only civil jurisdiction was working. For the criminal jurisdiction, a police force, a prison and bailiffs at state command are indispensable, all of which remained firmly in the hands of the New Forces until after the elections in 2010. During the political crisis in February 2010, the Court of Justice was plundered and subsequently closured again until after the elections, as described in the methodology chapter.

[455] In practice, the handover of administrative powers between the Com-zone and the prefect meant that all "issues" concerning the person in charge of the region's administration had to be addressed to the prefects or sub-prefects now. Such issues can be the opening of a new branch of a company, the reception of an official visitor, the organisation of the Independence Day.

tool of the ultra-nationalist ideology *ivoirité*. In 2007, even if 'the state came back' to rebel-held territory in the person of a Prefect and Sub-prefect, the representatives sent to Man, at least, did not belong to the pro-Gbagbo camp. The Prefect, for instance, was of Akan origin and privately supported the politics pursued by the RHDP electoral coalition, where he was in the same political camp with the rebels' candidate Alassane Ouattara (RDR).[456] Another element was conductive to the smooth cooperation in Man. The Prefect had nearly reached retirement age and had something of an elder statesman. According to the figurational logic described in the previous chapters, old age could only create further willingness for co-operation on the side of the rebels and contribute to mutual trust.[457]

Basically, those prefectorial representatives of the state who took office in the rebel-held parts shared political views for the most part, at least. The comparison with the Court of Justice in Man is revealing in this respect. Some of the staff sent from Abidjan was from the south-western quadrant (Gbagbo-heartland) and only the slightest comment in the direction of the politics of names destroyed the credit of trust that they had been attributed by the RDR stronghold in Man. Subsequently, as described in the methodology chapter, the staff was warned and left in time and the court was sacked. Other state institutions, such as the Prefecture, and private houses of local FPI politicians remained untouched in this action and were protected by force by the rebels against vandalising youths. Hence: Côte d'Ivoire was back at the heart of the Ivorian politics of belonging again.

Whereas in 2002, the lines of trust and distrust were mainly drawn along the politics of belonging, it was still along these very same lines, along the politics of belonging, that the first tentative steps were made in the trust-building process. The first people to go to the rebel-held parts if not locals were Abidjanais with northern origins. I have talked to an employee of the water company who said that as someone with origins from the north, he did not hesitate to accept an assignment in Man in 2004 (Diabaté[458]). The same is true for a beverage and cigarette distributor; they sent staff with northern origins to open branches in Man in 2007 (see Lass[459] and Mohammed[460], later in the chapter).

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[456] This information is based on an interview with the Prefect, Amani Michel, in 2010 and is based on observations made during the political crisis.

[457] This assessment is based on a comment made by one of the young high-ranks.

[458] Diabaté, 40s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (SODECI), Man, 30/12/2008.

[459] Lass, 30s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (beverage distributor), Man, 08/03/2009.

[460] Mohammed, 30s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (cigarette distributor), 23/01/2009.

Elections and the creation of suspicion

There was growing impatience with the painfully slow progress of the preparations for elections. The following quote from Gba, a retired teacher, exemplifies a popular way of expressing the general 'fatigue':

"Tout le monde en parle que la situation est exagérée, que la situation est vraiment exagérée: Qu'est-ce que le gouvernement attend? Qu'est-ce que l'union des deux camps (Forces Nouvelles et forces loyalistes) attend maintenant pour mettre fin à la situation, que tout le monde est fatigué. On a tellement crié qu'on est fatigué, on est fatigué, on est fatigué, qu'on est fatigué de dire qu'on est fatigué. @@@"[461]

This fatigue of rebel rule created the ideal breeding ground to gain support among the electorate in Man for the President in the south. Increasingly, disagreements with 'hungry' low-ranks were taken as an opportunity to stage protest in the neighbourhood, the time of 'entente' was over. People felt strong, they would no longer put up with rebels' breaches of social norms, it was time for a change: 'After the war, is the real war', some youths would tell us in conversations who decided to support Laurent Gbagbo for presidency.[462]

My field work fell into this period of heightened political tensions. It shaped the way some of my informants expressed themselves, particularly their relationship towards the rebels that I was interested in. The ones who said *"on est toujours en guerre"* were the ones who had said *"on dort pas"*, described in the preliminary findings in the methodology chapter.[463] Those who had said *"on dort bien"*, were those who said *"le mot guerre même, on a oublié."*[464]

Initially, at the beginning of my stay, I was easily seduced by 'anti-rebel-talk'. 'Rebels' were people who had taken arms, I regarded them with suspicion. If someone said they were bad, I found it credible and easily believed it. Although I listened to different people, I did not hear their nuanced statements, only those that corresponded to the view I already had. Fortunately, I had taped many of the interviews so that I could re-listen and hear other nuances. But it was participation in the first place that allowed me to move away from this abstract, monolithic

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[461] Gba, 60s, retired teacher, Dan-speaking, Man, 26/02/2009.
A major reason of course was that both sides, the government and the New Forces profited financially from the "no war no peace" situation and state of emergency (McGovern 2011, 89).
[462] Paul, 30s, Dan-speaking, Doyagouiné (Man), 12/10/2008.
[463] Paul, 12/10/2008.
[464] His statement in full: "Dans ces temps ça va. On dort bien. … Il n'y a pas de problèmes, on dort. Le mot guerre même, on a oublié." Konaté, 30s, Jula-speaking, youth representative, Dioulabougou, 21/10/2008.

image I have had of rebels. Participating in social life under rebel rule, meeting the rebels on duty, spending time with them – most of the time when they were off duty - , allowed me to familiarise myself with them, grasping their subjectivities, refining my typifications of this initially novel actor for me, too.

The Dir-cab, the one in charge of the civil-military relationship of Loss' crew and responsible for social cohesion, observed that politics introduced disagreement and alienation into the socially mixed population of Man. With the elections approaching, social milieus that had cooperated quite well together, began taking their distance towards each other again: *"Malheureusement avec les élections qui approchent, avec les hommes politiques chacun tire le drap de son côté."*[465]

Cohesion weakened increasingly. The competition for the hearts and minds lowered the willingness to cooperate with one another. The camp who managed to rally more people behind was going to 'be president' for the coming 'decade' (hoping for two terms of office). The region of Man with its heterogeneous population had turned into a hotly contested political terrain in the post-APO frame.

Security and trust in the post-APO frame

Office holders, strangers to me, in the telecommunication centre, for instance, said in greeting exchanges, when I said good morning and how are you: 'Si on vous voit, on sait que ça va; que ça commence à aller, n'est-ce pas?'[466] Hence, my presence told them something about the security situation in general. My presence in town signalled that the security situation must be better now than when 'all the whites left'.

What was characteristic of the post-APO frame was that parts of everyday life seemed so normal, whereas in a dispute, for instance, one was likely to realise that there was no regular police or justice system, yet.[467] In 2008/2009, civilian businessmen told me that they were not ready yet to launch their big investments, extend their compound or to move to the outskirts into quieter neighbourhoods with their families.[468] Although there was security in general,

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[465] FN, Directeur du cabinet civil (Dir-cab), Inza Fofana, Man, 10/08/2010.
[466] Telephone agency, field notes, February 2010.
[467] See also Förster (2009).
[468] M. Sangaré, 40s, Jula-speaking, businessman, Man, 20/10/2008; Nigerian businessman, 30s, Man, 15/02/2010.

everyone perceived the town centre as safer than the outskirts. For instance, by moving into a bigger house, everyone is informed that you are doing well, possibly attracting mischief and burglars. As elsewhere too, where no one sees or hears you, one riskes to become an easy target for robbers. Consequently, basic social trust was still thin in this respect and insufficient for projects that made them more vulnerable and required thicker forms of trust. Hence, these businessmen did not venture the leap of faith yet, as the trustfulness and the security situation was too precarious. They were not willing to suspend uncertainty, as the aspect of distrust was too significant in their assessment and the gap was too large to be bridged.

As this strategic thinking in business circles shows, these are rational and calculative forms of trust about whether trust is warranted or not, whether it was worth the risks, etc.. Nevertheless, the same businessmen kept their money in a safe in their offices along the commercial avenue at night guarded by the security of the New Forces whom they paid a weekly or monthly due – a sign of trust. But in case of personal projects beyond the familiar of the everyday, trust was still precarious. For every project that required thicker forms of trust that went beyond the routinised order of social life under rebel rule, basic social trust was still too brittle. There was security yes, but not enough *stability* to invest a large sum. The motto in early 2009 was to wait and see whether the calm could be trusted.

Security: Whom do people trust?

Due to the focus on trust in relation to security, I kept asking people *whom* they trusted for their safety now, in the post-APO frame: a person, an institution, or whom? But answers I received were not straightforward. The New Forces were largely contested, being both providers and a major threat to people's safety.[469] The UN, I was told, was only spotted in certain neighbourhoods on weekends, when some of the staff went to the mountain *Dent de Man*, one of the region's major touristic sites.[470] However, in the town centre and particularly Dioulabougou with its grid-like streets the UN passed often, as well as the rebels' patrols.[471] About the dozow, Marie summarised an impression that was shared by many: *"les dozow sont*

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[469] See methodology chapter.

[470] Group conversation, compound of village chief, neighbourhood Air France à gauche, Man, 12/12/2008. When asked to say something about the UN, an elder in the neighbourhood Grand-Gbapleu only mentioned that during a contact meeting with the ONUCI, the 'foreigners' took his picture, as he was wearing his local gown (village chief, (Grand-Gbapleu) Man, 17/10/2008).

[471] Traoré, 30s, Jula-speaking, youth representative, Dioulabougou, 21/10/2008.

là, et les voleurs viennent toujours".[472] (The same, by the way, was said about the New Forces: *"Ils sont là, mais ça vole toujours."*[473]) In the following, I will take a look at the dozow and their position and perception as security actors in the region of Man. After the New Forces and the UN (dealt with in Chapter 10), the dozow constituted the third important security actor in Man during the crisis. As I will show, their role in Man is largely confined to selective functions and spheres, a reason for which I look at them here in the context of neighbourhood and private security.

The dozow in Man

Comparisons between different zones and towns in the rebel-held north have revealed that there are remarkable differences in respect to security provisions. In the city of Korhogo, for example, the dozow were in control of civil security and policing during rebel rule. The rebels' domain only began at the roadblocks on the outskirts of the city (Förster 2009, 331–45). In Ferkessédougou, another town in the north, the dozow were restricted to security at the neighbourhood-level, where they monitored the flow of people and traffic at night.[474] In Man, the town was policed by the rebels down to the neighbourhood level, restricting the dozow's sphere of influence to 'inaccessible neighbourhoods'[475] and private security as watchmen.[476] Sporadically, they seem also to have guarded the market (Kouyaté 2006, 6). On my question at the New Forces' PCO, on the relationship between the dozow and the New Forces in Man, I was told that they were not part of their structure.[477]

The perception of and experiences in Man with the dozow are mixed, reflecting their marginal status in this region of Côte d'Ivoire, where they are not part of the firstcomer's culture. In a family who lives or 'sleeps' in a neighbourhood that is difficult to access by car and badly lit,[478] people said that they have tried out a dozo but their radio was removed from the car at night.

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[472] Marie, 40s, Dan-speaking, Catholic, market woman, Man, 02/12/2008. Another informant from a different neighbourhood said that they had dozow as night watchmen in their neighbourhood. But the other day, someone's clothes had been removed through an open window at night and the dozow came to 'ask pardon' in the morning (youth representative, 30s, Jula-speaking, Catholic, (Kennedy) Man, 25/03/2009.

[473] Robert, 40s, Dan-speaking, Catholic, employee of electricity company (CIE), Man, 05/04/2009.

[474] K. Bauer, personal communication, July, 2011.

[475] Due to the mountainous area, some neighbourhood are only accessible by foot, due to the steep, stony slopes.

[476] The dozow were often taken by wealthy traders and had to get paid as youths or rebel security actors.

[477] Zoulou, commander of the PCO, Dan-speaking, high-ranked rebel of the New Forces, 16/01/2009.

[478] "Comme la quartier est souvent noir, ça encourage les voleurs aussi." (Marie, 02/12/2008).

When they asked the dozo in the morning he said that he guarded people and not objects.[479] However, some rich traders and latecomers with origins from the north seem to opt for dozow as watchmen rather than youth, because they believe that possible bandits fear the dozow more than ordinary youths due to their special powers.[480] Although my sampling is not representative, it seems that the dozow in Man are not ascribed this particular trustworthiness, ethic and reliability that they have in the north, in their region of origin.

Residents of Man express doubts about the authenticity of the local hunter society in Man, hence they express institutional distrust. They suspect that the local society is manned with "*débrouilleurs*"[481]. This seems to be due to the fact that the appearance of the dozow in the region was parallel to the increase of unemployment and impoverishment in the 1990s. According to the dozows' own account, there was no hunter society in Man in former times. Only with the rise of banditry in the 1990s, initiated hunters like the dozo Koné became active and organised the dozow as a group. Furthermore, in relation to the politics of belonging dozow are identified as belonging to the pro-rebel side. Hence, they are classified in Man and other parts of the south as armed actors close to the rebels, ascribing them a political camp that they do not have in the north where they are perceived as a trustworthy institution serving the common good (Bassett 2004; Förster 2006, 2009, 2010; Hellweg 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011).[482] In Man, too, the 'real' dozow from and in the north, seem to be more respected and considered able and trustworthy. One of my informants with anti-rebel leanings said with awe that the dozow who came from the north decisively contributed to get rid of the Liberians.[483] The

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[479] The most negative assessment I heard was that to entrust the safety of your belongings to a dozo is like "confier sa viande à un chien" (youth representative, 30s, Jula-speaking, Catholic, (Kennedy) Man, 25/03/2009).

[480] M. Sangaré, 40s, Jula-speaking, businessman, Man, 20/10/2008; Dozo Fofana, 30s, leading position in Man, 16/01/2009.

[481] This is someone who has no regular income and accepts little jobs to get by.

[482] Hellweg who has studied the hunters in Côte d'Iviore since the 1990s, responds in the following way to abuses committed by dozow during the violent conflict: "But dozos were far from ethical or heroic in all that they did. Their lapses into gratuitous violence undermined their plausibility as unofficial police. As security agents and then as soldiers in Côte d'Ivoire's 2002–2007 rebellion, dozos committed atrocities against the same people they were ostensibly trying to protect or collaborate with in the 1990s: women, the poor, immigrants, Ivoirian citizens, and police. Their crimes included documented cases of rape, murder, and beatings. These acts paralleled similar abuses by state security forces (United States Department of State 1997, 1998, 1999), mirroring a generalized climate of cruelty and lawlessness in Côte d'Ivoire." (Hellweg 2011, 17–18)

[483] Paul, 30s, Dan-speaking, (Doyagouiné) Man, 12/10/2008.

leadership of the dozow in Man also told me that they contributed at the expulsion mission of the Liberians.[484]

Community night watch groups

Having offered a short comparison with the major security actor in the north, I will also briefly refer to the *groupe-d'autodéfense* that are widespread in the south. In comparison to the adjacent southern regions of the west, where the phenomenon of the youthful vigilantes and*"barragistes"* was impressive (Chauveau and Bobo 2003, 20), the situation in the rebel-held parts was slightly different. Many youngsters in the north became rebels who in the south perhaps would have been inclined to join the militia-like *groupe-d'autodéfense* (Chelpi-den Hamer 2011). In several neighbourhoods and villages I observed that youths put up community night watch groups in close collaboration with the village chiefs, when the population felt that burglaries had increased and they were too remote for or not keen on having the rebels' security in their midst. Usually, neighbourhood chiefs went to inform the New Forces' PCO and asked for oral consent for a night watch group.[485] However, such community night watch initiatives were not always appreciated by the rebels, as they easily came to adopt a more political agenda in the pre-election times of the post-APO frame.[486] I observed that as soon as the neighbourhood was quieter, these initiatives died down again. The difficulty of such night watch groups in relation to trust was well summarised by Dion:

Ceux qui surveillent, il faut que leur sécurité soit aussi garantie. Et tous ceux qui surveillent aussi, il faut que nous ne doutions pas de leur bonne moralité! […] Ils doivent être recensés. Il faut que la population accepte leur moralité. Il faut aussi que les Forces Nouvelles les acceptent.[487]

What people were describing to me for the time 2008/2009, the post-APO frame, were often cases of neighbourhood criminality that seemed to have increased during the crisis, which many also attributed to the impoverishment of youngsters who had lost their employment.[488] The fact

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[484] Dozo Fofana, 30s, leading position in Man, 16/01/2009.

[485] Committee of the village chief, (Grand-Gbapleu) Man, 17/10/2008.

[486] Field notes September and October 2008.

[487] Dion, 50s, Dan-speaking, elder of neighbourhood Lycée, Man, 04/08/2009. The fact that youths were slightly mistrusted by their own communities corresponds to observations Till Förster made in Korhogo, where one of the neighbourhood chiefs staffed the night watch groups with an elder each.

[488] M. et Mme. Gbe, 01/04/2010.

that residents of Man were mainly concerned about neighbourhood criminality during the post-APO time is noteworthy, because it tells us something about the decline of political violence and the rebels' relative success in providing security.[489]

Faire sa propre sécurité

Eventually, it was the idea of 'making one's own security' (literal translation) or 'providing one's own safety' that caught my interest. After several bad experiences with among others a dozo watchman, Robert decided that "God" will guard his family from now on and he dismissed the watchman: *"Je préfère, moi-même faire ma sécurité."*[490] Other informants made similar statements in conversations about how they ensured their safety. Civilians and rebels alike told me repeatedly that there can never be 100% safety and people had to look after their own safety, as in the following example by Diabaté:

Chacun à son propre niveau aussi doit pouvoir veiller sur sa propre sécurité. Parce que même s'il y a tout une armée d'éléments, qui vont venir assurer votre sécurité, tant que vous même de façon interne, ça veut dire, quand vous ne créez pas les conditions de votre propre sécurité ... voilà.[491]

Hence, some of my research participants directed my attention to the fact that security was about 'creating the condition of your own safety' rather than trusting a particular security actor, be it the rebels, the UN, the hunter association (dozow) or the neighbourhood's impoverished youths. According to Mohammed, a cigarette distributor, the key for safety was to make sure one had good relationships with 'everyone around':

En fait, ce qu'il faut comprendre, c'est qu'il faut avoir une bonne relation avec tout le monde autour. [...] Un élément incontrôlé [an 'uncontrolled' rebel] peut se lever, il va poser un acte. Si tu n'as pas des bonnes relations avec tes voisins, ton environnement, tout le monde va te

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[489] I did not further explore aspects of security linked to neighbourhood criminality. However, the safety of someone depended on several aspects: whether the person had something valuable to take (booty); whether the booty was easily accessible (no guards, no wall, no neighbours close-by) and on possible escape roots if discovered. At a general level, one can say that thievery and burglary partially depend on expected sanctions if caught. Furthermore, subjective security perceptions further depended on people's political views, as has been illustrated above.

[490] A bit later, he concluded the topic by iterating: "Donc sur le plan sécuritaire vraiment, on est là. Puisque il n'y a pas vraiment des forces de l'ordre vraiment comme ça, c'est chacun qui fait pratiquement sa sécurité" (Robert, 40s, Dan-speaking, Catholic, employee of electricity company (CIE), Man, 05/04/2009).

[491] Diabaté, 40s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (SODECI), Man, 30/12/2008.

regarder comme ça ... Si tu entretiens des relations avec tout le monde, il y a une solidarité qui se crée, dès qu'il y a un petit problème, celui qui peut agir, il agit rapidement. C'est un peu comme ça qu'on travaille ici.[492]

Hence, people like Mohammed entrusted their safety in 'good' neighbourly relations. From Mohammed's statement it does not seem that he established particularly close or intensive relations with his neighbours. To be on greeting terms seemed important, hence the kind of semi-personal relationship and range of proximity described in Chapter 7. Such thinking and practice underline once more that security is intricately linked with relationships and sociality (Hills 2009; Göpfert 2012, 68).

Mid-range relations with rebels

Still in search for a trustworthy protector and in line with the idea of neo-patrimonial relationships (Bayart 1993; Berman 2004; Daloz 2005), I wondered whether the key for safety in the region was to build a close relationship to one of the rebel chiefs. Knowing that Robert has also had difficult experiences with the rebels, I asked carefully:

KATHRIN: *Et pour hm... je sais pas. Est-ce que de temps en temps ... je sais pas, est-ce qu'il peut être important d'avoir une bonne relation avec un des chefs rebelles? Pour la protection ou pour régler quelque chose? Ou vous vous méfiez beaucoup d'eux?*

ROBERT: *Non non, c'est-à-dire, moi, ce que j'ai constaté... il faut pas les fuir, faut pas t'isoler d'eux, mais il faut pas aussi être en relation vraiment serré avec eux – parce que c'est des gens, quand tu es trop trop avec eux, ils peuvent penser que tu connais trop leurs secrets, et puis même si c'est pas eux qui viennent pour te brutaliser ou bien pour te maltraiter, ils peuvent envoyer des éléments à tout moment. Parce que s'il y a un conflit entre le chef, l'autre va dire s'il a eu l'information peut-être c'est par lui, ils savent pas par où il peut avoir l'information. Donc nous, je peux dire, ce sont des relations de travail seulement, qui nous liait; c'est-à-dire nous, quand nous, on veut aller faire un travail, on prend le laisser-passer, ils nous donnent, on va sur site, on fait notre travail. On les connaît pratiquement tous, tous ceux qui sont en chef là, on les connaît, mais c'est les relations de travail. C'est-à-dire, jusqu'ici, s'il ne sont pas venus me prendre à la maison, je ne les ai jamais invités – comme je vous invite à prendre l'alloco[493] – un chef à la maison ici.*

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[492] Mohammed, 30s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (cigarette distributor), 23/01/2009.
[493] Alloco (fried plantains) is a popular dish.

What Robert expresses is that his sense of security increased with a certain proximity with the rebels but that it also decreased at a certain point. Greater proximity also meant greater vulnerability. Too much closeness will raise suspicion, as much as avoiding the rebels will cause mistrust. To "flee" from them or to "isolate yourself from them", could make the rebels believe that you were plotting something behind their back or that you had something to hide.

Therefore, actors like Robert opted for a professional relationship that allowed for institutional trust in professional roles, e.g. the military administration interacting with the electrician Robert. Hence, contrary to what the logic of neo-patrimonial system might suggest, personalisation of relationships had its limits. If the relationship fell below a sort of mid-range distance, the relationship became more intimate, thereby requiring more trust due to greater vulnerability. In 2008, taxis were full of stickers warning that too much trust is dangerous: *'Trop de confiance attire le danger'*. A form of personalisation that reached proximities of a *personal* relationship with a rebel had its own downsides and no longer brought more safety. The range of proximity in work relationships was considered safer. Relationships that built on established roles that concealed insights into personal matters were perceived as the right range for trust in relationships with rebels.

Consequently, both isolation and intimacy were perceived as dangerous. I borrow the idea of mid-range distance from Till Förster. He observed a sort of proximity and distance for relationships between spouses, neighbours and kin in rural areas that seems to resonate with what Robert has described to me in the interview above. Förster characterised this range as a "mid-range distance": *"Sie vermeiden zu grosse Nähe stets genauso wie zu grosse Fremde. Die Extreme gelten als gefährlich."* (Förster 1994, 142)

I presume that the mid-range distance towards relatives is a narrower one than the mid-range distance towards rebels. Nevertheless, it illustrates nicely the idea of different circles of proximity that seem salient for trust in various relationships.

Let me mention how different ranges of closeness in (trust) relationships were expressed. "Eating together" is an emic expression of closeness and trust, as in the example above, which signals a closer and thicker relationship than mere communication or greeting exchanges. But when people emphasised that they were "together all the time"[494], they were expressing a very close friendship linked to an increased frequency of close encounters, which would go beyond "sharing alloco" mentioned in the interview above.

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[494] Mohammed, 23/01/2009.

The best way to deal with the rebels was to settle on a medium-range distance in a relationship with them. Building mid-range-distance trust relationships with the rebels was a strategy with the prospect of security and mutual trust. Avoidance and closeness were both associated with mistrust. What I have described so far is what seemed to be the best social range for most, except for those who had kinship relations, or were politically active on their side or who could count on privileged treatment due to their social status as whites, for instance.

I think that the mid-range sociality between rebels and civilians is one of the keys to understanding people's security management. Hardly anyone I talked to expressed a need to develop close connections to the commanders. Closeness to a rebel leader was neither necessary nor desirable for security and safety. People were not looking for a protector,[495] for someone who would run and come in case of an emergency – this would always be too late anyway. As Diabaté said: "even if there is an entire army of soldiers who come to assure your safety", it will not be sufficient to be safe. Rachelle's account has taught us, that commanders were not able to provide security, if people did not put themselves into the condition of their own safety.

Therefore, the answer to the question of how people ensured their safety in times of war and rebel rule is that they tried to create the conditions of their own safety, by knowing the social terrain and therewith preventing insecurity. Cultivating good neighbourly relations was a key strategy for that, as neighbours would be around to act, hence those who have the possibility (competence) to do something. All that people needed to ensure was that those around them were motivated to act on their behalf if need be.

Varying familiarities with life under rebel rule

Sociability among young men

My assistant, who grew up in Man, was at school in the southern part of Côte d'Ivoire at the onset of the war. When he returned to the region in 2004, Man had come under rebel rule. His childhood town had changed. Initially, he remembered, he could not make head or tail of his male peers. He told me that for a while, he was spending more time with girls. Some of his peers were rebels and others were not, so he needed to be careful when socialising in order not to 'offend' anyone or as locals say *'provoquer quelqu'un'*.

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[495] But they could connect themselves to powerful commanders in order to deter possible thieves from the outset.

A man in Facobly had noticed something similar. He had only been in the region for a month when I interviewed him in 2008. He mentioned that one had to observe certain rules if one wanted to socialise in a public bar where one would obviously encounter rebels, too: *"Il faut savoir marcher, il faut savoir s'adresser à des gens; il faut savoir consommer avec quelqu'un. Si tu as trop causé, tu parles trop français, tu apparais bien, vraiment tu es dans l'œil du cyclone."*[496]

In the presence of rebels, a particular attitude or role play in the sense of Goffman seemed necessary in order to avoid unpleasant situations (Goffman 1959). The rebels might not even be wearing military clothing or be on duty; hence, anonymous other young men could possibly feel 'offended' or challenged by someone's appearance and demeanour. This uneasiness requiring caution in the social sphere of the town indicates us that basic social trust was not as it used to be.

This issue of a changed sociability came up again and again in my research. Particularly figurations involving rebels and other young men were potentially insecure situations even in 2008/2009, prone to degeneration into showdowns among men. While during *Le temps sauvage* the use of guns was likely, it was more about fistfights or blows with the butt of a firearm in the post-APO frame. Often trivialities like urination would give the rebels a 'cause' to mark their superiority by brutally beating someone. To give a few examples, after drinking, a slightly tipsy young man was urinating too close to a boutique and was subsequently badly beaten by a group of rebels to the extent that he needed medical treatment.[497] In a similar case, a nightly patrol stopped in front of a house so that the rebels could relieve themselves. When a man complained about their urinating inside his compound, the rebels (eight in number) gave him a severe beating and took him to the gendarmerie; his mobile phone and bike disappeared that night, too.[498] To add a last example: A youngster on a visit from the south drove past a 'chief' near Sangouiné and 'did not greet him' properly. His (shiny) car was confiscated and only released

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[496] Jacques, 30s, Wè-speaking, FPI activist, Facobly, 06/11/2008. He uses expressions in local Ivorian French to describe someone with a rather confident presentation of self in a public bar that can be interpreted as showing off by others. "Speaking too much French" refers to someone who is well-educated and in former times at least was likely to have a well-paid job perhaps as a civil servant, and claiming superiority in the 'hinterland'. Those who assumed an air of importance or simply refused to submit to certain rebels' claims to superiority soon incurred a rebels' wrath and were 'beheaded'.

[497] Jacques, 06/11/2008.

[498] Watchman, 30s, Dan-speaking, Man, 17/03/2009.

after a 'compensation for personal suffering' had been paid and everyone had begged the 'chief's' pardon.[499]

'Creating problems' was a common practice these days and one had better learn quickly how to avoid it. If a rebel was particularly malevolent and violent, locals would say: *'Il faut te méfier de lui'*, 'be wary of this one', basically keep your distance from him. Sometimes people had long forgotten what exactly the rebel in question had done; but to steer clear of the person had become routine and practical knowledge.

Isabelle, the Guere woman we have met earlier, put it nicely in explaining how to be safe when dealing with rebels in more constraining situations: *"[S]i toi, tu parles avec force, tu veux avoir la force plus qu'eux, c'est ce qu'ils n'aiment pas."*[500]

Social relationships with armed actors were shaped by unequal power differentials and the threat and use of physical force. Even if the example of Auntie has shown that power can be subverted, domination and submission remained defining elements of the civil-military nexus and daily social life.

Once I asked a village chief in an interview whether one could say that there were good and bad rebels. He answered that yes indeed, there were good ones, bad ones and very bad ones.[501] More than those far in Abidjan, residents of the region of Man – civilians who actually had to share everyday life with the rebels – made distinctions and passed a balanced judgment on the rebels. Without having been asked, Macla for instance mentioned in the conversation with me: *"Mais néanmoins, dans cette situation-là, il faut reconnaître que, ils n'ont pas été aussi mauvais comme on le pense."*[502] He said that some of the rebels changed and some even received them as guests in the houses they occupied.

Another young man made it very clear to me that in life, everyone is not the same *"tout le monde n'est pas même chose"*, that there are those who are born as thieves and others who are not – even among whites, as he emphasised. He added the following example, in which a rebel lends 1000 CFA to a needy civilian and does not show any sign of anger, when the civilian insults him, the moment he comes to get the credit back:

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[499] Benjamin, 40s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, Podiagouiné, 14/01/2009.
[500] Isabelle, 05/11/2008.
[501] Chief of *Deugoulé, Dan-speaking, 18/01/2009.
[502] Amadou, 19/03/2009.

Il y a tout. Dans la vie il y a tout. Lui qui n'est pas rebelle, s'il a cœur chaud, il a cœur chaud. Mhm! Lui qui est rebelle, s'il a cœur chaud, il a cœur chaud. Il y a des rebelles même qui ont cœur froid! Tu vas l'insulter, tu vas lui faire tout, il va pas parler. Il va pas parler. Il y a quelques'uns qui sont rebelles, il prend son argent, il donne à quelqu'un [the civilian addressing the rebel]: 'Ah pardon, je n'ai rien aujourd'hui, mes enfants n'ont pas mangé aujourd'hui, pardon faut me donner 1000 crédit.' Il prend 1000 francs crédit, il le donne. Et après, quand il [the rebel] encaisse son argent, on l'insulte, et puis il dit rien, il est assis, alors qu'il est rebelle – ça se fait! Tout le monde n'a pas cœur chaud! C'est ça![503]

Such statements show that people made distinctions, but they also point to the fact that a few rebels who had a *"cœur chaud"* or who were *"nerveu"*[504] and breached social norms had a very unpleasant impact on the social climate in general. How locals dealt with that shall be explored next.

Frames – Vivre en fonction du temps

Aka, the barkeeper, said that one had to adopt a particular attitude in order to stay in the rebel-held zones:

Vous savez que quelqu'un qui te 'moyen', il y a une manière de parler à la personne. Tu as peur, mais tu es obligé de te soumettre à la personne. Voilà. C'est ça qui fait que souvent d'autres se débordent et puis ils ont des problèmes. Par rapport à moi, *Aka, où je suis, je sais qu'il n'y a pas de gendarmerie, il n'y a pas de justice, c'est eux qui nous surveillent, qui nous commandent.[505]

'Quelqu'un qui te moyen', is Ivorian French. *Moyen* is the French word for 'means', financial means. It illustrates that wealth and power are perceived to go hand in hand. The expression here means someone who has control over you: *'Il te moyen'*, *'il te maitrise'*, *'il te commande'*, etc.[506] Basically, in a societal condition without the rule of law and under the rule of rebels, one better accepted submission in a figuration with rebels. Back in 1985, Aka had an argument with a gendarme in a *maquis* in one of Man's neighbourhoods. Over the course of their dispute, the gendarme asked: Don't you know that I am a gendarme? Aka responded promptly that even if he was a gendarme, he was not born a gendarme and besides, off duty without a uniform, a

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[503] Gueu (junior), 17/10/2008.

[504] *"[...] parmi eux, il y avait ceux qui étaient nerveux et parmi eux il y avait ceux qui étaient gentils."* (Amadou, 19/03/2009)

[505] Aka, 22/01/2009.

[506] I am grateful to Gérôme Tokpa for providing this explanation.

gendarme was like anyone else! Chuckling, Aka added that these days, he could not say such a thing to a rebel: *"Dans ces temps, je ne peux pas dire comme ça à un rebelle. @@ Donc l'homme vit en fonction du temps. Voilà."*

"On vit en fonction du temps" – Aka said it twice in the interview. What is the meaning of it? What does it try to tell us? I think, Aka means to say that he has experienced different 'times' in his life which required him to adopt different attitudes in social interactions; to quote Aka again: *"J'ai une manière de gérer mes affaires, j'ai une manière de parler. Voilà."* It seems that he has acquired something like a repertoire of social practices that he makes use of according to the requirements of the time. Of course, he has his first choice of action, but as he has emphasised repeatedly, he would not hesitate to move with the 'times'. If necessary, he preferred to adjust to the conditions of the times so to speak. Hence, to assess a situation at hand, people like Aka in crisis-ridden contexts also acquire a sense of the general frame in which figurations take place. When in a frame of 'normal times' Aka could tell off a gendarme; this was unwise with a rebel even in the post-APO frame.

For the recent violent conflict, people distinguished a first time when there was still fighting that they referred to as "when guns were speaking", "en ce temps les fusils parlait"[507]. There was also "en temps de *Touré", one of the self-proclaimed rebel chiefs in Man, a time particularly associated with great insecurity for young women like Nicole. A very common reference point was the frame they called *"le temps sauvage"*, "wild time", but also *"en temps sauvage vrai vrai"*, during the deeply or really wild time, as described in Chapter 9. For instance, people would say, during the really wild times, they had experienced things never heard and thought of before: *"On a vécu des problèmes durs, que nous n'avions jamais vus."*[508]; thereby conveying that these events were not just experienced as an exaggerated version of 'normal times', but experienced as different in kind.

The rebels, too, talked about these different periods that went hand in hand with a certain comportment. Although I had not asked explicitly, a commander said in one of our conversations that their subordinates had to adapt their 'behaviour' to the course of 'time' and that those who did not, would be punished.[509]

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[507] Isabelle, Wè-speaking, 05/11/2008; Isabelle used this expression and a variation of the same expression from a Dan speaker: *"en ce temps, arme parlait partout"* (Gueu (junior), Dan-speaking, 17/10/2008).

[508] Chief of Podiagouiné, 14/01/2009.

[509] Commander of the PCO, 13/11/2008.

In 2008, people agreed that times had changed since their first encounter with the rebels, but people I talked to did not have any illusions as to the fact that these were not normal times[510], yet:

On a vécu des problèmes graves, pendant et dans la guerre, je peux pas dire après, puisque c'est pas bien fini d'abord [...] ils sont là, ça veut dire qu'on n'est pas encore à l'aise. On est toujours commandé par eux. [...] Donc ça veut dire que nous ne sommes pas pour le moment en paix.[511]

'*En temps normal*' is a reference point in comparison to all recently experienced time periods with a strong normative bent. The social memory of 'normal days' has to do with nostalgic feelings, normative, wishful thinking, a feeling of 'yesterday it was better' rather than about how these times were experienced at the time. It serves actors as a foil on which they project normative ideas of how social life should be. For instance, apart from the dozow, the Manois hardly talk about and remember that there was banditry in Man in the 1990s. The looting of the town during the war overshadowed anything they had experienced back then. Present and more recent experiences shape how we remember the past (see methodological chapter).

Lacking socialisation: The post-APO comers

It does not come as a surprise I think that most of the youngsters who committed the 'faux pas' with the rebels mentioned above had come to the region in recent times, only. People, who had lived through the wild time with the rebels, knew their position and the role they were expected to play (Goffman 1959). They did not develop the casualness and ease that I observed between some "post-APO comers"[512] and the rebels. The experience of people, who only had come to Man after 2007, like me for instance, was not the same as for those who had gone through these difficult times with the rebels at the beginning.

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[510] See also Kaufmann on the perception of "normal days" in Liberia, the "perceived normality and stability of the pre-war arrangements and daily routines" in contrast to the post-conflict everyday (Kaufmann 2011, 7).

[511] Chief of *Deugoulé, 18/01/2009. Even the rebels said that as long as they held their "irregular positions" or *postes de guerre',* the situation could not be fully normal. But what will the new normality be like? Many of the rebels have bought property in Man. The individuals will not disappear and most of them hope to keep their social role as security providers in one way or another.

[512] As mentioned before, the Ouagadougou Peace Accord or in French, Accord politique de Ouagadougou, short APO, was signed in March 2007 between Soro Guillaume and Laurent Gbagbo under the auspices of Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso.

I came across a person who ignored all unwritten social codes of conduct that would ensure safety and prevent unpleasant situations with the rebels that I have just described. In his early thirties and with origins in the north, Lass worked for a beverage distributor in Man. He came to Man in 2007, in the month of February and consequently he has not experienced the wild times.[513] I shall characterise him as a post-APO comer, as a person who lacked the practical knowledge of frames and figurations that the Manois have acquired during the times of war and rebel rule. Despite his "inevitable subjectivity" as a very confident young man (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 75), we can learn a great deal from him in comparison to those who had been socialised into life under pre-APO rebel rule.[514] His confidence partially rested on the good relationship he had with the commander-in-chief, Loss, as well as with people of Loss' entourage. As age mates, they connected easily when the beverage company introduced itself and made gifts to the local leadership as an entry fee to the market. What is interesting about Lass's comportment is that he disregarded several precautionary measures that others took and did not hesitate to boss lower-ranking rebels around. Lass did not show deference to the lower-ranks as he had good relationships with the commanders, so in the end the slighted complained:

"Les éléments se plaint au chef 'ils nous manquent du respect'; parce que les gens comme moi, les respectent pas, parce que je suis ami à tout les militaires."[515]

Lass lacked habitualised experience about both particularly sensitive figurations and shifting frames in a politically vulnerable context. He disregarded social norms that are characteristic for social life under rebel rule. He got involved in close friendships with rebels *("Je n'ai pas mal d'amis parmi eux");* he was so often with rebels that some rebels began thinking he was one of them *("Je suis toujours avec leurs chefs, donc il y a des éléments qui me prenaient pour un rebelle").*[516] If people observe that you 'walk' together with the rebels all the time, they easily assume you are one of them.[517]

Most pre-APO inhabitants of Man, maintained a certain aloofness towards the rebels, as described in the medium-range relationship. Some of those who had made the wild time wild,

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[513] Although the APO was to be signed only a month later, I shall characterise him as a post-APO comer (borrowing from the designation of first and latecomers), as he lacked the experience of the wild times.

[514] Note that there are different socialisation processes have to be understood as a continuum: "There are in practice, of course, many intermediate types between re-socialisation as just discussed and secondary socialisation that continues to build on the primary internalisations." (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 181) Coulter uses the term socialisation for 'rebel life' in Sierra Leone (Coulter 2009, 110).

[515] Lass, 30s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (beverage distributor), Man, 08/03/2009.

[516] Lass, 08/03/2009.

[517] Richard, 19/03/2009.

were still around in Man in the post-APO times. A certain mistrust and unease remained present and somehow, for many pre-APO inhabitants the rebels had something of wolves in sheep's clothing. Those who have never seen the wolves, like me, developed a different relationship to them than those whose memories of the times of the wolves constantly warned them to let go and feel free towards them. We may tentatively argue that pre-APO residents of Man had made experiences that have changed their a very basic feeling of trust of what human beings are and can do to each other.

In the following example, featuring an internal insurgency against the Com-zone, I will further illustrate this argument and introduce another frame.

Betrayal among the rebels

At the beginning of February 2009, an attack against the military leadership in Man shook everyone up; the lull of a seemingly smooth social life of the post-APO frame came to a screeching halt. The plan was to kill the Com-zone and to replace him with the second-in-command of the Com-secteur south, Malick. Chief Malick had been chosen by the conspirators due to an earlier disagreement with Loss. Although Malick played along, he finally betrayed the conspirators and led Loss's chief of security, Cobra, to the secret meeting place, where he, Malick, had been expected to provide ammunition. Two insurgents were shot on the spot, Cobra was slightly injured and the hunt for further insurgents claimed another couple of victims during the night. They took about 20 to 30 prisoners.[518]

Different explanations were given as to the objectives of the group, ranging from disturbing the Ouagadougou peace process to hindering the reunification of the two treasuries to personal grievances and material aspirations of certain mid-ranking soldier. As so often, a myriad of personal motives had pushed individuals to participate, sometimes due to personal networks and friends. The insurgent group seems to have had links to former rebel chiefs outside the country. Most of the conspirators, however, were local low-ranking men who had served under

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[518] The information is based on talks with several low and high-ranking rebels involved on both the insurgent and counter-insurgent side following the attempt in February 2009 (Amara, 20s, Senufo speaker, FN low-ranked, 06/11/2008; Bakary, 30s, Dan-speaking, FN low-ranked, 07/11/2008 and 16/02/2009; Fof, 30s, Jula speaker, FN low-ranked, 11/11/2008; Almamy, 30s, Jula-speaking, FN low-ranked, 14/11/2008; Renard, 40s, Jula-speaking, FN mid-ranked, 15/10/2008; Commandant Say-say, 30s, Jula-speaking from Man, FN mid-ranked, 07/11/2008; chief of security and commander of PCO, February 2009; Malick, 30s, Jula-speaking, FN high-ranked, 22/02/2010). I also talked to dozens of civilians about the event; these conversations provide the basis for the following argument.

A.B. le Lion and felt underprivileged under Loss;[519] allegedly, there were also a few new recruits from Abidjan or other zones and, last but not least, combatants close to the Com-zone were involved.

Whereas most conspirators' participation caused little indignation, the entire town talked about those who had been particularly close to Loss. Their betrayal was seen as a ruthless, mischievous act. Rumours in town had it that Loss cried in front of his assembled troops. Even though this was likely to be an exaggeration, as the commander could not express such emotions in public, people iterated this story, probably to emphasise the seriousness of the matter.

For once, trust and distrust, friendship, loyalty and betrayal were common subjects and on everyone's lips. Particularly the involvement of *Kamagaté was seen as betrayal. He was said to have been a close friend of Loss's and lived in the Com-zone's residence with his wife and child. This breach of personal trust came as a shock to everybody who knew him, combatants and non-combatants alike.[520] Members of the New Forces I talked to repeatedly said that if there was one among them who had been permitted to enter Loss's private rooms, it was Kamagaté. In all the conversations I heard, the intimacy between the two was stressed and contrasted with what had now happened, conjuring up disbelief over and over again. The betrayal of a close friendship was what somehow touched people more than other aspects of the failed internal insurgency.

Some of my FN informants said that Loss told everybody during the *rassemblement* (meeting of troops) that they should know he did not trust a single one of them. It was this moment of harsh dislocation of trust that thoroughly shook and shocked the Cobras and their leadership as brothers in arms. Everyone was reminded of their own vulnerability and that they operated in a

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[519] I happen to have talked to several of those involved two months before the failed attempt (see footnote above). The lower ranks who worked at one of the checkpoints in Man talked about the fact that the local leadership had duped them and that others had, unfairly in their eyes, gained more. One root cause is a conflict between 'little ones' of different commanders; between *'Lionceaux'* (lion cubs) who had fought in the main battles of Man in 2002 under the command of A.B. le Lion, the long-gone rebel chief, and the current leader Loss and his 'Cobras'. The man in charge, Losséni Fofana, and his entourage, my interlocutors complained, had given jobs to lower ranks who like Loss had come from Bouaké and other youngsters from his region of origin, Koyagas, i.e. men who had not participated in fighting, at all. This had created a lot of discontent among the 'old-ones' and some of them were ready to take up arms to fight for what they considered to be their right. One young low-rank, who was involved and badly hurt when captured, had lost his income at the roadblock when taxes for small motorbikes had been abandoned in the wake of the gradual reduction of taxes in general.

[520] Kamagaté had been working in the financial branch of the New Forces in Sémien in 2008, when I met him.

high-risk environment. In resignation, the third in command of the zone said it was close to an impossibility to be sure of someone's loyalty. Perhaps you may just once deny a wish to one of your *petits* and he might thereafter always bear a grudge. Therefore, at the end of the day, he would prefer to be in charge of his own safety and do without (body)guards – thus coming to the same conclusion as the civilian actors!

Since combatants of the *'garde rapproché'* and 'friends' like Kamagaté were involved, suspicion and mistrust gained ground. How many had been in the know? Who had been in on it and who had not? In a world suddenly fraught with suspicion, allegiances were hard to determine in the night the conspiracy was discovered. In the frenzy that ensued, everybody had to prove their innocence and ignorance about what had been going on. Hence, to demonstrate their loyalty and to leave no doubt as to their support for the commander, many acted in a particularly brutal way towards those who were identified as traitors, whether their guilt had been proven or not. When a witch-hunt starts, people become eager hunters. The more violent they act, the farther away they position themselves from the conspirators. Some even grabbed their phones and deleted the names of 'friends' who had been arrested to save their own skins.

Such clashes for leadership among the rebels are generally deadly affairs, as internal rivalries in Korhogo and Bouaké in 2004 have shown. The Com-zone of Man seems to have reacted in a comparably moderate way in 2009, it was not an exaggerated and prolonged witch-hunt, which earned him credit with soldiers and civilians alike. Several rebels were imprisoned in the civil prison in Man, others at the gendarmerie where someone professional was put in charge of the investigation.[521]

We can describe this type of situation as a state of emergency that calls for a different set of social practices – foremost among themselves.[522] The special occurrence of betrayal legitimized particularly drastic measures that are not allowed under normal circumstances. Hence, the internal insurgency triggered a shift of frame. States of emergencies are dangerous, as they may be taken as an opportunity by anyone to settle private scores, so-called *'règlements de comptes'*, or to appropriate goods that one has always wanted, but could not get hold of on an ordinary day. This could be because of a woman, for example, or to eliminate a witness who could testify

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[521] One of the wardens told me that *'ils n'ont pas fait cadeau'*, that those who were captured were badly beaten and unable to walk upright when they arrived (prison warden, Dan-speaking, FN mid-ranked, 13/02/2009). But a doctor was allowed in, The International Red Cross was granted access and even I was allowed to visit those I knew. They came out into the prison yard and we talked. Families brought their family member food, which always had to be tasted by those who brought it to prevent poisoning.
[522] See also Agamben (2008).

against you. A civilian I met in prison said there was a *'problème de femme'* he had with someone close to the commander that had caused him to be accused of being part of the insurgency. A rebel I knew from the roadblock was less lucky. He was shot on the spot, gunned down at 6 o'clock in the morning, the result of a personal requital. According to some rebels who were present, it was unnecessary, as he had not shown any form of resistance at his arrest.

The next morning, the town was full of armed men and military movements, something inhabitants had not seen for a long time. Even though the New Forces stressed that it was something 'internal', amongst themselves, and that civilians were not concerned, the town centre emptied at night fall. Everyone went home and locked their doors. To be seen outside was perceived as risky. You could find yourself in the wrong place at the wrong moment – perhaps without even knowing that you were passing close by a place where they had located suspects – and be asked questions, brutalised, etc. In such a frame of emergency and retaliation, mere allegations may have fatal outcomes. Dead is dead, after all. Although no curfew was imposed, the population of Man went home quickly at night. For someone like me, this was quite impressive.

Interestingly, Lass, whom I introduced before as a post-APO comer, told me that he had gone out that night for a drink as usual, but he found himself in empty streets. Astonished at the sight of a locked-up town and scared by the ghostly atmosphere, he turned the car round and went back home. Well-informed about the conspiracy and even close to Kamagaté, he did not sense the possible dangers of the situation.

What this tells us is that Lass did not have the same sense of the situation as the resident population of Man. He had not lived through the *temps sauvage* like the Manois and therefore lacked their sedimented experience and powers of perception. He did not sense the dangers they sensed and did not take the precautions they took. No one had told the population to stay indoors, for 'locals' it went without saying. They tacitly agreed on the appropriate attitude – distrust – and the corresponding action for the frame at hand: In a situation such as this, it was best to stay indoors. The Manois did so because they had been socialised into life under rebel rule. In their stock of knowledge at hand *(Wissensvorrat)*, they had stored a frame one might call 'state of emergency' – a frame within which things happened that on a usual evening did not.

Summary and discussion

This last empirical chapter has brought different strands of inquiry together in the time frame after the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement. On the one hand, 'state actors' and politicians supporting the government had come back to Man, which has brought aspects of trust between the warring parties back into our regional focus. Further aspects were security provision at the neighbourhood-level, relational aspects between the population and the rebels in terms of a trustful proximity (mid-range) and questions sociability (figurations with young men). In the last empirical case-study, shifting frames have been explored along an example that put the rebels back into our focus.

This last example emphasised that rebels had their weak points, too. Their bodies and selves were vulnerable as anyone else's.[523] As Popitz brilliantly argued, everyone has the power to do harm and simultaneously everyone is vulnerable in various ways and may be fatally injured (Popitz 1999). Therefore, it is wrong to presume that "substantial power differences virtually wreck the possibility and meaningfulness of trust […]." (Hardin 2006, 34–35) The 'powerful' are exposed and need some trust in their subordinates. On several occasions during informal participation, I observed how rebel chiefs dealt with their subordinates in a firm but fair manner, sometimes mixing reprimand with humorous role play. By doing so a chief made sure that the message passed without having created an enemy, seeking to convince with words and gain respect rather than sterile compliance.

Contrary to my preliminary assumption, people were generally less concerned about finding a trustworthy armed actor whom they could entrust their safety, than about assessing how others would act, anticipating the trustfulness and safety of social situations. Quite obviously people tried to make sure that insecurity did not become an issue in the first place. Prevention is better than cure. Making your own security meant to be friendly to everyone, but not being too close to them either, as proximity would only increase vulnerability and require more trust for a feeling of safety. What this tells us about security issues in times of violent political conflict is that security is about managing relationships between ourselves and our social environment.

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[523] It is well known that rebels tried to protect themselves with magic and blessings, as well as many non-combatants, by the way. Nearly every combatant had his *"gris-gris"* (amulets) (Badouel 2004, 88) or asked for blessings from their ancestors and elders in their village of origin (high-rank and low-rank, Man 2009). Amara, one of my low-rank rebel research participants said that the friend with whom he had joined the rebellion believed in the protecting potions. One day, when Amara was having lunch, this friend told another companion to try and shoot him with a "Kalash" and his friend fell down dead.

Establishing relationships by calibrating the most trustful position of proximity to our consociates was critical for ensuring one's safety.

The literature generally presumes that institutional trust is lost and that personalised trust in powerful violent actors in such a situation prevails. People like Robert kept relationships with the rebels deliberately impersonal and restricted interactions with them to clearly defined purposive professional activities. This meant that he did not initiate talk about personal matters or suggest having a drink, etc., so that the range of interactions and common activities were not broadened.

Paul once said that young people were like a knife, if you don't know how to take it, you will cut yourself.[524] Somehow this is quite true for the rebels with 'coeur chaud'. How to handle them was critical for both civilians and fellow rebels. "Some people engage in these acts for profit and power, and some commit serious abuses while doing so. But the key point is that most do not." (Nordstrom 2004, 179) With time everyone knew who was how and a degree of familiarisation made life in common more predictable. That the security situation had calmed down was also due to the fact that there was a degree of predictability. If you stayed put at the lower level the rebellion had ascribed to you, little could happen. If you had other aspirations, you took risks. Even this was predictable, hence a situation of thin trust. The rules of how to deal with this type of armed rebel cadets became so engrained that it had become an expected social norm. If you did not comply, you were the one causing trouble.[525] But some youths were tired of holding back all the time, hiding themselves and of displaying a colourless self in public.

A Repertoire of frames and figurations

My empirical argument is that people in Man have developed a repertoire of typified trust situations out of frames and figurations of trustfulness. With this repertoire of practical knowledge they were able to assess other's actions and ensure their safety. The combination of frames and figurations served people as an orientation for managing social life in different situations. Whereas Chapter 8 explained and illustrated the idea of figurations, I will summerise the idea of frames here.

A frame is not just a period of time, it is more than that. I have heard people talk about different "times", but I have seen locals act according to different "frames" (Goffman 1974). A frame

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[524] Paul, 12/10/2008.
[525] Benjamin, 14/01/2009.

also refers to a political situation that can only take a day and then shift back to the familiar flow of social life under rebel rule.

In composing and defining these frames I have relied on what research participants described to me were the conditions associated with social life in these times. Frames may accentuate and magnify social practices from "normal times" or vice versa. Hence, at least in certain times, they are not completely alien in their structure of abuse, but exaggerated ones from normal times. Frames impinge on how people may relate to each other. Certain social norms of interaction could no longer be taken for granted; hence it was necessary to take on a more distrustful attitude towards certain social actors in some situations.

Perhaps one can imagine that actors developed repertoires of trustfulness that combine figurations with frames in a creative way, as Aka has described.

In a musical sense, the actors have to play the same piece of interaction (figuration) on different instruments (in different frames). They master different strings, brass and percussion so-to-speak, manners of interacting in different political frames. They choose the instrument appropriate for the frame at hand, try not to mourn the change in sound and then play melodiously, even if the tonality is different. The range of possible expressions may have shifted: they can no longer play and reach the highest pitch, but they will do everything to keep the piece they have to play recognisable.

12 Conclusions

In August 2010, when the French peace-keepers were no longer stationed in Man, I met a group of four young soldiers in town. They wondered whether I did not feel unsafe and gestured at the weapon hanging on their belt. From my vantage point, the idea that a small pistol would protect me in a rebel-held zone was amusing. I took the opposite approach for my security plan, namely not to be armed, but to be accessible and open about what I did. This enhanced my feeling of safety. The (ex)rebels knew that I was around and accepted me asking questions. I told some of my rebel research participants not to tell me anything they would regret afterwards.

I would like to conclude as follows: First, I provide a summary of what I think my main empirical findings from my ethnographical research in relation to the transformation of trust. The aim is not to summarise the ethnographic data as presented by chapter, but to highlight each chapter's findings and discuss them on a higher level to obtain a broader picture of such transformations. I then revisit situations of neither trust nor distrust in my ethnography, reconsider forms of distrust, before proposing a theoretical perspective on trust based on my empirical work on security and agency. By way of conclusion, the chapter will be rounded off with a glance to the future.

Transformations of trust in the Ivorian violent conflict

Returning to the overall question of this thesis: How does trust become transformed in times of war and rebel rule? A preliminary answer is: transformations of trust occur in close relation to social dynamics and political transformations. I have tried to shed more light on the interrelationship between the trustor and his/her social environment by: firstly, dividing at the theoretical level, the trust process into sequences to sharpen my analytical lens and exploring transformations of trust empirically. In the following section, I will pick up some of the threads that I found particularly interesting and pull them together.

Theoretical approach

Basically, I have understood trust as the confident expectation about how others will act. With a focus on predictability, trust means to overcome uncertainty, and feel confident about being able to anticipate how others will act in social life. For the empirical context of this study, I distinguished expectations of benign or safe acts (trust) from expectations of harmful acts (distrust). The ethnography is theoretically oriented around the Simmelian notion of trust that combines 'good reasons' for trust with the suspension of uncertainty (or 'a leap of faith') (Möllering 2001, 2006).

In order to analyse and explain trust and trust situations, I divided trust into different sequential acts drawing on Emirbayer and Mische's theory of agency (1998). My main interest was in understanding how actors decided whether to trust or not to trust someone or something, and I concentrated my explanation on the assessment of trustworthiness based on actors' stock of knowledge at hand. In trust research, explanations of trustworthiness are frequently based on motivations and competence, but I also refer to four different types of trust in post-conflict societies: personal, institutional, basic social and normative.

Methodology

Implicit forms of trust (attitudes) are enacted in social practices, through which they are externalised in social interactions and thus examinable – provided we have information about actors' intentions. The main methods I used in this study were participation during the last period of rebel rule and the reconstruction of trust situations on the basis of narrated sequences of events *(Handlungsabläufe)*. Based on a reflexive-realist approach, narrated events were conceived as accounts testifying social practice rather than being a mere discursive construction, as a radical constructivist approach would have it. Through the eyes of the narrator – or better via experience-based retrospective verbal reconstructions, I was able to access trust situations from the beginning of the conflict and deduce information about actors' experiences of trust situations.

Empirical findings

In this ethnography, I analysed trust situations in the military-civilian nexus in the region of Man during the violent Ivorian conflict between 2002 and 2010, with a focus on the assessment of trustworthiness. Four types or different bases for trust were identified ranging from personal or institutional to more general (basic social trust) to normative trust that actors drew on to assess the trustfulness of a situation at hand.

A perhaps rather banal finding for the beginning of the war is that the major logic of trust and distrust in the Ivorian conflict was between the opposing sides of the violent political conflict, revolving around the politics of belonging (*ivoirité*) and the country's division into government supporters and opponents. Both sides of the conflict suffered persecution, as exemplified from my ethnographic records in the text (Chapter 7).

People's already low institutional trust in the state apparatus further diminished after the failed coup in September 2002, particularly among northerners. Active government opponents were the first to experience repression from the security forces of the state. With the escalation of the war, an even wider range of people were targeted. Distrust in the security services of the state was so strong that it affected other state service sectors in Man, such as the vaccination service (Chapter 9). Institutional mistrust in this health institution was overcome by personal trust in the long-term health worker, which enabled institutional trust to be restored. Personal trust played a similarly important role in (re-)building institutional trust when schools were reopened. In this case, it was not a state institution that was mistrusted, but rather a 'rebel school', which the locals were not sure they could consider a 'real' school. Again personal trust in one of the professional teachers helped trust-building between the parents and the institution as such.

Contrary to the assumption in the literature on trust, my ethnographic case studies revealed that personal relationships needed to be further differentiated (Chapter 7). In the context of the politics of belonging that in its generalised form was shaped along ethno-regional divides in Man, trust proved strongest in: a) family members and b) friends with the same political orientation, as well as in c) strangers who shared a common ethno-political background. Drawing on these social categories often helped to protect people, while the role of neighbours and colleagues was more ambiguous. They could act as both protectors *and* informers. An analysis of their relationship to the victim revealed that, despite the fact that they had personal insights that made the truster vulnerable, they lacked the more interdependent and tight relationship of e.g. a family member. I have argued that such semi-personal relationships are critical in highly contested political environments.

The day the rebellion reached Man, trust in the societal sphere of the town was withdrawn and people sought shelter in their homes (Chapter 6). This is where people subjectively experienced a sense of safety. It was an unprecedented event and (adult) people experienced a double crisis due to the physical insecurity and uncertainty about the continuity of social life. This moment can be described as a dislocation of trust, during which trust had to be reconfigured. Hidden in

their homes, people first mainly by listened and observed to get information about the new situation. The major change constituted the presence of a novel type of actor, I argue drawing on the work of Schütz, namely the rebels.

Sooner than one might have expected, a process of typification and familiarisation between the population and the rebels set in. This process of familiarisation eventually reached a degree of routinisation in daily life, although it did not become so sedimented that it turned into habituation (Chapter 9). Regarding people's relationship with the rebels, the transformations of trust can be described as a gradual process of familiarisation and the building of a 'thin layer' of trust that allowed actors to predict secure and insecure situations and thus take part in social life with some certitude.

Processes of trust building

On the basis of the ethnographic data presented, it would be wrong to talk about a transformation from trust to distrust and back to trust in absolute terms. The familiar society did not change completely or become unrecognisable after the rebels took control. Some people took advantage of the moment to acquire goods or settle scores with means unthinkable in 'normal times'; but as my data suggests, most people continued observing social norms. This corresponds to Carolyn Nordstrom's findings that: "Some people engage in […] acts for profit and power, and some commit serious abuses while doing so. But the key point is that most do not." (Nordstrom 2004, 179).

Whereas some armed actors fought to keep up social norms, others were particularly notorious in violating social norms, to the extent that we can speak of particular attitudes and practices that people adopted in rebel-held territory (Chapter 11). These social practices, I maintain, became routinised to the extent that we can speak of a secondary socialisation process that newcomers (post-APO comers) lacked. Hence, one can argue that social life under rebel rule developed its own 'practical norms', to use Olivier de Sardan's term (Olivier Sardan 2008) or "standards" (Förster 2009).

The initial period under the rebels in Man is remembered as the wild time (Chapter 9). Based on normative, institutional and personal trust, people with various backgrounds sought help from the rebel leadership to provide them security – a sign of trust. Even though some leaders were well disposed and tried to intervene, the presence of unruly Ivorians or foreign supplementary forces and the rebels' preoccupation with pushing south weakened the New Forces' capacity to provide security. Whereas in northern Côte d'Ivoire, the hunter association continued to function as a trusted institution and even expanded its service provision as a

security actor, there was no comparable institution in the Dan-speaking west. In Man, the position of the local hunters – mainly 'strangers' or latecomers – was too marginal to take on the formative function the dozow had in the north (Chapter 11).

In mid-2003 after the end of the war, Man received a new leadership under Losséni Fofana that gradually managed to improve the security situation. A single chain of command was established and subordinate soldiers were registered, trained and, if necessary, punished (Chapter 10). The rebels' dependency on tax revenues was another factor that made them intensify their efforts to provide order and security and that decisively contributed to them acting in a more trustworthy manner. To attract more business, and thus taxes, the rebels made efforts to make conditions more predictable. They wanted economic actors and the UN to regard them as trustworthy and professional. Since the rebels largely relied on the local economy for their income, the civilian population had leverage to make their claims heard.

Up until about mid 2004, the main reason for the improved trust situation was the reduction of uncertainty and insecurity, or put more positively, situations becoming more predictable. By then most local actors would have been able to discriminate between trustful and distrustful situations. Hence, both security and insecurity could be better predicted because people had become familiar with social life under rebel rule, i.e. a kind of 'thin' trust prevailed. 'Thicker' forms of trust were fostered with the establishment of (personal) contacts and communication (Chapter 10).

Combining frames and figurations of trustfulness
During fieldwork I came to see that locals had acquired an implicit practical knowledge about the trustfulness of situations involving rebels. People who had only recently come to Man lacked this knowledge (Chapter 8). The trustfulness of a situation chiefly depended on: a) who was part of the figuration (the civilian's social marker/role and the sub-category of the rebel/role), and b) the frame or general condition in which the figuration took place (e.g. wild times, consolidated rebel rule, state of emergency). In other words, whether a rebel was trustworthy depended on who he or she interacted with. Several of my ethnographic case-studies exemplify this. At the risk of overgeneralisation, these studies indictate that, for the local Lebanese, trust in the Liberian mercenaries was less warranted as the mercenaries were looking for expensive goods. As (white) expats, the Lebanese felt they could trust Ivorian rebel leaders more as the rebels were concerned to have a favourable reputation internationally. At the beginning of the war, young women distrusted Liberians and other notorious combatants because sexual exploitation was frequent, whereas in later periods women were generally more

confident that the rebels in Man would not sexually harm them. Another pattern of trustfulness I observed is that, in general, older men could trust the rebels more than younger men. In situations of dispute, old men felt safe enough to intervene to a certain extent, whereas young men in the same situation risked being harmed until late periods of rebel rule. Hence, experiences of trust and distrust are socially differentiated and are rooted in pre-wartime social dynamics. As Coulter (2009) put it, the characteristics of social relationships seem to be magnified in times of war and rebel rule.

The local people acquired a sense of different frames in addition to the logic of figurations described in the previous paragraph (Chapter 11). Frames impact on social norms. An upheaval frame may allow more violence, and may warrant less trust than on an ordinary day during the last phase of rebel rule. This practical knowledge about trustfulness had, by my arrival in Man in 2008, reached a degree of routinisation that we can refer to as a secondary socialisation. Local people had in common an ability to assess trust situations and act accordingly that newcomers lacked.

Security dynamics in Côte d'Ivoire's violent conflict

While figurations are contingent, the identification of more-or-less dangerous figurations allowed people to make choices, for instance, about which family member to send to speak to the rebels. To use Emirbayer and Mische's terminology (1998), we can say that people imagined and anticipated the trustfulness of a figuration and judged how best to act strategically. Social navigation refers precisely to this subjective knowledge about how best to act in a certain figuration framed by the political situation at hand.

The social navigator is 'moved' by the ups-and-downs of changing political situations that cast familiar figurations from 'normal days' into a particular frame, either enlarging or reducing room for manoeuver in the figurations. In a 'frame of emergency', everyday tendencies are magnified. Social norms that on an ordinary day are abused in a figuration with 'weaker actors', would on such a day also be abused in interactions with a more powerful actor. When the daughter of our social navigator attracted just comments from armed men at checkpoints on a normal day, she would have difficulties in turning down their 'invitations' on a day of emergency and rioting, when everything seems permitted. The rebels might tell her to just sit with them for a while on a bench,[526] harmlessly at first. If she hesitated, they might accuse her

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[526] I personally experienced this on two occasions in the loyalist part of the country. Once the gendarme asked my travel companion, my sister-in-law, to come along. The second time, a gendarme sitting inside

of disliking them because her family supports the other side. In such frames, some actors 'create problems' for others and thereby 'corner' them to take what they want from them. But as we have seen in the ethnographic example with Nicole and Thomas (Chapter 8), women can sometimes navigate out of such figurations – disappearing in the presence of everyone.

Frames have an impact on social norms, influencing 'what is allowed' in a figuration at hand. In the 'war frame', gender relations and sexual practices are magnified, as Coulter (2009) and Woods (2012) have noted. The same goes for political violence, which is also magnified with a wider range of people targeted. Political actors would no longer be just arrested, but gathered together and killed on the spot. Practices of appropriation and extraction take many forms when magnified. In the account of the chief of Kandopleu (Chapter 9), it started with 'voluntary' donations, which then turned into looting, and taxes at road-blocks before escalating into theft and murder.

Frames also have an influence on basic social trust and the security situation in general. Most of the time, frame shifts go hand in hand with changes in social practices. In the frame of a normal day, you may take your health and house for granted. In the 'upheaval frame', you will be more likely in a position where you have to decide to protect one or the other: Either you stay to look after the house and risk being harmed, or you opt to save your skin and take the risk of losing the house in your absence. It is here that the assessment of the situation is crucial. What is the extent of the magnification set by the frame of the new political situation? Is there a figuration, such as a semi-personal relationship with an acquaintance that has turned particularly sour recently, making it likely that he or she will direct someone to the house of the social navigator to take revenge?

Take the example of the old Bamba's family (Chapter 7). In 2002, they felt so threatened that they took all their valuables to their neighbours, locked up the house and left. Old Bamba, the family member most exposed due to his political activism, even left the region on foot to save himself even though he was over 70. His wives and children stayed away from the town for a couple of months, but old Bamba only felt safe enough to come back in 2007, after the OPA agreement.

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the check-point shelter told the driver of the minibus to call me, keeping the drivers' papers in the meantime. Both times, I was not asked about my papers, it was just for a chat. With my social markers as a European expat shaping the figuration and during the post-APO frame, they were satisfied and I was greeted respectfully. After giving my number, I was free to go.

Violence continued to need legitimisation. It is not an everyday matter for you to go and *'casser maisons des gens'*. When the preparations for the presidential elections were blocked in February 2010, the Court of Justice in Man was looted, but the New Forces prevented the destruction of private houses of pro-government politicians.

After the presidential elections in late 2010, however, when Laurent Gbagbo, the outgoing president, refused to acknowledge his election defeat, the private property of pro-Gbagbo politicians in Man was no longer protected. Each and every house of wealthy Gbagbo-supporters was *'cassé'*, ransacked. Everything was removed, including bathtubs, built-in cupboards and cables.[527] The frame may even have allowed murder. A Gbagbo supporter's residence was burnt to the ground and a watchman who resisted badly injured. Pro-Gbagbo Dan activists who had financially benefited from supporting the outgoing President left hidden in the back of their cars, sometimes in disguise, covered with belongings. However, when people set out to loot supermarkets and other private properties, the (ex)rebels intervened and stopped them.

Despite Old Bamba's continued support for Gbagbo, his house was spared in 2010. Auntie, the junior wife, had always given food to the penniless youngsters in the neighbourhood who were cheeky enough to ask. During the election campaign, her husband remained in the background and younger Big Men were at the forefront. After the post-electoral violence had past, one of the young rebels told Auntie that their group had considered several times entering their house, but someone in the group said that they could not attack the house because the junior wife was so kind.

To sum up and highlight the major security dynamics and logics of violence in Côte d'Ivoire between 1999 and 2010:

One of the characteristics of the Ivorian conflict has been that the occasional explosions of violence are often deflated and de-escalated very quickly. This is possible, I argue, because many of the protagonists understand that the violence in which they are involved has been 'bracketed' – it is intended to send a message, but definitely not meant to spin out of control into a durable cycle of tit-for-tat violence. (McGovern 2010b, 73)

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[527] Field notes June 2011.

Trust: Pioneer or consequence of political transformations?

The sequence in which actors either extend trust or not is decisive for transformations of trust and trust building. Based on the analytical framework for trust described in Chapter 4, it can be described as a sequence of "problematisation" that consists of actors' cognitive assessments of the trustworthiness of a situation at hand, which is also where the types of trust in post-conflict settings are located, and the actors' willingness to accept vulnerability.

Does trust follow political transformations like a shadow or does trust spearhead social change? The analysis of trust building (Chapter 10) suggests first that, in the case of (more cognitive) evidence-based forms of trust, the trustor as a careful observer only extends 'more' trust when warranted. Hence, evidence-based dimensions of trust may follow trustworthier conditions. In this sense, trust does follow when the security situation improves and a political transformation occurs. But this is just one part of the story. Trust has a second quality. More forward-pushing dimensions seem to precede trustworthy conditions, which externalise and visualise the way trustworthiness has become warranted. If there is a willingness to extend trust beyond what evidence warrants, trust creates and makes trustworthier conditions palpable. In that case, trust reaches out to new shores, bridges social divides and 'pioneers' political transformations.

The analysis of trust relationships teaches us that the gap in the leap of faith can be reduced on both sides: the person who would like to be trusted may signal his or her trustworthiness and the possible trust-giver may become willing to extend trust – for reasons that I was not able to investigate in depth in this ethnography. Communication seems crucial in transmitting motivations and emotions before they become manifest in practice. We can communicate and exchange from a safe place (Chapter 6) and be moved by the messages of peace over the radio, which can lead to a change of attitude (Marie, Chapter 9). Future research may be able to shed more light on how emotional and more future-oriented forms of trust transform attitudes.

Trust does not, however, follow enhanced security situations like a shadow. As long as actors are not willing to trust, trust will not 'grow' automatically even if trust were warranted. Trustworthiness may be enhanced and thereby trust fostered, but trust still needs to be conferred by the trust-givers themselves. An example is the reconciliation process in Côte d'Ivoire. Although the security situation was enhanced in 2012 and although the state had launched into reconstruction projects that produced visible results for all, trust lagged behind (Heitz Tokpa 2018). If people's hearts and minds cannot be won over to produce the leap of faith and 'reconnect', trust will not not develop. It is merely trustworthiness that follows security like a

shadow, not trust itself. To conclude, due to its multiple dimensions, trust may follow *and* precede political transformations.

Re-considering mistrust, trust and distrust

Revisiting emic situations of neither trust nor distrust

When I wrote Chapter 6 on the onset of war, I realised that there was a point in my analysis for which I lacked an appropriate term or concept. Considering how Martin described the responses of his mother and other adults around him to the war situation, two difficulties seemed to be at stake: they were threatened by (physical) insecurity, but what caused a further 'crisis' for them then was also an inability to predict/anticipate how social life would continue (uncertainty). His mother was certain in her judgement that it was insecure and dangerous outside, but uncertain how they should act in the novel situation. She seemed unable to typify and grasp the situation because she lacked experience-based knowledge. According to Martin, his mother did not condemn the fighters, but left her judgement open and opted for prudence. Only when a friend called did her characterisation develop into a more fixed state of knowing.[528] The rebels were typified as untrustworthy and the situation as insecure. Hence, the family adopted an attitude of distrust. The decision to distrust was translated into practice by keeping away from the rebels, which is a way to enact distrust. To avoid fighting, they left Man to go to their village.

The last sequence can be classified as an assessment of trustfulness that resulted in deciding to distrust. The moment prior to this, however, which I have described as a dislocation of trust, remains difficult to characterise. It is the state of unfamiliarity, the momentary inability to engage in familiarisation, which I found difficult to capture as in the example with Martin's mother. Due to a lack of knowledge (ignorance), actors were stuck in a state in which they were unable to 'place' either trust *or* distrust in their social world outside. It is this state of uncertainty, the temporal inability to characterise and typify a situation that caught my interest.

I found similar situations in my empirical examples, in which research participants expressed difficulties to judge based on a lack of knowledge (ignorance). For instance, I was told that, when the schools and the health service re-opened, actors initially neither clearly trusted nor distrusted these institutions (Chapter 9). They expressed doubt and suspicion. Tia (in Chapter

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[528] This process may be called 'signification'. After signification has taken place, other bits of information seemed to corroborate it and (more certain) 'knowledge' develops.

10) described how the people in his neighbourhood initially lacked knowledge about the rebels' mission, which lead to suspicion. This distrust was later overcome mainly through communication and sharing information.

Analysing these situations led me to make the following distinctions:

> **(1) Predictability of untrustworthiness**[529] (e.g. Martin's family left Man due to fighting/insecurity);

> **(2a) Unpredictability of un/trustworthiness** due to insufficient information (e.g. Martin's mother was uncertain how to act when the first armed men rushed around the compound; similarly, Tia was uncertain about the rebels' intentions and mission);

> **(2b) Unpredictability of un/trustworthiness** due to ambiguous information, when the signs of trustworthiness are unclear: pros and cons are more or less equal (e.g. restarting health institutions and schools under rebel rule seemed 'a responsible move', but it could be a trick).

The decisive difference between the examples of (1) and (2) is actors' ability to make predictions about the trustworthiness of the trustee. (1) is a case of distrust (predictability of insecurity), whereas in (2) actors are unable to decide whether to trust or to distrust the rebels. People seemed to lack the knowledge base on which to assess the trustworthiness of the situation. Attempts to familiarise fail temporarily or cannot be settled satisfactorily from the actors' point of view. In all examples of (2), actors' assessment was kept 'on hold', remaining unresolved until information was obtained that clarified the situation and allowed actors to decide to adopt an attitude of either trust (e.g. parents sent their children to school) or distrust (e.g. Martin's family left the town).

The place of mistrust

In the trust literature, the type of unpredictability described in (2) is also sometimes mentioned:

If I trust you, I have specific grounds for the trust. In parallel, if I distrust you, I have specific grounds for the distrust. I could be in a state of such ignorance about you, however, that I neither trust nor distrust you. I may therefore be wary of you until I have better information on you. (Hardin 2004a, 3–4)

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[529] This and the following formulations may be also read as 'a tendency towards' the predictability of untrustfulness.

Hardin describes perfectly what I refer to above as a state of unpredictability in which neither trust nor distrust were possible due to a lack of knowledge. But neither Hardin nor Ullmann-Margalit, who Hardin refers to, provides a satisfactory explanation for the state of "wariness" (Ullmann-Margalit 2004; Hardin 2006, 18). This seems to be a regrettable theoretical gap in trust research. The term 'mistrust' is rarely used in Anglophone trust research, but I am not sure why.[530] The Russell Sage Foundation has published more than a dozen volumes on trust, but none of them deals with mistrust and only one is about distrust. Trudy Govier (1997) describes distrust, but not mistrust, referring instead to "suspicion" and "doubts" (see Chapter 4). Monolingual English dictionaries imply that 'suspicion' and 'doubt' are used as 'synonyms' for mistrust. Mistrust is used in situations where we do not trust someone (but do not distrust them either) because we have doubts about them. Distrust is used when we feel sure that others cannot be trusted because we think they are not reliable and because we have "grounds" for distrust (Hardin 2004a, 3–4).[531]

My explorative ethnographic research on trust indicates that forms of distrust – *and* mistrust should be further explored. I propose using the term 'mistrust' for the *form of distrust* described above in (2) as the unpredictability of un/trustworthiness. The term distrust can then be used only for situations involving untrustworthiness (1).

Mistrust may arise for two reasons (as described in (2a) and (2b) above) due to either: a) insufficient information, or b) ambiguous information. In both cases, actors have difficulty making sense of the situation and deciding whether to trust or distrust it. As a consequence, the actors' assessment gets stuck and remains 'on hold' in a problematisation sequence, corresponding to the space between the two vertical lines halfway between the poles of trust and distrust in the trustfulness continuum shown in Figure 5 (Chapter 4). In this space trust- and distrustfulness are almost balanced out, resulting in a standoff leading to the mistrust described in (2b). The situation is ambiguous because the signs of trustworthiness and untrustworthiness are equally strong and actors find it difficult to choose between them.

The closest description I have found to this notion of 'mistrust' is in Luhmann,[532] who highlights the temporal sequentiality of the trust process and argues that familiarity *(Vertrautheit)* is necessary for and precedes trust *(Vertrauen)* und distrust *(Misstrauen)*

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[530] I suspect it must be addressed in psychology or philosophy, but I have failed to find any references, but see Luhmann (1968).

[531] German has only the term *Misstrauen* for the English words 'distrust' and 'mistrust'.

[532] I am grateful to Kerstin Bauer for directing me to this reference.

(Luhmann 1968, 96).[533] From this perspective, mistrust precedes trust and distrust, as in a decision-making flowchart, with mistrust forking into trust or distrust, as I elaborate below.

The fork of trust

Here I describe what I call 'the fork of trust', with the aim to link trust back to the security issues and social action that form the heart of this ethnography. The following questions seem particularly salient, especially in social anthropology with its focus social agency: What are the social actions that attitudes of mistrust, trust and distrust generate? How did people in Man act when they trusted the situation, and how when they distrusted it or were unable to either trust or distrust it?

To answer these questions, I would like to go back to the Goffmanian perspective and zoom to the moment "[w]hen an individual enters the presence of others" and tries to make sense of the situation, establishing who is who (Goffman 1959, 1). Usually, actors are able to familiarise themselves with the situation within seconds and, by drawing on their stock of knowledge, 'recognise' the type of situation at hand. But if this fails because there is no 'proto-type' for such a situation in the actor's stock of knowledge, as was the case with Martin's mother, then the situation cannot be clarified. The familiarisation process becomes stuck in the problematisation sequence. The actors are unable to recognise what they are dealing with, and thus unable to make an assessment of the un/trustworthiness of the immediate future. This is Hardin's state of "wariness", unpredictability and uncertainty or, in Govier's terms, a situation of doubts.[534] This state in the problematisation sequence is the place of mistrust, and what I call the handle of the fork (see figure 8 below).

Let us presume now that the actor manages to familiarise himself or herself with the situation and overcome the state of uncertainty, mistrust and doubt. At this point in the sequential trust process, the actor has established the Simmelian knowledge base that allows him or her to assess the trustfulness of the situation. Signs of trustworthiness will either point towards trustfulness or distrustfulness. The social navigator is at the point where he or she has clarified the situation

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[533] This aspect has also been mentioned in the theoretical chapter.

[534] As described above, due to lack of knowledge or ambiguity, actors do not manage to familiarise themselves with the situation at hand and to build a knowledge base for establishing trust or distrust (Simmel 1992 [1908], 393; Luhmann 2001, 144–45; Möllering 2006, 94–98).

and finds 'good reasons' to either trust or distrust. It is at this point that trust and distrust go separate ways. They fork off.[535]

Let us first presume that the situation has received a trustful evaluation, and trustful elements prevail. The actor, a woman, wants to get food from the market after combats have ceased. She decides to adopt a trustful attitude. So far she has not extended trust. For the sake of simplicity, we can imagine that the moment she steps out of the house is the moment she becomes vulnerable and where she actually trusts. This is the sequence of the leap of faith, the suspension of uncertainty in Möllering's terms. Now that we can see her stepping out of the house, we can observe a manifestation or enactment of trust – of basic social trust in this example.

Returning to the fork where trust and distrust go separate ways. In conflict situations, distrustfulness and insecurity become strong expectations. Obviously, the social navigator does not suspend her doubts, but takes them seriously and thinks about an alternative course of action (strategies) that will allow her to circumnavigate this 'obstacle' in her path. She may have to change her preferred plot of action in order to avoid the insecure situation. Hence, there is no leap of faith. An attitude of distrust results in a different course of action that merits being clearly distinguished from 'trust'.

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[535] The reader may wonder why I describe the situation as either trust or distrust. Are there no in-betweens? Here I am writing in ideal-typical terms, while at the same time looking at trust in relation to (physical) security in the context of violent political conflict. Clearly, security issues throw a stark light on certain decisive questions. Speaking from my own experience, there was no indifferent or neutral position in relation to security that I could adopt as long as I was involved in a situation. My vulnerability meant I had to choose between either trusting that I would be more or less safe or if I distrusted the security situation, doing something about it. Here a state of in-between makes little sense. A third position was that I was unsure about how to judge the security situation at hand and this is precisely how I want to theorise mistrust in the context of security. My data suggests that the state between a sense of security and a sense of insecurity is something like 'uncertainty'. To remain stuck in a state of uncertainty can be as uncomfortable as extreme forms of distrust, because if I cannot exclude the worst from the range of possibilities (by trusting), I still have to fear the worst.

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                                              ────────────────────────>   2a) trust
                                             │
                                             │
1) mistrust ─────────────────────────────────┤
                                             │
                                             │
                                              ────────────────────────>   2b) distrust
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Figure 8: The fork of trust

The fork-like shape of the trust process is supported in the literature on violent conflicts. Both Marshall-Fratani (2006) and Förster (2010) use the popular saying *'Savoir qui est qui'*[536] in relation to the Ivorian crisis to capture similar processes. Both describe a situation of ambiguity where social actors seek to clarify the social roles and identities of other actors. Förster describes the situation in the 1990s when it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between real and fake policemen on the highways and security declined as a result (Förster 2010, 704). Deciding whether those in uniforms could still be trusted was tricky. This hampered predictability and created doubts and suspicion, i.e. mistrust (Förster 2010). After the violent onset of the rebellion, security and order were reconfigured and security actors became identifiable again – a situation Förster describes as *Maintenant, on sait qui est qui* (Förster 2010). Trust here means knowing how to assign social roles, and is the opposite of uncertainty. The process Förster describes is therefore one that shifts from an uncertain confusing societal situation to a situation in which actors were able to judge 'who is who' and to predict their social roles, and thus able to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy actors and situations.

Social trust here also means to know how the society we live in works. Therefore, my analysis juxtaposes repertoires of social figurations and frames to accounts of disorientation, chaos and uncertainty. My argument presupposes that not knowing due to ignorance or ambiguity (uncertainty) is sometimes a more difficult state for actors than knowing where the dangers lie (insecurity) because knowing the dangers means actors can avoid them and address or even solve them.

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[536] This is a widely used notion throughout Francophone West Africa (e.g. in Cameroon, Benin or in the Congos) (Förster 2010, 704).

After about 2004, familiarisation had reached a level in Man in which mistrust was largely overcome. People were familiar with the social order and daily life under rebel rule and knew *'qui est qui'*.

Trust research has, unfortunately, failed to explore distrust, let alone mistrust. Most studies only talk about low-levels or the absence of trust and have very little to say what that means for social action. But ignoring distrust and mistrust in our analytical lens makes us blind to important aspects of the transformation of trust and agency, which we may otherwise overlook. Distrust does not lead to a leap of faith. Quite the contrary, it is the starting point for a very different course of action. Distrust, the predictability of insecurity or the firm expectation that if I do X, it will go wrong, leads to different forms of agency. Rather than suspending the remaining uncertainty and 'leaping', the actor will adopt avoidancy strategies and find ways to circumnavigate the situation.

Extreme forms of trust and distrust

So far I have explained the fork of 1) mistrust, 2a) trust and 2a) distrust on the basis of un/predictability.[537] The handle of the fork corresponds to 1) unpredictability (uncertainty), and the prongs to 2a) predictability of security plus the leap of faith and 2b) predictability of insecurity plus e.g. avoidance. These correlations are presented below. First, I need to add extremer forms on both sides of the fork to account for the intensifications of both trust and distrust I encountered in my fieldwork.

The form of trust described so far is close to predictability and is considered in trust research as 'thin trust'. 'Thicker' forms of trust, such as 'to trust that someone will do the right thing for me', e.g. a friend or a health institution will act appropriately when I am unconscious, are forms of trust that go (far) beyond predictability. 'Predictability' has a rather sterile feel to it, whereas trust goes beyond what we can anticipate (Lewis and Weigert 1985). Thick trust has stronger emotional tones and an open-ended character (Govier 1997). It corresponds to what Giddens (1991) conceptualises as "ontological security" (see Chapter 4).

Distrust is on the other side of the fork, and may take on a thicker or stronger form, which Giddens termed "dread/angst". This also signals an increase in the affective dimension

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[537] Predictability here means the ability of actors to assess a situation as either trustworthy or untrustworthy. Most of the time I use 'trustfulness' to allude to the fact that I mean degrees of trustworthiness, and not complete trustworthiness.

(Giddens 1990, 39). Once again, predictability declines in the extreme form of distrust.[538] Drawing on Macamo, I distinguish here between *predictable* insecurity (distrust) and *unpredictable* insecurity (dread/angst) (Macamo 2017 [2008]). Macamo observed that people in Mozambique coped with dangers by turning them into risks. Aware of the recurrent dangers (insecurity), they "tame[d] their fate", took precautions where they could and accepted certain constraints. His data on war refugees revealed that people were able to pursue social life in times of war as along as attacks were predictable – in the sense that they were likely to occur at a particular time of the day, allowing actors to organise their lives around these periods of heightened insecurity. People cooked during daytime and slept in the bush at night.[539] Only when attacks became irregular and likely to occur at any time of the day did they become unpredictable. Then people packed up their belongings and fled because they could no longer ensure their safety by organising their lives around spatio-temporally confined violent moments (Macamo 2017 [2008]). Following Giddens, I suggest that the situation in which actors decided to flee in Mozambique may be referred to as one of dread and ontological insecurity (Giddens 1990, 36).[540]

Luckily, Côte d'Ivoire has not experienced a guerrilla-like war and the violent conflict never developed, in a sense, its full potential (McGovern 2011). In many of the Dan-speaking villages in the region of Man, inhabitants fled to the bush at the beginning of the crisis, but they never had to abandon their villages for a long period of time. Nevertheless, I did find examples of extreme forms of distrust (dread/angst) in the region such as in my case-study of old Bamba, who fled the region, or of Rachelle, who had to hide or isolate herself from the town of Man for a year.

Looking at the opposite side of the fork, 'thick trust', it seems that social life under rebel rule never reached this level of trustfulness. Basic social trust under rebel rule, i.e. institutional trust and personal trust in the rebels, remained thin in general. However, as I have argued in Chapter 10, I did find some indications of thicker forms of trust, e.g. when the youth representative Tia, said that, despite the difficulties, they lived in "perfect symbiosis" with the rebels and had "no

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[538] This means that predictability makes a wave-like transformation through the trust spectrum displayed in the table below.

[539] Quoting their guard in Chad, Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk describe similar routines: "Pendant la nuit, les gens quittent leurs cases pour passer la nuit dans la montagne parce qu'ils ont peur des rebelles et, pendant le jour, ils regagnent le village." (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2007, 86)

[540] Giddens writes: "[this] constitutes the opposite of trust – which is not, I shall argue later, simply mistrust." (Giddens 1990, 36)

big problems" with them.[541] It is precisely this generosity and forbearance in ignoring the trustee's mistakes or mishaps that reveals the qualities of thick forms of trust, when actors predisposed to have a certain optimism and a strong conviction that the other will act in a benevolent way if they can.

The motion of navigation

My primary objective in this study has not been to develop a theory of trust. However, to understand my ethnographic data, some conceptual clarifications were required, which led me to explore 'trust' more theoretically. Below, I tentatively sketch out preliminary correlations between trust, security and agency based on my empirical work during violent conflict in Man and summarise them in the following table.[542] I hope that this ideal-typical simplification clarifies these concepts and stimulates deeper theoretical discussion of mistrust, trust and distrust.

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[541] Tia, 27/02/2009.

[542] I am grateful to Kerstin Bauer, who urged me to include the last column in the table below.

Attitude of Trustfulness	Assessment of others' actions (predictability)	Security assessment	Enactment of trustfulness (agency)
Thick trust	Expectation of benevolent action; strong feeling of safety (beyond predictability, open-ended trust)	Ontological security	Mode of optimism, forbearance, investment, etc.
Thin trust	Expectation of others' harmless actions (predictable)	Security	Execution of plot of action by leap of faith, suspension of uncertainty, bracketing of vulnerability, etc.
Mistrust	Inability to predict others' actions due to ignorance or ambiguity; may turn out to be either harmful or harmless; state of not knowing, undecidedness (unpredictable)	Uncertainty	Adoption of a wait-and-see attitude, doubts, dilemma, confusion, hesitation, paralysis, waiting, etc.
Distrust	Expectation of harmful action (spatiotemporally predictable)	Insecurity	Avoidance, circumnavigation, disguise, giving in, submission, etc.
Dread/angst	Expectation of harmful action paired with inability to determine the spatiotemporal moment of others' harmful actions, resulting in dread and feeling of terror (beyond predictability, arbitrariness)	Ontological insecurity	Flight, isolation, etc.

Table 9: Relationships between trust, security and agency in violent conflict

Whether the fork-like distribution presented above makes sense for trust research in other contexts than in relationship to security is an open question and requires further investigation. For a violent political conflict as in this study, distinguishing between mistrust, trust and distrust in relation to uncertainty, security and insecurity should, I hope, help to clarify these complex concepts.

When considering the enactment of thin trust, I was surprised not to find more examples of 'fancy' actions, similarly to those I found for less severe distrust and mistrust. It may be that thin trust and security are 'the normal', so that many plots for action are 'unspectacular', but absolutely crucial for daily life in any context, not just violent conflicts. This is also why security is generally defined as the absence of 'dangers' (Hills 2009a).

In studying trust, I have found Henrik Vigh's notion of moving "social terrain" helpful, which redirected my analytical lens back to the actor who evaluates, decides and acts, i.e. who 'socially navigates'. The "motion within motion" (Vigh 2010, 420) in social navigation is portrayed schematically in the table. The motion of navigation stems from the different assessments and subsequent enactments and practices. In the case of security and trust, the navigator moves 'straight', "executing" his or her plot for action (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). In the case of distrust and insecurity, he has to circumnavigate the obstacles. If he gets into a state of fear, he might flee, as the terrain is too dangerous. 'Thick trust' has a pinch of optimism, and the social navigator might be able to invest or lie back and enjoy the dependability.

But the social navigator may also get stuck in a situation of uncertainty, with doubts about which course of action will take him or her where he or she wants to go. There is too much 'fog': nowhere is good, but at the same time nowhere is bad. This makes deciding to trust difficult. It is the situation of mistrust and uncertainty that is paralysing. People cannot really move on – they are undecided and in "waithood" (Honwana 2012). Only when the 'fog' clears is the social navigator able to discriminate between trustful (promising) and distrustful paths to enact his or her project. This situation is one that social anthropologists have addressed particularly in relation to social adulthood and unemployed youths, captured in the term "social moratorium" (Vigh 2006, 149). The routinisation of this state may be observable in practices of *débrouillage* (Vigh 2006).

By way of conclusion

Practices of distrust

In the context of the violent Ivorian conflict, I have argued that gradual familiarisation occurred which allowed social life to regain a state of predictability – predictability of both security and insecurity between 2002 and 2004. Distrustful situations were predictable. The group of journalists I mentioned in Chapter 7 expected repression from the state and therefore took precautions – a clear sign of distrust and a form of *predictable insecurity*. One of them, who was difficult to identify, wrote the article revealing the the wave of political arrests by the government. Most people had acquired knowledge of how to live along with rebels. By expecting the unexpected, social navigators entered figurations 'prepared for the blow'. This involved them in positioning themselves at a subordinate level, which is where the rebels wanted to see them. Vigh's image of "navigation" and "shadowboxing" captures the bodily and mental motion of actors in volatile political settings well (Vigh 2010). People have to bend, to back down or to speak at half volume to manage distrustful situations. These practices became sedimented and incorporated practical knowledge that they acquired during the conflict.

If you found yourself caught up in a figuration, you were left with immediate "judgment" (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). 'You make a mistake, you are dead', people told me, as happened to those who tried to 'discuss' with Liberian combatants during the wild times. *'Faut donner, c'est finit'*, some would say when describing possibly dead-end figurations. You give them what they want, they leave and life goes on.

But if you refrain from giving and 'argue', *'ils vont te tuer cadeau'*, they will kill you 'for nothing'. Often, it was for a car, a TV …. At the end of the day, it was not worth being dead for a TV, a car or a cow. *"Prends! Prenez! Faut partir, c'est bon, il n'y a pas de problèmes!"* people said when recounting such scenes, events and figurations – and how best to act in the mode of distrust. They would say to those who resisted in such situations: *'Pourquoi te faire tuer pour ne rien? C'est toi même qui a cherché [ça].'* To distrust, to give in and swallow injustices had become the practical norm. By changing their attitudes, an insult became a joke, a theft turned into a gift. These routinised practices, the transformation of meaning, had become the art of living during times of war and rebel rule. They are the practices of distrust.

But people had become tired of living in a mode of distrust, of accommodating 'rebel behaviour', which too often meant a breach of social norms. Sometimes, people were just not ready to accept the unacceptable. As Thomas said: *"Quelqu'un va venir prendre ta propre femme, parce que tu as arme ? NON, ça c'est trop foutaise! On peut pas accepter ça. Je lui ai*

dit ça [to the rebel]: 'Moi, je préfère mourir pour ma raison.' 'Ils l'ont tué.' ... On sait pourquoi ... 'Ils l'ont tué'. C'est comme ça."[543]

People in Man had grown tired after years of 'interim' rebel rule. *'On est fatigué,'* they said – tired of "shadowboxing" (Vigh 2010, 423), hiding their selves (Goffman 1959). They wanted to walk upright, tall and straight, and this is why the man who had worked at the sawmill died (Chapter 1).[544]

The leap of faith

In the context of disasters, Macamo asked: "How do individuals ensure that they will act again? And again, and again?" (Macamo 2017 [2008], 224) In our context here, we might ask correspondingly: Where do actors get the strength, hope and courage to become trusters again after devastating experiences? How come locals were still willing to suspend uncertainty and trust?

If trust was disappointed, I have heard people say: *'Dieu va faire mon combat', 'Dieu est grand. Et tout ce que Dieu fait est bon'.* Such practices of placing questions of justice into the hands of God may be called "sublimation" (Dobler 2004, 35–37). By doing so, actors no longer try to seek justice, but trust that God will give them justice (Dobler 2004, 35–37).[545] It is an attitude of faith that prepares actors to trust again, act again and perhaps again.

When talking about the security situation in her neighbourhood Marie said: *"On a recours à eux aussi [Forces Nouvelles] et on a recours à Dieu! @@ Parce que c'est Dieu seulement qui peut nous protéger de tout ça d'abord, avant que les hommes n'interviennent."*[546]

Sometimes, trust was reciprocated, but at other times, it was not. Whatever one does, there is no guarantee that one will find trustworthiness where one expects it. To experience the fulfillment of trust, we have to risk disappointment as well. An element of uncertainty remains and can only be bracketed off by an attitude of trust (Möllering 2006).

'One has to try to trust' captures perhaps the moment when "trust laughs at dangers" and shows us its "courageous" side (Lingis 2004, xii), the moment when trust feels "like a river" that releases agency and pulls the truster forward (Lingis 2004, 65).

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[543] Thomas, 25/03/2009.
[544] See the opening scene of the introduction.
[545] "The one who trusts or has faith in divine justice, may take worldly injustice in a calmer way." (Dobler 2004, 35–37) (Author's translation).
[546] Marie, 02/12/2008.

Despite the violations and insecurities they experienced, many people in the region of Man were still willing to try again, performing the leap of faith anew and trusting. The act of trusting, the suspension of uncertainty, enabled them to pursue social life in times of war and under rebel rule. As Robert said: *'Pour la confiance il faut commencer quelque part, sinon, on arrive nulle part. Il faut oser.'*[547]

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[547] Robert, field notes 20/02/2012.

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Appendix

List of Research Participants

The following list includes only research participants mentioned in the text. If possible and necessary, names have been anonymised.

Name	Research participant's short description	Main interview	Chapter
Aka	40s, Akan-speaking, barkeeper, *maquis*, Facobly	22/01/2009	8, 11
André	40s, Wè-speaking, Facobly	06/11/2008	10
Auntie	40s, Dan-speaking, Man	12/10/2008 23/02/2009	7, 8, 12
Benjamin	40s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, Podiagouiné	14/01/2009	11
Charlaine	40s,Women's representative, Dan-speaking, Podiagouiné	14/01/2009	8
Chef de canton, Logoualé	60s, Dan-speaking, teacher, educationist	26/03/2009	3
Chef de terre, Dompleu	50s, Dan-speaking	13/08/2012	3
Chef de terre, Gbê-pleu	60s, Dan-speaking, Man	10/04/2009	3
Chef de terre, Podiagouiné	70s, Dan-speaking	14/01/2009	3
Chérif	50s, Dan-speaking, entourage of village chief, Sipilou	28/07/2010	6
Chief of *Deugoulé	60s, Dan-speaking	18/01/2009	11
Chief of Kandopleu	70s, Dan-speaking, village between Man and Biankouma	03/08/2010	7, 9
Chief of neighbourhood	Air France à gauche, Man (group conversation)	12/12/2008	11
Diabaté	40s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (SODECI), Man	30/12/2008	5, 11
Dion	50s, Dan-speaking, elder of neighbourhood Lycée, Man	04/08/2009 03/11/2008	5, 11
Doumbia	30s, Jula-speaking, journalist	20/12/2008	7
Dozo Fofana	30s, leading position in hunter association, Man,	16/01/2009	11
Dozo Koné	60s, leading position in hunter association, Man	16/01/2009	11
Elder in *Dhéobly	50s, Wè-speaking	15/03/2009	9
Elder in Grandgbapleu	60s, Dan-speaking, entourage neighbourhood of chief	17/10/2008	11
Elderly man	70s, Wè-speaking, planter, Man	21/10/2008	3
FN, Almamy	30s, Jula-speaking, low-ranked	14/11/2008	10, 11
FN, Amara	20s, Senufo-speaking, low-ranked	06/11/2008	11
FN, Bakary	30s, Dan-speaking, low-ranked	07/11/2008 ; 16/02/2009	3, 11
FN, Camara	20s, Jula/Dan-speaking, low-ranked	02/12/2008	3
FN, Cobra	chief of security, 30s, Jula-speaking, high-ranked	24/11/2008	10

FN, Commandant Say-say	30s Jula-speaking from Man, mid-ranked	07/11/2008	11
FN, Com-Secteur	40s, Senufo-speaking, high-ranked	30/10/2008	10
FN, Dir-cab	40s, Jula-speaking, high-ranked, Directeur du cabinet civil, FN zone 6, Man	10/08/2010	9, 10, 11
FN, Fof	30s Jula-speaking, low-ranked	11/11/2008	11
FN, gendarme	30s, Jula-speaking, mid-ranked	06/08/2009	10
FN, Little cowboy	20s, Jula-speaking, low-ranked	06/11/2008	11
FN, Malick	30s, Jula-speaking, Com-secteur adjoint, high-ranked	22/02/2010	11
FN, Prison warden	40s, Dan-speaking, mid-ranked	13/02/2009	11
FN, Renard	40s, Jula-speaking, mid-ranked	15/10/2008	11
FN, Zoulou	40s, commander of the PCO, Dan-speaking, high-ranked	13/11/2008	10, 11
Gba	60s, retired teacher, Dan-speaking	26/02/2009	10
Gérard	50s, Wè-speaking, Facobly	06/11/2008 11/11/2008 22/01/2009	8, 10
Gueu	60s, Dan-speaking, planter, (Fraternité) Man	17/10/2008	10, 11
Gueu (junior)	30s, Dan-speaking, planter, (Fraternité) Man	17/10/2008	10, 11
Isabelle	40s, Wè-speaking, market woman	05/11/2008	8
Jacques	30s, Wè-speaking, Facobly,	06/11/2008	10, 11
Jeanne	20s, Dan-speaking, farmer, illiterate	12/04/2009	8
Kamal	50s, Lebanese, NGO worker	25/02/2009	3
Konaté	30s, Jula-speaking, Jula and Dan/Wè background, football coach, youth representative, Man	12/12/2008	7, 10, 11
Lass	30s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (beverage distributor)	08/03/2009	11
Létitia Bamba	20s, Dan-speaking, student	24/10/2008	7
M. et Mme. Gbe	30s, Dan-speakings, active in local NGOs	01/04/2010	9
M. Sangaré	40s, Jula-speaking, businessman	20/10/2008	11
Macla	40s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, Logoualé	19/03/2009	5, 6, 10
Madame Kouakou	50s, Akan-speaking, government health service	03/04/2009	9
Maméry	30s, Jula-speaking, political activist, RDR	27/03/2009 04/08/2009	7
Marie	40s, Dan-speaking, Catholic, market woman	02/12/2008	3, 9, 11, 12
Martin	20s, Dan-speaking, student	03/10/2008	6
Mohammed	30s, Jula-speaking, employee in leading position (cigarette distributor)	23/01/2009	5, 11
Moussa	20s, Jula-speaking, student, (Dioulabougou) Man	14/10/2008	6, 7
Nigerian businessman	30s, Man	15/02/2010	11
Old Bamba	70s, Dan-speaking, Muslim, FPI activist	29/09/2008	7, 11, 12
Old Fofana	70s, Jula-speaking, civil servant in retirement	15/06/2011	6

Oulaï	50s, Dan-speaking, elder of neighbourhood (Doyagounié) Man	12/10/2008	6
Paul	30s, Dan-speaking, (Doyagouiné) Man	12/10/2008	11
Peter	60s, European decent, missionary	17/03/2009	7
Rachelle	30s, Dan-speaking, market woman	13/10/2008	8
Rama Sangaré	40s, Jula-speaking, trader	16/10/2008	7
Reza	30s, Lebanese, businessman	27/12/2008	8
Richard (research assistant)	20s, Dan-speaking, Catholic, student	30/09/2008	5, 11
Robert	40s, Dan-speaking, Catholic, employee of electricity company (CIE)	05/04/2009	6, 9, 11, 12
Romano	50s, European decent, missionary	17/03/2009	10
Sabine Bamba	20s, Dan-speaking, hair stylist	02/10/2008	5
Sably	70s, Wè-speaking, warden in retirement	15/06/2011	8
Seydou	30s, transporter family, (Dioulabougou) Man	31/07/2009	7
State administration, *mairie*	Local council, three deputy mayors, Dan-speaking	30/03/2009	9
State administration, Prefect	Prefect, 60s, Akan-speaking	01/04/2010	11
State administration, Sub-prefect	Sub-prefect, 30s, Jula-speaking	25/03/2009	11
The Boutiquier	30s, Dan-speaking	31/03/2009	8
Thomas	30s, Tura-speaking, (his wife is Nicole), craftsman	25/03/2009	8
Tia	30s, Dan-speaking, youth representative, A-levels, planter, Lycée	27/02/2009	10, 12
Tounkara	60s, Jula-speaking, head teacher, primary school Libreville, Man	16/12/2008	9
Touré, Féréboué	70s, Jula-speaking, elder of (Dioulabougou) Man	05/04/2009	3
Traoré	30s, Jula-speaking, youth representative, (Dioulabougou) Man	21/10/2008	5, 7, 11
UN	Man, 20s, European descent, electoral section	03/03/2010	5
UN	Woman, 20s, European descent, electoral section	20/02/2010	5
UN	50s, European descent, head of security section	29/10/2008	3
UN	30s, African descent, staff security section	20/10/2008	3
UN	40s, South American descent, military observer	28/10/2008	10
UN	30s, African descent, police section	26/10/2008	10
Union representative	60s, Jula-speaking	09/12/2012	10
Watchman	30s, Dan-speaking	17/03/2009	11
Youth representative	30s, Jula-speaking, (Kennedy) Man	25/03/2009	11
Zahlé	40s, Lebanese, businessman	13/11/2008	10

Frequently mentioned individuals

The following individuals are frequently mentioned in the text, but no informants.

Adams, early C.O. in Man with an army background, died in 2004 in Korhogo.

Com-zone (Loss), Losséni Fofana, Commandant de zone, Commander-in-Chief of the rebel movement Les Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) in Man, July 2003 until 2010

General Robert Guéï, interim head of state after the coup in December 1999, Dan background, shot on 19 September 2002 in Abidjan.

Laurent Gbagbo, President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire; South, founder of political party FPI.

Ousmane Coulibaly, Ben Laden today Ben le Sage, C.O. in 2003 in Man until June, later Com-zone in Odienné.

*Touré, early self-proclaimed rebel chief in Man.

Zusammenfassung (Summary in German)

Vertrauen und Misstrauen
im Rebellen kontrollierten Teil der Côte d'Ivoire

Gesellschaftliches Leben während des Gewaltkonflikts in der Region Man, westliche Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2010)

Katharina Elisabeth HEITZ TOKPA

Einführender Teil: Kapitel 1 bis 5

Thema der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die Transformation von gesellschaftlichem Vertrauen im politischen Konflikt der Côte d'Ivoire. Aufgrund des Kontexts wird Vertrauen in Bezug auf Fragen der Sicherheit/Unsicherheit hin untersucht. Im Zentrum stehen Vertrauenssituationen zwischen unterschiedlichen zivilen Akteuren und Angehörigen der Rebellion in diachroner Perspektive. Das Kerninteresse der Arbeit besteht darin zu verstehen, wie es lokalen Akteuren möglich war, die Vertrauenswürdigkeit *(trustfulness)* von Situationen einzuschätzen und entsprechend zu vertrauen oder auch nicht.

Theorie zu Vertrauen

In Anlehnung an die Vertrauensforschung in der Soziologie und Philosophie ging die vorliegende Arbeit von einer minimalen Vertrauensdefinition aus, die Vertrauen als eine überzeugte Annahme über das Handeln anderer auffasste (Endress 2002). Diese Konzeption stellt den Aspekt der Vorhersehbarkeit in den Mittelpunkt des Verständnisses. Alsbald machte sich jedoch eine klare Unterscheidung in wohl- bzw. übelwollende Handlungen anderer notwendig, sodass sich Vertrauen in der Arbeit allein auf die Erwartungen wohlwollender Handlungen anderer bezieht (d.h. Sicherheit), während die Erwartungen schädlicher Handlungen anderer mit dem Begriff Misstrauen *(distrust)* belegt werden (d.h. Unsicherheit).

Im Anschluss an Guido Möllering (2001, 2006), der den Simmelschen Vertrauensbegriff aufgreift, unterscheidet diese Arbeit zwei Schritte im Vertrauensprozess: 1. ‚gute Gründe' für Vertrauen und 2. den Vertrauenssprung *(leap of faith)*, d.h. die Suspension oder Ausblendung der eigenen Verletzlichkeit und der Ungewissheit. Es ist erst die Suspension, welche den eigentlichen Akt des Vertrauens oder des Vertrauen Schenkens ausmacht und letztlich den Vertrauensbegriff von anderen Konzepten wie der Risikoeinschätzung und Vorhersehbarkeit absetzt.

Das facettenreiche, elastische Phänomen des Vertrauens kann sowohl in routiniertem als auch in zukunftsgerichtetem Handeln eingebettet sein. Der Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit liegt jedoch im Vertrauensentscheid und -handeln in der Gegenwart. Die Studie bindet Vertrauen an die Handlungstheorie von Emirbayer und Mische (1998) an und konzentriert sich auf den gegenwartsbezogenen Handlungsstrang der „praktischen Evaluation". Damit lässt sich Vertrauen als Handlungsprozess in aufeinanderfolgende sequentielle Akte unterteilen: 1) „Problematisieren" unterteilt in a) „Charakterisierung" der Vertrauenswürdigkeit aufgrund von bereits erworbenem Wissen und Typen (Wissensvorrat) und b) zukunftsgerichtete „Überlegungen" (v.a. die Bereitschaft, die eigene Verletzlichkeit zu akzeptieren). Am Ende des Problematisierungsprozesses hat der Akteur Klarheit über die Vertrauenswürdigkeit des potentiellen Vertrauensempfängers gewonnen und zieht seine zukunftsgerichteten Intentionen in Erwägung, bevor er sich für eine Haltung „entscheidet". Nimmt der Akteur eine Haltung des Vertrauens ein, so folgt als letzter Akt die „Ausführung", die Suspension, der Moment also, in dem der Akteur Vertrauen schenkt und dabei verletzlich wird. Erst mit der Suspension der eigenen Verletzlichkeit und restlichen Ungewissheit wird Vertrauen externalisiert und der Akteur zu einem Vertrauenden. Der hier beschriebene Prozess vollzieht sich gewöhnlich in (Bruchteilen von) Sekunden.

Forschungsstand

Diese handlungsorientierte Auffassung von Vertrauen macht die vorliegende Studie anschlussfähig an die Diskussion zu sozialem Handeln in der Ethnologie des Krieges, innerhalb derer wesentliche Beiträge in den Nachbarstaaten Liberia, Sierra Leone und Guinea Bissau verfasst worden sind (Utas 2003, Jackson 2005, Vigh 2006, Coulter 2009). In der ethnologischen Literatur wurde bis anhin soziales Handeln in politisch unruhigen Gebieten als „Navigieren" bezeichnet (Vigh 2006) oder in Strategien und Taktiken (Utas 2005) unterschieden, sowie als Phönix-artige Kreativität (Nordstrom 1997) beschrieben. Indem diese Ethnographie Vertrauenssituationen unter die Lupe nimmt, beschreibt sie die Vertrauenswürdigkeit anderer Akteure und fragt indirekt danach, was es Akteuren erlaubt, ihr subjektives Projekt (Handlungsentwürfe) um Hindernisse herum zu steuern. Anders ausgedrückt gibt diese Ethnographie eine theoretische Antwort darauf, was es Akteuren erlaubt, in politisch stürmischen Gewässern zu navigieren und vertrauenswürdige, sichere Pfade zu orten.

Vertrauen in Krisengebieten wurde bislang vor allem in der politikwissenschaftlichen Literatur behandelt. Diese Autoren gingen bei einem Angriff auf das staatliche Gewaltmonopol lange von einem Vertrauensverlust gepaart mit Chaos und Unsicherheit aus (Rotberg 2003, Kasfir

2003, Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005). Es wurde angenommen, dass sich Vertrauen auf interpersönliche Beziehungen *(personal trust)* reduziert und mit einem Vertrauensverlust in soziale Normen, Institutionen sowie in anonyme Andere einhergeht *(normative, institutional and basic social trust)*. Die vorliegende Studie zeigt jedoch, dass zumindest im politischen Gewaltkonflikt der Côte d'Ivoire interpersönliche Vertrauensbeziehungen für Akteure auch speziell gefährlich werden konnten und dass Vertrauen in Institutionen, Normen und anonyme Andere durchaus möglich war, jedoch einer situativen Dynamik unterlag, die ich im Folgenden anhand von Rahmen und Figurationen beschreiben werde.

Fallstudie und ethnographischer Kontext

Wie sich soziales Vertrauen transformiert, untersucht die vorliegende Studie empirisch am Beispiel des politischen Gewaltkonflikts in der Côte d'Ivoire. Regional beschränkt sich die Arbeit auf die Region der Stadt Man im Westen des Landes, welche während des Konflikts unter Rebellenherrschaft geriet. Wie andere Städte entlang der Oberen Guineaküste setzt sich Man zu fast gleichen Teilen aus ersten Siedlern (sog. Autochthonen) und später Zugezogenen zusammen. Als zu Beginn der Krise der aus Man stammende frühere Interimspräsident General Robert Guéï angeblich von Regierungsseite ermordet wurde, stellte sich die autochthone Bevölkerung auf die Seite der Aufständischen. Doch die Folgen des Krieges – Gewalt, Plünderung und Verarmung – und die Unfähigkeit der Rebellenspitze, die Bevölkerung vor Übergriffen ihrer Mitstreiter zu schützen, sowie Sicherheit zu bieten, entzogen der Rebellion immer mehr an Legitimität und Vertrauen. Die Region Man nahm im rebellenbesetzten Norden eine besondere Stellung ein, da sich vor allem die Sprachgruppe der Wè gemäss der Geopolitik der Côte d'Ivoire stereotyperweise der Regierung gegenüber als loyal positioniert hatte.

Die Feldforschung fand zwischen September 2008 und 2012 statt und betrug gut dreizehn Monate. Für die erste Phase des Konflikts 2002/2003 konnten die Ereignisse dank einer lokal herausgegebenen Zeitung rekonstruiert werden.

Methodologie

Mittels der Methode der Teilnahme am täglichen Leben hat sich bald herausgestellt, dass lokale Akteure Situationen anders einschätzten als ich. Während junge Männer und Frauen sich von gewissen Rebellenchefs aus Furcht fern hielten, verflogen Unsicherheit und Misstrauen in meiner Gegenwart. Diese Erfahrung lenkte den Blick auf die unterschiedlichen Akteure in einer Interaktion – eine analytische Perspektive, die in der Arbeit als interdependente Figuration (Elias 1983) bezeichnet und als solche analysiert wird.

Die vorherrschende Meinung in der Literatur ist, dass Akteure und Institutionen für alle gleich vertrauenswürdig sind oder nicht. Fragen der Vertrauenswürdigkeit stellten sich jedoch als komplexer und dynamischer dar. Je nachdem, wer der Vertrauensgeber in einer Figuration war, handelte der Vertrauensempfänger anders. Dies machte ein Umdenken in der Analyse notwendig. Es war also nicht ausreichend, Akteure und deren Vertrauenswürdigkeit zu beschreiben. Vielmehr musste das Hauptaugenmerk der Analyse auf Interaktionen (Figurationen) in einer bestimmten Situation (Rahmen, nach Goffman 1974) gelenkt werden.

Dem oben erwähnten Misstrauen gegenüber gewissen Rebellen, die in der Zeit nach dem Friedensabkommen von Ouagadougou (2007) wie gewöhnliche Militärs auftraten, musste ebenfalls nachgegangen werden. Dies machte eine diachrone Perspektive notwendig. Denn offensichtlich prägten Erfahrungen vom Anfang des Krieges, welchen ich nicht miterlebt hatte, das Verhältnis. Vergangene Erfahrungen wurden anhand von offenen Interviews rekonstruiert und in Anlehnung an die dokumentarische Methode der Ethnomethodologie als existentielle Ereignisse und Handlungssequenzen analysiert (Garfinkel 1967, Jackson 2005).

Empirischer Teil: Kapitel 6 bis 11

Kapitel 6

Im Allgemeinen sind Menschen aufgrund ihres alltäglichen Zusammenlebens mit anderen Akteuren mit deren typischen Handlungsweisen vertraut. Bricht ein Krieg aus, so entsteht jedoch eine neue Situation und der vertraute Alltagszustand wird aufgehoben. Ein Krieg bringt neue Akteure ins soziale Gefüge, im untersuchten Fall v.a. die Rebellen. Über deren typisches Handeln können vorerst noch keine verlässlichen Annahmen getroffen werden, so dass eine Ungewissheit entsteht, die als Vertrauensverlust bezeichnet werden kann.

Eine Analyse dieses Moments der Aufhebung *(dislocation)* unternimmt das Kapitel 6. Aufgrund von Erinnerungserzählungen vom ersten Tag werden die ersten erfahrbaren Kriegsmomente rekonstruiert, um somit die Transformation von Vertrauen genauer erfassen zu können. Dabei zeigte sich, dass gesellschaftliches Grundvertrauen *(basic social trust)* in die soziale Sphäre der Stadt rapide sank und persönliches Vertrauen in die Familie jedoch im Verhältnis dazu besonders stark war. Zuflucht suchten die von mir befragten Personen vorerst „zu Hause", egal ob ihr Daheim an exponierter Stelle lag oder nicht. Aus diesem subjektiv empfundenen sicheren Ort, aus geschützter Position, wurden erste Informationen über die Kämpfer und die neue Situation mittels Beobachtungen und Hören eingeholt. Früher als gemeinhin in der Literatur angenommen setzt damit ein Prozess des Vertrautmachens ein (nach Schütz). Das Vertrautmachen *(familiarisation)* bezieht sich einerseits auf die neue

gesellschaftliche Situation allgemein, andererseits auf die Rebellen als neuartigen Gewaltakteur. Vertrautmachen ist hier weniger Vertraulichkeit und Nähe, als vielmehr Rollensicherheit und Vorhersehbarkeit – in populärem westafrikanischen Französisch ausgedrückt *„savoir qui est qui"* (Förster 2010), wissen wer wer ist und wer sich wie gegenüber wem verhält.

Kapitel 7

Dies bringt uns zur Frage, entlang welcher die Kriterien Vertrauen und Misstrauen, Sicherheit und Unsicherheit verteilt waren. Im Kapitel 7 wird gezeigt, dass der Gewaltkonflikt in der Côte d'Ivoire in einer viel beschriebenen politischen Auseinandersetzung wurzelt, die sich über Jahre angebahnt hatte, sich jedoch erst in den 1990er Jahren nach dem Tod des ersten Präsidenten Houphouët-Boignys akzentuiert hat. Unmittelbar nach dem fehlgeschlagenen Coup im September 2002 waren Feind und Freund ganz deutlich entlang politischer Zugehörigkeit verortet, wie dieses Kapitel anhand beider Konfliktparteien ausführlich illustriert. Doch mit zunehmender Eskalation wurden Gewaltakte auf ganze ethno-linguistische Gruppen, die mit der jeweiligen Konfliktpartei in Verbindung gebracht wurden, ausgeweitet. Die Zeit zwischen dem 19. September und dem 18. Dezember 2002, als Man definitiv von den Rebellen eingenommen wurde, war geprägt von Misstrauen und Denunziation. Die Analyse zeigt, dass in dieser von Verdacht geprägten Situation persönliche Beziehungen besonders sensibel waren.

Arbeitskollegen und Nachbarn haben einerseits persönliche Informationen über uns, andererseits fühlen sie sich uns gegenüber jedoch oft nicht so stark verbunden, wie Familienmitglieder dies meist sind. Sogenannte Denunzianten waren also oft Menschen, mit denen man eine persönliche Beziehung hatte, jedoch nicht enger verbunden war. Andererseits zeigt sich aber auch, dass z. B. Nachbarn, die dem anderen politischen Lager angehörten, in bestimmten Situationen besser positioniert waren, Einspruch zu erheben, gerade weil sie sich dies aufgrund ihrer politischen Zugehörigkeit erlauben konnten, eine Tat, die für Mitglieder der eigenen Familie zu riskant gewesen wäre. Auch wenn engere Beziehungen (z.B. Verwandtschaft) mit stärkerer sozialer Kontrolle einem Vertrauensbruch entgegenwirken, so bleibt ein Vertrauensbruch immer eine Möglichkeit auch unter Verwandten und engen Freunden.

Kapitel 8

Das in Kapitel 7 erläuterte Erklärungsmuster der politischen Gewalt und der persönlichen Beziehungen reicht nicht aus, um Vertrauen und Misstrauen, Sicherheit und Unsicherheit angemessen zu beschreiben und zu erklären. Deshalb widmet sich Kapitel 7 der exemplarischen

Analyse verschiedener Interaktionen (Figurationen), die sich aus unterschiedlichen zivilen wie bewaffneten Akteuren zusammensetzen. Die monolithische Kategorie „Rebellen" muss hier unterschieden werden in a) ihre Kerngruppe (MPCI), b) regionale Hilfstruppen, mehrheitlich aus Liberia und Sierra Leone, c) militarisierte, meist lokal rekrutierte, Jugendliche und d) aus dem Gefängnis entlassene Kriminelle. Auf der Seite der Zivilbevölkerung, die oft als eine form- und machtlose, unbewaffnete Masse dargestellt wird, müssen ebenfalls Identitätsmerkmale *(social markers)* unterschieden werden. Eskalierende und de-eskalierende Komponenten liessen sich interessanterweise entlang klassischen sozial-strukturellen Kategorien beobachten und als figurationsbestimmend beschrieben. Ethnizität, Geschlecht, Einkommensschicht und Alter bestimmten, in welchem Masse Figurationen für zivile Akteure vertrauenswürdiger erschienen als andere, die eher zur Vorsicht mahnten. Der Gewaltkonflikt in der Côte d'Ivoire stellte sich daher weniger als eine abgesonderte Wirklichkeit dar und kann folglich als eine Verstärkung von Machtbeziehungen, die in schwächerer Form auch im Alltag vorhanden sind, beschrieben werden. Das Wissen um diese Dynamiken schienen lokale Akteure grösstenteils in prädikativer Form als praktisches Wissen zu teilen.

In Figurationen mit gewissen selbsternannten Rebellenkommandanten und Söldnern waren junge Frauen zu Beginn des Krieges besonders gefährdet und Misstrauen war angebracht. Das Verhältnis zwischen Rebellen (in der Côte d'Ivoire waren es grossmehrheitlich Männer) und Frauen kann sich jedoch keinesfalls auf sexuelle Gewalt reduzieren lassen, wie dies oft in NGO Berichten geschildert wird. Dies wird an einem ethnographischen Beispiel besprochen, in dem Interaktionen zwischen einer Essensverkäuferin auf dem Markt und vier Rebellen beschrieben werden. Daran lässt sich auch gut die transformative Dynamik von Figurationen aufzeigen. Die Rebellen waren keineswegs „lose Moleküle" (Kaplan 1994), sondern gesellschaftlich eingebunden, so dass auch sie sich sozialen Normen beugen mussten. Dies wiederum registrierte die Zivilbevölkerung und befähigte sie, gewisse Forderungen gegenüber den Rebellen auch durchzusetzen. Die Rebellion in der Côte d'Ivoire war kein Guerillakrieg, in dem sich die Kämpfer im Busch versteckten und nachts, aus dem Hinterhalt, Überfälle durchführten. Die Rebellen wohnten vielmehr in den unterschiedlichsten Quartieren der Stadt und mischten sich tagtäglich unter die Bevölkerung. Sie bildeten keine soziale Gruppe abseits, ähnlich einer „alternativen Gesellschaft" (Chabal 2009), wie es andernorts in der Literatur – z.B. für Sierra Leone (Peters 2011) – beschrieben worden ist.

Während in der Mano-Fluss-Region (Liberia und Sierra Leone) Gewalt gezielt gegen die ältere Generation angewendet wurde, war dies in der Côte d'Ivoire nicht der Fall. Im Gegenteil, ältere Menschen waren weniger gefährdet und wurden zum Teil sogar bevorzugt behandelt. Sie

konnten intervenieren und Partei für bedrohte Personen ergreifen in Situationen, in denen es für junge Männer viel zu riskant gewesen wäre. Vor allem zu Beginn des Krieges wurden Uneinigkeiten unter jungen Männern rasch mit einem Schusswechsel geklärt. Dieses Muster der speziellen Unsicherheit und des Misstrauens für junge Männer hielt bis zum Schluss der Krise an, wie das Eröffnungsbeispiel der Arbeit zeigt.

Die erwähnten Gewalt-, sowie Miss- und Vertrauensmuster können nicht umfassend behandelt werden, doch dienen sie der exemplarischen Darstellung eines praktischen Wissens an Figurationen, das sich – so argumentiere ich – die lokale Bevölkerung angeeignet hat.

Die beiden folgenden Kapitel 9 und 10 behandeln das institutionelle Herrschaftsverhältnis zwischen der Bevölkerung und der Rebellenführung als stärksten Gewaltakteur und Schutzanbieter.

Kapitel 9

Die erste Phase der Rebellion, die bis Mitte 2003 andauerte, wird allgemein als *Le Temps Sauvage (vrai-vrai)* erinnert. Menschen unterschiedlichster Gruppierungen aus der Bevölkerung wandten sich in dieser Zeit mit Sicherheitsproblemen an die Rebellenchefs in Man, ohne dass eine persönliche Verbindungen zuvor bestanden hätte. Daraus lässt sich schliessen, dass die Rebellen einen Vertrauensvorschuss genossen – auch als Institution. In Interaktionen mit Rebellenchefs bedienten sich zivile Akteure gängiger kultureller Praktiken und behandelten die Kommandanten wie eine Autoritätsperson.

Gerade sogenannte Chefs mit einer kriminellen Vorkriegsvergangenheit beeinträchtigten jedoch den Alltag beträchtlich. Zum neuen Lebensstil dieser Rebellen gehörten Autos, Frauen, Ess- und Trinkgelage. Aufgrund mangelnder Kontrolle über ihre eigenen Kämpfer und Mitstreiter gelang es der lokalen Führung der Rebellen in der ersten Phase der Rebellion nicht, Sicherheit und Ordnung herzustellen. Dies führte zu viel Leid und einem Vertrauensverlust in der Zivilbevölkerung. Oft schien Unsicherheit auf Seiten der Rebellen eher Ausdruck eines Unvermögens zu sein als mangelnde Motivation.

Diese erste Phase war von einer unglaublichen Ambiguität geprägt: Auf der einen Seite herrschte grosse Unsicherheit, wobei Normüberschreitungen und Gewalt an der Tagesordnung waren, auf der anderen Seite wurden die *mairie* sowie Schulen (auch wenn nur schwach besucht) wieder geöffnet und unterschiedliche Kommunikationskanäle (Radio, Fernsehen und Zeitungen) wurden in Betrieb genommen oder entstanden neu. Obwohl es sich dabei nur um eine relativ kurze Zeitspanne im Vergleich zur ganzen Krise handelt (v.a. 2003), nimmt diese formative Phase im sozialen Gedächtnis einen überproportionalen Platz ein und legte den

Grundstein der Beziehung zwischen der Bevölkerung und den Rebellen. Ein grosser Teil der Erinnerung an Gewalt fällt in diese Zeit. Dies bedeutet umgekehrt, dass die darauffolgende Zeit, als sich die neue Equipe unter der Führung des Rebellenchefs Losséni Fofana etabliert hatte, es schaffte, Sicherheit, Ordnung und Vertrauen herzustellen. Das Kapitel 10 versucht zu beschreiben, wie und zu welchem Grad das gelang.

Kapitel 10

Gemäss der Literatur verlangt Vertrauensaufbau in erster Linie die Schaffung von vertrauenswürdigen Bedingungen (Hardin 2002; Warren 1999) und kann mit Signalisieren von Vertrauenswürdigkeit gefördert werden (Gambetta and Hamill 2005). Als eine der effektiveren, vertrauensstiftenden Massnahmen kann jedoch der Aufbau von Beziehungen und Kommunikation gelten (Govier 2006).

Der Führung unter dem Rebellenchef Losséni Fofana gelang es, durch die Registrierung ihrer Mitstreiter, der Einführung von hierarchischen Strukturen, der Zentralisierung des Zugangs zu Waffen, Trainings und Bestrafung Ordnung in die eigenen Reihen zu bringen und diese auch besser zu kontrollieren. Ein Radioprogramm wurde initiiert, in dem die Bevölkerung anonym Übergriffe melden konnte. Auch dieses zeigte abschreckende Wirkung auf Übeltäter.

Als einer der ersten Akte nach der Machtübernahme in Man organisierte die neue Führungsspitze unter Loss ein Treffen mit den wirtschaftlichen Akteuren der Stadt. Gemeinsam wurden Missstände analysiert und anschliessend zu entrichtende Steuern pro Branche festgelegt. Dieser Vorgang wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit unter dem Titel „Sicherheit als Gegenleistung für Steuern" behandelt und zeigt auf, wie mit solchen Aushandlungsprozessen zivilen Wirtschaftsakteuren Handlungsspielraum und Macht (nach Popitz 1999) verliehen wurde. Es entstand ein wechselseitig abhängiges Verhältnis, in dem Geschäftsleute Sicherheit und Vorhersehbarkeit forderten, während die Rebellen für den Unterhalt ihrer Truppen und für ihre persönliche Bereicherung gleichfalls auf eine rege Geschäftstätigkeit angewiesen waren. Die Rebellen hatten ein Interesse daran, vertrauenswürdig zu erscheinen, weil sie dadurch mehr Business und geschäftstüchtige Akteure anzulocken erhofften. Eine Strategie dabei war, dass Soldaten in konventioneller Militärkleidung auftraten, um darin einen professionellen Eindruck zu machen.

Anschliessend an die Beschreibung der Rebellenstruktur, die ich als militärisch-patrimonial bezeichne, folgt in der vorliegenden Arbeit ein Fallbeispiel, in dem beschrieben wird, wie sich institutionelles Vertrauen in die Sicherheitsorgane der Rebellen von Seiten der Zivilbevölkerung etablieren konnte. Auch die UNO – als aussenstehender, vermittelnder

Akteur – hatte einen vertrauensfördernden Einfluss, zumindest auf die allgemeine Situation, weniger jedoch in konkreten Figurationen. Der Einfluss der UNO steht jedoch nicht im Fokus dieser Arbeit. Wichtig festzuhalten ist, dass es im Selbstverständnis der Rebellen stets wichtig war, ein möglichst gutes Image nach aussen abzugeben (McGovern 2010).

Der bis anhin beschriebene Prozess der Vertrauensbildung bezieht sich in erster Linie auf Vorhersehbarkeit und Sicherheit und geht einher mit Ordnungssicherheit sowie der Institutionalisierung von Macht, was von Popitz als Basislegitimität beschrieben worden ist. Diese bezeichnet eine grobe erste Akzeptanz von Herrschaft, die weniger weit geht als Legitimität – verstanden als ein von den Untergeordneten als (moralisch) richtig empfundenes Recht, über sie zu herrschen.

Im Anschluss daran hat mich die Frage interessiert, ob es der Führung von Loss gelungen ist, weiterführendes Vertrauen aufzubauen, nämlich als eine Form von Vertrauen, die sich in erster Linie auf Vorhersehbarkeit und Verlässlichkeit stützt, also z.B. Vertrauen, das wohlgesinntes Handeln des Vertrauensempfängers (Rebellenführung) miteinschliesst.

In Bezug auf diese Frage scheint mir, dass den *Forces Nouvelles* auf nationaler wie lokaler Ebene ein geschickter Schachzug gelungen ist. Sie stellten sich als eine Art Schiedsrichter zwischen die politischen Lager. In Man traten sie eher als Interimsverwalter auf denn als Machtanwärter und neue politische Kraft und Partei. Sowohl die autochthone Bevölkerung als auch zugezogene Ivorer in Man empfanden die Rebellen/Militärs nur als eine Ordnungsmacht auf Zeit. Loss' Führungsstab ist es also gelungen, sich glaubhaft als Übergangsadministration darzustellen. Eindrücklich schildern Jugendvertreter, wie sie vom *Directeur de Cabinet*, der Führung in Man, zu einem Treffen eingeladen worden sind, das ihr Misstrauen gegenüber den Rebellen abbauen konnte. Wo bis anhin keine „Verbindung" (*lien*) gewesen war, stellte sich nun ein Aufeinanderzugehen ein, entstand eine Verbindung und Kommunikation. Dieses Vorgehen – das Aufbauen von Beziehungen – schuf Vertrauen und manifestierte sich in von den Rebellen finanzierten Projekten. Wie ich zu argumentieren versuche, ist diese Form von Vertrauen weitreichender als blosse Vorhersehbarkeit und Verlässlichkeit.

Kapitel 11

Das Kapitel 11 behandelt die Zeit, die ich selbst durch Teilnahme miterlebt habe. Es ist die Zeit nach dem Ouagadougou Friedensabkommen (APO) von 2007, das staatlichen Akteuren die Rückkehr in die Region ermöglicht hat, so z.B. den Präfekten. Es kam zu einer territorialen Machtteilungsregelung. Im Mai 2009 gab Kommandant Loss in Man die oberste Führung der

Administration an den Staat zurück. Die Rebellen beanspruchten die Bereiche Sicherheit und Steuern jedoch weiterhin für sich.

Die, wie ich sie nenne, Post-APO-Zeit, war jedoch nicht nur von versöhnlichen Tendenzen zwischen den Kriegsparteien geprägt. Die anstehenden Präsidentschaftswahlen brachten neue Divergenzen mit sich, die den sozialen Zusammenhalt in Man auf den Prüfstein stellten. Akteure, die sagten, es gäbe keine Sicherheit oder emisch ausgedrückt, „man schlafe nicht", stellten sich als dieselben heraus, die sagten, „es sei noch immer Krieg". Die Gegenposition bekam ich aber ebenso zu hören: Man schlafe gut, und das Wort Krieg sei längst vergessen. Zwischen diesen Polen gab es auch Leute, die die Situation wie folgt einschätzten: „Man schlafe mit einem wachenden Ohr." Sicherheit in der Art, wie gut man schläft, auszudrücken, hat sich als emische Übersetzung von „Sicherheit" herausgestellt – ein Wort, das es in den lokalen Sprachen nicht gibt – sie kann aber auch als Vertrauen interpretiert werden. Wer schläft, gibt Kontrolle ab und vertraut darauf, wieder unversehrt aufzuwachen.

Die Handlungsbestrebungen der Bevölkerung in Bezug auf Vertrauen und Sicherheit richteten sich weniger darauf, sich einen vertrauenswürdigen Sicherheitsakteur zu suchen, der Schutz anbieten konnte, sondern wohlwollende Beziehungen mit den Mitmenschen – auch den Rebellen – aufzubauen und zu pflegen versuchen.

Dabei wäre es falsch, sich eine besonders enge Verbindung vorzustellen. Zu grosse Nähe bringt neue Probleme, Misstrauen und Unsicherheit mit sich, so dass enge persönliche Vertrauensbeziehungen gerade mit den Rebellen tendenziell eher vermieden wurden. Ebenfalls als unvorteilhaft wurde das Gegenteil eingestuft, nämlich sich gegenüber den Rebellen übertrieben distanziert zu verhalten. Vor ihnen fliehen oder eine zu grosse Distanz zu ihnen wahren, erregte Verdacht und Misstrauen. Die bewährteste Position in diesem Vertrauensverhältnis schien sich also in einer „mittleren Reichweite" etabliert zu haben, die an das Öffentlichkeitsverhältnis im dörflichen Alltag erinnert (Förster 1994).

In diesem letzten empirischen Kapitel füge ich dem praktischen Wissen um Figurationen, den Aspekt des „Rahmens" (Goffman 1974) hinzu und arbeite vergleichend unterschiedliche Rahmen heraus, z.B. Post-APO-Zeit und *Temps sauvage*. Ich kontrastiere das Handeln lokaler Akteure, die vertraut sind mit den Rebellen und in diesen Alltag sozialisiert worden sind, mit Akteuren, die erst nach dem Ouagadougou Friedensabkommen nach Man gekommen sind. Gerade eine vergleichende Perspektive macht deutlich, dass lokale Akteure über ein praktisches Wissen verfügen, aufgrund dessen sie Situationen einschätzen und bewältigen können. Sogenannte Fremde, die dieses Wissen nicht haben, finden sich so z.B. nachts alleine auf der

Strasse wieder, in einer Situation (Rahmen), in der kurz davor ein Anschlag auf den Kommandanten Loss verübt worden ist.

Schlussteil: Kapitel 12

Empirische Schlussfolgerungen: Rahmen und Figurationen

Anhand der empirischen Daten entwickelt die Studie zwei analytische Perspektiven auf Vertrauenswürdigkeit und Sicherheit im politischen Gewaltkonflikt der Côte d'Ivoire: Rahmen und Figurationen. Was ich als Rahmen und Figurationen bezeichne, sind Orientierungshilfen, anhand derer Akteure bestimmen können, in welchem Masse sie spezifischen andern Akteuren vertrauen können. Rahmen und Figurationen sind situationsbestimmend, in dem sie grob den Bereich möglicher Handlungsweisen abstecken, also gewisse Handlungsabläufe unwahrscheinlich machen sowie andere Handlungen begünstigen. Als Akteur verschafft uns das Handlungssicherheit für Interaktionen mit anderen. Die allgemeine Sicherheitslage oder politische Situation habe ich als Rahmen bezeichnet. Da wir es mit stark wechselhaften politischen Situationen zu tun haben, entsteht für Aussenstehende leicht der Eindruck von Unordnung. Doch Akteure, die in solchen Gebieten leben und agieren, erarbeiten sich mit der Zeit ein Orientierungswissen und können grösstenteils abschätzen, in was für einer Situation sie sich gerade befinden.

Rahmen haben einen Einfluss darauf, welche soziale Normen gerade gelten: ob z.B. (nur) Häuser geplündert oder aber auch Personen physisch verletzt werden. Als Figuration habe ich eine Mikrosituation der direkten Interaktion bezeichnet. Eine Figuration beeinflusst die Dynamik in einer Interaktion zwischen zwei und mehr Akteuren. Auch an einem normalen Tag sind bestimmte Akteure vertrauenswürdiger als andere. Kriegs-Rahmen, also eine Kriegssituation verstärkt und verschiebt Figurationen des Alltags. Tendenzen von Sicherheit und Unsicherheit, Vertrauen und Misstrauen werden verstärkt. Anstatt nur gestohlen, wird geplündert oder Menschen werden körperlich angegriffen. Soldaten am Checkpoint knöpfen den Menschen mehr Geld ab, doch ein Ausländer kann auch getötet werden etc.

Ein Wissen über Interaktionsfigurationen entwickeln alle Menschen. In einer relativ stabilen politischen Situation reicht es oft zu wissen, wer wer ist – doch in politisch instabilen Situationen müssen Akteure abschätzen können, wer wann wer ist, also wer in unterschiedlich gerahmten Situationen wie handelt. Akteure in Krisengebieten eignen sich ein Wissen an, wie sich Figurationen in einer Krise verändern können. Sie erarbeiten sich ein Repertoire an Figurationen in bestimmten Rahmen, das ihnen hilft, sich zu orientieren und überzeugte Annahmen über das Handeln anderer Akteure zu treffen. Weiss ein Akteur, dass er in einer

Situation nur wenig vertrauen kann, richtet er sich darauf ein – meistens jedenfalls – und trifft entsprechende Vorkehrungen.

Theoretische Schlussfolgerungen: Mistrust, trust *und* distrust

Eine wichtige Erkenntnis der Untersuchung ist demnach, dass soziales Vertrauen vor allem darauf beruhte, dass eine gewisse Vorhersehbarkeit von sozialem Handeln gegeben war: sichere sowie unsichere Situationen mit Rebellen konnten identifiziert und entsprechend damit umgegangen werden. Die Analyse der ethnographischen Daten machte jedoch die Öffnung der Forschungsperspektive hin zu Formen des Misstrauens notwendig. Dabei stellte sich eine Unterscheidung in *mistrust* und *distrust* als relevant heraus, für die es im Deutschen nur den Begriff Misstrauen gibt.

Ein Akteur empfindet *mistrust* in einer Situation der Ungewissheit. Dies kann zwei Ursachen haben: Entweder aufgrund von 1) Unwissen wegen ungenügend Informationen oder aber aufgrund von 2) Uneindeutigkeit, wenn sich vertrauenswürdige und nicht vertrauenswürdige Indikatoren die Waage halten. In beiden Situationen fällt es dem Akteur schwer, eine klare Entscheidung zu treffen und entweder eine Haltung des Vertrauens *(trust)* oder Misstrauens *(distrust)* einzunehmen. Der Akteur bleibt in der Phase des Problematisierens stecken, was sich in Zweifeln, Zögern, Warten, Empfinden eines Dilemmas, etc. äussert. Hier zeigt sich, dass sich die resultierenden Handlungsentwürfe von Vertrauen und *mistrust* stark unterscheiden. Dasselbe gilt für *distrust*. Auf eine Haltung von *distrust* folgt nicht der Vertrauenssprung, d.h. die Suspension von Ungewissheit; im Gegenteil, der Akteur versucht die Situation zu umgehen oder sich sonst zu schützen. Gerade ein Fach wie die Ethnologie, welche sich für das soziale Handeln von Akteuren interessiert, muss ein Interesse haben, *trust, mistrust* und *distrust* zu unterscheiden und die unterschiedlichen Handlungsentwürfe zu untersuchen.

Im untersuchten Gewaltkonflikt hat sich die anfängliche Situation der Ungewissheit und das damit verbundene Misstrauen *(mistrust)* allmählich in Vorhersehbarkeit von Vertrauen *(trust)* und Misstrauen *(distrust)* quasi als Vergabelung aufgefächert. Damit waren sowohl Sicherheit als auch Unsicherheit zeitlich und räumlich einschätzbar. Die Möglichkeit, sichere und unsichere Situationen antizipieren zu können, machte das gesellschaftliche Leben vorhersehbar und schuf minimales Vertrauen *(thin trust)*.

Auf beiden Seiten der Gabel lässt sich noch je eine extremere Form von Vertrauen *(trust)* bzw. Misstrauen *(distrust)* ausmachen: auf der einen Seite steht der von mir verwendete Begriff dichtes Vertrauen *(thick trust)* und ontologische Sicherheit und auf der gegenüberliegenden Seite Angst *(dread/angst)* beziehungsweise ontologische Unsicherheit. Die ethnographischen

Beispiele der Studie zeigen beide Extremformen auf: die Extremform von Misstrauen *(dread/angst),* gefolgt von Flucht (alter Bamba) oder Verstecken/Isolation (Rachelle für 1 Jahr), sowie die Steigerungsform von Vertrauen *(thick trust).* Diese letztere Form zeigte sich in Stimmungsäusserungen von Jugendvertretern, in denen sie sich trotz schwieriger Momente zu Aussagen ‚(eigentlich) gibt es keine Probleme', ‚wir leben in perfekter Symbiose' hinreissen liessen. Gerade die Disposition, auch einmal über ‚Fehler' von andern hinwegzusehen und diese nicht so stark zu gewichten, zeichnet diese dichtere Form von Vertrauen aus.

Wenn wir also von Navigieren *(social navigation)* sprechen, so können wir uns mehr oder weniger bewusste Situationsanalysen der Akteure vorstellen, in denen praktisches Wissen – hier beschrieben als Figurationen und Rahmen – in Betracht gezogen wird. Nicht immer entscheiden sich Akteure, unsicheren Figurationen auszuweichen, im Gegenteil. Manche Akteure handeln trotz Misstrauen und Unsicherheit und riskieren dabei ihr Leben. Der ‚waghalsige' Aspekt von Vertrauen stand nicht im Zentrum dieser Arbeit und kann am Schluss der vorliegenden Analyse als ein dringendes Forschungsdesideratum bezeichnet werden.

An welcher Stelle im Vertrauensprozess entscheidet sich, ob und wie sich Vertrauen transformiert? Wo lässt sich der Moment des Wandels festmachen? Die theoretische Antwort der vorliegenden Arbeit lautet: in der Sequenz des „Problematisierens", d.h. einerseits bei der Evaluation der Vertrauenswürdigkeit – hier sind die Vertrauenstypen angesiedelt –, andererseits in den zukunftsgerichteten „Überlegungen" wie der Bereitschaft, Verletzlichkeit zu akzeptieren. Wichtig ist festzuhalten, dass Vertrauen grösserer Vertrauenswürdigkeit nicht wie ein Schatten folgt. Gerade die Côte d'Ivoire erlebt zurzeit, dass mehr Sicherheit oder z. B. auch Strassenbau für alle nicht per se Vertrauen generieren. Ein Vertrauender muss die Bereitschaft zu Vertrauen selbst aufbringen.