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**Executive Scandals During the Workers' Party Governments in
Brazil:
Causes and Mechanisms**

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ABSTRACT

Corruption scandals involving the president or other members of the executive branch have long been used as a control or independent variable in studies on Latin American presidentialism. This research seeks to contribute to the literature by treating executive scandals as the dependent variable, using the Workers' Party governments in Brazil (2003-2016) as a case study. First, a number of independent interval variables that potentially affect the dependent variable are tested using regression analysis, and then, independent categorical variables are identified and causal mechanisms connecting the independent interval and categorical variables to executive scandal emergence are uncovered, making use of *Y-centered theory-building process tracing* and data from interviews with media professionals and an ex-Supreme Court judge. Four different potential causal mechanisms connecting a total of up to five different independent variables to executive scandal emergence are identified, providing a point of departure for future research on the topic. This study contributes to the Latin American presidentialism literature by providing insight into the causes of executive corruption scandals, a previously overlooked topic.

Keywords: corruption scandals, presidentialism, media, Latin America, process tracing, presidential approval, intra-elite conflict, judicial politicization.

RESUMO

Escândalos de corrupção que envolvem o presidente ou outros membros do Poder Executivo têm, durante muito tempo, sido usados como variável independente ou de controle em estudos sobre presidencialismo latino-americano. Esta investigação busca contribuir para esta literatura através do uso como variável dependente de escândalos que envolvem o poder executivo, usando como estudo de caso os governos do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) no Brasil (2003-2016). Primeiro, algumas variáveis independentes intervalares que podem afetar a variável dependente acima indicada são testadas usando regressão, e depois, variáveis independentes categóricas são identificadas e mecanismos causais que conectam as variáveis independentes intervalares e categóricas com a emergência de escândalos envolvendo o poder executivo são desveladas, usando *Y-centered theory-building process tracing* e entrevistas com profissionais de mídia e um ex-ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Foram identificados quatro potenciais mecanismos causais que conectam um total de até cinco variáveis independentes com a emergência de escândalos envolvendo o poder executivo, assim fornecendo um ponto de partida para investigação futura do tema. Esta investigação contribui para a literatura sobre presidencialismo latino-americano ao fornecer novo conhecimento sobre as causas de escândalos de corrupção envolvendo o poder executivo, um assunto anteriormente desconsiderado.

Palavras-chave: escândalos de corrupção, presidencialismo, mídia, América Latina, *process tracing*, aprovação presidencial, conflito intra-elite, politização judicial.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbrev	Meaning
CB	Correio Braziliense/Brasilia Mail, newspaper
CBN	Central Brasileira de Notícias/Brazilian News Center
CESOP	Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública/Center for Public Opinion Studies
CNI	Confederação Nacional da Indústria/National Confederation of Industry
CNT	Confederação Nacional do Transporte/National Confederation of Transport
CPI	Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito/Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry
C-SPAN	Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network
FHC	Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ex-president of Brazil
IBGE	Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística/Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
IMDC	Instituto Mundial de Desenvolvimento e da Cidadania/Global Institute of Development and Citizenship
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MA	Amazonas, Brazilian state
MS	Mato Grosso do Sul, Brazilian state
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Olivieri, Araújo, Suarez, construction company
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PAC	Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento/Growth Acceleration Program
PC do B	Partido Comunista do Brasil/Brazilian Communist Party
PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhista/Democratic Labor Party
PL	Partido Liberal/Liberal Party
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro/Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (current name: Movimento Democrático Brasileiro/MDB)
PP	Partido Progressista/Progressive Party
PR	Paraná, Brazilian state; Partido da República/Party of the Republic (current name: Partido Liberal/PL)
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira/Brazilian Social Democracy Party
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores/Workers' Party
PTB	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro/Brazilian Labor Party
RIP	Revelations, Investigation and Prosecution
SP	São Paulo, Brazilian state (when used between brackets), or city (no brackets)
STF	Supremo Tribunal Federal/Supreme Court of Brazil
TCU	Tribunal de Contas da União/Federal Court of Accounts

INTRODUCTION

Corruption scandals involving the executive branch of government are a much-studied subject in the literature on Latin American presidentialism and can have critical consequences: they can lead to a lowering of presidential approval (Carlin, Love & Martínez-Gallardo, 2015; Pérez-Liñán, 2007), or, in the worst case, to impeachment and other interruptions of the presidential mandate (Pérez-Liñán, 2007; Hochstetler, 2006; Hochstetler & Edwards, 2009). However, surprisingly little has been written about how these scandals emerge—how accusations of executive wrongdoing reach the media, what motivates, discourages or prohibits the media from reporting on them, and how these accusations become full-fledged scandals. There are, after all, a lot of intermediate steps between the occurrence of executive wrongdoing and its becoming a media scandal, and little has been published about what factors actually cause the emergence of scandals.

One of the rare examples of research treating scandals as a dependent variable comes from Pérez-Liñán's (2007) book on presidential impeachment in Latin America, of which a small segment about potential violations of regression assumptions examines a possible inverse relationship between scandals and presidential approval, where low presidential approval leads to increased scandal publication (119). A test of this inverse relationship using data from six South American administrations faced with impeachment demonstrates evidence of drops in approval caused by external factors in turn leading to an increase in scandals involving executives (123).

From the broader literature on corruption and the media, a number of other variables potentially influencing the disclosure of executive corruption scandals, such as the honeymoon period (the first few months of a presidential mandate), economic performance, and intra-elite conflict, can be deduced. Intra-elite conflict can be accompanied by strategic leaks of compromising information to the press, whereas approval, the honeymoon period (Pérez-Liñán, 2007) and economic performance potentially affect the public's sensitivity to corruption (De Sousa, 2002; Zechmeister & Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013, Carlin et al., 2015), which could in turn influence press incentives to investigate and report on corruption (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). A useful case study for the emergence of government corruption scandals is the period of Workers' Party (PT) rule (2003-2016) in Brazil, as it was a period characterized a high variance of the dependent variable, containing moments of unprecedented scandal proliferation as well as pacific moments with relatively few scandals.

The aim of this research is to identify the variables that influence the disclosure of corruption scandals, using the aforementioned period as a case study, as well as to uncover potential mechanisms linking these variables to scandal emergence. This study adopts a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative with qualitative research methods and can be characterized as a *Y-centric theory-building* case study, according to Beach & Pedersen's (2013) methodological process tracing. The research is *Y-centric* in the sense that the focus lies on the dependent variable with little pre-existing knowledge about the independent variables that affect it (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 16). It is a theory-building study in the

sense that the aim is to contribute to the formation of a theory explaining the occurrence of Y in the absence of a fully-fledged theory that can be readily tested in the case at hand (ibid.).

Chapter 1 discusses the relevant general and case-specific literature and Chapter 2 presents the methodological framework that underpins this study. These theoretical chapters are followed by two empirical chapters. The first of these, Chapter 3, examines statistical correlations between a number of independent variables and scandals, making use of ordinary least-squares regression analysis, and finds a weak but statistically significant negative effect of approval on scandals. Chapter 4 then explores potential mechanisms linking the aforementioned variables to scandals using theory-building process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). To this end, a number of journalists and editors working for Brazilian print, tv and radio outlets with a national scope were interviewed, in addition to sociologist, political scientist and radio columnist Dr. Sérgio Abranches and ex-Minister of the Supreme Court Dr. Carlos Ayres Britto. Four different mechanisms resulted from this analysis, two of which describe how information about government corruption reaches the public, while the remaining two describe how individual corruption allegations reaching the public turn into full-fledged scandals. This study contributes to the broader literature on Latin American presidentialism by taking executive corruption scandals as the dependent variable, which has been uncommon so far, providing insight into these scandals' causes.

CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses the literature relevant to the topic of this study and is divided into four sections. The first section addresses the broader literature on how scandals interact with other variables. The second section provides background information on investigative reporting in Latin America and its relationship with the state. The third section then discusses case-specific literature, and, finally, the fourth section provides a brief history of this study's temporal delimitation: the Workers' Party governments of 2003-2016.

SCANDALS AND OTHER VARIABLES

Up to this point, corruption scandals implicating the executive branch of government and/or the president personally have been treated either as an independent variable or as a control variable in the literature on Latin American presidentialism (Carlin, Love & Martínez-Gallardo, 2015; Pérez-Liñán, 2007; Hochstetler, 2006; Hochstetler & Edwards, 2009), but hardly ever as a dependent variable. As mentioned in the introduction, the sole exception to this is a small section of Pérez-Liñán's 2007 book, in which the author speculates that low presidential approval could make audiences eager for criticism of the president and the government, which in turn would encourage editors and journalists to investigate and expose executive scandals (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 119). Following Sabato (1993), Pérez-Liñán (2007) refers to this dynamic as a *feeding frenzy* (92). As the existence of a feeding frenzy would violate the assumptions of his main regression analysis in which approval is taken as the main dependent variable and scandals as an independent variable, Pérez-Liñán (2007) examines this potential inverse relationship using a two-stage least-squares analysis of presidential approval, scandals, and economic and other variables in six Latin American administrations that faced impeachment crises (119-123). He then demonstrates that a decrease in approval caused by an exogenous factor led to a proliferation of scandals, which further harmed approval (*ibid.*). Aside from presidential approval, Pérez-Liñán (2007) finds that the so-called *honeymoon period*—used as a control variable and operationalized as a president's first three months in office (115)—was associated with fewer scandals (122).

Because there are no known studies within the Latin American presidentialism literature that explicitly treat executive scandals as their main dependent variable, a much broader literature must be consulted for variables that potentially affect scandal emergence. A possible clue is provided by the literature on the electoral punishment of corrupt politicians. A number of authors argue that the importance citizens attach to government corruption is conditional on macroeconomic conditions. For instance, De Sousa (2002, cited by de Sousa and Moriconi, 2013), writing in the European context, proposes that citizens' attitudes towards government corruption are conditional on shifts in the dominant model of political economy, with the model's success causing them to largely ignore any reported corruption that may be happening within the government that is carrying out the model, while the model entering in crisis causes them to expect more financial propriety from their representatives (475). Zechmeister & Zizumbo-Colunga (2013), using AmericasBarometer data from 19 presidential systems in the Americas, provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that the perception of both personal as

well as general economic conditions moderate the relationship between the perception of corruption and presidential approval, with negative perceptions strengthening the negative correlation between corruption and approval (1191), while Carlin, Love, & Martínez-Gallardo (2015), using data from 18 Latin American presidential countries, present similar findings taking inflation and unemployment as moderator variables. As the media's advertisement incomes directly depend on readership and viewership statistics, a surge in interest in government corruption among its target audiences could hypothetically encourage them to invest more resources into investigative journalism and the publishing of content related to this topic, thus potentially leading to a surge in government corruption scandals.

Another, older literature places the emphasis not on public opinion, but on elite actors, and, in particular, conflict among these actors. A number of scholars within this literature have pointed out that intra-elite conflict is a strong driver of press disclosures of government wrongdoing (Elliott, 1978, cited by Waisbord, 2000: 111; Paletz & Entman, 1981, cited by Waisbord, 2000: 111). More specifically, Ginsberg & Shefter (1990), cited by Waisbord (2000), argue that the rise of watchdog journalism, not only in Latin America but also in the United States during the latter decades of the 20th century, has been a symptom of the emergence of “politics by other means” (111). They argue that the declining efficacy of traditional mechanisms of political conflict resolution and government formation, such as elections, as a result of declining party membership and electoral deadlock, has led to the rise of what they call the politics of *RIP* (revelations, investigation and prosecution) (ibid.). In this new mode of doing politics, the media and the courts have come to “play a [...] central role as arenas for politics by other means” (ibid.), to the detriment of traditional democratic institutions such as political parties and Congress (Waisbord, 2000: 111).

Unlike the United States, most of Latin America has always been characterized by political instability and institutional deadlock, with democratic periods frequently interrupted by military coups ushering in periods of military dictatorships (Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich, 2017: 2; Valenzuela, 2004: 5). Ever since Juan Linz' seminal 1990 essay titled “The perils of presidentialism”, a number of authors have linked the problems of executive-legislative conflict, political gridlock and a tendency toward authoritarianism experienced by many Latin American countries to presidentialism, a system shared by the vast majority of countries in the region (Linz, 1994; Valenzuela, 2004). In this light, Waisbord (2000) argues that courts and media have replaced military coups as the principal way in which “powerful actors have (...) tried to influence decision-making processes and shape the public agenda in Latin-America” (111).

INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING IN LATIN AMERICA

Before examining the aforementioned variables more thoroughly, some more context is required. Therefore, this section provides an overview of how the Latin American media landscape was transformed as a result of re-democratization, and the new set of incentives this transformation has given rise to in relation to the media's relationship with the state.

Traditionally, the Latin American media landscape has been dominated by large conglomerates—examples include *Globo* in Brazil, *Televisa* in Mexico, *El Comercio* in Peru, RCN in Colombia, and *Clarín* in Argentina (Avella & Rincón, 2018: 165)—many of which colluded with, and were openly partial in favor of the military juntas and nominally democratic one-party governments which ruled the majority of countries in the region during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (Boas, 2013: 49; Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 72; Porto, 2007: 364). After democratization, market growth coupled with a reduction in government advertising funds—itsself a result of a general decrease in government funds due to the privatization of state companies—has led more news organizations to adopt a commercial approach and has increased their sensitivity to large advertisers rather than state officials (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 71-74; Waisbord, 2000: 65). It was in this context of increased media independence vis-à-vis the state that a set of incentives emerged which led the media to adopt a more aggressive posture toward the government, including a keenness to expose corruption and power abuse (ibid.). This keenness to reveal abuse was arguably strengthened by a generation of journalists which had had the formative experience of practicing journalism in a context of harsh censorship (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 78-81). Furthermore, this aggressive posture against the government built prestige and recognition among audiences, which also had a recent memory of censorship and the limited and one-sided news that it produced (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 73; Waisbord, 2000: 69-71). Simultaneously, a new set of professional values revolving around investigation, independence, and objectivity had blown over from the United States (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 68; Waisbord, 1996: 346), propelled by the formative experience of the Watergate scandal (1972-1974) that led to the impeachment of President Richard Nixon (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 81; Waisbord, 2000: 169; Alves de Abreu, 2017: 35).

Aside from these normative factors, the exposition of government wrongdoing was driven by a number of novel financial incentives. The opening and expansion of the media market did not only enable media corporations to assert a degree of independence from the state, it led media corporations to compete for consumers, and publishing high-profile scandals was an effective way to increase viewership (Kellam & Stein, 2016: 43). Nevertheless, despite their diminution, government advertising funds were still significant, and the media still sought political favors (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 71; Waisbord, 2000: 66). Paradoxically, this provided another incentive to maintain an aggressive posture, as exposing scandals implicating the government improved the bargaining position of media corporations vis-à-vis the state: the media came to use their power to disclose scandals as a way to pressure the government into conceding funds and other favors (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 73-74).

Despite the democratization of the region, there are still deterrents to watchdog reporting. Waisbord (2000) mentions stringent libel legislation, gag laws, high levels of violence experienced by journalists (60-63) as well as a weak public information-access laws (106) as serious obstacles for investigative reporting. As such, Waisbord considers democracy a necessary but not a sufficient condition for watchdog reporting (64). Apart from legal factors, states have some economic leverage over media. They still control substantial advertising budgets and have the power to pass crucial tax

breaks and grant telecommunications and broadcasting licenses (66-67). Furthermore, business opportunities of private advertisers largely depend on good relations with government, making them reluctant to fund reporting that attacks their partners in government (67). However, there is no complete collusion between government and media, as different media organizations have different political and business interests and may still uncover corruption in parts of the state that they do not depend on for advertising or licenses (68).

Apart from these legal and economic factors, the media's continued dependence on the government is also cultural in nature. There exists a professional culture that defines information from the authorities as the highest form of information (94). This, in combination with the scarcity of human and monetary resources and the economic need to publish new stories regularly (107), results in a journalistic practice that Waisbord labels "denuncismo" [roughly translatable to 'denunciationism'] (103). Denuncismo is characterized by easy reporting based on the cultivation of a small number of official sources with little independent investigation or fact-checking (ibid.). Rather than the desire to publish objective news, denuncismo is driven by the intention of official sources to use the media to inflict political damage on specific individuals, usually rivals, by leaking compromising information about them off-the-record (104). Consequently, there exists a give-and-take relationship between reporters and sources: reporters get the info they need to publish explosive stories, while their sources get to damage their opponents anonymously (108).

Another result of democratization and the expansion of media markets is a greater need for the media to maintain credibility in the eyes of their audience, as readership and viewership size determines advertising revenue. Credibility, or trust, is not a straightforward concept, however. Waisbord (2006) identifies at least two different types of trust, which partly contradict one another. The first type of trust is based on professionalism and technical competence and is linked to what the author calls *journalism of information* (71). This model of journalism is based on Enlightenment values and aims for the objective presentation of the facts independently of ideology and politics (71-72). The second type of public trust is based on ideology and the defense of particular interests (71). This type of trust is linked to what Waisbord calls *journalism of opinion*, which is based on ideological resonance with, and political loyalty to audiences (71-72).

Simultaneously, the constant changes of government that are a part of democracy discourage the media from developing any long-term commitments to particular parties or factions, leading them instead to adopt a strategic "middle-of-the-road" position (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 73; Waisbord, 2006: 69). Waisbord (2006) points out that this impartiality is dictated by business interest, and, apart from changes of government, is also motivated by a decreased attachment to party identity among voters (69). There are examples of highly partisan Peruvian, Mexican and Brazilian media suffering substantial losses or going out of business after the party and/or president they supported was removed from government or lost an election (Waisbord, 2012: 70). As a result, the extent to which the press can be partial in favor

of specific parties is limited, but, as Porto (2007) points out, so is the extent to which the press can be hostile to a given party, as any party can come to power and threaten the company's interests (367).

As such, it becomes clear that the media are governed by a set of different and often contradictory incentives. But perhaps these different incentives are partly compatible. For instance, adopting a middle-of-the road position is still a position, and can be thought of as a kind of political loyalty—to the average citizen. A substantial segment of the population—possibly the majority—after all, are not card-carrying members of specific political parties, and their opinions fluctuate. Linking this back to the earlier discussion on presidential approval and scandal emergence, under the assumption that media editors seek to appeal to the median reader or viewer, an aggressive posture towards a popular president could undermine the audience's trust—just like an overly friendly posture toward an unpopular president. Consequently, media outlets might be reluctant to publish scandals implicating the president or his/her ministers when he/she has a high approval rating, while being extra keen on exposing such scandals when the president is highly unpopular.

But journalists and politicians are not the only players here. Legal officials such as judges, prosecutors, and solicitors-general advance their careers by investigating corruption accusations and publishing their findings in the media (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 86). An illustrative example of this dynamic are public prosecutors. Alves de Abreu (2017), writing about the Brazilian context, points out that the Brazilian Public Prosecutor's Office (*Ministério Público*) rose in institutional prominence as a result of the 1988 Constitution, which granted it powers unmatched anywhere else in the world (41). Public prosecutors (*procuradores*) tend to be from the generation that was born in the 1960s, are predominantly from (lower) middle class households, tend to identify politically as being from the center or the center-left, and tend to be very critical towards Brazil's judicial system (42). They are hampered in their efforts to further social justice by a judiciary and a Federal Police force that tend to be less progressive (42-43). In an attempt to circumvent these institutions, prosecutors seek out the media, which they provide with information about accusations that they are investigating and court cases they are involved with (43). As such, the picture that emerges from this discussion is of a kind of symbiosis between the media and state officials: legal officials and politicians provide the media with material for stories, whereas the media allow a platform to these officials to further their professional objectives.

MEDIA IN BRAZIL

While the literature discussed up to this point has addressed Latin America as a whole, the following two sections have a case-specific focus. First, key information is provided on the Brazilian media landscape and how it relates to existing theorization on media systems worldwide, followed by a brief history of the Workers' Party governments with a specific focus on corruption scandals and some of the previously discussed variables and mechanisms potentially influencing them.

With 34.90 newspaper sales per 1000 adult inhabitants, the Brazilian media system is characterized by a low circulation of newspapers compared to the U.S. and Europe (Albuquerque, 2012: 78). In 2005, the titles with the largest circulation were, in order, *Folha de São Paulo*, with a circulation

of 309,383; *O Globo*, which is part of the Globo conglomerate, and has a daily circulation of 276,385; *Extra*, also part of Globo, with a circulation of 267,225; *Estado de São Paulo*, with a circulation of 231,165, and *Zero Hora*, with a circulation of 174,617 (ibid.). Four of these newspapers, *Folha de São Paulo*, *O Globo*, and *Estado de São Paulo*, are oriented towards a small, urban elite, whereas only one, *Extra*, is oriented towards a popular audience (ibid.). Nevertheless, despite their low popular readership, the elite newspapers have a “great capacity to set the agenda, frame questions, and influence perceptions and behaviors at the elite level” (ibid.).

Brazilian media consumption, however, is dominated not by print media but by television, with 90% of households owning a tv set in 2006 (ibid.). Television takes up a large share of the advertising budget (58.7%), and is dominated by a few large, national networks (ibid.). The largest of these, Globo Network, had an audience share of 55% in 2004 (79). Notwithstanding, when it comes to investigative journalism, print media, and especially weekly magazines, still play a leading role (Alves de Abreu, 2017: 40). Competition with TV forced print media to distinguish themselves by taking up a more investigative role, publishing big corruption revelations (Alves de Abreu, 2017: 40; Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 74), and especially weekly magazines dispose of more time for investigation than do daily television newscasts and newspapers (Alves de Abreu, 2017: 40). The largest titles in this segment are *Veja*, *Istoé* and *Época* (Poder360, 2017).

The Brazilian media landscape also distinguishes itself from its neighbors’ in the relatively large size of its advertising market, meaning that government advertising constitutes a smaller proportion of the income of media companies than usual in the region (Waisbord, 2000: 69). This allows the media in Brazil more independence from the state than media in other countries in the region (ibid.).

The low circulation and elite orientation of newspapers as well as the dominance of television found in Brazil are reminiscent of Hallin & Mancini’s *polarized pluralist model* (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, cited by Albuquerque, 2012: 78). This model is dominant in Southern Europe (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), and, aside from a low-circulation and elite-oriented press, is characterized by a weak culture of professionalism within journalism, and strong parallelism between politics and the media (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, cited by Albuquerque, 2012: 74). In a 2002 paper, Hallin and Papathanassopoulos compare the aforementioned countries’ media systems to those of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, and conclude that the features that characterize the Southern European countries are present in more extreme forms in the three Latin American countries (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002, cited by Albuquerque, 2012: 76).

In contrast to Hallin, Mancini and Papathanassopoulos, Albuquerque argues that the polarized pluralist model does not quite capture the Brazilian reality. Political parallelism is defined by Hallin and Mancini as the strength of the connections between political parties or general political tendencies on the one hand, and media organizations on the other (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, cited by Albuquerque, 2012: 80). According to Albuquerque (2012), Brazil was characterized by strong political parallelism until the 1950s (80), when the *liberal model*, characterized by a high-circulation press, pluralistic

information-oriented journalism, strong professionalism and market dominance, and predominant in the Anglo-Saxon nations, notably the United States (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, cited by Albuquerque, 2012: 74), began to exert some influence on the Brazilian media system (Albuquerque, 2012: 79). It led to a more information-oriented type of journalism to develop in Brazil (ibid.). Beginning from 1964, the military regime destroyed political parallelism for good, as it outlawed all hitherto existing political parties and replaced them with a phony two-party system (81). At the same time, economic growth and significant government investment led to the growth of large media conglomerates such as Globo during this period, paradoxically allowing them to play an active political role in Brazil's transition to democracy later on (ibid.). From that moment on, these conglomerates adopted a commercial, catch-all approach rather than aligning themselves with specific political groups (81).

Albuquerque points out, however, that this does not mean that the Brazilian media do not behave as political actors—they do intervene in the public debate, but more from a civic conviction of holding power to account and to mediate disputes between the three branches of government rather than on behalf of specific political groups (89). This insight leads Albuquerque to criticize Hallin & Mancini's political parallelism dimension for conflating a politically active role of the media with party-political instrumentalization of the media (95). Brazil being a presidential rather than a parliamentary system, the media tend to focus on the person of the president rather than on the collective bodies that are political parties, aside from prioritizing administrative aspects of government over party politics (91). As a result, parallelism between political parties and the media does not apply to Brazil, but this does not mean that Brazilian media do not play a political role (ibid.). Brazil, as such, combines elements of the polarized pluralist and the liberal models with features belonging to neither.

THE WORKERS' PARTY GOVERNMENTS

Now that the Brazilian media landscape has been characterized, this section provides a chronological account of the period under study, with special attention for corruption scandals, approval, and economic developments. After winning the 2002 presidential elections on his fourth attempt with 20 million votes in excess of his run-off competitor José Serra from the center-right PSDB (Brazilian Social Democratic Party), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was inaugurated President of Brazil on the 1st of January of 2003 (Samuels, 2006: 2); Singer, 2009: 83). Despite his landslide victory, however, his center-left Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) had only obtained around 20 percent of seats in Congress, which meant that the president had to forge not only a large governing coalition but also a large legislative coalition in order to reach a majority in the Chamber (Michener & Pereira, 2016: 480). The former came to include eight parties, which made it the “most fragmented ministry ever formed in the history of Latin American presidentialism” (Amorim Neto, 2006: 2). At the same time, Lula had disproportionately awarded cabinet positions to PT members rather than distributing them evenly among his coalition partners (Michener & Pereira, 2016: 480). Furthermore, even with this large governing coalition, in order to attain legislative majorities for his proposals, Lula needed to reach out to ideologically distant opposition parties such as the center-right PSDB and PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)

(Samuels, 2006: 13-14). This governing strategy turned out to be fragile for two different reasons: the president's left-wing base did not appreciate his collaboration with right-wing parties, while his right-wing partners were dissatisfied with their underrepresentation in his cabinet (14).

It was in this context that, in May 2005, Roberto Jefferson, federal deputy and president of the small Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), frustrated about having been abandoned by the PT due to his involvement with a corruption scheme at the National Mail Company, accused the government of making monthly payments to legislators in exchange for legislative support (Michener & Pereira, 2016: 480-81). The scheme came to be known as the *mensalão* (big monthly payment) and allegations of collaboration with the scheme spread quickly, implicating members of the executive as well as the legislative branches (Samuels, 2006: 17). Soon after, the origin of the monthly payments was discovered: government officials had "laundered fake loans from state-owned banks through publicity agencies to then buy the votes of legislators" (Michener & Pereira, 2016: 481). The PT leadership, however, in an attempt to play down the accusations, claimed that, rather than originating from public banks, the money had come from illegal campaign donations from the private sector, a practice that is known in Brazil as *caixa dois*, literally meaning 'second cash-box' (Samuels, 2006: 17). Some authors consider the *mensalão* debacle to be an illustration of the challenges of governing in multiparty presidential systems and the incentives for corruption these systems generate (Mello & Spektor, 2018: 114). The revelations of the scheme published by the media ultimately led to the resignation of Lula's chief of staff, José Dirceu, in addition to the revocation of the parliamentary seats of those involved in the scheme (Samuels, 2006: 17). Although Lula was never personally implicated in the scandals, his popularity took a dip that would reach around 10 points at its maximum, starting around the time of the scandal, as shown by the data of Campello & Zucco (in press). However, it quickly recovered and had returned to pre-scandal levels by mid-2006 (ibid.).

Despite the *Mensalão* that had implicated his party, Lula was reelected in a landslide in 2006, with an advantage of 20% of the vote (a margin equal to the 2002 outcome) compared to his run-off rival of the PSDB, Geraldo Alckmin, ex- [and future] governor of São Paulo (Hunter & Power, 2007: 1). His reelection has been credited to the tangible effects of social policies such as the *Bolsa Família*, a monthly payment to poor families on the condition of sending their children to school, and an increase in the minimum wage, which dramatically expanded the incomes of Brazil's poorest 50% (16). Lula's second term was accompanied by a relative scarcity of scandals. Instead, Lula's approval ratings rose to unprecedented heights, exceeding 80 percent when Lula left office (Campello & Zucco, in press).

It was in this context that, on the 31st of October in that same year, Dilma Rousseff, Lula's ex-chief of staff and appointed successor, was elected president with 56% of the vote (Peixoto & Rennó, 2011: 307). Although not as spectacular as Lula's landslide victories in 2002 and 2006, this was still an impressive result, especially considering that Rousseff had never run for any election before and only had a meager 11% of voting intentions according to polls held a year earlier (ibid). Furthermore, shortly after being inaugurated on the first of January of 2011, she was already enjoying approval ratings of

73% (Pinheiro, 2014: para. 11). After the honeymoon, her approval ratings stabilized around 50% in March 2011 (Campello & Zucco, in press). During the second half of 2011, Rousseff fired six ministers and a significant number of second-tier office holders, all for corruption-related charges, as part of her zero-tolerance approach (Abranches, 2018: 277). This ministerial crisis was not accompanied by a drop in approval—in fact, her approval even increased to around 60% during this period (ibid.). It would stay around that level until June 2013. In that month, massive popular protests sparked by bus-fare hikes in São Paulo but generalizing to a host of issues, including the poor provision of public services and corruption, spread across Brazil’s major cities (Melo, 2016: 60). The protests coincided with a 27% drop in presidential approval, from 57% down to 30%, but shortly rebounded to about 44% (Pinheiro, 2014: para. 84, para. 88).

In the Spring of 2014, news broke about the 2005 overpayment by state oil corporation Petrobras of a United States oil refinery (para. 100). As Dilma Rousseff had been Minister of Mines and Energy as well as president of the administrative council of Petrobras at the time, a *Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry* (CPI) was opened (para. 100-102). Although Rousseff was not personally implicated in the scandal, which was nicknamed *petrolão*, the ex-director and ex-president of Petrobras were arrested as part of the Federal Police’s *Lava Jato* (Car Wash) operation (para. 103). This operation was named after a Brasília car wash establishment that was used as a cover for money laundering, and through which the corruption scheme at Petrobras was discovered (Anderson, 2019: para. 6). Under the aegis of Sérgio Moro, a regional judge hailing from Curitiba, Paraná (para. 10), the operation used plea bargains to arrest, in a timespan of several years, hundreds of complicit politicians, public-sector executives, and businessmen from a number of key Brazilian multinational corporations—notably construction companies Odebrecht and Andrade Gutierrez—who had paid kickbacks in exchange for concessions from the oil corporation (Melo, 2016: 60).

Although judges like Moro normally only pronounce verdicts, the Lava Jato operation had merged the functions of police, prosecutors and judges into one, resulting in a conflation of the powers of accusation and condemnation (Anderson, 2019: para. 27). This put Moro in an especially powerful position, which he exploited to the maximum: he would leak evidence to the press in order to “short-circuit due process, convicting targets before trial in public opinion” (para. 33). Although this practice is illegal, Moro used the media as his “megaphone” to put pressure on any Supreme Court judge who would contradict him (ibid.). This is a very clear example of the previously discussed dynamic, described by Pérez-Liñán and Alves de Abreu, where some legal officials, confronted with more reluctant sectors of the judiciary, seek out the media in order to circumvent the institutions.

After two heavily contested election rounds in 2014, Rousseff was barely reelected with a difference of only 3% of the votes with rival Aécio Neves of the center-right PSDB (Avelar, 2017: 346; Melo, 2016: 52). To make matters worse, the economy had entered into recession by late 2014 (Abranches, 2018: 295), leading Rousseff to adopt a strict austerity package on January 1st 2015—the first day of her second term in office—in spite of campaign promises (Avelar, 2017: 346; Melo, 2016:

62; Amorim Neto, 2016: 45). This, in combination with proliferating Lava Jato-driven corruption allegations against politicians and public officials (Melo, 2016: 62-63) led to the largest street protest in the history of Brazil on March 15, 2015, which explicitly demanded Rousseff's ouster (Avelar, 2017: 346). Meanwhile, government approval ratings plummeted until reaching an all-time low of 9% near the end of that year (Campello & Zucco, in press).

In November, after Dilma had rejected his offer for mutual protection from impeachment respectively prosecution, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha from the PMDB, suspected of owning million-dollar secret Swiss bank accounts (Anderson, 2019: para. 11), broke with the government coalition and accepted a parliamentary impeachment request on December 2 (Amorim-Neto, 2016: 43). In Brazil, as in all presidential democracies, impeachment can only happen when the president has committed a crime classified as an impeachable offense (Lei nº 1.079, de 10 de abril de 1950). In the case of Dilma, her use of fiscal pedaling—the masking of deficits in the federal budget for electoral purposes, which had been common practice among previous governments—was used as a ground on which to impeach her (Anderson, 2019: para. 9). Pro-impeachment protests intensified again during the Spring of 2016, and in March of that year, the government coalition broke down (Pérez-Liñán & Polga-Hecimovich, 2017: 13). In the first week of that month, Moro had released an illegally-tapped phone call from Dilma to Lula in which the former offered the latter—who had just been arrested and interrogated by the Federal Police—the position of chief of staff in order to provide him with immunity from prosecution, adding to the public outrage (Anderson, 2019: para. 12; Katz, 2018: 93-94). In a plenary voting session in April, 71.5% of deputies voted in favor of forwarding the impeachment process to the Senate, surpassing the two-thirds majority required (Amorim Neto, 2016: 43). Finally, on August 31, three-quarters of senators voted in favor of impeachment, leading to Rousseff's definite removal from the presidency of Brazil (*ibid.*), bringing an end to thirteen years of Workers' Party rule.

CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

As mentioned in the introduction, the goal of this study is to uncover possible variables influencing the emergence of corruption scandals implicating members of the executive branch of government in Latin American presidential regimes, in addition to plausible mechanisms linking these variables to the dependent variable. An appropriate method for a research problem like the one described above is Y-centered theory-building process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). This method is used when the researcher is interested in a known dependent variable Y but is not sure what causes it (16). Theory-building process tracing is a novel method, that, as of Beach & Pedersen's writing in 2013, had never been applied in any published article (*ibid.*).

In Y-centric theory building, the first step is to identify one or more potential independent variables (Xs) that could explain Y (168). Beach & Pedersen do not provide any information on how these Xs should be identified, but in this research it will be done by testing correlations between a number of potential interval Xs—derived from the literature on politics and the media—and Y, as well as by registering any additional categorical Xs that may arise from the interviews. The goal of theory-building process tracing is to uncover plausible causal mechanisms explaining the relationships between the identified independent variables and the dependent variable of interest (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 60). For the purposes of this study, this means that for each interval X showing a clear—preferably significant—correlation with Y, and for each categorical X for which there is some theoretical or empirical reason to believe that it may be related to Y, a potential mechanism linking it to Y is explored. Regular theory-building process tracing then proceeds in three additional steps: in the second step, (additional) empirical observations are collected, which, third, are searched for manifestations of parts of potential mechanisms connecting (some of) the Xs with Y (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 16-17). Clues from existing theorization on the topic can serve as guidelines for where to search for potentially relevant empirical material (17). In a fourth step, inferences are made from the observed manifestations to the existence of underlying mechanisms (18).

Each of the mechanisms to be uncovered should ultimately be conceptualized in the form of several parts, each consisting of an entity and an activity, describing a step-by-step process whereby causal forces are transmitted from X to Y through the activities performed by the mechanism's entities (45). The mechanisms should be as parsimonious as possible; they should not include any superfluous elements (50). However, it must be noted that no claims can be made about whether the uncovered mechanism is the only mechanism linking X and Y: "In the complex social world, most outcomes are the product of multiple mechanisms acting at the same time" (89). While case-specific observations are used to uncover these mechanisms in the initial case study, the mechanisms themselves should have no case-specific elements, as they should be applicable to a wider population of cases—Latin American presidential regimes in this case—and testable in subsequent case studies (11, 69-70, 72). This wider population of cases to which a given mechanism applies are determined by its "degree of contextual specificity" or "scope-conditions" (54), which, in this case, are Latin American presidential regimes.

There is no specific reason why the mechanisms to be uncovered in this research might not be applicable to presidential countries outside Latin America, but the broader literature on scandals, executive approval and impeachment out of which the research question at hand emerges and with which this research engages in dialogue happens to revolve around Latin American presidential systems. As such, this study also limits itself to Latin America.

Case-selection in Y-centric process tracing normally consists of finding a *deviant case* (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 154-56). Deviant cases are defined in relation to established correlations between Y and a known X (ibid.). A deviant case would be one where, for instance, there exists a well-established positive correlation between X and Y, but in the case of interest X is large but Y is small, or X is small and Y is large (ibid.). Hence, the case of interest deviates from the relationship that is widely accepted in the literature. In this situation, it is clear that Y is not influenced by the known X (ibid.). As such, there must be other independent variables at work in causing Y—which can be uncovered using Y-centric theory-building process tracing (ibid.). However, as mentioned previously, there are hardly any quantitative studies that take scandals as the dependent variable, and therefore there is no well-established correlation in relation to which a deviant case can be identified. Therefore, the case selected for the research is a most-likely case in which Y, scandals, is overwhelmingly present, as the period of Workers' Party governments in Brazil (2003-2016) was accompanied by the revelation of the two largest known corruption schemes in the history of Brazil—perhaps even the world—Mensalão and Petrolão (Mello & Spektor, 2018: 113-14).

Chapter 3 is guided by a deductive approach, its focus being quantitative correlations between potential independent variables and the dependent variable of executive scandal disclosure. Chapter 4, then, takes an inductive approach and focuses on everything in between X and Y: theory-building process tracing is employed to verify the direction of the relationships between the independent variables identified in Chapter 1 and tested in Chapter 3—as some of them could just as well be influenced by Y—and to uncover mechanisms linking X and Y based on interviews with journalists, editors and other professionals with relevant knowledge and experience. Some of the previously identified independent variables are further specified or adjusted on the basis of novel insights that emerge from the analysis.

CHAPTER 3 - VARIABLES AFFECTING SCANDALS

The purpose of this chapter is to find out which of the potential variables affecting executive scandals identified in the literature review correlate significantly with the dependent variable. The literature review identified three categories of variables: public opinion effects such as presidential approval and the honeymoon period, economic variables such as inflation and unemployment, and intra-elite conflict.

HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses regarding each of the aforementioned variables are the following. Presidential approval is expected to be negatively correlated with executive scandal disclosure (H1), just like the honeymoon period (H2). Inflation and unemployment, on the other hand, are expected to be positively correlated with scandal disclosure (H3 and H4). The indicator used for intra-elite conflict is *cabinet coalescence*, which, as explained below, should negatively affect conflict. Cabinet coalescence is therefore expected to be negatively correlated with scandals (H5).

DEFINITIONS AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS

Because this research communicates with a broader literature on executive scandals and its relationship with presidential impeachment, approval, and economic factors, this research also focuses on executive scandals. This study follows Pérez-Liñán's (2007) definition of scandals as "news events disclosing acts of corruption or abuse of power performed by (...) the president, his or her top cabinet members, the president's family, and the president's close friends" (65). This definition is used by other authors as well, such as Carlin et al. (2015) and Pont Vidal (2018). However, in contrast to Pérez-Liñán, this study treats scandals as its main dependent variable.

Although Pérez-Liñán (2007) does not provide a very detailed operationalization of scandals, the list of scandals he provides for the administrations studied consists of accusations of misconduct by ministers, executive secretaries, presidents of Central Banks and presidents of large state corporations, in addition to the president's advisors and close collaborators (125-131). Because Lula and Dilma's Workers' Party has relatively high party discipline, ideological coherence, and organizational density for Brazilian standards (Samuels, 2006: 4), I have also included scandals implicating the Workers' Party leadership, and specifically the Secretary General, the Treasurer, and the President.

When it comes to determining which accusations published in the media constitute "news events", Pérez-Liñán provides little information. For the purposes of this study, it was assumed that a news event cannot simply be an individual news item published by an individual media outlet. For a single news item to be considered a news event, it must be featured prominently across the main national media platforms. As the print media are still protagonists when it comes to investigative reporting (see Chapter 1), the largest two national newspapers in circulation, O Globo and Folha de São Paulo, must both feature the accusation on their front pages at least once. Although weekly magazines are important players in investigative journalism, they only come out weekly and their front pages usually feature only one story. Daily newspapers, on the other hand, provide a record of the most important stories of the day on their front pages, while the less important ones are relegated to the inner pages. This filters out

minor stories and allows for comparability between newspapers: if the two largest newspapers of the country each decide to highlight a particular story on their front pages, it can reliably be considered a news event, above and beyond the potential biases of individual news outlets.

As mentioned in the literature review, the honeymoon period refers to the early stages of a president's administration, which tend to be characterized by little criticism as high expectations have not yet been qualified by the actual governing performance of the president (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 115). This research adopts Pérez-Liñán's (2007) operationalization of this dummy variable as the first three months of a presidential administration (115).

The two macroeconomic variables used in this study are inflation and unemployment, which are most directly felt by the population. Although these variables were used by Pérez-Liñán (2007) for their possible effect on his main dependent variable of approval (117), the aforementioned research by De Sousa (2002) and Zechmeister & Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) provides evidence that macroeconomic factors may influence the population's interest in executive corruption. This increased receptiveness to government corruption might hypothetically affect media incentives to investigate and publish about the topic.

While the variables discussed so far have well-defined and commonly used operationalizations, the remaining variable, intra-elite conflict, is very difficult to operationalize. However, a possible indicator for one type of intra-elite conflict, executive-legislative conflict, is cabinet coalescence, a variable capturing the judiciousness of cabinets in terms of a proportional representation of coalition parties in the executive branch through the appointment of ministers that are members of these parties (Amorim Neto, 2018: 297). The rationale behind the use of this indicator is that a judicious distribution of cabinet posts is related to tight coalition discipline, while a less judicious distribution would lead to a less disciplined coalition with increased potential for executive-legislative conflict (Amorim Neto, 2018: 297; Amorim Neto, 2002: 65-73).

The index of cabinet coalescence most often used by students of Brazil's coalitional presidentialism is the *Rose index* (Rose, 1984, cited by Amorim Neto, 2018: 301), given by:

$$R = 1 - \frac{\sum |M_i - V_i|}{2}$$

where M stands for the number of ministries held by members of party i , and V stands for the number of legislative seats occupied by the same party, either in the Lower House or in the Senate, yielding a unique value for each legislative chamber (302). Amorim Neto (2018) collected data on Brazilian cabinets from 1985 to 2016, with which he calculated the cabinet coalescences of the 33 cabinets that existed in this period, for the Lower House as well as the Senate (306). Aside from the Rose index, Amorim Neto uses the *Gallagher index* (Gallagher, 1991, cited by Amorim Neto, 2018: 302), given by:

$$G = 1 - \sqrt{\frac{\sum (M_i - V_i)^2}{2}}$$

However, since the Rose index is more conservative than the Gallagher index—it does not square the numerator—and more commonly used in studies of Brazilian coalition presidentialism, this index was selected for the research at hand.

DATA

For the creation of the scandal database, all of the front pages of *Folha de São Paulo* between 1/1/2003 and 12/5/2016, comprising the entire period of Workers' Party governments, were analyzed. These are about 5000 front pages. For any news item that met the scandal definition, a brief description of the act of corruption or power abuse was registered in an excel sheet together with the date of publication, and the name(s) and position(s) of the people implicated. See Appendix A for the full scandal codebook. After the initial list of scandals was completed, the online *O Globo* archive was used to filter out accusations that were not published in that newspaper. See Appendix B for a complete list of the scandals that were coded for the period of interest. The reason that the 5000 front pages of *O Globo* were not also analyzed was because of the limited amount of time that was available—for the one researcher working on this study, it took months of work to even analyze the front pages of one newspaper. The choice of *Folha de São Paulo* rather than *O Globo* as the newspaper to create the original list of scandals was motivated by a comparison of the two newspapers' mission statements. *Folha*'s mission statement affirms that the editorial board seeks to practice critical, unpartisan and pluralist journalism (*Folha de São Paulo*, n.d.), whereas *O Globo*'s mission statement mentions neutrality, accuracy and agility as its core values (*O Globo*, n.d.). As such, judging from its mission statement, *Folha* was expected to adopt a more critical stance and therefore publish more corruption stories than *O Globo*. The expectedly more conservative *O Globo* (in a methodological as well as a political sense) was then used to filter out the corruption stories that were not news events from the list.

The approval data were provided by Campello & Zucco (in press), as a courtesy of the authors. Campello & Zucco harmonized presidential approval data between 1985 and 2016 from one journalist and several of the most important Brazilian polling agencies (journalist Fernando Rodrigues, Datafolha, CNI, CNT and CESOP) (ibid.). The question posed by these opinion polls is the following: “o presidente X está fazendo um governo...”, which loosely translates to: “President X is running a government that is...” (ibid.). The answer categories are “péssimo, ruim, regular, bom, ótimo” (terrible, bad, regular, good, great) (ibid.). Campello & Zucco take the combined percentages of “bom” and “ótimo” to be the approval rating (ibid.). The very phrasing of the question implies that, although the president is the subject of the sentence, the question also includes the government, meaning that the approval of the president individually and that of his or her government on the whole are not completely separable. This provides another compelling reason to include cabinet members and other high-ranking government officials into the operationalization of executive scandals. The data for the period of interest (2003-2016) were clipped from the complete dataset. As Campello & Zucco provide data points on the level of the day, often with a couple of data points per month, monthly averages were calculated in order to merge their data with this research's dataset, which uses the month as its unit of analysis.

The monthly data on inflation and unemployment were taken from the IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). Inflation (IBGE, n.d.-a) is calculated as the percentual difference in the prices of an index of basic consumer goods (IBGE, 2019), whereas unemployment (IBGE, n.d.-b) is operationalized as the percentage of economically active or inactive people above 10 years of age, in the metropolitan areas of the five big cities of Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Porto Alegre, without a formal job (IBGE, 2016). As mentioned previously, the data on cabinet coalescence were taken directly from Amorim Neto’s 2018 study.

Finally, it must be pointed out that, while the period under study contains four presidential office terms—two of Lula’s and another two of Rousseff’s—the entire period was taken as a single dataset, as individual office terms would have provided too few data points for a linear regression to yield any meaningful results.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was performed, with scandals as the dependent variable, and months as the unit of analysis. Two different models were produced. In the first model (see Table 3.1), one scandal corresponds to one episode, or one database entry. However, as some episodes implicated more than one person meeting the operational definition, a second model was produced in which each person involved in an episode was counted as one scandal.

Table 3.1. *Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models of scandals.*

Model	1 (episodes)	2 (persons)
Approval	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.014* (0.006)
Honeymoon	-0.376 (0.295)	-0.494 (0.391)
Inflation	-0.273 (0.248)	-0.325 (0.329)
Unemployment	-0.048 (0.039)	-0.041 (0.052)
Coalescence Lower House (Rose index)	-5.679+ (3.062)	-5.678 (4.061)
Coalescence Senate (Rose index)	3.119 (2.195)	2.681 (2.911)
Constant	3.124+ (1.681)	3.681 (2.230)
R ²	.069	.071
N = 160		

Note: Entries are regression coefficients (standard errors).

Key:

* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.

+ Coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.

Table 3.1 shows the results of the ordinary least squares regression of the two models. The effect of popularity, although relatively small, is negative and statistically significant at least at the .05 level across both models, which is in accordance with H1. The coefficient is slightly larger when scandals are treated as the number of people implicated in accusations, which suggests that the greater variance resulting from the counting of persons involved in the episodes brings out the effect slightly more strongly. However, the R^2 values show that the models explain only about seven percent of the observed variance in scandals, suggesting that there are many other unknown variables affecting scandal emergence. None of the remaining independent variables are significant, but Lower House coalescence comes close with a p-value of 0.066 in the first model, where scandals are counted as episodes. When looking at the signs of the effects, we see that the signs of approval, honeymoon and Lower House coalescence correspond to their respective hypotheses. On the other hand, the economic variables of inflation and unemployment have negative signs, contradicting hypotheses 3 and 4, and Senate coalescence has a positive sign, partially contradicting hypothesis five.

Interestingly enough, Pérez-Liñán (2007) finds positive—though insignificant—effects of inflation on approval in some of his models (117, 121). He explains this counterintuitive result by observing that the data are biased because of the high values during the Collor presidency (1990-1992) in Brazil. However, he also provides a theoretical explanation, citing Weyland's claim that extreme inflation can be a boon to popularity, as a president confronting this kind of inflation might be perceived as a brave risk-taker (Weyland, 2002, cited by Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 118-119). For the PT-period, there might be another explanation, however: the highest inflation values of this period correspond exactly to two theoretical honeymoon periods: those of Lula's first term, and those of Dilma's second term. The latter, however, can hardly be described as a honeymoon, as the first three months of Dilma's second term saw her approval plummet from 32% to 12% in addition to two scandals in February. Still, the inflation Lula experienced in his first month as President of Brazil is the absolute maximum of the entire period, with a value of 2.25%, while he enjoyed solid approval of 56.6%.

Another seemingly counter-intuitive result is the positive sign of Senate coalescence. Octavio Amorim Neto, in personal communication, observed that, in Brazil, the Senate, being smaller, less fragmented, and driven by broader electoral incentives than the Lower House, has a different logic from the latter (March 26, 2019). Furthermore, during the PT period, the Senate was used several times by the government to overturn decisions taken by the Lower House (*ibid.*). For scandal disclosure, this could mean the following: whereas high Lower House coalescence reflects a more judicious distribution of executive resources and therefore a reduced potential for conflict and the accompanying leakage of

compromising information, high Senate coalescence provides the government with leverage in that chamber, potentially allowing it to overturn decisions taken by the Lower House, increasing executive-legislative conflict.

An important point to be taken into account with regard to these results, is that many of the variables could also be affected by scandals rather than only affecting scandals. There is no way to prove the direction of a relationship based only on quantitative results. Scandals could, on theoretical grounds, lead to a lowering of approval, a point of departure which has been taken by many studies. Serious corruption scandals could affect investors' expectations and therefore influence financial markets—which in turn affect inflation and unemployment. Scandals involving the executive could make coalition partners want to distance themselves from the government, jeopardizing the coalition and affecting cabinet coalescence. It must be admitted that this uncertainty, which is a part of political science research, can never be eliminated completely. Therefore, this research does not claim that there exists a unidirectional relationship between these variables and scandal disclosure. Instead, it admits that most of these relationships are bidirectional, while emphasizing its interest in the parts of the relationships that run to scandals, and not from them. The objective of the second chapter is to find out whether any plausible causal mechanisms can be uncovered leading from each of the hypothetical independent variables to scandals, as correlations by themselves do not imply causation.

CHAPTER 4 - CAUSAL MECHANISMS LEADING TO SCANDALS

As mentioned previously, the aim of this chapter is to uncover mechanisms that lead from some of the independent variables that were explored in the previous chapter to the dependent variable, in addition to mechanisms flowing from previously unexplored variables. In agreement with Chapter 2, these mechanisms will be conceptualized in terms of parsimonious chains of entities executing actions that influence other entities, and so forth. Although this is an inductive theory-building study, even these studies have deductive elements, as they depart from clues drawn from the literature (see Chapter 2). As such, provisional mechanisms are conceptualized on the basis of the literature, which are then evaluated in light of the observations, and adjusted or rejected where necessary.

THE INTERVIEWS

Most of the observations used here come from interviews with journalists and editors from prominent media outlets operating nationally, but include an ex-President of the Supreme Court, Dr. Carlos Ayres Britto, and a sociologist, political scientist and radio columnist, Dr. Sérgio Abranches. See Appendix C for a more in-depth description of sampling methodology. A number of questions were formulated beforehand, addressing several topics, such as the interviewees' professional histories, identities and values, selection criteria for newsworthy topics, the search for information and their relationships with sources. The full set of questions can be consulted in Appendix D. It must be noted, however, that the predefined questions were not used as a rigid script to be followed during the interview. Sometimes the answers for questions further down the line were already provided in the answers to previous questions, and sometimes novel questions arose from the spontaneous direction taken by some of the conversations. As such, the interviews can be characterized as semi-structured.

PRELIMINARY MECHANISMS

The following four main mechanisms leading to executive scandal publication emerge from the literature review:

1. Rivalry between individual politicians, of which at least one is a member of the executive branch (X) → politician A (belonging to any branch of government) seeks to damage executive member B's reputation by leaking compromising information about the latter to the media (n_1) → the media publish this information (n_2) → executive corruption scandals emerge (Y). This mechanism will henceforth be referred to as the *strategic-leaking mechanism*.
2. Conflict between two factions of the political elite, of which at least one enjoys representation within the executive branch (X) → political elite faction A seeks to neutralize faction B (n_1) → political elite faction A uses its allies within the Public Ministry, the Police and/or the Judiciary to unleash the politics of RIP (Revelations, Investigation, Prosecution) onto faction B (n_2) → the media publish the revelations from the investigation (n_3) → executive corruption scandals emerge (Y). This mechanism will henceforth be referred to as the *RIP mechanism*.
3. Low presidential approval (X) → the media seek political loyalty to the average viewer, listener or reader (n_1) → the media adopt a milder posture towards a popular president, while adopting

a harsher posture towards an unpopular president (n_2) \rightarrow executive corruption scandals emerge (Y). This mechanism will henceforth be referred to as the *political-loyalty mechanism*.

4. Adverse macroeconomic conditions (X) \rightarrow audiences, dissatisfied with the president's economic performance, show increased interest in, or heightened sensitivity to, stories about government corruption (n_1) \rightarrow the media seek to attend to the audiences' demands for specific content (n_2) \rightarrow the media investigate and publish about executive corruption when audiences' interest in it is heightened (n_3) \rightarrow executive corruption scandals emerge (Y). This mechanism will henceforth be referred to as the *corruption-sensitivity mechanism*.

In addition to the abovementioned mechanisms, there are two 'neutral', or standard mechanisms that serve as null-hypotheses and shall henceforth be referred to as *null-mechanisms*:

- a. Executive corruption (X) \rightarrow the Federal Police discovers executive corruption (n_1) \rightarrow the Federal Police passes this information on to the media (n_2) \rightarrow the media publish the information (n_3) \rightarrow executive corruption scandals emerge (Y). This mechanism will henceforth be referred to as the *law-enforcement mechanism*.
- b. Executive corruption (X) \rightarrow honest government officials or civil servants, committed to institutional integrity, see acts of corruption being committed in the executive (n_1) \rightarrow said actors denounce the corrupt acts to the authorities or the press (n_2) \rightarrow the media publish the denunciations (n_3) \rightarrow executive corruption scandals emerge (Y). This mechanism will henceforth be referred to as the *integrity mechanism*.

In the following segments, each of the above mechanisms is examined in light of the interview observations and adjusted where necessary. The mechanisms that are adjusted, however, are not considered to be definitive but should instead serve as points of departure for future research.

MECHANISM 1: STRATEGIC LEAKING

The first mechanism, the strategic-leaking mechanism, is relatively simple and encounters a lot of support among the interviewees. The interviewees demonstrated a strong conscience of the dangers of "being used by the press". Journalist Lincoln Macário, who currently works for the official Chamber of Deputies television, TV Câmara (the Brazilian equivalent of C-SPAN), but who has 20 years' experience as a journalist working for major networks such as Bandeirantes, TV Brasil (public) and CBN (part of Globo Group), points out that journalists are often used, and in order to not be used, they must know who their sources are and check the information they receive, at the risk of publishing something that is not true, or that has malicious interests behind it. However, Macário admits that there are strong incentives for journalists to publish information without checking, and to publish it quickly, as they are competing with one another. He mentions an example of a secret dossier about an executive secretary of the Sports Ministry, which, after he checked it, turned out to be false. Other journalists, who did publish it, suffered a court case. Hence, despite the existence of strong incentives to publish denunciations without checking, being sued for libel is a real deterrent of this practice, aside from jeopardizing the quality of the news and the reputation of the media outlet one works for.

Aside from Macário, all interviewees demonstrated awareness of the dangers of *denuncismo* and strongly emphasized that information received from off-the-record sources is always triangulated with other sources before being published. This means that n_2 must be changed. Instead of being passive recipients of information, the media process the information that they receive, check it using other sources, and then decide whether to publish it or not. The new n_2 would then become: ‘The media check the information, and if it is confirmed by other sources, they publish it’. If information is really checked this meticulously, this would put a serious check on the ease with which politicians can smear their rivals—they would need to come with substantiated claims in order to achieve this. For instance, when federal deputy Roberto Jefferson denounced the Mensalão scheme and his denunciation turned out to be truthful, it caused a major crisis for the Lula I government and Brazilian democracy as a whole. It is unlikely that a false accusation would have had the same effect.

Returning to n_1 , some interviewees emphasized that politicians often tell on rival fellow party members. For instance, BandNews Radio editor-in-chief Adriano Oliveira calls this “fogo amigo”, or friendly fire. According to Oliveira, politicians have power interests, coupled to certain demands, to be appointed president of a commission for instance. However, when their superiors within the party do not grant them these demands, these politicians may leak compromising information about said superiors: friendly fire. This analysis of friendly fire as a way to blackmail those who ‘owe’ you a favor corresponds exactly to Roberto Jefferson’s behavior. As mentioned in the literature review, he revealed the mensalão not because he thought it was morally the right thing to do, but because the PT had ceased to work with him as an ally due to his involvement with a kickback scheme at the National Mail Company. Not having received the favor he had been promised, he decided to expose the government’s vote-buying scheme. This observation helps to qualify Y better. The phrase ‘rivalry between individual politicians’ is not very specific. The fact-checking conducted by the media assures that politicians cannot simply make up false allegations and have them published. Therefore, a politician will realistically only have compromising information about a rival when he has a link with that person, when he is an insider in the other’s business. They might be fellow party members, or work for the same ministry. Even Jefferson, despite being a member of the PTB and not of the presidential PT, was an insider in the government’s vote-buying scheme.

Apart from politicians leaking in order to damage their opponents, the literature review discusses a similar dynamic with legal actors such as prosecutors and judges, who leak confidential details from ongoing investigations and court cases in order to expedite the legal process and mobilize public opinion behind their cause. Dr. Carlos Ayres Britto, ex-President of the Supreme Court, observes the following about these kinds of leaks:

This leaking of information, of elements of an inquiry, of a court case, when they are still confidential, this leaking is unconstitutional, it is anti-judicial. (...) The leaking problem is serious. Especially if it is a leak called ‘selective’. [When one] leaks to disadvantage someone

specific, rather than to disadvantage everyone equally. Or to benefit someone, rather than to benefit everyone equally.

This dynamic leads to information about corruption cases to be prematurely released, when they are still confidential, and would have been released to the public at a later date. This practice benefits prosecutors and judges as it helps them maintain momentum in the cases they are working on and stay in the spotlight of public opinion. A good example of such a strategic leak was the tapped phone call from Dilma to Lula, mentioned in the literature review, which Moro released precisely in the same month that the governing coalition broke down and popular protest against the administration reached an all-time high. Nevertheless, these leaks do not lead to novel information reaching the public, they just lead to information reaching the public earlier than it would otherwise have. As such, this dynamic does not explain how corruption allegations become public and does therefore not serve this study's objectives. In sum, the observations converge in favor of the strategic-leaking mechanism, while also calling for two small adjustments: n_1 must be updated to reflect that a politician leaking about a rival, must have a close connection to this rival, and this rivalry is generally not public. n_2 must be updated to reflect that the media check the information they receive.

On the other hand, some interviewees point at the existence of the integrity mechanism. Vicente Nunes, executive-editor of the *Correio Braziliense* (CB) newspaper, says that there are many people who denounce corruption because they are committed to integrity and do not agree with it. As mentioned in the methodology section, there are always several mechanisms at work simultaneously, and therefore, the strategic-leaking mechanism and the integrity mechanism by no means exclude one another.

MECHANISM 2: RIP

In contrast to the petty nature of the strategic-leaking mechanism, the RIP mechanism is much more complex, as it involves factions rather than individual politicians, and the existence of this conflict is often carefully hidden from the public in order to uphold the impression that the authorities are neutrally enforcing the law. This also means that it is difficult to discern for journalists, who are not involved in the conflict that is happening at the political-elite level. What also does not help is that the media hold opinions from authorities in high esteem, while these authorities may themselves be stakeholders in the conflict. Leonardo Meireles, editor of politics, Brazil and economics at the *Correio Braziliense* newspaper, points out that they mostly consult authorities, such as the government, the police and the judiciary, which is something the paper's leadership demands.

As such, the only way to evaluate the RIP mechanism is to analyze the chronological record of the period under study. As mentioned in the literature review, there have been two big scandal explosions during this period, the 2005 Mensalão and the Lava Jato that began in 2014 and is technically speaking still ongoing. Political scientist Sérgio Abranches points out that, when the PT came to power, the party's leadership decided to pay Congress members in return for votes, so that it could execute its progressive agenda without having to make compromises. This approach, according to Abranches, ended up further corrupting the system as well as the party itself. Under the assumption that this analysis is correct, there

was indeed a case of intra-elite conflict at the root of the mensalão, but it played out in quite a different way from the one described by the RIP mechanism. Rather than investigating and prosecuting their potential opponents in Congress, the PT decided to neutralize them by paying them, by themselves engaging in corruption. Abranches, therefore, argues that it is more common for the different branches of government to collude with one another in corruption schemes, than to check one another. The author observes a recent change in attitude of a part of the Supreme Court and the Public Ministry against the Lava Jato investigations, giving habeas corpus and refusing to investigate accusations. He believes that there is a political movement to interrupt the investigation, coinciding the approximation of some Supreme Court ministers and other officials to said investigations.

There is some specific evidence in support of Abranches' view. On May 23, 2016, a recording of a conversation between Senator Romero Jucá (PMDB-Roraima) and Sérgio Machado, ex-president of Transpetro, the transportation branch of Petrobras, was passed on to the media by the Prosecutor-General's Office and published (Valente, 2016). The conversation had taken place in March of that year (ibid.), just after a Lava Jato raid on Odebrecht had seized notebooks containing encrypted logs of payments to some 200 politicians of nearly all parties (Anderson, 2019, para. 13). In the recording, Jucá and Machado express the fear that, after the Supreme Court had authorized the arrests of the suspects in the Odebrecht scandal, said suspects would engage in plea bargains, potentially implicating Jucá and Machado themselves (Valente, 2016). Jucá then suggests that "The government must be changed in order to stop this bleeding" (ibid.). To which Machado adds: "Man, the easiest way would be to put Michel [Temer, then vice-president, in the presidential office]. (...) It's an agreement, putting Michel [in the presidency], in a great national agreement" (ibid.). Jucá then replies: "With the Supreme [Court], with everything" (ibid.).

This conversation would be called a *smoking gun* in process tracing lingo. It directly reveals how officials from different branches of government, a senator and an ex-president of a key state corporation, aim to conspire with the Supreme Court to change the government and to protect themselves and their allies from corruption investigations. This observation has great inferential power because of its high uniqueness, meaning that it does not "overlap" with observations that would be expected if alternative hypotheses were true (Van Evera, 1997, cited by Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 101). Put differently, this finding conforms to a view in which the separation of powers in Brazil is compromised. It does, however, not mesh well with the alternative view of strong republicanism and separation of powers.

While there is considerable evidence pointing at collusion between the nominally separate powers in order to stop corruption investigations when they become politically inconvenient, there is little evidence in support of different factions within the state using the politics of RIP to damage one another. True, so far it has been the PT that has taken the brunt of Lava Jato persecution, but it had been the presidential party for more than 13 years and therefore the most prominent at the time. Furthermore,

the PT was in power during the two greatest scandal outbreaks in Brazilian history: mensalão and petrolão.

This does not take away from the fact that other parties have been avid participants in both schemes as well as running some of their own corruption schemes, resulting in the prosecution of many non-PT politicians and government officials as well. There is also little reason to believe that Lava Jato began as a partisan project. After all, as mentioned in the literature review, the operation's name literally means car wash, in reference to the Brasília gas station-cum-car wash where a seemingly small money laundering scheme was discovered. Following the trail of this scheme, the Federal Police stumbled upon the much larger petrolão. As such, it seems unlikely that the operation had been planned beforehand.

On the other hand, Sérgio Moro, the judge in charge of the operation, has posed on pictures with PSDB figureheads (Anderson, 2019, para. 22), the main opposition party at the time, and would go on to be Bolsonaro's Minister of Justice and Public Security (para. 1). Furthermore, from a certain point in time Moro became more and more focused on impeaching Dilma and convicting Lula (para. 12, para. 22), which he managed to fulfill in the end, although some of the evidence he based the conviction on was particularly flimsy (Katz, 2018: 93; Anderson, 2019: para. 29). However, all of this could have been a matter of opportunism and personal zeal, and it is not clear that Moro was acting on behalf of a certain political faction. The evidence at this point is just too limited to make any claims of this nature.

From this discussion, a very specific mechanism emerges:

2. Far-reaching corruption investigation affecting a large number of politicians and civil servants (X) → a faction of politicians and/or civil servants feels threatened by a corruption investigation (n_1) → said faction conspires with their allies within other branches of government to obstruct the investigation (n_2) → fewer corruption scandals emerge (Y)

This mechanism is different from the ones discussed up to this point, as it negatively affects the dependent variable of scandal disclosure. Still, its inclusion is important as there is some strong evidence in support of it.

MECHANISM 3: POLITICAL LOYALTY

The ideological resonance mechanism predicts that the media seek political loyalty to the audience's greatest common denominator. A harsh treatment of a popular president could then undermine trust, as well as a lenient position towards an unpopular president—which could be the same president at different points in his or her office term. Regarding n_1 , 'the media seek political loyalty to the average reader, viewer or listener,' almost all of the interviewees responded that their main concern was with reporting the facts. At the same time, however, some of them stated that, aside from informing people, their mission was to "form" (the specific Portuguese word used was *formar*) people's opinions. Leonardo Meireles defined the word *formar* as bringing the news in such a way as to encourage the audience to analyze it critically. TV Bandeirantes reporter Caiã Messina used this same word, arguing that, as Brazil is a poor country with a low level of education, its press has a social function, and, aside from informing the people, it needs to form them. The word *formar* here has been translated here as 'to

form', but the original Portuguese word is rather complex and rich in meaning. For instance, it can be used in the sense of 'to shape', such as in 'shaping critical thinking', which is what Meireles does, or in a sense of 'to educate', which corresponds to Messina's use of the word. In a similar vein to Meireles, Adriano Oliveira considers that "The journalist helps with the critical debate. That is also my role as a journalist."

Vicente Nunes, on the other hand, emphasizes journalism's relation to citizenship: "I am committed to journalism, to its role in a democratic regime. The role of citizenship—journalism is citizenship". Lincoln Macário puts this in an even stronger way: "I am an enthusiast of journalism and of communication, as an important role for society, mainly for the people's emancipation, empowerment and decision-making." So, aside from informing the public, four seemingly different roles of journalism are expressed here: stimulating critical thinking and debate, educating, exercising citizenship, and emancipation. However, these different concepts of journalism's function share a common denominator: the role of journalism is understood to be a civic one. Journalism is almost seen as a kind of social activism, with educational characteristics. These findings suggests that journalists and editors are indeed committed to certain ideas and values, in line with Waisbord's concept of journalism of ideas mentioned in the literature review. However, it is not necessarily the case that they share these values with the average member of the public. It also does not seem like they hold these values *because* they believe they reflect the beliefs of the average media consumer. Hence, based on these observations, it is difficult to assert that the media seek political loyalty to the public.

The second part of the political-loyalty mechanism predicts that the media adapt their stance on the president to his or her approval rating. Lincoln Macário, commenting on the existence of honeymoon periods in Brazil, says the following:

I think it's kind of common during the first months in government, always because of the power of the ballot box, because of the [electoral] victory's repercussions, because of the [president's] popularity, that they [the media] were a bit more lenient. But after a while this wears off.

When asked why it was that the media are sensitive to presidential approval, Macário commented: "Because, I think that, if you are very critical, you can reduce the number of readers and therefore lose advertising income."

This analysis is entirely in line with the political-loyalty mechanism, except for the fact that Macário places this dynamic within the context of the honeymoon period specifically. However, there is reason to treat it with caution, as this is Macário's personal analysis rather than a specific experience in which his superiors told him not to publish something in order not to offend a popular government. He did point out that the outlets he was working for at the time, Radio CBN and TV Bandeirantes, discouraged the disclosure of government corruption during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government, while encouraging it during Lula's. However, Macário observed that this seemed to have been related to clientelism rather than presidential approval.

No other interviewee suggested any relationship between the popularity of the president and the media's stance vis-à-vis him or her. Most of them vehemently denied it, and some suggested that it is mainly scandal disclosure that causes approval to diminish rather than the other way around. For instance, Roberta Paz, executive editor of the Brasília franchise of GloboNews, an all-news channel, said, in a matter-of-fact way, that she did not believe that presidential approval could not be linked to the publication of corruption denunciations. Rather, she said, "I think that the number of denunciations is related to the number of swindles that the person committed. (...) I don't feel guided by public opinion." Caiã Messina expressed a similar idea, saying that, as long as the accusation is truthful, it is published, regardless of the popularity of the accused.

Leonardo Meireles, on the other hand, expressed a more complex view of the interaction between presidential popularity and scandals:

Perhaps, when you have a very high popularity, it won't help having them [the media and other actors] just having the denunciation. The denunciation will be made and will be investigated.

But it will not achieve as much echo as it would if [presidential] popularity were low, for instance.

Meireles' view points towards a complex interplay between presidential popularity and scandal disclosure. Rather than the media choosing to publish or withhold corruption allegations depending on presidential approval, high popularity might soften the impact of corruption accusations, whereas low popularity might exacerbate it. Corruption accusations reach the public from time to time, but when the president enjoys little popularity, a single denunciation will get more "echo" and potentially turn into a full-fledged scandal that reverberates across several major media outlets. This feeding frenzy effect could lead to corruption scandals to be more common during periods of low presidential approval.

The following mechanism emerges from Meireles' analysis:

3. Low presidential approval (X) → individual corruption allegations implicating members of the executive published by the media have a great impact (n₁) → other media pick up on the allegations and feature them prominently, turning them into scandals (n₂) → corruption scandals emerge (Y).

The conclusion to be taken from this finding is that a distinction must be made between variables and mechanisms leading to corruption allegations reaching the public on the one hand, and variables and mechanisms leading to individual corruption accusations to turn into scandals. This means that the six mechanisms mentioned at the beginning of this chapter must be redefined in terms of whether they lead to the emergence of corruption allegations, or to the transformation of said allegations into full-fledged scandals. The next section will return to this issue.

MECHANISM 4: CORRUPTION SENSITIVITY

The final mechanism, the corruption-sensitivity mechanism, is more difficult to evaluate, especially because of the first part: audiences dissatisfied with the government's economic performance show increased interest in stories about government corruption.

As discussed in the literature review, several studies indicate that audiences attach more importance to government corruption when facing economic adversity, which is then translated into lower approval for the sitting president, and/or fewer votes for the incumbent president when he runs for a second term. However, for a case study such as the one at hand, acquiring suitable data is a serious obstacle. Zechmeister et al. (2013) use data from the AmericasBarometer to gauge perceptions of corruption (a proxy for examining sensitivity to the issue), but this only works for cross-national studies involving a large number of countries, as the AmericasBarometer surveys are only held once every two years (Latin American Public Opinion Project [LAPOP], n.d.), and therefore provide very few data points for a time-series study of an individual country. Other public opinion surveys such as Latinobarómetro (n.d.) and Transparency International (n.d.) suffer from the same limitation. As such, the complexity of this question calls for a dedicated study unto itself and is therefore beyond the scope of the research at hand. However, this study is meant to provide a point of departure for more in-depth further research, and, although it is not possible to thoroughly address this matter here, it is instead highlighted as a gap to be filled in by said further research.

It is, however, possible to evaluate the remaining two parts of the mechanism on the basis of the interview observations. The second part predicts that the media seek to attend to audiences' demands for specific content. When asked about the criteria on the basis of which topics for news items are selected, some interviewees highlighted that topics should have an impact on the lives of individual citizens, while others emphasized that topics should be of interest to society. In the words of Adriano Oliveira:

[A topic] that will change the citizen's life. [This is] what I learned when I was an intern. What I heard a lot from my editors and professors. "How does this affect your life? [Think about this] when you think about a topic to develop."

A reporter from a national television network who wished to remain anonymous laid the focus on society as a whole rather than the individual citizen: "Everything that is of interest to society, we disclose, we publish. So all things related to public opinion are taken into account." Other interviewees specified how exactly they identified the topics that are drawing the attention of the public. Vicente Nunes points out that, by monitoring traffic on Correio Braziliense's website, he is able to identify the topics that are drawing attention, which he then uses as a "thermometer" to determine what articles and reports will be produced during the day.

Oliveira, Meireles and the anonymous reporter highlight the role of social media in agenda-setting. Meireles provides a specific example from the June 2013 protests. He points out that the traditional media had not seen these protests coming, which had originated on social media. He and his colleagues then entered Facebook groups to discover that all of the information was there: "The first guy said: 'We will not pay these 25 cents!' [referring to the price increase in bus tickets], until someone said: 'So let's unite.'" This discussion reveals that the media not only seek to report that what they think is relevant to the public, but that they are often overtaken by public opinion, having to resort to

measuring website traffic and following social media. As there is a clear convergence in the interviewees' responses regarding this issue, they provide compelling evidence in favor of n_2 .

N_3 predicts that the media investigate and publish more about corruption when audiences display a heightened interest in this topic. The observations, however, cast doubt on the idea that the media are at all able to uncover new acts of corruption. Meireles argues that, over the last few decades, the media have lost substantial ground to legal authorities as protagonists in the revelation of corruption scandals. He points out that, nowadays, in an estimated 95% of cases, corruption allegations originate with justice or the police. This observation is repeated by other interviewees, such as Roberta Paz, who also identifies legal authorities—the Federal Police, the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministério Público) and the Judiciary—as the main sources when it comes to corruption allegations. However, Meireles argues that this was different when he started working for the *Correio Braziliense* in 1996. In that time, he says, reporters would uncover information about corruption that the authorities would not provide, and would then confront the authorities and the suspects with this information. This, according to Meireles, stands in stark contrast to the contemporary *modus operandi*, in which Lava Jato passes all of the information to the reporter, who readily receives it and goes after it. Meireles links this change to an increase in libel lawsuits suffered by his newspaper starting from the 1990s. These lawsuits are expensive and therefore impede the functioning of the newspaper, aside from instilling its journalists with a fear of publishing information from sources other than the authorities.

The chronological record provides reason to believe that the shift identified by Meireles has really occurred. Of the three most impactful corruption scandals over the last three decades, the first two were revealed by the press, whereas the third one was revealed by the Federal Police. The 1992 *PC scheme*, a massive corruption network revolving around ex-president Fernando Collor's campaign treasurer, Paulo César "PC" Farias which ultimately led to Collor's impeachment, came to light because the then-president's brother, Pedro Collor, revealed it to *Veja* magazine, which then published about it (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 16). The second major corruption scandal, *mensalão*, as mentioned before, was revealed when federal deputy Roberto Jefferson disclosed it to, again, *Veja* magazine (Junior, 2005). This stands in stark contrast to *petrolão*, which was discovered and single-handedly ferreted out by the Federal Police, the Public Prosecutor's Office and even some members of the judiciary, reducing the media's role from a key actor in the revelation of corruption to a simple mouthpiece of the authorities. This finding casts doubt on the validity of n_3 , which assumes that the media choose to investigate and publish or withhold corruption allegations. Out of the parts that make up the corruption-sensitivity mechanism, then, only n_2 is clearly supported by the observations. All in all, null-mechanism A seems to capture the current reality more closely than the corruption-sensitivity mechanism in its current form. This does, however, not mean that sensitivity to corruption has now been ruled out as a factor of interest. Instead, the conclusion from the discussion on the corruption-sensitivity mechanism might also apply here: when audiences are dissatisfied with the president's performance, they are more avid for government corruption stories, and when this is the case, a single executive corruption allegation

reaching one or more media outlets is more likely to be featured more prominently on that medium or those media, as well as being more likely to be picked up by other media outlets as well. Therefore, this single accusation is more likely to turn into a full-fledged scandal.

CONCLUSION

The previous discussion calls for a reformulation of all four literature-derived mechanisms. Alternative mechanisms 1 and 2, as well as both null-mechanisms are essentially about how information about executive corruption reaches, or is impeded from reaching, the media, whereas mechanisms 3 and 4 are about how published corruption allegations turn into full-fledged scandals, a distinction that had initially been overlooked. This insight also warrants a reevaluation of the brief discussion on strategic leaking by legal officials in the segment on the first mechanism. Although these leaks might not bring new information to the table—this information would have been released legally at a later date—a well-timed leak could transform the leaked information into a scandal, while it might otherwise have passed without much ado. Therefore, an additional mechanism emerges, which is described below. Furthermore, mechanisms 3 and 4 should be merged into a single mechanism driven by two different, potential independent variables.

As such, the final four mechanisms become:

1. Rivalry between two closely collaborating politicians, of which at least one is a member of the executive branch (X) → politician A seeks to damage his collaborator's reputation by leaking compromising information about the latter to the media (n₁) → the media check this information with other sources, and in case of a convergence of different sources, publishes this information (n₂) → executive corruption allegations reach the public (Y). This mechanism will be referred to as the *friendly-fire mechanism*.
2. Far-reaching corruption investigation affecting a large number of politicians and civil servants (X) → a faction of politicians and/or civil servants with representation in the executive branch feels threatened by a corruption investigation (n₁) → said faction conspires with their allies in other branches to obstruct the investigation (n₂) → fewer executive corruption allegations reach the public (Y). This mechanism will now be named the *justice-obstruction mechanism*.
3. Ongoing legal inquiry into or court case about corruption in the executive branch (X) → a legal official such as a prosecutor or a judge seeks to expedite the legal process in order to maintain momentum and retain the public's attention (n₁) → said legal official circumvents due process by illegally leaking a key piece of information at a strategically-timed moment (n₂) → the leaked piece of information achieves a greater media impact compared to if it had been made public the legal way at a different point in time (n₃) → executive corruption scandals emerge (Y). This mechanism inherits the name of the former first mechanism: the *strategic-leaking mechanism*.
4. Adverse economic conditions (X) AND/OR Low presidential approval (X) → audiences, dissatisfied with the president's (economic) performance, show increased interest in, or heightened sensitivity to, stories about government corruption (n₁) → the media seek to attend

to audiences' demands for specific content (n_2) → the media feature corruption allegations involving members of the executive branch more prominently than they would otherwise (n_3) → executive corruption scandals emerge (Y). This mechanism inherits the name of the former fourth mechanism: the *corruption-sensitivity mechanism*.

The two null-mechanisms remain the same, except for the fact that they explain how corruption allegations reach the public, rather than how they turn into scandals.

All four alternative mechanisms enjoy at least some support from the empirical record, but that does not mean that they are bullet-proof, nor exhaustive. Mechanisms are as strong as their weakest parts and these weaknesses must be further examined in future research. Specifically, the link between economic conditions and/or presidential approval on the one hand and the public's sensitivity to government corruption on the other hand must be tested in the Brazilian case.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Aside from observations directly relevant to the research objectives, a number of additional noteworthy findings must be shared here. The interviewees who work for newspapers, specifically Vicente Nunes and Leonardo Meireles from *Correio Braziliense*, point at a broader crisis in the traditional media's financial model. They mentioned a restructuring at CB, in which the two editors that had been managing three separate sections—politics, economics and Brazil—were repurposed as reporters, while Vicente Nunes, aside from being executive editor, would from then on also manage those three sections. This crisis is related to the emergence of social media, the legacy media's subsequent diminishing prominence as information channels, in combination with the latter's failure to make money by publishing through the new information channels of social media. In Nunes' own words:

That's why we keep on taking beatings. Because we have not yet been able to identify exactly what the traditional media's role is in this context that we are living in. Even considering we have more credibility—72% of the news stories that circulate on social media have the traditional media, the newspaper, as their background. Why? Because it has more credibility. But we don't know how to make use of that, we don't know how to make money of it, so we are lost. It's hard. It's a new world.

The picture that emerges from this analysis is that of a vicious cycle: with the rise of social media, the legacy media lose their capacity to make profit, compromising their quality and making them even less able to compete with social media. This development is problematic, because, as Nunes said, the traditional media have more quality checks than social media, which have none, and are therefore more credible than the latter. Furthermore, traditional media often have key contacts in politics and government. Sources are able to talk off the record precisely because the traditional media give them a platform to do that. It is much less viable for an honest source who must stay anonymous in order to avoid retribution to create an anonymous social media account and leak that way, as, having little to no followers, his posts would simply disappear in the vast cacophony of opinion that is social media. For these reasons, losing the traditional media would amount to a loss for democracy.

Another previously mentioned development pointed out by these interviewees is the increased proactivity of law-enforcement authorities. However, according to Meireles, this is not necessarily a bad thing. “Today, they [the authorities] are much more proactive. I think that that’s great, it’s marvelous.” However, it has serious implications for the analysis at hand, which has focused on the media as the main actor in the revelation of corruption. If law-enforcement authorities have replaced the media as the principal actor in this, then further research must shed more light on the factors that influence these institutions’ efficacy in discovering corruption. A topic for further research is where this leaves the media. If, due to the obsolescence of their financial model, the media have fewer resources to conduct their own research, how are they going to check the law-enforcement institutions?

Furthermore, as discussed in the literature review, there are signs that legal officials might themselves be sensitive to public opinion, as the cult-following acquired by judge Sérgio Moro has shown, in addition to his use of strategic, illegal leaks to mobilize public opinion behind his case. However, Dr. Ayres Britto points out that, in his view, the Brazilian judiciary has not been courting public opinion, a practice that he strongly condemns. Nevertheless, further research must shed light on the possible existence of this dynamic, as it is not only of analytical interest, but also, more importantly, of normative interest. Since Rousseff’s impeachment, Lula’s hastily executed prison sentence, based on rather flimsy evidence (Katz, 2018: 93), and the Intercept Brazil’s revelation, on June 9, 2019, of messages between Moro and Deltan Dallagnol, Lava Jato’s lead prosecutor, showing the two collaborating—which is prohibited by law—on the investigation of Lula’s supposed possession of a beachfront apartment supposedly donated to him by contractor OAS (Fishman et al., 2019), as well as deciding to deny him an interview with the press on the grounds that this would supposedly help PT presidential candidate Fernando Haddad get elected (Greenwald & Pougy, 2019), demonstrate even more the extent to which the Lavo Jato operation has been politicized. The fact that new-style prosecutors and judges such as Dallagnol and Moro have been able to act unilaterally and in defiance of the law, carefully timing their leaks, arrests and decisions in line with the electoral calendar without suffering any kind of disciplinary consequence, raises the question of whether the power of law-enforcement and legal officials is still healthy in light of the checks and balances of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

CONCLUSION

This research set out to identify independent variables that affect the disclosure of corruption scandals involving the executive branch of government and to uncover possible causal mechanisms connecting these independent variables to the dependent variable. Although scandals affecting the president and his or her close collaborators have long been used as an independent or control variable in studies on Latin American presidentialism, no study has systematically investigated what variables and mechanisms lead to the emergence of executive corruption scandals. This study has taken a mixed-methods approach, using ordinary least squares regression to test a number of interval variables that potentially affect scandal disclosure, as well as Y-centered theory-building process tracing to uncover additional, categorical independent variables and mechanisms leading from said variables to the dependent variable. It was found that, out of the tested interval variables, only approval had a statistically significant (negative) correlation at the 0.05-level with scandals. The rest of the variables—the honeymoon period, inflation, unemployment and cabinet coalescence (taken as an indicator for intra-elite conflict)—were not significant at any noteworthy level. It must be noted that, while these variables were treated as independent, some of them could be dependent on scandals instead. Regarding the mechanisms, four mechanisms were derived from the observations, two of which describe how corruption allegations reach the public, whereas the remaining two describe how individual corruption allegations turn into scandals. The friendly-fire mechanism describes individual politicians and other state actors leaking compromising information about close collaborators, with whom they experience rivalry, to the press in order to harm said opponents. The justice-obstruction mechanism describes how politicians and other state actors under investigation use their allies in other branches of government to obstruct said investigation. The strategic-leaking mechanism describes how members of the judiciary and the Public Ministry make strategically-timed and often illegal leaks, which can transform information that might otherwise not have achieved a lot of echo into scandals. Finally, the corruption-sensitivity mechanism describes that, when audiences' interest in government corruption is triggered by their dissatisfaction with the president's performance, the media respond to this renewed interest by featuring individual corruption allegations more prominently, turning them into full-fledged scandals. In addition to these alternative mechanisms, two previously formulated 'null-mechanisms' leading to publicized corruption allegations, albeit not necessarily to scandals, were supported by the observations: the law-enforcement mechanism, which describes law-enforcement authorities' uncovering corruption schemes, and the integrity mechanism, which describes honest government officials, civil servants and private-sector employees revealing corruption happening in their respective sectors to the media or the authorities. The findings of this research should by no means be taken as final but should instead serve as a point of departure for future research that could more thoroughly test the proposed mechanisms. More specific issues to be addressed by future research are the causes of corruption sensitivity for the Brazilian case, as well as the interaction of law-enforcement and legal officials with public opinion.

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APPENDIX A: SCANDAL CODEBOOK

For the creation of the scandal database, all of the front pages of Folha de São Paulo between 1/1/2003 and 12/5/2016, comprising the entire period of Workers' Party governments, were analyzed. These are about 5000 front pages. For any news item that met the scandal definition, a brief description of the act of corruption or power abuse was registered in an excel sheet together with the date of publication, and the name(s) and position(s) of the people implicated. If the same episode was mentioned on the front page for several days, or if new developments related to an existing case were published, these were not coded again. After the initial list of scandals was completed, the online O Globo archive was used to filter out accusations that were not published in that newspaper. For every accusation published in Folha, it was verified whether this accusation was also published on an O Globo front page by using the search function over a period of one month around the respective Folha edition. If it turned out the accusation was also present in O Globo, any differences with the Folha news item were registered in the excel sheet. Then, for each month in the period of interest, a random date was chosen, leading to a list of 160 dates, and for each date, the front page of O Globo was analyzed to see if there were any scandals that had been overlooked in Folha. For any new accusation found, the Folha archive was then used to find out whether Folha had also published about it on the front page. Accusations that only appeared in one of the newspapers were then deleted from the database, whereas accusations that differed across the newspapers were harmonized in order to reflect only the facts that either news item had in common.

After the initial database had been produced, it became clear that, in many cases, once one accusation emerged against a specific minister or other person of interest, others would follow in rapid succession until the minister in question resigned or was dismissed. In order to not overestimate the number of scandals, these cascades of accusations were coded as one scandal if they occurred in the timespan of one month. After all, these additional accusations were merely caused by the previous accusation rather than being the result of any external factor. There were also cases in which each newspaper published a different accusation about the same individual, around the same time. If both newspapers published different accusations about the same person of interest, it was counted as one scandal, with the database description mentioning both accusations, along with the newspapers that had published either accusation.

APPENDIX B: LIST OF SCANDALS

Date	Episode	Involved
October 2003	The national secretary of Public Security, Luiz Eduardo Soares, requested his resignation after contracts that his wife and ex-wife had with the secretary became public. The institution was being audited for suspected favoritism with respect to contracts.	Luiz Eduardo Soares, National Secretary of of Public Security
October 2003	Minister of Sports, Agnelo Queiroz, brought money from his Ministry to the Pan-American Games (Jogos Pan-Americanos) in Santo Domingo, which took place in August of this year, to pay for expenses that had just been financed by the Brazillian Olympic Committee. After criticism, Queiroz announced that he would return half of the R\$ 11.112 that he received.	Agnelo Queiroz (PC do B), Minister of Sports
December 2003	Accused by the Federal Prosecutor's office (Ministério Público Federal) of irregularities in official trips to Buenos Aires, New York and Lisbon, illicit enrichment, damages to the exchequer e violation of the principles of public administration.	Benedita Silva (minister of " Assistência")
February 2004	Video from 2002 shows two confidants of Chief of Staff José Dirceu negotiating with a "bicheiro" (organizer of illegal betting game), offering favorable treatment in competitions in exchange for bribes and contributions for electoral campaigns. Advisor to Dirceu resigns.	Waldomiro Diniz, sub-chief of Parliamentary Matters of the Presidency/sub-chefe de Assuntos Parlamentares da Presidência and advisor to Chief of Staff/Ministro da Casa Civil José Dirceu (until January)
May 2004	General Coordenator of Logistical Resources of the Ministry of Health (advisor to the Minister of Health) arrested for suspicion of participation in a criminal network acting within the Ministry and which manipulated public tenders for the purchase of hemoderivatives. Police operation nicknamed Operação Vampira (Operation Vampire).	Humberto Costa, Minister of Health
July 2004	The president of Banco do Brasil (a state-owned bank), Cássio Casseb, stands accused of not having declared to the Receita Federal (Department of Federal Revenue) a foreign bank account of his, through which he transferred more than half a million dollars between 1999 and 2002.	Cássio Casseb, President of Banco do Brasil
August 2004	Folha reports that the opposition demands the dismissal of Henrique Meirelles, the president of the Central Bank, who is suspected of fiscal fraud, including a large money transfer between undeclared bank accounts, and the declaration of a piece of land worth R\$ 1 to the Receita. Globo reports that Lula decides not to fire Meirelles despite unspecified allegations.	Henrique Meirelles, President of the Central Bank
September 2004	Accused by the Federal Prosecutor's Office of having used public goods in order to ask for votes for São Paulo mayor Marta Suplicy in the municipal elections of 2004, which is forbidden by electoral law.	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic

February 2005	Lula said in Espírito Santo that he avoided to disclose alleged corruption cases during the FHC government (1995-2002) about which he was told by a "high companion" (companheiro alto) and recommended to his interlocutor that he "shut his mouth" in order not to ridicule FHC's government. The PSDB wants to process Lula for this.	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic
April 2005	Folha reports that, according to a 1995 report of the Department of Federal Revenue (Receita Federal) accuses current minister of Welfare Jucá of having embezzled R\$ 1,45 million in federal funds to a philanthropical entity in Roraima and having used the money for personal and electoral expenses. Globo reports that canvassers for the Jucá Senate campaign in 2002 used welfare files belonging to the federal government to threaten welfare beneficiaries if they wouldn't vote for Jucá.	Romero Jucá, Minister of Welfare (Previdência)
June 2005	Roberto Jefferson, national president of the PTB (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro/Brazilian Labour Party), claims that the treasurer of the PT (Workers' Party) made monthly payments to members of parliament in exchange for support in Congress. This is the infamous Mensalão scandal.	Delúbio Soares, Treasurer of the PT
June 2005	Roberto Jefferson alleges in interview with Folha that Dirceu was aware of the mensalão scheme, and that the bags full of money were delivered to a room next to Dirceu's office.	José Dirceu, Lula's Chief of Staff (Casa Civil)
June 2005	Ex-chief department Chief of the Mail (ex-chefe de departamento dos Correios) linked irregular contracts to PT members Pereira and Gushiken.	Sílvio Pereira, Secretary General of the PT Luiz Gushiken, Minister of Government Communication (Comunicação de Governo)
July 2005	Advertising man Marcos Valério, one of the people suspected of operating the mensalão scheme, paid a debt of R\$349,927.53 to the PT in July of 2004. The payment was accepted in a note signed by PT Treasurer Delúbio Soares and had as guarantors Marcos Valério and PT President José Genoino. Soares and Genoino step down.	José Genoino, President of the PT Delúbio Soares, Treasurer of the PT
August 2005	Jefferson, in a new corruption accusation, claims that it was under the guidance of Lula that advertising man Marcos Valério and the treasurer of the PTB (Brazilian Labour Party, Jefferson's party), went to Lisbon to negotiate an operation to pay off debts of PTB members' electoral campaigns. The operation involved Portugal Telecom and Banco Espírito Santo and would have yielded R\$ 100 million for the PT and the PTB, but ended up not being carried out.	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic
August 2005	Márcio Lacerda, removed from the position of executive secretary of the Ministry of National Integration after appearing as a beneficiary of money coming from Marcos Valério, affirmed that the money paid for Lula's presidential campaign debt.	Márcio Lacerda, executive secretary of the Ministry of National Integration

August 2005	In a testimony to the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry in charge of the scandal about the national Mail company (state company), Duda Mendonça admits to having illegally received R\$11,9 million from advertising man Marcos Valério in the Bahamas in 2003 as part of the payment of the R\$15,5 million debt leftover from the PT's 2002 election campaigns. Duda Mendonça was in charge of the campaigns for Lula, José Genoino, and a number of other important PT members.	Duda Mendonça, political advertising specialist in charge of Lula's 2002 presidential campaign
August 2005	Ex-deputy and president of the PL (Liberal Party) Valdemar Costa Neto, said that the PT paid for support of his party to Lula, presidential candidate at the time, and that both Lula was aware of the payment as he was present when the deal was made.	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic
August 2005	"Doleiro" (somebody who buys and sells dollars on the black market) Antonio Claramunt claims to have worked for PT politicians in 2002 and 2003 and accuses the Minister of Justice to have illegally sent money abroad.	Márcio Thomaz Bastos, Minister of Justice
August 2005	Ex-Treasurer of the PT Delúbio Soares admitted that the R\$ 457 thousand withdrawn from Marcos Valério's bank accounts by an ex-advisor to Minister Ciro Gomes were used to pay for expenses with the recording of Ciro's messages of support for Lula during the second round of the latter's 2002 presidential campaign.	Ciro Gomes, Minister of National Integration
August 2005	Ex-advisor to Minister Palocci, the lawyer Rogério Buratti, told the Public Prosecutor and the police that Palocci, when he was mayor of Riberão Preto (2001-2002) received R\$ 50 thousand per month from the city's trash collection company. The money was then passed on to Delúbio Soares, ex-treasurer of the PT. He also alleged that Lula's presidential campaign received R\$ 2 million from companies operating bingo houses in São Paulo and Rio. The money was passed on to ex-treasurer Delúbio Soares with ex-advisor to ex-Chief of Staff Dirceu, Waldomiro Diniz, serving as an intermediary in Rio.	Antonio Palocci, Minister of Finance Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic
October 2005	Bruno Daniel, brother of the assassinated ex-mayor of Santo André (SP), Celso Daniel, accused Gilberto Carvalho, advisor (chefe-de-gabinete) to Lula, to have participated in an illegal fundraising scheme for the PT.	Gilberto Carvalho, advisor (chefe-de-gabinete) to Lula
October 2005	According to the magazine Veja, Lula's committee received US\$ 3 million or US\$ 1,4 million from Cuba in campaign finance.	Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic
December 2005	Reporter (relator) of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) of the Mail, Congress member Osmar Serraglio (PMDB-PR) said that a payment of R\$ 1 million made by the PT to Coteminas, company of vice-president of the Republic José Alencar, on May 17, may be linked to a caixa dois scheme.	José Alencar (Vice-President of the Republic)
January 2006	The Bingo CPI investigates Paulo Okamoto, president of Sebrae and friend of Lula's for having paid, between 2003 and 2004, a debt of about R\$ 29 thousand of President Lula with the PT. The CPI suspects that the debt has been paid with money from the caixa dois operated by businessman Marcos Valério and examines illicit use of public money, of	Paulo Okamoto, president of Sebrae and friend of Lula's Roberto Teixeira, lawyer and friend of Lula's Jorge Mattoso, president

	the partisan fund (fundo partidário) for Lula's expenses. Lawyer and friend of Lula's Roberto Teixeira and the president of public bank Caixa, Jorge Mattoso were also summoned by the CPI.	of Caixa Econômico Federal
March 2006	Caretaker (caseiro) Francenildo Costa will confirm today to the Federal Police that Antonio Palocci (Finance) frequented, between 2003 and 2004, a house rented in Brasília by his ex-advisors in the City Hall of Ribeirão Preto that was used for sharing money. These declarations contradict the Minister's testimony to the Bingo CPI.	Antonio Palocci, Minister of Finance
March 2006	The president of the Caixa Econômica Federal, Jorge Mattoso, told the Federal Police that he handed to Palocci information about the bank secrecy of housekeeper Francenildo Costa, which was broken illegally, as a way of discrediting him, after he had revealed to the Federal Police that Palocci had lied to the Bingo CPI. Mattoso and Palocci resign.	Antonio Palocci, Minister of Finance Jorge Mattoso, President of the Caixa Econômica Federal
April 2006	The lawyer Arnaldo Malheiros said that Minister of Justice Bastos tried to help Palocci to defend himself. He confirmed that Bastos participated in a meeting with himself, ex-Minister Palocci and ex-president of the Caixa Jorge Mattoso after the breaking of housekeeper Costa's bank secrecy. The meeting happened before Palocci and Mattoso's testimonies to the Federal Police.	Márcio Thomaz Bastos, Minister of Justice
September 2006	Special advisor of the Personal Secretary of the Presidency (assessor especial da Secretaria Particular da Presidência) Freud Godoy resigned from his post after having been accused of negotiating the purchase of a secret dossier with information about José Serra, PSDB candidate for governor of São Paulo. Confidant of Lula, with his own office at Planalto, Freud's name was mentioned by Gedimar Passos, who had been arrested on Friday with R\$ 1,7 million, money that was allegedly destined for paying for the dossier.	Freud Godoy, Special advisor of the Personal Secretary of the Presidency (assessor especial da Secretaria Particular da Presidência)
September 2006	Three of Lula's campaign managers have had their names cited in the case of the dossier against tucanos (PSDB members) prepared by the Vedoin family, who led the sanguessugas mafia, in a note of the Época magazine, which claims that the respective figures offered the dossier to weeks ago.	Ricardo Berzoini, National President of the PT and Lula's campaign chief Oswaldo Bargas, manager of the Lula campaign Jorge Lorenzetti, risk and media analyst of the Lula campaign
May 2007	The Minister of Mines and Energy, Silas Rondeau, stands accused of having received R\$ 100 thousand in bribes from construction company Gautama, and resigns.	Silas Rondeau, Minister of Mines and Energy
June 2007	Vavá, Lula's brother, is accused by the Federal Police of influence peddling in the Executive branch and the exploitation of prestige (exploração de prestígio) in the Judicial branch. The Federal Police raided his house as part of Operation Check-Mate, which aims to take down the so-called slot machine mafia. Specifically, they investigate a	Genival Inácio da Silva (Vavá), Lula's brother Dario Morelli Filho, friend and handyman of Lula's family

	possible payment to Vavá by defeated federal deputy candidate Nilton César Servo (PSB-MS), who is fugitive. Servo is thought to have been a partner of Dario Morelli Filho, one of the prisoners, in a casino. Morelli is a friend and handyman of Lula's family.	
June 2007	Another brother of Lula's, José Ferreira da Silva/Frei Chico, admits having called Vavá on May 20 to warn the latter that Lula wants to see him in Brasília to talk about his alleged lobbying of the government.	José Ferreira da Silva (Frei Chico), Lula's brother Genival Inácio da Silva (Vavá), Lula's brother
November 2007	Minister of Institutional Relations, Walfrido dos Mares, stepped down after having been accused by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of embezzling R\$ 3,5 million of public funds in order to finance Eduardo Azeredo's (PSDB) 1998 gubernatorial Minas Gerais campaign, in a scheme operated by Marcos Valério. Dos Mares was vice-governor at the time.	Walfrido dos Mares, Minister of Institutional Relations
January 2008	Ministers Matilde Ribeiro (Racial Equality), Orlando Silva (Sport) and Altemir Gregolin (Fishing) made irregular use of their government credit cards with expenses in tapioca restaurants (tapiocarias) and BBQ restaurants (churrascaria).	Matilde Ribeiro (Minister of Racial Equality) Orlando Silva (Minister of Sport) Altemir Gregolin (Minister of Fishing)
February 2008	Minister of Labor Carlos Lupi, who is also president of the PDT (Democratic Labor Party), has privileged several NGOs and other entities linked to the PT by signing million-real deals with them.	Carlos Lupi, Minister of Labor
March 2008	Main advisor of Dilma Rousseff (Chief of Staff), Erenice Alves Guerra, compiled a secret dossier with expenses of ex-president FHC, which includes expenses of former First Lady Ruth Cardoso and of ministers of FHC.	Erenice Alves Guerra, Executive Secretary of the Chief of staff
May 2008	The Federal Police has identified José Aparecido Nunes, Secretary of Internal Control of the Casa Civil as the one who leaked the dossier about FHC.	José Aparecido Nunes, Secretary of Internal Control of the Casa Civil
June 2008	President Lula and Chief of staff Dilma Rousseff used their influence in the authorization of the sale of air cargo company VarigLog to logistics company Volo. The lawyer who negotiated the deal, Roberto Teixeira, friend of Lula's, received large sums of black money from VarigLog. Lula as well as Dilma have had meetings with Teixeira that were not registered in their public agendas.	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic Dilma Rousseff, Chief of staff Roberto Teixeira, lawyer and friend of Lula's
July 2008	The Public Ethics Commission of the Presidency decided to investigate Lula's cabinet chief Gilberto Carvalho, who received ex-deputee Luiz Eduardo Greenhalgh (PT), who in turn acted as a lawyer in favor of Opportunity banker Daniel Dantas, who is being investigated for corruption and money laundry as part of operation Satiagraha.	Gilberto Carvalho, advisor (chefe-de-gabinete) to Lula
September 2008	Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim is summoned to explain to the CPI of the Congressional Wiretapping (Grampos da Câmara) the fact that the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) bought briefcases for doing the illegal wiretappings.	Nelson Jobim, Minister of Defense

August 2009	Ex-secretary of the Federal Revenue Lina Maria Vieira accuses Dilma (Chief of staff) of having asked her, in a secret meeting, for a swift conclusion of the investigation into Senate President José Sarney, which she interpreted as an implicit wish to close the investigation.	Dilma Rousseff, Chief of staff
March 2010	Prosecuting attorney (promotor) José Carlos Blatt, of the State of São Paulo's public prosecutor's office, requested the breaking of the bank secret of the PT's new Treasurer, João Vaccari Neto, who is being investigated for supposed money laundering, gang formation (formação de quadrilha), "estelionato" (selling something that has already been sold), and unjust appropriation at Bancoop (Habitational Cooperative of the Bankers of São Paulo), when he was president of the cooperative. The money from Bancoop was allegedly used to finance PT campaigns.	João Vaccari Neto, PT Treasurer
March 2010	Lula was fined R\$ 5.000 by the Minister of the Superior Electoral Tribunal, for having made a pro-Dilma speech in a PAC (Growth Acceleration Plan) event in Rio de Janeiro in May 2009.	Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic
May 2010	President Lula and pre-candidate for the Presidency, Dilma Rousseff, used the Sindical Force's (Força Sindical) 1st of May party in São Paulo in order to compliment the PT government. The event was sponsored with R\$ 1 million of federal state companies. The PSDB will undertake legal action for premature electoral propaganda, which is illegal.	Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic Dilma Rousseff, pre-candidate for the Presidency
May 2010	Phone recordings revealed Secretary of Justice Romeu Tuma Júnior's involvement with the São Paulo cell phone mafia.	Romeu Tuma Júnior, National Secretary of Justice
June 2010	PSDB pre-candidate for the presidency, José Serra, accused his adversary Dilma Rousseff of being behind a secret dossier about him, his relatives, and other PSDB members. According to Veja magazine, PT members set up an espionage team. The pre-candidate got irritated upon receiving information that his daughter, Veronica, was a target of investigations. Three days later, journalist Luiz Lanzetta, suspected of making the dossier, resigned from the Rousseff campaign.	Dilma Rousseff, pre-candidate for the presidency
July 2010	In defiance of electoral legislation, Lula complimented candidate Dilma during the launch of the public notice (edital) of a proposed bullet train line connecting Rio and SP.	Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic
September 2010	Director of the national Mail company, Correios, Artur Rodrigues da Silva, and consultant Fabio Baracat pointed out to Folha that the son of Chief of Staff Erenice Guerra (succeeded Dilma on April 1) is mediator (intermediador) between a company (MTA Linhas Aéreas) and the Lula government. Israel Guerra lobbied in order to help the company to renovate a concession of Anac, which permitted a contract with Correios. According to Veja magazine, the Minister enabled her son's actions.	Erenice Alves Guerra, Chief of staff
October 2010	In a testimony to the Federal Police, journalist Amaury Ribeiro Jr. accused Rui Falcão, press coordinator of Dilma's campaign to have copied information about people connected to PSDB candidate José Serra from his computer,	Rui Falcão, press coordinator of the Rousseff campaign

	in the context of the espionage scandal that came out in March. Amaury himself admitted to have ordered information about the PSDB members that were later included in the dossier that circulated during Dilma's pre-campaign.	
April 2011	Vice-President of the Republic, Michel Temer, is investigated by the Supreme Court (STF) under the suspicion that he has participated in a bribe scheme of companies possessing contracts in the port of Santos (SP). He is accused of having received over R\$600 thousand in bribes.	Michel Temer, Vice-President of the Republic
May 2011	The purchase of a luxury apartment in São Paulo and an office in 2009 and 2010 by Antonio Palocci, shortly before assuming the position of Chief of staff, means that the property of R\$ 375 thousand, which he declared in 2006, multiplied by a factor of 20 in four years. The goods had not been declared to the Exchequer.	Antonio Palocci, Chief of staff
July 2011	Minister of Transportation, Alfredo Nascimento (PR), resigns after accusations of involvement of the PR (Party of the Republic) and the Ministry with overbilling and bribes in relation to public road and railway works.	Alfredo Nascimento, Minister of Transportation
August 2011	The Federal Police arrested the Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism, Frederico Silva da Costa, whom they suspect of participation in a scheme that allegedly led to the embezzlement of almost R\$ 3 million.	Frederico Silva da Costa, Executive Secretary of Tourism
August 2011	Minister of Agriculture Wagner Rossi used, at least twice during the past year, the airplane belonging to Ourofino Agronegócio, a company that produced veterinarian products, seeds and "defensivos". At the end of 2010, the company obtained a license permitting the sale of a foot-and-mouth disease vaccine, a market with a yearly turnover of R\$ 1 billion.	Wagner Rossi, Minister of Agriculture
September 2011	Minister of Tourism Pedro Novais (PMDB-MA) stepped down after Folha revealed that he paid the housekeeper with public money for seven years and that his wife used another employee as a private driver.	Pedro Novais, Minister of Tourism
October 2011	Two participants in an alleged embezzlement scheme of money from the Ministry of Sports accused Minister Orlando Silva (PC do B) of having received money.	Orlando Silva, Minister of Sports
November 2011	A number of allegations envelops the Minister of Labor, Carlos Lupi (PDT), including his assistance to an NGO belonging to a fellow PDT member, the use of bogus employees and companies, him receiving daily rates from his ministry for a trip to Maranhão, on which he carried out the agenda of his party, and his use of a private airplane provided by a businessman whose NGOs have contracts with the ministry.	Carlos Lupi, Minister of Labor
December 2011	Minister of Development, Industry and Commerce, Fernando Pimentel (PT), said in an interview that he had not informed President Dilma Rousseff about consultancies he carried out as there had been "nothing irregular" about them. He denied accusations of influence peddling when he worked as a consultant and received around R\$ 2 million.	Fernando Pimentel, Minister of Development, Industry and Commerce

January 2012	A number of corruption allegations envelops Minister of National Integration, Fernando Bezerra. Folha reports him privileging his son, a member of Congress, with the largest volume of amendments from the Ministry in 2011, with a total value of R\$ 9,1 million, and him using public funds to buy the same plot of land twice when he was mayor of Petrolina, in 1996 and 2001, while Globo reports him privileging his home state of Pernambuco with funding for flood prevention.	Fernando Bezerra, Minister of Integration
February 2012	The Minister of Cities, Mário Negromonte (PP), resigned after having been accused of favoring allies with funds from the Ministry. He is the 7th minister to fall under suspicion of irregularities.	Mário Negromonte, Minister of Cities
February 2012	A number of accusations envelops the new Minister of Cities, Aguinaldo Ribeiro. Folha reports that he owns two radio stations in Paraíba, registered in name of his ex-accountant and a personal assistant, which, after Ribeiro's appointment as the new Minister, dedicated two hours of tribute to him. Globo reports that Ribeiro already answered to processes at the STF (Supreme Court) and favored the city administered by his mother with funds.	Aguinaldo Ribeiro, Minister of Cities
May 2012	Fernando Pimentel, Minister of Development, omitted from an official document the fact that he was given a ride in an airplane chartered by a businessman in Italy in 2011.	Fernando Pimentel, Minister of Development, Industry and Commerce
November 2012	The Federal Police accused the Cabinet Chief (chefe de gabinete) of the Presidency in São Paulo, Rosemary Novoa de Noronha, of influence peddling, corruption and identity theft.	Rosemary Novoa de Noronha, Cabinet Chief of the Presidency in São Paulo
August 2013	The Minister of Foreign Affairs (Relações Exteriores), Antonio Patriota, was fired after the flight of Bolivian Senator Roger Pinto Molina to Brazil. The episode caused a crisis in the government and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Itamaraty, which declared not to have known about the operation, conducted by the diplomat Eduardo Saboia.	Antonio Patriota, Minister of Foreign Affairs
September 2013	The Federal Police arrested 22 under suspicion of fraud in the Labor Ministry. The executive secretary of the Ministry, Paulo Roberto Pinto, is suspected of having participated in the fraud and testified by judicial order in Brasília. The suspicion is that the scheme has embezzled R\$ 400 million, liberated for the IMDC, an entity in Belo Horizonte which offers professional qualification services.	Paulo Roberto Pinto, Executive Secretary of the Labor Ministry
January 2014	Future Minister of Health (nominated the day before, he would assume the office on February 3), Arthur Chioro, is investigated by the Public Prosecutor's Office of São Paulo for administrative improbity. Current Secretary of Health of São Bernardo (SP), he stands accused of simultaneously running a health consultancy company.	Arthur Chioro, nominated Minister of Health
January 2014	Minister of Health, Alexandre Padilha, signed a R\$ 199,8 thousand deal with an NGO of which his father is a partner and founder.	Alexandre Padilha, Minister of Health

March 2014	According to Petrobras Executives, Dilma Rousseff, and the rest of the administrative council of the state company over which she presided at the time, had knowledge of the complete process around the purchase of a Pasadena, U.S., oil refinery for an inflated price in 2006 (Folha, 20-3-2014). In that year, Petrobras purchased 50% of the assets of a U.S. oil refinery for US\$ 360 million. One year earlier, however, the Belgian company Astra Oil had bought 100% of the refinery for only US\$ 42,5 million (Folha, 22-3-2014).	Dilma Rousseff, President of the Republic
August 2014	Almost a year after the purchase of the Pasadena refinery began to be investigated by the TCU (Tribunal de Contas da União/Federal Court of Accounts), Graça Foster, president of Petrobras, transferred three Rio properties to her relatives. For a TCU judge, this may have been motivated by a desire to avoid her property being blocked.	Graça Foster, President of Petrobras
September 2014	Ex-director of Petrobras, Paulo Roberto Costa, who is being investigated for corruption and money laundering, mentioned a number of politicians to the Federal Police whom he claims have received bribes from the state corporation. Among them are the Minister of Energy and Mines, Edison Lobão, and the Treasurer of the PT, João Vaccari Neto.	Edison Lobão, Minister of Mines and Energy João Vaccari Neto, PT Treasurer
November 2014	The Federal Police and the Prosecution collected testimonies that involve the Minister of Agriculture, Neri Geller (PSDB), in an alleged agrarian fraud scheme in Mato Grosso. The damage to the exchequer may reach R\$ 1 billion.	Neri Geller, Minister of Agriculture
February 2015	Ex-Petrobras manager Pedro Barusco, witness in the Lava Jato operation, accuses the PT's Treasurer, João Vaccari Neto, of having negotiated Petrobras contracts for ship building companies in exchange for hundreds of millions of reais in kickbacks for the PT and himself.	João Vaccari Neto, PT Treasurer
February 2015	A period of 80 days since the eruption of Lava Jato has been omitted from the agenda of the Minister of Justice, Eduardo Cardozo. Encounters of Cardozo with lawyers of contractors, including Odebrecht, were criticized.	José Eduardo Cardozo, Minister of Justice
April 2015	The TCU approved a report that considers the fiscal maneuvers carried out by Rousseff's first government in order to cover the government's deficit with money from federal public banks (so-called "pedalada fiscal") to be crimes of responsibility. The decision would motivate the October impeachment request against the president.	Dilma Rousseff, President of the Republic
June 2015	In a plea bargain, the owner of construction company UTC, Ricardo Pessoa, confirmed to prosecutors of the Lava Jato operation that he collaborated with R\$ 7,5 million to the 2014 Rousseff campaign and also contributed to the campaign of Aloizio Mercadante (PT), currently Chief of Staff, to the São Paulo government in 2010. A news item from the next day reports that Minister of Social Communication, Edinho Silva, had also been mentioned by Ricardo Pessoa in his testimony.	Dilma Rousseff, President of the Republic Aloizio Mercadante, Chief of staff Edinho Silva, Minister of Social Communication

October 2015	A document was presented to the President of the House of Representatives, Eduardo Cunha, in which a group of lawyers including ex-petista (PT member) Hélio Bicudo and ex-Minister of Justice under FHC (Fernando Henrique Cardoso) Miguel Reale Jr. officially accuse Dilma Rousseff of having used "pedaladas fiscais" again in her current government (the 2014 pedaladas having previously been condemned by the TCU), and request her impeachment.	Dilma Rousseff, President of the Republic
December 2015	In a new phase of the Lava Jato operation, a large number of PMDB members were investigated, including the ministers Henrique Alves (Tourism) and Celso Pansera (Science and Technology).	Henrique Alves (Tourism) Celso Pansera (Science and Technology)
January 2016	Text messages from Léo Pinheiro, ex-president of OAS who was condemned to 16 years in prison for corruption, indicate that Jaques Wagner, currently Chief of staff but governor of Bahia at the time, accepted campaign donations for the 2012 PT Bahia campaign in exchange for construction contracts for OAS.	Jaques Wagner, Chief of staff
February 2016	PT marketer João Santana was arrested for having illegally received R\$ 7,5 million abroad from Odebrecht in 2014, when he was in charge of Dilma Rousseff's presidential campaign.	João Santana, political marketer of the PT
March 2016	Ex-president of contractor Andrade Gutierrez, Otávio Azevedo, said to have illegally paid R\$ 6 million to Dilma's 2010 campaign.	Dilma Rousseff, President of the Republic
March 2016	Delcídio do Amaral (PT), senator and ex-leader of the government in the Senate, alleged in his plea bargain that President Dilma Rousseff acted to obstruct the Lava Jato operation with the help of then-Minister of Justice, José Eduardo Cardozo, and current Minister of Education, Aloizio Mercadante. According to Delcídio, Dilma nominated a judge to the Superior Court of Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justiça) with a mission of avoiding punishments to contractors accused of bribing. He also presented recorded phone calls between Minister of Education Aloizio Mercadante and one of Amaral's advisors, in which the former offers financial and political support to get Delcídio out of prison. Amaral also implicated Vice-President Michel Temer, with Folha reporting that he accused Temer of having sponsored the appointment of Jorge Zelada, who was arrested in the Lava Jato operation, to a Petrobras directory, and Globo reporting that Amaral accused Temer of being very close to João Augusto Henriques, the PMDB's operator in the Petrobras embezzlement scheme.	Dilma Rousseff, President of the Republic Aloizio Mercadante, Minister of Education Michel Temer, Vice-President of the Republic
March 2016	President Dilma Rousseff, in a telephone conversation with Lula, intercepted this Wednesday (16) by Lava Jato, told Lula that she would send him a "terms of inauguration" (termo de posse) as a minister in order to be used "in case of necessity". To investigators, the President acted to avoid that Lula be imprisoned before being nominated Chief of staff, a position with privileged jurisdiction (foro privilegiado).	Dilma Rousseff, President of the Republic

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW METHODS

The interviewees were encountered through snowball sampling, which uses existing mutual contacts in order to find a small number of initial interviewees, and recommendations from these first interviewees then lead to additional interviewees, and so forth (Lynch, 2013: 41-42). Within the sample obtained through snowball sampling, purposive sampling assured that a diversity of interviewees was consulted (41): interviewees worked for different kinds of distribution channels, such print newspapers, television, and radio, aside from working for different media networks and outlets, such as Globo, Record, CBN, and Correio Braziliense (CB). A key reason to use snowball sampling is the difficulty of access to respondents when using cold contact, something that is especially experienced by those just beginning to conduct research, such as thesis writers (43). Although this method yields a non-random sample, this is not a problem in process tracing research, which relies on case-specific pieces of information—or *causal process observations* (CPO)—that provide information about context and mechanism, rather than on generalizable data-set observations (40). In the words of Martin (2013):

When constructing a case study to investigate causality in a particular case, one looks for the smoking gun: one cares less about getting a representative sample of the individuals who may have been affected by an event than about identifying the individuals or institutions responsible for the particular action. (113)

Bleich & Pekkanen's (2013) recommendation that snowball sampling continue until saturation has been reached—a point at which “each new interview within and across networks reveals no new information about a political or policymaking process” (91)—was followed and said point had been reached even before the last interview was conducted.

APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Regarding the formulation of interview questions for process tracing research, Martin's (2013) recommendations were followed. This means that, first, neutrality was maximized in order to avoid the use of leading questions, which may end up molding the interview responses to confirm the researcher's hypotheses (117). Second, questions focused on behaviors rather than attitudes and preferences, and about the conditions under which the participants engage in certain behaviors (ibid.). Third, and especially crucial for process tracing, questions were formulated in an open-ended manner, which leaves room for respondents to share their own perceptions of the issues at hand (119). Fourth, a number of questions addressing the concerns of the interviewees were included, not just in order to avoid leading questions and confirmation bias, but also because this could lead to unexpected insights (ibid.). The questions were divided into a number of different categories and are presented below. (J) refers to questions exclusively for journalists, while (E) refers to questions exclusively for editors. For the two special interviewees, Dr. Ayres Britto and Dr. Sérgio Abranches, a number of unique questions were formulated, also presented below.

Histórico de trabalho

- Depende do entrevistado. Começa com um curto resumo das informações que você já sabe sobre o entrevistado. Depois, pergunta se está certo. Finalmente, pergunta sobre coisas que você não sabe em relação ao histórico de trabalho da pessoa.
- Por exemplo: “Pelo que eu já sei sobre você, você... [resumo do histórico conhecido deles], certo?”
- “Uma coisa que eu ainda não sei sobre você é... [pergunta sobre o histórico da pessoa]”.

Identidade profissional

- Como você entende o seu papel profissional?
- Quais, você diria, são seus valores profissionais?

Encontro, seleção e publicação de notícias

- Por favor, conte um pouco sobre a sua rotina de trabalho.
- Você geralmente apresenta seu editor/sua editora com notícias/assuntos que/sobre quais você gostaria de reportar, ou seu editor/sua editora geralmente lhe sugere/manda reportar sobre certos assuntos/notícias? (J)
- Quando você traz assuntos sobre qual gostaria de reportar, como você escolhe esses assuntos? (J)
- Você geralmente sugere/manda os seus jornalistas reportarem sobre certos assuntos, ou eles/elas geralmente lhe apresentam com assuntos sobre quais eles gostariam de reportar? (E)
- Como você seleciona as notícias que vão ser publicadas? Quais são os critérios nessa seleção? (E)

- Você geralmente faz a sua própria investigação, consultando fontes (pessoas, documentos, etc.) que lhe parecem relevantes, ou são geralmente as fontes (pessoas) que lhe contatam? (J)
- Quais tipos de fontes você costuma consultar? Qual desses você consulta mais frequentemente? (J)
- Quais são as suas principais dificuldades em obter informação? (J)

Relação com fontes (J)

- Você mantém relações com um número de fontes-chaves? Ou costuma consultar (ou ser contatado por) fontes com quais você nunca teve contato antes, na base do assunto que você está investigando naquele momento?
- No caso de fontes com quais você mantém relações duradouras, essas relações se baseiam em quê? Qual é o motivo para a fonte fornecer informações para você?

Encontro, seleção e publicação de notícias sobre corrupção de governo

- De onde geralmente surge(m) informação/acusações de corrupção ou abuso de poder por parte de funcionários do governo? Da sua própria pesquisa ou das indicações das suas fontes (pessoas) ou de algum vazamento feito pela Polícia ou pelo Judiciário?
- Há alguma diferença quanto à seleção de assuntos a reportar (J)/à seleção de notícias a serem publicadas (E) quando se trata de corrupção de governo? Se sim, qual/quais?

Opinião pública/popularidade

- A opinião pública tem alguma influência sobre os assuntos sobre quais você decide reportar (J)/a seleção de notícias a serem publicadas (E)?
- Digamos que um funcionário público/político sobre o qual surge uma acusação de corrupção ou abuso de poder é muito popular. Como isso afeta a escolha de reportar essa acusação (J)/publicar uma notícia sobre essa acusação (E)?
- Digamos que esse funcionário público/político seja bastante impopular—seja conhecido mas impopular. Como isso afeta a escolha de reportar essa acusação (J)/publicar uma notícia sobre essa acusação (E)?
- Você vê alguma relação entre a popularidade da pessoa—dado que ela é conhecida—e a quantidade de informação comprometedora que você recebe sobre ela das suas fontes? (J)

Perguntas para Dr. Carlos Ayres Britto

- O Professor foi ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal entre 2003 e 2012 e presidente daquele órgão em 2012, além de ter sido presidente do Conselho Nacional de Justiça em 2012 e do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral de 2008 a 2010, certo?
- Como o Professor entendia (ou ainda entende) o seu papel cívico quando era Ministro do STF?
- Quais são (e eram) os seus valores cívicos?
- O Mensalão foi descoberto em junho de 2005, enquanto o julgamento daquele esquema de compra de votos foi julgado só em agosto de 2012. Porque que o julgamento demorou tanto?

- Qual é, segundo o professor, a relação entre o Poder Judiciário e a imprensa?
- Na literatura sobre a relação entre o Judiciário e a imprensa, alguns autores mencionam que alguns funcionários do poder judiciário, principalmente os mais progressistas, vazam informações e evidências de processos jurídicos para a imprensa para adiantar esses processos, principalmente quando eles sentem que outros elementos mais conservadores (quer dizer: ligados ao status quo) dentro ou fora do judiciário tentam obstruir os processos. O professor reconhece esse tipo de comportamento?
- O professor acha que a opinião pública tem alguma influência sobre a atuação do Judiciário? Se sim, qual?

Perguntas para Dr. Sérgio Abranches

- O Doutor vê alguma relação entre o conflito político, seja entre os Poderes Executivo e Legislativo, seja entre partidos de coalizão ou dentro do partido do presidente, e a quantidade de denúncias de corrupção que chegam à imprensa?
- O Doutor, no seu livro, fala muito do custo de gestão de coalizões. O Doutor acha que esse custo tem alguma relação com a quantidade de denúncias de corrupção que chegam à imprensa? Por exemplo, um custo fiscal alto, pode ser visto como indicador de uma coalizão instável, carente, com muitas contradições internas e muito conflito potencial, certo? Uma situação que geraria desafeto nos membros da coalizão. Será que esse desafeto se traduz para o vazamento de informação comprometedor sobre parceiros de coalizão, seja do mesmo partido, seja de outros partidos?

CURRICULUM VITAE

JORIS DAVID ALBERDINGK THIJM

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PORTUGAL

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2019 (March-May)	Visiting researcher at Fundação Getúlio Vargas , Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
2018	Research assistant at project MAPLE (Mapping and Measuring and Analysing the Politicisation of Europe before and after the Eurozone Crisis), principal investigator: Marina Costa Lobo, ERC Consolidator Grant n° 682125 .

Research interests

Corruption, clientelism, political scandals, media and politics, Brazilian politics, Latin American politics, multiparty presidentialism, judicial politicization.

EDUCATION

2019 (expected)	MA Political Science, Lisbon University Institute (ISCTE-IUL) , Lisbon, Portugal.
2016	BA Social Sciences, Amsterdam University College , Amsterdam, The Netherlands. With distinction (Cum Laude).

GRANTS AND AWARDS

2018	Prémio de ingresso/admission prize, ISCTE-IUL (€1,000).
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LANGUAGE SKILLS

Dutch	Native
English	C2 (speaking, reading and writing)
Portuguese	C2 (speaking, reading and writing)
Spanish	Basic speaking and reading skills
German	Basic speaking and reading skills
