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Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

School of Social Sciences

Department of Social and Organizational Psychology

# When and how does the promotion of inclusive global identities affect attitudes towards refugees in Germany?

Frederike Luisa Bock

Dissertation submitted as partial requirement for the conferral of Master in Psychology of Intercultural Relations

Supervisor:

Doutora Rita Guerra, Investigadora Auxiliar,

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Humanity is like the fingers of a hand,

Each one is different.

But we are all connected as one.

## Acknowledgements

## Abstract

The current study draws on one of the major theories of intergroup relations, the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), and aimed to examine if and how promoting an inclusive common global identity or a more complex global identity among German citizens improves attitudes and helping behavioral intentions toward refugees. This topic has become more important with the increasing numbers of asylum seekers coming to Germany (Eurostat, 2015). This work, therefore, focuses on the context of Germany and seeks to understand which intervention is most suitable for this national context. Participants (N = 178) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (i.e., common global identity, complex global identity or a control condition) and read a fabricated newspaper article. After the manipulation participants' attitudes and helping behavioral intentions towards refugees were measured. Results revealed that, as predicted, a complex global identity was more successful, relative to a common global identity to promote more positive attitudes and behaviors towards refugees. These effects were mediated by reduced intergroup threats and reduced dehumanization. Results are discussed in terms of the importance of considering the context in which groups are situated, as well as, implications for developing strategies to promote harmony between refugees and Germans. Implications for journalists, politicians, as well as, NGO's campaigning for the rights of refugees are given.

Keywords: Common ingroup identity, complex identity, intergroup threat, dehumanization, refugees, Germany

PsycINFO Codes:

> 3000 Social Psychology
> 3020 Group & Interpersonal Processes

## Resumo

O presente estudo baseia-se numa das principais teorias das relações intergrupais, o modelo da identidade endogrupal comum (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), e examinou se, e de que forma, a promoção de uma identidade comum global ou de uma identidade global complexa melhora as atitudes e as intenções comportamentais de ajuda de cidadãos alemães em relação aos refugiados. Este tópico tornou-se mais relevante devido ao número crescente de requerentes de asilo que chegam à Alemanha (Eurostat, 2015). Este trabalho foca-se assim no contexto alemão e procura analisar qual intervenção mais eficaz neste contexto nacional. Os participantes (N = 178) foram aleatoriamente atribuídos a uma de três condições experimentais (identidade comum global, identidade global complexa ou condição de controlo) e leram um artigo de jornal criado pelos experimentadores. Após a manipulação das diferentes formas de identidades comuns, foram medidas as atitudes e as intenções comportamentais de ajuda em relação aos refugiados. Os resultados revelaram que, tal como previsto, uma identidade global complexa foi mais eficaz, relativamente à identidade comum global, na promoção de atitudes positivas e comportamentos de ajuda aos refugiados. Estes efeitos foram mediados pela redução de ameaças intergrupais e da dezumanização. Os resultados são discutidos em termos da importância teórica de considerar o contexto social no qual os grupos estão inseridos, bem como, as implicações para o desenvolvimento de estratégias de promoção da harmonia entre refugiados e alemães. São ainda apontadas implicações para jornalistas, políticos, assim como para ONGs que actuam pelos direitos dos refugiados.

Keywords: Common ingroup identity, complex identity, intergroup threat, dehumanization, refugees, Germany

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## Introduction

Currently, there are 65.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide (UNHCR, 2015). Wars, crisis and natural catastrophes made millions of people flee from their home countries and the number of refugees assisted by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees increased, reaching a record high (UNHCR, 2014). As a consequence, refugee receiving countries are becoming increasingly diverse, bringing new challenges for politicians and host citizens. For example, the main topics of political discourse across European countries are borders, security and national identity (UNHCR, 2015). Also, minority populations, such as asylum seekers, are used in political discourse and media coverage to create threat perceptions, increasing discrimination and racism (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009). The recent increase in hate-crimes after Brexit in the UK, Trump's election in the US and the electoral success of far right winged parties in the western world suggest that these events could be interconnected (Human Rights Watch, 2017). However, the national contexts in which these discrimination events occur need to be looked at individually, taking into account the specificities of each context. This is especially true when it comes to the implementation of interventions that aim to reduce intergroup hostility and improve relations between host citizens and incoming refugees.

Social psychology has a long tradition in studying processes such as categorization and identification with social groups, as these are fundamental processes in intergroup relations related to intergroup bias and, consequently to different strategies that can be used for improving intergroup relations (Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson, 2010). Up to date most research examines different ways of improving intergroup relations between majorities and ethnic minorities by promoting intergroup contact (Allport, 1954). Different models have been advanced to explain the positive consequences of intergroup contact (Pettigrew, 2010). For example, the decategorization model holds that optimal intergroup contact reduces group categories (Brewer, 2007). Other theorists proposed that promoting different forms of inclusive identities will result in optimal intergroup contact (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). There is considerable empirical evidence that supports these different theoretical models. However, to date, there has been relatively little research focusing on the contextual factors that can impact the effectiveness of the common identity approach. It is not yet clear what form of inclusive identities (e.g., common, or more complex form of dual-identity), and under which conditions, is the most appropriate to improve attitudes towards minorities such as refugees. The present study takes a step to fill this gap by examining a) the

efficacy of different forms of common identity (i.e., complex global identities vs. common global identities) to improve attitudes and prosocial behavior towards refugees; b) the underlying mechanisms that account for these positive effects, namely reduce intergroup threat and dehumanization, and c) whether these positive effects are enhanced, or hindered, depending on the endorsement of civic or ethnic definitions of the national identity. Additionally, this study seeks to explore if campaigns portraying a message of all humans being part of a common global identity or a more complex global identity can improve attitudes and behavioral intentions towards refugees in the German context.

The practical relevance of this research becomes obvious when one considers the fact that Germany, especially in 2015, was one of the major destinations of asylum seekers coming to Europe (Eurostat, 2015). In 2015/2016 1.222.195 people claimed asylum in Germany, stressing the need for a successful integration of refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016). Although Germany's welcoming culture has been praised in international mass media (e.g., Akrab, 2015)), refugees often experience inequalities, hostility and racism at individual and institutional levels (Amnesty International, 2016). Amnesty International criticized German authorities for failing to effectively investigate alleged human rights violations and highlighted that hate crimes against refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants increased sharply (Amnesty International, 2016). These incidents indicate that there is a strong need for a humane response to this challenge that is not just aiming to avoid negative treatments but which also fosters supportive public action.

In the next sections, we present our main theoretical constructs and discuss our theoretical model. We start by describing the common ingroup identity model (CIIM), on which this study draws on. Within this section, we describe the concept of global citizenship. Following this we illustrate the functioning of intergroup threats and explain the role of dehumanization in the given context. Finally, national identity representations will be outlined while setting a focus on the German context to better understand why a common identity in previous research did not succeed at improving intergroup attitudes (Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006).

## Chapter I – Literature Review

**The Common Ingroup Identity Model**

It is a universal human tendency to simplify complex environments by classifying objects and people into groups or categories (Turner, 1987). Categorization often happens spontaneously on the basis of physical similarity, proximity or shared fate (Campbell, 1958). Although social categorization helps understanding the world by simplifying it, it also produces intergroup biases between ingroup and outgroup members (Crisp & Hewstone, 2006). Social categorization impacts the way people think and feel about others in terms of social perception, affect, cognition and behavior (Dovidio et al., 2010). Therefore, interventions for improving intergroup relations often focus on categorization among social groups (Stephan & Stephan, 2001). Most research on prejudice reduction focus on majority groups due to their higher status and power. Majority group members' recognition of discrimination and injustice, as well as, support and help is indispensable for minorities' integration outcomes (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015a). We therefore focus on the majority perspective in the present work.

The common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) proposes that by changing the nature of social representations from "*us*" and "*them*" to a more inclusive "*we*" it is possible to reduce intergroup bias. A body of research showed that recategorizing ingroup and outgroup members within a more inclusive common identity reduces intergroup bias, prejudice and discrimination (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Recategorization increases the attractiveness of ingroup members to former outgroup members because ingroup favoritism generalizes to the former outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). According to the common ingroup identity model, intergroup bias can be reduced by either making salient the perception of a common or a dual identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). A common identity can be achieved by increasing the salience of common memberships while not emphasizing the original subgroup identities. Common identities can be achieved by making salient common belonging such as nationality, but also by factors such as common goals or fate (Dovidio et al., 2010). Dual identities, in contrast, involve the simultaneous salience of a common, inclusive identity, and the minority-majority subgroup distinction (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Why and when the salience of a common or a dual identity is more effective remains unclear. One factor that determines the success of either a common or a dual identity is the impact that these approaches will have for reaching the interests of one's own group (Dovidio

et al., 2010). This results in different identity representation preferences of majority and minority groups (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2012). Majority members are known for preferring common group identities over dual identities because a common identity practically assimilates the minority, making them conform to the majority group that typically holds primacy of definition over the common group (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007). A common identity for majority members is preferable because it helps them maintaining their higher status by pulling attention away from disparities between the groups (Dovidio, Saguy, Gaertner, & Thomas, 2012). Thereby, a common identity reduces the likelihood of collective action among disadvantaged group members (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). The salience of a dual identity among majority members can increase intergroup bias, under certain circumstances, because an outgroup member who stresses his or her subgroup identity is perceived as threatening to the status quo of the dominant group (Dovidio et al., 2010). Minority members on the other side generally prefer dual identities, over common identities, because dual identities allow them to keep their heritage identity while being part of the larger society (Dovidio et al., 2012).

Some recent work, however, showed that although preferred by majorities, common national identities may not always be the optimal strategy to promote positive intergroup attitudes and that they can also lead to increasing bias (Esses et al., 2006; González & Brown, 2003). Esses and colleagues (2006) showed that inducing a common national identity among high social dominance orientated Germans did not improve attitudes towards immigrants while the same manipulation was successful among high social dominance orientated Canadian participants. These findings stress the importance of considering the contextual factors when implementing recategorization interventions.

In cultures where diversity is part of the national identity, like it is the case in Canada, a common national identity can be successful (Esses et al., 2006). However, maintaining a common national identity in the face of cultures that reinforce separate group memberships might be problematic (Hewstone, 1996). When group identities are associated with high status or highly visible cues to group membership (e.g., skin color), it will be difficult to abandon these group identities completely or to be colorblind (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2012). Thus, a common identity under certain circumstances can threaten groups' uniqueness and distinctiveness (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999), and thereby foster more competitive intergroup comparisons leading to higher levels of intergroup bias.

According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people seek membership in positively distinct groups, in order to achieve positive self-esteem, by positively

differentiating their ingroup from a comparison outgroup on some valued dimension. Brewer (2012) proposes that the optimal identity simultaneously satisfies the need for inclusion and the need for differentiation from relevant outgroups. Social identities are therefore "selected and activated to the extent that they help to achieve a balance between needs for inclusion and for differentiation in a given social context" (Brewer, 2012, p. 90). These social identity motives have important implications for the functions and limits of social identification as a motivator of prosocial behavior (Brewer, 2012). The challenging part is finding the right balance between inclusiveness and distinctiveness while implementing a superordinate identity in a certain context.

It is important to note that optimal distinctiveness is a dynamic equilibrium and that identity motives vary across situations, cultures and individuals (Brewer, 2012). These social identity motives underlie differences in values of independence and interdependence on the individual, relational and collective level (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). Individuals with collectivist values for example should be sensitive to any threat to the clarity and stability of ingroup-outgroup distinction (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). Individualists depend on each other just as members of collectivist groups but compared to collectivist values, individualism gives greater weight to personal interests and therefore negotiates interdependence differently (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). Individualists have a higher activation of inclusion because the need for differentiation is chronically met by the emphasis on individual responsibility (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). Following this the optimal distinctiveness of collective social identities is met at a higher level of inclusiveness (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). Thus, in an individualistic value system, like it predominates in Germany, the clarity of ingroup-outgroup distinction is somewhat less important since obligations to groups are not absolute or highly reliable (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). This results in a high level of social identification across a wide range of social groups and a high tolerance of within-group diversity or inclusive identities (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). The present thesis therefore moved away from the approach of implementing a common national identity and explored the effect of different, more complex, forms of inclusive global identities in the German context.

**Complex inclusive identities**

The complexity of the modern world offers multiple group identities that are optimal, within different contexts, to meet identity inclusion and differentiation needs (Brewer, 2012). Thus, a new identity reference is needed to subsume all individuals regardless of race, skin-color and ethnicity. McFarland and colleagues (2012) propose that people that regard all

humanity as one ingroup should be low in bias against groups whom others would consider as outgroups (e.g., other races nationalities and religions) (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012). Recent empirical evidence showed that identification at this highest inclusive level (i.e., humanity) is related to a variety of pro-social and cooperative behaviors beyond national borders (Reysen, Pierce, Spencer, & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). There is evidence that identification with all humanity is positively related to support for human rights, which is an important factor for integration outcomes (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012). One process that explains the relation between identification with all humanity and pro-social behavior is distributive justice, because people belonging to a common category are perceived to be entitled to the same rewards (Wenzel, 2000).

Clarifying the concept of all humanity however is difficult due to the use of seemingly synonymous terms to describe a superordinate global identity (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). In the present research, we want to see how altering a national identity in the German context can improve attitudes towards refugees. Our goal was to create a superordinate identity that equally subsumes Germans and refugees. For this purpose, we decided to use the term *global citizenship* and defined it as embracing cultural diversity.

Following a social identity perspective, we propose that making the membership of the group ''global citizens'' salient makes people feel a psychological connection with global citizens (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Consequently, greater identification with global citizens should predict endorsement of the group norms, values and behaviors such as embracing diversity (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013).

On the other hand, the group of "global citizens" may not fulfil groups' needs for differentiation and distinctiveness. Especially feeling distinct from others might be difficult if only the common global identity is salient (Branscombe et al., 1999). To solve this, a more complex global identity that at the same time stresses a global identity and diversity should be sufficiently inclusive and exclusive at the same time. The fact that Germany, as an individualistic country (Hofstede, 2017), has a high tolerance of within group diversity (Brewer & Roccas, 2001) may allow a more complex global identity to be successful in the German context. A complex identity recognizes group distinctiveness by drawing attention to group disparities and allowing the subgroups to maintain their uniqueness while being united under a superordinate identity (Dovidio et al., 2012). Therefore, a more complex identity may be preferable in situations where group identities are central and assimilation goals would be threatening to ingroup distinctiveness (Riek, Mania, Gaertner, McDonald, & Lamoreaux, 2010).

Having multiple group memberships has the potential to reduce the likelihood that one's social world can be reduced to a single ingroup-outgroup distinction (Brewer, 2012). Research shows that when multiple ingroups are perceived to differ in their typical values it results in a more complex and inclusive representation of one's social identity (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). The recognition of more inclusive identities can therefore foster both members of minority and majority groups to mobilize and address social injustices (Dovidio et al., 2012).

Also, just using common global citizenship as a superordinate category bears some problems if the former majority considers itself as more typical. It has been shown that perceived higher prototypicality of the superordinate group (e.g., developed countries feeling more prototypical for the global community than developing countries) can predict outgroup derogation (Wenzel, Waldzus, & Steffens, 2016). This is grounded in the assumptions of the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) which states that within a superordinate group, subgroup members "project" their subgroup's characteristics onto the prototype of the superordinate group. In other words, if global citizenship is framed as an extension of Western, Christian, economically developed societies, groups that are minorities or just less powerful in the public discourse might be seen as less prototypical and therefore less entitled to have access to resources and power (Wenzel, Waldzus, & Steffens, 2016). Thus, a common global identity can stabilize power relations and legitimize the status quo of privileged developed countries such as for example Germany (Dovidio et al., 2012). Framing the superordinate global category as complex, so that different subcategories can be equally prototypical at the same time, can curb ingroup projection (Wenzel et al., 2016).

Nonetheless, increasing the diversity of a superordinate group can lead, among majority members, to an increase of threat because they perceive the legitimacy of their dominance questioned (Wenzel et al., 2016). Over inclusive and indistinct superordinate groups make it less likely that people identify with them (Wenzel et al., 2016). Research also showed that too much diversity makes members of prototypical subgroups become more conservative, less inclusive, and with negative attitudes towards minority groups (Wenzel et al., 2016). This stresses the functional role of group inclusiveness in actual intergroup relations. Wenzel, and colleagues (2016) propose that, in order to reduce the negative consequences of ingroup projection, consensus about the superordinate identity and the complexity of its representation is needed.

German participants seem to feel threatened by a common national identity when it comes to the integration of immigrants (Esses et al., 2006), therefore a more inclusive global

identity may be less threatening to Germans. Based on the literature reviewed we propose a more complex, rather than a simple common global identity, to be more successful in the German context. We will assess different forms of threat perceptions to better understand the particularities of the German context and why a complex global identity is probably more successful in Germany.

**Intergroup threats**

Intergroup threats occur when one group's actions, beliefs, or characteristics challenge the goal attainment or well-being of another group (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). Intergroup threats can take a number of forms, such as realistic and symbolic (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). In the famous Robbers Cave Experiment, Sherif and his colleagues validated the realistic conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1971), that accounts for group conflicts as being the result of competition between groups for desired resources (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Stephan and Stephan, in their integrated threat theory stressed the fact that perceived threats have real consequences, regardless of whether or not the perceptions of threat are accurate or not (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Realistic threats relate to political and economic power, as well as, to the physical well-being and safety of the ingroup (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Studies found that when minority and majority groups perceive that they compete for scarce resources like jobs, land or social welfare, there is a rise in hostility between the groups (e.g., Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). Additionally, symbolic threats, that stem from conflicting values, norms and beliefs, have been shown to influence outgroup attitudes negatively (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Symbolic and realistic threats can, both, influence outgroup attitudes simultaneously (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Tajfel, 1978). Indeed, each of the threat types makes significant and unique contributions to negative outgroup attitudes (Riek et al., 2006). Thus, when attempting to reduce negative outgroup attitudes, intergroup threats should be separately considered.

However, little research has explored how to reduce symbolic and realistic threats (Riek et al., 2010). Riek and colleagues (2010) found that intergroup threats act as a mediator of the relationship between superordinate identities and outgroup attitudes. They concluded that a superordinate identity increases positive outgroup attitudes by reducing the different types of threat (Riek et al., 2010). A superordinate identity could create the impression of cooperation and shared fate, which reduces realistic threats (Riek et al., 2010). A superordinate identity also stresses similarities between groups and thereby decreases

symbolic threats that stems from perceived differences in values (Riek et al., 2010). This might work even better in a dual or complex identity condition because it allows subgroup members to maintain their identities and some of their differing values, while focusing on the common values as well (Riek et al., 2010). But, remaining the subgroup divisions along which resources have to be distributed intact like it would be the case in a dual or complex identity condition can be less effective in reducing realistic threats because groups feel they are still competing for resources (Riek et al., 2010).

Riek and colleagues (2010) assumed, but were not able to show, that a one group representation is more likely to reduce realistic threats while a dual identity should diminish symbolic threats. In the present study, we want to test if this can be transferred to a common global identity and a complex global identity, in the sense that a common global identity reduces realistic threats and a complex global identity reduces symbolic threats.

Threat perceptions, though, are strongly linked to media coverage. It is generally acknowledged that information relayed through the mass media plays an important role in the formation of attitudes (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009) which also affect the willingness of prosocial behavior (Dovidio et al., 2010). Specifically, in the German context, media coverage suggests that Germans are more concerned with the violation of their values and norms (symbolic threats) than with the competition for actual resources (realistic threats) like jobs, social welfare and health care (UNHCR, 2015). Mainstream media and political discourse staged the incidents of reported sexual assaults in Cologne during New Year's Eve 2016 as the end of German *Willkommenskultur* (welcoming culture) (Boulila & Carri, forthcoming). Ever since, public discourse is concerned with the German value of gender equality in view of the 'refugee crisis' (Boulila & Carri, forthcoming). At the same time, due to the omnipresence of Islam-related topics concerning the refugee situation, fears of an Islamization of Germany are pushed by media coverage (Busse, 2015). The Islam is often pictured in the media as an archaic, barbarian, and sexist religion, which represents a threat to the values and norms of the liberal-democratic German society (Hafez, 2010). The concerns for German values and norms are often accompanied by a legitimation of overt Islamophobia (Boulila & Carri, forthcoming). We therefore expect to find higher symbolic threat values, relative to realistic threat values, among our German participants. Besides intergroup threats, research also shows that dehumanization of outgroups is associated with negative attitudes towards vulnerable outgroups. Thus, in the present study, we will also examine the role of dehumanization of refugees.

**Dehumanization**

Dehumanization describes the denial of full humanness to others (Haslam, 2006) and is related with less favorable attitudes towards refugees (Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008). Specifically, humanness is reserved to describe one's own group (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007) or the self (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), denying full humanness to others. We therefore want to test if dehumanization of refugees can be decreased by recategorizing people under different forms inclusive global identities.

Most often dehumanization is mentioned in relation to ethnicity, race and immigration (Haslam, 2006). There is no unitary definition of what dehumanization is and how to measure it. Several authors propose different dimensions in their work. Bastian and Haslam for instance propose two forms of dehumanization corresponding to the denial of the two forms of humanness: denial of human uniqueness and human nature (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). Denying uniquely human attributes to others representing them as animal-like, and denying human nature to others representing them as objects or automata (Haslam, 2006). Human nature refers to fundamental attributes of humanity, such as emotionality, warmth and cognitive flexibility (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). When human nature attributes are denied to people they are explicitly or implicitly linked to objects or machines and seen as cold and lacking emotion (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). Human uniqueness, on the other side, refers to attributes that are seen as distinguishing humans from animals, and involves refinement, civility, morality, and higher cognition (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). When human uniqueness attributes are denied to people they are compared to animals, seen as immature and irrational (Bastian & Haslam, 2010).

The dehumanization of low status groups in society may serve to justify the status quo of a majority (Pratto, 1999). Media plays an important role in this process (Esses, Medianu, & Lawson, 2013). Portraying refugees as violating appropriate procedures and trying to cheat the system leads to less favorable attitudes toward them and less support for the current refugee policy (Esses et al., 2008). Perceptions of falsely claiming asylum, thereby violating principles of justice, evoke the dehumanization of refugees in general, such that refugees may be perceived as less than human and thus not worthy of fair treatment (Esses et al., 2008). Esses and colleagues (2008) proposed that individuals who are high in right-wing authoritarianism may also dehumanize refugees if they see refugees as a threat to traditional values. However, this was not supported by the findings (Esses et al., 2008). Instead results

showed that refugees were dehumanized in order to keep them in their place and prevent them from competing for resources with the dominant national group (Esses et al., 2008).

In the present study, we aim to examine if a more inclusive global identity decreases dehumanization and thereby improves attitudes and behavioral intentions towards refugees coming to Germany. Finally, to better understand contextual factors that can impact the success of these different forms inclusive identities we will assess different conceptions of national identity.

**Citizenship representations**

Research suggests that Germans' threat perceptions differ from the Canadians' (Esses et al, 2006). It remains open if this is true and if these differences in defining the national ingroup and perceiving threat can be attributed to the German citizenship representations that are regarded as rather exclusive and ethnic (Brubaker, 1992). A civic national representation, emphasizes ideologies and abstract national values of a society, which determine rights and obligations (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015b). Ethnic identity representations stand for exclusive, impermeable boundaries, as those who do not share common heritage and ancestry will never be regarded as fully fitting into the national ingroup (Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010). Civic identity representations in contrast, are more inclusive boundaries. Everyone who is legally part of the nation and fulfills their citizenship obligations is considered as an ingroup member, irrespective of ethnic background (Meeus et al., 2010).

The well-known distinction between ethnic and civic forms of citizenship exemplifies how culture and institutions have an impact on national identity and thereby shape responses to immigration and asylum (Kohn, 1944). Citizenship representations are a product of historical, legal and social influences (Brubaker, 1992). Even though a strict distinction between ethnic and civic nations does not reflect reality (Nieguth, 1999), different types of citizenship representation have an impact on the types of political participation that are available to citizens and non-citizens (Andreouli & Howarth, 2013). However, multiple identity representations coexist within a country, implying that citizens of the same country can either adopt a more ethnic or a more civic identity representation (Meeus et al., 2010). Differences in the inclusiveness of ethnic and civic national identity help to understand public' subjective opinions of who is perceived as being part of the national ingroup (us) and who is not (them) (Gaertner, & Dovidio, 2000; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015b).

Germany is an example of an ethnic nation. For instance, Germanys naturalization laws, until recently, were following the principle of the right of blood by which citizenship is

not determined by place of birth but by having one or both parents who are citizens of the state (Federal Foreign Office of Germany, 2013). Also until recently the non-native population of Germany was not allowed to acquire full political rights (Andreouli & Howarth, 2013). Nowadays, German naturalization laws have changed and can be considered more liberal (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). This, in part, can be attributed to the European integration: citizenship policies are converging in the European Union, and therefore policies no longer clearly reflect national cultures (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). However, research found that German citizens expressed specific self-descriptive traits and referred to their cultural traditions when asked about the meaning of their national identity which supports the assumption that Germany might still be considered a predominant ethnic nation (Ditlmann, Purdie-Vaughns, & Eibach, 2011).

Empirical evidence shows that an ethnic national identity has negative consequences for attitudes towards immigration, whereas a civic national identity often tends to have more positive consequences (Reijerse, van Acker, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Duriez, 2013). This is especially true when immigrants are ethnically and religiously distinct from the native population, as with Muslim asylum seekers in Western Europe (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015a). Research also found that violations of national identity expectations led to higher levels of exclusion from national identity on the part of citizens (Ditlmann et al., 2011) (Ditlmannetal.,É. In a study, immigrants that showed attachment towards the German national identity, without sharing the German cultural heritage, threatened the bonds that hold the nation together (Ditlmann et al., 2011). This may explain why the salience of a common national identity was not effective in a heritage based country such as Germany (Esses et al 2006). Citizens of a heritage based country like Germany might perceive immigrants that admit that they reside out of mere convenience as less threatening to the national cultural values and distinctiveness (Ditlmann et al., 2011).

Overall, it remains unclear if the idea of national identity as something that passes on and that cannot be acquired by just being born in Germany is dominating national identity representations. Based on previous findings we can expect the German participants to endorse an ethnic national identity (Brubaker, 1992). However, as outlined before, changes of the traditional policy of *jus sanguinis* towards a more liberal naturalization law also make it possible to expect that Germans, nowadays, also endorse a civic national identity (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). We will test which citizenship representation is dominating German national identity and how it affects the promotion of a common and a complex global identity.

**Present study**

The present study tests the efficacy of inducing different forms of inclusive, common, identities to improve attitudes and prosocial behavior towards refugees. Specifically, we test a) the relative efficacy of complex global identities vs. common global identities vs control to improve attitudes and prosocial behavior towards refugees; b) the underlying mechanisms that account for the positive effects of both complex and common global identities, namely reduced intergroup threats and dehumanization, and c) whether these positive effects are enhanced, or hindered, depending on the endorsement of civic rather than ethnic conceptions of national identity. From the literature review the following theoretical model and hypotheses can be derived.



*Figure 1.* Theoretical model

**Hypothesis**

Overall, we expect that a complex global identity will be more effective than a common global identity in promoting more positive attitudes and helping behavior towards refugees. Specifically:

H1: Regardless of condition, we expect symbolic threat to be higher than realistic threat values.

H2: Complex global identity will reduce symbolic threat and thereby lead to positive attitudes and more intentions of helping refugees.

H3: Common global identity will reduce realistic threat and thereby lead to positive attitudes and more intentions of helping refugees.

H4: Complex global identity will reduce dehumanization and thereby lead to positive attitudes and more intentions of helping refugees.

H5: Finally, we expect the positive indirect effects of complex and common global identities will be particularly stronger for those who endorse a civic rather than an ethnic national identity.

## Chapter II - Method

**Participants**

Participants were recruited through convenience sampling and were contacted via social network platforms and invited to participate in a study examining "The comprehension of online newspaper articles". After reaching a minimum of 50 participants per condition we stopped data collection. Participants were given an informed consent saying the study was confidential, anonymous and voluntary. Eighty-one participants were excluded because they did not meet the inclusion criteria: 25 did not indicate to have German citizenship; 3 were less than 18 years old; 53 were removed because they dropped out the survey without answering to the dependent measures. The final sample included 178 German citizens who were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions (59 to the common global identity condition, 58 to the complex global identity condition and 61 to the control condition).

The 178 participants had a mean age of 32.95 ($SD$ = 13.46, range: 18-78) and 116 were women (65.2%). The sample was highly educated with 61.8 % having a university degree. Fifty percent of the participants were currently studying and 53.1% had either no income or a maximal income of 1.000 Euro per month. The majority of the sample indicated a rather left-winged preference on the political self-placement scale ($M$ = 3.00, $SD$ = 1.08, *range*: 1-7) and indicated a low level of religiousness ($M$ = 2.33, $SD$ = 1.55, *range*: 1-7). 80.9% of the respondents self-categorized as Germans, while 8.43% of the participants indicated that they identify with eithera global identity, all humanity, Europeans, cosmopolite, or no nationality at all. Participants were moderately identified with German national identity ($M$ = 4.06, $SD$ = 1.11, *range*: 1-7)[1].

Procedure

The study consisted of five parts (Figure 2). In the first part, after participants consenting to participate in the study, we measured demographics and citizenship representations. The second part was presented as a study about the comprehension of newspaper articles. Participants were asked to read a newspaper article that served to implement the manipulation. According to the conditions, the articles contained messages to foster either a common global identity, a complex global identity or an unrelated message (control condition).

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[1] Identification with German national identity was assessed with the Multicomponent Ingroup Identification Scale (Leach et al, 2008).

Immediately after, in the third part, participants read a short distraction article about an unrelated topic (upcycled dishes made off coffee ground) to avoid the effect of demanding characteristics. Following this, participants answered to a manipulation check. In the fourth part, we assessed our dependent measures and finally participants were debriefed. Participants were told the study did not test the comprehension of online media articles and the real goal of the study was to understand if inclusive identities can promote more positive attitudes towards refugees coming to Germany. They were also informed that the articles were fabricated by the research team to create different forms of inclusive identities

```
1. part: Demographics + Moderator
    2. part: Manipulation
        3. part: Distraction
            4. part: Dependent variables: attitudes, behavioral intentions
                5. part: Debriefing
```

*Figure 2.* Study procedure

**Manipulation**

Participants were instructed to read the online articles very carefully, as they later would have to "answer some questions about them." The articles were short online reports that contained images to support their content (see Appendix B and C). The experimental articles used in both common and complex identity conditions both talked about the video "The DNA Journey"[2] that was a viral advertisement of travel guide momondo that became famous in social media in 2016. The content of the article was adopted according to complex global or common global identity condition.

The article of the common global identity condition stated that "we have much more in common with other nationalities than we would expect and that we are all members of one global family". The article of the complex global identity condition stated "that we can have different cultures, religions, skin colors, or nationalities but at the same time we are all global citizens who have much more in common than we would expect." Next, a few paragraphs explained the procedure of the DNA testing experiment conducted by travel guide momondo. The results were presented in different ways according to the condition: in the common global identity condition results showed that „somehow we are all related with each other!" while the complex global identity condition stressed that "while being different we are all

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[2] 28% and 26% of participants in the common and complex global identity conditions, respectively, already knew the video.

somehow related with each other!". The emotional reactions of the participants in both articles were described to increase further identification among the reader. The common global identity article finished with the statement that "being aware of our commonalities might help reaching peace" and "the truth is that we are all united in being human!". The complex global identity article closed with the remark that "we are all different, but this experiment also shows that there is more that connects us. Diverse and united in being human - that's what global citizens are!" In the control condition participants read an article about the mysterious decline of songbirds of approximately the same length as the other two articles.

Measures[3]

Demographics

We measured the following demographics: gender, age, nationality, education, income and job situation. Additionally, we used the well-known political self-placement scale (Jost, 2006) to assess participant's political orientation (ranging from 1 = *far-left* to 7 = *far-right*).  Religiousness was assessed in a similar way (1 = *Not at all religious* to 7 = *Very religious*). The whole questionnaire is available in  Appendix D.

**Manipulation check**

Given the exploratory nature of the manipulations, we used several different measures to assess its success. We created a direct measure to check if participants understood the content of the manipulated article by asking their agreement with specific statements according to the experimental condition. In the common global identity condition participants answered on a 3-point scale (1 = *not true, 2 = partly true, 3 = true*) to what extent the following statement was true: "According to the first article to what extent people are all part of one global family." In the complex global identity condition participants were asked: "According to the article to what extent are we all different but at the same time have a lot in common as global citizens of the world?". In the control condition participants were asked to indicate their favorite article and say if they consider the coverage of the articles objective.

We also assessed participants' endorsement of complex and common global identity. We adapted previously used items to measure traditional endorsement of dual identity (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015b). Participants indicated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree)* how much they agreed with the following: "Even though we are all culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse, I have the feeling we all

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[3] Additionally, the competence and warmth scale (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu, 2002)and German national identification (Leach et al., 2008) were assessed.

belong to one community of global citizens" ,"In spite of the cultural ethnical and religious differences, all of us together make up the global society of today", "Despite all the cultural ethnical and religious differences, I often have the feeling that we are all part of a global community and that we all work together as global citizens of the world." Higher values mean a higher endorsement of complex global identity ($\alpha$ = .75.)

Common global identity was measured with an adapted version of the global social identification scale (Reese, Proch, & Cohrs, 2014). Participants indicated how much they agreed on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree)* with 5 items (e.g. "It is important for me to define myself as a part of the world community", "I feel strongly connected to other global citizens"). Higher values indicate a higher endorsement of a common global identity ($\alpha$ = .92).

Finally, we also included the more traditional items that are used to measure group identity representations (Guerra, Gaertner, António, & Deegan, 2015). The item: "I see us as one group of global citizens" measured common global identity. "I see us as two groups playing together on the same team" assessed complex global identity and "I see us as two separate groups" measured a two-separate groups representation. The response format consisted of a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree)* to 7 (*strongly agree)*.

**Ethnic and civic identity**

Ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity were evaluated with Reijerse and colleagues (Reijerse et al., 2013) measures. Ethnic citizenship was measured with three items (e.g., "To what extent do you consider it important that a person has German ancestors?", $\alpha$ = .82.) Civic citizenship was assessed with five items (e.g., "To what extent do you consider it important that a German person agrees that someone who legally settles in Germany and who follows all basic rules, must receive the same rights as a German citizen?", $\alpha$ = .62). The items were measured on 7-point Likert scales (ethnic: 1 = *very unimportant*, 7 = *very important*/ civic: 1 = *I don't agree at all* to 7 = *absolutely agree*). Higher scores on both scales meant stronger endorsement of the respective citizenship representation.

Realistic and symbolic threat

Realistic and symbolic threat were assessed with Stephan and Stephan's intergroup threat scale (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Realistic threat was assessed with four items that focused on political and economic threats (e.g., "Too much money is spent on welfare programs that benefit refugees"; $\alpha$ = .78). Symbolic threat was measured with six items (e.g.," Refugees don't understand the way Germans view the world.", $\alpha$ = .84). All items

were measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*. High scores indicate greater perceived threat.

Dehumanization

Dehumanization was assessed with the human nature (e.g., "Refugees are emotional, responsive and warm", reverse coded) and human uniqueness (e.g., "Refugees lack self-restraint like animals") scale (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). Participants answered to eight items on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*. Positive items were reversed such that higher rates on the scale indicate a higher degree of dehumanization of refugees. To confirm the two-factor structure of the scale we conducted an EFA with principal-axis scoring extraction and Promax rotation on the items. The number of retained factors was determined by scree plot analysis, and item loadings were taken from pattern matrices (Costello & Osborne, 2005). The results revealed an initial two-factor solution explaining 55.89% of variance. The item "Refugees are unsophisticated" did not load on any of the two factors and was removed ($r < .12$). This resulted in a one-factor solution, that explained 55.92% of variance. All remaining items loaded acceptably in the single factor, ranging from .65 to .81. In the present sample, the two-factor structure could not be confirmed and therefore we created a single index of dehumanization ($\alpha = .90$).

Feeling thermometer

The feeling thermometer is used in general population surveys and political polls to measure respondents' attitudes and feelings toward certain objects (Liu & Wang, 2015). It uses a 101-point rating scale, where 0 indicates very cold and unfavorable feelings while 100 indicates very warm and favorable feelings (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). In the current questionnaire participants were asked to rate how warm they felt towards refugees.

Social Distance

*Social distance* was adapted from previous research (Binder et al., 2009). Participants indicated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all* to 5 = *very much*) to what extent they were favorable of having refugees as in-laws, houseguests, neighbors, boss or co-workers ($\alpha = .93$). After reverse coding the items, higher values indicate greater desire for distance.

Behavioral intentions

As behavioral intentions are the closest cognitive predictor of actual behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) we assessed helping behavioral intentions. We created a fictitious scenario and asked participants to indicate their willingness to engage in eight helping behaviors ("The project "refugees welcome" is currently looking for supporters who help integrating refugees into German society."). Participants indicated on 5-point Likert (1 = *not*

*likely* to 5 = *very likely)* how likely it was that they would engage in several activities (e.g., "donating money, taking part in a demonstration for refugees or sharing media content about the situation of refugees online"). Higher values indicate greater intention for getting involved into helping behavior. For parsimony reasons, we conducted an EFA with principal-axis scoring extraction and Promax rotation on the items. The number of retained factors was determined by scree plot analysis, and item loadings were taken from pattern matrices. The results revealed an initial two-factor solution explaining 52% of variance. The two-factors reflected clearly more active (organizing and distributing clothing donations" or "teaching German") vs. passive ways of helping (e.g., "sharing media content about the situation of refugees online" or "writing a post about the rights of refugees on the personal social network page, blog or website"). Items ("Signing a petition for human rights of refugees" and "persuade friends and family to volunteer for refugees") that loaded ≥.32 in more than one factor were removed to avoid cross-loading, and this resulted in a two-factor solution, that clearly differentiated active helping and passive helping behavior items (Costello & Osborne, 2005). All remaining items loaded acceptably in only one factor, ranging from .34 to .89 for the passive helping behavior, and .57 to .77 for active helping behavior. We then computed an active helping behavior scale (e.g., "Taking part in a demonstration for refugees", "organizing and distributing clothing donations" and "teaching German", α = .73). The passive helping behavior scale included the items "donating money", "sharing media content about the situation of refugees online" and "writing a post about the rights of refugees on the personal social network page, blog or website" (α = .67). For an overview of the reliability of all measures see Appendix A.

## Chapter III - Results

Overall and regardless of condition, results revealed, as expected (H1), that participants had higher levels of symbolic threat ($M$= 2.91, $SD$ = 0.78) relative to realistic threat ($M$ = 1.79, $SD$ = 0.80), $t$ (177) = -20.09, $p < .001$.

**Manipulation check**

Results of the direct manipulation check revealed that, overall, 80.3% of the participants that were in one of the experimental conditions understood the main message of the manipulation. Specifically, 77.6% of the participants who were assessed in the complex global identity condition and 83.1% in the common global identity condition chose the correct statement (Table 1).

Table 1. *Absolute and relative frequencies of manipulation check*

|  | CGI | CxGI | N (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not true | 1 (1.7%) | 2 (3.4%) | 3 (2.6%) |
| Partly true | 9 (15.3%) | 11 (19%) | 20 (17.1%) |
| True | 49 (83.1%) | 45 (77.6%) | 94 (80.3%) |
| N (%) | 59 (50.4%) | 58 (49.6%) | 117 (100%) |

*Note.* CGI = common global identity, CxGI = complex global identity.

We conducted a 3 experimental condition (control vs. common global identity vs. complex global identity) x 2 group identity (endorsement of complex global identity vs. global social identification) within-factor repeated measures ANOVA to examine the effect of the manipulation on corresponding measures of complex and common global identities. Results showed a main effect of group identity, $F$ (1) = 55.36, $p <.001$, $\eta^2_p$ =.25. Overall, and regardless of the experimental condition, participants endorsed more complex global identity ($M = 5.49$, $SD = 0.10$) than common global identity ($M = 4.94$, $SD = 0.10$). There was no significant interaction between the experimental condition and group identity.

**Manipulation effects on dependent variables**

We conducted a 3 experimental condition (control vs. common global identity vs. complex global identity) MANOVA on our main dependent variables, to examine the overall effects of our manipulation. The assumptions of normal distribution of the dependent variables within groups and equality of covariance matrices were partly violated. Nonetheless, some MANOVA test statistics have been proved to be robust to violations of these assumptions (Field, 2009). To account for that, we reported the more conservative multivariate test statistic: Pillail's trace.

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Results revealed a marginally significant multivariate effect of condition on the dependent variables, $V = 0.14$, $F (14,316) = 1.64$, $p =.068$, $\eta_p^2 = .068$. As expected, univariate tests revealed a significant effect of the manipulation on the feeling thermometer, $F (2,163) = 3.40$, $p = .036$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; the dehumanization scale, $F (2,163) = 3.48$, $p = .033$, $\eta_p^2 = .041$ and the active behavior scale, $F (2,163) = 3.11$, $p =. 047$, $\eta_p^2 = .037$. There was also a marginal effect on the realistic threat scale, $F (2,163) = 2.51$, $p = .085$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$ and the symbolic threat scale, $F (2,163) = 2.74$, $p = .067$, $\eta_p^2 = .033$. The effect of condition on the social distance scale, $F (2,163) = 1.95$, $p = .146$, $\eta_p^2 = .023$ and the passive behavior scale, $F (2,163) = 0.62$, $p = .595$, $\eta_p^2 = .006$ was not significant.

Simple contrasts comparing the complex global identity vs the control condition showed that participants in the complex global condition revealed lower realistic and symbolic threat, lower dehumanization, more positive feelings towards refugees and more intentions of active helping (see Table 2). Simple contrasts comparing common global identity vs control condition revealed that participants in the common global identity condition, showed marginally lower levels of realistic threat. These findings supported our general hypothesis that complex global identity would be more effective in triggering positive intergroup outcomes than a common global identity.

Table 2. *Means by experimental condition*

|  | Control | CGI | CxGI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Realistic threat | 1.96 (0.10) | 1.69† (0.11) | 1.66* (0.11) |
| Symbolic threat | 3.09 (0.10) | 2.86(0.11) | 2.76* (0.11) |
| Social distance scale | 3.32 (0.10) | 3.51 (0.11) | 3.60 (0.11) |
| Feelings thermometer | 71.05(2.34) | 76.14 (2.46) | 79.66*(2.40) |
| Dehumanization scale | 2.58(0.11) | 2.49 (0.12) | 2.17*(0.12) |
| Active behavior | 3.11 (0.14) | 3.14 (0.14) | 3.58* (0.14) |
| Passive behavior | 2.74 (0.14) | 2.82 (0.15) | 2.61 (0.14) |

*Note:* CGI = common global identity, CxGI = complex global identity, * = $p < .05$,† = $p < .10$.

**Indirect effects of complex global and common global identities**

To examine our hypotheses, we ran three 5,000 bootstrapped parallel mediation models using PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), one for each dependent variable -+ feeling thermometer, social distance, and active behavioral intentions. For all models, the experimental manipulation was the predictor (dummy coding: D1 control = 0 vs. common global identity = 1 vs. complex global identity = 0; D2 control = 0 vs. common global

identity =0 vs. complex global identity = 1). The mediators were realistic threat, symbolic threat and dehumanization. All mediators were mean centered.

**Feeling thermometer**

Supporting H2, the positive indirect effect of complex global identity on warmth felt towards refugees through decreased symbolic threat was significant, $b_{AB2} = 0.91$, $SE = 0.63$, 95% CI [0.06, 2.63] (Figure 3). The direct effect of complex global identity vs. control on symbolic threat was significant, $b_{A2} = 0.30$, $SE = 0.15$, $p = .040$, 95% CI [-0.59, -0.02], that is, participants revealed less symbolic threat in the complex global condition relative to the control condition. Decreased symbolic threat was then related to warmer feelings towards refugees, $b_{B2} = -3.01$, $SE = 1.59$, $p = .059$, 95% CI [-6.14, 0.12] (Figure 3). Supporting H4, results also showed a significant positive indirect effect of complex global identity on participants' feelings towards refugees through decreased dehumanization, $b_{AB3} = 3.37$, $SE = 1.51$, 95% CI [1.01, 7.19]. Specifically, results showed that participants in the complex global identity condition, relative to those in the control, revealed, as expected, less dehumanization of refugees, $b_{A3} = -0.41$, $SE = 0.16$, $p = .011$, 95% CI [-0.73, -0.09]. Decreased dehumanization was then related to warmer feelings towards refugees, $b_{B3} = -9.61$, $SE = 1.39$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-12.35, -6.87] (Figure 3). Finally, results showed no reliable indirect effects of the common global identity condition on warmth through realistic threat $b_{AB} = 0.68$, $SE = 0.60$, 95% CI [-0.11, 2.37] which did not support H3.



*Figure 3.* Indirect effects of complex global identity on warmth.

*Note.* ** = $p < .01$, * = $p < .05$, † = $p < .10.$, --- = n.s.

## Social Distance

Confirming H2, the indirect effect of complex global identity on social distance towards refugees through decreased symbolic threat, $b_{AB2} = -0.06$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.01]) was significant. Specifically, results showed that participants in the complex global identity condition, relative to those in the control condition, revealed, less symbolic threat, $b_{A2} = -0.31$, $SE = 0.15$, $p = .036$, 95% CI [-0.59, -0.02]. Decreased symbolic threat was then related to less social distance towards refugees, $b_{B2} = 0.20$, $SE = 0.08$, $p = .014$, 95% CI [0.04, 0.36] (Figure 4). Further supporting H4 results showed a significant indirect effect of complex global identity on social distance through decreased dehumanization, $b_{AB3} = -0.13$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [-0.26, -0.03]. Results showed that participants in the complex global identity condition, relative to those in the control condition, revealed, less dehumanization, $b_{A3} = -0.40$, $SE = 0.16$, $p = .014$, 95% CI [-0.72, -0.08]. Decreased dehumanization was then related to less social distance towards refugees, $b_{B3} = 0.33$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.19, 0.47] (Figure 4). Contrary to H3, results showed no reliable effects of the common global identity condition (relative to the control) on social distance through decreased realistic threat, $b_{AB} = 0.05$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.17]. Additionally, results showed a significant indirect effect of complex global identity on social distance towards refugees through decreased realistic threat, $b_{AB1} = -0.05$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [-0.17, -0.003]. Participants in the complex global identity condition, relative to those in the control condition, revealed less realistic threat, $b_{A1} = -0.29$, $SE = 0.15$, $p = .052$, 95% CI [-0.57, 0.003]. Decreased realistic threat, was then related to less social distance towards refugees, $b_{B1} = 0.19$, $SE = 0.08$, $p = .018$, 95% CI [0.04, 0.36].



*Figure 4.* Indirect effects of complex global identity on social distance.

*Note.* * = $p < .05$, † = $p < .10$. --- = n.s.

**Active behavior**

Supporting H2, results showed a significant indirect effect of complex global identity (relative to the control) on participants' active behavior intentions through decreased symbolic threat, $b_{AB2} = 0.09$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.01, 0.25]). Specifically, results showed that participants in the complex global identity condition revealed, as expected, lower symbolic threat ($b_{A2} = -0.32$, $SE = 0.15$, $p = .024$, 95% CI [-0.62, -0.05]) relative to the control condition. Decreased symbolic threat ($b_{B2} = -0.26$, $SE = 0.12$, $p = .027$, 95% CI [-0.50, -0.03]) was then related to more intentions of engaging in active helping behavior (Figure 5). Contrary to our expectations (H4), the indirect effect of complex global identity on active behavior through decreased dehumanization was not significant, ($b_{AB3} = 0.06$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [-0.004, 0.20]). Confirming H3, results showed a reliable indirect effect of the common global identity condition (relative to the control) on active behavior through decreased realistic threat, $b_{AB} = 0.09$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.001, 0.27] (see Figure 5). Specifically, results showed that participants in the common global identity condition revealed, as expected, lower realistic threat ($b_A = -0.27$, $SE = 0.15$, $p = .075$, 95% CI [-0.57, 0.03]) relative to the control condition. Decreased realistic threat ($b_{B1} = -0.32$, $SE = 0.12$, $p = .006$, 95% CI [-0.55, -0.09]) were then related to more intentions of active behavior (Figure 5). Although not expected, results showed a significant indirect effect of complex global identity (relative to the control) on participants' active behavior intentions through decreased realistic threat, $b_{AB1} = 0.10$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.01, 0.28]). Results showed that participants in the complex global identity condition revealed lower realistic threat ($b_{A1} = -0.30$, $SE = 0.15$, $p = .043$, 95% CI [-0.59, -0.01]) relative to the control condition. Decreased realistic threat ($b_{B1} = -0.32$, $SE = 0.12$, $p = .006$, 95% CI [-0.55, -0.09]) were then related to more intentions of active behavior.



*Figure 5.* Indirect effects of complex global identity and common global identity on active behavior. *Note.* * = $p < .05$, † = $p < .10$. --- = n.s.

**Conditional effects of complex global and common global identities**

To further examine if the indirect effects of complex and common global identity were moderated by civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity (H5) we ran six 5,000 bootstrapped moderated mediation models using PROCESS macro for SPSS with model 7 (Hayes, 2013), one for each dependent variable and with each moderator. For all models, the experimental manipulation was the predictor (dummy coding: D1 control = 0 vs. common global identity = 1 vs. complex global identity = 0; D2 control = 0 vs. common global identity = 0 vs. complex global identity = 1); the mediators were realistic threat, symbolic threat and dehumanization, and the moderators were civic and ethnic national identity. All mediators were mean centered.

Indexes of moderated mediation were not reliable for all the models tested. Thus, contrary to H5, there was no evidence to support our expectation that participants' civic conception of German national identity would moderate the positive effects of complex global identity.

**Chapter IV – Discussion**

Given the current refugee crisis and the increasing numbers of asylum seekers arriving to Germany, there is a strong need for research that examines strategies that can create a welcoming atmosphere and positive attitudes towards these groups. Prior research showed that there is cultural variation regarding which identity representation is optimal for reducing intergroup bias across different national contexts (Esses et al., 2006). We discussed some difficulties that can arise from using the German national identity as a reference for merging different social groups (Esses et al., 2006). Thus, the objective of current study was precisely to compare the efficacy of different common identity interventions to promote positive attitudes and behaviors towards refugees in Germany. Grounded on Brewer's proposal that social identification is always a process of compromise between needs of inclusiveness and distinctiveness (Brewer, 2012), we tested the efficacy of two different forms of inclusive identities – common global identity and complex global identity, to decrease intergroup threats and dehumanization, thereby improving attitudes and behavioral intentions towards refugees in Germany.

Generally, and regardless of condition, participants showed higher symbolic threat rather than realistic threat when it comes to refugees. This is consistent with H1 and with research that shows that Muslims elicit higher symbolic threat (Hafez, 2010). Overall, consistent with our hypotheses, results showed that a complex global identity was more effective than a common global identity to improve attitudes and helping behavioral intentions among German participants. Specifically, our results showed that a complex global identity reduced symbolic threat (H2) and thereby led to positive attitudes and more intentions of helping refugees. We predicted a common global identity to reduce realistic threat and that decreased realistic threat was then related to an improvement in attitudes and helping intentions (H3). However, we could only observe the predicted positive indirect effect of common global identity on the active behavior scale, and not on the feeling thermometer or the social distance scale. Consistent with H4, results showed that a complex global identity decreased dehumanization and thereby led to positive attitudes and more intentions of helping refugees. In general, our results showed that campaigns portraying a message of all humans being part of a complex global identity improve attitudes and behavioral intentions towards refugees in the German context.

We proposed that inducing a complex global identity was more effective in improving attitudes and behavioral intentions toward refugees, than the common global identity, because it is more likely to reduce the symbolic threats that are prevailing in Germany (Busse, 2015;

Riek et al., 2010). Results confirmed this assumption. The complex global identity allows subgroup members to maintain their original identities and differing values, so they do not perceive conflicting values and consequently symbolic threats. Therefore, the prevailing of symbolic threats among German participants might explain why a complex global identity worked better. The complex global identity, although not predicted, also reduced realistic threats. The decreased realistic threats were then related to less social distance and more behavioral intentions of helping refugees.

Our results are also consistent with the reasoning that a more complex, rather than a simple common global identity, could be more successful in the German context because it avoids the negative effects of ingroup projection (Wenzel, Waldzus, & Steffens, 2016) and helps meeting needs for differentiation and distinctiveness at the same time (Brewer, 2012). However, the current study did not directly test this idea, and future studies could measure ingroup projection and needs for differentiation and distinctiveness to further test this idea.

Interestingly, we found different mediating mechanisms of the complex global identity condition on our dependent measures. We predicted the complex global identity to reduce symbolic threat and dehumanization and thereby decreasing social distance, and increasing warmth feeling and helping intentions. However, the positive effect of the complex global identity on the feeling thermometer (i.e., warmth) was mediated by dehumanization and symbolic threat, but not by realistic threat. We should note however, that the effect of dehumanization was stable after repeating the analysis while the effect of symbolic threat was less stable. Additionally, the positive effect of the complex global identity on social distance was mediated by the three predicted mediators - dehumanization, symbolic and realistic threats. However, the positive effect of the complex global identity on helping behavioral intentions was mediated by symbolic and realistic threats but not by dehumanization.

The feeling thermometer and the social distance scale were both supposed to measure attitudes towards refugees, thus we would expect that the underlying mechanisms that explained the effect of the experimental condition would be the same. However, as stated above, we found different mediating mechanisms on the attitude measures. One can speculate that the abstractness and proximity to real life considerations of the social distance scale and the feeling thermometer varies and that intergroup threats might have stronger effects on more direct measures of attitudes (social distance scale) or even behavioral intentions while dehumanization affects more indirect, abstract measures such as the feeling thermometer.

Finally, based on previous research showing that the inclusiveness of a national identity is crucial for the successful integration of asylum seekers (Ditlmann et al., 2011), we expected that the positive effects of a complex global identity would be stronger among Germans with a civic citizenship representation relative to Germans that endorse an ethnic national identity (H5). Not supporting this hypothesis, results showed no moderation effects of either civic or ethnic citizenship on the effect of complex or common global identity on attitudes and behavioral intentions. This result might be related to the content of the manipulation that induced global identities without mentioning a German national identity as a significant group identity. Because the manipulation did not mention a German national identity, the German identity may not have been salient for participants and thus, its content (either civic or ethnic) was not relevant.

Additionally, the sample showed a clear endorsement of civic national identity, relative to ethnic. This finding supports previous research (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010), but also contradicts other research showing Germany as an example for ethnic national representations (Brubaker, 1992; Ditlmann et al., 2011). This might be related to some demographic characteristics of the sample, which was highly educated, low in religiousness and left winged, all potential corollaries of civic citizenship representations.

Overall results revealed that, as predicted, a complex global identity was more successful, relative to a common global identity to promote positive attitudes and helping behaviors towards refugees. These effects were mediated by reduced intergroup threats and reduced dehumanization. At a theoretical level, these findings suggest that, consistent with the work of several other researchers (Esses et al., 2006; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), there are psychological mechanisms like intergroup threats and dehumanization that need to be changed for successfully improving intergroup attitudes. Thus, when applying an intervention that aims to reorganize national identities it is important to take into account the context in which groups are situated.

**Practical implications**

Research on news' coverage about immigration showed that media tend to create a discriminatory discourse that separates "*us*" from "*them*" (Wodak, 2011). Media also use stereotypes and metaphors (Cisneros, 2008) to stigmatize migrant groups (Happer & Philo, 2013). The formation of negative public attitudes towards refugees influences, among others things, the occurrence of overt discriminatory behavior and even hate crimes (Hewstone et al., 2002). Research shows that current media coverage concerning refugees and other

minorities is still biased by stereotypes (Geschke, Sassenberg, Ruhrmann, & Sommer, 2010). Some topics find repeatedly entrance in media coverage about refugees. Often refugees' eligibility is questioned, they are presented as a financial burden, their negative influence on the local culture is stressed and they are portrayed as criminals or even terrorists (Alia & Bull, 2005). This biased information selection affects societies' threat perceptions, attitudes and thereby increases the likelihood of prejudiced behavior (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006).

On the other side, media attention to humanitarian crises and their shocking impacts, is inevitable to show the world what is going on and raise awareness and empathy for those in need (Ethical Journalism Network, 2015). These findings stress the importance of fair and truthful media coverage about refugees and, at the same time, offer a possibility for social intervention. We were able to show that media fabricated articles can be used to improve attitudes and prosocial behavior intentions toward refugees and, thereby, break through the vicious circle that operates between media coverage and public reactions.

Of course, changing people's conceptions of national identity is a difficult task, nonetheless our findings offered some promising contributions that can be used to develop strategies to promote harmony between refugees and Germans. For instances, non-Governmental Organizations that are campaigning for the rights of refugees could derive ideas for social interventions and contents for campaigns from our findings. Passing on, in media campaigns, the message that we are all human but at the same time diverse seems to be a promising tool to promote positive attitudes and prosocial behaviors toward refugees in Germany.

Journalists and editors should be encouraged and reminded to practice careful, sensitive and ethical journalism and to be aware of the power media has (Ethical Journalism Network, 2015). The dangers of hate-speech, stereotyping and social exclusion of refugees and migrants in news coverage should be communicated to journalists and editors.

Finally, we recommend that political discourses underline the value of an ethnically diverse society while at the same time stressing common human values - in order to reduce discrimination. Promoting a complex global identity in political discourse and publicity campaigns can be a possible solution to reduce xenophobia and racism in Germany.

**Limitations and future research**

Our research suggested some issues worthy of further investigation. First, we were not able to find the expected moderation of citizenship representations on the effect of complex or common global identity on attitudes and helping behavioral intentions towards refugees.

As previously referred, our sample was rather left-winged, non-religious, highly educated and which are all factors that can potentially be related to endorsement of civic citizenship. Thus, there may have been a low variability of citizenship representations that can partially explain why we could not find significant moderation effects. The current study should be replicated with a more diverse sample to further examine this idea. Additionally, as stated above, our manipulation did not involve directly the German national identity, thus the civic or more ethnic character of this national group may not relevant when we focus on human global identity. To further clarify the non-significant moderation, future research could also manipulate German national identity as the superordinate group and measure citizenship representations.

Additionally, future research could also benefit from taking a broader perspective on historically and contemporary demands within a nation to better understand why the same strategy (i.e., inducing common identities) in some cultures was successful and in others not. For instances, future research could investigate if the success of different inclusive national identities is related to cultural dimensions, as stated by Hofstede (2017). Cultural dimensions of collectivism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance influence perceived threat (Stephan & Renfro, 2002), which, as we showed, mediated the effect of a complex global identity on attitudes towards refugees. Another venue could be exploring if the acculturation expectations of majority members in a given society are related to the effectiveness of inclusive global identities (Zagefka, Tip, González, Brown, & Cinnirella, 2012).

Given the importance of the national context, identity motives and specificities of threat perceptions demonstrated in the current research, it would be useful to replicate this research across a variety of nations. This would allow us to identify factors that determine when and why the promotion of inclusive global identities increases intergroup harmony. A cross cultural comparison could also help to understand if cultural differences in threat perceptions and dehumanization tendencies impact the success of different inclusive global identities. Future research could take into consideration that identity motives and intergroup threats are dynamic and related to political and cultural changes, so an intervention that increases intergroup harmony nowadays might not work in the future (Brewer, 2012).

Future research could also broad the dependent measures assessed, to include additional attitudinal responses, to allow us to better understand why we found different mediating effects on the dependent measures. Another limitation of the current work is that we only measured self-reported behavioral intentions. Given the intention-behavior gap, it seems necessary that future studies examine the influence of different inclusive global

identities on actual behavior. Since our results do not necessarily rule out alternative plausible models, future studies could also examine if a complex global identity reduces intergroup threats which than decrease dehumanization which in turn result in positive attitudes (e.g., Esses, Medianu & Lawson, 2013).

We intended to explore strategies for improving attitudes and helping behavioral intentions toward refugees coming to Germany. Future research could try to distinguish if different groups of asylum seekers (e.g., refugees coming from non-Muslim countries vs Muslim countries) evoke different threat perceptions and therefore demand different social interventions (Hartley & Pedersen, 2015). Finally, relations between immigrants and nonimmigrants are not one-sided, thus it is also important to examine how conceptions of different inclusive global identities influence refugees' attitudes and willingness to integrate. Thus, future studies could also focus on the perspective of refugees.

**Conclusion**

The current research adds to the current literature on inclusive identities by demonstrating that a common global identity may be limited in producing positive intergroup relations in Germany. A more complex global identity –that acknowledges all kind of cultural, ethnical and religious subgroups and the superordinate global identity –  however, may be the key to trigger positive intergroup relations and social change among refugees and Germans. A complex global identity thus, may be most effective in contexts where symbolic threats rather than realistic threats are salient and where identity needs for differentiation are higher, like it is the case in Germany.

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## Appendix A - Reliability of the measures

Table 3. *Reliability of the measures (N=178)*

| Scale | number of items | range | α |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethnic identity scale | 3 | 1-7 | .82 |
| Civic identity scale | 5 | 1-7 | .62 |
| Realistic threat scale | 4 | 1-7 | .78 |
| Symbolic threat scale | 6 | 1-7 | .84 |
| Dehumanization scale | 7 | 1-7 | .90 |
| Social distance scale | 5 | 1-5 | .93 |
| Endorsement of CGI and CxGI scale | 3 | 1-7 | .75 |
| Common global identification scale | 5 | 1-7 | .92 |
| Active helping | 3 | 1-5 | .73 |
| Passive helping | 3 | 1-5 | .67 |

*Note.* CGI = common global identity, CxGI = complex global identity.

**Appendix B - Complex global identity manipulation**

# Different cultures, nations, or religions make up the global citizens of today: an emotional journey through our diverse DNA



Foto: Screenshot

**One video makes millions of people cry. A DNA test shows us that global citizens of today who are proud of their country, skin color, traditions and cultures also have much more in common with each other than we would expect.**

04.06.2016, 12:27

How much do we know about our identity? Where are we from and who are our ancestors? In current times where migration became such a relevant social and political issue these questions become more and more relevant. Countries have different criteria to decide who can live there and who can't, who can be a citizen and who can't: Citizenship? Culture? And which role do genes play? Travel guide Momondo asked these questions and shooted a stirring video which within days became viral. It passes on the message that we can have different cultures, religions, skin colors, or nationalities but at the same time we are all global citizens who have much more in common than we would expect.

In April, this year 67 people from around the world were invited to an experiment about their origin. Participants were asked what they thought the test would uncover, what they think about their origin and were also encouraged to share some of their views and prejudices about people from different parts of the world.

# Astonishing results: „while being different we are all somehow related with each other! "

"Are you ready to go on a journey based on your DNA?", asks the researcher to all participants. They agree and hand in a saliva sample. Two weeks later they were invited back to see the surprising results: Nobody was 100 percent what he or she expected to be – A proud British who earlier on mentioned that he was "not a fan of the German people" realized that he was even 5 % German and a Kurdish woman who voiced her "problem with Turkey" has Turkish blood in her veins. The reactions of all participants were very emotional as they realized that despite our differences we are all connected and have something in common.

More than 2 million watched the video. "We started the DNA journey to show people that there are more things they have in common than they would expect ", explains Momondo Travel Guide. The message is stirring: Many of us have grown up thinking we're a part of a particular cultural story. But our DNA reveals that we're actually a part of many stories. Our genes remind us that there has always been exchange and migration and that we are much more similar than we think we are. We are all different, but this experiment also shows that there is more that connects us. Diverse and united in being human - that's what global citizens are!

**Appendix C - Common global identity manipulation**

# We have much more in common than we would expect: An emotional journey through our DNA



Foto: Screenshot

**One video makes millions of people cry. A DNA test shows that we have much more in common with other nationalities than we would expect and that we are all members of one global family.**

04.06.2016, 12:27

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## Astonishing results: „somehow we are all related with each other! "

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More than 2 million watched the video. We started the DNA journey to show people that there are more things they have in common than they would expect ", explains Momondo Travel Guide. The message is stirring: Many of us grew up thinking that we are part of a certain cultural history. But our DNA shows that we are actually part of many histories. Our genes remind us that there has always been exchange and migration and that we have actually more in common than it appears. Being aware of our commonalities might help reaching peace. The truth is that we are all united in being human!

## Appendix D - Questionnaire

Q1. **How old are you (please use numbers to represent years)**

_____

Q2. **What is the highest level of education you have completed?**
- o No final certificate
- o Certificate of completion of compulsory basic secondary schooling (Hauptschulabschluss)
- o General certificate of secondary education (Realschulabschluss)
- o Junior high school (Fachhochschulabschluss)
- o High school (Abitur)
- o Completed training course
- o College Bachelor's degree
- o College Master's degree
- o PhD

Q3. **Please select your gender**
- o Male
- o Female
- o other

Q4. **Professional situation**
- o student
- o employee
- o free lancer
- o unemployed
- o pensioner
- o Other:_____

Q5. **What is your monthly income?**
- o no income
- o 0-1000 Euro
- o 1001-2000 Euro
- o 2000-3000 Euro
- o 3000-4000 Euro
- o 4000-5000 Euro
- o More than 5000 Euro

Q6. **Are you a German citizen?**
- o Yes
- o No

Q7. **Which group do you most identify with? (check only one)**
- o Germans
- o Turks
- o Russians
- o Polish
- o Other:_____

Q8. **Political orientation**

| Very left-winged | | | Neither left nor right-winged | | | Very right-winged |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| □  1 | □  2 | □  3 | □  4 | □  5 | □  6 | □  7 |

Q9. **Religiousness**

| Not at all religious | | | Neither left nor right-winged | | | Very reliogious |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| □  1 | □  2 | □  3 | □  4 | □  5 | □  6 | □  7 |

Q10. **To what degree do you agree with the following?**

| Strongly disagree | Disagree | Somewhat disagree | Neither agree not diagree | Somewhat agree | Agree | Strongly agree |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

10.1. I feel a bond with other Germans

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

10.2. I feel solidarity with other Germans

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

10.3. I'm glad to be German.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

10.4. Being German gives me a good feeling.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

10.5. I often think about the fact that I am German.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

10.6. The fact that I am German is an important part of my identity.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

**Q11. To what extent do you consider the following personal characteristics and points of view to be important in order to regard someone as a German person? To what extent do you consider it important that . . .**

| Strongly disagree 1 | Disagree 2 | Somewhat disagree 3 | Neither agree not diagree 4 | Somewhat agree 5 | Agree 6 | Strongly agree 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11.1.that person has German ancestors? | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 11.2. that person was born in Germany? | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 11.3.that person grew up in a German family from an early age? | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

**Q12. To what extent do you consider it important that a German person takes the following points of view?**

| Strongly disagree 1 | Disagree 2 | Somewhat disagree 3 | Neither agree not diagree 4 | Somewhat agree 5 | Agree 6 | Strongly agree 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12.1. "Being German" has nothing to do with origin or cultural background, but only with the extent to which someone actively participates in German society. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 12.2. Members of all cultural groups may participate in the political process, where societal rules are developed. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 12.3. Someone who legally settles in Germany and who follows all basic rules, must receive the same rights as a German citizen. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 12.4. Origin or cultural background cannot be reasons to deny someone German Citizenship. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 12.5. German citizenship is something that is attainable to anyone who legally settles in Germany, who adheres to the legal rules and actively participates in society. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

The promotion of inclusive global identities in Germany

Q 13. **How** much do you agree with each of the items?

| Strongly disagree | Disagree | Neither agree nor disagree | Agree | Strongly agree |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13.1. Refugees dominate German politics more than they should. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13.2. Too much money is spent on welfare programs that benefit refugees | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13.3. Many companies hire less qualified refugees over more qualified Germans. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13.4. The German legal system is more lenient on refugees than on Germans. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13.5. Refugees and Germans have very different values.. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13.6. Refugees don't understand the way Germans view the world. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13.7. Refugees do not value the rights granted by the Constitution as much as Germans do. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13.8. Germans and refugees have different family values. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13.9. The values of refugees regarding work are different from those of Germans. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13.10. Germans do not get as much respect from refugees as they deserve. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

Q14. **To what extent are you favorable of having refugees as:**

| Not at all | | | | Very much |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

| 14.1. Co workers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

| 14.2. boss | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

| 14.3. neighbors | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

| 14.4. houseguests | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

| 14.5. In-laws | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

Q15. **Please rate how warm you feel towards refugees on the scale below.**

Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable and don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. Feel free to use the entire extent of the scale.



0     50     100     _____

Q16. **To what extent do you agree with the following?**

| Strongly disagree | Disagree | Somewhat disagree | Neither agree not diagree | Somewhat agree | Agree | Strongly agree |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Refugees...

| 16.1. are refined and cultured. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

| 16.2. lack self restraint like animals. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

| 16.3. are rational and logical, or intelligent. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16.4. are unsophisticated. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 16.5. are open minded and can think clearly about things. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 16.6. are emotional, responsive and warm. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 16.7. are superficial and have no depth. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 16.8. are mechanical and cold, like a robot. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

## Q17. **How much do you agree with the following?**

| Strongly disagree | Disagree | Somewhat disagree | Neither agree not diagree | Somewhat agree | Agree | Strongly agree |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17.1. Even though we are all culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse, I have the feeling we all belong to one community of global citizens'. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 17.2. In spite of the cultural ethnical and religious differences, all of us together make up the global society of today' | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 17.3. Despite all the cultural ethnical and religious differences, I often have the feeling that we are all part of a global community and that we all work together as global citizens of the world.. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

## Q18. **When thinking of refugees and Germans in Germany…**

| Strongly disagree | Disagree | Somewhat disagree | Neither agree not diagree | Somewhat agree | Agree | Strongly agree |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18.1. I see us as one group of global citizens. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 18.2. I see us as two groups playing together on the same team | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 18.3. I see us as two separate groups . | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

Q19. **How much do you agree with the following?**

| Strongly disagree 1 | Disagree 2 | Somewhat disagree 3 | Neither agree not diagree 4 | Somewhat agree 5 | Agree 6 | Strongly agree 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1. I feel strongly connected to other global citizens and the world community as a whole. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| 19.2. It is important for me to define myself as a part of the world community. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| 19.3. I feel strongly connected to other global citizens. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| 19.4. I am aware to be part of the world community. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| 19.5. Being part of the world community is an important aspect of my identity. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |

Q20. **The project "refugees welcome" is currently looking for supporters who help integrating refugees into German society. How likely is it for you to get involved with the following activities or initiatives?**

| Not at all | | | | Very much |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.1. Donating money | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| 20.2. Signing a petition for human rights of refugees | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| 20.3. Taking part in a demonstration for refugees | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| 20.4. Sharing media content about the situation of refugees online | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| 20.5. Persuade friends and family to volunteer for refugees | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| 20.6. Writing a post about the rights of refugees on the personal social | | | | | |

| network page, blog or website | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

| 20.7. Organize and distribute clothing donations | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

| 20.8. Teaching German | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

| 20.9. not helping at all. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

Q21. **How many hours per week would you volunteer for the refugees welcome project?**

_____ hours per week