

iscte

INSTITUTO
UNIVERSITÁRIO
DE LISBOA

The Chinese Dream: challenges and impacts for China's Foreign Policy

Carolina Ribeiro de Sousa

Master in International Studies

Supervisor:

Doutora Cátia Miriam Costa, Integrated Researcher and Invited Assistant
Professor

CEI_Iscte-University Institute of Lisbon

October, 2021



SOCIOLOGIA
E POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS

Department of History

The Chinese Dream: challenges and impacts for China's Foreign Policy

Carolina Ribeiro de Sousa

Master in International Studies

Supervisor:

Doutora Cátia Miriam Costa, Integrated Researcher and Invited Assistant
Professor

CEI_Iscte-University Institute of Lisbon

October, 2021

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Cátia Miriam Costa, for all her patience, support, and encouragement throughout this process. Thank you for always assisting me in every doubt I had, for taking the time to give me advice and guidance and, mostly, for sharing your knowledge with me. Your classes inspired me even before my thesis was a plan, and I don't believe it would have materialized without your help and support.

I would like express my deepest gratitude to my parents, who always supported me in every way possible throughout all my academic years. From moral support, to encouraging words, they were there for me in the best and worst of times. Thank you for providing me with opportunities you couldn't have dream of when you were my age and all the sacrifices you made for me. My gratitude is infinite.

In addition, a very big thank you has to be given to my grandparents as well, for being such an important part of my own identity and always encouraging me to follow my path, even when they don't fully understand it.

Last but not least, a very special thanks goes to my friends and my boyfriend, for constantly giving me advice, helping me review my work and, more importantly, being often times my personal therapists. I wouldn't have delivered this dissertation without you!

Thank you!

Carolina

RESUMO

O sonho chinês foi apresentado pela primeira vez por Xi Jinping em 2012. Desde então, o conceito tem sido utilizado como um objectivo comum da nação, servindo como uma forma de aumentar o nacionalismo dentro da China, bem como de conferir legitimidade ao PCC. Por isso, o Sonho Chinês é geralmente visto como um conceito mais nacional do que internacional. Contudo, o conceito é frequentemente utilizado também internacionalmente, quando se dirige a outros países: termos como o "Sonho Africano" e o "Sonho Mundial" começaram a aparecer em discursos proferidos por Líderes chineses, usados como uma ferramenta de “soft power”. Muitas vezes, o sonho é retratado como um conceito pacífico e é utilizado para estabelecer relação com outras nações. O conceito requer, como muitas vezes enfatizado por muitos líderes chineses, um mundo pacífico e boas relações externas, especialmente a nível regional. Mas a contradição entre esta necessidade e a crescente pressão da população para defender os interesses chineses no estrangeiro e a dependência da legitimidade do PCC na realização do sonho pode causar um conflito de interesses dentro do conceito.

Assim, a fim de compreender os pontos divergentes e convergentes da dimensão internacional e nacional do Sonho Chinês, e responder à pergunta "como é que o Sonho Chinês afecta a Política Externa Chinesa", a análise investiga tanto discursos nacionais como internacionais emitidos pelos líderes do PCC e relacionados com o conceito. O objectivo é compreender a contradição e os obstáculos do conceito e relacioná-los com as implicações que têm para a política externa chinesa.

Palavras-chave: Sonho Chinês; política externa chinesa; Partido Comunista Chinês; Soft Power; Nacionalismo

ABSTRACT

The Chinese Dream was first introduced by Xi Jinping in 2012. Since then, the concept is being used as a common goal of the nation, serving as a way of increasing nationalism inside China, as well as drawing legitimacy to the CCP. So, the Chinese Dream is usually perceived as more of a national than international concept. However, the concept is often used internationally as well, when addressing other countries: terms such as the “African Dream” and the “World Dream” started to appear in speeches delivered by Chinese Leaders, standing as a soft power tool. Often, the dream is portrayed as a peaceful concept and is used to relate to other nations. The concept requires, as many times emphasized by many Chinese leaders, a peaceful world and good external relations, especially regionally. But the contradiction between this need and the increasing pressure of the population to defend Chinese interests abroad and the dependence of CCP’s legitimacy on the realization of the dream may cause a conflict of interests within the concept.

So, in order to understand the divergent and converging points of the international and national dimension of the Chinese Dream, and further answer the question “how does the Chinese Dream impact Chinese Foreign Policy”, the research analysis both national and international discourses delivered by the CCP leaders and related to the concept. The aim is to understand the contradiction and obstacles of the concept and relate them to the implications they have for Chinese foreign policy.

Keywords: Chinese Dream; Chinese foreign policy; Chinese Communist Party; Soft Power; Nationalism

Table of contents

Glossary	vi
Chapter I - Introduction	1
Chapter II – Chinese Dream: Literature Review	3
2.1. Historical background	4
2.2. Chinese Dream: Values, aim and dimensions	8
2.3. Core ideas of the Chinese Dream	11
2.4. Aim of the Chinese Dream	13
2.5. National vs international dilemma of the Chinese Dream	14
2.6. International context of the Chinese Dream	17
Chapter III – Chinese Foreign Policy	19
3.1 Pillars of Chinese Foreign Policy: From the Bandung Conference to the 21 st Century	19
3.2 National interest and the Chinese Foreign Policy	24
3.3. Soft power and the Chinese Foreign Policy	26
3.4 Impact of the Chinese Dream in Chinese Foreign Policy	31
Chapter IV – Methodology	33
Chapter V – The Chinese Dream Discourse	36
5.1 The Chinese Dream Domestic Discourse	36
5.2 The Chinese Dream International Discourse	43
5.3 Comparison of the Chinese Dream Discourse in the domestic and international dimension: converging and diverging perspectives	49
Conclusion	51
Bibliography	53
Appendix A: Internal Discourse Table	61
Appendix B: External Discourse Table	67

Glossary

CCP – Chinese Communist Party

CPC – Communist Party of China

PLA – People’s Liberation Army

PRC – People’s Republic of China

SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Chapter I - Introduction

The Chinese Dream was introduced for the first time by Xi Jinping in 2012. Since then, the concept has been used by many CCP leaders and it became Xi's signature ideology. The concept represents a new element for the ideology that sets the tone for a new nationalist attitude, with its own values associated, becoming a powerful common goal that shapes China not only domestically but also internationally.

The importance of the concept is better explained by Zhang Wang, in his article "The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context", who states the following:

"Liu refers to the Chinese Dream as the new leadership's "mission statement" and "political manifesto" for the Party and the country's future; and it is "a major strategic thought" for developing socialism with Chinese characteristics. Judging from the CCP's propaganda efforts, the Chinese Dream has become the signature ideology for Xi's term. Without a doubt, understanding the concept of the Chinese Dream is essential to understanding Xi Jinping's administration and China's future policy orientation." (Wang, 2013)

The concept requires, as many times emphasized by Chinese leaders, a peaceful world and good external relations, especially regionally. However, the contradiction between these needs and the increasing pressure of the population to defend Chinese interests abroad may cause a conflict of interests within the concept. On the other hand, the Chinese Dream is often used in many international discourses as a source of soft power, with the creation of a "common goal" between China and the world, referring to concepts such as the African Dream, World's Dream, etc.. trying to make the Chinese Dream relatable to the world, in general, seem to be a way of exporting the concept and bring credibility and relatability to China.

Keeping this focus, it becomes important to study how the Chinese Dream goes beyond domestic policy, influencing and being used in foreign policy. So, the main goal of this dissertation will be to explore the impact of the Chinese Dream in China's foreign policy, answering the question "How does the Chinese Dream influence China's foreign policy?". In order to do so, it will be explored how the domestic effect of the Chinese Dream influences the Chinese external relations and analyze the usage of the Chinese Dream as a mechanism of international soft power.

Since the Chinese Dream is mostly used in political discourse, to answer those questions, the investigation aims to analyze two sets of discourse: internal discourse and external discourse.

The argument will be studied in three main parts: the first part with literature review, introducing the Chinese Dream itself, with historical background, the definition of its core values and concrete agenda, as well as its purposes and international context; the second part exploring Chinese Foreign Policy, through literature review; and the third part answering the question “How does the domestic effect of the Chinese Dream influence the Chinese external relations?”, with the examination of the internal discourse, and the question “Is the Chinese Dream a source of soft power for China to use internationally?”, exploring the usage of the concept in international political communication discourse. After the last two questions are answered, this dissertation hopes to explore the influence of the Chinese Dream in China’s Foreign Policy.

Only qualitative methods will be used, consisting of the examination of discourses given by CCP leaders, and published in official websites, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and Xinhua news. The discourses were selected based on their importance to the subject, all having direct references to the Chinese Dream. Categories of analysis with the main subjects associated with the Chinese Dream will be created, and the usage of the concept will be examined, as well as the convergences and divergences of the Chinese Dream in the national and international scope.

Chapter II – Chinese Dream: Literature Review

“Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, on November 29, 2012, visited "The Road Toward Renewal" exhibition in Beijing, pledging to continue targeting the goal of “great renewal of the Chinese nation.” (National People’s Congress of China, 2012)

It was in a very particular occasion that Xi Jinping decided to announce, for the first time, his vision of the Chinese Dream. The exhibition mentioned above illustrates the Western occupation of China in the XIX century, together with the Opium Wars and the 1911 Revolution that ended the Qing Dynasty. All these events pose as the representation of a very dark and known time in Chinese history, identified by the Chinese as the “century of humiliation” or “Hundred Years of National Humiliation”. It was in that context that Xi Jinping introduced the concept of the Chinese Dream:

“In my view, to realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history.” (Xi, 2012)

Even though the conceptual and linguistic idea of a Chinese Dream was not new, - having already been published a book on the subject by Liu Mingfu in 2009, entitled “The Chinese Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era”, which shouts for China to regain its previous position as a powerful country, lost in the century of humiliation, and argues that China is eligible to lead the world, since it is a superior nation tested through history – it was the first time that the concept was promoted by any leader of the CCP. There is, in fact, no way of knowing if Xi’s new ideal was or was not inspired by the book.

However, the concept of national rejuvenation has been used by other Chinese leaders, together with the concept of national humiliation. To understand national adherence to the concept, as well as grasp the basic meaning of the Chinese Dream, and how meaningful it is for China, it becomes important to first examine the historical background behind the concept of national rejuvenation, the biggest pillar of the Chinese Dream, and how it was used as a mobilization tool by many generations of Chinese leaders.

2.1 – Historical background

Many scholars are still struggling to understand the Chinese Dream, and the intentions behind the concept. Some of them argue that it is closely related with the American Dream, others set it as the end of China's peaceful international approach, and many do not see it as more than propaganda. But why is it so hard for the outside world to comprehend the concept?

As explained by Pröpper in his article “The “Chinese Dream”: An Analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative”:

“To understand a vision is to unravel its history and its future. An answer to the question being raised all over the world, “What does China think?” should therefore start in its past. ‘What past?’ one may ask, since due to what Edward Said famously named “Orientalism” (the idea of Western “natural superiority” and the perception of inferiority or even unimportance of the East) most have deemed this past unworthy of serious study.”(Pröpper, 2020)

To understand any concept to the fullest, it would be wise to start in the past, matching with the above-mentioned author. In this case, the first step to understand the Chinese way of thinking is to know how the country used to perceive itself, in order to understand the concept of national humiliation, with its subjacent view of national rejuvenation.

Before the 19th century, Chinese used to consider China the center of the world (in mandarin, China is written zhongguo 中国, which literally means central kingdom or country), both culturally and morally. Pröpper argues that this feeling may be traced back to the Silk Roads, a time of network that culminated in China:

“(…) China's exploration and conquests also lead to the (military) expansion of its physical and intangible horizon to the borders of Asia and beyond: thereby forcing the title “Middle land” or “Land under Heaven (Tianxia),” which China, still uses to define itself. (...) In part as the result of the success of the Silk Roads of old, China has long seen itself as the world's preeminent civilization. (...) However, in the early modern era, the world's center of power shifted to the West.” (Pröpper, 2020)

With the foreign occupation of China, by the West and Japan, this feeling of greatness was shaken, giving birth to the humiliation factor. According to William A. Callahan, this humiliation feeling is quite common in domestic and international policies and is highly underrated by many scholars (mostly western scholars) when studying China. He argues that

the individual feelings such as humiliation, guilt and victimhood have been nationalized, creating what he calls the “Guilt of Nations”. In the case of China, he says, the national humiliation factor is not used in a xenophobic way but rather in a self-critical examination, since it is mostly about celebrating China’s weaknesses, with a clear idea of history and recovery: only through humiliation can a country rejuvenate.

In fact, “humiliation” was long portrayed in classical Chinese texts as the builder and protector of social boundaries, such as the ones between proper and improper or civic and barbarian. Thus, no wonder that after the 20th century, the humiliation factor started being used as the guardian of national borders:

“China needs to not only "other" Japan and the West, but "other" itself by way of a thorough self-criticism: National humiliation is necessary for national salvation.” (Callahan, 2004)

Since the occupation of China by foreign forces was not as territorial as it was ideological, self-criticism was more predominant. Not just foreigners, but also the Chinese leaders were blamed for their weakness in dealing with the foreign forces. This feeling was so strong, that between 1927 and 1940, there was an official holiday called National Humiliation Day. Now, the narrative is that the humiliation century ended in 1949, when the Communist Party gained power and supposedly saved the country.

In Mao era, the national humiliation narrative was not used as an ideological tool or a source of legitimacy. He chose to use the class struggle theory to explain the Chinese revolution, foreign occupations as well as civil wars. According to Zheng Wang, at that time, “(...) the CCP’s propaganda machine repeatedly taught people that under Mao’s brilliant leadership the Party achieved one victory after another.” (Wang, 2013). So, instead of drawing legitimacy to the CCP through the humiliation past, emphasis was put in the victories of the Revolution. At this time, nationalism was rejected since it contradicted the internationalism of the cause.

However, in Callahan’s words, after the cold war, “(...) understandings and self-understandings of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have shifted from Communism to nationalism.” (Callahan, 2004). With the crackdown of communism in Eastern Europe and with the demonstrations in the spring of 1989, according to Wang, there was “three belief crises”: Socialism, Marxism and trust in the communist party. With this legitimacy crisis in hands, CCP had to look for another source of legitimacy, and so CCP’s leaders started to apply, once again, the humiliation and rejuvenation narrative, using modern history to create new justifications to

redefine the Party's mission. In Wang's own words, "(...) the CCP claims legitimacy with a portrayal of itself as the historic agency that restored national unity and practical independence." (Wang, 2013)

Still during Deng Xiaoping's ruling, in the early 1980s, a slogan that can be related to the Chinese Dream was put forward: the slogan of "invigoration of China." According to the Chinese leader, China was still behind in modernization, comparing with the rest of the world, and so invigoration was needed. This concept has common characteristics with the Chinese Dream: both concepts highlight making China more powerful and wealthy, relating the national success with the individual success of its people.

It was not, though, until Jiang Zemin's ruling that the narrative of the rejuvenation of China was put forward. In the beginning of the 1990s, CCP presented its mission of "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". This mission was to restore China to its previous glory, before the century of humiliation, instead of realizing communism, showing the switch to a more nationalistic approach. Jiang's rejuvenation narrative stressed how foreign powers triggered China's suffering in modern history, and that the main goal was to restore the country's past glory, and not its random rise. In his own words, "Only the CCP can rejuvenate China." (Jiang, 1991), proving that the rejuvenation narrative was highly used to draw legitimacy to the CCP.

From this time on, the national-humiliation theme was used in China to reinforce claims on islands, such as Hong Kong and Macao, as belonging to China. This usage of the humiliation narrative is described by Callahan:

"Since China lost face by losing territory to Western powers and Japan before 1945, now it must make sure not to lose face again by losing territory to its Southeast Asian neighbors." (Callahan, 2004).

In fact, spatiality is particularly important in the humiliation and rejuvenation narratives. Rejuvenation will only be achieved, in Chinese eyes, when the previous Qing empire is put together again, in its culmination of glory, which includes territories such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Macao and Hong Kong, as well as specific islands in South China Sea.

The following leader, Hu Jintao, not only continued Jian's patriotic approach and rejuvenation narrative, but also officially introduced three new connected narratives: the "harmonious society", a Confucian-based concept that promoted peaceful and harmonious

relationships; the “scientific development concept”, created to give response to the rise of ecological degradation; and the “well-off society”, which gave rise to the promise that China’s GDP would achieve the GDP of moderately developed countries by 2021.

With the rise of Xi Jinping as CCP’s leader, the rejuvenation narrative took a new step: the attention was drawn mostly to rejuvenation itself, and not so much the humiliation narrative. However, it keeps the tradition of painting an image of a better future for the people. Even the concrete agenda of the Chinese Dream, the “two 100-years” - of China becoming a “moderately well-off society” by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the CCP, and a fully developed country by 2049, which is the 100th anniversary of People’s Republic of China – seem to be a continuation of Hu’s goal of rising China’s GDP to the level of moderately developed countries. As said by Chunlong Lu, “(...) the concept of the Chinese dream is the natural result of a long-lasting discourse of national rejuvenation, victim mentality and rising nationalism.” (Lu, 2015)

All these narratives presented, though having many differences, seem to have a common goal: making the people believe that only through the leadership of the CCP can people’s life improve.

As said by Wang, “Xi’s Chinese Dream narrative is like an old wine in a new bottle with the dream’s name replacing Jiang and Hu’s national rejuvenation, Deng’s invigoration of China, and Mao’s realization of socialism and communism.” (Wang, 2013). It also applies better for today’s China, a strong country economically and a global player. The emphasis has now passed from the past grief to the future glory. As stated by Sørensen, “Rather than on foreign invasion and exploitation, the focus is on the positive elements and strengths in Chinese history and in Chinese ancient civilization with strong calls to revive and be proud of Chinese cultural values, strengths and achievements” (Sørensen, 2015). However, even if subjacent, the humiliation is always present, in people’s identity and history, and most importantly, as the engine of China’s rejuvenation.

The humiliation and rejuvenation narratives are, what may be called, a master narrative and national story. Wang explains:

“For any political party, it is vital to have a vision for the future that serves to provide compelling ethical or moral motivations to inspire people’s participation in the party’s cause. Therefore, it is necessary for a party to make clear its mission and to elucidate its vision for the future—these are prerequisites for the construction of the party’s political legitimacy. In

countries with authoritarian governments, this narrative is often supplied by the regime in power and represents the interests of that government.” (Wang, 2013)

The Chinese Dream may, then, be now perceived as a continuation of that national story, a page turning towards what has for long been the China’s long-lasting goal: the goal of regaining its previous glory. But what are, then, the values behind that national story? And do the people believe it?

2.2 – Chinese Dream: Values, aim and dimensions

A very particular feature of the Chinese Dream, one that distinguishes it from the American Dream, is that the Chinese Dream has three dimensions, seen as intertwined: the national dimension, the social dimension, and the individual dimension.

These three dimensions are identified by Chunlong Lu in his article “Urban Chinese Support for the Chinese Dream: Empirical Findings from Seventeen Cities”. In his research, Chunlong examines the support of the Chinese dream among Chinese citizens. He made this study in seventeen different cities (Beijing, Shenyang, Tianjin, Chengdu, Wuhan, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Nanning, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Qingdao, Lanzhou, Guiyang, Dalian, Nantong and Sanya), carrying out surveys to cover the research. While his sample doesn’t necessarily speak for the general Chinese population, since it only covers 17 cities, it is a good starting point to understand people’s view of the concept. The sample included 3000 responders, in which 2878 valid questionnaires were gathered. Among those, 92.4% of the people had heard about the concept of Chinese Dream, presented by president Xi. Regarding the understanding of the concept, 54% of the urban residents of the sample pointed out that the core values of the concept were: country prosperity, national revitalization, and the happiness of people; 24 % answered that the essence of the Chinese Dream is individual dream and individual development; and 20 % stated that the core value of the Chinese Dream is a strong and prosperous country and the rise of the nation. Only 2% of the sample had no perception about the Chinese Dream.

From these results, the author takes two conclusions: that China’s urban residents have at least a basic understanding of the Chinese Dream; and that China’s urban residents have formed basic perceptions of the core value of the Chinese Dream and understood the three basic

dimensions of the Chinese Dream: national dimension, social dimension, and individual dimension, as previously argued.

The author further analyses the resident's perceptions of the core values of the Chinese Dream and its dimensions by designing statements for the sample to evaluate from 1-5, from "completely disagree" to "completely agree". With these answers, he analyses the results using a structural equation model, from which he concludes the following:

"Firstly, most Chinese urban residents from seventeen cities have had a basic cognition of the concept of the Chinese dream, and this cognition includes three basic dimensions: country dimension, social dimension and individual dimension. Secondly, most urban residents from seventeen cities tend to link national dream, social dream, and individual dream together. It means that in supporting the individual dream, they also support the national dream and the social dream. (...) Thirdly, by analyzing the nature of the values of the Chinese dream, we find the national dream is mainly related to national prosperity and the improvement of socialist democracy, the social dream primarily focuses on social equality and justice as well as harmony and trust among people, while the individual dream mainly reflects the pursuit of individual happiness and equal opportunity for everyone." (Lu, 2015)

We can see, then, that the three dimensions of the Chinese Dream do not conflict with each other, but they are rather seen as interrelated. By supporting one of the dimensions, most people support the other two. We can then understand the concept not as individualistic, but as collective, in the sense that it has strong collective features. The correlation between the self, the society and the national elements portrays very well the complexity of the concept, which seem to carry a common interest of the people to prosper in all respects and rejuvenate the country. These dimensions loose frontiers in the concept, showing a nationalistic attitude that naturally intertwines with all aspects of one's life.

This correlation was made clear by president Xi from the start, and has been covered by official channels as well:

"History tells us that everybody has one's future and destiny closely connected to those of the country and nation," the Party leader said, noting that the people's wellbeing relies on the strength of the country and prosperity of the nation." (National People's Congress of China, 2012)

According to Michael Gow, in his article “The Core Socialist Values of the Chinese Dream: towards a Chinese integral state”, the Chinese Dream is intimately related with core socialist values. He claims that the publicity campaign launched to disseminate Core Socialist Values is a component of the Xi Administration’s Chinese Dream campaign, disseminating both through the media, poster art, infrastructures, etc. This view is supported by Michael X. Y. Feng, in his article “The ‘Chinese Dream’ Deconstructed: Values and Institutions”:

“There is a series of so called ‘core socialist values’ first announced in the Report of the 18th Party Congress delivered by the former Party Secretary-general Hu Jintao and endorsed by Xi in his ‘CD’ concept. They include prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity and friendship. Some more values are also embedded in Xi’s concept, including socialism, scientific development, and traditional Chinese culture.”(Feng, 2015)

Michael Gow identifies in these values the same dimensions as previously identified in the Chinese Dream by Chunlong Lu:

“These values have since been organized into three categories: prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony at the national level; freedom, equality, justice, and rule of law as societal values, and patriotism, dedication, integrity, and geniality as citizens’ concerns.” (Gow, 2017)

It can be argued that the “core socialist values” are, in many ways, connected with the Chinese Dream, since they are portrayed as the values that will make the Chinese Dream achievable. They have a correlation in dimension and principle, and both seem to be represented as the Chinese way of thinking. As said by Gow, the campaign of the core socialist values, which is an element of the Xi Administration’s Chinese Dream operation, “(...) constitutes a crystallization of the CCP’s values in contrast to “western” liberal values.” (Gow, 2017).

He further argues that the core socialist values are closely related with Confucian concepts, such as benevolence, righteousness, honesty, respect, friendship, and filial piety. Gow explains this correlation by arguing that “(...), through drawing on Confucian concepts already absorbed into existing common-sense understandings and aligning new concepts with these, this strategy makes the adoption of Core Socialist Values less prone to rejection as it merges with the existing currents of common sense (...).” (Gow, 2017)

It may, then, be reasoned that the Chinese Dream, the Core Socialist Values and Confucian thought are linked. “Many propaganda posters from the umbrella Chinese Dream

campaign align the Confucian concept of the morally superior person with the role of the citizen referenced in the Core Socialist Value.” (Gow, 2017). Both the Chinese Dream and the Core Socialist Values aim to reflect shared beliefs (incrustated in the existing “common-sense” related to Confucian values) that cement the legitimacy of the CCP. The concepts easily appeal to different ethnicities and groups within China, which serves the countries cohesion as well.

Michael X. Y. Feng identifies other values as crucial to the realization of the Chinese Dream, those being: socialism; democracy, or “socialist democracy”, which functions as a centralism democracy, with different features from the democracy perceived in western countries; freedom, that, again, functions very differently from the American term, being the emphasis put in insuring that people have several rights and freedoms set by the law; rule of law, run under the CCP’s leadership; equality; justice, with the protection of basic individual rights, or “development right”; Scientific development, which is mainly related to environmental protection; patriotism, or nationalism; and Traditional Cultural Values, where the Confucian values stand. The author relates the last two values:

“With the advancement of reform and opening up, China has become economically stronger and stronger. Accordingly, a strong national pride came back to the government and people, so did an interest in traditional Chinese culture, including Confucianism” (Feng, 2015)

In conclusion, the Chinese Dream is a concept that speaks to the Chinese population in general. Its values are incrustated in Chinese common-sense, related to the Confucian values, and highly intertwined with the Core Socialist Values. Within the Chinese Dream, there is a clear line that connects the people with society and the nation. Rejuvenating China must start with improving the society, which starts with one’s self improvement. On the other hand, the success of the country relates to society itself, which ultimately influences one’s personal life. No aspect is isolated from the others, showing the collectivism of the concept of the Chinese Dream.

2.3 – Core ideas of the Chinese Dream

Xing Li, in his article “Interpreting and Understanding “The Chinese Dream” in a Holistic Nexus”, identifies five core ideas and implications of the Chinese Dream.

First, as settled previously, the Chinese Dream is about rejuvenation of the country, the historical renewal of China, that will lead to the improvement of people’s life. Second, he identifies the Chinese Dream as a dream of the people including aspects such as education,

social security, health, etc. Third, it is of universal importance. In his own words, “The Chinese Dream is a dream of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit for all. It is connected to the beautiful dreams of the people in other countries. The Chinese Dream will not only benefit the Chinese people, but also people of all countries in the world.”(Li, 2015). Here we can identify the international scope of the concept, which develops outside of China, relating to some of the values previously studied.

In his fourth point, the author argues that the Chinese Dream takes some inspirations from the American Dream, even if it is not intended to replace the later. “Although they differ from each other in a number of comparative perspectives, they are both based on the premise of global development and world peace, and so the two Dreams are complementary and cooperative.” (Li, 2015). This point may be opposed by a statement made by Pröpper, who says “Unlike the American Dream, this Chinese dream is not territorially bound.” (Pröpper, 2020) which perceives the American Dream as exclusively American, unlike the Chinese Dream. To this view, a stand taken by Chunlong Lu may be added. According to him, the concepts are opposite, in the sense that the Chinese Dream is collectivist, and the American Dream is individualistic. So, they are seen as essentially different: “To some extent, the core value of the American dream emphasizes that the individual dream and national dream are in antagonistic and strained relations. (...) In the concept of the Chinese dream, the individual dream is unified with national dream and social dream as one entity. Therefore, individual dream, social dream and national dream are organic and unified.” (Lu, 2015).

In his last point, Xing Li argues that the Chinese Dream stems from and is based on three sources of confidence: “(...) a socialist development path with Chinese characteristics; a socialist theoretical system with Chinese characteristics; and a socialist sociopolitical system with Chinese characteristics.” (Li, 2015). According to him, these characteristics can only be assured by the CCP, the leader in the realization of the Chinese Dream.

In the view of the author, there is no doubt in stating that the Chinese Dream is an internal and external policy statement made by President Xi Jinping. To this view, a declaration made by Camilla T. N. Sørensen may be added “Although it is easy to dismiss such slogans as the “Chinese dream” coming from the Chinese leadership as pure propaganda and empty talk, they play an important role in organizing thought and action in Chinese politics as they often reflect new or changed priorities in the Chinese leadership.” (Sørensen, 2015). That new thought and action, as well as changed priorities, will influence China not only inside, in the

country's domestic policies, but also outside, in China's foreign policy. One may then ask, what is the aim of the Chinese Dream?

2.4 – Aim of the Chinese Dream

There are two goals often mentioned when addressing the Chinese Dream. Those are part of its concrete agenda: the “two centenary goals”. The first one is to establish a “moderate well-off society” by 2021, when the CCP makes its 100th birthday; the second is to create a “rich and strong socialist country” by 2049, when the PRC marks its 100 years.

Besides these concrete goals, officially stated, often scholars try to study other aims of the concept. However, before getting into the aims, maybe it would be better to understand the need of a Chinese Dream.

As argued by Zheng Wang, when president Xi came to office, he had already a lot of challenges to face. The author identifies the Bo Xilai scandal as the “(...) most significant political crisis Beijing faced since 1989” (Wang, 2013), exposing internal fragilities of the government. At this point, Xi Jinping needed to unite people, both from right and left, creating a common ground of acceptance. Adding to this point, Xing Li points out other sociopolitical problems, such as political dissidents, Uighur academics and internet activists. Since national rejuvenation is so close to the Chinese history and society, as argued by Wang, “(...) the Chinese Dream is meant to play the role of societal glue to unite people together.” (Wang, 2013). The goal here is to give a nationalistic sense to the concept of the Chinese Dream, that draws legitimacy to the CCP (since the CCP leaders often state that only with CCP can China be rejuvenated) and unites the people with one common goal.

Another issue arising, according to Xing Li, is the rapid economic growth that China has been experiencing in the last decades, which amplified the differences between the rich and the poor, and created social, environmental, and even cultural problems. As explained by Wang, “With the rising complaints and unrest from the grassroots level about social inequity, Xi Jinping and the Party have also made special efforts to connect the Chinese Dream with the Chinese public” (Wang, 2013). Here, one of the dimensions of the Chinese Dream is particularly useful: the individual dimension. Connecting the success of the country with individual success, as well as addressing general public concerns such as health, education and employment, the Chinese Dream may be the response to making the Chinese people feel

connected with the CCP and ease the unrest, that was also created by the deacceleration on economic development in general.

“(…) China Dream concept emerged out of a broad and ongoing debate/ dispute sparked by a strong sense of crisis that China is facing after more than three decades of economic reform and marketization.”(Li, 2015).

So, the Chinese Dream is a needed concept, that came to unite China and deviate the attention from the present to the future. As argued by Camilla T. N. Sørensen, the Chinese Dream is an effort to ensure China’s domestic stability and CCP’s legitimacy: “Public anger and protests are growing all over the country, and Xi’s response is the anti-corruption and rectification campaigns to show resolve and clean-up the party – get back to “serving the people” – and the “Chinese dream” to rally or unite the Chinese people and get them to focus beyond the immediate challenges they are facing by presenting them with a vision for China’s development over the next decades.” (Sørensen, 2015). According to the author, the concept is needed to safeguard the continuation of China’s reforms and development.

The Chinese Dream is, in conclusion, a common goal of the people, to ease the worries of the population, and make people focus on the future instead of the present. It is also a source of legitimacy, since “only CCP can rejuvenate China”. This concept is a much-needed tool to enhance nationalism, safeguard unity and assure further plans made by the Communist party. As said by Michael Gow, “CCP is compelled to align its interests with the broader interests of the Chinese people and different groups, to appeal to them, and to engage in an active process of fostering consensus (…)”(Gow, 2016)

However, additional questions, other than the domestic dimension of the concept, are raised when analyzing the Chinese Dream: how can this concept, of regaining China’s greatness and accomplishing the Chinese Dream, be applied internationally? How does it impact China’s foreign policy?

2.5 – National vs international dilemma of the Chinese Dream

“For Xi Jinping, the main context for promoting the Chinese Dream narrative is domestic politics. However, a major challenge for the concept is whether the outside world understands the “Chinese Dream.” (…) the current debate regarding China tends to focus on two competing

arguments that suggest China's rise will either upset the balance of power or growing interdependence will integrate China more with the world." (Wang, 2013)

The Chinese Dream has attracted much attention in western media: the concept was featured in *The Economist*, with headlines such as "Chasing the Chinese Dream" and "China's dream and nightmares", in the *New York Times*, with articles such as "The China Dream – trouble on the way to paradise" and "The Elusive Chinese Dream", in the Portuguese newspaper *O Público*, with an analysis called "Xi Jinping e o Sonho Chinês", among others. It is often portrayed as a dangerous concept, that may bring international instability. As explained by Sørensen, "The dominant interpretation thus is that the "Chinese dream" is a nationalistic doctrine, where the focus is on regaining – with military force if necessary – China's rightful great power status, dignity and respect." (Sørensen, 2015). So, the Chinese Dream is often associated with the increase of China's military power, and the rise of a much more assertive foreign policy.

However, Zheng Wang argues that the very use of the word "rejuvenation" instead of "rise" contradicts that view. According to the author, most Chinese perceive the Chinese Dream as a regaining of China's international status, and not as the creation of a brand new one, with the goal to restore fairness, and not to suppress others: "Chinese consider the process of rejuvenation as a restoration of fairness instead of a gain of advantages over others." (Wang, 2013). Even in more aggressive actions, such as Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the south China sea disputes, Chinese consider their own actions as defensive, a way to protect their rightful interests: territories left by their ancestors and for which they have historical rights over.

Alex Berkofsky, in his article "The Chinese Dream" and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies —Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities" further clarifies this perspective: "(...) China itself cannot find anything aggressive about any of its regional foreign and security policies. It is—at least from its own perspective— merely reclaiming what has belonged to China since "ancient times." (Berkofsky, 2016). However, the author has a different view on the subject. In his own words, "(...) details of the "resurrection" of Chinese power (...) have made sure that the "dream" is turning into a nightmare for those in Asia who are at the receiving end of increasingly and unambiguously aggressive Chinese policies related to territorial claims in the East and South China Seas." (Berkofsky, 2016). Berkofsky clearly relates the renewal of the Chinese Nation with the country's expansion of its borders. For him, in the eyes of China, the regaining of the past power and influence, with the consequential occupation of territories that

China claims to have had in the past, is not only China's right, but more like China's obligation. In Berkofsky's view, "(...) unilaterally reclaiming islands in the South China Sea and building civil and military facilities on them is in Southeast Asia (and pretty much elsewhere too) perceived to be the very opposite of the kind of "peaceful development" and "Sharing the Chinese Dream" Xi Jinping has been promising since 2012". (Berkofsky, 2016)

On the other hand, as Yang Jiechi stated in his article "Implementing the Chinese dream", the Chinese Dream, to be accomplished, has to have a secure and stable international environment, especially in the region: "The Chinese dream requires a peaceful and stable international and neighboring environment, and China is committed to realizing the dream through peaceful development." (Yang, 2013) The dream must be realized through a peaceful development. It is true that China has benefited a lot from international peace, and much of its growing was and is due to that. "China has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of globalization. Embracing globalism has brought China unprecedented wealth and power which has also been served as a foundation for the new Chinese Dream" (Wang, 2013). Today, most international discourses related to the Chinese emphasize mutual understanding, win-win strategies and peaceful relations. In the words of Xi Jinping himself, "(...) the Chinese Dream can be realized only in a peaceful international environment and under a stable international order." (Xi, 2017)

At this point, the perspective of Berkofsky is met by the one of Sørensen, who elaborates: "The "Chinese dream" is, however, not all "peaceful development" and "win-win". A tougher and bolder Chinese approach in relation to safeguarding Chinese sovereignty and core interests is also visible in several of the speeches and statements. (...) Xi Jinping, while being "firmly committed to peaceful development, will never forsake the legitimate interests or compromise on China's core interests" (Sørensen, 2015). So, we come to a contradiction of interests within the concept, that seem to go in circles.

This contradiction is explained by Zheng Wang as the domestic vs foreign dilemma of the Chinese Dream: "China's peace narrative for its neighbors is not working well with the concurrent internal rise of nationalism. Concerning these situations, talking about peace and harmony receives domestic criticism, accusing the government of not protecting China's national interests." (Wang, 2013). Even though China benefits a lot with international stability, since its development is dependent on the global market, importation of resources, investments, etc., China's domestic problems make it easy for the CCP to think of increasing nationalistic

foreign policies to create domestic unity. And, as explained by Lutgard Lams, nationalism is a two-sided coin:

“Nationalism can be described as a coin with two sides: the inclusion of the in-group members involves the exclusion of those harbouring other beliefs, values, habits, and so on. Self-glorification usually rides in tandem with demonization of the threatening Other, who is the negative mirror of the Self.” (Lams, 2018)

Also, the need of CCP to keep its mission of rejuvenating China, which gives legitimacy to the party and secures its own survival, increases the pressure in defending China’s national interests. “(...) when international events occur, especially when China’s national sovereignty or status is challenged, the Party needs to be tough to maintain its image. The government often finds that it has less room for flexibility in negotiation over foreign affairs. (...) This is a major dilemma between Chinese domestic politics and foreign relations.” (Wang, 2013). So, in China, population with a strong nationalist sense towards the Chinese Dream and the rejuvenation of China, seem to be raising their voice when it comes to foreign policy, demanding a more active role by the CCP in defending China and its interests. These factors, all together, explain, in part, why the CCP is taking a more assertive international approach, with a stronger and more confident discourse.

With this dilemma in hand, one may ask which one is stronger: the stable international environment China needs to prosper, or China’s national unity?

2.6 – International context of the Chinese Dream

When examining the Chinese Dream, an important aspect is the internationality of the concept since it was already identified as one of its core ideas. As stated before, many CCP leaders have become clear about the international context needed for the realization of the Chinese Dream: a peaceful one. However, in some way, the Chinese Dream also seems to extend to an international level, by relating to other people’s dreams. Often concepts such as the “World Dream” or the “African Dream” are mentioned by CCP leaders:

“The Chinese Dream is in consistence with the beautiful dreams cherished by people of other countries and, in particular, highly consistent with the African Dream.” (Lu Shaye, 2013)

“In his meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last October, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that Chinese and Indian dreams are interconnected and mutually compatible.” (Yang Jiechi, 2014)

“The Chinese dream, which is highly compatible with the dreams of other people in Asia, Africa and beyond, will bring benefit not only to the Chinese people but also to the people all over the world.”(Xi, 2015)

The international promotion of the Chinese Dream, thus seems to become, in Sørensen’s words, “(...) part of the Chinese soft power campaign and hence of Chinese efforts to promote a positive image of itself internationally (...)” (Sørensen, 2015). According to the author, the Chinese Dream is being used as a tool to expand international recognition of China’s philosophies and ideals, increasing the world’s overall respect for China. However, one should study what those ideals are, and in which way is China’s Foreign Policy being carried, in order to fully understand how the Chinese Dream fits in it.

Chapter III – Chinese Foreign Policy

China has passed, in the last decades, from an isolated country to one of the worlds' most powerful countries and the second biggest world economy. As stated by Marc Lanteigne, “The rise of China (Zhongguo 中国) within the international system has been heralded as one of the most significant changes in turn-of-the-century global relations.” (Lanteigne, 2020). As so, much attention has been given to its external affairs and as stated by Mikael Weissmann, “To accurately understand China’s external affairs, there is a need to grasp the bigger picture, to be able to understand what is guiding the Chinese foreign policy, why this is so, and how the Chinese foreign policy decision making works.” (Weissmann, 2015)

3.1 - Pillars of Chinese Foreign Policy: From the Bandung Conference to the 21st Century

According to Emre Demir, it is important to distinguish Chinese Foreign Policy between pre- and post-reform eras. While in the first period, China was dedicated to global revolution, supporting other countries in their insurgency to socialism, in the second period, China started to focus more on a policy of economic reform, which pushed the country to open and get integrated in global economy.

“From the early days of the republic to the final days of the Mao era, China’s foreign policies were deeply affected by Mao’s thinking and ideological standpoint, and by fluctuations in domestic politics” (Demir, 2019). As argued by the author, in the beginning of the Mao era, diplomatic relations were mainly focused on socialist countries, particularly in the Soviet Union, with the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950. However, in 1954, Zhou Enlai created new guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy: the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”. These principles underpin Chinese Foreign Policy to this day, and they can be summed up in the Zhou Enlai’s speech at the well-known Bandung Conference, in 1955: “following the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems can be realized.” (Zhou, 1955). It was in this occasion that the principles rose to fame, suiting well the Mao’s Third World Identity and policy of solidarity with the so-called Third World.

Today, these five principles remain one of the core values of Chinese Foreign Policy, and, according to Kevin G. Cai, they can be traced back to the Confucianist and Taoist – two important philosophical traditions of China - idea of “Harmony”. This concept of “Harmony” defends, in practical terms, the co-existence of different interests that balanced together could optimize the benefits for two different sides. “Such a Confucian idea of harmony is clearly behind Chinese foreign policy, which is first of all designed to avoid confrontation in external relations. An illustrative example is China’s insistence on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in international relations, a core value of Chinese foreign policy.” (Cai, 2020)

With the deterioration of China’s relations with the Soviet Union, China “(...) started following an independent foreign policy, and in mid-1962, Mao initiated a foreign policy that was driven by a more leftist ideology.” (Demir, 2019). As explained by the author, at this time, Mao formulated a new foreign policy, trying to strengthen its relationship with the “two intermediate zones”, the first one being the economically underdeveloped countries of Africa, South America and Asia, and the second being developed and imperialist countries. The development of relationships with the second group was particularly hard and, when in 1966 Mao started the phase of the Revolution, with a “anti-imperialism” and “anti-revisionism” position, China started to get isolated. This isolation ultimately forced Mao into more pragmatic policies in the early 70s, and also to the tightening of its ties with the US. “As China was once again formally accepted as a member of the international community, a strategic triangle between China, the Soviet Union and the US was established in Asian politics” (Demir, 2019). In fact, China even entered the UN in 1971, an important step into being internationally recognized, and, more importantly, into China’s internationalization. Yet, this phase didn’t last long. With the resignation of Nixon in 1974, and the rise of Kissinger, China turned its attention back at the so-called “Third World”, backing its position.

With the ascendance of Deng Xiaoping, in 1978, China’s foreign policy took another turn. An economic opening up and modernization process took place in the country, and so, China needed foreign capital and technology, which made the country open up and strengthen its relations with the US. After 1982, China adopted an independent foreign policy, “(...) abandoning any grand strategy related to the export of communism, while also continue to oppose hegemony, regardless of whether it be Soviet or US in origin” (Demir, 2019). In the 80s, the main priorities were economy and modernization, as well as the reunification of the country, with a “go out” strategy, intended to encourage Chinese firms to go abroad, a strategy that, according to Weissmann, prevailed to the mid-2000s. In 1984, Deng Xiaoping introduced the

formula “one country, two systems”, that exists to this day. However, in 1989, with the Tianmen incident, Chinese Foreign Policy took a step-back. Afraid to lose its legitimacy, the CCP took a violent approach to the incident, which rose international discontentment: “Immediately after the crackdown, the US, Western and most Eastern European states, Australia, Canada and Latin American countries protested and criticised the PLA’s maltreatment of the protesters and developed countries in the West applied sanctions against China” (Demir, 2019). The crack between the party and the people also accentuated, threatening CCP’s legitimacy even more, a threat that was aggravated in the immediate years by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Once again, China had to adjust its role in the world and its own identity. With the new leader, Jiang Zemin, the “socialist market economy” concept was introduced and, overall, a low-profile approach was adopted. According to Weissman, China strengthened its demonstration of acceptance of the international norms, increasing collaboration, especially in security issues: “(...) once again being an active part in the international community can be characterised as a pursuit of “comprehensive power”, acknowledging that a global power needs multidimensional strength.” (Weissman, 2015). This view is supported by Demir, who states “(...) throughout the 1990s, in the eyes of both regional and non-regional actors, Beijing was “playing by the rules”, had transformed into a “responsible state” and was pursuing a foreign policy that was compatible with the existing international system.” (Demir, 2019). In this period, China tightened its relations with Africa, one of the main markets for China’s investment and financial cooperation, and regained sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao. The new integration of China in the international community culminated in the country’s integration in the WTO, in 2001.

In the 2000s, Weissman argues that the underlying foreign policy is the “new security concept”, a strategy proclaiming the key principles to guide foreign policy, principles that, on the author’s view, state the Chinese aspirations in the post-Cold War order. “Besides acknowledging the adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, it emphasises mutually beneficial economic cooperation, confidence building and the establishment of “strategic partnerships” not directed at a third country.” (Weissman, 2015). This new security concept prepares a new emphasis of Chinese foreign policy, the China’s “peaceful rise”, a concept that came to reassure the international community of China’s peaceful intentions, and that China was not a revisionist country: “Emphasis was put on arguing that China’s rise is not a zero-sum game, but a mutual win situation” (Weissman, 2015). Due to negative connotations to the term “rise”, the concept was later changed to “peaceful development”. In 2005, Hu also

introduced the concept of “Harmonious World”, that highlights the need for equality, openness, democratization in international affairs and peaceful coexistence. Again, the Confucianist ideal of “Harmony” is transported to Chinese Foreign Policy: “(...) China’s emphasis on sovereignty, equality, mutual respect, non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs and win–win in international relations can all be explained by referring to the Confucian concept of harmony.” (Cai, 2020) This was a period of stable relations with the US and other world powers, but especially a period of strengthening relations with the country’s own neighborhood, with the creation of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), for example: “The Shanghai process, giving a path to the Shanghai Five informal meetings and afterwards to the SCO formal structure, results from a Chinese effort to connect with the Central Asian countries. After the rapprochement with Russia, the conjuncture seemed perfect to envision a new kind of international pact based on the control of internal and external threats, such as secessionism, borders revision, and terrorism..” (Costa, 2021). Those stable relations were extended to other parts of the globe: “China did also expand its perspective, giving attention also to Africa, Latin America and Europe.” (Weissman, 2015). This expansion can be seen in the creation of several forums, since “(...) China has been investing in the creation of regional forums that allow it to have permanent or deeper contact with certain regions of the globe. These structures of multilateral dialogue between countries of the South and facing development challenges have become one of the most effective strategies for China to enter a new cycle of international life.” (Costa, 2020). One example of those forums is Fórum Macau, which was created in 2003 with the intention to establish closer ties with the Portuguese Speaking Countries.

Both Weissman and Demir perceive the year 2008 as a turning point in China’s foreign policies, although they point different reasons for it. In Demir’s view, the positive period in China’s foreign policies was lost after the financial crisis of 2008, much due to three reasons: first, Beijing choice to support North Korea when the latter conducted nuclear and missile tests in 2009; second a number of decisions that affected Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations, “Iran’s nuclear program and China’s nonparticipation in the UN sanctions against Tehran in 2010, the US arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010 and President Barack Obama’s postponed meeting with the Dalai Lama in February 2010 led to friction between the two governments” (Demir, 2019); and third the re-appearance of Diaoyu/Senkaku islands issue in 2010, that led to tensions with the East Asian countries. On the other hand, Weissman presents a complementary explanation for the matter. According to the author, at the time of the “global” crisis, the US and other western countries were severely affected, but China kept almost

“unharmful”. As so, China regained a new confidence, and started having a more active and aggressive attitude on the international stage. “Since 2011 China has made attempts to regain the regional and international trust. China’s more assertive behaviour has destroyed most of two decades of trust-building (...)” (Weissman, 2015)

When in 2012, Xi Jinping was assigned as the party’s leader, China started to move from a “keeping a low profile” strategy to one of “striving for achievements”. According to Weissman, the main goal of this more active foreign policy is to reach modernization, create a peaceful international environment and develop domestic economy. So, in the author’s view, the key element for Xi is to keep peaceful relations with other states, to secure the import of national resources and improve domestic development: “The overarching goal is to ensure prosperity in China, to open up “new paths for the nation’s rejuvenation, and create conditions that benefit the Chinese people” (Weissman, 2015).

Demir presents a much similar view on the subject:

“Under Xi, Chinese foreign policy has transformed from being uncoordinated and non-committal to being more coordinated, active, creative and assertive (Ferdinand 2016, 942). This change can be seen as a process of transition from the long-time implemented low-profile policy, to a strategy of striving for achievement (Yan 2014), which can be defined as the creation of suitable conditions for the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation.” (Demir, 2019).

From both author’s statements, it can be then concluded that national rejuvenation is kept as the main aim of Xi’s presidency and, as such, greatly influences current Chinese foreign policy.

Another aspect of Xi’s foreign policy, pointed out by Weissman, is the leader’s attention to developing China’s relationships with its so called “old friends”. The author identifies China’s focus in the emerging developing nations and powers as part of that tactic:

“China has been trying to widen its impact in the emerging developing world, trying to increase its presence and influence in Central Asia, South Asia, Latin America and Africa. It is also trying to develop its cooperation with other emerging major states, such as India, Mexico, South Africa and Russia.”(Weissman, 2015)

In that line, Demir identifies the launching of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as one of the most important aspects in Xi’s presidency. Through the project, the leader hopes to improve connectivity with the Euroasian region, and overcome its internal problems in terms

of economy, security and politics. In fact, Weissman identically states that, in Xi's presidency, foreign policy is not a priority, since domestic pressure is on his focus. "China is approaching more difficult times as it has to manage pressing domestic challenges, including slowing economic growth, shifting social structures and socio-economic unrest caused by increasing socioeconomic inequalities. Thus it can be expected that the foreign policy path will be even more guided and driven by domestic concerns than it used to be."(Weissman, 2015). This increasingly concern for domestic policy, when compared with foreign policy, makes it important to understand the domestic impacts on the later.

3.2 - National interest and the Chinese Foreign Policy

As stated by Marc Lanteigne, "(...) identifying a clear separation between China's domestic political interests and its foreign policy can be a complicated process." (Lanteigne, 2020). In the article "Constructing an Analytical Framework for Explaining Chinese Foreign Policy", Kevin G. Cai elaborates the correlation between domestic interests and Chinese foreign policy. According to him, China's national interests are the determining factor that set the direction and objectives of Chinese foreign policy, leading to explicit tactics used to achieve these foreign policy objectives: "China's foreign policy, like that of other powers, is clearly formulated to pursue the country's national interests as identified by the Chinese communist state." (Cai, 2020). These national interests are called "core interests" and are defined in a white paper that was published by the Information Office of the State Council of the PRC in 2011 called "China's Peaceful Development". That paper identifies 6 core interests of China: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, national unification, China's political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and basic precautions for safeguarding sustainable economic and social development. As identified by the author, in order to pursue these interests, the CCP has established and developed seven key foreign policy objectives, that Cai identifies in a ranking:

The first, and more important, objective is to "maintain China's existing political system". This assures the maintenance of CCP as the prevalent political power of China. This objective goes according with the premise that "only CCP can save China".

Related to the previous is the second objective – "maintaining state sovereignty". This is one of the main arguments used in the non-interference principle, allowing for subjects as

human rights to be seen as internal affairs of China, so foreign countries have no right to interfere. This objective is also highly related to the nation's political independence, after going through the "century of humiliation", when the country was reduced to a semi-colony. So, "(...) maintaining state sovereignty is seen as fundamental for maintaining China as an independent nation-state." (Cai, 2020)

The third objective identified by Cai is to "maintain the country's national security". In fact, all of China's international armed conflicts are perceived as defensive, rather than offensive, which traces back to this objective. Even according to Confucian values, harmony does not mean compromising one's principles. As explained by Cai, "(...) if the fundamental national interests like sovereignty, territorial integrity, national independence, national security and so on are threatened as a result of foreign intervention or foreign invasion, the preconditions for harmony no longer exist and self-defense is, therefore, justified so as to defend the national interests under the concept of harmony" (Cai, 2020). So, in the eyes of China, more assertiveness is justified, and does not go against its own Foreign Policy principles when security is at stake.

As a continuation of this goal, comes the fourth foreign policy objective: to "preserve China's national integrity". This point directly affects CCP's legitimacy and is highly related with the concept of rejuvenation – "Maintaining lasting prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and Macao and achieving China's full reunification are essential to realizing national rejuvenation" (Xi, 2017) -, which ultimately also leads to much assertiveness when it comes to territorial disputes with neighboring countries, including in the South China Sea. This correlation is supported and explained by Axel Berkofsky in his article "The Chinese Dream" and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities", who states that China's aggressive attitudes towards territorial disputes is a "(...) demonstration of Chinese (military) power and the ability to reclaim and occupy what—at least in Beijing's view—has belonged to China since "ancient times." Given that the "Chinese Dream" aims at re-building the power and influence China had in the past (...), re-claiming and occupying territories China claims to have possessed in the past is hence China's right and—at least from a Chinese perspective—obligation" (Berkofsky, 2016). Also, much related to this point, comes the fifth objective, which is to accomplish "national unification with Taiwan".

The sixth objective is to guarantee China's continued economic development and modernization. It is specially for this goal that China must assure peace and a stable

international environment, otherwise modernization and development within the country would prove next to impossible.

The last objective of Chinese foreign policy identified by Cai is to “(...) enhance the nation’s international position and restore its great-power status” (Cai, 2020). According to the author, this is an objective that is very supported by the Chinese people and important for CCP, in the eyes of the famous “century of humiliation”: “This foreign policy objective was first reflected in the famous slogan at the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949 that “the Chinese people have stood up.” It has been most recently reflected in the concept of “China dream” (...). The China dream concept clearly refers to a vision of making China a global power in the process of peaceful development and global cooperation.” (Cai, 2020)

The author further relates the first objective with all the others, stating that the successful implementation of all the other objectives would enhance CCP’s legitimacy, securing the current political system. “It is in this sense that to some extent the interests of the CCP and the interests of the Chinese nation are overlapped.” (Cai, 2020).

On the other hand, it can also be seen the importance of national rejuvenation when it comes to China’s foreign policy. Being highly related with two of the objectives and being the main goal of the Chinese Dream, this common point makes the correlation between Chinese foreign policy and the Chinese Dream undeniable.

3.3. Soft power and the Chinese Foreign Policy

Soft power was firstly introduced by Joseph Nye, who defined it as “(...) the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies.” (Nye, 2008). In other words, soft power aims at making others want the same outcomes as you, without the use of any coercive measures; it is an opposing term to hard power, which is the capability to change what others do. So, according to this definition, soft power may be considered a positive tool for foreign policy. At the same time, soft power is also very influenced by a country’s foreign policy, since the last sets the nation’s international image, or, in other words, a country’s capacity to attract. These are codependent terms.

Beston H Arif, in his article “The Role of Soft power in China’s Foreign Policy in the 21st century” argues that “(...) China’s aspiration to be considered as a more powerful state

regionally as well as globally depends on further attention to the role of soft power in its decision making of foreign relations.” (Arif, 2017). The importance of soft power in Chinese foreign policy is well represented in the number of publications and discourses highlighting the theme – “(...) Chinese soft power and public diplomacy is being studied in at least 24 Chinese university centres and a similar number of them within government-affiliated think tanks. The notion also features prominently in Chinese official discourse (...).” (Lams, 2018). So, it would be important to understand what is soft power for China, its evolution, objectives and resources.

The concept of soft power started to generate interest in China in the early 90s, after the collapse of Soviet Union. Barthélémy Courmont identifies an article written by Wang Huning in 1993 as the first introduction of the issue in China, as Wang referred to soft power as a potentially relevant strategy to develop Beijing’s influence and power, highlighting culture as the main source of it. “By this time, the construction of soft power was organized in China, although still hesitant, but it already differed from its general acceptance in the United States, in the emphasis put on the need to use it as a strategy to increase China’s influence and power.” (Courmont, 2013). The hesitation in embracing the concept may be explained by the tensions following the Tianmen Incident, for at this time soft power was treated as a “Western concept” by most Chinese leaders. Nonetheless, with time and mostly after the mid-1990s, academics started to truly consider soft power relevant. In the early 2000s, this interest expanded to politicians and the media.

However, during this process, the concept of soft power was redefined, to the point where it may be called “Chinese soft power”, with different characteristics from the original. Different schools of thought were developed, theorizing and defining Chinese soft power in different ways. The most dominant school of thought is identified by Courmont as the “cultural school” or “Shanghai school”, that identifies culture as the main source of soft power: “Culture is the main source of soft power because it includes two other sources of soft power identified by Nye: foreign policy and domestic politics. For the supporters of the cultural school, ancient history and traditional culture are the main elements of the Chinese cultural soft power. To improve the attractiveness of China on the world stage, this school therefore advocates the promotion of Chinese culture abroad” (Courmont, 2013).

It was not until 2007, at the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, that soft power was formally declared as a political strategy. The concept of soft power explored by the “cultural school” was the one adopted by Hu Jintao as well:

“Officially, “Hu Jintao has called for a renewal of socialist cultural initiatives, stimulating cultural creativity in the whole nation and making culture an important part of Chinese soft power.” This idyllic vision of Chinese power is unusual to say the least, and for the first time relies almost exclusively on the tools of soft power (...) without ever mentioning the economic or military fields, except to indicate that China seeks to play a more significant role in maintaining peace, to a level that has been interpreted in China as a “national renaissance.”” (Courmont, 2013).

According to the author, at this time, there were two ambitions pursued regarding soft power. The first was using soft power to establish China as a full power. Only through the balance of the two complementary powers - soft and hard power - would China become a major power. And second, “(...) soft power favored and accelerated the implementation of a “set of favorable environments” for the growing Chinese power: a stable and peaceful international and regional environment; a cooperative environment based on equality and mutual benefits; and an environment “fair and friendly” (...) within the media.” (Courmont, 2013). So, unlike hard power, soft power doesn't go against China's peaceful international stand or ideals. At this time, many soft power initiatives, such as the Confucius institutes or the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, were launched and received a lot of financing.

Beston H Arif argues that China's interest in soft power has intensified after President Xi came to office. According to the author, in 2014 “(...) Xi announced that developing China's soft powers can be achieved through the state's ability in global communication and its capacity of building a good communication system. He also believes that new media can play this role by increasing creativity and presenting reliability of China's publicity and the China's stories, voices and characteristics should be well explained” (Arif, 2017). This rising interest in soft power seems to be an effort to fulfill China's own national interests. Through it, China can expand its economic ties and integrate its market in the global economy even more, as well as getting more involved in the policy of developing countries, making new alliances in Asia, Africa and Latin America. “Soft power would benefit China's interests in several ways. China is looking to secure its natural and energy sources as a main element to boost its economic growth; therefore, its close ties with more countries provide more alternatives to reach these resource needs. As Gil (2008) states, “China wants to create a peaceful international environment in which its economic development can continue and in which it can portray itself as a responsible and constructive player in world politics” (p. 117).” (Arif, 2017). So, new

initiatives were introduced by president Xi, such as the Belt and Road Initiative or the Chinese Dream.

According to Arif, China uses various sources of soft power. With a long history and traditional culture, culture seems to be the main source. Equally important is China's economy: "In order to promote its soft power China heavily needs economic power to support media broadcasting, cultural and art institutions both inside and outside the country." (Arif, 2017). Other important source is education, with increasing programs welcoming international students to Chinese universities. Assistance and aid in other countries, specially, in South America, Africa and Southeast Asia, seem to be a real source of soft power as well: "Since 2010, China's aid and assistance have increased dramatically. In 2009, China's foreign aid was \$124.8 billion, it then increased to \$168.6 billion in 2010, it continued to grow to \$189.3 billion in 2011, while it was only \$1.7 billion in 2001." (Arif, 2017). However, the author identifies political values as a step back, since issues such as human rights violations and low freedom of speech are not well seen by the international community.

William A. Callahan argues that the main objective of Chinese soft power is "(...) to fight against those who see China as a threat, and cultivate those who see it as an opportunity." (Callahan, 2015). Complementarily to Arif, Callahan views Chinese soft power as primarily an issue of domestic politics. For the author, soft power is more about producing values, much more than it is about exporting pre-existing values: "Before it can spread values abroad, soft power policy first needs to produce and police values at home. Soft power thus is not an entity that can be empirically measured, so much as a domestic process of social construction that defines the symbolic borders of self and Other, and thus of identity and security" (Callahan, 2015). So, more than attracting the international community, Chinese soft power seeks internal balance within China, looking to safeguard CCP's legitimacy. The author calls this domestic focus as part of the "PRC's 'identity dilemma'", where it is argued that the main issue for China's involvement internationally is "(...) identity politics of answering the question 'Who is China?'" (Callahan, 2015), a question raised from a moral vacuum filling a progressively more consumerist country, which led to a values crisis. As a result, Chinese soft power discourse turns more and more to traditional values, such as peace and harmony. Foreign policies such as the "peaceful development" or "harmonious world" are all based on these values and see Chinese civilization as open and tolerant. But another contradiction stands in the eyes of the author: "(...) alongside this positive view of a benevolent China that embraces the outside world, identity and security are linked in the negative process of drawing symbolic

borders between self and Other. Rather than a set of stable ‘essential values’, civilisation here is better understood as a contingent discourse that takes shape in relation to its opposite: barbarism.” (Callahan, 2015). In this way, domestic politics become attached to foreign politics through this distinction, from the positive and civilized inside to the negative and barbaric outside. The author calls this phenomenon “negative soft power”.

Callahan further connects the term of negative soft power with the Chinese Dream. The author argues that both soft power and the Chinese Dream are invoked as the response to the “values crisis” China is facing. “Xi’s China dream appeals to a combination of traditional China and socialist modernity: especially the China model of development and Confucian civilisation.” (Callahan, 2015). For the author, the fact that president Xi introduced the concept in the Road to Rejuvenation’ exhibit, that portrays China’s “(...) victimised sense of national identity as national humiliation.” (Callahan, 2015), makes it clear that there is a negative soft power attached to it. China’s success is always contrasted with the century of humiliation of foreign intervention, making the Chinese Dream part of the identity dilemma: “The optimism of the China dream here relies on the pessimism of the national humiliation nightmare. The China dream thus is not just a positive expression of national aspirations; at the same time, it is a negative soft power strategy that cultivates an anti-Western and an anti-Japanese form of Chinese identity.” (Callahan, 2015)

Anny Boc also relates the Chinese Dream with soft power, or, in this case, strategic narratives. The author argues that the Chinese Dream is intended to create universal appeal: “Hence, the Chinese Dream and African Dream can both be seen as narratives that are strategically employed by the CCP to achieve a desired purpose or intention.” (Boc, 2015). So, what role does the Chinese Dream have in the Chinese Soft Power? This question may be partially answered by Cai Mingzhao 2013’s summary of the directives on how to better promote China’s soft power:

“Three clear objectives stood out: 1) Further promote the China Dream overseas; use the China Dream as the guideline to present good information about China; 2) Strengthen the effort to develop overseas publicity and spread China’s voice; 3) Strengthen the work to build a discourse system and put effort into creating new concepts, criteria, and expressions that will fit both the domestic and the international environment.” (Lams, 2018)

So, looking at the first objective defined by Cai, the Chinese Dream is aimed at being used as guideline to present information about China, and is being promoted overseas as a soft power tool. The concept seems to be, then, central to China's soft power strategy.

3.4 Impact of the Chinese Dream in Chinese Foreign Policy

The Chinese Dream is, as previously seen, a national concept, that establishes clear objectives for China (the two-centenary goals) and a national history, which influences and is a source of nationalism.

As explored by Wang, even though the Chinese Dream requires a peaceful international environment – “(...) it is in the fundamental interest of China to maintain regional and global peace and stability.” (Wang, 2013) -, the need to enhance nationalism within China and adopt more nationalistic foreign policies, creates what Wang calls “a major dilemma between Chinese domestic politics and foreign relations” (Wang, 2013). Also, as previously seen, since national interests are the major influencer of China's foreign policies and being the Chinese Dream one of China's biggest goals and national glue, which brings legitimacy to the CCP, the Chinese Dream directly influences foreign policy objectives. So, even though the Chinese Dream is mostly a national concept, it greatly influences foreign policies by extension. This explains the more aggressive policies taken in certain occasion, such as in the South China Sea disputes, where the nation's sovereignty or status is challenged, and so CCP needs to be strong to maintain its image and keep the mission of rejuvenating China as a top priority.

On the other hand, the Chinese Dream is also used internationally. As stated by Sørensen, “(...) Chinese leadership seeks to promote the “Chinese dream” internationally as a continuation of China's peaceful development strategy.” (Sørensen, 2015), integrating the Chinese Dream in the Chinese soft power campaign. This view is supported by Anny Boc, who states: “Similar to the notion of “peaceful development” and “harmonious world,” the CCP has promoted the Chinese Dream narrative heavily in the media targeting foreign audiences” (Boc, 2015). Through the international dissemination of the concept, the CCP looks to increase international recognition of China's values and philosophies. The fundamental elements of the Chinese Dream – peace and harmony- are emphasized as traditional ideals of China. “Xi has also several times in his speeches on the “Chinese dream” stressed that China as a great power should have a correct view on and approach to upholding “justice” (yi, 义) and seeking

“interests” (li, 利).”(Sørensen, 2015), meaning that other’s interests will always be taken into consideration. Often is stressed that economic interests will never be as important for China as fairness, morality and justice when dealing with other countries. “The Chinese International Relations scholar Wang Yizhou (2014a: 8) argues that this increased importance of “correct viewpoint on justice and interests” (...) as a guiding principle of Chinese foreign policy under Xi underlines his emphasis on how China should take increasing great power responsibility by e.g. providing more public goods and foreign aid.” (Sørensen, 2015).

From the Chinese Dream, notions such as the “African Dream” and “Asian Dream” were born, focusing on the common goals China may have with other country or people. Chinese values are often portrayed as similar to those in the receiving end. Anny Boc analyses this connection through the African Dream:

“Xi Jinping has been able to export his ideological signature abroad, particularly by creating an African Dream, which he closely connects and relates to the mantra of the Chinese Dream. (...) The analyses on the construction of the African Dream show that the CCP seeks to create a collective Dream by pointing out the similarities between the two regions.” (Boc, 2015)

So, being the Chinese Dream both a domestic and international concept, used in different ways and influencing foreign policy contradictorily, it becomes important to analyze the diaspora between the usage of the term at the national and international level. Only by understanding the differences and similarities between the usage of the Chinese Dream for increasing nationalism and for soft power can we have a full sense of how the subject influences Chinese foreign policy.

Chapter IV – Methodology

In order to understand a concept as complex and multi-perspective as the Chinese Dream, a good analysis of the state of art is indispensable. So, the research started by delimiting the concept, through exploring different perspectives, presented by authors from various backgrounds and with often divergent assessments. The objective was to first expose the origins of the concept, in an historical and cultural sense. As stated by Lotman, “A text can be defined by the type of memory it needs for it to be understood.” (Lotman, 1990). So, to properly analyze discourses related to the Chinese Dream, and clearly identify the public they are addressed to, it is indispensable to understand the “common memory” behind the concept, a memory constructed through history and interpreted in a particular cultural perspective inside its own “semiosphere” - semiosphere is a concept introduced by Lotman, it is “(...) the result and the condition for the development of culture (...)” (Lotman, 1990). Next, it was important to understand the multitude of the concept, and its different usages inside and outside the national context. To fully do so, one must have a perception of China’s foreign policy as a whole and try to situate the concept of the Chinese Dream in it.

After identifying the dichotomies in the usage of the concept through the state of art and creating a solid background to minimize misperceptions, the study will use discourse analysis and content analysis to further understand the impact of the concept on China’s foreign policy.

Based on the contradiction of the usage of the concept nationally and internationally and, as previously explored, the notion that the national dimension of the subject impacts the international dimension and vice-versa – a perception supported by Lotman, who argues that the boundary of a semiotic space is a major element in defining the semiosphere’s identity –, the analysis hopes to explore both national and international discourses. The goal will be to further understand the different ways in which the concept is used, how those ways differ and on what instances they annul the other’s meaning. Exploring the exposing of the Chinese Dream to the national audience will let us understand in what ways nationalism is being enhanced and how the world is perceived inside the concept. Exploring the exposing of the concept to the international audience will allow us to see how that same concept is used outside its context, and if it is being used as a soft power tool.

In order to do so, and following Bardin’s three steps of content analysis, a pre-analysis was carried. First, discourses produced by authority figures of the CCP were selected. Author (not as an individual, but as an origin) is identified by Foucault as part of the internal systems

of exclusion, and an important factor in power relations. Being CCP the institution behind the concept, the representatives of that institution should be the ones studied. Adding to that, Bourdieu argues that “A performative utterance is destined to fail each time that it is not pronounced by a person who has the 'power' to pronounce it (...)” (Bourdieu, 1991), showing the importance of choosing the right speaker to analyze. The discourses selected are inside the timeline of the concept (posterior to 2012) and were retrieved mostly from Chinese official channels. After a floating reading of the material, discourses were selected based on their need for the research. The goal was to get diversified contexts - discourses addressed to different publics in diverse parts of the globe when it comes to external discourses, and in treating different subjects when it came to internal discourses - that directly addressed the Chinese Dream and/or national rejuvenation of China, seen to be fundamentally attached to the Chinese Dream. After the pre-selection, enters the step of exploring the material, where categories (or units of registration) were created based on the text corpus in order to assess not only the topics raised but also their variations according to the circumstances of their production and their different publics. So, different categories were selected for the internal and external discourses, given that the themes were often so diverse. This distinction is important since, as previously mentioned, they belong to different semiospheres, and are fated to different interpretations and ways of communicating. The next step will be to interpret the content of those already selected and categorized discourses. A qualitative analysis is a more malleable and adaptable, as well as unpredictable, method, as stated by Bardin. As so, it is a method that requires more context, reason why the background study of the concept was so exhaustive.

Both the concept of semiosphere, by Lotman, and the importance of power relations, by Foucault and Bourdieu, are on the basis of the discourse analysis, that selects different approaches that take in consideration the producer and the receiver of the discourse, and through which variation on the content may be analyzed. However, the analysis will be complemented and enriched by content analysis, through which the message itself will be examined. The texts were selected based on the person delivering them (a Chinese Leader), on the importance of the text for the theme (directly linked to the Chinese Dream or China's rejuvenation) and on the timeline (discourses delivered after 2012). When it comes to the national audience, most discourses were delivered in Chinese. Some of them were found already translated to English, and others were still in the original language, being posteriorly translated by the author for the reader's understanding. This fact may pose as a disadvantage since the analysis is tied to the quality of the translation. When it comes to the international audience, almost all the discourses

(with the exception of two) were already delivered in English, since they were address to non-Chinese speakers.

Chapter V – The Chinese Dream Discourse

“States with different identities have different world-views, which, in turn, make different impacts upon its foreign policies and strategies” (Qin, 2010). This is the main reason why the Chinese Dream influences Chinese Foreign Policy so much. It establishes an identity that echoes in the way the world itself is perceived; it is the lenses through which China perceives itself and others. It is not possible to get access to details of closed meetings or debates inside Chinese Leadership and, as so, the best option is to analyze discourse, or, in other words, the way in which the Chinese Dream is presented to the outside.

With China’s fast growing economy and international influence, there seems to have appeared in the international community a certain fear, a suspicion of the “Chinese threat”. China has tried over the years to ease those suspicions, with the formulation “peaceful development”, for example. However, those strategies did not completely succeed. As so, “(...) in recent years various scholars have highlighted the necessity to strengthen China’s “discursive power” (话语权) in order to counter the Western “discursive hegemony” (话语霸权). (...) Chinese government needs to establish its own “discourse system” (话题体系) to explain China’s international behavior properly.” (Boc, 2015). This goal plays a big factor in China’s foreign strategy. So, what part does the Chinese Dream play?

5.1 The Chinese Dream Domestic Discourse

Regarding the domestic discourse, the research analyzed 12 discourses and identified recurrent themes. Grounding on those themes, five main categories were created: common enemy; unity of China, a category with three sub-categories – reunification, unity of ethnicities and common goals; national humiliation; legitimacy to the CCP; and Chinese dream and the world. The categories will be further examined one by one.

The first one, “common enemy” can be related to Lotman’s notion of semiosphere. It is through the demarcation of space/values that the semiosphere’s boundary is delimited, through opposing notions such as poor/rich, civilized/barbaric or, in this case, friend/enemy. As stated by Lotman, “No matter whether a given culture sees the ‘barbarian’ as savior or enemy, as a healthy moral influence or a perverted cannibal, it is dealing with a construct made in its own inverted image.” (Lotman, 1990). It is the opposition that makes clear one’s own position. This

category is seen in discourses such as the speech delivered by President Xi at the NPC closing meeting in 2018. Here he states:

“Since modern times began, to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation has become the greatest dream of the Chinese nation. Chinese people never yield despite reverses, and they stand firm and indomitable. With the spirit of fighting the enemy to the last minute, the resolve of recovering the lost on the basis of self-reliance, and the ability of rising up among the community of nations, the Chinese people have made continuous efforts for more than 170 years to fulfill the great dreams. (...) No force can stop Chinese people's march toward realizing their dreams as long as we unite as one and strive together!” (Xi, 2018).

In this section of the discourse, the Chinese Dream is clearly related with the national humiliation narrative. Xi speaks of an “indomitable” and “self-reliant” nation, that has a “spirit of fighting the enemy” and “rising up”. Together with the allusion to efforts made for more than 170 years (correspondent to the first opium war), these terms become an allusion to the century of humiliation. However, they are used in a positive, rather than self-indulgent, tone. The focus is on the “efforts” to “fulfill great dreams”, and the “ability to rise up” and “recover”. The discourse takes, then, a turn to the present when stating “No force can stop Chinese people's march toward realizing their dreams”. The past is brought to the future as a continuous fight to this “force”, a force that the Chinese people had fought and continue to fight: a common enemy, standing on the way of those “great dreams”.

In this discourse, Xi uses some characteristics that define the Chinese people. He describes them as “firm” and “indominable” and ends with the remark that Chinese people need to be together to fight their “enemy”. As stated by Lotman, culture defines itself. By defining Chinese people, Xi Jinping seems to be defining its own country, projecting the characteristics that in the eyes of the Chinese Dream define the people. Clearly, the concept is born from a complex past, one that conducted to the creation of the term “Chinese Dream”. “Whether we have in mind language, politics, or culture, the mechanism is the same: one part of the semiosphere (as a rule one which is part of its nuclear structure) in the process of self-description creates its own grammar [...]” (Lotman, 1990). The way a culture describes itself defines it as well.

On another speech delivered by president Xi in 2017, at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the same theme reoccurs:

“Our Party was deeply aware that, to achieve national rejuvenation, it was critical to topple the three mountains of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism that were oppressing the Chinese people, and realize China’s independence, the people’s liberation, national reunification, and social stability.” (Xi, 2017)

This time, the “force” or enemy is plainly identified as “imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism”. These terms seem to oppose in the discourse to the national rejuvenation, defined as the realization of “China’s independence, the people’s liberation, national reunification, and social stability.”. So, there is a demarcation, as mentioned before, between the inside/outside, civil/barbaric and friend/enemy: “(...) every culture begins by dividing the world into “its own” internal space and “their” external space.” (Lotman, 1990). Independence, liberation, reunification and stability live inside the semiosphere of the Chinese Dream discourse, opposed to the outside, posed as imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. According to Xi, there was a common enemy that had to be segregated as much as possible from China, in order to accomplish rejuvenation.

The second category is unity of China. This category is separated in three subcategories: reunification, a term that, as seen, plays a big part in the Chinese Dream concept; unity of ethnicities; and common goal, which is to realize the Chinese Dream.

As previously seen, reunification takes a big part in two of the key foreign policy objectives of the CCP: to preserve China’s national integrity and unite with Taiwan. It is also identified as a crucial point when it comes to the Chinese Dream: “Our country must be reunified, and will surely be reunified. This is a historical conclusion drawn from the evolution of cross-Straits relations over the past seven decades; it is also critical to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era.” (Xi, 2019). As often mentioned by CCP leaders, rejuvenation would only be accomplished, in their eyes, after the full unification of China. This is the narrative used to justify assertiveness of Chinese foreign policies concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea, for example. The narrative is here used as certainty– “will surely be reunified” – making it seem almost fate related.

The Chinese Dream is, complementarily, used as a bond that unites Taiwan with mainland China: “(...) 中国梦与台湾的前途是息息相关的。中国梦是两岸共同的梦，需要大家一起来圆梦。“兄弟同心，其利断金。”两岸同胞要相互扶持，不分党派，不分阶层，不分宗教，不分地域，都参与到民族复兴的进程中来，让我们共同的中国梦早日成真。” (Xi, 2014). (Translation: “The Chinese dream and the future of Taiwan are closely related. The

Chinese Dream is a dream shared by both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and we need to come together to fulfill it. "When two brothers think alike, it is more than gold can buy." Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should support each other and participate in the process of national rejuvenation regardless of party affiliation, class, religion, or region, so that our common Chinese dream can come true as soon as possible!). So, not only the Chinese Dream is related to reunification, the reunification is also related to the Chinese Dream, since it poses as "motivation" to it. The concept is, in a way, being employed as a mean to create Chinese nationalism in Taiwan.

The same applies to the subcategory of the unity of ethnicities: "People of all ethnic groups across the country are engaged in a joint endeavor to realize the Two Centenary Goals and fulfill the Chinese Dream of national renewal."(Xi, 2017). The common goal is used to create a bond across ethnicities that are not always attached through culture or identity. Once again, the Chinese Dream is used to increase nationalism.

Both these subcategories lead us, in a way, to the last one: common goal. In this subcategory, the Chinese Dream is used as a common goal for all Chinese people: "中国梦是国家梦、民族梦，也是每个中华儿女的梦。广大海外侨胞有着赤忱的爱国情怀、雄厚的经济实力、丰富的智力资源、广泛的商业人脉，是实现中国梦的重要力量。" (Xi, 2014) (Translation: "The Chinese Dream is a national dream, a people's dream, and a dream of every Chinese child. Overseas Chinese have passionate patriotism, strong economic strength, rich intellectual resources and extensive business contacts, and are an important force in realizing the Chinese dream.") In this discourse we can see well present the three dimensions of the Chinese Dream – national ("国家梦"), societal ("民族梦"), and personal ("每个中华儿女的梦"). It is even extended to the Chinese people abroad, as a goal that still tight them together to the nation. This common goal is ultimately integrated in the nationalistic sense of the people, as an objective that, as a Chinese, one intrinsically has.

As a whole, the category "unity of China" seems to relate to the nationalistic sense of the country, where the leaders use the Chinese Dream narrative to justify reunification of the country and to increase the people's nationalism, by creating a common goal that sets them with a feeling of belonging and shared mission. On the year of the completion of the first goal - to establish a "moderate well-off society" by 2021- Xi re-introduces Mao Zedong theme of "common prosperity", looking to pursue a more "egalitarian" society. As explained in an article by Bloomberg, "Ahead of its 100th anniversary in July, the Communist Party declared

the completion of a long effort to create a “moderately prosperous society.” That opened a door for Xi to set the pursuit of common prosperity as a new guiding principle.” (Paskin, 2021). So, it is notable that this common goal narrative is not going to decrease, and more elements will be added to the extension in which that “community” is perceived.

The third category, “National humiliation discourse”, is intertwined in the previous categories, as a basic understanding and the “mother” discourse of the Chinese Dream. This category has only explanation and understanding inside China’s own culture, due to the historical events only lived and understood by the Chinese people. As explained by Lotman, “The text is not only the generator of new meanings, but also a condenser of cultural memory. (...) The sum of the contexts in which a given text acquires interpretation and which are in a way incorporated in it may be termed the text's memory. This meaning-space created by the text around itself enters into relationship with the cultural memory (tradition) already formed in the consciousness of the audience. As a result the text acquires semiotic life.” (Lotman, 1990). So, a given text is always understood under a certain context. The same applies to discourse and, in this case, to the Chinese Dream. Chinese Dream discourse lives in the same semiotic space as the national humiliation discourse. Although the humiliation discourse is not loudly present, nor is it addressed as directly as in previous discourses given by other generations of Chinese leaders, it is still underlyingly present:

“The Chinese nation, which since modern times began had endured so much for so long, has achieved a tremendous transformation: it has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong; it has come to embrace the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation.” (Xi, 2017)

However, the tone seem to have changed to a more positive remark. Expressions such as “transformation”, “stood up”, “grown rich” and “strong” show that the humiliation narrative is not so much about the humiliation itself anymore, but the pride of the nation for overcoming that time. It is perceived as a source of honor and a demonstration of strength, materializing, ultimately, in a source of nationalism.

In the next category, legitimacy to the CCP, the Chinese Dream discourse is used to justify the party’s validity, expressing the accomplishments of the Communist party or arguing that the Chinese Dream can only be accomplished through the party. Pierre Boudieu claims that actions are always interest-driven, with gains of different forms and kinds: economic, social, cultural or symbolic power. The Chinese Dream discourse may be perceived exactly as that: a mean to getting symbolic power or, in other words, legitimacy.

As stated by John B. Thompson, “(...) symbolic power is an 'invisible' power which is 'misrecognized' as such and thereby 'recognized' as legitimate. The terms 'recognition' (reconnaissance) and 'misrecognition' (meconnaissance) play an important role here: they underscore the fact that the exercise of power through symbolic exchange always rests on a foundation of shared belief.” (Thompson, 1991) And the Chinese Dream plays that role: the shared belief that enables the party to be recognized as legitimate, allowing the misrecognition of power, and, ultimately, providing the symbolic power itself. That is seen in passages such as this:

“The Party is the highest force for political leadership and the fundamental guarantee of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” (Xi, 2018)

This statement by Xi underlines the assumption that the Chinese rejuvenation is connected with the party, being the later the “guarantee” to the previous. So, in the eyes of this connection, whoever would want the national rejuvenation to be accomplished, would want the CCP in power.

Another example of this is in the speech delivered in the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China of 2017 by president Xi: “Realizing our great dream demands a great project. This project is the great new project of Party building that is just getting into full swing. As history has shown and will continue to bear witness to, without the leadership of the Communist Party of China, national rejuvenation would be just a wishful thinking.” (Xi, 2017). Here Xi clearly states that, without CCP, the national rejuvenation of the country “would be a wishful thinking”, marking the idea that only through CCP can the “great dream” be accomplished; as a result of this logic, if anyone would want the Chinese Dream to be accomplished then would, by extent, consider the CCP as the legitimate ruling party. By defending his argument through history – “As history has shown and will continue to bear witness to (...)” – Xi seems to be regarding his concept as a given fact, falling in the sphere of common sense. There is ultimately a naturalization of the ruling of the party: it is already part of “history”, according to Xi’s statement, and an undeniable truth that the Chinese Dream would only be “wishful” “without the leadership of the Communist Party of China”.

The last category is the Chinese Dream and the world, a category where the leaders expose the way the world is perceived within the context of the Chinese Dream. In the discourse delivered by Xi at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, he states:

“The dream of the Chinese people is closely connected with the dreams of the peoples of other countries; the Chinese Dream can be realized only in a peaceful international environment and under a stable international order. We must keep in mind both our internal and international imperatives, stay on the path of peaceful development, and continue to pursue a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up. We will uphold justice while pursuing shared interests, and will foster new thinking on common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. We will pursue open, innovative, and inclusive development that benefits everyone; boost cross-cultural exchanges characterized by harmony within diversity, inclusiveness, and mutual learning; and cultivate ecosystems based on respect for nature and green development. China will continue its efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order.”(Xi, 2017)

By starting the segment relating the Chinese Dream to the “dreams of other peoples”, Xi seems to be setting the tone by giving an international dimension to the concept. Once again, there is also a presence of a strong idea that the Chinese Dream needs a stable and peaceful international environment to be accomplished – “(...) the Chinese Dream can be realized only in a peaceful international environment and under a stable international order.”- alluding to the unharmful dimension of the concept. In this section, Xi connects the Chinese Dream in the international context to values highly attached to Confucian ideals, such as harmony – “(...) boost cross-cultural exchanges characterized by harmony (...)” -, righteousness – “We will pursue open, innovative, and inclusive development that benefits everyone (...)” - and respect, - “respect for nature”. In the segment, the leader uses terms attached to China’s culture, making it very easy for the people to understand. These are all considered ethically superior principals of Confucius, for which China is portrayed by Xi here as a morally strong country.

In most of these categories (common enemy, unity of China and national humiliation discourse), the Chinese Dream is used to increase nationalism and unity in China. The concept is also used both as a motivation and a justification for the reunification of China, even when that influences foreign relations. The concept itself is sometimes defined by contrast to the outside, as seen in the “common enemy” category, establishing a strong sense of the values attached to the Chinese Dream, but creating, consequently, undesirable others in a form of enemy that, as seen through the samples, are not someone but rather something, an abstract presence. This abstract presence may be associated with a various number of concrete agents, such as countries, regions of the world or people which may ultimately lead to tensions and deteriorate China’s foreign relations.

On the other hand, the concept of the Chinese Dream is internally exposed as a shared dream, meaning, and international ideal. As stated before, the concept does require, in the eyes of the leaders, a peaceful international environment and is associated with Confucian values that are far from aggressive. However, as seen in literature review, Confucius does not regard defensiveness as morally punishable. As so, in this case, the “reunification” dimension, attached to the Chinese Dream, does not come in contradiction to that peacefulness when, in the eyes of the CCP, China is protecting what’s rightfully Chinese. This urge to defend the country may be enhanced by nationalism that, as seen before, is being highly encouraged through the Chinese Dream. Also highly attached to the term is the national humiliation, as a basis for the rejuvenation of the nation. It is imperative, in China’s eyes, that the country does not “lose face” or sovereignty when it comes to international relations. A solid nationalistic sense is attached to that positivism that China “stood up” or “raised up”, and “transformed” from a bullied nation to a “strong” one. The fact that the national humiliation discourse has shifted for the Chinese Dream puts a great pressure on China, for it is not a weak country anymore and its pride in that fact has to be maintained at all costs. That is the danger the Chinese Dream poses internationally: the time has come to place nationalism on China’s achievements and on what it has overcome. The Dream is in motion and must not be shattered, especially because the legitimacy of the party is, as analyzed, greatly attached to its accomplishment.

5.2 The Chinese Dream External Discourse

Regarding the external discourse, the analysis chose to categorize 30 discourses. This gap in number, compared with the internal discourse, is due to the diversification asked in regard to the global location of the audience: it is essential to select discourses addressed to the 5 continents in order to completely understand the usage of the concept around the world. Because of the previous mentioned concept of Semiosphere, introduced by Lotman, the discourse has to be adapted to the different cultures and contexts found around the world. As so, the concept of the Chinese Dream is also exposed in different ways by the Chinese leaders. Another aspect to have in consideration regarding the external discourse is that it differs from the previous due to power relations. As explored by both Foucault and Bourdieu, power is an important factor when examining discourses. While in internal discourse the Chinese leaders pose as hierarchically superior to their public, in the external discourse the power relations change, and, as a consequence, so does discourse.

Inside the external discourse, four categories were identified: common goals, referring to the usage of concepts such as “World Dream” and “African Dream”; Chinese values and CCP legitimacy, as in trying to show China’s credibility; sameness vs otherness, as a kind of us versus them narrative, where similarities are emphasized in contrast to a third entity; and lastly the China/World category, where the leaders use the Chinese Dream to state China’s vision and contributions to the world.

Soft power has already been defined as “(...) the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” (Nye, 2018). Very close to that definition, comes Bourdieu definition of symbolic power: “(...) a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization (...)” (Bourdieu, 1991). In the category “Common goal”, the Chinese leaders seem to extend their Chinese Dream to other people’s Dreams. That “dream”, that here loses sense in terms of the rejuvenation of China and the humiliation century, gains a new perspective- it stops being a national term, to become international; all of the sudden, it is not a “dream” only Chinese, but shared by the world. As stated by Bourdieu, it is the changing of the vision that enables the action. By giving a “vision”, or, in this case, a shared dream, China seems to be trying to relate to other countries, as a shared bond (similarly to what happens in domestic discourse), thus increasing its influence or, in other words, its soft power and symbolic power.

In 2013, president Xi gave a speech at the Julius Nyerer International Convention Center, where he stated: “The over 1.3 billion Chinese people are working hard to realize the Chinese dream of great national renewal, and the over one billion African people are committed to the African dream of gaining strength from unity and achieving development and rejuvenation.” (Xi, 2013). Here, the “African Dream” is defined with terms closely related to the Chinese Dream: “unity”, “development” and “rejuvenation”. So, the dreams seem to converge in meaning and mission, in what seems like an attempt to place Chinese difficulties in the same stance as the African ones, thus relating to the approach China seems to have in terms of identifying as the representer of the “Global South”. China tries, in a way, to enter or create a common semiosphere with Africa, where values, objectives and obstacles align, bringing two very different regions together. Further on the speech, Xi says: “The Chinese and African people should enhance unity, cooperation, mutual support and assistance so as to make our

dreams come true.”(Xi, 2013). As stated by Bourdieu, symbolic power marks a change of vision that enables action. There seems to be a very clear call to action on this stance: to enhance “unity”; “cooperation”, “support” and “assistance”. These actions all lead to the belief that, through them, the “dream” is achievable. If one, then, believes the dream, one should, based on what was said, support the relationship between China and Africa. There is a clear outcome that is wanted from the speech, placing then the “dreams” narrative in the scope of soft power.

In another different circumstance, Xi addresses the Australian Parliament with the same narrative: “As the Chinese saying goes, true friendship exists only when there is an abiding commitment to pursue common goals. (...) Australians often say that those who lose dreaming are lost. As the Chinese and Australian people strive to fulfil our respective dreams, let us join hands and work shoulder to shoulder to create a brighter future for the China-Australia comprehensive strategic partnership and to enhance peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.” (Xi, 2014). An association is made in the discourse between friendship and common goals: commitment to common goals is proportional to the level of friendship. Here, the concept of dreams is vaguely mentioned and not as clearly defined as in Africa – showing an adaptation to relations of power and contexts. However, similar to the previous speech, there is a call to action: to enhance China-Australia partnership. That partnership connects with terms such as “peace”, “stability” and “prosperity”, that seem to be part of the objective but a reward at the same time and extend beyond the two countries.

In another speech given by Yang Jiechi in the USA, the leader states: “The Chinese dream and the beautiful dreams of people across the world, including the American dream, are concerted and mutually complementary to each other.” (Yang, 2013). In this case, there seems to be no attempt at all to make the Chinese Dream similar to the American Dream. However, they are described as “concerted” and “complementary”, offering a similarity in goals but not exactly a common goal between the two countries. Again, the discourse and usage of the concept is adjusted to its audience.

All these occasions have one thing in common: through “dreams” China is trying to relate with other countries, to establish similarities and put common interests on the table, exerting a kind of symbolic power that sometimes calls to direct action.

The following category, Chinese Values and CCP’s legitimacy is intended to highlight China’s (and the Party’s) achievements, while showing its values. In a seminar of the Chinese Dream and the African Dream, Lu Shaye stated that: “The Chinese Dream, in essence, is about

prosperity of the country, rejuvenation of the nation, and happiness of the people. This is a blueprint we have drawn according to the historical trajectory of China. It is in keeping with our national conditions, receives strong support from the Chinese people, and provides a source of inspiration as we work for greater development. What has happened in the past 60-plus years since the founding of the People's Republic proves that we have the confidence and capability to realize the dream.” (Lu, 2013) The Chinese Leader starts by defining the Chinese Dream, connecting it with terms such as “prosperity”, “rejuvenation” and “happiness”. Speaking of country, nation and people, the author clearly identifies the three dimensions of the dream - national, societal, and personal – offering a clarification on the concept and its values. He further relates the Chinese Dream to the “historical trajectory of China”, emphasizing the authenticity of the concept, followed by a description of the positive effects of such concept – “receives strong support”, “source of inspiration”, “greater development”. After, China’s capability is highlighted by stating that history is a “prove” of China’s ability to realize its dream. By identifying the beginning of that implied history of success as “the founding of the People's Republic”, the merit of that “success” is put under the CCP’s leadership. In a way, leaders seem to be using the Chinese capacity to realize its dream to spread a sense of legitimacy abroad, thus safeguarding the most important key foreign policy objective: maintain China’s existing political system.

The next category, sameness versus otherness, is, again, related to a demarcation inside the scope of us versus them. It is through similarities that a union is formed, and those similarities could not exist without an opposing other, the otherness. The discourse is used to highlight common experiences and values. This may be perceived as an attempt to create a feeling of “common memory”, mentioned before, where certain terms and expressions resonate to not only Chinese but the audience to which the discourse is addressed. As stated by Lotman, “Communication with another person is only possible if there is some degree of common memory.” (Lotman, 1990). This common memory comes naturally when the leaders are addressing China: the same history and culture enable an inherent understanding of concepts and values. However, on a different semiosphere, a different culture with different values, that common memory has to be created, and the better it is, the better the communication will be. One example that falls into this category is Lu Shaye’s discourse at the seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream in 2013:

“(…) the Chinese Dream and the African Dream are both for greater strength through independent efforts. Both China and Africa went through trials and tribulations in the

past. As two great nations, we do not allow ourselves to be at the mercy of others or blindly follow others. (...). We oppose others' interference in our internal affairs, keep to our own path of development, and mainly rely on ourselves for economic and social development. We don't interfere in others' internal affairs either. We respect the right of people of other countries to choose their own path of development and social system, and base our positions and policies on the merit of facts.” (Lu, 2013). First, Lu Shaye makes a declaration about what both the Chinese Dream and the African Dream are about: “greater strength through independent efforts”. “Independency” here is a key term, since in the next phrase Lu speaks of the “trials and tribulations of the past”, clearly referring to China’s humiliation century and colonialism in Africa. That is confirmed in the next statement, by the usage of expressions such as “mercy of others” and “blindly follow others” referring, once again, to independency or the lack of it. However, the discourse is focused on a positivity of accomplishment, similar to the one given to the Chinese Dream when addressing the century of humiliation in internal discourse, by the usage of expressions such as “oppose others' interference”, “keep to our own path of development” and “rely on ourselves”, asserting, again, the independence idea, contrasted with the previous struggles that came from the absence of it. That is perceived here as a common struggle and a common accomplishment. Those are followed by common ideals: “respect the right of people” and “merit of facts”. All those values and accomplishments are connected here to the respective dreams of each nation, for they are a presupposition behind them, as seen in the first sentence.

On another speech, delivered by Wang Yi in 2020 at the French institute of international relations the same category of discourse may be found: “Like Europe, China is one of the oldest and most respected civilizations in the world. As President Xi Jinping said, realizing national rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese nation since modern times. Only nations that once achieved greatness could appreciate the meaning of rejuvenation. Only peoples that survived so many trials and tribulations would yearn for rejuvenation.” (Wang, 2020). In this discourse, the leader tries to connect to a completely different audience with completely and, in many ways, opposite experiences and memories. In here, China perceives itself as an old and respected civilization, alongside Europe. That common experience, together with, again, “trials and tribulations”, supposedly makes the concept of rejuvenation understandable to Europe. With the expression “only nations” and “only peoples” the leader seems to be limiting this understanding to those who had those experiences, meaning, in this

case, China and Europe. That exclusivity of understanding is, again, intended to create that “common memory” fundamental to communication and bonding.

The last category, China/World, is a clarification of where the world stands on the concept of the Chinese Dream. On a speech delivered by Xi Jinping at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly New York, the leader stated: “The realization of the Chinese dream will bring more opportunities to other countries and contribute to global peace and development.” (Xi, 2015). In this case, Xi associates the Chinese Dream with “opportunities to other countries” and “peace” and “development” for the world, asserting that the world would benefit from the accomplishment of the dream. This is, again, evidence of the international dimension of the Chinese Dream.

Further on that speech, Xi also states: “We cannot realize the Chinese dream without a peaceful international environment, a stable international order and the understanding, support and help from the rest of the world. (...) China will continue to participate in building world peace. We are committed to peaceful development. No matter how the international landscape may evolve and how strong it may become, China will never pursue hegemony, expansion or sphere of influence. China will continue to contribute to global development. We will continue to pursue common development and the win-win strategy of opening-up.” (Xi, 2015). In this case, instead of showing the benefits the Chinese Dream would have to the world, Xi shows the conditions of the world that are needed for the realization of the dream. Those resonate conditions are “peaceful international environment, a stable international order and the understanding, support and help from the rest of the world.”. These values of “peace”, “stability”, “understanding” and “support” seem to have an association with the core socialist values that, in turn, are associated with Confucian values. The following statement highlights that, with the usage of terms highly related with the concept of harmony, such as “peace”, “common development” and “win-win”. These are all values that, in the discourse, are used to describe China’s attitude towards the world so, in a way, China is claiming Confucian values as its national values.

On another speech, delivered at Paris, Xi Jinping states: “The Chinese dream is about contributing to the common good of the world. “In poverty, one should still hold himself to a high standard; when prosperous, one should contribute to the wellbeing of all.” This ancient Chinese maxim describes the lofty aspirations and vision cherished by the Chinese people. By managing its own affairs well, China is both fulfilling the responsibility to its own people and

contributing to the common good of the world. As it grows steadily, China will, as it has done in the past, continue to endeavor to contribute to world peace and development.”(Xi, 2014). Again, by referring to “common good” and “peace” as values desired by China, Xi seem to be resonating to that idea of harmony and benevolence, very characteristic of Confucius. The leader uses an “ancient Chinese maxim” and refers to the “past” as to show the long-term commitment of the country to those values. Again, the Chinese Dream is associated with Confucian values, and is being emphasized as a non-threatening goal.

On the international scope, there is not just a clarification of the concept of the Chinese Dream, together with the assertion of the values behind it, but an active usage of the concept to relate to other countries from various parts of the world. As seen in the beginning, the Chinese Dream is, in fact, being used as a soft power tool: through attraction (e.g. relating cooperation with the accomplishment of dreams, portraying China as a peaceful country hoping to extend its dream to the world), China is looking for an outcome (e.g. enhancing cooperation with other countries, improve its international image). When there seem to be almost no similarities, China found in the Chinese Dream an opportunity to create them. So, the Chinese Dream is not only being used to unite China, but also to unite China to the world, giving an international dimension to the concept, on top of the former three presented (national, social and personal).

5.3 Comparison of the Chinese Dream Discourse in the domestic and international dimension: converging and diverging perspectives

In terms of values, the Chinese Dream does not seem to change much from the domestic to the international dimension. The same core socialist and Confucian values present on the national concept are exposed in international discourse. Since the audience differs, and so does the semiosphere, the leaders assert those values to the outside more often than in national discourses, in order to enhance the understanding of the concept. So, the Chinese Dream is more often used as an explanation and not as a given concept.

The Chinese Dream is, as well, used both in domestic and international audience as a soft power tool: as a mean to justify or call to actions, not through coercion but through attraction. If one believes in the Chinese Dream and its values, one believes in the actions associated with it and in the ruling of the party; if one wants to extend the Chinese Dream to its own country and adapt it to their national dream, then one is by association in favor of China and following the values presented. This leads to the legitimacy issue: the Chinese Dream is

used on the inside and outside as a source of legitimacy to the party and an assertion of the party's values. The idea that if one wants to have the dream realized, one must want the CCP in charge is implicit in discourses. The concept is also used as a way of unity, inside China between the people, ethnicities, and regions, and outside between China and other countries.

In a way, it is not possible to separate the concept in its international and national dimension, just as it is not possible to separate the national, societal, and personal dimensions, since they are all intertwined. Even in national discourse, the internationality of the concept is mentioned, as seen in the category "Chinese Dream and the world". So, the analysis would add a dimension that is often underestimated: the Chinese Dream is a national, societal, personal and international concept.

However, that internationality is put in cause when exploring the national dimension in isolation. First, the concept of the Chinese Dream is, as mentioned, used to increase nationalism in China, actioning cohesion and justifying reunification. That reunification has in base all the territories considered by CCP as Chinese, so the Chinese Dream serves as an excuse to consider aggressive foreign policies as defensiveness instead of offensive. The big issue of the Chinese Dream remains, thus, in its origin: the Chinese Dream was born, not from the humiliation narrative and a dark time in Chinese history, not from victimization of the country of the stigmatization of the nation; the concept comes from the assertion that that dark time, humiliation and victimization have passed. It comes from a glory achieved after tragedy. It is the revindication that greatness is being restored to the country, with the CCP at its lead. It is a prove, in the Chinese eyes, of the CCP's success, socialist success and communism success. So, the narrative must not fall, for if it falls, so does the country's, and maybe more importantly, the CCP's credibility. This is the true influence the Chinese Dream has in Chinese Foreign Policy: a country whose leadership and pride are hold by a dream, a dream that cannot be shattered, or the country would come to be shattered as well. In order not to shatter the dream, all is possible, all is justifiable, all is doable and will be done.

Conclusion

The research addressed the question of how the Chinese Dream concept influences Chinese foreign policy. To explore that question, an extensive literature review was carried giving background on the concept itself, thus providing the basis for the future analysis. The analysis was then conducted using discourse analysis and content analysis, a qualitative method that provides insight on how the concept is being used, what other concepts are associated with it and what are the recurrent themes connected with the Chinese Dream. It was never the research's intention to understand the veracity of what is said by the Chinese leaders, but rather to understand the usage and how the concept is applied. That method comes, however, with limitations. There is always a degree of subjectivity when it comes to qualitative methods, especially in analyzing discourses and their content. It is not possible to perceive the real intention behind the usage of the Chinese Dream. To do so, one should be present at CCP closed meetings and have access to confidential files which, unfortunately, was not possible. In order to fully address the question of the impact of the Chinese Dream on Chinese foreign policy, one should also have a perception on the real impact and influence the concept causes both nationally and internationally. To have that perception, the analysis should be complemented with quantitative methods measuring the audience's adherence to the concept, and the real influence of the Chinese Dream in China's nationalism.

Nevertheless, the work concluded that the Chinese Dream has a deep international dimension: it is used to perceive the world, and to let the world perceive China in a certain way. It is used to create unity both inside and outside of China, to increase CCP's legitimacy, again, nationally and internationally, as well as to show China renewed strength and capacity. It is used to create common goals as much as to portray China as an advocator of Confucian values, such as benevolence, harmony, and peace. In this sense, it is concluded that the Chinese Dream is used as a soft power tool outside and inside the country, and as a source of legitimacy to the CCP.

However, through the discourses, it was possible to understand the importance of reunification and unity to the concept. Furthermore, it was possible to understand how crucial the concept is for the CCP's credibility and, ultimately, survival. Internally, nationalism gains strength from the concept as well, being the renewal faced as pride, a measure for the country's power and value. Through these notions, one understands the significance of accomplishing the Dream, with all the conditions included. As so, any threats for the Dream, are threats for

the country itself, in the eyes of the CCP. That impacts foreign policy, in enabling aggressiveness when those conditions are put in cause. Action becomes justifiable as to protect what is said to be China's interests. Nothing that diminishes China in any way is now tolerable since nationalism is constructed based on rejuvenation. And reunification is non-negotiable in the eyes of the Dream. Without it the Chinese Dream will not be accomplished. So, what is considered by the outside as Chinese foreign policy, is considered by China as internal policy - a rather crucial one. Outside, Chinese actions are perceived as offensive, when for China they are seen as defensiveness, which increases tensions and misunderstandings. However, CCP depends on its perseverance when dealing with these issues, since, as stated before, its own survival is at stake. So, China will keep on pushing for its Chinese Dream to be accomplished.

So, if in one hand, China needs a stable and peaceful external environment for its growth and for the consequential accomplishment of the Chinese Dream, it also needs to be obstinate when dealing with the outside, so as to keep the party's legitimacy and the country's pride at the surface. Those two situations walk hand in hand with the Chinese Dream, placing foreign policy at a crossroads.

References

- Arif, Beston. (2017). The Role of Soft Power in China's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. *International Journal of Social Sciences and Educational Studies*. 3. 94-101. 10.23918/ijsses.v3i3p94.
- Bardin, L.(2011). *Análise de conteúdo*. São Paulo: Edições 70.
- Berkofsky, Axel. (2016). "The Chinese Dream" and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities. *Asia-Pacific Review*. 23. 109-128. 10.1080/13439006.2016.1244963.
- Boc, A. (2015). The Power of Language: Globalizing "The Chinese Dream". *Fudan J. Hum. Soc. Sci.* 8, 533–551 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-015-0102-y>
- Bourdieu, Pierre, 1930-2002. (1991). *Language and symbolic power*. Cambridge, Mass. :Harvard University Press,
- Cai, K.G. (2020). Constructing an Analytical Framework for Explaining Chinese Foreign Policy. *Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 5, 355–373. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-020-00150-5>
- Callahan, W. A. (2004). National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism. *Alternatives*, 29(2), 199–218. <https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540402900204>
- Callahan, William. (2015). Identity and Security in China: The Negative Soft Power of the China Dream. *Politics*. 35. 10.1111/1467-9256.12088.
- Chasing the Chinese dream (2013). *The economist*. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2013/05/04/chasing-the-chinese-dream>
- China's dream and nightmares (2018). *The economist*. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2018/11/03/chinas-dream-and-nightmares>
- Costa, Cátia Miriam (2020). « O discurso chinês para os países africanos de língua portuguesa: O papel do Fórum Macau », *Relações Internacionais (R:I)*, ID : [10670/1.yqiwnt](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2564-3_2)
- Costa, Cátia Miriam (2021). "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Future: India and Pakistan as new members". In J.R.A. Pila, A. G. Acosta, M.T. Jarrín (Ed.). *The future of the asia-pacific in the new world order* (pp. 155-173). Tirant lo Blanch
- Costa, Cátia Miriam. (2020). The Words of the Belt and Road Initiative: A Chinese Discourse for the World?. 10.1007/978-981-15-2564-3_2.

Courmont, Barthélémy. (2013). What Implications for Chinese Soft Power: Charm Offensive or New Hegemony?. *Pacific Focus*. 28. 10.1111/pafo.12014.

Demir, Emre. (2019). Understanding the transformation in Chinese foreign policy: A historical evaluation from 1949 to 2019. 1. 6-24. 10.38154/cjas.11.

Feng, M.X.Y. (2015). The ‘Chinese Dream’ Deconstructed: Values and Institutions. *J OF CHIN POLIT SCI* 20, 163–183. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-015-9344-4>

Foucault, M. (1971). Orders of discourse. *Social Science Information*, 10(2), 7–30. <https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847101000201>

Gaspar, C. (2019). Xi Jinping e o “sonho chinês”. *O Público*. Retrieved from <https://www.publico.pt/2019/12/16/mundo/analise/xi-jinping-sonho-chines-1897424>

Gow, Michael (2017) The Core Socialist Values of the Chinese Dream: towards a Chinese integral state, *Critical Asian Studies*, 49:1, 92-116, DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2016.1263803

Heng (2013). The China Dream – Trouble on the way to paradise. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/opinion/heng-the-china-dream.html?searchResultPosition=2>

Jiang Zemin (1991). Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China. *People’s Daily*. <http://en.people.cn/>

Kong Xuanyou (2016). Realize Win-Win Cooperation in Asia By Promoting Exchange and Mutual Learning among Civilizations [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Lams, L. (2018). Examining Strategic Narratives in Chinese Official Discourse under Xi Jinping. *J OF CHIN POLIT SCI* 23, 387–411 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-9529-8>

Lanteigne, M. (2019). *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (4th ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429437908>

Li Yuanchao (2015). To Renew the Friendship Across High Mountains and Contribute Asian Wisdom to World Peace and Developmen [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Li Yuanchao (2016). Remarks by Vice President Li Yuanchao at the Reception In Honor of President Pranab Mukherjee [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Li, Xing. (2015). Interpreting and Understanding "The Chinese Dream" in a Holistic Nexus. *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*. 8. 10.1007/s40647-015-0098-3.

Liu Guangyuan (2013). Deepen China-Africa Media Cooperation and Enrich the China-Africa Community of Shared Destinies [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Liu Yandong (2016). Join Hands to Create a Bright Future of Peace and Prosperity [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Lotman, I. U. M. (1990). *Universe of the mind: A semiotic theory of culture*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lu Shaye (2013). Speech by Mr. Lu Shaye, Director-General of African Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream--Achieving Common Development through Joint Efforts [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Lu, Chunlong. (2015). Urban Chinese Support for the Chinese Dream: Empirical Findings from Seventeen Cities. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 20. 10.1007/s11366-015-9343-5.

Lui Hua (2014). 坚定不移追求中国人权梦 推动国际人权事业健康发展 [Speech transcript]. Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in the Macao Special Administrative Region. <http://www.fmcoprc.gov.mo/chn/>

Navarro, Z. (2006) In Search of a Cultural Interpretation of Power: The Contribution of Pierre Bourdieu. *IDS Bulletin* 37(6): 11-22

Nöth, W. (2015). The topography of Yuri Lotman's semiosphere. *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, 18(1), 11–26. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877914528114>

Nye, J. S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 94–109. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699>

Paskin, Janet (2021). What ‘Common Prosperity’ Means and Why Xi Wants It. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-03/what-common-prosperity-means-and-why-xi-wants-it-quicktake>

Pröpfer, Henrik (2020) "The “Chinese Dream”": An Analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative," *International Social Science Review*: Vol. 96 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. Available at: <https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol96/iss1/3>

Qin Yaqing (2010) “Struggle for Identity: A Political Psychology of China’s Rise”. In Brantly Womack, ed. *China’s Rise in Historical Perspective*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield

Roselle, L., Miskimmon, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2014). Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power. *Media, War & Conflict*, 7(1), 70–84. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696>

Sørensen, C. T. N. (2015). The Significance of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” for Chinese Foreign Policy: From “Tao Guang Yang Hui” to “Fen Fa You Wei”. *Journal of China and International Relations*, 3(1), 53-73. <https://doi.org/10.5278/ojs.jcir.v3i1.1146>

Wang Yi (2013). Peace, Development and Cooperation Must be Moved Forward Instead of Backward [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Wang Yi (2014). 中印共同追求民族复兴梦想[Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Wang Yi (2015). Build on Past Achievements and Open up the Future of All-round Development of China-Africa Friendship and Cooperation [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Wang Yi (2017). Toward Peace and Development for All [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Wang Yi (2020). Upholding the Trend of Peace and Development of Our World with Unity, Cooperation, Openness and Inclusiveness [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Wang, Z. (2013). The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context. *J OF CHIN POLIT SCI* 19, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-013-9272-0>

Wasserstrom, N. J. (2014). The Elusive Chinese Dream. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/the-elusive-chinese-dream.html?searchResultPosition=5>

Weissmann, M. (2015). Chinese Foreign Policy in a Global Perspective : A Responsible Reformer “Striving For Achievement”. *Journal of China and International Relations*, 3, 151-166.

Xi Jinping (2012). Xi Pledges ‘Great Renewal of Chinese Nation [Speech transcript]. Xinhua. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/>

Xi Jinping (2013). Trustworthy Friends and Sincere Partners Forever [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2013). Working Together Toward a Better Future for Asia and the World [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2013). 建设社会主义文化强国 着力提高国家文化软实力 [Speech transcript]. CPCnews. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2014). Build a Community of Shared Destiny for Common Progress [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2014). Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence To Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2014). Full text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's address to Australia's Parliament [Speech transcript]. The Strait Times. <https://www.straitstimes.com/>

Xi Jinping (2014). Speech by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Meeting Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of China-France Diplomatic Relations [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2014). Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China At UNESCO Headquarters [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2014). Work Hard to Build a New Model of Major-Country Relationship Between China and the United States [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2014). 习近平会见第七届世界华侨华人社团联谊大会代表 [Speech transcript]. 中央政府门户网站. <http://www.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2014). 习近平在中法建交 50 周年纪念大会上的讲话 [Speech transcript]. 中央政府门户网站. <http://www.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2014). 共圆中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦 [Speech transcript]. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. <http://www.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2015). Carry Forward the Bandung Spirit for Win-win Cooperation [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2015). Jointly Write a New Chapter in the Partnership of Comprehensive Cooperation Between China and Latin America and the Caribbean [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2015). Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2015). 中华民族一家亲 同心共筑中国梦 [Speech transcript]. CPCnews. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2015). 习近平在伦敦金融城的演讲 [Speech transcript]. Xinhua news. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/>

Xi Jinping (2017). Address at the Meeting Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong's Return to the Motherland and The Inaugural Ceremony of The Fifth-Term Government of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region [Speech transcript]. Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. <http://www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/eng/>

Xi Jinping (2017). Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era [Speech transcript]. Xinhua news. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/>

Xi Jinping (2018). Full text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's speech at opening ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit [Speech transcript]. Xinhua Net. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/>

Xi Jinping (2018). Speech delivered by President Xi at the NPC closing meeting [Speech transcript]. China daily. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/>

Xi Jinping (2019). Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China's Peaceful Reunification [Speech transcript]. Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee. <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/>

Xi Jinping pledges 'great renewal of Chinese nation' (2012). National People's Congress of China, p. 26-27

Xi Jinping pledges 'great renewal of Chinese nation' (2012). *National People's Congress of China*, p. 26-27

Yang Jiechi (2013). China's Diplomacy At a New Historical Starting Point [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Yang Jiechi (2013). Implementing the Chinese Dream. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America. <http://www.china-embassy.org/>

Yang Jiechi (2014). Joining hands, and dreams [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Yang Jiechi (2015). Foster a Vision of Common, Comprehensive, Cooperative And Sustainable Security to Build a Better World Of Enduring Peace and Common Development [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Yang Jiechi (2018). Working Together to Build a World of Lasting Peace and Universal Security and a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>

Yang Jiechi (2013). Remarks by State Councilor Yang Jiechi at the Joint Opening Session of The Fifth Round of China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogues [Speech transcript]. Consulate General of People's Republic of China in Perth. <http://perth.chineseconsulate.org/>

Zhang Dejiang (2016). Full text of keynote speech of China's top legislator at Belt and Road Summit in Hong Kong [Speech transcript]. The National People's Congress of People's Republic of China. <http://www.npc.gov.cn/>

Zhou, Enlai (1995). Main Speech by Premier Zhou Enlai, Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Distributed at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference [Speech transcript]. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Translation from China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), 9-20. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121623>

Appendix A: Internal Discourse Table

	Analysis Categories						
	Common enemy	Unity of China			National humiliation discourse	Legitimacy to the CCP	Chinese dream and the world
		Reunification	Unity of ethnicities	Common goals			
<p>Speech delivered by President Xi at the NPC closing meeting (Xi, 2018)</p>	<p>x</p>			<p>x</p>		<p>x</p>	
<p>The Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation Is a Dream Shared by All Chinese (2014) (Seventh Conference of Friendship of Overseas Chinese Association)</p>				<p>x</p>			<p>x</p>

<p>Working together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China's Peaceful Reunification (Xi, 2019)</p> <p>(Speech at the Meeting Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan)</p>		<p>x</p>					
<p>Address at the Meeting Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong's Return to the Motherland and The Inaugural Ceremony of The Fifth-Term Government of The Hong Kong Special</p>		<p>x</p>	<p>x</p>				


Administrative Region (Xi, 2017) (Meeting celebrating the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to the motherland and the inaugural ceremony of the fifth-term government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region)							
Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a new era (Xi, 2017)	x	x		x	x	x	x

(Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China October 18, 2017)							
习近平：共圆中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦 (Xi, 2014) Taiwan		x					
摘自习近平 2013 年 12 月 30 日在中共中央政治局第十二次集体学习时的重要讲话 (Xi, 2013)				x			x
摘自习近平 2014 年 3 月 27 日在中法建交							x

5 0周年纪念大会上的讲话 (Xi, 2014)							
摘自习近平 2 0 1 4 年 3 月 2 7 日在中法建交 5 0周年纪念大会上的讲话 (Xi, 2014)				x			
摘自习近平 2 0 1 4 年 6 月 6 日会见第七届世界华侨华人社团联谊大会代表时的讲话 (Xi, 2014)			x	x			
习近平 2 0 1 5 年 9 月 3 0 日在会见基层民族团结优秀代表时强调 (Xi, 2015)			x				

习近平 2015 年 1 0 月 22 日在伦敦金融城 的演讲 (Xi, 2015)							x
---	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------

Appendix B: External Discourse Table

	Analysis Categories			
	Common goal	Chinese values and CCP's Legitimacy	Sameness vs otherness	China/World
				
Trustworthy Friends and Sincere Partners Forever (Xi Jinping, 2013) (Julius Nyerer International Convention Center, Africa)	x			x
Speech by Mr.Lu Shaye, Director-General of African Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream-- Achieving Common Development	x	x	x	x

<p>through Joint Efforts (Lu Shaye, 2013)</p> <p>(seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream)</p>				
<p>Deepen China-Africa Media Cooperation and Enrich the China-Africa Community of Shared Destinies (Liu Guangyuan, 2013)</p> <p>(Seminar on China-Africa Media cooperation)</p>	x			
<p>Working together towards a Better Future for Asia and the World (Xi, 2013)</p> <p>(Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2013)</p>		x		
<p>Working Together to forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperation and Create a</p>	x			x

<p>Community of Shared Future for Mankind Statement (Xi, 2015)</p> <p>(General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly New York)</p>				
<p>Full text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's address to Australia's Parliament (Xi, 2014)</p> <p>(Australia's Parliament)</p>	x	x		
<p>Full text of keynote speech of China's top legislator at Belt and Road Summit in Hong Kong (Zhang Dejiang , 2016)</p> <p>(Belt and Road Summit)</p>	x			
<p>Full text of Chinese president Xi Jinping's speech at the opening ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit (Xi, 2018)</p>	x			

<p>(opening ceremony of the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC))</p>				
<p>Remarks by State Councilor Yang Jiechi at the Joint Opening Session of The Fifth Round of China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogues (Yang Jiechi, 2013)</p> <p>The US Department of State</p>	<p>x</p>			
<p>Peace, Development and Cooperation Must be Moved Forward Instead of Backward</p> <p>(Wang Yi, 2013)</p> <p>Opening Plenary Meeting of the United Nations Special Event, New York</p>	<p>x</p>			
<p>China at a New Starting Point</p> <p>(Wang Yi, 2013)</p>	<p>x</p>			<p>x</p>

United Nations General Assembly New York				
China's Diplomacy At a New Historical Starting Point (Yang Jiechi, 2013) 21st Century Council Beijing Conference		x		x
Joining hands, and dreams (Yang Jiechi, 2014) New Delhi	x			x
Speech by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Meeting Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of China-France Diplomatic Relations (Xi, 2014)	x	x		x

Paris				
Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China At UNESCO Headquarters (Xi, 2014) UNESCO			x	
Remarks by Vice President Li Yuanchao at the Reception In Honor of President Pranab Mukherjee (Li Yuanchao, 2016) Beijing to India	x			
Join Hands to Create a Bright Future of Peace and Prosperity (Liu Yandong, 2016) Opening Ceremony of the Fifth World Peace Forum				x

<p>Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence To Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation</p> <p>(Xi, 2014)</p> <p>Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</p>	x			x
<p>Work Hard to Build a New Model of Major-Country Relationship Between China and the United States</p> <p>(Xi, 2014)</p> <p>EUA</p>				x
<p>Build a Community of Shared Destiny for Common Progress</p> <p>(Xi, 2014)</p>	x			

China-Latin American and Caribbean Countries Leaders1 Meeting				
Jointly Write a New Chapter in the Partnership of Comprehensive Cooperation Between China and Latin America and the Caribbean (Xi, 2015) China-CELAC Forum	x			
Foster a Vision of Common, Comprehensive, Cooperative And Sustainable Security to Build a Better World Of Enduring Peace and Common Development (Yang Jiechi, 2015) Munich Security Conference	x			x
Carry Forward the Bandung Spirit for Win-win Cooperation (Xi, 2015) Asian-African Summit	x	x		x

<p>To Renew the Friendship Across High Mountains and Contribute Asian Wisdom to World Peace and Development</p> <p>(Yuanchao, 2015)</p> <p>India</p>	<p>x</p>			
<p>Build on Past Achievements and Open up the Future of All-round Development of China-Africa Friendship and Cooperation</p> <p>(Wang Yi, 2015)</p> <p>Future of All-round Development of China-Africa Friendship and Cooperation</p>	<p>x</p>		<p>x</p>	
<p>Realize Win-Win Cooperation in Asia By Promoting Exchange and Mutual Learning among Civilizations</p> <p>(Kong Xuanyou, 2016)</p> <p>The International Seminar on East Asian Civilizations Exchange</p>	<p>x</p>			

<p>Toward Peace and Development for All</p> <p>(Wang Yi, 2017)</p> <p>United Nations General Assembly</p>		<p>x</p>		<p>x</p>
<p>Working Together to Build a World of Lasting Peace and Universal Security and a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind</p> <p>(Yang Jiechi, 2018)</p> <p>Opening Ceremony of the Seventh World Peace Forum</p>	<p>x</p>	<p>x</p>		<p>x</p>
<p>Upholding the Trend of Peace and Development of Our World with Unity, Cooperation, Openness and Inclusiveness</p> <p>(Wang Yi, 2020)</p> <p>French Institute of International Relations</p>			<p>x</p>	
<p>王毅部长谈中印关系：中印共同追求民族复兴梦想</p>	<p>x</p>			

<p>(Wang Yi, 2014)</p> <p>India</p>				
<p>坚定不移追求中国人权梦 推动国际人权事业健康发展</p> <p>(Liu Hua, 2014)</p> <p>7º Fórum dos Direitos Humanos de Pequim</p>		<p>x</p>		<p>x</p>