

Department of Psychology

**Being in or being out: Social exclusion and destructive collective
behaviour of disadvantaged groups**

A Dissertation presented in partial fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of

Doctor in Psychology

Speciality in Social Psychology

By

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December, 2011

RESUMO

A presente tese expõe uma abordagem baseada na identidade social para explicar acções colectivas praticadas por grupos em desvantagem social consideradas pela maioria em vantagem social como mais problemáticas (i.e., destrutivas/danosas/violentas). Propomos que o comportamento destrutivo, e respectivas emoções negativas, não são meras expressões de conflito intergrupais, sendo antes respostas a acções praticadas pela maioria em vantagem percebidas pela minoria em desvantagem como transgressões que violam standards mínimos (por comparação a standards máximos), standards esses estabelecidos por categorias supra-ordenadas. Resultados de dois estudos de campo (Estudo 1 com imigrantes em Portugal e Estudo 2 com fumadores) e dois estudos experimentais laboratoriais nos quais se recorreu a um jogo virtual (Estudos 3 e 4) corroboram, em geral, as nossas hipóteses: A percepção de violação de standards mínimos conduz a emoções negativas e a comportamento destrutivo. Os Estudos 3-4 revelam que estas percepções são mais prováveis no caso de exclusão social (em comparação com formas mais benignas de privação, i.e., marginalização), sugerindo uma mediação em cadeia desde a exclusão até ao comportamento destrutivo, via percepção de standards mínimos e emoções negativas. Inesperadamente, a mediação via emoções negativas foi parcial, sugerindo uma ligação directa entre violação de standards mínimos e comportamento destrutivo. Também inesperadamente, ser marginalizado já conduz a emoções negativas (Estudos 2-3), mas não a comportamento destrutivo. Resultados do Estudo 1 sugerem que a identificação com categorias supra-ordenadas promove percepções de standards como mínimos e emoções negativas quando estes são violados, podendo também atenuar as intenções de recorrer a acções destrutivas.

Palavras-chave: comportamento destrutivo, emoções negativas, grupos socialmente desfavorecidos, standards/objectivos mínimos, exclusão, identidade supra-ordenada.

Códigos de classificação (Associação Americana de Psicologia):

3000 - Psicologia Social;

3020 - Processos Grupais e Intergrupais

ABSTRACT

The current thesis presents a social-identity-based approach to explain collective actions by disadvantaged groups that are considered by advantaged majority members to be most problematic (i.e., destructive, harmful and/or violent). We propose that destructive behaviour and corresponding negative emotions are not mere expressions of intergroup conflict, but are responses to actions by the advantaged majority perceived by the disadvantaged minority as transgressions that violate minimal (as compared to maximal) standards established by inclusive superordinate categories. Results of two field studies (Study 1 with immigrants in Portugal and Study 2 with smokers) and two laboratory experiments using a virtual ball toss setting (Studies 3 and 4) generally support our hypotheses that perceived violation of minimal standards leads to stronger negative emotions and destructive behaviour. Studies 3-4 also show that these perceptions are most likely in the case of social exclusion (as compared to more benign forms of deprivation, i.e., marginalization), suggesting a two-step chain mediation from exclusion to destructive behaviour via minimal standard violation perception and negative emotions. Unexpectedly, mediation by negative emotions was only partial, speaking for a direct link between minimal standard violation perception and destructive behaviour. Unexpectedly as well, being only marginalized but not excluded increases already negative emotions (Studies 2 and 3), but these do not translate into destructive behaviour. Results of Study 1 suggest that identification with superordinate categories foster perceptions of standards as minimal and negative emotions when they are violated, but can also attenuate intentions to destructive actions.

Key-words: destructive behaviour, negative emotions, disadvantaged groups, minimal standards/goals, marginalization, exclusion, higher-order identity.

Classification codes (American Psychological Association) :

3000 – Social Psychology;

3020 – Group & Interpersonal Processes

The work developed within the scope of the present thesis was fully financed by

FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA, TECNOLOGIA E ENSINO SUPERIOR

by means of a Phd grant with the reference: SFRH / BD / 29838 / 2006

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Act as if what you do makes a difference. It does.

William James

To all of those that, not only made me believe that what I did makes a difference, but – and most importantly! – made a difference in my life. My deep and ever lasting thank you ...

To Sven Waldzus, my supervisor. Dear Sven, if it were not for you there would not even be a thesis, the more a thank you section! For every (long) email read, for every meeting scheduled, for every comment made, for every discussion, my thank you. For pushing me further than I ever thought I could go! And then pushing me a bit more. It was not always easy, but it really helped me growing.

To Steve Wright, my (co-)supervisor. Dear Steve, I do not have enough words to thank you! For your availability, your help, your insightful and always precious comments, for your enthusiasm when discussing this project with me. For showing me that it is possible to be as passionate about work as about family and that it is possible not to neglect any of these.

Ao Prof. Jorge Vala, relator deste projecto de doutoramento. Por todos os comentários, sugestões, provocações. Por me ajudar, não só a olhar criticamente o trabalho já desenvolvido, como a olhar criticamente o trabalho ainda a desenvolver.

To Prof. Thomas Kessler, who was always available and such a great source of help in a world still discovering what min-max does mean (or what we do mean with min-max)!

À FCT. Ao ISCTE, em especial ao Programa Doutoral em Psicologia, à coordenação do programa, aos colegas e professores. Ao DEPSO e ao secretariado, em especial à Teresa. Ao CIS, à Fátima Costa, à Sílvia Rangel, à Joana Mota. Ao LAPSO, em especial à Helena Santos. Aos participantes. Sem vós esta tese jamais seria possível! To SFU, especially to the Intergroup Relations and Social Justice Lab and to the participants. To the IGC, especially to Annette Baier. My sincere thank you!

To Allard Feddes, to Mara Mazzeuaga, to Mauro Bianchi, to Mira. Life never stops surprising us and thanks to its twist and turns we got to meet. And it is with great joy that I thank you. I just found so much comfort and help in your wise and friendly words!

To Gamze Baray, to James Climenhage, to Chad Danyluck, to Stephan Schumann, to Beatrice Fleischmann, to Anne Berthold, to Darren. Thank you so much for making me feel so welcomed when so faraway from home. Thank you for making me smile every single day that I shared with you!

À Joana Alexandre, à Leonor Rodrigues, à Catarina Gonzalez, à Cristina Camilo, à Rita Morais, à Rita Correia, à Ana Loureiro, ao Ricardo Rodrigues, à Aline Vieira, ao Mário Paulino. E em especial à Miriam Maria. Por cada palavra, cada gesto, cada partilha, cada ajuda (mais ou menos logística), o meu sentido obrigada! Não teria sido o mesmo sem vocês. E de certo não teria sido o mesmo sem ti, Miriam. Agradeço, além de tudo o mais, a tua generosidade, o teu encorajamento, o teu altruísmo (mesmo que alguma psicologia duvide da sua existência). A tua amizade.

To my two favourite “D’s” in the world: Doreen Player and Doris Forer! What would have I done without you? Every time I think about you and all we shared, I cannot help smiling. Thank you for all the shared conversations, all the shared feelings, all the shared meals! Thank you for all the joy, depth and colour you brought into my life!

À Magda Roberto, à Sónita Gonçalves. Este, de facto, não tem de ser um percurso solitário! Agradeço muito muito a vossa presença na minha vida. A vossa disponibilidade, a vossa amabilidade, as vossas palavras de apoio. O vosso carinho. A vossa amizade. É bom ver que no final de um doutoramento ganhamos bem mais do que uma tese e um “título”.

Ao Dré, à Cats Maria, à Karina, ao Nuno Costa. À Raquel Monteiro, ao Quinito, à Sílvia Ferreira. Mesmo que nem sempre o soubessem ajudaram-me tanto e tanto que não poderia deixar de vos agradecer! Cada bocadinho partilhado convosco foi como que uma lufada de ar fresco que me impeliu a continuar.

Ao Júlio. Aos meus pais e irmã. À minha família, em especial à Si. Sem vós este percurso nem sequer teria feito sentido e a minha vida teria um outro qualquer sabor, uma outra qualquer cor, uma outra qualquer dimensão. Agradeço o facto de estarem sempre lá para mim. Apesar das vossas próprias lutas e problemas. Apesar da longa duração deste percurso. Agradeço o vosso amor, carinho, compreensão. Agradeço o facto de nunca me deixarem esquecer o que de facto vale a pena nesta vida!

*A todos os que me acompanharam de perto neste percurso.
Á minha família, em especial aos meus pais.
Ao Júlio (B.!!), que nunca nunca nunca deixou de acreditar em mim.
Nem deixou que eu o fizesse.
A minha vida não teria a mesma alegria e doçura sem vós!*

LIST of ABBREVIATIONS:

- AMOS: Analysis of MOment Structures
- Br: Brazilians
- Cv: Cape-Verdeans
- GLM: General Linear Model
- ICC: Intra-Class-Correlation
- SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

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CHAPTER I

General introduction

Man is not truly one, but truly two.

Robert Louis Stevenson

Besides being a popular book, *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* also became a metaphor for the human nature and condition: Even though most of the time people behave in a constructive, positive, rule-following manner (i.e., as Dr Jekyll), there is a possibility that, under circumstances, these very same people undertake destructive, negative, violent, rule-breaking behaviours (i.e., as Mr Hyde). And this behaviour's duality has been grabbing the attention of several and quite different lines of thought: From religion to philosophy to social sciences, there has been an enduring effort to try to understand why, how and when will the Jekyll inside of us transform into the Hyde (also) inside of us.

1.1 Research questions and aims of the present work

Like the author of this well known novel, we believe that it is not a question of whether or not people will reveal the Hyde inside of them it is rather a question of *when*. Unlike the author, however, we are less interested in understanding when individuals in general turn into someone who engages in dissocial behaviour. Instead, we are interested in problematic group behaviour. More concretely, this thesis aims at understanding when members of disadvantaged groups opt for destructive forms of collective behaviour.

1.1.1 The disadvantaged going for destructive behaviour

One question the socio-psychological perspective on destructive behaviour has been concerned with for a long time is whether or not individuals and groups respond to unfair, miserable circumstances that place them in a disadvantaged position with destructive behaviour (e.g., social identity theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; relative deprivation theory, Gurr, 1970; system justification, Jost & Hunyady, 2002; tokenism, Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Going beyond the debate about whether individuals/groups will or not engage in destructive forms of behaviours, the present

thesis is rather interested in predicting when and why such behaviours will be a probable option for disadvantaged groups.

In the current thesis, we approach the problem with the assumption that the disadvantaged will go for destructive behaviour when such an option is legitimate.

Instead of providing a conclusive answer, this approach raises two important questions: Who defines what is normative (and legitimate) and nonnormative, and when does destructive behaviour – a usually nonnormative behaviour – become legitimate?

In order to answer these questions, we may need to take two perspectives into consideration: That of the outside observers and that of the actors engaged in the behaviour. In that sense, destructive behaviour is observed, therefore norms that define which behaviour is destructive, and therefore usually nonnormative, are defined by outside observers. In contrast, the norms that render such behaviour legitimate serve as motivation, and therefore are defined by the actors engaging in such behaviour. Based on a deeper analysis of this constellation, we propose that destructive behaviour becomes legitimate in circumstances in which the targets of such behaviour deserve to be punished because they violated what we will later define as minimal standards.

1.1.1.1 Defining destructive behaviour

When we mention destructive behaviour we are referring to a specific type of collective action in which the disadvantaged groups may engage under specific motivational conditions: An action usually seen by others as negative, destructive, or nonnormative. The key element to take into consideration is the fact that when describing the behaviour as destructive we are referring to the other's perceptions, not to the perspective of the acting disadvantaged group. Implicit in this view is the idea that judgments about normativity depend on the salient social identity and, consequently, on group perspective. In this sense, and in order to take into account the perspective dependency of what is seen as normative behaviour from the point of view of the various involved groups, we use *destructive intergroup behaviour* as our working term. In our perspective, destructive intergroup behaviours are actions displayed by members of a disadvantaged group that are perceived by other members of the society as means for harming other society members or groups by thwarting or destroying something valued by those members of the larger society.

Corresponding to this understanding of destructive behaviour, the unit of analysis in this thesis is the intergroup relation between a disadvantaged group, potentially

engaging in destructive behaviour, and an advantaged, dominant group being the potential target and/or victim of such destructive behaviour.

1.1.1.2 The role of superordinate categories

In order to answer the first question of who defines what is normative, we resort to self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and to the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). We believe that social groups do not exist in a social vacuum and we believe that the social environment of social groups includes more than the ingroup and relevant outgroups. As self-categorization theory, we assume that the members of different groups compare their ingroup with relevant outgroup(s) in terms of a superordinate category which encompasses both in- and outgroups (Turner et al., 87; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). For example, we can expect that immigrants living in Portugal compare themselves to non-immigrants, because both groups are included in the superordinate category of the Portuguese Society.

In asymmetric intergroup relations, the superordinate category defines the terms of reference for intergroup relations between advantaged and disadvantaged subgroups as it provides a cognitive and normative basis for comparisons between subgroups (Turner et al., 1987) and for relations between these subgroups. It provides standards for evaluating the own group's and others' situation and for deciding if and how to act upon it. Thus, aside of the subordinate ingroup, superordinate categories provide a second potential source of normative pressure and positive social identity. For instance, immigrants in Portugal who evaluate their situation will not just search for differences from or similarities with other subgroups, but will also consider how the situation in general is for people living in Portugal. Of particular relevance for our purposes is that, besides constituting the frame of reference for general evaluative judgments, superordinate categories also provide the basis for judgments on fairness and entitlements (Weber, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2002; Wenzel, 2004).

In order to provide the background for subgroup comparisons, shared membership in superordinate categories needs that, to a certain degree, subgroups share a common understanding of what such a superordinate category is. However, the understanding of superordinate group norms might not be completely consensually shared by the subgroups: The disadvantaged and advantaged groups might not perceive in the same way and might not agree that a particular action is (non)normative for the superordinate

group. Recent research and theorising has shown that the perspectives of subgroups on what is normative within the superordinate category may differ because members of each subgroup will tend to project characteristics (e.g., values, norms and goals) of their own ingroup onto the superordinate category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 2005; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). As a consequence of such ingroup projection, each subgroup will tend to perceive the superordinate category as more similar to their own ingroup than to the other subgroups (e.g., Imhoff, Dotsch, Bianchi, Banse, & Wigboldus, 2011). Thus, we would propose that not only the idiosyncratic norms of the subgroups, but also the norms of the superordinate group, depend on the perspective of the subgroup.

As a summary, we assume that, besides the own group, the source of normativity to which groups resort is a relevant superordinate category. Besides some consensus between different subgroups, there might also be some disagreement about what is (non)normative for the superordinate category. This is the case as the norms of the superordinate group are dependent on the subgroup's perspective (as a result of ingroup projection).

1.1.1.3 The role of maximal and minimal standards/goals

The idea that the several subgroups included in the same superordinate category might differ in their interpretation and representation of the normative basis provided by the superordinate group is an important assumption. Such interpretations might differently impact the behaviours displayed by the subgroups and their members.

In order to answer our second question – when will destructive behaviour be considered normative? –, we need to clarify these assumptions.

Based on the work of Kessler et al. (2010), we argue that the degree of consensus about the normative basis offered by the superordinate category depends on the type of standard/goal we are referring to. The motivational approach developed by Kessler et al. (2010) states that groups have two types of standards/goals: maximal and minimal. While maximal standards/goals are ideals derived from categories' prototypes (i.e., an idealized most representative exemplar of a given category) that describe conducts and goals valued by the group, minimal standards/goals are compulsory, as they define necessary requirements for the group and inclusion criteria of the superordinate category (Schubert, Mummendey, Waldzus, & Kessler, 2010). In that sense, maximal

standards represent ideals that members of the superordinate category (or subgroups) should strive to achieve to the greatest possible degree, serving as references for gradual evaluations in terms of how close the individual members (or subgroup) have come to achieving those ideals. In other words, categories' prototypes provide the standards for intracategory comparisons and differentiation of individuals and subgroups, so that the closer an individual/subgroup comes to such standards – in comparison to other individuals/subgroups – the more relatively prototypical they will be (Turner et al. 1987; Mummendey & Wenzel 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). The more relatively prototypical an individual/group is, the more central will be the (status) position the individual/subgroup occupies within the superordinate category. Minimal standards establish criteria that have to be met by all members (or subgroups), thus representing either/or evaluations, with those actors or situations who meet these criteria being considered acceptable and those not meeting minimal standards being considered unacceptable.

Individual members and subgroups can be assumed to be motivated not only to meet the minimal standards of a superordinate category, but also to come as close as possible to its maximal standards: Meeting the former should guarantee access to the benefits of being included in a desired superordinate category, while meeting the latter should grant its members (or subgroups) a positive intracategory evaluation.

1.1.1.4 Responses to non-achievement of maximal and minimal standards

Yet, how consensual are the disadvantaged and the advantaged subgroups' perspectives about the maximal standards of the superordinate category? As mentioned in section 1.1.1.1, resorting to ingroup projection will lead to some disagreement between different subgroups as each will tend to see their ingroup to be relatively more prototypical than it otherwise would be (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Nevertheless, because advantaged groups have access to more resources, they are able to validate these ingroup projections more effectively than disadvantaged groups. As a consequence disadvantaged groups are often seen both by themselves and by others as less prototypical of the superordinate category than advantaged groups (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Waldzus et al., 2004). Given this consensually shared view, not reaching maximal standards is consistent with the disadvantaged group's non-prototypicality. In this context, if the advantaged dominant outgroup acts in a way that limits or prevents the disadvantaged dominated group from accessing resources needed to achieve

maximal standards/goals, this will not be interpreted as an unexpected transgression/violation in terms of the norms and values of the superordinate category. This is the main reason why the collective action that may result in such situations will not be destructive.

How consensual are the minimal standards of the superordinate category? Unlike judgments about relative prototypicality that allow the subgroups to express some ethnocentricity in the definition of the prototype of the superordinate category (via ingroup projection), judgments about acceptability (or unacceptability) refer to criteria that not only must be met by all members and all subgroups within the category (Kessler et al., 2010), but that are expected to be shared by all subgroups (i.e., both the advantaged and disadvantaged groups). Consequently, a transgression/violation of a minimal standard – the required criteria for inclusion – is far graver, triggering more severe consequences than a violation of a maximal standard. We suggest that minimal standards, as they refer to basic aspects of the category identity, are so central for the superordinate category's existence and preservation that the violation of such standards will trigger the perceived necessity to punish these violations.

Punishment usually implies negative treatment of the one that is punished. In this sense, even though displaying extremely negative treatment of others is unusual and a last resort choice as it typically represents a transgression of fairness norms, when such a behaviour is displayed towards someone that violated a minimal standard, it becomes not only understandable but also necessary (e.g., Vidmar, 2000) and legitimate (Fritsche, Kessler, Mummendey, & Neumann, 2009; Kessler et al., 2010; Schubert et al., 2010, Waldzus, Schubert, & Raimundo, 2010). Thus, the punishment of minimal standard violations is a situation in which harmful behaviour (punishment) is considered not only acceptable, but even normatively required. In the particular situation that is the focus of analysis in this thesis, however, it is not enough to identify the punishment of minimal standard violations as the normative context rendering doing harm legitimate. Who usually controls a superordinate category are the dominant, advantaged groups, not the disadvantaged ones. When members of a disadvantaged group observe that the more advantaged outgroup acts in a way that prevents the disadvantaged group from achieving minimal standards/goals, these acts may be recognized by the latter as efforts to undermine not only their group's position within the superordinate category but also as threats to their very membership in the superordinate category (e.g., Tyler, 1989; Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 1996).

1.1.1.5 Social exclusion as minimal standard violation

Given the consequences that violating minimal standards might have, it is important to understand what acts of the advantaged powerful group could be interpreted as preventing the disadvantaged powerless group from meeting minimal standards.

We propose that excluding the disadvantaged group from the superordinate category would be one of those acts that would be interpreted as a typical instance of a minimal standard violation. Yet, exclusion per se would not necessarily lead to severe consequences for the advantaged group: Only when the members of a disadvantaged group continue to see themselves as members of the superordinate category will the outgroup's attempt to exclude them be seen as threatening and illegitimate. In this case, the actions of the advantaged outgroup will themselves be characterized as a violation of the minimal standards of the superordinate category and, therefore, should be adequately punished. Given that actions that violate minimal standards will be seen as threatening not only to the target subgroup but also to the entire superordinate category as they threaten its identity, efforts to protect the superordinate category will include harsh consequences for the violators and will be seen both as legitimate and necessary. This is why the usual response to the violation of a minimal standard by an outgroup would be its exclusion from the superordinate category. However, when violation is perpetrated by an advantaged dominant group and the victims are members of a disadvantaged group, the victims not only lack the power to exclude the outgroup but they may themselves be targets of exclusion. Under these circumstances, we propose that the response to such a violation will be destructive intergroup behaviour. Therefore, destructive intergroup behaviour represents an effort to protect the superordinate category. The disadvantaged group resorts to such a behaviour as a means of punishing the advantaged group who is believed to have violated a minimal standard by preventing members of the disadvantaged ingroup from meeting the minimal standards of the superordinate group.

As a summary, whether the subgroups included in the same superordinate category might differ in their interpretation and representation of what is (non)normative for the superordinate category depends on the type of standard/goal we are referring to. Maximal standards/goals, as associated to relative prototypicality, will be more dependent on ingroup projection and therefore will be the target of more disagreement.

Minimal standards/goals, on the other hand, must be met by all members and all subgroups within the category (Kessler et al., 2010), and are expected to be shared by all members and by all subgroups, thus, are more consensual. Such different interpretations might differently impact the behaviours displayed by the subgroups and their members: Violations of maximal standards are not expected to result in destructive behaviour, while as a response to the violation of minimal standards, destructive behaviour is not only expected but necessary and legitimate. Therefore, and answering our second question, destructive behaviour, a usually nonnormative action, becomes legitimate when displayed by the disadvantaged as response to minimal standard violations perpetrated by the advantaged.

1.1.1.6 Marginalization and social exclusion and the role of maximal and minimal standard violations

Besides explaining the psychological conditions leading to collective destructive behaviour, our theorising also intends to understand how people react in face of social rejection. We are interested in understanding and explaining the reactions of disadvantaged groups to particular forms of rejection, that is: Marginalization (a milder form of rejection and deprivation) and exclusion (a more extreme form of rejection and deprivation).

Not meeting maximal standards/goals has important implications for the disadvantaged, as it is expected to result in a less central (lower status) position within the superordinate category, that is, in marginalization. But marginalization can be more than an outcome of not meeting maximal standards. Marginalization might also further contribute to the disadvantage of the group as it makes it even harder to approach maximal standards. Therefore, attempts of the advantaged dominant group to marginalize the disadvantaged group might be seen as actions that limit the disadvantaged group's access to the resources needed to meet maximal standards/goals. We suggest that in such case, dissatisfaction may be the result, but that such dissatisfaction will most probably not lead to destructive behaviour.

Not meeting minimal standards/goals has even more important implications, as most probably it will result in the exclusion from the superordinate category. This is especially relevant for the disadvantaged as they will most probably be the victims of such exclusion. And most importantly, they will most probably perceive this exclusion as actions by the advantaged that violate minimal standards/goals. These perceived

minimal standards violations by the advantaged will be seen as threatening not only to the disadvantaged group being the target of such violations, but also to the entire superordinate category. Yet, the advantaged outgroup's actions will only be deemed illegitimate and, thus deemed worth adequate punishment, when the disadvantaged group members identify themselves with the superordinate category. Nevertheless, a disadvantaged group that faces exclusion and perceives it as a minimal standard violation usually lacks the power to punish the advantaged outgroup in the usual fashion by excluding it. It is exactly under these circumstances that we propose that a disadvantaged group will resort to destructive intergroup behaviour.

As a summary, we try to explain the destructive behaviour of disadvantaged groups as a motivationally-based response to exclusion. More concretely, we argue that it is not exclusion per se but rather its interpretation as a violation of a minimal standard by the advantaged group that motivates destructive behaviour.

1.1.1.7 A note on disadvantage

As this thesis focuses on the destructive behaviours displayed by disadvantaged groups, it seems relevant defining what we mean by disadvantaged.

The term may seem self-evident, and one of the reasons is that we may tend to say that a disadvantaged group is one that holds some sort of disadvantage, which is an obvious tautology. For example, according to the Oxford dictionary (1995), a disadvantage is “a negative point or condition; a thing that tends to prevent somebody succeeding, making progress, etc (...)” (p. 327).

In our definition, we emphasize the relative position of the disadvantaged as well as their lack of power. What most distinguishes the groups we mention in our studies is the fact that the advantaged group dominates the superordinate category in terms of relative prototypicality (and, thus, status) and has the power to exclude the disadvantaged group from the superordinate category in case the latter violates a minimal standard. Thus, and in very practical terms, we define a disadvantaged group as the one that is hindered from achieving certain standards of the superordinate category. When hindered from achieving maximal standards, disadvantaged groups will see their position within the superordinate category as relatively less prototypical and experience marginalization. When hindered from achieving minimal standards, disadvantaged groups will see their membership in the superordinate category threatened and experience exclusion.

1.1.1.8 The role of emotions

In addition to constituting or not the normative conditions for destructive behaviour we also expect that being prevented from meeting a maximal versus a minimal standard will have different emotional consequences. In line with intergroup emotion theorists (e.g., Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007), we assume that group relevant events elicit group level emotions, and emotions motivate action. Yet, we assume that whether or not being prevented from meeting a standard becomes emotionally relevant is affected by the type of standard: We assume that not meeting minimal standards/goals is far more unpredicted and involves far more severe implications than not meeting a maximal standard/goal. This is so, not because minimal standards are more valuable than maximal standards, but because it is expected that the former are met by all members of the superordinate category.

1.2 General hypotheses

So, to sum up, when exploring the motivations for destructive behaviour the current research focuses on the disadvantaged group's perspective in which the advantaged dominant outgroup appears as the perpetrator of violations of minimal standards/goals and in which the display of destructive behaviour is the adequate response to such a violation.

The hypotheses guiding the work were the following:

H1) The more disadvantaged group members are confronted with exclusion, as compared to marginalization, the more they should perceive the violation of a minimal standard as compared with the violation of a maximal standard.

H2) The more disadvantaged group members perceive the violation of a minimal as compared with the violation of a maximal standard, the stronger negative emotional reactions they should have.

H3) The stronger negative emotional reactions of disadvantaged group members are, the stronger tendencies for destructive behaviour they should have.

H4) Exclusion should increase disadvantaged groups' tendencies for destructive behaviour through an indirect effect via perception of minimal standard violation and negative emotions.

Thus, this thesis, not only studies the particular psychological situation of disadvantaged groups, but also takes into account the disadvantaged groups'

perspective. The present thesis aims at testing specific theoretical hypotheses on the perceptions of intergroup situations of marginalized and excluded disadvantaged groups. More specifically, it tests whether excluded and marginalized disadvantaged groups have different concerns, and, thus, would respond differently to their situation. It also tests how emotions are affected by these concerns and their effect on intergroup behaviour.

By doing so, this thesis intends to contribute to a better understanding of the conditions underlying the display of extremely negative responses towards more advantaged outgroup(s) and toward superordinate categories (Kessler et al., 2010).

1.3 Empirical overview

In order to test our hypotheses we conducted four experimental studies, two field studies and two laboratory studies. This strategy allowed us both to test our assumptions in more controlled environments and to assure the ecological validity of our results.

1.3.1 Field study, Study 1

The first experimental field study was designed to test whether destructive behaviour and negative emotions on the part of disadvantaged groups depended on the type of standard that they believe has been violated. We expected that immigrants living in Portugal felt negative emotions and expressed intentions for destructive behaviour only if ingroup's members were deprived by the Portuguese majority of resources in a manner that violates minimal standards. Experimental and correlational results generally supported the overall hypotheses: The experimental data showed that, for at least a part of the sample (for which the manipulation was successful), only when being deprived of a resource was described as a minimal standard violation did the participants go for more destructive compared to constructive action, a relation that was mediated by negative emotions. In the correlational analyses using the entire sample the only predictor of destructive behaviour and negative emotions was the degree to which the deprivation was perceived to be a violation of a minimal standard. There was also correlational evidence showing that perceiving a minimal standard violation led to the display of negative emotions and to the display of destructive behaviour, but there was no significant mediation.

1.3.2 Online study, Study 2

Besides replicating the results of the first field study, with this second field study we aimed at verifying whether experiencing exclusion versus marginalization led to differences in the disadvantaged minority members' perceptions of the violation of standards (minimal vs. maximal), in the display of negative emotions and in the display of destructive behaviours. To do so, we conducted an online study with smokers living in Portugal in which we manipulated the degree of expected future deprivation from accessing a good that the disadvantaged minority has to face.

The results revealed that, although the manipulation had no effect on perceived exclusion and on the display of negative emotions, it impacted perceptions of violation of standards and behavioural tendencies: In the exclusion condition, as compared to the marginalization condition, the participating smokers were more ready to interpret the scenario as a minimal standard violation and tended to expect themselves and the ingroup members to show more destructive behaviours. Correlational data were consistent with the hypotheses that perceived exclusion was perceived as a minimal standard violation and that perceiving a violation of a minimal standard led to the display of more negative emotions which, in turn, led to the display of more destructive behaviour. Moreover, the results revealed that the relation between perceived exclusion and the display of destructive behaviour was mediated both by perceived minimal standard violation and experienced negative emotions.

1.3.3 Laboratory studies, Studies 3 and 4

Even though we were able to manipulate some of the main variables in the real world context in Studies 1 and 2, laboratory studies were also conducted in order to overcome some limitations of the previous studies. Two laboratory studies were conducted in order to test if experiencing different degrees of deprivation (marginalization, exclusion) led to differences in perceptions of the violation of standards (minimal vs. maximal), in the display of negative emotions and in the display of destructive behaviours. Both studies were conducted with university students living in Portugal and were based on a pre-programmed virtual ball toss game: A situation of minority (with all participants belonging to the disadvantaged minority) versus majority was created and the degree of inclusion in the game was manipulated.

In one of the studies (Study 3) we introduced a no deprivation control condition in addition to the marginalization and exclusion conditions that were used in Study 2, and in the other study (Study 4), we only tested the exclusion against the no deprivation control condition, but changed the design to rule out an alternative explanation by a possible confound between type of standard violation (minimal versus maximal) and severity of standard violation: Before introducing the social exclusion manipulation, we presented a mindset priming. We manipulated the accessibility of a given standard by introducing an unrelated task designed at priming a minimal standard related mindset or a maximal standard related mindset.

The results of Study 3 support our hypotheses: Exclusion impacted the perceptions of violation of minimal versus maximal standards, the display of negative emotions and the display of destructive behaviour. In contrast to participants in the no deprivation control condition, the players in both the marginalization and the exclusion conditions perceived more standard violations in general, but they were more ready to interpret the game situation as a violation of minimal standards as compared to maximal standards in the exclusion condition than in the marginalization condition. Moreover, even if participants reported more negative emotions in both the marginalization and the exclusion conditions, they only displayed destructive behaviour in the exclusion condition. The results of the correlational data were consistent with the hypotheses that exclusion was perceived as a minimal standard violation and that perceiving a violation of a minimal standard led to the display of more negative emotions which, in turn, led to the display of more destructive behaviour. Moreover, the results revealed that the relation between exclusion and the display of destructive behaviour is partially mediated both by perceived minimal standard violation and experienced negative emotions.

The results of Study 4 revealed that, as expected, perceiving a minimal standard violation did not only depend on the experience of exclusion: The participants exposed to a minimal mindset priming that faced exclusion were the ones that perceived more minimal standard violation than participants in all the other conditions. Most importantly, as predicted, they also tended to display more negative emotions and more destructive behaviour than participants in the other conditions. Moreover, the correlational analyses showed that the effect of the combination of minimal mindset priming and exclusion on the display of destructive behaviour was mediated by negative emotions, although only partially. However, the results also indicated that the relation between the combination of minimal mindset priming and exclusion and destructive

behaviour was not unequivocally mediated by minimal standard violation and negative emotions.

1.3.4 Meta-analysis

Finally, we conducted a meta-analysis to summarize the results over the three chain mediations tested in Studies 2 to 4.

The results showed that there was overall robust support for our theoretical model, despite the fact that, in Study 4, the mediation was not significant.

In very general terms, the results of our studies allow us to conclude that facing a maximal standard violation has not the same emotional and behavioural consequences than facing a minimal standard violation. They also showed that facing marginalization has not the same consequences as facing exclusion: Even if marginalization already leads to negative emotions, these do not translate into destructive behaviour, as it happens in the case of exclusion. Most importantly, our result show that it is not the experience of exclusion per se that leads to the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour, but rather its interpretation as a minimal standard violation versus as a maximal standard violation.

1.4 Organization of the dissertation

After this general overview of the thesis, we will present a more detailed description of the main theoretical concepts underlying this work and review relevant theories and research related to it. Then we will give a more detailed empirical description of the studies undertaken, and finally we will discuss the implications and limitations of the current work and present some suggestions for future research.

More precisely, chapter II will present a theoretical introduction to the current work. This chapter stresses the importance of taking into account broader superordinate categories for the understanding of intergroup relations, and focuses on the concepts of standards/goals violation and their impact on the understanding of intergroup behaviour. Chapters III and IV will present the empirical evidence used to test our hypotheses. Chapter III will present the two field studies: The field study with immigrants and the online study with smokers mentioned earlier. Chapter IV presents the two laboratory studies also previously mentioned.

Chapter V will provide a discussion of the obtained results, a reflection about the implications and possible practical repercussions of the current work, as well as its limitations and its possible future developments.

CHAPTER II

Theoretical introduction

2.1 The socio-psychological perspective on being a disadvantaged group undertaking intergroup destructive behaviour

“The Soweto uprising or Soweto riots were a series of clashes in Soweto, South Africa on June 16, 1976 between black youths and the South African authorities. The riots grew out of protests against the policies of the National Party government and its apartheid regime. June 16 is now celebrated in South Africa as Youth Day.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soweto_uprising. Retrieved July 28, 2010

Dominant groups often look with suspicion at subordinate, disadvantaged outgroups. For instance, many white Christian majorities in the western world distrust Muslims, Jews, Gypsies, immigrants or ethnic minorities. If (when) dominant group members reflect on the possibility that existing status differences may be illegitimate, this can awaken concerns that the subordinate group (or at least some of its members) may give up their commitment to the larger social system and turn instead to destructive behaviour, such as violent collective action or terrorism (e.g., Martin, 2006). These fears are quite reasonable as bloody revolutions have been part of the history of most societies, and these revolutions have been the subject of popular art and culture all over the world. They are also the focus of scientific theorising. Social psychological theories of aggression, such as frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) and theories of intergroup relations, such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970) have postulated a link between the perceptions of illegitimacy of inequality and collective and conflict-related behaviour. However, it is also true that given the ubiquity of intergroup inequality, violent revolutions and other forms of disruptive social protest are relatively rare. Thus, the prevalent assumption that inequality should lead to rebellion often seemed at odds with societal reality, and many theories turned from trying to explain revolts to trying to explain their absence. Intergroup researchers explored ideas like outgroup favouritism (e.g., Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993), false consciousness or system justification (Marx & Engels, 1932/2002; e.g., Jost &

Hunyady, 2002), beliefs in a just world (e.g., Olson & Hafer, 2001) or tokenism (e.g., Wright, 2001; Wright et al., 1990) to provide explanations for the absence of collective responses to disadvantage.

In short, on the one hand, there is anecdotal evidence, folk wisdom, theorising and research showing that disadvantaged groups engage in collective action as a response to illegitimate disadvantage. On the other hand, there is anecdotal evidence, theorising and research showing that members of disadvantaged groups actually do the opposite, namely go along with and accept their underprivileged situation.

2.1.1 When and how will disadvantaged groups rebel?

Fortunately, theoretical approaches such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and relative deprivation theory (see Walker & Smith, 2002) have done much to specify some of the conditions under which disadvantaged group members will or will not engage in collective action, and considerable research support has been amassed for these claims (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Kessler & Mummendey, 2002; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Simon et al., 1998; Wright & Tropp, 2002).

However, one limitation in these dominant theories is that they focus primarily on predicting the occurrence of collective behaviour, with much less emphasis on predicting different forms of collective action (see Wright, 2010). For example, social identity theory predicts that disadvantaged groups who perceive the *status quo* as changeable (unstable) and illegitimate should engage in intergroup competition (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), but there is no clear prediction about whether this competition will be peaceful or violent. The same applies to more recent attempts to integrate various branches of research on collective action. Based on results of their meta-analysis, Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008), for instance, present an integrative social identity model of collective action in which collective action that carries a component of protest is directly predicted by the strength of the individual's identification with the disadvantaged group and indirectly via perceived injustice and efficacy. Although this model makes other important distinctions, it does not specify the unique antecedents for different forms of protest. Obviously, the specific form of collective action taken by members of the disadvantaged group has important practical implications. It makes a real difference whether a group of North-African immigrants in Paris protests peacefully by marching in the streets or whether they set cars on fire and plunder shopping-centres on the way.

In this thesis, we propose a theoretical approach that intends to explain a particular type of collective action by disadvantaged relatively powerless groups. We focus on actions that are motivated by intergroup relations and that would be described by observers as destructive, such as revolts, political murder, terrorism, etcetera. Thus, the focus of the current approach is less on *if* members of disadvantaged groups engage in collective action, but rather on *when* members of disadvantaged groups engage in behaviours that are considered by others to be negative, destructive, or in violation of important societal norms.

2.1.1.1 Normative versus nonnormative collective action

One initial approach to this question is the distinction between normative and nonnormative collective action (e.g., Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, & Zeller, 1987; Vanbeselaere, Boen, & Smeesters, 2003; Wright, 2001; Wright et al., 1990). The general claim is that members of disadvantaged groups will stick to actions that conform to the accepted rules of the larger social system as long as this form of collective action is thought to have a reasonable chance of success. However, if normative tactics prove ineffective or the advantaged group is seen to be engaging in its own nonnormative efforts to maintain its power, the perceived legitimacy of the societal norms are compromised and normative actions may give way to nonnormative action (Wright, 2010). This approach illuminates two important conceptual points that provide the basis for the current theoretical approach. First, it recognizes that what is normative and what is nonnormative¹ depends on group perspective. Thus, actions that are widely accepted to be nonnormative in terms of the accepted rules of the broader society can become normative within the specific disadvantaged group. In other words, when disadvantaged group members' actions shift from normative to nonnormative in terms of the rules of the broader society, they may still be following the norms of their ingroup.

Secondly, this normative/nonnormative distinction also recognizes the critical importance of the "larger society", the superordinate category that defines the terms of reference for intergroup relations between advantaged and disadvantaged subgroups.

¹ Nonnormative behaviour can refer to a wide range of actions, some being considered more extreme than others and, thus, possibly having a differential impact on the targets of such behaviours, as well as on the judgments and reactions these may instigate. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the current argumentation what is significant is that the distinction depends on group perspective (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1998; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel et al., 2007), rather than distinguishing between different types of nonnormative behaviours and their implications.

Superordinate categories refer to higher-order categories encompassing the actor's ingroup and the relevant outgroup (Turner et al., 1987; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Superordinate categories (e.g., the larger society) provide a necessary cognitive and normative basis for comparisons between subgroups (Turner et al., 1987), and provide the basis for relations between these subgroups. Thus, superordinate categories provide a second potential source – along with the local subordinate ingroup – of normative pressure and positive social identity (e.g., based on positive distinctiveness in comparison with relevant outgroups, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As important, they also provide the basis for judgments of fairness and entitlements (Weber et al., 2002; Wenzel, 2004).

However, where the normative/nonnormative distinction falls short is in how it represents subgroup members' understanding of the superordinate group norms. This discussion implies that the understanding of superordinate group norms is consensually shared by the subgroups; that both the disadvantaged and advantaged groups understand and agree that a particular action is nonnormative for the larger superordinate group. Thus, this view holds that disadvantaged groups that endorse and engage in violent protest, for example, understand that their actions are nonnormative from the perspective of the broader society, but simply ignore these norms in favour of their subordinate ingroup norms. However, while there is likely to be some consensus across subgroups about the norms, values and goals of the superordinate group, recent research and theorising has also shown that there can also be disagreement, and the content of the superordinate identity, including what is normative, can be highly contested. Perspectives of subgroups on what is normative within the superordinate category may differ because members of each subgroup will tend to project characteristics (e.g., values, norms and goals) of their own ingroup onto the superordinate category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus et al., 2005; Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003; see Wenzel et al., 2007 for an overview). Thus, each subgroup will tend to see the superordinate category as somewhat more similar to their own ingroup than to the other subgroups (e.g., Imhoff et al., 2011). This means that, in many cases, it will be extremely difficult to tell what is objectively normative within a superordinate category.

Diverging from the normative/nonnormative collective action approach, we argue that not only the idiosyncratic norms of the subgroups, but also the norms of the superordinate group (the larger society), depend on the perspective of the specific subgroup. For instance, people who commit terrorist acts that kill one or more people

often claim to be acting on behalf of a superordinate group. Using the distinction between normative and nonnormative action to understand this motivation is difficult. It seems contradictory that one would violate the accepted rules for action and harm members of the very group that one seeks to protect. It seems much more reasonable to conclude that these actors have put the interests and normative values of their subordinate ingroup ahead of the interests and norms of the superordinate category. We might be inclined to conclude that they are simply lying and actually care little about the interests of the superordinate group.

In contrast, we propose that it is possible that those engaged in terrorist acts are actually motivated by what they see to be the norms of the superordinate category (the larger society), but that their interpretations of what acts are normative within this particular situation differ from those of members of the advantaged subgroup or outside observers. That is, they may be aware that members of the advantaged group perceive their acts as nonnormative, but they themselves perceive their actions to be entirely consistent with the normative values of not only their smaller subgroup, but of the superordinate category as well.

The idea that violent actions can be understood by those engaging in them to be consistent with the normative values of the broader society may be difficult to accept when considering the current socio-political context with our overriding concerns about terrorism. However, it may be easier to understand when referring to historical events. For example, the attempt by Graf von Stauffenberg to kill German chancellor Adolf Hitler on the 20th of July 1944 was clearly considered to be a nonnormative act by the Nazis and also by many Germans at that time. However, from the perspective of the German resistance group preparing the plot it was not only normative in terms of their own values, but it was also consistent with what they saw to be the values of the broader German society. In their minds, Hitler and the Nazis were the group that was violating basic German values. Thus, killing Hitler was normative in terms of these broader German values. Interestingly, this view of what was by any definition an attempted political murder is now shared by many Germans, including most historians.

We do not mean to imply that all terrorist acts can be understood to be the same as the 1944 attempt to kill Adolf Hitler. However, we are proposing that calling collective action that violates the norms of the larger society as seen by the advantaged group (and often by us as researchers) “nonnormative” may limit our understanding. Such limitation might not be very obvious, as, in the words of Emler, (2009): “... individuals

and groups that hold power in a society determine what is to count as normative and what as deviant.” (p. 128). Taking for granted what is only the dominant group’s perspective, however, fails to consider the ways that destructive behaviour can also be normative, not only in terms of idiosyncratic norms of the disadvantaged group itself, but also in term of more general norms of the larger society as they are understood by the disadvantaged group (and perhaps by history as well).

2.1.1.2 Destructive group related behaviour

In order to be able to take into account the perspective dependency across subgroups about what is normative (i.e., in line with rules and values) for the larger society, we prefer to use *destructive intergroup behaviour* as our working term. We define destructive intergroup behaviour as actions by members of a disadvantaged group on behalf of their ingroup that are perceived by other members of the society as intending to harm other society members or groups, including causing physical harm and damaging or destroying something that is valued by those members. Acts that are perceived by other members of the society as an effort to create something positive, but have accidental negative side effects (“collateral damages”) would not be described as destructive intergroup behaviour. Destructive intergroup behaviour is thus defined by the perceptions of other members of the society (i.e., those who are not members of the actor’s group) and includes any action that they believe is intended to produce negative outcomes for members of the society. In addition, we focus on perceptions of the proximal intent of the action. Thus, even actions that may be recognized as having a long-term goal that is positive for the society would be described as destructive if the action is perceived as having a more immediate intention of harming. In that sense, trying to kill Adolf Hitler was destructive intergroup behaviour as much as any other political murder, because there would be consensus that the immediate intent of the action was to harm. Similarly, collective vandalism, and other manifestations of politically motivated violence would almost always be described as destructive intergroup behaviour.

By this definition, destructive behaviour is not the same as what has normally been the focus of intergroup relations research. For the most part, social competition has been operationalized in terms of simple ingroup favouritism. As Brewer (2001) clearly articulates, ingroup favouring responses can confound efforts to help the ingroup with efforts to harm the outgroup. However, ingroup love and outgroup hate are different

things, and while positive behaviour towards the ingroup may be the default response to social categorization (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), destructive behaviour intended to harm the outgroup requires more specific conditions, perceptions and motivations. Illuminating some of these conditions, perceptions and motivations is the goal of this thesis.

We would also like to emphasize that this approach does not claim to be able to explain the conceptual and motivational causes of or reasons for each individual destructive act. In all destructive acts a large number of possible political, economic, psychiatric, hedonic, utilitarian or interindividual/relational factors might play a role. People might blow themselves up in a suicide attack due to normative pressure from their small activist reference group, they might finance such terrorist attacks by calculating that they may help them maintaining power in their home countries, or they might set a car on fire in order to impress a desired lover. Instead, the current approach attempts to explain how normative contexts emerge that render the choice of destructive intergroup behaviour legitimate from the point of view of a specific social group. Thus, the question is not what the individual motives are in each destructive act, but rather what is the broader understanding within the disadvantaged subgroup that underpins these specific individual motives and would lead to positive evaluations of these acts by other group members (e.g., why would abstaining from the suicidal terrorist act be felt as betrayal to one's comrades; why would financing terrorist attacks contribute to maintaining one's power position; or why could a potential lover be impressed by setting a car on fire?).

2.1.1.3 Transgressions and destructive intergroup behaviour

Previous theorising on nonnormative action proposed that people should only opt for nonnormative actions if relevant normative actions are either unavailable or have been proven ineffective, because norm violations entail higher potential costs and are inconsistent with a commitment to the norms arising from identification with the larger superordinate category (see Wright, 2010). We share the view that disadvantaged groups will generally avoid destructive actions, but disagree that the choice of destructive action rests on the unavailability or ineffectiveness of normative actions.

Generally, we propose that destructive intergroup behaviours by disadvantaged groups are responses to perceived transgressions of the normative imperatives of the superordinate category perpetrated by the advantaged dominant outgroup. Members of

the disadvantaged group will engage in destructive behaviour – actions usually seen to be nonnormative from the point of view of the advantaged group – when the advantaged group itself is seen to be violating important superordinate norms (Wright et al., 1990). Thus, destructive behaviour by members of a disadvantaged group depends less on their perceptions of normative alternatives (i.e., possible normative actions) and more on their interpretation of the advantaged group's actions.

For instance, in a study of responses to unjust inequality Wright and colleagues (1990) found that participants in a condition in which their group was disadvantaged and completely excluded by an advantaged outgroup endorsed collective nonnormative action even when normative options were available and untried. Wright et al. attempted to explain this result by speculating that disadvantaged groups may consider normative action ineffective because the advantaged group had already violated fairness norms. However, recognizing the possibility of perspective dependency of what is normative, an alternative explanation would be that the actions of the advantaged group in this total exclusion condition were seen by members of the disadvantaged group (the participants) to violate important norms of a shared superordinate category (e.g., everyone involved in the study). Thus, unlike the other conditions where the negative outcomes received by the participant and his or her group resulted from actions by the advantaged group that, while unexpected and frustrating, were understood to be within the norms of the study, total exclusion of all members of the participant's group may have been seen as unacceptable within the general rules of the study. Social norms not only define appropriate and inappropriate behaviour, they also define the conditions under which a given behaviour is appropriate or not. In the exclusion condition, because the actions of the advantaged group were thought to violate the normative values for the larger context, collective protest (which was the operationalization of nonnormative behaviour in Wright et al.'s study) was then understood to be a normative response to such a transgression, irrespective of (or even *because* of) the fact that it was presented as something that was unacceptable to the advantaged outgroup.

2.1.1.4 Morality

Moghaddam (2005) proposes a similar argument in his discussion of terrorism. He claims that while terrorists may appear to be morally disengaged from the point of view of the majority (Bandura, 1990), they are actually particularly morally engaged, and their moral standards are not essentially different from those of the majority. Although

outside observers or victims may clearly categorize their behaviour as immoral, from the point of view of the perpetrators and their sympathizers their behaviour is justified by higher-order norms and values and it is the commitment to these higher-order values that inspires and sustains these violent acts despite their high cost.

Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) come to a similar conclusion: Being part of a terrorist group may not only give its members access to a particular social reality that condones violence, but this particular reality is/can be shared with the larger society. Of course this sharing varies greatly: There can be a minimal overlap between the terrorists' perspective and the larger society's perspective, but there can also be quite a significant overlap. In the latter case, terrorism can to a certain degree be seen as legitimate (Kruglanski & Sheveland, 2010), as it may be understood as occurring on behalf of the larger society itself. For instance, Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) mention the example of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. According to official polls, during the second Intifada which occurred in 2000 about 80% of the Palestinian respondents supported the suicide attacks against the Israelis.

Moreover, Chen and Kruglanski (2009) reflect on how the morality typology developed by Haidt and Graham (2006, cited by Chen & Kruglanski, 2009) can be applied to terrorism. According to these authors, terrorism justifications draw on several moral arguments, namely arguments that relate not only to the morality of the ingroup (e.g., justice to one's people, Chen & Kruglanski, 2009), but also to more general notions such as the morality of harm and reciprocity (e.g., when describing the outgroup's cruel actions, Chen & Kruglanski, 2009) and the morality of purity (e.g., when mentioning a quest against infidels, Chen & Kruglanski, 2009). An example of the morality of harm and reciprocity is offered by a statement from Osama bin Laden in a 1997 CNN interview cited by Chen and Kruglanski (2009): "We declare jihad against the United States because the U.S. government is unjust, criminal and tyrannical. The mention of the United States reminds us before everything else of those innocent children who were dismembered, their heads and arms cut off ..." (p. 215). In the same vein, Kelman (2001) stated that "...terrorist acts are seen by the actors as legitimate acts that are morally permitted and even required." (p. 65).

A related research program has recently shown that attitudes held with strong moral convictions ("moral mandates") are characterized by strong ties to emotions, intolerance towards attitudinally dissimilar others, and difficulties in conflict resolution. For example, Skitka, Baumann and Sargis (2005) found in their community studies that:

“... people do not want to work with, live near, or even shop at a store owned by someone who does not share their morally mandated opinions” (Skitka, 2010, p. 273). Moreover, people also have more extreme emotional reactions towards issues about which they hold strong moral convictions (e.g., Mullen & Skitka, 2006). Such moral mandates should also increase the willingness to accept violent means to achieve goals and standards that they prescribe. Thus, perceiving others as acting against one’s moral convictions might be a likely predictor of destructive behaviour (e.g., Skitka, 2010).

To sum up, several authors have provided plausible arguments and empirical evidence that destructive acts can be committed on behalf of moral motives that transcend ethnocentric concerns for the actors’ particular ingroup. However, what these approaches do not specify is what issues would inspire a sense of shared moral conviction for members of a specific social group and, thus, serve to coordinate their emotional and behavioural responses in a way that would lead to destructive intergroup behaviour.

2.1.1.5 Conditions fostering destructive intergroup behaviour

As mentioned earlier, a primary contention of our model of destructive behaviour is that disadvantaged groups react to the actions of the advantaged dominant group, as they perceive them. Since disadvantaged groups are usually dependent on the more powerful dominant group, they will evaluate their situation and regulate their behaviour in response to the actions and perceived intentions of the advantaged dominant group. When socio-structural differences of power and advantage are at stake, some actions by the advantaged group may elicit perceptions of threat from the disadvantaged group. In such cases, dominant groups’ actions that are interpreted as threatening should make social identity more salient and increase the probability of collective action (e.g., Turner, 1975). However, we propose that the emergence of destructive intergroup behaviour requires more than perceptions of threat. Not all threat responses lead to destructive behaviour. Threat may also lead to avoidance behaviour (Kamas, 2010; Kamans, Otten, & Gordijn, 2010). For example, Kamas (2010) shows that while physical threat leads the powerless to display avoidance behaviour (Studies 2.1 and 2.3), obstacle threat (e.g., access to valuable resources) leads the highly identified powerless to confront the outgroup (Studies 2.2 and 2.3). Other indirect evidence of differentiated reactions to disadvantage in the face of a clearly dominating outgroup comes from studies conducted by Scheepers, Spears, Doosje and Manstead (2006). They have

shown that groups facing a condition in which a group has “nothing to lose”, that is in a stable, low status position, can display extreme forms of ingroup bias that they would not show if the intergroup context were less stable. For example, in Study 2 the authors asked the participants to imagine they were the main character in a handball game between two teams and that this main character at a certain point makes an offensive discriminatory comment against the outgroup team, namely that they are “a bunch of bastards and losers who don’t know anything about the game except rough play.” (p. 950). The authors were interested in the interpretation of the negative statement as serving an instrumental (i.e., team-motivating) or identity-expressive purpose (e.g., “*To what extent did you make the statement to present your team in a positive light?*”, p. 950). Relative group status, stability of relative group status and communication context were manipulated. That is, the ingroup was assigned a stable or unstable high or low status, and the comment was either made in a more private context (only the ingroup team members would hear it, intragroup context) or in a more public context (both teams could hear it, intergroup context). Among other results, the authors found that in the unstable low status condition the statement was seen as high in instrumentality in the intragroup communication context but low in instrumentality in the intergroup communication context, presumably as it could provoke the outgroup. In contrast, and most importantly for our argument, under the “nothing to lose” conditions (stable low status) perceived instrumentality of the derogatory statement was also high in the intergroup communication context. The authors interpret this result in the sense that “... under these conditions groups have nothing to lose and may use in-group bias even in an intergroup context, perhaps in an ultimate attempt to fluster the out-group” (p. 951). Even if there were no concrete outgroup actions involved in the design of this study, it seems that the outgroup is seen as an adequate audience for such derogatory statement, which is consistent with the idea that such destructive behaviour can under certain circumstances be interpreted as functional not only on the level of the (sub)ingroup, but also on the more inclusive level of the superordinate category as audience.

To conclude, we hold that in order to trigger destructive behaviour, the dominant group’s action and the eventual threat it causes have to prompt a particular set of motivational basis within the intergroup context. To elaborate the foundation of such a motivational basis we rely on more recent research on how people assign punishment in general. This research has shown that the type of standard that people use for the

evaluation of others is of tremendous importance for their willingness to assign negative treatment to them.

2.1.2 Minimal-standard violations as the explanation for destructive intergroup behaviour displayed by disadvantaged groups

2.1.2.1 Maximal and minimal standards and goals

Recently, Kessler et al. (2010) presented a motivational approach that distinguishes two types of standards, so called minimal and maximal standards, and explores the differential impact of these two types of standards for judgments and evaluations of one's own and other's behaviour (see also Fritsche et al., 2009; Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008). This approach has also been applied to the study of intergroup relations (Schubert et al., 2010; Waldzus et al., 2010), describing how minimal and maximal standards influence evaluations of ingroup and outgroup behaviours².

Maximal standards are ideals that describe actions, goals, and experiences that are valued by the group and which members (or subgroups) should strive to meet to the greatest possible degree. In this sense, maximal standards serve as references for gradual evaluations in terms of how close the individual (or subgroup) has come to achieving the ideal. For example, maximal standards for members (subgroups) of French society (the superordinate category) might be: To be economically successful, to be able to send one's children to the best schools, to work in a respected profession, have control of one's living conditions, to have a beautiful house and the best medical care, eventually get rich, and to participate fully in French cultural life. Another example would be that psychotherapists (the superordinate category) hold a maximal standard of 100% success in the treatment of their clients. Although no particular French citizen or subgroup of French citizens, and no particular school of psychotherapy (subgroups), achieves these standards completely, citizens and schools that come closer to the maximal standards will be evaluated more positively and gain a higher reputation than those that do not.

² This model describes how the minimal/maximal distinction can be applied to goals as well as standards. The distinction between goals and standards has a number of important implications. For example, standards are more relevant for normative evaluations while goals are more important for motivational aspects of self-regulation. However, this distinction is not the focus of the current discussion. Thus, we will refer primarily to minimal or maximal standards, but we will also mention goal at times when the context seems relevant.

Minimal standards are essential requirements for the group. They define the inclusion criteria for the superordinate category in that meeting these standards is a requirement for all members (or subgroups). Thus, these standards are represented as an either/or evaluation. Members who, because of their own actions, fail to meet these standards or situations that prevent members from meeting these standards are considered unacceptable. For instance, in French society it might be considered essential (a minimal standard) that citizens have at least some access to housing and acceptable medical care, are free to exercise their religious faith, and are treated as human beings by the police. Preventing any French citizen from meeting these standards would be considered a violation of minimal standards and, as a consequence, would be perceived as unacceptable. In terms of the behaviour of actors, let us return to the case of psychotherapists. This superordinate group has conduct rules that ensure a non-harming relationship with one's clients. One of those fundamental rules (minimal standards) is that psychotherapists should not have intimate relations with their clients. Any school (subgroup) of psychotherapists that would endorse intimate relations between therapists and clients would be considered by the other schools as violating a minimal standard for the profession and thus would be deemed unacceptable for inclusion in the superordinate group.

From this description, we may anticipate that some standards/goals may be more likely interpreted as maximal or minimal. Nevertheless, we believe that perceiving a standard/goal as maximal or minimal is not an entirely rigid process. In principle, what is regarded as a minimal or as a maximal standard/goal is also a matter of discourse, convention and belief. For instance, some people or groups may consider a certain standard/goal rather as minimal while other people or groups may see it rather as maximal (Fritsche et al., 2009). Moreover, the same people/group may interpret the same standard as minimal or maximal as a function of a situation or context (Kessler et al., 2010). As such, besides agreement and stability as a result of discourse, convention, and belief, there might also be an individual, situational and contextual readiness to interpret standards as minimal or maximal.

2.1.2.2 Evaluations in terms of maximal standards

The definition of any given category is often represented by a prototype, an idealized most representative exemplar. The prototype provides the standard for intracategory comparisons and differentiation of individuals and subgroups within the

category. Prototypicality, the degree to which an individual or subgroup is consistent with the accepted group prototype, is conceptualized in self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) and in the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel et al., 2007) as the basis for group evaluation. More precisely, “(...) ethnocentrism, attraction to one's own group as a whole, depends upon the perceived prototypicality of the ingroup in comparison with relevant outgroups (relative prototypicality) in terms of the valued superordinate self-category that provides the basis for the intergroup comparison” (Turner, 1987, p. 61). Thus, the members of different groups compare their ingroup with relevant outgroups with reference to the prototype of the relevant superordinate category, and the evaluation of the ingroup and outgroup depends on how well each group demonstrates characteristics thought to be typical of this prototype. For example, ethnic white French in France might compare themselves with North-African immigrants living in France (because both groups are included in the superordinate category of the French Society), and the evaluation of the ingroup and the outgroup would depend on the degree to which members of these two subgroups are thought to possess the prototypical characteristics of a member of the French society.

The concept of prototypicality is crucial for understanding maximal standards. The prototype of a superordinate category provides the maximal standards for individual members and subgroups. Thus, the perceived prototypicality of a given individual or subgroup describes the degree to which they are thought to be meeting maximal standards (Schubert et al., 2010). In other words, the more a group is perceived to be prototypical of the superordinate category – and hence the closer it is to achieving the proscribed maximal standards – the more positively it will be evaluated. Also, the more a group is perceived to be prototypical of the superordinate category – and hence the closer it is to achieving the proscribed maximal standards – the more central is its (status) position within the superordinate category.

2.1.2.3 Evaluations in terms of minimal standards

Judgments about whether a subgroup's experiences, behaviours or characteristics are acceptable or not (whether they meet minimal standards) are quite different from judgements about the subgroup's relative prototypicality (the degree to which they are approaching maximal standards). For instance, in four studies Kessler et al. (2010) assessed or manipulated the type of standard and the degree of deviation displayed by a

target and then measured the evaluation of deviants or the assigned punishment for such deviation. They found that while evaluation/punishment of deviation from a maximal standard varied gradually, depending on the degree of deviation, minimal standards defined a clear cut-off point and evaluations varied dichotomously between acceptable versus unacceptable.

This dichotomous structure of evaluations in terms of minimal standards is consistent with the idea that minimal standards represent necessary conditions for group membership. That is, meeting minimal standards is deemed to be necessary for inclusion within the category. Thus, these criteria must be met by all members and subgroups within the category and no member or subgroup should be explicitly denied the opportunities to meet these standards (see also Rips, 2001).

Thus, a violation of a minimal standard has more severe consequences than a violation of a maximal standard. Failure to meet a minimal standard can lead to exclusion from the superordinate category and can trigger extremely negative treatment of the violators. For instance, most people might be horrified to learn that someone has tortured, raped and killed a 7 year old child, and one part of this horror might come from the widely shared idea that such behaviour is simply incompatible with being human. One likely response to this kind of behaviour would be to doubt the humanity of the perpetrator, and even people who are usually against capital punishment or torture and who usually favour fair legal procedures and even forgiveness might consider making an exception for this particular perpetrator: After all, fair procedures and forgiveness are reserved for those who meet the minimal standards of humanness, and he cannot be completely human, can he? So, although very negative treatment and exclusion of others are normally considered a transgression of fairness norms, when the target has violated a minimal standard, these actions become understandable and even legitimate (Fritsche et al., 2009; Kessler et al., 2010; Schubert et al., 2010; Waldzus et al., 2010). *Thus, actions that would normally be considered nonnormative can be seen as normative if they are in response to a violation of minimal standards.* Similar claims can be made about responses to subgroups that appear to be violating minimal standards. These violations will be seen as threatening not only to the subgroup that is directly targeted by the action but also to the entire superordinate category as these acts violate a basic aspect of the category identity. Thus, forced exclusion of the subgroup and other actions that harm or punish the responsible group may be perceived not only as legitimate but as necessary (e.g., Vidmar, 2000).

Some of the characteristics of minimal standards, particularly the rigorous responses when minimal standards are violated, seem similar to moral mandates (Skikta, 2010) or to what has been described as taboo trade-offs (Tetlock, Kirstel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Moral mandates or taboo-trade offs can be understood as attitudes that are likely to take the form of minimal standards. We would suggest, however, that not all minimal standards need to be linked to moral issues. For instance, to become a member of MENSA (the international high IQ society), one has to demonstrate an intelligence quotient in the top two percent of the population. This is a clear (although somewhat arbitrary) minimal standard although it has little to do with morality. What is more important for the current analysis is that minimal standards are considered as absolutely necessary conditions for being a member (or subgroup) of a superordinate category.

2.1.2.4 Maximal/minimal standards and goals and related concepts

As previously stated, maximal and minimal standards refer to different aspects of group life: The former would be more relevant when considering intracategorical differentiation and refer to desired ideals; the latter would be more relevant when considering intercategorical differentiation and refer to necessary conditions for membership in a particular category. Given this, minimal standards would be more salient in an intergroup context or when decisions about group membership are at stake (e.g., deciding if a deviant should be marginalized or excluded); and maximal standards would be more salient in an intragroup context, once membership in a group is guaranteed and, so, minimal standards are met.

Nevertheless and as stated at the end of section 2.1.2.1, we also believe that perceiving a standard as maximal or minimal is not a rigid process, but it rather depends on individuals, situations and contexts. For instance, Fritsche et al. (2009) have demonstrated that individuals differ in their maximal and minimal standard orientation and that this difference had an impact on the affect displayed towards and the treatment of norm-violators. Results revealed that individuals with a relative dominance of minimal standard orientation displayed more negative affect and more negative treatment of (i.e., more severe deserved punishment and more inclination to exclude them) individuals and groups that violated norms.

Moreover, Kessler et al. (2010) successfully primed minimal versus maximal standard mindsets, leading individuals to interpret the same standard violation either as

minimal or maximal, depending on the priming condition. In one study they asked participants to take part in two unrelated tasks: In the first task participants were primed with a minimal versus maximal standard mindset in an unrelated context; in the second task they were then invited to evaluate four traffic offenses. The mindset priming in the first task was designed at manipulating the accessibility of the different types of standards. Participants were asked to help a cartoon mouse to find her way through a maze. In the minimal standard condition participants were instructed “that the mouse had to run through the maze” (p. 1220), for instance to get some cheese.³ In the maximal standard condition, the participants were instructed “that the farther the mouse goes through the maze, the more cheese she will get...” (p. 1220). The second task was designed to measure the degree of punishment that should be assigned to the traffic offenses. The authors found that when participants were primed with a mindset that made them perceive evaluative in terms of maximal standards, their evaluations of deviants (in terms of the degree of assigned punishment) depended on the degree of deviation from the given standard. However, when participants were primed with a minimal standard mindset, the evaluation of the same deviants were dichotomous, that is, participants established a clear cut-off point that defined the deviants’ behaviour as either acceptable or not. Beyond this cut-off criterion, evaluations did not depend on the degree of deviation.

Thus, there is both interindividual and situational variation in maximal or minimal standard orientation, making people more sensitive to interpreting transgressions in an either/or fashion (congruent with a minimal standard mindset) or to interpreting transgressions in a gradual fashion (congruent with a maximal standard mindset). Interestingly, in the original formulation of maximal and minimal standards, Brendl and Higgins (1996) also mentioned some factors that could influence the standards’ representation: Chronic outcome focus (a chronic negative outcome focus would lead to setting more minimal standards), previous success/failure (failure would lead to setting more minimal standards), and the fact that valenced reference points could be a result of previous evaluations of events (in the sense that an event that supports a standard is always positively valenced).

³ The mindset priming was also used to (orthogonally) manipulate the regulatory focus: In the promotion condition, participants were presented with an attainment scenario for the mouse in the maze; and in the prevention condition, participants were presented with an avoidance scenario for the mouse in the maze. As this manipulation was not relevant for our current argumentation and had no effect, we decided not to present it in the main discussion.

A related, but not identical concept to the distinction between minimal and maximal standards is the concept of regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997, 1999). Some similarity to that concept might be suggested by the fact that maximal standards are the ones individuals/groups strive to meet and that minimal standards are the ones individuals/groups evade failing to meet. Indeed, both the distinction between minimal/maximal standards and the concept of regulatory focus go back to the original formulation of minimal and maximal goals presented by Brendl and Higgins (1996). Moreover, in their formulation they state that maximal standards serve as an incentive fostering approach movements toward positively valenced end states (a promotion focus); and that minimal standards offer a protection against failure and foster avoidance movements from negatively valenced end states (prevention focus)⁴.

However, according to Kessler et al. (2010), the distinction between minimal and maximal standards and the concept of regulatory focus with its distinction between promotion and prevention should be considered as orthogonal, suggesting that both types of standards (minimal vs. maximal) should elicit both types of regulatory focus (prevention vs. promotions) and translate into both approach and avoidance tendencies. As Fritsche et al. (2009) suggest: Both minimal and maximal standards may refer to the attainment of positive outcomes and to the avoidance of negative ones. Indeed, in their study about traffic rule violations described above, Kessler et al. (2010, Study 4) manipulated minimal/maximal standard orientation and regulatory focus independently. Overall, regulatory focus had no effect on the dependent variables in this study. Moreover, in a correlational study Fritsche et al. (2009, Study 2) found that measured prevention and promotion focus were not correlated with measured minimal/maximal standards.

Another important clarification refers to whether the maximal and minimal standards should be thought of as either descriptive or injunctive norms (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) or as both of them. While descriptive norms refer to frequency of behaviour (Schroeder, 2010), to what is done (Cialdini et al., 1990); injunctive or prescriptive norms refer to what should and should not be done (Schroeder, 2010), to

⁴ Also interestingly, Brendl and Higgins (1996) recognized that beyond its differences, namely that the nonnegative end state specified by minimal standards is reached by avoiding negative events, and that the positive end state specified by maximal standards is reached by approaching positive events, both type of standards share some similarities: Both specify positively valenced events as end states, events which should be approached. So, even if minimal standards are guided by an avoidance motivation, this avoidance strategy is subordinated to an approach motivation, i.e., a minimal standard translates into the avoidance of a negative event at the strategic level of the standard hierarchy so that a positively valenced (nonnegative) end state can be approached at a higher identity level of that same standard hierarchy.

what ought to be done (Cialdini et al., 1990) and its violation may result in others' disapproval and even sanctioning (Cialdini et al., 1990; Schroeder, 2010). Given this link between the prescriptive norms and a possible display of punishment and given the more informing character of the descriptive norms, it seems that the concepts of maximal and minimal standards are rather referring to the former normative framework. Nevertheless, and keeping in mind that descriptive/prescriptive norms denote differentiated aspects of norms, Cialdini and colleagues (1990) also recognized that what ought to be done is usually what is done. Relying on Fritzsche et al. (2009), who state that "(...) superordinate categories provide the descriptive and the prescriptive standards for the evaluation of the included subgroups and their members." (p. 4), we also assume that maximal and minimal standards should be thought of as both descriptive and prescriptive.

To sum up, the distinction between minimal versus maximal standards is crucial for the evaluation of and the response to norm violations, over and beyond the related distinctions between promotion and prevention focus as well as between descriptive and injunctive norms. In the next step of our reasoning we apply the distinction between maximal and minimal standards to the intergroup context of disadvantaged groups that respond to transgressions committed by dominant outgroups (see section 2.1.1).

2.1.2.5 Preventing disadvantaged groups from approaching maximal standards

As mentioned earlier, research on the ingroup projection model has shown that members of subgroups will tend to project characteristics from their own subgroup onto the prototype of the superordinate category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). However, groups with numerical advantages (majorities) and those with more social power (dominant groups) are often able to instantiate these ingroup projections more successfully than are members of minorities and disadvantaged groups. Thus, minorities and disadvantaged groups are often seen by others, and even by themselves, as less prototypical of the superordinate category than majorities/dominant groups (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Waldzus et al., 2004). One implication of this lack of prototypicality is that they are perceived as farther from achieving maximal standards and, thus, as having a less central (status) position within the superordinate category. Nevertheless, because greater prototypicality is associated with more positive evaluations and outcomes (Wenzel et al., 2003), disadvantaged groups will often expend considerable energy and effort to approach maximal standards.

We do assume that when the actions of the advantaged group are seen by the disadvantaged group to directly undermine their access to the resources needed to achieve these maximal standards, dissatisfaction may result and disadvantaged group members may engage in collective action in an effort to remove the barriers set up by the advantaged group. However, striving to approach maximal standards requires a general acceptance of the shared ideals and representation of the superordinate category. This acceptance of the superordinate group norms, coupled with some consensus about the disadvantaged group's non-prototypicality and non-central (status) position, means that interference by the advantaged group should not be entirely unexpected, and these transgressions should not be seen as entirely inconsistent with the norms and values of the superordinate category. When this is added to the high costs and risks associated with destructive behaviour (e.g., Jackman, 2001), it is very likely that the collective action that can result when disadvantaged groups are prevented from achieving maximal standards will *not* be destructive.

2.1.2.6 Inviting destructive intergroup behaviour: Preventing disadvantaged groups from meeting minimal standards

When a disadvantaged group within a superordinate category is confronted with acts by a more advantaged outgroup that prevent members of their group from meeting minimal standards, the disadvantaged group's members are likely to recognize these as efforts to undermine not only their group's relative status within the superordinate category, as it might happen with a maximal standard violation, but as threats to their very membership in that category (e.g., Tyler, 1989; Tyler et al., 1996). In other words, such acts might be interpreted as social exclusion. Although the possibility of exclusion can be highly threatening, perceptions that the ingroup is being excluded alone will not necessarily lead to destructive intergroup behaviour. Destructive action against the outgroup will only emerge when members of the disadvantaged group do not accept their exclusion. Only when they continue to see themselves as members of the superordinate category will the advantaged group's efforts to exclude them be seen as illegitimate.

However, we propose a more specific description of what these perceptions of illegitimacy represent. Recall that earlier, in section 2.1.2.1, we argued that a direct effort to prevent other members of the superordinate group from meeting minimal standards can in itself be seen as a violation of a minimal standard. Thus, when

members of a disadvantaged subgroup continue to see themselves as legitimate members of the valued superordinate category and they believe that the actions of the advantaged outgroup are designed to explicitly deny them the opportunity to meet minimal standards of that category, these actions by the advantaged group will be characterized as a violation of minimal standards.

As described above, violations of minimal standards threaten the very identity of the superordinate category. Thus, efforts to exclude, harm or punish violators may be necessary to protect the superordinate category. Thus, the usual response to a subgroup that violates a minimal standard is efforts to exclude them. However, when the perpetrator of the violation is a dominant group and the victims are members of a disadvantaged group, the victims will usually lack the power to exclude the perpetrators. It is under these circumstances that we predict the response will be destructive intergroup behaviour. *Thus, destructive intergroup behaviour represents a disadvantaged group's effort to protect the superordinate category by punishing the advantaged group who they believe has violated a minimal standard by preventing members of the disadvantaged ingroup from meeting the minimal standards of the superordinate group.* Since the disadvantaged group lacks the power to exclude their more advantaged adversary, they instead turn to destructive intergroup action designed to severely punish the perpetrators.

However, our earlier discussion of relative prototypicality of advantaged and disadvantaged groups is also relevant here. Dominant majority groups are very likely to be seen not only by their own members but also by uninvolved third parties within the superordinate group and even observers outside the superordinate category as the most prototypical subgroup within the superordinate category. Thus when the disadvantaged group takes destructive collective actions against this advantaged group, these harmful actions may well be seen as negative, violent and nonnormative. Paradoxically, actions intended to protect the superordinate group by punishing the violator of a minimal standard (the dominant group) will be seen by others as harming that very same superordinate group.

Interestingly, and paving the way for tragic escalation, the response of the advantaged group to the destructive behaviour of the disadvantaged group will likely be further deprivation of the resources needed to achieve minimal standards and further efforts to exclude the disadvantaged group. Thus, a cycle of social exclusion and destructive intergroup behaviour leads to escalating intergroup conflict in which each

group sees itself as the victim (e.g., Kelman, 1999) - in our terms, the victim of the other group's violation of a minimal standard⁵.

2.1.3 Minimal standard violations and destructive behaviour in the larger societal context: The question of marginalization and social exclusion

Apartheid — meaning separateness in Afrikaans (...) — was a system of legal racial segregation enforced by the National Party government in South Africa between 1948 and 1994.(...) New legislation classified inhabitants people into racial groups (black, white, coloured, and Indian), and residential areas were segregated by means of forced removals. (...). The government segregated education, medical care, and other public services, and provided black people with services greatly inferior to those of whites.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apartheid>. Retrieved 11 January 2011

Our theorising so far intended to explain the psychological conditions leading to group-related destructive behaviour. However, our theorising does not only intend to provide a model for a psychological process, but it also intends to provide a partial answer to the socially relevant question of how people react in the face of different degrees of social rejection.

More specifically, we are interested in understanding and explaining the reactions of disadvantaged, relatively powerless groups (usually minorities) to particular forms of rejection, that is: Marginalization and exclusion. We use social rejection as a more general term with different degrees or forms: Milder forms such as marginalization and more extreme forms such as exclusion. Marginalization means partial rejection, for instance as a full central member in a valued group. Those who are marginalized are still accepted as group members, but only peripherally, not as full members. In contrast, we use the term exclusion in this thesis to describe being fully rejected by the group.

⁵ Whether or not intergroup conflict implies violations of minimal standards or goals might also shape the kind of social identities (e.g., their militancy) that emerge from such intergroup dynamics (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2005). The current research focuses only on the disadvantaged group's perspective in which the dominant outgroup appears as the perpetrator of violations of minimal standards and goals.

2.1.3.1 A note on disadvantage

As this thesis focuses on the destructive behaviours displayed by disadvantaged groups, it seems relevant defining what we mean by disadvantaged.

The term may seem self-evident, and one of the reasons is that we may tend to say that a disadvantaged group is one that holds some sort of disadvantage, which is an obvious tautology. According to the Oxford dictionary (1995), a disadvantage is “a negative point or condition; a thing that tends to prevent somebody succeeding, making progress, etc (...)” (p. 327). According to the same dictionary, being disadvantaged means “having a poor social, educational, etc background; [being] deprived (...)” (p. 327).

These definitions are quite general, relying on objectively identifiable characteristics. The same objectively identifiable characteristics may be found in some socio-psychological attempts to define the concept of disadvantage. For example, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) mention having an ethnic minority background and living in circumstances of poverty as what defines a disadvantaged position. Jost and Burgess (2000) refer to disadvantaged groups as those being “... low in social standing ...” (p. 294) and being “...assigned to positions of low status...” (p. 294).

To sum up, despite the different focus in defining disadvantage, some common characteristics can also be derived: The definitions seem to rely on the objective social structure in order to delineate this concept; there is no reference to the numerical dimension, i.e., being numerically disadvantaged; there are references to objective material dimensions, such as the access to material resources (e.g., the previously mentioned circumstances of poverty); and there are references to more symbolic dimensions, such as the access to education, social status, and power.

A different line of reasoning is presented by Schmitt and collaborators, who define this concept in a more dynamic framework, by stressing its relative dimension: A group, the authors state, is disadvantaged relatively to other (more advantaged) groups (e.g., Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002; Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002). The authors also mention the fact that being in a disadvantaged position impacts group life, as such a position results in less positive outcomes, namely in terms of power and psychological well-being.

We propose a perspective that may help integrate the different views – the more objective ones and the more relative one – on disadvantaged.

Different from the theories previously presented we consider relevant to take into account the fact that both advantaged and disadvantaged groups can be thought of as part of a higher-order, superordinate category that encompasses both of them (Turner et al., 87; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

In order to provide the normative basis for subgroup comparisons, the membership in superordinate categories requires a certain degree of shared understanding about what constitutes such superordinate category, namely in terms of its standards. In this sense, and more in line with the objective perspective on disadvantage, this consensual agreement should assure a universal application and respect for the standards of a superordinate category within its boundaries.

Nonetheless, recent research and theorising has shown that the perspectives of subgroups on what is normative within the superordinate category may differ because members of each subgroup will tend to project the characteristics of their own ingroup onto the superordinate category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus et al., 2005; Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003). Thus, what seem to be “objective” standards of superordinate categories depends on group perspective, and evaluations are based on subgroup comparisons, which is more in line with the reasoning presented by Schmitt and collaborators (e.g., Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002).

More concretely, what most distinguishes the groups we mention in our studies is the fact that the advantaged group, because is more effective in validating the ingroup projections, dominates the superordinate category, in terms of relative prototypicality (and, thus, status) and has the power to exclude the disadvantaged group from the superordinate category in case the latter violates a minimal standard. Thus, and in very practical terms, we define a disadvantaged group as the one that is hindered from achieving certain standards of the superordinate category. When hindered from achieving maximal standards, disadvantaged groups will see their position within the superordinate category as relatively less prototypical and experience marginalization. When hindered from achieving minimal standards, disadvantaged groups will see their membership in the superordinate category threatened and experience exclusion.

In our theorising we also assume that disadvantaged groups are inevitably intertwined with advantaged groups and that the former react to the perceived actions performed by the latter. We further expect that the disadvantaged are most likely the “victims” of marginalization and exclusion and that the advantaged will be the ones

marginalizing or excluding them. Most importantly, because of the power of the advantaged dominant group, being marginalized or excluded has devastating consequences for a less powerful, disadvantaged group. In as much as desired or needed states or resources are linked to group membership, marginalization limits a group member's or subgroup's full access to those states or resources: That is, the marginalized group faces partial deprivation. Accordingly, exclusion blocks access to group related states and resources completely. That is, in our use of the terms we assume that both marginalization and exclusion, besides being different forms of rejection, also represent different forms of deprivation, being marginalization a less extreme one, and exclusion de facto a quite extreme one. We acknowledge that in that sense marginalization may be seen as involving some degree of exclusion (e.g., Maynard & Ferdman, 2009) or may be seen as an "in between [inclusion and exclusion] position" (Beck, Madon, & Sahay, 2004, p. 238).

Given all of this, we propose that it is also relevant to consider the side of the perpetrator of marginalization and exclusion to understand the disadvantaged group's reactions to being marginalized or excluded.

2.1.3.2 Rejecting

Social rejection and exclusion are social facts, and in order to understand their consequences it might be useful to take into account their function. Several researchers discuss the role of rejection as an intentional, meaningful and motivated action (Fritsche & Schubert, 2009). Rejection in that sense is seen namely as having evolutionary advantages (e.g., avoiding diseases, Fritsche & Schubert, 2009) and as being a form of punishment/correction of undesired behaviour within a group (e.g., Ouwerkerk, Van Lange, Gallucci, & Kerr, 2005; Williams & Govan, 2005). It has also been seen as having self-serving motives, such as being used as a strategy by non-central group members to assert their own sense of inclusion and commitment to the ingroup (e.g., Pickett & Brewer, 2005); as having identity-related motives, such as self-enhancement and uncertainty reduction (e.g., Hogg, et al., 2005). It has also been discussed as a means of managing group composition by preserving the individuals that benefit the group and excluding those that do not (Levine, Moreland, & Hausmann, 2005). Finally, it has been presented as a means to sustain, clarify and strengthen the norms of the ingroup by fostering the exclusion of those that deviate from group norms (Abrams, De Moura, Hutchison, & Viki, 2005; Fritsche & Schubert, 2009; see also the "black sheep

effect”, Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988).

Although exclusion can be part of intergroup behaviour, most of the work in this area has focused on a more individual level of analysis or explored the intragroup dynamics underlying the phenomenon of being rejected/rejecting. Some notable exceptions include work on the role of exclusion in intergroup conflict: Hewstone and colleagues (2005), for instance, reflect on how the religious segregation in Northern Ireland helped in the maintenance and escalation of the conflict between Catholics and Protestants (and on how intergroup contact might help overcoming it). The authors reflect on how the religious segregation, translated into residential, marital and educational segregation, contributed to the exacerbation of the conflict resulting from the Catholics’ claims of discrimination. More concretely, the physical and social separation was understood to feed violence which, in turn, fed the segregation (Hamilton, 1995, cited by Hewstone et al., 2005).

Other work establishes a link between groups’ representations and the definition of group boundaries: The common ingroup identity model (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) presents recategorization into a common more-inclusive group as a means of expanding group boundaries, thereby changing perceptions of who is included in (and should be treated positively) and who is excluded from (and may be the target of more negative emotions, attitudes and behaviours) the ingroup. For example: Portuguese and Spanish may display negative emotions, attitudes and behaviours when thinking about each other. Recategorizing both groups as part of Europe allows for the inclusion of the former outgroup in a new common more inclusive ingroup. Thus, granting the former outgroup positive treatment. These dynamics are indirectly also of importance for the understanding of exclusion: If sharing positive resources and evaluation with a certain group is undesired, such inclusion in a superordinate common ingroup can be hindered, keeping the group exclusive.

Finally, Rice and Mullen (2005) show how the cognitive representation of immigrants can be used as a tool for direct exclusion. For example, the authors show that, compared to immigrant groups that are the target of more complex representations namely in terms of physical traits, personal traits and food habits, and that are the target of less negatively valenced representations, immigrant groups that are the target of

simpler⁶ and more negatively valenced representations are less admitted in the USA, with reference to immigration quotas.

To sum up, despite their more or less obvious social costs, there are several reasons and functionalities that make social rejection and exclusion likely and integral parts of many intergroup relations and interactions.

2.1.3.3 Being rejected

Understanding the experience of being rejected is such a pervasive concern that there is a vast socio-psychological literature on the outcomes, reactions and functions of the myriad experiences of “being rejected” (for a review see Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005).

According to the literature on ostracism, stigmatization, segregation, exclusion, etcetera, there is a motivational basis for avoiding rejection, as being rejected leads to a wide variety of negative outcomes ranging from reflexive pain (e.g., Williams, 1997) to decreased cooperation and lowered cognitive performance (e.g., Twenge & Baumeister, 2005), to feelings of isolation, a decreased sense of belonging, self-esteem and sense of meaningful existence (e.g., Williams & Govan, 2005), to feelings of self-blame (Mendes, McCoy, Major, & Blascovich, 2008), to feelings of being deprived from resources, perspectives and identities (e.g., MacLaughlin-Volpe, Aron, Wright, & Lewandowski Jr, 2005), to self-defeating behaviour (e.g., Twenge & Baumeister, 2005). This literature also emphasizes that people are not only motivated to avoid rejection, but that they are also motivated to belong: The gregarious side of men is attributed an evolutionary value (e.g., Gruter & Masters, 1986; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Williams, 2001), it is viewed as a fundamental need (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1969; DeWall, 2010; Pickett & Brewer, 2005; Twenge & Baumeister, 2005) and as providing individuals with a sense of collectiveness (e.g., Hogg, Fielding, & Darley, 2005) and with group identities (Wright, Aron, & Tropp, 2002).

2.1.3.4 Acting upon being rejected

Within the discussion of the pernicious effects of rejection, the literature pays considerable attention to how those being rejected react. Here the evidence is not

⁶ According to the authors the complexity/simplicity of a cognitive representation is a function of the number of mutually exclusive categories referring to physical traits, personal traits, personal names, food habits, group names, or miscellaneous (Allen, 1983, cited by Rice & Mullen, 2005) being used. The greater the number of categories used, the greater the complexity of the representation.

consensual: Some scholars found evidence suggesting antisocial, aggressive behaviour to be the response to rejection (e.g., DeWall, 2010; DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009; Geller, Goodstein, Silver, & Sternberg, 1974); some emphasize the use of prosocial behaviour as the most effective response when experiencing rejection and/or found empirical evidence for that being the case (e.g., DeWall, 2010; Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; Williams & Sommers, 1997). Some authors report that rejected participants tend to avoid further contact/interaction (e.g., Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Molden, Lucas, Gardner, Dean, & Knowles, 2009), and finally some authors try to reconcile these different views, to clarify what might be the causes for different responses in face of rejection. Williams (e.g., 2001, 2009) argues that both antisocial and prosocial behaviour may follow rejection under different circumstances: When exclusion threatens belonging and self-esteem needs, prosocial behaviour should follow; when exclusion threatens control and meaningful existence needs, antisocial behaviour will follow. Richman and Leary (2009) also contribute to this integration by presenting a multi-motive model: Three sets of motives (social connection, antisocial urges and avoidance of future rejection) can be experienced after an episode of rejection and which motive will guide the person's reaction will depend on the person's interpretation of the episode. For example, when the episode is perceived as unjust, the relationship is little valued and there are low expectations of repairing it, antisocial behaviour will be the outcome of the rejection episode.

The theories we have presented seem to study the reactions to exclusion (be it anti- or prosocial behaviour) as concerning the fulfillment of individual and group-related needs and do not address more general normative concerns that may be elicited by the act of rejecting/excluding or by the display of antisocial behaviour.

So, as a summary we can point out that the study of rejection seems to pinpoint the motivated and intentional role of rejecting on the one hand, and the adverse effects of being rejected on the other hand. That is, even if rejecting serves a number of evolutionary advantageous punitive and even self-serving motives, those being excluded feel a wide range of negative outcomes, from pain to lowered cognitive performance. Despite some exceptions that discuss the role of exclusion at the intergroup level of analysis, the study of rejection seems to be mainly focused on the individual and on the intragroup level. When presenting the side of the "perpetrator", the focus seems to be rather on the (intra)group level. As can be understood from the research presented in section 2.1.3.1, rejecting seems to be a powerful and useful tool

for managing group composition, and clarifying group norms and functions, even if/when the individual needs (to belong) must be sacrificed for the sake of the group. When considering those being rejected (the “victims”), the focus seems to be more on the individual level. Individuals are both motivated to avoid rejection and to belong, and so, they react in face of rejection. In the literature exploring such reactions, these seem to be motivated by individual needs, such as the need to belong (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995), rather than by concerns on the behalf of the group. Others and/or groups seem to be means to achieve an end: Avoiding rejection and maintaining belonging.

Like the theories we presented in this section, we are also interested in further understanding the reactions to rejection in general, and to exclusion in particular, yet framing them within an intergroup approach. In very general terms, we focus our attention on how disadvantaged groups react to rejection/exclusion, which we assume creates a form of deprivation that is not self-inflicted, but rather imposed by an advantaged group. This is so, because given its disadvantage, the less powerful group will more easily be a victim rather than a perpetrator of rejection/exclusion. We also assume that disadvantaged groups are inevitably intertwined with advantaged groups and that the former react to the perceived actions of the latter. We further believe that both disadvantaged and advantaged groups are not interacting in a social vacuum: Both groups can be thought of as parts of a higher-order, superordinate category. The superordinate category (e.g., the larger society) provides not only the frame of reference for comparisons between the subgroups included (Turner et al., 1987), but also the normative basis used for regulating the relations between these subgroups. Thus, in an attempt to further the understanding of the phenomenon of rejection, we present an approach that is concerned with the disadvantaged group as a “victim” of rejection/exclusion, yet acknowledges and takes into consideration the importance of the interrelation between the “victim” and the “perpetrator” of rejection/exclusion. The approach we take tries to offer a fresh explanation both of why avoiding a particular instance of rejection – i.e., exclusion – is social identity related motivationally-based, and of why destructive behaviour, from the perspective of the disadvantaged group displaying it, is an acceptable reaction to some forms of rejection (i.e., exclusion) but not to others (i.e., marginalization).

2.1.3.5 Further understanding rejecting and being rejected

As discussed in the summary of the previous section, there is an apparent divergence between “victim” and “perpetrator” in the rejection phenomenon: While research focusing on the former points to the adverse effects of rejection (as a form of social deprivation), research focusing on the latter highlights, for instance, the role of rejection as a useful tool for punishing unwanted behaviour. Nevertheless, both “victims” and “perpetrators” of rejection do not live in a social vacuum, they might rely on some common ground in order to give meaning and legitimacy to their claims and behaviours: As discussed in section 2.1.3.2 (and in previous sections), we believe that both the “victim” and the “perpetrator” of rejection may share a broader vision of the social world and how it works/should work, that they may rely on a common source that can both dictate that individuals or groups can decree rejection/exclusion and how these same individuals or groups should react when the target of rejection/exclusion. We believe that there is a common basis for assessing one’s own and others’ behaviours and for guiding one’s behaviour.

What would be the basis for both “victim” and “perpetrator” of rejection/exclusion to evaluate their situation and decide when and how to act upon it?

2.1.3.5.1 The role of superordinate categories

As previously noted, following self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) and the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), we assume that in an intergroup context the normative basis for evaluating one’s and others’ situation and for deciding if and how to act is provided by more inclusive, higher-order categories encompassing both the ingroup and the relevant outgroup(s). These superordinate categories (e.g., the larger society) provide not only the frame of reference for comparisons between the subgroups included in them (Turner et al., 1987), but also the normative basis for the regulation of relations between these subgroups. If this assumption is correct, we can conceptualize not only the less inclusive ingroup, but also more inclusive, superordinate categories as potential sources of normativity and positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) for members of disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, these superordinate categories also provide the basis for judgments concerning justice, legitimacy and entitlements (Weber et al., 2002; Wenzel, 2004).

Given that several subgroups – each with its own idiosyncratic agenda – are included in the same superordinate category, they might differ in their interpretation and representation of the normative basis provided by the superordinate group. And such interpretations might differently impact the behaviours displayed by the subgroups and their members.

2.1.3.6 Rejecting/being rejected and the role of maximal and minimal standards and goals

Based on the work of Kessler et al. (2010), we argue that the degree of consensus about the normative basis offered by the superordinate category depends on the type of standard we are referring to. In terms of maximal standards, recent research and theorising (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) has shown that there can be disagreement about what is normative, in terms of prototypically, for the superordinate group. Members of each subgroup will tend to project their ingroup's characteristics onto the superordinate group and, thus, perceive the superordinate category as more similar to their ingroup than to the outgroup, rendering the ingroup as more normative than the outgroup. This process is not equally accessible to both the advantaged powerful groups and the disadvantaged powerless groups: As the former have access to more resources, they are able to validate these ingroup projections more effectively than the latter.

As the same time as there are disagreements, there might also be some consensus across subgroups about the maximal standards (norms, values and goals) of the superordinate group. Both disadvantaged groups and dominant groups often agree that the former are less prototypical of the superordinate category. As a summary: Because the advantaged group is more successful in projecting the ingroup characteristics onto the superordinate category, it appears as more prototypical and, thus, occupies a more central (status) position within the superordinate category. Maximal standards are derived from the prototypes of the superordinate categories. From these two premises follows that the advantaged group is more likely to approach the maximal standards and that the disadvantaged group, which is less prototypical of the superordinate group, is inherently further from meeting the maximal standards (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Waldzus et al., 2004).

Not meeting maximal standards and goals has important implications for the disadvantaged, but it should not result in their exclusion from the superordinate

category. We would rather expect it to result in a less central (lower status) position within the superordinate category, that is, in marginalization. In that sense, marginalization can be seen as an outcome of not meeting maximal standards.

Once a group is marginalized by an advantaged dominant outgroup, however, this marginalization can also be the reason for (continuing) failure to meet maximal standards. To overcome this usually undesirable situation, members of disadvantaged groups would have to approach maximal standards. They might, apart from advocating their own perspective on what is prototypical and desirable for the superordinate category, try to do so by striving for good jobs and good education; trying to be successful or famous in the mainstream. Those (probably few) that can make it might then advocate for their (sub)ingroup to improve its position. However, the marginalization might even further contribute to the disadvantage of the group as it makes it even more difficult to approach maximal standards, creating a negative feedback loop for the disadvantaged. Therefore, attempts by the advantaged dominant group to marginalize the disadvantaged group might be seen by disadvantaged group as limiting their access to the resources needed to meet maximal standards/goals. In such case, we propose, dissatisfaction may be the result. Nevertheless, such dissatisfaction will probably not lead to destructive behaviour. The most important reason for this is that there are some reality constraints that must be taken into account. Because not reaching these maximal standards and being limited to remain at the margin of the superordinate category is somehow consistent with the disadvantaged group's non-prototypicality. Thus, the actions of the advantaged outgroup are not an unexpected transgression/violation in terms of the core norms and values of the superordinate category.

Moreover, striving to meet maximal standards/goals entails the general acceptance of those goals plus the costs and risks associated with engaging in destructive behaviour, makes it likely that any collective action that results from preventing disadvantaged groups from meeting maximal standards/goals by marginalizing them will *not* be destructive.

Minimal standards are different from maximal standards. As already stated in section 2.1.2.3, because minimal standards must be met by all members and all subgroups within the category (Kessler et al., 2010), they are expected to be shared by all members and by all subgroups (i.e., both the advantaged and disadvantaged groups), thus, they involve a more consensual understanding and interpretation by all the

members and subgroups encompassed within the superordinate group. Even if there also can be, due to ingroup projection, different perspectives of the different subgroups on what the consensual minimal goals are, consensus is expected and assumed.

Also as opposed to maximal standards, the transgression/violation of minimal standards and goals will most probably result in the exclusion of the violators from the superordinate category. Because achieving minimal standards is required for all members and subgroups of a superordinate category, if the disadvantaged do not meet minimal standards, it either implies their exclusion (if they were supposed to be the beneficiaries of such standards), or exclusion would be the usual punishment for such a violation (if they were supposed to be the actors according to those standards). For example, people living in Portugal (superordinate category) expect to have access to some resources that are seen as so basic that are available to everybody (minimal standards). An example of such resources would be health care. If a person is prevented from having access to needed health care (benefiting from a minimal standard) that would imply that that person is excluded from the superordinate category. Not having access to a resource from which one should benefit is exclusion. In terms of punishment, we can think about the following example: Drivers (superordinate category) have to follow a series of rules in order to keep their license. Some of these rules are more fundamental (minimal standards) than others. One of these fundamental rules states that drivers should not drive with a level of alcohol in the blood of more than 0.5g/l. In case a driver does so, violating a minimal standard, s/he is punished by being excluded from the superordinate category from one month up to one year.

Accordingly, just as marginalization can be the outcome of not meeting maximal standards, exclusion can be the outcome of not meeting minimal standards. Therefore, if a more advantaged powerful outgroup acts in a way that prevents members of the disadvantaged powerless ingroup from meeting minimal standards/goals, these acts will most probably be interpreted as efforts that challenge not merely the disadvantaged group's relative position within the superordinate category (e.g., in terms of status) but even as threats to the disadvantaged group's membership in the superordinate category (e.g., Tyler, 1989; Tyler et al., 1996). For instance, if inmates of the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq are put naked on a dog leash and forced to walk like a dog, this might be interpreted as a threat to these inmates' (and their group's) human dignity, not just

because it threatens their status and prestige within humanity, but particularly because it is seen as questioning and threatening their very humanity itself.

Exclusion will have more far reaching consequences than marginalization as well. Like marginalization exclusion should lead to dissatisfaction, as exclusion makes it impossible to achieve minimal standards, which is rarely in the interest of the (excluded) disadvantaged group. However, as argued in section 2.1.2.6, when considered to be illegitimate, exclusion will in itself be seen as an act, committed by the advantaged dominant group, that violates minimal standards, and actions that violate minimal standards/goals will be seen as threatening not only to the target group, but as threatening also to the entire superordinate category as these acts violate a basic aspect of the superordinate group's identity.

Yet, the advantaged outgroup's actions (exclusion of the disadvantaged group) will only be deemed illegitimate and in violation of the minimal standards of the superordinate group when the disadvantaged group members consider themselves as legitimate members of the superordinate category and, thus, identify themselves with the superordinate category. Only in this case should, then, the actions of the advantaged outgroup be adequately punished. This is an important point to keep in mind, as the works of McLaughlin-Volpe et al. (2005) show that, at least at an individual level, there are circumstances under which exclusion may be provoked or easily accepted. When exclusion enables one to escape a relationship that is offering less than expected; or limiting one's personal growth; or preventing one from engaging in a more desirable opportunity for accessing more material and social resources, more perspectives or identities (i.e., to self-expand), individuals are more willing to exit the relationship or accept its end.

Apart from such particular cases, as long as the superordinate identity is relevant, an excluded group might feel the necessity to punish those who are responsible for their exclusion, not only because of their resulting disadvantage, but also because exclusion is incompatible with minimal standards shared within the superordinate category. As the usual punishment of minimal standards violation is exclusion, a powerful group might be able to mobilize the superordinate group to "exclude the excluders", as happens at times in politics, for instance when less radical parties collaborate to exclude right wing extremists. As mentioned in section 2.1.2.6, however, usually a disadvantaged group that faces exclusion and feels the need to perform such punishment lacks the power to exclude the perpetrators, that is, the advantaged

outgroup. It is exactly under these circumstances that we propose that a disadvantaged group will resort to destructive intergroup behaviour as a means of rightfully punishing the advantaged outgroup's transgression/violation.

In the current analysis we try to explain the destructive behaviour of disadvantaged groups as the motivationally-based response to exclusion. More concretely, we argue that it is not exclusion per se but rather its interpretation as a violation of a minimal standard that motivates destructive behaviour. This behaviour is not only motivated by subgroup interests, but legitimately derived from norms, goals and standards of superordinate identities.

2.1.4 The role of emotions

We are not only interested in the more "obvious" behavioural reactions displayed by the disadvantaged group to actions by the advantaged group. In addition to the expected different behavioural responses to actions by the advantaged group that are perceived to prevent the disadvantaged ingroup from reaching minimal versus maximal standards, we also expect different emotional consequences following these two forms of deprivation. One reason why emotional responses are as important as behavioural ones is that even if not all members of a disadvantaged group actually engage in certain destructive acts, negative emotions of non-acting group members might still motivate some active or passive (e.g., toleration) social support for destructive behaviour.

Moreover, negative emotions might be particularly motivating and elicit actions that people would otherwise abstain from, because of their social costs. As in some of the research previously discussed, our interest in the role of emotions is also motivated by a desire to go beyond mere structural explanations for the human behaviour, namely in terms of the (objective) work, living and material conditions. We are interested in understanding how people perceive the socio-structural environment in which they live and their position within it. We are also interested in how these perceptions may translate into motivated emotional and behavioural responses. In Suny's (2004) words: "The connection between emotions and action (...) provides an important link in connecting structural environment to human action." (p. 10).

After a period in which emotions were rarely considered in socio-psychological research (e.g., Dias, Cruz, & Fonseca, 2008; Frijda, 1988), the 1980's saw a renewed interest in this field. In the 1990's a novel idea appeared: Going beyond the individual-level analysis, some researchers established a more direct connection between group

membership and emotional display (Smith, 1993; Smith & Mackie, 2010a). Moreover, the idea of emotions as irrational responses was basically abandoned.

Within this new school of thought, one of the most utilized theories is intergroup emotions theory (e.g., Smith & Mackie, 2010b), which advances previous work in this area by clearly establishing that social categorization(s) and social identity(ies) impact our emotions (e.g., Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wilgboldus, & Gorjin, 2003). In line with intergroup emotion theorists (e.g., Smith et al., 2007), we assume that group-relevant events elicit group-level emotions, and that these emotions inspire action.

Intergroup emotions theory is based on the assumptions of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) that the process of identifying with a group transforms group membership into an aspect of the self. Social identity is therefore saturated with emotional meaning (Smith & Mackie, 2010a; Smith & Mackie, 2010b; Smith et al., 2007). As a consequence, when group membership is salient, the group becomes an important source of information on how to appraise a social situation or object: Depending on its implications for the ingroup, the situation/object will be positively or negatively appraised (Smith & Mackie, 2010a; Smith & Mackie, 2010b; Smith et al., 2007).

This framework explains how events' affecting the social group(s) one belongs to – and not necessarily the individual self directly – translate into emotional reactions. When considering intergroup relations, one relevant dimension refers to reactions toward outgroups, be it reactions in actual or imagined interactions or even reactions in the absence of the outgroup (Smith & Mackie, 2010a). More concretely, several studies have shown that outgroups can elicit anger and/or fear and that these emotions entail fight or flight behavioural tendencies, respectively (e.g., Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Yzerbyt et al. 2003). When will an outgroup elicit which emotion? Some studies show that an emotional display and subsequent actions depend on appraisals of the group's relative strength (Mackie et al., 2000) – or as Otten (2009) puts it, on the group's status – so that stronger groups (majorities) would display anger and, thus, tend to attack and weaker groups (minorities) would display fear and, hence, tend to avoid. Others show that minorities also display anger towards a wrongdoer majority (Kamas, 2010; Kamas, Otten, & Sassenberg, 2007, cited by Otten, 2009).

Even if there is evidence suggesting that stronger groups (majorities) and weaker groups (minorities) react in a certain way, should we expect all the members of the same group to display similar intensity of feelings and, thus, react in the same way?

According to Seger, Smith and Mackie (2009) the answer is rather straightforward: “(...) group-based emotions correlate with group identification.” (p. 460). There is further evidence showing that one of the emotions most dependent on (in)group identification is anger: Those who are highly identified with the ingroup tend to express more anger towards an outgroup (Smith & Mackie, 2010b; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). But it is not only the outgroup that may elicit anger. There is also evidence that the ingroup may elicit anger: Braun, Otten and Gorjin (2008, cited by Otten, 2009) showed that ingroup perpetrators perceived as having non-ambiguous harmful intents are targets of anger. And even more interestingly, this anger predicted the display of negative behavioural responses, a result that supports other results showing a link between anger and attack tendencies (e.g., Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2010; Mackie et al., 2000; Smith & Mackie, 2010b). This evidence seems to complement the emphasis placed by (fraternal) relative deprivation research (e.g., Lima & Vala, 2003; Walker, 2010; Walker & Smith, 2002) on the association between anger and resentment, resulting from perceptions of injustice, and the display of collective action. Given these results, including the emotional display seems an important part of the study of destructive behaviours performed by the disadvantaged.

To summarize, we may say that these data seem quite relevant for our argument: We assumed that the violation of minimal standards will lead members of a disadvantaged group to display destructive behaviour and we presented exclusion by the advantaged majority outgroup as a typical instance of such a violation. We argued that exclusion will be interpreted as a minimal standard violation when the members of a disadvantaged group identify as members of the more inclusive superordinate category from which the advantaged group is trying to exclude them. Previous research suggests that identification is important for the display of emotions, especially anger. It further suggests that anger can be elicited by ingroup members, and it suggests that anger leads to attack tendencies and collective action. Even though there is also evidence that anger is usually felt by the advantaged and that, thus, the advantaged are the ones displaying attack tendencies, we expect the disadvantaged group to display destructive behaviour and, in line with emotions theorising, we expect such destructive behaviour to result from negative emotions.

Until now we have focused on those who may be considered the “victims”. However, the problem we are more interested in (destructive behaviour) is defined as such only from some perspectives, which may represent a challenge for clearly

identifying “victim” and “perpetrator”. We present the violation of a minimal standard by the advantaged as the trigger of the display of destructive behaviour by the disadvantaged. In that sense, it is the advantaged who are the “perpetrators”. However, we also portray the disadvantaged group as (rightly) inflicting harm – i.e. wrong doing – on the advantaged outgroup. In that sense, and in the eyes of the advantaged, it may seem that the disadvantaged are the “perpetrators”. Thus, in such a scenario, it can be quite revealing to explore how emotional theorists understand the emotional display of the wrongdoers.

Several lines of research have addressed the situations in which the ingroup is the wrongdoer. In such a context, guilt and shame are the most studied emotions. Here the emotional display would depend on the appraiser’s focus: A focus on the (ingroup) wrongdoers would elicit shame, whereas a focus on the (outgroup) victim would elicit guilt (e.g., Brown, 2009; Halperin et al., 2010). This line of research is also relevant to the problem at hand as our theorising assumes that the disadvantaged group will not be a passive “victim”, but rather act because of its situation: We predict that in face of a minimal standard violation carried out by the advantaged group, the disadvantaged group will resort to destructive intergroup behaviour. One possible consequence of perpetrating destructive collective behaviour could be that the perpetrator feels guilt and shame, and avoiding these emotions plays an important role in regulating social behaviour. Thus, negative collective moral emotions such as collective guilt and shame might mean high emotional costs for such behaviour, which can explain why destructive behaviour is rather rare and requires particular motivational or even emotional triggers more directly linked to fight tendencies.

However, guilt and shame might be avoided given a moral interpretation of destructive behaviour. Thus, discussing morality with reference to emotions is important: In section 2.1.1.4, for example, we discussed that those engaging in terrorism can be seen as morally engaged or disengaged depending on the group perspective. A particular constellation of situational characteristics might actually neutralize collective guilt and shame, thus eliminating the appraisal that destructive behaviour is a moral transgression.

Conversely, emotions might also impact moral interpretations and judgments. Horberg, Oveis and Keltner (2011), for example, present emotions as influencing moral judgments: Emotions are elicited by appraisals associated with specific concerns, such as purity and justice, which underlie socio-moral judgements. More specifically,

emotions would amplify the relevance of a given socio-moral concern, which would be reflected in a given moral judgment. Even more concretely, appraisals of a behaviour as unjust would make the specific socio-moral concern about justice salient and be reflected in moral judgments about justice, and eventually in moral decisions about punishment.

Another contribution is given by Huebner, Dwyer and Hauser (2009), according to whom the role played by emotions in moral judgment is somewhat limited. In contrast with argumentations suggesting that emotions are the foundation of moral judgments, the authors argue that the primary role of emotions is rather as motivators of morally relevant action. Even if narrow, the role the authors attribute to emotions is in line with emotions theorists' reasoning that emotions inspire actions. We also rely on this assumption, even if our focus, like that of emotions theorists, is not on morality.

Another example is offered by Halperin et al. (2010), who present guilt and shame as moral emotions, i.e., emotions that are elicited when situations or behaviours are appraised as violating moral values. Yet, and as we mentioned when discussing the situations in which the ingroup is the wrongdoer, guilt and shame tend to arise in situations in which the ingroup misbehaves. In contrast, when others (e.g., outgroups) are seen as behaving in an unjust, unfair (Halperin et al., 2010; Horberg et al., 2011), norm transgressing fashion (Chipperfield, Perry, Weiner, & Newall, 2009; Halperin et al., 2010; Weiner, 1986), or in a justice violating way (Barclay et al., 2005), anger is the elicited emotion. One of the earliest approaches to collective emotions, relative deprivation research (e.g., Lima & Vala, 2003; Walker, 2010; Walker & Smith, 2002), also describes anger and resentment as outcomes of perceptions of injustice. This research further establishes a link between these emotions and collective action. Especially relevant for our discussion are the intergroup comparisons that can result in fraternal deprivation (Runciman, 1966), a sense that the ingroup is worse off than it deserves. These situations would result in perceptions of injustice and lead to anger and, thus, to collective action. For our purposes, it is important to understand whether such discrepancies are interpreted as minimal or maximal standard violations. From our theorising we would link such deserving for disadvantaged minorities rather to minimal standards than to maximal standards, and, thus, expect more anger responses to minimal rather than maximal standard violations.

As a final summary, in line with intergroup emotions theorists, we assume that people can and do experience emotions on behalf of the social groups they belong to.

We believe the way one represents the group(s) one belongs to impacts emotional response and emotional response impacts behaviour. More concretely, we assume that social identification, both with the subgroup and with the superordinate category, impacts the way the disadvantaged group interprets actions by the advantaged group (in terms of maximal or minimal standards), the emotions elicited by such interpretations, as well as the behaviours inspired by such emotions. In particular, we predict that being deprived of resources needed to meet minimal standards (possible exclusion) should be much more unexpected and have much more serious implications for the disadvantaged ingroup than does deprivation of resources needed to pursue maximal standards (marginalization). This is why, we propose that the perception that an advantaged dominant outgroup is preventing the ingroup from reaching a minimal standard should inspire stronger negative emotions, particularly frustration and anger related emotions than the perception that it is undermining the ingroup's striving to reach a maximal standard.

CHAPTER III

Destructive intergroup behaviour and negative intergroup emotions displayed by disadvantaged groups: The role of minimal standards

After an incursion into the theoretical foundations of the present work, we are left with quite a number of claims that, even if theoretically sound, need some further support. In the current chapter we will present some of the empirical research that tests our theoretical arguments. To do so, we will begin by presenting two field studies, one of them an online study.

3.1 Overview

As stated before, the present thesis wishes to go beyond the debate about whether or not disadvantaged groups resort to (destructive) collective actions, by rather focusing on understanding when these groups will opt for such behaviour. In order to understand such a phenomenon, we propose that it is relevant to study intergroup behaviour not only with reference to the more immediate intergroup relation between ingroup and outgroup, but also to take into account the fact that subgroups are part of higher-order, more inclusive categories: Superordinate categories that encompasses the relevant subgroups and provide the normative grounds on which all the subgroups should base (and evaluate) their behaviour upon (Turner et al., 1987; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). The subgroups encompassed within a given superordinate category may have different perspectives on how to define the superordinate category and, hence, its norms and standards. Within this divergence of perspectives, we assume that advantaged dominant groups may more easily determine what the superordinate category represents and what it holds as normative or nonnormative, via more effectively projecting their own characteristics onto the superordinate category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus et al., 2005; Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003; see Wenzel et al., 2007 for an overview). Nevertheless, we also believe that more disadvantaged groups will still fight to have their perspective and representation of the superordinate category seen as valid. Following this logic we argue that the disadvantaged group's behaviours we are interested in understanding are seen as destructive by the advantaged (out)group, but not necessarily by the disadvantaged group actually displaying the behaviours. Accordingly, these destructive behaviours and corresponding negative emotions are not mere expressions of intergroup conflict.

Instead, we hypothesize that these destructive behaviours are responses to actions by the advantaged dominant majority when these actions are perceived by the disadvantaged minority as transgressions that violate minimal standards – rather than maximal standards – established by inclusive superordinate categories and that apply both to the advantaged and the disadvantage groups (Kessler et al., 2010). So, given such a transgression, the destructive behaviour displayed by the disadvantaged group is not only legitimate and normative from this group's point of view (Fritsche et al., 2009; Kessler et al., 2010; Schubert et al., 2010; Waldzus et al., 2010), but also necessary.

Having this in mind, one first empirical step is to establish that the violation of a minimal standard – and not the violation of a maximal standard – represents the psychological and motivational basis under which the display of destructive behaviour becomes relevant. Because we are referring to asymmetric power relations, facing deprivation or frustration due to undesired acts of the advantaged outgroup is not necessarily unexpected for members of a disadvantaged minority, and, in most cases, destructive behaviour might be too costly to be considered an adequate response. Even though a disadvantaged group might not passively accept the domination of the definition of superordinate norms and standards by the advantaged majority, there is usually still some consensus about what is normative and nonnormative for the superordinate category, both in terms of the prototype of the superordinate category (providing the basis for maximal standards) and about essential necessary criteria for inclusion in the superordinate category (providing the basis for minimal standards). Whereas minimal standards have to be met by all members and subgroups of the superordinate category, subgroups may differ in prototypicality and therefore also in their closeness to achieving maximal standards. Given this shared consensus, actions that prevent the disadvantaged group from achieving maximal standards do not have the same impact as those actions preventing the disadvantaged form reaching minimal standards. Only those actions that hinder the disadvantaged minority from reaching minimal standards are considered as minimal standard violations and should lead to the display of destructive behaviour by the disadvantaged. To test this assumption is the purpose of Study 1.

3.2 Study 1

3.2.1 Hypotheses

This first study was designed to test the following hypotheses:

- H1) Confronted with being prevented from reaching a minimal standard/goal members of disadvantaged groups should show stronger negative emotional reactions, than when prevented from approaching a maximal standard/goal.

- H2) Confronted with being prevented from reaching a minimal standard/goal members of disadvantaged groups should show stronger tendencies towards destructive intergroup behaviour, than when prevented from approaching a maximal standard/goal.

- H3) The effect of being prevented from reaching a minimal standard/goal on destructive intergroup behaviour should be mediated by negative emotions.

Our hypotheses were tested in a field study with members of disadvantaged groups. All participants were members of a disadvantaged ethnic minority and were confronted with a scenario involving their group being prevented by the advantaged dominant majority outgroup from reaching a relevant standard. We manipulated the minimal versus maximal character of the standard violation and measured emotional responses and behavioural intentions. As a manipulation check we measured minimal/maximal standard perceptions. Finally, and given that we present a social-identity-based approach to explain collective actions by disadvantaged groups, identification of participants with their disadvantaged ingroup and with the superordinate category was also measured.

3.2.2 Method

Participants

Participants were 279 members of immigrant communities from Cape-Verde (N = 137, 49.1%) and Brazil (N = 142, 50.9%) living in the Lisbon region of Portugal, from 18 to 82 years old ($M = 33.04$ years; $SD = 10.96$). The sample included 167 (59.9%) female and 87 (31.2%) male participants; 25 (9%) participants did not indicate their gender. For the simplicity of the presentation, we will refer to the immigrant group the participants belong to as their ethnic ingroup and we will refer to the Brazilian participants as Br and to the Cape-Verdean participants as Cv.

Ethical concerns prevented us from creating situations of actual standard or goal violations. Instead, we presented participants with scenarios portraying hypothetical situations in which the Portuguese majority prevents the ethnic ingroup from accessing some goods. The scenarios were framed in a manner consistent with deprivation of the opportunity to reach either a minimal or a maximal standard/goal. In addition, we varied the scenarios to include deprivation of one of two different valued goods (minimum salary or housing). The result was a 2 (scenario content: minimum salary vs. housing) x 2 (violation type: minimal standard violation vs. maximal standard violation) between-subjects design.

Manipulations

Participants were asked to read a scenario and to imagine that they (and their group) were actually experiencing it. In the two minimal standard violation scenarios, the participant's ethnic ingroup is blatantly deprived by the advantaged dominant outgroup of a good (housing or minimum salary) that is usually expected to be accessible for all members of the superordinate category. In the two maximal standard violation scenarios, access to the goods (housing or minimum salary) for all members of the superordinate category is framed as desirable, but is in fact restricted so that many ingroup members do not receive it. Thus, although in both conditions the disadvantaged minority group is deprived of the good, in the minimal standard condition the failure to meet the standard by members of the disadvantaged minority is clearly violating shared expectations within the superordinate category. The scenarios presented to the Cape-Verdean participants (adapted in the case of Brazilian participants) read as follows:

1 - Minimum salary, minimal standard violation condition

Currently all the workers living in Portugal have the right to a minimum salary. However, the Government's Economic Committee states that, in order to keep Portugal's economy growing, this situation has to change. The Committee states that, in order to keep growing economically, Portugal needs to lower its labour costs. According to the Committee, one way to provide cheaper labour is to allow employers to pay less than the minimum salary to the immigrant workers (e.g., Cape-Verdean). This means that the immigrant workers can start receiving less than the minimum salary.

2 - Minimum salary, maximal standard violation condition

Currently, all workers living in Portugal have the right to a minimum salary. However, not all workers actually receive it. In order to keep Portugal's economy growing, this situation has to change. One proposal states that, in order to keep Portugal's economy growing, there is a need to ensure that all the workers in Portugal – Portuguese and immigrants (e.g., Cape-Verdean) – receive the minimum salary. This proposal was not approved by the Government's Economic Committee, which means that it is not certain that all the workers – especially immigrants – will receive the minimum salary.

1 - Housing, minimal standard violation condition

The Government's Committee for Housing is elaborating plans to change the housing conditions in Portugal. The Committee has made a proposal that, in order to improve Portugal's housing conditions, the Plan for the Eradication of Shantytowns must proceed. That is: All the huts and shacks used as housing in the country must be destroyed. This proposal further states that not all of those living in shantytowns will be relocated into social housing projects. Many immigrants (e.g., Cape-Verdean) will have to find their own new housing, as there are no guarantees that they will be relocated into social housing.

2 - Housing, maximal standard violation condition

There are plans to change the housing conditions in Portugal. One proposal states that the Plan for the Eradication of Shantytowns must proceed. That is: All the huts and shacks used as housing in the country must be destroyed and there must be a guarantee that all those living in shantytowns will be relocated into social housing projects. All Portuguese and all immigrants (e.g., Cape-Verdean) should be provided with social housing. This proposal was not accepted by the Government's Committee for Housing, which means that it is not certain that all those living in shantytowns – and foremost immigrants – will be relocated into social housing.

Procedure

The data from the Br participants was collected in the Lisbon office of a public Portuguese organization supporting immigrants. The data from the Cv participants was collected in a neighbourhood in the periphery of Lisbon with a high concentration of Cape-Verdean residents.

The procedure was similar for both groups. Participants were invited to take part in a study about “life in Portugal” by filling in a questionnaire. Questionnaires were completed individually. The researcher or an assistant clarified questions about the study and offered assistance in case participants had difficulties completing any items. For example, if a participant had difficulties in reading, the researcher/assistant would read the questions to the participant and registered his/her answer. In these cases, the researcher/assistant was careful not to influence the participants’ response.

*Measures*⁷

Manipulation checks. Standard perception. In order to assess whether the participants experienced the deprivation described in the scenario as minimal or maximal, we measured the minimal versus the maximal character of the standard/goal presented in the scenario. Based on the works of Kessler et al. (2010), two items measured minimal character (e.g., “For us Cv/Br it is absolutely necessary to receive the minimum salary “, $r(261) = .69, p < .001$), and two items measured maximal character (e.g., “For us Cv/Br receiving the minimum salary would be desirable, though we know that this does not always happen”, $r(263) = .75, p < .001$). Answers were given on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 “totally disagree” to 7 “totally agree”). The two indexes were positively correlated, $r(261) = .29, p < .001$, indicating that the more a standard was perceived as a minimal standard, the more it was also perceived as a maximal standard. In the data analysis we controlled for the common variance of these two measures.

Emotional responses. We asked participants to rate the extent to which the possibility of the presented scenario becoming reality made them feel: Despair, resentful, furious, calm, satisfied and happy (e.g., “As a Cv/Br this situation makes me feel despair.” on scales from 1 “not at all” to 7 “very much”). A principal component analysis revealed a one factor solution. The factor explained 48.4% of variance; despair, resentful, furious loaded positively, the remaining emotions loaded negatively on this factor. An index of negative emotions was created by averaging the negative emotions and the reversed positive emotions ($\alpha = .82$).

Behavioural responses. For ethical reasons and to minimize the impact of social desirability (as we were especially interested in destructive behaviours),

⁷ For a full description of the manipulations and measures of this and all other studies see the appendices (Appendix A for Study 1, Appendix B for Study 2, Appendix C for Study 3 and Appendix D for Study 4).

behavioural intentions were assessed through open-ended questions. Participants were asked to write down likely behavioural responses of their ethnic ingroup or of themselves as a member of the ingroup to the situations described in the scenarios. As we wanted to collect a variety of both constructive and destructive behaviours, we used a two-step method. Using two questions allowed us to introduce a sensitive topic - destructive behaviour - in a contextualized structure. In the first question⁸ the framing was more general (*“In problematic situations it seems that we understand better when people or groups behave in an unusual way.”*) and participants were asked about their own likely actions (*“As a Cv/Br what would you feel like doing?”*). In the second question⁹ the framing was more specific (*“In these situations, it is easy that we understand better why people and groups behave in a way that is usually considered unacceptable as it goes against the law or against a sense of morality.”*) and the participants were asked to consider the behaviour of others as well as themselves (*“In such a situation what do you imagine that could happen?”*).

Not all the participants reported behavioural intentions. Thus, data analyses on these measures included a smaller sample size (N = 166, Br = 93, Cv = 73).

Two independent White Portuguese raters, who were blind to the minimal versus maximal conditions, rated (using 7-point scales ranging from 1 “not at all” to 7 “very much”) the behaviours listed by participants on the degree to which they could be considered: *Positive* (Intra-class-correlation between raters – ICC = .83), *negative* (ICC = .81), *constructive* (ICC = .81), *destructive* (ICC = .76), *normative* (ICC = .60), *violent* (ICC = .70), and *directed against the Portuguese Society* (superordinate category; ICC = .53). The raters were told to base their ratings on the norms, values and goals of the Portuguese Society. The average ratings of the two raters were used to create two

⁸ This question was framed as follows: *Many times we hear people or groups talking about things they did or wish to do in certain situations. We do not always agree with what we hear, but there are also opinions that are similar to our own opinion. In problematic situations it seems that we understand better when people or groups behave in an unusual way. Think again about the situation when you read about the modification of the minimum salary/housing. As a Cv/Br what would you feel like doing in such a situation?*

⁹ The second question was framed as follows: *Instead of behaving positively and constructively, many times people or groups face situations so complicated that they have to display more extreme behaviours. That is, in those situations, people or groups behave in a destructive way against all of those around them. Also in these situations, it seems that we understand better why people and groups behave in a way that is usually considered unacceptable as it goes against the law or against a sense of morality. Think again about the modification of the minimum salary/housing. In such a situation what do you imagine that could happen?”*

indexes¹⁰. The items *negative*, *destructive* and *violent* ($\alpha = .80$) were combined to produce a measure of *destructive behaviour*. Examples of destructive behaviour listed by the participants include: “Maybe drug deal” (in Portuguese: “Talvez traficar”); and “Suicide” (in Portuguese: “Suicídio”).

The items *positive*, *constructive* and *normative* ($\alpha = .73$) were combined to produce a measure of *constructive behaviour*. Examples of constructive behaviour listed by the participants include: “Employers have to be accused” (in Portuguese: “Os patrões têm que ser denunciados”); and “Find help for fighting for their rights” (in Portuguese: “Procurar ajuda para lutar pelos seus direitos”).

The item *directed against the Portuguese Society* was analysed separately because it focused on the target of the action rather than on the character (constructive vs. destructive) of the action.

Identification. Identification with the ethnic ingroup and with Portuguese Society (superordinate category) was measured with an adapted form of a scale introduced by Schubert and Otten (2002). Participants were presented with 7 pairs of circles: A smaller circle representing themselves and a bigger circle representing the ingroup or the superordinate category. The seven pairs of circles were arranged vertically on the page. The top two circles were separated by some distance and as they moved down the page, the distance between the two circles became smaller until, in the final pair, the smaller circle was completely included and located in the centre of the bigger circle. Participants completed the scale twice, being asked to choose the pair of circles that best represented the closeness first between themselves and their ethnic ingroup and second between themselves and the Portuguese Society.

¹⁰ Although the value for the ICC of *against the superordinate category* was problematic, we kept this variable in the analysis because it was of particular theoretical interest. Results, however, should be interpreted with caution.

3.2.3 Results


*Manipulation check*¹¹

In order to determine if our scenario manipulations were effective in producing the intended minimal versus maximal violation, we performed a 2 (violation type: Minimal vs. maximal) x 2 (scenario content: Minimum salary vs. housing) x 2 (nationality of the participants: Br vs. Cv) x 2 (indexes for the manipulation check: Minimal standard vs. maximal standard) GLM with the indexes for the manipulation check as within-subject factor. The results revealed a main effect of the indexes of the manipulation check ($F(1,253) = 17.54, p < .001$), showing that participants perceived the scenarios more in terms of a minimal standard ($M = 5.37, SD = 1.43$) than in terms of a maximal standard ($M = 4.96, SD = 1.53$). This effect was qualified by several interactions: A two-way interaction with scenario content, $F(1,253) = 15.22, p < .001$; a three-way interaction with scenario content and violation type, $F(1,253) = 6.60, p = .011$; a three-way interaction with scenario content and nationality, $F(1,253) = 9.23, p = .003$; and a marginally significant four-way interaction, $F(1,253) = 3.32, p = .07$.

In order to interpret this four-way interaction we performed separate 2 (violation type: Minimal vs. maximal) x 2 (indexes for the manipulation check: Minimal standard vs. maximal standard) GLMs for each national group and each scenario. The analysis showed that the manipulation was effective only for the Br participants who were confronted with the minimum salary scenario, indicated by a significant interaction, $F(1,63) = 7.13, p = .01$. For these participants, the difference between the perceptions of a minimal and a maximal standard violation was bigger in the condition where the violation of a minimal standard was presented ($M_{\text{minimal standard}} = 5.39, SD = 1.81$ vs. $M_{\text{maximal standard}} = 3.48, SD = 1.82$) than in the condition where the violation of a maximal standard was presented ($M_{\text{minimal standard}} = 5.00, SD = 1.51$ vs. $M_{\text{maximal standard}} = 4.53, SD = 1.85$) (Figure 1).

¹¹ Because field experiments have to take into account that there is more probability of systematic error variance resulting from the relevant social context, we started our analyses in both field studies, that is, in this study and in Study 2 by controlling for interindividual differences in group identification, both in all experimental results and in the regression analyses of the direct effects. Different from Study 2, such control for identification did not change any effect in Study 1. For reasons of parsimony, for Study 1 we therefore report only results without identification measures as covariates.

Figure 1: Perceived violation of minimal and maximal standards displayed by Br participants in the minimum salary scenario (both conditions of the manipulation).



Hypotheses' tests

As the manipulation appears to have been successful only for the Br participants who were presented with the minimum salary scenario, we tested the effect of the manipulation on the dependent variables only for this subsample.

Impact on the display of negative emotions

For the Br participants confronted with the scenario where they were deprived from the minimum salary, a one-factorial GLM testing the effect of violation type (minimal vs. maximal) on the negative emotions index yielded a significant effect of violation type, $F(1,64) = 5.48$, $p = .022$, $partial \eta^2 = 0.08$. As predicted in H1, in the minimal standard violation condition participants responded more with negative emotions ($M = 5.37$, $SD = 1.23$) than in the maximal standard violation condition ($M = 4.68$, $SD = 1.18$).

Impact on the display of destructive behaviour

The two indexes of destructive and constructive behaviour were highly correlated ($r = -.80, p < .001$). In H2 we hypothesized that type of violated standard would predict the specific variance of destructive behaviour beyond of what is already explained by the shared variance with constructive behaviour. Therefore we tested the effect of violation type (minimal vs. maximal) on destructive behaviour in a GLM with constructive behaviour as a covariate. In addition to a significant effect of the covariate, $F(1,39) = 55.49, p < .001, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .59, B = -0.67, SE = 0.09$, there was a significant effect of violation type, $F(1,39) = 4.48, p = .041, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .10$. As predicted, in the minimal standard violation condition, participants listed more destructive behaviours ($M = 4.19, SD = 0.76$) than in the maximal standard violation condition ($M = 3.78, SD = 0.97$).

As predicted, a similar GLM on the number of constructive behaviour listed with destructive behaviour as a covariate, revealed no significant effect of violation type ($M_{\text{minimal violation}} = 3.70, SD = 1.00; M_{\text{maximal violation}} = 3.76, SD = 0.97$), $F(1,39) = 2.14, p = .15, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .05$.

Testing the mediation model

In order to test the mediation model presented in H3, we will take a two-step approach. We will first test it step by step, and then we will test the model as a whole.


As the link between minimal standard violation and the display of negative emotions has already been described, we will just test the link between the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour.

To do so, we regressed destructive behaviour on negative emotions, while statistically controlling for constructive behaviour, $R^2 = .65, F(2,37) = 37.21, p < .001$. Results showed that destructive behaviour was significantly predicted by constructive behaviour ($\beta = -.78, p < .001$) and, as expected, by negative emotions ($\beta = .28, p = .006$).

Then, in order to test the whole mediation model, we computed a regression analysis that estimated the indirect effect of the dummy coded manipulation of minimal (1) versus maximal (0) standard violation on destructive behaviour, mediated by negative emotions (Figure 2), while controlling for constructive behaviour, $R^2 = .67, F(3,36) = 24.09, p < .0001$. To avoid problems resulting from deviations from the perfect normal distribution and to achieve more robust estimates, we used the

bootstrapping method (with 10000 bootstrap resamples) with bias-corrected estimates and confidence intervals to access the indirect effect as proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2008). Because the sample size was small and the hypothesis was clearly directed, we choose a one-tailed significant test for the indirect effect by estimating 90% confidence intervals. As shown in Table 1, from the predicted effects, only the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable (b path) was significant. More importantly, the more robust bootstrap estimates indicated that the indirect effect of the dummy coded manipulation of standard violation via negative emotions on destructive behaviour was significant ($a*b$: $B = 0.1142$, $SE = 0.0955$, with a 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.0132 to 0.3594).

Figure 2: Mediation model using dummy coded manipulation of standard violation. For estimates of a, b, c' (c) see Table 1.



Note: Dummy coded manipulation of standard violation compares minimal standard violation (= 1) to maximal standard violation (= 0).

Table 1: Total effect (c) and direct effects of the mediation analysis (see Figure 2) for the effect of dummy coded manipulation of standard violation on destructive behaviour via negative emotions, while controlling for constructive behaviour.

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
a	0.6171	0.3671	1.68	.1012
b	0.1885	0.0761	2.48	.0181
c	0.3542	0.1813	1.95	.0583
c'	0.2379	0.1762	1.35	.1855

Note: Dummy coded manipulation of standard violation compares minimal standard violation (= 1) to maximal standard violation (= 0).

Perceptions of a standard as minimal or maximal

After testing H1 to H3 with the experimental data from the Br participants in the minimum salary scenario (the sample in which the manipulation was successful), we continued the analysis with correlational data from the entire sample. Intercorrelations between perceived standard violations, emotions and behaviour are presented in Table 2.

In order to test these hypotheses with the correlational data of the whole sample, a series of multiple regression analyses were conducted. We also tested whether the effects would depend on nationality and content of the scenarios by including all higher order interactions with these variables in our initial analyses, following the procedures described in Aiken and West (1991). As including these interactions did not significantly increase the explained variance, we will report results collapsed across nationality and scenario content.

Table 2: Intercorrelations between perceived standard violations, emotions, behaviour, identification with the ethnic ingroup and identification with Portuguese Society.

		B	C	D	E	F	G	H
A - Minimal standard violation	<i>r</i>	.29***	.14†	-.07	.15†	.39***	.15*	.26***
	<i>N</i>	261	159	159	140	255	261	262
B - Maximal standard violation	<i>r</i>		-.04	.00	-.23**	.07	.16*	.06
	<i>N</i>		157	157	138	253	258	259
C - Destructive behaviour	<i>r</i>			-.80***	.31***	.02	.06	.12
	<i>N</i>			166	147	154	161	161
D - Constructive behaviour	<i>r</i>				-.17*	.10	.02	-.08
	<i>N</i>				147	154	161	161
E - Behaviour against the Portuguese Society	<i>r</i>					.18*	-.13	.01
	<i>N</i>					135	142	142
F - Negative emotions (index)	<i>r</i>						.02	.01
	<i>N</i>						256	257
G - Identification with ethnic ingroup	<i>r</i>							.36***
	<i>N</i>							268
H - Identification with Portuguese Society								

Note: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$.

Predicting the display of negative emotions

As shown in Table 2, perceived minimal standard violation was positively correlated with negative emotions, whereas perceived maximal standard violation was not. In order to test the specific role of perceptions of these two violations in explaining the variance of negative emotions, we regressed negative emotions on perceived minimal and maximal standard violations, $R^2 = .17$, $F(2,250) = 26.32$, $p < .001$. As expected in H1, emotions were predicted by perceived minimal standard violation ($\beta = .43$, $p < .001$) but not by perceived maximal standard violation ($\beta = -.07$, $p = .28$).

Predicting behavioural display

First, we regressed destructive behaviour on perceived minimal and maximal standard violations and statistically controlled for constructive behaviour, $R^2 = .69$, $F(3,153) = 115.21$, $p < .001$ ¹². Destructive behaviour was significantly predicted by constructive behaviour ($\beta = -.82$, $p < .001$) and, as predicted in H2, by perceived minimal standard violation ($\beta = .10$, $p = .032$), but not by perceived maximal standard violation ($\beta = -.05$, $p = .24$). To check that this effect was specific for destructive behaviour, we then regressed constructive behaviour on perceived minimal and maximal standard violations and statistically controlled for destructive behaviour, $R^2 = .68$, $F(3,153) = 111.76$, $p < .001$. Constructive behaviour was predicted only by destructive behaviour ($\beta = -.84$, $p < .001$). Perceived minimal standard violation ($\beta = .06$, $p = .21$) and perceived maximal standard violation ($\beta = -.04$, $p = .36$) had no significant effect.

Testing the mediation model

Similarly to the procedure reported for the experimental data, in order to test H3 with the whole sample, we will also take a two-step approach. We will first test the mediation model step by step, and then we will test the whole model.

The link from perceived minimal standard violation to negative emotions has already been reported, so we will only test the link from negative emotion to destructive behaviour.

We began by regressing destructive behaviour on negative emotions, while statistically controlling for constructive behaviour, $R^2 = .69$, $F(2,151) = 166.90$, $p < .001$. Destructive behaviour was significantly predicted by constructive behaviour ($\beta = -.83$, $p < .001$) and, as expected, by negative emotions ($\beta = .10$, $p = .035$).

We then computed a regression analysis that estimated the indirect effect of perceived minimal standard violation on destructive behaviour, mediated by negative emotions (Figure 3), while controlling for the effect of maximal standard violation and constructive behaviour, $R^2 = .69$, $F(4,146) = 83.48$, $p < .0001$. Again we used the bootstrapping method with 10000 bootstrap resamples with bias-corrected estimates and

¹² When analyzing the impact of the conditions of the manipulation on the behavioural display, we abstained from reporting a GLM with repeated measures because of the extremely high correlations between the repeated measures. When the variables under analysis are highly correlated, using this methodology is not informative. Accordingly, the results revealed very low observed power, $power = .16$, and according to Cohen (1988), low observed power results in higher probabilities of committing Type II error (see also Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2004).

confidence intervals to access the indirect effect proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2008).

As shown in Table 3, two of the predicted effects (a and c paths) were significant. Unexpectedly, the direct effect of emotions on destructive behaviour was not significant, nor was the indirect effect of the perceived minimal standard violation via negative emotions on destructive behaviour ($a*b$: $B = 0.0138$, $SE = 0.0140$, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from - 0.0106 to 0.0470).

Figure 3: Mediation model using perceived minimal standard violation. For estimates of a, b, c' (c) see Table 3.




Table 3: Total effect (c) and direct effects of the mediation analysis (see Figure 3) for the effect of perceived minimal standard violation on destructive behaviour via negative emotions, while controlling for the effect of maximal standard violation and constructive behaviour.

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
a	0.3654	0.0693	5.27	.0000
b	0.0383	0.0341	1.72	.2637
c	0.0621	0.0287	2.16	.0323
c'	0.0481	0.0313	1.54	.1265

3.2.4 Additional analyses

Destructive intergroup behaviour and negative intergroup emotions displayed by disadvantaged groups: The role of higher-order identity

After testing the hypotheses, we also performed a number of additional analyses in order to explore other potential relations between the measured variables.

Predicting perception of a standard as minimal or maximal

As shown in Table 2, perceived maximal standard violation was positively correlated with identification with the ethnic ingroup¹³ but not with identification with the superordinate category (Portuguese Society). To test the specific impact of identification with the ethnic ingroup, we regressed perceived maximal standard violation on both identification measures, controlling for perceived minimal standard violation, $R^2 = .09$, $F(3,254) = 8.71$, $p < .001$. Results show that, in addition to the effect of perceived minimal standard violation ($\beta = .27$, $p < .001$), there was a significant effect of identification with the ethnic ingroup ($\beta = .13$, $p = .046$), but no effect of identification with the superordinate category ($\beta = -.05$, $p = .43$).

¹³ In average, participants felt identified with their ethnic ingroup, $M = 5.18$, $SD = 1.94$.

Table 2 also shows that identification with the superordinate category¹⁴ (Portuguese Society) was positively correlated with perceived minimal standard violation. However, the same was true, though weaker, for identification with the ethnic ingroup. In order to test the specific impact of identification with the superordinate category, we regressed perceived minimal standard violation on both identification measures, controlling for perceived maximal standard violation, $R^2 = .13$, $F(3,254) = 13.79$, $p < .001$. In addition to the effect of perceived maximal standard violation ($\beta = .26$, $p < .001$), identification with the superordinate category predicted perceived minimal standard violation ($\beta = .23$, $p < .001$), whereas identification with the ethnic ingroup did not ($\beta = .05$, $p = .45$).

Identification and the display of destructive behaviour

Given the previous results, we further analysed the impact of identification. First, we decided to test a possible moderating effect of identification with the superordinate category of the relation between perceived minimal standard violation and destructive behaviour. To do so, we regressed destructive behaviour on perceived minimal standard violation, identification with the superordinate category, and their interaction, while controlling for constructive behaviour¹⁵, $R^2 = .71$, $F(4,154) = 94.30$, $p < .001$. Predictor variables were first centred. Destructive behaviour was significantly predicted by constructive behaviour ($B = -0.79$, $SE = 0.042$, $p < .001$). The effect of perceived minimal standard violation was marginally significant ($B = 0.04$, $SE = 0.027$, $p = .10$), and there was no meaningful main effect of identification with the superordinate category ($B = 0.03$, $SE = 0.021$, $p = .23$). More importantly, the perceived minimal standard violation by identification with the superordinate group interaction was significant ($B = -0.04$, $SE = 0.014$, $p = .012$). Relying on 95% confidence intervals, the region of significance for the effect of perceived minimal standard violation was estimated to be limited to centred identification scores lower than $-.24$. That is, perceived minimal standard violation appears to lead to destructive behaviour only for participants who are below the group mean in identification with the superordinate category. The estimated effect for low identifiers (one standard deviation below the

¹⁴ The average identification with the superordinate category was lower than identification with the ethnic ingroup, $M = 4.11$, $SD = 1.93$.

¹⁵ When further controlling for the impact of maximal standard violation ($B = -0.52$, $SE = 0.026$, $p = .052$), the reported results do not change, $R^2 = .71$, $F(5,151) = 74.86$, $p < .001$.

mean) was significant ($B = 0.11$, $SE = 0.035$, $p = .002$) while the effect for high identifiers was not ($B = -0.02$, $SE = 0.038$, $p = .59$).

Emotions and identification

We found that the link between perceived minimal standard violations and destructive actions was only significant for those who indicated low identification with the superordinate category. However, the fact that for high identifiers higher perceived minimal standard violations do not lead to more destructive behaviour does not necessarily mean that greater perceived minimal standard violation would not lead high identifiers to feel the same negative emotions as low identifiers. Indeed, when we regressed negative emotions on perceived minimal standard violation, identification with the superordinate category, and their interaction (controlling for perceived maximal standard violation and identification with the ethnic ingroup), $R^2 = .18$, $F(5,244) = 10.61$, $p < .001$, the only significant predictor was perceived minimal standard violation ($B = 0.39$, $SE = 0.054$, $p < .001$). Thus, even though for those highly identified with the superordinate category violation of a minimal standard was not related to destructive behaviours, it was as strongly related to intense negative emotions as it was for low identifiers.

Harming the superordinate category

In addition to measures of destructive and constructive behavioural responses, the current study included a measure of the degree to which participant's reported action intentions were seen to be directed against the superordinate category. One interesting potential consequence of destructive responses directed at the advantaged group is that, because they intend to harm prototypical members of the superordinate category, they may be seen as also being directed against the superordinate category itself. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, the more destructive and the less constructive a behaviour was seen to be, the more it was also seen as being directed against the superordinate category. However, when regressing the degree to which a behaviour was seen to be directed against the superordinate category on constructive and destructive behaviour, $R^2 = .10$, $F(2,144) = 8.85$, $p < .001$, the only significant predictor was destructive behaviour, $\beta = .48$, $p < .001$ ¹⁶.

¹⁶ An alternative explanation for this result might be that behaviour that is directed against the superordinate category can be seen as part of the destructive character of the behaviour displayed by the disadvantaged. Therefore, in Study 2, and in face of the present results, we decided to include this

3.2.5 Discussion

This study was designed to test whether destructive behaviour and negative emotions on the part of disadvantaged groups depend on the type of standard/goal that they believe has been violated. Using scenarios in a field study with immigrants living in Portugal, we predicted that Cape-Verdean and Brazilian immigrants feel negative emotions and express intentions for destructive behaviour if members of their groups are deprived by the Portuguese majority of resources in a manner that violates minimal standards, but not if that deprivation is described as a violation of maximal standards. We also predicted that the relation between a minimal standard violation and the display of destructive behaviour should occur via negative emotions. Although the manipulation of type of standard violation was only successful for part of the sample, experimental and correlational results generally supported this overall hypothesis.

The experimental data showed that, for at least a part of the sample, only when being deprived of a resource was described as a minimal standard violation did we see greater destructive compared to constructive action. In addition, in the correlational analyses using the entire sample the only predictor of destructive behaviour and negative emotions was the degree to which the deprivation was perceived to be a violation of a minimal standard. These results support the broader argument that actions by disadvantaged groups that are considered by advantaged majority members as most problematic (i.e., destructive, negative and violent actions) are not a mere expression of intergroup conflict, but are instead responses to transgressions by the advantaged dominant majority, that are perceived to violate minimal standards set by the superordinate category. Thus, destructive behaviour and the emotions that accompany it can be understood as motivated not solely by membership in a disadvantaged group but also by their perceived shared membership in a superordinate group. We also expected that the relation between a minimal standard violation and the display of destructive behaviour elicited by the advantaged group transgressions would be mediated by negative emotions. Interestingly, that was the case for the Brazilian sample facing the minimum salary scenario, that is, for the subsample for which the manipulation was successful: For this subsample, the relation between a minimal standard violation (manipulation dummy coded) and displaying destructive behaviour was mediated by the

dimension – against the superordinate category – in the destructive behaviour index. In addition, it is worth mentioning that in the present study including against the superordinate category in the destructive behaviour index did not substantially change the reported results.

display of negative emotions. That was not the case when considering the correlational analysis for the whole sample. For the whole sample, even though there was correlational evidence showing that perceiving a minimal standard violation led to the display of negative emotions, and that the display of negative emotions led to the display of destructive behaviour, there was no significant mediation. Thus, for the whole sample it seems that the minimal standard violation effect on destructive behaviour is not an emotional response: Negative emotions and destructive behaviour might be correlated only because both correlate with perceived minimal standard violation. Results from this one study do not allow explaining the contradiction between these correlational results and the mediation found with the experimental results for Brazilian participants facing a minimum salary scenario. Further studies are necessary to test these mediation processes.

Results also point to the important role played by identification with the ingroup as well as identification with the superordinate category. Remarkably, in this study identification with the ethnic ingroup (immigrant groups) seemed to facilitate the interpretation of a situation of deprivation more in terms of the violation of a maximal standard, that is, one that is desirable but usually not achieved, whereas identification with the superordinate category (Portuguese Society) seemed to facilitate the interpretation of the same situation more in terms of the violation of a minimal standard, that is, one that is absolutely necessary for the ingroup to meet. Besides, we also found that although high identifiers with the superordinate category saw the standards in the scenarios as more minimal and were emotionally as upset as low identifiers when learning that members of their immigrant groups were deprived from achieving them, they displayed a weaker relation between such deprivation and destructive behaviour. Minimal standard violation led to destructive behaviour only for those participants whose identification with the superordinate category was below the average. The double role of identification with the superordinate category, namely as giving disadvantaged minority group members the feeling that the standards they are deprived of have minimal character on the one hand, and as attenuating the link between this perception and intentions of destructive behaviour on the other hand, may be responsible for the fact that we did not find any total correlation between superordinate identification and destructive behaviour. As our results show, however, this non-correlation does not mean that superordinate identification is unimportant for the understanding of destructive behaviour.

Some limitations, complications and simplifications of our study should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. First of all, only one of the two scenarios that were used for the manipulation of minimal versus maximal standards was effective, and only for one of the two immigrant groups. This difficulty may be due to the fact that we used relevant issues with natural groups in a real intergroup context. The involved groups have a history with these issues and hold strong opinions about them. However, for the subsample for which the manipulation was successful, results support the correlational findings, and the external and ecological validity that is gained by field experiments outweighs the risk of partially unsuccessful manipulations.

Another unexpected result was the high correlation between constructive and destructive behaviours. It seems that to a far degree, behaviour of disadvantaged groups is simply seen the more negative, destructive and violent, the less positive, constructive and normative it is. Clearly the shared variance between these characterizations plays a role, and in practical contexts it might sometimes be enough to use just this one dimension. However, for the theoretical explanation of destructive behaviour it is essential that we found differentiated predictions for destructive behaviour when the shared variance is controlled for.

Another serious limitation of this first study was that we could not avoid a possible confound between minimal versus maximal standards violation and the severity of the violation. Therefore an alternative explanation could be that the higher degree of negative emotions and destructive behaviour was rather due to higher severity of the violation than to the minimal character of the violated standards. This problem also applies to the subsequent studies (2 and 3), but will be experimentally ruled out by Study 4. Finally, and due to ethical concerns, methodologically we limited our study to scenarios and self-reported hypothetical behaviours listed as response to open questions. Following these ethical principles, this critique applies also to the other reported field-study (Study 2), but will be addressed later by laboratory experiments (Studies 3 and 4).

Despite of these limitations, we can argue that the distinction between being prevented from reaching a minimal standard/goal and being prevented from approaching a maximal standard/goal is an important contribution for the understanding of both, when disadvantaged groups rebel (i.e., showing destructive behaviour and negative emotions) and when they do not.

3.3 Study 2

The present study intends to replicate results from Study 2 in a different context, but also to provide a more complete test of our theoretical model. Hence, Study 2 already addresses a typical social context in which disadvantaged groups most probably experience violation of minimal standards, and that is therefore of particular interest for our research: It introduces social exclusion as an extreme situation that prevents the disadvantaged group from reaching the minimal standards of a superordinate category.

3.3.1 The different role(s) of exclusion in majorities and minorities responses to transgressions

Study 1 showed that depriving the disadvantaged group from a good (minimum salary or housing) can lead to the perception of minimal standard violations, which then triggers negative emotions and destructive behaviour. In our theoretical analysis (Chapter II), we had provided the logical reasons for such an effect: We propose that being hindered from achieving minimal standards by the advantaged majority can be seen, by the disadvantaged group, as (an illegitimate) attempt of social exclusion as the disadvantaged are being deprived from meeting standards (e.g., accessing goods to which all members of the superordinate category are entitled too) from the superordinate category.

Although social exclusion can sometimes be seen as legitimate, for instance as the usual punishment for the violation of a minimal standard, when illegitimately used (at least from the point of view of the “victim”) it becomes – paradoxically – a minimal standard violation itself. This is the case we are trying to describe from the disadvantaged group perspective.

Our explanation model assumes a causal chain from perceiving social exclusion, via minimal standard violation perception, on negative emotions and destructive behaviour. Study 2 intends to offer a first empirical test of this chain mediation.

By exploring exclusion as an instance that may be (different from other forms of deprivation, e.g., marginalization) interpreted as a violation of minimal standards and, as a consequence, may be the cause of the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour we bring our assumptions closer to socially relevant real life contexts and, thus, we contribute to the external validity of our model. As exclusion is experienced

every day by individuals and groups, being able to show how those experiencing exclusion interpret it is crucial for the understanding of its consequences.

3.3.2 Hypotheses

In order to manipulate exclusion and to test the mediation effect of exclusion via minimal standard violation perception on negative emotions and destructive behaviour, we designed an online study. Resorting to the changes taking place in the Portuguese smoking context, we invited smokers to participate in a study where they could express their opinion about the new Smoking Prevention Law that was introduced in Portugal on 1st January 2008. The participants were then asked to imagine that they experienced a hypothetical situation in which the non-smokers limited, in varied degrees, their admittance in public spaces. More precisely, in one condition the scenario suggested that smokers were marginalized in public spaces, in another condition the scenario suggested that they were excluded.

So we created a context in which smokers, which considered themselves as a disadvantaged minority at the time when the new Smoking Prevention Legislation was implemented, faced some negative changes in their situation due to acts committed by the allegedly advantaged majority outgroup, and we expected that:

- H1) The disadvantaged minority members should perceive more the violations of a minimal rather than of a maximal standard when they are excluded as compared to when they are only marginalized.

- H2) The more the disadvantaged minority members perceive the violation of a minimal standard as compared with the violation of a maximal standard, the stronger negative emotional reactions they should have.

- H3) The stronger the negative emotional reactions of the disadvantaged minority members are, the stronger tendencies for destructive behaviour they should have.

- H4) Exclusion as compared to marginalization should increase the disadvantaged minority's tendencies for destructive behaviour through an indirect effect via perception of minimal standard violation and negative emotions (see Figure 6).

3.3.3 Method

3.3.3.1 Pre-study

This study was designed in order to verify how smokers perceived their status and prestige relatively to non-smokers. According to the Special Eurobarometer (2007), in 2006 only 24% of the Portuguese population were smokers, that is, a clear numeric minority. We also assumed that the mere fact that a more restrictive Smoking Prevention Legislation was implemented in Portugal should contribute to subjectively place smokers in a more disadvantaged position than non-smokers. Nevertheless, we decided to conduct a study to verify if that was the case and if, in fact, smokers, felt more disadvantaged, at least in terms of status and social prestige, than non-smokers.

Participants

The data was collected using a convenience sample of smokers. Participants were smokers living in Portugal, from 19 to 68 years old ($M = 35.10$, $SD = 14.83$). From the 21 participants, 14 (66.7%) are female; 18 (85.7%) were born in Portugal; 12 (57.1%) had up to the 12th grade. Twenty participants (95.2%) were smokers and one did not report whether s/he was a smoker or not.

Procedure

Potential (smoker) participants were invited to collaborate on a study on “opinions about the group of smokers” by filling in a paper questionnaire. After finishing the questionnaire with the dependent variables and socio-demographic information, participants were thanked and briefly debriefed.

Measures

Perceived social prestige. In order to verify how smokers assigned social prestige to the smokers ingroup and to the non-smokers outgroup, we presented the participants with two arrows placed side by side and pointing up. One arrow referred to the social prestige of the group of smokers. The other arrow referred to the social prestige of the group of non-smokers. Both of the arrows presented 7 vertical divisions. Answers were given on a 7 point scale, corresponding to the 7 vertical divisions, and ranging from very low social prestige (1 at the bottom of the arrow) to very high social prestige (7 at the top of the arrow).

Perceived status. In order to verify how smokers assigned status to the smokers ingroup and the non-smokers outgroup, we also presented the participants with two arrows placed side by side and pointing up. One arrow referred to the status of the group of smokers. The other arrow referred to the status of the group of non-smokers. Both of the arrows presented 7 vertical divisions. Answers were also given on a 7 point scale, corresponding to the 7 vertical divisions, and ranging from very low status (1 at the bottom of the arrow) to very high status (7 at the top of the arrow).

3.3.3.1.1 Results

Perceived relative social prestige

We performed a 2 (social prestige: Ingroup vs. outgroup) GLM with social prestige as within-subject factor. Results showed a marginally significant effect of social prestige, $F(1,20) = 3.93$, $p = .061$, $partial \eta^2 = .16$. The effect showed that, in general, participants perceived the non-smokers outgroup as having more social prestige ($M = 5.10$, $SD = 1.26$) than the smokers ingroup ($M = 4.14$, $SD = 1.35$).

Perceived relative status

We then performed a 2 (status: Ingroup vs. outgroup) GLM with status as within-subject factor. Results showed a significant effect of status, $F(1,19) = 6.81$, $p = .022$, $partial \eta^2 = .24$. The effect revealed that the participants perceived the non-smokers outgroup as having higher status ($M = 5.20$, $SD = 1.10$) than the smokers ingroup ($M = 4.30$, $SD = 1.13$).

3.3.3.2 Main study

Participants

Participants were smokers living in Portugal, from 18 to 69 years old ($M = 28.96$, $SD = 8.55$). From the 219 participants, 115 (52.8%) are female and 103 (47.2%) male; 54 (24.8%) were born in Lisbon; and 125 (57.1%) have finished their undergraduate studies. Twenty participants with high or very high nicotine dependency according to the *Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence* (Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker, & Fagerstrom, 1991) were removed from the sample. The data of four other participants were excluded from the analysis as normal quantile-quantile plots indicated that they were outliers with extreme values deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations

from the means of the two main dependent variables. As a result we had a working N of 195 smokers.

Design

This study was designed at exploring the impact of exclusion from a superordinate category on the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour by the disadvantaged group. To do so, we introduced participants to an exclusion manipulation.

Regarding the manipulation, ethical concerns led us to create hypothetical situations in which the participants faced different degrees of exclusion, rather than creating situations of actual exclusion in the natural context. More concretely, we used scenarios in which the (non-smoker) Portuguese majority extremely or moderately limits the (smoker) minority's admittance in public space. Thus, the design included two between-subjects conditions: Exclusion versus marginalization.

Manipulations

Participants were asked to imagine that they experience a hypothetical situation regarding the Smoking Prevention Law (Law nº 37/2007 of 14th of August) that was introduced in Portugal on 1st January 2008. After presenting information on the actual application of the law, participants were informed that further modifications of the Smoking Prevention Law are planned. In the exclusion condition, the further modification to the law was portrayed as a situation in which smokers would be completely denied access to a significant part of the public space, that is, the disadvantaged minority would be totally excluded; in the marginalization condition, the further modification to the law was portrayed as a situation in which smokers' access to a significant part of the public space would be restricted but not denied, that is, the minority would be marginalized, but not excluded. The exclusion scenario presented to the smokers read as follows:

“Like all EU countries, Portugal follows the EU Directives for the Prevention of Smoking. These directives are created by the European Committee for the “Prevention of Smoking”. According to this Committee, the new Law in force in Portugal is to break ground for a harsher, more restrictive Law.

According to this Committee, the upcoming Law for the Prevention of Smoking will seek to:

- *banish smokers from indoor ventilated public spaces and indoor ventilated working spaces.*

- *banish smokers from outdoor areas contiguous to indoor public spaces and work places. Smokers will only be allowed to smoke if they stand 10m away from the doors and windows of those spaces.*

- *banish smokers from outdoor places, like: terraces, highway rest stops and gas stations, picnic areas, and, streets near public spaces for minors (such as schools).*

With these plans, the European Committee for the Prevention of Smoking has the aim of bringing the measures against smoking in force in Portugal – and in all of Europe – in line with the measures already in force in those countries that have a longer tradition in the prevention of smoking, such as the USA and Canada.”

The marginalization scenario used the same text except that instead of reading “*banish smokers*” (“*banir os fumadores*” in Portuguese) the participants read “keep smokers away” (“*afastar os fumadores*” in Portuguese).

Procedure

Potential participants from a list of people who had indicated readiness to participate in studies were invited by email to individually collaborate on a study about “opinions of smokers on the new Portuguese Smoking Prevention Law” by filling in an online questionnaire. Accordingly, only smokers participated in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two versions of the questionnaire corresponding to the two experimental conditions (exclusion vs. marginalization). After finishing the questionnaire including all dependent variables, socio-demographic information and the *Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence* (Heatherton et al., 1991), participants read a standardized debriefing. Particular care was taken to make clear that the information about plans to further change the law were entirely invented and that, thus, any eventual experience of marginalization or exclusion was artificially induced for methodological reasons and should not be taken as a response to any real current or future event, nor as an expression of the participants’ personal characteristics. Participants were encouraged to contact the experimenter in case of any inconvenience or in case they would have additional questions. None of the participants contacted the experimenter.

Measures

Manipulation-checks. Perceived exclusion. In order to verify whether the scenarios led to feelings of exclusion, we measured both the individual (“*As a smoker, I feel excluded from public spaces*”) and the group (“*I feel that we smokers are excluded from public spaces*”) perceptions of exclusion, $r(195) = .89, p < .001$. Answers were given on a 7 point scale, ranging from not at all excluded (1) to very excluded (7).

Perceived standard violation. We also were interested in confirming if the situations portrayed in the scenarios led the participants to perceive a violation of a minimal or a maximal standard. We used two sets of measures to assess the degree of violation of a minimal versus maximal standard conveyed in the scenario, with an adapted version of the measures introduced by Kessler et al. (2010): One set had an indirect framing and measured the character of the standards; the other had a direct framing and measured the violation of the standards itself. Four items measured perceived minimal standard violation (e.g. of indirect framing, “*For us smokers it is absolutely necessary to have the possibility to smoke in public spaces*”; e.g. of direct framing, “*For us smokers, not having the possibility to smoke in public spaces is unacceptable*”, $\alpha = .88$), and four items measured perceived maximal standard violation (e.g. of indirect framing, “*For us smokers to have the possibility to smoke in public spaces would be desirable, but we know that it is not always like that*”; e.g. of direct framing, “*For us smokers, not having the possibility to smoke in public spaces should be an exception*”, $\alpha = .78$). Answers were given on a 7 point scale, ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (7).

These indexes were positively correlated, $r(195) = .65, p < .001$, indicating that the more the participants perceived a situation as portraying the violation of a minimal standard, the more it was also perceived as portraying the violation of a maximal standard.

Emotional responses. We asked participants to rate the extent to which (from not at all – 1 to very much – 7) thinking about the further modifications to the Preventing Smoking Law made them feel: Desperate, resented, furious, frustrated, outraged, calm, happy, thrilled, animated, and satisfied (e.g., “*As a smoker, the new plans for Smoking Prevention make me feel desperate*”). A principal component analysis with *varimax* rotation revealed a two-factor solution according to the Kaiser-Criterion and scree plot analysis: Happy, thrilled, animated, and satisfied loaded positively on the first factor, which explained 62.78% of the variance; desperate, resented, furious and frustrated

loaded positively on the second factor, which explained 14.44% of the variance; calm and outraged loaded on both factors and were not considered in the analyses. An index of positive emotions was created by averaging all the positive emotions that loaded only on the first factor ($\alpha = .87$) and an index of negative emotions was created by averaging all the negative emotions that loaded only on the second factor ($\alpha = .93$).

Behavioural intentions. In order to respect ethical concerns and to minimize the impact of social desirability (as we were especially interested in the extremely negative behaviours), and similarly to the procedure described in Study 1, we measured behavioural intentions using open questions. We asked the participants to write down likely behavioural responses of smokers (their ingroup) or of themselves as a member of their disadvantaged minority group to the presented scenarios. As our intention was collecting a variety of both constructive and destructive behaviours, we used a two-step method similar to the one used in Study 1. Using two questions helped us respecting ethical considerations as it allowed us to introduce a susceptible topic - destructive behaviour - in a contextualized structure: The first question¹⁷ had a more general framing (*“In problematic situations it seems that we understand better when people or groups behave in an unusual way.”*) and the participants were involved directly in the question/answer (*“As a smoker what would you feel like doing?”*); the second question¹⁸ had a more specific framing (*“Also in these situations, it seems that we understand better why people and groups behave in a way that is usually considered unacceptable as it goes against the law or a sense of morality.”*) and the participants were less involved in the question/answer (*“In such a situation what do you imagine that could happen?”*).

¹⁷ This question was framed as follows: *“Many times we hear people or groups talking about things they did or wish to do in certain situations. We do not always agree with what we hear, but there are also opinions that are similar to our own opinion. In problematic situations it seems that we understand better when people or groups behave in an unusual way. Think again about the new plans for the Prevention of Smoking. As a smoker what would you feel like doing in such a situation?”*

¹⁸ The second question was framed as follows: *“Instead of behaving positively and constructively, many times people or groups face situations so complicated that they have to display more extreme behaviours. That is, in those situations, people or groups behave in a destructive way against all of those around them. Also in these situations, it seems that we understand better why people and groups behave in a way that is usually considered unacceptable as it goes against the law or against a sense of morality. Think again about the new plans for the Prevention of Smoking. In such a situation what do you imagine that could happen?”*

Not all the participants reported behavioural intentions. That is the reason for a reduced N of 95 when presenting data concerning the participants' behavioural intentions.

As described for Study 1, two independent raters belonging to the majority (i.e., Portuguese non-smokers) were instructed to evaluate the behaviours listed in the participants' answers, taking the norms and values of the Portuguese Society as the reference for such evaluations. The raters were blind to the exclusion versus marginalization conditions and coded the participants' answers on a 7 point scale, ranging from not at all (1) to very much (7), in terms of how much each behaviour written by the participants could be regarded as: *Positive* (Intra-class-correlation between raters – ICC = .84), *negative* (ICC = .85), *constructive* (ICC = .81), *destructive* (ICC = .84), *normative* (ICC = .59), *violent* (ICC = .63), *against non-smokers* (outgroup, ICC = .55) and *against the Portuguese Society*¹⁹ (superordinate category, ICC = .47). Using the average ratings of the two raters, we created two indexes²⁰: One for destructive behaviour, aggregating the mean of negative, destructive, violent, against the outgroup and against the superordinate category ($\alpha = .86$), and one for constructive behaviour, aggregating the mean of positive, constructive and normative ($\alpha = .89$). Examples of destructive behaviour listed by the participants include: “Try our best to break this duty” (in Portuguese: “Tentar ao máximo prevaricar”); and “Continuing smoking in those places” (in Portuguese: “Continuar a fumar nesses locais”). Examples of constructive behaviour listed by the participants include: “Being civilized” (in Portuguese: “Ser civilizado”); and “Some sort of demonstration” (in Portuguese: “Algum tipo de manifestação”).

These behavioural indexes were also strongly and negatively correlated, $r(107) = -.86, p < .001$, indicating that the more the participants listed destructive behaviours, the less they listed constructive behaviours. Given this relation, in the data analysis we controlled for the common variance of these two indexes.

Identification. In order to verify the degree of identification with the disadvantaged minority group (ingroup), we used a verbal measure adapted from Leach

¹⁹ Following the results of Study 1 (see section 3.2.4, *Harming the superordinate category*), we decided to include this variable in this index.

²⁰ Although the values for the ICC of *against the superordinate category* and *against non-smokers* were problematic, we kept these variables in the analysis because of its particular theoretical interest. Results, however, should be interpreted with caution.

et al. (2008). The participants responded to 10 items (e.g., "When I think about myself, I feel solidarity with smokers", $\alpha = .87$) on a 7 point scale, ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (7).

3.3.4 Results

Manipulation check

We tested the effect of the manipulation (exclusion vs. marginalization) on the participants' perceived exclusion in a GLM with identification with the ingroup as a covariate. Results showed only an effect of the covariate, $F(1,192) = 39.36, p < .001$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .17$, $B = 0.89$, $SE = 0.14$. The effect of the manipulation was not significant, $F < 0.5$: Perceived exclusion did not vary according to the conditions of the manipulation.

These results show that the manipulation did not have the expected effect on the manipulation check. Nevertheless, because the reasons for such lack of effect are not clear (as it could be attributed to either non-effectiveness of the manipulation or insensitivity of the measure to detect a successful manipulation), and in order to avoid not only Type I, but also Type II error (which is more critical for manipulation checks), we tested the effect of the manipulation on other variables.

Hypotheses' test

Impact on perceived violation of minimal and maximal standards

We performed a 2 (conditions of the manipulation: Exclusion vs. marginalization) x 2 (perceived standards violation: Minimal vs. maximal) GLM with the index for perceived standards violation as within-subject factor and identification with the ingroup as a covariate. Results showed a main effect of standards violation, $F(1,192) = 56.24, p < .001$, qualified by a significant interaction with the manipulation, $F(1,192) = 4.80, p = .030$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .024$. The main effect showed that, in general, participants perceived situations portrayed in both conditions of the manipulation more as violations of maximal standards ($M = 3.96, SD = 1.21$) than as violations of minimal standards ($M = 2.69, SD = 1.27$), but, as predicted, this difference was smaller in the condition of exclusion ($M_{\text{minimal_violation}} = 2.68, SD = 1.28$ vs. $M_{\text{maximal_violation}} = 3.87, SD = 1.21$) than in the condition of marginalization ($M_{\text{minimal_violation}} = 2.73, SD = 1.26$ vs. $M_{\text{maximal_violation}} = 4.26, SD = 1.21$). We also verified that the standards violation

significantly interacted with identification with the ingroup, $F(1,192) = 6.97, p = .009$: Identification increased the perceived violation of both standards, with stronger increase for the minimal standards ($B = 0.76, SE = 0.087$) than for the maximal standards ($B = 0.54, SE = 0.089$).

Impact on the emotional display

As shown in Table 4, the exhibition of negative emotions is negatively and highly correlated with the exhibition of positive emotions. Thus, as for behaviour, we tested for the impact of the manipulation on the specific variance of each type of emotions in two separate analyses.

We first tested the effect of the manipulation (exclusion vs. marginalization) on the display of negative emotions in a GLM with identification with the ingroup as a covariate. We verified that the display of negative emotions varied according to identification with the ingroup, $F(1,192) = 44.87, p < .001, partial \eta^2 = .19$, but not according to the conditions of the manipulation, $F < 0.3$. Identification increased the display of negative emotions ($B = 0.74, SE = 0.11$). We then repeated this analysis adding positive emotions as a second covariate. Results revealed that the display of negative emotions varied according to the display of positive emotions, $F(1,191) = 61.98, p < .001, partial \eta^2 = .24, B = -0.46, SE = 0.059$, and according to identification with the ingroup, $F(1,191) = 20.40, p < .001, partial \eta^2 = .097, B = 0.46, SE = 0.10$. The effect of the manipulation, $F(1,191) = 0.20, ns$, was, again, not significant.

A similar GLM on positive emotions with identification with the ingroup as a covariate, showed that the display of positive emotions varied according to identification with the ingroup, $F(1,192) = 25.68, p < .001, partial \eta^2 = .012, B = -0.59, SE = 0.12$. Again, the effect of the manipulation, $F(1,192) = 0.01, ns$, was not significant. Repeating the analysis adding negative emotions as a second covariate, revealed that the display of positive emotions varied according to the display of negative emotions, $F(1,191) = 61.98, p < .001, partial \eta^2 = .24, B = -0.53, SE = 0.07$, and (marginally) according to identification with the ingroup, $F(1,191) = 3.28, p = .072, partial \eta^2 = .017, B = -0.20, SE = 0.11$, but not according to the conditions of the manipulation, $F < 0.02$.

Impact on the behavioural display

As shown in Table 4, listing destructive behaviours is negatively and highly correlated with listing constructive behaviour. In order to understand the specific impact of the conditions of the manipulation on the variance of each type of behaviour, we conducted two separate analyses²¹. First, we tested the effect of the conditions of the manipulation (exclusion vs. marginalization) on destructive behaviour in a GLM with identification with the ingroup as a covariate. Results showed that destructive behaviour varied (marginally) according to the conditions of the manipulation, $F(1,92) = 3.24, p = .075, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .034$: Facing a condition of exclusion increased the destructive behaviours listed by the participants ($M = 4.49, SD = 0.80$) compared to facing a condition of marginalization ($M = 4.17, SD = 0.75$). Then, in order to explain the specific variance of destructive behaviour, we repeated the previous analysis adding constructive behaviour as a second covariate. Besides the effect of constructive behaviour, $F(1,91) = 260.97, p < .001, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .74$, results showed that destructive behaviour varied depending on identification with the ingroup, $F(1,91) = 4.42, p = .038, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .046$, and, as expected, on the conditions of the manipulation, $F(1,91) = 4.13, p = .045, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .043$. More specifically, identification with the ingroup ($B = 0.098, SE = 0.047$) as well as facing a condition of exclusion increased the destructive behaviours listed by the participants (*estimated marginal means*: Condition of marginalization: $M = 4.26, SE = 0.88$ vs. condition of exclusion: $M = 4.47, SE = 0.47$).

For constructive behaviour, the pattern of results was the expected: Participants tended to list slightly more constructive behaviours when facing the condition of marginalization ($M = 3.53, SD = 0.093$) than when facing the condition of exclusion ($M = 3.30, SD = 1.20$). However, this difference was not significant. In a GLM with manipulation as factor and identification with the ingroup as a covariate, constructive behaviour did not vary, neither according to identification with the ingroup, $F < 0.5$, nor according to the conditions of the manipulation, $F < 0.8$. Repeating this GLM and including destructive behaviour as a second covariate revealed that constructive behaviour was only influenced by destructive behaviour, F

²¹ When analyzing the impact of the conditions of the manipulation on the behavioural and emotional display, we abstained from reporting a GLM with repeated measures because of the extremely high correlations between the repeated measures. When the variables under analysis are highly correlated, using this methodology is not informative. Accordingly, the results revealed very low observed power, $\text{power} = .22$ and $\text{power} = .06$, respectively, and according to Cohen (1988), low observed power results in higher probabilities of committing Type II error (see also Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2004).

(1,91) = 260.97, $p < .001$, $partial \eta^2 = .74$, but neither by identification with the ingroup, $F(1,91) = 2.08$, $p = .15$, nor by the manipulation, $F(1,91) = 1.66$, $p = .20$.

Table 4: Intercorrelations between perceived exclusion, perceived standards' violations, emotions, behaviour and identification with the disadvantaged minority ingroup.

		B	C	D	E	F	G	H
A - Perceived exclusion	<i>r</i>	.67***	.59***	-.60***	.52***	.13	-.10	.41***
	<i>N</i>	195	195	195	195	95	95	195
B - Minimal standard violation	<i>r</i>		.65***	-.57***	.50***	.15	-.09	.53***
	<i>N</i>		195	195	195	95	95	195
C - Maximal standard violation	<i>r</i>			-.57***	.40***	.01	.04	.41***
	<i>N</i>			195	195	95	95	195
D - Positive Emotions (index)	<i>r</i>				-.57***	-.09	.0	-.34***
	<i>N</i>				195	95	95	195
E - Negative emotions (index)	<i>r</i>					.18†	.0	.43*
	<i>N</i>					95	95	195
F - Destructive behaviour	<i>r</i>						-.86***	.15
	<i>N</i>						95	95
G - Constructive behaviour	<i>r</i>							-.06
	<i>N</i>							95
H - Identification with disadvantaged minority ingroup	<i>r</i>							
	<i>N</i>							

Note: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$.

Correlational data

Even though our manipulation had no significant effect on the manipulation check, results showed that facing a scenario of exclusion versus a scenario of marginalization had a differentiated impact on perceived standard violation and behavioural display, revealing that further analyses of the data should be interesting. We continued, therefore, with correlational analyses using the measure of perceived exclusion as independent variable instead of the experimental manipulation.

We tested the theoretical model proposed in our hypotheses (Figure 6) both step by step testing individual paths and as a whole testing the overall indirect effect. This strategy allowed us both to control and rule out alternative explanations for each step as well as provide a full test of the proposed chain mediation.

Predicting perceived violation of minimal and maximal standards

To test the first step of the model, we regressed minimal standard violation and maximal standard violation on perceived exclusion. Interestingly, and as shown in Table 5, both perceived violation of a minimal standard and perceived violation of a maximal standard were significantly predicted by perceived exclusion, which did not change when statistically controlling for identification with the ingroup and for the respective alternative standard violation, that is minimal controlling for maximal and maximal controlling for minimal standard violation (Table 5). These results make it necessary to test for effects of both perceived minimal and maximal standards violations when predicting emotions and behaviour.

Table 5: Summary of linear regression analyses for variables predicting minimal and maximal standard violations.

Minimal standard violation									
Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Perceived exclusion	0.45	0.04	.67***	0.36	0.04	.54***	0.25	0.04	.38***
Identification with ingroup				0.44	0.08	.31***	0.35	0.74	.25***
Maximal standard violation							0.34	0.06	.33***
R^2			.45			.52			.60
<i>F</i>	(1,193)	157.24***		(2,192)	108.07***		(3,191)	93.50***	

Maximal standard violation									
Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Perceived exclusion	0.37	0.04	.59***	0.32	0.04	.50***	0.17	0.05	.27***
Identification with ingroup				0.28	0.08	.20**	0.10	0.08	.07
Minimal standard violation							0.41	0.07	.43***
R^2			.34			.37			.47
<i>F</i>	(1,193)	102.24***		(2,192)	59.11***		(3,191)	55.80***	

Notes: the values in brackets associated with the *F* values refer to the degrees of freedom;
 *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

Predicting emotional display

For testing the second step of the theoretical model, we regressed negative and positive emotions on perceived minimal standard violation and perceived maximal standard violation. As can be seen in Table 6, both perceived standard violations predicted both negative and positive emotions. When statistically controlling for the impact of identification with the ingroup, the prediction of the display of negative emotions by minimal standards violation was still significant whereas the prediction by maximal standards violation became marginal (Table 6). Most importantly, when predicting only the specific variance of negative emotions by statistically controlling for positive emotions, the effect of minimal standard violation remained significant but the effect of maximal standard violation disappeared completely. For the prediction of positive emotions, results did not change either when statistically controlling for the effects of identification with the ingroup, or additionally for negative emotions (Table 6). These results make it also necessary to test for effects of both negative and positive emotions on behaviour.

Table 6: Summary of linear regression analyses for variables predicting the display of negative and positive emotions.

Variable	Negative emotions								
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Minimal standard violation	0.52	0.10	.43***	0.43	0.10	.35***	0.19	0.09	.15*
Maximal standard violation	0.21	0.10	.17*	0.19	0.10	.15†	-0.05	0.09	-.04
Identification with ingroup				0.31	0.12	.18*	0.28	0.11	.16**
Positive emotions							-0.57	0.07	-.55***
R^2			.30			.32			.51
<i>F</i>	(2,192)	42.88***		(3,191)	31.63***		(4, 190)	49.49	

Variable	Positive emotions								
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Minimal standard violation	-0.44	0.09	-.38***	-0.42	0.09	-.38***	-0.22	0.08	-.19**
Maximal standard violation	-0.41	0.09	-.33***	-0.41	0.09	-.33***	-0.32	0.08	-.26***
Identification with ingroup				-0.06	0.11	-.04	0.08	0.10	.05
Negative emotions							-0.47	0.06	-.48***
R^2			.41			.41			.57
<i>F</i>	(2,192)	68.48***		(3,191)	45.61***		(4,190)	63.72	

Notes: the values in brackets associated with the *F* values refer to the degrees of freedom; *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

Predicting behavioural display

To test the next and final step of the model, we regressed destructive behaviour on positive and negative emotions while statistically controlling for constructive behaviour. As expected in H3, destructive behaviour was predicted by negative emotions, but not by positive emotions (Table 7). These results did not change when statistically controlling for identification with the ingroup, which had no effect (Table 7).

Table 7: Summary of linear regression analyses for variables predicting the display of destructive behaviour.

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Negative emotions	0.10	0.32	.19**	0.09	0.03	.17**
Positive emotions	0.01	0.03	.02	0.01	0.03	.03
Constructive behaviour	-0.60	0.04	-.86***	-0.60	0.04	-.86***
Identification with ingroup				0.04	0.05	.04
R^2			.76			.76
<i>F</i>		(3,91)	99.32***	(4,90)		74.21***

Notes: the values in brackets associated with the *F* values refer to the degrees of freedom; *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

Testing the mediations

Before testing the complete model, we computed two regression analyses in order to estimate indirect effects. To avoid problems resulting from deviations from the perfect normal distribution and to achieve more robust estimates, we used the bootstrapping method (with 10000 bootstrap resamples) with bias-corrected estimates and confidence intervals to assess the indirect effect as proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2008).

In order to test the first mediation model, we computed a regression analysis that estimated the indirect effect of perceived exclusion on negative emotions, mediated by minimal (a_1) and maximal (a_2) standard violations (Figure 4), $R^2 = .31$, $F(3,191) = 28.99$, $p < .0001$. As shown in Table 8, all predicted direct effects (a_1 , b_1), and the total effect (c) were significant. More importantly, the more robust bootstrap estimates indicated that, as predicted, the indirect effect of perceived exclusion via minimal standard violation on negative emotions was significant (a_1*b_1 : $B = 0.1315$, $SE = 0.0525$, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.0383 to 0.2458). The bootstrap estimates further indicated that, as expected, the indirect effect via maximal standard violation was not significant (a_2*b_2 : $B = 0.0240$, $SE = 0.0380$, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from - 0.0511 to 0.0996). Unexpectedly, the mediation by minimal standard violation was only partial, as indicated by a significant direct effect of perceived exclusion on negative emotions (c').

Figure 4: Mediation model using perceived exclusion as the predictor. For estimates of a_1 , a_2 , b_1 , b_2 , c' (c) see Table 8.




Table 8: Total effect (c) and direct effects of the mediation analysis (see Figure 4) for the effect of perceived exclusion on negative emotions via perceived minimal and maximal standard violations (predicted effects in italics).

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>a1</i>	<i>0.4451</i>	<i>0.0355</i>	<i>12.54</i>	<i>.0000</i>
<i>a2</i>	<i>0.3723</i>	<i>0.03668</i>	<i>10.11</i>	<i>.0000</i>
<i>b1</i>	<i>0.2997</i>	<i>0.1054</i>	<i>2.84</i>	<i>.0049</i>
<i>b2</i>	<i>0.0638</i>	<i>0.1016</i>	<i>0.63</i>	<i>.5311</i>
<i>c</i>	<i>0.4073</i>	<i>0.0483</i>	<i>8.43</i>	<i>.0000</i>
<i>c'</i>	<i>0.2501</i>	<i>0.0659</i>	<i>3.79</i>	<i>.0002</i>

In order to test the second mediation model, we computed a regression analysis that estimated the indirect effect of perceived minimal standard violation on destructive behaviour, mediated by negative (a_1) and positive (a_2) emotions (Figure 5), while controlling for the effects of maximal standard violation and constructive behaviour, $R^2 = .77$, $F(5,89) = 58.79$, $p < .0001$. As shown in Table 9, all the predicted direct effects (a_1 , b_1 paths) were significant. More importantly, the more robust bootstrap estimates indicated that, as predicted, the indirect effect of the perceived minimal standard violation via negative emotions on destructive behaviour was significant (a_1*b_1 : $B = 0.0516$, $SE = 0.0226$, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.0167 to 0.1084). The bootstrap estimates further indicated that, as expected, the indirect effect via positive emotions was not significant (a_2*b_2 : $B = 0.0017$, $SE = 0.0181$, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from - 0.0291 to 0.0454).

Figure 5: Mediation model using perceived minimal standard violation as the predictor. For estimates of a_1 , a_2 , b_1 , b_2 , c' (c) see Table 9.




Table 9: Total effect (c) and direct effects of the mediation analysis (see Figure 5) for the effect of perceived minimal standard violation on destructive behaviour via negative and positive emotions, controlling for the effects of maximal standard violation and constructive behaviour (predicted effects in italics).

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>a1</i>	<i>0.5089</i>	<i>0.1293</i>	<i>3.94</i>	<i>.0002</i>
<i>a2</i>	<i>-0.5017</i>	<i>0.1217</i>	<i>-4.12</i>	<i>.0001</i>
<i>b1</i>	<i>0.1021</i>	<i>0.0336</i>	<i>3.03</i>	<i>.0032</i>
<i>b2</i>	<i>-0.0063</i>	<i>0.0357</i>	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>.8603</i>
<i>c</i>	<i>0.0395</i>	<i>0.0411</i>	<i>0.96</i>	<i>.3394</i>
<i>c'</i>	<i>-0.0156</i>	<i>0.0443</i>	<i>-0.35</i>	<i>.7259</i>

We also tested an alternative mediation model in which we tested the indirect effect of maximal standard violation on destructive behaviour via positive and negative emotions. As expected, neither the indirect effect via positive emotions (a_2*b_2 : $B = 0.0014$, $SE = 0.0212$, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from - 0.0351 to 0.0507), nor the indirect effect via negative emotions (a_1*b_1 : $B = 0.0257$, $SE = 0.0180$, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from - 0.0005 to 0.0740) were significant.

Testing the two-step chain mediation

In order to test the complete model, we computed a multiple regression analysis using the bootstrap method proposed by Hayes, Preacher and Myers (2011) and their SPSS macro MED3C to access the indirect chain mediation effect, allowing for the statistical control of the effect of covariates.

We tested the indirect effect of perceived exclusion on destructive behaviour via minimal standard violation and negative emotions, both included as chain mediators ($a_1*a_3*b_2$ in Figure 6), while controlling for the effect of all alternative predictors and confounds, that is, for maximal standard violation, positive emotions and constructive behaviour. As the predicted effect was clearly directed, and chain mediations are extremely difficult to detect (given that they are a statistical combination of three direct effects) we decided to test the chain mediation one-tailed by estimating 90% confidence intervals. All expected direct effects (a_1 , a_3 , b_2) were significant whereas all other direct effects were not significant (Table 10). Also as predicted, results revealed a significant indirect effect via both chained mediators ($a_1*a_3*b_2$: $B = 0.009$, $SE = 0.0066$, with a percentile based 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.0005 to 0.0211, $p_{\text{one-tailed}} = .037$, and with a bias-corrected percentile based 90% confidence interval²² ranging from 0.002 to 0.026, $p_{\text{one-tailed}} = .015$)²³. The other two but incomplete mediations (a_1*b_1 and a_2*b_2) were not significant as 0 was within their 90% confidence interval.

We also tested three unpredicted alternative processes that could lead from perceived exclusion to destructive behaviour, one via maximal standard violation and

²² Whereas percentile based confidence intervals were estimated using the SPSS macro provided by Hayes et al. (2011), p-values and bias-corrected confidence intervals were estimated using AMOS 17 (Arbuckle, 2008), relying on the same bootstrap method. Estimates of effects and standard errors were identical in both analyses.

²³ The same analysis without controlling for maximal standard violation and positive emotions revealed also a significant chain mediation ($a_1*a_3*b_2$: $B = 0.0235$, $SE = 0.0113$, with a 90% percentile based confidence interval ranging from 0.0075 to 0.0438).

positive emotions, a second one via minimal standard violation and positive emotions and a third one via maximal standard violation and negative emotions. Again, the other variables were always controlled for as covariates (constructive behaviour always, negative emotions or positive emotions when the respective other was in the mediation and minimal or maximal standard violation when the respective other was in the mediation). In none of these three alternative models any of the indirect effects (complete or incomplete) was significant, as 0 was always within the 90% percentile based confidence intervals.

That is, the predicted chain mediation via perceived minimal standard violation and negative emotions is the only significant effect leading from perceived exclusion to destructive behaviour.

Figure 6: Chain mediation model using perceived exclusion as the predictor. For estimates of a_1 , a_2 , a_3 , b_1 , b_2 , c' (c) see Table 10.




Table 10: Total effect (c) and direct effects of the chain mediation analysis (see Figure 6) for the effect of perceived exclusion on destructive behaviour via perceived minimal standard violation and negative emotions, while controlling for the effects of perceived maximal standard, positive emotions and constructive behaviour (predicted effects in italics).

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>a1</i>	<i>0.2802</i>	<i>0.0689</i>	<i>4.06</i>	<i>.0001</i>
<i>a2</i>	0.0434	0.1043	0.42	.6785
<i>a3</i>	<i>0.3150</i>	<i>0.1467</i>	<i>2.15</i>	<i>.0345</i>
<i>b1</i>	- 0.0056	0.0480	- 0.12	.9068
<i>b2</i>	<i>0.1029</i>	<i>0.0338</i>	<i>3.04</i>	<i>.0031</i>
<i>c</i>	<i>-0.0065</i>	<i>0.0318</i>	<i>-0.20</i>	<i>.8386</i>
<i>c'</i>	- 0.0185	0.0333	- 0.55	.5805

3.3.5 Discussion

With this study we aimed at going further than Study 1 by exploring the role of exclusion as a typical instance of the type of standard violation which should cause the disadvantaged group to display destructive behaviour. More specifically, we aimed at verifying whether experiencing exclusion as compared to more benign forms of deprivation leads to differences in disadvantaged minority members' perceptions of the violation of standards (minimal vs. maximal), in the display of negative emotions and in the display of destructive behaviours. To do so, we conducted an online study with smokers living in Portugal. Using scenarios, we manipulated the degree of expected deprivation from accessing a good the disadvantaged minority has to face in the future (blatant deprivation in the exclusion scenario and limited access to the good in the marginalization scenario) and measured perceptions of exclusion, perceptions of violation of minimal and maximal standards, the emotional responses to such scenarios and the behavioural tendencies elicited by them.

More precisely, we created a specific situation that frustrated smokers' expectations about their total inclusion in the superordinate category (society) by presenting a specific situation that went further than the actual Smoking Prevention Law on limiting smokers' access to a part of public space. With that, we intended to slightly (marginalization condition) and deeply (exclusion condition) frustrate smokers' expectations in order to test whether this would affect their (negative) emotions and (destructive) behavioural tendencies. Moreover, by frustrating such expectations, we intended to create different frames that would allow different interpretations of the same situation: When slightly frustrating smokers' expectations (marginalization) we aimed at facilitating the interpretation of the situation in terms of a maximal standard violation; when deeply frustrating smokers' expectations (exclusion) we aimed, in turn, at facilitating the interpretation of the situation in terms of a minimal standard violation.

Although the manipulation check was not sensitive to our subtle manipulation, the experimental results partially support and the correlational results completely support our hypotheses. Interestingly, the manipulation had also no effect on the display of negative emotions. That is, it seems that our participants felt excluded and responded with negative emotions not only when they were totally excluded, but already when they were just moderately deprived (i.e., marginalized). Nevertheless, our manipulation impacted perceptions of violation of standards and behavioural tendencies. In the

exclusion condition the participating smokers were not only less ready than in the marginalization condition to interpret the scenario as a violation of maximal rather than minimal standards, they also tended to expect themselves and ingroup members to show more destructive behaviours than those facing marginalization. These results are quite encouraging for our endeavor to understand destructive behaviour, as they show that exclusion from a superordinate category impacts disadvantaged minorities' perceptions and reactions. The unpredicted differentiated results for emotions and behaviour are intriguing as they might mean that in their expression of emotions participants followed different principles than in their predicted behaviour, and that the specific effect of exclusion interpreted as minimal standard violation (as compared to only marginalization and interpretations as maximal standard violation) may be probably limited to the regulation of behaviour but might not generalize to emotional display.

Nevertheless, the correlational analysis of the data shows that negative emotions do play a role as determinants of destructive behaviour: Emotions varied according to the identification with the ingroup of smokers and – more importantly – to self-reported perceived exclusion. In general the results of the correlational analyses were consistent with the hypotheses that perceived exclusion was perceived as minimal standard violation (H1) and that perceiving a violation of a minimal standard led to the display of more negative emotions (H2) which, in turn, led to the display of more destructive behaviour (H3). Moreover, the results revealed that the relation between perceived exclusion and the display of destructive behaviour is mediated both by perceived minimal standard violation and experienced negative emotions (H4), but not by perceived maximal standard violation or positive emotions.

These results show that it is not deprivation per se, but rather the extreme form of deprivation that constitutes exclusion, and is therefore interpreted as a violation of minimal standards, that leads people to experience emotional distress triggering destructive behavioural reactions. This is especially true as the direct link between perceived exclusion and the behavioural display was not significant, but the indirect link via perceived minimal standard violation and negative emotions was.

Overall, the correlational support for the two-step chain mediation speaks for the idea that the key role in the onset of destructive behaviour as a response to exclusion is played by violated minimal standards and negative emotions rather than by violated maximal standards and lack of positive emotions. Although maximal standard violations were as much predicted by perceived exclusion as minimal standard violations, only the

latter, but not the former predicted specifically negative emotions over and above their shared variance with positive emotions. Moreover, although positive emotions were also (but negatively) predicted by perceived minimal standard violation, they did not predict destructive behaviour, while negative emotions did.

At a first glance, the fact that on the one hand the manipulation did not affect negative emotions although affecting destructive behaviour, but on the other hand correlational data are consistent with the idea that negative emotions serve as a mediator of destructive behaviour seems to be a contradiction. Of course, that the fact that the complete model could only be tested with perceived exclusion rather than with the manipulation of exclusion as the focal predictor limits the possibility of drawing causal conclusions. However, we rather suggest resolving this apparent contradiction by keeping in mind that this study was conducted with a real group, smokers, who probably held relatively established a priori beliefs and attitudes in terms of smokers' degree of inclusion within the larger society, and also relatively fixed expectations and (lay) theories about their social reality. At the time the study was conducted the new Law for the Prevention of Smoking was still a quite controversial theme, so people had probably strong attitudes regarding this issue. Attempts to change or move such beliefs, attitudes and perceptions may not always be successful, especially if the manipulation is as subtle as it was in the current study. We manipulated exclusion and marginalization by only changing a word ("banished" vs. "kept away", "banido" vs. "afastado" in Portuguese). That is, participants might differ in their degree of felt exclusion and hold negative emotions, independently of the manipulation we used. These interindividual differences then also predict interindividual differences in destructive behaviour.

However, as much as this reasoning might explain the lack of effect on the manipulation check, it might not completely explain the null-effect on emotions. If the results of this study are not an artifact, we might have to modify our theoretical conclusions insofar as they seem to suggest that people can have as much negative emotions when their group is only marginalized as when it is totally excluded, even if they perceive maximal standard violations rather than minimal standard violations. Nevertheless, such negative emotions do not necessarily lead to destructive behaviour. What leads to destructive behaviour are negative emotions that are triggered by perceptions of minimal standard violations, which are more likely in the case of exclusion than in the case of marginalization. However, to back up such a conclusion, another study in a more controlled setting seems necessary.

As a final remark, we may also mention some limitations of this study. First, as already mentioned in the discussion of Study 1, ethical concerns led us to use scenarios and self-reported hypothetical behaviours listed as response to open questions as a proxy for real destructive behaviour. Yet, given the online nature of the present study, this seemed the more adequate methodology to help us fulfilling our empirical purposes. Other limitations were already mentioned in the discussion of Study 1: One refers to the unexpected high correlation between constructive and destructive behaviours. Nevertheless, again we stress that for our theoretical explanation of destructive behaviour it is essential that we find differentiated predictions for destructive behaviour when the shared variance of both types of behaviours is controlled for. The other refers to the confound between minimal versus maximal standards violation and the severity of the violation. As mentioned in the discussion of Study 1, this confound will be addressed in Study 4.

A last limitation is that we did not have a no deprivation control condition. That makes it difficult to interpret the null-effects of the manipulation on perceived exclusion and negative emotions. In our interpretation we assumed that participants in both conditions of marginalization and exclusion felt negative emotions, but we do not have any proof that they actually felt more negative emotions than they would have without any exclusion or marginalization.

CHAPTER IV

To comply or to rebel? Disadvantaged minorities' behavioural and emotional responses to perceived marginalization and exclusion

4.1 Overview

After presenting empirical evidence supporting the importance of the role of perceiving minimal versus maximal standards violations and their differentiated impact in the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour in Study 1, we have replicated these results in Study 2. Moreover, in Study 2 we also enriched the process under study in order to come to a deeper understanding of one of the most pervasive and problematic social phenomena in intergroup relations: Social exclusion. Study 2 already gave a first hint that being excluded, rather than marginalized, can be, for disadvantaged groups, perceived as a minimal standard violation. Even if plausible and in line with our theoretical reasoning, however, we cannot yet be completely sure whether this is actually the case, because both Studies 1 and 2 had some limitations. One was the hypothetical character of these studies as for ethical reasons we could not expose these real-life groups to actual experiences of exclusion or engage them in actual destructive behaviour. Moreover, the measure of behaviour was an evaluation of the character of the behaviour rather than the degree of engagement in clearly destructive behaviour. That is, we have measured how much the average listed behaviour of each participant can be characterized as destructive and as constructive. That produced highly negatively correlated measures of destructive and constructive behaviour, and to measure effects specifically on destructive behaviour we had to control for large part of the variance. Finally, none of the previous studies had a baseline control condition without any deprivation, which makes the interpretation of some results difficult.

In order to overcome these methodological limitations and gather clearer evidence for the predicted chain mediation process, two laboratory studies are now presented. Like the previous study, these studies aimed at, in general, testing the hypothesis that it is not the experience of deprivation per se that leads to the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour by the disadvantaged, but rather the effect of exclusion on the perception of minimal standard violation. Thus, these studies aim at better understanding if the interpretation of exclusion, rather than marginalization, in terms of minimal versus maximal standards violation does translate into differentiated

emotional and behavioural consequences. Apart from replicating results from Studies 1 and 2, the current studies also have some specific aims, namely to complement the previous studies and to overcome their methodological limitations and to test whether the finding of Study 2 that only destructive behaviour, but not negative emotions, differed in the exclusion and in the marginalization contexts.

4.2 Study 3

In order to further advance the study of the relations postulated in our hypotheses and to address several of the limitations of Studies 1 and 2, we conducted a third study in a controlled environment and using artificial groups with no previous history. Participants were involved in a virtual ball toss game in which they played as member of a team against another one, and in which each team could win money, depending on the game. We expected that in such a setting the task of manipulating exclusion and marginalization would be easier.

Moreover, in such a controlled context, exclusion and marginalization would be less contaminated by conventional social meanings resulting from actual political and historical processes. Besides, we also included a condition with no deprivation at all in order to have a more complete design by including baseline measures, and, therefore, having a stronger test of our hypotheses. This addition of a baseline condition of no deprivation (i.e., full inclusion, neither marginalization, nor exclusion) particularly intended to test whether our interpretations of the results of Study 2 were plausible, namely that participants felt highly excluded and negative emotions already as a response to marginalization.

A final advancement of this study refers to the measurement of destructive behaviour: While the previous studies relied on self-reported hypothetical behaviours, the present study exposes participants to actual deprivation and measures actual behavioural responses, yet still respecting the ethical concerns previously mentioned.

In order to pursue all of these goals, we manipulated social exclusion of the ingroup and we measured emotional responses and destructive behaviour.

4.2.1 Hypotheses

Our predictions in this study were in line with our theoretical reasoning, but also took into account the results from Study 2:

- H1) Participants should interpret the situation more as standard violations in the deprivation conditions (marginalization and exclusion) as compared to the no deprivation control condition. However, in line with our reasoning, and as was predicted and found already in Study 2, interpretations as violation of minimal standards versus maximal standards should be increased in the exclusion condition as compared to the marginalization condition. As a consequence, the specific variance of minimal and maximal standard violation should show differentiated patterns: When statistically controlling for maximal standard violation, minimal standard violation should be higher in the exclusion condition only as compared to the other two conditions. In contrast, when statistically controlling for minimal standard violation, maximal standard violation should be higher in the marginalization condition only as compared to the other two conditions.

- H2) Participants should feel more negative emotions in the marginalization and exclusion conditions than in the no deprivation control condition. If results from Study 2 require the conclusion that negative emotions are experienced not only when facing exclusion, but already when facing marginalization (see discussion of Study 2), then both conditions marginalization and exclusion should (as in Study 2) not differ from each other. If, however, results of Study 2 were an artifact, negative emotions should be stronger in the exclusion condition than in the marginalization condition, according to our original hypothesis.

- H3) Participants should show more destructive behaviour in the exclusion condition than in the other two conditions, whereas the marginalization condition should not differ from the no deprivation control condition.

- H4) Moreover, we also expected, as in Study 2, that the effects of exclusion on destructive behaviour should be mediated by minimal standard violation perception and negative emotions in a two-step chain mediation.

4.2.2 Method

Participants

Participants were university students of various subjects (37, i.e. 35.3%, studied psychology) living in Portugal, from 18 to 59 years old ($M = 23.12$, $SD = 7.81$). From the 105 participants, 66 (62.9%) are female, 46 (43.8%) were first year students and 101 (96.1%) were born in Portugal. Six participants who ended the experiment in an unusual

way and eleven participants who suspected they were not playing with real other participants were removed from the sample. As a result we had a working N of 88.

Design

Like in Study 2, in the current study we manipulated social exclusion of the ingroup and measured perception of minimal and maximal standards violation as well as emotional responses and destructive behaviour. Different from Study 2, we used a between-subjects design with three conditions: No deprivation versus marginalization versus exclusion.

As ethical concerns prevented us from creating situations of “real” exclusion in a natural context, we created an artificial situation in order to introduce the manipulation of exclusion. Based on the works of Williams, Cheung and Choi (2000), we developed a virtual game in which participants were members of a numerical minority team²⁴ that had to play with a numerical majority team. The task of the players was to throw and receive a ball, with each move increasing some virtual money account of the team receiving the ball. During the game, the majority team did totally (exclusion condition), partially (marginalization) or did not (no deprivation condition) deprive the minority team from accessing a good (receiving the ball). During the game, destructive behaviour was measured. Perceptions of minimal and maximal standards as well as positive and negative emotions were measured afterwards.


Manipulations

After a period of trial, the participants were invited to take part in a simple game in which they would play in teams and had to catch and throw a virtual ball (see Figure 7). The participants were always assigned to the numerical minority team, but were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in terms of the degree of exclusion in the game: In the no deprivation condition, both the majority team and the minority team were granted equal access to the good (the possession of the ball), in the marginalization condition, the majority was granted greater access to the good, while the minority team

²⁴ As stated in the theoretical introduction, we do not believe that the numerical aspect of a group is the most relevant one when we are defining its advantage or disadvantage. Nevertheless, and as will become clearer with the unveiling of the present study, creating a game situation in which a numerical minority had to face a numerical majority allowed us to reproduce the most relevant aspects of being disadvantaged in an artificial setting. Moreover, this allowed us not only to more easily equate the laboratory setting to the natural settings used in the present thesis (as both our natural disadvantaged groups are also numerical minorities).

was deprived from total access to the good by having limited possession of the ball; finally, in the exclusion condition, the majority team had almost exclusive access to the good, whereas the minority team was severely deprived from accessing the good by having almost no possession of the ball.

Figure 7: Print screen of a ball toss game session.



Procedure


The data was mainly collected in two Portuguese University Institutes. The researcher (or an assistant) recruited the participant(s) in the university campus and invited them to collaborate in an experiment designed to improve an online game developed by a number of Portuguese Universities, including the University Institute of Lisbon. Usually three participants took part simultaneously in one session. When the researcher (or the assistant) was not able to recruit three participants, sessions were run with fewer participants.


When the participant(s) agreed to collaborate, they were guided to the laboratory of the campus into a room where three computers and three seats were arranged in a way that allowed the participants to have a good visibility of the computer's screen placed in front of them, but not of the other two computers' screens.


All the instructions were standardized and were presented on the computer screen: The participants were introduced to the game, had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the game in a trial period, played the game itself, filled in a questionnaire (where some of the dependent variables were included) about their experiences in the game and finally were debriefed²⁵ and compensated for their participation with a 5€ voucher.


More specifically, the information participants received was the following: The goal of the game was to catch a virtual ball as many times as possible. The game would be played by two teams: The blue one (minority team, 2 players) and the yellow one (majority team, 4 players) and would have the duration of 5 minutes. Each participant could receive up to 10€ for her/his collaboration, and part of this amount could be accumulated during the game: After catching the ball 3 times, the team would receive 0.10€ for every additional catch. The participants were also informed about the available commands and options they could use during the game. Each player could pass the ball to any other player, that is, to a member of the own team or to a member of the other team. Moreover, the participants could use several optional messages (e.g., “*Pass me the ball*”) and emoticons (e.g., 😊) to communicate with all other participants (via a public chat) or just with the team members (via a private chat); the participants could also choose to withdraw small quantities of money from all the players in the game²⁶; withdraw all the money from all the participants in the game²⁷; quit the game²⁸ or, in exceptional cases, send an email to the researcher²⁹. Note that when all the players

²⁵ At the end of the study, a standardized debriefing was presented to the participants. Although standardized, the debriefing was adapted to the condition of the manipulation that the participants faced: The higher the level of exclusion the participant was exposed to, the more detailed and thorough the debriefing.

²⁶ Every time a participant pressed the button , 0.10€ would be withdrawn from all the players, including the participant that pressed the button.

²⁷ When a participant pressed the button , all the money would be withdrawn from all the players, including the participant that pressed the button.

²⁸ When a participant pressed the button , the participant quit the game, while the other participants would continue playing.

²⁹ When a participant pressed the button , a new window would open and the participant could type in the information s/het wanted to send to the researcher.

in the game were down to an account of 0€ as a result of repeated withdrawals the game would end up for all the players.

Irrespective of the manipulation condition, each participant played a single session of the game in which there were 30 ball throws. The computer program controlled the behaviour of all players except for the naïve participant's behaviour. The behaviour of the other players varied according to the experimental condition. The no deprivation condition was pre-programmed so that each team received the ball in 15 ball throws; the marginalization condition was pre-programmed so that the minority team received the ball in 8 ball throws and the majority team received the ball in the remaining 22 ball throws; the exclusion condition was pre-programmed so that the minority team received the ball in only 2 ball throws and the majority team received the ball in the remaining 28 ball throws.

Measures

Manipulation-checks. Perceived exclusion. In order to access the degree to which the participants felt excluded during the game, we measured the perceptions of exclusion in the post-game questionnaire with three sets of items: One set of three items measured self-perceptions of exclusion (e.g., “*During the game, I felt that my team participated in the game*”, [reversed]); a second set of three items measured the ingroup's perceptions of exclusion (e.g., “*Irrespective of what I think, during the game, the other players of the BLUE team felt that our team participated in the game*”[reversed]); and a final set of three items measured the meta-perceptions of exclusion (e.g., “*I think that, during the game, the YELLOW team felt that my team participated in the game*”, [reversed]). Answers were given on a 7 point scale, ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (7). A principal component analysis revealed a one-factor solution explaining 66 % of variance, according to the Kaiser-criterion and scree plot analyses. An index of perceived exclusion was created by averaging all the items, $\alpha = .94$.

Perceived standard violation. In order to check whether the game situation led the participants to perceive a violation of a minimal or a maximal standard, we measured the degree of violation of a minimal versus a maximal standard. Based on the works of Kessler et al. (2010), two items measured perceived minimal standard violation (e.g., “*For me, the game's situation was absolutely unacceptable*”, $r(57) = .38, p = .004$) and two items measured perceived maximal standard violation (e.g., “*For*

me, the game's situation was a situation that should be avoided whenever possible", $r(65) = .66, p < .001$). Answers were given on a dichotomous scale (yes/no) and on a 7 point scale, ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (7) and the indexes were created by aggregating the z-standardized values.

Emotional responses. We asked participants to rate the extent (from 1 – not at all to 7 – very much) to which, during the game, they felt: Despaired, resented, furious, frustrated, guilty, fearful, calm, thrilled, cheerful, satisfied and happy (e.g., "During the game, I felt calm"). A principal component analysis with *varimax* rotation revealed a three-factor solution: Thrilled, cheerful, satisfied and happy loaded positively on the first factor explaining 37.65 % of variance; despaired, resented, furious and frustrated loaded positively on the second factor explaining 18.84% of variance; guilty and fearful loaded positively and calm loaded negatively on the third factor explaining 11.77% of variance. An index of positive emotions was created by averaging thrilled, cheerful, satisfied and happy ($\alpha = .86$); an index of negative resentment-related emotions was created by averaging despaired, resented, furious and frustrated ($\alpha = .83$), and, finally, an index of negative resentment-unrelated emotions³⁰ was created by averaging guilty, fearful and calm (rev.) ($\alpha = .63$).

Because in this study the three emotion indexes are correlated (negative resentment-related emotions were correlated with both, positive, $r(88) = -.43, p < .0001$ and negative resentment-unrelated emotions, $r(88) = .30, p = .004$) and principal component analyses with less than 100 participants are often unstable (e.g., Gorsuch, 1983; MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999), we also created a single index of negative emotions by averaging the reversed positive emotions and the negative emotions ($\alpha = .82$). This single index will also allow us to keep the results comparable to those of Study 1.

We will use the single negative emotions index in the main analyses and report some additional analyses with the three emotion indexes.

Behavioural responses. The behavioural responses available to the participants were the following: Normative (sending an email to the researcher), moderately destructive (withdrawing small amounts of money from all the participants in the game) and/or extremely destructive (withdrawing all the money from all the participants in the

³⁰ Given our theoretical argumentation that resentment and anger would be the most likely emotional triggers of destructive behaviour, and in the absence of better suited names for the factors aggregating the negative emotions, we use these more theory-driven names.

game by withdrawing small amounts of money until the participants were left with no money). None of the participants chose sending an email to the researcher (normative behaviour)³¹. We used withdrawing small amounts of money (moderately negative behaviour that could also assume the form of extremely negative) as our behavioural measure. More specifically, we used the number of times the participants pressed the button corresponding to this option: The more often the participants used the button, the more destructive the behaviour they displayed.

Identification. In order to verify the degree of identification with the minority team (ingroup) and with all the players in the same game session (superordinate category), we used a verbal measure adapted from Leach et al (2008). The same measure was first used with reference to the ingroup and then with reference to the superordinate category. For both the ingroup and the superordinate category, participants responded to 10 items (e.g. for identification with the ingroup, "*During the game, and thinking about the Blue Team players, I felt committed to the Blue Team*", $\alpha = .88$; e.g. for identification with the superordinate category, "*During the game, and thinking about the players of Session X, I felt I am similar to the average player of Session X*", $\alpha = .87$) on a 7 point scale, ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (7).

4.2.3 Results

Manipulation check

We tested the effect of the manipulation (no deprivation vs. marginalization vs. exclusion) on the participants' perceived exclusion in a GLM. Results showed that the effect of the manipulation was highly significant, $F(2,85) = 15.35$, $p < .001$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .26$. Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the no deprivation condition felt less excluded ($M = 3.48$, $SD = .86$) than those in the marginalization condition ($M = 4.20$, $SD = .84$, $t(85) = 2.82$, $p = .017$) and that they felt less excluded in the marginalization condition than in the exclusion condition

³¹ During the game, participants had a third extremely destructive behavioural option: Withdrawing all the money from all the participants in one step. Only one participant chose this option and was not considered in the data analysis, as described in the participants' section.

We should also clarify that the remaining 5 of the 6 participants that were removed from the sample because they ended the game in an unusual way did it by pressing the withdraw button at the beginning of the game, so that the game ended immediately after pressing the button once. Because we cannot be sure about the reasons that led the participants to choose such a strategy (Was it a deliberately destructive behaviour? Was it a distraction?), we decided to remove these participants from the sample.

($M = 4.87$, $SD = 1.17$, $t(85) = 2.61$, $p = .032$). Thus, we successfully manipulated the degree of exclusion in this study.

Hypotheses' test

Impact on perceived minimal and maximal standards violation

As can be seen in Table 11, the pattern of means was consistent with H1. Both standard violation perceptions were much lower in the no deprivation condition than in the two deprivation conditions (marginalization and exclusion), but in the exclusion condition minimal standard violation perception was higher than maximal standard violation perception, whereas the opposite was the case in the marginalization condition.

Table 11: Descriptive statistics of minimal and maximal standard violations according to the conditions of the exclusion manipulation.

Condition of the manipulation	Minimal standard violation			Maximal standard violation		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
No deprivation	-0.36	0.62	31	-0.36	0.65	31
Marginalization	0.07	0.98	28	0.27	1.11	28
Exclusion	0.30	0.86	29	0.18	1.04	29
Total	-0.00	0.86	88	0.02	0.98	88

In order to test whether these differences were significant, we first performed a GLM with repeated measures with the manipulation as between-subjects factor and minimal standard violation versus maximal standard violation as within-subjects factor. As predicted, there was a significant main effect of the manipulation on the shared variance of both standard violation perceptions, $F(2,85) = 4.63$, $p = .012$, $partial \eta^2 = .10$. Planned contrast analysis indicated that this effect was due to a difference between the no deprivation control condition and the other two conditions, $F(1,85) = 9.15$, $p = .003$, $partial \eta^2 = .10$, whereas the marginalization and exclusion conditions did not differ from each other, $F(1,85) < 1$. Moreover, planned contrast analysis also suggested that the interaction between the manipulation and the type of standard (minimal vs. maximal) in the marginalization and exclusion conditions was at least marginally significant, $F(1,85) = 3.52$, $p = .064$, $partial \eta^2 = .04$. However, as in previous studies, the two measures of standard violations were highly correlated ($r = .76$) so that interpretations of repeated measures analyses were not really conclusive (see footnotes 12 and 19). Therefore, in order to test for the effects on the specific variance we also conducted two univariate GLMs, one for minimal standard violation while controlling for maximal standard violation as a covariate, and one for maximal standard violation while controlling for minimal standard violation. The overall effect of the manipulation was marginal in the first GLM, $F(2,84) = 2.77$, $p = .068$, $partial \eta^2 = .06$. More importantly, planned contrast analysis revealed that, as predicted, perceived minimal standard violation was higher in the exclusion condition (*estimated marginal mean* = 1.89, $SE = 0.10$) than in the other two conditions, $F(1,84) = 5.54$, $p = .021$, $partial \eta^2 = .06$, and that it was not different in the marginalization condition (*estimated marginal mean* = - 0.09, $SE = 0.10$) and in the no deprivation control condition (*estimated marginal mean* = - 0.11, $SE = 0.10$), $F(1,84) < 1$.

Moreover, in the second GLM (on maximal standard violation, statistically controlling for minimal standard violation) the overall effect of the manipulation was not significant, $F(2,84) = 1.76$, $p = .179$, $partial \eta^2 = .04$. More importantly, however, planned contrast analysis revealed that, as predicted, perceived maximal standard violation was marginally higher in the marginalization condition (*estimated marginal mean* = 0.20, $SE = 0.12$) than in the other two conditions, $F(1,84) = 3.47$, $p = .066$, $partial \eta^2 = .04$, and that it was not different in the exclusion condition (*estimated marginal mean* = - 0.08, $SE = 0.12$) than in the no deprivation control condition

(*estimated marginal mean* = - 0.05, *SE* = 0.11), $F(1,84) < 1$. To conclude, results support H1 almost perfectly.

Impact on the emotional display

In order to test if the display of negative emotions varied according to the manipulation of exclusion, we performed a GLM with exclusion manipulation as between-subjects factor. Results revealed that exclusion had a significant effect on the display of negative emotions, $F(2,85) = 8.79$, $p < .001$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .17$. Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that negative emotions were lower in the no deprivation control condition ($M = 2.65$, $SD = 0.67$) than in the marginalization condition ($M = 3.25$, $SD = 0.87$), $t(85) = 2.79$, $p = .019$, and in the exclusion condition ($M = 3.52$, $SD = 0.94$), $t(85) = 4.08$, $p < .001$. Replicating results from Study 2, negative emotions were not different in the marginalization and in the exclusion conditions, $t(85) = 1.23$, $p = .66$.

To sum up, results confirm the results from Study 2 that participants showed equally strong negative emotions in the marginalization and exclusion conditions. Moreover, this study adds some validity to this result as it shows that both in marginalization and exclusion conditions participants experienced more negative emotions than in the control condition, which supports our interpretation of the results of Study 2.

Impact on destructive behaviour

Because the distribution of this variable was too skewed (*Skewness* = 3.92, *Kurtosis* = 17.02) to be used in regression analyses and GLMs, we created a normal score of destructive behaviour using Blom's Formula (Blom, 1958) for the transformation (*Skewness* = 1.52, *Kurtosis* = 1.04) that was used in all significance tests. The original variable and the transformed variable showed a Pearson correlation of .82, and logically a rank correlation (Spearman's Rho) of 1.0. Running significance tests on the transformed, more normally distributed variable is more adequate, as it gives less weight to extreme values which would otherwise disproportionately impact the results. Yet, for better interpretability, we will report the untransformed raw data in the descriptives.

In order to test if the manipulation of exclusion had an impact on the display of destructive behaviour, we performed a GLM. Results showed a significant effect of the

manipulation, $F(2,85) = 8.96, p < .001, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .17$. Planned contrast analysis revealed that, as predicted in H3, participants facing a condition of exclusion displayed more destructive behaviour ($M = 3.48, SD = 6.24$) than those in the other two conditions, $F(1,85) = 15.09, p < .001, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .15$. Also in line with H3, the residual contrast analysis showed that destructive behaviour in the condition with only marginalization ($M = 0.79, SD = 2.31$) did not differ from the one in the no deprivation control condition ($M = 0.10, SD = 0.40$), $F(1,85) = 2.46, p = .12, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .028$.

Test of the mediation model in regression analyses

The current study provides a new test of our model of interrelations between the main variables (Figure 10), allowing us to examine the stability of the model across different settings and groups. As the manipulation check has shown that our manipulation was successful, we conducted the mediation analysis using the manipulated exclusion as predictor, more precisely, the contrast testing the difference between the exclusion condition against the other two conditions, because only in this condition we expected (and found, see above) a total effect on destructive behaviour

Intercorrelations between the measured variables are shown in Table 12. Following the methodological procedure described for Study 2, we tested the model first step by step and then as a whole. The test of the first step of the model is identical to our analysis testing H1 (see above). However, the second and third steps of the chain mediation were not tested yet.

Table 12: Intercorrelations between perceived exclusion, perceived standards' violations, emotions, behaviour, identification with the minority ingroup and identification with the superordinate category.

		B	C	D	E	F	G
A - Perceived exclusion	<i>r</i>	.48***	.39***	.62***	.43***	-.36**	-.17
	<i>N</i>	88	88	88	88	88	88
B - Minimal standard violation	<i>r</i>		.78***	.56***	.17	-.30*	-.17
	<i>N</i>		88	88	88	88	88
C - Maximal standard violation	<i>r</i>			.42***	.06	-.02	-.07
	<i>N</i>			88	88	88	88
D - Negative emotions (index)	<i>r</i>				.43***	-.39***	-.19†
	<i>N</i>				88	88	88
E - Destructive behaviour	<i>r</i>					-.21†	-.12
	<i>N</i>					88	88
F - Identification with minority group	<i>r</i>						.54***
	<i>N</i>						88
G - Identification with superordinate category							

Note: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

Predicting emotional display

For testing the second step of the model, we regressed negative emotions on perceived minimal standard violation and maximal standard violation, $R^2 = .31$, $F(2,85) = 19.55$, $p < .0001$. As predicted, perceived minimal standard violation significantly predicted ($\beta = .60$, $p < .001$) negative emotions while the prediction by maximal standard violation was not significant ($\beta = -.04$, *ns*).

Predicting behaviour

To test the next and final step of the model, we regressed destructive behaviour on negative emotions, $R^2 = .19$, $F(1,86) = 19.70$, $p < .0001$. As expected, destructive behaviour was predicted by negative emotions ($\beta = .43$, $p < .001$).

Testing the mediations

As described for Study 2, before testing the complete model, we computed two regression analyses for estimating indirect effects at different steps of the causal chain mediation. Again we used 10000 bootstrap resamples with bias-corrected estimates and confidence intervals to access the indirect effect as proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2008).

Because the sample size was small and the hypothesis was clearly directed, we choose a one-tailed significant test for these indirect effects by estimating 90% confidence intervals.

We begun by computing a regression analysis that estimated the indirect effect of exclusion on negative emotions, mediated by minimal (a_1) and maximal (a_2) standard violations (Figure 8). For that purpose we included the contrast testing the exclusion condition against the other two conditions (-1 -1 2) as predictor. We also tested whether results changed when the orthogonal residual contrast (-1 1 0) was included as a covariate. As this was not the case, we report the results without this covariate, $R^2 = .35$, $F(3,84) = 14.77$, $p < .0001$. As shown in Table 13, all the predicted effects (a_1 , b_1 , and c paths) were significant. More importantly, the more robust bootstrap estimates indicated that the indirect effect of the exclusion via minimal standard violation on negative emotions was significant (a_1*b_1 : $B = 0.0846$, $SE = 0.0486$, with a 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.0218 to 0.1854). The bootstrap estimates further indicated that the indirect effect via maximal standard violation was, as expected, not significant

(a_2*b_2 : $B = - 0.0022$, $SE = 0.0166$, with a 90% confidence interval ranging from - 0.0306 to 0.0236).

Figure 8: Mediation model using exclusion as the predictor. For estimates of a_1 , a_2 , b_1 , b_2 , c' (c) see Table 13.




Table 13: Total effect (c) and direct effects of the mediation analysis (see Figure 8) for the effect of exclusion on negative emotions via perceived minimal and maximal standard violations (predicted effects in italics).

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>a1</i>	<i>0.1035</i>	<i>0.0637</i>	<i>2.36</i>	<i>.0205</i>
<i>a2</i>	0.0808	0.0739	1.09	.2773
<i>b1</i>	<i>0.5401</i>	<i>0.1501</i>	<i>3.60</i>	<i>.0005</i>
<i>b2</i>	- 0.0043	0.1294	-0.03	.9734
<i>c</i>	<i>0.1955</i>	<i>0.0649</i>	<i>3.01</i>	<i>.0034</i>
<i>c'</i>	0.1147	0.0581	1.97	.0516

In order to test the second mediation model, we computed a regression analysis that estimated the indirect effect of perceived minimal standard violation on destructive behaviour, mediated by negative emotions (Figure 9), while controlling for the effect of maximal standard violation, $R^2 = .20$, $F(3,84) = 7.14$, $p = .0002$. As shown in Table 14, the predicted direct effects (a and b paths) were significant and the total effect (c) was marginal. More importantly, the more robust bootstrap estimates indicated that the indirect effect of perceived minimal standard violation via negative emotions on destructive behaviour was significant ($a*b$: $B = 0.2430$, $SE = 0.1038$, with a 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.1008 to 0.4483).

Figure 9: Mediation model using perceived minimal standard violation as the predictor. For estimates of a, b, c' (c) see Table 14.




Table 14: Total effect (c) and direct effects of the mediation analysis (see Figure 9) for the effect of perceived minimal standard violation on destructive behaviour via negative emotions, controlling for the effect of perceived maximal standard violation.

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
a	0.6138	0.1478	4.15	.0001
b	0.3921	0.0955	4.11	.0001
c	0.2647	0.1418	1.87	.0654
c'	0.0240	0.1428	0.17	.8669

Testing the two-step chain mediation

In order to test the complete model, and following the methodological procedure described for the previous studies, we computed a multiple regression analysis using the bootstrap method to access indirect chain mediation effects proposed by Hayes et al. (2011).


Following the procedure of the previous analyses, we used exclusion (contrast exclusion vs. marginalization and no deprivation control; 2 -1 -1) as the focal predictor in the mediation analysis.

We tested the indirect effect of exclusion on destructive behaviour via minimal standard violation and negative emotions, both included as chain mediators ($a_1 * a_3 * b_2$ in Figure 10)³². All expected direct effects (a_1 , a_3 , b_2) and the total effect (c) were significant whereas almost all other direct effects were not significant (Table 15). The only unpredicted direct effect is the one from exclusion to negative emotions (a_2) and on destructive behaviour indicating that the eventual mediation is not complete, but only partial. Most important, as predicted, results revealed a significant indirect effect via both chained mediators ($a_1 * a_3 * b_2$: $B = 0.0271$, $SE = 0.0178$, with a percentile based 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.0043 to 0.061, $p_{\text{one-tailed}} = .013$, and a bias-corrected percentile based 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.007 to 0.070, $p_{\text{one-tailed}} = .013$).

³² We also tested whether the chain mediation was significant when the orthogonal residual contrast (-1 1 0) and maximal standard violation were included as covariates, using a 90% percentile based confidence interval. As this was the case, we report the results without these covariates.

tailed = .006)³³. We also tested the alternative model of a chain mediation via maximal standard violation instead of minimal standard violation. As expected, the chain mediation in this alternative model was not significant, as 0 was within the confidence interval of the indirect test.

Figure 10: Chain mediation model using exclusion as the predictor. For estimates of a_1 , a_2 , a_3 , b_1 , b_2 , c' (c) see Table 15.



Note: Exclusion refers to a focal contrast comparing exclusion (= 2) to marginalization (= -1) and no deprivation (= -1).

³³ As mentioned for Study 2, while percentile based confidence intervals were estimated using the SPSS macro provided by Hayes et al. (2011), p-values and bias-corrected confidence intervals were estimated using AMOS 17 (Arbuckle, 2008), relying on the same bootstrap method. Also in this analysis, estimates of effects and standard errors were identical in both analyses.

Table 15: Total effect (*c*) and direct effects of the chain mediation analysis (see Figure 10) for the effect of exclusion on destructive behaviour via perceived minimal standard violation and negative emotions (predicted effects in italics).

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>a1</i>	<i>0.1503</i>	<i>0.0637</i>	2.36	.0205
<i>a2</i>	0.1150	0.0573	2.01	.0481
<i>a3</i>	<i>0.5362</i>	<i>0.0941</i>	5.70	.0000
<i>b1</i>	-0.1092	0.0954	1.14	.2558
<i>b2</i>	<i>0.3362</i>	<i>0.0936</i>	3.59	.0005
<i>c</i>	<i>0.1992</i>	<i>0.0511</i>	3.90	.0002
<i>c'</i>	0.1498	0.0506	2.96	.0040

Note: Exclusion refers to a focal contrast comparing exclusion (= 2) to marginalization (= -1) and no deprivation (= -1).

4.2.4 Additional analyses

Given the interesting results we obtained in the previous studies when considering both the identification with the ingroup (Studies 1 and 2) and with the superordinate category (Study 2), we decided to explore the role of such variables in the laboratory context.

After exploring the role of identification, and as mentioned in the measures' section, we will also explore the role of the three indexes of different types of emotions indicated by the principal component analysis we reported in that section.

4.2.4.1 The role of identification with the ingroup and with the superordinate category

Because this was a laboratory study, the participants taking part in the ball toss game had no previous history as group members. In such a context, and given the short duration of the experiment, it may not be easy to ensure that the participants develop a sense of identification. Moreover, in such ad-hoc groups the level of identification might also be influenced by the experience that participants have with the group during


the experiment, and therefore might also be influenced by the experimental manipulations. Thus, before using our identification measures as covariates to control for interindividual differences, we decided to check whether the manipulation had an impact in the reported identification.

Effect of the manipulation on identification

GLMs on identification with the ingroup and on identification with the superordinate category with the manipulation (no deprivation vs. marginalization vs. exclusion) as factor showed that the manipulation had a significant effect on the reported identification with the ingroup, $F(2,85) = 3.27, p = .043, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .07$, but not on the reported identification with the superordinate category, $F < .59$. Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the no deprivation condition felt more identified with the ingroup team ($M = 4.26, SD = 0.77$) than those in the exclusion condition ($M = 3.69, SD = 1.09, t(85) = 2.44, p = .049$). Participants in the marginalization condition felt as identified ($M = 4.14, SD = 0.81$) as the participants in the no deprivation condition, $t(85) = -.52, p = 1$, although their identification level was not significantly different from the one of the participants in the exclusion condition, $t(85) = 1.87, p = .19$.

As can also be seen in Figure 11, interestingly, identification with the ingroup is still relatively high in the marginalization condition and it drops in the exclusion condition.

Figure 11: Estimated marginal means of identification with the ingroup according to the conditions of social exclusion manipulation: No deprivation, marginalization and exclusion.



Given these results ingroup identification could not just be considered a simple interindividual difference variable, therefore we decided not to include the identification measures as covariates in the main analyses.


4.2.4.2 The role of the different types of emotions

When presenting the measures used in this study, we reported that a principal component analysis had indicated the possibility of three emotional indexes: Positive emotions, negative resentment-related emotions and negative resentment-unrelated emotions. After having reported the main analyses with the overall single index composed by all emotions, we will now present some additional analyses using the three emotional indexes, keeping in mind that results might be interpreted with some caution, given the moderate sample size.

*Hypotheses' test**Impact on the emotional display*

In order to test if the display of negative resentment-related emotions varied according to the manipulation of exclusion, we first performed a 3 (exclusion manipulation) x 3 (type of emotion) GLM with type of emotion as within-subjects factor. Results showed not only a significant main effect of type of emotion, $F(2,170) = 42.38$, $p < .001$, $partial \eta^2 = .33$, but also a significant interaction between type of emotion and exclusion, $F(4,170) = 8.22$, $p < .001$, $partial \eta^2 = .16$. In general participants reported more positive ($M = 3.87$, $SD = 1.16$) than negative resentment-related emotions ($M = 2.76$, $SD = 1.43$), $t(85) = 5.13$, $p < .001$, and more negative resentment-related than negative resentment-unrelated emotions ($M = 2.28$, $SD = 0.98$), $t(85) = 3.45$, $p = .003$, with no differences between experimental conditions for resentment-unrelated emotions, $ts(85) < -0.97$, $ps = 1$, and slightly less positive emotions in the exclusion condition ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.21$) than in the no-deprivation control condition ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 1.03$), $t(85) = 2.81$, $p = .019$, with marginalization in between ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 1.13$). Most importantly, however, negative resentment-related emotions were specifically triggered by the exclusion manipulation (Figure 12). Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons showed that negative resentment-related emotions in the marginalization condition ($M = 3.03$, $SD = 1.45$) and in the exclusion condition ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.48$) were higher, $ts(85) > 3.44$, $ps < .003$, than in the no deprivation control condition ($M = 1.88$, $SD = 1.43$), but did not differ from each other, $t(85) = 1.22$, $p = .677$.

Figure 12: Estimated marginal means of negative resentment-related emotions, negative resentment-unrelated emotions and positive emotions according to the conditions of social exclusion manipulation: No deprivation, marginalization and exclusion.



To sum up, also when using the three emotional indexes, results show that participants displayed more negative resentment-related emotions in the marginalization and in the exclusion conditions than in the no deprivation control condition, which lends even more supports to our interpretation of the results of Study 2. Interestingly, there was not only no difference in the display of negative resentment-unrelated emotions and positive emotions between participants facing the different conditions of exclusion, but these emotions also present a different pattern from the one of the negative resentment-related emotions (Figure 12). Thus, it seems that, not surprisingly, participants' emotional responses were quite specific. Appraisals of being deprived from an expected access to a valuable good by a dominant outgroup was more likely to trigger emotions such as frustration and anger rather than guilt or fear, or a drop in positive emotions.

Correlational analyses

We will now continue with the correlational analysis. As previously described, we will start by testing our meditation model step by step.

Predicting emotional display

We regressed negative resentment-related emotions on perceived minimal standard violation and maximal standard violation. As predicted, perceived minimal standard violation significantly predicted negative resentment-related emotions while the prediction by maximal standard violation was not significant (Table 16). However, when predicting only the specific variance of negative resentment-related emotions by statistically controlling for negative resentment-unrelated emotions and positive emotions, the effect of minimal standard violation became marginally significant.

Negative resentment-unrelated emotions were not predicted by perceived minimal standard violation nor by maximal standard violation, and that did not change when statistically controlling for negative resentment-related emotions and positive emotions (Table 16).

Unexpectedly, positive emotions were (negatively) predicted by perceived minimal standard violation, but not by maximal standard violation. Interestingly, when statistically controlling for negative resentment-related and for negative resentment-unrelated emotions, the effect of minimal standard violation was still significant (Table 16).

Table 16: Summary of linear regression analyses for variables predicting the display of negative resentment-related emotions, negative resentment-unrelated emotions and positive emotions.

Variable	Negative resentment-related emotions					
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Minimal standard violation	0.76	0.25	.46**	0.42	0.26	.25†
Maximal standard violation	0.04	0.22	.02	0.08	0.21	.05
Negative resentment-unrelated emotions				0.30	0.14	.21*
Positive emotions				-0.35	0.12	-.29**
R^2			.22			.33
F		(2,85)	12.56***		(4,83)	10.12

Notes: the values in brackets associated with the F values refer to the degrees of freedom; *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

Negative resentment-unrelated emotions						
Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Minimal standard violation	0.22	0.19	.20	0.17	0.20	.15
Maximal standard violation	0.08	0.17	.07	0.05	0.16	.05
Negative resentment-related emotions				0.19	0.08	.27*
Positive emotions				0.11	0.10	.13
R^2			.07			.12
F		(2,85)	3.04†		(4,83)	2.86*

Positive emotions						
Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Minimal standard violation	-0.76	0.20	-.57***	-0.60	0.21	-.45**
Maximal standard violation	0.19	0.18	.16	0.19	0.17	.16
Negative resentment-related emotions				-0.25	0.09	-.31*
Negative resentment-unrelated emotions				0.12	0.12	.11
R^2			.21			.28
F		(2,83)	11.15***		(4,83)	8.04***

Notes: the values in brackets associated with the F values refer to the degrees of freedom; *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

Predicting behaviour

We then regressed destructive behaviour on negative resentment-related emotions. As expected, destructive behaviour was predicted by negative resentment-related emotions, but the result became marginally significant when statistically controlling for the effects of negative resentment-unrelated and positive emotions (Table 17).

Table 17: Summary of linear regression analyses for variables predicting the display of destructive behaviour.

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Negative resentment- related emotions	0.18	0.05	.36**	0.11	0.06	.22†
Negative resentment- unrelated emotions				0.05	0.08	.06
Positive emotions				-0.18	0.07	-.28*
R^2			.13			.20
<i>F</i>		(1,87)	12.85**		(3,84)	6.85***

Notes: the values in brackets associated with the *F* values refer to the degrees of freedom; *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

These results are also interesting, namely the fact that, unlike the results so far, the lack of positive emotions also seems to play a role in the expression of destructive behaviour. Nevertheless they are also more complex than those we obtained using the single negative emotions index. Given this, we will not further test the chain mediation using the three emotional indexes.

4.2.5 Discussion

With this study we aimed at collecting more evidence suggesting that experiencing different forms of deprivation, namely in terms of varied degrees of exclusion (marginalization vs. exclusion), leads to differences in perceptions of the violation of standards (minimal vs. maximal), in the display of negative emotions and in the display of destructive behaviour. With this study we did not only intend to replicate the effects found in Study 2, but also aimed at testing our interpretation of the unexpected result that we had found in Study 2, namely that even if participants only showed destructive behaviour in the exclusion condition, they reported negative emotions not only in such extreme deprivation conditions, but already under conditions of marginalization. We also intended overcoming some limitation of Study 2 by including a condition of no deprivation in the design, by using artificial groups in a more controlled environment and by having a more direct behavioural measure.

To accomplish these aims, we conducted a laboratory study with university students living in Portugal, using a pre-programmed virtual ball toss game: A situation of minority versus majority was created, the degree of deprivation experienced in the game was manipulated and perceptions of exclusion, perceptions of violation of minimal and maximal standards, the emotional responses elicited by the game and the behaviour displayed during the game were measured.

We consider that using this new paradigm was beneficial in several ways: It allowed directly manipulating exclusion; it prevented the strong impact of social desirability in the expression of negativity (both at an emotional and at a behavioural level) that might perhaps have distorted results in the more publicly controversial context of Study 2; and it allowed for accessing actual behavioural responses, instead of behavioural intentions.

More precisely, we created a specific game situation that frustrated players' expectations about their total inclusion in the superordinate category (all the participants playing in that session) by constraining the players' access to the virtual ball (and associated gains in money). With that we intended to not at all (no deprivation condition), slightly (marginalization condition) and deeply (exclusion condition) frustrate the players' expectations in order to assess whether this would have an impact on the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviours. By frustrating such expectations only partially in one condition and totally in the other condition, we

intended to create diverse frames that would facilitate different interpretations of the same situation: When slightly frustrating players' expectations we aimed at facilitating the interpretation of the game situation in terms of maximal standard violation; and when deeply frustrating players' expectations we aimed at facilitating the interpretation of the game situation in terms of minimal standard violation. The condition in which we did not frustrate the players' expectation served as a baseline control condition.

Our prediction was that destructive behaviour would be an outcome only of exclusion, but not of marginalization and that this effect should be mediated by perceived minimal (not maximal) standard violation and negative emotions in a chain mediation. Moreover, we also expected that – in line with results in Study 2 – negative emotions should be stronger in both the marginalization and the exclusion conditions, even if not leading to destructive behaviour under marginalization.

The manipulation was successful: Participants felt the more excluded, the more they were actually excluded. Then, experimental results support our hypotheses: Exclusion impacted the perceptions of violation of minimal and maximal standards, the display of negative emotions and the display of destructive behaviour. In contrast to participants in the no deprivation control condition, the players in both the marginalization and the exclusion conditions perceived more standard violations in general, but they were more ready to interpret the game situation as a violation of minimal standards as compared to maximal standards in the exclusion condition than in the marginalization condition. Moreover, even if participants reported more negative emotions in both the marginalization and the exclusion conditions, they only displayed destructive behaviour in the exclusion condition, a pattern that replicates the results of Study 2.

Concerning the correlational data, results were consistent with the hypothesis that exclusion was perceived as a minimal standard violation and with the hypotheses that perceiving a violation of a minimal standard led to the display of more negative emotions which, in turn, led to the display of more destructive behaviour. Moreover, the results revealed that the relation between exclusion and the display of destructive behaviour is mediated both by perceived minimal standard violation and experienced negative emotions. Interestingly, this mediation was not complete, which seems to suggest that not all destructive behaviour might be triggered by an emotional response, but that it might eventually also serve strategic purposes (Scheepers et al., 2006).

Moreover, these results suggest that – as suspected in the discussion of Study 2 – already marginalization is enough to trigger the experience of the violation of maximal standards, but also the experience of minimal standards as well as negative emotions. Nevertheless, interpretations in terms of minimal standard violations and, in turn, destructive behaviours are more likely responses to exclusion, not to marginalization.

Overall, the results of the current study support and complement the findings of Studies 1 and 2 showing that it is not exclusion per se, but rather the interpretation of exclusion as a violation of minimal standards that leads people to display destructive behavioural reactions, presumably triggered by the experience of emotional distress. Even though manipulations and measures of our constructs were not always perfect as they are, most of the time, empirically confounded in real life (e.g., exclusion predicts the perceived violation of both minimal and maximal standards, which are highly correlated), these results are meaningful as the relations we hypothesized are consistently significant when confounded variables are controlled for. Thus, also in this study the correlational support for the two-step chain mediation seems to highlight that violated minimal standards – rather than violated maximal standards – and negative emotions are the key variables for explaining the display of destructive behaviour as a response to exclusion. Although maximal standard violations were also predicted by exclusion, only the minimal standard violations predicted negative emotions.

Besides, the indirect link between exclusion and destructive behaviour, via perceived minimal standard violation and negative emotions, was significant: This evidence together with the results from the previous studies speaks for the importance of how participants interpreted the situation they were presented with (in terms of minimal and maximal standards), rather than just for the impact of the situation (of exclusion) itself. A noteworthy strength of this study is that, unlike Study 2, it allowed us to test the complete model with the manipulation of exclusion, thus, allowing us to draw causal conclusions.

One interesting, though unpredicted, result in this study was an effect of the exclusion manipulation on identification with the ingroup. Participants had lower levels of identification in the exclusion condition than in the other conditions. The fact that the participants had no previous group history can be a possible explanation for this result. Thus, it might be the case that the participants were making their identification dependent on what they experienced with the team during the game. A pleasant experience (e.g., no deprivation, which implied being involved in the game and earning

money) translates into a relatively high ingroup identification, whereas an unpleasant experience (i.e., exclusion) translates into a relatively low ingroup identification. We would argue that the participants in the exclusion condition used dis-identification from the ingroup as a strategy of social mobility, which is one plausible response to a negative social identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Most remarkable for our purposes is that – although the difference between the exclusion and the marginalization conditions was not significant – the clear drop in identification was in the exclusion condition and not already in the marginalization condition (Figure 11). This pattern indirectly supports the idea that exclusion is more than just being deprived of a desirable good, but creates a particularly unbearable situation that has severe impacts on people's social identity.

A worth mentioning limitation of this study is the possible confound between the exclusion manipulation and the fact of whether displaying destructive behaviour (withdrawing small amounts of money from all the participants in the game's session) is costly or not: The participants placed in the exclusion condition did not get the opportunity to start accumulating money every time the members of their team receive the virtual ball. Given this, and different from the other two conditions, going for destructive behaviour in the exclusion condition does not seem a costly option as it only harms the team against which the naïve participants are playing. We would argue, however, that participants in the exclusion condition who opted for destructive behaviour might still have made a decision for a costly option, given that such behaviour might upset the outgroup and by this undermine the chances to receive the ball by them in the future. Nevertheless, this limitation is a serious methodological problem which will be addressed in the next study.

Another very serious methodological problem of this study, which was already present in the previous studies, is the confounding of the manipulation of standard violation with the severity of deprivation from a desired good and with the overall severity of standard violation. Therefore, one could still argue that the results of the three presented studies can be explained by the more parsimonious idea that behavioural responses will be the more extreme the more severe the induced deprivation and the more severe, therefore, the violation of standards. Such an argumentation would claim that our standard violation framing in Study 1 and the distinction between marginalization and exclusion in Studies 2 and 3 did not capture qualitatively different situations, namely violations of maximal or minimal standards, respectively, but just a

quantitative difference between less extreme and more extreme disadvantage/standard violations. This confound, is, of course, unavoidable as long as the degree of deprivation is used as the exclusive manipulation or predictor of standard violations, because in real life exclusion and minimal standard violations are de facto a more extreme form of deprivation than marginalization and maximal standard violations. However, inspired by previous research on minimal and maximal standard violations (Kessler et al., 2010) we addressed also this methodological problem in the next study.

4.3 Study 4

In order to address the limitations of Study 3 we conducted a second experimental study. Concretely, this study intends to overcome the possible confound between facing an exclusion condition and the fact of whether displaying destructive behaviour is costly for the disadvantaged group and to overcome the limitation of all previous studies, namely the possible confound between the type of standard violation (minimal vs. maximal) and the severity of standard violation. Such confound is quite usual when we are dealing with natural groups, but should be more easily distinguishable in an artificial setting and resorting to artificial groups.

Like in Study 3, we let participants believe that they played with other participants a virtual ball toss game and that they were member of a minority team playing with a majority team.

To address the problem of a possible confound with severity, we did not only manipulate exclusion, but also the cognitive accessibility of a given type of standard by introducing a mindset priming task. This task was designed at priming a minimal standard related mindset versus a maximal standard related mindset. Apart from that, we manipulated social exclusion of the ingroup and we measured emotional responses and destructive behaviour. While exclusion itself is still confounded with severity of the standard violation, the mindset priming is not. However, as has been discussed in the theoretical introduction, theoretically most of standards can be interpreted either as minimal or as maximal standards. Therefore, the mindset priming should influence the interpretation that participants apply to one and the same standard violation (i.e., exclusion) of the same level of severity. When participants are primed with a minimal standard mindset, the same standard violation (exclusion) should be interpreted more likely as a minimal standard violation than when they are primed with a maximal standard mindset (Kessler et al., 2010). Therefore, we only expected the detrimental

effects of standard violation on negative emotions and destructive behaviour when there was 1) de facto a standard violation (i.e., in the exclusion condition) and 2) participants were primed with a minimal standard mindset.

4.3.1 Hypotheses

Given its specificity when compared to the previous studies, this study tries to test a slightly different set of hypotheses:

- H1) The disadvantaged minority members exposed to a minimal mindset priming and to exclusion should perceive more violation of a minimal standard (as compared with the violation of a maximal standard) than disadvantaged minority members either not facing any exclusion or facing exclusion but primed with a maximal mindset. They should also show stronger negative emotions and more destructive behaviour than participants in the other condition.

- H2) The more disadvantaged minority members perceive the violation of a minimal standard as compared with the violation of a maximal standard, the stronger negative emotional reactions they should have.

- H3) The stronger the negative emotional reactions of disadvantaged minority members are, the stronger tendencies for destructive behaviour they should have.

- H4) Facing exclusion and being exposed to a minimal mindset priming should increase disadvantaged minorities' tendencies for destructive behaviour through an indirect effect via minimal standard violation perception and negative emotions (see Figure 15).

4.3.2 Method

Participants

Participants were first year university students of applied communication living in Portugal, from 18 to 33 years old ($M = 20.62$, $SD = 3$). From the 66 participants, 37 (i.e., 56.1%) are female. In order to ensure that participants had understood the subtle difference in the Portuguese instruction of the mindset priming, eight non-Portuguese participants were removed from the sample. As a result we had a working N of 58.

Design

In the current study we manipulated the accessibility of a given standard by introducing a mindset priming and measured emotional responses and destructive

behaviour. We also manipulated social exclusion of the ingroup, this way including an instance of a standard violation that could be interpreted as minimal or maximal, depending on the mindset priming.

Accordingly, this study used a 2 (mindset priming: Minimal standard vs. maximal standard) x 2 (social exclusion: No deprivation vs. exclusion³⁴) between-subjects design.

Overview

We invited the participants to collaborate on two tasks: A sensori-motor coordination test and an online game. Before being introduced to the online game and, therefore, before applying the social exclusion manipulation, the participants were asked to perform a sensori-motor coordination test, the unrelated task used to introduce the mindset priming. Applying a technique developed by Kessler et al. (2010, Study 4), we primed the mindset using differentiated instructions about how to perform the sensori-motor coordination test.

The subsequent online game served to manipulate exclusion. Similarly to the design used in Study 3, we created an artificial situation in order to introduce the manipulation of the degree of exclusion. Again, based on the works of Williams et al. (2000), we developed a virtual game in which participants were members of a numerical minority team that had to play with a numerical majority team. Just like in Study 3, the task of the players was to throw and receive a ball, with each move increasing some virtual money account of the team receiving the ball. During the game, the majority team did (exclusion condition) or did not (no deprivation condition) deprive the minority team from accessing a good (receiving the ball). During the game, destructive behaviour was measured. Positive and negative emotions were measured afterwards.

Manipulations

Mindset

The participants were invited to perform a simple task to evaluate their sensori-motor coordination. More specifically, they were invited to help a cartoon mouse make

³⁴ As the problems addressed in this study were not specific for the marginalization case, and as we have replicated the specific results for the marginalization condition of Study 2 already in Study 3, we decided not to include a marginalization condition, not only for reasons of economy, but also to avoid exposing more participants than necessary to unpleasant experimental procedures (according to the principle of minimizing suffering as much as possible).

her way through a maze so that she could get some cheese to end her hunger. The participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, in terms of the mindset priming³⁵: In the minimal standard condition, the participants were asked to **quickly find a way through the maze** and they were also told that **only if they find the way through the maze** would the mouse get cheese, otherwise the mouse would remain hungry; in the maximal standard condition, the participants were asked to find a way through the maze **as far and as fast as possible** and they were also told that **the further they went in the maze** the more cheese the mouse would get. After completing the priming task, participants were introduced to the online game, the task designed at manipulating social exclusion.

Social exclusion

Similar to the procedure in Study 3, after a period of trial, the participants were invited to take part in a simple game in which they would play in teams and had to catch and throw a virtual ball. The participants were always assigned to the numerical minority team, but were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in terms of exclusion in the game: In the no deprivation condition, both the majority team and the minority team were granted equal access to the good (the possession of the ball), in the exclusion condition, the majority team had almost exclusive access to the good, whereas the minority team was severely deprived from accessing the good by having almost no possession of the ball.

Procedure

The data was collected in a Portuguese University in Lisbon.

The researcher recruited the participants via the collaboration with professors, who agreed to let the researcher collect the data in the classroom. The participants were invited to collaborate in two tasks: A sensori-motor coordination test and an experiment designed to improve an online game developed by Portuguese Universities, including the Lisbon University Institute. The procedure was the following: All the participants with access to a computer took part simultaneously in one session. As far as possible, attention was taken so that the participants had a good visibility of the computer's

³⁵ In the original technique, Kessler et al. (2010) used the mindset priming to manipulate both the type of standard (minimal vs. maximal) and the regulatory focus (prevention vs. promotion). Because Kessler et al. (2010) neither expected nor found effects of regulatory focus we held it constant in our study by only using the promotion version of the original technique.

screen placed in front of them, but had as little visibility as possible of the other computers' screens.

For all the participants, all the instructions were standardized and were presented on the computer screen: The participants were invited to collaborate on two tasks, introduced to the sensori-motor coordination test, introduced to the game, had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the game in a trial period, played the game itself, filled in a questionnaire about their experiences in the game (where some of the dependent variables were included), and finally were debriefed³⁶.

More specifically, the participants were informed of the following: For the first task, participants were asked to imagine that it is summer time and that a small hungry mouse rides through her territory. Out of a sudden, the mouse is magnetically attracted by the seductive smell of her favourite cheese. The goal of the task was to help the mouse satisfy her hunger by guiding her through a maze, by pencil marking her way in a paper-printed maze. Depending on the mindset priming condition, participants read either the minimal standard instruction or the maximal standard instruction.

After finishing the task, the participants were introduced to the online game and, analogous to the description of Study 3, received information about this second task: The goal of the game was to catch a virtual ball as many times as possible; the game would be played by two teams: The blue one (minority team, 2 players) and the yellow one (majority team, 4 players) and would have the duration of 5 minutes. In reality, all other players were simulated by the computer.

Participants were instructed that each of the participants playing would receive a compensation for her/his collaboration. This compensation would be accumulated during the game: After catching the ball three times, the team would receive 0.10 € for every additional catch. Different from Study 3, in order to avoid a confound between the exclusion manipulation and costliness of discounting (destructive behaviour), both teams were informed that they would begin the game with a virtual account of 0.20€ each. After receiving three times the virtual ball, both teams saw their virtual account

³⁶ At the end of the study, a standardized debriefing was presented to the participants. Although standardized, the debriefing was adapted to the condition of the manipulation that the participants faced: Participants who were exposed to exclusion received more detailed and thorough debriefing than the other participants to make sure that they were not negatively affected by their participation in the study. Especially care was taken so that the participants, especially those facing an exclusion condition, clearly understood that they were the only real participants in the game and that all other participants were computer generated.


increasing 0.10€ each time any team member caught the virtual ball. With that specific change in the procedure we made sure that discounting was always costly for the ingroup and the participants, independently of whether participants were in the exclusion condition or not (at the end, all participants were paid 0.75€ each, as a symbolic compensation for their participation, as this was the maximum amount of money each member of the minority team could accumulate during a game session).


The participants were also informed about the available commands and options they could use during the game. Each player could pass the ball to any other player, that is, to a member of the own team or to a member of the other team. Moreover, the participants could use several optional messages (e.g., “*Pass me the ball*”) and emoticons (e.g., 😊) to communicate with all other participants (via a public chat) or just with the team members (via a private chat).


Several functionalities were implemented in the game in order to allow to measure actual destructive behaviour. The participants could choose to withdraw small quantities of money from all the players in the game³⁷; withdraw all the money from all the participants in the game³⁸; quit the game³⁹ or, in exceptional cases, send an email to the researcher⁴⁰. Note that when all the players in the game were down to an account of 0€ as a result of repeated withdrawals the game would end up for all the players. Withdrawing money from all players was used as an indicator of destructive behaviour.

Irrespective of the manipulation condition, each participant played a single session of the game in which there were 30 ball throws. The computer program controlled the behaviour of all players except for the naïve participant’s behaviour. The behaviour of the other players varied according to the experimental condition. The no deprivation condition was pre-programmed so that each team received the ball in 15 ball

³⁷ Every time the participant pressed the button , 0.10€ would be withdrawn from all the players, including the participant that pressed the button.

³⁸ When a participant pressed the button , all the money would be withdrawn from all the players, including the participant that pressed the button.

³⁹ When a participant pressed the button , the participant quitted the game, while the other participants would continue playing.

⁴⁰ When a participant pressed the button , a new window would open and the participant could type in the information s/he wanted to send to the researcher.

throws; the exclusion condition was pre-programmed so that the minority team received the ball in only 2 ball throws and the majority team received the ball in the remaining 28 ball throws.

*Measures*⁴¹

Manipulation-checks. Perceived standard violation. In order to check whether the game situation was perceived in terms of a violation of a minimal or a maximal standard and whether the mindset priming impacted such a perception, we measured the degree of violation of a minimal versus maximal standard. Based on the works of Kessler et al. (2010), four items measured perceived minimal standard violation (e.g., “For me, the experience during the ‘Ball Toss’ game was an experience that should never happen”, $\alpha = .61$) and four items measured perceived maximal standard violation (e.g., “For me, the experience during the ‘Ball Toss’ game was an experience that should happen as little as possible”, $\alpha = .72$). Answers were given on a dichotomous scale (yes/no) and on a 7 point scale, ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (7). Interestingly, the perceived minimal and maximal standard violations are highly correlated, indicating that the more the participants perceived a situation as representing a minimal standard violation, the more they perceived the same situation as a violation of a maximal standard as well ($r(58) = .80, p < .001$).

Perceived exclusion. In order to access the degree to which the participants felt excluded during the game, we measured the perceptions of exclusion in the post-game questionnaire with two sets of items: One set of three items measured self-perceptions of exclusion (e.g., “During the game, I felt that my team participated in the game”, [reversed]) with the answers given on a 7 point scale, ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree; a second set of three items also measured self-perceptions of exclusion (e.g., “During the game, I felt that my team was included in the game” [reversed]), but the answers were given on a dichotomous scale (yes/no). An index of perceived exclusion was created by averaging the z-standardized values of all the items, $\alpha = .73$.

Emotional responses. We asked participants to rate the extent (from 1 – not at all to 7 – very much) to which, during the game, they felt: Despaired, resented, furious, frustrated, guilty, fearful, powerless, calm, enthusiastic, cheerful, satisfied, curious and happy (e.g., “During the game, I felt calm”).

⁴¹ Given the unusual results we obtained in Study 3 with our identification measures (see section 4.2.4.1), we decided not to include identification measures in Study 4.

A principal component analysis with *varimax* rotation requiring a forced three-factor solution revealed a similar structure, though not equal (which is not surprising given that some additional emotions were included), to the one found in Study 3: Enthusiastic, thrilled, satisfied, curious and happy loaded positively on the first factor explaining 27.10 % of variance; despaired, resented, furious, powerless and frustrated loaded positively and calm loaded negatively on the second factor explaining 27.09% of variance; guilty and fearful loaded positively on the third factor explaining 13.08 % of variance. An index of positive emotions was created by averaging enthusiastic, thrilled, satisfied, curious and happy ($\alpha = .88$); an index of negative resentment-related emotions⁴² was created by averaging despaired, resented, furious, frustrated, powerless and reverse coded calm ($\alpha = .85$), and, finally, an index of negative resentment-unrelated emotions was created by averaging guilty and fearful ($r = .66$).

Also like in Study 3, because the three emotion indexes are correlated (negative resentment-related emotions were correlated with both, positive, $r(58) = -.42, p = .001$ and negative resentment-unrelated emotions, $r(58) = .36, p = .005$) and principal component analyses with less than 100 participants are often unstable (e.g., Gorsuch, 1983; MacCallum et al., 1999), we also created a single index of negative emotions by averaging the reversed positive emotions and the negative emotions ($\alpha = .87$). As mentioned in Study 3, this single index will allow us to keep the results comparable to those of Study 1. Again, we will use the single negative emotions index in the main analyses and report some additional analyses with the three emotion indexes.

Behavioural responses. The behavioural responses available to the participants were the following: Normative (sending an email to the researcher), moderately destructive (withdrawing small amounts of money from all the participants in the game) and/or extremely destructive (withdrawing all the money from all the participants in the game by withdrawing small amounts of money until the participants were left with no money). Only two participants chose sending an email to the researcher (normative behaviour), so this measure was not used in further analyses. Like in Study 3, we used withdrawing small amounts of money (moderately negative behaviour that could also assume the form of extremely negative) as our behavioural measure. More specifically, we used the number of times the participants pressed the button corresponding to this

⁴² Although powerless and reverse coded calm are not directly linked to resentment, these two emotions entered this index because in the current context their association with the other resentment-related emotions made sense. Therefore, and for reasons of readability, we kept the labels of the emotion indexes the same as in Study 3.

option: The more often the participants used the button, the more destructive the behaviour they displayed.

4.3.3 Results

Manipulation check

Perceived social exclusion

We tested the effect of the conditions of the social exclusion manipulation and of the mindset priming in a 2 (exclusion vs. no deprivation) x 2 (maximal mindset priming vs. minimal mindset priming) GLM on perceived exclusion. As indicated by a main effect of exclusion, $F(1,54) = 39.00$, $p < .001$, $partial \eta^2 = .42$, the manipulation of exclusion was successful. Perceived exclusion was higher in the exclusion condition ($M = 0.55$, $SD = 0.43$) than in the no deprivation condition ($M = -0.33$, $SD = 0.62$). As expected, no other main or interaction effect was significant.


Perceived minimal and maximal standards violation

According to our manipulation, we would expect participants to have experienced a minimal standard violation if they were excluded and primed with a minimal mindset. In order to test this prediction, we performed planned contrast analysis in a one-factorial GLM, with a four category variable as predictor (representing all four conditions of the 2 x 2 design) and perceived minimal standard violation as dependent variable. The analysis revealed a significant effect of the manipulations, $F(3,54) = 4.79$, $p = .005$, $partial \eta^2 = .21$. More concretely, the planned contrast analyses testing the condition of exclusion after minimal mindset priming against the other conditions (-1 -1 -1 3) revealed that – as intended by the manipulation – participants exposed to a minimal standard priming who faced a condition of exclusion considered their experience more as violation of a minimal standard ($M = 0.54$, $SD = 0.62$) than those in all the other conditions, $F(1, 54) = 9.82$, $p = .003$, $partial \eta^2 = .15$. The residual between-category differences, that is, between the conditions with exclusion but maximal mindset priming ($M = 0.16$, $SD = 0.59$), without exclusion but minimal mindset priming ($M = -0.34$, $SD = 0.82$) and without exclusion and maximal mindset priming ($M = -0.10$, $SD = 0.60$) were not significant, $F(2, 54) = 2.28$, $p = .11$.

We then tested if perceiving the violation of a maximal standard varied according to the conditions of the social exclusion manipulation and the mindset priming, by performing a similar one-factorial GLM. The analysis revealed a significant effect of the manipulations, $F(3,54) = 3.97$, $p = .012$, $partial \eta^2 = .18$. Not surprisingly, this time the effect of the manipulation factor was all explained by the effect of exclusion, as indicated by a corresponding contrast (-1 -1 1 1), $F(1,54) = 11.20$, $p = .001$, $partial \eta^2 = .17$. Residual between-category differences were not significant, $F(2, 54) = 0.36$, $p = .70$. That means that participants did not only experience stronger maximal standard violation in the exclusion condition with maximal mindset priming ($M = 0.26$, $SD = 0.58$), but also in the exclusion condition with minimal mindset priming ($M = 0.41$, $SD = 0.65$) as compared with the no deprivation condition with maximal mindset priming ($M = -0.32$, $SD = 0.73$) and minimal mindset priming ($M = -0.36$, $SD = 0.99$). This result is not surprising, given that minimal standard violations are most probably also seen as maximal standard violations, whereas maximal standard violations alone do not necessarily imply minimal standard violations.

Given the close relationship (i.e., large shared variance) between maximal and minimal standard violation perceptions, we continued the analysis by testing for effects on each variable while controlling for the other variable as a covariate. Remember that what should be interpreted as a standard violation, either maximal or minimal, is exclusion. Therefore, we would expect higher standard violation experience in the exclusion condition as compared to the no deprivation condition. However, the interpretation of the violation as minimal standard violation or as maximal standard violation should depend on the mindset priming. Therefore, when statistically controlling for maximal standard violation, exclusion should increase experience of minimal standard violation in the minimal mindset priming condition, but not in the maximal mindset priming condition. Conversely, when statistically controlling for minimal standard violation, exclusion should increase experience of maximal standard violation in the maximal mindset priming condition, but not in the minimal mindset priming condition. The pattern of estimated marginal means in the covariance analysis supported this reasoning (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Estimated marginal means of minimal and maximal standard violations according to the conditions of social exclusion manipulation and to the mindset priming.



Moreover, when controlling for perception of maximal standard violation as a covariate, the planned contrast testing our prediction for experienced minimal standard violation (0 -1 0 1) was significant, $F(1, 53) = 4.58, p = .037, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .08$, and there were no residual between-category differences, $F(2, 53) = 0.47, p = .62$. When controlling for perception of minimal standard violation as a covariate, the planned contrast testing our prediction for experienced maximal standard violation (-1

0 1 0) was marginal, $F(1, 53) = 3.38$, $p = .072$, $partial \eta^2 = .06$, and there were no residual between-category differences, $F(2, 53) = 0.02$, $p = .98$.

Overall, our manipulation check shows that the manipulation was successful. Although the experience of minimal and maximal standard violations is empirically highly correlated, the mindset priming successfully moderated the interpretation of the exclusion experience as a minimal standard violation or as a maximal standard violation.

Hypotheses' test

Impact on the emotional display

In order to test if the display of negative emotions varied according to the conditions of the social exclusion manipulation and according to the mindset priming, we performed a one-factorial GLM. Results revealed a significant effect of the manipulations, $F(3,54) = 2.94$, $p = .041$, $partial \eta^2 = .14$. As predicted, the results of planned contrast analysis revealed that participants exposed to a minimal mindset priming that faced a condition of exclusion displayed more negative emotions ($M = 3.89$, $SD = 1.02$) than those in all other experimental conditions, $F(1,54) = 5.99$, $p = .018$, $partial \eta^2 = .10$. Residual between-category differences were not significant, $F(2,54) = 1.41$, $p = .25$. That means, participants in the other three conditions, namely those exposed to a minimal mindset priming that did not face a condition of exclusion ($M = 3.22$, $SD = 0.93$), those exposed to a maximal mindset priming that did not face a condition of exclusion ($M = 2.82$, $SD = 0.94$) and those exposed to a maximal priming that faced a condition of exclusion ($M = 3.42$, $SD = 1.12$), did not differ in their report of negative emotions.

Impact on the behavioural display

As in Study 3, because the distribution of this variable was too skewed ($Skewness = 6.03$, $Kurtosis = 40.42$) to be used in regression analyses and GLMs, we created a normal score of destructive behaviour using Blom's Formula (Blom, 1958) for the transformation ($Skewness = 1.31$, $Kurtosis = 0.73$; Pearson correlation between raw variable and transformed variable: $r = .70$; rank correlation Spearman's Rho = 1.0.) that was used in all significance tests. Yet, as in Study 3, for better interpretability, we will report the untransformed raw data in the descriptives.

To test whether the manipulation of social exclusion and the mindset priming had an impact on the display of destructive behaviour, we performed a one-factorial GLM with planned contrast analysis. Results showed a significant effect of the manipulations, $F(3,54) = 4.13$, $p = .010$, $partial \eta^2 = .19$. More specifically, the results of the planned contrast analysis revealed that, as predicted, participants exposed to a minimal standard priming that faced a condition of exclusion displayed more destructive behaviour ($M = 2.40$, $SD = 6.05$) than those in all the other experimental conditions, $F(1,54) = 7.47$, $p = .008$, $partial \eta^2 = .12$. Residual between-category differences were not significant, $F(2,54) = 2.45$, $p = .096$. That means that the other three conditions, namely minimal mindset priming/no deprivation ($M = 0.87$, $SD = 2.21$), maximal mindset priming/no deprivation ($M = 0.07$, $SD = 0.26$) and maximal mindset priming/exclusion ($M = 0.67$, $SD = 0.89$) did not significantly differ from each other.

Testing the mediation model


After verifying the effect of our manipulations and testing our hypotheses, a final test is provided by presenting the mediation model. We decided to present the full model instead of a step by step regression test plus the full mediation model, as a step by step methodology would be redundant with the data previously presented. Again we used the bootstrapping method with 10000 bootstrap resamples with bias-corrected estimates and confidence intervals to access the indirect effect as proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2008). And again we choose a one-tailed significance test for these indirect effects by estimating 90% confidence intervals, both because of the small sample size and because the hypothesis was clearly directed.

In order to test the mediation model, we created a focal contrast variable comparing participants exposed to a minimal mindset priming and exclusion (coded with 3) against the others, that is, against those primed with a minimal mindset and not exposed to exclusion (coded with -1), those primed with a maximal mindset and exposed to exclusion (coded with -1) and those primed with a maximal mindset and not exposed to exclusion (coded with -1). This contrast variable entered as the predictor in the mediation analysis, $R^2 = .14$, $F(2,55) = 5.61$, $p = .0061$ ⁴³. We tested the indirect

⁴³ We also tested whether the mediation was significant when two orthogonal residual contrasts were included as covariates. As this was the case, we report the results without these covariates.

effect of the focal contrast on destructive behaviour via negative emotions (Figure 14). As shown in Table 18, almost all the predicted effects (a, c paths), except the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable (b path), which was marginal, were significant. More importantly, the more robust bootstrap estimates indicated that the indirect effect of the focal contrast via negative emotions on destructive behaviour was significant ($a*b$: $B = 0.0312$, $SE = 0.0236$, with a 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.0033 to 0.0890)⁴⁴. As the c' path, that is, the direct effect of the contrast on destructive behaviour while controlling for the mediator, was also significant, the mediation was only partial.

Figure 14: Mediation model using minimal mindset priming and exclusion manipulations as the predictor (contrast). For estimates of a, b, c' (c) see Table 18.



Note: Focal contrast compares those exposed to a minimal mindset and exclusion (= 3) to those exposed to a minimal mindset and no deprivation (= -1), to those exposed to a maximal mindset and exclusion (= -1) and to those exposed to a maximal mindset and no deprivation (= -1).

⁴⁴ Interestingly, the indirect relation was statistically significant despite the fact that the effect of the negative emotions on destructive behaviour was not (it was only marginally significant). We think this was the case because the robust bootstrap method we employed is less affected by the deviation of the distribution on the dependent variable (i.e., destructive behaviour) from the normal distribution.

Table 18: Total effect (c) and direct effects of the mediation analysis (see Figure 14) for the effect of focal contrast (exclusion + minimal standard priming) on destructive behaviour via negative emotions.

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
a	0.1883	0.0754	2.50	.0155
b	0.1630	0.0912	1.79	.0795
c	0.1459	0.0525	2.78	.0074
c'	0.1152	0.0543	2.12	.0383

Note: Focal contrast compares those exposed to a minimal mindset and exclusion (= 3) to those exposed to a minimal mindset and no deprivation (= -1), to those exposed to a maximal mindset and exclusion (= -1) and to those exposed to a maximal mindset and no deprivation (= -1).


Testing the two-step chain mediation

In order to test the complete model, and following the methodological procedure described for the previous studies, we computed a multiple regression analysis using the bootstrap method to access indirect chain mediation effects proposed by Hayes et al. (2011).

In line with the procedure described for the previous mediation analysis, we used the exclusion focal contrast as the predictor. We tested the indirect effect of exclusion on destructive behaviour via minimal standard violation and negative emotions, both included as chain mediators ($a_1 \cdot a_3 \cdot b_2$ in Figure 15). Almost all the expected direct effects (a_1 , a_3) and the total effect (c) were significant whereas almost all other direct effects were not significant (Table 19). Unexpectedly, results did not reveal an unequivocally significant indirect effect via both chained mediators ($a_1 \cdot a_3 \cdot b_2$: $B = 0.0094$, $SE = 0.0092$, with a percentile based 90% confidence interval ranging from -0.0023 to 0.0261, $p_{\text{one-tailed}} = .105$, but with a bias corrected percentile based 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.001 to 0.034, $p_{\text{one-tailed}} = .039^{45}$).

⁴⁵ As mentioned for Studies 2 and 3, while percentile based confidence intervals were estimated using the SPSS macro provided by Hayes et al. (2011), p-values and bias-corrected confidence intervals were estimated using AMOS 17 (Arbuckle, 2008), relying on the same bootstrap method. Also in this analysis, estimates of effects and standard errors were identical in both analyses.

Figure 15: Chain mediation model using minimal standard mindset priming and exclusion manipulations as the predictor (contrast) of destructive behaviour. For estimates of a_1 , a_2 , a_3 , b_1 , b_2 , c' (c) see Table 19.



Note: Focal contrast compares those exposed to a minimal mindset and exclusion (= 3) to those exposed to a minimal mindset and no deprivation (= -1), to those exposed to a maximal mindset and exclusion (= -1) and to those exposed to a maximal mindset and no deprivation (= -1).

Table 19: Total effect (c) and direct effects of the chain mediation analysis (see Figure 15) for the effect of minimal mindset priming and exclusion manipulations as the predictor (contrast) on destructive behaviour via perceived minimal standard violation and negative emotions (predicted effects in italics).

<i>effect</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>a1</i>	<i>0.1639</i>	<i>0.0512</i>	<i>3.20</i>	<i>.0022</i>
<i>a2</i>	<i>0.1148</i>	<i>0.0789</i>	<i>1.45</i>	<i>.1513</i>
<i>a3</i>	<i>0.4483</i>	<i>0.1894</i>	<i>2.37</i>	<i>.0215</i>
<i>b1</i>	<i>0.1673</i>	<i>0.1406</i>	<i>1.19</i>	<i>.2393</i>
<i>b2</i>	<i>0.1285</i>	<i>0.0954</i>	<i>1.35</i>	<i>.1837</i>
<i>c</i>	<i>0.1459</i>	<i>0.0525</i>	<i>2.78</i>	<i>.0074</i>
<i>c'</i>	<i>0.0943</i>	<i>0.0569</i>	<i>1.66</i>	<i>.1031</i>

Note: Focal contrast compares those exposed to a minimal mindset and exclusion (= 3) to those exposed to a minimal mindset and no deprivation (= -1), to those exposed to a maximal mindset and exclusion (= -1) and to those exposed to a maximal mindset and no deprivation (= -1).

4.3.4 Additional analysis


Like in Study 3, we presented three emotional indexes and a single negative emotions index in our measures' section. Also as in the previous study, we reported the main analyses with the single index and will now present some additional analyses using the three emotion indexes.

Hypotheses' test

Impact on the emotional display

In order to test if the display of negative resentment-related emotions varied according to the conditions of the social exclusion manipulation and according to the mindset priming, we performed a 4 (experimental condition: maximal mindset/no deprivation vs. minimal mindset/no deprivation vs. maximal mindset/exclusion vs. minimal mindset/ exclusion) x 3 (type of emotion: positive vs. negative resentment-related vs. negative resentment-unrelated) GLM with type of emotion as within-subject factor. Results showed a significant main effect of type of emotion, $F(2,108) = 42.01$, $p < .001$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .44$. In general participants reported less negative resentment-unrelated emotions ($M = 1.66$, $SD = 1.08$) than positive ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.28$), $t(54) = 9.90$, $p < .001$, and negative resentment-related emotions ($M = 3.07$, $SD = 1.51$), $t(54) = 8.18$, $p < .001$, with the latter two types of emotions not differing from each other, $t(54) = 2.08$, $p = .127$. Most importantly, there was also a significant interaction between type of emotion and the experimental manipulations, $F(6,108) = 3.80$, $p = .002$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .17$. As can be seen by the pattern of estimated marginal means (Figure 16), similar to Study 3, and exactly as expected, the pattern of negative resentment-related emotions was different from the one of positive emotions and negative resentment-unrelated emotions.

Figure 16: Estimated marginal means of negative resentment-related emotions, negative resentment-unrelated emotions and positive emotions according to the conditions of social exclusion manipulation and to the mindset priming.



More precisely, different from all other emotions' types, negative resentment-related emotions were highest in the exclusion condition after minimal mindset priming. We tested in the GLM whether the relative weight of negative resentment-related emotions was indeed significantly stronger in the minimal mindset/exclusion condition than in the other conditions by combining the contrast testing this latter condition against the other conditions $(-1 -1 -1 3)$ with the transformation coefficient matrix testing negative resentment-related emotions against the other two emotions' types $(-1 2 -1)$. Indeed, this planned contrast analysis revealed a significant effect, $F(1,54) = 12,63$, $p < .001$, $partial \eta^2 = .19$. Two orthogonal residual contrasts were not significant, one testing the maximal mindset/exclusion condition against the two no deprivation conditions $(-1 -1 2 0)$, $F(1,54) = 3,11$, $p = .084$, $partial \eta^2 = .054$, and one testing the two no deprivation conditions against each other $(-1 1 0 0)$, $F(1,54) < 1$.

We also tested the effects on each type of emotions in separate GLMs. In a first GLM we tested our hypothesis for the effect of the manipulation on negative resentment-related emotions, while controlling for negative resentment-unrelated and

positive emotions as covariates in planned contrast analysis. As predicted, negative resentment-related emotions were stronger in the exclusion condition after minimal mindset priming ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 1.61$) than in all other conditions, $F(1,52) = 6.01$, $p = .018$, $partial \eta^2 = .104$. No residual between-category differences were significant, $F(2, 52) < 0.1$. Thus, there were no differences between the maximal mindset/exclusion condition ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 1.77$), the minimal mindset/no deprivation condition ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 1.21$) and the maximal mindset/no deprivation condition ($M = 2.53$, $SD = 1.29$). Results for resentment-related emotions were the same when the other types of emotions were not controlled for as covariates, $F(1,54) = 5.20$, $p = .027$, $partial \eta^2 = .088$.

We had no specific hypotheses for positive emotions and negative resentment-unrelated emotions, but the pattern of means (Figure 16) suggested that there was an effect of the exclusion manipulation on these two emotions. Indeed, 2 (exclusion manipulation) x 2 (mindset priming manipulation) GLMs, always controlling for the respective other types of emotions, showed that indeed positive emotions ($M = 4.22$, $SD = 1.17$), $F(1,52) = 4.81$, $p = .033$, $partial \eta^2 = .085$, and negative resentment-unrelated emotions ($M = 1.95$, $SD = 1.19$), $F(1,52) = 4.98$, $p = .018$, $partial \eta^2 = .104$ were stronger in the no deprivation condition than in the exclusion condition ($M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.14$ and $M = 1.31$, $SD = 0.82$, respectively). There were no main effects or interactions of the mindset priming manipulation, and results were the same when the other emotions' types were not controlled as covariates with exclusion's effects on positive emotions, $F(1,54) = 13.31$, $p = .001$, $partial \eta^2 = .198$, and negative resentment-unrelated emotions, $F(1,54) = 5.04$, $p = .029$, $partial \eta^2 = .085$.

Correlational analyses

We will now continue with the correlational analyses.

Predicting emotional display

We regressed negative resentment-related emotions on perceived minimal standard violation and perceived maximal standard violation. Unexpectedly, although both perceived minimal standard violation and perceived maximal standard violation were positively correlated with negative resentment-related emotions ($r(58) = .31$, $p = .02$ and $r(58) = .26$, $p = .044$, respectively), they did not predict negative resentment-related emotions when entered together as predictors in a linear regression analysis.

Most probably this non-result is due to multicollinearity, as the observed power for each of the effects was very low ($power = .36$). These results did not change when statistically controlling for the effects of negative resentment-unrelated and positive emotions (Table 20).

Negative resentment-unrelated emotions were neither correlated with, nor predicted by perceived minimal standard violation or perceived maximal standard violation. These results did not change when predicting only the specific variance of negative resentment-unrelated emotions by statistically controlling for negative resentment-related and positive emotions (Table 20).

Unexpectedly, positive emotions were not only (negatively) correlated with both perceived minimal and maximal standard violations, but also marginally predicted by perceived minimal standard violation, but not by perceived maximal standard violation. However, when statistically controlling for the effects of negative resentment-related and negative resentment-unrelated emotions, the effect of minimal standard violation becomes non-significant (Table 20).

Table 20: Summary of linear regression analyses for variables predicting the display of negative resentment-related emotions, negative resentment-unrelated emotions and positive emotions.

Variable	Negative resentment-related emotions					
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>
Minimal standard violation	0.53	0.47	.26	0.20	0.38	.10
Maximal standard violation	0.11	0.42	.06	0.10	0.33	.05
Negative resentment-unrelated emotions				0.60	0.15	.43***
Positive emotions				-0.50	0.14	-.43***
R^2			.09			.38
<i>F</i>		(2,55)	2.86†		(4,53)	8.18***

Notes: the values in brackets associated with the *F* values refer to the degrees of freedom; *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

Negative resentment-unrelated emotions						
Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>
Minimal standard violation	-0.01	0.33	-.01	-0.01	0.30	-.01
Maximal standard violation	-0.02	0.29	-.02	-0.05	0.26	-.04
Negative resentment-related emotions				0.29	0.12	.35*
Positive emotions				0.29	0.10	.53***
R^2			.001			.24
<i>F</i>			(2,55) 0.01			(4,53) 4.25**

Positive emotions						
Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>
Minimal standard violation	-0.67	0.36	-.38†	-0.46	0.33	-.26
Maximal standard violation	0.05	0.32	-.03	0.002	0.29	.001
Negative resentment-related emotions				-0.39	0.11	-.45***
Negative resentment-unrelated emotions				0.36	0.14	.30*
R^2			.17			.34
<i>F</i>			(2,55) 5.51**			(4,53) 6.93***

Notes: the values in brackets associated with the *F* values refer to the degrees of freedom; *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

Predicting behaviour

We then regressed destructive behaviour on negative resentment-related emotions. As expected, destructive behaviour was predicted by negative resentment-related emotions, however although the standardized regression coefficient did not decrease, the result became marginally significant when statistically controlling for the effects of negative resentment-unrelated and positive emotions (Table 21).

Table 21: Summary of linear regression analyses for variables predicting the display of destructive behaviour.

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Negative						
resentment- related emotions	0.14	0.06	.29*	0.15	0.08	.30†
Negative resentment- unrelated emotions				-0.15	0.10	-.16
Positive emotions				-0.10	0.08	-.16
R^2			.08			.17
<i>F</i>			(1,56) 4.99*			(3,54) 3.64*

Notes: the values in brackets associated with the *F* values refer to the degrees of freedom; *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p \leq .10$.

As was the case already for Study 3, although the results using the three emotions indexes in several regards support our theoretical reasoning, they are also more complex than those we obtained using the single negative emotions index (partly because these types of emotions are correlated with each other) and, thus, we will not further test the mediations using these indexes.

4.3.5 Discussion

Like the previous studies, Study 4 was designed to test whether destructive behaviour and negative emotions displayed by the disadvantaged minority groups are a consequence of the type of standard (minimal rather than maximal) that the disadvantaged believe has been violated by the advantaged majority group. This study, like Study 3, used a more controlled environment than the field Studies 1 and 2 and resorted to artificial groups with no previous history which allowed for the measurement of actual (destructive) behaviour under conditions of actual exclusion, while attenuating the impact of social desirability in the participants' display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour. Most importantly, going beyond all the previous studies, the present study did not only manipulate the degree of deprivation that was supposed to trigger the experience of minimal or maximal standard violations, but also manipulated the cognitive accessibility of minimal versus maximal standards by a context-unrelated mindset priming. That way it added validity to the results of the previous studies as it allowed to rule out the alternative explanation by a possible confound between the type of standard violation (minimal vs. maximal) and the severity of standard violation.

We invited university students to take part in two tasks – a maze and a virtual ball toss game. In the maze, the participants had to help a mouse to make her way through a maze and the instructions the participants read were used to prime either a minimal standard or a maximal standard orientation. In the virtual ball toss game the participants' team had to throw and catch a virtual ball to/from another team and the game was used to manipulate exclusion. We expected the participants to feel negative emotions and display destructive behaviour when the members of their minority team were deprived by the majority team members of resources (exclusion from having access to the virtual ball) but only if this deprivation was interpreted as violating minimal standards, but not if it was interpreted as violating maximal standards. We expected this to be especially true for participants who were primed with a minimal standard mindset but not for those primed with a maximal standard mindset.

The results indicate that the manipulations were successful: Participants facing exclusion did feel more excluded than the ones that did not face exclusion in the ball toss game. More interestingly, the results also revealed that, as expected, perceiving a

minimal standard violation did not depend only on the experience of exclusion: The participants exposed to a minimal mindset priming that faced exclusion were the ones that perceived more minimal standard violation than participants in all the other conditions.

Most importantly, the combination of being exposed to a minimal mindset priming and facing social exclusion seems to have created the particular context in which, as predicted, participants tended to display more negative emotions and more destructive behaviour than participants in the other conditions. This data shows that being excluded, as the theories on ostracism, stigmatization, exclusion, etcetera, stress, is painful, but – and this is the novelty introduced by this study and by this thesis – this should be more the case when such an exclusion is experienced and interpreted as a minimal standard violation rather than as a maximal standard violation.

For our theoretical understanding the most important implication of the results of this study is that it probably produced the clearest evidence for the important role that minimal standards play in the emotional and behavioural response to deprivation. As participants were invited to take part in two unrelated tasks – a maze and a virtual ball toss game – the mindset priming in the maze task was completely unrelated to any experience of deprivation and exclusion in the game. Yet it still influenced the effect of the exclusion manipulation on dependent variables (the emotional and behavioural responses) that were designed and framed with reference to the game, therefore directing the participants' attention, when answering, to the game's experience and, thus, making a possible influence of the mindset priming presented with the maze less likely.

Moreover, the correlational analyses also showed that the effect of the combination of minimal mindset priming and exclusion on the display of destructive behaviour was mediated by negative emotions, although only partially. However, the results from the chain mediations analysis were not unequivocally significant: When relying on confidence intervals without bias correction, results revealed that effect of the combination of minimal mindset priming and exclusion on the display of destructive behaviour was not mediated both by perceived minimal mindset and negative emotions. We believe that this non-significant result is partially due to the fact that our mediator

was manipulated via our mindset priming. Nevertheless, we have to admit we were not successful in replicating this chain mediation a second time.

Another important result of this study is that it ruled out another possible confound that was a problem in Study 3, namely between the exclusion manipulation and costliness of destructive behaviour. While in Study 3 participant in the exclusion condition actually never accumulated money that would be discounted when they engaged in destructive behaviour (discounting for all players), in the present study both teams began the game with a positive virtual account that rendered destructive behaviour (withdrawing 0.10€ from both teams playing) a costly option also in the exclusion condition, as the disadvantaged team would be harming not only the advantaged outgroup team, but the ingroup team as well. Moreover, the possible confound with costliness cannot explain the effects of the mindset priming manipulation.

These results, taken together with the ones from the previous studies, support the argument that actions displayed by a disadvantaged minority that are considered by the advantaged majority as destructive are not just an expression of ingroup favouritism or defense of the minority ingroup's interests (remember that the display of destructive behaviour during the game was costly not only for the advantaged transgressor group but also for the disadvantaged ingroup). Instead, we conclude that these are responses to perceived transgressions perpetrated by the advantaged majority that are interpreted as violations of minimal standards established by the superordinate category.

Moreover, this study shows that being socially excluded, which is one – if not the most emblematic – manifestation of disadvantage, has its most detrimental effects insofar as it is experienced as a violation of a minimal standard and, thus, as unacceptable within the normative frame of the superordinate category. Once again we have support for the argument that the display of destructive action and negative emotions is better understood as motivated not only by membership in a disadvantaged group, but also by the perceived shared membership in a superordinate group.

Some inconclusive results of this study have also to be mentioned. As in Study 3, when distinguishing between different types of emotions, results were rather mixed. Although experimental results (i.e., effects of the manipulations on different types of emotions) were exactly in line with our predictions and confirmed the results on the

overall emotions index, correlational relations of these different types of emotions with perceived minimal and maximal standard violation and also with destructive behaviour were rather weak. This is most probably due to multicollinearity, as the different types of emotions were correlated with each other. The small sample size in this study contributed to the problem. Although we purposefully (for ethical reasons) had kept sample size small, just large enough to have sufficient participants for an experimental effect, this small sample size at the end did not allow obtaining more conclusive correlational results.

Nevertheless, given the evidence we have presented in the four studies, we consider that both the distinction between minimal and maximal standards seems to be relevant in the understanding of the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour, and that exclusion seems to play a role as an instance of a minimal standard violation and, thus, as a trigger of negative emotions and destructive behaviour.

4.4. Meta-analysis over the complete model

In three of our studies (Studies 2, 3 and 4) we have tested the chain mediation describing our overall theoretical model, namely an effect of exclusion on destructive behaviour, mediated by the perception of minimal standard violation, which in turn triggers negative emotions, which finally leads to destructive behaviour. Although effects went into the same direction in all three chain mediation tests, only two of them were unequivocally significant (Studies 2 and 3). In Study 4, the mediation was not significant according to the analysis without bias-correction in the estimation of percentile based confidence intervals. In order to summarize the results over all three tests, we conducted a meta-analysis based on the significance tests in all three studies (using the less supportive significance tests that referred to confidence intervals without bias correction). Indeed, the meta-analysis⁴⁶ showed a significant collective effect: $Z = 3.304$, $p = .001$, corresponding to an effect-size of $r = .196$; test of homogeneity $Chi-square = 0.47$, $df = 2$, $p = .789$. The Fail-Safe N (that is, the number of studies with zero-effect that would be necessary for indicating that this effect would not be significant at the .05 level) was 7. Thus, we can conclude that there was overall robust support for our theoretical model.

⁴⁶ The meta-analysis was conducted using the software Meta-Analysis 5.3 developed by Ralf Schwarzer.

CHAPTER V

General discussion

The generalizations of social psychology are (...) limited by the creative and boundless diversity of human social behaviour.

Henri Tajfel⁴⁷

Going beyond the debate of whether or not groups engage in destructive behaviour, this thesis intended to explore the circumstances under which disadvantaged groups recognize the display of destructive behaviour as relevant. More concretely, we have been undertaking a social-identity-based approach to explain collective actions by disadvantaged groups that are considered by members of advantaged groups to be most problematic (i.e., destructive, negative, harmful, violent, etcetera). We assume that these destructive behaviours and corresponding negative emotions are not mere expressions of intergroup conflict, but are responses to actions of the advantaged dominant group perceived by the disadvantaged minority as transgressions that violate minimal standards established by inclusive superordinate categories. We further propose that these perceptions are most likely when actions by the advantaged dominant group prevent members of disadvantaged groups from meeting the minimal standards for membership in the superordinate group. In other words, our approach suggests that destructive intergroup behaviour and strong negative emotions on the part of disadvantaged groups depend on the type of standard that they believe has been violated by the advantaged group. Thus, destructive action and the negative emotions that accompany it can be understood as motivated not solely by membership in a disadvantaged group but also by perceived shared membership in a superordinate category.

In order to test these ideas we conducted four studies: Two field studies, one with immigrants living in Portugal (Study 1), and an online study with smokers (Study 2); and two laboratory studies with players in a virtual ball toss game (Studies 3 and 4). Study 1 was designed to empirically test our assumption that only actions that hinder the

⁴⁷ Tajfel (1978, p. 6)

disadvantaged minority from reaching minimal standards are considered by disadvantaged minority members as minimal standard violations, and our hypothesis that only violations of minimal standards – and not violations of maximal standards – represent the motivational basis underlying the display of destructive behaviour by the disadvantaged. Study 2, besides replicating the results of Study 1, intended to provide a more complete test of our theoretical model. It addressed a typical social context in which disadvantaged groups most probably experience violation of minimal standards: It introduced social exclusion as an extreme situation that prevents the disadvantaged group from reaching minimal standards of a superordinate category.

Several methodological limitations of the previous studies were then addressed in Studies 3 and 4. All three, Studies 2, 3 and 4 were designed to test the hypothesis that it is not the experience of deprivation per se but the interpretation of exclusion (rather than marginalization) as a violation of minimal versus maximal standards that leads to the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour.

In general results support our hypotheses, but there were also some unexpected findings that require a modification of our theoretical approach. The experimental results of Study 1 could only be analysed for part of the sample as the manipulation was only successful for the Brazilian immigrants' subsample. Nevertheless, for this subsample, the deprivation from a resource led, as predicted, to more destructive compared to constructive action when it was described as a minimal standard violation than when it was described as a maximal standard violation, a relation that was mediated by negative emotions. The correlational analysis showed that, for the entire sample, the only predictor of destructive behaviour and negative emotions was the degree to which the deprivation was perceived to be a violation of minimal standards. Even though there was also correlational evidence showing that perceiving a minimal standard violation led to the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour, there was no significant mediation. Thus, for the whole sample it seems that the relation between perceived minimal standard violation and destructive behaviour is not entirely due to an emotional response.

The subsequent three studies then manipulated social exclusion as a predictor leading to destructive behaviour. In all three studies we tested a theoretical model that

predicted social exclusion to be seen as a minimal standard violation, which then should trigger negative emotions, leading in turn to destructive behaviour. This model found support by the data patterns of all three studies, although the chain mediation was only significant in Studies 2 (for the correlational analysis) and 3 (for experimental effects), but not in Study 4.

Study 2 was a field-experiment with smokers as a minority facing scenarios of either marginalization or exclusion. Results revealed that, although the manipulation check was not sensitive to our subtle manipulation, the manipulation of exclusion (vs. marginalization) had a significant effect on perceived minimal standard violation and destructive behaviour. In the exclusion condition the participating smokers interpreted the scenario more as a violation of minimal (as compared to maximal) standards and also tended to expect themselves and ingroup members to show more destructive behaviours than those facing marginalization. Besides, the results of the correlational analysis were consistent with the hypotheses that perceived exclusion was perceived as a minimal standard violation and that perceiving a violation of a minimal standard led to the display of more negative emotions which, in turn, led to the display of more destructive behaviour. Moreover, the results revealed that the relation between perceived exclusion and the display of destructive behaviour was mediated both by perceived minimal standard violation and experienced negative emotions, but not by perceived maximal standard violation or positive emotions.

Unexpectedly, the manipulation had no effect on the display of negative emotions. The latter result was interesting, as it seems that the participants felt negative emotions not only when they were totally excluded, but already when they were marginalized.

Study 3 was a laboratory study with participants playing in a virtual ball toss game between a majority team and a minority team. Participants were always in the minority team, and – depending of the experimental condition – their team was marginalized or completely excluded. Different from Study 2, we also included a no deprivation control condition in which the players' team was fully participating in the game without facing any deprivation. The results of Study 3 show that exclusion increased the perceptions of violation of minimal versus maximal standards and destructive behaviour, and the chain mediation of the overall model was significant.

However, results also replicated the unexpected finding of Study 2, namely that participants reported more negative emotions in both the marginalization and the exclusion conditions than in the no deprivation control condition. Again, participants were already responding emotionally in the marginalization condition, but only in the exclusion condition did they turn to destructive behaviour. Related to this was another interesting result, namely that the mediation of the effect of exclusion on destructive behaviour was not complete, which seems to suggest, as in Study 1, that not all destructive behaviour might be triggered by an emotional response.

Although testing the same hypotheses as the previous studies, and using the same virtual ball toss setting as Study 3, Study 4 was of particular importance, as it addressed the alternative explanation of our results by the fact that minimal standard violation is naturally confounded with overall severity of standard violation. To rule this alternative hypothesis out, we did not only manipulate exclusion (this time testing it only against the no deprivation control condition), but also primed participants' relative accessibility of minimal standards versus maximal standards by a completely unrelated mindset priming (using a method developed by Kessler et al., 2010). As expected, perceiving a minimal standard violation did not depend only on the experience of exclusion but also on the mindset priming, so that excluded participants that were exposed to a minimal standard mindset priming were the ones that perceived more minimal standard violation, experienced more negative emotions and showed more destructive behaviour than participants in all the other conditions. Moreover, the correlational analysis also showed that the effect of the combination of minimal mindset priming and exclusion on the display of destructive behaviour was mediated by negative emotions, and again, the mediation was only partial.

As a summary of the empirical results of all studies we can say that, although highly correlated with perceived maximal standard violation, perceiving a minimal standard violation has different consequences than perceiving a maximal standard violation. Perceiving the former, rather than the latter, leads to the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour. Moreover, our results further show that being exposed to marginalization is not the same as being exposed to exclusion. Marginalization may already lead to a certain, though less extreme, degree of perceived

exclusion and – different from what we expected – negative emotions, but these do not translate into destructive behaviour. Also, being marginalized leads more to perceptions of maximal standard violations than to perceptions of minimal standard violations. In contrast, exclusion leads to more perceived minimal standard violations, rather than maximal standard violations and such perceived minimal standard violations lead to the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour.

5.1 How much does the data support the theoretical model?

None of our studies provided perfect support for our theoretical assumptions and predictions, but the different studies complement each other so that the overall support is actually substantial. While the laboratory studies had higher internal validity, the field studies support the external and ecological validity of our approach. For instance, our results indicate that manipulating our key variables was easier in the laboratory than in the field context. Yet, even in the absence of completely successful manipulations (Studies 1 and 2), our correlational results supported our hypotheses: In Study 1 the subsample for which the standards manipulation was successful showed the expected results, and in Study 2 experimental results were found despite an unsuccessful manipulation check. The laboratory studies then allowed to have more direct measures of actual behaviour and to rule out alternative explanations.

Moreover, although the predicted chain mediation from exclusion, via minimal standards violation and negative emotions to destructive behaviour was not significant in all studies, a meta-analytical check of the accumulated evidence indicates a clear indirect effect. Despite such substantial support for our overall approach, we also had several unpredicted results that are worth a deeper exploration.

5.2 The role of negative emotions as predictors of destructive behaviour

Some of our results are particularly informative in the light of arguments derived from relative deprivation research (e.g., Lima & Vala, 2003; Walker, 2010; Walker & Smith, 2002). According to relative deprivation theory, intergroup comparisons can result in perceptions of injustice leading to fraternal deprivation (Runciman, 1966) and the experience of anger, which then, in turn, would lead to collective action. Our results correspond to this line of thinking insofar as deprivation was interpreted as a standard

violation which then triggered negative resentment related emotions. We would argue, however, that it is also important to take into account the type of standard that is violated, that is, not all injustice might lead to the same feelings of resentment. In our data, for instance, perceptions of minimal standard violations rather than maximal standard violations led to negative feelings and were the ultimate predictor of destructive behaviour as well. Nevertheless, although exclusion is the most likely situation to be interpreted as minimal standard violation and to trigger negative emotions, our data show that being “only” marginalized also leads to negative feelings, even if it does not necessarily lead to perceived minimal standard violations, nor to destructive behaviour. Accordingly, relative deprivation theory might still accurately predict negative emotions, even without distinguishing between minimal and maximal standard violations. One reason can be that being marginalized is also a quite aversive experience, though being a lighter form of rejection and deprivation than exclusion is. Though lighter, this form of deprivation is probably already enough to create a sense that the ingroup is worse off than it deserves, and this fraternal deprivation does translate into negative emotions, most probably for other reasons than perceived minimal standard violation. Relative deprivation theory might fall short, however, when predicting actual destructive collective action, because our data show that exclusion and minimal standard violations play a key role as predictors of such behaviour. With other words, negative, resentment related emotions will not always lead to the same behavioural responses.

One explanation for our complex results on emotions can be that we aggregated different negative emotions in composite indexes, even when distinguishing between different types of emotions. Therefore we do not know whether being marginalized versus being excluded is impacting different negative emotions. With other words, one reason why both marginalization and exclusion led to the display of negative emotions, but that these negative emotions only triggered destructive behaviour in the exclusion conditions, and not in the marginalization conditions, can be that perhaps the negative emotions triggered by exclusion were more relevant for collective destructive action than the emotions triggered by marginalization.

For example, Tausch et al. (2011), present anger as a constructive emotion leading to normative action and contempt as a derogatory emotion leading to nonnormative action.

Even though their results did not always support the lack of a link between anger and nonnormative action – what is somehow congruent with our results –, the fact that contempt was a positive predictor of nonnormative action is an important result to be taken into account. The type of emotions measures that we used in our studies does, unfortunately, not allow for a more detailed analysis of the role of different single emotions. Future studies on this issue might therefore involve more precise emotional measures, which, for instance, capture differentiated anger-related and contempt-related appraisals.

Another observation about the role of emotions in our studies refers to guilt and shame, emotions usually studied in a context in which the ingroup is the wrongdoer. As we have shown in the additional analyses of both Studies 3 and 4, the negative resentment-unrelated emotions, which did include guilt, were generally low in our studies. In Study 4, when participants were playing in the ball toss game, these emotions even decreased in the exclusion as compared to the inclusion condition.

This is an interesting result, as in the exclusion condition at least part of participants engaged in destructive behaviour, that is, they acted as wrongdoers, and those who did not might have been tempted to do so. Thus, in a certain way one could expect some increased levels of guilt in the exclusion condition. Obviously that was not the case. On the contrary, in line with our reasoning, even if resorting to destructive behaviour in such a context may harm not only the outgroup but also the ingroup, our disadvantaged participants most probably did not feel as wrongdoers, as if they perceived their behaviour as justified. Thus, they might have felt that the punishment was deserved for the advantaged perpetrator, and that such punishment was more important than avoiding “collateral” damages for the ingroup.

Interestingly and also unexpectedly, the relation between being excluded and displaying destructive behaviour did not always include an emotional response. In Study 1 the correlational results showed that perceiving a minimal standard violation was related to the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour, but – although there was a mediation of the experimental effect for the subsample in which the manipulation was successful – there was no significant mediation in the correlational pattern for the overall sample. In Study 3 the results revealed that the mediation of the

relation between exclusion and the display of destructive behaviour both by perceived minimal standard violation and experienced negative emotions was not complete. Finally, in Study 4, the correlational analyses showed that the effect of the combination of minimal mindset priming and exclusion on the display of destructive behaviour was only partially mediated by negative emotions. Taken together these results seem to suggest that not all destructive behaviour might be triggered by an emotional response, but might be a more direct response to minimal standard violations and possibly serve strategic purposes (Scheepers et al., 2006; Tausch et al., 2011). It could be argued that destructive behaviour could be seen as assuming a strategic form of empowerment for disadvantaged groups. Drury and Reicher (1999), for example, discuss and show how empowerment can be an outcome of crowd behaviour, while discussing power not as a group's attribute, but rather as a social relation. Chen and Kruglansky (2009), on the other hand, suggest that terrorism might be a tactic of minority influence amongst other reasons because of "... the considerable power it places in the minority hands in its struggle against some majority." (p. 205).

Participants might consider such empowerment by destructive collective behaviour to be a reasonable option, even if it is very risky. As we have stated in the theoretical introduction, when the disadvantaged resort to destructive behaviour, it may lead to a cycle of violence escalation as the advantaged would react by further excluding the disadvantaged. Such a situation would, in turn, lead the disadvantaged to (continuing to) resort to destructive behaviour as a means of punishing the advantaged group's transgression. This way, for the disadvantaged punishing the advantaged group's transgression can be especially costly. The fact that our data show that they still do it – and they might even do it strategically – represents an obstacle to the rationalist approach, as it shows that individuals (and we would add, groups) are willing to resort to such a tool even if the costs might outweigh the gains (e.g., Carpenter, 2006; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). This "altruist punishment" (Fehr & Gächter, 2002) is attributed an important role in the promotion of cooperation by, for example, refraining free riding (Carpenter, 2006; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Although cooperation is not the subject of this thesis, this argumentation shows how punishment can be strategically used to deter an unwanted behaviour. In the same line, there are authors who argue for an instrumental value of

violence (e.g., Jackman, 2001). Jackman (2001) suggests that when using instrumental violence, even if the more immediate goal is harming, its aim is to facilitate another goal, such as punishment, hence its instrumentality.

In the same vein, we believe that the motivation behind the display of destructive behaviour by the disadvantaged is punishing the advantaged violator of minimal standards so that an illegitimate situation is put to an end and, thus, the superordinate category can be protected (and not only the subgroup victim of the violation). And maybe there are situations in which such motivation does not need an emotional response associated to it. In this respect our perspective differs from the relative deprivation tradition (e.g., Gurr, 1970; Walker, 2010; Walker & Smith, 2002), not only because we believe that the most important motivation behind destructive behaviour is not the idea of being entitled to something one does not have, but also because we have data showing data that anger and resentment might not always be present as the fuel for collective destructive behaviour.

To sum up, the role of negative emotions as mediators of the relation between exclusion and destructive behaviour is both more limited and more specific than we originally hypothesized. Negative emotions do play a role as a mediator in destructive behaviour. However, people might abstain from destructive behaviour even if they feel strong negative emotions, when these negative feelings are not responses to minimal standard violations, and they may opt for destructive behaviour as a punishment of minimal standard violations even without having particularly strong negative feelings.

5.3 Marginalization, exclusion, standards' violations and the display of destructive behaviour

In our theorising and studies we introduced the distinction between minimal standard violation and maximal standard violation and identified minimal standard violation as predictor of destructive behaviour. Thus we focused on the impact of being prevented from reaching minimal standards.

Nevertheless, our research already provided some hints about the consequences of the violation of maximal standards: Being marginalized already gave raise to negative emotions even if it did not translate into destructive behaviour. This is a quite interesting

result that, besides being informative in the light of arguments derived from relative deprivation theory it might also be relevant for the rejection, ostracism, etcetera literature. This literature is to a far degree consensual when presenting the pernicious effects of being rejected, but not as consensual when presenting the behavioural reactions to rejection. Thus, it is acknowledged that being rejected is an adverse experience and that individuals are not only highly motivated to avoid rejection (e.g., Williams & Govan, 2005) but also to belong (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In line with the rejection literature, we also find the pernicious effects of being rejected in both the marginalized and exclusion conditions: Being marginalized and excluded leads to negative emotions. Nevertheless, in the mentioned literature it is not clear whether or not these motivations will lead to pro- or antisocial behaviour as a response to being rejected. Both responses have been found. Some authors even proposed ways of integrating these (apparently) contradictory responses. For instance, Williams (e.g., 2001, 2009) argues that when ostracism threatens belonging and self-esteem needs, prosocial behaviour should follow, whereas when ostracism threatens control and meaningful existence needs, antisocial behaviour will follow.

Our data may complement the literature on rejection as it suggests a different interpretation for these differentiated behavioural responses. Our results seem to suggest that facing marginalization and facing exclusion is not perceived in the same way and, thus, does not have the same consequences. In this sense, our data seems to suggest that the display of destructive behaviour would rather depend on the type of standard that individuals and groups perceived that has been violated.

Another way in which our research may complement the rejection literature is by reinforcing the idea that it might be helpful to differentiate between degrees of rejection, or, as in our reasoning, between qualitatively different types of rejection (such as exclusion versus marginalization). Such distinction may have several implications. For example, Williams (2007), states that the concept of ostracism can be operationalized as being ignored or as being excluded. We would suggest that being ignored is possibly more similar to being marginalized and, thus, would lead to less destructive behaviour than being excluded.

Often studies on ostracism just compare an inclusion condition to an ostracism condition or eventually add an over-inclusion condition (e.g., van Beest & Williams, 2006, Study 2; Williams et al., 2002, Study 4), a design that might not allow for the most comprehensive results when referring to behaviour. On the other hand, the studies that differentiate between several degrees of rejection (e.g., Williams et al. 2000, Study 1) do not have behaviour as the dependent measure and, thus, do not help clarifying when pro- and antisocial behaviour follows rejection.

One implication refers to the studies where prosocial behaviour was found as a response to rejection: We could argue that in some of these studies, participants might have felt marginalized rather than excluded and this might have been the reason for the display of prosocial behaviour. For example: After including or ostracizing participants in a ball-tossing game, Predmore and Williams (1983, cited by Williams & Govan, 2005) asked the participants to take part in a second task. Participants could choose to work alone, with the same group with whom they played the ball-tossing game or with a new group. Results showed that the ostracized participants choose to work with a new group. The authors interpreted this as a prosocial behaviour as a truly antisocial would be choosing working alone. We would propose that this type of measure actually might have eliminated the total exclusion experience for the participants, because having the possibility not to work alone provided the opportunity to continue participating and might have helped the participants to interpret their experience more in terms of marginalization than in terms of total exclusion.

Another way in which our research may complement the research on ostracism is by offering a fresh framing for the fundamental needs that are threatened by rejection: Belonging, self-esteem, control and meaningful existence are presented as fundamental individual needs that would explain the option for prosocial or antisocial behaviour. We would argue that the social context, namely the intergroup context should be taken into account in the study of the behavioural responses to being rejected. That is, whether or not and how far frustrations of such individual needs are experienced depends on appraisals informed by social norms and identity-based expectations and evaluations. Our studies show that the concepts of minimal and maximal standards, which are derived from a superordinate category that is the referent normative basis for the subgroups

encompassed within it, are relevant for the understanding of the display (or not) of destructive behaviour.

Finally, our research might shed some light on the discussion about the adequacy of antisocial behaviours as a response to rejection. For instance, Twenge and Baumeister (2005) propose that "... when one is rejected, it makes more sense to be less aggressive and more prosocial, in an attempt to (...) establish affiliation." (p. 29). Our results show that at least disadvantaged groups follow an opposite rationality when rejection takes the form of exclusion: It is vital to react destructively in face of exclusion as it represents a minimal standard violation that threatens not only the subgroup that is the victim of the violation, but also the superordinate category that encompasses both the disadvantaged victim and the advantaged perpetrator itself.

Even so, we would suggest that future research should address the more specific impact of being prevented from approaching maximal standards as this issue should be studied more carefully.

5.4 Minimal standards and inclusion within superordinate categories

The results of Studies 2 to 4 are of particular importance for the specific relation between exclusion and perceived minimal standard violations. Study 2 showed that marginalization may already lead to negative emotions, but these do not translate into destructive behaviour. Exclusion, on the other hand, had different consequences: Our data suggests that it leads to more perceived minimal standard violations, rather than maximal standard violations and such perceived minimal standard violations lead to the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour.

Given the importance of minimal standards in terms of defining who is included – and therefore who is entitled to the benefits derived from inclusion – in a given superordinate category, our results seem to speak for a constant monitoring (e.g., sociometer theory, Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) of the disadvantaged subgroup's position within the superordinate category, less in terms of its prototypicality, but more in terms of its inclusion. Such monitoring would guarantee that at least their inclusion in the superordinate category is not compromised. We have no data to test such a prediction, but we speculate that, compared to other more advantaged, dominant

subgroups of superordinate categories, disadvantaged minorities are more sensitive for cues that would suggest exclusion.

Besides, given the assumed shared character of minimal standards and that therefore a violation of a minimal standard is threatening not only for the disadvantaged subgroup being the target, but to the whole superordinate category, these results also seem to speak for a constant monitoring of the stability of the superordinate category itself and for the respect for the superordinate category's minimal requirements. As disadvantaged groups are often permanently more vulnerable to social exclusion than more advantaged dominant groups they might therefore also feel superordinate categories as being at risk to be threatened by minimal standard violations. One could also speculate that this can be the basis for solidarity with other disadvantaged groups also facing exclusion. This could be the case as, from the point of view of the disadvantaged, not only their own, but the exclusion of any subgroup represents a violation of a core standard of the superordinate category and punishing the advantaged perpetrator would guarantee the preservation of the superordinate category itself. Again, we have no data to back up such a speculation, but we suggest that future research addresses this issue.

5.5 How much evidence is there for normative considerations?

We had proposed that destructive behaviour cannot be understood without taking into account normative influences (Louis & Taylor, 2002), as maximal and minimal standard lead to different (normative) consequences. More precisely, we had pointed out that destructive behaviour is particularly motivated by the understanding of norms derived from the superordinate identity and that those involved may see their destructive acts as necessary to protect the values of the superordinate category. In this regard, our model is consistent with the idea that it is moral engagement, rather than moral disengagement that leads to destructive behaviour (Moghaddam, 2005).

In the design of our studies we did not include direct measures that could support these claims. However, our results provide indirect support. They generally show that it is exactly the (perceived) violation of a minimal standard that leads to the display of negative emotions and destructive behaviour. Thereby, these results support the broader argument that actions by disadvantaged groups that are considered by advantaged

majority members as most problematic (i.e., destructive, negative and violent actions) are not a mere expression of intergroup conflict, but are instead responses to transgressions by the advantaged dominant majority, that are perceived to violate minimal standards set by the superordinate category. Thus, destructive action and the emotions that accompany it can be understood as motivated not solely by membership in a disadvantaged group but also by their perceived shared membership in a superordinate group.

Other indirect evidence for normative considerations on the level of the superordinate identity comes from Study 1, which provided additional data that allowed us to reason about the role of identification with the disadvantaged ingroup and with the superordinate category for the perception of standards as minimal versus maximal and, thus, for the understanding of the display of destructive behaviour. Results showed that identification with the immigrant ingroup seemed to facilitate the interpretation of a situation of deprivation more in terms of the violation of a maximal standard, whereas identification with the superordinate category (Portuguese Society) seemed to facilitate the interpretation of the same situation more in terms of the violation of a minimal standard. In the following section we will elaborate our results on identification in more detail.

5.6 The role of identification

Given our general suggestion that being prevented from achieving minimal standards is likely to produce destructive intergroup behaviour but that being prevented from pursuing maximal standards will not, it appears important to consider what factors will influence whether an existing standard is seen as maximal or minimal. Like previous theorising about minimal and maximal standards, we assume that standard type is not fixed, but dependent on interactions between different persons (Fritsche et al., 2009), contexts and situations (Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008; Kessler et al., 2010). One factor that we analysed in Study 1 was the role played by group identification in determining perceptions of standard type. As described earlier, our approach to collective action takes seriously the fact that the social identity of members of disadvantaged groups cannot be reduced to their membership in this particular disadvantaged group, but also includes their membership in the larger superordinate category. Cape Verdean and Brazilian immigrants living in Portugal are not only immigrants, they are also members

of the broader community of people living in Portugal. Thus, we decided to explore the role of identification with the superordinate category as well as with the disadvantaged ingroup in the responses of members of disadvantaged groups to acts of the advantaged dominant group.

We included measures of identification with the disadvantaged subgroup in Studies 1, 2 and 3, and of identification with the superordinate category in Studies 1 and 3. We can start by saying that results of Study 1, that is within the “hot” context of immigrants and non-immigrants living in Portugal are consistent with our general argument, that is, identification with the subgroup predicted perception of maximal standard violation, while identification with the superordinate category predicted minimal standard violation. We think this is the case as identification with the subgroup denotes a focus on the desirable outcomes the own group can achieve within the superordinate category. Results also show that identification with the superordinate category, though increasing sensitivity to minimal standard violations, also restrains destructive behaviour, thus putting members of disadvantaged groups into an ironic ambivalent motivational situation that carries potential for conflict escalation but can also undermine social change.

The result that identification with the superordinate category increases the degree to which a given standard is perceived to be minimal rather than maximal is consistent with our argument that while subgroups within a superordinate category may hold their “idiosyncratic” particular minimal standards, these standards should only become a valid basis for judgments about the acceptability of other groups if they are generalized (perhaps as a result of ingroup projection) to the superordinate category. One condition contributing to this type of generalization is identification with this superordinate category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus et al., 2003; Wenzel et al., 2003). In addition, membership in superordinate categories will imply several minimal standards but disadvantaged group members will only see themselves as entitled to these minimal standards if they perceive themselves to be part of the superordinate category (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Wenzel, 2004). For instance, the right to some access to housing and minimal salary might be considered a minimal standard among the people living in Portugal. However, only immigrants who identify with the overall community of

people living in Portugal should have a strong tendency to consider these as minimal standards that apply to immigrants living in Portugal as well.

On the other hand, engaging in destructive intergroup behaviour was attenuated by strong identification with the superordinate category, most probably as this identification might have led members of the disadvantaged group to see members of the advantaged dominant group not only as members of the perpetrator outgroup (that should be treated negatively) but also as members of the superordinate ingroup (that should be protected, Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Thus, it seems that identification with the superordinate category plays two roles, namely it increases the tendency to see standards as minimal, while at the same time reducing the extent to which being prevented from meeting these standards will lead to destructive behaviour.

As a result, strong identification with the superordinate category should lead to strong ambivalence for members of disadvantaged groups. On the one hand, this identification pushes them towards destructive behaviour because they perceive more minimal standard violations by the advantaged outgroup, on the other hand it pulls them away from destructive behaviour because of their commitment to the norms of the superordinate group and their perception of outgroup members as fellow members of a common ingroup.

Given that members of disadvantaged groups might differ in their identification with the superordinate category, this ambivalence might have interesting consequences for the dynamic of collective destructive intergroup behaviour. At the beginning, those members who are more identified with the superordinate category might more easily perceive minimal standard violations by the advantaged majority and show extremely negative emotional responses. These emotional responses might provide the normative basis for destructive behaviour. However, because these members have clear compunctions about acting on these emotions, it may be that destructive intergroup behaviours are more likely to be carried out by other members of the disadvantaged group who are influenced by the normative emotional climate but do not identify so strongly with the superordinate category. If this type of sequence was to be found, it would also not be surprising that

those engaged in destructive intergroup behaviour should notoriously overestimate the agreement of other members of their disadvantaged ingroup with their destructive acts.

As inspiring as results of Study 1 were in terms of the role of identification, results were different in the other studies. In Study 2, with smokers, ingroup identification on the subgroup level predicted perceived minimal standard violation and negative emotions, but as we did not have a measure of superordinate category identification we cannot tell how specific this relation was. In Study 3, that is, in the more artificial context of ad-hoc and temporary membership in a player-team in a virtual ball toss game, identification with the superordinate category was not a reliable predictor of standard violation perception, but interestingly we found a decrease of ingroup identification as an effect of the exclusion manipulation. It is not surprising that in this context the power of identification is less relevant, as there is no previous history and the existence of the group at stake is quite limited in time. We interpreted the result of reduced identification with the subgroup as a social mobility strategy, as predicted by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

5.7 Contributions to the explanation of destructive collective action

Although the field is understudied, several approaches have been developed that are relevant for the understanding of decisions to engage in more extreme forms of collective action. How our research contributes to the understanding of the role of resentment as it was conceptualized by relative deprivation theory was already discussed.

Our approach also complements the interpretation of the tokenism phenomenon as a “buffer” against collective nonnormative action. As we mentioned in the theoretical introduction, an alternative explanation to the Wright and collaborators’ (1990) results could be that the actions of the advantaged group in the total exclusion condition were seen by the disadvantaged group as violating minimal standards of a shared superordinate category (e.g., everyone involved in the study). Therefore, in this condition, collective protest (which was the operationalization of nonnormative behaviour in Wright et al.’s study) is now understood by the disadvantaged group to be a normative response to such a transgression, exactly because – we would suggest – the fact that such behaviour was presented as unacceptable to the advantaged outgroup. Our results seem to support our

interpretation of the tokenism phenomenon, especially when taking into consideration the different behavioural outcomes of being marginalized versus being excluded.

For instance, in Wright et al.'s study, the participants placed in the partially open group with a 30% quota and in the partially open group with a 2% quota – the token conditions – were less likely to endorse collective nonnormative action than those that faced the close group condition. We would suggest that the partially open conditions would be similar to a marginalization condition, and that the close group condition would correspond to a total exclusion condition. So, the fact that the participants endorse nonnormative collective action only in the close group condition (total exclusion condition) would, in the light of our results be due to the interpretation of such exclusion as a minimal standard violation. That is, it would not be tokenism per se (i.e., marginalization) that would act as a “buffer” against the display of nonnormative collective action, or in our wording destructive behaviour, but rather the interpretation of a rejection situation rather as a maximal standard violation.

Our research also extends a social identity perspective on destructive behaviour. There is considerable evidence that social identity theory's proposition that perceptions of boundary permeability and associated beliefs about the possibility of individual mobility from disadvantaged to advantaged group (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Wright et al., 1990) as well as the perceived stability of the current social order (e.g., Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990) both play key roles in the decision to engage in disruptive forms of collective action. Recent work by Scheepers and colleagues (2006) has provided evidence that a "nothing to lose" sense of desperation can emerge when strong feelings of illegitimate disadvantage are combined with no hope that things will change, and it is this desperation that produces the highest levels of more extreme collective actions by disadvantaged group members. While we agree that this analysis is reasonable, our approach adds another layer of complexity: While the reasoning of Scheepers et al. (2006) focuses on a subgroup identification, our results suggest that both the identification with the disadvantaged subgroup and with the superordinate category are relevant and that, in fact, it is the identification with the superordinate category that both motivates and refrains action. Within this frame, it may well be that the most extreme cases of destructive intergroup behaviour will emerge when a perception that the

advantaged group has violated a minimal standard in their treatment of the disadvantaged ingroup is combined with a sense that these violations are systemic and unlikely to change. Thus, our analysis provides a more precise description of the basis for strong feelings of illegitimate disadvantage which combines with what Scheepers and colleagues are calling "the nothing to lose" perceptions of stability to produce highly destructive intergroup behaviour.

Another way in which our research extends a social identity perspective on destructive behaviour becomes clear when considering the works of Simon and Klandermans (e.g., Simon, 2009; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). In line with these authors we believe that social (collective in the author's terminology) identity is of key importance in instigating collective action. We also propose that it is not enough to take into account the identification with the more immediate subgroup, but that identification with the superordinate category that encompasses the group endorsing the collective action, the target group of the action and even groups that are just external observers should also be taken into account. Differently from these authors, we do not suggest that social identity is also the goal of the collective action. We would rather propose that the goal of the destructive behaviour displayed by the disadvantaged is to legitimately punish the violation of a minimal standard perpetrated by the advantaged group. We acknowledge that such behaviour will protect the superordinate category and, ultimately, the social identity of the disadvantaged group. But such action is not carried out in first place in order to affirm such identity but rather to deter an unwanted, illegitimate behaviour that threatens both the disadvantaged subgroup and the superordinate category. Also according to the authors (see also Simon & Rush, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010), both identification with the immediate subgroup and identification with the superordinate category should be taken into account. This dual identification is, according to the authors, a politicized collective identity that entails behaviours that respect the normative frame derived from the superordinate category. In that sense, this politicized identity would not, in general, foster radical nonnormative behaviours (such radicalization could happen, for example, if a politicized identity is replaced by a radicalized identity in case an "... escalating dynamic is set in motion", p. 1354). In our argumentation, we also propose that identification with the superordinate category is important because the

superordinate category is the basis of normative reference. Differently from the authors we nevertheless suggest that it is not a radicalized identity that leads to nonnormative behaviour. We propose that when the disadvantaged group feels both identified with the ingroup and with the superordinate category and the advantaged group perpetrates a minimal standard violation, both the ingroup and the superordinate category are worth being protected by legitimately punishing the advantaged group. Such punishment assumes the form of destructive behaviour as the disadvantaged lack the power to exclude the advantaged perpetrator from the superordinate category. Also important in our argumentation is the fact that the destructive behaviour displayed by the disadvantaged group is considered nonnormative by the advantaged group and outside observers, but not by the disadvantaged group itself. More importantly, the disadvantaged group is taking such actions also in behalf of the superordinate category and as legitimate response to a transgression perpetrated by the advantaged group.

We further agree with the authors that what is (non)normative is defined with reference to a specific system, in our case the superordinate category and that there is some consensus about what is (non)normative and also some disagreement. The agreement allows for the superordinate category to be conceived as a common normative basis; the disagreement arises from different group perspectives and translates into ingroup projections. Nevertheless, we would propose that identities that facilitate radicalization do not "... allow or prescribe the adoption of political ends and/or means that lie outside the social system's limits of normative acceptance ..." (p. 1364). We would rather propose that there can be an alternative explanation for more radical forms of behaviours: Our data show that at least disadvantaged groups engaging in destructive behaviour are acting in response to violations of standards that they consider to be essential (minimal standards) particularly because of their identification with the superordinate category, and that they are engaging in what they perceive to be a normative, legitimate response to a violation of minimal standard perpetrated by an advantaged outgroup.

Finally, our research may also contribute to the understanding of more extreme forms of destructive behaviour such as terrorism. The literature on terrorism is still rather descriptive, characterizing stages or processes that can be observed prior to people's

actual engagement in destructive behaviour. We understand our approach as part of a theoretical endeavour that goes beyond such description as it attempts explaining destructive behaviour with reference to normative influence, higher-order social identities and goes beyond moral psychological processes. In that sense, terrorism, as well as milder forms of destructive behaviour, can be understood as a disadvantaged group's legitimate response to minimal standard violations perpetrated by advantaged groups. We would not suggest that our theoretical argumentation applies to all cases of terrorisms (or all cases of destructive behaviour), as it does not intend to explain the conceptual and motivational causes or reasons of each individual destructive act. But it provides a theoretical framework, empirically supported by our results, that allows for a conceptualization of such destructive behaviours taking into account the perspective of those engaging in them. This is especially relevant as those engaging in destructive behaviour, in our argumentation, not only understand it as necessary, but also as legitimate.

More concretely, our approach may be helpful for understanding why individuals engage in terrorism. For example, Kruglansky and Shevland (2010) discuss some of such motivations: There can be personal motivations such as a quest for personal meaning (Kruglansky & Fishman, 2009); ideological reasons such as obeying God's will; and a third category that would be especially relevant for the understanding of suicidal attacks. This latter category encompasses a "... sense of social duty or obligation, whether internalized or induced by social pressure." (p. 917). Our argumentation would complement such perspective by emphasizing the importance of social identities. Even though Kruglansky and Fishman (2009) state that "Acting on behalf of one's group perceived to be wronged (...) creates an opportunity for significance gain ..." (p. 14), we would suggest that significance gain comes from a positive group identity. Accordingly, in our theoretical reasoning, the punishment of the advantaged perpetrator is only adequate when the disadvantaged group feels identified with the superordinate category. In such cases, the minimal standard violations perpetrated by the advantaged are seen as threatening not only to the subgroup victim of the violation, but as threatening to the whole superordinate category. Therefore, there is a sense of obligation, but is not an

abstract feeling as presented by Kruglansky and Shevland (2010). It is a quite concrete obligation: To deter an unwanted behaviour and, thus, protect the superordinate category.

5.8 Practical, social and political implications

As behaviour within intergroup dynamics is often an act of communication and part of attempts to exercise social influence, understanding the motivations underlying its display is relevant not only in theoretical terms, but also in practical terms. This is especially true for more disruptive forms of behaviour, such as destructive behaviour as we define it. The recent years have provided us with numerous examples of this type of communication: The riots in France in October and in November of 2005 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_civil_unrest_in_France), the riots in London in August of 2011 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_England_riots), and the 2011 Norway attacks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Norway_attacks), just to name a few. From our theorising, these acts would be understood from the perspective of the perpetrators as legitimate responses to minimal standard violations committed by an advantaged majority. It might be painful from an outside perspective to engage in such an epistemic approach, but our data speak for the possibility that we will never understand such destructive behaviour if we do not consider that those involved in the riots or the attacks felt that they had to punish an advantaged perpetrator, not only to protect their subgroup, victim of the minimal standard violation, but also to protect the superordinate category, that is, the larger society, itself.

It is within this logic of reasoning that we also proposed in the theoretical introduction that it is possible that those engaged in terrorist acts are actually motivated by what they see to be the norms of the superordinate category (the larger society). Yet their interpretations of what acts are normative within this particular situation differ from the interpretations of the advantaged subgroup or outside observers. The perspectives of subgroups on what is normative within the superordinate category may differ because members of each subgroup will tend to project characteristics of their own ingroup onto the superordinate category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus et al., 2005; Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003). Thus, each subgroup will tend to see the

superordinate category as somewhat more similar to their own ingroup than to the other subgroups.

Amongst others, Moghaddam (2005) proposes a similar argument in his discussion of terrorism: Terrorists may appear morally disengaged from the point of view of the majority (Bandura, 1990), but they are – in contrast – particularly morally engaged, and their moral standards are not essentially different from those of the majority.

We acknowledge that the idea that violent actions can be understood by those engaging in them to be consistent with the normative values of the broader society may be difficult to accept, especially when considering concerns about terrorism. We only want to make the point that even when considering the most negative forms of behaviour, these are extremely negative from one of the perspectives, but perfectly adequate from the other, not although they are destructive, but exactly because they are destructive and intend to harm others.

Our analysis cannot directly inform the ethical evaluation of motivations for destructive behaviour: The same psychological processes might be involved in the motivation for partisan struggle to which the judgment of history will attribute the highest moral credentials, as in the motivation of terrorist action which history will consider the most condemnable atrocities committed by perpetrators who most probably hold extremely idiosyncratic convictions about what are violations of minimal standards within more inclusive superordinate categories. In practical terms, however, our reasoning has nevertheless several implications. It might provide disadvantaged groups with the conceptual tools to understand why certain ideologies that advocate for or against destructive actions appeal (or do not appeal) to their members. For advantaged dominant groups, our conclusion has much in common with political arguments that deny the idea that important ends (e.g., saving lives of innocents) can justify any means to achieve them (e.g., forcing detainees by torture to betray their central values and convictions). Transgressions of higher-order norms by those who are in power can lead to destructive responses and vicious circles of escalation of violence and conflict.

This thesis may help revitalize the discussion about what social exclusion is or might be and about how it may be felt and understood in the most varied situations. Beyond more structural and objective forms of exclusion, we can also conceive more identity-

related forms of exclusion that might occur when ideas about how a society should be are excluded from the political discourse. Such exclusion can be felt as a more severe form of exclusion than exclusion in economic terms. It translates into a “no voice” situation, which, although probably a more subtle form of exclusion, might be felt as more illegitimate than exclusion in socio-structural terms, as all members of a society should, at least, have an opinion on how society should be. Socio-structural (e.g., economic) exclusion on the other hand might be more easily acceptable if it is seen as an outcome of objective conditions, such as lower educational levels or poorer skills.

We would propose that another contribution of the present thesis refers to a classic, yet always current, topic: The impact of preconceptions. As social scientist we should not only be aware of them, but take them into account in our theorising. Ultimately we are studying perspectives. But we as researchers are not immune against the temptation to assume that the dominant perspective is the default one and defines common sense. Actually, that is exactly why a perspective becomes dominant. But there is always someone who does not share that perspective and it might be more informative to take such disagreeing perspectives into account than to simply dismiss it as deviant.

This is not a new argument – there is the work of Moscovici (e.g., 1985) about minority influence, the work of Tajfel (1978) on the psychology of minorities, and more recently the idea of a complex representation of a superordinate category as a strategic way for minorities to become more prototypical (e.g., Alexandre, 2010). But it is an important argument for the scope of the present thesis.

5.9 Limitations and future directions

Even though we already mentioned some studies-specific limitations, we also would like to point some transversal limitations, simplifications, etcetera that restrict the contribution of this thesis. As in previous research on that issue (e.g., Fritsche et al., 2009, Study 2), we encountered in our research very high correlations between minimal and maximal standard violations. We found such high correlation despite the clear theoretical distinction between the concepts and the fact that we heavily relied on the available theoretical background in order to build our measures. Several reasons might account for such juxtaposition. As we stated in the theoretical introduction, the concepts

of minimal and maximal standards might be both, conventionally defined and shared within a certain culture, but at the same time not perfectly fixed, but still open to variations as a function of individuals, situations and contexts. In our studies we usually placed participants in a situation in which there was some ambiguity in terms of how to interpret the standard violation. That is, while in social reality it might often be clear what is considered a minimal standard and what is considered a maximal standard, the standards in our studies allowed, for methodological reasons, to be considered as minimal or as maximal standards. In combination with the fact that we asked participants to independently evaluate the degree to which minimal and maximal standards are violated, such ambiguity might have produced covariation between these two judgments, as both were compared to the common counter-situation of no standard violation at all.

Another reason might be that using self-report measures as blatantly as we did might not be the ideal procedure to capture what actually counts as minimal standards. As minimal standards are usually not violated, they might not enter very often the focus of attention, so people might most of the time not even be aware of them.

Finally, taking into consideration the definitions of minimal and maximal standards/goals, we might consider that, in one's reasoning – and probably in one's daily life – what is necessary (minimal standards) is also desired (maximal standards), but that what is desired is not always necessary. For example, one might need a job. While such necessity to get a job can create a minimal standard (not getting it is unacceptable), this might also become a desired goal in the sense that the sooner one gets the job the better. Conversely, however, one might also desire to have a very well paid job. Yet this might not necessarily create a minimal goal in the sense that for being considered an active contributing member of society having a less well paid job might still be considered acceptable. That means that if measured with independent items that do not force participants to decide between the minimal and the maximal character of the standards/goals (see Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008), high endorsement of standards/goals framed as minimal might imply also their high endorsement of standards/goals when framed as maximal. Even if the opposite would not necessarily be the case, this relation will manifest itself in high correlations.

Nevertheless, despite these high correlations, our results reveal that, emotionally and behaviourally, facing a minimal standard violation is not the same as facing a maximal standard violation. Even if there is a large amount of shared variance, these concepts still have a unique contribution for the phenomenon under study. Even so, future research should strive for the construction of better measures for these concepts and for a better understanding of the dynamics underlying both of these concepts.

Other conceptual simplifications that were present throughout all of our studies were that we did not clearly distinguish between standards and goals in our theoretical reasoning, that we did not distinguish between particular forms of destructive behaviour (e.g., terrorism, political violence, vandalism, etcetera), and that we also did not distinguish between collective action and more individual forms of intergroup behaviour. Although not essential for the theoretical hypotheses of this research, these distinctions might be relevant for further developments of this approach.

Moreover, further developments might also more deeply consider the perspective of the advantaged dominant group. We actually did not include the advantaged groups' perspective in our studies as we were interested in destructive behaviour of disadvantaged groups. Therefore, in our theorising, the advantaged group only appeared as the perpetrator of exclusion and marginalization from the disadvantaged group's perspective. Not disregarding the negative impact that these forms of rejection and deprivation might have on those that suffer them, these do not exactly qualify as destructive behaviour as we define it. In that sense, our theorising and our studies do not address the display of destructive behaviour by advantaged, dominant groups. This might be an important issue to address: If in our theorising we link the display of destructive behaviour to the lack of power, one could predict that, under circumstances in which the advantaged feel less powerful they may also turn to destructive behaviour. Thus, political campaigns inducing feelings of threat and vulnerability of the dominant majority might be precursors of engagement in harmful destructive actions such as civil war or genocide. Considering that the advantaged usually have access to more resources, such destructive behaviour might have devastating outcomes.

5.10 Final remarks

This thesis introduces what we see to be a critical distinction between being prevented from reaching a minimal standard and being prevented from pursuing a maximal standard. As our results show, this distinction is important for predicting when members of disadvantaged groups will experience strong negative emotions and resort to (what the advantaged and outside observers consider) destructive behaviour and when they will undertake (what the advantaged and outside observers consider) more normative forms of collective action.

We understand our approach as part of a theoretical endeavour that attempts to explain destructive behaviour with reference to normative influences, higher-order social identities and going beyond moral psychological processes. Taking into account the different perspectives of subgroups on superordinate norms, our approach does not need to refer to abstract morals. Nor does it need the assumption that actors engage in distorted or group-specific idiosyncratic moral processes to explain destructive behaviour. As shown by our data, the fact that the participants playing in the ball toss game (Study 4) displayed destructive behaviour that was costly not only for the advantaged transgressor group but also for the disadvantaged ingroup, reveals that the actions displayed by the disadvantaged are not just an expression of ingroup favouritism.

This approach links destructive behaviour and negative emotions with a particular type of transgressions, the violation of minimal standards, committed by the advantaged dominant majority.

We also consider our data as strong support for our proposal that exclusion plays a role as an instance of minimal standard violation and, thus, as a trigger of negative emotions and destructive behaviour.

Therefore this approach also links destructive behaviour and negative emotions with a particular type of motivation: Punishing the violation of minimal standards committed by the advantaged dominant majority.

Importantly, these minimal standards are established by superordinate categories. Therefore, the negative emotions and destructive behaviour can be understood as motivated not only by membership in a disadvantaged group but also by perceived shared membership in a superordinate category. In this sense, our research shows that

destructive behaviour can be displayed towards those who are included in our own category. Our research shows that there is no need to cognitively recategorize those toward whom we will display destructive behaviour into an extreme social negative social category (e.g., delegitimization, Bar-Tal, 1990). In fact, we would suggest that, exactly because both the advantaged and the disadvantaged subgroups are members of the same superordinate category will the former be punished with destructive behaviour by the latter. This is so, as the disadvantaged wish to deter an unwanted behaviour: The violation of minimal standards of the superordinate category.

Overall, we believe our research contributes to the understanding of an unusual topic of research: When members of disadvantaged groups undertake destructive behaviour as a legitimate punishment for the advantaged groups' transgressions.

In the light of our findings the *Soweto uprising* can be understood as a disadvantaged group undertaking destructive behaviour as a legitimate punishment for advantaged groups' transgressions, which in this case was the introduction of Afrikaans as compulsory language in south-African schools. More generally, the suspicion with which advantaged dominant groups often look at some disadvantaged groups may be justified as long as there is the risk that members of those advantaged groups may be perceived by the disadvantaged as having violated some minimal standards of the superordinate category.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Study 1

List of measures, Portuguese version⁴⁸:

Example adapted for the Brazilian community



O Centro de Investigação e Intervenção Social (CIS) é um Centro de Estudos independente do Governo. O CIS analisa, entre outras coisas, as opiniões das pessoas e grupos acerca de outras pessoas e grupos. Interessa-nos o que as pessoas pensam acerca dos comportamentos, opiniões e pensamentos dos outros.

Assim, para conhecermos a sua opinião, pedimos que responda às perguntas que se seguem da forma que mais corresponde à sua opinião. Não há respostas certas ou erradas para o que perguntamos. Há apenas opiniões. É a sua opinião que nos interessa.

As perguntas que se seguem são sobre vários grupos a viver em Portugal, entre eles os Portugueses e os Brasileiros. Embora nem sempre seja fácil distinguir os Portugueses dos Brasileiros, aqui usamos estes nomes para simplificar. Quando falamos em Portugueses, estamos a falar de pessoas nascidas em Portugal e com pais também nascidos em Portugal. Quando falamos em Brasileiros, estamos a falar de pessoas nascidas no Brasil e com os pais também nascidos no Brasil. Vamos também fazer perguntas acerca da Sociedade Portuguesa, ou seja sobre TODAS as pessoas que vivem em Portugal. É importante que responda ao questionário seguindo a ordem das perguntas, ou seja, responda às perguntas pela ordem que lhe são apresentadas e nunca de outro modo (por exemplo: responder primeiro às últimas perguntas e só depois responder às primeiras perguntas).

As respostas ao questionário são voluntárias, ou seja, pode parar a qualquer momento de responder (se não se sentir bem a responder, por exemplo); e anónimas, ou seja, quem responde não deve escrever em nenhuma folha do questionário o seu nome ou morada.

Agradecemos a sua
colaboração!

Carla Esteves
(Investigadora do CIS/ISCTE- Lisboa)

⁴⁸ The original questionnaire included other measures that were not related to the purpose of this thesis, so we will only present those measures that were relevant for the purpose of this thesis and, thus, were used in the analyses.

Caracterização sócio-demográfica

Por favor, não escreva o seu nome.

Tendo em conta a apresentação dos grupos feita no texto em cima, considera-se:

Português(a)

Brasileiro(a)

Outro(a) _____ (por favor escreva qual)

1) Manipulation, minimal standard violation, housing scenario:

Leia o texto que se segue com atenção.

Por favor: tenha o cuidado de só responder às perguntas que se seguem ao texto se tiver percebido bem o texto.

Imagine-se a viver esta situação:

O Comité do Governo para a Habitação está a fazer planos para mudar as condições de habitação. O Comité tem uma proposta que diz que, para melhorar as condições de habitação em Portugal, o Plano de Erradicação das Barracas tem mesmo de continuar a ser cumprido. Ou seja, todos os bairros ou zonas onde ainda existam barracas têm de desaparecer, pois todas as barracas do país têm de ser destruídas. Esta proposta diz ainda que nem todas as pessoas vão ser realojadas em bairros sociais. Os imigrantes (ex.: Brasileiros) devem procurar eles próprios uma nova casa, pois não se garante que os imigrantes sejam colocados em casas de habitação social.

Pensando na situação da **alteração do realojamento**, diga-nos o que sente, como Brasileiro(a), ao imaginar viver esta situação. Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

2) Manipulation, maximal standard violation, housing scenario:

Leia o texto que se segue com atenção.

Por favor: tenha o cuidado de só responder às perguntas que se seguem ao texto se tiver percebido bem o texto.

Imagine-se a viver esta situação:

Há planos para mudar as condições de habitação em Portugal. Uma proposta diz que o Plano de Erradicação das Barracas tem mesmo de ser cumprido – ou seja, todas as barracas do país têm de ser destruídas – e que tem de se garantir que todas as pessoas que moram em bairros de barracas vão ser realojadas em bairros sociais. Tem de se garantir que todos os portugueses e imigrantes (ex.:Brasileiros) vão ter direito a casas de habitação social.

Esta proposta não foi aprovada pelo Comité do Governo para a Habitação, o que significa que não é certo que todas as pessoas que vivem em bairros de barracas – principalmente os imigrantes – sejam realojadas em bairros sociais.

Pensando na situação da **alteração do realojamento**, diga-nos o que sente, como Brasileiro(a), ao imaginar viver esta situação. Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

3) Manipulation, minimal standard violation, minimum salary scenario:

Leia o texto que se segue com atenção.

Por favor: tenha o cuidado de só responder às perguntas que se seguem ao texto se tiver percebido bem o texto.

Imagine-se a viver esta situação:

Actualmente todos os trabalhadores a viver em Portugal têm direito a receber o salário mínimo, mas o Comité Económico do Governo defende que, para Portugal crescer economicamente, esta situação tem de mudar. Este Comité defende que Portugal precisa de baixar os custos da mão-de-obra para poder crescer. Segundo este Comité, uma maneira de conseguir ter mão-de-obra mais barata é dar aos patrões a possibilidade de pagar menos do que o salário mínimo aos trabalhadores imigrantes (ex.: Brasileiros). Isto significa que os trabalhadores imigrantes poderão passar a receber um salário bastante inferior ao salário mínimo.

Pensando na **alteração do salário mínimo**, diga-nos o que sente, como Brasileiro(a), ao imaginar que esta situação vai acontecer. Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

4) Manipulation, maximal standard violation, minimum salary scenario:

Leia o texto que se segue com atenção.

Por favor: tenha o cuidado de só responder às perguntas que se seguem ao texto se tiver percebido bem o texto.

Imagine-se a viver esta situação:

Actualmente todos os trabalhadores a viver em Portugal têm direito a receber o salário mínimo, mas nem todos os trabalhadores o recebem mesmo. Para Portugal crescer economicamente esta situação tem de mudar. Para Portugal crescer é preciso garantir que todos os trabalhadores a viver em Portugal – portugueses e imigrantes (ex.: Brasileiros) – recebem o salário mínimo.

Esta proposta não foi aprovada pelo Comité Económico do Governo, o que significa que não é certo que todos os trabalhadores – principalmente imigrantes – recebam o salário mínimo.

Pensando na **alteração do salário mínimo**, diga-nos o que sente, como Brasileiro(a), ao imaginar que esta situação vai acontecer. Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

1) Measure of emotions

- Como Brasileiro(a), esta situação deixa-me:

Preocupado(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada preocupado(a)	Muito pouco preocupado(a)	Pouco preocupado(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco preocupado(a)	Preocupado(a)	Bastante preocupado(a)	Muito preocupado(a)

Calmo(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada calmo(a)	Muito pouco calmo(a)	Pouco calmo(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco calmo(a)	Calmo(a)	Bastante calmo(a)	Muito calmo(a)

Desesperado(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada desesperado(a)	Muito pouco desesperado(a)	Pouco desesperado(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco desesperado(a)	Desesperado(a)	Bastante desesperado(a)	Muito desesperado(a)

Ressentido(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada ressentido(a)	Muito pouco ressentido(a)	Pouco ressentido(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco ressentido(a)	Ressentido(a)	Bastante ressentido(a)	Muito ressentido(a)

Satisfeito(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada satisfeito(a)	Muito pouco satisfeito(a)	Pouco satisfeito(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco satisfeito(a)	Satisfeito(a)	Bastante satisfeito(a)	Muito satisfeito(a)

Furioso(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada furioso(a)	Muito pouco furioso(a)	Pouco furioso(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco furioso(a)	Furioso(a)	Bastante furioso(a)	Muito furioso(a)

Contente

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada contente	Muito pouco contente	Pouco contente	Nem muito, nem pouco contente	Contente	Bastante contente	Muito contente

2) Measure of behaviour

Muitas vezes ouvimos as pessoas ou grupos falarem de coisas que fizeram ou gostavam de fazer em determinadas situações. Nem sempre concordamos com o que ouvimos, mas há também opiniões mais parecidas com as nossas.

Em situações problemáticas até parece que percebemos melhor que as pessoas ou grupos tenham, às vezes, comportamentos e atitudes que, normalmente, não têm.

Pense de novo na situação sobre a **alteração do salário mínimo**. Como Brasileiro(a), que teria vontade de fazer numa situação dessas?

Escreva nas linhas que se seguem os comportamentos de que se lembrar (escreva apenas um comportamento em cada linha). Não use os quadrados ao lado das linhas. Esses quadrados vão ser usados só na próxima pergunta.

1) _____

2) _____

3) _____

4) _____

5) _____

6) _____

7) _____

8) _____

9) _____

10) _____

Em vez de terem comportamentos positivos e construtivos, muitas vezes as pessoas ou grupos estão em situações tão complicadas que têm mesmo comportamentos mais extremos. Ou seja, nessas situações as pessoas e grupos têm comportamentos que são destrutivos para todos à sua volta. Também nestas situações até parece que percebemos melhor que as pessoas ou grupos tenham comportamentos e atitudes que, normalmente, são consideradas inaceitáveis, porque vão contra a lei ou contra sentidos de moral.

Volte a pensar na situação da **alteração do salário mínimo**. Numa situação destas o que imagina que possa acontecer?

Escreva nas linhas que se seguem os comportamentos de que se lembrar (escreva apenas um comportamento em cada linha).

1) _____

2) _____

3) _____

4) _____

5) _____

6) _____

7) _____

8) _____

9) _____

10) _____

3) Measure of minimal and maximal standard violations

Agora, volte a pensar na situação em que se fala do **salário mínimo**. Relembre como se sentiu ao imaginar-se a viver nessa situação. Pensando no que sentiu, responda às seguintes perguntas:

- **"Para nós Brasileiros é indispensável receber o salário mínimo"**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- **"Para nós Brasileiros era bom receber o salário mínimo, mas sabemos que nem sempre é possível"**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- **"Para nós Brasileiros é absolutamente necessário receber o salário mínimo"**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- **"Para nós Brasileiros receber o salário mínimo era desejável, mas sabemos que nem sempre é assim"**







1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

4) Measure of identification with the ingroup

Observe as imagens que se seguem.

Imagine que o círculo grande representa os Brasileiros. E que o círculo pequeno o representa a si.

Olhando para as várias opções, escolha a imagem que, na sua opinião, melhor representa a proximidade que você sente com os Brasileiros. Faça um X no quadrado junto da imagem que escolher.




5) Measure of identification with the superordinate category

Observe as imagens que se seguem.

Imagine que o círculo grande representa a Sociedade Portuguesa. E que o círculo pequeno o representa a si.

Olhando para as várias opções, escolha a imagem que, na sua opinião, melhor representa a proximidade que você sente com a Sociedade Portuguesa. Faça um X no quadrado junto da imagem que escolher.



6) Socio-demographic data

Caracterização sócio-demográfica

Por favor, não escreva o seu nome.

Idade _____

Sexo _____

APPENDIX B

Study 2

List of measures, Portuguese version⁴⁹:

CIS - Centro de Investigação e Intervenção Social

Unidade de Investigação em Ciências Sociais/ISCTE

O Centro de Investigação e Intervenção Social (CIS) é um Centro de Estudos independente do Governo. O CIS analisa, entre outras coisas, as opiniões das pessoas e grupos acerca de acontecimentos que se dão no mundo. Interessa-nos o que as pessoas pensam acerca de determinados acontecimentos e situações.

Uma das situações recentes que nos interessa é o impacto da NOVA LEI DE PREVENÇÃO DO TABAGISMO, a Lei n.º 37/2007 de 14 de Agosto, que entrou em vigor a 1 de Janeiro de 2008.

É a sua opinião sobre esta nova Lei que gostaríamos de conhecer.

Assim, para conhecermos a sua opinião, pedimos que responda às perguntas que se seguem da forma que mais corresponde à sua opinião. Não há respostas certas ou erradas para o que perguntamos. Há apenas opiniões. É a sua opinião que nos interessa.

É importante que responda ao questionário seguindo a ordem das perguntas, ou seja, responda às perguntas pela ordem que lhe são apresentadas e nunca de outro modo (por exemplo: responder primeiro às últimas perguntas e só depois responder às primeiras perguntas).

As respostas ao questionário são voluntárias, ou seja, pode parar a qualquer momento de responder (se não se sentir bem a responder, por exemplo); e anónimas, ou seja, quem responde não deve escrever em nenhuma folha do questionário o seu nome ou morada.

Agradecemos
a sua colaboração!

Carla Esteves
(Investigadora do CIS/ISCTE- Lisboa)

⁴⁹ The original questionnaire included other measures that were not related to the purpose of this thesis, so we will only present those measures that were relevant for the purpose of this thesis and, thus, were used in the analyses.

1) Socio-demographic data

Antes de passarmos às questões, gostaríamos de lhe pedir alguns dados socio-demográficos.

Como já dissemos, trata-se de um questionário anónimo e apenas pretendemos recolher informações que nos permitam caracterizar os participantes deste estudo.

Idade _____

Sexo _____

Escolaridade _____

Naturalidade _____

É fumador(a)? Sim Não

2) Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence

Se é fumador(a), por favor responda ainda às questões sócio-demográficas que se seguem:

- Quanto tempo depois de acordar fuma o seu primeiro cigarro?

- Nos primeiros 5 minutos
- 6 a 30 minutos
- 31 a 60 minutos
- Após 60 minutos

- Acha difícil evitar fumar nos lugares onde é proibido?

- Sim
- Não

- Qual o cigarro que mais lhe custaria deixar de fumar?

- O primeiro da manhã
- Qualquer outro

- Quantos cigarros fuma por dia?

- 10 ou menos
- 11 a 20
- 21 a 30
- 31 ou mais

- Fuma mais frequentemente durante as primeiras horas após acordar do que durante o resto do dia?

- Sim
- Não

- Costuma fumar mesmo se estiver muito doente, e passar a maior parte do dia acamado?

- Sim
- Não

3) Measure of identification with the ingroup

Existem muitas formas de dizer quem somos e quando pensamos em nós e na nossa vida, podem ser muitas as dimensões em que pensamos e com que nos identificamos.

Claro que nem tudo na nossa vida tem o mesmo grau de importância e não nos identificamos do mesmo modo com todas as dimensões da nossa vida. Mas há dimensões que são para nós muito importantes – independentemente da opinião de outras pessoas.

Vai encontrar algumas frases que as pessoas habitualmente utilizam quando falam sobre si. Estamos interessados na sua opinião para cada uma delas. Para responder assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião

- Quando penso em mim ... :

" ... sinto-me solidário(a) com os fumadores "

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... sinto-me comprometido(a) com os fumadores "

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... sinto-me feliz de fazer parte do grupo de fumadores "

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... sinto que é agradável ser do grupo de fumadores "

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- Quando penso em mim ... :

" ... sinto que ser do grupo de fumadores é uma parte importante da minha identidade"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... sinto que ser do grupo de fumadores é uma parte importante da imagem que tenho de mim próprio(a)"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... sinto que tenho muito em comum com os fumadores típicos"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... sinto-me semelhante ao fumadores típicos"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... sinto que os fumadores têm muito em comum entre eles"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... sinto que os fumadores são muito semelhantes uns aos outros"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

1) Manipulation, minimal standard violation:

Leia o texto que se segue com atenção.

O texto que vai ler diz respeito à Nova Lei de Prevenção do Tabagismo e as informações que nele são apresentadas têm sido divulgadas pela Direcção Geral de Saúde (DGS).

Por favor: tenha o cuidado de só responder às perguntas se tiver percebido bem o texto.

Recorde a Lei n.º 37/2007 de 14 de Agosto (que entrou em vigor a 1 de Janeiro de 2008):

“A Lei n.º 37/2007 de 14 de Agosto estabelece, como regra geral, a proibição de fumar em espaços públicos fechados e locais de trabalho; tem em vista garantir a protecção da saúde dos frequentadores e trabalhadores nesses espaços e orienta-se pelos seguintes princípios: direito à protecção contra os riscos provocados pelo fumo do tabaco e o dever de não poluir o ar em ambientes fechados.

Passa a ser proibido fumar nos serviços da Administração Pública; nos estabelecimentos de saúde e de ensino, bem como em espaços destinados a menores de 18 anos; locais de trabalho; meios de transporte; centros comerciais; estabelecimentos de restauração, incluindo bares e discotecas; museus; bibliotecas; salas de espectáculos; recintos de desporto fechados; aeroportos; estações ferroviárias, rodoviárias, marítimas e fluviais; recintos de feiras e exposições; parques de estacionamento cobertos e outros locais de atendimento directo ao público.

Em caso de incumprimento da Lei, existem coimas. Entre elas: de 50 a 750 euros para o fumador que fume em locais proibidos; de 50 a 1 000 euros para os responsáveis que não determinem aos fumadores que se abstenham de fumar e que não chamem as autoridades, se necessário.”

Fonte: DGS

Como todos os Países da Europa, também Portugal segue as directivas Comunitárias que dizem respeito à Prevenção do Tabagismo. Estas directivas são indicadas pelo Comité Europeu para a ‘Luta contra o Tabagismo’.

De acordo com as indicações deste Comité, a Nova Lei de Prevenção do Tabagismo que vigora em Portugal trata-se apenas de uma preparação para uma Lei mais rígida e restritiva.

De acordo com este Comité a próxima Lei de Prevenção do Tabagismo procurará:

- banir os fumadores de locais públicos e locais de trabalho fechados e ventilados
- banir os fumadores das áreas ao ar livre contíguas aos locais públicos e locais de trabalho fechados, podendo os fumadores apenas fumar a 10m das portas e janelas desses locais
- banir os fumadores de locais públicos ao ar livre, como esplanadas, áreas de serviço e postos de abastecimento de combustível, parques de merendas, ruas nas imediações de espaços destinados a menores de 18 anos (como escolas)

Com estes planos, o Comité Europeu de ‘Luta contra o Tabagismo’ pretende aproximar as medidas de prevenção do tabagismo em vigor em Portugal – e na restante Europa - das medidas que vigoram em países cuja tradição de prevenção do tabagismo é mais longa (como os Estados Unidos ou o Canadá).

2) Manipulation, maximal standard violation:

Leia o texto que se segue com atenção.

O texto que vai ler diz respeito à Nova Lei de Prevenção do Tabagismo e as informações que nele são apresentadas têm sido divulgadas pela Direcção Geral de Saúde (DGS).

Por favor: tenha o cuidado de só responder às perguntas se tiver percebido bem o texto.

Recorde a Lei n.º 37/2007 de 14 de Agosto (que entrou em vigor a 1 de Janeiro de 2008):

“A Lei n.º 37/2007 de 14 de Agosto estabelece, como regra geral, a proibição de fumar em espaços públicos fechados e locais de trabalho; tem em vista garantir a protecção da saúde dos frequentadores e trabalhadores nesses espaços e orienta-se pelos seguintes princípios: direito à protecção contra os riscos provocados pelo fumo do tabaco e o dever de não poluir o ar em ambientes fechados.

Passa a ser proibido fumar nos serviços da Administração Pública; nos estabelecimentos de saúde e de ensino, bem como em espaços destinados a menores de 18 anos; locais de trabalho; meios de transporte; centros comerciais; estabelecimentos de restauração, incluindo bares e discotecas; museus; bibliotecas; salas de espectáculos; recintos de desporto fechados; aeroportos; estações ferroviárias, rodoviárias, marítimas e fluviais; recintos de feiras e exposições; parques de estacionamento cobertos e outros locais de atendimento directo ao público.

Em caso de incumprimento da Lei, existem coimas. Entre elas: de 50 a 750 euros para o fumador que fume em locais proibidos; de 50 a 1 000 euros para os responsáveis que não determinem aos fumadores que se abstenham de fumar e que não chamem as autoridades, se necessário.”

Fonte: DGS

Como todos os Países da Europa, também Portugal segue as directivas Comunitárias que dizem respeito à Prevenção do Tabagismo. Estas directivas são indicadas pelo Comité Europeu para a ‘Luta contra o Tabagismo’.

De acordo com as indicações deste Comité, a Nova Lei de Prevenção do Tabagismo que vigora em Portugal trata-se apenas de uma preparação para uma Lei mais rígida e restritiva.

De acordo com este Comité a próxima Lei de Prevenção do Tabagismo procurará:

- afastar os fumadores de locais públicos e locais de trabalho fechados e ventilados
- afastar os fumadores das áreas ao ar livre contíguas aos locais públicos e locais de trabalho fechados, podendo os fumadores apenas fumar a 10m das portas e janelas desses locais
- afastar os fumadores de locais públicos ao ar livre, como esplanadas, áreas de serviço e postos de abastecimento de combustível, parques de merendas, ruas nas imediações de espaços destinados a menores de 18 anos (como escolas)

Com estes planos, o Comité Europeu de ‘Luta contra o Tabagismo’ pretende aproximar as medidas de prevenção do tabagismo em vigor em Portugal – e na restante Europa - das medidas que vigoram em países cuja tradição de prevenção do tabagismo é mais longa (como os Estados Unidos ou o Canadá).

4) Measure of emotions

Continuando a recordar a informação que leu, e pensando nos **novos planos para a Prevenção do Tabagismo**, diga-nos o que sente como fumador(a).

Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

- Como fumador(a), os novos planos para a Prevenção do Tabagismo deixam-me:

Calmo(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada calmo(a)	Muito pouco calmo(a)	Pouco calmo(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco calmo(a)	Calmo(a)	Bastante calmo(a)	Muito calmo(a)

Desesperado(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada desesperado(a)	Muito pouco desesperado(a)	Pouco desesperado(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco desesperado(a)	Desesperado(a)	Bastante desesperado(a)	Muito desesperado(a)

Contente

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada contente	Muito pouco contente	Pouco contente	Nem muito, nem pouco contente	Contente	Bastante contente	Muito contente

Ressentido(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada ressentido(a)	Muito pouco ressentido(a)	Pouco ressentido(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco ressentido(a)	Ressentido(a)	Bastante ressentido(a)	Muito ressentido(a)

Entusiasmado(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada entusiasmado(a)	Muito pouco entusiasmado(a)	Pouco entusiasmado(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco entusiasmado(a)	Entusiasmado (a)	Bastante entusiasmado(a)	Muito entusiasmado(a)

Furioso(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada furioso(a)	Muito pouco furioso(a)	Pouco furioso(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco furioso(a)	Furioso(a)	Bastante furioso(a)	Muito furioso(a)

Animado(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada animado(a)	Muito pouco animado(a)	Pouco animado(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco animado(a)	Animado(a)	Bastante animado(a)	Muito animado(a)

- Como fumador(a), os novos planos para a Prevenção do Tabagismo deixam-me:

Frustrado(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada frustrado(a)	Muito pouco frustrado(a)	Pouco frustrado(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco frustrado(a)	Frustrado(a)	Bastante frustrado(a)	Muito frustrado(a)

Satisfeito(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada satisfeito(a)	Muito pouco satisfeito(a)	Pouco satisfeito(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco satisfeito(a)	Satisfeito(a)	Bastante satisfeito(a)	Muito satisfeito(a)

Indignado(a)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada indignado(a)	Muito pouco indignado(a)	Pouco indignado(a)	Nem muito, nem pouco indignado(a)	Indignado(a)	Bastante indignado(a)	Muito indignado(a)

5) Measure of behaviour

Muitas vezes ouvimos as pessoas ou grupos falarem de coisas que fizeram ou gostavam de fazer em determinadas situações. Nem sempre concordamos com o que ouvimos, mas há também opiniões mais parecidas com as nossas.

Em situações problemáticas até parece que percebemos melhor que as pessoas ou grupos tenham, às vezes, comportamentos e atitudes que, normalmente, não têm.

Volte a pensar nos **novos planos de Prevenção do Tabagismo**. Como Fumador(a), o que teria vontade de fazer numa situação destas?

Escreva nas linhas que se seguem os comportamentos de que se lembrar (por favor escreva apenas um comportamento em cada linha). Use apenas as linhas. Os quadrados que se encontram junto das linhas serão usados nas próximas questões.

1) _____

2) _____

3) _____

4) _____

5) _____

6) _____

7) _____

8) _____

9) _____

10) _____

Being in or being out

Em vez de terem comportamentos positivos e construtivos, muitas vezes as pessoas ou grupos estão em situações tão complicadas que têm mesmo comportamentos mais extremos. Ou seja, nessas situações as pessoas e grupos têm comportamentos que são destrutivos para todos à sua volta. Também nestas situações há vezes até parece que percebemos melhor que as pessoas ou grupos tenham comportamentos e atitudes que, normalmente, são consideradas inaceitáveis porque vão contra a lei ou contra sentidos de moral.

Volte a pensar nos **novos planos de Prevenção do Tabagismo**. Numa situação destas o que imagina que possa acontecer?

Escreva nas linhas que se seguem os comportamentos de que se lembrar (por favor, escreva apenas um comportamento em cada linha). Use apenas as linhas. Os quadrados que se encontram junto das linhas serão usados nas próximas questões.

1) _____

2) _____

3) _____

4) _____

5) _____

6) _____

7) _____

8) _____

9) _____

10) _____

6) Measure of perceived exclusion

Continuando a pensar nos novos planos de Prevenção do Tabagismo, lembre como se sente quando pensa nesses plano.

Pensando no que sente, responda às seguintes perguntas:

- "Eu, como fumador(a), sinto-me excluído(a) dos locais públicos"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada excluídos	Muito pouco excluídos	Pouco excluídos	Nem muito, nem pouco excluídos	Excluídos	Bastante excluídos	Muito excluídos

- "Eu sinto que nós fumadores estamos excluídos dos locais públicos"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada excluídos	Muito pouco excluídos	Pouco excluídos	Nem muito, nem pouco excluídos	Excluídos	Bastante excluídos	Muito excluídos

7) Measure of minimal and maximal standard violations

Continuando a pensar nos novos planos de Prevenção do Tabagismo, lembre como se sente quando pensa nesses plano.

Pensando no que sente, responda às seguintes perguntas:

- “Para nós fumadores é indispensável poder fumar nos locais públicos”

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- “Para nós fumadores era bom poder fumar nos locais públicos, mas sabemos que nem sempre é possível”

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- “Para nós fumadores é absolutamente necessário poder fumar nos locais públicos”

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- “Para nós fumadores poder fumar nos locais públicos era desejável, mas sabemos que nem sempre é assim”

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- “Para nós fumadores não poder fumar nos locais públicos é inaceitável”

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "Para nós fumadores não poder fumar nos locais públicos deveria ser uma exceção"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "Para nós fumadores não poder fumar nos locais públicos não deveria ser acontecer nunca"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "Para nós fumadores não poder fumar nos locais públicos deveria ser regra o menos frequentemente possível"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

APPENDIX C

Study 3

Ball toss presentation, Portuguese version:

O jogo 'Bola Virtual' é um jogo simples:

- há duas Equipas em jogo, a Equipa AMARELA e a Equipa AZUL*
- cada jogador recebe 5€ pela sua participação no jogo*
- o objectivo do jogo é receber a 'Bola Virtual' o maior número de vezes possível*
- cada vez que um jogador recebe a 'Bola Virtual', a sua Equipa recebe 0,10€.*

ATENÇÃO: *as equipas não recebem 0,10€ automaticamente.*

Para terem direito a receber este valor, as equipas têm de receber pelo menos 3 vezes a bola.



Ou seja, só depois de receberem a bola 3 vezes é que as equipas começam a acumular 0.10€.



As equipas que não receberem pelo menos 3 vezes a bola não acumulam 0,10€ cada vez que os seus jogadores receberem a bola.



*- no final do jogo – e nunca ultrapassando um total **máximo de 10€** -, cada jogador(a) recebe: os 5€ iniciais + o montante que a sua Equipa tiver acumulado no decorrer do jogo, dividido pelo número de jogadores que constituem a Equipa (por exemplo: se a Equipa tiver acumulado 6€ durante o jogo e se a equipa for constituída por 3 jogadores, cada jogador receberá 2€)*

- Comandos:

- pode escolher para que jogador quer passar a 'Bola Virtual': clique – com o botão esquerdo do rato – sobre o ícone com a identificação do jogador para quem pretende passar a bola.

- pode usar o ícone  para, a qualquer momento do jogo, retirar dinheiro a TODOS os participantes do jogo. Cada vez que carregar no ícone , TODOS os participantes do jogo perdem 0,05€ do dinheiro que tiverem acumulado até ao momento. Pode usar esta tecla até todos os participantes ficarem com 0€. Quando todos os participantes ficarem com 0€, ACABA o jogo para TODOS.

- pode usar o ícone  para, a qualquer momento do jogo, retirar TODO o dinheiro a TODOS os participantes do jogo. Ao usar o ícone , todos participantes ficam com 0€ e ACABA o jogo para TODOS.


- pode desistir do jogo a qualquer momento. Basta usar o ícone . O jogo terminará para si, mas continuará para os restantes jogadores. Se usar o ícone  receberá apenas 5€ pela sua participação no jogo (não receberá o dinheiro acumulado durante o jogo).

- Extras do jogo:

- pode usar frases e ícones expressivos para comunicar durante o jogo: pode escolher entre os vários ícones expressivos e frases que lhe são apresentados:
- pode usar os ícones expressivos e as frases para comunicar só com os membros da sua Equipa, usando a zona da comunicação privada (Chat Privado da Equipa)
- pode usar os ícones expressivos e as frases para comunicar com todos os participantes, usando a zona da comunicação pública (Eventos - Chat Público)


- Outras informações:

- a participação no jogo é anónima: apenas serão pedidos dados socio-demográficos que permitam caracterizar os jogadores do 'Bola Virtual'
- a participação no jogo é voluntária: pode abandonar o jogo a qualquer momento (se se sentir desconfortável com o jogo, por exemplo)
- em situações excepcionais pode também comunicar com o investigador: basta enviar-lhe um

email, usando o ícone .

- no final do jogo faremos algumas perguntas acerca da sua participação no jogo
- Antes do jogo propriamente dito, vai ter a oportunidade de experimentar o jogo, numa sessão de treino simulada. Nesta sessão de treino, o computador vai ligar-se ao servidor e você vai participar num jogo virtual em que vai jogar com o servidor. Você vai ser o único jogador real; os restantes jogadores serão simulados.
- Quando se sentir preparado(a) para começar a sessão de treino clique – com o botão esquerdo do rato – no botão abaixo.

Print screen of a ball toss trial session:



Esta é a SESSÃO X do 'Bola Virtual'

- Estamos a desenvolver este jogo em parceria com equipas de investigação de laboratórios de outras Universidades Portuguesas. Por isso é importante que participantes de locais diferentes possam ter acesso ao jogo. É por esta razão que usamos um jogo online.

- Para podermos ter participantes de locais diferentes a participar num mesmo jogo, o servidor vai ligar-se aos participantes que estão nos laboratórios dessas Universidades Portuguesas.

- Pedimos-lhe que se concentre ao máximo no jogo e que evite qualquer forma de distracção.

- **Quando se sentir preparado/a para começar o jogo avise o investigador e aguarde as suas instruções.**

Por favor, **NÃO** clique no botão abaixo antes de lhe ser dada essa instrução! O botão abaixo inicia o jogo.

Print screen of a ball toss game session:

The screenshot displays a game interface for a ball toss session. At the top left, it shows 'Sessão 1127' and a list of player names and scores: 0.075€ : AM4, 0.075€ : AM3, 0.075€ : AM2, and 0.075€ : AM1. Below this, the 'Equipa Amarela' has a score of 0.3€ and the 'Equipa Azul' has a score of 0.2€. The main game area features a central soccer ball with four yellow player icons (AM1, AM2, AM3, AM4) and two blue player icons (A1, A2) arranged in a circle. A gear icon is visible in the top right of the game area. At the bottom of the game area, there are buttons for 'Amarelo 1', 'Amarelo 2', 'Amarelo 3', 'Amarelo 4', and 'Azul 2'. To the right, there are two chat windows: 'Eventos - Chat Público' and 'Chat Privado da Equipa'. The public chat window contains a list of events: 'Jogada de A1', 'A1 jogou', 'Vez de A2', 'A2 jogou', 'Vez de AM3', 'AM3 jogou', 'Vez de AM1', 'AM1 jogou', 'Vez de AM3', 'AM3 jogou', 'Vez de AM1', and 'AM1 jogou'. A soccer ball is partially visible on the right edge of the screenshot.

List of measures, Portuguese version⁵⁰:

1) Measure of emotions

Gostaríamos, agora, de saber a sua opinião sobre vários aspectos desta experiência:

- sobre o jogo propriamente dito,
- sobre a participação das equipas,
- e sobre os jogadores com que teve oportunidade de participar no jogo.

Começamos por lhe pedir que:

Pensando no jogo em que acaba de participar, pense em como se sentiu durante o jogo.

O que se lembra de ter sentido durante o jogo?

Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde ao que sentiu.

- DURANTE O JOGO, senti-me:

Calmo/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada calmo/a	Muito pouco calmo/a	Pouco calmo/a	Nem muito, nem pouco calmo/a	Calmo/a	Bastante calmo/a	Muito calmo/a

Desesperado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada desesperado/a	Muito pouco desesperado/a	Pouco desesperado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco desesperado/a	Desesperado/a	Bastante desesperado/a	Muito desesperado/a

Contente

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada contente	Muito pouco contente	Pouco contente	Nem muito, nem pouco contente	Contente	Bastante contente	Muito contente

Ressentido/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada ressentido/a	Muito pouco ressentido/a	Pouco ressentido/a	Nem muito, nem pouco ressentido/a	Ressentido/a	Bastante ressentido/a	Muito ressentido/a

⁵⁰ The original questionnaire included other measures that were not related to the purpose of this thesis, so we will only present those measures that were relevant for the purpose of this thesis and, thus, were used in the analyses.

Being in or being out

Entusiasmado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada entusiasmado/a	Muito pouco entusiasmado/a	Pouco entusiasmado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco entusiasmado/a	Entusiasmado /a	Bastante entusiasmado/a	Muito entusiasmado/a

Furioso/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada furioso/a	Muito pouco furioso/a	Pouco furioso/a	Nem muito, nem pouco furioso/a	Furioso/a	Bastante furioso/a	Muito furioso/a

Animado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada animado/a	Muito pouco animado/a	Pouco animado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco animado/a	Animado/a	Bastante animado/a	Muito animado/a

Frustrado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada frustrado/a	Muito pouco frustrado/a	Pouco frustrado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco frustrado/a	Frustrado/a	Bastante frustrado/a	Muito frustrado/a

Culpado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada culpado/a	Muito pouco culpado/a	Pouco culpado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco culpado/a	Culpado/a	Bastante culpado/a	Muito culpado/a

Com medo

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

Satisfeito/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada satisfeito/a	Muito pouco satisfeito/a	Pouco satisfeito/a	Nem muito, nem pouco satisfeito/a	Satisfeito/a	Bastante satisfeito/a	Muito satisfeito/a

2) Measure of minimal and maximal standards violations

Continuando a pensar no jogo em que acaba de participar, relembre toda a situação do jogo.
Como foi a situação do jogo?

Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

- Para mim, a situação do jogo foi:

- "... absolutamente inaceitável"

O	o
Sim	Não

- "... uma situação que, sempre que possível, devia ser evitada"

O	o
Sim	Não

- "... uma situação que não deveria acontecer nunca"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "... uma situação que deveria ser evitada tanto quanto possível"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

3) Measure of perceived exclusion

Continuando a pensar no jogo em que acaba de participar, relembre a situação do jogo e a sua participação.

Como vê a sua participação no jogo?

Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

DURANTE O JOGO, eu senti que :

- "... a minha Equipa participou no jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "... a minha Equipa estava excluída do jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "... a minha Equipa teve uma participação marginal no jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

Continuando a pensar no jogo em que acaba de participar, relembre a situação do jogo e a participação da sua Equipa.

Como vêem os outros jogadores da Equipa AZUL a participação da vossa Equipa?

Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

Independentemente do que eu penso, DURANTE O JOGO ...:

- "... os outros jogadores da Equipa AZUL sentiram que a nossa Equipa participou no jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "... os outros jogadores da Equipa AZUL sentiram que a nossa Equipa estava excluída do jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "... os outros jogadores da Equipa AZUL sentiram que a nossa Equipa teve uma participação marginal no jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

Continuando a pensar no jogo em que acaba de participar, relembre a situação do jogo e a participação da sua Equipa.

Como acha que a participação da sua Equipa no jogo foi vista pela Equipa AMARELA?
Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

Acho que, DURANTE O JOGO ...:

- "... a Equipa AMARELA pensou que a minha Equipa participou no jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "... a Equipa AMARELA pensou que a minha Equipa estava excluída do jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "... a Equipa AMARELA pensou que a minha Equipa teve uma participação marginal no jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

4) Measure of identification with ingroup

Como dissemos, na nossa vida há todo o tipo de situações, pessoas e grupos: há situações rotineiras, outras novas; há pessoas e grupos que conhecemos melhor, outros pior e há situações que nos aproximam ou afastam de outras pessoas ou grupos.

E mesmo em encontros muitos curtos, com condições de contacto muito limitadas, as pessoas são ótimas formadoras de impressões, tendo boas intuições acerca de outras pessoas ou grupos.

Pensando jogadores que participaram no 'Bola Virtual', diga-nos o que sentiu em relação a esses jogadores durante o jogo.

Pense nos jogadores da Equipa AZUL.

O que sentiu relativamente aos jogadores da Equipa AZUL?

- DURANTE O JOGO, e pensando nos jogadores da Equipa AZUL ... :

" ... senti-me solidário/a com a Equipa AZUL"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti-me comprometido/a com a Equipa AZUL"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti-me feliz de ser da Equipa AZUL"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que era agradável ser da Equipa AZUL"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que ser da Equipa AZUL era uma parte importante da minha identidade"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que ser da Equipa AZUL era uma parte importante da imagem que tinha de mim próprio/a"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que tinha muito em comum com os jogadores típicos da Equipa AZUL"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti-me semelhante aos jogadores típicos da Equipa AZUL"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que os jogadores da Equipa AZUL tinham muito em comum entre eles"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que os jogadores da Equipa AZUL eram muito semelhantes uns aos outros"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

5) Measure of identification with the superordinate category

Pensando agora nos Jogadores da Sessão X do 'Bola Virtual', diga-nos o que sentiu em relação a esses jogadores durante o jogo.

O que sentiu relativamente aos Jogadores da Sessão X?

- DURANTE O JOGO, e pensando nos Jogadores da Sessão X ... :

" ... senti-me solidário/a com os Jogadores da Sessão X"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti-me comprometido/a com os Jogadores da Sessão X"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti-me feliz de ser um d os Jogadores da Sessão X"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que era agradável ser um d os Jogadores da Sessão X"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que ser um d os Jogadores da Sessão X era uma parte importante da minha identidade"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que ser um d os Jogadores da Sessão X era uma parte importante da imagem que tinha de mim próprio/a"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que tinha muito em comum com os jogadores típicos da Sessão X"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti-me semelhante aos jogadores típicos da Sessão X"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que os jogadores da Sessão X tinham muito em comum entre eles"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... senti que os jogadores da Sessão X eram muito semelhantes uns aos outros"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

6) Socio-demographic data

- Para finalizar alguns dados socio-demográficos :

Por favor, não escreva o seu nome.

Idade _____

Sexo _____

Universidade que frequenta _____

Curso que frequenta _____

Ano (do curso) que frequenta _____

Naturalidade _____

APPENDIX D

Study 4

Print screen of the ball toss presentation, Portuguese version:

1) Manipulation, minimal standard mindset priming:

Bem-vindo/a

Vamos pedir a sua colaboração para duas tarefas:

- 1) vamos pedir-lhe que complete uma pequena tarefa destinada a avaliar a coordenação sensorio-motora
- 2) vamos pedir-lhe que nos ajude a testar um jogo, o 'Bola Virtual'

Passamos a apresentar a **primeira tarefa** para a qual pedimos a sua colaboração:

Por favor, leia atentamente as instruções que se seguem e tente concentrar-se completamente na tarefa.

A tarefa é simples:

Imagine: É Verão e um rato pequeno passeia com muita fome através do seu território. De repente, ele é como que magneticamente atraído pelo aroma sedutor do seu queijo favorito.

Deve ajudar o rato a matar a sua grande fome. Encontre rapidamente **um caminho através do labirinto**. Só se encontrar o caminho até ao queijo, é que o rato fica com o queijo; senão o rato fica com fome.

Quando se sentir preparado/a para começar a tarefa, peça ao/à investigador/a que se encontra na sala para lhe entregar a folha com o labirinto.

Assim que terminar esta tarefa, e para poder passar ao jogo 'Bola Virtual', clique - com o botão esquerdo do rato - no botão abaixo.



2) Manipulations, maximal standard mindset priming:

Bem-vindo/a

Vamos pedir a sua colaboração para duas tarefas:

- 1) vamos pedir-lhe que complete uma pequena tarefa destinada a avaliar a coordenação sensorio-motora
- 2) vamos pedir-lhe que nos ajude a testar um jogo, o 'Bola Virtual'

Passamos a apresentar a **primeira tarefa** para a qual pedimos a sua colaboração:

Por favor, leia atentamente as instruções que se seguem e tente concentrar-se completamente na tarefa.

A tarefa é simples:

Imagine: É Verão e um rato pequeno passeia com muita fome através do seu território. De repente, ele é como que magneticamente atraído pelo aroma sedutor do seu queijo favorito.

Deve ajudar o rato a matar a sua grande fome. Encontre **um caminho tão rápido e tão longe quanto possível através do labirinto.**

Quanto mais longe chegar no labirinto, tanto mais queijo fica para o rato.

Quando se sentir preparado/a para começar a tarefa, peça ao/à investigador/a que se encontra na sala para lhe entregar a folha com o labirinto.

Assim que terminar esta tarefa, e para poder passar ao jogo 'Bola Virtual', clique - com o botão esquerdo do rato - no botão abaixo.




Feito o teste de coordenação sensorio-motora, pedimos a sua colaboração para um outro estudo.

Passamos, então, agora à **segunda tarefa**:

Bem-vindo/a ao jogo 'Bola Virtual'!

O jogo 'Bola Virtual' é um jogo simples:

- há duas Equipas em jogo, a Equipa **AMARELA** e a Equipa **AZUL**
- o objectivo do jogo é receber a 'Bola Virtual' o maior número de vezes possível
- ambas as Equipas começam o jogo com um saldo de 0,20€
- durante o jogo, cada vez que um jogador recebe a 'Bola Virtual', a sua Equipa recebe 0,10€
Atenção: as equipas não recebem 0,10€ automaticamente. Para terem direito a receber este valor, as equipas têm de receber pelo menos 3 vezes a bola. Ou seja, só depois de receberem a bola 3 vezes é que as equipas começam a acumular 0,10€.
As equipas que não receberem pelo menos 3 vezes a bola não acumulam 0,10€ cada vez que os seus jogadores receberem a bola.
- o jogo terá a duração média de **5 minutos**
- no final do jogo - e nunca ultrapassando um total **máximo de 3€** -, cada jogador/a recebe:
 - o montante que a sua Equipa tiver acumulado no decorrer do jogo, dividido pelo número de jogadores que constituem a Equipa (por exemplo: se a Equipa tiver acumulado 3€ durante o jogo e se a equipa for constituída por 3 jogadores, cada jogador receberá 1€)



Comandos do jogo:

Número 3 - Com este ícone (e outros semelhantes) pode escolher para que jogador quer passar a 'Bola Virtual'.

Clique - com o botão esquerdo do rato - sobre o ícone com a identificação do jogador para quem pretende passar a bola.



- Com este ícone pode, a qualquer momento do jogo, retirar dinheiro a TODOS os participantes do jogo.

Cada vez que carregar neste ícone, TODOS os participantes do jogo perdem 0,10€ do dinheiro que tiverem acumulado até ao momento. Pode usar esta opção até todos os participantes ficarem com 0€. Quando todos os participantes ficarem com 0€, ACABA o jogo para TODOS.




- Com este ícone pode, a qualquer momento do jogo, retirar TODO o dinheiro a TODOS os participantes do jogo.

Ao usar este ícone, todos participantes ficam com 0€ e ACABA o jogo para TODOS.



- Com este ícone pode desistir do jogo a qualquer momento.

O jogo terminará para si, mas continuará para os restantes jogadores.




Extras do jogo:


- pode usar frases e ícones expressivos para comunicar durante o jogo:
pode escolher entre os vários ícones expressivos e frases que lhe são apresentados:

- pode usar os ícones expressivos e as frases para comunicar só com os membros da sua Equipa, usando a zona da comunicação privada (Chat Privado da Equipa)


- pode usar os ícones expressivos e as frases para comunicar com todos os participantes, usando a zona da comunicação pública (Eventos - Chat Público)


Para usar estes ícones e frases, clique com o botão esquerdo do rato sobre o ícone .

Depois de clicar no ícone de , abre-se uma janela onde vai poder ver os ícones expressivos e as frases que pode escolher.




Outras informações:

- a participação no jogo é anónima: apenas serão pedidos dados socio-demográficos que permitam caracterizar os jogadores do 'Bola Virtual'
- a participação no jogo é voluntária: pode abandonar o jogo a qualquer momento (se se sentir desconfortável com o jogo, por exemplo)
- em situações excepcionais pode também comunicar com o investigador:
basta enviar-lhe um email, usando o ícone .
- no final do jogo faremos algumas perguntas acerca da sua participação no jogo
- Antes do jogo propriamente dito, vai ter a oportunidade de experimentar o jogo, numa sessão de treino simulada. Nesta sessão de treino, o computador vai ligar-se ao servidor e você vai participar num jogo virtual em que vai jogar com o servidor. Você vai ser o único jogador real; os restantes jogadores serão simulados.
- Quando se sentir preparado/a para começar a sessão de treino clique - com o botão esquerdo do rato - no botão abaixo



Print screen of a ball toss trial:



Vamos agora DAR INÍCIO ao jogo propriamente dito.

Por isso ...

Bem-vindo ao jogo 'Bola Virtual'!

Esta é a SESSÃO 1132 do 'Bola Virtual'


- Estamos a desenvolver este jogo em parceria com equipas de investigação de laboratórios de outras Universidades Portuguesas. Por isso é importante que participantes de locais diferentes possam ter acesso ao jogo. É por esta razão que usamos um jogo online.

- Para podermos ter participantes de locais diferentes a participar num mesmo jogo, o servidor vai ligar-se aos participantes que estão nos laboratórios dessas Universidades Portuguesas.

- Pedimos-lhe que se concentre ao máximo no jogo e que evite qualquer forma de distração.

- **Quando se sentir preparado/a para começar o jogo avise o investigador e aguarde as suas instruções.**

Por favor, **NÃO** clique no botão abaixo antes de lhe ser dada essa instrução! O botão abaixo inicia o jogo.



Print screen of a ball toss game session:

Sessão 1127 0.075€ : AM4
0.075€ : AM3
Equipa Amarela 0.3C 0.075€ : AM2
0.075€ : AM1

A2: 0.1€
A1: 0.1€

Equipa Azul
0.2C

AM1 AM2
A1 A2
AM3 AM4

Amarelo 1 Amarelo 2
Amarelo 3 Amarelo 4

Azul 2

Eventos - Chat Público

- [] Jogada de A1
- [] A1 jogou
- [] Vez de A2
- [] A2 jogou
- [] Vez de AM3
- [] AM3 jogou
- [] Vez de AM1
- [] AM1 jogou
- [] Vez de AM3
- [] AM3 jogou
- [] Vez de AM1
- [] AM1 jogou

Chat


Chat Privado da Equipa

Chat

Being in or being out

Gostaríamos, agora, de saber a sua opinião sobre vários aspectos desta experiência:

- sobre o jogo propriamente dito,
- sobre a participação das equipas,
- e sobre os jogadores com que teve oportunidade de participar no jogo.



List of measures, Portuguese version⁵¹:

1) Measure of minimal and maximal standard violations

Pensando no jogo em que acaba de participar, lembre toda a situação do jogo. Como foi a situação do jogo?

Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

- Para mim, a situação do jogo foi:

"Uma situação que não deveria acontecer nunca"

0	0
Sim	Não

"Uma situação que, sempre que possível, deveria ser evitada para todos os jogadores da Sessão X"

0	0
Sim	Não

"Uma situação em princípio tolerável"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

⁵¹ The original questionnaire included other measures that were not related to the purpose of this thesis, so we will only present those measures that were relevant for the purpose of this thesis and, thus, were used in the analyses.

"Uma situação que deveria ser evitada o máximo de vezes possível"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

"Uma situação absolutamente inaceitável para todos os jogadores da Sessão X"

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sim	Não

"Uma situação que deveria acontecer o menos possível"

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sim	Não

Continuando a pensar no jogo em que acaba de participar, relembre toda a situação do jogo.
Como foi a situação do jogo?

Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

- Penso que ...

" ... não ser posto em tal situação é um requerimento mínimo para todos os jogadores da Sessão X"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

" ... quanto menos todos os jogadores da Sessão X forem colocados em tal situação, melhor"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

2) Measure of emotions

Continuando a pensar no jogo em que acaba de participar, pense em como se sentiu durante o jogo.

O que se lembra de ter sentido durante o jogo?

Assinale a resposta que corresponde ao que sentiu.

- DURANTE O JOGO, senti-me:

Calmo/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada calmo/a	Muito pouco calmo/a	Pouco calmo/a	Nem muito, nem pouco calmo/a	Calmo/a	Bastante calmo/a	Muito calmo/a

Desesperado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada desesperado/a	Muito pouco desesperado/a	Pouco desesperado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco desesperado/a	Desesperado/a	Bastante desesperado/a	Muito desesperado/a

Contente

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada contente	Muito pouco contente	Pouco contente	Nem muito, nem pouco contente	Contente	Bastante contente	Muito contente

Ressentido/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada ressentido/a	Muito pouco ressentido/a	Pouco ressentido/a	Nem muito, nem pouco ressentido/a	Ressentido/a	Bastante ressentido/a	Muito ressentido/a

Entusiasmado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada entusiasmado/a	Muito pouco entusiasmado/a	Pouco entusiasmado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco entusiasmado/a	Entusiasmado /a	Bastante entusiasmado/a	Muito entusiasmado/a

Furioso/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada furioso/a	Muito pouco furioso/a	Pouco furioso/a	Nem muito, nem pouco furioso/a	Furioso/a	Bastante furioso/a	Muito furioso/a

Being in or being out

Animado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada animado/a	Muito pouco animado/a	Pouco animado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco animado/a	Animado/a	Bastante animado/a	Muito animado/a

Frustrado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada frustrado/a	Muito pouco frustrado/a	Pouco frustrado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco frustrado/a	Frustrado/a	Bastante frustrado/a	Muito frustrado/a

Culpado/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada culpado/a	Muito pouco culpado/a	Pouco culpado/a	Nem muito, nem pouco culpado/a	Culpado/a	Bastante culpado/a	Muito culpado/a

Com medo

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

Satisfeito/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada satisfeito/a	Muito pouco satisfeito/a	Pouco satisfeito/a	Nem muito, nem pouco satisfeito/a	Satisfeito/a	Bastante satisfeito/a	Muito satisfeito/a

Impotente

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada impotente	Muito pouco impotente	Pouco impotente	Nem muito, nem pouco impotente	Impotente	Bastante impotente	Muito impotente

Curioso/a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada curioso/a	Muito pouco curioso/a	Pouco curioso/a	Nem muito, nem pouco curioso/a	Curioso/a	Bastante curioso/a	Muito curioso/a

3) Measure of perceived exclusion

Continuando a pensar no jogo em que acaba de participar, relembre a situação do jogo e a sua participação.

Como vê a sua participação no jogo?

Assinale o número junto da resposta que corresponde à sua opinião.

DURANTE O JOGO, eu senti que :

- "... a minha Equipa participou no jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "... a minha Equipa estava excluída do jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

- "... a minha Equipa teve uma participação marginal no jogo"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Discordo totalmente	Discordo muito	Discordo	Não concordo, nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito	Concordo totalmente

"... a minha Equipa estava incluída no jogo"

Sim Não

"... a minha Equipa teve uma participação limitada no jogo"

Sim Não

"... a minha Equipa estava fora do jogo"

Sim Não

4) Socio-demographic data

- Para finalizar alguns dados socio-demográficos :

Por favor, não escreva o seu nome.

Idade _____

Sexo _____

Universidade que frequenta _____

Curso que frequenta _____

Ano (do curso) que frequenta _____

Naturalidade _____