# A METAPHILOSOPHICAL DEFENCE OF WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTION OF POLYTHETIC METHODS OF ANALYSIS

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# DECLARATION

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing, which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. It has not been previously submitted, in part or whole, to any university or institution for any degree, diploma, or other qualification.

In accordance with the Department of Philosophy guidelines, this thesis does not exceed 100,000 words, and it contains less than 150 figures.

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# ABSTRACT

This thesis advances a metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy and specifically, its emphasis on a plurality of different philosophical methods. The thesis aims to achieve three things. The first task is to clarify the meaning of Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods. This is attained by defending a metaphilosophical interpretation of methods as polythetic. I argue that Wittgenstein's later emphasis on methods consists of a polythetic account of numerous different methods. The diversity of the methods is a necessary consequence that results from two distinct sources of conceptual confusions. These relate to grammatical confusions and confusions resulting from captivations that Wittgenstein identifies as numerous aspects of scientism. The second is to develop the potential application that the metaphilosophical analysis and defence of polythetic methods can offer to current exegetical controversies, relating to the meaning of methods (PI 133). The metaphilosophical interpretation of methods rejects both grammatical and therapeutic interpretations as having missed the metaphilosophical context of Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods. It is argued that the complexity of the sources of confusions determine the form of methods to be polythetic and far more complex and diverse than either grammatical or therapeutic interpretations would permit. Thirdly, in concluding, the thesis claims that the metaphilosophical interpretation of methods and its defence of the polythetic conception of methods has several potential applications. This is evident in the need for new diverse methods of analysis that require dynamic forms of conceptual analysis, as well as diverse multiple conceptions of methods.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

NB (1979). Notebooks 1914–16.

TLP (1922/1961). *Tractatus* Logico-Philosophicus

RLF (1929). —Some Remarks on Logical Form

PR (1975). Philosophical Remarks.

BB (1958). The Blue and Brown Books.

BT (2005). The Big Typescript: TS 213

PG (1974). Philosophical Grammar.

CL (1995). Cambridge Letters.

RFM (1978). Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics

PI  (1953/1958). Philosophical Investigations.

RC (1977). Remarks on Colour

PO (1993). Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951

OC (1969). On Certainty.

Z   (1967). Zettel.

CV Culture and Value

MS Manuscripts

# INTRODUCTION

*"For some years now, it seems to me, in the institutionalised study of philosophy there has been an imbalance between comprehension and criticism: comprehension has waned while criticism has waxed. Students of philosophy have been encouraged to sharpen their critical skills to the detriment of improving their comprehension… The slogan 'Philosophy is an activity' does not have quite the nihilistic ring it had some few years ago, nor is it… as though the history of philosophy began and ended with Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.(Gibson: 1982: xiii)"*

## Prologue

In his book *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, R.F. Gibson highlights the importance of attaining a balance in philosophical research "between comprehension and criticism" (Gibson: 1982: xiii). Gibson highlights how this balance was then beginning to be achieved, and this is evident in how Wittgenstein's work is, according to Gibson, being comprehended rather than the target of unnecessary criticism (ibid). Taking Gibson's advice is central to the format and style of the analysis and interpretation that is defended herein. The thesis, first and foremost, aims to comprehend Wittgenstein's work. It specifically aims to comprehend the perplexing final comments of PI133 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. The thesis defends an interpretation of Wittgenstein's focus

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on philosophical method[1]. Wittgenstein emphasises that philosophical method cannot be defined by as a singular uniform activity. Rather philosophical method for wittgenstein in the *Investigations* is something radically different. The nature and relations of the sources of philosphical confusions are diverse. Accordingly the methods to clarify and resolve the nature of the confusions need to be as equally diverse. For Wittgenstein the practice of philosophy necessarily consists of a plurality of different methods. The thesis specifically focuses on examining the meaninig of Wittgenstein's conception of a plurality of methods. I argue that Wittgenstein develops a conception of polythetic[2] methods during the mid-1930's, as the final response to his original metaphilosophical investigation into the nature of philosophical problems, practice and method.

The defence of interpreting wittgenstein's emphasis on methods as polythetic methods offers a positive contribution to clarifying numerous aspects of Wittgenstein's focus on methods. The account of polythetic methods offersa coherent response to the apparent unfinished form of Wittgenstein's account of methods in the methodological sections 89-133 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. The conception of polythetic methods also offers an account of the meaning of methods that is complimentary to Wittgenstein's claims that the methods must be specifically unique to philosophy and the nature of philosophical problems. It satisfies Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods as a new way of doing

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[1] To begin I claim that the term 'Method' is in need of clarification; how do we generally understand it and how do we understand it in the context of philosophy? What method or methods are used in philosophy? How can we determine which is the correct one and which are not suitable? Is there a criterion for determining a method for philosophy in the same sense that scientific method defines science as a subject? How can we determine the value or veracity of the methods employed? In philosophy what are the valued outcomes we expect to achieve with our philosophical methods? Therefore, a method is a structured stepped instruction on how to achieve the desired outcome. There are numerous methods of analysis ranging from conceptual, logical, linguistic to morphological, all of which have been ascribed to Wittgenstein's approach. Definition of METHOD (Merrian Webster: 2014) "1: a procedure or process for attaining an object: as a (1): a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of inquiry employed by or proper to a particular discipline or art (2): a systematic plan followed in presenting material for instruction b (1): a way, technique, or process of or for doing something (2): a body of skills or techniques 2: a discipline that deals with the principles and techniques of scientific inquiry 3 a: orderly arrangement, development, or classification: plan b: the habitual practice of orderliness and regularity" From the above definition, it is immediately clear that a method is a system or order of instruction to follow to attain the desired outcome.

[2] The term polythetic is defined as cluster classification where there is no one common shared characteristic determining a classification but rather a host of resemblances. "A polythetic class is defined in terms of a broad set of criteria that are neither necessary nor sufficient. Each member of the category must possess a certain minimal number of defining characteristics, but none of the features has to be found in each member of the category. This way of defining classes is associated with Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblances." See: http://www.iva.dk/bh/lifeboat_ko/CONCEPTS/monothetic.html. "class is ordinarily defined by reference to a set of properties which are both necessary and sufficient (by stipulation) for membership in the class. It is possible, however, to define a group *K* in terms of a set *G* of properties *f*1, *f*2, . . . , *fn* in a different manner" see (http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/Keith/Chapter.3/Ch.3.html) and Beckner, M., The Biological Way of Thought, Columbia University Press, New York, 22 (1959). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology By Michael Ruse

philosophy. It also sustains Wittgenstein's important demarcation between the form of philosophical methods against scientific method. The polythetic conception of methods, I argue, presents a coherent account of Wittgenstein's focus on methods as different forms of elucidation that are peculiar to the specific form of the confusion. His is a challenging task that aims to determine a method to a particular form of confusion. Ritchey echoes this challenge:

> *"Analysing complex policy fields and developing futures scenarios presents us with a number of difficult methodological problems. Firstly, many, if not all of the factors involved are nonquantifiable, since they contain strong social-political dimensions and conscious self-reference among actors. This means that traditional quantitative methods, causal modelling and simulation are relatively useless."(Ritchey: 2013)*

The thesis builds the interpretation and defence of polythetic methods upon a metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein's approach to language and philosophy. To support the metaphilosophical interpretation the analysis forwards an alternative account of how Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell had influenced the early formative stage of his philosophical development. The metaphilosophical interpretation developed herein identifies how their influence can be elucidated in terms of a metaphilosophical framework. A framework that directs and focuses Wittgenstein's subsequent work to consider the question of language, philosophical problems as pseudo-linguistic problems, a focus on method as the primary challenge of philosophy, a critique of philosophy and a rejection of Russell's scientism. It develops further into a specific critique of philosophy that is conceptualised as the linguistic turn, which I argue is a metaphilosophical turn due to its requirement and dependency on a method, specific to the inference that all philosophical problems are conceptual confusions rooted in language.

I maintain that the paradigmatic change to polythetic methods that begins in 1930 results from the continuation of a metaphilosophical framework he first considered in 1912. It was this metaphilosophical investigation that led to the establishment of Wittgenstein's linguistic turn and the monothetic conception of logical analysis that he forwarded in the *Tractatus*. The metaphilosophical interpretation maintains that Wittgenstein's response

in 1930, to what I claim is the failed monothetic[3] method of the *Tractatus,* is the most important determining factor in bringing about the change to a polythetic conception of methods. This metaphilosophical interpretation does not hold to be the definitive interpretation.

There are other possible metaphilosophical interpretations that do not focus on method in the manner I do, one such example is forwarded by Paul Horwich (Horwich: 2012). Horwich, emphasises the importance of a metaphilosophical context of understanding Wittgenstein's work as a work that contrasts to scientific investigations. He develops an account of Wittgenstein's approach as consisting of a general therapeutic method. One that focuses on a critique of traditional philosophy as theoretical philosophy. Horwich takes the now common procedure of utilising this contrast to hinge his account of philosophical practice to be therapeutic. I endorse a great deal of Horwich's approach, especially his emphasis on the difference between scientific and philosophical practice. For example, science deals with typically empirical matters that present a context of needing more knowledge or what Horwich describes as ignorance of some knowledge (Horwich: 2012: 170).

The discovery of new knowledge will resolve such ignorance and the problem is answered. Philosophical problems are according to Wittgenstein, pseudo-problems that result not from a lack of knowledge or ignorance of some empirical fact but rather from a confusion in what we must already know. To use a brief example of what this means, consider the grammatical muddle in the surface grammar of the following statements: 'I have a pain' and 'I have a pin' but if someone were to say 'I don't know if I have a pain', would lead to puzzlement. The search for the pain and the expectation of finding a pain is not the solution to the problem. Wittgenstein's point is that the problem is not a problem at all, it is a pseudo-problem, and it is only by means of understanding the grammatical mix up or muddle that has led to the statements 'I have a pain' or 'I don't know if I have a pain', that the pseudo-problem/confusion is dissolved. There are clearly confusions that arise from misunderstanding and errors stemming from how we use language. It is the subtle differences between the grammatical rules and context of use that are highlighted to be of importance in understanding the source of the confusion.

Like Horwich, I also identify the importance of contrasting and understanding what he identifies as T-philosophy which I encapsulate into my more specific analysis of

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[3] "A monothetic class is defined in terms of characteristics that are both necessary and sufficient in order to identify members of that class. This way of defining a class is also termed the Aristotelian definition of a class." See: (http://www.iva.dk/bh/lifeboat_ko/CONCEPTS/monothetic.htm).

scientism. Rather, the thesis offers a defence of the metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein's focus on methods as polythetic methods. A significant part of this interpretation relates to what I maintain is Wittgenstein's invaluable contribution to understanding the important differences between philosophical problems as pseudo-problems and scientific problems as typically empirical based problems. This is most evident in the post-1930 emphasis on how the many diverse forms of a preoccupation and captivation with science confuse the philosopher. It is the misconceived attempt to adopt the principles and method of science to deal with pseudo-philosophical problems that lead to further confusions. We are further confused and brought deeper into philosophical puzzlement when attempting to scientifically contextualise philosophical problems by a scientific, structured analysis and investigation. Wittgenstein's focus on identifying and clarifying the numerous manifestations of scientism is intrinsic to his conception of philosophical methods. There are several aspects to what I identify as scientism; many relate to a failure to accurately understand the difference between the form of scientific problems and philosophical pseudo-problems. In addition, in my analysis and defence, I argue that the metaphilosophical interpretation of polythetic methods consists of two distinct variable factors. Simply put, the first variable determines the source of philosophical confusions to be a general misunderstanding of the workings of language and the second relates to what are clearly the many aspects of Wittgenstein's critique of scientism in philosophy. The latter is most evident in developing methods to combat what Wittgenstein points to as an insatiable craving for the adoption of scientific hypo-deductive methods as a means of solving such pseudo-linguistic problems. Peter Hacker offers what I consider to be the definitive definition of scientism:

> *"Scientism is the illicit extension of the forms and methods of enquiry in the natural sciences to domains for which they are inappropriate. It is motivated by a conception of the unity of science and of the uniformity or reducibility of all forms of explanation and understanding with or to the patterns of explanation and understanding that are thought to be characteristic of the sciences. In its crudest forms it assumes that any genuine problem is to be answered by forms of scientific explanation." (Hacker: 2001: xi)[4]*

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[4] Hacker follows this definition of scientism with another insightful remark concerning how to further elucidate Wittgenstein's focus against scientism as a rejection of methodological monists and leaning toward methodological pluralist. However, Hacker stresses that he holds Wittgenstein never entertained

Pascal Engel offers an account of scientism that is specific to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical critique of philosophy. Interestingly, Engel claims that none of these points are exclusive or distinct to Wittgenstein collectively or individually (Engel: 2007: 14).

> *"a) anti-scientism : philosophy is not a science, and cannot be one. It must not find inspiration in science. All attempts by philosophers at trying to imitate scientific methods are vain.*
>
> *b) anti-theory: philosophy cannot and should not propose theories or theses. Its role is purely therapeutic. The best that it can propose is a new, more adequate way of seeing things, but nothing which looks like a philosophical proposition.*
>
> *c) metaphysical quietism: metaphysical disputes, especially those which bear on realism and anti-realism, are empty and senseless.*
>
> *d) anti-formalism: the use of formal methods in philosophy, mathematical or logical ones, is both illusory and obnoxious.*
>
> *e) anti-academism: philosophy is not a profession, and it does not flourish within academic circles. It is a way of life, and it should show us the way to live – even if it need not say it."* (Engel: 2007: 14)

Engel suggests that the above points, relating to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical critique are not unique to Wittgenstein. Engel maintains that they are evident in the works of "Nietzsche, to Derrida and to a number of post-modernist writers), and a number of analytic philosophers… such as Putnam and Mc Dowell have held similar views" (Engel: 2007: 14). Although, Engel's point is of value given that it supports a general concern with scientism that is not unique to Wittgenstein, the connections are, I suggest, limited. Engels identifies Wittgenstein's account of anti-scientism to consist of the above key points. Like Hacker, Engel rightly claims that Wittgenstein's conception is built on a clear demarcation of the principles and method of science. Engel maintains that the anti-theoretical emphasis means that the conception of practice must constitute a therapeutic

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this contrast. (Hacker: 2001: xii). I use the term scientism to highlight Wittgenstein's aversion to and criticism of the attempt to adopt the principles and method of science into philosophy. Wittgenstein was not new to this notion of separating philosophy from science. Allan Janik points out that for Wittgenstein, R.G Collingwood, Gabriel Marcel and Martin Heidegger, philosophy does not consist of a body of knowledge. See Janik: 1992: 34.

conception of philosophy. It is this idea that therapy is diametrically opposed to captivations with scientism, that I do not accept in Engel's or Horwich's analysis. This point will be examined further in chapter seven as it is a deceptive one that has led to a great deal of confusion in understanding Wittgenstein's focus on method and how the contrast to scientism determines what methods can and cannot be used. This is one aspect of the thesis analysis that has an important defence of the alternative metaphilosophical interpretation. The emphasis on metaphysical quietism is a widely accepted view, and this is considered further in my analysis. This is especially evident in the focus of my analysis, to hold specifically to the analysis of method. The focus on anti-formalism is also a significant part of the analysis and specifically relates to the defence of the conception of scientism developed in the thesis. However, the anti-academism is omitted as an optional attribute that is not of primary significance to the analysis.

Along with the outline given above, Hacker's definition and Engel's points, we have a general outline of what Wittgenstein's account of scientism amounts to. This account will suffice for our present aims and will provide a contextual meaning to develop my analysis further. What is immensely important in Engel's analysis is his point that Wittgenstein's approach and his emphasis on anti-scientism are at odds with the scientistic metaphysical philosophy that has come to dominate anglophone philosophy (Engel: 2007: 15). This is a view that was perhaps first identified in the 1970's by Anthony Kenny and more recently brought to the fore with Paul Horwich's and Timothy Williamson's debate in DCU concerning Williamson's attack on Horwich's approach and critique of traditional/theoretical philosophy (Horwich: 2012, 2013). The thesis examination takes a different direction to Hacker's, Engel's and Horwich's analysis of Wittgenstein's anti-scientism, by focusing specifically on method and using this analysis as a means of defending a polythetic conception of methods.

Following the above, the metaphilosophical interpretation of polythetic methods and its emphasis on two distinct sources of philosophical confusion contrasts to standard and therapeutic readings. Grammatical interpretations hold to what, I argue, is a systematic constructivist conception of methods that are centred on an essentialist interpretation of methods. Standard interpretations focus on a systematised account of perspicuous representation of grammar. They typically hold to an essentialist account of methods as unified by the claim that all methods are concerned with grammatical perspicuity. I claim that this is an essentialist conception of methods and therefore is equivalent in form to a monothetic method. I further claim that Wittgenstein's criticism of the failure of the

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*Tractatus* method was a criticism of a similar form of a monothetic method. Therefore, both standard and theraputic readings in forwarding a monothetic conception of philosophcial method, fail to acknowledge Wittgenstein's important criticism of the failed method of the monothetic method of the *Tractatus*.

I argue that post-1930 Wittgenstein develops a new account of methods as polythetic methods amounts to the principal positive contribution of Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy. This claim has several potential positive applications; it offers an alternative means of understanding the context, vision, and meaning of his later emphasis on methods. It also provides a means of elucidating the debate between contemporary, standard and resolute interpretations as failing to comprehend a complexity to Wittgenstein's methods as consisting of more than a monothetic conception of grammar or therapy. Finally, the metaphilosophical interpretation of polythetic methods identifies the important potential application this has to other non-empirical forms of problem solving and analysis. The polythetic conception of methods offers an important means of responding to several central concerns with Wittgenstein's later emphasis on methods as therapies and as a rejection of a method (PI 133).

It aims to respond to the clear difficulties posed by what appears to be Wittgenstein's inability to offer a coherent and complete account of the meaning of his emphasis on methods. This point is addressed later, but it is clear that Wittgenstein leaves the emphasis on methods with a lot of loose ends (Staten: 2001). The account of methods is in a state of flux and in need of further clarification. The polythetic account offers some contribution towards this requirement of further clarification. Another aspect that is often appealed to is Wittgenstein's focus on grammatical confusions and the difficulties with the captivations of scientism. There is no clear account of how the two relate. How does grammar specifically account for all the various confusions and problems that relate to Wittgenstein's critique of scientism? For example, it is unclear how a captivation with generality and the search for hidden essences or the desire to discover new truth and knowledge specifically relate to the conception of grammar. Even if this relationship is more evident than I suggest, it still remains that the distinction between confusions that have their source in grammatical confusions or scientistic confusions is a worthwhile strategy to adopt in order to elucidate the relationship. I admit that Wittgenstein generally does propose all confusions to be grammatical but in other places he admonishes the focus on language to be only relevant for a particular problem (BB). This is taken up in my analysis in chapter five. The point is that Wittgenstein identifies scientism and its

numerous aspects as a cause of confusions, and this is perhaps where a great deal of the emphasis on therapy has a relevance, but it must be stressed it is not a general rule.

I maintain that the standard appeal to misplaced grammatical rules typically in the surface grammar is not sufficient to cater for the variety and diversity in possible confusions and the possible methods required to elucidate them. The polythetic conception of methods offers a direction that potentially caters for more than one source of conceptual confusion. Indeed, this is a key part of the metaphilosophical interpretation. I maintain that by the application of a metaphilosophical analysis it is evident that there must be at least two sources of conceptual confusion. Grammar is one possible source and the captivation with science is another. It is the volume and variety of possible variations of conceptual confusions that could arise from them that I maintain Wittgenstein necessarily developed a family resemblance model of pattern relations and grouping. The methods are as diverse as the possible forms of confusions. The polythetic model is Wittgenstein's response to the metaphilosophical question of philosophical identity and method. It provides an alternative model of analysis that is free from contamination of methods such as science, that are categorically different.

# The Metaphilosophical Position: Both Language and Scientism determine Method.

*"Hermeneutics (from the Greek hermeneuô = to interpret) is the systematic study of texts—and philosophical texts in particular. And here it is clear that any sensible interpretation of a philosophical text must unfold against the background of an understanding of the situation of philosophy and the nature of the philosophical enterprise. (Rescher: 2007: 1)*

As the quotation identifies, there is a distinct hermeneutical challenge to the interpretation of any philosophical text. This, I maintain is especially the case with Wittgenstein's work. It is evident that what Rescher points out to be the important background and context to a text as "the situation of philosophy and the nature of the philosophical enterprise" is especially relevant to Wittgenstein. It is important because there remains a need to

understand and appreciate Wittgenstein's unique position from the context of metaphilosophy. The thesis identifies how Wittgenstein places his work in a challenging position from the beginning, by means of its critique of established philosophical practice. To understand the importance of Wittgenstein's investigation into philosophy and to provide an accurate analysis of its ideas, it is necessary to engage with the contexts of the work and also attempt to align oneself with the vision of the work. I hold that his work begins with an inquiry into philosophical method in 1912/3 and this continues to determines the focus of his work in two key periods first ends with the final draft of the Tractatus and the second begins with the critique of the Tractatus method in1929 and continues until 1937.

Therefore, it is Wittgenstein's focus on philosophical method and methods that is most important. He sought to change philosophy radically as a subject through the enterprise of developing and communicating a new philosophical method, one free from the past linguistic and metaphysical dogmatism that he would claim typified traditional philosophical method. A dogmatism that Wittgenstein maintained was founded on a failure to understand the logic of language and also an inability to understand the important differences between scientific forms of investigation and philosophical investigation.

## The Metaphilosophical Context

The question of method and metaphilosophy is a complex matter that has come to dominate a relatively minor amount of philosophical investigation since Wittgenstein's ideas were first published. In a general sense, the issues that relate to Wittgenstein's approach are issues that relate to philosophical identity. What is philosophy? What does it investigate? How should it investigate it? Moreover, what contribution does this activity make? These are, I claim, metaphilosophical questions that represent just one aspect of many, considered in the thesis that determine Wittgenstein's work to have an important metaphilosophical focus on the question of method. The metaphilosophical interpretation

developed and defended in the thesis attempts to investigate Wittgenstein's focus on philosophical method as principally a metaphilosophical investigation. The principal advantage of this approach is that it provides an alternative axis of analysis to Wittgenstein's work, that offers what is claimed to be a more accurate understanding of the meaning and context to his emphasis on philosophical method. The thesis will continually assess the advantages of positioning method as the primary route of analysis in understanding Wittgenstein's work. The aim of this introduction is to provide a general viewpoint of the landscape that the thesis will traverse. The hope is that with this direction, the route of the analysis to be undertaken will not seem too unexpected or impenetrable.

The thesis maintains that to understand accurately and interpret the meaning of Wittgenstein's focus on method and methods it is necessary to comprehend the core metaphilosophical context to his work. This can be appreciated by four key motivations:

## 1. The Critical Investigation into Philosophy

The thesis claims that Wittgenstein's work is determined by a critical investigation into philosophy and specifically philosophical method. This investigation is, I argue, a metaphilosophical investigation due to its critical questioning of philosophy itself. It is an inquiry into philosophical identity[5]. For Wittgenstein, philosophy was nothing more than its problems but I maintain that for Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach philosophy was its methods.

> *"For philosophy isn't anything except philosophical problems, the particular individual worries that we call "philosophical problems"."(PG: 193)*

## 2. The Critical Investigation into Philosophical Method

It is argued that the focus on philosophy relates to the question of philosophical method. I claim that the specific focus on method is instrumental to understanding Wittgenstein's

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[5] Erich Reck (2002: viiii-x) claims that there is a clear identity crisis in Analytic philosophy: "Moreover, there seems to exist a kind of identity crisis in analytic philosophy today, a loss of certainty about what philosophy really is, or should be. As a result, the boundaries between various philosophical schools—analytic philosophy, pragmatism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and so on—are getting blurred more and more."

approach. Only by means of an accurate account of its metaphilosophical context can the meaning of method and methods be elucidated and presented in a form that brings some justice to Wittgenstein's investigation. It is further argued that the question of philosophical method is one of the defining questions of metaphilosophy.

## 3. Method as a Catalyst of Change

I claim that the focus on method for Wittgenstein is important as a strategic tool to necessitate a change in philosophy. For Wittgenstein's philosophical method the activity of elucidation defines philosophy. Philosophy as a subject of investigation is synonymous with the method of elucidation. Therefore, the aim to change philosophy by means of a change in method corresponds to a metaphilosophical challenge.

## 4. Wittgenstein's Methods Concern Linguistic, Conceptual and Methods to Combat the Effects of Scientism

The thesis defends the view that Wittgenstein proposes a conception of polythetic methods that consists of grammatical methods, therapeutic methods and methods that are specific to combatting the effects of scientism in philosophy. This conception of polythetic methods is diametrically opposed to previous conceptions of philosophy as a cognitive discipline defined by a search of new knowledge or truths. Wittgenstein's conception of polythetic methods consists of a non-cognitive descriptive practice. One that is focused on the elucidation of differences that contribute to achieving a necessary change in understanding. This practice supports seeing the nature of the confusion for what it is, rather than as an empirical, metaphysical or logical problem. This position is, I claim, a metaphilosophical position. It consists of changing the practice of philosophy to a practice composed of numerous different methods of perspicuous representation of grammar, therapeutic methods and methods to combat the confusions related specifically to the numerous aspects of scientism[6]. The claim is that Wittgenstein sought to change philosophy by a change in method. What underlies this metaphilosophical challenge consists of the most complex and radical attempts to form a new conception of philosophy based on two key inferences. These were a direct response to what Wittgenstein inferred

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[6] The emphasis on the importance of Method to Wittgenstein's approach is rarely addressed in the context of metaphilosophy. Although method is often highlighted as important. "Wittgenstein's interpreters are practically undivided that method plays a central role in his philosophy. This comes as no surprise if we bear in mind the Tractarian dictum: "philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity"." Milkov: 2012: 65

to be two sources of philosophical confusion. Firstly, that philosophy is concerned with linguistic analysis. Secondly, that the form of this analysis is distinct from science and consists of a unique method that must be free from contamination from other types of investigation, specifically scientific ones.

## Wittgenstein as an Analytic Metaphilosopher

The thesis is analytic in style and focus. It maintains that Wittgenstein's work is primarily metaphilosophical analysis as it is metaphilosophical in direction and analytical in practice. This is not a straightforward categorisation, as there is significant controversy relating to how one approaches and places Wittgenstein's work. To categorise it as analytic is also controversial but this, with the addition of the ascription of metaphilosopher, is perhaps the most economical means of giving his work a more accurate sense of identity and contextual focus. The challenge is to circumvent the controversy of how to place Wittgenstein. The thesis attempts to achieve this by focusing the analysis on Wittgenstein's unique approach to philosophical method as a question that moves beyond the question of classification of plausible philosophical positions. The point is that the thesis is specific to Wittgenstein's focus on method and, in this context, I qualify the claim that Wittgenstein is clearly a metaphilosopher. The analysis developed and defended in the first half of the thesis supports this claim. This focus means that many of the different and related areas such as the contrast to continental philosophy, the specific challenge of modern scientistic conceptions of philosophy, as developed by Austin (1979), Davidson (1984), Quine (1970), Gibson: 1982) and Williamson (2007), are often only pointed to as potential target areas for further research. Robert Fogelin (2009) makes an important point in relation to this omission and possible challenges to it. He maintains that Austin's motivations and goals would certainly not of been of interest to Wittgenstein. What is clear is that while there are similarities that have furnished many a thesis they are not of direct relevance to the analysis developed in this thesis.

> *"There are, however, important differences between Wittgenstein's and Austin's approaches. Austin thought of himself as a participant in a project involving the "joint labours of philosophers, grammarians, and numerous other students of language" that would yield, sometime in the twenty-first century, "a true and*

*comprehensive science of language" (Austin 1979, p. 232).
Wittgenstein would, I think, have little interest in the development of
such "a true and comprehensive science of language,"" (Fogelin:
2009: 8)*

Davidson, Quine and Williamson represent examples of philosophers who often appreciated an importance to linguistic/conceptual analysis and at the same time looked to science to develop the method and status of philosophy. The absence of a detailed consideration of their view is a result of what Fogelin with reference to Austin highlights as too great a divide between Wittgenstein's anti-scientism and the type of endorsement they offer in support of science and philosophy being united. Hacker's analysis supports my position on this point by claiming that the works of Davidson (1984) in particular and the move to adopt a scientistic conception of philosophy that embraces theory construction and metaphysics in philosophy has constituted a "rejection of Wittgenstein's philosophy and methodology". The crucial point for Hacker is that this "has not been the result of the refutation of his ideas and the proven inadequacy of his methods. Indeed, it has not even rested on comprehension of his ideas." (Hacker: 2013: xx). Hacker's point relates to what so many Wittgensteinian philosophers identify as the fallacy of straw Wittgenstein. In short, any thesis requires restraint to support and develop its key areas of focus, and the decision was to focus on developing the metaphilosophical interpretation of methods. The important point is that the analysis and metaphilosophical interpretation defended here does have important consequences for understanding Wittgenstein's general approach, and it potentially offers an important tool for clarification even if this is simply as an alternative contrasting position to more mainstream interpretations.

## Developing the Claim that Two Variable Values Determine Wittgenstein's Conception of Method.

The metaphilosophical interpretation develops a structured analysis of Wittgenstein's focus on philosophical method as the analysis of language and his anti-scientism. This is developed further by considering the claim that there are two key parts to Wittgenstein's focus on method. It is focused on the analysis of philosophical problems as forms of linguistic confusion. It also rejects any forms of what are considered to be examples of scientism in philosophy. Wittgenstein first offered a finalised method of logical analysis

of language in the *Tractatus* in 1921 which he came to reject by the end of 1929 and offered a developed replacement by 1937. In the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* written in around 1945, I claim Wittgenstein's following statement supports this reading:

> *"For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognise grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book." (PI: Preface)*

What is important is that the metaphilosophical interpretation maintains that Wittgenstein came to perceive "grave mistakes" in the *Tractatus*. The mistakes he highlights, I claim, are not in his formulation of the metaphilosophical challenge and the focus on method. The mistakes, I maintain, are specific to the values of the variables to his approach that relates to how he conceived language meaning and scientism. It is how these two values combine to determine the conception of philosophical method in the *Tractatus* to be a monothetic conception of method, that is important.

The metaphilosophical interpretation maintains that the specific formulation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical challenge consists of a structured approach to the development of a new conception of philosophical method. The structure relates to three determining factors that will be investigated in the course of the thesis. The first aspect, if we are to follow Wittgenstein's approach, claims that there is a fixed determination of any possible inferred method. It concerns the inference and concepts that constitute the "Linguistic Turn" (LT going forward) to necessitate that the overall format of any possible method will be focused on dissolving philosophical problems principally as forms of linguistic confusions. Therefore, if this is accurate, the method must consist of some format of linguistic analysis. The point is that the focus of the investigation, the subject of investigation and the medium of investigation or method of investigation are necessarily linguistic in nature (Wittgenstein's LT). Secondly, what I refer to for the moment, as the primary variable, concerns Wittgenstein's emphasis on determining the accurate, logical workings[7] of language. This is important given that it will determine a more accurate account of the specific form that methods can take. For example, if the workings of language are determined to be logical then any method of analysis will be

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[7] This is mostly referred to by Wittgenstein as the 'logic of language'. For the moment I shall hold to the workings of language to clarify my point and not to confuse it with a particular form of language analysis.

necessarily logical in elucidating the workings. The method of analysis is, I claim, symbiotic to the actual inference of how one configures the workings of language. The specific account of the workings of language that is inferred will determine the form that any potential method can take as a means of analysis dependent on effectively elucidating the workings of language. The third concerns, what I shall refer to as the secondary variable and relates to Wittgenstein's conception of anti-scientism. It presents his critique of scientism and the effort to apply scientific method and principles into philosophy. This secondary variable could have a fixed attribute in determining a limit to a method of analysis using its clear division between scientific method and principles and what Wittgenstein suggests to be philosophical method. Wittgenstein's point is that there is no possibility of a sharing or exchange of data sources or methods between science and philosophy. This is repeatedly emphasised by Wittgenstein in The *Tractatus*. Where the emphasis is on the all-important demarcation between science and philosophy.

> *"The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions", but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred."* (TLP: 4.1121)

For example, science and philosophy are according to Wittgenstein simply incompatible (TLP: 4.1121); science has the domain of the empirical and philosophy has no business with any form of empirical data, hypothesis or inferred principles. Whatever philosophy is for Wittgenstein or could be, it is clear that it is not compatible with our current understanding and conception of science. Therefore, whatever method is developed as a new method for philosophy, it is necessarily an incompatible and contrasting one to science. This critique is useful, given that science as a model of empirical data acquisition, hypothesis and verification offers some contribution in determining what philosophy must be, by using the negative contrast of what it cannot be.

## The Key Concept of Analysis: Metaphilosophy

*"WHAT is the subject-matter of philosophy? There is no universally accepted answer to this question. Opinions differ, from those who regard it as contemplation of all time and all existence - the queen of the sciences- the keystone of the entire arch of human knowledge - to those who wish to dismiss it as a pseudo-science exploiting verbal confusions, a symptom of intellectual immaturity, due to be consigned together with theology and other speculative disciplines to the museum of curious antiquities, as astrology and alchemy have long ago been relegated by the victorious march of the natural sciences.*

*Perhaps the best way of approaching this topic is to ask, what constitutes the field of other disciplines? How do we demarcate the province of, say, chemistry or history or anthropology? Here it seems clear that subjects or fields of study are determined by the kind of questions to which they have been invented to provide the answers. The questions themselves are intelligible if, and only if, we know where to look for the answers." (Isaiah Berlin: 1999)*

The above quotation from Isaiah Berlin sums up the overall theme that the thesis is concerned with. I suggest there is an underlying criticism in the quotation against Wittgenstein's own criticisms of traditional philosophical practice. The main reason for this is the tone of the quotation and the fact that this was a subject that Berlin and Wittgenstein had disagreed on when they attended each other's talks in the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge. However, the quotation contains several of Wittgenstein's focus points and clearly points to his sentiment of critiquing philosophical practice and method. The emphasis on not knowing what philosophy is would suggest a question as to its practice or method. There are different types of interpretations from, a priori hypothesis (Moore) to cognitive science in search of new truths and knowledge (Russell), or a pseudo-science misaligned with a false direction due to a misunderstanding of language (Wittgenstein).

**Introduction**

Wittgenstein's emphasis on differences is what I believe Berlin closes with here as the need to appreciate the precise boundaries between different forms of investigation and the various rules for determining the correct methods are required. Berlin is pointing to the need to make clear distinctions between the sciences and philosophy, specifically how the distinctions are evident regarding the nature of the problem and the possible answer. However, there is a need to make a further distinction between types of investigations that operate at the normal philosophical level and investigations that bring philosophy itself into question. Metaphilosophy, can be seen in its most general form concerned with the question of what is philosophy, what does it investigate and how should it investigate it? Also, how can philosophy as an important subject of research and investigation, be accurately defined or described? The core challenge is the apparent difficulty of trying to define what philosophy is. Philosophy is a subject of investigation but what does it investigate? The term often used to categorise and name this practice of investigating philosophy is also in dispute, with some such as Paul Horwich suggesting 'metaphilosophy' (Horwich: 2012) is the most suitable and fitting title. While others, such as Timothy Williamson, rejects Metaphilosophy and defends the more traditional title of the 'philosophy of philosophy' (Williamson: 2007).

The thesis investigates how this question of philosopohical identity and method was in a unique way, addressed by Wittgenstein. The thesis argues that Wittgenstein addresses the issue of philosophical identity and matters relating to how one can understand philosophy by a challenge to change the way philosophical problems[8] are viewed, interpreted and responded to[9]. Wittgenstein claims that the problems are deceptive and are better understood as confusions resulting from what he suggests to be a failure to understand the workings of language (TLP: preface). If Wittgenstein is correct in his claim, then it is also apparent that more traditional forms of philosophical investigations are typically dogmatic and complicate matters further in attempting to give a metaphysical or theoretical response. This is evident in how they are captivated with the search for new

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[8] From the very beginning Wittgenstein conceives of philosophical problems as illusory, in that they have the appearance of something profound, or they may have the appearance of an empirical proposition or problem and when we treat them as such it only gives rise to more nonsense. Therefore, Wittgenstein suggests we must look to the workings/logic of language, the logical and syntactic form in order to see the error of our ways.

[9] It's no coincidence that Wittgenstein's first paper to The Moral Science Club in Cambridge was entitled 'What is Philosophy?' as Marie McGinn highlights Wittgenstein was from the beginning focused on questions that were focused on investigating the practice, subject and nature of philosophical problems as well the questions of method. So much so that she insists that Wittgenstein's 'concern with diagnosis and method remains characteristic of Wittgenstein throughout his philosophical development' (McGinn: 2013: 2)

knowledge where only elucidation of the nature of the confusion can adequately remove or rather dissolve what had appeared as a problem. What is important and unique concerning Wittgenstein's approach concerns how the actual context of the problem with philosophy itself, is resolved by replacing an erroneous method of philosophical practice with a more accurate linguistically informed method. I suggest this emphasis on method determined Wittgenstein's investigation to be a unique metaphilosophical one concerned with the question of philosophical method as a response to the difficulties relating to understanding philosophy, philosophical problems and philosophical identity

## The Change from the Early to the Later as a Change in Method: A Method, a New Method and Methods

One of the principle aims of this thesis relates to the defence of the claim that Wittgenstein's central concern is the metaphilosophical question of method. The suggestion is that the later final statements on methods[10] (from around 1937/8) in the *Investigations* represents his final response to what I shall refer to as the metaphilosophical question or challenge of method. The first was the method of linguistic analysis offered in the *Tractatus* (1921) that was primarily developed from Wittgenstein's account of the workings of language. The method was a prescriptive method that promised to offer a global means of elucidating the logic relationship between thought, language and the world to determine *Sinn* from *Sinn loss*. Although Wittgenstein rejected the use of scientific method and principles in philosophy from a very early stage, the Tractarian method offered was similar in one sense to scientific method given that it consisted of one prescriptive method that could potentially cater for all the different forms of philosophical confusions. This example of generality was for Wittgenstein a consequence of the specific format of the workings of language he identified. It is no coincidence that this perhaps would have satisfied Frege's advice that what is most important is to establish a new method (CN: 105).

> *'All I can give you,' he told Alice Ambrose, 'is a method; I cannot teach you any new truths' (Fann: 1969:109, fn. 3).*

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[10] As Peter Hacker points out the change began late in 1929 but it is only with the work proposed in the Investigations from around 1936/7 that we see what Hacker describes as a polished version of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy (Hacker: 1986: 146)

The second method was announced by Wittgenstein in 1930 and is described as the discovery of a new method (BB: 28, Hacker: 1986: 147). This new method amounts to Wittgenstein's first response to what I suggest is the failure of the Tractarian method and is represented by the rejection of the method of logical analysis to develop the conception of the use concept and its focus on grammar. Wittgenstein in 1930/1 attempts to develop this account of grammar and to supplement it with a clearer account of how a method of grammatical clarification can be practised. What is important at this juncture is that Wittgenstein is specific in detailing how forms of scientism in philosophy also give rise to philosophical confusion. Wittgenstein in the early thirties identifies that there is a new account of meaning as use and accordingly a new account of philosophical clarification as grammatical elucidation or analysis. This is supplemented further by his specification that some forms of philosophical confusion result from a failure to resist the appeal and captivating allure of all things scientific (scientism). At this point, the emphasis remains on a method of grammatical clarification with a more accurate concern for scientism. From 1931 to 1937 Wittgenstein works to develop both his conception of grammar and his anti-scientism in philosophy.[11] There are many possible ways to interpret this development in Wittgenstein's concern and focus with the form of philosophical practice as a method or methods. Two possible scenarios are most apparent.

The first is that Wittgenstein's focus to change traditional philosophy from 1916 to 1921 is one conception of philosophy. The second conception of philosophy is Wittgenstein in transition with his rejection of the *Tractatus* as a whole and from its ashes he formulates another conception of philosophy from 1929/30 up to around 1935/6 beginning of an early account of grammar and a critique of scientism supporting a new method of philosophical practice. This is eventually developed into the later philosophy post 1936/7 with the rejection of a method and the emphasis on methods. Such a tripartite and a dual Wittgenstein have been argued in different guises (Moyal-Sharrock: 2012).

The second scenario is the interpretation of the thesis and holds that Wittgenstein's inheritance from Frege and Russell consisted of a specific challenge to replace traditional philosophy with a new linguistically informed conception of philosophy. This challenge was hinged on the format of establishing a new method as the most desirable means of achieving this aim to change philosophy. Wittgenstein stepped away from their respective positions to formulate his own, regarding a distinct linguistic conception of philosophy

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[11] This is further supplemented by several potent statements relating to the practice, method and form of some confusions to be a sickness, malaise and mental cramp distortion in need of therapy or therapeutic activity. This is highlight by *Sass: 2002: 120,* Kenny: 1984: 38.

which has been referred to as a LT in philosophy. Wittgenstein's linguistic conception of philosophy is unique in several ways. First, it is founded on the inference that all philosophical statements and problems are in some form rooted in a misunderstanding of the workings of language. Second, the account of the workings of language will determine the format of the method of linguistic elucidation. Third the correct method of linguistic elucidation will remove the confusion by laying bare the source of the confusion. Fourth, there is no relation or similarity to the cognitive method of science as there is no discovery of new knowledge. There is no cognitive aspect or need for explanation to any method of linguistic elucidation, given that the activity is descriptive, and its subject is language[12]. Fifth, the outcome is the desired change in understanding. A change relating to how one views language and how one has come to perceive and acknowledge the confusion as what it is a mistake that can be resolved by seeing matters more clearly. In short, the metaphilosophical interpretation of methods highlights a complexity to Wittgenstein's emphasis on a plurality of methods that is more complex than what current interpretations of methods have identified and defended.

## Chapter Summary

In each one of the eight chapters, there is a focus on how the metaphilosophical interpretation points to a potentially different interpretation of a part of Wittgenstein's work that has been the centre of controversy.

Chapter One:
In chapter One the focus is on understanding how Wittgenstein develops what I argue to be a unique metaphilosophical framework. The framework, I claim is Wittgenstein's response to the influence of Frege and Russell. It is framed by how their focus on logic/linguistic analysis, a critique of philosophy, an emphasis on a need for a new method and Wittgenstein's critical response to the notion that the method of science can be adopted into philosophical investigations and method. I claim that Wittgenstein's critical investigation into philosophical method was a direct response to these specific aspects of influence from Frege and Russell. The metaphilosophical framework directs Wittgenstein's investigation to focus on what I claim are the two variables values of the

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[12] This contrasts with the cognitive conception of linguistic analysis developed by Gilbert Ryle in the late 1930's (Ryle: 1949)

logic of language and a critique of scientism. The two variable values are intrinsic in determining the specific conception of philosophical method.

Chapter Two:

The second chapter follows the analysis of the first and argues that Wittgenstein's linguistic turn was also a metaphilosophical turn and primarily focused on the development of a linguistic method of philosophical analysis to support the claim the problems of philosophy were conceptual confusions that had their source in a failure to understand the logic of language. The challenge that the linguistic turn poses, I claim, is a challenge to method. The linguistic turn requires a method to support its application. The analysis of the linguistic turn reaffirms that Wittgenstein's focus and investigation are on philosophical method.

Chapter Three:

The third chapter maintains that the conception of metaphilosophy was a problematic concept that was often used in deceptive and uninformed ways. As a response, the work of Morris Lazerowitz is appealed to as evidence of a unique Wittgensteinian context to the development and origin of the concept of metaphilosophy. This development of the Wittgensteinian context to metaphilosophy offered a means to clarify the concept, and a means to support the thesis application of the concept to Wittgenstein's focus on method. It also provided a means to introduce some of the important ideas of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach and how philosophers, according to Lazerowitz, are perennially stuck in the fly bottle.

Chapter Four:

The fourth chapter concerned the metaphilosophical analysis of the *Tractatus* method. The analysis uses the framework and the two values to assess how they determine a specific monothetic method of logical/linguistic analysis. The *Tractatus,* I maintain, had the primary focus of forwarding the new method of logic/linguistic analysis. The *Tractatus* presents a developed systematic account of the two variable values as the logic of language and his passive critique of scientism. I claim that the method failed due to Wittgenstein's own captivation with aspects of scientism. This claim is supported by focusing the analysis on the two variable values.

**Introduction**

Chapter Five:

The fifth chapter develops the analysis further by claiming that the monothetic method of the *Tractatus* was the principal focus of what Wittgenstein acknowledged as the mistakes in the work. It was further claimed that the specific mistaken conception of the monothetic method was instrumental in relation to Wittgenstein developing a polythetic conception of methods. I claim that Wittgenstein utilises the failed method of the *Tractatus* as a model to completely revise the two variable values and develop a radically different conception of philosophical method as consisting of a plurality of methods. The difference now relates to what I claim to be the focus on developing a model that contrasts to science. Wittgenstein aims to develop a conception of methods that are unique to philosophy and the nature of the sources of philosophical problems and puzzlement. What is important is the role of Wittgenstein's new account of scientism as an independent but also interrelated source of philosophical confusion. I maintain that by accepting scientism as a separate source of confusion alongside grammatical confusions, numerous difficulties relating to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and its relation to the *Tractatus* are overcome.

Chapter Six:

The sixth chapter focuses on developing a clear account of Wittgenstein's emphasis on a plurality of methods in the *Philosophical Investigations.* It examines the important statements in the phase of methodology between 89-133 and examines how we can further elucidate the contrast Wittgenstein makes in PI 133 between a method and methods like different therapies. The metaphilosophical investigation comes to a close in section PI 133. I claim that the polythetic conception of methods brings to a close Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation, but it leaves matters open. This is a troubling outcome, and I attempt to respond to it by emphasising the need to understand the nature of the predicament that is presented in the final statement. It confronts the reader with Wittgenstein's own conclusion that a conception of methods needs to avoid scientism, and this means no systematisation. The question Wittgenstein leaves us with, concerning the emphasis on methods, is a statement to focus on diversity and plurality. The same diversity and plurality is evident in the confusions and needs to be reflected in the methods. I maintain that only a polythetic conception of methods can cater for such diversity and plurality.

Chapter Seven:

The seventh chapter develops the analysis of polythetic methods further, by bringing together a series of examples of different methods. The aim was to identify a diverse array of methods that numerous commentators have identified and focused on. The strategy of chapter seven was to provide evidence that there was already a requirement for a polythetic conception of methods if we look to current Wittgensteinian exegesis. This strategy was further strengthened by the key claim of the thesis and the analysis of the two variable values as two distinct sources of philosophical confusion. It was argued that the variation of the two sources and the diversity of possible confusions also required a conception of polythetic methods. Collectively these two strategies support the defence of the polythetic conception of methods. As a further support, the analysis identified how the polythetic conception of methods supported the possibility of drawing together a hybrid conception of methods that overcomes the current exegetical controversy relating to the debate between resolute and standard interpretations of methods. The polythetic conceptions of methods identified how essentialist interpretations failed to understand the significance of Wittgenstein's response to the failings of the *Tractatus* and the development of a new conception of scientism that strengthened the original demarcation and aimed to account for the numerous aspects of scientism that philosophers are captivated by.

# CHAPTER ONE: THE METAPHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK: LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS, ANTI-SCIENTISM AND A NEW METHOD

*"I will only mention that to the great works of Frege and the writings of my friend Bertrand Russell I owe in large measure the stimulation of my thoughts." (TLP: Preface)*

## 1.1 Introduction: Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell

The analysis defends the claim that there are four strands of influence from Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell that determine the young Wittgenstein's philosophical focus to consist of a metaphilosophical focus on method. His investigation is uniquely focused on philosophical identity in terms of method. I argue that from this metaphilosophical frame, Wittgenstein goes further to identify how there are at least two variables that determine the format of philosophical method. The values that Wittgenstein offers for each variable will ultimately determine the format of the method of philosophical practice.

### 1. The Analysis of Logic and Language

Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell developed two independent conceptions of logic that had important consequences for philosophy. The most important relate to the claim that some philosophical problems are pseudo-problems that have their origin in conceptual confusions rooted in the logical vagaries of ordinary language. There is a link between some philosophical problems such as problems of non-existence that are pseudo-

problems that result from a failure to understand language, its logical structural deficiencies and its deceptive surface syntax. This can be the development of a method of logical analysis of language consisting of a precise artificial notation or concept script that will provide the necessary logical precision to circumvent the limitations of the problematic syntax of ordinary language.

## 2. A Critical Investigation into Philosophy

Following (1), it was apparent that the logical developments of Frege and Russell had a potentially important role to the identity, conception and method of philosophy. A critical assessment of the practice of traditional metaphysical philosophy was sustained through the work of Russell and to a lesser degree Frege. What this critique of philosophy presented was the need to linguistically, logically and methodologically overhaul the practice of philosophy. A logicist critique of philosophy was an important consequence of their developments in logic.

## 3. The Focus on Method

Resulting from (1) and (2) there was a directive, largely resulting from Frege's comments in CN 105 that the challenge to philosophy was not the search for new truths but rather the challenge to establish a new informed method for philosophy. A method that would do for philosophy that the developments in scientific method achieved for the sciences. The importance of a change to a more informed method related to how, if successful, it would also necessitate a change in the general conception and identity of philosophy.

## 4. The Contrast to the Method of Science

Russell also perceived the importance of changing philosophical method. His focus was a much more critical reproach that follows from the three previous points. A part of Russell's significance was in how his steadfast emphasis on the need to adopt the method of science into philosophy was necessary. Russell firmly believed that the successful hybrid conception of philosophy and scientific method would provide philosophy with the positive identity and results that it needs. Russell's views are extensive and comprehensive and offer what appear to be a well-founded approach to the adoption of scientific method into philosophy. It was Wittgenstein's critical reaction to Russell's claim that is important to understanding what I identify as Wittgenstein's anti-scientism.

In my analysis, I maintain that the four above points constitute what is a metaphilosophical framework that determines Wittgenstein's investigation into philosophical method. His focus on method is a metaphilosophical one that centres on the critical investigation into philosophical method as a means of changing philosophy. The search for a new method of logical/linguistic analysis will, for Wittgenstein, represent a linguistic turn that states that all the problems of philosophy are linguistic in form. Wittgenstein focuses on developing a new philosophical method specific to the inference that all problems are forms of linguistic confusion. This I claim is the first variable value of his metaphilosophical investigation. This is supported by what I argue is the second variable value, Wittgenstein's anti-scientism which is a direct response to Russell's focus on the adoption of the scientific method into philosophy. In the thesis, I develop and use this conceptual account to develop what I argue to be Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical framework and the two variable values of language and his anti-scientism as a functional model that determines a philosophical method that is logically/linguistically informed and uncontaminated from the method of science. It is a method that is specific and unique to philosophy. This I argue, constitutes Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical challenge. The analysis of the thesis focuses on the two variable values of linguistic analysis and his anti-scientism as the most important aspects to understanding the development and changes in Wittgenstein's focus and development of a conception of philosophical method. The changes in these two values are instrumental in moving from a monothetic conception of method to a polythetic conception.

What little we know of Wittgenstein's philosophical beginnings can be found mostly in Wittgenstein's Notebooks (NB). They record a part of his early period of philosophical work, and it is evident from the notes that Wittgenstein's critical investigation into philosophy was already firmly in place in 1914/5[13]. Although the Notebooks are predominately focused on logic, there are numerous relevant sections relating to what is clearly Wittgenstein's critical engagement with questions that bring philosophy as a practice into question. This point is highlighted by K.T. Fann who claims that the "seeds to Wittgenstein's later philosophy were already contained in his pre-*Tractatus* Notebooks" (Fann: 1971: 42). Another interesting source relates to the minutes of the Cambridge Moral Science Club. On the 29th of November 1912, Wittgenstein gave a

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[13] There are numerous statements in the Notebooks from the beginning of September of 1914 – that specify Wittgenstein's developing direction of critique of philosophy. Wittgenstein is questioning the relationship between the logical developments and the move from the subject/predicate form of analysis to his atomic form of analysis. Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914-16

paper entitled "What is Philosophy?" and clearly, it is evident that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation was underway in 1912. We have here a definition of philosophy as defined by an account of propositions as primitive and contrasted to the propositions of science:

> *"Philosophy was defined as all those primitive propositions which are assumed as true without proof by the various sciences." (PPO: 332)[14]*

A part of this critique relates to questions that link to Frege and Russell's approaches concerning logic and the practice of logical analysis. The Notebooks offer Wittgenstein's thoughts, engaging with and criticising what he perceives as errors in Frege and Russell's conception of logic, ordinary language and how they claim it functions. For example, Wittgenstein is not critical of ordinary language in the way that Frege and Russell are heavily critical of it as a sometimes vague and confusing language. One clear difference pointed to in the Notebooks as a criticism of Frege concerns Wittgenstein's important idea that language must have sense and already be well formed to make sense (N.B: 2). For language to be recognised, it simply must have a sense. The question of the determinacy of sense leads him to further question how the developments in logic can be applicable to the practice of philosophy.

> *"We may indeed say: We have signs that behave like signs of the subject-predicate form, but does that mean that there really must be facts of this form? That <u>is,</u> when those signs are completely analysed? And here the question arises again: Does such a complete analysis exist? And if not: then what is the task of philosophy?!!?"* (NB: 2)

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[14] At the next meeting Wittgenstein attended was in 1929 and the minutes record that Wittgenstein's focus remains on philosophical problems. "Mr Wittgenstein . . . pointed out that enough philosophical problems could be raised in twenty minutes to occupy the minds of the members of the club for the rest of the evening." (PPO: 333)

> *"How it is reconcilable with the task of philosophy, that logic should take care of itself?"*[15] *(NB: 2)*

Admittedly, this early critique of philosophy relates to several of the key notions forwarded in the *Tractatus*' investigation into the subject area of logic, language and philosophical method. It is also evident from these early writings how Wittgenstein is critical of many of Russell's and Frege's ideas, specifically relating to the notion of developing or changing philosophy. In what follows, the chapter's analysis focuses on developing a clearer account of how this early phase determines Wittgenstein's work to become focused on a critical investigation into philosophical method. The analysis centres on three key aspects of philosophical critique, logical/linguistic analysis and philosophical method as three defining characteristics that shape Wittgenstein's critical investigation into philosophy and determines his investigation to be one focused on philosophical method. The analysis of the three aspects also supports the thesis claim that Wittgenstein's reaction to Frege and Russell is important, in understanding how Wittgenstein's critical investigation evolves into a metaphilosophical investigation by focusing on the question of philosophical method.

> *"The significance of the work of Frege and Russell for Wittgenstein's early thought is not a matter for dispute." (McGinn: 2006: 109)*

## 1.2 Other Influences

There is an obvious challenge to the specific focus on Frege and Russell that the analysis offers here, and this relates to the array of other possible influences that are often identified and appealed to as central to Wittgenstein's philosophical work. There is no doubt that there are numerous potential sources of influences. Frege, Russell, Moore and Schopenhauer are the most commonly identified. There are numerous other less apparent but nonetheless important influences such as Kant and Boltzmann. Nonetheless, the focus of the thesis is on method, and the thesis claims that in relation to method Frege and

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[15] "Does not my study of sign language correspond to the study of the processes of thought, which philosophers have always taken as so essential for philosophy of logic?--Only they always got involved in inessential psychological investigations, and there is an analogous danger with my method too. [See 4.1121.] 11.11.14." (NB: 28)

Russell are the most relevant and important. Collectively they determine the context to Wittgenstein's investigation as a critical one into philosophical method. Other interpretations highlight the complexity and fertility of the soil that Wittgenstein's ideas are grown in.

> *"Among those he names, as influencing his thought are Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, Ludwig Boltzmann, Heinrich Hertz, Karl Kraus, Adolf Loos, Otto Weininger and Oswald Spengler. He was intimately familiar with the writing's of Goethe, Schiller, Morike and Lessing, representative of the 'high' German culture, and he greatly admired Tolstoy and Dostoevsky." (Goldstein: 1999: 9)*

Goldstein identifies Boltzmann, Hertz, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, and Spengler as key influences on Wittgenstein.[16] Wittgenstein was known to have read Schopenhauer[17] in his youth on his sister's recommendation, and indeed, through Schopenhauer was introduced to many of the central tenets of Kant.

> *"Hertz's The Principles of Mechanics undertook a philosophical examination of the logical nature of scientific explanation. The point of science, he argued, is the anticipation of nature. Its data are our knowledge of past events, its method is theory-construction, its mode of reasoning is deductive." (Hacker: 1986: 2).*

Hacker claims that Hertz was an exception for Wittgenstein, one that positively influenced Wittgenstein's understanding of how analysis can elucidate what appear to be empirical problems to be nothing more than conceptual ones. In his *The Principles of Mechanics,* Hertz (2007) recounts how he resolved the problem he was having with the notion of "force", not through experiment or deduction but rather through analysis.

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[16] See Goldstein (1999), Hacker (1986) and Monk (1996) for more on the significance of Hertz's and Boltzmann's influence. L. Goldstein (1999), L. Boltzmann: 1974: 167, Hacker: 1986: 3-6, also, see Goldstein (2004), *Wittgenstein, as Soil*, for an account of the significance of Hertz Boltzmann and Bolzano p5-6 both were physicists with a deep philosophical interest in their subject.

[17] Goldstein (1999) identifies 5.631-5.641(See also Janaway 1989:30), 6.421, 6.43, 6.431, 6.4311, 6.4312, 6.43, and 6.522 as passages directly relating to Schopenhauer. 'Schopenhauer was one of the list of luminaries whose trains of thought Wittgenstein said that he passionately seized for his own purposes. He himself, he said was 'merely reproductive' in his thinking (CV: 16). Others on the list were Boltzmann, Hertz, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler and Sraffa.' (Goldstein: *2004*)

Hacker positively describes this as a turning point in Wittgenstein's approach by appreciating Hertz as offering a "conception of the analytic dissolution of conceptual confusion" (Hacker: 1986: 4)

## 1.3 The Context of Frege and Russell's Influence

It was undoubtedly the specific nature of the logical revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that played a key part in determining the format of Wittgenstein's approach. The logical revolution that Frege and Russell's developments brought about had significant consequences for philosophy and so a logical critique of philosophy ensued.  As the above quote from the preface to the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* (TLP going forward) suggests, Wittgenstein wanted to highlight his indebtedness to Frege and Russell. Clearly, Wittgenstein was indebted to both Frege and Russell. There is undoubtedly an array of factors from Frege and Russell's work that could potentially be identified as influential to Wittgenstein. One example is offered by Alfred Nordmann who maintains that the contemporary controversy between therapeutic and metaphysical interpretations of Wittgenstein's infamous ladder in the *Tractatus* now centres on the exegetical question of how to interpret Frege's notion of 'Elucidation' *(Nordmann: 2002: 356).*

What is important to appreciate is the development of a concept of logical analysis appropriate for philosophical investigation that was borne out of developments in mathematics and logic. There was also the more general development of conceptual analysis as offered by G.E. Moore during this period in Cambridge. Juliet Floyd[18] (2002) develops this point further and quite rightly suggests that it is difficult to understand Wittgenstein without first understanding the roots of his ideas in this period of logical and mathematical revolution. The aim is to avoid such exegetical challenges regarding the controversy surrounding particular sources of influence, by holding the focus of my analysis specifically on supporting a metaphilosophical interpretation.

The specific form of the key influences is evident and to some extent are popular targets of exegesis. For example, it is perhaps uncontroversial to focus on Wittgenstein's rejection of Russell's captivation with adopting aspects of science into philosophy. This

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[18] From Frege to Wittgenstein Perspectives on Analytic philosophy ed: Erich H Reck "Number and Ascriptions of Number in Wittgenstein's Tractatus pp308

is a common and well-documented theme of analysis relating to their relationship[19]. However, what matters concerning the analysis offered here is that it develops this point specifically as a metaphilosophical influence. I maintain that the rejection of Russell's captivation with science is instrumental in developing Wittgenstein's anti-scientism to its strongest developed form post-1930. Wittgenstein's statements now communicate a concern for the dominance of the scientific form of thinking and seeing the world. The scientific worldview is focused upon systematic construction and order. Wittgenstein's critique concerning some philosophical method of inquiry is often portrayed as a structured system of investigation with empirical weighted aspirations and knowledge claims. For Wittgenstein, this activity of and attraction to philosophical systematisation is erroneous. It results from a captivation with science is erroneous and is supported by philosophers intentionally and unintentionally. The order and systematisation of philosophical investigation as a metaphysical system is misconceived. This critique represents his criticisms of the system of logic and the work that he had developed in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein is highlighting the appeal of the complex, the general pattern of a theory, the all-encompassing captivation of generality and hidden essences. The purpose of the activity of clarification in philosophy has only been a means to an end to some hidden substratum or foundation to support what is perceived. Wittgenstein now makes his approach clear by emphasising that the practice of elucidation and the methods of elucidation he will come to focus on in the period of 1936/7 are an end in themselves (MS 109 200: 5.11.1930). The activity of clarification is the goal for if it is successful, there is nothing to be discovered and the confusion vanishes. The interesting point is now Wittgenstein's critical reproach of the most potent and controversial symbol of the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein admonishes the need for a 'ladder' and claims that if any appeal to a ladder is involved, then the approach and its direction are misconceived.

## 1.4 The Context of a Philosophical Critique

The primary motivating factor that needs to be considered in order to understand Wittgenstein's critical investigation into philosophical method concerns the general critical concern of the early nineteenth century that philosophy is in a state of confusion, and it is in need of change. This relates to a general philosophical critique that arises

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[19] See Hacker: 2007: 3, Hacker: 1986: 156-9, Hacker: 2009, Nordmann: 2002, Medina: 2002: 87, Pears: 1987:199, Hutto: 2006

primarily out of the developments in logic brought about by Frege and Russell. Frege identified how mathematics and the problem of cardinal numbers were resolved by a logical account of number. To develop a clear account of the context and key motivations to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy this section offers a brief synoptic overview of the logical revolution that constitutes the background to Wittgenstein's early work and the format of his initial metaphilosophical moves. It aims to provide some clarification as to why the developments in logic offered by Frege and Russell had significant ramifications for the practice of philosophy.

> *"The Theory of Descriptions seemed to reveal the true logical form of certain kinds of proposition, and to highlight the gulf between deceptive grammatical form and logical form." (Hacker: 1986: 8)*

It is important to identify some of the key influences that determine this critical framework of logical/linguistic analysis, the focus on method and the rejection of scientism as intrinsic to determining Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation. The important point here is that Frege and Russell did not target philosophy from the outset. Their interests were primarily in mathematical and logical problems. Nevertheless, it was the developments made in resolving and elucidating mathematical and logical problems that each came to realise had the most profound philosophical consequences. Frege to some extent tried to develop the philosophical import but his philosophical training was limited, his brilliance was in logic[20]. Frege had a great deal to say regarding the potential of how these developments in logic and mathematics would impact on how we understand and practice philosophy.

> *"Unlike Frege, Russell had an explicit and elaborate conception of philosophy and its methods. He conceived of philosophy as the most general of the sciences, variously characterizing it as the science of the general…" (Hacker: 1986: 9)*

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[20] Nordmann in his paper, *Another New Wittgenstein: The Scientific and Engineering Background of the Tractatus* identifies Graßhoff as drawing attention to Wittgenstein's declaration in 1911 that Frege would not engage in any discussions outside logic and mathematics (Graßhoff: 1998: 246) *(Nordmann: 2002:356) printed in the Journal Perspectives on Science vol.10*

However, it was Russell who was the staunchest exponent of the need to actively apply the developments in logic and necessitate a change in philosophy. It was clear that a great deal of what were regarded as important philosophical questions and problems were based on grave logical and conceptual misunderstandings.

> *The logical revolution began with Frege in 1879 and his work on the notion of cardinal number published in his Grundlagen in 1884 displayed that number is "nothing but a prolongation of deductive logic" (Russell: 2004: 830).*

Russell was as able a philosopher as a mathematician and logician; this meant he was able to offer a more informed and complete account of the philosophical ramifications of the developments in logic, but Russell credits Frege with those developments. Wittgenstein initially embraced a large amount of these insights and the logicist approach offered by Frege and Russell. He embraced the metaphilosophical motivation to question philosophy as a practice and to challenge the form and nature of the problems it dealt with and the method or methods it typically employed in trying to resolve these problems. Although he embraced the motive of questioning philosophy as a clear need to change philosophy, Wittgenstein began to criticise their approaches and formulated his unique approach to the question of how to practice philosophy.

## 1.5 The Context of Philosophical Method

The focus on method and scientism is key to understanding Wittgenstein's early metaphilosophical motivation and direction. Therefore, there are two aspects of Wittgenstein's response to Frege's specific emphasis on a need to develop a new philosophical method and Wittgenstein's reaction to Russell's captivation with the adoption of scientific method and principles of investigation into philosophy. In light of the key advances in logic, the aim is to specifically change philosophical method. First, it is argued that from Frege, his critical notion that the challenge to change philosophy, is not a challenge to change philosophy to another form of pursuing answers or truth. Rather, the challenge to support a change is in the challenge of developing a new method for philosophical practice, one that will do for philosophy what the hypo-deductive method achieved for science. The problem of identifying the correct subject of philosophical investigation and the accordingly correct method of investigation is a challenge that

Hacker maintains has since Frege, come to define a characteristic of modern philosophy. Hacker claims that the search for subject and method stems from science envy. The sciences are clear on the subject of study and the method of investigation. This is perceived as the basis of their success.

> *"...each cognitive discipline has its own object of study. But if we examine the history of modern philosophy, it appears to be a subject in search of a subject matter. In the modern era, great philosophers recurrently attempted to isolate a distinctive subject matter for philosophy, and a proper method for achieving the knowledge, which, they held, had evaded their predecessors."* (Hacker: 2013: 4)

Therefore, I defend the view that Wittgenstein's focus on the question of method (as the key move in changing philosophy) has its origins with Frege. I claim what Wittgenstein inherits and what determines his approach to philosophy for most of his career, is evident in the format of this approach, and this is directly traceable to his reaction to Frege and Russell. This is summarised as his metaphilosophical aim to develop a method, unique to his inference that the form of philosophical problems are linguistic confusions and one free from the contamination of philosophers' captivations with scientific method. The seeds are most evident in Wittgenstein endorsing Frege's advice from his Concept Notation (CN) to focus not on the search for new truths but on the establishment of a new method (CN: 105).

> *"All I can give you is a method; I cannot teach you any new truths"* (WL: 97)[21]

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[21] This was first pointed out in Fann: 1971: 'All I can give you,' he told Alice Ambrose, 'is a method; I cannot teach you any new truths' (Fann 1971:109, fn. 3).

## 1.5.1 Frege and the Search for a New Method

> *"One will search Frege's works in vain for a systematic discussion of the nature of philosophy. He was a mathematical logician whose primary interest was to 'set mathematics upon secure logical foundations'... he thought, as many before him had, that ordinary language stands in the way of philosophical insight. Thought is enslaved by the tyranny of words." (Hacker: 1986: 7)*

What is of particular importance regarding the metaphilosophical interpretation is how Wittgenstein's approach is very much defined by a key point that Frege made, and Wittgenstein clearly embraced. Frege following his analogy between the microscope and the eye concludes that the microscope like his ideography is aimed at what he describes as specific tasks or scientific purposes. The interesting point Frege makes here is that his ideography is not focused on the discovery of truths. Rather his efforts to advance it are more concerned with developing a method in the same way a new method had been so instrumental in progressing science. This is a point that Reck supports and identifies, as also evident in Cora Diamond's appraisal of Frege's influence on Wittgenstein. Reck states that Diamond's views are similar to his own when she claims that "Wittgenstein's whole outlook on philosophy – its problems, its methods, and so forth—was strongly influenced by Frege" (Reck: 2002: 30). It is I claim Frege's emphasis on an improvement in philosophical method that Wittgenstein endorsed.

> *"This ideography, likewise, is a device invented for certain scientific purposes, and one must not condemn it because it is not suited to others. If it answers to these purposes in some degree, one should not mind the fact that there are no new truths in my work. I would console myself on this point with the realisation that a development of method, too, furthers science. Bacon, after all, thought it better to invent a means by which everything could easily be discovered than to discover particular truths, and all great steps of scientific progress in recent times have has their origin in an improvement of method". (Begriffsschrift: 1879: preface).*

Therefore, putting to one side the details of the logical revolution of Frege's work, what we can now appreciate following Russell's appraisal of Frege is a requirement to change the practice of philosophy. An important event occurred in logic, mathematics and philosophy in 1879 with Frege's new logical explanation of cardinal numbers. This logical development came from how both Frege and Russell perceived how this had important ramifications to understanding the nature of philosophy, the subject of philosophy and how accordingly philosophy ought to be practised regarding a philosophical method. The philosophical ramifications of this development in logic meant that philosophy had to change. The challenge was in determining what the changes amounted to and how could they be supported?

Frege's work's *Sinn und Bedeutung* and his *Begriffsschrift* both offer accounts of Frege's approach to logically resolving such difficulties in ordinary language. Frege identified a characteristic form of how ordinary language can be deceptive regarding how the same referent could have numerous different senses. The example often appealed to is the referent 'Venus' and the various senses of it as the morning star and evening star. The statement 'the morning star is bright' has as its reference a truth value of it being true or false. The sense of the proposition will determine the method of determining its truth value. Therefore, the reference of the sentence 'the morning star is bright' is its truth value of a bright morning star. What is significant here concerns how Wittgenstein's approach appears to embrace Frege's idea that the method of determining truth value is itself determined by the form of the proposition. I maintain that Wittgenstein follows this line of thought with his emphasis on how the account of language meaning will determine the method of elucidation of language.  It is plausible that, when one considers Wittgenstein with this in mind that, he is perhaps endorsing Frege's approach here that the key tactic in developing science has been improvements in scientific method. Wittgenstein's focus on the metaphilosophical question of practice and method is an endorsement of Frege's point here. The development of philosophy for Frege and Wittgenstein is brought about by a development in method. This appears to be a plausible approach as it is further supported by the manner in which Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation into method continues until at least 1937.

For example, the referential theory of meaning referred to as the picture theory of meaning in the *Tractatus* employs a method of linguistic elucidation based on clarifying the logical form of a state of affairs and the logical form of a proposition which is then further elucidated by the employment of a truth table. Moreover, the approach to dissolving

philosophical problems developed in the *Tractatus* concerns Wittgenstein's attempt to provide a working method of linguistic elucidation that utilises logical techniques of analysis and a referential approach to meaning in order to establish a working method. Wittgenstein's aim, like Frege's, was one of focusing on developing a method that could be employed by philosophers in the pursuit of clarification. The point being that for both Frege and Wittgenstein, it is suggested that there is a possible relation between how Wittgenstein focused on the search for the correct method of linguistic elucidation and the  aim to redefine philosophy as a practice (Katz: 1990: 1). Wittgenstein's aim was not the philosophical search for truth or knowledge but rather the pursuit of a new method. A method that was specific to form of the confusion that gave rise to philosophical problems and puzzlement.

## 1.6 Variable One: The focus on logical/linguistic Analysis

The context of logical/linguistic analysis is central to Wittgenstein's approach and focus on method.  Following the developments in logic, the development of an artificial notation, as Frege developed with his *Begriffsschrift* or *Concept Script* offered a potential analytic tool to clarify the nature of the errors. It provided a means that identified examples of how logical frailties or misconceptions evident in natural or ordinary languages contributed to philosophical confusion and pseudo-problems. This was especially the case with statements relating to existence, such as the round square exists and the round square is both round and square.  It was the property of existence that natural language statements seemed to give to the subject as a predicate that was deceptive. The property of existence appears to result from ordinary forms of sentence structure. Ordinary language gave such statements a deceptive property of existence and this philosophically troublesome aspect was first identified by Frege. Frege was the first to recognise the import of logic and how the application of an artificial notation would dissolve such confusions. He offered his logical analysis of language as function/argument as a significant development over the subject/predicate form.

> *"Frege borrowed the notation for functions from arithmetic, and*
> *enlarged the realm of applicability of a function beyond the domain*
> *of numbers. Then, supplanting the subject/predicate division, which*
> *was    characteristic   of   previous   logical   systems,   by   a*

> *function/argument division, he created a logical notation, a*
> *Begriffsschrift – literally, Concept Writing – which would serve to*
> *represent thoughts about any objects whatsoever. Like the language*
> *of arithmetic, his Begriffsschrift represented thoughts so that the*
> *inferential connections between them were molded in the*
> *representations themselves. The project was enormously*
> *successful." (Mendelsohn: 2005: 7)*

As Mendelsohn points out in the above it was the manner in which Frege superseded the traditional subject/predicate distinction to formulate a more accurate account of language representing by function/argument. This enabled the development of the concept script as a more developed artificial notation that would enable the accurate analysis of logical relationships in language. Frege and Russell's support and communication of his ideas brought about a paradigm shift in philosophical practice that focused on the logical analysis of language as an important tool or method of removing confusions from philosophy.

> *"We may indeed say: We have signs that behave like signs of the*
> *subject-predicate form, but does that mean that there really must be*
> *facts of this form? That is, when those signs are completely*
> *analysed? And here the question arises again: Does such a complete*
> *analysis exist? And if not: then what is the task of philosophy?!!?*
> *How it is reconcilable with the task of philosophy, that logic should*
> *take care of itself?[22]" (NB: 2)*

What such statements highlight relates to the claim that the most obvious reason for this is that Wittgenstein was, to a great extent, endorsing and clearly following the philosophical critique and the philosophical direction of his mentors Frege and Russell[23].

> *"From Frege's work it followed that arithmetic, and pure*
> *mathematics generally, is nothing but a prolongation of deductive*

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[22] "Does not my study of sign language correspond to the study of the processes of thought, which philosophers have always taken as so essential for philosophy of logic?--Only they always got involved in inessential psychological investigations, and there is an analogous danger with my method too. [See 4.1121.]
11.11.14." (NB: 28)
[23] Sass suggests Wittgenstein's endorsement of Russell's 'Theory of Types' at the age of 19 was a pivotal point in changing from Engineering to Logic. (*Sass: 2002: 126) see Manuscript 30*

> *logic. This disproved Kant's theory that arithmetical propositions are "synthetic" and involve a reference to time. The development of pure mathematics from logic was set forth in detail in Principia Mathematica, by Whitehead and myself." (Russell: 2004: 830)*

As Russell points out here, what is important about Frege's logical explanation of number is the potential consequences and application this has for philosophy. Russell suggests this is twofold. Firstly, it proves that a great many of the famous metaphysical system builders in the history of philosophy who relied on providing a logical system to support their metaphysical theory, such as Kant, Leibniz, Spinoza and Plato were misguided. It identified to Russell[24] how a great deal of philosophical problems were created and sustained with the greatest respect and admiration because of an appeal to a misconstrued logical system and its use as a proof to support a philosophical theory (Russell: 2004). Secondly, Russell suggests what is also important concerning Frege's work is that it now offers a different method of practising philosophy. One empowered by a correct logical theory and he suggests Frege's work to be the first example of "logical-analytical method in philosophy" (Landini: 2007, Russell: 1988).

Frege and Russell individually worked on a logical solution to the problem of existence and existential statements that ordinary language seemed to create. They identified how a failure to accurately understand how language worked gave rise to what appeared to be genuine philosophical problems concerning existence and identity. The focus on language or the logical analysis of it was strategic to unravelling and solving such linguistic confusions. Frege suggested that the key to applying and utilising the developments in logic to philosophy was concerned with establishing a new philosophical method and not the search for new truth or knowledge. An artificial notation, as suggested by Frege and Russell, was the obvious new methodological tool that would provide a means to remove such confusion from philosophical statements and redefine the practice as one of logical analysis. This move to utilise a more precise language was presented in his point concerning his analogy between the microscope and the human eye as relating to an artificial notation and ordinary language. Frege's point, which is clearly supported by

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[24] Ronald Jager suggest that due to the composition of Russell's "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description" 1911 that it is clear that a great deal of the logical workings to his approach of Logical Atomism are still in their infancy and it is the next essay "On the Nature of Acquaintance" 1914 that a clearer account of Russell's conception of knowledge as knowledge of particulars (Jager: 1972)

Wittgenstein, is that while an artificial notation is superior to ordinary language in its exact precision is deficient in many other ways. Frege describes how his ideography can offer an invaluable precision that the eye cannot achieve, but the eye Frege suggests:

> *"Because of the range of its possible uses and the versatility with which it can adapt to the most diverse circumstances, the eye is far superior to the microscope. Considered as an optical instrument, to be sure, it exhibits many imperfections, which ordinarily remain unnoticed only on account of its intimate connection with our mental life. But, as soon as scientific goals demand great sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be insufficient. The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited to precisely such goals, but that is just why it is useless for all others." (Frege: 1878: 6)*

The eye also supports a generality or a wide vista that the microscope cannot. For Frege both the ordinary language and the artificial notation had a role to play and both had their respective value. In short, while the artificial notation had its importance it did not undermine the value of ordinary language. What was clear to both Frege and Russell was how it appeared that ordinary language was incapable of supporting the complexity of philosophical statements. It was the misapplication of ordinary language that was of the utmost concern. This is why the only possible solution was the development of an artificial notation designed specifically for the purpose of analysis and clarification of philosophical statements. Matthew Ostrow (2002) I maintain is correct in clarifying a common point of dispute in relation to the method of philosophical analysis that Wittgenstein forwards in the *Tractatus*. Ostrow points out that although Wittgenstein often specifies the importance of Frege and Russell's advice in developing a more accurate concept script, Wittgenstein never actually utilises one.

Wittgenstein, as Ostrow rightly identifies has held to the elucidation of ordinary language by the method of analysis rather than a method of using an artificial notation. What this means is that, even after identifying in several places the importance of an artificial notation. Wittgenstein holds to the possibility of elucidation by means of the method of logical analysis he himself develops. From the above, it is clear that Frege and Russell both had an important influence on Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach. This approach clearly consists of the unique critique of philosophy, the focus on

logico/language analysis and the focus on philosophical method. The analysis now turns to how these aspects are further developed by Wittgenstein's specific reaction to Russell and the development of his anti-scientism. Wittgenstein clearly embraced this notion of an intrinsic link between a failure to accurately understand the logic of language, meaning and philosophical problems as forms of confusion. Marie McGinn develops this point further by claiming that Wittgenstein's focus on language "is dominated by a particular set of problems" regarding logic, negation, inference, the logical constants, language, truth and falsity (McGinn: 2006: 108). McGinn maintains that the system of Wittgenstein's logical account of language is based on the inference that there is a "single great problem" (McGinn: 2006: 107 - 8)[25].

> *"Don't get involved in partial problems, but always take flight to where there is a free view over the whole single great problem, even if this view is still not a clear one." (NB: 23)*

I think McGinn view is helpful here in developing my point relating to Wittgenstein's conception of language. I maintain, like McGinn that Wittgenstein's had or rather was disposed to the logical conception of language before he began his investigation.

> *"It is rather that coming to see the nature of a proposition clearly is, at the very same time, coming to see negation and the status of the propositions of logic clearly: we have here, not a number of separate problems, but one great problem." (McGinn: 2006: 109)*

The investigation was logically loaded before he had undertaken it. Wittgenstein had determined the investigation by having a determined preconception of the primary value in, what I claim is a metaphilosophical framework. The investigation into logical form and the question of a referential account of meaning was a result of Wittgenstein's logical bias. He determined language to fit his logical expectation.

> *"My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition." (NB: 39)*

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[25] McGinn's paper has been an excellent support for this analysis of Wittgenstein's method. See '*Wittgenstein's early philosophy of language and the idea of 'the single great problem'* (McGinn: 2006: 109)

What is important here is the need to understand how the logical analysis of language consisted of the analysis of the proposition, as the elucidation of the logical workings of language determined or rather satisfied Wittgenstein's expectation for one generic form of confusion to define the nature of philosophical confusion. This is why Wittgenstein states that it rested on a false method and a new method that was monothetic to deal with the single "great problem" (TLP: preface).

> *"The remark is, nevertheless, revealing as to the nature of Wittgenstein's early conception of his philosophical task of clarification. For it shows that Wittgenstein is working with a preconceived idea of the logical structure of our language, which is expressed in 'the logical propositions', whose unique status must somehow be made apparent. It is clear that Wittgenstein himself does not consider where this idea of 'the logical structure of our language' comes from, but that he allows it to determine how he conceives the purpose of description and to dictate, at least in part, his approach to the task of clarification." (McGinn: 2006: 108)*

The metaphilosophical interpretation offers some specific clarification to the problem that McGinn relates to this question of the source of Wittgenstein's disposition to determine the method of elucidation to be one of logical/linguistic analysis. She does not mean it as the influence from Frege or Russell. Rather, what she is questioning is how Wittgenstein although disposed to determine language to be logical and the method to be some form of logical/linguistic analysis, was unaware of his disposition to do so. The metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein's investigation consists of the metaphilosophical framework and the two values of the logic of language and scientism as specific to configuring the method. From it, we are in a better position to answer McGinn's question. This will be elucidated fully later but for the moment the response is that it was a form of a captivation with scientism that clarifies the form of what disposed Wittgenstein to determine the method of philosophy to be a monothetic method focused on logic/linguistic analysis of language. The difficulty concerns how it is important to clearly understand how an accurate account of the workings of language is integral to an accurate conception of philosophical method. The lesson from this stage of the analysis

concerns how an accurate account of language is determined by how we are predisposed to investigate it. This is a challenging predicament.

## 1.7 Variable Two: The Rejection of Scientism

*"Our civilisation is characterised by the word progress. Progress is its form, it is not one of its properties that it makes progress. Typically it constructs. Its activity is to construct a more and more complicated structure. And even clarity is only a means to this end & not an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity, transparency, is an end in itself I am not interested in erecting a building but in having the foundations of possible buildings transparently before me. So I am aiming at something different than are the scientists & my thoughts move differently than do theirs."*
*(MS 109 200: 5.11.1930)*

It is the further development of the critique of scientism in becoming a key determining factor in Wittgenstein's later metaphilosophical approach that is important. The focus on scientism I argue is multifaceted. It consists in its most basic form as a reaction to Russell's desire and support for the adoption of science into philosophy, as a mutual marriage of convenience. It also consists of, as the above quotation highlights, as Wittgenstein's general concern with the dominance of the scientific world view, of construction and building rather than understanding and looking. Wittgenstein's critical reaction to the attempt to adopt scientific principles and method into philosophy is also instrumental. It is also what I identify in chapter five as the important vision Wittgenstein attains from the acknowledgement that the Tractatus system and method failed due to an over systematisation that itself reflected his own unconscious captivations wth science and systematisation. In its original format, it is primarily a reaction to Russell, although it is to a lesser extent evident in Wittgenstein's reaction to Frege too. It is Wittgenstein's focus on how Russell seeks to emulate the practice and method of science in such a way that a new conception of a scientific philosophy is possible. I claim this is the key motive for Wittgenstein developing his critique of scientism.

*"Russell's method in his "Scientific method in philosophy" is simply*
*a retrogression from the method of physics." (NB: 2.5.15)*

Russell maintained that the most economical means of developing or progressing philosophy was to make philosophy more science orientated in method and in practice. Although Wittgenstein was undoubtedly influenced by Russell, it is his negative and critical reaction to Russell's admiration for science and the desire to change philosophy into a philosophical science that stimulated much of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach. Russell's emphasis on science became a defining tool in communicating what philosophical practice or methods should avoid (Russell: 1905, 1917,).[26] Russell's influence on Wittgenstein resulted in what I claim is a negative reaction to his desire to marry science and philosophy. The critical reaction to Russell's scientism is clearly a propellant to Wittgenstein's work and its distinct metaphilosophical investigation focused on developing a new method unique to philosophy and free from scientism, a new method that would change philosophy.

*"Logic must turn out to be a totally different kind than any other*
*science." (WLR: Cambridge, 22.6.12.)*
*"It is, I maintain, from science, rather than from ethics and religion,*
*that philosophy should draw its inspiration." (Russell: 1917)*

Wittgenstein was a staunch critic of Russell's desire to adopt scientific method and principles into philosophy. Science and philosophy had nothing in common for Wittgenstein.

*"Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical form of scientific*
*propositions (not only of primitive propositions). The word*
*"philosophy" ought always to designate something over or under but*
*not beside, the natural sciences. [Cf. 4.111.]" (NB: 106-7)*

Wittgenstein's rejection of Russell's desire to endorse the application of scientific methodology into philosophy was, according to Ray Monk, first founded upon his

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[26] This is perhaps captured most succinctly in Russell's paper 'On Scientific Method in Philosophy', in Mysticism and Logic (Penwin,
B Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method m Philosophy (Open Court, Chicago, p. 33. Russell, 'On Scientific Method in Philosophy', in Mysticism and Logic (Penwin, Harmondsworth, 1953)" Ch. VI, pp. 95-119.

rejection of Russell's Herbert Spencer lecture "The Scientific Method in Philosophy" (Monk: 1996). It is clear, as both Monk and Glock suggest and clearly support my claim that Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell were focused on his desire to adopt science into philosophy. Wittgenstein remained a constant admirer of Russell and took Russell's work so seriously that I argue that a great deal of his conception of philosophy is in reaction to Russell's ideas (Glock: 2002: 207)[27]. Donald Suter defends a different contrasting interpretation and suggests that like Russell and Moore, Wittgenstein followed the traditional approach searching for truth using an elaborate system founded on some sort of metaphysical inference of unknowable entities such as 'simple names'. Suter also points out that Wittgenstein develops Russell's emphasis in his work 'On Denoting', that philosophy has a role in dissolving philosophical 'puzzles' (Suter: 1989.3).

> *"...every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical." (Russell: 2009: 26)*

Wittgenstein embraces this motif and adapts it into a general rule. Wittgenstein at the same time admonishes Russell's emphasis on how such puzzles can be resolved. Russell sought to adapt the method of science into his new approach to philosophy and believed that 'puzzles are to logical theories as experiments are to theories in the physical sciences'.

> *"This brings me, however, to a question of method which I believe to be very important. What are we to take as data in philosophy? What shall we regard as having the greatest likelihood of being true, and what as proper to be rejected if it conflicts with other evidence? It seems to me that science has a much greater likelihood of being true in the main than any philosophy hitherto advanced (I do not, of course, except my own). In science there are many matters about which people are agreed; in philosophy there are none. Therefore, although each proposition in a science may be false, and it is practically certain that there are some that are false, yet we shall be wise to build our philosophy upon science, because the risk of error*

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[27] Glock refers to McGuiness on this (McGuinness 1988, 87–8, 114)

*in philosophy is pretty sure to be greater than in science. If we could hope for certainty in philosophy the matter would be otherwise, but so far as I can see such a hope would be a chimerical one." (Russell: 2010: 145)*

This quotation from Russell provides an excellent summary of his endorsement of adopting the method of science into philosophy. One response is to argue that Wittgenstein's concern with 'method' and 'methods' relates to his desire to metaphilosophically overhaul the practice of philosophy. This began in 1912 with Wittgenstein's consensual indoctrination into Russell's logicist programme. From this Wittgenstein develops a critical, metaphilosophical response to the practice of philosophy. He maintains philosophers are in confusion, dogmatically using language to formulate questions that have no answers and resorting to metaphysical theorising to further answer and question and so according to Wittgenstein, the problematic cycle continues. Wittgenstein maintains that the only recourse is to determine the practice of philosophy by means of establishing a more informed account of how language works. The practice of philosophy had been founded on a dogmatic and erroneous referential account of language that suggested that words referred to objects in the world.

*"A notable feature of these philosophical problems is that they seem to be about things in the world and yet are not answerable by empirically investigating those worldly things... Thus we have the two dominant metaphilosophies - two conceptions of the proper subject-matter of philosophy, of the type of truth it endeavours to discover, of the right method to follow in discovering this truth. In effect, the two meta philosophies differ in respect of the kinds of human faculty they take to be appropriate in arriving at philosophical knowledge, and hence in where we should look for philosophical enlightenment.*

*The two approaches are, familiarly enough: (a) the view that philosophical questions are (ultimately) empirical or scientific and (b) the view that they are (upon reflection) analytic or conceptual."*
*(C. McGinn 1993: 9, 10)*

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein offered a logical analysis of language that focused on the nature of the relationship between thought, word and object and offered a referential theory of meaning often referred to as the picture theory of meaning. The picture theory was built upon the analysis of the proposition and how words and statements mirrored the logical concatenation of objects in the world and states of affairs. Wittgenstein maintained that the analysis of a proposition in this way reflected all language use. Accordingly, if language was of the same referential form, then a method of elucidating that referential form would suffice in enabling participating philosophers in practising the method and dissolving the pseudo-problem by means of application of the method. If we follow Colin McGinn's dichotomy between empirical/scientific questions and conceptual/analytic questions, it is evident that the nature of the interpretation of the problem, according to this reading is the key motivating factor in determining the form or kind of method to be employed (*McGinn 1993: 9, 10*). For Russell, science was a success and philosophy was stuck in a state of confusion. His approach to adapt and employ scientific principles of investigation and method into philosophy was an obvious choice.

The key factor that contributed to the development and particular focus of Wittgenstein's initial metaphilosophical investigation relates to Russell's efforts to bring the practice of philosophy more in line with the practice of the sciences. Russell was a firm believer and supporter of moving philosophy forward by changing the manner in which it was practised. Logicism was the first move in changing the practice of philosophy and building a new basis to philosophy that would be more amenable to building a scientifically informed method that would hypothetically engage, test data and support theory construction.

> *"In science, this combination has existed since the time of Galileo; but in philosophy, until our time, those who were influenced by mathematical method were anti-empirical, and the empiricists had little knowledge of mathematics. Modern science arose from the marriage of mathematics and empiricism; three centuries later, the same union is giving birth to a second child, scientific philosophy, which is perhaps destined to as great a career. For it alone can provide the intellectual temper in which it is possible to find a cure for the diseases of the modern world." (Russell: 1996 :120-1)*

Wittgenstein's early rejection of the adoption of scientific method into philosophy represents the beginning of what becomes his later critique of scientism in philosophy.

> *"Despite the shift in what was meant by 'philosophy is purely descriptive' the contrast remained firm and the antagonism to the Russellian comparison of philosophy to science was maintained. Scientific Investigations are irrelevant to philosophy. The discovery of new facts, the invention of new theories, can contribute nothing to the solution or dissolution of the non-empirical problems of philosophy."* (Hacker: 1986: 156)

## Conclusion

The conclusion to this chapter maintains that the logicist revolution inaugurated by Frege and Russell is instrumental in determining what will become Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation into philosophy. It is important to appreciate the array of the main interrelated factors that contribute to the development of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation. Accordingly, both Frege and Russell's logicist approach set out some of the key parameters of what would become Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation. Frege and Russell shared a desire to logically reinvent philosophical practice. They shared an admiration for science, a desire to adapt scientific method into philosophy and a need for philosophy to adopt a new informed philosophical method. They shared a concern that ordinary language was directly related to the creation of pseudo-philosophical problems, and each supported the idea that a more precise logical notation would resolve such confusions by elucidating the nature of the error or confusion. These shared insights are but a few that point to a metaphilosophical inheritance that both shaped Wittgenstein's work using his positive affirmation and negative critique of some of these shared insights.

Frege emphasises the need to focus on the question of developing a more systemised philosophical method that will do for philosophy what scientific method has done for the sciences. Russell, in contrast, is far stronger then Frege in emphasising his need to replace philosophy completely with his new conception of philosophy called logical atomism. Russell is seen by some to offer a far more complex response to the problematic relationship between language and reality. Russell was critical of Frege's conception of

sense and used his criticisms as a determining factor in building his own conception of grammar and grammatical categories that were far more complex than Frege's more limited approach, that did not differentiate between the grammatical categories (Morris: 2008: 72). The point is that Russell developed his theory of descriptions first published in his work *On Denoting* (Russell: 1905) as a more accurate means of resolving deceptive language statements that suggested the existence was a quality that could be identified and logically analysed. The logical analysis of such statements determined that the confusion relates to a statement that gives a quality of existence to something that did not normally qualify as a having the quality of existence. For Russell and indeed Frege the problem of such existence statements related to how ordinary language was imprecise and often had a confused syntax. Logical analysis with the aid of an artificial notation provided the means of identifying the nature of this confusion in ordinary language.

> *"Thus "The golden mountain does not exist" means:*
> *"There is no entity c such that 'x is golden and mountainous is true*
> *when x is c, but not otherwise."*
> *With this definition the puzzle as to what is meant when we say "The*
> *golden mountain does not exist" disappears.*
> *"Existence," according to this theory, can only be asserted of*
> *descriptions."(Russell: 2004: 740-2)*

In a general sense, both Frege and Russell believed an artificial notation would remove such vagaries from philosophy. The theory of descriptions is suggested by many to be Russell's chief contribution in changing the focus of philosophy to language using his theory of descriptions. Frank Ramsey famously described the theory of descriptions as a paradigm in philosophy given that it offered, as Russell suggests, a potential solution to numerous forms of philosophical confusion relating to identity and existence (Kitis: 1989: 155, Mendelson: 2005). If Frege can be described as doing much of the legwork in developing a new theory of logic, it was Russell who brought the developments in logic to the philosophical world in the early 1920's. It was also Russell who is identified as being mostly responsible for popularising the shift in attention to investigating language and its relation to philosophical problems. The possible method of logical atomism was suggested by Russell to be the correct method of practising philosophy. Russell in 1918,

and in Wittgenstein's absence, believed Wittgenstein would potentially support his new conception of philosophy which he referred to as:

> "...every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical."(Russell: 2009: 26)

There are numerous different interpretations, each claiming different accounts of how Frege or Russell did or did not influence Wittgenstein. Marie McGinn provides an excellent summary of the controversy and disputes relating to who influenced Wittgenstein in the early phase (McGinn: 2006: 110).What is clear is that there is an undeniable influence from both Frege and Russell that the actual specifics of the influence need not concern us here.

Whether you favour Russell, as Kitis (1989), Goldfarb (2002), Proops (2002) and Mendelson suggest, or Frege, as Katz (1990) Goldstein (1999) and Geach (1976) maintain is of no consequence to our analysis. Denis McManus (2006) in a similar vein to my reading of Frege and Russell's influence also identifies both having an important influence in determining Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. McManus does not perceive the influence in the same format as the two variables values of the logic of language and the critique of scientism. However, he does emphasise the importance of what I will claim concerns the generalisation of the relation between linguistic confusion or what Russell identifies as confused syntax and philosophical problematic statements. Throughout the thesis, I appeal to the work of Denis McManus who offers a great deal of analysis that is of a similar sentiment to my metaphilosophical interpretation and yet we differ greatly in how we conclude with applying our metaphilosophical understanding of Wittgenstein's work. McManus believes in the *Tractatus* method has had an important value as a workable method.

> "My own reading of the Tractatus places these concerns at its heart and argues that this implausible-sounding diagnosis of philosophical confusion, and its complementary but equally implausible sounding prescription for how that confusion might be prevented, actually has some power." (McManus: 2006: 4)

What is important to my interpretation appears to be of no significance to his. My focus is that the two key claims about method and scientism are clearly identified as key defining factors in the development of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation. As will be the focus of chapter six, unlike McManus I argue that the method of logical analysis has no power to it and is rejected as Wittgenstein came to acknowledge that it was founded on a misconception. What it does have is an informative lesson to how the depth of the misconception and its understanding will radically change Wittgenstein's conception of method.

> *"Frege provided many of the essential ideas for the Linguistic turn, particularly in its earliest phases. He introduced – or provided influential formulations of – such ideas as that certain philosophical problems are pseudo-problems arising from imperfections of ordinary language." (Katz: 1990: 1)*

The import of this is in relation to understanding the motives behind Wittgenstein's critical approach to philosophy. According to Kitis, Frege's main motivation for developing the concept, Sinn was related to the problems of "non-existent subject terms, opaque contexts, and identity statements" (Kitis: 1989). The chapter defends the following five points as supportive of the claim that Wittgenstein's focus on philosophical method was initially determined by his specific reaction to Frege and Russell:

1. The general metaphilosophical context of logicism as a critique of philosophy.

2. Wittgenstein's rejection of Frege and Russell's emphasis on the value of the adoption of scientific method to develop philosophical method.

3. Wittgenstein's endorsement of Frege's scientistic approach to the metaphilosophical focus on questioning and developing philosophical method.

4. The LT and its metaphilosophical question of method.

5. Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical question of method: a general misunderstanding of language and the pseudo-problems of philosophy.

> *"Russell's method in his "Scientific method in philosophy" is simply a retrogression from the method of physics." (NB: 2.5.15)*

Wittgenstein was critical of such approaches, and it is clear that this constituted a part of his general anti-scientism and how he sought to provide a demarcation and division between philosophy and science especially concerning method. This demarcation was to offer some degree of conceptual utility in elucidating the nature of the confusion between scientific and philosophical method.

# CHAPTER TWO: A LINGUISTIC AND A METAPHILOSOPHICAL TURN

*"...by "linguistic philosophy" (I mean) the view that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use." (Rorty: 1992: 3)*

## 2.1 Introduction

The last chapter focused the thesis analysis on developing a clear account of the origin to the two variable values. What is now of concern is to clarify how Wittgenstein's early work and the focus on the two variables, the logic of language and his critique of scientism, develops a unique outcome of a linguistic turn (LT). The LT is used to represent Wittgenstein's methodological claim that all philosophical problems have their source in forms of conceptual confusions rooted in language (TLP: Preface). Confusions Wittgenstein claims, primarily result from a failure to accurately understand the workings of language (ibid). The early period from 1913-1919 develops the systematised method of logical analysis that is finally formulated in the *Tractatus*. It is an elaborate system representing how thought, language and the world are united by a logical isomorphic relationship that is necessary for language to work and represent. The logical/linguistic system requires a method of logical/linguistic analysis that will provide the necessary means of elucidation of propositions. Wittgenstein's challenge is to provide a method of analysis that adequately elucidates the logical linguistic relations. The method should determine whether propositions are either intelligible bipolar propositions (science), senseless logical propositions (logic) or nonsense propositions (philosophy). The important point is that Wittgenstein's method is solely concerned with the logical analysis of language. The subject of philosophical investigation is language, the method of

analysis is logical/linguistic analysis and the dissolution of philosophical problems is brought about by the application of the method of analysis. Therefore, Wittgenstein's approach does not just entail a LT but it also consists of a metaphilosophical turn given its key methodological focus on changing the nature of philosophical problems and the practice of philosophy in relation to method. The LT requires a new working method of analysis that will elucidate the workings of language in such a way that the confusions become surveyable.

Therefore, the LT arises out of two major claims. First, that the source of the problems of philosophy are in fact conceptual confusions rooted in numerous forms of linguistic confusions, that result from a failure to accurately understand the logic of language. Secondly, as a consequence to this inference, it is a categorical necessity that philosophical method must consist of some form of linguistic analysis. The LT presents Wittgenstein's original response to Frege and Russell's critical investigation into philosophy and philosophical method. It represents Wittgenstein's founding claim of his critical investigation into philosophy by hinging the focus on the workings of language. The question is what form or method will the analysis take? Or what factors will determine the form of the analysis? These are questions that can only be answered by what I claim to be the specific values of the two contributing variables, Wittgenstein's account of the logic of language and the critique of scientism. It is the value or specifics of each of that ultimately determines what the method of analysis will be.

For example, according to Wittgenstein the aim of philosophical practice is, according to the LT, a matter of untangling the linguistic knots and confusions that have given rise to the questions and statements of philosophy. The problems of philosophy were the result of linguistic muddles and therefore could not be solved or dissolved by theory construction or metaphysical investigations but only by the application of the appropriate method of linguistic elucidation. One that is specific to the linguistic form of the confusions themselves. Therefore, the linguistic form of the confusions needs to be elucidated. The first challenge of the LT is the communication of workings of language in order to forward the appropriate conception of a working method.

## 2.2 The Context to Wittgenstein's Linguistic Turn

There is a need to develop the analysis further by clarifying the context of Wittgenstein's LT in order to avoid confusion and gain a clearer account of the focus on language. First, it is the claim that the origin or source of philosophical problems are not in the lack of knowledge whether it be apriori or empirical  knowledge rather the source relates to

confusions in language. Wittgenstein's LT relates to what Rorty defines as a key notion of linguistic philosophy that problems are solved or dissolved by "understanding more about language" *(Rorty: 1992: 3).* It is this concept that is central to Wittgenstein's early conception of logical/linguistic analysis. This claim describes the early general framework of logical/linguistic analysis that informs Wittgenstein's subsequent conception of philosophy and method. The notion relates to the claim that a failure to accurately understand language working leads to confused perspectives on language meaning and use. Such confusions are the root cause to proposing and formulating philosophical statements and philosophical problems. Wittgenstein states in 1931 that the removal of the confusion will cease the question being asked and so the confusion disappears. It disappears as it is no longer perceived to be a legitimate question but rather a confusion resulting from an inaccurate account of the workings of language.

> *"The task of philosophy is to soothe the mind about meaningless questions. Whoever doesn't tend to such questions doesn't need philosophy." (8.2.1931: PPO: 73)*

The challenge for Wittgenstein is to determine and develop a coherent method specifically for the purpose of analysing language in such a way that it elucidates the origin to the confusion. As will become apparent this task was notoriously difficult. The challenge of developing and even communicating a new method of analysis was complicated.

The problem of method, is for Wittgenstein interconnected to the metaphilosophical problem of philosophical identity, the nature of philosophical problems and methods of analysis. The question of method was framed metaphilosophically as a question of philosophy itself. It is for this reason that it is possible to appreciate that Wittgenstein perceives the change in method as a means to change philosophy; method would according to Wittgenstein's approach define philosophy. The most complicated aspect related to the development of an account of the workings of language and the need to forward a working method of analysis/elucidation specific to the workings. According to my interpretation of Wittgenstein's approach, a method is determined by what he inferred to be two key factors which I refer to as two variables. The conception of how language worked or what Wittgenstein refers to as the logic of language (TLP: preface) also contains his emphasis on a demarcation of scientific method. Both variables determine

the workings of language and necessarily determine the method of elucidation as the defining practice of his conception of philosophy.

The *Tractatus* offers Wittgenstein's first account of a demonstrable method of logical/linguistic analysis. The *Tractatus* presents Wittgenstein communicating and elucidating an accurate account of how he believed language logically works. The specific format of the two values meant that he had now provided a means to show how all philosophical statements were of the same form of confusion. Therefore, he had in 'essentials' potentially resolved all problems by the postulation, and presentation of his application of his new method. The negative outcome Wittgenstein became aware of, as identified in the preface of the *Tractatus,* is that although he believed he has the unassailable solution to all philosophical problems by way of the analysis of a proposition he had not reached a satisfactory outcome. As I will detail in the next chapter, the application of his metaphilosophical method was seemingly successful in its implementation but not fortuitous in the nature of its valued goal, as the manner of the removal of linguistically weighted philosophical confusion was perhaps unsatisfactory.

## 2.3 The Linguistic Turn

Frege and Russell's view was that only some philosophical problems were a result of confusions and errors in language but this only related to a limited amount of philosophical problems (Russell: 2004). According to Russell, there were genuine philosophical problems that needed to be answered. The point is that the motif of the connection is developed further into a concept that comes to form much of Wittgenstein's linguistic conception of philosophy. Wittgenstein's most controversial move was to develop the suggestion of a relation between some philosophical problems as pseudo-linguistic confusions, to an imperative that claimed that all philosophical statements or problems were a result of a failure to accurately understand the logic of language. The significant difference between Frege and Russell's approach is how Wittgenstein strengthens the three points identified as key influences in the previous chapter:

1. Wittgenstein strengthens the notion of a philosophical critique as a critique of all philosophy as founded upon an erroneous method (TLP: preface).

> *"The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I
> believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the
> misunderstanding of the logic of our language." (TLP: preface:
> OGD).*

2. Wittgenstein focuses specifically on identifying a new method of philosophy, one that avoids the dogmatism of past philosophy as it will for the first time be informed by an accurate account of the workings of language (TLP: preface).

3. The workings of language and the critique of scientism are two factors Wittgenstein uses to formulate a new conception of method. Philosophy is concerned with the analysis of language in order to dissolve philosophical problems. This method is further defined by what is, a critique of scientism in philosophy. Brought together by Wittgenstein's specific approach, developments and reaction to Frege and Russell constitute what is the first LT in philosophy.

Therefore, I maintain the LT was developed out of a focus on logical/linguistic analysis and a critique of scientism. I further argue that the LT confronts Wittgenstein with the challenge of method as it presents the requirement to provide and defend a new method. Hence, from investigating Wittgenstein's work, it is clear that the conception of philosophy, the conception of method and the LT are intrinsic to one another.

## 2.4 Understanding Wittgenstein's Generalisation as Determining a Linguistic Turn

Wittgenstein in September of 1914 was already aware that, the results of his particular method of linguistic analysis and the account of meaning offered would have a deciding and formative role determining any practice or method of philosophy he could propose.

> *"Then: if everything that needs to be shewn is shewn by the existence
> of subject-predicate SENTENCES etc., the task of philosophy is
> different from what I originally supposed." (NB: 1914-16: 3.9.14)*

The subject of investigation constituted an epistemological question that determined how the investigation or method of investigation could be carried out. Moreover, as the question of meaning was a general question, if Wittgenstein was accurate here the conception of meaning would determine that all philosophical problems were of one form, and all philosophical activity was therefore of one method. The results of

Wittgenstein's investigation into language meaning and representation became a general question of philosophical method, a question of philosophy in general. Once this can be systematically displayed it then develops into Wittgenstein's conception of the 'LT'. Wittgenstein's challenge was to develop a philosophical method that was specifically suited to what his analysis claimed to be the linguistic origin and form of the confusions. Wittgenstein's general approach centres on his inference which is in a rudimentary form a generalisation of Frege and Russell's emphasis on the notion that some philosophical problems result from forms of logical/linguistic confusions.

> *"The obscurity obviously resides in the question: what does the logical identity of sign and thing signified really consist in? And this question is (once more) a main aspect of the whole philosophical problem." (NB 1914-16: 3.9.14).*

For Wittgenstein, the key was in the generalisation of all philosophical problems and the form of support he offers as a systematic analysis of the logical form of a proposition. The generalisation was inferred in the *Tractatus* upon his generalisation that the logical form of a proposition is representative of all language. The initial response Wittgenstein offered was centred on a conception of language that determined meaning by the isomorphic relationship between thoughts, words and objects. The logical relations were mirrored and according to Wittgenstein, this was necessary for representation to work. Indeed, the logical mirroring was necessary for language to represent the world and the logical form of objects in it.

> *"In the proposition we--so to speak--arrange things experimentally, as they do not have to be in reality; but we cannot make any unlogical arrangement, for in order to do that we should have to be able to get outside logic in language.--But if the quite general proposition contains only "logical constants", then it cannot be anything more to us than--simply--a logical structure, and cannot do anything more than shew us its own logical properties. If there are quite general propositions--what do we arrange experimentally in them? [Cf. 4.031 and 3.03.]" (NB: 1914-16: 15.10.14)*

The logical isomorphic form of representation meant that all language shared a common form and therefore all language could be analysed by a common method that was specific to the elucidation of the logical form. I emphasise that Wittgenstein's logical analysis was focused on deciphering how language worked in order to provide an accurate account of philosophical method and not for the sake of linguistic understanding or insight.

> *"The analysis which he elaborated in his first major work, the Tractatus, was linguistic. It was analysis not of ideas, as in classical empiricist analysis, or of concepts, conceived of universals that can be inspected by the mind, but of propositions." (Watzka: 2002: 1)*

This point relates to how to read Wittgenstein and how to appreciate his initial motivations. Wittgenstein is clearly concerned with fathoming the logical relations between language and the world, his analysis is as Watzka points out, not concerned with empirical data or apriori concepts, and its focus is on the analysis of propositions. The question is why does Wittgenstein focus his analysis on language alone? One response to this issue relates to Wittgenstein's emphasis on drawing a limit to what can be said as a technique of drawing a limit to the sayable and making a distinction between the unsayable i.e. philosophical statements. It also related to how he had determined the logical form of a proposition to be the general form of all language. Therefore, the method to analyse the logical form of a proposition would constitute a general method of analysis for all language.

## 2.5 Defining the Linguistic Turn

For many Wittgensteinians and non-Wittgensteinians alike the most controversial and influential outcome that Wittgenstein arrived at was the notion of a 'LT'. Wittgenstein did not use this terminology himself; rather the terms had been initially used by Gustav Bergmann, who suggested that there was a complex relationship between philosophical practice and language that was unique to philosophy. It was this relationship that Bergmann suggested defined what he conceived as a 'LT' (Rorty: 2007). The meaning of the term 'LT' with reference to Wittgenstein is somewhat more complicated and represents what I suggest to be Wittgenstein's own conceptual workings and captivations, in connection with his metaphilosophical investigation and how this provides a metaphilosophical framework to his investigation. It relates to how this framework itself determines the question of method to be decided by the two variables of the logic of

language and his critique os scientism in philosophy or his anti-scientism. All of which is motivated by what I have maintained to be his underlying captivation with the idea of revolutionising philosophy in terms of what was initially a new logically and linguistically informed method.

The general interpretation of the meaning of Wittgenstein's LT as supported by Rorty in the above, claims that philosophy is a subject composed of numerous different fields of study, logic, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, political philosophy, philosophy of mind and aesthetics. According to Rorty's reading, this could now be redefined as a subject composed of one specific field of study. A study that is solely concerned with the dissolution of philosophical problems by means of clarifying the linguistic confusions that are mistakenly interpreted as philosophical problems.

In the context of Wittgenstein's philosophy and the conception of a LT, one he worked with prior to 1930, this rough outline would be problematic. The reason for this is that the definition of a LT in the context of Wittgenstein's approach is not as straightforward as one would at first assume. For example, the previous outline of the different fields of study would not represent the conception of philosophy that Wittgenstein was working with in connection with his conception of a LT. The simple fact is that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the context of a LT is far more limited. It largely concerns questions of a metaphysical form and does not for example cater for a broad sweeping conception of philosophy. Wittgenstein's LT did not relate to ethics, politics, and aesthetics or for example more modern offshoots of philosophy such as philosophical anthropology or sociology. Therefore, the first criticism that relates to Wittgenstein's notion of a LT is that it works with his very specific and marginalised conception of philosophy. Philosophical statements are different and do not work according to the criterion of Wittgenstein's referential account of meaning. They do not refer to states of affairs in the world or possible states of affairs, therefore, they do not have any possibility of truth or falsity. They lack sense in this regard, and they are, according to his criteria, nonsense statements that his method of logical analysis will elucidate and thereby dissolve them.

Therefore, perhaps the most economical route is to be clear on a definition of the LT that will support the analysis developed in the thesis. Avishai Margalit gives an insightful conception of what he believes the LT represents.

> *"The LT is perhaps the most characteristic feature of analytic*
>
> *philosophy. ... On Wittgenstein's account, our metaphysical*

> *illusions are a by-product both of the surface structure of language (early Wittgenstein) and of its use (later Wittgenstein"* (Avishai: 2009, Glock and Hyman (eds) 2009:11)

However, Avishai's interpretation highlights a problem that Peter Hacker attempts to address in his paper "*The Linguistic Turn in Analytic Philosophy*". Hacker does not take the use of the phrase 'LT' to be as straightforward as Avishai maintains. Hacker's point is that the concept of a LT is far more complicated than it first appears. Even when one considers the origin and evolution of the idea as Avishai and Hacker do and go some way to expand upon them, it remains that several aspects of it are in need of clarification. What is of importance here is what Hacker identifies as the need to clarify what the relationship is between the claim that philosophy is concerned with a method of linguistic analysis and that the problems of philosophy are a result of linguistic confusions (Hacker: 2013: 926-947).

## 2.6 The Linguistic Turn as a Metaphilosophical Turn

What is of specific concern to my analysis and defence of a metaphilosophical interpretation relates to how the LT changes the investigation to one focused on providing a new method of linguistic analysis. This shift in focus moves the investigation to what I suggest is a metaphilosophical investigation concerning the development of a method specific to the claim that all philosophical problems have their origin in linguistic confusion. It is the challenge to change how one views the practice of philosophy by changing how one views and understands the source of philosophical problems.

> *"What, according to linguistic philosophers thus understood, is the subject matter of philosophy? What is a philosophical problem and how is it to be distinguished from other kinds of problems, e.g. in science or mathematics? What is the source (or sources) of the problems of philosophy?"* (Hacker: 2013: 926-947).

The point is that Wittgenstein's LT is metaphilosophically weighted by its demand for a new linguistic method to support it. It is not a particular change in method, for example, it is not like the change in method between Socratic method and Aristotelian method. I suggest that what is important concerning this change in method is that Wittgenstein was aware that it necessitates a complete shift in the conception of philosophy or in how one understands the subject of philosophy. This is a point that is developed further by Hacker in the following:

> *Or does it just recapitulate the methodological claim that philosophical problems – whatever they are – are solved or resolved by one or the other of the two methods … What is the source (or sources) of the problems of philosophy? What is the appropriate method (or methods) for the solution of philosophical problems? What is the result of successful philosophical investigations? Is it philosophical truths (akin to the truths produced by successful scientific investigations)? If so, how are they to be characterised? And if it is not, what is it? (Hacker: 2013: 926-947).*

## 2.7 Three Metaphilosophical Questions of Wittgenstein's Linguistic Turn

The above prepares the ground for a more detailed analysis in the next chapters, concerning how the focus on language acts as the primary determining factor of the method of logical analysis in the *Tractatus*. However, I claim that Wittgenstein's linguistic turn is not strictly the linguistic turn that it is often taken to be. If one follows the metaphilosophical analysis defended herein then it is evident that the LT has more to it than linguistic confusion it also consists of Wittgenstein's anti-scientism. The LT is perhaps a deceptive concept in this respect, as it clearly points to a method that should consist solely of linguistic analysis. This I claim is mistaken and relates to the general failure to comprehend both Wittgenstein's concern with language as a source of philosophical confusion and scientism as an additional source that contributes to confusion. This is an evident tension in the method that Wittgenstein defends in the *Tractatus*. I maintain that Wittgenstein's method in the *Tractatus* and his altered conception of methods in the *Investigations* consists of the two variable values of the logic of language and the critique of scientism. What I aim to develop next is how the

application of the concept of metaphilosophy can determine the linguistic turn, to also constitute a metaphilosophical turn. The means of achieving this consists of adapting the primary metaphilosophical questions into key positions that the linguistic turn hinges upon. This provides a means of clarifying how the linguistic focus also determines what I claim to be the metaphilosophical framework to Wittgenstein's approach and investigation. The metaphilosophical framework will determine Wittgenstein's conception of method as it is determined by the linguistic turn. In closing the analysis of the LT it should be now evident that the LT is metaphilsophcially loaded in realtion to its requirement for a new method specific to the logical/lingusitc form of the confusion. This is most clear when one considers the three general metaphilosphcial questions:

### Metaphilosophical Question 1: What is the Subject of Investigation of Philosophical Investigation?

Wittgenstein's response is that if language is the source of the confusion, then it is language that must be the subject of investigation, and certainly not the seemingly appealing philosophical problems that arise from such misunderstanding. Wittgenstein's approach maintains that the workings of language need to be accurately identified in order to understand how the failure to comprehend language has given rise to philosophical problems.

### Metaphilosophical Question 2: What is the New Practice of Philosophy?

Once we are clearer on how language works, Wittgenstein's next metaphilosophical move is to offer a new conception of philosophical practice that uses the information of the accurate account of the logical workings of language as a tool to untangle the linguistic knots and confusions that constitute the catalogue of philosophical problems.

### Metaphilosophical Question 3: What Method or Methods Define this Practice?

The question is how are philosophers meant to utilise the account of language to dissolve such confusions? What method or methods can philosophers use to ensure an accurate application of the logic/workings of language to a philosophical confusion?

The above three questions relate to the metaphilosophical significance to Wittgenstein's LT and support my claim that it is arguably a metaphilosophical turn, and it supports a metaphilosophical framework to his challenge to develop a new method. The

metaphilosophical significance of Wittgenstein's work in trying to provide an account of the workings of language and to determine a practice consisting of a clear method or methods focused on linguistic elucidation. The important point here relates to the central claim of the thesis argument namely, that this is only one aspect of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical turn. There is another aspect that is less evident in the early work but becomes more prominent in the later work that concerns Wittgenstein's criticisms of scientism in philosophy.

## Conclusion

To understand Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation and the meaning of method it is necessary to clarify his approach by considering the following points. The suggestion that not some but all philosophical problems result from linguistic confusion (a key claim of *Tractatus* 1918) and therefore philosophical practice (Method) must necessarily be one of linguistic clarification, is key. Wittgenstein's LT is officially forwarded in the *Tractatus,* but it was in germination for much of the years leading to completion of the work and therefore was a defining characteristic of his work from 1913-1918 (NB). It was Wittgenstein's analysis of language that brought about the two requirements of the LT that all philosophical problems are linguistic confusions, and therefore, all philosophical practice (Method) is linguistic clarification. Specifically, it was Wittgenstein's analysis of the logical form and referential nature of a proposition that defined all language, that enabled him to forward the LT. This will be examined in more depth later. The key negative outcome was that by the complete logical analysis of the proposition Wittgenstein had as he points out in the preface of the *Tractatus*, forwarded the 'final solution of the problems' which he goes on to suggest is of little achievement.

To end the chapter, it is important to reiterate that there are different metaphilosophical influences and contexts to Wittgenstein's work that all relate to the question of philosophical method. This conclusion is first supported by the claim that Wittgenstein's principal motivation to question philosophy is inherited from the metaphilosophical concerns and focus of Frege and Russell. Both aimed to critique philosophical method and replace it with a new logically and scientifically informed method. Russell identifies Frege as the first to provide the first complete example of "the logical-analytical method in philosophy" (Landini: 2007: 27). It is suggested that Wittgenstein embraces the motive

to critique and supersede philosophical method but rejects each specific support for the adoption of scientific method. These two aspects are the first identifiable metaphilosophical motives of what will be suggested to be Wittgenstein's general metaphilosophical approach.

# CHAPTER THREE: METAPHILOSOPHY AND WITTGENSTEIN

*"Metaphilosophy is philosophy's poor and neglected cousin. Philosophers are on the whole too busy doing philosophy to take time to stand back and consider reflectively how the project itself actually works. And they tend to produce texts without too much consideration of how this looks from the standpoint of the consumer. All this, it seems to me, affords good reason for attending to philosophical hermeneutics, reflecting on the issue of how philosophical texts are to be understood and interpreted." (Rescher: 2006)*

## 3.1 Introduction: The Problem with Metaphilosophy

In the last chapter, the analysis developed and defended an account of the LT as a metaphilosophical turn and argued that it also determined the focus of Wittgenstein's investigation to be a metaphilosophical one focused on method. Our attention now moves to develop the findings from the last chapter in relation to the concept metaphilosophy. This chapter offers a clarification and critical assessment of metaphilosophy. The complexity of this task relates to how the concept metaphilosophy not only remains unclear but is typically interpreted without considering what I argue is the necessary and important Wittgensteinian context to its meaning. The chapter draws upon the work of Morris Lazerowitz as a positive means of bringing some necessary clarification and contextual meaning to the concept. I claim that Lazerowitz's work offers an important Wittgensteinian context to metaphilosophy that not only clarifies the concept but also supports the application of the concept to Wittgenstein's work. In short, it is claimed that

metaphilosophy has a specific Wittgensteinian context that is integral to understanding Wittgenstein's focus on philosophical method and methods.

> *"Metaphilosophy is the project of examining philosophy itself from a philosophical point of view—it is the philosophy of philosophy, if you will. Its definitive mission is to facilitate an understanding of how philosophy works – the aim of the aim of the enterprise, the instrumental and procedural resources for its work, and the prospect of its success."*
> *(Rescher: 2014: xi)*

Therefore, my analysis begins with the claim that metaphilosophy is a concept designed to categorise a particular type of philosophical investigation that focuses on investigating the practice of philosophy itself (Rescher: 2014). Furthermore, it is the specific nature of Wittgenstein's investigation into philosophical method that determines his work to be distinctly metaphilosophical. I maintain that Wittgenstein's focus on method is a uniquely metaphilosophical focus. It encapsulates the three metaphilosophical questions by means of its focus on forwarding a new conception of philosophical problems as linguistic confusion and an according novel conception of philosophical practice as a method of linguistic analysis or elucidation.

> *"What is philosophy? How should we do it? Why should we bother to? These are the kinds of questions addressed by metaphilosophy – the philosophical study of the nature of philosophy itself."*
> *(Overgaard: 2013: 3)*

It is evident that philosophical investigations are concerned with solving philosophical problems whereas metaphilosophical investigations are generally concerned with the three metaphilosophical questions and the numerous questions that follow from them. In what follows, I claim that metaphilosophy is an important and applicable concept to Wittgenstein's work and specifically his focus on method.

## 3.2 Clarifying Metaphilosophy

*"As the foregoing sketch begins to suggest, three very general metaphilosophical questions are (1) what is philosophy? (2) What is, or what should be, the point of philosophy? (3) How should one do philosophy?" (Joll: 2010)*

Throughout the corpus of introductions and commentaries, there are three key questions that recur again and again in discussion describing and attempting to define metaphilosophy and communicate what is the main subject of investigation for metaphilosophy. The above three questions I claim can assist in elucidating a criterion of what qualifies as a 'meta' philosophical investigation. For this reason the criterion centres on the three key questions that focus the investigation on the subject, practice and methods of philosophy (Joll: 2010).

## 3.3 Criticisms and Challenges to the Application and Use of Metaphilosophy to Wittgenstein's Work

Since the development and use of the concept metaphilosophy, there is a clear disdain for the use of the term by many philosophers and many Wittgensteinian philosophers too. Stanley Cavell clearly admonishes what he describes as the 'fashionable' distinction between philosophy and metaphilosophy (Cavell: 1967). Metaphilosophy is a practice often seen as what Gilbert Ryle (1949, 2009) suggests is a fruitless, distracting and an unnecessary preoccupation with questions about methods (Ryle 2009). Ryle is not alone in his criticisms of metaphilosophical investigations. Numerous philosophers such as Karl Popper (1962), Richard Rorty (1992, 2007), Stanley Cavell (1979) and Timothy Williamson (2006, 2007) all take a negative stance against the use of the term metaphilosophy. In various ways, all are critical of the idea that there is a value to be gained from bringing philosophy and philosophical method into question (Overgaard et al: 2013, Williamson: 2007).

The general questioning of philosophy, its subject, method and the related questions has been criticised by some commentators such as Popper as a distraction from the real business of philosophy. Popper is often appealed to as an example of a philosopher who has gone to great efforts to produce works that examine the practices and methods of

philosophy and yet rejects the classification that questions, such as what is the method or practice of philosophy are worthwhile questions (Popper: 1962). Perhaps Popper is on to something here as it draws our attention to the question when does one cross over into the domain of questioning philosophy itself of doing metaphilosophy?

## Criticism 1: The Rejection of the Term Metaphilosophy

> *"Without attempting to define the terms precisely, we may put the difference to a first approximation thus: the current methodology of the natural sciences is a posteriori; the current methodology of philosophy is a priori. What should we make of this difference?"* *(Williamson: 2007: 1)*

The first challenge with the use of the modern conception of Metaphilosophy relates to the term itself. Some commentators such as Timothy Williamson argue that the term Metaphilosophy is a 'deceptive appendage' that should be rejected in favour of the more traditional coinage of the 'philosophy of philosophy'. Williamson follows this criticism by offering what is best described as a more restrictive conception of the 'philosophy of philosophy' and suggests that the task of the philosophy of philosophy is best described as an investigation into philosophy and not a prescription on how to practice or carry out philosophy.

> *"The primary task of the philosophy of science is to understand science, not to give scientists advice. Likewise, the primary task of the philosophy of philosophy is to understand philosophy, not to give philosophers advice – although I have not rigorously abstained from the latter."* *(Williamson: 2007: ix)*

Williamson highlights an interesting point in his criticism of metaphilosophy. He suggests that the 'meta' part of metaphilosophy is deeply deceptive and suggests that it places the investigation 'above or beyond' philosophy. This would suggest that to investigate philosophy is to separate the investigation from philosophical practice, whereas Williamson maintains that by holding to the more traditional 'philosophy of philosophy' the investigation remains within philosophy and is, therefore, less confusing (Williamson: 2008: ix). Williamson's criticism of metaphilosophy is one that we can appreciate, his

emphasis on 'meta' as a negative distracting and deceptive component is reasonable. Nicholas Rescher *(Rescher: 2006: 1)* offers perhaps the most economical account of metaphilosophy that also provides some response to Williamson's concerns by clearly specifying the need to determine practice rather than merely providing a portrait of philosophy.

> *"Metaphilosophy is the philosophical examination of the practice of philosophising itself. Its definitive aim is to study the methods of the field in an endeavour to illuminate its promise and prospects."*
> *(Rescher: 2006: 1)*

## Criticism 2: The Rejection of the practices of Metaphilosophy

The more serious criticisms waged against metaphilosophy as a valid discipline and accepted form of philosophical investigation comes from many of the pro-science camps. It seems that it is a common criticism that the philosophers who argue for the implementation of scientific principles into philosophy and the development of philosophy as a subject along with science are the main critics of metaphilosophy.

If other disciplines are questioned, then it would seem warranted to adopt the same type of questioning and develop the inquiry into the subject of philosophy itself. Undoubtedly, there is, it appears, an irritation felt by many philosophers when the subject of philosophy is itself brought into question.

## Criticism 3: The Philosophers of Science and the Rejection of Metaphilosophy

The point is that at very least if philosophy can investigate science in the context of the philosophy of science then why is it difficult to investigate philosophy. Science investigates all that is observable and empirical and it has a clear method of hypo-deductive reasoning concerned with a possible hypothesis and testing it in experiment. Indeed, philosophers are interested in questioning and investigating the parameters of scientific investigation in the subject 'philosophy of science' but the subject that is the philosophy of philosophy which has become superseded by the term 'Metaphilosophy', is less clear and far more controversial. The question is how philosophers can justify the practice to investigate the subject, practice and methods of science and at the same time

be critical of other philosophers who question philosophy, its subject and its method. The above quotation gives some insight into this example as it clearly describes the very general questions and what many consider to be constitutive of a negative conception of philosophy and certainly undermines the conception of philosophy as a serious investigation.

> *"Crude rationalists, crude empiricists, and linguistic or conceptual philosophers (those who take the linguistic or conceptual turn) share a common assumption: that the a priori methodology of philosophy is profoundly unlike the a posteriori methodology of the natural sciences; it is no mere difference between distinct applications of the same underlying methodology… Although there are real methodological differences between philosophy and the other sciences, as actually practiced, they are less deep than is often supposed." (Williamson: 2007: 3)*

The key point here is that, unlike science, there is no agreed method of practice in philosophy which would suggest a greater urgency and need to investigate and question philosophical practice. It remains that the philosophy of science has a dedicated following and is certainly a more fashionable if not credible area of research. Whereas, the philosophy of philosophy or metaphilosophy is certainly unpopular and seems to be a less important field of philosophy. There is something peculiar in this. To return to the point at hand, there is a clear deficiency in philosophy that relates to developing some degree of consensus as to the goal of philosophical practice, the subject of philosophical investigation, and what is the correct philosophical method. All of which would suggest a need to embrace metaphilosophy and the practice of clarifying philosophy itself.

The fact is that philosophers generally do not like to bring the subject of philosophy into question, this undoubtedly stems from certain themes of criticism waged against philosophy as a subject of apparently little evident results. The interesting point here is that whether the questions are coming from outside philosophy or other philosophers, there remains a general disdain for the practice. Moreover, very often philosophers themselves seem to fail to distinguish between the fact that if the critical questions are coming from other philosophers, then there is usually a metaphilosophical context to the questions or the investigation and the goal is not to undermine or bring the practice into

doubt but rather achieve clarity to such questions. As Gutting points out there is a clear need to investigate philosophy and what constitutes its practices and methods.

> *"My discussion belongs to the disdained and marginalized domain of metaphilosophy, and I hasten to assure the reader that "I, too, dislike it." But I've tried to avoid the two features that have typically made metaphilosophy so unsatisfying: a dogmatic attitude that derives the nature of philosophy from controversial philosophical doctrines (e.g., idealist metaphysics or empiricist epistemology) and an abstract, overly generalized approach that pays no attention to the details of philosophical practice." (Gutting: 2: 2009)*

The problem is partly that some metaphilosophical questions are branded to be of the same spirit as those from outside philosophy that offer a critical reproach of philosophy. This can only be achieved by means of  a coherent defence of the application and a specific and detailed account of the applicability and compatibility of the concept metaphilosophy to Wittgenstein's work. The tactic to achieving this is best obtained by appealing to the originator of the concept Morris Lazerowitz and his own explanation of how he developed the idea from his understanding of Wittgenstein's focus on investigating philosophy.

## 3.4 Metaphilosophy and Method

Morris Lazerowitz identifies an important Wittgensteinian context to the concept of metaphilosophy (Lazerowitz: 1968, 1970). First, Lazerowitz's account offers a more positive means of understanding a general account of metaphilosophy. Lazerowitz emphaises the need to understand the origin of the term as a means to differentiate Wittgenstein's 'meta' practice as distinct from regular philosophical investigations due to its focus on philosophy itself.  Second, I maintain that a clear understanding of the general account of metaphilosophy is necessary and integral in attempting to analyse and develop Wittgenstein's philosophy and the main aspects of it.  Third, the most relevant aspect of the thesis concerns how Lazerowitz's conception of metaphilosophy highlights a meaningful metaphilosophical context that is integral to understanding Wittgenstein's focus on philosophical method. This is specifically relevant when considering

Lazerowitz's efforts to make an important distinction to Wittgenstein's work and investigations into philosophy as operating at a 'Meta' level.

It is evident that the general account of metaphilosophy and the Wittgensteinian context are intrinsic to one another. In investigating the meaning of contemporary metaphilosophy, it was suggested that three general metaphilosophical questions offer a basic criteria to assist in making a distinction between philosophical and metaphilosophical statements. It was proposed that a great deal of Wittgenstein's focus in investigating philosophy was hinged on a search for a new more accurate and linguistically informed method. This view was also supported by the appeal to the general criteria of metaphilosophy as predominantly concerned with questions and investigations relating to philosophical method. Therefore, again it is suggested that the general account of metaphilosophy and the Wittgensteinian account are intrinsic to one another in terms of the focus on method as the defining characteristic of a metaphilosophical investigation. What is now apparent is that the analysis and defence of the metaphilosophical interpretation identify how the emphasis on philosophical method is integral to both.

If we are to follow the publication topics in Wittgensteinian exegesis, the term metaphilosophy is very seldom used. The reason for this is suggested to be the disdain for this aspect of Wittgenstein's work. This is a point that Sorin Bangu appeals to in developing his own interpretation of Wittgenstein's emphasis on the notion of family resemblance.

> *"...to challenge the almost unanimous opinion according to which Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical views are rather incoherent, or even mistaken altogether. Highly idiosyncratic, his views on the therapeutic nature of philosophy are considered "the weakest part of Wittgenstein's later work – slogans unsupported by argument (...), which can be isolated from the rest""* (Bangu: 2005: 55)

This could suggest that there is little interest or no serious application of metaphilosophy to Wittgenstein's work. This is an unusual outcome given that I claim there is an immensely important and evident metaphilosophical context that is central to Wittgenstein's overall philosophical approach. The metaphilosophical context to Wittgenstein's work is for most not obvious when considering his two principle works the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. It is perhaps only by looking at the preceding context

of these two works that the metaphilosophical context begins to surface. Wittgenstein's first paper in 1912 to the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge was called "What is philosophy?". When asked by R.B Braithwaite what he would name the series of lectures he was to give in 1930 he replied:

> *"The subject of the lectures would be philosophy. What else can be the title of the lectures but Philosophy." (PPO: 340)*

The opening statement to his first lecture in 1930 was recorded by Desmond Lee's notes (Lee: 1980: 1) and emphasises the specific critical claim Wittgenstein starts with that sets the tone for his work.

> *"Philosophy is the attempt to be rid of a particular kind of puzzlement. This 'philosophic' puzzlement is one of the intellect and not of instinct. Philosophic puzzles are irrelevant to our every-day life. They are puzzles of language. Instinctively we use language rightly; but to the intellect this use is a puzzle." (PPO: 341)*

In order to develop the analysis, it is important to consider other interpretations that expand upon the emphasis on his conception of philosophy and in varying degrees emphasise a metaphilosophical context to Wittgenstein's work. Such examples would appear to support the interpretation and defence developed here, but this is largely not the case. There is a minority of philosophers that have in varying degree attempted to draw attention to the importance of Wittgenstein's work in a metaphilosophical context. Denis McManus (1995, 2006), Meredith Williams (1999), Kelly Dean Jolley (1993), Peter Hacker (2013) and Paul Horwich (1993, 2012) are all Wittgensteinian's who identify the importance of approaching or interpreting at very least parts of Wittgenstein's work in the context of metaphilosophy. Collectively, the contrasting approaches highlight a need to be clear and diligent in how one seeks to apply the concept metaphilosophy to Wittgenstein. It is important to be informed as to the meaning of metaphilosophy and the relevance of the application to Wittgenstein's work. There is I maintain a positive requirement to understand Wittgenstein focus on methods as a unique metaphilosophical investigation.

*"In particular, it grows out of my conviction that there is philosophy in Philosophical Investigations , and not merely a dismissal of philosophy in it. But unlike others who might endorse my conviction, I do not take Wittgenstein to be a philosopher of language say, a use-theorist or some type of pre-positivist or post-positivist. Instead, I take Wittgenstein to be a philosopher of philosophy, a metaphilosopher, and I take him to be centrally concerned with the nature of philosophical problems: with what they are, how they come into being, with how they rise and fall, with how they give expression to human nature, and in particular with how they manifest various deep-going forms of human desires, human longings and human needs." (K. Jolley: 2013)*

There are numerous Wittgensteinians such as Kelly Dean Jolley, Paul Horwich and Denis McManus who specifically focus on the importance of a metaphilosophical context to Wittgenstein's work. They all claim that this metaphilosophical context is exegetically important in determining how one interprets key concepts in Wittgenstein's work. Such views supports the metaphilosophical interpretation defended in the thesis. Unfortunately, the application of metaphilosophy is not straightforward and differences immediately become apparent. There is as will be addressed shortly a tendency to use metaphilosophy as a slogan to highlight Wittgenstein focus on investigating philosophy without addressing the significance of it and certainly not as a conceptual tool of elucidation. Moreover, commentators such as Jolley fail to acknowledge or consider the significant relationship between Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach and his emphasis on method and methods.

## 3.5 Misunderstanding Wittgenstein and Metaphilosophy

*"'If my name survives, then only as the terminus adquem of the great philosophy of the West. As the name of him who burnt the library of Alexandria.' Unsurprisingly, this conception of philosophy has met with much resistance since Wittgenstein's death and it is at the moment to a large extent rejected by analytic philosophers."* *(Kanterian: 2007: 174)*

As Kanterian points out in the above quote from Wittgenstein's personal diary Wittgenstein was aware that he was offering a radical critique of traditional philosophy and this critique threatened to undermine what he was developing as a positive change in method.

There is a tendency to refer to Wittgenstein as a metaphilosopher on the basis of two assumptions that are often misunderstood. The first concerns how one understands the meaning of metaphilosophy and second how one interprets some aspect of Wittgenstein's work to be metaphilosophical. There is clearly a need to appraise the two elements to clarify the relationship and to assess its merits. I argue that the types of interpretation that appeal to Wittgenstein as a metaphilosopher are misconceived as they generally lack the support of an appeal his specific work as metaphilosophical. For example, Sass develops an important focus on the psychological aspect of philosophical confusion and how this relates to Wittgenstein conception of philosophy and need to change philosophy. Sass fails to support his insights further by failing to appeal to what I claim to be the most significant and important motive for the application of metaphilosophy; the aim to change philosophy by means of a change in method. It is the workings of a detailed account of the specifics of his investigation into philosophical method that are metaphilosophically important and what I claim constitutes the main motivation for his work. I appeal to Morris Lazerowitz's account to support this claim as he emphasises the same point. Wittgenstein's work is first and foremost metaphilosophical because it investigates the practice and method of philosophy at a meta-level. This is my criticism of other commentators, there is a general failure to develop the importance of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical focus specifically on the question of method.

James Conant also highlights the importance of the emphasis on method and methods but fails to develop this in the context of a metaphilosophical context (Conant: 2007). Kelly Dean Jolley (2013) emphasises that Wittgenstein should be first considered as a metaphilosopher but fails to perceive any significance of it to the question of method. Gordon Baker (2004) draws attention to the importance of Wittgenstein's aim to change the practice of philosophy and goes to great lengths in developing a therapeutic account of Wittgenstein's emphasis on practice but fails to develop the metaphilosophical context to the desire to change philosophy. Peter Hacker, while producing some of the most important work on Wittgenstein also highlights the importance of the metaphilosophical focus but admits its unpopularity has represented a failing on Wittgensteinian research to

develop this side of his work. This was perhaps an admission of his own failings to develop this in his own work (Hacker: 2013).

The aim is now to further defend and support the application of the concept metaphilosophy as a necessary and important concept to Wittgensteinian exegesis and analysis. There is a great deal in common with the focus on metaphilosophy defended here and Horwich's metaphilosophical interpretation such as the premise that the context of metaphilosophy is integral to understanding the key concepts and different aspects of Wittgenstein's work (Horwich: 2012: 1).

> *"The real foundation of Wittgenstein's philosophy, it seems to me, is his metaphilosophy: his account of what philosophical problems are, how they should be treated, and what in the end can be accomplished by resolving them. Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning, it seems to me, is merely a specific application of that general methodology."* (Horwich: 1993: 154)

Therefore, Horwich's work is important in providing some specific support to the direction of the thesis analysis, and his work will be appealed to in supporting the thesis defence. There are important differences in how Horwich and I interpret the meaning of metaphilosophy and its relation to Wittgenstein, that need to be considered. I support this claim, by further developing the importance of the work of Wittgensteinian Morris Lazerowitz in order to conceptually handle and support a necessary distinction. This concerns how Wittgenstein's investigation into philosophical practice and method operated at a 'meta' level. It was this distinction between regular philosophical investigations and Wittgenstein's investigation as a 'meta' level investigation that Lazerowitz identified as key in developing the concept. The analysis supports the conclusion that there is an intrinsic Wittgensteinian context and meaning to the concept metaphilosophy. This is clear from the relationship between the development of the concept metaphilosophy and Wittgenstein's work as an investigation into philosophical analysis and method.

## 3.6 Lazerowitz: The Historical Development of a Wittgensteinian Conception of Metaphilosophy

In 1970 Morris Lazerowitz was asked to contribute to defining the meaning of the term metaphilosophy in the first edition of the journal '*Metaphilosophy*'. Lazerowitz was known to have been the originator and initial supporter of the use of the term in philosophy. Therefore, Lazerowitz's contribution is instrumental in clarifying and understanding the origin and meaning to the term metaphilosophy. In his introduction, Lazerowitz sums up a general account of the meaning of metaphilosophy by identifying two parts to how the term is often meaningfully interpreted. The first aspect, Lazerowitz points out has been the contextual use of the term in Lazerowitz's own work developing what he describes as Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and its critical response to the practice of traditional theory orientated philosophy.

> *"The word has a brief history. It was coined by me in 1940 so as to enable me to refer unambiguously to a special kind of investigation which Wittgenstein had described as one of the "heirs" of philosophy… For some philosophers, I have discovered, the word has come to be the name of the special view I have advanced and elaborated over the years: the view that represents a philosophical theory as a gerrymandered piece of language, which, because it is presented in the ontological idiom, is capable of creating the intellectual illusion that a theory about things is being stated and also of giving expression to a cluster of unconscious ideas. Putting aside the special view with which the word 'metaphilosophy' has become associated, the need to improve our understanding of philosophy, what it is and how it works, can no longer be in question for philosophers who are serious about their subject."* (Lazerowitz: 1970)*

Lazerowitz emphasises that the meaning of the term relates to Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy as a non-theoretical practice. He also emphasises the need for philosophy to develop a new method specific to the forms of confusion and their source. Lazerowitz determines the source and influence of the term metaphilosophy to the development of

Wittgenstein critical investigation into philosophy. Lazerowitz was a pupil to Bouwsma and Moore and was also married to Wittgenstein's pupil and executor Alice Ambrose. Lazerowitz claimed he developed the term in 1940 (Lazerowitz: 1970) with an emphasis on the 'meta' as conceptual device to communicate the different level of analysis beyond regular analysis concerning the problems of philosophy. It is clear that metaphilosophy concerns the questioning of philosophy itself, the discipline, the subject and the practices that are appealed to in answering the questions relating to 'what is philosophy?'. This is why Lazerowitz suggested that such questions needed to be differentiated from what are more regular forms of philosophical questioning. The difference between the two relates to how metaphilosophical questions are questions that focus on philosophy as a discipline and as practice. They are questions that go beyond the norm of philosophical questioning and question the subject itself. For this reason, they require what Lazerowitz maintains is the need to be differentiated by the 'meta' and appropriately more accurately referred to as meta-questions.

The meta-questions that are suggested to define metaphilosophy are questions that philosophers themselves tend to present in a philosophical theoretical form such as 'what is x?' In this sense metaphilosophy like epistemology is very much a practice undertaken solely by philosophers. The general search for essential definitions as in the form of questioning; what is 'x', in what is 'science' are philosophical questions. However, when we ask 'what is philosophy?' we need to clarify the context of the question to determine whether it qualifies as a metaphilosophical question. It is unclear how to answer 'what is x' therefore a deeper more complex response needs to be investigated. Perhaps the question 'what is philosophy?' has the same difficulty and this is why Lazerowitz sought to differentiate such questions from regular philosophical practice. Lazerowitz was keenly aware of Wittgenstein's emphasis on the nature of philosophical confusion. His own mentor Bouwsma was famous for not articulating philosophical theories but rather for identifying the confusions in the philosophical theories offered by others (Bouwsma: 1968: 82).[28]

> *"Metaphilosophy is the investigation of the nature of philosophy,*
> *with the central aim of arriving at a satisfactory explanation of the*

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[28] There are other interpretations of metaphilosophy that are said to predate Lazerowitz claim as the originator in 1940. See Nicholas Joll's paper on Metaphilosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/con-meta/

> *absence of uncontested philosophical claims and arguments…"*
> *(Lazerowitz: 1970)*

Besides the specifically Wittgensteinian context to metaphilosophy, Lazerowitz identifies the pressing need to question philosophy, "the need to improve our understanding of philosophy, what it is and how it works, can no longer be in question for philosophers who are serious about their subject" (Lazerowitz: 1970). Lazerowitz maintains that the term is a reflection of Wittgenstein's efforts to investigate and highlight the practices and methods of philosophy itself. This relates to the bewitching manifestations in how language confuses philosophers and leads them to investigate and theorise. It relates to responding to philosophical problems as legitimate apriori or empirical problems that seem to relate to some empirical confusion needing philosophical engagement.

It was this aspect that Lazerowitz suggested constituted the chief motivation for Wittgenstein's critical investigation into the practice of philosophy and in trying to determine how philosophy should and should not be practised. Therefore, the relevance of the term metaphilosophy has a significant relation to the work of Wittgenstein, not only in Wittgenstein's own investigations into the practice of philosophy but also in connection with the uniquely Wittgensteinian development of the term itself by Morris Lazerowitz.

## 3.6.1 Exposition of the Argument: Understanding the Context to a New Method of Analysis

To make one of his key points, concerning the move to philosophical analysis as a move to a uniquely different method of philosophical practice, Lazerowitz draws our attention to a clear misconception concerning Wittgenstein's conception of analysis and how it is important not to confuse it or mistake it for the conception of analysis offered by his contemporaries and those who influenced him. Lazerowitz focuses on G.E. Moore's early conception of analysis (Moore: 1922) as an important and often misunderstood influence on Wittgenstein. The emphasis is on Moore's account of analysis and how it clearly influenced Wittgenstein in developing his own. This is an important point that needs to be explored a great deal as it is integral to how Wittgenstein will move to a developed metaphilosophical investigation into philosophical method.

*"The problem then becomes one of understanding rightly how a philosopher is using language who says, 'Physical things are not real', or 'Physical things exist but are mere appearance'" (Lazerowitz: 1968: 55)[29].*

Lazerowitz's point is that Moore had influenced Wittgenstein and his focus on the relation between ordinary language and misunderstanding philosophical problems, its relation to philosophical investigation, the desire to launch into metaphysics, and the focus on the analysis of confusions as genuine problems. An important difference Lazerowitz draws our attention to is that although Moore clearly influences Wittgenstein in relation to these important points, Moore fails to develop their significance to the level that Wittgenstein does. Moore does not, I claim, take the analysis of these relations to philosophical confusions and philosophical method to a meta level. He does not use them to bring philosophy itself into question. Moore remains at the philosophical level of questioning method. What this highlights is that there is a need to further clarify the important difference concerning the end goal of analysis and the desire for knowledge claims.

There are clear affinities between Wittgenstein and Moore, concerning how they both come to view the nature of philosophical problems. Lazerowitz highlights this affinity between Moore's statement that language was 'expressly designed to mislead philosophers' (Lazerowitz: 1968: 55) and Wittgenstein's later emphasis in the investigations where he states that 'philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language' (PI: 89). Lazerowitz's focus on Moore as the key influence concerning the analysis of language is also supported by other commentators such as Edward Cell who also maintains that it was Moore's focus on analysis rather than Frege and Russell's approach that was key to Wittgenstein (Lazerowitz: 2002: 101). Cell maintains Moore's language-based insights in his revolt against Idealism as the first linguistic move to not only adopt an analytical method but also in identifying that there is a relation between confusions in ordinary language and philosophical problems (Cell: 1971:11-13)[30]. According to Cell, Moore's importance is related to his suggestion that

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[29] Lazerowitz suggests that the emphasis on the need to employ analysis as the primary response to philosophical problems as erroneous philosophical statements was a key to G.e. Moore and therefore this aspect of Wittgenstein's approach is directly related to Moore influence.

[30] Laurence Goldstein, by contrast, suggests that it is Frege's seminal work *'Sense and Reference'* that heralds the birth of the first analytical moves and thus represents the first attempt to tackle the problematic nature of ordinary language. Nonetheless, the point is that the idea of analysis as the key practice of philosophical investigation was growing in popularity not just from logic but also Moore's focus on the analysis of language. (Goldstein: 2000)

traditional philosophic disagreement and problems result from failing to understand the nature of the questions philosophy traditionally attempted to tackle.[31]

> *""Linguistic philosophy" is commonly understood to designate a conception of philosophy in which the philosopher's task is construed as the clarification of meaning, rather than the construction of a comprehensive world view." (Cell: 1971:11)*

Lazerowitz and Cell both rightly identify the important influence that Moore's early conception of philosophical analysis has on the development of Wittgenstein's own form of analysis. Cell can be seen to follow the more popular view regarding this line of influence between Moore and Wittgenstein. However, Cell like others fails to perceive what Lazerowitz identifies as the important difference between the conceptions of analysis that Moore identifies and the analysis that Wittgenstein develops. The most important difference here is how Wittgenstein's analysis is not focused on the attainment of new knowledge or truths. The point is that the idea of analysis is evident but how that analysis is practised and what it pursues needs to be considered. Lazerowitz's point is that Moore develops his account of common sense in connection with his analytical approach as a pre-emptive move in developing an argument based on a theory of knowledge. Moore is highlighting the need for analysis as a change in philosophical practice merely to find what he considers a more strengthened position to defend his argument of a common sense defence of knowledge claims. As a criticism of Moore's form of analysis, Lazerowitz describes Moore's position as a more comfortable one in the fly bottle (Lazerowitz: 1968: 55). The point is that Moore is not changing philosophy per se rather he is pointing to some difficulties in the practice of philosophy that can, he suggests, be overcome with a move to a more analytical practice but he is firmly seated on the bench of traditional philosophy[32]. Moore is staying on the playing field of theoretical philosophy supported by philosophical arguments. Lazerowitz makes the important point that there is a distinction between the insightful philosophical critiques and alternative approaches that other philosopher's offer and Wittgenstein's approach. What Lazerowitz suggests is

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[31] In that Moore's conceptual analysis was concerned with the analysis of mind independent concepts rather than ideas or impressions and spearheaded the revolt against idealism initially in numerous papers from 1898 and specifically in 1903 Moore offers a refutation of idealism via criticism of Berkeley's esse is percepi. The point is that in his early papers and ultimately in his *Principia Ethica*, Moore invoked analysis as method or approach in philosophy.

[32] The use of Traditional philosophy here follows that of Paul Horwich's emphasis on traditional philosophy as theoretical philosophy in search of knowledge see Horwich: 2012.

that other philosophers such as Moore in identifying the need for conceptual analysis are quite revolutionary in critiquing philosophical practice and are certainly influential to Wittgenstein and his development. However, they stop short of following Wittgenstein in departing from the philosophical game, searching for knowledge or arguing and defending different claims of knowledge.

> *"The implication of these remarks is that a philosopher changes language in one way or another under the illusion that he is expressing a proposition about what there is (or is not) and about the nature of what there is. The further implication is that the revised piece of language is semantically idle. That is, it has no actual use to communicate information, yet creates the illusion of expressing a speculation about the world." (Lazerowitz: 1987: 8)*

Lazerowitz's central point is that philosophers fail to follow through on their philosophical critiques. He implies that they stop short at the point where they need to move outside philosophy in order to view the landscape of their analysis and linguistic uses from a bird's eye view. Lazerowitz summarises the important difference of Wittgenstein's approach:

> *"The important thing to be grasped about the nature of a philosophical problem, which makes it utterly unlike a mathematical or a scientific problem, is not that understanding it is a prerequisite for its solution but is its solution." (Lazerowitz: 1987: 7)*

They fail to move to a 'Meta' level. They persist with the core activities that define traditional theoretical and metaphysical philosophy. The only possibility to move beyond it is to resist the cycle of engagement in argument and refutation and follow Wittgenstein and move to a 'meta' level outside philosophy. The purpose of such a move is to reach a vantage point above philosophical language use that reveals what Lazerowitz describes as the stalemate of philosophical practice (Lazerowitz: 1968: 56). The challenge is according to Lazerowitz's analogy, that philosophers are typically immersed in a stratagem of argument, defence and refutation. Lazerowitz maintains that to be freed from this captivation they need to command a bird's eye view which is what Lazerowitz hints at to be the 'Meta' level that Wittgenstein operates in. Therefore, the Meta level can be

described as the bird's eye view that supports the necessary vista to see the practices and activities of philosophers from a vantage point where their moves are perceived as what Wittgenstein later describes as an engine idling.

> *"The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work." (PI: 132)*

According to this view, philosophical utterances are akin to the cogs and gears of the engine spinning without contact. They are animated by the use or utterance but do not make any contact with the network of rules that link statements with a language game and its underlying context and form of life. The statements are not doing the work that the philosophers intended or believed them to be doing. They are idling, but from this idling they have an appearance of activity and purpose. However, there is nothing more going on than the idling itself. This motif relates to the core of Wittgenstein's insight into language and philosophy and it is apparent from the beginning of his work. Wittgenstein was concerned with philosophical language use and claimed that although it had all the appearance of normal meaningful discourse and was often engaged with and assessed to great depths of understanding, it remained essentially dogmatic use. The philosophers could not, in their analysis of language as in the case of Moore move beyond the plane of their statements. They were captivated by the notion that the problem needed to be solved by a superior theory or more accurate account. They simply failed to see that the meaning of their statements were dramatically different from what they appeared to be. They could only appreciate this difference by means of a move to the meta level to attain the required overview, in order to assess the relationship between philosophical language and the apparent meaning of the statements used.  In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein states:

> *"Whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions." (TLP: 6.53)*

In closing, Lazerowitz identifies the importance of the notion of the relationship between philosophical problems, statements and confusions in ordinary language. He draws our attention to and uses the importance of Moore in developing a critical response to this relation as linguistic analysis. We claim Lazerowitz uses this influence to further

highlight his development of the concept metaphilosophy. He is making a distinction that Wittgenstein develops to draw attention to the significant difference between philosophical analysis that aims to engage or refute a philosophical question or problem. This is contrasted with analysis that moves to question the nature of the practice that gives rise to the question or problem in the first place and clarifies the nature of its hold and captivation. In order to achieve this, one needs to move to a vantage point outside the practice of philosophy to a 'meta' level. Philosophical analysis or at least a significant part of it for Wittgenstein must begin from a 'meta' level. This is the unique and interesting factor that is key to differentiating Wittgenstein's work as a metaphilosophical work and for supporting the application of metaphilosophy to it.

In relation to the thesis argument, the emphasis here by Lazerowitz is important in highlighting the 'Meta' level that Lazerowitz suggests that Wittgenstein's analysis is aiming to operate at. Namely, that Wittgenstein is not doing philosophy, he is attempting to analyse the practice of philosophy itself specifically the linguistic practice of philosophy. Therefore, his target is to analyse the linguistic use of philosophy in order to determine the nature of what he infers to be the confusions that drive philosophers to utter such things as "numbers are real". For the moment, this is utilised as an example of how Lazerowitz's specific analysis of Wittgenstein's approach supports the application of the concept metaphilosophy to his work and the development of the concept in general.

> *"The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. Its whole meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent." OGD TLP Preface*

As pointed out at the start of the chapter there is a challenge in clarifying what metaphilosophy is and how to define and explain it. Paul Horwich who has published specifically on Metaphilosophy (Horwich: 1993, 2012) suggests that the classification has a relevant value in understanding Wittgenstein's work and the differences between philosophical works that operate or aim to operate at a meta level and philosophical works that keep to the activities of clarifying or trying to solve philosophical problems. Horwich develops this point as a criticism of some Wittgensteinians who fail to perceive any

metaphilosophical importance in interpreting Wittgenstein's work. Horwich suggests that philosophers such as Jerry Katz, Michael Dummett and Saul Kripke are guilty of the same error of getting things the wrong way around when interpreting Wittgenstein (Horwich: 1993: 153-4). They focus on a concept of language meaning as the fruits of Wittgenstein's investigation without considering the relevance that Wittgenstein's focus on language meaning has in his work and the context of his investigation. What Horwich is pointing to is what I identified in the introduction as the tendency that commentators have in focusing on a fragmentary approach to Wittgenstein's work.

> *"The real foundation of Wittgenstein's philosophy, it seems to me, is his metaphilosophy: his account of what philosophical problems are, how they should be treated, and what in the end can be accomplished by resolving them. Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning, it seems to me, is merely a specific application of that general methodology. And if this direction of thought is not recognised, then we are going to misunderstand Wittgenstein's work and make it into a much easier target than it is." (Horwich: 1993: 154)*

Horwich's criticism is a valuable one and certainly supports the general trajectory of the thesis by supporting the metaphilosophical context to Wittgenstein's work. He quite rightly suggests that there is a clear disparity between how philosophers tend to negatively interpret Wittgenstein's work without considering what we claim to be the important metaphilosophical context. To neglect the metaphilosophical context will, Horwich insists, only lead to misinterpretation and a weakened Wittgenstein that is open to misappropriate criticisms. I support Horwich on this view. Horwich's point and criticism centres on how many commentators have erroneously taken Wittgenstein's conception of meaning to be the pivotal and central goal of his work.

Horwich (1993) offers what I claim to be his clearest and strongest support for a metaphilosophical interpretation. He emphasises the importance of approaching Wittgenstein's work from a metaphilosophical standpoint. The more accurate interpretation relates to placing Wittgenstein's focus on meaning as an inferred outcome to his metaphilosophical investigation. Horwich claims that such interpretations have contributed to weakening Wittgenstein's approach by focusing it on language meaning

alone. This is undoubtedly one of the most important aspects of the metaphilosophical interpretation that Horwich and this thesis develops. We both place Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation into philosophy as the most important and primary motivation for his work.

## 3.7 A Non-metaphilosophical Interpretation Can Only Support a Straw Wittgenstein

Even the most complimentary reading of the non-metaphilosophical interpretations can only identify Wittgenstein's work as one concerned with an account of linguistic meaning in order to develop any philosophical consequences. Richard Rorty uses the example of a 'Straw' Wittgenstein to highlight the evident array of misinterpretation that persists in Wittgensteinian exegesis. Yet Rorty is an example of a philosopher who perceives the linguistic aspect to be paramount to Wittgenstein's work without any appeal to any metaphilosophical context (Rorty: 2007).

The past two decades have seen a significant decline in the popularity of Wittgenstein's philosophy so much so that many non-Wittgensteinian philosophers have seemingly developed an unspoken consensus that some of Wittgenstein's bigger ideas are well past their sell-by date (Hutchinson and Read: 2005). This is evident from the apparent volume of heavily critical articles and papers that now prevail in academic philosophy that chastise Wittgenstein's ideas as defunct and dated[33]. As Rorty, describes a 'statistical blip' in the history of philosophy but Rorty's point is that a large amount of the negativity directed at Wittgenstein is a result of a failure to adequately understand and engage with Wittgenstein's ideas. Accordingly, most commentators are simply getting it wrong and are dealing with or criticising their own 'straw' Wittgenstein. This idea is not unique to Rorty, Stanley Cavell as far back as 1967 emphasises that a large amount of the criticisms waged against Wittgenstein's later work and his followers was 'misdirected' especially the wave of ordinary language philosophy that came out of Oxford in the 60's.

> *Furthermore, we argue that those who summarily dismiss Wittgenstein's lasting significance are generally found to be*

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[33] http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/41347-Wittgenstein-s-metaphilosophy/
http://Wittgensteinrepository.org/agora-ontos/article/viewFile/2247/2233

> *dismissing a straw Wittgenstein, though crucially a straw Wittgenstein often fashioned by 'friends' and foes alike.*[34]

This is a consistent form of defence, and perhaps a possible response would be to suggest that Rorty's and Cavell's line of defence of Wittgenstein's philosophy could be offered for any philosophical work. Perhaps, this is possible criticism but the defence does have a specific relevance to Wittgenstein and appears to be a genuine one with reference to Wittgenstein's work. It does have some particular weight with Wittgenstein's work given the widely accepted view that the work has a unique array of exegetical challenges to it. Rorty is correct in his suggestion that there is a great deal of anti-Wittgensteinian criticism that has simply gotten it wrong due to the complexity of the exegetical decisions and challenges that are a necessary part of Wittgenstein's work. The idea of a straw Wittgenstein has some importance to it, and this is a helpful example to open the investigation. It is a helpful analogy as it draws attention not only to the exegetical challenges inherent in Wittgenstein's philosophy, the diverse differences of opinion that prevail in Wittgensteinian philosophy, and the popularity of the anti-Wittgensteinian sentiment in contemporary philosophy (Dale:1997). Yet, if Rorty is accurate it remains a possibility that a great deal of Wittgensteinian exegesis and the criticisms waged against his ideas are largely misplaced, focused on a misconception of Wittgenstein's own original ideas.

> *One reason that critical terminology is often overlooked or not explicitly thematised when understanding a philosopher is a general disrelish for metaphilosophy. Too often, metaphilosophy is treated as unserious, as some- thing less than or somehow other than philosophy. But for me, metaphilosophy is just more philosophy. What a philosopher has to say about his own efforts at philosophising or about the efforts of others is to be taken as seriously, to be as self-consciously and conscientiously and deliberately at- tended to, as what he has to say about knowledge or about goodness or about truth. Certainly, it turns out to be no easier to reckon with a philosopher's metaphilosophy than it is with his epistemology or ethics or philosophy of language. If you think it is*

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[34] http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/whosewitt.pdf

*easier, then I submit that you simply have not really tried it. (Jolley: 2013)*

The above quotation offers an example of a Wittgensteinian philosopher Kelly Dean Jolley attempting to defend Wittgenstein as a metaphilosopher. What is apparent from this statement is how Jolley insists that 'metaphilosophy is just more philosophy', but I think this is an accurate and deceptive manner of defending metaphilosophy in the context of Wittgenstein. The most critical aspect to it relates to the clear need to establish metaphilosophy as something at a different level to philosophical practice. If metaphilosophy was just more philosophy, it would be more philosophy and not move to a meta level. The point being is that Wittgenstein's work offers an example of how his investigation into philosophical method and his aim to change the practice of philosophy relates to what I claim presents the definitive example of metaphilosophy.

## 3.8 Analysis: Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophical Challenge

The thesis defends a metaphilosophical interpretation of the meaning of Wittgenstein's later emphasis on 'methods'. The strategy of this defence relies on making explicit what is defended as the important metaphilosophical context to Wittgenstein's work. The central claim that is defended is that Wittgenstein, from the beginning of his philosophical career was concerned with the goal of changing philosophy. K.T. Fann supports my point here when he emphasised that Wittgenstein's "master problem: what are the nature, tasks and methods of philosophy? He is not interested in language for language's sake but for the sake of philosophy" (Fann: 1971: 82). This is a view that has been given some recent support with the work of Dawn Phillips, who also maintains that Wittgenstein was principally concerned with the challenge to change philosophy (Phillips: 2002). Contrary to Phillips my suggestion is that Wittgenstein uses the notion of a change in method as the catalyst to bring about the required change in philosophy.

> *I argue that the say-show distinction was not a grave mistake in the Tractatus and that Wittgenstein did not reject the Tractarian conception of philosophy. I argue that he considered the failure of the Tractatus to be its reliance upon certain traditional presuppositions, and that these mistakes were exposed and dispelled in the Investigations. (Phillips: 2002: 11)*

What is central to my concern is the focus on method, the according challenge to change philosophy by means of a change in method. The metaphilosophical interpretation I develop supports the view that Wittgenstein was in the later period and in the *Philosophical Investigations* critical of the *Tractatus*. I argue that what I claim to be the embedded passive account of scientism in the *Tractatus* fails to provide an adequate critique of scientism. From this understanding, he developed a strengthened account of scientism in the 1930's that supports an active conception of scientism. The metaphilosophical interpretation develops an account of the change between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* that identifies two important factors that determine Wittgenstein's account of philosophical method in the *Tractatus* and they both, I claim are critically changed (this is clearly a criticism of Phillips' suggestion that the say/show distinction remains).

What needs to be specified is Wittgenstein's possible answer to the question; what method or methods can be identified as necessary to ensure the successful dissolution of such confusions? What is important to appreciate is that the application of the methods and the assessment of their success will determine whether the approach is successful or not. If the method or methods fail to dissolve the philosophical confusions then clearly the approach remains a metaphilosophical investigation or a metaphilosophical work in progress, and there is no end to philosophy or metaphilosophy. A possible outcome here is that Wittgenstein has left the investigation firmly immersed in a metaphilosophical context with more metaphilosophical work to be done. However, if the method or methods are successful then the approach inaugurates a change in philosophy, and the new conception becomes central and the metaphilosophical investigation has come to an end. What this means in the context of metaphilosophy relates to criticising those who claim Wittgenstein demands an end to philosophy. I claim that the end of philosophy is a misconception. Wittgenstein's focus on an end is actually an end to metaphilosophy that is achieved once the final method or methods are provided. This point was first argued for by Denis McManus (McManus: 1996).

## 3.8.1 A Metaphilosophical Wittgenstein and the Metaphilosophical Interpretation of Methods

The thesis defends the position that a metaphilosophical interpretation of methods identifies a complexity to Wittgenstein's conception of methods that points to the possibility of two different conceptions of methods at play. One of grammar and one consisting of his criticisms of scientism in philosophy. What is important to appreciate here is that the conception that grammatical confusions are the key contributing factor to philosophical confusions, as developed by standard readings such as the one offered by Peter Hacker cannot be the complete account of how language gives rise to philosophical confusions. As pointed out in the above the basic premise to the LT is that philosophy must change, given that philosophical problems are not as they appear. They are not empirical, conceptual or logical problems in need of a theoretical response or solution, rather they are according to Wittgenstein linguistic confusions that can only be dissolved by a more accurate account of the workings of language. This will support my interpretation of the first step of Wittgenstein's new conception of philosophy. There is a need to adequately identify how Wittgenstein suggests that philosophical statements do not represent language working. In order to do this, he has to communicate an account of language normally working. He needs the contrast to appreciate the differences and develop an account to communicate how to attain the necessary understanding of them. This is why the methods of elucidation will be goal driven to achieve this understanding. Once this distinction can be supported the next task is to elucidate the nature of the confusion by elucidating the differences between language working and language only appearing to work. In the later approach, this is developed specifically as a contrast between the original grammatical rules of language use and the confused statements and confused rules that present philosophical statements

## Conclusion

The chapter developed and defended a specific interpretation of metaphilosophy concerning Wittgenstein's work. The metaphilosophical interpretation was supported by four strategic moves. First, it identified the initial context of Wittgenstein's investigation into philosophy as consisting of the initial focus on the logical analysis of language, the rejection of scientism and the search not for philosophical truth but a new philosophical method. Next, the analysis moved to consider the uncertain status of metaphilosophy as

a concept that many philosophers were simply uncertain whether it was appropriate or whether it had a value or benefit to philosophy. The response was to clarify metaphilosophy as a working criteria that consisted of the three metaphilosophical questions. This was applied to Wittgenstein's work, and it was suggested that following the criteria there was a clear metaphilosophical context to the work. The third support then focused on a brief analysis of Wittgenstein's LT as necessitating a metaphilosophical turn. The thesis defends the conclusion that there is an important metaphilosophical context to Wittgenstein's LT and the most challenging aspect to the LT is understood as the metaphilosophical question of philosophical method. The fourth and final support is the principal argument that solidifies the specific use and application the thesis makes of the concept of metaphilosophy to Wittgenstein's work. It utilised the work of Morris Lazerowitz to offer a definitive account of the intrinsic relationship, the origin and the development of the concept metaphilosophy. This was developed as an analytical tool to differentiate the meta level of Wittgenstein's investigation into what I argued previously was a method focused on linguistic analysis and a rejection of scientism. With a clearer account of metaphilosophy strengthened by its Wittgensteinian origins, the next requirement is to return now to metaphilosophically analyse and clarify Wittgenstein's account of method and methods.

# CHAPTER FOUR: THE *TRACTATUS LOGICO PHILOSOPHICUS*: A MONOTHETIC METHOD OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS

*"The early Wittgenstein(s)… critique of metaphysics would use such logical-linguistic ideas to show that metaphysical language as a whole is without meaning. Nothing in his early philosophy better sums up all the essential elements in his critique—its linguistic turn, its implacable hostility to metaphysics, and its underlying naturalistic perspective – than Wittgenstein's penultimate comment on one of the Tractatus 's principal theses: The right method in Philosophy would be this…" (Katz: 1990: 2)*

## 4.1 Introduction:

The above quote from Katz summarises the important conclusion from the first chapter concerning the claim that Wittgenstein's development of Frege and Russell's logico-linguistic analysis provided him with the basis for his own critique of philosophy, specifically philosophy with a metaphysical direction. The great metaphysical system builders of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, who tried to metaphysically theorise and explain reality by means of a metaphysical theory, were according to Wittgenstein's critique of metaphysics, bewitched by a form of linguistic dogmatism[35]. Wittgenstein maintained that the language of metaphysical philosophy, the propositions of philosophy

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[35] An important theme in the work of Oskari Kuusela has focused on analyzing Wittgenstein's approach in relation to forms of dogmatism and Wittgenstein's critique of philosophy as a critique of forms of linguistic dogmatism (Kuusela: 2008).

that claimed to explain reality were 'without meaning' *(Katz: 1990: 2)*. Katz's emphasis on method as the principal thesis of Wittgenstein's work, supports the metaphilosophical analysis developed in the first chapter when he states in the above, that what is most important to understanding Wittgenstein's philosophical critique, his linguistic turn, and his hostility to metaphysics, centres on his conception of his account of philosophical method. This is what a part of the focus of the next three chapters is concerned with; how the different parts of Wittgenstein's approach are networked together under the different configurations of what we claim are the two variables; the logic of language and his anti-scientism in determining a new conception of philosophical method. This chapter focuses on the analysis of the *Tractatus* as offering Wittgenstein's logicist account of the logic of language and a critique of scientism embedded into the method as a passive demarcation between the propositions of science and the propositions of philosophy[36].

Both are combined into a complex system that is specific to Wittgenstein's inference that there is a logical isomorphic relationship between thought, language and world. Wittgenstein's conception of language is determined by his logical inference concerning how he maintains language must reflect the natural, logical order of relations in the world. K.T. Fann offers the most economical summary of the *Tractatus* that will provide a basis to the analysis that follows (Fann: 1971: 35-6). The aim of the TLP is to provide a limit to thought by means of providing a limit to language. What lies at the other side of this limit is nonsense but we can only communicate the limit by first working to identify what can be thought. What can be said consists of the propositions of science and will determine what cannot be said. What Wittgenstein states in the *Tractatus* are elucidations that once their work has been achieved they can be understood as nonsense.

The focus of our analysis of the *Tractatus* concerns how it systematically presents Wittgenstein's conception of language and scientism as the two variables that determine method. It further examines how the two variables are hinged in his conception of the proposition as depicting all language and therefore providing a general wholesale problem that can be responded to with an equally wholesale method. It is this general wholesale aspect that determines Wittgenstein's method in the *Tractatus* as a monothetic method. The form of the proposition is also central to Wittgenstein's specific account of his anti-scientism in philosophy. The form of a proposition of science is used by

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[36] In holding to the focus on developing the phalysis of the logic of language and the critique of scientism, I have avoided approaching other key points of exegetical controversy and other important concepts such as the emphasis on a limiting aspect to his approach, questions relating to general interpretations that attempt to place the work to be an idealist or realist approach. I have avoided the mystical and ethical side of saying and showing.

Wittgenstein as the contrast of language working according to his account of the logical form of a proposition.

> *"The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy."* (TLP: 6.53)

## Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophical Framework[37]

The *Tractatus* presents Wittgenstein's attempt to communicate his new conception of philosophical method. What is particularly interesting to understand in relation to this method is how it leaves a difficult conclusion. One that remains the centre of controversy as to its essential function.

> *"Wittgenstein demonstrates how thought, language, and the world that they represent must be for that conception to make sense, but with the ultimate purpose of showing us that it doesn't, as well as why we come to think that it does."* (McManus: 2006: 1)

As the quotation from McManus points out the resolute interpretation of the method of the *Tractatus* relates to and communicates a conception of logical analysis that works out how to analyse language only to show the reader that actually it doesn't function as a method at all. For resolute interpretations, the method of the Tractatus once developed and applied is to be discarded. The resolute interpretation and the work of McManus have a great deal to offer in clarifying the relationship between Wittgenstein's method and his analysis of the logic of language and scientism. However, the upper-level stratagem of therapy that they appeal to is brought down to present a possible role in understanding how some confusions require more than an accurate understanding of the logic of language or a demarcation with scientism. This notion of a role for therapy is developed in chapter seven. The thesis forwards a metaphilosophical interpretation, I argue that Wittgenstein's investigative approach, consists of a metaphilosophical framework that is

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[37] The use of 'Metaphilosophical framework' is not related to what McManus refers to when speaking of the Resolute interpretation of the Tractatus as the "the book's 'framing' metaphilosophical remarks" (McManus: 2006: 46)

specifically focused on a metaphilosophical investigation into philosophical method. The motivation for this framework is the metaphilosophical challenge to change philosophy by a change in method. The metaphilosophical framework limits Wittgenstein's investigation, to centre on what I claim are the two variables of the logic of language and the critique of scientism. I defend the position that it is Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical inference that any possible philosophical method is determined by the values of at least the two variables. First, to combat the confusion brought about by linguistic dogmatism, an accurate account of how language meaningfully functions is necessary. Second, to remove and avoid further confusion any possible method will be concerned with logic/linguistic and conceptual elucidation and therefore, must contrast with the methods of science. Science and its method are specific to empirical data analysis and acquisition. These two factors are what I claim, Wittgenstein specifies and forwards in the *Tractatus*. His approach I argue must follow these two variables as the determining factors to any possible configuration of philosophical method.

The metaphilosophical framework sets the direction and context to the investigation; it determines the investigation to concern 'meta' philosophical questions as opposed to the regular philosophical practice of engaging with philosophical questions. It consists of the attempt to investigate philosophical practice from a meta level. It does not engage with the philosophical problems it rather asks what philosophical problems are, and how should they be treated or responded to. This will then determine the format of the investigation into determining what method or methods can be developed that are specific to the inferred form of the philosophical problems. Wittgenstein's response in the *Tractatus* is that philosophical problems are linguistic confusions that arise due to a failure to understand the logical workings of language.

**The Early Metaphilosophical Framework:**

What are philosophical problems? *Forms of linguistic confusions*

What gives rise to philosophical problems as linguistic confusions? *A failure to understand the logic of language*

**Response**: An accurate understanding of the logic of language will significantly contribute to determining the specifics of a method. A method that will elucidate the logical workings of language.

## 4.2 Philosophical Problems and the 'Logic of Language'

To support the analysis of a metaphilosophical framework and what I argue are the two variables of the logic of language and his anti-scientism, it is plausible to work with the idea that Wittgenstein begins his metaphilosophical investigation with the question what are philosophical problems? He responds with the claim that philosophical problems are forms of linguistic confusions that result from a failure to accurately understand the logic of our language (TLP: preface). This staged response sets up his analysis in the *Tractatus*, as obtaining a better understanding of the logic of language, one that would facilitate a more accurate method of conceptual clarification. What is important to appreciate as soon as one proceeds through the *Tractatus*, is that its complexity suggests that not only is this challenge not straightforward but it is clearly more complicated than Wittgenstein could have first imagined. In 1949 Wittgenstein remarked on this difficulty in attempting to utilise his methods to elucidate the problems of psychology.

> *"The logic of language is immeasurably more complicated than it looks." [Cf. LWI, 525]*[38]

In section 93 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein appears to be criticising this very point of his failure in the *Tractatus*. He is clearly acknowledging how he himself was seduced and blinded by the idea that the form of the proposition was something unique and had a significant and remarkable feat to achieve in representing the world. Wittgenstein states that "The forms that we use in expressing ourselves about propositions and thought stand in his way." It is evident that Wittgenstein is admitting here, that he has framed the whole context of his investigation in logic. This captivation with the systematisation of logic determines him to develop a logical system to respond to this logical framework. This I claim is what he means when he states that the forms of representation stands in the way. Wittgenstein was captivated by the idea that the form of the proposition could represent all of the different variations of language use. His approach seems straightforward in that he had taken what appeared as indisputable, the necessary requirement that language must logically represent the world for it to function.

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[38] LAST WRITINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY: *Volume II:44*

The workings of language were presented in the logical form of a proposition. Wittgenstein as Denis McManus claims centred the problem of elucidating the workings of language in the problem of elucidating the form of a proposition and how it must represent (McManus: 1995).

> *"Belief in the existence of the 'general form of a proposition' had at one time underwritten Wittgenstein's belief that the whole of philosophy was the attempt to solve a 'single problem'. Wittgenstein's progressive recognition of the flaws in his early monistic account of language lead to its replacement by an account which acknowledge the existence of different systems of propositions with different logical characteristics." (McManus: 1995: 352).*

The form of a proposition depicted a logical form that unified all propositions by a shared quality. It was this inference that supported a monothetic method of analysis. All propositions and therefore all language shared a common analysable logical form that was shown by the logical relationships of names in a statement and objects in the world. The monothetic method was determined by what McManus states to be the "monistic account of language" and the dogmatic inference concerning the necessary logical relation. What is clear is that in the *Investigations,* Wittgenstein makes numerous statements that support the reading that he came to reject the logical account of language. This is for most standard interpretations an uncontroversial and somewhat obvious claim. What is not obvious and is in need of further clarification is how the metaphilosophical interpretation identifies how the rejection of the *Tractatus* conception of method, is a rejection of his interpretation of the proposition as definitive of all language. The proposition and the logical form it presented was for Wittgenstein representative of the logic of language. This was further supplemented and strengthened by his attempt to embed his anti-scientism into his conception of the logic of language by using the contrast as a demarcation between science and philosophy.

> *"One person might say "A proposition is the most ordinary thing in*
> *the world" and another: "A proposition--that's something very*
> *queer!"--And the latter is unable simply to look and see how*
> *propositions really work. The forms that we use in expressing*
> *ourselves about propositions and thought stand in his way.*
> *Why do we say a proposition is something remarkable? On the one*
> *hand, because of the enormous importance attaching to it. (And that*
> *is correct). On the other hand this, together with a misunderstanding*
> *of the logic of language, seduces us into thinking that something*
> *extraordinary, something unique, must be achieved by*
> *propositions.--A misunderstanding makes it look to us as if a*
> *proposition did something queer." (PI: 93)*

The analysis in this chapter is focused on defending the claim that the monothetic method Wittgenstein proposes in the *Tractatus* was a decisive failure. The analysis claims that the nature of the failure is perhaps the most important factor in the development of Wittgenstein's later conception of polythetic methods. The specific nature of the failure not only offered the most important insights into philosophical problems, methods, forms of analysis and more their interrelations. It also communicated how the philosopher was bewitched by language in many more ways than Wittgenstein had first imagined. It also identified how the philosopher was held by a captivation with the method of science (scientism). The thesis claims that it is Wittgenstein's understanding and reaction to this failure that is most important to his development of a polythetic account of methods as proposed in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In developing this account, the analysis critically engages where necessary, with other competing interpretations concerning the method of the *Tractatus* and its relation to what I claim to be the polythetic conception of methods in the *Investigations*. There is clearly an important relationship between the method of the *Tractatus* and the methods of the *Philosophical Investigations*. It is this relation Wittgenstein is pointing to in the preface to the *Investigations* and in section 133.

> *"Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the*
> *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to*
> *someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old*
> *thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in*

> *the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking". (PI: Preface)*

In PI 133 Wittgenstein again draws our attention to this relationship when he states:

> *"There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies." (PI: 133)*

The aim is now to provide an in-depth analysis of what I claim to be the first variable of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach to establishing a new philosophical method: the logic of language and how it significantly determines Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method in the *Tractatus*. In the preface to the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein provides some important insight into how he intends to approach the metaphilosophical challenge of method. He states that his investigation is principally concerned with the problems of philosophy and how he suggests they have resulted from a confused philosophical method. What is important to note, is that Wittgenstein claims that this failed method itself rests on a failure to accurately understand the 'logic of our language'. Therefore, the starting point to our analysis concerns clarifying what Wittgenstein means by the logic of language. It is also important to understand that whatever conception of the logic of language Wittgenstein offers will according to the strategy or function of his approach determine the format of the method to be employed in the analysis of philosophical propositions.

## 4.3 Other Interpretations

> *"The one point on which standard readers and resolute readers are generally able to agree is that they deeply disagree about how to read the Tractatus —and, in particular, how to understand its conception of nonsense." (Conant: 2007: 114, 2002: 374-6).*

There are numerous variations of the two different interpretations of the overall method of the *Tractatus*. The thesis argues that the *Tractatus* offers a new conception of philosophy as a new method. There is a great deal of controversy relating to what this method consists of.

> *"True, the method employed for this, logical analysis, was new, but the aim, or rather the dream, of revealing the essence of things was as old as philosophy itself. It was the dream of establishing philosophy as metaphysics, a super-science discovering the most fundamental features of the world by means of the most rigorous method. And it was a dream that the early Wittgenstein thought had come true in his Tractatus." (Kanterian: 2007: 170)*

To further clarify what I argue to be the method of the *Tractatus* I now consider other interpretations as a useful contrast of important points of difference. To achieve this, I have focused on the exegetical debate concerning what is described as the dominant metaphysical reading and the critical new Wittgenstein or resolute reading. Goldfarb maintains that the dominant reading of the *Tractatus* concerns a metaphysical reading (Goldfarb: 2011). This is also known as the standard reading, and it claims that there are important ineffable truths that are shown in the *Tractatus*. They cannot be said as they are not propositions of science. There is also a positivist reading that claims that ordinary language is "at best misleading or vague and at worst empty." (Conant: 2002: 375). This is because ordinary language is logically defective. The logical defections of ordinary language are what are the root cause of the metaphysicians desire to theorise as a response to forms of words that appear metaphysically interesting. Such forms of words are misleading and only a result of the defective logic of ordinary language.

> *"In such cases, the utterances of the metaphysician can be demonstrated to be nonsense by exposing them as logically (or conceptually) flawed, where these flaws are to be traced to specifiable infringements upon the conditions of meaningful discourse." (Conant: 2002: 375)*

The positivist interpretation highlights the importance that many suggest is the key to Wittgenstein's method as focused on providing a distinction between meaningful and meaningless language. Although, I do not forward a positivist reading in my analysis the emphasis it places on understanding Wittgenstein's method as attempting to utilise a demarcation between meaningless and meaningful language is a helpful contrast that

elucidates an importance aspect of how the focus on that analysis on the workings of language is intrinsic to the method of analysis.

> *"Particular versions of the positivist reading differ over matters of detail—some will say these infringements arise through violations of "the principles of logical syntax," others will appeal to "criteria of cognitive significance," yet others to "rules of grammar." What all such readings have in common is the idea that Wittgenstein seeks a theory that would enable him (a) to furnish a method for exposing the sentences of metaphysicians as intrinsically nonsensical, and (b) through the application of such a method to demarcate meaningful from meaningless discourse."* (Conant: 2002: 375)

The ineffabilist interpretation or standard or metaphysical interpretation was developed in response to the strict criteria developed in the positivist reading as too restrictive and leaves very little that can be qualified as meaningful. The metaphysical reading uses the emphasis on nonsense and the mystical to offer an alternative interpretation that maintains that although the emphasis on nonsense is clearly a dismissal of important statements. The key move for the metaphysical reading concerns the claim that the statements can still have importance and value as showing us something about the world that cannot be said. According to the metaphysical reading, Wittgenstein's philosophical method consists of a challenge to communicate what is important but nonetheless nonsense according to the criteria of his referential account of language meaning. The point is that there are two forms of nonsense that the method of analysis identifies, one is misleading nonsense and the other is illuminating nonsense (Conant: 2002: 375). The former consists of what the positivists would maintain are meaningless linguistic mistakes but it the metaphysical readings addition of ineffable truths that set them apart from the positivist view. The nonsense statements still communicate something meaningful. Hacker identifies Ramsey as the main aggressor in claiming that Wittgenstein work is misconceived and "useless" if it is holding to a claim of important nonsense as its contribution (Hacker: 1986: 26).

> *"Ramsey argued that either philosophy must be of some use, or else*
> *it is a disposition which we have to check. If philosophy is nonsense,*
> *then it is useless and we should not pretend as Wittgenstein did that*
> *it is important nonsense." (Hacker: 1986: 26).*

Hacker suggests K.T Fann comes to the defence of Wittgenstein in order to try and respond to the attack of others who perceive the claim to nonsense as a significant fault to Wittgenstein's position. Fann argues that because Wittgenstein made the statements in the *Tractatus* then the statements can be said and should not be consigned as nonsense. Fann' strategy highlights a misreading between commenters failure to understand the preface and the final statements (Fann: 1971: 34-5). Bruce Howes maintains that both standard and resolute interpretations have failed to accurately interpret the meaning of Wittgenstein's statements in the preface that have led to so much controversy (Howes: 2007: 3).

> *"His nonsense sentences can lead readers to see what he tried—and*
> *failed— to say: such sentences are, supposedly, illuminating in the*
> *sense that the reader's appreciation that they are nonsense may help*
> *her come to see the ineffable truths that Wittgenstein tried, and*
> *failed, to put into words… Such nonsense sentences communicate*
> *truths by getting the reader to grasp the truths lying behind his*
> *words."(Morris and Dodd: 2009: 6)*[39]

The challenge then is to choose to let the demarcation cast off all to nonsense, accept that there is ineffable truth or important nonsense or rather to accept the deeper message of the *Tractatus* for a framing text that is nonsense and only has a therapeutic role. The dominant view simply holds that a statement is nonsense because they lack "meanings that yield sense – end of story" (Goldfarb: 2011). From this account Goldfarb suggests that there are three forms of communication sustained in the *Tractatus*, saying, showing and suggesting. The former being the more contentious suggestion being offered by Goldfarb's approach (Goldfarb: 2011). The debate around the dominant metaphysical reading and the contrasting resolute reading will offer a means of elucidating how Wittgenstein's understanding of the failure of monothetic method forwarded in the

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[39] Mysticism and nonsense in the Tractatus Morris, Michael Dodd, Julian 2009 European journal of philosophy

*Tractatus* is instrumental in developing his metaphilosophical interpretation of methods. The metaphilosophical interpretation of methods suggests that Wittgenstein's principal aim is to change philosophy. The catalyst to achieve this aim is to identify a new philosophical method. It is suggested that these two factors are key in determining the overall format of Wittgenstein's approach. Although the dominant interpretations of *Tractatus* method certainly have relevance to the analysis. The relevance is primarily one of elucidation and contrast. The reason for this is that the contentious issues from both sides do not directly influence our analysis of the *Tractatus*. Whether one supports the resolute reading and its claim that there is a therapeutic aspect to the framing text and that the statements in the work must be accepted as nonsense, in order to avoid chickening out, is of no direct concern to my analysis. Whereas the resolute interpretation claims that according to Wittgenstein's own recommendation, what is strictly nonsense is nonsense, and that is it.

Both metaphysical and resolute interpretations have failed to appreciate what I claim to be most important, which concerns how the two variables of the logic of language and the critique of scientism determine the conception of philosophical method. The method Wittgenstein develops in the *Tractatus* is what is important but its importance lies not in what it communicates or in what its application achieves. Rather what I will claim in the next chapter is that the method is according to Wittgenstein a valid conclusion of the values. The method itself is a working method, the method functions as it should according to the two values he had provided. The conclusion that he ends the *Tractatus* with is that the method achieves very little. Wittgenstein was aware that there is something wrong with the method, this is a view supported by James Conant (2002: 121). It is this acknowledgement from Wittgenstein that will define the turning around of the investigation by a focus on changing the two values. In relation to method and its failure, I argue in the next chapter that Wittgenstein comes to identify that it is the two values that are inaccurate and it is his focus on changing them that is important.

## 4.4 Variable One: Language Use: The Difficulty with the *Tractatus*' Conception of the Logic of Language

From 1914/5 as pointed out in the first chapter Wittgenstein's linguistic turn maintained that the task of philosophy is not to engage the propositions of philosophy but rather to elucidate them by means of the appropriate method of logic/linguistic analysis. The

challenge, clearly then, is in determining the most accurate method. This is important as the method itself, will, we claim come to define Wittgenstein's new conception of philosophy. The *Tractatus* presents, as Katz pointed to in the quotation at the start, Wittgenstein's attempt to communicate his new method of logic/linguistic analysis. In setting out to achieve this task the *Tractatus* undoubtedly offers a complex and mostly clear, communicable account. One that aims to provide a new philosophical method specific to the inference that all philosophical problems are forms of linguistic confusion resulting from a failure to understand the logic of language. This is Wittgenstein's attempt to answer the metaphilosophical question of changing philosophical practice and method of logico/linguistic elucidation that is specific to the unique nature of the subject of investigation.

> *"Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries." (TLP: 4.112)*

In order to assess what the method amounts to it is first necessary to understand some of the factors that determine the complexity of the method. Wittgenstein gives us some guidance in the preface as to how to understand the formulation of the method he proposes in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein's primary target consists of the problems of philosophy. They are he claims a result of a failure to understand the logic of our language. The logic of language is the isomorphic relationship between thought, language and object. Wittgenstein needs to accurately identify the logic of language. This is the challenge of the *Tractatus* method. Wittgenstein hinges everything on the form of the proposition as the decisive presentation of the logic of language. From the seemingly simple inference that a more accurate account of the logical workings of language would provide the basis of a new method of philosophy as logico/linguistic elucidation. The problem is that Wittgenstein maintained that logic was shown in the relations between names in a proposition and objects in a state of affairs. This logical isomorphic relationship was logically necessary, and therefore, the form of a proposition was necessarily the same for all propositions. Wittgenstein had identified a means of determining language meaning

to fit the restrictive conception of logic. The problem is that in order to support this conception he must ultimately return to the type of metaphysical theory construction that constituted a key criticism that his approach was meant to support. Wittgenstein was immediately tied to a metaphysical account of logical simples and essentialism to support the inference that propositions are logically analysable into their simple parts. The *Tractatus* presents Wittgenstein's vision of language as a logical system immersed in a web of logical relations mirroring the web of logical relations of objects in the world. To understand the workings of language Wittgenstein maintains that we must understand the logical relations and the mirroring relationship between thought, language (proposition), and world (material properties).

> *"The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented—only by the configuration of objects that they are produced." (TLP: 2.0231)*

In facilitating this task, Wittgenstein is immediately confronted with decisions regarding the metaphysical nature of the world and the ability of language to represent it. The metaphysical challenges are first concerned with how Wittgenstein can logically capture and communicate the logical relations of the world (material properties) and language (propositions).

## 4.5 Understanding Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophical Propositions

> *"(In a letter to Russell in 1919 Wittgenstein characterises the distinction between factual statements (what a proposition says) and the elucidation of the essential (what a proposition shows) as 'the cardinal problem of philosophy." (Kuusela: 2005: 97)*

From the contextual outline provided in the previous section, our concern now turns to the specific question of what is the method of logico/linguistic analysis that Wittgenstein proposes in the *Tractatus*. It is by means of focusing on method that it is possible to elucidate this relationship further. Wittgenstein is offering a strict logical criterion that demarcates between the propositions of science as fact-stating language and what is

referred to as the sayable. This is contrasted with what is not sayable but can only be shown. From the point of view of the metaphilosophical interpretation the saying and showing distinction or at least how it is typically interpreted by both metaphysical and resolute interpretations is problematic.

The say/show distinction does appear to suggest that the propositions of philosophy can only be shown. The difficulty in this relates to the dichotomy between science and philosophy as two examples of language use that are contrasted against each other. Science concerns the fact-stating language of the world as it displays an isomorphic relationship between the concatenation of objects in the world and names in a proposition. Philosophical propositions do not say anything regarding a state of affairs in the world, if they did they would simply not be philosophical they would belong to science. Therefore, the contrast to science is important here in determining what philosophy is and is not. The propositions of philosophy if anything can only show something about the world.

*"What can be shown, cannot be said". (TLP: 4.1212)*

The difficulty here is in understanding what exactly the distinction is meant to do. Is it determining all philosophy to the mystical as something that has importance but cannot be said but still according to the metaphysical readings of Hacker (Baker and Hacker: 1983, Hacker: 86, and Pears: 1987, 88, 2006) holds something important as ineffable truths concerning the world. Or is it as the resolute interpretations hold that what is nonsense for Wittgenstein is simply nonsense and needs to be treated as nonsense, there is no chickening out as Cora Diamond insists (Diamond: 1991: 181-2)

## 4.6 Philosophy and method

An immensely important point follows wherein 'the totality of propositions is language' (4.001), which means that it is the representational character of propositions that constitutes sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*). The sense of a proposition is determined by the logical relation of its names and by the referential character of names standing for simple objects in the world. In 4.002 Wittgenstein identifies the importance of 'the tacit convention on which understanding of everyday language depends is enormously complicated', which correlates with the rule-following aspect of his later approach but is superseded here by the representational importance of propositions.

*"Philosophical problems and questions are not false but nonsensical — we cannot give an answer to questions of this kind but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophy arise from a failure to understand the logic of our language. (They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful) and it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all."* (4.003)

The fundamental importance of this point is in how it relates to Wittgenstein's overall goal with the *Tractatus* namely, the resolution of philosophical problems. The key to understanding this relates to the previous four sections where Wittgenstein laid out his account of the world as a totality of facts. Particularly important is his contention that combinatorial form determines what states of affairs an object can and cannot take part in. His next move was then to point out that for a picture, thought or a proposition to represent it must mirror the logical form of a state of affairs. It depicts and represents the simple objects by means of things, propositional signs or names. Therefore, with regard to language, a proposition has sense, if it represents a possible state of affairs in the world, and whether such a possible state of affairs obtains or not, does not affect the sense of the proposition. As previously pointed out, the sense of a proposition is determined by the logical relation of its names and by the referential character of the names standing for simple objects in the world. Whether a proposition represents a state of affairs that is a possible one in the world is determined by the combinatorial form of each of the simple objects. Each simple object that constitutes the state of affairs are represented by the simple names in the proposition. Every meaningful name represents an object in the world; the object it represents has stood in a logical relationship with other objects in a state of affairs. It is this sum of all possible relationships that constitutes the essential combinatorial form of an object. Given that it is the combinatorial form of an object that determines what state of affairs or what other objects it can share a state of affairs with, then if the combinatorial form of an object does not facilitate it sharing a state of affairs with another object then the two objects do not constitute a possible state of affairs.

Philosophy is not a part of the natural sciences; its propositions are not false but nonsensical. The reason why they are not false relates to how we judge a proposition to

be true or false by comparing it with reality, and we cannot answer the questions[40] of philosophy in this way. We can, however, answer the questions of science by comparing them with the world. This aspect of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy remains in the later methodology; it was immensely important to him that significance of the difference between philosophy and science be appreciated. The next step in the *Tractatus* is to return to the picturing relation with regard to a proposition. Wittgenstein does so in order to strengthen the contrast with scientific propositions, which are the sum of all true propositions that represent actual states of affairs and also all possibly true propositions that represent all possible states of affairs. Philosophy, in contrast, does not consist of any true propositions but only pseudo-propositions. They appear to have sense in the way scientific propositions do, in that their form seems to be legitimate by mirroring a possible state of affairs and the names also seems to refer, but on closer inspection it is evident, according to Wittgenstein, that they represent a misunderstanding of the logic of our language.

The twist with regard to the Tractarian conception of philosophy is given in 4.11, wherein Wittgenstein leads on from the previous points regarding the bipolarity of propositions to suggest that the sum total of true propositions is the whole of natural science: 'Totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences)' (4.11). Wittgenstein uses the contrast between the methods and practices of science against those of philosophy in order to highlight the importance of not regarding philosophy as scientific, or not to adopt scientific method in philosophy: 'Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences' (4.111). Science discovers new knowledge whereas philosophy has no body of doctrine; it can only clarify the logic of our language in order to remove confusions and philosophical problems:

**Philosophy aims at logical clarification of thoughts.**
**Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.**

Wittgenstein is contrasting philosophy with science, in that science is concerned with a paradigm of knowledge, it has a criterion by which to make knowledge claims and substantiate such claims. Whereas philosophy does not, it makes, according to

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[40] 1.5.15 "My method is not to sunder the hard from the soft, but to see the hardness of the soft.
It is one of the chief skills of the philosopher not to occupy himself with questions which do not concern him."

Wittgenstein, no claims about how the world is. For anything that concerns such questions is science, not philosophy, and so with the linguistic turn of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein has given philosophy the role of analysing language. It is this activity of clarification that Wittgenstein sums up, as 'All philosophy is a critique of language' (TLP: 4.0031).

The metaphilosophical interpretation is founded on the two key values of linguistic analysis and the rejection of scientism, both are intrinsically related. Wittgenstein's focus on linguistic analysis also demands that there are no unique philosophical claims to truth or knowledge. Philosophy is essentially non-cognitive. Science is cognitive and is focused on the search for knowledge, therefore, the linguistic conception of analysis Wittgenstein is defending is in direct contrast to science (TLP: 4.1122, 4.113).

There are three types of propositions; first, the propositions of science are intelligible propositions that are bipolar and have sense, the propositions of logic are senseless propositions and the propositions of philosophy are nonsensical. Wittgenstein has used the demarcation between the propositions of science, logic and philosophy to show the differences in how language is intelligible, sometimes senseless and sometimes nonsensical. The conception of analysis contrasts with science but what is important to note at this stage of our analysis is that it is an indirect relationship between the analysis of language and the linguistic confusion. Whereas, in the later approach, we will see that the contrast with science is a direct one that relates to clear examples of confusions that are specifically related to scientism and not through the medium of linguistic analysis.

## 4.7 Variable Two: Wittgenstein's Critique of Scientism

> *Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.*
> *(The word "philosophy" must mean something which stands above*
> *or below, but not be- side the natural sciences.)* *(TLP: 4.111)*

Wittgenstein develops his early concerns relating to his critique of scientism further in the *Tractatus* by first emphasising the categorical difference between science and philosophy. The development of his critique of scientism in philosophy by means of his contrast with science constitutes a significant part of the *Tractatus* instruction. It uses the contrast to the practice and method of science in several important strategic ways. The contrast to science is embedded into the scheme of the *Tractatus* program, and it is used to support the conception of language, the say/show distinction, the ladder and his conception of the mystical. The anti-scientism in the *Tractatus* is a complex aspect that

is both active and passive in several parts of the work. It is active in how it is used to represent meaningful propositions, and it is passive in that it is used as a criterion to determine the say/show distinction, his conception of philosophy and his method. It is how the critique of scientism that Wittgenstein develops into the *Tractatus* contributes one of the variables to the Tractarian conception of method that is most important. He maintains that philosophy cannot operate on the level of the sciences, it is something entirely different and must, therefore, be above or below the sciences (TLP: 4.111). Wittgenstein is stressing this contrast and difference and in the next point, he further develops the categorical difference of scientific method and his new conception of philosophical method[41]. Philosophical method only concerns the logical clarification of thoughts, and language represents thoughts, therefore, it is the logical clarification of language.

> *"The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions", but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred."* (TLP: 4.112)

This is strengthened by emphasising that philosophy does not have any theories, it cannot act or practice a form of hypo-deductive experimentation to support a hypothesis. Rather, according to Wittgenstein, philosophy is an activity of elucidation that does not produce statements concerning knowledge claims as the propositions of science do. Philosophy as Wittgenstein has now determined it with the method of logical analysis is concerned solely with the logical elucidation of propositions 'to make them clear'. This is why Wittgenstein states in the preface that in essentials all the problems are solved.

> *"I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems. And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved."* L.W Vienna 1918 (TLP preface)

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[41] For more on this contrast see (Hacker: 1986: 22)

In the *Tractatus* and its formulation of the linguistic turn the critique of scientism was primarily displayed in Wittgenstein's methodological pronouncements concerning how science was categorically different to philosophy. This represents the beginning of Wittgenstein's demarcation between philosophy and science as two distinct practices that share no commonality. The contrast with science is utilised by Wittgenstein to highlight not only the different form of each investigation but to highlight how the propositions of science are intelligible and represent language working well. Whereas, the propositions of philosophy represent language not working satisfactorily and only producing propositions that are nonsensical. The contrast with science presents Wittgenstein's anti-scientism as a means of displaying the incompatibility between the two. It also presents Wittgenstein's attack on those including Russell, who sought to adopt the method and principles of science into philosophy.

> *"For, as Wittgenstein came to realize, Russell's conception of logical form was defective. Furthermore, his grasp of the character of philosophical investigation was methodologically unsound. Russell argued in 'On Scientific Method in Philosophy' that it was by concentrating attention upon the investigation of logical form that the new style analytic philosophy could avoid the holistic methods and consequent errors of past philosophy, and emulate the progressive methods of the sciences." (Hacker: 1986: 13)*

Russell's account and intention were based on the idea that science and philosophy could in effect support one another in method and development. This is what Wittgenstein perceived to be most problematic, and this is what a great deal of the anti-scientism in the *Tractatus* is focused upon.

> *"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.)" (TLP: 4.111)*

This distinction was further supported and strengthened by the specific form Wittgenstein identified as the logic of language. The linguistic demarcation Wittgenstein made

between what can be said and what can be shown, and between sense and nonsense, also had an important bearing on supporting the demarcation between philosophy and science.

> *"The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences)." (TLP: 4.11)*

The *Tractatus* focuses on embedding Wittgenstein's anti-scientism into his conception of the logic of language. Collectively the critique and the conception of linguistic method of logical analysis should constitute the development of a method that is in strict contrast to science. The contrast is clearly evident in Wittgenstein's approach as an integral part of how he develops a conception of analysis. His conception is concerned with elucidation of the logic of language, it is descriptive and not explanatory (TLP: 3.33, 4.023, 4.26, 4.5), it is focused on the analysis of logical simples of elementary propositions (TLP: 4.21, 4.211, 4.22, 4.221, 4.25) as well as in the form of propositions that describe the simples. The point is that a complex can be analysed into its simples. Objects are simple (TLP: 2.02) and names refer to objects and "the configuration of objects produces a state of affairs" (TLP: 2.0272). Language pictures a state of affairs like a picture represents objects by its pictorial form (TLP: 2.17).

> *"Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely." (TLP: 2.0201)*

Science represented all of factual discourse, all of what can be said was the domain of science as Wittgenstein states in 6.53 of the *Tractatus*.

> *"The correct method in philosophy would really be to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. what belongs to natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy," (TLP: 6.53)*

John Cook claims that Wittgenstein's advice here in 6.53 is far too vague, and more investigation is needed. Cook maintains that Wittgenstein's strategy here centres on the need to restate traditional metaphysical problems in a "formal mode, as questions about language" (Cook: 1994: 52). Cook offers an approach that many would find no issue

with, but it is I claim symptomatic of non-metaphilosophical interpretations that fuel a view that Wittgenstein's primary goal is, therefore, metaphysical. The metaphilosophical interpretation offers a different interpretation of Wittgenstein's emphasis in 6.53. The method Wittgenstein develops in the *Tractatus* does not have a valued outcome as a new truth, or some ineffable truth what it can only offer is the vanishing or dissolution of the confusion by means of the method of logical analysis. Therefore, those that neglect the significance of the method as the end in itself will undoubtedly seek to locate some valued outcome as an end to the method.

What is now interesting is how the philosophical confusion is a result of misunderstanding the demarcation between what can be said i.e. meaningful fact-stating language, which belongs to the domain of the natural sciences and what cannot be spoken of.[42] If we follow Wittgenstein's last sections, then Philosophy represents examples of confusing the language of science. It represents examples of breaking the logical rules governing the correct use of words and propositions. What gives words and statements meaning such as the reference to a state of affairs or an object in the world, is not present for philosophical statements. What compounds philosophical statements and leads to our focus on them is that they still appear to have sense.

> *"In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification—and so belongs to different symbols—or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way. Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence; 'exist' figures as an intransitive verb like 'go', and 'identical' as an adjective; we speak of something, but also of something's happening. (In the proposition, 'Green is green'—where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last an adjective—these words do not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols.)"* (TLP: 3.323)

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[42] The distinction between what can be said and what can be shown is a direction that the thesis can only point to as a relevant one as it is an area that is controversial and has a great deal of analysis relating to it.

Another example of philosophical confusions in the *Tractatus* taken from the above quote relates to the same word having "different modes of signification" such as the example Wittgenstein gives of "Green is Green" where we have an example of the same word being used as a proper name and as an adjective. Wittgenstein suggests that the whole of philosophy is full of such examples of linguistic confusions (TLP: 3.324). This is why philosophy as a practice must be focused on the logical clarification of thoughts and accordingly Wittgenstein insists that philosophy as a practice must be an activity of elucidation and not a doctrine of investigation as in the sciences (TLP: 4.112).

> *"Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries." (4.112)*

The natural sciences are concerned with hypothesis, the collecting of empirical data that is used to develop theories that are tested and used to infer a natural law of science. For Wittgenstein, this conception of science is distinct and has no import to philosophical investigation, elucidation or any form of practice or method that can be referred to as philosophical (TLP: 4.1122). Wittgenstein's critique of scientism in the *Tractatus* is built into his conception of the logic of language and the system he develops to provide the monothetic method of logical analysis. The method is monothetic as it is a general uniform method that is specific to Wittgenstein's conception of the logic of language. It is specifically how he now specifies philosophical confusion to be intrinsic to a failure to understand the demarcation and difference between statements of the natural sciences and how they relate to the world. Philosophical statements may have the same appearance and therefore, appear to have the same importance or validity as scientific statements, but Wittgenstein's point is by means of his account of the workings of language and anti-scientism and they do not reflect the actual way language logically works. The logic of language determines what is sayable. If we follow Wittgenstein's advice in the last sections of the *Tractatus*, we are confronted with a conception of the logic of language

that provides a criterion for determining the sayable to be strictly limited to the propositions of science. This leaves out a great deal of language use. Wittgenstein was fully aware of this and used the appeal to silence and the mystical as a means of lessening the apparent austerity of his approach.

The challenge was not only to understand the form of this confusion but to resist and stop confusing the language of scientific statements with philosophical statements. It is possible to now perceive more clearly how the *Tractatus* presents Wittgenstein's response to the metaphilosophical challenge of developing a new method specific to philosophy. This is achieved by bringing together a comprehensive account of the logic of language with the further support of the embedded demarcation with science as his critique of scientism. I maintain that this system constitutes a new method of philosophy concerned with the primary task of a logical analysis of language. The system is determined by the manner in which Wittgenstein identifies the workings of the logical, referential, isomorphic nature of thought, language and world. It is also determined by his critique of scientism although this is clearly stated throughout the *Tractatus*, it is less clear how it functions in the method itself. It does have a role as limiting the sayable and in clarifying the demarcation between science and philosophy, between meaningful statements and pseudo-statements. It is the philosopher's task to employ the method of logical analysis in order to elucidate philosophical statements in such a way as to show how they are not meaningful like the statements of science but are pseudo-statements that only have the appearance of sense, they appear to have a reference and logical form. They appear to be bipolar propositions that can be determined to be true or false. The method is tasked to show that the appearance is mistaken and accordingly the confusion is removed.

There is a difficulty regarding how to identify what Wittgenstein rejects and criticises in the *Tractatus* and what he continues to develop in the later conception of philosophy as proposed in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In a very general sense, Marie McGinn suggests that Wittgenstein did not reject the "details of the theories about logic and language that he put forward, but in the whole style of thought that the *Tractatus* expresses" (McGinn: 1997:5). The metaphilosophical interpretation takes a different approach that is in direct contrast with McGinn's position here. The metaphilosophical interpretation proposes what appears to be an opposite sentiment, one that suggests Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical challenge remains as a style of thought that the *Tractatus* focuses on as a distinct approach. The reason I claim this is that what McGinn refers to as the theories about logic and language is exactly what the metaphilosophical

interpretation developed here specifies as the pivotal changes. The metaphilosophical interpretation metaphilosophically frames Wittgenstein's approach as a metaphilosophical investigation into philosophical method. This is a result of what was identified as the influences of Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein's response to a linguistic turn and its metaphilosophical endorsement of requiring a new method. The Tractarian system defends a method of logical analysis that is founded upon an inbuilt demarcation between philosophical method and scientific method.

## Conclusion:

> *"It follows that the philosophical method practised in the Tractatus (as opposed to the method preached by the Tractatus) is not strictly the correct one."* (Hacker: 1998: 24-5)

The metaphilosophical interpretation maintains that Wittgenstein sought to change philosophy by a change in method. The change in method must achieve two things. First, it must be informed by an accurate account of the logic of language. Second, it must be isolated from the method of science. It must be a method unique to philosophy and its format of elucidation. The challenge is to marry both the variable of the how the logic of language will determine method and how the critique of scientism will also contribute to determining the conception of method. The individual configuration of each of the two variable inputs into Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical framework was misconceived in the *Tractatus*. It is also the case due to the form of this confusion that the manner in which Wittgenstein brought the two concepts together was accordingly confused. The *Tractatus* presents a response to the metaphilosophical framework that was misconceived. The conception of the logic of language as presented in the logical form of a proposition was wrong. The conception of scientism as a critical demarcation between what is sayable and what is shown was misconceived and so was the conception of philosophy and method of logical analysis.

The monothetic method of logical analysis failed, and the metaphilosophical challenge to change philosophy by means of a new method remained. The analysis aimed to examine what the method of the *Tractatus* amounted to and why it failed. The aim was to understand and identify what is in the *Tractatus* that is key to contributing to the later emphasis on methods. Why did Wittgenstein reject the monothetic conception of method

in order to endorse and develop the polythetic conception of methods as the only feasible account of philosophical investigation?

Therefore, the monothetic method of logical analysis was a method that failed to be compatible with the workings of language. The problems of philosophy were not due to a failure to understand the logic of language, but Wittgenstein now came to acknowledge that the workings of language were grammatical. The focus and change to grammar are a significant development on the earlier account, but it was also radically different in that the grammar was socially anchored in social practices and activities. This is the first key point of difficulty in Wittgenstein's program of changing philosophy to a focus and elucidation of language (his linguistic turn). The difficulty is summarised in the following question, how does one know whether the workings of language identified are even accurate or correct? According to Wittgenstein's approach once an accurate conception of the workings of language are identified then an account of the workings and how they can be elucidated determines the form of the practice and method required. The account of the workings of language determines the form of the practice that the linguistic elucidation must take.

The success of the approach now depends on the accuracy of the workings of language identified. The problem is that once the workings are identified how is it possible to appraise them? How do we know or how can we test the workings of language? A thorough application of language would be exhaustive, and so perhaps a test group would suffice? Certainly not, as this is the failing of the *Tractatus* as it used a test group so to speak by taking the form of the proposition to cater for the form of all language. This was a misconceived approach and Wittgenstein came to acknowledge this as a significant failing on his part.

> *What is mirrored in language I cannot use language to express. [Cf.*
> *4.121.] 23.4.15*

It is also evident that Wittgenstein has determined the form of the method he offers in the *Tractatus* by three factors. 1. The focus on the logical analysis of propositions as the general form of language meaning 2. The emphasis on logic determines the form of the method 3. The method is uniform and monothetic. The conclusion is that the method is determined by Wittgenstein's inference that language must be isomorphic by means of a logical relationship between thought—proposition—state of affairs. The aim of the chapter is to use the metaphilosophical approach to develop an analysis of the *Tractatus*, specifically in connection with defending the claim that the two variables of the logic of

language and the critique of scientism, both determine the conception of a monothetic method in the *Tractatus*. The important point here is to understand how Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach (is a challenge to change philosophy by a change in philosophical method), is founded upon the development and integration of the two variables of the logic of language and the critique of scientism.

> *"On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems. And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved." L.W Vienna 1918 (TLP preface)*

In the *Tractatus* the workings of language were logical, it is the calculus conception of language that Wittgenstein suggested to accurately account for how language and the world logically interact and support meaningful communication. The calculus conception of language consists of system of rules that determine thought, language and world (Engelmann: 2012: 284). Therefore, it is the method of logical analysis that defines the overall activity of linguistic elucidation. The method of logical analysis will elucidate the nature of the confusion and provide the necessary clarification to remove the linguistic confusions that deceptively appear as genuine philosophical problems. Following this direction, Wittgenstein believed he had successfully provided the method and means for a radical change in philosophy using the method he forwarded in the *Tractatus*. Accordingly, Wittgenstein left philosophy with the belief that he had 'in essentials' (*TLP:* preface) solved all the problems of philosophy by the potential application of the method he had offered in the *Tractatus*. The important conclusion that can now be considered is how the method of the *Tractatus* communicates an important insight from the attempt to develop a method specific to the nature of the problem. Wittgenstein misconceived the nature of the problem of how language specifically works. He was captivated by the notion that logic and systematisation that it necessitated would offer a means of resolving the question of how language functions.

# Chapter Five: The Rejection of the Monothetic Method and the Development of a Conception of Polythetic Methods

## 5.1 Introduction: The Return to Cambridge 1929

After a period of absence of nearly ten years, and partly in response to stimulation from meetings with the Logical Positivists in Vienna who had infamously misinterpreted his work[43], Wittgenstein returned to philosophy in Cambridge in 1929. With his return, as is evident in his paper '*Some Remarks on Logical Form*' (LW: 1929), Wittgenstein initially attempted to rectify what he identified as logical deficiencies.

> *"The method for doing that, he continues, is 'to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary language leads to endless misunderstandings'; so we must 'replace [ordinary language] by a symbolism which gives a clear picture of the logical structure, excludes pseudo-propositions, and uses its terms unambiguously' (RLF: 29–30). That is essentially the view that he had advanced 10 years earlier in the Tractatus." (Child: 2011: 77)*

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[43] The Dutch Mathematician L.E.J Brouwer is sometimes referred to as a key influence to Wittgenstein's renewed interest in Philosophy. Sluga maintains it was Brouwer's critique of formalism and the reliability of logic. Sluga makes an interesting point that Brouwer developed a "conception of mathematics as a human construction" and forwarded his approach in "terms derived from Schopenhauer". (v: 1996: 15)

As Child points out, Wittgenstein's first response was to hold to the logicist programme of a logical/linguistic method. Wittgenstein, holds to the idea of complex propositions that needed to be analysed into logical simples. This was upheld as the only possible form of method that could elucidate the logical workings of language. At first, he continued with the attempt to resolve apparent logical discrepancies such as colour exclusion and his account of elementary propositions. Over the months following his return, Wittgenstein came to acknowledge how the very idea of an account of logic he had forwarded in the *Tractatus* was wholly misconceived. The idea that a symbolism would rectify the issues of ordinary language was confused. Wittgenstein acknowledged that the method of logical analysis could not provide an adequate account of meaning. It could not account for the workings of language, its system of analysing language and its method of solving philosophical problems by elucidation, were all defunct. Wittgenstein's concerns turned onced again to the metaphilsophcial question of the nature of philsophcial confusion and the method of analysis that would remove confusion by means of lingusitic elucidation of the workings of langauge. This is a view supported by Reck who suggests that, during this period of his return to Cambridge, Wittgenstein was concerned with questions relating to philosophical method. It was according to Reck, the acknowledgement that the *Tractatus* method was inadequate that once again determined his focus on method.

> *"Which general method or methods are appropriate for philosophical inquiry? He was more and more convinced that the method used in the Tractatus was fundamentally inadequate."* (Reck: 2002: 24)

Engelmann maintains that Wittgenstein's reaction to the failings of the earlier work are more complicated than most other interpretations suggest. Engelmann claims that Wittgenstein attempted to apply a phenomenological conception of language and grammar to resolve the difficulties but it was only after this attempt failed that he finally moved to a developed account of grammar (Engelmann: 2012: 284). What Engelmann points to, as the developed account of grammar, represents the move from a calculus conception of rules or syntactic rules to a contrasting and different conception of rules that are very much embedded in our social activities and "our form of representation, our way of seeing things" (Glock: 1996:198).

*"Philosophical problems are not solved by experience… Philosophical trouble arises through seeing a system of rules and seeing that things do not fit it." (WLP: 1)*

I claim that Wittgenstein's radical change began in late 1929 and by 1931 Wittgenstein had committed to reject the method of logical analysis. In the Philosophical Remarks, much of which consists of notes from 1929-30, it is clear Wittgenstein is still immersed in logicism when describing a logical method as defining philosophy:

*"And since in reality it has a sense, this isn't the structure of our visual field. The genuine criterion for the structure is precisely which propositions make sense for it--not, which are true. To look for these is the method of philosophy." (PR: 256)*

## 5.2 The Importance of Wittgenstein's Acknowledgement of the Mistakes he had made

He came to acknowledge that he was dogmatic in expecting logic to provide the medium of representation and the subject of analysis. Wittgenstein's expectation of a logical correlation between language and world was erroneously founded on a dogmatic inference. It assumed that logical form was the all-important mechanism that enabled language to represent. Wittgenstein focuses on logical form and built a conception of the logic of language and logical analysis upon it. Wittgenstein later acknowledged that the idea of a fundamental logical correlation, as the only means of determining meaning, was misconceived. Wittgenstein had created a mistaken theory based on the hypothesis that logical form presented the logical functioning of all language. He had endeavoured to further support this theory and accordingly built a complex logical structure to communicate the system of representation. At every point of difficulty, Wittgenstein had developed the system of the *Tractatus* and its system of logic further. He advanced with more logical constructions to account for any additional challenges. Wittgenstein at the end of 1929, was confronted with a complex grandiose metaphysical, logical system based on the hypothesis of logical form. The system was mistaken. The method of logical analysis that it supported was therefore misconceived. It is evident that this complex

grandiose logical system was founded on a mistake. The mistake concerns what, I claim, is Wittgenstein's captivation with scientism in undertaking his initial metaphilosophical investigation. This concerns the relationship between the workings of language and his inference that philosophical problems are rooted in forms of conceptual confusions, that have their source in different forms of linguistic confusions. Wittgenstein built the logical system of the *Tractatus* based on a mistaken ideology that claimed that logic necessarily provided the medium of analysis, in order to elucidate how thought and language represented the world. I maintain that this mistake was a result of Wittgenstein falling prey to several aspects of what he later acknowledges as scientism. The *Tractatus* presented Wittgenstein's passive anti-scientism. This was primarily focused on utilising the critique in the form of a demarcation between science and philosophy and a means of supporting the criterion of what can be said and what cannot be spoken of and can only be shown. I claim in the analysis that follows, that the significance of metaphilosophical interpretation now becomes apparent in how it clarifies the form and importance of Wittgenstein's rejection of the *Tractatus* system and the monothetic method of logical analysis it supported. It also clarifies the nature of Wittgenstein's acknowledgement and understanding the significance of the failure and how he had erroneously developed the system of the *Tractatus* while captivated by scientism. The conclusion to this analysis concerns two important claims that result from the analysis. First, that the consequence to Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of his captivation of scientism concerns the development of an independent active account of anti-scientism. One that brings together the original passive account as a demarcation and supplements this with the identification of numerous examples and insights relating to the complex array of different ways and aspects of how scientism captivates the philosopher. Second, the equally important realisation that the investigation into the workings of language and the question of how to investigate language and how one expects language to work is weighted in scientistic motives. These are what Wittgenstein identifies as captivations with the methods of science before one's eyes (BB) and the numerous statements he makes pointing to how confusions relating to pictures, analogies and archetypes captivate the philosopher.

## 5.3 Understanding the Change 1929-31

In this section, my aim is to develop an account of the different factors that contribute to the rejection of the logical system. The focus is to identify the motivating factors of the changes. There is not one single motivation that can be identified as bringing about the change rather, I claim, there are several. First, I consider what Wittgenstein himself identifies, using his acknowledgement of the mistakes and acceptance of others criticisms, such as those from Ramsey and Sraffa[44], as significant. This is followed by what other commentators such as Avishai Margalit identify as the failings of the *Tractatus* system. These are important in understanding the apparent difficulties that Wittgenstein acknowledged in his conception of logic. I follow this analysis by developing an alternative way of understanding why Wittgenstein rejected the *Tractatus* method, and yet it remained so important that he wanted it published with the *Investigations*. I claim that Wittgenstein's suggestion that he wanted both the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* to be published together offers a valuable insight into the metaphilosophical challenge to change method. This related to the importance Wittgenstein placed on the need to understand and utilise the contrast to the *Tractatus* system and method. It is this contrast that supports the conception of polythetic methods he develops in the *Investigations*. I claim that this reasoning relates to Wittgenstein turning the failure of the *Tractatus* method to his benefit by utilising the method as a model to develop his account of scientism and his conception of polythetic methods.

This analysis supports the final section of the chapter and the defence of my account of understanding the context to the change by analysing how, what I claim to be the metaphilosophical framework and Wittgenstein's reassessment of the two variables and the complete change in the values determine a new polythetic conception of methods.

It is important to attain some understanding of how Wittgenstein specifically came to acknowledge the mistakes and further analysed the details of their source over the next years. This is evident in two distinct textual sources. The most direct evidence is developed in the published lecture notes from 1930-1936. These include; *Moore's Lecture Notes*, the *Lectures on Philosophy*, The *Blue and Brown Books* and also Wittgenstein's own *Note Books* and notes that have been compiled into the volumes,

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[44] Fann identifies Wittgenstein's story to Malcolm relating Sraffa's Neapolitan gesture broke the hold of the idea that a proposition must be a picture of reality by emphasizing the functional aspect to meaning. (Fann: 1971: 48)

*Philosophical Grammar*, *The Remarks on Philosophy*, *The Big Typescript* and the early draughts of the *Investigations* part 1. The aim is to elucidate the key aspects of Wittgenstein's transition from a monothetic method to a polythetic conception of methods, as a response to the overwhelming complexity of scientism. Wittgenstein does provide some guidance in achieving this. First of all, he offers a record of key points as a chain of progression in his notes from 1930 to 1937 and the final draught of part one of the *Investigations* which was completed in its current state in the mid-forties (Stern: 1991). It is evident from the textual evidence that in the early 1930's, Wittgenstein was working with these ideas in a formative stage[45]. It is from the context of metaphilosophy that it is evident that this phase presents a transition that begins with the rejection of the monothetic method and continues with the development and conclusion of the polythetic methods. I argue that this acknowledgement relates to the most valuable insight that contributes to his radical conception of polythetic methods.

### 5.3.1 Wittgenstein's Rejection of the Method of Logical Analysis

*"My view in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was wrong: 1.12 because I didn't clearly under-stand the sense of the words "a logical product is hidden in a proposition" (and similar words), 2.13 because I too thought that logical analysis would have to bring hidden things to light (as do chemical and physical analysis)". (BT: 82e)*

As the above quotation from the 'Big Typescript' identifies, Wittgenstein clearly states that he was wrong in developing the method of logical analysis in the *Tractatus*. He emphasises that what had contributed to his erroneous formulation of method relates to how he dogmatically presumed that "logical analysis would have to bring hidden things to light (as do chemical and physical analysis)." (BT: 82e). It was a captivation with the idea that logical analysis was the most effective method of identifying the hidden logical simples, in the same way, chemical analysis identified the elements of substance. Wittgenstein had taken the ideal of a practice of empirical analysis to be the most appropriate form of analysis for his investigation into the logic of language. His first

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[45] It must be understood that the only part of the record listed in the above, that was intended for publication was part one of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

dogmatic move was to determine the investigation as one of logical analysis. Wittgenstein was immersed in logic and logic was the chosen medium of analysis. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine how it could have been any other way. The second dogmatic move that follows from the first is to determine the propositions of language to be complex. By doing so, he had reinforced the requirement for analysis and the need to break the complex down into its simpler parts. In the analysis that follows there are three important interrelated claims that I defend as integral to the metaphilosophical interpretation. The first is that Wittgenstein rejected the method of logical analysis as it failed to account for the workings of language. Second, the *Tractatus* system failed. The reason for its failure was a direct result of what Wittgenstein acknowledged as his captivation with aspects of scientism. Third, what Wittgenstein acknowledged as his captivation with scientism pointed to numerous different aspects and examples of how forms of confusion lead to philosophical puzzlement. This acknowledgement determined Wittgenstein to develop a new complex account of how philosophers are captivated by scientism.

### 5.3.2 Ramsey and Sraffa

Wittgenstein suggests that this change in understanding was brought about as a result of comments made to him by Frank Ramsey (PI: 81) and Pierre Sraffa (PI: preface). Wittgenstein acknowledges both to have contributed to the insight into how we are often confused by the importance and weight one places on the captivating idea of the construction of an ideal language as a definitive improvement over ordinary language. In PI 81 Wittgenstein develops this point by identifying how a part of his confusion was in falling prey to the idea that logic could represent an order to the world in a similar way to how science identifies patterns in natural phenomena and creates theories.

> *"… in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules…Whereas logic does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like." (PI: 81)*

A logical conception was appealing, as it could provide a system to account for the requirement that language must be rule-governed. However, Wittgenstein came to acknowledge that meaning in ordinary language must also be rule-governed but not like the rules of a calculus conception that tabled strict rules of meaning according to logical relations. Ordinary language must be determinable by its rule-governed nature, but the challenge is to develop a conception of this rule-governed nature without falling back into the same restrictive conception of a calculus. This relates to what Sraffa contributed to Wittgenstein's understanding. It concerned, as Milkov points out, the understanding that for Wittgenstein's logical system to effectively account for all types of communication it must be able to account for gestures. This point is summarised by Fann, as Wittgenstein turns from the form of language to the function of language (Fann: 1971: 82). Wittgenstein's logical system did not account for how such actions as gestures were a part of the meaning. There was more than reference going, on there was a social context of action that also needed to be considered.

> *"The most significant part of this transformation was that human actions were put at the centre of philosophy of language – a step further stimulated by Piero Sraffa's insistence that Wittgenstein's logic must also explain such means of communication as gestures. Now Wittgenstein elaborated a logic–ontology that not only starts from making pictures of states of affairs; it also starts from learning model-actions and language expressions. In short, he did not merely explore the problem of how we form sentences but also how we form actions." (Milkov: 2012: 70)*

Mathieu Marion in his paper '*Wittgenstein, Ramsey and British Pragmatism'* draws our attention to the significance of Frank Ramsey's criticisms of the *Tractatus* in relation to "how it may of set into motion the later Wittgenstein" and his comprehension of the nature of what he identifies as the mistakes of the *Tractatus* (Marion: 2012). Marion argues that Wittgenstein utilises or 'picks up' Ramsey's "notion of 'variable hypothetical' as a rule, not as a proposition, on pragmatist grounds and that Wittgenstein picked this up in 1929. Marion holds that Wittgenstein changes to a 'dynamic' view of meaning and abandons the 'static' view of the *Tractatus* (ibid). Interestingly, Marion traces Ramsey's

pragmatism to Russell, and it is Marion's view that this Pragmatism of Ramsey is passed forth to Wittgenstein.

> *"As for the first clue, what would that gap be? My suggestion is that we look at Ramsey's review of the Tractatus and his critique of Wittgenstein's analysis at 5.542 of 'A believes p' as "'p' says p". Ramsey's qualms had to do with the fact that he rejected Wittgenstein's grounding of the notion of 'truth-possibility' on the notion of 'possibility of existence or non-existence of states of affairs', in 4.3:*
> *Truth-possibilities of elementary propositions mean possibilities of existence or non-existence of states of affairs." (Marion: 2012)*

Ramsey and Sraffa both insist that there were more notable examples of meaning outside of any referential account of meaning. Wittgenstein's response to what he conceived as the failure of the *Tractatus* began to be communicated in his lectures in his private rooms in Cambridge. To reiterate the key point here is to understand that what Wittgenstein came to acknowledge as the failings in the *Tractatus* relate specifically to the conception of language and the logical method that was a logical consequence of this particular logical conception of the workings of language.

## 5.4 Identifying the Mistakes in the *Tractatus* System

> *"The author of the Tractatus laboured to reveal that the structure of the world cannot be described but only shown. The author of the Investigations bent his efforts to reveal how what seemed to show itself was an optical illusion." (Hacker: 1986: 168)*

It is a strategy of standard readers like Hacker, to identify what they claim to be numerous arguments, statements and points developed in the *Investigations* that represent a clear attack upon the thesis of the *Tractatus*.[46] There are four evident interconnected

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[46] Goldstein identifies Norman Malcolm's book *Nothing is Hidden* as an excellent account of Wittgenstein's attack on his earlier work, wherein Malcolm identifies 'fifteen positions that are taken in the *Tractatus* and rejected in Wittgenstein's later writing's' (Malcolm, 1984, p. viii)

methodological approaches in the *Tractatus* that the *Investigations* is explicit in repudiating: theory construction, the search for hidden essences, the calculus conception of language and the mind as a subjective operator. With the 'picture theory,' Wittgenstein uses the referential form of a proposition to represent the whole of meaningful language. Hacker suggests that the fundamental change from the earlier to the later philosophy is seen in Wittgenstein's realisation that he was wrong to think that the referential approach to language and its correspondence or referential theory with word and world was definitive. Again in *Philosophical Grammar*, Wittgenstein is clearer in identifying the criticisms and changes relating to how his preoccupation with logic determined the central claim of a logical form mirrored in language and world.

> *"In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus I said something like: it is*
> *an agreement of form. But that is an error." (LW: PG: 212)*

Goldstein points to how Wittgenstein came to criticise the *Tractatus*, by now suggesting grammatical errors are caused by holding to 'false assumptions about how language works, e.g., that the sole function of language is to convey (represent) thoughts, or that a word applies to X because X satisfies certain conditions necessary and sufficient for the application of that word (the word represents X). The proper method in philosophy is to diagnose these errors, not to advance theories of one's own.' (Goldstein: 1999: 3)

### *5.4.1 Elementary Propositions and the Problem of Colour Exclusion*

To approach the question of the relationship between the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* in this way is a controversial claim. It is one that contrasts against Avishai Margalit who instead highlights the reason for the change in method is related to a point developed by Peter Hacker. Hacker's claim is that the rejection of the earlier method relates to a failure in the system of the previous approach. This was brought to Wittgenstein's attention by the failure of the approach to account for the problem of colour exclusion *(Margalit: 2009: 13).* This may well be a significant contributing factor to the rejection of the previous method, but I do not think it is a deciding factor. What is important is to understand how Wittgenstein came to understand the nature of this failure and how he responded to it. As Margalit claims, it is how Wittgenstein configures the stable form of

philosophical problems that is instrumental to understanding how he accordingly formulates a method or methods.

> *"How does Wittgenstein's later philosophy develop? ... Thus, it seems natural to think that once Wittgenstein accepts that there are necessary relations among elementary propositions in his return to philosophy in 1929, the Tractatus collapses and a new philosophy is created. This is a widely held view."* (Milkov: 2012: 70)

The logical simples are the constituents of elementary propositions. Wittgenstein now comes to repudiate this conception of logical analysis of complex propositions as he came to acknowledge the mistaken basis for the error of his approach.

> *"We mean all sorts of things by "proposition", and it is wrong to start with a definition of a proposition and build up logic from that."* (WLP: 11)

Elementary propositions constituted a theory of hidden simple essences. Wittgenstein's focus on this hypothetical inference and argument to support it, resulted from a captivation with science. Wittgenstein came to acknowledge that the expectation of an idealised structured system of language or calculus conception of rule determined language was a form of delusion brought about by a captivation with an aspect of scientism.

> *"This is all connected with the false concept of logical analysis that Russell, Ramsey and I used to have, according to which we are writing for an ultimate logical analysis of facts, like a chemical analysis of compounds... Grammar is for us a pure calculus (not the application of a calculus to reality)."* (PG: 311)

Again in his *Lectures on Philosophy* in 1932 Wittgenstein makes the same point but follows it by stating that a part of his error related to the expectation that an investigation needed to be systematic and this supported the application of a method of logical analysis. Wittgenstein now maintains that he and Russell were both wrong in upholding that

propositions need to be analysed into simple constituents, and this method of analysis would identify the logical simples or what he refers to as "first elements," "individuals" and "atomic propositions."

> *"Russell and I both expected to find the first elements, or 'individuals', and thus the possible atomic propositions, by logical analysis. Russell thought that subject-predicate propositions, and 2-term relations, for example, would be the result of a final analysis. This exhibits a wrong idea of logical analysis: logical analysis is taken as being like chemical analysis. And we were at fault for giving no examples of atomic propositions or of individuals. We both in different ways pushed the question of examples aside. We should not have said 'We can't give them because analysis has not gone far enough, but we'll get there in time.'" (WLP: 11)*

Wittgenstein points out in the above quotation, that there is a natural dogmatic expectation to see language working in a systematic and logical way. There is a natural inclination to expect that language works according to a calculus with definite rules and a system determining correct use. It is the need to approach language free from the expectations of systemisation and aspects of scientism that is challenging. Wittgenstein, I claim acknowledges this challenge in how he came to perceive the mistakes of the Tractatus to centre on this initial move to dogmatically proceed to investigate language as something unquestionably systematic.

Scientism and its manifestations are a common obstacle to the development of an accurate philosophical method. One of the common targets of analysis regarding Wittgenstein's rejection of the *Tractatus* relates to his configuration of the logic of language and the system he built based on the logical form of the proposition. A proposition is a picture of reality; elementary propositions are the one to one picture of reality in its most basic and simplest format. Elementary propositions are inferred by Wittgenstein as logical simples to support his claim that ordinary or complex propositions are composed of elementary propositions. The complex objects that form part of ordinary propositions consist of a potential of several different elementary propositions. Therefore, Wittgenstein's method of logical analysis was built on the inference that the criteria of meaning and sense were determined by the analysis of complex propositions into their elementary propositions.

Numerous difficulties are presented as evidence of Wittgenstein's method failing, this relates to his unsuccessful account of the logic of language such as the nature of elementary proposition and their inability to cater for the problem of colour exclusion. Elementary propositions must be logically independent of one another. Therefore, 'A is red' means that 'A' is not blue, green, black or white and so on. This means that the proposition 'A is red' cannot be an elementary proposition. As the proposition "A is red' also contained information pertaining to 'A is not blue', 'A is not yellow' etc. Therefore, elementary propositions were not the simple objects Wittgenstein intended them to be. Elementary propositions in the end, according to Wittgenstein's system were actually complex propositions. The system that he created was built upon the inference of simple elementary propositions, but this inference was misconceived.

> *"What is incorrect is the idea that the application of a calculus in the grammar of real language correlates it to a reality or gives it a reality that it did not have before. Here as so often in this area the mistake lies not in believing something false, but in looking in the direction of a misleading analogy. ... But the meaning of the word does not consist in something's corresponding to it, except in a case like that of a name and what it names; but in our case the bearer of the name is merely an extension of the calculus, of the language. And it is not like saying "this story really happened, it was not pure fiction". (PG: 311)*

### 5.4.2 Generalisation of the Proposition and One Single Great Problem

> *"Don't get involved in partial problems, but always take flight to where there is a free view over the whole single great problem, even if this view is still not a clear one." (NB: 23)*

Conant offers some analysis of Marie McGinn's suggestion that we should not treat Wittgenstein's method as piecemeal as Warren Goldfarb suggests, rather we should hope to follow Wittgenstein's lead and achieve a vista of the 'whole single great problem'(NB 1914-16). Conant goes on to use this as a means to highlight his agenda of sounding off as in agreement with a standard reader and then launching into a critical tirade of the

obvious differences. However, first, let's try to appreciate Conant's point here. He suggests that his agreement here in approaching Wittgenstein's work to be concerned with a single significant problem rather than distinct piecemeal problems is reflected in the format of philosophical method offered in the *Tractatus* and the later work.

Margalit makes an insightful point that it is the middle period and the rejection of the earlier approach that supports a change in method *(Margalit: 2009: 15)*. Margalit offers an interesting take on the contrast between Wittgenstein's method of logical analysis in the *Tractatus* and the method he emphasises in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Margalit suggests the former method was akin to Wittgenstein using a hammer while the latter was more of a tuning fork *(Margalit: 2009: 12, 15)*. I can appreciate the difference Margalit points to in her example, as the *Tractatus* method perceived everything to be a nail (a form of linguistic/logical misunderstanding) that needed only to be hit by a hammer (logical analysis).

> *"Abraham Kaplan introduced the idea of 'the law of the instrument'. He formulated it thus: 'Give a small boy a hammer and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding'. Criterion and verification can be useful tools. Wittgenstein, I believe, believed it when he said that there is no one method in philosophy, but methods, in the plural (PI, 133). Each, I would add, has a limited scope and a limited use. But Wittgenstein was often understood in the light of the law of the hammer: every problem is a philosophical nail only to be pounded by the hammer. Wittgenstein's notion of criterion was taken as such a hammer." (Margalit: 2009: 15)*

Like Margalit (2009), Hacker (2007), Fogelin (1987), Milkov (2012) and McGinn (2013) all agree that Wittgenstein came to criticise the conception of logic, and the analysis of a proposition. This was the fundamental failure that related to his own dogmatic inference that the form of a proposition represented all language. We claim that this dogmatic error was an important lesson to Wittgenstein and pivotal in determining how his reaction to the *Tractatus* would determine the later conception of philosophy and polythetic methods. Margalit's account correctly identifies how the main change is brought about regarding how Wittgenstein came to understand the nature of the philosophical problem. The metaphilosophical challenge to change philosophy by a change in method failed.

There is a clear difference of opinion about how to understand the period between 1930 and 1936/7. There are numerous exegetical difficulties arising from this period. Peter Hacker maintains in his paper '*Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism'* that there is no significant change in Wittgenstein's approach during this period. Some resolute readers have argued that there are significant changes in Wittgenstein's approach during this period. James Conant, for example, has offered several arguments and papers specifically on what these changes are (Conant: 2007). The issue is a complicated one for each interpretation has a host of differences and little agreement.

In my analysis, I agree with parts of what Hacker is proposing in forwarding his standard reading of Wittgenstein's work, especially the relevance of the emphasis on perspicuous representation as a part of the method of elucidating the grammatical network of rules. There are significant disagreements with his account, but it is specifically his claim that there are no important changes in Wittgenstein's work during this period that is concerning. Hacker does not appreciate the importance of what I claim are the evident complex changes Wittgenstein clearly undertakes regarding method. My analysis is that the two values of grammar and scientism are developed over a period of several years. This is evident in Wittgenstein's claim that he had discovered a new method in 1930, and this is developed and changed to emphasise in PI 133 that there is "not a method although there are methods".

To disagree with Hacker on this means there is no easy solution to the disparity. I maintain he is wrong at this point but how can this be so? Wittgenstein's announcement of a new method in 1930 clearly had a different status to the finalised version emphasising a plurality of methods in 1937. The most economical means of understanding this difference relates to how the conception of grammar itself was advanced from its initial conception in 1930/1 to its developed account in 1936/7. This is the same for Wittgenstein's new critique of scientism which also developed significantly between 1930 and 1937. The difficulty relates to how to understand this period of Wittgenstein's work where in 1930 he finally came to reject the *Tractatus* program of logical analysis and subsequently announce the discovery of a 'New Method.' Many may question the importance of this announcement especially given that we only know of it by means of those who attended his lectures held in his room. Fortunately, the notes of G.E. Moore offer some contribution to resolving this challenge. Moore was an avid note taker and regular participant of Wittgenstein's lectures. His notes prove to be a reliable resource.

## 5.5 The *Tractatus* as a Model of a Monothetic Method of Logical Analysis and the Development of a Conclusive Critique of Scientism

I claim that Wittgenstein developed the most intricate logical system to account for a mistaken inference at the very start of his investigation relating to the logic of language (TLP: preface). What is now important to understand is the significance that I claim this false result has for Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein developed and forwarded the method of logical analysis in the *Tractatus* as the final solution to the problems of philosophy. This method was a response to what I maintained to be the metaphilosophical challenge to change philosophy by developing an informed method and in reply to the question what is the correct method for philosophy. The method of logical analysis forwarded in the *Tractatus* was founded on a misconceived conception of the logical workings of language. Wittgenstein in the context of his metaphilosophical framework was correct in targeting the workings of language as intrinsic to understanding the demarcation between meaningful language and philosophical language. This was an important part of the metaphilosophical framework. The first value concerns the focus on language as a source of conceptual confusions that give rise to pseudo-philosophical problems. The idea, I maintain is that the accurate identification of the workings of language would provide the necessary understanding to determine meaningful statements in relation to language working. This is contrasted and utilised as a conceptual criterion to determine meaningless statements in relation to language idling or not functioning as the statement appears to suggest. The surface grammar or surface structure of a statement may seem to be unproblematic, this is what the deception consists in. A philosophical statement for Wittgenstein has the appearance of a statement that is working, but this is an illusion. There is nothing supporting the statement, it does not have a purpose. It is idle gasing. It is merely a prefabricated copy, a decoy duck that appears to be unsuspicious and to be something that has no reason to cause alarm. Apart from the appearance, everything else is empty and hollow.

### 5.5.1 The Critique of Logical Analysis

Wittgenstein forced a logical system onto how he conceived language to work. His investigation consisted of building a logical model of language working as an isomorphic referential system. In doing so, Wittgenstein had not provided an account of language working; he had essentially created a complete inaccurate model of what language would

be like if it were to logically represent the world. The model Wittgenstein created was, I claim a logical strawman; it consisted of a model that was he came to acknowledge, a failed attempt at communicating the workings of language. The resolute interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, like the one offered by Denis McManus claims in a similar fashion that the body of the *Tractatus* is nonsense, it is an elaborate decoy. Its purpose is to draw our focus while our understanding chews over the statements and becomes more enthralled with their complexity. The principal aim is to keep our focus fixed on the elaborate system and detailed model (the method of analysis). We proceed with awe in climbing each step of the ladder until we reach the top where we read that:

> *"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." (TLP: 6.54)*

Everything that has been awe inspiring in developing the most complex logical system must be thrown away as nonsense. The resolute interpretation has a great deal of value to it, and it offers a possible account of how to resolve the discrepancy between the statements of important truth in the preface of the *Tractatus* and the statement in the above claiming that they are nonsensical. The metaphilosophical interpretation does not enter this arena, it rather holds to the specific question of method[47].

> *The early Wittgenstein had been captivated by a general diagnostic story according to which philosophical problems arise when we come to see 'syntax' as 'substantial' and a Begriffsschrift, which we currently lack, would eliminate that danger. Crucially, the collapse of this general diagnosis does not herald an attempt to construct a*

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[47] The metaphilosophical interpretation does potentially offer some assistance as an alternative contrasting account to key points of controversy such as the relationship between the Tractatus and the Investigations. The question of how many Wittgenstein's, the relevance of the metaphilosophical context and the metaphilosophical analysis of Wittgenstein's focus on method. All of these key areas have some import to both Resolute and Standard readings.

> *new unified vision, to replace that which had been abandoned.*
> *(McManus: 2006: 247)*

The above quotation from McManus gives some insight into the context of Wittgenstein's focus on developing what I claim is the mistaken method of logical analysis. McManus holds to the view that Wittgenstein was captivated by "a general diagnostic story" of logical analysis that he had largely inherited from Frege and Russell. McManus rightly identifies that this diagnostic story comes to an end or is rejected, but the interesting point is that McManus goes on to suggest that Wittgenstein fails to replace it.

### 5.5.2 How the Critique of Logical Analysis is developed into an aspect of Scientism

McManus maintains that Wittgenstein's early "metaphilosophy had distorted the nature of philosophical confusion and the task of the philosopher" (McManus: 2006: 248). I argue that the metaphilosophical investigation is the positive aspect that was undermined by inaccurate values that Wittgenstein configured for the two variables. The nature of how Wittgenstein misconceived the two values is immensely important in understanding the failure of the *Tractatus* monothetic method. What is important is Wittgenstein's specific rejection of the method. His response to utilise the failed method as a model and how this contributes to the development of the polythetic conception of methods is what is now important. All of these points relate to what I claim is Wittgenstein's acknowledgement and understanding that the monothetic method he forwarded in the *Tractatus* was a result of his own captivation with aspects of scientism.

### 5.6 Wittgenstein's Captivation with Scientism: A Monothetic Method of Logical Analysis

> *"For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen*
> *years ago, I could not but recognise grave mistakes in what I set out*
> *in that first book." (PI: preface)*

The importance of the mistakes Wittgenstein came to acknowledge and begin to understand concerns the principal motivation that shifts his focus to a polythetic conception of methods. This relates to how the *Tractatus* defence of the monothetic method presented him with numerous examples of how he himself had fallen prey and been misconceived by forms of scientism. What is of particular importance is to

understand that Wittgenstein, when developing the *Tractatus*, was already aware of the difficulties that related to attempting to adopt scientific method into philosophy. He had offered a critique and developed an embedded critique of scientism into his method. Nonetheless, the method he forwarded in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein came to acknowledge, consisted of a litany of errors relating to how he was captivated by aspects of scientism. He was critical of the desire relating to an admiration for science and its successes and most apparent in attempts to use scientific method to assist philosophical investigation in forwarding theoretical and hypothetical responses to philosophical statements. Wittgenstein's key move from his linguistic turn was anti-scientistic, it was an approach that insisted that all philosophical problems were, in fact, pseudo-statements arising out of confusions in how philosophers dogmatically used language. Wittgenstein claimed that because of the general form of such conceptual or linguistic confusions that defined philosophical problems, they could not be solved by empirical investigation. This awareness is reflected in his attempt to develop the demarcation between philosophy and science as a conceptual tool to highlight the important differences. The demarcation was a conceptual and logical tool to assist in removing confusions that related to philosophers using the method and principles of scientific investigation in philosophical investigation. Wittgenstein's numerous statements in the *Tractatus* supported the utility of this demarcation to assist in comprehending the different methods between hypo-deductive analysis and logical/linguistic analysis.

> *"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences."* (TLP: 4.111)
> *"Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science."* (TLP: 4.1122)

The important insight Wittgenstein gained from this relates to what must be his acknowledgement that he had an awareness of such difficulties, and yet was blindsided by more complex aspects of scientism that he simply failed to consider. These were evident in how he developed a misconceived conception of the logic of language, a misconceived critique of scientism, a misconceived conception of their relationship and finally a misconceived new method of philosophy. A method that failed to achieve Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim to change philosophy by a change in method.

*"I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems." (TLP: Preface)*

The systematic method of logical analysis that Wittgenstein forwarded as the final solution to all philosophical problems was a failure. The metaphilosophical approach continues, but the specific configuration of the two values as the determining factors of his method are radically changed. I argue that what Wittgenstein now focuses on understanding is how both values were misconceived as a result of the specific forms of scientism that he himself had fallen prey to. I claim that the depth and extent of this misconception communicated the most important and valuable insight to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach. It was the manner of Wittgenstein's own dogmatism that led to the development of a method of logical analysis. The point is that Wittgenstein came to acknowledge that this method was formulated and defended as a result of his own captivations with aspects of scientism. In the *Tractatus,* the captivation with systematisation and logic. Both negatively held Wittgenstein's focus and led to an erroneous conception of the logic of language, scientism and accordingly a mistaken conception of method. This is an immensely important point. It is in understanding how he himself was captivated by aspects of scientism in developing the system of the *Tractatus* that provided Wittgenstein with the necessary understanding to dissolve the hold of these aspects of scientism and see them for what they are. Wittgenstein came to understand how he was mistaken by an expectation of order, specifically a necessary logical order, that required structure, rules and systematisation.

The inference of the complex propositions, the method of logical analysis and the inference of logical simples, Wittgenstein acknowledged in 1932 to be a result of a complicated captivation with science. He was captivated by the idea of analysis as a process that made the discovery of new knowledge of the hitherto unseen and unknown simples. Denis McManus also highlights this position and appeals to Wittgenstein in (*Philosophical Grammar:* 210) and dates the comment to 'in around 1932'. McManus develops the point further by identifying how it relates to Wittgenstein's further admission that he sought the method of logical analysis to undertake a 'complete analysis' of the proposition (McManus: 2006: 241-3). This also relates to the generalisation of the proposition, as pointed out in depth in the last chapter and McManus identifies this relation too. Although, McManus provides an excellent analysis of the *Tractatus* and develops many of the directions that have been omitted here, to offer a more

comprehensive account of the *Tractatus* approach to philosophy, he fails to develop or make the connections in relation to how this can be clarified as Wittgenstein coming to acknowledge a more robust complex account of scientism.

McManus is certainly interested in developing the significance of the contrast to scientism, but he does not perceive this as relating to a particular source of philosophical problems. He does not perceive any apparent importance in setting out Wittgenstein's development of the critique of scientism as another specific source of philosophical confusion. In the same way, Wittgenstein identifies confusions in grammar as a source of philosophical problems. This is clearly a challenge to the metaphilosophical interpretation. The metaphilosophical interpretation defended here maintains that there are two distinct sources of philosophical confusion. One source is accepted by most commentators in some form and relates to confusions rooted in misunderstandings of language. Aspects of scientism are also identified by others as significant, but the metaphilosophical import of the possibility of aspects of scientism presenting another source of philosophical puzzlement remains underdeveloped. This is the type of position McManus is forwarding; he identifies language as a limited source of confusions but still accepts that for Wittgenstein it is the principal source of confusions that gives rise to philosophical problems. He is aware of the role that captivations with aspects of scientism have in contributing to philosophical confusion but is not concerned with developing this beyond identifying the intricate relation of aspects of scientism and philosophical confusion. McManus clearly sees no need to pursue this possibility further. This certainly depicts the general response to scientism; it is important, but it relates to linguistic confusions or is overshadowed by them. The metaphilosophical significance of scientism is not given the consideration it clearly requires.

In the analysis that follows, I argue that the conception of scientism is complex as it is both interwoven with linguistic confusions and at times also independent of them. What this means is that I defend an interpretation of Wittgenstein's account of scientism that is another distinct source of confusion that leads to philosophical problems. Therefore, scientism is an important and complex aspect as equally significant as his account of grammar as a source of philosophical confusion. This claim is supported by an important point identified by McManus, in *Moore's Lecture Notes*. According to Moore, Wittgenstein made the point several times in his lectures that his focus on addressing general questions on language was not because he thought language was *"the subject-*

*matter of philosophy. He did not think it was. He discussed it only because he thought that particular philosophical errors or 'troubles in our thought' were due to false analogies suggested by our actual use of expressions. (M 257)"* (McManus: 2006: 249). A similar point is developed by Engelmann in claiming that one aspect of Wittgenstein's methods relates to what he develops as a genetic method. A method that Engelmann claims Wittgenstein developed by investigating the source and origin to philosophical problems. Engelmann refers to this as the genetic method:

> *"... bring Wittgenstein to his new method, which investigates the genesis of philosophical problems. He thinks that false analogies and misleading trains of thought underlie and engender philosophical puzzlement. By means of the clear formulation of how philosophical problems are generated, the method aims at their dissolution before they develop into a theory." (Engelmann: 2012: 285)*

This point goes against the general view that Wittgenstein's focus was on language and the analysis of it to remove linguistic confusions that are a source of philosophical problems. It highlights the fact that Wittgenstein was not focused on language as the only source of philosophical confusions. In the above Moore suggests, Wittgenstein does emphasise how forms of linguistic confusion are troublesome due to false analogies in language use. This will be developed further, but I want to utilise this example to support my claim that Wittgenstein developed a coherent account of scientism as another important source of philosophical confusions. This claim is supported by my analysis and I argue that the method of the *Tractatus* was monothetic in that it focused entirely on the logic of language as the only source of philosophical confusion. What is now apparent is that the developed critique of scientism is also a coherent source of conceptual confusions that give rise to philosophical problems. To support this claim I need to defend the claim that there are two distinct sources of confusions that philosophical problems and puzzlement are rooted in. The challenge to this is overcoming the view that all philosophical problems are rooted in forms of linguistic confusions. The difficulty is that Wittgenstein is unclear in relation to this. At times he claims that all problems have their source in misunderstandings of language and at other points, he develops an in-depth account of how scientism gives rise to confusions that lead to philosophical puzzlement.

> *"Formerly, I myself spoke of a 'complete analysis', and I used to believe that philosophy had to give a definitive dissection of propositions so as to set out clearly all their connections and remove all possibilities of misunderstanding. I spoke as if there was a calculus in which such a dissection would be possible… At the root of all this there was a false and idealised picture of the use of language." (LW: PG: 211)*

In the *Philosophical Grammar*, Wittgenstein clarifies the mistakes he had made about language, its correlation with the world and the method of removing philosophical misunderstandings. He claims that the root of his confusion related to what he describes as *"at the root of all this there was a false and idealised picture of the use of language" (LW: PG: 211)*. Wittgenstein is clearly placing the focus on misunderstanding language as the root cause of his failings. I challenge this view as a deceptive one and instead claim that although the language is the main reason for the mistake, it is the nature of how Wittgenstein was confused by aspects of scientism that led to the mistake and its dogmatic defence of the conception of the logic of language. Wittgenstein identifies the idealised picture of language as a system united by a logical form of relations between names and objects. It was a complex logical system that needed to be analysed into simpler parts. The method of analysis was one specifically suited to the nature or form of the complex proposition. The logic of language as the logical form of the proposition determined the form of the logical method of analysis. The goal of the method of analysis was to identify the elusive basic building blocks of the complex proposition.

In 1932 Wittgenstein states the following as the start his first lecture of the term:

> *"I am going to exclude from our discussion questions which are answered by experience. Philosophical problems are not solved by experience, for what we talk about in philosophy are not facts but things for which facts are useful. Philosophical trouble arises through seeing a system of rules and seeing that things do not fit it. It is like advancing and retreating from a tree stump and seeing different things. We go nearer, remember the rules, and feel satisfied, then retreat and feel dissatisfied." (WLP: 1932: 2)*

It was the nature of the confusions that was now important and how they pointed to a complexity to scientism he was previously unaware of. It was perhaps, what he would later refer to as an aspect blindness to numerous examples of how scientism distorted and confused our understanding of language, and the forms of investigation philosophers were disposed to take. It was the effect of scientism that was particularly relevant to how philosophers were captivated by the systematisation, order, structure, the search for the hidden, names referring to objects, essentialism, generality, and analysis of complexes into simples. All of which Wittgenstein claimed the *Tractatus* presented to him and resulted from a captivation with the method of science in unexpected and perplexing ways.

> *"The questions "What is length?", "What is meaning?", "What is the number one?" etc., produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.)" (BB: 1)*

Wittgenstein in the *Blue Book* uses the example of philosophy's attempt to investigate the mind to communicate how language and forms of scientism complicate the investigation. The "puzzlement caused by the mystifying use of our language" and the dogmatic acceptance of scientism both contribute to endorsing a philosophical problem. This endorsement supports investigating a philosophical problem by appealing to some quasi-scientific method. We investigate a philosophical problem created from a misleading form of words and respond with theory construction, hypothesis, and analysis.

This is an important point; Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to an example of how a misunderstanding of language and a captivation with scientism combine to further complicate the confusion. The irony of the error is that with increasing complication what appears to be the philosophical problems gains importance due to the apparent difficulty to investigate it. The problem relates to the failure of the scientistic forms of investigation to adequately provide any satisfactory result. What the example clarifies is one particular form of confusion that has its source in a linguistic confusion but the confusion is further complicated and developed by a scientistic response to it. The matter can escalate further by the intractable nature of the confusion, which now suggests that something deeper,

more elusive and more important is at issue. Wittgenstein elucidates this point further concerning questioning the nature of the mind:

### 5.6.1 Linguistic confusions and the critique of Scientism

Moore identifies how Wittgenstein draws a distinction between his new method of practising philosophy and what Moore describes as what we would refer to as traditional philosophy. Moore states that Wittgenstein claimed that he had undertaken a new method that redefines the practice in the same way Galileo invented dynamics and "chemistry was developed out of alchemy." Wittgenstein now claimed to offer a "new subject and not merely a stage in a continuous development" (Moore: 1953: 26). This is what Moore describes as Wittgenstein's kink in the evolution of philosophy[48] as a more informed method of elucidation unique to the task of a skill of conceptual elucidation. Wittgenstein now specifically rejected traditional philosophy and its search for deep theoretical explanations (Moore: 1953: 26). This, Wittgenstein claims, is simply misguided, in that such 'explanations' are founded on a confusion of language, and it is the nature of this confusion that Wittgenstein is ultimately concerned with. Wittgenstein thus rejects the methodology and practice of traditional philosophy, for he believes it rests on a fundamental error, as it has misunderstood how language works, and consequently, a whole catalogue of chimerical philosophic puzzles are sustained as this misunderstanding is perpetuated.

> *"As regards his own work, he said it did not matter whether his results were true or not: what mattered was that "a method had been found ." (Moore: 1953: 26).*

The above quotation from Moore is an example of how the initial metaphilosophical framework, first developed by Frege and Russell, now continues into the later period. The quote specifies what I argued Wittgenstein endorsed from Frege in developing the metaphilosophical investigation not into truths but into the establishment of a new method informed by an accurate account of the logical/grammatical workings of language. Again this is a clear continuation of the same aspects as proposed in the *Tractatus* conception, namely that philosophical problems are illusions arising out of a failure to understand the workings of language. Therefore, Wittgenstein perceived his role to be one of setting

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[48] Also referred to as a Copernican revolution in Philosophy

things right, by bringing to view the factors that held philosophers captive, through misunderstanding the logic of language and how it works. Wittgenstein perceived his task to destroy the houses of cards that philosophers build and to clear up the ground upon which they stand:

> *"What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand." (PI 118)*

## 5.7 The Metaphilosophical account of the context of the change in 1930

It is this monothetic conception of method that I claim defined the system of the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein in response to its failure and utilisation of the insights that the failure offered was able to use the *Tractatus* as a methodological model of a logical, analytical method. It was Wittgenstein's utilisation of the understanding he gained from acknowledging the failings of the *Tractatus*'s analytical method that I claim enabled Wittgenstein to develop a radical conception of polythetic methods. Wittgenstein came to recognise that the grave mistakes of the *Tractatus* had the most profound impact in determining and providing the catalyst for the development of the radical conception of polythetic methods he forwards in his *Philosophical Investigations*.

It is evident that Wittgenstein not only accepted that the method of logical analysis forwarded in the *Tractatus* was a failure but more importantly, he turned this to his advantage. He used the *Tractatus* as a model to rebuild his metaphilosophical investigation. I maintain that Wittgenstein used the *Tractatus* monothetic method as a valuable model to gain vital insights into the workings of language and the effects of scientism. I argue that because of the valuable insights and information attained from the *Tractatus* monothetic model Wittgenstein can further develop his metaphilosophical investigation. The failure of the logical model of analysis in the *Tractatus* supports Wittgenstein in developing a radically new conception of the workings of language. This conception of language now consists of a grammatical network of rules embedded into social practices. His anti-scientism is further developed as another source of conceptual confusions that lead to philosophical puzzlement. Therefore, the utilisation of the *Tractatus* as a model enables Wittgenstein, to totally change the two variable values. In

what follows, my analysis focuses on the changes Wittgenstein makes to these values from 1930 to 1937.

### 5.7.1 Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophical Framework

Following the development and defence of the metaphilosophical interpretation, I argue that the metaphilosophical framework continues into this phase of Wittgenstein's work from 1930 until perhaps 1937. With the failure of the method forwarded in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein once again resorted to the metaphilosophical framework to readdress the problem of philosophical identity and method. The framework is merely a conceptual tool to give some structure to the metaphilosophical investigation. It presents Wittgenstein's identification of the source of conceptual confusions that result in philosophical problems and ascribes a possible methodological response. All of which is framed in the context of a metaphilosophical investigation. I claim that the significant difference now concerns the addition of the critique of scientism as an additional source of conceptual confusions that give rise to philosophical problems. If we hold to the criterion of the metaphilosophical approach and its focus on method, it is evident that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation and strategy remains much the same as the one initially developed and supported in the period from 1914 to 1919. The continuation is primarily determined by the endurance of what I have defined as the metaphilosophical framework and the two key variables relating to the focus on the workings of language and his anti-scientism. Their collective formulation will determine any possible conception of methods. The challenge is now to develop and defend a clear account of how the variables determine what I claim to be Wittgenstein's polythetic conception of methods.

The two following tables provide an outline of the differences between the earlier and later metaphilosophical frameworks:

**The Early Metaphilosophical Framework:**

**What are philosophical problems**? *Forms of linguistic confusions*

What gives rise to philosophical problems as linguistic confusions? *A failure to understand the logic of language*

**Response**: An accurate understanding of the logic of language will significantly contribute to determining the specifics of a method. One that will elucidate the logical workings of language and support.

### The Later Metaphilosophical Framework:

**What are philosophical problems?** Forms of linguistic confusions and confusions arising from aspects of scientism captivate the philosopher

(a) Forms of linguistic (grammatical) confusions

(b) Forms of confusions resulting from a captivation with the method of science

**What gives rise to philosophical problems as linguistic confusions?** A failure to understand the grammatical network of rules that relate to language use.

**What gives rise to philosophical problems as confusions arising from aspects of scientism?** An inability to understand the many different aspects of scientism that captivate the philosopher. This is outlined in Wittgenstein's important statement in the Blue Book relating to how the philosopher "constantly sees the method of science before their eyes":

> *"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness" (BB, p. 18).*

**Response**: An accurate understanding of the grammar of language will significantly contribute to determining the specifics of various methods required to perspicuously represent the relevant segments of our grammar. In relation to scientism, the model of the *Tractatus* offers a useful tool to communicate many of the different aspects of scientism and how the philosopher is captivated by them.

The metaphilosophical framework remains but is developed further with the critique of scientism now presenting another distinct source of philosophical puzzlement and problems arising from conceptual confusions. It is the two values that now change. It is the conception of grammar and scientism that represent the two sources of confusions. Before considering the two variables, the focus now turns to the analysis of the significance of the failure of the *Tractatus*.

## 5.7.2 The Change in the Two Variable Values

The conception of a method that Wittgenstein develops, in the beginning, consists of two important variables concerning an accurate account of the logic/grammar of language and his anti-scientism. The two variables determine the format of the method. The difference between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*, I claim is a difference in how Wittgenstein comes to configure the two variables. The point is that it is only by appreciating his work in the context of the metaphilosophical challenge that it becomes apparent that there is a different relation between the two works then both therapeutic and standard interpretations suggest. In the *Tractatus* the workings of language are logical, it is the calculus conception of language that Wittgenstein suggested to display accurately how language and the world logically interact and support meaningful communication.

The method of the *Tractatus* itself was a function of the two values of the logic of language and the formulation of his critique of scientism. It forwarded a method of logical analysis that supported the analysis of complex propositions into their simple elementary propositions which could then be determined to have meaning, or its truth value could be ascertained. I claim the values of the two variables were misconceived. I maintain that the change in method that is evident after 1930 represents the specific changes Wittgenstein was developing in relation to the values of the two variables: the workings of language and his anti-scientism.

What is now important to understand concerns what I maintain are the specific changes in values and how these changes determine a radically new conception of method as polythetic methods. The previous analysis of the *Tractatus* argued that the early work[49] and its logical foundations were largely based on the inference that there was a necessary logical correlation between language and the world. This needs to be explicated in order to determine the logic of language (Variable One). The philosophical method defended in the *Tractatus* specifically concerned the elucidation of the logical form using a method that focused on the logical analysis of language. The analysis aimed to break down the

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[49] David Stern quite rightly suggests that the early and late dichotomy of Wittgenstein's work is largely an inaccurate appendage resulting from the fact that the Tractatus was published in 1922 and the investigations in 1953. The appendage was sustained during a period where there was little availability of the now mass of material available that represents the period from 1922 up to Wittgenstein's death in 1951. Stern again rightly suggests that there is clearly a middle period and a middle Wittgenstein. I agree to Stern's analysis. (Stern: 1991: 203)

complex and search for the simple elementary propositions as the simple building blocks that constituted the logical ground and supported the theory of meaning. As part of this approach, Wittgenstein used an account of scientific method as a means to demarcate the different source of philosophical problems, the different form of them and the different method of philosophical problems as conceptual confusions. In 1930 this logical/linguistic conception of philosophical problems as conceptual confusions was rejected. The method of logical analysis was rejected as a 'grave mistake' that resulted from Wittgenstein's failure to recognise his own captivations with the method of science.

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Variable One: The Workings of Language,

Early Value: The conception of the logic of language was centred on the logical form evident in a proposition's isomorphic ability to mirror the manifest logical relations of objects in the world. A proposition must have a determinable sense for it to have the capacity to represent a possible state of affairs. This aspect also determined its bipolar nature as it could be verified by a correspondence theory of truth in determining whether it was true or false. This conception of the logic of language was I claim, an incorrect value as it became evident that it had a very limited application.

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Variable Two: The Critique of Scientism

Early Value: The manner in which Wittgenstein used his critique of scientism, primarily related to its contrasting role as an embedded demarcation between what can be said and what can be shown. This value of scientism also failed, and this specifically relates to its failure to cater for what were several new examples of how aspects of scientism captivate and lead to confused statements and directions for analysis.

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It is the mistakes in the *Tractatus*' conception of method and changes to the two values that Wittgenstein had developed in response to the two variables that I claim are the most

important factors in determining the development of his unique conception of polythetic methods. Identifying and developing a coherent analysis of the nature of the mistakes in Wittgenstein's conception of the two variables and how he came to understand how he needed to change the values in light of the errors, is what is now important.

# Conclusion

> *"The comparison which forces itself upon us is that of the mental medium with the protoplasm of a cell, say, of an amoeba. We observe certain actions of the amoeba, its taking food by extending arms, its splitting up into similar cells, each of which grows and behaves like the original one. We say "of what a queer nature the protoplasm must be to act in such a way", and perhaps we say that no physical mechanism could behave in this way, and that the mechanism of the amoeba must be of a totally different kind. In the same way we are tempted to say "the mechanism of the mind must be of a most peculiar kind to be able to do what the mind does". But here we are making two mistakes. For what struck us as being queer about thought and thinking was not at all that it had curious effects which we were not yet able to explain (causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one; but a muddle felt as a problem."*
> *(BB: 5-6)*

As pointed to in the above example concerning Wittgenstein's comments in the *Blue Book* on the 'mind', it is clear that the marrying of the two values is for Wittgenstein beyond question. Therefore, the challenge is to defend the interpretation that each value demands a plurality of methods. If this defence is sufficient, then it establishes the cogency of the claim that both values together necessitate a conception of polythetic methods.

Micheal Hymers offers some assistance in clarifying what I maintain is Wittgenstein's acknowledgement that the method of the *Tractatus* is a false method. Hymer's talks of the 'Epistemic Neurosis" that compounds and confuses philosophers to ask questions of explanation, theory and truth and knowledge (Hymers: 1999: 2). Indeed, Hymers is not alone in appealing to such talk of philosophical neurosis, this talk of neurosis is itself I claim an example of the very malady that Hymers is attempting to elucidate. It is the

generalised appeal to the need for therapy as a means of removing a psychological source of philosophical confusion that I find problematic. It is the attempt to define philosophy as consisting solely of therapeutic methods that I claim is at odds with Wittgenstein's emphasis on the relevance of the therapies he speaks of. There is undoubtedly some worth to this account of "method like different therapies" (PI: 133) and its focus on the philosopher as disposed to confusion. What I want to highlight is that the notion of therapy is a valuable one, but it cannot be the only source or the defining source of philosophical confusion. This objection relates to the lesson from the monothetic conception of the method in the *Tractatus*. There is not one unifying essential quality that defines all forms of conceptual confusions that give rise to philosophy puzzlement or problems. This I claim is the first lesson from Wittgenstein's model of the monothetic method of the *Tractatus*. Whether it is a wholesale method as I claim traditional resolute readings suggest in the form of Diamond (1991) and Conant (2007) interpretation or a patient specific piecemeal therapeutic plurality of methods that Gordon Baker (2006) suggests. Or it could also concern the claim of the standard reading's focus on a general account of methods united by a focus on elucidating or making perspicuous the grammar of the language in such a way that we can perceive the difference to bring about the required understanding to enable the confusion to vanish (Hacker: 2007, Pears: 1987, 1988, Fogelin: 2009). All three interpretations are in agreement that the goal of the methods is the vanishing of the confusion. The difficulty is that none of them agrees on what the form of the methods must be to achieve this. The interpretation developed here does not engage with the question of what a method must be. It is not strictly concerned with the value of the methods themselves in the sense whether the method is grammatical, wholesale therapeutic or patient specific therapeutic. What is the target of the thesis concerns the question of the meaning of Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods as a plurality of methods. I claim that what Wittgenstein emphasises is a polythetic conception of methods. Potentially, a polythetic conception of methods could cater for a consideration of an array of methods consisting of a combination of the above examples.

# CHAPTER SIX: WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTION OF POLYTHETIC METHODS (1937- )

*"Philosophy is philosophical problems." (PG: 30)*
*"All I can give you is a method; I cannot teach you any new truths"*
*(WL: 97)*

*"The main barrier is the scientism that pervades our mentality and our culture. We are prone to think that if there's a serious problem, science will find the answer. If science cannot find the answer, then it cannot be a serious problem at all. That seems to me altogether wrong. It goes hand in hand with the thought that philosophy is in the same business as science, as either a handmaiden or as the vanguard of science."[50]*

## 6.1 Two values become two sources of conceptual confusions

The conceptual scheme of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach, I maintain, is an insightful one that had a positive potential application. It set out to remove a form of linguistic dogmatism relating to uninformed accounts of language use in philosophy and it aimed to remove what it measured to be deceptive captivations with science. Therefore, to investigate Wittgenstein's work in relation to the metaphilosophical framework was an expedient tool. It focused the attention on two difficulties with Wittgenstein's approach concerning how the two values of the workings of language and his critique of scientism determined the specific formulation of philsophcial method. It is the specification of each

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[50] https://jamesgarveyactually.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/hackers-challenge.pdf

value that will determine the format of the method. For example, the value relating to the workings of language will necessarily determine the format of how the methods of elucidation relating to language rules are determined in form. Wittgenstein has shown this by utilising the *Tractatus* model as an example of what one particular method of analysis would look like if language was predominately logic. What is important is that this can be contrasted with the *Investigations* and its value of grammar in order to see the similarities and differences.

The values were misconceived as a result of the complex, veiled aspects of scientism and how they determined a dogmatic captivation with systemisation. All of which I argue was a result of what Wittgenstein came to acknowledge as the many complicated forms of how scientism captivates the philosopher. This is evident as a predisposition to engage any investigation in the context of philosophy and metaphilosophy as a disposition to systematise. What is important to understand is that this disposition to systematise is prior to any pre-emptive effort not to systematise or to avoid scientism. This is evident from Wittgenstein's attempt to identify the workings of language and to respond to philosophical identity in terms of philosophical problems and the method to dissolve them. Philosophy is synonymous with the methods that are used in the dissolution of confusions.

Three important points are a consequence of Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the failure of the *Tractatus* method. First, the mistakes of the *Tractatus* method were a result of the captivations of science. Secondly, the captivations of science are far more complex and problematic than Wittgenstein had first considered. Third, some aspects of scientism constitute another source of confusion. It is clearly the case, that some philosophical confusions are not grammatical but are themselves rooted in the hold of scientism. These three points I now argue necessitate that Wittgenstein's emphasis on a plurality of methods is necessarily a polythetic conception. The polythetic conception is the only possible conception that can cater for the wide variety of relations that are shared by the diverse group of methods that constitute Wittgenstein's approach. I build upon this analysis in defending the metaphilosophical interpretation of polythetic methods.

## 6.2 The Challenge of Scientism

*"Philosophic problems are conceptual, not empirical. Their answers do not lie in the production of empirical assertions about*

*linguistic use, or in the production of special philosophical propositions… Philosophy is an activity whose primary product is the disappearance of philosophical problems. An essential part of the activity is indeed the eliciting and arrangement of obvious rules of use… For the linguistic investigation receives its purpose from conceptual problems of philosophy, not from empirical problems in linguistics (PI, sec109)." (Hacker: 1986: 161)*

The analysis now turns to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* to further develop and defend the metaphilosophical interpretation of polythetic methods. The *Investigations*[51] brings to a close Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical enquiry. There is no systematic account of a method, in fact, there is no possibility of a method or any systematisation. This is the key to the lesson of the *Tractatus*. It is the complexity of the hold that the captivation with systemisation and the method of science has upon the philosopher that Wittgenstein describes in psychological terms as a disease of the understanding. It is this complex account of the aspect of scientism and the resulting disposition to systematise that Wittgenstein's appeal to therapies and identification of malaise and sickness relate to. It is undeniable that a great deal of the resolute, therapeutic and grammatical interpretations of methods are invaluable in developing our understating of the complex array of challenges to the conception of methods. Following the previous anlaysis I now argue that resolute, therapeutic and grammatical interpretations of methods have misinterpreted the specific emphasis on a plurality of methods. Other non-metaphilosophical interpretations have by their focus on a monothetic essentialist conception of methods overlooked what I consider the most important point of Wittgenstein's statement in PI 133. Its rejection of a single uniform method and its emphasis on a plurality of methods. It is I claim an emphsis on a plurality that demands a diversity of methods to respond to the diverse sources of confusion.

The lesson of the *Tractatus* is to resist the many aspects of scientism and the disposition to seek systemisation. It is clear that any form of generality, essentialism and constructivism will struggle to avoid such systemisation. Wittgenstein's critique of scientism and the emphasis on elucidation is often referred to as a therapeutic activity.

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[51] What is referred to as the Philosophical Investigations and what is of specific concern to the thesis relates to part one of the book which consists of work that was largely undertaken between 1935/6/8. Wittgenstein labored on the different attempted drafts for nearly ten years up until 1947 and toyed with the idea of publishing the Philosophical Investigation throughout that period. (Baker and Hacker: 2005: 6)

Such as the accounts offered by resolute readings, and the numerous forms of other variations of therapeutic interpretations on offer. This is an unsatisfactory outcome that also detracts from the importance of Wittgenstein's emphasis on a plurality of methods. To fail to appreciate the significance of a plurality of methods is to fail to accurately comprehend Wittgenstein's conception of anti-scientism. I claim that any interpretation that supports a single unifying form to methods have misconceived Wittgenstein's emphasis on a diverse plurality of methods. This is highlighted by Wittgenstein's contrast and rejection of a monothetic method (PI: 133). To claim that all methods are therapeutic undermines the significance of the grammatical methods. Moreover, to claim that all methods relate to forms of grammatical perspicuity, is again to undermine the important methods that clearly relate to the need to achieve a change in aspect. It is the challenge to elucidate the psychological hold that some confusions have on the philosopher that requires more than the perspicuous representation of grammar. The only option is to embrace the emphasis on a plurality of methods and elucidate the significance of the two variable values and how they determine methods. It is only by accepting that the source of philosophical confusion relates to both grammatical confusions and scientistic captivations that the significance of the plurality is identified.

## 6.3 Polythetic Methods

The *Investigations* brings together Wittgenstein's finalised methodological account of philosophy as a practice defined by numerous methods. The clearest statement concerns the claim that there is now only a plurality of methods, and the first task is to understand what Wittgenstein means by a plurality of methods. This is certainly not clear. What is clear is that he is rejecting uniformity and singularity. He is rejecting the possibility of an essentialist conception of a monothetic method that infers all particular methods to share a single unifying property. In this chapter, my goal is to develop the analysis by defending the polythetic conception of methods. A polythetic conception provides a means to account for the required variety and variation in the different methods associated with Wittgenstein's later emphasis on methods. I claim that this is a task that is overdue and it is certainly only the beginning to what, I claim is a necessary venture that provides some tangible form to Wittgenstein's alternative conception of philosophy as a conception of polythetic methods.

The focus of the analysis relates to defending the following statement. Philosophical puzzlement and problems are rooted in two distinct but deeply related sources of conceptual confusions that are ingrained in misunderstandings specific to language and confusions specific to forms of scientism. From the analysis of the sources, it is evident that a myriad of different forms of difficulties arise. Some are displayed in the surface grammar of language, the misapplication and misuse of grammatical rules, pictures and archetypes in language, various dispositions relating to how we are in philosophy captivated by the method of science, urges and desires to systemise, structure, and develop expectations of how things should be. These are, according to my understanding of Wittgenstein's approach, a variety of possibilities that arise from each source and arise from a mixing of each. For example a statement such as 'I have a pain' (PI: 151, 244-257, 271) presents an innocuous statement that shares the surface grammar of a great number of statements that are generally used in our day to day activities and interactions with one another such as I have a pen as an exclamation to the person desperately looking for one. The surface grammar or form of the statement 'I have an x' is fine until we confuse the surface grammar with words that have no place with this rule of use. This error gives rise to a perplexing and somewhat fascinating philosophical puzzlement. The puzzlement is one form of confusion but it is the scientistic response to appeal to a metaphysical theory or system to try and seek out the solution to this problem that communicates another example of puzzlement. How did I get from the seemingly innocuous statement 'I have a pain' to the question of inner private sensation statements? This simplistic example of the infamous sections on pain behaviour sets out the basic form of the analysis. There are two sources of philosophical confusions that can combine in numerous ways to form an ever more complex array of forms of philosophical puzzlement. With growing complexity comes an increasing challenge to resist the disposition to respond in a systematic scientific manner. In what follows, I now develop an account of Wittgenstein's conception of grammar, grammatical confusions and grammatical methods of perspicuous representation. This is followed by an account of how scientism, systemisation and captivation with scientific method also gives rise to scientistic confusions and methods.

## 6.4 Polythetic methods: A Means of Grouping a Variety of Different Methods

I argue that there are two possible sources of confusions that give rise to philosophical problems. These have been developed as the two variable values that determine the account of philosophical method or methods. Each variable, I now claim requires a polythetic conception of methods.  To support this claim, the analysis must demonstrate that there are confusions that have their source in scientism and are removed by combatting the specific aspects of scientism. The conception of polythetic methods is important here as it is the only conception of a plurality of methods that can support two variant types of methods. Therefore, the metaphilosophical defence of polythetic methods is a defence of the two values as two distinct sources of philosophical confusion.

The metaphilosophical interpretation now defends the polythetic conception of methods as a necessary formation to account for what, I claim are the two variable values. These values are two distinct but multi-layered and interrelated sources of conceptual confusions based on language and captivation with aspects of scientism. The defence consists of developing an analysis of methods as grammatical methods of perspicuous representation. This is a point that is supported by the analysis offered by Deangelis who also maintains that, following Wittgenstein, it is clear that the attainment of a perspicuous representation demands the use of several different methods.

> *"A "clear view", a "perspicuous representation" of the use of words was a central goal of the later work. It was not, however, to be achieved via "a single philosophical method", a unified conception of language (as in the Tractatus), but rather via many connected observations about this or that use of words. A related goal was to show that once such a perspicuous representation has been achieved the impetus toward philosophy would whither away." (Deangelis: 2007: 58)*

I claim that such grammatical methods that are focused on perspicuity need to be supplemented by a further method relating to the elucidation of the social anthropological aspect required  to surview the grammatical network of rules. This interpretation maintains that there are several different types of methods that are required to adequately

elucidate grammar to Wittgenstein's requirement. This I claim, is pointed to by Wittgenstein in the *Investigations*. An example is, the additional anthropological method of looking to social contexts and a morphological method to bring together the diverse forms of data, from grammatical rules to social contexts. The point is that the standard readings emphasis on a uniform, essentialist account of grammatical methods is deceptive. There are numerous different forms of methods required to attain an accurate level of perspicuous representation. This conception of polythetic methods claims that all methods, although varied in forms, can work together to deal with one source of conceptual confusion but numerous methods are required to achieve this. It is perhaps described as a genetic conception of polythetic methods. The genetic aspect relates to the need to understand the source of the confusion and adapt to it by developing and utilising an array of methods. The key point is that all methods aim to achieve grammatical perspicuity. The polythetic conception covers a range of variation that is comparatively moderate given that the methods, although different in form, are focused on one goal. The stronger interpretation of polythetic methods that I now defend concerns a wider range of variation of methods given that there are two sources of conceptual confusions that give rise to philosophical problems and puzzlement. The grammatical confusions remain significant, but there is now also the equally important source of confusions that relate to the numerous aspects of scientism.

## 6.5 PI: 133: The rejection of a method and focus on methods

> *"There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies."* (PI: 133)

The chapter brings together a series of examples of different possible methods that relate to Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods. This will provide one clear part of my defence that there is a divergent plurality of methods. I rely on the work of others in piecing together a novel array of methods. My challenge is to order these methods by utilising the model of a polythetic conception of relational grouping. The strategy is to build on the present account of methods and first begin with a varied data set of methods that are related to Wittgenstein. The challenge is to understand the importance and meaning of the plurality itself as the defining characteristic of his conception of philosophy,

philosophical practice and methods. Sections 89-133[52] are accepted to be Wittgenstein's statements on his conception of philosophy or what Hacker and Fogelin refer to as the sections on methodology. The focus of the analysis is not to determine the different types of methods; rather the strategy is to focus on the meaning of the emphasis on plurality. I claim that the meaning of Wittgenstein's account of methods consists of a polythetic conception of methods as a plurality of numerous different methods. What is important is that the plurality of methods are related and grouped by a family resemblance model and not a unified essential property. This distinction presents the end to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation and his final response to the metaphilosophical challenge and the question of method. The section finishes with PI 133, and it is here that Wittgenstein ends with the most direct statement on his rejection of 'a method' and endorsement of methods.

> *"There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies." (PI: 133)*

Wittgenstein's rejection of "a method and emphasis on methods like different therapies" is a statement that has not been given the attention, I claim, it clearly deserves. This is perhaps due to the sense of dissatisfaction that this conclusion offers, to what I have argued, to be an extensive metaphilosophical investigation. The dissatisfaction relates to the obvious limitations that Wittgenstein's statements offer in contributing to the development of a concise account of a new philosophical conception of philosophy as defined by a plurality of methods. Wittgenstein explains very little of the specifics of his conception of methods and his focus has rather been on offering what are clearly heavily loaded statements, in need of further analysis.

> *"So, according to one reading of PI 133, there are philosophical difficulties that Wittgenstein does not address in the Investigations; he breaks off "the series of examples" that he uses to demonstrate his method. He does this at least in part because he wants us to learn*

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[52] Robert Fogelin maintains that there is a tendency to lose the significance of these statements in this section of the Investigations: "Wittgenstein's methodological passages have, of course, been noticed and remarked on by most commentators. But they are not always accepted as fundamental guides to understanding Wittgenstein's reflections on specific topics. After a brief (perhaps solemn) acknowledgment, they often drift out of sight." (Fogelin: 2009: 3). There are other sources directly relevant to the conception of methods and Peter Hacker identifies sections 86-93 in the BT. (Hacker: 2013: x)

*to use his method, and good teachers never solve all of their students' problems; good teachers never "spare other people the trouble of thinking."' We might say, then, that Wittgenstein leaves us a few practice exercises that we can use in completing our homework assignment, that is, in learning to use his method." [53]*

It is also evident that this phase of the *Investigations* presents, what I claim to be, further disquietudes and difficulties that confront his enquiry into methods that he could not satisfactorily answer in an expected form. A reason given for this lack of instruction is that Wittgenstein is providing a limited number of examples to work with in order to develop our understanding of his methods. Wittgenstein leaves this methodological phase of the *Investigations* with a feeling of needing more. Wittgenstein leaves this section on methodology with a methodological cliff-hanger in the final statement of PI 133. It also relates to the fact that Wittgenstein does not fulfil our expectations to provide a clear, succinct list of methods and provide instruction on how to apply them, or a means to assess their legitimacy. This is what one would expect to follow Wittgenstein's statement in PI: 133. However, we are left asking more questions. What are the methods, how do they work and how can they be determined to be successful or employed accurately? Even if we try and support Wittgenstein here and follow Milkov's (2012) suggested analogy that Wittgenstein's pedagogical style presents an instruction manual, by way of its focus on communicating contextual illustrations, the fact is his account of methods still remains unclear (Milkov: 2012). Is it a pedagogical tool to reinforce the challenge of seeing his alternative approach and to bring to the fore the different way of thinking it requires?

## 6.6 The Challenge of Scientism

Rather than appealing to such pedologcial reasoning, I maintain that this apparent incomplete account of methods relates to a difficulty Wittgenstein could not resolve. Due to the nature of the sources of confusions and the dynamic, varied and fluid form. It is impossible to impose a structure or an order and therefore it is impossible to systematise methods to respond to the numerous different forms that the confusions can and could take. The final statement of the metaphilosophical investigation consists of Wittgenstein's admission that it is impossible to pin the methods down in any expected way. There are

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[53] See Tim Black's review: http://reasonpapers.com/pdf/24/rp_24_10.pdf

a series of examples and there are numerous guiding insights that point to further examples but there is no instruction leaflet. Rather Wittgenstein offers several guiding principles that help in understanding the series of examples. What I offer in the analysis that follows, is a series of examples of Wittgenstein's guiding principles in relation to whatcan be identified as possible methods. More often than not the suggestion is that a particular type of methods is a defining example. Therefore, the series of examples offer some assistance in comprehending Wittgenstein's account of how there are numerous possible methods.

What I have defended is an account that is relationally based on the family resemblance model. If my analysis is correct, at very least there are two sources of conceptual confusions that give rise to philosophical puzzlement. Accordingly, there is a requirement to accommodate such a diverse grouping of interrelated confusions. Therefore, I claim that the concept of polythetic methods is the only plausible classification model. I have not attempted to pin down or pursue the task of attempting to formalise the methods themselves. I have, where possible, given an account of a particular method, identified other methods that been developed and I have attempted to point to directions that offer great clarification of the emphasis and diversity of methods. Although there is no system of methods there is a lot that can be done to map out the methods and understand the differences. Staten maintains that there is no possibility of approaching Wittgenstein's work from the direction of attempting to understand a structure to it. Although Staten makes some excellent points this is not one of them.

> *"It is sometimes said that Wittgenstein underwent a Kehre between the early and the late work, with perhaps a transitional period in between' others assert against this view that there is a fundamental unity between earl; and late. As against both of these views, I want to suggest that there is no unity in the later work itself, or even in the Investigations, By this I don't mean that Wittgenstein keeps changing his mind or that he contradicts himself." (Staten: 2002: 57)*

To the contrary, I claim that there is an order to Wittgenstein's work that centres on a metaphilosophical frame to his investigation. This metaphilosophical context is most clear when we consider Wittgenstein's work, as focused on elucidating the nature of two

targets as the sources of philosophical puzzlement. Following the above, Staten further claims that Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy remains in an uncertain state. For, although it is built on the conception of language game and forms of life, what follows in terms of a conception of philosophy, Staten claims Wittgenstein "leaves' all sorts of loose ends hanging":

> *"I mean that he never arrives at any comprehensive final position but keeps probing at the same fundamental questions and bringing out new aspects of them. On this reading, the invocation of language games and forms of life in the early sections of the Investigations does not provide an immovable foundation for everything else; it makes possible his entry into the type of investigation characteristic of his later period, but It leaves' all sorts of loose ends hanging, loose ends that are not mere details calling for mopping-up work but rather the horizon towards which further investigation should orient itself." (Staten: 2002: 57)*

The interesting point is that like many others who emphasise the pedagogical aspect to Wittgenstein's evident lack of instruction of what the methods amount to, Staten also maintains that the omission is intentional too. This does not mean there is nothing to be said (TLP .6.8) rather there is plenty to say on the new conception of methods and what the methods are and are not. There is no retreat to silence here there is only Wittgenstein's challenge to marry the two variable values that the analysis has focused on throughout the thesis; the workings of language and the critique of scientism. Whereas, I maintain that the omission is rather an unavoidable and necessary outcome rather than some intentional form of teaching. It's unavoidable, as the challenge to marry language as a source of philosophical puzzlement with the critique of scientism remains. This is why the conception of polythetic methods provides a workable scenario to further develop the conception of methods without the clear restrictions of qualifying the relationship between language and scientism. This omission, I claim relates specifically to how we have considered the development of the variable value of scientism throughout the thesis. I have focused on highlighting Wittgenstein's emphasis on scientism as a methodological struggle to achieve a conception of philosophical methods that can accommodate a conception of scientism married into his conception of the workings of language. The

metaphilosophical interpretation has defended a conception of scientism that is continually developed by Wittgenstein in greater strength and significance. The conception of scientism in the *Tractatus* focused on the demarcation between the method of science and the method of philosophy. Again after 1930, I maintain and provide an account of how Wittgenstein developed the conception of anti-scientism to its clearest conception. However, in the *Investigations* it is apparent that although Wittgenstein acknowledges the significance of the importance of combatting the captivations of scientism, it is once again consigned to the workings of language. Wittgenstein has, in the methodological sections, highlighted several of the most important aspects to scientism. In PI 89, he emphasises the demarcation to science by the rejection of searching for something that is new or hidden. Philosophy is contrasted to science, philosophy is for Wittgenstein a non-cognitive activity that does not seek to discover new knowledge or truths. In PI 90 he admonishes the notion of penetrating phenomena and instead defines the methods of philosophy as grammatical.

> *"Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, brought about, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of our language. -- Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called 'analysing' our forms of expression, for sometimes this procedure resembles taking a thing apart." (PI: 90)*

Wittgenstein specifically states that the grammatical elucidation resolves misunderstandings that have resulted from confusing the grammar of different regions of our language. Such misunderstandings may have superficial surface similarities but have quite different grammatical rules pertaining to their use. The contrast highlights Wittgenstein's support for grammatical perspicuity. He develops this further in PI91, again reiterating that there is a captivation with the idea of a final analysis. It is the feeling that unless the final analysis is undertaken, we feel dissatisfied with the analysis. In PI93 and PI94 he emphasises how language can mislead and distract us into thinking something strange is pointed to that is in need of investigation. We are held captive by the forms of our expressions, like illusions we cannot quite understand them but nonetheless hold our

attention to them (PI96). We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. (PI 97)

## 6.7 The End of the Metaphilosophical Investigation

The *Investigations* brings together Wittgenstein's finalised account of his new conception of philosophy as consisting of a plurality of methods. The challenge of philosophical identity is the same as the challenge to investigate the workings of language. It is a challenge that has a difficulty, defined and determined by an expectation of how things should be. Wittgenstein is trying to get to the source of this expectation. The problem is that we cannot see how things are without first freeing ourselves from the hold of the expectation. It is only once we are released from the disposition and expectation that we can perceive the mistaken expectation for what it is. This I claim is Wittgenstein's central metaphilosophical message, that we are captivated by an expectation of systematisation, that philosophy is cognitive and that it is focused on searching for new knowledge. The workings of language had expected to be deep, systematic, perplexing, complex, and logical. Therefore, the system of representation and methods of analysis must be logical. This point is developed by Gibson who identifies Wittgenstein's emphasis on how we are captivated by pictures:

> *"It is because we are held captive by a certain picture – a theory, as Wittgenstein often puts it – that we are unable to see what is already in plain view; our meta- physical commitments prevent us from seeing our world aright. So the question becomes: how do we find that feature of our world which is already open to view but which we somehow fail to see; how do we come to identify that aspect of our form of life which can bring to clarity what we once thought only a metaphysical thesis could explain? The closest thing Wittgenstein offers philosophy as a method for achieving this clarity is the idea of a "perspicuous representation"" (Gibson: 2004: 118)*

In the *Investigations,* the metaphilosophical investigation comes to a close with Wittgenstein's conception of polythetic methods. It is apparent that the final statement on

methods in section 133 brings to an end Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical investigation. This is a view that is supported by Denis McManus in his paper "*Philosophical Investigations* 133" (McManus: 1995). McManus claims that the real subject at issue in section 133 is metaphilosophy. More recently McManus develops the same point in his authoritative analysis of the *Tractatus* "*The Enchantment of Words*" (McManus: 2006) where, in the appendix, he offers an insightful analysis of the *Investigations*. I claim that the conclusion to the metaphilosophical journey is Wittgenstein's conception of polythetic methods.

> *"It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem. There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies." (PI: 133)*

I maintain that McManus points to something important here. He claims that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical message here is in his renunciation to define philosophy or to provide a final conception. This I claim, could relate to Wittgenstein's emphasis in 133 that the metaphilosophical self-questioning of philosophical identity can be brought to an end by the demonstration of the method of examples. As McManus suggests, philosophy can stop bringing itself into question. Philosophy is now defined by its methods. Furthermore, for McManus, the main point of PI 133 is its emphasis on changing our expectation, regarding what we want philosophy to be. This is an important point that has a role to play in answering a possible objection to the defence of polythetic methods. It concerns what many have identified, and others have attempted to enforce as Wittgenstein's claim to end philosophy. There has been a challenge to understand Wittgenstein's statements such as the one in PI 133 that seems to suggest that he is

seeking an end to philosophy. This is a theme that has drawn some attention. William Deangelis argues that Wittgenstein sought to end philosophy both in the *Tractatus* and in the *Investigations*. He maintains that this aim to end philosophy was developed by Wittgenstein from the work of Spengler "to call for a philosophy that will put an end to all philosophy" (Deangelis: 2007: 52, 58).

This is the challenge that the polythetic conception of methods faces. How are we to understand Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical problems as forms of linguistic confusions? It is no accident that McManus, in developing his specific metaphilosophical interpretation of this section in PI 133 offers a response to this question that is not too far from our conception of polythetic methods. He forwards an account of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical problems as radically different to an essentialist account. There are for McManus, no "determinate, essential, characteristics" that can define Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophical problems.

*"we should not expect to find a set of determinate, essential, characteristics which make philosophical problems philosophical"*
*(McManus: 1995)*

## Conclusion:

Denis McManus offers a more accurate understanding of Wittgenstein's radical approach to the subject of philosophy. According to the metaphilosophical interpretation defended here, and this is the view that I believe McManus is supporting, philosophical problems cannot be unified by a single aspect or form that all philosophical problems share. This again leads to an important point. McManus claims that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical problems cannot be systematised. The desire to systematise philosophy and its problems and methods is a captivation of science. Philosophy cannot be identified by one shared characteristic. The range of potential confusions is so great that the only possible account to cater for the variety is a family resemblance relational model of confusions and a polythetic conception of methods to understand the variety. This is the challenge to Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods; it appears to go against our own expectations of what we expect philosophical problems to be like and what we expect the methods of response to be like. Our expectation is in the way of seeing how things are. It is our disputation to systematise, and it is the difficulty and force of this that Wittgenstein

was trying to get a conceptual handle on with his conception of grammar and anti-scientism.

Wittgenstein's polythetic conception of methods, that I claim presents an accurate account of his later emphasis on methods, offers a unique means of addressing the challenge of developing a method specific to philosophy and the specific form of the array of confusions that give rise to philosophical problems. The variety of forms that confusions can potentially take cannot be accommodated by a monothetic method but rather require a polythetic conception of methods. One that is diverse and malleable enough to deal with the potential of philosophical confusions that remain. The diversity and multifaceted forms that the confusions can potentially take means that there is no possibility of a fixed system or rigid method. For this reason, the analysis focuses on contrasting the metaphilosophical interpretation to the two dominant interpretations. The standard reading was identified as integral to understanding how the focus on methods not only dealt with the diversity of grammatical confusions but also presented a therapeutic aspect by means of its contrast to scientific method. The grammatical interpretation was comprehended as making a key contribution to understanding the importance of grammatical elucidation and the complex nature of Wittgenstein's conception of grammar. While it was important for this contribution, it is criticised for failing to develop the metaphilosophical significance of Wittgenstein's focus on method and for sustaining a misconceived monothetic account of methods as contained within the parameters of grammatical perspicuity alone. The standard reading offered a developed account of Wittgenstein's critique of scientism that contributed to the thesis but in the end, the interpretation of scientism developed by the standard reading lacked what I argue to be the capacity to cater for the variety and volume of possible confusions.

# CHAPTER SEVEN: POLYTHETIC METHODS: GRAMMAR, ANTI-SCIENTISM AND THERAPY

## 7.1 Introduction: Wittgenstein's Captivation with Scientism

In his lecture notes between 1932 and 1936 Wittgenstein goes to great lengths to identify the many aspects of scientism as the most complex forms of confusion and misunderstanding. There appears to be a disparity between the emphasis and importance that Wittgenstein places on scientism in this section of the *Investigations* and the significance it had previously presented to him. To understand his conception of scientism in the *Investigations*, we must understand that it is the emphasis on a plurality of methods that represents Wittgenstein's response to that failure. The concept of a family resemblance model of relations is Wittgenstein's response to the captivation to seek uniformity. Wittgenstein's critique of scientism is most evident in the contrasting conception of a plurality of methods. It is the conception of philosophy itself as a plurality of methods that constitutes Wittgenstein's conception of scientism. The conclusion to this chapter claims that the conception of a plurality of methods is a polythetic conception of methods that consists of methods concerned with grammatical perspicuity, making perspicuous the captivations of the many aspects of scientism and where needed utilising methods that have a therapeutic focus of supporting a change in aspect that the other two forms of methods of perspicuity cannot achieve. The complexity to the confusions that constitute philosophical puzzlement and problems means that the three forms of methods identified can have numerous variations. Therefore, the methods that are needed to resolve the possible array of confusions are potentially numerous and at very least need to be equally as diverse. The focus is to defend a conception of methods that supports the possibility of such variation. In what follows, I provide evidence and, where possible,

examples to support three possible types of methods that are specific to confusions that are grammatical, scientistic and relate to a psychological disposition. There has been a great deal of attention given to the grammatical and therapeutic methods and comparatively little to the possibility of methods specific to scientism. For this reason, the thesis focuses throughout on developing this relation.

## 7.2 Wittgenstein's General Template of a Method

To begin, we must first follow Wittgenstein and develop a clear account of some of the decisive factors that determine what a method can and cannot be. This is the same for any method, whether it is concerned with the perspicuous representation of grammar or with combatting or removing the captivations of scientism. These are necessary factors that determine methods.

### 1. Methods are descriptive

> *"Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot justify it either." (PI 124)*

The basic format of a method is determined by the requirement that it is descriptive. This means that it is not concerned with an account of explanation. This is Wittgenstein reinforcing the contrast to the method of science; he is setting out a demarcation between explanation and description. The description is simply different in type.

> *"Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. -- Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us. The name "philosophy" might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." (PI: 126)*

According to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, all methods must be descriptive, there are no explanations in philosophy. This is a controversial claim that has met

significant resistance (Dummett 1991, p. xi)[54]. Science seeks new knowledge whereas Wittgenstein's methods seek only what is in plain view. We cannot normally see that the nature of the confusion and the grammatical differences are in plain view because we are aspect blind to them. The necessary change in understanding will determine a change in aspect that will allow us to the see the nature of the confusion, and the confusion then loses its hold and vanishes. This is the model of perspicuous representation that is the defining method.

## 2. Methods are Genetic: Mauro Engelmann's Genetic Method

Mauro Engelmann claims that Wittgenstein's new method is defined by its focus on the origin of philosophical problems. It is concerned with understanding the genesis to the confusions that give rise to philosophical problems. Engelmann specifically refers to how false analogies and misleading trains of thought engender philosophical puzzlement (Engelmann: 2012: 285). What is also of relevance is Engelmann's attention to how he suggests that philosophical puzzlement can lead to theory construction or scientism.

> *"...investigates the genesis of philosophical problems. He thinks that false analogies and misleading trains of thought underlie and engender philosophical puzzlement. Using the clear formulation of how philosophical problems are generated, the method aims at their dissolution before they develop into a theory." (Engelmann: 2012: 285)*

What Engelmann identifies, as the genetic method of looking to the source of the confusions that give rise to philosophical problems and especially the difficulties relating to false analogies and misleading trains of thought, points to another credible method. The genetic method constitutes a third form of method and following Engelmann's suggestion, I agree that it primarily deals with a disposition to theorise, which is clearly an aspect of scientism.

> *"(In order to convince someone of the truth, it is not sufficient to establish the truth, but one has to find out the road from the*

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[54] The quote is cited by Robert Fogelin (Fogelin: 2009: 4-5)

> *misconception to the truth.) (One has to start with the misconception*
> *and bring him to the truth). (I.e., one has to expose the source of the*
> *misconception, otherwise hearing the truth is not helpful. It cannot*
> *penetrate as long as something else takes its place.) (MS 110, 58)"*
> *(Engelmann: 2012: 297)*

## 3. Methods are not Unified by a General Property: McManus' Conception of Philosophy as a Family Resemblance Concept of Problems

> *"Philosophy is a family-resemblance concept and what connects*
> *the problems, claims, arguments etc. that we call 'philosophical' are*
> *'a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-*
> *crossing' (PI: 66)" (McManus: 1995: 354)*

It is important to understand Wittgenstein's emphasis that there cannot be "a method" (PI: 133). There are a variety of methods. Methods are diverse and varied in form and application. It is the conception of philosophy as a family resemblance concept that McManus pivots his analysis of a non-essentialist interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical problems. This clearly ties in with the focus of our analysis on polythetic methods. The claim that the methods are polythetic relates to this and I argue that, according to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical problems in the *Investigations* the problems are characterised by a family resemblance relation.

> *"And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in*
> *the same way, can see how similarities crop up and disappear.*
> *And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated*
> *network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities*
> *in the large and in the small." (PI: 66)*

Therefore the conception of the philosophical subject is now elucidated as a family resemblance concept. This means that the conception of philosophical method also requires an equivalent conception of methods characterised by a relational model as a family resemblance conception.

> *"I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family a build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth -- overlap and criss-cross in the same way. -- And I shall say: 'games' form a family.*
> *And likewise the kinds of number, for example, form a family." (PI: 67)*

The conception of philosophy, as pointed out previously, is for Wittgenstein defined by the conception of methods and so, philosophy is a family resemblance concept as McManus correctly points out. The emphasis on a family resemblance conception of philosophy is a helpful one that offers a foundation of support to the defence of the polythetic methods. This relates to the family resemblance form of modelling to cater for nonlinear characteristic grouping and rather focus on attempting to capture shared and diverse characteristics.

## 4. Methods are Morphological: Krkac's Morphological Method[55]

Kristijan Krkac develops an important and comprehensive analysis of Wittgenstein's emphasis on perspicuous representation as an example of a morphological method (Krkac: 2012). Krkac appeals to Wittgenstein's emphasis on the need to elucidate and find similarities and analogies between different language games. What Krkac is highlighting is the need to approach Wittgenstein's focus on methods as concerned with elucidating, by means of perspicuous representations of grammar. Krkac points to Wittgenstein's remarks relating to Frazer's *Golden Bough* as an example of Wittgenstein developing and contrasting the morphological method of perspicuous representation. He contrasts the morphological method with Frazer's efforts to employ a scientistic method in analysing the primitive forms of rituals. Wittgenstein's morphological method, according to Krkac, involves a "conceptual investigation which consists of finding similarities and analogies between many, and at first glance completely different and

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[55] There are disparate references to referring to Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods as morphological. The following are an example of several: Baker and Hacker: 2005: 333, Krkac has focused on this interpretation more than any other but unfortunately I am unable to give his work more than the summary of what I consider its relevance to our current analysis.

disconnected cases (of usage of words) which are in fact morphology as a method" *(Krkac: 2008*, 2012*)*.

It is the various forms of structure relating to the forms of grammar, language games and forms of life that are important to Krkac. He is insightful in forwarding his analysis and claiming that these examples are already forms. It is the morphological method of perspicuous representation that elucidates these forms. I think he is accurate in this appraisal. What is most important concerning Krkac's emphasis on a morphological method is that it is contrasted as an example to scientific method and therefore provides an identifiable and contrasting method to philosophy. It also captures the diverse and unique requirement that Wittgenstein's focus on perspicuous representation demands. Krkac is following Cavell in emphasising the critical contrast to science that Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to here. Cavell communicates a more lucid account of this critical contrast. Cavell maintains that it is evident from Wittgenstein's notes on Frazer and the points further developed in PO 133 and PI 122, that Wittgenstein is critical of how Frazer is captivated by the method of science (Krebs: 2012: 120). This captivation leads him to develop a misconceived accounts of what is really going on. Frazer has immediately alienated him from the practices and missed the important anthropological context to their meaning. This is what I claim Wittgenstein learnt first-hand from his own captivation of developing a system to account for something that has no possibility of a linear or systemised structure. Frazer, like Wittgenstein, is dogmatic in his desire to systemise the rituals. It is only by being guided to see the differences that he could see that no system or theories are relevant here.

## 7.3 Grammatical Methods: The Perspicuous Representation of Grammar

### 7.3.1 Grammatical Confusions

*"...when presented with a philosophical question is not, for Wittgenstein, part of the data set to be used to answer the question. It should, instead, be viewed with suspicion. We should step back and investigate how the question arose and why, in the context of philosophical reflection, we are inclined to answer it in the particular way we do. This is a sermon Wittgenstein preaches over and over again." (Fogelin: 2009: 168)*

To emphasise the continuation of this value we can now understand it as a source of confusion that results from a failure to understand the grammatical workings of language. This understanding is achieved by attaining a perspicuous representation of the areas of grammar that relate to the confusion. The focus on grammatical perspicuity presents the interpretation offered by standard readers such as Peter Hacker and David Pears. The standard readings offer detailed accounts of the methods that relate to attaining a perspicuous representation of grammar. Peter Hacker's standard reading offers in-depth accounts of methods of perspicuous representation, and this ground is immensely well documented. I support the standard reading of grammatical methods and shall, therefore, offer an account of grammatical methods of perspicuity that follows the work of Hacker. Where my analysis departs from Hacker's and the standard approach is that I hold that there is a role for a therapeutic aspect that goes against the central claim of the standard reading, that all methods are concerned with grammatical perspicuity. I disagree with this generalisation and maintain that it has missed the metaphilosophical significance of Wittgenstein's rejection of the *Tractatus* monothetic method. The standard reading, I claim, has fallen prey to a form of essentialism and generality in determining that all methods are of one form of grammatical perspicuity. This is a criticism that is supported by Oskari Kuusela who has ties to the resolute camp. Tamara Dobler is also a resolute reader and she utilises Kuusela's criticisms of the standard reading as having a methodological weighting that contrasts to the standard views analysis of grammatical perspicuity.

> *Instead, grammatical rules are part and parcel of the philosopher's model of description that sheds light on actual use of language by means of similarities and dissimilarities."* (Dobler: 2011: 31)

Wittgenstein forced an ideal on language and sublimed logic in order to force it to fit this ideal of a uniform logical structure of complex and simple constituents (Hacker: 1986: 162). Wittgenstein had formulated a conception of reductive analysis in the *Tractatus* that was in sync with his metaphysical conception of language and its isomorphic nature and its reliance on a notion of elementary simple names (Hacker: 2007: 5). There is no longer a requirement to formulate a method of logical analysis that was designed to penetrate language in search for hidden simples. Wittgenstein in PI: 107 admits that this erroneous logical conception was quite different from the language he now comprehends to be determined by the social application and the according grammatical web of rules.

*"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty.-- We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!" (PI: 107)*

### 7.3.2 Methods of Grammatical elucidation: Language Games Method and Grammatical Rules

Kuusela supports the view defended in the last chapter that the shift that occurred in 1930-2 was a shift in method (Kuusela: 2008). Therefore, to understand the conception of grammatical methods we must first examine the concept of grammar, it is necessary to understand the meaning of Wittgenstein's conception of rules.

*"We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games "language-games" and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game. And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses. I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game"." (PI: 7)*

Sections 1-88 present Wittgenstein developing and supporting his account of language meaning as embedded in the social activities that constitute our practices and social interactions. It is from this important conception of games [56] that Wittgenstein further develops the notions of family resemblance and rules. It is from the development of the

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[56] See PI: 3, 7, 16, 21-4, 27, 31, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53-5, 57, 60, 61, 64, 66-71, 81, 83, 86

conception of language games that Wittgenstein prepares the ground for his section on methodology in sections 89 -133. There is a complex network of relations that presents the dynamic format to Wittgenstein's approach. It is in direct contrast to how he had configured the account of the logic of language in the *Tractatus* as rigid and logically straight. Whereas the conception of games, family resemblance, grammar and forms of life relate to one another in a fluid and dynamic web. All of which is utilised to support his conception of 'meaning is use' (PI: 43) as the new value for the first variable. Wittgenstein's conception of grammar (PI: 29, 38, 122, 150, 165) now officially replaces the conception of logic.

> *"To have mastered a certain concept is to have mastered the technique of the use of a certain word in some language or other. To possess a concept is to be able to use a word or phrase correctly, to explain what one means by it in a given context, and to respond with understanding to its use. Concepts are human creations, made not found. They are comparable to instruments made for human purposes, and their acquisition is comparable to the mastery of the technique of using an instrument. They are rule-governed techniques of word use." (Hacker: 2009: 4)*

This network of rules is nothing like a calculus or a table format of strict rules, they are entirely different in type. The rules are not prescribed to the language as an instruction determining this is how to use 'x'. Wittgenstein's conception of rules is categorically different to learning the regular grammar of language or syntax that is ruled governed by learning the correct and incorrect formula. Rather, the rules are learned in the context of a form of life and in the specific context of a language game. It is the participation in social activities that constitutes learning the rules of grammar.

> *"One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and more complicated ones. He too might be given the explanation "This is the king",—if, for instance, he were being shewn chessmen of a shape he was not used to. This explanation again only tells him*

*the use of the piece because, as we might say, the place for it was*
*already prepared. Or even: we shall only say that it tells him the use,*
*if the place is already prepared. And in this case it is so, not because*
*the person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules,*
*but because in another sense he is already master of a game." (PI:*
*31)*

In PI 31 Wittgenstein clarifies this point further and maintains that it is only from the background and context of established rule learning that we are open to learning in the way we do, we are "already master of a game" (PI 31). Wittgenstein points out in PI: 29 that when I obey a rule it is a rule that is learnt as a part of my learning of the social context that animated the learning of the rule. There is no choice to obey a rule. There is simply no meaning to interpreting the rules as optional or normative. Wittgenstein's emphasis on the rule-governed nature is not straight forward. Choice does not relate to Wittgenstein's conception of grammatical rules. It is your world view to obey the rules as you do (Staten: 2002: 45).

> *"When I obey a rule, I do not choose.*
> *I obey the rule blindly." (PI: 219)*

Our form of life is one orientated toward learning the grammar of language. The analysis of grammar is more complex than Wittgenstein would like to admit. Although he does point out in several places that it is challenging to elucidate grammar (PI: 7). In section 133 Wittgenstein sets out the contrasting differences to his clarification of his conception of methods. He states that the philosopher or rather the methods of philosophy are not formulated to discover all possible rules as a system of what is correct or incorrect.

> *"The puzzles and paradoxes of philosophy are no longer dismissed*
> *as meaningless in one fell swoop, because Wittgenstein now sees the*
> *legitimate use of language as more complicated and*
> *multidimensional than the Tractatus had allowed. Wittgenstein*
> *maintains that the proper practice of philosophy amounts to a*
> *therapy from the intellectual anxiety produced by improper*
> *philosophical questioning. Philosophical problems melt away in the*

> *course of arriving at the correct understanding of the meanings of*
> *innocent-appearing terms like 'know', 'pain', 'believe', 'free', that*
> *give rise to conceptual confusions. The meanings of these terms are*
> *determined by the rules of a philosophical grammar, discovered in*
> *the therapeutic exercise of specifying what Wittgenstein calls a*
> *perspicuous representation of their nonphilosophical pragmatic*
> *uses as ordinary language tools in the diverse linguistic transactions*
> *of everyday human activity." (Jacquette: 1998: Preface)*

As Jacquette points out, there can be no criterion to determine the validity of a rule. The validity of a rule is not something that can be judged on paper as part of an equation. Yet Wittgenstein stresses it is complete clarity we seek, but again this is not a clarity of a system that will elucidate some misunderstood logical process or mechanism. Rather this is a clarity relating specifically to the nature of the confusion. It is the clarity that illuminates the actual confusion itself, the form of the error that led to the philosophical statement. It is a clarity of seeing differences between one language game and how the statement is used and another language game and how the statement was misappropriated. Once the differences are surveyed the confusion is no longer, it vanishes, and the problem completely disappears by making the entanglement of the rules perspicuous.

> *"This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that*
> *is, to survey." (PI: 125)*

Understanding a rule is to understand how to use a word correctly. How do we know we are following a rule correctly? Strictly speaking, it is not a conscious act to say I will follow the 'x' and the outcome of 'p' is achieved. There is not a table of rules to appeal to, like the standard measure. Rather we follow a rule instinctively as part of our social makeup as part of the fabric of a form of life that we take part in. We take part in a particular language game with specific rules that we have learnt according to our practices. Wittgenstein uses the concept of rules to highlight that there is an order, but the order of utilising a rule in a specific way is only as successful as the practice that we are taking part in. We do not make up rules to order, although there is always a possibility that in a given group this may work. Rather we inherit and learn rules according to the needs of our social groups. The variety of language games is determined by the variety

of social practices that we partake in. The grammatical network of rules that we work with is determined by our form of life. It is by looking to the different forms of life and different language games that are part of them that we can perceive the differences in grammatical rules.

> *"Our clear and simple language-games are not preliminary studies for a future regimentation of language a as it were, first approximations, ignoring friction and air resistance. Rather, the language- games stand there as objects of comparison which, through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language." (PI: 130)*

Therefore, there is as Peter Hacker identifies in his paper "Wittgenstein's Anthropological and Ethnological Approach" (Hacker: 2009), a clear anthropological aspect to understanding Wittgenstein's conception of rules and the grammatical web that they are part of. It is the variety of the grammatical rules that determines his conception of meaning is use that now changes the conception of philosophy from a monothetic method to an emphasis on methods. The fluidity and the array of rules determine an equally fluid and multifaceted array of potential errors in how the grammatical rules of one language game can be confused with another. This is the most consistent form of error that leads to language confusion and according to Wittgenstein leads to philosophical confusion.

> *"Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.—Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called an "analysis" of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart." (PI: 90)*

Consequently, there are numerous potential forms of philosophical confusion that demand a plurality of methods to be more than just a range of different methods focused

on variations of one type of confusion. Rather, what is most important and radical to Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods is the diversity he requires to respond to the possible diverse array of confusions that he points to as the root cause of philosophical confusion. Throughout the analysis, the focus has been on investigating how the two variable values are qualified by Wittgenstein's specific conception of language meaning and his specific formulation of how scientism contributes to philosophical confusion. The two values each demand a multiplicity of methods but combined together, require a polythetic conception of methods. In what follows the aim is to defend an interpretation of a plurality of methods based on what I defend as the variable of the grammar of language and the developed critique of scientism. The first task is to develop an account of the context of methods in the *Investigations*.

### 7.3.3 Grammatical Mistakes as a Source of Philosophical Confusion

It is the variety of forms of misunderstandings relating to the grammar of language that now relates to the manner in which language and philosophical problems are linked. The first variable relates to the same challenge, to accurately understand how the grammar of language determines meaning. The section on grammar considers the key parts, all of which point to a variety of different forms of grammatical confusion that lead to philosophical statements, problems and confusion. The first challenge is to develop a clear account of Wittgenstein's conception of grammar as the first variable that requires a plurality of different methods.

What is important to note is that the conception of grammar demands a plurality of methods. This plurality could be argued to operate on only one level namely a singular focus on grammatical perspicuity. A strict interpretation of monothetic here would determine methods to be unified by the essential characteristic of grammar. This is representative of what standard readers such as Hacker put forward. They defend a conception of methods as consisting solely of grammatical perspicuity.

> *"What had seemed to be the logico-metaphysical forms of things that had to be mirrored in the logical syntax of any possible language were no more than the shadow cast by grammar upon the world. What seemed to be metalogical1 connections between language and reality, that pinned names to the objects that are their meanings, and ensured a pre-established harmony between thought,*

> *language and reality, were actually no more than instruments of language, and connections within grammar." (Hacker: 2009: 2)*

Hacker identifies 1) Analogies in the surface grammar of language. (2) Projecting the features of one language game on to another. (3) The phenomenology of the use of language. (4) Pictures or archetypes embedded in language. (5) The model of presentation and solution of problems in the natural sciences. (6) Natural cravings and dispositions of reason. (7) Projecting grammar onto reality. (8) Philosophical mythologies as examples of different confusions that all have their source in grammatical confusions (Hacker: 1986: 168-75). What is evident from Hacker's list is how little relates to aspects of scientism. It is this overemphasis on grammar as the only source of confusion that is deceptive.

### 7.3.4 Methods One and Two: Making Grammar Perspicuous

A part of the thesis analysis has been to identify a complexity to Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods that is not appreciated by other interpretations. The aim has always been to elucidate the unusual features of Wittgenstein's meaning of methods. Wittgenstein, at the beginning of the *Philosophical Investigations,* highlights this issue by drawing our attention to the need to combine two distinct forms of investigation to make perspicuous segments of grammar.

> *"If one looks at the example in §1, one can perhaps get an idea of how much the general concept of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. -- It disperses the fog if we study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of use in which one can clearly survey the purpose and functioning of the words. A child uses such primitive forms of language when he learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explaining, but training." (PI: 5)*

Wittgenstein points out in section 5 that he is attempting to communicate how to understand the workings of language by studying the phenomena of language. Indeed a lot of sections 1 -88 are concerned with developing sketches of the workings of language in the phenomena of his primitive linguistic/social activities. Wittgenstein is identifying

that the task of elucidating the workings of language and the grammatical rules that constitute the workings, relates to what he describes as removing the haze that surrounds it. Therefore, it is evident that method1, the perspicuous representation of grammar, is not straightforward. It needs to be supplemented by using another method that focuses on elucidating the social phenomena of language. Peter Hacker has developed this point a great deal in his paper Wittgenstein's *Anthropological and Ethnological Approach* (2009). Hacker develops the significance further and identifies how the importance of the social aspect functions in Wittgenstein's conception of language meaning, use and therefore the workings of language. Therefore, the social or anthropological aspect requires a method of elucidation to support method1. The elucidation of the social aspect is, therefore, another example of a method and shall be referred to as method2. Wittgenstein is emphasising here that method1 is not adequate without method2, with the application of method2 Wittgenstein claims that we "can clearly survey the purpose and functioning of words".

### 7.3.5 Wittgenstein's Example of Method Three: the Grammatical Perspicuity the Color Octahedron

> *"A main source of our failure to understand is that we don't have an overview of the use of our words. -- Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links. The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterises the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)" (PI: 122)*

In PI 122 Wittgenstein provides some guidance regarding the employment of grammatical methods of perspicuous representation. He identifies the importance of getting to the source of the problem, which correlates to Engelmann's point and emphasis on a genetic method. Wittgenstein is stating that the origin or source of the problem is a failure to understand that we can attain a perspicuous representation of our words. As he pointed out in PI 5 the haze that surrounds grammar does not give it a clear surveyability. The challenge is to attain a surveyability in such a way that we can identify the connections between the different segments and rules of grammar. The emphasis here in

122 is on Wittgenstein establishing the importance of grammatical confusions that can be resolved by making surveyable the grammatical relations. The connections and differences are what are important. Several commentators have drawn attention to the limitations of Wittgenstein's account of perspicuous representation as a method of elucidating grammar. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein does offer some insight into the significance of perspicuity. Wittgenstein's colour octahedron display an example of how perspicuous representation works (Hutto: 2006: 1-2, Baker: 2006: 23, Lugg: 2010: 156). Therefore, this is an important feature that cannot be neglected.

*"The entire grammar of the network of colour- words seems to be condensed into a diagram that can be taken in at a glance (i.e. a diagram that has the attribute of being surveyable (ubersichtlich or ubersehbar))." (Baker: 2006: 23)*

Gordon Baker describes the importance of the colour octahedron in communicating a great deal of explanation into a diagram. The significance of it relates to how it offers a concise account of grammatical rules. For example, as Lugg (2010) suggests, in a straight forward format it determines that there is a grammatical rule for reddish blue but not for reddish green. The octahedron is a rare example of a visible snapshot of active rules relating to colour combinations.

### 7.3.6 Conclusion to Grammatical Methods

In the above, I have claimed that grammatical methods cannot define the meaning of Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods in the *Investigations*. As pointed to in the above, if all methods are concerned with grammatical perspicuity then Wittgenstein could have certainly developed a clearer account of what the methods are. He does provide examples of methods concerning grammatical perspicuity (see sections 251-7). This is why the focus on grammar and the methods of elucidating grammatical rules does present the most communicable part of Wittgenstein's account of methods. However, the account of methods, I claim, cannot be solely defined by methods of grammatical perspicuity, and this is why we are left dissatisfied. Wittgenstein's conception of polythetic methods is not a prescriptive account of methods. It is piecemeal in this sense, and this is what I maintain Gordon Baker points to in his analysis of methods as patient specific. I would maintain that the methods are confusion specific and according to the two values there are three

cluster types of confusions requiring equally diverse methods. First, there are certainly grammatical confusions that consist of confusing grammatical rules from one language game to another. For example "I know I have a pin" and "I know I have a pain" (PI: 246). Second, there are the confusions arising from aspects of scientism and the captivation with the method of science. The critique of scientism is more focused on in the BB and is more polished in the *Investigations*. I maintain that the confusions that result from scientism relate to the captivation with science in general, its systematisation, its method, its principles of empirical data analysis and the focus as a cognitive discipline that identifies and supports knowledge claims. It is a more causal worldview that is presented in the hold of seemingly natural fixation to cause and effect, explanation and what is hidden as focal points of what an investigation should be. Wittgenstein clarifies this in several places:

*"We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena" (PI: 90)*

The conclusion is that, following the development of the metaphilosophical interpretation of philosophical problems as grammatical confusions, it is now clear that a monothetic conception of methods, as an essentialist account of methods sharing one common characteristic of grammatical error, is not sufficient to account for the variety of grammatical confusions. In addition, appealing to Denis McManus, the conception of philosophical problems as family resemblance modelling characteristic of shared and relative relational forms of confusion is a more accurate account of the variety of grammatical confusions. This is further supported by the metaphilosophical interpretation that grammatical confusions are one source of confusion. This is apparent in the defence of the model of Wittgenstein's approach as a metaphilosophical framework that employs the strategy of analysis of two variable values to determine a polythetic conception of methods. There is also the additional point that in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein was critical of the monothetic conception of method to such an extent that his rejection of it and the mistakes it presented to him, I claim, determines his response to focus on developing the polythetic conception. Our attention now turns to the second value of his critique of scientism as the second source of philosophical confusion. This follows the previous points in furthering the strategic support for the conception of polythetic methods.

The first criticism against the standard reading concerns Hacker's and others consistent captivation with the notion that the methods are only concerned with the grammatical

elucidation of rules and the according policing of the grammatical rules. The standard reading although often aware of other aspects such as cravings, archetypes and pictures that bewitch our understanding, it seeks to reduce these to grammatical confusions that are resolvable by means of methods concerned with grammatical perspicuity. The metaphilosophical interpretation identifies that there is a distinction in place between Wittgenstein's conception of grammatical methods concerned with grammatical perspicuity and the criticisms of scientism in philosophy that point to non-grammatical methods that, although are related to grammatical rules, are not dissolvable by means of the employment of methods concerning solely grammatical perspicuity. In this section, I argue that the critique of scientism developed in response to the failure of the *Tractatus* is an active critique that is focused on combatting both confusions that relate to grammar and scientism and confusions that relate solely to aspects of scientism.

## 7.4 Anti-Scientism and Methods

Following the above account of the variety of grammatical methods, it is simply not clear exactly how grammar and scientism relate. This challenge reflects the difficulties Wittgenstein confronted in trying to work out the origin of confusion and the different aspects to it. There are several possibilities as to how the conception of grammar and the criticisms of scientism relate to one another. Are they intrinsic to one another, two separate conceptions of methods that Wittgenstein is trying to marry or are they simply not compatible with one another? Is it the case that the confusions from language throw up problems that we are captivated to react to in a scientistic way? Are the captivations held deep in language and accordingly we are seemingly naturally disposed to react in a systematic way? The problem regarding Wittgenstein's account, relates to what he identifies as the numerous examples of scientism and how they captivate us. In what follows, I claim that his later account of scientism is a separate source of confusion that gives rise to further philosophical puzzlement and problems. This analysis maintains that there are two distinct sources of conceptual confusions and therefore it follows that only polythetic methods can suffice.

The defence of the conception of scientism as an independent source of philosophical problems is required for the strong polythetic conception of methods to be coherent. The aim is to defend the claim that Wittgenstein's critique of scientism must be comprehended as a distinct, autonomous source of philosophical confusions. What is important to

appreciate is that the conception of language confusion as a source of philosophical confusion is for standard readers uncontroversial.

> *"Philosophy cannot achieve knowledge in the manner in which the sciences do, and advances in philosophy are not to be measured in the currency of scientific progress. It aims at understanding, and the form of understanding at which it aims is categorically distinct from the forms of understanding characteristic of the empirical sciences." (Hacker: 2013: x)*

Standard readers, like Hacker in the above, emphasise the importance of the contrast to science. However, they take the view that Wittgenstein's critique of scientism is embedded into the conception of linguistic confusion in a similar way to how I claim the early critique of scientism was embedded into the *Tractatus* conception of the logic of language. The analysis of the demarcation between science and philosophy is an accurate portrayal of one part of Wittgenstein's critique of scientism. It identifies how a part of the critique of scientism is also built into the conception of grammar that Wittgenstein develops in the *Investigations*. The difference is, it appears that standard readings hinge this aspect to be the most significant but I maintain that this is only one aspect of Wittgenstein's strengthened critique of scientism. The account of scientism Wittgenstein develops after 1930 was claimed to be an active conception that had many different aspects to it. The demarcation and contrasting use of the differences as a strategy of elucidation are but one part of his critique of scientism. This is an important point given that it identifies a possible reason why the standard reading forwarded by Hacker loses sight of any possibility of a distinction between grammatical sources of philosophical confusion and confusions that have their sources in scientism. The importance of the demarcation remains nonetheless as its role is to focus our attention on identifying the differences in order to reinforce the understanding to resist the urge in seeking to adopt the method of science into philosophy.

## 7.4.1 The Grammatical Objection:

The most significant challenge to the metaphilosophical defence of polythetic methods relates in part to the strategy of the defence and the claim that the many aspects of

scientism present a second source of conceptual confusion, that gives rise to philosophical puzzlement and pseudo-problems. To defend such a position will certainly offer an open sided attack from those such as Hacker, who hold fast to the view that all confusions are grammatical. Indeed, I appreciate the possibility of the grammatical interpretation, and I can perceive several potential avenues of further analysis that could hold to the grammatical focus, while also adopting a moderate therapeutic application as a contrast to systematisation and a grammatical context to aspects of scientism. This position is perhaps a strengthened account of Hacker's own position. The challenge is I maintain not to settle for a conception of a plurality of methods that will continually labour to restrict methods to suit its expectation of what a method should be. No matter what way you can adapt it, Hacker's emphasis on methods will always be open to the criticism of essentialism as long as the motto that represents the account states that all conceptual confusions are grammatical. One possible workaround here would relate to the claim that although the origin of the methods is grammatical confusions, does it mean that all methods to resolve grammatical confusions need to be focused on grammatical perspicuity?

### 7.4.1 Analysis of Wittgenstein's Strengthened Conception of Scientism

This demarcation between science and philosophy is central to Wittgenstein's general critique of scientism in philosophy and continues into the later conception of scientism. What this pointed to was that the problems of philosophy were to be demarcated and contrasted with the problems of science (Phillips: 2003: 130). Phillips maintains that the general format of the contrast between the problems of philosophy and the problems of science is sustained as the general notion that philosophical problems are "misunderstandings or confusions, rather than a knowledge deficit" (ibid). The importance of this contrast is developed further by Phillips, who rightly maintains that, deciphering whether a particular problem is scientific or philosophical is important, as an accurate appraisal is required to avoid an unnecessary erroneous task of applying the wrong methodology. This is perhaps what Wittgenstein failed to consider in his investigation in the *Tractatus*.

> *"Hence the task of philosophy is not to provide solutions to problems, but to recognise cases when nothing is being said and hence realise that nothing further needs to be said. Seeing clearly*

> *that the apparent problem is not a problem is how philosophy can make its confusions disappear."* (Phillips: 2003: 130)

Wittgenstein's conception of scientism is dramatically changed and developed into a more active, strengthened conception from 1930 onwards. Nikolay Milkov (2012) draws our attention to the importance of perceiving Wittgenstein's focus on method as evolving from 1929. Wittgenstein's approach and his critique of scientism have within it a metaphilosophical critique against philosophers who seek to adopt the ideals and methods of science into philosophy to assist philosophy in the discovery of philosophical truths about the world. What is now important is how Wittgenstein recognises his earlier approach in the *Tractatus* to have fallen prey to the same captivations with forms of scientism that he was so critical of. It is this insight that proved so valuable to Wittgenstein, as it will determine much of the change in how he develops and strengthens his critique of scientism in philosophy. The analysis focuses on elucidating Wittgenstein's claim that philosophers are captivated by the methods of science before their eyes (BB: 18). In the preface to the BB, Rush Rhees makes a critical point that supports the metaphilosophical analysis of Wittgenstein's conception of scientism and the changes Wittgenstein made to it in the early thirties. Rhees claims that Wittgenstein makes the point that some forms of philosophical puzzlement relate to the first variable of the need to understand the workings of language to resist the now obvious temptation to misunderstand how language itself functions. This misunderstanding of the logic or workings of language was a key cause of philosophical puzzlement. Language it seemed was expected to be formalised and systematically rule governed by a strict order that determined meaning. This is emphasised by Wittgenstein, and Rhees rightly highlights it to be one of the main causes of confusion. It was also a troubling one that posed a challenge to Wittgenstein's approach.

> *"...the man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used, and, trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against.... paradoxical results".* And at first that looks something like what he said later, in the Investigations, about a tendency to sublime the logic of our language. But here in the Blue Book he does not bring out what there is about the use of language or the

*understanding of language that leads people to think of words in that way."* (BB: Preface: xi)

It is only by means of elucidating Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical approach that it is possible to comprehend this issue. First, it presents the importance and complex challenge that the accurate account of the first variable poses. Language itself poses a complex problem given that before one can begin to respond to any attempt to elucidate its logic or workings one has first to broach the deceptive nature of what we expect language to be like. This again correlates to Wittgenstein's criticism of the *Tractatus* in that the focus on logic as the medium of how language functions determined the account of the workings of language to be logical and systematic. The interesting aspect here is that this systematisation that the account of logic offered was a welcoming one given that it suited what one expected. It correlated to an expectation of systematisation. This difficulty identifies a further part of the complex nature regarding how the first variable of identifying the logic/workings of language is more challenging than first assumed. A part of this complexity changes the focus back to the question of scientism and the intricate relationship between the first variable and second variable. The specific configuration of the account of language is also in part, determined by not just how it will be married to the conception of scientism but also how there is an aspect of each, evident in each variable. What I mean is that the challenge to accurately identify the logic/workings of language is further complicated by a form of scientism that first needs to be overcome. This is one of the important outcomes that Wittgenstein specifically gained from the failure of the *Tractatus*' method. He was now aware for the first time that to account for language meaning he must overcome the different aspects of scientism that confront the investigation into the question of meaning from the outset. If he is to hold to the metaphilosophical framework, he must now respond to the challenge of overcoming these examples of scientism to provide an accurate account of the logic/workings of language. The importance of this is that the metaphilosophical framework remains in place, the account of language will still contribute in determining the method or methods of elucidation. Rush Rhees clarifies this point further:

> *"But here in the Blue Book he does not bring out what there is about the use of language or the understanding of language that leads people to think of words in that way. Suppose we say that it is because philosophers look on language metaphysically. All right; but when we ask what makes them do that, Wittgenstein answers in the Blue Book that it is because of a craving for generality, and because "philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does" (p. 18). In other words, he does not find the source of metaphysics in anything specially connected with language. That is one very important point here, and it means that he was not anything like as clear about the character of philosophical puzzlement as he was when he wrote the Investigations." (BB: Preface: xi)*

In short, the metaphilosophical investigation has changed from the one he had carried out in developing the *Tractatus* method. The change is unique to the two variables. The challenge to identify the workings of language highlights the complexity of scientism as well as the unexpected difficulty of its intricate relationship to the investigation into the logic/workings of language. It specifically relates to the expectation of a system of meaning, a common essential characteristic, the possibility of hidden essences and the need to achieve a final analysis of the simplest constituents. These all are key parts of the *Tractatus* approach and are key in determining the method of analysis he proposed. Therefore, the challenge of scientism in philosophy and the captivation with the method of science is now, in light of the failure of the *Tractatus*, a precursor to the elucidation of the workings of language. There are several interesting consequences to this. First, it supports the metaphilosophical interpretation by backing up the claim that there is a difference between grammatical methods and methods to combat scientism. This is evident given that the account of language itself requires an ability to overcome or rather resolve confusions relating to scientism even before the investigation into language is undertaken. Second, it highlights as Rhees identifies, that what Wittgenstein refers to as the craving for generality is a difficulty that captivates the philosopher. It constitutes another main source of confusion and specifically relates to what he describes as the

*"methods of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does"* (BB: 18).

> *"Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalisation. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive'. (Think of such questions as "Are there sense data?" and ask: What method is there of determining this? Introspection?)"* (BB: 18)

The craving for generality is directly related to Wittgenstein's own admission and criticism of the *Tractatus*, that in developing the monothetic conception he had been captivated by the idea of one wholesale problem of philosophy that required one wholesale method of logical analysis. I maintain that this factor communicated an important insight relating to how this claim resulted from Wittgenstein's dogmatic acceptance of his own captivation with the method of science by holding to a generalised conception of the proposition as representative of the logical form of all language.

> *"This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit. This spirit is different from the one which informs the vast stream of European and American civilisation in which all of us stand. That spirit expresses itself in an onwards movement, in building ever larger and more complicated structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity in no matter what structure. The first tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery--in its variety; the second at its centre--in its essence. And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one stage to the next,*

> *while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is*
> *always the same." (PR: preface)*

I would suggest that what is most important in this statement from 1930 is the demarcation that Wittgenstein is highlighting. It is the demarcation between the method of science, its search for more complicated structures in explaining the world and statements of discovery that is contrasted against descriptive methods of elucidation. Wittgenstein hints that this captivation is embedded in our world view. This is contrasted with what he maintains, is the spirit of his work. What I claim he is doing here is drawing our attention to the possibility of a radically different worldview, as presented in a new and different method of investigation. One that has not been utilised before, as never before has the nature of the confusion been identified in this way. A novel interpretation of the form of philosophical problems, as linguistic confusions now demands a novel method of elucidation.

### 7.4.2 The Strategy of Defending the Metaphilosophical Interpretation of Polythetic Methods

The previous chapter and in the above section I argue that the mistakes Wittgenstein identified in the *Tractatus* were the most important factors in determining his change to the radical conception of Polythetic methods. I claim that it was Wittgenstein's acknowledgement and understanding of the specific forms of scientism that had captivated him. This led to the mistake of developing an entire metaphysical grandiose system to account for how he inferred language must be logically structured and systematised for it to be able to represent objects and state of affairs in the world. This mistake was what I claim, Wittgenstein turned to his advantage by utilising the failed system of logical analysis to model the machinations of scientism at play. Wittgenstein was able to use this model of the *Tractatus* system of logical representation and monothetic method of logical analysis, to further develop and elucidate how these complex aspects of scientism appear to result from dormant dispositions that are awoken with a philosophical statement to infect our thinking. The language immediately moves toward the therapeutic leanings, and it is evident that this is why Wittgenstein used the motifs of therapies, therapeutic, malady and illness to describe how we are disposed to aspects of scientism and dogmatically captivated by it. This is most evident in how Wittgenstein develops the theme of rebuking aspects of scientism in a sporadic way. He

contextually points to numerous aspects of scientism that relate to our methodical outlook, our quasi-logical perspective of cause and effect, how we are determined by our inclinations to undertake an investigation in a systematic way, how we hold our gaze to expectations of systematisation and seek an explanation.

I claim that with his acknowledgement of the mistake of the *Tractatus* method, his use of the failed method as a model, his utilisation of the model permits him to develop and contain numerous aspects of scientism. This containment supports the development of a specific conception of his response to scientism as another source of conceptual confusion that gives rise to pseudo-philosophical problems. It also identifies numerous forms of how conceptual confusions rooted in a failure to understand the workings of language lead to philosophical problems and puzzlement that are met with aspects of scientism that further complicate the confusion. In many of the examples that Wittgenstein works with I claim he is identifying how a linguistic confusion is further compounded by a scientistic response. Therefore, what becomes apparent is that there are two sources of confusions, one rooted in language and one rooted in aspects of scientism. The challenge is to understand how they combine in the practice of traditional philosophy and how Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and its claim to a plurality of "methods like different therapies" can respond to the array of complex confusions. What is most important to understand now is the benefit of the concept "Polythetic" in elucidating what I claim to be the key features of Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods.

### *1. Knowing When to Stop*

The practice and methods of philosophy were, as Wittgenstein would later suggest in PI109, a result of the queer way in which language bewitches us. Therefore, there is no problem to be solved. The final solution is rather a dissolution that does not contribute to knowledge as was traditionally the expectant result to a solution of a philosophical problem.

> *"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomena in philosophical investigation: the difficulty — I might say — is not that of finding a solution but rather that of recognising as the solution something that looks as it were only a preliminary to it. "We have already said everything. — Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!" This is connected I believe,*

*with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it. The difficulty here is to stop."* (Z: 314)

The key for Wittgenstein is to resist engaging the problem and to know when to stop[57] seeking an explanation to it, as was the traditional response, but rather seek to clarify the nature of the confusion first.[58] If one follows Wittgenstein here and agrees to stop and first seek to clarify the manner in which the philosopher is using language, then there is a need for some form of comparison that will support in making perspicuous the differences. The differences are important for Wittgenstein as it is by effectively displaying and comprehending the differences that we come to see where we had gone wrong. It is the erroneous use of language in forming the statement that presents the philosophical problem that constitutes the first confusion. This is further complicated by seeking to engage the statement by theoretically explaining it, for example, in terms of some hidden essence.

### *2. Bangu's Family Resemblance as a Method to Dissolve the Captivation with Essentialism*

Wittgenstein's emphasis on family resemblance is important to understanding the conception of polythetic methods, but it is not integral to it. I would argue that although the concept of family resemblance is key to the notion of developing a non-essentialist account of a grammatical network of language-games each with their network of rules. It is also integral as a defensive utility to combat the captivation with essentialism by communicating an alternative contrasting picture. The family resemblance model is criticised by Sorin Bangu (2005) who claims that the family resemblance notion is often interpreted in two ways. First, as a straightforward anti-essentialist rebuke and second, a reading that places caution on the general anti-essentialist claim and identifies the need "for more caution in attributing such straightforward anti-essentialist tenets to Wittgenstein is recommended… as the point of the family resemblance passages is that

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[57]Knowing when to stop is an aspect highlighted by the late D.z. Phillips and is also developed by Peter Hacker as one of the key forms of 'scientism' the desire to penetrate to seek unseen essences.
[58]For me there is 'One' metaphilosophical Wittgenstein and the demarcation of an earlier and later Wittgenstein is best understood as a demarcation of methods. The metaphilosophical critique was permeant while the understanding of how language worked changed.

words need not have essentialist definitions (capturing common properties) in order to function as words." (Bangu: 2005: 54). Bangu draws our attention to an important point that the family resemblance concept can be overplayed, and other possible interpretations need to be considered before one ascribes to the standard non-essentialist interpretation. He develops his analysis further by drawing his approach closer to my own and appeals to the metaphilosophical context to support Wittgenstein's position in this part of the *Investigation's.* Bangu claims that:

> *"On my account, the family resemblance idea is not meant to reject essentialism, but to render this doctrine irrelevant, by dissipating its philosophical force. The role of these sections can be better understood in light of the provocative aim of Wittgenstein's philosophical method, as stated (for instance) at PI 133: "[t]he philosophical problems" - associated with essentialism in this case, "should completely disappear"."(ibid)*

It is evident that Bangu's conclusion can be strengthened further to support the conception of polythetic methods that is defended here. I claim that there is a potential to interpret the emphasis on family resemblance as an example of a method that is unique to the dissolution or vanishing of the confusion or appeal of essentialism. Bangu does not address the question of the source of the confusion that presents itself as the captivation with essentialism, and Wittgenstein's point is that it is to the source of the confusion where we must look. I maintain that the captivation with essentialism is an obvious example of an aspect of scientism that was identified in chapter five as one of the key aspects of the scientism that captivated Wittgenstein in the elaborate logical scheme of the *Tractatus* method. It was a scheme founded on attempting to explain and account for the dogmatic inference relating to an essentialist theory of meaning. Reconsidering this again, it is evident that the metaphilosophical interpretation cannot support Bangu's general interpretation. As it is not compatible with the view defended here, I claim that essentialism in all of its forms, especially relating to philosophical method, is mistaken and represents a form of captivation. This relates to what Wittgenstein describes as the craving for generality and the search for the hidden (BB:5). However, this does not mean that we cannot take the possible support offered from Bangu's interpretation. His conception of family resemblance can be utilised, as he suggests, in the metaphilosophical

context as an example of a particular method to remove and dispel the hold of essentialism.

*"We begin to understand how and why the philosophical problems associated with (definitional) essentialism should "completely disappear"" (PI 133)." (Bangu: 2005: 71)*

## 7.5 Therapeutic Methods

Luntley maintains that Baker and Hacker have supported the standard reading and its claim that the most accurate interpretation of Wittgenstein's approach relates to "grammatical investigations". They identify grammatical methods as the most positive means of philosophical practice or what Luntley simply suggests as a 'better way of doing philosophy' (Luntley: 2010: 32). The point is that Baker and Hacker's standard reading is, as Luntley stresses, also therapeutic in its orientation in developing Wittgenstein's critique of scientism. Baker and Hacker according to Luntley, and I think he is right here, are defending grammatical methods as having a therapeutic value by means of their opposition and critique of philosophical method that relate to theoretical, metaphysical, empirical and its related attempts to offer an explanation of phenomena. Luntley takes Baker and Hacker's account of grammatical methods as a weak therapeutic interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception due to their constructive approach. According to Baker and Hacker's standard reading grammatical methods are concerned with the attainment of an Ubersicht or surview of sections of language, in order to elucidate the specific network of grammatical rules governing the specific linguistic use. It is focused on a constructivist type of elucidation of the network of grammatical rules.

### 7.5.1 The Need for Therapeutic Methods

*"As is well known, in the Investigations Wittgenstein compared philosophy to therapy. In his so-called Middle Period, Wittgenstein was more specific, calling forth some of the imagery of psychoanalysis… My claim is that this is the same method in both the Investigations and the Tractatus." (Reck: 2002: 65)*

The above quotation from Reck summarises his interpreting claim that therapy Wittgenstein speaks of especially in the middle period is similar to psychoanalysis. What is interesting is that Reck claims this same method is evident in both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*.

> *"Philosophy is not anything over and above the problems and their removal." (Kenny: 1984: 38)*
>
> *"Philosophy isn't anything except philosophical problems, the particular individual worries that we call 'philosophical problems'." PG, p.193 (Kenny: 1984: 45)*

Kenny is helpful in understanding the conflict between grammar and scientism but he relates it to a dichotomy between grammar and therapy. In that, he quite rightly suggests two 'rather different views of philosophy' in Wittgenstein's later methodology. One of these concerns what is best described as a therapeutic practice (see PI. 255, 133), and the other relates to philosophy as contributing to an 'overall understanding' or 'clear view of the world' (Kenny: 1984: 38). Kenny also suggests that Wittgenstein described philosophy like a 'physical medicine', as a cure for 'physical diseases' (PI 119 MS 213, 425). The point is that philosophy is sometimes preventive and sometimes curative. Preventive in the sense, as Kenny suggests, that the philosopher has to boil down the philosophical problems to what we can take in and by doing so the problem evaporates (MS 159,3b) (Kenny: 1984: 39). What this means is that the role of the philosopher is one of making surveyable the differences, in the rules and contexts of application that result from the differing grammatical systems of reference. What is important to appreciate is that Wittgenstein is suggesting that the perennial misunderstanding of grammar has manifested itself in forms and pictures that have become embedded in language.

### 7.5.2 Fann's Account of "Metaphorical Description of Philosophical Problems in Psychological Terms."

Numerous different interpretations attempt to accommodate what Fann describes as the "Metaphorical Description of Philosophical Problems in Psychological Terms". This element of Wittgenstein's work has been the centre of controversy since the sixties. The account offered by Fann offers a straightforward account of the therapeutic feature. Fann

claims that for Wittgenstein, the philosopher is confronted with philosophical puzzlement or a problem which has arisen "mainly through a misinterpretation of our forms of language – they are linguistic 'or rather 'conceptual problems'" (Fann: 1971: 86).

### 7.5.3 Sass's Therapeutic Method

> *"Wittgenstein's own antiphilosophizing is, after all, grounded not in absorption but in a* kind of alienated critical self-consciousness – or perhaps we should speak of absorption in a kind of alienated critical self-consciousness. The purpose, in any case, is deconstruction, discouragement, perhaps therapy, certainly not the construction of an alternative philosophical edifice. Wittgenstein writes, "The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher." (Sass: 2001: 122).

Sass appeals to Wittgenstein's statement dated 1931 from MS 154 and published in CV concerning the emphasis on philosophy and temperament. Sass is looking for something in Wittgenstein's work that is clearly there but to the extent that Sass interprets it to be, is doubtful. For example, nowhere does Sass attempt to explain his claim that what Wittgenstein is emphasising here relates to his temperament and to a more general outlook, that is more like a general world view or Weltanschauung. Sass is making a lot out of what he suggests to be Wittgenstein's 'deepest propensities' and what is a metaphilosophical critique of philosophy. Sass hinges his view on elucidating or at very least, associating the personality traits he suggests are evident in Wittgenstein with Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical critique.

> *"If it is said on occasion that (someone's) philosophy is a matter of temperament, there is some truth in this. A preference for certain comparisons is something we call a matter of temperament & far more disagreements rest on this than appears at first sight". (CV: 17)*

Overall Sass is perhaps correct in the general approach of his analysis to make this connection but where he undermines and draws our attention to the limitations of his

analysis is in his failure to support this in any adequate way of appealing to some non-psychological textual analysis. To some degree, Sass attempts to do this by following the popularised interpretation of what is considered as one of Wittgenstein's primary motivations to question philosophy. Sass relates this to Bertrand Russell's attempt to remove confusion from ordinary language use by means of a logical deduction in his theory of types. Sass is highlighting the link between being deceived by misunderstanding and Wittgenstein's critique of philosophy. What appeared as a genuine vexing problem was no more than a confusion that, with the right response, could be dissolved. It is this idea of being in a state of confusion and not knowing that is beneficial to understanding Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy. Sass is helpful in developing this point further. Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy is unique in that he perceives philosophical problems to be a result of confusion. The difficulty is that we are psychologically locked into the confusion, it is a part of the framework from which we engage the world. It is something integral to the way in which we interact and work in the world. It is dogmatic in the sense that there is nothing alarming about the manner in which it functions.

> *"Wittgenstein, in fact, actually defined philosophy in this way: as a bringing to explicit awareness of what would normally stay in the background – a matter of focusing on "aspects... hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity," of examining "the real foundations of his inquiry [which normally] do not strike a man at all" (PI § 129). Indeed, he doubted that anyone who lacked this capacity for getting outside normal presuppositions could really be called a philosopher at all... philosophical problems, according to Wittgenstein, cause "vague mental uneasiness" or "mental cramp" (NM 43); he likens philosophical views and questioning to a kind of illness in need of therapy" (Sass: 2001: 120)*

Language works and is key to our social makeup, any disagreements or misunderstandings in our conversations are usually resolved through further discussion. Wittgenstein is not critical of ordinary language per se, it is the manner in which ordinary language and its philosophical use have given rise to philosophical problems that are of concern. The complexity in understanding this is a difficulty in understanding the difference between philosophical language use and ordinary language. This difference

Wittgenstein sought to clarify but found that it was far more complicated than he first imagined. Wittgenstein had in his early approach to philosophy hinged his response to elucidating this difference to be centred on the accurate identification of the logical workings of language in such a way that the differences would become apparent. What he stated was that the problems of philosophy were based on a misconceived method of philosophical practice. The response then was to change the method of philosophical practice to bring about the required change. I suggest this part of Wittgenstein's approach in his early philosophy placed too much emphasis on elucidating the workings of language as the means to removing confusion. It is undoubtedly immensely valuable, but as Wittgenstein acknowledges in his post-1930's approach, the psychological aspect that Sass is highlighting here is more complex than Wittgenstein had first thought. His later emphasis on what have been identified as the therapeutic aspects to his approach highlight this.

> *"This transformation or shift of attitudes is not, however, the entire story: for (as shall be seen concerning the early Wittgenstein) on the more abstract or reflexive plane of metaphilosophy, Wittgenstein's schizoid and his antischizoid inclinations are simultaneously in play in both his earlier and his later periods. Wittgenstein demonstrated a remarkable ambivalence regarding the very enterprise of philosophizing. Although he insisted, at times, on his great respect for philosophy, he more often described it as a source of "deep disquietudes," of vague mental "uneasiness," "mental cramps," and even "torments," and as an illness in need of cure" (PI § 111, § 133, P 173–5). (Sass: 2001: 100)*

### 7.5.4 Baker's Patient-Specific Therapy

Gordon Baker maintains that the methods are concerned not with grammatical elucidation but rather 'patient specific therapy'. Baker endorsed the Freudian conception of therapy that was developed by Friedrich Waismann. Baker developed a unique conception of therapeutic methods that relates to a model of patient specific methods similar to Freud's form of analysis. It was not concerned with general grammatical confusions it was not a prescriptive method is was a specific one suited to the particular form of malaise that

afflicted the philosopher. The methods were not grammatical specific. What Baker emphasised was that perspicuous representation was not just a means of elucidating grammar. It could be used in numerous diverse ways.

*"Perspicuous representation need not be a representation of our grammar; it can also be representation of religious ceremonies, magical rites" (Baker 2004:42-4)*

Like the patient of psychoanalysis who is brought to see the hidden causes of his error and confusion, the philosopher will be brought to see the relations between using language and the difficulties and confusions that follow. Like the psychoanalyst, all the philosopher does is make the patient aware of what he is doing. Hence, Wittgenstein perceives his new methodology to be 'a cure for the sickness of the understanding' in that the task of philosophy is to put things back in order (BB. p44), the sickness that we have is a psychotic sickness of delirium. Indeed, this is why Wittgenstein suggests that his approach is akin to a therapeutic practice like those in psychoanalysis:

*"The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness" (PI, 255).*

The therapist brings the patient to see what is hidden from them by means of sublimation and so Wittgenstein is attempting to bring the reader to see what was hidden from them by means of the bewitching effect of language.

*"There are different philosophical methods, like different therapies" (PI, 133)*
*"The philosopher must bring those immersed in the 'latent nonsense' of philosophical theory construction to the surface where all is open to view and what was once latent nonsense, now becomes patent nonsense" (PI. 524) (Hacker: 1986: 154).*

The procedure of therapy has the goal of attaining a surview of the web of relations that the words that are the cause of the puzzlement have but first the bewitched must come to see for themselves why they erred in such a way:

> *"Philosopher and therapist alike aim to give the afflicted insight into their own understanding and misunderstanding." (Hacker: 1986: 155)*

### 7.5.5 Gould's Methods of an External elucidation internal captivation

Gould focuses on what he describes as his effort to undermine what he identifies as misconceived interpretations relating to "Wittgenstein's view of pictures as a source of philosophical disorder". What is particularly relevant and interesting in Gould's approach is how he focuses on reappraising Wittgenstein's emphasis on how the pictures are a source of philosophical puzzlement. The pictures hold us captive.

> *"A picture held us captive. And we couldn't get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably." (PI: 115)*

Gould maintains that following Wittgenstein's claim that language contains pictures that hold us captive, it follows that it is language that confronts us with the captivating pictures that are a source of philosophical puzzlement. The pictures have a role in the complex way language bewitches us and leads to philosophical puzzlement. The pictures add a further challenge to perceiving or seeing matters unhindered by such distractions and distortions. Accordingly, Gould points out that the pictures are another source of difficulty that prohibits the perspicuous representation of grammar.

This corresponds to Wittgenstein's point in PI 5 that there is a haze surrounding grammar that can only be removed by looking at the activities of language games, in the form of language actively in use. What we are confronted with, if we follow Gould's reasoning, is that there is a requirement of a method to support the release from the captivating pictures that prohibit grammatical perspicuity. The conundrum is that some pictures that hinder grammatical perspicuity may require grammatical perspicuity to dissolve the hold of that the captivation has on us.

> *"At the very least, the idea of being "held captive" suggests a kind of immobility – one that would prevent the movement that is required to command the view of language that we need to bring our*

> *disquietudes to an end. To get to where we want, we must be able to "arrange" what we have always known (cf. §109). The activity of such "arranging" is incompatible with being immobilised by a picture." (Gould: 2004: 81)*

Gould develops the analysis to make a striking point concerning the immobility that results from the captivation. It is a form of captivity forced upon us by the pictures. We are held captive by the inability to see how there is nothing out of the ordinary or unusual at work, there is nothing strange going on even though the statement would suggest there is. What this points to is a need to elucidate further the intricate differences that are becoming apparent between the sources of philosophical puzzlement and the methods required to remove such forms of puzzlement. In PI 126 Wittgenstein claims that "everything lies open to view" but this is a deceptive claim to make concerning the grammar that is hidden by a haze (PI: 5) and is often blocked by the captivations of pictures (PI: 115). Wittgenstein states in PI 127 that "the work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections for a particular purpose", this purpose is to see connections between forms of grammar to make perspicuous the rules and see the differences and ask if the words ever used in this way.

> *"For our forms of expression, which send us in pursuit of chimaeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing extraordinary is involved." (PI: 94)*

What the analysis is pointing to is what I claim to be a struggle between Wittgenstein's efforts to emphasise the importance of grammatical perspicuity as the principal form of a method of grammatical elucidation and the clear conflict between the claim that everything lies open to view and the numerous examples of different parts that hinder or restrict the ability to surview grammar.

> *"Moreover, there is a strong hint that such pictures are, generally speaking, false pictures, blocking a clear view of what we need to know. Such pictures may not be the only source of our "bewitchment" by language, but they must surely figure largely in any account of that bewitchment." (Gould: 2004: 81)*

There is an evident need to clarify what I identify as a possible inconsistency between Wittgenstein's emphasis on grammatical confusions and the methods of perspicuous representations of grammar. There is more at play here than a grammatical confusion and therefore grammatical perspicuity alone is not sufficient to elucidate and remove the confusion. The only worry here is that with increasing complexity there is a fear of falling back into a further captivation with systematisation. Wittgenstein was certainly aware of this possibility, and this is sometimes suggested to relate to his clear resistance to offer any more specific guidance on the source of confusions and the methods to deal with confusion. Gould condenses a part of this difficulty in the following statement:

*"As he reminds us, his goal is to replace explanation with description. What he describes is clearly (a) an internalisation; followed by (b) a kind of externalisation: the picture repeats, what we repeated: we absorbed it into our language: it seemed to lie in our language, and language repeats it back to us." (Gould: 2004: 86)*

Gould claims that language can hold the picture and it can be repeated back to us. A picture possibly presents a misunderstanding that has been 'absorbed' into language itself "and language repeats back to us".

## 7.6 The Resolute Therapy

To remove confusions, Wittgenstein maintains that we must understand the nature of the confusion itself, i.e. how a failure to accurately understand the workings of language is the key factor in making philosophical statements, questions and theories that further complicate the initial confusion.

*"Thus, the goal of Wittgenstein's book is to change the way its reader conceives of philosophy. It is designed to introduce a philosophical method or a program for philosophical clarification which consists in making apparent that and how philosophical sentences, which we are inclined to take as making sense, dissolve into nonsense upon closer examination. (I will call this method "elucidation- with-nonsense")." (Kuusela: 2012: 125)*

If the goal for the resolute interpretations is, as Kuusela suggests, to change the way the reader conceives of philosophy then the metaphilosophical interpretation and its defence of polythetic methods should not be too alarming. In fact, it achieves what Kuusela identifies as important to the resolute interpretation by clarifying the philosophical method and the form of the methods of clarification that will make the problems vanish. Where it differs from the resolute interpretation is that it also endorses the grammatical conception of grammatical elucidation. The most important contribution that the resolute reading can make to the conception of polythetic methods relates to the obvious need for some aspect of therapy. There is a requirement for a therapeutic approach to both values. Both grammatical and scientism require what I claim to be a therapeutic aspect of coming to work on oneself to see the errors of our ways as a disposition to seek explanation, to search for essences and to look for an answer where there is none. The need for therapy or therapeutic activities has a role to play in the polythetic conception of methods. If grammatical perspicuity has something to elucidate in terms of differences between language uses and rules of grammar, then it offers a technique of elucidation based on data sets of language games and data of rules and differences. However, the confusions of scientism are generally of a different form. The variety of possibilities in which our captivation with science can take hold is extensive, and this is partly the kernel of the lesson Wittgenstein learnt in forwarding the logical system of analysis in the *Tractatus*. Scientism is perhaps something embedded in misunderstanding false pictures and archetypes in language. It is certainly also something embedded in our disposition, expectations and desires to systematise, construct, order, build, analyse, deconstruct and theorise. I claim it relates to what Mulhall, in forwarding his resolute approach to the *Investigations*, identifies as the importance of the awareness of what we bring to an investigation.

> *"For on Wittgenstein's conception of the matter, philosophical dialogue is always therapeutic in its purposes; hence, it is concerned with understanding the complex of desires, intentions, fantasies, and confusions that find expression in the interlocutor's contribution to such dialogues. Hence, our involvement in such dialogues necessarily involves us in a mode of psychological understanding (of others, and of ourselves in so far as the interlocutor expresses*

> *our own compulsions and convictions); so when a philosophical dialogue focuses on the grammar of psychological concepts, it is in effect a study of one of its own most central resources. Hence, each step within it can invite a transition to such reflexive levels of reflection." (Mulhall: 2007: 56)*

The resolute reading has generally claimed that the same therapeutic activity developed in the *Tractatus* applies to the *Investigations* as well. Both works deal with philosophical confusions that are illusionary. They claim that the confusion or illusion is generated by our failure to accurately understand language. Therefore, therapy is the only activity that is suitable to remove such confusion by bringing the afflicted to a point where they can see things aright. This contrasts with the standard reading and the emphasis on the perspicuous representation of grammar, as the means of achieving the necessary elucidation to dissolve the confusion.

> *"A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance to us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things."* *(PI: 122)*

In the following sections, I attempt to draw out the possibility that the therapeutic approach and its focus on therapy, rather than grammatical elucidation, could be more open to a hybrid relationship. One that combines both grammatical methods and therapeutic methods. The main thrust of this approach concerns Wittgenstein's emphasis on scientism and the contrast to all things scientific in developing the therapeutic contrast. This is what I claim the real utility of Wittgenstein's emphasis on therapeutic amounts to. It offers another means of communicating the important unique difference between philosophical problems and methods and scientific problems and method.

As our focus on the resolute reading is specific to the *Philosophical Investigations,* the resolute interpretation developed is more of a reading in line with the resolute approach rather than a resolute reading. It would be presumptuous to claim that the reading developed by the likes of Mulhall is representative of all resolute readers. Therefore, we

are confronted with a limited amount of resources from the resolute camp that is specific to the later work alone. This can be achieved by considering the collection of essays constituting the first part of Crary and Read's *The New Wittgenstein* (Crary and Read: 2000) and Stephen Mulhall's *Wittgenstein's Private language* (2007). Nonetheless, it remains that they do not concentrate their focus on a specific metaphilosophical account of the meaning of methods. The reasoning for this is unclear. It is possible to determine what each position would offer as an account of methods, by assessing what each reading forwards as Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. It then becomes evident what their conception of methods amounts to. This is the strategy herein.

There are important differences between what Wittgenstein describes as the sources of philosophical confusion. There are important differences between grammatical sources of confusions and confusions that arise specifically from what we have identified as his critique of scientism, especially how the captivations with the method of science potentially lead to philosophical confusion. An example of this is when "misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, by certain analogies between forms of expression in different regions of language" (PI: 90) give rise to what appear as philosophical problems. Peter Hacker has developed this point in recent years with his attempt to apply Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as a practice that consists solely of methods concerned with elucidating grammar to confusions that he claims have come to reflect the way neuroscientists talk about the brain and brain states.

> *"We unthinkingly assume that mental states and processes are just like physical states and processes, only mental, that mental states are a species of state, another species of which is physical states. But that is precisely what we have no title to do. (Chess moves, Wittgenstein remarked, are not kinds of movements.) We think that mental processes are comparable to physical processes like digestion or breathing. But, Wittgenstein stresses, these are incomparable." (Hacker: 2013: 98)*

## Conclusion: Scientism and Polythetic Methods

The two variables, I claim, support an alternative dichotomy between grammatical confusions as a source of philosophical problems and non-grammatical confusions relating to Wittgenstein's conception of scientism, that give rise to philosophical

problems. The purpose is to draw attention to how the various forms of interpreting methods as grammatical or therapeutic develop an essentialist and restrictive account. I suggest this restriction can be surpassed by means of the metaphilosophical interpretation and its defence of methods as consisting of polythetic inter-relations as a response to the two sources of philosophical confusion as the two values of grammar and scientism. The conclusion to the chapter maintains that the polythetic conception is beneficial. It emphasises the need to address the key motivations of both standard and resolute interpretations as making a possible valuable contribution to developing the polythetic interpretation further. This would be achieved by contributing to the polythetic emphasis on the importance of grammatical methods and the need for forms of therapeutic methods. The positive conclusion is that the polythetic conception of methods can openly endorse additional methods that can be supported by the family resemblance criteria of diverse relations. The goal is to utilise and assess the differences as potential support for the metaphilosophical interpretation. I want to address the contribution that each position makes in developing the metaphilosophical interpretation of polythetic methods. While their contributions are valued, they have come to a point where a change is now required. The challenge is in determining how the important insights from each position can contribute to a move beyond the current stalemate.

Therefore, the polythetic conception of methods offers the only means of supporting what the newer Wittgensteinians are currently seeking as a type of hybrid or alternative interpretation that aims to move beyond the dichotomy of standard versus therapeutic (Read and Lavery: 2012). I suggest that the metaphilosophical interpretation's emphasis on polythetic methods achieves this move beyond what has become a deceptive and misleading notion of a therapeutic or grammatical Wittgenstein. The terms grammar, grammatical, therapeutic and therapy have become somewhat loaded terms in the context of Wittgensteinian exegesis and have perhaps lost a great deal of Wittgenstein's original approach and emphasis. This is perhaps a result of two decades of the ever increasing the pressure exerted upon them to bring them in line with a particular viewpoint. Therefore, the metaphilosophical interpretation at very least offers a means to illuminate what has become an intractable problem in contemporary Wittgensteinian exegesis.

What is now important to comprehend is the thesis claim that with this reappraisal Wittgenstein's first task is to investigate the workings of language free from captivations of science[59].

> *"But if you say that our languages only approximate to such calculi you are standing on the very brink of a misunderstanding. For then it may look as if what we were talking about were an ideal language. As if our logic were, so to speak, a logic for a vacuum.—Whereas logic does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like." (PI: 109)*

This predisposition to error consisted of a captivation with the method of science. Wittgenstein had fallen prey to a fascination with logic as a form of systematisation that science offers. In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein describes this as a captivation with the methods of science before one's eyes. Wittgenstein was captivated by scientific method in undertaking his initial investigation into language. There was, Wittgenstein identifies, already a prior disposition to construct a conception of the workings of language as distinctly logical. The presumption was that for language to represent, it had to represent the logical form of the spatiotemporal relationships between objects in the world.

We ask a question 'what is x?' and according to Wittgenstein, we further complicate matters by falling prey to the adoption and desire to employ a scientifically framed method into the practice of philosophy. this is especially reinforced when undertaking the initial examination of a philosophical problem. We begin by engaging and reacting to our immediate failure to answer the question 'what is x?' by assuming that this failing requires engaging in a theoretical response. If we cannot immediately explain or solve the answer then we assume the solution must be deeper, we must look to a general theory

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[59] Connective and Therapeutic analysis replaces reductive and constructive analysis see Hacker, The Achievement of the *Investigations* p. P107 For more on importance of therapeutic aspect see p108-5 and Hacker's lists suggested areas of Wittgenstein on p111: - Z382 'slow cure all important', PI133 'Different Philosophic methods like different therapies', PI524 'Philosophy's task is to transform latent nonsense in to patent nonsense', PI124 'elicit rules of language from bewildered', and PI125 'Philosophy is to render surveyable the entanglement of rules that led to the problem.'

relating to some hidden essence. This is what Wittgenstein had experienced in the investigation into language meaning that is forwarded in the *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein's response to this consists of the development of a polythetic conception of methods. They are necessarily polythetic as the range in the grouping is potentially exhaustive, and the commonality is not linear but is presented as a family resemblance model of mixed relations. This is the only means of capturing the possibility of shared characteristics of such a divergent pattern. To break the stalemate of the grammar versus therapy debate I have argued that there has been a consistent development of two sources of philosophical confusion in Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical focus on philosophical method. They relate to methods that focus on problems that have their source in confusions rooted in language and methods that focus on confusions that are rooted in captivations. There are numerous variations to the complex ways in which these two sources of conceptual confusion can cause philosophical puzzlement and problems. I have defended the analysis in this chapter that there are numerous forms of methods that relate to Wittgenstein's statement in PI 133 that there is not a method though there are methods like different therapies. I hope that this analysis captures the meaning of this statement.

# CONCLUSION

> *"Wittgenstein's most important contribution to modern philosophy lies in his method. He is reported to have said: 'All I can give you is a method; I cannot teach you any new truths.' In another lecture he remarked to the effect that it did not matter whether his results were true or not: What mattered was that 'a method had been found'. His method, of course, cannot be followed as a recipe or formula, it is rather an art. Wittgenstein, above all, was an artist who created a new style of thinking, a new way of looking at things"* (Fann: 1971: 109-10)

The thesis agrees with the description offered by Fann in the above. I have defended the claim that Wittgenstein's importance is in his focus on developing a new conception of philsophcial method. More specifically it is the importance of providing an alternative method to the systematic constructive methods that have dominated how we perceive problems, confusions and generally determine our investigations and expectations. We are immersed in a worldview that perceives all problems and confusions to fit an expected model of scientific or causal explanation. We expect structure, systematisation and order even in relation to forms of conceptual confusions where such concepts have no relevance. Fann points to the difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein's focus on methods by identifying that the methods cannot be "followed as a recipe or formula". It is difficult to understand the different and unique form of Wittgenstein's approach and the "new style of thinking" and "a new way of looking at things" that it offers. This challenge to understand Wittgenstein's different approach and the importance of a plurality of methods can be elucidated by means of developing a metaphilosophical interpretation of his focus on philosophical method. It is this challenge to elucidate and understand Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods that the thesis has focused on by developing the metaphilosophical defence of polythetic methods. The motivation for this defence concerns the claim that Wittgenstein's emphasis on methods is a specifically relevant and important means of understanding the need to develop alternative programs of investigation that are specific to forms of conceptual confusions. This means not applying modes of constructive

analysis, deductive reasoning and norms of scientific methods of analysis that are typically focused on empirical data analysis and assessment. The thesis argues that Wittgenstein's rejection of a monothetic conception of method presents a rejection of the dominance of this scientistic/causal form of investigation. Wittgenstein's alternative conception of polythetic methods rejects the constraints of the scientistic approach and its expectation of uniformity and singularity. Wittgenstein's polythetic conception instead focuses on embracing diversity, plurality, both differences and similarities in developing a family resemblance model of grouping. It is this emphasis on a new conception of methods that emphasises variety and volume of different confusions that presents Wittgenstein's most important contribution to modern philosophy.

The thesis argues that Wittgenstein's focus on philosophical method is the most important part of his work and is perhaps the most neglected aspect . The focus on the importance of Wittgenstein's concern with philosophical method is supported by a minority of Wittgensteinian philosophers; K.T. Fann, Paul Horwich, Peter Hacker, Denis McManus and to a certain extent Marie McGinn, Oskari Kuusela and James Conant. The thesis focuses on rectifying this disparity by further clarifying and developing the importance of Wittgenstein's focus on method. Accordingly, it was only by understanding and embracing this metaphilosophical context that an accurate account of Wittgenstein's focus on Method could be attained. The appeal to understanding Wittgenstein's critical investigation into philosophy as distinctly metaphilosophical investigation was not a popular exegetical strategy.

There was only a handful of Wittgensteinians that would support such a strategy[60]. Paul Horwich and Denis McManus offered the clearest support by identifying and developing their own metaphilosophical approach to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy.

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[60] Most Wittgensteinian's would agree that in a general sense, Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy defines his work. Other such as Fann, Milkov, Conant, Hacker, would if we are to judge from their own focus on method, that it is the specific focus on a conception of philosophical method or methods that define his work. A few others such as Horwich, McManus, and Jolley go further to elucidate the focus on Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as a metaphilosophical investigation. The interpretation defended in the thesis has developed a specific metaphilosophical interpretation and analysis of Wittgenstein's conception of methods. The thesis has defended the metaphilosophical interpretation of a polythetic conception of methods. I maintain that the polythetic conception of methods offers a positive and accurate interpretation of Wittgenstein's later emphasis on methods as the defining practice of his later conception of philosophy (PI 133). I maintained that the conception of polythetic methods represents Wittgenstein bringing to a close an important metaphilosophical investigation that defined his work since its beginnings. A beginning that consisted of an investigation into philosophical identity in a unique way. It centred on the analysis of the form of philosophical problems as conceptual confusions and the development of a pertinent philosophical method that was unique to philosophy and independent from the contamination of scientism. This was claimed to be a metaphilosophical strategy carried out by Wittgenstein as a means of qualifying a new conception of philosophy by the defence and exposition of a new philosophical method.

## Conclusion

However, both of their therapeutic approaches were significantly different to my own conclusion. Whereas, the metaphilosophical interpretation of methods I defend is critical of therapeutic interpretations or any interpretation that failed to recognise the significant emphasis on a diversity of methods.

The thesis consists of using the context and application of metaphilosophy as a conceptual tool to support a specific focus on Wittgenstein's analysis and development of a new conception of philosophical method. The overall strategy has been to centre on defending two exegetical claims in order to support the thesis claim concerning the metaphilosophical defence of polythetic methods of analysis. The first concerns the claim that Wittgenstein's later focus on a plurality of methods presents his final concluding remarks of his radical conception of philosophical method consisting of different methods. I argue that this conclusion was left in a state of openness or as Staten describes as a conclusion with loose ends (Staten: 2002: 57). The emphasis on methods was undoubtedly important but it was left in an unexpected state of perplexity. The focus on methods was left just hanging in mid-air with no expected account as to its trajectory or final destination. There was no detailed account of the employment, assessment or detail. Judging by Wittgenstein's comments on the different forms of grammatical confusions and the various aspects of scientism that further complicate matters, it is clear that the account of methods was undoubtedly more complex than Wittgenstein was letting on or was identifying in sections 89-133 of the *Investigations*.

This disconnected conclusion of his account of methods was peculiar and unexpected. This was highlighted further when one considers the context to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as an investigation focused specifically on philosophical method. Again this difficulty was further highlighted as an unusual and unexpected outcome by considering the exegetical controversy that surrounded the question of meaning, interpretation and importance of the emphasis on a plurality of methods. There was such a significant difference in scope of interpretations relating to the meaning of methods that something irregular was going on. The standard reading centred on a constructivist account that emphasised a descriptive analysis that could elucidate grammatical rules and grammatical networks mapped out as a subsystem of language-games that were wired into a larger network of meaning consisting of a form of life. The standard readings constructivist account of grammar is, I claim, clearly systematic. This is particularly evident in the manner in which it formulates grammatical perspicuity. Although, many standard readers such as Hacker would deny the charge of systematisation or of

perspicuous representation being formulaic. There is no doubt, as Fann suggests in the quote at the beginning, that there is a need to avoid formulaic constructions of methods but it is evident that Hacker's emphasis on perspicuous representation is closer to being formulaic than he would admit. Hacker's account of grammatical perspicuity consists of a prescriptive method that offers the potential to identify specific methodological techniques. Therefore it is, I argue, an essentialist model of relations and has therefore inadvertently forwarded a monothetic method of analysis. This was, according to my analysis, an unwelcome conclusion that goes against my claim that Wittgenstein's most important acknowledgement of the mistakes he had made in the *Tractatus* related to the rejection of a monothetic method of philosophical analysis. The alternative option of therapeutic interpretations presents mostly a deconstructivist format that shuns the rigidity and systematisation of grammatical perspicuity as the final analysis and rather focuses on therapeutic framed activities of elucidation concentrated on resolving inner confusion relating to language and philosophy. The contrast between the grammatical and therapeutic accounts of methods highlights the difficulty with interpreting the meaning of Wittgenstein's final emphasis on a plurality of methods. I have intentionally avoided developing the investigation in the terms of constructive and deconstructive analysis and instead utilised what I claim are more useful concepts of monothetic and polythetic.

## Further Research:

In each one of the chapters, I maintain that several legitimate lines of questioning are identified. There is, therefore, a clear potential for further research specific to each chapter.

Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical inheritance:

In chapter one, I argue that, from the influences of Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein developed a metaphilosophical framework that determined the specific direction of what I claim is his metaphilosophical investigation into philosophical method. I argue that Wittgenstein inherited and endorsed the logicist critical investigation into the logic of language, the focus on philosophical problems as pseudo-problems, and the response to develop a new method of philosophy that was specific to the linguistic sources or forms of the confusion. I also claim that it was Wittgenstein's critical reaction to Russell's clear support and documented campaign to adopt scientific method into philosophy that provided the stimulus for his critical reproach of all aspects of scientism. I contend that

to interpret Wittgenstein's influence to be uniquely metaphilosophical is an important and underappreciated aspect of their influence. It is also important to develop this understanding more specifically than the general outline I have provided as a start to my analysis. It would require a dedicated focus on the question of, for example, Wittgenstein's anti-scientism as a response to Russell's support for the adoption of scientific method in philosophy.

There is a considerable amount of research continually focused on determining the influence that Frege and Russell had on Wittgenstein. In my analysis, I defend the argument that Frege and Russell's influence was significant in providing a platform for Wittgenstein to critically investigate philosophy in a unique way. What is important to comprehend is how the different factors of influence frame Wittgenstein's investigation to be a unique metaphilosophical one. Firstly, the specific format of the influences determined Wittgenstein's investigation to be focused on philosophical method. Second, the focus on method was determined and framed by what I identify as two variables values. The first was the emphasis on the logical workings of language as the necessary focus of investigation that controls the specific form of method required. The second concerns the demarcation between the method of science and the method of philosophy.

## **The Linguistic Turn and Metaphilosophy**

I argue that Wittgenstein's 'Linguistic Turn' is the first outcome of the metaphilosophical framework/investigation and the focus on how the values determine philosophical problems to be linguistic confusions that require a method focused specifically on logical/linguistic elucidation. Wittgenstein's claim that the source of philosophical problems are rooted in a misunderstanding of the workings of language and therefore the method of philosophy must be a method concerned with linguistic elucidation constitutes Wittgenstein's linguistic turn. I argue that the LT is intrinsically metaphilosophical as a result of how it demands a new conception of philosophical method. I claim that Wittgenstein's critical investigation into philosophical method constituted a metaphilosophical framework from which Wittgenstein developed the LT. The LT was a conceptual focus on philosophical method, it was primarily a metaphilosophical emphasis on a new method determined by the claim that all philosophical problems were rooted in linguistic confusions. There was a clear requirement to clarify and support the application of the concept metaphilosophy to Wittgenstein. I maintain that in order to develop an

accurate understanding of metaphilosophy; we must appeal to the Wittgensteinian origins to the concept, as is evident in the work of Morris Lazerowitz. Collectively the analysis and defence of these arguments support my application of metaphilosophy to the analysis of Wittgenstein's focus on philosophical method. I claim that metaphilosophy is an important analytical tool that is necessary to clarify the complexity of Wittgenstein's critical investigation into philosophical identity and method. The thesis developed an in-depth analysis of this metaphilosophical investigation from its beginnings, as a critical reaction to the work of Frege and Russell up to the statement in PI 133 that emphasises a plurality of methods as the defining characteristic of his later conception of philosophical practice. It develops and defends the application of metaphilosophy to Wittgenstein's work and specifically his focus on method. There is certainly more specific investigation required into the development of the concept and its clear Wittgensteinian origins, through the work of Lazerowitz. The application of the concept metaphilosophy is claimed to be integral to achieving an accurate account of Wittgenstein's focus on method.

## **The Importance of Wittgenstein's Critique of Scientism**

It is how Wittgenstein's critique of scientism determines his conception of method that is one of the most underappreciated aspects of his focus on method and remains in need of further research. Every step of the thesis analysis is focused on his critique of scientism and its relation to method. The grammatical aspect has been well documented but the significance of scientism in the form of analysis developed in the thesis offers a different approach. Wittgenstein's conception of anti-scientism is central to the thesis analysis. It begins with Wittgenstein's reaction to Russell's focus on scientism, the development of a linguistic turn as the strategy to develop a method of philosophical analysis free from scientism and unique to philosophy. It was from this analysis of the failings of the *Tractatus* that a pivotal part of the thesis defence is defended. The key claim is that the *Tractatus* failure was intrinsic to Wittgenstein's own captivation with scientism and especially forms of scientism relating to essentialism. The monothetic methods and the logical system that Wittgenstein developed to support it were built on a false assumption that language was necessarily logical. This predisposition to scientism is what, I claim, Wittgenstein came to acknowledge as, the most serious mistakes of the *Tractatus*, and it was the utilisation of the Tractatus system and method that supported his development of a radical new family resemblance model to combat the captivation with essentialism. The

thesis develops a clearer account of Wittgenstein's strengthened conception of his critique of scientism. It is argued that this account of scientism in its developed form, potentially offers a second source of conceptual confusion. If this is an accurate interpretation, it would require a polythetic conception of methods. The thesis defends the polythetic interpretation of methods. The polythetic conception is defended as an important alternative to other interpretations that appeared to rely on a monothetic conception of methods. It is claimed that the monothetic interpretations of methods failed to accurately understand the pivotal phase in the early 1930's and Wittgenstein's development of a clear account of a critique of scientism.

Wittgenstein's contribution is, as Fann suggested, his novel focus on methods as a conceptual tool that has the potential to contribute to growing needs for an alternative to empirical based method[61]. The point is that as the move to non-empirical focused sciences develops and such fields as data analytics develops there is a requirement for methods of analysis and elucidation that can cope with diversity. The diversity of polythetic methods is in the nonessentialist conception of relations and grouping of non-linear modelling of shared characteristics. The diversity of polythetic methods relates to the numerous forms of confusions that can arise from both grammatical confusions, confusions resulting from captivations with aspects of scientism and numerous other variations of the two sources. Therefore, there is a greater variation required to satisfactorily respond the variation in the forms of confusions. The forms of confusions are certainly not linear and therefore there is no prescriptive single method to resolve all or to cater for all. The diversity of the polythetic conception of methods is reflected in what I have identified as three generic forms of methods that will contribute to a wide array of methods. There are at very least grammatical methods concerned with perspicuous representation, there are methods specific to combatting the hold and captivations with the numerous aspects of scientism, there are therapeutic methods that deal with confusions that are psychologically loaded. The therapeutic methods can cater for both grammatical pictures embedded into language that we fail to see that we are aspect blind to but nevertheless are confused by. There are also therapeutic methods that could be specific to captivations with scientific method and our dogmatic fascination with causation and systemisation. There are numerous forms of confusions and numerous forms of methods, this variation is significant and the volume of possible confusions and methods is equally as significant.

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[61] Massimo Pigliucci is a biologist who has taken Wittgenstein's family resemblance model of grouping to elucidate the problematic nature of the species problem (Massimo Pigliucci: 2003).

**Conclusion**

Wittgenstein's rejection of the monothetic conception of method in the Tractatus is key to understanding the development of the polythetic conception of methods. It is claimed that this resulted from the change in variables from the logic of language to the grammar of language and from a passive conception of scientism inbuilt into the conception of language to an active independent conception of his critique of scientism. In chapter seven, I maintain that the metaphilosophical framework should come to an end with the successful development of the conception of polythetic methods. However, it was evident that there are still difficulties confronting the conception and the difficulties related to the challenge to move from a monothetic conception to understanding that philosophical method must consist of a polythetic conception of methods. The analysis develops and defends the conception of polythetic methods and concludes with assessing some of the possible challenges to it. Chapter seven focuses on developing the defence of the metaphilosophical interpretation of polythetic methods further by bringing together a series of examples of different methods. The aim was to identify a diverse array of methods that numerous commentators have identified and focused on. The strategy of chapter seven was to provide evidence that there was already a requirement for a polythetic conception of methods if we look to current Wittgentienian exegesis. This strategy is further strengthened by the key claim of the thesis and the analysis of the two variable values as two distinct sources of philosophical confusion. It is argued that the variation of the two sources and the diversity of possible confusions also required a conception of polythetic methods. Collectively these two strategies support the defence of the polythetic conception of methods. As a further support, the analysis identifies how the polythetic conception of methods supports the possibility of drawing together a hybrid conception of methods that overcomes the current exegetical controversy relating to the debate between resolute and standard interpretations of methods. The polythetic conceptions of methods identify how essentialist interpretations failed to understand the significance of Wittgenstein's response to the failings of the *Tractatus* and the development of a new conception of scientism that strengthened the original demarcation and aimed to account for the numerous aspects of scientism that philosophers are captivated by.

## A Hybrid Conception of Methods

The polythetic conception of methods offers the only means of supporting what the newer Wittgensteinians are currently seeking as a type of hybrid or alternative interpretation that

aims to move beyond the dichotomy of standard versus therapeutic (Read and Lavery: 2012). I suggest that the metaphilosophical interpretation's emphasis on polythetic methods has the potential to offer a means of combining both therapeutic and grammatical interpretations.

## Non-Philosophical Applications of Polythetic Methods of Analysis

> *"Lavery argues that a too impassioned quest for a "philosophically superior" reading of the Tractatus misses a key point in the study and the philosophy of Wittgenstein: moving beyond cloistered academic debates and into applying philosophically honed critical intelligence to the problems of the lived-world." (Lavery and Read: 2012: 3)*

What is particularly interesting is how the polythetic conception of methods has numerous potential applications outside of philosophy as an alternative to the over reliance and captivation with scientific method. Since Wittgenstein carried out his investigations into philosophical method, a great deal of change has occurred in developing new directives and new subjects of an investigation that are clearly focused on the analysis of data that is not strictly empirical data. The point is that there are several fields of investigation that are more conceptual than empirical and are categorised as scientific. An example of these changes relates to how for example the science of computing or computer science is very much considered a science in the typical form of science such as physics or chemistry. There are important differences that are often lost in such a categorisation as science.

## Polythetic Methods as a Means of Responding to Conceptual Confusions in Neuroscience

Peter Hacker has developed this line of thinking further with his focus on how Wittgenstein's methods of grammatical elucidation have a positive role to play in the untangling of, what Hacker claims to be conceptual confusions in neuroscience. Wittgenstein was aware of the potential and went to great lengths in developing the application of his methods to confusions relating to philosophical psychology. From following the work of Peter Hacker, his advice relating to how Wittgenstein's ideas have not been applied in philosophy nor has their application outside philosophy been

adequately developed or even considered. Hacker is perhaps the only Wittgensteinian that has specifically focused on developing and collaborating with a neuroscientist to work on developing what Hacker perceived as the obvious merits of Wittgenstein's insights relating to grammatical perspicuity as a method that can remove specifically troublesome conceptual confusions. I think Hacker is courageous and correct in doing this. He has certainly identified a benefit to Wittgenstein's methods of perspicuous representation and thereby supported how applications can achieve with due diligence a form of cogency that is left wanting in Wittgenstein's final statements on methods. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein passes the gauntlet to his followers to continue the work on developing the conception of a plurality of "methods like different therapies". Indeed, Hacker has taken the gauntlet and continues the work that Wittgenstein had started.

Returning to the analysis of chapter seven I am respectively critical of Hacker's conception of grammatical methods and I identify what I consider is his omission and failure to appreciate the significance of Wittgenstein's emphasis on diversity and plurality of methods. Wittgenstein develops these conceptions of methods out of his contrast to the failed method of the *Tractatus*, the numerous anti-scientistic statements and the array of statements on the different forms that grammatical confusions can take. Unfortunately, Hacker, for whatever reasons, has resisted this contrast to an essentialist and anti-systematic account of methods. The conception of grammatical perspicuity that he defends was a conception some years ago that I also ascribed to but from the research that has contributed to this work it is undeniable that there cannot be a monothetic essentialist account of grammatical methods. Therefore, Hacker's application of the grammatical methods of perspicuous representation has fallen short of communicating the full importance and potential import of what I claim to be Wittgenstein's conception of polythetic methods.

However, as has been examined in great detail, it is not just Hacker's conception of methods of grammatical perspicuity that fails to endorse and develop the significance of Wittgenstein's emphasis on a plurality of methods. I also argue that the numerous therapeutic interpretations that have developed interpretations focused entirely on a therapeutic goal of salvation from confusion have also failed to develop an account of methods that is diverse. The conception of polythetic methods is defended only as a means to capture this diversity of shared family resemblance relations without falling prey to captivations with essentialism, generality, and theory construction. A monothetic method has all the hallmarks of such captivating aspects of scientism and Wittgenstein, I claim,

was aware of this by utilising the model of the monothetic method of the Tractatus to develop the unique conception of polythetic methods.

The point is that Hacker has identified the importance of the application and potential applications of Wittgenstein's methods of analysis and elucidation present to other forms of research that have moved into a grey areas of not fitting the criteria of empirical hypo-deductive methods and yet are confronted with problems that require complex combinations of methods to deal with conceptual confusions that may appear as empirical problems. Hacker identifies neuroscience as an example that Wittgenstein's methods of grammatical perspicuity can contribute to. I maintain that following the analysis of the polythetic conception of methods the potential is to develop not just grammatical methods but a combination of several methods to deal with new and evolving conceptual confusions. Methods that are specific to combatting the numerous forms of scientism and the overwhelming dogmatic disposition to seek order, systemization and most importantly essentialism, where there is no such application. As technologies rapidly develop, there is a need for realtime methods of elucidation and analysis that can respond to a volume and variety of possible different forms of problems or confusions. This is the most apparent application of Wittgenstein's conception of polythetic methods. One example of a rapid technological change is in the area of neuroscience with the development of realtime scanning and imaging equipment. There are a host of conceptual problems arising in relation to how to not only talk about the brain states as displayed in a visual real-time context but it is also the questions relating to how the data and information of the person can be assessed in accord with the data of the visual representation of possible brain processes. Neuroscientists are already appealing for help in confronting the conceptual problems that are arising. In the paper "*Beyond mind-reading: multi-voxel pattern analysis of fMRI data*" the authors raise several questions relating to the challenge of developing a multifaceted and diverse program of problem-solving that requires a diverse array of methods in one contextual application[62]. This same context of requiring numerous diverse methods to respond to questions that are more conceptual than empirical is also evident in the new growing field of Big Data Analytics[63]. One direction that I claim is most important here is how the most recent developments and changes in data analytics and specifically big data analytics is now beginning to confront current research with significant challenges relating to question of developing

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[62] See Kenneth A. Norman et al., Beyond mind-reading: multi-voxel pattern analysis of fMRI data, TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences (2006), doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.07.005
[63] This is an area of research that I intend to further develop in my work in Big Data Analysis.

new methods of analysis and data handling to confront the unprecedented formats and sizes of current data sets and future data sets. What this means is that a typical data set today relating to real-time data analytics requires a radical new approach in configuring methods capable of elucidating the form of the challenge. This is a new area of research that does not fit the criteria of a typical scientific area of research. The terms and statements and methods utilised in analysing and developing this area need to be informed and free from dogmatism. In the same way, Wittgenstein perceived from the beginning of his career that the dogmatism of language use had effectively resulted in the creation of philosophical problems. There is now a requirement to be linguistically informed in other forms of conceptual investigations that relate to linguistic dogmatism, as philosophical problems do for Wittgenstein. It is well known that before any algorithm or data strategy is identified, there is a human and interpretative element that decides on how to develop the particular analytic investigation that needs to work with a complex, diverse field of different challenges and decisions to formulate an algorithm. It is the polythetic conception of Wittgenstein's Methods that potentially offers an equally diverse means of handling an array of different forms of confusion as they arise. Wittgenstein's methods are designed to be beyond systematisation and as equally as diverse as the confusions that can potentially arise. The challenge that confronted Wittgenstein is to first identify what is the most accurate method of investigation, analysis or elucidation. To make an informed method of analysis before carrying out the investigation. The challenge is to see beyond the method of science as the only plausible and credible method.

The thesis forwards a metaphilosophical defence of polythetic methods as a means of overcoming the apparent confusion relating to Wittgenstein's emphasises on methods. The metaphilosophical interpretation offers a means of overcoming the unexpected form of what appears to be an account of methods left in mid-air with several apparent loose ends. It brings a degree of clarity to the emphasis on methods and is, therefore, _important_ as an elucidatory tool in relation to Wittgenstein's later emphasis on methods. It also identifies the _important_ relation to Frege and Russell in developing a logical/linguistic conception of analysis, a critique of philosophy, a focus on method, the all important critique of scientism. The metaphilosophical context of the focus on method was developed and identified as integral to understanding the critical relationship between the _Tractatus_ and the _Investigations_. I claim that this reaction is intrinsic to the development of the polythetic conception of methods. It was Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the mistakes of the _Tractatus_ system of logical analysis that I claim constituted the catalyst

of change by developing a coherent critique of how the many aspects of scientism confuse the philosopher in expecting a system or order where there is none. It was Wittgenstein's focus on breaking the hold of a scientific worldview and the dogmatic appeal to systematisation and empirical focused methods to investigate conceptual confusion that is most important. In the previous section, I detailed the important application that Wittgenstein's conception of polythetic methods offers to philosophy and the current exegetical controversy relating to the meaning of methods. I also emphasise the important application the conception of polythetic methods has to other growing research areas such as neuroscience and data analytics.

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