Governing the Donor-NGO Relationship:
Three Essays on Accounting in International Cooperation and Development

Nelson Duenas

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By: Nelson Duenas

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Signed by the final examining committee:

_____ Chair
Dr. Zeynep Arsel

_____ External Examiner
Dr. Matt Bamber

_____ Examiner
Dr. Joel Bothello

_____ Examiner
Dr. Sophie Tessier

_____ Examiner
Dr. Matthäeus Tekathen

_____ Thesis Supervisor
Dr. Claudine Mangen

Approved by _____
             Dr. Cédric Lesage, Graduate Program Director

             _____
8/29/2022   Dr. Anne-Marie Croteau, Dean
             John Molson School of Business.

Abstract

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Three Essays on Accounting in International Cooperation and Development

Nelson Duenas, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2022

This dissertation reports on three essays relating to the governance of international cooperation relationships between donors and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that implement development aid projects in Global South countries. These essays draw on a case study of a human rights Colombian NGO and multiple interviews with actors along the international cooperation chain, to explore how trust, control, and accountability impact the donor-NGO relationship. The first chapter draws on Lewis and Weigert's sociological perspective of trust to unpack trust and its underlying emotional and cognitive dimensions over time, in the relationship between the NGO and its donors. This study highlights that trust in NGOs is not replaced by accountability, as accounting and civil society research argues. Instead, accountability and trust, especially its emotional dimension, are mutually constitutive. The second chapter builds on the ideas above to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the trust-control interplay, a longstanding debate in management accounting literature. Using the same sociological perspective as a method theory, the study proposes that a qualitative mix of cognitions and emotions is what determines trust and its relationship with technocratic control at any point in an inter-organizational relationship within the aid chain. The evidence suggests that trust and control have a reinforcing relationship, as the latter serves the cognitive dimension of trust along the different stages of an inter-organizational relationship. These results come from the continuous rearrangement of trust's constitutive dimensions, emotions, and cognitions, which call for specific technocratic control mechanisms. The final chapter delves into issues of NGO agency in what critical accounting literature calls the international development assemblage. It aims at understanding how the Colombian NGO responds to donor practices and conditionalities in development and managerial agendas and what is the role of accounting in this process of NGO agency. The study finds that the NGO deploys five responses that allows it to navigate the development assemblage. By relying on Bhabha's post-colonial approach of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence, it suggests that accounting is an ambivalent means that allows donors to advance their development and managerial agendas, but also helps the Southern NGO to mobilize its own ambitions. Altogether, these three studies illustrate the complexities of governing international cooperation and development relationships, and the role of accounting in them.

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Contribution of Authors

Chapter 2:

Dr. Claudine Mangen participated in conceptualization, data analysis, and manuscript editing and writing.

All authors reviewed the final manuscripts and approved of their contents.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the last two decades, accounting scholarship has witnessed an increasing interest in the accountability and governance of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Cordery et al., 2019; Gray et al., 2006). This interest is largely explained by the important roles NGOs play in social development and economic intervention around the world (Agyemang et al., 2017; Goddard & Juma Assad, 2006). These roles are shaped by NGOs' funding relationships since they have important economic, managerial, political, and social implications (Claeyé, 2014; Gray et al., 2006). NGOs' funding relationships articulate what is known as international cooperation and development. In this setting, donors from industrialized countries, mostly of North America and Europe, transfer resources to the Global South, meaning low-income and often politically or culturally marginalized regions (Dados & Connell, 2012), to implement development projects. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), official development assistance reached USD 157.12 billion in 2020 (OECD, 2022). Local NGOs in Global South countries receive a big portion of these resources to advance socially desired goals such as poverty alleviation, environmental protection, or human rights advocacy.

International cooperation and development relationships are related to accounting, management control, and accountability in two main ways. First, as providers of funds, donors can implement control and accountability mechanisms designed to assess the effectiveness of aid funding, measure the performance of NGOs, and regulate their behavior (Agyemang et al., 2017; Chenhall et al., 2010; Davila, 2012; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). This upward accountability from NGOs to donors, and the resource dependence which stems from international cooperation arrangements, place NGOs in a position where they need to demonstrate their competence to manage funds and earn donors' trust, especially if they want to attract more funds and sustain long-term partnerships (Agyemang et al., 2017; Chenhall et al., 2010; Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Yang et al., 2017). Trust, considered an antecedent and lubricant of cooperation (Chenhall et al., 2010; Lui et al., 2006) is key for achieving successful international cooperation relationships (Dahan et al., 2010; Diallo & Thuillier, 2005; Lewis & Sobhan, 1999; Zaheer & Harris, 2006)

Second, powerful stakeholders in international cooperation, such as donor countries and multinational NGOs, have their own development agendas and their own vision of adequate project management. This vision is associated with managerialism, which is the application of

managerial techniques on the grounds of superior ideology, expert training, and the exclusiveness of managerial knowledge to establish what counts as results, what value for money means, and how projects should be monitored (Girei, 2022; Klikauer, 2015). Donors' development and managerial agendas often clash with Southern NGOs' perspectives on the development problems that should be attended and the ways in which development projects should be managed (Girei, 2022; Martinez & Cooper, 2017; O'Leary & Smith, 2020). This is not a minor issue, considering that many Southern NGOs come from grassroots and indigenous movements with different systems of values and cosmovisions (Finau & Chand, 2022). The advancement of donor agendas is considered a process of neocolonialism that aims at homogenization, based on Western canons (Alawattage & Azure, 2021; Hopper et al., 2017; Neu & Ocampo, 2007; Sauerbronn et al., 2021; Toivonen & Seremani, 2021). The asymmetries between Western and Global South actors open the door to study processes of impositions, conditionalities, NGO agency, and resistance.

Following the above, and despite the rich research tradition in NGO accountability (Cordery et al., 2019; Gray et al., 2006; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006) issues of trust, management control, and NGO agency remain understudied. This lack of research has potential implications for how relationships between donors and Southern NGOs are sustained and how development projects are managed in a setting where "power asymmetries cannot be suspended" (Brown & Dillard, 2013, p. 178). This dissertation aims to shed light on these issues by exploring the processes through which Southern NGOs establish relationships with their donors and how they exert agency in face of managerial, control, and accountability conditionalities. The three essays in this dissertation ask *« How does trust interrelate with accountability and control in international cooperation relationships between donors and Southern NGOs? »* and *« How does Southern NGOs respond to donor practices and conditionalities in international development and what is the role of accounting in this process? »*.

To explore these questions, the three essays draw on multiple data sources. First, a three-month participant case study of a Colombian NGO named DREAM that has multiple funding relationships with international donors. This organization is suitable to study issues of trust, control, and accountability due to the nature of its mission and its managerial ties with international actors. Second, 36 interviews with relevant actors in international cooperation and development across Colombia and Canada. Third, a corpus of documents dealing with control, accounting practices, and accountability requirements of development projects. While each one of the essays

has its own theoretical lenses and coding procedures, overall the dissertation relies on an inductive and interpretive methodology. The above means that observations and findings in the fieldwork guide the theory-building process. Iterations between the empirical data and the theoretical framework in each chapter allows to generate theoretical insights, not only for the setting of international cooperation, but also for accounting and management control domains at large.

Using the methods above, I explore the two big research questions as follows: the first two essays focus on trust and its relationship with accountability and control, and the third essay concentrates on NGO agency in the donor-NGO relationships. I now briefly summarize each essay.

The first essay delves into an idea sustained in NGO and civil society literature: trust in international cooperation relationships is substituted for stringent arrangements of accountability, highly regulated contracts, and administrative codes. According to the above-mentioned literature, trust is no longer relevant as a governing principle of international cooperation relationships between NGOs and donors. The evidence in this essay cautions that this is not the case and trust continues to play a role. Cooperation relationships have not become purely managerial and trust has not been eroded and replaced but remains present. Drawing on the sociology of trust, particularly Lewis and Weigert's (1985) framework of cognitive and emotional trust, the evidence illustrates how trust involves two dimensions: an emotional dimension grounded in shared values and intrinsic motivations about the NGO's mission and a cognitive dimension anchored in checking and monitoring the NGO. The importance of each trust dimension in the donor-NGO relationship depends on the particular stage of the cooperation relationship. The emotional dimension is relatively more important early on when the relationship is being established, whereas the cognitive dimension dominates later on in the reporting and audit stage. Throughout the relationship, the two dimensions interact and complement each other. This bidimensional view of trust implies that trust, especially its emotional dimension, has a mutually reinforcing relationship with accountability. These findings contribute to the accounting and NGO literatures by showing how trust and accountability are not straightforward substitutes. Trust involves more than rationally assessing the other party; it is anchored in emotional features such as mutual concern, care, and shared values, which affect accountability practices.

The second essay builds on the first essay to delve into the debate of the interaction or interplay between trust and control, which has a rich tradition in the management accounting literature. The essay explores how trust interrelates with technocratic control in different stages of

an international cooperation relationship. It highlights how different trust building activities, such as reputation, aligned interests, or communication interact with technocratic control practices to govern and sustain the donor-NGO relationship. Also, this essay has important theoretical aspirations beyond the international cooperation setting. It suggests that control is related to cognitive and emotional dispositions towards the trustee in a relationship, surpassing the idea that control and trust are exclusively tied to assessing another party's trustworthiness, as previously suggested in the literature. The evidence shows that along the different stages of an inter-organizational relationship, control reinforces the donor-NGO relationship by catering to the cognitive dimension of trust and by regulating further emotional investments in the relationship. Taken together, the findings show how different control practices reinforce trust in the relationship. As this essay not only has implications for the international cooperation literature but also targets the theoretical underpinnings of control-trust research, it is presented as a conceptual paper that uses international cooperation as an empirical setting.

The final essay of the dissertation turns to neocolonial donor practices and NGO agency. It explores how the NGO responds to the pressures and conditionalities of what the recent accounting literature calls the international development assemblage (Martinez & Cooper, 2017, 2019; Rahaman et al., 2010) and dives into the role of accounting in the donor-NGO encounter. The essay shows first how Western donors introduce accounting and accountability programs as devices of colonial authority. Subsequently, the essay identifies five responses that the NGO uses to navigate the development assemblage and advance its own ambitions. Using Bhabha's (1994) post-colonial approach of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence, the essay demonstrates that the donor-NGO encounter gives rise to a third space in which the NGO is both an accomplice and resister of colonial authority. This ambivalence that occurs in this third space also influences accounting, which becomes a double-edged tool that helps to mobilize the NGO's mission but also caters to the programmatic and ideological ambitions of Western actors. This essay contributes to the accounting literature by showing that the link between NGO agency and donor managerial and accountability agendas escape absolute poles of acceptance and rejection. Instead, manifestations of NGO agency move in a space of ambivalence: they simultaneously have a foot in both poles of acceptance and rejection of donor practices. In addition, the essay shows that accounting has an ambivalent role in the donor-NGO encounter. On one hand, it mobilizes the NGO's marginal aspirations and allows it to navigate the international development assemblage. On the other hand,

it sustains the managerial homogenizing agenda of Western donors. Despite contestations and challenges from the NGO, accounting advances donors' neocolonial authority.

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 present the three essays, each with its own conclusions, limitations, and directions for future research. Finally, Chapter 5 highlights the overall contribution of the dissertation.

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Chapter 2: Trust in international cooperation: Emotional and cognitive trust complement each other over time

Abstract

I unpack trust and its underlying emotional and cognitive dimensions over time, based on a case study of a Colombian human-rights NGO and its donors. The emotional trust dimension is anchored in the values and interests that the NGO and its donors share. The cognitive trust dimension is grounded in the control and reporting practices of the NGO and its donors. I highlight the dynamic nature of trust by showing how the emotional and cognitive dimensions shape trust over time as the NGO-donor relationship progresses. Depending on the relationship stage, trust can be grounded relatively more or less in its emotional and cognitive dimensions. Across the different stages of the relationship, the two trust dimensions are complements and reinforce one another. My study highlights that trust in NGOs is not replaced by accountability, as accounting and civil society research argues. Instead, accountability and trust, especially its emotional dimension, are mutually constitutive.

2.1 Introduction

Civil society and accounting research recognizes trust as fundamental for international cooperation and development (Agyemang et al., 2017; Bebbington, 2005; Becker et al., 2020; Davis et al., 2020; Dewi et al., 2019; Diallo & Thuillier, 2005; Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Martinez & Cooper, 2017; C. Yang et al., 2017; Yates et al., 2021). However, trust remains poorly understood as scholars characterize it in two opposite ways.

On the one hand, trust is viewed as having been eroded and replaced by highly regulated contracts, administrative codes, and stringent controls (Cooley, 2010; Eikås & Selle, 2002; Elbers et al., 2014; Evans et al., 2005; Wallace, 2004). Trust is no longer relevant for international cooperation relations, henceforth governed by accountability and administration. On the other hand, scholars propose an alternative to this "lost trust" (Power, 1994, p. 10): they argue that trust has changed and is grounded in calculative procedures, management systems, and audit expertise (Davenport & Low, 2013; Martinez & Cooper, 2017; Power, 1994, 1997). This view emphasizes

rationality (Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017) and conceptualizes trust as a mere cognitive exercise that predicts an actor's behaviour by assessing their attributes (Coleman, 1994; Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 2002; Nooteboom, 2002; Williamson, 1993). Trust is reduced to a cognitive dimension that involves knowledge (Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017). To promote accountability based on transparency and external oversight, the governing actors in international cooperation have implicitly adopted this rational view of trust (Becker, 2018; Burger & Seabe, 2014; Dougherty, 2019; Havrda & Kutílek, 2010; Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Phillips, 2012; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010; van Zyl & Claeyé, 2019).

The two views above characterize trust as either irrelevant or unidimensional and grounded in cognitions. My study cautions that this characterization of trust is incomplete, as it sidesteps the emotional dimension of trust, which, as I show, is essential for international cooperation. Moreover, the two views implicitly depict trust as static. My study admonishes that this static view of trust is lacking as it is silent on how trust, as I find, changes over time as cooperation relationships progress.

I use a case study of a Colombian human-rights non-governmental organization (NGO) funded by various donors. At this NGO, I record participant observations and collect interviews and documentation; I also interview individuals in international aid. I show how trust in the relationship between the NGO and its donors is grounded in cognitive and emotional dimensions that interact, consistent with the sociological view of trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). I also illustrate how trust is dynamic. The role of the emotional and cognitive trust dimensions evolves as the NGO-donor relationship progresses through different stages. Early on, when the NGO sets up its mission and attracts potential donors, the emotional dimension is paramount. As the NGO-donor relationship solidifies and donors decide to fund the NGO, the cognitive trust dimension gains importance. It recedes again into the background when the NGO designs projects and implements them on the ground, often in physically remote areas far away from donors. During the reporting and audit stage, the cognitive dimension is most salient, as the NGO reports on its projects and their results while being audited by donors. The emotional dimension becomes critical again in the last stage when the NGO and its donors consider their future and decide whether to maintain and renew their relationship. Throughout the relationship stages, the emotional and cognitive dimensions act as complements and support one another.

In sum, I show how trust in international cooperation can be bidimensional, dynamic, and interactive. I extend the literature on trust, accountability, and NGOs by cautioning that the unidimensional approach for understanding trust undertheorizes trust (Cooley, 2010; Eikås & Selle, 2002; Elbers et al., 2014; Engdahl & Lidskog, 2014; Evans et al., 2005; Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Martinez & Cooper, 2017; Power, 1994, 1997; Sloan & Oliver, 2013; Tremblay-Boire et al., 2016; Wallace, 2004). Trust can be close to unidimensional and characterized by its cognitive dimension, but only during a particular stage in the NGO-donor relationship (i.e., the reporting and audit stage). Over the lifetime of this relationship, trust cannot be reduced to its cognitive dimension; instead, it is better conceptualized as a bi-dimensional construct grounded in an emotional dimension as well. My dynamic approach for analyzing trust further highlights how the emotional and cognitive dimensions wax and wane over time depending on the NGO-donor relationship stage. My study illustrates that a unidimensional, static view of trust results in misunderstanding how trust relates to accountability. By reducing trust to rational assessments, this view substitutes trust with accountability. Instead, my analysis highlights that the emotional trust dimension interacts with accountability in mutually reinforcing ways throughout the cooperation relationship.

I proceed as follows. Next, I review research on trust in international cooperation. Section 3 discusses the sociological framework I use for characterizing trust. Section 4 details the case study, data, and methods. In Section 5, I present the findings; I discuss their implications in Section 6. Finally, I conclude.

2.2 Literature Review

Civil society and accounting research focuses on accountability, governance, and accounting practices and how they shape international cooperation relationships. It discusses NGO accountability using a rational perspective of trust, which reduces trust to knowledge, "a calculative exercise involving observations of other actors that yields a prediction about their future behaviour." (Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017, p. 139) An actor trusts once they have rationally assessed a potential partner's attributes based on available evidence and can conclude that the attributes are positive and help predict partner behaviour (Coleman, 1994; Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 2002; Nooteboom, 2002; Williamson, 1993). Sloan and Oliver (2013) and Becker et al. (2020) admonish that research on trust-building in partnerships focuses on rational practices

that signal quality and trustworthiness. Similarly, Yates et al. (2021) recognize the existence of a notion of trust that "reinforces the role of accounting, reporting, and transparency within the building of trust." (p. 6) Consistent with this view of trust, governing actors in international cooperation highlight transparency, disclosure, and performance (AbouAssi & Trent, 2016; Cazenave & Morales, 2021; Goncharenko, 2019; Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Mawdsley et al., 2005; Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2019; Wenar, 2006).

The rational view of trust characterizes trust as unidimensional and anchored in cognitions. Some scholars implicitly recognize that more than knowledge can be involved in trust that characterizes relationships between Northern donors and Southern organizations. Eikås and Selle (2002) posit that relations between donors and non-profit organizations (NPOs) have shifted, from an "old system of cooperation, basically founded upon close integration and mutual trust" (p. 48) to a new human services architecture, which stresses "competition, time-limited contracts, legal control and accountability." (p. 48) Similarly, Evans, Richmond and Shields (2005) argue that, in the past, "relationships between the State and NPOs tended to be regulated by bonds of trust, not highly regulated contracts" (p. 76) and that "administrative accountability has come to replace the more informal trust relationships that prevailed during the Keynesian period." (p. 87) Wallace (2004) points out how, in foreign aid, "the new tools of management and accountability are used where trust does not exist or has broken down." (p. 215) Elbers, Knippenberg, and Schulpen (2014) explain that trust and equality have become "difficult to uphold" (p. 8) due to the advent of development managerialism, which emphasizes effectiveness, technicality, and transparency. Martinez and Cooper (2017) and Davenport and Low (2013) document how relationships shifted from being grounded in trust and solidarity to an assemblage based on formalized administrative codes and audit-based compliance. These scholars recognize that trust can involve more than knowledge. Nevertheless, they suggest that relationships based on trust have shifted to be driven exclusively by knowledge and grounded in controls and accountability practices.

This research relates to the general debate on trust and accountability, which is usually framed in an agency view that conceptualizes relationships in terms of agents and principals (Becker, 2018; Hielscher et al., 2017; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010; Tremblay-Boire et al., 2016; Yates et al., 2021). Since predicting another actor's behaviour is key in the agency view, it uses accountability as a substitute or proxy for trust (Swift, 2001; Yates et al., 2021). Following Agyemang et al. (2019), scrutiny-through-accountability mechanisms proxy for trust in sectors

that lack trust. Contracts and information are the glue that holds relationships together (Seal & Vincent-Jones, 1997), making trust moot (Gundlach & Cannon, 2010; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Consistent with the agency view (Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017), the rational perspective of trust focuses on gathering information for predictability purposes (Johnson & Grayson, 2005). Trust understood as not exclusively based on knowledge (e.g., anchored in shared values) is obsolete; formal accountability substitutes for trust (O'Neill, 2014).

In contrast, Power (1994) proposes an alternative view of trust. Although it is still framed in rational terms, his view suggests that new accountability models simply displace trust instead of replacing it. They shift the locus of trust from "those engaged in everyday work" to "experts involved in policing them, and to forms of documentary evidence or in management assurances about system integrity." (p. 11) In other words, "different conceptions of trust are produced through procedures, expertise and calculations." (Martinez & Cooper, 2017, p. 26) With the rise of new public management where control, efficiency, and accountability are encouraged, organizational arrangements favour systems that can be audited. Experts (i.e., auditors) become trust guardians, suggesting that trust shifts from partner organizations to systems and verification experts. In the words of Cazenave and Morales (2021): "to gain the trust of their funders, NGOs first need to gain the trust of their auditors, which means making themselves more auditable." (p. 12)

My discussion illustrates how managerial and accountability practices are prominent in international cooperation and how they have changed many "dispositional relationships" to "contractually situational" ones (Cooley, 2010, p. 246). Trust is viewed, at best, as a unidimensional construct grounded in knowledge and, at worst, as irrelevant. I caution that this view of trust is incomplete as it sidesteps the continuing relevance of emotions in trust and how emotions and knowledge evolve and interact. The concept of trust, I argue, is not only bidimensional but also dynamic.

I unpack the bidimensional and dynamic nature of trust in international cooperation. My goal is to improve the understanding of how emotions and cognitions comprise trust, how they evolve throughout cooperation relationships, and how they interact.

2.3. Theoretical framework

I discuss the general scholarship on trust before describing the sociological perspective of trust that underlies my analysis.

2.3.1. The concept of trust

Trust permeates life on many levels (i.e., personal, intra-organizational, inter-organizational, systemic), is slippery, and difficult to study (Amoako, 2019; Das & Teng, 2001; Frederiksen, 2016; Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Luhmann, 1979; Nooteboom, 2002; Nooteboom, 2011). Scholars have proposed various conceptualizations of trust, grounded in calculus, knowledge, and identification (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996); goodwill and competence (Vélez et al., 2008); and affect and cognition (McAllister, 1995). Nevertheless, scholars agree on an underlying understanding of trust that englobes three elements—reliance, risk, positive expectations—that characterize a relationship between at least two actors (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Hoffman, 2002; Jagd & Fuglsang, 2016; McAllister, 1995; Möllering, 2005a). Sako (1992) posits that trust is "an expectation held by one trading partner about another, that the other behaves or responds in a predictable and mutually expected manner." (p. 37) Similarly, Gambetta (1988), Mayer et al. (1995), Lewicki & Bunker (1996), Das & Teng (2001), and Vélez et al. (2008) suggest that trust involves positive expectations in a risky situation, about another actor.

The two-sidedness of trust lies at the core of any analysis of trust (Nooteboom, 2002). An actor, the trustor (i.e., the subject of trust), places trust in another actor, the trustee (i.e., the object of trust). Their relationship is the unit of analysis. In this context, "to ask any question about trust is implicitly to ask about the reasons for thinking the relevant party to be trustworthy" (Hardin, 2002, p. 1). Trust, then, is tied to how an actor's trustworthiness is assessed (Malkamäki et al., 2016). Trustworthiness relates to "trustees' perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity." (Amoako, 2019, p. 82) It involves trustee characteristics and actions that lead the trustor to trust the trustee more or less (Mayer et al., 1995).

This characterization of trust can be traced back to traditional sociological research on trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Luhmann, 1979; Misztal, 1996; Möllering, 2001; Simmel & Wolff, 1964). This research posits that trust is a collective attribute applicable to social interactions rather than isolated psychological states. Trust is a "mutual faithfulness on which all social relationships ultimately depend" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 968). It functions as the best alternative to the extremes of "chaos and paralysing fear" (Luhmann, 1979, p. 4). Although indispensable in social

relationships, trust always involves an element of risk and potential doubt (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Since trust requires engaging with other actors in uncertain situations, it is foremost relational, future-oriented, and risk-related.

2.3.2. Trust: Emotion, Cognition and Behavior

I now further discuss the sociological perspective on trust. According to Lewis and Weigert (1985), the unitary social experience of trust has three dimensions, or sociological bases: cognition, emotion, and behaviour. Cognition refers to processes that enable actors to identify "persons and institutions that are trustworthy" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 970), based on knowledge and experience with the object of trust. The actor who trusts cognitively chooses whom they trust in what circumstances (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). The familiarity needed to trust is developed through the cognitive dimension via factual knowledge about the object of trust. It enables the trustor to make a cognitive leap "beyond the expectations that reason and experience alone would warrant" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 970) since trust "presumes a state of incomplete knowledge" (Johnson & Grayson, 2005, p. 501). Otherwise, actors would be omniscient, thus obviating the need to trust (McAllister, 1995).

Complementing the cognitive trust dimension is the emotional dimension, grounded in affective bonds and emotional investments in a relationship (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). When forming cognitions, an actor develops emotional bonds with the object of trust, which usually involve shared identity and values (Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Luhmann, 1979). The emotional dimension contributes to justifying the act of trust based on a belief in the relationship's intrinsic virtue (McAllister, 1995). Johnson & Grayson (2005) point out that "as emotional connections deepen, trust in a partner may venture beyond that which is justified by available knowledge." (p. 501) Without the emotional dimension, "proper trust does not occur" (Möllering, 2001, p. 410).

The third dimension is behaviour, which is the actual undertaking of the trusting act, its "behavioral enactment" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 971). For Lewis and Weigert (1985), the behavioural dimension involves undertaking a risky course of action after having formed positive expectations about the counterpart's actions. This dimension interacts with and reinforces the cognitive and emotional dimensions to create a unitary social trust experience.

Since behaviour is the constitutive medium for enacting trust, Lewis and Weigert (1985) posit that all trusting relationships mix cognitive and emotional dimensions. They speak of cognitive and emotional trust. Cognitive trust refers to knowledge, facts, and rational choices. Emotional trust alludes to common principles, shared values, affections, and goodwill. The cognitive and emotional dimensions represent two theoretical extremes of a trust continuum that characterize all trusting relationships. Lewis and Weigert (1985) point out how both dimensions are necessary, arguing that "if all cognitive content were removed from emotional trust, we would be left with blind faith or fixed hope […] on the other hand, if all emotional content were removed from cognitive trust, we would be left with nothing more than a coldblooded prediction or rationally calculated risk […] trust in everyday life is a mix of feeling and rational thinking, and so to exclude one or the other from the analysis of trust leads only to misconceptions that conflate trust with faith or prediction." (p. 972)

The framework of Lewis and Weigert (1985) emphasizes how emotions and cognitions "are present in every instance of trust to some extent" (p. 972) and how the qualitative mix of these trust dimensions differs "across instances of trust" (p. 972). Trust can vary across relationships. In some relationships, the cognitive dimension matters more (e.g., trust in a system), while in others, the emotional dimension dominates (e.g., trust in interpersonal relationships). My study is concerned not with how trust varies across relationships but with how it varies within a particular relationship over time. Lewis and Weigert (1985) suggest dynamism in how trust works by pointing out that one of the two trust dimensions can be prevalent in the unitary experience of trust. However, they do not explore how trust, and its cognitive and emotional dimensions, evolve within a relationship. I address this question in the setting of international cooperation.

2.4. Methodology

I rely on a qualitative inquiry that uses field observations, interviews, and archival data (Denscombe, 2014; Spradley, 2016). Qualitative inquiries reveal the complexity inherent in natural settings and focus on bounded phenomena embedded in their context (Miles et al., 2013). They enable researchers to meaningfully capture the dynamics involved in how practices, such as those involved in trust, develop over time because they help unfold social processes (Savolainen & Ikonen, 2016).

My inquiry involves three months of fieldwork, including interviews, in a Colombian NGO named DREAM.[1] My goal was to capture events, factors, and conditions that shape DREAM's relationships with its donors. I also interview individuals in foreign aid who work in accounting, compliance, auditing, and project management. I aimed to capture the views of actors outside of DREAM and to triangulate insights from the fieldwork.

2.4.1. Research Site

DREAM is a Colombian NGO that works on peace, justice, and human rights. Its activities range from promoting and protecting human rights in Colombia to legally and juridically assisting victims of internal Colombian conflicts in cases such as rural community land spoliation, social leader persecution, and illegal arrests by governmental security forces. DREAM engages in intense advocacy work to denounce, at the international level, the precarious human rights situation in Colombia. Formal and volunteer staff at regional and national levels carry out DREAM's initiatives.

Four decades ago, DREAM emerged from grassroots movements; it has chapters across Colombia and strong links with similar social and political organizations. DREAM is one of the first organizations to have defended human rights in Colombia. When DREAM was created, Colombia was shaken by an intense political agitation that involved two clashing forces—a growing leftist movement and a severely repressive Colombian government.

At the time, political power in Colombia was concentrated in a few hands. Dominant elites exercised authoritarian control to contain and silence dissident voices for a more just, inclusive, and equal country. Clashes between elites and dissidents brought episodes of violence against popular movements of students, unions, peasants, and the working class. These episodes involved arrests based on political grounds; evictions of peasants and racial minorities from ancestral lands; and tortures, massacres, and forced disappearances of individuals from opposition parties. Many of these practices were illegal and violated human rights. In this context, DREAM emerged as a civil society response to the social and political situation and a much-needed counterforce to the Colombian government's authoritarian and unfair actions. DREAM has a clear goal: denounce and fight criminal power abuses and support political repression victims.

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[1] To protect confidentiality, I use pseudonyms for all organizations and do not disclose some dates and other details.

Soon after its creation, DREAM started to consolidate its presence at the national level by opening chapters across Colombia. It reached out to international agencies to make visible, at the international level, the critical Colombian human rights situation. At this time, DREAM started to receive funding from international NGOs for its political goals.

Throughout the years, DREAM has resisted the emergence of new armed actors, new forms of political repression, and even violent attacks against itself. DREAM maintains its original mission and has expanded its work to adapt to changes in the Colombian social and political reality. Recently, threats against social leaders surged; in 2020, 310 human rights defenders were assassinated in Colombia (Indepaz, 2021). The Colombian government continues to avoid making sufficient efforts to protect human rights, especially after the peace agreements signed with guerrilla groups in 2016 (Pardo, 2019).

DREAM's highest decision-making body is the National Assembly, which has delegates from regional chapters. The Assembly has the mandate to determine the overall strategy, direction, and work plan and approve financial statements and the general budget. This mandate is implemented by the National Executive Committee, whose members are elected by the National Assembly.

Two main groups carry out DREAM's operations. The first group (henceforth POL) includes 15 lawyers, researchers, and political scientists who plan, implement, and evaluate projects. POL represents the core of DREAM's missional work. The second group is the administrative and accounting team (ADCO) responsible for budgeting, financial reporting, accounting, control, and general management. ADCO includes an administrative manager, a part-time accountant, two accounting technicians, and an administrative assistant. The law requires that an external statutory auditor monitors their work. Management and internal control duties are the joint responsibility of the National Executive Committee and ADCO.

DREAM is suitable for studying trust in international cooperation because its funding is highly dependent on resources from several international donors. At the time of the study, DREAM received funds channelled through about 11 cooperation agencies and NGOs (from Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Norway) and multilateral programs. These funds come from ultimate donors (e.g., governments of Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland; the European Commission). DREAM's relationships with its donors are anchored in shared political objectives. DREAM defines itself as a civil society organization whose political and social mission is to

defend human rights. Organizations that support DREAM share this objective or the vision of a country with social justice and free from human rights violations. Cooperation agreements that DREAM signs with its donors back up these shared values.

2.4.2. Data Collection

The fieldwork at DREAM took place between late January and April 2019. One co-author was the on-site researcher; they gained access to DREAM using professional contacts who introduced them to relevant decision-makers. The researcher negotiated access to DREAM in exchange for a twelve-week full-time unpaid internship in the administrative and accounting team (henceforth ADCO). Because the researcher has a background in accounting and business, their main task consisted of helping ADCO. The researcher worked daily and hand-in-hand with ADCO on various activities (e.g., budgeting cooperation projects; general financial planning, accounting, and control; economic reporting to donors; updating administrative procedures). The researcher conducted ten in-depth formal interviews with key personnel and had informal conversations with other staff. They experienced first-hand how controls, requirements, and accountability demands from projects shaped DREAM's relationships with its donors. While the researcher was a member of ADCO for all internship-related purposes, their role as an outside academic researcher was clear to everyone at DREAM from the start. Being an insider and outsider and being aware of their dual-purpose role (Spradley, 2016) helped the researcher avoid "going native" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). The researcher retrieved relevant documents from DREAM (listed in Appendix A).

Formal interviews were semi-structured. I used a flexible protocol, shown in Appendix B, to ensure the on-site researcher was open and responsive to the interview situation and could adjust interactions with interviewees to their position, experience, relationships with external stakeholders, and work area. Interviews lasted between 30 and 65 minutes each. Informal conversations and observations proved as valuable as formal interviews. Witnessing events and routines at DREAM and having casual chats with the personnel enabled the on-site researcher to capture details, processes, relationships, and other elements that expanded knowledge on relevant issues or confirmed what interviewees told. The researcher noted informal conversations and observations in their daily field log-book. These diverse sources enriched the accounts and understanding of DREAM.

Outside of DREAM, and during two years (from July 2018 to July 2020), the on-site researcher conducted 26 formal interviews with Colombian and international actors in foreign aid (i.e., Northern NGO personnel, program managers, accountants), listed in Appendix A. Some actors were directly related to DREAM (e.g., donors, auditors, a former DREAM executive member). Interviews, which lasted between 30 and 80 minutes, were digitally recorded when permitted. They focused on control, accounting and administrative practices, project design, accountability requirements, and donor-NGO relationships.

All interviewees inside and outside of DREAM gave formal consent to being interviewed via an individual consent form. All interviews were digitally recorded when allowed (see Appendix A). In 11 cases where recording was not possible, the researcher took detailed notes during and right after each interview to ensure information was registered in verbatim form and appropriately summarize the interview.

The on-site researcher accessed formal documentation publicly available from the cooperation agencies' websites (e.g., cooperation agreement templates, terms of reference, funding conditions). They took notes from DREAM's archives (e.g., about control and accountability procedures), cooperation agreements, project proposals, budgets, programmatic and financial reports, e-mail correspondence, and publications (see Appendix A). Except for five interviews and some documentation, all data are in Spanish. I have translated all excerpts and documents shown in this study.

2.4.3. Data Analysis

My approach is inductive and interpretive: it recognizes that "interpretations of actors take place within a particular historical, political and economic context" (Collier, 2001, p. 70), and its theorizing process is data-driven (Langley, 1999a). I use a bottom-up approach and thoroughly read my texts (e.g., interview transcripts) to understand their significant themes. During this process, I refer to trust research and link themes in my texts to the sociological view of trust because of its tight fit with my themes.

I use thematic analysis via NVivo. In the first coding round, I group related concepts under one theme. I pay attention to the context that interviewees discuss, which helps us understand relevant events (e.g., specific actions by governing actors in international aid, political events in Colombia). I code and analyze iteratively by identifying and refining themes while referring to

trust research. The on-site researcher asks some interviewees inside and outside DREAM for feedback on the coding and analysis outcome.

This iterative process reveals how trust in this setting is dynamic. Interviewees stress temporality and dynamics by referring to the past and how DREAM's relationships with donors have evolved. I do not carry out a longitudinal study that follows in real-time how trust develops. Instead, I use an indirect, retrospective approach similar to Savolainen and Ikonen (2016), which implies that data related to the past is "analyzed and interpreted to make an inference about the process of emergence after it has occurred, but the process is implicit and assumed since direct, real-time assessment is not possible." (Savolainen & Ikonen, 2016, p. 241) This approach is used in organizational research to capture temporality and dynamics (Adobor, 2005; Coslor & Spaenjers, 2016; Kozlowski et al., 2013).

In the last step, I use the coded themes within the complexities and contextual events in the field (Van Maanen, 2011) to produce a narrative of the dynamic features of trust and its dimensions throughout the different stages of DREAM's relationship with its donors. My research is partially inspired by problematization (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011), which involves generating research questions by challenging assumptions in scholarship. My interest in trust does not originate from challenging assumptions in research. Instead, once I started working with my data, I realized that I need to unpack trust because of the problematic assumptions that scholars make about it.

2.5. Findings

The emotional and cognitive trust dimensions are present and interact throughout DREAM's relationships with its donors. These relationships are characterized by six stages: DREAM's mission setup, fundraising, project design, project implementation, reporting and audit, and renewal of funds. Table 2.1 summarizes, for each stage, the emotional and cognitive dimensions, which I now discuss.

2.5.1. Mission setup

About 40 years ago, DREAM set up its mission to defend and promote human rights and social justice. DREAM emerged from the Colombian social movement that wanted to address government violations and unfair actions. A magazine from the Colombian social movement describes its birth and mission.

"The movement around human rights defense emerges around YEAR X, in a relation of open conflict with the State. In this first instance [the early years of the Colombian human rights movement], the [human rights'] NGOs focus on denouncing, fighting and educating about human rights violations perpetrated by state actors [...] In this context, DREAM was born [...] DREAM is committed to contributing to demanding, promoting, and disseminating the respect for human rights of all people in Colombia." (Magazine A, 2013)

DREAM embarked on its advocacy work with its founders' private funds. It engaged in knowledge work to disseminate its mission and activities: it denounced, at the international level, human rights abuses and issued bulletins about the Colombian human rights movement. This knowledge work ensured that well-known international human rights organizations noticed the grave Colombian human rights violations and visited Colombia to expose these violations, which local authorities encouraged (Our History, DREAM, 2013).

"DREAM is a legal entity of a non-partisan, broad nature [...] its role is to denounce the governmental repression and abuses of unions and promote a solidarity movement with imprisoned social leaders. To build on these denouncements, it published this document, which reaffirms and demonstrates the truthfulness of events that DREAM denounced a long time ago." (Visit Report, International Organization 1, 1980)

In this stage, DREAM has no formal relationships with donors; it starts interacting with potential donors and international cooperation agencies intent on improving Colombian human rights (Our History, DREAM, 2013) and building relationships around the human rights cause. These first interactions involve a mix of the cognitive trust dimension (e.g., DREAM's knowledge work) and the emotional dimension (e.g., shared principles and mutual concern about human rights). Without DREAM's knowledge work, the bonds between donors and DREAM would not have emerged. Once donors know about Colombia's precarious human rights situation, they become interested in supporting human rights defence work. Even though donors have few cognitive elements to use as a basis for decision-making, these elements capture their attention, at which point the emotional trust dimension takes over. While both trust dimensions are mutually supportive and necessary, the emotional dimension is prominent. Ultimately, concerns about human rights and interest in supporting fragile social movement organizations enable formal relationships to develop.

Stage	Emotional trust	Cognitive trust	Interaction between emotional and cognitive trust
Mission setup	Forty years ago, DREAM set up its mission (i.e., human rights defence, social justice) and built ties to international organizations that shared its values and priorities.	DREAM's knowledge work (e.g., bulletins, international advocacy) attract the attention of international organizations.	The two trust dimensions are complements and necessary. The cognitive dimension ensures that donors know about DREAM and its work. The emotional dimension is most salient since shared concerns for human rights enable the relationship to emerge.
Fundraising	Potential partnerships between DREAM and its donors start and develop because of shared values and interests.	Donors screen DREAM's administrative, operative, and accountability capacities.	The two trust dimensions are complements, necessary, and equally important. The cognitive and emotional dimensions both are necessary and enable the relationship to progress.
Project Design	DREAM submits project proposals following its objectives and approach. Donors do not challenge DREAM's project conception since they believe in DREAM's motivations.	DREAM's proposals need to comply with donor guidelines and requirements and need to follow the logical framework.	The two trust dimensions are complements, necessary, and equally important. The cognitive dimension enables donors to complete the project proposal and direct DREAM's behaviour. The emotional dimension enables donors to provide DREAM with autonomy.
Project Implementation	DREAM implements activities using its expertise and approach. Donors do not intervene significantly. They rely on DREAM's political and advocacy work.	Donors focus on administrative accountability (e.g., verification of receipts). DREAM needs donor approval to modify major project activities.	The two trust dimensions are complements, necessary, and equally important. The emotional dimension enables project implementation since donors cannot physically check each activity in the field. The cognitive dimension ensures that DREAM is accountable for its fieldwork.
Reporting and Audit	The emotional dimension is mostly absent, but donors can be flexible (e.g., accountability requirements).	DREAM needs to submit progress and budget reports and is externally audited.	The cognitive dimension is dominant, and the emotional dimension is mostly absent.
Renewal of Funds	Donors remain interested in funding DREAM since they believe in its mission and motivations.	Donors assess project renewal via their experience with DREAM. Donors and DREAM may agree on improvement plans.	The two trust dimensions are complements, necessary, and equally important. The emotional dimension strengthens affective bonds between DREAM and donors; the cognitive dimension offers them new information, enabling them to adjust their behaviour.

Table 2.1. Emotional and cognitive trust in each stage of the relationship between DREAM and its donors and their interaction

2.5.2 Fundraising

Potential partnerships between DREAM and its donors start with values and interests that donors share with DREAM.

"DREAM has long-term relationships with agencies from Switzerland, from Spain, with NNGO1, which have been relationships of 8, 10, 30 years. These relationships result from the affinity and alignment between the interests of the donor and those of DREAM."[2] (Executive Committee Member A, DREAM)

DREAM communicates its interests and values by engaging in lobbying and advocacy practices that target international governments, civil society organizations, and NGOs. These practices enable DREAM to raise awareness about human rights and internal conflicts in Colombia and establish links for potential cooperation initiatives.

"DREAM MEMBER X has been in several countries of the European Union making public before several governmental and civil society actors the human rights situation in Colombia. [...] IO2 invited DREAM MEMBER X to talk to the Human Rights Sub-commission of the European Parliament. [...] DREAM MEMBER X emphasized that the international community is not aware of the human rights crisis that their country is going through." (IO2, Public interview, 2013, discussing a high-level officer at DREAM)

Advocacy work makes DREAM visible, nationally and internationally. It attracts donors that share DREAM's vision about its missional work.

"An initiative from the presidency that started in 2011 was precisely to have an active fundraising agenda [...] So what we did was strengthen the links with civil society organizations. [...] we have always been focused on Europe, both public and private entities from Europe. [...] One way to give visibility to our work and to obtain resources was precisely to build networks with organizations from there." (POL Member, DREAM)

"We look for organizations that share our values, that fight for the same causes. That is our work base [...]. In the beginning, we don´t ask for big things, only that organizations share the same convictions to fight against poverty and inequalities." (High-level officer, Donor of DREAM, NNGO 3)

During fund-raising, donors look beyond sharing DREAM's values and mission; they are interested in features such as DREAM's administrative and accountability capacity.

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[2] I identify donors as NNGO1, NNGO2, etc. NNGO stands for "Northern NGO."

"This is the gathering of relevant information regarding a potential partner and using that information to make a decision on whether it qualifies to be a partner or not. The assessment targets three main areas;

- *Identity of the Civil Society Organization in relation to Donor X vision, mission, goals and values. Are we compatible?*
- *Programmatic fit with Donor X's work.*
- *Capacity – current and willingness to acquire more." (General Conditions, Donor of DREAM, NNGO2)*

The excerpt shows how both missional and administrative elements are relevant for donors that explore partnership potential. Donors formally screen organizations they are interested in and assess their administrative, legal, and control practices. Results and audit reports from previous projects become evidence for donors.

"Reputation is one of the elements that lead to trust. And reputation is built through former experiences with previous cooperation projects. Cooperation agencies start to ask, 'send me your previous audit reports, send me reports of previous projects you have implemented,' also initial assessments. Just sending documentation about those former projects starts to create a reputation and the trust to work with the organization." (Administrative and financial manager, local NGO)

In sum, fundraising activities involve the emotional and cognitive trust dimensions. The emotional dimension is grounded in how donors share DREAM's interests and values and rally around its missional work. The cognitive dimension is anchored in how donors formally screen DREAM's administrative, operative, and accountability capacities to undertake projects. Without the cognitive dimension, donors would lack the sense that they can predict DREAM's behaviour, which is crucial for them to commit funds. Without the emotional dimension, donors would not feel comfortable relying on DREAM beyond the information they use during screening. A partnership with DREAM requires that donors feel optimistic about DREAM's motivations. Both trust dimensions reinforce one another and are equally crucial for the emerging relationship. They interact as complements in securing the relationship between DREAM and its donors.

2.5.3. Project Design

Project design is highly intertwined with fundraising. Usually, donors establish the parameters of the projects they wish to fund. Within these parameters, DREAM submits project proposals following its objectives, approaches, and lines of action.

"[Cooperation] agencies sort of design the path; they indicate the scope of action in which we can move. We are a human rights organization; we are clear about what we want to change; we know what we want to target. But each call for proposals delineates our framework of action. [...] there is a sort of indirect influence in the type of projects that we formulate because they [donors] also define the sectors and problems they want to target. And we decide whether we submit a proposal for that call. So I would say there is a permanent dialogue between what the agency wants and what we want." (POL Member, DREAM)

An excerpt from a call for proposals from one of DREAM's donors illustrates how donors establish the parameters of projects they are interested in funding.

"Objective: Carry out activities of cooperation, solidarity, promotion, and consolidation of economic and social development in impoverished countries that aim at improving living conditions, promoting equality between men and women, and developing natural, technical and human resources. [...] Priorities: Promote knowledge and recognition of human and labour rights, as well as their respect, and denounce their violations." (Call for Proposals, Donor of DREAM, NNGO4)

DREAM designs projects at the program level by detailing how they are implemented and how its mission is carried out. DREAM also conceives the core aspects of proposals. Donors may require some changes and adjustments; however, they do not challenge DREAM's design and conception. They trust DREAM's political, social, and advocacy work.

"Donor trust is based on our work. DREAM is an organization with more than 40 years of work, and that generates trustworthiness among agencies. Our work and the reports about it are transparent and strengthen the relationship [...] Despite the prevalence of administration, the link of trust is there; agencies rely on political work." (Executive Committee Member A, DREAM)

Sometimes, project design does not involve a proposal but negotiations with donors about general advocacy work. Based on DREAM's mission, donors decide about funding.

"[After citing a specific example of an activity that DREAM carried out, which they were presenting to a donor] We do this, and if the cooperation agency buys our argument, it will assess whether it can cooperate and give resources to support DREAM's work."
(Executive Committee Member A, DREAM)

At the administrative level, DREAM's proposals are expected to comply with donors' guidelines, formats, and legal requirements. To clarify its objectives and ensure verifiability, DREAM uses the logical framework, a standard project methodology that donors demand (see

Appendix C).[3] Donors set the total budget allocation; some donors have predefined amounts to allocate while others are open to negotiation by agreeing to fund DREAM's needs. When a donor accepts a proposal or decides to fund DREAM, DREAM is expected to comply with particular reporting and accountability conditions at the time when it signs the cooperation agreement (e.g., be formally registered as an NGO; have no pending debts with local tax authorities or related to employee salaries and benefits).

When discussing an upcoming project, an NGO and donor may agree that the NGO undertake improvement plans in specific pre-identified areas[4].

> *"The main objective of the capacity assessment is to analyze the existing capacity strengths and weakness to build on the capacity assets and address the gaps by formulating a capacity development plan to make the organization perform effectively and efficiently, set and achieve objectives, solve problems and deliver better results." (General Conditions, Donor of DREAM, NNGO2)*

In this stage, both emotional and cognitive dimensions are necessary. Unlike other international cooperation arrangements where a donor hires a local NGO to implement a predefined project, DREAM designs its projects without donors intervening significantly. DREAM uses its convictions and objectives to develop the project's program and conceive its proposal, which requires that donors emotionally trust DREAM's strategies, expertise, and motivations. Without donors' emotional trust that translates into DREAM having autonomy in project conception and design, DREAM would not cooperate with donors. At the same time, DREAM's proposal is expected to respect technical, administrative, and accountability parameters that donors deem necessary for cooperating. While donors rely on cognitive trust to complete the proposal and direct DREAM's behaviour via improvement plans, the proposal's program requires their emotional trust. The emotional and cognitive dimensions interact as complements and are equally prominent.

2.5.4. Project Implementation

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[3] Also known as the logframe, the logical framework is a key tool for project planning that is expected to be included in each project proposal in the international cooperation sector. It involves a grid with assumptions, goals, outcomes, outputs, and activities, measured by indicators and means of verification. The logframe reflects technocratic goals of measurement and verifiability.

[4] Many donors look for strengthening their partner NGOs organizationally via improvement plans that apply not only to DREAM but to other local NGOs as well.

My fieldwork reveals that DREAM implements agreed-on activities using its approach and expertise. The POL team ensures implementation across Colombia. DREAM regularly communicates with donors about significant issues that arise during implementation. While a few donors offer to accompany DREAM's team in the field, most donors let DREAM handle the implementation. Donors may provide suggestions but, otherwise, refrain from intervening. Donors can do sporadic check visits in the field. In general, however, DREAM takes the initiative in showing its fieldwork to donors.

> *"As lawyers, we don't have the certainty that the result will be the one that we want, that a judge will embrace our arguments, and that they will rule in our favour. For us, as lawyers, it is important to know that they [donors] trust our work, which translates into logistic and economic support because it is not only a matter of money but also of logistic structures that help our work [...] Although there is no complete certainty about judicial outcomes, agencies know the work of DREAM. We have reached general goals and objectives. That builds trust for us." (Lawyer A, POL member, DREAM)*

Donors emotionally trust DREAM's mission and work. They believe in DREAM's intrinsic motivations for human rights and social justice and therefore rely on its political and advocacy activities. Donors stand behind DREAM's work, which they affirm publicly in their communications.[5] At the administrative level, donors pay extra attention to administrative accountability in areas such as project reporting, invoice and receipt verification, and compliance with legal requirements. They expect DREAM to provide them with means to verify that agreed-on activities have been implemented via, for instance, photographic evidence, attendance lists, and invoices.

> *"For donors, it is clear that politically, the organization executes its activities, implements what it has to do, and meets its objectives. So, about this, they are 'relaxed.' But the financial part is where they cast their eyes. Since they are a bit relaxed on the political aspect, they emphasize the financial domain." (ADCO Member, DREAM)*

Throughout project implementation, donors expect DREAM to comply with rules and conditions in cooperation agreements, including accounting and control requirements, financial management considerations, confidentiality conditions, and ethics codes (displayed in Appendix D). DREAM is expected to seek donor approval for changes to major project activities (including

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[5] In a recent case of threats and defamations against DREAM, various donors publicly expressed their support of DREAM as an important human rights advocate and highlighted DREAM's key role in Colombia's civil society. To maintain DREAM's anonymity, I do not present any excerpts from these public statements.

activity location, communities to attend to). Usually, donors understand that changes in project implementation may be necessary and readily approve them.

> *"We try to be very close to the action, to what the organizations do, because that allows you to understand when there are changes in planning, when there are changes in budget, and when there are delays in implementation. Those kinds of things go beyond what was planned initially and normally stress donors. If you are very close, with very fluid communication and close to what they [local NGOs] do, you measure what they are doing. You can better evaluate how much you push and how much you do not […] You help find solutions, making the organization feel that you are with them. You are not just supervising and monitoring, but you are aware of what they are facing and looking for joint solutions because the project belongs to both; it is not the project that I paid for, but you have to execute." (High-level officer, Donor of DREAM, NNGO 3)*

When donors have a certain level of comfort about an NGO's work, they are open to negotiating and finding alternative ways to advance project activities while ensuring the NGO's accountability. Donors' accountability demands do not drive DREAM's work on the ground yet constrain or impact some of it. DREAM's activities often occur in marginalized areas, where DREAM cannot obtain formal evidence (e.g., legal invoices, receipts). Sometimes DREAM must adjust its activities (e.g., implement them in other places) or negotiate alternative accountability practices (e.g., provide alternative documents for legal invoices).

> *"There are agencies that, due to their experience in Colombia, are quite understanding of certain realities. Realities like what? That you cannot ask everybody for invoices or receipts. For instance, when we do workshops [in the regions], people arrive in small fishing boats, on donkeys, in motorbikes, which means they are people [transportation service providers] who obviously do not have a formal business or legal registration; that does not exist in those territories [Colombian peripheral regions]. […] And some agencies understand this, but others do not, which generates difficulties for our political work, because it implies a series of restrictions, such as changing places where activities will take place, the exclusion of certain communities and people due to these same difficulties [of legalization of expenses]." (Project Coordinator, DREAM's sister Organization)*

During project implementation, there are training workshops, assistance procedures, and constant communication about providing administrative accounts.

> *"It is very important to have good communication with agencies because this allows us to exert proper control. They tell us what the best thing to do is, what the right thing to do is in a given situation, what we can improve on, and whether processes we undertake internally are adequate. They give us tips about how to improve, but always there is this link with them to report things in the right manner." (ADCO Member, DREAM)*

In summary, during project implementation, emotional and cognitive trust interact when DREAM implements activities on the ground, and donors demand accountability about the activities. Both the cognitive and emotional trust dimensions are necessary.

> *"Nowadays, the relationship [with donors] is still based on trust, but with all the rigour and requirements from the agencies: reports, attendance lists, means of verification, periodic financial reports. Monitoring from the agency has increased a lot, especially on the financial side. DREAM's projects still happen thanks to trust, but we need to comply with all the regulations." (ADCO member, DREAM)*

Emotional trust is necessary for project implementation since donors cannot physically check every single activity that DREAM implements in the field. Donors must rely on the feelings of comfort and security that DREAM's care and concern about its work generate. The emotional dimension is particularly salient when implementation deviates from the project proposal. When projects are delayed or DREAM cannot provide formal evidence, some donors are flexible and open to alternative accountability arrangements.[6] DREAM thus retains much autonomy in project implementation, and donors emotionally trust its implementation approach. Accordingly, donors do focus not on monitoring implementation but on administrative and accountability practices. DREAM needs to inform donors about significant events and comply with accountability requirements. Donors guide DREAM in fulfilling these requirements. DREAM is expected to be accountable for all its fieldwork, even when donors are flexible in finding alternative accountability arrangements. Some accountability requirements can affect DREAM's activities and how DREAM accounts for them, even though this is not their goal. Without accountability arrangements, which underlie the cognitive trust dimension, donors would not support DREAM's field activities. If DREAM does not meet accountability requirements during project implementation, donors can stop funding. In sum, the emotional and cognitive trust dimensions are equally essential and interact as complements. The most tangible outcome of the accountability process is reporting and audit, which I discuss next.

2.5.5. Reporting and Audit

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[6] Delays can happen due to public order problems in conflict zones where activities are being implemented, strikes and blockades, logistic aspects with beneficiary communities, and lack of staff in the regions.

Reporting and audit occur during and after project implementation. When starting a project, some donors hold training workshops to train NGOs like DREAM in reporting and accountability procedures.

> *"Most donors offer training when projects are about to start. […] Usually, it is a two or three-day workshop where they talk about the political and strategic part. On the second day, they talk about how they want the reports, how are we going to deliver them, and there is always a person that will accompany us in this regard throughout the project." (ADCO Member, DREAM)*

DREAM is expected to submit periodic narrative and quantitative financial reports that detail the progress on activities and budget execution. Some donors require that DREAM submit all invoices, receipts, and accounting records related to project implementation. Reporting is usually a necessary condition for funds to continue to be disbursed.[7] Donors guide DREAM during the reporting process to get reports in their preferred form. When a report is presented differently or has mistakes, donors ask for corrections, adjustments, and clarifications. At the administrative level, reporting is what holds the relationship together.

> *"From the administrative viewpoint, the only thing we can do is show sound management to make the donor feel confident that it is going to put its money in an organization that manages the money well and that will have a good operation with that money […] the way to sustain the relationship with the donor is to give it what it wants. And what it wants are reports both narrative and financial about what you are doing, evidence of what the donor is helping to build." (ADCO Member, DREAM)*

When projects are being implemented and finished, donors engage in additional verification activities through external audits (see Appendix D). Auditors examine internal controls, budget execution, administrative procedures, and project expenses. DREAM's accountant highlights the audit's importance for the relationship.

> *"We have audits on specific projects or audits on the entire organization […] we can lose credibility if the audit goes wrong, and we could lose funding resources. Therefore, we should comply with what is planned and budgeted with each donor." (ADCO Member, DREAM)*

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[7] Most donors disburse funds in partial installments (e.g., every six months). They pay a first installment; after six months, DREAM is expected to submit a report; the donor does not proceed with the subsequent installment until this report is received and approved. The same procedure applies for subsequent installments.

Reporting and audit are about accountability and information, which are critical elements of the cognitive trust dimension that dominates this relationship stage. The emotional dimension is less visible; it is present only behind the curtains. For instance, while donors are very strict with reporting conditions, they can be flexible with particular accountability requirements or reporting deadlines because of their emotional trust in DREAM. They can be lenient in interpreting adverse audit findings. They may hold training workshops mentioned above because they genuinely care about improving and professionalizing DREAM. The interaction between emotional and cognitive trust dimensions remains complementary, even though there is much less interaction than in previous stages due to the emotional dimension's reduced role.

2.5.6. Renewal of Funds

When a project with a donor is about to end, there may be an opportunity for funding to be renewed for the same or a new project. For renewal to happen, the donor needs to have funds available, and both parties need to maintain an interest in the relationship. Donors assess their interest by drawing on their experience of working and collaborating with DREAM. They rely on project results and overall project management. External auditors issue an opinion about DREAM's financial and administrative project management. Donors use this opinion to assess whether they wish to continue the relationship. If both parties agree to continue, they may agree on improving the local NGO and future project implementation.

> *"You should approach organizations to know their needs, their working times. We have a great advantage because we work in a very planned manner. We create clear work schedules, we do annual institutional strengthening plans, and from there, we say, 'ok, what are the things you want to prioritize this year considering the available personnel on the field?' That helps in the sense that people feel that they are participating in a process and that things are not imposed on them." (Program Officer, NNGO3)*

The nature of DREAM's mission and work implies that initiatives can lack short- or medium-term tangible results (e.g., judiciary cases against social leaders, social and political rallies to change the status quo). Still, some donors keep funding such initiatives due to their interest in social issues; they trust DREAM's mission and their relationship's strength.

> *"Something very important for the relationship is DREAM's social purpose. DREAM supports the victims [of Colombian conflicts]. Its social purpose is the victims, and it has been accountable administratively, financially. And politically, DREAM has taken its work to a high level of credibility because it has demonstrated to its donors that its social*

purpose or the objects of the cooperation agreements were 100% implemented for the benefit of communities and victims." (ADCO Member, DREAM)

In this stage, the emotional and cognitive trust dimensions interact and are equally important. The emotional dimension is grounded in how donors maintain their interest in the relationship, trust DREAM's mission, and positively assess DREAM's integrity in administrative and financial matters. The cognitive dimension is anchored in how DREAM and its donors, while working with each other on a project, gradually accumulate experience and learn new information, which becomes an additional informational input. This input adds to donors' other information (e.g., project reports, audit opinions) and enables donors and DREAM to adjust their behaviour continuously.

This additional input also has implications for the interactions between the cognitive and emotional trust dimensions. For instance, if a project goes well and DREAM reaches its goals, this success boosts DREAM's reputation. Donors then rely even more on the comfort generated by DREAM's advocacy work and may become more lenient or flexible in some requirements or situations. Throughout the relationship, the two trust dimensions are continually reflecting new informational and affective elements, which becomes especially visible in this last stage. As in the other stages, the two dimensions complement one another.

In summary, the six stages of the relationship between DREAM and its donors illustrate how the cognitive and emotional trust dimensions change over time and interact to constitute the dynamic experience of trust. Trust evolves as the relationship between DREAM and a donor progresses. During this evolution, the emotional and cognitive dimensions play different roles, depending on the relationship stage; yet, both dimensions are present in each stage and are interdependent. This interdependence is illustrated by how DREAM members reply when I ask about the overall elements that build trust in a relationship.

"First, I believe that to maintain stable relationships, there should be agreements, clear understandings at the political level. I mean, about our role in society and I think cooperation agencies understand this well. Besides the political side, there should be perfect clarity, perfect understanding of the context, and perfect comprehension of the role that we, the organizations, play. I consider that trust is also built upon the basis of administrative integrity. And we have been reliable and dutiful in the administrative part. I mean, we have earned the trust of all agencies that have worked with us because they recognize our integrity and the fulfillment of our obligations [...] and that integrity leads to agencies having trust." (Project Coordinator, DREAM)

"First, we are one of the first human rights organizations in Colombia. Second, our work is dedicated to the promotion of human rights. Third, we have been very judicious on the accounting and administrative levels. There has always been a good control of projects, and we have been accountable about them." (National Executive Committee Member B, DREAM)

2.6. Discussion

2.6.1. Interactions between cognitive and emotional trust

My findings show how trust in a cooperation relationship involves two dimensions—emotion and cognition—that interact and adjust continuously over time. The emotional dimension is grounded in donors sharing DREAM's political cause and values (e.g., "understandings at the political level," "promotion of human rights"). The cognitive dimension is anchored in donors knowing about DREAM's operational capacities and administrative compliance (e.g., "trust is also built upon the basis of administrative integrity," "judicious on the accounting and administrative level"). Each trust dimension is more or less crucial for the relationship, depending on its stage. I identify six stages: mission setup (i.e., the NGO establishes its mission), fundraising (i.e., the NGO and donor establish their cooperation), project design (i.e., the NGO designs funded projects), project implementation (i.e., the NGO executes projects), reporting and audit (i.e., the NGO reports on projects, their results, and is audited by the donor), and renewal (i.e., the NGO and donor decide whether and how to maintain their relationship). In the first two stages, during mission set-up and fundraising, trust is anchored in the emotional dimension that stresses shared goals and values, enabling donors to make the leap to commit to the cooperation. The emotional dimension complements the cognitive dimension, grounded in donors assessing the NGO.

As the relationship progresses, the two trust dimensions evolve and continue to reinforce each other. In the third and fourth stage, the emotional dimension is grounded in donors relying on DREAM's political work and intrinsic motivations, which are vital for project design and implementation. The cognitive dimension is anchored in DREAM complying with donor requirements, which ensures continuous donor support. In the fifth stage, during reporting and audit, cognitive trust dominates via accountability demands and monitoring procedures, which provide donors with information and enable them to monitor DREAM's behaviour. While the emotional dimension is less relevant, it remains present as donors continue to trust DREAM's mission and values. Accordingly, donors are willing to reduce their interventions during project implementation and are flexible with formal accountability practices. Finally, when DREAM seeks

to renew funding, the emotional and cognitive dimensions are anchored in new elements that emerged during the relationship (e.g., feelings about advocacy work, project results, audits) and help DREAM and its donor assess whether and how to sustain their relationship.

My findings show how the cognitive and emotional trust dimensions are dynamic in two respects. First, the relevance of each trust dimension varies depending on the relationship stage. In the mission setup stage, the emotional dimension is more prominent, while in the reporting and audit stage, the cognitive dimension dominates. Second, as the relationship progresses through its six stages, the two trust dimensions evolve as both parties learn new cognitive and affective elements relevant to the relationship. Donors incorporate new knowledge and feelings, which modifies their cognitive and emotional view of the NGO.

Overall, throughout the different stages, the emotional and cognitive dimensions are necessary and complement each other. If one dimension is missing, the other dimension cannot sustain the relationship. This complementary interaction crosses the boundaries of the individual stages: the two trust dimensions influence each other across the relationship's different stages. For instance, the shared values and affective bonds developed early on in the relationship enable donors, later on, to be flexible with some reporting requirements or lenient in interpreting audit findings. Here, the emotional trust that developed between the mission setup and project implementation stages affects the reporting and audit stage.

I characterize the six stages of the NGO-donor relationship linearly for exposition purposes. In practice, stages often overlap because NGOs simultaneously have multiple ongoing projects. For example, while DREAM submits a proposal to a new donor, its POL team works on the ground to implement a project co-financed by three other donors, each with specific accountability demands and deadlines. At the same time, the first-year audit of another project is occurring. The different activities that co-occur shape and reshape the trust between the NGO and its donors. For instance, they affect the NGO's reputation or confirm or invalidate how donors perceive the NGO. NGO activities continuously rearrange how its donors assess it at a cognitive and emotional level.

The six relationship stages that I present typically characterize a cooperation relationship in human rights and social progress. Other project arrangements are possible and may imply additional steps (e.g., requests for showing project results in particular scenarios, joint initiatives with other civil society organizations). These steps extend one or more of the six stages (e.g., requests for showing project results extend project implementation; joint initiatives with other civil

society organizations affect fundraising, project design, project implementation, and reporting and audit). My analysis remains relevant for understanding trust in a donor-NGO relationship characterized by these modified and extended stages: the emotional and cognitive dimensions continue to reinforce one another.

2.6.2. Implications

My dynamic conception of trust and its emotional and cognitive dimensions has four sets of implications. First, it challenges the view that cooperation relationships have shifted from being grounded in trust to being purely managerial. This view highlights that trust is no longer relevant to international cooperation relationships: it has been eroded and replaced by controls, accountability requirements, and administrative codes (Cooley, 2010; Eikås & Selle, 2002; Elbers et al., 2014; Evans et al., 2005; Wallace, 2004). I caution that cooperation relationships have not become purely managerial. Instead, trust remains present through the interaction of an emotional dimension that highlights shared values and a cognitive dimension that stresses accountability. This interaction is dynamic: the two trust dimensions evolve throughout the cooperation relationship in the role that they each play in ensuring trust.

Second, Martinez and Cooper (2017) argue that, in the new era of cooperation relationships, "different conceptions of trust are produced through procedures, expertise, and calculations." (p. 14) Similarly, Power (1994, 1997) posits that new public management emphasizes efficiency, control, and checking; it promotes systems that can be audited and wherein auditors become guardians of trust. These positions are related to a rational view of trust, according to which trust is reduced to its cognitive dimension grounded in obtaining information about others (Lewis & Weigert, 1985) and relying on the proper functioning of mediating systems (Luhmann, 1979). Here, trust shifts from organizations to systems and experts: donors need to trust not the local NGO but management systems, procedures, and auditors who certify their adequacy (Cazenave & Morales, 2021).

My analysis offers a different perspective on trust by showing that trust involves not only disclosure and accountability, which enact its cognitive dimension, but also an emotional dimension. The two trust dimensions are present throughout the different stages of the cooperation relationship, and their relative importance depends on the particular stage. Trust is thus produced "through procedures, expertise, and calculations" (Martinez & Cooper, 2017, p. 14) but only to

the extent that they supplement or enhance the emotional trust dimension by backing up the "good rational reasons" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 972) that sustain an act of trust. My case study reveals that some donors decide to work with organizations that lack reliable management and control systems at the start. Feelings of security based on shared values drive the act of trust and fill in the gaps wherever reliable evidence or rational assurance are missing.

Third, the literature often makes simplistic trade-offs between trust and accountability (Agyemang et al., 2019; Davenport & Low, 2013; Gundlach & Cannon, 2010; Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; O'Neill, 2014; Seal & Vincent-Jones, 1997; Swift, 2001; Tremblay-Boire et al., 2016; Yates et al., 2021). These trade-offs involve a unidimensional view of trust that reduces trust to cognitions grounded in a static assessment of another actor's attributes through accountability procedures. These procedures aim to ensure that the actor informs about practices; they also monitor and enforce the actor's conduct through safeguards and penalties (Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Seal & Vincent-Jones, 1997). Accountability is a substitute for trust. Because both trust and accountability are anchored in gathering information for predictability purposes, this substitution makes sense.

In contrast, my analysis highlights how trust and accountability are not straightforward substitutes. Trust involves more than rationally assessing the other party; it is anchored in emotional features such as mutual concern, care, and shared values, which affect accountability practices. My bi-dimensional view of trust implies that trust, especially its emotional dimension, and accountability maintain and reinforce each other. For instance, in the project design and implementation stages, DREAM accepts a donor's accountability demands partly because it is granted autonomy via the donor's emotional trust. If this emotional trust were absent, and the donor was to impose conditions and restrict DREAM's autonomy in the field, DREAM would probably refuse to participate in the relationship, making moot any accountability considerations. Accountability, then, presumes a minimum of emotional trust. At the same time, complying with accountability requirements enhances emotional trust, as illustrated in the funding renewal stage. In sum, my results suggest that (emotional) trust and accountability are mutually constitutive.

Fourth, my understanding of trust as dynamic challenges an implicitly static view of trust. The literature on trust and accountability in the NGO setting overlooks the evolution of trust throughout the different stages of the cooperation relationship to focus instead on the overall assessment of NGO trustworthiness (Becker, 2018; Becker et al., 2020; Dougherty, 2019; Keating

& Thrandardottir, 2017; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010; Reinhardt, 2009; Tremblay-Boire et al., 2016). This assessment implies that, independent of the relationship stage, donors should gather as much information as possible to assess whether an NGO is trustworthy and credible enough to receive funds (Becker, 2018; Becker et al., 2020; Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Reinhardt, 2009; Tremblay-Boire et al., 2016). In contrast, I propose a dynamic view of trust that highlights how trust and its cognitive and emotional dimensions change over time as the cooperation relationship progresses through different stages. The emotional dimension is critical early on in the relationship, as the NGO seeks to attract donors and secure funds. As the relationship progresses, both the emotional and cognitive dimensions become equally necessary to ensure project design and implementation. My results highlight how the cognitive dimension then dominates subsequently, at a particular stage in the relationship, when the NGO reports to its donors and is audited. Nevertheless, my results emphasize that the emotional dimension remains relevant in this stage since the underlying feelings of security enable different ways of rendering accounts. In the last relationship stage, the emotional and cognitive dimensions are again equally important. Trust, as I show, involves an ongoing and interactive rearrangement of its two constitutive dimensions. It is evolving and not necessarily linear in its development (Savolainen & Ikonen, 2016).

More generally, my analysis extends the trust framework in Lewis and Weigert (1985) by highlighting how trust's emotional and cognitive underpinnings evolve throughout a single trust relationship. Lewis and Weigert (1985) propose that "variations in the relative importance of the cognitive base of trust in comparison to its emotional base" (p. 970) allow to differentiate between different types of trust and that the qualitative mix of cognitions and affections differs "across instances of trust" (p. 972). However, they do not discuss how trust dimensions can evolve as parties in a relationship incorporate new informational and affective elements. In other words, they only differentiate between emotional trust (i.e., relationships with more emotional content) and cognitive trust (i.e., relationships with more cognitive content) without speaking to the relative importance of these trust dimensions in the context of a relationship that progresses through time. My analysis highlights how trust is dynamic throughout a cooperation relationship: its emotional and cognitive underpinnings evolve and interact in ways that continuously rearrange their relevance in the trust mix.

2.7. Conclusions and future research

Many civil society and accounting studies see trust in international cooperation relationships as eroded and replaced by highly regulated contracts, administrative codes, and stringent accountability. Trust appears to be no longer relevant as a governing principle of international cooperation relationships between NGOs and donors. Instead, my study emphasizes that trust has not been eroded and replaced but remains present in international cooperation. I unpack trust using a case study of a Southern NGO and illustrate how it involves two dimensions: an emotional dimension grounded in shared values and intrinsic motivations about the NGO's mission and a cognitive dimension anchored in checking and monitoring the NGO. The importance of each trust dimension in the donor-NGO relationship depends on the relationship stage. The emotional dimension is relatively more important early on when the relationship is being established, whereas the cognitive dimension dominates later on in the reporting and audit stage. In the other stages (e.g., project design, project implementation, funds renewal), the emotional and cognitive dimensions are equally relevant. Over time, both the NGO and the donor learn new cognitive and affective elements pertinent to their relationship, which feed into the cognitive and emotional trust dimensions. Throughout the relationship, the two dimensions interact and complement each other.

My study has limitations. I use a single case study triangulated with interviews and information from the foreign aid chain. My findings may not be generalizable to the larger NGO setting outside of Colombia. DREAM is quite representative of the Colombian human rights movement. My observations lead us to think that the conclusions apply to other, similar, Colombian human rights NGOs. I need further studies to substantiate this belief.

I do not delve deeply into how specific elements (e.g., credibility, reputation, mutual learning, organizational maturity, relationship age) shape trust (Inkpen & Currall, 2004) nor how they interact with control. The management control literature on inter-organizational relationships has developed fruitful frameworks about the nexus between trust and control in for-profit settings (Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Vélez et al., 2008). Future studies could explore how such frameworks can be applied in the foreign aid chain.

Finally, I do not deal with conditionalities that local NGOs face, specifically, power asymmetries, and North-South imbalances. DREAM, and other local NGOs, acknowledge these asymmetries and imbalances. Their need for resources makes them nevertheless participate in cooperation relationships: compliance and the duty to follow donor conditions are part of the

game's rules. My understanding of trust is situated within these conditionalities. I leave consideration of power asymmetries and North-South imbalances to future research. To explore these issues, researchers can turn to the development literature (Abrahamsen, 2004; Claeyé, 2014; Escobar, 2011; Gulrajani, 2011).

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APPENDIX A. Interviews and documentation

Interviews in Colombia

Role (Organization)	Experience in years	Record
National Executive Committee Member A (DREAM)	> 30	Notes
National Executive Committee Member B (DREAM)	> 20	Notes
Project Coordinator (DREAM)	15	Audio recorded
Administrative & Financial Manager (DREAM)	4	Audio recorded
Statutory Auditor (DREAM)	15	Notes
Accountant (DREAM)	12	Audio recorded
Administrative Assistant (DREAM)	13	Audio recorded
Accounting Assistant 1 (DREAM)	1.5	Audio recorded
Accounting Assistant 2 (DREAM)	29	Audio recorded
Project Coordinator Sister Organization (DREAM)	2	Audio recorded
Former Executive Member (Formerly DREAM)	16	Notes
High-level officer (Northern NGO branch)	18	Notes
Audit Partner (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	30	Audio recorded
Project Implementation (Northern NGO branch)	16	Audio recorded
Administrative & Financial Coordinator (Northern NGO branch)	20	Notes
Administrative & Financial Coordinator (Local organization)	15	Notes
Financial Manager (Northern NGO branch)	10	Notes
Project Coordinator (Local organization)	21	Audio recorded
Administrative Coordinator (Northern NGO branch)	4	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	10	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	14	Audio recorded
Program Officer (Northern NGO branch)	3	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	3	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	5	Audio recorded
Accountant (Local organization)	4	Audio recorded
Project Formulation (Northern NGO branch)	5	Audio recorded

Interviews in Canada

Role (Organization)	Experience in years	Record
Finance (Northern NGO, Poverty Reduction)	2	Audio recorded
Compliance (Northern NGO, Children Advocacy)	17	Audio recorded
Budgeting (Northern NGO, Children Advocacy)	7	Audio recorded
Consultant & former NGO manager (Various Northern NGOs)	22	Audio recorded
Advisory (Northern NGO, Poverty Reduction)	1	Audio recorded
Communications (Northern NGO, Poverty Reduction)	2	Notes
Program Coordinator (Various Northern NGOs)	5	Audio recorded
Consultant (Management Consulting Firm for NGOs)	4	Notes
Project Administrative Officer (Northern NGO)	11	Audio recorded
Program Officer (Various Northern NGOs)	8	Notes

APPENDIX A (continued). Interviews and documentation

Reviewed documentation

Donors' publicly available information
- Cooperation Agreement Templates
- Terms of Reference & Funding Conditions
- Administrative & Financial Formats
- Guidelines for Submission of Funding Requests
- Guidelines for Narrative and Financial Reporting
- Audit Guidelines
- Transparency Guidelines
- Call for Proposals
- Strategy Plans

DREAM
- Archival & Accounting records
- Administrative and Accounting Procedures & Formats
- Budgets & Financial Reports to the donors
- Financial Statements
- Audit Reports
- Narrative Reports
- Project Proposals
- Cooperation Agreements
- E-mail correspondence
- Internal Control Policies
- Procedures and functions manuals
- Organizational charter
- Risk Management Program
- Online publications
- Annual Work Plan
- Employment contracts

APPENDIX B. Interview Protocol

1.   Preliminaries before an interview

a.   <u>Presentation of the study</u>: Although the participant was introduced to the purpose of the project in the phase of contacting potential individuals, remember to start the session by introducing yourself and explaining the purpose of the project, its context (part of a Ph.D. research proposal), as well as your interest in it as a researcher.

b.   <u>Objective and overview of the interview</u>: Present the interview's purpose and what will be done with the collected data (e.g., improving knowledge about the field, refining concepts and relationships).

In addition, explain the overall content of the interview. It has a first, brief section with specific questions regarding the participant's experience in the field (e.g., positions held, organizations worked with). Then there is a second, larger section guided by open questions related to specific aspects of the donor-NGO relationship, management and control/execution of international cooperation projects.

c.   <u>Permission of interviewee</u>**:** Explain that, if the interviewee agrees, the entire interview will be audio-recorded and transcribed later on. Mention that this is done to have the opportunity to better assess objectively the information provided and to listen carefully during the interview. Ask for permission to record the interview. Take the opportunity to address pending issues regarding the consent form (e.g., signatures, copies.), which should have been sent to the participant before the interview. The consent form should explain that confidentiality is assured to each participant and that no data will be associated with any individual or organization. Invite the interviewee to sign the consent form. If the interviewee does not sign the consent form or manifests any discomfort with their participation, do not proceed with the interview.

Remind the participant that the study has academic purposes only. Also, *explain their right to withdraw from the study at any point in time.*
In addition, explain all aspects of confidentiality and information security (storage, coding), emphasizing that only you, as the main researcher, will link what is said in the interview with the interviewee's identity. Explain that the interview is anonymous.

2.   Semi-structured interview

This is a guide to the questions that may be asked in the interview, and it is by no means exhaustive. Accordingly, not all the questions here should be asked, and questions that are not included may be asked. Each interview develops in its way, according to the profile and inputs of the interviewee.

Remember to be respectful and empathetic at all times.

APPENDIX B (continued). Interview Protocol

a. Experience in the field

How long have you been working on the organization? How long have you been associated with international cooperation, and what are the positions held/areas of work?

a. Specific aspects of the donor-NGO relationship

On management controls (opening questions)
    1. How has been your experience working with international cooperation projects, especially matters related to project management and compliance?
    2. From your experience, what are the usual control systems required by the donor in a typical project? What are the criteria used to design or choose controls?
    3. What is your opinion of the management approaches and controls required by the donor? How does the organization react to controls?
    4. Can you give me concrete examples of how the controls/accountability mechanisms are usually deployed/implemented in projects?
    How has the adoption of control, accountability and management practices, as part of project implementation, affected the entity and its organizational development?

On compliance and other aspects of the donor-NGO relationship
    5. Can you give me examples of unfortunate situations/misunderstandings between the donor and the organization related to divergences in management/control practices?
    6. Can you give me examples of cases where the relationship between the donor and the organization has been strained because of unfortunate, negative events?
    7. How is the relationship with donors that you have worked with for several years/longstanding relationship?
    8. What have been the elements that have guaranteed a stable, longstanding relationship with the donors?
    9. How is the usual approach when requesting/accepting assistance from a donor?
    10. How useful and adequate has been the training in management practices offered by the donor?
    11. In your opinion, what is the most crucial element in the donor-NGO relationship to guarantee project success?
    12. Have there been disagreements between the organization and the donor related to project design, management, and execution? Could you share some experiences?

Closing questions
    13. How do you foresee the future of the international development field in general?
    14. What do you consider should be the role of control in international cooperation projects?
    15. What are your hopes for the donor-NGO relationship in the future?
    16. Is there anything I have not asked about your experience in this area that you would like to tell me?
    17. Do you know other people who could be interested in sharing their experiences and perspectives on this issue?

APPENDIX C. DREAM's basic logical framework matrix (the Logframe)

DREAM's logframe is a grid that includes assumptions, goals, products, results and activities, measured by indicators and means of verification. It is essential in any funding application in international cooperation and development.

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
Expected impact: Explanation of the long-term effects that the NGO wants to contribute to, directly or indirectly, through the project.	Description of how the project has contributed to the expected impact.	Information that shows project progress relative to impact indicators (i.e., secondary sources like studies). It is common to make specific evaluations ex-post to establish impact.	Important events, conditions or decisions outside of NGO control and necessary to progress towards an impact.
Expected objective: Explanation of the intended effect of project implementation, with one single project objective being recommended.	Description of how the project is achieving or has achieved its objective, which includes details of quantity, quality, and time.	Information that shows project progress relative to objective indicators.	Important events, conditions or decisions outside of NGO control and necessary to meet the objective.
Product: Explanation of the direct product to be obtained from project activities. It must always be possible to observe whether a result has been produced or not.	Description of how the project produces or has produced expected products, which includes details of quantity, quality, and time.	Information and methods that show product obtainment.	Important events, conditions or decisions outside of NGO control and necessary to obtain the product.

Activities
Each expected result requires undertaking activities, which need to be identified for the first X months of the project.

Flow
Activities should result in products; products should lead towards fulfilling the objective; the objective should contribute to the expected impact.

APPENDIX D. General conditions in a cooperation agreement

This Appendix displays excerpts from donor agreement templates and terms of reference.

1. NNGO 2

Requirements for a partnership with Donor X

X.1 Assessment of partner
This is the gathering of relevant information regarding a potential partner and using that information to make a decision on whether it qualifies to be a partner or not. The assessment targets three main areas;

- Identity of the Civil Society Organization in relation to Donor X's vision, mission, goals and values. Are we compatible?
- Programmatic fit with Donor X's work.
- Capacity – current and willingness to acquire more.

This process takes place in different ways and at different times. For continuing partnerships, assessments will be informed to a large extent by the quality of the previous partnership, especially information from the monitoring log, while for new partners, it may take a combination of some or all of the following methods:

- Having one-on-one discussions/interviews
- Document review (e.g., registration certificate, audited accounts, reports/evaluations/studies)
- Seeking references/recommendations from other partners/donors
- Field visits to see how the organization operate and gather information from stakeholders
- Participation in the organization's forums

X.3 Assessment of partners' capacity and Capacity building plan
The main objective of the capacity assessment is to analyze the existing capacity strengths and weaknesses to build on the capacity assets and address the gaps by formulating a capacity development plan to make the organization perform effectively and efficiently, set and achieve objectives, solve problems and deliver better results. It is also important to note that capacity building is a process that cannot be accomplished within a short span of time. During the initial instance of the partner assessment to fit the program, an assessment serves as an input to capacity building needs. The capacity assessment that is performed after signing the contract serves as a baseline.

The partner capacity assessment findings are the driving force behind capacity development plan/proposal. This is a combined initiative developed to deliver prioritized responses identified by both parties (Partner and Donor X). Therefore, after the plan is developed, a mutual agreement is signed, indicating the responsibility drawn in line with the agreement of cooperation. The partner jointly collaborates with Donor X to implementing the plan. If a partner requires an external facilitator, Donor X may be required to identify potential resource personnel or even act as a resource person.

APPENDIX D (continued). General conditions in a cooperation agreement

X.4 Monitoring

Monitoring is the activity of following up on activities, results and financial situation. Monitoring is required in order for Donor X to uphold its accountability internally, towards rights holders, back donors and the general public.

Donor X, stakeholders and providers of services such as auditors shall be granted access to the organization, documentation, supported projects and stakeholders for field visits, participation in activities and control.

Donor X shall communicate their intentions and purpose clearly and timely in order for the partner organization to prepare appropriately for the visit.

Reports from field visits and control activities by Donor X or service providers should always be sent to the partner organization for information and to give the opportunity to add or correct information.

4.13 Reports from partner organizations

Annual and Final Reports shall be submitted to Donor X in accordance with the agreement. It consists of a narrative and a financial part. The narrative report must be analytical and special emphasis should be on the following:
- Fulfilment of outcomes and impacts.
- Deviations from plans and goals
- Lessons learned from the work by the Organisation
- Future adjustments to the activities and expected results in the Application.

The financial accounts are to follow the same disposition as the approved budget. Comments shall be provided on deviations higher than 10% between outcome and budget.

2. NNGO 5

X.1 The recipient organization agrees: 1) To carry out the activities described in the Work Plan and Budget (attached hereto) and their updates related to the subsequent delivery of funds in tranches; 2) Deliver quarterly reports to the Steering Committee; and 3) Deliver audited annual statements [income statement and balance sheets]. […] The funds provided in compliance with this Agreement will be used to produce the results specified in its annual performance goals.

X.2 The recipient organization agrees to meet the performance objectives contained in Section X. If the recipient organization does not fulfill its responsibilities specified in article X.1 or does not reach at least 70% of any of the performance objectives established for a given year, the Steering Committee will have reason to suspend any further support.

3. NNGO 6

About formulating objectives and indicators:

The project objective(s) have to be formulated such that they are achievable by the end of the funding period. Therefore, they should clearly and realistically describe the effects that are to be achieved by the end of that period (as a rule as intended changes in the lives/work of the direct target groups or project beneficiaries).

The project objectives have to be verifiable. They must, therefore, precisely describe, for example, the number of people, groups or communities in which the envisaged change is to become visible.

APPENDIX D (continued). General conditions in a cooperation agreement

The task of those responsible for project implementation is to ascertain both during the project and on its completion whether the intended changes have taken place, in other words, whether the project objectives have been achieved. Therefore, it is generally necessary to establish indicators by which achievement of the objectives can be observed and measured.

Chapter 3: The Trust-Control Interplay: Evidence from the International Cooperation Sector

Abstract

This paper introduces the sociological perspective of trust as a method theory to study the interaction between trust and control in inter-organizational relationships. Building on the extensive research tradition on this topic, I identify two main problems in the literature: the theoretical ambitions of trust-control research remain limited to applying trustworthiness perspectives to specific inter-organizational scenarios and the framing of the trust-control interplay in terms of substitution or complementarity. Using the sociological perspective of trust, I surpass these limitations by positing that a qualitative mix of cognitions and emotions determines trust and its relationship with technocratic control. I assess these ideas through a case study in the international cooperation sector. The evidence suggests that trust and technocratic control have a dynamic relationship characterized by co-creation and mutual reinforcement along the different stages of an inter-organizational relationship. These dynamics result from the continuous rearrangement of trust's constitutive dimensions, emotions, and cognitions, which call for specific control mechanisms.

3.1. Introduction

Many scholars conceive trust and control as primary governance mechanisms of inter-organizational relationships (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Das & Teng, 2001; Holtgrave et al., 2017; Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Minnaar et al., 2017; Vlaar et al., 2007; Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra, 2009)[8]. These concepts are considered alternate strategies to manage uncertainties, reduce complexity, and increase predictability (Abdullah & Khadaroo, 2020; Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Kalkman & de Waard, 2017), leading to an extensive research tradition in management accounting and organizational literature (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Long & Sitkin, 2018). Despite the above, research on the theoretical underpinnings of the interaction between trust and control remains limited (Long & Sitkin, 2018).

First, in terms of theoretical lens, scholars study the trust-control interplay mostly from the trustworthiness perspective and its focus on competence and goodwill (see for instance Abdullah & Khadaroo, 2020; Badenfelt, 2010; Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Das & Teng, 1998, 2001; Dekker, 2004; Delbufalo, 2015; Holtgrave et al., 2017; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Long &

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[8] Control in this paper refers to technocratic control and excludes the idea of social control. Section 3.3.2 expands on this conceptualization of control.

Sitkin, 2018; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Ning, 2017; Sako, 1992; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Varoutsa & Scapens, 2018; Vélez et al., 2008; Vlaar et al., 2007; Woolthuis et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2011). While this lens helps assess the trust-control interplay in an inter-organizational relationship, it mainly focuses on the attributes or characteristics of the counterpart (the trustee) to justify the act of trust, and from there, its link with control. This approach is incomplete because it leaves out the fundamental dimensions that make a party trust and that do not depend on the trustee; that means, it excludes the drivers of the trust experience that lie in the trustor (Mayer et al., 1995).

Second, most trust-control studies frame the discussion in terms of the complementarity or substitution between trust and control. Their goal is to assess the situations in which control is more prevalent than trust, and vice versa, and how to combine these governance mechanisms for optimal results within an inter-organizational relationship. I call this approach "functional", due to its focus on the performance and usefulness of trust-control configurations. Examples of this approach can be found in several inter-organizational scenarios, such as client-contractor relationships (Badenfelt, 2010; Ning, 2017), interfirm disputes (Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011), public-private contracts (Abdullah & Khadaroo, 2020; Vallentin & Thygesen, 2017) or strategic alliances between buyers and suppliers (Dekker, 2004; Delbufalo, 2015; Hickey et al., 2021; Holtgrave et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2013; Lui, 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Şengün & Nazli Wasti, 2009). While these studies inform us about the roles of control and trust in particular situations, they do not address the theoretical underpinnings of the control-trust phenomenon. Particularly, how control relates to the constitutive dimensions of trust, namely cognitions and emotions. This limitation occurs because trust-control dynamics are highly contingent on the situation and the setting (Das & Teng, 1998; Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Long & Sitkin, 2018; Ning, 2017) and because the complements/substitution dichotomy is set as an ultimate research goal (Möllering, 2005).

In this article, I surpass these limitations and advance theoretical knowledge on how control interacts with trust. For this endeavor, I build on the theoretical framework used in Chapter 1, the sociological perspective of trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985), which focuses on emotions and cognitions as the basis of social exchanges. Using this perspective as a method theory (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014), I posit that the interactions of trust's emotional and cognitive dimensions are the main drivers behind trust-control relationships.

I use the international cooperation sector as a novel empirical site to explore the above theoretical lens and research question. International cooperation, which belongs to the broader setting of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the non-profit sector, involves inter-organizational arrangements among a series of actors (e.g., funding agencies, multinational NGOs, and local NGOs) to implement development projects in Global South countries. Since undertaking development projects requires collaboration, shared goals, and operational autonomy, trust and control become paramount for governing these relationships. Surprisingly, this empirical setting has not been explored in trust-control research.

I rely on an extensive qualitative research design that includes participant observation within a Colombian NGO and interviews with multiple stakeholders within the international cooperation sector. The empirics show how different trust-building activities and control practices emerge throughout an inter-organizational cooperation relationship, and more broadly, how technocratic control interacts with the emotional and cognitive dimensions of trust. I show how early in the relationship, the combination of emotional bonds around the NGO's mission (i.e., emotions) and knowledge about its work (i.e., cognitions) set an initial level of trust between donors and the local NGO. This incipient trust calls for control because donors require cognitive assurance to keep investing in the relationship. Control becomes the principle that donors use to know more about the partner, establish measurable objectives, and guide the counterpart's behavior during project implementation and delivery. Control practices (such as planning tools, capacity-building plans, and reporting mechanisms) interact with different trust-building activities (such as transparency, communication, or sound management) that emerge in different relationship stages. The interplay between trust and control allows the relationship to flourish and solidify. But even more, such interplay is determined by the ultimate dynamic interaction between donors' cognitive needs and the emotional bonds around the local NGO and its work, in each stage of the cooperation relationship.

This paper contributes to management accounting and organizational literature in various ways. First, it shows how trust and control co-create and relate to each other due to an underlying interaction of cognitions and emotions. In doing so, the paper shows how current trustworthiness approaches in the literature are problematic, by demonstrating that the phenomenon of control and trust goes beyond an assessment of a partner's trustworthiness. Cognitions and emotions also influence the act of trust and its interaction with controls. In each stage of the cooperation

relationship, the mix of cognitions and emotions molds the specific control practices that come to support different trust-building activities. Second, the study shows how control caters to the cognitive dimension of trust by facilitating knowledge and behavioral influence and how this process elicits emotional responses along the cooperation relationship. In other words, control becomes a catalyzer that serves the cognitive dimension of trust and regulates emotional investments in the relationship. Instead of setting the substitution or complementarity between trust and control as an ultimate research goal, as done in previous studies, the findings in this paper invite us to look at trust and control as processes that co-create and mutually influence each other due to continuous movements and adjustments of underlying emotional and cognitive dimensions. Taken together, the findings suggest that the rearrangements between cognitions and emotions in the final qualitative mix that constitutes the phenomenon of trust determine its relationship with technocratic control.

I structure this document as follows. First, I present the literature problematization of the trust-control interplay. Then, I introduce the concepts of trust, control, and the sociological perspective of trust. Later, I introduce the international cooperation sector as an empirical setting and the research methods. Subsequently, I present and discuss the findings to finally conclude.

3.2. Literature Review[9]

Trustworthiness perspectives dominate the studies of the trust-control interplay in inter-organizational settings. These perspectives focus on the attributes, qualities, or characteristics of the counterpart in a social exchange to analyze trust and its relationship with control[10]. The trustor's beliefs or expectations about the trustee's specific characteristics, e.g., its competence or benevolence, frame the analysis (Long & Sitkin, 2018; Massaro et al., 2019; Nooteboom, 2002; Saparito et al., 2004). From the assessment of the trustee's attributes, different control practices emerge to reduce opportunistic actions, reinforce good conduct, and make the trustee cooperate and work in pursuit of aligned objectives (Badenfelt, 2010; Coletti et al., 2005; Şengün & Nazli

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[9] This literature review focuses on works that specifically target trust and control in interorganizational relationships. However, I included a few texts outside this scope, such as Mayer et al. (1995) and Long and Sitkin (2018), whose theoretical insights equally apply to interorganizational settings.

[10] Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) suggest an alternative explanation for the importance of trust and trustworthiness in interorganizational relationships, especially in horizontal networks. Trust is a problematizing devise that becomes relevant when absent. When conflict exists, the concern for trust is at its highest because of the general absence of trustworthiness between members of a network. They posit that trust is an aspect of evaluation, "a statement about how a relationship can be evaluated" (p. 243).

Wasti, 2009; Vélez et al., 2008). Following this idea, scholars use attributes of integrity, competence, and goodwill as frameworks to assess organizational trustworthiness (Abdullah & Khadaroo, 2020; Badenfelt, 2010; Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Das & Teng, 1998, 2001; Dekker, 2004; Delbufalo, 2015; Holtgrave et al., 2017; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Long & Sitkin, 2018; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Ning, 2017; Sako, 1992; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Varoutsa & Scapens, 2018; Vélez et al., 2008; Vlaar et al., 2007; Woolthuis et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2011). Trustworthiness relates to "how the perceptions of the characteristics and behavior of the trustee form the basis on which the trustor becomes willing to be vulnerable. Trustworthiness originates from trustees' perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity" (Amoako, 2019, p. 82). In this sense, trust is categorized as competence trust, which refers to the expectation of a partner's technical and managerial ability to perform by the agreed goals of a partnership (Abdullah & Khadaroo, 2020; Badenfelt, 2010; Das & Teng, 2001; Vélez et al., 2008); and goodwill trust, which refers to the expectation that the counterpart has moral obligations to demonstrate non-opportunistic behavior in unforeseen situations (Abdullah & Khadaroo, 2020; Das & Teng, 2001; Khodyakov, 2007; Vélez et al., 2008).

While assessing a party's trustworthiness is essential in analyzing trust (Malkamäki et al., 2016), it is not the only tenet. Previously, Mayer et al. (1995) cautioned that analyzing trust exclusively in terms of the trustee's characteristics is not best because it leaves out the inner processes that make a trustor trust. "Perceptions of ability, benevolence, and integrity of another party leave a considerable amount of variance in trust unexplained because they neglect between-trustor differences in propensity to trust" (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 724). More extensively, when analyzing trust and its relationship with control, I should consider the elements that constitute an actor's perceptions of its social reality which do not depend on the characteristics of the trustee. These elements lead actors not only to trust but also to control. For instance, in pursuit of collaborative objectives, trustors require information to satisfy operational needs, shape activities and get a sense of clarity and comfort (Kloot, 1997; Langfield-Smith, 1997). These needs do not exclusively depend on the trustee, but also on external factors (e.g., inherent uncertainties in the implementation of a project) that lead to the implementation of controls (Kloot, 1997), and which relate to the constitutive dimensions of trust, emotions and cognitions. Thus, by considering trust's constitutive dimensions, I may generate new insights into how control relates to the phenomenon of trust.

A second problem in the literature is that most studies frame the trust-control discussion in terms of complementarity or substitution (Abdullah & Khadaroo, 2020; Caglio & Ditillo, 2020; Högberg et al., 2018; Massaro et al., 2019; Mellewigt et al., 2007; Minnaar et al., 2017; Ning, 2017; Sydow et al., 2003; Vallentin & Thygesen, 2017). That means, trust and control are either complementary mechanisms that when combined have positive effects on a relationship (Caglio & Ditillo, 2020; Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra, 2009) or substitutes, where the development of trust reduces the need for control, and vice versa (Abdullah & Khadaroo, 2020). In the agenda of trust-control research, some studies use the complements/substitution dichotomy as an ultimate research goal, by trying to illustrate the prevalence of one view over the other (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; de Man & Roijakkers, 2009; Mellewigt et al., 2007; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Vallentin & Thygesen, 2017) or by focusing on the instances in which trust and control complement or substitute each other in specific relationships (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Nicolaou et al., 2011; Vélez et al., 2008; Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra, 2009). Previously, Möllering (2005) cautioned that the work that focuses on the complementarity/substitution dichotomy "may never result in a single dominant view" (p. 285). Also, following Neumann (2010), this dichotomy fails to distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post levels of trust and control existing in the different settings in which the trust-control interplay is studied.

Overall, the discussion above shows how a large part of trust-control research has limited itself to illustrating trust-control dynamics in specific inter-organizational settings using trustworthiness frameworks (e.g., competence trust and goodwill trust mainly) and to find substitution and/or complementarity in such settings. This approach, while generating valuable control-trust insights for the empirical setting in question, does not show how control relates to the constitutive dimensions of trust. In this sense, I concur with Long and Sitkin (2018) who assert that "scholars are currently unable to develop more comprehensive and more accurate pictures of the overall theoretical landscape that encompasses control–trust relationships" (Long & Sitkin, 2018, p. 728) due to their focus on a limited set of issues and particular aspects of trust-control relationships (Long & Sitkin, 2018). Considering that trust-control dynamics are contingent on the situation and the setting (Das & Teng, 1998; Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Long & Sitkin, 2018; Ning, 2017; Vélez et al., 2008), new theoretical approaches are necessary to expand knowledge on the interaction between trust and control (Möllering, 2005; Neumann, 2010).

In line with the above, I introduce the sociological perspective of trust as a method theory. This approach allows us to study how technocratic control relates to trust, due to its emphasis on the constitutive dimensions of the social trust experience, emotions and cognitions.

3.3 Theoretical Framework

In this section, I present the conceptualization of control adopted in the study. Subsequently, I introduce the concept of trust and its sociological perspective.

3.3.1 Definition of Control

In this study, control refers to the strategic planning, management, and operational measures and activities that an organization undertakes to decide on the objectives to pursue, the resources needed to achieve those objectives, and how resources are used to achieve objectives efficiently and effectively (Kloot, 1997; Langfield-Smith, 1997). This broad definition, when applied to inter-organizational settings, includes the systems, procedures, processes, and actions that a controlling party takes to specify, measure, monitor, and reinforce the counterpart's work efforts to align them with agreed performance objectives, plans, and standards (Khodyakov, 2007; Ouchi, 1979). Control in inter-organizational settings includes "the various policies and procedures used to ensure that the partners' behavior and decisions are consistent with the inter-organizational relationship objectives and strategies" (Vélez et al., 2008, p. 971). It "requires the possibility of monitoring to determine if actors deviate from the rules agreed upon" (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005, p. 264). This process requires information that will allow the controlling actor to intentionally influence, direct, and monitor behavior through rules, norms, procedures, and practices (Dekker, 2004; Tomkins, 2001; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000).

The definition of control that I adopt in this paper relates to what management accounting literature calls technocratic, technical, or operational control, which focuses on input, output, and behavioral monitoring through formal and technical means (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith, 1997). It is worth mentioning that previous studies confound technocratic control with formal controls. However, as Long and Sitkin (2018) point out, technocratic control can be applied using formal and informal means.

In this paper, I exclude the idea of social control, for two reasons. First, social control is highly intertwined with trust, particularly, its emotional dimension. The line between these two

concepts is blurred, as social control, likewise emotional trust, refers to the use of shared norms, commonality of values, and beliefs to encourage desirable behavior (Das & Teng, 1998; Şengün & Nazli Wasti, 2009). That is why in some studies trust is considered a (social) control mechanism (Bachmann, 2001; Badenfelt, 2010; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Das & Teng, 1998; Dekker, 2004; Khodyakov, 2007), leading to portray trust and social control as functional equivalents and used interchangeably (Long & Sitkin, 2018). The second reason for not considering social control is that in the inter-organizational relationships in my empirical setting, the relation between trustor and trustee is mainly governed through technical/technocratic controls.

3.3.2 The sociological perspective of trust

Despite the complexity associated with the study of trust, most scholars agree on a basic conceptualization of this concept, which includes "positive expectations" and "willingness to become vulnerable" as a common basis (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Mayer et al., 1995; Vélez et al., 2008). Trust denotes the positive expectations of one party regarding the other in a risky situation (Das & Teng, 2001; Gambetta, 1988; R. J. Lewicki et al., 1998). It implies the belief that, under conditions of uncertainty, potential trustees (i.e. the object of trust) will avoid using their discretion to harm the interests of the actor that confers trust, which is the trustor (Hoffman, 2002; Tomkins, 2001).

The sociological perspective of trust posits that trust is a collective attribute belonging to collective units such as dyads, networks, or groups (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Trust is not psychological but rather sociological and relational because actors would not need to trust apart from social relationships. Trust has three dimensions or social bases: cognition, emotions, and behavior. Cognition relates to what we know about someone or something; it enables actors to identify "persons and institutions that are trustworthy" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 970), based on knowledge, perceptions, and interactions with the object of trust. Evidence, information, and experience serve as a platform from which the trustor makes a cognitive leap (Lewis & Weigert, 1985) and decides to trust, because trust "presumes a state of incomplete knowledge" (Johnson & Grayson, 2005, p. 501).

Emotions are the second building block in the unitary experience of trust. Emotions refer to how we feel about the object of trust. Emotions work by sticking and binding actors together, creating the effect of a collective (Ahmed, 2004). The emotional dimension involves shared

identity, shared values, and a belief in the relationship's intrinsic virtue (Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Luhmann, 1979; McAllister, 1995). When interacting and accumulating experiences with the object of trust, the trustor develops and reaffirms emotional bonds with it (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). The emotional dimension complements the cognitive by bringing the strong positive affections that make us trust a partner beyond what good rational reasons (cognition) may justify (Johnson & Grayson, 2005; Lewis & Weigert, 1985).

The third dimension of trust is behavior, which is the actual undertaking of the trusting act, its "behavioral enactment" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 971). The behavioral dimension of trust manifests in "the undertaking of a risky course of action on the confident expectation that all persons involved in the action will act competently and dutifully" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 971). Behavior reciprocates the cognitive and emotional dimensions to create the social experience of trust.

Since behavior is just the constitutive medium for undertaking trust, Lewis and Weigert (1985) posit that all trusting relationships mix cognitive and emotional dimensions. They speak of cognitive and emotional trust. Cognitive trust refers to knowledge, facts, and rational choices (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Theiss-Morse & Barton, 2017). Emotional trust alludes to common principles, shared values, sense of belonging, and intrinsic motivations (Duenas & Mangen, 2021; Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Cognitive and emotional trust represent two theoretical extremes of a trust continuum that characterize all trusting relationships. Lewis and Weigert (1985) point out how both dimensions are necessary, arguing that "trust in everyday life is a mix of feeling and rational thinking, and so to exclude one or the other from the analysis of trust leads only to misconceptions that conflate trust with faith or prediction." (p. 972)

The framework of Lewis and Weigert (1985) emphasizes how emotions and cognitions "are present in every instance of trust to some extent" (p. 972) and how the qualitative mix of these trust dimensions differs "across instances of trust" (p. 972). Trust can vary across relationships. In some relationships, the cognitive dimension matters more (e.g., trust in a system), while in others, the emotional dimension dominates (e.g., trust in interpersonal relationships). Chapter 1 extends Lewis and Weigert's (1985) framework by showing how trust's cognitive and emotional underpinnings evolve within a single relationship that progresses through time. The experience of trust implies an ongoing and interactive rearrangement of its two constitutive dimensions of cognitive and emotional trust. This means that in an inter-organizational relationship, the two trust

dimensions are present throughout the different stages of the cooperation relationship, and their relative importance depends on the particular stage.

Consistent with the sociological perspective that sees trust as a phenomenon involving a cognitive dimension and an emotional dimension, and that control is a phenomenon aiming at regulating and directing actions through rules and practices, I posit that the complexities in the study of the control-trust interplay require to look at the fundamental dimensions of emotions and cognitions and their ongoing interaction in any evolving inter-organizational relationship. More specifically, I explore the interactions between technocratic control, cognitive trust, and emotional trust. I use the international cooperation sector as an empirical site for this endeavor. Interorganizational relationships between donors and local NGOs in Global South countries allow us to analyze how trust and control emerge as governance mechanisms of international cooperation relationships and how cognitive and emotional dimensions enact control and trust. The following section describes the research methods and the empirical site.

3.4. Research Methods

I use data collected from 1) a participant observation case study with a Colombian NGO; 2) 25 formal interviews with relevant actors within the international cooperation sector; 3) documentation on policies, guidelines, control practices, agreements, and methodologies pertaining to international cooperation projects. I explain below the research site, data collection, and the approach for data analysis.

3.4.1 Research Site

The international cooperation sector is an assemblage of multiple actors (e.g., donors, multinational NGOs, Southern NGOs) that, in its most simplified version, can be described as follows. Ultimate donors (e.g., governments of industrialized countries) allocate funds to advance development goals in Global South countries. Most donors have a governmental cooperation agency that administers and manages these funds. Sometimes these funds are entrusted to Northern multinational NGOs or large charities, which in turn establish partnerships with Southern NGOs. In this context, the NGO in my study, named DREAM[11], develops relationships, either with governmental agencies or Northern NGOs, the latter acting as the most proximate donor.

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[11] This is a fictional name to ensure anonymity.

DREAM is a Colombian NGO that advocates human rights and peacebuilding. Some of its activities include preventing human rights violations, legally assisting victims in cases of reparation of human rights violations, assisting and monitoring the implementation of the peace agreements signed in 2016 between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas[12], presenting proposals of public policies for dismantling illegal armed groups, among others. DREAM emerged decades ago from grassroots movements; it has chapters across Colombia, participates in national and international forums, and belongs to a network of civil society organizations with similar objectives.

DREAM has two main areas: 1) research and project management, which oversees the planning, design, and implementation of human rights and peacebuilding projects; 2) accounting and administration, which takes charge of all the legal, administrative, accounting, control, and accountability duties. At the time of the study, the accounting and administration team included an administrative manager, a part-time accountant, two accounting technicians, and an administrative assistant. The law requires that an external statutory auditor monitors their work. DREAM's highest decision-making body is called the National Assembly, which comprises delegates from regional chapters. This Assembly has the mandate to determine the overall strategy, direction, and work plan and approve financial statements and the general budget. The Executive Committee, appointed by the National Assembly, implements such a mandate.

The relationship between DREAM and its donors is suitable for studying trust and control because donors, by funding DREAM to implement human rights and peacebuilding projects, can influence its behavior in several areas (e.g., administrative, operational); but also, they relinquish control in other areas (e.g., project design, implementation of activities on the ground) to guarantee project success, therefore the need for trust.

DREAM defines itself as a civil society organization whose political and social mission is to promote peace and human rights in Colombia. Organizations that support DREAM share this objective of a peaceful country that respects human rights. Thereby, DREAM's relationships with its donors are grounded in shared values and shared objectives.

3.4.2 Data Collection

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[12] FARC is an acronym for "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia." FARC was the world´s oldest guerrilla group and in 2016 signed a peace agreement with the Colombian government, which intended to end a fifty-year war.

Data collection took place during twenty-four months, from July 2018 to July 2020. I used two main research strategies: participant observation inside DREAM (Denscombe, 2014; Spradley, 2016) and interviews with actors within the international cooperation sector. In the first case, I gained access to DREAM in an unpaid 12-week full-time internship within the administrative and accounting team. Thanks to my background in accounting and administration, I supported this team in budgeting international cooperation projects, general financial planning, economic reporting to donors, updating administrative procedures, pre-audit verifications, among other activities. Sharing routines with actors at the site and collaborating with them in day-to-day tasks allowed me to understand the role and functioning of controls and administrative requirements, collect insights about trust-building mechanisms, and know more about other aspects of DREAM and its inter-organizational relationships with donors, such as actors' attitudes, interactions, beliefs and interpretation of events and processes (Parker, 2017). In addition, I conducted 11 in-depth formal interviews with key personnel (see appendix A) and had informal conversations with other staff.

Formal interviews were semi-structured. I used a flexible protocol, shown in Appendix B, to ensure I was open and responsive to the interview situation and could adjust interactions with interviewees according to their position, experience, and relationships with external stakeholders. Interviews lasted between 30 and 65 min each. Informal conversations and observations proved as valuable as formal interviews. Witnessing events at DREAM and having casual chats with the personnel enabled me to expand my knowledge on relevant issues or confirmed what interviewees asserted. I noted informal conversations and observations in my daily field logbook.

As a second research strategy, I conducted 25 formal interviews with relevant officers within the international cooperation sector, such as consultants, accountants, program officers, compliance managers, among others (see appendix A). Some of these interviewees were either directly related to DREAM (e.g., officers within DREAM's donor organization) or highly knowledgeable of the specific setting in which DREAM operates (e.g., Colombian external auditors that work for some of DREAM's donors, managers of related Colombian NGOs). Like the interviews at DREAM, this second set of interviews took a semi-structured form. I used a flexible protocol to ensure proper interaction with the participants according to their position, experience, relationship with different stakeholders, and work area (appendix B). The conversations revolved around issues of control, administrative practices, project design, capacity-

building, and donor-NGO relationships. These interviews, which lasted between 30 and 80 minutes, were digitally recorded when permitted (see appendix A).

All 36 interviews were formally consented using a consent form. From these, 11 interviews were not digitally recorded. In such cases, I took detailed notes during and immediately after the interview, to ensure that the information was registered in verbatim form and appropriately summarize the interview. Also, I emailed the interviewees with the interview transcripts for approval and discussed preliminary coding results with selected key interviewees for validation purposes.

I supplemented the interviews and observational data with formal documentation publicly available from the cooperation agencies' websites (such as terms of reference, funding conditions, formats, guidelines, policies, etc.) and notes, project documentation, and publications taken from the archival records of DREAM (see Appendix A). Except for some documentation and five interviews, all data are in Spanish. I provide translations for the quotes shown in this document.

3.4.3 Data Analysis

This study started as an inquiry about the particularities of the trust-control interplay in the international cooperation sector. However, while navigating the literature, I discovered the theoretical limitations that persist in the discussions about trust and control, which call to mobilize alternative perspectives for its study. In this sense, I follow Lukka and Vinnari (2014), which discuss the use of method theories (in this case sociology of trust) to discuss management accounting issues. A method theory is "a meta-level conceptual system for studying the substantive issue(s) of the domain theory at hand" (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014, p. 1309). In this case, the domain theory corresponds to the set of knowledge in management accounting and organizational studies that refers to the trust-control interplay.

The study has an inductive and interpretive nature, because the theorizing process is mainly data-driven (Langley, 1999) and because the meanings and relations between donors and beneficiaries in the context of international cooperation projects are socially constructed. That means the study's outcomes come from the contextual considerations that the people inside the international cooperation organizations (e.g., donors, intermediary NGOs, audit firms, local NGOs) make. This search for social meanings implies the necessary collection of qualitative data (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). While I present a basic specification of the concepts of trust and control

following previous literature, I greatly emphasize the empirics. For their analysis, I follow Grodal et al.'s (2020) active categorization framework, in which contribution to theory development starts by asking questions and focusing on theoretical puzzles. In such an initial process, "the researcher concentrates on the parts of the data they find most surprising or salient" (p. 14). I start with a broad theoretical inquiry about trust and control. Using the software N-Vivo, I identify and extract emerging patterns and trends across interviews, as well as repeated assertions and common perspectives. As a result, I obtain a first group of codes, noticing the salience of trust-building activities and various control practices.

In the subsequent round of coding, I refine the initial categories by dropping, merging, and splitting the trust and control categories, looking to integrate processes and practices with similar purposes and to differentiate those with different roles, in hopes of generating "finer distinctions" (Grodal et al., 2020, p. 23) (see appendix C). In this stage, I noticed the prevalence of emotional and cognitive elements. In a third stage, I make sense of the data by looking for relationships between categories, recognizing that categories "are not created independently of each other but often evolve in parallel" (Grodal et al., 2020, p. 24). I sequence the interactions of cognitions and emotions that constitute trust and control into different stages of a typical international cooperation relationship, to recognize that the relationships between categories occur in an evolving setting. The whole data analysis process occurs under constant iterations between the literature on trust, control, and the empirics.

It is worth mentioning that DREAM has various relationships with different donors. At the time of the study, around 11 cooperation agencies and NGOs from various countries were supporting DREAM's work. However, in this paper, I condense and present these relationships into one. This data reduction is possible and makes sense for two reasons. First, most of these relationships follow a similar stage pattern of negotiation, formalization, design, implementation, and potential renewal, which is how I structure the findings. Therefore, what I present in the findings is a typical cooperation relationship for DREAM. Second, many controls, administrative procedures, rules, and terms of reference are very similar across the international cooperation sector. When asked about the relationship with DREAM and local NGOs, most interviewees on the donor side speak in general terms about how these organizations must comply with donor controls and requirements that are highly standardized. This situation is a consequence of the prevalence of technocratic/technical means to govern the cooperation relationship. Regardless of

some degree of customization of control and administrative requirements that every specific relationship may have, each donor uses a similar set of controls to govern the relationship with all the NGOs that it supports.

3.5. Findings

In this section, I present how technocratic control practices emerge and support different trust-building activities throughout the cooperation relationship between DREAM and its donors. Building on the approach on stages developed in chapter 2, I divide the cooperation relationship into five stages: 1. Project Exploration; 2. Project Establishment; 3. Project Design; 4. Project implementation; and 5. Project delivery and renewal of funds.

3.5.1 Project Exploration

In this stage, technocratic control is absent because there are no formal cooperation relationships yet that enable donors to introduce binding agreements, formal screenings, contractual safeguards, or rules that DREAM must abide by. Instead, trust emerges as the mechanism that sets the social connection between DREAM and its donors. Both parties get together due to the commonality of interests around human rights, peacebuilding, and social justice. Alignment of objectives and shared values are manifestations of emotional trust that allow to explore potential collaborative arrangements.

> *"What we were looking for was to generate a strong and consolidated human rights movement. NNGO2 appeared in this process; they started with us a process aimed at participation before [human rights] international bodies. We combined our political action and human rights defense before the State of Colombia with NNGO2's help in ensuring that such institutional representation had a bigger impact." (Former Executive Member, DREAM)*

This initial trust is possible due to the interaction of two factors: first, the incipient knowledge or cognitions that donors have about the mission and work of DREAM, and second, the emotional attachment that the mission of human rights defense generates.

> *"International cooperation functions to support those who could impact their societies. Through this [advocacy] work, all those international solidarity groups saw DREAM's*

[human rights] bulletins as the fundamental elements to carry out solidarity activities with the Colombian people." (Former Executive Member, DREAM)[13]

The analysis reveals how emotions mainly stand behind trust-building activities, in this case, shared objectives and aligned interests. It is precisely the donors' lack of deep knowledge about DREAM's capabilities that makes necessary the introduction of technocratic controls to assess the partner and formally establish a cooperation relationship, as the next subsection shows.

3.5.2 Project Establishment

Before deciding to formally partner for a development project, donors make sure that DREAM has the capacity and abilities to implement it. They introduce controls to formally assess DREAM's trajectory, track record, and experience.

> *"How do we choose our partners? They have a trajectory and track record in these [development] issues [...] they have national-level representation. We also do an initial assessment to check that the organizations have no corruption or issues with the use of money. It is like a filter, of experience, local work, and reputation." (Program Officer #1, NNGO 2, Donor of DREAM)*

As the interviewee above mentions, reputation is one of the main elements that donors assess in any local NGO that wants to partner with them. Reputation encapsulates the beliefs over the local NGO's attributes that make it viable to partner with.

> *"Reputation is one of the elements that build trust. And reputation is assessed through former experiences with previous international cooperation projects." (Administrative Director Colombian NGO and former international cooperation auditor)*

Reputation and the overall partner assessment include several areas: missional, operational, and financial. Control practices drive this assessment by gathering information and evidence.

> *"This process takes place in different ways and at different times. For continuing partnerships, assessments will be informed to a large extent by the quality of the previous partnership, especially information from the monitoring log, while for new partners it may take a combination of some or all of the following methods:*
> - *Having one-on-one discussions/interviews*
> - *Document review (e.g., registration certificate, audited accounts, reports/evaluations/studies)*
> - *Seeking references/recommendations from other partners/donors*

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[13] DREAM issues bulletins and reports informing the human rights situation in Colombia.

- *Field visits to see how the organisation operate and gather information from stakeholders.*
- *Participation in the organisation's forums (General Conditions, NNGO4, Donor of DREAM)*

Donors introduce controls to know more about DREAM and direct its behavior towards good stewardship of cooperation resources through contractual conditions. Also, for many donors, building capacities in DREAM is one of the main motivations behind the partnership. The cooperation relationship is not only about partnering for delivering a project, but also about supporting DREAM to make it stronger in advancing its mission. Controls in capacity-building plans are a catalyst for this purpose.

"The main objective of the capacity assessment is to analyze the existing capacity strengths and weaknesses to build on the capacity assets and address the gaps by formulating a capacity development plan to make the organization perform effectively and efficiently, set and achieve objectives, solve problems and deliver better results." (General Conditions, Donor of DREAM, NNGO4)

"Our donors beyond providing us with financial resources, they also provide us with political and technical support, insofar as they allow us to improve organizationally. I would say learning is one of the forms of relationship that we have with the [cooperation] agencies" (Project Coordinator, DREAM)

In sum, reputation, credibility, and capacity are trust-building activities that help to formally establish a cooperation relationship. Donors assess these elements through controls that collect information and guide behavior. By knowing more about DREAM's capabilities, past activities, strengths, and weaknesses, donors are more confident to formally establish a cooperation partnership. Subsequently, donors and DREAM sign formal cooperation agreements, where the latter commits to comply with rules, policies, and administrative requirements (see appendix E). Also, the parties agree on capacity-building efforts, where donors set the building blocks to exert influence over DREAM's behavior by creating commitments on administrative and operational areas (e.g., staff training, leadership development, fundraising, and income diversification).

In this stage, I can see how trust and control rise as governance mechanisms of formal cooperation relationships and how the cognitive and emotional dimensions of trust interact with control. The initial level of trust that comes from the project exploration stage shapes the form of control needed when formalizing the relationship. In other words, donors emotionally trust DREAM due to its longstanding service to human rights, making it a valuable potential partner.

However, they have limited knowledge of DREAM's capacities and abilities. The controls adopted in this stage aim mainly at enhancing this knowledge, reinforcing the cognitive side of trust. Trust calls for control, as the latter is necessary to bring more knowledge that allows donors to regulate further emotional investments in the relationship (e.g., support for capacity building), which becomes tangible in the signing of a cooperation agreement. The above means that while control caters to the cognitive side of trust, it elicits emotional responses that enhance commitment towards the partnership and development of capacities within DREAM, as the quote below shows.

> *"NNGO4's policy of working with long-term partnership commitments make it possible for NNGO4 to give added value as an accompanying partner supporting partner organisation's capacity development [...] NNGO4 and the partner organization shall in the first year of cooperation learn to know each other and develop a joint capacity development plan defining prioritized capacity building needs and expected results."*
> *(General Conditions, Donor of DREAM, NNGO4)*

Overall, the interaction of cognitions and emotions that constitutes trust shapes control. This interaction underlies trust-building activities of reputation and capacity assessment and shows that donors are comfortable with DREAM's intrinsic motivations for human rights (i.e., emotional trust) but require more assurance about its abilities and capacities (i.e., cognitive trust). Control comes to interact with and reinforce the cognitive side of trust. Without the assurance, knowledge, and the opportunity that control brings to influence behavior, donors would pull out of the relationship. The interaction cognitive trust-control elicits emotional responses, as donors make the leap into a formal cooperation relationship. This leap reveals the need for trust because formal agreements and binding commitments cannot regulate every aspect of the relationship, nor can they give complete assurance that the development initiative will be carried out in the agreed terms. Trust is thus necessary and manifests in the willingness of both parties to work for human rights and peace. Trust and control interact to make possible the cooperation relationship.

3.5.3 Project Design

Establishing a formal partnership involves DREAM's design of a project proposal. This NGO submits proposals based on its own priorities, areas of work, and development approaches. The following quote shows how DREAM first considers the needs of the communities for which they work when formulating a proposal.

"When it comes the time of formulating a project, this is a much more technical task that is determined by what the [National] assembly has said that we can do and what our priorities are at a strategic level. And in terms of project implementation, we have a permanent dialogue with the communities and social organizations we support. In other words, they nurture DREAM's work because they tell us 'we have this need, there is an issue of land restitution in that region', and they request that we look for [cooperation] resources to work on such issues." (Project coordinator, DREAM)

DREAM designs all the core aspects of proposals (e.g., objectives, products, activities), following donors' funding parameters (e.g., administrative, budgetary). Donors may require adjustments but ultimately relinquish control on project conception and design to DREAM. In other words, donors emotionally trust DREAM's political, social, and advocacy work.

"NNGO1's priority is to support concrete activity for the defense and promotion of human rights in countries of the South and the East. It supports projects that are planned and carried out by local NGOs and it believes that the local front line NGOs know best how to fight for their fundamental rights" (Organizational Documentation, NNGO1, Donor of DREAM)

"Donor trust is based on our work. DREAM is an organization with more than 40 years of work, and that generates trustworthiness among agencies. Our work and the reports about it are transparent and strengthen the relationship [...] Despite the prevalence of administration, the link of trust is there; agencies rely on our political work." (Executive Committee Member A, DREAM)

In project design, donors require that DREAM formulate objectives and performance indicators (i.e., controls) as part of the process to guarantee measurability, monitoring, and verifiability in project implementation. The following excerpt from donor documentation indicates the formulation of objectives associated with project design:

"The project objective(s) have to be formulated such that they are achievable by the end of the funding period. They should therefore clearly and realistically describe the effects that are to be achieved by the end of that period (as a rule as intended changes in the lives/work of the direct target groups or project beneficiaries).

The project objectives have to be verifiable. They must therefore precisely describe, for example, the number of people, groups or communities in which the envisaged change is to become visible." (On formulating objectives and indicators, NNGO 5, Donor of DREAM)

Additionally, DREAM should include a logical framework in each project proposal (also known as the logframe), which is a formal control device for project planning in the international cooperation sector. The logframe allows planning and managing the project by sequencing

activities, products, and results for achieving a goal (see appendix D). A consultant of international cooperation projects explains the role of the logframe as a control in project design:

> *"We develop the logframe as we submit the proposal and then it′s approved, the project is approved and then you kind of have to stick to that plan, you can find your logframe with your inputs, your outputs, short term results, medium-term results, long term results, and all of your indicators, so you work with that frame for a five year period, but with annual objectives, so the controls are on that level so you have to report back to your donor and say ′if we had intended to do these activities and reach these many beneficiaries, how much have we actually achieved? How can we explain the discrepancy′?" (Consultant of third sector organizations #1)*

The quotes above show two things. First, how communication emerges as a trust-building activity in project design. By managing and transmitting clear expectations about what project implementation would look like, DREAM reinforces donors' positive beliefs in the relationship. DREAM uses control practices to communicate what it plans to do in the formats and devices that donors specify. Performance indicators and logframes allow DREAM to communicate its intended work, objectives, activities, and outputs, following its own expertise and autonomy. Second, donors monitor DREAM through these control mechanisms and devices. Their purpose is to inform the NGO's behavior and enable future comparison of DREAM's performance against benchmarks and objectives that the NGO predefined.

Behind the process of setting and communicating expectations, emotional trust, cognitive trust, and control interact to manage the cooperation relationship. Donors emotionally trust the NGO, as demonstrated by the autonomy they grant to DREAM in designing a project proposal that serves its mission, using its work approach and expertise. Donors believe in DREAM's intrinsic motivations to defend human rights and peace. But even though at this stage donors know more about DREAM abilities, reputation, and capacity, they need tangible information about the future project implementation. Donors need to know what to expect. They require specific information about objectives, outputs, activities, timeframes, etc. DREAM informs about these elements through several control mechanisms, as described above. It supports the trust-building activity of communication by giving donors more knowledge about DREAM's intended behavior. In short, control serves the cognitive dimension of trust. Without controls that allow knowing the specifics of the intended implementation and the benchmarks to manage expectations, donors would consider the development project too uncertain to fund. Controls help donors make sure that DREAM aligns with the agreed objectives.

Despite that emotional trust manifests in donors' reliance on DREAM's intrinsic motivations for human rights (which contributes to DREAM's operational autonomy) emotional trust and control do not interact directly in this stage. However, the cognitive reinforcement that control brings to the relationship allows donors to keep emotionally investing in it, as I will see next.

3.5.4 Project Implementation

DREAM implements the designed project following its expertise on the ground and work approach. This autonomy reflects donors' beliefs in DREAM's deep care for human rights (emotional trust); and the positive expectations on DREAM's capability to advance human rights goals, expectations that knowledge work in previous stages (cognitive trust) helped to build. Instead of focusing on checking every single activity on the ground, donors expect open communication and transparency from DREAM, as the following quotes illustrate:

> *"Full and total communication, total transparency of the NGO is what builds trust with the cooperation agency [...] as long as the [local] organization tells everything to the agency, about why they are doing things like this, or any significant change in the project, that assures trust and guarantees that the parties can keep collaborating in the long term" (Administrative Director Colombian NGO and former auditor for cooperation agencies).*

> *"We try to establish high communication relationships because that allows us as donors to try to be very close to the action [...] You help find solutions, making the organization feel that you are with them. You are not just supervising and monitoring, but you are aware of what they are facing and looking for joint solutions because the project belongs to both; it is not the project that I paid for, but you have to execute. NNGO2 is trying to achieve certain goals, it believes that this organization [DREAM] helps it achieve those goals. So NNGO2 consider them like partner or teammates so to speak [...] They get financed. And there are also these very strong levels of demands [for compliance]. But in terms of fluid communication, attitude towards finding solutions together with the organization you are funding, that is very important to create that trust." (High-level officer, NNGO2, Donor of DREAM)*

The quote above also suggests that communication enhances the affective bonds (emotional trust) between the parties, because by working together for a common goal the donor and DREAM become "partners or teammates." In addition, interviewees, when asked about the elements that build trust, highlighted compliance with donor conditions, as well as sound administrative and financial management:

> *"Sound management. The management, the administration, because if there is no good management, they [donors] take away the financing. (Accounting Assistant, DREAM)."*

I consider that trust is also built upon the basis of administrative integrity. And we have been reliable and dutiful in the administrative part. I mean, we have earned the trust of all agencies that have worked with us because they recognize our integrity and the fulfillment of our obligations [...] and that integrity leads to agencies having trust." (Project Coordinator, DREAM).

Donors verify compliance and sound management through control practices such as reporting, performance indicators, budgetary tracking, and external audit:

"With NNGO8 we have had various grants. And their control is based on activities, time, and money. Therefore, when you send them a report, they ask you to link the money you are spending with the activity you are doing and with the period you said that you would use to undertake such activity. So, they have the three lines. And that is a way to control and measure how you are executing the funds in the periods allocated for it. You cannot miss that; there should be a correlation because if you don't spend the money on the time and activities, you said you would do, you will have to reframe the grant. (Administrative Manager, DREAM).

"The audit is very important for donors. They [auditors] demand information and realize whether we manage the resources well. According to this [results of audit] is that donors keep funding us" (Accounting Assistant, DREAM).

In sum, communication, transparency, sound management, and compliance are mechanisms that build trust in an ongoing cooperation relationship. The local NGO is expected to communicate major implementation issues and seek donor approval for project modifications. Donors look to ensure this transparency and disclosure through binding agreements and other control practices, which actors inside DREAM recognize as essential to improve their organization and the cooperation relationship:

"I believe there is a positive aspect [about implementation of control] because that forces us to perfect our procedures. Here at DREAM, we are not reluctant to improve our project formulation, assessment, and monitoring system. We believe this is an invitation to generate improvements to quantify better what we do. Due to this, DREAM has changed notably from the organizational viewpoint [...]" (Project coordinator, DREAM).

The above shows how behind the trust-building activities of communication, transparency, compliance, and sound management, control comes to support the cognitive side of trust. Despite that donors emotionally trust DREAM, they still need to know what is happening on the ground. Control caters to these informational needs, by letting donors know how DREAM is progressing and implementing the activities, and how it is addressing any challenge that may surface in project

deployment. Adequate management signaled through compliance with donor requirements and verified through financial reporting, narrative reporting, and external audit satisfies donors' informational needs.

Without trust, donors would have to check every single activity on the ground. Without control, donors would not have ways to know and influence what is happening in implementing the project. But in addition, the arrangement of cognitions and emotions is what drives the trust-control interplay. The assurance on the emotional dimension is not enough to reduce the complexity and uncertainty associated with the project's implementation. The cognitive dimension takes prominence and calls for controls that render an account of DREAM´s behavior on the ground. In sum, project implementation is mostly about cognitive trust, and emotional trust does not directly interact with control.

An additional effect that becomes visible in this stage is the impact of the trust-building activities in developing affective bonds between the parties. When donors see that DREAM is transparent, communicates the implementation, dutifully complies, and manages the funds well, it reaffirms the positive expectations about DREAM's intrinsic motivations for its work, which will influence the assessment of potential long-term partnerships as the following stage shows.

3.5.5 Project Delivery and Renewal of Funds

By the end of a project cycle, DREAM looks to get extended funding and sustain long-term relationships with its current donors or initiate partnerships with new ones. Various factors determine DREAM's possibilities to do it. First, DREAM's ability to deliver the project goals and achieve objectives.

> *The task of those responsible for project implementation is to ascertain both during the project and on its completion whether the intended changes have taken place, in other words whether the project objectives have been achieved (On formulating objectives and indicators, NNGO 5, Donor of DREAM).*

A member of DREAM states how fulfillment of objectives is crucial for a trusting relationship:

> *"In few words, what matters is [project] delivery and compliance. Fulfillment of the agreement, compliance with norms, rules, laws and requirements" (Accountant, DREAM)*

Fulfillment of objectives adds to the trust-building activities of compliance, sound management, and transparency described in the previous stage. The conjunction of these trust-building activities, and the use of controls that give an account of them profile DREAM as an organization that successfully delivers projects, complies with legal and donor requirements, and adequately manages donor funds. DREAM's success in its political and advocacy work, coupled with its exemplary record in control and compliance, enhances its reputation as a valuable partner for current and new donors.

> *"Reputation is everything; it is essential to obtain funds. In all audits there will always be observations [audit findings] [...]And they have not been an impediment to obtaining resources because they have not been about substantive issues. So all of that [good behavior] is heard around, regardless of some things that we have to improve. I do feel that reputation is critical, at least for the [cooperation] agencies that are here."*
> *(Administrative staff member, DREAM)*

The quote above shows how DREAM acknowledges its reputation as crucial to obtaining funds. Like the previous stages, donors recur to controls to verify DREAM's fulfillment of objectives and increased capacity. Some of these control practices are capacity-building assessments, performance indicators, final financial and narrative reports, and audit reports. While these control practices serve the cognitive dimension of trust, this stage is far from one where cognitions prevail. The mutual learning and enhanced capacities from DREAM's adequate project implementation and delivery reinforce both trust dimensions, as donors incorporate new knowledge (cognitions) and reaffirm emotional ties (emotions) around the NGO. Donors want to see DREAM thriving in its work, and continuous support for capacity development reflects such affective bonds.

> *"NNGO4 emphasize organisational sustainability and one contributing factor to organisational sustainability is continuous capacity development. NNGO4's policy of working with long-term partnership commitments make it possible for NNGO4 to give added value as an accompanying partner supporting partner organisation's capacity development." (Contract Conditions, NNGO4, Donor of DREAM)*

The entire project lifecycle increases DREAM's reputation and capacity, with consequences for control. As donors have learned more about DREAM and developed a certain level of trust (i.e., enhanced emotional bonds and knowledge about the counterpart), some aspects of the control

process, such as budgetary constraints or additional verification procedures, may be adjusted or renegotiated. Some interviewees walk us through this process:

> *"We must raise awareness in our work teams to comply with the [cooperation] agencies, because this allows us to negotiate better things for the administrative part. It is what happened with NNGO6; we were negotiating a new project[14]. They told me 'we are not going to give you money for the technical officers salaries'. I told them: 'impossible, if I do not have a contribution of 600 thousand pesos a month, if I do not have contributions for the technical officers [...] tell me who will execute the project for me? It is impossible'. I fought it, and they gave it to me as transportation and food [budgetary line]. In the end, there are many agencies open to negotiate." (Administrative staff member, DREAM)*

> *"I think when you have a long-term collaboration with a partner that has demonstrated sound capacity, you get the report, and you don't go through it. It's fine. So they learned over the years not to make… I called it 'errors' [...] That comes through years of working together" (Former program manager NNGO9, Consultant of third sector organizations #1)*

This change towards more favorable conditions and less stringent monitoring comes, to a great extent, from the arrangement of cognitions and emotions that leads donors to rely on DREAM and reinforce their positive expectations of the relationship. Ultimately, funding renewal derives from such donor reliance, as the following quote suggests:

> *"We won the core fund [NNGO4 funding program], we got it renewed due to our excellent administration. That's how it feels to me because our work is easily seen, the advocacy and activities that we do can be easily seen. NNGO4 constantly moves in those political spaces and sees that we are politically active. Last year when they [NNGO4 as donor] came to visit us, that visit would determine our continuity in that core fund. And we got it." (Administrative staff member, DREAM)*

As we can see in this last stage, the interaction between cognitive and emotional trust shapes the need for control. While donors have learned and reaffirmed their emotional ties to the NGO throughout the project cycle, they need to verify the fulfillment of objectives and goals. Control takes the form of verification procedures to check on achievement of objectives and final accountability checks (e.g., closing financial and narrative reports, project outcomes, audit reports). In doing so, it caters to the cognitive side of trust by providing knowledge of reached goals, compliance of closing administrative procedures, and overall project completion. This role of enhancing cognitive trust is vital for donors in assessing the extension or renewal of a

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[14] NNGO6 is a recurring donor of DREAM.

partnership. Donors get more comfortable in providing renewed funding if they know more about the project outcomes and the NGO's improved capacity and behavior in project delivery.

Despite the conditionalities and lack of flexibility that comes with international cooperation funds, some donors are open to negotiate more favorable conditions for DREAM. This adjustment will depend on the qualitative mix between cognitions and emotions. If DREAM delivers on the political side and fulfill project objectives, it may not be subject to greater monitoring and control, despite minor issues in reporting or project execution. This may happen because the cognitive dimension in the relationship reaches a point of satisfaction, and the emotional dimension takes over. Thus, while most controls will remain in place, some concessions or flexibility (extended deadlines for reporting, funding of new activities and items) may emerge to benefit DREAM.

3.6. Discussion

3.6.1 The Trust-Control Interplay: Interactions Between Cognitions and Emotions

This paper sets out to explore how technocratic control relates to trust, particularly its cognitive and emotional dimensions. The analysis shows how different trust-building activities and control practices emerge and interrelate as governance mechanisms of the cooperation relationship. Additionally, it suggests a model of the interactions between emotional trust, cognitive trust, and control through each stage of the cooperation relationship, depicted in Table 3.1.

Overall, the table shows the manifestations of and needs for cognitive trust in the cooperation relationship (first row). These cognitive needs interact with manifestations of emotional trust, such as care for human rights or affective bonds for the NGO and its work (second row). The interaction between both trust dimensions molds the need for technocratic controls (downward arrows). In turn, control caters to the cognitive dimension of trust by filling information needs and knowledge gaps (upward arrows). This mutually reinforcing process occurs in support of trust-building activities (third row), in each stage of the relationship, from project establishment to project delivery and renewal.

|	PROJECT EXPLORATION	PROJECT ESTABLISHMENT	PROJECT DESIGN	PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION	PROJECT DELIVERY AND RENEWAL
Cognitive trust	Incipient knowledge of DREAM's work	Limited knowledge about DREAM's reputation and capabilities	Lack of knowledge about DREAM's specific plans for project deployment	Need to know project progress and DREAM's behavior on the ground	Learning during the project cycle; knowledge of goals reached
Emotional Trust	Care about human rights / Pride and joy in supporting Southern social movements	Reliance on DREAM's intrinsic motivation for human rights	Reliance on DREAM's intrinsic motivations for human rights	Reliance on DREAM's intrinsic motivation; development of bonds	Developed affective bonds, care about DREAM and its cause
Trust building activities	-Aligned Interests -Shared values	-Reputation -Capacity -Credibility	-Communication of project plans	-Communication -Transparency -Sound management -Compliance	-Fulfillment of objectives -Learning -Enhanced reputation & capacity
Technocratic Control	-Not used in this initial stage.	-Partner Assessment -Reference checking -Document review -Field visits -Capacity building plans	-Project proposal -Formulation of objectives -Performance indicators -Logical framework -Technical planning tools -Budgets	-Financial Reporting -Audit procedures -Formal Letters -Narrative reports -KPIs -Budgetary execution	-Final Reports -Audit Reports -Capacity building assessment -Improvement plans
Interaction Emotional/Cognitive Trust and Control	The interaction of cognitions and emotions creates an initial level of trust that opens the door for a formal relationship	The cognitions-emotions interaction calls for controls that bring more information and checks on DREAM's track record and abilities, satisfying the cognitive side of trust	As donors rely on DREAM's motivations, control is geared towards satisfying cognitive needs about project implementation	While donors emotionally trust DREAM's motivations, they implement controls to monitor the implementation and use of resources, catering to the cognitive side of trust	Control enhances knowledge. Emotional bonds around the NGO and its cause are reaffirmed, which allows extending the partnership

Table 3.1 The Trust-Control Interplay As Defined By Emotions And Cognitions

The table shows how in the project exploration stage, control is absent and therefore does not interact with cognitive and emotional trust. Instead, aligned interests and shared values emerge as the trust-building activities that bring the parties together to explore a formal relationship. These activities mostly result from the emotional side of trust. Donors have an emotional attachment to supporting NGOs that work on development causes of their interest, bringing them closer to those organizations. Emotions align communities through the intensity of their attachments (Ahmed, 2004). The prevalence of shared concerns around human rights creates emotional bonds between the parties and enables an initial level of trust.

Later, as the parties attempt to formally establish a partnership, the initial interaction of cognitions and emotions calls for technocratic control. Donors rest assured in their emotional attachment to supporting the NGO's cause but need to know more about DREAM capacities and abilities. They introduce the first set of controls such as capacity building plans, and administrative and operational assessments to check the reputation and capacity of the NGO to implement cooperation projects. Without applying these controls that lead to a positive evaluation of DREAM, donors would not enter into a formal agreement. Technocratic control makes possible the partnership by catering to and reinforcing the cognitive side of trust. Still, the need for such control was previously shaped by the interaction of cognitive and emotional trust.

The formalization of the partnership includes the design and submission of a project proposal. In this relationship stage, donors feel good about the NGO and know more about its capabilities, motivations, and previous endeavors. However, they need more knowledge about the specifics of the project they are funding: what resources are needed, what communities will be served, what specific activities will be undertaken, and what outcomes will be obtained. DREAM communicates the specifics of how it will proceed with the project using controls such as budgets, technical planning tools, formulation of objectives, and performance indicators. This communication process enhances trust because it allows the parties to know and manage the expectations around future project implementation, reducing uncertainty. Given the need for cognitions, control serves the cognitive side of trust in this stage.

Once DREAM implements the project on the ground, its compliance with rules and regulations, adequate project management, communication, and transparency build trust because these are good behaviors that signal trustworthiness and progress towards the missional objectives. Control serves the purpose of informing, influencing, and monitoring adequate behaviors through

accountability and administrative requirements, compliance objectives, financial reporting, and periodic external audits. Without a positive assessment that results from the use of these controls, donors would pull out of the relationship (e.g., the NGO not complying with agreements, or misusing the funds). In this stage, the prominence of cognitions influences the form of control needed. In other words, controls should inform about NGO behavior and the progress in project implementation. Control caters to the cognitive side of trust. However, in serving this purpose, there are effects on the emotional side of trust. Unlike project formalization and design, project implementation occurs in a more extended period (one to three years usually). During this time, communication exchanges, transparency practices, dutiful application of controls, and the overall donor-NGO exchange create and reaffirm affective bonds between the parties, reinforcing emotional trust.

Finally, when DREAM delivers the project and seeks to secure additional funding, the fulfillment of project objectives and enhanced capacities become crucial elements that donors consider for an extended partnership. The parties have interacted along the entire project cycle at this stage, which affects both emotional and cognitive trust. In the first case, the constant sharing and learning allow donors to grow affective bonds with the local NGO and reaffirm emotional ties around the human rights cause. In the case of cognitive trust, donors get to know and experience the enhanced reputation and capacity that comes after another project is successfully delivered. Once again, controls in this stage serve the cognitive side of trust by checking successful project delivery through reporting and external audit procedures. But also, when talking about extending the partnership, donors and DREAM may negotiate more flexible conditions in certain aspects, such as operational constraints or funding of new items/activities. While this bargaining process is complex (as it depends on donors' organizational policies and budgetary conditions), it is also influenced by the qualitative arrangement between cognitions and emotions at that point in the cooperation relationship. A certain assurance on the emotional and cognitive dimensions of trust favors better funding, administrative conditions, and the partnership's renewal.

3.6.2 Implications

The analysis of the trust-control interplay through the lenses of the sociological perspective of trust has two main implications. First, control has a cognitive nature and its interaction with trust should not be framed exclusively in terms of attributes' assessment of a counterpart. Second,

instead of setting the substitution or complementarity between trust and control as a research goal, trust and control are mutually influencing concepts that ultimately depend on the interaction of cognitions and emotions. Below I explain each implication.

In the first implication, previous research draws upon trustworthiness perspectives (e.g., competence trust and goodwill trust) to study the trust-control interplay. This paper shows how this approach is problematic because the interaction between trust and control goes beyond the attributes' assessment of a counterpart (Long & Sitkin, 2018; Malkamäki et al., 2016; Mayer et al., 1995; Nooteboom, 2002). A complete analysis of trust and its interaction with control also requires looking at the drivers that lead the trustor to trust, and that does not depend exclusively on the qualities of the trustee. As this paper illustrates, the mix of trust's constitutive dimensions, emotions and cognitions, affect donors' dispositions and evaluative attitudes towards the local NGO. Control engages with this process by directly catering to the cognitive dimension of trust, in all stages of the inter-organizational relationship. This catering occurs because the central role of control is providing information and influencing behavior, which are cognitive events (i.e., satisfy donors' knowledge needs and use knowledge to direct actions). Donors use technocratic control practices to know more about the development project and to influence and monitor NGO behavior. These roles of control become more evident in the stages where cognitions are more prevalent (i.e., project design, project implementation). In addition, while control does not have direct and large interaction with the emotional side of trust, it elicits emotional responses. When the cognitive side of trust is reassured through controls, emotional commitments to the goal of the partnership and affective bonds towards the local NGO increase.

The above suggests that control is primarily a phenomenon of cognitive nature that can be triggered by cognitive and emotional motives and that elicits both cognitive and emotional responses.Additionally, the interaction between control and trust is a relational phenomenon, where the trustor assesses another's trustworthiness and tries to influence its behavior, but based on what it knows and how it feels about that other party and the objective of the relationship (e.g., the development goal around human rights) (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Tomkins, 2001).

Regarding the second implication, instead of setting the complementarities or substitutions between trust and control as an ultimate research goal, this paper extends research by showing how both concepts are mutually constitutive phenomena that ultimately depend on the interaction of cognitions and emotions. The constant interaction between trustor and trustee molds the trust-

building activities and control practices that govern the inter-organizational relationship. In this sense, trust and control are mutually influencing due to the underlying interaction of cognitive and emotional dimensions. Early in the relationship, an initial mix of emotions and limited cognitions determines the need for and the form of control (i.e., controls for partner assessment). The introduction of these required control practices impacts the qualitative mix of cognitions and emotions, as it reinforces knowledge and regulates further emotional investments in the relationship. The unfolding of the relationship alters the relative importance of the cognitive and emotional dimensions of trust along the different stages of an inter-organizational relationship . In this process, control acts as a catalyzer that not only influences NGO behavior but also, reinforces and regulates donors' knowledge and emotional attitudes.

I must mention that the implications above differ from those in chapter 2 in two ways. First, chapter 2 focuses on the relationship between trust and accountability specifically for the international cooperation sector. Instead, this chapter focuses on the factors (cognitions and emotions) that condition a specific state at different times (the trust-control interplay) rather than the nature of the state itself (trust and control in international cooperation). In so doing, it proposes that, regardless of the interorganizational setting, the underlying interaction between the constitutive dimensions of trust determines the nature of the trust-control interplay. For instance, the international cooperation sector depicts a set of relationships with a notorious salience of emotions at the beginning of the relationship, due to the political component of the shared development goals that donors and local NGOs advance. Control comes to reinforce or fill in the situations where cognitions are lacking. However, in relationships with a different prevalence of cognitions and emotions the trust-control interplay may be quite different. The sociological perspective opens new possibilities for exploring control and trust interactions in other empirical scenarios. Second, the trust-control interplay is a larger theoretical debate in management accounting literature than that of accountability. This debate includes ideas of substitution and complementarity arrangements that streamline a given interorganizational relationship. The insights in chapter 3 aim at moving away from binary readings of substitution and complementarity between trust and control, and instead, seeing both concepts as mutually influencing whose interaction changes over time.

3.7. Conclusion

Trust-control research remains limited to the application of trustworthiness perspectives to specific inter-organizational scenarios, and the framing of the trust-control interplay in terms of substitution or complementarity. In this paper, I use the sociological perspective of trust as a method theory to provide a complete view of the trust-control interplay. Through a case study in the international cooperation sector, I show how a qualitative mix of emotions and cognitions determines the technocratic control practices needed in the relationship and the evaluative attitudes towards the trustee. The sociological perspective challenges the idea that trust is exclusively tied to assessing another party's trustworthiness. The evidence suggests that along the different stages of an inter-organizational relationship between a Colombian NGO and its donors, control and trust have a dynamic interaction characterized by co-creation and mutual influence. Emotions and cognitions around the NGO and its work lay an initial trust foundation that calls for specific control practices. As the relationship progresses, control reinforces the donor-NGO relationship by catering to the cognitive dimension of trust and by regulating further emotional investments in the relationship. Taken together, the findings highlight that control has a cognitive nature whose interaction with trust should not be framed exclusively in terms of attributes' assessment of a counterpart. Additionally, instead of setting the substitution or complementarity between trust and control as a research goal, trust and control are mutually influencing concepts that ultimately depend on the interaction of cognitions and emotions.

This study has some limitations. As it targets a theoretical puzzle rather than an empirical problem, the validity of the results beyond the international cooperation sector needs to be explored. I suggest in this paper that beyond the specificities of any particular setting, an arrangement of emotions and cognitions rules how trust and control relate to each other. The sociological framework suggests that the trust-control interplay will display other characteristics in relationships where the cognitive aspect is much more prevalent and therefore the role of control and its impact on the relationship will adapt accordingly. Consider trust in an unknown outsourcing operator. Here, controls rather than trust may emerge first to make the partner behave in a specific way, through exhaustive business contracts.

In addition, the role of history is not fully acknowledged in this paper. Decades of interactions between donors and aid recipients have shaped international cooperation relationships, along with the control and accountability practices here described. In this sense, this paper is not

a longitudinal study where I track in real time the evolution of trust and control (Savolainen & Ikonen, 2016). This event may take away from the findings the processual nature of the trust-control interplay. Future research may dive into this issue by crafting a longitudinal study within the international cooperation sector.

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APPENDIX A. Interviews and documentation

Interviews in Colombia

Role (Organization)	Experience in years	Record
National Executive Committee Member A (DREAM)	> 30	Notes
National Executive Committee Member B (DREAM)	> 20	Notes
Project Coordinator (DREAM)	15	Audio recorded
Administrative & Financial Manager (DREAM)	4	Audio recorded
Statutory Auditor (DREAM)	15	Notes
Accountant (DREAM)	12	Audio recorded
Administrative Assistant (DREAM)	13	Audio recorded
Accounting Assistant 1 (DREAM)	1.5	Audio recorded
Accounting Assistant 2 (DREAM)	29	Audio recorded
Project Coordinator Sister Organization (DREAM)	2	Audio recorded
Former Executive Member (Formerly DREAM)	16	Notes
High-level officer (Northern NGO branch)	18	Notes
Audit Partner (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	30	Audio recorded
Project Implementation (Northern NGO branch)	16	Audio recorded
Administrative & Financial Coordinator (Northern NGO branch)	20	Notes
Administrative & Financial Coordinator (Local organization)	15	Notes
Financial Manager (Northern NGO branch)	10	Notes
Project Coordinator (Local organization)	21	Audio recorded
Administrative Coordinator (Northern NGO branch)	4	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	10	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	14	Audio recorded
Program Officer (Northern NGO branch)	3	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	3	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	5	Audio recorded
Accountant (Local organization)	4	Audio recorded
Project Formulation (Northern NGO branch)	5	Audio recorded

Interviews in Canada

Role (Organization)	Experience in years	Record
Finance (Northern NGO, Poverty Reduction)	2	Audio recorded
Compliance (Northern NGO, Children Advocacy)	17	Audio recorded
Budgeting (Northern NGO, Children Advocacy)	7	Audio recorded
Consultant & former NGO manager (Various Northern NGOs)	22	Audio recorded
Advisory (Northern NGO, Poverty Reduction)	1	Audio recorded
Communications (Northern NGO, Poverty Reduction)	2	Notes
Program Coordinator (Various Northern NGOs)	5	Audio recorded
Consultant (Management Consulting Firm for NGOs)	4	Notes
Project Administrative Officer (Northern NGO)	11	Audio recorded
Program Officer (Various Northern NGOs)	8	Notes

APPENDIX A (continued). Interviews and documentation

Reviewed documentation

Donors' publicly available information
- Cooperation Agreement Templates
- Terms of Reference & Funding Conditions
- Administrative & Financial Formats
- Guidelines for Submission of Funding Requests
- Guidelines for Narrative and Financial Reporting
- Audit Guidelines
- Transparency Guidelines
- Call for Proposals
- Strategy Plans

DREAM
- Archival & Accounting records
- Administrative and Accounting Procedures & Formats
- Budgets & Financial Reports to the donors
- Financial Statements
- Audit Reports
- Narrative Reports
- Project Proposals
- Cooperation Agreements
- E-mail correspondence
- Internal Control Policies
- Procedures and functions manuals
- Organizational charter
- Risk Management Program
- Online publications
- Annual Work Plan
- Employment contracts

APPENDIX B. Interview Protocol

1. Preliminaries before an interview

a. Presentation of the study: Although the participant was introduced to the purpose of the project in the phase of contacting potential individuals, remember to start the session by introducing yourself and explaining the purpose of the project, its context (part of a Ph.D. research proposal), as well as your interest in it as a researcher.

b. Objective and overview of the interview: Present the interview's purpose and what will be done with the collected data (e.g., improving knowledge about the field, refining concepts and relationships).

In addition, explain the overall content of the interview. It has a first, brief section with specific questions regarding the participant's experience in the field (e.g., positions held, organizations worked with). Then there is a second, larger section guided by open questions related to specific aspects of the donor-NGO relationship, management and control/execution of international cooperation projects.

c. Permission of interviewee**:** Explain that, if the interviewee agrees, the entire interview will be audio-recorded and transcribed later on. Mention that this is done to have the opportunity to better assess objectively the information provided and to listen carefully during the interview. Ask for permission to record the interview. Take the opportunity to address pending issues regarding the consent form (e.g., signatures, copies.), which should have been sent to the participant before the interview. The consent form should explain that confidentiality is assured to each participant and that no data will be associated with any individual or organization. Invite the interviewee to sign the consent form. If the interviewee does not sign the consent form or manifests any discomfort with their participation, do not proceed with the interview.

Remind the participant that the study has academic purposes only. Also, *explain their right to withdraw from the study at any point in time.*
In addition, explain all aspects of confidentiality and information security (storage, coding), emphasizing that only you, as the main researcher, will link what is said in the interview with the interviewee's identity. Explain that the interview is anonymous.

2. Semi-structured interview

This is a guide to the questions that may be asked in the interview, and it is by no means exhaustive. Accordingly, not all the questions here should be asked, and questions that are not included may be asked. Each interview develops in its way, according to the profile and inputs of the interviewee.

Remember to be respectful and empathetic at all times.

APPENDIX B (continued). Interview Protocol

a. Experience in the field

How long have you been working on the organization? How long have you been associated with international cooperation, and what are the positions held/areas of work?

b. Specific aspects of the donor-NGO relationship

On management controls (opening questions)
>1. How has been your experience working with international cooperation projects, especially matters related to project management and compliance?
>2. From your experience, what are the usual control systems required by the donor in a typical project? What are the criteria used to design or choose controls?
>3. What is your opinion of the management approaches and controls required by the donor? How does the organization react to controls?
>4. Can you give me concrete examples of how the controls/accountability mechanisms are usually deployed/implemented in projects?
>5. How has the adoption of control, accountability and management practices, as part of project implementation, affected the entity and its organizational development?

On compliance and other aspects of the donor-NGO relationship
>6. Can you give me examples of unfortunate situations/misunderstandings between the donor and the organization related to divergences in management/control practices?
>7. Can you give me examples of cases where the relationship between the donor and the organization has been strained because of unfortunate, negative events?
>8. How is the relationship with donors that you have worked with for several years/longstanding relationship?
>9. What have been the elements that have guaranteed a stable, longstanding relationship with the donors?
>10. How is the usual approach when requesting/accepting assistance from a donor?
>11. How useful and adequate has been the training in management practices offered by the donor?
>12. In your opinion, what is the most crucial element in the donor-NGO relationship to guarantee project success?
>13. Have there been disagreements between the organization and the donor related to project design, management, and execution? Could you share some experiences?

Closing questions
>14. How do you foresee the future of the international development field in general?
>15. What do you consider should be the role of control in international cooperation projects?
>16. What are your hopes for the donor-NGO relationship in the future?
>17. Is there anything I have not asked about your experience in this area that you would like to tell me?
>18. Do you know other people who could be interested in sharing their experiences and perspectives on this issue?

APPENDIX C. Sample Coding Procedure

Coding Procedure: Merging, dropping, grouping, and splitting categories

From broad codes in the initial review of data, I iteratively create, drop, merge, and split codes until getting a rough coding structure related to the emergence of trust-building activities and control practices.

QUOTE	CODE	CATEGORY
The donor is looking for a partner. A partner who represents you in a region where the organization is a leader. So they look for strategic partners in certain regions to promote certain issues. If one seeks to talk about the afro movement in a region, then they will look for that organization (auditor of cooperation projects)	Alignment of Interest	Trust Builders
NNGO X currently supports and sends funding for two projects: one with rural women and female ex-combatants, and one with indigenous women, where at the local level we work with local women's organizations. We do not directly execute the projects but contact the organizations so that they can develop them in their territories (Program staff, donor)		
They guided us in the objectives, with the needs that they identified from Europe, then they helped us with the objectives and we appropriated them. (Colombian NGO).		
We evaluate that organizations do not have problems of corruption, that they do not have trouble with money. Like they pass a filter too. First of experience, and second, of work and recognition of local work. That's what we take care of a lot (Program staff, donor).	Reputation & Capacity	
Reputation is one of the elements that leads to building trust and reputation is built through previous experiences with previous cooperation projects. All that is evidence that audits have been done then the Cooperation Agency begins to ask "send me your previous audit reports, send me what previous projects you have executed and worked on and those initial evaluations... and just the fact of sending documentation on those previous projects begins to create a reputation and begins to create confidence to work with this organization (Compliance officer)		
Normally, the relationship that organizations have with cooperation agencies is a close relationship, and it is a relationship of trust, because now, at this moment, funding is not being granted just like that. There must be prior knowledge of an organization. This is a process that can take up to a couple of years, if we get to know each other, there are visits, documentation, references are requested. And they are organizations that are not only financed by a cooperation agency, but are financed by other agencies, and they talk to each other (Audit partner)		

Appendix C. Coding Procedure: Merging, dropping, grouping, and splitting categories

QUOTE	CODE	CATEGORY
"This process takes place in different ways and at different times. For continuing partnerships, assessments will be informed to a large extent by the quality of the previous partnership, especially information from the monitoring log, while for new partners it may take a combination of some or all of the following methods: •Having one-on-one discussions/interviews •Document review (e.g., registration certificate, audited accounts, reports/evaluations/studies) •Seeking references/recommendations from other partners/donors •Field visits to see how the organisation operate and gather information from stakeholders •Participation in the organisation's forums (General Conditions, Donor of DREAM, NNGOX)	Controls for Reputation & Capacity	Control Practices
Of course one finds cases where everything depends on the severity. We establish risk categories, high, medium, and low, and that is where one determines "here there is high risk for this and this, medium and low and we are going to continue reinforcing it but there is not so much economic or reputational risk", because sometimes we are more interested in the reputational than the economic one. The economic one you can repay, the reputational one if you start having very bad audits always of the same donor, there will be a moment in which the donor says "these people have been working with them for twenty thousand years, and we always find the same problems, so we are not going to finance them anymore." That is the one that worries us the most.		
"The main objective of the capacity assessment is to analyze the existing capacity strengths and weaknesses to build on the capacity assets and address the gaps by formulating a capacity development plan to make the organization perform effectively and efficiently, set and achieve objectives, solve problems and deliver better results". (General Conditions, Donor of DREAM, NNGOX)		
Mobility in certain zones, we need to maintain constant communication with them even when we do personal trips such as vacations, so we have a security group where we need to inform the places we are travelling to, obviously the activity reports, we need to constantly send reports to NNGOX and they in turn transmit those to the donor, but this is something very normal in all organizations of international cooperation. There are also some close contacts with the Canadian embassy, in the case of Oxfam Quebec, so we have invitations that allow to strengthen links and that can be beneficial to the branch, because it is not the same to enter with a Canadian organization than entering with a national/local organization. (Program Officer, NNGO X)	Controls for communication and transparency	
Being an accompanying partner, NNGO2 puts a lot of emphasis on timely and accurate communication respecting the integrity and role of the partner as an implementing organisation. Both parties in the agreement have an obligation to inform each other about significant changes in their respective functions that might affect the fulfilment of the agreement. Important information that might have implications on the agreement, other legal or financial consequences shall always be made in writing with an officially stamped letter. (General Conditions, Donor of DREAM, NNGOX)		
"[The local organization] will inform of any event that may affect the implementation of the action or delay it [...] it will inform any change in the juridical, financial, technical, organizational, or control situation" (General Conditions, Donor of DREAM, NNGOX)		

Appendix C. Use of Grodal et. Al's (2020) Active Categorization Framework

I use Grodal's framework to guide the data analysis process, moving from the formulation and refining of a research question to reaching a coherent narrative or a "working hypothesis".

Move	Definition	Application	Round of Coding
Asking questions	Approaching the data with specific questions that researchers want answers to	How does trust and control interact in the third sector/ international cooperation setting?	1
Focusing on puzzles	Focusing on the part of the data that is most surprising or salient to the researchers	After an initial revision of the literature and the data, two things are puzzling: 1) most studies focus on the dynamics of trust and control in particular dyadic relationships, with limited contributions to overall theory, as they focus in trying to find substitutions or complementarities in such specific settings; 2) the salience of emotional elements, and the need for information provision in the cooperation relationship	1
Asking questions (reframing)	Reframe the initial research question to align it with the puzzle	The analysis of trust-control should include other theoretical lenses that allows to assess the salience of emotional and informational elements. The sociological perspective of trust allows to do this, due to its focus on the cognitive and emotional dimensions of trust. The new research question is: how cognitions and emotions interact to enact trust and control?	1
Dropping categories	Dropping categories that were generated during the initial part of data analysis but that turned out not to have theoretical traction.	Some interviewees expressed how they were having "administrative exhaustion" due to the amount of control and accounting requirements from donors. This category lost relevance when analyzing donors' trust on the local NGO	2
Merging categories	Uniting two or more existing categories to create a superordinate category	I merged the separate categories of reputation, credibility, and capacity under one single umbrella code, as all of them refer to the track record, experience, abilities and reputation of the NGO in implementing human rights and peacebuilding projects	2
Splitting categories	Separating a category into two or more subordinate categories	I initially categorized trust building activities into the heading "trust builders". Subsequently, I distinguished trust builders into 5 big subordinate categories: 1) alignment of interests; 2) communication & transparency; 3) compliance; 4) sound management; 5) fulfillment of objectives	2
Relating and/or contrasting categories	Comparing several categories with each other to identify relationships between them (or the lack of such relationships)	Relating trust building activities with control practices to see how they connect to each other (i.e. they repel or support each other; they do not relate); Uncovering how emotions and cognitions underlie in both trust and control mechanisms	2,3
Sequencing categories	Temporally organizing categories that researchers have identified in the data	I divided a typical cooperation relationship at DREAM into five stages. I sequenced the interaction between trust-building activities and control practices along such stages	3
Developing and/or dropping working hypotheses	Formulating an overarching theory and, by iterating through the data, either finding increasing evidence for it, leading to its elaboration, or finding contradictory or unsupportive evidence leading to its abandonment	The interaction between emotions and cognitions is what constitutes the trust-control interplay. The emotional and cognitive dimensions of trust interact with control practices to govern the cooperation relationship. The interaction of these dimensions shapes control; it also determines trade-offs and complementarities between trust and control	3

APPENDIX D. DREAM's basic logical framework matrix (the Logframe)

DREAM's logframe is a grid that includes assumptions, goals, products, results and activities, measured by indicators and means of verification. It is essential in any funding application in international cooperation and development.

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
Expected impact: Explanation of the long-term effects that the NGO wants to contribute to, directly or indirectly, through the project.	Description of how the project has contributed to the expected impact.	Information that shows project progress relative to impact indicators (i.e., secondary sources like studies). It is common to make specific evaluations ex-post to establish impact.	Important events, conditions or decisions outside of NGO control and necessary to progress towards an impact.
Expected objective: Explanation of the intended effect of project implementation, with one single project objective being recommended.	Description of how the project is achieving or has achieved its objective, which includes details of quantity, quality, and time.	Information that shows project progress relative to objective indicators.	Important events, conditions or decisions outside of NGO control and necessary to meet the objective.
Product: Explanation of the direct product to be obtained from project activities. It must always be possible to observe whether a result has been produced or not.	Description of how the project produces or has produced expected products, which includes details of quantity, quality, and time.	Information and methods that show product obtainment.	Important events, conditions or decisions outside of NGO control and necessary to obtain the product.

Activities
Each expected result requires undertaking activities, which need to be identified for the first X months of the project.

Flow
Activities should result in products; products should lead towards fulfilling the objective; the objective should contribute to the expected impact.

APPENDIX E. General conditions in a cooperation agreement

This Appendix displays excerpts from donor agreement templates and terms of reference.

1. NNGO 2

Requirements for a partnership with Donor X

X.1 Assessment of partner
This is the gathering of relevant information regarding a potential partner and using that information to make a decision on whether it qualifies to be a partner or not. The assessment targets three main areas;

- Identity of the Civil Society Organization in relation to Donor X's vision, mission, goals and values. Are we compatible?
- Programmatic fit with Donor X's work.
- Capacity – current and willingness to acquire more.

This process takes place in different ways and at different times. For continuing partnerships, assessments will be informed to a large extent by the quality of the previous partnership, especially information from the monitoring log, while for new partners, it may take a combination of some or all of the following methods:

- Having one-on-one discussions/interviews
- Document review (e.g., registration certificate, audited accounts, reports/evaluations/studies)
- Seeking references/recommendations from other partners/donors
- Field visits to see how the organization operate and gather information from stakeholders
- Participation in the organization's forums

X.3 Assessment of partners' capacity and Capacity building plan
The main objective of the capacity assessment is to analyze the existing capacity strengths and weaknesses to build on the capacity assets and address the gaps by formulating a capacity development plan to make the organization perform effectively and efficiently, set and achieve objectives, solve problems and deliver better results. It is also important to note that capacity building is a process that cannot be accomplished within a short span of time. During the initial instance of the partner assessment to fit the program, an assessment serves as an input to capacity building needs. The capacity assessment that is performed after signing the contract serves as a baseline.
The partner capacity assessment findings are the driving force behind capacity development plan/proposal. This is a combined initiative developed to deliver prioritized responses identified by both parties (Partner and Donor X). Therefore, after the plan is developed, a mutual agreement is signed, indicating the responsibility drawn in line with the agreement of cooperation. The partner jointly collaborates with Donor X to implementing the plan. If a partner requires an external facilitator, Donor X may be required to identify potential resource personnel or even act as a resource person.

APPENDIX E (continued). General conditions in a cooperation agreement

X.4 Monitoring
Monitoring is the activity of following up on activities, results and financial situation. Monitoring is required in order for Donor X to uphold its accountability internally, towards rights holders, back donors and the general public.

Donor X, stakeholders and providers of services such as auditors shall be granted access to the organization, documentation, supported projects and stakeholders for field visits, participation in activities and control.

Donor X shall communicate their intentions and purpose clearly and timely in order for the partner organization to prepare appropriately for the visit.

Reports from field visits and control activities by Donor X or service providers should always be sent to the partner organization for information and to give the opportunity to add or correct information.

4.13 Reports from partner organizations
Annual and Final Reports shall be submitted to Donor X in accordance with the agreement. It consists of a narrative and a financial part. The narrative report must be analytical and special emphasis should be on the following:
- Fulfilment of outcomes and impacts.
- Deviations from plans and goals
- Lessons learned from the work by the Organisation
- Future adjustments to the activities and expected results in the Application.
The financial accounts are to follow the same disposition as the approved budget. Comments shall be provided on deviations higher than 10% between outcome and budget.

2. NNGO 5

X.1 The recipient organization agrees: 1) To carry out the activities described in the Work Plan and Budget (attached hereto) and their updates related to the subsequent delivery of funds in tranches; 2) Deliver quarterly reports to the Steering Committee; and 3) Deliver audited annual statements [income statement and balance sheets]. […] The funds provided in compliance with this Agreement will be used to produce the results specified in its annual performance goals.

X.2 The recipient organization agrees to meet the performance objectives contained in Section X. If the recipient organization does not fulfill its responsibilities specified in article X.1 or does not reach at least 70% of any of the performance objectives established for a given year, the Steering Committee will have reason to suspend any further support.

3. NNGO 6

About formulating objectives and indicators:
The project objective(s) have to be formulated such that they are achievable by the end of the funding period. Therefore, they should clearly and realistically describe the effects that are to be achieved by the end of that period (as a rule as intended changes in the lives/work of the direct target groups or project beneficiaries).

The project objectives have to be verifiable. They must, therefore, precisely describe, for example, the number of people, groups or communities in which the envisaged change is to become visible.

APPENDIX E (continued). General conditions in a cooperation agreement

The task of those responsible for project implementation is to ascertain both during the project and on its completion whether the intended changes have taken place, in other words, whether the project objectives have been achieved. Therefore, it is generally necessary to establish indicators by which achievement of the objectives can be observed and measured.

Chapter 4: 'The Book Retains Its Presence' – NGO Agency and Accounting Ambivalence in the International Development Assemblage

Abstract

This paper examines how a Southern Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) that advocates for human rights responds to the requirements and practices of its Western donors. These practices are conveyed through accounting and accountability programs within the international development assemblage. I discuss how Western donors in the assemblage advance a managerial neocolonialization of the Global South, and how this process elicits different responses from the NGO. These responses are compliance, questioning, negotiation, discreet non-compliance, and explicit rejection of donor requirements and practices. By relying on Bhabha's (1994) post-colonial theory, I discuss how these responses are manifestations of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence. As the NGO mimics and appropriates what Bhabha calls the "English book"—an analogy for donors' neocolonial efforts—, the NGO simultaneously challenges donors' authority by reproducing imperfect copies of their book. I contribute to the accounting literature in the NGO setting by revealing that, in the process of NGO agency, accounting is an ambivalent tool that allows Southern NGOs to navigate the international development assemblage, but that also sustains donors' managerial agendas. Despite contestations and challenges, the English book retains its presence.

4.1. Introduction

This chapter explores the agency of Southern Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in dealing with the impositions and conditionalities of the international development assemblage, and the role of accounting in this process. The international development assemblage refers to the governance and calculable workspace where Southern NGOs operate (Martinez & Cooper, 2017, 2019); it comprises the actors, goals, resources, accounting practices, managerial and accountability approaches mobilized around international development projects (Martinez & Cooper, 2017, 2019)[15].

The funding relationships within the development assemblage are sustained by the adoption of principles and practices of management control, cost-efficiency, value for the money, stringent financial and technical accountability (Burkett, 2011; Claeyé, 2014; Evans et al., 2005; Girei, 2022). Through these practices, Western donors of international development projects exercise power over NGOs: they can control, constrain, and direct NGOs' actions, as donors decide

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[15] For simplification purposes, this paper uses indistinctively the terms "NGO" and "Southern NGO." I use the term Northern NGO to refer to multinational NGOs or NGOs located in the Global North.

which development projects are worthy of funding and how such projects should be managed (Abrahamsen, 2004; Claeyé, 2014; Crawford, 2003; Girei, 2022). In addition, donors advance neoliberal and neocolonial interventions, that is to say, arrangements that emphasize market relations and performance-driven reforms which perpetuate the Global South's dependence on the hegemonic Western thinking (Alawattage & Azure, 2021; Chiapello, 2017; Crvelin & Becker, 2020; Duval et al., 2015; Girei, 2022; Hopper et al., 2017; Miller & Power, 2013; Neu & Ocampo, 2007; Peterson, 2012; Sauerbronn et al., 2021; Toivonen & Seremani, 2021)[16].

The process above is not free from contestation and tensions. Southern NGOs are not passive recipients of Western discourses and practices (Claeyé, 2014). NGOs, in navigating demands of upward compliance to donors and staying true to their identity and mission (Cazenave & Morales, 2021; Chenhall et al., 2010; Girei, 2022), respond to donor conditionalities in ways that may change and disrupt the operation and practices of the international development assemblage. Resistance, understood as the practices that subjugated actors mobilize to oppose, disrupt, and withstand power (Lilja et al., 2017), is part of the donor-NGO dialectical process of exchange that modifies the neocolonial agenda. But also, this process of NGO agency and resistance may have consequences for the role of accounting in international development relationships.

Previous studies focus on how accountability and control practices impact the activities of NGOs (Agyemang et al., 2017; Boomsma & O'Dwyer, 2019; Chenhall et al., 2010; Dixon et al., 2006; Goddard, 2021; Goddard & Juma Assad, 2006; Gray et al., 2006; O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007, 2008) and how accounting practices operate as technologies of government in international development (Duval et al., 2015; Martinez & Cooper, 2017, 2019; Neu et al., 2009; Neu & Heincke, 2004; Rahaman et al., 2007, 2010). However, they do not explore the varied pictures that emerge around processes of NGO agency and the role of accounting in it. Only a few studies have recently started to assess these issues (Crvelin & Becker, 2020; Girei, 2022; O'Leary & Smith, 2020). They offer varied explanations that, in conjunction, point towards

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[16] In this paper I use the terms colonial and neocolonial. Colonialism refers to the exercise of "formal and direct political control of a society and its people by a foreign ruling state" (Go, 2015, p. 1). Neocolonialism refers to "the continued exercise of political or economic influence over a society in the absence of formal political control" (Go, 2015, p. 1). International development interventions are considered a form of neocolonialism, as they continue external control over former colonies by more subtle methods, such as managerial requirements and pressures to align to foreign development agendas (Langan, 2015, 2018).

simultaneous and contradictory stances of opposition and alliance; of appropriating technocratic practices to challenge governance agendas, while questioning such technocratic practices.

On the issue of NGO agency, for instance, NGO responses to donor practices seem to fluctuate between two opposite poles: opposition vs compliance (Girei, 2022), and authoritative versus internally-persuasive accountability (O'Leary & Smith, 2020). Also, NGOs' agency and resistance seem to not imply a preformed oppositional program. Rather, they gradually unfold and surface in mediating spaces where subjugated actors rework imposed accounting regimes to give shape to their competing intents (Crvelin & Becker, 2020; O'Leary & Smith, 2020). Regarding the role of accounting, it is presented not only as challenged and resisted, but also as being used to challenge and resist agendas and governance plans emanating from Western actors in the development assemblage (Crvelin & Becker, 2020; Girei, 2022; O'Leary & Smith, 2020). This ambivalence, while implicitly suggested in Crvelin and Becker (2020), O'Leary and Smith (2020), and Girei (2022) remains unexplored in accounting literature. This paper aims to further explore these ambivalent and motley pictures of NGO agency and accounting, by asking the following two interrelated questions. H*ow do Southern NGOs respond to donors' accounting and accountability practices in the international development assemblage? What is the role of accounting in the process of NGO responses to donor practices?*

Using the case of a Colombian NGO that advocates human rights, I show how this NGO responds to the practices and conditionalities in development goals and managerial agendas that its Western donors impose. I find five main responses or manifestations of NGO agency: compliance, questioning, negotiation, discreet non-compliance, and explicit rejection of donor demands and practices. All of these NGO responses have a salient feature: they show some degree of compliance to and appropriation of donor demands, but at the same time, they disrupt donors' authority by advancing nuanced forms of contestation and non-compliance. In other words, NGO responses not only fluctuate between the poles of acceptance and rejection of donor demands and practices, but also, they simultaneously have a foot on both poles. In doing so, the NGO avoids becoming a full, perfect replica of Western practices. Overall, the findings show how the NGO moves in an ambivalent space that allows the expression of its marginal practices and aspirations, while enacting donor demands and practices.

To theorize from these findings, I draw upon post-colonial theory, particularly Bhabha's (1994) theoretical triangulation of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence. This framework allows

me to explore how the encounter of "colonizer" and "colonized" gives birth to an ambiguous space of action, called the "third space of enunciation." This in-between, liminal space, which is different from the combination or mere clash of both entities, is a fertile ground for ambivalent stances of compliance and contestation. By using the analogy of an "English book" (the Gospel) as a symbol of colonial authority installed in every colony, Bhabha (1994) theorizes how the colonized react to authority in various ways. Despite enacting the agency of the colonized, acts of challenge and resistance to colonial powers in the third space of enunciation are still ingrained in the English book's commanded practices.

I extend the literature on accounting and accountability in international development by showing how the conjunction of the NGO's different responses results in an ambivalent posture towards the practices of its donors and the overall development assemblage. This ambivalence is consistent with Bhabha's framework. On one hand, the NGO embraces Western accounting and managerial practices as they help it to navigate the development assemblage; on the other hand, it subverts these practices due to their lack of alignment with local reality and the needs of the organization. The NGO is both an accomplice and a resister of colonial authority. This ambivalence is identifiable in the role of accounting. Accounting is an ambivalent tool that allows the NGO to mobilize its marginal ambitions through stable funding relationships in the development assemblage, while maintaining donors' current managerial practices and homogenizing agenda. In other words, donors' aim of standardizing NGOs' aspirations and modes of operation and management is not ultimately shattered by the NGO's contestation acts. Accounting embodies the "English book", a device of authority that despite being subverted through appropriation, questioning, challenging, negotiation, and rejection, remains present in the (former) colonies.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the accounting literature devoted to NGO agency and resistance. Section 3 introduces Bhabha's (2004) post-colonial approach of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence. Section 4 describes the case study and research methods. Section 5 presents the case narrative of donors' deployment of accounting and accountability practices and the subsequent NGO responses. Section 6 discusses how the donor-NGO encounter, and particularly the different NGO responses, are manifestations of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence. This section also discusses the study's implications for accounting literature. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions for future research.

4.2. Literature Review

The interpretive and critical accounting literature focuses on how accounting practices operate as technologies of government in international development (Duval et al., 2015; Martinez & Cooper, 2017; Neu et al., 2006, 2009; Neu & Heincke, 2004; Rahaman et al., 2007, 2010) and how accountability relationships influence NGOs' activities (Agyemang et al., 2017; Boomsma & O'Dwyer, 2019; Chenhall et al., 2010; Duenas & Mangen, 2021; Goddard, 2021; Goddard & Juma Assad, 2006; O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007, 2008). There are three main takeaways from these discussions. First, donors constrain and control NGOs' behavior through the prescription of accounting devices and accountability practices that frame NGOs as subjects of governance (Duval et al., 2015; Martinez & Cooper, 2017; Neu et al., 2009; Rahaman et al., 2007, 2010). These practices have effects on NGOs' professionalization, missional activities, and relationships with different stakeholders (Agyemang et al., 2017; Boomsma & O'Dwyer, 2019; Chenhall et al., 2010; Goddard, 2021; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). Second, accounting practices gather, coordinate, and control heterogeneous actors within international development to constitute and assemble a field of governance, the international development assemblage. This assemblage reorientates the behavior and aspirations of Southern NGOs and social movements in ways useful to foreign actors (Martinez & Cooper, 2017; Neu et al., 2009). Third, Western actors homogenize Southern NGOs through standard accountability requirements, performance-driven reforms, and management control practices. These homogenizing efforts represent the advancement of a neocolonial project over the Global South (Crvelin & Becker, 2020; Duval et al., 2015; Hopper et al., 2017; Neu & Ocampo, 2007; Rahaman et al., 2007; Sauerbronn et al., 2021).

The discussion above illustrates the rich literature on the effects of accountability relationships in international development and the use of accounting to govern NGOs' actions and the space where NGOs operate. Much less research has focused on NGOs' responses to the conditionalities and practices of their donors and the role of accounting that results from this process of NGO agency. These aspects deserve more attention because NGOs are not mere passive recipients of Western discourses and practices (Claeyé, 2014; Toivonen & Seremani, 2021). As some recent studies demonstrate, the imposition of development and managerial programs is not a straightforward phenomenon shielded from contestation and opposition (Crvelin & Becker,

2020; Girei, 2022; O'Leary & Smith, 2020). For instance, Crvelin and Becker (2020) show that ultimate beneficiaries of development projects appropriate and reprogram accounting requirements to mobilize personal hopes and desires, away from the Northern NGO aspired market rationale. Similarly, O'Leary and Smith (2020) propose that NGOs do not always accept authoritative forces of accountability that seek verifiable understandings of impact and performance. NGOs constantly look for ways to change these forces, through mundane acts of resistance. More recently, Girei (2022) uses Gramsci's notion of "war of position" to explore different forms of NGO micro-resistance, namely the small and sustained acts of opposition that NGOs enact in their everyday work. In doing so, this author discusses what NGO routinary acts count as resistance to technocratic accountability regimes, and when resistance counts.

The studies above highlight two features of the processes of NGO agency and the role of accounting in the donor-NGO encounter. First, NGO agency and resistance alternate and fluctuate between two poles. For O'Leary and Smith (2020), "moments of resistance" occur between two modes of accountability: an authoritative mode and an internally-persuasive mode. This persuasive mode means the appropriation and usage of accounting for the NGO's own purposes; in Girei (2022), resistance is a dialectical process that encompasses both opposition and alliance. For Crvelin and Becker (2020), resistance does not always imply a preformed oppositional program but rather gradually unfolds in mediating spaces between the dominant and the subjugated actor, allowing the latter to reprogram imposed accounting structures.

Second, accounting is either challenged and resisted, or rather used and reprogramed to enact agency and resistance. Crvelin and Becker (2020) suggest that subjugated actors resist through, rather than against, the Northern NGO's accounting practices. Accounting becomes a device that can be hijacked to mobilize alternative aspirations. However, this hijacking does not mean that accounting can be completely manipulated or modified. Accounting defines the limits within which oppositional agency can be mobilized. Similarly, O'Leary and Smith (2020) suggest that accounting is not a tool with an inherent essence or foundation but rather a phenomenon whose subjunctive properties enable the NGO to have moments of resistance. Accounting's subjunctive possibilities allow the NGO to engage with donor authoritative discourses of accountability and transform them into an internally persuasive mode. In Girei (2022), accounting is a force with a neocolonial character detached from the material and cultural contexts where NGOs operate, but still subject to be both resisted and used to make it meaningful to the NGOs' day-to-day work and

mandate. The different roles presented above are attributed to accounting's mediating capacities to connect different programs (Crvelin & Becker, 2020); to accounting's subjunctive possibilities that make visible the silenced aspirations of marginalized "others" (O'Leary & Smith, 2020); or to accounting's functional purposes that serve neoliberal and neocolonial aims, but that can be made meaningful for the subjugated.

Overall, the studies above point towards simultaneous and contradictory stances of opposition and alliance; of appropriating technocratic practices to challenge managerial discourses and agendas while questioning and challenging such technocratic practices. These contradictory stances occur in both the process of NGO agency and the role of accounting in the encounter with donor requirements and practices. This paper further explores these ambivalent and varied pictures of NGO agency and accounting by asking two questions. *How do Southern NGOs respond to donors' accounting and accountability practices in the international development assemblage? What is the role of accounting in the process of NGO responses to donor practices?* For this purpose, I rely on post-colonial theory, as described next.

4.3. Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts a post-colonial approach focused on hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence. This section discusses why this framework is suitable to study issues of NGO agency and the role of accounting in the donor-NGO encounter.

4.3.1 Post-Colonial Theory

I rely on Bhabha's (1994) postcolonial approach, specifically its concepts of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence. I use these concepts because they invite to think about how a subjugated actor appropriates, translates, imitates, and reinterprets the practices of a more powerful actor. In line with my research questions of how Southern NGOs respond to donors' accountability practices and what the role of accounting is in the process of NGO responses to donor practices, Bhabha's theorization focuses on the interfaces and interchanges between actors. It allows theorizing how the subjugated exert their own agency in processes of colonialization (Forsyth et al., 2017; Peterson, 2012). Hybridity and its associated concepts, although initially enunciated to study culture, acknowledge that the interchanges between colonizer and colonized can take many

forms and operate in non-obvious ways. In the subsections below, I explain the concepts of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence.

4.3.1.1 Hybridity

Hybridity refers to how colonial authority attempts to translate the identity and practices of the colonized into a singular universal framework, but it fails and produces something else (Bhabha, 1994; Papastergiadis, 2015). This failure occurs due to the agency of colonized actors, who engage with and challenge colonial power (Ashcroft et al., 2001; Bhabha, 1994). Hybridity questions the idea of purity or originality in a culture because the clashes and contradictions that occur between colonizer and colonized allow for the appropriation, translation, re-historization, and new readings of traditional social and cultural meanings and symbols (Bhabha, 1994).

Hybridity takes place in the third space of enunciation, a concept that Bhabha uses to define the contact zone between colonizer and colonized. "We should remember that it is the 'inter' – the cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the *in-between* space – that carries the burden of the meaning of culture" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 38). Hybridity refers thus to the processes that occur in the third space of enunciation, which challenge "our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary past" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 37). The impossibility of a "pure culture" challenges "the narrative of the Western nation" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 37).

The products of the relationship between colonizer and colonized redefine culture as a continuous process of interpretation and reinterpretation of knowledge systems and practices on the part of the colonized (Claeyé, 2014). In this spirit, processes of hybridity are continuous, universal, and always involve contestation and competing interests as they are embedded in unequal relationships of power (Bhabha, 1994; Claeyé, 2014; Forsyth et al., 2017). The third space of enunciation that colonization produces allows eluding the "politics of polarity" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 39) that characterize the discussions on neocolonialism, because in discussing binaries such as Western versus Non-Western, dominated versus subjugated, modern versus traditional, it highlights "the multiplicity of outcomes that might occur when two entities meet and interact" (Peterson, 2012, p. 12). In consequence, absolutes poles such as full acceptance or total rejection are not possible. What exists are ambivalent processes of appropriation and challenge, adoption and contestation, nuanced responses, and agency that reshape norms and activities (Bhabha, 1994;

Peterson, 2012; Tajes et al., 2011). In sum, hybridity involves the cultural statements and systems "constructed in this contradictory and ambivalent space of enunciation" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 37).

Hybridity is considered a form of challenge and resistance, as the colonial encounter is not about the indisputability of colonial authority but rather an intervention of the colonized that revaluates symbols and subverts the colonial discourse. Bhabha uses the analogy of an English book as a symbol of colonial power installed in every colony, to illustrate how hybridity's dialectic articulation between colonizer and colonized challenges authority. The idea of the English book originates in The Gospel. Bhabha (1994) narrates how the Gospel is circulated among the Indians outside New Delhi as part of the first catechists' efforts. Bhabha uses this story to illustrate how colonial rule and discipline is constituted in the colonies. The English book represents the fixity of colonial power and the attempts to impose a European cultural heritage.

"if the appearance of the English book is read as a production of colonial hybridity, then it no longer simply commands authority…Hybridity intervenes in the exercise of authority not merely to indicate the impossibility of its identity but to represent the unpredictability of its presence. The book retains its presence, but it is no longer a representation of an essence; it is now a partial presence, a (strategic) device in a specific colonial engagement, an appurtenance of authority" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 114).

The above passage means that any process of colonial authority (the discovery and placement of the Book) is also a process of displacement because the mere presence of the book opens the door to its repetition, translation, misreading, distortion, and dislocation (Bhabha, 1985). Hybridity thus invites us to focus on the third space where the colonizer installs the book and the colonized appropriates it and challenges it; the borders and interspaces where identities meet, perform, and collide.

I use hybridity to theorize how a Southern NGO responds to donor conditionalities and practices, and how the products of the donor-NGO encounter (the third space) shape the role of accounting in the international development assemblage. However, a discussion of hybridity is incomplete without referring to its associate concepts of mimicry and ambivalence.

4.3.1.2 Mimicry and Ambivalence

Mimicry is the result of the colonized's close imitation and mimicking of the colonizer that results in an imperfect copy due to the inclusion of a distinct local dimension (Bhabha, 1994; Toivonen & Seremani, 2021). "Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86). The colonized, by imitating the colonizer's culture, practices, and values, deliver a partial representation of the colonial object, a blurred copy that disrupts the colonizer's authority (Bhabha, 1994). Mimicry is repetition of partial presence, it never fully represents the colonial object. Such partial representation exposes the artificiality of colonial powers (Bhabha, 1994).

The idea of mimicry is based on ambivalence, that is, the ambiguity towards the other in the colonial encounter, a fluctuation between attraction and repulsion with the colonial opposite (Ashcroft et al., 2001; Bhabha, 1994). For the colonized, ambivalence is the parallel engagement with and repulsion of colonial authority (Bhabha, 1994; Young, 1995). Similarly, the colonizer feels attracted to the inferior but exotic colonized, while the latter is never fully opposed to colonial authority (Ashcroft et al., 2001). "Rather than assuming that some colonized subjects are 'complicit' and some 'resistant', ambivalence suggests that complicity and resistance exist in a fluctuating relation within the colonial subject" (Ashcroft et al., 2001, p. 12). Ambivalence implies simultaneously having one foot in both sides of the colonial encounter.

The ambivalence of the colonial discourse is what feeds mimicry as a subversive tool. Mimicry is a strategy for appropriation, regulation, and discipline yet also a threat to normalized knowledges and disciplinary powers (Bhabha, 1994). In eliciting local repetitions of Western models, the colonizer fears that these copies result in a threatening sameness (Bhabha, 1994; Roque, 2015). Bhabha quotes Sir Edward Cust's reflections of British colonizers in West Africa to describe the ambivalence of colonial discourse:

"It is out of season to question at this time of day, the original policy of a conferring on every colony of the British Empire a mimic representation of the British Constitution. But if the creature so endowed has sometimes forgotten its real significance and under the fancied importance of speakers and maces […] a fundamental principle appears to have been forgotten or overlooked in our system of colonial policy – that of colonial dependence. To give to a colony the forms of independence is a mockery; she would not be a colony for

a single hour if she could maintain an independent station" (Sir Edward Cust, 1839, as quoted by Bhabha, 1994, p.85).

The passage above highlights how mimicry is not far from mockery, because it opens the door to irony, parody, and masquerades that reveal how colonial attempts to control behavior derive in subversion and resistance. That is why mimicry is "at once resemblance and menace" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86). Mimicry is a camouflage that is both partial resemblance and partial difference and whose ambivalence "contains the seeds of disruption of colonial authority" (Roque, 2015, p. 202).

In sum, Bhabha's ideas discuss how the encounter of colonizer and colonized produces an ambivalence that both nurtures the colonial system and empowers the colonized. Ambivalence is the base of hybridity and mimicry, because the colonized subject in the third space of enunciation "is never simply and completely opposed to the colonizer" (Ashcroft et al., 2001, p. 12). As the colonized interacts with the colonizer, the former appropriate the latter's practices, and reinterprets them in its local context. I use Bhabha's theoretical triangulation of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence to discuss how Southern NGOs respond to the colonial authority of its donors, and the role of accounting that results from the donor-NGO encounter.

4.4. Methods and Research Context

This paper draws on data collected from two main sources: first, a participant observation case study with a Colombian NGO named DREAM[17]; and second, twenty-five formal interviews with Colombian and Canadian actors placed within the international development assemblage. I explain in the following subsections the research site, data collection, the approach for data analysis, and reflexivity of the researcher.

4.4.1 Research Site

DREAM is a Colombian NGO that advocates human rights, social justice, and peacebuilding. Some of its activities include preventing human rights violations, legally assisting victims in cases of reparation of human rights violations, presenting proposals of public policies for dismantling illegal armed groups, and monitoring the implementation of the peace agreements

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[17] This is a fictional name used to ensure the anonymity of the organization.

signed in 2016 between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas[18]. DREAM emerged decades ago from grassroots movements; it has chapters across Colombia, participates in national and international forums, and belongs to a network of civil society organizations with similar objectives.

DREAM is part of the international development assemblage, which can be described in the following way. At the upper level, DREAM's ultimate donors (e.g., governments of Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), allocate funds for international development projects. Most governments have a cooperation agency that administers and manages these funds, following governmental operational plans and development agendas. Many times, these funds are entrusted to Northern NGOs or large charities, which in turn establish partnerships with Southern NGOs. In this context, DREAM develops relationships with these donors (either the governmental agency or the Northern NGO). These relationships come in some cases from donors' explicit interest in supporting DREAM's work, while others emerge as DREAM formulates projects in open calls for proposals to obtain funding.

DREAM is suitable for studying issues of NGO agency because it is subject to conditionalities and accountability requirements from its donors. These requirements influence or constrain DREAM's behavior in several areas (e.g., administrative, organizational, political). At the time of the study, around 11 cooperation agencies and Northern NGOs from various countries (Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Norway) supported DREAM's work.

DREAM has two operational divisions: 1) research and project management; 2) accounting and administration. The first division oversees the planning, design, and implementation of human rights and peacebuilding projects funded by international donors. The second division takes charge of all the legal, administrative, accounting and control duties. DREAM's highest decision-making body is called the National Assembly, which comprises delegates from regional chapters. This Assembly has the mandate to determine the overall strategy, direction, and work plan and approve financial statements and the general budget. The Executive Committee, appointed by the National Assembly, implements this mandate.

4.4.2 Data Collection

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[18] FARC is an acronym for "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia." FARC was the world´s oldest guerrilla group and in 2016 signed a peace agreement with the Colombian government, which intended to end a fifty-year war.

Data collection took place for twenty-four months, from July 2018 to July 2020. I used two data sources: first, participant observation inside DREAM (Denscombe, 2014; Spradley, 2016), and second, interviews with different actors within the international development assemblage. In the first case, I gained access to DREAM in the form of an unpaid 12-week full-time internship within the administrative and accounting team. Thanks to my background in accounting and administration, I supported this team in the budgeting of development projects, general financial planning, economic reporting to donors, updating administrative procedures, and pre-audit verifications. My prolonged presence at the organization and participation in its daily routines allowed me to know the role and functioning of accounting practices, administrative requirements, and accountability demands from DREAM's donors (Parker, 2017). I focused on understanding accounting practices, donor demands, control and accountability practices, and their impact on the organization's relationships. While I was a member of the accounting team for all internship-related purposes, my role as an outside academic researcher was clear to everyone at the organization. By experiencing the feeling of being an insider and outsider and by being aware of my dual-purpose role (Spradley, 2016) I avoided "going native" within the organization (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). "Going native" means "losing all sense of distance or objectivity" (O'Reilly, 2008, p. 12) due to the extreme involvement with the community under study.

Within DREAM I conducted eleven in-depth formal interviews with key personnel (see appendix A) and had informal conversations with other staff. The formal interviews were semi-structured. I used a flexible protocol, shown in Appendix B, to ensure I was open and responsive to the interview situation and could adjust interactions with interviewees according to their position, experience, relationships with external stakeholders, and work area. Interviews lasted between 30 and 65 min each and were digitally recorded when permitted (see appendix A). I complemented the interviews with informal conversations and observations. Witnessing events at DREAM and having casual chats with the personnel enabled me to capture details, processes, and other elements that expanded my knowledge on relevant issues or confirmed what interviewees asserted (Parker, 2017). I noted informal conversations and observations in my daily field logbook. These diverse sources enriched my understanding of DREAM and its functioning.

As a second data source, I conducted 25 formal interviews with auditors of international cooperation projects, NGO consultants, managers of Colombian NGOs, and relevant staff within Northern NGOs, like program officers and compliance managers (see appendix A). Many of these interviewees were either directly related to DREAM (e.g., officers working within DREAM's donors) or highly knowledgeable of the specific assemblage in which DREAM operates (e.g., external auditors working for some of DREAM's donors). Like the interviews at DREAM, this second set of interviews took a semi-structured form, where I used a flexible protocol to ensure proper interaction with participants (appendix B). The conversations revolved around issues of control, administrative practices, project design, accountability requirements, capacity-building, and donor-NGO relationships. These interviews lasted between 30 and 80 minutes and were digitally recorded when permitted (see appendix A).

All 36 interviews were formally consented using a consent form. From these, 11 interviews were not digitally recorded (see appendix A). Instead, I took detailed notes during and immediately after each interview, to ensure that the information was registered in verbatim form and appropriately summarizes the interview. Also, for validation purposes, I emailed interviewees the interview transcripts for approval and discussed preliminary coding results with selected key interviewees.

I supplemented interviews and observational data with formal documentation publicly available from cooperation agencies' websites (such as terms of reference, funding conditions, formats, guidelines, policies) and notes, project documentation, and publications taken from archival records of DREAM (see Appendix A). Except for some documentation and five interviews, all data are in Spanish. I translate the quotes shown in this document.

4.4.3 Data Analysis

The study is interpretive because the meanings and relations between donors and beneficiaries in the context of international development are socially constructed. As interpretive research recognizes that human experiences and social contexts shape our knowledge of a social phenomenon (Creswell, 2003; Guba & Lincoln, 1994), this study heavily relies on the participants' views and their subjective interpretations of donor-NGO relationships, which allows developing a pattern of meanings (Creswell, 2003).

To make sense of the data, I follow an approach similar to Miles and Huberman (1994), which starts with a phase of data reduction through meaningful distilling, organizing, and selecting. In this first round of coding, using the software N-Vivo, I create initial categorizations using broad codes such as "donor interests," "NGO accounting practices," or "North-South" to concentrate on sections of the data that speak to donor conditionalities and NGO agency (see appendix C, coding round 1).

In the second round of coding, I refine the initial categorizations to reflect emerging patterns and themes that relate to the intersection of donor practices and different NGO responses, calling for a theoretical framework that suits these emerging trends. In this sense, the study is inductive and data-driven (Langley, 1999), as the empirical material leads the case narrative, and the theoretical lens follows to articulate what the data is reflecting. At this stage, I produce a rough thematic chart that condenses donor practices and NGO responses into main conceptual categories. This conceptually ordered chart belongs to what Miles and Huberman (1994) call within-case display (see appendix C, coding round 2).

Finally, in the third round of coding, continuous iterations between the empirics and the theoretical framework allow me to derive more specific codes that reflect DREAM's nuanced responses to donor conditionalities. I analyze the relationships between the refined codes and assess the emergent conclusions to produce a narrative that constitutes the findings of this article.

4.4.4 Researcher's Reflexivity

Researching the donor-NGO relationship in the Global South is always a challenge. In this section, I reflect on two aspects associated with the process of data collection and analysis. First, my subjectivity affects the interpretation and the case narrative of Southern NGOs' agency (Dar, 2018; Toivonen & Seremani, 2021). I am a researcher born and raised in Colombia but trained in the Global North and informed with Western theoretical postures. This profile influences how I make sense of the empirical setting. In times when the decolonization agenda in accounting academia is more relevant than ever (Alawattage et al., 2021; Sauerbronn et al., 2021), it is important to acknowledge the subjectivity of the researcher. As a strategy to offset any detrimental impact of this inherent subjectivity, I selected some participants to review the preliminary coding and had discussions with them to discuss and validate preliminary findings. In addition, many of the interviewees are at different ends of the donor-NGO relationship, and most of them

acknowledged donor conditionalities, impositions of managerial practices, and other complexities of the empirical setting described in the findings. This approach enables me to reconcile different perspectives under a coherent narrative that builds on the recognition of tensions between donors' agendas and NGOs' own development.

The second concern revolves around the extent to which interviewees are open to talking, to an external actor, about sensitive issues of the donor-NGO relationship (e.g., organizational control, accountability demands). I noticed that during formal interviews, some actors were somehow cautious in their assertions about the relationship with donors, while others were more open and critical in their assertions. For instance, an interviewee at DREAM talked about the fundamental role of a Western NGO in helping DREAM to become "a more structured organization." While these assertions could have been part of an intentional effort to impress the researcher, informal chats with other actors and daily routines at the organization helped me triangulate these assertions. In addition, being a Colombian native allowed me to build rapport with interviewees through local manners, idioms, and customs. This strategy enabled me to not pressure the interview agenda, letting interviewees to freely speak about their social and organizational realities.

4.5. Findings

This section presents the donor-NGO encounter as the third space of enunciation that gives rise to different manifestations of NGO agency. I present first how DREAM's donors impose and elicit adoption of their development and managerial practices (Section 4.5.1). Subsequently, I show how DREAM exerts agency by responding to these donor practices, through five types of responses: compliance, questioning, negotiation, discreet non-compliance, and explicit rejection of donor practices (Section 4.5.2).

4.5.1 Donor conditionalities and practices

Donors encourage the adoption of their development and accountability agendas through the repeated use and promotion of managerial values and Western accounting practices along the development assemblage. Under the premise of "aid effectiveness," this promotion draws on

principles such as alignment to good practices and results-based management, which are intended for the benefit of all actors in the assemblage.[19]

> *"By implementing these principles, the countries and organisations that endorsed the Paris Declaration are making major breakthroughs in improving aid effectiveness, tackling issues that have hampered development for decades. Developing country governments and civil society are reaping the rewards in the form of better, more aligned and more predictable donor support [...] The lessons of the Paris Declaration and its principles can help encourage better ways of working together, to the benefit of all."* (OECD, 2015, p. 337)[20]

DREAM's donors adopt the managerial principles promoted in the international development assemblage, and disseminate them through contract conditionalities and supporting practices of what they consider to be adequate project management. The following quotes illustrate this point.

> *"The Beneficiary [the NGO] will carry out the action jointly and severally with respect to the Contracting Authority, taking all necessary and reasonable measures to guarantee that such action is undertaken in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Contract. To this end, the Beneficiary will execute the action with all the care, efficiency, transparency, and diligence required, in accordance with the principle of good financial management and with the best practices in this area, described in clause XX."* (extract from contract with NNGO1, Donor of DREAM)[21]

> *"We have a team here to accompany the process of accountability in the reports, which is an administrative team that helps .... visits them [the local NGOs], [the team] reviews the draft reports with them, so that when they send the final report to us, we get a fairly clean report. And another team of people who are the people in the programmatic team and the program officers who are the ones who accompany in technical and political terms to make sure the project goals are fulfilled."* (High-level officer, NNGO2, Donor of DREAM)

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[19] Results-based management is a project life cycle approach that focuses on performance measurement, procedural upward accountability, efficiency in the use of resources, achievement of outcomes, and maximization of results (Girei, 2022; Global Affairs Canada, 2015).

[20] "The Paris Declaration (2005) is a practical action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It gives a series of specific implementation measures and establishes a monitoring system to assess progress and ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments" (*Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action - OECD*, n.d., para. 3). The Paris Declaration was produced by State-level actors and constitutes the pinnacle of managerial reforms on development at the beginning of the new millennium, endorsed by leading development practitioners (Bissio, 2013).

[21] Donors are identified as NNGO1, NNGO2, etc. NNGO stands for "Northern NGO."

Failure to comply with donor conditions may lead to donors halting their support, for instance, by withholding money disbursements. Such penalties are clearly established in the cooperation agreements signed with DREAM. These conditionalities show how donors constrain and influence DREAM's behavior, which is a phenomenon that officers within DREAM's donors openly recognize:

> *Once we decide whom to work with, it is true that we act in a very vertical way. We make diagnoses of the organizations' capacities, we identify that they are well equipped in administrative and financial terms, logistical capacity, capacity to present reports. We evaluate that, and although we do not rule them out because they are weak, we ask them to start a strengthening process." (High-level officer, NNGO 2, Donor of DREAM)*

Donors also predefine through contractual conditions the accounting practices that are considered "valid" to manage the relationship, and the mechanisms to give an account of development projects (See appendix E). Also, when DREAM submits a project proposal, it should follow the guidelines, methodologies, and formats of the cooperation agencies.

> *"The project must be presented in accordance with the logical framework methodology and with a results-based management approach. In this part, you must succinctly and specifically explain the following: expected impact […] expected results […] products." (Guidelines project proposal NNGO3, Donor of DREAM)[22]*

The logical framework is a project management methodology used for designing, monitoring, and assessing international development projects. It is a visual tool that links objectives, inputs, activities, and expected results. The results-based management approach and the logical framework show how Western actors in the assemblage conceive only one way of formulating and managing projects, leaving no room for alternatives to emerge.

Finally, donors also elicit the adoption of their managerial agendas through capacity-building plans. When donors decide to fund DREAM, they enact these plans to route the Southern NGO towards a role model of receiving aid. While in principle capacity building plans aim at empowering the local organization, they normatively shape its preferences towards a homogenizing vision around "good management" of international development projects.

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[22] The logframe, for several decades now, has been paramount in any funding application in international development, as most cooperation agencies and Northern NGOs use it and require it from Southern partners (Martinez & Cooper, 2020). The logframe reflects technocratic goals of monitoring, efficiency, and verifiability (Martinez & Cooper, 2020; Wallace, 1997; Wallace et al., 2007). See appendix D for an example of the logframe.

"The main objective of the capacity assessment is to analyze the existing capacity strengths and weakness to build on the capacity assets and address the gaps by formulating a capacity development plan to make the organization perform effectively and efficiently, set and achieve objectives, solve problems and deliver better results." (General Conditions, NNGO4, Donor of DREAM)

In sum, donors elicit the adoption of their managerial values and accounting practices through managerial discourses, contractual impositions, and Western project management methodologies. These donor practices constrain and influence DREAM's behavior by directing it towards a role model of how international development should be managed. However, this process is not exempt from contestation, as the Southern NGO may respond in multiple ways. The following section shows DREAM's responses to donor practices.

4.5.2 DREAM's responses

DREAM responds to donor practices through multiple ways that fluctuate between dutiful compliance to explicit rejection of donor practices. I condense these responses into five categories: compliance, questioning, negotiation, discreet non-compliance, and explicit rejection. These NGO responses occur in the third space of enunciation, the in-between or liminal space where donor and NGO meet and interact. The following sub-sections explain each response.

4.5.2.1 Compliance

DREAM embraces donor practices, and dutifully complies with donor managerial orientations and impositions. DREAM recognizes that compliance is the main way to maintain sound relationships with its donors. When asked about the factors that guarantee stable funding relationships, some DREAM members argue:

"The only way you can maintain a good relationship with the donor is to give it what it wants. And what it wants are both narrative and financial reports of what you are doing, [it is necessary] to leave evidence of what the donor is helping to build […] otherwise, no relationship can be sustained if requirements are not met." (Administrative Manager, DREAM)

"We have been very judicious on the accounting and administrative levels. There has always been a good control of projects, and we have been accountable about them." (Executive Committee member A, DREAM)

DREAM also acknowledges that embracing donor methodologies and practices helps it to be organizationally stronger and better navigate the development assemblage.

"Technicalities and projects' greater formalization requirements have their good sides. 'Technification' leads to planning, which is good. It is not a comfortable change but has many advantages. It enhances planning, which allows our work vision to get transformed into cooperation projects; it professionalizes the organization, its management, and its staff." (Executive Committee member B, DREAM)

A DREAM member attaches the organization's good standing and results to the adoption of donors' orientations.

"DREAM was born as a much more political organization, less programmed, less planned, and today it is an organization that operates under a program, with a plan. And I can cite concrete examples. When DREAM was born, it was in the fashion of a solidary action, closely linked to issues of unions, grassroots struggles. And today, without leaving its vision of human rights defense, it has clearly defined areas, it has an operational plan, it has a clearly defined mission and vision. This was possible, in part, thanks to international cooperation agencies. I quote the case of one, NNGO3, which said: 'for you to function much better it is necessary that you do an exercise of looking at yourself, of evaluate yourself, and try to collectively build your aspirations'. And I think that was a great achievement of cooperation agencies [...] they made us a much more useful tool, a tool with much clearer aspirations to serve those we want to serve." (Project Coordinator, DREAM)

Another member of DREAM highlights how the adoption of donor requirements transforms the organization for the better.

"As long as the organization implements the controls that donors request, hopefully in a very strict manner [...] that gives you a unique administrative strengthening. Every time you do a [administrative] training, every time they ask you for more, you learn new things, you start to have an idea of everything you are doing, how to improve [...]management controls will always be the opportunity to strengthen the organization." (Administrative manager, DREAM)

By adopting donor practices, DREAM appropriates the means of the development assemblage to serve its purposes in the local context. In the following quote, a member of DREAM highlights how the technical procedures for project formulation are translated and adapted to meet the local needs of the grassroots movement.

"Each of our regional chapters is comprised of the youth, unions, victims [of the Colombian civil conflict]. They are an active part and politically decide. They have the

opportunity to define our road map, our strategies in the [National] Assembly. So, they have a direct incidence in the formulation of what we can do, both politically, administratively, and organizationally. Then, when the time to formulate a project comes, this is a much more technical task, but it comes predetermined from what the [National] Assembly has said that we can do and what are our priorities at the strategic level."
(Project Coordinator, DREAM)

In sum, compliance refers to meeting and adopting donor requirements and practices. DREAM considers that this response helps maintain stable funding relationships. Also, by adopting donor practices, DREAM better navigates the international development assemblage, because adoption raises DREAM profile as a strong organization able to manage aid funding. Finally, DREAM embraces and appropriates donor practices to better serve its grassroots constituents in the local context.

4.5.2.2 Questioning

Despite complying, DREAM does not agree with many donor practices and requirements. DREAM questions and challenges these practices because they do not align with local reality, and because of the administrative burden that they carry. Still, DREAM's care for its organizational stability compels it to comply, as the following quote shows.

"Some projects are very cumbersome in their reporting [interviewee cites an example of administrative overload]. But we are subject to the changes that each donor implements constantly. For us, it would not be a surprise that out of the blue the presentation or reporting of expenses may change. And while this means a lot of work this is not new for us [...] We are aware that DREAM depends on these donors, so we do our best to satisfy them because they are the ones that are giving us funds." *(Accounting Assistant 2, DREAM)*

Another interviewee questions how donor requirements of enhanced professionalization become a burden for DREAM.

"We don't have the position of 'custodian' anymore [the custodian used to manage DREAM's all administrative matters]. Instead, the administrative division grew a lot. It is five people for an organization that has no more than 30 employees. That's a lot. But still, we keep it [this size of the administrative division] focusing on a management that should be reliable and trustworthy for the [National] Assembly and our donors."
(Executive Committee member B, DREAM)

The same interviewee questions donor practices of not financing administrative expenses necessary to sustain DREAM and administrative project control.

> *"Donors do not fund administrative expenses. This is a consequence of the current model of cooperation. Normally, with our own generated resources we used to finance some political actions which are important for us. However, due to deficit [of financial resources] those [own generated] resources now go to the administrative division and to cover project expenses that donors don't fund." (Executive Committee member B, DREAM)*

DREAM's administrative manager also questions and discredits donor funding practices:

> *"I don't know how donors visualize this, but they give you money for a project and they ask you twenty thousand reports, but they never give you money for the administrative staff that manages the project. And that makes our job more difficult [interviewee describes work overloads]. So basically they are telling you 'manage well my resources but do it with your own means [...]This is not logical at all, I mean, it's very hard to manage 20 projects and only one person in charge of them." (Administrative manager, DREAM)*

Finally, another DREAM member questions the overall model of donor cooperation in the development assemblage, but also acknowledges that DREAM plays along with it to survive in this assemblage.

> *"One of the formulas that certain European states played to limit and put many conditions on cooperation is the bureaucratization of the procedure, a lot of bureaucracy, many controls, it is like the technification of the procedures as far as possible [...] Northern NGOs made a change in the dynamics of not putting only a human rights defender but also a development expert to work with us and to measure the validity of human rights with the same scope of development [the development assemblage]. Then appeared the formats, the tables, the control mechanisms, the mechanisms of leaving evidence, a formula to test us. I think that many organizations got left behind [they disappeared]. Not DREAM, DREAM strengthened its administrative part." (Former Executive Member, DREAM)*

As the quotes show, DREAM does not agree with many donor requirements and practices, but still complies with them. When reporting practices are unstable and cumbersome, DREAM's accounting staff obey donor rules. When donors do not provide resources to manage their projects, DREAM cedes its own generated funds and overloads the work of its administrative staff. DREAM's questioning of these practices represents an exercise of agency, a response of non-

conformity. As the next sub-sections will show, questioning plants the seed for further disruption of donor practices.

4.5.2.3 Negotiation

DREAM negotiates different aspects of the cooperation relationship, such as the scope of activities, accountability demands, and budgetary constraints. Here DREAM raises its voice regarding requirements that are difficult to implement, or against conditions that are not favorable, and intervenes to secure better conditions.

> *"We must raise awareness in our work teams to comply with the [cooperation] agencies because this allows us to negotiate better things for the administrative part. It is what happened with NNGO6; we were negotiating a new project[23]. They told me 'we are not going to give you money for the technical officers' salaries.' I told them 'impossible, if I do not have a contribution of 600 thousand pesos a month, if I do not have contributions for the technical officers [...] tell me who will implement the project for me? It is impossible'. I fought it, and they gave it to me as transportation and food [budgetary line]. In the end, there are some agencies open to negotiate." (Administrative staff member, DREAM)*

Another instance in which DREAM attempts to negotiate better conditions is the type of evidence required to support an expense on the ground. The following quotes illustrate this point.

> *'Remembrance Space' is a public space in which victims [of the Colombian internal armed conflict] commemorate their relatives, friends, and people that were part of the [grassroots] movement in the territories, and that were assassinated by paramilitaries or State agents. They [donors] ask us for attendance lists. How do you ask for an attendance list in a public space? [...] the idea is that people in the community see what happened, dialogue with the victims, look at the conflict from another perspective. But I can't ask people who are passing by [on the street] for names, emails, or cell phones. I can't ask you that, it's impossible. And there have been [accountability] requirements of that type." (Project Manager, DREAM)*

> *"Donors ask for enhanced control or better supporting documentation for transportation expenses. It is necessary to have the ride ticket. But many times, workshops and events have place in locations where people come from veredas [small rural communities far from villages]. The situation is complicated because they mobilize using small boats, horses, which are not conventional [transportation] means and obviously that does not come with a ticket." (Accounting Assistant #2, DREAM)*

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[23] NNGO6 is a recurring donor of DREAM.

In the quotes above, interviewees ridicule donor practices due to their lack of alignment with local reality. Legit activities for a cooperation project cannot be administratively supported in the ways that donors demand. While donors predefine and mobilize rigid accountability schemes, DREAM challenges these demands and attempts to negotiate alternative arrangements. For instance, these alternatives are filling transportation lists with the signature of project beneficiaries and photographic evidence of workshops. If such negotiation is not satisfactory in softening accountability requirements, the project's political activities are impacted.

"There are agencies that, due to their experience in Colombia, are quite understanding of certain realities. Realities like what? That you cannot ask everybody for invoices or receipts [interviewee mentions another example of transportation in rural places] hotel, accommodation is another instance. You go to Colombian Region1, to the community of "The Fortress" farm. There is where everyone arrives, sleeps, and works. What legal registration or invoice are you talking about? That is not feasible. And some agencies understand this, but others do not. This generates difficulties for our political work, because it implies a series of restrictions, such as changing places where activities will take place and the exclusion of certain communities and people due to these same difficulties [of legalization of expenses]." (Project Manager, DREAM)

Finally, negotiation also includes a dialogue around DREAM's development goals and activities. The following quote shows how DREAM negotiates with donors the scope of its political activities.

"I would say that cooperation agencies draw the path, show the area or scope of action upon which we can move. We are a social justice organization, we are clear about what we want to change. But each call for proposals delineates our scope of action [...] there is an indirect incidence in the type of projects we formulate because they [donors] define which sectors and problem areas they want to target. And we decide whether we present a project for that call for proposals. So I would say there is a dialogue, between what the cooperation agency wants and what we want." (Project Coordinator, DREAM)

In sum, negotiation shows how DREAM challenges different donor practices, and how DREAM intervenes to obtain better conditions or relational approaches. DREAM negotiates aspects such as budgetary constraints, alternative evidence for administrative accountability, and the scope of activities. When negotiation does not result in a positive outcome for DREAM, its activities on the ground are impacted. The following subsection shows DREAM taking further measures towards donor practices, in part to reduce the impact on its activities.

4.5.2.4 Discreet non-compliance

DREAM gives the appearance of complying with donor requirements, but behind the scenes it advances its own purposes, which may not be explicitly agreed upon with donors. It also includes situations where DREAM does not comply with administrative accountability requirements without notifying its donors, for the sake of not impacting its missional activities on the ground. Discreet non-compliance does not mean fraud or misuse of funds, but rather represents how the NGO advances its own vision for a project while maintaining an impression of complete alignment with donors. The following quote illustrates this point.

> *"Fundraising is so complicated that sometimes in the formulation of projects, is necessary to reshape the language of our work to guarantee the approval of the proposal, sometimes even contrary to the very essence of our strategic aspirations or our political expressions. For example, we speak of 'State criminality' and there are calls for proposals in which that expression, depending on who issues the call, may imply being left out of funding. And that means starting to clarify elements that for us are substantial. In practice, that will not mean a change in the work we do on the ground. But it is a thing that we should not do, because it is part of our jurisdiction as a [grassroots] movement to define things as we collectively consider them." (Project Manager, DREAM)*

The interviewee complains that to secure funds, DREAM needs to relinquish the use of a term important for DREAM's political aspirations. Considering that DREAM fights human rights violations, which in some cases may have been perpetrated or facilitated by the Colombian government, some project proposals may include terminology such as "State criminality." However, this expression may clash with donors' political perspectives, as international cooperation funds are sometimes channeled through programs in partnership with the Colombian government. Therefore, DREAM should mask its political views, at least in the use of terminology, to secure the funds. Still, DREAM uses the devices and methods of the development assemblage to obtain approval for a proposal that on the ground advances its original goals.

Another example of discrete non-compliance occurs with some administrative requirements that DREAM does not fulfill.

> *"Some controls are not realistic, they do not facilitate the processes. For instance, a donor requires that for every single air ticket that DREAM buys there should be three [supporting] quotations. In an organization where so many members travel on a continuous basis, it is not viable nor feasible to relentlessly ask three travel agencies for quotes for different travels every time, just to comply with this. No airline or travel*

agency will accept this. This [requirement] does not facilitate the work." (Executive Committee member B, DREAM).

In the end, DREAM does not fulfill this quotation requirement and does not notify its donors. What it does is support its legit travel expenses by attaching boarding passes and invoices in its accounting documentation, hoping that donors overlook this incomplete adherence to quotation requirements. So, unless the audit verifications catch this partial non-compliance, donors will not know about the lack of quotations.

Another interviewee provides another example.

"You go to ColombianRegion2 [border with another country]. There, gas is informally sold in pimpinas [small containers]. Nobody gives you receipts. If you go to a SHELL [gas station] you won't get gasoline at any time, because it is more profitable for them to sell it as contraband. And the problem is that if you don't bring an invoice, the cooperation agency won't reimburse you. So, to get around I use the car and I fill the tank, it's obvious. But then, the activity was carried out, the objective was met, but the agency does not recognize the expense because there is no adequate supporting documentation […] In this sense, agencies are out of touch with Colombia's reality." (Executive Committee member A, DREAM)

In the quote above, the interviewee mentions how an administrative requirement cannot be fulfilled on the ground, due to the economic reality of a particular geographic region. The legit expense of an approved project activity is charged to the project without fulfilling all donors' administrative requirements. As DREAM runs the risk of getting those expenses tagged as "non-eligible," it does not report the lack of compliance to avoid financial implications. What it does is support the expense in the best possible way (with equivalent documents and activity reports). But, unlike the negotiation response, the alternative accountability arrangement was never agreed upon with donors. DREAM hopes that donors and auditors do not catch the glitch in the expense's supporting evidence.

In sum, discreet non-compliance represents a form of agency where DREAM decides to mask its political aspirations, or to not adhere or fully adhere to a particular donor practice. Instead, it keeps operating under its own vision for a project, or without letting that an accountability requirement impinges its activities on the ground.

4.5.2.5 Explicit Rejection

DREAM explicitly rejects donor practices and impositions and mobilizes its own agenda without depending on donors' support. This form of agency enables DREAM to avoid any situation that may compromise its commitment to peace and human rights. The following quote illustrates such a situation, where a former donor wanted a change to a different line of work:

"Cooperation [international development] has an impact on the agenda of organizations, and although the agenda of DREAM has changed, it hasn't been at the rhythm of what agencies want. For instance, NNGO5 was an agency that used to give us funds, and they decided to make a change and they moved to issues of sustainability and social responsibility in mining companies. They asked us if we were interested in that job. We think it is an interesting issue but is not part of our agenda nor of our work. Hence NNGO5 left." (Executive Committee member B, DREAM)

The quote above shows that despite the influence of donors to change the orientation of its work, DREAM openly opposes pressures to change and instead remains true to its social and political mission. DREAM's accountant confirms this response:

"DREAM remains true to its principles. If the donor demands that DREAM must change, DREAM prefers to not present a proposal, or if DREAM is already executing a project, the first thing it does is [to say] 'hey, let's sit down to talk because we can't do it like this… and this was not the initial agreement we had'. DREAM does not change its core objectives, it keeps its mission intact." (Accountant, DREAM)

Another form of explicit rejection is DREAM's determination to avoid financing from sources that play a questionable role in the Colombian civil conflict, which is one of DREAM's missional areas:

"Our cooperation is fundamentally focused on Europe, we have not explored the United States, because of the USAID issue, and let's say for an ethical perspective regarding the role of the USA cooperation in Colombia and its implication in the Colombian conflict. So we were always focused mostly on Europe." (Project coordinator, DREAM) [24]

Similarly, DREAM does not look for financing of activities that are important for its mission, but that donors do not financially support despite liking such activities.

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[24] USAID is the United States Agency for International Development. The political actions of the US in the recent history of Colombia and other Latin American countries have been categorized for some actors as a form of support to dictatorial movements (Trejos Rosero, 2011).

"We have a line of work which is Activity1, no one finances us that, we assume those expenses. We don't even search for resources for this activity because we know that donors will not finance that. No chance for that [...] donors do like the things we do but they don't like to see them in their contracts. This demonstrates that DREAM has clarity in its work and knows what its priorities are." (Executive Committee member B, DREAM)

Despite the large dependence on donors' funds, DREAM looks for alternative sources of income, such as donations and mobilization of juridical activities that generate its own resources. DREAM in its current size and scope is not financially sustainable without Western funds. However, these income diversification efforts allow DREAM to alleviate some of that financial dependence and keep operating under its own vision. Paradoxically, these efforts are anchored in DREAM's own perception of itself as an organization that has appropriated the development assemblage's technical means to advance its social and political agenda. The following quote points at this situation:

"The human aspect, the belief that we are doing something important is a determining factor that allowed DREAM to have been there for so many years. The other factor is that the DREAM knew how to improve organizationally. It didn't stop at simply denouncing, it didn't stop at just pointing out what it doesn't like, but rather it became an organization that politically intervenes, that wants to influence society and public institutions to transform them, but having clear tools. For this reason, it has defined areas in which it wants to work. Areas of research, of incidence, I mean, having that clarity of how one can influence, and producing results help to maintain organizations." (Project Coordinator, DREAM)

In sum, DREAM explicitly rejects donor conditionalities that threaten its autonomy to work for human rights and peacebuilding, and looks for ways to mobilize its own aspirations. Explicit rejection is not only about refusing donor demands. It also includes DREAM's active efforts to avoid funding and accountability relationships with donors that do not align to its social and political agenda. Interestingly, the findings in the fieldwork also show that, despite DREAM's different acts of contestation and non-conformity, donors' accountability agendas remain largely untouched, anchored in managerial values and standard Western accounting practices. The following quote from an external auditor of Colombian NGOs working for DREAM's donors, shows how donors still ground development relationships in managerial values of control, planning, and administrative accountability.

"Cooperation agencies are currently interested in ensuring that the NGOs that receive international cooperation resources in Colombia are strengthened organizations. We are working on better evaluating these organizations [interviewee mentions adoption of COSO framework for audit evaluations]. It is a way of saying 'hey, this is an organization that can adequately respond to international cooperation requirements.' This is something new that is being done because donors increasingly require stronger organizations that have good controls, that have sound financial and operational management, that have good personnel management policies, that have adequate compliance with legal regulations and terms of reference, tax, labor, accounting standards." (Audit Partner, Audit Firm of Colombian NGOs)

The next section discusses how the five DREAM responses, enunciated in the encounter with donor practices, are representations of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence. It also discusses the implications of the donor-NGO encounter in the third space of enunciation for the role of accounting.

4.6. Discussion

In this section, I summarize the findings and discuss their implications regarding each of my research questions. Section 4.6.1 discusses how the NGO responses are manifestations of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence, addressing my first research question. Section 4.6.2 discusses how accounting has an ambivalent role in the donor-NGO encounter, addressing my second research question. Subsequently, section 4.6.3 discusses the contribution and implications of these findings for accounting literature.

4.6.1 The English Book and NGO agency in the third space of enunciation

International development "comprises a vision, a body of knowledge, a set of tools and techniques, as well as a way of doing and being" (Claeyé, 2014, p. 14). In line with this assertion, the findings in this paper show that Western actors in the development assemblage promote a set of material and discursive practices with which Southern NGOs should align. These practices embody the "English book," a symbol of donors' neocolonial rule. The English book is grounded on technocratic values of effective aid management, value for the money, and instrumental rationality (Burkett, 2011; Claeyé, 2014). It preaches the benefits of strategic management tools, performance measurement systems, and technical accountability practices, but also enforces their adoption. The English book's principles and practices aim at controlling, regulating, and

homogenizing the Southern NGO's behavior. The book thus represents donors' authority and becomes the guiding light of the international development assemblage.

The findings also point out that the introduction and placement of the English book in the Global South colony is far from being a straightforward transition where a dominant actor frames and marginalizes its opposite (Bhabha, 1994; Crvelin & Becker, 2020; Mumby, 2005). Rather, the encounter between funders and the Southern NGO configures a third space of enunciation. In this liminal, in-between space, the NGO responds in different ways. As I show next, these NGO responses are manifestations of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence.

4.6.1.1 NGO responses as a manifestation of hybridity and mimicry

Circling back to my first research question, *how do Southern NGOs respond to donor conditionalities and practices in the international development assemblage?,* I identify in the data five responses: Compliance, Questioning, Negotiation, Discreet non-compliance, and Explicit rejection. The findings show that overall, DREAM's responses fluctuate between the extremes of acceptance and rejection of donor practices. This fluctuation allows DREAM to mobilize its own ambitions by relying on the means and practices of the "English book," while implicitly subverting it. This simultaneous reliance and subversion is a manifestation of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence. Below I further explain how the first, third, and fourth responses are manifestations of hybridity and mimicry, and how the second and fifth responses are manifestations of hybridity. Later, in subsection 4.6.1.2, I discuss how DREAM's responses are manifestations of ambivalence.

The first response, compliance, embodies hybridity. The English book attempts to translate the practices of the colonized into a homogenizing vision of management but fails and produces something new. The colonized, in their appropriation of donor practices, translate them for their own aspirations, giving them a new local meaning. This response becomes only partial presence and partial representation, because DREAM's adoption will never be an exact reproduction of the book. It is rather a blurred copy.

Compliance is also a manifestation of mimicry. DREAM attempts to mimic and appropriate donors' habits, practices, and values. DREAM imitates donors' role models by embracing practices of technical planning, Western accountability, and management control. This imitation includes a local dimension, as donor practices are appropriated and translated to serve the local context, namely the needs of the grassroots movement.

The second response, questioning, is a manifestation of hybridity. DREAM dutifully complies with donor requirements, but also reflects on the obstacles that such requirements have for its administrative and operational work on the ground. The questioning of these requirements is a mode of subversion, a form of opposition that is kept out of the colonizer's sight, a hidden transcript of dissent (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012; Scott, 1990). Donors attempt to translate the practices of the colonized into the Western canons of the English book (Bhabha, 1994; Papastergiadis, 2015). But in this process, DREAM contests such canons, enacting difference from donors' rule. DREAM challenges accountability ideals by questioning the administrative overload and other difficulties they generate.

The third response, negotiation, is a manifestation of hybridity because it shows how donors' authority is not indisputable. By intervening to negotiate better conditions and softening of accountability requirements, DREAM revaluates and displaces donors' authority. This intervention is a subversion of the colonial discourse. Negotiation enacts hybridity by challenging colonial conditions and searching for new relational terms. Negotiation is also a form of mimicry. DREAM ridicules and mocks Western requirements by doubting their feasibility on the ground. It subverts their compliance by negotiating and enacting alternative accountability mechanisms (e.g., photographic evidence instead of attendance lists).

The fourth response, discreet non-compliance, is another manifestation of hybridity. DREAM surreptitiously advances its social and political objectives while managing impressions of compliance with donor practices. These actions represent the disruption and displacement of donors' rule, another hidden transcript of dissent. They hide dissenting opinions against authority while allowing DREAM to blind from sanctions (e.g., avoiding non-eligible expenses). In addition, discreet non-compliance is also a form of mimicry. It is a camouflage that allows the Southern NGO to quietly advance its projects on the ground without attending donors' authority. This response is a masquerade that mocks donors' rule. In this sense, discreet non-compliance shows mimicry's threatening capacity.

Finally, explicit rejection represents a more extreme form of hybridity. By not engaging with donors in a funding and accountability relationship, DREAM challenges their rules of authority. It openly manifests its discontent with the pressures and conditionalities of the English book. Colonial authority fails to translate DREAM's aspirations into its singular homogenizing agenda. Paradoxically, while explicit rejection is DREAM's most extreme intervention to dispute

colonial rule, it occurs after DREAM has already appropriated some of the means of the development assemblage. DREAM recognizes itself as a better organization due to the embracing of some of the book's commanded practices. By previously attending demands of enhanced professionalization and technical planning, DREAM has equipped with better tools to look for other sources of income and alleviate dependence from Western donors. This situation enacts hybridity, because DREAM's appropriation of donor practices allows it to reinterpret knowledge systems and challenge donors' rules of authority. This phenomenon highlights the ambivalence that occurs in the process of NGO agency. Indeed, the following section shows how the different NGO responses are grounded in ambivalence.

4.6.1.2 Ambivalence in NGO agency

As explained in section 4.3, hybridity and mimicry are based on ambivalence. Instead of assuming that some colonized subjects are compliant with colonial authority and others resistant, ambivalence is about how both poles coexist in a fluctuating relationship (Ashcroft et al., 2001). That is why the colonial subject is reproduced "as almost the same but not quite" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86). As the findings illustrate, DREAM's responses simultaneously have a foot on both poles: acceptance and rejection. All responses rely on the means and practices of donors while simultaneously subverting their intentions and authority. This phenomenon represents parallel complicity with and subversion of the English book. DREAM camouflages in the development assemblage by mimicking its managerial patterns but also it disrupts the assemblage's authority by being a partial difference of donors' homogenizing agenda. This fluctuation moves away from absolute poles of rejection or acceptance. In other words, DREAM never fully engages with one or the other.

Ambivalence is present even in what may look as the extreme responses of "compliance" and "explicit rejection." In the first case, DREAM adopts and appropriates the technical means of the development assemblage (acceptance) to mobilize the aspirations of the grassroots movement in a process of translation. This appropriation and translation of knowledge systems is an unintentional form of subversion (Bhabha, 1994). In adopting and mimicking the practices of its donors, DREAM learns new codes and practices (e.g., technical planning) which later will empower it to question them and even to become less dependent from its donors (rejection). The mimicry in "adoption and compliance" makes this response a menace, because it contains the seeds

of disruption of colonial authority (Roque, 2015). Following Bhabha (1994), the ambivalence of mimicry is "an insurgent counter-appeal" that "revaluates the normative knowledges." (p. 91)

In the case of explicit rejection, while DREAM openly challenges donors' aspirations by rejecting funding relationships, it has already incorporated some of the practices and means of its donors. DREAM is better equipped to sustain part of its operation without Western donors' direct help, or to obtain new funding sources by using what it has appropriated from the English book (e.g., formulation of projects, project-cycle life management, monitoring of outcomes). As an interviewee said, "*I think that was a great achievement of cooperation agencies [...] they made us a much more useful tool, a tool with much clearer aspirations to serve those we want to serve.*" Thereby, this response also represents complicity with and rejection of colonial authority.

The other three responses, questioning, negotiation, and discreet non-compliance are also ambivalent. They anchor in donor practices by fully or partially complying with them (acceptance). Even in discreet non-compliance, DREAM partially complies to be able to manage impressions. But also, all three responses simultaneously contest many of the book's practices (rejection) by means of disagreement, mocking, negotiation, and overlooking. Overall, the five responses reflect DREAM's ambivalent posture towards the English book. As an interviewee mentioned, DREAM "*has changed*" but "*it hasn't been at the rhythm of what agencies want.*" The responses show how DREAM remains attached to the values of the peacebuilding grassroots movement. But also, DREAM is grounded in the technocratic principles and practices that the English book promotes. The NGO questions many of these practices but also recognizes that their appropriation and compliance allow it to navigate the international development assemblage. The third space of enunciation, the liminal space where donors and DREAM intersect, is thus a space of ambivalence, because the NGO's responses contain elements that simultaneously fluctuate between complicity with colonial authority and resistance to it.

4.6.2 Accounting as an ambivalent tool

In this section, I discuss the implications of the paper's second research question, *What is the role of accounting in the process of NGO responses to donor practices?*

The findings show that DREAM's accounting practices are rooted in Western approaches of project management, performance measurement, and administrative accountability. This situation occurs due to DREAM's appropriation of donors' material and calculative practices, as

evidenced in all five responses. This way of enacting accounting allows DREAM to survive in the international development assemblage and suggests that accounting has an ambivalent role: it elicits rejection and attraction towards donors' neocolonial practices. At the same time, despite contestations and challenges from DREAM, donors' accounting and accountability programs do not suffer important modifications. They are still the guiding light of the development assemblage and still govern DREAM's current cooperation relationships with Western donors.

Accordingly, the ambivalence in accounting helps DREAM advance its interests while mobilizing donors' governance programs. DREAM appropriates and translates accounting to promote its marginal aspirations. Yet, the findings also illustrate the difficulties that DREAM has in mediating the relationship with its donors in ways different from Western conceptions of accounting. Thus, accounting "seems to have no immediately obvious counterpart" (Crvelin & Becker, 2020, p. 4): DREAM is not enacting alternatives to Western views of accounting. At its best, accounting, always grounded in managerial principles of technical planning and results-based management, is used to serve the local ambitions of the grassroots movement.

Accounting is thus a main chapter in the English book. It is established by a colonizer that prompts its adoption, repetition, and imitation. Even though accounting plants the seed for subversion in the colonial encounter, the NGO's subsequent disruptive efforts are not enough to shatter the colonizer's homogenizing agenda. In this sense, accounting retains its presence, it is a (strategic) device in a specific colonial engagement, an appurtenance of authority. Accounting in the international development assemblage is not just a symbol of colonial authority but also a product of colonial hybridity. Accounting is ambivalent: it serves donors' ambitions, but also mobilizes the aspirations of the local NGO.

4.6.3 Contributions

The discussion above has two main contributions. First, NGO agency is an ambivalent process of hybridity and mimicry that escape absolute poles of acceptance and rejection. Second, accounting is an ambivalent tool that advances the aspirations of both NGOs and donors. Below I explain each contribution.

In the first case, I expand previous literature by showing that NGO responses to donor accounting and managerial agendas are ambivalent processes that escape absolute poles of acceptance and rejection. This phenomenon has not been discussed in accounting literature.

Previous accounting studies focus on strategies of micro-resistance, and while they implicitly hint at the hybridity that occurs between two poles in oppositional encounters within international development, they do not explain how different NGO responses are a manifestation of ambivalence. O'Leary and Smith (2020) talk about "moments of resistance" that occurs between two modes of accountability: an authoritative mode and an internally persuasive mode. NGOs do not always accept authoritative forces of accountability and look for ways to change them. Resistance emerges when the internally persuasive discourse contradicts the authoritative discourse. Crvelin and Becker (2020) mention how subjugated actors enact resistance by discovering ways to work with imposed structures to give shape to their own personal projects. Girei (2022) suggests that hidden or covert acts of resistance could be seen as a dialectical process that encompasses both opposition and alliance. Instead, this paper shows that NGO agency is a manifestation of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence, a product that occurs in the donor-NGO liminal space. Each one of DREAM responses is not inscribed in either acceptance or rejection of donor practices, but rather has a foot on both poles of the colonial encounter. This simultaneity or ambivalence that occurs within each DREAM response is an important phenomenon to highlight because it shows how a Southern NGO is complicit with and a resister of colonial rule. In addition, these ambivalent responses of partial representation and partial difference with donors' authority enables the NGO to navigate the international development assemblage.

The second contribution of this paper is making explicit the ambivalent role of accounting in the governance of the development assemblage. This paper reveals that although accounting helps powerful actors govern NGOs' actions and the space where NGOs operate (Abrahamsen, 2004; Duval et al., 2015; Martinez & Cooper, 2017; Neu et al., 2006; Rahaman et al., 2010), it is also a vehicle that enables NGOs to enact agency and mobilize local agendas. The third space of enunciation unfolds accounting as a double-edged instrument that helps advance donors' agendas and governance programs, while allowing NGOs to advance their own purposes. This double role that reaffirms accounting's own ambivalence is poorly discussed in accounting literature. To the best of my knowledge, two studies refer to this ambivalence. Crvelin and Becker (2020) and O'Leary and Smith (2020) highlight accounting's capacities (either mediating or subjunctive) to connect different governance programs and help subjugated actors give shape to their own aspirations. I argue that such capacities are in fact a manifestation of ambivalence. Accounting's capacities to mobilize the marginal aspirations of Southern NGOs are possible due to their

complicity with colonial rule. In this sense, the evidence in this paper is consistent with Girei (2022), who mentions that NGOs' covert acts of resistance are accompanied by apparent complicity and compliance.

Beyond the two contributions above, it is worth mentioning that this paper confirms an existing idea in Crvelin and Becker (2020), O'Leary and Smith (2020), and Girei (2022): resistance is not planned, but rather emerges according to the different scenarios the NGO is involved in. Paradoxically, Girei (2022), starting from a theoretical stance different from Crvelin and Becker (2020) and O'Leary and Smith (2020), reaches similar conclusions. For Girei (2022), accounting has an inherent neocolonial character detached from the material and cultural contexts where NGOs operate. Instead, Crvelin and Becker (2020) and O'Leary and Smith (2020) do not attach any inherent character or any pre-existing strategy to accounting that occurs ex-ante. For Crvelin and Becker (2020), accounting's mediating capacity is, in itself, an achievement of its encounter with a heterogeneous world filled with a myriad of different aspirations. For O'Leary and Smith (2020), accounting becomes purposive, meaning that instead of attaching any pre-existing functional claims, the subjunction in accounting allows new understandings of the world to unfold. But overall, all studies, including this chapter, point towards a similar avenue: that NGO agency and aspirations, as mobilized and enacted through accounting, are not pre-formed or planned. Rather, they unfold.

4.7. Conclusion

Drawing on a case study of a human rights Colombian NGO and its funding relationships, this paper explores how the organization responds to the pressures and conditionalities of the international development assemblage and the role of accounting in such a phenomenon. Starting by analyzing how Western actors introduce managerial, accounting, and accountability programs as devices of colonial authority—the English book—this paper identifies five main strategies that the NGO uses to navigate the development assemblage and advance its own ambitions. Using Bhabha's post-colonial approach of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence, the paper demonstrates that the encounter of donor practices and NGO agency gives rise to a third space in which the Southern NGO is both an accomplice and resister of the English book. This ambivalence also influences accounting, which becomes a double-edged tool that helps mobilize the NGO's mission but also caters to the programmatic and ideological ambitions of Western actors.

In terms of limitations, this paper does not fully engage in discussions of the political meaningfulness of resistance acts towards emancipation. The ambivalence in the third space of enunciation allows the NGO to mock and subvert its donors' discourses and practices. However, these disruptive acts, whether or not they are manifestations of productive resistance, may not constitute a truly emancipatory program, consistent with Girei (2022) and Crvelin and Becker (2020). While accounting is a device that can be hijacked to mobilize alternative aspirations, it also defines the limits within which oppositional strategies can be mobilized. Thus, these strategies remain anchored in the status quo, limiting the potential to create a truly alternative model of accountability. Future studies may keep exploring when acts of resistance contribute towards the articulation of alternative development programs.

Future research can also dive deeper into the intersection of accounting and culture. In my empirical data, issues of different cultural worldviews around accountability emerged. More specifically, the notion of "formality" in accountability is usually associated with Western requirements of signed documents, invoices, and bureaucratic procedures. However, in peripheral Southern regions, many NGO project activities (subject to be measured and represented in an accounting system) do not fulfill such requirements or traits, but it does not mean they are less formal. For instance, serving lunch in a big communal pot in the middle of a farm, preceded by the speech of a farmers' leader, is quite formal. The cultural differences around Western and Southern perceptions of accounting are a great topic of research.

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APPENDIX A. Interviews and documentation

Interviews in Colombia

Role (Organization)	Experience in years	Record
National Executive Committee Member A (DREAM)	> 30	Notes
National Executive Committee Member B (DREAM)	> 20	Notes
Project Coordinator (DREAM)	15	Audio recorded
Administrative & Financial Manager (DREAM)	4	Audio recorded
Statutory Auditor (DREAM)	15	Notes
Accountant (DREAM)	12	Audio recorded
Administrative Assistant (DREAM)	13	Audio recorded
Accounting Assistant 1 (DREAM)	1.5	Audio recorded
Accounting Assistant 2 (DREAM)	29	Audio recorded
Project Coordinator Sister Organization (DREAM)	2	Audio recorded
Former Executive Member (Formerly DREAM)	16	Notes
High-level officer (Northern NGO branch)	18	Notes
Audit Partner (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	30	Audio recorded
Project Implementation (Northern NGO branch)	16	Audio recorded
Administrative & Financial Coordinator (Northern NGO branch)	20	Notes
Administrative & Financial Coordinator (Local organization)	15	Notes
Financial Manager (Northern NGO branch)	10	Notes
Project Coordinator (Local organization)	21	Audio recorded
Administrative Coordinator (Northern NGO branch)	4	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	10	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	14	Audio recorded
Program Officer (Northern NGO branch)	3	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	3	Audio recorded
Auditor (Audit firm of cooperation projects)	5	Audio recorded
Accountant (Local organization)	4	Audio recorded
Project Formulation (Northern NGO branch)	5	Audio recorded

Interviews in Canada

Role (Organization)	Experience in years	Record
Finance (Northern NGO, Poverty Reduction)	2	Audio recorded
Compliance (Northern NGO, Children Advocacy)	17	Audio recorded
Budgeting (Northern NGO, Children Advocacy)	7	Audio recorded
Consultant & former NGO manager (Various Northern NGOs)	22	Audio recorded
Advisory (Northern NGO, Poverty Reduction)	1	Audio recorded
Communications (Northern NGO, Poverty Reduction)	2	Notes
Program Coordinator (Various Northern NGOs)	5	Audio recorded
Consultant (Management Consulting Firm for NGOs)	4	Notes
Project Administrative Officer (Northern NGO)	11	Audio recorded
Program Officer (Various Northern NGOs)	8	Notes

APPENDIX A (continued). Interviews and documentation

Reviewed documentation

Donors' publicly available information
- Cooperation Agreement Templates
- Terms of Reference & Funding Conditions
- Administrative & Financial Formats
- Guidelines for Submission of Funding Requests
- Guidelines for Narrative and Financial Reporting
- Audit Guidelines
- Transparency Guidelines
- Call for Proposals
- Strategy Plans

DREAM
- Archival & Accounting records
- Administrative and Accounting Procedures & Formats
- Budgets & Financial Reports to the donors
- Financial Statements
- Audit Reports
- Narrative Reports
- Project Proposals
- Cooperation Agreements
- E-mail correspondence
- Internal Control Policies
- Procedures and functions manuals
- Organizational charter
- Risk Management Program
- Online publications
- Annual Work Plan
- Employment contracts

APPENDIX B. Interview Protocol

1. Preliminaries before an interview

    d.   <u>Presentation of the study</u>: Although the participant was introduced to the purpose of the project in the phase of contacting potential individuals, remember to start the session by introducing yourself and explaining the purpose of the project, its context (part of a Ph.D. research proposal), as well as your interest in it as a researcher.

    e.   <u>Objective and overview of the interview</u>: Present the interview's purpose and what will be done with the collected data (e.g., improving knowledge about the field, refining concepts and relationships).

In addition, explain the overall content of the interview. It has a first, brief section with specific questions regarding the participant's experience in the field (e.g., positions held, organizations worked with). Then there is a second, larger section guided by open questions related to specific aspects of the donor-NGO relationship, management and control/execution of international cooperation projects.

    f.   <u>Permission of interviewee</u>**:** Explain that, if the interviewee agrees, the entire interview will be audio-recorded and transcribed later on. Mention that this is done to have the opportunity to better assess objectively the information provided and to listen carefully during the interview. Ask for permission to record the interview. Take the opportunity to address pending issues regarding the consent form (e.g., signatures, copies.), which should have been sent to the participant before the interview. The consent form should explain that confidentiality is assured to each participant and that no data will be associated with any individual or organization. Invite the interviewee to sign the consent form. If the interviewee does not sign the consent form or manifests any discomfort with their participation, do not proceed with the interview.

Remind the participant that the study has academic purposes only. Also, *explain their right to withdraw from the study at any point in time.*
In addition, explain all aspects of confidentiality and information security (storage, coding), emphasizing that only you, as the main researcher, will link what is said in the interview with the interviewee's identity. Explain that the interview is anonymous.

2. Semi-structured interview

This is a guide to the questions that may be asked in the interview, and it is by no means exhaustive. Accordingly, not all the questions here should be asked, and questions that are not included may be asked. Each interview develops in its way, according to the profile and inputs of the interviewee.

Remember to be respectful and empathetic at all times.

APPENDIX B (continued). Interview Protocol

<u>a. Experience in the field</u>

How long have you been working on the organization? How long have you been associated with international cooperation, and what are the positions held/areas of work?

<u>a. Specific aspects of the donor-NGO relationship</u>

On management controls (opening questions)
>1. How has been your experience working with international cooperation projects, especially matters related to project management and compliance?
>2. From your experience, what are the usual control systems required by the donor in a typical project? What are the criteria used to design or choose controls?
>3. What is your opinion of the management approaches and controls required by the donor? How does the organization react to controls?
>4. Can you give me concrete examples of how the controls/accountability mechanisms are usually deployed/implemented in projects?
>5. How has the adoption of control, accountability and management practices, as part of project implementation, affected the entity and its organizational development?

On compliance and other aspects of the donor-NGO relationship
>6. Can you give me examples of unfortunate situations/misunderstandings between the donor and the organization related to divergences in management/control practices?
>7. Can you give me examples of cases where the relationship between the donor and the organization has been strained because of unfortunate, negative events?
>8. How is the relationship with donors that you have worked with for several years/longstanding relationship?
>9. What have been the elements that have guaranteed a stable, longstanding relationship with the donors?
>10. How is the usual approach when requesting/accepting assistance from a donor?
>11. How useful and adequate has been the training in management practices offered by the donor?
>12. In your opinion, what is the most crucial element in the donor-NGO relationship to guarantee project success?
>13.Have there been disagreements between the organization and the donor related to project design, management, and execution? Could you share some experiences?

Closing questions
>14. How do you foresee the future of the international development field in general?
>15. What do you consider should be the role of control in international cooperation projects?
>16. What are your hopes for the donor-NGO relationship in the future?
>17. Is there anything I have not asked about your experience in this area that you would like to tell me?
>18. Do you know other people who could be interested in sharing their experiences and perspectives on this issue?

APPENDIX C. Coding Procedure: Within-case Display

From broad categories determined in an initial round of coding, I derive quotes associated to donor interests and practices:

	CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONALITIES	MANAGERIAL PRACTICES
DONOR PRACTICES	"The NGO carry out the action jointly and severally with respect to the Contracting Authority, taking all necessary and reasonable measures to guarantee that an action is carried out in accordance with the Description of the action that appears in Annex I and in the terms and conditions of this Contract. To this end, the Beneficiary will execute the action with all the care, efficiency, transparency and diligence required, in accordance with the principle of good financial management and with the best practices in this area…see clause XX (extract from contract with NNGO1) .	"By implementing these principles, the countries and organisations that endorsed the Paris Declaration are making major breakthroughs in improving aid effectiveness, tackling issues that have hampered development for decades. Developing country governments and civil society are reaping the rewards in the form of better, more aligned and more predictable donor support […] The lessons of the Paris Declaration and its principles can help encourage better ways of working together, to the benefit of all." (OECD)
	"The main objective of the capacity assessment is to analyze the existing capacity strengths and weaknesses to build on the capacity assets and address the gaps by formulating a capacity development plan to make the organization perform effectively and efficiently, set and achieve objectives, solve problems and deliver better results". (General Conditions, Donor of DREAM, NNGO2)	"Results based management which is the dominant approach that has been popular since the 1990s, so results based management of course comes with the log frame at the beginning… usually actually we developed the log frame as we submit the proposal and then it´s approved, the project is approved and then you can a have to stick to that plan, you can find your log frame with your inputs, your outputs, short term results, medium term results, long term results, and all of your indicators, so you work with that frame for a five year period, but with annual objectives, so the controls are on that level so you have to report back to your donor (Consultant, Interview 3)

From broad categories determined in an initial round of coding, I derive quotes associated to NGO practices associated to the cooperation relationship. These quotes form a rough draft of my final categorization of NGO agency.

	COMPLIANCE	RESISTANCE
NGO PRACTICES	"Some cooperation agencies demand that they [accounting documents] be placed, numbered, sealed, that all concepts be clear, we also have to fix some documents that only send transportation and we have to abide by what the budget says, have a clear concept" (Accounting assistant 2, DREAM)	Our cooperation is fundamentally focused on Europe, we have not explored the United States, because of the USAID issue, and let's say for an ethical perspective regarding the role of the NorthAmerican cooperation in Colombia, and its implication in the Colombian conflict. So we were always focused mostly on Europe (Project coordinator, DREAM).
	NEGOTIATION	
	"We had a wide perspective of this situation, we did not let ourselves be locked up and we got ready for this situation […] to a certain extent, we impacted the cooperation arrangements, for instance with NNGO2, NNGO3, NNGO4, NNGO5, and with NNGO1 we had talks about how the cooperation relationship should be. While these relationships lasted, cooperation with these donors were more horizontal" (Former Executive Member, DREAM).	"We must raise awareness in our work teams to comply with the [cooperation] agencies because this allows us to negotiate better things for the administrative part. It is what happened with NNGO6; we were negotiating a new project . They told me 'we are not going to give you money for the technical officers' salaries'. I told them 'impossible, if I do not have a contribution of 600 thousand pesos a month, if I do not have contributions for the technical officers […] tell me who will implement the project for me? It is impossible. I fought it, and they gave it to me as transportation and food [budgetary line]. In the end, there are some agencies open to negotiate." (Administrative staff member, DREAM)

Appendix C (continued). Coding Round 3: Final Categorization (Draft Sample)

From the distilled coding in round 2, I derive a more refined categorization of NGO responses to donor practices.

COMPLIANCE	NEGOTIATION	DISCREET NON-COMPLIANCE
I believe that there is a positive aspect to the extent that it forces us to perfect our procedures. We have not been closed to improving our formulation system, or the evaluation and monitoring of projects. We believe that this can be an invitation to generate improvements, to better quantify what we do, to better perceive what we do (Project Coordinator, DREAM)	"We had a wide perspective of this situation, we did not let ourselves be locked up and we got ready for this situation […] to a certain extent, we impacted the cooperation arrangements, for instance with NNGO2, NNGO3, NNGO4, NNGO5, and with NNGO1 we had talks about how the cooperation relationship should be. While these relationships lasted, cooperation with these donors were more horizontal" (Former Executive Member, DREAM).	"The consecution of resources is so complicated that sometimes in the formulation of projects, is necessary to reshape the language of the work that we develop to guarantee the proposal approval, sometimes even contrary to the very essence of our strategic bets or our political expressions. For example, we speak of State criminality and there are calls for proposals in which that expression, depending on who issues the call, may mean being left out of funding. And that means starting to clarify on elements that for us are substantial. In practice, that will not mean a change in the work we do, but it is a question that we should not do because it is part of our jurisdiction as a movement to define things as we collectively consider them." (Project Manager, DREAM).

QUESTIONING	EXPLICIT REJECTION	
I think that many organizations got left behind at that time, many people could not take the step. Not DREAM, DREAM strengthened its administrative part." (Former Executive Member, DREAM) If we say [in the proposal] there are 3 workshops in 3 regions, those 3 workshops will only happen in those 3 regions. But if, for example, it turns out that the political context changes, or a security context changes, and an emergency or a need arises in region 4, we cannot go there because we promised in the project that there will be only 3 regions, and only those 3 regions can be served. In previous times, we could have gone easily to the other region. So, [donors] linear logic somehow prevents being much more flexible, and responding to a changing conjunctural context like the Colombian one (Project Coordinator, DREAM).	"Cooperation has an impact in the agenda of organizations, and although the agenda of DREAM has changed, it hasn't been at the rhythm of what agencies want. For instance, NNGO5 was an agency that used to give us funds, and they decided to make a change and they moved to issues of sustainability and social responsibility in mining companies. They asked us if we were interested in that job. We think it is an interesting issue but is not part of our agenda nor of our work. Thus NNGO5 left." (Executive Committee member B, DREAM)	

APPENDIX D. DREAM's logical framework matrix (the Logframe)

Logical Framework Matrix

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
Expected impact: Explanation of the long-term effects that the NGO wants to contribute to, directly or indirectly, through the project.	Description of how the project has contributed to the expected impact.	Information that shows project progress relative to impact indicators (i.e., secondary sources like studies). It is common to make specific evaluations ex-post to establish impact.	Important events, conditions or decisions outside of NGO control and necessary to progress towards an impact.
Expected objective: Explanation of the intended effect of project implementation, with one single project objective being recommended.	Description of how the project is achieving or has achieved its objective, which includes details of quantity, quality, and time.	Information that shows project progress relative to objective indicators.	Important events, conditions or decisions outside of NGO control and necessary to meet the objective.
Product: Explanation of the direct product to be obtained from project activities. It must always be possible to observe whether a result has been produced or not.	Description of how the project produces or has produced expected products, which includes details of quantity, quality, and time.	Information and methods that show product obtainment.	Important events, conditions or decisions outside of NGO control and necessary to obtain the product.

Activities
Each expected result requires undertaking activities, which need to be identified for the first X months of the project.

Flow
Activities should result in products; products should lead towards fulfilling the objective; the objective should contribute to the expected impact.

DREAM's logframe is a grid that includes assumptions, goals, products, results and activities, measured by indicators and means of verification. It is essential in any funding application in international cooperation and development.

APPENDIX E. General conditions in a cooperation agreement

This Appendix displays excerpts from donor agreement templates and terms of reference.

1. NNGO 2

Requirements for a partnership with Donor X

X.1 Assessment of partner
This is the gathering of relevant information regarding a potential partner and using that information to make a decision on whether it qualifies to be a partner or not. The assessment targets three main areas;

- Identity of the Civil Society Organization in relation to Donor X's vision, mission, goals and values. Are we compatible?
- Programmatic fit with Donor X's work.
- Capacity – current and willingness to acquire more.

This process takes place in different ways and at different times. For continuing partnerships, assessments will be informed to a large extent by the quality of the previous partnership, especially information from the monitoring log, while for new partners, it may take a combination of some or all of the following methods:

- Having one-on-one discussions/interviews
- Document review (e.g., registration certificate, audited accounts, reports/evaluations/studies)
- Seeking references/recommendations from other partners/donors
- Field visits to see how the organization operate and gather information from stakeholders
- Participation in the organization's forums

X.3 Assessment of partners' capacity and Capacity building plan
The main objective of the capacity assessment is to analyze the existing capacity strengths and weaknesses to build on the capacity assets and address the gaps by formulating a capacity development plan to make the organization perform effectively and efficiently, set and achieve objectives, solve problems and deliver better results. It is also important to note that capacity building is a process that cannot be accomplished within a short span of time. During the initial instance of the partner assessment to fit the program, an assessment serves as an input to capacity building needs. The capacity assessment that is performed after signing the contract serves as a baseline.

The partner capacity assessment findings are the driving force behind capacity development plan/proposal. This is a combined initiative developed to deliver prioritized responses identified by both parties (Partner and Donor X). Therefore, after the plan is developed, a mutual agreement is signed, indicating the responsibility drawn in line with the agreement of cooperation. The partner jointly collaborates with Donor X to implementing the plan. If a partner requires an external facilitator, Donor X may be required to identify potential resource personnel or even act as a resource person.

APPENDIX E (continued). General conditions in a cooperation agreement

X.4 Monitoring
Monitoring is the activity of following up on activities, results and financial situation. Monitoring is required in order for Donor X to uphold its accountability internally, towards rights holders, back donors and the general public.

Donor X, stakeholders and providers of services such as auditors shall be granted access to the organization, documentation, supported projects and stakeholders for field visits, participation in activities and control.

Donor X shall communicate their intentions and purpose clearly and timely in order for the partner organization to prepare appropriately for the visit.

Reports from field visits and control activities by Donor X or service providers should always be sent to the partner organization for information and to give the opportunity to add or correct information.

4.13 Reports from partner organizations
Annual and Final Reports shall be submitted to Donor X in accordance with the agreement. It consists of a narrative and a financial part. The narrative report must be analytical and special emphasis should be on the following:
- Fulfilment of outcomes and impacts.
- Deviations from plans and goals
- Lessons learned from the work by the Organisation
- Future adjustments to the activities and expected results in the Application.
The financial accounts are to follow the same disposition as the approved budget. Comments shall be provided on deviations higher than 10% between outcome and budget.

2. NNGO 5

X.1 The recipient organization agrees: 1) To carry out the activities described in the Work Plan and Budget (attached hereto) and their updates related to the subsequent delivery of funds in tranches; 2) Deliver quarterly reports to the Steering Committee; and 3) Deliver audited annual statements [income statement and balance sheets]. […] The funds provided in compliance with this Agreement will be used to produce the results specified in its annual performance goals.

X.2 The recipient organization agrees to meet the performance objectives contained in Section X. If the recipient organization does not fulfill its responsibilities specified in article X.1 or does not reach at least 70% of any of the performance objectives established for a given year, the Steering Committee will have reason to suspend any further support.

3. NNGO 6

About formulating objectives and indicators:
The project objective(s) have to be formulated such that they are achievable by the end of the funding period. Therefore, they should clearly and realistically describe the effects that are to be achieved by the end of that period (as a rule as intended changes in the lives/work of the direct target groups or project beneficiaries).

The project objectives have to be verifiable. They must, therefore, precisely describe, for example, the number of people, groups or communities in which the envisaged change is to become visible.

APPENDIX E (continued). General conditions in a cooperation agreement

The task of those responsible for project implementation is to ascertain both during the project and on its completion whether the intended changes have taken place, in other words, whether the project objectives have been achieved. Therefore, it is generally necessary to establish indicators by which achievement of the objectives can be observed and measured.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This dissertation comprises three essays that make important contributions to the literature on accounting and accountability in international cooperation and the NGO setting. First, this dissertation explores how trust interrelates with accountability in donor-NGO relationships. It does so by exploring an idea present in NGO and civil society studies: that trust has been eroded and replaced by highly regulated contracts, administrative codes, and stringent accountability. The first chapter of the dissertation challenges this idea and demonstrates that trust remains present through the interaction of an emotional dimension that highlights shared values and a cognitive dimension that stresses accountability. The chapter offers an alternative perspective on trust to rational views, by showing that trust involves not only disclosure and accountability, which enact its cognitive dimension, but also an emotional dimension. In addition, by moving away from a unidimensional conceptualization of trust, it highlights trust's dynamic nature. As the relationship between the NGO and its donors progresses throughout different stages (i.e., mission setup, fundraising, project design, project implementation, reporting and audit, renewal), the two trust dimensions continuously interact in ways that rearrange their relative importance in the final trust mix. That is why in some stages of the international cooperation relationship the emotional dimension of trust is either more critical (i.e., mission setup), equally important to the cognitive dimension (i.e., fundraising, project design, project implementation, renewal) or less prominent (i.e., reporting and audit).

Second, this dissertation explores how control and trust interrelate in international cooperation relationships. By building on the first chapter, the second essay elucidates the different trust building activities that make a donor trust an NGO, and how these activities interact with technocratic control practices along different stages of a cooperation relationship. The findings show that control and trust co-create and mutually reinforce each other, as an incipient level of trust calls for control mechanisms that help to establish and solidify the donor-NGO relationship. This chapter has theoretical implications for the trust-control interplay, as it shows that an underlying interaction of emotions and cognitions determines such interplay. The constitutive dimensions of trust regulate the need for control mechanisms that serve the cognitive dimension of trust, with implications for further emotional investments in the relationship. These findings

challenge previous conceptualizations of the trust-control interplay that rely exclusively on trustworthiness frameworks.

Finally, the third essay explores how a Southern NGO exerts agency and copes with the conditionalities and practices of its donors. By relying on five different responses that include compliance, questioning, negotiation, discreet non-compliance, and explicit rejection of donor demands and practices, the NGO navigates the international development assemblage. This chapter shows how donors advance a neocolonial program sustained by the exclusiveness of Western management orthodoxy and reveals the ambivalent role of accounting. On one hand, accounting helps advance donors' development and managerial agendas; on the other hand, it also helps mobilize the local NGO's ambitions, which often are not aligned with donors' vision of accountability.

Overall, this dissertation analyzes the complexities of governing international cooperation and development relationships. It shows how the inherent imbalances between funder and recipient make the latter adopt many of the discursive and material practices of the former. Regardless of the theoretical lenses adopted (i.e., sociology of trust, post-colonial theory), the dissertation reveals that DREAM, the local NGO in this study, should (partially) comply with control and accountability requirements to secure important resources for its sustenance. These requirements have significant impacts on its organizational and operational structures. But instead of letting these factors minimize the advancement of its mission, DREAM stands firm and find ways to mobilize its aspirations.

APPENDIX A. Definition of technical terms

The following is the definition of technical terms used in this dissertation. This list is sorted in alphabetical order.

Accountability

Following Dann and Sattelberger (2015), accountability in international cooperation for development "is about setting clear goals and targets, being responsible for delivering on them and accepting potential sanctions for lack of compliance with commitments" (p. 67). Actors must be held to account by managerial methods that involve controlling performance by setting targets, measuring success based on achieving targets, rewarding success, and sanctioning failure (O'Neill, 2014). While NGOs are accountable to multiple stakeholders, like donors, beneficiary communities, regulators, taxpayers (Ang & Wickramasinghe, 2022; Cordery et al., 2019), this dissertation focuses exclusively on the upward accountability relationship from NGOs to their most proximate donors (i.e., the governmental agency or intermediary Western NGO that provides funds).

Civil society

Civil society refers to "the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family, and market." (Centre for Civil Society, 2006, p. 1). Civil society is an institutional space "in which citizens could form associations, organize public action, and represent their interests and aspirations" (Lewis & Madon, 2004, p. 120). Therefore, it is associated with third sector organizations that promote democratic and public causes, such as movements that promote "effective resistance to authoritarian regimes, democratizing society from below while pressuring authoritarians for change." (Foley & Edwards, 1996, p. 38).

Global South

Global South refers to "regions outside Europe and North America mostly (though not all) low-income and often politically or culturally marginalized" (Dados & Connell, 2012, p. 12). The Global South includes countries of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania.

Studies on international development speak of a North-South or Western-Non Western divide (e.g., Arrighi et al., 2003), which has a focus on geopolitical power relations. In this vein,

this paper uses indistinctly the terms "Western" and "Northern" to refer both the "designation of institutional power and ideological Eurocentricity" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 31) and also donors and dominant actors of the development assemblage that are mostly located in industrialized countries of North America and Europe. The term "Southern NGO" refers to NGOs located in Global South countries with a history of subjection to colonial rule (Clarke, 2018).

Managerialism

Following Klikauer (2015) and Girei (2022), managerialism is the application of one-dimensional managerial techniques on the grounds of superior ideology, expert training, and the exclusiveness of managerial knowledge to establish what counts as results, what value for money means, how projects should be monitored, and who has the authority to make such claims. Managerialism in international development anchors in results-based management, which is a project life cycle approach based on performance measurement, procedural upward accountability, efficiency in the use of resources, achievement of outcomes, and maximization of results (Girei, 2022; Global Affairs Canada, 2015).

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)

While there is no uncontested definition of NGOs (Gray et al., 2006), literature usually defines them as self-governing, voluntary, autonomous, non-profit-making organizations, with a focus on social wellbeing (Claeyé, 2014; Cordery et al., 2019; Gray et al., 2006; D. Lewis, 2010; Vakil, 1997). Cordery et al. (2019) consider that NGOs are defined by two singular characteristics: their social purposes and their constraint on the distribution of surpluses. NGOs are considered agents of civil society advocacy and welfare services providers for disregarded communities (Cordery et al., 2019; Doh & Guay, 2006; Edwards & Hulme, 1995; Gent et al., 2015; Lang, 2012; Murtaza, 2012). NGOs are under the umbrella of the third sector, a concept that encapsulates voluntary, community, and social economy organizations that "differ from organizations in the corporate or governmental sectors in terms of how power and control within the organization is exercised" (Claeyé, 2014, p. 23).