

Visual Histories of Occupation

A Transcultural
Dialogue

Edited by Jeremy E. Taylor

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In memory of Miriam Y. Arani

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On a more personal note, I thank my wife and children for the patience, flexibility and love they have shown me as I have worked on compiling this volume over the last year or more.

Visual Histories of Occupation is dedicated to the memory of Miriam Y. Arani – one of the book's contributors, and an erudite scholar of photography under occupation in wartime central and eastern Europe. Dr Arani passed away in 2019.

Introduction: Visual histories of occupation(s)

Jeremy E. Taylor

Why occupation?

As ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, the memory of historical atrocities in east Asia, and disputed boundaries in regions such as the Caucasus and south Asia all remind us, 'occupation' remains a pertinent, if highly contentious, milieu in many parts of the world today. While the definition of 'occupation' continues to be debated in legal fora, it is in the realm of 'the visual' that responses to various historical and contemporary cases of occupation are often articulated most clearly. Be it the iconic image of Adolf Hitler posing in front of the Eiffel Tower in German-occupied Paris in June 1940 (Figure I.1), or the evocative works that the British artist Banksy has produced in Gaza and the West Bank, the history of occupation is often written in images (Figure I.2). Little wonder, then, that the very field of 'visual cultures' has emphasized the debt it owes to the study of conquest and occupation in determining the questions it asks and the methodologies it deploys – a point that leading scholars in the field have often acknowledged.¹

Despite all this, few attempts have been made to foster a comparative scholarly dialogue on the history of occupation(s) from a visual perspective. To be sure, interest in occupation has generated a vast literature which addresses a range of important questions. Much of this research is informed by ethical concerns about how 'occupiers', 'the occupied' and others act under or remember the experience of occupation itself. Mirroring the rise in 'insurgency studies' since the early 2000s,² contemporary conflicts have prompted many scholars to revisit historical cases of occupation that have long been ignored. Witness the rise in comparative studies of occupation which emerged following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the parallel rise in politicized debates over the judgement of historical and contemporary actors which this generated.³

However, the question of how people record, respond to, interpret or remember cases of occupation in distinctly visual ways – and in different geographic and temporal contexts – continues to evade systematic analysis. And despite debates about the role

I thank all scholars who took part in the Cultures of Occupation Conference, held at the University of Nottingham in January 2018. Their comments and suggestions, especially during the final discussions, helped to shape this Introduction.



Figure I.1 The iconic photograph by Heinrich Hoffmann of Adolf Hitler posing in front of the Eiffel Tower on 23 June 1940, following the German invasion of Paris. Getty Images. (See Plate 1.)



Figure 1.2 Men taking photographs of artwork by the British artist Banksy on the walls of buildings that had been destroyed during an Israeli attack on Beit Hanoun, Gaza, 27 February 2015. Photo by Mustafa Hassona/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.

of recent occupations in shaping the very field of ‘critical visual studies’, few attempts have been made to apply such innovations to historical cases of occupation. While a number of scholars have certainly put ‘the visual’ at the forefront of the study of specific occupations (examples of which I will detail below), far fewer have responded to such questions in a comparative or interdisciplinary manner, or asked, in a more general sense, what occupation ‘looks like.’⁴ Opportunities for scholars who study visual practices associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to compare notes with their peers who work on the iconographies of Japanese-occupied Asia, for example, remain scant.

This volume represents a first attempt to provide a platform for such interaction. It does this by adopting a deliberately flexible analytical framework which encompasses a number of quite different perspectives and approaches. While a well-theorized debate on the distinction between ‘art history’, ‘critical visual studies’ and ‘visual cultures’ has raged since the early 2000s,⁵ this book includes contributions which adopt what might be defined as more ‘traditional’ art historical approaches, as well as ‘visual culture’-inflected studies of how occupation shape(d) particular ‘ways of seeing’ or wider ‘visualities’. In addition, it includes cultural histories of occupation which preface visual (rather than literary, sonic or legal) texts as their primary source of evidence or explore the visual manifestations of occupation policies.

Rather than ‘choosing a side’ in such debates, this collection consciously adopts a more expansive approach that is often referred to as ‘visual history’. As Gerhard Paul, one

of the main exponents of such an approach, suggests: 'Visual history ... considers images in a wider sense both as sources as well as independent artifacts of historiographical research and likewise looks at the visibility of history and the historicity of the visual.'⁶ Responding to the wider 'visual turn' that has been experienced in the Humanities, as well as the increasing ease with which scholars can now access large numbers of historical and contemporary images, this approach places 'the visual' at the centre of the study of the past. For Paul, visual history 'addresses the whole field of visual practice as well as the visibility of experience and history'.⁷ Most importantly, however, visual history takes as its starting point a simple yet often neglected principle, that is, the need to write 'against the ingrained anti-visualism of the social sciences' and accept – as Sumathi Ramaswamy argues – that 'pictures, too, have stories to show and arguments to manifest, and that images are not just illustrative and reflective but also constitutive and world-making rather than world mirroring'.⁸ Indeed, one of the most fundamental contributions made by adherents of this approach is the belief that images – regardless of the media in which they are produced – can generate an agency all of their own. As Horst Bredekamp suggests, for example, 'Politics requires images, it gives rise to images; but it can also follow where images may lead'.⁹ In this volume, we shall see various examples of precisely this process in the politically fraught context of occupation.

Rather than drawing a clear distinction between 'art history', 'cultural history' and 'visual cultures', then, the 'transdisciplinary research' inherent in visual history can provide a space within which scholars from diverse disciplinary traditions can engage with one another. Indeed, many 'visual historians' have been open to the lessons that parallel approaches, such as 'visual cultures', can provide, for 'visual history' entails not just the foregrounding of images in accounts of the past, but also an acknowledgement (and historicization) of the ways in which wider social and cultural contexts shape *which* images (or groups of images) are seen, *how* they are seen and by *whom* they are seen. Below, we will explore how recent cases of occupation have been instrumental in reinforcing such sensibilities in the theoretical scholarship.

In adopting 'visual histories' in its very title then, this book demonstrates that art historians, cultural historians, visual anthropologists, critical theorists and visual cultures scholars *can* engage in fruitful debate (in this case on 'occupation') without necessarily replicating each other's methods and/or sources. Indeed, while a good deal of scholarship that has been written consciously under the banner of 'visual history' has engaged most enthusiastically with photography in the past, this collection takes a deliberately broad perspective with regards visual sources. It features chapters on photography, print media, cinema, contemporary art, material culture, heritage sites and museums. It also takes cues from 'critical visual studies' and 'visual cultures' by including chapters which interrogate multiple archives (written, visual and material) to pose questions about what is rendered visible and – perhaps most importantly – *invisible* under occupation.

To be sure, a number of collections *have* employed a similarly broad set of methodological parameters to explore region-specific questions of occupation in the past. In an important but much overlooked volume, Marlene J. Mayo, J. Thomas Rimer and H. Eleanor Kerkham map the 'aesthetic life' of Japanese imperialism in Asia (and its aftermath), bringing together essays on Taiwanese painting under Japanese

colonialism and the role of the post-war Allied occupation of Japan in shaping artistic practices in that country.¹⁰ Similarly, in *Narrating Conflict in the Middle East: Discourse, Image and Communications*, Dina Matar and Zahera Harb bring together scholars from media studies, critical theory and literature to examine the ways in which societies that were or are still occupied by Israeli forces – Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories – have responded to such occupation in cultural (and often highly visual) ways.¹¹ Taking a more ‘traditional’ art historical approach, Lisa Brock, Conor McGrady and Teresa Meade also raise important questions about ‘the role of visual culture in situations of war, occupation, and resistance’ in their special issue of *Radical History Review* published in 2010. Stressing the explicitly political nature of visual culture ‘in any given situation’, the need to address the ‘visual’ in relation to occupation is, for these scholars, linked inextricably to the ‘partisanship’ of the artist, especially in terms of resisting occupation.¹² More recently, the mobilization of artists for and against war and invasion in a multitude of contexts has been explored by Joanna Burke and others in *War and Art* – ‘a visual, cultural and historical analysis of the ways armed conflict has been represented in a range of artistic forms.’¹³ The manner in which the memory of occupation is visualized through museums and historical sites is also starting to generate a new wave of critical scholarship, reflected in a number of forthcoming publications.¹⁴

The questions posed in such research parallel some of those raised by the contributors to this book. More importantly, this book shares with these earlier endeavours a conviction that a focus on ‘the visual’ is necessary if we are to truly understand the impact that foreign occupation has on culture (in every sense of that word); on the lived experience of occupation (for all those involved in it); and on the wider cultural and social contexts in which occupations occur. As we will see in surveying some of the extant literature below, occupation by its very nature involves the imposition of new ‘visual regimes’ of external provenance which entail concealment as well as revelation; which determine what is visible and what is not; and which disrupt many existing visual and artistic practices, while circumscribing new visual cultures unique to the occupation context.

This can best be illustrated when we look beyond specific cases of occupation, and set aside notions of exceptionalism (i.e. in getting beyond the tendency to limit one’s interest to the study of ‘the occupation’ – a phrase which, paradoxically, means entirely different things in different parts of the academy). Earlier collections have often consciously chosen to work within specific geographic and temporal boundaries, meaning that lessons learnt about ‘the visual’ in one case are rarely applied to others. In its wider focus, this volume seeks to foster the comparative study of ‘the visual’ under occupation further by adopting a more ambitious framework encompassing various cases from around the world.

In calling for a comparative study which moves *beyond* regional borders, this book does not argue that ‘all occupations are the same’. Indeed, I heed Laura Hein’s warning about the ‘dangers in assuming’ that one occupation ‘can provide a template for anywhere else.’¹⁵ If anything, the chapters in this book underline the fundamental differences that define occupations across the modern era and in different parts of the world. Nor does this book seek to compile some visual typology of occupation. While

comparative studies are useful, they also remind us that different cases of occupation have had consequences that reflect local conditions, traditions and histories.

Nonetheless, this book suggests that much can be achieved by taking a comparative approach to the study of many situations, periods or conflicts that are often considered in isolation despite sharing the 'occupation' label. In other words, while respecting the exceptional nature of many cases of occupation, this collection sets aside the place- or nation-specific exceptionalism which informs a good deal of the existing scholarship. It does this by including chapters which explore 1930s Manchukuo; Second World War Poland, China and the Philippines; post-war Germany, Japan, Okinawa and the Soviet Union; 1960s Israel-Palestine; and the Middle East, Europe and Australia today. It also includes chapters which, in themselves, explore the value in (and limitations of) a comparative study of 'occupation' per se.

While the idea of 'transnational' history has become common in recent years – including in histories of occupation¹⁶ – this book also encourages what might best be described as a 'transcultural' comparative study of occupation. As an approach that deliberately seeks to underline and examine 'border crossing and entanglement', 'transcultural history' is well suited to a comparative study of occupation.¹⁷ Indeed, while acknowledging the centrality of 'the occupation' to various national histories – including those written from above and below – this book adopts a 'transcultural' approach in an attempt to highlight the cultural influences and legacies of one occupation on others; the temporal and geographic fluidity of images and visual narratives across and between various 'occupied territories'; and the changing historical memories of past occupation in light of ongoing occupations and conflicts today. The nascent field of 'transcultural history' has already demonstrated how such an approach can shed entirely new light on the political and social aspects of historical occupation.¹⁸ And many contributions to this volume adopt, to some degree, a transcultural sensibility to the study of specific cases of occupation. In doing so, they mark out new points of intersection and overlap, identify original theoretical angles from which to revisit studies of specific cases of occupation, and share conceptual, methodological and theoretical innovations derived from vastly different contexts.

While not all chapters in this volume are necessarily transcultural, comparative or interdisciplinary as standalone studies, the collection as a whole highlights the 'border crossing and entanglement' of images, ideas, visual technologies and memories across and between specific cases of occupation; the comparisons that might be drawn between vastly different conflicts in different parts of the world and across the late-modern period; and the benefits of deploying methods and approaches from an array of disciplinary traditions when analysing the 'visual histories of occupation' in a more general sense.

New questions about old ideas

There is already a significant literature in a range of disciplines which aims to define 'occupation'. This includes a body of work in critical legal studies which considers the origins of the 'law of occupation'. Under the Hague Conventions, concluded in

1907, 'belligerent occupation' was first defined as a state of affairs occurring when one sovereign state invaded the territory of another and was obliged to administer the occupied territories of that state temporarily (i.e. until the end of the conflict) – though the need for some internationally recognized legal regime to define and manage such cases dates back to the Napoleonic Wars.¹⁹ While post-Second World War judgements (such as the Fourth Geneva Convention) have refined these earlier definitions, the Hague Conventions remain the basis for definitions of 'occupation' in the legal context today – something which has itself generated extensive debate.²⁰

While the 'law of occupation' remains an important framework, an increasing amount of scholarship now critically engages with the limits of the definitions of 'occupation' that this provides in practice. Some legal scholars have been critical of the tendency to use the 'myth of temporality' inherent in such definitions to obfuscate new forms of domination or conquest, for example.²¹ Others have criticized the inherently Eurocentric origins of 'occupation' – that is, a notion originally developed to define relations between European states (rather than, for example, European powers and areas beyond Europe that these powers subsequently colonized).²² Historians working within a postcolonial framework have sought to move away from such definitions altogether, taking issue with a legally defined occupation/colonialism dichotomy which 'perpetuates a distinction between European and non-European development, but also hinders a useful perspective on both European military history and the history of foreign occupation'²³ – though this approach has also been criticized as an elision of occupation and colonialism in some quarters.²⁴ Such an approach explains studies that draw a direct line between colonialism and the recent military occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan,²⁵ as well as recent conceptual innovations like Salah D. Hassan's notion of 'never-ending occupations', that is, cases in which 'regimes of occupation often project themselves long into the future, averting complete withdrawal and instituting a permanent presence ... through the establishment of garrisoned military bases'.²⁶

In political science, scholars have noted the 'evolving meanings' of occupation, especially in light of conflicts in the Middle East in recent decades. Some scholars have followed a path common in social science research in seeking to establish catch-all definitions, for example, describing occupation as 'a form of government imposed by force or threat thereof'.²⁷ Others have sought more expansive frameworks which cover 'the legally distinct situations of colonialism, foreign occupation, and those multinational states whose disconnected nations regard their rulers as alien', Michael Hechter's category of 'alien rule' being one such example.²⁸

Such work exists alongside more disparate attempts to describe the relationship between 'occupation' and related concepts (such as 'colonialism' and 'conquest') which seek to find a concise working definition for the milieus to which the term 'occupation' is often attached (over and above those recognized as 'belligerent occupation' in international law). Occupation might be 'a condition of compromised sovereignty' for one scholar and a 'new form of empire: a network of overseas bases and informal spheres of influence' for another.²⁹ For Amahl Bishara, occupation is 'one of the most obvious cases in which the politics of sovereignty intrudes, in an everyday and pervasive way, in arenas of life often presumed to be free of state politics'.³⁰ Indeed, as the burgeoning

scholarship on Israel-Palestine suggests (a good deal of it theoretically inspired by advances in postcolonial theory), occupation sometimes has little to do with the control of 'sovereign territory' at all: the mind and the senses can both be 'occupied',³¹ as can the skies above.³² Such definitions are cited here not to discredit or undermine in any way the research with which they are associated, but rather to demonstrate the diversity of scholarly definitions now attached to the word 'occupation'.

Thanks to the emergence of the Occupy movement since 2011, a number of scholars have also explored the origins and multiple meanings of the term 'occupation', as well as the ways in which the very idea of 'occupation' has changed. As W. J. T. Mitchell suggests, 'The clearest symptom of the uncanny reversal in the meaning of the word *occupation* has been its transformation from its principal meaning in the preceding historical epoch, a label for military conquest and neocolonialism.'³³ Yet the practice of 'Occupying Wall Street' in New York or 'Occupying Central' in Hong Kong is not quite as removed from the Hague Convention-understanding of 'occupying' foreign territory following conquest as we might assume. 'You may occupy space in a normal way, as owner or tenant', muses Jacques Rancière: 'But the notion takes on its full meaning when you take possession of a space which is not yours.'³⁴ In other words, the aims of the Occupy movement to 'take back' space (and to transform parks, squares or streets into spaces for protest and debate) have a far closer connection to the sense of 'occupation' as 'military conquest and neocolonialism' than might at first be apparent. As the Occupy movement's development in places such as Hong Kong have shown, these two concepts are intimately linked in their focus on sovereignty, power and spatial control. This is a topic to which I will return in the Epilogue.

It is not the aim of this volume to add to this growing list of definitions. Nor am I seeking to establish a 'taxonomy of occupation' which can be neatly applied across vastly different contexts. All cases of occupation – even within wider regional conflicts (e.g. the German occupation of various societies across Europe during the Second World War) – are unique, and all resist attempts at reductionism. However, it is precisely the impossibility of establishing a catch-all definition of 'occupation' beyond that set down in international law that can serve as the basis for critical discussion about visual expression under vastly different situations labelled with this very term.³⁵ In other words, debates about the meaning of the term 'occupation' can be encouraged and continued, without necessarily allowing such definitions to mark an end point of scholarly enquiry. Such an approach might even allow scholars working on cultural expression or practices in contexts that are denied the very label of 'occupation' (including examples which are *not* covered in this volume, such as Kashmir, Tibet and Western Sahara), the ability to move beyond justifying one's research to sceptical critics.

Such an approach – one which suspends the search for a singular definition of 'occupation' while actively engaging in debates *around* such definitions – may appear vague. However, it has already been applied in parallel fields, such as Genocide Studies. For example, the *Journal of Genocide Research* acknowledges that 'genocide is a contested legal, historical, sociological and political term that is applied in various spheres'. Yet this periodical combines empirical research on genocide with conceptual reflection on the term itself.³⁶ In addition, comparative social histories of 'occupation'

which are not limited to protracted wrangling over legal definitions have already been written: Christine de Matos and Rowena Ward's 2012 volume, for example, compares the effects of military occupation across the Asia Pacific region and the Middle East throughout the second half of the twentieth century.³⁷ In temporal and geographic ambitions, this volume seeks to follow such examples, though with a far clearer emphasis on 'the visual'.

From Manchukuo to Palestine: Approaches to the study of occupation

A sweeping account of all studies of occupation in which questions of 'the visual' have been emphasized would be impractical and would serve little purpose. It is possible, however, to identify a number of key literatures which have often not been considered in comparison with each other, yet which provide contrasting models of how best to embark on 'visual histories' of occupation. In the context of this volume, such a review also serves the purpose of laying the groundwork for a number of chapters which directly address, and critically engage with, such work.

When it comes to visual cultures in Japanese-occupied Asia, for example, the historiography of Manchukuo – the 'puppet state' established by the Japanese Kwantung Army in what is now northeast China in 1932 – remains arguably the best documented of cases. Thanks to the vast amount of pictorial propaganda, cinema, photography and graphic art that was produced by the 'occupiers' in this part of northeast Asia from the early 1930s through until 1945, scholars have been spoilt for choice when it comes to visual primary sources. Digitization projects such as the 'Manchukuo Propaganda Posters & Bills' database (developed through the efforts of Kishi Toshihiko at Kyoto University)³⁸ and major collections of Manchukuo print media held at institutions such as Harvard-Yenching Library have in turn contributed to a rise in the scholarly literature on the 'visual history' of this entity (Figure 1.3).³⁹ Much of the resulting work has detailed the seemingly counterintuitive role of Japanese leftist artists in the celebration of this settler-colonial project.⁴⁰ In other cases, scholars have traced the development of visual technologies in Manchukuo, and questioned the role of modern media in shaping not just Japanese rule there, but also the visual memory of that rule.⁴¹ While such research has revealed much about the extent to which Manchukuo's rulers visually re-packaged this quasi-colony through new iconographies, however, it has tended to stress the role of Japanese cultural producers over other groups. In other words, a good deal of this work (though by no means all of it) has tended to focus on the role of the occupying power in 'picturing' a new Manchuria, rather than local responses to such visualities.⁴² Such 'visual histories' have been important, however, in demonstrating that a foregrounding of visual sources and a proper consideration of visual technologies can shape an entire field, and shed light on a period or place that text-based studies are unable to do alone.

This 'occupier-heavy' literature on Manchukuo can be contrasted to the focus on 'the occupied' in histories of Vichy France – another 'puppet state' which temporally overlapped with Manchukuo. While Vichy studies has provided us with much of the




Figure 1.3 ‘Wangdao le tu da Manzhou fengsu’ (The customs of Greater Manchuria, the paradise of the Kingly Way); ‘The Life of Manchu’ [*sic*]: Cover image of a set of postcards from Manchukuo (1932–45). Original image held by the Harvard-Yenching Library of the Harvard College Library, Harvard University. (See Plate 2.)

highly visual lexicon that we now apply to studies of occupation in other contexts (e.g. 'the dark years'),⁴³ it has also generated a significant literature on the cultural life of this wartime regime on its own terms.⁴⁴ Indeed, it remains perhaps the richest of literatures on 'visual histories of occupation', with major studies of 'collaborationist' art, cinema and visual culture being published in French and English in recent decades. Many of these studies are important in defining methods and strategies for addressing the nature of 'the visual' under occupation and sit alongside broader discussions concerning 'the visual' and representational legacies of the occupation experience in the post-war decades in France. Monographs by scholars such as Stéphanie Corcy, Laurence Bertrand Dorléac and others, together with numerous edited volumes dedicated to cultural production in Vichy France, provide a range of templates for the analysis of artistic and visual production in wartime France.⁴⁵ Many such works detail attempts by French artists to defend 'national' traditions under occupation as a means of adhering to Vichy policies while maintaining some level of cultural autonomy and perhaps even defiance.

The iconographies that are Corcy's and Bertrand Dorléac's quarry have also been the subject of major exhibitions, such as 'La Collaboration', which was held at the Archives nationales in Paris in 2014.⁴⁶ Here the history of Vichy was revisited through 'image acts' (such as Philippe Pétain's iconic handshake with Adolf Hitler at Montoire-sur-le-Loir on 24 October 1940),⁴⁷ the fascist aesthetics of Vichy poster art, and the revealing private photographs of 'collabos' and German officers. Other recent exhibitions have taken a more investigative approach (in line with recent government initiatives) in casting light on a very different 'visual history' of Vichy France – the role of the 'collaborationist' authorities in the Nazi looting of art.⁴⁸

Another lasting contribution of the Vichy historiography has been its emphasis on the gendering of both visual cultures under occupation, and the memory of occupation itself. Writing against the 'gender-blindness' of earlier work, for example, Claire Gorrara has sought to analyse the ways in which women writers in post-1968 France remembered the occupation,⁴⁹ while Hanna Diamond's 'women's history' of the war in France provides a broad overview of the experience of women both living under and working against occupation.⁵⁰ More important in terms of 'visual histories of occupation' is Francine Muel-Dreyfus's close reading of Pétainist archetypes such as the 'Vichy Mother', which were developed not just as conservative responses to the supposed decline of French manhood, but as fully imagined figures on the posters and in the staged rituals of occupation propaganda. In other cases, the highly visualized manner in which French women who had been accused of literally 'sleeping with the enemy' were publicly humiliated at Liberation has opened up new avenues for enquiry around the entanglements of gender, power, memory and visual culture in the aftermath of occupation.⁵¹

Most importantly, however, the Vichy historiography explores the memory of occupation and the manifestations of that memory in various spheres of expression. Perhaps as a collective response to the 'Vichy syndrome', that Henry Rousso described as a 'diverse set of symptoms whereby the trauma of the occupation ... reveals itself in political, social and cultural life',⁵² scholars of Vichy have produced vast amounts of work detailing how the memory of the occupation is articulated in visual representations and

narratives, museums and even the natural and built environments.⁵³ Such approaches continue to inform studies of ‘collaboration’ in other contexts today.

The ethics of ‘collaboration’ are approached in a quite different way in the subfield of ‘Occupation Studies’ which has been such a key part of Japanese historiography since the 1970s.⁵⁴ Since the early 2000s, social, cultural and gender historians – including scholars who contribute to this collection⁵⁵ – have utilized a range of visual materials to compile major studies of what some have laconically labelled the ‘good occupation’ that was imposed on Japan between 1945 and 1952.⁵⁶ As with much of the above-mentioned literature on Vichy, a good deal of this research has focused on issues of gender. This has ranged from Mire Koikari’s work on women in post-war Japan and Okinawa (much of the latter directly examining gendered visual representations of ‘the occupied’)⁵⁷ to Sarah Kovner’s groundbreaking research on sex work under occupation – a topic which raises ‘fundamental questions about imperialism and individual agency, political economy and cultural change.’⁵⁸ Both these scholars have argued that occupation, by its very nature, includes a highly gendered set of power relations that fundamentally reshape how an occupied society is represented, and how those living under or with occupation ‘see’.

In other instances, however, the occupation is identified as a crucial *period* within which lasting developments in (and – as Jennifer Coates explains in this very volume – scholarship on) visual media and performing arts, such as cinema, photography and theatre, were first developed, often out of attempts to navigate the censorship imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).⁵⁹ If ‘the visual’ remains peripheral to issues of power and agency in such work, it is nonetheless an important component of this literature – be it on photographic depictions of occupation-era sex workers or the aesthetics of occupation-era cinema. It is therefore no coincidence that some of the leading names in the field of Japanese ‘Occupation Studies’, such as John Dower, were also some of the first to call for an embrace of the ‘visual turn’ in Japanese history more generally.⁶⁰

Interest in the US post-war occupation of Japan was, in many instances, re-ignited as a result of a more recent occupation which, of itself, also inspired a new wave of critical scholarship, including that written from ‘visual cultures’ and art historical perspectives. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 generated an entire field of scholarship – conferences, books and journals⁶¹ – across a range of disciplines. Indeed, despite starting two years after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the scholarship on the occupation of Iraq soon outstripped that related to Afghanistan in terms of sheer volume. And if for other ‘occupations’ it has been politics, military affairs or social history which have dominated the debate, for occupied Iraq, visual cultures have emerged as a crucial part of the academic discourse. For Nicholas Mirzoeff, one of the leading scholars of ‘visual culture’, the American invasion of Iraq was a transformative moment that forced us to confront ‘the global imaginary’; after all, ‘there were more images produced [during the invasion of Iraq in 2003] – whether on television, as photography or on the Internet – than in any other comparable period of history.’⁶² It is not simply the production of images which made this invasion and subsequent occupation unique, however. The ways in which specific ‘visual events’ arose from the occupation of Iraq, and how through this conflict the use of images as weapons

of war became evident, have all reshaped how visual culture scholars understand the relationship between image, power, violence, and 'ways of seeing' or 'ways of watching'. It was the release of photographs of the torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib in 2004, for instance, that raised fundamental questions about the control of 'the visual' under occupation, subsequently inspiring broad scholarly responses.⁶³ For Mirzoeff, the concealment and eventual release of these images, and the reaction (or lack of reaction) to them, were all instructive of not simply occupation, but empire and war more generally in the twenty-first century. Indeed, in the fact that such images remained concealed for so long, Mirzoeff argues that we can see evidence of how 'the visibility of war remains profoundly undemocratic'.⁶⁴ Such ideas continue to inform more recent debates about visual cultures well beyond those based on the US occupation of Iraq.

The occupation of Iraq is not the exclusive domain of 'visual culture' theorists, however. Media scholars and art historians have also found in the American invasion new visual histories to write and new questions to ask. The televised 'toppling' of a Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad on 9 April 2003, and the discovery and subsequent desecration of pre-occupation Ba'athist iconography, have all inspired critical appraisals from a variety of angles, to say nothing of a new batch of 'iconic' images that were designed to propagate particular ideas about the nature of the US occupation⁶⁵ (Figure I.4). Since 2003, a number of scholars have also highlighted the effects of the US occupation on visual expression within Iraq itself, while underlining the extent to which discussion of 'visual culture' and Iraq has seen certain forms of visual expression largely ignored. Nada Shabout, for example, has documented and deconstructed the new forms of artistic expression that were installed in a 'new Iraq' under American rule.⁶⁶ At the same time, she has highlighted the scholarly tendency to erase the story of modern Iraqi visual expression (both before and since 2003), even while the US occupation has inspired so much theoretical exploration of the relationship between war and visual culture more generally. Through initiatives such as the Modern Art Iraq Archive,⁶⁷ Shabout and others have sought to free discussion of Iraq's modern visual heritage from an obsession with the fate of Iraqi antiquities in the chaos following 2003, and with occupied Iraq's place in the theorizing of global visual cultures.⁶⁸

In terms of sheer volume, however, the literature on visual cultures of occupation in Japanese-occupied Manchukuo, Vichy France, post-war Japan and early twenty-first-century Iraq all pale in comparison with the scholarship on the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. In the field of cultural production, this covers everything from art and cinema to photography and more ephemeral forms of visual expression, such as graffiti and new media.⁶⁹ Indeed, this is a vast scholarship which includes contributions in visual anthropology, critical theory and comparative literature, as well as media studies, art history and visual cultures. Just as importantly, such literature is giving rise to new modes of theorizing, in more general terms, about the place of the 'the visual' when trying to understand the nature of the Israeli occupation, and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In one recent volume on *Visioning Israel-Palestine*, for example, Gil Pasternak argues for the need to ask 'questions about cultural products and productions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to bring into view the conflict's dynamic and evolving reality that political discussions and public debates tend to suspend for rhetorical impact'.⁷⁰



Figure I.4 The much photographed covering of a Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad with a US flag in preparation for the statue's toppling by US troops on 9 April 2003. Gilles Bassignac/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images. (See Plate 3.)

Gil Hochberg's *Visual Occupations* (2015) marks an important watershed in the study of this topic, and provides lessons which remain relevant well beyond the field of Israel-Palestine studies. While Hochberg's book 'explores ... various attempts to expose and reframe the conditions of vision that underlie the Israeli-Palestinian conflict',⁷¹ it also raises broader questions about 'the visual' in relation to occupation which are valid for studies in other contexts. Indeed, Hochberg's simple yet profound set of underlying questions about Israel-Palestine – that is, 'what or who can be seen, what or who remains invisible, who can see and whose vision is compromised' – are entirely valid for cases of conflict and occupation in different contexts. Despite a good deal of her book being dedicated to contemporary art, Hochberg's monograph nevertheless has lessons for scholars of contemporary *and* historical cases of occupation, from present-day Kashmir to Second World War China.⁷² Indeed, her questions about what is 'seen' and 'unseen' under occupation have inspired some of the most innovative attempts to link the visibility of occupations (such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan) with historical conflicts.⁷³ Hochberg's work has even inspired a reassessment of the visual technologies of surveillance that have been developed under different circumstances in recent years: the highly controversial use of drones in the prosecution of war in Afghanistan (and other countries), for example, is now being interrogated with recourse to such an approach, as scholars unpack how such visual technologies shape the very way in which conflict is written about.⁷⁴

The structure of the book

The innovations developed in each of these disparate ‘occupation literatures’ remain entirely valid. Indeed, they inform many of the chapters in this book. At the same time, however, each provides a quite different emphasis on how ‘the visual’ is used as a topic of study vis-à-vis occupation. For Hochberg, the issue is fundamentally about ‘ways of seeing’ under occupation – a consideration of how the circumstances of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict play out in a highly visualized manner, but also how they have a tangible influence on the ways in which people in Israel-Palestine *see* the land and each other. This is an important approach which goes to the very heart of answering the question: ‘what does occupation look like?’

It is for this reason that Part One of this book is entitled ‘Ways of seeing under occupation’, for it includes three chapters which adopt an approach that parallels many of the sorts of questions posed by Hochberg. The purpose of this section, then, is to examine how the very notion of ‘ways of seeing’ might be applied to the study of some of the best-known historical cases of occupation – the occupation of various parts of Germany and Japan by the Allied powers in the years immediately following the end of the Second World War. In Chapter 1, for example, Alexey Tikhomirov shows how the Soviet occupation of Germany heralded a fundamental re-ordering of the visual realm – from colours to symbols – as well as visual practices, as the Soviets sought to overturn the visual regime that had been put in place under the Third Reich. Making use of police, security and Party files from Germany and Russia, Tikhomirov shows how this ironically led to local Germans re-adopting Nazi symbols, icons and visual tropes as a form of anti-Soviet resistance in everyday life. In addition, there developed aesthetic tensions between German communists and their Russian allies, as the latter attempted to impose a Russian vision of a communist, post-war Germany on their former enemies. In exploring the notion of a ‘visual occupation regime’, this chapter marks an important starting point for the book as a whole, but also speaks directly to themes of post-war occupation by other Cold War powers that other contributors (e.g. Oliver and Koikari) explore in later chapters.

In Chapter 2, Emily Oliver examines how the Allied occupation authorities in post-war Berlin provoked outrage by exhibiting David Lean’s *Oliver Twist* (1948) – a film which visualized anti-Semitic stereotypes through its depiction of the character of Fagin. Under this ‘visual occupation regime’, the cultural insensitivity of the occupiers thus played a role in shaping immediate memories of Nazi visual media, and stoked animosity in a city still dealing with the destruction visited upon it in the closing stages of the war. Oliver shows that the transplanting of Fagin from nineteenth-century England to film screens in post-war Berlin raised all manner of uncomfortable memories of Nazi visual culture in the context of rapid social change and conflict. The film even provoked comparisons with the propaganda cinema of the regime that the British were attempting to replace and whose policies they had sought to eradicate.

The notion of a ‘visual occupation regime’ which proscribes certain ‘ways of seeing’ is continued in the third chapter in this section. Jennifer Coates examines the role of the American occupation authorities in post-war Japan as they sought to use cinema

as a means of fundamentally re-shaping Japanese society, especially when it came to the role of women and children. Based on dozens of ethnographic interviews with Japanese cinema-goers from the Kansai region of that country, the chapter shows how this ranged from the actual practice of 'watching a movie' to the content of films themselves. As Coates illustrates, however, the Hollywood archetypes and film stars that were promoted by the Americans to 'occupied' audiences were endowed with quite different significance by local Japanese cinema-goers. Even within the occupation context, then, local audiences had some degree of agency over what they saw, and how they chose to see it.

The chapters which make up Part Two of the book adopt a quite different approach to their study of occupation, and one which might best be described as a study of 'visual and artistic responses to occupation'. All three chapters in this section examine how artists and other cultural workers – including both the 'occupied' and 'occupiers' – have responded through the visual arts to the circumstances of occupation in quite different ways. The chapters in this section also deal, to a greater or lesser degree, with the memory of occupation (and the erasure of that memory), as well as the legacy of past and ongoing cases of occupation in academic and artistic circles today. This section thus underlines the continued importance of art historical methods in coming to terms with both visual expression under occupation, and – perhaps more importantly – the legacies of earlier occupations on artistic activity today.

Baluyut starts Chapter 4 by assessing the wartime and post-war work of one of the most celebrated painters of the Philippines – Fernando Amorsolo. Much of Amorsolo's *oeuvre* from the mid-twentieth century engages directly with gendered representations of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines (1942–5). More importantly, however, Baluyut expands her analysis to look at the ways in which Amorsolo's pictorial depictions of the occupation have themselves been 'occupied', via the international art market, by institutions in contemporary Singapore. As Baluyut argues, Amorsolo's artistic musings on race, class and gender under Japanese wartime occupation take on an entirely new significance when they are transplanted into a postcolonial Singapore. Baluyut's chapter thus speaks to other sections of the book which deal with the Japanese occupation of Asia, but raises wider questions about the trade in visual depictions of occupation today, and the ways in which this trade shapes the cultural memory of occupation.

In Chapter 5, Maayan Amir details an event which has been almost entirely erased from the artistic memory of Israel, that is, the 'Israeli Artists for Security' Exhibition which was partly organized by the Ministry of Defense, and held immediately after the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 – the conflict which resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. Involving many of the leading artists in Israel at the time, this exhibition included significant numbers of works which embodied 'abstract representations of the landscapes' of the region, as Israeli artists began to re-imagine their country in the context of the start of the occupation. More importantly, Amir suggests that the nationalism – and the idea of artists creating 'art for security' – that first prompted so many to participate in this event no longer sits comfortably with a more critical artistic scene in the country. Amir's chapter also speaks directly to other chapters in

the volume (such as Noga Stiassny's contribution) which explore Israeli interpretations of 'occupied' landscapes.

The approach adopted by Chrisoula Lionis in Chapter 6 is quite different, for it traces how artists from diverse geographic backgrounds use 'humorous aesthetic strategies for documenting and re-assessing experiences of emergency, crisis and collective trauma that arise from the experience of foreign occupation'. Lionis addresses 'laughter's unique ability to communicate the lived experience of occupation' by exploring the works of artists in the Palestinian Diaspora, in post-Financial-Crisis Greece, and from Indigenous communities in Australia. Conceptually, Lionis's choice of case studies directly addresses the changing definitions of 'occupation' that are explored in this Introduction; at the same time, in her analysis of 'laughter as resistance', Lionis's take on visual responses to occupation underlines the power of humour as a tool of cultural resistance.

In Part Three of the book – 'Picturing Occupation' – contributors adopt methodologies that have typified a good deal of the recent research on Manchukuo, in emphasizing the creation of new iconographies and the deployment of modern media technologies in the process of occupation. This section thus highlights the importance of exploring not just the images that are created in response to occupation, but the specific media through which such images are deployed, with both chapters focusing on photography, photojournalism and pictorials. In each case, however, the contributors show how images can also be subverted for quite different purposes in the hands of 'collaborators' or, indeed, those who resisted occupation. Miriam Arani's close reading of media from Nazi-occupied Poland in Chapter 7, for example, shows not merely how Nazi pictorials in and about Poland reinforced established Nazi ideologies on race, but also how Nazi photography could be subverted by Poles for the purpose of resistance. Mire Koikari also paints a nuanced picture of cultural power relations in her analysis of the Cold War pictorial *The Okinawa Graphic* in Chapter 8. For Koikari, this publication mirrored earlier magazines that had been used by the Japanese empire to promote its own occupation of territories conquered in Asia and the Pacific in the 1930s and 1940s (including those discussed in other chapters of this book). At the same time, however, it evolved into a source of subtle criticism about American representations of Okinawa, even while it sought to recast Okinawa as a compliant (though strategically crucial) corner of the American Asia Pacific (at a time when US forces were deployed here as a means of deterring Chinese communist expansion).

In contrast, Part Four of the book focuses far more directly on the memory of past occupations – not unlike much of the research on Vichy today – as well as the ways in which such memories are visualized in landscapes and institutions. This is important because, as the theoretical literature on 'visual history' reminds us, memory studies as a field is now deeply intertwined with the development of 'visual history' methodologies.⁷⁵ In Chapter 9, Jean Hillier and Shulan Fu contrast the ways in which two quite different built environments within the Chinese city of Harbin – that is, the modernist architecture of the city's pre-war Russian community and the heritage landscape of the Japanese 'puppet state' of Manchukuo – have been interpreted in vastly different ways in a People's Republic of China where the memory of Japanese

occupation is a contentious topic in contemporary politics. While the 'state-sanctioned memory' of Japan's occupation of Manchukuo (now China's 'northeast') stresses the atrocities visited upon the Chinese during wartime, the ambiguities inherent in many of the city's streetscapes mean that 'historical memories are appropriated in order to shape antipathic occupation identities and narratives of conflict'.

In Chapter 10, Katarzyna Jarosz compares museums dedicated to the memory of Soviet 'occupation' in four countries: Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine. Despite the fact that all of these societies experienced some form of Soviet rule, the social memory of this experience is quite different in each case. Such museums of Soviet rule – such as the recently opened Vabamu Museum of Occupations and Freedom in Estonia⁷⁶ – are increasingly being focused on as sites for the study of Soviet occupation and its memory.⁷⁷ As Jarosz argues, it is not simply contemporary geopolitics (including recent disputes over sovereignty, and new cases of 'occupation', in the Caucasus) which shape how the Soviet past is presented in such institutions, but also the influence of other cases of historical trauma, which have provided templates for representations of occupation in the post-Soviet world.

This section (and the book) ends in precisely the same location in which the volume starts – Berlin. Noga Stiassny's reflective chapter on the transcultural and transhistorical relationship between imperial German, Nazi, Zionist and Israeli notions of landscape – those that were put into place during the Nazi occupation of places such as Poland (as Miriam Arani's chapter highlights) *and* during the longest occupation in the modern era, that is, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories – underlines the transcultural aims of the book as a whole. Stiassny examines the ways in which 'remembered' European landscapes, and particularly the forest, informed later (and current) representations of the Zionist landscape, as well as how such ideas continue to shape contemporary Israeli perceptions of what Stiassny refers to as 'Palestina', as it grapples with both the memory of trauma in Europe and the realities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today.

In a book of this nature, it is not possible to address all cases of 'occupation'. A conscious decision has also been made *not* to return to certain cases of occupation which have already inspired some of the significant sets of literature outlined above. In other words, just as this collection does not seek to provide a catch-all definition of the term 'occupation', it does not pretend to represent every case of occupation within its pages. While drawing on the methodological innovations developed in studies of Vichy France, for example, I have resisted the temptation to retrace such scholarship by including a 'Vichy chapter' herein. Similarly, the voluminous scholarship produced over the last decade in response to the American occupation of Iraq, while methodologically informing a number of this book's contributions, has not been reproduced in chapter form here. And even when well-researched 'occupations' have been addressed in this volume, an attempt has been made to shift the focus away from the centre of such scholarship. The occupation of the West Bank, for example, is explored in this book through the lens of Israeli artists who were mobilized in favour of it in 1967, and to Palestinian artists living with the consequences of that occupation in the Diaspora. The US-led occupation of Japan is de-centred in discussion of cinematic culture beyond Tokyo and print culture in a contested Okinawa.

What ultimately brings all these individual chapters together is a belief in the need to put the study of 'the visual' at the very heart of discussions about the study of occupation, and to move beyond the exceptionalism and particularities that have so often dominated scholarship on specific cases of occupation in the past. By placing very different 'visual histories of occupation' alongside one another, this book encourages the reader to make theoretical, methodological and conceptual comparisons and connections between what are, in many instances, seemingly incomparable cases of occupation. Indeed, in offering new perspectives on the 'visual history' of occupation from various parts of the world and across the modern era, it is hoped that this collection will provide a model for future transcultural dialogues on occupation and demonstrate how a focus on 'the visual' can help expand our understanding of the nature of occupation itself.

Notes

- 1 On this, see Nicholas Mirzoeff, 'Introduction: For Critical Visuality Studies', in *The Visual Culture Reader*, ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff (London: Routledge, 2013), xxix–xxxviii.
- 2 On this, see Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, 'The Study of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency', in *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, ed. Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (London: Routledge, 2012), 1–20.
- 3 On the influence of the US occupation of Iraq on debates about the study of the US occupation of Japan (and the Japanese occupation of various parts of Asia in the mid-twentieth century), see John W. Dower, 'The Other Japanese Occupation', *Japan Focus* 1, no. 6 (2003): 1–5; see also John Whittier Treat, 'Seoul and Nanking, Baghdad and Kabul: A Response to Timothy Brook and Michael Shin', *Journal of Asian Studies* 71, no. 1 (2012): 121–5.
- 4 There are, of course, exceptions. The excellent work of Cora Goldstein in comparing the control of visual media across different occupations from various periods is one. See, for example, Cora Sol Goldstein, 'A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Control: The German Military Occupation of France (1940–1942) and the American Military Occupation of Germany (1945–1949)', *The Journal of Military History* 80, no. 4 (2016): 1083–116.
- 5 On this debate, see W. J. T. Mitchell, 'Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture', *Journal of Visual Culture* 1, no. 2 (2002): 165–81; see also Deborah Cherry, 'Art History Visual Culture', *Art History* 27, no. 4 (September 2004): 479–93.
- 6 Gerhard Paul, 'Visual History (English version)', 2011: https://zeitgeschichte-digital.de/doks/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/792/file/docupedia_paul_visual_history_v1_en_2011.pdf (accessed 6 February 2020).
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Sumathi Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 2.
- 9 Horst Bredekamp, *Image Acts: A Systematic Approach to Visual Agency*, trans. Elizabeth Clegg (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 52.
- 10 Marlene J. Mayo, J. Thomas Rimer and H. Eleanor Kerkham, ed., *War, Occupation and Creativity* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001).

- 11 Dina Matar and Zahera Harb, ed., *Narrating Conflict in the Middle East: Discourse, Image and Communications Practices in Lebanon and Palestine* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).
- 12 Lisa Brock, Conor McGrady and Teresa Meade, 'Editors' Introduction', *Radical History Review* 106 (Winter 2010): 1–3.
- 13 Joanna Burke, 'Introduction', in *War and Art: A Visual History of Modern Conflict*, ed. Joanna Burke (London: Reaktion Books, 2017), 38.
- 14 Constantin Iordachi and Péter Apor, ed., *Occupation and Communism in Eastern European Museums: Revisualizing the Recent Past* (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming).
- 15 Laura Hein, 'Revisiting America's Occupation of Japan', *Cold War History* 11, no. 4 (2011): 579–99.
- 16 For an example, see Ethan Mark, *Japan's Occupation of Java in the Second World War: A Transnational History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018). For a guide to transnational history more generally, see Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History* (London: Palgrave, 2013).
- 17 Madeleine Herren, Martin Rüesch and Christiane Sibille, 'Introduction: What Is Transcultural History?', in *Transcultural History: Theories, Methods, Sources*, ed. Madeleine Herren, Martin Rüesch and Christiane Sibille (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), 1–10.
- 18 Timothy Nunan, 'The Violence Curtain: Occupied Afghan Turkestan and the Making of a Central Asian Borderscape', *Transcultural Studies* 1 (2017): 224–58.
- 19 Yoram Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 8–9.
- 20 For example, the Expert Meeting on Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory, hosted by the International Committee for the Red Cross in 2012, with findings published in the special issue of the *International Review of the Red Cross* 94, no. 885 (Spring 2012), entitled 'Occupation'.
- 21 See, for example, Aeyal Gross, *The Writing on the Wall: Rethinking the International Law of Occupation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
- 22 Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, 'Preoccupied with Occupation: Critical Examinations of the Historical Development of the Law of Occupation', *International Review of the Red Cross* 94, no. 885 (Spring 2012): 51–80.
- 23 Jürgen Zimmerer, 'The Birth of the Ostland Out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermination', *Patterns of Prejudice* 39, no. 2 (2005): 200; for a more recent example of scholarship on the Nazi occupation of eastern Europe through the lens of colonialism, see Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, *Hitler's Brudervolk: The Dutch and the Colonization of Occupied Eastern Europe, 1939–1945* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2015).
- 24 Peter M. R. Stirk, *A History of Military Occupation from 1792 to 1914* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 4–5.
- 25 For example, Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan. Palestine. Iraq* (Oxford: Wiley, 2004).
- 26 Salah D. Hassan, 'Never-ending Occupations', *The New Centennial Review* 8, no. 1 (2008): 1–17.
- 27 Peter M. R. Stirk, *The Politics of Military Occupation* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 45.
- 28 Michael Hechter, *Alien Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 27.

- 29 Sarah Kovner, *Occupying Power: Sex Workers and Servicemen in Postwar Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 5–6.
- 30 Amahl A. Bishara, *Back Stories: U.S. News Production and Palestinian Politics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 110. My thanks to Simon Faulkner for bringing this definition to my attention.
- 31 On the ‘occupation of the senses’, see Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, ‘The Occupation of the Senses: The Prosthetic and Aesthetic of State Terror’, *British Journal of Criminology* 57, no. 6 (2017): 1279–300; on the ‘occupation of the mind’, see Refqa Abu-Remaileh, ‘Narratives in Conflict: Emile Habibi’s *Al-Waqa’i al-Ghariba* and Elia Suleiman’s *Divine Intervention*’, in *Narrating Conflict in the Middle East: Discourse, Image and Communications Practices in Lebanon and Palestine*, ed. Dina Matar and Zahera Harb (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 85–109.
- 32 On ‘airborne occupation’ in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2012), esp. 237–58.
- 33 As Mitchell notes in ‘Image, Space, Revolution: The Arts of Occupation’, *Critical Inquiry* 39, no. 1 (Autumn 2012): 12. From 2011 onwards, suggests Mitchell, ‘the word *occupation* took on a new meaning: the reclaiming of public space by masses of disenfranchised people’. On the ‘Occupy Central’ movement in Hong Kong and its links to ‘a consciousness born of the anxieties provoked by the prospect of unification [between what was then colonial Hong Kong and the PRC] in the 1980s and 1990s’, see Arif Dirlik, ‘The Mouse That Roared: The Democratic Movement in Hong Kong’, *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* 2, no. 2 (2016): 665–81.
- 34 Jacques Rancière, ‘Occupation’, *Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon*: <https://www.politicalconcepts.org/occupation-jacques-ranciere> (accessed 10 February 2020).
- 35 The act of labelling particular periods in history, or specific power structures, ‘occupations’ is itself something that a number of chapters in this book directly address.
- 36 <http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=cjgr20> (accessed 10 February 2020). See also Alexander L. Hilton, ‘Critical Genocide Studies’, in *Genocide Matters: Ongoing Issues and Emerging Perspectives*, ed. Joyce Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja (London: Routledge, 2013), 42–58.
- 37 Christine de Matos and Rowena Ward, ed., *Gender, Power and Military Occupations: Asia Pacific and the Middle East since 1945* (London: Routledge, 2012).
- 38 http://app.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/infolib/meta_pub/G0000021MAN (accessed 8 February 2020).
- 39 Kate Kondayen, ‘Testament to Manchukuo’, *Harvard Gazette*, 23 September 2015: <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2015/09/testament-to-manchukuo-2/> (accessed 8 February 2020).
- 40 Annika Culver, *Glorify the Empire: Japanese Avant-Garde Propaganda in Manchukuo* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014).
- 41 Kari Shepherdson-Scott, ‘A Legacy of Persuasion: Japanese Photography and the Artful Politics of Remembering Manchuria’, *Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts* 27 (2015): 124–47.
- 42 In contrast to fields such as literature, in which Chinese resistance to Japanese imperialism in Manchukuo has been well documented in major monographs such as Norman Smith, *Resisting Manchukuo: Chinese Women Writers and the Japanese Occupation* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).

- 43 A fact that some scholars of Vichy have been happy to draw attention to. See, for instance, the review essay by Brett Bowles entitled 'Illuminating the Dark Years: French Wartime Newsreels on DVD', *Historical Journal of Film, Radio, and Television* 27, no. 1 (2007): 119–25.
- 44 Despite the claim by Frederic Spotts in *The Shameful Peace: How French Artists and Intellectuals Survived the Nazi Occupation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 2, that 'there is no single book offering some idea of what daily life [under German occupation] was like ... across the range of arts and letters'.
- 45 Stéphanie Corcy, *La vie culturelle sous l'Occupation* (Paris: Editions Perrin, 2005); Laurence Bertrand Dorléac, *Art of the Defeat, France 1940–1944*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Los Angeles, CA: Getty Research Institute, 2008); Agnès Callu, Patrick Eveno and Hervé Joly, ed., *Culture et médias sous l'Occupation: Des entreprises dans la France de Vichy* (Paris: Éditions de CTHS, 2009).
- 46 Thomas Fontaine and Denis Peschanski, *La Collaboration: Vichy, Paris, Berlin, 1940–1945* (Paris: Éditions Tallandier, 2014).
- 47 To reference Bredekamp, *Image Acts*.
- 48 Aurelien Breeden, "'We Are Amplifying the Work": France Starts Task Force on Art Looted under Nazis', *New York Times*, 15 April 2019: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/arts/design/france-art-looted.html> (accessed 8 February 2020).
- 49 Claire Gorrara, *Women's Representations of the Occupation in Post-'68 France* (London: Macmillan Press, 1998).
- 50 Hanna Diamond, *Women and the Second World War in France, 1939–1948: Choices and Constraints* (London: Routledge, 1999).
- 51 A. W. Moore, 'History, Memory and Trauma in Photography of the Tondues: Visuality of the Vichy Past through the Silent Image of Women', *Gender & History* 17, no. 3 (2005): 657–81.
- 52 Henry Rouso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 10.
- 53 For a recent example, see Margaret Attack and Christopher Lloyd, ed., *Framing Narratives of the Second World War and Occupation in France, 1939–2009: New Readings* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).
- 54 John W. Dower, 'Occupied Japan as History and Occupation History as Politics', *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 2 (February 1975): 485–504; Dower's monograph *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999) is often listed as one of the seminal works in the field.
- 55 See, for example, Mire Koikari, *Pedagogy of Democracy: Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2009).
- 56 Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer, 'The Good Occupation', Discussion Paper No. 514, Harvard Law School, May 2005.
- 57 Mire Koikari, *Cold War Encounters in US-occupied Okinawa: Women, Militarized Domesticity and Transnationalism in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
- 58 Kovner, *Occupying Power*, 3.
- 59 Isolde Standish, *A New History of Japanese Cinema* (New York: Continuum, 2006); Julia Adeney Thomas, 'Power Made Visible: Photography and Postwar Japan's Elusive Reality', *Journal of Asian Studies* 67, no. 2 (May 2008): 365–94; Samuel L. Leiter, ed., *Rising from the Flames: The Rebirth of Theater in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).

- 60 I am thinking here of Dower's work through MIT's 'Visualizing Cultures' Project, the mission of which 'is to use new technology and hitherto inaccessible visual materials to reconstruct the past as people of the time visualized the world (or imagined it to be)'. See <https://visualizingcultures.mit.edu/home/index.html> (accessed 8 February 2020).
- 61 For example, the *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies* (now the *Journal of Contemporary Iraq & the Arab World*), which commenced publication in 2007 through Intellect Books.
- 62 Nicholas Mirzoeff, *Watching Babylon: The War in Iraq and Global Visual Culture* (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 12.
- 63 See, for example, the special issue of the *Journal of Visual Culture* 5, no. 1 (2006), edited by Suhail Malik, which included various articles directly addressing these images and their wider cultural and political significance.
- 64 Nicholas Mirzoeff, 'Invisible Empire: Visual Culture, Embodied Spectacle, and Abu Ghraib', *Radical History Review* 95 (Spring 2006): 21–44.
- 65 Florian Göttke, *Toppled* (Rotterdam: Post Editions, 2010).
- 66 See, for example, Nada Shabout, 'The "Free" Art of Occupation: Images for a "New" Iraq', *Arab Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 3–4 (2006): 41–53; and Nada Shabout, 'Bifurcations of Iraq's Visual Culture', in *We Are All Iraqis: Aesthetics and Politics in a Time of War*, ed. Nadje al-Ali and Deborah Al-Najjar (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2012), 3–25.
- 67 <https://artiraq.org/maia/about> (accessed 6 February 2020).
- 68 On this, see Nada Shabout, 'Historiographic Invisibilities: The Case of Contemporary Iraqi Art', *International Journal of the Humanities* 3, no. 9 (2005): 53–63.
- 69 For some representative collections and monographs (not hitherto cited in this Introduction), see Rebecca L. Stein and Ted Swedenburg, ed., *Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); William Parry, *Against the Wall: The Art of Resistance in Palestine* (London: Pluto Press, 2010); Ariella Azoulay, *From Palestine to Israel: A Photographic Record of Destruction and State Formation* (London: Pluto Press, 2011).
- 70 Gil Pasternak, 'Introduction: Encounters at the Cultural Boundaries of Conflict', in *Visioning Israel-Palestine: Encounters at the Cultural Boundaries of Conflict*, ed. Gil Pasternak (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 3.
- 71 Gil Z. Hochberg, *Visual Occupations: Violence and Visibility in a Conflict Zone* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 3.
- 72 Max Kramer, 'Mobilizing Conflict Testimony: A Lens of Mobility for the Study of Documentary Practices in the Kashmir Conflict', *Social Sciences* 6, no. 3 (2017): 1–21; Jeremy E. Taylor, 'The "Occupied Lens" in Wartime China: Portrait Photography in the Service of Chinese "Collaboration", 1939–1945', *History of Photography* 43, no. 3 (2019): 284–307.
- 73 An outstanding example being Susan L. Carruthers, 'Why Can't We See Insurgents? Enmity, Invisibility, and Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan', *Photography and Culture* 8, no. 2 (2015): 191–211.
- 74 Andrea Brady, 'Drone Poetics', *New Formations* 89/90 (Winter 2016): 116–36.
- 75 Paul, 'Visual History (English version)'.
 76 <https://www.vabamu.ee> (accessed 6 February 2020).
- 77 Iordachi and Apor, *Occupation and Communism in Eastern European Museums*.

Part One

'Ways of Seeing' under Occupation

The 'visual occupation regime' in post-war East Germany, 1945–61

Alexey Tikhomirov

Introduction

The Third Reich's unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945 led to the creation of four occupation zones on German territory. The Allies – the Soviet Union, the United States, the UK and France – aimed to re-educate their former enemy. Establishing respective monopolies on public space, the media and channels of communication was essential to the victors' efforts to demilitarize, denazify and democratize the Germans. To achieve these goals, all five senses were important, as the occupying powers strove to remake public and private spaces. However, sight (and hence visibility) was a crucial sense in each occupation regime's endeavour to realize power by controlling bodies, managing emotions and transmitting ideology into the 'hearts and minds' of the population. In the Americanization that went on in the western occupation zones and the Sovietization introduced in the eastern zone, 'visual occupation regimes' were created to re-programme ways of seeing and introduce new practices of observation grounded in two antagonistic systems: those of the United States and the Soviet Union. These regimes aimed to create a visual 'frontline' of the Cold War and distinguish the capitalist world from the socialist world¹ (Figure 1.1). The result was the establishment of what we might call 'visual occupation regimes', with their own images and aesthetics, rules governing observation and recognition, and practices of seeing and interpreting the world. In short, a visual occupation regime constitutes a web of meanings that has the power to create solidarities, form subjectivities and provide stability for political orders.

Recent attention to historically determined practices of seeing and observing is rooted in the 'visual turn' and 'sensory turn' in the Humanities.² Analysis of visibility is driven by the dominant place of sight in the hierarchy of the senses, which itself is biologically conditioned but also has its own history.³ Since the Renaissance, the common belief that what is visible constitutes authentic facts – or *truths*, and genuine testimony in legal disputes – and the Reformation's increasingly politicized practices of allowed and taboo seeing suggest an intimate connection between visibility and both the realization of power and the (de)legitimization of political orders. This visibility–power nexus is especially evident in the state- and nation-building efforts

of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and is an essential part of the 'visual histories of occupation.'⁴ Despite this, the visual dimension of conducting, justifying and living under occupation rule remains largely absent from a good deal of historical scholarship.⁵

By examining the organization, surveillance and perceptions of communist visuality in public spaces in this chapter, I will analyse visuality's role in proclaiming, legitimating and negotiating the occupation in the Soviet zone in Germany. I will do this by drawing on archival sources, including reports found in files from the Social Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – SED) and the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD), and sources from the Eastern Bureau of the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei – SPD), as well as observations recorded in memoirs and other published accounts.⁶ Moscow's reprogramming of East German seeing practices was designed to Sovietize space, time and, above all, subjects themselves. Initially, the positive images of the Soviet Union promulgated by the 'occupiers' were important because erasing all pre-war negative attitudes towards the Soviet Union from German minds was a crucial task for the SMAD. Before 1945, what most Germans knew about the Soviets came from Nazi propaganda, which warned of the 'Judeo-Bolshevik threat' and the dangers of pan-Slavism to Western civilization⁷ (Figure 1.2). This knowledge had to be banished and replaced with representations of a harmonious socialist world in which concepts of racial inequality were irrelevant. Using visuality to bring East Germans into the post-war Soviet empire was another key component of the Soviet occupation project. The emergence of a common space of visuality made it possible to centralize, homogenize and synchronize the Eastern bloc. This allowed East Germans to join the bloc of socialist states, to announce the creation of an 'antifascist, democratic state' and to share the global Soviet mission of 'preserving peace throughout the world', especially as the Cold War intensified in the spring of 1946.

In particular, post-war visuality created a space of subjectivization within which ordinary East Germans had to learn not only how to 'speak Bolshevik' but also how to see, recognize and observe the world like Soviets.⁸ East Germans were objects of observation: Soviet surveillance institutions monitored them, noting their ability to see and interpret Sovietized reality in the approved fashion. However, East Germans were also active observers, seeing socialist reality and learning to react 'correctly' to Soviet films, exhibitions, posters and what they saw on trips to the Soviet Union (Figure 1.3). In this way, ordinary people mastered a 'space of agency' and became producers of the Soviet symbolic order. Children and adults remade themselves into Sovietized subjects by generating their own meanings for life in the Soviet zone of occupation. As Jonathan Crary, Galina Orlova and Aleksei Golubev have shown, an observer-position with a precisely focused way of seeing reality is a historical construct for realizing power over the subject. It is also a means of forming subjectivities by visually determining the ideological prism through which the world is interpreted, and the borders separating the visible and the hidden are strictly defined.⁹

I understand the 'visual occupation regime' to be the strategies and tactics deployed by the SMAD and the SED for visualizing the political in public space, with the cooperation of a set of state and party institutions, mass organizations and individual



Figure 1.2 Nazi poster stating 'Victory or Bolshevism', urging German citizens to persevere after the call for a 'total war', February 1943. Bildarchiv im Bundesarchiv, Signature: Plak 003-029-043. (See Plate 5.)



Figure 1.3 Visitors at an exhibition on the Soviet Union's achievements in developing socialism, held at a Berlin publishing house during German-Soviet friendship month, 14 December 1950. Photographer: T. Rudolph. Bildarchiv im Bundesarchiv, Signature: Bild 183-08934-0004.

intermediaries. However, a visual occupation regime could also be described as the underlying capacity to generate visual power itself and to produce new meanings of the Soviet occupation for the defeated nation. This system of public symbols and iconography transmitted ideological content to the population via images, involved them in party-state rituals and mobilized them emotionally during propaganda campaigns. The stability of the visual order was ensured by the occupation authorities' ability to endorse certain practices of seeing and observing. For this reason, the visual occupation regime embodied a disciplinary system whose regeneration was ensured by both official encouragement of the correct way of seeing and the simultaneously making taboo of undesirable ways of looking at Sovietized reality, that is, introducing 'symbolic blindness' to disturbing topics, experiences and memories. As I will show, the ways in which the visual occupation regime was administered reveal official efforts to reconfigure the Nazi past, explain the difficulties of the present and provide an orientation towards a 'bright future'.

Before the defeat: Visuality and the agony of the 'national community'

During the final months of the Second World War, the visuality of the Third Reich underwent a dynamic reconfiguration. The mass concealment, destruction and

burning of Nazi symbols showed that many ordinary Germans actively participated in delegitimizing the Third Reich. Purging public space was also a spontaneous, prophylactic measure intended to forestall violence from the Allied armies. Just before the surrender, the Nazi visual order became a security threat. To avoid the rage of the 'liberators', portraits of the Führer were covered up with neutral landscapes or pictures of flowers.¹⁰ Everywhere, copies of *Mein Kampf*, portraits of Hitler or photographs of relatives in military uniform were hidden in attics or basements.¹¹ In general, hiding artefacts which indicated that one once belonged to the 'national community' was widespread. Like many other people, for example, one former judge burnt his copy of *Mein Kampf* and his party card in the kitchen rather than on the street in front of his house because he was afraid people would see him, and because he did not want to retain evidence of Nazi Party membership.¹² Former soldiers put on civilian clothes, and hid, buried or burnt their uniforms to get rid of signs of active support for the Third Reich. These acts of spontaneous behaviour indicated the growing loss of visual legitimacy for the Nazi regime.

Insofar as modern dictatorships of the twentieth century were primarily regimes of visual power, decreasing the Third Reich's visibility in public and private spaces signified the weakening of its dominance.¹³ Likewise, the strengths (or weaknesses) of political orders matched the intensity with which they saturated public arenas with the visual artefacts of power. Under the Soviet occupation regime, visibility played an especially important role in proclaiming, justifying and challenging the legitimacy of Soviet supremacy because the 'occupiers' and the 'occupied' spoke different languages, came from different cultures and saw each other as sworn enemies. As a result, in practical terms, visibility became the only common mode of communication. Therefore, visibility was central to acceptance of the occupation, but also to expressing opposition, resolving conflicts and mitigating feelings of rage and vengefulness.

For Soviet soldiers, the sight of Nazi artefacts justified violence towards individuals and local communities. They interpreted Nazi insignia – on flags, badges, official documents, posters and party cards – that they saw when they raided German homes as proof that people were Nazis.¹⁴ The owners of these materials were categorized as Hitler's accomplices; they were considered 'enemy elements' who could be imprisoned in special NKVD-MVD camps or sent to the Soviet Union for compulsory labour.¹⁵ Visual artefacts of the Third Reich often incited vandalism and looting during which Red Army soldiers destroyed homes, smashed up furniture and stole possessions.¹⁶ Finally, these highly charged objects provoked violence, often against women, as a means of taking vengeance on the enemy.¹⁷ According to numerous memoirs, women crying for help, children shouting, the sight of fire and blood, and the smell of burning and decomposing bodies were the main features of the sensory experience during the war's final months.

Despite the obvious inevitability of defeat, violations of the Third Reich's prevailing visual order were still harshly penalized. Nazi terrorist organizations fought to restore the Third Reich's public symbolism. Distinguished by ideological fanaticism and personal loyalty to Hitler, these groups saw themselves as the last stronghold of the 'national community'. They defended Nazi visibility as a matter of national honour and were ready to ruthlessly punish fellow citizens for harbouring defeatist sentiments.

Members of the underground Werwolf organization demanded that people take down white flags and restore Nazi posters to previously visible positions, threatening to shoot people on the spot for non-compliance.¹⁸ In one such case, a homeowner who had written on his door 'We are not Nazis! We welcome the liberators!' was captured by members of the Volkssturm (Nazi militia) and hanged from a tree.¹⁹ This example demonstrates how individuals who refused to demonstrate loyalty to the 'national community' risked severe punishment from the military police or SS detachments. The bodies of such people who had been hanged were left in public places, with placards around their necks bearing derogatory inscriptions which described them as 'deserters', 'traitors' or 'saboteurs' because they had refused to join the Volkssturm.²⁰

The Red Army's offensive and Germany's capitulation on 8 May 1945 led to the practice of putting up white and red flags on buildings, signifying that the inhabitants were reconciled to defeat and recognized the Soviet Union as the victor.²¹ 'White flags wherever you looked. They were hung from apartment windows in cities and villages, in factories and administrative buildings. Over many days, weeks even, they defined the picture in Germany in the spring of 1945,' wrote Stefan Dörnberg (later to become a historian and politician in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)) in his memoirs.²² White became a marker of loyalty. People thought buildings with white flags would not be set on fire and people wearing white armbands would not be shot.²³ Refugees from East Prussia draped red and white flags over their carts as they made their way to the 'homeland', so that they would not anger divisions of Allied soldiers.²⁴ Refugees themselves used white armbands to ensure their own safety.²⁵ In settlements taken by the Red Army, men held out white handkerchiefs as they went to the Soviets to surrender in the hope that they could remain with their families.²⁶ At the same time, this palette of colours helped orient the local population and displaced people. Houses displaying red flags were considered dangerous since people assumed that Red Army soldiers or the Soviet military administration must be quartered there. Many people gave these buildings a wide berth. On the other hand, refugees saw houses without flags as safe places to rest, seek help or spend the night.²⁷

After the victory: Visual (dis)order after the end of the war

After the capture of Berlin, Red Army soldiers wrote letters home describing themselves as 'winners' who were now in the 'den of the fascist predator'.²⁸ They celebrated Europe's liberation from Nazism in public spaces and made it clear that they were 'masters of the situation'.²⁹ The first Soviet posters on the streets proclaimed that the 'court of history' had been convened. They provided visual justification for the acts of violence that the soldiers of the liberating forces were perpetrating on civilians. This violence was the outcome of wartime propaganda inciting Soviet citizens to hate the Germans. This propaganda also told soldiers that they had a 'moral duty' to avenge the suffering of their families and the destruction of their motherland, reminding them of the well-known Russian saying that 'whoever comes to us with a sword will perish by this sword'³⁰ (Figure 1.4).



Figure 1.4 Red Army soldiers celebrating victory, early May 1945. Bildarchiv im Bundesarchiv, Signature: Bild 183-E0406-0022-018.

Immediately after the end of war, the Allies began to purge public space in Germany of the symbols of the Third Reich and to publicly shame Germans for Nazi crimes³¹ (Figure 1.5). In the summer of 1945, shops, schools, administrative buildings and streets throughout all the occupation zones were cleansed of 'fascist signs'.³² The new authorities confiscated and destroyed portraits of Nazi leaders, as well as pictures featuring swastikas, the 'party's eagle' and soldiers in uniform.³³ Maps of the Third Reich and books with Nazi content were seized from libraries.³⁴ Cinemas could no longer rent Nazi propaganda films.³⁵ There was even a proposal to gather a complete collection of Nazi literature and seal this in locked storage spaces. A directive issued by the Allied Control Council on 13 May 1946 ordered the removal of former monuments and emblems as a first step towards this end.³⁶

During the first month following the surrender of the Third Reich, a new visual hierarchy of the victors and the defeated was established. Posters featuring images of Soviet leaders, and others bearing 'Comrade Josef Stalin's Statement about Germany and the German People' were put up across the zone³⁷ (Figure 1.6). These acquainted the population with a new image of Stalin as the victor on whose will the future of the German people would henceforth depend. Significant efforts were made to popularize the outcomes of the Potsdam Conference. For example, more than 1 million copies of propaganda material were printed in Saxony alone. This included 513,000 copies of excerpts from the Berlin Conference resolutions; 10,000 copies of a poster with the complete text; and 500,000 copies of Stalin's pronouncements about 'the Germans and



Figure 1.5 Banner in the US sector in Berlin (Neukölln), which reads ‘That was the reorganization of Europe. 4.5 million antifascists were brutally murdered in Auschwitz alone! That is why Nazism should be eliminated, root and branch,’ summer 1945. Photographer: Kurt Ochlich. Bildarchiv im Bundesarchiv, Signature: Bild 183-2005-0901-517.

Germany.³⁸ In Thuringia alone, the SMAD printed 320,000 posters with extracts from the Potsdam resolutions.³⁹

The initial strategy of occupying the public sphere with the visual signs of victory meant that every available empty space – on streets and bridges, in parks, houses and administrative buildings – was used. From the summer of 1945 onwards, propaganda artefacts were exhibited in shop windows to give the population a positive image of the Soviet authorities and present information about the ‘actual political situation’. The newspaper *Tägliche Rundschau*, as well as posters and portraits of socialist leaders, began to be displayed in cities, towns and villages across the Soviet zone.⁴⁰ These propaganda artefacts were usually put up by representatives of different political parties to get their visual ‘party line’ into public space. To avoid competition between the SPD and the Liberal Democrats (Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands – LDP), the SMAD rapidly organized communist visual agitation, demanding that local government organs seize the public domain by putting visual representations of the occupying power wherever possible. Sometimes this visual onslaught provoked fights between SED members and people belonging to other parties. One such incident took place on 6 September 1946 in the Weimar district when SED members who had been sent to put up posters ran into a group from the LDP who were on the same mission (and who were pasting their posters on top of communist propaganda).⁴¹



Figure 1.6 A poster with Stalin's declaration of 23 February 1942 on the streets of Berlin in the summer of 1945: 'The experience of history says that the Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state remains.' Bildarchiv im Bundesarchiv, Signature: Bild 183-R89842.

The population's iconoclastic reactions – damaging the occupying power's official iconography in public places – were a means of expressing criticism and erecting symbolic barriers to the transfer of Soviet ideology to East Germany. For example, in August 1945, six posters with excerpts from the Potsdam Conference resolutions to which anti-Soviet slogans had been added were sent to the SMAD administration in

Brandenburg. Written in ink, in German, the following messages appeared on these posters:

1. He who lied once will no longer be believed.
2. It is all rubbish.
3. You know how to talk.
4. I will teach you culture (Stalin).
5. Why do they steal?
6. What kind of a woman do they take without asking?⁴²

On two propaganda kiosks with posters about 'Marshal Stalin on the Germans and Germany', the word 'Stalin' was crossed out and 'Hitler' written in its place. On a poster with the message 'The Hitlers come and go but the German people, the German state remains,' someone wrote 'If this continues for a few more years, nothing will remain of the German people.'⁴³ Fear of the Red Army reinvigorated memories formed by Nazi propaganda about the Soviet Union as a 'dangerous and wild, culturally backward and Asiatic country' that threatened Germany with pan-Slavism, world proletarian revolution and the worldwide 'Jewish conspiracy'.

Along with iconoclastic acts, frightening rumours were also spread. These concerned secret agreements that the Allies had supposedly made during the Potsdam Conference: a German army could not be created for the next seventy-five years; the consumption of alcohol would be banned and marriages would not be allowed to take place for two years; the country would be occupied for twenty years and prisoners of war would not be released for thirty-five years.⁴⁴ As a result, during the Nuremberg trials, angry comments such as 'Better death than slavery', 'Russia is the paradise of murderers, thieves, and criminals' and 'Stalin and Molotov should go to Nuremberg, they are the main criminals, scum, and abusers of girls'⁴⁵ were scrawled on buildings in Brandenburg Province.

Strong anti-Polish sentiment was also expressed when the new German border along the Oder-Neisse line was created. Shortly after the 'New Poland' exhibit opened at the Leipzig Trade Fair in 1947, for example, the organizers had to remove the visitors' book because it had become a 'collection of chauvinistic expressions vilifying Poland and celebrating the Germans' "civilizing mission" in a Slavic country. In one entry, Silesia was called a 'German province and German blood'; the writer saw the territorial transfer of land to the Poles as the destruction of the 'German order' and 'polluting a pure territory'.⁴⁶

For the visual occupation regime, red became the key colour. People with 'powerful' red armbands, be they soldiers or civilians, were recognized in public spaces as representatives of the new authority.⁴⁷ Memoirs describe how public spaces were filled with different shades of red during the Red Army's advance. In cities and villages, posters and banners whose preponderant colour was red were put up with increasing frequency.⁴⁸ In the popular perception, red was associated with distrust and suspicion of the occupying forces in the first post-war years. After peace was concluded, red posters summoned German men to register at the Soviet military commandant's office; in most cases these men were usually deported to the Soviet

Union for forced labour.⁴⁹ As a result, red was connected with the destruction of the family and the home, the death of close relatives and experiences of violence. In a sermon given by a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, red was identified with the apocalypse: the red flag was called the 'scarlet cloth which causes unhappiness and discord for humankind', and the SMAD regime was likened to a Satan appearing 'on earth like a large, fiery red dragon'.⁵⁰ Fear of being sent to the Soviet Union was so closely associated with the colour that when Red Army patrols wearing red armbands on their sleeves appeared at a restaurant in the town of Gotha, customers panicked and fled immediately.⁵¹

Brown – the colour of the Third Reich – was contrasted with red, the marker of the Soviet order, and in the post-war years came to signify resistance to the occupiers. Writing with a brown pencil on a toilet stall, an anonymous commenter declared that 'if Ivan tramples [us], we will be brown again'.⁵² On the one hand, iconoclastic gestures in public, even in intimate places, were automatically addressed to representatives of the occupying powers. On the other hand, they addressed German society, calling for solidarity and national unity in the struggle against the Soviet 'occupiers'. Thus, anti-Soviet leaflets pointing out the similarity between the Nazi and Bolshevik regimes, signed by a group called 'the Brown Shirts', were pasted on lampposts on Karl Marx Square in Leipzig.⁵³ On an official appeal of the anti-fascist bloc, someone scribbled the word 'hunger' in red ink. Across the Soviet zone, Stalin was called the 'red dictator of starvation'.⁵⁴ Sometimes swastikas were painted on roads and sidewalks with red or brown paint.⁵⁵ People made frequent insulting references to communists as 'red dogs' or 'red swine', and on looking at a Soviet flag someone asked, 'Why are they hanging up this red rag near the city administration?'⁵⁶

Affirming the visual occupation regime: Institutions, media and actors

The policy of Sovietizing public space began when the Soviet red flag was planted on the Reichstag in Berlin. But the visual occupation regime developed in the context of a broader standardization of the channels and spaces of communication. The SMAD Propaganda Department was the key agency: it oversaw the editorial board of the newspaper *Tägliche Rundschau*, as well as radio stations and the House of German-Soviet Friendship in Berlin. It was also responsible for censoring radio programmes, magazine and newspaper articles, theatre productions and films. According to one report sent to Moscow, as of December 1946 the Propaganda Department controlled thirty-seven newspapers, five radio stations and fifty-two magazines.⁵⁷ From the autumn of 1948, the SMAD moved towards an explicit policy of banning periodical publications produced in the West or those published without a Soviet licence.⁵⁸ Efforts to remove alternative information altogether led to a purge of places where various kinds of information sources were available, including bookstores, kiosks, hairdressers' salons and public libraries; putting kiosks, buffets and restaurants at train stations under observation; and creating groups of police to observe post offices, railway stations and areas where vehicles traversed the occupied zones.

The visual occupation regime did not end with the formation of the GDR on 7 October 1949. The GDR's political elite began to influence the redesign of public space. The SED worked – with the SMAD and through its own party-state institutions and mass organizations, as well as schools, universities and study circles – to Sovietize the new country. It prioritized the redesign of public space, initially focusing on removing every symbol with militaristic, fascist or 'anti-democratic' content. In a 17 January 1950 decree, the Politburo of the SED recommended that the Ministry of Internal Affairs carry out a second inspection of place names, memorials and national *lieux de mémoire*.⁵⁹ The leaders of imperial Germany were included in the list of cult figures who became taboo after the war because their names had been integrated into narratives that had legitimized the Third Reich. As a result, representatives of the Soviet military administration removed posters with portraits of Frederick the Great and Bismarck from the Tauber printing house's 'Paper and Time' exhibit at the Leipzig Trade Fair.⁶⁰ To construct the East Germans' new political topography, in April and May 1951 alone, some 159 street signs with 'Prussian' street names were removed in East Berlin.⁶¹ These streets were renamed in honour of the leaders of socialist and communist movements.⁶² Monuments celebrating monarchs, important imperial figures or imperial events were blown up, dismantled or replaced with memorials to fallen Soviet soldiers in an attempt to bring Moscow's cult of the Second World War to the GDR.⁶³

Homogenization and centralization of the visual occupation regime took place in conjunction with preparations to celebrate Stalin's seventieth birthday. In October and November 1949, the GDR, like other socialist countries, asked Moscow for informational materials and visual artefacts devoted to Stalin's life and deeds. To satisfy this demand, Soviet information organs developed a plan for sending out materials that had been approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU).⁶⁴ Each photograph sent abroad received its own 'passport' on which an editor stamped the time period for which its visa was valid (i.e. how long the original image could be reproduced in an Eastern bloc country). Thus, photographs connected with the life and deeds of Lenin and Stalin, photographs illustrating historic and revolutionary themes, and photographs of party congresses were certified for one year in 1952.⁶⁵ Soviet censors also monitored the incorrect placement of images of Lenin and Stalin in foreign publications, which was seen as a reflection of 'political carelessness, [and] lack of principles'.⁶⁶

Although Moscow held the reins, the Germans came up with many initiatives for designing the occupation regime's visual space. In August 1949, the SED Politburo made an official request for texts, pictures and busts of Stalin from the Soviet Union.⁶⁷ Exhibitions such as 'On the Life and Deeds of Comrade Stalin', which narrated the 'leader's' biography and the advantages of the Soviet model of development, were in high demand.⁶⁸ The CC CPSU and the Foreign Affairs Ministry agreed on every list of materials to be sent out.⁶⁹ These materials would be used as templates for subsequent replication in East Germany.⁷⁰ Soviet cultural production had to be sent to the GDR at an accelerated pace because there was little normative knowledge about Stalin, who was known to the Germans primarily in Nazi terms as the enemy. For this reason, Moscow continued to control all visual production involving Stalin, even after the materials

arrived in Berlin, by means of a special representative of the All-Soviet Society for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries (VOKS).⁷¹

Just before the Soviet leader's birthday on 21 December 1949, and in response to urgent requests from the Society for German-Soviet Friendship, VOKS hastened to send articles, collections of photographs, portraits, posters, sheet music and recordings of songs about Stalin.⁷² In accordance with a resolution of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship, 5,000 copies of the 'Stalin Exhibition' (which took the form of twelve enormous illustrated sheets) and 10,000 copies of Stalin's portrait were printed (Figure 1.7). All the Houses of German-Soviet Friendship, clubs and enterprises were told to have busts of Stalin ready.⁷³ Visual materials were set up at the back of the stage at ceremonial meetings in which speeches about Stalin's biography were featured and at showings of Soviet films.⁷⁴ Graphic materials were also important in designing 'red corners' in which the Soviet leader's life story as well as the Soviet Union's accomplishments in industry, science and technology were visualized. At the House of German-Soviet Friendship in Berlin, an exhibit of reproductions from the Tretyakov Gallery was designed. The handover of these pictures was staged as a solemn act, presenting Soviet visual production to the German people in the presence of Soviet and GDR bosses.⁷⁵

With the escalation of the Cold War, Moscow ordered the SMAD to step up political propaganda in East Germany.⁷⁶ Although numerous reports noted the 'absence of



Figure 1.7 Exhibition about Stalin at a conference of state delegates held in the House of Workers in Halle, early December 1949. Photographer: Günther Paalzwow. Bildarchiv im Bundesarchiv, Signature: Bild 183-2004-0603-500.

systematic, centralized control over visual agitation' during the early period of the Soviet occupation,⁷⁷ the policy of intensified Sovietization in the late 1940s fundamentally changed the situation. From February 1947 onwards, political posters for visual agitation could be printed only if the SMAD issued a special licence.⁷⁸ For the thirtieth anniversary of the October Revolution in 1947, the SMAD adopted a resolution demanding meticulous oversight of all noticeboards and political information kiosks since they were often not used for the intended purposes, instead becoming places to disseminate anti-Soviet comments and leaflets.⁷⁹ Centres for political information were created in 1950. These were the 'Portrait of the Street' information kiosks with the latest newspapers, which were located on the main streets and squares of cities throughout the GDR. Well-organized centres of political information now replaced posters chaotically hung on the walls of buildings, fences and bridges. The GDR's Information Service was in charge of designing and monitoring these information points. Visual agitation was especially important in areas on the border with West Germany, as well as along expressways and major highways. In these regions, official iconography visualized the border between the two opposing systems on the Cold War's ideological frontline.

The establishment of a planned socialist economy, including a centrally organized system to produce and sell propaganda artefacts (usually in response to orders from the Party), intensified the saturation of public spaces with the symbols of power. A catalogue of objects with political symbolism was published in 1949. This offered consumers an assortment of busts, bas reliefs, posters, portraits, postcards and badges with images of the 'leaders of the workers' movement'.⁸⁰ As a rule, these objects were produced on East German soil, using Soviet models, and then distributed with monitoring from above to mass organizations, party organs, the army, schools and universities. Attempts to organize retail sales of propaganda products were unsuccessful, however, because consumer demand for such items was virtually non-existent. Thus, the owner of a small store in Leipzig selling various kinds of pictures admitted that hardly anyone was interested in portraits of Stalin, Lenin, Marx or Wilhelm Pieck (the first president of the GDR). The employees of the SMAD, however, were some of the most enthusiastic buyers of 'pictures that were artistically kitschy'.⁸¹

The emergence of the visual occupation regime was stimulated by the affect management of Sovietized German subjectivity by introducing the language and practices of shame about Nazi crimes as well as pride in belonging to the 'camp of history's victors'. These emotions from the official register of feelings were seen as symbolic resources for negotiating 'friendship' with the Soviets. Emotional rhetoric allowed the East Germans using it to become active observers and producers of Soviet discourse, avoiding the position of being passive spectators while showing their political conversion from 'enemies' to 'friends' of the Soviet Union. For example, after visiting the Museum of the Defence of Leningrad with an East German delegation, Otto Grotewohl (the first prime minister of the GDR) expressed repentance on everyone's behalf, writing in the visitors' book: 'We leave here in shock, here we have seen how Germany's name was covered in shame and dishonour'.⁸² Even more noteworthy was the way other members of the delegation described their impressions of moving from shame to pride: 'Going through the museum, we experienced not only burning shame

for the deeds of our compatriots who tormented this eternal city, but also measureless pride in the Soviet people who held high the light of reason and justice in the midst of darkness and grief.⁸³

Deploying these symbolic resources also involved making public representations of 'shaming acts'. For example, one TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) photograph of 23 September 1955 visualized the staging of a public display of remorse in the presence of Soviet leaders. It showed the GDR's highest party-state authorities – Ulbricht, Grotewohl, Otto Nuschke and Lothar Bolz – standing in silence with sombre, conscience-stricken faces after laying a wreath in the village of Petrishchevo at a monument honouring Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, a partisan who had been murdered by the Nazis. Dramatizing shame for the Nazis' crimes was designed to mobilize the self-Sovietization of the East Germans, offering them a chance to delete the 'brown past' from their biographies, by looking at the Soviet Union in the right (i.e. political) way. Like the words and acts of the political elite, schoolchildren's paintings produced for school drawing contests offered similar proof of political conversion. They showed that the 'correct' gaze had been formed by illustrating a before-and-after contrast: each drawing depicted the Third Reich's militarism as well as the post-war, peace-loving 'bridges of trust' and 'columns of friendship' joining Moscow and Berlin.⁸⁴ On the one hand, such symbolic politics reinforced identification with a discourse about the Soviet Union as the 'guarantor of peace throughout the world'. On the other, these images made the expression of traumatic German experiences of rape, deportations and territorial schism after the end of the war taboo, and drove such expressions underground.

'Excesses' and mistakes in creating the visual occupation regime

Efforts to visually redesign public space ran into several organizational complications, especially when it came to the failure to get rid of old or worn-out posters, which 'spoil the appearance of cities and villages'.⁸⁵ In 1952, Party inspection reports noted that kiosks, which were supposed to display official posters, were empty, in poor condition or were not being used for their designated purpose. For example, theatre companies, cinemas, opera companies and sports teams all used these kiosks to put up announcements for their own events.⁸⁶ Visual agitation was not very effective because there were 'not enough posters', 'officials worked unsystematically', and there were 'delays in delivering posters by certain dates'. For example, most of the posters issued for Stalin's birthday in December 1951 did not arrive at Saxony's Propaganda Department until early January 1952 and were therefore not publicly displayed because they were no longer relevant.⁸⁷ Another problem was that thousands of copies of posters of the leaders were treated in ways which denigrated the symbols of power. For example, after ceremonial marches and rallies during the Third World Youth and Student Games in August 1951 in East Berlin, portraits of Eastern bloc leaders were seen in the personality cult's forbidden zone: 'thrown away without a glance in the gutters', 'muddied', and 'heaped up in a side street'.⁸⁸

The expansion of the party-state propaganda's reach facilitated the Sovietization of public space. The Information Service's Agitation Department issued periodic

bulletins entitled 'Advice for Visual Agitation' which gave practical guidance on creating slogans; explained how to prepare banners and where to place them; and discussed how to design public spaces such as cafeterias, shops, reading rooms, the vestibules of administrative buildings, train stations and the facades of apartment blocks. In January 1951, the Information Service's Department of Planning and Peace Propaganda in Chemnitz ordered that every public waiting room be supplied with posters, slogans, party newspapers and literature in order to 'appeal to and persuade a large part of the population to engage in progressive, democratic state building', and also to create a '*visual atmosphere of love for the best friend of the German people, the great Stalin*.'⁸⁹ Places targeted for such appeals included hospital admissions departments and polyclinics, the reception rooms of public premises, municipal offices, and kindergartens and schools, that is, public places where groups of people spanning the entire spectrum of age, gender and profession were likely to go.⁹⁰

This policy of intensively saturating public space with the symbols of Soviet power resulted in some 'excesses'. Thus, during one inspection, staff members of the SMAD's Information Bureau themselves compared the military commandant's offices with trade fair exhibition halls and kindergartens. Reports mentioned the excessive use of garlands, portraits, five-pointed red Soviet stars, flags and banners, which the population referred to as 'political kitsch', a 'farce' and a 'circus.'⁹¹ Discussions of propaganda work in East Germany recommended that propagandists combat the 'sectarian ideas' which were responsible for the disproportionate number of red flags and unauthorized changes to street names to honour the leaders of the German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands – KPD).⁹²

The Soviets themselves even had to acknowledge the crude character of agitation work. In July 1946, G. M. Bespalov, the head of the SMAD's Information Bureau, wrote to Moscow:

Our propaganda is too intrusive, it is served up too openly and hits you over the head ... we must turn away from this style of irrefutable statements and crude bragging and learn how [to create] more subtle and clever propaganda that acquaints the reader with the advantages of our social system in ways that he doesn't notice.⁹³

These 'excesses' showed the Soviets that their propaganda was not compatible with East Germans' experience and memories. Mayors of cities and villages alike told the SMAD that propaganda posters and slogans did not match German realities.⁹⁴ Hoping to improve the situation, the SED official Anton Ackermann met with Bespalov in November 1946. During their conversation, Ackermann complained that the German power organs had no autonomy because of the 'SMAD's unceasing custodial interference in the SED's affairs'. 'For example', Ackermann said:

Why do SMAD representatives look over SED leaflets and posters when these young and inexperienced officers, although they have the best intentions, nonetheless cannot judge these matters with the same competence as old, experienced workers from the German Communist Party? Meanwhile, everywhere SED leaflets and

posters are painstakingly examined, corrected and, in many cases, this only makes things worse.⁹⁵

Despite such complaints, Soviet control over public space and the SMAD staff's arbitrariness continued. For example, a certain Captain Belkin, the SMAD political commissar in the Dippoldiswalde region in Saxony, insisted that SED candidates running for seats in the local organs of government be photographed on the eve of the elections in 1949. The first photographs taken, however, were all deemed to be inappropriate, and new posters with full-length images of the candidates had to be created because, in his opinion, the portraits taken earlier did not correspond to the 'Soviet model'.⁹⁶

Iconoclasm and the limits of self-Sovietization

Although the political elites and some people engaged in self-Sovietization, other sectors of the population offered some resistance to the visual occupation regime, as political reports and summaries of the population's moods indicate. Documents noted that acts of iconoclasm took place primarily 'during the evening hours', 'when twilight falls', or 'in the dark of the night'. Every day at sunset, a political revolution of sorts took place. With the onset of darkness, the occupying powers lost their monopoly on the vigorous surveillance of public space. Sensing that the fetters on its autonomy had been loosened, society took the initiative and committed political acts in those zones of social life that, by day, demanded strictly regulated behaviour. Thus, night was a transitional zone, a borderland where actors could leave the public spheres of party and state and enter an anonymous sphere of political activity. At dawn, the regime took back the reins of power, removing all traces of popular violence from the streets and squares. These acts reveal the limits of the East Germans' self-Sovietization, as well as how emotionally charged the visual symbols of power could be.

The competition between day and night, a reflection of the political conflict between the occupation regime and society, showed itself in the Saxon town of Strehla, where the Ernst Thälmann cult was proclaimed with posters bearing the image of this pre-war leader of the German Communist Party.⁹⁷ These posters were put up during the day and torn down at night. In Glauchau, anti-Stalin and anti-Soviet graffiti was scrawled on the walls of the town's main factory during the night before the May Day parade. At dawn, police patrols wiped away all visual traces of social indignation in a space that, a few hours later, would become an arena for staging a society of collective consensus.⁹⁸ Likewise, official propaganda messages on the Day of Liberation were changed during the night in Friedersdorf. Wreaths that had been laid at Soviet obelisks were discovered the following morning on the graves of German soldiers.⁹⁹

Iconoclastic practices took place in different locales during daylight hours and at night. By day it was possible to voice opinions freely, without risk of persecution, inside certain intimate niches of public space. Thus, during a Soviet inspection of the Lindner rolling stock factory in Ammendorf in October 1948, antigovernment graffiti was

discovered in the toilets.¹⁰⁰ In 1953, just after Stalin's death, a campaign of spontaneous iconoclasm unfolded on the walls of the toilet stalls at another enterprise in Thuringia. Portraits of leaders were removed from prominent locations in the building and taken into the toilet stalls, where they were adorned with drawings of gallows and animal body parts as well as crude anti-Soviet and anti-government graffiti.¹⁰¹ Such displacements of the symbols of power from the 'sacral zone' to 'dirty places' disrupted the official system of public symbolism. To reduce the communicative potential of the toilets, the factory's management had to issue numerous orders about repainting them every week.

Like the dates chosen for iconoclastic acts – party-state holidays, propaganda campaigns and leaders' birthdays – the places where such acts took place intensified their political tone. Defacing portraits and damaging busts of the leaders in 'peace corners' and the rooms dedicated to the leaders in factories, schools, mass organizations, and party and state institutions were automatically considered political acts, instances of 'destruction of the social order' carried out by 'domestic and foreign enemies'. Thus, one night, in the 'peace corner' of a factory in Teltow, a deerstalker cap was placed on a bust of Stalin.¹⁰² With its earflaps and peaked brim, the cap made the bust of Stalin look silly rather than imposing. Another incident took place in Leuna, on the eve of the Day of the October Revolution. During the night of 2–3 November 1951, a bust of Stalin was abducted from the peace corner at the Walter Ulbricht factory. On the following day, the bust – having been smeared with dirt – was put near the factory directors' offices by unknown persons. A sign had been hung around its neck that read, 'You are as worthless as W. Pieck.'¹⁰³

The most widespread forms of covert and anonymous iconoclasm ranged from taking down and ripping up posters, banners and insignia to breaking shop windows displaying leaders' portraits.¹⁰⁴ Yet damage inflicted on visual images – and specifically on the facial features of political leaders – constituted the most serious insult to the regime. This was because defiling such images made the regime 'lose face'. Indeed, this was the first thing the security organs noticed. For example, the SPD's Eastern Bureau reported that on the eve of Stalin's birthday, portraits of the Soviet leader were smeared with mud and ink, and the eyes and mouth were gouged out.¹⁰⁵ Portraits of Thälmann taken down in Lugau were discovered the next day with the eyes gouged out and the nose and mouth ripped out.¹⁰⁶

Adding drawings or text was similar to crossing out whatever was printed on images bearing the personality cult's iconography. Such alterations demonstrated the regime's loss of authority in the population's eyes, and were intended to show publicly that it was possible to change the official meaning of propaganda. For example, on 7 January 1946, a copy of an issue of the *Thüringer Volkszeitung* which included a portrait of Pieck was put in the editorial staff's mailbox. Pieck's nose had been coloured red and, immediately after the slogan published with the portrait, 'W. Pieck – son of the people', a question mark had been added. The inscription that followed – 'The same kind of lies the Nazis told'¹⁰⁷ – thematized the problem of trusting the East German leadership, whose methods of ideological work evoked associations with Goebbels's Ministry of Propaganda. In Brandenburg, someone used the text of a poster with one of Stalin's key slogans – 'The Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state

remains' – to sum up the results of the Soviet occupation regime in East Germany.¹⁰⁸ An appeal to the civilian population was added to the poster's official text:

To the German people of the eastern zone! Stalin said 'The Hitlers come and go, but the German people remain!' But what has really happened? Three years of robbery and theft! Three years of famine and death! Three years of assaults on our girls and women! Three years of lies about the people's democracy! Let's drive out the ones who besmirch culture!!!¹⁰⁹

Similar reinterpretations of propaganda usually included the drawing of gallows or a guillotine on portraits of leaders.¹¹⁰ A call to exercise popular justice vis-à-vis the East German leadership was recorded on the eve of celebrations of the centenary of the 1848 Revolution, which was one of the SED's first attempts to present a new picture of the past linked to the traditions of a democratic popular movement.¹¹¹ On a notice board in the city of Bernau someone scrawled the following in chalk: 'In honour of the holiday hang the slaves of the Russians – Pieck, Seidewitz [the prime minister of Saxony] and Grotewohl – by their feet. Heil Hitler!'¹¹² The semantics of the deprivation of honour included symbolically reducing leaders to animals. This was done by adding text making offensive comparisons of the leaders with animals or drawing animal body parts on their images. Thus, in October 1950, in the border town of Faulungen, insults were written on an SED election campaign poster: 'Pieck is a fat pig.'¹¹³ And at dawn a swastika was discovered scrawled on a building in Potsdam. Underneath it was a message supposedly signed by the Werwolf organization: 'We are here again. If the Americans come, we will hang the red dogs.'¹¹⁴ Thus, official representations of the personality cult were transformed; sacred images became profane and dirty in the widespread practice of dishonouring and insulting the SED regime.

Overt forms of iconoclasm, however, were much rarer. These were distinguished by broad public participation in official rituals and the adoption of more aggressive modes of communication with the regime. The June 1953 uprising was the high point of public violence directed against symbols of the dictatorship. Portraits, pictures, busts and books written by communist leaders were damaged or completely destroyed first.¹¹⁵ In the insurgents' hands, personality cult objects were no longer symbols of power. Instead, they were used to mete out physical violence on SED supporters. For example, in the town of Eisleben, the insurgents jammed a portrait of Stalin onto the head of a Soviet soldier who attempted to defend the leader's image.¹¹⁶ Likewise, when the mayor of Ludwigsdorf refused to give up his authority, a portrait of Pieck was stuck onto his head.¹¹⁷ Public rituals of violence changed people's usual roles and positions, transforming representatives of the regime into victims, while simultaneously giving members of the public the roles of judge and executioner. After seizing Party and administrative buildings and wreaking havoc on them, insurgents carried the regime's insignia – flags, emblems, posters, portraits and banners – to nearby central squares and streets, heaped them in piles and set fire to them while crowds watched.

The appearance of such overt, conflict-laden tensions in public spaces forced the regime to resort to removing the symbols of power from these spaces. This was especially true during crises. Faced with the threat of popular unrest, the state had to

temporarily remove portraits, posters and banners from places where large crowds gathered. Thus, during the 1953 uprising, the administration took down images of Pieck, Ulbricht and Grotewohl in train-station waiting rooms in Bitterfeld and Dessau to avoid provoking unrest.¹¹⁸ As a result of the iconoclastic acts that took place in June 1953, the regime became more sensitive to the effects of saturating public places with the symbols of power. It started to work on crisis management in public space. The regime's representatives finally realized that although the symbols of power were a means of proclaiming a political order, these symbols also had the potential to overthrow the regime. In an instant, they could become targets of popular iconoclasm and could be transformed into desirable objects for rituals of violence.

Conclusion

The Soviet occupation regime formally ended when the GDR was founded in October 1949. However, as my analysis has shown, visibility remained an effective way to maintain Soviet influence on East German politics and a channel for further Sovietization. Nikita Khrushchev's February 1956 secret speech 'On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences' was a turning point in Soviet control over visibility in the GDR and the other socialist states. Only in the wake of harsh criticism of Stalin were the socialist countries for the first time allowed to use their own judgement in designing May Day demonstration columns with portraits of the leaders of the labour and communist movements, without instructions from 'Soviet friends.'¹¹⁹ The CPSU's Twenty-Second Congress continued the policy of purging public spaces of Stalinist representations in 1961. During the night of 31 October–1 November Stalin's body was removed from the Mausoleum and buried at the Kremlin wall. This gesture became the signal for the Politburo of the SED to undertake a decisive restructuring of the visual occupation regime on the periphery of the post-war Soviet empire. The SED's new source of legitimacy became propaganda focused on German heroes of the anti-Nazi resistance and national leaders of the communist movement; the GDR political elite simultaneously preserved the imperial hierarchy with Moscow as the empire's centre by reviving the Lenin cult. De-Stalinization did not mean a complete de-Sovietization of public space or the destruction of the visual occupation regime.

My analysis draws attention to the sensory dimension of the Sovietization of East Germany. It gives sight pride of place as the key sense in the formation of Sovietized German subjectivity and the affirmation of the Soviet occupation regime through administering visibility in public and even private spaces.¹²⁰ Since the organs of sight ensure knowledge of the world and a connection with one's environment, establishing a monopoly over the human body and politicizing sight (as well the other senses, which were politicized perhaps to a lesser extent) were the key goals of the occupying forces. The sense organs became the central transmitters of the ideological. Thanks to the hierarchy of sense organs, visibility/sight was transformed into the primary mode of the everyday experience of occupation through which the political was successfully organized, programmed and documented. All of this may seem quite obvious, but scholars still need to do much more to acknowledge – as the contributors

to this volume do – the unconscious visual dimension that lies at the heart of so many occupation regimes.

Notes

- 1 Cora Sol Goldstein, *Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in Occupied Germany* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Alexey Tikhomirov, 'The Stalin Cult between Center and Periphery: Structures of the Cult Community in the Empire of Socialism, 1949–1956: The Case of the GDR', in *Der Führer im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Benno Ennker and Heidi Hein-Kircher (Marburg: Herder-Institut, 2010), 297–321.
- 2 Doris Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns: Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2006).
- 3 Constance Classen, ed., *A Cultural History of the Senses*, 6 vols (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
- 4 For example, Cecilia Cristellon, *Marriage, the Church, and Its Judges in Renaissance Venice, 1420–1545* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 89–90; Robert W. Scribner, ed., *Bilder und Bildersturm im Spätmittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002); Ronald G. Asch and Dagmar Freist, ed., *Staatsbildung als kultureller Prozess: Strukturwandel und Legitimation von Herrschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005); Alexey Tikhomirov, 'Popular Justice and Iconoclasm in Post-war East Germany: Premodern Rites of Violence in the (De) Legitimation of Modern States', in *Popular Justice in Europe (19th–20th Centuries)*, ed. Émile Delivré, E. Berger and M. Loehnig (Bologna and Berlin: Il Mulino and Duncker & Humblot, 2017), 173–90.
- 5 In recent publications it is also a missing point. See Camilo Erlichman and Christopher Knowles, ed., *Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany: Politics, Everyday Life and Social Interactions, 1945–55* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018); Tatjana Tönsmeier, 'Besatzung als europäische Erfahrungs- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Der Holocaust im Kontext des Zweiten Weltkrieges', in *Der Holocaust: Ergebnisse und neue Fragen der Forschung*, ed. Frank Bajohr and Andrea Löw (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2015), 281–98.
- 6 Alexey Tikhomirov, 'Luchshii drug nemetskogo naroda': Kul't Stalina v Vostochnoi Germanii (1945–1961 gg.) (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2014), 11–15.
- 7 Martin Pase, *Stalin im Blitzlicht der Presse und Karikatur* (Dresden: F. Müller, 1941); Christian Windecke, *Der rote Zar: Genosse Stalins Weg zur Macht* (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1932).
- 8 Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
- 9 Jonathan Crary, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Galina Orlova, "'Karty dlia slepykh': Politika i politizatsiia zreniia v stalinskuii epokhy', in *Vizual'naia antropologiya: Rezhimy vidimosti pri sotsializme*, ed. E. R. Iarskaia-Smirnova (Moscow: Variant, 2009), 57–104; Aleksei Golubev, 'Zapadnyi nabludatel' i zapadnyi vzgliad v afektivnom menezhzhmente sovet'skoi sub'ektivnosti', in *Posle Stalina: Pozdnesovetskaiia sub'ektivnost' (1953–1985 gg.)*, ed. Anatolii Pinski (St Petersburg: EUSPB, 2018), 219–54.

- 10 Tobias Ronge, *Das Bild des Herrschers in Malerei und Grafik des Nationalsozialismus: Eine Untersuchung zur Ikonografie von Führer- und Funktionärsbildern im Dritten Reich* (Münster: Lit, 2010), 335.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF), R-7317, op. 10, d. 29, l. 259.
- 13 Jörg Baberowski, 'Was sind Repräsentationen sozialer Ordnung im Wandel? Anmerkungen zu einer Geschichte interkultureller Begegnung', in *Arbeit an der Geschichte: Wie viel Theorie braucht die Geschichtswissenschaft?*, ed. Jörg Baberowski (Frankfurt: Campus, 2009), 8–18, esp. 10.
- 14 *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse*, vol. 2 (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984), 228.
- 15 Between May 1945 and May 1949, some 41,907 German citizens (35 per cent of all Germans in the camps) died in special NKVD-MVD camps in Germany. See N. V. Petrov, *Stalin i organy NKVD-MGB v sovetizatsii stran Tsentral'noi i Vostochnoi Evropy* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011), 58.
- 16 GARF, R-7317, op. 10, d. 29, l. 259.
- 17 *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse*, vol. 1, part 1 (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1954), 396.
- 18 Sven Keller, *Volksgemeinschaft am Ende: Gesellschaft und Gewalt 1944/45* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), 187, 408. The death penalty awaited anyone who refused to maintain the ritual order of the 'national community': whoever did not want to raise his/her hand in the traditional Nazi salute, saying 'Heil Hitler!', was called a 'traitor' and threatened with immediate execution. See *Volksgemeinschaft am Ende*, 411.
- 19 Ibid., 143.
- 20 *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung*, vol. 1, part 1, 285.
- 21 Wolfgang Leonhard, *Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder*, 23rd edn. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 2006), 429–30.
- 22 Stefan Dörnberg, *Befreiung 1945: Ein Augenzeugenbericht* (Berlin: Dietz, 1985), 100.
- 23 *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung*, vol. 1, part 1, 464.
- 24 Ibid., 448–9.
- 25 Ibid., 264–5.
- 26 Ibid., 270, 444, 473.
- 27 Ibid., 278.
- 28 The soldiers' rhetoric was a response to Stalin's order of 1 May 1944, which enjoined them to 'follow the wounded German beast and kill it in its own den'. See Elke Scherstjanoi, ed., *Rotarmisten schreiben aus Deutschland: Briefe von der Front (1945) und historischen Analysen* (Munich: Saur, 2004), 3, as well as the letters written by soldiers on 26, 44 and 182.
- 29 Scherstjanoi, *Rotarmisten schreiben aus Deutschland*, 144.
- 30 Ibid., 213. This phrase is attributed to Alexander Nevsky, Prince of Novgorod, whose cult became widespread during the 'Great Patriotic War'. See Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, *Aleksandr Nevskij: Heiliger – Fürst – Nationalheld: Eine Erinnerungsfigur im russischen kulturellen Gedächtnis (1263–2000)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004).
- 31 Peter Reichel, 'Berlin nach 1945: Eine Erinnerungslandschaft zwischen Gedächtnis-Verlust und Gedächtnis-Inszenierung', in *Architektur als politische Kultur: Philosophia Practica*, ed. Hermann Hipp and Ernst Seidl (Berlin: Reimer, 1996), 273–96.

- 32 For example, GARF, f. R-7077, op. 1, d. 246, l. 10–11 (1945); GARF, f. R-7133, op. 1, d. 271, l. 3 (1945).
- 33 Ronge, *Das Bild des Herrschers in Malerei*, 337–8.
- 34 GARF, f. R-7077, op. 1, d. 171, l. 2 (1945).
- 35 GARF, f. R-7077, op. 1, d. 172, l. 12 (1945).
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- 37 GARF, f. R-7184, op. 1, d. 46, l. 26.
- 38 GARF, f. R-7212, op. 1, d. 55, l. 17.
- 39 *Ibid.*, l. 25.
- 40 GARF, f. R-7077, op. 1, d. 173, l. 192 (1946).
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- 42 GARF, f. R-7212, op. 1, d. 238, l. 260.
- 43 *Ibid.*
- 44 GARF, f. R-7077, op. 1, d. 27, l. 49–50.
- 45 GARF, f. R-7071, op. 1, d. 212, l. 226; f. R-7077, op. 1, d. 192, l. 236.
- 46 GARF, f. R-7212, op. 1, d. 202, l. 9–12.
- 47 Scherstjanoi, *Rotarmisten schreiben aus Deutschland*, 157.
- 48 Stefan Aust and Stephan Burgdorff, ed., *Die Flucht; Uber die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2011), 90.
- 49 *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevolkerung*, vol. 2, 35, 73.
- 50 GARF, f. R-7313, op. 3, d. 4, l. 136–8 (1949).
- 51 GARF, f. R-7184, op. 1, d. 56, l. 16.
- 52 GARF, f. R-7133, op. 1, d. 280, l. 34 (1948).
- 53 GARF, f. R-7133, op. 1, d. 187, l. 16 (1946).
- 54 GARF, f. R-7184, op. 1, d. 163, l. 125.
- 55 GARF, f. R-7212, op. 1, d. 218, l. 49.
- 56 GARF, f. R-7212, op. 1, d. 202, l. 359 (1948).
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- 58 For 1948, N. P. Timofeeva and Ian Foittsik (Jan Foitzik) eds., *Politika SVAG v oblasti kul'tury, nauki i obrazovniia: tseli, metody, rezultaty, 1945–1949: Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006), 271–3.
- 59 Sanger, *Heldenkult und Heimatliebe*, 91.
- 60 GARF, f. R-7212, op. 1, d. 255, l. 320.
- 61 Maoz Azaryahu, 'Zuruck zur Vergangenheit? Die Straennamen Ost-Berlins 1990–1994', in *Denkmalsturz: Zur Konfliktgeschichte politischer Symbolik*, ed. Winfried Speitkamp (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1997), 137–54.
- 62 Sanger, *Heldenkult und Heimatliebe*, 76–9; Maoz Azaryahu, *Von Wilhelmplatz zu Thalmannplatz: Politische Symbole im offentlichen Leben der DDR* (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1991), 59–76.
- 63 Regina Scheer, 'Geschutzte Leere: Ein Recherchebericht uber politische Denkmaler in Brandenburg', in *Vielstimmiges Schweigen: Neue Studien zum DDR-Antifaschismus*, ed. Annette Leo and Peter Reif-Spirek (Berlin: Metropol, 2001), 127–51.
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- 65 GARF, f. R-8581, op. 2, d. 628, l. 111–12 (1952).
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‘Fagin in Berlin provokes a riot’: David Lean’s *Oliver Twist* and perceptions of Jews in occupied Germany

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Introduction

In February 1949, Berlin citizens clashed violently with the police in the city’s British sector, outside a cinema which was screening an adaptation of the film *Oliver Twist*. The point of contention was not Dickens’s eponymous orphan but one of his chief villains: protesters maintained that the film’s portrayal of Fagin was anti-Semitic and that it should therefore be banned from German cinemas. The incident caused heated comment in the press of all occupation zones of Germany and attracted considerable attention abroad.¹ Although the production company quickly withdrew the film, this apparent blunder in British occupation policy served as a touchstone for much larger issues at the time.

The incident raises important questions about the connections between culture and politics in the Allied occupation of Germany, about the visual depiction and perception of minorities, and about relations between the ‘historic triangle’ of occupiers, Germans and Jews during this period.² As Frank Stern notes, this triangle ‘was a tension-ridden part of a more comprehensive triangle that included the United States with its American Jewish community, Germany with the Jewish remnant, and the Jewish settlement in Palestine as the precursor of the State of Israel.’³ It is necessary to situate the Berlin incident within these wider contexts to understand why *Oliver Twist* caused such offence in Germany. Was it really as anti-Semitic as protesters claimed? What visual histories and stereotypes did *Oliver Twist* mobilize? How did the context of Allied occupation determine the British film’s German reception? What actually happened during the riots, who were the protesters, and how were they portrayed in different Allied-licensed newspapers? What role do race and ethnicity play in studying the Allied occupation of Germany? Cinema is a key medium for

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studying the socio-political landscape of occupied Berlin, due to its considerable popularity and its purported psychological potency.⁴ When dealing with a population whose viewing habits had been shaped by twelve years of Nazi cinema, 'cinematic representation, reorganization, and control constituted a crucial cultural component of [...] the victors' postwar plans to denazify and democratize Germany', forcing them to strike a balance between censorship and consumer choice.⁵ The *Oliver Twist* controversy highlights the difficulties of the Western Allies' paradoxical mission to impose democracy from above.

This chapter disentangles the convoluted and variously manipulated narratives surrounding the Berlin protests against the *Oliver Twist* screening. It begins by examining the film itself, focusing particularly on Alec Guinness's portrayal of Fagin, in order to evaluate the charges of anti-Semitism levelled against it. David Lean's *Oliver Twist* adaptation has received much critical attention, frequently including comparisons with Dickens's novel and debates on the film's anti-Semitism, but most of this work only mentions the Berlin protests in passing.⁶ To understand how *Oliver Twist* came to be shown in occupied Berlin, it is necessary to outline British film policy for occupied Germany and how this restricted the choice of British films for export. Scholarly work on British cultural policy during the occupation remains sparse, with Gabriele Clemens's 1997 overview still the most comprehensive source.⁷ Moreover, there exists almost no secondary material on the Berlin protests themselves, which is why this chapter uses German, American and British newspaper reports, and a contemporary confidential account by a Berlin-based rabbi, to reconstruct what exactly happened in response to the first German screenings of *Oliver Twist*.⁸ A key question in this context concerns the identity of the protesters, variously described as Berliners, Jews, Poles, foreigners or criminals. This requires a closer examination of Jewish communities and displaced persons (DPs) in occupied Germany, their treatment by different Allied forces, and their perception by the German population. There is a wealth of studies on different facets of DP life in post-war Germany: most focus on the large DP populations in the American zone or the Belsen-Hohne Camp in the British zone, while comparatively little has been written specifically on the situation of DPs in occupied Berlin.⁹ The chapter concludes by examining the ways in which Lean's *Oliver Twist* was subsequently instrumentalized in the trial of Veit Harlan, director of the notoriously anti-Semitic film *Jud Süß* (1940). While Harlan's work and subsequent denazification have generated much critical commentary, the role played by Lean's *Oliver Twist* in the trial has been somewhat neglected.¹⁰ Analysing reactions to a British film in a post-war German context enables us to trace continuities and changes in identity politics and allegiances between different national groups and minorities during the Allied occupation.

The portrayal of Fagin in *Oliver Twist*

David Lean's *Oliver Twist* premiered in the UK in June 1948. Alec Guinness's portrayal of Fagin in the film referenced a number of Jewish stereotypes. Wearing a large prosthetic hook nose and a long, matted wig and beard, with several of his teeth blacked out, Guinness adopted a Yiddish-inflected Cockney accent and was frequently shot

from below (Oliver's perspective), making him appear powerful and threatening.¹¹ In choosing to present Fagin in this obviously stereotypical manner, Lean and Guinness ignored concerns already raised during the production process, particularly from the United States. As early as May 1947, Hollywood's self-regulating censorship body, the Production Code Administration, had stated:

We assume, of course, that you will bear in mind the advisability of omitting from the portrayal of Fagin any elements or inference that would be offensive to any specific racial group or religion. Otherwise, of course, your picture might meet with very definite audience resistance in this country.¹²

In response to this letter, make-up artist Stuart Freeborn asked Lean whether he should tone down the look he had created for Fagin, to which Lean replied: 'To hell with them! We're not going to change a thing.'¹³ Film critic Al McKee has labelled this 'a startling example of artistic tunnel vision', while Juliet John describes Lean's adaptation as 'brilliant but unthinkingly offensive'¹⁴ (Figure 2.1).

Although *Oliver Twist* was largely well-received in Britain, the film predictably met with opposition in the United States. With Israel having declared its independence in May 1948, and the first of many wars in the Middle East underway, a private screening was arranged for Jewish American campaign groups in September, resulting in unfavourable reactions. The New York Board of Rabbis recommended to the President of the Motion Picture Association of America that the film be banned, prompting the British head of the production company, J. Arthur Rank, to postpone its US release indefinitely.¹⁵ Less than a month later, upon hearing that the adaptation was to be released in the US zone of occupied Germany, American Jews petitioned the US Civil Affairs Division (CAD) to revoke this decision. This, too, was successful, with the CAD duly deciding to postpone the film's release in the American zone indefinitely.¹⁶

Despite the repeated criticism, Lean continued to defend his film's portrayal of Fagin, claiming that it was based on the original illustrations by George Cruikshank, as well as Dickens's own description of Fagin as 'a very old shrivelled Jew, whose villainous-looking and repulsive face was obscured by a quantity of matted red hair.'¹⁷ In the novel, we learn that Fagin is dirty, 'dressed in a greasy flannel gown, with his throat bare', and occasionally Dickens even gives his Jew animalistic features:

As he glided stealthily along, creeping beneath the shelter of the walls and doorways, the hideous old man seemed like some loathsome reptile, engendered in the slime and darkness through which he moved: crawling forth, by night, in search of some rich offal for a meal.¹⁸

Given these examples, Lean was justified in claiming that his conception of Fagin was no more of a caricature than Dickens's.

Since Dickens never depicts Fagin praying, attending synagogue or speaking of his beliefs, his is clearly not a religious but an ethnic definition of 'Jewishness'. Dickens confirmed this when defending himself against claims of anti-Semitism in a letter in 1863:



Figure 2.1 Alec Guinness (centre) as Fagin in *Oliver Twist* (1948). Diomedia.

Fagin, in *Oliver Twist*, is a Jew, because it unfortunately was true of the time to which that story refers, that that class of criminal almost invariably was a Jew. But surely no sensible man or woman [...] can fail to observe – firstly, that all the rest of the wicked *dramatis personae* are Christians; and secondly, that he is called a ‘Jew’, not because of his religion, but because of his race. [...] I make mention of Fagin as the Jew, because he is one of the Jewish people, and because it conveys that kind of idea of him which I should give my readers of a Chinaman, by calling him a Chinese.¹⁹

Based on these comments, it is difficult to imagine what 'kind of idea' Dickens wished to give his readers of Fagin other than a stereotypical image of an eastern, unassimilated Jew. Fagin looks different from other East End characters due to his long unkempt hair and his facial features (although the novel makes no specific mention of the shape of his nose). This alone might not necessarily trigger negative associations in the reader's mind, but when added to Fagin's bullying and criminal behaviour and Dickens's descriptions of Fagin as 'hideous' and 'loathsome', it paints an extremely unflattering picture of the novel's only Jewish character whilst emphasizing Fagin's otherness.

Whereas the novel's narrator frequently cues the reader to think of Fagin as 'the Jew', Lean was quick to point out that screenwriter Stanley Hayes's script did not once identify Fagin as a Jew.²⁰ However, Lean's faithful visual rendering of Dickens's descriptions and Alec Guinness's spirited portrayal of the role drew on a long history of Jewish stereotypes. Charles Drazin notes that 'Lean distilled Dickens's work into brilliantly cinematic images but it was the fidelity of those images to the original racist conception of Fagin that made them especially shocking in the context of the 1940s.'²¹ Maria Cristina Paganoni agrees:

Close-ups of Fagin's chipped teeth, shaggy eyebrows and matted hair, profile shots emphasizing his 'Semitic' nose, as well as the effect of his droning voice, are all cinematic techniques that visually and verbally translate what the lexical choices of the novel construct as a monstrous otherness.²²

Notably, one thing Lean's film adds to Dickens's version is Fagin's thick Yiddish accent, 'which categorizes him as an alien with an unstable national identity'.²³ Occasional Yiddish inflections can also be heard in the German version, dubbed by the actor Robert Meyn, suggesting that this Fagin might hail from somewhere in eastern Europe.²⁴

Over the course of the nineteenth century, and particularly since the influx of Jewish refugees from eastern Europe after the First World War, Germans had come to regard eastern European Jews as the epitome of cultural backwardness: 'ghetto Jews', or *Ostjuden*, were perceived as dirty, coarse, loud and immoral.²⁵ According to Steven Aschheim, this view was initially 'formulated and propagated by West European and especially German Jews, serving as a symbolic construct by which they could distinguish themselves from their less fortunate, unemancipated East European brethren'.²⁶ As German Jews assimilated into middle-class society during the nineteenth century, eastern European Jews were perceived as retaining all the characteristics they had striven to overcome. Chief among these was the Yiddish language, 'widely regarded as a corrupt and lowly derivation of German', and therefore despised as an uneducated vernacular.²⁷ Other characteristics frequently associated with *Ostjuden* were unproductivity or criminality, begging and an itinerant lifestyle, boorishness and a narrow worldview.²⁸ In the aftermath of the First World War, German anti-Semites seized upon this perception of a very visible minority to construe eastern European Jews as dangerous to German society: 'Against the postwar background of defeat and economic disintegration, it was easy to present the "mass invasion" of *Ostjuden* as a fundamental threat to German morality, economy, sexuality, politics, and culture.'²⁹ Throughout the Nazi era, exaggerated caricatures of *Ostjuden* could regularly be found

in *Der Stürmer* and other right-wing publications, along with stereotypical depictions in propaganda films such as *Der ewige Jude* (The Eternal Jew) (dir. Fritz Hippler, 1940) and *Jud Süß* (Jew Süß) (dir. Veit Harlan, 1940), all of which reinforced a deeply negative image of eastern European Jews in the German mind – a topic which is discussed at length in Miriam Arani's chapter in this volume.

Although an English creation, Fagin fits perfectly into these particular stereotypes. He is enamoured of material wealth, and Lean's film depicts him greedily handling jewels and pocket watches. Paganoni notes:

He appears to combine and condense in his person the features of the utmost villainy and Jewishness, as if they were somehow inextricable. A thief, a miser, a pimp, possibly a pederast and paedophile, he is part of a Jewish peddling network that inhabits the London underworld.³⁰

In one of the film's scenes, Fagin hides away his treasures and threatens Oliver with a knife when he believes the boy will disclose his hiding place. His actions are motivated by selfish greed: training up young boys to be pick-pockets ultimately serves to line Fagin's own pockets. Based on his visual presentation and his character traits, Fagin conforms to the much-peddled stereotype of the dirty, rough, uncultured eastern Jewish criminal. While Dickens's novel was already well-known in Germany since its first translation in 1839, Fagin's vivid appearance on screen in 1949 suddenly enabled a direct comparison with visual depictions of Jews in Nazi cinema. Lean's faithful rendition of Dickens's nineteenth-century anti-Semitic stereotype caused offence in post-war Berlin not because this was an incomprehensible foreign attitude being imported to another country by its occupiers, but precisely because in the German context the stereotype was so familiar and mobilized attitudes which had been encouraged since before the Second World War, and which Germans were now meant to overcome.

British film policy in occupied Germany

Considering the strong reactions *Oliver Twist* had provoked in the United States, it is surprising that the British division of the Control Commission for Germany nevertheless released the film in Berlin's British sector in February 1949. Reporting on the protests, America's *LIFE* magazine remarked:

Between Dickens and Director Lean history had interposed the ghosts of six million murdered Jews and the specter of genocide. It was hard to see why the producers of *Oliver Twist* had insisted on such complete fidelity [to Dickens] and it was harder still to guess why the authorities had not only permitted exhibition of the picture in Germany but refused to withdraw it immediately after the inevitable reaction came.³¹

Why did British Military Government take such a reckless decision? A closer look at British film policy suggests that the *Oliver Twist* blunder may have been the result of financial pressures limiting Britain's film exports to her zone of occupation.

British film policy in occupied Germany officially pursued two main goals: (i) to promote an appreciation of British cultural achievements and values, as well as a greater understanding of British occupation policy and (ii) to open up the German market to the British film industry, which was in danger of being eclipsed by Hollywood.³² In addition to these official goals, the majority of films imported by the British authorities were chosen simply for their entertainment value. During the early occupation period, the Control Commission's London-based Film Section chose a cross-section of recent British films for release in its zone, including, notably, two other Dickens adaptations: *Great Expectations* (dir. David Lean, 1946) and *Nicholas Nickleby* (dir. Alberto Cavalcanti, 1947).³³ However, from the outset the selection was constrained by financial considerations. In order to enter into a contract with Military Government, production companies were required to cover all costs for raw materials, post-production (including dubbing or subtitling) and provision of sufficient copies, while the Control Commission would merely finance transport and insurance for feature films. J. Arthur Rank's production company was one of very few capable of shouldering such a financial burden, meaning that initially it was the only company to reach an agreement with the British authorities. Until 1947, Rank enjoyed a quasi-monopoly on British film exports to Germany.³⁴ In October 1947, responsibility for selection, export and distribution of films passed to the newly licensed private company Eagle-Lion Distributors.³⁵ While the Control Commission retained censorship powers, it is likely that selections were still biased in favour of the Rank label: Eagle-Lion Distributors was part of Eagle-Lion Films, owned by J. Arthur Rank.

Oliver Twist's German release thus occurred at a point when the British authorities had technically ceded responsibility for film selection to a private distributor, but could nevertheless be held responsible for controversial decisions. This unresolved situation resulted in a 'blame-game' in the wake of the Berlin protests. The day after the protests, the Soviet-zone newspaper *Neues Deutschland* gave the following summary of responses to the calls for a German ban of *Oliver Twist*:

The Berlin representative of 'Eagle-Lion-Films' [...] stated [...] that the decision had been taken to continue screening the controversial film despite demonstrations, pending a decision by the British Military Governor. [...] A representative of the British Military Government stated that the film's cancellation or non-cancellation was a 'purely German matter'. The 'mayor' of West Berlin [...] responded by claiming that the Western city administration could not influence the question of further public screenings, as this decision lay solely with the responsible British authorities.³⁶

This extract illustrates the confusion caused by the transition from military-controlled censorship to free market laws and German self-government in the later phase of the Allied occupation, and the resulting difficulties in determining who was responsible for film policy decisions. It also points to a longstanding quandary plaguing the Western Allies' cultural policy: how to promote democracy and free choice through undemocratic means (i.e. from above). Although a loosening of Allied control and a free market for cultural products were the ultimate goals, this could occasionally

result in the ‘wrong’ kinds of films being shown – thus triggering renewed calls for censorship and, in this particular case, violent protests.

Protests in Berlin

Oliver Twist opened at the Kurbel Cinema in Berlin-Charlottenburg on 18 February 1949. When it was shown again two days later, around sixty protesters inside and outside the auditorium disrupted the screening.³⁷ Police were called to the scene, and once the protesters had been ejected from the auditorium, the cinema’s proprietor decided to cancel all further screenings that day. West Berlin’s mayor and representatives of Berlin’s Jewish community wrote to British Military Government, calling for the film to be banned from German cinemas. British Military Government chose not to comment on these initial protests, merely informing the Kurbel’s proprietor that the licence for *Oliver Twist* had not been revoked. Meanwhile, Eagle-Lion Distributors demanded that the film be screened as scheduled at the Kurbel.

The following day, the screening went ahead under the protection of fifty German police officers positioned outside the cinema. When a crowd of around 200 protesters attempted to force its way from the street into the cinema, the police started beating protesters with their truncheons.³⁸ Protesters threw stones at the police, who attempted to control the crowd through the use of fire hoses, with some officers even drawing their guns and firing warning shots. Twenty-five protesters and fourteen police officers were injured during the incident and a number of protesters were arrested and taken into custody.³⁹ British Military Police were present and observed the incident, but did not intervene. Finally, the cinema’s proprietor announced the film’s cancellation, after which the protesters retreated, reportedly singing the Israeli national anthem.⁴⁰

From this last piece of information, we might glean some information on the protesters’ identity, which was itself a hotly contested issue. Most newspapers attributed the protests to Berlin Jews, but within these parameters there were important differences in tone and characterization, as well as some confusing contradictions. The Soviet-sector press seized upon the incident as an example of the Western powers’ failed denazification of Germany, variously characterizing protesters as ‘members of the Jewish people [Volk]’;⁴¹ ‘outraged Jewish demonstrators’⁴² and ‘members of [Berlin’s] Jewish community [Gemeinde]’.⁴³ *Neues Deutschland* also delightedly claimed the involvement of ‘a large number of progressive, non-Jewish people’⁴⁴ and consequently proceeded to write more generally about ‘antifascist demonstrators’.⁴⁵ The American-licensed *Tagesspiegel* adopted a more neutral stance, speaking of ‘members of the Jewish population’, ‘members of Berlin’s cultural life’ or simply ‘a few demonstrators’.⁴⁶ The French-licensed *Kurier* described the protesters as consisting ‘almost exclusively of Poles’.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the tone was starkly different in a number of British-licensed publications: the Berlin-based *Telegraf* spoke of ‘Jewish circles, which are usually seen on the Kurfürstendamm, where they enjoy little sympathy’.⁴⁸ At this point the Kurfürstendamm, Berlin’s main shopping street, was one of the centres for black market activity. London’s *Daily Telegraph* gave a curiously detailed description of the protesters as ‘clad in tight-waisted coats, carefully creased trousers and snapbrim felt

hats' and 'shouting in broken German'.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the German Social Democratic Party's newspaper, also licensed by the British, openly claimed that the demonstration had been organized by 'Polish Jews'⁵⁰ and 'paid black-marketeers'.⁵¹

British occupation authorities seem to have relied almost exclusively on these latter sources for the information they chose to pass on to their superiors back in London. According to a confidential telegram to the Foreign Office:

Reliable information suggests that [the demonstrators] were Jews, many of them of non-GERMAN nationality, known to be leaders of black market activity in areas not far removed from the cinema. We have, however, no firm proof of this. The demonstrations seem to have been deliberately organised.⁵²

Considering its admitted lack of evidence, the Political Division seemed remarkably certain of the protesters' identity and of the event's pre-planned nature. Citing the *Telegraf*, the report went on to indict more Berlin Jews:

In addition it is suggested that Jews from UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] camps were concerned, who had been removed from BERLIN some time ago, only to return illegally. The presence of such elements amongst the demonstrators had doubtless deterred many honest BERLINERS from associating themselves with the demonstrations.⁵³

Quite apart from the implied contrast between 'honest Berliners' and dishonest, criminal Jews, this report once again raises questions regarding the protesters' identity. In order to understand who these demonstrators actually were, and why non-German Jews might illegally return to Berlin in 1949, it is necessary to take a closer look at Allied treatment of Jews in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Jewish DPs in occupied Germany

After the cessation of hostilities in 1945, there were over 7 million foreign civilians in Germany, most of them there against their will.⁵⁴ Hailing from a number of different countries, these displaced persons, or DPs, had been brought to Nazi Germany for forced labour, or in the case of the 30,000–50,000 Jewish DPs, had survived labour camps, extermination camps, and even death marches.⁵⁵ One of the huge tasks facing the Allies when they assumed control of Germany was therefore to repatriate millions of people as quickly as possible. Since constant fuel shortages and the destruction of train lines made transport difficult, DP camps sprang up all over Germany in order to house, feed, clothe, care for and contain DPs until they could be repatriated. Initially, both American and British policies dictated that DPs should be registered and processed by nationality, with different nationalities being treated according to their former status as either victims or allies of the Nazis. In practice this led to a number of paradoxical situations: for instance, Italian and Hungarian Jews found themselves classed as part of the Axis powers along with their non-Jewish compatriots.⁵⁶ Moreover, following years

of horrendous deprivation, Jewish survivors often required completely different levels of healthcare and nourishment compared to non-Jewish DPs.

American policy towards Jewish DPs changed drastically in the autumn of 1945, when *The New York Times* published Earl G. Harrison's devastating report on conditions in European DP camps. President Truman had tasked Harrison, a former US Immigration Commissioner and the dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, with investigating the treatment of Jewish DPs. After a three-week tour of different facilities, Harrison stated that the Allies were not only failing to provide adequate food, housing and clothing for Jewish DPs, but were also keeping them as prisoners in undignified conditions:

As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not exterminate them. They are in concentration camps in large numbers under our military guard instead of SS troops. One is led to wonder whether the German people, seeing this, are not supposing that we are following or at least condoning Nazi policy.⁵⁷

Contrary to the previous Allied practice of classing all DPs by nationality, Harrison demanded that Jews be treated differently: 'The first and plainest need for these people is a recognition of their actual status and by this I mean their status as Jews.'⁵⁸ While admitting that it was 'not normally desirable to set aside particular racial or religious groups from their nationality categories', Harrison justified his demand by stating that 'this was done for so long by the Nazis that a group has been created which has special needs.'⁵⁹ According to Harrison, 'Jews as Jews' had been 'more severely victimized than the non-Jewish members of the same or other nationalities', and therefore the first step towards some form of justice was to acknowledge Jewish distinctiveness.⁶⁰ Accordingly, the Americans created separate Jewish DP camps, 'policed by the US army, administered by UNRRA and opened to [...] Jewish relief organizations.'⁶¹ Conditions in these camps were generally better than in other DP camps and the daily ration for Jewish DPs was raised to twice that of German civilians.⁶²

It was here that American and British policy diverged. While General Eisenhower appointed a Special Adviser on Jewish Affairs, the British occupation authorities refused to recognize Jews as a separate category. Their justification was that separate treatment for Jews would represent a reinstatement of Nazi racial policies.⁶³ However, this was merely a smokescreen: Britain was determined to prevent large-scale emigration to Palestine, at this point still under British mandate.⁶⁴ Following the Second World War, Britain was more dependent than ever on Arab goodwill in the Middle East in order to maintain its access to Arabian oil and the Suez Canal.⁶⁵ The British government therefore had a vested interest in preventing any further emigration of European Jews to Palestine. Recognizing 'Jews as Jews', as Harrison demanded, would have meant recognizing not just a religious or ethnic but a separate *national* identity for Jews – and as a nation they might lay claim to a state or homeland.

Instead of gradually being resolved through repatriation, the DP problem in Germany in fact became more acute from late 1945 onwards. Many Jewish survivors returning to eastern Europe encountered renewed anti-Semitism in their former

homelands. Following a number of violent anti-Semitic pogroms in Poland in 1946, Jews began to pour back into Germany, until these "infiltrates" from Poland and eastern European countries came to represent two-thirds of the overall Jewish DP population.⁶⁶ Paradoxically, the western zones of occupied Germany became the safest place for Jews in post-war Europe, as they were controlled by the Allies and provided access to Jewish relief organizations. The Zionist underground network *Bricha* helped large numbers of Polish Jews transfer illegally into Germany, so that between 1945 and 1948, there were approximately 250,000 Jews temporarily living in the American and British zones of occupied Germany.⁶⁷

A key station on the way from Poland to the American zone of Germany was Berlin, where this mass influx was first felt: 'By November 1945 7,000 Polish Jews had reached the city; by the end of December that same year between 250 and 300 were coming to Berlin every day.'⁶⁸ There were three Jewish DP camps in Berlin (two in the American sector and one in the French sector), where Jews were cared for by various relief agencies. Their 'privileges' included better rations and clothing supplies than the German population. In the post-war economy of scarcity, these supplies could be profitably traded on the black market, creating an invidious situation. According to Grossmann, Germans 'saw the refugee camps as centers of black market activity fed by easy access to the cigarette and food supplies of the occupiers.'⁶⁹ However, Hilton points out that DPs were not trading the cigarettes and chocolate from their aid packages for profit, but 'because they had no other alternative sources of goods to barter.'⁷⁰ Despite the fact that everyone in post-war Berlin – Germans, occupiers, and DPs – participated in black and grey markets in some form or another, 'Germans saw DP involvement as immoral, whereas their own was simply a matter of necessity', and 'occupation officials reinforced this perception.'⁷¹ Polish Jews came to be viewed as chiefly responsible for the illicit trade, providing a welcome scapegoat for both Germans and occupiers.⁷² Their increased supplies and black market activity reinforced the stereotype of eastern European Jews as misers, traders and profiteers – 'a population consumed with the acquisition of wealth at the expense of others, which in the postwar period was characterized as the "blackest" of illicit trade.'⁷³ It was in this spirit that a June 1947 article in the *Berliner Illustrierte* could proclaim that the letters DP should stand for *Deutschlands Parasiten* ('Germany's parasites').⁷⁴

Not only were the new eastern Jewish arrivals segregated from the Germans through their geographical concentration in DP camps and their preferential treatment by American aid organizations, but many also looked markedly different from other Berliners. The American Koppel Pinson, educational director for displaced Jews in Germany, remarked in 1947 that among the 'infiltrates' one saw 'bearded Jews of the traditional East-European type with all the tempo of the formerly bustling Jewish communities of Warsaw, Vilna or Lodz.'⁷⁵ According to Pinson, these DPs had no interest in assimilating into German society:

On one point there is universal agreement – that Jews must not in any way contribute to the rehabilitation of the German economy. 'We have slaved for the Germans enough', they say, 'and we will not contribute to the recovery of the nation that is responsible for the mass slaughter of our people'. This attitude is largely

responsible for the failure of Jewish DP's to seek gainful employment in Germany. They will work for UNRRA, they will work for the occupying powers, they will work for their own camp, but they steadfastly refuse to seek any integration into German industry or commerce.⁷⁶

Since most eastern Jewish DPs rejected the notion of a Jewish future in Germany, viewing it instead as a transit station on the way to the United States or Palestine, they also often refused to acknowledge the authority of German civil and political institutions, giving both the German police and the occupiers an excuse to regard them as a somewhat lawless population.⁷⁷ At the same time, Jewish DPs wanted to ensure their demands were heard and therefore tended to stage public protests in streets and squares, favouring a 'direct and confrontational style of politics typical of prewar Jewish nationalists – the "politics of noise," as its opponents had labeled it'.⁷⁸ All of these aspects combined to make a conspicuous minority even more noticeable in post-war Berlin, rendering it unpopular with both Germans and occupiers.

Germany's DP population decreased considerably in mid-1948, following the establishment of Israel in May and a change in US immigration rules in the same year.⁷⁹ Additionally, most Berlin DPs were evacuated from the city's western sectors during the early phase of the Berlin blockade in July 1948 in order to reduce the number of people the Western Allies needed to supply by air: empty planes returning from their food deliveries for 'Operation Vittles' were used to transport DPs to Frankfurt in the American zone. However, around 150 Jewish DPs chose to remain in Berlin, and Jewish organizations estimated that several hundred returned to the city over the following months to resume their trade.⁸⁰

While most black market activity in Germany had ceased after the currency reform of 1948, Berlin's western sectors remained a hotbed of illicit trade due to the scarcity of goods created by the Soviet blockade. Although voluntary Jewish returnees were no longer eligible for assistance from Jewish aid organizations, their illegal trading on Kurfürstendamm continued, leading to increased friction with Berlin's German Jewish community (*Jüdische Gemeinde*).⁸¹ German-born Steven Schwarzschild, who had returned from exile in the United States to serve as Chief Rabbi of Berlin from September 1948 to May 1950, articulated these differences in outlook between Jewish DPs from eastern Europe and Berlin's Jewish community in a report for the World Union for Progressive Judaism (London) in December 1948:

Due to the greatly different attitudes to almost every problem affecting Jewish existence in this country, beginning with the relationship to the German environment and state, to questions of Jewish Law and rite, as well as the difference of language and mentality, it is next to impossible to establish a working relationship with the elements of Eastern European Orthodoxy.⁸²

Eastern Jewish DPs were thus ostracized not just by non-Jewish Germans and some parts of the occupying forces, but also by their German co-religionists, who regarded them as a potential hindrance to their own successful re-integration into post-war German society.

Given this negative climate, it is clear that introducing a vivid screen presence such as Fagin, the greasy, petty criminal who hoards his valuables away, would further inflame the already fraught situation in occupied Berlin. In a highly confidential report on the *Oliver Twist* riots, Schwarzschild identified the crowd of protesters as having been 'constituted almost exclusively of the former DPs who now transact their business of a dubious nature on the Kurfuerstendamm' and claimed that they were using the *Oliver Twist* screenings as an occasion to articulate their frustration with British foreign policy:

The general attitude was one of defiance, not so much of the German public and police as rather of British authority. (The psychological pattern is consciously an imitation of Israeli precedents: 'In Israel we defied England and won; here we are defying England and shall win. In Israel we used these methods; we shall do so here.' On the whole these are people who are rootless and without any social or moral anchorage, but who compensate for this lack by fancying themselves in the role of patriots in exile.⁸³)

Schwarzschild was not the only one to criticize the DP population's use of *Oliver Twist* as an opportunity for its 'politics of noise'. A Berlin woman, writing to British Military Governor Brian Robertson in February 1949, objected to the film's cancellation, demanding that Berliners should be allowed to make up their own minds about it. Having argued that it was not the film itself but contemporary newspapers which incited anti-Semitic feeling among Germans, she asked:

What is the attitude of the mayor and of the world to the fact that we calmly watch the 'gold and silver men' openly conduct their business on the Kurfürstendamm? No-one is afraid that the behaviour of these people, who are all without exception Jews, might give rise to anti-Semitic tendencies! The Jewish community [*Jüdische Gemeinde*] and the mayor should make it their first task to make these people disappear for good from the Kurfürstendamm; by allowing them to remain they are causing far greater harm to themselves and could be encouraging anti-Semitism. Our peaceful attitude, particularly towards these Jews, surely affords the best evidence of our opinion.⁸⁴

According to this Berlin citizen, neither the British film nor the German population was to blame for the anti-Semitic climate, but the foreign Jews themselves, who were solely responsible for Berlin's black market, and making a sizeable profit from it.

This attitude was not confined to Berlin, or even to occupied Germany, but could also be found in some parts of the British press. Disregarding anti-Semitism's long historical roots in Germany, an article in *The Times* stated:

It is generally agreed that most of the demonstrators were Polish Jews who have come to Berlin as displaced persons or refugees. These non-German Jews predominate in the black market on the Kurfürstendamm, the main street of the

British sector. Their presence and apparent prosperity has contributed much to such anti-Semitism as now exists here.⁸⁵

Meanwhile, the *Daily Telegraph* reported that German bystanders had ‘openly expressed their indignation at the inability of the police to deal with “foreign spivs and black market operators”’, and the newspaper concluded that ‘British prestige has suffered severely by allowing the film to be twice forced off the screen by an organized demonstration of a handful of foreigners.’⁸⁶ Joining forces with the German population to defend Berlin against the negative influence of eastern European Jews, *The Times* reached the astonishing verdict that ‘the only positive result of an unhappy episode has been to increase German feeling against foreign Jews.’⁸⁷ Less than four years after the liberation of Belsen, and following a protracted struggle over Palestine, allegiances had clearly shifted: in the British press at least, Germans and Jews had effectively switched roles as victims and perpetrators.

Oliver Twist and *Jud Süß*

Only ten days after the violent clashes surrounding the release of *Oliver Twist*, the trial against German film director Veit Harlan opened in Hamburg (in the British zone). Harlan was charged with crimes against humanity, with the trial focusing particularly on his 1940 film *Jud Süß* – the most notoriously anti-Semitic work of Nazi cinema. It was argued that the film had incited racial hatred against the Jewish population and thus encouraged anti-Semitic pogroms. According to the *Telegraf*, Harlan’s defence had requested a screening of David Lean’s *Oliver Twist* during the trial.⁸⁸ *Oliver Twist* was to be used as an example of works which could unintentionally appear anti-Semitic, thus ostensibly exonerating Harlan by showing that he was not the only director to produce this kind of work, and weakening the claim that *Jud Süß* had had a unique political impact.⁸⁹ Through its use as evidence to defend an alleged former Nazi propagandist, Lean’s film became an even greater embarrassment to the British authorities.

Harlan’s request to use *Oliver Twist* as part of his defence strategy was already known when the film opened in Berlin, and repeatedly used to condemn it in the press. A few days after the violent protests, the Soviet-licensed *Berliner Zeitung* noted with more than a hint of irony:

Anyone still harbouring doubts as to whether *Oliver Twist* is an anti-Semitic film has now had confirmation of this through the behaviour of a highly competent expert. Veit Harlan has demanded that the film be shown ‘in his defence’, and the court has granted this request.⁹⁰

It seems that the mere association with the name Harlan was enough to prove the film’s anti-Semitic bias. Harlan’s trial, however, proved to be a more complicated matter.

The court was not debating whether *Jud Süß* was anti-Semitic, nor whether Harlan was responsible for making the film. Instead, the prosecution was attempting to show that the act of creating the film constituted a crime against humanity, because it had

led directly to violent anti-Semitic behaviour, and thus helped to legitimize genocide. In a sense, it was not Harlan who was on trial, but the film *Jud Süß* itself. However, this direct causal link between a film and specific political events was extremely difficult to prove. In charging Harlan with crimes against humanity, the court had set itself a number of impossible tasks. Firstly, it had to decide whether directing *Jud Süß* constituted a crime according to the laws of the occupation. Secondly, it had to determine the extent of the director's input into the finished product. Thirdly, it had to define the original intentions behind the film. And finally, it had to establish the film's reception by analysing its effect on the population in the early 1940s.⁹¹ Due to the difficulty of marshalling evidence for any of these factors, Harlan was eventually acquitted on 23 April 1949.⁹² He had successfully argued that Goebbels had forced him to make the film. The fact that Harlan had never been a member of the Nazi Party and that his first wife had been Jewish also counted in his favour.⁹³ The court could prove neither that Harlan had taken an active part in the genocide, nor that he had known of the intentions of those in power in the Third Reich. It eventually concluded that 'the measures of persecution and extermination [of Jews] would have been carried out even without the film *Jud Süß*'.⁹⁴

Harlan's acquittal caused outrage in the Soviet-licensed press. According to the *Berliner Zeitung*, the Harlan trial was proof that Western Allied policy over the past four years had led to 'the tearing up of the Potsdam Agreement and remilitarization'.⁹⁵ The paper went on to link the verdict with the recent *Oliver Twist* protests:

It is unsurprising that a military government which tried to force through an anti-Semitic film with the aid of weapons would let the director of another anti-Semitic film be acquitted.⁹⁶

Neue Zeit provided a more measured response to the verdict, recognizing the legal difficulties involved:

If we assume that Harlan cannot legally be convicted for his work on the film *Jud Süß*, this does not so much prove that there is a loophole in our legal system, but that Harlan's 'crime' is of a kind not covered by the law.⁹⁷

The paper lamented that the Hamburg court had not added a moral condemnation to its announcement of Harlan's acquittal, claiming that it was now the press's responsibility to prevent Harlan from regaining a foothold as a director in post-war Germany.

Long before the court reached its verdict on Harlan, Rabbi Schwarzschild had realized the impact the *Oliver Twist* incident would have on the trial's outcome:

The Jewish community of Berlin has done almost irreparable damage to the prosecution of this Nazi, because the Defence has announced the position that, basing itself on the identification of the film 'Jew Suss' with 'Oliver Twist' [...], if Veit Harlan is to be punished, so would have to be dealt with J. Arthur Rank and the British producers of the film 'Oliver Twist'.⁹⁸

The outcome of the Harlan trial and the strong criticism it attracted drew attention to the uncomfortable continuities in anti-Semitic stereotyping from Nazi cinema to post-war British films. The Berlin protesters had merely pointed out these continuities, certainly not wishing Harlan to be acquitted, but instead highlighting the underlying anti-Semitism which in their view informed British foreign and occupation policy.

There were of course important differences between Lean's *Oliver Twist* and Harlan's *Jud Süß*. Lean had not made his film in order to incite racial hatred, or indeed in any way to promote a particular government policy. Unlike *Jud Süß*, the film was not systematically screened in all occupied territories in order to legitimize policies of discrimination and persecution. Instead, *Oliver Twist* was released in British-occupied Germany because it was one of very few high-quality British films available at the time, making officials oblivious to, or willing to overlook, the film's inherent anti-Semitism. However, this tacit acceptance of British anti-Semitism was exposed in the Harlan trial. The entire trial rested on the belief that a film could directly influence the viewer's political outlook. Harlan's defence cleverly exploited this premise: once *Oliver Twist* had been admitted as evidence, the court could not convict Harlan without also indicting cultural products beyond Germany's borders and forcing the occupying powers to examine their own racial prejudices.

Conclusion

Analysing reactions to Lean's *Oliver Twist* in post-war Germany throws into sharp focus the connections between politics and culture under occupation, and the problems caused by differences in occupation policy. With regard to the perception of Jewish distinctiveness, politics and culture reinforced each other in perpetuating stereotypes which mobilized antagonism towards eastern Jews; while American support for Jewish DPs set them apart from the German population, British cultural policy enabled a film to be screened which drew on a visual language familiar to German viewers from Nazi cinema, promoting the view that Jews were markedly different from the rest of the population. The incident complicates Stern's notion of a 'historic triangle' composed of occupiers, Germans and Jews by demonstrating that the 'occupier' category was by no means monolithic. Even when limiting the analysis to American and British occupation policy, we need to pay attention to the differences between the two. Once this distinction is made, it becomes clear that there was no such thing as 'Allied occupation policy': an occupying power's policies and attitudes on the ground in Germany were influenced by that country's domestic pressure groups, specific national history and wider foreign policy interests. Thus, both the change in American DP policy and the decision to ban *Oliver Twist* from the US occupation zone occurred as responses to domestic outrage and lobbying by the American Jewish community. An unintended consequence of US policy was that Germans once again found in the highly conspicuous and allegedly 'privileged' Jewish DP community a scapegoat for their own post-war economic misfortune, reviving prejudices fostered before and during the war. Meanwhile, British DP policy was based on denying Jewish distinctiveness in order to protect Britain's foreign interests in Palestine. Screening

Oliver Twist in Berlin brought all of these issues to a head: the film's othering of eastern Jews exposed British denials of Jewish distinctiveness as false and gave protesters and journalists the opportunity of likening the British occupiers to the Nazi regime they had replaced.

It is no coincidence that the protests occurred in Berlin: this was where the world powers most obviously jostled for dominance after the Second World War. Any differences in occupation policy were thrown into sharp relief through the close geographic proximity of four different sectors, allowing for direct comparison between occupying forces. Thus, in Berlin it was possible for Jewish DPs to access aid in a US sector camp and trade their surplus goods in other sectors, arousing discontent among the German population. Equally, in Berlin inhabitants could see films which had not been released in their zone of occupation, simply by crossing into a different sector. It was also possible for foreign journalists to observe and contrast the treatment of Jews in different sectors of Berlin and report this to their readers at home. The *Oliver Twist* protests were one of many examples showing that four-power control over one city engendered more problems than the occupiers could hope to foresee, and might at any point shed a very negative light on one occupying power while the others looked on. A key concern at this time of incipient Cold War was avoiding embarrassment on the international stage, particularly in the eyes of the other occupiers. The persistent attacks between different zonal newspapers following the *Oliver Twist* protests demonstrate that the Soviet-zone media in particular would seize any opportunity to exploit another power's perceived weakness in the ideological struggle over Germany's future. Accordingly, British steps to rectify the policy blunder demonstrated an overriding concern with appearance over substance: while the film was withdrawn from Germany following the Berlin clashes, nothing about British occupation policy actually changed, indicating that ultimately politics trumped culture. Having caused a riot in Berlin, Fagin disappeared from German screens, but controversial attitudes towards unassimilated Jews did not.

Notes

- 1 See 'Baton charge on Berlin *Oliver Twist* Objectors', *Daily Telegraph*, 22 February 1949, 1; 'Berlin Cinema Fight: *Oliver Twist* - Jews Stop First Performance', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 February 1949, 5; 'Berlin Jews Object to *Oliver Twist* Film', *The Times*, 21 February 1949, 3; 'Fagin in Berlin Provokes a Riot', *LIFE*, 7 March 1949, 38-9; Drew Middleton, 'Berliners Halt *Oliver Twist* Film: Call Fagin Portrayal Anti-Semitic', *The New York Times*, 21 February 1949, 1.
- 2 Frank Stern, 'The Historic Triangle: Occupiers, Germans and Jews in Postwar Germany', in *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era*, ed. Robert G. Moeller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 199.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 203
- 4 In the late 1940s, 54 per cent of the West Berlin's population regularly attended the cinema. See Bettina Greffrath, *Gesellschaftsbilder der Nachkriegszeit: Deutsche Spielfilme 1945-1949* (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1995), 124.

- 5 Heide Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 5.
- 6 See Charles Drazin, 'Dickens's Jew – from Evil to Delightful', *The Jewish Chronicle*, 3 May 2013: <https://www.thejc.com/comment/comment/dickens-s-jew-from-evil-to-delightful-1.44612> (accessed 21 October 2018); Juliet John, 'Fagin, the Holocaust and Mass Culture; or, *Oliver Twist* on Screen', *Dickens Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (2005): 204–23; Al McKee, 'Art or Outrage? *Oliver Twist* and the Flap over Fagin', *Film Comment* 36, no. 1 (2000): 40–5; Maria Cristina Paganoni, 'From Book to Film: The Semiotics of Jewishness in *Oliver Twist*', *Dickens Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (2010): 307–20; Gene Phillips, *Beyond the Epic: The Life and Films of David Lean* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006).
- 7 See Gabriele Clemens, *Britische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland 1945–1949: Literatur, Film, Musik und Theater* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997).
- 8 See Steven S. Schwarzschild, 'Highly Personal and Confidential Report of the Events Resulting from the Showing of the British Film *Oliver Twist* in Berlin, February 19th–22nd' [25 February 1949], *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 61 (2016): 243–8.
- 9 See Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Susanne Dietrich and Julia Schulze Wessel, ed., *Zwischen Selbstorganisation und Stigmatisierung: Die Lebenswirklichkeit jüdischer Displaced Persons und die neue Gestalt des Antisemitismus in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998); Fritz Bauer Institut, ed., *Überlebt und unterwegs: Jüdische Displaced Persons im Nachkriegsdeutschland* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997); Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Anna Holian, *Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015); Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, 'Jüdische Überlebende als "Displaced Persons": Untersuchungen zur Besatzungspolitik in den deutschen Westzonen und zur Zuwanderung osteuropäischer Juden', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 9 (1983): 421–52; Königseder and Juliane Wetzal, *Waiting for Hope: Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-World War II Germany*, trans. John A. Broadwin (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001); Avinoam J. Patt and Michael Berkowitz, ed., *'We Are Here': New Approaches to Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2010). One notable exception focusing specifically on Berlin is Angelika Königseder, *Flucht nach Berlin: Jüdische Displaced Persons 1945–1948* (Berlin: Metropol, 1998).
- 10 See Hester Baer, *Dismantling the Dream Factory: Gender, German Cinema, and the Postwar Quest for a New Film Language* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009); Frank Noack, *Veit Harlan: 'Des Teufels Regisseur'* (Munich: Belleville, 2000); Siegfried Zielinski, *Veit Harlan: Analysen und Materialien zur Auseinandersetzung mit einem Film-Regisseur des deutschen Faschismus* (Frankfurt: Rita G. Fischer, 1981).
- 11 For photographic documentation of Guinness's transformation see Phil De Semlyen, 'Stuart Freeborn at Work: Turning Alec Guinness into Fagan [sic]', *Empire*, 7 February 2013: <http://www.empireonline.com/features/stuart-freeborn-oliver-twist-make-up> (accessed 22 October 2018).
- 12 Joseph I. Breen to A. Reginald Allen, 13 May 1947, *Oliver Twist* file, Production Code Administration (PCA) files, Margaret Herrick Library, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, Beverly Hills, CA, USA. For more on this controversy, see Thomas Doherty, *Hollywood's Censor: Joseph I. Breen & The Production Code Administration*

- (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 222–4; Anthony Slide, *Banned in the USA: British Films in the United States and Their Censorship, 1933–1960* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 112–13.
- 13 Lean quoted in Phillips, *Beyond the Epic*, 129.
- 14 McKee, 'Art or Outrage?', 44; John, 'Fagin, the Holocaust and Mass Culture', 207.
- 15 See Slide, *Banned in the USA*, 113. Lean's *Oliver Twist* was eventually released in the United States in 1951 with twelve minutes of film cut.
- 16 See Hansjörg Gehring, *Amerikanische Literaturpolitik in Deutschland 1945–1953: Ein Aspekt des Re-Education-Programms* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1976), 57–8.
- 17 Charles Dickens, *Oliver Twist* (1837–1838; Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1992), 70.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 70 and 166.
- 19 Charles Dickens to Mrs Eliza Davis, 1863, quoted in Deborah Heller, 'The Outcast as Villain and Victim: Jews in Dicken's *Oliver Twist* and *Our Mutual Friend*', in *Jewish Presences in English Literature*, ed. Derek Cohen and Deborah Heller (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 42.
- 20 See Phillips, *Beyond the Epic*, 129.
- 21 Drazin, 'Dickens's Jew'.
- 22 Paganoni, 'From Book to Film', 311.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 313.
- 24 For the German dubbing cast, see Martin Schowanek, *Deutsche Synchronkartei*: <https://www.synchronkartei.de/film/3862> (accessed 22 October 2018).
- 25 See Steven E. Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 3; Julia Schulze Wessel, 'Zur Reformulierung des Antisemitismus in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft: Eine Analyse deutscher Polizeiakten aus der Zeit von 1945 bis 1948', in *Zwischen Selbstorganisation und Stigmatisierung: Die Lebenswirklichkeit jüdischer Displaced Persons und die neue Gestalt des Antisemitismus in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft*, ed. Susanne Dietrich and Schulze Wessel (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998), 151.
- 26 Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers*, 3.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 11.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 230.
- 30 Paganoni, 'From Book to Film', 310.
- 31 'Fagin in Berlin', *LIFE*, 39.
- 32 See Clemens, *Britische Kulturpolitik*, 165.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 174.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 166–7.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 170.
- 36 'Provokation gegen das fortschrittliche Berlin', *Neues Deutschland*, 22 February 1949, 4.
- 37 See 'Fagin in Berlin', *LIFE*, 38; 'Berlin Cinema Fight', *Manchester Guardian*, 5.
- 38 Political Division to Foreign Office, 22 February 1949, FO 1056/265, The National Archives (London) (TNA).
- 39 'Blutige Krawalle um *Oliver Twist*', *Der Sozialdemokrat*, 22 February 1949, 1.
- 40 'Berlin Cinema Fight', *Manchester Guardian*, 5; 'Oliver Twist abgesetzt', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 22 February 1949, 4.
- 41 'Gegen neofaschistische Rassehetze', *Berliner Zeitung*, 23 February 1949, 2.
- 42 *Ibid.*

- 43 'Protest gegen *Oliver Twist*', *Neue Zeit*, 22 February 1949, 3.
- 44 'Oliver Twist', *Neues Deutschland*, 23 February 1949, 1.
- 45 'Eine Schande für das demokratische Berlin', *Neues Deutschland*, 23 February 1949, 8.
- 46 'Oliver Twist abgesetzt', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 4.
- 47 'Der eilige Protest: Zu dem Film *Oliver Twist*', *Der Kurier*, 21 February 1949, 3.
- 48 Arno Scholz, 'Auf deutschem Rücken ausgetragen', *Telegraf*, 22 February 1949, 16.
- 49 'Baton Charge', *Daily Telegraph*, 1.
- 50 'Tumulte gegen den Film *Oliver Twist*', *Der Sozialdemokrat*, 21 February 1949, 3.
- 51 'Blutige Krawalle', *Der Sozialdemokrat*, 1.
- 52 Political Division to Foreign Office, 22 February 1949, FO 1056/265, TNA.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Vintage, 2004), 14–15.
- 55 See Jacobmeyer, 'Jüdische Überlebende als "Displaced Persons"', 421.
- 56 See Leonard Dinnerstein, 'Britische und amerikanische DP-Politik', in *Überlebt und unterwegs: Jüdische Displaced Persons im Nachkriegsdeutschland*, ed. Fritz Bauer Institut (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997), 109–10.
- 57 Earl G. Harrison, 'Text of Report to the President on Conditions among Refugees in Western Europe', *New York Times*, 30 September 1945, 38.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Cohen, *In War's Wake*, 135.
- 62 See Königseder and Wetzel, *Waiting for Hope*, 34.
- 63 See Grossmann, *Jews*, 140.
- 64 See Stern, 'The Historic Triangle', 219.
- 65 See Leonard Dinnerstein, 'America, Britain, and Palestine: The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and the Displaced Persons, 1945–46', *Diplomatic History* 4, no. 3 (1980): 285; Königseder and Wetzel, *Waiting for Hope*, 38.
- 66 Patt and Berkowitz, 'We Are Here', 3.
- 67 See Grossmann, *Jews*, 132.
- 68 Königseder, *Flucht nach Berlin*, 205.
- 69 Grossmann, *Jews*, 165.
- 70 Laura J. Hilton, 'The Black Market in History and Memory: German Perceptions of Victimhood from 1945 to 1948', *German History* 28, no. 4 (2010): 488.
- 71 Ibid., 488 and 496.
- 72 See Königseder, *Flucht*, 182.
- 73 Hilton, 'The Black Market', 495.
- 74 See Königseder, *Flucht*, 188–9.
- 75 Koppel S. Pinson, 'Jewish Life in Liberated Germany: A Study of the Jewish DP's', *Jewish Social Studies* 9 (1947): 104.
- 76 Ibid., 113.
- 77 See Holian, *Between National Socialism*, 187.
- 78 Ibid., 190.
- 79 Hilton, 'The Black Market', 496.
- 80 See Königseder, *Flucht*, 197–8.
- 81 Ibid., 198–200.
- 82 Steven S. Schwarzschild, 'Quarterly Report to the World Union for Progressive Judaism 29th December 1948', *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 61 (2016): 236–7.
- 83 Schwarzschild, 'Highly Personal and Confidential Report', 245.

- 84 K. Küppers, 'Eine Berliner Meinung zu Oliver Twist', letter to General Brian Robertson, Berlin, 26 February 1949, FO 1056/265, TNA.
- 85 'Berliners Not to See *Oliver Twist*', *The Times*, 23 February 1949, 3.
- 86 'Baton Charge', *Daily Telegraph*, 1.
- 87 'Berliners Not to See *Oliver Twist*', *Times*, 3.
- 88 See 'Veit Harlan vor Gericht', *Telegraf* (Berlin edition), 4 March 1949, 2.
- 89 See Noack, *Veit Harlan*, 300.
- 90 'Jud Süß und *Oliver Twist*', *Berliner Zeitung*, 26 February 1949, 3.
- 91 See Zielinski, *Veit Harlan*, 47.
- 92 The prosecution immediately appealed this decision, and another trial was held in 1950 – also resulting in an acquittal.
- 93 See Baer, *Dismantling the Dream Factory*, 203.
- 94 'Freispruch für Veit Harlan: Ernste Warnung und Mahnung der Berliner VVN', *Neues Deutschland*, 24 April 1949, 7.
- 95 'Wider den Blut-Regisseur: Protest gegen den Freispruch im Harlan-Prozeß', *Berliner Zeitung*, 29 April 1949, 3.
- 96 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 97 'Was das Hamburger Gericht vergessen hat', *Neue Zeit*, 24 April 1949, 1.
- 98 Schwarzschild, 'Highly Personal and Confidential Report', 247.

Cultural memories of occupation in the Japanese cinema theatre, 1945–52

Jennifer Coates

Introduction

In some respects the Allied occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 would appear to be a relatively straightforward kind of occupation, which could be characterized fairly simply as ‘a form of government imposed by force or threat thereof’.¹ Following the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, which ended a protracted and widespread military campaign of fifteen years in east Asia and the Pacific region, Japan was extremely vulnerable to further force, or the threat of force, from the victorious Allies. Prominent historians such as John Dower have argued that the citizens of post-war Japan even embraced defeat.² The Allied occupation of Japan, led predominantly by US forces (except in Hiroshima, Tottori, Okayama, Shimane, Yamaguchi and the island of Shikoku), is popularly understood as a successful example of occupation, laying the ground for a special relationship between Japan and the United States for decades to come.

As Mire Koikari notes in this volume, the field of ‘Occupation Studies’ (*Senryō Kenkyū*) ‘has predominantly focused on US rule in mainland Japan’, obscuring the roles of other Allied forces (such as British Commonwealth Occupation Forces) and other geographical locations (such as Okinawa). Much English-language and Japanese scholarship repeats this pattern, while Okinawan scholarship has been marginalized in the field.³ In Japanese film studies we can observe similar tendencies, with some disciplinary specificities. Scholarship in Japanese and in English on cinema under occupation has largely focused on the relationship between Tokyo-based studio personnel and the offices of the US-led Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (hereafter ‘SCAP’). In part, this narrow focus is due to the significant amount of documentation on film production and censorship produced by SCAP and archived in Japan and the United States. These materials have allowed film scholars to trace the conception and production of film texts, intertwining film history and occupation history. Occupation personnel have written some of the foundational texts on the cinema culture of the period, published in both Japanese and English.⁴

Another structural factor in the focus on Tokyo-US relations during the occupation is the large number of American films imported and screened during the period. As Hollywood was one of the few thriving film industries by 1945, American-made films dominated global cinema screens in the years of devastation following the end of the Second World War. Furthermore, as film studies as a discipline began in the post-war era, Japan's first film scholars were almost all connected to the occupation in some way. For example, Donald Richie, the first recognized critic and scholar to publish on Japanese cinema in English, first came to Japan with the US occupation force in 1947. The very foundations of the field are therefore tied to a particular experience of the occupation of Japan that privileges the Tokyo-US relationship.

As Koikari argues, this narrow focus is a 'methodological and epistemological blind spot' in studies of the occupation.⁵ While we are yet to see significant studies of occupation-era cinema culture in Okinawa and other regions, this chapter attempts to shift focus from Tokyo by presenting material from an ethnographic study of the memories of film viewers in the Kansai region of western Japan. Further moving away from the top-down approach that privileges the accounts of state actors, US occupation personnel and bureaucratic materials such as SCAP memos, the focus of this chapter is the voices of Kansai residents, largely children, during the occupation. In this way, I aim to contribute to the shifting of 'Occupation Studies' away from the dominant focus on Tokyo-US relations, towards the regions and to include grass-roots voices.

In the spirit of this volume, which asserts the impossibility of establishing a catch-all definition of or approach to 'occupation', this chapter further explores living memories of how certain key aims of the Allied occupation of Japan were mediated in order to question the success of these goals. Focusing on the attempts of SCAP to educate the populace about the new rights for women included in the 1947 Constitution of Japan, this chapter explores the role of censored cinema content in communicating occupation-led social reforms. In the living memories of those who grew up in the era, certain aspects of the Allied occupation of Japan appear to have left a different cultural legacy from that which the censors of the time foresaw. Despite a thriving film culture in Japan, audiences did not comply with many of SCAP's suggestions for behavioural change. Ethnographic research with viewers who attended the cinema during this period reveals the limits of how occupation policy shaped cultural expression, and how cultural expression is received and interpreted by occupied peoples. Based on four years of fieldwork in the Kansai region of western Japan, the study on which this chapter is based is comprised of interviews with viewers who regularly attended the cinema during the Allied occupation of Japan; a large-scale questionnaire project with participants born between 1935 and 1950; and participant observation at retrospective film screenings and film clubs specializing in occupation-era cinema. The memories shared by now-elderly viewers suggest the value of an ethnographic approach for understanding the structuring elements behind non-conformist behavioural patterns during occupation. We must distinguish non-compliance and deliberate subversion from bad planning or unfounded expectations on the part of occupation forces and bureaucratic bodies. At the same time, we must also account for changes in memories of occupation over time, as citizens with experience of occupation readjust their recollections to fit with the contemporary socio-political concerns of our globalized

world, and re-narrate the experience of occupation for younger generations. This chapter demonstrates the key role that memories of cinema play in this contemporary interaction, responding to the fundamental question of how occupation shapes cultural expression, and how resulting 'cultures of occupation' can be studied and understood.

The occupation of Japan, 1945–52

A fixation on national 'cultures' and 'values' features prominently in the planning and documentation of occupation, and in accounts of ongoing relationships between occupied societies and the 'occupied'. This has certainly been the case for the US-Japan relationship, often discussed in terms of shared or conflicting 'cultures'. John Dower points to a US obsession with 'culture' during wartime, arguing that 'postwar American fixations on "culture" were rooted in World War II'.⁶ Orientation films for soldiers and occupation personnel, such as *Our Job In Japan*, 'gracefully explained that, "Our problems in the brain, inside of the Japanese head"'.⁷ Occupation goals were posited in terms of 'changing Japanese minds by drastically altering the political, social, economic and educational structures that had conditioned them to think and behave as they did'.⁸ The popular cinema was identified as one means to change this conditioning.

After beginning the occupation of Japan on 2 September 1945, SCAP circulated the *Memorandum Concerning Elimination of Japanese Government Control of the Motion Picture Industry* on 16 October 1945,⁹ indicating that the cinema was imagined as a means to 'educate' and 'reorient' Japanese viewers.¹⁰ Censors regularly instructed Japanese filmmakers in the kind of content expected of post-war cinema, requesting changes and deletions in synopses and screenplays, before censoring or completely suppressing final film prints. Trade and fan magazines were similarly restricted in their reporting on the film industry and its stars.

While a number of chapters in this volume explore how occupation creates new ways of seeing, and new ways of watching films, the censorship process in Japan from 1945 was surprisingly text- and discourse-based, rather than concerned with visuality as such. The Motion Picture Division of the Civil Information and Education Section (hereafter 'CIE') checked synopses, screenplays and filming plans, while the Civil Censorship Detachment (hereafter 'CCD') examined prints, before approving or suppressing a film. Filmmaker Iwasaki Akira, who was forced to work closely with CIE and CCD personnel in the early years of the occupation, noted bitterly the importance of written materials in the attempt to secure permission to start production on a new film. While Iwasaki recalled that the occupation personnel 'were convinced that cinema was a most important instrument for effecting the necessary changes to make Japan a peaceful and democratic nation',¹¹ he was sceptical about the development of this tool. Early written scenarios were examined by David Conde, head of the Motion Picture and Theatrical branch of the CIE until July 1946, who had no knowledge of the Japanese language.¹² He was assisted by a number of Japanese American officers, who Iwasaki alleges had 'less than perfect command of Japanese'.¹³ In this respect, the early

stages of occupation film production had more to do with writing, translation and imagination than they did with seeing.

At the same time, however, SCAP produced both written and filmed guides instructing viewers on *how* to watch (censored) films. In this respect, SCAP attempted to shape not only the film text but also the viewer's predicted response. A series of educational films produced by SCAP and the CIE demonstrated how this was to be done. A short educational film entitled *New Eyes, New Ears* (SCAP 1951), comprised of live action and animated sequences, identified children as a particular target demographic for educational screenings. Focusing on the activities of the 'audio-visual officer', the film shows two young men borrowing CIE-approved films from a local library, and being shown an instructional film-within-a-film on how to manage the screening. A seven-step plan for a successful screening included the following recommendations: preparing pre-selected viewers to drive the discussion session after the screening; explaining the reasons for showing the film; and advice to 'encourage the bashful to speak'.¹⁴ In this case, the 'bashful' audience member is animated as a blushing young woman. In addition to the emphasis on women and children as the target demographic for re-education through film screenings, we must also note that SCAP and CIE mandates focused on writing and talking about film over developing new ways of seeing.

Hiroshi Kitamura writes of the Japanese cinema as a "contact zone" that reflected the uneven power dynamic of the occupation.¹⁵ SCAP's censorship practice was similar in many ways to that of the wartime government; violent or sexualized imagery was banned under both systems, and while SCAP's insistence on the inclusion of kissing scenes was a direct counter-measure to the ban on displays of physical intimacy issued by Japan's wartime government,¹⁶ it reflected that same government's insistence on the inclusion of ideologically significant imagery with the aim of engendering a change in social attitudes. SCAP also encouraged the studios to self-censor, forming the Motion Picture Producers Association (Eiga Seisakusha Rengōkai) on 5 November 1945, renamed the Japanese Association of Filmmakers (Nihon Eiga Seisaku Renmei) on 1 March 1947, and colloquially abbreviated to 'Eiren'. Isolde Standish argues that the 'oligopolistic practices' of the major studios were 're-affirmed and re-enforced by the occupation reforms' in the 1950s in this way.¹⁷

There was significant popular demand for film products, as audiences in newly defeated Japan embraced the cinema as a means of escape from the harsh reality of the poverty and uncertainty of the early occupation years. The popularity of film grew rapidly from 1945, culminating in a peak admissions rate of 1.13 billion viewers in 1958.¹⁸ In interviews, many viewers recall the era as one 'without many entertainments'¹⁹ and the cinema is remembered as the major attraction for young children in particular, in comparison to radio broadcasts and reading materials.

Cinema production rates increased rapidly year on year during the occupation, as did film imports. SCAP controlled the import of foreign films to Japan, with a heavy bias for Hollywood productions, according to the 'one-distributor-per-country rule' announced in December 1946.²⁰ In 1946, thirty-nine American films, five foreign films of non-American origin (all imported before the war) and sixty-seven Japanese films were screened in cinemas. The Central Motion Pictures Exchange (CMPE) was

inaugurated in May 1947 as a private enterprise to import and distribute Hollywood films. By 1950 foreign imports had risen to 185, 133 of which were American. A new quota system was introduced in the same year to cap foreign imports based on the number of films from a particular country shown over the previous ten years. Just as SCAP censorship of Japanese-made films mirrored the Japanese wartime government's own censorship practices in many ways, the use of imported American-made films for 'attracting hearts and minds' during the occupation of Japan similarly echoes the earlier use of Japanese films and co-production films in Japan's colonies as pro-imperial propaganda.²¹ After the control of foreign film importation was given over to the Japanese government in 1951, the percentage of foreign films released in Japan declined from 52.7 per cent to 40.7 per cent between 1951 and 1952.²² Audience attendance was calculated at 733 million (rounded to the nearest million) in 1946, increasing by 3.2 per cent in 1947, 1.7 per cent in 1948 and 3.7 per cent in 1949.²³ In this way, the cinema provided a substantial audience for SCAP's carefully crafted and censored film content.

Reforming occupied Japan, women and children first

Censored media content was largely focused on communicating SCAP's key reform priorities to mass audiences. In October 1945, Supreme Commander General Douglas MacArthur included equal rights for women in five priority reforms, ranging from democratization to demilitarization. Universal suffrage, female admission to national universities and the elimination of the pre-war adultery law were ratified, and the Land Reform Law of October 1946 allowed women to inherit family property for the first time. By May 1947, support for gender equality had been included in Article 24 of the post-war Constitution, while Article 14 outlawed discrimination on the basis of sex. Furthermore, the payment of equal wages to both genders as stipulated in Japan's basic employment law, the Labor Standards Law (*Rōdō kihon-hō*), was also enacted in 1947. These measures towards gender equality were conceived as a means to democratize post-war Japan, and so censors advised filmmakers to include gender-equal characters and narratives in cinema productions.²⁴

While it would be wrong to consider the Allied occupation as the beginning of gender-equality discourse in Japan, the 1947 Constitution marked a major shift in the rights available to Japanese women. Before the outbreak of war, the *Meiroku Zasshi* (Meiji Six Society Journal, 1874–5) had featured an early debate on the definition of equality between women and men,²⁵ and activists such as Kishida Toshiko and Fukuda Hideko practised public speech making (*enzetsu*) in the early Meiji period.²⁶ After the government restricted women's political activities, journals such as *Fujin no Tomo* (Ladies' Companion) (1906–), *Seitō* (Blue-stocking) (1911–16) and *Fujin Kōron* (Ladies' Public Debate) (1916–) continued to present women's views, often related to the question of gender equality. Yet women's rights were not protected. In fact, women were actively restricted by a number of pre-occupation laws, including the Civil Code of 1898, which institutionalized a patriarchal approach to family structure through the Household System (*ie seido*), and the Household Registry Law (*Kosekihō*) enacted in

1871 (effective 1872) which worked with the Civil Code to ensure a legal framework that enforced the principles of male rule.

The inclusion of provisions for gender equality in Articles 14 and 24 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan is often discussed today as the occupation forces' legacy. However, Christine de Matos argues that 'gender reform was not a priority of the architects of the Occupation, but was rather an afterthought in the wider reform program, or perhaps subsumed beneath the more amorphous labels of democratization and human rights.'²⁷ Historians and activists alike speculate that Japanese activists and lawmakers would have achieved universal suffrage without the intervention of SCAP, in light of the destabilization of gender roles occasioned by wartime conscription and reliance on female labour. Nonetheless, occupation personnel took an active role in translating Article 24 of the new Constitution for the film industry.

David Conde encouraged studios to present a positive image of girls and women on film, banning the production of films that 'deal with or approve the subjugation or degradation of women.'²⁸ Studios and scriptwriters were encouraged to produce material that depicted emancipated Japanese girls and women as aspirational, and narratives featuring female subservience were deleted from film scripts.²⁹ SCAP influence over film content continued until June 1949, when regulation was taken over by the Motion Picture Code of Ethics Committee (Eiga Rinri Kitei Kanri Iinkai), a self-regulating organization modelled on the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (later the MPAA).

One might assume, as the occupation authorities appear to have, that achieving gender equality, at least as it was understood in 1945, would involve participants of both sexes. Not only must men and boys learn to treat women in a more egalitarian fashion, women and girls must learn to demand fairer treatment. Occupation authorities emphasized the need for women and girls to educate themselves about what gender equality could mean for female citizens.³⁰ A Political Information-Education Program, prepared by the CIE in June 1948, called for all media branches to coordinate in an effort to make Japanese audiences aware of the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizens.³¹ The programme advised liaising directly with Japanese film producers to persuade them to include material and themes related to the political education of the Japanese populace. In November 1948, the programme was developed into a 158-page book entitled *Information Programs*, designed as reference material for all CIE officers.³² Yuka Tsuchiya notes an emphasis on gender in this material in line with the CIE proposal for 'instituting gender democracy',³³ which suggested that politically informed film content could complement the political education conducted through community organizations, clubs and education programmes.³⁴ In the early post-war era, as many Japanese citizens 'embraced the overwhelmingly popular rhetoric of democracy',³⁵ girls were encouraged to participate confidently in public democratic life.³⁶ In the field of radio, recently enfranchised Japanese women were 'encouraged to broadcast their concerns and thoughts' as the CIE 'believed radio could play a vital role in teaching and preparing women to exploit their new positions in Japanese society'.³⁷ Yet occupation authorities and cinema industry personnel alike appear to have largely relied on

the assumed popularity of cinema to bring female viewers to the theatre. Special measures developed for radio, such as recruiting more female content creators, were not applied in the cinema industry.

There is some indication that individual producers and distributors attempted to ensure that young women participated in post-war cinema culture. The CMPE, which managed the distribution of US films, targeted features such as a post-war remake of *Little Women* (dir. Mervyn LeRoy, 1949) explicitly at a young female audience. Promotional events included 'four-sisters contests' and inviting girls with four siblings to attend cinema screenings for free.³⁸ Yet young female viewers at cinema theatres remained in the minority. The Sunday Audience Survey conducted by the Six Domestic Film Company Production Materials Survey Group (Hōga Rokusha Seisaku Shiryo Chōsa Kai No Nichiyō Kankyaku Chōsa) indicates that the total female audience peaked in 1956 with a turnout of 37.4 per cent.³⁹ During the occupation and into its aftermath, female viewers made up less than half of the commercial film theatre audience, although they outnumbered men within the Japanese population. In 1945, the population was 47.1 per cent male and 52.9 per cent female, with 4 million more women than men; by 1950, women outnumbered men by 1 million, or 51 per cent to 49 per cent (a demographic trend that continues today).⁴⁰

Female viewers attended the cinema in significantly lesser numbers than male viewers, particularly when we consider their over-representation in the occupation era population as a whole. This pattern is borne out by nation-wide studies of fan activities, for example, in annual surveys conducted by film magazine *Eiga no Tomo*, which registered the gender of respondents as two-thirds male.⁴¹ Girls and young women did participate in writing to fan columns, and a number of the magazine's advertisements were for female-oriented products such as lipstick.⁴² Yet editorial staff suggested that the lesser participation of women indicated the continuation of 'traditional' social norms,⁴³ including the muting of female voices – particularly those of the young, less independent and less well off – in the public sphere.

Given the thriving girl's magazine and *manga* industries, it seems significant that young female voices were muted in popular cinema discourse. When we compare girls' participation in popular cinema discourse with the number of young women writing to girl's lifestyle magazine *Shōjo no Tomo* (Girl's Friend), it seems clear that young female film viewers were not opting out of participation in cinema culture due to a general disinclination towards, or lack of precedent for contributing to popular culture discourse. Yet memories of the era related by viewers suggest that a number of factors prevented girls from attending the cinema in the same numbers as boys. The next section presents an account of the cinema spaces of occupation-era Japan alongside viewers' memories of how they accessed those spaces, raising key issues regarding girls' engagement with the cinema and its narratives. The ethnographic material presented below is drawn from a larger study that blends interviews with film viewers and material from a long-form questionnaire project with letters and emails on memories of cinema-going, and participant observation at several cinemas and film groups specializing in retrospective screenings of post-war films. All data has been anonymized using pseudonyms.

Going to the cinema in occupied Japan

Cinema theatres in occupied Japan were organized into three tiers: first-tier cinemas were the most expensive and showed the most recent films; second- and third-tier cinemas showed older films, often in shabbier surroundings and using older prints and equipment. These second- and third-tier theatres were cheaper and popular with children and young families. In the Kansai region, first-run 'roadshow' theatres were few: the Yasaka Kaikan in Kyoto, the ABC in Kobe and the Sennichimae in Osaka.⁴⁴ A number of cinemas had been destroyed or badly damaged by wartime bombing and fires. Yet the city of Kyoto alone had as many as sixty film theatres operating between 1947 and 1956,⁴⁵ so the choice was not limited except by the time and money available to the viewer. These factors correlate with age, gender and social class, as well as geographical location. The choices on offer ranged from the modern and well-designed film theatres advertising heating and cooling technologies, to the basic theatres located in less stylish parts of town or in the suburbs. Family trips to the film theatre involving children as young as four were generally limited to the second- and third-tier theatres, while the only questionnaire respondent whose first cinema encounter occurred in an up-market city centre cinema was also the oldest, aged nineteen on her first visit.

Attempts to improve and modernize film theatres were charted by local Kansai newspapers. These were used by individual theatres to communicate with their audiences about renovations and new rules. For example, in 1947 the Asahi Kaikan in Kyoto announced in a local newspaper that from May of the same year the 'stuffing system' (*tsumekomi shiki*) that had seen popular screenings filled to standing capacity would be replaced by a 'capacity limit, one showing' system, in which the theatre would be closed for entry after all seats were filled, and audience members would be asked to leave the theatre at the end of the film.⁴⁶ Due to audience dissatisfaction, this was replaced in the following year with a substitution system whereby a viewer leaving before the end of the screening gave up the empty seat to an arriving viewer, who could remain in the theatre for the next screening of the same film.

The Yasaka Grand introduced the first seat reservation system in Kyoto in 1947, which allowed viewers to sit together with companions, rather than wherever there was a space. In the cheaper second- and third-run cinemas, viewers were packed in with little regard to who had arrived together. First-tier cinemas disciplined the audience by requiring reservations and using seat allocation; yet at the same time, they also protected certain audience members by the same means. Second- and third-tier cinemas were certainly freer in terms of how the audience could come and go, or arrange themselves, but this very freedom could feel threatening to viewers positioned as vulnerable by age, gender, class and physical ability. Women in particular reported feeling uncomfortable and unsafe in packed theatres in their younger years. While young women from wealthy families had no difficulty accessing elite cinemas, girls from poorer backgrounds struggled to afford the safer first-tier cinemas, yet hesitated to enter the rowdy and dirty second- and third-tier theatres.

Even when explicitly encouraged to go to the cinema, young women met a number of obstacles to spending time freely there. A number of female study participants

recall being asked to bring their younger siblings to the cinema with them as a kind of incentivized babysitting. Of those who took very young children to the cinema, many recall being forced to leave the theatre, or becoming distracted from the film onscreen, by the behaviours and demands of younger siblings. A significant number of younger viewers, both male and female, recall forcing an older sister to leave the cinema theatre or miss key moments of a film, by crying, shouting or otherwise behaving in a manner requiring intervention. For example, Mr Hashimoto remembered his elder sister complaining that he caused her 'some amount of trouble' by crying in the cinema during a screening of *Shōnenki* (Boyhood) (dir. Kinoshita Keisuke, 1951).⁴⁷ Faced with the choice of babysitting at the cinema, going to a local playground or reading quietly at home, we can understand why even girls with an interest in film might prefer the quieter entertainments of magazines and novels or the freer space of the playground where noisy siblings would not cause the children to be ejected.

While elegant first-tier cinemas advertised theatre cooling techniques including enormous blocks of ice with flowers frozen inside of them, the majority of female interviewees and questionnaire respondents recalled the dirt and stench of second- and third-tier film theatres. Many noted the change in cinema culture from the occupation era to the present. An anonymous questionnaire respondent born in 1943, who began attending the cinema in 1948 at the age of five, wrote: 'In those days the film theatres weren't so beautiful. Now they look like hotels!' A significant number of female interviewees and questionnaire respondents also mentioned the unpleasant smell of the cheap seats near the toilets. Ms Yamashita, born in 1946, recalled, 'The smell was terrible!'⁴⁸ For children and younger viewers, these were the most affordable seats; however, the stench could give the movie-viewing experience a sense of sufferance, further dissuading girls from attending. Male participants did not discuss the conditions of the cinema theatres, except to note the prevalence of smoking. A number regretted that it is no longer possible to smoke, eat and drink in film theatres. Only one male respondent remembered bringing a younger child to the cinema, whereas the rest remembered being brought to the theatre by elder sisters or mothers.

Younger girls were therefore limited in their power to consume cinema narratives by several factors, including the availability and willingness of an elder relative to take them to the cinema. Boys recalled entering more freely, and often alone or with friends of the same age. Many male interviewees recalled entering the cinema without paying by claiming to have an urgent message for a friend inside the theatre.⁴⁹ In contrast, female study participants' memories of accessing the cinema as young girls in the early post-war era tend to feature warnings against visiting certain areas of town at certain times, and reminders to remain with friends or family members, prohibiting the free entry enjoyed by their male peers. Going to the cinema alone with a boy could make a girl vulnerable to criticism from other girls as well as adult family members and teachers.⁵⁰ While occupation personnel identified the cinema as a key tool for the re-education of the Japanese populace, in particular younger citizens, girls did not generally enjoy easy access to the cinema theatre. A significant imbalance in the gender of the post-war cinema audience, as well as differing ideals of acceptable cinema-going behaviours for young men and women, raises questions about the efficacy of using the cinema to empower girls.

Getting ‘inside of the Japanese head’: Films and their interpretation

Even when girls and young women could access the cinema, the reception of film content designed to empower young female viewers was not consistent with the re-education processes imagined by SCAP. Narratives that centred on female heroines taking their destinies into their own hands proliferated on the Japanese screen during the occupation, both in Japanese film productions and in a large number of imported American and European films. Many imports specifically targeted young viewers, as schoolchildren were imagined as a new generation with fewer ties to wartime ideologies, and greater potential to become ideal post-war democratic capitalist citizens. Humanist narratives about schoolchildren, educational documentary films and animated films were aimed at this demographic. Yet the narratives and imagery shaped by the occupiers did not always translate for the occupied as desired or planned.

For example, Ms Yamashita (born 1946) and Ms Otsuka (born 1943) recalled their memories of Disney’s *Cinderella* (dir. Clyde Geronimi, Hamilton Luske and Wilfred Jackson, 1950), which premiered in Japan on 7 March 1952, as less than favourable. The two visited the cinema separately to see the film, aged six and nine respectively. Both recalled a negative initial response to the film, which they actively enhanced during our conversation by mocking the narrative and its characters, encouraging each other in escalating their attacks on the film and its perceived morals. In this respect the recollections analysed below must be understood as living memories rather than objective record.

In theory, *Cinderella* was the ideal romantic fable for the era, complying with a number of occupation reform goals. After the passing of the 1947 Constitution, women could inherit property and petition for divorce, reforms which challenged the dominance of the old interdependent family system. The protagonist’s refusal to follow the wishes of her evil stepmother and elder siblings demonstrates the independent thinking that occupation reforms sought to implement in the younger generations of post-war Japan. *Cinderella*’s insistence on marrying for romantic love against her family’s wishes similarly reflects the new social climate in which women were encouraged to forgo the old system of arranged marriage, or to exercise their right of refusal and choose their spouses for themselves. Simultaneously, co-education was introduced and the compulsory schooling term was extended to nine years. Women were encouraged to obtain some tertiary education and to work before marriage, bringing Japan’s urban female population out of the home for longer than had previously been customary. In these key social developments, the likelihood of women and girls meeting their prince was significantly increased compared to the gendered segregation enforced within the middle and upper classes during wartime.

These aspects of the *Cinderella* story have been used to sell any number of products and services in Japan since 1952. Laura Miller notes the propensity of the title’s use in other films, television shows and novels, arguing that ‘*Cinderella* is used to denote individual agency to overcome obstacles or to achieve one’s dreams.’⁵¹ This is certainly borne out by responses collected by Wakakuwa Midori, who asked her female students to write essays about what *Cinderella* meant to them.⁵² ‘For many of the women, the

story of Cinderella represents the belief that one should seek one's cherished desires for the future. One student wrote that "I think it is a story about really holding onto a dream".⁵³ Cinderella as a model of a very American-style independence and agency still carries currency in Japan today. Yet for some young viewers at the end of the occupation in 1952, she was too much too soon.

Ms Yamashita and Ms Otsuka remember understanding Cinderella as a 'selfish' (*wagamama*) heroine making a silly fuss about a party. They questioned her choice to prioritize independence and romance over family, asking, 'Why couldn't she just stay at home?'⁵⁴ Cinderella's insistence that all single women had been invited to the ball was supposed to represent democratic reasoning, while her subsequent romance with Prince Charming emphasized young women's rights to the independent pursuit of romantic love, protected by the new Constitution. Yet Ms Yamashita and Ms Otsuka recalled their impressions of the heroine as needlessly forceful and dramatic, and joked that such passionate defence of one's independence and romantic happiness was read very differently in Japan than they imagined it would be in the United States. Young Japanese female viewers of romance and emancipation narratives were not the passive, compliant audiences posited by SCAP's censorship process, but rather were actively engaged and critical.

At the same time, however, Miller's account of the many afterlives of Cinderella in Japanese popular culture opens up the possibility that the film may have influenced Ms Yamashita and Ms Otsuka in other ways. Miller observes that the Japanese beauty and fitness industries have adopted the Cinderella icon, citing Takano Yuri's diet and fitness manual 'Five Points for Making a Cinderella Body'.⁵⁵ Despite rejecting Cinderella as a model for family relations and romantic partnership, Yamashita san is among many participants in the research project who continues to adhere to beauty and fitness principles in her later years. At age seventy-two, she hired a personal trainer to help her 'get back my waist', recalling Miller's observation that beauty regimes and contests using the Cinderella name are not restricted to the young. 'In the precincts of the salon, any woman, no matter how old she is, can become a Cinderella.'⁵⁶

These specific references to physical beauty ideals suggest Cinderella as a persuasive occupation-era heroine at the visual level at least, if not at a narrative level. The character's tiny waist, emphasized by her iconic blue ballgown, recalls the beauty narratives of the occupation era, which contrasted Japanese women's physical attributes unfavourably with those of the white Anglo-European women whose images appeared in magazines, advertising and imported films (Figure 3.1). The Australian Maida Coaldrake (née Williams), who lived in Japan for seven years during the occupation and its aftermath, castigated the Japanese female figure and carriage in 1949, claiming that even while wearing 'our type of clothes', the Japanese girls that she met 'lack the finish and carriage' due to a style of walking that would 'push your stomach alternately in and out'.⁵⁷ The custom of padding the waist under the kimono to create an even cylindrical torso contrasted with the 'wasp waist' popular in Western fashions of the 1940s, and positioned Japanese beauty ideals as far removed from the Anglo-European styles becoming popular in occupation-era Japan. Ms Yamashita's fixation on a defined waist suggests that the imported beauty ideals of the era are still valued by the generation that grew up under occupation.



Figure 3.1 Still from *Cinderella* (1950). Walt Disney Picture from the Ronald Grant Archive, *Cinderella* (US 1950), Date: 1950. Diomedia.

Cinderella's blond, waved hair may have been slightly less achievable than a belted waist, but the permanent wave became a fixture in post-war salons, in which, as Laura Miller argues, any woman 'can become a Cinderella'. Kanako Terasawa's interviews with female fans of Hollywood cinema record women copying the hairstyle of another cinema princess, Audrey Hepburn in *Roman Holiday* (dir. William Wyler, 1953).⁵⁸ Terasawa's interviewees recall making or ordering clothing inspired by the tight waists and full skirts of imported cinema, and Cinderella's flowing ballgown was certainly aspirational in a period of scarcity and restriction. The visual representation of such pro-democracy (and pro-romance) heroines influenced beauty ideals, whether they changed behaviours or not. Both consciously and unconsciously, girls were influenced by cinema content, but not always in the prescriptive manner imagined by occupation officials, industry personnel and advertising strategists.

Film stars as behavioural models

In addition to imported and animated films, SCAP and the studios also attempted to reach young film viewers through the stars of the post-war studio systems in Japan and overseas. A number of American, European and Japanese stars were marketed as emancipated female role models for young female viewers. As well as appearing in films with great frequency, occupation-era stars also spoke to the public through

censored trade and gossip magazines. In these publications, stars presented an image of their personal lives and opinions that was carefully designed to increase their popularity, and thereby their box office following, increasing the value of the star within the studio system. At the same time, professional commentators and everyday viewers published their own opinions about the stars in regular columns, editorials and fan sections of the popular journals. In this way, stars could be criticized or publicly shamed for performing in certain ways both on- and off-screen. This made it difficult for certain film stars to live out occupation reforms, even if they had wished to do so. Young film fans also observed the censure that certain stars received for Americanized or Westernized behaviours, and remember feeling dissuaded from practising those behaviours themselves.

For example, Hara Setsuko (1920–2015), a wartime child star whose pro-war image was rehabilitated in the early post-war era by Kurosawa Akira's humanist *Waga seishun ni kuinashi* (No Regrets for Our Youth, 1946), stood out among the popular Japanese actresses of the occupation era (Figure 3.2). While critics hailed Hara as a new type of woman, academics have considered the possibility that she may have been one of the first queer stars of the Japanese cinema.⁵⁹ Viewers' opinions about Hara were divided. While some considered her appearance, star persona and career to epitomize modern cosmopolitan femininity, others recorded distinctly ambivalent responses to her independent public persona.⁶⁰ Yet even young female viewers who considered Hara a successful modern woman struggled to see her as a practical role model. One female interviewee born in 1943, who began attending the cinema in 1949, articulated this difficulty in these terms:

Hara Setsuko was so beautiful, and she had so many male fans. I thought she certainly wasn't like other girls [...] But I always felt, how would you put it, she was a bit above everything. Maybe there were people like that in real life, you know, well, kind of closing their hearts (*kokoro ni shimatte*) and living out their whole lives alone. I thought, 'Well, I guess there is also that kind of way to live' (*sō iu ikikata mo arun da nā to omoimashita*).⁶¹

That 'kind of way to live' was hard for a young woman in post-war Japan to emulate. Hara publicly chided reporters for the gossip and industry presses who quizzed her on her romantic life, insisting on her independence, which led some to brand her 'aloof' (*kokō*).⁶² Hara's insistence on privacy was interpreted either as secrecy, hiding a non-heterosexual orientation, or as some speculate, covering a lifelong love for director Ozu Yasujirō, with whom she worked on some of her most famous films including the 'Noriko trilogy': *Banshun* (Late Spring, 1949), *Bakushū* (Early Summer, 1951) and *Tōkyō monogatari* (Tokyo Story, 1953). Hara retired after the director died in 1963 and became a reclusive figure in the Kamakura area outside Tokyo. While the independent Hara lived out many of the new freedoms young women had gained after the ratification of the post-war Constitution in 1947, it would nonetheless have been very difficult to live as she had, fiercely independent and without a recognized family structure. The relentless probing of the gossip and industry presses, as well as a number of unfavourable publications attacking Hara's character,⁶³ demonstrated



Figure 3.2 Signed portrait of Hara Setsuko. From the author's collection.

that such an independent way of living was not yet considered socially acceptable for young women. Young female viewers such as Ms Koyama seem to have recognized this, despite the SCAP propaganda embedded in popular film texts that encouraged young women to be independent and pursue their hearts' desires.

Yet certain cultural elements of the American-led occupation of Japan found more widespread popularity across the defeated nation. In particular, Americanized fashions, hairstyles, material culture and entertainments became hugely popular. According to Ms Koyama, this could be understood as proof that the defeated citizens, particularly children, 'had no hate' for the victorious Americans.⁶⁴ Film stars who successfully modelled this 'longed for' (*akogare*) American style, symbolizing modern attitudes and luxury, became enormously popular.

Reference to and performances of mastery of Western culture was a significant aspect of Hara's appeal for many young women watching her films in the post-war years. One study participant who chose the English pseudonym 'Elizabeth' and included English language material as well as Japanese in her questionnaire response recalled copying Hara's smile in the mirror as a young girl and attempting to mimic her laugh. Elizabeth's use of an Anglophone name and selected English phrases indicates an interest in or sense of affinity with Anglo-European culture. It therefore seems fitting that Elizabeth would indicate some identification with Hara's public persona, inflected with non-Japanese characteristics. Hara was expressly associated in post-war film discourse with Westernized fashions,⁶⁵ and fans and critics often speculated that she had Russian or German ancestry. These associations were only heightened by her breakout role in the German-Japanese co-production *Atarashiki tsuchi/Die Tochter des Samurai* (The New Earth) (dir. Itami Mansaku and Arnold Fanck, 1937).

Yet while Elizabeth prized Hara's exoticism, she recalls reproducing only those behaviours understood as attractive in a highly traditional gendered sense, such as a graceful smile or laugh. She did not express any desire to copy Hara's iconoclastic approach to marriage and family. In this way, certain young female viewers embraced female stars as role models; yet, the impact of fan attractions on young viewers' aspirations could not be controlled to the degree that SCAP and the studios appear to have imagined. Subversive young female viewers latched on to Hara's Westernized appeal, contextualized by a wider history of appreciation for Anglo-European tropes in girls' culture, but rejected her anti-romantic independent lifestyle just as strongly as others rejected Cinderella's all-consuming focus on heterosexual romance.

Conclusion

The ethnographic materials analysed in this chapter suggest that, counter to the SCAP-produced discourse of cinema as a great social equalizer during the occupation, the disproportionate difficulties that girls and young women faced in entering cinemas in certain areas or at certain times, and the distractions posed by caring for others within the space of the cinema itself, impeded free consumption of cinema narratives. Despite the careful crafting of the content of post-war Japanese films to uphold democratic ideals, the occupiers appear to have given little thought to the environment in which

these films would be viewed, and how this environment might affect access or response to film content. As film narratives were often censored and produced with a young female audience in mind during the occupation, the barriers girls and young women faced in entering the cinema directly undermined attempts to transmit inspiring images and narratives of female emancipation to young female viewers.

At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that we must distinguish non-compliance and deliberate subversion from bad planning or unfounded expectations on the part of occupation forces and bureaucratic bodies. In the study presented here, the majority of the audience for SCAP's censored cinema did not deliberately reject the cultural products imported and created by the occupation. Instead, a fundamental blindness to key elements in the structuring of post-war Japanese society doomed the exercise before it was thoroughly tested.

At the same time, however, it remains apparent that narratives and imagery crafted by occupying censors, however carefully, do not always translate as intended for viewers in occupied countries. Cultural signifiers are not uniform for the occupiers and the occupied, leading to mis-readings, re-readings and reading against the grain, both deliberate and accidental. We must also account for changes in memories of the occupation over time, as citizens with experience of the occupation readjust their recollections to fit with the contemporary socio-political concerns of our globalized world and re-narrate the experience of the occupation for younger generations. This chapter has argued that memories of cinema play a key role in this contemporary interaction.

In focusing on women's experiences of cinema-going here, I do not wish to suggest that male viewers were ignorant of the gender-equality theme present in many popular film texts, or disinclined to participate in implementing gender equality in everyday life. Rather, I have used ethnographic methods to explore some of the ways in which SCAP's already-compromised message of gender equality may have been lost in transmission to an imagined audience of newly emancipated women, expected to 'exploit their new positions in Japanese society'. The burden of social change in the direction of gender equality was often rhetorically assigned to female citizens, who were expected to demand and defend the new rights SCAP had legislated for them. In considering why female audiences may not have taken up the invitation to remodel their lives and expectations after the new social order on-screen, we must think about the many ways women came to, and engaged with, the cinema, as well as how potentially receptive groups for occupation reform may have been inadvertently shut out of the very theatres and spaces where new ways of being were shown.

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Part Two

Visual and Artistic Responses
to Occupation

Occupation, resistance and collaboration: Triangulating Japan, the Philippines and Singapore through Fernando Amorsolo's *Defend Thy Honour*

Pearlie Rose S. Baluyut

Introduction

Bestowed posthumously with the National Artist of the Philippines Award in 1972,¹ Fernando Amorsolo is known for his elegant portraits of Filipino elites and American officials, and of rural landscapes populated by idealized peasants cast in tropical light. While the former graced the residences of his patrons at home and abroad, the latter were reproduced as posters, tourist brochures and calendars for mass consumption. In contrast to these popular and commercial genres, however, Amorsolo also produced a body of work during and about the Japanese occupation of the Philippines (1942–5).² Besides sketching the sufferings of Filipinos as these unfolded in the streets, Amorsolo painted the destruction of Manila and the rape of the Philippines in his studio. *Defend Thy Honour* (1945) depicts an interior with a Filipino holding a *bolo*³ and shielding a Filipina in torn clothes from an unseen Japanese soldier (Figure 4.1). Addressing both horror and honour, Amorsolo documented the occupation as a historical and personal trauma, embodying and gendering the Philippines as a victim of rape. Acquired by Brigadier General Frank E. Lowe (President Harry S. Truman's military observer) during his mission to the Philippines and subsequently taken back to the United States, the painting was eventually passed to another owner and returned to the Philippines. There it remained until 2012, when the National Gallery Singapore (NGS) purchased it.

Singapore's claim to be the centre of 'New Asia' and its transformation into a global city of the arts required, as part of its cultural development, the aggressive acquisition of Southeast Asian national treasures under the guise of institutional collaboration and museological partnership. Art historian Kevin Chua describes the NGS's 'politics of inclusion' as a form of 'curatorial colonialism' facilitated by its power, prestige and pocket.⁴ The sale of Amorsolo's work was made possible after the Philippines' National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) allowed it to leave the country despite laws designed for its protection. While some critiqued the NGS's acquisition of *Defend Thy Honour*, others construed it as an indication of Philippine art's increased value



Figure 4.1 Fernando Cueto Amorsolo, *Defend Thy Honour*, 1945. Oil on canvas, 91.4 × 153.7 cm. Collection of National Gallery Singapore. © Fernando C. Amorsolo Art Foundation, Inc., Philippines. (See Plate 6.)

in the regional market. Indeed, besides the issues of race and gender central to the painting – a violent image and story familiar not just in the Philippines, but also in Singapore, which was also occupied by Japan – class is inherent in its circulation as a commodity and as a token of cultural capital.

For this volume, Amorsolo's Filipina rape victim intersects with and speaks to the oft-gendered ways in which artists and cultural producers in general respond to, and render into image, the experience of occupation. Interestingly, occupation was also embodied by Amorsolo, as well as by his older and younger brothers, who were executed by the Spaniards for joining the revolution in the late nineteenth century and by Filipino guerrillas for collaborating with the Japanese in the mid-twentieth century, respectively. Contributing towards a triangular study of 'visual histories of occupation', this chapter explores the iconography of the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines and the latter's museological collaboration with Singapore. Moreover, it takes into consideration the larger contexts of imperialism, Orientalism, nation-state formation and globalization, arguing that power relations are in constant realignment and that history – and individual and collective memory – is consensually reframed through art and its attendant scholarship and exhibition.

Biographical and colonial intersections

Born in the district of Paco, Manila, during the Spanish colonial period on 30 May 1892, Fernando Cueto Amorsolo would spend his early years in Daet in the province

of Camarines Norte, where his father Pedro found work as a bookkeeper for two abaca firms and 'his love for the simple rural life would become the foundation for his artistic output for which he is most well-known'.⁵ His mother Bonifacia recognized Amorsolo's artistic skill based on his drawings of ships by the harbour and shared them with her first cousin Fabian de la Rosa, a renowned painter in Manila. However, the execution of Amorsolo's older half-brother Perico at the hands of the Spaniards eager to quell the revolution, and his father's subsequent death from a heart attack, prompted Bonifacia and her remaining children to return to Manila in 1905, which was already occupied by the Americans. Because of familial affinity and financial precarity, the family lived with de la Rosa who taught art to Amorsolo in his studio. While Amorsolo's mother made embroidery for a living, Amorsolo sold his sketches for 15 centavos until he matriculated from the University of the Philippines School of Fine Arts in 1914 where, eventually, he would wield his brush as an art professor by 1918.⁶ At twenty-five years of age, Amorsolo started a family of his own with Salud Jorge.

Striking a balance between fine and commercial art practice, Amorsolo made advertisements for Ivory soap, painted movie posters for the Ideal Theater and illustrated two Tagalog novels. It was his *marka demonyo* label, or 'devil moniker' design, for a bottle of gin, featuring the iconic warrior St Michael the Archangel wielding his mighty sword upon Lucifer, that impressed Enrique Zobel, the owner of the Ginebra San Miguel Brewery. Zobel was an art patron and a descendant of a Spanish merchant from Mexico who had amassed the family's initial and vast fortune from the galleon trade between Acapulco and Manila from 1565 until the trade was terminated by King Ferdinand VII in 1817.⁷ Zobel sponsored Amorsolo's art education at the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando in Madrid, where he was accepted not as a student, but as an art professor on a seven-month term, surpassing the Filipino painters Félix Resurrección Hidalgo (1855–1913) and Juan Luna (1857–99) who had merely studied there in the 1880s. Like Hidalgo and Luna, Amorsolo visited the collection of Museo del Prado, studying the court painter to King Philip IV, Diego Velázquez (1599–1660) – known for his mastery of composition and fluid brushstrokes essential to pictorial expression – and Joaquín Sorolla (1863–1923), known for his light that suffused subjects and landscapes in the manner of the French impressionists.⁸ These artistic influences during his sojourn in Madrid (as well as in New York where he held his first one-man show of thirty paintings at the Grand Central Art Galleries in 1919) helped Amorsolo develop his signature style of painting, and to provide for his growing family.⁹

'Peacetime'

The Treaty of Paris in 1898 facilitated the changing of the guard in the Philippines from the Spaniards to the Americans. The Americans were armed with their own imperial gospel upon arrival: English, ice cream and Hollywood glamour. Despite the oft-forgotten Philippine-American War (1899–1902), the subsequent American occupation of the Philippines, through until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, was considered a time of peace. Fernando Amorsolo's paintings, rendered in two divergent styles,

subjects and contexts, testify to this. For the portraits of and commissioned by American servicemen, entrepreneurs and their wives in the capital city, as well as Filipino elites who managed their *haciendas* (estates) in absentia, Amorsolo employed the painterly approach of Diego Velázquez and the superior finish and chromatic flourishes of the American realist artist John Singer Sargent, flattering his sitters with the heightened artificiality of gestures and postures characteristic of this genre. Yet for other genres, such as landscapes and seascapes, Amorsolo imported Sorolla's bright sunlight to shine upon the subjects he was most familiar with: the Filipino folk in the countryside.

As early as 1914, Fernando Amorsolo was painting with precision vivid portraits of American officials, including US President Woodrow Wilson, to grace the Panama Exposition of the same year.¹⁰ After his return from Madrid, Amorsolo resumed painting Americans in the Philippines, including the *Maiden with Lanzones* (1924), a portrait of a white woman wearing the *baro't saya* – the traditional attire of a Filipina peasant consisting of a blouse covered with a large, square kerchief and a skirt wrapped around a long skirt – that originally formed the collection of the California Historical Society in San Francisco, California, but later entered the collection of the Ayala Museum in Makati City, Philippines – a museum built and expanded by the descendants of Zobel (who had sent the painter to Madrid).¹¹ Popularly regarded as the 'painter of sunlight', Amorsolo painted several other portraits that were part of private and public collections. In the Early Twentieth Century Gallery of the National Museum of the Philippines (NMP), for example, one finds several canvases whose sitters' likenesses, personalities and tastes are finely distilled by Amorsolo, as well as an unfinished portrait of socialite Florencia Singson Gonzalez-Belo wearing a pink cocktail dress and resting on an easel next to a studio chair and a side table donated by the painter's widow Maria del Carmen Amorsolo.

'As American influence slowly crept into Filipino culture in the bigger cities', writes Edwin A. Martinez,

the artist yearned for the life he knew during his early childhood days in Daet ... the rural setting where American culture was slow to trickle down. His paintings would embody an affinity for the traditions and lifestyle he knew during the Spanish era ... scenes of fiestas, old churches, and rituals that were the legacy of the Philippines' former colonial masters.¹²

Combined with his proverbial diffidence, Amorsolo rescinded invitations to social events in the metropolis and retreated to the quiet pastoral landscapes of his youth in his mind and canvases.¹³ Similar to the *vedute* or city view, and *capricci* or fantasy paintings and prints by the Italian Canaletto, and/or in addition to the portable souvenirs of Roman coins and medals, bought by those who participated in the European Grand Tour during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Amorsolo's early-twentieth-century paintings were commissioned, purchased and/or brought back by the Americans to the United States as mementos of the islands. Indeed, the American occupation of the Philippines inaugurated mass tourism, as evidenced by the proliferation of picture postcards and tinted photographs, and the collection and circulation of bodies and objects (which occurred as early as 1904 when Filipinos from

various regions in the archipelago, as well as cultural artefacts, were sent to St Louis to inhabit the 'Philippine reservation' and entertain fairgoers). Amorsolo's paintings of country life and brown bodies indulged the Americans to discover, delight in and desire the foreign, the erotic and the dangerous.¹⁴

In Gallery XIX (or the first gallery of the GSIS Wing) at the NMP, genre paintings of peasants in rural landscapes provide a glimpse of Amorsolo's busy studio before and after the Second World War.¹⁵ *Under the Mango Tree (Mango Picking)* (1935) shows a gathering under a large mango tree whose low branches form a generous canopy shielding two Filipinas and a Filipino from the sun while another Filipina basks in the characteristic tropical light, and a Filipino makes his way to the foreground with his basket filled with green mangoes. *Tinikling* (1950), on the other hand, celebrates the pause in agricultural labour, with peasants watching barefoot *tinikling* dancers jump between bamboo poles. *Ricefield* (1954) offers a magisterial view of peasants at rest, planting or on a *carabao*,¹⁶ and a mountain under a warmly lit, blue sky with cumulus clouds. *Oracion* (1959) frames a verdant rice field, foregrounded by lilac-coloured flowers and a cluster of *nipa* huts¹⁷ in the distance, while a husband, who has removed his *sombrero*, stands next to his kneeling wife and son on a cart attached to a *carabao* in a gesture of prayer. As if revisiting his own childhood, Amorsolo parts the dense bamboo stalks of the countryside to reveal a river in *Children Playing River Raft* (1963), which shows young, semi- and completely nude boys swimming around and/or on a bamboo raft. The gallery also includes *Tindahan* (1964), showing an outdoor stall typical in rural towns, with coconuts, papayas, watermelons and yellow mangoes on the ground or in baskets, tended by a mother cradling a child while others make their purchases, groom a cock or wander the streets. Finally, *Las Lavanderas* (The Washerwomen) (1964) provides a voyeuristic experience of two women washing clothes and bathing in the river under the midday sun while wearing clothes made transparent by the wet treatment of the surface and deft brushstrokes.

Inspired by his surroundings and visual culture such as printed references, Amorsolo's *Afternoon Meal of the Rice Worker* (1939) – a prototype for similar canvases set in the rustic countryside where peasants perform gendered roles such as cooking lunch, nursing a child or waiting under a mango tree while others afield plant under the blistering sun – won First Prize at the World's Fair in New York in 1939, and is testament to the increasing popularity of the artist and his paintings abroad at the time.¹⁸ Benefitting from the patronage of Americans and later tourists, Amorsolo would become a favourite target of forgers.¹⁹ And yet the culture of the copy is central to Amorsolo's practice, as his work had been reproduced as or incorporated into posters, tourist brochures and calendars throughout the years. In stark contrast to these popular and commercial genres, Amorsolo's body of work during and on the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 was remarkably different.

The Japanese occupation

The Japanese marched into the 'Open City' of Manila on 2 January 1942. Fernando Amorsolo depicted the burning and bombing of Manila in several canvasses showing

a smoke-filled, Turner-like sky and half-sunken ships engulfed in flames along the south bank of the Pasig River by the Intendencia – a Spanish colonial relic that the Americans had converted into an office building.²⁰ That same year, he also painted *The Burning of the Santo Domingo Church* (1942) in Intramuros, showing the thick, black smoke enveloping the Gothic revivalist structure as fire-fighters aimed their hose at the stained glass windows and the debris surrounding the fenced statue of the sixteenth-century Dominican friar Miguel de Benavidez, the third Archbishop of Manila. Elsewhere, *Bataan* (1942) shows a personification of the nation: a woman wearing a golden yellow veil, kneeling in front of a dead Filipino guerrilla and gazing to the heavens while the fire rages behind her. Despite witnessing pathos and panic, as well as the looting and general disorder in Manila as reported by the American educator-turned-editor A. V. H. Hartendorp of *The Manila Times*²¹ – or the surrender of Filipino and American troops outside the garrison in Corregidor in May 1942 – the painter and his family remained in the city. Two of his rented apartments were in close proximity to the residences occupied by Japanese nationals-turned-military, including a grain dealer and a professor who tended a flower garden.²²

While Amorsolo continued to remain under the patronage of prominent Filipino families such as the Vargases, Zobels and Aranetas, his heirs tell us that commissions were slow, accounts were difficult to settle and paintings were often altogether rejected.²³ Compounding economic scarcity was the difficulty of acquiring painting materials, among many other things, due to exorbitant costs. His *Still-Life with Paper Money* (undated; c. 1944) with a slightly peeled banana and two turnips over a 10- and 5-peso bill is an economic and political commentary; inscribed in the shadow of the banana is the text 'No[v]. 25, 1944 (La/o?) under heavy bombing on Grace Park'.²⁴ In addition, he was unable to travel to rural Marikina, Antipolo or the outskirts of Manila, where he used to draw and paint *en plein air*.²⁵ This predicament may explain why Amorsolo accepted the patronage of the Japanese authorities as their portraitist, especially after he was brought to one of the Kenpeitai (military police) generals whose friend, Ikegami Shūho (the Japanese artist who had won second place for his entry entitled *Dawn* at the 1939 New York World Fair's Exhibition – the exhibition at which Amorsolo had claimed first prize), greatly admired the latter.²⁶ Moreover, the Japanese authorities favourably regarded Amorsolo's paintings of peasants in the countryside as they visualized the 'Filipinization' of the Filipinos²⁷ (Figure 4.2). Indeed, his art was the only trade he knew, and it became 'his tool and shield against an oppressive authority';²⁸ income from the enemy obviously also allowed him to support his large family.

Yet Amorsolo also countered Japanese propaganda, sketching the Filipinos' sufferings unfolding in the streets and painting the destruction of Manila. As a silent witness-turned-visual correspondent chronicling the turbulent occupation of Manila from his studio window or apartment balcony overlooking the Japanese military barracks, Amorsolo captured the self-sacrifice and will to survive of his countrymen, including those roaming the city with push carts transporting food, goods and people, as well as the child scavengers, modelled after his own children, in search of anything that could be recycled.²⁹ In *Marketplace during the Occupation* (1942) – a reproduction of which adorns the cover of this volume – Amorsolo rendered a bustling and crowded local fruit market drenched in warm light with the curious addition of a Japanese




Figure 4.2 'Planting the seeds of our glorious tomorrow'. An unattributed Japanese propaganda poster from the occupation period (1942–5) depicting Philippine peasant women planting seeds in a field, 19 × 25 in. Hoover Institution Archives Poster Collection, JA-86.

banner and flag, as well as a bow-legged soldier patrolling the area with his rifle.³⁰ On the other hand,

tragedy dominated his canvases. The idyllic world within which the introverted artist chose to confine himself was torn asunder ... The paintings were not made in conjunction with a client's preferences but were reflections of the conflicting emotions raging within. Amorsolo was deeply affected as he watched his surroundings ravaged by war.³¹

He 'became a mediator between countryside and city war subjects, visually documenting and commenting through his notations and inscriptions in pencil, color studies, and canvasses whenever time and safety allowed him to do so.'³² *At the Age of 52* (1944), Amorsolo's self-portrait in graphite on paper, depicts a weak and sick man suffering from diabetes.

Defend Thy Honour

A deeper visual understanding of the epic and the everyday during and about the Japanese occupation is made possible by Gallery VIII, the War Gallery at the NMP, which displays several oil paintings and sculptures donated by Jaime Laya, a bureaucrat who had been responsible for the systematic acquisition of artworks during his term as Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines and as Minister of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports during the last quarter of Ferdinand E. Marcos' rule (1965–86). Daring for its graphic content, this visual collection provides a glimpse of Philippine history: the oil paintings of Wenceslao Garcia, such as *Mealtime at the Prison Camp* (1945), showing emaciated bodies on a bamboo bunk bed; works by Dominador Castañeda, such as *Death March* (1948), which depicts bloodied bodies left behind by weak survivors marching to their death on a dirt road beside a rice field; or works by Gene Cabrera, such as *A Tragic Lesson (The Fall of Bataan)* (1957), which shows a crowd of skeletons whose skulls don a white veil, military cap or green helmet. But Diosdado M. Lorenzo's *Doomed Family* (1945) and *Rape and Massacre in Ermita* (1947) are far more brutal in their depictions of torture, rape and murder than anything Amorsolo painted. 'It was very rare', writes Don S. Amorsolo, 'that a person in [Amorsolo's] paintings would be depicted screaming with rage or wailing in intense displays of emotion. Tragedy was portrayed through subtle means.'³³ Others, however, observe that Amorsolo's war pictures were 'melodramatic, akin to illustration art'.³⁴

After a preliminary study in 1943, which the Amorsolo family still possesses,³⁵ Amorsolo painted and signed a canvas measuring 153.7 cm wide and 91.4 cm tall. *Defend Thy Honour* (1945) depicts a bedroom interior of a home floored by bamboo slats: on the left is a wooden stool and an embroidered white linen-covered table-turned-altar with a crucifix between two candlesticks and some flowers on a vase; on the right is a rumpled bamboo bed. Occupying the centre of the composition are two figures. On the right stands a barefoot adult male with short black hair wearing a light blue-collared shirt tucked underneath his belted khaki pants, rolled up to just below his knees. On the left is a cowering young woman with long black hair whose white bra

strap falls from her right shoulder while a peach fabric, possibly a torn dress, slips from her waist, revealing her right hip in the manner of the Venus de Milo. The visual unity of these two figures is unmistakable: while his right hand firmly holds a *bolo* whose tip diagonally points to the ground to shield her, his left arm is raised across his chest, offering a white fabric to cover herself. Furthermore, his right foot is in front of and intersects with her left foot, creating a chiasmic pattern. Although no one else appears in the canvas, Amorsolo painted the figures looking intensely not towards each other but to their left, and included a Japanese military cap on the floor between the edge of the woman's peach dress and the man's left foot, thus visually uniting the three. Given the man's furrowed black brows and tight lips (a sign of fury and defiance) and the woman's ambiguous facial expression (possibly the result of shock) one construes that the man has interrupted a rape; yet, the soldier is clearly still in the room. Despite the chaos of the bed and the violence associated with this side of the canvas, domestic order and spiritual devotion prevail on the opposite side: on the altar, the crucified Jesus Christ becomes a witness and symbolic protector because the light from the candles flanking him does not flicker. Indeed, Amorsolo retained his hope.³⁶

Addressing both horror and honour, Amorsolo documented the Japanese occupation as a historical and personal trauma, embodying and gendering the Philippines as a victim of rape. Indeed, 'womanhood is idealized and epitomized as a "nation in distress"'.³⁷ 'Though often seen as beautiful figures', his Filipina subjects 'project a liberating attribution. He refused to depict them as exacting realistic representations of critical situations.'³⁸ Instead, the painter 'oscillates between the beautiful and what was behind it, its "otherness"'.³⁹ Amorsolo describes the beautiful in this manner:

One with a rounded face, not of the oval type ... The eyes should be exceptionally lively ... The nose should be of the blunt form but firm and strongly marked ... The ideal Filipina beauty should have a sensuous mouth ... not ... white-complexioned, nor of the dark brown color ... but of the clear skin ... which we often witness when we meet a blushing girl.⁴⁰

Art historian Florina Capistrano-Baker notes that 'through his portrayal of the winsome country lass, Amorsolo succeeded in weaning Filipinos from the colonial ideal of the half-Spanish, half-Filipina mestiza and turning to a nationalistic Filipino ideal'.⁴¹ One example of this liberating attribution and beautiful ideal is *Palay Maiden* (1920), a portrait of an ebullient peasant carrying a bundle of rice stalks and a sickle (Figure 4.3). The woman foregrounding the rice field epitomizes the Philippine flag: a blue kerchief on her head, a transparent white blouse, a red skirt and a yellow harvest.⁴²

Rather than 'full bodied Caucasian women', observes Martinez, Amorsolo drew Filipinas 'with slender physiques, narrower hips, and smaller breasts'.⁴³ And yet while 'patriarchal and colonial discourses of the time represented the ideal white-American woman as asexual', Elizabeth Mary Holt writes that 'Filipinas were portrayed as the antithesis of that ideal – dusky, passionate, exciting, exotic, erotic, sexually powerful, and perilously attractive to white-American males'.⁴⁴ Indeed, Amorsolo also rendered reclining, bathing and planting women as completely nude, scantily clad or topless, respectively, appearing uninhibited, sensual or oblivious, be they the lowland and



Figure 4.3 Fernando Amorsolo, *Palay Maiden*, 1920. Oil on canvas, 33.63 × 22.75 in. Ayala Museum Collection, Makati City, Philippines. Courtesy of the Fernando C. Amorsolo Art Foundation, Inc., Philippines. (See Plate 7.)

Christianized Filipina ideal, or Muslim, Igorot or other Indigenous women. Could this be the 'otherness' that Amorsolo oscillates to and which, through polarized representations, the Japanese soldiers desired – resulting in the systematic rape and tragedy of the so-called 'Filipina comfort women' – and, at the same time, loathed because these women did not conform to their expectations of the feminine ideal?

Japanese propaganda included the status of Filipino women as Orientals ... they did not adhere to the simulacra or likeness of a Japanese woman ... [or] conform to the image of a woman that the Japanese authorities wanted them to be [rather, they participated] not only with his family decision-making, but also in the front lines and in the underground movement during the war.⁴⁵

Gender roles shifted when Filipinas actively served during the Second World War, as evidenced by the photograph of the twenty-year-old Mila Calma unfurling the flag of the Tarlac Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces - USAFFE with one hand, while her other hand rests upon a revolver hanging from a cartridge belt.⁴⁶ And yet there is another image of resistance that comes to mind.

Esperanza L. Osmeña was twenty-four when the forty-two-year-old Cebuano Sergio Osmeña took her as his second wife, two years after his first wife Estefania V. Osmeña, who bore him ten children in the span of seventeen years, had died at the age of forty-two. Osmeña served as Vice President of the American-engineered Commonwealth, which was presided over by Manuel L. Quezon in 1935 and continued as a government-in-exile based in Washington, DC, after the Japanese invaded the Philippines. Upon Quezon's death from tuberculosis while quarantined in New York in 1944, Osmeña returned to the Philippines with General Douglas MacArthur (and to his wife Esperanza who had never left the country) as president (1944–6). The commemoration of the First Lady's forty-ninth birthday on 31 December 1945 with a canvas painted by a 'Mrs. P. Mesina' and offered as a gift by the seventeen 'Kapisanan ng Kababaihan sa Pilipinas' (Committee of Filipino Women) is anachronistic and comedic. Manila was liberated from the Japanese in March 1945, and their inclusion in the painting might have represented a form of polite vengeance for the atrocities suffered by many, especially women. Set in the countryside with *nipa* huts and coconut trees, the painting shows on the right an Amorsoloesque woman in her tricolour ensemble with one knee on the ground, feeding *darak*, or food scraps, to the three black, brown and white pigs, while on the far left, by the river bank, three Japanese soldiers eat a meal under a tree. Here is a canvas by, for and because of women: labouring rebels in their own way, women who remained on the battleground with the 'swines'.

Renowned for his genre of rural landscapes and portraits of peasants, Amorsolo's paintings cradle subversive elements, but they also demonstrate an essentialist and eroticized imagining of a Filipino nation and race. *Defend Thy Honour*, which is consistent with the theme of war, and whose violence is literal (with the word 'rape' included in the title of the work) and pictorial (the Filipina is undone as the bed is unmade), braids these two intriguing strands. Moreover, Amorsolo's Filipina rape victim, as well as the guerrilla Calma and the anonymous peasant who resembles Esperanza L. Osmeña, intersects with and speaks to the experiences of women figuring

in narratives and representations of occupation in other contexts – including those touched on in other chapters in this volume. Acquired by Frank E. Lowe during his mission in the Philippines and taken back to Portland, Maine,⁴⁷ *Defend Thy Honour* eventually passed to another owner through marriage, possibly after 1968. The painting remained in a relatively good state at this same owner's private residence in the Philippines until the NGS purchased it in 2012.

Nations and museums in the Southeast Asian imaginary

The 'invention' of Southeast Asia as an area of art historical study in European and American universities during the Second World War on account of the Japanese occupation (and, later, the Cold War) can be traced first to the establishment of British Admiral Louis Mountbatten's 'South-East Asia Command' in 1943, the publication of the first map of Southeast Asia by the National Geographic Society in 1944, the First Southeast Asia Art Exhibition organized in Manila in 1957, and the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asia in 1961 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Under its slogan of 'one vision, one identity, one community', ASEAN has expanded its membership to include ten countries within the region: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. According to the ASEAN Declaration of 1967, the original member states would operate towards a set of shared goals to strengthen the region, but they would also define each nation as establishing its own identity.⁴⁸

While the historian Benedict Anderson credits the spread of print capitalism in the form of novels and newspapers as providing the means for creating 'imagined communities',⁴⁹ museums also made legible this modern imaginary. Indeed, museums are inextricably linked to the development of nation-states. A historical, theoretical and critical reading of this connection is thus essential for an understanding of the relationship between individuals and institutions in both the Philippines and Singapore.

Art history, according to the art historian Donald Preziosi, is 'a network of interrelated institutions and professions whose overall function has been to fabricate a historical past that could be placed under the systematic observation for use in the present'.⁵⁰ This includes 'art criticism, aesthetic philosophy, art practice, connoisseurship, the art market, tourism, commodity fashion systems, and the heritage industry'.⁵¹ For over two centuries, the museum has served as an ally of art history and as a key institution of modernity. Museums have been organized in such a way as to display and represent the character, historical development and evolution of humanity through their material traces such as monuments, documents and artefacts. Increasingly, they have played a critical role in not just constructing, but also interrogating racial, gender, ethnic, social, cultural and, of course, national identities. Today, there are museums of every kind, including the traditional history, art, science and natural history museums that arose from the *Kunstammer* or 'cabinet of curiosities', and others that defy categories, such as virtual museums and online websites.

Ivan Karp and Steve Lavine's anthology *Exhibiting Cultures* exposes the artifice of exhibition displays in a postmodern era of hybrid national identities,⁵² while Eileen

Hooper-Greenhill's *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge* examines the ways in which museums have functioned as stages for the creation of public information about history, heritage and scientific and cultural knowledge.⁵³ Aching to diagnose nostalgia and to interrogate the metaphors of the 'miniature' and the 'gigantic' as modes of signification that animate the world, Susan Stewart published *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection*.⁵⁴ A series of essays on the political and ideological implications of all museum exhibits and institutional policies were compiled by Daniel Sherman and Irit Rogoff in *Museum Culture: Histories, Discourses, Spectacles*.⁵⁵ And, of course, Tony Bennett, in his book *The Birth of the Museum*, interrogates the 'political rationality' of the museum in the narrative, ideology and performance of progress, arguing that museums serve the collective good of the state by disciplining the citizenry, an extension of the contours of state power through its institutions dealt with by Michel Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*.⁵⁶ Indeed, besides their function as memory machines that 'order things', or as a technological apparatus that disciplines the body politic, museums, according to Carol Duncan's *Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art Museums*, are settings of civic engagement as ritual.⁵⁷

Museums, therefore, increasingly transcended their meaning as a physical institution holding collections and became 'a conceptual system through which collectors interpreted and explored the world they inhabited'.⁵⁸ Eventually, the 'magical, the confused, various, and haphazard nature of things could be tamed, named, and displayed on a table to constitute a firm base of knowledge'.⁵⁹ 'Art History and Museology', writes Preziosi, were not just 'modes of knowledge production', but 'engines of modernity'.⁶⁰ Collecting things was, essentially, a way of grasping the world – of possessing power – and museums and their contents make nations legible. 'The West, it appears' observes cultural historian Timothy Mitchell, 'is a place organized as a system of commodities, values, meanings, and representations, forming signs that reflect one another in a labyrinth without exits'.⁶¹ However, museums also constitute a 'third space' and, therefore, have the capacity to engender contradiction.⁶² This transforms culture into a process wherein the art displayed becomes a critique; however, the critique, inevitably, folds into a commodity. Fernando Amorsolo's *Defend Thy Honour*, a critique turned commodity, is a case of curiosity and tragedy.

Collaborations and occupations

In 2012, the NCCA through Republic Act No. 10066 ('an Act Providing for the Protection and Conservation of the National Cultural Heritage, Strengthening the NCAA and Its Affiliated Cultural Agencies, and for Other Purposes')⁶³ delegated the NMP, as an affiliated cultural agency, to appraise the value of Fernando Amorsolo's *Defend Thy Honour* to assist its current owner, a private citizen of the Philippines, in its mediated sale to the NGS.⁶⁴ The NMP carried out its task by appointing and convening a group in Manila on 14 June 2012. This group included myself, who wrote the summary report, as well as the daughter of Amorsolo (i.e. Sylvia Amorsolo Lazo), and Mara Pardo de Tavera, a descendant-in-law of the nineteenth-century painter Juan Luna. We took into consideration Amorsolo's status as the first Filipino to be conferred

(posthumously) the National Artist of the Philippines in Painting Award by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1972, the art historical and national significance of his work(s), and the local and global market involving the past sale of his works, assigning the value of 20 million Philippine pesos (approximately US\$400,000) exclusive of government taxes, registration fees and other charges (e.g. licensing fees and permits) to the work. In the event that the NGS later decides to de-accession the same painting, we agreed as a manifest condition of sale that the Philippines, through either its affiliated cultural agencies or private and/or non-profit organizations and/or foundations, should be given the first opportunity to purchase the work.

Moreover, we raised a number of concerns. Section 4.3 of R.A. 10066 states, 'All the country's artistic and historic wealth constitutes the cultural treasure of the nation and shall be under the protection of the State which may regulate its disposition.'⁶⁵ While the delisting of national cultural treasures is addressed in Section 12, and given further elaboration in terms of criteria in Section 12.14, the NCCA, as the Act's administrator, failed to comply with Section 12.1 because it did not 'issue temporary remedies' for the work's protection after the petition to delist it was approved.⁶⁶ In principle, the NCCA should have prevented the painting's delisting and release outside the Philippines for the purpose of sale despite the proposal and subsequent appeals made by the owner/seller on the grounds of medical emergency and/or financial obligations. By making an exemption to the R.A. 10066, the NCCA set a dangerous precedent for others to submit similar applications and/or appeals, exacerbating the precarious state of national cultural treasures. While the NCCA complied with Section 13, which states that 'The appropriate cultural agency shall be given the right of first refusal in the purchase of cultural property declared as national cultural treasures', the NCCA should put in place contingency plans in case the appropriate cultural agency is unable to purchase it on account of its limited acquisition budget.⁶⁷ The NCCA, which is encouraged to 'provide financial assistance in the form of a grant to historic, archaeological, architectural, artistic organizations for the conservation or research on cultural property', as stated in Section 41, should be mandated to appropriate from its National Endowment for Culture and the Arts funds, as stated in Rule XVI, an account source earmarked specifically for emergency purchases of cultural properties to preclude their sale outside the country.⁶⁸ Because of this legal oversight and financial predicament, the NCCA renders its own provision in Section 13, 'that the government shall be given the first option for three months to buy these cultural properties when placed on sale', essentially inoperative.⁶⁹

Indeed, the legal exemption made by the NCCA to allow for the out-of-country release and sale of Amorsolo's painting is worsened by its failure to promulgate and enact laws allocating emergency funds for its purchase. In recent decades, sales of Amorsolo paintings by independent collectors have occurred in and outside the Philippines, and have also been auctioned by the prominent auction house Christie's in Hong Kong. Priced from 6 million pesos (approximately US\$120,000) to 18.2 million pesos (approximately US\$364,000), as of May 2010, according to various sources, these figures collectively indicate a robust climate for Philippine art.⁷⁰ The Philippines' cultural tragedy regarding *Defend Thy Honour*, however, became an international coup for Singapore, a nation rising meteorically as the 'New Asia' (a slogan adopted by the

Singapore Tourism Board and its National Arts Council, through its claim of an Asian authenticity, its definition of a national identity and its positioning in the late capitalist global market).⁷¹ Singapore's desire for coherence requires, among other cultural infrastructure and development programmes, the aggressive acquisition of the arts of its neighbours, rivalling Beijing, Hong Kong and Tokyo as a 'global city of the arts'. As *The Straits Times* correspondent Janadas Devan reports:

Singapore, that is, has to remain Asian for competitive economic advantage. The logic is impeccable: Singapore fears becoming like America, not because it fears losing its Asian soul, but because becoming like America will weaken its ability to compete successfully in the global market, become a full-blown developed economy, and thereby become like America. Singapore, in other words, has to remain Asian in order to become Western.⁷²

When the former Supreme Court and City Hall – two important buildings in the landscape and iconography of the Japanese military occupation of Singapore⁷³ – were repurposed and inaugurated as the NGS on 24 November 2015, *The Straits Times* reported that it was 'the first museum of such scale in the world dedicated to the art of Singapore and Southeast Asia'.⁷⁴ This had not always been the case, however. The SG\$532-million restored behemoth filled its empty walls in the Southeast Asian Art Gallery with purchases of national treasures, including Fernando Amorsolo's *Defend Thy Honour* (with an acquisition date and collection number of '2012-00733') in the 'Manifesting the Nation' Wing. 'As a visual art institution that aspires to be of international standard', says Chong Siak Ching, CEO of the NGS,

we want to showcase the best artworks in our museum as far as we can, but unfortunately, these are not all with us, so collaboration and partnership with other museums is very important ... Our curators worked very closely with the other museums in the region and also with private collectors.⁷⁵

Director of the NGS Eugene Tan states: 'The Philippines is one country where we have the most partners in terms of institutional partners, as well as individuals'.⁷⁶ Filipino Clarissa Chikiamco, the NGS Southeast Asian Curator, 'denied Singapore was acquiring art of foreign countries "to lock and stock away"', adding that "'rumors" of Singapore's wholesale acquisitions of Philippine art were exaggerated'.⁷⁷ Chikiamco stated: 'We want [Philippine art] on display where members of the public, local and foreign, will be able to see them. These members include the Philippine community in Singapore, of which there is a strong and growing presence'.⁷⁸ Blogger Arnaldo Arnaiz billed the NGS as 'a must-visit for every Filipino'; yet, others felt conflicted and aired their sentiments on Facebook.⁷⁹

In reality, according to one local report, the Filipinos are strangers to their heritage even when the museum 'is attached to a mall'.⁸⁰ In addition to purchases, 50 per cent of Philippine art at the NGS were loans from the NMP, the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), the Metropolitan Museum of Manila, the Ayala Museum, the Ateneo Art Gallery and the University of Santo Tomas, as well as

key private collections (one example being Félix Resurrección Hidalgo's *La Banca*, on loan from Eleuterio Pascual). Chikiamco says:

We consider [Jose Joya's *Hills of Nikko* (1964)] a very significant loan for us ... for one year but of course, we would be very happy if [the] National Museum could extend the loan to us for another year more! We will also very likely be making future requests for loans as our changing exhibitions program rolls out.⁸¹

She explains that 'the loan period varies, although it's for at least a year and at most five years.'⁸²

In March 2014, the NGS sent a curatorial team to Manila to attend an art conference at the Ayala Museum, as well as expand its collaboration and partnerships, networking with directors, collectors and curators. When I met with Chikiamco on 13 January 2017 at the NGS, she was concerned that the loans were about to reach their expiration date and that the works would eventually have to be returned, leaving the walls empty. How ironic that the fifteen rooms at the Southeast Asian Gallery were divided on 'key impulses across four different periods' and that the first was prophetically called 'Authority and Anxiety', encompassing the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the works of Western-influenced titans such as the Indonesian Raden Saleh and Filipino Luna. Chikiamco affirms, 'It shows the Philippines has a strong connection with its neighbors and not just in the art on display but also the historical context in which artists responded to.'⁸³ She adds: 'There is something deeply meaningful in identifying and exploring connections with the rest of the region.'⁸⁴ In today's regional or global branding phenomena across the tropics (as evidenced by the NGS) or the desert (as evidenced by the Louvre Abu Dhabi), museum collaborations have become the norm. After NMP Director Jeremy Barns attended the grand inauguration of the new NGS in Singapore on 23 November 2015, even posing next to Amorsolo's *Defend Thy Honour* canvas with the CCP Artistic Director Chris Millado,⁸⁵ Barns welcomed NGS officials as 'international partners and future collaborators' to 'strengthen professional ties and plan for future collaborations' at the NMP in Manila.⁸⁶ NGS Director Tan, NGS Deputy Director Russell Storer and Chikiamco were toured by Barns in the galleries featuring artworks by Luna. One of the fruits of this collaboration is the blockbuster 'Between Worlds: Raden Saleh and Juan Luna' exhibition which opened at the NGS in November 2017 and closed in March 2018, and which juxtaposed the two nineteenth-century painters. According to Chua:

By all accounts, the National Gallery Singapore is shaking up exhibition production in Southeast Asia: displaying rarely seen art from the region, acquiring important works, teasing out loans from recalcitrant lenders, engineering cooperative agreements with international institutions, generating new scholarship on art of the region, and prioritizing research over exhibition. At its best, the gallery is using its enormous power – and deep pockets – to institute a politics of inclusion in Southeast Asia: so necessary for the region closed off to outsiders and often mired in private ownership and enclave thinking. But this may all add up to nothing more than a curatorial colonialism. And though the gallery is actively trying to

rewrite the art history of the region – the Saleh-Luna show was an important link in establishing its chain of Southeast Asian modernism – this exhibition, by affirming the state-nationalist account of both artists, offered little that was critical or new.⁸⁷

Perhaps Chua's observation of the NGS's 'curatorial colonialism' is symptomatic of British imperialism's heritage in this former colony. Jeevan Vasagar writes that this legacy is seen by Singapore as beneficial and, thus, it returns to this colonial model to govern its people, build economic wealth and lead the cultural development of the region.⁸⁸ The NMP, the institution that convened the group to appraise and defend Amorsolo's *Defend Thy Honour* in 2012, itself declared five years later that it strongly

supports NGS's efforts to promote the Philippines' artistic heritage, particularly in the larger regional and international context, and lauds its success in bringing to Asia for the first time such key works as *La Muerte de Cleopatra* and *Les Ignores*. Important paintings were also lent by the NM itself as well as other Philippine collections.⁸⁹

Indeed, Singapore, writes Devan, becomes 'the most perfect modern fulfillment of the Orientalist project – conceived and executed, this time, by "Orientals" themselves.'⁹⁰

The brilliant light that characteristically bathed the pastoral landscapes of Amorsolo was overcast by the occupation by and violence of the Japanese imperial forces. Embodied by the Filipina in *Defend Thy Honour*, the Philippines endured a literal and pictorial rape. Faced with a new and more powerful nemesis and lacking the ability to fight with hard cash, a second 'rape' occurred. Or not. In a museological context, the Philippines invades and occupies Singapore.⁹¹ Besides the centrality of race and gender, and its figuring in the NGS galleries, class is inherent in the circulation of Amorsolo's painting – as well as other Philippine works of art – as tokens of cultural capital and consumption. This was clearly demonstrated when the Filipino columnist and historian Ambeth Ocampo attended the opening of the 'Between Worlds: Raden Saleh and Juan Luna' exhibition at the NGS to speak, because he – like other Filipino elites – had loaned pieces from his collection to the NGS. One wonders how many Filipinos can afford to travel to Singapore to see Philippine art. One also wonders who Chikiamko is referring to as the 'Philippine community in Singapore' who were targeted as potential museum visitors, given that most members of this community are migrant domestic helpers who, as 'servants of globalization', would rather spend their Sundays at the Lucky Plaza Mall than the NGS.⁹²

Concluding contradictions

Reframing the nation as individual and the political as personal may provide insight. Beguiling because of his commercial popularity, but highly misunderstood because of the dearth of critical art historical and transnational analysis around him, Fernando Amorsolo was not just a nationalist, a pioneer or a revolutionary, but equally an artist

of commensurable contradictions living and working under various regimes. In the childhood rural town of Daet, the oldest half-brother of Amorsolo named Perico met his fate: 'bound with a bamboo pole strapped to his back, taken to jail', and executed by the Spaniards on charges of joining the revolution.⁹³ Amorsolo also had a younger brother named Pablo who apprenticed to the same uncle-painter in Manila, drew editorial illustrations for the Philippine mass media (such as *Graphic*, *Tribune*, *La Vanguardia*, *Herald* and *Manila Times*) and taught painting at the School of Fine Arts in the University of the Philippines in 1924.⁹⁴ According to family accounts, these two brothers 'were completely a study in extremes, in terms of outlook and lifestyles ... [Amorsolo] was an apartment dweller, while Pablo a homeowner.'⁹⁵ Moreover, Amorsolo's apartment hosted political discussions initiated by his son, who kept a radio to listen to news.⁹⁶ During the Battle of Manila (February–March 1945), the Japanese attempted to destroy everything in their path, burning blocks of houses, killing men and raping women and children. Amorsolo courageously climbed the roof of his apartment. The resulting sketches he made of these events were developed into paintings such as *Rizal Avenue on Fire* (1945), *Ruins of the Manila Cathedral* (1945) and *San Sebastian Church Through Quiapo Ruins* (1945).⁹⁷ Unlike Perico, who died at the hands of the Spaniards, Pablo became 'a follower of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere and served as a colonel of the dreaded Kenpeitai.'⁹⁸ Eventually, Filipino guerrillas captured Pablo who 'was sentenced and executed by the firing squad in Antipolo.'⁹⁹ Three biological brothers – Perico, Fernando and Pablo – exemplified complex acts of resistance and collaboration. Local, regional, national and global power relations, indeed, are in constant realignment, and history and personal and collective memory are consensually reframed as demonstrated in this triangular study of the visual culture of occupation through Fernando Amorsolo's *Defend Thy Honour*.

Notes

- 1 Established through President Ferdinand E. Marcos's Proclamation No. 1001 in 1972, this award is the highest state honour given to individuals who excel in the visual, performing and literary arts.
- 2 Amorsolo depicted the burning and shelling of Manila in several canvasses, such as *The Bombing of the Intendencia* (1942) and *The Burning of Manila* (1942).
- 3 A large knife, similar to a machete.
- 4 Kevin Chua, 'Between Worlds: Raden Saleh and Juan Luna', *Artforum* (April 2018): 177.
- 5 Fernando Amorsolo's biography is well-documented by his descendants. References to his life are based primarily on Edwin A. Martinez, 'Biography', Fernando C. Amorsolo Art Foundation: <http://www.fernandocamorsolo.com/biography.html> (accessed 10 November 2018) and the expanded print version by Sylvia Amorsolo Lazo, Edwin A. Martinez, Don Sebastian Amorsolo, Jane Allinson and Michael Romero, ed., *Maestro Fernando C. Amorsolo: Recollections of the Family* (Quezon City: Fernando C. Amorsolo Art Foundation, 2009). Details are also included in Manuel D. Duldulao, *Twentieth Century Artists*, vol. 1, 2nd edn. (Quezon City: Legacy Publishers, 1995), 12–13.
- 6 See a selection of Amorsolo's sketches from 1917 to 1920 in Lazo et al., *Maestro Fernando C. Amorsolo*, 29–34.

- 7 For more information on the genealogy and corporate history, see Pearlie Rose S. Baluyut, 'The Ayala Museum: A Site of Culture, Capital, and Displaced Colonial Desire', *Australian Journal of Art* 14, no. 1 (1998): 71–89.
- 8 Alfredo Roces, *Amorsolo* (Makati City: Filipinas Foundation, 1975), 30, 43.
- 9 Amorsolo's first wife, Salud Jorge, with whom he had six children, died in 1931. He had six more children with a 'common law partner', Virginia Santos, before marrying Maria del Carmen in 1935, who gave him eight more children. See Martinez, 'Biography', and Florina H. Capistrano-Baker, 'Whither Art History in the Non-Western World: Exploring the Other(s) Art Histories', *The Art Bulletin* 97, no. 3 (September 2015): 251.
- 10 Roces, *Amorsolo*, 35 and Florina H. Capistrano-Baker, ed., *Pioneers of Philippine Art: Luna, Amorsolo, Zobel, Transnationalism in the Late 19th–20th Century* (Makati City: Ayala Foundation, 2006).
- 11 Through the work of Elizabeth Mary Holt, Capistrano-Baker discusses American women's penchant for cross-dressing as a form of appropriation that signifies the power struggle between white and coloured bodies. See Capistrano-Baker, 'Whither Art History', 251 and Elizabeth Mary Holt, *Colonizing Filipinas: Nineteenth-Century Representations of the Philippines in Western Historiography* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2002), 70. On the Ayala Museum, see Baluyut, 'The Ayala Museum'.
- 12 Martinez, 'Biography'.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Holt, *Colonizing Filipinas*, 70.
- 15 These paintings were purchased by the GSIS at an auction on Southeast Asian Modern and Contemporary Art at Christie's in Hong Kong, as evidenced by the purchase and inventory tags behind the canvasses.
- 16 A type of water buffalo.
- 17 A traditional type of house built on stilts.
- 18 Don S. Amorsolo, 'The Afternoon Meal of the Rice Workers', in *Maestro Fernando C. Amorsolo: Recollections of the Family*, ed. Sylvia Amorsolo Lazo, Edwin A. Martinez, Don Sebastian Amorsolo, Jane Allinson and Michael Romero (Quezon City: Fernando C. Amorsolo Art Foundation, 2009), 43–52. In 1931, Amorsolo also exhibited *Conversion of the Filipinos* at the Philippine Pavilion of the Paris Exposition.
- 19 Ramil Dugal Gulle, 'Getting real: Avoiding fake Amorsolos', *ABS-CBN News*, 2 October 2008: <https://news.abs-cbn.com/features/09/27/08/getting-real-avoiding-fake-amorsolos>
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Art for security: The weaponizing of Israeli art in times of emergency

Maayan Amir

Introduction

The Six-Day War (also known as the 'June 1967 War') was fought between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries Egypt (which at that time was known as the 'United Arab Republic'), Syria and Jordan, from 5 June to 10 June 1967. Considered 'one of the shortest wars in recorded history', Israel gained a sweeping military victory in this conflict.¹ During the war, thousands lost their lives, with most of the casualties on the Arab side. In the war's aftermath, Israel expanded its national territory to 'three and a half times its original size'.² As a result, more than a million Palestinians came under Israeli rule in the newly occupied territories, consequently reshaping the Arab-Israeli conflict and the balance of power in the entire Middle East, and starting a period of occupation which has continued to the present day.³

It was claimed that 'in the days prior to the Six-Day War, the Israeli people were deceived by their leaders that the fate of the nation was in real jeopardy on a par with the Holocaust'.⁴ Israeli artists responded collectively to the war in a number of ways. One particular instance of this surge in national sentiment took place on 25 July 1967 – barely a month and a half after the end of the war – when the exhibition 'Israeli Artists for Security' (in English it appeared as 'Israeli Artists for Defence') opened at the Helena Rubinstein Pavilion of the Tel Aviv Museum of Art. Among the hundreds of artists who participated in this exhibition were Joseph Zaritsky, Yehezkel Streichman, Dani Karavan, Lea Nickel, Aviva Uri, Ziona Tajar, Anna Ticho, Ruth Schloss and Raffi Lavie. 'Israel's artists have donated 350 works of art to contribute to the national security effort', the official press release announced.⁵ It was 'the greatest of exhibitions for the most important of causes', a newspaper advertisement declared, urging the public to purchase the works with the slogan: 'Buy a painting – donate to our nation.' Another advertisement shrewdly appealed to the public to 'not stay out of the picture'⁶ (Figure 5.1).

The exhibition was organized jointly by the Association of Israeli Painters and Sculptors, the Israeli Ministry of Defense (under the auspices of the Public Committee of Defense Loan Bonds) and the Tel Aviv Museum of Art. According to the protocol of

תערוכת

"אכונני ישראל למען הבטחון"

**הגדולה בתערוכות
לחשובה במטרות**

במוזיאון תל-אביב ביתן הלנה רובינשטיין מוצגות
למכירה 350 תמונות ופסלים שנתרמו ע"י אמני
ישראל ל"קן הבטחון".

אגודת הציירים והפסלים בישראל, הנהלת מוזיאון
תל-אביב, המועצה הציבורית "בהתנדב עם", חוג
ידידות המוזיאון, קוראים לציבור לרכוש יצירות
אמנות אלו שתמורתן קודש לבטחון ישראל.

המחירים שנקבעו הם למטה מהמחירים הרגילים
וזאת כדי לאפשר את הרכישה לחוגים רחבים ולא
לאספנים בלבד.



התערוכה פתוחה מיום ג' 25.7.67 ועד יום ג' 8.8.67 בשעות 10-1
למנהי"צ ומ"ד 7-אחה"צ. הכניסה הפשוטה

Figure 5.1 'Israeli Artists for Security' advertisement in *Davar*, 27 July 1967.

a meeting held on 16 July 1967 at the home of the painter Reuven Rubin, the purpose of the exhibition was to 'sell 350 works donated by the artists, with all proceeds going to the Defense Fund'. The logistics were shared out between the three partner organizations: the Association of Painters and Sculptors committed itself to delivering the works to the museum; the Ministry of Defense dealt with all the invitations to the opening, collaborating with Geva Studios to film the exhibition and events, and

covering all the organizational costs; and the artists themselves volunteered to 'take shifts helping to sell the works'. The protocol was endorsed by the Director of the Tel Aviv Museum, Dr Haim Gamzo, as well as by Reuven Rubin, signing himself as 'the painter Reuven'.⁷

Largely forgotten over the years, this exhibition is now rarely mentioned in histories of Israeli art. Several of the original participants (with whom I have spoken) have no recollection of it. Nonetheless, a handful of records in the archives of the Tel Aviv Museum shed some light on the event. 'In early June,' one document recounts, 'the Central Committee of the Association of Painters and Sculptors urged Israel's artists to contribute to the national security effort by donating their works, in addition to their individual purchases of security loan bonds'. It was noted that the artists 'responded generously and donated high-quality works'.⁸ The press release also boasted: 'All art lovers in Israel must ensure that the works find their way to 350 Israeli homes', adding that many of the artists have lowered their fees for the occasion. A 26 July story in the daily *Ma'ariv* repeated the official release almost word for word, calling the exhibition 'a contribution to the war effort' and declaring it 'an opportunity to see works by Israeli artists of all schools and all groups side by side'.⁹

My interest in this seemingly marginal event in the history of Israeli art is prompted by several factors. Firstly, a study of this exhibition can help us rethink the complex relationship between artists and the state, and between art and ideology, offering another unique entry – currently missing – to the existing historical narrative of Israeli art, while also shedding new light on a period considered to be the moment when Israeli political art first started to bloom and come into its own. Secondly, it can help us observe the mechanisms that produce social, conceptual, cultural and ethical conformity, mechanisms whose mode of operation in the exhibition – viewed decades later with greater hindsight with regards the war's long-term outcomes and the ongoing occupation of the West Bank and other areas – offers some fascinating insights. I wish to return then to a visual event instigated by this war, an artistic endeavour in which Israeli artists aligned themselves with the state in a show of 'active citizenship' by offering their art as a contribution to the 'war effort'. And while Israeli art since the Six-Day War has become known more for its overt criticism of 'the Occupation', my focus on this specific exhibition aims to offer a rather different beginning to the history of the visual response to the war and its grave ramifications. In a sense, my intention is to show how the moment which marked the onset of the current state of affairs was also identified with the objectification of art for the nation's 'sacred' security. Notably, by enmeshing artistic production with national security issues, the exhibition provides a unique vantage point from which to examine urgent contemporary questions regarding the ties between art and declared *states of emergency*, whereby the latter is posited as an irrevocable condition for guaranteeing national security.

It is important to mention that my point of departure is the exhibition's Hebrew title, which, unlike its English parallel, which included the word 'defence' (as if to justify the use of force) – implying that the exhibition endorsed the moral necessity of impeding a one-sided invasion – should instead have been translated more literally as 'Israeli Artists for Security'. This strategic skewing of meaning is what interests me in particular. Not only does the Hebrew title refrain from specifying the funding goal

of the initiative – making the title generic for an exhibition rather than an art sale – more importantly, it cites the much more contested concept of *security*, now widely viewed by scholars of international law as a pointedly political term that denotes ‘the alleviation of threats to cherished values.’¹⁰ In what follows, my aim is to respond to this title and its provocative pairing of the two ostensibly remote concepts of art and security. This chapter will attempt to unravel the issue of the limits between art and life when the latter comes under threat, a threat this particular exhibition resuscitated. Specifically, my objective is to show that, though quite blatant, the exhibition’s rhetoric betrayed some of the subtle ways in which art can position itself vis-à-vis the social and body politic.

The title itself, ‘Israeli Artists for Security’, slyly twisted the modernist slogan ‘art for art’s sake’, exposing the aggressive and nationalist potentialities concealed by the underlying discourse.¹¹ I will first point to the way in which differentiating life from art is central to this exhibition’s peculiar historical absence from the nation’s cultural memory. I will then challenge the purpose of creating such a clear-cut distinction between life and art by drawing upon the origins of the notion of ‘art for art’s sake’ to show that while substituting ‘art’s sake’ for ‘security’s sake’ is patently inconsistent with the founding principles of the doctrine, it is these same principles that seem to have made this swap possible. Moving from the exhibition’s title to the titles selected for the works on exhibit, I will then show how, despite the organizers having foregrounded a diversity of artistic styles, the captions applied to the artworks reveal a striking conformity and similarity, as manifested in a sizeable number of titles dedicated to landscapes. I will suggest that the tendency of the works towards abstract representation is contradicted by titles that instead portray the pre-war, divided Jerusalem as a singular entity; at the time, the public perception of the state’s boundaries was hazy and indeterminate, and this contrast turned the exhibition into a third space in which the viewers/citizens oscillated between slogans and images, between nostalgia and a more concrete perception of territory, between hard boundaries and their elusive, boundless abstraction. This perplexing artistic representation of reality was orchestrated in a state of emergency such that inalienable moral values were rebadged in the ‘spirit of national unification’. Furthermore, since the citizen attending the exhibition was induced to purchase a depiction of state-land to assist the national security effort, in a sense, she/he was also co-opted to secure the land at a representational level.

A ‘most important cause’

A press gathering took place on 25 July 1967 at the Helena Rubinstein Pavilion with the participation of representatives from all the institutions involved (i.e. the Artists Association, the museum itself and the Ministry of Defense). Significantly, the press release at the time exalted the historic role of the exhibition and lauded its cause. However, the exhibition is now hardly ever mentioned in art literature on this period, regardless of the extensive advertising campaign for it that was conducted by an external professional public relations company, A. Tal & Co., and which widely promoted the exhibition on a daily basis from 26 July to 4 August 1967 in all of Israel’s

major newspapers, mainly in the news section, along with regular commercials on two radio stations¹² (Figure 5.2).

In their catalogue for the 2008 exhibition *The Birth of Now: Art in Israel in the 1960s* – created as part of a collaborative initiative led by Israel's six leading museums, and aiming to offer 'a decade-by-decade' exploration of Israeli art from the establishment of the State of Israel to the present – curators Yona Fischer and Tamar Manor-Friedman describe the period between the end of 1967 and the end of 1968 as 'not long enough for the artists to collect their bearings and react'.¹³ According to these curators, it was too early to 'readjust and respond', and at the time Israel's 'mainstream artists devoted more attention to individual and aesthetic concerns than to political or social issues'. The curators briefly mention that a few artists' immediate reply to the conflict was to contribute to war albums marking victory in 1967 battles, but they also argue that, by doing so, artists were merely 'carried away' by their feelings, rather than actively responding to events. 'The impact of the war', the authors claim, 'with all its symbolic and critical significance, would become pervasive and would break forth only in the 1970s'. That said, the curators do discuss other exhibitions, including one held at the Tel Aviv Museum a year later, which attempted to respond in a more critical way to the war's consequences.¹⁴

Similarly, writing about the war's aftermath, Yigal Zalmona, in his book *A Century of Israeli Art* – written at the time when Zalmona was the chief interdisciplinary curator of Israel's museum network – omits any mention of the 1967 exhibition and its affirmative all-encompassing response to the war, preferring instead to focus on the occasional early artistic endeavours aimed at criticizing the militaristic atmosphere




Figure 5.2 Israeli Artists for Defence Fund Leaflet, 1967. Courtesy of the Tel Aviv Museum of Art.

that prevailed in the aftermath of that conflict. Zalmona suggests that these outbursts may have been influenced by parallel resistance movements that developed in response to the war in Vietnam.¹⁵

In his blog summarizing year-by-year trends in Israeli art, the art critic Gideon Ofrat expands on the euphoria that swept through the local art world, galvanized by the territorial gains of 1967. Ofrat stresses the lack of direct artistic responses to the war, adding that the Israeli art world was largely oblivious to the war's complex implications. Interestingly, Ofrat singles out the 'exemplary bravery' of artist Ruth Schloss, whom he indicates as 'the social-humanistic conscience of Israeli art'. For him, in June 1967 Schloss was the first to react with a series of ink sketches depicting Palestinian refugees crossing Allenby Bridge (which connects the West Bank to Jordan). He notes that Schloss had travelled to Jordan's bridges right after the fighting subsided, making rapid sketches on the battlefield. Citing curator Tali Tamir, he adds that Schloss was 'one of the first to resist the occupation from day one'.¹⁶ Ofrat was another who refrained from including the 'Artists for Security' exhibition in his retrospective of the art scene. To have actually mentioned this exhibition would have raised the issue that, despite her having witnessed the combat zone and the victims' flight first hand, Schloss had soon afterward taken part in an exhibition which basically advocated military force. That said, the oil painting that Schloss submitted to the 1967 exhibition embodied a rather different theme from the one mentioned above, and was titled *Women in Landscape*.

Although it remains a mystery as to why such a wide-scale national effort ended with this strange amnesia, it is nevertheless clear that the 'Israeli Artists for Defence' exhibition is not consistent with the historic Western art narrative, and is also at odds with the so-called international art scene – the very same narrative that the aforementioned writers declaredly deploy as their model for sampling, organizing and conceptualizing local trends in the Israeli art field, and thereby recommending what will be remembered and preserved. Broadly speaking, the history of Israeli art is usually narrated and studied through a timeline that complies with dominant trends governing Western art, albeit somewhat delayed in the case of Israel. In 1967 (though also earlier), while Israeli art was still following the trajectory of modernism, Western art had moved away from formalist abstraction to become far more overtly political and 'socially engaged'. Viewed in retrospect in terms of both the political implications of the Six-Day War and the growing mood of socially critical postmodernism spreading across the Western world, the exhibition disrupts the writers' attempts to narrate contemporary art's progress towards a more critical stance, to follow the Western storyline which the curators both embrace and strive to confirm. In these circumstances, it is only logical that this exhibition would become historically insignificant and consequently be rebutted, ignored or simply forgotten.

What is more, I suggest that this peculiar amnesia over an exhibition that manifested the war's influence on the Israeli art arena is actually an outcome of the theoretical stance taken by the abovementioned art critics themselves. The critics' ideological stance is one of severing the artists' lives from their works – and even their public endeavours – and viewing these as detached and external, when instead they sought ways in which the war's ramifications would affect the form, content and very nature of the artworks. In this sense, the way the artists were aligned to the national community

– even though it was presented in an exhibition in one of the state's most important museums – would paradoxically become irrelevant, because it would be as if they adhered to the view that 'life is one thing, art is another ... let us keep the two apart'.¹⁷ My view is that even if this were so, much can be learnt from this case of art serving an external purpose – some scope outside and beyond itself – especially in times of violent conflicts or acute national security concerns.

We need to look into this act of shifting the onus from art in its own right to the issue of security. This shift seems to stem from an art scene focused on modern tendencies and the point at which art sought to enforce its autonomy from events and contingencies.¹⁸ This political engagement emerges in the 'Security' exhibition, which seemed to embody the links between art on the one hand, and occupation and militarism on the other. This manoeuvre essentially implies that this involved art 'for the nation's sake', a further variation of the formula whereby art was abruptly detached from its social function. In this way, the common idea of art created for 'the pursuit of pure beauty – without any other preoccupation', 'without confounding ... with patriotism and alike', was hijacked for reasons of state security and defence. With this in mind, I wish to return briefly to some selected examples of 'art for art's sake', and in particular ones that complicate the idea that art can be detached from moral obligations.¹⁹

Art for art's sake?

Interestingly, the invocation 'art for art's sake' plays an influential role in art's route towards self-determination. The origins of this concept have been traced to the Enlightenment as part of the dominant ambition to liberate science, law, morality – and all forms of art – from the grip of religious authority.²⁰ Despite the diverse interpretations ascribed to the phrase from the eighteenth century up until the first half of the twentieth century – interpretations that have migrated, merged and transformed across a variety of cultural arenas in Europe and beyond – 'art for art's sake' has become a staple for any discussion on the political heft of art, of its autonomy and the ultimate limits of its impact. In contemporary times the idea of 'art for art's sake' is commonly considered a refuge in which artists can secure their interests when they feel themselves 'threatened from one direction or another, and have had to justify themselves and their activities ... by insisting that art serves no ulterior purpose, but is purely an end in itself'.²¹ Basically, they advocate art's independence and reject the need for any usefulness or moral justification.

However, a closer look at the real outcomes reveals a much more active engagement in life. The roots of the phrase precede the modernist ethos, and have been traced to the Christian doctrine which contends that 'nothing exists wholly for its own sake, since everything is always also in relation to Christ'.²² Therefore, it seems to stem not from ideas of autonomy as such, but rather from a theology that emphasizes total attachment. As early as the seventeenth century, the political thought of English philosopher John Locke was identified with the notion of 'truth for truth's sake'. In a 'Letter to Anthony Collins' (an English thinker and a government official in Essex)

dated 29 October 1703, Locke famously wrote: 'Believe it, my good friend, to love truth, for truth's sake, is the principal part of human perfection in this world, and the seed-plot of all other virtues.'²³

Locke's proclamation was understood to express the hazards of submitting oneself to the authority of tradition in a society divided by competing doctrines of faith. By placing truth itself at the centre, he aimed to replace adherence to an 'innate' morality with a more developed system of active rational negotiation of moral values.²⁴ Locke's adherence to truth for truth's sake, as a means to resist obedience to external authority, actually predates 'art for art's sake' and might have provided the conceptual humus for the field in which this idea materialized. According to Bell-Villada, it was Anthony Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury – privately educated by Locke himself and later influenced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant – who is considered to have introduced the idea of 'art for art's sake'.²⁵ While Bell-Villada does not elaborate on Locke's specific influence on Cooper, he expands on Kant's contribution and particularly on his *Critique of Judgment*, which posed an aesthetic judgement and analysis of beauty associated with a notion of 'Purposiveness Without a Purpose'.²⁶ Viewing 'art for art's sake' through the Kantian conceptualization of 'disinterested beauty' prompted a new perception of the formula as 'aesthetic separatism'.²⁷ Against this, Bell-Villada asserts that Kant's conception of beauty must be regarded in light of his overall ideology, in which he does not explicitly call for the separation of beauty from morality. He cites Kant: 'If the beautiful arts are not brought into more combination with moral ideas ... the spirit can become dual, and the mind disconnected with itself and peevish.'²⁸ Moreover, according to Bell-Villada, Cooper himself presented a dual doctrine which defined the aesthetic experience as something both independent from personal desires yet at the same time tied to moral conduct.²⁹ The discrepancy between the two positions relates to a contemporary perspective which pitched beauty versus utility, whereas for eighteenth-century thinkers the two concepts were complementary.³⁰

An interpretation of Kant's ideas also shaped the French '*l'art pour l'art*' – a maxim that arose from a series of lectures given in 1818 by Victor Cousin, the chair of philosophy at the Sorbonne, and first published in 1836. Cousin is quoted as saying: '*Il faut de la religion pour la religion, la morale pour la morale, comme de l'art pour l'art.*'³¹ A year later, in his *Französische Bühne* (Letters Concerning the French Stage) (1837), the German poet Heinrich Heine declared: 'I am for the autonomy of art. It is not to be regarded as handmaiden of religion and politics, it is its own definite justification', later adding: 'My motto is Art in the purpose of art, as love in the purpose of Love, and even life itself is the purpose of life.'³² Heine's biographer Philip Kossoff points out that it would be a mistake to conclude that Heine separated the world from life itself:

He considered art that was aloof from life as being just as hostile to art as to life. He insisted that art must not be subordinated to religion or politics or the government. Art must be autonomous but it retains validity only if it is connected to life. Just as the giant Antaeus remained invincible so long as his feet touched the earth, so the poet remains strong and mighty so long as he stands on real ground, but he loses his strength at once when he rises ecstatically into the blue.³³

Even the French nineteenth-century poet and critic Théophile Gautier warns against abandoning reality: 'Artists should understand that they are wrong to isolate themselves ... in some sort of ideal abstraction outside of any possible application.'³⁴ Interestingly, it seems that to whatever extent the notion of 'art for art's sake' was understood as including a commitment to moral values, already in the eighteenth century it gave rise to ideologically contradictory forces, such as the alliance between advocates of romanticism and '*art pour l'art*' and militant liberals cultivating a mood of resistance to the Bourbon crown and towards the monarchy in general.³⁵ Moreover, it was claimed that the freedoms to be gained from '*art pour l'art*' and the notion that art should follow laws of its own could resolve what until then appeared to be opposing aesthetics views. 'The critic, whose duty it is to understand everything', noted Gautier, 'can without contradicting himself, accept points of view which are in appearance contradictory. Therefore, one must not be astonished to see us praise works opposite in character. We must judge them in relation to the principles chosen by the artists themselves.'³⁶

While such historic examples may complicate the relation between 'art for art's sake' and its social role, whose possible manifestations would continue to emerge, in France this '*art pour l'art*' sentiment was identified with the anti-monarchist Left, but is now commonly seen as representing its opposite. That is, today 'art for art's sake' is linked not only with a retreat into aestheticism, but also with cultural and political conservatism.³⁷

Taking place towards the end of the heyday of modernism in Israel, the 'Israeli Artists for Security' exhibition resonated with the dying echo of a dual agenda that invoked art's autonomy while simultaneously calling for moral commitment, even if such commitment would most likely be perceived today as 'immoral'. More importantly, the exhibition illustrated an ideological quagmire whereby Christian values blurred with truth, with art, and eventually with (national) security, exposing a slippery path that led to viewing security as a sacred value – or at least establishing the ground for clustering all these disparate values as interchangeable on the same representational plane.

Security and the language of opposition, or 'art for life's sake'

Contrary to the complexity that 'art for art's sake' entails, and despite the seeming tautology of the phrase itself, the entire argument around 'art for art's sake' is riddled with dichotomies and contradictions. These include influential statements such as Gautier's 'everything that is useful is ugly, for it is the expression of some need, and the needs of men are ignoble and disgusting.'³⁸ And 'for all time there has existed, in painting, two schools, that of the idealists and that of the realists. ... The former has soul, the latter has life.'³⁹ Some critics have emphasized that 'art for art's sake' applies mainly to sight, while 'all the rest of the senses relate to literature, music etc.', identifying 'art for art's sake' with visual data, as opposed to other narrative forms.⁴⁰ Flaubert's declaration – 'I feel an invincible repulsion to putting on paper anything from my heart' – implies a sort of opposition between self-alienation and intimacy.⁴¹ Additional extensions of this binary view include individualism versus altruism;⁴² form versus content;⁴³ artistic

achievement versus ethical goals;⁴⁴ symbolism versus representation of reality;⁴⁵ beauty as opposed to realism;⁴⁶ unpopular versus popular;⁴⁷ dehumanization versus humanization;⁴⁸ and, most strongly, juxtaposing art in opposition to life. Viewing the circumstances that led to the 1967 exhibition 'Israeli Artists for Security' through this polarizing lens, it would seem that the show embodied the direct, utilitarian opposite of 'art for art's sake'. And while the notion of art's autonomy was coupled with expressions of resistance to 'dominant or administrated realities', the resulting exhibition was paradoxically an act of dire conformity and an expression of unflinching support for the institution of the nation-state.⁴⁹

At this point we also need to consider the origins and meaning of the word 'security', which stems from the Latin *securus* (lit., 'free from care'),⁵⁰ and compare it to the common understanding of the notion of 'art for art's sake' as meaning 'an emphasis upon form and beauty to the expressed exclusion of all other concerns.'⁵¹ Ironically, the two notions seem to share this spirit of disregard for context, and even defiance. On this basis, one might see a strange consistency in the alignment of 'art for art's sake' with the fight for independence – in the face of war's threat. While the original slogan 'art for art's sake' is hinted at in the 1967 exhibition's title, recalling also the expression of 'life for art's sake', the exhibition itself might well be described as an event of 'art for life's sake.'⁵² An entire community of artists (perhaps fearing extinction?) aligned themselves around the objective of security (safety) and in so doing promoted the 'national interest'. It appears that swapping 'art's sake' with 'security's sake' for the exhibition's title effectively jeopardized art's autonomy and resistance to utility, and turned the event into a deadly resource for warfare. This is proof that in times of emergency, art can be conveniently repurposed for fatal material ends. Notably, a document signed by the Tel Aviv Museum's then director expresses his pride at having raised a total of 50,000 Israeli pounds through the sale of the artworks, and of having the 'great honour' of assigning this sum to the military.⁵³

The spirit of national unity and the 'writing on the wall'

Unlike the sublime horizon often invoked by modernist paintings, and regardless of the exhibited artworks' supposed aspiration to varying levels of abstraction, the paintings presented at the 1967 exhibition did, however, touch 'real ground'. We can see this from the 'writings on the wall' – of the museum – that is, from the titles of works themselves. Despite the claimed diversity in styles alleged in the exhibition press release, the 'List of Exhibits' conveyed a common artistic choice for their labels. Oddly enough, while the Tel Aviv Museum failed to keep any visual documentation of the exhibition, it nonetheless did preserve a detailed record of the participating artists, the titles of their works and the prices of the works themselves.

Titling an artwork has been described as 'a signifying technique', and 'a textual strategy' that has the power to shape the experience of the viewer.⁵⁴ 'The title of a painting often provides the first and even the only language by which the image will be constructed,' notes the philologist Ruth Bernard Yeazell.⁵⁵ Specifically, for the modern period, historian John C. Welchman has identified

three non-distinct categories of titular activity ... First, the continuation of broadly denotative titles, where the words are presumed to stand in direct and untroubled relation to which is represented. Second, the set of titles that can be said to provoke connotative, allusive, or even in Dada and Surrealism, absurd and non-consequential references to an image. And third, the conclusively modernist practice of advertising the absence of a title through the description 'Untitled' or through numbering or other systemic, non referential designations.⁵⁶

To illustrate the title's relation to the work, Welchman cites Marcel Duchamp's description of the modern title as an 'invisible color'.⁵⁷ The art historian Ernst Gombrich goes as far as to claim that 'unlike images, language can make ... [a] vital distinction ... between universals and particulars'. For him, the title of an artwork 'is also an instruction to adopt a given mental state'. In regard to modern titles, Gombrich emphasizes that 'studying the two-volume catalogue of the Guggenheim Museum collection by Angelica Zander Rudenstine, one finds that among the 252 paintings from the period 1880–1945 there is not one comparable title'.⁵⁸ He also takes into consideration the fact that with modernist works it is not always clear whether the artists have personally chosen the titles themselves, or if titles were assigned by exhibition organizers.

In the case of the 'Israeli Artists for Security' exhibition – and in any case within the specific ideological context – the titles are to some degree instructive.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the importance of naming the works in the exhibition – either because the purpose was to sell the works and they therefore needed tagging in some way, or because failing to provide a title would imply letting the painting 'speak for itself' – is perhaps confirmed by the fact that not one of the works in the 1967 exhibition bore the label 'Untitled'.⁶⁰

Normally, the titles of modern artworks vary considerably. However, in 'Israeli Artists for Security' there is a glaring similarity among the titles chosen. Of the 350 works included, forty-six paintings were titled after Israeli landscapes, with a significant number depicting Zfat, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jaffa and Ein Hod, among other sites. Strikingly, at least thirty-two artists chose titles referring explicitly to Jerusalem, and employed an assortment of media such as oils, watercolour, and even ink and gouache drawings to capture views of the city. Many of these works were titled simply *Jerusalem* (e.g. those by Gad Ullman, Coca Lapidot, Rita Most and Avraham Naton, to mention only a few). Considering that prior to the war Jerusalem had been divided, with the western part of the city under Israeli rule and the eastern part under Jordanian rule – a partition known also as the pre-1967 border (which became irrelevant after the Israeli victory, an event which was perceived by the Israeli state as marking the unification of the city, but by others as marking the start of the occupation of the eastern part of the city) – the artists' invocation of Jerusalem as a single, unified whole must have acquired a new political meaning. Other artists favoured alluding to the burden of the pre-war territorial border-partition arrangement. For instance, the artists Haya Alperovitz and Elhanan Halpren titled their works *Mount Zion*, being the closest vantage point from which Israelis could previously view Jerusalem's Old City and the Temple Mount under Jordanian rule. Others embraced the newly annexed, most contested area of the Old City as their point of reference. For instance, Shaul Ohaly and Kurt Singer titled their works *Jerusalem's Old City*, and Zvi Raffeli

indicated the monumental site of the *Wailing Wall*. More bluntly, as if to foreground the physical presence at the only recently excluded areas, artist Ruth Arion named her work *In the Old City of Jerusalem*, and Ephraim Lifshitz labelled his *Impression from an Ancient Wall in the Sanhedrin Catacombs*. An additional thirty-one works resorted to the generic and non-specific title *Landscape*, though some did include references to specific sites in the Israeli countryside. With regard to the exhibition's circumstances, a handful of artists donated works celebrating the military triumph; for example, the head of the artists' union and the exhibition organizer, painter Reuven Rubin, titled his work *Victory Bouquet*, while artist Shlomit Hermoni's submission was titled *Yenentie Women Victory Dance*.⁶¹

Nevertheless, it should be noted that other titles betray a greater detachment from the exhibition's context. For instance, the theme of 'flowers' recurred in such works as *Tulips* (Malka Ventik) and *Water Plants* (Joseph Zdroyevich), along with blossoms in general (Joab Bar-el). Several other titles are peculiarly divorced from the reasons behind the exhibition. Examples include *Eggplants* by Hedwig Lehmann-Grossman and *A Couple of Monkeys* by Lehmann Rudolf. Interestingly, both of the artists whose titles seem least relevant to the occasion were not content with donating a single work – as their colleagues had done – and instead both made available no fewer than ten works, their presence conspicuous on the museum's walls.

Nevertheless, the substantial amount of works with abstract representations of the country's landscapes – submitted under the urgent pretext of a state of emergency and for national security ends that likely prompted viewers to push aside or at least postpone questions of personal style – recontextualize the disconnect between the title and the abstract depiction of the territory itself, creating a virtual space for the collective political imagination to inhabit. The dynamic between the names given to individual works and the title of the exhibition suggests a phantom space mirroring newly occupied territory that now required national defence. In a sense, the conversion of those 'cherished values' that replaced Christ with truth, with art, and later with security, once viewed in interaction with the works' titles, is dilated to include the state's territory, reflecting the conservative agenda by which national security is equated with rigorous territorial control. Moreover, it is in this impalpable space between the captive titulars accompanying the exhibition and the elusive territory that the darkness of insecurity finds a peculiar endorsement for military force where citizenship appears to be equated with land ownership, not only in a concrete sense, but also symbolically. Various slogans urged the exhibition's visitors to acquire these landscapes as an act of national importance, marketing private purchases as vital for ensuring national security. By doing this, the meaning of land ownership was extended to the representation of that territory. As such, the exhibition 'Israeli Artists for Security' was artfully branded as a manifestation of national unity.

Interestingly, also at the representational level (since it was the fuzzy, indefinite borders of the territory that fomented the sense of insecurity), one has to question where exactly in the exhibition this spirit of national unity resided. While the diversity of the artworks and artistic genres in the exhibition was beyond dispute, including lyrical abstraction, post-impressionism, primitivism, expressionism, to name only a few, the organizers appear to have been indecisive regarding where exactly this spirit

arose from. Was it from the works of art themselves, from their being displayed collectively at the museum, or perhaps from the initiative itself?

Several versions of the exhibition press release kept in the museum archives reveal that this quandary also preoccupied the organizers. The handwritten version of the document – presumably its first draft – stated:

Today, having finally been able to view all the works at the exhibition ... we can say that artists with diverse aesthetic views, from various schools and currents, are presented here side-by-side ... contributing together to our country's awakening and unity. The spirit of national unity permeates the halls of the Tel Aviv Museum of Art.⁶²

However, a printed version with handwritten annotations expunged the original statement, presuming to locate the source from which 'the spirit of national unity' sprang. Instead of the 'halls of the Tel Aviv Museum' the text was revised to read: 'The spirit of national unity is reflected from the execution of the initiative "Israeli Artists for Security."' Furthermore, in an abridged version of the text relayed to the Geva News Company, the sentence was amended as follows: 'For the first time since the formation of the Association of Israeli Painters and Sculptors, all of its members join forces, their participation symbolizing the perfect unity created by this sacred objective.'

Despite the final version that put the 'national spirit' back into the initiative and its objective, it might be that 'Israeli Artists for Security' presenting their works thus side by side – modernist paintings and sculptures – shows that, in a moment of crisis, these artworks generated a virtual and physical space capable of harbouring the output of an entire community of creators, albeit impromptu. However, one might say that the exhibition epitomizes the pitfalls of the institutionalization of experimental ideas in times of emergency. And when an art fair endorsing warfare suddenly poses as an accepted reaction – basically weaponizing art – the question of separating art from life (and life from art) instantly becomes much more convoluted and even sinister.

The weird oblivion clouding the 'Israeli Artists for Security' exhibition held in 1967 remains, and the event coincides with the moment commonly perceived as marking the birth of Israeli conceptual and political art. This moment has been variously described as 'essentially political', and 'intrinsically linked the rejection of traditional art forms of painting and of sculpture, which concealed and also naturalized the political questions'.⁶³ However, the exhibition rather suggests another view of the end of high modernism at the local level. Moreover, it is precisely the peculiar disconnect between the ties between the war and its implications, between social values and aesthetic values, and between the narrative of Israeli art history and that of Western production that underscores the frontiers between life and art in a state of emergency.

Deletion of normative irregularities in regard to artistic grand narratives might lead again to a failure to recognize the distance between artistic ideology and political action. Moreover, it might blur the blind spots related to the act of conforming to and absorbing internationally acknowledged radical ideas. In terms of contemporary art, the modernist rhetoric seems to have been replaced by a discourse which stressed art's potential to emerge from these zones of discomfort, a discourse in which

instability itself becomes a central value, fuelling creativity. However, one might say that one consensus was merely replaced by another equally restrictive regime, at least when understood through translated slogans. My belief is that this historical event demonstrates how in modern times security can become a sacred value, and art a legitimate means to ensure it. It shows that in times of emergency, even though it may have fallen into oblivion and disappeared from the national radar, art can abruptly become a form of ‘ammunition’ for the state agenda. This fact forces us to re-examine the ways in which art risks abetting and endorsing prevailing power relations. In the ‘Israeli Artists for Security’ exhibition, it was no longer a case of art for its own sake, but art for the sake of power and force, for this was an event that marked the beginning of an ongoing occupation.

Notes

- 1 Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Presidio Press, 2017), 305.
- 2 Ibid., 307.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Simon Dunstan, *The Six-Day War 1967: Sinai* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 91; see also Gideon Ofrat, ‘1967: Was There Art?’: <http://gideonofrat.wordpress.com/?s=1967> (accessed 17 October 2018).
- 5 Details are taken from an undated, untitled and unattributed press release (hereafter ‘Press Release: Israeli Artists for Security’), in Hebrew, held at the Tel Aviv Museum Archive.
- 6 ‘Israeli Artists for Security’, *Davar*, 27 July 1967; see also ‘Do Not Stay Out of the Picture’, *Máariv*, 3 August 1967.
- 7 L. Kaplan to Ministry of Defense, Israeli Artists for Security Meeting Protocol, 17 July 1967. Tel Aviv Museum Archive. So far, Rubin’s familiarity with ‘art for art’s sake’ has remained unexplored; yet, his biography provides multiple pointers that suggest he had a close acquaintance with the literature relating to this concept, and also knowledge of the principal artists identified with its diverse applications. For example, as a young art student at the École des Beaux-Arts in 1913–14, Rubin recalled an influential portal inscription by Ingres (*Le dessin est la probité de l’art*), an artist described as the closest exponent of Théophile Gautier’s ‘conception of art’. In his biography, Rubin moreover underlines his close friendship with ‘art connoisseur and critic’ Alfred Stieglitz in New York, sealed when Stieglitz first commissioned him to exhibit in the Anderson Gallery in 1920. Stieglitz has long been considered the vehicle for the secessionist ‘art for art’s sake’ revolt. Furthermore, Rubin notes that he read Baudelaire and Victor Hugo. Interestingly, upon his return to Palestine in 1923–24, Rubin was proud to see a poster he had designed ‘printed by Zionist organization after the Balfour Declaration, appealing for funds for Palestine’, and later declared: ‘I threw away all the ideas I had derived from Bezalel Art School and the Paris Beaux-Arts ... life was starkly primitive’. This ideological volte-face, along with his overt endorsement of art in the promotion of political ideals, seems to fit well with the stance expressed in the exhibition ‘Israeli Artists for the Defense Fund’, and the replacement of ‘art’s sake’ with that of ‘security’. Reuven Rubin, *My*

Life, My Art (New York: Sabra Books, 1974), 69, 139–41, 46, 48, 60; Anita Brookner, *Romanticism and Its Discontents* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2000), 102; Helen Thomas, *Dance, Modernity and Culture* (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 76.

- 8 This is taken from an undated, untitled and unattributed document (hereafter ‘Document: Israeli Artists for Security’) in Hebrew held by the Tel Aviv Museum and the Public Committee for Defense Loan Bond.
- 9 ‘Press Release: Israeli Artists for Security’.
- 10 Paul D. Williams, ‘Security Studies: An Introduction’, in *Security Studies*, ed. Paul D. Williams (London: Routledge, 2012), 1–12.
- 11 In Hebrew, ‘art for art’s sake’ is usually translated as ‘art for art’, and therefore the substitution with ‘art for security’ is clear. Though there is no research which explores the history of the translation of the notion of ‘art for art’s sake’, note that the phrase ‘art for art’ can be linked to Victor Hugo. On ‘Art for Art’ by Victor Hugo, see Editorial, ‘Art for Art’s Sake: Its Fallacy and Viciousness’, *The Art World* 2, no. 2 (1917): 98–102.
- 12 A. Tal & Co. (Public Relations) to the Tel Aviv Museum, 6 August 1967. Tel Aviv Museum Archive.
- 13 Yona Fischer and Tamar Manor-Friedman, *The Birth of Now: Art in Israel in the 1960s* (Ashdod: Ashdod Art Museum/Monart Center, 2008), 12.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 4, 7, 13, 76–8.
- 15 Yigal Zalmona, *A Century of Israeli Art* (Farnham: Lund Humphries, 2013), 279.
- 16 Ofrat, ‘1967: Was There Art?’
- 17 Ortega Y. Gasset, cited in Kelly Comfort, *Art and Life in Aestheticism: De-Humanizing and Re-Humanizing Art, the Artist and the Artistic Receptor* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 6.
- 18 In the 1960s in Israel, art was described as a process of ‘transition from the absolute, autonomous ideology of the abstract artists of the “New Horizon” group, to open, multi-dimensional, and, above all, individual channels of expression’. This affirmation also indicates a process of ‘retreat from the absolute control of the abstraction which started already at early 60s, when artists of “New Horizon” return to landscape painting’. See Fischer and Manor-Friedman, *The Birth of Now*, 8, 28.
- 19 Gautier, cited in Editorial, ‘Art for Art’s Sake’, 98.
- 20 Precedents to this modern invention lead far back to Greece; see, for example, Editorial, ‘Art for Art’s Sake’, 98–102.
- 21 Iredell Jenkins, ‘Art for Art’s Sake’, *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* 1 (1973): 108–11.
- 22 Stephen Cheeke, *Transfiguration: The Religion of Art in Nineteenth-century Literature before Aestheticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 45.
- 23 John Locke, *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes*, vol. 9, 12th edn. (London: Rivington, 1824). On Collins, see William Uzgalis, ‘Anthony Collins’, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/collins/>
- 24 Greg Forster, *John Locke’s Politics of Moral Consensus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 61.
- 25 Gene H. Bell-Villada, ‘The Idea of Art for Art’s Sake: Intellectual Origins, Social Conditions, and Poetic Doctrine’, *Science & Society* 50, no. 4 (1986): 415–39, esp. 420.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 423.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 420.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 424–5.

- 29 Ibid., 421.
- 30 Ibid., 422. Bell-Villada notes in ‘The Idea of Arts for Art’s Sake’, 420 that Shaftesbury’s ‘major work, the *Characteristics*, enjoyed remarkable success, going through eleven editions from 1711 to 1790’.
- 31 Cousin, cited in Bell-Villada, ‘The Idea of Arts for Art’s Sake’, 427.
- 32 Philip Kossoff, *Valiant Heart: A Biography of Heinrich Heine* (Cranbury: Cornwall Books, 1983), 151.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Lynette Stocks, ‘Théophile Gautier: Advocate of “Art for Art’s Sake” or Champion of Realism?’ *French History and Civilization* 2 (2009): 49.
- 35 Ibid., 428.
- 36 Gautier, cited in Stocks, ‘Théophile Gautier’, 41–60.
- 37 Bell-Villada, ‘The Idea of Arts for Art’s Sake’, 428. It should be noted that ‘art for art’s sake’ was considered conservative much earlier. See, for example, Gustave Courbet, ‘The Realist Manifesto’, 1861: <https://arthistoryproject.com/artists/gustave-courbet/realist-manifesto-an-open-letter/> (accessed 23 January 2020); see also Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1936), in *Visual Culture: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies*, ed. Joanne Morra and Marquard Smith (London: Routledge, 2006), 114–37.
- 38 Théophile Gautier, *Mademoiselle de Maupin* (London: Penguin Classics, 2016).
- 39 Gautier, cited in Stocks, ‘Théophile Gautier’, 41
- 40 Ibid., 16.
- 41 Ibid., 99.
- 42 Editorial, ‘Art for Art’s Sake’, 99.
- 43 Ibid., 99.
- 44 Stocks, ‘Théophile Gautier’, 37.
- 45 Comfort, *Art and Life*, 2.
- 46 Ibid., 44.
- 47 José Ortega Y. Gasset, *The Dehumanization of Art, and Other Writings on Art and Culture* (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 66.
- 48 Gasset, *The Dehumanization of Art*. Kelly Comfort uses the term to describe the process of eliminating the human from art’s subject matter; the method of isolating art in its own autonomous sphere, the desire to free art from human utility or usefulness. See Comfort, *Art and Life in Aestheticism*, 2.
- 49 Despite discussing the concept of ‘life as art’, Simpson mentions in this context writers identified with ideas of ‘art for art’s sake’, such as Baudelaire and Adorno. See Zachary Simpson, *Life as Art: Aesthetics and the Creation of Self* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 7.
- 50 P. G. W. Glare, *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1968), 1722.
- 51 On sensualism, see Stephen Cheeke, *Transfiguration*, 49.
- 52 Comfort, *Art and Life in Aestheticism*, 2.
- 53 M. Ben Haim to M. Kashti, Israeli Artists for Security, 10 September 1977, Tel Aviv Museum Archive.
- 54 J. C. Welchman, *Invisible Colors: A Visual History of Titles* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 323–4.
- 55 Ruth Bernard Yeazell, *Picture Titles: How and Why Western Paintings Acquired Their Names* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 4.
- 56 Welchman, *Invisible Colors*, 8.
- 57 Ibid., 8.

- 58 Ernst Hans Gombrich, 'Image and Word in Twentieth-Century Art', *Word & Image* 1, no. 3 (1985): 213–41.
- 59 Although instructions to the participating artists were not found in the archive, it may also be assumed that since it was a sale exhibition and the works were designated to be in circulation in the art market, and the labels were meant to facilitate the exchange, the Tel Aviv Museum and the organizers requested the artists to title their works. Yeazell adds that 'even in the twenty-first century, many art lovers are probably unaware how often the titles they consult on museum walls testify to a work's reception history rather than the words of the painter'. However, in our case, whether the works' titles were given by the artists or by the exhibition organizers, their meaning in the context of the exhibition is instructive. Yeazell, *Picture Titles*, 4, 13 and 14.
- 60 On the practice of omitting titles, see Yeazell, *Picture Titles*, 19.
- 61 In using the word 'Yenentie', the artist was referring to Yemenite Jews.
- 62 Press Release: Israeli Artists for Security.
- 63 On the political orientation of conceptual art, see Mordechai Omer, 'Foreword', in *Ha-'Enayim shel ha-medinah: omanut hazutit bi-medinah le-lo gevulot*, ed. Mordechai Omer, Uri Ram and Ellen Ginton (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Museum of Art, 1998), 7–10.

Humour in states of occupation: Contemporary art and cultural resilience in Palestine, Greece and Australia

Chrisoula Lionis

Introduction

With strategies of protest that range from giant diaper-wearing hot-air balloons, to the rise of the hashtag #nottheonion, the presidency of Donald Trump has ignited new debates on the politics and indeed potential of humour. Although at the outset of Trump's presidency many were quick to declare satire dead (as truth seemed to have indeed become stranger than fiction), what we have actually witnessed has been a spectacular resurgence in the use of humour in political commentary and public protest. This, in turn, has served to reinvigorate scholarly research and debate into the efficacy of humour as a political tool, particularly for marginalized or oppressed groups.

Humour is, as they say, all about the timing. Where vernacular forms of humour (memes, comics, cartoons, etc.) generate their virility in relation to how swiftly and innovatively they relate to recent events, the humour that operates in contemporary art follows a very different temporal register. In simple terms, art takes time. It takes time to be produced (particularly when commissioned); it takes time to be programmed for exhibition, time to be installed and time to be critically evaluated. The 'slow humour' of contemporary art thus functions very differently to other visual vernacular forms. Although we have seen a rise in analysis of humour as well as attempts to formulate new conceptual frameworks for understanding the spread of laughter through vernacular forms (particularly through digital platforms), leading scholars across the social sciences and Humanities continue to lament the lack of scholarly analysis on humour.¹ Although this paucity is felt across the Humanities more broadly, it is acutely visible in fields that critically engage with contemporary art practice.

This paucity of scholarship is surprising given the marked uptake in strategies of humour by artists from sites of emergency and/or occupation, and those dealing

with issues of collective trauma. Since the 1990s, visual culture and related fields have maintained a focus on the themes of trauma and emergency – something that is evident, for example, in the scholarship around aesthetic representations of emergency, research on migration, affect, and memory, and investigations of socially engaged art practices.² Underlying these projects is an approach that warns against the dangers of reducing trauma to a mere aesthetic concern. Moreover, within an increasingly globalized art world, the phenomenal growth in ‘mega-exhibitions’ (e.g. documenta, biennales such as Sharjah and Gwangju) has led to a situation where major art events are increasingly framed as cultural laboratories for the debate and analysis of urgent contemporary political, cultural and social issues.³ Given that this diversification of art making, consumption and criticism has run parallel to a view of trauma as the sensibility emblematic of the last century, it is in some ways not surprising that artists from sites of political upheaval are often framed as ‘local informants’ prescribed the task of narrating experiences of trauma, and ‘their’ social and political histories. This is most acute in the engagement with artists from sites of occupation.⁴

This chapter investigates how and why artists from around the world are increasingly turning to humorous aesthetic strategies for documenting and re-assessing experiences of emergency, crisis and collective trauma that arise from the experience of occupation. Critically engaging with diverse understandings of the concept of ‘occupation’, this chapter focuses on three key case studies to offer a comparison of how humour operates within contemporary art produced in diverse geographies currently under various forms of occupation: Palestine (military occupation), Greece (financial occupation) and Indigenous Australia (denied sovereignty). Focusing on the work of contemporary artists including Emily Jacir (Palestine), Richard Bell (Australia) and Panos Sklavenitis (Greece), and mapping changes to art infrastructure across these three sites, this chapter makes clear laughter’s unique ability to communicate the lived experience of occupation. Underpinned by a discussion as to why humour is crucial to the social function of art, this chapter thus aims to reveal humour’s capacity for operating as a tool of cultural resilience in three key ways: through political enactment, critical evaluations of collective identity and a reconfiguration of relationships to specific geographies.

Restoration of dignity: Humour as cultural resilience under occupation

The body of research investigating the relationship between humour and the experiences of crisis, trauma and marginalization from other disciplines (e.g. philosophy and sociology) has not been applied to visual culture. Cultural studies research on the subject is often dominated by literature reviews of seminal theories of humour (‘superiority theory’, ‘relief theory’ and ‘incongruity theory’). Where scientific fields such as psychology provide numerous in-depth investigations of the relationship between humour and trauma, focusing in particular on its potential as a ‘mature-defence mechanism’ and survival strategy,⁵ the bulk of work on humour in cultural studies is underscored by an enquiry into whether humour can hold the key to social,

political and ideological change and subversion, or whether it simply maintains the status quo. The analysis of the relationship between humour and marginalization is largely made up of analysis of the history and social impacts of ethnic and racially based humour.⁶ This line of enquiry is also bound to the investigation of humour as a means of re-enforcing collective and national identity.⁷

When beginning to think through the applicability of this scholarship in developing a framework for understanding humour as a form of cultural resilience in contemporary art, one is presented by two chief problems. The first of these relates to the idea of resilience in contemporary art as being most closely associated with 'social-practice' modes of art making: forms of art that not only represent social-political problems, but attempt to forge participatory art with a practical application in the service of 'real' world justice. The second, and no doubt more pressing problem is how to actually define 'cultural resilience'. Although there remains a lack of a comprehensive and unified definition of 'cultural resilience', leading interdisciplinary scholars in the field agree on a general definition of resilience as being a continual process that provides individuals with the ability to bounce back, and perhaps even thrive in the face of adverse life experiences.⁸

Whether we describe it as resilience, or with terms such as 'anti-fragility',⁹ there is a growing awareness of the need to build resilience in order to face a climate that is increasingly characterized as being in a permanent state of crisis. This is perhaps nowhere more important than for communities subject to systematic oppression, violence and collective trauma. For anthropologist Catherine Panter-Brick (a leader in the field of conflict, resilience and health), at the centre of resilience rests the issue of dignity, which is key to a hopeful future.¹⁰ It is these two issues – hope and dignity – that underscore the cultural resilience offered by humour in contemporary art from sites of occupation. Humour not only allows artists to evade 'trauma envy', it also allows for empowering narrations of contemporary experience and the imagining of alternative and hopeful futures. That said, cultural resilience (like humour) is undoubtedly context specific, shifting its shape and impact according to the specific histories, experiences and needs of diverse cultures.

Hierarchies of suffering: Forms of occupation

An investigation of how humour operates in the practice of artists living through diverse forms of contemporary occupation entails not only a critical evaluation of differing forms of art making and their reception, but also an unpacking of diverse contemporary understandings of what is meant by the term 'occupation'. Although the attempt to define 'occupation' is implicit across all contributions to this volume in one way or another – debates about definitions of the term 'occupation' are outlined in the volume's Introduction – the aim in this chapter is also to investigate why this term has grown in use across contemporary art discourse. The broad use of the term 'occupation' in contemporary art discourse in effect not only mirrors the growing use of the term across diverse disciplines, but also points to uncertainty behind the actual meaning of the term.

This uncertainty about the term 'occupation' is by no means new. It is something that can be traced across several centuries and, as Michel Vuethey notes, occupation is a term disputed across practically all contemporary conflicts, effectively rendering it juridically inoperative.¹¹ Confusion about the term is thus measured not only in the minds of those drafting military and legal conventions, but also in the minds of 'occupiers' and 'occupied' populations. Tracing the historical trajectory of the term, Peter Stirk proposes an essential conceptual distinction between 'conquest' and 'occupation' (the latter being 'a distinctive military government and temporary authority').¹² It is perhaps this emphasis on 'temporary authority' that underscores the association between 'occupation' and spheres outside of military conflict in recent years.

For the political philosopher Jacques Rancière, the broadened applicability of the term 'occupation' (in the political sphere) is a phenomenon that can be traced over the last decade. He explains that previously occupation was considered a 'side issue' that belonged to either the 'military sphere' (as epitomized by the case of Israel/Palestine) or the 'social sphere' (argued to be exemplified by 'sit down' protests described in French as *grèves avec occupation*). For Rancière the recent spike in popularity of the term in the political sphere is linked to movements alleged to emerge ephemerally, that do not strive towards a clear and specific outcome, and are pitted against representative politics; here he refers to the Occupy movement.¹³ This ephemeral and viral nature of the global Occupy movement (and its relationship to the so-called 'Arab Spring') is argued by art historian W. J. T. Mitchell to signify a shift in our understanding of the term 'occupation'. For Mitchell, the term is now alleged to embody 'unlimited grammatical flexibility', which, although signifying the reclaiming of public space for disenfranchised masses, involves 'a paradoxical temporal and rhetorical dimension'. In short, what Mitchell makes clear is that the term 'occupation' now may be said to stand for political, spatial and temporal activity that we might previously have associated with *counteroccupation*.¹⁴

Whilst Rancière and Mitchell's discussion around how this emphasis on 'occupation' centres on the attempt to transform the function of common (and therefore political) space is an important one, it is more pertinent here to consider how their arguments suggest that the critical evaluation of the term 'occupation' mirrors the rise of another key term over the last decade – 'crisis'. Whereas the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 jettisoned popular use of the term 'crisis' around the world, the foundations for this popularity were arguably laid in the decade prior. This was when the idiom of 'exception' became central to international political discourse, and the ideas of Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben (despite their differing emphases) became the locus of research not only in political and international studies, but also in visual culture.¹⁵

This trajectory goes some way in explaining why there has been an increased tendency to describe art practice as operating under a state of 'occupation', even when these environments are, at least strictly speaking, not under military occupation. Crucially, my decision here to harness the term 'occupation' to analyse contemporary art from the diverse geographies of Greece, Australia and Palestine is done with the full knowledge that the 'occupation' faced by each population is vastly different. Further to this, my aim here is not to compare the severity of diverse forms of occupation, as this would be a process akin to creating a hierarchy of suffering. Rather, my emphasis

is grounded on an assessment of how and why humour emerges as a strategy in the practice of contemporary artists living in sites frequently described as being under occupation, and how the experience of occupation is once perceived as a repeated process rather than a standalone event.

Each of these sites is legislatively understood as being in a political state of exception: military occupation in Palestine; the Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER) in Australia; and economic austerity in Greece. Thus, despite the geographical and cultural gulf that separates each of these examples, they share one vital thing in common – a loss of sovereignty. Although this absence of sovereignty is felt to varying degrees across all three sites, it goes some way in explaining why, over the last few years, discourse around contemporary art produced in these three sites has been increasingly tethered to the term ‘occupation’.¹⁶ This is, of course, not particularly surprising in the case of Palestine, where major projects such as the Palestinian Museum and events such as the art biennial Qalandiya International are continually framed as ‘art under occupation’. More recently, however, there has been an increased tendency to frame Indigenous art practice in Australia as operating under occupation – something compellingly argued in the work of anthropologist Jennifer Biddle.¹⁷ In the case of Greece, this shift in the conceptual framing of contemporary art practice became more pronounced with the advent of the German contemporary festival *documenta 14* in Athens in 2018, when the city was increasingly framed as a ‘German colony’.¹⁸

An important dimension that cuts through all three of these examples is that they have each been harnessed as epitomizing political tropes centred on the idea of resistance. Although this is most obvious in the case of Palestine (epitomized perhaps with the catch-phrase ‘we are all Palestinians’), it is also clear in heroicized media representations of anti-austerity protests in Greece, and to views of Indigenous Australians as carriers of a ‘timeless’ culture.¹⁹ Though often linked to a sense of political solidarity, these essentialist framings too often cast these populations as rich in cultural capital but poor in critical and intellectual capital.²⁰ Moreover, the larger significance here is that, of course, we are not all Palestinians, nor are we all Greeks, or Indigenous Australians. This is to say that specificity matters, equally in politics as with humour.

Running parallel to this frame of ‘occupation’ has been a turn towards the use of humour in cultural output emerging from Greece, Palestine and Indigenous Australia. Whereas there has been in-depth analysis on this shift in studies of contemporary Palestinian art,²¹ it has only recently become the object of scholarly analysis in Greece and Australia, with particular attention paid towards ‘Blak’ comedy on television and in theatre in Australia,²² and mimetic strategies of over-identification in Greek contemporary art.²³

It is important here to make several things clear about the conceptual approach to humour in this text. Firstly, although discussion in this chapter engages with various typologies of humour employed in contemporary art practice (wit, irony, parody, pastiche, etc.), this is not the primary emphasis. Rather, focus here is geared towards understanding the impetus behind humour in contemporary art from sites of ‘occupation’ as well as its reception. Secondly, discussion here is based on an approach that assumes there is no such thing as a ‘Greek’, ‘Palestinian’ or ‘Indigenous’ sense of

humour. Rather, examples of humour in contemporary art emerging from each of these sites are informed by specific histories and collective identities. In this way, analysis herein seeks to affirm the idea that humour in contemporary art coming from each of these sites is idiosyncratic insofar as the events that shaped each of these collective identities and experiences are particular to each group. Thus, in order to glean insight into how the humour generated in contemporary art responds (or indeed intervenes) in the experience of occupation, it is vital to understand the specific experiences of occupation that run across these three sites.

Exile and connection to place: Humour and Palestine

Despite the number of military occupations underway today (e.g. the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, or the Russian occupation of Georgia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia), it is the Israeli occupation of Palestine that is most often understood and referred to as ‘the’ Occupation. Just as the term ‘Palestine’ changes meaning depending on the context (fluctuating between pre-1948 historical Palestine and today’s Palestinian Territories), so too can the phrase ‘Occupied Palestine’. This term is, however, most accurately attributed to the fifty-year occupation that followed Israel’s success in the 1967 June War/Six-Day War – a topic examined in Maayan Amir’s chapter in this book. Where the foundation of Israel in 1948 is referred to as *al-Nakba* (or ‘the Catastrophe’) and is considered the seminal moment in modern Palestinian history (responsible for the exile of 80 per cent of the Arab population of historical Palestine), the Arab defeat in 1967 is commonly referred to as *al-Naksa* (the ‘set-back’). Marking the beginning of the longest military occupation in modern history, the *Naksa* is frequently understood as the moment that would define decades of conflict between Israel and Palestine. In concrete terms, Israel’s victory in 1967 saw it occupy East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as the Golan Heights in Syria and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Despite Israel’s resounding victory and the resulting devastating territorial losses, the *Naksa* also signalled the loss of faith in Arab allies, thus ushering in a new era of political self-determination (with Palestinian leadership over the Palestine Liberation Organization) and a re-energized revolutionary movement.

The move away from revolutionary politics towards international diplomatic negotiations came with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, when Palestinians achieved international recognition for their claims for sovereignty over territory. Establishing the Palestinian National Authority (PA), and commonly understood as the beginning of the ‘peace process’, the accords set out the general guidelines for Palestinian self-government over the West Bank and Gaza. Carving Palestinian territory into areas A, B and C, the accords were allegedly designed as a five-year temporary measure that would pave the way for transfer from Israeli military government and its civil administration to the creation of a Palestinian sovereign state. This process has now taken almost three decades. The result is that today Palestine finds itself in a state of arrested development, and Israel’s military occupation continues alongside the siege over Gaza and the ongoing denial of the Right of Return for almost 5 million

Palestinian refugees living in exile around the world. Somewhat surprisingly, it is against this background that the international profile of Palestinian contemporary art has grown at an unprecedented rate.

Often described as a 'cultural renaissance', this growth is visible across almost all art forms, and can be measured in the growth in arts infrastructure, the international training of artists, the opening of new education centres, arts festivals and the establishment of art and museum spaces across the West Bank and Jerusalem. The establishment of these new initiatives is, on the one hand, a testament to Palestinian creative ingenuity. On the other hand, however, it is a reflection of the challenges faced by both artists and cultural institutions. Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 and heightened restrictions on movement, Palestinians have been subject to a geographical, economic and cultural fragmentation brought about by the occupation. The result is that it is impossible to have a space that is open to all local Palestinian artists and the public; which is to say that Palestinians in Gaza cannot participate in exhibitions in the West Bank and Jerusalem; artists with Israeli passports cannot take up residencies in the United Arab Emirates or Lebanon; and Palestinians born in the Diaspora (particularly those with passports from countries in the Arab world) find access to Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel beyond their reach.²⁴

The point here is that Palestinians across the geographical spectrum (whether living in Israel, the Territories, the Diaspora or in refugee camps around the world) are all in diverse ways impacted upon by the experience of exile and occupation. This is an issue reflected directly in the work *Sexy Semite* by artist Emily Jacir. A relational artwork involving collaboration with Palestinians living in the United States, this work involved the commissioning of a series of advertisements in the personals section of the *Village Voice* newspaper. Routinely appearing in the newspaper across the years of 2000 and 2002, these advertisements all appeared to be by Palestinian readers, each seeking a romantic liaison with a Jewish reader as a means of facilitating a return to the homeland by way of the Israeli Law of Return. One advertisement, for example, reads 'Palestinian Semite in search of Jewish soul mate. Do you love milk & honey? I'm ready to start a big family in Israel. Still have house keys. Waiting for you.' The text in this advertisement demonstrates the conditions laid out by Jacir when commissioning participants for the project: namely that each advertisement should reference the continual denial of the Right of Return, and that it should also use the term 'Semite' as a means of undermining the terms frequent understanding as pertaining only to Jews.

Eventually this pattern of advertisements roused suspicion, and media outlets went so far as to speculate that the personals were part of a Palestinian terrorist plot.²⁵ Although this might seem laughable when considered in the context of a chapter focusing upon contemporary art, this (mis-)reading of the work highlights a significant feature of humour: namely, its ability to function as what philosopher Simon Critchley describes as a 'secret code'.²⁶ The 'secret code' of humour at play in *Sexy Semite* is twofold. Firstly, it presents a parody of genuine newspaper personals, drawing from acronyms characteristic of personals including 'LTR' (long-term relationship), or 'SKG' (seeking), and clichéd personality descriptors such as 'enjoying walks on the beach' and 'enjoying sunsets'. Secondly, and more importantly to our purposes here, these clichés are set alongside stereotypes of Palestine and Israel in each advert (e.g. olives, falafel

and 'land of milk and honey'). Most importantly, these advertisements draw reference to very particular Palestinian nationalist signifiers including citrus fruit, mention of house keys and a description of the city of Acre with the Palestinian name of Akka rather than the Israeli 'Akko'.

Sexy Semite thus seeks to 'return' Palestinian readers both literally (using the Israeli Law of Return), but also symbolically through a strategy of humour. The inclusion of these national signifiers in the work makes the initial advertisements in the *Village Voice* instantly recognizable to particular readers as a humorous act of multifaceted political subversion. For Palestinians (and to a certain extent for those who stand in solidarity with them) laughter precedes the context of the gallery because these banal objects are immediately understood as cultural signifiers and therefore do not require framing devices or contextualization. Put differently, although we might appreciate that having a sense of humour is a universal human trait, humour is undoubtedly context specific and, importantly, it serves as a form of cultural insider knowledge.²⁷ For Simon Critchley, humour is argued to validate a shared understanding of custom and place, but also disposition and character. With this in mind, humour is said to be the vehicle that connects us strongly to a particular place and leads us to predicate characteristics of that place while attributing certain customs and dispositions to its inhabitants. Humour therefore takes us back to the place where we are from (whether that is our neighbourhood or the nation), something of immense value for people who are not only occupied, but also in the seventh decade of their exile.²⁸

Importantly, *Sexy Semite* was produced on the heels of the outbreak of the Second Intifada – an event commonly understood as signalling the failure of the 'peace process'. It is here useful to draw attention to two important facts: (i) that the Second Intifada ushered in a surge of international interest in Palestinian cultural production; and (ii) that running parallel to this was a marked shift towards the use of humour in Palestinian contemporary art. The crucial point here is that although this shift towards humour can be argued to reflect the failure of the peace process and a decline in Palestinian nationalist hopes, it must also be understood as a reflection of international interest in Palestinian cultural production.²⁹ The example of Palestinian art outlined here is but one example of what can be described as a cycle enacted by the international art world for the extraction of cultural capital. This cycle is characterized by a progression that begins with international media interest into sites marred by an experience of 'crisis' (i.e. war, disaster and economic or political instability), followed by an influx of humanitarian efforts (NGOs, humanitarian volunteers, etc.), followed finally by international curatorial interest in art production from that latest site of crisis.

Stereotypes and curatorial othering: Humour and Greece

Whilst this 'cycle' for the extraction of cultural capital can be traced in Palestine for the better part of two decades, international curatorial interest in Greece is a much more recent phenomenon. That is to say the foreign investment and international curatorial and artistic interest came not only as a surprise, but also on an unprecedented scale. Where international interest in Palestinian cultural production is continually framed

by Israel's military occupation, engagement with contemporary art from Greece is framed by a sense of 'occupation' of a very different register: the imposition of economic austerity in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, when Greece found itself in the international media spotlight. This became most pronounced in 2010 when the country revealed the enormous scale of its deficit and was locked out of international bond markets. In the years that followed, Greece was subject to drastic austerity measures imposed by its creditors in exchange for three major bail-out packages. The so-called 'Troika' creditors (the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank) imposed measures that included drastic pay cuts, cuts to pensions, privatization and major tax reforms. Where these bail-outs were consistently framed by the international media as 'rescue' packages that provided Greece with a 'life-line', the perception by Greeks themselves often reflected polar opposite sentiments; creditors were not saviours – they were 'occupiers'.

Public protests and clashes with police aside, this popular sentiment was made perhaps most visible in the suicide of a seventy-seven-year-old retired pharmacist Dimitris Christoulas in April 2012. Killing himself with a single bullet to the head outside parliament in Syntagma Square, Christoulas left a suicide note calling for the death of collaborators, likening the current government in Greece to the 'Quisling' administration of Giorgios Tsolakoglou during the Nazi occupation of Greece (1941–4).³⁰ Christoulas's suicide points to a prevailing feeling of exploitation by a national government perceived to have been selling off assets to northern European overlords – a sentiment no doubt bolstered by the insistent reminder by the Greek press of Germany's failure to pay for lawful reparations for damages to the Greek population, infrastructure and forced loans issued to the Bank of Greece during the German occupation during the Second World War. As social anthropologist Daniel Knight has convincingly demonstrated, the significant thing about this popular narrative is that it serves to condense the histories of both Ottoman and Second World War occupations with current feelings of dispossession, resulting in a sense of repeated history.³¹ This sense of a repeated history of occupation has also been evident in the continual reference to the Greek military junta of 1967–74. Perhaps most clear in the often-repeated slogan of the Greek Indignant (*Aganaktismenoi*) movement, 'bread, education, liberty; the junta did not end in 1973', there remains a prevailing sense that democracy has been suspended under austerity in Greece.³² Although this sense of suspension can be mapped across populist rhetoric in Greece over several decades, this is a sentiment now also traceable across international media coverage of Greece's debt crisis that have gone so far as to proclaim that Greece is being treated as a 'hostile occupied state'.³³

Studies focused on the self-image of Greeks in response to this sense of hostility have mapped the rise of humour as a form of transgression for Greeks of diverse backgrounds progressively defined as European subordinates in need of the tutelage of powerful northern European governments.³⁴ Where these studies have focused on vernacular forms of humour, there is a growing scholarship on the turn towards humour in Greek contemporary art as a response to perceptions of 'crisis-porn led tourism' in Greece.³⁵ This has become most pronounced in the wake of celebrated contemporary German art festival documenta 14's presence in Athens (alongside

Kassel), an event that cracked open the debate about art's role in the Othering of the Greek population during and following the global financial crisis of 2008. Despite documenta 14's attempts to critically engage with the contemporary challenges to democracy and to invert the aforementioned sense of North/South tutelage through its curatorial rationale of 'learning from Athens', the event came under severe fire by many for risking the repetition of a 'colonial dynamic' by bringing an enormous German exhibition to Greece (whilst securing venues very cheaply, or for free) at the very same time that Eurozone-imposed tax increases and pension cuts were enforced.³⁶

With accusations levelled towards it that ranged from 'agent of exoticization' and 'exploitation of communities' living in Athens,³⁷ documenta was characterized by a vague de-colonial ethos that framed Athens as a pinnacle of crisis. Criticized for the instrumentalization of refugee and migrant populations, and the expectation that Greek artists narrate life under the spectre of austerity, documenta chose to focus upon specific aspects of Greek society. For curator and artist Kostis Stafylakis this served to 'nurture nationalist self-victimisation of Greeks by painting them as guileless agents of indigenous resistance'.³⁸ This view was no doubt intensified by curator Adam Szymczyk's comments that the exhibition never sought to represent the local Athens art scene, adding if people do not feel represented 'they should think about why they are not heard'.³⁹ This paternalistic statement was taken up quite literally in Athens-based artist Panos Sklavenitis's 2017 video work *How to be Seen (and Heard)* (Figure 6.1).

First presented in Zagreb shortly after documenta 14's presence in Athens, the work presents a 'self-portrait' of Sklavenitis seemingly attempting to perform the kinds of behaviours that generate international visibility for Athenian artists living in a context of crisis. Parodying conventions of 1960s performance and conceptual art, and narrated



Figure 6.1 Panos Sklavenitis, *How to Be Seen (and Heard)*, 2017. Video (still). Courtesy of the artist. (See Plate 8.)

by a computer-generated female voice that narrates the artist's actions and speech from Greek to English, the work chronicles Sklavenitis' everyday life with an earnestness that translates as absurd; ranging from recordings of the artist as he showers, to close ups of his foot, and documentation of him at work with an awkwardly positioned life model. The humour in Sklavenitis's work can thus be argued to spring from an over-identification with two stereotypes. The first is the stereotype of the conceptual and performance based artist. The second is an over-identification with the stereotype of Greeks living under austerity. When coupled with the didactic narration that persists throughout the video, the strategy of over-identification serves to make clear the tropes that have consistently been used to frame contemporary art practice in Greece.

With a soundtrack punctuated by a soundscape of birds singing and gentle female vocals, the video is characterized by self-mockery that depicts the artist as a didactic simpleton seeking to frame his work around issues of austerity, protest and social instability. Presenting an opaque recording of the artist's bust against a moving montage of news images of protest in Greece, the video addresses the audience directly to ask 'please relate my name to these images'. Of particular interest here is the way the work taps into the trope of indignation that arguably has come to inflect all social orders in Greece. For Dimitrios Theossopoulos this indignation is argued to unravel in everyday discourse, not only engendering identification with new subject positions, but also linking the current predicament of austerity with previous crises – family, war, poverty and social inequality.⁴⁰

How to be Seen (and Heard) calls into question the dominance of the trope of indignation in contemporary Greek society, whilst also seeking to satiate the appetite and expectations of the international art market that consistently frame contemporary art practice around issues of austerity and crisis. Of particular interest is the way in which the video outlines the 'one rule' for visibility in the contemporary art circuit. Sklavenitis explains (via the video's narrator) that all sectors of culture and society can achieve visibility so long as 'women artists must do feminist stuff. Non-heterosexuals must do queer stuff, African artists must do African stuff, and so on and so forth.' Going on to explain that wealthy, able-bodied, white, cisgender, straight males 'can do what they want and be heard', Sklavenitis points clearly to what philosopher Jacques Rancière describes as a distribution of genre. For Rancière the world is divided between those who can, and those cannot afford the luxury of images.⁴¹ In such a world artists living in experiences of crisis and occupation are, as *How to be Seen (and Heard)* suggests, confined to the didactic and 'authentic' recording of life under the spectre of violence and oppression.

Sovereignty and authenticity: Humour and Indigenous Australia

Where the climate of 'crisis' in Greece has manifest in a conflation of multiple historical foreign occupations (whether military, fiscal or cultural), the undermining of sovereignty in Australia is one enforced within the same nation-state. To unpack what is meant by this, it is useful here to consider a joke that circulated in Australia in 2007 stating that Australia was the first member nation of George W. Bush's 'Coalition

of the Willing' to invade itself.⁴² To a non-Australian audience, the target of humour within this joke is very likely misunderstood. As opposed to the military occupation of Palestine and the Troika's demands over Greece, the Northern Territory Emergency Response (often referred to as 'the Intervention') is little-known outside Australia. Announced by the Australian government in 2007 following the release of the *Little Children are Sacred* report, the NTER was a militarized 'emergency' intervention into Indigenous affairs framed by the government under the rubric of 'stabilise, normalise, exit'.⁴³ Effectively seizing control of seventy-three Aboriginal communities, the NTER enforced a range of disciplinary measures that included restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol, the prohibition of pornography, enforced school attendance, government management of welfare-supported spending, and compulsory leasing of community land.⁴⁴

The most significant aspect of the NTER to consider for our discussion here is that it served to clearly suspend all forms of self-determination for multiple communities across the Northern Territory. Furthermore, the framing of the intervention as an 'emergency' allowed the Australian government to harness a logic of militarism and racialized disciplinarity that served to organize, sustain, legitimize and give effect to 'white' sovereign power.⁴⁵ Although the NTER is often framed in material terms as a military occupation of Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory, it also, however, signifies a sense of ongoing occupation and undermining of self-determination experienced across the broad spectrum of Indigenous and Torres Strait Islander communities.⁴⁶ This sentiment is underscored by the continual denial of constitutional recognition via treaty. Today, more than three decades have passed since the historic signing of the *Barunga Statement*, when Prime Minister Bob Hawke promised to sign a treaty for Aboriginal self-determination and self-management, control of ancestral lands, compensation, and full civil, economic, social and cultural rights. Though the *Barunga Statement* is on display in Australia's Parliament House in Canberra, a treaty remains unsigned. In the last ten years, the persistent denial of both sovereignty and self-determination is clearly manifest in the failure of the 'Close the Gap' Policy, and the refusal of the government to approve the *Uluru Statement from the Heart*.⁴⁷ The salience of this is amplified if we consider the irony of the treaty process, namely that treaties assume participation of sovereign parties and that Indigenous people never ceded their sovereignty – the Crown simply ignored it under the doctrine of *terra nullius*.

Although all social and geographical orders are impacted upon through the denial of sovereignty, specific government policies – notably the NTER – have worked to problematically expand political, social and cultural differentiations of indigeneity.⁴⁸ In the art world, this discriminatory preoccupation with differentiation over forms of indigeneity manifests most clearly in an emphasis on 'authenticity'. Market demands, cultural stereotypes and a blurred line between art and ethnography have come together to forge a perception of a hierarchy of Indigenous 'authenticity' that is centred on differentiation between 'remote' and 'urban' indigeneity.⁴⁹ This perceived dichotomy frames rural art production as representing 'timeless' and 'spiritual' artefacts, leaving 'urban' art to appear as disassociated with traditional culture, and therefore somehow unauthentic. This discriminatory dichotomy underwrites the motivation behind the foundation of the Indigenous art collective proppaNOW. Founded in Brisbane in

2003, the collective is notable for exploring current political issues and for re-enforcing a view that 'urban' Aboriginal art is testament to a 'living culture' that has evolved through time. This emphasis is particularly clear in the work of proppaNOW founding member Richard Bell's large 2003 acrylic painting on canvas *Scientia E Metaphysica* (*Bell's Theorem*) (Figure 6.2).

Emblematic of the artist's parody and appropriation of Western post-war art movements such as pop art and abstract expressionism, *Scientia E Metaphysica* draws simultaneous reference to abstraction in Aboriginal art and within abstract expressionist 'drip' paintings. In such a way, the work challenges the appropriation of Indigenous art by non-Aboriginal artists, suggesting that artists re-appropriate Western abstraction in return.⁵⁰ With large text splashed across the canvas that implores the audience to understand that 'ABORIGINAL ART it's A WHITE thing', the artist calls attention to the commodification of Aboriginal art. Expanding on this sentiment, Bell explains that 'there is no Aboriginal art industry. There is however an industry that caters for Aboriginal Art. The key players in that industry are not Aboriginal.'⁵¹ Appropriating what is arguably the most celebrated form of Western abstract art in the post-war period, *Scientia E Metaphysica* clearly flies in the face of expectations that Indigenous artists be confined to 'authentic' forms of 'spiritual' abstraction, typically analysed through ethnographic frameworks.

Scientia E Metaphysica complements *Bell's Theorem*, a manifesto written by the artist that directly calls into question the linkages between an art market that demands



Figure 6.2 Richard Bell, *Scientia E Metaphysica* (*Bell's Theorem*), 2003. Acrylic on canvas. Courtesy of Milani Gallery and the artist. (See Plate 9.)

cultural authenticity, and Australia's *Native Title Act* (1993). By deeming native title over territory to continue after Crown sovereignty only if a clan or group has maintained substantial legal and customary connection with the land, the *Native Title Act* privileges particular forms of indigeneity, locking out those living in urban areas from claims over land.

Considered together, *Scientia E Metaphysica* and *Bell's Theorem* present a parody of two forms of Western modernist artistic traditions: the manifesto and abstract painting. In such a way the close resemblance to these strategies can be argued as being akin to a strategy of colonial mimicry. Under Homi Bhabha's conception of mimicry, the colonized subject's mimicry of the colonizer's behaviours unsettles the boundaries of colonial order.⁵² Although this consequence of mimicry is traceable in Bell's work (calling into question, for example, the structures and players that continue to deny Aboriginal sovereignty), it is true also that this strategy of mimicry serves to embarrass and call attention to the power relationships at play within the art market.⁵³ This is to say that the work implicates the viewer, the curator and the buyer in something much bigger than the consumption of art; they too are tied up in the messy, brutal politics of ongoing dispossession and denials of sovereignty.

Occupation on repeat: Humour and temporality

Cutting across all three of the states of occupation discussed in this chapter is an appreciation of occupation as being much more than a standalone event. Rather, it is an experience repeated across generations. Although the concept of repeated occupation (and more widely the issue of temporality) can be traced across disciplines ranging from international relations to anthropology, the temporal experience of occupation and its legacies are rendered differently in visual culture – a point that is demonstrated across all the contributions in this volume.

Significantly, the so-called 'temporal turn' in contemporary art (one marked by practices focusing on 'contemporaneity' and geopolitical experiences of time)⁵⁴ has run parallel to the emphasis not only on 'occupation' in art discourse, but also alongside a proliferation of strategies of humour in art produced from sites of conflict. To understand how humour responds to this sense of repeated occupation, it is important to appreciate the close relationship between humour and temporality. The unique relationship between them is poignantly described by philosopher Simon Critchley who explains that humour is produced by 'the disjunction between duration and the instant, where we experience with renewed intensity both the slow passing of time and its sheer evanescence'.⁵⁵ Fracturing what Jacques Rancière describes as a 'distribution of genre',⁵⁶ and requiring audiences to bring together a series of diverse references including historical events and cultural signifiers in order to 'get the joke', the laughter produced by these works effectively signals a temporal 'snap', collapsing the space between the past, present and future.

In the cases of humour in contemporary art across Greece, Palestine and Australia, this temporal 'snap' makes clear the linkages between occupation and the present, and its intimate connection to experiences in previous generations. Importantly, although

this acknowledgement of repeated occupation might be interpreted as disheartening, it should also be understood as a symbol of resistance, and indeed cultural resilience. Furthermore, if resilience is contingent on the restoration of dignity and the facilitation of hope for the future,⁵⁷ the humour evident in contemporary art across Palestine, Greece and Australia is capable of nurturing vital forms of cultural resilience that facilitate hope for the future: namely political enactment, critical evaluations of collective identity and affirmation of connection to disputed territory. Above all else, however, perhaps the greatest capacity of humour is its ability to ‘defamiliarise the familiar’.⁵⁸ It is laughter that makes strange the realities we take as ‘normal’, allowing us to imagine new realities in their place, and innovative approaches to burning political issues too often perceived as insurmountable.

Notes

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Part Three

Picturing Occupation

Photojournalism as a means of deception in Nazi-occupied Poland, 1939–45

Miriam Y. Arani

Introduction

Outside Europe, the conflicting memories of Germans, Poles and Jews are hard to understand. They are informed by conflicts before and during the Second World War. In particular, the impact of Nazism in occupied Poland (1939–45) – including the Holocaust – is difficult to understand without considering the deceitful propaganda of Nazism that affected visual culture in a subliminal but crucial way. The aim of this chapter is to understand photographs of the Nazi occupation of Poland as visual artefacts with distinct meanings for their contemporaries in the framework of a specific historical and cultural context. I will discuss how Nazi propaganda deliberately exploited the faith in still photography as a neutral depiction of reality, and the extent of that deceit through photojournalism by the Nazi occupiers of Poland. In addition, I will outline methods through which to evaluate the reliability of photographic sources. For the purposes of reliability and validity, I use a large, randomized sample with all kinds of photographs from archives, libraries and museums in this study. Additionally, I examine newspapers, illustrated magazines and books to find out more about the scope of published photographs. This cultural material is then contextualized with written records, scholarly research regarding the historical context, and interviews with Polish photographers and lab assistants.

At first glance, it would appear that the Nazi Party simply continued its tradition of glorifying Adolf Hitler in Poland during the German occupation of that country. Portraits of Hitler – paintings and sculptures – were present in all offices of German authorities, in public premises and in schools. Technically advanced media formats of the early twentieth century enriched this practice of glorifying the head of state in the public sphere, through photographic portraits of Hitler; still and moving images of him giving speeches; radio broadcasts by Hitler; and photo books like *Mit Hitler in Polen* (In Poland with Hitler).¹

But the visual culture of Nazism involved many more changes. The Nazis aimed to foster a German master race by force. Their aesthetic ideal was exemplified in the classicist, imperial-style sculptures of male nudes by Arno Breker and Josef Thorak.

The occupation policies in Poland enforced a racialization and racial selection of the occupied population according to this standard of visual taste regarding the physical appearance of the human body.

Whose ‘true-to-life’ pictures? Conflicting visual memories

The Nazi occupation affected Polish society in its entirety, including people of Jewish descent and others.² Many Polish citizens escaped to other countries.³ The Nazi authorities tried to settle ethnic Germans in occupied Poland, but in the end lost even eastern territories traditionally inhabited by Germans (e.g. Pomerania and Silesia). After the Second World War, people in affected nations and different groups of victims saved photographic sources relating to occupied Poland with various thematic emphases. In particular, the collective memories and related photographic collections of Poland and Israel were shaped by these experiences.

It is widely known that the State of Israel, established in 1948, has sought to prove the obsessive persecution of Jews under Nazi rule in Europe. Less prominent but equally extensive, however, is the Polish notion of national martyrdom, through which conflicts with Germany during the Polish partitions (1772–1918) and the Nazi occupation are commemorated. At the end of the First World War, Poland had been re-established as a democratic republic. It included a German minority in its western regions, and a more or less ‘Polonized’ Jewish minority in its eastern regions.⁴ In 1939, Poland was home to the largest Jewish community in Europe – a community that was divided between opponents and supporters of the Zionist idea of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (as explored in Noga Stiassny’s chapter in this volume). Nazi Germany saw Jews as racially undesirable subjects and had already expelled more than 10,000 Polish Jews across the German-Polish border in October 1938.⁵

After the seventeen-year-old son of an expelled Jew shot a German diplomat in Paris in November 1938, the Nazi Party demolished the premises of German Jews and incarcerated around 30,000 of them in concentration camps.⁶ These zones, which existed outside of German law and which were maintained and guarded by the Party’s security services in Germany, were extended into Poland after the German conquest of that country.⁷ In autumn 1939, the *Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei* (Commander of the SS and chief of the German police) Heinrich Himmler was appointed as *Reichskommissar für die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums* (Commissar for the Strengthening of Germanism), and the SS and German police forces under his command invaded Polish territory with an expanded scope of roles. In occupied Poland, they were tasked with enforcing a new social order based on the occupier’s racialization of the occupied population.⁸

After the First World War, many Germans had harboured a sense of national martyrdom, seeing themselves as victims of neighbouring countries.⁹ The Nazi government exploited such sentiments by pretending that its military assault on Poland in autumn 1939 was an act of national defence. After Hitler’s decision in spring 1939

to attack the Polish Republic, pictures were continuously circulated in Germany to prove the supposed Polish aims to obstruct Germans.¹⁰ During the German invasion, the Ministry of Propaganda requested that the German press report that Poles and Jews had attacked ethnic Germans in Poland. Specialized propaganda companies comprising uniformed photojournalists who accompanied the Wehrmacht produced a vast number of graphic images of victims of war in western Poland. Nazi propaganda focused specifically on a series of events in September 1939, which was referred to as *Bromberger Blutsonntag* (Bloody Sunday of Bydgoszcz), to evoke the notion that it was solely Germans who had been the victims of Polish aggression.¹¹ Pictures taken by occupying propaganda companies were widely published for domestic use and for a worldwide general public. The different but always visually graphic *Blutsonntag* publications show how the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda addressed a great variety of target groups. The Nazi Party commemorated *Bromberger Blutsonntag* as a key event of German martyrdom under Polish rule regularly among Germans in occupied Poland in order to justify all kinds of assaults and measures against Polish citizens.

When Nazi Germany together with the Soviet Union attacked the Polish Second Republic in autumn 1939, Germany occupied two-thirds of Polish territory. Poland became – second to Belarus and the western Ukraine – the country which suffered the highest percentage of civilian casualties under Nazi occupation in Europe.¹² This high death toll was in part a result of the firm anti-Jewish policies, later known as the Holocaust, enacted by the Nazis.¹³ These policies were intimately connected with the political objectives of the Nazi Party to create a German colonial empire in eastern Europe, summarized by Himmler's staff in the *Generalplan Ost*, which ended in the introduction of ruthless occupation policies against Polish society in its entirety.¹⁴

Assuming that photography is received as an unbiased depiction of reality, many Jewish and Polish victims of Nazi policies believed after the Second World War that the photographic evidence of Nazi crimes in occupied Poland could inform the general public.¹⁵ But after the war, the majority of Germans rejected the visual evidence published by various victims groups in Poland and elsewhere.¹⁶ The reason for this was not a general distrust in the credibility of photographs, but a kind of immunity against any evidence contradicting the Nazi narrative of German martyrdom.¹⁷ Many press photographs produced in the Nazi period were still in use after the war as illustrations in various German publications.¹⁸ The credibility of German photojournalism under Nazi rule was, for a long time, unquestioned. By the end of the twentieth century, however, misleading captions attached to supposedly 'true-to-life' press pictures had become a cause of debate in Germany.¹⁹ Larger numbers of pictures with slanderous intent only survived in collections created by victims of the Nazis, who aimed to prove the defamatory nature of Nazi visual culture.²⁰ Up until 1989, for example, photographs of Nazi crimes in Poland were used in East Germany as proof of external fascist policies, something for which citizens of West Germany were exclusively blamed. In contrast, citizens of West Germany kept photographs with depictions of Nazi crimes secret, because these were used as evidence by public prosecutors.²¹

Methodologies

Being confronted with conflicting memories and approaches towards visual sources produced during the Nazi occupation of Poland, it is crucial to recognize the existence of different perspectives about the same period and territory, and a shared vocabulary regarding photographs which pre-establishes what one will be able to say about pictures.²² Both sides – the former occupiers and the former occupied – believed that photographs were objective depictions of reality. But photographs depict only small frames of the visible world. The occupiers and the occupied took pictures generally under different conditions. Most people living under occupation were busy with daily survival, and photography was considered a far less important activity, whereas the conquerors were preoccupied with establishing their new position. In addition, the ruling Nazi Party privileged some photographers who pursued their careers under Nazi rule, while discriminating against others. Many photographers had to escape, were not allowed to work in their profession or were incarcerated or killed.²³

The fate of photographers in Nazi-occupied Poland was based on ethno-racial categories, irrespective of their professional skills and achievements. Therefore, any study of this topic should include a consideration of those who were privileged or discriminated against (or eliminated) in visual culture under occupation. It is important to place a shared comprehensive and ethical approach above a national approach, so as to consciously include pictures taken by photographers discriminated against under Nazi rule.

The visual legacy of the Nazi occupation of Poland is a large pictorial mass source, a large sample of material culture which can be analysed using the frameworks of archaeology, art history, cultural anthropology and sociology. Considering the enormous number of pictures that exist, a sociological approach would appear to be a suitable framework to adopt. One of the first sociological frameworks to be established for the study of photography was that developed by Gisèle Freund.²⁴ Based on her studies in art history and sociology, combined with her profound practical knowledge of photography, Freund established several relevant criteria for a comparative analysis of photographs created during the Nazi period:

1. Photography is so common in everyday life that it is not consciously taken into account as a medium;
2. photographs appear to be neutral depictions of reality, but they should be understood as a result of social, economic and political circumstances and processes;
3. snapshot photographs by amateurs should be distinguished from press photographs, owing to different purposes and different modes of production;
4. a comparison between press photography in different societies indicates different limitations for photojournalism, which are rooted in the political framework of the respective society;
5. photographs are a means through which different political angles or points of view on a topic can be expressed.²⁵

Freund's statements about photography under Nazi rule need to be supplemented with later research describing the involvement of governmental authorities and political measures more precisely.²⁶ For example, to what extent was it possible for the occupied to take pictures? Statements from and photographs of Nazi victims in occupied Poland,²⁷ and a lack of certain topics in a large number of surviving photos, also need to be considered. Did the peculiar directives enforced by the authorities prohibit the depiction of certain things or actions? Who regulated the photographic coverage inside the fenced-in and guarded camps and ghettos established by the occupiers?²⁸

Several methods proposed in an edited collection about visual sociology for qualitative research offer useful advice on how to analyse large samples of photographs as source material within a sociological framework. These methods can be applied, with some modifications, to historical photographic sources as well.²⁹ Of course, the average technical possibilities and limitations of photography, as well as the dissemination of cameras in the period in question, also need to be considered. For example, in the 1930s, about 10 per cent of the German population, mainly inhabitants of the cities, took snapshots privately. Before the occupation in Poland, the situation was relatively similar. This assumption corresponds with the large numbers of surviving photographs from urban centres in Poland.

When examining historical photographs as visual data, a comparison of pictures taken by various photographers can provide visual details and the physical context in which to place particular phenomena.³⁰ A comparative analysis of different photographs showing the same group of people under different circumstances but in the same place (created shortly prior to the occupation or taken by political adversaries during the occupation) can provide correlative insights, but requires an overview of the context.³¹ After acquiring knowledge about the historical framework, additional questions can be asked. For example, how do the pictures correspond with historical data from other sources? Who took these photographs, and for what purpose? What was the photographer intending to express? What possibilities did photographers have to express themselves?³²

Uses of photography by the occupiers and the occupied

To examine the use of photography by the occupiers and the occupied, I have analysed a large sample of pictures in a defined chronological and geographical frame: the Reichsgau Wartheland – a newly formed administrative unit in Nazi-occupied western Poland. This unit was integrated in October 1939 into the German Reich with the intention that it be Germanized through the forced settlement of ethnic Germans, the expulsion of Poles and the murder of Jews (commencing in 1941). The Nazi policies in this area served as a model for other occupied territories later in the war.

In order to make the most valid and reliable statements about the pictures that have survived from this area, I have examined about 30,000 photographs from German and Polish institutions. Approximately 10,000 of these were relevant picture sources from the place and period under investigation.³³ Many of the photographers – with

the exception of licensed photojournalists³⁴ – cannot be identified, nor can the circumstances under which many of the photographs taken be reconstructed. As a consequence, the comparison of the prints themselves as physical objects (format and material), the characteristics of picture composition and subject, as well as inscriptions or stamps on the back of the images, become the basis for assumptions about their creators and their original purpose. This allows for a reconstruction of several ‘creator groups’ which can be associated with different styles of photography (with each shaped by the function of photography for different groups). These include:

1. Photography for mass communications (e.g. press photography and photojournalism);
2. photography for individual self-representation (e.g. studio portraits);
3. photography for the purpose of maintaining personal memories (e.g. snapshots and private photo albums);
4. photography as a form of social control (e.g. photographic records of the police); and
5. photography as a form of resistance (this evolved in consequence of the obstructive changes introduced by the occupiers in the above-mentioned groups).

The occupying forces disbanded and expropriated all Polish mass media in order to establish a new media under the control of the Nazis. They stopped the occupied population from creating and circulating visual information about events. In the Reichsgau Wartheland, it was predominantly Germans who created the first four types of photography. The resulting studio portraits reflected what clothing the occupiers expected people in this region to wear: Germans wore uniforms or a distinctive sign of Nazi-identified ‘Germanness’, for example, while Poles were forbidden from wearing uniforms.³⁵ Furthermore, the Nazi Party demanded that Jewish people in occupied Poland wear a distinctive label on their civilian clothes as early as the end of 1939 – earlier than in Germany itself.³⁶ From the summer of 1941, Poles and Jews in the Reichsgau Wartheland were forbidden from possessing or using cameras privately. Cameras were instead meant to become a tool for the occupiers’ production of photography.

The type of photography with the widest public reach – photojournalism – underwent fundamental changes. The German press, which was set up quickly inside the Reichsgau Wartheland to replace the former Polish press, used photographs to create the illusion of a territory entirely populated by Germans. The Poles, who in reality made up three-quarters of the population, were rarely represented in these media products. When they *were* depicted, the captions accompanying the images did not mention their belonging to the Polish people. In this occupied territory in western Poland that was to be Germanized rapidly under the occupiers’ settlement policies, all publications addressed a solely German readership.

The occupying administration denied equal rights to the occupied, and divided the population in Poland into four categories: *Reichsdeutsche* (Germans from Germany); *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans from places other than Germany); Poles; and Jews and Romani. They regulated the lives of the occupied down to the smallest detail, and established a racially-based distribution of housing, funding and food. So-called ‘Aryan’

Germans received the best housing, the most funds and the most food. A number of former Polish citizens were included in the 'German nation' as *Volksdeutsche*, but the majority of Poles were defined as *Schutzangehörige* (protected subjects) without citizen's rights, and were forced into a life of poverty as a subordinate workforce for the occupiers.³⁷ At the lowest end of the spectrum were Jews and Romani, to whom even an impoverished life was denied. They were declared legal non-entities, received the most brutal treatment and became victims of insidious mass murder.

The following two examples demonstrate how the Nazi Party presented the occupied in the Reichsgau Wartheland to a German public in its illustrated magazines. A comparison of these 'picture stories' demonstrates the extent of the deception that was inherent in the occupiers' photojournalism.

A picture story about Poles in the Reichsgau Wartheland

In 1940, in the Nazi weekly magazine *Illustrierter Beobachter*, a picture story claimed to show the difference between Germans and Poles (Figure 7.1).³⁸ The report identifies dirty, dark-haired children in a chaotic arrangement as Poles on the left page. On the right page, neatly dressed, eager children moving in military choreography are identified as Germans. The pictures visualize the superiority of Germans and the inferiority of Poles in accordance with the basic instructions of the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda in October 1939.³⁹ They express this by contrasting German order with Polish disorder



Figure 7.1 'Noch vor einem Jahr – und heute!' (One year ago – and today!), *Illustrierter Beobachter*, 15 August 1940. From the author's collection.

(i.e. the contempt of conservative elites in Germany for the Polish Republic) and stress the strong and decisively militant spirit of Nazi society, which demanded individual subordination in order to claim the nation's superiority over others.

The delusive impact of this picture story lies in its drawing attention away from how the occupation policies affected the occupied. Immediately after the conquest, specially organized *Einsatzgruppen* (SS and police squads) searched for Polish citizens listed on the *Sonderfahndungslisten* (most wanted lists), and murdered, both publicly and secretly, thousands of such people. Other Poles listed were sent to concentration camps or prisons so that all potential opposition could be eliminated. Then hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens (including Jews) were evicted from their homes so that ethnic Germans from several eastern European countries could be resettled in the Reichsgau Wartheland.⁴⁰ The photo report exempts the occupiers from any responsibility for the deteriorating situation of Polish citizens by depicting them as inherently lacking the merits of 'Aryan' Germanness. The images highlight the supposed backwardness of the occupied so that the notion of civilizational progress could be presented as a consequence of the occupation.

The disbanding of all Polish organizations, and a strong system of surveillance of the occupied in the Reichsgau Wartheland, left few chances for Poles to make their experience of occupation known to a broader public. Many searched for new ways to take, gather or distribute photographs. The most extensive pictorial documentation of occupation policies in the capital of the Reichsgau Wartheland was collected by members of the 'Szare Szeregi' (the wartime term for the Polish Boy Scouts and Girl Guides who joined the Polish resistance). They clandestinely photographed numerous signs in public places which forbade Poles from entering parks, playgrounds and churches. Other secretly taken photographs showed camps for foreign POWs and Jews, as well as secret schools, which the Szare Szeregi had organized for Polish youth.⁴¹ They used self-taken and self-gathered photographs to counter the occupiers' assertions, and forwarded these to the Polish Government-in-Exile. To gather photographs of Nazi crimes, the Szare Szeregi maintained contact with lab assistants in photographic studios and shops, who in most cases were Poles. When developing films or printing pictures in darkrooms, these people became invisible witnesses to what Germans were photographing during the war. It became a widespread practice for such lab assistants to secretly make extra prints from the occupiers' films and to pass these to the Polish Underground State (Polskie Państwo Podziemne).⁴² In this way, many pictures of Nazi crimes were secretly circulated.⁴³

A picture story about Jews in the Reichsgau Wartheland

In 1941, the Nazi magazine *Illustrierter Beobachter* published a three-page picture story claiming, in a sensationalist manner, that the German police had discovered hidden gold and treasures in the Jewish ghetto in the city of Lodz.⁴⁴ The title and the captions of the photo report suggest that Jews are inborn liars who bypass the law. It shows neat and orderly-dressed German policemen interrogating poor looking people, and searching untidy, dark cellars to find valuables.

The delusive impact of this picture story lies in blaming the victims after they have been ruthlessly dispossessed of all their belongings. During the conquest of Lodz, the invading occupying forces blocked all bank accounts; demolished, robbed and seized Jewish property; arrested all leading members of the Jewish community; and appointed a *Judenrat* (Jewish Council) to execute the occupiers' orders.⁴⁵ In order to 'Germanize' the city, the SS and German police forces expelled all Jews from their homes and concentrated them in a fenced-in ghetto in the city. The *Judenrat* acted as an employer of the ghetto inmates to produce commodities for German customers. But the occupation authorities were disappointed with the profits gained from the Lodz Ghetto. This picture report in the Nazi magazine about alleged hidden treasures was published after the ghetto inmates staged several protests because they were suffering from starvation.⁴⁶

Under Nazi rule, Polish Jews were entirely excluded from journalism and had no chance to legally publish images. However, the State Archives in Lodz hold twenty-seven albums with contact prints of images taken by Jewish photographers who took pictures for the *Judenrat* in occupied Lodz. There were around a dozen Jewish photographers working in the ghetto. They worked for other internees, producing portraits for ID cards or pictures for the illustrated reports of the *Judenrat*.⁴⁷ Only some of the photographers can be identified by name, the best known being Mendel Grossman. A collection of pictures printed on contemporary photographic paper at the Wiener Library, London, is labelled with the photographer's stamps and includes inscriptions. These images show people in workshops and healthcare institutions. Grossman passed on prints to friends and acquaintances in order to increase their circulation and to hand them down to posterity.⁴⁸

Photojournalism as a means of propaganda

The photo reports discussed above, produced for a German readership, demonstrate the usage of photojournalism as a means of Nazi propaganda targeting the occupiers' society. By comparing the occupiers' picture stories with photographs taken by the occupied, it becomes clear that the occupant's visual culture contorted Polish and Jewish life to justify assaults on the occupied, and to support racialized prejudices and policies.

Since its beginnings in Germany, Nazism governed through intimidation and coercion in combination with propaganda in all forms of media.⁴⁹ This also happened in occupied Poland. Immediately after the conquest of Poland, the Nazi government banned all Polish newspapers, closed down all Polish publishing houses and founded (with confiscated property) new publishers who issued newspapers and magazines in strict adherence to Nazi propaganda guidelines. In the Reichsgau Wartheland, which was to be rapidly Germanized, it established the regional publisher NS-Gauverlag, which published only in the German language. In the Generalgouvernement (General Government), which was planned as a long-term residence area for Poles, it installed a publisher called the Zeitungsverlag Warschau-Krakau which issued German-language

newspapers and a broad variety of magazines in Polish.⁵⁰ The use of media produced by foreign publishers was forbidden.⁵¹

The Ministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (Ministry for Enlightenment and Propaganda) in Germany exerted central political control over all cultural affairs and mass media. It directed editors and journalists secretly in daily briefings on what topics they should cover, and how those topics should be covered. These directives also affected picture editing in newspapers and illustrated magazines, although they were only given orally to photojournalists.⁵² The Ministry of Propaganda also comprised a subsection for press photography, which was in charge of the political control of pictures in newspapers and illustrated magazines with a high circulation.⁵³

In addition, permission was required from a newly established press chamber in order for a journalist to work, and anyone who did not fit with the Nazi worldview (i.e. espousing a particular political attitude and adhering to specific racial requirements) was denied such permission. Jews were explicitly excluded, but such rules also affected the majority of Poles and so-called 'hostile foreigners.' While in the Reichsgau Wartheland all Polish journalists were banned from working, in the Generalgouvernement an unknown number of Polish press photographers were approved for inclusion on the list of licensed professionals. They were subordinates to German editors and had to abide by Nazi directives.⁵⁴ Their adherence to such directives was controlled at the editing phase.

The general public did not know how the Nazi government exerted control over the press, because the involved journalists had to keep such directives secret.⁵⁵ The most influential picture editor of the Nazi Party, Willy Stiewe, continuously published advice on how to use the high credibility of photography to convey the political worldview of Nazism to a general public.⁵⁶ He emphasized the importance of captions to pre-establish what one was looking at. Furthermore, he explained how to manipulate the impact of pictures without retouch. Firstly, this could be done when actually taking pictures, by choosing specific subjects and motifs, by staging scenes for the camera, by adopting the appropriate point of view of the subject and by using lighting. Secondly, it could be achieved during the editing phase by cropping a picture in order to emphasize or omit certain things.

The practical guide by Willy Stiewe on how to produce photographs that conveyed a Nazi worldview helped occupation photographers and editors as they sought to stress racial distinctions introduced into occupied Poland and to promote ethnic cleansing in publications for Poles. As mentioned above, Nazi propaganda in occupied Poland generally distinguished between the visual culture in territories in which rapid 'Germanization' was planned (i.e. the Reichsgau Wartheland) and territories in which a long-term resident Polish population was planned (i.e. the Generalgouvernement).

Race as the visual ideology of the occupier

The Nazi obsession with race affected occupation policies as well as visual culture.⁵⁷ Nazi propaganda used the widespread belief that photographs were 'true-to-life' pictures to popularize race as a visual ideology in an intransigent way, and to justify the

introduction of a new social order in occupied Poland. The visual culture of Nazism popularized in accordance to its *völkisch* (ethnoracial) ideal the utopia inhabited by an ethnically homogenous, racially 'pure' population, which was labelled 'Aryan' and visually imagined according to an aesthetic ideal of the Nordic body (as represented in the sculptures of Thorak and Breker).⁵⁸ The glorification of supposedly Nordic looks in all kinds of images and picture stories served as a transcultural visual imagination, one that created imagined coalitions across national and cultural boundaries with populations in northern Europe, and imagined contradictions with peoples in southern and eastern Europe, as well as in Asia and Africa. Nazism emphasized a belief in the inequality of races, and in biological determinism. Human individuality was denounced in favour of a concept of racial types endowed with unchangeable, inborn physical and mental traits.

In Nazi-occupied Poland the categories of race and ethnicity replaced categories of religion, class and political orientation, and created new patterns of inclusion (ethnic Germans) and exclusion (Jews and Romani). The Nazi authorities excluded Catholic Poles from equal rights because of *ethnicity*, and Jewish Poles because of *race*; in both cases, marriage between Poles and Germans was outlawed. Occupation publications designed for a Polish readership called upon readers to judge someone's race by their appearance. One example was a contest for the Polish population in the Generalgouvernement to identify nationality as a category implicitly equated with ethnicity and race (Figure 7.2).



Figure 7.2 'Czy mnie znasz?' (Do you recognize me?), *Ilustrowany Kurjer Polski*, 23 August 1942. From the author's collection.

When choosing motifs and when editing photographs, a set of visual patterns was repeated to indicate racial differences. The introduction of race as a visual ideology in occupied Poland was an intransigent change in the visual culture of Polish society, introducing a condemnation of racial deviance from the Nordic ideal. Nazism postulated a fundamental racial difference between so-called Aryans and Jews, and



Figure 7.3 Title page of the *Ilustrowany Kurjer Polski*, 8 December 1940. From the author's collection.

visualized this mainly as a contrast in the appearance of males. The Nazis understood Jewish Poles to be an 'Asian' people inside Europe.⁵⁹ In consequence, Nazi visual culture presented male Jews in Poland for a German general public as 'Oriental' types with noses resembling those on the ancient reliefs of Persepolis, in contrast to Nordic types with facial proportions resembling those on ancient Greek sculptures.⁶⁰ Occupation press photography repeatedly presented the Nordic type as fair-haired, light-eyed and fair-skinned, and the Jewish type as dark and endowed with evil attributes, in order to foster sympathy for the former and antipathy towards the latter (Figure 7.3).⁶¹

Photojournalism for the general German public

The visual culture imposed by the occupiers shaped a copious visual memory of Jewish Poles as backward Asian types. Most easily recognizable in occupied Poland were Jewish males dressed in traditional clothes. Picture reports repeatedly presented so-called 'caftan Jews' – a category that is discussed in its post-war incarnation in Emily Oliver's chapter in this volume – and reduced the broad variety of Jewish people in occupied Poland to a visual pattern of backwardness.

German press photographers purposefully staged scenes in which Polish Jews were forced to pose for the camera. One example is a picture story published on 5 December 1940 in the *Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung*, the most widely circulated weekly publication in Germany at that time. This was a front-page story headlined 'Im Ghetto von Lublin' (In the Lublin Ghetto) and showed German policemen persecuting Jewish traders (Figure 7.4).⁶² Like the photo report on Lodz in the Nazi magazine *Illustrierter Beobachter* discussed above, this story supported the image of Jews as criminals. But the picture story about Lublin focused much more on men endowed with a physical appearance that was regarded as non-European, and who were dressed in traditional Jewish clothing. In addition, it conveyed the impression of trade as being an inborn instinct of Jewish people. The ways in which this German photo report under Nazi rule visually highlights the supposed backwardness of Jewish males in the Polish city of Lublin become obvious when we compare it to a significant number of pictures of the Jewish quarter in the same city produced by a Polish photographer shortly prior to the Nazi occupation. In addition, written records prove that only 7 per cent of the Jewish population in this city earned their living from trade prior to the occupation.⁶³ At the time that this picture story was published in Germany, however, the Nazis had started to create a ghetto for Jews in Lublin, and had seized all Jewish assets in the Generalgouvernement.⁶⁴ Hence, this picture report for a general German public justified occupation policies by criminalizing any attempt by Jews to trade in everyday goods.

Photo reports about German policemen persecuting Jews in occupied Poland were part of a large-scale Nazi propaganda campaign against Polish Jewry. This increased with the German conquest of Poland in 1939 and reached its first peak at the end of 1940 with the release of Nazi Germany's most aggressively anti-Semitic film, *Der ewige Jude* (The Eternal Jew) (dir. Fritz Hippler). During this campaign, many picture stories by different German journalists who had been travelling through occupied Poland



Figure 7.4 'Im Ghetto von Lublin' (In the Lublin Ghetto), *Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung*, 5 December 1940. From the author's collection.

slandered Polish Jews as dishonest and dirty criminals characterized by their laziness or illegal trading (rather than by 'honest labour').⁶⁵

Most picture stories produced for the general German public represented Polish Jews as racially (e.g. through physical appearance) and ethnically (e.g. through clothing) recognizable. The repeated image of the 'caftan Jew' in German visual culture drew attention away from the fact that Nazism classified people not by their practised religion, but *racially* as Jews. Importantly, the Nazi definition of Jewishness as it was applied in occupied Poland was broader than in Germany: regardless of someone's self-definition, every Pole with one Jewish parent was classified as a Jew.⁶⁶ Only a few photo reports published for the German public indicated the existence of secular Jews in occupied Poland. When secular Jews *were* represented in the occupation media, they were alleged to have an innately bad moral character – something that had been supposedly inherited biologically.

One example of this was a four-page picture story entitled 'Juden unter sich' (Jews among Themselves) published on 24 July 1941 in the *Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung* for the general German public.⁶⁷ This photo report deals with the Warsaw Ghetto, which was established by the occupiers in 1940. Before the occupation, Jewish residents made up one-third of the population of the Polish capital. But Nazism introduced into occupied Poland ethno-racially segregated areas and divided larger cities into separate districts for Germans, Poles and Jews, corresponding with a distribution of resources according to the racial status of each group. Some 400,000 people who were classified as Jews were

crowded into a walled and fenced-in space equal to 3 per cent of Warsaw, leading to the outbreak of epidemics. The German administration controlled the entire economy inside the ghetto and accepted a rapidly increasing rate of mortality for its inmates.

The *Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung* published its picture story one year after the establishment of the Jewish ghetto in occupied Warsaw, after 100,000 residents of the ghetto had already died of starvation, exhaustion or disease. The pictures for this report were taken by German photographers attached to the Wehrmacht's Propaganda Company 689 in the first half of 1941. They purposefully chose motifs that would confirm their propaganda messages and contrived scenes in which people were forced to pose in front of their cameras.⁶⁸ Even while taking pictures, then, they visually emphasized an alleged racial tendency of the ghetto's inhabitants to bargain and to engage in ruthless competition. This deceitful and fraudulent visual representation of the occupied in the legal press under Nazi rule is evident after we compare it to pictures produced by other photographers who did not belong to the ranks of licensed press photographers, compare published pictures produced by licensed press photographers with unpublished pictures, and correlate the visual sources with the results of other historical research.

Legally sanctioned press photography in Nazi-occupied Poland omitted to depict Jewish self-help and solidarity in Warsaw, denying the very existence of Jewish social and welfare organizations before and during the war.⁶⁹ The inhabitants of ghettos were forbidden under occupation policy from taking photographs of the persecution, deportation and murder that they faced, and had no opportunities to publish images openly. Nonetheless, some Jewish photographers in occupied Warsaw contributed a few pictures to Emanuel Ringelblum's underground archive,⁷⁰ which attempted to document the occupiers' persecution and murder of Jews. Many high-quality pictures and prints were produced by Foto-Forbert in the Warsaw Ghetto for the American Joint Distribution Committee to raise funds for Jewish self-help.⁷¹

The majority of private photographs depicting the Warsaw Ghetto, however, were those taken by travelling German soldiers. These soldiers often reproduced topics that had been introduced to them through the mass media.⁷² However, some private German snapshots contradict the visual messages conveyed in Nazi picture reports. They show a broader variety of physical appearance amongst ghetto inhabitants than German press photographs did, for example, as well as acts of solidarity amongst the inhabitants, and undignified mass burials.⁷³ The best-known photographic evidence for the persecution and murder of Jews in Warsaw is, in fact, that created on behalf of the commander of the SS and police, who were sent to quell the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943.⁷⁴

Photojournalism designed for the general Polish public

Nazi media policies were designed to target various audiences, including German audiences, as well as readers in occupied Poland itself.⁷⁵ The visual culture of occupation imposed by Nazism was characterized by its ubiquitous representation of German power. Picture stories praised Germans as gifted human beings without

physical or moral imperfections, demonstrating the superiority of German weapons and science in particular. The constant presentation of Germany's achievements was meant to convince Poles of their inferiority. In those territories which were earmarked for rapid 'Germanization,' Nazi propaganda institutions demonstrated the inferiority of the Polish majority by simple ignorance: they acted as if no Poles at all existed in such areas (with some concessions after 1943). In occupied territories earmarked for the long-term residence of Poles, on the other hand, Nazi propaganda addressing the Polish public was more complex, but was still designed to continuously convince the occupied population of their inferiority.

The *Ilustrowany Kurjer Polski* (1940–4) – an occupation magazine published in Polish and designed for a Polish readership in the Generalgouvernement – emphasized in a subliminal way the importance of racial purity, especially in comparison to the United States and the Soviet Union. It slandered the United States as a country of grotesque consumerism and racial impurity. After the German assault on the Soviet Union in summer 1941, the Nazi government was presented in this magazine as a bulwark against Bolshevism. The magazine presented the Soviet Union as a home of poor and distressed Asian hordes. Presenting Nazi Germany as a defender of Christianity in Europe, the *Ilustrowany Kurjer Polski* also aimed to secure the support of Polish conservatives.⁷⁶ According to Hitler's advice that propaganda had to suggest that separated adversaries belong to one category, the *Ilustrowany Kurjer Polski* presented Jews as the principal enemy identified with both Bolshevism and capitalism. In this framework, Polish Jewry seemed to be part of a powerful worldwide network – in contradiction to their actual isolation in ghettos in Nazi-occupied Poland.

The Nazi press published in Polish tried to convince the Polish public of the social and economic advantages of the occupiers' measures against Jews. In the case of Warsaw, it was mainly secular Jews who were depicted in the *Ilustrowany Kurjer Polski*; to have done otherwise would have rendered a photo report less than credible in the eyes of Polish readers. One example is a single-page picture story entitled 'Warszawskie Ghetto' (Warsaw Ghetto) published on 15 December 1940.⁷⁷ A Polish photographer who had been licensed by the occupation authorities took photographs in the ghetto for this picture story. The accompanying text implicitly denied the occupiers' control of the economy inside the ghetto, and suggested that inborn racial tendencies were to blame for the fate of the ghetto's inhabitants.

Comparative and correlative insights

The attempts of the occupied to counter the assertions of Nazi visual propaganda in and about Poland varied according to a number of factors. These included the respective occupation policies in different territories, and the traditions, conditions and abilities of the people involved in the resistance movement throughout Poland.

As mentioned above, it was a widespread practice amongst lab assistants all over occupied Poland to collect and forward copies of prints as evidence of the crimes committed by the occupying forces. After two years of occupation, the Polish Home Army started to train several dozen Polish photographers in Warsaw to document life

and the resistance under occupation. With this advanced level of organization, the Polish resistance movement took many pictures of the armed uprising against the Nazi occupation in Warsaw in 1944.⁷⁸ They produced photographs technically comparable to those taken by the occupiers, but distribution of such photographs was limited to the area of the uprising itself.

In territories which were under more intense surveillance by the German police, different conditions prevailed. The clandestine work of the Polish Scout movement in the Reichsgau Wartheland provides an example for the limited possibilities of resistance under such circumstances, because the occupation authorities constantly threatened people with arrest, torture or death for expressing adverse opinions. As a consequence, only a few photographs were taken (and under enormous precautions), and the technical quality of such images cannot be compared to those taken by officially sanctioned and well-equipped photojournalists.

The same can be said regarding the *Sonderkommando* photographs from Auschwitz when compared to those pictures taken by SS members in the same concentration camp.⁷⁹ The SS prevented the taking of photographs by unauthorized persons at Auschwitz. The *Auschwitz-Album* includes a large number of pictures taken by SS members showing how, in 1944, SS staff forced Hungarian Jews from a local train station to the camp.⁸⁰ It was only the cooperation of the Polish resistance movement around the camp with Polish and Jewish prisoners inside it that made it possible to take a few pictures from the *Sonderkommando*'s point of view. These images show naked women being forced into a gas chamber, and the burning of corpses outside of it following this murderous procedure.⁸¹ The film with these pictures was developed by a Pole in a small town nearby, shortly before the arrival of Soviet troops. Because the SS personnel were of the opinion that Jewish women would be unable to undertake physical work, they became the preferred subjects of mass murder.⁸² This was highlighted visually by the *Sonderkommando* prisoners – but not by the SS photographers.

The occupation media presented the enlarged scope of tasks undertaken by the SS and the German police in occupied Poland only in a deceptive manner. On 12 October 1939, for example, the Nazi magazine *Illustrierter Beobachter* published a picture story about Warsaw.⁸³ It claimed that the German police had to be deployed in the Polish capital to protect Poles from their own police, thus drawing attention away from attacks by the SS and the German police on Polish civilians.⁸⁴ The most infamous of these were the shootings of about 1,700 Warsaw residents carried out by SS squads and the German police between late 1939 and July 1941 on the outskirts of the city in a forest near the village of Palmiry.⁸⁵ Some photographs of these shootings, supposedly taken for internal reporting purposes, were intercepted by the resistance movement and forwarded to the Polish Government-in-Exile. Likewise, the occupation media did not report on police raids that had been occurring since spring 1940 in the cities, carried out on behalf of the German employment authorities to recruit Poles to be sent abroad as forced labour.⁸⁶

Such picture stories prove the excessive criminalization of the occupied by the Nazi government. The visual culture correlates with a system of legislation which metered out punishment according to racially based distinctions. For the same deeds, Poles and Jews were more harshly punished than Germans. As a consequence, they became

objects of photographic records by the German police and the SS en masse.⁸⁷ Both the police and the SS took many such photographs for internal communications. Besides standardized photographs used to identify criminals, racial classification pictures were used as a supplement for internal reports. Sections with photographs attached to reports demonstrate the work – rounding up Poles, keeping ghettos under guard and welcoming superiors – of particular police and SS units.⁸⁸ These reports, as well as private photo albums produced by SS members, show (through their choice of motif and their captions) the extreme hostility that police and SS staff felt towards the people of occupied Poland.⁸⁹ Most of these pictures are not well suited to convincing the general public about the need for the brutal treatment of defenceless civilians. Yet these photographs are the most valuable and reliable sources we have for countering the assertions made by the deceitful picture reports that were featured in the occupation press.

Conclusion

In this chapter, photographs produced under occupation have been understood as part of material culture, embodying political as well as economic relationships between the occupiers and the occupied. Several reasons have been given as to why the occupied generated fewer photographic records than the occupiers. A comparison of German press photographs and picture reports depicting Nazi-occupied Poland, with pictures by other photographers under different political circumstances, yet showing the same groups of people in the same places, provides two correlative insights. Firstly, Nazi photojournalism was a political tool of deception. Secondly, the various other photographic sources correspond much more with the written records of both the occupiers and the occupied.

During the Second World War, photojournalism met the needs of a non-reading majority, much like the medieval *Biblia pauperum* (paupers' bibles) had once done – pictures would be placed in the centre of the page and would be accompanied by a brief text in the local language. Most important regarding the deceptive character of Nazi photojournalism in and about occupied Poland was its impact on the knowledge of Germans and Poles about the occupation itself. Deceptive picture stories influenced the perceptions of Germans and Poles alike about the situation, and had an impact on their expectations and actions. Most people – the occupiers and the occupied – believed photographs to be 'true-to-life' pictures, or unbiased depictions of reality. The picture reports for a German general public about the occupied substituted first-hand experience and apparently convinced many readers.⁹⁰ The average German believed the news coverage provided by the German press. They were not aware of the secret steering of the press or the staged character of press photography. The widespread belief in photo reports made it possible for the Nazi government to misinform the general public. Picture stories in magazines and other mass media pre-established what they were going to look at in real life. The majority of Germans remained unaware of the extent of the destruction in occupied Poland. And the fraudulent facade of Nazi visual culture justified and hid the vast crimes against peace and humanity that were committed in occupied territories.

During the 1920s, European theories of authoritarian leadership owed much to Gustave Le Bon's anti-democratic crowd psychology. Le Bon claimed – amongst other things – that a leader has to evoke images to successfully steer human crowds. Visual culture under Nazism followed such ideas. Picture stories in magazines created definitions of situations in order to evoke new behaviours amongst readers, in the sense of a self-fulfilling prophecy in favour of Nazism, complementing other occupation policies. The iconography of 'Germanness', of occupied Poland and of Polish Jewry all represented visual definitions that affected subsequent developments. In particular, the introduction of race as a category to occupation policies and visual culture had enormous consequences. The majority of Poles in the Generalgouvernement supposedly remained unaware of the subliminal influence that the racist ideology of Nazism had on the visual culture of occupation.⁹¹ It caused serious difficulties in understanding Polish society before 1939 in accordance with the democratic self-definition of its pre-war population. In particular, the visual memory of Polish Jews as backward – an image shaped by Nazi occupation propaganda – needs to be reconsidered critically.⁹²

Notes

- 1 Heinrich Hoffmann, ed., *Mit Hitler in Polen* (Berlin: Zeitgeschichte – Verlag, 1939). See also Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); John Connelly, 'Nazis and Slavs: From Racial Theory to Racist Practice', *Central European History* 32, no. 1 (1999): 1–34; Jochen Boehler, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg. Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2006).
- 2 For instance, Romani people in Poland, Soviet POWs and Polish children, all of whom the occupiers 'Germanized' by force.
- 3 Stanisława Lewandowska, *Prasa polskiej emigracji wojennej 1939–1945* (Warsaw: Instytut Historii PAN, 1993).
- 4 Lucjan Dobroszycki and Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, *Image before My Eyes: A Photographic History of Jewish Life in Poland before the Holocaust* (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), xvi–xvii, 128–32, 140–52. See also William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, ed. Eli Zaretsky (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1918, 1994).
- 5 Jerzy Tomaszewski, *Auftakt zur Vernichtung: Die Vertreibung polnischer Juden aus Deutschland im Jahre 1938* (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2002).
- 6 Ulrich Herbert, *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft 1903–1989* (Bonn: Dietz, 1996), 215–24.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 133–80; Andrej Angrick, Christoph Dieckmann, Christian Gerlach, Peter Klein, Dieter Pohl, Martina Voigt, Michael Wildt and Peter Witte, ed., *Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42* (Hamburg: Hans Christians, 1999), 13–96; Karol Marian Pospieszalski, *Hitlerowskie 'prawo' okupacyjne w Polsce. Wybor dokumentow*, 2 vols (Poznan: Instytut Zachodni, 1952/1958); Diemut Majer, *'Non-Germans' under the Third Reich: The Nazi Juridical and Administrative System in Germany and Occupied Eastern Europe, with Special Regard to Occupied Poland* (Baltimore, MD: Hopkins University Press, 2003).

- 8 Czeslaw Pilichowski, *Obozy hitlerowskie na ziemiach polskich 1939–1945: Informator encyklopedyczny* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1979); Gudrun Schwarz, *Die nationalsozialistischen Lager* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1997); Nikolaus Wachsmann, *Hitler's Prisons* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). Nazi policies in occupied Poland were based on a memorandum from the Nazi Party's Office for Racial Policies (which was also responsible for preparing the Nuremberg laws) entitled 'Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete', and dated 25 November 1939. On its implementation, see Isabel Heinemann, 'Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut': *Das Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 193.
- 9 Herbert, *Best*, 96–9.
- 10 Miriam Y. Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder von Deutschen und Polen im Reichsgau Wartheland 1939–45. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Region Wielkopolska* (Hamburg: Kovac, 2008), 186–9.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 189–216.
- 12 Norman Davies, *Europe at War, 1939–1945: No Simple Victory* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2007), 13–14.
- 13 Margaret E. Wagner, *The Library of Congress World War II Companion* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2007), 663–705, 683–7, 691; on the persecution of Jews in the Generalgouvernement, see Bogdan Musiał, 'Aktion Reinhardt': *Der Völkermord an den Juden im Generalgouvernement 1941–1944* (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2004).
- 14 Hans Mommsen, 'Umvolkungspläne des Nationalsozialismus und der Holocaust', in *Von Weimar nach Auschwitz. Zur Geschichte Deutschlands in der Weltkriegsepoche*, ed. Hans Mommsen (Munich: Ullstein, 2001), 295–308; Mechthild Rössler and Sabine Schleiermacher, ed., *Der 'Generalplan Ost': Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik* (Berlin: Akademie, 1993); Czeslaw Madajczyk, *Faszyzm i okupacje 1938–1945*. 2 vols (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1983–4).
- 15 Centralna Żydowska Komisja Historyczna W Polsce, *Zagłada Żydostwa Polskiego. Album Zdjęć* (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Centralnej Żydowskiej Komisji Historycznej, 1945); Edward Serwanski and Irena Trawinska, *Zbrodnia niemiecka w Warszawie 1944r. Zeznania-zdjęcia* (Poznan: Instytut Zachodni, 1946); Jürgen Stroop, *Es gibt keinen jüdischen Wohnbezirk in Warschau mehr*, ed. Andrzej Wirth (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1960); Jüdisches Historisches Institut Warschau, ed., *Faschismus – Getto – Massenmord: Dokumentation über Ausrottung und Widerstand der Juden in Polen während des Zweiten Weltkriegs* (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1961).
- 16 Habbo Knoch, *Die Tat als Bild: Fotografien des Holocaust in der deutschen Erinnerungskultur* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2001).
- 17 Willy Stiewe, *So sieht uns die Welt. Deutschland im Bild der Auslandspresse* (Berlin: Deutsche Rundschau, 1932), 7; Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, 217–18.
- 18 Knoch, *Die Tat als Bild*.
- 19 Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, 229.
- 20 The Wiener Library in London, for instance, holds reproductions of anti-Semitic picture reports published in Germany since 1933. Several Polish institutions hold visual sources demonstrating the defamation of Poles since 1939.
- 21 Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen and Volker Riess, ed., 'Schöne Zeiten': *Judenmord aus der Sicht der Täter und Gaffer* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1988); Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Volker Riess and Wolfram Pyta, ed., *Deutscher Osten 1939–1945:*

- Der Weltanschauungskrieg in Photos und Texten* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003).
- 22 Derral Cheatwood and Clarice Stasz, 'Visual Sociology', in *Images of Information*, ed. Jon Wagner (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), 262.
- 23 Klaus Honnef and Frank Weyers, ed., '*Und sie haben Deutschland verlassen müssen*'. *Fotografen und ihre Bilder, 1928–1997* (Bonn: Rheinisches Landesmuseum, 1997). The most prominent German photographer killed because of race was Erich Salomon. On Salomon, see Janos Frecot, *Erich Salomon: 'Mit Frack und Linse durch Politik und Gesellschaft'* (Munich: Schirmer/Mosel, 2004). Adolf and Wladyslaw Forbert were successful Polish photographers who escaped Nazi racial persecution. On this, see Janina Struk, *Photographing the Holocaust: Interpretations of the Evidence* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 36–7, 84, 139–40 and 143–9.
- 24 Freund was born in 1908 in Germany and escaped in 1933 to France. She defended her doctoral thesis in 1936 at the Sorbonne. She became familiar to a broader public as a photojournalist for *Life* and *Time*. Gisèle Freund, *Photographie und Gesellschaft*, trans. Dietrich Leube (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1989); see also Honnef and Weyers, '*Und sie haben Deutschland verlassen müssen*', 168–71.
- 25 Freund, *Photographie und Gesellschaft*, 6, 116–89, 217–27.
- 26 Fritz Saenger, *Politik der Täuschungen. Missbrauch der Presse im Dritten Reich: Weisungen, Informationen, Notizen* (Vienna: Europa, 1975); Bernd Weise, 'Pressefotografie als Medium der Propaganda im Presselenkungssystem des Dritten Reiches', in *Die Gleichschaltung der Bilder: Zur Geschichte der Pressefotografie 1930–1936*, ed. Diethard Kerbs (Berlin: Frölich & Kaufmann, 1983), 141–55; Freund's statements on Hitler's photographer Heinrich Hoffmann were replaced and supplemented in Rudolf Herz, *Hoffmann & Hitler: Fotografie als Medium des Führer-Mythos* (Munich: Klinckschardt & Biermann, 1994).
- 27 Struk, *Photographing the Holocaust*, 80.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 244.
- 29 Jon Wagner, ed., *Images of Information: Still Photography in the Social Sciences* (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1979). Special attention to methodology is given in Part II.
- 30 Jon Wagner, 'Avoiding Error', in *Images of Information*, ed. Jon Wagner (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1979), 147–60 (esp. 148–9).
- 31 John Collier, 'Evaluating Visual Data', in *Images of Information*, ed. Jon Wagner (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1979), 161.
- 32 Wolf Buchmann, "'Woher kommt das Foto?'" Zur Authentizität und Interpretation von historischen Photoaufnahmen in Archiven', *Der Archivar* 52, no. 4 (1999): 296–306.
- 33 Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, 67–127.
- 34 Rolf Sachsse, *Die Erziehung zum Wegsehen: Fotografie im NS-Staat* (Dresden: Philo Fine Arts, 2003), 288.
- 35 Czeslaw Luczak, *Diskriminierung der Polen in Wielkopolska zur Zeit der Hitlerokkupation* (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1966), 206, 343–9. In the Reichsgau Wartheland the Nazi authorities prohibited Poles from owning or directing companies, and handed all companies over to Germans. In the Generalgouvernement, Poles were allowed to own and/or direct companies.
- 36 Golda Tencer, ed., *And I Still See Their Faces: Images of Polish Jews* (Warsaw: Shalom Foundation, 1996), 164–7; Kersten Brandt, Hanno Loewy and Krystyna Oleksy, ed., *Before They Perished.... Photographs Found in Auschwitz*. 2 vols (Oswiecim: Panstwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, 2001), 152, 305, 363, 469, 471–5.

- 37 Majer, 'Non-Germans' under the Third Reich.
- 38 'Noch vor einem Jahr – und heute!'; *Illustrierter Beobachter*, 15 August 1940, 820–1. Photographs by Hilmar Pabel.
- 39 Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, 324–5; Eugeniusz C. Krol, 'Die Propaganda des Dritten Reiches gegenüber Polen und den Polen von 1939–1945', in *Im Objektiv des Feindes: Die deutschen Bildberichterstatter im besetzten Warschau*, ed. Eugeniusz C. Krol (Warsaw: Rytm, 2008), 15–30. The directive requested that the German press portray Poles and Jews thereafter as 'Untermenschen' (subhumans).
- 40 Czeslaw Luczak, *Diskriminierung der Polen in Wielkopolska zur Zeit der Hitlerokkupation* (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1966); Isabel Heinemann, 'Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut'.
- 41 Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, 722–52. The Poles in the Reichsgau Wartheland were denied access to education, culture and sport. Luczak, *Diskriminierung der Polen*, 326–7 and 330–7.
- 42 Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, 701–19.
- 43 Struk, *Photographing the Holocaust*, 37.
- 44 Anon, 'Zum Tag der deutschen Polizei: Gold im Ghetto. Die Sicherheitspolizei im Kampf gegen Judenwucher', *Illustrierter Beobachter*, 20 February 1941, 221–3. Photographs by Georg Piper.
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- 46 Alan Adelson and Robert Lapides, *Lodz Ghetto: Inside a Community under Siege* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989).
- 47 *Ibid.*, xx, 46, 80, 282, 462 and 503; Struk, *Photographing the Holocaust*, 86–94.
- 48 Miriam Arani, *Mendel Grosman: The Lodz Ghetto (1940–1944) Photograph Collection at the Wiener Library, London* (Berlin: Deutsch-Polnische Akademische Gesellschaft e.V., 2013): http://www.dp-ag.org/en/wp-content/uploads2013/12/WL-DPAG_grosmanEN.pdf (accessed 1 August 2018).
- 49 Fritz Schmidt, *Presse in Fesseln: Eine Schilderung des NS-Pressetrusts* (Berlin: Archiv & Kartei, 1947); Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz, *Journalismus im Dritten Reich* (Munich: Beck, 1989); Peter Longerich, 'Nationalsozialistische Propaganda', in *Deutschland 1933–1945. Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft*, ed. Karl-Dietrich Bracher (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1993), 291–314.
- 50 Lucjan Dobroszycki, *Reptile Journalism: The Official Polish-language Press under the Nazis, 1939–1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).
- 51 Under Nazi rule, listening to foreign radio broadcasts was persecuted and punished.
- 52 Jürgen Hagemann, *Die Presselenkung im Dritten Reich* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1970); Hans Bohrmann, Gabriele Toepser-Ziegert and Karen Peter, ed. *NS-Pressenanweisungen der Vorkriegszeit. Edition und Dokumentation* (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1984–2001).
- 53 Bernd Weise, 'Pressefotografie als Medium der Propaganda im Presselenkungssystem des Dritten Reiches', in *Die Gleichhaltung der Bilder. Zur Geschichte der Pressefotografie 1930–1936*, ed. Diethard Kerbs (Berlin: Frölich & Kaufmann, 1983), 141–55.
- 54 Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, 255–60 and 275–9; Dobroszycki, *Reptile Journalism*.
- 55 Hagemann, *Die Presselenkung im Dritten Reich*.

- 56 Willy Stiewe, *Das Bild als Nachricht. Nachrichtenwert und -technik des Bildes. Ein Beitrag zur Zeitungskunde* (Berlin: C. Duncker, 1933); Willy Stiewe, 'Was fordern wir vom Pressebild? Die Aufgaben des Bildberichters und Bildschrifteleiters', *Gebrauchsfotografie* 48, no. 7 (1941): 125–31.
- 57 George L. Mosse, *Der nationalsozialistische Alltag: So lebte man unter Hitler* (Königstein: Athenaeum, 1978), 78–130; Joseph Wulf, *Presse und Funk im Dritten Reich. Eine Dokumentation* (Frankfurt: Ullstein, [1966] 1983), 222–5.
- 58 See the definition of *völkisch* in Ulrich Herbert, *Best*, 62–3.
- 59 Struk, *Photographing the Holocaust*, 81; Krol, 'Die Propaganda des Dritten Reiches', 15–30 (esp. 18).
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- 72 Alexander B. Rossino, 'Eastern Europe through German Eyes: Soldiers' Photographs, 1939–42', *History of Photography* 23, no. 4 (1999): 313–21.

- 73 Miriam Y. Arani, 'Aus den Augen, aus dem Sinn? Publierte Fotografien aus dem besetzten Warschau 1939 bis 1945', *Fotogeschichte* 17, no. 65 (1997): 33–58; and no. 66 (1997): 33–50.
- 74 Jürgen Stroop, *Es gibt keinen jüdischen Wohnbezirk in Warschau mehr* (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1960).
- 75 Dobroszycki, *Reptile Journalism*.
- 76 Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, 165–73.
- 77 'Warszawskie Ghetto', *Ilustrowany Kurjer Polski*, 15 December 1940, 12. This is reprinted in Struk, *Photographing the Holocaust*, 75.
- 78 Stanislaw Kopf, *Z kamera w powstanczej Warszawie – 1944* (Warsaw: Zwiasek Polskich Artystow Fotografikow, 1994).
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- 80 Israel Gutman and Bella Guterman, ed. *Das Auschwitz-Album*, trans. Alma Lessing (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005).
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- 82 Robert L. Koehl, *The SS: A History, 1919–45* (Stroud: Tempus, 2004), 188.
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- 86 Ulrich Herbert, *Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des 'Ausländer-Einsatzes' in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches* (Bonn: Dietz, 1999), 77–114; Alfred Konieczny and Herbert Szurgacz, ed., *Praca przymusowa Polakow pod panowaniem hitlerowskim 1939–1945* (Poznan: Instytut Zachodni, 1976), XXXIX–LIII.
- 87 Arani, *Fotografische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, 533–40, 544–7 and 556–60.
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- 89 Jacek S. Sawicki and Jochen Böhrer, *SS-Oberscharführers Hermann Baltruschat 's Career 1939–1943* (Warsaw: Instytut Pamieci Narodowej and Deutsches Historisches Institut, 2014).
- 90 The impact of propaganda efforts was traced by the Security Service (SD) of the SS: Heinz Boberach, ed., *Meldungen aus dem Reich: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938–1945* (Herrsching: Pawlak, 1984), esp. chapters 1.7, 2.6 and 9.
- 91 This was linked to pre-war ideas in Polish eugenics. On this, see Magdalena Gawin, *Rasa i nowoczesnosć: Historia polskiego ruchu eugenicznego* (Warsaw: Neriton, 2003).
- 92 See Tencer, *And I Still See Their Faces*; Frank Michael Schuster, 'Im Osten nichts Neues. Die Wahrnehmung der Juden in Polen im Ersten und im Zweiten Weltkrieg', in *Information Warfare. Die Rolle der Medien bei der Kriegsdarstellung und -deutung*, ed. Claudia Gunz (Göttingen: V&R, 2007), 230–50.

Re-visualizing Okinawa: Gender, race and Cold War US occupation in *The Okinawa Graphic*

Mire Koikari

Introduction

In September 1964, *The Okinawa Graphic*, a popular news magazine in Okinawa, published an article entitled ‘Mutual Friendship and Responsibility – High Commissioner Watson.’ Announcing the arrival in Okinawa of Lt General Albert Watson II, the magazine expressed cautious optimism about this change in personnel in the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), the central organ of administration in this occupied territory. In contrast to his predecessor, Paul Caraway, whose iron-fisted control had generated much fear and discontent, Watson seemed a better option for Okinawa. Advocating ‘friendship’ and ‘responsibility’ as central pillars of his reign, Watson would surely be more flexible in his governance, respectful towards the islanders’ sentiments, and open to the idea of Okinawa’s eventual autonomy, the magazine noted. Despite some optimism, however, the new commissioner remained unknown. Announcing his intention to defend freedom at any cost, Watson seemed far more determined than Caraway to use Okinawa as a staging arena for anti-communist offensives, while the latter had at least paid lip service to showcasing the islands as a model of ‘democracy’.¹

Prior to his arrival in Okinawa, Watson had stopped over in Hawaii, a former US territory turned fiftieth state, where Japanese and Okinawan immigrants exerted significant influence. As the magazine reported, during his one-week stay in Hawaii, Watson attended a variety of events, most notably a welcome party hosted by the Okinawa Association of Hawaii. The published photos conveyed a sense of excitement surrounding the occasion. Okinawan American leaders showed up in droves to greet Watson, whose rule would soon impact Okinawa. A dinner event was held in the opulent Imperial Banquet Room at the newly refurbished Kaimana Beach Hotel in Waikiki (now the New Otani Kaimana Beach Hotel), a Japanese American establishment built on a property once owned by the white merchant McInerny family.² Among the more than 300 attendees was Ms Teruya, the Okinawan American beauty queen who added feminine charm as she chatted casually with Mr and Mrs Watson.³

To commemorate the occasion, the magazine printed a two-page spread under the heading, 'Aloha High Commissioner Watson.' In it, twelve Okinawan American leaders offered individual remarks accompanied by their formal portraits in suits and ties. Offering 'Aloha from the bottom of our hearts,' they praised the work of the previous high commissioners and commended US rule in Okinawa for its political, economic and social benefits to the islanders. While glorifying the success of the occupation, the leaders also used the occasion to make 'suggestions' about US governance in Okinawa. Alluding to various tensions and frictions brewing in Okinawa, Asato Sadao urged Watson to make extra efforts in understanding the islanders' customs and habits and fostering 'genuine cooperation' between the occupiers and the occupied. 'A pathway' would surely open up, Asato stated, when both sides exercised 'good will and reasonable thinking.'⁴ Nakamine Shinsuke emphasized the importance of generating 'discussions' between Americans and Okinawans. He hoped that the new commissioner would display 'generosity' by lending his ears to 'the voices of people' and heeding grassroots wishes.⁵

The Okinawa Graphic's coverage of Watson highlighted a number of dynamics circulating within and beyond Okinawa at the time. Following Watson's footsteps from Hawaii to Okinawa, it reiterated the idea of 'manifest destiny,' that is, a US westward advance which enlisted island communities across the Pacific as 'stepping stones' to Asia. Watson's emphasis on 'friendship' reflected emerging Cold War rhetoric, whereby cultivating 'people-to-people' relations with racial-national others constituted a crucial strategy amidst civil rights mobilizations at home and decolonization movements abroad.⁶ Gender played a salient role in this Cold War dynamic. As indicated by the presence of Ms Teruya at Watson's welcome party, women were indispensable in generating cross-cultural affinity and affiliation, whose feminine presence would soften and obscure ongoing racial and national tensions. Hawaii, tropical islands full of 'Aloha,' provided an ideal backdrop for such performance. The islands' multiracial population – itself an outcome of the colonial-style plantation economy built on the backs of immigrants of colour – affirmed the standing of the United States as the champion of racial diversity and democracy. The promotion of Hawaii as a symbol of multiculturalism masked the plight of Indigenous Hawaiians, whose increasing marginalization was in stark contrast to the rising status of Japanese and Okinawan immigrants after the Second World War.⁷ While reflecting the dominant workings of power, the 1964 article also showcased the agency of the marginalized and subordinated. Providing laudatory remarks, Okinawan American leaders also articulated their opinions towards the occupiers, suggesting changes in the existing mode of governance.

This chapter examines *The Okinawa Graphic*, a bi-lingual (English and Japanese) news magazine whose visual and narrative contents reveal much about war and occupation, militarism and imperialism, and nationalism and transnationalism in the early Cold War decades.⁸ During the US occupation of Okinawa (1945–72), this magazine constituted a dynamic site of discursive production, where texts and images, reportage and advertisements, and editorials and letters from readers were informed by gender, race, nation and empire. A visual repository of exceptional value and volume, the magazine still plays a crucial role in present-day Okinawa. Its current copyright holder, Shinseisha Press, produces 'company history' (*shashi*) for local business and

civic organizations for a fee, recycling previously published photos to recount and recollect stories from the past.⁹

This chapter will first provide background information on the US occupation of Okinawa, Occupation Studies (*Senryō Kenkyū*) and 'graphic magazines' (*gurafushi*)



Figure 8.1 Cover of *The Okinawa Graphic* featuring a female model with Ryukyuan-style hair and fashion. Courtesy of Shinseisha Press. (See Plate 10.)

in order to situate *The Okinawa Graphic* in relevant historical, discursive and genre contexts. The chapter will then examine select articles from the magazine, with analytical attention to words (English and Japanese), and more importantly visual (especially photographic) images. Unlike other publications such as *Shurei no Hikari* and *Konnichi no Ryukyu* – propaganda magazines issued by the occupiers¹⁰ – *The Okinawa Graphic* is a rare, understudied artefact whose content reveals far more nuance and ambiguity. Complicit in dominant political dynamics, the magazine also showcased multitudes of discursive manoeuvres and manipulations, demonstrating the islanders' will, tenacity and capacity in diverse and sometimes surprising ways (Figure 8.1).

History, scholarship and genre convention

The US occupation of Okinawa took place on the heels of the Pacific War, whose ending was particularly violent for the islanders. As the Battle of Okinawa raged from 1 April to 22 June 1945, Okinawa, Japan's southernmost prefecture, became a site of deadly confrontations between the United States and Japan, resulting in enormous destruction of human life and infrastructure across the islands. Following the ceasefire, Okinawa was administratively separated from mainland Japan, which had controlled the once-independent kingdom since 1872, and was placed under US rule. In the emerging Cold War context, Okinawa held exceptional significance for the region's geopolitical dynamics. With its proximity to locations of strategic importance in Asia and the Pacific, Okinawa was slated to become the 'Keystone of the Pacific', from which the United States would launch its offensive against communist foes. Cold War militarization deeply impacted the islands, displacing residents, generating countless crimes and accidents, and transforming Okinawa into a permanent garrison. Far from compliant, Okinawans engaged in resistance, both small and large. Best known were the successive waves of 'island-wide struggles' (*shimagurumi tōsō*), in which Okinawans were mobilized en masse to protest the US military presence in the 1950s (called 'the first wave') and the 1960s ('the second wave'). The protest mobilization coalesced into the reversion movement, demanding Okinawa's return to Japanese administration. The reversion, which took place in 1972, did not stop Okinawa's militarization, however. To this day, US military facilities in Japan are disproportionately concentrated in this tiny island prefecture. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) also exert an increasingly significant presence, whose post-Cold War expansion in Okinawa has been notable.¹¹

During the occupation, the United States deployed a variety of cultural strategies in order to contain the islanders' opposition. Okinawa was renamed 'Ryukyus', an old name for the islands that predated Japanese rule. Local culture and tradition were promoted, fostering an Okinawan identity apart from mainland Japan, and stifling the islanders' wish for reversion. American food, clothing, medicine and other everyday materials were introduced, making the occupiers' culture familiar and digestible. The home economics movement emerged, enlisting women of diverse backgrounds and nationalities to disseminate knowledge and technologies of American (i.e. modern) homemaking.¹² The University of the Ryukyus (UR) and

the Ryukyuan-American Cultural Center (initially called the ‘Information Center’) were established, providing spaces for the islanders to learn about US culture and history. At the centre of all these dynamics was USCAR, the central organ of US governance from 1950 to 1972.

For discussions of post-war Okinawa, the field of ‘Occupation Studies’, or *Senryō Kenkyū*, provides a crucial context. A trans-Pacific arena of scholarship, this field has involved notable scholars such as John Dower in the United States and Sodei Rinjirō in Japan, and has generated numerous studies on the topic. Despite its richness and diversity, however, Occupation Studies has predominantly focused on US rule in mainland Japan. In so doing, it has obscured the importance of other Allied forces (such as British Commonwealth Forces) in the occupation of Japan, and has overlooked other geographical locations (such as Okinawa) that were also part of the post-Second World War US occupation. While Okinawan scholars – Miyagi Etsujirō, Yakabi Osamu and Ōta Masahide, among others – have produced detailed accounts of US rule in Okinawa, their work tends to be marginalized in *Senryō Kenkyū*.

The pattern of marginalization remains in place to a remarkable degree today. Scholars of Japan continue to approach the ‘*Senryō*’ (Occupation) as a mainland Japanese event, placing Okinawa outside the purview of analysis. This tendency not only reinforces a well-established dynamic of knowledge production, where the colonized is repeatedly subordinated to the colonizer to sustain the latter’s primacy. A lack of attention to Okinawa also results in a failure among scholars to examine the varied connections between the islands and the mainland. In the early post-war decades, numerous exchanges involving peoples, ideas and resources took place between Okinawa and mainland Japan, informing not only Okinawan but also Japanese experiences. In ongoing discussions of the occupation, then, Okinawa continues to be a methodological and epistemological blind spot, whose recuperation is an urgent matter not only for those studying Okinawa, but also for those studying mainland Japan.

Gurafushi – news magazines characterized by their extensive use of pictorial images – is a well-established genre in Japan. Pictorials such as *Asahi Gurafu*, *Mainichi Gurafu* and *Sankei Gurafu* garnered wide readership in a manner similar to *Life* and *Time* in the United States. Similarities are not coincidental, as these magazines shared an intertwined history. In the early twentieth century, as the newly available technologies of printing and photography circulated across Asia, Europe and the United States, they spawned a new mode of literacy, that is, graphic magazines, in more than one nation or region.¹³ When radio and television were not widely available, periodicals featuring photographic images became a crucial means of (visual) communication, contributing to the creation of an ‘imagined community’ in Japan and elsewhere.¹⁴

An essential tool in nation building, *gurafushi* also played a crucial role in the expansion of empire. In Japan, as the imperialist drive gained force, English-language *gurafushi* – *Asahi Graph Overseas Edition* (by *The Asahi Shinbun*), *Nippon* (by Nihon Kōbō), *Front* (by Tōhōsha), and *Commerce Japan* (by Bōeki Kumiai Chūōkai) among them – were published with Western readers as their main target. Circulating attractive images of and narratives about Japan, in which women, children and domestic objects played a prominent role, these publications functioned as propaganda tools whose aim was to contain Western criticism regarding Japan’s foreign policies. These magazines

also provided a crucial training ground for individuals such as Natori Yōnosuke, Domon Ken and Kimura Ihei, the ‘founding fathers’ of Japanese photography whose involvement in propaganda activities suggests a problematic link between war- and art-making.¹⁵ Importantly, among those involved in the production of the magazines were Japanese socialists and communists, whose complicity in the wartime state is interpreted as a subversive means of survival by some¹⁶ and a troublesome instance of ‘conversion’ (*tenkō*) requiring critical analysis of ‘war responsibility’ (*sensō sekinin*) by others.¹⁷ The legacy of *gurafushi* is therefore complex and multifaceted, inseparable from Japan’s past ‘occupations’ in Asia, but also potentially subversive of them.

Emerging in post-Second World War Okinawa, *The Okinawa Graphic* followed the format of its mainland predecessors, while also articulating its own unique dynamics. Its founder was Sakiyama Kishō, an Okinawan businessman whose profile was as colourful as the photographic images circulated by the magazine.¹⁸ Originally from Nago, Okinawa, Sakiyama dabbled in various business ventures before, during and after the Second World War. Prior to the war, he sold Okinawan liquor, *awamori*, in Tokyo. He also managed a high-end hotel, Naha Hotel, in Okinawa. Migrating to *Nanyō* (the ‘South Seas’), where a large number of Okinawans resided as part of a Japanese imperial scheme focused on sugar production and fisheries,¹⁹ Sakiyama also worked for the Japanese colonial government headquartered in Palau. Once the war was over, he returned to Okinawa to start a German-style bakery and run a subsidiary of Shōchiku, the leading film producer-distributor in Japan. *The Okinawa Graphic* was yet another business endeavour undertaken by this multitalented businessman. As discussed below, the magazine reflected its founder’s varied and sometimes incongruous interests, as well as the double nature of mainland *gurafushi* wherein complicity and subversion constituted prominent features.

The Okinawa Graphic

In post-war Okinawa, the islanders’ responses and reactions to US rule were far from straightforward. On the one hand, the occupiers were figures of adoration, as they ended Japanese rule, under which Okinawans had endured political marginalization, economic exploitation and cultural stigmatization for decades. On the other hand, the occupiers were also targets of bitterness, resentment and discontent, as they relegated Okinawans to the position of second-class citizens just as the Japanese had previously done. Though the hierarchy between ruler and ruled was obvious to everyone, the US occupiers insisted on the rhetoric of ‘people-to-people’ relations to emphasize mutuality and obfuscate disparity, a discursive strategy Okinawans frequently – and knowingly – went along with. Emerging within this context, *The Okinawa Graphic* became an ambivalent space of meaning making, circulating heterogeneous and often contradictory sentiments and pronouncements.

The magazine’s pro-American stance was evident in its depictions of the occupiers. In the New Year’s issue in 1960, the magazine published an interview with High Commissioner General Donald Booth at his private residence in Okinawa. Sakiyama Kishō, who conducted the interview, described his choice of interview site as follows: ‘The object of the visit was to introduce ... the life of a typical American couple at home

and thereby help promote mutual understanding between Okinawans and Americans.' The general was more than willing to play a part in this Cold War performance of mutuality staged at his own residence. Having just returned home, he made a point of changing from his military uniform into a suit and tie to emphasize his civilian status for the duration.

The published interview cast Mr and Mrs Booth as 'friends' of the islanders by highlighting their fondness for local objects, customs and habits. The photos showcased the couple's 'modest but attractive' home, where their penchant for learning from and adopting a culture different from their own was fully on display. Mrs Booth was an avid student of Japanese *ikebana* (flower arrangement), whose artistic production decorated the interior space of their home. Mr Booth too turned out to be a lover of things Asian. Outside, in the corner of their spacious yard, was a Japanese-style garden the general himself tended. The couple's personal demeanour also demonstrated their affinity with local culture. Mrs Booth displayed a soft and gentle disposition, far more 'Oriental' (*Tōyō teki*) than other US military wives Sakiyama had known. Equally charming was the down-to-earth attitude of Mr Booth, who chatted about his hobbies (fishing and photography) as though he were a *shomin teki na ossan* (a middle-aged man next door). As the Booths lived 'a well-regulated daily life pivoting around a well-balanced democratic relationship', their residence stood as a citadel of the American creed. Obscuring the absolute power the general held over the islanders, the interview presented a domesticated and domesticating vision of US rule, with the High Commissioner embodying a Cold War ethos of inter-cultural affinity and affiliation.²⁰

Cross-cultural affinity and affiliation was a popular theme in the magazine. In September 1959, the magazine printed a series of photos on the Fourth of July celebrations in Okinawa and the United States. Reporting on a gala reception hosted by General and Mrs Booth, the magazine printed a picture in which the newly appointed Civil Administrator John Ondrick and his wife were exchanging handshakes with local business and political leaders. Other pictures – the US marine artillery commemorating the occasion with a gun salute and US Air Force jets flying in formation – emphasized an intimate link between military power and national prowess. Thanks to the courtesy of the US military, the magazine also gained access to the image of an oil painting of George Washington in 1766 and that of the military parade in Pennsylvania in 1959, both of which were included in the issue. The Fourth of July celebration was a festive occasion for Okinawans to learn about the occupiers' culture and history.

Beyond the lives of Okinawa-based US military officials, the discourse of militarism and militarization often enlisted women and children. For its very first issue in April 1958, the magazine printed an image of Okinawan Boy Scouts on the cover. Originating in the UK at the turn of the century, the Boy Scout movement proliferated in the United States, providing a site of masculine-military socialization of youth.²¹ Imported into occupied Okinawa, it was appropriated to showcase the Cold War tenet of cross-cultural affinity and affiliation. Inside the magazine, an article related how Okinawan and American youths in the islands jointly celebrated International Friendship Week, an annual commemoration of Robert Baden-Powell, the founder of the British Boy Scouts.²² Women too played a prominent role in narratives about the military. Stories involving American military wives were repeatedly published in the

magazine, introducing their varied activities at the school of the deaf and blind,²³ the International Women's Club²⁴ and the Okinawa Chapter of the Ikebana International.²⁵

Moreover, in the occupied islands, American-style housing embodied US power and authority. In November 1958, the magazine published a two-page spread entitled 'American Village in Futenma', presenting a 'picturesque picture of ultra-modern homes with its beautiful green lawns, shrubs, gardens and paved sidewalks' near the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.²⁶ According to the magazine, the residential complex, set up exclusively for the occupiers and their dependents, was the definition of 'comfortable living'. Emphasizing the occupiers' power in gendered terms, the narrative also pointed out that this ideal was achievable for the islanders: 'Before too long, Okinawans would come to experience the comfortable living enjoyed by Americans.'²⁷ Mobilized as 'proof' for this argument were Okinawan Americans in Hawaii. Their 'modern' and 'luxurious' homes were repeatedly featured in the magazine, highlighting the American domestic ideal and Okinawan immigrants' ability to achieve it. The message was not difficult to decipher. Just as the immigrant minority was able to obtain domestic luxury in US-controlled Hawaii, so could Okinawans as long as they remained under US rule.²⁸

In addition to housing, domestic commodities – food, clothing and household appliances – also conveyed US power. During the occupation, Okinawans became well acquainted with American brands such as Pepsi-Cola, Coca-Cola, Bridgestone and Singers. The magazine played no small part in this, as it was relentless in advertising their products in its pages. The promotion of American domestic products sometimes mobilized the power of science. This was seen in the case of wheat. As large quantities of American wheat poured into Okinawa as part of relief efforts, the magazine promoted its consumption as a way to tackle vitamin-B deficiency (humorously called *B-taran byō*), which was allegedly caused by the islanders' overreliance on rice. Wheat was a pathway towards 'rationalization of dietary habits', the magazine stated.²⁹ In addition to science, religion sometimes provided a lending hand in promoting wheat. In its 1960 report on the free school lunch programme, the magazine explained that the programme was 'a result of a donation of 1.2 million lbs. of wheat flour made by the U.S. government', whose transfer to Okinawa was mediated by 'the good offices of the International Catholic Welfare Service Council and the International Christian Welfare Organization'. Printed on the page were two student essays. One of them, written by a boy, expressed a deep sense of gratitude for the delicious gift of bread and milk (also a relief item) he received; another, written by a girl, articulated her hope that she would one day achieve an American physique whose excellence she reasoned was due to their daily consumption of milk and bread. Next to the essays was a picture of a tiny girl in a lunchtime classroom. A first or second grader, the girl held a large piece of bread in one hand and a cup of milk in another. Ready to bite into the bread, she could barely contain her excitement, as her small frame was bursting with anticipation of this pleasure³⁰ (Figure 8.2).

In *The Okinawa Graphic*, pro-American discourses proliferated then. Yet the magazine's accounts of the occupation were hardly uniform. Equally frequent were expressions of criticism of the United States. This was seen in the magazine's coverage of a military accident at the Miyamori Elementary School. On the morning of 30 June 1959, a US fighter jet crashed into the school building during the snack (milk)



Figure 8.2 Article promoting the newly started school lunch programme featuring the American ‘gift’ of milk and bread featured in the March 1960 issue of *The Okinawa Graphic*. Courtesy of Shinseisha Press.

break, killing sixteen people and injuring more than 100, the majority of whom were children.³¹ While military-related accidents were frequent, the 1959 incident stood out as it took away so many young and innocent lives.

In the magazine’s coverage of the disaster, photographic images took far more space than written text. In the August issue, the magazine printed a series of horrific images from the crash site. One photo showed an elementary school boy with severe burns all over his body lying naked on a hospital bed. Another showed a different victim, also a boy, whose tiny body was curled up on a stretcher as he was carried out of the building.³² In the October issue, the magazine reported on the joint memorial service attended by Okinawans and Americans. While the English title, ‘Joint Memorial Service’, was neutral enough, the Japanese title, ‘Kurikaesuna kono kanashimi o’ (Never to repeat this sorrow), was far more visceral. The article refrained from condemning the Americans, including High Commissioner Booth who attended the service, in any explicit terms. However, it still made its criticism legible by presenting an image of a victim’s mother breaking down in the middle of the service and another of the surviving classmates grieving at the altar. Preserved in these images was the indelible memory of US domination and its consequences.³³

The corporeal nature of war-making and empire-building was highlighted in other pieces as well. In June 1958, as part of the series entitled ‘Oraga Mura’ (my village), the magazine cast a spotlight on Miwa, a community located in the southernmost area

of the main Okinawa island, where the last phase of the Battle of Okinawa had been fought. A newly formed administrative district, Miwa, absorbed three pre-existing villages – Kiyari, Mabuni and Makabe. The reason for the merger was the drastic loss of population in these villages where so many had perished during the battle. As the magazine explained, the naming of Miwa – whose Chinese characters denoted ‘three’ and ‘peace’ – reflected the wishes of local residents who had seen too many lives disappear amidst chaos and bloodshed in the final days of the war.³⁴

In Okinawa, however, the dead would never completely disappear. In July 1962, the magazine turned the camera on what remained – and reappeared – in the aftermath of the Battle of Okinawa. The black-and-white photos showed human skulls and bones, some left in underground caves and others on open ground and exposed to the scorching sun. Still unaccounted for and unable to find their way home, these bones presumably belonged to some 20,000 individuals who had been caught in the crossfire between the United States and Japan. Utilizing the power of photography, the magazine invoked the memory of the slaughter literally in black-and-white terms. Against the backdrop of these stark images, the magazine also commented on another matter, that is, the different and unequal trajectories that the mainlanders and the islanders had each experienced since the end of the Second World War. Referring to the notion, popularized in mainland Japan – that the *senjo* (post-war period) had already run its course – it argued that the ‘post-war’ was far from over in Okinawa, where the foreign occupiers remained and the remnants of the war were barely below the surface.³⁵

Japanese empire and its legacies

In *The Okinawa Graphic*, the portrayal of Japan – Okinawa’s former colonizer whose influence hardly abated after the Second World War – was as complex as that of the United States. Similar to its approach to the United States, the magazine circulated numerous narratives whose tone and content were favourable to mainland Japan. Just as high commissioners were visible in the magazine’s accounts of the United States, the imperial household was a recurring topic in its depictions of Japan. The foremost symbol of and driving force behind pre-1945 Japanese expansionism, the imperial family (re)gained popularity in post-war Japan and Okinawa, with women and domesticity playing a pivotal role in facilitating this shift.

In the chronicle of high-profile events in post-war Japan, the 1959 marriage of Crown Prince Akihito to a commoner, Shōda Michiko, outshone others. The ‘wedding of the century’ triggered the ‘Mitsū (Michiko) Boom’, generating enormous excitement among Japanese and Okinawans.³⁶ Joining the festivities, the magazine reported on the young, handsome couple, following their tennis-court romance, the wedding gala, and the birth of their first son Naruhito (nicknamed ‘Naru-chan’), and Michiko’s motherhood.

The fervour surrounding the royal nuptials cannot be explained away as merely a case of popular fascination with celebrity affairs. In the early post-war context, the romance of Akihito and Michiko held political significance. The union of the imperial heir and a commoner sanitized the memory of the war that had been fought in the name of the

emperor. This in turn cleansed the image of Japan as an imperial aggressor, signalling its rebirth as a democratic nation. In occupied Okinawa, imperial institutions went through further reconfiguration. With the rise of the reversion movement, the symbols long associated with the emperor – the national flag (*Hinomaru*) and national anthem (*Kimigayo*) among them – were (re)deployed to express Okinawans' wish to end the US occupation and rejoin their *sokoku*, or homeland, Japan. The imperial portrait published in the magazine on the occasion of New Year in 1962, most likely a reprint of the official photo issued by the Imperial Household Agency for the public, captured a new discourse circulating in the mainland and its refraction occurring in the islands. Featuring the emperor, the empress, the crown prince and his brother, the photo placed young mother Michiko and her first-born Naruhito at the very centre of this domestic(ated) vision of Japan. The magazine provided a brief narrative, celebrating the imperial family as the embodiment of the beauty and peace of the *sokoku*, to which Okinawans wished to return. Equating mainland Japan with the newly democratized imperial family, the magazine imagined Okinawa's reversion in terms of its return to and reunion with the reformed family.³⁷

Okinawa's longing and belonging to the 'home(land)' was also frequently expressed via the islanders' attachment to Japanese domestic materials, whose popularity vied with those associated with the United States. Aware of Okinawa's potential as a consumer market, mainland Japanese manufacturers advertised their products via the print media, lectures and demonstrations, and shows and exhibits, cultivating brand loyalty years before the reversion. Advertisements for Japanese food items – Kikkoman soy sauce, Ajinomoto spice, Kirin beer, Nisshin flour, Meiji milk – proliferated. Equally popular were Japanese electronic appliances, that is, washing machines, electric fans, portable cameras and automobiles produced by Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Toyota, Sanyo and Minolta. The magazine not only published advertisements for Japanese products. It also shed light on how they were made. As seen in the reports on Kikkoman,³⁸ Citizen³⁹ and other industrial giants, the magazine repeatedly praised the rationality, precision and cleanliness characterizing production sites and processes in the mainland so as to highlight the industrial power and prowess of Japan.

Of the various domestic materials circulating in Okinawa, milk embodied layers of meaning. During the US occupation, American home economists promoted the consumption of milk as a way to improve the islanders' health, an essential ingredient in Okinawa's modernization (and 'civilization'). As powdered skim milk, a leading aid product, made its way into the islands from the United States, its unpleasant taste became forever associated with US rule among the islanders. Soon, however, Japanese dairy producers also made their way into Okinawa's consumer market. Among them was Morinaga Milk Industry, a leading national brand, whose infant formula, Morinaga dry milk, became extraordinarily popular. At one point, the product accounted for more than 90 per cent of the baby formula consumed in this occupied territory.⁴⁰

In Okinawa, Morinaga's marketing strategies targeted mothers and babies. The baby contest, an annual event where infants were weighed, measured and judged, provided a welcome venue for the company to publicize its baby formula. The 1962 contest, sponsored by Morinaga Milk Industry, the *Ryukyu Shinpō* newspaper and the Okinawa Women's Federation, attracted nearly 20,000 babies (and their mothers). The winner

in the baby boys division was sixteen-month-old Takara Masahiko, who struck a pose in front of the camera with the medal draped over his plump, naked body. His mother was quoted as saying that the key to the first prize was Morinaga dry milk. Printed on the opposite page was a large advertisement for the said product.⁴¹ At the following year's event, Morinaga's promotional drive was even more aggressive. Ōno Isamu, company president, flew to Okinawa to hand out the 'gold medals' to the 'best babies' in Okinawa, one to a baby boy and another to a baby girl⁴² (Figure 8.3).

The understanding of Japan as the source of knowledge and technologies of bodily wellness was also seen in the popularity of mainland cosmetics in Okinawa. Shiseido, a leading brand of national (and international) repute, became a chief player in the islands' beautyscape. Its marketing strategies included a 'beauty tour', whereby the company's representatives would fly to Okinawa to visit local high schools and provide instruction on beauty techniques and technologies. The magazine's April 1965 issue reported on one such tour. Several Shiseido representatives, dressed in business suits and high heels and sporting well-coiffed hair, dispensed a series of beauty tips and secrets to graduating seniors. The demonstrations focused on 'not only diet and beauty sleeps but also hair style, makeup, color harmony, fashion, manner and culture', to which students, all in school uniforms and some still wearing their hair in pigtails, paid scrupulous attention. Printed on the same page was the list of Shiseido cosmetics



Figure 8.3 Article from the April 1963 issue of *The Okinawa Graphic* featuring a baby contest providing an opportunity for Morinaga Milk Industry to publicize its nutritional knowledge and technology. Courtesy of Shinseisha Press.

necessary to achieve this ideal of Japanese femininity, including facial cleanser, nourishing cream and a new line of lipsticks called 'Cherry Pink'.⁴³

Political dynamics surrounding women's bodies, already noticeable in the story of Shiseido, was even more evident in the phenomenon called 'collective employment' (*shūdan shūshoku*). Repeating the pre-war pattern of labour migration, in which Okinawans had worked in the industrial centres of Osaka and Tokyo for low wages,⁴⁴ the post-war 'collective employment' arrangement sent young islanders to the same regions, once again defining Okinawa as a reservoir of cheap labour for Japanese capital. Its disciplinary nature was especially notable in cases involving Okinawan women.

In March 1964, the magazine shined a spotlight on collective employment involving women (recent graduates of junior high schools in Okinawa) at mid- to small-scale textile factories in the greater Osaka region. The first piece was a roundtable discussion (*zadankai*) entitled 'Okinawan Maidens are Hard at Work', which involved Japanese employers, a representative of the Okinawa Employment Agency and a reporter from the magazine, all of them men. The discussion highlighted the employers' perceptions of workers. They observed that Okinawan women lacked speed, creativity, inquisitiveness and education. However, once they grasped the nature of their assignment, they turned out to be a capable, obedient and diligent workforce. Indeed, their quality was so good that one company in Hyōgo Prefecture hired only women from the islands. As its president half-jokingly stated, with the majority of his factory workers coming from Okinawa, he planned to rename the company 'Okinawa Textile' in the near future. Intending to be favourable, the employers' commentary was frequently paternalistic as well as stereotyping.

The roundtable discussions also shed light on the workers' living and working conditions. The employers were eager to demonstrate how much they cared about their charges. The company dormitories provided excellent living conditions. The opportunities for self-cultivation (such as lessons in the tea ceremony and flower arrangement) and recreation (such as volleyball and swimming) were plentiful. Even night school was available for further education. Assuming the role of 'surrogate parents', the employers patrolled the areas surrounding the factories, making sure that employees did not wander into questionable places such as bars. They even informed the (real) parents back in Okinawa of their daughters' daily conduct, work performance and monthly earnings on a regular basis. Far from critical, the magazine praised the quality of these living and working conditions, and commended the 'humane relationships' that the Japanese employers cultivated with their Okinawan employees.⁴⁵ During the discussion, hardly any attention was paid to the fact that these practices rearticulated a pre-existing colonial dynamic in gendered terms, where Japan was cast as a male guardian and Okinawa a female child in need of protection.

Following the roundtable discussion, the magazine profiled a number of factories in the region. At Yamamoto Textile in Kaizuka, Osaka, a subsidiary of Dai Nippon Bōseki (commonly known as Nichibō; later Unitica),⁴⁶ thirteen women from the islands engaged in 'light-load' work. The company's products were distributed nationally and internationally, and were also purchased by the US military in Okinawa to make soldiers' summer uniforms. Relations between the supervisors and the workers were warm and personal, as evident in a series of published photos that showed smiling workers on

the job and in recreation.⁴⁷ A similarly positive account was given of another company, Kyōritsu Woolen Yarn Spinning in Yamato, Nara Prefecture. The factory floors were so 'clean' and 'up-to-date' that one wondered if it were indeed a factory. Equally or even more awe-inspiring were various welfare programmes available for the workers. The dormitory, equipped with television sets and other modern amenities, was more like a hotel, and the workers had access to educational and recreational opportunities. Showing the Okinawan women lined up in company uniforms on the factory floor and in the living quarters, the magazine once again visually highlighted the orderly lives they led under the benign gaze of their generous employers.⁴⁸

Repeatedly the magazine cast mainland Japan in a positive light. However, just as its depictions of the United States varied, its portrayal of the mainland was diverse and even contradictory at times. The Okinawan body, a site of subordination in the examples discussed above, also became a vehicle for (potential) contestation vis-à-vis the former colonizer, Japan. In November 1958, the magazine published a piece entitled 'Okinawa-ban Nitōhei monogatari' ('The GI Story' in the translated title provided by the magazine). In it, two Okinawan men – former Lance Corporal Tokuda Anshū and former Army Captain Ōshiro Shinichi – recounted their experiences as Japanese imperial soldiers. Despite the light tone at the outset where the two men poked fun at the military, their discussion soon turned to incidents of Japanese prejudice and discrimination that they and their fellow islanders had endured during the war. Back then, they explained, few Okinawan soldiers would ever be promoted to the higher ranks due to their linguistic handicap. The islanders' use of their local tongue, combined with their (seeming) inability to speak in standard Japanese, fed into the view that Okinawans were racially inferior. The perceived racial difference not only resulted in numerous obstacles but also triggered numerous cases of physical and verbal abuse. Okinawan soldiers were yelled at, slapped and kicked, and even beaten to a pulp. Clearly the emperor's soldiers were not treated equally. The understanding of Japanese superiority and Okinawan inferiority was prevalent even, or especially, in the military.

Yet, as Tokuda and Ōshiro recalled, it was Okinawans' bodily differences from mainland Japanese that saved their lives in the end. Accustomed to the subtropical environment and skilled in fishery, Okinawan soldiers were able to survive the final phase of the war when they were stranded in remote outposts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific where the sun was scorching and food barely available. The camaraderie among the islanders was another factor contributing to their survival. Their shared language and ethnic heritage became a source of physical and spiritual sustenance under those unfathomable circumstances. Despite harsh memories, the two former soldiers wistfully recalled the genuine bonds, trust and even 'military spirit' they shared with their comrades during the war.⁴⁹

In Tokuda's and Ōshiro's accounts, the memories of Japanese racism and imperialism, however painful, were relatively contained. On some occasions, however, Okinawans' anger erupted. In 1970, the magazine reported on the public protests against former Japanese Army Captain Akamatsu Yoshitsugu who visited Okinawa. A commander in the outer island of Tokashiki during the war, he was considered responsible for one of the *shūdan jiketsu*, that is, compulsory mass suicides enforced

under the orders of Japanese commanders in the final days of the Battle of Okinawa.⁵⁰ In Tokashiki alone, approximately 400 people lost their lives as a result. The purpose of Akamatsu's visit was to attend the twenty-fifth memorial service held for the war dead on the island. However, Akamatsu had to abandon his plan half way through. As soon as he landed at Naha Airport, Okinawan protesters and reporters surrounded him, creating a tense scene captured in one of the photos. Later, attempting to board a ship to reach Tokashiki, he was blocked by a group of young men from the island. Holding up a banner that read 'Never Forgive Captain Akamatsu', shown in another photo, the men shouted 'Apologize!' 'Go home!' and 'Why did you come here?' At a subsequent press conference, Akamatsu insisted that he had never issued an order to force Tokashikians to take their own lives. Highlighting the contentious nature of Okinawa-Japan relations, the magazine provided a pictorial account in which Okinawan bodies visibly confronted and blocked the former imperial commander.⁵¹

Nonetheless, Okinawa's relationship with Japan was complex and convoluted. The ambivalence and ambiguity characterizing the relationship between the two were made evident on the occasion of Okinawa's reversion on 15 May 1972. In the May, June and July issues of that year, the magazine published a series of photographic retrospectives which recounted Okinawa's 'Nagakatta sokoku e no michi' (long journey back home). With the end of US rule, Okinawa would finally 'recover its humanity under the Peace Constitution' of Japan and join the latter in taking a step towards a new era. Amidst the euphoria, the magazine reported on a small event, the symbolic significance of which was hard to overlook. Two Okinawan youths – Matsukawa Kazuhide and Odo Tōru – were admitted to the National Self-Defense Academy of Japan, a training ground for the revamped Japanese military, newly named the JSDF. Having passed the highly competitive exam, the two were attending the entrance ceremony at the academy in Kanagawa Prefecture. The joyous mood was enhanced by the cherry blossoms swirling across the academy grounds, a symbol of Japan par excellence. Matsukawa and Odo were given words of encouragement by the academy's principal, Inoki Masamichi, and dignitaries of the JSDF, and were joined by three other Okinawans who had entered the academy a year before. With a picture of five uniformed students from Okinawa raising their hands in a crisp salute, the magazine celebrated the end of US rule and the islands' return to Japan in explicitly militarized terms.

Paradise, Hawaiian style

The complex nature of *The Okinawa Graphic*, evident in its depictions of the United States and Japan, also characterized its representations of Hawaii, another island community under US rule. Hawaii was first and foremost the 'Paradise in the Pacific', an island utopia full of tropical flora and fauna, exotic hula girls and magnificent landscapes. Equally important, however, was the fact that Hawaii was a place where Okinawan immigrants had achieved exceptional success. Immigrating to the Hawaiian islands more than half a century ago, the first-generation immigrants – often referred to as 'pioneers' – had overcome numerous challenges, established a thriving ethnic

community and realized the American dream. Buoyed by their ethnic success, some members of the Okinawan American community were ready to engage in competition and even criticism vis-à-vis Japan. Despite being critical of Japan and its imperial legacies, however, they rarely challenged US colonialism in Hawaii, where the Indigenous population continued to struggle against numerous odds in their own islands.

In the magazine, narratives of Okinawan immigration to Hawaii proliferated, with things feminine and domestic once again playing a leading role. As discussed earlier, Okinawan American homes were conspicuously featured in the magazine, providing a vision of 'comfortable living' and highlighting the democratic nature of the United States. Hawaii was indeed the nearest 'America' from which domestic ideals as well as objects travelled to Okinawa. Immediately after the Battle of Okinawa, Okinawan American leaders in Hawaii, including Asato Sadao mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and Wakukawa Seiei discussed below, had organized relief efforts, shipping large quantities of second-hand clothing and other household materials to war-torn Okinawa with the help of US military transport.

The discourse of family was also at the centre of success narratives of Okinawan immigrants in Hawaii. In 1962, the magazine published a photographic portrait of the Shingaki clan, whose patriarch, Shingaki Zenshin, was originally from Itoman in Okinawa. The two-page spread featured Mr and Mrs Shingaki at the centre, surrounded by their children – seven daughters and seven sons – and grandchildren. Having obtained 'an extremely respected and secure livelihood', the Shingakis' familial-domestic scene was visual proof of the comfort and prosperity that Okinawan immigrants enjoyed in the United States.⁵² In March 1965, the magazine published another story on Okinawan American success. The United Okinawans Federation of Hawaii organized an annual celebration of the elders, where more than 800 members of the federation turned out to honour the 'pioneers' of their community. At the centre of the celebration was 101-year-old Fukuhara Goze, an immigrant woman with snow-white hair and deep wrinkles who exuded a sense of contentment as she smiled at the camera.⁵³ Constituting part of the sixty-fifth anniversary of Okinawan immigration to Hawaii, this and other events held that year circulated many congratulatory narratives on the 'Pioneers', 'Aloha Spirit' and 'Lovely Nature' in 'Paradise'.⁵⁴

The discourses of family, immigration and ethnic success sometimes intersected with those of the military. In March 1960, the magazine published a story on Second Lieutenant Higaonna Ryōkichi, a member of the US Army Engineering Corps. Born in Gushikawa, Okinawa, and educated in Okinawa and Hawaii, this young officer was newly assigned to Okinawa. This not only gave him a chance to contribute his engineering skills to the occupation; he was also able to reunite with his grandparents and former teachers and classmates, all of whom welcomed him back with enthusiasm. As the young Okinawan American officer stepped back into his former stomping ground, the magazine described the moment as full of nostalgia. As the occupation was re-imagined as an occasion for a kinsman's return home, US rule would cease to be a case of foreign domination violently imposed at gunpoint and instead become a moment of family reunion.⁵⁵ The discourse of 'returning home', which played a powerful role in erasing Japanese imperial violence, also obfuscated US military violence in the occupied islands.

On some occasions, the magazine provided a space in which Okinawan immigrants in Hawaii would express criticism regarding Japan. In July 1962, the magazine printed two statements sent in by residents in Hawaii under the title 'Opposition to Okinawa's Reversion to Japan.' It was a provocative gesture. As the magazine explained, in Okinawa, where the reversion movement was gaining momentum, anyone expressing even a slight disagreement with Okinawa's return to Japan would be ostracized. The magazine nevertheless decided to publish the statements, giving Uehara Tokuo and Kakazu Hashitsugu, both seventy-three years old and originally from Okinawa, a chance to voice their opinions, accompanied by their formal portraits to signal the seriousness of their arguments.

Stating his fondness for Japanese people at the outset, Uehara proceeded to condemn pre-1945 Japanese rule in Okinawa. Since the annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom in the late nineteenth century, Japan had treated Okinawa as a 'step child', leaving the islanders in an impoverished state for decades. Given this history, Uehara argued, the post-war US occupation was a blessing. US investment, driven by Okinawa's significance as a garrison, led to the development of infrastructure and the rising standard of living in the island. Clearly, the occupation 'liberated' Okinawa and brought 'happiness' to its people. To add credence to his argument, he pointed to benefits in other places, notably Hawaii and the Philippines. Given the beneficent and beneficial nature of the occupation, US rule in Okinawa should continue.

Kakazu, another contributor, could not agree more. As he observed, not everyone supported reversion in Okinawa. In his recent visit to the occupied islands, he found that only a small minority, roughly 10 per cent of the population including educators, administrators and politicians, supported the reversion. The majority of the islanders, most of whom were farmers living in rural areas, preferred US rule. Those in favour of the US administration, among whom Kakazu counted himself, could not forget the violent nature of Japanese control. As far as he was concerned, the difference between US and Japanese rule was that between liberation and slavery. Given the thriving nature of Hawaii, another island community under US control, the occupation would surely bring happiness to Okinawans, Kakazu concluded.⁵⁶

As indicated by Uehara's and Kakazu's arguments, support for the US occupation of Okinawa critically hinged on the idealization of Hawaii, and also the Philippines, as showcases of US democracy.⁵⁷ Needless to say, their views, while critical of Japanese imperialism, let the US empire entirely off the hook. Yet (even) in Hawaii, not everyone agreed with this perspective. In 1965, amidst the celebration of the sixty-fifth anniversary of Okinawan immigration, the magazine published an essay by Wakukawa Seiei, 'Hawai boke no naka ni omou' (My Musing amidst Hawaii Stupor), with a portrait which conveyed his serious academic persona. A Marxist intellectual, Wakukawa, originally from remote Nakijiin in Okinawa, had been involved in progressive social movements in Okinawa, mainland Japan and Hawaii since before the war.⁵⁸ His essay provided a counter-discourse to the ongoing glorification of Hawaii.

According to Wakukawa, residents in Hawaii were afflicted by a disease called *Hawai boke* (Hawaii stupor). Too eager to believe in the superficial image of the islands, they were blind to the fact that the 'Paradise in the Pacific' was in fact full of cynicism, fictitiousness and contradictions. The disease was rampant in *Nikkeijin*

shakai (Japanese American society), in which he included Okinawan immigrants. While congratulating their achievements in Hawaii, *Nikkei*, or Japanese Americans, would constantly look back to Japan with longing and envy. The principles of obedience, conformity and harmony prevailed, marginalizing dissenting voices and stifling any criticism of the 'American way of life'. Conformity to the status quo was so thorough that McCarthyism – the anti-communist witch-hunt raging in the US mainland – exerted even more influence in Hawaii. Unlike the pioneering generation who had tilled the soil, the current generation was spending too much time, money and energy playing golf and having cocktail parties with descendants of plantation owners and managers. Completely Americanized, the *Nikkei* community presented a mirror image of their white counterparts; worse still, the community's pro-American views would even exceed those of the latter. Hawaii's *Nikkei* had become too well trained, contained and domesticated (*kainara sareta sugata o sukkari totonoeta*).

In addition to providing a stinging critique of Japanese and Okinawan immigrants in Hawaii, Wakukawa also commented on the state of its Indigenous population. Despite his critical stance, his account of the islands' Indigenous people was surprisingly stereotypical. Good-natured and yet primitive, Hawaiians would not think about the future and instead focus on the here and now. They surf in the ocean, inhale the sweet smell of *leis* (flower garlands) and indulge in the passion of hula. Such was the sorry state of 'Aloha'. Wakukawa recirculated the familiar trope of primitive and inferior natives as he portrayed Indigenous Hawaiians as a group of people who were failing to catch the wave of modern progress.⁵⁹ Notwithstanding his otherwise critical perspectives, his account failed to question the history of US imperialism and its structural violence that had for decades shaped the lives of the original inhabitants of the islands.

Conclusion

During the US occupation of Okinawa, *The Okinawa Graphic* played a complex and multifaceted role in discursive production in the occupied islands. Circulating pro-American and pro-Japanese discourses and images, the magazine also became a fluid site of negotiations where Okinawans and Okinawan Americans would articulate varied and often contradictory sentiments and pronouncements vis-à-vis the imperial powers. As Okinawans and Okinawan Americans engaged in a variety of discursive manoeuvres – some predictable and others unpredictable – they defied any easy categorization as 'victims' or 'resisters', requiring us instead to pay analytical attention to nuances and contradictions proliferating on the ground.⁶⁰ More than anything else, this chapter's analysis highlights the significance of women, children and immigrants as historical actors in occupation-era politics. Often sidelined in mainstream accounts, their stories and images proliferate in the pages of this magazine, indicating the importance of rethinking and recounting this and other histories from marginalized and often forgotten vantage points.

Notes

- 1 'Yūai to sekinin no seiji o – Watoson shin benmukan chakunin,' *Okinawa Gurafu* (hereafter *OG*), September 1964, 3–5. All issues of *Okinawa Gurafu* cited in this chapter, unless otherwise noted, are deposited at the Hamilton Library East Asia Collection, University of Hawai'i, Honolulu, Hawaii. The English title on the magazine cover alternated between *Okinawa Graphic* and *Okinawa Graph* during the occupation. In this chapter, I refer to the magazine as *The Okinawa Graphic*.
- 2 The New Otani Kaimana Beach Hotel Official Website, 'Kaimana Story-History': <http://www.kaimana.com/kaimana-story-history/> (accessed 13 September 2018). The Imperial Banquet Room replicated the design of the historic Nijō Castle in Kyoto.
- 3 'Yūai to sekinin', 6–7.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 9.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 6 For the significance of Cold War rhetoric of affinity and affiliation, see Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
- 7 Dean Saranillio, 'Colliding Histories: Hawai'i Statehood at the Intersection of Asians "Ineligible to Citizenship" and Hawaiians "Unfit for Self-Government"', *Journal of Asian American Studies* 13, no. 3 (2010): 283–309.
- 8 The predominant language in the magazine was Japanese, with supplementary summary translations provided in English for select pieces. Some of the articles had no English translation, and all of the advertisements were in Japanese.
- 9 http://www.s-syuppan.com/memorial_magazine/ (accessed 17 September 2018).
- 10 Chihiro Komine, 'U.S. Occupation of Okinawa by Photography: Visual Analysis of *Shurei no Hikari*', *The Okinawan Journal of American Studies* 5 (2008): 25–30.
- 11 For critical discussions of recent JSDF expansion in Okinawa, see Makoto Konishi, *Okinawa tōsho sensō: Jiseitai no kaikyō fūsa sakusen* (Tokyo: Shakai Hihyōsha, 2016).
- 12 Mire Koikari, *Cold War Encounters in US-occupied Okinawa: Women, Militarized Domesticity, and Transnationalism in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
- 13 The transnational nature of the genre is well reflected in the career of Natori Yōnosuke, the foundational figure of *gurafushi*. Learning photographic techniques in Germany and starting his career in Europe, Natori returned to Japan in 1932 and established a publishing company, Nihon Kōbō, in 1933. Travelling internationally through the 1930s and 1940s, he had his photographic work published in *Life* magazine in the United States. For critical assessment of Natori and other Japanese photographers in pre-war and wartime Japan, as well as the transnational nature of the genre, see Mari Shirayama, '*Hōdō shashin*' to sensō, 1930–1960 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2015) and Yoshiyuki Morioka, *Books on Japan 1931–1972: Nihon no taigai senden gurafushi* (Tokyo: BNN Inc, 2012).
- 14 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
- 15 Morioka, *Books on Japan*; Shirayama, '*Hōdō shashin*'.
- 16 Seiichi Tagawa, *Yakeato no gurafizumu: 'Front' kara 'Shūkan San Nyūsu' e* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005).
- 17 Shirayama, '*Hōdō shashin*'.

- 18 The magazine's cover design predominantly featured Okinawan women. As these 'cover girls' sometimes wore traditional garments and hairstyles and other times sported modern fashion, they embodied the islands' heritage and tradition, or its modernity and progress – two themes that were salient in the magazine.
- 19 For *Nanyō* under Japanese control and Okinawan migrants' complex location in it, see Akiko Mori's oral history interviews with Okinawan returnees from the South Seas, *Fukusū no senritsu o kiku: Okinawa, Nanyō Shotō ni ikita hitobito no koe to sei* (Kyoto: Mori Akiko, 2016); Akiko Mori, *Hajimari no koukei: Nihon tōchika Nanyō Shotō ni kurashita Okinawa imin no katari kara* (Kyoto: Mori Akiko, 2017).
- 20 'Mistā Būsu no sugao', *OG*, 1 June 1960, no page numbers.
- 21 Michael Rosenthal, *The Character Factory: Baden-Powell and the Origins of the Boy Scout Movement* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); Mischa Honeck, *Our Frontier Is the World: The Boy Scouts in the Age of American Ascendancy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).
- 22 'Te o kunda kodomotachi, kokusai yūkō no hi', *OG*, April 1958, no page numbers.
- 23 'Kōtō Benmukan ga gāden pāti', *OG*, July 1961, 23.
- 24 'Kokusai Fujin Kurabu no shinnen enka', *OG*, February 1964, 7.
- 25 'Hekiganryū no ochakai', *OG*, May 1959, no page numbers.
- 26 A site of continuing tensions and contentions between Okinawa, the United States and Japan, 'Futenma' is synonymous with US military domination and Japanese complicity in it in present-day Okinawa.
- 27 'Futenma no Amerika mura', *OG*, November 1958, no page numbers.
- 28 Koikari, *Cold War Encounters*, 137–9.
- 29 'Oidase B-taranbyō: beishoku kara funshoku e', *OG*, February 1959, no page numbers.
- 30 'Ichi nichi nijūmanko, gakkō kyūshoku hajimaru', *OG*, March 1960, no page numbers.
- 31 The number of casualties later rose to eighteen.
- 32 'Ishikawa ni gunki tsuiraku', *OG*, August 1959, no page numbers.
- 33 'Kurikaesuna kono kanashimi o–namida mo arata ni Ishikawa gōdō ireisai', *OG*, October 1959, no page numbers.
- 34 'Oraga Mura, Miwa-son', *OG*, June 1958, no page numbers.
- 35 'Okinawa wa mada sengo da!: hinome miruka ikotsu niman tai', *OG*, July 1961, no page numbers. The statement, '*Mohaya sengo dewa nai*' (the post-war phase is over), was first popularized in mainland Japan following the publication of the 1956 Economic White Paper. It argued that post-war recovery and reconstruction had been completed and had given way to an era of 'high economic growth'. Signalling the start of a new beginning in the mainland, where the US occupation had ended in 1952, the notion was hardly applicable to Okinawa, where foreign rule continued. Japan's successful revitalization had much to do with the fact that Okinawa bore the disproportionate burden of Cold War (re)militarization.
- 36 For the 'Michiko Boom' in mainland Japan, see Jan Bardsley, *Women and Democracy in Cold War Japan* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), especially Chapter 5, 'Fashioning the People's Princess: Shōda Michiko and the Royal Wedding of 1959', 106–37. For the same phenomenon in occupied Okinawa, see Koikari, *Cold War Encounters*, 191–3.
- 37 'Yasakaeru Kōshitsu goikka', *OG*, January 1962, 1.
- 38 'Shōyu toshi Noda kengaku ki', *OG*, August 1958, no page numbers.
- 39 'Anata no ude ni Shichizun o', *OG*, June 1961, no page numbers.

- 40 'Enzeru no Morinaga o tazunete', *OG*, September 1960, no page numbers.
- 41 'Akachan Okinawa ichi', *OG*, July 1962.
- 42 'Yoshihiko, Mayumi-chan Okinawa ichi: Morinaga Miruku kara kin medaru', *OG*, April 1963, 26–7.
- 43 'Utsukushiku narimashō: gakuen de kōhyō no Shiseido seiyō kōza', *OG*, April 1965: 28–9.
- 44 Wendy Matsumura, *The Limits of Okinawa: Japanese Capitalism, Living Labor, and Theorization of Community* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).
- 45 'Okinawa museme wa hataraki mono', *OG*, April 1964, 4–5.
- 46 At the time, Nichibō Kaizuka was a site of another kind of female bodily discipline. The company's volleyball team, whose members were composed of its Japanese female employees, became the national team of Japan, winning the 1962 World Championship and the Gold Medal at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. Nicknamed *Tōyō no majo* (The Witches of the Orient) for their invincibility, members of the team endured excessive physical training at the hands of their coach, Daimatsu Hirobumi, a former imperial soldier whose wartime experiences of violence and humiliation were said to inform his coaching style. The disciplinary nature of the training was overlooked, however, amidst the national(ist) celebration triggered by the team's victories on the international stage, a landmark event that signalled the end of the *sengo* (post-war) and the beginning of a new era for Japan. See Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 155–62, and Helen Macnaughtan, 'The Oriental Witches: Women, Volleyball and the 1964 Tokyo Olympics', *Sport in History* 34, no. 1 (2014): 134–56.
- 47 'Orimono kabushiki gaisha', *OG*, April 1964, 10–11.
- 48 'Kyōritsu Keito Bōseki Kabushiki Gaisha', *OG*, March 1964, 8–9.
- 49 'Okinawa-ban nitōhei monogatari', *OG*, November 1958, no page numbers.
- 50 For the controversy over memories of the compulsory suicides in wartime Okinawa, see Norma Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), especially Part I: Okinawa, 33–106.
- 51 'Akamatsu Yoshitsugu moto taii raitō o megutte', *OG*, June 1970, 14–15. The issue's digital version was made temporarily available by the magazine's copyright holder, Shinseisha, in August 2018.
- 52 'Hawai dayori', *OG*, July 1961, no page numbers.
- 53 'Hawai no keirōkai nigiwau', *OG*, March 1965, 22–3.
- 54 'Aroha Hawaii', *OG*, August 1965, 14–15.
- 55 'Furusato ni nasake ari: 11-nen buri de kaetta wanpaku kozō', *OG*, March 1960, no page numbers.
- 56 'Hawai kara Nihon fukki hantai', *OG*, July 1962, 20–1.
- 57 For gender analysis of the US colonization of the Philippines, see Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
- 58 For Wakukawa's biographical information, including his extensive interview by Hokama Shuzen, another notable Okinawan intellectual, see Wakukawa Seiei ikō tsuitō bunshū kankō iinkai, ed., *Amerika to Nihon no kakehashi Wakukawa Seiei: Hawaii ni ikita ishoku no Uchinānchu* (Tokyo: Niraisha, 2000).
- 59 'Hawai boke no naka ni omou', *OG*, August 1965, 25. The issue's digital version was made temporarily available by the magazine's copyright holder, Shinseisha, in August 2018.

- 60 For the complex nature of Okinawans' agency, see also Tze May Loo, *Heritage Politics: Shuri Castle and Okinawa's Incorporation into Modern Japan, 1879–2000* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014) and Masamichi Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

Part Four

Visualizing and Remembering
Landscapes of Occupation

An uncanny architecture of cultural heritage: Representations of the Japanese occupation in Harbin, China

Jean Hillier and Shulan Fu

Introduction

Occupation has a lasting impact, leaving forms of cultural legacy. Transforming legacy into heritage involves active selection and a valuation of tangible and intangible occupation elements.¹ Selected elements may be represented by previously occupied territories in memorial museums dedicated to ‘historic events commemorating mass suffering of some kind.’² Also referred to as ‘trauma sites’³ or ‘atrocities heritage’,⁴ museums and landscapes exist as material testimony to the violence which occurred at a certain place. In this chapter, we explore the cultural expression of the legacies of occupation in the city of Harbin, China. In a period of just over 100 years, Harbin was controlled by Russian, Japanese, Soviet and Chinese authorities, experiencing a rapid succession of different regimes. As Wei Song, Robert St Clair and Song Wang comment: ‘The modern history of China is written all over Harbin.’⁵

Harbin is the capital city of Heilongjiang Province, and is currently undergoing an attempted economic transition from manufacturing to tourism. Accordingly, the municipality is aiming to transform the city’s buildings that were constructed and utilized by Russian and Japanese occupiers in the first half of the twentieth century into tourist attractions. Many of these sites have been afforded heritage status as the municipality claims these structures ‘built by foreign imperial forces as their own.’⁶ The buildings have become heritage monuments, preservers of order and state-sanctioned memory in what has been described as China’s fourth most beautiful ‘colonial city.’⁷

Harbin’s monuments, however, commemorate the Russian colonial period, whilst either eliding, or openly condemning, the legacy of Manchukuo (1932–45) – the ‘puppet state’ established by the Japanese Kwantung Army in what is now China’s northeast – embodied in those same buildings. Traces of occupation afford ambiguity to the cityscape of Harbin as historical memories are appropriated in order to shape antipathic occupation identities and narratives of conflict. Yet Harbin was also the site of a utopian vision for Manchukuo. The Japanese established Manchukuo as an

‘independent, civilian nation-state’,⁸ based on a new type of collaborative, alliance-based imperialism grounded in the reciprocal ‘three faces’ of military occupation, economic development and agrarian in-migration.⁹ Harbin exemplified the occupation regime’s desire for railway and urban construction programmes to encapsulate state-of-the-art architectural, infrastructural and urban planning technology.¹⁰ Today, Japanese occupation-era banks and shops represent an uncanny architecture which vacillates between past and present, but which remains opaque to the gazes of those who pass by them.

For several decades, the Japanese occupation of Manchukuo was regarded in China as a period of shame and humiliation.¹¹ Recently, emphasis has shifted towards representing the area that was once governed as Manchukuo as central to the revolutionary communist movement in China. Victims of the Japanese occupation are now regarded as martyrs, with the construction of two memorial museums displaying evidence of Japanese atrocities: the Museum of Evidence of War Crimes by Japanese Army Unit 731 (Qin-Hua Rijun de 731 budui yizhi) and the Northeast Martyrs’ Memorial Museum (NEMM) (Dongbei lieshi jinianguan).

However, while heritage may promote the representation of a particular version of history by state-sanctioned institutions, it may also be a resource that can challenge and redefine values and identities. The angle of vision might be displaced, recognizing the epistemological uncertainty about how past events may be understood and how some events, people, structures and artefacts are rendered silent by current heritage practices. In this chapter, we suggest that place could be regarded as a relational assemblage – a milieu – rather than as an isolated container. If the Japanese occupation of China’s northeast can be regarded not as a localized ‘thing’, taking place, for example, at Unit 731, but as an unfolding process, arising from the broader geographical phenomena and temporal patterns,¹² then codifications of violence as the exclusive preserve of particular cultures (the Japanese) on particular people (Han Chinese) become less tenable. A displaced angle might suggest that the streets of Harbin and the texts in the city’s museums are less ‘tools of memory’, telling or reminding visitors of *a* story, but as ‘tools of productive thinking’ through which *multiple* stories unfold.¹³

In what follows, we critically explore the occupation heritage represented in Harbin’s museums and attempt to displace the angle of vision, such that other elements emerge. We draw on the concepts of refrain and milieu, as utilized by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,¹⁴ to suggest rethinking Harbin and its heritage structures as milieus of relational assemblages which perform multiple stories. In this manner, Harbin’s heritage might commemorate not only martyrs, but also the ‘memory of the nameless’: the uncounted numbers who perished at the time, or were abandoned following the Japanese withdrawal. A refrain and milieu-based approach can afford a deeper, more nuanced, understanding of circumstances and signifiers.

We offer brief introductions to the spheres of occupation heritage and ‘red tourism’ in China. We then explore the concepts of refrain and milieu as a frame for our analysis. After contextualizing Chinese, Russian and Japanese actions in relation to China’s northeast from 1858 to 1949,¹⁵ we present stories from Harbin, gleaned through personal visits, observations, note-taking and conversations, together with secondary

data sourced from academic and tourist-oriented texts and materialities,¹⁶ including publications, websites and blogs.

Our analysis explores the refrains of official attempts to control Harbin's heritage of occupation and reveals the uncanny – the double: the stranger inside, the familiar made strange – of its architectural inheritance. Freud's discussion of the uncanny emphasizes the double as multiple projections of oneself/the city, including, perhaps, unacceptable elements.¹⁷ The double represents those aspects that are ignored in order to preserve a particular self/city image. We suggest that a relational milieu approach to cultural heritage in Harbin has the potential to go beyond current practices which aim to (re)awaken memories and emotions of victimhood at the hands of the Japanese occupiers. A milieu approach can look beyond museum walls and heritage plaques, both to the broader Japanese town plans, infrastructures and buildings of the city and to the lives of others – Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Koreans, Russians and Japanese – who also became victims of the occupation and its aftermath, both in China and in Japan. We suggest, in conclusion, that a seemingly settled expression of the legacy of the Japanese occupation of Harbin has the potential to become a cultural heritage expression of understanding, rather than of antipathy.

Occupation heritage and red tourism

Up until the mid-1980s, it could be argued that the remnants of the Japanese occupation of Manchukuo were a legacy of the event – neglected, if not forgotten. The traumatic and negative nature of the memories which many sites embodied meant that physical artefacts tended to be either destroyed as acts of erasure, or neglected in an attempt at forgetting and 'moving on'. Over time, and particularly since the late 1980s in what has been termed 'the new remembering',¹⁸ sites have been mobilized for didactic purposes and choices have been made regarding what and whom are remembered, and what and whom remain silent.

A legacy only becomes heritage through intervention,¹⁹ such as the inauguration of museums in 1985 concerned with the Nanjing Massacre and the Museum of Evidence of War Crimes by Japanese Army Unit 731 in Pingfang, Harbin. These museums represented repositories of war exhibited as patriotic education bases for school children, workers' groups and a few tourists. In the last three to four years, however, the Chinese government has intervened, spending billions of yuan to conserve buildings associated with the Japanese occupation and construct stylish new museums designed by leading Chinese architects in line with its promotion of 'red tourism' (i.e. tourism to sites associated with the communist movement).

Gilly Carr demonstrates that family, local or popular memory may differ from official memory, which tends to construct identities of actors as 'us' or 'them', 'heroic resisters' or 'aggressors', 'victims' or 'perpetrators'.²⁰ Such 'official' identities are insufficiently nuanced and, in China's northeast, tend to ignore a range of actors (such as Russians, Koreans, Jews and rural Japanese settlers) affected by the occupation in different ways, in addition to those engaged voluntarily or otherwise in non-resistance

or ‘collaboration’, provision of ‘comfort’ services, and of post-‘Liberation’ looting and acts of revenge.

The promotion of red tourism in China officially commenced in 2004. By 2006 there were over 200 sites nationally listed and supported financially as revolutionary cultural heritage. This initiative was regarded as a means of both patriotic education and promotion of economic development via tourism outside of the large cities along China’s east coast.²¹ Northeast China was designated to commemorate ‘Anti-Japanese Heroes and Endless Snowfields.’²² Sites associated with the Japanese occupation of China commemorate ‘national humiliation’ and are places where visitors can mourn the victims of past ‘atrocities at the hands of the imperialists.’²³ The Unit 731 Museum and the NEMM, together with the Harbin Revolutionary Martyrs Memorial Museum and Cemetery (Ha’erbin geming lieshi jinianguan), are all listed as red tourism sites. However, the Harbin streetscape – the centre of the city’s tourism strategy – is not listed as such.

Refrains and milieus

In order to consider questions of how the Japanese occupation of Manchukuo is memorialized, codified and represented, we draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of refrain and milieu. Deleuze and Guattari define a refrain as

a prism, a crystal of space-time. It acts upon that which surrounds it, sound or light, extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, projections, or transformations. The refrain also has a catalytic function: not only to increase the speed of the exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it, but also to assure indirect interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural affinity, and thereby to form organized masses.²⁴

A refrain is ‘any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes.’²⁵ Refrains may be optical, such as heritage plaques or signage. We suggest that assemblages (such as a city or a discourse) achieve territorial consistency through refrains. However, as we explain below, refrains also possess capacities for deterritorialization and decoding assemblages, stimulating the creation of new understandings and new assemblages.

To comprehend what a refrain might do, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the concept of milieu. A milieu is a nexus of knowledge formation and power tactics. It includes economic, social, political and environmental elements and capacities to affect and be affected.²⁶ It is all of ‘a spatial environment, a medium of action and a force of movement in-between, (re)productive of a specific ordering of space, time and relations.’²⁷ A milieu approach recognizes the complex relationalities between forces and elements. Every milieu is coded, defined by periodic repetition of refrains. In the territorial assemblage that is Harbin, we can discern various coded milieus, including a heritage milieu, a milieu of Japanese Manchukuo and a milieu of Russian cosmopolitanism. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, milieus pass into one another:

‘They are essentially communicating.’²⁸ Russian buildings pass into Japanese-occupied buildings into heritage attractions.

Milieus themselves are not territories. Rather, they can become components of a territory when territorialized via refrains. As birds sing to mark their territory, heritage signage and landmarks organize the ‘chaos’ of city structures directionally into a territorial assemblage.²⁹ Refrains may also organize an assemblage dimensionally (‘intra-assemblage’) through motifs and counterpoints (such as Russian cosmopolitanism, Japanese barbarity or Chinese victims). In addition, Deleuze and Guattari explain that milieus are ‘vibratory’, susceptible to change and to becoming components of new assemblages (‘inter-assemblage’).³⁰ Relational milieus give form to evolutionary environments where relations alter the course of flows: ‘Points form assemblages, multiple journey systems associate into possibly disconnected or broken topologies; in turn, such assemblages ... change, divide and multiply through disparate and complex encounters and gestures.’³¹

A refrain is constructed by detachment of a materiality (such as a building, a streetscape, a glass bottle or a suit of overalls) from ‘the seeming self-evidence of its form, function and meaning, allowing it to congeal a singular and immediate assemblage of sensory affects.’³² This affords what Guattari terms ‘a feeling of being,’³³ catalysed by a mix of mythical, historical and social references. We thus perceive Harbin as territorial assemblage in relational terms as ‘a potential of difference, as an open field performing and constructing its own sense through its relations to wider processes, material and conceptual.’³⁴

Manchukuo and Harbin

Bordering present-day North Korea and the Russian Federation, China’s northeast has long been a contested area. At the turn of the twentieth century, it was largely a Russian concession. Hence the cultural heritage of Harbin is now replete with ‘baroque’ Russian architecture, much of it built in an eclectic-classical style. The area has a long multiethnic history, having been home to Manchus, Mongols, Han Chinese, Russians (including many Russian Jews) and Koreans. Harbin, founded in 1898 as an administrative centre for the Russian Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), was located at the nexus of an expanding trade between Asia, Europe and North America. The city originally had a predominantly Russian population, although migrants from over fifty different countries soon came to seek work in the commercial and financial sectors of the city, and sixteen different national consulates were located in the city’s Nangang district.

Russian and Japanese expansionism led to warfare in this area in 1904–5, with the Japanese subsequently taking over northeast China. However, the ‘contested borderland’ of northeast China³⁵ between Japan, Russia and China was a porous, liminal space in which the Fengtian warlord Zhang Zuolin attempted to play Japan, Russia and China off against each other in a ‘double game.’³⁶ In return for Japanese military support, Zhang granted extensive agricultural and industrial concessions in what Japan regarded as a strategic buffer zone against Russian expansionism. Following

Zhang's assassination, his son, Zhang Xueliang, declared allegiance to the unification of the Republic of China under the Chinese Nationalist Party (or 'KMT'). Angered by these 'anti-Japanese' actions, the Japanese army staged the Mukden/Manchurian Incident in 1931 as an excuse for invading the area.³⁷ Manchukuo was subsequently established as a Japanese-'guided' yet 'independent' republic in 1932, and Puyi was made emperor of Manchukuo in 1934.³⁸ The Manchukuo National Railway Company became a massive cartel. Over 300,000 Japanese 'pioneer' farmers were brought to Manchukuo to work the land in what was effectively a 'modern enclave' economy.³⁹

Manchukuo was to serve as a model for a new world order of inclusive ethnic harmony. Its state-founding proclamation stipulated following the 'Kingly Way' (*Ôdô*),⁴⁰ bringing peace, democracy and the 'harmony of the five races' (*gozoku kyôwa*) – Manchus, Japanese, Han Chinese, Mongols and Koreans – in a 'working relationship under a new structure of authority'.⁴¹ The Japanese regarded Manchukuo as 'a blank canvas' on which to display the best and most modern industry, farming, planning and architecture.⁴² Its capital Shinkyô (now Changchun), as well as Harbin and other cities, represented concentrated examples of such ideas. Designed and constructed by the best Japanese urban planners of the time, they became showcases for the most advanced technologies and ideas, many of which had not yet been realized in Japan itself.⁴³

Lacking natural resources to ground vital industrial and agricultural progress in Japan, the Japanese sought to geographically expand their empire from 1937 onwards, describing the move as an 'emancipation' rather than an invasion or 'occupation'.⁴⁴ However, resistance from Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese government led to full-scale war between China and Japan. In Manchukuo, the Kwantung army assumed control of civilian organizations and put in place a regime of control and surveillance. From 1937 onwards, the demands of the war dominated all socio-economic development in Manchukuo. Many Chinese civilians and soldiers living in the region were conscripted by the Japanese to work in factories and coal mines, as well as on construction projects,⁴⁵ while others were taken to Japanese military centres, including the biological and chemical weapons development programme centred on Unit 731 in Harbin.

The year 1941 marked a turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese war, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor bringing the United States into the war, and the Japanese empire expanding into Southeast Asia and the Pacific, leading to the Japanese occupation of many former European or US colonies in the region – events that are explored in other chapters in this volume. In 1945, the Soviets declared war on Japan and attacked Manchukuo, overthrowing Puyi and 'liberating' the area, so that it came under effective Soviet occupation. These 'liberated' areas were transferred in 1946 by the departing Soviets to the People's Liberation Army (Jiefangjun), led by Mao Zedong and the Chinese communists. Retribution against remaining Japanese who were stranded in China was swift and furious.⁴⁶ Whereas emperor Puyi and Manchukuo's military leaders had been captured by the Russians in 1945, and the Japanese scientists engaged in the weapons programmes were able to leave either for Japan or for the United States under the aegis of the Americans, some 270,000 Japanese 'pioneer' farmers were abandoned, with an estimated 80,000 such farmers dying. Indeed, approximately 250,000 of the 2.15 million Japanese who had settled in

Manchuria perished in 1945.⁴⁷ Alleged Chinese ‘collaborators’ also faced retribution, for lack of resistance to the Japanese invasion, for commercial acquiescence, or for being forced or conscripted into manual labour by the Japanese.⁴⁸ Unfortunately, some local residents took the opportunity to settle old scores, whilst others assumed all those with wealth were guilty of ‘collaboration’. Nationally, over 30,000 people were legally prosecuted, whilst non-lawful retribution was widespread.

Harbin cultural heritage: Museums

Under cultural legislation in China, local municipalities are responsible for declaring and protecting ‘immovable cultural relics’. In Harbin, the Urban and Rural Planning Bureau, in collaboration with the Harbin Party History Network, has declared over fifty landmark structures since 1996. Zhongyang dajie (Central Street) has been designated part of an Architectural Arts Museum, in which are preserved thirty-five buildings, seventeen of which are on this street itself. Importantly, however, the criterion for landmark status is aesthetic value rather than historical significance. The State Administration of Cultural Heritage lists only immovable cultural relics deemed of national value, such as the Jihong Railway Bridge (known as the Shoko Bashi Bridge during the Japanese occupation) and the Unit 731 Museum. Many of the protected ‘first class preserved buildings’ reflect the Chinese-baroque or ‘eclectic’ architectural styles of the Russian colonial period, and are located in ‘Old Harbin’⁴⁹ in and around the districts of Daoli and Nangang, where ‘historic blocks’ have been designated for renovation and commercialization for tourism.⁵⁰

Our concentration on Japanese occupation heritage now leads us to explore two specialized museums before turning to the cityscape of Harbin more generally. The Unit 731 Museum and the NEMM attempt to superimpose time via reconstructions of past events through dioramas (a method often used in China) and artefacts, including photographs. Post-war testimonies by Japanese workers; materials from American translations of Japanese records, Russian tribunals and American reports; often-blurred black-and-white photos from the 1930s and early 1940s; and tools and implements all are used to present ‘evidence’, constructing facts about the past. These facts are used as reference for claims of historical truth and accuracy. The museums, and their locations on sites of atrocities, catalyse affective dimensions: to shock, to move, and to generate emotions and feelings of shame, pain and anger.

The NEMM (which was opened in October 1948 following expulsion of the KMT from Harbin) is a three-storey classical Greek-style building that was first constructed by the Russians as a public library in 1931, but was taken over by the Japanese in 1932 and used temporarily as administrative offices and then as the military police (Kenpeitai) headquarters. It is a relatively simple museum featuring static displays of artefacts behind glass. Reconstructions of the torture room, police cells, as well as statues and photos of martyrs, with information mainly in Chinese, depict Japanese activities in the city (including named comfort women) and commemorate anti-Japanese resistance, especially the female fighter and martyr Zhao Yiman. The museum includes some passport-style photographs and information about a few Chinese

named victims. The museum includes sections on collaboration, and recognizes the contributions and lives of Koreans and Russians who were ‘sacrificed’ by the Japanese occupiers (Figure 9.1).

The Unit 731 Museum at Pingfang, in comparison, is far larger. Established in 1985 as a national patriotic education base in one of the few buildings remaining from the Japanese medical experimentation and germ warfare unit, the museum has been upgraded and extended at an estimated cost of US\$62.5 million and was opened in its present form in August 2015 on the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War (Figure 9.2).

It is estimated that anywhere from 3,000 to 250,000 people were killed by what was officially called the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army (Unit 731) as part of experiments under the command of General Ishii Shirō, a medical specialist in plagues and epidemics. Built between 1934 and 1939, the complex covered 6 km², comprising over 150 structures, including a farm, a brothel and a swimming pool. Unit 731 also had its own airfield and railway line. Local people were told that the complex was a timber mill, with victims referred to by the Japanese as dehumanized ‘logs’ (*maruta*). ‘Participants’ were provided by the Kenpeitai and included criminals, anti-Japanese activists (i.e. non-collaborators), those engaged in alleged ‘suspicious activities’ and those who ‘share[d] the same thoughts as criminals.’⁵¹ Infants and pregnant women were particularly used.⁵² It is estimated that around 70 per cent of those who died were Chinese, together with Soviets, Koreans and Allied prisoners of war.



Figure 9.1 The Northeast Martyrs’ Memorial Museum, Harbin. Photograph by Jean Hillier.



Figure 9.2 The Museum of Evidence of War Crimes by Japanese Army Unit 731, Pingfang. Photograph by Shulan Fu.

Most common practices included infection with various diseases, followed by vivisection without anaesthetic, and freezing and thawing to promote gangrene and rot. Ceramic bombs dropped twenty-nine different germ agents, especially cholera, anthrax, plague and glanders, on over 100 'sorties' on local villagers, with tens of thousands 'collected' for dissection. Local women used for 'comfort' services were infected with syphilis and were sometimes forced to become pregnant in order to study foetal disease transmission. People were also used as targets for weapons-testing, including grenades and flame-throwers. After experimentation, their remains were incinerated. Of those who entered Unit 731, there are no accounts of any survivors.⁵³

The departing Japanese exterminated the remaining *maruta* with methane gas and attempted to destroy the buildings and documentary evidence. Much of the material on display at the Unit 731 Museum is comprised of copies of the Japanese experiment records given to the US authorities at the end of the war and translated into English with the assistance of Unit 731 scientists. Also included are Soviet war tribunal archives in English, as well as testimonies gathered from some Japanese former workers at the unit (three on video) and the surviving relatives of victims. All these take on the essence of 'sacred texts'.⁵⁴ Artefacts (such as surgical instruments, hooks, gas masks, test tubes, clothing and glass bottles) form the remainder of the exhibits, with a few dioramas also included. Explanations and audio guides are available in English as well as in Chinese. The message on the information signage is clear:

The human experiments had completely violated the terms of international conventions and the spirit of humanitarianism, morality and medical guidelines. It was a dark, evil, brutal and violent chapter in the history of human civilization;

Both germ contamination test and pathological anatomy were done on most human objects as conventional experiment methods; while vivisection, the most inhuman experiment method, was done on some of the 'test objects';

From 1940 to 1945, at least 3,000 people were perished for being infected with deadly bacteria through the Laboratory of The Devil [*sic*].

The new museum is located on the site of some of the Japanese workers' dormitories, adjacent to the old museum. Designed by the prominent architect He Jingtang, the 6,300 m² building symbolically resembles a black box recorder to preserve and reveal information, slanting into the barren grey earth like a scalpel. The main galleries are below ground, with the main hall literally a place of reflection, utilizing the squared skylights of the roof, the highly polished black marble floor and reflecting pools of glass and water to aesthetic effect. The void of the hall draws its power from the absence of those who perished as a result of the work of Unit 731 – the memory of the nameless.

The final exhibition room is dedicated to telling the story of the 'secret deal' between the United States and Japan,⁵⁵ in which Unit 731 staff were exempted from war criminal charges in exchange for the data from the experiments that were conducted. Copies of 'top secret' messages referring to the deal are presented:

Telegram 52423 from US Far East Command (General McArthur) to US Department of Defense, May 6th 1947. Part Three:

'7. Documentary immunity from "war crimes" given to higher echelon personnel involved will result in exploiting the twenty years experience of the director, former General ISHII, who can assure complete cooperation of his former subordinates, indicate the connection of the Japanese ... staff and provide the tactical and strategic information.'

The remaining dormitories for the 4,500 staff of Unit 731 continue in use as apartments and local shops for residents of Pingfang. A discreetly located museum shop and café offers T-shirts, cups, paperweights and keyrings with the new museum symbol and logo.⁵⁶ A free catalogue is available, while books, DVDs and postcards in Chinese and English are also on sale.

All the elements are powerful in their individual ways. Neither museum includes in its exhibits any of the thousands of photographic and filmic materials which the Japanese special recording unit took of the experiments as they occurred (only photographs of some of the Japanese perpetrators are shown), although many horrific photographs of the experiments can be found on the internet. We were unable to discover whether this is a deliberate strategy of the museum curators to avoid a potential 'pornography of violence' where 'voyeuristic impulses subvert the larger project of witnessing'⁵⁷ or whether it is related to the fact that Chinese attitudes to death and its depiction are different to those held in Western societies, with a cultural reluctance to present

dead bodies or skeletons, especially when these are of unidentified persons. Since Kirk Denton reports that, on his visit in 2004, the NEMM basement 'was filled with gruesome photos of piles of dead children, severed heads, and bodies disfigured by gas attacks', we suspect it is the former.⁵⁸ Does this practice, however, merely re-enact the 'bystander avoidance' that renders such atrocities possible?⁵⁹

Chinese museums and visitor expectations represent a mediation of traditional symbolisms of death, burial and remembrance which will catalyse different affect for those from other cultural traditions and possibly for younger Chinese visitors, more exposed to Western culture and high-tech animation.⁶⁰ Affect does not reside in an artefact, such as a report reproduction, enlarged and blurred, or a shiny metal can. It is mobilized in the museum through the rhetorical discourse refrains of the information panels through which the refrains of textual materialities, such as reports, photographs, bottles and cylinders, are read.

Western tourists – used to far more graphic museum displays and horror movies – appear relatively inured to the museum. Comments on TripAdvisor from 2017 suggest that the milieu has not been territorialized as intended. Interactions were seemingly not catalysed between elements without natural affinity, such as Unit 731 and international tourists. Comments include 'not that scary' (a Canadian visitor); 'those who love museums and war museums especially, will enjoy this' (a Singaporean visitor); 'a fun way of sharing the history' (an Austrian visitor); 'one of the best places in Harbin' (an American visitor); and 'well-stocked gift shop' (a British visitor). Chinese visitor comments expressed more shock, disgust and anger against the Japanese, with some demanding an apology.

Harbin cultural heritage: Streetscapes

The city of Harbin flourished economically under the Russians. Many large, sumptuous mansions were constructed for wealthy financiers, and commercial and industrial entrepreneurs, in Nangang district. This area, south of the main railway station, boasted broad boulevards lined by consulates. The Russian-Jewish population congregated in Daoli and Butou around what is now Zhongyang dajie. Hospitals, places of worship, banks, theatres and libraries were constructed in a Chinese-baroque and/or eclectic-classical style. These were frequently designed by Y. P. Ridanov of the Harbin Development Construction Bureau from 1903 to 1938, under both Russian and Japanese occupations. It is these buildings which form the core of Harbin's recent drive for tourist income, particularly from Russia. On structures designated as 'immovable cultural relics', plaques in Chinese and English give information (though not always the same in both languages), while many include a barcode and website for the Harbin Party History Network, which offers more information about each respective building.

With regard to the 'protected' structures, there is no doubt that the Japanese took over many of the Russian buildings: 'Their predilection for the picturesque preserved the city centre.'⁶¹ For example, the public library (built in 1931) became Japanese administrative offices, and later the headquarters of the military police; a theatre became the Japan-Manchuria Cultural Association (1933); the Board of Directors' Hall of the China Eastern Railway Management Bureau (built in 1903) became the Yamato Hotel in 1936;

and the renowned Hotel Moderne (built in 1914) became the Madie'er or Modan Hotel in 1933.⁶² Other structures remained the property of their original owners, including the National Bank of Jews (built in 1923), Jewish entrepreneurs' mansions and private Jewish hospitals and restaurants. The Japanese also constructed several, now listed, buildings, from municipal offices, assembly halls, public utilities (e.g. the telegraph office), hotels (especially the Hotel New Horizon, 1936, now the International Hotel) and banks, to villas, department stores and restaurants (Figure 9.3).

The only official public cemetery for the Japanese war dead, Fangzheng, is not on any Chinese tour itinerary of Harbin (or on TripAdvisor). Whilst the Martyrs' Cemetery of the War of Resistance against Japan appears on the list of red tourism sites, the China-Japanese Friendship Garden (Zhong-Ri youhao yuanlin) emphatically does not. Unsignposted at the end of a dirt road, the Friendship Garden contains the graves of some 5,000 Japanese who died, having been abandoned after the Japanese surrender. Most were women and children. Some collectively committed suicide, some fled into forests and perished of cold and starvation, and some were killed by Chinese bandits or Soviet troops.⁶³ Many of those who survived were adopted or married into Chinese families. They were subsequently denied repatriation until Japanese immigration reform in 1989.⁶⁴



Figure 9.3 Heritage-listed Japanese buildings in Harbin (Left: Harbin Assembly Hall; Top right: Harbin Telephone Exchange and Telegraph Office; Bottom right: Manchurian Central Bank Building). Photographs by Jean Hillier and Shulan Fu.

In 1963 – a time of thawing Sino-Japanese relations – Premier Zhou Enlai responded positively to locals’ requests to excavate and cremate the bones that they had found in their fields, and to entomb the ashes. In the 1980s, the ashes were removed to the present site in order to allow the spirits of the dead, as well as those from other Manchukuo locations, to be honoured.⁶⁵ In 1995, a monument was constructed by a repatriated orphan in honour of the Chinese parents who adopted Japanese children (Figure 9.4).



Figure 9.4 The China-Japanese Friendship Garden, Fangzheng, 2008. Wikimedia Commons.

In July 2011, the local municipality constructed two memorial walls in the garden. The first, 5 metres high by 10 metres long, was dedicated to ‘the perished Japanese colonial settlers’ and included the names of 229 known deceased with an inscription proclaiming ‘love and humanity’.⁶⁶ The second wall was erected to ‘departed Chinese foster parents’. Unfortunately, Chinese nationalists objected to these memorials and attempted to destroy the larger wall. Two days later, the municipality demolished the wall in order to avoid further attacks, closed the garden and removed directional signage.⁶⁷ The all-but-unknown cemetery at Fangzheng represents further uncanny heritage of the Japanese occupation of Manchukuo in its ‘embodied absence’ and in the ‘disembodied presence’ of the spirits of Japanese women and children.⁶⁸

The heritage of occupation in Harbin

Harbin demonstrates several legacies of the Japanese occupation. Not all of these legacies, however, are officially recognized as ‘heritage’. Whilst the material traces of the Japanese past may be visible in Harbin, their legibility is uncanny – potentially latent, exemplified by the many unlisted, non-plaques buildings in the city, the glossed information on signage and the padlocked cemetery at Fangzheng.

‘Official’ heritage demonstrates the territorialization of particular infra- and intra-assemblages: of museums and museum exhibits, building plaques and the buildings themselves. These ‘popular’ refrains bring into play motifs of Chinese people as victims and martyrs of Japanese evil, brutality and violence. The two museums are effectively concerned with bearing witness through testimony. Displays of artefacts, dioramas and information panels structure the stories of ‘evil’ (both Harbin museums), ‘ogre caves’ (Unit 731) and the ‘Laboratory of The Devil’ (Unit 731), in which ‘invaders’ and ‘war criminals’ (Unit 731) committed atrocities against hundreds of thousands of ‘martyrs’ and ‘heroes’ who ‘watered the flower of peace with their flesh and blood’ (NEMM) in what was China’s ‘national humiliation’. The milieu of death is territorialized in the Unit 731 Museum into a coded ‘truth’ of the Japanese occupation through refrains of report pages, photographs, ceramic bombs, instruments and discourse. As Carol Duncan remarks: ‘To control a museum means precisely to control the representation of a community and its highest values and truths.’⁶⁹ We urge visitors to Harbin to think carefully about what and whose narratives are depicted and whose are not – to become aware of what is lost or forgotten.

We suggest, however, that the beauty and grace of the museum buildings might aestheticize and detract from the intended symbolism and message.⁷⁰ The angled entrance pavilion of the Unit 731 Museum, glass-wrapped and fitted out in black marble, could belong to an art gallery, theatre or concert hall. Is the Unit 731 Museum a manifestation of the aestheticization of politics? Is it an ‘architectural propaganda machine’ for the Chinese government?⁷¹ The austere beauty of the new museum building is in extreme contrast with the stark functionality of the remaining Japanese buildings at Unit 731 and with the atrocities that took place on the site.

The rhetoric of the information panels and visitor guides at the Unit 731 Museum is vitriolic and replete with blame. Unlike at the NEMM, there is little or no consideration

of the non-Chinese who perished in Harbin and at Unit 731, or of the violence meted out by Russians and Chinese after the Japanese surrender on those who had been left behind, or those local citizens who were accused of collaborating with the Japanese. Neither is there mention of the substantial economic, infrastructural, cultural and architectural achievements under the Japanese administration from which northeast China benefitted (and has continued to do so).⁷² This is a constructed milieu of Japanese occupation: a product of a specific ordering and coding of space, time and relations.

There is little, if any, space in such territory for the China-Japanese Friendship Garden at Fangzheng, or the shops, restaurants, clinics and infrastructure of Japanese Manchukuo which have become 'just another feature of the everyday landscape'.⁷³ Resentment appears strong, at least in official representations: 'This debt of blood must be paid.'⁷⁴ An official Japanese apology would be a start. But what Tim Winter terms 'heritage diplomacy' seems unlikely in a climate in which China celebrates its victory over Japan, who, in turn, officially neither denies nor acknowledges activities at sites such as Unit 731.⁷⁵

Perhaps the deliberate absences on the heritage signage of Chinese-baroque, art nouveau and modernist buildings which local residents and tourists find so appealing might become more explicitly legible about their Japanese heritage. In this way, the past could meet the present in a new territorialization of the multiple 'selves' of Harbin, besides that of sanitized early-twentieth-century Russian cosmopolitanism with new refrains as signifiers of mental space.⁷⁶ A new inter-assemblage would not gloss the atrocities which took place in and around Harbin. But as Simon Springer asks: 'In what ways can we raise the question of violence in relation to victims, perpetrators, and even entire cultures, without reducing our accounts to caricature, where violence itself becomes the defining, quintessential feature of subjectivity?'⁷⁷ Springer suggests that we might question the relationship between place and violence by regarding place as a relational assemblage rather than as an isolated container. If violence could be regarded not as a localized 'thing' taking place at Unit 731 or in the basement of the headquarters, but as 'an unfolding *process*, arising from the broader geographical phenomena and temporal patterns', then Springer argues that the accounts of violence as the *exclusive* preserve of particular cultures (the Japanese) on particular people (Han Chinese) are untenable.⁷⁸

A new inter-assemblage might also facilitate discussion of the ambiguous grey zones of 'collaboration'⁷⁹ – of survival rather than sympathy; of political and commercial elite fear and confusion rather than self-centred rationality; of pretended rather than real complicity; even of compassion for abandoned orphans and women after the Japanese surrender – such that the refrain of the notorious term *hanjian* might vibrate.⁸⁰ By displacing the angle of vision and vibrating the milieu, the uncanny may become visible and legible, manifest as absent presence or present absence. A displaced angle might suggest the materialities of the Harbin museums and streetscapes, not so much as refrains and milieus, narrating a single story, but moving between and catalysing interactions between *multiple* stories. For instance, the archival texts of the Japanese experiments at Unit 731 could become no longer inert material through which to reconstitute what was done, but material as an assemblage of relations: of Japanese

scientists, military officers, unwilling conscripts and the Kenpeitai; of pregnant women, comfort women, manufacturers of a wide range of equipment and instruments; of buildings and infrastructure; of chemicals and bacteria; of non-human animals such as fleas, rats, squirrels and horses; and of General Douglas McArthur and American politicians, scientists and military personnel. Thinking of Manchukuo and Harbin as relational assemblages might commemorate the ‘memory of the nameless’ – not only of Chinese, but also of Russians, Koreans and prisoners of war who were killed at Unit 731, or Japanese farmers and workers, or Chinese suspected of ‘collaboration’, who died at the hands of locals or Russian ‘liberators’ in Harbin and other areas after the end of the war. With regard to the latter, Gilly Carr reminds us that ‘drawing attention to dark histories is never a comfortable thing’,⁸¹ but a deeper, more nuanced, understanding of circumstances and signifiers could be useful, not least to surviving relatives of the deceased: a new milieu – a new ‘new remembering’.⁸²

A new ‘new remembering’ of the Japanese occupation of Manchukuo might remind us of the capacity for human violence against others which lurks behind the veneer of civilization. Rather than reacting with horror, grief and anger at the photographs of vivisection at Unit 731 (which can be found on the internet or in the Unit 731 Museum bookshop, or when listening to the testimony of the Japanese conscript who was denied food and drink until he agreed to perform vivisection), might we ask ourselves if we could behave in a similar manner? Under what circumstances? Could we (or one of our relatives) perhaps have been the ordinary soldier in the photograph, sitting quietly before being ordered to disperse lethal bacteria into waterways? Would we regard dining at the Yamato Hotel, watching a movie at the Modan Hotel, shopping in Zhongyang dajie or being treated at the Jewish hospital as acts of ‘collaboration’? Visitors to Harbin might experience critical and ethical deep learning of what it means to be human, and how easy it is to succumb to the unknowable evil that exists in the dark recesses of human nature, and for humanity to collapse.⁸³

Conclusion

Urban landscapes symbolize the shifting contours of socio-political logics and perspectives on history. Designated cultural heritage sites territorialize stories through the use of refrains in order to elicit affect and emotion in visitors, whose capacity to be affected is influenced by their own life experiences and any prior exposure to the events and stories represented. As Rumi Sakamoto writes,⁸⁴ the sites ‘mobilize’ subjects into their ‘patriotic history and identity via emotional authenticity’.⁸⁵

The city of Harbin illustrates the lifecycle of event, legacy and heritage suggested by Carr.⁸⁶ City centre buildings and their stories have been doubled, with selected elements erased, neglected or transformed. Other sites were turned into places of patriotic education in the 1980s and reconfigured as complexes for the ‘exhibition of the evil’ (NEMM) during the Japanese occupation of Manchukuo.

What we suggest, however, is to look beyond the museum walls to wider processes and materialities, both to the broader Japanese town plans, infrastructures and buildings of Harbin and northeast China, to electric power production, an inter-city

rail network, innovative farming systems, and to the lives of others – Chinese, Koreans, Russians and Japanese – who were affected by the occupation and its aftermath, both in China and in Japan. Forgotten or repressed legacies of familiar objects, buildings and places may irrupt into present consciousness and understandings of an interconnected, global world.

We counsel awareness of the dangers of territorializing the past in pursuit of certain objectives, and advocate examination of relations between forces and elements in heritage milieus relating to the Japanese occupation. Perhaps judgement may be deferred as refrains and milieus vibrate, becoming components of new assemblages, affording new understandings and feelings of being.

The city of Harbin might become not a place of answers and blame, but a place of relationally unsettling the uncanny, of multiple narratives and of questions. The museums, for example, might stimulate us as visitors to bear witness to and take responsibility not only for the past, but also for the future – achieving the stated aim of the Unit 731 Museum to ‘provide its visitors [with] a deep reflection on war and human nature’;⁸⁷ challenging the production and use of biological weapons; and challenging ourselves and latent sympathies with, or capacities for, violent conduct. In this way, the heritage occupation in Harbin may be released from the clutches of historical categorizations and silences, and be mobilized in the cause of other perceptions oriented to human conscience and the future.

Appendix: Northeast China, 1858–1949: Key events.⁸⁸

Date	Event
1858	Tsarist Russia takes concessions from Qing Dynasty in Manchuria for the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER).
1894–5	First Sino-Japanese War (resulting in Japanese victory).
1898	Harbin founded as a CER railway hub.
1899–1901	Boxer Rebellion. The ‘Eight-Nation Alliance’ (United States, Austro-Hungarian empire, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia) defeat Chinese forces; Russia gains control of northeast China.
1904–5	Russo-Japanese War: Japan takes over former Russian concessions in China.
1905	Revolution in Russia.
1906	Under the Japanese, the southern branch of the CER becomes the ‘South Manchuria Railway Company’ (Mantetsu).
1907	The Qing government establishes the ‘Dong san sheng’ (three eastern provinces), that is, Fengtian, Jilin and Heilongjiang.
1910	Japan annexes Korea.
1911	The Qing government is overthrown in China.
1912	The Qing Emperor Puyi abdicates.
1915	Japan acquires economic rights and land leases in Manchuria, as well as control of coal and iron mines, trading and shipping companies, electricity and railways.

1917	The Bolshevik Revolution occurs in Russia.
1920	Zhang Zuolin becomes governor general of the three eastern provinces, but tolerates the existence of Japan's Kwantung Army in Manchuria in return for Japanese support.
1922	The Soviet Union is established.
1922–6	Mass in-migration to Manchuria from north China occurs, and the area experiences an economic boom due to agricultural and industrial expansion with Japanese investment.
1928	Zhang Zuolin is assassinated by the Kwantung Army. His son, Zhang Xueliang, takes over and declares allegiance to the ROC. Zhang Xueliang denies land to the Japanese, and reclaims leased territories and Mantetsu.
1931	The 'Mukden Incident' occurs.
1932	Japan establishes the 'Republic of Manchukuo'. By 1932, Japan owns 64 per cent of all industrial capital in Manchukuo. In 1932, the League of Nations investigates Japanese actions in Manchukuo, and the Lytton Committee reports that China should retain the area.
1933	Manchukuo National Railway company takes over all rail lines in the area.
1934–6	The 'Manchukuo empire', ruled by Puyi (the former Qing emperor), is founded; the Kwantung Army takes control of civilian organizations; there is massive Japanese investment in industrial production.
1937	Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurs, leading to the Japanese invasion of China.
1940	The 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere' (including Japan, Manchukuo, occupied China, etc.) is declared.
1941	Japan attacks Pearl Harbor. The United States enters the war against Japan.
1945	The Soviets enter the war against the Japanese in August 1945. The Soviet 'liberation'/'invasion' of Manchukuo begins with negotiations with the ROC for the independence of Mongolia and the transfer of military and industrial resources left by the Japanese to the Soviets. In May 1946, the Soviets leave northeast China and hand control of Manchuria to the People's Liberation Army.
1945–9	Chinese Civil War and Communist Revolution.
1949	Establishment of the People's Republic of China under the Chinese Communist Party.

Notes

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- 3 Maria Tumarkin, *Traumascapes: The Power and Fate of Places Transformed by Tragedy* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2005).
- 4 J. E. Tunbridge and G. J. Ashworth, *Dissonant Heritage: Management of the Past as a Resource* (Chichester: Wiley, 1996); William Logan and Keir Reeves, ed., *Places of Pain and Shame: Dealing with 'Difficult' Heritage* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).

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National narratives of 'occupation' in historical museums of the post-Soviet landscape

Katarzyna Jarosz

Introduction

This chapter focuses on narratives regarding the Soviet past, as represented in historical museums in former Soviet bloc countries. My aim is to investigate how and why a past that was similar across the Soviet bloc can be interpreted in many different ways. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and in the ideological vacuum left behind after its fall, the question of national identity became one of great importance in all the countries of the former Soviet bloc, conventionally referred to in the literature on the subject as 'post-Soviet space'.¹ Olivier Roy in *The New Central Asia*, for example, argues that 'one significant change is that national identities indeed have taken root; the fabrication of nations has worked'.²

A common element in the history of countries as diverse as Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine is a prolonged period of Soviet rule – a period referred to, sometimes controversially, as 'occupation' and/or 'colonization'. The Russian Federation refuses to use these terms, maintaining a narrative of victory in the 'Great Patriotic War' (i.e. the Second World War), followed by a post-war era in which industrialization and other successes took place. In Russia, Ewa Thompson writes that 'the politics of interpretation is still informed by the imperial vision. Russian history is yet to be recast in postcolonial terms'.³ Post-Soviet Russia still refuses to recognize its 'colonial' past. When, in 2005, Vladimir Putin declared that the collapse of the Soviet Union had been the greatest geopolitical disaster of the century, most Russians agreed with him.⁴

Just as importantly, within those states that were 'occupied' or 'colonized' by the Soviet Union, the narrative is far from homogeneous. The deconstruction and revision of the Soviet past across the former Soviet bloc, which started in official narratives after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, differs depending on the country. Indeed, it is sometimes not even the same within specific countries. On the one hand, the Soviet past is interpreted as being synonymous with oppression and mass deportations; on the other, it can evoke images of stability, peace and a generous welfare state. Alexander Cooley suggests that, in Central Asia, even the invocation of the term 'colonial' still makes many people uncomfortable, and the common refrain, not just amongst the

ruling elite, is that the ‘Russians brought us electricity’.⁵ In contrast, the official position in Georgia is that the country was a victim of Soviet occupation; since 2010, 25 February, the day of the ‘Soviet invasion’, has been marked as an official holiday called ‘Soviet Occupation Day’. In the Baltic states, ‘occupation’ is also a common word in official narratives. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states based their entire legal discourse on the claim that the military occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union, under the auspices of the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, as well as their subsequent incorporation into the Soviet Union, contravened international law.⁶ This claim means that these countries re-established their independence on the basis of having been *de jure* annexed and occupied by the Soviet Union. The terms ‘colonialism’ and ‘colonial’ were already being used in Western historiography in the 1960s with reference to the Baltic states. Robert Conquest, for example, argued that ‘The three newest colonies in the world today are the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.’⁷ Despite all this, such terms are still considered controversial in political discourse in the Baltic states today.⁸ ‘The Baltic Republics represented an “outpost of Western civilization”’⁹ and with their grand history, economic development and high rates of literacy, under the Soviet regime they felt culturally superior to Russians. ‘Preferring to think of themselves as superior to other colonized peoples [...] the Balts find being lumped together with the rest of colonized humanity unflattering, if not humiliating, and want to be with the “civilized” part of the world.’¹⁰

This chapter does not seek to resolve historiographical disputes over whether certain countries were indeed ‘occupied’ and/or ‘colonized’ by the Soviet Union. Rather, I am guided by the words of Gayatri Spivak: ‘When an alien nation-state establishes itself as ruler, impressing its own laws and systems of education and rearranging the mode of production for its own economic benefit, “colonizer” and “colonized” can be used.’¹¹ Similarly, the notion of ‘post-Soviet space’ itself, in the context of the terms ‘occupation’ and ‘colonization’, is not always clear. The question is whether ‘post-Soviet space’ exists, as such, or whether this phrase is simply an empty label. Firstly, it has to be borne in mind that ‘post-Soviet space’ is neither homogeneous nor monolithic. It is composed of varied sub-regions and numerous countries, each differing in many elements, but all sharing a common history, and a common set of legacies and influences.

In order to demonstrate the full spectrum of these often contradictory narratives, I have chosen to examine a number of museums dedicated to the memory of Soviet rule in a number of countries across the former Eastern bloc. I will explore how these museums build narratives around the experience of Soviet rule, as well as how they visualize such narratives through displays, exhibits and publications. In order to do this, I will pose the following auxiliary questions: What do these museums commemorate of the Soviet ‘occupation’? How does the presentation of Soviet rule align with my own knowledge, based on general historical knowledge and on my sensibilities and ideas about the period? What strategies and techniques of creating a specific narrative are used in each case? And what are the overarching aims of each museum in its own national context?

The material for my case studies is drawn from a number of museums in a range of countries. I will examine the display of exhibits at these museums, the spaces of the museums themselves, the publications they have produced and even the role of

museum guides at each site. By choosing such an approach, and by looking at museums across an array of vastly different countries which share a Soviet past, I hope to show the multitude of narratives that have been attached to this shared past.

The first of these museums is the Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights (Okupacijų ir laisvės kovų muziejus), or 'MOFF' (formerly known as the 'Museum of Genocide Victims'), in Lithuania. This museum documents 'the loss of independence in the middle of the twentieth century, repression by Soviet authorities, and the self-sacrificing and persistent fight for independence'.¹² The building in which this museum operates formerly housed numerous institutions, including the KGB, which took over the building in 1944, and stayed there until 1991. In October 1992, the Museum of Genocide Victims was founded by order of Lithuania's Minister of Culture and Education and the President of the Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees. In the basement, the former KGB prison was reconstructed, with the upper two floors containing contemporary displays relating to anti-Soviet and anti-Nazi resistance. The museum changed its name and became the MOFF in 2017.

I will also be examining Grūtas Park (Grūto parkas), or 'GP', in southern Lithuania, which was founded in 2001. GP, considered by Lonely Planet to be one of the 'strangest' museums in the world, is a kind of outdoor theme park.¹³ It includes a playground, a restaurant, a small zoo and a sculpture garden in which are exhibited about 100 sculptures from the Soviet era, depicting Soviet leaders in various poses along with other Soviet ideological relics from the period of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a significant number of propaganda monuments and sculptures were left all over Lithuania. Many of these were either taken down and put into storage by local municipalities, or damaged. Viliūmas Malinauskas, a local entrepreneur, won a contest in 1998 to create a 'rest home' for such monuments and sculptures, and exhibits were subsequently transported to the site. Tourists can now admire sculptures of Joseph Stalin looking relaxed with his pipe and a book, of Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Cheka (the forerunner of the KGB), looking sombre and demonic in his long coat, and of Vladimir Lenin.

Beyond Lithuania, I will be examining the Museum of the Soviet Occupation (Sabch'ota ok'up'atsiis muzeumi), or 'MSO', in Georgia. This museum was established to commemorate the 880,000 Georgians who were killed or exiled under the Soviet occupation. It was opened on 26 May 2006, that is, the anniversary of Georgia's declaration of independence from the Russian Empire in 1918. The museum contains about 3,000 exhibits, documents and photographs. Many of the exhibits came from Tbilisi's KGB archives. The timeline of the exhibition begins in 1918 with the first Democratic Republic of Georgia, and continues through the years of the invasion of Georgia by the Red Army, the subsequent Soviet occupation, the independence of Georgia in 1991 and the Russian-Georgian military conflict in 2008. In addition, however, a very different Georgian museum that I will be considering is the Joseph Stalin Museum (jopez s'talinis muzeumi), or 'SM', in the city of Gori – Stalin's hometown. The SM was first opened in 1957 and quickly became a temple to Stalin. Today, the museum complex consists of a small wooden hut – the same hut in which Stalin was born and spent the first years of his life – as well as Stalin's personal railroad carriage, in which he travelled to Potsdam and Yalta. The museum's main building is

a huge villa in which Stalin once lived. It now contains his office furniture, gifts that were presented to him over the years, his personal belongings and even his death mask.

In Ukraine, I will be considering the National Museum Holodomor Victims Memorial (Nacional'nyj muzej «Memorial zhertv Holodomoru), or 'NMHVM'; located in Kiev. On 28 November 2006, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of Ukraine adopted the Law on the Holodomor of 1932–1933, signed by President Viktor Yushchenko. Under this law, the Holodomor of 1932–33 – a great famine that was particularly harsh in the ethnically Ukrainian areas of Ukraine and Russia, and which claimed the lives of several million people – was considered to be a genocide of the Ukrainian people. The new law also led to the decision to construct the NMHVM.¹⁴ The museum opened on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Holodomor in Kiev. Its aim is to honour the memory of the victims of the Holodomor. The museum is composed of a memorial complex and an underground 'Hall of Memory' with permanent exhibitions, where there is a unified register of Holodomor victims – a 'National Memory Book' containing 882,510 names (Figure 10.1).

In Kyrgyzstan, I will be examining the National State History Museum (Kyrgyzskij gosudarstvennyj ystorycheskij muzej) or 'NSHM' in Bishkek. The aim of this museum is to present the history and culture of the Kyrgyz people from antiquity to the present. The museum has changed its name a number of times, but many people still refer to it as the 'Lenin Museum', rather than by its official title. In this museum, thousands of documents stand testament to Lenin's revolutionary activities and theories, as well as



Figure 10.1 The National Museum Holodomor Victims Memorial in Kiev on 22 November 2014 (the eighty-first anniversary of the Holodomor). Photo by NurPhoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images. (See Plate 11.)



Figure 10.2 The National State History Museum in Bishkek, September 2009. Photo by Eric Lafforgue/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images.

to the work of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan. It also holds some 2,000 portrayals of Lenin, with everything from reliefs to sculptures, and inscriptions in Russian and Kyrgyz reading 'Workers of the World, Unite!' (Figure 10.2).

In considering each of these museums in these countries – Lithuania, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan – that all experienced some form of Soviet control, I will analyse displays, publications (e.g. catalogues, leaflets and booklets) and museum websites. I will consider the very different institutional history of each museum. My aim is to explore how the periods of Soviet 'occupation', 'colonization' or control in each of these societies are now memorialized and visualized, and how museums themselves play a pivotal role in shaping wider social memory about Soviet rule. As I will demonstrate, museums help us to understand how the Soviet past is represented, visualized and narrativized in vastly different ways across Europe and Central Asia today.

Museums as political and memory machines

Collective memory is ephemeral and can easily be distorted and interpreted in various ways according to political, religious or economic conditions. State authorities possess various means by which collective memory can be reproduced. Museums, along with textbooks and public spectacles, constitute a major instrument in the process

of nation-building. A key element and a priority of museums and heritage sites is the interpretation of the past.¹⁵ Stuart Hall argues that ‘museums do not simply issue objective descriptions or form logical assemblages; they generate representations and attribute meaning and value in line with certain perspectives or classificatory schemas which are historically specific’.¹⁶

By underlining moments of suffering and national shame – and by omitting other moments – narratives can be made to shape understandings of the past which fit into specific social, economic, political or religious conditions. It is worth quoting Spencer Crew and James Sims here on the possibility of transparent and objective museology, for neither artefacts nor exhibitions are neutral: ‘The problem with things is that they are dumb. They are not eloquent, as some thinkers in art museums claim. They are dumb. And if by some ventriloquism they seem to speak, they lie.’¹⁷

Museums can be described as ‘memory machines’ through which curators and directors create stories through their specific choice of exhibits, labels and captions. This is particularly the case in countries that are in the process of shaping new national identities. Societies in transition seek to build a new future, while also dealing with a complicated past. Museums are institutions closely connected to the national collective memory, and sites in which ‘imagined communities’, to reference Benedict Anderson, can be born.¹⁸

In my notion of ‘narrative’, I build on the work of the psychologist Jerzy Trzebiński, who has observed that the idea of the world and of human life existing in culture always takes the form of a story. Stories are a means of understanding the world. People see stories as a stream of events and problems. The universality of this narrative way of understanding the world is demonstrated by the fact that stories are a common element in religion, mythology, legends and fairy tales, as they are in literature, opera and cinema. Stories as a means of expressing thoughts and ideas represent an effective narrative means of understanding the world.¹⁹

The past is also often retold in this narrative way. The question, however, is what *kinds* of stories are told through museums. What happened in the past? Who was guilty? Who was innocent? How does each story end? The words ‘story’ and ‘narrative’ are often considered to be interchangeable in popular discourse. However, for scholars there is a clear distinction between the two. A story tells what happened at a certain time to a certain person. A narrative (or discourse), on the other hand, is the manner in which the story is told or represented, be that in a book, a film or a museum. Heritage tourist sites and museums authorize a master narrative – the official version of cultural identity – as imposed by policymakers and nation-builders.²⁰ These sites streamline memory, history, events and emotions into a powerful and unified vision imparted to posterity. The museums that are the subject of my analysis in this chapter are politicized and conflictual sites, where difficult histories are revealed and reassessed. They are, in part, ‘sites of conscience’.²¹

Museums related to the period of Soviet occupation have mushroomed throughout the countries of the former Soviet bloc. However, these are very often controversial projects that are closely connected to contemporary political debates, and might even be interpreted as attempts to write a ‘final chapter’ into each of the national histories with which they are connected. I do not aim to analyse the wider politicization of such

events in this chapter, as there is already an extensive literature on the issue.²² But it is important to bear this context in mind when considering the ways in which such museums depict the Soviet past.

Under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine (2005–10), for example, the NMHVM became the site of an obligatory visit for all official guests and international delegations to Ukraine. In 2008, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev declined Yushchenko's invitation to attend the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Holodomor at this museum, although two years later, during an official visit to Kiev, he did visit the NMHVM after a newly elected pro-Russian President, Viktor Yanukovich, had officially rejected the definition of this famine as a 'genocide'. Similarly, the opening of the MSO in Georgia drew expressions of personal displeasure from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who considered the displays at the museum to be highly provocative.²³

In Lithuania, the MOFF has elicited antagonistic criticism for placing an emphasis on crimes committed under Soviet rule and downplaying the Holocaust (in which Lithuanian collaborators also played an active part) while the creation of GP gave rise to hostile criticism from across the political spectrum – members of a group of former political prisoners even went on hunger strike in order to try to force the government to stop the project, which they claimed was 'drenched in the blood of partisans'.²⁴ Juozas Galdikas, a spokesperson for the survivors of Stalinist deportations, argued that 'Malinauskas [i.e., the park's owner] does not care that these forests where Grutas Park was built once served as shelter for Lithuanian freedom fighters against Soviet occupants [...]. What is the purpose of this park? To laugh at our pain?'²⁵

The Soviets as the enemy

At all of the museums that are the subject of my analysis, four major narratives – sometimes schizophrenic and contradictory, even within the same institution or country – can be observed. The first of these narratives could be summarized as 'the Soviets as enemy, aggressor and brutal colonizer'. In this narrative, 'colonized' countries are presented purely as victims. The MSO offers a good example of this. This museum in Tbilisi is a kind of mausoleum of Georgia's occupation. One of the museum's centrepieces, for example, is a steel-framed wooden door which symbolizes Soviet terror.²⁶ The central artefact in the museum is a life-size, wooden train carriage – a carriage which is said to have originally been used to transport cattle and in which participants in the national uprising of 1924 are said to have been executed. The carriage has been placed in a darkened room in the museum, and is lit from the inside, so that beams of light shine through bullet holes in its side. At this museum, there is no opportunity to reconcile the past and the Soviet occupation. The museum makes a clear and obvious attempt to equate the terms 'Soviet' and 'Russian'. Indeed, historical trauma is directly linked to more contemporary developments in many of the museum's displays. For example, a documentary shown to museum visitors is a 2008 film about the Russian-Georgian conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, along with Russia's military intervention and occupation of regions that Georgia claims as its

own territory today. A map with secessionist territories and displayed in the museum is captioned with the phrase 'the occupation continues'. The message here is simple: there is no reconciliation, as Georgia is still an 'occupied' country.

In Lithuania, the MOFF follows the official government narrative about the Soviet past and stimulates public debate about the political past. It was developed according to a political agenda, that is, as part of a national revival movement, which started in the late Soviet period in 1988 and lasted into the 1990s. The exhibits in the museum are built around a dichotomy of the 'oppressed' and the 'oppressor', the 'occupied' and the 'occupiers'. Even though the museum premises are located in a building that was once used by the Gestapo during the Nazi occupation of Lithuania (1941–4), there is only one perpetrator identified in this museum – the Soviets – and one ideology that is said to be responsible for historical crimes – communism. The fifty years of the Soviet occupation are presented as being a period of brave resistance on the part of Lithuanians, and the struggle of a heroic, occupied nation against the Soviet regime, eventually resulting in Liberation.

The NMHVM was built on what are almost theological ideas of suffering and resurrection in Ukraine. The structure of the museum and the choice of exhibits are commemorative rather than informative. On 22 November 2008 (when the museum was inaugurated), the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko stated that the museum would be a resurrection of our memory, and a source of purification from lies and filth. 'It is to be pure and honest work, as only such work can help bring a just national order and decent living conditions to Ukraine. We must dress Ukraine in a neat shirt and remove the symbols of totalitarianism from her body.' In using the word 'filth', Yushchenko was referring to Soviet symbols.²⁷

In all of these 'occupation' museums – constructed according to the notion of 'the Soviets as enemy, aggressor and brutal colonizer' – the world is divided into good and evil, oppressor and oppressed. There are 'good Georgians' and 'evil Soviets'; Ukrainian or Lithuanian victims and Soviets perpetrators; civilized Lithuanians or Georgians, and cruel, primitive and barbaric Soviets.

National histories, Soviet nostalgia and commercialization of the Soviet brand

The Soviet period is an integral and highly significant part of the history of a number of countries in Europe and Central Asia. At the NSHM in Bishkek, such an approach is clear. The picture presented here is of the Soviets unifying the nation, industrializing the country and bringing civilization and industry. In other words, the Soviets are presented as agents of peace and progress. In Kyrgyzstan, Soviet rule is considered not as an 'occupation', but as a period of transition from a nomadic to a civilized society. Since the Kyrgyz Republic gained its independence in 1991, the transformation of Kyrgyz society has been very painful, and many people have started to feel increasingly nostalgic about the Soviet past.²⁸ During a meeting with Vladimir Putin in 2019, the Kyrgyz President, Almazbek Atambayev, stated: 'Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.'²⁹

Such an image of the Soviet past is clear at the NSHM. The myth of the Great Patriotic War, for example, is central to the narrative presented through this museum. For decades, Soviet propaganda stressed that, at the time of the war, Kyrgyzstan's population was about one and a half million; 363,144 people were drafted into the Red Army, with 160,000 of these people not returning.³⁰ The 385th Artillery Division, which was established in Kyrgyzstan, participated in the Soviet attack on Berlin on 16 April 1945.³¹ This is all represented in a mural shown at the museum, representing Soviet soldiers dancing and eating in harmony with Kyrgyz farmers. In addition, there is a mural of a Russian marine in the company of Kyrgyz women in traditional dress, and a mural showing an elderly Kyrgyz holding a banner featuring a portrait of cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin. The inclusion of such artwork speaks clearly to the notion that the Soviet Union was an integral – perhaps even the most significant – part of the history of this country. In this museum then, the Soviets are not 'others' but 'us.'

Collective nostalgia for communism is a widespread phenomenon in many countries of the former Soviet bloc. In Poland, for example, several museums bearing the name of 'the Polish People's Republic Museum' have been set up over the last decade, many including iconic objects from that period.³² Those parts of Germany which were formerly the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have also witnessed an explosion of such 'Ostalgia', though the communist past has been commodified and merchandized in such cases. Daphne Berdahl, for example, has argued that 'Ostalgia can be an attempt to reclaim a kind of *Heimat* (homeland), albeit a romanticized and hazily glorified one.'³³ Nostalgia is often considered a strategy for coping with a problematic past, and, as Fruzsina Müller explains, 'the development of collective nostalgia is very likely when personal lifelines are crossed by a large historical event or sudden change in society that evokes similar fears or answers in people. This makes them feel nostalgic because they notice how different everything was only a few years before.'³⁴

Museums are a common communicative platform for mediating such nostalgia. Thus, the notion of commodifying nostalgia to document everyday life in the Soviet period has become very common since the turn of the twenty-first century. One result of this tendency has been the creation of several 'nostalgic' museums of Soviet rule in various countries of the former Eastern bloc.

Lithuania's GP is a typical example of this phenomenon. GP features two small wooden cottages. The first is presented as an 'authentic' house from the 1960s. The second, also built in the style of the 1960s, is a typical 'culture house' – a kind of clubhouse that existed in the Eastern bloc during the Soviet period. Such clubs were established in a large number in the Soviet Union. Run by political organizations or trade unions, they played a significant role; they served as *sui generis* schools of culture – places where workers, children, adolescents and pensioners could broaden their horizons, expand interests and relax after a day of work.

At GP, paintings, graphics and different communist memorabilia introduce the visitor to the atmosphere of socialist realism. Inside are displayed all manner of Soviet material culture, including toys, socialist realist paintings, rugs decorated with Lenin's face, musical instruments (such as 'pioneer drums' – played by members of the Soviet Young Pioneers at events such as marches), flags and small gadgets (such as Soviet-era

calculators). There is also a machine from the 1970s, with a large barrel dispensing *kvass* – a beverage made from fermented bread, which was commonly consumed during the Soviet era. The park's restaurant offers typical 'Soviet dishes,' and visitors are welcome to buy vodka and raise a toast to Stalin. At GP then, the Soviet era is evoked through nostalgic memories of 'the good old days,' childhood and youth.

One common way of dealing with an uncomfortable, ambivalent heritage can be found through 'Disneyization,' which, as Alan Bryman has observed, consists of commodifying and homogenizing the past into more digestible forms.³⁵ There are several components of the Disneyization process, one of which is 'theming,' whereby different elements are combined into one leitmotif. GP in Lithuania is one example of the Disneyization of the past. The leitmotif found in GP is the Soviet past itself. The food, atmosphere, the Soviet restaurant, cultural house and the very idea of 'having a drink for Stalin' – these are all made to interact with each other here. A second component is the 'dedifferentiation of consumption,' by connecting various categories of leisure, hospitality and retail. In GP there is a restaurant, a zoo, a fast food kiosk, a souvenir shop, a playground and a sculpture exhibition. By creating a false reality in the form of shallow pastiche, the park thus lulls visitors into a false sense that they are experiencing real history.

At the time of its establishment, GP sought to desacralize a tragic or sacred past. But disarming past atrocities with laughter is not a new strategy. GP can be read as a profanation of the sacred past. However, leaving this classical dichotomy aside, re-colonizing the past for pure entertainment can be read in a different way, that is, as an act of sabotage. Through the desacralization of the ideological content of Soviet icons, and by reducing the past to a collection of statues that now look out of context, the collapse of the Soviet system is demonstrated through concrete examples. The absurdity of the Soviet occupation is a counterpoint to the sacred elements of Lithuanian collective memory.

Nostalgia for the Soviet Union is also still very strong in Georgia. As many as 42 per cent of Georgians believe that the break-up of the Soviet Union was a negative development.³⁶ It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the SM acts as kind of time capsule for Georgians, in which everything (including the museum's own guides) seems to have been imported directly from the Soviet Union. A visit to the SM makes it feel as if nothing has changed in the last sixty years, despite Khrushchev-era de-Stalinization, the fall of the Soviet empire, Georgia's proclamation of independence and the removal of monuments to Stalin from Gori's main square in 2010.

Under the pro-Western government of Mikheil Saakashvili (2004–13), attempts were made to erase everything Soviet in Georgia, and to transform this 'Stalin Museum' into a 'Stalinism Museum'. In 2012 a commission was established whose aim was to discuss the future of the SM. However, after parliamentary elections in 2012, the new government was much more eager to cooperate with Russia, and the idea of altering the SM petered out. Lasha Bakradze, a Georgian historian and professor of Soviet history (and one of Georgia's most visible and active analysts of Soviet heritage), has argued that 'the Stalin Museum is a very special thing, and its survival to this day is amazing. We need to make this safe. We need to show everybody how primitive Soviet propaganda was. How primitive the Stalin cult was. So we need to keep it as the Stalin Museum.'³⁷

Today, the museum is still a shrine to one of the worst dictators of the twentieth century. This monumental villa, built in a Stalinist gothic style, is expressed as being a shrine, both in material terms – through its collections and exhibits – and in the narratives presented by its tourist guides. An 'authentic' Soviet atmosphere is encapsulated in the décor used, furniture from the epoch, the inclusion of large portraits and photographs of Stalin, as well as newspaper articles about Stalin's youth and his career as a bank robber. Captions and text are written only in Russian, and museum guides speak only Russian. The narrative of the museum is enhanced by the museum employees themselves, who are not only passionate about the subject, but give a sense of admiring Stalin, as a politician and a great Georgian. One room which dispels any lingering doubts about the nature of the museum is the 'death mask room'. Here, a darkened oval amphitheatre displays the macabre sight of Stalin's death mask, made in bronze and placed upon an altar-like stand, on a white pillow on red velvet (Figure 10.3).

According to Lasha Bakradze, it is clear that

even those Georgians who were not brainwashed by Stalinist propaganda and who believed Georgia was a victim of Communist rule, thought of Stalin as being more than just a Soviet leader and the architect of the totalitarian regime. For them too, he was also a Georgian, who remained the sole leader of a huge empire for three decades.³⁸




Figure 10.3 Stalin's death mask at the Stalin Museum in Gori, January 2008. Photo by Pigi Cipelli/Archivio Pigi Cipelli/Mondadori via Getty Images. (See Plate 12.)

In other words, in Georgia, Stalin no longer remains a political symbol, as there is no longer an ideology behind him. For most Georgians who sympathize with Stalin today, he is seen more as a folk hero. He is a Georgian who is both evil and cruel, but also smart and clever. The traumatic inferiority complex of a colonized people is compensated for by a kind of primitive pride in Stalin. Georgia was 'occupied' by Russia, but Russia was ruled by Stalin.³⁹

Narrative-building strategies: From historical amnesia to collective memory

One strategy that reinforces suffering is the 're-humanization' of victims, namely bringing them to life in the museum. The narratives deployed by the MOFF, the MSO and the NMHVM all place a great deal of emphasis on individual human beings. The collections of these museums are curated in a specific way: they consist to a large degree of personal items that once belonged to deportees or to partisans of the resistance movements. This is, of course, part of a larger tendency that Bickford and Sodaro, and Lacquer, have all observed: that is, since the Second World War, memorial projects have often focused more attention on the individual.⁴⁰ The museums that are the subject of this chapter use various techniques to underline individual people, for example, by naming them. This can be expressed through lists of names, or through the inclusion of original documents along with family and personal photographs, but also by presenting personal artefacts that were previously in the possession of victims, such as everyday objects, and works of art or jewellery made by prisoners. The aim of these strategies is to bring back and build up the memory of individual people, to transform them from simple statistics into individuals. For example, the NMHVM has published a 'book of memory' with the names of Holodomor victims. At the MSO in Tbilisi, and at the MOFF in Vilnius, through displays of photographs and documents from before the occupation period, Georgians and Lithuanians are shown to be more than just victims. The emphasis is shifted from the Georgians or Lithuanians being purely victims of occupation, to subjects existing independently of the occupation and having their own histories. The crucial aspect becomes not how they died, but how they lived and who they were.

In Vilnius, objects belonging to political prisoners, and later discovered in mass graves in which these prisoners had been buried, have been put on display, along with labels providing information about their owners (such as the years of their birth and death). The section of the museum dedicated to deportations includes vernacular objects, such as hand-embroidered tablecloths, items made of lace, hand-made jewellery and crucifixes, while the captions provide information on the history of the exhibits and the links to specific owners. The same technique is used in both Tbilisi and Vilnius, with numerous photographs of people who were deported, executed or repressed, along with detailed information about such individuals (such as their names, birth and death dates, profession or social status before the occupation) all included (Figure 10.4). In Tbilisi, there are also photographs of members of the Georgian elite who disappeared after the Red Army invasion and in the subsequent



Figure 10.4 Photographs of former prisoners of the KGB displayed at the Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights in Vilnius, 2015. Getty Images.

years, as well as a long list of the names of people (including children) who were executed by the Soviets.

The strategy of omitting inconvenient or shameful facts, but at the same time underlining those facts that fit into a specific narrative (and thereby decontextualizing several facts, or presenting them not as a subject of debate but as indisputable) is a common strategy used in a number of these museums. In addition, the process of selecting or glossing over facts can be observed, which is clearly present in the MOFF, where the uncomfortable parts of the past, namely collaboration between Lithuanians and Nazis, is summed up in just one sentence. The narrative of double genocide, the aim of which is to equalize and symmetrize Nazi and Soviet crimes, was officially endorsed by the Lithuanian government. Indeed, it was only in 2017, and after prolonged political debates and diplomatic protests, that the museum changed its name from the 'Museum of Genocide Victims' to the 'Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights'. The museum – referred to as 'the "mother" of Double Genocide museums within the EU'⁴¹ – came under harsh criticism for sweeping under the rug the active participation of Lithuanians in the Holocaust. However, according to international legal definitions, the Soviets, when considering all the crimes that have been perpetrated against Lithuanians, are not actually guilty of genocide in Lithuania. Daniel Brook, using very emotional words, has stated: 'Lithuania wants to erase its ugly history of Nazi collaboration – by accusing Jewish partisans who fought the Germans of war crimes.'⁴² Over 90 per cent of Lithuania's 220,000 Jews were killed during the Second World War, and since 1991 (when the country became independent), not a

single citizen has been punished for Holocaust crimes in Lithuania. Most of Lithuania's 200,000–220,000 Jews were killed and left in mass graves within five months of the Nazi invasion of Lithuania in 1941, but this is not mentioned at the MOFF. Neither is this sinister part of Lithuanian history (i.e. Lithuanian collaboration with the Nazis) a part of the museum narrative.

At the SM, the strategy of selective memory is also used extensively. A guide who has worked there for thirty years states clearly that, in her opinion, Stalin was a great man who cared about his country. During a guided tour on the afternoon of 26 August 2016, the same guide conceded that 'not everything went as planned, and terrible things took place too, of course, but he really cared about his people, his country'. In the story told by the guide, there is no room for gulags, repression, purges or any trace of the horrors of Stalinist persecution. What counts, and what is presented in the paintings and documents on display, are Stalin's numerous talents and artistry. By visiting the museum, it is possible to come away with the impression that Stalin was a brave, James Bond-type hero, who was able to escape Siberia five times – or to write poetry.

Conclusion

Museums are sites where memory, power and nationhood intersect.⁴³ They are also sites that construct or stress specific and selective narratives about identities, 'concretizing memory or institutionalizing a particular vision of history in a hegemonic way'.⁴⁴ Craig Calhoun and Anthony D. Smith have both argued that a pre-existing history is crucial in the process of creating a national identity and in nation-building more generally.⁴⁵ Imagining the nation entails imagining national history and national myths. In each of the countries that I have examined in this chapter, 'post-communist memory' has developed in various directions since 1991, from a schema of suffering and resurrection, to acceptance and glorification, or even mockery of a tragic past.

National identity is built not only on national pride and a sense of 'sameness', but also to a large degree on a contrast with 'others'. This can be seen in a number of the museums that I have explored in this chapter. These museums shape discourse, legitimize national memories and build collective memories based on a dichotomy of the 'occupied' versus the 'occupiers'; the 'innocent' versus 'criminals'; or 'civilized nations' versus 'barbarians'. As Bell and Said have both observed, in postcolonial societies such distinctions are crucial for self-identification.⁴⁶ And as I have shown, such dichotomies are clearly visible in the way in which museum exhibitions are constructed in many societies that once experienced Soviet control.

Narratives that do not fall easily into such dichotomies often end up being marginalized. In *Memory, History and Forgetting*, Paul Ricoeur shows that narratives are constructed through selectivity in a continuum of memory and forgetting, arguing that 'one cannot recall everything and one can always recount differently, due to the unavoidable selective nature of narrative and its connective functions. Selection means that seeing one thing means not seeing another'.⁴⁷ The political narratives of history or memory politics entail 'remembering' certain events of the past and 'forgetting' others. Museums are sites that create national identity through a proper selection of

what should be remembered and what should be forgotten. This can be seen clearly in the ways in which the Soviet 'occupation' is narrativized, visualized or forgotten in museums across the former Soviet bloc today.

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Occupying (imagined) landscapes

Noga Stiassny

Introduction

Since the turn of the millennium – and in the last decade, in particular – a new ‘bottom-up’ phenomenon has emerged in Israeli art: contemporary Israeli artists have travelled to central and eastern Europe and appropriated landscapes for artworks which form a spatial marker of the atrocities of the Holocaust, and of Jewish life and culture, that previously existed in those places. As a result of the Israeli artist’s physical encounter with the contemporary Diasporic landscape and the personal and collective memories it evokes, the Diasporic landscape becomes the *star* of the work, often including an implicit or explicit reference to forest imagery.

An example of such a work is the series *Don’t Trust Security Arrangements (Berlin)* (2010) created by the Israeli photographer Dror Daum (1970–). In 2010, Daum travelled to Germany with Bengal fireworks of the kind often used by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers against protesters in his suitcase. Despite carrying the fireworks, Daum – who has an Ashkenazi appearance¹ – passed through Ben-Gurion Airport, renowned for its rigorous security checks, without any hindrance. Nor was Daum stopped at the German border. Arriving in Berlin, he went to the Tiergarten, Berlin’s popular forest-like park. There he lit the fireworks and documented their explosion (Figures 11.1–11.4).

The experience of looking at Daum’s series of photographs is that of standing in the depths of a forest that continues well beyond the photographic frame. The photographs depict a green, vegetative environment; the rays of the sun strike the leaves and the ground, while a stain seems to ‘float’ in the air, with the viewer’s gaze following the ‘floating stain.’ With the aid of that stain, Daum’s imagined forest issues a seductive invitation to the viewer, evoking an environment in which magic might occur. However, as the fate of many figures in *Grimms’ Fairy Tales* demonstrates, a German forest can quickly become a ‘site of danger’, and Daum’s appropriation of forest imagery should be considered with this in mind.²

Daum’s work serves here as a short visual introduction for this chapter’s central claim: that the Israeli-Zionist geographical imagination – as an imagination that emphasizes historical rootedness³ – realized in the Zionist approach towards the ‘biblical landscape’ has been inspired by the development of Germany’s geographical imagination, and primarily by the latter’s approach to the image of the ‘German forest.’ The identification





Figure 11.1–11.4 Dror Daum, *Don't Trust Security Arrangements (Berlin)* [The Purple Series], 2010. Four archival pigment prints, 20 × 26 cm each. Courtesy of the artist. (See Plate 13–16.)

of a specifically ‘German forest’ – and the national ideas it embodies – began almost in parallel with the foundation of Zionism in the late nineteenth century.⁴ However, in referring to that image through a contemporary prism, one should recognize that the ‘German forest’ is also tied inextricably to the Holocaust, its physical space still marked today by numerous Jewish mass graves.⁵ On that basis, this chapter will later return to Daum’s work and expose how – through the reference to the image of the ‘German forest’ – *Don’t Trust Security Arrangements (Berlin)* commemorates the Holocaust, while simultaneously challenging the Zionist geographical imagination.

Zionism’s geographical imagination: A Jewish return

The origins of the English word ‘landscape’ are found in the Dutch and German languages; yet, landscape only became a part of a holistic concept, and one evaluated by its scenic qualities, during the Renaissance. Nonetheless, the desire for a national landscape was first identified in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the emergence of national movements in central Europe, including the Zionist movement.⁶

The Jewish longing to reunite with the biblical landscape reflected a 2,000-year-old hope of return to the landscape(s) of Zion. However, this hope did not always carry the same territorial notion of a ‘return’ that characterized the nineteenth-century Zionist movement. The Zionist movement was never monolithic, but rather embraced a multitude of ideas about what Zion should be. Despite varying views about how Zionism should be realized, and although a few of the early proposals were more pragmatic than others (such as the Uganda Scheme of 1903), the dominant ideal of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was to establish a partnership between the Jew and his ‘lost’ ‘biblical homeland’ – not as an individual, but rather as a ‘we’-collective.⁷

Between the utopian ideal of a ‘biblical landscape’ and the challenges inherent in the realization of it, Zionism – a colonial-imperialist project in the nineteenth-century spirit, seeking to maximize its nationalist and economic grip on a Jewish national landscape – did not lack complexity. Nonetheless, the Zionist movement perceived itself as being anti-colonial: the liberator of the ‘biblical landscape’ for the homeless Jew.⁸ This dichotomy, founded in the territorial aspiration ‘to return home’, cannot be separated from the anti-Semitism that reared its ugly head in central and eastern Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, expressed in events such as the Dreyfus affair (1894) and the Kishinev pogroms (1903–5) – events that led to the strengthening of the political side of the movement.⁹ But how was it that a movement widely perceived as secular and modern, and with a clear socialist orientation, a movement that ceased to rely on liturgy and oral traditions, chose to rely on an ancient book from the religious Jewish corpus – the Bible – as ‘forensic evidence’ supporting the legitimacy of Jewish ownership of ‘biblical Zion’?

To answer this question, we must look to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ‘Biblical Reform’, as Yaacov Shavit and Mordechai Eran have named it,¹⁰ although ‘ethno-linguistic reform’ might be a better definition. Beginning in the late eighteenth century with the Haskalah movement (the Jewish Enlightenment), Biblical Reform left

its mark on the cultural identity of European Jewry during the nineteenth century. In parallel with the awakening of nationalist desires among other European nations, the modern character of the Haskalah movement led to a renewed interest in Hebrew as a spoken language, and consequently to the replacement of rabbinical literature with the Bible.¹¹ This transformation of the Bible from a work of sacred literature into a formative book had a decisive impact on the Jewish Yishuv in Palestina,¹² for as Shavit and Eran argue, without a return to the Bible, Zionism could not have emerged.¹³ In other words, political Zionism demanded a *secular* nationalization of the landscapes of Zion through an experience of *religious* revelation.¹⁴

According to Rob van der Laarse, the re-invigoration in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of Renaissance ideas that aligned landscape with national identity was predominantly influenced by a romantic concept of the 'authenticity' of landscapes.¹⁵ This fetish for 'landscape authenticity' enabled the (re-)construction of an 'antique' collective memory for a nation of 'its' landscape, despite no living person having experienced that memory to 'remember' it. What the Zionist movement therefore aspired to was the (re)design of the nineteenth-century landscapes of Zion to 'fit' Zionism's geographical imagination – Zion as a 'biblical' and 'authentic' landscape just waiting to be settled and cultivated by and for the Jews. As part of the secularization of what paradoxically came to be a political-religious national movement (even if interpreted as separate from *religious* Zionism), the Bible therefore bestowed an 'objective', 'authentic' and thus 'authoritative' validation of the Jewish claim to 'return' to the landscape of Zion – a claim that reached beyond a vague divine promise to inherit the land.¹⁶ This does not necessarily mean that the biblical landscape did not exist as a physical reality. It does, however, mean that the artificial meanings attached to the paradigm of landscape in the nineteenth century by the Zionist movement have influenced the formation of Zionism's geographical imagination, and consequently, the (re)writing of an exclusively Jewish 'landscape biography' on the landscape of Zion.¹⁷

Framed and visualized as a past, holy landscape in the present tense, and as one closely and exclusively linked to Jewish heritage, the landscape biography of Zion was understood independently, irrespective of the existence of other residents in that country. Although written reports show that the Jewish Yishuv recognized local Arab residents, due to the time in exile, the history of Zion was as old as the Jewish Yishuv itself. As part of a Zionist interpretation of a Judeo-Christian romantic tradition (itself a product of nineteenth-century modernity), Diasporic life was conceived as an interim period, a *pre-return* situation, with a few exceptions such as the Crusader period.¹⁸ Moreover, fundamental to the idea of a Jewish return was the assumption that such a return would lead to a Jewish Renaissance, a cultural rebirth in the *old-new* biblical homeland.¹⁹ This belief led to the emergence of two distinct 'times' that, only when combined, could have constructed the Zionist geographical imagination and, thereby, the Zionist landscape biography: one a spiritual, partly mythical and partly theological time (i.e. national memory); the other, a modern, historical and chronological sense of time (i.e. national history).

That being said, it is impossible to assess Biblical Reform, as well as Zionism's 'landscape authenticity' fetish and its influence on the shaping of the perception of 'biblical landscape', without addressing the background from which the Zionist

movement and its geographical imagination emerged – namely, nineteenth-century Germany, and consequently, the formation of Germany’s geographical imagination. The ties between political Zionism and Germany’s geographical imagination may be better understood if we re-think the Zionist concept of ‘biblical landscape’ against the image of the ‘German forest’. Similarly to Zionism’s ‘biblical landscape’, during the nineteenth century the ‘German forest’ began to gain national significance as a physical and symbolic national symbol tied to the idea of the ‘sublime’, thereby becoming an ‘authentic’ entity worth protecting.²⁰

The ‘German forest’ behind Zionism’s ‘biblical landscape’

As the act of mythologizing a landscape as ‘authentic’ and ‘national’ gained ground among various European nationalist movements, the aspiration to ‘excavate’ the ‘authentic past landscape’ as part of a national heritage in the present found its way into the nineteenth-century German geographical imagination.²¹ Following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1 and the establishment of the German Empire, a German national identity was much required.²² In the search for a cultural identity for the new nation, the German arboreal environment – particularly its ‘Nordic’ forests – became objects of admiration based on an emotional and memorial symbolism of one collective German habitat.²³

Although larger forested areas appeared in neighbouring countries, the forest was perhaps one of the easiest symbols for Germans to collectively identify with, as woodland covered 20–30 per cent of the landscape.²⁴ However, always loyal to a specifically Prussian identity, Otto von Bismarck saw a strengthened hold on the land through conquest as his contribution to the German homeland. Bismarck’s procrastination in designing national symbols, even after he welded Germany together and founded the Kaiserreich, disturbed many Germans.²⁵ In consequence, the formation of a national identity was undertaken in large part by members of the German bourgeoisie (*Bildungsbürgertum*).²⁶ As a result, the German national landscape, with the forest at the forefront, quickly became a way to ‘tell’ the history of the new German nation. Whereas the ‘German forest’ allowed the new German nation to (re)claim its national yet ‘natural’ and ‘authentic’ landscape, the rural inhabitants of Germany’s countryside were perceived as being firmly ‘rooted’ in the landscape.²⁷ With this in mind, the ideology of the German *Heimat* (‘home’ or ‘homeland’) movement conceived the German collective identity as an identity based on a connection between ‘blood and soil’ (*Blut und Boden*). The idealization of bloodline as a special characteristic of a race connected to its (imagined) national landscape led to an obsession with the past, historical and mythological, real and fictional alike.²⁸

The propagation of ‘German forest’ imagery during the Kaiserreich era also led to the establishment of the forest as a field of study, with trees perceived as living in an exterritorial space beyond civilization (*Urwald*).²⁹ This approach enabled a shift of the forest from monarchical to common ownership, being understood as a space for more democratic forms of transportation (as opposed to aristocrats’ horses).³⁰ This understanding was expressed in the institutionalization of forest-hiking, which

allowed women, pupils and young students to join the bourgeoisie in their walks (e.g. *Wandervogel*, *Touristenvereine* and *Heimatkunde*).³¹ As a result, the period preceding the First World War was witness to the production of many artworks preoccupied with the image of the 'German forest', such as Caspar David Friedrich's famous paintings. According to Donna West Brett, even the works of the Brothers Grimm, which include volumes such as *Altdeutsche Wälder* (Old German Forests) from 1813, served as a catalyst for the national subtext associated with the image of the 'German forest'.³²

During this period, forested land played a dominant role in the German economy, being linked to the timber industry, architecture, fuel, hunting, horticulture and livestock farming.³³ Accordingly, the forest gradually started to appear in parliamentary discussions and press debates over state policy issues, such as timber tariffs, wood ownership and the right of access to forests.³⁴ In late-nineteenth-century Germany, the forest was officially declared 'German national property', and the new German state became a contributor to the overall design of forest imagery.³⁵ Based on historical – by now national – continuity, the forest became a suitable space in which to place national monuments, erected mainly in picturesque locations, while ancient trees and primeval forests were catalogued as *Naturdenkmäler* (natural monuments). Certain remarkable trees in Germany were mentioned in various *Baumbücher* (tree-books) and appeared on maps and in postcards as a way to mark Germany's great historical victories and national tragedies.³⁶ Prominent examples are the 'Luther Elms' (*Lutherbaum*) near Worms; the Linden at Bordesholm (*Die Linde zu Bordesholm*) in Holstein, near the burial place of the founders of both the Russian and Oldenburg dynasties; and the various 'Goethe's Oaks' spread around the country.³⁷ Trees had always told stories about German antiquity, but now, 'antique' nature was endowed with the ability to tell a new narrative.

However, due to population growth and industrialization during the late nineteenth century, many of Germany's forests deteriorated.³⁸ That being the case, alongside the cultural, artistic and economic domains, nineteenth-century science joined in the 'task' of shaping Germany's geographical imagination.³⁹ In fact, it was science that 'in the search for metaphors, produced the most violent images of the woods – [seizing on] images that helped popularize the social Darwinism at the root of Nazism'.⁴⁰ Following Alexander von Humboldt's classification of plants as *Völker* (peoples), German scientists and forestry experts adapted forest imagery to produce botanical-racial models of society.⁴¹ Armed with new knowledge about tree types and growth conditions that would be most productive for timber, scientists began re-shaping German forests, 'making' them fit German national needs.⁴² Unproductive sylvan landscapes were eradicated and replaced with forests of timber-efficient trees planted in grid patterns that would allow for easier monitoring.⁴³ As a result of such actions, a new spatial aesthetic emerged – one that presented geometric perfection as the ideal for this national symbol. From that moment on, one can easily follow the roots of the German (re-)branding of eastern occupied territories as 'German landscapes', when Prussia expanded into that geographical sphere, perceiving it as part of a German-forest *Heimatscape* (i.e. German national landscape).⁴⁴

Influenced by German imagery and the glorification of the German cultural landscape, a quite similar process occurred in Palestina regarding the image of the

'biblical landscape' and the ways in which this image was interpreted by German-speaking Zionists, almost in parallel with the process of nationalizing the image of the 'German forest'. Based on the production of an 'old-new', 'authentic' national landscape, German concepts and practices around a territorial collective identity were translated into the Jewish-Zionist mindscape (exemplified in Herzl's *Altneuland*, 1902).⁴⁵ This geo-cultural transposition between the German geographical imagination and the Zionist equivalent opened the path to implementing the notion of an 'authentic' national landscape and the belief in a Jewish 'return', manifested in the concept of the 'biblical landscape'.⁴⁶

Geo-cultural transposition: A forestial-'biblical landscape'

Resonating to some extent with the poor state of forests in Germany, nineteenth-century Palestine was neither a land of 'milk and honey' nor a land rich in forests. It was, rather, an arid land suffering from soil erosion, over-grazing, the uprooting and clearing of trees, desertification, and a problematic land ownership registration system. Alon Tal's work on the woodlands of Israel indicates that as far back as the early Ottoman period (after 1516), attempts – usually unsuccessful or short-lived – were made to afforest the Holy Land.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, over the years, the woodlands of Palestine experienced extensive ecological degradation that was massively intensified after the invasion of Napoleon in 1798–9. The few remaining green areas could not withstand the destruction inflicted on them during the First World War, and the rapid construction of railways to aid the Ottoman armies on the southern front.⁴⁸ This man-made destruction was accompanied by the prevalence of locusts and other natural pests that caused the trees to suffer from poor life expectancy, which in turn led to economic shortages. Disappointed to find that the reality did not suit their (German-shaped) geographical imagination, Christian pilgrims and Jewish immigrants discovered a Palestine left with very little forestial-'biblical landscape' to behold.⁴⁹

Remarkably, nineteenth-century German authors assumed that the 'lost' civilizations of Persia, Babylon, Syria, Asia Minor, North America as well as Palestine 'had to have fallen victim to the result of deforestation',⁵⁰ an assumption consistent with the Zionist aspiration to 'make the desert bloom'. Herein lies the modern complexity at the heart of Zionism's geographical imagination: almost everything from antiquity had been damaged or destroyed and therefore needed Jewish (re)construction and/or repair. However, at the same time, the bareness of the country made it possible to 'see' the stories of the Bible and, thereby, to 'resurrect' the biblical scenery.⁵¹ A Zionist desire to cultivate the landscape, drain the swamps, revive the desert and build a new state existed, but in parallel with a sense that the landscape had belonged to the Jews since antiquity.

The second half of the nineteenth century saw early attempts to import forest trees to Palestine, carried out mainly by a group of German Templers who settled in German enclaves (*Moshava Germanint*) in the country.⁵² Immediately thereafter, and alongside the establishment of the first Jewish rural settlements (*Moshavot*), the first 'Zionist trees' also arrived.⁵³ Planting increased after Baron de Rothschild bestowed his

patronage on the Jewish Moshavot, donating seeds and plants to beautify them, as well as eucalyptus trees to dry out the swamps.⁵⁴

Until the establishment of the State of Israel as a Jewish state (1948), two main organizations were engaged in afforestation under the rule of the British Mandate: the Forest Department of the British Mandate and the Jewish National Fund (JNF, or 'Keren Kayemet LeYisrael'). A careful look at the differences between the JNF conception and planting of forests and the British Mandate's afforestation plans for the same land highlights the fact that these organizations had very different motivations for planting trees.⁵⁵ Qualitatively, the British Mandate's afforestation policy was primarily symbolic, aspiring to bring a green revolution to Palestine by fighting soil erosion and the degradation of sand dunes, for the good of the country's future, in the belief that most of the country's inhabitants would rely on agriculture rather than on forestry. By comparison, the JNF saw the forest as a tool for reinforcing land ownership.⁵⁶

Established in 1901 at the Fifth Zionist Congress, the JNF had the goal of purchasing and developing lands in Palestine as part of a Jewish 'land redemption' (first under Ottoman rule, and later under the British Mandate). Owned by the World Zionist Organization, the JNF was a hybrid organization – a Jewish trustee that was 'neither an NGO nor a non-profit association,' whose shareholders were Jews from Palestine and the Diaspora – and all afforestation activities were undertaken for them and on their behalf.⁵⁷ Despite the involvement of foreign experts – often experts from Germany – in afforestation efforts, forests were initially seen by the JNF as a low priority, and not a vital necessity for the Jewish Yishuv.⁵⁸ Thus, the JNF was quick to undertake additional tasks in the construction of the Yishuv in Palestine, such as agricultural assistance programmes, the creation of new grazing areas, the construction of reservoirs and even the establishment of orphanages.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, clearly evident in the actions of the JNF was an unmistakably romantic ambition, rooted in nineteenth-century Germany, which interpreted the multiplicity of forests as a blessing on the land of Israel. While the first 'Zionist forests' were a continuous experiment, after many failed afforestation attempts, the JNF policy was revised.⁶⁰ The organization began to encourage planting fruitless trees, which required less maintenance but still corresponded to the ideology of protecting the new lands purchased for the Jews. Another advantage was the creation of a source of employment for the members of the growing Yishuv. When a decision to plant fruiting trees was made, olive trees were frequently chosen. Native to the Mediterranean, olive trees fitted the Zionist agenda well. Indeed, they broadened it, since by-products such as olives and olive oil could be exported to the Diaspora, and labelled 'made in Israel'.⁶¹

The Arab population did not welcome the 'Zionist trees,' mainly because they saw them as part of a Jewish national mission. This hostile reaction often translated into chronic disregard of the Mandate's grazing restrictions, but also vandalism, arson and even violence against forestry officials. Although Arab residents might have benefitted from afforestation as well, it is possible that these destructive actions stemmed from their lack of inclusion in the decision-making process behind the afforestation policies of both the British Mandate and the JNF.⁶² However, the Arab inhabitants' resistance to the afforestation process must also be interpreted on the basis of the Zionist geographical imagination and its connection to the image of the 'German forest' and the

national practices born from it. Accordingly, during the first decades of the twentieth century, as the Jewish-Arab struggle over the contested landscape of Palestina and its trees intensified, Jewish territorial sovereignty expanded by means of planting more and more trees. Many trees were hastily planted, often on cleared land not suitable for cultivating agricultural produce, in order to keep the area in Jewish hands.⁶³ Hence, the Zionist use of the 'biblical landscape' as a forestial-biblical entity – as conceived by the JNF – was a means of erasing a former Arab narrative. Still more, resonating with the Prussian Germanization of the occupied territories of eastern Europe, the Zionist desire to create a new, self-determined collective identity tied to 'its' 'authentic' national landscape was meant to produce a new landscape, shaped like an old one, but with different aesthetics and the added biological seal of its new Jewish owners (e.g. the planting of Herzl Forest in 1907). Trees were just the simplest and quickest way to achieve this goal.⁶⁴ Furthermore, following the 1948 'Palestinian Exodus' – known to many Palestinians now as *al-Nakba* (the Catastrophe) (or the 'abandonment of the Arabs', as the Israeli version has it) – some of the ('abandoned') Palestinian villages were replaced by forests, planted in such a way that would not only prevent any possibility of a future Arab (re-)claim on the land, but so that any visual and material proof of the communities that had once existed in those places would be erased. Where a forest is born, a new/old Palestinian settlement cannot exist.⁶⁵

According to van der Laarse, working under the fetish of 'landscape authenticity' translated into a need to frame heritage sites by narrowing their 'biography' to a unique national heritage, leading to an easy metamorphosis into conflicting notions of authenticity and identity.⁶⁶ Accordingly, the 'Zionist trees' manifest the core narratives 'told' by the 'biblical landscape'. Similarly to the German process of manipulating the image of the 'German forest' into one charged with a national meaning, the image of the 'biblical landscape' became a means of Zionist propaganda featuring the 'nationalization of nature' as well as 'naturalization of the nation' in both pre- and post-1948 Israel.⁶⁷ In practice, this dual process can be seen in attempts to return to an ancient 'authentic' and 'biblical' forested landscape in order to narrate contemporary history. On the one hand, this involved a return to the Bible; on the other, it involved attempts to 'Judaize' Palestina – including its forests – both physically and symbolically. This could be said to be a manifestation of a nineteenth-century Jewish Oedipal complex vis-à-vis Germany (or at least with German culture) as its focus. This romantic German-Zionist geographical imagination assisted in designing the emotional legacy of a modern Jewish return, but based on a Jewish bloodline belonging to an ancient, glorious, Jewish territory, rather than to Germany.

The forest as a memory image of the Holocaust

During the first decades of the twentieth century, the German public was already inclined to bestow a national sense on forest imagery.⁶⁸ As such, the 'German forest', and the meanings attributed to it, became a major thread in Nazi occupation techniques, such as those explored in Miriam Arani's chapter in this volume.⁶⁹ By expressing fidelity to a sublime power embodied in the national landscape, spatial imagery and practices

were used in Nazi Germany to visualize racist ideologies. Nature and landscape became a vehicle for increasingly racial, nationalistic and 'nostalgic' reconstructed history, while any departure from this theme was immediately considered an expression of irrational decadence.⁷⁰ Landscape-fetishism was a way to strengthen the allegiance of the German *Volk* (people) to 'their' fatherland and was therefore integrated into almost every aspect of everyday life. Landscape-related art, landscaping, architecture, film making – all played a role in Nazi nation-building efforts, and were highly influenced by romantic precedents, including romanticized depictions of forest imagery.⁷¹

References to a mythological past associated with forest imagery enabled the Reich's leaders to re-brand Germans as the *Waldvolk* (the people of the forest), nourishing the image of a healthy life. Cast as 'Europe's best forest protectors', this added further to the promotion of a national(istic) identity.⁷² Trees were also incorporated into the Nazi liturgy and planted throughout the country, not only in celebration of Hitler's birthday but also for other occasions.⁷³ In fact, under the Nazi regime, the soil itself became a heritage object, a status reinforced through romantic soil rituals (*Nationale Erdrituale*).⁷⁴ Examples include Langemarckhalle, built by Werner March for Berlin's 1936 Olympic Games, and meant to commemorate those who fell on enemy territory during the First World War, and the massive Totenburgen of Wilhelm Kreis which, in common with many other Nazi memorials, contained soil imported from various regions and foreign territories, all seen now as part of the German national landscape. This reverence was further strengthened by the revival of folk legends, as well as by the legislation of strict preservation laws and forest-fauna policies, such as the Reich Law for the Protection of Nature (Reichsnaturschutzgesetz) of 1935, and Hermann Göring's appointment as the Reichsjägermeister (Reich Hunting Master).⁷⁵ Furthermore, Heinrich Himmler initiated a campaign to create organic farms across Germany – farms which later cynically appeared in Nazi concentration camps.⁷⁶ Driven by these policies, oak leaves displayed a soldier's rank, while Nazi soldiers were often photographed next to trees.⁷⁷

Against the backdrop of a romantic worldview, and aided by 'German forest' imagery, the Nazis (re-)Germanized what had been perceived as an 'original' and 'authentic' homeland into a large 'German forest' territory, for example, in the Sudetenland (1938). This gradual process was ideologically and culturally justified, similarly to the Zionist approach, as a 'German return' after 600 years to *their* lost *Heimat*, while in fact inventing 'a large scale of brand new *Heimatscapes*, in which every German could feel at home'.⁷⁸ Backed by the nineteenth-century science of botany, this Nazi '*Heimat-scaping*' process was expressed through the colonization and 'cleansing' of the German Reich in the occupied territories of eastern Europe during the Second World War – legitimized by the policy of *Lebensraum*. In order to 'cleanses' the German Reich of 'contaminants', the Nazis not only planted trees throughout the land, but also used them as a vegetal curtain to obscure activities within the concentration camps situated mainly in the eastern occupied territories.⁷⁹

Within this Nazi context, German forest imagery draped itself with a multi-layered significance onto the Jewish-, soon-to-be Israeli-mindscape. While the ideas behind the image of the 'German forest' fascinated many Zionists – ideas translated to the 'biblical landscape' – the Nazi 'fatal attraction' to an 'authentic' German national

landscape, resulting in the Holocaust, complicates that image.⁸⁰ The continuous re-charging of that image with Nazi ideology rendered the forest a place of partisan revolt and shelter for survivors on the one hand, and a site where murders were performed far beyond any civilized threshold on the other.⁸¹ Consequently, after 1945, the image of the 'German forest' became a sort of *memory image* for the Holocaust and its traumatic spatiality.⁸² Resonating with the transnational iconography of the Holocaust, in post-1945 Jewish memory, entering the 'German forest' became equal to crossing a liminal border that indirectly reminded (Israeli-) Jews of the danger of Jewish life in exile. Therefore, based on a nineteenth-century imagination, but also charged with a clear racist ideology, in 1948 – with the establishment of the new Jewish state – the 'German forest' took a turn, becoming a multi-layered image: a national, even nationalist symbol that was also a 'Holocaust icon'.

From 'return' to 'occupation'

As soon as the Second World War ended, many Nazi ideas and aesthetics were either legally or socially banned, becoming taboo. Due to their place as *völkische Kunstwerke* (national(istic) artworks) during Nazi rule, romanticist depictions of the 'German forest' were also denazified in the post-war years. Subsequently, despite its significance to the Zionist geographical imagination – although mentioned in Holocaust-related films or Holocaust memoirs (and, remarkably, also in several early literary works written in Hebrew) – the image of the 'German forest' became unofficially taboo in Israeli art.⁸³ Taking this into account, van der Laarse expresses the opinion that the fetish for an 'authentic' national landscape – historically based on a romantic worldview and subsequently refined to fit Nazi ideology – has been neither fully denazified nor neglected.⁸⁴ Although current studies seek to challenge the single-narrative model enforced on a landscape, van der Laarse argues that since 'connoisseurship is still a basic assumption of authorized heritage narratives', the metaphor of the 'archaeological layering of time' continued to prevail well into the twentieth century.⁸⁵ The effect of this can be seen in the Zionist celebration in post-1948 Israel of 'its' 'authentic' and 'biblical' landscape biography.

From 1948 onwards, two processes related to the 'German forest' can be identified: firstly, it had to be rejected; paradoxically, it was subsequently and continuously re-adopted, both as a physical reality and as a concept that encouraged expansion and occupation under the claim that the landscape was 'authentically' biblical, and therefore part of the Jewish national territory. This duality, rooted firmly in the concept of 'return' (exemplified in the Zionist concept of the 'Negation of the Diaspora'), was already a feature of Israel's 1948 Declaration of Independence. Alongside mention of the Bible, inferring the Jewish biblical (or, as some would say, historical) right to own the Land of Israel, the Declaration explicitly referred to the 'landscapes of the Holocaust' and the Nazi atrocities committed on them.⁸⁶ Using these traumatic/heritage-scapes as a way to justify the legitimacy of building a Jewish national home in Israel can be interpreted as a transformation of the pre-1948 Zionist landscape into what van der Laarse refers to as a 'landscape paradox': 'On the one hand, a nostalgic longing for authenticity asks

for timeless, place-bound experiences in a postmodern consumer society,' while on the other, one has a new site that is 'permanently "under construction"'.⁸⁷ This means that the post-1948 Zionist landscape has stood for the construction of a post-1948 collective identity bound to an Israeli territory and a Jewish bloodline. In parallel, the landscape has enabled the fabrication of a timeless, collective national identity.

In light of the above, the multiplicity of artworks displaying a romantic depiction of the 'biblical landscape' in early Israeli art (even Eretz Yisraeli art) is understandable,⁸⁸ as is the long visual absence of Holocaust imagery.⁸⁹ However, despite the visual absence of Holocaust imagery – particularly of its landscapes as well as of the 'German forest' – in Israeli art, post-1948 Israeli affections for romantic ideas identified with 'German trees' can still be identified in practical terms. For instance, echoing Hitler's Oak and Hitler's Linden – planted across the German Reich for special occasions – the Israeli Knesset decided to celebrate its birthday on the Jewish holiday of Tu BiShvat, the Jewish New Year of the Trees. As well as this festive landmark, the link between pre-1945 Germany's geographical imagination and the Zionist equivalent continued beyond 1948 in other events (e.g. naming a forest after a Zionist donor, planting a tree in a newborn's name, or planting a tree as a birthday present), subtly underlining the subliminal claim that underpins the Zionist forest-imagery-transposition, that 'a nation cannot occupy its own country'.⁹⁰

Politically, the post-1948 emphasis was given to Holocaust victimhood (e.g. the Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany in 1952–3). In fact, Holocaust victimhood-related terminology is still constantly (re)produced in Israel, especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁹¹ Visually, however, the national emphasis focused primarily on the active Jewish fight. At the forefront of those stories stands the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of April 1943 – an event which is touched upon elsewhere in this volume. As part of an attempt to equate Jewish ghetto fighters with fighters in Israel's War of Independence (1948) – and thereby to move further towards Nordau's vision of *Muskeljudentum* (Muscular Judaism) configured to the pre-1948 Zionist pioneering-soldier ethos⁹² – the story of the uprising was nationalized to such an extent that it led to the abbreviation of details that did not correspond with the ghetto myth of bravery, but supported the creation of an Israeli 'chain of heroism'.⁹³ This 'chain' appears in several of the Holocaust monuments erected in Israel over the years, such as the Monument to Mordechai Anielewicz created in 1951 by Nathan Rappaport, only two years before the establishment of Yad Vashem (Israel's official memorial to the victims of the Holocaust).⁹⁴ In parallel, by 1951, less than three years after the establishment of the State of Israel, the Jewish state had initiated a massive planting programme, more ambitious than all the programmes of the British Mandate period put together.⁹⁵

Following the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973), the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank entered the Israeli 'biblical landscape'. Although there was no formal decision on annexation, save in regard to East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, the territory under Israeli control after these wars was three times larger than it had been before the wars.⁹⁶ This 'creeping annexation' of new territories, which continues to occur in the present day, reflects an archetypal Jewish fear in the form of the pre-state 'wandering Jew'. At the same time, the

addition of new territories is perceived as the modern realization of an ancient 'biblical landscape'. The renaming of some of the areas in question with Hebrew names (e.g. Judea and Samaria) was a symbolic expression of the occupation.⁹⁷ However, in physical terms, more than an act of 'Hebraization', this act reflects a process of 'biblicalization', namely, heritagization of the Bible. Akin to the German need to nationalize occupied eastern territories by giving them German names (e.g. 'Sudetenland' or 'Auschwitz') – as well as using biblical sources to name occupied territories – the use of Bible/God-related terminology gained popularity in the naming of new Jewish settlements beyond the Green Line (e.g. 'Bereshit' (Genesis), or the suffix 'El' (God)).

To further enforce the post-1967 'biblicalization' process by practical means, new JNF-KKL forests were planted on the ruins of Palestinian villages (e.g. 'Canada Park').⁹⁸ As Tal reminds us, in order to withstand the overwhelming traffic of Israeli-Jewish visitors coming to see 'their' united capital with their own eyes after the Six-Day War, the road that passes through Bab el-Wad (Sha'ar HaGai) – the site of one of the most difficult battles of the War of Independence – was expanded at the expense of the forest planted there not fifty years earlier under the British Mandate.⁹⁹ However, a few years later, when the forest failed to survive the substantial changes imposed upon it, tree branches began to break, and a severe ecological crisis erupted. This was met by Israeli politicians' frustration over the sad forestial scenery that Israeli-Jewish visitors had to witness on their way to old and holy Jerusalem.¹⁰⁰

A culture of occupation

The Israeli attempt to implement ideas associated with the 'German forest' as a means of 'Heimat-scaping' the contested Israeli-Palestinian landscape was always dependent on the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hence, the 'German forest' spans other aspects of daily life, which has enabled further enforcement of the Israeli occupation. Two key examples are the connection between the 'German forest' and archaeology, and between the former and commemoration practices. Through these spatiality-related practices, Israel can better normalize its culture of occupation.

Many nineteenth-century German foresters were also amateur archaeologists who recorded their finds from the forest as scientific proof of Germany's long history in an ancient forestial territory.¹⁰¹ Also resonating with this link, in post-1948 Israel, the new heroes of the 'biblical landscape' were acknowledged military figures who led well-known archaeological expeditions (such as Yigael Yadin or the self-proclaimed archaeologist Moshe Dayan).¹⁰² The implicit relationship between the image of the 'German forest' and post-1948 archaeology shows how the German-shaped Zionist geographical imagination allows Israel to create Jewish historical continuity in respect of 'its' 'biblical landscape'. The poor archaeological record of the Land of Israel before the arrival of the Israelites is a good example. Likewise, archaeological 'chapters' that did 'fit' the Zionist landscape biography were heightened; after the Six-Day War, archaeological artefacts such as the Dead Sea Scrolls were looted from The Jordanian Archaeological Museum's branch located in East Jerusalem. These artefacts, now in Israeli possession, are presented in the 'Shrine of the Book', the Israel Museum's

archaeological branch, as forensic evidence to justify Jewish ownership of the entire 'biblical landscape'.¹⁰³ Other 'chapters' perceived as 'less suitable' (for instance, the Byzantine and Ottoman periods) were kept hidden from the national landscape biography, as has recently occurred in the City of David archaeological project.¹⁰⁴

Corresponding to the increasing adherence to the 'biblical landscape', and continuing the national thought pattern associated with forest-walking in nineteenth-century Germany – further encouraged by Nazi Germany – through the educational system and the IDF, organized field trips have become another way to (re)claim the national Zionist landscape biography. Through the feet of young Israelis, biblical and Second Temple period-related sites have assisted in defining Israel's national memory. An example of this spatial strategy can be seen at the site of Masada. Within the first few years of the existence of the Jewish state, Masada – surrounded by breath-taking, 'biblical', desert scenery – had become synonymous with national heroism, a metaphor for the heroic fight of the 'few against the many'. But it was only in the 1960s – with the Eichmann Trial (Jerusalem, 1961–2), the 'reunification' of Jerusalem (1967), and new Jewish settlements established on annexed ground beyond the Green Line all in the background – that Masada was declared a national park by Israel's National Nature and Parks Authority. Masada has become a site of pilgrimage, where Israeli pupils are taken to celebrate their Bar-Mitzvah and Bat Mitzvah ceremonies (at the age of twelve or thirteen, respectively), and IDF soldiers make a pledge of service.¹⁰⁵

In correlation with the post-1945 Holocaust-related meaning attached to the image of the 'German forest', direct encounters with Israel's national landscape derive from the same logic that would later inspire initiatives to conduct school and IDF delegations on 'roots-journeys' (*Masa Shorashim*) to the ruins of the Nazi concentration camps in eastern Europe.¹⁰⁶ Like their 'footwork' in Israel, the act of walking the path of the nation's heroes and tragedies in eastern Europe is intended to 'teach' Israeli pupils and IDF soldiers about their national history, and to bring them closer to their Jewish identity – an identity already grounded in a stand-alone Jewish site of memory, within and outside the 'biblical landscape'.

However, the (meta-)narrative of a 'chain of heroism' that connects Jewish death in the 'landscapes of the Holocaust' with heroism (and death) in post-1948 Israel has also made concrete use of trees in commemorative acts as a kind of a Jewish interpretation of romantic soil rituals.¹⁰⁷ A prominent example comes from German-born Israeli artist Yitzhak Danziger, who offered to plant a 'Memorial Site for the Slain Soldiers of Egoz Commando Unit' not far from the Nimrod Fortress in the Golan Heights. On the Jewish holiday of Tu BiShvat in 1977, Danziger (together with bereaved IDF families) initiated the planting of oak seedlings.¹⁰⁸ Despite being an undisputed pioneer in Israel's Land Art in the 1970s, Danziger's belief in the sublime power of nature (especially that of the oak tree) – perhaps inspired by his pre-war German homeland – has gained popularity in Israel's commemorative practices. This can be seen in other commemorative projects such as Rishon LeZion's Memorial Park. This 160,000 m² complex includes the Hurshat HaBanim (The Sons' Grove), commemorating those who have fallen in the course of Israel's wars (where planting started in 1984); a monument for the 6 million Jews exterminated by the Nazis (1992); Hassidei Umot Haolam (Righteous among the

Nations) Boulevard (1994); and a monument honouring individuals from all over the world who fought the Nazis (1995).¹⁰⁹

Remarkably, the same arboreal-spatial link between the landscapes on which the image of the 'German forest' evolved and those on which it was applied in Israel/Palestine is exemplified in Yad Vashem's building: surrounded by trees that were planted for the Righteous among the Nations, one glass window projects images of Diasporic pogroms and the Holocaust, while another window gazes at the 'biblical landscape', which in reality includes the Occupied Palestinian Territories behind the Green Line. As the building of Yad Vashem clearly shows, the transposition of the 'German forest' into Israel is multifaceted. The failure to reject Nazi landscape fetishism in the post-1945 era has had an enormous effect on post-1948 Israel's culture of memory and, thereby, its culture of occupation.

Whose security arrangements should not be trusted?

Given that the denazification process (as it relates to the landscape-fetishism that perpetuated romantic concepts and reinforced them in nationalistic interpretation) has not yet been completed, let us now return to contemplate why Dror Daum chose to perform his art in Berlin's Tiergarten, after evading both Israeli and German security controls.

Despite the possibility of the Tiergarten being a 'non-Holocaust landscape' (a site devoid of any connection to the historical event) for the non-Israeli viewer, the forest's fear-fascination effect evoked by Daum's photographs heightens the multi-layered characteristics associated with the image of the 'German forest' in the Israeli mindscape. Through the reference to forest imagery, and created as a result of a physical encounter with Berlin's pseudo-forest, *Don't Trust Security Arrangements (Berlin)* depicts the empty German forest as a 'memory image' for the crimes of the Holocaust and Jewish loss: an image of fugitive Jews, partisan fighters, hidden Nazi concentration camps and dead bodies in mass graves. However, the Tiergarten itself lacks any proof of these suspected past crimes. The image of the German forest is caught between the seen and the unseen, an image awaiting 'astigmatic resurrection'.¹¹⁰

In an attempt to figure out what they are looking at, viewers are obliged to confront the crimes that remain outside the frame, alongside the traces of those crimes within the image. Forced to speculatively connect the pieces of the puzzle, the viewers are required to adopt a forensic eye – the intended scanning gaze of the artistic creation.¹¹¹ By avoiding any hint of the contemporary city of Berlin, or any depiction of human presence in the Tiergarten, the photographs already accommodate unseen symbolic traces of past terror against Jews, assisting the artist to commemorate and mourn the loss inflicted on his people. At the same time, however, through the smuggling of explosive material on a flight from Israel, and the documentation of the fireworks going off in Germany – hinted at in the title – the reference to the 'German forest' undermines Israel's security mechanisms and its discriminatory profiling system, which also operates at Ben-Gurion Airport. This is the same mechanism that – due to the role that the 'German forest' has played in the shaping of Zionism's geographical

imagination – protects Israelis, especially those who look like Daum. It is also the same mechanism that encloses and encapsulates within the landscape, often on a racial basis, those ‘others’ who do not ‘fit’ into the national narrative which Israel has forced onto the ‘biblical landscape’.

Daum’s journey to Germany and his reference to the image of the ‘German forest’ can also be interpreted as an intention to point a finger at the German authorities who failed to recognize the coming danger that the artist carried with him, and as a result, the crime he would commit. In this situation, the ‘German forest’ becomes an explosive metaphor for Germany’s contribution to the formation of Zionism’s concept of ‘return’ to an ‘authentic’ ‘biblical landscape’ as an exclusive Jewish heritagescape. As a result, *Don’t Trust Security Arrangements (Berlin)* challenges the Zionist national birth myth of the post-war State of Israel. And Daum can only do this from where it all started – a landscape that is connected to the origins of (pre-)Zionism, and upon which one of the most notorious terror events of modern times also occurred.

Being associated with both the ‘biblical landscape’ and the ‘landscapes of the Holocaust’, the image of the ‘German forest’, as depicted in Daum’s work, reveals the complex influence that Germany’s geographical imagination has had on Zionist identity, and thereby, on that of contemporary Israel. Thus, taking a stand against both security arrangements by means of a physical and symbolic ‘return’ to a (pre-1948) German forest, it is as if *Don’t Trust Security Arrangements (Berlin)* is trying to tell us that nobody has taken full responsibility for the denazification of the fetish of landscape-authenticity and the practices – as well as the imagined landscapes – born from it. These are practices and imagined landscapes that are still very much present in Israel today.

Notes

- 1 Immigrants and descendants of Jews from central and eastern Europe.
- 2 Donna West Brett, *Photography and Place: Seeing and Not Seeing Germany after 1945* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 177.
- 3 Derek Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations* (Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1994).
- 4 Jeffrey K. Wilson, *The German Forest: Nature, Identity, and the Contestation of a National Symbol, 1871–1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).
- 5 Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1995).
- 6 Eric Hirsch, ‘Introduction: Landscape. Between Place and Space’, in *The Anthropology of Landscape: Perspectives on Place and Space*, ed. Eric Hirsch and Michael O’Hanlon (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 1995), 1–30; Rob van der Laarse, ‘Fatal Attraction: Nazi Landscapes, Modernity and Holocaust Memory’, in *Landscape Biographies: Geographical, Historical and Archaeological Perspectives on the Production and Transmission of Landscapes*, ed. Rita Hermans, Hans Renes and Jan Kolen (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 345–75.
- 7 Tom Selwyn, ‘Landscapes of Liberation and Imprisonment: Towards an Anthropology of the Israeli Landscape’, in *The Anthropology of Landscape: Perspectives on Place and Space*, ed. M. O’Hanlon and E. Hirsch (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 1995), 114–34.

- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, 'Exile within Sovereignty: A Critique of the Concept "Negation of Exile" in Israeli Culture (Part 1)', *Theory and Criticism* 4 (1993): 23–53 (in Hebrew).
- 10 Yaacov Shavit and Mordechai Eran, *The Hebrew Bible Reborn: From Holy Scripture to the Book of Books. A History of Biblical Culture and the Battles over the Bible in Modern Judaism* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007).
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 The Jewish 'Yishuv' refers to early Jewish residents in the region from the late nineteenth century, throughout Ottoman rule, and later, in Mandatory Palestine, that is, prior to the establishment of the State of Israel as a Jewish state in 1948. In this chapter, in place of the expression 'Mandatory Palestine' I employ the popular Israeli-Hebrew terminology, spelling 'Palestina' with an 'a' at the end of the word in order to differentiate pre-1948 Israel from Palestine, ending with the letter 'e', the latter standing at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This linguistic distinction, which is based on the Hebrew language (פלשתינן/פלשתינה) and closely relates to the German word '*Palästina*', has enabled Israeli politicians to claim over the years that 'there is no such thing as the Palestinian People'.
- 13 Shavit and Eran, *The Hebrew Bible Reborn*.
- 14 Selwyn, 'Landscapes of Liberation and Imprisonment'.
- 15 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 16 Shavit and Eran, *The Hebrew Bible Reborn*.
- 17 Rob van der Laarse, 'Gazing at Places We Have Never Been. Landscape, Heritage, and Identity. A Comment on Jörg Rekkittke and Philip Paar: "Past Pictures. Landscape Visualization with Digital Tools"', in *The Cultural Landscape & Heritage Paradox: Protection and Development of the Dutch Archaeological-Historical Landscape and Its European Dimension*, ed. T. (J. H. F.) Bloemers, H. Kars, A. Van der Valk and M. Wijnen (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 321–8.
- 18 Raz-Krakotzkin, 'Exile within Sovereignty'.
- 19 Ibid.; Selwyn, 'Landscapes of Liberation and Imprisonment'.
- 20 Schama, *Landscape and Memory*; Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 21 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 22 Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 23 Uli Linke, *Blood and Nation: The European Aesthetics of Race* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 24 Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 25 Alon Confino, 'The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Heimat, National Memory and the German Empire, 1871–1918', *History & Memory* 5, no. 1 (1993): 42–86.
- 26 Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 27 Linke, *Blood and Nation*, 197–211.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Brett, *Photography and Place*, 159.
- 33 Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 34 Ibid., 5–48.
- 35 Ibid. One consequence was the introduction of the Field and Forest Law (*Feld-und Forstpolizeigesetz*) on 1 April 1880.

- 36 Schama, *Landscape and Memory*.
- 37 Wilson, *The German Forest*. One famous Goethe Oak was, in fact, inside the Buchenwald concentration camp. It later became a memorial site within the territory of Buchenwald Memorial.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 40 Wilson, *The German Forest*, 177.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 43 Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 44 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 45 In this context, Nordau's admiration of the 'Nordic' landscape can be seen in his novel *The Malady of Our Century* (1887), and implicitly, in his decision to change his 'eastern European' name 'Simcha Südfeld' to the 'Nordic' name 'Max Nordau'. On this, see Rob van der Laarse, 'Masking the Other: Max Nordau's Representation of Hidden Jewishness', *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historique* 25 no. 1 (1999): 1–31.
- 46 While it was Zionism that looked up to Germany, Germany also looked to Zionism. The appearance of the 'German forest' dates to the Reformation, when Germans re-encountered the ancient Roman book of Cornelius Tacitus, *Germania* (c. 98 CE). Tacitus characterizes trees as the source of German power and freedom, albeit with religious aspects dominant over nationalist ones. In the early twentieth century, Tacitus's book, commonly in print since the 1470s, became an integral part of Germany's *Urgeschichte* (ancient history). Therefore, it is not especially surprising to discover that, just as Zionism modified and secularized the Bible in order to justify the 'biblical landscape', so too did Hitler later find a strong connection between Tacitus's *Germania* and the re-emergence of the German Reich. Another example of the mutual relationship is found in Nordau's *Entartung* (Degeneration) (1892–3), which influenced Nazi ideology. To this list, one might also add the establishment of the Landesgruppe Palästina and the early Nazi movement in Palestina, which perceived the Holy Land as part of 'our [Germany's] beautiful Palestine'. On this, see Heidemarie Wawrzyn, *Nazis in the Holy Land, 1933–1948* (Berlin, Boston and Jerusalem: De Gruyter; Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2013).
- 47 Alon Tal, *All the Trees of the Forest: Israel's Woodlands from the Bible to the Present* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013).
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Ibid.; Nili Liphshitz and Gideon Biger, 'Afforestation Policy of the Zionist Movement in Palestine 1895–1948', *Katedrah: le-toldot Erets Yiśra'el ye-yishuvah* 80 (1996): 88–108.
- 50 Wilson, *The German Forest*, 43–6.
- 51 Yael Zerubavel, 'Memory, the Rebirth of the Native, and the "Hebrew Bedouin" Identity', *Social Research* 75, no. 1 (2008): 315–52.
- 52 It is interesting to note that the (semi-cooperative) village called 'Alonei Abba', located in Lower Galilee, was originally established as a Templar settlement called 'Waldheim' (Home in the Forest).
- 53 Tal, *All the Trees of the Forest*.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Liphshitz and Biger, 'Afforestation Policy'.
- 56 Ibid.; Irus Braverman, *Planted Flags: Trees, Land, and Law in Israel/Palestine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

- 57 Tal, *All the Trees of the Forest*.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Liphshitz and Biger, 'Afforestation Policy'.
- 60 Tal, *All the Trees of the Forest*.
- 61 Ibid.
- 62 Ibid., 88–9.
- 63 Liphshitz and Biger, 'Afforestation Policy'.
- 64 Braverman, *Planted Flags*.
- 65 Carol B. Bardenstein, 'Trees, Forests, and the Shaping of Palestinian and Israeli Collective Memory', in *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present*, ed. M. Bal, J. Crewe and L. Spitzer (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1999), 148–68. According to Eitan Bronstein Aparicio, founder of 'Zochrot' – an NGO whose goal is to 'promote acknowledgement and accountability for the ongoing injustices of the Nakba' – most JNF forests and sites are located on the ruins of Palestinian villages: <https://www.zochrot.org/en/article/55963> (accessed 13 August 2020). In this context, however, it is important to note that before 1948 the JNF not only paid market value for lands purchased from the Mandate, but also refrained from planting forests on purchased fields. On this, see Tal, *All the Trees of the Forest*.
- 66 Rob van der Laarse, 'Beyond Auschwitz? Europe's Terrrorscapes in the Age of Postmemory', in *Memory and Postwar Memorials: Confronting the Violence of the Past*, ed. M. Silberman and F. Vatan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 71–94.
- 67 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 68 Schama, *Landscape and Memory*; Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 69 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 70 Artworks of this sort were frequently, and absurdly, condemned as 'degenerate art' (*Entartete Kunst*), borrowing Nordau's terminology.
- 71 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 72 Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 73 Brett, *Photography and Place*.
- 74 Hans-Ernst Mittag, 'Nationale Erdrituale', *Kritische Berichte: Zeitschrift für Kunst- und Kulturwissenschaften* 25, no. 1 (1997): 4–22.
- 75 Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 76 Schama, *Landscape and Memory*.
- 77 Ibid.; Brett, *Photography and Place*.
- 78 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction', 360.
- 79 Schama, *Landscape and Memory*. Ironically, despite the effort expended to eliminate any possibility of the German Heimatscape testifying to the Nazi horrors carried out upon it, no other genocide has produced more evidence than the Holocaust.
- 80 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 81 Schama, *Landscape and Memory*.
- 82 Brett, *Photography and Place*, 162. On the role trees play as sites of Palestinian collective memory, see Bardenstein, 'Trees, Forests, and the Shaping of Palestinian and Israeli Collective Memory'.
- 83 Indeed, Jewish prisoners represented their traumatic landscapes even from within the locations of the Nazi atrocities. However, these were heavily marginalized or entirely excluded from the Israeli art canon, being mainly viewed as visual testimonies of the Nazi atrocities that occurred there and then.
- 84 van der Laarse, 'Fatal Attraction'.
- 85 Ibid., 345.

- 86 The text of the 1948 Declaration can be found here: https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm (accessed 15 January 2020).
- 87 van der Laarse, 'Gazing at Places We Have Never Been', 324.
- 88 Dalia Manor, 'Biblical Zionism in Bezalel Art', *Israel Studies* 6, no. 1 (2001): 55–75; Dalia Manor, 'Orientalism and Jewish National Art: The Case of Bezalel', in *Orientalism and the Jews*, ed. Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek Penslar (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 2005), 142–61.
- 89 Dalia Manor, 'From Rejection to Recognition: Israeli Art and the Holocaust', *Israel Affairs* 4, no. 3–4 (1998): 253–77; Roe Rosen, 'The Visibility and Invisibility of Trauma: Traces of the Holocaust in the Work of Moshe Gershuni and in Israeli Art', *The Jerusalem Review* 2 (1997): 98–118.
- 90 An idiom that frequently appears in political discourse in Israel.
- 91 This can be traced from Abba Eban's use of the term 'Auschwitz borders' through to the use of the Yellow Badge motif during the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005. The trail continues in the pleas by Knesset Members Rehavam Zé'evi and Avigdor Liberman to apply a transfer to the Palestinians, while also accusing Palestinians of wishing for a 'Judenreines Land', and in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's famous speech in September 2016, in which he accused the Palestinians of 'ethnic cleansing'.
- 92 On this, see van der Laarse, 'Masking the Other'.
- 93 Batya Brutin, *Living with the Memory: Monuments in Israel Commemorating the Holocaust* (Beit Lohamei ha-Getta'ot: Beit Lohamei ha-Getta'ot Press, 2005) (in Hebrew).
- 94 On this work, see <http://www.israelpublicart.com/public-art-catalog/monument-to-mordechai-anilewicz> (accessed 14 February 2020). A similar approach can be found in the warm national reception that greeted the novella and play entitled *He Walked through the Fields*, written by Moshe Shamir – one of the greatest writers of the Tashach Generation (the Hebrew year of Israel's Declaration of Independence).
- 95 Tal, *All the Trees of the Forest*, 32–3.
- 96 Uri Ram, 'A Decade of Turmoil: Israeli Society and Politics in the Seventies', in *The Eyes of the Nation: Perspectives on Israeli Art of the Seventies. Visual Art in a Country without Boundaries*, ed. E. Ginton (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Museum of Art, 1998), 346–326 (countdown).
- 97 Ibid.
- 98 Bardenstein, 'Trees, Forests, and the Shaping of Palestinian and Israeli Collective Memory'.
- 99 Tal, *All the Trees of the Forest*, 56–7.
- 100 This may call to mind Germany's 'forest death crisis' (*Waldsterben*) of the 1980s.
- 101 Wilson, *The German Forest*.
- 102 Jonathan M. Golden, *Ancient Canaan and Israel: New Perspectives* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004).
- 103 Remarkably, the first exhibition to be presented in the Israel Museum in Jerusalem (1965), dealt with 'the image of the Bible in Western art', while the museum itself – built on the former lands of the Arab village Sheik Bader and designed to resemble an Arab village – presents a unique fusion between art and archaeology. On this, see Zvi Efrat, *The Object of Zionism: The Architecture of Israel* (Leipzig: Spector, 2018).
- 104 A topic explored in Raphael Greenberg, 'Contested Site: Archaeology and the Battle for Jerusalem', *Jewish Quarterly* 54, no. 4 (2007): 20–6.

- 105 Whether or not the historical site of Masada delivers any archaeological proof of the alleged heroic story is still highly contested. However, there is a consensus in the research regarding the role of the myth surrounding the site, and its growth in particular since 1967. On this, see Yael Zerubavel, 'Bar Kokhba's Image in Modern Israeli Culture', in *The Bar Kokhba War Reconsidered: New Perspectives on the Second Jewish Revolt against Rome*, ed. P. Schäfer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 279–97.
- 106 Israeli delegations to Poland began in the 1960s, but with the entry of the IDF into Lebanon in the 1980s, these were introduced into the education system.
- 107 Mittag, 'Nationale Erdrituale'. To continue the vegetal terminology, IDF soldiers who die are referred to in Hebrew as 'young flowers cut off in their prime'.
- 108 Mordechai Omer, *Yitzhak Danziger* (Tel Aviv and Tefen: Tel Aviv Museum of Art; The Open Museums Tefen, 1996) (in Hebrew).
- 109 Brutin, *Living with the Memory*.
- 110 Brett, *Photography and Place*.
- 111 Ralph Rugoff, *Scene of the Crime* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

Epilogue: Towards a comparative study of the visuality of occupation(s)

Jeremy E. Taylor

‘Retrocede Hong Kong!’ Transcultural images of occupations past

In March 2019 – as this volume was being compiled – popular protests against the introduction of the ‘Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill’ broke out in Hong Kong, as many Hong Kongers objected to the possibility of being subject to extradition to mainland China. These protests escalated over the following weeks and months, with extradition soon being eclipsed by numerous other grievances about the nature of governance in this city. By August 2019, almost a quarter of the entire population of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) was coming onto the streets to join anti-government marches. Some of the protests turned increasingly violent, with Hong Kong International Airport temporarily being closed, and clashes between protestors and police occurring on university campuses by November.¹

News agencies focused on the challenge that the 2019 protests posed for the legitimacy of the SAR authorities. However, there were two important characteristics of the protests (as well as the responses to them) which largely went unnoticed by the international press. The first of these was that the events of 2019 were played out as much through the control and circulation of images as they were on the streets – or, to put it another way, the control of Hong Kong’s ‘representational spaces’ mattered just as much as the physical cordoning of city thoroughfares.² Visuality and the control of images were central to the protests.³ One of the enduring legacies of 2019, for example, was the resurrection of ‘Lennon Walls’ as a mode of anti-hegemonic expression.⁴ In 2019, Hong Kong’s (and Hong Kong-themed) Lennon Walls, plastered with a vast numbers of Post-it notes, upon which were written or drawn pro-protest messages, emerged as icons of the movement.⁵

Yet the visuality of the 2019 protests went far beyond walls. It manifested itself in the circulation via social media of photographs of police violence and of crowds marching in downtown Hong Kong, as well as in overt acts of anti-Beijing iconoclasm, as some protestors defaced images of Chinese leaders or threw Chinese flags into Victoria Harbour. If there were ever any doubts about the centrality of ‘the visual’ in

2019 in Hong Kong, these were dispelled following the introduction in October of a colonial-era ordinance that banned the wearing of masks by protestors – a regulation that would, in effect, make protestors' faces *visible* to the authorities.

The second, though far less discussed, element of the Hong Kong protests was their symbolic and rhetorical links to various interpretations of the concept of 'occupation'. Despite the catalyst of the extradition bill in March 2019, the protest movement could trace its origins to events that had taken place in Hong Kong during 2014 – that is, the 'Umbrella movement', which had started under the rubric of 'Occupy Central'.⁶ While generated by Hong Kong-specific grievances over SAR rule and the perceived interference of the PRC authorities in Hong Kong affairs, the 'Occupy Central' movement was, in other words, equally inspired by the performative precedents of the 'Occupy Wall Street' movement some years earlier and the wider Occupy movement around the world. These origins were evident in much of the iconography of the 2019 protests. Images of streets crowded with hundreds of thousands of protestors in 2019 echoed imagery that had emerged through Occupy protests elsewhere almost a decade earlier.⁷

The link to 'occupation' went far deeper than such Occupy antecedents, however. The very language of the protest movement in 2019, much of it deliberately ironic, touched directly on questions of sovereignty, or made reference to historical cases of military occupation beyond Hong Kong. The regular calls by protestors and graffiti artists to '*gwong fuk*' Hong Kong – a verb commonly rendered as 'liberate' in the English-language press, but which is better translated as 'retrocede', or 'restore [territory that has been lost]', and used as an expression of protest in Hong Kong since 2016 – deliberately referenced the lexicon of wartime Chinese nationalism, as lands once 'occupied' by the Japanese empire were 'retroceded' to Chinese sovereignty in 1945.⁸ Contrarily, the calls by some protestors for the United States to 'liberate' Hong Kong (making use of English-language rhetoric derived from the Second World War in Europe),⁹ or for the restoration of British colonial rule, all suggested that Hong Kong was somehow suffering under foreign (i.e. PRC) occupation, and that a change of sovereignty was therefore needed. Even the labelling of Hong Kong's Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor as a 'puppet' or a *gong gaan* (traitor to Hong Kong) by protestors recalled Second World War-era Chinese resistance rhetoric.¹⁰ Such language spoke directly and provocatively to a PRC government which now puts memory of the 'bleakest chapter in the history of China' (i.e. the Japanese occupation) at the heart of its patriotic education.¹¹ In waving foreign flags, or scrawling expressions such as *gwong fuk Heunggong* (retrocede Hong Kong) onto Lennon Walls, protestors were suggesting that Hong Kong itself was, in many senses, 'occupied' by an authoritarian China. In Hong Kong, the Rancièrian understanding of 'Occupy' and the Hague Convention inspired–notion of 'occupation' overlapped with and complemented each other.

I start this epilogue (and end this book) with the 2019 protests not because I believe that twenty-first-century Hong Kong should be viewed as comparable to Nazi-occupied Europe in the 1940s or the Occupied Palestinian Territories today. What Hong Kong does illustrate, however, is that many anti-hegemonic protest movements around the world now draw on notions of 'occupation' (and, indeed, 'Liberation') from a variety of temporal and geographic contexts. In Hong Kong's case, this includes 1980s Prague,

post-Second World War China and Europe, and the Occupy movements of the early twenty-first century.

A number of chapters in this edited volume have shown how such transcultural and transhistorical borrowing – by those who resist occupation *and* by those who advocate or enact it – is now commonplace well beyond Hong Kong. Chrisoula Lionis has shown us that memories of the Nazi occupation of Greece have shaped more recent responses to what she calls ‘financial occupation’ in the post-Financial Crisis years. And Katarzyna Jarosz reminds us that the methods deployed in visualizing and commemorating the trauma of the Holocaust have, in recent decades, shaped the choices made by museums in the ‘post-Soviet space’ of eastern Europe as they re-envisage the experience of Soviet occupation. The Hong Kong protests underscore not only the ongoing sensitivity that accusations of ‘occupation’ can evoke, but also the longevity of the textual and visual rhetoric originating in historical cases of occupation in cultural politics all around the world today. To cite Gerhard Paul’s notion of ‘visual history’ again, such cases highlight the ‘historicity of the visual’ in contemporary politics and events.¹²

What I hope this volume has highlighted more broadly, however, is that a dialogue which brings together studies from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Australia can help to bring such transcultural ties into a far clearer focus – with regard to not just ongoing events or occupations today, but also cases of occupation from earlier periods. Indeed, this book starts and finishes with two studies which highlight the movement of images, modes of visibility and ‘ways of seeing’ across continents, decades and ideologies. The battle for control of the ‘visual narrative’ in post-war East Germany did not stop with the introduction of new ‘ways of seeing’ from the Soviet Union in 1945; it was, equally, a struggle to respond to, manipulate or re-deploy the visual cultures of a defunct Third Reich. The visual and geographic imaginings that are used today to justify discussions around the possible annexation of areas within the Occupied Palestinian Territories by the Israeli government share a common ancestor in the arboreal visions that were once used to justify Nazi occupation of central and eastern Europe.¹³ Yet the movement of imagery, visual rhetoric, and visual narratives across time and space can be found throughout this collection, as the visual references to American rule in Hawaii during the US post-war occupation of Okinawa (a key theme in Mire Koikari’s chapter) demonstrate. Even the spaces in which ‘national’ histories of occupation are commemorated today suggest intriguing transhistorical and transcultural connections: the sites at which Nazi, Japanese and Soviet occupation is commemorated in the Baltic states, eastern Europe and China, all draw on a common visual rhetoric of trauma (despite the very different experiences of occupation in each of these countries or regions). And as Pearlie Rose S. Baluyut’s chapter shows us, there are unsettling echoes of earlier conflicts in the very spaces that are chosen as sites in which visual responses to historical cases of occupation are displayed today.

Images and ‘ways of seeing’ under occupation

Attention to transcultural and transhistorical links – to the manner in which different ‘occupations’ speak to each other across time and space – is not unique to the case

studies which have been featured in this book, or indeed to the visual history of occupation more broadly. Yet it is only through a comparative approach that such links become clear. One of the many consequences of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the emergence of 'occupation studies' as a scholarly field (though it is seldom defined in this manner) and, as part of this, the compiling of comparative studies of foreign occupation from a range of disciplinary perspectives. Many of the key texts from this body of comparative scholarship in political science, sociology and law have been cited at different points throughout this volume.¹⁴

Comparative *visual* studies of occupation, however, have been rare.¹⁵ This is surprising given that the study of the visual aspects of occupation(s) have been so central to theoretical developments in fields such as 'critical visual studies' and 'visual cultures', and despite (to cite Gerhard Paul again) the 'visuality of history' that is now being acknowledged across the academy. For Gil Hochberg, occupation in and of itself determines 'what or who can be seen, what or who remains invisible, who can see and whose vision is compromised';¹⁶ the 'visual' is thus central to the very essence of the occupation that represents the focus of her study – that is, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Similarly, for scholars whose focus is the image (rather than 'ways of seeing'), there is an inalienable link between conflict and the control of 'the visual' which predates the more recent cases of occupation that have inspired so many theoretical advances in the study of visual cultures. As Horst Bredekamp argues, for example:

Images have always been an effective weapon – as symbols of victory, as propaganda, as indoctrination – even in the arsenals of well-matched belligerents, be it in parallel with, or subsequent to, the more literal waging of war. But in the context of an asymmetrical war they may even become primary weapons.¹⁷

The studies that make up this volume have, if anything, confirmed such arguments. For those who overtly resist occupation – through art, iconoclasm or subversion – images have always been, and remain, crucial 'weapons' in 'asymmetrical wars' against foreign incursion. We can see this in the Palestinian Diaspora today as much as we can see it in post-war East Germany and US-occupied Okinawa. Yet as Maayan Amir, Miriam Arani and other contributors to this volume remind us, art can also be 'weaponized' in support of occupation.

Many of the chapters in this volume have also demonstrated how control of the production, circulation and destruction of images (e.g. the policies that occupation authorities put in place with regard film exhibition, the organization of art exhibits, the production of photographs or even the trade in visual media) have been central to attempts to 'control' the occupied as well. Alexey Tikhomirov's innovative model of the 'visual occupation regime', for example, describes 'a web of meanings that has the power to create solidarities, form subjectivities and provide stability for political orders' in such contexts. Such regimes include their 'own images and aesthetics, rules governing observation and recognition, and practices of seeing and interpreting the world'. As Emily Oliver notes in her chapter, however, such regimes need not always represent a coherent whole. Policies governing cultural production under occupation can be

influenced by a multitude of sources, including 'domestic pressure groups, specific national history, and wider foreign policy interests'. Nor are such regimes necessarily always hegemonic, despite harbouring aspirations to be so. One of the recurring themes in many of this book's chapters has been the *limits* of occupying powers' attempts to control visual or representational space. Jennifer Coates reminds us that visual media is not always interpreted by 'the occupied' in ways that occupation authorities may plan, and Mire Koikari demonstrates that under US rule, 'Okinawans engaged in resistance, both small and large'. As Miriam Arani's study shows, even under the most repressive and violent cases of occupation, some groups and individuals do find ways to turn images produced in the service of 'visual occupation regimes' into tools of resistance.

To be sure, the sudden and often violent introduction of new power relations that are visited upon a society under occupation can disrupt (or completely re-order) the place of that society in what Deborah Poole has described as the 'visual economy' – that is, the system in which 'images also accrue value through the social processes of accumulation, possession, circulation, and exchange'.¹⁸ At the same time, however, such transformations do not always benefit the 'occupier'. The subversion of 'visual occupation regimes' – as well as the (sometimes playful) endowment of old and new images, modalities and visual narratives with new meanings and significance – is all part of the 'occupation experience'.

While not all contributors have necessarily adopted Poole's notion of 'visual economy' here, many have nonetheless put discussion of the circulation of images as material objects (be these works of art, photographs, films or pictorials) that are produced, circulated or interpreted during occupation at the forefront of their analyses.¹⁹ Material 'image objects' can become resources for the prosecution of war and subsequent occupations. Their exchange can also become a source of funds and morale for an occupying force – as was the case with the artworks that adorned the walls of the Tel Aviv Museum at the long-forgotten 'Israeli Artists for Security' Exhibition in 1967 (as detailed in Maayan Amir's chapter). Miriam Arani's chapter underlines the need to analyse not just the contents of photographs, but the processes by which photographs are produced and then moved as objects across and within occupied territories. The movement of such image objects takes on a quite different significance in Pearlie Rose S. Baluyut's contribution, in which the trade in the visual residue of occupation is shown to continue well beyond the occupation itself and might even be interpreted as constituting new forms of cultural domination as a result of shifting economic and power relations within Southeast Asia.

Methodologically, such studies suggest that the boundaries which supposedly separate art history, visual anthropology, cultural history and 'visual cultures' are perhaps more porous than they are often presented as being.²⁰ More importantly, however, they illustrate how a focus on occupation as a unique milieu can complement existing research in fields such as the history of photography, heritage studies and memory studies. A growing body of literature on what might be termed 'occupation photography', for instance, is already engaging with the place of official photography in 'shaping interpretations' of occupied territories, or in creating and sustaining the 'visual power politics' inherent in all cases of occupation.²¹ A number of this book's chapters represent important new contributions to this emerging field.

A similar case might be made for the study of occupation and memory that, since Henry's Rousso's crucial intervention, has remained a major thread in the study of the changing interpretations of occupation.²² A good deal of such literature has explored the creation of narratives around memories of historical cases of occupation,²³ and there is an increasing move towards comparing the development of quite different narratives in light of post-occupation politics in different parts of the world.²⁴ It has been in the field of 'occupation museum studies' which the visualization of such memories has been particularly prominent.²⁵ This is a fact that a number of chapters in this volume amply illustrate. These detail the role of museums and heritage sites in not simply visualizing certain elements of the memory of occupation, but rendering other elements entirely invisible – just as occupation authorities themselves once rendered those who resisted occupation invisible.

Making comparative studies of occupation visual

I have resisted the temptation to advocate a single set of methodologies for the study of 'the visual' under occupation in this volume. Instead, the notion of 'visual history' has been adopted in the collection's title precisely because it allows for a broad set of approaches that are compatible with quite different disciplines, from art history to visual anthropology. But what can a dialogue which focuses on 'the visual' contribute to the study of occupation beyond that which political, legal or sociological studies have done in the past?

Firstly, I would argue that the application of a 'visual history' approach not only affirms but also extends our grasp of conclusions that are emerging in cognate fields (such as those touched on above). Take, for instance, the burgeoning scholarship on occupation and gender. Some of the leading scholars of occupation are gender historians, and the books and articles written by scholars such as Mire Koikari, Sarah Kovner and Christine de Matos²⁶ – to say nothing of an entire generation of scholars who felt compelled to respond to the release of the Abu Ghraib images in 2004²⁷ – have become seminal works in the field. Central to much of this scholarship is the notion that the complex power relations that develop under occupation are, by their very nature, gendered. 'Occupation power,' argue Christine de Matos and Rowena Ward, for example:

is performed, negotiated and subverted on a daily basis through the questioning and interrogation of both normative and changing gender roles in occupation power hierarchies and in occupied societies and spaces.²⁸

By adopting a broadly 'visual history' approach to the study of occupation, such arguments only become more convincing. Indeed, the inextricable links between gender, occupation and visibility are reinforced in this volume by the mere fact that gender is present – to a greater or lesser degree – in virtually every chapter, with a number of authors putting it at the centre of their studies. Gender was crucial to

attempts to install new 'ways of seeing' in US-occupied Japan and Okinawa, just as it was in Soviet-occupied East Germany and the Japanese-occupied Philippines.

A transcultural 'visual history' of occupation of the sort attempted through this volume not only confirms the findings of earlier studies in sociology and other fields. It can also help to pose new questions that have the potential to go beyond the well-established study of gendered representations of men and women under occupation. How do specific modes of visibility that are employed under occupation not simply reflect existing gender relations but themselves *gender* the power relations which emerge in such contexts? How (to reference Jennifer Coates's chapter) can gendered archetypes and stereotypes that are developed in entirely different cultural and political circumstances be manipulated, reinterpreted or reinvented in new occupied contexts? And how are memories of past occupations gendered in their modes of display or visualization today?

Similar questions might be asked about the study of race – a topic which a number of recent studies have shown to be virtually impossible to separate from gender in the occupation context.²⁹ As one recent collection on the topic has argued, for instance, occupations are essentially 'occupations of "the Other";'³⁰ and their prosecution is defined by the institutionalization of cultural, ethnic and racial distinctions between 'occupiers' and 'the occupied' alike. Ironically, the immutability of such distinctions is at least part of the reason behind the common condemnation of 'collaborators' (i.e. members of the 'occupied' society who commit the supposedly ultimate act of betrayal – cooperating with 'outsiders' against one's own 'people') in overtly racialized *and* gendered ways – be those *collabos* in post-war France or *gong gaan* in Hong Kong in 2019. There is also a burgeoning scholarship on the sociology of race and gender with regard to the spaces of compromised sovereignty found in military bases. Much of this work explores the complex ways in which racial hierarchies from 'occupier' nations interact with the new power relations experienced under occupation,³¹ as well as the fate of children born of liaisons or relationships between occupying forces and local people.³²

A 'visual history' of occupation allows us to actually *see* the power of visual media in supporting the racializing policies which often accompany occupation forces, and to consider how 'ways of seeing' such media are themselves gendered and racialized. This can be seen in the use of photography and cinema in the depiction of 'occupied races' as well as in the 'nationalization' of gendered archetypes envisaged under the brush of 'occupied' artists. More importantly, however, a comparative study allows us to see the movement of racialized stereotypes across different occupations – the 'caftan Jew' in Nazi-occupied Warsaw and British-occupied Berlin, for example, or the bow-legged caricature of the Japanese soldier who appears in resistance art in Manila and modern-day museums dedicated to the memory of occupation in China alike.

What all of this suggests is that the 'historicity of the visual' and the 'visuality of history' lie at the heart of occupation. By its very nature, occupation renders some things visible and other things invisible; proscribes certain 'ways of seeing' while undermining others; and endows images and visual tropes with new significance and meaning. Only by stepping outside the 'ingrained anti-visualism of the social sciences'

will we be able to see this,³³ and only by acknowledging that occupations have ‘visual histories’ will we be able to arrive at a fuller understanding of occupation itself.

Notes

- 1 For a chronological overview of the protests, see Martin Purbrick, ‘A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests’, *Asian Affairs* 50, no. 4 (2019): 465–87.
- 2 On this, see John Lowe and Stephan Ortmann, ‘Unmasking Nativism in Asia’s World City: Graffiti and Identity Boundary Un/making in Hong Kong’, *Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies* 34, no. 3 (January 2020): 398–416.
- 3 A point that Daniel Garrett has made with regard to the protests that took place in Hong Kong some years earlier. See Daniel Garrett, *Counter-hegemonic Resistance in China’s Hong Kong: Visualizing Protest in the City* (Singapore: Springer 2014).
- 4 ‘Lennon Walls’ were first used in Hong Kong in 2014, but were inspired by the original Lennon Wall in Prague that had been set up in 1980 as a space in which anti-government messages could be visualized through graffiti and murals. On the origins of Lennon Walls, see Robert J. Kruse, II, ‘Contemporary Geographies of John Lennon’, *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 22, no. 5 (2005): 456–61.
- 5 Mai Corlin, ‘The Visual Resistance of the Hong Kong Protest Movement: From Post-it Notes to PR Machine’, ADI/ChinaTalks lecture, University of Copenhagen, 19 December 2019: <https://asiandynamics.ku.dk/english/news/mai-corlin-visual-resistance-of-hong-kong-protests/> (accessed 10 February 2020).
- 6 Sebastian Veg, ‘Creating a Textual Public Space: Slogans and Texts from Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement’, *Journal of Asian Studies* 75, no. 3 (2016): 673–702.
- 7 On the image of the crowd as a major component of the visuality of the Occupy movement prior to Hong Kong in 2014, see W. J. T. Mitchell, ‘Image, Space, Revolution: The Arts of Occupation’, *Critical Inquiry* 39, no. 1 (2012): 8–32.
- 8 Geremie Barmé, ‘Restoring Hong Kong: Revolution of our Times’, *China Heritage Quarterly*, 6 August 2019: <http://chinaheritage.net/journal/restoring-hong-kong-revolution-of-our-times/> (accessed 10 February 2020).
- 9 ‘Hong Kong protestors appeal to Trump for help’, *BBC News*, 8 September 2019: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-49625233> (accessed 10 February 2020).
- 10 And specifically the term ‘*hanjian*’, which (as we saw in Jean Hillier and Shulan Fu’s chapter in this volume) continues to be used in China to condemn those who are believed to have ‘collaborated’ with Japanese occupation forces in the 1930s and 1940s. On the use of such language in Hong Kong, see Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘“Beijing’s Puppet”: Carrie Lam Faces Reckoning in Hong Kong’, *The Guardian*, 14 June 2019: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/14/carrie-lam-hong-kong-chief-executive-china-beijing-puppet> (accessed 10 February 2020).
- 11 Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 56.
- 12 Gerhard Paul, ‘Visual History (English Version)’, 2011: [https://docupedia.de/zg/Visual_History_\(english_version\)](https://docupedia.de/zg/Visual_History_(english_version)) (accessed 6 February 2020).
- 13 I am referring here to Noga Stiasny’s chapter. On recent debates about the possible annexation of parts of the West Bank, see Michael Lynk, ‘Annexation and the End of the Two-state Solution’, *Palestine-Israel Journal* 24, no. 1 (2019): <https://www.pij.org>

- org/articles/1943/annexation-and-the-end-of-the-twostate-solution (accessed 10 February 2020).
- 14 Cora Goldstein's work is representative of such an approach in political science. For an example of her work, see '2003 Iraq, 1945 Germany, and 1940 France: Success and Failure in Military Occupations,' *Military Review* 90, no. 4 (2010): 43–50; for a comparative study from a sociological perspective, see Cornelius J. Lammers, 'The American Occupation Regime in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Iraq,' *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 1 (2012): 49–70; for a comparative legal study, see Aeyal Gross, *The Writing on the Wall: Rethinking the International Law of Occupation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
 - 15 Although, as mentioned in the Introduction, a number of collections *have* been published, one example being the special issue of *Radical History Review* 106 (Winter 2010), edited by Lisa Brock, Conor McGrady and Teresa Meade.
 - 16 Gil Z. Hochberg, *Visual Occupations: Violence and Visibility in a Conflict Zone* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 5.
 - 17 Horst Bredekamp, *Image Acts: A Systematic Approach to Visual Agency*, trans. Elizabeth Clegg (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 2.
 - 18 Deborah Poole, *Vision, Race and Modernity: A Visual Economy of the Andean Image World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 11.
 - 19 On the study of the materiality of objects, see Elizabeth Edwards, 'Objects of Affect: Photography beyond the Image,' *Annual Review of Anthropology* 41 (2012): 221–34.
 - 20 On the relationship between these disciplines, see Arnd Scheider, 'Unfinished Dialogues: Notes towards an Alternative History of Art and Anthropology,' in *Made to Be Seen: Perspectives on the History of Visual Anthropology*, ed. Marcus Banks and Jay Ruby (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 108–35.
 - 21 On the former, see Claire Gorrara, 'What the Liberator Saw: British War Photography, Picture Post and the Normandy Campaign,' *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 9, no. 4 (2016): 303–18; on the latter, see Hans Petschar and Herbert Friedlmeier, 'The Photographic Gaze – Austrian Visual Lives during the Occupation Decade: A Cross-section of Ordinary Austrians Photographed by American and Austrian Artists,' in *Austrian Lives*, ed. Günter Bischof, Fritz Plasser and Eva Maltschnig (New Orleans, LA: University of New Orleans Press, 2012), 384.
 - 22 Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
 - 23 Margaret Atack and Christopher Lloyd, ed., *Framing Narratives of the Second World War and Occupation in France, 1939–2009: New Readings* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).
 - 24 Daniel Chiro, Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider, ed., *Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014).
 - 25 Constantin Iordachi and Péter Apor, ed., *Occupation and Communism in Eastern European Museums: Revisualizing the Recent Past* (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming).
 - 26 Including the research of these scholars that was cited in the Introduction.
 - 27 An overview of such scholarship can be found in Melanie Richter-Montpetit, 'Militarized Masculinities, Women Torturers, and the Limits of Gender Analysis at Abu Ghraib,' in *Researching War: Feminist Ethics, Methods and Politics*, ed. Annick T. R. Wibben (London: Routledge, 2016), 1–29.

- 28 Christine de Matos and Rowena Ward, 'Analyzing Gendered Occupation Power', in *Gender, Power and Military Occupations: Asia Pacific and the Middle East since 1945*, ed. Christine de Matos and Rowena Ward (London: Routledge, 2012), 1.
- 29 See, for example, Nadjie Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, *What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), esp. 82–3.
- 30 Christine de Matos and Robin Gerster, ed., *Occupying the 'Other': Australia and Military Occupation from Japan to Iraq* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2009).
- 31 See, for example, Micah Wright, 'An Epidemic of Negrophobia: Blackness and the Legacy of the US Occupation of the Dominican Republic', *The Black Scholar* 45, no. 2 (2015): 21–33.
- 32 For a representative example, see Heide Fehrenbach, *Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
- 33 Sumathi Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 2.

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


Plate 1 The iconic photograph by Heinrich Hoffmann of Adolf Hitler posing in front of the Eiffel Tower on 23 June 1940, following the German invasion of Paris. Getty Images.




Plate 2 'Wangdao le tu da Manzhou fengsu' (The customs of Greater Manchuria, the paradise of the Kingly Way); 'The Life of Manchu' [sic]: Cover image of a set of postcards from Manchukuo (1932–45). Original image held by the Harvard-Yenching Library of the Harvard College Library, Harvard University.



Plate 3 The much photographed covering of a Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad with a US flag in preparation for the statue's toppling by US troops on 9 April 2003. Gilles Bassignac/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images.

WERKTAG ZWEIER WELTEN



Die Armeen der Spinnere erhält das Glück, ein Tatenheind zu weben der Welt.



Man webt für den Frieden in der Sowjetunion, von Tag zu Tag steigt die Stoffproduktion.




Die sich als Henker der Völker bewährt, schmieden schon wieder das Krieges Schwert.



Dort wo die Völker ihr Schicksal anstehen, wird Stahl geschmiedet für Wohlstand und Frieden.



Wo Friedliche Völker bebauen ihr Land, wirft Anikälter die Verbrecherhand.



Von Schädlingen zu zubereit die reiche Saat, setzt Flugzeuge ein der Sowjetstaat.



Die Arme redt neugierig das USA-Kapital, es wünscht den Weltkrieg ein drittes Mal.



Ein Wald von Händen stimmt für den Frieden der Welt, es wird uns allen die Aufgabe gestellt.

**Zwei Welten, zwei Wege – wir haben entschieden,
Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft heißt Wohlstand und Frieden**

Plate 4 GDR Poster: 'Working day of two worlds: two ways, two worlds – we have decided, German-Soviet friendship means prosperity and peace', 1950. Bildarchiv im Bundesarchiv, Signature: Plak 100-041-026.



Plate 5 Nazi poster stating 'Victory or Bolshevism', urging German citizens to persevere after the call for a 'total war', February 1943. Bildarchiv im Bundesarchiv, Signature: Plak 003-029-043.



Plate 6 Fernando Cueto Amorsolo, *Defend Thy Honour*, 1945. Oil on canvas, 91.4 × 153.7 cm. Collection of National Gallery Singapore. © Fernando C. Amorsolo Art Foundation, Inc., Philippines.



Plate 7 Fernando Amorsolo, *Palay Maiden*, 1920. Oil on canvas, 33.63 × 22.75 in. Ayala Museum Collection, Makati City, Philippines. Courtesy of the Fernando C. Amorsolo Art Foundation, Inc., Philippines.




Plate 8 Panos Sklavenitis, *How to Be Seen (and Heard)*, 2017. Video (still). Courtesy of the artist.




Plate 9 Richard Bell, *Scientia E Metaphysica (Bell's Theorem)*, 2003. Acrylic on canvas. Courtesy of Milani Gallery and the artist.



Plates 10 Cover of *The Okinawa Graphic* featuring a female model with Ryukyuan-style hair and fashion. Courtesy of Shinseisha Press.



Plate 11 The National Museum Holodomor Victims Memorial in Kiev on 22 November 2014 (the eighty-first anniversary of the Holodomor). Photo by NurPhoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images.



Plate 12 Stalin's death mask at the Stalin Museum in Gori, January 2008. Photo by Pigi Cipelli/Archivio Pigi Cipelli/Mondadori via Getty Images.









Plate 13–16 Dror Daum, *Don't Trust Security Arrangements (Berlin)* [The Purple Series], 2010. Four archival pigment prints, 20 × 26 cm each. Courtesy of the artist.