

Rethinking Globalizations

GLOBAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

IN SEARCH OF SYNERGY

Małgorzata Zachara-Szymańska



Global Political Leadership

Global Political Leadership explores contemporary shifts in leadership, and the related leadership crisis, in the global world.

Globalisation is now perceived as a threatening and hostile force, with many of its advocates and political supporters turning away from it, but its processes cannot be reversed. New powers emerge, old ones re-emerge, and uncertainty about the future global order is increasing. This book tells the inside stories of global power games and asks important questions about the leadership crisis in the western world. The author provides an interpretative framework for contemporary shifts within the western political sphere based on the concept of global leadership. This framework presents the nature of transformation caused by global processes, as part of which force and coercion have ceased to be the main modus operandi of the international realm. The issue of global political leadership has often been neglected in international relations literature, while being widely exploited by managerial and organisational studies. However, all social organisations have 'gone global' within the last several decades; they are more interconnected and more dependent on global processes, so the question of effective leadership strategies matching these new realities is highly necessary, even – or especially – at a time when globalisation is no longer seen as a leading political programme.

This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of global affairs, politics and international relations, leadership and development, and diplomatic studies.

Małgorzata Zachara-Szymańska is Associate Professor in the Faculty of International and Political Studies at Jagiellonian University, Poland. Find her on Instagram: [@lifelong_curiosity](https://www.instagram.com/lifelong_curiosity)

Rethinking Globalizations

Edited by **Barry K. Gills**, *University of Helsinki, Finland* and
Kevin Gray, *University of Sussex, UK*.

This series is designed to break new ground in the literature on globalization and its academic and popular understanding. Rather than perpetuating or simply reacting to the economic understanding of globalization, this series seeks to capture the term and broaden its meaning to encompass a wide range of issues and disciplines and convey a sense of alternative possibilities for the future.

Time, Climate Change, Global Racial Capitalism and Decolonial Planetary Ecologies

Edited by Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian

Globalizations from Below

The Normative Power of the World Social Forum, Ant Traders, Chinese Migrants, and Levantine Cosmopolitanism

Theodor Tudoroiu

Economics and Climate Emergency

Edited by Barry K. Gills and Jamie Morgan

Global Political Leadership

In Search of Synergy

Małgorzata Zachara-Szymańska

Post-Covid Transformations

Edited by Kevin Gray & Barry Gills

The Reconfiguration of Twenty-first Century Latin American Regionalism

Actors, Processes, Contradictions and Prospects

Edited by Rowan Lubbock and Ernesto Vivares

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Rethinking-Globalizations/book-series/RG

Global Political Leadership

In Search of Synergy

Małgorzata Zachara-Szymańska



ROUTLEDGE



Routledge

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2023 Małgorzata Zachara-Szymańska

The right of Małgorzata Zachara-Szymańska to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Publikacja została sfinansowana ze środków Priorytetowego Obszaru Badawczego Society of the Future w ramach programu „Inicjatywa Doskonałości – Uczelnia Badawcza” w Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim.

The publication was funded by the Priority Research Area Society of the Future under the program “Excellence Initiative – Research University” at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Zachara-Szymańska, Małgorzata, author.

Title: Global political leadership : in search of synergy /

Małgorzata Zachara-Szymańska.

Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. |

Series: Rethinking globalizations |

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022023930 (print) | LCCN 2022023931 (ebook) |

ISBN 9780367763916 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367763954 (paperback) |

ISBN 9781003166757 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Globalization—Political aspects—Western countries. |

Political leadership—Western countries. | World politics—1989— |

Western countries—Foreign relations administration. |

Western countries—Foreign relations—21st century.

Classification: LCC JZ1318 .Z333 2023 (print) |

LCC JZ1318 (ebook) | DDC 303.48/2—dc23/eng/20220815

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2022023930>

ISBN: 978-0-367-76391-6 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-76395-4 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-16675-7 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003166757

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Newgen Publishing UK

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
Introduction	1
<i>Contested meaning of leadership</i>	5
<i>Research paradoxes</i>	6
1 Landscape of Political Leadership in the 21st Century	12
<i>Beyond the static world: Leadership in the theoretical views of international relations</i>	12
<i>What is global leadership about? The provision of public goods in a globalised world</i>	23
<i>Managing global uncertainties: The influence of individuals and the unity of states</i>	35
<i>Leadership in practice: Climate change as a global political leadership process</i>	51
2 Changing the Centre of Gravity: Global Leadership Strategies in the Post-American World	76
<i>The search for synergy in an age of great competition</i>	76
<i>Interdependence and the need for organised anarchy</i>	84
<i>The decline of authorities and the rise of dispersed political imaginaries</i>	92
<i>Leadership in practice: Pandemic of abdicated leaders</i>	100
3 Focus on Followers: Individual Empowerment and Public Affairs on a Global Scale	140
<i>Blurred lines: Leadership and followership in tackling global problems</i>	140
<i>Psychological dimension of leadership–followership relations</i>	150
<i>A brave new world: The global middle class and challenges of leadership</i>	161

vi	<i>Contents</i>	
	<i>The empowered citizen and democratic decline</i>	165
	<i>Leadership in practice: Leaders beyond borders and “power with” in global policy shaping</i>	174
4	Global Leadership as Sense Making	215
	<i>Leaders, context and conscience</i>	215
	<i>Narratives and identity construction within the global space</i>	229
	<i>Interpreters as power brokers</i>	237
	<i>Leadership in practice: Memory of the Holocaust in western public imaginaries</i>	251
	Conclusion	284
	<i>Three dimensions of leadership: How structural, relational and cognitive leaderships work in global politics?</i>	287
	<i>Perspectives on progress: The transition to sustainability and the new international order as leadership challenges</i>	290
	<i>Index</i>	298

Acknowledgements

Every book is a joint enterprise. I am fortunate to be able to pursue my intellectual journey surrounded by bright people sharing their experiences and insights. Many relevant ideas that touch upon problems at the junction of politics, culture and leadership were first discussed with my husband Marcin Szymański and my Jagiellonian University colleagues: Garry Robson, Jola Szymkowska-Bartyzel, Marcin Grabowski and Marcin Fatalski. I really appreciate your company!

I am also indebted to my mentor and life-time friend, professor Andrzej Mania, director of the Institute of American Studies – professor Łukasz Kamiński, and the dean of the Faculty of International and Political Studies – professor Paweł Laidler, for their constant support of my research endeavors.

This is my third book since the moment when my daughter Milena was born, and the third one that I would like to dedicate to her – I truly treasure the cheerful and inspiring presence that she brings to the world...

The publication was funded under the programme “Excellence Initiative – Research University” at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.

Publikacja została dofinansowana ze środków finansowych w ramach programu “Inicjatywa Doskonałości – Uczelnia Badawcza” w Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Introduction

This book outlines an interpretative framework for contemporary shifts within the western political sphere on the basis of the concept of global leadership. It presents the nature of the transformations caused by global processes, as a part of which, force and coercion have ceased to be the main *modus operandi* of the international realm. The research field is marked here by the processes and interactions oriented towards the provision of global public goods and governance of global flows of people, money, goods and knowledge. Global political leadership refers to relations between state leaders and a variety of other actors actively engaged in generating global change. The fact that different actors using different means are engaged in the provision of global public goods expands the analytical scope of this research, not limiting it to international politics, as is traditionally associated with interstate relations.

The issue of global leadership is not sufficiently explored in the literature on international relations (IR), while it is widely used by managerial and organisational studies. It should be noted, however, that not only firms, but all social organisations have ‘gone global’ over the last 30 years – they are more interconnected and definitely more dependent on global processes. This raises the question of what leadership strategies would be effective in light of these new realities, especially at a time when globalisation is no longer seen as a leading political programme.

Making leadership a central point of reference, this analysis attempts to take the conversation beyond the conceptual frame of the power hierarchies depicted by major IR theories. It recognises that leadership processes are equally important for generating global coherence as the leaders themselves; the fact that the status of power holders does not necessarily transform actors into leaders and reluctance towards taking a leadership role is one of the serious threats for global order. The biggest players – hegemonic states and regional leaders – are still important in the game, but their relative power diminished while the price of projecting power increased, causing a reluctance to take responsibility for the shape of global structures. Globalisation, with its most important aspect of increasing interdependence, introduced qualitatively different conditions of operating within the international realm,

2 Introduction

modifying the terms of both the mutual effects and opportunity costs of disrupting the relationship. This is why this is not a book about western state leaders but rather about leadership processes built on the basis of institutional, cultural and political relations taking place on many levels – from presidential and prime ministerial offices, through public opinion leaders and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to individual citizens. All of these parties participate in the ongoing transition of power, and influence what will result in the emergence of the new world order.

One of the major paradoxes of the current moment of the international system's evolution is the fact that governments are increasingly taking isolationist courses in shaping both policies and public imaginaries. Globalisation is no longer seen as a reasonable political programme, yet there is no returning to the pre-global era. Public priorities of nation states are inherently connected to the global environment, as there is no national prosperity without global markets, and no social, health or environmental resilience without cooperation with others. Although ignored or silenced in political discourse, the importance of global connections has been drastically revealed by the Covid-19 pandemic. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine further uncovered the practical consequences of economic and energy interdependence, as sanctions and other response strategies of the western states proved to be a double-edged sword. These contradictions between global public interests and national interests have long undermined the global governance system, which is meeting increasing obstacles in the pursuance of its basic function – the provision of global public goods. The problem of shaping collective action that could secure stable international order and systemic resilience is one of the major puzzles of global relations. The leadership factor seems to be an important, yet underdiscussed, factor contributing to global inertia: “Governors can exercise leadership and creativity, two terms that are oddly absent in most discussions about global governance” (Avant et al.: 9). There is indeed a growing need for creative solutions to global problems, but they can only be recognised as important and implemented when political leaders put them at the top of the agenda by changing the way global politics is understood and exercised.

Leadership roles within international relations are played by individuals as well as states and other types of organisations (represented by individuals). Yet modern international relation theories disregard the role of the individual leader, giving instead primary consideration to the state and its endeavours. There is a striking difference in assumptions between IR and political leadership studies in this regard. The latter picture the history of IR as a sequence of interactions between statesman as they are perceived as being responsible for the trajectory of international powers. They are usually presented in romanticised, heroic terms, questioned by critical leadership studies (CLS). The IR discipline assumes that states are unitary actors and their position in the structure is predominantly shaped by their economic and military potential. In effect, IR covers the relations of states with each other and the

international organisations they create, while the environment of interaction in the contemporary world is much wider.

The study of IR had its beginnings at a time when states were expanding their powers beyond their geographical and social boundaries in a planned and consistent effort and created the first international institutions to provide control and the benefits of the effects of scale and common security measures in protecting their interests. Traditional notions of the power and predominance of the state has since then dominated the IR conceptual framework. It has long been argued, however, that the qualitative change observed in the global environment since the end of the 20th century transformed the nature of politics, but the essence and implications of this transformation are still to be captured by theory. What is known is that in the realist outlook dominating in the field since its inception, placing the focus on what divided international actors and the wars and atrocities caused by these divisions does not reflect the entire mechanics of the system. Growing interdependence shifted the analytical focus towards common parts of the equation – shared beliefs and interests. With the progressing global integration, the number of interactions between international actors grows substantially, thus increasing the complexity of the environment. Global space and global politics have apparently become more chaotic; visions and frameworks created in more stable times no longer fit the dynamics of international realities. as they present IR as merely raw calculations of national power, economic interdependence or ideological waves that limit our understanding of its nature.

The international system oriented towards providing order, as described in the categories of ‘balance of powers’ and ‘spheres of influence’, has increasingly started to be pictured in terms borrowed from complexity theory, as the realm composed by many combined components and driven by incomplete information (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; Bousquet and Curtis, 2011; Orsini et al., 2019). The complicated structure of the global political and social space needs a synergy that would make this structure something more than the sum of its parts, providing coherence, order and patterns in the anarchical global reality. Interactions present an entry condition for the synergy between the autonomous parts of the system. The question of who designs, governs and influences this structure is essential while undertaking the search for this synergy if the history of IR is written rather by impersonal forces or the footprints of individuals.

Economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek (following Adam Smith’s concept) used the notion of a ‘spontaneous order’ to describe the operating principle of a free market system and cultural evolution (1973). He argued that these self-organising social phenomena are useful because they transmit more information than can be conveyed through conscious design. While social development is made by actions of man, it cannot be designed by man. The most important social institutions, despite not being a result of planned implementation, supervision and control, do not represent chaotic realities of disorder; on the contrary, they are ordered in a way that is impossible

4 *Introduction*

to reproduce in an organised manner. The theory draws on research in the biological sciences which reveals that apparently, chaotic processes rely on repeatable patterns and certain rules of design.

Both complexity theory and system theory make an attempt to introduce non-linearity, chance and disruption to the analysis of social processes. They complement classical science which was founded on the linear causality linking two basic variables. There is a contrast between some IR theories seeing forces providing conceptual and factual order to the global affairs as passive and repetitive, and the other parts of science recognising humans, which in fact construct these forces, as creative and active. Here the place for a processual perspective that views leadership as an ongoing social interaction involving all organisational actors, presents itself (Tourish, 2014).

Within the context of different world views, interests, cultures and fragmented information, a platform for negotiating differences and workable arrangements is crafted on the basis of communication. Interactions have become the organising force introducing order, logic and purpose to the global sphere, so leadership as a guiding mechanism of interaction can be an important lens through which to study global relations.

During the course of the 20th century, not only did the number of international organisations expand, but international space has been gradually filled with a myriad of cooperatives, regimes and public and private transnational arrangements. The multiplication of actors involved in IR and the number of transnational interactions have progressed exponentially over the last four decades. The transition from international to transnational/global types of relations stood at the centre of the complex interdependence reality in which states adjust their behaviour to transnational processes and in so doing increasingly shift from international politics to world politics.

While IR involves states, transnational interaction concerns non-state actors, such as multinational corporations or NGOs, individuals, social groups, etc. This is the reason for choosing global leadership as the subject of this book rather than international leadership. The broader perspective not only creates a better chance for revealing the analytical potential of the concept but also allows presentation of a wider spectrum of global sphere mechanics. This is the study of global interaction, in which not only leadership but also the followership perspective is taken into account. Followers of different kinds and interests – citizens, workers, migrants, activists and states – are part of the global picture, not as passive background, but rather as members of reflective communities, able to recognise their options as being actively involved in relationships with leaders. Recognition of the complexity of global affairs is consequential in redefining the features of leadership as confronting new realities while traditional ways of leadership conceptualisation risk offering a theory of complex processes led by non-complex leaders (Tourish, 2019).

Contested meaning of leadership

While the term ‘leadership’ is rather contested in IR literature and is often used in a confusing, inconsistent manner, there is no doubt that processes fundamental to the shape of the international scene involve the whole range of leadership activities. Leadership should be understood as a social role created in interactions between leader and followers (governments and citizens, hegemons and weaker states in the given system). When applied to the global/international realm, leadership refers to the actions of state leaders, corporate managers, NGO activists, public opinion figures and others responsible for the course of international politics, introducing rules, standards, ways of thinking and other components of global synergy. Their presence is captured by processual perspective suggesting that leadership is a “fluid process emerging from the communicatively constituted interactions of myriad organisational actors” (Tourish, 2014: 80).

Within the IR framework, leadership has often been limited to the single intellectual construct that concerns the ability of international actors to exercise power and influence. Conceptual approaches in leadership studies suggest rather that the whole ‘international space’, instead of being the place where leadership is applied, presents in fact a unique leadership framework. When we assume that interaction is the base mechanism that may produce the synergy effect, making global space something more than a sum of its parts, leadership reveals itself as an operating mode in forming hierarchies, contracts and both permanent and hybrid governance structures. Actors present in the global sphere pursuing their interests seek contact, exchange views, form coalitions and interest groups, and actively provide the rules and structure of global order. In the absence of a superior authority (global government), actors seeking to fulfil their needs create not only a free market of goods central to the global economic system but first and foremost a free market of ideas in which information is exchanged. Leadership refers to the ability to enter this market of ideas and influence others, thus contributing to the overall state of the global system. The classic definition by Burns can be applied to the international system as it is competitive; and possession of resources and power does not equal the capacity to use them:

Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilise, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done in order to realise goals mutually held by both leaders and followers.

(Burns, 1979: 18)

The way leadership is seen and defined strongly depends upon the epistemological position from which practices defined as leadership are described. Traditional leadership theories have focused on the relationship between the

6 Introduction

leader and the follower (Gardner, 1990; Kouzes and Posner, 1993) with a bias towards leaders usually presented in terms typical for heroic leadership. The complexity of the global realm, however, requires a more holistic approach to interaction between actors which results in the most important contemporary processes that encompass leader–follower relationships, organisational hierarchy and the social network. The position of leader can be described in various ways, but none of the definitions limits this position to the fact of holding office or representing high rank in the political hierarchy. The person needs to identify as a leader and others need to orient towards that identity or to sanction it in some way (Grint, 2010).

The leader exists as a formal leader only when he or she achieves a situation in which an obligation, expectation or right to frame experience is presumed, or offered and accepted by others. It involves a complicity or process of negotiation through which certain individuals, implicitly or explicitly, surrender their power to define the nature of their experience to others. Indeed leadership depends on the existence of individuals willing, as a result of inclination or pressure, to surrender, at least in part, the powers to shape and define their own reality.

(Smircich and Morgan, 1982: 258)

Power enables actors to coerce or dominate, while a distinctive quality of leadership lies in the identification of the needs and expectations of followers. These change over time, so leadership is conceptualised as an *activity*, as a process that reflects how an individual or group entity engages in and fulfils roles and responsibilities in the national/international/transnational/global area.

Leadership analyses presented in this book cover behaviours of a variety of collective and individual leaders in an attempt to decode intentions that guide their actions, examine epistemological and methodological preferences that stand behind their interpretations and make sense of the observed phenomena. It is grounded in the assumption expressed by Bernard Bass that “Leadership is not a ‘mystical or ethereal concept’ but rather, leadership is an observable, learnable set of practices’ thank to which ‘leaders really make a difference’” (2008: 10).

Research paradoxes

Studies of leadership commenced with the examination of the major political figures that transformed the course of history. Leadership is and always has been inherently connected to the realm of politics, yet the essence of today’s thinking about leadership is hardly based on or reflected in the study of politics. Leadership studies has undergone an intense phase of development over recent decades, but most of the innovative concepts and fresh theoretic thinking primarily concerned business leaders and covered economic relations. A major problem presented by these attempts is the reluctance to go

from the specific to the general, from an account of the leaders to the analysis of the mechanics of his/her influence. Despite the fact that the global political environment produces increasingly complex and ambiguous contexts, the overwhelming majority of political leaders are depicted in heroic tones in accordance with the social needs for myth creation. At least two paradoxes characterise the research gap, confirming the need for revitalising the conceptual frames of political leadership:

- a) Heroic leadership descriptions rarely bear ambiguity of meaning, contradiction, doubt or tension rooted in the competing demands and limitations of the leader's own actions. As a result, the world in which leaders operate is increasingly dynamic, both in politics and business, as they need to confront "the new normal", a "stormy field", a complex reality filled with the "black swans". Yet, the leaders' actions are described as straightforward and firm so the heroic image of the leader does not in any way reflect the nature of the surrounding social world.
- b) Political leaders, at least in democratic systems, are not able to operate behind the veil of public ignorance. Due to media development and the transformation of political coverage standards, leaders are highly exposed to public scrutiny, which makes it difficult or impossible to sustain the hero image over the long term. Leadership relations in democratic societies evolved in the direction of the "followers-driven" model, in which the image of the leader is carved according to the needs and expectations of the public. Image-building is more reactive than ever, which in essence contradicts the mechanics of the hero-image construction. "Thus, electors want their leaders to be just like them but also much better than them. They want a genuinely great leader who is nevertheless humble and has the 'common touch'. They want somebody who will do their bidding, listen to them, and not break promises, yet they will hold in contempt the leader who merely follows the polls, has no 'vision', and refuses to make tough, unpopular decisions" (Kane and Patapan, 2012: 44).

Such paradoxes explain the vacuum of political leadership development – a level of development that hardly exceeds the boundaries of biographical studies and case studies presenting chosen political leaders solving particular leadership problems. Such fragmentary accounts best fit into the framework of the positivistic turn that social sciences are experiencing as it reflects the approach that all explanation is causal and consists of subsuming particular cases under hypotheses. This perspective, in which quantitative research methods dominate, being seen as more useful and even closer to the truth about social reality, forms the basis for managerial and organisational studies. While the discipline of leadership produced a lively debate about conceptual boundaries and opportunities for studying the relationship between leaders and followers, the political study overview lacks systematic theoretical development. This further widens the gap between the fairly well conceptualised

8 Introduction

political environment and leaders who are considered to be able to influence and shape this environment; but neither their meaning, nor the operational level of their actions has been critically discussed and interpreted in the changing contexts. There are several possible explanations for research into political leadership lagging behind research into business:

- a) Research base. The principle of hypothesis testing is more useful and practically applicable to the realm of a company than it is for social groups. Therefore, despite the fact that both private and public sector organisations mark continuous and pervasive change and increasing interdependencies, research oriented at understanding processes in commercial enterprises is easier to conduct and more popular. Business leaders may be more prone to cooperate with researchers as they don't rely that strongly on wide public opinion in pursuing their goals, while politicians who are professionally involved in building and popularising images, may be fearful of their deconstruction during the research process.
- b) The nature of leadership in the business realm appears more rational as it is connected to the sphere that heavily relies upon quantitative accounts of reality. Market forces are commonly expressed in the numbers of products sold, the extent of support for trends and the financial value of trade marks. Leadership in politics cannot be so strongly translated into numbers; furthermore, it is strongly embedded in charismatic and sacred connotations. The ability to exercise influence stands at the centre of leadership qualities and since ancient times, it has been associated with some kind of rare predispositions, which is reflected in the etymological roots of the word 'charismatic', derived from the Greek *kharisma* ("divine gift" or "gift of grace"). Charismatic influence exercised over entire nations or large international groups presents a difficult subject of systematic inquiry guided by the positivistic paradigm. The subject of analysis in political leadership, with its non-rational, mystic components, naturally contradicts the efforts to emulate the natural sciences in its reliability and replicability of results (Atwater et al., 2014). There are no appropriate scientific methods for measuring fascination, emotional involvement or willingness to sacrifice. Early leadership studies were embedded rather in the humanistic orientations that, through the use of hermeneutic, historiography or conceptual analysis, offered insight into the complex problems that arise from sets of social, political, economic, and environmental conditions. But while the trend for a positivistic approach to social studies progressed, a preference arose towards research strategies oriented at the analysis of fragmented parts of the social life without clear references to the general structure. As a result, as Joanne Ciulla observes: "... many empirical papers in leadership studies spend more time explaining and justifying the methods used in the research, than they do actually exploring or analysing a problem" (Ciulla, 2019: 343). The contemporary state of the field development does not fundamentally

differ from the diagnosis formulated nearly half a century ago when Ralph Stogdill concluded that “Four decades of research on leadership have produced a bewildering mass of findings. The endless accumulation of the empirical data has not produced an integrated understanding of leadership” (1974: vii).

- c) Interdisciplinarity of the subject. Leadership processes reflect all the complexity of the social world, having to deal with history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, as well as extended accounts about economic life, rhetorical analysis, game theory, enriched with references to visual arts and literature. At the core of the investigations stand humans and all their physical and intellectual qualities – all of the spotlight is focused on human nature that shapes the quality of the relationship between the leader and the follower. The integration of such a vast array of tools, languages and perspectives into the comparative analysis of political leadership is not an easy process as the transfer of findings is vulnerable to distortion. Additionally, ever increasing professionalization of disciplines in the academy limits the space for a broad, comprehensive analysis of the social phenomena.

Leadership studies, just like political studies, IR and other related disciplines, lag behind the dynamics of the social reality. The most influential diagnosis of the direction of the development of industrial society was (and most likely still is) moving ever closer towards continuous pervasive change, increasing interdependency and mounting uncertainty. On the social sciences platform, growing interdisciplinarity can be interpreted as a sign of interdependency, just as growing specialisation and narrowly defined expertise may be an expression of uncertainty. This does not cancel out the importance of efforts oriented at presenting a coherent perspective of leadership. In fact, the story of attempts to generate “the grand theory of leadership” by an interdisciplinary panel of 25 scientists (the General Theory of Leadership Group) headed in 2001 by James MacGregor Burns, sheds light not only on the aspirational aspect of the discipline’s development, but first and foremost on the complexity of the project of making leadership studies “an intellectually responsible discipline” (Goethals and Sorenson, 2006). The process revealed major tension between the approach postulating a coherent, unitary articulation of leadership and that which advocates for conceptualisation that would embrace all diversity of the fields that developed thinking about leadership within their boundaries. The attempt left a rich documentation of an abundance of theoretical frameworks with contradictory and sometimes clashing voices and perspectives. A general sense, produced by this endeavour is that a positivist approach, although valuable for its rigour and clarity, does not exhaust possible options of describing leadership phenomena as explanations of human behaviour, and natural processes are at times logically distinct operations.

The voices that resounded during the debate expressed the focal point of scientific effort in reaching for the truth about leadership that also supports

reflections presented in this book. The ways scientists look at things through the lens of the “instrumentarium” of their discipline does not necessarily bring fragmentation and trivialisation if the practice of making connections and inferences becomes inherent in the art of providing explanation (Ciulla in Goethals and Sorenson, 2006). Two decades after the Great Theory of Leadership Group was formed, there remains no conceptual order in the field. Leadership studies lack internal consistency – approaches and concepts are sometimes entangled in contradiction, but the overall research space still leaves room for broadscale inquiries and intellectual experiment. The fact that a general theory has not been formulated does not erase leadership’s position at the core of human condition, its link to civilisational progress and major achievements of the past or contemporary societies.

The concept of leadership can and should be applied to the analysis of IR, as it seems to be flexible and adaptable to practical scenarios. Rather than transferring concepts of leadership to the problems of IR, this research effort is oriented at dialogue between disciplines, which can result in better understanding the human agency in shaping global affairs. The leadership approach may be better tailored to understanding influences within different levels of analysis in IR, enabling probing questions to be asked about which actions count and who should be observed as a *spiritus movens* introducing change within the global realm. These efforts are driven by the observation of growing tension between the human agency perceived as people’s ability to act on behalf of goals that matter to them and the interests of political, organised entities such as states and international organisations. The tension is a result of the fact that actors other than political are increasingly seeking ways in which to voice their postulates and support their cause at the international level of political interaction. Human agency is increasingly exercised at the individual level, in groups or through democratic participation. The leadership approach can thus be useful in understanding how coordinated action operates in the poliarchic and complex international field.

References

- Atwater LE, Mumford MD, Schriesheim CA and Yammarino FJ (2014) Retraction of leadership articles: Causes and prevention. *The Leadership Quarterly* 25(6): 1174–1180.
- Avant D, Finnemore M and Sell, S (2010) *Who Governs the Globe?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Axelrod R and Cohen M (2000) *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bass BM (2008) *The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research and Managerial Applications* (4th ed.). New York: Free Press.
- Bousquet A and Curtis S (2011) Beyond models and metaphors: Complexity theory, systems thinking and international relations. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24(1): 43–62.
- Burns JM (1979) *Leadership*. New York: Harper and Row.

- Ciulla JB (2019) The two cultures: The place of humanities research in leadership studies. *Leadership* 15(4): 433–444.
- Gardner JW (1990) *On Leadership*. New York: The Free Press.
- Goethals GR, Sorenson, GLJ (2006) *The Quest for a General Theory of Leadership*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Grint K (2010) *Leadership – A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hayek FA (1973) *Rules and Order. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Vol 1*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kane J and Patapan H (2012) *The Democratic Leader: How Democracy Defines, Empowers and Limits its Leaders*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kouzes JM and Posner BZ (1993) *Credibility*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Orsini A, Le Prestre P, Haas PM, et al. (2019) Forum: Complex systems and international governance. *International Studies Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1095/isr/viz005>.
- Smircich L and Morgan G (1982) Leadership: The management of meaning. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 18: 257–273.
- Stogdill RM (1974) *Handbook of Leadership*. New York: Free Press.
- Tourish D (2014) Leadership, more or less? A processual, communication perspective on the role of agency in leadership theory. *Leadership* 10(1): 79–98.
- Tourish D (2019) Is complexity leadership theory complex enough? A critical appraisal, some modifications and suggestions for further research. *Organization Studies* 40(2): 219–223.

1 Landscape of Political Leadership in the 21st Century

This chapter provides an investigation into the theoretical approaches of International Relations (IR), in which the contemporary debate over power shifts in the global structure and its consequences for political leadership may be placed. Globalisation has created conditions under which many areas of public policy that were once considered to be purely national issues have spread across borders and become global in reach and impact. As a consequence, the achievement of crucial goals such as financial stability, human security or the reduction of environmental pollution depends on the systemic cooperation of a number of actors involved in decision-making processes. The chapter presents key conceptualisations of global political leadership, illustrated more by the mechanics of global processes than by the actions of actors taking prominent positions in international structures.

Beyond the static world: Leadership in the theoretical views of international relations

Studies of international cooperation in general and multilateral negotiations in particular reveal that leadership is a crucial determinant of success or failure in efforts to address complex problems, reaching international agreements and establishing international institutions (Young, 1991; Rhodes and T-Hart, 2014). Previous findings, within the fields of leadership and political studies alike, popularised the notion of leadership being a key factor in any far-reaching political endeavour. The paradox lies in the fact that while cooperation, influence and conflict avoidance create the essence of IR practice, its theoretical approaches rather neglect the question of leadership. The dominant view of leadership in international affairs is based on the relationship between individual state leaders and the way in which international politics is made. Such a conceptual image is illustrated by the “Great Man” approach, bringing charismatic presidents and visionary statesmen to the forefront of IR. The earliest systematic attempts to study leadership were based on identifying traits that distinguished leaders from non-leaders. The view that leaders are born not made was challenged in the middle of the 20th century, when a greater variety of leadership situations and a widening gallery of great leaders

led researchers to go beyond searching for a limited set of personal attributes (Stogdill, 1974). The focus was moved to relationships between people in the specific context of a social situation. Personality traits were considered as relative to the requirements of a certain situational context; however, as leadership studies is about leaders it is widely accepted that analysis of their personalities provides valuable information about leadership processes.

Leaders were studied in terms of their dispositions, by situating individual belief systems and visions within the course of historical processes. So, Paul Kennedy argues that one cannot understand German *Weltpolitik* in the period prior to the First World War (WWI) without a psychological and leadership profile of Wilhelm II (1982), and Janice Gross Stein presents the importance of Mikhail Gorbachev's psychological profile for the shape of his foreign policy strategies (1994). At the early stage of IR discipline's development, the instincts of individuals and actions of nations were linked together via an identification process: individuals identify themselves with the powerful nation – in order to satisfy their lust for power. As a result, according to this logic, by sharing the power of the nation they become powerful themselves (Morgenthau, 1946; Snyder et al., 1954 [2002]; Putnam, 1988). But gradually this methodological individualism, locating the origins of international politics in human nature, has been increasingly replaced with structural orientations, based primarily on estimates of material power balances and imbalances (Waltz, 2003; Marx, 1970). In this assumption that the group – a nation or ethnic community – must be studied through its parts, as well as through the individual psyche of man, there was plenty of space for leadership studies. But in the assumption that structures or impersonal forces (class struggle, geographic or climatic determinism, economic and technological developments) form the dominant frame for shaping international dynamics, the causal agency of individual leaders cannot be proved, so it becomes irrelevant.

Early thinkers of the school of classic realism considered the behaviours and world views of individual leaders as a key component in the understanding of international affairs (Morgenthau, 1946), but since then the role of leaders has been removed from the field. The seminal work of Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (1954 [2001]), shaped thinking about the international realm over the past half-century by proposing three “images” in IR analysis: individuals, states and the state system. These were identified as independent variables to explain state behaviour – the decision to start a war. Of the three levels of analysis, the explanatory power of the third – the international system – was described as being the most important. The legacy of this view was long prevalent, finding its imprint in the way in which the influential contemporary realist Robert Jervis answered the question “Do leaders matter?” (2013). His reply denied the leader's role in shaping the international scene, as his analysis focused on the structural imperatives of anarchy or interdependence that define the range of foreign policy options: “Presidents are not mere pawns, but neither are they masters of their own or their countries' fate”

(Jervis, 2013: 178). As a consequence, although contemporary realism admits that human nature and striving for power and security (Gilpin, 1986: 304–5) stand at the origins of political strategies, the state has been made the primary unit of analysis, reducing leaders to “rational actors” bound to respond to the structural conditions found in the wider socio-political framework (Waltz, 1979). In this view states are oriented towards obtaining security; the perception of risk makes them ally with others, especially with actors considered to be a source of threat.

The leadership theme within the field of IR *per se* is best dated back to the late 1960s and early 1970s (Snyder et al., 1954 [2002; Nye and Keohane, 1971; Rosenau et al., 1971]). A number of scholars – in reaction to the emerging literature on the integrated economy – began to examine systematically the relationship between political power and international strategies (Gilpin, 1971). Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane elaborated on the conditions needed to create stable economic order (Gilpin, 1971; Nye and Keohane, 1971; Rosenau et al., 1971; Krasner, 1976).

In the 1990s Oran Young applied the concept of leadership to the study of international regimes (Young, 1991). According to this view, leadership “refers to the actions of individuals who endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991: 285). While observing the mechanisms used by various types of regimes, Young distinguished three forms of leadership that enabled cooperation among different partners and the coordination of a diverse range of issues. Structural leadership is the bargaining leverage provided by material power. The entrepreneurial form of leadership involves agenda setting, the creation of policy options, and alternatives while negotiating higher goals. Intellectual leadership refers to the power of ideas to shape thinking behind the principles underpinning institutional arrangements, guide understanding of the issues and provide interpretation of the facts. Those forms of leadership were present in the negotiation oriented at solving global problems ranging from the environment to nuclear non-proliferation. As globalisation accelerated development of the new global governance structures, distinctive forms of institutional dynamics and interplay emerged. Young demonstrated that leadership qualities matter in the international decision-making process, as much as structural forces.

The school of realism makes leadership one of its prominent topics in the most acclaimed of the theories constructed within this field, which however replaces world leadership with “hegemony” (deriving from the Greek word *hegemonia*, which translates to dominance or leadership). Hegemonic stability theory proposes a scenario in which a state with the capability or resources to lead (Clark, 2011: 4) plays a stabilising role for the whole structure. This theory created a basis for conceptualising leadership in general, as leaders have often been associated with hegemons in IR. Two components have been recognised as key to hegemonic positioning within the international

structure: access to resources, which reinforces the position of the state, and willingness to bear the costs of stabilising the global order, thereby providing for the “global public good”. The pattern has been identified on the basis of the British role in the western international system in the 18th and 19th centuries, and with the example of American hegemony in the post-war years of the second half of the 20th century. Charles P. Kindleberger argued that the great depression at the beginning of the 20th century was a consequence of power transition – Great Britain was no longer able to stabilise the international system and the United States (USA) hesitated to take the leadership role (Kindleberger, 1973: 305).

The leadership question stands at the centre of the hegemonic stability thesis: a leader provides stability and the absence of a hegemon is associated with disorder (Kindleberger, 1981; Snidal, 1985). It could be assumed that a state that can occupy a hegemonic position becomes a leader because it is able to provide stability to other members of the structure. Hegemony, however, does not exhaust the variety of relations covered by leadership, as it is primarily connected to domination. A hegemonic position entails “predominance of one state over its peers” (Stiles, 2009: 2–3), or “preponderance of military and economic capabilities” (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 49). It is interesting in the context of leadership approaches to relations between people and group actors, to see how this influential IR theory inherently connects hegemonic capabilities with power, understood as the sum of a state’s attributes such as “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” (Waltz, 1979: 131). John Mearsheimer, for example, defines a hegemon as a “state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system” (2001: 41). Such a situation of dominance allows a single actor to control the other actors, designing the environment in which they operate. In this sense, hegemony secures cohesion of the international system, by ensuring the reproduction of its major processes and relations. It produces the structure in which its dominance is reproduced with the involvement of other, weaker actors (Gilpin, 1971).

The general view that emerges from realist accounts of hegemonic status is that this kind of leader not only has to possess enough power to ensure that they will be followed, but that most of all they have the will to establish international rules and take responsibility for maintaining international order.

Although the notion of a hegemonic state able to establish organisational principles in the system has sparked long-term and vivid debate within the discipline, in the face of growing fragmentation of the international realm, the school of realism returned to the role of the human. Fareed Zakaria even claimed that “statesman not the states, are the primary actors in international affairs” (1998: 42). Such statements not only respond to the configuration of powers within the international realm, but use the international arena to meet the needs and expectations of their domestic audiences. The behaviour of individual politicians, their orientations and value systems, have again grown to be important factors influencing the decision-making

process. The turn of neoclassical thinkers towards analysis of individual factors in leadership and their role in foreign policy formulation illustrates the limitation of explanations based on purely materialistic reasoning. Structural realism, although powerful in shaping the systemic forces that form the international realm, is of no use in explaining particular historical events or foreign policy. In order to draw a detailed picture of the processes creating a structural configuration, the statesman's intentions and perception of the relative distribution of power is indispensable. Emergence of the new orientation within the school of realism also responds to recognition of the increasing influence of the domestic public, empowered by both democratic systems of governance and the forces of globalisation. This has been reflected in the theoretical assumption of neoclassical realism, that materially wealthy and politically capable states project power abroad not when they see an opportunity to do so, but rather when their political leadership has sufficient strength to extract from society the resources required to support expansion (Zakaria, 1998).

In an increasingly uncertain and dynamic environment the primary aim of the state is not security, as in the classical realist outlook, but control and influence. Rather than being "resource-maximizers" states are "influence-maximizers" (Zakaria, 1998: 19). Such a view provides much of the conceptual space for leadership inquiries, with regards to both statesmen and state research subjects.

Although not accepted unconditionally by IR scholars, this type of reasoning might indicate that leadership, although rarely called by name, has become a micro-level variable indispensable in the search for explanations for the making of foreign policy. The significance of leaders is limited to a particular historical context, a single decision-making process or ideology construction in a specific time and place, but at the same time the international structure evolves as the sum of such leadership processes.

The general overview of liberalism, the equally prominent theory within the field, reveals a similar lack of explanation of the role of political leadership in power structure and decision-making processes. An individual or group leader is expected to mitigate tensions between values and practice and strengthen the feasibility of liberal ideals. But the instruments, scale of involvement and codes of conduct pertinent to this are not discussed theoretically and can only be analysed as a result of historical inquiries:

One can scan the indexes, contents pages and texts of the canonical writings of contemporary liberal political theory – whether it be the work of Rawls, Dworkin, Brian Barry, Raz, Galston or pretty much any of the other leading liberal theorists – in vain in search of any explicit reference to political leadership, let alone any even moderately extensive discussion of it. The topic simply does not figure in their writings as something relevant to or worthy of their attention.

(Horton, 2009)

The fundamental assumption of the mechanisms aimed at bringing to people all over the world a peaceful and prosperous coexistence originated in the idea of the Kantian world republic. Immanuel Kant was looking for mechanisms that could produce a lasting peace and envisioned a “federation of peoples”, founded on a broad cooperation of republican states. In the world republic free and equal individuals, united by one global sovereign, would achieve a “fully juridical condition” (Pogge, 1988: 198). So the source of order in IR is the condition of the individual, who can express their wishes and fulfil obligations within the boundaries of the republican state. Neoliberalism considers that, in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, cooperation is possible through mutual trust and the creation of norms, regimes and institutions, so not necessarily has to be the effect of a hegemon’s domination. The liberal concept is commonly seen as a response to the vision of international realists, but there are similarities in linking hegemony with leadership in both accounts. John Ikenberry, the founder of institutional liberalism, states that “hegemony is manifest essentially as rule-based leadership” (2001: 83). Robert Gilpin uses these terms interchangeably, suggesting that “hegemony or leadership is based on a general belief in its legitimacy at the same time that it is constrained by the need to maintain it; other states accept the rule of the hegemon because of its prestige and status in the international political system” (1987: 73).

The major problem raised by the liberal school of thought, given its grounding in the source for complex interdependence theory, is that a hegemonic base for global development is no longer possible. Robert Keohane in his classical account states that power became increasingly relativised, the responsibility and burden of maintaining the international order grew, and, consequently, the world moved into an “after hegemony” phase (1984). According to this view, the relation between the hegemon and other actors creating the structure is more subtle and complex than the simple equation in the realist accounts that equates hegemony with material predominance. Keohane explicitly describes the nature of the leadership relation: “the hegemon plays a distinctive role, providing partners with leadership in return for deference; but unlike an imperial power. It cannot make and enforce rules without a certain degree of consent from other states” (1984: 56).

The leadership problem has also been present in the field focusing on the provision of international stability in connection with the theory of public goods. The development of each and every entity within the international structure is conditioned by the provision of goods and services that are public, or collective, such as peace, trust, good governance and prosperity. Keohane argues that order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power and that it is constituted by the formation of regimes and the provision of public goods (Keohane, 1984: 31–9).

Leadership relations are hardly hidden in the description of the liberal modus operandi of the international system, composed of three layers (Ikenberry, 2011). The first refers to established rules and institutions that

are negotiated by the international actors that agree to act upon them. The process of establishing this order clearly implies a leadership relation, as state and non-state actors are constantly involved in developing their agenda, on the basis of alliances requiring the support or consent of others. The leader in the system (liberal hegemon) shapes the milieu in which other states operate and, due to its leadership position, is able to establish the rules of conflict and cooperation. The activities of the leader entail the provision of public goods, which forms the second layer of the international system. Security or an open international market needs nourishing, through the control and support of the leader, who also uses these goods as incentives to influence others. The relation is developed with the use of the “channels and networks for reciprocal communication and influence” (Ikenberry, 2011: 71–72), which presents the third layer of international order.

This account clearly refers to leadership processes, as the assumption of shared interests and consensual order foundational for the liberal model implies the necessity of leadership activities in reaching a common view and establishing consensus.

To some extent, leadership is captured in the research dealing with the diminishing autonomy of the nation state and patterns of democratic governance beyond it. The most prominent works of David Held and Danielle Archibugi focus on the variety of forms that governance takes in the global and transnational arena (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Held, 1995; Archibugi et. al, 1998; Held et al., 1999). Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls have also presented extended concepts on transnational cooperation and cosmopolitan law (Rawls, 1999; Habermas, 2001).

The question of why major political powers rise and fall has also been asked by George Modelski and William Thompson, whose research concentrated on economic influences, bringing interesting conclusions to studies of leadership in the international context (Modelski, 1999; Modelski and Thompson, 1999). Study of a half-millennium of global politics revealed a pattern in the selection and succession of global leaders. The theory of long cycles of world leadership is organised around four cyclical phases, indicated on the basis of their function in the evolution of the world’s affairs and specific interaction between the actors involved. In the agenda-setting phase questions are raised about the legitimacy of the leadership, the ability of the leader to control current problems. Other powerful countries aspire to influence world affairs and change the world political framework. The phase of “Coalitioning” brings de-concentration, loss of the margin of superiority enjoyed by the sitting world leader and the integration of a new power-wielding coalition. The “Macro-decision” phase marks a generation-long period of violence, which can take a form of global warfare, in which two major coalitions clash. Once the war ends with the victory of one coalition, and the following “Execution” phase starts, the strongest actor in the coalition bears the global leadership role and sets up their strategies and programmes of world government. In this concept a series of prerequisites for the takeover of the leadership role

are necessary: global reach, a strong economy, cultural openness and global problem responsiveness (Modelski and Thompson, 1999). Soft and hard power factors are combined.

Mancur Olson, in his theory of collective action, reveals the role of leadership and the logic of followership in pursuing common goals. Organising the group is costly; it requires investment and energy, so the public good is supplied when a dominant actor values the good more than the cost of providing it (Olson, 1965). Olsonian findings dominate thinking on group mobilisation in democracies, but reveal some universal features of the rules of engagement that could also be applied at the international level. The essence of the collective action problem is that the provision of public goods, when it requires cooperation among two or more parties, depends on the parties' self-interest. Even though an identified goal may be collectively desirable, the individual costs borne by the group's members prevent them from participating in the group enterprise. This makes cooperation unlikely. In the case of states competing for position within the international structure, when the role of hegemon is impossible to achieve, the individual national costs of providing public goods are likely to exceed the expected gains. So relative power may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the embracing of the leadership role. Such a construction of the cooperation principle limits the chances of a form of diverse and broad cooperation developing. Olson states clearly that "the larger the group, the less it will further its common interests" (Olson, 1965: 36).

Inquiries into issues of identity, motivation, individual impact and interests brought new and meaningful interpretations of leadership into the context of international politics. A focus on the individual, on human consciousness and its role in international life (Ruggie, 1998: 856), can be seen as the essence of the constructivist turn in IR. Constructivists argue that human interaction is not shaped by material factors, but primarily by ideational ones and that IR is constructed by social facts, which can exist only by human agreement (Adler, 1997). Social forces shape individuals' understanding of knowledge and truth. Objective statements about reality in this tradition are denied – meanings are socially constructed and therefore cannot be detached from one's views, experience and values. Social norms are constructed and reconstructed by agents operating under specific conditions that vary as to both space and time, so agents and structure are mutually constituted (Wendt, 1999). By arguing for the importance of social factors, common norms and frameworks, constructivists have been able to challenge generally approved views within the IR field. Constructivism, however, lacks a theory of agency; it does not explain the motivation in agent-led change.

The most substantial role for leadership appeared within the school of foreign policy analysis, situated however beyond the frame of the three IR grand theories – realism, liberalism and constructivism. This approach is characterised by the employment of in-depth psycho-biographies of leaders so as to link their personalities, life experience and beliefs to subsequent

patterns of leadership and foreign policy choices (Snyder et al., 1954 [2002]). Attention has been gained primarily by the personal dimension of leadership influence, while leadership as a process, as a relations-based platform for change, involving interaction between actors in which roles are not necessarily defined (Barker, 1997), is absent from the field. As a consequence, identity formation has rarely been linked to the development of shared leadership, and collective leadership models concerned more with shared influence and the combined leadership behaviours of groups have been mostly excluded from the new conceptualisations of the international and global environment (Ahn et al., 2004; Dalakoura, 2010).

Foreign policy is analysed with a focus on aspects long acknowledged in leadership studies, such as personality traits, value systems, information processing and social influence dynamics. While classic realism and foreign policy analysis (FPA) represent two ends of the spectrum in defining the place of leadership outlook in a discipline, neoclassical realism paradoxically draws from the same source as FPA and uses the same methods.

Even such a sketchy summary of thinking on leadership within the major IR theories inevitably leads to the conclusion that all of the major schools of thinking include leadership in their reasoning. Realists focus on conflict and threat avoidance, while cooperation and progress grew to be distinctive features of the liberal approach to IR. Nevertheless, both paradigms present space in which leadership thinking, planning and execution is needed, as both the struggle for power and striving for cooperation involve the activities of leaders.

The intellectual search for new ideas is especially compelling in the philosophical tradition of realism. After two decades dominated by reflection on structural constraints around the behaviour of states, the neoclassical school emerges as a response to the direction of global transformation. The language of hierarchy, hegemony and empire has long been the analytical prism through which scholars explained international politics. Such language, however, has not been able to cover all the events and strategies that have appeared as a consequence of growing economic integration and massively increased social connections. International reality has revealed logics and outcomes that can no longer be interpreted within theoretical frames of realism – hierarchical dimensions do not seem suitable for catching the essence of non-state actors' influence and the growing transnational connections that extend beyond the explanatory potential of the “great powers in competition” model. In a way, the desire to examine international realities more closely won over the need to maintain intellectual clarity and elegance, while building the static architecture of the international system on the basis of neo-realism and neoliberal institutionalism.

Consequently, the field of IR is theoretically unintegrated, divorced from the prospect of operationalising all levels of analysis in a deductively consistent manner. Expectations of any kind of grand logic that could make the picture of the fragmented world coherent again, as in the early visions of realist

or liberal thinkers, have vanished. Yet the substantive focus of investigation shifts in the direction of responding to real-world problems and describing real-world processes, which brings about a space for other ways of thinking about relations between international actors. As a consequence the composition of the field is fragmented, as many approaches and concepts try to look beyond the established paradigm (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). Such a shift is heralding a new chapter in the discourse on global order, in which leadership can and should be incorporated as it presents an opportunity to shed new light on the ways in which connections may be re-established in a disrupted world. This is especially important as the role of theoretical endeavour is not only to provide an analytical model; theories “do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities, but also our ethical and practical horizons” (Smith, 1996: 113).

“Thucydides Trap” revisited

Thucydides’ masterpiece “History of the Peloponnesian War”, has long been considered a primary source of knowledge about the nature of war, humans in general and leaders in particular, and the essence of IR. Thucydides “is usually credited with being the first writer in the realist tradition as well as the founding father of the international relations discipline” (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987). He tries to understand the causes and sequences of events that resulted in war between Athens and Sparta, giving readers conclusions about the universal value of war – a phenomenon that has for a long time been considered as rooted in human nature. Thucydides also delivers a detailed interpretation of the events that become a point of reference in the analysis of historical and contemporary conflicts. The war at the end of the fifth century BCE was decided when Sparta, a land power that led the Peloponnesian League, became pressed by the rising power of Athens, and started a preventive war. Thucydides was the first to analyse human behaviour in wartime. He provided a convincing rationale for the existence and politics of states, highlighting the importance of security and survival, which later become central tenets of realism.

The idea that all states are motivated by fear, honour and interest, as stated by several different characters in Thucydides’ account, was accepted as a fundamental principle of interstate relations. Robert Gilpin, Kenneth Thompson, Kenneth Waltz and Martin Wight credited Thucydides’ approach to being a model of how IR should be imprinted into the scholarly imagination. While the power-centred vision reflected in the account by Thucydides become the most renowned one, it is certainly not the only one that could have been drawn from the work (Alker, 1988; Orwin, 1994; Clark 2011). The course of events presented

by Thucydides was not inevitable. The probability of war between a rising power and an established one has been labelled the “Thucydides Trap”. However, analysis of historical events does not confirm that every situation of rivalry inevitably leads to war. The origins of 20th-century world wars cannot not be reduced to the simple fact of rivalry between Britain and Germany. Contemporary factors such as nuclear power, general economic and social interconnectedness, and the changing nature of war also limit the repetitive potential of the Thucydides Trap. Power transition on the world stage has long been organised with the use of means other than hegemonic war. Thus, according to some contemporary readers of Thucydides, conflict between Athens and Sparta was not predetermined. A war lasting 27 years cannot be accounted for by a single explanation indicating causality and inevitability. The “History of the Peloponnesian War” is considered to be in large part focused around large forces in history, a dramatic shift in the distribution of the capabilities of states within an anarchic system. This is true, but is just one of the pieces of the composition, albeit one that made a permanent impression on the way international life was perceived. The work, however, is to the same extent dedicated to individual personalities and the ways in which they directed and redirected the unfolding story. A closer look at the course of events in which they were involved shows that they were driven by a series of blunders, reinterpretations and miscalculations, jealousy and paranoia: “[H]e is also showing the reader how the angle of vision of the actors led to the conflict. The story is as much about Athenian and Spartan perceptions of their interests as it is about systemic alterations in the balance of power” (Jaffe, 2017). BF Skinner (1981) noted that historians are by definition selective in their accounts: “Like the astronomer and cosmologist, the historian proceeds only by reconstructing what may have happened rather than by reviewing recorded facts”, and Thucydides was no different in this respect. He presented a romanticised idea of Pericles, depicted as the perfect statesman, while the reader is made quite aware of the fact that the demagogic anti-intellectual Cleon was not his favourite. His vision of politics is multidimensional – apart from leadership Thucydides elaborates on treaties and shows appreciation for diplomacy and other forms of communication between societies. Only a superficial reading of the story could lead to the conclusion that military power is an ultimate resource in politics. So, it is not necessarily Thucydides who occupies such a prominent position in political discourse, but rather realist readings of the work focusing on particular passages rather than the whole.

What is global leadership about? The provision of public goods in a globalised world

Leadership within the global context is a new focus in the literature of IR (Gill, 2012; Helms, 2014), but the scale and consequences of the profound transformation of positions of leaders has not yet been adequately addressed. Investigation into this issue has been fragmentary to date and it has taken into account only marginally the influence exercised by processes that lead to the expansion of global and transnational spheres of interaction. Leadership is becoming increasingly important because the new operational system of the world is to be shaped not only by creating a balance of power within the group of the most important international players, but more than ever before by securing the needs and rights of citizens. Protection of the global commons and negotiation of the strategies that enable coordination of global flows of people, money, goods and knowledge have become more complex than in any previous period due to the multiplication of actors involved and emergence of new kinds of global needs. More cross-border issues have arisen. Leadership is also seen as a response to the multiplication of the crises and challenges that not only destroy the myth of the “global village” but decompose the international structure by weakening trust and the sense of common destiny (Gill, 2012).

While IR studies present the position of leaders against the background of structural processes that provide opportunities and scenarios for statesmen, global political leadership is action-oriented. Following Keith Grint’s approach (2010a), the conceptual framework of this book examines global political leadership by trying to answer the questions of where, who, what and how with regard to influencing social realities and driving global change:

Leadership as a position: Is it where “leaders” operate that makes them leaders?

Position-based leadership will be defined in this book not as a place in formal or informal hierarchies of international politics. The frame of analysis encompasses the whole world, not in purely geographical terms but also with reference to processes and events that shape the realities of the majority of the world’s population. Global political leadership in this context refers to relations between nation states and the plethora of other actor actively involved in shaping social realities, in contrast to “international politics”, which has been traditionally associated with interstate relations. Leadership positioned in the global sphere includes international politics, transnational processes, and local activities that are oriented at influencing global issues. As Grint (2010a) suggests “Leadership along this positional dimension, then, differs according to the extent to which it is formally or informally structured, and vertically or horizontally constituted”, so different actors execute leadership in different spaces, but some of their activities build the general dynamics

of global society and global systems. The way of thinking about the nature and function of leadership here draws upon two concepts – “world society”, as proposed by the English School of International Relations, and polyarchic governance, popularised on the basis of Elinor Ostrom’s research. The first stresses the existence, necessity and importance of norms in the international realm. In the realist outlook of the English School’s thinkers, the world is structured by anarchy and the only possible organisational scheme must be based on the sovereign power of states and the rules of behaviour they provide; in the original concept, therefore, “world society” is equated with the “society of the states”. “Global society” creates a conceptual space that encompasses all of the actors active in governing common goods or solving global problems. Nevertheless, the most important feature of the original concept stays intact: relations within society are norm-governed, and patterns of behaviour, as regularities that occur within the system, are the product of the norms settled upon. This aspect distances the conceptual space of the “global” from its geographical connotation. Global political leadership refers to the sphere in which the norms of global society are formulated and reformulated, where the organising principles of the system are being established by consensus or domination, giving birth to a dense fabric of international law and rules.

The concept of polyarchic governance, on the other hand, frames the research field in a different manner from that usually found within the conceptual boundaries of IR. Global studies, global politics, global governance – all of these branches and approaches have been developed to address the increased role of transnational and global issues on all of levels of political interaction. All of these concentrate mainly on the institutional framework of global governance, which is seen as responsible for identifying and controlling the impact of widespread transformation. After more than three decades of accelerated globalisation processes, it is clear however that single policies adopted only at a global scale are unlikely to provide effective governance in crucial areas. Despite their unquestionable achievements in a number of fields, global governance actors are not always able to generate sufficient trust among involved parties to ensure that collective action can take place in a comprehensive and transparent manner. The polyarchic approach spreads decision-making processes and actions across various levels and engages local, regional and national stakeholders. Leadership exercised at local level that adequately addresses global problems will be considered to be an aspect of global leadership, despite the fact that the scale of initiatives may be very limited in the geographical sense.

Person-based leadership: Is it who “leaders” are that makes them leaders?

The gallery of global leaders varies from statesman to individual citizens active in international forums, business people involved in the provision of public goods, experts, journalists; all kinds of people that become the *spiritus*

movens of changes oriented at achieving global coherence and expanding the platform of cooperation. It is being increasingly acknowledged that approaches to global commons governance based on structural leadership may be flawed, as there is strong empirical evidence of a decline in the view that in the area of public good provision “it is not really people or policy that provides leadership, but the structure itself” (Ikenbery, 1996: 390). Prevailing in or dominating the structure does not necessarily secure desired outcomes. Consequently, all collectives and individuals able to initiate social change embedded in the wider context of global transformation may be treated as global leaders.

The logic of the post-hegemonic system implies that governance of the commons will be exercised through collaboration, as opposed to hegemony, domination and unilateralism. Processes oriented towards the provision of resources are generated on the basis of action, involvement, willingness to lead, conceptually covered by the idea of “behavioral leadership” (Helms, 2014). Accordingly, a global leader is not necessarily situated in a high position in the international structure; his/her actions are oriented at providing global public goods. Globalisation has greatly increased demands for new forms of political leadership, as processes important for leaders and societies are increasingly shaped within multilayered international and transnational forums. This is the result of the revolution in governance, both private and public, that the world has witnessed during the last 30 years. International and transnational areas have been filled with regulatory bodies, loose initiatives, regimes, and both ephemeral and more persistent forms of governance in which political activity takes place, in most cases, outside the channels of formal politics. Leaders standing behind the construction of innovative forms of governance, embracing global change, proposing new solutions or disrupting global coherence have to be recognised as included in the composition of forces shaping global realities.

Effective multilateral responses emerge outside the institutional frameworks or as a part of them, as institution building does not usually keep up with the pace of international developments. These processes reveal the increasing importance of leadership, and despite the fact that non-state actors cannot establish binding regulations, their activity is essential for the transformation of social and political mindsets. New norms are being created, and a redefined public imagination covers global issues as they become part of everyday realities of billions of people. Furthermore, citizens equipped with technological opportunities are unprecedentedly active in transnational networks, exercising power outside the political boundaries of the state. Kenneth Grint makes reference to psychological concepts of leadership by posing the question “Is it who you are that determines whether you are a leader or not?” (2005). The search for an answer takes us even further away from the study of “international relations” and towards the study of “global society”. Leaders’ behaviours reflect their world views and belief systems, which in turn resonate with the cultural environments in which they operate. As the “‘global society’ concept

is one of the forms of a universal market of ideas, the ethos of leaders”, and their experiences and strategies coexist with and contradict those of others, in an arena of constant exchange (Derungs, 2011; Mendenhall, 2013).

Leadership as result: Is it what “leaders” achieve that makes them leaders?

Results-based leadership in the global environment is related to goal-oriented activities that are important for global coherence, influence the well-being of people and in some cases even seek to secure the survival of humanity. The list includes:

Norm creation. Regime theories and behavioural leadership both assume that norms have causal effects on the behaviour of states and present them as an explanatory variable of the IR system. Established and recognised norms, although hard to validate empirically, are necessary among actors participating in the global sphere if they are to achieve coherence, provide legitimacy and maximise the effectiveness of new types of cooperative forms and arrangements. They are held collectively, and entail expectations towards future behaviours by providing road maps for the shaping of policy. Leaders provide new norms, and assure their impact influences others through socialisation, knowledge transfer and their framing of discourse. They are often perceived as sources of authority, legitimising the idea and/or institution they represent. Authority is especially important in broadening the cooperation platform and achieving a shared understanding, so it should be considered as social capital of the global environment, in which distrust-related anxieties clash with a growing need for synergy building. Norm-based global leadership is involved in negotiating conflicting representation of our shared global/common reality, which in turn increases chances for broadening the consensus on moral values and unifying the rules of domestic and international politics.

International rules provide a normative platform in the context of the anarchic structure of the global political environment, and are necessary for the execution of global processes and the protection of the commons, though there is of course a natural tension between global and national agendas.

“Norms shape actors’ awareness and acceptance of the methods and technologies on which they might rely to accomplish their objective” (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 463). General principles are often contested on local grounds and rejected in national political disputes, as they represent values that are perceived as standing in opposition to particular interests, such as a non-national definition of the common good, equality of nations, supranational bureaucracies or the influence of experts in policy design. Norm-based leadership affects how actors define their interests and preferences and also links them to policy choices that work to unify rather than divide mechanisms for the global community.

Provision/protection of public goods. The notion of global public goods has been introduced into political studies in the form of a realisation that individual well-being does not depend only on the action of national governments, but increasingly relies on the provision of global public goods secured by international or transnational actors.

The concept originated in economics but is widely used within the area of global studies, framing the debate about global responsibilities, interrelations and long-term governance. The change within this area is profound, as previously global public goods were seen as automatically accessible (as with clean air or water) or provided on the basis of high level political agreements (e.g. the nuclear security obtained as a result of non-proliferation agreements). They were never secured unilaterally by the most powerful nation, but nevertheless reliance on multilateral efforts in their creation is unprecedented.

A public good, according to the definition developed in the sphere of economics, should possess two characteristics: non-rivalry – everyone can use the asset without imposing limits on others; and non-excludability – individuals and groups cannot be excluded from using the good. In theory, the benefits from these goods are available for all, but this does not imply that everybody derives the same utility from them. In practice, the criteria of full non-rivalry and non-excludability are hard to meet, so additional the categories “club goods” (non-rivalrous but excludable) and “common pool resources” (non-excludable but rivalrous) have been introduced.

“Global public goods differ from their national counterparts in terms of the complexity – the multi-actor, multi-sector, multi-level nature – of their provision path, as well as in terms of the policy-interdependence they entail” (Kaul, 2012). The assertion underlying the adaptation of the notion of global public goods in the studies of global leadership is that people are increasingly dependent on the supranational level in securing their vital needs, with their well-being potentially threatened by a leadership gap in this sphere.

Development of the concept can also be described as inherently connected to the question of leadership. Although the idea of public goods was introduced by such classic philosophers as David Hume and Adam Smith (Musgrave and Musgrave, 2003), it began to resonate as a conceptual category within political science after Mancur Olson discussed public good provision in his seminal book, *The Logic of Collective Action* (1971). The indispensability of leadership has been connected to the need for societal change and dynamism because, as Olson argues, while the group may strongly desire and benefit from a particular collective good, under many circumstances people will not take individual action to achieve it. The mechanics of the provision of collective goods requires leadership in order to break the common rule according to which parties are likely to act in a short-term and self-interested manner, because while the costs of acting are borne individually the benefits

of acting are shared by all. This position presents the basic condition that can cause individual and collective interests to be aligned.

The entire debate about public goods is heavily rooted in economic thinking about the patterns of benefit that arise from the use and financing of public goods. The governance of these represents an area of accelerated leadership processes, offering insight into potentially innovative solutions, effective and less effective strategies, as well as the design and execution of actions that are global in scope. A major assumption in standard economic theory is that public goods tend to be under-provided, because individual actors are tempted to freeride. The free-rider issue is heightened at the global scale of public good provision, as the size of the group is maximised in this scenario; leadership intervention and mitigation behaviours, and the building of trust or use of coercion are even more essential (Olson, 1971: 34–44). So though there may be non-rivalry embedded in the definition of the public good in terms of consumption, all of the actors involved usually avoid the responsibility connected to their provision. Freeriding heavily shapes the way global public goods are seen in terms of governance. The result, as Buchholz and Sandler explain, is that “From the perspective of standard models which describe public good provision by independent agents, the prospects for successful leadership appear rather poor” (2017). Confronted with choice, actors would engage in strategies of the prisoners’ dilemma or the chicken game, in which the leader’s initiative does not result in cooperation as followers are rather inclined to freeride. Within the realm of global public good provision factors of rivalry, conflict and historical animosity present major stumbling blocks. These are decisive in thinking about collective action in terms of rational choice theory, which predicts that individuals will not collaborate in the absence of external authority, or in highlighting the dangers of freeriding in multilateral cooperation.

Research on various forms of governance with multiple centres is increasingly shedding light on other collaboration scenarios, in which parties are able to balance different interests and promote learning, trust and consensus building. The groundbreaking field studies research by Elinor Ostrom provides an insight into the ways communities maintain long-term sustainable institutions (commons) for common resources (irrigation systems, forest) governance (Ostrom, 1990: 90). Local communities collaborate in allocating and preserving natural resources that their members rely upon for their livelihood. Such polyarchic governance forms proved to be effective in a number of different geographical and political contexts, in New England, Indiana, Bolivia, Uganda and Tanzania or Nepal (Ostrom et al., 1992, 1994; Dietz et al., 2003; Ostrom, 2010). The system they operate in resembles IR structure – in its lack of effective, centralised control (failed, fragile states), actors operate in an anarchical context (Keohane and Ostrom, 1994: 1). Yet, they are able to make arrangements successfully. Therefore, as Ostrom admits “the Hobbesian conclusion that the constitution of order is only possible by creating sovereigns who then must govern by being above subjects, monitoring

them, and by imposing sanctions on all who would otherwise not comply can be questioned” (Ostrom et al., 1992: 414). There are number of conditions embedded in the process, of which communicative factors that guarantee common understanding of interests is clearly linked to effective leadership (Keohane and Ostrom, 1994: 1; Ostrom, 1990: 211–12).

Disrupting the status quo. Interdependence has produced new types of power and new forms of influence, widening the possibilities for disruptive and destabilising action. Global political leadership in the normative sense is oriented at formatting the system and keeping it together in stable form, which is an entry condition for improving coordination and intensifying interaction. The outlook on global leadership practices would not be complete, however, without also including the countervailing forces, aimed at increasing chaos, disruption and isolation, that serve the interests of narrower groups. Power brokers with unprecedented access to the tools of mobilisation and disruption, in weak polities relatively unconstrained by laws or constitutional structures, compete for resources and control. The increased mobility of people and capital, and the technological progress that enables mass organisation across geographical boundaries also produces an acceleration of other kinds of flows – such as weapons, nuclear waste, dangerous biological components. The presence of well organised, well-led criminal or narrowly defined interest groups increases the potential for more frequent change and discontinuity in the international system. The powers of instability, nationalism and extremism present the field of leadership with challenges that, if executed well, increase disruption and chaos.

While the global age provides more opportunities for malevolent states, regimes or organisations, it needs to be recognised that disruption lies at the core of leadership in any sense. By noticing opportunities, finding different interpretations of well-known facts, reframing problems, and introducing innovative ways to see and do things, leaders catalyse processes that result in social change. The ability to shape the cognitive level in terms of defining needs and aims stands at the core of leadership, as it relates also to the sphere of defining global public goods, which like other things are socially constructed. Cultural and social backgrounds shape the image of public needs differently. An example of the way in which sanitation emerged as a public good provides an insight into this mechanism (Gasper, 2002; Deneulin and Townsend, 2007). In 19th-century Europe the sanitation needs of the whole population were recognised in the context of public health measures – improvement in the sanitation system for both rich and poor resulted in the spread of disease from the bottom to the top of the social hierarchy being contained. A comparison with the South African situation reveals that different social arrangements made the perception of mass transport from remote black townships to privileged white areas more justified as a “public good” than sanitation.

Cognitive mechanisms not only condition what should be included in the definition of the global public good, which presents the main point of reference for global leadership, but also define the major tasks for change-oriented leadership.

Leadership as process: Is it how “leaders” get things done that makes them leaders?

There are two basic areas in the evaluation of performance of leaders: observing their interaction with other leaders, and the ways in which they influence their followers.

Leaders–leader interaction. The space of IR presents an ambiguous reality. An actual hierarchy constructed by military and economic dominance is juxtaposed with a systemic principle of international recognition, on the basis of which the voice of the smallest state carries the same weight as the voice of the most powerful. While the normative layer of politics is organised around the public interests and well-being of the people, entire generations are relentlessly crushed in the midst of international competition. States are meant to be primary actors, but many non-state entities more effectively shape the global realities to which states have to adapt. As a consequence, the nature of global political leadership is saturated in ambiguity as well: while the presidents of the United States and Moldavia can present themselves as independent leaders of free nations, both equally mythologised internally by a political operational machine of media and public rituals, their actual positions in terms of agency are incomparable. Historically, most of the globe operated along hierarchical lines, as relations were structured in the form of colonial domination, hegemonic orders, spheres of influence and patron–client relations. Furthermore, the guiding logic of domestic leadership and pursuit of the interests of state in the international realm differ, so statesmen are not comfortable in admitting that they themselves accept the role of follower (Wiener, 1995).

A leadership process organised around global issues introduces coherence, manages expectations, and translates requirements for collective action into a language that is persuasive in the context of local interests. The major challenge that has arisen around leader-to-leader relations is the trust-building that enables joint action. In terms of global public good provision, overcoming competitiveness is probably the hardest task in building a synergistic culture based on the principle that the provision of global goods is not a zero-sum game, in which the loss of one equals the gain of another. As in any interpersonal relation, the personal characteristics of leaders come into play and can present assets as well as potential barriers. Global history is filled with examples of groundbreaking events made possible by the emotional bounds developed between political leaders. Domination or positioning within the international structure is not the only, determining source of shared policy views between

statesmen. At the base of the embracement of leadership in the study of global issues there is an assumption that common ground can be seen as expression of the discursive, emotional and ideological commonalities between people bearing leadership roles. Furthermore, traditional organisation of the international arena has changed, as new forms of cooperation have emerged in a number of fields. Leadership has become an even more essential component of synergy building, because many governance and coordination forums are not institutionalised and require constant mobilisation in order to exist and thrive.

Leader–follower interaction. “The question ‘what is leadership?’ is unanswerable because it is not possible to analyse leaders in the absence of followers or contexts” (Grint, 2005).

Political leadership implies followership on every level of interaction, as the existence of, support of and dialogue with followers are constitutive of the leader, as well as for politics. Conceptualising followership is one of the major benefits that IR and political leadership studies can gain from leadership studies; though the role of followers in political processes is undisputable, followership as such has rarely been made the subject of inquiry.

Political science and even political psychology have tended to neglect political followership (Gabriel, 2011), despite the fact that the role of followers in shaping the processes of global change is increasing. The foundational base for an appreciation of the role of followers in social processes has been created by the nature of the democratic model, affirming the demos and inviting citizens into the arena of governance. As noted by Robert Dahl, the idea of the self-defining demos obliterates “the distinction between democracy and a nondemocratic order” (Dahl, 1989: 128).

This principle is inherently linked to the idea of followership, as notions of engagement, civil duty and political connection have been circulating in the discourse about democratic participation. Not all citizens of the democratic states are to be considered political followers, as not all of them identify with the political system and align themselves in solidarity with their co-citizens. The nation state has also ceased to be the exclusive platform for citizen’s obligations towards justice, dedication and involvement. Other social spheres compete for people’s attention, as a sense of belonging to the same group is starting to be effectively produced by entities other than states – such as transnational networks, global corporations, activist groups. People internalise local, commercial and social relationships in the form of identities. Identities and solidarity stand at the centre of collaborative processes, so the fact that actors other than traditional political forces such as church or state are willing to generate and steer them means multiplication of the leadership spheres and processes available to followers. They may be anchored to a cultural identity or a historical past, but realised on the basis of mobility, interdependencies and shared experiences or projects.

Mechanisms of participation developed in democratic systems spread to other networks and constituencies, giving rise to different kinds of

post-national identities. The unifying platform is connected not to common origins, as in the national model, but rather to shared involvement, action and a sense of agency. Acceleration of the leadership processes on different levels of social interaction can also be seen as an important manifestation of the expansion of individual empowerment. This trend refers equally to the position of “leaders” as well as “followers”, as both are mutually constitutive and “dialectically” related.

Structural, cognitive and relational dimensions of leadership

Global political leadership is a multidimensional phenomenon conceptualised through three distinct dimensions present in the leadership process: structural, relational and cognitive. The organising framework of analysis presented in this book recognises the roles different leadership processes play within the global sphere of political interaction and aims to explore the mechanism of their contribution to the governance of global commons. Leadership is observed here in behavioural terms in order to systematise the different processes in which it is exercised and expose the ways in which they are interrelated. Distinction of the structural, relational and cognitive dimensions is rooted in the approach initiated by Oran Young to the analysis of the role that leadership plays in regime formation (Young, 1991). Young lists three forms of leadership: structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership and intellectual leadership. He also refers to the notion of charismatic leadership, which however in his view has not been relevant to the scope of his analysis (Young, 1991: 287). Young’s concept has provided a framework for revealing the nature of the formation of international institutions and reflected the dynamic of the international realm that was dominant at the turn of the century. The leadership matrix, presented as a summary of the “leadership in progress” sections of this book, has been designed to analyse a broader range of leadership processes in the global realm, and modifies Young’s original concept to better reflect leadership mechanisms in the reality of fragmentation. However, while the background against which leaders and followers operate is subject to change, their relation is always based on the interplay of different types and styles of leadership. Coercion is mixed with “the power of attraction” (Nye, 2008). Global political leadership emerges from new sources and takes new forms, so it is especially important to link these transformations to the fundamental components of the political organisations in which power is produced: structure, knowledge and relations. The analytical scope of this approach is intended to reveal and systemise the outcomes of leadership. Therefore the dimensions of leadership are discussed here, rather than its forms. This approach reflects a general assumption that leadership processes, rather than leaders, should be a major unit of analysis of global political leadership. This is especially important in an era of the empowerment of followers, which often becomes the driving dynamic

of leader–follower relations. The patterns that animate important global processes are hidden not only in the influences generated by material and military power, but increasingly in the complexities of individual decision making or collective behaviour.

The history of global political leadership suggests that processes initiating social change do not emerge organically from particular historical or cultural circumstances. Rather, they are constructed by the interaction between leaders and followers, as both search for ways in which to get their needs addressed. The mechanisms guiding actors' orientations result in certain outcomes within the global political arena, and these are revealed here via an examination of processes across three major leadership dimensions:

- 1) The structural dimension of leadership illustrates the state of the international scene, and the variety of actors involved in the creation of conflict and cooperation. Here leadership processes are driven primarily by power relations, hierarchies of interest and the bargaining leverage provided by material power. These have been explored by the “structural leadership” school, which describe the process as “the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order” (Ikenberry, 1996: 389). Structural leaders can act in the name of a state or any other organisation, engaging in leadership processes to enhance the structural power of the side represented. All forms of leadership (e.g. institutional bargaining, negotiation, sense making, power broking) that result in structural change to the actor's position that have consequences for the whole system are covered by this dimension.
- 2) The cognitive dimension of leadership represents the sphere in which knowledge is produced, shared and transformed. It provides answers to the basic conceptual frame of the given issue grounded in the questions of “what?”, “who?” and “how?” The nature of the problem of global public goods itself does not suggest any imminent course of social change, so the variety of linguistic interpretations, cultural prisms and situational differences between the parties involved in dialogue presents the scale of the challenge of creating cognitive coherence among the actors involved. The cognitive layer of leadership relies, to a great extent, on the power of the ideas generating the understandings of global issues by forming and disseminating conceptual frameworks.
- 3) The relational dimension of leadership includes all the interactive components needed to produce effective collective action, of which contact, a shared understanding of the problem, trust and long-term commitment play the major roles. They determine the character and scale of the relational dimension of leadership in the global public goods arena, indicating the conditions under which actors can enter into cooperation, what perspectives this cooperation will develop, and how transformative it will be for the global picture.

Dimensions of the leadership framework link the perspective of international studies, which provides insights into states' interests, orientations and the international dynamics in which they are involved, with leadership studies, which focuses on human agency, in order to combine structural and individual factors related to the use of power. It covers various mechanisms that bring about leadership status, enriching existing explanations of cooperation and conflict in the governance of global public goods. Leadership is part of the major theoretical explanations that guide our understanding of the global public goods dilemma, but it has never been a major feature of analysis. The problem of the global commons has been strongly embedded in rational choice theory, which explains social and economic behaviour on the grounds of self-interest and profit maximalisation. Rational institutionalism sees cooperation frameworks as a system of interest, power and incentive; the constellation of these elements decides whether or not actors enter into cooperation.

According to this view freeriding and the under-provision of global public goods prevail, because political leaders are carriers of the interests of states actors in such a way that non-cooperation inevitably results. While leaders' role in shaping institutional arrangements and political decision making is acknowledged in the analysis of global processes from the rational choice theory standpoint, factors contributing to the changing balance between interests and incentives are excluded. The mechanism of framing, norm creation and shaping of ideational factors is widely covered by social constructivism. The constructivist turn has resulted in the assertion that interests of actors are not given but socially constructed, yet this perspective fails to sufficiently cover agency. Both analytical perspectives have merit, depending on what is being investigated, yet they overemphasise the role of social structures and norms, not paying sufficient attention to the agents that create and transform them.

Alternative explanations of global relations highlight a combination of variables contributing to the outcomes of global public goods governance. Leadership is often taken into account, as it indicates how and why changes occur, specifying the actors and mechanisms that bring it about. A leadership-based approach assumes that the material as well as social and cognitive components present in the global environment are sources of influence, activated through agency and manifested in the leadership process. Action, and the capacity to influence originate in leadership, therefore the structural, cognitive and relational dimensions of leadership help to reveal the micro-foundations of the political processes in global issues. This allows us to include individual and group emotions (trust, anxiety, rage), behaviours (avoidance, engagement), mechanisms determining the formation and changing of beliefs (cognitive biases, political narratives) and many other factors, broadening the explanatory contours of the global public goods problem.

Managing global uncertainties: The influence of individuals and the unity of states

The notion of leadership has long been embedded in visions of the international system, and during the recent decades of dynamic transformation has grown to the central position in international debate about global order. Calls for stronger leadership emerged as a common tool of political rhetoric while responding to crises, preparing joint action or demanding international cooperation, as a common platform of decision making and governance is the only known way to address challenges of interdependence.

The need for global synergy clashes, however, with trends that are undermining trust and diminishing prospects for collective action: the rise of populism in the western world, the intensification of nationalistic tendencies, and sweeping fragmentation on ideological and economic grounds. Additionally, the belief that mobilisation for development of the global agenda and macro-thinking about global processes is vital and necessary for protection of the common interests of humanity is deeply embedded within the vision of a liberal world order that is increasingly seen as being in decline. The coincidence of a global transition period with the increasing urgency of the need to manage provision of public goods globally makes the question of leadership even more pressing. Looking back in time, we see global actors have exercised leadership through seeking solutions to collective problems.

If the global institutional structure has proved to be suitable for governance tasks focused on controlling and managing already recognised and tested problems (*déjà vu* – as seen before), leadership is needed to generate responses to the increasingly urgent problems that are equivalent to *vu jàdé* (never seen before) (Weick, 1993; Grint, 2010b). The number of ongoing transformations requires facing unknown, and developing an innovative response to, situations that, at least in terms of scale and pace, are unprecedented.

The main function of global leadership is, then, to address the uncertainty related to the emergence and possible consequences of wicked problems – relentless and chronic as they are – which cannot be changed without transforming the environment in which they belong, and while every attempt to solve them generates new problems (Grint, 2005). While this category of problems inherently belongs to the sphere of politics, as they vary from wealth distribution to illicit drug use, the intensive transmission of wicked problems from the domestic to the transnational level has been observed as contributing to a growing sense of uncertainty. One of the wicked problems' major characteristics is their complexity, the ambiguity connected to their causes, and their consequences – and the challenges involved in finding optimal ways of addressing them. The nature of this challenge puts governments in the difficult position of trying to confront them with long-term, coherent policies that could limit their scale and expansion without generating additional sources of grave issues. The organisational system of the

state, with a centralised political establishment and a clear hierarchy, offers a still-imperfect but workable framework for management of these problems, while the anarchic international arena cannot secure the planning and executive functions of the overreaching authority of any form of global government. The growing urgency of the major “global issues” humanity has to face, such as climate change or rising inequality, coincides with the emergence of wicked problems related to structural and functional disorder in the global system’s logic. The most urgent include the following.

Global order transition. The world order founded after the Second World War (WWII) is in a moment of transition: new powers emerge, old-ones re-emerge, the world economy is more interconnected and interdependent than at any time before and uncertainty about the future global order is increasing. This is caused by several factors, with the most essential being the gradual erosion of US and western primacy, the return of sharp great-power competition across all three key regions of Eurasia, the revival of nationalism and the empowerment of the agents of international strife and disorder.

Economic and political processes have reshaped the global power landscape over the course of the last 50 years – the rise of China and India, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the intensity of European integration after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The pillar of modern multilateralism – the United Nations (UN) Charter – was created on the basis of democratic rule and involved a wide range of participants. However, the UN system had limited opportunities for growth in Cold War political realities dominated by geopolitics. After the Cold War, efforts to develop institutional governing bodies funded on relatively open and multilateral grounds were doubled. As a result of globalisation, a transnational space appeared between the level of the international system and that of the state. This new space covers activities, processes and cross-border phenomena derived both from inside countries as well as from international interaction. The inter-state and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), accompanied by private initiatives established for a variety of purposes and proliferated at all levels, are changing profoundly the way in which economic and social processes are mediated. The expansion of multilateralism does not mean that its major historical ambition has been accomplished – the international state of anarchy has not been transformed into a society bound by commonly recognised norms and guided by a clear system of governance. Instead, it produced a clash between the ambitions and realities of nation states and the egalitarian logic of multilateralism.

Global relations have been undergoing far-reaching and fast-paced transformation. This, and a number of other features fundamentally changing the nature of the international environment gave rise to the question of how global relations should be regulated. As a result, the concept of global governance went from an unknown to a central theme in the study of IR within just the last two decades of the 20th century (Rosenau, 1990, 1995; Rosenau

and Czempiel, 1992; Held, 1995; Avant et al., 2010). Global governance puts institutions at the centre of its political programme, perceiving international, institutionalised frameworks as responses to the reduced steering capacity of national political systems. It was meant to be a structure able to effectively deal with emerging global problems, acting on behalf of the common good in the absence of global government. The effectiveness of the system, however, is increasingly being questioned, as progress even on major global issues, such as trade or the environment, has been halted and the appearance of grave new challenges such as global pandemics is weakening the resilience of the system. The low level of transparency of global governance processes and the limited role of directly democratically legitimised representatives in negotiations of the global commons have resulted in a growing trust deficit and an inability to transform technocratic processes into political vision.

It is becoming increasingly unclear who makes and manages the international order, as leaders of global governance structures – the USA and member states of the European Union (EU) – are showing signs of uncertainty as they face the complexity of global challenges.

Construction of such an order has always been founded on clear leadership or, using the IR terminology, hegemony of the strongest actor or actors. The USA, after “the unilateral moment” of its history in the last decade of the 20th century, plays less of a leadership role globally. The influence of China is increasing, but this is not accompanied by a willingness to take responsibility for the shape of global order, which China finds illegitimate (Zakaria, 2008). With the rise of the “rest” of the powerful Asian and Latin American economies, the western world finds it harder to defend liberal positions or the order established after 1945. This power shift is combined with the crisis of identity of western countries. Three of the most powerful social narratives of Europe and the USA are increasingly seen in retreat: the internationalist vision, consensus building, and institution building have ceased to be seen as features of an effective international strategy.

In the face of unresolved international crises, terrorist threats, strategic rivalries, and growing internal opposition, the traditional centres of global power and coordination of global affairs are giving up their role in building new global governance structures. Diverging national interests, difficulties with the practical implementation of agreements and a lack of trust impede attempts to build new forms of geopolitical consensus, which as a consequence leads to the diminishing importance of the traditional leaders in global power networks.

Governance crisis. Globalised world politics became increasingly characterised by the “erosion of boundaries separating what lies inside a government and its administration and what lies outside them” (Shapiro, 2001). Economic integration created a wave of privatisation and outsourcing as it swept across advanced industrialised and developing countries, encouraging

states to retrench from their traditional roles as exclusive providers of public goods and services. Many spheres traditionally treated as exclusive areas of state governance, such as transport, urban planning, health care and even education, have been replaced by private–public partnerships and other forms of power sharing. Furthermore, corporations and global civil society organisations have begun to claim a growing presence in global affairs, leading to profound reconfiguration of global power and authority while not being fully visible at the level of formal governance bodies. At the same time the question of global public goods has become part of national policies, as governments locally struggle to bear the consequences of their under-provision. It has been estimated that between 1960 and 1980 social expenditure for education, health, pensions and other benefits more than doubled on average (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000; Ruggie, 2003), as liberal democracies sought to compensate for the risks connected to globalisation and economic integration. Such risks are multiplied when global problems remain unmanaged and unsolved, so the cost of compensation rises, while at the same time a state's resources are heavily dependent on external factors (foreign investment, global risks). Apparently local political actors should be interested in investing in global governance, but such a political strategy rarely pays off during election cycles, so the logic of internal politics prevents them from doing so. Agency becomes polarised between different levels of governance structures, at the national and supranational levels, which underlines the major paradox of the political powers of our time: the clash between global influence and the national operational framework of short-term election cycles. Nation states have remained central in the global structure of economic, communication and social ties, but the relevance of their political establishments is coming under scrutiny from below and from above. Political leaders face ever-growing complexity in contemporary governance, menaced as it is by incomplete information for decision making and reinforced by multilevel and multi-organisational agents competing in the public arena. External factors, such as international financial markets, corporate practices, international organisations and the nature of global processes, rather than individual virtues and leadership qualities, are increasingly seen as conditioning the provision of public goods.

Growing interconnectedness and integration of the global environment have led to significant changes within international structures, which in turn transformed the logic of politics in nation states. An entire sphere of authority concerned with operating and cooperating beyond the national state has been created and constitutes an effective layer of governance (Young, 1999; Held and McGrew, 2002). It forms a vital part of the interaction between active citizens, effective states and transnational organisations which can redistribute power, voice and opportunity. This should not, however, overshadow the fact that global organisations designed to address global problems are increasingly incapable of managing the instabilities created by global interdependence (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995; Weiss, 2008). They will not be transformed

soon, as the political impetus for cooperation is less compelling today than it was in 1944, following decades of war and depression. These organisations are only as strong as their member states, so their condition reflects the increasingly apparent, accumulating shortcomings of representative democracy, which tends to ignore factors that stand outside of the electoral cycle, such as neighbouring countries or future generations.

Government, governance and leadership

Given the complexity of today's governance sphere, the nature of power, delegation and decision making within governments and outside of them is unclear. Apart from government and parliamentary bodies, a whole array of issue networks and policy communities are active in public regulation and governance (Kooiman, 2003; Miller and Rose, 2008). Decision-making processes at the global level are even more complicated, and the boundaries between national and international dimensions of governance are increasingly blurred. For most global problems, no single political institution enjoys an exclusive governance mandate: "Tens of thousands of international institutions are in existence today. Most of these institutions enjoy a significant degree of autonomy, but they do not always operate in silos. International institutions interact with each other and form a complex web of interdependent relationships" (Kim, 2020). The operational logic of the relation between national political powers and international institutions is based on "nested principal-agent relationships" (Nielson and Tierney, 2003: 250). Voters in member states initiate a delegation chain, which moves through national parliaments, governments, representatives on institutions' boards and assemblies, and ends with the organisation's staff. In short, "[m]ember governments (making up the principal) hire an IO [international organisation] (agent) to perform some function that will benefit the members" (Nielson and Tierney, 2003: 245).

The problem lies in the fact that these member governments usually have divergent interests, so there are tensions between them that concern political interests and preferences. Although international organisations would be the most effective while acting independently, member states are reluctant to delegate authority and relinquish control; they know as many states control organisations, that their particular national interests will never be completely congruent with the preferences of others. There is always a difference between what the member state wants and what the international agent does. "Agency slack", the temptation to act independently of their principals and thus to overreach their delegated authority is also expressed in international organisations' staff pursuing their own interests to maximise budgets, responsibilities and autonomy (Hawkins

et al., 2006). International organisations are players in the power game, often oriented towards becoming masters rather than servants.

In the interconnected world, the process of steering society and the economy is more complex than ever; people avoid participation, which results in the sense of being excluded from the consultative process of establishing common goals around which this governance should be organised. Citizens don't see themselves as authoring their own laws through representatives, and this interlinkage between them and global governance is rarely the subject of public deliberation. It often happens that in public discourse institutions of global governance are presented as a kind of global government, from which national constituencies should be protected. The fact that states voluntarily delegate power to international organisations so as to benefit from the relationships that ensue is often absent from public view. The impression is reinforced by messages and activism surrounding the World Trade Organization (WTO), the G8, and UN negotiations. Accusations of despotism of powerful, exclusive and opaque international institutions are much louder than praise for the decades of humanitarian work and institution building. The nuances of relations between national and international governance bodies are difficult to be captured by the public eye. It is not commonly known that all the international organisations are as strong as their member states and as effective as their members allow them to be by providing resources and legitimisation, and that in fact the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have very little direct power over countries unless and until a country runs into economic problems. This is a reason for the inertia of the global governance system:

The truth is that the leaders of the neoliberal states don't want effective global governance. Why not? Because effective global governance would be public governance, would guide and regulate, would insist on controlling the wilder excesses of finance and capitalism generally, would seek to steer the global economy. It would, in a phrase, be social democratic in character. It could not be otherwise, given what needs to be done. However, the leaders of the countries that still dominate global governance don't want this type of global governance.

(Payne, 2016)

The nature of collective action and delegation of powers poses many serious obstacles to cooperation, yet the level of interdependence and the urgency of global public goods problems does not leave other options for states. They just have to cooperate. The globalisation

phase lasted long enough to bring to light the fact that, in an increasingly interconnected world, problems of integrated economy, security, health and environment inevitably affect every country, and therefore require collective action at the global level. The leadership component proves to be decisive here, as synergy building is a process of constant negotiation and consensus creation. Preferences are not given, they are shaped, so in order to exceed the limits of narrowly defined national interest an interactive process of discursive engagement in the establishment of common aims is required. Global governors might be institutionally and operationally effective, but they need to be global leaders to be able to protect the commons. Evolution of the global governance system can be seen as a formative period of experimentation, filled with crises and disappointments, as well as some successes. The organisation of the international system is not adapted to the necessity of providing global public goods, yet the merciless logic of collective action and relational decision thinking are not the only options on the table. Power, prosperity and dominance are amorphous concepts that mean different things to different people at different times. Although states create international institutions and provide reasoning for their existence in policy creation processes, they see them more as a problem than a solution. Yet they frame the conditions of cooperation, so a discursive process is needed to transform the competitiveness approach into a cooperative one, or to enable cooperation within the framework of competition.

Retreat from globalisation. Globalisation has been the leading theme of IR in recent decades. Linked to the pre-eminence of the western world, it has been perceived also as an opportunity for other regions to expand economically and politically. Now, the globalisation narrative has lost its bearings and most of the world is showing strong signs of backlash against further integration. The Brexit referendum result and rise of populist movements are often interpreted as signs of reorientation in the strategies of global players, and as a revolt against globalisation. Projects that were meant to symbolise the revival of global integration – the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), both networks of mega-regional trade agreements – have also been rejected. This, combined with the resurgence of state industrial policy and large, market-distorting economies, challenges the functioning of the open world order and imperils the design of any new one. Many long-standing political and social concerns remain unresolved, which sharpens the perception that existing forms of governance are inadequate.

But the “broken promises” of globalisation are not limited to the economy. Despite interconnectedness, there is a growing sense that intercultural

dialogue does not improve understanding. The communication revolution and general integration have helped exacerbate opportunities for organised crime and terrorist networks. While this aspect of globalisation has long been recognised, it seems that the western public has just entered a phase of disillusionment about the scale and nature of globalisation challenges (Der Derian, 2001). As a result, the long movement towards market liberalisation has stopped, borders are being fortified, national sentiments are on the rise, and globalisation is commonly contested in political debate.

Discourse about the shape of globalisation, its strengths and weaknesses, has stopped but the process itself is thriving – ever-increasing streams of information, people, money, and goods are moving around the globe at a fast pace. The international community lacks the language, an appealing metaphor, to describe the current state of IR. Transformation of the international setting required the ideological synthesis and simplification necessary for constructing political vision. Public perspectives are fragmented and chaotic in the absence of a narrative frame, a concept that could explain the world in accessible, if not familiar, terms.

Changes taking place within the global arena require new ways of thinking about boundaries and the limits of political activity. Multi-stakeholder multilateralism has already become the norm, but global realities lack an organisational frame that could capture new forms of influence. Many actors sitting at the negotiation table where global issues are discussed have empowered interests other than those of the state, but this practice does not describe their role in global hierarchies of power. It is difficult, if not impossible, to sketch the international structure composed by the myriad decision-making centres and economic and social actors that shape global realities. There are areas where leadership is exercised by individuals, by corporate executives or internet-based networks of coalitions of the willing. They are in many cases ephemeral, informal, difficult to capture in the institutional sense, yet they play a vital role in the handling of global affairs. Examples range from the International Landmines Campaign, through major rating agencies that have become power brokers for media magnate Ted Turner and his offer to help pay off the US debt to the UN. These individuals, employing formal and informal forums of action, exercise global leadership and guide global processes, yet are absent from descriptions of global power structures. Therefore, the attempt to capture the role of leadership within the global realm has to be guided by a process rather than a structure. As Modelski and Devezas explain:

This is the central term of an analysis that privileges change over stasis, and “flux” over structure. It is a distinct way of perceiving reality, in that it “connects the dots” to create event sequences. More than a mere trend (a drift, tendency, or general movement), it is defined as “series of connected developments unfolding in programmatic coordination”.

(2007)

Most of IR approaches are suited rather to the avoidance of ambiguity and paradox, while global transition within the social sphere – the empowerment of individuals, political fragmentation, the transformed abilities of the nation state – increasingly reduces the clarity of the global picture. Therefore a new conceptual lens for specifically capturing the nature of the processes that change the position of individuals (leaders as well as followers) and states in the global realm has become necessary.

International relations and the individual

As Frey explains, “Politics and political science are indubitably about people, but in rather special sense, not in the most common intuitive sense. Political science usually does not deal with people in either their individuality or their totality” (Frey, 1985: 127).

The effort to bridge the IR and leadership perspectives on the evolution of global power needs to address the task of identifying the subject of its research. Both perspectives focus on power, the ability to influence and agency as expressed in the construction of new rules and institutions. For leadership studies, however, the major point of reference is the individual, the person involved in a power relation, while group actors play a primary role in shaping the state of global affairs according to the major lines of IR theory. Pictured as independent, sovereign entities, they are presented as reflecting the preferences of members of their societies, while at the same time people gathered within the geographical boundaries of states are forced to live with the foreign strategies of their governments. Individual attributes constitute the base from which visions of the mechanics of the international structure are drawn, but the role of individuals is rarely openly acknowledged and examined, despite the fact global reality is increasingly shaped by problems directly connected to the status of people in the wider world.

This is one of the gaps that the leadership perspective could help to close in the theoretical outlook of IR, shifting attention away from the international structure to the actors who engage in processes that shape and transform reality. In both the realist and liberal pictures of the international system, political leadership is prior to the moment from which thinkers decide to draw their vision. They rarely ask about the mechanics of the state governance system, emergence of bureaucratic structures or interest groups. These are inherent components of states – black-boxes that become objects of interest only from the moment they are seen as a part of the international structure. The peak of the greatest theoretical achievements of the IR discipline is embedded in the historical process of the social grouping that resulted in the composition of modern statehood. Differences come down to the operational layers of the system, as realists, liberals and constructivists argue about the organising principles that hold the system together. The third of the IR grand theories however, comes closest to recognising the role of individuals; it recognises relations within the international realm as organised according to patterns of

social interaction, comparable to individuals within human society. But in fact all kinds of inquiry about the nature of the international system originated in the study of patterns that govern individuals and group behaviour.

The dynamics of IR come down to the interplay between right and wrong in human nature. While political leadership is not explicitly analysed in the discipline of IR, various features of human beings have always found their way into the theorisation of world politics. All three traditions within IR studies fundamentally differ in their judgement on human nature. Realists view human beings as inherently egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self-interest overcomes moral principles, while liberals hoped for the possibility of establishing moral order in human affairs. The liberal vision draws heavily upon individual rights and freedoms, the recognition of which creates a basis of universal justice and perpetual peace. Here the citizen–state relation is human-centred – political units are provided to guard individual freedoms and serve as a platform for recognition of the universal justice which crosses different levels of social and political life (Kant, 1991). The Kantian understanding of human principle is especially interesting in the context of leadership in global politics, as one of his most influential intellectual endeavours probed the question of relations between all humans irrespective of state borders.

The formative features of the philosophical origins for modern thinking about international politics were established in reference to the gallery of individuals. At times they bore a name, and were situated in a defined time and place, like Machiavelli's Prince, but more often the reference was made to human nature passion, ambition and reason (Machiavelli, 1966). These attributes were considered to be the driving force of interaction, growth and change, so IR scholars have drawn from several prominent areas of psychology to inform their research. Perception of the psychological condition of the human provided the origins for the leading concept in the field. They were central to the way Thomas Hobbes rationalised the “state of nature” – a situation without central authority, which enabled human appetites to be pursued without restraint (Hobbes, 1946). This war of all against all was driven by competition, diffidence and brutality interacting in anarchy. It would be difficult to question the importance of the psychological dimensions of fear and despair to the realist mind:

Realists like E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz sought to highlight the manipulation, accumulation, and balancing of power by sober unsentimental statesmen, focusing above all on the limits imposed on states by the international distribution of material resources.

(Legro and Moravissick, 1999)

Human nature has been pictured in line with the Hobbesian legacy and treated as a permanent factor in the course of history: many different kinds of leaders have led many different kinds of states, but they have all fought

wars. This assumption made Kenneth Waltz reject leaders as an explanatory platform in IR. In his seminal work *Man, the State, and War* (1954 [2001]), Waltz points out that while searching for the causes of war there is sometimes no need to go further than the personal profile of a leader; that the immediate causes of war are contained in the first and second of his “images” (Waltz, 1954 [2001]): “According to the first image of IR, the locus of the important causes of war is found in the nature and behaviour of man. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected impulses, from stupidity” (Waltz, 1954 [2001]: 16). Realism does not expect a lot from human nature, and even its critics have confirmed that humanity in most places and most times lived according these low expectations (Wendt, 2000). This, in turn, makes neglect of the presence of the second group of leaders – those that pushed their people towards extraordinary achievements and brought civilisational development, freedom and progress – so even more remarkable.

This long tradition of historical and leadership inquiries proves that although the grand theories of IR are reluctant to make reference to the individual level of analysis, the subject of individual actors, their perceptions and emotions cannot be avoided: “The personality and characters of individual actors played a vital role ... If the ‘great man’ theory of history represents a distortion, structural approaches placing exclusive weight on ideology or the struggle for power among independent nation states hardly suffice as alternatives” (Stueck, 1995: 8).

Several influential IR thinkers have included other than state-level relations in their design of international order. Not surprisingly, some of these concepts clearly resemble proposals formulated within the leadership studies domain. Hegemonic theories condition influence with the possession of material incentives which bear the features of transactional leadership – pre-eminent powers use their capabilities to order relations among subordinate polities through exchange. An alternative proposal by Ikenberry and Kupchan, based on “altering the substantive beliefs of leaders in other nations”, not only refers directly to individuals, but describes the essence of transformational leadership within the practice of IR:

Hegemonic control emerges when foreign elites buy into the hegemon’s vision of international order and accept it as their own – that is, when they internalise the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the nature of the international system.

(1990: 285)

This process involves vision, knowledge distribution and a construction of meaning oriented towards the creation and diffusion of norms as “the process through which national leaders internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into the community formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its leadership

position” (1990: 289). Such an understanding of the hegemonic position entails not only material and symbolic power but, most of all, coherent vision of the international order that is being constructed through means at the hegemon’s disposal. The realisation of the vision entails reaching other people, persuading them and motivating them to act; in other words, creating a relationship between leaders and influential individuals who it is hoped will carry the vision and messages further. So behind the impersonal concepts of the “hegemon”, “states” and “nations”, on which the operational language and dominant paradigm have been founded, an ontological claim appears that the world ultimately consists of individuals.

Constructivists’ introduction of the social construct to the discussion provided recognition of the role of perception and cognitive forces in international affairs, but not much insight into the role of the individual. There have been few attempts “to bring the individual back in” directly to the field of IR (Young, 1991: 281). Oran Young explicitly defines individual leadership against the background of regime theory; the character of the conceptual gap has been convincingly described in the article by Byman and Pollack “Let us now praise great men: Bringing the statesman back in” (2001). Recognition that social sciences deal with the person in “ manifold terminological shapes and forms: as actor, agent, subject, individual, person, body/being, self, mind, psyche” (Jacobi and Freyberg-Inan, 2015: 8) has increasingly generated a conviction about the need for deeper conceptualisation of the impact of the individual on IR. The view that many theories of international politics rely on implicit individual foundations is rarely questioned. Interest in the individual is also reflected in growing developments in psychological approaches to IR. While studies of personality marked development of the field for a long time, psychological tools are used to study elite behaviour (Keller and Yang, 2008), conduct experiments among elites (Renhsen, 2015), or deliberate on contextual features for the study of psychological mechanisms (Renhsen et al., 2017). A further line of analysis examines the biological or neuronal conditions that frame negotiation, interaction, and leadership processes (Jervis, 2017; Holmes, 2018), expanding the lens of studies onto the individual construction of IR. The sum of these developments can be seen as a reaction to the conceptual breach created by the denial of the individual in major IR theories. Now knowledge is accumulating in this area, widening the grounds for inquiry but also confirming that recognition of the role of individual influence and agency in shaping international reality has grown.

Human brain, social brain and the Anthropocene

Categories in which the dynamic of global equilibrium has been expressed differ from those concerning human history. The major vision of the international realm is based on the assumption that

states and other international actors differ in their qualities from individuals, ignoring the ways in which individuals relate to societies. Individuals don't guide the faith of their group or societies in complete separation from their own individual ways. It seems, however, that separation of the political entities from the rest of society allows them to engage in moral dualism and relativism. The decision to annihilate masses of people with the use of the atomic bomb seems to have another, more impersonal dimension when it is placed within the spectrum of national interests. Although the individual is embedded in society and represents part of the nation, two distant logics are being used to explain and judge individual history and national history. The two are only loosely linked together, as though politicians, since obtaining their professional status, are less human. Another drift between the organisation of human civilisation and the way in which international life is pictured lies in rejection of the cooperative nature of man. Adaptation is the major principle of evolution. Humans became the dominant species on earth because they were able to communicate, share ideas and cooperate; humans, more than other animals, developed the skill of understanding and responding to one another in order to act together. Members of any other species cannot understand each other and provide rationale for cooperation without being bound in close relationship. This is one of the most impressive manifestations of the plasticity of human social organisms – their capacity to adjust themselves in accordance with evolutionary characteristics. Humans began their own path to victory in the lottery of evolution from the time the brain became the social brain. Our hunter-gatherer ancestors made war to get and expand the resources needed for survival, but they were also heavily involved in reproductive levelling. They built institutions to share food and information, to make decisions by consensus, and to gang up on would-be dominants or freeriders: those that would monopolise reproductive and material resources or exploit the cooperation of others. Among the features that make humans exceptional, Yuval Noah Harari (2014) puts the ability to create fictional stories at the top of the list. Only humans use abstract concepts as a basis for their large scale cooperation: Creativity served them to provide realms other than material, visible on the base of the concepts that become fundamental for large groups of people, like god, governments, laws, taxes, marriage, money ... Things that do not actually exist, except in our common imagination. All these things are fictional stories. They are not a biological reality, but it's a very powerful and convincing and benign

fiction that helps us organize our political and legal systems in the modern world.

(Harari, 2017)

This is the mechanism that allowed humans to employ huge amounts of knowledge and technology and create culture, and that linked individual and group behaviour to the requirements of the environment. Cultures provide learning patterns that enable cooperation. They can erode and be recreated in response to emerging factors to which people, individually and collectively, have to adjust. The superb adaptive abilities of humans enabled the creation of the age of humans – the Anthropocene. The beginning of the process was marked by two factors: agricultural revolution and ultra-sociality. Living in communities, people were constantly interacting with others and entirely dependent upon them: the sharing of work led to specialisation and the division of labour, and the sharing of information led to knowledge accumulation, socialisation and self-sacrifice in order to protect the community (Gowdy and Krall, 2013a): “Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of evolution is its ability to generate cooperation in a competitive world. Thus, we might add ‘natural cooperation’ as a third fundamental principle of evolution beside mutation and natural selection” (Nowak, 2006: 1563). Ultra-sociality created civilisations and global wicked problems, undermining the global system as a result of the extensive use of the planet’s biophysical resources. The paradox here lies in the fact that cooperation became a successful adaptation strategy for early humans, when they had to face food shortages, probably as a consequence of changes in ecological conditions (Tomasello, 2014: 36). Humans had to cooperate to survive and thrive. A consequence, however, of this higher level of social organisation is the fact that people are unable to make the changes necessary to ensure humanity’s long-term survival. Political leaders and followers have long been operating in a system that is ultrasocial but impersonal, and tends to replicate itself without consideration for long-term consequences. Although humans rule the world, the internal contradictions and multiplicity of dynamics within this ultrasocial reality reduce their ability to undertake large-scale cooperation in order to introduce radical change (Gowdy and Krall, 2013b).

Are states unitary actors?

Kenneth Waltz (1996: 54) made the assumption that states are “unitary actors with a single motive – the wish to survive” the foundation of his theory of international politics. States – operating on the basis of the

sovereignty principle, as geographically and socially defined, are considered to be the primary actor in IR and have presented the basic analytical unit since the inception of IR as a discipline. The pervasiveness of realism in the IR intellectual tradition does not close the debate about possible interaction between domestic and international systems. It has been a constant *leitmotif* of IR studies, not only connecting them to other disciplines, but also making an attempt to come closer to reality and enrich conceptual variety. The assertion about the coherence of states has been challenged on the grounds of neoclassical or neotraditional realism, arguing that domestic and international environments interact in shaping foreign policy; but it is still deeply rooted in conceptual images of global politics. The structural perspectives of IR illustrate the system with a picture drawn on the basis of Arnold Wolfer's (1962) "states-as-billiard-balls" metaphor, in which states interact on a pool table and every collision changes the entire dynamics of the whole structure. The assumption about states being billiard balls played a major role in the development of IR studies, not only by forming the core realism as the dominant paradigm within the field, but also as a questionable issue.

As has long been argued by representatives of the neoliberal perspective in IR, such a static picture of the international system does not cover the internal political dynamics of states, the evolution in their systemic and ideological orientations. Ann Marie Slaughter argued that the classic vision of realists has become obsolete in a world in which the political sphere has expanded beyond the actions of governments, which are now just one of the many segments of national societies. One function of the government is to pursue IR, but the systemic integration of the globe means that the official politics of the state have ceased to be the sole unit of analysis: "States were like billiard balls. We tried to prevent them from crashing into each other. We did not, however, look inside them. We did not think we could change what happened inside them" (Slaughter, 2012: 288).

The trajectory of the profound transformation within the international social sphere influenced the possibilities and patterns of the state's relations, both with citizens and external international actors. In the liberal view of IR, globalisation not only reframed discussion of the distribution of power within the international system, but changed the nature of IR. According to Slaughter (2004), the rise of trans-governmental networks marked the beginning of the new world order, in which the nation state can no longer be conceived as a hierarchical unitary actor. German cultural historian Karl Lamprecht announced, as early as in 1905, the fall of the territorially defined nation state, in the face of the expansion of the "tentacle state" that had to deal with overseas political organisations, diasporas, exports, investments and exported ideas (Lamprecht, 1905). The process of the expansion of state structures, influences and areas of interest continued throughout the following decades, accelerating in the moment of "hyper-globalization". The wave of economic integration connected political organisations into a global

web and created new opportunities, forcing states into significant expansion of their interactions. In the globalised world finance became deregulated, technology autonomous and identities fluid. International organisations, transnational corporations, institutions of private governance, INGOs, social networks and consulting bodies gained influence in affairs of the nation state. The number and nature of political spaces defined as “social spaces wherein actors meet to make, apply, interpret and enforce rules” (Stone Sweet et al., 2001: 13) definitely increased. These new political spaces enabled “skilled actors” to engage, influence and practise new forms of governance. However, after two decades of analysing the global political sphere there is little evidence to support early visions of the decline of central governmental authorities losing their function in favour of issue-specific border-crossing networks. Neither has the state evolved into a strategic manager of a “networked polity” (Ansell, 2000). The changes have been profound, but do not in fact breach the institutional roots that link the state with the international environment.

The state, besides developing a dense net of external relations and expanding its functions, was able to maintain the closest relations with citizens and remains the primary point of reference in identity formation. The concept of the state does not always imply homogeneity, as states generally do not precede nations (Keating, 1988). State governance systems, represented by personalities and symbols able to create meaning, have long been the most accessible and natural area in the formation of leadership relations. Accelerated globalisation made it evident that prominence of the state is planted in relations with its people; with citizens that linked their individual identities with the particular concept of the nation, framed in the administrative format of the state. States, in reality, have ceased to be unitary actors, as revolution in transportation and communication provided individuals and organisations with the tools to reach beyond state boundaries. The collective identity of the state, which is crucial for its viability, is being constantly undermined by the influence of global media and external groups of interests and ideologies, in some cases creating individualised social spaces more effectively than the state. Identities, causes and channels of influence have expanded and become globalised, as different social groups developed strategies of foreign public engagement. It needs to be noted, however, that although globalisation made some states socially incoherent, the agency gained by actors other than states has not been easily institutionalised and structured, so their position in competition over strategic resources is inferior.

Hyper-globalisation in the second half of the 20th century marked processes of political decomposition of the state, providing opportunities for agency for actors not belonging to state structures. The most important change however, so far overlooked in the IR literature, has taken place in the sphere of relations between states and citizens.

Leadership in practice: Climate change as a global political leadership process

The realities of climate change present the most far-reaching of the world's contemporary wicked problems (Grint, 2005), as they entail the development of complex systemic risks that outpace existing approaches to their analysis. The gravity of the situation increases in the reality of fragmented political power, divergent interests and differences in conceptual approaches to the problem. Managing climate change requires global political leadership, as the problem is a model illustration of the influence of global realities on the conditions and perspectives of particular societies, and the fact that it cannot be managed unilaterally. This situation reveals the limitations of depicting global leadership solely in terms of state politics, illustrates the influence of individuals on global climate change realities and contributes to the discussion of the unitary formation of the nation state and global governance.

It has to be noted, however, that just as climate change presents itself as a series of difficult or intractable issues, the leadership context in which it needs to be presented is equally multilayered. The point of departure here is provided by the characteristics of climate change, which not only touch the essence of global divisions, but imply redefinition and widening of the present cooperation paradigm. The crucial features include:

a) Climate change is global in reach. For the first time in modern history, a truly global understanding of the universal problem is needed to provide an effective solution that must be implemented everywhere. In the context of change-oriented leadership, globality is the main feature of the problem, influencing all three leadership dimensions. The historical division of the highly developed (Global North) and developing (Global South) parts of the globe and unequal distribution of the consequences of climate change presents the divisive structural characteristic of the international system. It is estimated that developing countries “would bear some 75 to 80 per cent of the costs of damages caused by the changing climate” (World Bank, 2009: xx), although their share in the production of climate damage was limited (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992; Parry et al., 2007). Such asymmetry between responsibilities and impacts creates a “double injustice” narrative on the side of the Global South. As a consequence, a longstanding economic global divide is further exacerbated by climate change, which is growing to be a principal source of tension between developed and developing countries. During recent decades of climate negotiations, the world witnessed different forms of leadership, but none of them was able to overcome the structural dimension of the problem. What stands as a main obstacle in the process of designing such negotiations then is the divergent logic of the climate discourse in the South and in the North. The western world applies the

narrative of the protection of nature, while developing countries make human well-being the primary point of reference. This means that during global climate negotiations developing countries have consistently stressed their “right to development” and the unfairness of having to carry the same economic burden as highly industrialised societies. In fact, as mitigation measures are implemented only in western countries, their effects expose developing societies to greater risks. The model example is provided by the practice of converting land to biofuel production, which in recent decades has driven up the price of essential foodstuffs and thus cut real incomes of poorer people. The question of climate justice and this unequal burden presents a barrier that hasn’t been crossed on the cognitive level of leadership in the western world. While knowledge about the nature, dangers and individual responsibilities of citizens has resulted in some form of environmental turn in many societies, awareness of the global context of the issue remains low. As cognitive advancement shapes, to a great extent, the negotiating position of governments, this dimension greatly influences relational climate change leadership. Leadership in this area is needed the most, as the power balance in climate change politics is distorted, the stakes are high and the mitigation costs even higher.

Although recent geo-economic shifts have raised the position of developing nations at the climate change negotiating table, the process is being held within a highly fragmented, post-western political environment, under conditions of great pluralism of interests. The line of division is an economic one – while it is becoming apparent that western societies have already crossed the line marking the correlation between certain levels of income and an increase of subjective well-being (Frey, 2018), a majority of countries around the world are still in the phase of evolution in which economic growth improves life expectancy, standards of living, health conditions and overall human contentment.

b) Climate change is a public as well as individual matter. The ability to effectively address climate change risks is viewed primarily within the area of international negotiations, as part of the activities of governments and public organisations. These are seen as providing the authority, tools and financing for a coherent global framework of climate change risk mitigation. However, given the nature of the democratic system in the majority of the world’s societies, the roots of this political process are located in the environmental orientations of individuals. Citizens, cast in a double role – as followers in the nation-state system of governance and leaders in their local communities – are the primary bearers of environmental values. Success of the desired direction in addressing climate risks lies within the beliefs and ethical positions that are transformed into the behaviours of individuals. The question of whether people are ready to give up the energy-intensive lifestyle, rewrite the principles of traditional economy and agree on sacrifices in order to follow the rules of the more sustainable models will play a decisive

role in building the adaptive capacity of the western societies. Patterns of individual reasoning are also increasingly important given the recognition of polycentric climate governance forums and bottom-up initiatives, in which communities and non-state groups seek to realise diverse benefits or avoid costs associated with environmental hazards (Ostrom, 2010). Its growing prominence brings about a new set of challenges for leadership studies, as these polycentric, non-hierarchical arrangements involve many centres of decision making and fluid patterns of action, in which it may be difficult to distinguish leaders from followers (Ostrom, 2012; Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017). The most important challenge within the area of cognitive and relational leadership is creating recognition of the global dimension of climate disruption connected to the notion of responsibility. This requires fundamental transformations of the market rules, recognition of environmental limits to growth and the ability to overcome them through human creativity (Romer, 1994, 2018). The solutions are located between the bottom-up level of citizens' activities, and the regulations, sanctions or standards imposed from above.

c) Climate change stands beyond the logic of conventional political practice. Given the fact that only 100 investor and state-owned fossil fuel companies are responsible for around 70 per cent of the world's historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Hyman, 2020), climate change mitigation solutions, in order to be effective, need to be grounded in the collective efforts of the most industrialised states. In recent decades there has been hardly any high-level political encounter in which the issue is not discussed, and its institutionalisation has resulted in numerous UN and regional declarations, and well over 500 multilateral legal instruments (Mitchell, 2018); but progress on the issue remains limited. Global society has not been mobilised for deep decarbonisation. A bumpy road of diplomatic deadlocks, crises and betrayals has been marked out by the nature of the risks and designed solutions that stand beyond the logic of known standards of political behaviour. Climate change policies, by necessity imposing restrictions and limits, do not bring their authors any kind of direct political gain, nor fit into the majority of voters' preferences, as it is not the most important policy priority across society (Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). As far as public opinion is concerned, the problem of climate change competes with other environmental and social issues for a limited amount of resources and attention. Furthermore, evaluation of policies for climate change is inevitably influenced by the context in which the valuation is framed, and such contexts remain within the boundaries of the political power game (Spence and Pidgeon, 2010). As a result, any politician who would base their agenda on climate couldn't be perceived as effective in the short term, due to the long-term character of the processes involved and the variety of factors influencing the overall picture. In the case of climate change, the burden-gratification mechanism of the provision of common goods has been reversed. Standard political logic is built around a

requirement for effort or sacrifice requirement, which is followed by gratification. Leaders urge followers to make sacrifices for the global cause and persuade others to join these efforts, even if gratification is uncertain, remote in time and may never even happen. Key political discourses of climate change are concentrated around not making the situation worse, minimising threats and introducing long-term changes. These steps are effective in managing the situation, but all parties involved are aware of the fact that in order to find a solution, radical shifts in definitions of economic growth, human happiness and civilisational progress are needed. As this paradigm shift clearly means attempting to chart unknown waters, any kind of coherent political vision is not possible, which increases the political risks of the domestic actors involved. The rule book of the climate-friendly world has not yet been written, and all scenarios for the future can easily be questioned, so the exercise of cognitive leadership is immersed in uncertainty. These cognitive barriers present an early stage of the political process, developing further into contested and controversial forms from the traditional understanding of the idea of public goods.

***International political leadership on climate change. What is required?
What is missing?***

The current politics of climate change focuses on two constraints: scarcity of resources and global transition to a low-carbon society and a green economy. It has already been established that the cure for the climate lies in the complex redesigning of lifestyles in the Global North and more sustainable models of development in the Global South. On the political level these goals have been expressed by the proposed targets for GHG emissions reduction that are being adopted by governments across the world. Through implementation of the 2008 Climate Change Act in the UK, the Chinese Five Year Plans, or the EU Roadmap aiming to reduce domestic European GHG emissions by 80 per cent by the year 2050, climate disruption is meant to be tamed. Since 2015, the Paris Agreement, accepted after a decade of negotiation, has been an organising regime of international climate governance. The mitigation model is based on voluntary promises of action through nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – each member state is free to determine its level of contribution. The Paris Agreement does not include legally binding obligations, introducing only review mechanisms that keep track of progress at individual and collective levels.

States' confidence in multilateral instruments able to effectively address climate change was seriously undermined in 2009, when the first attempt to create a new treaty in Copenhagen failed. There are no substantial differences in terms of the regime model proposed in Copenhagen in 2009 and Paris in 2015. The leadership factor is believed to contribute to the finalisation of the Paris agreement. The range of actors that have been indicated as leading the process (the EU, the High Ambition Coalition, the Latin American

negotiation alliance Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), non-state actors) illustrate its multidimensional character (Oberthür and Groen, 2017).

Despite the fact that there has been a sea change in outlook since the earliest efforts to address climate change, the targets are increasingly ambitious and the issue has shifted to the mainstream of political debate, but the prospect of establishing an effective climate governance strategy is still vague. What is missing is global cognitive convergence, a vision that would combine the differing needs of disparate societies, supported by a commitment to follow the established track. In a situation in which climate innovations are thriving, awareness is rising and new initiatives are countless, the overall level of carbon emission continues to increase (Global Carbon Project, 2019), demonstrating that there is no getting away from the need for a global approach in dealing with climate change. The essence of an effective leadership process is connected to the logic of the climate change problem: the global emissions equation is one in which a non-cooperative equilibrium among states leads to tragedy of the commons. The global commons can only be managed on the basis of universal cooperation, without which a bad equilibrium of selfish strategies on the part of states and businesses leads to global disruption. This picture reveals a paradox: that climate change governance is situated within the boundaries of politics, which by nature is based on the self-interest of states, while protection of the climate commons must rely on common-interest rationality. The major leadership challenge, then, is to transform the logic of international politics in which narrowly defined interests overtake the principle of cooperation. Such a transformation, if possible at all, will only be made at state level; states are the principal actors of IR and any other actor will not have the capabilities (and interests) to effectively influence and change the structural elements of the system. In the context of climate change negotiations, only states have “the power to orient and mobilize others for a purpose” (Nye, 2008: 19). While leadership exercised by climate activists and trendsetters is crucial for the cognitive dimension of climate change, only a state could impose long-term rules for industries and citizens and demand compliance. In the history of international efforts to tackle climate disruption the structural layer of leadership based on domination and competition has been the main area determining the scale and nature of international efforts. Many aspects of the material power determining the position of actors within the international structure can easily be quantified, and form an international hierarchy – indicating a pattern which guides behaviours of great powers and their followers.

Nowadays, states, which are crucial to the establishment of the global framework because of their combination of economic weight, global interests and levels of GHG emissions, are greatly divided over the question of climate change strategy. Surveys conducted during the negotiating rounds suggest that although there is not any universally recognised climate change leader, expectations are divided between China, the EU and the USA, which together

are responsible for the majority of global emissions of GHGs, and produce about half of global GDP (Parker et al., 2012). An overview of their leadership matrix dimensions will provide an insight into the balance of power in global climate change politics:

United States of America

The example of the USA perfectly illustrates the tension between the internal constraints and international obligations of states, while they approach global public goods issues. In the early 1970s, Sweden and the USA acted as early environmental leaders with Japan and Germany as the main early followers. Later political division over the USA's involvement in international climate-related activity not only blocked its participation in specific climate governance initiatives, but also diminished willingness to use its structural leadership tools – resources and influence. Under these obstacles, the USA is seen in the climate change framework as necessary but “reluctant and unreliable” (Kalantzakos, 2017: 34). So, while the USA's size and prominence makes it necessary for any climate governance framework, the perceived magnitude of the costs of tackling climate change causes widespread concern among the American public, being rather strengthened than mitigated by politicians. Climate change represents one of the most intractable of contemporary policy controversies for the American public. The issue is used instrumentally within the policy spectrum, as environmental politics in the USA has long been defined by competing visions, interests and imperatives. There is no stable underlying consensus about what are the key climate facts and how the USA should react, as the standpoint of politicians taking leading roles in the debate differ significantly in terms of fundamental orientations (Hyman, 2020). Enacting strong climate policies has been for a long time impossible due to lack of the American public's support, but the attitude towards including principles of green growth into modernisation projects is changing. Social and political actors are gradually stepping up in order to produce policy innovation, especially that climate risks are presented as part of the economic and social systems' vulnerability. Yet, the scale and scope of mitigation measures are still a heavily divisive subject in American politics.

Lack of coherent narrative about climate change uncertainty makes the USA's relationship with multilateral efforts to address climate change fluctuate between opposite ends of the engagement/disengagement spectrum (Kelemen and Vogel, 2010).

All the important multilateral climate change agreements were negotiated with the involvement of the USA, but support of political actors gradually vanished. Requirements and terms of climate progress had often been assessed as not addressing the concerns of a domestic public.

At the first major stage of global efforts to establish a legally binding treaty with CO₂ emissions targets and a market for trading emissions, the

US Congress refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, agreed by 150 countries in 1997, despite the active role of the Clinton administration. Although the president, along with Vice-President Al Gore, promoted US endorsement of the protocol, the fossil fuel industry and organised labour used substantial resources to influence the Senate to oppose the agreement. This turn of events seriously diminished USA's credentials to lead climate governance efforts and demonstrates how critical are shifts in domestic politics in shaping the American position on international environmental agreements. Reluctance to participate in any of the multilateral environmental efforts marked the two terms of the Bush Presidency, but changed when Barack Obama took office. His administration was meant to mark a "new chapter in American leadership on climate change" (Obama, 2008). A clear concept for modelling the global mechanism of climate change was presented at the Paris conference in 2015, but the leadership position of the USA was abandoned by Donald Trump, under whose administration a record number of regulatory rollbacks has discredited the US position within the climate change leadership framework (Harvard University Kennedy School, 2019). The new democratic administration under President Joe Biden has made climate change one of the key policy issues, re-entered the Paris Agreement and has set an unwavering commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050. While the USA continues to be the world's leading economy, any global climate regime depends on its participation. Reluctance towards obligation puts the state in the position of global bad contributor, while its acceptance means participating in collective global public good provision. The political position of the USA also shapes other countries' perspective on internationally introduce climate rules and their willingness to cooperate in the frameworks.

European Union

Although the EU is the world's biggest market and a leading political force, its structural leverage is diminished by constant tensions between member states and European institutions. The imperative of coherence is particularly hard to meet in the European multilevel system of governance, characterised as it is by both vertical and horizontal fragmentation. A multitude of actors – 27 member states, various European institutions, national and supranational private actors, European regions and cities – cooperate and compete to shape European policies, rather than being guided by clear steering and control mechanisms. Nevertheless, the EU is commonly recognised as a leader in global climate policies, the one that sets ambitious goals and builds a global agenda on the issue. The reluctance of the USA over the Kyoto Protocol provided the EU with a unique opportunity to capitalise on its powers and to assume a leadership role in the climate change regime. Since then, climate governance has become an important expression of the EU's position in world politics (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). The EU builds its credibility as a climate change actor by relying heavily on cognitive influence. The interests

of the EU have been defined along the lines of climate change protection, which gradually, through persuasion and the use of hard power instruments has led to a redefinition of the ideologies and beliefs that constitute member states' interests (Lieberink and Wurzel, 2017). An important dimension of EU cognitive leadership within the area of climate change was to build an alliance supporting multidimensional changes oriented at emissions reduction. Despite the fact that problem's gravity had already been recognised during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997, most of the actors involved – member states, industry associations, environmental NGOs – were sceptical towards emission trading systems (Grubb et al., 1999: 94). Acceptance of the idea and implementation of the mandatory instruments took time and considerable effort. The EU has transformed the climate change agenda from a normative level into an area of economic and social opportunity. As a result climate policies are now among the identifying features of the EU, which sees itself as “leading global action to 2020 and beyond” (EC, 2009), having been “at the forefront of efforts to combat climate change” (EC, 2008). The EU's self-identification helped in the acceleration of EU-internal policies, such as the 2008 “climate and energy package”. This sets binding legislative targets intended to ensure that member states cut their GHG emissions by 20 per cent, and produce 20 per cent of their gross energy consumption from renewable energy sources by 2020 (EC, 2008). Furthermore, in 2014 the EU formulated its targets for 2030, which involve 40 per cent reduction of GHG, 27 per cent renewable energy and 27 per cent improvement in energy efficiency. The union's organisational and legal culture has been effectively created around climate issues, based on favourable public opinion, influential green parties and active NGOs.

EU environmental strategies are both “polycentric” (Ostrom, 2010) and oriented at moving the global regime-building process forward. The EU's international credibility relies on the success of the supranational governance model it represents, as well as its role-model status in setting climate goals and incorporating reduction norms into its internal policies (Kilian and Elgström, 2010). The supranational structure of the EU certainly played a leading role in building effective climate change policies in member states. Although not without exceptions (mainly Poland), indicating the seriousness of the challenge of creating internal consensus, the overall willingness to coordinate actions within the EU has increased over the last 20 years. Internal support for climate change strategies may also fluctuate in the course of implementing the phase focused on the provision of substantial financial and technological support to developing countries, given the fact that the migration crisis has been the most crucial factor influencing the EU's integrity within last decade. Externally, relying on its general political and economic weight, the EU has generally exerted leadership based on soft power resources, diplomacy, persuasion and argumentation. While the strategy was effective in strengthening its self-identification on the global scene, credibility of the EU's leadership is often questioned.

China

The economic rise of China, which has taken place over the last 30 years at an unprecedented pace, has resulted in both a change in power relations at the global level and a massive increase in global GHG emissions. Since the beginning of the global climate change regime, the position of China and related power shifts have negatively influenced the prospects for serious global effectiveness. That is why this state is perceived as the key actor in the future of global climate change actions (Kalantzakos, 2017). China's narrative of developmental injustice and ecological imperialism dominated the position of developing countries, as seen in the latest phase of climate negotiations finalised by the Paris Agreement in 2015. The transformation of its role from passive participant to proactive actor presents one of the most fundamental prospective structural changes in the whole global climate protection framework.

China's domestic environmental problems dictate that the political establishment must fight "airmageddon", or build its credibility as a supplier of "clean technologies". Over the last two decades China has become one of the world's top producers of low energy light bulbs, wind turbines, solar panels, solar water heaters, and batteries for electric cars. The Chinese share of global investment in the renewable energy sector is one third (Buckley, 2017). It has already become the market leader and a political actor able to recognise the diplomatic benefits of acting tough on climate change.

The principle that guides China's relational activities is rational pragmatism, which increasingly directs this country's strategies towards long-term cooperative approaches. That case of the political game around the Kyoto agreement between China and the USA has become a paradigmatic metaphor for the risks involved in the attempt to find a cooperative regime foundation for action on climate. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the USA, as a highly developed country, was committed to reduce its GHG emissions by 7 per cent, while China, having the status of a developing country, gained the most favourable terms. The self-interest of these two parties trapped the whole cooperative structure in the classical prisoner's dilemma. China's fast economic development track implies an increase in emissions despite the fact that at the time its emissions level was alarmingly high, having risen between 1990 and 1995 by 38 per cent (IEA, 2017). The USA's focus, in this context, was on stopping its prospective rival from gaining too much power. As a result Washington decided to withdraw from the Protocol, arguing that the USA could not accept a treaty that was binding for itself but not for China. The two main CO₂ emitters (between them 33.6 per cent of the world total in 1990, almost 44 per cent in 2018 [Marechal, 2018]) decided not to reduce their emissions levels. Since that time China, as the world's biggest emitter of CO₂ (from 2007) and the second largest economy (from 2010), has become a pivotal actor in virtually all important global climate forums. It has been clear, though, that as in the case of the USA, domestic strategic

concerns lead Chinese policies. As Chris Patten puts it: “China will not move without America, and America will not move without China. They are locked together. An agreement between them is vital to saving the century” (2009: 379). Pressed, however, by the alarming condition of its air quality, in the first decade of the 21st century China started to initiate a series of ambitious domestic energy and climate policies, with the breakthrough coming before the 2015 Paris Agreement. Since the American withdrawal from the climate change framework, Beijing is increasingly expected to take a lead in the international coalition against climate change, but Chinese concerns are rather focused on domestic concerns.

Followers in climate change processes ... whose well-being is at stake?

The picture of climate change leadership, although dominated by the great state players accepting or rejecting the role of global leaders, is in fact equally well depicted by followers and their interests, world views and expectations (DeRue and Ashford, 2010; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). A focus on followership is particularly important in the light of the latest phase of the global regulatory framework, representing a bottom-up approach that grants greater autonomy to states to determine the level of their contributions (Rüdiger, 2019). Governance of the serious and intractable climate problem can be analysed from two perspectives: as efforts oriented towards the management of pro-change behaviours, or providing solutions to tackle the problem (e.g. lowering emissions rates). These are inherently connected, but realised on different platforms. While societal infrastructure, human habits and organisational routines are constructed within state borders and according to the scripts of local culture, solution-based projects have to be designed and implemented at the international level, due to the physical, universal nature of climate change. The nature and challenges of the leader-follower relation in each of these areas have distinctive features:

International level followership

This is determined by the informal hierarchy of states in the international realm. When a state plays a leadership role, its actions are oriented towards other states that might follow its lead. Although states with smaller structural weight may take leadership roles in distinct processes within the complex framework of climate change regulation (like Sweden), the effectiveness of the whole framework is heavily dependent on the great players. So in this respect the leadership position of the big emitters in the framework sheds a new light on leader-follower relations. While the common conviction states that “there are no leaders without followers” (Nye, 2008: 35), the structure of the

climate change problem proves that even if the great state leadership does not intend to influence followers, but commits itself to the process, it becomes its driving force (like China or the United States). Here, followers are not those who empower a leader, but rather a leader's capabilities, weight and resources, with the primary importance of social resources.

Structure of the climate change problem grants the most prominent roles to the most prominent emitters, but it is the relations between change-oriented partners which creates the synergy that produces results. The ambitious wind power production of Denmark (20 per cent of the country's energy production comes from wind; the target for 2025 has been set at 50 per cent) does not influence the global situation, but generates knowledge, "know-how", proven solutions that are locally sensitive and internationally relevant. When those pioneering experiences are passed on to China, the effect could have a global dimension (Danish Energy Agency, 2018). The follower/leader roles in the Danish–Chinese energy partnership are covered with ambiguity, but its relational aspect offsets the structural asymmetry of the international position of partners to the common benefit. Engagement of the great powers creates a compliance effect among allied states and possibly other partners/rivals, as they in turn become perceived as leaders in the process.

The socially constructed identity of the great power leader creates further opportunities, which may be capitalised upon in cooperation with others, so the leader has the incentive to influence other states and established leader–follower relationships. The mechanism of "structural domination" of the great emitters within climate change governance itself does not exclude this area from the leadership spectrum. Even if the leadership–followership relation is based on different patterns from those that obtain in interpersonal processes, there is still a change-oriented relation, which would not be possible without the involvement of both parties. Furthermore, the hierarchy is a product of the highly competitive international environment, in which both materially and normatively powerful states are in the race for power and prestige. So even in the case of the leading powers, backed in their leadership aspirations by the resources and tools of influence, there are fundamental structural obstacles in establishing leader–follower relations with other great powers. Understanding cooperative norms and requirements vary in different parts of the world and the principles of sovereignty and non-interference further complicate leadership contexts. For example, China or India conceptualise European "climate leadership" in global climate politics according to different rules from EU states and did not perceive a need to "follow" the European lead.

States that, by virtue of their strategic weight are limited to the position of followers on the structural level, may embrace leadership roles as cognitive or relational agents. This kind of proactive followership is best illustrated in the political strategies of small states, lacking material capabilities at the structural leadership level, but vitally interested in development of the climate change framework. Small states (which include several of the least-developed countries (LDCs) like Lesotho or Haiti), to which climate change represents the most immediate threat, are leveraging their united political weight under the banner of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Thanks to joint, proactive diplomacy, they managed to create their own recognised identity as states least responsible for climate change (UN, 2010: 6), but hardest hit by its effects. So by taking a proactive stance AOSIS placed its interests on the global agenda, providing a strong argument supporting the notion that the dichotomisation of the roles of leaders and followers should not be overexaggerated (Collinson, 2014).

Citizen-level followership. The intensification of climate risks coincides with, and partially is, a consequence of unprecedented social and economic development – a source of individual empowerment on a global scale. As a result, climate political leadership and its consequences should be seen, now more than ever, as largely constructed by followers and hence influenced by followers' cognitive patterns and inter-follower social influence processes. Citizens granted autonomy by global markets and technological opportunities cannot be viewed merely as recipients or moderators of a leader's influence, and as vehicles for the actualisation of a state's vision, mission or goals. Even in the case of the authoritarian regime in China, climate reorientation has been clearly connected to pressures from below caused by serious air pollution (Kuhn, 2014). Changing patterns of political followership also produce more ambiguity within the paradigm of the unitary state. In response to the formal US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the US Climate Alliance took the lead and pledged to meet US reduction targets agreed at the UN climate summit in 2015 regardless. A bipartisan group of state governors from 25 states, representing 55 per cent of the US population and 60 per cent of US GDP, presents an interesting case study of state-citizens (leader-followers) relationship, especially in the context of tracing the sources of power of the state. The explanatory context of this case cannot be limited only to citizens' disobedience and contestation but includes governance and power perspectives.

The major form of incarnation of the individual's influence on the international system is however the rise of private governance and the presence of non-state actors in the global space. Individuals and groups gained new possibilities to make choices and to transform those choices into desired

actions and outcomes, to turn their vision into reality, which in the climate change area is illustrated by the massive growth of non-governmental organisations operating internationally (INGOs), climate change networks, and activists' actions (Anheier et al., 2012). Citizens gained a vast array of tools for political expression outside the boundaries of the state. They, as activists, public opinion leaders or policy initiators influence the state of affairs besides their national identity, build transnational networks and promote their agenda independently from the policies of the official government of their country of citizenship. As a consequence of this trend former US Vice-President Al Gore has been replaced in the position of the most prominent global climate activist by Greta Thunberg. An independent activist, not involved in the power structures of her nation state, has been granted authority by a global public to influence not only social imaginaries but also international decision-making forums. This type of leadership is especially important in a period of cognitive transition that enables the shift into the next phase of global climate action, as it involves not only a redefinition of market principles but also transfer of resources from the western world to developing countries, to raise the level of harmonisation of global policies. The conceptual picture of global relations, previously based on a simple division between rich and poor countries, has become much more complex, as the last half a century brought the most rapid rise in incomes in history, especially in the developing world. This trend is strictly embedded in the climate change discourse as empowerment covers various forms of economic and social development, which directly influence climate condition. From the perspective of the more than a billion people that 30 years ago lived in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2018) and reached a decent standard of living just recently, any climate mitigation cost is beyond the rational decision-making spectrum. So politically the issue of climate change is part of a dividing narrative of climate imperialism, blocking the economic way forward for the less privileged societies of the world. Framing the issue on the basis of equity and "climate justice" produces an expectation of growing streams of climate initiatives, technology and finance, causing in turn a firm social opposition that blocks political processes in western countries. Even far-sighted politicians on both sides of this divide are trapped by electoral dynamics, which makes progress in global negotiation impossible. Most of all, any grand, long-term collaborative programme is blocked by the social imaginaries strongly referencing the "us vs them" divisions in the context of progress. As noted by Paul Romer:

[T]hem is a group that poses an existential threat, they may steal our resources, but there is also an opportunity – we may steal their resources from them. Even if all we do is share, when it is more for them it will be less for us.

(2018)

The more the idea of progress is based on resources, the less chance there is for finding a rationale for sharing them, as climate prevention investments are perceived as a zero-sum game. Modern industrial societies were founded as societies of scarcity, focused on the production of wealth and primarily organised around generating economic growth. This model has been transmitted around the world along with the distinctive meanings of wealth and well-being. But new conceptualisations of market relations, linking value with a different set of motivations rather than purely financial gain, are on the rise in the western world and it is a primary leadership challenge to include them in the mainstream political and civic philosophies. Thus, the success of sharing economy, eco-friendly lifestyles or the cause economy should be seen as ways of addressing climate change challenges, but also serve as vehicles for followers' self-determination, answering their needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. These trends are generally seen as more individualistic – in the sense that they better respond to personalised lifestyles and are anti-systemic – and taking place beyond the structures of the traditional economic system, as well as more democratic as users enjoy increased decision-making powers.

These new practices of citizen involvement are in line with the patterns of power relations provided by one of the more extensively discussed concepts addressing environmental hazards, the concept of the “risk society” (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992). The magnitude of unintended and unforeseen side effects of modern life – climate change among them – produces growing scepticism among the public towards traditional institutions that are unable to cope with these complex risks. Furthermore, globalisation of the climate change problem has led to the emergence of new anxiety-based communities and different forms of what Beck describes as “sub-politics” (1992). National territorial boundaries dissolve, as local communities, organisations and individuals begin to interact globally, creating a global society within the local context (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 2002). Although the practical results of individual's activities in global politics have been questioned (Barnett and Duvall, 2005), and globalisation as a political programme is increasingly in retreat, the growing empowerment of individuals influences the cognitive and relational dimensions of political leadership, pushing the transition forward. With regard to climate risk, modern followers find themselves confronted with certain unignorable side effects of their “modern” lifestyle and, consequently, have started to become consciously involved in constructing mitigation strategies. Therefore, they present a level of involvement opposite to the demonised picture of followers as short-term thinkers and reluctant to embrace novelty and risk taking, being subordinated to the vision of their cognitively more mature leaders (Ford and Harding, 2015; Leitch and Harrison, 2018).

Conclusion

Taking climate change politics as a conceptual frame of analysis, this case study presents the structural, cognitive and relational dimensions of

leadership inquiries within the IR realm. Covered with the discourse of social change, globalisation and practices of policymaking, climate disruption as an interactional phenomenon differs from any other kind of long-term deliberative process in modern history, and probably in history *per se*. The scale of the problem, its complexity and its connection to multipolarity require a new approach, and long term processual engagement. The analysis indicates that these components are situated more within the cognitive and relational dimensions of the leadership matrix, while international politics is constructed around the structural components – climate change dynamics as driven by power and competition. In media coverage and analytical commentaries these spheres overlap, but the operating logic within each of them is different. Categories provided by the leadership matrix, used as analytical tools, allowed this analysis to place the failures of international climate change politics into a deeper context; of established ways of defining the strategic and operational logic of diplomatic efforts, deeply touching on issues of power, global hierarchies and asymmetry. Examination of both the international- and citizen-levels of climate politics leads to the assumption that both state leaders and global followers exercise considerable power and influence in change-oriented processes. They represent interwoven forms of political power and identity that are not easily separable. The main problem that has been revealed is that while international reality is being increasingly transformed in the direction of polycentric governance forms, the logic of international climate change politics is based on a state-centric approach. Leadership is viewed there as hegemonic influence originated in domination, not a relation between asymmetric actors oriented towards implementing change.

Even a general overview of climate change governance presents an interesting point of reference for the leader/follower relationship, it being a multilayered reality in which leadership is exercised in global and, simultaneously, national contexts, according to the different operational logic which obtains in each. While within the structural level of international climate leadership such a distinctive form asymmetry may be a useful tool with which to describe reality, it does not play a similar role in conceptual or relationship dimensions, where the lines between leaders and followers are changing, and may be blurred and intersecting. The main IR discourse constructs individuals into a form of political agency that is quite passive and reinforcing of the dominant forms of governance. This is, however, neither true within the climate change context nor desirable. The active model of citizenship must be stimulated, as civic engagement seems to be a necessary part of the social change synergy. This conclusion is particularly important, given the assumption that international reality is more socially constructed than given. So though formal climate diplomacy tends to be organised around states and designed in *realpolitik* terms, the real focus both for governments and bottom-up opinion leaders should be on the new conceptualisations of human and social needs within increasingly pressing climate requirements (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 The leadership matrix – Global public good: stable climate

	<i>Structural leadership</i>	<i>Cognitive leadership</i>	<i>Relational leadership</i>
Key criteria	Assessed according to the criterion of the key emitting states' involvement with the climate regime.	Assessed according to the criterion of the effectiveness of the shaping of global public discourse, around climate mitigation and the potential to redefine understandings of national interests and incentives.	Assessed according to the criterion of ability to generate collective action on climate.
Nation states	Low influence record/high influence potential. States have a monopoly over structural leadership effects. The high efficiency barrier to participation in the climate regime (it must include China, USA, India and UE) impedes collective action.	Low influence record/high influence potential. In democratic states progress depends on the synergy between social cognitive leadership and efforts undertaken by people in positions of power. Rising climate change concerns increase internal pressure on governments. Yet discourse embedded in the notion of historical responsibilities is often instrumentalised.	Low influence record/high influence potential. Major emitters embrace a competitive rather than cooperative approach and actively search ways to reinforce their position, especially economically. The EU highlights its role as a “normative power” within the area, promoting the “green growth” concept as competitive advantage.
International organisations	Low influence record/high influence potential. Weak tools for influencing the structural dimension of leadership. International Organisations (IO's) role is reduced to the will of their most powerful member states. Though discussed at UNCTAD ¹ and the WTO, institutional innovation such as open sourcing green technologies, or calls for “New Multilateralism” that would lead a Global Green New Deal, have not yet generated enough traction among member states. While loose, aim-oriented transnational coalitions are effective,	High influence record/high influence potential. IOs are active in framing climate issues and raising climate awareness; however their image as technocratic bodies limits their credibility. The EU's efforts to promote balance between economic and climate policy aims and fair transition to a low-carbon economy are especially visible.	High influence record/high influence potential. IOs play a prominent role in creating grounds for multilateral cooperation and dialogue, ever-expanding the system of horizontal and vertical interaction. Institutional leaders often transform political and strategic relations into social ones or turn controversial political topics into technocratic issues.

<p>Social movements Global environmental leaders</p>	<p>especially in the process of institutional bargaining, in most cases methods of institutional decision making are ill-suited to a polarised global realm.</p> <p>Low influence record/low influence potential. Social movements and their leaders are not in a position to generate structural effects.</p>	<p>High influence record/ high influence potential. Effective and credible in framing the climate issue as universal. The narrative is shaped with the use of multiple concepts: human rights, generational conflict, global justice, sustainable economic growth, global competitiveness, systemic resilience.</p>	<p>High influence record/ high influence potential. Play a mediating role between climate action supporters and institutionalised politics. Their major influence potential is based on effective mobilisation. Pressure exercised from below enabled NGOs to obtain consultatory status in multilateral forums.</p>
<p>Business</p>	<p>High influence record/high influence potential. Industry is a major contributor to climate change, as about 100 fossil fuel companies are responsible for around 70 per cent of the world's historical GHG emissions (Hyman, 2020). Major global economies protect the prominent role of oil industries that lack incentives for transformation. The IMF has found that the implicit global subsidy from undercharging for energy and its environmental costs in 2017 was US\$5.2 trillion, or 6.5 per cent of world GDP (Coady et al., 2019).</p>	<p>High influence record/high influence potential. Use diverse means to influence public debate, not only to promote fossil fuel interests, but also question the consensus on climate change. Industrial actors lack credibility as communicators to the general public, yet effectively influence business and decision makers. Likely to have strategic prominence in the transition to sustainability through innovation, or reinforcing new norms and beliefs in climate conscious business operations. Many industries shape consumers' orientations and lifestyles, easing or hardening the transition to more sustainable behaviours.</p>	<p>High influence record/high influence potential. Large commercial actors extensively use lobbying and other tools of relational leadership to influence regulatory spaces of major states. Several oil companies are larger than many countries in economic terms, so they often have bargaining leverage. They are part of the international effort to promote sustainability, yet these interactions result rather in soft, image-building outcomes than tangible regulatory commitments. Failed efforts to abolish the investor state dispute mechanism (ISDM), part of the Energy Charter Treaty, used to prevent government action towards greater control over energy prices, provide an example of relational equilibrium.</p>

Source: Author's own work.

Note

1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

References

- Adler E (1997) Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics. *European Journal of International Relations* 3: 319–363.
- Ahn MJ, Adamson JS and Dornbusch D (2004) From leaders to leadership: Managing change. *Journal of Leadership and Organisational Studies* 10(4): 112–123.
- Alker H Jr (1988) The dialectical logic of Thucydides' Melian dialogue. *American Political Science Review* 82(3): 805–820.
- Anheier H, Kaldor M and Glasius M (2012) The global civil society yearbook: lessons and insights 2001–2011. In: Moore H and Selchow S (Eds) *Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of Critical Reflection*. Houndsmills: Palgrave.
- Ansell C (2000) The networked polity: Regional development in Western Europe. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* 13(3): 303–333.
- Archibugi D and Held D (Eds) (1995) *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Archibugi D, Held D and Koehler M (Eds) (1998) *Re-Imagining Political Community*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Avant D, Finnemore M and Sell S (2010) *Who Governs the Globe?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barker RA (1997) How can we train leaders if we do not know what leadership is? *Human Relations* 50(4): 343–362.
- Barnett M and Duvall R (2005) Power in international politics. *International Organization* 59(1): 39–75.
- Beck U (1992) *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernisation*. London: SAGE.
- Bretherton Ch and Vogler J (2006) *The European Union as a Global Actor*. New York: Routledge.
- Buchholz W and Sandler T (2017) Successful leadership in global public good provision: Incorporating behavioural approaches. *Environmental Resource Economics* 67: 591–607.
- Buckley T (2017) China's global renewable energy expansion. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.
- Byman DL and Pollack KM (2001) Let us now praise great men: Bringing the statesman back in. *International Security* 25(4): 107–146.
- Clark I (2011) *Hegemony in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Collinson D (2014) Dichotomies, dialectics and dilemmas: New directions for critical leadership studies. *Leadership*, 10(1): 36–55.
- Dahl R (1989) *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dalakoura A (2010) Differentiating leader and leadership development: A collective framework for leadership development. *Journal of Management Development*, 29(5): 432–441.
- Danish Energy Agency (2018) *The Joint Danish-Chinese Cooperation on Climate and Energy*. Available at https://ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/Globalcooperation/china_cooperation.pdf (accessed 6 July 2022).
- Deneulin S and Townsend N (2007) Public goods, global public goods and the common good. *International Journal of Social Economics*, 34(1/2): 19–36.

- Der Derian J (2001) Global events, national security, and virtual theory, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 3(30): 669–690.
- DeRue S and Ashford S (2010) Who will lead and who will follow? A social process of leadership identity constructions in organizations, *Academy of Management Review*, 35(4): 627–647.
- Derungs IM (2011) *Trans-cultural Leadership for Transformation*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dietz T, Ostrom E and Stern P (2003) The struggle to govern the commons. *Science* 302(5652): 1907–1912.
- EC (European Commission) (2008) *Tackling Climate Change*. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/tackling_climate_change/index_en.htm (accessed 18 September 2020).
- EC (European Commission) (2009) *EU Action Against Climate Change. Leading Global Action to 2020 and Beyond. DG Environment*. Luxembourg Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Ford J and Harding N (2015) Followers in leadership theory: Fiction, fantasy and illusion. *Leadership* 14(1): 1–22.
- Frey BS (2018) *Economics of Happiness*. Cham: Springer.
- Frey FW (1985) The problem of actor designation in political analysis, *Comparative Politics*, 17(2): 127–152.
- Gabriel Y (2011) Psychoanalytic approaches to leadership. In: Bryman A, Collinson D, Grint K and Uhl-Bien M (Eds) *The SAGE Handbook of Leadership*. London: Sage: 393–405.
- Gasper D (2002) Fashion, learning and values in public management: reflections on South African and international experience, *African Development*, 27(3/4): 17–47.
- Giddens A (1991) *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. (2002) *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives*. New York: Routledge.
- Gill S (2012) *Global Crises and Crisis of the Global Leadership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilpin R (1971) The politics of transnational economic relations, *International Organization*, 25: 398–419.
- Gilpin, R (1987) *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gilpin R (1986) The richness of the tradition of political realism. In: Keohane RO (Ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press: 301–321.
- Global Carbon Project (2019) *Summary from Global Carbon Report 2019*. Available at www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/archive/2019/Japan_NIES_GCB2019.pdf (accessed 9 July 2020).
- Gowdy J and Krall L (2013a) The transition to agriculture and the evolution of human ultrasociality. *Journal of Bioeconomics* 16: 179–202.
- Grint K (2005) Problems, problems, problems: The social construction of ‘leadership’, *Human Relations*, 58(11): 1467–1494.
- Grint K (2010a) *Leadership: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Grint K (2010b) Wicked problems and clumsy solutions: The role of leadership. In: Brookes S and Grint K (Eds) *The New Public Leadership Challenge*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 169–186.
- Gross Stein J (1994) Political learning by doing: Gorbachev as uncommitted thinker and motivated learner. *International Organization* 48: 155–183.
- Grubb M, Vrolijk C and Brack D (1999) *The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment*. London: Earthscan and Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Habermas J (2001) *The Postnational Constellation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Harari YN (2014) *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind*. London: Vintage Books.
- Harari YN (2017) *Why Humans Run the World*. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzj7Wg4DAbs (accessed 12 February 2022).
- Harvard University Kennedy School (2019) *Energy and Environmental Law Programme 'Regulatory Rollback Tracker'*. Available at <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/> (accessed 19 July 2020).
- Hawkins DG, Lake DA, Nielson DL and Tierney MJ (2006) Delegation under anarchy: States, international organizations, and principal–agent theory. In: Hawkins DG, Lake DA, Nielson DL and Tierney MJ (Eds) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 3–38.
- Held D (1995) *Democracy and the Global Order*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Held D and McGrew A (Eds) (2002) *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Held D, McGrew A, Goldblatt D and Perraton J (Eds) (1999) *Global Transformations*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Helms L (2014) Global political leadership in the twenty-first century: Problems and prospects. *Contemporary Politics* 20(3): 261–277.
- Hobbes T (1946) *Leviathan*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Holmes M (2018) *Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Social Neuroscience and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Horton J (2009) Political Leadership and contemporary liberal political theory. In: Femia J, Korosenyi A and Slomp G (Eds) *Political Leadership in Liberal and Democratic Theory*. Exeter: Imprint Academic: 11–30.
- Hyman, E (2020) Who's really responsible for climate change? *Harvard Political Review*. Available at <https://harvardpolitics.com/climate-change-responsibility/> (accessed: 18.07.2022).
- IEA (International Energy Agency) (2017) *CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion*. Paris: IEA.
- Ikenberry GJ (1996) The future of international leadership. *Political Science Quarterly* 111(3): 385–402.
- Ikenberry GJ (2011) The future of the liberal world order. Internationalism after America. *Foreign Affairs* 90(3): 56–68.
- Ikenberry GJ and Kupchan C (1990) Socialization and hegemonic power. *International Organization* 44: 283–315.
- Ikenberry, J. (2001) *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jacobi D and Freyberg-Inan A (Eds) (2015) *Human Beings in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Jaffe SN (2017) *The Risks and Rewards of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War*. Available at <https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-risks-and-rewards-of-thucydides-history-of-the-peloponnesian-war/> (accessed 12 January 2019).
- Jervis R (2013) Do leaders matter and how would we know? *Security Studies* 22(2): 153–179.
- Jervis R (2017) *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kalantzakos S (2017) *The EU, US and China Tackling Climate Change. Policies and Alliances for the Anthropocene*. London & New York, NY: Routledge.
- Kant I (1991) *Political Writings*. Edited by H.S. Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaul I (2012) Global public goods: explaining their underprovision. *Journal of International Economic Law* 15(3): 729–750.
- Keating M (1988) *State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State*. London: Harvester / Wheatsheaf.
- Kelemen DR and Vogel D (2010) Trading places: the role of the US and EU in international environmental politics. *Comparative Political Studies* 43(4): 427–456.
- Keller JW and Yang YE (2008) Leadership style, decision context, and the poliheuristic theory of decision making: An experimental analysis. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(5): 687–712.
- Kennedy P (1982) The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: Reflexions on Wilhelm II's place in the making of German foreign policy. In: Rohl JCG and Sombart N (Eds) *Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: chap. 5.
- Keohane R (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane RO and Ostrom E (1994) Local commons and global interdependence – heterogeneity and cooperation in two domains – introduction. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6(4): 403–428.
- Kilian B and Elgström O (2010) Still a green leader? The European Union's role in international climate negotiations. *Cooperation and Conflict* 45(3): 255–273.
- Kim RE (2020) Is global governance fragmented, polycentric, or complex? The state of the art of the network approach. *International Studies Review* 22(4). Available at <https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/22/4/903/5571549?login=false> (accessed 15 December 2021).
- Kindleberger CP (1973) *The World in Depression: 1929–1939*. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley University Press.
- Kindleberger CP (1981) Dominance and leadership in the international economy: Exploitation, public goods, and free rides. *International Studies Quarterly* 25(2): 242–254.
- Kooiman J (2003) *Governing as Governance*. London: Sage.
- Kowert P and Legro J (1996) Norms, identity and their limits. In: Katzenstein P (Ed.) *The Culture of National Security, Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Krasner SD (1976) State power and the structure of international trade. *World Politics* 28(2): 317–347.
- Kuhn BM (2014) Climate protection governance and participation in the People's Republic of China, *ASIEN, The German Journal on Contemporary Asia* 133: 52–71.

- Lamprecht K (1905) *What is History?* Trans. EA Andrews. New York: Macmillan.
- Legro JW and Moravcsik A (1999) Is anybody still a realist? *International Security* 24(2): 5–55.
- Leiserowitz A (2006) Climate change risk perception and policy preferences: The role of affect, imagery and values. *Climatic Change* 77: 45–72.
- Leitch C and Harrison R (2018) Entrepreneurial leadership: A critical review and research agenda. In: Blackburn R, De Clercq D and Heinonen J (Eds) *The Sage Handbook of Small Business and Entrepreneurship*. London: SAGE: 15–35.
- Liefferink D and Wurzel RKW (2017) Environmental leaders and pioneers: Agents of change? *Journal of European Public Policy* 24(7): 651–668.
- Liefferink D, Wurzel, RKW and Torney D (2017) Pioneers in polycentric climate governance. In: Jordan A (Ed.) *Governing Climate Change: Polycentricity in Action?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 135–151.
- Lorenzoni I and Pidgeon N (2006) Public views on climate change. European and USA perspectives. *Climatic Change* 77: 73–95.
- Machiavelli N (1966) *The Prince, and Selected Discourses*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Marechal J-P (2018) *What Role for China in the International Climate Regime?* IRIS: Asia Focus.
- Marx K (1970) *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. New York: International Publishers.
- Mearsheimer JJ (1994/1995) The false promise of international institutions. *International Security* 19(3): 5–49.
- Mearsheimer JJ (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Mendenhall ME (2013) *Global Leadership: Research, Practice, and Development*. New York: Routledge.
- Miller P and Rose N (2008) *Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Mitchell RB (2018) Data from 2002–2018, International Environmental Agreements Database project (Version 2018.1). Available at <http://iea.uoregon.edu/> (accessed 28 May 2019).
- Modelski G (1999) From leadership to organization: The evolution of global politics. In: Bornschier V and Chase-Dunn C (Eds) *The Future of Global Conflict*. London: Sage: 11–39.
- Modelski G and Devezas T (2007) Political globalization is global political evolution. *World Futures* 63: 1–16.
- Modelski G and Thompson WR (1999) The long and the short cycles of global politics in the twenty-first century: An evolutionary approach. *International Studies Review* I(2): 109–140.
- Morgenthau HJ (1946) *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Musgrave RA and Musgrave P (2003) Prologue. In: Kaul I et al. (Eds) *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization*. New York: Oxford University Press: xii.
- Nielson DL and Tierney MJ (2003) Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. *International Organization* 57(2): 241–276.
- Nowak MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. *Science* 314(5805): 1560–1563.
- Nye J and Keohane R (1971) Transnational relations and world politics: An introduction. *International Organization* 25(3): 329–349.

- Nye JS (2008) *The Powers to Lead*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Obama B (2008) *A New Chapter on Climate Change*. Available at http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_obama_promises_new_chapter_on_climate_change/%20target= (accessed 12 March 2020).
- Oberthür S and Groen L (2017) Explaining goal achievement in international negotiations: The EU and the Paris agreement on climate change. *Journal of European Public Policy* 25: 708–727.
- Olson M (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Olson M (1971) *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Orwin C (1994) *The Humanity of Thucydides*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ostrom E (1990) *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ostrom E (2010) Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change. *Global Environmental Change* 20(4): 550–557.
- Ostrom E (2012) Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: Must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales? *Economic Theory* 49(2): 353–369.
- Ostrom E, Walker J and Gardner R (1992) Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. *American Political Science Review* 86(2): 404–417.
- Ostrom E, Gardner R and Walker JM (1994) *Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Parker CF, Karlsson Ch, Hjerpe M and Linnér B-O (2012) Fragmented climate change leadership: Making sense of the ambiguous outcome of COP-15. *Environmental Politics* 21(2): 268–286.
- Parry M, Arnell N, Berry P, Dodman D, Fankhauser S, Hope C, Kovats S, Nicholls R, Satterthwaite D, Tiffin R and Wheeler T. (2009) *Assessing the Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of the UNFCCC and Other Recent Estimates*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Patten Ch (2009) *What Next? Surviving the Twenty-first Century*. London, Penguin Books.
- Payne T (2016) The Coming Crisis: Why global governance doesn't really work. SPERI. Available at <http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2016/06/14/the-coming-crisis-why-global-governance-doesnt-really-work/> (accessed 6 November 2019).
- Pogge T (1988) Moral progress. In: Luper-Foy S (Ed.) *Problems of International Justice*. Boulder, CO: Westview: 283–304.
- Putnam RD (1988) Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization* 42(3): 427–460.
- Rawls J (1999) *The Law of Peoples*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Renshon J (2015) Losing face and sinking costs: Experimental evidence on the judgment of political and military leaders. *International Organization* 69: 659–695.
- Renshon J, Lee J and Tingley D (2017) Emotions and the micro-foundations of commitment problems. In: *The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations*, supplement, *International Organization* 71(S1): 189–217.
- Rhodes RAW and T Hart P (2014) Puzzles of political leadership. In: Rhodes RAW and T Hart P (Eds.) *The Handbook of Political Leadership*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1–21.

- Romer P (1994) The origins of endogenous growth. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 8(1): 3–22.
- Romer P (2018) *On the Possibility of Progress*. Nobel Prize Lecture. Available at www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2018/romer/lecture/ (accessed 20 December 2021).
- Rosenau J, Hermann CG and Kegley W (1971) *New Directions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Rosenau JN (1990) *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rosenau JN (1995) *Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. *Palgrave Advances in Global Governance Series*. Study of World Politics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Skinner BF (1981) Selection by consequences. *Science* 213: 501–504.
- Slaughter AM (2004) *A New World Order*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Slaughter AM (2012) Remarks, the big picture: Beyond hot spots and crises in our interconnected world. *Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs* 1: 286–302.
- Smith MJ (1996) Positivism and beyond. In: Smith S, Booth K and Zalewski M (Eds) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snidal, D (1985) Coordination versus prisoners' dilemma: Implications for international cooperation and regimes. *American Political Science Review* 79(4): 923–942.
- Snyder R, Bruck HW and Sapin BM (1954 [2002]) *Foreign Policy Decision Making*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Spence A and Pidgeon N (2010) Framing and communicating climate change: The effects of distance and outcome frame manipulations. *Global Environmental Change* 20: 656–667.
- Stiles K (2009) Introduction: Theories of non-hegemonic cooperation. In: Brem S and Stiles K (Eds) *Cooperating without America: Theories and Case Studies of Non-Hegemonic Regimes*. London: Routledge.
- Stogdill RM (1974) *Handbook of Leadership*. New York: Free Press.
- Stone Sweet A, Sandholtz W and Fligstein N (Eds) (2001) *The Institutionalization of Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stueck W (1995) *The Korean War: An International History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tanzi V and Schuknecht L (2000) *Public Spending in the 20th Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tomasello M (2014) *A Natural History of Human Thinking*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Uhl-Bien M, Riggio RE, Lowe KB and Carsten MK (2014) Followership theory: A review and research agenda. *Leadership Quarterly* 25: 83–104.
- UN (United Nations) (2010) *Trends in Sustainable Development – Small Island Developing States (SIDS)*. New York: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). Available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1349.php (accessed 15 July 2022).
- Viotti PR and Kauppi MV (1987) *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. New York: Macmillan.

- Waltz KN (1954 [2001]) *Man, the State and War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz KN (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Waltz KN (1996) International politics is not foreign policy. *Security Studies* 6: 54–57.
- Waltz KN (2003) Thoughts about assaying theories. In: Elman C and Elman MF (Eds) *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field. BCSIA Studies in International Security*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: vii–xi.
- Weick KE (1993) The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 38: 628–652.
- Weiss T (2008) *What's Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Wendt A (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wendt A (2000) On the via media: A response to the critics. *Review of International Studies* 26: 165–180.
- Wiener J (1995) 'Hegemonic' leadership: Naked emperor or the worship of false Gods? *European Journal of International Relations* 1(2): 219–243.
- Wolfers A (1962) *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- World Bank (2009) *World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank (2018) *Piecing Together the Poverty Puzzle*. Available at <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30418/9781464813306.pdf> (accessed 11 July 2020).
- Young OR (1991) Political leadership and regime formation: On the development of institutions in international society. *International Organization* 45(3): 281–309.
- Young OR (1999) *Governance in World Affairs*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Zakaria F (1998) *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Zakaria F (2008) *The Post-American World*. New York: W.W. Norton.

2 Changing the Centre of Gravity

Global Leadership Strategies in the Post-American World

In the moment of global order transition, when the rulebook of the international game is being rewritten, the competition over power and resources is intensifying. The complicated structure of the global political and social space lacks the kinds of synergistic relationships that would make this structure something more than the sum of its parts, and provide coherence, order and patterning in the anarchic global reality. The sphere of leadership presents an operational framework for global politics that is used for, as well as against, the development of global synergies. This chapter discusses the tensions between growing fragmentation and creative disruption that may lead to new solutions and ways of thinking about the provision of global public goods. It also addresses the problem of increasingly polarised political imaginaries and a growing feeling of disconnection between elected rulers and voters, both of which undermine trust in, and support for, democracy in the western world. The last part of the chapter discusses the leadership dimension of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The search for synergy in an age of great competition

The idea of competition has always been dominant in visions of the anarchical international sphere. International relations (IR) started its very existence as a science analysing war and peace and quests for power and prestige – it is as old as humanity. The actions of the international actors have always been seen guided by rivalry. Rulers, strategists and monarchs on the pages of history textbooks have been presented in the constant search for new lands, resources and the optimal position in the hierarchy. Cooperation, although widely discussed and appraised, never gained a central spot in the field as maximising gains in security, wealth or recognition has been perceived as a primary goal of political leaders.

Competition and conflict have maintained primacy even under conditions of increasing interconnectedness and in spite of the historical evidence of successful cooperative projects leading to long-standing systemic effects. It is not only history that provides a clear account of the roots

of today's international frameworks – theory also confirms this in many aspects. Every security, economic and political alliance has been founded on the basis of agreement and formal or informal cooperative frameworks. Every revolution that has changed the world – French, American, Green, Industrial – has emerged as a product of cooperation and joint effort. The intensity of antagonism between Cold War adversaries – the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union – did not exclude peaceful co-existence under the banner of mutually agreed and coordinated deterrence. The principle of collective security, being the most advanced framework to eliminate aggression in the international realm, places at its centre collective action.

Despite the whole array of examples from the past that prove the transformative power of international cooperation, it only became a subject of scientific inquiry with the accelerations and massification of transnational flows in the latter decades of the 20th century. Globalising the world brought to the fore the question of how and why states cooperate in anarchical environments, offering a stimulus for reinforcing the picture of the world as an irreversibly interconnected realm. Connectivity has long been the major force enabling globalisation, even in its pre-modern form. The novelty of today's version of global economic and political integration has been driven by the scale of interdependencies. The international system has developed links and connections bringing actors into relations in which changes introduced or experienced by one party influence the range of choices of others, which transforms the shape of the whole system. Interdependence has become an organising principle of the international structure. As a result, states increasingly address similar problems (cybersecurity threats, public health threats, economic downturns), and the effectiveness of their responses depends on the types of reactions of other actors. It often happens that when pressed with diminishing trade flows and a severe drop in employment rates during times of economic crisis, states see protectionist policies as a rational tool, while unilateral reactions tend to deepen the economic fragility of the system. The Covid-19 pandemic presents a vivid example of interdependent decision-making patterns where arrangements and protective policies in the countries that struggled initially with the epidemic were partially or entirely transferred to other systems. In the case of climate change or environment protection in general, only policy diffusion and convergence could lead to tangible results. Even states openly engaged in competition or conflict are constrained in their bargaining options by interdependence. The political rhetoric of hostility, trade wars and ideological difference stands in contrast to the trends of economic relations, becoming more and more profound. Interdependence is manifested within trade, investment links and resources distribution as well as tourism, media networks and labour flows. An increasing number of organisations, other than commercial, are also operating on a multinational, regional or global basis.

There are generally two major ways of presenting international cooperation in the IR literature. One romanticised piece offered a story about the conflicting actors, who, recognising power democratisation and shared principles, were able to overcome their selfishness and enter cooperative arrangements. This outlook is strongly rooted in the liberal way of thinking about the world and looks back at early idealists active in the 1920s, who truly believed that such a global cooperative platform as the League of Nations could eliminate war from human history.

The other approach shifts focus from cooperation to the precondition of conflict, presenting cooperation as a strategy emerging from the logic of selfishness. Early research by Taylor and Axelrod (Taylor, 1976; Axelrod, 1981) presented international actors as selfish but able to cooperate in the desire to protect their assets in spheres of influence. Egoists form alliances to maximise their profits and they don't need structural frameworks to achieve their goals (Axelrod, 1981). Thomas Schelling, while describing the nature of international cooperation, faced the dilemma of whether to label it "theory of bargaining", "theory of conflict" or "theory of strategy" (Schelling, 1980). The premise that cooperation is situated within the spectrum of conflict has also been elaborated by Robert Keohane with relation to the global political economy (2005[1984]). He indicated the need for institutions that could maintain cooperative platforms, even in the absence of a dominant state – a global hegemon who would take the lead and manage the question of public goods provision. Elinor Ostrom also highlighted the importance of institutions for collective action and described trust, reputation and other "non-commodified spaces" as conditioning cooperation (Ostrom, 1990). The pace and scale of economic integration empirically confirmed this assumption. Cooperation became a new paradigm of the globalised era in the second part of the 20th century, only to be abandoned in the second decade of the 21st century. This was exactly the moment in which, due to interdependence, global problems aggravated unilateralism; narrowly defined national interests have replaced cooperative approaches on the global scene. It has transpired that interdependence requires novel solutions and approaches that are costly to implement and haven't been previously tested. The complex architecture of a global system of governance, with its interlinkages, causes and results, relationships and proportions in which interdependence changes actors' behaviours, is yet to be fully conceptualised.

The quality and quantity of transformation influencing the global order justified claims about a crisis or multiple crises threatening the status quo and relevance of existing rules and balance. Numerous analyses indicate gloomy perspectives for the future ranging from a new cold war to the "G-zero world" (Bremmer, 2012), and international scholarship desperately lacks a prognosis that would be favourable to the global human condition.

Rational choice and its discontents

The question of rationality and rational choice has long been discussed as a primary dilemma of global cooperation and synergy-oriented policy choices. Rationality and logic are attributed to strategies increasing individual wealth rather than those that could benefit all actors present in the relationship. The prevalence of this view has developed in the context in which the economic sphere was a primary scene for globalisation. Global politics is strictly connected to global economic conditions, providing structures within which political agents act, so the concepts fundamental for economic efficiency are easily adapted to other dimensions of social relations. This is why the fiction of *homo economicus* fits so well into the vision of the international realm proposed by realist theory. People are selfish and states are selfish – they transfer their selfishness to the international organisations of which they are members, which results in their inertia with regard to the distribution of goods and global equity. Orientation on individual gain, without broader consideration of the common good, stands at the centre of the prisoner's dilemma as well as the tragedy of the commons.

Self-interest and self-love play a prolific role in explaining the behaviours of both leaders and followers, but although popular, they don't exhaust explanations of the complex realities of the global realm. They represent "an approach that assumes away most of the complexity of political actors", especially under the condition of interconnectedness (Olsen, 2001: 191). In other words, rational choice offers a limited reading of rationality, which is a product of the superficial understanding of the politics limited to national boundaries and only one existing generation.

This is not, however, the only story about relationships between people willing to pursue their individual aims. According to the traditional, long-established perspective of neoclassical economic studies, close social ties have been characteristic of pre-market societies. Modern economic systems gradually disembodied market behaviours from social relations, making rationality and self-interest a driving force for building individual wealth. A similar view can be successfully applied to the realm of international politics, seen in the global era as an increasingly separate, differentiated sphere in modern society. The behaviour of states is guided in this sphere by rational calculations of individual gain, as other actors are rarely considered as partners, and more as competitors to which there are no social or kinship obligations.

It is worth noting that this principle of individual rationality and utility – widespread in discussions about failures of global governance and global cooperation – has been increasingly questioned in economic thinking. Many voices confirm that rational choice theory can only be

applicable in situations in which parameters are externalised and identified (Yee, 1996: 1010). Representatives of the Carnegie School of decision making (Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1957; Cyert and March, 1963) openly questioned the principle of full rationality in organisational decision making. Simon famously argued that no man is able to apply full-blown rationality to decision making; the request simply exceeds cognitive patterns of behaviour. Tversky and Kahneman added that an individual's practical rationality is shaped by cognitive biases (1981). Rationality can thus only be defined within the boundaries of the organisational culture being determined by established routines, norms, technologies and interests. Culture is essential to adaptation processes, which means that human cultures are flexible and change to reflect the needs of people living in a given moment in a given place (Richerson and Boyd, 2005). While culture is considered a factor in international politics – a background that allows understanding of the irrational behaviour of “others” – the issue of cooperation and coherence had been rather overlooked until the historical moment in which international institutions started to play a foundational role for the global order. The emergence of global institutions did not, however, provide the synergy needed for the systematic development of cooperation and coordination mechanisms. International institutions are explained through the lens of the rational interest paradigm. Robert Keohane argues that rational states join international institutions only when they can expect benefits (reduced transaction costs, information flows, reduced insecurity) relative to the reversed point, which is the situation in which the state's ability to join is restricted. However, rational choice theory does not explain why international institutions cannot provide more incentives to their members, or alternatively convince them that they should be more involved for greater benefits. If, as sociobiologists argue “Human beings, are absurdly easy to indoctrinate – they seek it” (Wilson, 1975: 562), why are only selfish gains being seen as the legitimate subject of this indoctrination, while the common good and political participation cannot? Rationality as an illustrative framework is not enough to explain the rise and fall of institutional cooperation, just as prosocial orientation and altruism as primary grounds of cooperation don't resist critique. As Wilson et al. (2009: 190) explain:

The two faces of human social behaviour – selfishness and altruism – have long presented the human behavioral sciences with a paradox. Daily life is replete with examples of selfishness, from students who insist that the dog ate their homework to CEOs who plunder entire companies for their own gain. Yet, people also perform acts of kindness, from lending cups of sugar to dying for their country.

While sociobiology research has made a serious attempt to illustrate how prosocial behaviours work in practice, the study of IR only finds references to the evolutionary frameworks that highlight domination, selfishness and warlike human nature (Shaw and Wong, 1987; Thayer, 2000).

The successes of liberal international order were due to strong leadership enabling the global provision of public goods. The first component was secured in the realm of politics, the other provided by market forces. The current political situation is marked by the leadership gap as politicians find strategies oriented at reinforcing a common global sphere too risky for their national interests and the ever-growing need for the correction of market rules. Seen from this perspective, the figure of the desired international order is based on the synergy which is both a product of its structure and the deliberate actions of its members, working towards common goals. The most important concepts of international governance – international institutions, convergence, human development, transnational regimes – are synergistically oriented. This synergy is to be found between national economies forming the global market between states involved in collective security alliances, actors gathered in regional institutions and more or less formalised networks. While much has been written about the nature and conditions of international cooperation, it seems that the concept of synergy can raise a welter of new ideas about how and under what circumstances global actors can increase their effectiveness in the pursuit of global stability and the protection of public goods.

Synergy has been widely used in social science to explain the mechanisms of cooperation. This is commonly defined as a result of the interaction of two or more components, parts, agents or forces, which is greater than the sum of their individual contributions. Synergy is seen as an optimising mode for goal-oriented strategies, as it enables results that cannot be achieved in the course of individual actions. It illustrates the degree to which joint actions combine the complementary strengths and resources of actors in the search for better solutions (Gray, 1989: 5; Mayo, 1997). Synergy is perceived as a key indicator of a successful collaboration process, in which partners effectively merge all their skills, experiences and perspectives to reach a desired outcome (Lasker and Weiss, 2003).

The concept is best described by reference to the processes in which it manifests itself: chemistry, molecular biology, ecology, genetics and physics all offer numerous accounts confirming synergy as non-linear mechanics organising organic and physical life. However, synergy has not been widely applied to the explanation of social behaviours; it has been indicated as a basic condition of social cooperation (Corning, 1998), so that all cooperative endeavour contains an element of synergy.

Examples of synergetic actions within the social domain vary in historical perspective and in nature; however, all reveal operational and sociocultural aspects standing behind the phenomena. One of the most influential examples comes from Adam Smith's work, which revolutionised thinking about the mechanics of production. Describing the realities of the 18th-century pin factory, Smith noted the difference between individual production and the division of labour. While working independently, a single labourer would not be able to produce even one pin per day; collective effort based on dividing up the various tasks associated with making pins results in the production of about 48,000 pins per day (Smith (1964 [1776])). While sometimes whole complexes of systems are described as synergetic, in order to fulfil this condition, actions of the involved parties must be oriented towards a particular goal. Effective organisations are always synergy-based, as the collaboration of people involved in the processes produces not only results, but framework, understanding and culture that influence the behaviour of the people involved. Global business expansion in the era following the Cold War has been mainly based on a synergy principle. Corporate giants have reached their position by using synergetic interaction that resulted in economies of scale, creating extensive networks of knowledge sharing, achieving operational optimisation and competitive advantage (Jonhson et al., 2008). All actors involved in the synergetic relationship both shape the structure and are shaped by the structure. Psychology often uses synergy to explain group mechanisms or strengthen therapeutic effects. Starting from gestalt phenomena through social facilitation, group "syntality", mob psychology and cult behaviour – all these techniques and mechanisms are embedded in synergistic contexts.

Synergy has been associated with effectiveness, optimisation and the ability to mobilise resources and achieve results. The application concerned economic actors, institutions and public agents, and the concept of synergy has been used in research discussing patterns of social change, providing an insight into the synergetic structure and the variety of its forms. A desired result can be reached as a consequence of complementary actions, coexistence or interconnectedness. This dimension can be better articulated through reference to "embeddedness" – a notion currently used in political sociology and state theory to explain how individuals, institutions and social processes – despite following their own distinct logic founded on different premises and surrounded with distinct social contexts – interact with each other as part of the synergetic environment (Granovetter, 1985; Barber, 1995; Krippner, 2001). Such a perspective was pioneered by Karl Polanyi who discerns the changing place of the economy in society throughout human history (1944) and offers a vision of all economies as "embedded and enmeshed in institutions" (Polanyi et al., 1957).

Peter Evans (1996) elaborates on the role of "embeddedness" while analysing relationships leading to the desired synergy between citizens and public officials, claiming that "synergy based on embeddedness is the essence of the most important contemporary instances of market success". So,

complementary to the understanding of the term “embeddedness” referring to the ties between institutions, economic processes and others, and the larger social context, it can be argued that this analytical category may shed light on the mechanics of synergy-building in the global arena. Embeddedness means that actors’ preferences are integrally connected to social and institutional reality; they cannot exist independently and are always created in a given historical context. State embeddedness is defined as “ties that connect citizens and public officials across the public-private divide” (Evans, 1996: 1120). The same divide and divergence of interest between private and public actors can be found today in the global realm, so understanding of this dynamic may be beneficial for the reconstruction of cooperative frameworks in the modern global environment. Embeddedness places individual rationality into the context of social relations, finding it constrained, or at least firmly connected to the cultural frameworks and mainstream orientations of the epoche. Interests are central to the study of international politics and they can’t be understood without decoding the norms, circumstances and interactions in which they are embedded (Ruggie, 2003; Zürn, 2013).

States and non-state actors operate in anarchy, but it is in their interests to transform this environment into organised anarchy. While interests will remain divergent and preferences fluid and ill-defined, some degree of consistency is generated through action and through processes in which actors have a chance to interact, communicate and influence each other. Interaction itself is to be seen as a kind of leadership process, as it is discursive and goal oriented. The number and frequency of interactions produce the degree to which synergy is introduced into the system. This synergy is created on the basis of leadership processes at the structural, relational and cognitive levels and embraces all agents operating in areas connected to global public goods. They all make sense and act in a set of patterns of institutional and global understanding. Citizens, traditionally pictured as followers, independent from the repressive powers of the state, are increasingly present on the international stage. Their postulates, roles and interests are often different from the positions of their nation states, so these processes cannot be captured either by the pluralist school, which maintained that states can be reduced to social forces (Dahl, 1972), or by the state-centred position claiming the opposite. Framing state–society relationships in terms of embeddedness confirms empirical observations that the state is not always embedded in society. Notions of “hybridity” (Evans, 2005) and the “mutual constitution” of states and societies (Block and Evans, 2005) add an additional dimension to this picture. Analysis of the social dimension of the international strategies of states is important given the fact that the dominant neo-realistic rhetoric based on principles of power and interest don’t take into account transformation within states. Meanwhile, political apathy, individual empowerment, increased mobility, revolutionary access to information, cognitive technologies and trust in public spheres have grown to play roles in global affairs.

Synergy has become a defining category for this book because it presents opposition to the *a priori* view, dominating in the IR field from its inception, that global politics is a zero-sum game. This realistic outlook of the state's behaviour has been widely discussed in the field and supported by influential voices, but it is problematic in the context of global interdependence, making absolute gains in global politics possible. Looking at global processes from the perspective of synergy could help solve a current theoretical impasse in terms of conceptualising global relations in the age of both competition and interconnectedness. Vivid examples and self-evident connections between the boundaries of the concept and real-life frameworks indicate that synergy shouldn't be treated merely as a metaphor but more as a prism through which global politics is observed. The more fragmented, multipolar world that emerges from global transformation is commonly presented as a threat in the context of effective control and coordination. This is further exacerbated by tensions aggravated by political leaders that form their opinions on polarising factors in many societies, demonising opponents and curtailing democratic processes. In the long term, the rise of this interstate polarisation damages all institutions essential to democracy. In effect, transformation of the global structure in terms of power shifts between leading states and the emergence of non-state actors is accompanied by multilayered lines of division, minimising the prospect of cooperation. The international governmental system thus suffers from congestion, and measures to produce coherence are difficult to take.

While conflict and interference among different actors in the global system are common, synergistic interactions do take place and lead to constructive outcomes. They are, however, matters of intention provided by the vision shared by leaders and followers and interactions that produce common understanding and a spectrum of rational decisions.

Interdependence and the need for organised anarchy

Interdependence has brought about systemic changes within the operational framework of the international realm, transforming conditions of vulnerability and resilience. Different layers of interdependence combining economic flows with information networks, cybersecurity, human mobility and diffusion of risk increase a state's vulnerability to external economic and political interference. Global networks function as a spontaneous system that cannot be controlled by the dominant actor, so in this regard, it differs from an institutional club decision-making forum, to which access has always been controlled by the strongest actors in the group. Here is why the question of leadership emerges. Many diagnoses of the current moment of IR's development indicate a leadership gap. There is no defined centre of power able to navigate and shape change and continuity within the global order. Power and authority are dispersed and multifaceted, not corresponding with the organisational structure of global governance institutions. Symptoms of

the leadership gap in “high” politics are expressed in the reluctance of the most powerful states to embrace typical leadership strategies to leverage their resources, deploy ideas and facilitate coalition and networks in order to promote policy change. As a result:

We live in a world where, formally, global economic and political governance is supposed to take place at the G-20 level (...) But in practice there is no global leadership and there is severe disarray and disagreement among the G-20 members not only about monetary and fiscal policy, exchange rates and global imbalances but also about global climate change, trade, financial stability, the international monetary system, energy and food security and global security.

(Roubini, 2011)

The dynamic of international order has changed, there is no state actor able to bear the risks of the global hegemony, so the system suffers from the structural leadership gap. With the absence of hegemonic power, state and non-state actors are in the process of negotiating ways in which different public goods such as security, free trade and financial stability could still be provided. Furthermore, since a stable international community can also be seen as a collective good, the threat of fragmentation, disarray and prolonged instability is even more fundamental (Barrett, 2007: 12).

The current version of international order has been built on the power of Great Britain, playing the role of hegemon until the early days of the 20th century and the USA imposed its Pax Americana, providing security to most of Western Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, and leading global financial institutions. There are no signs that the growing rise of China will produce continuity of the western model of hegemony. “We are now living in a G-Zero world, one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage or the will to drive a truly international agenda” (Bremmer and Roubini, 2011). The period of transition is characterised by the leadership deficit as the relative power of western leaders diminishes and other states are not willing to fill the void (Bremmer, 2012). The price of projecting power increased, causing reluctance to take responsibility for the shape of global structures. On the global forum, China is perceived as a rising power that is avoiding a leadership position in the traditional sense (Bishop and Xiaotong, 2020). The growing proliferation of power makes traditionally strong players weaker by increasing their dependence and the costs of their actions while at the same time reinforcing new, more autonomous players. One of the striking differences between the USA’s and China’s rise to power is the fact that the USA would not be able to reach its hegemonic status without taking the lead in crucial areas of international interaction – specifically trade, the arms race, the space race and modernisation – while for China, the leadership role would be a burden rather than an opportunity.

The above pattern is multiplied in regional contexts. *The Economist* has called Germany the reluctant hegemon – trapped between its national interest and its constitutional commitment to Europe (*The Economist*, 2020). While Germany’s position has been described as a dilemma of being “forced to take a leadership role it never wanted” (*The Economist*, 2020), the USA has actually always wanted to play a prominent global role. However, its deteriorating leadership capabilities have not been reflected in a coherent vision of its place in a changing order. The intention of “leading from behind” expressed in the era of Barack Obama might be interpreted as a signal of the difficulty of recognising the sense of direction. The idea of “leading from behind” doesn’t mean US mobilisation to empower other international actors in the spirit of constructing a polyarchic global realm; it should rather be treated as recognition of the necessity to transform the traditional leadership models. At the same time, countries such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa have been assigned greater influence in economic as well as political matters both within their regions and in world politics. They act as regional hegemons, stabilising their areas of influence; however, they lack potential and the intention to take responsibility for the distribution of global public goods. The historical examples of Japan and Russia confirm that neither a spectacular economic march to the first tier of global players nor global leadership ambitions are enough to really become a global power. What is characterised for today’s moment of international transformation is that even if the emerging powers of Asia and Africa would rather remain “would-be great powers” (Hurrell, 2006; Nolte, 2010), or potential “new titans” (*The Economist*, 2006), they are not excluded from leadership roles. Countries defined under the rubric of “emerging powers” dominate their neighbours in terms of power over resources with regard to population, territory, military capacity and gross domestic product (GDP). They are wealthy enough to buy influence through aid, loans, or other kinds of investment and have developed enough soft power strength so as to come up with innovative solutions and persuasive visions. In addition, they articulate a wish to change the distribution of power. The group bid made by Brazil, India, Germany and Japan aspired to permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Brazil and India also played a leading role in the founding of the Group of 20 (G20) at the Cancun meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Although the world is becoming increasingly more interconnected, there is a tendency to remain separated from external influence. The emphasis on sovereign powers and the narrowly defined national perspectives are symptoms of Robert Kaplan’s claim regarding the revenge of geography (Kaplan, 2012). One of the most striking features of Britain’s “leave” vote and the US presidential elections was geography, reflecting to some extent a regional map of “winners” and “losers” in relation to recent social and economic changes. During the period of American dominance “geography was lost” in the midst of global political ambition, but frontiers and demarcation lines are again becoming the organisational principles of political imagination.

With the lack of structural hegemon, actors in the system are in the process of negotiating new models of the provision of global public goods under the condition of political fragmentation and complex interdependency. The latter, outlined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) in their seminal study of IR, has become the dominant feature of today's global environment. The factor of interdependency is one of defining the position of states within the international hierarchy. The state's power is measured not only in traditional terms of military and economic potential and size of territory and population but by a whole array of contexts, from those that are easy to measure such as foreign direct investment (FDI) or research and development (R&D) spends to more subtle factors of the state's power of attraction. As Joseph Nye rightly admitted "power is like love – easier to experience than to define or measure but no less real for that" (1990). The circumstances of complex interdependence make the traditional criteria for strength and influence more difficult to assess; states conduct relations around multiple issues and through multiple channels and that also made the use of force by major states increasingly costly (Keohane and Nye, 1977). This is another factor diminishing the probability of emergence of the next global hegemon. Therefore, global public goods have to be secured on the basis of international agreements within a global governance system.

The architecture of global governance created after World War II (WWII) and largely reflecting the world as it existed in 1945 has not been adapted to the fundamental changes in the international system. Global transformations have strongly influenced traditional authority structures and have presented a number of challenges that have required complex, multilateral responses.

A dense network of international and transnational institutions has developed in recent decades. The structure is composed primarily of supra-national actors, such as the European Commission (EC); judicial actors, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC); intergovernmental organisations; as well as hybrid and private organisations, such as the World Conservation Union or Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Aside from these distinct categories, there are also less formalised and more temporary goal-oriented institutions operating at the crossroads of national and international space. International mass media, rating agencies, consulting and expert bodies have become important power brokers influencing the agency of the main actors in transnational space.

The explosion of movements, groups, networks and organisations that engage in global or transnational public debate has inevitably influenced the mechanism of governance at all levels. In the Report of the Commission on Global Governance (1992: 336) a general scenario for governance of the new times has been formulated:

States remain primary actors but have to work with others. The United Nations must play a vital role, but it cannot do all the work. Global governance does not imply world government or world federalism. Effective

global governance calls for a new vision, challenging people as well as governments to realize that there is no alternative to working together in order to create the kind of world they want for themselves and their children. It requires a strong commitment to democracy grounded in civil society.

Additionally, some analysts have seen these political structures as a platform for the development of universal standards, especially in the area of human rights. The core of their conception of global governance constitutes the need for more cooperation among governments, non-state actors, more coordination within the framework of the United Nations (UN) system, and a central position for humans within politics. In the aftermath of the devastating conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the concept of humanitarian intervention was developed on the assumption that the international community is obliged to scrutinise policies that have led to mass displacement, terror or even genocide. New frontiers of governance and institution building were oriented towards constructing a global environment in which many different cooperative platforms and initiatives could increase the overall level of trust and provide the increased synergy needed to address common problems.

The complex nets of governance beyond the state have been especially visible within two areas:

- a) The first of these areas concerns issues that have become too complex for a single state alone to govern, control or provide a solution. The list of global problems includes: humanitarian crises, military conflicts between and within states, climate change and economic volatility. In this area, the key function of governance is regulation of social and political risk and coordination of common efforts. Global governance bodies are working towards a new style of “problem solving” rather than a bargaining style of decision making.
- b) The second of these areas concerns governance gaps created as a result of intensified globalisation. Broad strands of cooperative and competitive interdependency among sovereign nations, transnational corporations (TNCs), networks of experts and civil societies have expanded to address issues that threaten local and global communities. Such a mapping of global governance activity confirms that shaping global realities is not only a matter of public actors but a complex web of private and public actors and their involvement.

Until recently, the most acclaimed way to deal with global problems was global governance, yet influence of the system of global institutions is eroding: “the G-20 has become another bureaucratic forum where much is discussed but little agreed upon and a lot disagreed upon” (Roubini, 2011); the UN has long been suffering from an inability to act decisively, especially

on controversial matters. Bretton Woods institutions at the moment of their inception accounted for half the world's output. Today, their influence has shrunk – they account for under a quarter (Steil, 2020).

The assumption that transboundary processes and actors can be regulated by political actions underlines the impressive development of global institutions, coordinating bodies, multilevel governance structures and ad hoc problem-solving initiatives that took place after the end of the Cold War. The belief that governance is possible without government (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992) was first amplified by the creation of a plethora of governance bodies, just to be abandoned when it became apparent that state members had not yet developed operating modes that would combine national interest and the governance of common space. As a result, the assessment of global governance is highly ambiguous. There are analysts arguing that the way global governance is in practice is effective (Coen and Pegram, 2015: 417), while others indicate that there is in fact institutional learning and autonomy in place, so global institutions are in the process of constant adaptation in order to be able to better respond to unexpected challenges (Persson, 2019).

The existence of specialised forums created to deal with global problems does not automatically bring solutions to them. Institutional arrangements are driven by the strategies of actors, so the scale and nature of intervention is a matter of their choice and change. Several decades after the end of the Cold War, the scenario assuming constraining power of international institutions (Vernon, 1971; Keohane and Nye, 1977) over individual nations still hasn't been fulfilled. It is rather states who decide about taking more vigorous courses of action or throwing the agreed arrangements into institutional inertia. This operational pattern heavily influences the way in which the most urgent issues of humanity are managed and indicates the dynamics within the international system. The history of the USA provided grounds for conceptualisation of the liberal hegemony based on institutional mechanisms of order maintenance. The road map drawn for state leaders by the IR school of realism based on the recognition of power and self-interest under such circumstances cannot be directly implemented. What is observed within the international scene is a change of structure that has shifted away from recognised models of unipolarity, hegemonic stability and multipolarity in the traditional sense. The evolving framework, however, does not neglect the importance of power in IR. Keohane and Nye declare that

[R]ather than viewing realist theory as an alternative to liberal “interdependence” theory, we regarded the two as necessary complements to one another (...) liberalism and realism both have their roots in a utilitarian view of the world in which individual actors pursue their own interests by responding to incentives. Both doctrines view politics as a process of political and economic exchange, characterized by bargaining. (1987)

These bargaining capabilities are influenced by actors, institutions, regimes and processes that operate within a state which may be useful in compensating traditional military capabilities.

As John Ikenberry describes it:

[S]tate power is embedded in a system of rules and institutions that restrain and circumscribe its exercise. States enter international order out of enlightened self-interest, engaging in self-restraint and binding themselves to agreed-upon rules and institutions. In this way, order is based on consent.

(2001: 61)

Thus, the difference between leaders and hegemon in this view is that the leader creates consent, while the hegemon concentrates power and influences others by domination. Material power, ideas and institutions are combined into a comprehensive theory of hegemony, as the dominant power has to be recognised by others, as a creator of a shared normative framework. Two important factors make these views of hegemony obsolete in today's international system. The first is that it is becoming apparent that for the long-standing hegemon, maintenance of its hegemonic status is not necessarily in agreement with its interests. The other is that the concept of hegemony refers to the question of the provision of public goods in a marginal form, while this has become a major gap within the current governance framework. Thus, the major problem of the transformative moment of international order is not the lack of power, it is rather a lack of leadership.

Global provision of public goods

Climate change prevention is probably the most discussed process focused around the global provision of public goods. It is an example of an existential global problem which has been at the forefront of the global agenda for several decades but whose effect has thus far been rather limited. Climate-change negotiation presents an epic story on a global scale with its contested parties, misunderstandings, historical animosities and interests-driven rhetoric. This case is also representative of the global public goods arena, the importance of which is expanding. The label of "global public goods" is not used in strictly economic terms, but rather as an indication of common areas that require cooperation, such as issues concerning the environment, trade, financial stability, health care, poverty reduction and culture preservation across national borders. Many of the issues characterised as public goods are in fact common pooled resources. Yet they usually share the freerider problem, providing incentives to leaders of each country to act in ways that leave all countries worse off. The purest type of global public goods

are universal and valued equally across the world, like clean air and disease control. As Nordhaus (1999) notes “Most important global public goods involve some kind of stock – stocks of pollution, stocks of knowledge, biological or genetic stocks, ‘reputational’ stocks in the case of monetary systems, and ‘institutional stocks’ in cases of market and democratic systems”.

Complete eradication of tuberculosis or polio can only be achieved under conditions of universal participation; all countries have to coordinate their efforts. The opposite situation is also possible when a single state has both the ability and the incentive to provide the public good which will be available for the whole community. In cases in which more benefit is derived from a global public good than the cost of providing it unilaterally, then the given state will likely provide it, even in the absence of cooperation, like the USA who maintained a strong currency and made it a bedrock of the international financial system.

An example that is often cited which illustrates the effectiveness of the international community in implementing the global public goods framework is ozone layer protection (DeSombre, 2000). Negotiations were oriented at limiting the production and use of ozone-depleting chemicals, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The Montreal Protocol governing ozone depletion imposed trade sanctions on those who refused to comply. Its success was based on setting an efficient objective for the global public good; but first of all incorporating all important countries into the agreement.

The case of the WTO also provided strong incentives for compliance for partners interested in the liberalisation of trade. However, when the individual costs for participants increased with the advancement of the trade liberalisation process, development of the system was halted. Advancement in communications and technological development brought a new perspective for individual empowerment but also created favourable conditions for the expansion of the transnational criminal network. The illegal sale of weapons, money laundering, human trafficking and other types of crime are perpetrated regionally and globally. The gravity of the threat requires multilevel coordination of national security agencies to produce public goods of safety and predictability. The more global integration, the greater the scale of cross-country spillovers. Their recognition of the gravity of these challenges does not secure collective action to address them. Efforts oriented at intervention can only appear as a result of a coordinated political process. This is the major reason for which the subject of the global public good occupies a prominent position within the global political leadership spectrum.

Both scholars and practitioners stress the urgency of the new model of global public goods provision and distribution (Zürn, 2016; Schwab,

2017). Negligence in this respect will result in increased gravity of neglected problems and more crises, which in turn further undermines the legitimacy of international cooperation. Leadership is crucial in establishing what can be considered the global public good and how the hierarchies of its protection will be organised. This indicates the political aspect of the phenomena. It is to be identified through an interactive, discursive leadership process what should be subject to protection as well as whether these goods should be prioritised in the context of competition for finite resources. This is not only the subject of pure economic analysis. Actors would rather consider their reputation, ability and moral duty to influence global public goods provision (Keohane, 2005 [1984]). They also respond to international norms and adjust their policies to international standards and mechanisms of social pressure. Countries are more likely to criminalise human trafficking when they are included in the US annual Trafficking in Persons Report, and countries that are placed on a “watch list” are also more likely to impose strict standards of monitoring.

The number of issues for which international cooperation is required to produce global public goods is growing. The most urgent concern biodiversity with regard to the use and sharing of fresh water; harmonisation of rules related to the financial market; harmonisation of privacy and cybersecurity regulations; coordination in the fight against corruption and for better governance. Delay in action can result in irreversible changes; the impact of climate change or biodiversity loss may arise far into the future. Antibiotics, a cornerstone of modern medicine are under threat due to their overuse and misuse. Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has become recognised as a major threat to human health around the world. A world without effective antibiotics could have a drastic impact on population health, global development and the global economy (World Bank, 2017). The danger of AMR moving across borders demands the strengthening of global governance arrangements. As in the case of any other global public good, the mechanism of effective intervention is straightforward: no country can avoid the consequences if antimicrobials become ineffective. Effective action is only possible if all countries, agencies and other actors organise themselves across national boundaries.

The decline of authorities and the rise of dispersed political imaginaries

The authority problem is one of the fundamental issues defining the status of actors within the international arena. Every type of leadership relationship is authority based, but this factor is especially important in global

political leadership, where coercion is rare and leaders rather use the power of attraction or socialisation to make others do as they wish. Authority can be defined simply as “the ability to induce deference in others” (Avant et al., 2010: 9); it describes a leader’s position with relation to the group and allows influencing the members of this group. Legal and political authority of the state remain at the cornerstone of the ontological foundation of the international system. This major framework enables the horizontal allocation of authority determining which states exercise authority over a particular person, organisation or activity. “To claim authority is to claim the right to be obeyed” (Wolff, 1970: 5), but the mechanism of this process in the international realm has to be different from the case of domestic legal systems as it lacks a single centralised legislator. The system instead relies on specialised and separate treaty-making conferences and venues oriented as negotiating and implementing norms. Within this framework, authority is structured in a variety of ways, so that considering the legal position as the only justified and firm source of global authority would be reductionistic. Legal authority is rather precise in scope – it is obliged to recognise, create, vary and enforce obligations. But other kinds of authorities, although more ambiguous, also shape the international realm. Recognition of international institutions has been based on legal and technocratic reasoning assuming their right to implement changes in the desired areas on the basis of their expertise. Private authorities have covered many important areas of the transnational space, leading to a situation in which individuals or private bodies claim authority over chosen areas and their status is respected by others, even without the involvement of government institutions. Their ability to act and being recognised as entitled to act rests on three components – power, legitimacy and connection to public interest, at the core of which is global public goods protection and distribution (Mende, 2021).

While the normative power to generate, promote and recognise international rules is a primary basis of international order, enforcement power is necessary to keep the order in place. Power and the ability to impose will on others is not a sufficient element of authority – the normative element providing reasoning for what needs to be done is necessary.

Authority involves more than the ability to get people to do what they otherwise would not; authority often consists of telling people what is the right thing to do. There is a persuasive and normative element in authority that is tightly linked to its legitimacy.

(Barnett and Finnemore, 2005: 170)

Growing international fragmentation resulted in increased powers of the entities that were historically absent from IR and now have gained agency at this level. Actors other than the state operate in the transnational space, inevitably crossing the line of hierarchical authority, distributed between an individual level, through local (municipal), substate, state, plurilateral and

multilateral organisations (Trachtman, 2008). They exercise their authority in a variety of forms, emphasising different components to different degrees. While transnational corporations have power over resources, the normative component of their influence is limited. Regimes, on the other hand, focus on normative and ideational dimensions of global governance (Wiener, 2018). Rising fragmentation and lack of clarity in the area of authority can be treated as one of the signs of the decay of power – an observable phenomenon of reality in which the gaining and wielding of power are becoming increasingly complex and elusive (Naím, 2013). The nature of power has been transformed as a consequence of changes brought by technology and mobility.

The proliferation of people, information, wealth and vision that people use to navigate their lives is greater than ever. Communication and information technologies have not only brought completely new tools with which to share ideas but have also changed the way people experience social relations. Their capacity to isolate from the outside world, public sphere included, has grown – they can leave confusing or difficult situations without consequences. Mobility revolution means that people can more easily get to places they want to be, just as they can stay away from the places where they don't want to be (Naím, 2013). Finally, the mentality revolution has encouraged people to question sources of authority, undermining political and corporate power centres. Constant exposure to new ideas and scenarios that are alternative to those being realised make people accept given truths with hesitancy. They are less likely to accept received wisdom and be obedient to traditional forms of power. Governments, churches, families and business organisations are being questioned, and as a result, their ability to operate effectively diminishes. Even the established democratic systems can't protect themselves against rising political clientelism and crises of public confidence in political leadership (Lees-Marshment, 2015).

In the outlook of some analysts this widespread diffusion of power and authority leads to “rising entropy in the international order” (Schweller, 2001: 1, Crocker, 2015). Here, the state of entropy reflects not only a change in who is in power but also how this power is executed and how interactions and relations on the global scene produce and impact upon power. With the emergence of new forms of legitimation and contestation, even powerful states and once respected international organisations face particular challenges for accountability, representation and legitimacy. Governments still enjoy the undisputed privilege of political legitimacy, which justifies their right to exercise power; however, they have largely lost their monopoly over ideas and communication. They no longer shape reality with the use of powerful narratives, but are increasingly seen as just providers of services. Their rational legal authority might not be questioned but it does not grant power to capture the attention and imagination of crowds. These are captured by social networking platforms, cultural processes and battles of ideas that take place outside of party politics and parliamentary venues.

Globalisation, the introduction of mobility, contributions to poverty amelioration and the spread of education and literacy has transformed the environment in which political organisations exist, multiplying political power centres and directing attention to the question of authority. Global leadership is part of the equation too, as authority is directly connected to the right of presenting a diagnosis of the status quo and visions for the future. As in national political systems, electoral legitimacy is a source of authority – global non-state leaders exercise leadership but their authority is highly contested. As a result, traditional leaders accuse new leaders on the grounds of lack of authority in order to weaken their position, while new leaders disregard the effectiveness and competence of old leaders. However, the presence of both is necessary for the international system to function. Authority, just as leadership, has a relational dimension – it emerges between people or groups being in a hierarchy “in which one group is recognized as having both the right and the competence to take binding decisions for the rest of the community” (Cronin and Hurd, 2008: 6). What is increasingly visible is that “new” leaders effectively compete with traditional leaders for being recognised as righteous and competent. This can be seen as a consequence of structural transformation expanding the set of actors required to govern human affairs or as a crisis of traditional forms of political leadership.

Political figures were, until recently, seen as entitled and prepared to shape public imaginaries, with the help of intellectuals, scientists or artists, but their credibility has been collapsing for a long time. Traditionally, at least some political leaders were considered public authorities – as possessing legitimation – justified in terms of moral or other socially embedded beliefs. Credibility, recognition and a certain degree of trust is required in order to convey the message that would be listened to and accepted as common vision. One of the features of the global era is the fact that universal appeal is rare. It is hard to provide even a short list of leaders who would claim authority and their claim recognised by a majority of the national or regional public. The Dalai Lama could be an example, but besides him, the global reality is that there is a lack figures who enjoy both recognition and authority. For leaders to be of global appeal is especially difficult as they address diverse audiences whose norms might differ and even be conflicted. Global agora where standards would be agreed and rules of the game accepted has been under construction for nearly a century, yet the project is far from complete. Global public institutions are being increasingly contested on the grounds of ineffectiveness and legitimacy; private institutions, which are often more efficient, are presented as selfish and also lacking legitimacy. National governments alone have insufficient influence over global affairs, but when they group in clusters, coalitions and alliances, the road to consensus over crucial issues of resources redistribution, responsibilities and international norms is long and often leads to a dead end.

Political authorities in general are questioned not so much on the basis of competence but rather with regard to the ethical foundation of their leadership processes and how their behaviour is connected to public interest.

Rules of the global power game prefer order over justice, particular gains over the common good, and short-term victories over long-term projects. Environmental justice, developmental aid, and refugee crises – the global realm is composed of processes of primary importance, directly referring to the fundamental question of right and wrong. In the process of political decision making, leaders are confronted with constant moral ambiguity – they have to manoeuvre between different philosophical orientations, narratives and definitions of truth, being aware of the fact that their final decisions will always be the subject of critique. This contestation is not simply one possible scenario; it is rather a rising cost of their public involvement and a necessity for navigating complex realms of technology and social relations.

Demise of the agora and politics of the fragmented

Democracy is a system of governance organised around a common space where people gather, physically or symbolically, to discuss important matters. For this reason, information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been seen as a tool for promoting social change, opening up new arenas for civic participation and protest. Indeed, online platforms, mobile telephones and other information technologies are widely used by people all around the globe to voice their opinions, define their political identities and change their life situations. But the impact of technological proficiency of societies on their ability to lead and transform socio-economic realities remains uncertain. Theoretically, the transparency enabled by online platforms and big-data technologies substantially widens one's possibilities for acquiring knowledge of public affairs sufficient for the casting of an informed vote and keeping the government accountable. The problem is that this potential is vastly under-exploited. Citizens behave as "cognitive misers", retrieving, processing and storing only limited amounts of information (Brady et al., 1995). Social media and technology are used as mediums for social engagement, identity building, self-expression and sharing opinions rather than for creating institutions or persistent forms of influence. Tech-savviness leads to widespread "slacktivism" – cyber-engagement in a cause that requires little personal effort. Some scholars see this as the result of diminishing interest in social issues and even of a more general deterioration of civic culture (Bennett, 2008). Others claim that digital natives still feel socially engaged by participating in online activism and creating a vital forum for political discourse (Christensen, 2011). There is, however, no clear cause-effect link between this kind of involvement and political gains and social transformation.

Pluralism of cyber space generates diffusion of interests and association, directing people to different issues. Cyberspace is a space of the particular. It worships radical ideas and provides the means of its

long-term existence. The public agenda was easier to construct in the time of traditional media when the general public were exposed to the same types of transmission. In this reality, the spectrum of accepted opinion has to be, by definition, moderated. With cyberspace, the operational logic of the game has changed, as millions of viewers and readers are no longer required for public recognition or financial success. Internet shows and channels are profitable with just a few thousand people, so the more distinctive they become, the more radical their message and the greater their chance for long-term effect. Under such circumstances, the commons remain undefined, since there is no single “public” but many “publics”. Sobolewska and Ford (2020), in their book about the causes of Brexit, indicated educational expansion and rising ethnic diversity as key drivers in the polarisation. Older and younger electorates engage in a culture war just because their social environments are drastically different. The diverse, liberal bubble of city youngsters clashed with the homogenic bubble of the older generation driven by fears and resentment. There were politicians and media involved in the mediation but a lack of public authorities and general deficit of trust made the task impossible. The tale of “two tribes” sharing the geographical space of the nation without being able to really listen and understand each other has also been told with regards to the polarised societies of the USA, Poland, Brazil and many others.

Even places historically prone to diversity, such as global cities serving as information and economic hubs, are drowned by growing fragmentation. In big cities, gentrification separates people from each other. A rise of ethnically homogeneous zones within an extremely heterogeneous environment is observed. Western financial centres, which before were symbols of social mobility and possibilities, have turned into places of division and rising inequality. Neither “bridging” nor “bonding” kinds of trust (Portes, 1998) seem to be in place any more, which although being specific for every geographical location, are more associated with the destructive influence of the impersonal, overwhelming “globalisation” more than with particular behaviours and everyday choices of followers. Market culture has been transposed to political realities, citizens are demanding more rights, regulation, deregulation, justice, services and public strategies, but they don’t see themselves as a part of “society’s stakeholders”, obliged to engage constructively with government institutions and invest in trust among themselves.

A prerequisite for inclusive and responsive policymaking is that citizens use their voice. Public deliberation, political evaluation and criticism are thus embedded in political practice. So contemporary conditions have influenced the popular vision of democracy. An incomplete picture of

the system circulates, in which benefits are given to citizens, not necessarily constructed by them. A long-standing truth that the human is a social animal has also undergone adjustment when people shifted their social needs and activities to cyberspace. Their private spaces become filled with people offering endless amusement and company, so community building, civic activities and public engagement have for many lost their ability to provide emotional gratification. The public arena has become empty and every cause and issue that demands citizens' attention requires their mobilisation.

Post-politics

The question of the authority of leaders emerges as one of the dilemmas connected to shifts in the political arena. There are some claims that western societies have already reached the status of anti-politics or post-politics systems, where the relationship between political leaders and their followers have been permanently destroyed (Crouch, 2004; Žižek, 2008; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014). This crisis manifests itself in the statistics illustrating democratic conditions. A growing number of people are not interested in the public space, disaffected with the instituted rituals of a representative democracy. People choose not to vote in elections, they feel disconnected from the governance processes, even concerning areas where they live. Geographically defined identity and the sense of belonging has been replaced by the concept of social networks of interpersonal ties. Traditional forms of political activity, such as party membership, attending rallies, signing petitions or contacting government officials provided support, information and a sense of belonging. Nowadays, people – young people in particular – get connections and this kind of social gratification outside of political platforms (Zachara, 2020). World “politics” have gained negative connotations. Max Weber might have written about politics as a vocation, a public service in which his ideal politician combined passion, a feeling of responsibility and a sense of proportion, but in popular understanding, a political leader is rarely seen as idealistic and community-oriented. They are increasingly found to be inadequate. The Aristotelian view arguing that the life of the politician is a life devoted to the promotion of the common good is not getting much traction among ordinary participants and observers of the political arena (Morrison, 2001). Democracy, although remaining a respected idea, bears in itself an unfulfilled promise. The prospect of change, betterment, expansion of individual freedoms and ideals of the “good life” is weakly linked with operational levels of electoral games and parliamentary politics. People grew disillusioned with regard to the purposes of politics. In the outlook of many, politics is still about power and conflict – as it always has been – but it is no longer about public good.

The way people perceive politics influences the nature of the leader–follower relationship. Formal authority, connected to the office the person holds, is not sufficient to induce deference in followers. The powerful romanticised myth of the hero–leader created high expectations connected to political figures. There is a tacit assumption that their position should be backed with not only competences and merits but also inherent moral qualities. Furthermore, the ability to exercise leadership is not static – it depends on the leader’s credibility. Non-state actors, whose authorities are founded on the claim that they stand for under-represented groups or causes (such as the environment, or human rights victims), publicly declare commitment within certain areas. Their authority holds for as long as others perceive them actively fulfilling their promise. However, the ability to assess political leadership rests on the condition of citizens’ competence and political literacy. The competence gap is one of the factors of disconnection between elected rulers and the voters which undermines trust in, and support for, democracy. With generational change, politics may further deteriorate the politician’s position without offering alternative ways to connect followers with political decision makers. Young people, who will be a decisive power in shaping the social structure in future, have been gradually losing interest in participation and acquiring citizenship skills (e.g. Furnham and Gunter, 1987; Mardle and Taylor, 1987; Park, 1995). From sociological analyses, there arises an image of a generation that is less interested in formal and institutional politics, has less trust in public authority and is less active in social participation than previous age cohorts (Lawless and Fox, 2015; Shames, 2017). While it is natural that youth introduce their own forms and standards to areas of interest, it seems that disengagement progresses further with every decade without introducing any ideas of how to improve the political machinery. There are signs that young people are rejecting conventional politics in favour of channelling their attention and energy to single issues, such as the environment and human and animal rights:

Whenever I speak at colleges and universities, I tell my audience of students about this butterfly in Indonesia that is becoming extinct. I ask them if I wanted to launch an NGO to try and save these butterflies from extinction, how many of the students would want to join me? Inevitably, there are a lot of people interested and willing to sign up to help. Then I say, forget that, I just made it up. I don’t know anything about butterflies. I don’t know if there is one in danger of extinction in Indonesia. I was just testing how many of you were interested in making the effort, doing good, and devoting time and energy to an interesting cause; however, now, suppose I want to join a political party with a group of people. I ask how many students would want to leave with me after the speech and decide which political party to join and go all together and lead it. And, you know, the students run for the exits. They’re not interested

(Naím, 2014: 246).

New social movements and fluid forms of activism, like Occupy Wall Street and Fridays for Future, have been emerging in response to the inadequacy of formalised, institutional solutions to social needs. Their egalitarian-participatory agenda gained wide, transnational support but failed to connect with the actual structures of institutionalised power. While it is easier with the availability of cyberspace networks to generate political momentum, sustaining mobilisation and supporting long-term involvement of participants seems to be harder than ever. However, while channels of social mobilisation are different and the ability of followers to influence the social or political scene is greater than ever, the mechanism through which social change can be effectively implemented remains unchanged. It is based on institutionalisation, entailing high organisational costs and long-term engagement. Without reaching this phase, fluid and fragmented forms of activism play a more disruptive than transformative role. This is a practical difference between formalised politics, which is perceived as inadequate, and the conflictual, vivid, contesting power of political expression, necessary to keep democracy alive but also demonising electoral politics by depicting it as a hegemonic consensus, reduced to procedures and technocratic governance.

The post-heroic era of political leadership is strongly entrenched in conditions of liberal democracy, with its institutionally installed distrust towards power holders. Although social change cannot be achieved beyond the political sphere, as it touches resource distribution as well as identity, formal politics has become a highly contested area. Voters' apathy and indifference is a sign of self-marginalisation that potentially creates a vicious circle of decreasing political authority, resulting in the further erosion of the democratic model. If the most talented and virtuous leaders become uninterested in using their competences within the frameworks of institutionalised politics, the transformational potential of the elites will inevitably decrease. The guardians of the commons will not be chosen from among the best but from among the rest.

Leadership in practice: Pandemic of abdicated leaders

A novel type of coronavirus (Covid-19) first appeared in Wuhan, China, in December 2019/January 2020. This highly infectious virus has placed the world on a cataclysmic course, resulting in more than 5 million deaths worldwide by December 2021 (WHA, 2020). The actual total number of cases remains unknown, as testing is limited in most countries.

The coronavirus pandemic has been the gravest international crisis since WWII, both in terms of its multidimensional character and its duration. It poses unpredictable adaptive challenges to individuals as well as to global and local institutions, infiltrating all forms of social life. Governance of this crisis has been a complex, multilevel conundrum involving a range of players – from governments and public health ministers, through CEOs of leading pharmaceutical companies, to the billions of people struggling with the pandemic

worldwide. Global in nature, the pandemic requires national leaders to understand the consequences of utilised strategies from a far broader perspective than that of ensuring the well-being and survival of their own citizens; it requires global thinking and interpreting events with a focus on interconnectivity and common destiny. The pandemic marked a moment of global transition, one that made the worldwide health system vulnerable. Specifically, the pandemic revealed weaknesses of the global health protection model and that leadership for global issues is geographically dispersed and takes many forms.

The flaws and triumphs of leadership during the Covid-19 pandemic may be best understood by applying the concept of positive peace as formulated in the 60 lessons from peace studies by Johan Galtung (1985). Galtung's original concept of positive peace was built in reference to the human health system; health is understood not only as an absence of disease but also as an ability to develop a strong immune system that can prevent and resist health hazards (Galtung, 1985). Therefore, Galtung considered the effectiveness of the global system for peace in its actual and potential forms, as well as the system's resilience. Global political leadership represents one of the major factors influencing the systemic ability to resist the causes of violence and develop synergies to reduce structural vulnerabilities. The general conditions that increasingly challenge global synergy and undermine systemic resilience are described by the concept of volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA), which is used in the contemporary socio-economic arena due to the high frequency and magnitude of change (Shambach, 2004; Bennett and Lemoine, 2014). First usage of the concept coincided with the emerging field of complexity and chaos theory; later, the use of the term was widely adopted following the financial crisis of 2008–09, when societies suddenly found themselves addressing global economic turmoil. Another vivid example of complex system dynamics has been the global crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic.

The appearance and spread of the virus have raised prominence of the VUCA factors of uncertainty, indeterministic tendencies, nonlinear relationships and feedback processes in defining a threat and response formulation. The pandemic not only confirms the unprecedented level of threat with which the global order must contend but also presents a major period of turbulence in the evolution of global order that may either accelerate or block synergy. This effect is due to the nature of pandemics, which have the features of a "black swan" – that is, a single, highly transformative event that shapes social realities on a large scale (Taleb, 2007). Although the nature of pandemics is not entirely consistent with that of a black swan event, it is worthwhile to see some of the attributes of pandemics through the lens of this concept, to analyse the extent to which the dramatic consequences of the pandemic could have been prevented. The Covid-19 pandemic is similar to a black swan event in three major ways. First, the pandemic is outside the realm of regular expectations. The possibility of a pandemic has long been predicted, as disease outbreaks such as SARS, Ebola, Marburg, hantavirus,

Zika and avian influenza are all considered to be outcomes of anthropogenic impacts on ecosystems (World Bank, 2012). Many earlier reports, security analyses, intelligence assessments and expert commentaries indicated that such an outbreak was not a question of “if” – only “when?”. Analysis of the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), in a 2012 report, suggested that “An easily transmissible novel respiratory pathogen that kills or incapacitates more than one percent of its victims is among the most disruptive events possible” (NIC, 2012). The timing of its appearance and the exact nature of this *specific* SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus had not been predicted, but the probability of a global pandemic involving a highly infectious respiratory virus was considered a plausible scenario. However, prediction of an outbreak does not imply that protective systems were in place when the outbreak occurred. Thus, the effect of the shock and “strategic surprise” that multiplies the consequences of pandemics puts Covid-19 in the category of being outside the realm of regular expectations.

Second, explanations for the occurrence concocted after the fact make it explainable and predictable. The mechanism of cross-species transmission of viruses has been well researched, providing an explanation for the appearance of new mutations. The potential impact of the pandemic and the pace of its reproduction could also be assessed based on global mobility and increased urbanisation. The emergence of the pandemic is inevitably connected to the nature of globalisation, “and the ultimate cause of the epidemic is not the coronavirus particle, but the concentrated centers of population, the global market, and the contemporary system of international trade within which humans across the planet now live out our lives” (Fox, 2020).

Finally, this event has an extreme impact on society. A pandemic that poses a threat to the survival of a substantial part of the global population has triggered unprecedented responses impacting all levels of social interaction. At the initial stage, with a limited medical capacity to treat the disease, nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) were the main strategy for containing social risks. Consequently, half of the world’s population was asked to stay at home (Standford, 2020). The most utilized measures included lockdown (home isolation, voluntary/required quarantine) and various forms of social distancing for vulnerable groups or entire populations. The framework of action included the closure of schools/universities and non-essential businesses/workplaces, and cancelling or postponing events (i.e. major conferences and tradeshow, concerts and festivals, political debates and elections, and sports seasons, including the Summer Olympics 2020). With international travel bans affecting over 90 per cent of the world population within just two months, the framing of the global tourism system moved from over-tourism to “non-tourism”

(Gössling, et al., 2020).

The capacity of individuals, societies and systems to respond to and influence change has been tested, bringing a reorganisation of the hierarchies of policy objectives and shared beliefs. Governments around the world have been forced to impose a suite of extraordinary public policies, which have not only limited the public health crisis but also produced what are likely to be long-term impacts on expectations of the public regarding the role of government, national debt, and general socio-economic models. Governments were expected to take creative but balanced measures to preserve public safety and the economy; in so doing, they became the ultimate bearers of societal risk. Although the situation was extraordinary, it took considerable time for the enforcement of protective measures to lead to normalisation and adaptation. As the number of crises increased, a substantial gap was revealed between citizens' expectations and leadership efforts in preventing and containing risk factors. In summary, outbreaks of Covid-19 have contributed to a culture of concern in which political and bureaucratic leaders fall short of the increasingly urgent demand for effective crisis prevention, preparedness and response.

The importance of resilience as a concept has grown drastically, both in the context of public health systems and recognition of the need to redesign social models that can better account for and adapt to crises, as well as address change and uncertainty. Simultaneously, the fragility of international and national systems has been exposed, fuelling changes in alliances, institutions and the global economy. Dealing with the immediate health crisis has accelerated adaptive mechanisms, ranging from the rapid relaxation of regulations regarding the manufacture of medical devices such as masks and ventilators or eliminating barriers to the employment of medical professionals, to massive increases in public welfare spending and in public debt.

The scale and disastrous consequences of the pandemic bear testimony to serious gaps in the coherence of international dynamics as well as global leadership deficits. According to Larry Brilliant, a World Health Organization (WHO) expert "Outbreaks are inevitable. Pandemics are optional" (after Matthewman, 2015: 27). If the health governance system had been designed and led per the logic of interconnectedness, the risk of the pandemic could have been eliminated or mitigated. Over the past several decades, countries have agreed on several cooperative arrangements against severe global disasters, of which pandemics have been considered the most certain. Every major epidemic in the past quarter-century – HIV, SARS, avian flu, swine flu and Ebola – provided grounds for collective action and institutional learning; however, previous epidemics did not result in sufficient coordination and preparedness for Covid-19. To a major extent, the emergence of this pandemic was a result of leadership gaps in global health governance and national political decision making. China refused to share substantial data, and many countries failed to report the actual scale of the pandemic for fear of political consequences. Even in the wealthiest countries in the world, the supply of essential protection equipment was insufficient. While some specific needs,

such as ventilators, could not have been foreseen, the structural needs of the local and global systems have long been ignored, amplifying the gravity of the pandemic crisis. Although the WHO, WTO and other global governance bodies were established to shield humanity and the international system from systemic risk, the problem of traditional collective action dominated the logic of actors in leadership positions when faced with a considerable challenge. The lack of leadership caused general unpreparedness for the entire international system as well as for states to address the crisis. Despite rational evidence and knowledge-supported prognosis, neither rich nor underdeveloped states expanded their efforts to gather adequate supplies and introduce legislation that would increase public access to health care, even in states in which such an increase was desperately needed. While there was sufficient information, the lack of political will influenced the scale of the pandemic and the inability of the majority of states to respond adequately.

The need for leadership

Covid-19 not only destabilised economic systems and forced millions of people to change their ways of living but also revealed the value of leadership and its inherent linkage to the most natural human needs of survival and safety. Leadership is commonly considered a key factor in crisis management; extraordinary situations influence judgement and decision-making processes, so leaders bear the burden of directing attention, embracing uncertainty and managing expectations (Boin and Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2016; Johansson and Back, 2017). The scale and length of the pandemic created leadership challenges beyond the already tested scripts for crisis governance, thereby expanding the complexity of leadership processes as well as the methods used by leaders to impact reality. Consequently, leadership processes have been primarily oriented towards adapting to the new conditions and constraints, testing the adequacy of existing governance structures and developing new ad hoc roles. In many places in the world, the pandemic restored the sense of a critical need for effective public leadership to benefit the common good (Brookes, 2011). Leaders were faced with the necessity of trade-offs among competing values; they were forced to balance health, safety and economic development, individual freedom and collective interest (e.g. forced quarantine decisions), transparency and privacy, rights and obligations, efficiency and equity, and free expression vs the prevention of rumours and panic. Hence, the question of good leadership is a key factor shaping how communities and nations address the Covid-19 global health crisis.

Various leadership styles have been used by leaders to influence their realities during the pandemic; many styles have been reframed or adapted in a novel way and tested out in the context of a prolonged, high-risk and high-stakes setting. The nature of the crisis has amplified the importance of the *servant-leadership* model, which is most commonly associated with health and care industries but is gaining an increasingly wide audience in the

political domain. The model, which was formulated by Robert K. Greenleaf (1977 [2002]), focuses on how traditional power-centred authoritarian leadership styles can be enriched or replaced with more cooperative and human-centred approaches. Consequently, the model helped to rediscover the idea that leadership is a vocation, an idea that was gradually replaced by the logic of success or profits guiding human organisations in capitalistic and individualistic collectives. The Covid-19 pandemic sharpened awareness of the value of leadership oriented towards benefiting the common greater good. The ideal of a decisive, growth-oriented and bold leader has been replaced with a leadership model based on caregiving, protection and vocation. The public health crisis placed people in the context of the “out there” depicted by Margaret Atwood in *Oryx and Crake*: “there was a lot of dismay (...), and not nearly enough ambulances”, which made them appreciate a culture of empathy, care and humility. The values of caregiving, protection and vocation, which were earlier marginalised and overshadowed by individualism and materialism as dictated by the rules of market forces, shifted from the “naively idealistic” end of the spectrum to “socially essential and empowering” during the pandemic.

The lack of contradiction between the roles of servant and leader has been illustrated in Greenleaf’s original concept of servant leadership by evoking the story of the servant Leo, featured in Herman Hesse’s 1958 novel *The Journey to the East*. Leo – “a person of extraordinary presence” (Greenleaf, 1977 [2002]: 21), travelled with members of the League, known as the greatest individuals of all times, in their mythical journey, performing the most menial tasks for the group and inspiring its members with his positive attitude. When the humble servant disappears, travellers from the League fall into disarray and chaos and are unable to continue their journey. “All goes well until Leo disappears” (Greenleaf, 1977 [2002]: 21). The greatest minds of history, both imaginary and real – including Plato, Mozart, Paul Klee and Baudelaire – could not follow their path in search of the ultimate truth without servant Leo. Despite their individual virtues, they became disillusioned and confused as one after another deserted the others and their eastward trek. Leo eventually was revealed as the President of the League, who sits on the High Throne over all who journey. As the personification of a servant and a leader, Leo symbolises a path to empowerment through service, the protection of human dignity and the promotion of well-being: “This unaffected man had something so pleasing, so unobtrusively winning about him that everyone loved” (Hesse, 1956: 25).

The emergence of the pandemic not only demonstrated the urgent need for servants and authentic political leadership but also enabled the rediscovery that stewardship rather than rational optimisation should be the major guiding principle for institutions devoted to benefiting the public good. It has become even more apparent that the political strategies that long ignored the structural dysfunctionalities of social systems brought exceptionally high social and financial costs. Consequently, health-care servants became heroes at this time of crisis. People on the street in diverse places around the world

applauded doctors and nurses fighting Covid-19 on the front line. Petitions, flash mobs and other displays of solidarity demonstrated rising support for the demands of the health-care sector, expressing not only an awakened need for protection but also a renewed sense of social cohesion.

The specific historical context of the pandemic shaped the public view of the leader's role and generated tensions that affected leadership needs. The rise of populist leaders, who promoted post-truth politics and capitalised on anxiety and division, have shaken alliances and the relations between governments and their citizens. In reaction to the trends undermining the established set of values of political leadership, the need grew dramatically for *authentic leadership*, exercised on firm, transparent and ethical grounds. This was especially apparent in countries in which populist leaders were supporting their agenda by providing benefits for their followers at the expense of others. Flawed governmental and international strategies often failed to provide protection and guidance to the public, so people searched for such protection elsewhere, often in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or trust-based organisations and networks, which are motivated and interconnected differently from public or private entities. Government authority has been seriously undermined in countries in which authoritarian leaders use state power to weaken institutional frameworks, silence medical experts and spread conspiracy theories. Providing leadership during the pandemic – an unfolding, unpredictable phenomenon – required nuanced orientation, ability to resist the temptation to embrace the immediate or obvious interpretation of the situation and the framing of the pandemic in a way that allowed followers to bear the lack of cognitive closure. Consequently, the question of values became essential during the pandemic, as many people are inclined to search for immediate, oversimplified or simply untrue answers in moments of desperation and the necessity of facing the unknown.

The uniqueness of human experiences during the pandemic motivated some to action and community building and others to prioritise the necessity to preserve their life, health and material stability. In the first year of the pandemic, an estimated 81 per cent of the global workforce was affected by full or partial lockdown measures (ILO, 2020). The situation was particularly pressing for informally employed workers: in India, 90 per cent of street vendors were unable to work; in Africa, 35 million informal service sector jobs and 15 million in the manufacturing and construction sectors were vulnerable to unemployment (Jayaram et al., 2020). Informal part-time workers and a wide group of entrepreneurs in well-developed countries found themselves beyond the reach of institutional help. Work from home proved to be a privilege that was not accessible to everyone. Activism shifted its expression from street demonstrations to the daily lives of citizens, thereby mobilising their leadership potential and resulting in strikes and active protests (Evelyn, 2020; Sainato, 2020). People in self-organised communities are self-reliant, use collective learning to determine effective solutions and are more adaptive

and responsive to unwelcome challenges. In an effort to define authentic leadership, William L. Gardner et al. (2005) wrote: “With today’s pressures to promote style over substance, dress for success, embrace flavor-of-the-month fads and fashions, and compromise one’s values to satisfy Wall Street’s unquenchable thirst for quarterly profits, the challenge of knowing, showing, and remaining true to one’s real self at work has never been greater” (2005: 343). The connection that people have with their authentic self is fragile, especially when not nurtured carefully in the midst of the expectations and dynamics of the “business as usual” framework. A “sink-or-swim moment” serves as a reminder for both leaders and followers that ethical and instrumental components in leadership need to be kept in balance.

Two contradictory phenomena, interconnectedness and exclusion, can be evoked as defining frames of the Covid-19 crisis. The need for **shared leadership** increased rapidly when interpersonal contact, travel, and social activities were restricted. In many social systems – businesses, education, and health – NGOs, people and organisations began working together in new ways, unlocking new capacity for collaboration and innovation. During distance working and distance learning, the roles of established leaders and followers shifted, releasing the potential for building new kinds of social relations. After the initial phase of uncertainty and transformational chaos, the public benefited from a greater degree of agility than was possible in institutions clinging to an outdated and inflexible hierarchical leadership paradigm. Lockdown periods have been commonly depicted as society being frozen in time and associated with TV images of oddly empty streets, suggesting that all people are hiding in the bunkers waiting for the coronavirus infection curve to bend. This media framing has been highly misleading; thriving innovations have emerged to address the new circumstances of lockdown. Kouzes and Posner (2012) describe proactivity as “a leadership commitment to challenging the process”, and examples of this attitude range from initiatives at the very heights of global politics to the mobilisation of individuals at the bottom. The pandemic has spurred the creation of innovative emergency responses, initiatives and partnerships. Often, the first people on the scene within communities most affected by the outbreak were representatives of informal networks and groups of people connected by social ties, including community organisations, faith groups and clubs. The crisis confirmed the impact of these types of informal leaders, who bridged systemic gaps left by existing institutions. For example, in Detroit, low-income residents have limited access to transportation and its costs may account for 30 per cent of net income for the poorest 20 per cent of households. A network of social favours and informal car sharing was established to help people get to job interviews, to schools, or buy food. In neighbourhoods such as Washington Heights in New York City, the Dollar Van network, a shared-mobility solution, helped people cope with insufficient public transit, with a higher ridership than that of some private mobility providers (WEF, 2020). #NeighbourhoodChallenge, popularised in Austria and later expanded into Germany, symbolises a plethora of self-organised

purchasing and helping initiatives for high-risk groups and the homeless; activists sew masks and hospital gowns and read, sing, and entertain online for children and elders in quarantine (Spear et al., 2020).

Leaders' necessity to act according to unique scripts, which resulted in vibrant solidarity networks and social innovation, was rarely recognised in the domain of political leadership during the pandemic crisis. While the efforts of leaders have been transformative in many industries, signs of shared leadership have seemingly failed to reach politics, where the leader/follower binary model of leadership proved to be incredibly persistent. Those in positions of power have been disinclined to delegate authority to innovate or transform their images during the deep political crisis of the pandemic. Moreover, shared leadership has not become commonplace, despite the systemic conditions that favour cooperation and shared responsibilities. In most democracies, governance takes place in a distributional power setting: political leaders and institutions share power; central government shares power with supranational and subnational governments; and the state shares power with societal groups and private corporations. However, the Covid-19 crisis failed to trigger such impulses, which reduce tensions between power centres. On the contrary, in many cases it provoked concentration rather than proliferation of power; leaders encouraged a "rally round the flag" reaction from the public to mitigate the signs of outrage that were emerging in response to the mismanagement of the pandemic (Yam et al., 2020). State leaders, busy with their local crisis management tasks, often withdrew from planning and executing international strategies, thus deepening the global leadership gap. Instead, state leaders were oriented towards maximising their political influence. For some, the path to reaching this goal led through protection of the public good and bold efforts to halt the pandemic, while others managed the immediate shock of the crisis at the expense of long-term viability of societies. Every country followed its own path, outlined by its leaders, ignoring the obvious global dimension of the pandemic. Instead of having a coherent form of transnational or global strategy, the pandemic has been characterised by post-globalisation, reflected in the nationalising of supplies, the closing of national borders, and in many cases, the isolating of states from the rest of the world.

Another vital aspect of political leaders' performance and shifts in building leadership relations is the increased importance of *expert leadership*. The framework of the pandemic has made scientific knowledge a strategic source of power and platform for decision making (Christensen, 2020; Lavezzolo et al., 2020). Experts in many fields – virologists, immunologists, epidemiologists, public health researchers, clinicians and many others – increased their effort to pool knowledge and provide a coherent interpretation of the events of the pandemic. Epidemiological data have also become an object of denial, especially in cases of populist governments, whose image may be threatened by the gravity of the pandemic:

PRR (populist radical right) politicians (...) sometimes went so far as to deny the existence of the pandemic, and insofar as they had a response it was to find someone to blame for the crisis, whether it be the European Union (EU), the World Health Organization (WHO) or migrants.

(Falkenbach and Greer, 2020)

The cognitive aspect of leadership is crucial when facing challenges of radical uncertainty, as it is the leader who frames the situation, gives danger its name and provides a rationale for behavioural adaptation. The cognitive orientations of particular leaders also play a role: How do they think? How do they perceive, process and apply information to build solutions?

In experts we trust

The role of public health experts, physicians and scientists increased as they provided a rationale for mitigation strategies and credibility for pandemic policies. Suddenly, epidemiologists became heroes of mass imagination and icons of the common struggle. In America, Anthony Fauci, a top infectious disease specialist and White House adviser, received many commendations from leaders and gained iconic status as a symbol of reason and champion of science over superstition. His leadership role was mythologised in the form of pop culture artefacts and productions – from the top Hollywood stars portraying doctors in an evening show to a video game called “Fauci’s Revenge” with lasers shooting out of his eyes to help defeat the virus. In addition, T-shirts with the slogan “In Fauci We Trust” and coffee mugs with the line “Keep calm and wash your hands” have become popular items of the day. Virologists worldwide became new celebrities during the Covid-19 crisis. In Sweden, the image of the state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell became the public face of the pandemic response, although his experimental approach assumed herd immunity had already arrived. “All power to Tegnell, our liberator”, t-shirts and mug slogans demanded. Popularity of top German coronavirus experts has reached levels exceeding those of the most popular political leaders. Virologist Christian Drosten has become a household name, as was Lothar Wieler, who was in charge of the Robert Koch Institute, which advises the German government. Spanish social media have been awash with montages of the image and memes of the memorable moments of Dr Fernando Simón, the nation’s health emergency chief. Some scientists have become *de facto* leaders for large swaths of the population during the crisis because their credibility and ethics have been perceived as higher than those of politicians. Hence, trust has become key in crisis communication and relationship building. As Keith Grint said,

Few people like to hear bad news, especially from their leaders in bad times, when we all seek solace and comfort. However, telling people good news is easy, even (or especially) if it is not true; while telling people things they need to hear that they would rather not, is much more difficult, and therefore a more important test of leadership.

(2020)

Before politicians, governors, school heads and health ministers initiated adequate policy actions, they needed to make sense of new events in the pandemic. Political leaders have been faced with hard choices while defining and explaining situations that have not only been without precedent but are also constantly transforming. In particular, at the beginning of 2020, narratives and diagnoses quickly became outdated as new circumstances enforced shifts. The majority of decision makers were slow to absorb the scale of risks and prioritise public health. Strategies for denying, ignoring and underestimating the threat of the virus reflected the political interests of power circles. In many cases, the leadership crisis accompanying the pandemic was connected to underestimation of knowledge, and the data and expert consultants used by disoriented or manipulative political leaders. As Tourish (2020) explains, “an environment of radical uncertainty means that leaders have less information, expertise, and resources to guide them than is often assumed”. Conversely, successful leadership strategies centralise scientific knowledge in the political measures taken to prevent and react to pandemic outbreaks, manifesting expert leadership in the process. When the severity of the pandemic dramatically revealed itself, the prerequisite of “expert knowledge” for advanced planning and preparation as well as central design and strategy may have seemed self-evident. However, in many cases the shift from “business as usual” to extraordinary measures took too long, aggravating public risk. Over time, there has been an increase in the public impression that misperceptions of the virus of some political or business leaders contributed to both the spread of the virus and mass fatalities, which could have been avoided had these leaders followed the advice of scientists (see, for example, Calvert et al., 2020; Gray and MacAskill, 2020; Telford and Kindy, 2020). Politicians in all countries used experts and crucial social agents for crisis management. However, in some cases, politicians’ diagnoses contributed to the solution, whereas in others, they contributed to the problem. Experts were needed both for justifying inaction, or as a counterbalance for common denialism, conspiracy theories and the Covid-19 “infodemic” on social media (Tham and Lu, 2020). In some states, the value of political decision making informed by scientific evidence has become even more evident as one examines the consequences of downplaying the risks. For example, the US intelligence services and scientific community warned of the virus several months before a “national emergency” was declared.

International order in the time of Covid-19. Worlds apart

Since the first decade of the 21st century, the global system has been increasingly immersed in a form of “interregnum” expressed as a general crisis of leadership and decline in governability. The pandemic that started in 2020 has marked another deep change in the international order and has contributed to shifts at all levels of governing hierarchies, transforming the structures as well as the behaviours of the actors within them. Covid-19 emerged during a weakening of institutional regional and global governance frameworks (Ferguson et al., 2017; Ikenberry, 2018; Glaser, 2019); a major crisis within the Eurozone precipitated by Brexit, crisis participation in the UN and the ICC, and the reluctance of developing nations to join western governance bodies. These signs of erosion of the international system have only been amplified by the magnitude and depth of disruption due to the pandemic, which caused further disintegration of the liberal model in which international institutions respond in times of crisis. Organisations from the WHO to the Group of Seven (G7) were often incapable of effective decision making and the adoption of responsive measures.

The United Nations Security Council could not agree on a Covid-19 resolution, as the US and China could not concur. Furthermore, the Group of Twenty (G20) and the G7 have been unable to reach even basic decisions on global economic recovery; the G7 was incapable of even issuing a final statement, as the US wanted to “coin” Covid-19 as a “Chinese virus”. Instead of real efforts to build cooperation, we have been witnessing an endless blame game. Recently, the UN Security Council and WTO were under attack. Presently, the WHO is the target, exactly when the world needs it like never before.

(Likhotal, 2020)

Far from producing greater collaboration during adversity, Covid-19 has exacerbated global rivalries, exposing tensions that existed long before the pandemic. Both response strategies and action or inaction within the global governance framework were used for political gains.

Covid-19 occurred during the expansion of global health governance, which did not, however, result in expanded crisis management capabilities. The importance of global health governance has been widely recognised in the 21st century, and this recognition has manifested itself in a vast array of new international health actors, multi-sectoral initiatives, development assistance for health (DAH), private foundations and private–public partnerships that enriched the field. Nevertheless, despite the need for coordinated global cooperation to prevent pandemics expressed in the UN Social Development Goals (SDGs) and other high-ranked declarations, global health governance has long been exposed to growing fragmentation. Policy gridlocks have also

seriously hampered effective performance, suggesting that the rise of a far more expansive ecosystem does not mean decisive global health leadership.

Traditionally, the WHO has been viewed as a global authority, best equipped for the task of coordinating global health crises; however, the WHO has only fulfilled this role during regional epidemics – swine flu, acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), or Ebola. As Covid-19 swept across continents, it became apparent that while unilateral response to a global crisis would inevitably be inadequate, the range of possible systemic reactions is also limited. The rule of global solidarity, initially declared a necessity of the universal pandemic response, was soon weakened. Real or perceived trade-offs between domestic health threats and support for weaker countries now dominate the logic of national decision-making systems. As a result, the overall Covid-19 response, instead of profiting from growing networks and innovative institutional and functional platforms within the area of global health governance, has revealed the fundamental flaws of the international health governance system. The WHO, the only forum designed to coordinate the pandemic response on a global level, is only as strong as the mandate of its members. States, especially those with resources that could be mobilised, opted for nationalistic strategies, as the nature of the crisis has been of primary importance to human functioning and well-being. In effect, every decision in the matter has been seen as bearing high political risk and analysed as a zero-sum game. Lack of trust reached its peak with the US decision in 2020 to withdraw from WHO, ceasing the organisation's position as structural leader of the pandemic response.

Recent nationalism has impeded international cooperation in designing systemic responses to pandemic-related matters, which has also been highlighted in strategies regarding vaccines. Development of an effective preventive vaccine has been a key concern since the beginning of the pandemic. Ethical guidelines of several international bodies indicate that once developed, Covid-19 vaccines should be treated as global public goods, made equitably available in all countries. As are all other crucial medical technologies, vaccines are, in fact, rivalrous and excludable, but they have been catalogued as strategic assets responsible for universal well-being and stability. In other words, while ill-fitting into the economic definition of a public good, vaccines are considered global public goods in a normative more than a literal sense (WHA, 2020). UNAIDS had made a strong call for a “People’s vaccine” against Covid-19 that would be available to everyone, in all countries, free of charge (Soucat, 2019). Although world leaders, including China’s President Xi, Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, France’s President Macron and the EC, confirmed this position towards the vaccine, actual distribution has been organised according to national interests. “Herd immunity” has been perceived as a way to fully restore economic and social activity or the end of the period of painful political compromises connected to lockdowns and other severe protective measures. High stakes in the game fuelled fierce competition, and the resulting model of vaccine distribution erased the idea of

global solidarity, replacing it with “vaccinationalism”. Global health governance bodies realised the dangers related to vaccine distribution; even before any of the vaccines had been officially registered and released, the WHO established a fair allocation framework for the equitable availability of vaccines and treatments across all countries. The COVAX distribution mechanism, which was established to share vaccine doses with poorer countries, has been hailed as a groundbreaking global collaboration to accelerate the development, production and equitable access to Covid-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines (Gavi, 2020). With 190 countries engaged in conversations to join COVAX, normative foundations for global collaboration in vaccine distribution have been widely accepted. However, the wealthiest countries made direct deals with pharmaceutical companies while also participating in multi-lateral platforms. Consequently, at the early stage of distribution, more than 82 per cent of doses were acquired by wealthy countries and fewer than 1 per cent were sent to low-income countries (Murthi, 2021). The USA pre-ordered enough vaccine doses to vaccinate twice the size of its population, the UK four times its population and Canada enough for five times its population. China, Russia and India secured early contracts with domestic vaccine industries. In the middle of 2021, Europe and North America administered 84 and 82 doses per 100 people respectively, while South America administered 59 doses, Asia 54; across Africa, the rate was fewer than 5 doses for every 100 people (Murthi, 2021).

Global vaccine policies have demonstrated how the pandemic crisis has exacerbated power-based rivalries: finite global manufacturing capacity, in which low-income states cannot compete, have collided with wealth disparities and self-interest. Western countries, which paid higher prices per vaccine dose than COVAX was able to pay, were also in a position to offer legal concessions and at times were imposing export restrictions. Ultimately, these wealthy countries bought up the inventories of pharmaceutical companies before they could be accessed by low-income and middle-income countries (Fidler, 2010). The actual agreements of governments with big pharma were confidential, so the behaviours of states were not transparent; however, the fragmented information available confirms that states were in a race for the vaccine. Media releases speculated about the US government’s attempts to acquire a German vaccine developer in March 2020, a communique from French firm Sanofi indicated that first dibs on its vaccines would go to the US market, and tensions surrounding preferences in the UK for purchasing Astra-Zeneca vaccines revealed a non-cooperative approach by these governments (Dyer, 2020). In effect, the ability to contain the pandemic has been limited to wealthy and powerful states, those that either were in power to negotiate supplies in the early stage of vaccine distribution or were able to develop the vaccine themselves, such as Russia. Competitive instincts indulged by western states further undermined the public health resilience of low-income countries that faced shortages of malaria drugs, which were secured on the global markets for Covid-19 clinical trials. Estimates from the WHO indicate that

disruption in the supply of malaria drugs might have affected 769,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa as a result, double the number estimated given the normal drug supplies (WHO, 2020b).

The Covid-19 public health threat was considered existential for every government, and unsurprisingly, it triggered nationalistic first reactions. Nevertheless, the failure of vaccine multilateralism, despite agreed institutional foundations, was neither rational nor effective. At first, COVAX was heralded as the global procurement platform that would soon be reduced to an aid project for poor countries. EU states not only questioned the leadership on the matter but also made the rulebook of vaccine politics less transparent. Canada, being the first G7 country to use the COVAX procurement system in February 2021, has been accused of “vaccine pirating”, even though the purchase was legitimate (Usher, 2021). Most nations failed to see vaccination as a fundamentally global issue, ignoring experts’ recommendations and providing their populations with an illusion of safety, which could not be truly obtained unilaterally – the population of a single nation cannot be protected when others are unprotected. Inequitable distribution of vaccines contributed to prolonged spreading of the virus, which in effect extended the pandemic, further depressing global trade and allowing the virus to evolve, potentially increasing its virulence or resistance to vaccine variants.

Global strategies to combat the Covid-19 pandemic not only demonstrated a lack of leadership regarding the vision for global distribution of public goods but also fundamentally undermined trust between political actors. The line of division ran between the Global North and Global South, between those in power and those left behind. Yanzhong Huang summarised the situation in 2021: “The results of this vaccine apartheid are now apparent: as of 25 January none of the 68.1 million vaccine doses administered globally had been provided in low- or low to middle-income countries” (2021). The WHO director-general summarised the situation by stating that “the rapid development of Covid-19 vaccines is a triumph of science, but their inequitable distribution is a failure of humanity” (UN, 2021).

Leadership and responsibility

A sense of responsibility has always been an important characteristic of “good leadership” and “good politicians”, assuming instrumentally rational and morally justified actions guided by perception of the common good. A crisis is often valued as a leadership test because it forces leaders to embrace the anger of the masses, their responsibility for failure and the necessity to tell the unwanted truth. Providing solutions at the time of Covid-19 has inevitably confronted leaders with contested social values, as interpretations of the situation had been based on multiple arguments that are equally valid, often clashing, and which cannot be tested or proved to be correct. The nature of the pandemic crisis

requires responsibility to be at the centre of responsive strategies; however, the political reality in the biggest states have been policies based on paranoid, hubristic and impulsive decision making.

Although the essence of the Covid-19 health crisis is the spread of the virus, its political dimensions have often included the spread of disinformation, false narratives, blame games and other signs of irresponsibility. Leaders have engaged in acts of selfish, destructive and outright “toxic leadership” acts (Padilla et al., 2007), fuelling existing uncertainty and spreading chaos. At the earliest phase of the pandemic, China embraced a disinformation policy, hiding the source of infection and refusing to share the necessary information and access with WHO officials. Chinese experts, including the Wuhan doctor who was summoned and admonished by the local police for spreading rumours, were prosecuted for trying to warn of the danger before the government formally acknowledged the virus. US and Chinese leaders vigorously participated in a blame game concerning the origins of and responsibility for the pandemic. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Zhao Lijian started a Twitter post claiming that the US military was responsible for releasing the virus. The primary points of reference in this public debate were China’s prestige and the US president’s image. Donald Trump, US President, embraced the strategy of disinformation and denigration of science to cover his administration’s failure in fighting the crisis. He took the stance of ignoring the threat, labelling it as a hoax created by the opposite party or just flu, and recommended the ingestion of cleaning detergents to kill the virus or untested drugs he deemed to be effective (Bailey et al., 2020; Devakumar et al., 2020). Just as the American president had done, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, in the initial period of the pandemic, ignored the gravity of the situation and his own advice about social distancing and wearing face masks. The UK’s pandemic leadership response has been severely questioned and described as the most disastrous science policy failure for decades. Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, often referred to as the “Trump of the Tropics” described Covid-19 as a “small flu”, deliberately flouted social distancing rules and remained indifferent to the increasing death toll. These examples reflect multiple leaders’ errors, from incompetence and opportunism to downright dishonesty and bad will, which in turn undermined public trust and delayed adaptation to the virus. Presidents and prime ministers have failed to frame the situation as a serious one that demanded the public’s attention and involved uncertainty. For instrumental reasons, their words, symbols and behaviours have conveyed false messages, which made it difficult for the public to make sense of the situation and embrace optimal individual strategies. As a result, Covid-19 has revealed that leaders’ ability

to assume responsibility was not the primary factor in their selection as leaders. The USA, Brazil, India, Great Britain, and many other societies with elected leaders paid a high price for compromising the selection criteria of their representatives. Once in office, they grew obsessed with drama and self-promotion rather than addressing realities, and were oriented towards creating alternative worlds where they could “seek the appearance and brightness of power instead of real power” (Weber, 1919: 61).

The problem of vaccine distribution reveals how the obvious tension between cooperative public health strategies and competitive geopolitical imperatives played out in the race to develop and secure access to crucial health technologies. As a result, the whole system of global health governance has turned out to be too fractured for an effective global pandemic response. These fractures have led to divergent Covid-19 responses, with the US adopting an isolationist posture, China shoring up its alliances and expanding its influence and the EU vigorously defending the multilateral system, at least theoretically. While the pandemic policies of each state in the world contributed to the overall balance of regional stability, the approach of these three actors, the US, China and the EU, were particularly important to the transformation of international order.

USA

For more than a century, the USA has been viewed as an example of a successful nation, able to overcome obstacles and downturns – “an indispensable nation” for the world’s stability and prosperity. The pandemic added to the long list of signs of weakening American primacy. For the first time, the USA entirely abandoned the position of leader in a major international crisis, and despite its economic and technological primacy, failed to keep the pandemic under control. The combination of the seriousness of the challenge and the lack of a comprehensive strategy has compromised America’s ability to secure the health of its citizens, eclipsed America’s economy and undermined trust in its political system. The effect of the pandemic is similar to that of two other events that have weakened the power of the western world during the first two decades of the 21st century – the 9/11 attacks and the global financial crisis. The challenge of the pandemic has been fought against the backdrop of the rise of populism, which signalled a general crisis of the western political project. As a result, the relative power of the USA has decreased, undermining not only the position of this state in the global system but also the system as a whole. The US approach to the pandemic in 2019–20 has generally been characterised by denial, use of the pandemic to fuel its conflict with China and the manifestation of “America First” strategies, which failed

to address the country's infection rate, the world's highest. "The American response to the Covid-19 pandemic reinforced doubts about American competence. That the novel coronavirus would reach American shores was inevitable ... What was not inevitable was that the disease would take the toll it did" (Haass, 2020).

Internally, President Donald Trump downplayed the severity of the coronavirus threat, even when the USA had become the epicentre of the pandemic. Internationally, the Trump administration not only refused to take a leadership role but also undermined multilateral coordination efforts. In 2020, the US administration froze all US funding for the WHO, putting its finances in peril at a time when the organisation was most needed. The US president accused the organisation of being biased towards the Chinese government. Trump's administration also blocked the G7 foreign ministers' statement on the coronavirus crisis and a declaration by the UN Security Council by insisting on labelling the virus the "Wuhan virus". Similarly, the administration refused to join COVAX and imposed export bans on Covid-19 vaccines and essential vaccine components. The US unilateral strategy for vaccine development was initiated through Operation Warp Speed, a partnership between the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the US Department of Defense (DoD), private firms and other federal agencies. Two Covid-19 vaccines were launched in January 2021 and made available to the general public in March 2021. The pandemic crisis revealed the nature of the interconnectedness and dimensions of geopolitical power shifts in areas usually hidden from the public eye, such as the US dependency on China for key pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment (PPE). As China's official news agency claimed in 2020, "If China announces that its drugs are for domestic use and bans exports, the United States will fall in the hell of a new coronavirus epidemic" (cited in Fox and Scott, 2020: 178).

The US government's approach towards pandemic management changed dramatically after the election of 2020, when a new Democratic administration took office in Washington. President Joe Biden rejoined COVAX and became its single largest donor. The strategy of denialism of the previous administration has been replaced with the escape-forward strategy, which is based on expansion of the vaccination programme, investment in health infrastructure and acceleration of the transfer of science into practice. However, efforts have been mainly inwardly oriented, without wider consideration of global issues. While the new American administration embraced responsible, science-based strategies in fighting the pandemic, things had failed to return to their normal before the pandemic. The crisis was a stress test of global leadership that the USA failed, and this failure leaves a long-term legacy of distrust and disorientation. There are serious questions as to whether America can ever again have the influence it once enjoyed. "Once burned, many nations will be twice shy and afraid of following American leadership. Even if the next American president chants the old mantras, everyone now knows that his successors might not" (Appelbaum, 2020).

EU

Although the EU has been pushed to endorse a more geopolitical strategy (i.e. “Team Europe”) than it has in the past, the leadership role of the EU during the Covid-19 global crisis has nevertheless been undertaken with reluctance. The pandemic occurred amid Brexit implementation, the moment when, due to rising populism and tensions, the coherence of the European project had been tarnished and at the peak of serious transatlantic drift. Moreover, the pandemic brought a major public health challenge and raised questions regarding the ability of the European community to effectively contribute to global problem solving. The EU’s first response gave the impression of a lack of coordination and vision. Crisis management, under the condition of high uncertainty, has been difficult for all national governments in the world, but even more complex for the EU as a supranational authority, which holds only a limited mandate to interfere with the internal affairs of member states. The pandemic has exposed chronic contradictions between European values and the increasing nationalisation of members’ interests. Although health is not an EU competence, it is clear that public opinion across Europe expects active engagement of European structures in addressing the pandemic. However, it took the EU nearly two months after the first case of Covid-19 in Europe to propose measures to limit the outbreak. All the nation states profiled their pandemic response individually; responses were uncoordinated and lacked a common understanding of the emergency. Seventeen member states suspended freedom of movement and reintroduced internal border controls. The initial phase of the response was overshadowed by unanswered calls from Italy, which was hit exceptionally hard by the first wave of the pandemic. After the initial decline in trust between countries and inconsistent governance, the EU began reacting swiftly by using tools at its disposal to respond to the existing crisis. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), a dedicated agency established in 2005 to strengthen Europe’s response capability, took control of epidemiological surveillance, detection and risk assessment of threats. The agency is also in charge of the early warning and response system (EWRS), which connects public health agencies across Europe to facilitate the sharing of surveillance data. EWRS has gradually become a major platform of information for member states. The Civil Protection Mechanism was also used to mobilise crisis resources across Europe to help organise the return of citizens who were abroad. The Council Secretariat-General’s Integrated Political Crisis Response (ICPR) platform enabled diplomatic consultations, information sharing and coordination in agreement with potential responses. However, none of these cooperative frameworks has been designed to manage such a widespread crisis, one which is required to simultaneously address the needs of all member states. Thus, although many pre-existing tools were used and developed during the pandemic, the major health crisis of the pandemic suggested that the EU only had capacity for reactive and fragmented management. The EC decided

to use the Solidarity Fund to buy protective equipment, “green lanes” were established to allow essential workers and patients to move around Europe despite the suspension of Schengen and major efforts were directed towards vaccine research. Furthermore, significant investment was made to mitigate the devastating effects of the pandemic on the economy. Additionally, the EU struggled with disinformation and continued an ongoing debate on European identity.

While grave crises often serve as a unifying force in national contexts, the EU as a political body experienced the opposite scenario, as member states denied even elementary forms of solidarity while implementing export bans for critical medical equipment in the spring of 2020. The lack of coordination provoked competition and accusations of interference and piracy behaviour (Aubrecht et al., 2020). As the situation progressed and governments realised that a long-term perspective on the crisis was required, they started to embrace some cooperative strategies. For example, when health systems were overwhelmed, patients were moved over the French border to hospitals in Germany and medical equipment was sent abroad to support nations that were most in need (Loss and Puglierin, 2020). The crisis has cast a new light on the ability of the EU to confront global challenges and resulted in an ambitious reform project “to build the world we want to live in”, worth nearly €800 billion (von der Leyen, 2020).

An external response to the pandemic has been announced as a “Team Europe” strategy, and it includes a combined financial package, support for global preparedness and the promotion of global coordination and multilateralism. The EU’s willingness to step up on issues of global health governance has been especially strong in response to the US withdrawal from the WHO. However, promotion of the need for coordination and a sense of common purpose has produced inconsistent results. The EU served as an early sponsor and promoter of the COVAX-based vaccine-procurement mechanism. The financial pledges from the EU to Gavi COVAX were sustained and supported by the policy of vaccine multilateralism – the decision to export over half of the vaccines produced in the Communities territory by mid-2021 (Borrel, 2021). The EU’s response to the crisis was widely viewed as weakening the image of the community from the perception of European society. The public sees the European Directorate (sic) for Health and Food Safety and the European Medicine Agency and wonders why they do not act, given they have the necessary tools and money. The answer is that just as Europol is not an actual police force, these European health administrations do not have any real powers to act. They are largely – you get it – “coordinating” bodies; they assemble information and data from all over Europe and transmit the information between member states, and the most they can do is issue recommendations (Verhofstadt, 2020). Conversely, the EU’s global regulatory power and influence in the world seem to be enhanced, as the pandemic revealed long-nurtured values of cooperation and synergy for the benefit of the entire international system (Bradford, 2020).

China

While the image of the western world has weakened due to the pandemic, similar repercussions have not touched China, the state where the pandemic started. According to some, the general image of China has been reinforced due to effective preventive measures and a general perception of having handled the pandemic well. As the first country struck by Covid-19, China initiated its response under the condition of uncertainty and undertook some frantic measures, but within a relatively short time, the country was able to effectively manage the spread of the disease. The initial lockdown in Wuhan, the Chinese province where the infection began, lasted for 72 days. In March 2020, 16 temporary treatment centres (FangCang Yiyuan) with over 10,000 beds were closed after treating over 13,000 patients (Chen et al., 2020).

While the notion of success in the fight against the pandemic has been widely used as a soft power tool in promoting Chinese global leadership, assessment of the situation is difficult due to the government's systematic suppression of reliable information regarding Covid-19. What is known is that drastic measures and violation of the rights of affected regions were interpreted as a determination to protect the rest of the population from a disaster; in this view, political leaders demonstrated their ability to accept responsibility for sacrificing the rights of the few for the sake of the nation. At the ideological level, China's pandemic approach actively called for more than citizens' participation; it assumed that individuals would be ready for heroic sacrifices, which is the concept Zhang (2020) called "disaster nationalism". State media also celebrated the contribution of ordinary citizens more than usual, indicating a more human-centred and participatory approach. Zhang notes the *People's Daily* hashtag, "Thank You, Every Ordinary Chinese Citizen" (Zhang, 2020). International commentaries of China's pandemic strategy oscillated with regard to the country's human rights policies, transparency and technical instruments of containment. Some suggest that drastic measures were undertaken to implement the "zero-Covid policies", which led to a dramatic drop in the number of confirmed cases within just weeks of the beginning of the coronavirus crisis. Aggressive quarantine, severe travel restrictions and mass contact tracing were introduced at the human cost of censorship. The Chinese government perceives transparency as a threat, and this perspective guided information policies concerning Covid-19 – from barring WHO experts investigating the outbreak from entering China, through the punishment of whistle blower doctors including Li Wenliang and journalists such as Zhang Zhan, who revealed drastic lockdown measures, to the surveillance and harassment of virus victims' families. In the account from Human Rights Watch (HRW), winning the coronavirus war in China was "conditioned on silencing its critics" (HRW, 2020). The nature of pandemic procurement justifies the use of surveillance to monitor citizens' activities. While use of ICT and the quick response (QR) health code (Ma, 2020) is common in Asian countries and often seen as an example of social

innovation, their use increased the risk of combining public health considerations with further restrictions in the case of China. Conversely, effective handling of the crisis provided China with the opportunity to highlight its role in stabilising international order and expanding its presence in the world. The Chinese government was quick to fill the gap created by the United States with regard to WHO funding. China is one of the WHO's largest contributors and a leading donor to the WHO's Covid-19 response. The flagship Chinese foreign expansion project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been used to provide medical equipment, supplies and treatment to partner countries. As its official strategy confirms: "China considers it a mission to contribute more to humanity. Its wishes are to offer more public goods to the international community and join forces with other countries to build a better common future" (China's International Development Cooperation in the China's State Council Information Office, 2021). Yet, while Chinese humanitarian strategies support nations in need, they are also oriented towards technological and economic infiltration, which risks the danger of strengthening authoritarian regimes and non-democratic tendencies.

For a good number of countries – in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Middle East, and even eastern and southern Europe – the Covid-19 experience validates a more aggressive approach to technology and governance. China already has a foothold in some of these countries, providing automated tools for internal security, such as facial recognition, drones, and AI. These tools can spread further in the name of public health.

(Fox and Scott, 2020: 180)

The power of *techné*

The fundamental sense and purpose of leadership relations is to influence, guide and model the behaviours of others. Effective guidance and citizens' compliance were especially important for maintaining safety measures during the pandemic. However, the desired result has been obtained not only through appeals to the followers' sense of responsibility, but also with the help of tracking technologies. The widespread use of technology and communication systems for monitoring behaviours during the pandemic has important implications for how leadership will be understood and exercised in the future. One of the innovative outcomes of the pandemic is the application of big data analysis to ensure effective social control (Ma, 2020). Several nations have integrated digital technology into government-coordinated containment and mitigation processes that include surveillance, testing, contact tracing and strict quarantine. QR health codes have served as Covid-19 health status certificates and travel passes, with colour codes indicating

behavioural patterns of people in their pandemic struggles. Some countries have introduced technology as a supportive tool for containment, but for others, the Covid-19 crisis has provided opportunities for the mass testing of social management solutions. Chinese authorities have long been effective in monitoring, shaping and containing the online behaviour of society. The concept of social governance (*shehui zhili*) is considered one of the principles of the state-society relationship in China. Social stability and regime security are seen as relying upon the state's competency and capacity to monitor and censor, capabilities that are secured and expanded upon through China's layered system of surveillance. The most direct exemplification of the merger of technology and state power in China is the Social Credit System (SCS) – otherwise referred to as the Social Trust System, which was created to secure compliance of firms and organisations. During the pandemic, the system was used to distribute financial aid to struggling businesses and to restrain individuals found to be non-compliant with pandemic regulations. The pandemic experiment has also helped monitor and control citizens' offline behaviour. China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology merged geospatial tracking data from China Telecom, China Unicom and China Mobile to track and monitor population movements (Lu, 2020). Consequently, AI-powered surveillance cameras, drone-borne cameras and portable digital recorders are used to prevent public gatherings. Health codes make algorithmic decisions about who may have been exposed to infection and should therefore quarantine at home (Pan, 2020). Surveillance technology has enabled control of the spread of Covid-19 and provided citizens with timely government services during the worst throes of the pandemic. Although China might have used technology for pandemic control purposes on a large scale, similar experiments have been introduced in most other countries, and they seem to be the most effective in Asia. South Korea has managed to maintain one of the lowest per-capita Covid-19 mortality rates in the world thanks to mass technology use. It has implemented tools for aggressive contact tracing through security camera footage, facial recognition technology, bank card records and global positioning system (GPS) data from vehicles and mobile phones to provide real-time data and detailed timelines of people's travel. Singapore, which also scored an impressively low per-capita Covid-19 mortality rate, has also made technology critical to its response. One of the essential solutions is the Bluetooth-based, open-source TraceTogether application and token that exchanges short-distance Bluetooth signals when individuals are in close proximity to each other. The storage of these data enabled the identification of contacts of every individual diagnosed with Covid-19. Efficiency of technological tools is highly dependent on the level

of social discipline, early introduction, and high rate of adaptation to technology use. Common usage is required to reach a satisfactory level of effectiveness, so states able to impose mandatory use of control apps or those with a high level of social trust gained the most information from such tracking systems.

Technology plays a pivotal role in reshaping crisis-response strategies. It is essential in the security domain, and the role of technology has grown in terms of market trends, public health and social services. The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the pace of digital transformation and marked the historic deployment of remote work and digital access to services across health, education and other domains. Thus, the role of technology is increasing within the leadership domain. While states and organisations keen on innovation have long been called “technological leaders”, technology has played an increased role in shaping leadership processes in many dimensions of political life. Advances in analytics and artificial intelligence have allowed the development of leader–follower relationships that are technology-mediated, and the effectiveness of these processes is becoming increasingly technology-dependent. Sophisticated systems can facilitate cognitive and physical operations. The political leadership domain has already absorbed this transformation, so dilemmas concerning the ethical use of technologies within the social sphere are becoming part of the leader’s reality and a growing factor in their effectiveness.

Followers and leaders in a time of pandemic: Turning the tables

Every leadership process takes a dialectical form of the relationship between the leader and the follower. In many ways, the timing of pandemics put this symbiotic relationship to the test. While leaders have always been perceived as those who coordinate their followers to produce desired actions and outcomes, followers’ behaviours are playing an important role in protecting public health during the pandemic. Ordinary people – citizens, workers and followers – have become key to the success of public health pre-emptive measures. The public’s willingness to believe in proposed solutions and their efforts to follow the constraints has been crucial, especially because imposed restrictions often drastically transformed their lives and, for many, meant long-term economic insecurity, personal loss and breakdown of the family. In many cases, citizens’ efforts have been long term, extraordinary and involved risks. During the pandemic, it has been insufficient to preserve collective stability and security. The nature of the situation requires followers’ initiative, risk-taking and responsibility – consequently, their influence has risen dramatically, regardless of their choices and preferences. Numerous followers assumed leadership roles to address the need for synergy in effectively responding to the crisis.

Essential workers, the health-care sector, scientists, teachers, psychologists and psychiatrists have made extraordinary efforts to fulfil their roles during the pandemic. Their contributions far exceeded the stereotypical picture of the follower, seen as a person doing what others want them to do. The importance of the crisis raised expectations of charismatic leaders embedded in the mass imagination as figures of the highest moral standards, able to act decisively and protect the public good. This vision clashed with the realities produced by long-term trends of the individualisation of political and social cultures that deteriorated trust in public servants, limiting the impact of authorities. The leader–follower relationship was circular rather than organised according to top-down schemes. Two influential trends shaping political realities in the western world clashed, framing the leader–follower relationship processes of the pandemic:

Factor of the anti-political age. This is characterised by the duality of roles in which politicians of democratic societies function, torn between an “authority statesman” and “a man just like us”. This “paradox of the democratic leader” (Kane and Patapan, 2012) influenced the nature of politics in the last decades of infotainment, celebrity politicians and the race for popularity, which was associated with declining trust in the entire political class and the diminishing position of politicians in the social hierarchy (Hetherington, 2005; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015; Cox and Kernell, 2019). The Weberian perception, which assumes that a leader possesses some form of divinely inspired gift, has long disappeared. The crisis revealed the inadequacy of the celebrity–politician model in some states, as public leaders deferred use of their enforcement powers and resources to protect the public, effectively denying the essence of their role as leaders. The desire for heroic, competent and morally grounded statesmen, experts and representatives has increased dramatically, but in many places, they are hard to find.

The factor of reflective society. Citizens of the western world and beyond have become economically, cognitively and politically empowered, which has generally influenced the role they play in the leader–follower dyad. For a long time, the follower was seen as a resource in the leader’s quest for power and goals and understood as a tool that would best serve leaders’ aims if guided by fear not love (Machiavelli, 1950 [1532]). However, the submissive role of the follower has been greatly reduced in the contemporary world.

Citizens, instead of being merely recipients of public goods, grew to be an integral part of the process of their provision, as users, participatory decision makers, consumers and sources of data and information. In most democracies, citizens do not wish to express their expectations but are often eager to openly criticise their government. The top-down decision-making approach, once the standard in politics, has shown its ineffectiveness in many areas (Carpini et. al., 2004) but has not been replaced by permanent participatory

arrangements. Such a political culture may not work in the long term, as often repressive pandemic measures must be taken to protect public health.

Slowing viral transmission of the Covid-19 virus has required significant shifts in behaviour, yet the uncertainty embedded in this crisis could not guarantee that individual sacrifice would translate into increased social security, which was one of the factors underlying followers' refusal to quarantine or wear masks and their reluctance towards vaccination. Success of the mitigation strategies depended on the degree to which people and individuals were willing to accept the constraints and limitations of the extraordinary period. The level of adaptive response depends on trust and social cohesion.

As a result of these two interwoven trends described above, expectations of strong leadership were constantly clashing with the already widely shared lack of trust in democratic institutions and their abilities. In the USA, Brazil, Great Britain, and several other states, the public were mistreated in several ways. Their leaders fail to inform, coordinate and manage their expectations, creating a wave of disbelief and deepening insecurity and chaos. The pandemic also provided opportunities for governments to gravitate towards authoritarianism. Limitations on civil liberties and the weakening of democratic institutions have been justified by exceptional circumstances. As a result, the time of the pandemic in many places in the world has proven to be a period of civil strife. The atmosphere of uncertainty and common frustration, not always tamed by effective leadership, has reinforced mass anger. People reacted *en masse* to the restriction of movements, social injustice, underfunding of emergency services, precarious work conditions and structural violence revealed by circumstances of the crisis. Part of the followership spectrum was a riddle of the erratic and irrational behaviour of denialists, supporters of conspiracy theories, and radical groups. Americans marched against face masks and thousands of far-right Germans attempted to storm parliament in anger at lockdown measures demonstrating how quickly fear and conspiracy can spread in society. Citizens oppose the position of disadvantaged recipients of the decision makers' will who are deprived of a voice in policy choices. Long-term social tension has resulted in the backlash of anti-restriction protests, which are particularly strong in Canada, the USA, France, Belgium, Australia and New Zealand. The popular motive that protesters used was oppression, "medial segregation" as a result of vaccination mandates, and general "good-versus-evil posturing".

Covid-19 infodemic

Competitiveness and limitations of the pharmaceutical industry, which was unable to serve the needs of all countries simultaneously, were not the only barriers to the global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines. Despite a firm record of disease control through their use, vaccine denial, hesitancy and anti-vaccination sentiments have proven to be important

factors impeding attempts to limit the influence of the pandemic. This phenomenon is rooted in contradictory and false message exchanges that are significantly boosted by social media, leading to the sharing of fringe opinions. As a result, as the WHO director-general described, “We’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic” (WHO2, 2020b). Public opinion leaders have been part of this infodemic, undermining trust in vaccines and contributing to the spread of conspiracy theories. Even before the Covid-19 crisis, political elites took part in distributing misleading information about vaccine safety. In Italy, the Five Star Movement (5SM) raised concerns about the link between the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine and autism, while in France, the right-wing National Rally questioned mandatory childhood vaccination (Kennedy, 2019). Research has linked the exposure to tweets from Donald Trump, the first known US president to publicly express anti-vaccination attitudes, with increased concern about vaccines among his supporters (Hornsey et al., 2020). The influence of the leader can be a crucial factor in determining individual orientations towards public choices. To counterbalance the fear of vaccination, governments and international media undertook the mission of targeted messaging. It is becoming clear from research that mistrust in governments is a factor for those who are reluctant to be vaccinated. A survey of the citizens of 19 countries confirmed that people with little trust in their government were less likely than others to say that they would receive a vaccine (Lazarus, 2020). Vaccination hesitancy was also explored in terms of scientific populism, driven by similar dynamics to political populism – profound distrust of elites and experts by disenfranchised and marginalised parts of the population. Research has confirmed significant association between the percentage of people within a country who vote for populist parties and the percentage of people who believe vaccines are unimportant or ineffective (Kennedy, 2019). Anti-vaccine sentiment, which is based on false information about the effects of vaccines, has been part of numerous conspiracy theories connected to the origin and nature of the virus. Media stories linked the pandemic with the interests of pharmaceutical companies, military industries, world governments, Bill Gates and other members of the “global elite”, 5G technology and many other factors, inciting the social imagination. Covid-19 conspiracies have become a global phenomenon, illustrating a universal reaction to complexity and uncertainty. This phenomenon is also connected to citizens’ perceptions of the competence and motivation of decision makers, experts and social leaders. Restrictions on mobility and vaccination practices have been widely disputed as violating human rights and building oppressive systems of social control. These sentiments have been amplified through social networks, promoting views and behaviours potentially harmful both individually and socially.

Rage against the restrictions, open rejection of the rules, anti-lockdown demonstrations and non-compliance – the various forms of social protest manifested differences in followers' views and orientations, which provided a perspective for analysis of a crisis of authority. This context evokes leadership transition and struggles when followers fight to be heard by creating a force to counterbalance official policies and gain public acceptance of alternative strategies. This mechanism guided a massive, 5-day strike of approximately 8,000 health-care workers from Hong Kong in February 2020. In the eyes of protesters, political leaders had failed to recognise public interest and implement adequate crisis management measures. Medical professionals demanded that the government close the border to mainland visitors and that the hospital authority ensure an adequate supply of surgical masks and other protective equipment. On another continent, the killing of George Floyd by a police officer in September 2020 triggered a wave of mass protests in the USA under the auspices of the anti-racist Black Lives Matter movement. In addition, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal introduced a near-total abortion ban in 2020, which set off Poland's biggest demonstrations since the fall of communism. Political conflicts not only marked public disagreement over acts of violence or vision of society proposed by the leaders, but also signalled a desire for deeper transformation and the rebuilding of social relations that could provide greater meaning for the anxiety and suffering embedded in the prolonged situation of fear, uncertainty and necessity to adapt.

The leadership framework of the pandemic – an uncertain environment, the pressure of timely decision making and the highest stakes in human life and safety – exposed the nature of the supportive bond: leaders depend on followers and vice versa. Failed communication strategies and a lack of decisiveness resulted in a decreased sense of control. Followers were looking for alternative explanations of realities and visions upon which they could build future perspectives. Conversely, leaders perceived as responsible and public-oriented were able not only to introduce drastic policies but also generate a certain culture of trust and unity, based on which people not only were willing to shape behaviours in the desired way but incorporated norms supporting the struggle with the virus. The coercive power of restrictions and lockdowns was supported with soft power exercised through an understanding of common goals, development of the need for transformation and belief in constructive outcomes (Pierro, 2013). The pandemic was also marked by examples of collective articulation of the need for better leadership and the introduction of more effective measures. Nevertheless, for millions of sceptical citizens, the Covid-19 pandemic brought the public sphere into the private domain. A direct linkage of individual risks and perspectives with shifts in political decision making and collective behaviours made the latter an important part of the private realm. The nature of the crisis raised the level of responsibility for the social environment and widened the capacity of the civil society of private individuals to organise itself independently of any imperative from the state. The uniqueness of the pandemic and potentially high individual costs

made followers more aware of their contribution to the collective good provision. This notorious flaw in the distribution and protection of the common good described by Garrett Hardin (1968) has been practically captured by the nature of the virus – non-compliance not only contributed to destruction of the shared resource (public health), but also bore the risk of high individual costs (infection), while in the classic situation, the risk is either non-visible or even replaced with gain for an individual (Gordon, 1954).

The time of the Covid-19 pandemic, apart from its economic and public health consequences, has led to redefinition of relationships in many areas of human life – at work, within a family, between firms and public institutions. All these transformations – at times radical – impact the connection between leaders and followers that foreshadows the shift of dynamics between them at every level of the leadership process. The pandemic represents “trauma time”, a decisive moment for leader–follower relations, when disruption urges them to reconstruct reality by establishing new rules of behaviour, redefining what is desirable, and restoring normalcy to the extent possible given it has already been deeply transformed by the group experience of the pandemic.

Conclusion

Covid-19 has been a truly global experience; no society has been unaffected by the pandemic, and some of the effects were devastating. The pandemic has revealed that global health governance does not equal global leadership, and the adequacy of existing institutions is insufficient. Moreover, it has revealed important divergences between members of the international community, continuing along the traditional lines of Global North–Global South divisions and the operational domain of the power game over medical resources and vaccines. Response at the global level – within the framework of the WTO or other agencies – has not revealed new global leaders, or brought any novel solutions for how to coordinate common threats. The Covid-19 crisis documented a lack of synergy, a necessary condition for orchestrated actions that not only respond to the complexity of global realities but also transform the international system to make it more than the sum of its parts. While the need for synergy, coordinated action, cooperation and joint strategies has been widely recognised, the overall picture of behaviour during the pandemic is far from meeting these conditions; instead of working together to contain the outbreak, major powers quarrelled over who should be deemed responsible. Scientific research became subsumed by national interests, and the development and distribution of vaccines was a process that experts once hoped would offer “a global solution” (Huang, 2021). The pandemic presents both risks and opportunities, and given the historical record of institutional innovation emerging from the greatest crisis of humanity, there is a chance that a gap in global health leadership will be filled.

The principle of competition is dominant between major powers; however, their interests are insufficiently related to the stabilisation of the international system. There are powerful actors in the system, but leaders are less visible.

States operate within a power vacuum, in which no country, and no group of countries, has the leverage – either political or economic – to promote and drive an international agenda or provide global public goods. This lack of synergy, recognition of common interests and interconnected agendas, put the international environment into the scenario that Charles Kupchan called “no one’s world” (Kupchan, 2012). The pandemic crisis has revealed profound and long-standing vulnerabilities in the global system. The competitive approach of the states does not work, interdependence cannot be denied and lack of cooperation between the most powerful actors generates costs for all the rest. As global connections are at the essence of pandemic mechanisms for preventing the spread of the virus and required for coordination efforts, they can play a role of “focusing event”, by redesigning conceptual frameworks and initiating a new consensus. Covid-19 created a unique opportunity in modern history for a situation with similar costs for both developed and developing countries. The material wealth of rich states did not play the role of protective shield unless political leaders embraced their responsibilities and directed their nations. Synergy, trust and global justice – the guiding principles of political life – revealed their practical dimensions. On the one hand, national and global imbalances aggravated the scale of the crisis, demonstrating that resilience must be built on the grounds of long-term processes of social cohesion; on the other hand, the pandemic was a manifestation of the human and social consequences of inequality and structural violence.

The leadership aspect of pandemic management is undeniable; according to the Global Health Security Index (GHSI, 2019), the USA and Great Britain were the two states best prepared for the occurrence of the public health threat. Nevertheless, their leaders’ reluctance to implement preventive measures combined with ignorance made the number of victims in those countries among the highest in the world. Thus, while the nature of the superspreading Covid-19 made it global, understanding of the governance measures remained local, focused on populations of any given state and driven by short-sighted political interests. Protection of the local population bears primacy in the hierarchy of political leaders’ goals. This logic cannot be denied, as presidents, prime ministers and public health decision makers have sworn to serve the country; but competitiveness and “my country first” approaches caused the disintegration of the entire system and also severely impeded their ability to help their people.

The Covid-19 pandemic has been an important period for the conceptualisation of global political leadership. It proved to be a story about leadership needs, which were exposed strongly at a time of existential crisis, revealing the inadequacy of some archetypical leadership scripts and bringing admiration for new strategies based on different optics. It is a story about globalisation, as pandemics presented a major test for global order, manifesting its shortcomings. It also confirmed the shortcomings of politics designed for local contexts and audiences, not adapted to the realities of common threats, and problems with executing protective procedures in a vast system composed of a series of culturally and politically bounded entities (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Leadership matrix: Global public goods: global public health

	<i>Structural leadership</i>	<i>Cognitive leadership</i>	<i>Relational leadership</i>
Key criteria	Assessed according to the criteria of global public health crisis management /resilience of global socio-economic systems.	Assessed according to the criteria of information access, effectiveness of dissemination and narrative framing in a way that facilitated crisis management and reinforced global public health resilience.	Assessed according to the criteria of collective action, multilateral coordination and multilevel synergy building that facilitated crisis management and reinforced global public health resilience.
Nation states	Average influence record/high influence potential. Have the widest range of tools to produce structural leadership outcomes. In many cases the capacity of governments to address problems, also rich-country governments have been undermined. High pandemic losses could have been avoided through collective action efforts, yet political leaders did not recognise the requirements of the global emergency and in many cases their actions weakened rather than strengthened global synergy.	Average influence record/average influence potential. Credibility in providing a science-based narrative has been a critical tool for crisis management. The global infosphere during the Covid-19 pandemic was fragmented and prone to disinformation, and even in the nation states with a high record of public transparency and trust the crisis was instrumentalised for short-term political gains.	Low influence record/high influence potential. Interdependence has been a major feature of the global pandemic crisis, yet on the political level Covid-19 was experienced as a series of coinciding national crises. Unilateral strategies embraced by the main actors weakened international institutions' ability to produce synergistic global responses.
International organisations	Low influence record/high influence potential. IOs have generally been unable to prevent member states from pursuing domestic strategies at the cost of multilateral cooperation. They generally have low influence over how policy responses and decisions are made. Failed to get first-mover advantage at the beginning of the	High influence record/high influence potential. IOs have become major pandemic information hubs delivering data necessary for policy shaping. They have also been exercising substantial leadership within framing visions of the post-crisis recovery, especially with regard to global market relations ('The Great Reset,' 'Build Back Better').	Low influence record/high influence potential. IOs failed to generate new platforms for long-term cooperation, focusing primarily on continuity of operations within already established networks.

Individuals	<p>crisis, and were not able to propose new directions of global governance reordering later.</p> <p>Low influence record/low influence potential. Individuals rarely produce leadership outcomes resulting in effects on the structural layer of global public health provision (with exception of Bill and Melinda Gates and a few others), yet the nature of the crisis revealed the importance of individual behaviours that <i>en masse</i> shape the overall picture of national\ regional resilience.</p>	<p>High influence record/ high influence potential. The leadership vacuum produced by failures of crisis management, and the actions of political leaders that undermined global trust, resulted in the rising influence of private citizens, who effectively framed the narratives of pandemic and power relations. Public experts, promoters of anti-vaccine perspectives and pandemic deniers shaped global public opinion. Radical and irrational narratives resonated strongly due to psychological shock.</p>	<p>Average influence record/ high influence potential. Despite social distancing, the relational layer of global public health leadership thrived. Individuals around the world not only collectively addressed pandemic-related public issues but were introducing and promoting social innovation, protesting and forming coalitions to demonstrate public will. In many societies, a lack of provision of public health goods fuelled social unrest in other spheres.</p>
-------------	--	---	--

Source: Author's own work.

References

- Albertazzi D and McDonnell D (+) *Populists in Power*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Applebaum A (2020) When the world stumbled: COVID-19 and the failure of the international system. In: Brands H and Gavin FJ (Eds) *COVID-19 and World Order: The Future of Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press: 223–237.
- Aubrecht P, Essink J, Kovac M and Vandenberghe AS (2020) Centralized and decentralized responses to COVID-19 in federal systems: US and EU comparisons. *Law & Economics of Covid-19 Working Paper Series*, 04.
- Avant D, Finnemore M and Sell S (2010) *Who Governs the Globe?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Axelrod R (1981) The emergence of cooperation among egoists. *American Political Science Review* 75: 306–318.
- Bailey JZ and Moon JR (2020) Racism and the political economy of COVID-19: Will we continue to resurrect the past? *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 45(6): 937–950.
- Barber, B (1995) All economies are “embedded”: The career of a concept, and beyond. *Social Research* 62: 387–413.
- Barnett M and Finnemore M (2005) The power of liberal international organizations. In: Barnett MN and Duvall R (Eds) *Power in Global Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 161–184.
- Barret S (2007) *Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bennett N and Lemoine GJ (2014) What a difference a word makes: Understanding threats to performance in a VUCA world. *Business Horizons*, 1126.
- Bennett WL (2008) Changing citizenship in the digital age. In: Bennett WL (Ed.) *Civic Life Online: Learning How Digital Media Can Engage Youth*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 1–4.
- Bishop ML and Xiaotong Z (2020) Why is China a reluctant leader of the World Trade Organization? *New Political Economy* 25(5): 755–772.
- Block F and Evans P (2005) The state and the economy. In: Smelser N and Swedberg R (Eds) *Handbook of Economic Sociology*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 505–526.
- Boin A and Hart PT (2003) Public leadership in times of crisis: mission impossible? *Public Administration Review* 63(5): 544–553.
- Boin A, Stern E, Hart P and Sundelius B (2016) *The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Borrel J (2021) We need to do more on the vaccine divide. European External Action Service. Available at www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/we-need-do-more-vaccine-divide_en (accessed: 20 June 2022).
- Bradford A (2020) *The Brussels Effect – How the European Union Rules the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brady HE, Verba S and Schlozman K (1995) Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. *American Political Science Review* 89: 271–294.
- Bremmer I (2012) *Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World*. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.
- Bremmer I and Roubini N (2011) A G-Zero world: The new economic club will produce conflict, not cooperation. *Foreign Affairs* 90(2): 2–7.

- Brookes S (2011) Crisis, confidence and collectivity: Responding to the new public leadership challenge. *Leadership* 7(2): 175–194.
- Calvert JG, Arbutnot J and Leake J (2020) Coronavirus: 38 days when Britain sleepwalked into disaster. *Sunday Times*, 19 April. Available at www.thetimes.co.uk/article/coronavirus-38-days-when-britain-sleepwalked-into-disaster-hq3b9t1gh (accessed: 20 July 2022).
- Carpini MXD, Cook FL and Jacobs LR (2004) Public deliberation, discursive participation, and citizen engagement: A review of the empirical literature. *Annual Review of Political Science* 7: 315–344.
- Chen S, Zhang Z, Yang J, Wang J, Zhai X, Bärnighausen T and Wang C (2020) Fangcang shelter hospitals: A novel concept for responding to public health emergencies. *The Lancet* 395(10232): 1305–1314.
- China's State Council Information Office (2021) *China's International Development Cooperation in the New Era*. Available at http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitpaper/202101/10/content_WS5ffa6bbbc6d0f72576943922.html (accessed 21 July 2022).
- Christensen HS (2011) Political activities on the internet: Slacktivism or political participation by other means? *First Monday* 16. Available at <http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3336/2767> (accessed 3 May 2021).
- Christensen J (2020) Expert knowledge and policymaking: A multi-disciplinary research agenda. *Policy & Politics* 49(3): 455–471.
- Coen D and Pegram T (2015) Wanted: A third generation of global governance research. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 28(4): 417–420.
- Commission on Global Governance (1992) *Our Global Neighborhood*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Corning PA (1998) The synergism hypothesis: On the concept of synergy and its role in the evolution of complex systems. *Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems* 21(2): 133–172.
- Cox G and Kernell S (2019) *The Politics of Divided Government*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Crocker CA (2015) The strategic dilemma of a world adrift. *Survival* 57(1): 7–30.
- Cronin B and Hurd I (2008) Introduction. In: Cronin B and Hurd I (Eds) *The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority*. London: Routledge: 3–22.
- Crouch C (2004) *Post-Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Cyert RM and March JG (1963) *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Dahl RA (1972) *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale, CT: Yale University Press.
- DeSombre ER (2000) The experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly remarkable, and remarkably particular. *UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy* 19(1): 49–81.
- Devakumar D, Shannon G, Bhopal SS and Abubakar I (2020) Racism and discrimination in COVID-19 responses. *The Lancet* 395(10231): 1194.
- Dyer O (2020) Covid-19: Trump sought to buy vaccine developer exclusively for US, say German officials. *British Medical Journal*, 368. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1100>.
- The Economist* (2006) The new titans. Special report. Available at www.economist.com/special-report/2006/09/16/the-new-titans (accessed 19 July 2022).

- The Economist* (2020) The reluctant hegemon. Available at www.economist.com/europe/2020/10/03/germany-is-being-forced-to-take-a-leadership-role-it-never-wanted (accessed 18 July 2022).
- Evans P (1996) Government action, social capital and development: reviewing the evidence on synergy. *World Development* 24(6): 1119–1132.
- Evans P (2005) Harnessing the state: Rebalancing strategies for monitoring and motivation. In: Lange M and Rueschemeyer D (Eds) *States and Development: Historical Antecedents of Stagnation and Advance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 26–47.
- Evelyn K (2020) Amazon workers walk out over lack of protective gear amid coronavirus. *The Guardian*. Available at www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/mar/30/amazon-workers-strike-coronavirus (accessed 21 Feb 2022).
- Falkenbach M and Greer SL (2020). Denial and distraction: How the populist radical right responds to COVID-19, *International Journal of Health Policy and Management* 10(9): 1–3.
- Ferguson N, Zakaria F and Griffiths R (2017) *Is this the End of the Liberal International Order? Niall Ferguson vs. Fareed Zakaria*. Toronto, ONT: House of Anansi Press.
- Fidler, DP (2010) *The Challenges of Global Health Governance*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Fox Ch and Scott T (2020) Flat no longer. Technology in the post COVID world. In: Brands H and Gavin FJ (Eds) *COVID-19 and World Order: The Future of Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press: 169–190.
- Fox NJ (2020) Money, markets and trade caused coronavirus pandemic. *Sociology Lens*. Available at www.sociologylens.net/topics/political-economic-sociology/money-markets-trade-caused-coronavirus-pandemic/29787 (accessed: 13 Jan 2022).
- Furnham A and Gunter B (1987) Young people's political knowledge, *Educational Studies* 13(1): 91–104.
- Gardner WL, Avolio BJ, Luthans F, May DR and Walumbwa F (2005) Can you see the real me? A self-based model of authentic leader and follower development. *The Leadership Quarterly* 16: 343–372.
- Gavi (2020) COVAX explained. Available at www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained (accessed 9 Nov 2021).
- GHSI (Global Health Security Index) (2019) Building Collective Action and Accountability. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Available at www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/2019-Global-Health-Security-Index.pdf (accessed 20 July 2022).
- Glaser CL (2019) A flawed framework: Why the liberal international order concept is misguided. *International Security*. 43(4): 51–87.
- Gordon SH (1954) The economic theory of a common-property resource. *The Fishery Journal of Political Economy* 62: 124–142.
- Granovetter M (1985) Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology* 91: 481–510.
- Gray B (1989) *Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Greenleaf RK (1977 [2002]) *Servant-Leadership: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness*. Mahwah, NY: Paulist.
- Grey S and MacAskill A (2020) Special Report: Johnson listened to his scientists about coronavirus – but they were slow to sound the alarm. Reuters, April 7. Available at

- www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-britain-path-speci/special-report-johnson-listened-to-hisscientists-about-coronavirus-but-they-were-slow-to-sound-the-alarm-idUSKBN21P1VF (accessed 20 July, 2022).
- Grint K (2020) Leadership, management and command in the time of the Coronavirus. *Leadership* 16(3): 314–319.
- Haass R (2020) Foreign policy by example. *Foreign Affairs*. Available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-05/protests-pandemic-world-watching (accessed 4 Dec 2021).
- Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. *Science* 162: 1243–1248.
- Hesse H (1956) *The Journey to the East*. New York: Picador.
- Hetherington MJ (2005) *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hornsey MJ, Finlayson M, Chatwood G and Begeny CT (2020) Donald Trump and vaccination: The effect of political identity, conspiracist ideation and presidential tweets on vaccine hesitancy. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 88(103947).
- HRW (Human Rights Watch) (2020) *World Report 2020*. Available at www.hrw.org/world-report/2020# (accessed 4 Nov 2021).
- Huang Y (2021) Why the world lost to the pandemic. *Foreign Affairs*. Available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-28/why-world-lost-pandemic (accessed 1 Feb 2022).
- Hurrell A (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? *International affairs* 82(1): 1–19.
- Ikenberry GJ (2001) *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ikenberry GJ (2018) The end of liberal international order? *International Affairs* 94(1): 7–23.
- ILO (International Labour Organization) (2020) *ILO Monitor*, 2nd edn: COVID-19 and the world of work. Available at ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/WCMS_740877/lang-en/index.htm (accessed 18 July 2022).
- Jayaram K, Leke A, Ooko-Ombaka A and Sun YS (2020) *Finding Africa's Path: Shaping Bold Solutions to Save Lives and Livelihoods in the COVID-19 Crisis*. London: McKinsey Institute.
- Johansson C and Back E (2017) Strategic leadership communication for crisis network coordination. *International Journal of Strategic Communication* 11(4): 324–343.
- Johnson G, Scholes K and Whittington R (2008) *Exploring Corporate Strategy*. London: Pearson.
- Kane J and Patapan H (2012) *The Democratic Leader: How Democracy Defines, Empowers and Limits Its Leaders*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kaplan RD (2012) *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*. New York: Random House.
- Kennedy J (2019) Populist politics and vaccine hesitancy in Western Europe: An analysis of national-level data. *European Journal of Public Health* 29(3): 512–516.
- Keohane R (2005 [1984]) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane R and Nye J (1977) *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Kouzes J and Posner B (2012) *The Leadership Challenge*, 5th edn. New York, NY: Wiley.

- Krippner G (2001) The elusive market: Embeddedness and the paradigm of economic sociology. *Theory and Society* 30: 775–810.
- Kupchan CA (2012) *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lasker RD and Weiss ES (2003) Creating partnership synergy: The critical role of community stakeholders. *Journal of Health and Human Services Administration* 26: 119–139.
- Lavezzolo S, Ramiro L and Fernández-Vázquez P (2020) The will for reason: Voter demand for experts in office. *West European Politics* 44(7): 1506–1531.
- Lawless JL and Fox RL (2015) *Running from Office: Why Young Americans Are Turned Off to Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lazarus JV, Wyka K, Rauh L, Rabin K, Ratzan S, Gostin LO, Larson HJ and El-Mohandes A (2020) Hesitant or not? The association of age, gender, and education with potential acceptance of a COVID-19 vaccine: A country-level analysis. *Journal of Health Communication* 25(10): 799–807.
- Lees-Marshment J (2015) *The Ministry of Public Input: Integrating Citizen Views into Political Leadership*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Likhotal, A (2020) Global leadership in the 21st Century. *Cadmus Journal* 4(2): 134–141.
- Loss R and Puglierin J (2020) The truth about European solidarity during corona. *European Council of Foreign Relations*. Available at www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_truth_about_european_solidarity_during_corona (accessed 17 September 2020).
- Lu D (2020) China is using mass surveillance tech to fight new coronavirus spread. *New Scientists*. Available at www.newscientist.com/article/mg24532703-600-china-is-using-mass-surveillance-tech-to-fight-new-coronavirus-spread/ (accessed 22 July 2022).
- Ma L (2020) Technology empowerment, digital drive and accurate pandemic control. *Social Science Weekly*. Shanghai: Shanghai Social Science Academy, 1695.
- Machiavelli N (1950) *The Prince and the Discourses*. New York: Modern Library, 1532.
- March JG and Simon HA (1958) *Organizations*. New York: Wiley.
- Mardle G and Taylor M (1987) Political knowledge and political ignorance: A reexamination. *Political Quarterly* 58: 208–216.
- Matthewman S (2015) *Disasters, Risks and Revelation: Making Sense of Our Times*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mayo M (1997) Partnerships for regeneration and community development. *Critical Social Policy* 17: 3–26.
- Mende J (2021) The contestation and construction of global governance authorities: A study from the global business and human rights regime. *Global Constitutionalism* 10(3): 377–399.
- Morrison D (2001) Politics as a vocation according to Aristotle. *History of Political Thought* 22(2): 221–241.
- Murthi M (2021) Absolutely Unacceptable' Vaccination Rates in Developing Countries. The Development Podcast. Available at www.worldbank.org/en/news/podcast/2021/07/30/-absolutely-unacceptable-vaccination-rates-in-developing-countries-the-development-podcast (accessed 10 Dec 2021).
- Naim M (2013) *The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States. Why Being in Charge Isn't What it Used to Be*. New York: Basic Books.
- Naim M (2014) The decay of power in domestic and international politics. *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 21(1): 245–251.

- NIC (National Intelligence Council) (2012) *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*. Washington, DC: United States NIC.
- Nolte D (2010) How to compare regional powers: Analytical concepts and research topics. *Review of International Studies* 36(4): 881–901.
- Nordhaus W (1999) *Global Public Goods and the Problem of Global Warming*. Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI). Available at http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/conf/annual/paper_1999.pdf (accessed 12 Jan 2021).
- Nye JS Jr (1990) The changing nature of world power. *Political Science Quarterly* 105(2): 177.
- Olsen JP (2001) Garbage cans, new institutionalism, and the study of politics. *American Political Science Review* 95: 191–198.
- Ostrom E (1990) *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Padilla A, Hogan R and Kaiser RB (2007) The toxic triangle: Destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and conducive environments. *The Leadership Quarterly* 18(3): 176–194.
- Pan X-B (2020) Application of personal-oriented digital technology in preventing transmission of COVID-19, China. *Irish Journal of Medical Science* 189(4): 1145–1146.
- Persson A (2019) Global adaptation governance: An emerging but contested domain. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 10(6): 618.
- Pierro A, Raven BH, Amato C and Belanger JJ (2013) Bases of social power, leadership styles, and organizational commitment. *International Journal of Psychology* 48(6): 1122–1134.
- Polanyi K, Arensberg CM and Pearson HW (1957) *Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Portes A (1998) Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern society. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24: 1–24.
- Richerson P and Boyd R (2005) *Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Rosenau JN and Czempiel EO (Eds) (1992) *Governance without Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roubini N (2011) It is a G-Zero, not a G-20, world. *New Perspectives Quarterly* 28(2): 27–30.
- Ruggie JG (2003) Taking embedded liberalism global: The corporate connection. In: Held D and Koenig-Archibugi M (Eds) *Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press: 93–129.
- Sainato M (2020) Strikes erupt as US essential workers demand protection amid pandemic. *The Guardian*. Available at www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/19/strikes-erupt-us-essential-workers-demand-better-protection-amid-pandemic (accessed 07 Nov 2021).
- Schelling TC (1980) *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schwab K (2017) World leaders reckon with a global rebalancing. *Financial Times*. Available at www.ft.com/content/04523434-d8da-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e (accessed 27 Jan 2017).
- Schweller RL (2001) The problem of international order revisited. *International Security* 26(1): 161–185.
- Shambach CSA (2004). *Strategic Leadership Primer*. Pennsylvania, PA: United States Army War College.

- Shames SL (2017) *Out of the Running: Why Millennials Reject Political Careers and Why it Matters*. New York: New York University Press.
- Shaw PR and Wong Y (1987) Ethnic mobilization and the seeds of warfare: An evolutionary perspective. *International Studies Quarterly* 31(1): 5–31.
- Simon HA (1947) *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making Processes in Administrative Organization*. New York: Macmillan.
- Smith A (1964 [1776]) *The Wealth of Nations*. London: Dent.
- Sobolewska M and Ford R (2020) *Brexitland: Identity, Diversity and the Reshaping of British Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Soucat A (2019) Financing common goods for health: Fundamental for health, the foundation for UHC. *Health Systems & Reform* 5(4): 263–267.
- Spear R, Erdi G, Parker M and Anastasiadis M (2020) Innovations in citizen response to crises: Volunteerism & social mobilization during COVID-19. *Interface: A Journal for and About Social Movements* 12(1): 383–391.
- Steil B (2020) Models for a post-Covid foreign economic policy. In: Brands H and Gavin FJ (Eds) *COVID-19 and World Order: The Future of Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press: 191–203.
- Stradling R (1977) *The Political Awareness of the School Leaver: A Programme for Political Education*. London: Hansard Society.
- Taleb NN (2007) *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*. New York: Random House.
- Taylor M (1976) *Anarchy and Cooperation*. London: Wiley.
- Telford T and Kindy K (2020) As they rushed to maintain U.S. meat supply, big processors say plants become covid-19 hot spots, worker illnesses spike. *The Washington Post*. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/25/meat-workers-safety-jbs-smithfield-tyson/. (accessed 12 June 2022).
- Tham K-Y, Lu Q and Teo W (2020) Infodemic: What physician leaders learned during the COVID-19 outbreak: A qualitative study. *BMJ Leader* 4: 201–206.
- Thayer BA (2000) Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary theory, realism, and international politics. *International Security* 25(2): 124–151.
- Tourish D (2020) Introduction to the Special Issue: Why the coronavirus crisis is also a leadership crisis. *Leadership* 16(3): 261–272.
- Trachtman JP (2008) *The Economic Structure of International Law*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tversky A and Kahneman D (1981) The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. *Science* 211: 453–458.
- UN (United Nations) (2021) COVID-19: UN Chief calls for G20 Vaccine Task Force, in ‘war’ against the virus. Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1092442> (accessed 9 Dec 2021).
- Usher AD (2021) A beautiful idea: How COVAX has fallen short. *The Lancet* 397(10292): 2322–2325.
- Verhofstadt G (2020) Time of coronavirus shows importance of being European. *EU Observer*. Available at <https://euobserver.com/opinion/147781> (accessed 22 Nov 2021).
- Vernon R (1971) *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US Enterprises*. New York: Basic Books.
- Von der Leyen U (2020) State of the Union. Building the world we want to live in: A Union of vitality in a world of fragility. Transcript of speech delivered at the European Parliament Plenary. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1655 (accessed 3 Feb 2021).

- Weber M (1919) *Le savant et le politique*. Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions.
- WEF (World Economic Forum) (2020) *Digitizing and Transforming Mobility Systems: Lessons from the Detroit Region*. Available at www.weforum.org/reports/digitizing-and-transforming-mobility-systems-lessons-from-the-detroit-region (accessed 10 Dec 2021).
- WHA (World Health Assembly) (2020) COVID-19 response. A73/VR/2. Available at https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA73/A73_R1-en.pdf (accessed 22 July 2022).
- WHO (World Health Organization) (2020a) *An ad hoc WHO Technical Consultation Managing the COVID-19 Infodemic: Call for Action*. Available at www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240010314 (accessed 25 Jan 2020).
- WHO (World Health Organization) (2020b) The Potential Impact of Health Service Disruptions on the Burden of Malaria. Available at www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240004641 (accessed 21 Oct 2021).
- Wiener A (2018) *Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wilson DS, O'Brien DT and Sesma A (2009) Human prosociality from an evolutionary perspective: Variation and correlations at a city-wide scale. *Evolution and Human Behavior* 30(3): 190–200.
- Wilson EO (1975) *Sociobiology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wilson J and Swyngedouw E (Eds) (2014) *The Post-Political and Its Discontents. Spaces of Depoliticisation, Spectres of Radical Politics*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Wolff RP (1970) *In Defense of Anarchism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- World Bank (2012) *People, Pathogens and Our Planet. The Economics of One Health*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank Group (2017) *Drug Resistant Infections: A Threat To Our Economic Future*. Final Report. Available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/323311493396993758/pdf/114679-REVISED-v2-Drug-Resistant-Infections-Final-Report.pdf> (accessed: 18 Aug 2017).
- Yam KC, Jackson JC, Barnes CM, Lau J, Qin X and Lee HY (2020) The rise of COVID-19 cases is associated with support for world leaders. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 117(25): 429–433.
- Yee AS (1996) The causal effects of ideas on policies. *International Organization* 50(1): 69–108.
- Zachara M (2020) The Millennial generation in the context of political power: A leadership gap? *Leadership* 16(2): 241–258.
- Zhang C (2020) Covid-19 in China: From “Chernobyl moment” to impetus for nationalism. *Made in China Journal* 5(2): 162–165.
- Žižek S (2008) *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*. London: Verso.
- Zürn M (2013) Globalization and global governance. In: Carlsnaes W, Risse T and Simmons BA (Eds) *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage: 401–425.
- Zürn, M (2016) *Global Governance – Crisis and Resistance. Interview with Prof. Michael Zürn*. London: UCL Global Governance Institute. Available at www.ucl.ac.uk/global-governance/news/2016/dec/global-governance-crisis-and-resistance (accessed 17 June 2017).

3 Focus on Followers

Individual Empowerment and Public Affairs on a Global Scale

The process of individual empowerment – one of the megatrends shaping the future of the international system for years to come – fundamentally impacts the way in which leadership processes are played out. Empowered by global markets and technological opportunities, citizens cannot be viewed merely as recipients or moderators of a leader's influence, or as vehicles for the actualisation of the leader's vision, mission or goals. In the globalised reality, both leadership and its consequences are more than ever largely constructed by followers and hence influenced by followers' cognitive patterns and inter-follower social influence processes.

This creates a need for more inclusive models of global political leadership distinct from traditional structural/positional approaches. The text looks into the motivations and patterns of organisational behaviours that have already been successfully applied within the area of global business, and assesses their potential for the political realm.

Blurred lines: Leadership and followership in tackling global problems

Research concerning leadership processes in international politics (Kindleberger, 1981; Pedersen, 2002), just like sources describing business leadership, confirms the well-explored notion indicating followers as an indispensable component of leadership. Surprisingly though, followers have often been described in hierarchical terms as possessing lower status than a leader or as being recipients of a leader's direction. In effect, followers as a subject of leadership research has long been discussed to better understand leaders: their influence, behaviour, styles and ways of motivating and directing followers in order to achieve organisational goals (Bass, 2008; Sy, 2010; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). Literature on international relations (IR) focuses almost exclusively on the leader or the hegemon. In the context of hegemonic influence seen as a coercion-based relationship, the question of followership becomes irrelevant. There is no followership without the autonomous decision of an actor who decides to follow. The notion of followership reappears when hegemony is discussed as a structural feature of the international environment, in which

the hegemon's dominance is related to responsibility for securing relations with the states in its area of influence by providing order, stability and security. However, the degree to which followers contribute to the process is rarely treated as an important factor of the relationship. They are discussed in the context of rivalry – whether or not they might possess attributes allowing them to challenge hegemon or freeride, and whether or not they are likely to use public goods without compensation.

It can be argued that such a leader-centered approach seriously distorts how we understand the nature of leadership in international politics. Focusing on the traits, interests, and capabilities of leaders and would-be challengers may tell us a great deal about which states are bound to be the most powerful in the international system at a particular historical conjuncture. But that approach tells us little about leadership, because it tells us little about the dynamics of followership – in other words, what drives followers to follow.

(Cooper et al., 1991: 395)

Just as leadership is an interactive process that builds on the interests of states, so is followership.

A follower-centred approach can be useful in the analysis of global relations under the condition of rising fragmentation and individual empowerment which grew to be one of the most important phenomena shaping these relationships. These trends, amplified by political polarisation and dispersion of authority, inevitably bring implications to the leadership processes influencing both global synergy and global public goods provision. Reinforced by global markets and technological opportunities, non-state actors and citizens cannot be viewed merely as recipients or moderators of a leading state's influence but also as vehicles for actualisation of the leader's vision, mission or goals. Relationships between de facto political leaders and followers are co-produced and largely accompanied by continuous shifts and renegotiation of power. In the globalised reality, both leadership and its consequences are more than ever largely constructed by followers and thus influenced by followers' expectations, their cognitive patterns and inter-follower social influence processes. What followers want and what they consider right, shape dynamics within the leadership/followership sphere. This exchange of roles – from follower to leader – recognised by followership theorists (Kellerman, 2008; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014) is more common in a scenario with multiple actors, transforming understanding of the leadership process in the global realm. Expansion of the transnational policy toolbox for a variety of actors in fact reversed the traditional model of the leader–follower relation in politics. States ceased to be exclusively responsible for global public goods provision, and although other actors cannot replace the prolific role that states have to play in global governance, transnational corporations, INGOs, foundations and individuals have already become active within the global public goods sphere.

Leadership–followership constellations are of a diverse nature and different compositions as a number of actors contribute to, influence and secure provision of global public goods. Within interconnected global realm states, there is often a lack of political incentive to provide them – individuals increasingly voice their concerns about the way in which global public goods are governed, and powerful economic actors have for long disregarded the issue as not related to their core interests; international regimes emerge as effective guardians and coordinators. Each and every politically active actor involved in the provision of global public goods brings to the fore its own interests, strategies and visions, which not only cause differential distributional implications but also shape the position of followers and their responses to leaders. Global followers – both in terms of the market and political organisations – construct leaders and leadership (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). Interconnected and mutually inclusive parts of leadership–followership relations can be represented in the global realm by:

a) The followership of individuals

Individuals become active in international affairs as advocates, norm setters or solution-providers. Powerful individuals have always shaped the course of history, but the global era has increased their opportunities for exercising agency, so they can operate beyond the systems of institutionalised politics. The position occupied by individuals in the global realm often doesn't fit the established leadership–followership dichotomy. According to traditional orthodoxies of leadership studies, individuals should be treated as followers, restricted in their actions by the regulatory and coercive powers of the state. However, individuals became more central as the fundamental cultural locus of social membership and identity, and their role goes beyond being one-sided – leaders are those in charge and followers are those influenced by leaders (Jackson and Parry, 2008). A wide range of activists, consultants, social innovators or public opinion leaders actively exercise leadership, which transcends boundaries of nation states. They cannot be considered as a product of the state's leadership when they question national policies and demand reforms that would result in recognition of a particular and universal agenda. Individuals present on the international stage can be considered both leaders and followers. They operate beyond the influence of one type of leader (for example state politicians, religious leaders, community leaders), but within the sphere of influence of others (for example human rights activists, international organisations, social justice movements).

Public engagement forms an important dimension of the protection of global public goods; even in the case of international frameworks being established, national governments find incentives to breach such frameworks so that World Trade Organization (WTO) or European Union (EU) rules, first established by national governments, are being abused by those same governments. Citizens of the democratic system will have an increasing role

in guarding international standards, which expressed their will when they approved it.

Global public goods (*res publica*) – like the WTO legal and dispute settlement as an indispensable building block for realizing the UN 2030 sustainable development goals and climate change mitigation – cannot be effectively protected without support from civil societies and democratic institutions (e.g. limiting fossil fuel consumption, fishery subsidies, “green-house gas emissions” and environmental pollution by plastics): The “law in the books” depends on social support and respect by citizens in order to remain an effective “law in action” (e.g. limiting environmental pollution by millions of citizens).

(Petersmann, 2020)

Every kind of political leadership requires followers to exercise their agency – to vote, sign a petition, share a Facebook post, demonstrate, organise a consumers’ boycott. Only active kinds of followership matter in goal-oriented political processes, yet the lines between leadership and followership are blurred. This is one of the parameters of evolving social interactions. Was Ted Turner – a US media magnate offering a check covering US financial responsibilities towards the United Nations (UN) a follower – influenced by national interests (Lynch, 2000)? He might as well be considered a global leader using private resources to support global stability undermined by the UN’s increasingly grave financial crisis caused by overdue US payments. The resources that enabled Turner to emerge in international politics belong to the traditional instrumentarium of power composed of money, military potential, size of population or territory. While still only a handful of individuals have access to financial assets of proper scale, or can get equipment and technology that may be used in terrorist attacks, access to information is growing. Widespread accessibility to information technology provides a platform for different voices to find followers, support and sympathisers in cyber space. Social media has radically lowered the transaction costs of mobilising populations, democratising access to the global public. The link between established notions of genuine leadership and hierarchically organised repositories of political power has long been broken. Leadership in global politics is fluid and dispersed, as leaders cannot command commitment via the legitimacy of elections, so they manage processes of generating political agendas and public decision making through direct and indirect communication processes (Kane et al., 2009: 2).

Individuals and citizens have traditionally been seen as following a rational strategy to let the state provide global public goods so they could enjoy them without bearing all the costs. However, confronted with the dramatic consequences of failures within areas of climate change, biodiversity and the social and environmental externalities of industrial production, they embrace the role of agents of change. Are they rather influenced by the global movement

or have leaders recognised the need for change and are seeking to influence others? Many individuals act internationally without representing a particular country but as a “global citizen”. Just as individuals can embrace diverse identities, they can shift roles within the vast sphere of possible engagement. Their effectiveness is related to power expressed in resources, expertise, relations, knowledge or sense making. The shift in the position of individuals is also related to their assessment of the degree to which their expectations are met. As Katz (1973: 209) noted: “outstanding leaders often lose their supporters and drop out of sight not because they have changed but because the pattern of wants and desires of their followers has”. The assumption behind this reasoning is that dissatisfied followers seek other leaders who would more fully address their requirements. Apart from being another manifestation of followers’ agency, the mechanism of constant search for optimal leadership results in probably the most consequential change of the global area, namely a widening leadership gap. When followers’ assessment of leaders’ problem-solving capacity is low, and when they don’t feel represented and engaged, they tend to withdraw into a private sphere. The leadership–followership role exchange adds to the recent deterioration of political leadership when social, intellectual and political authorities are considered to be ineffective in taming unfavourable social and economic processes. When leaders are not persuasive enough, inspiring or aware of the follower’s desires, they provoke political apathy, as disillusioned followers simply stop following.

b) The followership of states

In order to better fulfil their interests, states align with other states, forming coalitions, communities and alliances (Zachara, 2020). Although international rules assume that all sovereign actors are equal, the reality of the global power game is organised around hierarchical orders. Within every international forum there are stronger actors, able to exercise influence, and weaker actors who are constrained to accept domination or generate counter-balance for the hegemon/leading coalition. Notions of power, hierarchy and the ability to coerce have long dominated the IR field of inquiry. However, with increasing polarisation of power, they do not reflect reality any more. While there are still leading states in the international arena, the era of hegemonic dominance is over. The dynamic of power requires the US, China and regional actors to seek followership in order to strengthen their own positions on the international scene. This is not by any means a new phenomenon, as preserving the liberal global order in the 20th century required cooperation, constant negotiation and compromise. Followership always mattered.

In the Cold War era, both global adversaries were expanding their spheres of influence, offering all sorts of ideological and material incentives. Dissolution of the Soviet Union meant another reconfiguration of the leadership–followership structure, when Eastern European states sought

accession to NATO and the EU. They decided to follow ideologies and rules different from those offered by the failing Soviet Empire. The time just before and after the enlargement marked the heights of the EU position in global politics, while it severely deteriorated when Great Britain ended its membership in 2020. The end of the Cold War also confirmed the supremacy of the USA on the global scene, so the state was able to extend its international agenda due to wide international support.

The first Gulf War in 1991 was fought as a joint effort by 35 states from 6 continents. As Joseph S. Nye (1991: 48) commented: “[W]here America leads, others follow – this year, next year and for the following generation”. America’s “unilateral moment” hardly lasted into the next generation. The “coalition of the willing” called to legitimise US aggression in Iraq in 2003 included about 50 members, of which 34 decided to deploy troops in Iraq. Twenty-one of the 34 countries participating in the 1991 campaign decided not to support US efforts in 2003. The aggressive politics of the Bush administration undermined US leadership, putting into question whether American power was willing to address the concerns of followers. As a senior adviser to President Bush put it:

We’re an empire now, and when we act we create our own reality. And while you are studying this reality – judiciously as you will – we’ll act again, creating other new realities which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors ... and you, all of you will be left to just study what we do.

(cited in Suskind, 2004)

Here, the difference between the status of the dominant power (“we’re an empire now”) and leading power is illustrated. Leading power, even if takes a dominant position builds up political support based on transaction, admiration and common interests. Potential parties enter and sustain the relationship inclined by desire to create their own reality together with a leading state. When they are simply coerced, followers are left to merely study what the hegemon does. Followers can encourage leadership, offering prestige, support and status for the leader, while expecting security, stabilisation or economic reinforcement out of the relationship. This was the case of Southeast Asian governments, pressing Japan to embrace the leadership role in the region in the last decades of the 20th century. Followers’ expectations and aspirations played a crucial role in Japan’s emergence as a regional leader. They perceived a rising economic empire as a chance for expansion of their own production networks and modernisation of their societies. The rapid growth of China forced Japan to counter this regional transformation and followers’ orientation would again be a decisive factor in this power-game. In the course of the process Japan is seeking new ways to keep the US engaged in the East Asian region.

This leadership/followership dynamic is not unique for shaping cooperation/competition patterns in the regional and global context. Regional leaders build their position on the followership based on how firmly the leadership is recognised; this in turn strengthens their position in relations with the global leader, as the greater their support in the region, the more valuable a follower they become in the global power composition. This mechanism can be illustrated by the intensified tactics of Brazil, Germany and Japan, who spotted the opportunity for an upright shift in their position in a moment of global systemic transformation. They seek for more exposed leadership roles within global networks of power, aspiring to permanent seats on the UN Security Council (UNSC). It is symptomatic though that their efforts failed due to lack of support by neighbouring countries – the followers' backing proved not to be strong enough (Schrim, 2010).

The basic question in this respect is under which conditions do potential followers support global actors' bids for leadership? The leadership/followership configuration within one spectrum of interaction produces outcomes for other types of social relations. Furthermore, the condition of interdependence makes these outcomes dependent on the choices of other actors – both leaders and followers. Can Sweden entering into energy cooperation with China be considered a follower due to the asymmetry of powers they represent? Or maybe, Denmark having the status of wind-energy leading producer, should be considered a leader in this relationship? After all, wind-energy expertise provision stands at the centre of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Denmark and China initiated in 2006 – one of the instruments assisting China's transformation from the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GSGs) to the world's largest player in the area of renewable energy. Experts from the Danish Energy Agency work closely with the Chinese side on developing strategic energy policies, state-of-the-art methodologies and tools to encourage the use of renewable energy in the Chinese energy system. As a result, China became the world's third largest offshore wind-power installer, after the UK and Denmark, while Denmark has substantially expanded trade with China. However, defining this relationship in direct leadership–followership relations would be superficial, as both partners substantially differ in their ideological orientations. Tightening economic relations with China is beneficial, but exposes Denmark to the Beijing practice of employing trade as an economic weapon to advance its geopolitical and political aims. Chinese reactions after the Danish Prime Minister met the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, in 2009, leave no illusion that Denmark can be an exception in this regard. So, leadership–followership relations between state actors extend the simple equation based on reciprocity, as their interactions are multidirectional – the bilateral dimension is just one layer of the complicated structure of linkages. Parties never operate in a vacuum; on the contrary their choices are dictated by considerations provided by different kinds of relationship with financial markets, military alliances, resource providers, or diaspora.

c) The followership of transnational firms

Global social space is to a great extent composed of economic organisations, ranging from transnational corporations through technological start-ups, international experts and governing bodies. Transnational corporations have been recognised as “the leviathans of globalization” (Chandler and Mazlish, 2005), being “non-territorial spaces and management systems” (Ruggie, 2004) and proved to be especially well prepared for benefiting from global economic and social integration. Economic actors (private and public) have always played prominent roles as opinion leaders and social change agents, but in the global era, given their unprecedented presence in markets, they have become prominent mediators between individual needs and policies shaping the economic system. Their position within the leadership–followership dichotomy in the global arena is ambiguous, as they both serve as agents of change and find themselves in a relationship of dependency. The story about the role of economic organisations in shaping globalisation and global relations is fragmented and highly contested. Global corporations have become the major point of reference for studies on transnational interaction and non-state actors have been increasingly influential on the international scene since the 1980s.

Within the debate about global problems, economic organisations are often portrayed in negative terms as sustaining the modern type of imperialism, based on exploitation of natural resources, structural deficits in developing states, and social capital in the highly developed world: “they are rootless in ecological and social senses, displaying no real interest in the places they happen to function” (Polanyi, 1944). As Ciulla and Scharding (2019) put it:

The institutional setting of today’s mainstream business helps to dilute responsibility. It is a system in which the pursuit of profits is the only ultimate goal and where the externalization of costs upon society, future generations and nature is not an unfortunate exception, but the rule.

Within the spectrum of these debates, firms are viewed as impersonal entities, distinct from the actual people making the organisational structures. This impression is only deepened by the complexity of financial systems, which makes ownership and accountability even more blurred and impersonal. Although corporations are embedded in the national regulatory frameworks of nation states, they have long been considered to be increasingly independent and “out of control”, creating market trends, exploiting gaps in tax and regulatory systems, protecting their interests through strategic lobbying, corrupting state institutions in unstable regions to exploit their resources and populations. Integrated markets allow them to move between jurisdictions to avoid unfavourable labour and environmental regulations (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). George Ball suggested that transnational corporations should

be treated as “citizens of the world” (Ball, 1967: 29) to resolve the problem of their lack incentives to preserve and provide public goods.

Corporate expansion has been excoriated for its neglect of the public good, but also praised for increasing employment opportunities for populations of developing countries, contributing to their rise out of poverty, creating a business infrastructure and human capital base. While taking leadership positions in technological innovation and shaping global economic reality, powerful firms can be considered followers in the context of market regulations, consumers’ expectations and public image. The environmental and social harms of corporate actors, as well as their potential for being drivers of change, increased popular pressure from consumers and the general public: “stakeholder and special interest groups are increasingly well organized, and becoming more vocal and encompassing in the demands they make on businesses” (Whetten et al., 2002: 402). The private sector is involved in constant interaction with consumers and other stakeholders – all of these actors produce conditions and meaning that between them shape the leadership–followership dynamic. The major economic consensus linking economic growth per capita with human well-being and the social cohesion dominant in the 20th century reinforced business. It was a great provider of wealth and progress. The decline of this paradigm due to increased climate and social hazards revealed that the current phase of growth is increasingly uneconomic – its costs overshadow its benefits, tipping the scales in favour of social actors. Business performance increasingly depends on the reputation and power of social connections, so that various forms of contributing to global/local public goods provision are incorporated into competitiveness strategies.

Awareness of the limitations of the current version of global capitalism creates not only space for social innovation but also pressure for change. The judicial enforcement of corporate accountability for climate change indicates the direction of transformations. Transnational corporations are power holders in many areas, yet they have to follow the demands of the consumer base. A wave of lawsuits against fossil fuel companies that are delaying action on climate change or ceasing public contracts with firms accused of human rights violations illustrates the character of this dependency network. The urgency of global environmental problems reflected by the growing awareness of consumers has forced corporations to follow sustainability standards and engage in the development of green technologies. They responded to pressure exercised by the stronger actors in the system and were forced to follow the rules of powerful regulators. The extra-territoriality of American law and the mechanics of the EU’s single market global regulatory power, known as the “Brussels Effect” (Bradford, 2020) enforces compliance with the standards. The European Commission (EC) decision to block the merger between General Electric and Honeywell that had been approved by the US Department of Justice or the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that reached global impact illustrate power struggles over control

and the market influence between states and corporate actors. The dense networks of interaction displayed by economic leaders makes them a reservoir of global power and possible advocates of positive trends. This picture is, however, often overshadowed by a reluctance to take responsibility for the state of distribution of global public goods.

In the global policy arena, states, individuals, and transnational corporations have their own distinct areas of engagement, but they are also in constant interaction. Their contribution to the protection and provision of global common goods takes many forms, but they also often engage in rivalries. The issue of global common goods is often a bargaining chip in the game of power and influence but, more than anything, it is where interdependencies are inevitably revealed. The overall quality of life of individuals depends on the extent to which common goods are secured by the state, but multinational corporations also participate in ensuring economic stability and providing jobs, in this way becoming centres of innovation and technological development.

In order to attract the best talent, corporations offer various forms of “corporate citizenship”, providing substantial social support to employees who are then drawn closer to their orbit of influence. The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) brought businesses into the sphere of rendering services for the common good, but their motivations are often primarily associated with image building and the pursuit of profit. A sign of companies’ deeper involvement in the provision of common goods is the expansion of the CSR concept with a political component, resulting in Political Social Responsibility (PSR). As Scherer et al. (2016: 276) explain: “those responsible business activities [that] turn corporations into political actors, by engaging in public deliberation, collective decisions, and the provision of public goods or the restriction of public bads in cases where public authorities are unable or unwilling to fulfil this role”. Corporate actors are increasingly bold, stepping in where the state is unwilling or unable to perform its functions, forcing the two sides to cooperate, to create synergies. In this system, individuals hardly remain solely in a position of subordination. To a large extent, it is public engagement, activists’ influence and local versions of global environmental and human rights, as well as fair trade movements that determine where various issues are placed on governments’ agendas.

By the freerider logic, governments have no incentive to invest in solving global problems, but this is created for them by public pressure. The same citizens, acting as consumers, redirect the attention of corporate governments from the goals of sole profit to those of sustainable profit. Through public–private partnerships, national governments become better at delivering on their promises while providing improved conditions for social and economic development. Governments are aware that without powerful commercial organisations and their technological and innovative potential such development will not be possible, hence the network of dependencies becomes increasingly dense. In this web of interrelationships, the leader–follower relationships

determine the range of mutual interaction. On a structural level, this relationship will be subordinate to the regulatory and legal layer. Nominally, it is the state that controls citizens and economic actors, setting the rules and the consequences of their violation. This clear-cut relationship can only be seen at the level of structural leadership. In the sphere of cognitive leadership, the individual gains agency and is able to actively influence ideas and hierarchies of values, initiate collective action and force social change. If the result of the desired transformation is regulation, the state again takes control. In the realm of relational leadership, the interests of the three parties involved intersect – public institutions, businesses and citizens seek opportunities to influence each other, but also combine efforts to have an impact on other actors in the system. This dynamic of interaction within the nation state is embedded in a network of external, transnational dependencies. Corporations evaluate performance in a global context, spreading standards and ideologies. Individuals' mental horizons are shaped through their participation in global communication, educational and economic space.

The position of the state is influenced by the evaluation of private regulatory entities – rating agencies determine its ability to function in the global financial market, PISA controls the quality of the education system, international legal regimes and organisations control standards, set rules and sanctions. The interconnected system of links determines the character of the connections between actors; roles in this system are formed in a flexible manner, and leaders in some areas are followers in others. The way of seeing one's own position and the direction of one's aspirations determine actors' goals. If they coincide, it is this synergistic cooperation that allows for the reduction of transaction costs and strengthening of the resilience of the entire system; if they diverge, resources proliferate, needs go unsatisfied and the protection of global common goods loses its importance.

Psychological dimension of leadership–followership relations

With the development of social sciences, many mechanisms of human behaviour have been closely observed and analysed, as they became useful in explaining and designing leadership practices. The very notion of leadership is rooted in psychological dimensions; charisma and personality traits are seen as a source of influence over followers, so the individual features of leaders are not important *per se* but in the context of relations with followers. Behaviours of the most prominent leaders in the history of the world have been described through the lens of their personality. Tyrants, like Hitler or Kim Jong-il have been considered “malignant narcissists”, “self-absorbed”, “paranoic”, and passionate about promulgating their own personality cult with a strong belief in force (Post, 2004). These are rare cases though, in which there is no doubt that the vision and actions of the leader shaped the course of affairs; in other cases, the construct of impersonal forces has been used to cover individuals' bad decisions.

The argument between those treating history as being the result of impersonal forces and those who see it as a story of the “Great Man” in power is as old as civilisation. While Socrates appreciated the collective power of citizens of Athens – the Demos – Plato linked the condition of the city with a perfectly enlightened ruler – the philosopher-king. Modes of explaining the course of international politics have been dominated by structural outlook, focused on group actors, especially states. While their behaviours have at times been linked to the psychological conditions of their leaders, states were generally long treated as “black boxes” constrained by their structural position.

The notion of impersonal forces sometimes just overshadow the responsibility of political leaders to provide the impulse for events of great magnitude, which, as in the case of the First World War (WWI), altered the lives of millions for years to come (Ferguson, 1998). Interestingly, the very choice of story in which given events are presented and explained is also an illustration of the psychological condition of leaders, scientists or interpreters. Certainly not all of the identified patterns and modes of operation in world politics are reducible to psychological laws. However, since human nature has always been at the core of international theories, psychological tools and concepts can be helpful when incorporated into political life as one of the components among economic, structural and cultural conditions: “It is unquestionably simplistic to claim that History=Biography (...) It is however equally reductionist to claim that an understanding of individual persons and their psychological processes has nothing to contribute to analysis of the history of groups, social movements, institutions and nations” (Runyan, 1988).

Leaders have been observed and studied by behavioural scientists interested in the mechanism of their effectiveness and impact in order to reveal how their psychological state and internal competences are connected to the way they form and execute visions. Bandura (1982) proposed the self-efficacy construct to explain how self-confidence influences performance. The integrative theory of leadership by Chemers et al. (2000) analysed leader self-confidence and personality factors that impact leader-behaviour intentions. Goal theory (Locke and Latham, 1994) presents the way in which individuals can self-regulate their thoughts, motivation and behaviour.

While the psychological outlook is natural and common in political leadership analysis, the personalities and predilections of followers was not subject of particular scrutiny at all, despite recognition that the nature of the group imposes specific requirements on the leadership process, which is often critical for its success. By definition, psychology studies individuals but provides patterns that are reflected in group behaviour. A similar gap can be detected in IR studies. There has been debate in literature regarding whether or not states can be rational actors, and psychological reasoning has been introduced into the way in which national identities and cultural norms are explained, although psychology has been largely absent from the curriculum. This clashes with references to the psychological reasoning that has been increasingly applied in order to describe social and international politics, collective

action successes and failures and political decision making. Accounts of the most prominent events shaping the dynamics of the international environment are filled with human emotions, relationship issues, vulnerabilities; traumas do not only guide leaders' actions, they are also equally important in shaping the context in which the relationship between followers and the leader is developed. The ability to recognise and manage group emotion is considered to be a basic leadership competence. However, the findings of social psychology and behavioural decision theory are rarely considered to be a source of explanation in international or global politics. There is no way to detect with precision interlinkages between the psyche and the result; however, different branches of psychology offer concepts and discoveries that certainly expand our understanding of global political processes.

The evolution of human physiology has been linked to the evolution of human sociality – they always have been and inevitably remain interrelated. These relationships are created by neurological and social transformation: functioning in groups larger than cohorts or tribes was conditioned and accompanied by changes in the neurobiological system of individuals. Individual minds have to be adjusted to the more complex social situations and develop ways in which to navigate through an ever-growing combination of potential situations and responses that together create a social mind. Social ties, coexistence and the introduction and execution of complicated rules based on abstract ideas of justice or freedom all require sophisticated social cognitive skills. Individuals are forced to constantly adapt in order to expand control and cooperation of their social structures, and forced to develop a whole variety of traits enabling conflict resolution, family, food sharing, group living, empathy, dominance/submission, cooperation, collective decision making, etiquette, rituals and distribution of resources. Many of the dilemmas important for survival are purely political in nature; they concern alliances and conflicts (with whom to cooperate and with whom to fight?), resource distribution and ownership (who should I share with, what do I own?), creation of norms and violation (who should impose obligation, judge and punish?). Although political discourse and processes are immersed in different contexts and have various regulatory dimensions, today they still have at their essence a set of basic questions about identity, belonging, pride and humiliation, which have their distinct psychological expressions (Haidt, 2012).

The “cognitive revolution” that has a firm imprint on recent developments in social psychology has introduced new analytical categories to the study of foreign policymaking. Information-processing frameworks, cognitive balance, dissonance theories and social perception have also become present in the analysis of patterns of followers' reactions and behaviours. This prism has altered the view of man, who is seen as an active agent able to take autonomous decisions, change his attitudes through learning and transform the realities around him. The traditional dichotomy between an active leader and subjugated follower has been once more put under question.

The behavioural aspect of political life

Historically, political behaviours of individuals have mainly been studied through institutions such as governments or political parties that produce mobilisation or impose constrain. In contrast to these trends, political events have long been described with reference to psychological conditions of social anger, avoidance, fatigue, stress or panic. Emotions are the driving force behind the system of the evolution of beliefs, triggering new needs that transform institutions and rules of social life. The recognised patterns of reactions such as the “rally around the flag effect” or “political apathy” are rooted in the specific psychological states of followers. The first refers to the reaction to a crisis or attack that bolsters support for the political leadership, as people are highly motivated to maintain a positive view of the groups to which they belong, especially in the face of threat. The second refers to the reluctance to improve public areas, low political participation and lack of psychological feeling of attachment to public affairs. Political psychology reveals individual motivations that guide these behaviours, the way people make sense of the world and how they deal with its complexities, providing the picture of global transformation more completely.

There is no certain, and definitely no easy way to link the internal, psychological conditions of political actors (both leaders and followers) with the course of IR. Individual, personal motivations are hidden from the public eye and presented as rationalised and justified policies. One of the factors that could have played a role in the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq was a desire for revenge. President G. W. Bush was seeking an opportunity to punish Saddam Hussein for his attempt to assassinate Bush’s father in 1993. The change of political course in Poland, from pro-liberal to nationalistic, confrontational and authoritarian is often linked with trauma experienced by Jarosław Kaczyński, the dominant political figure in the country, who lost his twin brother in a plane crash. In 2010 Lech Kaczyński, President of Poland at the time, died in a plane catastrophe over the Russian city of Smolensk along with top-ranking members of the Polish military and members of Parliament. After the tragedy, the remaining twin reinforced his political influence, and the radical change of course in Poland according to some commentators is a manifestation of the psychological condition of the nation’s leader, who is “simply gripped by anguish, vengeance and paranoia, and is dragging his country along with him” (Santora, 2018).

The ability to influence group perception, to shape the “public mind” is a necessary component of effective political leadership. Political events – conflicts, problems and alliances – are waged largely in words and symbols aimed at “individual minds”, so both state behaviour and group behaviour processes can be explained by using insights rooted in cognitive sciences. Global macroprocesses reveal that in many areas, the balance between cooperation and self-interest has been disturbed; cognitive biases and psychological phenomena take them beyond a cost–benefit type analysis. This

also influences perception of the well-established patterns of actor–structure relation that have long organised the way in which the international scene has been described. Human nature, cognitive powers and decision-making frameworks heavily influence some of the crucial political strategies of today’s world. We might argue that climate change inertia and inability to redesign coal policies is an example of the misperception occurring in multipolar international environments. States mistakenly count on others to take care of introducing the new order. The fundamental question of these realities would be that misperception keeps the world in a clinch. Political leaders, who consider environmental policies too risky for their constituencies, and political followers who are not ready to face change and put pressure on their leaders resulting in their resistance, create the condition of inertia.

Many other puzzles of the international system can be expressed in the micro-level categories and casual mechanisms that guide behaviours. People’s attention can be guided and their use of information is selective. During the Cold War era, Soviet leaders presented the West as decadent, degenerate and threatening. This image becomes familiar to the Russian public, especially because exposure to this message has been continued into the Putin era. Rules employed by the Russian political leader in the 21st century, in terms of the “manipulation of public emotion [...] and by undermining the institutions of the West and the ideals of the West” (Applebaum, 2014: 30), has long been practised and perfected by secret services – the KGB and the FSB.

Just as persistency of political opinions can be supported by cognitive mechanisms, a sudden change of approach can also find an explanatory framework within cognitive psychology mechanisms. The perception of Josef Stalin among US policymakers underwent a radical change in a relatively short period of time; from a friendly ally “Uncle Joe”, the celebrated leader of the Soviet Union, America’s ally against Germany, became a symbol of oppression and an expansionistic force. The learning process is one of the conditions under which attitudes change. In the case of US policymakers, the major learning framework in 1949 was provided by US Ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan. In his 5,540-word telegram, which history recognises now as a “long telegram”, he put forward the argument for the isolation and containment of the Soviet Union, instead of emphasising cooperation. Interestingly, Kennan presented the Soviet leadership at the time as mentally ill, suffering “a psychosis which permeates and determines [the] behavior of [the] entire Soviet ruling caste” (cited in Costigliola, 1997). The vivid description of the nature of the Russian personality created patterns of reasoning that US policymakers employed in building strategies towards communism and Soviet politics for the next two decades.

There are various approaches presenting explanatory variables of influence and attitude change: social network analysis (Barabási, 2016); psychological theories of communication and persuasion (Berger, 1997); theories of procedural and distributive justice (Kim and Mauborgne, 1991; Caney, 2005;

Pogge, 2008); theories of cross-cultural psychology (Berry et al., 2002). They are rooted in traditions of social psychology and highlight the importance of similar factors, such as the nature of the relationship between communicating partners, their individual characteristics or features of the situation. The cognitive approach tries to distinguish between what is universal and what is particular in the way people think and how human cognitive mechanisms respond to external influences and how they are shaped by them. The distinction between universal and particular types of relationships and interlinks between them presents one of the major puzzles of global leadership: how to shape problems in such a way that they can be understood by people coming from different parts of the globe and representing different political positions. An article entitled “The weirdest people in the world?” (Henrich et al., 2010) highlights the bias of behavioural science, which bases its conclusions on a non-representative type of research subject, namely WEIRD subjects (Western, educated, industrialised, rich, democratic). The portrait of human cognition represented in the experimental studies is probably flawed, as are popular Western concepts that have the potential to shape the way of thinking in methods which might radically bias conclusions we draw about the world. Location matters no less than technology and public participation patterns. Cognitive psychological analysis of world politics is reminiscent of a constructivist programme, as it is concerned with the way information is processed and limitations of the human perception system. The exposure effect and other biases are especially important given the widespread adoption of social media transforming the way citizens encounter, seek, and engage with news and political information.

Once there were three networks that saw it as their responsibility to cover the news events in an objective way. Then people realized they could cover the news in such a way that they could turn a profit. Today, we have partisan cable news networks and clickbait “news” websites that feed off of political disagreement. They’re making money by energizing polarized audiences.

(Jost, cited in Weir, 2019)

Informal arenas of political debate and contestation grew in prominence as platforms of the formation of political sentiments. Citizens of many countries navigate all aspects of their social lives through digital communication and they use it as channels for change in terms of individuality, self-identity and self-expression. Cyberspace has also facilitated the fragmentation and radicalisation of political communication. Intense emotions, such as hate and lust, which are not that common in traditional media, such as newspapers or mainstream media channels, have grown to be increasingly present online. It has generally been confirmed that people automatically pay more attention to negative information in the environment, perhaps reflecting in-built responses to danger (Rozin and Royzman, 2001). The “politics of division” (Wheatley,

2019) guiding the Brexit campaign or the US presidential elections in 2016 and 2020 widely adopts this emotional mechanism to mobilise collective action.

The way people are is reflected in their behaviour. So what they feel and experience emotionally is inevitably one of the factors in developing relations and constructing realities. Individual features are important because they take part in the formulation of external realities. Self-esteem, although individual, is basically social in nature, as the way it is formed is strictly connected with interaction in the surrounding society. Psychologically resilient people make a resilient society; intellectually independent people tend to be critical towards their elites and rational in their assessment of events. This is because voting decisions, conflict and support belong to the sphere of individual identification, manifesting beliefs and expectations.

Psyche of “the global”. People invented social institutions in order to secure their needs – to find a secure place for themselves. Several social psychological models (for example, terror-management theory, uncertainty-management theory and anxiety-based formulations of authoritarianism) emphasise the idea that people are motivated to see the world as a secure/predictable place and in their public activities they seek an actual and/or symbolic sense of security. This trend is on the rise, as conditions of modernity facilitate anxiety introducing several factors of instability to the family, professional life and other types of trust relations. Although every historical period from the Industrial Revolution has been marked by profound change at the social and technological level, never before has the majority of the population had the level of access to information and capabilities of building narratives that link individual faith with the surrounding dynamics as they have now. Now, for the first time in the history of human evolution, the shadow of “the global” accompanies most societies in their everyday activities. Therefore, political behaviour is a product of complex interaction between the individual personality and features of the micro-environment and the macro-environment. Followers can be politically vocal at the transnational level. They are concerned with global problems as those problems directly shape their own lives: global politics, transporting some of the characteristics which were previously located at the level of macro-environment (like global issues, international organisations’ policies) to the level of micro-environment. The scale of involvement, opinion and emotions associated with different dimensions of the global is unprecedented. Emotions and psychological programmes have always steered the actions of individuals and groups, yet the psychological condition of societies is increasingly reflected in the diagnosis of global trends, problems and potential solutions to them. Poverty and desperation produce grievances, pushing people to terrorism, criminality and drastic forms of protest. A sense of historical injustice and ethnic animosities have long been indicative of factors of post-conflict management, diplomacy and cultural adaptation. Until recently, analyses of the common psyche were limited to cases of extreme oppression, genocide or prolonged insecurity,

but an increasing body of research presents them as factors shaping social dynamics in the national or regional context. Psychosocial studies combine individual and group perspectives in order to widen the analytical framework for analysis of social and political processes. This approach can also be applied to major global processes which are not only widely discussed at venues of international politics but are also increasingly reflected in the psychological conditions of individual citizens. Answering the question of how global politics is changing is related to the observation about how people around the world are changing, how they respond to new contexts created by technologies and modernity and whether individual responses are reflected in the general condition of societies. The links between the global and the psychological condition of individuals can be observed in many areas, of which the following are the subject of vibrant political debates:

Climate anxiety. The language of climate change communication is often fear-based in order to promote precautionary motivation and stress the importance of the problem. The tone of the discourse has been stated by one of the most prominent early analyses of the issue – the *Limits of Growth* report published by the Club of Rome in 1972 – which presented a bleak scenario of the collapse of human and earth systems in the 21st century due to population growth and environmental degradation (Meadows et al., 1972). Thus, for many decades, people have been exposed to the prospect of the increasingly powerful consequences of environmental harm, from rising temperatures and heat waves, through floods, tornadoes, hurricanes and droughts, to the disappearance of rivers and forests and the constantly shrinking Arctic. These prospects cause psychological reactions on a global basis. The mental-health outcomes of climate change manifest themselves in different forms from minimal stress and distress symptoms to clinical disorders, ranging from anxiety and sleep disturbances to depression, post-traumatic stress, and suicidal thoughts (US Global Change, 2016; Ursano et al., 2017). In response to growing eco-anxiety and various type of biospheric concern, psychotherapists are pioneering a new field of treatment, termed “eco-psychology” that covers different manifestations of eco-anxiety and solastalgia. The sociologist, Kari Marie Norgaard (2011), using methods of ethnography and the sociology of emotions explains the psychological influence of ecological threats and their social ramifications. The way people feel influences their choices, thus contributing to social change. Climate change and ecological threats are commonly considered to be important by an increasing number of people globally, which will not only create greater political pressure but will fuel political instability. Eco-anxiety seems to be a growing trend. Even in countries not yet directly affected by devastation due to climate change, there are numerous signs of personal and clinical accounts of subclinical depressive emotions, despair and guilt associated with the climate crisis and other global environmental issues (Pihkala, 2018). Climate-connected disorders and anxieties are increasingly noted by mental-health professionals and, although not yet formally

considered a diagnosable condition, recognition of eco-anxiety and its complex psychological responses is increasing.

Migration and meeting “the other”. Cross-border migration has become a symptom of the global era, marked by free flows of people, money and goods. Within recent decades, the number of migrants has grown and they now account for over 3 per cent of the global population; 86 per cent of the world’s refugees reside in a low- or middle-income country compared with 70 per cent 20 years ago (UNHCR, 2015, 15; Edwards, 2016). This trend will continue and its transformation into new sources of migration is being added to the global catalogue. People have always been escaping war and tyranny, now they not only escape poverty on a grand scale but also escape the dramatic consequences of climate change or search for places that could offer them better education or medical care. The figure of a migrant in the political realm exemplifies “the other” – a representative of a different species that is hard to understand and is often perceived as being hostile. It has become the major tool for the politics of fear.

The question of migrants induces anxiety because both media coverage and political narrative are oriented at this effect. The figure of a migrant is an ideal aim for political instrumentalisation, often playing the role of a scapegoat and being constantly criminalised and demonised. The narrative surrounding migrants indicates both state security and individual security risks, as the migration issue is the subject of bargaining between directly affected rich and poor countries. During the 2015 migration crisis, the Greek foreign minister declared that the Greek state would collapse if the EU did not agree favourable compensation for Greek efforts to manage migration flows (Tsourapas and Zartaloudis, 2021).

At the press conference organised by the Polish government at the moment of the migration crisis on the border with Belarus, pornographic scenes involving animals and children were displayed as one of the materials allegedly found among migrants’ possessions. Attitudes towards migrants was one of the imprints of Donald Trump’s presidency. In Hungary, the autocratic government demonises Muslim immigrants even though the country has hardly any due to their exceedingly restrictive immigration laws. Waves of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa are often presented in terms of security challenges. Fears about terrorism and crime add to traditional economic worries about the effects of large immigration flows on labour markets, housing markets, schooling, social services and government spending. They also create anxiety about the political, social and economic consequences of large population inflows (Halla et al., 2015).

In states with no tradition regarding migrants, the deterrence paradigm results in new draconian regulations preventing access for migrants, while in traditionally pro-migrant states, a shift in the shaping of these policies is visible. In the USA in the 1970s immigrants were perceived in a positive light, which was expressed in their earnings and social prospects. Several decades

later, the dominant view, which has been heavily exploited in political debate, is that migrants harm the opportunities of natives (Card, 2005). Historical examples and more recent interpretation of economic processes favourable to the presence of migrants don't seem to be convincing for the general public in many countries. Thomas Piketty (2013) says that immigration still boosts growth and, to some extent, addresses the most urgent problem of inequality. The result of immigration inflows on local markets in recent periods of turbulent change are inconclusive, but there are indications that immigration is beneficial for local communities in terms of diversity, corporate investments and the adoption of technology (Foged and Peri, 2016; Clemens et al., 2018). On the other side of the spectrum are persuasive cases of social ghettos, numerous failures in the social adjustment of immigrants and their children, a growing sense of ritualised grievances among immigrant populations that build their political agenda on the narrative of exclusion and inequality of opportunities. Integration, embedded in the basic understanding of globalisation, does not work automatically.

The challenge is to balance the need for foreign labour and the commitment to human rights for those migrants seeking economic opportunity and political freedom. Stigmatisation of migrants and prevention of their integration within societies, as well as promotion of a rhetoric aimed at radicalising the distinction between “us” and “them” are often used as part of instrumental political strategies. The issue of migrants, like many other global problems, has no easy solutions, but in the context of global coherence, the narrative that surrounds it is especially damaging. Migrants have become synonymous with unwanted people, marginalised and stigmatised, people from which other parts of the world need to be protected. These policies draw a line between rich and poor nations and between islands of prosperity and lands that are deemed to fail, especially given that the “migration solution” also has a purely territorial dimension. Australian migrant policies are managed by directing refugees to Papua New Guinea or Nauru where they are detained until determination procedures are completed. This direct spatial distancing of refugee camps and procedures symbolises that restrictive migration control policies are a major strategy in addressing the issue of rising numbers of asylum seekers. The level of tension surrounding dramatic accounts of migrants' life-risking travels contribute to misreading the overall dynamics of migration. Building “siege mentality” is one of the reactions to failures of interventionistic or protective policies that were meant to stop inflows (Parkers, 2020). The USA and Australia embraced strategies of distancing migrants, while the EU aimed to reduce drivers of immigration using trade, aid and technical support.

*Technology development.*¹ In visions popularised at the end of the 20th century, globalisation was associated with modernisation. Global production and distribution of goods was easily associated with the newest achievements of high-tech industry and presented as an engine for economic and social

development. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and Google have all been cited as important components in social revolutions, including those in Tunisia, Egypt, Iceland, Spain and the global Occupy movement. The change has been profound, transforming the way international activism works and power relations evolve. Nevertheless, a growing number of analysts diminish the effects of the technical revolution and its impact on shaping a global future. Paul Krugman notices that the fruits of technological revolutions were rather more “fun than fundamental”, while Sherry Turkle comments on communication technologies using moral panic narratives (Turkle, 2008, 2011). The techno-pessimistic sentiment fits into the general frames of the decline of globalisation. Trust in technology – once seen as a solution for global problems – has also been eroded for purely economic reasons. The main controversy is that technological growth changed the underlying structure of the economy, influencing the link between value creation and job creation. In future, when many (perhaps even most) work tasks will be fully automated, diverse systems will guide human life inducing fear and feelings of loss of control. People are increasingly displaced by machines, the labour force is under increasing pressure, with the shrinkage of jobs in many sectors and a growth of jobs assured only in personal services and technology. Some forecasts predict that better industrial automation and other forms of technological advancement will create a situation in which a minority of the labour force (around 15 per cent) will have a standard of living equivalent to today’s majority (Cowen, 2013). Technological progress promises to tackle if not solve some of the world’s urgent problems; it also carries the potential to manipulate human biology, behaviours and the environment.

Surveillance capitalism (Bellamy-Foster et al., 2014; Zuboff, 2015) has introduced new mechanisms into the relations of power between governments, state agencies, advertisers and internet monopolies. The whole range of institutional agents is able to gather, control and capitalise on individual data. This potential not only requires regulatory and security efforts but is also a source of anxiety. Apart from problems of governance and global issues, the public agora holds debates that generate intense disagreement over what is morally acceptable and fundamentally challenges traditional definitions of what defines human beings, human groups and definitions of “self” and “other”. Public anxiety plays a major role in the security domain and changing security strategies. Societies have grown fractured by a fall in trust and mounting threats to data privacy, security and reliability. Major technological advances change the way people love, hate and engage; furthermore, users are exposed to increased risks of manipulation – high tech algorithms of computer games, social media and online shopping directly influence human autonomy, causing psychological reactions. Social media’s connections to dopamine distributing mechanisms, compulsion loops and other neurobiological patterns of human reactions have been widely studied, shedding different light on the autonomy of users and indicating social media platforms as power brokers in relationships (Sunstein, 2017; Deibert, 2019; Zarsky, 2019). Development of social media

systems, on which user is both producer and consumer, relies on psychological research and “attention engineers” that are constantly improving the instrument to enhance their ability to guide users’ behaviour. There are suggestions that psychological experiments that have been unproven or criticised serve as a base for such developments (Hamilton, 2018). Technologies are commonly considered to have similar effects to drug or alcohol abuse. They create needs and sensations that become embedded into everyday experience of techno-modernity. Zygmunt Bauman (2005) indicated “immediacy” as a new paradigm, built on a notion of instantaneous contact and bearing the promise of immediate fulfilment.

Development and adoption of new ways of life and technologies are producing a range of ethical and social issues around the world. The new digital divide widens inequality, advanced technology can supplement and replace humans’ limited cognitive processing and AI models and algorithms are being adopted for the most sensitive areas of social and individual life, such as criminal justice or medical diagnosis. Technology constitutes an important mechanism of economy and is a part of geopolitics as well as individual cognition. Therefore, a pessimistic fearful attitude towards techno-science has many dimensions and gives insight into the general human condition. In this context, Martin Heidegger’s (1977) interpretation of technology may be conclusive – he sees technology not as a skill or practice but rather as a vision, a perspective that changes the way things are comprehended. In his essay “The age of the world picture” Heidegger maintains that in ancient Greece the word *techné* was not used as an indication of the act of creation or as “a means to an end” but rather as a lens showing reality in a certain light, opening new ways of understanding the world. *Techné* is linked to possibilities (it “brings-something-forth into presence”) and knowledge enabling the expansion of man’s rational power. Following this pattern of thinking, current dependence on technology seems far more serious, not only depriving modern societies of their desire for new gadgets but also influencing their perception of how the world works.

A brave new world: The global middle class and challenges of leadership

The last half a century has brought the most rapid rise in incomes in history. Millions of people have been raised from poverty and obtained a safe level of economic stability that allows them to have control over their destinies. The period started in the 1990s and was marked by a sharp reduction in the rate of hunger, higher standards of living and improvement within major areas of the Human Development Index (HDI), including near-universal access to education, the empowering effects of internet technologies and betterment of the status of women around the world (EUISS, 2012). Poverty reduction, despite regional differences, has been global, as since the early 1980s, improvements have been noted at a resoundingly similar pace in all regions. The main

illustration of these achievements has been the emergence of a middle class in Asia and in Latin America, where the middle-class population has expanded by 50 per cent in just six years, household incomes have grown and economic inequality has fallen for reasons of market incomes and social programmes (Ferreira et al., 2013). The unprecedented size of the new middle classes, likely to reach over half of the world by mid-century (UNDP, 2013, 14), is redesigning many aspects of systemic equilibrium – from resources pressures to energy distribution. While the global middle class reached its first billion around 1985, 150 years after the Industrial Revolution, the second billion was added 21 years later, in 2006 and the third in just another 9 years (Kharas, 2017). In 2016, around half of the world's population (3.6 billion out of 7.6 billion) belonged to the middle class (Kharas, 2017). The process has been considerably slowed down by the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemics: in 2020, about 150 million people were pushed out of this cohort (Kochhar, 2021). The greatest decline was noted in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), around 4.7 million people tumbled down the socio-economic ladder, finding themselves again in a situation of vulnerability or poverty. Covid-19 has revised but not reversed the middle-class trend, which is still identified as one of the most important phenomenon likely to shape both market structure and political arena over the next decades.

Historical meaning of middle class has been related to processes of modernisation and industrialisation in the countries of the West, creating an interplay between economic, social and cultural capital. In well-developed western states, the middle class has been associated with the power that guarantees stability of the system and steers the dynamics of political transformations. Global middle-class growth has been described mostly in terms of income, despite substantial differences in this respect between populations of western countries and the middle class in developing economies. As established by most of the research agencies (World Bank, OECD), middle-income people live on US\$10.01-US\$20 a day. It has been estimated that the US\$10 threshold, which is about five times higher than the World Bank global poverty line, can be considered enough to ensure basic economic stability. Thus, the life standards of the new middle class cannot be directly compared with the old middle class in western countries – in 2020, the official poverty line for a family of four in the USA stood at about US\$15.90 per person per day (in 2011 prices) (Kochhar, 2021). Thus, people who reached middle income globally will remain poor according to the standards of Western Europe or the USA.

The global middle class is only relatively well-off, but it is enough to bring about huge transformative potential. With the pace of the middle income trend, the fundamental question arises of whether reaching stable economic status would translate into some deeper meaning associated with social position and self-identification. Social mobility and status attainment are embedded within

the sociological and political understanding of the middle class (Treiman 1977; Bennett et al., 2008), being situated at the core of the transformational drive of the current moment in global history. It is not the economic position alone that changes the perspectives of this core social group but rather social traits and cultures that arise on the grounds of economic stability. This is why members of the middle class always played the role of guarantors of long-term sustained economic growth and the successful evolution of political institutions. By analogy, the recent emergence of large middle classes in the Asian, Latin American and African states is seen as a factor influencing global geographies of power – this social phenomenon may accelerate the chain of socio-political transformation far beyond these regions.

The individual has been liberated for the second time in modern human history. Enlightenment freed many in Europe from the coercion of the Church with its belief of predestination, and global middle-class formation liberated millions from economic constraints. The first liberation served as a precondition for secular cultural civic education and the development of modern society, while signs of the second are seen mostly on the markets and in transformation concerning the private rather than the public sphere. However, individual orientations and behaviours which are adopted and repeated by millions of people worldwide are not indifferent to the bigger picture of global stability and as a result, create trends shaping the direction of international order's evolution. Individuals and groups gained new possibilities for making choices and for transforming these choices into desired actions and outcomes; this freedom is associated with paving their own paths, and voicing their ideas and opinions becomes a source of personal identity, influencing macro-social processes (Heiman et al., 2012). However, a different scenario should also be taken into account, given the unstable position of new middle classes struggling to protect their own status. This attitude could have been reinforced with the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, which for the first time in decades, halted the growing trend. Greater uncertainty and growing economic risks may bring reinforcement of more conservative attitudes – once reaching the middle-class threshold, newcomers would behave in a more conservative way and prevent further social change. The developmental patterns that emerged at the end of the 20th century led in some cases to greater political participation and more stable institutions that uphold the rule of law, human rights and free markets. Globalisation has been central to these trends, bringing new challenges along the way, which have not, however, been mitigated by global institutions. While global economic integration has been remarkably successful in helping address inequality between nations, inequality within nations has grown, often with damaging domestic effects. Policymakers failing to realise the situation and unable to capture the complexities of globalisation often implement policies that exacerbate inequality (Krugman, 2019). The trajectory of growth of the global middle class definitely has an impact upon global trends in many areas of economic activity

from trade uncertainty, through greater inequality, to the middle income trap. Results of unequal distribution of wealth present one of the major challenges connected to the global middle-class rise, but the acceleration of global problems can also be seen in other important areas:

a) Environmental issues. The rise of the global middle class has been transformative for global economies because it has set a long-term consumption trend. The first decades of the 21st century have been marked not only by a significant shift in production and welfare since the 1990s but also by a global shift in the accompanying use of fossil fuels and CO₂ emissions. In 2017, China emitted more than the US (5.3 Gt CO₂) and the EU28 (3.5 Gt CO₂) combined (IEA, 2021). Higher incomes in rapidly expanding economies mean greater spending power and greater market participation. Consumption reflects transformation in diet, lifestyles, entertainment and the jobs market. A larger middle class undoubtedly contributes to higher carbon emissions and prompts increased competition for resources in global markets for oil, food and minerals. On the one hand, global markets are under pressure from the millions of people now aspiring to live their lives according to western standards, on the other, growing environmental problems could prevent these standards from spreading due to a lack of infrastructure securing safe water, good sanitation and hygiene conditions.

b) Social disintegration. The middle class revolution takes place predominantly in urban areas that have grown exponentially over the last decades. However, growth in urban areas is not sufficiently controlled, so it is disproportionate, exposing new and growing cities to the highest-impact risks. High population density increases the consequences of extreme weather events, health risks and the overloading of public services. Rapid city growth strains infrastructure in supporting more people, while growing inequality and greater awareness of it within the confines of a city setting are likely to increase social friction. Global urbanisation is more revolutionary than evolutionary so integrating social and spatial networks is becoming an issue of growing importance, as urbanisation does not equal inclusiveness. Identities and the sense of belonging are manifested through language, lifestyles and social practices, which are often hermetic. From the experience of three decades of urbanisation, one can draw the conclusion that sharing geographical space does not equate to contact. As a consequence, people grew divided both within cities, where newcomers have a different status from long-term residents, and between cities and provinces. Cities have become systems of economic betterment, but their function as systems of encounters or communication lags behind expansion. A new world that is being constructed is marked by segregation, expressed not only in restrictions in access to public services or other common pool resources but also at the basic level with regard to restrictions on contact, limiting prospects for cooperation (Freeman, 1978; Ostrom, 1999).

c) *New versus old middle-class paradox.* Two contradictory trends, the old middle class in the western world and a new middle class in developing countries, are shaping international realities today. The new middle classes are more likely to transform their newly gained autonomy into expanded life opportunities, even though their affluence is only relative. On the other hand, the old middle classes in western countries face growing frustration connected with more challenging market trends and the deterioration of their social position. It is a widespread conviction that the condition of western liberal democracies can be measured in the stability and prosperity of their middle class, which has been in a state of being undermined for several decades. The “malaise of the middle class” (Geiger, 1930) brought a general sense of anxiety, expressed in many forms of political unrest: Brexit, American and European populism and isolationism. Economic factors shape social expectations and beliefs to a great extent, so economic competition is easily transferred into the sphere of the public psyche, which makes it an important part of claims about failure of the liberal order. The position of the western middle class is also changing in the context of the global picture – western countries’ share of total global middle-class population is likely to drop from 11 per cent to 7 per cent in the forthcoming decades (NIC, 2012). American or European members of the middle class are able to fully benefit from the opportunities of a globalised economy, but their aspirations have been trimmed by the growth of precarious employment and by an increasingly polarised social structure. The percentage of the population falling below the national poverty line in advanced economies increased in 19 of 32 countries between 2007 and 2016, including France, Germany, Italy and Spain (NIC, 2021).

The empowered citizen and democratic decline

Creation of the global middle class has been acclaimed by international agencies and research bodies (Solava and Alkire, 2007; Hinchey, 2010; NIC, 2012; Rand Europe, 2015; Schutz, 2019) as an illustration of individual empowerment in action. The rise of millions of people from poverty meant that for the first time in history, the majority of people on the planet had gained the power to shape their own lives. Since the 1970s, the concept of empowerment has been broadly used in development studies, as well as in social psychology, public health, feminist studies, etc. It generally refers to marginalised groups which are struggling for public recognition and the results of this struggle are sometimes expressed in gaining access to resources, regulations or social rules. In the context of economic development, empowerment is understood in relation to the economic progress that *per se* eliminated the condition of economic deprivation, transforming other layers of the empowered group’s position. From education and health care to governance and economic policy, activities that seek to empower poor people are expected to increase development opportunities, enhance development outcomes and improve people’s quality of life.

Conceptualisation of the current moment in global social evolution stresses the possibility and direction of social change. The World Bank's (2013) report states that, for example:

[E]mpowerment is the process of enhancing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes. Central to this process are actions which both build individual and collective assets, and improve the efficiency and fairness of the organisational and institutional context which govern the use of these assets ... In essence, empowerment speaks to self-determined change.

The rise of the economic position certainly reinforces the agency of individuals, being the primary base of the culture of modernity. Individuals are perceived as entities that can make a difference, and this situation is often linked with the democratic political order defined as one offering the best conditions in which to exercise freedom (Archer, 2000). The notion of "the people" – borrowed from the preamble to the US's constitution – has long served as an instinctive point of reference in the western political lexicon, a key word to explain the spirit of democracy. It has long been expected that economic integration followed by individual empowerment results in the spread in the reign of "the people" across the globe, making the list of democratic states longer. Samuel Huntington's famous (1991) thesis of the third wave of democratisation has been drawn on for empirical data of democracy's expansion intensifying from the late 1970s. However, since the turn of the millennium, the process has been halted with a growing number of states shifting towards autocracy (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). The waves of democratisation from the 1970s and 1980s were directly connected with decolonisation, the end of the Cold War and economic processes of convergence – the fact that developed economies were growing faster than established economies. Today, it is not only the spreading of democracy that has been stopped, but even the most established world democracies suffer from political apathy, withdrawal from the "common" sphere and retreat from democratic values. Numerous studies have analysed the western culture of political avoidance (Rosenberg, 1954; Finifter, 1970; Amnå and Ekman, 2015; Zachara, 2020). Trust in political institutions such as parliamentary or legal systems is being undermined by technology and virtual participation that situates social gratification outside of political platforms. The phenomenon of "democratic deficit" (Norris, 2011) identifies the divergence between levels of satisfaction with the performance of democracy and public aspirations. While agency – the ability to act on behalf of what you value and have reason to value (Malhotra, 2003: 3) stands at the core of political participation, the number of expressed postulates clashes with the ability of most governance systems to address them, deepening social fragmentation and the sense of rejection.

Selectorate and winning coalition

The welfare and behaviour of followers determine the leader's strategies and orientations. Disengagement from politics observed in western democracies goes along with increased polarisation, which makes political leaders rely on stable party grounds, trying to expand the electoral base only within the narrow fraction of "swing" voters, without even trying to convince voters of the opposite side. Once in office, leaders want to remain in office (Mintz, 2004). Their strategies greatly depend on the configuration of their constituencies, discussed in theory by the "selectorate and winning coalition". As its title suggests, the whole game is about winning elections. In democratic systems, winning depends on the number of supporters – followers whose approval is necessary for the office holder to stay in office (winning coalition, W), which is recruited from the selectorate (S), meaning all people that have the right to take part in the leader's selection (de Mesquita et al., 2003). The large selectorates of modern liberal democracies reflect the core idea of the democratic system – the winning coalition size has to be large, being some portion (often around a half) of S. Small selectorates and small winning coalitions are typical for monarchies and military juntas. Autocracies tend to have a small W, although they experience considerable variation in the size of S. Types of policies and the survival of leaders are fundamentally influenced by these institutional variables. By generating support, leaders use the available goods which are being distributed among the whole population (public goods) or just among members of winning coalitions. Democracy in its nature presents better redistribution systems as leaders have to care about the support of the large number of voters, while in non-democratic systems, patronage, cronyism and corruption rather than the effective implementation of public policy are chosen as optimal choices. This changes when polarisation increases – voters are more sensitive to identity orientation than good governance factors. Mechanisms of polarisation change behaviours and attitudes towards political opponents. The distinction between "we" and "them" gain prominence, framing political competition is increasingly perceived as a zero-sum game. Those who are not with us are against us. A win for them means a loss for us. Cooperation or compromise is no longer possible (Carlin and Love, 2018). Under such circumstances, the primary factor for electoral choices is to keep the other group out of power, even at the cost of democratic erosion. Such perceptions eliminate the possibility of political cooperation and compromise (Carlin and Love, 2018; Carothers and O'Donohue, 2019). By fuelling ideological division and cultural wars, leaders shift the focus from political competition to identity, limiting the range of choice voters have. In such cases, democratic constraints of wide winning coalitions cease to work – supporting the leader in the position of power is seen as a matter of protecting "us" from a real threat.

It is indeed striking that emergence of the global middle class, being an unprecedented transformation of the global population, did not bring any substantial transformation of the ways in which politics is conducted. This put into question many popular views about interrelations between democracy and standards of living. Leading political economy models have been describing democratic systems as providing more public goods, and being more effective in income redistribution, than other governance models (Baum and Lake, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; Brown and Hunter, 2004). Citizens' choices have always been heavily correlated with their economic positions and views. A 2004 United Nations survey found that 54.7 per cent of respondents in Latin America would even choose a dictatorship if it would help to better address their economic problems (UNDP, 2004). Increased social tensions that have emerged on the basis of the relationship between democracy and markets in western countries also question the well-established view that democracies produce better social outcomes. The most widely told story of progress and prosperity is simple: open markets combined with a democratic system of governance provide the best results in terms of meeting the needs of individuals; so in places where the standard of living grew, social mobilisation has provoked demands for more freedom in other areas. Today, forces that brought economic freedom for many do not seem to be applicable to the advancement of democratic procedures.

The empowered individual has become the pivotal point for market forces, but in places where the specific culture of social cohesion hasn't been built deliberately, individualism, as a primary orientation of oneself, has contributed to its erosion. Apparently, the fact that citizens of western countries have been empowered for a long time has not strengthened their attitude towards engaged citizenship. Since ancient times, the figure of the enlightened citizen has played a crucial role in balancing forces between the establishment and popular views. Participation in politics and knowledge of public affairs have been considered part of culture and social status. Ancient agoras were replaced with coffee houses and private living rooms where citizens gathered to listen to music, talk about literature and discuss politics, public matters, etc. This was part of a lifestyle embedded in the intellectual construction of citizenship. Thus, it was commonly accepted that responsibilities of citizenship should not be seen solely in terms of paying taxes but should be expressed in other ways such as through involvement in the community, manifesting preferences and controlling the political establishment. Nurturing a middle ground was especially important in the context of the sustainability of democratic systems. When the middle class disappears, wrote Aristotle more than 2,000 years ago, the dominant voice in politics will belong to the poor, who are most interested in changing the wealth redistribution patterns. This, in turn, would provoke an authoritarian backlash of the elites, who would feel threatened in their positions: "The best constitution is one controlled by a numerous middle class which stands between the rich and the poor. For those who possess the goods of fortune in moderation find it easiest to obey the

rule of reason” (Aristotle, *Politics*, cited in Mulgan, 1977). Even despite the differences between Aristotle’s perspective and contemporary understanding of the essence of the democratic system, this reflection deserves attention. The best version of a governance system proposed by the Greek philosopher was a mixture of oligarchic and democratic institutions, and a strong middle class was needed to prevent constant conflict between rich and poor. According to this model, emergence of the global middle class increases the potential for peaceful and harmonious coexistence. The question is, however, whether this mechanism works only internally for the social strata of developing nations in which the middle class is expanding or universally, stabilising the international system as a whole. There is little doubt of the first scenario, in which reinforcement of the middle class builds the strength of the state. Their members are better educated, with social advancement they expanded their access to culture and the tools of individual empowerment. They are reinforcing their own, individual position, but it is unclear whether they reinforce social capital in their countries. Early studies analysing the phenomenon in East Asia and Southeast Asia also found widening gaps between the affluent upper middle class and the lower middle classes (Hsiao, 1999, 2001). The impact of new middle classes within the global outlook heavily depends upon the traits of economic developments and social perceptions of inequality as a factor of global justice. While there remains a dose of acceptance for the reality shaped by the Aristotelian concept of “proportional inequality” rooted in the fact that men are fundamentally unequal, Amartya Sen notices that “The concepts of equity and justice have changed remarkably over history, and as the intolerance of stratification and differentiation has grown, the very concept of inequality has gone through radical transformation” (Sen, 1973). With regard to global middle classes, the question then arises of whether their relatively inferior economic position would be the source of resentment or whether they would rather play a traditional stabilising position within the global equilibrium.

The big picture

One of the paradoxes of the global rise of the middle class that occurred on the basis of the liberal world order is the fact that instead of reinforcing this order, it contributes greatly to its erosion. Today, more people in the world enjoy a stable economic position and relative freedom than in any other moment in history. Global integration, intensely spreading technology and the wave of post-Cold War democratisation have provided new opportunities leading, in the case of many international players, to breaking with historical legacies of political instability and poverty. Wealth and political power have ceased to be an exclusive domain of the Global North. “The rise of the rest” (Zakaria, 2008) has been both a result and an illustration of the efficiency of globalised open markets and rule-based relations of the last period of global history. Appearance of the global middle class has obviously been connected

to the success of the Pax Americana, the relatively peaceful situation following the fall of the Iron Curtain, and the effectiveness of the spread of the market economy. However, the alliances, institutions and rules the USA created and upheld after WWII do not retain the dynamic and pace of the global world's transformation. The strength of international agreements regulating crucial issues of global coexistence, such as trade, arms control, environment, human rights – seem to be weakening. The triumph of the institutional and alliance architecture created during the Cold War, instead of strengthening the position of leading powers (the USA and Western Europe), brought reinforcement of non-western actors thus stimulating international competition. Naturally then, long-term leaders intend to limit the range of their international responsibilities and share the burdens of being the stabilising power with other players. These tactics, however, instead of introducing new rules of international coexistence and cooperation poured even more uncertainty into a system which was already disintegrating through the pace and magnitude of social and technological changes.

The USA severely undermined its international credibility by not being able to redefine its domestic and international aims in the period of transition from American hegemony to a multipolar world. From their initial reluctance to participate in the climate protection framework, through to the series of strategic mistakes from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan – leaving the country in full Taliban control – these policy failures signalised a strategic lack of vision with respect to America's role in the world. Both the USA and Europe tend to reorient their efforts from international engagement to solving urgent issues of domestic social incoherence and build resilience against the challenges of interdependence, represented by Covid-19 pandemics, cyberterrorism or migration flows. From the position of being at the forefront of global change, westerners have moved to the defender's position. Orientation on global expansion is being replaced by a focus on securing what's left from the triumphant years.

The first ever EU security strategy of 2003 expressed European aspirations to “share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (Solana, 2003), while the tone of the 2020 security strategy is definitely more inward oriented. It opens up with a declaration: “... we can leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens” and its conclusion states that “In an increasingly turbulent world, the European Union is still widely regarded as one of the safest and most secure places. However, this is not something that can be taken for granted” (EC, 2020). The increased mobility of empowered citizens of developing countries and the revisionist stance of autocratic governments greatly contribute to the shaky sense of security in the West. One of the lines of critique towards the post-war international order is that it was not global – not a world order but rather a western one. The past decades of stability and peace, not to mention prosperity were absent in the experience of many nations outside the western world. As a result, of the

major beneficiaries of the post-Cold War international configuration, it was predominantly China that grew to be its major contestator (despite benefiting greatly from it at the same time). The value system behind this order threatens the Chinese Communist Party's one-party rule, as it implies democratisation alongside economic development. As a consequence, instead of developing synergetic strategies that would strengthen the platform needed for dealing with global problems and global public goods distribution, governments gravitate towards unilateralism and protectionism.

Globalisation as a political programme has been widely abandoned. The system of international institutions that not only protected the interest of the West but also served as a platform for human rights promotion, economic convergence and social development is gradually eroding. A different dimension of the social layer of politics suggests that societies, specifically their group mentality, desires and ability to take action, will play a major role in the future quest for international position. Rather than being passive masses subordinated to the vision of its political leaders, empowered citizens, even in non-democratic systems are highly influential.

The People's Republic of China could in the future truly depend on its people. China has used its populations to leverage their international positions very effectively, but the peak of the labour flow to the market was reached a couple of years ago. The government now faces the task of transforming its human base into human capital while reorienting its economy from being export-based to being an internal market model. Within the social area, this process is, however, a double-edged sword as the market economy requires highly skilled, educated and creative people. A disciplined labour force is an asset for a processing-and-assembly economic model but is no longer an asset for an innovation-driven model. In the continuation scenario, expectation regarding its people is quite schizophrenic in the sense that they will be both empowered as economic actors and yet subjugated as political entities.

This lack of consistency in combining the individual entrepreneurship of the Chinese people with central planning could have facilitated the country's economic rise but might not be possible to stay unchanged in the long run. The Chinese government might be forced to reorient the economic model, just as it was constrained to shift its position on climate mitigation. The early phases of development relied on carbon-intensive industries and were supported by assertive rejection of environmental measures. However, with the rising human and economic costs of air pollution, water scarcity and soil contamination, political pressure for change has grown substantially and resulted in President Xi Jinping's promise that China will achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 (Government of China, 2021).

Despite the uniqueness of the Chinese culture that imprints group identity on individual strategies, the divergence between individual needs and the increasingly repressive system of governance inevitably produces tensions and political costs. Additionally, the rapid aging of China in the upcoming 20 to 30 years will increase pressure on basic public services and calls for urgent

improvement of old-age insurance systems and the medical insurance system as well as opportunities for social mobility and support for rural regions. People's expectations will influence the political agenda even further as for now "China seems to have the worst of both worlds: the worst of the political system under one-party rule and the worst of economic exploitation by naked capitalism" (Gao, 2015).

On the other hand, the Chinese government has the advantage of being able to introduce measures that are considered draconian in the western world, like the most advanced equipment to transform Chinese society into a surveillance state. The overall strategy of combating Covid-19 in China was also effective due to its ability to better influence individual behaviours by control, persecution and penalisation. The autocratic turn in many aspiring powers, like Brazil or India, is partially fuelled by the desire to better control social forces, to make the organisms of the state more steerable.

Turbulence experienced by western democracies implies searching for a middle-ground model. Due to changes in information and increased mobility, the institution of the state has to some extent lost control over the social identities of its people. Hybrid identity is both grounded in local culture and stems from an awareness of one's relation to the global world. While this system expands individual freedom, it undermines the knowledge-control and power-control regimes of states. Institutions of the state have fewer opportunities to discipline social relations and negotiate social orders, especially at a time when the western general public is disappointed with the evolution of the socio-economic model.

Traditional governing bodies, despite their legitimacy and unquestioned position, face difficulties in fulfilling their role. From being the main provider of security and prosperity, they have become complex problem solvers, expected to navigate people's lives, and govern all sorts of areas from services and infrastructure to health and well-being. Technology, the transformed media landscape, individual empowerment and other factors have heavily influenced relations between citizens and their government. Historically negotiated bargains still hold but the state's capacity is often questioned. Meeting public expectations is becoming almost impossible, as citizens have become better informed about their rights and ready to express their views, but at the same time, they have become more reluctant to engage in public affairs. The figure of the "demanding citizen" has been firmly embedded in the political landscape of most western democracies. The gap between governors and the subjects of their influence is constantly widening due to diminishing civic culture. Lack of participation implies a lack of understanding about the nature of the social contract, the distribution of political authority and the limit of interventions. On the other hand, governments often lag behind in providing innovative solutions to urgent issues. Slower rates of economic growth, increasing income inequality and the perception of "losing out" to global competition cause public demands to ensure existing conditions and strengthen protectionist preferences.

It is evident that individual empowerment has an impact upon the way in which social and political processes are played out in both the new powers that enjoyed most of the middle class growth and in the western democracies trying to protect their status. The evolution of western societies definitely had an impact upon the area of national and global cohesion – as more people gain agency, they bring their diverse postulates to the political fore, fighting to position them within the national and global agenda. The position of traditional intermediary organisations, such as political parties or community associations has been weakened, which reinforced the gap of expectations. Common interests, once revealed by the rule of aggregation, are now increasingly shaped by power and visibility due to wider participation in public affairs. Lobbying and cyber-activism produce an increasingly growing cast of those who scream the loudest, which often makes it harder to recognise collective preferences and transform them into public policies. Despite great hopes brought by the concept of deliberative democracy, it is still not clear to what extent citizens should directly participate in balancing the multilayered nature of the modern state. In both domestic and international contexts, the same factors influence governance modes producing, however, different expectations and contexts.

Middle class processes representing one dimension of the rise and fall of international order shift analytical gravity from the actions of states to the agency of individuals. It has been used in this chapter to exemplify the old structure–agency problem of whether it is societies that make people or people that make societies (Collier, 1994: 144).

Members of the middle class are seen as agents whose actions are constitutive of social change. Today's global outlook indicates a major divergence between the two realms of which the international order is composed. At the micro-level, in which the sum of individual behaviours shapes trends and processes, a great number of people have been liberated from the constraints of poverty and potentially, political marginalisation. On the meta-level, the directions of middle-class processes in both the western world and the developing world fuel global instability because they are founded on different premises and lead people in different directions. Citizens of high-income countries have noted a decline in their living standards, which makes them prone to radical political messages that present global economic prosperity as a zero-sum game: greater prosperity in one part of the world leads to deterioration in others. On the other hand, members of the global middle class in the developing world identify their progress in categories of “catching up” with western societies; narratives about their economic achievements and prospects are strongly related to the categories of historical justice, western imperialism and the unbalanced distribution of global power. This view, often reinforced by state propaganda, adds to existing divisions. Expectations and demands in both old and new middle classes have also grown. New, more technologically connected social players, who have more purchasing power, more education, more information and more awareness of their rights are a source

of immense pressure on their respective governments, which often lack the resources and institutional capacity to meet those expectations. Furthermore, as a consequence of global media influence, identities of modern middle-class members are multiple, contingent and fluid. They are not easily captured by the identities of political parties, so mass mobilisation takes the form of rather temporary eruptions of street and media protests, which are not likely to transform into an institutionalised political force able to create and implement a political agenda.

The postulates of members belonging to the newly emerged middle classes in the developing world indicate that in many areas, they share the common feature of the western cohort – they attach great importance to safety and security. Political classes, both authoritarian and democratic, often respond with economic policies seeking to support domestic consumers and the redistribution of growth to sectors with high domestic employment, instead of proposing deeper reforms or structural changes. These patterns, especially when analysed within the context of liberal governance visions, reveal the fundamental role of nation states in providing the environment in which individuals might grow. Individual empowerment has been possible only in regions in which the firm presence of the nation state secured infrastructure, long-term social investment and connectivity, while the main factors of individual oppression are rooted in the territories of failed states or fragile statehood. In the absence of structures of law and the institutional provision of rules, citizens cannot simply use the opportunities offered by globalisation or protect themselves against exposure to its flaws.

So while global changes have created new possibilities that can be leveraged directly by individuals, rather than being channelled through governmental structures, they can only be used when the basic conditions of modern statehood are met. However, even in rich countries, the spheres of economic and social exclusion grow. In the background of highly modernised economies and organised societies, islands of deprivation in terms of infrastructure, social services, transport and economic opportunities signalise social division. Inhabitants of these areas, who are predominantly rural and have long been economically and politically neglected, are gradually becoming more vocal. Searching for radical change, they often support populist, disrupting forces. This “revenge of the places that don’t matter” has been long shaping the global scene, expanding instability through terrorism, asymmetric risks, and brutal regime ideologies, fuelling migration and adding other factors to the list of urgent global problems.

Leadership in practice: Leaders beyond borders and “power with” in global policy shaping

The appearance of non-state actors in international politics has been widely analysed (Rosenau, 1992); however, assessment of their actions and potential has been conducted mainly from economic and legal perspectives. Global

change, although contested and impossible to define, is largely a product of political factors that shape popular awareness and direct institutional efforts. As a result, leadership roles are distributed widely among followers – individuals and organisations that are not engaged in the formal structures of political power, yet are able to guide the behaviours of others (Underdal, 1991). Leaders are required for change to happen, and when there is divergence between state politicians' interests and the common interests of mankind, non-state leaders emerge to initiate and foster a global agenda. The stage of political decision making has always engaged people who were not professionally involved in politics. Technocrats working in global institutions, intellectuals and representatives of global media or pop-culture elites have contributed to different layers of the political craft, building agendas and mobilising and persuading the masses. The history of the international system is inherently connected to the activities of global idealists and the formation of global organisations. The global space has been producing iconic figures since the moment of its creation. Norwegian Polar explorer and diplomat Fridtjof Nansen was appointed by the League of Nations as the first High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921. This recognised humanitarian used his influences to address, for the first time, the issue that later become the signature of the global era – the question of people who could not remain in their nation state, and were caught “in between” borders and countries. Humanitarian crises in the aftermath of WWI and the October Revolution in Russia were managed by legendary historical figures in international efforts to reduce human suffering: Jean Henry Dunant, Emily Greene Balch, John Raleigh Mott, Albert Schweitzer. Of course the line between social and humanitarian activists and state politicians is blurred, as such people often enter traditional politics, to serve a wider public with their expertise. The line between private and public leadership in the attempt to address puzzles of the provision of public goods has long been blurred.

Globalisation brought to the fore the phenomenon of “super-empowered individuals” – people who can mobilise resources and gain access to power structures in order to generate change. Within the security realm this status of “super-empowered” has been granted, for example, to Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, Henry Okah of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and Julian Assange, who stood behind Wikileaks: “Some of these super-empowered individuals are quite angry, some of them quite wonderful but all of them are now able to act much more directly and much more powerfully on the world stage” (Friedman, 2002).

Alternative forms of diplomatic engagement, linked to recognition and personal popularity, continue to grow in influence, and public opinion leaders and celebrities are increasingly active in international agenda setting. Some of them, like Bono or Angelina Jolie, use their position in global media networks to actively promote global issues, while others, like Greta Thunberg, gain celebrity status on the basis of their contribution to the global battle of

ideas. Individuals with a transformational orientation towards global reality have obtained, with the rise of social media, new resources of power that allow for novel non-state and non-collective agency. This form of leadership concerns the area of common goods, ideals and programmes that have universal appeal, or interventions justified on moral or civilisational grounds. Some of these spheres are situated beyond systematic administration and governance, but all require intervention because of the presence of long-term and far-reaching risks for international stability and general well-being; in fact, global leadership of non-state actors is, to a great extent, part of the attention business. This involves famous personalities, known and respected in the mass public imagination. There are very few professional politicians who would be recognised and trusted on the basis of their involvement in protection of global public goods – they might be persuasive advocates, but at the same time they inevitably face suspicion as to whether they do not promote and prioritise their national agenda. Politicians are viewed primarily as state representatives; cosmopolitan claims that highlight the interests of the human species as a whole with regard to issues like climate change or global stability rarely sound attractive when allied to the struggle for the support of local constituencies.

Global non-state leaders operate in an environment characterised by high degrees of uncertainty with regard to actor preferences and possible solutions. They often enter the uncharted waters of issues that have not yet been recognised by the general public, and mobilise the support of a very diverse group of followers, coming from different countries and presenting differing motivations. While attracting attention, mobilising and influencing behaviours are crucial for all leadership processes; in this case leadership is exercised primarily on the basis of “power with” via joint intentional action, strategic coordination, and the assistance of followers. This concept of power does not imply dominance or resistance, unlike traditional views associated with political power. In this leadership relation there is encouragement rather than coercion and inspiration rather than compulsion, yet it still corresponds with Robert Dahl’s (1957: 202–203) classic definition of power as being “relation among people” such that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. Leaders accompany their followers along their path to transformation and mobilisation towards awareness, involvement and action. The leader’s influence here is a source of guidance and purpose, allowing followers to accumulate and develop their resources towards common goals. Aligned with the leader, they are empowered, supported by others and supportive of others in their turn in common endeavours (Abizadeh, 2021).

The leadership–followership dynamic is shaped by the degree to which the follower regards the leader, the goals they promote and their orientation as worthy of active, intentional support. By gaining trust, leaders generate the intention to act and assist, as well as the legitimation of their strategies; followers willingly accord the leader the right to speak, decide

and act on behalf of the group or community. The gallery of global leaders includes entrepreneurs, public intellectuals, spiritual leaders, pop-celebrities and advocates of common interests operating transnationally. They shape relations with followers using unique resources for the generation of trust – fame, knowledge and expertise. These often interwoven factors provide the impetus for increasingly common global leadership–followership relations.

Recognition-based leadership. In the case of non-state global leaders, recognition is one of the primary resources on which their power rests. It provides them with status in an informal global order through which they can be recognised within the structure of formal institutions. Fame, expressed for example in the number of social media followers, commercial contracts or TV or radio appearances a person has to their name, has long been treated as an entrance ticket to political games. The exposition effect works both in commercial venues and on political scenes, raising levels of trust among especially, like-minded groups and supporters on the basis of which networks can be built. Popular artists, as opinion leaders, have always nurtured their personal brand. Politicians have learned the rules of this game. A long list of almost “celebrity-like” personae have established themselves in some of the most exposure-gaining roles in western politics, starting with former presidents of the United States, Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Very different in their political philosophies and strategies, they had both built their position on the most in-demand form of politics – the politics of trendiness, of “the moment”, of emotions.

This is not to say that the phenomenon is new – John F. Kennedy, for example, had public support comparable in intensity to that enjoyed by celebrities. Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, or French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, although following different scripts, both applied the power of popular culture to their political strategies. Entrepreneurs, like Bill Gates or Mark Zuckerberg, back their activities with financial resources, but the primary mechanism of their presence on the global stage is the recognition factor, the power of their personal brand. Actors, like these most successful businesspeople, have established themselves in the mass imagination as iconic figures symbolising the aspirations and dreams of ordinary people. Unlike politicians, who are increasingly submitted to public scrutiny, the rich and famous still carry one of the fundamental categories of leadership – sacredness. Like Greek gods, they are deeply human but they all present unique features, reflected in their material wealth, social recognition and the admiration that surrounds them.

They are separated from ordinary life. Public figures are part of the luxury culture that incorporated sacralisation as an important mode of hyper-consumption. They live in a parallel world, and are admirable but inaccessible. Global leaders are communicators, as their status is connected with maintaining relationships with the global public. Followers do not enter into a relationship with the famous in order to stay informed or obtain guidance

from them; they are, rather, attracted by the power of “a mythic world of excesses, extravaganzas and spectacle where nothing is beyond reach” (Nayar, 2009).

In order to understand leadership in the global realm, the issue of managing the relationship between leaders and followers has to be understood. Public figures construct – symbolically, rhetorically, discursively – a personal and imagined relationship with their supporters. They use their power of attraction in the environment that guides the behaviour of followers, as not only the personalities of leaders but also technological systems influence what followers do and how they perceive reality. The rise of social media, and advances in analytics and artificial intelligence have served as disruptors in their capacity to connect and influence. They have opened a market of recognition and trust-building among “ordinary people”, private individuals who can effectively develop their followership network to promote their agenda.

Knowledge-based leadership. Non-state leaders often play the role of wise men, describing and interpreting the world. Global issues, although embedded into the everyday realities of their followers, are usually not easy to capture in immediate, direct experience; therefore knowledge-based models are useful in both designing and explaining global policy change (Haas, 1992). The conceptual processes that leaders initiate reshape established frameworks not only in terms of thinking about global issues, but also constructing reality. UN Secretary General, Koffi Annan shifted international debate on the prevention of the most serious crimes from the “right to intervene” to the “responsibility to protect” by posing a famous question: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” (Annan, 2000). Bob Geldof introduced Ethiopian famine victims into the everyday reality of the western public in 1980s, lifting popular humanitarianism to a previously unseen level. When Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the term BRIC (without South Africa) in 2001, the states he described as potentially the most powerful economies in decades to come began to identify themselves with this idea, turning a hypothetical concept into reality. The politics of expertise is still politics, able to create its own language, rationality and epistemic communities.

Exercising knowledge, promoting ideas and actions, and diagnosing reality are among the major ways in which global leaders make their presence felt. They frame global issues, putting them in perspective, overcoming stereotypes and justification for inaction. They choose to address different audiences, profiling their message along different lines. While musicians involved in the Live Aid campaign were asking “Do They Know it’s Christmas?”, Bill Gates, talking in 2019 at a TED conference about malaria, released mosquitos into a crowd, explaining that “There’s no reason only poor people should have the

experience” (Gates, 2009). A wide number of experts and global bureaucrats rely on numbers and facts, carefully shaped into persuasive messages and policy recommendations. Jeffrey Sachs, while addressing the need to finance the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), combined emotional argument with calculation, placing the effort in the wider context:

The heartening thing is that this \$2–3 trillion is equivalent to a mere 2–3 per cent of the \$100 trillion of the world’s annual income. With just that small fraction of global output we could achieve global prosperity and environmental sustainability and all the goals of the SDGs.

(cited in Maurice, 2015).

Experts are an authoritative source of diagnoses about the condition of the world, as reflected in the data and statistics they put to wide public use. Yet their diagnoses are often questioned on the basis of legitimacy or instrumental political narratives. It is enough to analyse the impact of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on policymaking; the relation between knowledge production and agential position in a climate change regime becomes apparent. All leaders offer their followers some kind of knowledge about the world, which is not equivalent to the construction of a coherent, science-based path forward. This is especially important in relation to global issues, which in many cases are not yet codified in laws, standards or sanctions, and effective action requires changing informal norms and overcoming the beliefs that stand behind them.

While crossing the boundaries of traditional organisational frameworks of the state, party or non-governmental organization (NGO), global political leadership represents the features of the transformational model (Burns, 1978), in which the leader asks followers to transcend their own self-interests for the greater good.

Global leaders take part in the process of conscience formation with regard to the operational logic of the interconnected world. They promote new ways of thinking and set new models of behaviour for individuals and organisations, encouraging them to consider their long-term rather than immediate needs. Change is taking place within the spheres of extensive consumerism, energy use, global justice, migration and other issues from the catalogue of global wicked problems.

Two major factors stand behind non-state leaders’ successes in the global arena: the spread of technology and the decline of involvement in politics, especially in western democracies (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006). The growth of television, enabling as it did coverage of political scandals in the 1970s and 1980s, often critical of politicians, has been indicated as one of the sources of “political malaise” (Robinson, 1976). Extended technology and media use made people instantly, globally connected and increasingly adapted to the patterns of technology. Effective communication becomes easier, impacting the spreading of ideas and raising of transformative potential. Furthermore,

common and constant access to diverse news coverage and commentary through smartphones, websites, mobile apps and SaaS apps is seen as an asset in a democratic society, as proven in several studies (Aarts and Semetko, 2004; Aarts et al., 2012).

But the impact of technological proficiency, especially in the case of the younger generations (Y, X, Z), on the ability to lead and to transform socio-economic realities remains uncertain. They are able to effectively create media hubs and to mobilise crowds in every corner of the globe, but easy access to information reinforces distrust towards political institutions and the political class as a whole. Politics is increasingly portrayed as a shallow and dishonest profession, so corrupted politicians do not seem to be the appropriate actors when it comes to dealing with the world's most urgent problems. Connections between media use, information flows, trust and the condition of democracy have been widely researched, highlighting the role that media play in the connection between the individual citizen and the political representation of the community (Tsfati, 2010; Yamamoto and Kushin, 2014; Prochazka and Schweiger, 2019).

Traditional media are less trusted, as being biased and pursuing agendas of their own. Information flows in cyberspace are considered to be more generic, uncontrolled and reflecting the real opinions and orientations of the participants. They respond to a major challenge for contemporary political deliberation, which is to “bring some of the favourable characteristics of small-group, face-to-face democracy to the large scale nation state” (Fishkin, 1995). Transparency, commonly considered an important contribution to the quality of public life, has exposed each and every politician to a constant stream of both justified and unjustified criticism. Biases towards negative information, scandals and risks expose viewers to a distorted picture of the political arena. Politics, a space long reserved for social elites, “the chosen men”, hitherto depicted in the democratic tradition as a space in which popular aspirations and ideas could be represented, has largely lost its honourable character. People increasingly see politicians as unable to solve urgent problems, especially when they are global in nature. As a result, professional politicians become administrators of local, common spaces, rather than potential carriers of transformative ideas, capable of changing the world. To some extent disillusionment with the limitations of electoral politics draws people to global politics, which they understand to be constructed according to flexible rules, focused on issues crucial to humanity and full of attractive visionaries trying to drive social change.

Technocrats in the global leadership–followership framework

Technocracy has always been part of politics, political thought and governance. Plato considered ruling as *techne* – a process of constructing a social order based on well-grounded techniques and routines. The complexity of governance, in the context of effectiveness, fully developed after the Industrial

Revolution and was reflected in the Technocracy Inc. Movement of the 1930s which rose to prominence in the USA. Howard Scott, an engineer, had formed a group of technical experts in 1919 that later proposed a new form of economic management as a radical response to the Great Depression, gradually leading to the technocratic shift in modern democracies (Fisher, 1990). As time passed and the scale of technocratic endeavour grew, global space came to be governed by a plethora of institutions and regimes that are in a state of constant evolution towards being able to better respond to incoming challenges. A global governance system has been evolving from the first decades of the 20th century, to become a dense network of institutions, networks and regimes securing the participation of national actors in global markets, seizing opportunities afforded by the expanding transnational sphere and managing the commons. Global institutions have been founded on the basis of a rational legal authority that is legitimated in part by their development and adherence to objective rules, standards, and decision-making processes which continue to guide their evolution. These are applied fairly to demands from actors engaged in various processes. The rules of bureaucracy are made, applied, and guarded by technocrats, ideally free from ideological bias, using expert knowledge to find the most suitable responses to problems. Development of global governance structures created the class of global technocratic leaders who are politicians of a different kind, detached as they are from national interests and serving the ideas represented by global institutions. They were especially influential at the early phases of institution-building processes when new ideas were required to capture fluid instincts and interests. Their leadership, however, is increasingly being contested on the grounds of legitimacy.

*a) Evolution of the system of international organisations and nature of institutional leadership.*² Development of international organisations has been seen primarily as an expert-led process, as technocrats were seen as serving humanity in general and not specific nation states. The UN, established in 1945, can be defined today as a post-Second World War (WWII) governance innovation, which remains the only global organisation trying to support global synergy: it keeps the peace in far-flung war zones, assists in the management of natural and humanitarian disasters and promotes the global response to problems such as climate change and pandemics. Even before this major forum for dealing with the challenges facing the whole of humanity was brought to life, the pillars of the international financial system – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank – were launched. They both originated in WWII, following the UN Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944. A complementary organisation, the International Trade Organisation (ITO), designed to encourage free trade, was also founded later, in 1947. The Bretton Woods arrangements created a forum for economic governance, while the UN played the role of an arena in which systemic stability and progress were negotiated. The aim of the international economic institutions was to foster rebuilding of

the shattered post-war economy and to elicit international economic cooperation and mutual trust among all nations. Post-war developments in financial institutions are often considered to be the bedrock of liberal institutionalism, advocating as they do diplomacy and coordination of the common affairs of humanity. This is the role they have played; others, however, have considered the international system as merely the tool of leading states, used to protect their power and increase their share in power structure. John Maynard Keynes, a prominent architect of the Bretton Woods framework, declared that the system was created to seek “a common measure, a common standard, a common rule applicable to each and not irksome to any” (cited in Moggeridge, 1980: 101). This intention has clearly not been fulfilled by the Bretton Woods institutions, as they were designed essentially according to American scenarios and along its lines of interest. At the moment when the post-war structures of global governance were being designed, the USA possessed almost half the world’s manufacturing capacity, the majority of its food supplies, nearly all of its capital reserves and absolute military pre-eminence. America became the global net creditor for restoration of the international monetary system, especially to European countries. The American dollar became the international currency and American economic policies were predominantly aimed at shaping growth in developing countries. As the USA contributed the most assets to the newly founded institutions, it also gained the most voting rights, including a veto with regard to major policy decisions – not to mention the fact that the headquarters of the newly founded institutions were installed in Washington DC, so as to secure optimal compliance with the government’s policies.

All of these factors contributed to the fact that the system of global governance institutions certainly was biased, and widely considered as such, though the USA was predominantly using its position of power to establish a system that enabled distribution rather than concentration of power. Nevertheless, the tension between a vision of a maximally inclusive world order and the international realities of unequal opportunities has had a significant impact on the way global institutions are seen by the general public. Since the moment of becoming foundational pillars of the global system, the guiding ideals of peaceful coexistence and a prosperous future for all humanity have faded to a large extent as these institutions provide a political arena for a global power game.

The governance structure of the Bretton Woods system comprises mostly industrialised countries, which make vital decisions and form policies that are implemented by all other countries, as they represent the largest donors. Economic policies have become a platform for the promotion of neoliberal market philosophies – liberalisation of trade, deregulation of currency and privatisation of nationalised industries. Attachments to loan conditions were influenced by the Washington Consensus, which brought mixed results globally and in some cases led to the long-term disruption of local markets. The mixed results of the liberal market prescriptions in Latin American countries

and elsewhere caused mistrust and further distanced international institutions from national and regional publics.

As institutions of global governance cannot resort to coercion to the same degree as domestic regimes, trust is the basic currency of their development. The logic of their functioning is and always has been connected to the global power game, but to some extent they have developed their own autonomy. Trust and effectiveness in providing solutions for global problems could assure global institutions and their representatives legitimacy, yet with the rise of global competitiveness and fragmentation their influence is in decline. As a result, global governance lacks power when it is most needed, when institution-based global synergy is a condition for addressing the world's existential threats. The need for global governance is evident in a number of areas such as health, peacekeeping and the environment. And even though the provision of global public goods is firmly embedded on the agenda of global governance institutions, the impact of this idea is decreasing.

The UN has been long and severely criticised for not meeting expectations, yet paradoxically this is the only platform for cooperation that produces ambitious programmes to redesign global relations in the direction of greater synergy. The MDGs set in 2000 were replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. Both programmes indicate the major areas of global cooperation, such as economic growth, environmental protection, peace, justice and accountability. Both their implementation and potential for change rely on the political will and resources of nation states. While global institutions engage in the provision of public goods, they are able to effectively manage some of the most urgent issues of humanity only as long as their member states allow them to. This is an interlinkage that stands at the centre of the institutional leadership of international organisations. Their actions and orientations cannot be fully distinguished from the policies and orientations of their member states. International organisations represent the only forums for shaping the future of the global commons, yet the degree to which they are constituted by a genuinely collective purpose depends on the broad agreement of individual members of this collective.

The main potential of technocratic institutional leadership is located in relations, because in most cases the engagement of state members is decisive in turning political visions into reality. That is why the UN Secretary General is the world's prime example of responsibility without power, serving as a facilitator for cooperative action between member states and non-state actors. Therefore, international organisations suffer from both a democratic deficit and an elitist complex, and they are constantly struggling to find ways to moderate one without expanding the other. Large organisations tend to create a system that develops horizontal links: between the UN and regional organisations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union (AU), the EU, the Arab League and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Public–private cooperation has received considerable impetus since the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development focused on partnerships (between governments, NGOs and the private sector). By introducing inclusiveness policies, and inviting, for example, large corporations, NGOs and advocacy groups to participate in the consultancy process they try to create a wide spectrum of influence. Recognition of the private governance bodies which set international standards without government involvement, such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) or the International Organization of Standardization (ISO), should also be seen as a coordinated effort built around crucial fields of interaction and a complex regulatory framework. Most issue areas in world politics today are governed neither by individual institutions nor by networks or alliances rooted in nation states but rather a complex framework composed of interstate, infra-state, public–private and private transnational institutions, both formal and informal. Within this realm the issue of leadership is developed purely at the conceptual level, though its importance has been confirmed at the empirical level, revealing the mechanisms behind trust, agency and other components of collective action.

b) The nature of technocratic leadership. International organisations have accumulated considerable power and authority, yet neither the U nor any other of the institutional actors that form the bedrock of the system has developed a successful model of leadership that could link their structural powers with popular understanding and support. These entities are regularly subjected to contestation connected to both institutional leadership and individual leadership exercised by their employees and representatives. The rise and expansion of the global governance network invested more power and authority in the hands of relatively isolated international civil servants. Called “globalists”, the “global elite”, or “internationalists”, they are frequently used in local political debate in order to achieve short-term, widely contested political gains (Stephen and Zürn, 2019). “Davos Man”, the global technocratic class famously mocked by Samuel Huntington, were depicted by him as almost representing a different human species – rich, disconnected from the world, not recognising national borders and radically supportive of globalisation. They are presented as anonymous transnational experts, privileged and largely disconnected from those affected by their decisions. Private consultants, public figures, and scientific experts play leadership roles at international forums, especially within areas of global problems and urgently needed intervention. Their position enables them to penetrate global networks and influence social and economic systems, thereby transforming reality by imposing different norms and market relations, and introducing a new and different language. Growing interconnectedness makes them *de facto* global rulers, and *de facto* global leaders.

Technocrats working for international agencies and institutions are rarely perceived as neutral agents engaged in an attempt to achieve noble goals, but quite the opposite – as external agents interfering in national or

regional affairs, heavily involved in preserving western imperialism and global injustice. They are called technocratic, in the pejorative sense, as not being sensitive to the social aspects of the human condition, because they represent primarily technical reasoning and the professionalisation of governance. The issue of distance and the separation of decision makers from the recipients, regular people dealing with their policies, is directly related to the structure of the leader–follower relation. Global technocrats deal primarily with representatives of member states, but their access to the inhabitants of those states is limited. As a result they rarely enjoy public trust in their efforts to tackle the most difficult of the world's problems. Successes are instrumentally used to strengthen local government, while failures are often presented not as a result of joint actions but rather the responsibility of global governance bodies. The scale and wide range of the areas they cover often provide ammunition for critics of international institutions, who focus on their actual failure not only to provide public goods but also to advance the condition of those whose activities they are supposed to protect. In the case of the UN the most discussed failures concerned its peacekeeping force that, to cite a few controversial examples, became a source of a cholera epidemic in Haiti, adopted a quasi-bystander stance at the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, and was responsible for sexual or financial misconduct in a number of countries.

The most common line of critique international organisations face, however, is that they serve the interests of global elites and spread foreign cultural values. To some extent these claims are exaggerated to serve political agendas, but they are defensible in many areas as well. Practical tools for the accomplishment of market integration – even if they bring substantial long-term gains to local economic actors – may have wide-ranging consequences for other institutions and, correspondingly, for the system as a whole. For example, while adapting market practices to the requirements of global markets, IMF or World Bank professionals have influenced economic legislation to make it consistent with US antitrust or bankruptcy law. Although potentially opening markets to a wider flows of goods and labour, such interventions also provide competitive advantage for American legal firms and law schools (Carruthers and Halliday, 2006). Coordination service firms, rating agencies, prestigious accounting corporations under the supervision of the private International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have become power brokers, influencing international institutions to provide regulations not limited to the country of origin, but spilling over to impact financial systems of other countries (King and Sinclair, 2003).

The complexity of technical issues connected to the mechanics of market integration and harmonisation makes evaluation of these processes difficult for citizens and state politicians alike. While the existence and impact of national political arenas has generally been accepted and perceived as a condition for effective governance, the global political scene may, in the eyes of ordinary people, be vague to say the least. While events connecting

foreign policy are publicly observed, the nature of the global decision-making processes taking place in international governance venues such as the IMF or UN seem technocratic and obscure. These processes are even less transparent, and thus more suspicious for the public, even though the specialised input of experts to global governance is indispensable. As a result global institutions and their leaders are seen as a not fully accountable ruling elite that enjoys privileges stemming from their position of power and better understanding of the principles of the global power game. The legitimacy of the technocratic, international elites is heavily questioned because they are not part of a democratic power structure.

Governments increasingly place non-partisan experts in ministerial positions, and they occupy a position in the chain of delegation connecting electorate, parliament, government and public administration (Strom, 2000). Technocratic leaders at the top of global governance structures, although appointed in legal, transparent procedures accepted by all the involved parties, however lack democratic legitimacy. International organisations' claim to legitimacy is rooted in the assertion that they are neutral, transparent and represent non-ideological sources of truth. This is contested, in light of the fact that the practice of policymaking is highly politicalised. Although data and rational analysis play prominent roles in the decision-making processes of these forums, they are however also involved in conflict, clashes of interest and power struggles. However, their cognitive leadership is one of the most powerful platforms upon which the foundations' global synergy are constructed. The global technocratic class uses existing machineries of knowledge, and produces new ones, so as to be able to implement instrumental systems, in which information and data are used to foster social action. Over the period of the functioning of these international organisations, global experts have created a dynamic epistemic community that maintains and develops repositories of knowledge, symbols, ideas and forms of representation for global synergy building.

Celebrities in the global leadership–followership framework

The presence of artists as public figures in humanitarian and international affairs has a long history. Renowned individuals from different walks of life were invited to promote global causes and the UN's work from its inception. The first UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) ambassadors included publicly recognisable actors, actresses and singers. They lent the fame and recognition they enjoyed to the project of raising the profile of policies and strategies of specialised agencies of the UN system. The development of global entertainment industries, with their high-profile media platforms and global stars, only accelerated the "celebritisation" of humanitarian work and global development. Using their visibility, public figures traditionally used awareness-raising and the mobilisation of ordinary citizens to act in favour of a given cause. They were considered able to capture hearts and minds by creating the

emotional ties so closely related to the artistic work they were engaged in. One of the earliest examples of empirical research on the mechanism of celebrity leadership–followership relations revealed the potential of foregrounding non-political, non-expert leaders. The experiment involved the American singer Katy Smith, who made her reputation as a symbol of patriotism, introducing “God Bless America” on the national stage. On 21 September 1943, over the course of 18 hours she made 65 national radio appeals to 23,000,000 listeners in an effort to sell bonds to support the war effort. As a result of this campaign, bonds worth US\$36,000,000 were sold in only one day (Merton, 1946 [2002]). The scale and immediacy of the response made it clear that not only the message but also the medium is important in generating reactions. Merton (1946 [2002]) explored the nature of this real-life mass persuasion through interviews with those who bought bonds that day, polling, and content analysis of Smith’s appeals. Accounts illustrated a very personal social dynamic that was stimulated in people by the emotional nature of Smith’s appeal. Apparently, this dynamic produced a reciprocal effect that catalysed Smith herself to make even greater efforts over the course of the drive.

The history of every nation contains episodes of effective political leadership exercised by artists. Poets, actors, writers, active in both drama and comedy, have already established a long list of prominent political office holders. National presidential committees search for high-profile celebrities to support their candidate – the more famous people are on stage, the better. The role that artists play within the frames of global politics partially repeats some of the scripts developed in the past, but has also been expanded and adapted to the requirements of the new info-realities of global audiences. The mobilisation of fame came into focus especially after the overwhelming success of the 1985 Band Aid project initiated by rock singer Bob Geldof to help victims of the famine in Ethiopia. Popular artists inspired by Geldof featured together on “Do They Know it’s Christmas?” – the song that became both the fastest and biggest-selling single of all time, and raised £150 million worldwide for aid projects in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa (Straw and Rijken, 1989). In the American version of the project, 45 recording artists joined together as “United Support of Artists for Africa” (USA for Africa), and recorded another all-time hit: “We Are the World”. The movement was international, as artists in Germany, Canada and South Africa also released singles to raise funds for Ethiopia. The subsequent Live Aid concerts and mega-media spectacles confirmed the global influence potential of pop stars.

In the late 1980s, humanitarian activism widely used the power of the celebrity industry via the great Amnesty International tours, media exposure and grand commercial campaigns. Celebrities established their presence within the development arena by engaging an international public in fighting for global causes through advocacy campaigns: the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Jubilee 2000 campaign, the Make Poverty History campaign in 2005, the Save Darfur Coalition (since 2004), the 2007 Live Earth events and Hope for Haiti Now in 2010.

Celebrities began to be routinely active in the field of humanitarianism by aligning themselves with causes, representing various NGOs or humanitarian agencies, and forming their own organisations. Since the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan took office in 1997 with the strong desire to renew the organisation's image, 15 different UN agencies had appointed around 400 celebrity Goodwill Ambassadors by 2014 (Lim, 2014). Many charitable organisations, such as the Red Cross and Oxfam, reach for public personalities in order to get access to the transnational media platforms that have become critical players in humanitarian efforts and diplomacy. Celebrities' presence in the sphere of humanitarian affairs has become formalised – celebrity liaison offices are employed by many organisations and engagement in humanitarianism is considered as a sign of an established position by actors and musicians.

Celebrity-driven issue campaigns (CICs) have managed to focus attention on a variety of causes, and public figures have grown to be prominent in their political activism. However, it remains unclear whether these private diplomats, even those playing formal roles as UN ambassadors, are effective in helping political institutions achieve their objectives. Individuals who are neither state agents nor representatives of political authority effectively embrace leadership roles within the global framework. Artists and media personalities are involved in complex relationships of power and leave an imprint on how humanitarianism, development and advocacy are perceived (Thrall et al., 2008). The recognition factor allows these figures to play a role as public opinion leaders but does not provide them with direct tools for shaping the institutional and regulatory reality around the causes they support. They are increasingly present in the global sphere executing a number of functions:

a) Agenda setting. Celebrity diplomats use their status and high-profile media presence to indicate subjects and causes that are worth attention and support. They are regarded as influential actors and attention-managing leaders (Richey and Budabin, 2016). Their engagement strategies are at times focused on a single issue or single cause that might previously have gone unnoticed among the variety of problems and situations that require intervention. Celebrities develop their specific areas of expertise as long-term public-opinion impact projects that generate support in the form of political endorsements and financial resources. The long list of single-issue initiatives includes: Princess Diana's support for a global campaign against anti-personnel landmines, which resulted in the Ottawa Treaty in 1997; Ben Affleck's Eastern Congo Initiative, founded in 2010 to promote a single, relatively unknown region for non-experts; Angelina Jolie's campaigns focused on Cambodia, Madonna's on Malawi; Scarlett Johansson's work in support of girls' education in Africa; and Natalie Portman's activities in the area of microfinance, to name just a few.

b) Information hubs. Celebrities effectively play the roles of witnesses, ambassadors and activists. Their involvement transcends public-private

divisions, as educational and awareness campaigns are oriented at wide audiences, while appearances in political forums serve to educate public officials. This is why famous actors and TV personalities speak in front of the US Congress or UN General Assembly about situations in foreign countries, post-conflict reconstruction, developmental and humanitarian needs. However, while celebrity endorsements are a well-established marketing strategy, the credentials of pop stars in their framing of global issues have often been questioned. Their narratives have been described as naive, simplistic and manipulative; and the types of intervention and strategies they propose have been found misplaced. The “Live Aid” campaign has been criticised as one that served the interests of western capitalism and did not address the underlying causes of human rights issues (Huliaris and Tzifakis, 2011). In the case of the “Save Darfur Coalition”, experts expressed doubts concerning the way in which the conflict was presented and the adequacy of the measures advocated by the coalition (Kapoor, 2012). Shaping cognition stands at the centre of celebrities’ diplomatic involvement, as *Vanity Fair* has the ability to reach a greater public than an aid agency’s report, so celebrity messages may be critical to the shaping of public conception of the developing world and humanitarianism.

c) Fundraising and advocacy platforms. Celebrity diplomacy, invented as an awareness-raising tool, grew very quickly to become a money-raising platform. *Assignment Children*, a movie made by Danny Kaye (the first goodwill ambassador for the UN Children’s Fund, known as “Mr UNICEF”) in the 1950s not only informed hundreds of millions of people (a remarkable public at that time) about UNICEF’s work, but also generated a substantial revenue stream for the UN agency. George Clooney’s appearance on Oprah Winfrey’s show dedicated to his experiences on a trip to Africa resulted in a 20 per cent rise in donations to UNICEF (Huliaris and Tzifakis, 2011: 39). Bono’s Jubilee campaign, oriented towards debt relief for African countries, provides evidence for the direct effectiveness of advocacy campaigns. By 2006, the campaign had resulted in US\$24.5 billion debt being cancelled for 19 nations (McPherson, 2015: 60). In 2005, the ONE campaign, also initiated by Bono, urged members to contact their US senators to support a US\$100 million AIDS and Malaria amendment. It was passed, partly due to the pressure generated by the 25,000 calls that poured in (McPherson, 2015).

d) Promotion of universalism. Being powerful opinion leaders, celebrities effectively promote the notion of “the global”, telling a story about the one world that people share, and recognising the common features of the human condition. They might contribute to evolving cosmopolitan norms, but the position of the messengers heavily influences how the message is understood and how often contested. Public leaders support humanitarianism and development in non-western countries, while celebrity culture is a western invention. As a result, the global message expressed by rich and famous people

raises concerns about whether it is doing more harm than good for the cause of universalism. This aspect of celebrities' activity often faces severe critique, as one that presents a distorted vision of the world, reproducing a simplistic duality of empowered and oppressed. Messages about the heroic efforts of privileged public opinion heroes to "help", "save" and "rebuild" the societies of poorer countries discursively reinforce the position of the western world as powerful and capable, while the "others" remain dependent and passive.

Although sparking widespread criticism of their motives, celebrities' perceptions and image-building are interesting in terms of global leadership. Being "intimate strangers", celebrities are listened to and have leadership agency (Schickel, 2000). They have the power of opinion-shaping and an ability to add more noble components to their brands, cross the boundaries of trivial celebrity culture, and position themselves as involved in moral obligations, taking part in life-and-death decisions. Being often glorified as charismatic leaders allows them to present themselves in heroic roles, as struggling to achieve global justice. All this supports the figurative meaning of the sacredness connected to making history; the sacredness that is a necessary component of the leader-follower relation (Grint, 2010). The admiration of crowds is deeply emotional, and celebrities are credited with features superior to those of other people. The image of the saviour and fighter is desired by a global public, introducing an element of mysticism to the changing world discourse and responding to certain archetypal cultural models. Karin Wilkins (2014) observes that "Oprah's philanthropic work in global development takes on this nurturing role as she epitomizes the 'fairy godmother', Madonna's appeal is projected in terms of religious mission. Both Madonna and Angelina Jolie, after adopting children from developing countries, have been referred to as 'global mothers'". Bono appeared on the cover of *Time Magazine* in the Superman costume, under the heading "Super Bono", and the question of whether he is able to save the world. These public personalities are products of an integrated popular culture market, which heavily promotes a romanticised vision of the hero-leader, inevitably reinforcing the commercial image of celebrities. The satirical "White Saviour Barbie" Instagram site, for example, pokes fun at narcissistic western activists in Africa posting selfies, with the catch-phrase, "It's not about me ... but it kind of is". Global celebrities take on leadership roles and build connections with millions of people worldwide, but in their humanitarian missions, as well as while building their personal brand, they rely on media industries and play according to rules that offer them a form of individual exposure that gets maximum coverage.

Nevertheless, being as they are part of popular culture, these public opinion leaders introduce global problems to discursive spaces which they would otherwise never have a chance of penetrating. The multiplicity of media and media forms is needed to make global context familiar to viewers and listeners. Even platforms that are built on controversy and sensationalism may take part in awareness-raising and bringing global issues into local markets of ideas. Celebrities grew to be mediators between distant societies

and long-term, complex global issues like climate change or the environment, relating them to their audiences' consciences and lifestyles. The process often takes place in messy, non-linear and diffused ways, but it galvanises public imagination and generates action. Cognitive leadership is located at the centre of celebrities' roles within the global context; they hold mediating positions between the global environment and local processes, despite the fact that they and their messages are heavily criticised. Despite this, celebrities seem to respond to public expectation in terms of information propagation and patterns of engagement. Social media has changed communication patterns, so for the majority of the global audience the personalised, subjective, emotional accounts offered by celebrities are more attractive than more nuanced and detailed descriptions of complex humanitarian problems.

While socio-anthropological analysis eloquently situates celebrity diplomacy within western cultural power struggles, it is not a purely western phenomenon. Every culture in the world creates its celebrities who were present in public imagination even before the rise of the global media industry and celebritisation of aid. The phenomenon of celebrity diplomacy merges with the long-standing roles of public opinion leaders and cause advocates, introducing private individuals to the global arena and revealing the dynamics of the global public scene.

Business leaders in the global leadership–followership framework

Corporate actors have been long perceived as responsible for contributing to or causing the world's most persistent problems of social inequality, environmental degradation, the degradation of water, forests and arable land, and more. Yet, since the Industrial Revolution business leaders and their organisations have also been considered as vehicles of innovation and progress. A desire to improve the material well-being of people was in the background of revolutions in thinking about markets and developments in social, political and economic organisation. This task could not have been completed without the mass mobilisation of energy – an engine of the rising industrial age. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution and technological acceleration thereafter, human consumption of fossil fuels has significantly raised carbon dioxide (CO₂) levels, but also enabled the development of sophisticated forms of social organisation and technologies, bringing mass prosperity to the countries that embraced the principles of progress. Progress, empowerment and social expectation have long been defined and expressed in economic terms, so economic agents play a primary role in securing the social dimension of economic wealth: “Entrepreneurship is particularly productive from a social welfare perspective when, in the process of pursuing selfish ends, entrepreneurs also enhance social wealth by creating new markets, new industries, new technology, new institutional forms, new jobs, and net increases in real productivity” (Venkataraman, 1997: 133). The logic behind economic activities is rarely seen as including public consideration, as

[i]f markets are working well, there is no need to appeal to companies to fulfil some vague social responsibility. If there is a market failure, then there is a trade-off between private profits and public interest; in that case, it is neither desirable nor effective to rely on the goodwill of managers to maximize social welfare.

(Karnani, 2010)

As firms and corporations first became transnational and then highly globalised entities, business leaders are perhaps best equipped to face the challenges and limitations of interdependence. Business actors have been called on to demonstrate accountability, in the context of growing recognition of the fact that infinite growth is impossible in a world of finite resources. The Brundtland Report of 1987 introduced a three-dimensional approach – economic, social, environmental – as part of the sustainable development concept. The “Triple P” (People, Planet, and Profit) policy adopted by some leading companies marked the inception of the business social responsibility (BSR) orientation. Awareness of the limitations of the current version of global capitalism is rising, creating a process of social pressure within which the postulates of the labour groups, grassroots organisations, consumers and civil society cannot be easily ignored. Discussion about whether the idea of BSR/CSR is flawed or not continues, while business actors take on different forms of leadership within the global arena. The relation between international business and the global common good is unquestionable, as business organisations are social actors and so they rely on the provision of public goods to sustain and develop their activities. Corporations and business leaders are more visible in a global political scene, to fulfil the expectations of global markets and at the same time to mitigate risks for business connected with social and political instability or lack of resources.

In some cases global public goods are being reconceptualised, away from environmental and societal risk and towards economic risk for businesses. Multiple developments and coordination initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights (BLIHR), the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), or the European Foundation of Management Development (EFMD) and their policies of responsible global leadership represent international business’ efforts to go beyond their narrowly defined commitment to generating economic profit. Participation of corporate actors has been central to the SDG consultancy process. The private sector has been an integral part of discussions from the start, and has played a role in shaping the goals that were later included in their corporate sustainability agendas and corporate sustainability reporting. Private economic actors grew to be seen as indispensable factors for social development, the eradication of poverty and instability reduction:

As China and India develop – although not at such a breakneck speed as before – the world’s poor people will be concentrated in an arc of weak or

failing states, stretching from West Africa through Yemen to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In dealing with those countries, Malloch-Brown argues that it will not be sufficient to provide better healthcare and access to education or to provide a dynamic private sector to create jobs.

(Mark Malloch-Brown cited in Tran, 2012)

The variety of business actors operating internationally makes it difficult to diagnose their position within the global arena in precise terms. Many companies are guilty of different forms of discrimination, neglecting labour and human rights and engaging in harmful environmental practices, while others actively contribute to synergy building. The operations of them all are, however, no longer limited to the economic sphere, as they “play important political and social roles in making and implementing international and global public policies” (Forman and Segaar, 2006: 215).

a) Philanthrocapitalists. While the debate on whether (socially responsible) non-economic objectives can coexist with profit maximisation to guide the established model of western capitalism, the philanthropic activities of some of the richest people in the world have created a new platform of global leadership. Their activities illustrate “the growing role for private sector actors in addressing the biggest social and environmental challenges facing the planet” (Bishop and Green, 2015: 541). The category of philanthrocapitalists includes large-scale donors like Bill and Melinda Gates, Warren Buffet, Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan, and George Soros, who have not only become icons of western capitalism but have also decided to use their wealth “to change the world”.

The origins of philanthrocapitalism are to be found in the work of the first multimillionaires and great philanthropists, such as John D. Rockefeller, Henry Ford and Andrew Carnegie (Soskins, 2014), whose legacy is both contested and admired. Philanthrocapitalistic philosophies also draw from the New Public Management movement that emerged at the end of the 1980s (Jung and Harrow, 2019), calling for professionalisation, performance standards, measurements and control of social outcomes. The idea behind these concepts has long resonated in leading global governance organisations – the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the EC (Crane et al., 2014; McGoey, 2015; Adams, 2016; Natile, 2020; Richey and Ponte, 2011). Philanthrocapitalism, having been born in the global era, strongly operationalises its features by promoting representatives of the global elite who are accumulating wealth on an unprecedented scale thanks to the mechanisms of global integration and distribution. Their actions are not oriented towards local causes; rather, they attempt to solve urgent global problems and leave an imprint in history. In one of the foundational moments of philanthrocapitalism, in 1997 Ted Turner, billionaire founder of CNN, pledged US\$1 billion to support UN initiatives. In explaining this step, he gave a clear reference to the global: “We are a world of neighbours, and our fates and futures are connected” (Bishop and Green, 2008, 2015).

The most known philanthrocapitalists promote the idea of introducing tools and methods from business management to areas of public services and social value production. Bill Gates is strongly involved with the concept of creative capitalism, which sees social programmes aimed at improving sanitation, nutrition, education and infrastructure as investments that are expected to bring revenue. In this equation, repeated after Adam Smith's conviction of the value of self-interest as the cure for world poverty, the "fortunes of others" could be tied to "our fortunes—in ways that help advance both" (Gates, 2008). British entrepreneurial icon, Sir Richard Branson, came up with the term "Gaia Capitalism", describing attempts to merge the commercial priorities of the Virgin Business Group with environmental considerations. In 2007, Branson (in cooperation with Al Gore) encouraged "Gaia Capitalism" with a US\$25 million prize (the Virgin Earth Challenge) for coming up with a way to remove greenhouse gases (GHG) from the atmosphere.

Calling for a revision of capitalism, philanthrocapitalists reconstruct their identities, building their personal brands and strengthening their status of heroes of public imagination as figures who, like Gates, lie "at the intersection of attributed and achieved celebrity" (Bell, 2010: 191). The rise of philanthrocapitalism in the 21st century has been vigorously discussed in popular media as well as on analytical grounds. The phenomenon triggers strong emotions and generates worldwide attention, producing its own heroes and narratives. The *Washington Post* has called Gates a "champion of science-backed solutions", while *Politico* refers to him as "the world's most powerful doctor". The messianic fantasies surrounding philanthrocapitalists present its heroes as responding to a common global call, to address the needs of people across the globe that share the desire for a fairy tale in which noble members of the elite come to understand global injustices and accept the challenge of making the world a better place. Men such as Gates and Soros emerge "as celebrities, partly for their status as two of the richest people on earth, and partly for their spectacular generosity" (Kapoor, 2013: 48–49). They are positioned as extraordinary individuals – a computer genius, a bold innovator, members of the powerful financial elite who have effectively transformed technological realities, which implies that greater goals like "ending poverty" or being able to "find a sustainable way to reduce inequity in the world" (Gates, 2007) are within their power. Their leadership positions are clearly constructed on the basis of moral justification and sacredness: "Not only do the new nobles hold the power of wealth but, through mega-giving, they generate a moral imagery akin to religious figures who ostensibly self-sacrifice for the good of everyone else" (McGoey and Thiel, 2018).

Entrepreneurial heroism is embedded in the philanthrocapitalist leadership model not only to convince people to identify with the cause but also to support the commercial interests of the brands the business leaders represent. This is one of the many grounds on which philanthrocapitalists are criticised. The legitimacy and transparency of their initiatives are questioned. Large charitable activities are described as attempts to demonstrate the legitimacy of the global elite's growing wealth (McGoey and Thiel, 2018). Yet these claims are part of

the love–hate relationships that the world business leaders maintain with their global audiences, but are overshadowed by the fact that their involvement is voluntary, and the scale of the charitable investments involved is impressive. Apart from donating to charity, respectively, US\$31 billion and US\$37 billion from their personal wealth, Gates and Buffett also pioneered “The Giving Pledge”, which commits its signatories (more than 200 people) to donating at least half their wealth to support the attempt to solve global problems.

Philanthrocapitalists should be considered global leaders not only because they provide funding that enables expansion of the provision of global public goods and creation of institutional frameworks, but most of all as actors who support involvement in global affairs and call for global action. Bill Gates’s (2007) Harvard Commencement speech clearly addressed “the commons faith of humanity”, by saying: “I hope you will judge yourselves not on your professional accomplishments alone, but ... on how well you treated people a world away who have nothing in common with you but their humanity” (Gates, 2007). This shift from the status of the richest man in the world and business leader to a “leader of people” (Wessel, 2011) marks the leadership strategy of Gates and other philanthrocapitalists. They are able to raise awareness, call for action and effectively build narratives about global relations because their leadership is rooted in the public desire for the extraordinary and for people, actions and histories that exemplify it.

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) has been indicated as representing a new standard for and scale of private–public cooperation in the 21st century. With 1,600 staff members directing US\$5 billion in annual grants to 135 countries around the globe, it has emerged as the most influential private global health player. The organisation is the largest private grant-making institution in the world.

Since 2000, the foundation has spent nearly US\$54 billion on a wide range of initiatives related to global health, poverty alleviation and, more recently, the global roll-out of Covid-19 vaccines (Reuters, 2022). In its early history, the work of the foundation was heavily oriented towards supporting the development of new vaccines by providing western research and pharmaceutical companies with funding and working on the issue of education in the USA. The foundation has long been involved in supporting global health governance institutions. The most important of these is the WHO, which sets global health standards and has been systematically supported by the foundation. By 2016, the BMGF was investing US\$227 million annually, underwriting fully 11 per cent of the WHO’s annual budget – more than any member state with the exception of the US (Global Justice Now, 2016). The Gates Foundation is a leading funder of, as well as board member on, most of the world’s other

global health agencies and public–private partnerships (such as the Gavi Vaccine Alliance, the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria, and Unitaid). It is also the third-largest single source of development assistance for health (DAH) funds after the USA and UK (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2019: 144). This makes the private individuals behind the organisation, who have no democratic legitimation and are not politically accountable, extremely powerful within the global health arena. In 2020, the largest donors in global health were the USA at around US\$14 billion, followed by the BMGF at around US\$4.6 billion and the UK at around US\$4.3 billion (IHME, 2021).

Advocacy is the other principal activity of the foundation. Among other things, the issue of gender in raising communities up from poverty has been widely illuminated, resulting in policies oriented at the empowerment of women. Melinda Gates announced that the foundation can “systematically address gender inequalities and meet the specific needs of women and girls” wherever it works, and that it intends to systematically increase its focus on women’s specific needs and preferences” (Gates, 2014). Although the foundation’s work is involved in philosophical struggles over the issues of reproductive health and developmental tools, in many areas it expresses alignment with UN policies.

The BMGF gained its position on the basis of the directed and decisive efforts of its owners, a result of the weakening framework of global health governance illustrated by countries’ reluctance to invest in the system in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. In effect, rich, private individuals have become an indispensable part of any major global health initiative, holding a decisive voice in the general international forum: “Gates’ priorities have become the WHO’s” (Huet and Paun, 2017). The foundation is one of the core actors in “Health 8” – an informal group of leading players in global health governance, comprising the WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, GFATM, GAVI and the World Bank, which set the strategy and manage the world’s health. The foundation’s agenda, priorities and orientations have often been called into question. It promotes global health partnerships and reinforces the position of private donors, which shifts authority from public organisations to private actors that are accountable only to their boards of directors (Rushton and Williams, 2012). Direct investment into many pharmaceutical corporations raises concern about the prioritisation of corporate interests over public. The source of the money, as well as the spending priorities of the foundation, is affected by links between Microsoft and the foundation or partnerships with corporate giants like Coca-Cola or the oil industry and has been the subject of controversies (Stuckler et al., 2011). Concerns about trapping poor countries into a system of dependence on western donors and pharma giants have

often been raised in the context of the organisation's developmental policies. One of the major aspects of the foundation's influence is production and dissemination of global health data through financial support (grants of US\$105m and US\$279m) for the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), part of the University of Washington. IHME gathers and aggregates global burden of disease data, national estimates of health spending and development assistance for health data. These are used by global health institutions such as the WHO and the World Bank. Until 2019, the WHO produced an alternative global burden of disease study, but this practice was ceased by the memorandum of understanding signed by IHME and WHO (Clinton and Sridhar, 2017). Data availability has a primary role in defining approaches and setting priorities in global health, so influence over data-production institutions plays a role in agenda setting. There are serious issues with transparency, intellectual property (IP), and monopoly, which however cannot erase the fact that there is no government, coalition or any other private player able to replace the BMGF as a global player in health governance. It filled the leadership vacuum created by governments' slow reaction to transnational health emergencies and reluctance to develop a long-term global health protection strategy. As a result, private wealth-based organisations have risen to occupy positions of authority, using their resources to gain influence within the area, create policy recommendations and shape understanding of global health issues.

b) Social entrepreneurs. Social entrepreneurship is oriented towards introducing sustainability in economic activities by breaking the contradiction between profit and the public good. Ideas around social entrepreneurship concern activities that are socially responsible in the sense that they don't leave a negative imprint in social or environmental contexts. It represents a wide range of initiatives, from "the practice of addressing social problems by means of markets" (Mair, 2020: 333), to projects that are interpreted as transcending traditional models of capitalist organisation. The category of social entrepreneurs gained traction among scholars in business and organisational theory through being embedded in a public-oriented model of problem solving and represented in forms of inclusive innovation (Mortazavi et al., 2021), pirate organisations (Durand and Vergne, 2012) and hybrid organisations (Battilana et al., 2017). Business leaders initiating such structures and engaged in their development are thus increasingly expected to contribute to the solution of society's "grand challenges". Bornstein, in his book *How to Change the World* (2004: 1–2), presents social entrepreneurs as individuals with new ideas for addressing major problems who are relentless in pursuit of their visions, "... who will not give up until they have spread their ideas as far as they possibly can". Being in line with the picture of the hero-leader, they

are highly motivated and influential in their mission of providing new ideas to realise global policy change. Their image in the public domain is associated with valuable features, such as a sense of commitment and ethical responsibility to help others (Renko, 2013). Furthermore, social entrepreneurship contains the very distinctive components of innovation and empowerment. Social leaders operate in the area of disruption – trying to embed the social drive into market relations and catalyse social change; as an aspect of this process the potential of previously marginalised groups – women, the disabled, members of socially excluded groups – is being discovered. They demonstrate that the growth-driven market orientation has largely lost its legitimacy, and that a new social contract based on more balanced relations with a wide range of stakeholders is required. Social entrepreneurs take a lead in searching for social drive, experimenting in order to find ways of expanding well-being, and building social capital in a constantly changing environment.

As with almost all other categories of global leaders, social entrepreneurs essentially function at the boundaries of civic, political and market strategies – business actors follow social causes, and socially oriented individuals embrace market tools in their not-for-profit organisations. Public sector actors can act as promoters of social innovation, providing resources such as funding, increased support for networking, capacity building and digital technology, or through new legal frameworks. Companies engage in social innovation initiatives by developing new business models, providing specialised competences and resources such as hard infrastructure. Social entrepreneurs do not belong to the structural framework of global governance, but they represent an aspirational culture of innovation. In a period of general decrease of social capital in western countries, leadership of social entrepreneurs is especially needed, as rebuilding coherence requires mobilisation of resources, involvement of different stakeholders and governing bodies, and the development of ways of scaling-up social value.

Microloans and making a difference

Microfinance has become the most recognised and widely analysed form of social entrepreneurship. It accounts for loans of US\$124 billion taken by 140 million global customers (*The Economist*, 2020). The roots of microfinance can be traced in the history of many populations around the world, but the most acclaimed story that initiated its global success is represented by Muhammad Yunus – a Bangladeshi economist trained at Vanderbilt University and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. After a series of experiments confirming the reliability of members of poor communities in returning loans, in 1983 he founded the Bangladeshi Grameen Bank, which soon become an iconic symbol of the empowerment of marginalised communities. The microfinance mechanism was designed on grounds of social relations, oriented towards group lending – poor borrowers, to be reliable for traditional institutions, acted as guarantors for each other. The social innovation of micro-credit, micro-savings,

micro-insurance, and money transfers led to a whole range of synergetic effects for the people involved. Micro-creditors quickly manifested their creativity in expanding the possibilities afforded by access to the loans, as the mechanism as a whole was geared towards enabling low-income people to build businesses. The operational logic of the loan industry was partially reversed, and complemented by rules long-used in traditional modes of informal finance. The primary customers were women, not men, poor rather than rich, with repayments made public rather than kept private. Lending to women is considered one of the major reasons for microfinance's success (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). The proportion of women among top executives and directors in microfinance institutions (MFI) is much higher than the corresponding figures for traditional firms (Strøm et al., 2014). Grameen Bank changed social and commercial institutions in developing countries by changing perceptions and proving that the low level of entrepreneurial activities was due to lack of opportunity, not a result of cultural features or other conditions embedded in poor communities (Alvord et al., 2004). Microfinance transformed decades of thinking about markets and social policy in low-income countries, which had been based on economic solutions known and practised according to patterns established in rich countries. The exponential growth of this framework in Bangladesh brought it international recognition. Grameen Bank grew by 40 per cent per year at its peak, and the governments of Bangladesh, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands secured capital along with the International Fund for Agriculture and Development and the Ford Foundation (de Aghion and Morduch, 2005).

Microfinance established a strong position within development and empowerment instruments: it has its super-hero, its rituals, its fans and global recognition. The year 2005 was declared the international year of microcredit by the UN. The mechanisms behind microcredit are based on social relations, community ties and the redistribution of gains. They promote certain types of behaviours, transforming followers into leaders. Microcredit's organisational structure provided shared visions, instruction, norms of collaboration and a sense of collective responsibility (Spillane, 2006). Microcredit features the important quality of social entrepreneurship of transforming social problems into manageable problems by adopting innovative and creative strategies. This approach is valid not only in developing countries, but is being considered as a way in which transition of rich countries to the low-income economy or more sustainable economy can be achieved (Rey-Martí et al., 2016).

Conclusion

Examples of technocratic, celebrity and capitalistic leaders, operating transnationally and globally, illustrate the practical ways in which traditional "power over", with reference to political and legal institutions, is being complemented

and/or replaced by “power with”, exercised through mobilisation and the membership of people in the network. Popular understanding of leadership and research on leadership alike see leaders as causal agents who create and shape the leadership situation rather than simply responding to it (Yukl and Van Fleet, 1992). While observing the course of global politics through the perspective of followers it becomes clear that they have the ability to act, and that they use their agency in different contexts to shape global realities. Inhabitants of war-zones decide to flee, citizens of rising economies decide to develop their economic ties with the external world, technologically empowered opinion leaders gain international recognition. There is no simple causal relationship between aggregated behaviour and social change. Individuals can operate as agents of change, but in order to make this change permanent, institutions, norms or standards have to be introduced. These must be collectively recognised in the long term. A single terrorist, even determined and technically capable of attacking, does not bring terrorism as a security problem to the international forefront; only an effectively led, well-coordinated structure could attain this goal.

Within both national and global political processes, followership requires engagement, an active attitude of seizing opportunities for change or establishing political presence. Leadership and followership roles are therefore fluid and mutually reinforcing in a change-oriented process. That is why leadership beyond the state is exercised as power with, not power over. This mechanism can be well-supported by the approach to creation of social movements based on the notion of political opportunity (Tarrow, 1994): “Structure of political opportunities” refers to consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure (Tarrow, 1994: 85). Agency beyond the state is exercised when political opportunities emerge, and these can be created by both structure and leaders. Leaders, operating within the global infosphere, institutionalised governance frameworks or as individual agents of change might be able to provide this political opportunity, but they need followers in order to initiate and process social transformation. They might be engaged in a long-term process in the context of an institutional framework or social network oriented at supporting and developing relations, in order to establish political presence when the opportunity arises (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994). Political opportunity is not the only element required for a social movement to emerge. Agency beyond the state is rooted in the social relations developed between audiences from different states, cultures and backgrounds. Leaders and followers involved in global collective action also create the cultural resources needed to build understanding and a sense of connection. Involvement in such a process might lead to the emergence of collective identity (Joyce, 1994) grounded in the process of “becoming a follower”, but it might equally well be a result of an individual decision to support the cause, based on an impulse or short-term intention. Much of followers’ motivation and behaviour is rooted in the desire for a “public experience of the self” (McDonald, 2002).

Categories of leaders illustrate how agency in global policy processes operates, what kind of dispositions and resources are needed to become an actor in global affairs, and what kind of behaviours influence synergy building. Along with their involvement in the leadership relation, the divergent interests of followers shape the course of this relation. Ahmad and Loch (2020) indicated two social situations that require leadership: (a) when team members need to coordinate their actions to reach a collective goal; and (b) when they need to cooperate to achieve a goal, requiring that they resolve conflicts of interest. Both might be applied to the need for collective action oriented towards the better distribution of global public goods.

The embracing of the follower's perspective in the course of global transformation illustrates consequences of individual agency in international affairs that have often been neglected. The conception of the person as a sovereign individual and moral agent is situated at the centre of liberal philosophy, yet IR narratives most often subsume the individual into categories of historical power or state interests. Leadership brings human agency to the fore, both as a substance and as a product of relations between leader and followers (Emirbayer, 1997; Hofferberth, 2019). Contemporary global leaders base their presence and activities on the power legitimised by followers. The relation between the two parties has, at least partially, been reversed. Followers co-produce power through a dynamic relation in which they address their own needs as well as the leader's. Individual empowerment, supported by technical means of communication and the logic of the network, offer private actors a wider share of global presence and the potential to embrace leadership roles. Empowerment brings about opportunities and transformations that require more coordination in order to attain collective goals. The way in which charismatic, technocratic, regulatory or knowledge-based leadership is exercised depends to a great extent on the level of connection (or disconnection) with a global followership base. The relational factor – level of embeddedness in and dependence on the followership base – allows us to distinguish between “global governors” and “global leaders”. While all global leaders govern, as they exercise their leadership, not all governors are leaders (Avant et al., 2010). This distinction is important in the context of designing effective initiatives aimed at creating and distributing global public goods. Technocratic leaders, although implementing the greatest scale of developmental projects and thereby being the most effective functionally in transforming the world, are poorly understood by global followers. This might be the result of a well-established trend of replacing “idols of production”, such as politicians, with “idols of consumption”, such as a movie stars (Lowenthal, 1944). The major role of global non-state leaders within the cognitive dimension of leadership is their work on the new framing of global change, breaking with dominant ideas and practices already established in the areas of development, humanitarian aid, and design of the economic system, but also mitigating public anger and the sense of injustice (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Leadership matrix: global brokerage: sense making, mobilisation, collective action

	<i>Structural leadership</i>	<i>Cognitive leadership</i>	<i>Relational leadership</i>
Key issues. Criteria	Assessed according to the criterion of the effectiveness of shaping the power structure of the international system.	Assessed according to the criterion of the effectiveness of introducing the notion of the 'global' to the local, social and political contexts.	Assessed according to the criterion of ability to effectively form alliances, networks, channels of communication and global action.
Technocratic leaders	High influence record/high influence potential. Technocratic leaders are seen now as indispensable elements of global governance. Despite some degree of institutional autonomy, their range of influence depends on the orientations of nation states. A way of generating synergy beyond involvement of nation states has yet to be found.	Low influence record/high influence potential. Technocrats lack sufficient credibility and recognition to serve as global public opinion leaders. However, they effectively promote ideas within political spectrums. They play prominent roles in the area of leader-to-leader relations and minor roles in the area of leader–follower relations.	High influence record/high influence potential. Technocratic leaders are situated at the centre of institutional structures governing global relations. They have been systematically expanding the number of connections through which norms are negotiated and common purposes agreed.
Celebrities	Low influence record/low influence potential. Operating within non-formal areas of global politics they lack the tools and resources necessary for the generation of structural effects.	High influence record/high influence potential. Play a prolific role in framing the global dimension of public opinion. They promote various notions of 'the global', make connections between everyday choices and global political stances, invest their power of attraction to educate, raise awareness and inform.	High influence record/high influence potential. Play a role of global attention brokers, able to mobilise social responses. This makes them attractive partners in institutional cooperation and gives them access to high profile decision makers.

Philanthrocapitalists	Low influence record/rising influence potential. The limited scale of the philanthrocapitalists' influence has not, with a few exceptions, generated structural changes in the global system. However, the use of for-profit vehicles to conduct charity enhances their influence potential.	High influence record/high influence potential. The rich and powerful have always been heroes of mass imagination, despite the fact that business leaders' engagement in global issues is criticised as undemocratic and paternalistic. Although arousing inherent suspicion, they have the potential to effectively exercise cognitive leadership.	High influence record/high influence potential. Resources and recognition guarantee easy access to global governance forums, seeking assistance in addressing the problem of the commons.
Social entrepreneurs	Low influence record/low influence potential. The limited scale of influence of philanthrocapitalism has not yet generated structural changes in the global system. The search for social innovation increases, but their effects are likely to be more noticeable locally.	Low influence record/rising influence potential. Social entrepreneurs increasingly dictate the narrative and generate more involvement in global issues. Their potential for exercising cognitive leadership would rise with an increase in authenticity and a moral grounding of their message.	Low influence record/rising influence potential. Entrepreneurs have the ability to mobilise social powers to address intractable problems and propose innovation, so they are increasingly seen as promising partners in all cooperative developments.

Source: Author's own work.

Notes

- 1 Part of this section has already been published in an article: Zachara, M. (2017) The transatlantic globalisation dilemma: How to retain power, while contesting the principles? *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 53(1): 185–201. Cited with permission from the University of Warsaw.
- 2 Part of the description of the evolution of the system of international institutions has already appeared in Zachara, M. (2019) Can institutions save the world? Neoliberal institutionalist perspective on global governance. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 1(55): 41–58. Cited with permission from the University of Warsaw.

References

- Aarts K, Semetko H (2004) The divided electorate: Media use and political involvement. *Journal of Politics* 65: 759–784.
- Aarts K, Fladmore A and Stromback J (2012) Media, political trust, and political knowledge: A comparative perspective. In: Aalberg T and Curran J (Eds) *How Media Inform Democracy: A Comparative Approach*. New York: Routledge: 98–118.
- Abizadeh A (2021) The grammar of social power: Power-to, power-with, power-despite and power-over. *Political Studies* 1(17).
- Adams V (2016) *Metrics: What Counts in Global Health*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Ahmad M and Loch C (2020) What do the followers want? The core functions of leadership. *The Leadership Quarterly* 31(2): 101293–101293.
- Alvord SK, Brown DL and Letts CW (2004) Social entrepreneurship and societal transformation: An exploratory study. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 40(3): 260–282.
- Amnå E and Ekman J (2015) Standby citizens: Understanding non-participation in contemporary democracies. In: Barrett M and Zani B (Eds) *Political and Civic Engagement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. Abingdon: Routledge: 96–108.
- Annan KA (2000) Millennium Report *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations, 21st Century*. Available at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/413745> (accessed 26 July 2022).
- Applebaum A (2014) How he and his cronies stole Russia, a review of Karen Dawisha's book *Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?* *The New York Review* LX1(20): 26–30.
- Archer M (2000) *Being Human: The Problem of Agency*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Armendariz de Aghion B and Morduch J (2005) *The Economics of Microfinance*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Armendáriz B and Morduch J (2010) *The Economics of Microfinance*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Avant DD, Finnemore M and Sell SK (2010) Who governs the globe? In: Avant DD, Finnemore M and Sell SK (Eds) *Who Governs the Globe?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1–31.
- Ball GW (1967) Cosmocorp – The importance of being stateless. *Columbia Journal of World Business* 2: 25–30.

- Bandura A (1982) Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. *American Psychologist* 37: 122–147.
- Barabási A-L (2016) *Network Science*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Bass B (2008) *The Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*, (4th edn). New York, NY: Free Press.
- Battilana J, Besharov M and Mitzinneck B (2017) On hybrids and hybrid organizing: A review and roadmap for future research. In: Greenwood R, Oliver C, Lawrence TB and Meyer RE (Eds) *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Baum MA and Lake DA (2003) The political economy of growth: Democracy and human capital. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 333–347.
- Bauman Z (2005) *Liquid Life*. London: Polity Press.
- Bell CE (2010) *American Idolatry: Celebrity, Commodity and Reality Television*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
- Bellamy-Foster J and McChesney R (2014) Surveillance capitalism. *Monthly Review*. Available at <https://monthlyreview.org/2014/07/01/surveillance-capitalism/> (accessed 26 July 2022).
- Bennett T, Savage M, Silva EB, Warde A, Gayo-Cal M and Wright D (2008) *Culture, Class, Distinction*. London: Routledge.
- Berger CR (1997) *Planning Strategic Interaction: Attaining Goals Through Communicative Action*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Berry JW, Berry JW, Poortinga YH, Segall MH and Dasen PR (2002) *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bishop M and Green M (2008) Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich Can Save the World. New York: Bloomsbury.
- Bishop M and Green M (2015) Philanthrocapitalism rising *Society* 52: 541–548.
- Bornstein D (2004) *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bradford A (2020) *The Brussels Effect – How the European Union rules the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brown D and Hunter W (2004) Democracy and human capital formation, *Comparative Political Studies* 37(7): 842–864.
- Bueno de Mesquita B, Smith A, Siverson RM and Morrow JD (2003) *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Burns JM (1978) *Leadership*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Caney S (2005) *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Card D (2005) Is the new immigration really so bad? *The Economic Journal* 115(507): 300–323.
- Carlin RE and Love GJ (2018) Political competition, partisanship and interpersonal trust in electoral democracies. *British Journal of Political Science* 48(1): 115–139.
- Carothers T and O'Donohue A (Eds) (2019) *Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Carruthers BG and Halliday TC (2006) Institutionalizing creative destruction: predictable and transparent Bankruptcy Law in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis. In: Woo-Cumings M (Ed.) *Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East Asia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 238–280.

- Catterberg G and Moreno A (2006) The individual bases of political trust: Trends in new and established democracies. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 18: 31–48.
- Chandler AD and Mazlish B (2005) *Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chemers MM, Watson CB and May ST (2000) Dispositional affect and leadership effectiveness: A comparison of self-esteem, optimism, and efficacy. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 26: 267–277.
- Ciulla JB and Scharding T (2019) *Ethical Business Leadership in Troubling Times*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Clemens MA, Lewis EG and Postel HM (2018) Immigration restrictions as active labor market policy: Evidence from the Mexican Bracero Exclusion. *American Economic Review* 108(6): 1468–1487.
- Clinton C and Sridhar D (2017) *Governing Global Health: Who Runs the World and Why?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Collier A (1994) *Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy*. London: Verso.
- Cooper AF, Higgott RA and Nossal KR (1991) Bound to follow? Leadership and followership in the Gulf conflict. *Political Science Quarterly* 106(3): 391–410.
- Costigliola F (1997) Unceasing Pressure for penetration: Gender, pathology, and emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War. *Journal of American History* 83(4): 1309–1339.
- Cowen T (2013) *Average is Over: Powering America beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation*. New York: Dutton.
- Crane A, Palazzo G, Spence LJ and Matten D (2014) Contesting the value of “creating shared value.” *California Management Review* 56(2): 130–153.
- Dahl RA (1957) The concept of power. *Behavioral Science* 2(3): 201–215.
- Deibert RJ (2019) The road to digital unfreedom: Three painful truths about social media. *Journal of Democracy* 30(1): 25–39.
- Durand R and Vergne J-P (2012) No territory, no profit: The pirate organization and capitalism in the making. *M@n@gement* 3(15): 265–272.
- EC (European Commission) (2020) *EU Security Union Strategy*. Available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1596452256370&uri=CELEX:52020DC0605> (accessed 12 September 2021).
- The Economist* (2020) Covid-19 is causing a microcredit crunch. Available at www.economist.com/leaders/2020/08/15/covid-19-is-causing-a-microcredit-crunch (accessed 1 September 2020).
- Edwards A (2016) *Global Forced Displacement Hits Record High*. Geneva: UNHCR. Available at www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forceddisplacement-hits-record-high.html (accessed 4 June 2017).
- Emirbayer M (1997) Manifesto for a Relational Sociology, *The American Journal of Sociology* 103(2): 281–317.
- EUISS (European Union Institute for Security Studies, European Strategy and Policy Analysis System) (2012) *Global Trends 2030 – Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric world*. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Ferguson N (1998) *The Pity of War*. London: Allen Lane: The Penguin Press.
- Ferreira FHG, Messina J, Rigolini J, Lopez-Calva LF, Lugo MA and Vakis R (2013) *Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin American Middle Class*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

- Finifter AW (1970) Dimensions of political alienation. *American Political Science Review* 64(2): 389–410.
- Fischer F (1990) *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Fishkin, JS (1995) *The Voice of the People*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Foged M and Peri G (2016) Immigrants' effect on native workers: New analysis on longitudinal data. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 8(2): 1–34.
- Forman S and Segaar D (2006) New coalitions for global governance: The changing dynamics of multilateralism. *Global Governance* 12(2): 205–225.
- Freeman LC (1978) Segregation in social networks. *Sociological Methods and Research* 6(4): 411–429.
- Friedman T (2002) *Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World after September 11*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux: 3–6.
- Gao M (2015) Is a non-capitalist world possible? *The China Quarterly* 223: 807–813.
- Gates B (2007) Remarks of Bill Gates, Harvard Commencement 2007. Available at <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2007/06/remarks-of-bill-gates-harvard-commencement-2007/> (accessed 3 February 2020).
- Gates B (2008) *Creative Capitalism*. Transcript of speech delivered at World Economic Forum. Available at www.gatesfoundation.org/media-center/speeches/2008/01/bill-gates-2008-world-economic-forum (accessed 2 March 2018).
- Gates B (2009) *Mosquitos, Malaria and Education*. Speech delivered at TED Conference. Available at www.ted.com/talks/bill_gates_mosquitos_malaria_and_education/transcript (accessed 12 January 2022).
- Gates M (2014) Putting women and girls at the center of development. *Science* 345(6202): 1273–1275.
- Geiger T (1930) Panik im Mittelstand. *Die Arbeit* 7(10): 637–654. Available at library.fes.de/arbeits/pdf/1930/193010.pdf (accessed 12 July 2019).
- Global Justice Now (2016) Gated development: Is the Gates Foundation always a force for good? Available at www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/resources/gjn_gates_report_june_2016_web_final_version_2.pdf (accessed 24 November 2019).
- Government of China (2021) China's Policies and Actions to Address Climate Change. Available at www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/ycqhbh/syqhbh/202107/W020210713306911348109.pdf (accessed 2 August 2021).
- Grint K (2010) The sacred in leadership: Separation, sacrifice and leadership. *Organization Studies* 31(1): 89–107.
- Haas PM (1992) Knowledge, power and international policy coordination. *International Coordination* 46(1): 1–35.
- Haidt J (2012) *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion*. New York: Pantheon/Random House.
- Halla M, Wagner A and Zweimüller J (2015) Immigration and far-right voting: New evidence. VoxEU.org. Available at <https://voxeu.org/article/immigration-and-far-right-voting-new-evidence> (accessed 19 June 2019).
- Hamilton IA (2018) There's zero compelling evidence showing tech is as addictive as cocaine, according to scientists. *Business Insider*. Available at www.businessinsider.com/theres-no-evidence-that-tech-is-as-addictive-as-cocaine-2018-7 (accessed 26 July 2022).
- Heidegger, M (1977) Age of the world picture. In: *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. New York, London: Garland Publishing: 30–34.

- Heiman R, Freeman C and Liechty M (Eds) (2012) *The Global Middle Classes: Theorizing through Ethnography*. Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research Press.
- Henrich J, Heine SJ and Norenzayan A (2010) The weirdest people in the world? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 33(2–3): 61–83.
- Hinchey PH (2010) So after theory, what? Praxis and empowerment. *Counterpoints* 24: 127–114.
- Hofferberth M (2019) Get your act(ors) together! Theorizing agency in global governance. *International Studies Review* 21(1): 127–145.
- Hsiao H-HM (Ed.) (1999) *East Asian Middle Classes in Comparative Perspective*. Taipei: Academia Sinica.
- Hsiao, H-HM (ed.) (2001) *Exploration of the middle classes in Southeast Asia*. Taipei: Academia Sinica.
- Huet N and Paun C (2017) Meet the world's most powerful doctor: Bill Gates. *Politico*. Available at www.politico.eu/article/bill-gates-who-most-powerful-doctor/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
- Huliaris A and Tzifakis N (2011) Bringing the individuals back in? Celebrities as transnational activists. In: Tsaliki L, Frangonikolopoulos CA and Huliaras A (Eds) *Transnational Celebrity Activism in Global Politics: Changing the World*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press: 29–43.
- Huntington S (1991) *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press.
- IEA (International Energy Agency) (2021) *Global Energy Review: CO2 Emissions in 2020*. Paris: IEA.
- IHME (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation) (2019) *Financing global health 2018: Countries and programs in transition*. Available at: www.healthdata.org/policy-report/financing-global-health-2018-countries-and-programs-transition (Accessed: 23 March 2021).
- IHME (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation) (2021) *Financing Global Health*. Available at <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/> (accessed 03 March 2022).
- Jackson B and Parry K (2008) *Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book about Studying Leadership*. Los Angeles, CA, and London : Sage.
- Joyce P (1994) *Democratic Subjects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jung T and Harrow J (2019) Providing foundations. Philanthropy, global policy, and administration. In: Stone D and Moloney K (Eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Global Policy and Transnational Administration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 619–637.
- Kane J, Patapan H and t'Hart P (2009) Dispersed democratic leadership. In: Kane J, Patapan H and t'Hart P (Eds) *Dispersed Democratic Leadership: Origins, Dynamics and Implication*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kapoor I (2012) *Celebrity Humanitarianism: The Ideology of Global Charity*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Karnani A (2010) Doing well by doing good: The grand illusion. *California Management Review* 53(2): 69–86.
- Katz E (1973) Patterns of leadership. In: Knutson Jeanne N (Ed.) *Handbook of Political Psychology*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Kellerman B (2008) *Followership: How Followers Are Creating Change and Changing Leaders*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press.
- Kharas H (2017) The unprecedented expansion of the global middle class: An update. *Global Economy & Development Working Paper*, 100.

- Kim WC and Mauborgne RA (1991) Implementing global strategies: The role of procedural justice. *Strategic Management Journal* 12: 125–143.
- Kindleberger CP (1981) Dominance and leadership in the international economy: Exploitation, public goods, and free rides. *International Studies Quarterly* 25(2): 242–254.
- King MR and Sinclair T (2003) Private actors and public policy: A requiem for the new Basel capital accord. *International Political Science Review* 24(3): 345–362.
- Kochhar R (2021) *The Pandemic Stalls Growth in the Global Middle Class, Pushes Poverty Up Sharply*. Pew Research Center. Available at www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/03/18/the-pandemic-stalls-growth-in-the-global-middle-class-pushes-poverty-up-sharply/ (accessed 13 March 2022).
- Krugman P (2019) What economists (including me) got wrong about globalization. *Bloomberg*. Available at www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-10/inequality-globalization-and-the-missteps-of-1990s-economics (accessed 23 March 2021).
- Lim, YJ (2014) Promoting the image of the United Nations. *Journalism History* 40(3): 187–196.
- Locke EA and Latham GP (1994) Goal setting theory. In: O’Neil HF Jr and Drillings M (Eds) *Motivation: Theory and Research*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum: 13–29.
- Lowenthal L (1944) Biographies in popular magazines. In PF Lazarsfeld and F Stanton (Eds), *Radio research, 1942–43*. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce: 507–548.
- Lührmann A and Lindberg SI (2019) A third wave of autocratization is here: What is new about it? *Democratization* 26(7): 1095–1113.
- Lynch C (2000) Turner offers \$35 Million to Help U.S. pay U.N. Dues. *The Washington Post*. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/12/22/turner-offers-35-million-to-help-us-pay-un-dues/b0357400-8341-4b9e-b0be-2daf8ecc2795/> (accessed 23 March 2021).
- McAdam D (1982) *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago, IL: University Chicago Press.
- McDonald K (2002) From solidarity to fluidarity: Social movements beyond “collective identity” – the case of globalization conflicts. *Social Movement Studies* 1(2): 109–128.
- McGoey L (2015) *No Such Thing as a Free Gift: The Gates Foundation and the Price of Philanthropy*. London: Verso.
- McGoey L and Thiel D (2018) Charismatic violence and the sanctification of the super-rich. *Economy and Society* 47(1): 111–134.
- McPherson A (2015) *The World and U2: One Band’s Remaking of Global Activism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Mair J (2020) Social entrepreneurship: Research as disciplined exploration. In: Powell WW and Bromley P (Eds) *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*, 3rd edn. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press: 333–357.
- Malhotra A (2003) Conceptualizing and measuring women’s empowerment as a variable in international development. In: Narayan D (2005) *Measuring Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Maurice J (2015) UN set to change the world with new development goals. *Lancet* 386(9999): 1121–1124.
- Meadows DL, Meadows DH, Randers J and Behrens WW (1972) *The Limits to Growth*. New York: Universe Books.
- Merton RK (1946/2002) *Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive*. New York: Harper & Bros.

- Mintz A (2004) How do leaders make decisions? A poliheuristic perspective. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(1): 3–13.
- Mortazavi MH, Eslami AH and Vääätänen J (2021) Mapping inclusive innovation: A bibliometric study and literature review. *Journal of Business Research* 122: 736–750.
- Mulgan RG (1977) *Aristotle's Political Theory. An Introduction for Students of Political Theory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Natile S (2020) *The Exclusionary Politics of Digital Financial Inclusion: Mobile Money, Gendered Walls*. London: Routledge.
- Nayar PK (2009) *Packaging Life: Cultures of the Everyday*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- NIC (National Intelligence Council) (2012) *Global Trends 2030: Alternate Worlds*. Available at <https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/> (accessed 13 March 2021).
- NIC (National Intelligence Council) (2021). *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World*. Available at <https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/> (accessed 13 March 2022).
- Norgaard KM (2011) *Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday Life*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Norris P (2011) *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nye JS (1991) Still top dog. *The Economist/The Globe and Mail* Report on business: The world in 1991, January.
- Ostrom E (1999) Coping with tragedies of the commons. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1).
- Parkers R (2020) *The Siege Mentality: How Fear of Migration Explains the EU's Approach to Libya*. *The Eastern Mediterranean and Regional Security: A Transatlantic Dialogue* series. Available at www.fpri.org/article/2020/12/the-siege-mentality-how-fear-of-migration-explains-the-eus-approach-to-libya/ (accessed 23 March 2021).
- Pedersen T (2002) Cooperative hegemony. Power, ideas and institutions in regional integration, *Review of International Studies* 28(4): 677–696.
- Petersmann EU (2020) WTO adjudication@me.too: Are global public goods like the World Trade Organization owned by governments or by peoples and citizens? European University Institute Working Paper, LAW 2020/04.
- Piketty T (2013) *Le capital au XXI siècle*. Paris: Édition de Seuil.
- Pihkala P (2018) Eco-anxiety, tragedy, and hope: Psychological and spiritual dimensions of climate change. *Zygon*® 53(2): 545–569.
- Pogge T (2008) *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Polanyi K (1944) *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Post JM (2004) *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Prochazka F and Schweiger W (2019) How to measure generalized trust in news media? An adaptation and test of scales. *Communication Methods and Measures* 13(1): 26–42.
- Rand Europe (2015) *Individual Empowerment. Global Societal Trends to 2030. Report 3*. Santa Monica, CA: Cambridge.
- Renko M (2013) Early challenges of nascent social entrepreneurs. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice* 37(5): 1045–1069.

- Reuters (2022) Gates Foundation, Wellcome Trust pledge \$150 mn each for better pandemic response. Available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/magazines/panache/gates-foundation-wellcome-trust-pledge-150-mn-each-for-better-pandemic-response/articleshow/88987580.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst (accessed 12 March 2022).
- Rey-Martí A, Ribeiro-Soriano D and Sánchez-García JL (2016) Giving back to society: Job creation through social entrepreneurship. *Journal of Business Research* 69(6): 2067–2072.
- Richey L and Budabin A (2016) *Celebrities in International Affairs*. Oxford Handbooks Online: Scholarly Research Reviews. Available at www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935307.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935307-e-3 (accessed 23 June 2021).
- Richey L and Ponte S (2011) *Brand Aid: Shopping Well to Save the World*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Robinson MJ (1976) Public affairs television and the growth of political malaise: The case of ‘the selling of the Pentagon’. *American Political Science Review* 70(2): 409–432.
- Rosenau JN (1992) Governance, order, and change in world politics. In: Rosenau JN and Czempel E-O (Eds) *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1–29.
- Rosenberg M (1954) Some determinants of political apathy. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 18(4): 349–366.
- Rozin P and Royzman EB (2001) Negativity bias, negativity dominance, and contagion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 5: 296–320.
- Ruggie JG (2004) Reconstituting the global public domain – Issues, actors, and practices *European Journal of International Relations* 10(4): 499–529.
- Runyan WM (Ed.) (1988) *Psychology and Historical Interpretation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rushton S and Williams OD (2012) Frames, paradigms and power: Global health policy-making under neoliberalism. *Global Society* 26(2): 147–167.
- Santora M (2018) After a President’s Shocking Death, a Suspicious Twin Reshapes a Nation. *New York Times*. Available at www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/world/europe/poland-kaczynski-smolensk.html (accessed 10 February 2022).
- Sashkin M (2006) A new vision of leadership. In: Rosenbach WE and Taylor RL (Eds) *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*, 6th edn. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 7–20.
- Scherer AG and Palazzo G (2011) The new political role of business in a globalized world: A review of a new perspective on CSR and its implications for the firm, governance, and democracy. *Journal of Management Studies* 48(4): 899–931.
- Scherer AG, Rasche A, Palazzo G and Spicer A (2016) Managing for political corporate social responsibility: New challenges and directions for PCSR 2.0. *Journal of Management Studies* 53(3): 273–298.
- Schickel R (2000) *Intimate Strangers: The Cult of Celebrity in America*. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee.
- Schirm SA (2010) Leaders in need of followers: Emerging powers in global governance. *European Journal of International Relations* 16(2): 197–221.
- Schutz A (2019) *Empowerment. A primer*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Sen AK (1973) *On Economic Inequality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Solana J (2003) *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*. Council of the European Union, 15895/03, PESC787.

- Solava I and Alkire S (2007) Agency and empowerment: A proposal for internationally comparable indicators. OPHI Working Paper Series. Oxford: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative.
- Soskins B (2014) How US Philanthropy is Inspiring Foreigners to Give. *The Atlantic*. Available at www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/how-us-philanthropy-is-inspiring-foreigners-to-give/370889/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
- Spillane JP (2006) *Distributed Leadership*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Stephen MD and Zürn M (2019) Rising powers, NGOs, and demands for New World orders: An Introduction. In: Stephen MD and Zürn M (Eds) *Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Politics of Authority Beyond the Nation-State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1–37.
- Straw W and Rijven S (1989) Rock for Ethiopia. In: Frith S (Ed.) *World Music, Politics, and Social Change: Papers from the International Association for the Study of Popular Music*. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 198–209.
- Strom K (2000) Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. *European Journal of Political Research* 77: 261–289.
- Strøm RØ, D’Espallier B and Mersland R (2014) Female leadership, performance, and governance in microfinance institutions. *Journal of Banking & Finance* 42: 60–75.
- Stuckler D, Basu S and McKee M (2011) Global health philanthropy and institutional relationships: How should conflicts of interest be addressed? *PLOS Medicine* 8(4).
- Sunstein CR (2017) *Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Suskind R (2004) Without a doubt. *New York Time Magazine*. Available at www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/opinion/magazine/without-a-doubt-426725.html (accessed 23 March 2021).
- Sy T (2010) What do you think of followers? Examining the content, structure, and consequences of implicit followership theories. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 113: 73–84.
- Tarrow, S (1994) *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Thrall, AT., Lollo-Fakhreddine, J., Berent, J., et al. (2008) Star Power: Celebrity Advocacy and the Evolution of the Public Sphere, *The International Journal of Press/Politics*: 13(4): 362–385.
- Tran M (2012) Mark Malloch-Brown: Developing the MDGs was a bit like nuclear fusion. *The Guardian*, 16 November. Available at www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/nov/16/mark-malloch-brown-mdgs-nuclear (accessed 26 July 2022).
- Treiman DJ (1977) *Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Academic Press.
- Tsfati, Y (2010) Online news exposure and trust in the mainstream media: Exploring possible associations. *American Behavioral Scientist* 54(1): 22–42.
- Tsourapas G and Zartaloudis S (2021) Leveraging the European refugee crisis: Forced displacement and bargaining in Greece’s bailout negotiations. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 60(2): 245–263.
- Turkle S (2008) The tethered/untethered self. In: Katz J (Ed.) *Handbook of Mobile Communication Studies*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Turkle S (2011) *Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other*. New York: Basic Books.

- Uhl-Bien M, Riggio RE, Lowe KB and Carsten MK (2014) Followership theory: A review and research agenda. *Leadership Quarterly* 25: 83–104.
- UN (United Nations) (2015) *Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – A/RES/70/1*. New York: United Nations.
- Underdal A (1991) Solving collective problems: Notes on three modes of leadership. In: *Challenges of a Changing World, Festschrift to Willy Østregren*. Lysaker, Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute: 139–153.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2004) *Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizen's Democracy*. New York, UNDP.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2013) *The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World*. New York: UNDP.
- Ursano RJ, Morganstein JC and Cooper R (2017) Resource Document on Mental Health and Climate Change. APA Resource Document, 1.
- Venkataraman S (1997) The distinctive domain of entrepreneurship research. In Katz J and Brockhaus R (Eds), *Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence, and Growth*, Vol. 3. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press: 119–138.
- Weir K (2019) Politics is personal. *Monitor on Psychology* 50(10). Available at www.apa.org/monitor/2019/11/cover-politics (accessed 02 January 2021).
- Wessel M (2011) Idolize Bill Gates, Not Steve Jobs. *Bloomberg Business Week*. Available at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-01/idolize-bill-gates-not-steve-jobs (accessed 23 March 2021).
- Wheatley J (2019) *The Changing Shape of Politics: Rethinking Left and Right in a New Britain*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Whetten DA, Rands G and Godfrey P (2002) What Are the Responsibilities of Business to Society? In: Pettigrew A, Thomas H and Whittington R (Eds) *Handbook of Strategy and Management*. London: Sage Publications: 373–408.
- Wilkings KG (2014) Celebrity as Celebration of Privatization in Global Development: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Oprah, Madonna, and Angelina. *Communication Culture and Critique*. Available at <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ccr.12080> (accessed 27 July 2022).
- World Bank (2013) *Definition of Empowerment*. Available at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTEMPOWERMENT/0,,contentMDK:20272299~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:486411~isCURL:Y,00.html> (accessed 23 March 2021).
- Yamamoto M and Kushin MJ (2014) More harm than good? Online media use and political disaffection among college students in the 2008 election. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 19(3): 430–445.
- Yukl G and van Fleet DD (1992) Theory and research on leadership in organisations. In Dunnette MD and Hough LM (Eds) *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 3. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press: 147–197.
- Zachara M (2017), The Transatlantic Globalisation Dilemma: How to Retain Power, While Contesting the Principles? *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 51(1): 185–201.
- Zachara M (2019) Can institutions save the world? Neoliberal institutionalist perspective on global governance. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 55(1): 41–57.
- Zachara M (2020) The Millennial generation in the context of political power: A leadership gap? *Leadership* 16(2): 241–258.

- Zakaria F (2008) The rise of the rest. Blog Entry. Available at <https://fareedzakaria.com/columns/2008/05/12/the-rise-of-the-rest> (accessed 12 June 2021).
- Zarsky T (2019) Privacy and manipulation in the digital age. *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 20(1): 157.
- Zuboff S (2015) Big other: Surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization. *Journal of Information Technology* 30: 75–89. Available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2594754>, accessed 7 August 2022.

4 Global Leadership as Sense Making

The content of this chapter focuses on issues of the construction and reconstruction of identities as essential aspects of global leadership processes. It examines influential narratives constructed within global political leadership, revealing their roles as cultural formulations brought about by structural changes at the international level. Leadership narratives are placed here at the centre of the explanatory enterprise, as they cast considerable light on how individuals and groups identify themselves as belonging to a global community, structure or society. Visions and ideas associated with “the global” provide a context for the creation of leadership myths and ways of influencing cognitive and emotional attachment to certain events, problems and perceptions of reality. The final part uses leadership as a specific framework for the study of Holocaust memory; the mechanisms presented reveal how this story of civilisational failure is embedded in the practice of political leadership in the West and how it shapes western political imaginaries.

Leaders, context and conscience

Leadership is about generating change, introducing social practices, providing motivation and justification for them and allowing people to adjust to new contexts. Both leaders and followers need common histories to create connection and emotional grounding, as their relations rely upon a shared vision. This is why sense making is one of the basic tasks of leadership, shaping the way individuals enact change in both organisational and societal environments (Smircich and Morgan, 1982). People need a safe world, recognisable rules and instructions to develop the conviction that they can deal with realities, modify and transform them. The process of sense making enables the shifting of followers from the sphere of ambiguity and the unknown to conditions in which the clear identification of common goals and action towards them are possible. Leaders thus play the role of translators and interpreters, provide maps to explore a wider world and offer guidance through reality, as only by introducing predictability can they activate human agency. “History used to be told as the story of great men. Julius Caesar, Frederick the Great, George Washington, Napoléon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler,

Mao Zedong—individual leaders, both famous and infamous, were thought to drive events” (Byman and Pollack, 2019). They not only played roles of heroes and villains in historical accounts, they became points of reference for the time and place they lived in because of their ability to define a historical moment, to create it in a story about the desire for change, and recreate it through bringing about this change.

Sense making is a leadership instrument through which, by virtue of filtering and interpreting, there is creation of facticity to render “the subjective” into cognitive constructs that are instinctively recognisable. Theoretically, sense making has been developed on the grounds of linguistics and constructivism (Weick, 1995; Brown et al., 2008; Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). The first approach seeks to discover shared understanding in language, while the latter refers to sense making as a process of interpreting stimuli and constructing cognitive frames and mental schemata. As a result, the complexities of the world are being turned into a “situation that is comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard into action” (Weick et al., 2005: 409). While research within organisational studies and political studies alike prioritises organisational practices, sense making, although less perceptible, precedes and conditions everything that happens between people and within organisations. Sense making is a necessary component of social relations, one that introduces order into social life, counterbalancing fragmentation and atomisation. Where the global environment is concerned, the scale of the operation increases, but its nature remains the same. The chaos of the world is being replaced with order, anarchy of the global system in the human imagination is being transformed into structure, within which, actors interact with each other, seeking information, ascribing meaning and acting. Weick’s comparison to the musical improvisation well reflects its nature. The order that originates in jazz is constructed by musicians and comes into being in a performer’s on-the-spot decisions and a stream of common experiences. That order is the orchestra and only exists in the heads of members of the orchestra (Weick, 2001: 201). The jazz analogy expresses, in rather intuitive terms, the connection of individuals with all of the varieties of their cognitive and creative potential and influences provided by others:

For humans, thinking is like a jazz musician improvising a novel riff in the privacy of his own room. It is a solitary activity all right, but on an instrument made by others for that general purpose, after years of playing with and learning from other practitioners, in a musical genre with a rich history of legendary riffs, for an imagined audience of jazz aficionados. Human thinking is individual improvisation enmeshed in a sociocultural matrix.

(Tomasello, 2014: 1)

Thus, the enacted and performed dimension of sense making complements its cognitive and linguistic layers because the interpretation of reality is often

produced in the making. Sense making is performed in interaction, it requires engaging, speaking, writing, demonstrating and motivating, and these acts are interpreted as breaking rules, reinterpreting reality and transgressing taboos.

At the operational level, sense-making practice requires the construction of narratives, representations and assemblages – collections of social, technical and material elements. In the process, people develop their approach towards reality and towards their relations with others. Sense making is the space/activity where metaphysical aspects of leadership relations make themselves felt: individuals gather and categorise their emotional attachments and information into a mental construction which is being brought into existence in their heads. However, this approach, covering emotional bonding and intellectual involvement, differs from the most common ways of depicting a leadership process as a relation based on domination or impact, in which followers are passive and coerced rather than “autonomous agents that actively generate and maintain themselves, and thereby also enact or bring forth their own cognitive domains” (Thompson, 2007: 13).

The leadership relationship, just as every other meaningful interpersonal relationship, embodies particular assumptions about the world and the way it works, creating a persistent influence that does not dissolve simply because actors change their strategies. Enactivism, a term spurred from the research of biological organisms, used in the sense of being autopoietic and able to “recreate”, sees meaning as a product of interaction between autonomous individuals and their environment (Varela et al., 1991). Leadership relationships are created as a result of specific cognitive domains that are activated. In light of the enactive approach, followers engaged in the relationship with leaders are in constant interplay between the maintenance of self-identity and the requirements and influences of the environment, which is not a neutral, exterior reality but a set of events and material things already interpreted as an array of self-generated significances. Leaders and followers engage in the process of “participatory sense-making” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). The interpersonal relationships between are, like any other cultural or cognitive activity, shaped by the local social contexts within which the leadership process takes place, and the broader sociocultural history of the genre. Leaders’ political and ethical positions are co-produced with specific and contingent collections of elements. In consequence, leadership processes oriented at global cooperation or synergy develop, stall or decay depending on the effectiveness of persuasion, mediation and translation activities. Their effects are reflected in the way in which actors link generalised norms into particular vision, desired patterns of behaviour or the state of the world, which if accepted, can be translated into institutional arrangements, tools or techniques. Political vision, skilfully crafted, strongly influences people’s beliefs and behaviours, inspiring a sense of trust and mobilising action. Leaders of terrorist or criminal organisations, religious cults and faith communities gain the power of controlling beliefs and actions of their followers and this control can take extreme forms. The power of a compelling narrative

may authorise oppressive norms imposed at members of sects, justifies violent tactics and wins new recruits. The leader–follower relationship is twofold, as communications and incentives from both sides construct a shared reality and common meanings. In Karl Weick’s seminal outlook (1995, 2001), the practice of sense making is fundamental for identity construction, interaction and group formation. It takes a variety of forms, which are present in a particular organisational context and arrangements as well as in the following global leadership processes

a) Episodic–deliberative. All elements of human action and its complex effects require understanding. Within the frames of already constructed meanings, every new factor plays the role of an interruption, so absorbing and mediating new meaning requires comprehension, constantly addressing the question of what has happened and why. These episodic interruptions in the global environments – wars, crises, revolutions, technological change – force governments, statesmen and public opinion leaders to deliberately search for ways to restore interrupted activities. They name their change, so it can be organised into continuity: Cold War, global war on terror, European integration, collective security and so on. This continuous work is part of the leadership process, driven by the desire to construct a world that could be understandable and safe. The flow of international events is accompanied by the leaders’ efforts to observe, react to changes and put their interpretations in the already established framework of “who we are”. Discoveries, elections and emerging and failing institutions serve as interruptions opening up new terrain in a constant evolution. Political activities never cease to mediate and divide, forming hierarchies of power, introducing new ways of dealing with issues, making wars and peace or distributing resources, thus sense making as a global leadership practice is never completed (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014: 62–67).

b) Identity formation. Few issues carry as much political weight as the identity issue. Individuals define themselves, their role in society and in organisational contexts in relation to what they are doing, and why and how they are doing it. This process is extended to the group, the state and regional identity and plays a prominent role in formation and evolution in the global order. Social identity theory holds that a person’s self-concept is based on their membership within a group. Similarly, states, organisations and alliances create narrative and ideational frameworks, providing instruments through which their members can expand individual identities. Within the context of global politics, this issue of identity serves both the building of synergy and the fuelling of divisions. People have multiple identities in politics – aside from ethnic or national identities already ascribed to the person, other identities can be assigned, chosen by them, some of which can establish attachment to global issues; such identities may include “human rights supporter”, “climate change denier” etc... Identity is however often used

in political communication in defining the group as being at odds with the perceived “other” – an approach that can easily foster chauvinism, invidious discrimination and open antagonism.

c) Relational component. Sense making in social life is based on combining and transforming individual perspectives into categories allowing the defining of the world at the common level. Individually, people “live by inference” – being continually in the position of having to base their understanding of, and actions towards others on incomplete information that needs to be agreed and framed to build a story resonating with the group (Goffman, 1959: 3). Understanding of the world is constructed from the unique cultural resources that are available at particular times in particular places, so they require and allow particular types of relations. They appear, reappear and are used in connection to others – real, imaginary, historical figures that represent ideas and provide points of reference. Inevitably, emergence of the global era has been associated with the spread of new designates of activities that are performed outside of separate national communities. Imaginary spaces and approaches like “transnational areas”, “cosmopolitanism” and “common market” prompted political leaders to expand connections; therefore, an abstract notion of global politics has been gradually marked by real relationships, networks and diplomatic strategies.

d) Connecting the past to the present. Narratives link the past, the present and the future within some overarching explanatory, evaluative or interpretative account. Globalisation links people together across borders, draws them together and confronts them with cultural differences and reality in which they have to renegotiate their common histories, construct or revise myths that explain the current moment of their social lives. Their sense-making narratives are concerned with existential mysteries, such as life and death, good and evil, sacrifice and self-affirmation, which link ideational spaces historically developed on national grounds with the realities of the interconnected world. They are embedded in individual and group decision making, being part of the political processes which, while dealing with governance of current affairs and provision of future gains, are firmly embedded in systems of beliefs and ways of making sense of the world developed in the past.

e) Immersion in contextual references. Global leadership links particular experiences and beliefs with external cultural and political phenomena, expanding the reach of global culture. Sense making provides language and context, creating rules that allow actors to understand the realities around them. Most of the tools used by people to decode relations or social situations and the rules they follow are produced locally; and with the expansion of global processes, they gradually emerge into transnational spaces. The visions, beliefs and norms that leaders bring from the sphere of “the local” to the sphere of “the global” have been part of particular, cultural

orders. Although widespread dissemination of cultural ideas and products beyond national borders is an inherent part of global realities, these local cultures cannot simply be merged – they have to be negotiated. While the notion of global culture is still elusive, and cultural diversities both within and between societies cannot be truly grasped, the sphere of global contexts is still expanding. They are needed to organise realities and allow people to predict the consequences of their choices, so they not only provide meaning but determine their effectiveness. These contexts are evolving and undergoing constant negotiation being exposed at external transformations.

In every nation, within every leadership process sense making has always been connected to agency, context and actions, embedded in institutional structures of power, sustained by social practices such as public discourse, artistic work, ceremonies and rituals. It serves leaders to translate the cognitive processes into intention, guiding desires and behaviours. Leadership relations provide incentives that facilitate the process of inner sense making – an explorative evaluation of the direct possibilities of what the given situation implies and could be made into. This process reveals the range of perceptions and actions and their respective consequences, which creates a set of options or intentions about what the situation should be made into, what calls to respond to, with what means and why. Leaders as change agents are involved in chains of translation that make “actors modify, displace, and translate their various and contradictory interests into terms that allow action to occur” (Latour, 1999: 311) mediation needed in situations in which “an event or actor that cannot be exactly defined by its input and its output” (Latour, 1999: 307). Thus, to understand the mechanics and potential of global leadership, attention must be given to how meaning-in-use reflects the different ways in which actors assemble issues of coexistence, cooperation and synergy.

Mediation and rationality

Throughout the sense-making process, leaders mediate reality, taking the role of guides throughout the social world. Although people’s own experiences serve as an important point of reference for designing individual life strategies or perceptions of public sphere, the greater part of knowledge, beliefs and attitudes towards the past and present is mediated. The question of leadership is crucial in this respect as ideas are implemented through the mediation of their authority and charisma. Leaders play the role of social negotiators of knowledge, and the process is embedded in the assumption that political reasoning is based on objective knowledge, independent of individuals (Popper, 1968). Their role is especially important for domains where such objective knowledge is not yet available, so public opinion leaders extract knowledge from experts and conceptual structures. In the absence of objective knowledge, the position of intellectuals or the scientific community may vary, so leaders facilitate consensus. Furthermore, they frame the

discourse in such a way that even decisions rooted in politics can generally be justifiably defended on rational, or presumed rational grounds. The notion of “clashing rationalities” or “different rationalities” often comes to the fore when brutal or unusual tactics of political strategy are analysed. “Nihilist and irrational ... an aberrant form of violent activity devoid of any meaning ... attempting to understand its logic would be futile” – such a sentiment is widely present in the narratives surrounding the World Trade Centre attacks and terrorism in general (Neumann and Smith, 2005: 572). Similar reactions are connected to ethnic cleansing and cultural cleansing – demolition of the world heritage sites in Syria by ISIS, honour killings directed especially at women and girls and many, many others. In assessing rationality or irrationality, cultural prisms matter a lot as they establish a certain order of beliefs and norms that are used to justify actions. Modes of reasoning are based on shared meaning produced by cultures (Geertz, 1973).

Westerners may have a hard time understanding why someone would commit suicide for a political goal, but from another perspective where life is bleak and the prospect for improvement slim, suicide may seem like a rational act in order to make life better for the family members who remain.

(McDermott, 2004)

This example contains a direct reference to higher gods that justify personal sacrifice, which is rather universally understood but applied in a different social context and linked to different obligations. American pilots of the U-2 surveillance planes who flew over the Soviet Union during the Cold War always carried a coin that had a pin dipped in cyanide taped to it, so they could kill themselves if they crashed or were forced to eject over enemy territory. The perception of values changes over time and is heavily embedded into the value structure produced by the organisation or community. The topic of suicidal pills has returned when extremist, non-state actors like ISIS started to use brutal murders of captured Westerners – soldiers, journalists and humanitarians – as a means of propaganda. The rationality of “the more shocking the picture, the better” caused a number of people of American, British and Japanese citizenship to be beheaded, while a Jordanian pilot participating in airstrikes led by the US was filmed burning alive in a cage. The scale of ISIS barbarism brought a suggestion about the possibility of including quick death substances into military equipment, but it was rejected, as being “inconsistent with military values”, as explained by the US Air Force representative: “Pilots are trained to evade capture or resist and escape.” (Nelson, 2015).

Anthropological research explains political strategies in connection with cultural features and specific characteristics of diverse human structures, which influence individual beliefs. So conditions and constraints always frame rationality, and as Herbert A. Simon wrote, “The rationality of behaviour

depends upon the actor in only a single respect – his goals”. In his seminal works linking economic reasoning with psychology, he distinguishes substantial rationality and procedural rationality, of which the latter depends on the process that generated it (Simon, 1976: 66). This distinction leads to the essence of the many strategic choices made by leaders, which can be better understood as result of specific direct circumstances, not consequences. Of course, since rationality is recognised as a primary ground in political and economic decision making, skilled politicians will rarely push for actions that would be judged as irrational by the public. However, public understanding of the situation is debatable. Cultural frameworks result in types of people operating in the given way and being prone to certain codes and emphases in the process of providing a sense of worth and trust. Storytelling is the primary leadership tool used not only to present interests, ordering them in hierarchies and indicating the desired courses of action but also in the construction of these interests, just as they construct communities (Breuilly, 1993; Motyl, 2002).

The “stories of peoplehood” (Smith, 2003) most often used to generate or sustain political allegiances can be classified into three different types. “Economics” stories are about power expressed in wealth, progress and aspiration. They also have to refer to the fears of those who feel excluded or unwelcome. The major narrative constituting “the global” was of an economic nature. What joined people together was not a desire to connect for a common understanding but rather the increasingly intensive distribution networks of integrated markets. Global economy has been presented as a uniting power – one that may overcome historical and ethical divisions. The most prominent story guiding political globalisation was based on the “liberal peace hypothesis” making mutual trade an inhibitor of war (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The narrative was well rooted in Montesquieu’s *doux commerce* notion claiming that commercial relations between states moderate their ambitions and soften their manners encouraging peaceful IR. The story also appeared with a new twist when *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman expressed it in terms of fast food restaurants: Countries that both have McDonald’s restaurants don’t fight each other. Economic stories of globalisation not only failed to construct a sense of global belonging but fuelled aspirations that fought back with growing resentment and disappointment. Liberal peace after the Cold War and during the war on terror has rapidly turned into an age of intervention. Although most societies are richer today than they were 50 years ago, the feeling of losing out has grown to be a powerful driver of political instincts.

Interestingly, “political” stories common in the public space of nation states and non-state entities were never popular within the global arena. Leaders use them to align people with the idea of the power of a particular mode of political constitution that might enhance the ability of members. While such kinds of story are well represented by Robert Schuman’s concept of the united Europe that would build its political power through integration, they hardly appeared in the global context. The traditional notion of power is relational (power over), so “political power stories” relate to hierarchical

structure and competition. While both hierarchy and competition over power and resources are very much present in international practices, the narrative of “the global” embedded in the vision of liberal world order neglect them. It encompasses all societies and stresses cooperation rather than conflict; therefore, it has weak appeal to the prospect of building political prevalence. It ignores the mechanics of political instincts reinforced over centuries within the national and transnational framework.

The category that has been widely represented among the stories circulating within the global political sphere are “ethically constitutive” stories, indicating the values that people carry. Here, the sense of worth and trust is a result of commitments to intrinsic goods that are not directly expressed in terms of political or economic success. Expanding economic and political integration was associated with stories projecting the rise of “global civil society” or constructing “global community” in a worldwide public sphere and carrying substantial moral weight. The global age was seen as a moment in history in which transnational actors would be free to promote universal rather than nation-state or elite-oriented values. The story of the emergence of global ethics or the “law of humanity” captured the imagination of activists, politicians and networked citizens (Clark, 2001: 18). The story of the global future, the one that would be founded on democratisation and the spread of human rights across the world, largely ignored power relations not erased after the shift from the international order of states to global order. This and other ethically constitutive stories were put in line with other self-identification narratives coined in the long history of humanity, presenting successfully evolving societies that were able to adapt to new challenges. Optimism in this self-transformative potential of the human species, including in the ethical context, has to be tamed, however, by the power of counter-narratives describing the current global condition: stories of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), environmental disasters, deadly pandemics, technological integration, demographic trends, and the genetic manipulation of our own species (Smith, 2003: 166–167). In the case of efforts directed at global community construction, as in any other political endeavour, all types of story were woven together.

Cognition games

Political leaders are often seen as dishonest, cynically telling followers what they want to hear and being all things to all people. However, as the psychological perspective reveals, the problem may be less defined by leaders’ strategies of what they are actually saying but rather by the ways in which their words are heard and interpreted. Being in the world, including on the political scene, is a cognitive exercise in which current experience interplays with prior knowledge. People use cues and other information from political elites to translate their general value orientations into particular behaviour. Norms, beliefs and identities are closely connected with individual mental

representations that guide the perception and processing of new information. The human ability to select information advances individual ability to process, reason and provide solutions, and also places a barrier against absorbing and analysing information that is contradictory to existing knowledge or unfamiliar. The stories leaders tell in the process of generating human agency in order to initiate and sustain meaningful relations with followers have to be consistent with followers' cognitive base. They listen, understand, internalise values, participate and design individual courses of action according to scripts created by interaction with the old and new knowledge base.

There are many types of reasoning in social sciences that are directly connected with the wider context of political processes, social norms and specific circumstances that shape individual beliefs and behaviours. Events are explained against a background of specific historical circumstances that made people think about certain actions as "natural", based on "learned knowledge structures" (Chaiken et al., 1989: 213). Meaning production is always connected to building a hierarchy of information – everyday choices that prioritise one item of information over others. As Jervis (1983: 3) explains referring to deterrence:

People not only assimilate incoming information to their pre-existing beliefs ... but do not know they are doing so. Instead, they incorrectly attribute their interpretations of events to the events themselves; they do not realize that their beliefs and expectations play a dominant role.

Researchers in this area have identified a number of biases which result from cognitive limitations. Social life is framed by heuristics – judgemental shortcuts that guide people through the complexity of political decision making and complexity of the world in general (Gilovich et al., 2002). Called also "rules of thumb", heuristics have been described as "methods for arriving at satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of computation" (Simon, 1990:11). Their major role is to present reality in simpler terms and introduce order into an otherwise chaotic environment. Research of evolutionary biologists suggests that they are the result of the human brain's evolution, aimed at enhancing its adaptive capabilities.

While heuristics are often useful, they may also lead to systematic biases, potentially detrimental in shaping the course of foreign politics (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). Socially constructed, they are reproduced by media and opinion leaders, thus enabling the formation of subjective knowledge about the world. In the heuristic subjectively experienced and developed, the attitude towards certain elements of social life is being merged with collective praxis, manifested and confirmed by societal and political discourse. Therefore, voters tend to adopt the positions of their preferred candidate – opportunities and threats can be consistently misinterpreted, institutions shape expectations and diplomacy remains processed in direct contact because personal relations matter when issues of war and peace are on the table. An example of this is

the *instrumentalist* heuristic focus on rational pursuit of self-interest while explaining a given political behaviour. While the references to self-interests or state interests are widely used in decision-making processes shaping international relations, the notion is at least contested:

Whose self? Which interest? High-level governmental actors play multiple roles, ranging from the tough negotiator with foreign governments to the official sworn to uphold the law. It is not obvious which role will define the individual's view on a given issue. Even if the role is clear, there are likely to be competing interests. For instance, the President may need to choose between the immediate benefits of renegeing on a commitment and the uncertain, longer-term costs of doing so.

(Koechane, 2002: 124)

The *availability heuristic* guides popular assumptions about the probability of a given situation. It has been observed that it often happens that systemic transformations or instabilities occur in regional clusters, as changes implemented in one country provide more *availability* of a similar strategy in the perceptions held in its neighbourhood (Weyland, 2014). The *representativeness heuristic* is also often used, as citizens and other political actors assess “the degree to which A is representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974: 1124). A negative image of the national or ethnic group is often a result of judgements about the attitude of some of their representatives which is extended to the whole group (Vis, 2019).

Malthusian trap and other traps of deduction

Thomas Malthus in his 1798 essay on the “Principle of Population” argued that an increase in nominal wages of the lower classes would increase prices and impoverish the whole nation. In his theory, Malthus (1804) combined the population principle with the dynamics of the resources available for people in any given society, arguing that humans would outpace their local carrying capacity, so famine and poverty, vice and misery are the fate of mankind and a natural fact of life:

It has appeared, that from the inevitable laws of our nature, some human beings must suffer from want. These are the unhappy persons who, in the great lottery of life, have drawn a blank. The number of these claimants would soon exceed the ability of the surplus produce to supply. Moral merit is a very difficult distinguishing criterion, except in extreme cases. The owners of surplus produce would in general seek some more obvious mark of distinction.

(Malthus, 2015 [1798]: 89)

Malthus's calculations demonstrated that while food supply grew at a linear rate, populations tended to grow exponentially. The explanation of "natural causes" of poverty, that "God's plan to prevent people from being lazy" grew to be influential in shaping England's Poor Laws. Regulations introduced by Queen Elizabeth I in 1601 to provide food to people at the bottom of the income ladder were severely curtailed by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. Decision makers were inspired by the Malthusian reasoning that helping the poor only encourages them to have more children and thereby exacerbating poverty. The spirit of Malthus survived not only in natural selection and eugenic theories but also in today's deservingness heuristic, which shapes welfare policies by reference to the imagined attitude rather than by the actual behaviours of potential recipients. If the public considers representatives of the group as lazy and responsible for their own plight, support for the policies vanishes.

The state of public opinion is a result of constant negotiation between influential members of society, politicians and public opinion leaders. Its dynamics are shaped by both objective circumstances and subjective narratives. This is why President Ronald Reagan's liberal political agenda has been backed by the figure of the "welfare queen". "She used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans' benefits for four non-existent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare. Her tax-free cash income alone has been running at \$150,000 a year" Reagan announced at a campaign rally in 1976. The notion of the welfare queen has long been present in the American debate about welfare, along other stereotypical images of benefit target groups, and especially the "black" poor, in undermining the social legitimacy of welfare policies. As a result, the perception of desired governmental interventions grew to be a feature of national or even regional orientations. "Europeans are much more likely to believe that the poor are trapped in poverty and that their poverty is the result of forces beyond their control. Americans, by contrast, believe that effort, not luck, determines income and that the poor are not trapped" (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004: 183). Dominant ideologies heavily influence the ways in which social organisation is designed and might be decisive factors for the persistence of frameworks and solutions over time, even when their initial rationale vanishes. Gilens (1999) reveals a range of social narratives and heuristics providing reasons "why Americans hate welfare". A strong belief that black people are more lazy and less responsible than white people and the conclusion that they naturally position themselves as welfare beneficiaries not only triggers opposition to welfare but reinforces racial prejudice and tensions. Similar heuristics are used to stigmatise single mothers and lazy unemployed; recently in

many countries there has also been a growing focus on negative images of migrants as benefit recipients. Beliefs that provide reasoning for public policies are shaped by culture, of which leadership narratives are an important part. Thus, many politicians tend to play safe by avoiding radicalism and reinforcing socially grounded convictions. On the other hand, rising fragmentation and polarisation of information sources provide grounds for effective political strategy based not on a principle of representation (the number of people that share the leader's belief) but rather on the grounds of cohesive behaviours that members of the group demonstrate (whether they are disciplined voters). Under such circumstances, there is no reason to moderate the initial message, even when its radicalism has been out of context.

This is a way in which people, both leaders and followers, address the constant information deficit and asymmetry which constitute the permanent feature of the governing and political sphere. Nowadays, complexity in these areas is on the increase with both expansion of the spheres covered by the political spectrum and communicative spaces filled with different sorts of information where expert knowledge is blended with fabricated stories. Thus, given the fact that followers in democratic societies are obliged to be informed on the one hand but lack incentives to pay attention to politics on the other, they use heuristic mechanisms to take part in political discussion. "Politics is a sideshow in the great circus of life" (Dahl, 1966: 305), so convictions shaping the course of individual actions are to a large extent derived from readily available cues (Gieringer, 2008). Rules of the organisation of understanding and the ordering of political reality can also be provided by the institutional framework. For example, through party affiliation, followers reduce their decision-making options to the preferred party strategies. Political affiliation has traditionally been a strong driver of political behaviour as party members are more disciplined in public participation. The *likability* heuristic guides the way people use their judgement about parties and their leaders to make conclusions about political issues (Sniderman et al., 1993). Alignment with the party's ideology and viewpoint simplifies the intellectual process of political event analysis; it provides a kind of shortcut to followers and observers. Trust relations between leaders and followers allow the follower to conclude on the basis of the leader's credibility that his/her stances on issues are right. When citizens believe that a politician is right on what they consider to be key political issues, they may think that the politician is also right about other issues. In politics, heuristics are used to defend and justify the status quo or sustain a sense of belonging, even if this entails embracing strategies that are harmful to the followers' interests or are counterproductive. Trust in the leader's judgement bears a risk for followers and this trust is usually

founded on the assumption that the leader's qualities or experience make their judgement superior.

This dichotomy between “skilled” or “gifted” leaders and “ordinary man” has long been a primary point of reference in shaping relations between the two. Ordinary people were considered too unaware of the political world to take informed decisions, so they rely on leaders who represent their interests and world views (Campbell et al., 1960). This occurrence highlights the role of leaders, especially in explaining and interpreting international politics as it is assumed that citizens lack the sophistication and knowledge to establish their preferences within the area. A classic study by Philip Converse (1964) demonstrated that most citizens have unstable and weakly constrained policy preferences; therefore, they are not capable of making cost–benefit calculation analyses. Leaders, on the other hand, are especially concerned with perceptions of their performance as these perceptions form their political profile. “A politician’s political survival may also depend on having been perceived to win, whether or not they did, in fact, achieve significant tangible gains” (Jonhson and Tierney, 2004: 351). Therefore, perception management has long been recognised as a fundamental element of political success, which makes authoritarian rulers limit sources of information by imposing restrictions on the freedom of the press, so their carefully crafted messages could not be questioned.

But even in democracies, emotionally charged images and prejudices often replace knowledge and data in providing grounds on which citizens form their political positions. Perceptions of victories, “good old days” or friendship between nations matters for policymakers because the recalled history of the past event usually participates in shaping subsequent foreign policy. Well-established opinions embedded in social discourse actively structure public imagination – people can easily pick up well-functioning heuristics that are “the next-best thing to fully rational democratic decision-making” (Druckman et al., 2009: 493). There are numerous historical examples of mass deception that can be explained on these grounds. From the “big lie” which led to the extermination of Jews during the Second World War (WWII) (Herf, 2006), through deception by US and UK political leaders about WMD that justified the Second Gulf War (Mearsheimer, 2011) to Donald Trump’s denial of the Covid-19 pandemic. Thus, leaders’ or followers’ subjective expectations and perceptions of utility might be opposed to some apparent empirical truth due to cognitive biases, beliefs and circumstances, often acting at a subconscious level. This doesn’t erase, but rather complements the fact that public opinion may be modelled as a cost–benefit calculation or based on moral judgements. Even, or especially, in cases of the highest importance and with possible devastating consequences, such as war, people usually make their judgements adopting the position of political elites – they “follow the leader” (Berinsky, 2007). While at times misperceptions are used instrumentally to steer political situations and generate desired reactions, cognitive biases of leaders also create social realities, just as habits and routines.

Narratives and identity construction within the global space

The “idea of the global” tends to be taken for granted, as globalisation has thrown people into a state of interdependence, which has brought the need for reorganisation of the image of states and other actors. In the majority of works within political and international studies and political discourse, “global” automatically goes hand in hand with the idea of “globalisation”, which implies two dimensions of the term – spatial and normative. Spatial dimension means “worldwide”, concerning the whole planet, while normative is understood as the “world as a whole”, concerning the population of the planet, expressed in the concept of humankind. These dimensions are heavily present in the global imagination, providing a “structuring grammar of meaning” for the globalism debate (Taylor, 2002). Emergence of global market and communication networks provided a stimulus for connection that resulted in new material forms, as well as in the mental or ideational representations of them. The old exercise of organising political and economic life around new organisational and imaginary frameworks has been repeated once again on an unprecedented scale. Mechanisms of identity formation that organised human communities, from tribes, through ancient Greek city states, to modern nation states, were put in motion to work towards an elusive vision of the “global village”.

Aristotle described the essence of this process of the city’s construction, exposing forces shaping governance, economic development and social order evolving within the multilayered hierarchy of nodal systems. The vivid organism of the city emerged as a result of synoecism (*synoikismos*), a process that brought together people from diverse family tribes – a diverse *oikos* with its own history, allegiances, property, family and gods. Aristotle’s notion of difference included the experience of doing different things and acting in divergent ways which do not neatly fit together. The philosopher lists a detailed classification of tensions and disorders that may arise in the *polis* due to inequality, competing visions of the good, dishonesty, alienation, class conflicts, oppression of minorities, riots or armed conflict.

However, the constructed entity encompassed multiple religious or ethnic affinities within a single system of rule. In ancient times, people migrated to new areas where they could find space to establish cities – centres for collective life. Synoecism was further explored by Max Weber as a construct providing origins of the concepts of citizenship and community creation (Weber, 1968). Metaprocesses of globalisation transformed systems and individual biographies, putting people in motion in the search for optimal conditions of life. “The global” is about connections, a catalogue of processes which bring people together to produce goods, exchange ideas and create networks leading to reconciling differences. The direct experience with others is believed to eliminate tribalism, but inevitably it also leads to recognition that their ways of seeing the world are distinctive, therefore their actions are based on different premises.

Weick regards organisations as “sharing of meaning”, which can be achieved in the shared cultural, linguistic and philosophical context (1995). This was an idea that laid the foundation for global institutions and global governance; however, establishment of this institutional framework was not a result of the “global identity” formation but was merely accompanied by it. Thus, the widespread notion that contemporary social reality is “global”, doesn’t reflect the state of the actual sense-making process but rather reveals the ethnocentric character of supposedly universal global policies, programmes and conceptualisations. Both international practice and international studies naturalised the notion of “the global”, which is not, however, self-evident and while it is taken for granted in academia, it does not reflect the operational level of politics, which is concerned primarily with national and international, but not global contexts. The meaning is constructed and reproduced by a global imagination, one which is “not a representation that simply corresponds to an observable, empirical world but rather is itself a world-view produced and reproduced within contradictory and contested political and economic relations” (Kamola, 2014: 515–516).

The influence of powerful states and institutions promoting global transformation gave rise to a collective belief about the nature of global change, producing a driving force behind this change as “nothing changes the world like the collective belief that it is changing” (Bartelson, 2000: 180).

This helps the understanding of why global governance cannot be effective without leadership and why sense making of “the global” is such a complex process. Sharing of meaning is based on unified conceptual systems, so sharing of “the global” must occur at great scale between the broad range of actors involved. There is no easy way to sum up and refer to all interpretations of global realities that were ever constructed across cultures and languages. Combining them into one story that would reflect the past, present and desired future of nations, ethnic groups, clans and individuals seems to be an impossible task. Among many social allegiances people have to families, friends, colleagues and fellow citizens, there is total absence of – or barely any – allegiance to the global community. The notion of “the global” has been simply too far away from local realities for the majority of the global population. All efforts directed at building “a common story of humanity” must by definition be fragmented and heavily involved in power dynamics. History has always been written by the victors and sense making has been regarded as one of the privileges of the dominant powers. The task of providing the global vision has been historically connected with the politics of empires, spiritual leaders and tyrants. The emergence of global integration, however, brought an urgent need for a narrative indicating linkages between different parts of the world.

The global system is not natural as a grounding for identity formation because it encompasses a wide range of diversity: cultural and personal biographies shape what kinds of vision leaders might wish to construct and followers are willing to absorb. Furthermore, the global environment is

constantly changing, while people address the question of “who am I?” not only in relation to themselves but as a reaction to their social and material surroundings. Finally, the construction of identities take place in relation with others, as polarisation has as much a dividing as a binding function. A group, Smith (2003: 20) writes, constitutes political people when “it is a potential adversary of other forms of human association, because its proponents are generally understood to assert that its obligations legitimately trump many of the demands made on its members in the name of other associations”. The presence of “the other” symbolises the unfamiliar and the excluded, which by contrast leads to the exposition of unities, especially when members of “the other” are presented as threatening. This mechanism contributed to the emergence of important socio-political categories and still works in creating national, regional and religious identities. However, despite the fact that due to economic integration the world has been networked within one system of production and exchange, people are still connected more as buyers, producers and consumers, not as members of the common social framework.

a) Global vision. Current institutional order has been founded on the premise that economic integration will result in some form of global networked society in which peoples of the world recognise common good and work towards its protection (Giddens, 1990, Castells, 1996). The approach towards “the global” and “the commons” underwent a major evolution over the course of the last century. The development of international organisations gave birth to increased circulation of the notion of the “global” and established the mechanisms, practices and forms of expertise through which they shape the material infrastructure of international governance. Yet along the way, there were many errors, misconceptions and ideological struggles involved. Thus, ever since the League of Nations project in 1920, which didn’t survive long, international cooperation has been treated as a utopian concept within policy and public agendas.

Although the United Nations (UN) was conceived in 1945 as a “universal” organisation, its origin and maintenance has been credited almost exclusively to “a group of like-minded states centered on the Atlantic littoral” (Nye, 2017: 12). The narrative (and reality) of power politics, and the domination of the USA and the West turns out to be some of the important components of the troubles of multilateralism. The liberal world order was one of the “projects that aim to construct communities that are also enduring structures of political power” (Smith, 2003: 41). According to this vision, people of the world were to be constituted through economic and political narratives, woven together to construct political communities. However, even societies that advanced their position by wealth and power brought by global markets were not often referring to the ethically constitutive stories about global affinities but demonstrated persistent attachment to national identities (Smith, 2003).

At the end of the last century, the narrative of the “global village” (the prominent McLuhanian metaphor), received much tracking. Hope expressed

in the Kantian idea of perpetual peace and cosmopolitan order has captured the common imagination. The British prime minister announced in 1999:

We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community. By this I mean the explicit recognition that today more than ever before, we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavour.

(Blair, 1999)

The recognition of the need for cooperation, and the opportunities provided by globalisation captured political thinking in the West. It framed the global governance system that emerged as a response to the growing need of addressing imbalance and problems of interconnectedness. It combined technological determinism with the hope of producing some kind of common understanding, empowerment and bringing together geographically disparate individuals: “A new generation is emerging from the digital landscape free of many of the old prejudices ... Digital technology can be a natural force drawing people into greater world harmony” within a landscape where “we are bound to find new hope and dignity” (Negroponte, 1995: 230–231).

The vision of global community, despite its being highly popularised by influential international agents was neither culturally neutral nor globally accepted. From the standpoint of followers, there are common clashes between the rhetoric and practice of international institutions caused by their double role: they are both “technical” bodies that promote research and debates, and political actors that respond to governments. There is an obvious tension between these two roles which influences the credibility and public image of the whole global governance system. Thus, public officials and political leaders usually enjoy less of the audience’s trust than non-state or non-formal leaders – private actors, intellectuals, members of epistemic communities or philanthropists. Both categories shape the way in which global problems and solutions for global issues are constructed and the way “the global” is thought about in terms of political involvement. However, the obligations global leaders try to impose on individuals on the basis of their participation in the “global community” rarely take priority over other kinds of duties. Therefore, the notion of “the global” might serve as a platform for creating another identity that can be added to the multiple identities people have, but it fails to create a political entity. By choosing the global as an organising principle for a growing range of social actions, international institutions are motivated by the assumption that there is no other direction of political development. The global community needs a global governance system as other frameworks of governance developed at the national, international and regional level have proved to be insufficient and inadequate at addressing interdependence. The gravity of global problems that the world

faces leaves no room for any reluctance when it comes to collective action in resolving them. Yet, the idea that humankind is increasingly vulnerable due to the problems of the interconnected world has become widely shared as an ideology, but attempts to translate it to a coherent political programme imposing commitment face opposition.

The vision of the global community included many culture-related flows and processes described as Americanisation, westernisation or modernisation, often contested as forms of cultural imperialism. “Americanisation” of the global culture has been announced as one of the major threats to local identity and heritage. The explanatory power of the “one humanity, one world” narrative coexisted with the “clash of civilisations” (Huntington, 1993). Yet the vision of liberal institutionalists was based on an assumption of a unifying force of the markets. Mobilisation of the institutional power of global organisations that were meant “to bring people together” was seen to be a distinctive feature of the “hyper-globalisation” momentum, distinguishing it from “frames” or “social imaginaries” (Steger, 2008). The virtues of the new global culture were covered by the influence of the new category of global leaders – the “Davos Man”. In its 1997 editorial “In Praise of Davos Man”, *The Economist* describes the attitude and supposed impact of this category of businessmen, bankers, officials, and intellectuals who share beliefs in liberal values: “... there is something uncultured about all the money-grubbing and managerialism. But it is part of the beauty of Davos Man that, by and large, he does not give a fig for culture as the Huntingtons of the world define it ... If an idea works or a market arises, he will grab it” (*The Economist*, 1997: 18).

Fuelled by the assertion that the rational, economic man should be in control, the global governance system has been designed at a technical level, without broad communication with societies that could create motives, norms and attitudes favourable to a common human identity. As a result, global culture is rather contested and global education through art, law, politics, institutional settings, has never been implemented on a wide scale. Political efforts within the global have been limited to the “governance” and “management” of global issues, while wider reproduction of global sense making would require the socialising influence of major institutions at the state level. Global vision represents power that grew to be legitimised by the global institution’s structure, while not really culturally and symbolically rooted in social realities.

Shadows of the Great Divergence

The developmental agenda has long been the most visible political strategy oriented at bringing divergent parts of the world together. The Great Divergence, a gap in per capita incomes and the general level of socio-economic development of countries around the world, seriously affected their ability to establish partnership relations and finding common ground. Neither partnership, nor common ground were

possible for societies living in alternative realities, determined by their position on the global economic map. Concepts of modernisation, convergence, policy harmonisation and unity were brought together in the global community narrative that rose in prominence in the second part of the 20th century. Heralded by the UN, developmental projects have become “a grand strategy” into which global narratives were translated.

Adopted in 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) became central to the development discourse as it represented a consensus framework of international development, expanding it beyond economic growth. The project stated eight development aims addressing poverty, hunger, maternal and child mortality, communicable disease, education, gender inequality, environmental damage and the global partnership. All 189 UN member states agreed to achieve them. The UN, the World Bank and numerous other international bodies were involved in monitoring the implementation of goals and the project became a common point of reference in the debate about global dynamics. The narrative behind MDGs presenting the issue of ending poverty as a moral imperative and historical obligation was grounded in the assumption of the new frontier in IR brought by the condition of interdependence. The rhetoric of “ending poverty” has been present in the international arena for generations.

Called “the world’s biggest promise”, MDGs were presented as a tool to change the world (Hulme, 2009). They provided not only a vision for improving the situation of the poorest nations but also the establishment of effective cooperation patterns. The Millennium Project marked the momentum for the international organisation’s self-definition as a carrier of universal values, which challenged the view that the project was misused to promote a donor-centric view of development. This contradiction can be illustrated by its being heavily criticised by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the fact that the UN Secretary-General co-signed a report entitled “A Better World for All” (UN et al., 2000) together with the secretary general of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the president of the World Bank. Civil society organisations rephrased the title to “Bretton Woods for All”, suggesting that the agenda had been heavily ideologically oriented towards the formula “neo-liberal globalisation + MDGs = development” (Saith, 2007: 13). Thus, the notion of the global as a pattern to betterment throughout open markets, democracy and human rights has been expanded with the idea of solidarity and common efforts in fighting human suffering. However, the level in which the narrative corresponded with reality is open to discussion, as since the financial crisis of 2008, political momentum towards stronger

international development cooperation has shrunk. While the final report on the project asserts that it should be considered “the most successful anti-poverty movement in history” (UN, 2015: 3), there are doubts about the statistical manipulation that influenced the final outlook and the too narrow conceptualisation of poverty (Pogge, 2009).

At their expiration in 2015, the goals were replaced by the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which, despite increasing fragmentation, echo the premises of unity and cooperation across divisions. The UN secretary general, with reference to the SDG formulation, clearly declared his intentions: “I want this to be the most inclusive development process the world has ever known” (UNDP, 2013). Three-year long negotiations over what should be included in the next most robust roadmap for humanity led to 17 goals and 169 targets – ending poverty is its core objective, the project’s agenda is broader and includes environmental, social and economic sustainability. Both MDGs and SDGs captured global public imagination and became much more than a political platform for activating stakeholders and focusing developmental policies. They presented a clear vision of the global order, relations between and within societies, which concern all countries, whether they be rich or poor. SDG is seen by many as a centrepiece of global public policy framing – a vehicle for normative change and a source of new norms in international practice. This is a dominant message about the project issued by developmental agencies and involved parties. Critics, however, suggest that despite its universal aspirations, developmental practices are focused around solutions rooted in the same systems that produced the very problems, reproducing modern/colonial global imaginary (Khou, 2005; Ziai, 2016).

b) Global divisions. Multilateral strategies based on institutionalised global governance stress global allegiances by building moral narratives around them. Global stories cherish personal empowerment, social belonging and the equitable distribution of benefits, yet are approached with distrust in many places in the world. They are organised primarily around the future: future opportunities, gains, prosperity, well-being or just survival. They also include the present – actions that need to be taken, sacrifices that need to be made and dedication to avoid climate, economic and global health disasters. Globalisation, however, started in antiquity; global connections expanded gradually resulting in the age of commerce that provided the foundation for today’s model of the integrated economy. The process was marked by colonialism, human exploitation, reinforcement of imperial rules and distrust towards the “other”. Thus, a major inconsistency appears between the new narratives of the “global neighbourhood”, the “global future”, “Anthropocene” and well-established patterns of understanding

relations with the world, firmly rooted in previous frames of reference that summarise the past. The notion of the West often evokes negative images in the non-western world, referring to a history of colonialism, slavery and humiliation; since globalisation policies were promoted as part of the liberal agenda, the negative connotation expanded. The rule of black and white, and simplistic accounts about the logic of relationships between “us” and “them” has long been guiding global political decision making; however, recent developments contributed to the profound change of global realities. Until recently, the picture of the world could have been framed in the stereotypical categories of successful western nations and the disadvantaged “rest”. This binary thinking has been the subject of numerous scientific analyses indicating the fallacy of these stereotypes and presenting the extent to which language shapes reality. Yet in the practice of global politics terms “Third World”, “Developing World” or “Global South” refer to ways of thinking in categories of developmental policies and “help”, without much consideration of the historical grounds or the complexity of modernisation challenges. In the colonialist discourse, Asians and Africans are depicted as incapable of managing by themselves as their governance, group and family structures are suggested to be socio-culturally backward. Dominant views on development associate poverty with the lower position of poor countries on an evolutionary path. Within this spectrum, western countries are situated at the other end, representing the best achievements of humanity (Kapoor, 2014; Silva, 2015). In effect, historically both leaders and citizens of developing countries have been presented in the global agenda as “lesser” beings in need of being lifted up: Christianised, civilised, developed, organising themselves into a multiparty system and building a civil society that votes, etc. (Mignolo, 2012: 50).

Raising the complexity of global issues made the task of producing a global and consensual discourse on topics that have been the object of bitter disagreement, like free trade or migration, close to impossible. Some failures of global policies can be attributed to the fact that lack of framing, solid problematisation and discussion resulted in introducing unilateral and ad hoc policies. These were embedded into old fears about domination, imperialism and inherent injustice hidden in the design and policies of global and institutional arrangements. The great divide reflecting the split between the colonisers and the colonised, the oppressors and the oppressed has never been erased from global consciousness, so it continues to overshadow efforts towards the protection of global public goods. Today’s issues have inherently embedded the historical animosities. The notion of “the global” is becoming even more contested, as shaping the international order has ceased to be an exclusive domain of western powers. However, it is not clear to what extent the manner in which leadership of India or China sees the world coincide and to what extent they agree to the roles assigned to them in the western globalisation/globality narrative (Migdal, 2004: 7).

Interpreters as power brokers

All of mankind is political. Political visions are commonly used to organise reality, to transfer chaos into order and enable social change. Ideas and ideologies circulate within the social realm, without even being noticed, but in the process of social change generation, they become tools used by leaders to negotiate shared meaning. Any large-scale human cooperation – whether a modern state, a medieval church, an ancient city or an archaic tribe – is rooted in common myths that exist only in people’s collective imagination. They play a key role in social construction or describing “the objective reality”, immersing it in rationality and consistency. This process is repetitive and appears every time a context of social reality is transformed. Social revolutions, just as do scientific revolutions result in *changes* of world view and require adaptation of new interpretations of reality: the categories that are used to define the world are not valid anymore. Whether the transformation is seen as a result of historical force or leadership intervention is due to the mechanism of cognitive shift.

Leaders actively shape meaning by aligning individual situations with wider contexts through providing interpretation for experienced reality, their diagnosis and clues contributing to followers’ understanding of events. They explain the status quo that becomes the subject of change, the directions of this change and its desired outcomes. The ability to communicate, tell stories and shape public opinion is probably the most important tool in the leader’s arsenal. This is one of the reasons why non-formal leadership has a transformative potential. You don’t have to be in a formal position of power to tell a story that would change people’s perception. The story itself is an attribute of power. This is especially visible at the global level, when within the anarchical system, various actors – individuals, states and institutions – coin stories about how the world should be understood and what are the organising principles of the global system. Global leaders thus seek to explicate the relationships between people, actions, contexts, histories, environments and cultures. They also use their narrative tools to compete with alternative frameworks of meaning. By building narratives, they give stimulus to action, searching for drivers of human imagination and the natural need of agency. Situated between higher-order questions of world views, identities and norms on the one hand, and more tactical issues of framing on the other, narratives are a powerful and pliable tool for policy intervention (Narlikar, 2020).

Greta Thunberg

In 2018, a 15-year-old Swedish schoolgirl became the most recognisable leader of the global climate movement playing a pivotal role in generating momentum for global change. Three weeks prior to the Swedish elections, in September 2018, Thunberg decided to not attend school but instead sat in front of the parliament in Stockholm with a sign saying *Skolstrejk för Klimatet*

(School Strike for Climate). In late 2019, then aged 16, she drew the attention of politicians, public and scientific communities around the world addressing world leaders at the UN Climate Action Summit. Her passionate speech about the environmental consequences of capitalism became viral, millions of young people worldwide have responded to her messages and joined climate protests as the Fridays for Future (FFF) movement. She established her presence as a global face of the youth movement against climate inaction by speaking at climate conventions around the world – the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, addressing US Congress and more of the most influential political forums (Beeler, 2019). Her high-profile media interventions invigorated the global environmental movement, expanding the debate and generating a fresh and growing interest in long-standing environmental concerns.

The young campaigner has proven to be extraordinarily potent in crystallising the message about climate change and providing the rationale for taking individual action. Thunberg became the youngest individual to be *Time* magazine's person of the year in 2019. The scale of her influence is global and her message covers one of the permanent problems that cannot be approached, managed or solved unilaterally. The language and rules of engagement in the climate cause have radically changed due to her leadership, which helped to focus the spread of the activist's energy all over the world. The power of shaping the public imagination of the global population has its roots in moral authority, the recognition of her followers that she is right and that she should therefore be trusted and followed (Marris, 2019). Her leadership status is also confirmed by the scale of critique her contesters direct towards her. Major lines of critique are wrapped around features that make Thunberg credible for her supporters: her age, and her dedication.

Thunberg's critics dismiss her relevance as being too young to be autonomous in her actions, not driven by her authentic interests but rather by her Asperger's syndrome condition, having a negative influence on her peers by promoting absenteeism. Her stance on the global scene has also been questioned on the basis of her nationality, race and social position, categorising her work as one representing "white privilege", therefore not being credible in the task of revealing racial and class inequalities within the climate crisis (Nair, 2022). However, Greta Thunberg's ability to manage and galvanise the world's attention is evidenced by the fact that the US president recommended that Thunberg should "work on her anger management problem", the Russian president suspects that she is "poorly informed", and that the German chancellor praised her for her work; her speeches made global headlines (Kraemer, 2021).

A young girl protesting alone on the street with a cardboard sign has become a global leader in environmental education and idea formation – effectively conveying her message to the world. Her leadership status has been built upon narrative and mobilisation, of which the first ensured the visibility of conversations about climate change, and the latter provoked political action through policies and practices. Both components have proven to be disruptive, explicitly challenging power relationships. Her influence is however

established both in the method (political pressure and solutions), which she uses to shape her leadership relations, and in the result (movement formation).

a) Global youth movement. Thunberg has provided her face and voice for children, teenagers and a generation of young adults, activating their sense of responsibility for climate politics. Her narrative defines the young person's position within the climate change political debate and indicates their role in inducing global change. The younger generation around the world, she says, should be the most interested in climate action, as its representatives are the most exposed for the devastating climate change consequences and would have to bear most of their costs. Thunberg's message conveys the meanings of threat, danger and catastrophe that young generations are especially responsive to. Children and youth, who are disproportionately burdened by the consequences of climate change, are reported to be seriously anxious about climate change, with almost 60 per cent of respondents in the global survey declaring they felt "very" or "extremely" worried about climate change (Hickman et al., 2021). The audience's fear is being manifested in collective action and resistance. For millions of young people engaged in "Fridays for future" around the world, activism has become not only a form of fear relief but part of their generational identity. Greta Thunberg's generational conflict rhetoric caused a widespread response – the youth climate movement formed throughout the years 2018 and 2019 became one of the most widespread environmental social movements in history. On 20 September 2019 the "Fridays For Future" global climate strike was held – four million people took to the streets in 150 countries around the world (Alter et al., 2019). In response to this surge, the UN headquarters hosted its first Youth Climate Summit on 21 September 2019. School strikes for climate, climate marches and lawsuits against fossil fuel companies have become instruments of a counter-power against the dominant power of state politicians and global elites. Given the age of the participants and their position in the social structure, school boycotts could be seen as a form of civil disobedience, provoking comparisons between young climate protesters and the Civil Rights Movement or Apartheid opposition, which further highlighted its prominence. Thunberg gave voice to the idea of generational environmental betrayal, and challenged the silence culture about climate change, long cultivated by existing hierarchies of power: "The young people are starting to understand your [contemporary world leaders'] betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you. And if you choose to fail us, I say: We will never forgive you" (Thunberg, 2019a).

b) Political pressure. Actions and narratives popularised by Greta Thunberg and the youth environmental movement are oriented at urging decision makers to foster necessary international collaboration on climate action. Her presence at high-profile political events persistently draws attention to responsibility and guilt. Thunberg shapes the debate around irresponsibility and failures by world leaders to address adequately the most urgent global

issue. She reveals what was already known but kept silent – that governments and big business lack vested interest in sustainability. Political action, such as the Paris Agreement, rely on non-binding frameworks rather than some form of constraining cooperative arrangements that would precisely define obligations and contain sanctions for non-compliance.

Obviously, Greta Thunberg is not the first to notice the gulf between needs and actual actions. The Nobel prize laureate, William Nordhaus, along with other prominent scholars, called for countries to form a climate club and enforce sanctions on members (and non-members) who shirk responsibility. The major difference between previous voices of the global environmental movement and that of Thunberg is that she has openly called the illusion of international intervention, an illusion: “This is all we hear from our so-called leaders – words” and “The people in power can continue to live in their bubble filled with their fantasies, like eternal growth on a finite planet and technological solutions that will suddenly appear seemingly out of nowhere and will erase all of these crises just like that” (Thunberg, 2021). Climate change action facades in the form of corporate environmentalism or greenwashing is being revealed and exposed. The alarmist tone of the message is justified by the scale of the emergency – in facing the severity of the threat, rules of political correctness have to be rejected. Despite the potential for the effectiveness of naming and shaming strategies, they reinforce the image of the heroic leadership Thunberg embraced – a young girl standing in front of the wealthy and powerful, and not afraid to address world leaders in non-reverential terms. She makes a clear distinction portraying “us” as children, versus “you” – adults (“My message is that we’ll be watching you”, “You are failing us”). As the youngest person on stage addressing a room full of powerful people, she skilfully embraces the role of the wise, innocent child from the Andersen story, the only one who has the courage to shout “The Emperor is naked”. Holding political decision makers publicly accountable can be treated as another act of civil disobedience, breaking conventional norms and rituals of the high-level assemblages. The tone of moral outrage: “How dare you! I should be back in school on the other side of the ocean. Yet you all come to us young people for hope? How dare you!” (Thunberg, 2019b: 96) reinforces justification for the radical approach Thunberg requires and promotes.

c) Solutions. Greta Thunberg’s change-oriented leadership at its essence is to generate alternative systems of social organisation, new types of economic relationships, new ways of building relations with the environment (O’Brien et al., 2018). She presents herself not only as a contester, a rhetorical radical but first and foremost as a knowledge broker, as the programme of global climate transformation has solid, scientific grounds. In her perspective, there is no connection between the current order and any form of sustainable future. This is why radical actions are needed. *The Guardian* quotes Thunberg: “The climate and ecological crisis cannot be solved within today’s political and economic systems” (Thunberg in Murray, 2020), as factors contributing to

climate change, the growing demand for energy, agriculture, and waste are inherently rooted in the philosophies of unlimited economic growth. There are no alternatives to the liberal market-based development models that rely heavily on oil and gas without a mechanism that would introduce mitigation strategies into the developmental equation. She also raises questions of the irresponsible waste producing culture, highlighting behavioural patterns rooted in the world's consumerist society. Although called populist, Thunberg constructs herself as a messenger of science. She repetitively turns the attention of the global public to science and facts, documenting scale and possible consequences of climate change. She urges people to "listen to scientists", provides data and bases her emotional messages on well-researched grounds and solid sources. The meaning she assigns to climate change action is inherently rooted in ethical categories: responsibility, obligation and the necessity to collaborate. Greta Thunberg herself refrains from formulating any policy recommendations – her message clearly states that capitalism and sustainability follow different logic. Profit-oriented trade, the principle of economic growth, the political influence of businesses that are "too big to fail" stand in stark contrast with the requirements of the climate crisis. Thunberg proposes a course of action that is radical, which makes it resonate well with the youth audience and fits well in the dramatic picture of the ecological collapse she envisions. As the history of climate interventions based on regulations and restrictions proved them to be ineffective, old ways of thinking have to be abandoned, old deals and contracts resolved, and a priority of climate protection should be a unifying force for people and governments around the world.

Jeffrey Sachs

Jeffrey Sachs is an economist by profession, but also witness, participant and commentator of major global transformation over the last 50 years – he is one of the most prominent figures in the international development area. Sachs grew to be a global public opinion leader, government consultant and expert on international organisations. For several decades, he has been providing decision makers, academia and the general public with a narrative about conditions created by globalisation, its opportunities and flaws. Jeffrey Sachs is an example of a cognitive leader when he reveals the nuances of the global economy on the basis of his scientific credentials; as a relational leader, he is present in all the governance hubs where decision making and the conceptualisation of global affairs is taking place; as a structural leader, he has his role in shaping leadership processes at the structural level throughout national and international level policymaking. His view of the insider, of participants of high-profile political gatherings, informs about the state of mind of global decision makers, enabling people to understand the logic of institutional global order. However, in constructing his leadership style, he joins the status of the global technocrat with the reputation of the global messiah – a source of all-powerful truths and a provider of solutions that would heal the global future.

Along with Nobel prize winners Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, Sachs has become one of the few economists holding the status of public intellectual in the USA, raising awareness of global affairs. *Time* magazine has described him as “the world’s best-known economist”. He has also twice been named among *Time* magazine’s “100 Most Influential People in the World”. The “Great Man” leadership mythology that envelops him pierces through Sachs’s *Vanity Fair* profile: visionary economist, saviour of Bolivia, Poland, and other struggling nations, adviser to the UN and movie stars (Munk, 2007). As a policymaker, bestselling author, economic theorist, public speaker and celebrity, he uses a variety of channels to tell the story about the contemporary world, its challenges and the actions needed to address them. Sachs can be considered a model case of the Huntington Davos Man – not attached to national identity and globally oriented. The economist actually worked with the WEF and contributed to the rise of liberal institutionalism.

Although his orientations have been questioned, his strategies have been condemned and the effectiveness of his prescriptions have not always stood the test of reality, he certainly presents the world in terms of interconnectiveness and interdependence. His vision has always been global, based on conceptualising political organisations, citizens and economic actors as parts of the system. His strategy of tackling global problems has also been based on a network approach; with an “all hands on deck” mindset, he serves as a hub of contact for government officials, UN and World Bank technocrats and well-recognised CEOs of global companies. He is also no stranger to the world of celebrity, engaging members in philanthropic activities and supporting their projects with his public authority. In the foreword to his book, U2 frontman Bono praises Sachs: “His voice is louder than any electric guitar, heavier than heavy metal.” He himself gained the status of an aid celebrity, accompanying Bono, Madonna and Angelina Jolie on high-profile trips to Africa.

Jeffrey Sachs has built his international recognition on the basis of academic merit – he won a full professorship at Harvard at the age of 29 to become a distinguished Quetelet Professor of Sustainable Development at Columbia University, and Director of the Earth Institute. Yet his long-term involvement with international politics gave him the credentials to build a persuasive narrative about what economic globalisation is, how it should be governed and what kind of dangers it bears for humanity. The story he coined and promoted was part of the dominant western-oriented tales of globalisation, seen as a unifying force and providing opportunities by dissemination of economic growth. This was a line of his primary narrative which became a baseline of his plan for the eradication of extreme poverty in the world. He is internationally recognised by decision makers, activists and the media as a “world poverty fighter”, effectively bringing development economics to a broad popular audience. His major role within the spectrum of global leadership is being played, however, in assuring the high priority of issues of development on the global agenda. Representing high-profile power structures, Sachs emerges as a development voice raising empathetic slogans against

plagues of inequality, resources exploitation and human rights violations, while Japhy Wilson's (2014: 3) accounts in his book about Jeffrey Sachs provokes questions about integrity:

How uplifting, in these cynical times, to see a person of such status who is not afraid to take a principled stand. Perhaps ... yet something doesn't quite ring true. In the first place, Sachs's claim to represent 99 per cent sounds rather strange, given that he earns over US\$300,000 a year and lives in a US\$8 million Manhattan townhouse. And his demonisation of bankers, businessmen, and politicians who "sup with the rich and the billionaires" is also rather odd, considering his close working relationships with billionaire financiers.

Being part of the political–corporate nexus makes him prone to critique but also builds his leadership credibility as someone who "knows-what", "knows-how" and "knows-why".

a) Shock therapy. For many years, during the 1980s and 1990s, Sachs was known as "Dr Shock", the brilliant macroeconomist from Harvard who prescribed radical fiscal and monetary discipline to countries emerging from Communism (Munk, 2007). Although he dismisses the phrase, "shock therapy" has become Sachs's trademark. He initiated his career as a governmental consultant in 1985 in Bolivia, advising on control of the country's mounting hyperinflation problem. By taking radical steps provided by the macroeconomic stabilisation programme under the New Economic Policy, Sachs undermined the general consensus that existed at the time that it was impossible to avoid long-term recession as a side effect of price stabilisation (Pastor, 1992). His tactic, although accompanied by dramatic measures used to mitigate mass social protests, proved to provide results. Since that moment, impressed by his achievements, governmental officials from other Latin-American countries stood in line to discuss economic reform strategies. From 1987 to 1989, Sachs helped to design market intervention in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela, and he influenced Peruvian economic reforms. These experiences provided grounds for the idea of a "leap to a market economy" in Poland (Sachs and Lipton, 1990: 48) – a strategy for the immediate implementation of necessary reforms to establish a free market economy.

The programme jolting Poland out of socialism and into a market economy was seen as "One of the most spectacular and spectacularly risky macroeconomic experiments ever undertaken" (Weschler, cited in Munk, 2007), one that generated considerable praise and controversy over the years, especially for depriving millions of people of social safety. As Sachs himself admitted:

All in all, I would not only stand by these ideas, but also stand by the results (...) Poland actually transformed. I'm not a heartless guy. I'm not a free-market libertarian by a million miles. I wanted a cushion for

Poland. That was a large part of my aims and a large part of their interest in me, in terms of what I could get for them. And I did this in a number of ways.

(Feffer, 2015)

The story of economic salvation by Jeffrey Sachs has resonated, reinforcing his status around the world. However, Sachs was also responsible for the strategy adopted by the Kremlin, under the tutelage of the IMF and the US treasury, which brought disastrous consequences, fuelling income inequality, reinforcing the oligarchs and driving Russia towards defaulting on its debts. Russia's transition to capitalism was seen as a failure; however, Sachs continued to enjoy his status of international star in policy circles.

b) Extreme poverty reduction. Jeffrey Sachs has long been a major figure in global developmental discourse, arguing for the necessity and effectiveness of international developmental aid. In his view, addressing the great global challenges of poverty reduction and climate change is consistent with economic growth and should be done with the use of economic tools. Sachs argues that international intervention is the only possible way to get rid of extreme poverty, as people are “too poor to save... and thereby accumulate the capital per person” needed to lift themselves out of poverty (Sachs, 2005: 56). More money invested in development would eliminate the poverty trap and eventually provide the basis for better governance and the extension of institutional networks.

In recognising the severity of the global poverty problem, Sachs proposes a coherent vision of the past global relations and the perspective for future development. According to his narrative, the western world bears the blame for unequal development, and at the same time, it is responsible for reversing historical trends. Major developmental projects such as the MDGs were presented as a new paradigm, blurring the North–South boundaries. The story Sachs proposes is what often happens in developmental narratives, reinforcing the stereotypical picture of power relationships between donors and receivers. The West is a potent force, oriented as redefining global relations and is the only force that is able to intervene. His narrative addresses “the poor” and “underdeveloped” on the global public stage, depicting them in ways that can demand recognition and call for response (Umans and Arce, 2014). Sachs clearly establishes the moral case for aid by detailing the reach and severity of extreme global poverty. Statistics and stories are mixed together to present a compelling picture. In his letter from the village of Souri in Kenya, he reports that Malaria is constant, the rate of AIDS in the village population reaches 30 per cent, almost every family in the village takes care of a child orphaned by AIDS. Inhabitants are deprived of economic opportunities, as agriculture is rain-dependent and rainfall is erratic, farmers cannot afford fertilisers, and as a result, they are not able to produce enough food. This misfortune can however be erased:

The remarkable point is that this village could be rescued ... Survival depends on addressing a series of specific challenges ... all of which can be met with known, proven, reliable and appropriate technologies and interventions ... at a cost that is tiny for the world, but too high for the villages themselves.

(Sachs, 2004: 5)

Kenian Souri was the first millennium village and was launched by Jeffrey Sachs in 2004 as part of the UN affiliated Millennium Villages Project (MVP). The experiment was created as a result of the realisation that some countries in sub-Saharan Africa were not likely to achieve MDGs by the end of the time frame set for 2015. In searching for the answer to this puzzle Sachs identified the “big five” deficiencies (agricultural inputs, investment in basic health, investment in education, power transport and communication services, safe drinking water and sanitation) that would set the Souri community on a development path (Sachs, 2005: 232–235). Piloted in Souri, the project later grew to 80 villages across the developing world. It recommended intervention at the investment level of US\$110 per capita per year for a period of five to ten years (MVP, 2006). The idea was based on the assumption that investment in agricultural productivity would lead to a rise in cash income, which would in turn trigger transformation in other areas. The Souri case has been coined as a success story of the “big push” developmental concept.

The investments increased agricultural productivity by over 200 per cent and empowered Souri villagers in health and in education (Millennium Promise, 2006); however, the project’s sustainability over time has been the subject of discussion. Critics raised the issue that Sachs’s model proposes a style and operational solutions that have historically been characterised by failure. As millennial villages have been designed as a high profile initiative promoted by important figures as a test for a major developmental programme, some commentators have deemed it to be too important to fail. So the results, they say, might be rather a product of the desire for confirmation of the approach rather than addressing the core issues of poverty. Full assessment of the strategy’s effectiveness is not possible due to a lack of transparency: “The MVP data in Souri is highly confidential; independent researchers are not allowed to access any MVP data or even contact interviews with MVP staff on anything related to the project” (Kimanthi and Hebinck, 2018). There is constant uncertainty about the direct effectiveness of aid on the economic development of poor countries and the record of poverty initiatives backed by Sachs is mixed. On the one hand, he is portrayed as a tireless warrior for more just global relations, as a defender of the poor, and as a powerful voice of people who have long been abandoned. On the other, his prescriptions establish power hierarchies between donors and receivers and his methods raise concern. As he has become a “development advisor to the stars”, organising charity tours along with Madonna, Angelina Jolie and other high-profile pop-culture figures, his presence serves

as intellectual legitimization of the celebrities' humanitarian efforts. Like a modern missionary, he travels the third world spreading good news and drawing attention to human suffering. As his major academic adversary William Easterly (2005) sums up:

Jeffrey D. Sachs's guided tour to the poorest regions of the Earth is enthralling and maddening at the same time – enthralling, because his eloquence and compassion make you care about some very desperate people; maddening, because he offers solutions that range all the way from practical to absurd. It's a shame that Sachs's prescriptions are unconvincing because he is resoundingly right about the tragedy of world poverty. As he puts it, newspapers should (but don't) report every morning, "More than 20,000 people perished yesterday of extreme poverty".

c) economic model. Although Sachs's prescriptions for the economic transformation of post-communist countries were in line with liberal market orientations and the model of development he proposes draws heavily from capitalistic growth models, he is reluctant to sign a neoliberal manifesto. His vision of the global market includes growing engagement of the private sector in global public goods provision. Working with managers and business visionaries, he grew to consider them as necessary partners for the governance of global problems. They are mighty, they understand globalisation and successfully operate in the interdependent world.

I think the private sector is obviously essential for success on so many grounds. These companies know what they're doing. They're the most global actors in the world; they're often operating in more than 100 countries and they hold the technologies that are the key to development – with information technology, with broadband, with healthcare, with agriculture, with infrastructure.

(Feffer, 2015)

The financial and corporate world has power that cannot be ignored in the quest for a better world; nevertheless, Sachs is ready to admit that pathologies of turbocapitalism heavily contribute to the deterioration of the environment, social capital and global public goods protection:

The other face of businesses is that they are too powerful in our societies. They write the rules, they pay the politicians, sometimes illegally and sometimes via what is called legal, which is financing their campaigns or massive lobbying. Billions of dollars are spent and this is horrendous because if business writes the rules, it is not true their shareholder value is their value to society. This has got completely out of control and is leading to the breakdown of modern democracy.

(Cofino, 2012)

What Jeffrey Sachs postulates in his messages about the model of global economic relations is the restoration of virtue as the necessary foundation of the market. He indicates a Nordic economic model based on principles of universalism and the decommodification of social rights as a desired framework for human development. “I always wonder: how could I be described as a neo-liberal, which is a term of art, when I’m spending half my time berating the banks, trying to get the debts cancelled, trying to establish social funds, trying to make the public health care system work, and when I’m an admirer of Sweden?” (Feffer, 2015). Economics, in his view, has to be combined with ethics as roots of the global problems as migration, political polarisation and growing inequality are to be found in economic drivers that steer human decisions. The way Jeffrey Sachs interprets the world is rooted in the basic condition of interconnectedness. Climate change, ocean acidification, ozone depletion, pollution and freshwater scarcity increasingly shape the frames of the international economy, but they are not included in the economic evaluation as costs. What Sachs makes an indispensable condition of global synergy is coming back to the notion of economic responsibility. The challenges of the Anthropocene are strongly present in Sachs’s narrative, through which he makes the case for redesigning global relations, driven from a paradigm of economic growth to a paradigm of economic responsibility and ethic as a force of market. “The essence of the ethics of the Anthropocene is, fundamentally, a choice – the choice of pro-sociality, of supporting humanity, versus the choice of uncontrolled greed,” he concludes in his credo (Holtz, 2017).

Nadia Murad

She is an activist from the Kurdistan region of Iraq, the 2018 winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and the first rape survivor to be internationally recognised for campaigning on behalf of women who have been held in sexual slavery. She gained public attention by revealing a dramatic testimony of the ISIS massacre on Yezidi Kurds in August 2014. Nadia, who lost her mother, brothers and 18 other family members during the atrocities, was abducted by ISIS along with thousands of other women and girls, particularly Christians and Yezidis. Held in captivity for three months before she was able to escape, she was subject to grave abuse at the hands of ISIS fighters and was bought and sold various times. Murad’s testimonies were brought into the spotlight as they highlighted the urgency of international intervention to stop ISIS crimes, especially towards Yazidis. Her efforts were aimed at rescuing other victims who were still missing or held in captivity. Nadia Murad’s emergence as a sexual slavery survivor marked several transformations in the western imagination of the social costs of armed conflicts.

By sharing personal experience, Murad revealed shocking practices of ISIS confirmed by researchers and observers. The western public and decision makers were confronted with the realities of dehumanisation, institutionalisation and religiously justified violence. The politics of *sabaya* [slaves,

spoils of war] was regulated by ISIS's Department of Slaves, supervising the slave trade, while religious guidelines with regard to the treatment of women slaves were provided by Islamic State's Research and Fatwa Department (Callimachi, 2015). They considered captured children or women as "merely property" (Nicolaus and Yuce, 2017). At the core of Murad's leadership has always been exposing the nature of ISIS crimes and seeking justice for victims, but these justified claims have also had a powerful impact on the global imagination.

The meaning of universal values has been brought into debate as has the effectiveness of the global justice system. Murad's story exposes the division between the "safe and prosperous" western world and the "barbaric and war-prone" developing nations. In media accounts, these realities are separated and distant while the western role in the Iraq conflict and in the region have been silenced. Thus, Murad embraced the role of a weak victim, searching protection from the powerful and potent, revealing inconsistencies in the story that international organisations promote about international human rights, the moral obligation to punish crimes against humanity and the power to intervene in support of the weak and innocent. Despite her instrumental and political functioning in western public discourse, Nadia succeeded in becoming politically vocal for her own community through her vivid descriptions of the reality lived by Yezidis. Her authority has been founded on her experience of extreme suffering recognised by the public but not by the international human rights system. Her narrative functioned in powerful ways to establish a previously unacknowledged history of Yezidis, assigning meaning to cultural and individual trauma, verifying widespread western beliefs about decreasing levels of international violence, slavery elimination and the ability of the international system to prevent and punish the worst forms of human suffering. In this case, the shocking testimony of individual abuse has been confronted with an abstract notion of human rights, providing evidence for its existence and expansion. Personal experiences of degradation, horror and loss have been shared, consolidating the moral commitment to human rights.

The reality of wartime Iraq concerning slavery, brutality and disregard for human life were particularly exposed when compared with the blither of international celebrity diplomats. Murad's case was widely covered by the international press, from CNN to *Harper's Bazaar*, as she appeared in tandem with her counsel, Amal Clooney, the celebrity lawyer who is married to Hollywood star George Clooney. The alignment between the stardom of the lawyer and the experience of extreme brutality of the client she represented linked two distant realities together. It also conveyed a message about the incompatibility of the social and political realities of these worlds. However, the alignment reinforced Murad's position in her struggle for justice and the recognition of her suffering. Determined to challenge the impunity of her perpetrators, she detailed her experiences, raising global consciousness, which did not however provoke an international response. While the general public was confronted

with the scale and brutality of atrocities, Murad's case also brought discussion about the lack of legal instruments enabling those guilty of the crimes against humanity to be held accountable. The barriers Yezidis found in provoking international reactions might serve as an illustration of the deficiencies of international legal order as well as the limitations of the power of recognition of the atrocities. Despite a widespread campaign publicising the genocide, no international intervention occurred to help victims and stop the perpetrators – there was no path to international criminal justice available. When ISIS lost its stronghold in Syria, thousands of its fighters were detained by local Kurdish authorities and some foreign fighters were brought to trial in their countries of origin. What Nadia Murad does is to highlight the legal obligation shared by all states to prosecute the perpetrators and to combat their impunity.

a) Yezidis. Nadia Murad has become “the voice of Yezidis” on the international scene, spreading not only the knowledge about Yazidi genocide but also revealing to the world the complexity of the global cultural and religious mosaic. She represents members of an ancient, monotheistic religion that have lived in Iraq and Syria for hundreds of years and have been persecuted by ISIS because of their religious beliefs. The UN declared that the campaign against Yazidis in 2016 was genocide, as it was proven that through killing, sexual slavery, torture and enforcing conversion to Islam, ISIS intended to cease existence of the entire community. Yazidi girls, as young as 9 years old, have been taken as sexual slaves, and are being resold in the slave market without any international intervention. Boys as young as 6 years old have been recruited to be ISIS fighters, trained to hate and kill non-believers, to forget about their religion, and convert to Islam. The massacre of Yazidis in 2014 left more than 5,800 dead and 6,000 enslaved. The Yazidi case is an extreme one, not only because of the level of sophisticated organisation and institutionalisation of the sex slave trade by ISIS, or because of its embodiment of “chattel” slavery in the conventional sense of the word, but also because it was done according to ISIS's official and explicit proclamation. The violence against the group ceased in 2017 when Islamic State was defeated by the combined onslaught of a US-led international coalition; however, the minority faces severe risk of disappearance. Several years after the 2014 atrocities, one third of the estimated 30,000 that remained out of the 50,000–70,000 population lived in refugee camps, with more than 2,800 woman missing.

b) Rape as a weapon of war. Rape and other forms of sexual violence have been used throughout history as a weapon of war and political aggression. This element of the world's wars has long been unacknowledged in the context of justice or post-war reconciliation. Even though the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (IMTE) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) convened after WWII were made aware of massive rapes, these crimes were not explicitly criminalised and its perpetrators have largely escaped prosecution.

The silence of survivors persisted until the late twentieth century. In 1991, a group of Korean comfort women, kidnapped by imperial Japan and suffering sexual torture in the system of slavery controlled by government, called for reparation and an apology from the Japanese government. With the atrocities perpetrated during the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, rape was described by international bodies as a targeted policy to force or coerce civilians from one group out of a region claimed by another (Final report of the Commission of Experts, 1994). Wars and conflicts, often driven by nationalistic sentiments and ethnic animosities, create contexts in which rape becomes a “political event”, committed often with the intention to “pollute bloodlines” (St. Germain and Dewy, 2012). Sexual violence on a massive scale has been used as a war tactic in the South Sudan conflict and was in many ways emblematic of the humanitarian tragedy in a long-lasting civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2018, Dr Denis Mukwege, the founder and medical director of Panzi Hospital in Bukavu, where he has treated thousands of victims of sexual violence, shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Nadia Murad. They were both acknowledged for “their efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict” (Nobel, 2018). As he reports, in his home country of the Democratic Republic of Congo, “Rape is used systematically, methodically ... women are ashamed and stay silent” (*The Economist*, 2018: 59). The scale of sexual violence used in conflicts provides an illustration of systematic breaching of the rules of war and the decline of respect for international humanitarian law. Women, children and the elderly, customarily protected from violence, have now become targets of it (Deng, 2013).

“Rape as a weapon of war” is not a legal concept but it gained significance with efforts by the Rwandan and Yugoslav Tribunals to prosecute rape as a crime against humanity and genocide as a component of the conflicts in both regions. The UN Security Council asserted that wartime rape is a form of “war wound”, and that injuries and consequences of wartime rape, including pregnancy, must be treated on a par with any other wartime injury (Benshoof, 2014).

c) Feminist agenda. The essence of Murad’s leadership is placed in exposing a gender perspective on war and defying cultural expectations for abused females. Her public appearances draw a picture of a strong women’s agency, standing in opposition to the mainstream portrayal of Yezidi women and other victims of war as helpless and weak. The Nobel Committee (2018) recognised that she “refused to accept the social codes that require women to remain silent and ashamed of the abuses to which they have been subjected. She has shown uncommon courage in recounting her own sufferings and speaking up on behalf of other victims”. Murad’s actions and message present both practical and discursive implications. She forces the global public, in traditional as well as modernised societies, to understand and address cultural stigma about being the victim of and/or surviving sexual violence. This helps

eliminate the practice of silencing the denying agency of abused women and cultural scripts around it (Kelly, 1999).

The taboo surrounding sexual violence causes a situation in which victims are hesitant to report the crime and yet in many parts of the world, it still leads to their social rejection. The cultural rule guiding Yazidis' attitude towards ethnic coherence of the group enhanced the role of systematic, organised sexual violence in their genocide. Yezidi religious identity in Iraq is governed by the conservative rules of endogamic marriage across a three-tier caste system. Marriage outside the community, or even outside the caste, is strictly prohibited, as are children born of non-Yazidi parents. Researchers underline the fact that gender relations and social codes of conduct towards femininity and masculinity play a role in designing the tactics of terror: "ultimately, [...] the roots of ISIS's campaign of sexual violence come from the same neo-patriarchal origins as their regime antagonists", which entails that "victims of sexual assault – females and males alike – are frequently so stigmatised that they cannot return to their home communities" (Ahram, 2015). Although the Yazidis' religious patriarch formally transformed the role of victims stating that those who had been in ISIS captivity should be honoured as "holy women", the dictates of tradition led to the widespread rejection of children born to women raped by ISIS militants.

As the first UN Goodwill Ambassador for the Dignity of Victims of Human Trafficking, Nadia Murad turns global attention to the gravity of the problem. However, she herself and the other female survivors do not escape stereotypes of women and gender relations in the Middle East. In order to get prominence in the media to preserve the sense of alert in seeking international justice, Murad is required to follow their agenda, often concentrated on shocking stories from her time of captivity, not the wider context of Yazidis' needs and claims. To a great extent, the multidimensional problems of the Yazidis' genocide has been presented through the lens of a specific narrative of victimhood, connected to rape and sometimes excessive detailed accounts of the physical and mental abuse of the women. Thus, the way in which Nadia Murad uses her story as an advocacy tool is heroic; however, the way her story is used by the public confirms that "conflict-related sexual violence against girls and women by armed actors has become the most 'graphic and revolting' narrative that humanitarians and journalists have available to them, and the 'extra violent element makes it sellable'" (cited in Heaton, 2014: 631).

Leadership in practice: Memory of the Holocaust in western public imaginaries

The story of the Holocaust is a personal story of every one of 11 million civilian deaths, including 6 million Jews, Nazi perpetrators and passive observers. It has been one of the constitutive events of European and global communities, illuminating the possible consequences of divisions and hatred. Yet the meaning of Holocaust, its disastrous consequences, and the language with

which it has been described have never been self-evident to the general public, neither in the countries that witnessed ghettos and concentration camps, nor in other societies. This failure of sense making, of an ability to grasp the nature of the Jewish catastrophe, dates back to the 1940s. It contributed to a lack of response from the Allied forces to ethnic persecution and massacres in Europe. In 1941 Winston Churchill, in response to British intelligence reports about a mass killing campaign in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union, struggled to articulate the nature of the event and said “We are in the presence of a crime without a name” (Churchill, 1941). A name that could assign a proper meaning to the Nazi extermination policies was to be missing for a long time: “After 1945 in the West, the term ‘holocaust’ (with lower-case ‘h’) usually referred to the atomic blasts over Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the dire prospect of nuclear war between the superpowers” (King, 2012). Until 1944, when the Polish Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin first coined the term “genocide”, the proper meaning was not assigned to the nature of the crimes. It is striking that during the war, and for some time after, the importance of events was not fully recognised. The framing of the Holocaust took time, and “consciousness” from the beginning became a subject of political manipulation. Communist regimes erased Jewish victims from the collective memory of their societies, closing the history of WWII within the framework of national catastrophes; the awareness of the Holocaust was mostly dispersed, fragmented, limited to the sphere of private experiences of survivors and their immediate social circles. Scholars coined the term “conspiracy of silence”, as disputing the facts about the traumatic events of the Holocaust was avoided within survivors’ families as well as in western societies in general. As the horrors of the Holocaust proved to be hardly self-evident in a cultural sense, the historiography of the event and its accompanying narratives accumulated gradually over decades after the war, due to the efforts of different memory agents. Gradually, as scholarship expanded the vision of the Holocaust, it started to emerge as a part of the shared, international imagination, in an ever ongoing process of recreation and renegotiation. In order to accuse and punish the Nazi perpetrators a new category of crimes – Crimes Against Humanity – was coined. The accumulated data on the repression and destruction of the Jews was placed in a plausible historical sequence or chronology based on the theory of anti-Semitism and the development of National Socialism in Germany. Historiography, however, has not always been accompanied by efforts in the direction of sense making. The meaning of the genocide had to be constructed, its understanding crafted, with the individual experience of victims, survivors and witnesses permeating the narratives. The capture in Argentina by Mossad agents of Adolf Eichmann, one of the architects of the Holocaust brought the issue to the fore globally in 1960. The exposure and examination of survivors’ accounts, the emergence of Holocaust studies, artistic representation of the events in film and literature triggered an emotional and intellectual process making the Holocaust “... a central experience of our civilization” (Bauer, 1978: 11).

The memory of the Holocaust can potentially bear universal meaning, containing a message about human condition but its binding character, especially at the international scale, might be argued.

Avishai Margalit, in his *The Ethics of Memory*, asks a question about relations between the individual and communal in the creation and preservation of memory: “Who are the ‘we’ who may be obligated to remember: the collective ‘we’, or some distributive sense of ‘we’ that puts the obligation to remember on each and every member of the collective?” (Margalit 2004, 6–7). This collective “we” that Margalit examines is located in the global sphere, as Holocaust memory is shaped as a universal signifier of human suffering. Its universalisation implies a wide-ranging, deliberative sense-making process, oriented at and including the memory of the Holocaust in the moral consciousness of all nations. According to the universalisation script, the story of the Holocaust should be personal, resonating with the moral codes of people in any place and at any time in history. This “shared memory” of historical events is continuously being deliberately constructed on the basis of a consensus which is not necessarily linked to “primary experience” (Levy and Sznajder, 2006). The tragedy of the Jewish nation has indeed become one of the first fully-fledged transnational collective memories, issuing a universal warning directed at all kinds of anti-human ideologies. The meanings of the Holocaust have been heavily situated within obligations that come from history, reflected in ritualised phrases such as “duty to remember” and “never again”, which refer as much to individual historical consciousness as to political identity, and power relations. These examples of the “cultural tool kit” (Bruner, 1990) indicate the common line of narrating the Holocaust provided by formal education, public discussion, the media and messages conveyed through memorial sites. Constructing the Holocaust’s meaning was a process of institutional mediation, political manipulation and active agency. The networks of survivors and places of remembrance, supported by international institutions, governments and social actors expanded knowledge about the Holocaust and became part of the general strategy for fighting violence, racism and ethnocentrism. These direct and hidden discursive links to other events – action and inaction, particularly to other histories and legacies of political violence – make the Holocaust a particularly sensitive topic. The exhibitions and narratives of major Holocaust museums, in Israel (the Yad Vashem Holocaust Remembrance Centre in Jerusalem), the US (the Holocaust Museum in Washington DC) and Germany (the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin) prove, however, that public/global memory is a contested space of shared myths which are likely to be used with particular intention. The institutionalised, internationally recognised memory of the Holocaust has assigned particular obligation to remembrance, as “those who don’t remember history are doomed to repeat it”. The commemoration took on an international dimension with the introduction of Holocaust Remembrance Day (HRD) and the creation of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education and Research (ITF, IHRA – International Holocaust

Remembrance Alliance). In 2000, the Stockholm Declaration on Holocaust education and remembrance was signed by a group of high-ranking religious and civil society leaders, educators, historians, survivors and representatives of 46 states. They declared their responsibility for shaping the memory of the Holocaust in such a way that future generations will be able to understand its causes and reflect upon its consequences.

Discussion of universal/local features of Holocaust memory forced nations to address their pasts and their attitudes towards genocide. Even if not directly involved in the politics that led to the Holocaust, societies have been reflecting on their complicity, addressing any form of violence, injustice, silence or intolerance:

So while the ashes of twentieth-century Jewry literally swirl in eddies of postapocalyptic Europe, Jewish remains haunt the shores of every nation. If Jews were not actually rejected by these countries while fleeing desperately from Hitler's ovens, then almost every nation is complicit in having failed to act decisively, or expeditiously, or not having done enough.

(Baum, 2011)

These socially constructed narratives and imaginaries have usually been pressed into the service of particular political interests. Anxiety over unhealed wounds, unmet justice, social amnesia and contemporary Holocaust denial has led to a culture of reiterative performances of memory. While many memory agents justify their activities with fears that with the passing of time the Holocaust may vanish as a point of cultural reference, some maintain that the continuing presence of past crimes is obsessive: "Yesterday forgotten or almost ignored as a non-event, the genocide of the Jews today covers up almost all other memories in public space" (Traverso, 2009, 33–4).

Given the magnitude of the crime of the Holocaust, preserving and protecting its memory is one of the moral obligations of political leadership. It is political because this memory refers to collective conscience, knowledge production and meaning negotiation that should be recognised in the categories of public interest. It is in the interest of the public to actively engage with the negotiated and renegotiated meaning of the story of the destruction of European Jewry. Yet the international consensus on the need to develop new norms of remembrance clashes with instrumentalisation of the issue for political reasons, denying and weaponising it for public debate in trivialising contexts. Therefore Holocaust remembrance is a terrain of struggle over control of the ways in which a "culture of understanding" around the Holocaust is created.

Universal and particular features of leadership–followership dynamics

What does the history of the Holocaust tell us about the nature of leadership? This is a story about individual choices, mass deception and cruelty hidden

under the masks of mission and the greater good. Policies that resulted in Germany's offensive strategies and unprecedented atrocities of WWII are usually situated within the framework of "ethical leadership" or "bad leadership". Psychological orientation in leadership studies presents the earliest, most intuitive approach to the role of the leader's internal dispositions, the world of cognition, imagination and beliefs that determine a leader's performance. The history of the Holocaust has also been presented as the result of an evolution of world views, emotional attitudes and behaviours of the individuals that were either directly involved in the organisation of mass murder, or were inactive in the face of the reality of the persecution and terrorising of Jews in Germany, Poland and elsewhere. The figure of Adolf Hitler has, since his years in power, become the symbol of the powerful influence leaders have over their people, tapping into their emotions and redirecting them into routes they would probably have never found themselves in otherwise. His leadership path provides a manifestation of how emotional constructs, intensity of beliefs and a sense of mission create the striving for power, dictating types of leadership strategies and tools with which to execute them. Hitler is presented as being consumed by hatred of the Jews, Slavs, and Gypsies; this hatred was the power that made him a flawed genius – charismatic speaker, persuasive visionary and skilled strategist (Roberts, 2004):

Hitler's assumption of power by democratic means between 1930 and his nomination as Chancellor in 1933 is a classic study in disciplined focus on a single objective, the skilful manipulation of key constituencies, and a successful appeal to the emotions of the broad electorate.

(Davis, 1995: 62)

The mastery of leadership in his case was based mainly on creating circumstances and structures that made people behave in cruel, unhuman ways, without the label of cruelty being attached to their actions. Perpetrators, passive observers and supporters of the Nazi case, in the years of the regime, were reacting to forces in place and various constellations of power. Hitler's bold strategies and the ambition of his vision did not correspond to any familiar reality, assuring observers that rules of a new game had been put in place. All of a sudden, they were faced with developments and events they could not have foreseen, and hence they were incapable of dealing with them properly, according to the scripts of the "old world". The room left for reflection was becoming narrower with every step of the Nazi ideological march towards the extermination of the Jews. Orientations of followers in the process combine the two most discussed interpretations that historians attached to the final solution's role in the Nazis' philosophy and practice. The intentionalist interpretation is focused on the power of Hitler's intended and calculated actions and the responsiveness of the ideology he created, while functionalists highlight the structures and institutions of the Third Reich, explaining the Holocaust as an unplanned "cumulative radicalisation" (Browning, 1992;

Bessel, 2003). According to this view, implementation of the “final solution” was rather a result of combined decision making by the several power centres active in a polycratic regime. In this view Hitler’s influence only triggered the sentiments that were already present in the spirit of the nation and guided them towards action through a systematic process of bureaucratisation. While the issue still divides historians of WWII, this difference of approach does not change the fact that in order to make the Holocaust possible thousands of people needed to follow orders or just give their tacit permission for scenarios of persecution and annihilation of the Jews. Whether the leader’s message was sufficiently powerful to overcome the moral instincts of the population, or the chaos of war allowed many local initiatives solving the “Jewish problem” to emerge, the history of the Holocaust inevitably presents relations between minds of individuals and group behaviours that together produce a historical process. This is not a story of leadership itself but, unlike any other, a story about leader–follower relations. The leadership perspective offers a bridge between individual and group, manifesting the mechanism behind leader–follower relations and linking individual experiences, emotional and cognitive states with social processes. A racist ideology promulgated by a charismatic leader could be transformed into death camps and crematoria only due to the organised, systematic and dedicated actions of his followers:

The bureaucrats who were drawn into the destruction process were not different in their moral makeup from the rest of the population. The German perpetrator was not a special kind of German ... However one may wish to draw the line of active participation, the machinery of destruction was a remarkable cross-section of the German population.

(Hilberg, 1961: 1011)

The question of what made ordinary “middle-aged family men of working- and lower-class background” (Browning, 1992) willingly commit acts of genocide became an intellectual and moral challenge for social scientists, political leaders and citizens. Looking for the answers to this puzzle, Stanley Milgram initiated one of the most famous experiments in the field of social psychology in his Obedience to Authority (OTA) study. In the 1960s Milgram, an American Jew of European descent, heavily influenced by the scale of cruelty of the Holocaust revealed at the Nuremburg trials, decided “to see how far a person will proceed in a concrete and measurable situation in which he is ordered to inflict increasing pain on a protesting victim” (Milgram, 1974: 3–4). The research scenario, framed for the respondents as being about the effects of punishment on memory, included one naive subject put in the role of teacher who, using a one-way switch, was told to administer electric shocks of rising intensity to the “learner” (victim) sitting on the other side of a wall. An authority figure was introduced in the form of the experimenter steering the situation: demanding that the subject continue the procedure, ignoring the victim’s requests and providing a rationale for infliction of the shocks.

The completion rate reached the level of 65 per cent of participants, who continued the experiment even though the last shock on the scale was marked as “danger: severe shock”.

The project had significant implications in revealing patterns of human behaviour in general; however, it was initially designed on the basis of the hypothesis that Germans were naturally more obedient and conformist than otherwise comparable groups of different cultural backgrounds. This stereotypical “German behaviour problem” reflected the line of post-war public discussion about the motives and actions of Nazi war criminals. A series of experiments conducted in the USA by Milgram, and repeated by others around the world, found that a disturbing number of non-Germans were ready to inflict harm on another person. Just like Nazi perpetrators, Milgram’s subjects frequently justified their blind obedience on the grounds that they were “just following orders”.

The experiment took place simultaneously with Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem. Eichmann, charged with being a senior architect of the Holocaust, was found to be responsible for planning the efficient collection, transportation and extermination of those to be killed. His trial was broadly covered by the international media, including nightly television broadcasts across the USA from April to August 1961. It became a global spectacle, the scenes and events of which were followed by a crowd of reporters. Among them was one of the most prominent figures of 20th-century philosophy – Hanna Arendt.

In her *New Yorker* account of Eichmann’s trial, she concluded that instead of the image of “perverted sadist” and “abnormal monster”, she only saw a man who was “terribly and terrifyingly normal” (1977: 276), a “perfect bureaucrat”. His role in the Nazi regime was not rooted in his psychological or ideological orientations. Quite the contrary, as a thoughtless conformist, he was a perfect follower, an ambitious professional who sought to carry out his orders as competently as possible, without even a shadow of reflection. Eichmann and the other deskbound servants of the regime were able to use their stamps and bureaucratic authority to create the Nazi extermination machine, simply because they were banal and unable to think: “This long course in human wickedness had taught us – the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil” (Arendt, 1963: 231). This famous phrase, which became a subject of discussion and contestation, captured not only the nature of the consequences of Nazis’ actions but also the sources of enormous evil having originated in a banal incapacity to think independently.

The technical competence of followers of the Nazi regime was not balanced by any sign of moral conscience. Arendt argued that in the circumstances, in which those around Eichman had been similarly blindly devoted, his ambition pushed him to do everything to impress his superiors. As he testified, he sent millions to the gas chambers because he wanted promotion. With the “banality of evil” thesis, Arendt has also challenged the explanatory formula of the Holocaust as a case of incomprehensible evil that cannot be studied or dealt with because of the scale of the horror it unleashed. The reference to evil as

an explanatory base limits the possibilities of inquiry, placing the mechanisms of brutality, dehumanisation, mass murder and bureaucratic domination in a framework of uniqueness, whereas in fact they are rather common – “...we are born with a potential for obedience, which then interacts with the influence of society to produce the obedient man” (Milgram, 1974: 125).

Milgram’s experimental procedure evolved, as he searched for ways in which the tensions experienced by the subject could be reduced, resulting in a rising level of obedience. So the translucent screen separating the research subject from the victim was replaced with a wall, as physical distance matters in the decision on whether or not to inflict the most severe shock in the series. Participants were introduced to a series of “binding factors” such as US\$4.50 payments and the experimenter’s coercive statements about it being “absolutely essential” to “continue”. Binding factors (BFs) and strain resolving mechanisms (SRMs) pushed individuals to actions that were not considered by them to be autonomous. Psychology convincingly explains the mechanism through which cruel behaviour is justified and rationalised to the point that perpetrators “can live with it”. Milgram describes this phenomenon in terms of “agentic shift”, leading to an “agentic state” in which “the individual no longer views himself as responsible for his own actions but defines himself as an instrument for carrying out the wishes of others” (Milgram, 1974: 134). The behaviour of the individual is not experienced as being the result of “the self”, but dependent on the motivation of some other person. The effect was amplified by participants’ comforting belief that their infliction of harm would contribute to a greater (scientific) good.

Stanley Milgram, Hanna Arendt and others found that brutal, individual behaviour producing devastating effects can stem from the construction of a situation or context of authority. All humans are potential perpetrators, and only their ability to reflect, to see a wider context and to root their actions in moral conduct can spare them this fate. The Arendt–Milgram perspective, the so called M-H link, has been subject to controversy due to evidence for the voluntarism of ordinary Germans in their participation in mass murder; nevertheless, Arendt and Milgram provided a fruitful line of inquiry for studying leader–follower relations. While monstrous personalities and obsession-driven sociopaths happen to take a guiding role in history, the contribution and attitude of their followers is decisive in the scale of damage they cause. Douglas Kelley, the American psychiatrist who examined the mental health of 19 Nazi defendants before the Nuremberg trial, stated that “none of them [were] sufficiently deviate to be locked up by society under normal conditions” (Waller, 2007: 65).

Both political science and IR highlight the role of human nature in shaping events that create historical forces. The notion of human nature stands behind accumulated knowledge about interpersonal relations, bonds with leaders and mechanisms of influence that attract the attention of scholars of the extermination of the Jews. The Holocaust is as much about people as it is about a system: “The Holocaust is thus best seen not as a single ‘case’

but as a macro-historical matrix of highly variable forms of mass killing, resistance, and survival” (King, 2012). The destructive mechanisms guiding human behaviours can be amplified by organisational contexts, which is why the tragedy of the Holocaust, as well as the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War, the murders of unarmed civilians in Kosovo and many other examples of extreme brutality are investigated in terms of organisational norms, division of labour, and management (Bauman, 1989; Allen, 2005; Bloxham, 2008). Context is important, but it is always expressed through individual actions:

No one had issued orders that infants should be thrown into the air as shooting targets, or hurled into the fire alive, or have their heads smashed against walls; there had been no orders that people should be trampled to death, or become the objects of the murderous “sport” including that of killing with one blow of the hand.

(Arendt, 1966: xxiv)

As Zygmunt Bauman concludes, in the mechanics of the structure–agency nexus “bureaucracy picks up where visionaries stop” (1989: 105).

Schindler’s List – the story about a good Nazi

The story of Oskar Schindler, a Nazi factory owner who helped Jewish prisoners escape the Holocaust, has long taken a prominent position on the list of iconic hero narratives, influential in leadership and organisational studies. Stephen Spielberg’s award-winning movie *Schindler’s List*, released in 1993, only reaffirmed this status. It shaped the figure of the protagonist according to classic elements of the Hero’s Journey (the will to act, the acceptance of sacrifice, change in the status quo), as indicated by Joseph Campbell in 1949, highlighting his emotional conversion and the transformational character of his endeavour. Oskar Schindler’s life is indeed a vivid example of moral transformation. He began WWII as a greedy Nazi spy and devoted member of the Nazi party, but by the end of the war had risked his life, spent most of his fortune, and saved over 1,000 Jews from death in concentration camps (Rosenberg and Nowakowski, 2010).

The story of Schindler’s transformation and sacrifice, presented in a Hollywood manner, influenced perceptions of the “final solution” globally. “Schindler’s list” grew to take on the status of a metatext of historical evidence, despite the fact that the story presented is a rare exception and was not representative of the reality of human behaviours at the time, while crafting a portrayal of the Holocaust’s enormity and scope. The movie has met with criticism for not reaching the appropriate standards for portraying the sacred topic, as though

it is possible for anyone – a film-maker, an artist of any other kind, a philosopher or thinker – to fully transmit the horrors of the reality of the gas chambers. By providing meaning to places and people, the film triggered an important discussion about the Holocaust in culture, and enabled many people to make sense of an era that in the 1990s had already become distant, eventually gaining the status of a firm point in Holocaust collective memory, framing the issue, and adding an important image to the collection of the visual representations of the Holocaust in the western world.

But what exactly is the main line of that framing? An adventurous Nazi opportunist becomes able to see through the dehumanising surface of the totalitarian system; he sees not only living “corpses” (as Arendt describes victims of Nazi dehumanisation) but “his Jews” (as Schindler used to describe his factory workers). The figure of the good, bravehearted Nazi emerged, providing contemporary viewers with a sense of relief and comfort. The story is so powerful today because in a sense the figure of a “good Nazi” saved the image of western civilisation. The human capacity for monumental evil has been confronted with a vision of extraordinary courage, caring and compassion. The narrative, although not intended to be a historical representation of the Shoah, has become something far more important than a drama of the industrialist’s adventures during the Nazi occupation. While Schindler’s story caught the attention of the world, it was not an easy task to find a way of telling it convincingly in Kraków, in the historical surroundings of the forced labour camp in Płaszów and Deutsche Emailwarenfabrik (DEF). The actual buildings that provided the scene for the cinematic war-time events were long-forgotten and devastated, until the moment in which the attention of the world called for them to be revived.

In 2007, the historical site of the enamel factory in which Oskar Schindler established his business during WWII was transformed into a museum. The design of the exhibition proved to be a challenge for the memory-makers, institutions and historians involved. They had to bear the responsibility of Kraków’s wartime sense making in its sometimes conflicted, global and local dimensions. The global in this equation is represented by crowds of international tourists searching for the walls and squares that witnessed Schindler’s bravery. The local population itself was comprised of later generations which had survived in the Nazi-occupied city, having witnessed the liquidation of the ghetto, mass executions and transports to the concentration camps. They realised that Schindler’s story was not representative of what happened in Kraków during the war, that it took the exceptional powers of the global film-making industry to expose Schindler’s name, leaving other

heroes of the past, like Tadeusz Pankiewicz or Julius Madritsch in the shadows of global memory. Local memory was crafted by politicised, martyrological versions of WWII history and a profound sense of loss. Kraków's Schindler dilemma is representative of every attempt to build a sense-making process that encompasses brutality, genocide and failures of humanity.

For A.C. Bradley, "King Lear is too great for the stage" – similarly, for many, the story of the Holocaust is too brutal and inconceivable to be told. Every narration would be imperfect, fragmented, unable to encompass the enormity of the tragedy, and thus unfair. Furthermore, meaning-creating historical narratives are always incorporated into complex structures of social power and every exhibition's conception or film's scenario deals with the complexity of the sense-making process, the social dynamics of the creation of "myth" and "truth" (Dale and Burrell, 2008).

During the designing phase of the Kraków's museum exhibition, a team of historians decided that an alternative to the mainstream heroic historical discourse is required to address Poland's past during that period (Chwalba, 2002). The scale at which Schindler's myth started to resonate internationally sat uneasily with Holocaust sense making in Poland, especially with the version of WWII history written under communism. Finally, in Kraków's Emalia museum, Schindler's story is used as a stepping-stone into the history of the city's war experience. The place is presented as a "memory museum" in which the main exhibition "Kraków under Nazi Occupation, 1939–1945" [Kraków – czas okupacji 1939–1945] exposes a city that was the capital of the General Government when the Nazi governor Hans Frank took up residence in the Wawel Castle, the historical seat of Polish kings. While Spielberg wrapped the Holocaust's events around an individual experience, the exhibition focuses on communities – Poles and Jews revisiting, through the physical and psychological experience of the visitors – ghosts from the past (Agnew, 2004).

Lost in translation

Sense making is created through interaction – with witnesses, storytellers and institutional representatives engaged in creating a politically agreed vision of the past. Their activities transform common memory, an aggregate notion, the sum of the accounts and information about certain events available to the public, to a shared memory which requires communication to establish one version of the event likely to be accepted and reproduced: "shared memory in a modern society travels from person to person through institutions, such as

archives, and through communal mnemonic devices, such as monuments and the names of streets” (Margalit, 2002).

There is no defined mechanism that could secure the translation of events that are part of the past into categories understandable to contemporary inhabitants of the world. Descriptions are vivid and influential as long as they carry meanings, which are usually anchored in the subjective experiences transformed into narratives, which is why the most effective method of passing on knowledge about Holocaust is through eyewitness testimony. Survivors recounting stories about themselves and their families played the role of meaning engineers. Although they were perceived to be the only people fully entitled to give meaning to the past, the variety of orientations and strategies they used to deal with Holocaust experiences indicate complicated relations between “reality” and “representation”. While the communicative memory of survivor-witnesses is fading, ability to maintain representations of the Holocaust depends on the activity of political and social actors who reproduce and co-produce its meaning, again and again, supporting its circulation in the social arena. Shared images, impressions and accounts become intersubjective, embedded into nets of mutual understanding, composing a common identity and social cognition.

Theoretically, meaning creation is limitless, as events, despite being situated in the distant past, are always open to interpretation and reinterpretation. Hans-Georg Gadamer writes about the “fusing of horizons” (1975) being an indispensable part of dialogue. He also introduces the notion of “play” (Gadamer, 1975) as a central dynamic of understanding which is being created over time by the back-and-forth movement that takes place between partners engaged in a discussion. The expression of “play” reveals the mechanism of the constant revival of the meaning. However, in order to sustain this process, the meaning has to be discussed continually. Such an open, discursive strategy seems practical in the efforts to keep the history of atrocities alive, yet the moral weight of the Holocaust places it beyond history. An ahistorical approach is also present in discussions about the Holocaust’s uniqueness. As Alan Rosenbaum reflects:

The question of the “uniqueness” of the Holocaust has itself become a unique question. However, when we approach the Holocaust we are at once confronted with the following dilemma: if the Holocaust is the truly unique and unprecedented historical event that it is often held to be, then it must exceed the possibility of human comprehension, for it lies beyond the reach of our customary historical and sociological means of inquiry and understanding.

(Rosenbaum, 1996)

It seems that with the passing of time the meaning of the Holocaust is becoming more vague and disconnected from the actual experiences of current generations. The Holocaust still exists as a historical point of

reference, but it becomes less and less understood as a political and relational phenomenon, as its complexity is hard to capture and relate to the lives people are living now. It becomes “inconceivable” and placed “beyond comprehension”, not in the sense of the scale and gravity of what happened but because events of the past cannot be related any more to the realities of the present. So although the Holocaust is widely presented as part of a broader discussion about the current versions of the we/they problem and the dangers of war and social injustice, a genuine understanding of the phenomenon might be vanishing.

The processes of transforming the formative events of the past into conscious visions that might become part of the present have been subject of philosophical and social reflection. While personal experience is the most powerful source of meaning creation and psychological attachment, it can be approximated to a meaningful degree due to the strong emotional and intellectual involvement in events of the past. The psychological approach also assumes that history’s traumas are embedded in the development of individuals and societies. In western collective memory, the Holocaust continually reappears in psychoanalytic accounts researching the “transgenerational transmission of trauma” (Abraham and Torok, 1994: 17). In both historiographical and psychoanalytical research on the subject, the Holocaust continues to influence the present, not only of “the second generation”, the children of Holocaust survivors, but the general public. In this context, memory sites, remembrance rituals and public commemorations strengthen the sense of community through grief.

All these mechanisms reveal how the story of civilisational failure is embedded in the practice of political leadership in the West and how it shapes western political imaginaries. The place of the Holocaust in the universal imaginary is situated within the boundaries of the constant power-game between memory brokers and public opinion leaders who influence the public conscience when it comes to what happened in Eastern Europe during WWII and what meaning these events bear. Researchers, political leaders, survivors and deniers belong to the most influential category of memory agents.

Researchers

The Holocaust is the most documented genocide in human history, and the most studied and best described. Historiography is usually accompanied by sense making. Holocaust research and teaching blossomed in the post-war period in several places, in which seeds were sown by intellectuals who had been in exile during the Nazi era and survivor scholars who had emigrated after the war to North America, Britain, Israel and Australia. These mostly non-historical analyses were interdisciplinary in nature. On the grounds of political philosophy, sociology, psychology, literature and theology they grappled with the collapse of civilisation as a problem of human existence, of suffering, good and evil, socio-political structures, personality disorders and

the death of God. Then, in the 1980s, a new generation of historians of Nazi Germany concentrated on this “most important and sinister item”, as Telford Taylor put it, and specifically about decision making on and implementation of the Final Solution, spawning the intentionalist–structuralist debate.

In the post-Soviet era, they were joined by a new generation of European scholars who completed their doctoral dissertations on regional studies about the implementation of the Final Solution in Eastern Europe and on Nazi anti-Semitic practices in Germany and the Reich’s annexed territories. In the highly contested terrain of Holocaust memory, historians are guardians of the past – of the recollecting, reconstructing and examining of every historical event in its specificity. The importance of their role is manifested by increasing violence against the results of Holocaust research and the researchers themselves. Anti-intellectualism and the post-truth reality of public discussion make it easier to undermine the legitimacy of science and spread contrafactual messages. Governments manipulating historical consciousness are likely to gratify loyalty rather than professional expertise and training. An atmosphere of distrust and restriction leads to silencing and self-censorship: historians are afraid to ask critical questions in sensitive areas or openly discuss manipulative practices. Political influences can limit the possibilities of historians telling their story about what happened in the past, undermining their cultural authority. The art of collective memory shaping is based on historical sources, but they are often used in a selective manner, leading to the spread of fictional narratives that shape popular awareness of the past. While cultural representations of the Holocaust are increasingly found in the arts, public debate and education, researchers serve as the guardians of historical accuracy. Their role as memory agents providing critical reflection and rigour helps to set limits on attempts to shape public memory in a narrow or distorted historical context.

Political leaders

The Holocaust not only revealed the destructive power of Nazi leadership, but also heavily influenced romanticised accounts of the Allies. The issue of wartime response to the Holocaust casts a shadow over Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s and Winston Churchill’s status of “great leaders”. The “abandonment of the Jews”, a refusal to seize opportunities for rescuing them can be translated into practical decision-making processes in which western leaders failed to recognise the gravity of Nazi politics or deliberately ignored events in Europe. The Allies, busy with saving the world, barred escape routes for Jews and had been indirect accomplices in the Jewish nation’s destruction.

The question of political leadership is thus a part of the “civilizational failure” of the Holocaust. Echoes of the Evian Conference, in which international leaders discussed the question of aid for German Jews, are evoked in the context of national interpretations of the Holocaust, as well as the

contemporary dimension of the refugee crisis. All international leaders gathered at Evian expressed their sympathies with Jewish refugees but ultimately denied them refuge. This contradiction illuminates the issue of the sense-making power of leadership. Western leaders were framed in popular narrative in heroic terms, as struggling for justice and freedom. They came to the rescue of what was known as the Free World and, in simplest terms, had defeated evil and liberated the good. Discussion about their indifference towards the oppression of European Jews was incongruent with the idealised picture, and to a great extent was replaced by the opinion that no more could have been done to help the Jews.

The shadow of the past influences contemporary processes of memory making. The influence of political figures on how the issue of the Holocaust is framed in public discourse remains unquestioned. Politicians can enable creation of the community of remembrance, providing ordinary people with historical consciousness and the ability to embrace the complexity of the Holocaust. They are powerful memory agents providing the rules of education, symbolic representation and standards of public discussion, as Holocaust memory increasingly belongs to the public rather than the private domain. Deliberate mass murders and large-scale hate crimes have always been part of human history, yet they were largely forgotten, opening the doors for later generations that faced history repeating itself: the question “Who remembers the Armenians today?” was one of the indicators in creating the Nazi plans of the extermination of Jews.

This process of forgetting occurred as a consequence of the reluctance of political leaders to introduce contested and difficult terrains of the past. Such deliberate policies were often interwoven into leadership myth making. History was written by the winners, with control of information one of the spoils of war. Given the nature of genocides committed before the information age, only the perpetrators remained to choose the stories that they told about themselves. Yet, even if the knowledge about the Holocaust is widespread, the manipulation and instrumentalisation of that knowledge is a form of hiding from history. EU policy established a long-prevailing consensus about the way the Holocaust was taught in Europe and beyond. However, in many places not only does this consensus seem to be in danger, but high profile politicians openly dismiss or deny the Holocaust.

The French rightist Jean-Marie Le Pen dismisses the Holocaust as a mere “detail” of WWII history, while former President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad openly claims that it is a fiction made up by Jews, nothing but a “Jewish swindle” (Appelbaum, 2006). The way the Holocaust is shaped in political debate in the Middle East can be manifested by the Holocaust International Cartoon Contest organised in response to the 2006 controversy caused by Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. The competition was announced by *Hamshahri*, one of Iran’s most widely circulated daily newspapers, and co-sponsored by the Iranian House of Cartoons in Tehran.

Masoud Shojai, organiser of the exhibition, explained the idea behind the contest: “You see they allow the Prophet to be insulted but when we talk about the Holocaust, they consider it so holy that they punish people for questioning it” (cited in Whine, 2008).

The echo of the “clash of civilizations” that can be heard in this comment indicates the role of politicians and public authorities in shaping popular understanding of collective pasts and cross-cultural dialogue. Commemorating tragic events is often seen as a way to achieve reconciliation and the harmonious coexistence of diverse minorities, yet the effectiveness of these practices can be severely undermined by political actors who challenge the narrative to advance their goals.

Survivors

Memory preservation on a global scale depends on a vast network of public opinion leaders dedicated to describing the complexities of historical events and negotiating their meaning. Holocaust survivors have long played this role, exposing experiences that have not only enriched our knowledge about what happened but also allowed universality to be extracted from unique individual histories. They co-construct and exercise significant control over the narrative of the Holocaust and its heritage – and the role that is increasingly fading away. Survivors’ testimonials and records make the world understand the nuances and psychological complexity of the situation they were in. Furthermore, eye-witness accounts of the past bring insight into mechanisms of the human psyche, as well as people’s adaptive capabilities. Witnesses have played the powerful role of transmitting feelings, emotions, images and other elements of the experience to the social sphere. In the perpetrator-oriented narrative of the Holocaust that dominated the early stages of memory-making processes, victims were presented as passive objects of persecution, appearing on the stage of history only to be brutalised, humiliated and murdered.

Survivors tell a different story: the bureaucratic death machine of the concentration camps was filled with human emotions and actions. Victims now appeared to be subjects with agency, real people confronted with extraordinary circumstances. Jews, Roma, homosexuals and other oppressed groups had no choice; they were thrown into a completely new social reality, utterly dissimilar to anything they had experienced previously. Norms and patterns of behaviours that had been appropriate before the war were not fitted to this realm of brutality and horror. The significance of the survivors’ agency, knowledgeability, and potential for resistance, whether explicit and/or disguised, should be recognised as an aspect of leadership knowledge, bearing transformative potential. Participation in Holocaust meaning making on the personal and social level was, for many of the survivors, a form of addressing trauma and violent loss. The search for meaning was put at the centre of Victor Frankl’s (1969) logotherapy concept, influential not only in psychotherapy but considered part of the human condition in general. Survivors,

playing different social roles in the post-war period, conveyed the experience of the Holocaust through their message and activities, the course of their lives having been significantly informed by personal response to the Holocaust. The private knowledge that began to be passed on provided a most valuable base for public understanding.

Deniers

A high level of historical awareness serves as the best guarantor of preserving historical memory. The Holocaust is the most investigated and discussed crime in history, yet still critical gaps in our knowledge and awareness defy the global pledge to “never forget”. Educators, historians and memory brokers constantly address its denial, misinformation and distortion. The immediate impulse that provoked efforts to establish international standards of Holocaust remembrance was an article that appeared in the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* in 1997, pointing out that only two thirds of Swedish youth believed that the Holocaust had actually happened (Kaiser and Storeide, 2018). Holocaust denial covers all forms of negationism, trivialisation or justification of the crimes committed by Nazi Germany during WWII. The increase in intensity of denialism in the global public debate indicates that this is not only a short-lived phenomenon, but a persistent feature of Holocaust memory negotiation. The roots of the phenomenon are sought in antisemitism, National Socialist ideology and political motivation connected to the Israeli–Arab conflict.

As early as 1947, the French fascist Maurice Bardèche, in an effort to undermine the legitimacy of the Nuremberg trials, published a book claiming that death in the concentration camps was a result of hunger and disease and not premeditated extermination. He was joined in 1948 by Paul Rassinier, a former prisoner at Buchenwald, who strengthened his credibility in attacking concentration camp survivors for exaggerating their stories (Davidovitch and Nissim, 2017). Similar claims spread internationally as part of the activities of racist groups in the USA and elsewhere. This movement embraced a pseudo-scientific position, publishing works of an academic nature in order to establish a revisionist perspective. Although Holocaust revisionism has lurked on the fringe of public consciousness since the 1950s (in Germany, revisionists refer to the Holocaust as the Auschwitz-Lüge, or Auschwitz lie), revisionists claim that the Holocaust narrative, including the dramatic memoirs of Rudolf Hess, is often biased or distorted, or contains information elicited under duress. In December 1978, Robert Faurisson, a professor of French literature at the University of Lyons, published an article in *Le Monde* called “The Problem of the Gas Chambers, or the Auschwitz Rumor”, in which he challenged the claim that hydrocyanic gas had been used to kill people in the crematoria.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict accelerated Holocaust denial discourse in Arab countries. Understating the Holocaust and diminishing its status has long been part of some Palestinian leaders’ political strategy, as they

considered themselves the victims of Zionism. In 1984, the Palestinian National Authority Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas, published a book based on his doctoral thesis, alleging that the Holocaust was exaggerated and that Zionists created “the myth that 6 million Jews were murdered” (Davidovitch and Nissim, 2017). Some influential leaders and media outlets in the Arab world have included Holocaust denial into their anti-Jewish tone. In response to the 2000 Stockholm Declaration, Hamas issued an official statement that asserted the following:

What is supposedly called the Holocaust ... is an unfounded invented story ... the inventions of these grand illusions of a supposed crime that never happened ... clearly reveals the racist face of the Zionists who believe in the superiority of the Jewish race over all other nations.

(Davidovitch and Nissim, 2017)

Ideologically motivated denialism is often founded on a desire to rehabilitate Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime on the basis that Hitler never signed any written order to murder the Jewish population in Europe. The deniers’ argumentative tactics also include examining and debating the remains of the concentration camps, questioning evidence of the genocidal practices.

While deniers were initially politically and ideologically motivated, representing the post-war neo-Nazi movement in Germany, France and the United Kingdom, ignorance about the nature and facts of the Holocaust have grown to be more widespread and have contributed to the expansion of denialism. While in several countries the dissemination of Holocaust denial is a criminal offence, more generally trivialisation and inversion of the truth about the Holocaust have become part of public debate, influencing the collective consciousness and individual attitudes.

Global synergy and Holocaust sense making

Within institutionalised politics, the memory of Holocaust has been framed in terms of a universal moral lesson about good and evil, not limited to the Jewish tragedy in particular historical context. The Holocaust became part of the narrative through which political and intellectual elites constructed an imagined community of western civilisation and its failure. The mass murder of European Jews by the Nazis has been considered not only as a German–Jewish tragedy but as a tragedy of reason or of modernity itself (Arendt, 1963; Bauman, 1989; Adorno and Horkheimer, 1988). Intellectuals and public authorities have often described world order as being ravaged by barbarism, inhumanity and assaults on the very belief in progress. Under the apocalyptic shadow of the 20th century, failure of the international order was revealed, providing an impetus towards its transformation. Issues of the rise of Nazi Germany, fascism, nationalism, populism, the Holocaust, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the tragedy of the Great Depression were always present behind

the scenes during the foundation of liberal international order. Establishment of the UN was meant to tame malevolent forces around the globe, and to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” (UN Charter, 1945).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide embodied a commitment to universality and shared values. Yet, as Samuel Moyn argued, the declaration “was less the annunciation of a new age than a funeral wreath laid on the grave of wartime hopes” (2010: 2). Although the Holocaust issue had still not been openly aired, a consensus arose that the post-war order should be built in a novel way – with the intention of redefining IR and establishing clear standards of international law and respect for individual dignity. The foundational documents of the new order strongly manifested the need for international cooperation, indispensable for the spread of the principles of human rights and democracy. However, with the rise of the Cold War realities, the idea of globalism was overpowered by that of bipolarism while the issue of interconnectedness and a global framework were marginalised. In the 1940s, the US TV networks broadcast daily UN sessions, promoting internationalism and concern for others. The war against totalitarianism was won at great human cost which was considered unacceptable. When the memory of WWII was still fresh, the scale of its atrocities and horrors brought about reflection regarding the necessity of building an order on the principles of human dignity.

Deliberations taking place in the UN expressed the spirit of the epoch: humanity needed a unifying narrative that would be reflected in an institutional framework based on universal rather than particular, nationally defined interests. On the American political scene, isolationism had been rejected in favour of greater intervention in world politics. This was a signal of recognition that the general public should be aware of the course of global affairs, as the action of each and every nation influenced the general picture. Furthermore, discussion about the need for global government was reinvigorated, prompted by the urgent need for international control of atomic weapons. In August 1945, only a few weeks after Hiroshima, the *New Yorker* expressed this urgency, stating that “Nuclear energy insists on global government”. In the shadow of the potential for a new, nuclear holocaust, public opinion leaders, such as Walter Lippman, considered that nations would be “compelled” to create a world government, not through the persuasion of its advocates, but through “the inevitability of the truth.” The Chicago Committee to Frame a World Constitution (1945–1948) was formed to draw the theoretical foundations for a world federation and global government. In “the old continent”, the idea of the integration of Europe received a new and strong impulse, as a politically constructed notion of community was juxtaposed against the region’s brutal history of conflict and genocide. Founders of the European Community had personally experienced the brutality of two world wars, so European integration grew from the conviction that nationalist impulses of states that fuelled aggression should be confronted

by new, widely shared standards. The Schuman Declaration of May 1950 expressed the ambitions of a new project oriented towards “solidarity production”, “fusion of interests”, “setting up of common foundations for economic development”, necessary to preserve the peace (Schuman, 1950).

At the very beginning of European integration, then, it was a sense of insecurity that paved the way towards unification, rather than the moral shock of the genocide. The vision of European unity has been held together by a “political myth”, in which the meaning of the Holocaust has gradually become more prominent, as a unique model of democracy that emerged from the shared tragic past. Europeans’ very understanding of human rights and democracy, and historical processes behind their shared identity, were strongly connected to the crimes of Nazism. Apart from acknowledging the scale of the atrocity and development of the EU heritage policies, the issue provoked discussion about the differences in framing and picturing the Holocaust in different societies and the need to universalise its memory. A wider problem emerged of how the Nazis’ WWII politics should be represented in the global imaginary and how this should inform international culture and politics.

The major question is whether the Holocaust bears significance as a transformative event in terms of values and paradigms of international politics. While in the 1950s and 1960s, influence of the massacre resulted in a number of powerful symbolic gestures and meaningful processes, as time passes the Holocaust is increasingly being placed within areas of symbolic discourse. The story of extreme oppression, perpetrators and victims, the philosophical framing of the “choiceless choices” systematically vanish as sources of wisdom that can provide clues as to how to manage societies. The educational value of the Holocaust has long been recognised, but its influence on human behaviour and our moral foundations seems to be decreasing. A journey of scientific discovery within social psychology, political science, and organisation studies that revealed the mechanisms behind Holocaust has been largely ignored by statesmen and political decision makers: “It is an odd fact that the twentieth century’s most infamous instance of state-led political and social violence—the Holocaust—has remained largely peripheral to political science” (King, 2012). The perceived uniqueness of the Holocaust experience limits its role as a potential basis for theoretical political science as a point of reference for other brutal events in international history:

In the cases of Argentina and South Africa, Holocaust education can provide a safe environment to address local traumatic issues and thus contribute to the articulation of more inclusive national cultures of remembrance. In China, it familiarises students with new concepts, on the basis of which they can address their country’s own past of suffering and persecutions. In the case of Rwanda, it helps bring the local history

of genocide into a larger perspective, making it easier for historians and educators to approach recent events.

(Fracapane and Hass, 2014: 17)

This UNESCO-sponsored publication about the educational value of Holocaust history rightly argues for its wider application; the problem is, however, that political leaders are rarely interested in engaging followers in a public examination of difficult historical events. They fear complexity and uncertainty, rather using the Holocaust in instrumental battles over memory than as key to opening debates about their own histories of oppression. The European Agency for Fundamental Human Rights warns against the political use of history in its textbook for teachers: “Holocaust education must first be about exploring and attempting to understand and explain the historical context of the Holocaust. To be meaningful, it is vital that the past is not shaped to serve the needs of any moral, political, social or ideological agenda” (FRA, 2010).

Study of the Holocaust might, then, be an essential part of European and potentially global socio-historical literacy, providing students and citizens with a powerful means of assessing social and political processes. Memory of the Holocaust is firmly embedded in the symbolic imaginary of the western world, while political leaders compete for maximum diffusion and acceptance of the memory they prefer. This is an aspect of the struggle for political power that leaves societies open to manipulation and coercion (Langenbacher, 2003). Every occupied country in Europe developed its own “Vichy syndrome” (Judt, 2005: 809). In France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway the formation of a culture of remembrance has been based on different aspects, as their routes of transmission of Holocaust history differed substantially. In many cases, memory has been part of the identity myth, a “founding trauma” that plays a primary role in the creation of a political community (LaCapra, 2001). Advocates of the uniqueness option insist that there was nothing comparable to the Holocaust, making it impossible to draw any kind of universal message out of history, to acknowledge any “otherness”.

For example, the way things are framed in public discourse in Israel fuels the proliferation of nationalism and racism. Idan Yaron’s study documenting the experiences of Israeli teenagers who toured the death camp sites in Poland reveals sense-making scripts oriented at bolstering Jewish and Israeli pride, rather than a universal meaning of the events of WWII. Schedules, messages and educational content provided to the students were subject to a long list of the Education Ministry’s regulations and objectives, influenced by the leading remembrance agent – the Yad Vashem (Feldman, 2000). As a result, what should have been an experience of meaningful contact with history, enabling engaged comprehension of the past, is becoming a festival of nationalist spirit and revanchism. For many in Israel, a trip to the concentration camps has become a young person’s rite of passage. However, this direct, tangible

encounter with the consequences of racism against Jews might paradoxically strengthen xenophobic attitudes:

If pupils return home from Poland and say, “we have to kill all the Arabs,” then we haven’t accomplished anything. They say this in a single breath, with no problem, and it has become more legitimate in recent years ... What they learn in Poland comes down to what was done to the Jews in a certain period, and they conclude from this that we have to be strong and defeat the enemy. I conducted many observations in schools, and there is a deep problem of racism there. In practice, the trips to Poland do nothing whatsoever to deal with racism, which is a malignant problem in Israel. The moment the trip leads to intensified nationalism and a feeling of us against the world, we have achieved precisely the opposite of what we were aiming at.

(Idan, cited in Wolff, 2020: 315)

On the other hand the role of “victim consciousness” has been a prominent factor in shaping Polish attitudes toward the Holocaust. Poland has struggled with a dual sense of victimhood related to both the Communist and Nazi regimes, resulting in an “obsession with innocence” – a belief that the nation’s suffering spares it from being blamed for historical anti-semitism (Tokarska-Bakir, 2001). Additionally, on the EU stage, Eastern European politicians demand recognition of Stalin’s deadly record, which outdid the Nazis in terms of numbers of victims but has not been fully recognised or discussed internationally. The memory of the Holocaust was long instrumentalised by communist governments, manipulating the historical data and “nationalising” its victims to create an illusion of symmetry in narratives of war between the fates of the Poles and the Jews. The young generation, growing up after the democratic transformation of 1989 has still been heavily involved in a “rivalry of suffering”. When surveyed, they expressed the view that highlighting the extermination of the Jews might overshadow Polish suffering during WWII (Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, 2003). This kind of victimhood rivalry is common in countries of Eastern Europe. Narratives constructed by displays in the national pavilions of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum present a one-sided version of history. Austrians and Slovaks, contrary to historical facts, were described as victims, though there were numerous supporters of the Nazi regime among them, including Austrian SS guards at death and concentration camps (Krajewski, 2005). “An aggressive silence” in the German political memory of Holocaust, has been noted especially given the initial focus on perpetrators rather than victims. The Holocaust memory evolved from the initial re-education policies of the occupying Allied forces into a somewhat excessive form of remembrance culture, resulting in philosemitism becoming a discursive policy pillar of the *Whitewash of the Jewish Badge* (Stern, 1989).

The story of the massive destruction of European Jewry during WWII has established its presence in European history, philosophy and studies on the human condition, as part of the collective memories of the nations or ethnic groups. Holocaust imagery and motifs are often used in the service of diverse political and social agendas, and lessons from the Holocaust are usually complicated by nationalistic, biased narratives of heroism. Political elites, memory makers or memory agents selectively adopt and manipulate interpretations of the Holocaust in order to legitimise certain images or policies. Holocaust history is an open-ended process of remembrance. The elements of the past are added to the present imagination and used for particular gain, transposed into bullets in political struggle; their complexity is stripped away, with the intention of making them more accessible to a wider audience (Schwartz, 1982). Political efforts oriented at establishing a universal understanding of Holocaust also result in simplification of the complex socio-political and psychological framework of this genocide, highlighting emotions rather than genuine knowledge. In both cases “history is made easier at the price of making it less significant” (Bialystok, 1996: 125).

Conclusion

Leadership provides a specific framework for the study of Holocaust memory, revealing the function of memory narratives in shaping contemporary imaginaries and power relations. Practical lessons from both empirical and philosophical analyses of the ordinary person’s participation in the events is that human nature itself is neither able to restraint from committing evil, nor determined to perpetrate it. Circumstances and relations are decisive factors in generating effects and directing courses of action. Thus, the role politics plays in generating social rules and promoting solidarity or mistrust definitely influences either the creation or elimination of the micro-foundation of violence and injustice. Remembrance of the Holocaust is now largely seen as symbolic, yet our knowledge about its complexities contains practical aspects that could help with the shaping of better institutions and societies. What has been pushed into the sphere of “memory”, transformed into a leadership exercise of sense making – often in the service of particular interests – could have been used to enhance many aspects of social relations. Sense-making leadership is not only about abstract stories, the creation of myths and narratives but, as the Holocaust example illuminates, is also about defining reality. The process of making definitions, however, while based on retrospection and the assessment of the facts, also involves re-evaluation, interpretation and the introduction of ideational components to the picture. Memory play performs a social function by joining together the different temporal dimensions of past and present. Present beliefs and ideas guide a social reading of the past, while the knowledge and mental patterns formulated in the past shape the way

people see and understand the present. The systematic persecution and extermination of millions of Jews solely on the basis of their ethnic characteristics has been a subject of study within the areas of group behaviour and obedience, social norms, collective memory, political decision making, public health, and many others.

The Holocaust, in all its complexity, became a formative event for the western world as it is now constituted, revealing some of the mechanisms of its formation. Every set of findings adds another layer to already recognised perceptions and interpretative contexts. Philosophers, political scientists, and other resemblance agents generate collective memory by establishing a connection between it and the present moment, which is always temporal and situational. The meaning of the Holocaust has undergone numerous reconstructions throughout the 20th century, as it became clear that its story can be told in many ways and used for many purposes. Having been brought to the attention of the world, it has been said to have a universal meaning, as like all the great tales of humanity it is centred on the opposition between good and evil. And in this story, evil wins – WWII challenges the Enlightenment’s assertion of human progress: its exploitation of the efficiency of the deadly machine, its scale, bureaucratic nature and material bases have been silently assumed by some to be pathological in nature. The universal component of the processes that led to the extermination of Jews can be found in many aspects of contemporary power struggles, e.g. marginalisation, racism and social exclusion. The very mechanism of the instrumental treatment of the Holocaust memory belongs to the same category. Paradoxically, the dramatic history of the loss and tragedy of European Jewry, instead of performing the function of a warning sign against hatred and division, is being used to fuel them. What had previously been an enabling interpretation of the global future in terms of “hope” has been replaced by the category of “fear”. Memory of the Holocaust has long been recognised through its foundational character as the basis for the protection of human rights. It provided a normative mandate for the liberal world order, constructing a narrative of hope: after the worst possible elements of humanity had come to the surface, things could only get better, people wiser, and the future was to be built on dignity and inclusion. The ongoing subjectivisation and manipulation of Holocaust history can be interpreted as a sign of the deterioration of belief in the liberal model. Fear has taken over the global narrative: fear of the unknown, fear of repeating the mistakes of the past, fear rooted in uncertainty about transition. The interpretative key for Holocaust history has thus changed, diminishing the value of its universal meaning and increasing the need for particular visions of its events (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Leadership matrix: Learning from the Holocaust

	<i>Structural leadership</i>	<i>Cognitive leadership</i>	<i>Relational leadership</i>
Key issues. Criteria	Assessed according to the criterion of effectiveness in shaping understanding of the historical processes and usage of this knowledge to shape today's international affairs.	Assessed according to the criterion of effectiveness in building awareness of the Holocaust in relation to the sphere of universal values and virtues foundational to global affairs.	Assessed according to the criterion of ability to effectively form epistemic communities promoting Holocaust memory as a global heritage.
State leaders	High influence record/low influence potential. Tragic European history provided the impulse for a redesigning of the continent's governance. Yet the influence of the Holocaust and WWII on political decision making is decreasing as time passes. Lessons learned do not stand the test of time in providing structural effects to the system.	High influence record/low influence potential. The direction of evolution of Holocaust memory is increasingly guiding towards political instrumentalisation, so instead of creating synergy in historical sense making it is becoming a divisive political tool.	Low influence record/low influence potential. The memory of the Holocaust increasingly serves as a platform of polarisation between and within states, rather than a relation-building resource.
Researchers	Low influence record/Low influence potential. Historians' role in producing structural effects in global Holocaust memory is very limited, as the memorial process is a political act.	Average influence record/Low influence potential. Historical knowledge is a base for creating fragmented images of the Holocaust, and there is no direct transmission channel between epistemic communities and power centres that could help to produce global Holocaust memory.	Low influence record/Rising influence potential. The need to shape international understanding of the Holocaust was first revealed by scholars who played leadership roles in building transnational epistemic communities, aggregating historical data and reconstructing factography. Yet these efforts have been entirely translated into mechanisms through which the interplay between the universal scale of Holocaust memory and that anchored in the general space and culture of historical experience can be explained.

(continued)

Table 4.1 Cont.

	<i>Structural leadership</i>	<i>Cognitive leadership</i>	<i>Relational leadership</i>
Survivors	Low influence record/Low influence potential. Survivors played prolific roles as memory agents and anti-war activists, without exercising direct influence on the international system.	High influence record/Low influence potential. Survivors' accounts presenting the human dimension of the Holocaust enable people of all cultures and walks of life to relate to its history. They become memory brokers in translating their experiences into the language of modernity.	High influence record/Low influence potential. Public survivors' leadership has been based on relationship building and establishing international communities of memory. The disappearance of eye-witnesses from global debate is likely to negatively affect the persistence of their influence.
Deniers	Low influence record/Rising influence potential. Holocaust deniers' activities, seen as a part of broader phenomenon of disinformation and polarisation, demonstrate the increasing potential for disruption in the social and political sphere of the international system.	High influence record/Rising influence potential. As the historical events are becoming part of distant history, space for the contestation and denying of the Holocaust broadens. The authenticity of the memory sites can be increasingly questioned; demise of first-hand witnesses is likely to provoke an influx of competing narratives.	Average influence record/Rising influence potential. Transnational networks of Holocaust deniers are hermetic, yet are persistent and reinforcing their relational potential as a part of general radicalisation of the public sphere.

Source: Author's own work.

References

- Abraham N and Torok M (1994) *The Shell and the Kernel*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Adorno T and Horkheimer M (1988) *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.
- Agnew V (2004) Introduction: What is reenactment? *Criticism* 46(3): 327–339.
- Ahram AI (2015) Sexual violence and the making of ISIS. *Survival* 57(3): 57–78.
- Alesina A and Glaeser E (2004) *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Allen MT (2005) Introduction: A bureaucratic holocaust—towards a new consensus. In: Feldman GD and Seibel W (Eds) *Networks of Nazi Persecution: Bureaucracy, Business, and the Organization of the Holocaust*. New York: Berghahn Books: 259–268.
- Alter C, Haynes S and Worland J (2019) 2019 Person of the year – Greta Thunberg. *Time Magazine*. Available at <https://time.com/person-of-the-year-2019-greta-thunberg/> (accessed 9 December 2021).
- Ambrosewicz-Jacobs J (2003) *Me Us Them. Ethnic Prejudices and Alternative Methods of Education*. Kraków: Universitas.
- Appelbaum A (2006) Teheran's Holocaust lesson. *The Washington Post*. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2006/12/12/tehrans-holocaust-lesson/fb1019cb-90be-41c4-8916-715b0fdbad4a/ (accessed 10 December 2021).
- Arendt H (1963) *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Arendt H (1966) Preface. In: Naumann B (Ed.) *Auschwitz*. New York: Praeger.
- Bartelson J (2000) Three concepts of globalization. *International Sociology* 15(2): 180–196.
- Bauer Y (1978) *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective*. London: Sheldon Press.
- Baum R (2011) United States Holocaust museums: Pathos, possession, patriotism. *Public History Review* 18.
- Bauman Z (1989) *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Beeler C (2019) How did teen climate activist Greta Thunberg rise to fame so quickly? *The Guardian*. Available at www.pri.org/stories/2019-10-10/how-did-teen-climate-activist-greta-thunberg-rise-fame-so-quickly (accessed 9 June 2021).
- Benshoof J (2014) The other red line: The use of rape as an unlawful tactic of warfare. *Global Policy* 5(2): 146–158.
- Berinsky AJ (2007) Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American public support for military conflict. *Journal of Politics* 69(4): 975–997.
- Bessel R (2003) Functionalists vs. intentionalists: The debate twenty years on or whatever happened to functionalism and intentionalism? *German Studies Review* 26(1).
- Bialystok F (1996) Americanizing the Holocaust: Beyond the limit of the universal. In Millen RL (Ed.) *New Perspectives on the Holocaust*. New York and London: New York University Press.
- Blair T (1999) Speech in Chicago, 24 April. Available at www.econclubchi.org/Documents/Meeting/1afd70f3-4eb6-498d-b69b-a1741a5a75b1.pdf. (accessed 26 June 2021).
- Bloxham D (2008) Organized mass murder: Structure, participation, and motivation in comparative perspective. *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 22(2): 203–245.
- Breuilly J (1993) *Nationalism and the State*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Brown AD, Stacey P and Nandhakumar J (2008) Making sense of sensemaking narratives. *Human Relations* 61(8): 1035–1062.
- Browning C (1992) *The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bruner J (1990) *Acts of Meaning*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Byman D and Pollack KM (2019) Beyond great forces. How individuals still shape history. *Foreign Affairs*. Available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-10-15/beyond-great-forces (accessed 9 December 2021).
- Callimachi R (2015) ISIS enshrines a theology of rape. *The New York Times*. Available at www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html (accessed 23 June 2021).
- Campbell A, Converse P, Miller W and Stokes D (1960) *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.
- Castells M (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Chaiken S, Liberman A and Eagly A (1989) Heuristic and systematic information processing within and beyond the persuasion context. In: Uleman JS and Bargh JA (Eds) *Unintended Thought*. New York: Guilford Press: 212–252.
- Churchill W (1941) Broadcast to the World about the Meeting with President Roosevelt. Available at www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410824awp.html (accessed 12 January 2022).
- Chwalba A (2002) Dzieje Krakowa. Kraków w latach 1939–1945 (A History of Krakow, 1939–1945), vol. 5. Kraków: Literackie.
- Clark J (2001) Ethical globalization: The dilemmas and challenges of internationalizing global civil society. In: Edwards M and Gaventa J (Eds) *Global Citizen Action*. London: Earthscan.
- Confino J (2012) Rio+20: Jeffrey Sachs on how business destroyed democracy and virtuous life. *The Guardian*. Available at www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/rio-20-jeffrey-sachs-business-democracy (accessed 18 March 2021).
- Converse P (1964) The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In: Apter DE (Ed.) *Ideology and Discontent*. London: Free Press of Glencoe: 206–261.
- Dahl RA (1966) *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in the American City*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dale K and Burrell G (2008) *Spaces of Organization and the Organization of Space*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Davidovitch N and Dana N (2017) The Holocaust paradox: Holocaust denial and its use in the Arab world. *Israel Affairs* 23(2): 411–426.
- Davis S (1995) *Leadership in Conflict: The Lessons of History*. London: Macmillan.
- De Jaegher H and Di Paolo E (2007) Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 6(4): 485–507.
- Deng DK (2013) *Challenges of Accountability: An Assessment of Dispute Resolution Processes in Rural South Sudan*. Juba: South Sudan Law Society.
- Druckman JN, Kuklinski JH and Sigelman L (2009) The unmet potential of interdisciplinary research: Political psychological approaches to voting and public opinion. *Political Behavior* 31(4): 485–510.
- Easterly W (2005) A modest proposal. *The Washington Post*. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/2005/03/13/a-modest-proposal/cf219afc-22f9-4f1f-97b4-ffba7f7a058a/ (accessed 12 February 2021).
- The Economist* (1997) In praise of the Davos Man, 2(1).

- EU (European Union) Agency for Fundamental Rights (2010) *Excursion to the Past – Teaching for the Future: Handbook for Teachers*. Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights.
- Feffer J (2015) Jeffrey Sachs disdains neoliberalism, embraces Poland. *Foreign Policy in Focus*. Available at <https://fpif.org/jeffrey-sachs-disdains-neoliberalism-embraces-poland/> (accessed 20 November 2021).
- Feldman J (2000) National identity and ritual construction of Israeli youth pilgrimages to Poland. *Neue Sammlung* 40: 499–517.
- Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) Annex to Letter dated 9 December 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. United Nations Security Council, S/1994/1405.
- Fracapane K and Hass M (2014) *Holocaust Education in a Global Context*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
- Frankl VE (1969) *The Will to Meaning*. New York: New American Library.
- Gadamer HG (1975) *Truth and Method*. New York: Seabury.
- Geertz C (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books.
- Giddens A (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gigerenzer G (2008) *Rationality for Mortals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilens M (1999) Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Gilovich T, Griffin D and Kahneman D (Eds) (2002) *Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Goffman E (1959) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Heaton L (2014) The risks of instrumentalizing the narrative on sexual violence in the DRC: Neglected needs and unintended consequences. *International Review of the Red Cross* 96(894): 625–639.
- Hersh J (2006) *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hickman C, Marks E, Phikala P, Clayton S, Lewandowski E, Mayall E, Wray B, Mellor C and van Susteren L (2021) Climate anxiety in children and young people and their beliefs about government responses to climate change: A global survey. *The Lancet Planetary Health* 5(12): 863–873.
- Hilberg R (1961) *The Destruction of the European Jews*. Chicago, IL: Quadrangle.
- Holtz J (2017) Poverty is caused by a failure of ethics, not economy, Sachs says. *The Heights*. Available at www.bcheights.com/2017/03/26/poverty-caused-ethical-failure-not-economical-one-sachs-says/ (accessed 21 May 2021).
- Hulme D (2009) *The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): A Short History of the World's Biggest Promise*. Manchester: Brooks World Poverty Institute.
- Huntington S (1993) The clash of civilizations. *Foreign Affairs* 72(3): 22–49.
- Jervis RO (1983) Deterrence and perception. *International Security* 7(3): 3–30.
- Johnson DDP and Tierney DR (2004) Essence of victory: Winning and losing international crises. *Security Studies* 13(2): 350–381.
- Judt T (2005) *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Kaiser W and Homlong Storeide A (2018) International organizations and Holocaust remembrance: From Europe to the world. *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 24(6): 798–810.

- Kamola I (2014) US Universities and the production of the global imaginary. *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 16(3): 515–533.
- Kapoor I (2014) Psychoanalysis and development: Contributions, examples, limits. *Third World Quarterly* 35(7): 1120–1143.
- Kelly L (1999) Violence against women: A policy of neglect or a neglect of policy? In: Walby S. (Ed) *New Agendas for Women*. London: Palgrave Macmillan: 119–147.
- Keohane R (2002) *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*. New York: Routledge.
- Keohane R and Nye J (1977) *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Khoo SM (2005) The Millennium Development Goals: A critical discussion. *Trocaire Development Review*: 43–56.
- Kimanthi H and Hebinck P (2018) ‘Castle in the sky’: The anomaly of the millennium villages project fixing food and markets in Sauri, western Kenya. *Journal of Rural Studies* 57: 157–170.
- King C (2012) Can there be a political science of the Holocaust? *Perspectives on Politics* 10(2): 323–341.
- Kraemer D (2021) Greta Thunberg: Who is the climate campaigner and what are her aims? *BBC News*. Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49918719 (accessed 21 December 2021).
- Krajewski, S (2005) *Poland and the Jews: Reflection of a Polish Jew*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Austeria.
- LaCapra D (2001) *Writing History, Writing Trauma*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Langenbacher E (2003) Changing memory regimes in contemporary Germany? *German Politics and Society* 67(21): 46–68.
- Latour B (1999) *Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lau RR and Redlawsk DP (2001) Advantages and disadvantages of cognitive heuristics in political decision making. *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 951–971.
- Levy D and Sznajder N (2006) *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*, trans. Oksiloff A. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- McDermott, R (2004) *Political Psychology in International Relations*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Maitlis S and Christianson M (2014) Sensemaking in organizations: Taking stock and moving forward. *Academy of Management Annals* 8(1): 57–125.
- Malthus T (2015) *An Essay on the Principle of Population and Other Writings*. London: Penguin Books.
- Margalit A (2002) *The Ethics of Memory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Marris E (2019) Why young climate activists have captured the world’s attention. *Nature* 573(7775): 471–472.
- Mearsheimer JJ (2011) *Why Leaders Lie? The Truth about Lying in International Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Migdal JS (2004) *Boundaries and Belonging. States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mignolo WD (2012) The role of BRICS countries in the becoming world order. *Humanity*: 41–89. Available at www.academia.edu/9672768/The_role_of_BRICS_countries_in_the_becoming_world_order_Beijing_May_2012_ (accessed 17 March 2021).

- Milgram S (1974) *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Motyl AJ (2002) Imagined communities, rational choosers, and invented ethnies. *Comparative Politics* 34(2): 233–250.
- Moyn S (2010) *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
- Munk N (2007) Jeffrey Sachs's \$200 billion dream. *Vanity Fair*. Available at www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/07/sachs200707 (accessed 14 May 2021).
- Murray J (2020) 'Tipping point': Greta Thunberg hails Black Lives Matter protests. *The Guardian*. Available at www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jun/20/tipping-point-greta-thunberg-hails-black-lives-matter-protests (accessed 25 June 2020).
- MVP (Millennium Villages Project) (2006). Millennium villages: A new approach to fighting poverty. *Sustainability and Cost*. Available at www.unmillenniumproject.org/mv/mv_cost.htm (accessed 7 September 2019).
- Nair Ch (2022) *Dismantling Global White Privilege : Equity for a Post-western World*. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.
- Narlikar A (2020) *Poverty Narratives and Power Paradoxes in International Trade Negotiations and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Negroponte N (1995) *Being Digital*. New York: Knopf.
- Nelson S (2015) Suicide pills needed in fight against ISIS? *US News*. Available at www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/19/suicide-pills-needed-in-fight-against-isis-death-cult (accessed 17 March 2021).
- Neumann P and Smith M (2008) *The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works and Why It Fails*. London: Routledge.
- Nicolaus P and Yuce S (2017) Sex slavery: One aspect of the Yezidi genocide. *Iran and the Caucasus* 21(2): 196–229.
- Norwegian Nobel Committee (2018) The Nobel Peace Prize for 2018. Available at www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2018/press-release (accessed 19 March 2021).
- Nye JS (2017) Will the Liberal order survive? The history of an idea. *Foreign Affairs* 96(1): 10–16.
- O'Brien K, Selboe E and Hayward B (2018) Exploring youth activism on climate change: Dutiful, disruptive, and dangerous dissent. *Ecology and Society* 23(3): 42.
- Pastor M (1992) *Inflation, Stabilization, and Debt: Macroeconomic Experiments in Peru and Bolivia*. New York: Routledge.
- Pogge T (2009) How world poverty is measured and tracked. In: Elcke M, Schramm M, Klasen S and Pogge T (Eds) *Absolute Poverty and Global Justice*. Aldershot: Ashgate: 51–68.
- Popper KR (1968) Epistemology without a knowing subject. In: Van Rootselaar B (Ed.) *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science III*. Amsterdam: North Holland: 333–373.
- Roberts A (2004) *Hitler and Churchill: Secrets of Leadership*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Rosenbaum AS (Ed.) (1996) *Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Rosenberg K and Nowakowski J (2010) *Przewodnik po Krakowie Oskara Schindlera (Guide to Oskar Schindler's Kraków)*. Krakow: Galicja Jewish Museum.
- Sachs J and Lipton D (1990) Poland's economic reform. *Foreign Affairs* 69(3): 47–66.
- Sachs JD (2004) Letter from Sauri, Kenya. Available at www.worldagroforestry.org (accessed 12 February 2020).

- Sachs JD (2005) *The End of Poverty: How We Can Make It Happen in Our Lifetime*. New York: The Penguin Press.
- Saith A (2007) Millennium Development Goals and the dumbing-down of development: Goals set for the poor, goalposts set by the rich. *International Institute of Asian Studies Newsletter* 45: 12–13.
- Schuman R (1950) The Schuman Declaration, 9 May. Available at www.ena.lu/declaration_robert_schuman_paris_1950-022500006.html (accessed 20 March 2021).
- Schwartz B (1982) The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory, *Social Forces*, 61(2): 374–402.
- Silva DFD (2015) Globality. *Critical Ethnic Studies* 1(1): 33–38.
- Simon HA (1976) From substantive to procedural rationality. In: Anonymous 25 *Years of Economic Theory*. Springer: Boston, MA: 65–86
- Simon HA (1990) Invariants of human behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology* 41: 1–19.
- Smircich L and Morgan G (1982) Leadership: The management of meaning. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 18(3): 257–273.
- Smith RM (2003) *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sniderman PM, Brody RA and Tetlock PE (1993) *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- St Germain T and Dewey S (2012) *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: International Law, Local Responses*. Sterling: Kumarian Press.
- Steger M (2008) *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stern, F (1989) Philosemitism: The whitewashing of the Yellow Badge in West Germany 1945–1952. *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 4(4): 463–477.
- Taylor C (2002) Modern social imaginaries. *Public Culture* 14(1): 91–124.
- Thompson E (2007) *Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Thunberg G (2019a) *No One Is Too Small To Make a Difference*. London: Penguin Press.
- Thunberg G (2019b) Transcript: Greta Thunberg’s Speech at the UN Climate Action Summit, National Public Radio. Available at www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-un-climate-action-summit (accessed 18 March 2021).
- Thunberg G (2021) Greta Thunberg at Youth4Climate Summit 2021 in Milan. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=ceIE_ehQhtc (accessed 12 December 2021).
- Tokarska-Bakir, J (2001) Obsessed with innocence. *Gazeta Wyborcza* January 13–14: 22–23.
- Tomasello M (2014) *A Natural History of Human Thinking*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Traverso E (2009) Vom kritischen Gebrauch der Erinnerung. In: Flierl T and Müller E (Eds) *Vom kritischen Gebrauch der Erinnerung*. Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag: 27–46.
- Tversky A and Kahneman D (1974) Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science* 185(4157): 1124–1131.
- Umans L and Arce A (2014) Fixing rural development cooperation? Not in situations involving blurring and fluidity. *Journal of Rural Studies* 34: 337–344.
- UN (United Nations) (2015) *Millennium Development Goals Report 2015*. New York: United Nations.

- UN (United Nations) Charter (1945) *Preamble*. Available at www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html (accessed 14 July 2019).
- UN (United Nations) Development Program (2013) *Global Conversation on the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda*. New York: United Nations.
- UN, World Bank, IMF, OECD (2000) *2000 a Better World for All: Progress towards the International Development Goals*. Available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/jointpub/world/2000/eng/bwae.pdf (accessed: 22 July 2022).
- Varela FJ, Thompson E and Rosch E (1991) *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Vis B (2019) Heuristics and political elites' judgment and decision making. *Political Studies Review* 17(1): 41–52.
- Waller J (2007) *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weber M (1968) The City, in *Economy And Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Vol 3. New York: Collier: 1353–1354.
- Weick KE (1995) *Sensemaking in Organisations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Weick KE (2001) *Making Sense of the Organisation*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Weick KE, Sutcliffe M and Obstfeld D (2005) Organizing and the process of sensemaking and organizing. *Organization Science* 16(4): 409–421.
- Weyland K (2014) *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Whine M (2008) Expanding Holocaust denial and legislation against it. *Jewish Political Studies* 20(1/2): 57–77.
- Wilson J (2014) *Jeffrey Sachs: The Strange Case of Dr Shock and Mr Aid*. London and New York: Verso.
- Wolff (2020) Severing a historical bond: The implications of divorcing human rights from Holocaust education. *Holocaust Studies* 26(3): 306–328.
- Ziai, A (2016) *Development Discourse and Global History: From Colonialism to the Sustainable Development Goals*. Abington: Routledge.

Conclusion

Analysts and researchers often ask questions about why states and their leaders are generally reluctant with regard to cooperation despite the fact that they could amplify their influence and resources through cooperative interaction. This book constitutes an effort to include aspect of leadership in the analysis of global processes, especially in the context of cooperation and global synergy building. Leadership is understood here as a discursive relationship that takes place between interacting partners. The point of departure for this book was provided by the assumption that hierarchies in global politics have for a long time been in a process of transformation. While studies on non-state actors, regimes and other novel forms of activity on the political scene have been growing exponentially since the 1970s, the conceptual mapping of international reality has been far behind its empirical dynamics. In a space where there is no higher authority, relations of power are based on the ability to influence, founded not only on material or military prevalence but also on credibility, trust, recognition, persistence and other factors contributing to changing the rules and expectations that make up global structures. These relations are leadership relations. Their analysis seeks to shed light on both behaviours and outcomes that are transformative in global affairs. The leadership approach recognises agency mechanisms, both within and beyond the state, not as an inherent disposition but rather as a result of interaction and social relations between different actors. Such a view changes the way international dynamics are observed, presenting what constitutes the agency, what dispositions are needed to become a global leader and how leadership can be exercised to putting forth demands effectively (Haas, 1964: 84). Leadership is a guiding force behind macroprocesses organising global governance and global politics and offers a way to get to the roots of their micro-foundation. Decoding global political-leadership mechanisms is especially important for two reasons:

- a) it advances our understanding of the capacity for collective action at the global level. There are two general aims guiding actors' global activity. The first is limited to expanding their influence and building their international position, while the second is connected to the necessity to

secure global public goods. These aims are often interwoven, yet now in the face of shrinking resources and the growing importance of the global commons, visibility of the global sphere will only be increasing. The realities of the distribution of global public goods present the most far reaching of the world's wicked problems, being a leadership challenge that can be conceptualised through the three dimensions of the leadership matrix – the structural, the relational and the cognitive. They reveal various modes of influence, not limited to formalised political forums. Shaping global public conscience, generating social support, mobilisation and introducing global issues to the political agenda concern the essence of political thinking and doing, namely the distribution of resources;

- b) it is aimed at contributing to a hitherto unexplored explanation for the ongoing crisis of agency and responsibility within the area of the distribution of global public goods. Sovereign states, being the primary decision makers, operate under conditions of the globalised economy, being at the same time involved in global competition for power and resources. Thus, although global challenges cross nation state boundaries, the environmental, economic and crisis mitigation policies are often a result of short-term political strategies for which global synergy is not a decisive factor (Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010).

The position of global public goods within national political hierarchies is decisive for introducing effective governance measures. The history of institution building suggests that leadership matters most in times of crisis, and that crises often act as catalysts for social innovation. Global governance is in a state of flux, geopolitics is on the rise and thinking in terms of military dominance is still on the table. Yet a combination of powerful risk factors – the global pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine – has triggered a powerful transformational impulse. A new model of global politics is needed as there is now a prospect of the emergence of the next hegemonic power that could secure the provision of global public goods. High politics fails to provide solutions, but leadership processes are not limited to the offices of formal public officials. Therefore, the current leadership gap will inevitably be filled by the activities and strategies of different actors who will create new opportunities to mould the global sphere. The guiding mechanism of political life is applied here – reality is being transformed in the process. Engaged actors find ways to move forward while they foster their adaptive capabilities, transforming themselves while in the process of transforming global realities.

Observing political relations from the standpoint of human agency is especially interesting today because technology and integrated markets empower individuals and strengthen their autonomy in relation to political leaders. Over the past 20 years, at least 1.2 billion people have been lifted out of poverty – that is, their income has surpassed \$3.20 per day,

which is equivalent to the average poverty line in low-income countries (NIC, 2021). Human development has become a primary factor in organising global affairs in future. Substantial progress in women's basic health and education in recent decades as well as an expansion of legal rights in many countries has been accompanied by the empowerment of many previously marginalised groups, such as sexual, ethnic and religious minorities. The sphere of human development expanded. Aside from improvements in education, health and poverty reduction, governments are expected to provide market and technological opportunities and jobs. In many countries, political authorities struggle to meet the needs of a more urbanised, connected and vastly expanded global middle class.

As a result of the changes described above, the parameters of leadership interaction are fundamentally changing. Followers are independent enough to challenge the leaders, but their autonomy can also be expressed in political indifference, a wave of apathy sweeping across the world, as people don't recognise the value of the virtues of citizenship. This social factor is a serious source of disruption within and between countries. People in the global framework present both the problem and the solution. To an unprecedented extent, they are now able to flee conflict, crime, religious and social repression, or natural disasters; they can also leave their homes *en masse* to pursue better economic prospects. People have greater access to information and they can serve as sense-making brokers and effectively interfere in global affairs.

On the one hand, people who are in motion, crossing geographical boundaries, who effectively disseminate their narratives and who present their demands and visions and urge for social change increase the level of democratisation of the public sphere. On the other hand, the polarisation of forces within the public sphere makes governance more complex and the negotiation process between public and political spheres more difficult. Furthermore, political authority is becoming increasingly dispersed and fluid.

Political centres of gravity remain located in nation states which continue to be major political actors on the global scene. The organising logic of global and national decision making is, however, in contradiction. Interdependence, a major factor resulting from globalisation, constrains governments into cooperating. Gains resulting from economic integration can be sustained and expanded under the condition of deepening cooperation and investment in relations that enable keeping the system in balance. The urgency of global issues and requirements of the international system under structural reconstruction call for more political attention and increased effort. However, state leaders are busy with the demands and expectations of their national constituencies and are pressed by political competition. It is rarely the case that promoting global issues would generate an advantage for them in the national political race. Despite the fact that awareness of the gravity of global problems is rising, the pace at which public opinion absorbs the dangers and translates them into political postulates that can be effectively turned into policymaking

is too slow in relation to the potential harms. History of the rare (although important) successes of the global governance system and its many frequent failures exposes the competitive nature of global political relations that make actors place the emphasis upon narrow national interests questioning the viability of plans to protect the global commons. With a growing degree of political fragmentation, frequent social turmoil and rivalry in the political arena increasingly puts the global order at stake.

Three dimensions of leadership: How structural, relational and cognitive leaderships work in global politics?

Leadership is presented in this book as an indispensable component of any substantial form of political action, especially in areas that are important in the context of building global synergy. In order to understand the relationship between the requirements of protection/distribution of global public goods and leadership as a principle of effective political influence, different strategies of political actors need to be taken into account. Many forms of exercising agency to influence other actors and the social structure can provoke global change. Different forms and manifestation of leadership in global politics have been organised around structural, relational and cognitive patterns.

Structural leadership. Structural lines of inquiry to the greatest extent refer to the traditional categories in which politics has always been understood. The driving force behind structural leadership is power; therefore, state actors have been indicated as a primary force transforming global reality and creating the structure of relations, institutions, expectations and knowledge. International politics has always been driven by the desire for dominance and neither advances in technology, nor global economic integration have changed this. What have been changed are the means through which this dominance could be achieved on a global or local scale. Analysis of the leadership gap in global space reveals that contributing to the international order and providing global public goods have ceased to be effective strategies for the accumulation of power in the international arena. While international order was once built on the position of states that were driven by the desire to dominate, today the risks and burdens associated with global primacy are assessed as greater than the possible gains. Questions about whether or not China can lead or whether America can continue to lead refer to the transactional model of leadership, in which the most powerful state in the system exchanges its involvement in the provision of global public goods for resources, influence and the ability to coerce. This was a mechanism that kept hegemony at an exposed position. Yet this kind of transaction is no longer considered lucrative. The accumulation of disruptive global forces made meeting the responsibilities of the leading power more difficult. International competition is rising due to the emergence of new powerful actors, so the probability of long-term hegemonic

dominance is decreasing. While some authors differentiate between global leadership and global dominance (Brzezinski, 2004), these two phenomena, both driven by power, are often interwoven and complementary. However, while there is a need for concentrated power for global dominance, leadership can be disseminated and to a certain extent independent from the military and material components of power.

Global change and aspiration accentuate the need for global leadership rather than hegemony. A major puzzle of the structural level of global order is that the transformation from national to global patterns of policymaking has not taken place. Modelski (2005), in the framework of what he refers to as the ‘rise and decline of world powers’ or in the ‘long leadership cycle’, which focuses exclusively on nation states, predicted that the first half of the 21st century would be marked by a coalition-building phase. The prevalence of democracies in the global system was interpreted as a condition that favours cooperation and could result in some form of global equalisation. He was hoping for two alternative scenarios:

“a cohesive global democratic community, comprising not only the majority of the world’s population, but also the preponderance of its military, economic, and technological resources, and a majority “party” within the United Nations or “alliances between the several poles of that system, and within the United Nations, hence also between democratic and non-democratic states”.

(Modelski, 2005: 200)

Neither of these scenarios occurred. Nation states still operate as if constrained by the competitive run, while their ability to actively govern internal and external processes has been seriously undermined by global integration. While the adaptation process is ongoing, its outcomes are insufficient to build a synergetic global environment or an adequate form of global governance. Structural leadership is more oriented at reacting to global disorders than engaging in the task of reconfiguring important elements of order that are associated with global politics. A new model can be built as a crisis response in which new stimuli able to promote leadership relations emerge.

Relational leadership. All of the global actors face a double dilemma in having to address growing threats of the under provision of global public goods together with the necessity to build more effective economic systems. Global commons are hardly manageable without transnational coordination and a joint commitment to principles that could be globally enforced. Furthermore, many societies are still at the stage where all efforts need to be invested in generating economic growth and increasing the fungible wealth that is a condition of building even a basic kind of adaptive strategy. The European Union (EU) remains the most important institutional innovation, systematically facing

multiple crises. Among new powerful actors in the international arena, only China provides innovative forms of relation building through its flagship programme: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), expanding China's influence in 65 other countries that collectively cover two thirds of the world's population. While the declared aims of the project, promoted by Pekin as a developmental platform, have raised controversy, they also present a coherent relationship-based framework. China, even when reacting to the international critique of misalignment of its practices with international standards, responded with a relational approach establishing a partnership between BRI and the Social Development Goals (SDG) programme in several countries (Lee and Sullivan, 2019).

Relational leadership has always mattered in global politics, and it is likely that its importance is going to increase, given the scale of interdependence. Those leaders that will be able to intentionally design connections within a structure can replace risks of interdependence with chances for expansion not only in terms of economic development but also in the reimagining of its place in the world. Agency in international politics emerges as a result of interactive processes, which can define events, provide motivation and generate a sense of purpose.

The western response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 illustrates the nature of the process. Western powers initially shaped their reaction according to well-established scripts in terms of policy options and identification. The negotiating positions of American and European political leaders were grounded in certain identities and images of themselves held before the Russian invasion. The scale and brutality of Russian aggression was a game changer, redefining the western position and generating an unprecedented scale of mobilisation. Yet, this mechanism could not have been effective without relational context, role models, persuasion channels or trust. Shared beliefs are only a starting point for solving multi-lateral problems. There is never one sole, 'natural' solution on the table and the way this solution is generated is very much connected to what is happening within the relational layer of leadership. Actors enter relations and bring their concept of fixed political interest and coalition, but they are the subject of transformation as the process develops. Individuals, states, firms and organisations constantly reflect on what they want, and their orientations are shaped by the context, so the global arena can be presented as a dynamic network of leadership relations between actors engaging and disengaging in different issues.

The relational layer of global political leadership is especially important in the context of a new model of international order formation, characterized by the absence of hegemonic power embracing a 'heroic' leadership style. A shared vision, coordination patterns, formal and informal channels and routes of cooperation form the scene within which global political leadership is now being exercised. They organise both long-term governance issues that humanity is struggling with and immediate responses for emerging needs.

Cognitive leadership. The multipolarity of the global system implies that there are many sources of ideas and narratives that compete for recognition. Operating at the cognitive layer of global political leadership allows leaders and followers to understand and make sense of the notion of the global. The major gap within the area of cognitive leadership is connected with a lack of a global perspective and the absence of the coherent global story in the leadership narratives. While there is widely shared conviction about the failure of the current world order, no one seems to have an idea about its future shape. To a certain extent, this is a result of the unexpected turn in the global balance. The urgency of the transition has not been anticipated until recently. It is in fact quite the opposite – in the last decade of the twentieth century, the liberal order was considered to be a result of the Cold War confrontation and seemed to be ever ascendant. The sudden turn has manifested itself in a leadership deficit – local communities and global society alike lack a sense of direction, a meta-story of the human destiny that would introduce some degree of symbiosis in the way people answer the questions of where we come from, who we are and where we are all going. Their stories are becoming increasingly divergent. This is in striking contrast to the atmosphere of optimism of the previous periods of substantial human development. Now, the major tone of the debate is marked by uncertainty, fragility and risk perception.

Human cognition embedded in political processes is gradually starting to be recognised as an aspect in leadership and political studies. What has been a missing puzzle in the assessment of political behaviours of groups and individuals proves useful in understanding the guiding mechanism of global forces. Evolutionary biology confirms that in order to function in groups and to live as a community people had to reach a threshold of ability of “cognitive perspective taking” (Singer and Ricard, 2015: 43), which enabled them to imagine the emotions and perceptions of others. This transition from single to multiple perspective changed the way that people understood the world. The ‘I-mode’ of thinking and behaving has been gradually supplemented with the ‘we-mode’. Since cognitive capacities are interpreted as a sign of adaptation, in order to adapt to interdependent global realities, another shift in perception is required – from local mode to global mode – in which the perception of thoughts, emotions and strategies of ‘distant others’ will be taken into consideration while making political decisions.

Perspectives on progress: The transition to sustainability and the new international order as leadership challenges

Prospects for the global future look grim. Modern industrial civilisation has caused severe risk to the environment, the global economy and stability of the international system. Its resilience is additionally weakened by political power shifts and major disruption from the Covid-19 pandemic, which have deepened economic inequality, created new uncertainties and strained government resources. The pandemic has constituted an existential threat for

individuals and has been a game changer in the area of social interaction in every continent. The crisis put stress on the two systems strategic for social well-being – health and economics – causing profound psychosocial impact on individuals and communities all over the world. All the mitigation strategies and intervention within as well as between states, have been founded on the desire to stop the spread of the pandemic in order to protect the health and life of people, and reframing the circumstances from the state of abnormal to the state of normal. However, this cognitive and governance shift is also required in other areas influencing the resilience of the international system. Issues of climate change or migration represent crucial variables in the international peace and security framework, as their direct impact and prognosed run-on effects exacerbate tensions and uncertainties across societies. Environmental and social shifts produce challenges in other systems, undermining global well-being and amplifying risks associated with natural disasters and structural conditions of economic and social life. These risks cannot be governed and/or acted upon in traditional ways. They require new models of social organisation based on the redesigned logic of the economy. With the progressing intensity of climate change, the benefits of economic growth are increasingly threatened by environmental disruption, limiting resources and exacerbating tension among affected populations.

The culture of economic growth, accompanied by the rule of law and good governance, sums up the idea of progress. The vision of the global future is being drawn in terms of development, convergence and climate change mitigation as the image of the new sustainable order presents the prospect of just and stable economic conditions for all. The major problem that impedes its realisation is grounded in the fact that these visions are based on global cooperation, common understanding and universal consent with regard to achievable progress, while the sphere of interest of global actors, states and industries is highly divergent. Development of the cooperative culture between the variety of actors on the global scene has an evolutionary character. The period of intensive integration during the last decades of the 20th century has been followed by the stage of reluctance towards cooperation illustrated by isolationistic attitudes of the major states and global governance crisis. While global response to the Covid-19 pandemic was driven by division and competition, the international response to Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 has been much more coherent. Political leaders have been ready to accept the burdens of heavy economic sanctions on Russia, with their inevitable cost for local economies. Military support and diplomatic responses have been at an unprecedented scale.

The evolution towards cooperation includes cultural change and the redefinition of national interests. Their narrow conceptualisations have to be replaced with analysis of the long-term effects of those national interests on the global system's resilience. However, while the adaptive mechanism of political leaders is being developed slowly, the pace of transformation bringing

new risks is increasing. Major efforts are required for redefining popular beliefs about markets, their functions and the ways in which they should be governed, which in turn leads to transformation in political relations and redefinition of the terms of social contracts. Pursuit of the new sustainable economy and sustainable human development lead through efforts to manage and resolve conflict between different groups competing over resources and between clashing ideologies, values and interests. This task is becoming increasingly urgent, as the legitimacy of the current model of neoliberal capitalism has been seriously shaken by the scale of the global recession that began in 2007, the fiasco of the general pattern of support of developing economies established by the Washington consensus, and the rise of the precariat and inequality. While it has already become clear for experts and analysts that the current operating principle of global economic integration is not sustainable, there is no clear vision of the model that could replace it. The principles of sustainability have gained traction among policymakers, but it is still unclear to what extent they can be treated as a foundation for the new socio-economic model. The scale of experiment and social innovation that has been empirically confirmed remains limited, yet theories offer some promising concepts. Paul Romer's (1990, 1994) endogenous growth theory emphasising technological change and economics of ideas sheds a new light on thinking about the essence of economic activity in times of climate disruption and global fragmentation. When combined with Elinor Ostrom's polycentric approach to theories of collective action, it converges towards the coherent picture of not only the driving forces of global economic transition, but also the manner of their effective governance. The traditional concept of growth is based on psychical capital and natural resources, framing economy as a competitive game and operating through a highly unequal mechanism of value distribution. According to endogenous growth theory, growth occurs because of innovation from private knowledge entrepreneurs, who are incentivised by the prospect of earning profits from their ideas (Romer, 1990).

When drivers of economic growth are located in knowledge, the quality of human capital and innovation not only supports more sustainable solutions but also reduces hostility, resentment and dependency between naturally and socially connected global societies. The logic that locates the source of universal well-being in creative capital and innovative potential justifies widespread investment in human potential, as it is key for the pursuit of technical knowledge to drive sustainable, long-term economic growth. Romer's economic theory of history put innovation at the core of the process of constant improvement of the human standard of living.

Ideas placed at the centre of economic growth transform the global development perspective from competitive to cooperative as they are non-rival. Developmental differences, with colonialism and other forms of brutal political subjugation that now impede the path to sustainability, reveal themselves to be the results of long-term competition of powerful states for economic resources. In the standard economic model, rivalry underlies the scarcity and

politics of zero-sum thinking in the global economy. This is reflected in social imaginaries strongly referencing the ‘us vs them’ divisions in the context of progress. As Romer stated, they are “a group that poses an existential threat, they may steal our resources, but there is also an opportunity – we may steal their resources from them. Even if all we do is share, when it is more for them it will be less for us” (2018). The mechanism of the market and intellectual processes based on ideas is reversed: one party’s gains are obtained not at the expense of another party’s losses but thanks to another party’s participation, involvement and contribution. According to this view, globalisation is driven by gains from the reuse of ideas (Romer, 2010). Each idea only needs to be formulated once and, as opposed to other economic objects, can be used by any number of people simultaneously and repeatedly. The example of oral dehydration therapy provided by Romer illustrates the social gain from the idea that was measured when an increased number of people followed the rule of a simple drink enriched with electrolytes to address the problem of children dying in large numbers from diarrhoea in developing countries. As a result of dispensing this solution, deaths from diarrhoeal diseases globally have declined by more than 80 per cent since 1980 (Romer, 2010). Increase in its use does not result in scarcity of the idea as it is non-rival and nonexclusive. The opposite mechanism occurs – the more openly the idea is distributed, the greater the chance that it will be further developed.

The invention of the internet presents another example of an idea transformed into technology that can be consumed *en masse*; in fact the wider its use has become, the greater probability that users will further develop the possibilities of the global net. This case is also illustrative of recognition of the role played by specific conditions of knowledge transfer and creativity culture that have been developed in cybersphere, catalysing the exponential rise of new ideas. A World Bank study found that for every 10 per cent increase in broadband speed, GDP growth increases by 1.38 per cent in developing countries, and by 1.21 per cent in developed economies (Minges, 2015). This is important, as technology presents the primary prospect and context of global transition to sustainability. Introduction to the green economy can be interpreted as the response to climate change threats as well as a necessary phase of market reorientation in the search for an optimal version of the system (Friedman, 2008; Jacobs, 2013). This narrative, originating in Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942 [1975]), sees the accumulation of global crises as an opportunity to destroy inefficient capital by reducing overcapacity and creating openings for new market players. New patterns of economic activity have to be invented and introduced, current market relations redesigned and new knowledge disseminated. ‘Green technologies’ are expected to become a new engine of capitalist growth (Bina, 2013). The logic of this process assumes that the accumulation of new ideas, technologies and concepts will increase to reach the point of overcoming ‘the green growth paradox’, which occurs when emissions reduction effects are not a direct consequence of renewable energy expansion, but are connected to a

reduction in aggregate demand and production due to increases in unemployment (D'Alessandro et al., 2020).

Although there is not much doubt about the knowledge-intensive solutions for sustainability growth, Romer's theory poses one important condition that strongly influences the prospect of peaceful economic transformation which could be pursued globally and increase synergy. Ideas do not have the characteristics of rivalry or exclusiveness and are not public goods *per se*. Their introduction requires specific conditions to survive and proliferate, so their appearance and application must be accompanied by rules that structure interaction between people, market and the state. A combination of research subsidies and carbon taxes can successfully redirect technological change towards cleaner technologies (Acemoglu et al., 2014), but the cultural mechanism of sustainable growth goes way beyond the instruments that directly impact the rate of return of research and development investment. Any new idea, no matter how revolutionary, will fail to bring real change if not properly implemented, so the question of governance is of equal importance as the question of inventing tools and solutions. As forces of growth are internal rather than external, each state, region or society has to develop its own way of catalysing the explosion of ideas and such process can be neither politically nor culturally neutral.

The concept of polycentric governance (Ostrom, 2010), recognised as the next powerful swing in the environmental scholarly pendulum, completes the picture of potential transformation scenarios by providing a different view of who can be a leader of global governance. The shift from state-centred environmental regulations to local dimensions of governance has been discussed, revealing local communities' viable mechanism for resolving economic conflict. They demonstrate capacity in enhancing innovation, learning, adaptation and trustworthiness, which leads them to obtain multiple benefits at multiple scale. Leadership serves as a decisive component here. Trust, authority, long-term commitment and social recognition are all attributes of leadership relations that are of primary importance for the process. Within the realm of global governance, factors of rivalry, conflict and historical animosities present major shortcomings. These were decisive in describing climate mitigation action, migration governance and responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. Most reactions were in accordance with rational choice theory predicting that individuals would not collaborate without external authority or highlighting the dangers of freeriding in multilateral effort. Ideas, which stand behind solutions that could enable human development in the future are the product of not only intellect but also institutional rules, research infrastructure and state stimuli. They have to be guarded by state institutions or other forms of social contract, otherwise they will never become market goods. Knowledge infrastructure is institutionally complex as it is composed of tax rates, labour regulations, immigration restrictions, corruption and a number of other structures shaping economic interaction, such as political preferences and social norms. The combination of ideas as engines of growth

and polycentric forms of governance may then be key for peaceful transition to the new economic model and the new economic order. As economic well-being is created locally, the problems brought to communities by industrialisation and climate change will be governed most effectively by their members, with the active oversight of local, regional and national stakeholders, and the use of tools and resources generated at the global level.

The present moment of world evolution is based on contradictions between old and new ways of thinking and doing things to achieve political aims. Integration does not equate to coherence and synergy. The very basic rationale for forming political communities is better resource distribution that is meant to lead to progress expressed in realisation of the concept of 'the good life', agreed according to cultural lines around which societies are organised. In the West, the notion of the 'good life' is based on individual freedoms and individual empowerment. However, the great wave of economic and technological emancipation enhancing human potential everywhere in the world has not been translated into strengthening of social and political systems. Individual empowerment in its current form is not combined with engagement in the public sphere. The fabric of the social cosmos is becoming increasingly disintegrated. Effectiveness of the governance potential of political bodies has weakened so that governors find it difficult to address structural problems of inequality, justice and renegotiation of social contracts. This substantially limits the ability of national decision makers to be involved in the design of a more adequate institutional framework at the global level. Evolution of global politics at a higher level of international interaction has been ceased, but political tasks are still being performed by various leaders.

The growing complexity of global realities calls for leadership to be rediscovered and applied more broadly through international relations (IR) and political science. Leadership helps explain the rise of non-state actors, assesses their effectiveness and helps to better navigate issues, stories and voices that are constitutive of the dynamics of global affairs. Analysis of the leadership process helps to indicate areas of major contribution to global change and dynamics that drive other social and ecological crises.

The major problems of humanity are rooted in interdependence – they cannot be solved in the near future and their governance is made more difficult by concepts and theories of power accumulation that were long embedded into political thinking but no longer fit into integrated reality. The logic of power and dominance has presented a framework of creation of the two different socio-political spheres of the developed and underdeveloped worlds. Their integration is not limited to markets and supply chains but requires agreement with regard to the key norms on which a new paradigm of development will be established. Worsening of the natural conditions interwoven with economic vulnerability brought by high-impact security threats reinforces the vicious cycle of the weakening of institutions of the state, as well as conflict and fragility. Even fairly stable societies, overburdened with the combined pressures of climate change, population growth, urbanisation, environmental

degradation and rising socio-economic inequalities are touched by this mechanism to varying degrees. For all states, local communities and families, transition to a more sustainable economic model is the way to both provide and protect their economic security.

Analysis of the patterns and possible scenarios of this global transformation addresses two major problems of global political leadership, namely solution and scale. Solution lies in technologies and political mitigation strategies based on the cognitive patterns responsible for defining growth and well-being, while the problem of scale focuses on inclusiveness. Global coherence in the implementation of green growth policies not only increases the effectiveness of climate change governance but also contributes to the overall stability of the international system. Inclusiveness has grown to the position of centre of gravity of the transformational processes connecting various concepts and particular interests through institutionalised systems. Participation in economic transition and a new global order construction is conditioned by the current economic and political status of the state, community or industrial actor. Each of them can neglect or reject this process by following its own individual interests, but the synergy effect derived from the strategic orientations of other international players impacts the cognitive context of decision making, favouring sustainability solutions as an economically rational choice. Mechanisms of inclusiveness may also be strengthened along with the process of general growth, resulting in the creation of a global middle class (Kharas, 2017). A larger number of affluent, educated people equals more ideas in the global system, so prosperity and population expansion might cause growth to accelerate.

The leadership dimension of global politics not only reveals divergent interests and misconceptions about the fundamental issues – growth, justice, history – but also allows us to see the high cost of social transformation towards a more synergetic global environment. Both systemic resilience and human resilience are built through synergy and a cooperative approach expressed in various forms of governance with multiple centres that are able to balance different interests and promote learning, trust and consensus building. The essence of ongoing transformation lies not only in arguments about the need to adjust existing economic practices so as to reflect higher environmental standards but more in a redefinition of the logic of growth and the ability to implement these new principles into the very diverse social landscape.

References

- Acemoglu D, Aghion P and Hémous D (2014) The environment and directed technical change in a North–South model. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 30(3): 513–530.
- Bina O (2013) The green economy and sustainable development: An uneasy balance? *Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy* 31(6): 1023–1047.
- Brzezinski Z (2004) *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*. New York: Basic Books.

- D'Alessandro S, Cieplinski A, Distefano T et al. (2020) Feasible alternatives to green growth. *Nature Sustainability* 3: 329–335.
- Friedman T (2008) *Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution—And How It Can Renew America*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Haas EB (1964) *Beyond the Nation State. Functionalism and International Organization*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Harrison K and Sundstrom ML (Eds) (2010) *Global Commons, Domestic Decisions: The Comparative Politics of Climate Change*. London: MIT Press.
- Jacobs M (2013) Green growth: Economic theory and political discourse. In: Falkner R (Ed.) *Handbook of Global Climate and Environmental Policy*. Oxford: Blackwell. Available at <https://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publications/WorkingPapers/Papers/90-99/WP92-green-growth-economic-theory-political-discourse.pdf> (accessed 13 May 2021).
- Kharas H (2017) The unprecedented expansion of the global middle class: An update. *Global Economy & Development Working Paper*, 100.
- Lee K and Sullivan A (2019) *People's Republic of the United Nations: China's Emerging Revisionism in International Organizations*. Washington, DC: Center for New American Security. Available at <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/peoples-republic-of-the-united-nations> (accessed 9 Feb 2022).
- Minges M (2015) *Exploring the Relationship between Broadband and Economic Growth*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/178701467988875888/pdf/102955-WP-Box394845B-PUBLIC-WDR16-BP-Exploring-the-Relationship-between-Broadband-and-Economic-Growth-Minges.pdf> (accessed 29 July 2022).
- Modelski G (2005) Long-term trends in world politics. *Journal of World-Systems Research* 11(2): 195–206.
- NIC (National Intelligence Council) (2021) *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World*. Available at <https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/> (accessed 13 Mar 2022).
- Ostrom E (2010) Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change. *Global Environmental Change* 20(4): 550–557.
- Romer P (1990) Endogenous technological change. *Journal of Political Economy* 98(5): 71–102.
- Romer P (1994) The origins of endogenous growth. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 8(1): 3–22.
- Romer, P (2010) Which parts of globalization matter for catch-up growth? Cambridge: NBER Working paper, 15755.
- Romer, P (2018) *On the Possibility of Progress*. Nobel Prize Lecture. Available at <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2018/romer/lecture/> (accessed 20 Dec 2021).
- Schumpeter JA (1942 [1975]) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Singer T and Ricard M (Eds) *Caring Economics: Conversations on Altruism and Compassion, between Scientists, Economists, and the Dalai Lama*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 15–26.

Index

- Abbas, M. 268
Affleck, B. 188
Ahmad, M. 201
Ahmadinejad, M. 265
Annan, K. A. 178, 188
anthropocene 46–8, 247
Archibugi, D. 18
Arendt, H. 257, 258, 260
Aristotle 168, 169, 229
Atwood, M. 105
authority 5, 26, 28, 36, 38, 39, 44,
52, 63, 84, 87, 92–5, 98–100,
106, 108, 112, 118, 124, 127,
141, 172, 181, 184, 188, 196,
197, 220, 238, 242, 248, 256–8,
264, 284, 286, 294
Axelrod, R. 78
- Balch, E. G. 175
Ball, G. W. 147
Bandura, A. 151
Bardèche, M. 267
Bass, B. M. 6
Bauman, Z. 161, 259
Beck, U. 64
Berlusconi, S. 177
Biden, J. R. 57, 117
Bin Laden, O. 175
Bolsonaro, J. 115
Bono 175, 189, 190, 242
Bornstein, D. 197
Bradley, A. C. 261
Branson, R. 194
Brilliant, L. 103
Buchholz, W. 28
Buffet, W. 193, 195
Burns, J. M. 5, 9, 179
Bush, G. W. 57, 145, 153
Byman, D. L. 46
- Campbell, J. 259
Carnegie, A. 193
Carnegie School of Decision Making 80
Chan, P. 193
Chemers, M. M. 151
Churchill, W. 252, 264
Ciulla, J. B. 8, 147
Clinton, W. 57
Clooney, A. 248
Clooney, G. 189, 248
collective action 14, 19, 24, 27, 28, 30,
33, 35, 40, 41, 66–7, 77, 78, 91, 103,
104, 130, 150, 156, 184, 200–3, 233,
239, 284, 292
collective security 77, 81, 218
commons 23, 25, 26, 28, 32, 34, 37, 41,
55, 79, 97, 100, 181, 183, 195, 203,
231, 285, 287, 288
constructivism 19, 34, 216
Converse, P. 228
corporations 4, 31, 38, 50, 88, 94, 108,
141, 147–50, 184, 185, 192, 196
- Dahl, R. A. 31, 176
Dalai Lama 95, 146
Davezas, T. 42
Drosten, C. 109
Dunant, J. H. 175
- Easterly, W. 246
Eichmann, A. 252, 257
Elizabeth, I. 226
embeddedness 82, 83, 201
English School of International
Relations 24
Evans, P. 82
- Fauci, A. 109
Faurisson, R. 268

- Floyd, G. 127
 followership 4, 19, 31, 60–2, 125, 140–4,
 146–8, 150, 176–8, 180, 186, 187, 191,
 200, 201, 254
 Ford, H. 193
 Ford, R. 97
 foreign policy analysis (FPA) 19, 20
 Frank, H. 261
 Frankl, V. E. 266
 Frey, F. W. 43
 Friedman, T. 222
- Gadamer, H. G. 262
 Galtung, J. 101
 Gardner, W. L. 107
 Gates, B. 126, 131, 177, 178, 193–5
 Gates, M. 131, 193, 195–6
 Geldof, R. 178, 187
 Gilens, M. 226
 Gilpin, R. 14, 17, 21
 global governance 2, 14, 24, 36–8, 40,
 41, 51, 79, 84, 87–9, 92, 94, 104, 111,
 131, 141, 181–6, 193, 198, 202, 203,
 230, 232, 233, 235, 284, 285, 287,
 288, 291, 294
 global justice 67, 129, 169, 179, 190,
 248
 global middle class 161–5, 168, 169,
 173, 296
 global public goods 1, 2, 25, 27–9, 33,
 34, 38, 40, 41, 56, 76, 83, 86, 87, 90–3,
 112, 129–31, 141–3, 149, 171, 176,
 183, 192, 195, 201, 236, 246, 285,
 287, 288
 Gorbachev, M. 13
 Gore, A. 57, 63, 194
 Great Divergence 233
 Great Man theory 12, 45, 151, 242
 Greenleaf, R. K. 105
 Grint Keith 23, 109–10
 Grint Kenneth 25
 Gross Stein, J. 13
 G-Zero world 78, 85
- Habermas, J. 18
 Harari, Y. N. 47
 Hardin, G. 128
 Hayek, F. 3
 hegemonic stability theory 14, 15, 89
 hegemony 14, 15, 17, 20, 25, 37, 85, 89,
 90, 140, 170, 288
 Heidegger, M. 161
 Held, D. 18
- Hess, R. 267
 Hesse, H. 105
 Hitler, A. 150, 255, 256, 268
 Hobbes, T. 44
 Huang, Y. 114
 Hume, D. 27
 Huntington, S. 166, 184, 233
 Hussein, S. 153
 hyper-globalization 49
- Ikenberry, G. J. 17, 45, 90
 individual empowerment 32, 62, 83,
 91, 140, 141, 165, 166, 169, 172–4,
 201, 295
- Jervis, R. O. 13 224
 Johansson, S. 188
 Johnson, B. 115
 Jolie, A. 175, 188, 190, 242, 245
- Kaczyński, J. 153
 Kaczyński, L. 153
 Kahneman, D. 80
 Kant, I. 17
 Kaplan, R. D. 86
 Katz, E. 144
 Kaye, D. 189
 Kelley, D. 258
 Kennan, G. 154
 Kennedy, J. F. 177
 Kennedy, P. 13
 Keohane, R. O. 14, 17, 78, 80, 87,
 89
 Keynes, J. M. 182
 Kim, J. 150
 Kindleberger, C. P. 15
 Kouzes, J. M. 107
 Krasner, S. D. 14
 Krugman, P. 160, 242
 Kupchan, C. 45, 129
- Lamprecht, K. 49
 Le Pen, J. M. 265
 leadership: authentic leadership 106,
 107; cognitive leadership 54, 58, 66–7,
 130–1, 150, 186, 191, 202–3, 275–6,
 287, 290; expert leadership 108, 110;
 leadership gap 27, 81, 84, 85, 103, 108,
 144, 285, 287; relational leadership
 53, 66–7, 130–1, 150, 202–3, 275–6,
 289; servant leadership 105; shared
 leadership 20, 107, 108; structural
 leadership 14, 25, 32, 33, 56, 62, 66–7,

- 85, 130–1, 150, 202–6, 275–6, 287, 288; technocratic leadership 184
- Lemkin, R. 252
- Li, W. 120
- liberalism 16, 17, 19
- Lippman, W. 269
- Loch, C. 201
- Machiavelli, N. 44
- Macron, E. 112
- Madonna 188, 190, 242, 245
- Madritsch 261
- Malthus, T. 225–6
- Margalit, A. 253
- Mearsheimer, J. J. 15
- Merkel, A. 112
- Milgram, S. 256–8
- Modelski, G. 18, 42, 288
- Montesquieu, C. L. 222
- Mott, J. R. 175
- Moyn, S. 268
- Mukwege, D. 250
- Murad, N. 247–51
- Nansen, F. 175
- Nordhaus, W. 91, 240
- Norgaard, K. M. 157
- Nye, J. S. 14, 87, 89, 145
- Obama, B. 57, 86, 177
- Obedience to Authority (OtA) 256
- Okah, H. 175
- Olson, M. 19, 27
- O'Neill, J. 178
- Ostrom, E. 24, 28, 78, 292
- Pankiewicz, T. 261
- Patten, Ch. 60
- philantropiccapitalism 193, 194, 203
- Piketty, T. 159
- Plato 105, 151, 180
- Polanyi, K. 82
- political apathy 83, 144, 153, 166
- Pollack 46
- polyarchic governance 24, 28
- Portman, N. 188
- Posner, B. Z. 107
- Putin, V. 154
- Rassinier, P. 267
- rational choice 28, 34, 79–80, 294, 296
- Rawls, J. 18
- Reagan, R. 226
- realism 13–16, 19–21, 45, 49, 89
- Rockefeller, J. D. 193
- Romer, P. 63, 292–4
- Roosevelt, F. D. 265
- Rosenbaum, A. S. 262
- Sachs, J. 179, 241–7
- Sandler, T. 28
- Sarkozy, N. 177
- Scharding, T. 147
- Schelling, T. C. 78
- Scherer, A. G. 149
- Schindler, O. 259–61
- Schuman, R. 222
- Schumpeter, J. 293
- Schweitzer, A. 175
- Scott, H. 181
- selectorate 167
- Sen, A. 169
- Simon, H. A. 80, 221
- Simón, F. 109
- Slaughter, A. M. 49
- Smith, A. 3, 27, 82, 194
- Smith, K. 187
- Sobolewska, M. 97
- social entrepreneurs 197–9, 203
- Soros, G. 193, 194
- Spencer, D. 188
- Spielberg, S. 259, 261
- Stalin, J. 154, 272
- Stiglitz, J. 242
- Stogdill, R. M. 9
- surveillance capitalism 160
- synergy 3, 5, 26, 31, 35, 41, 61, 65, 66, 76, 79–84, 88, 101, 119, 123, 128–30, 141, 181, 183, 186, 193, 201, 202, 217, 218, 220, 247, 268, 275, 284, 285, 287, 294–6
- Taylor, T. 264
- Tegnell, A. 109
- Thompson, K. 21
- Thompson, W. 18
- Thucydides trap 21–2
- Thunberg, G. 63, 175, 237–41
- Tourish, D. 110
- Trump, D. 57, 115, 117, 126, 158, 177, 228
- Turkle, S. 160
- Turner, T. 42, 143, 193
- Tversky, A. 80

ultra-sociality 48
universalism 189, 190, 237
US National Intelligence
Council 102

Waltz, K. N. 13, 21, 45, 48
Weber, M. 98, 229
Weick, K. E. 216, 218, 230
Wieler, L. 109
Wight, M. 21
Wilhelm II 13
Wilkins, K. 190
Wilson, D. S. 80
Wilson, J. 243

Wingrey, O. 189
Wolfer, A. 49

Xi, J. 112, 171

Yaron, I. 271
Young, O. R. 14, 32, 46
Yunus, M. 199

Zakaria, F. 15
Zhang, C. 120
Zhang, Z. 120
Zhao, L. 115
Zuckerberg, M. 177, 193



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>