


'No Promotion After Jerusalem' – Sir Ronald Storrs: Personality and Policy in Mandate Palestine

Submitted by Christopher David Burnham to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Palestine Studies in March 2022.

This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that any material that has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University has been acknowledged.

Signature:

A photograph of a handwritten signature in black ink on a light-colored surface. The signature is written in a cursive style and appears to read 'Burnham'.

Abstract

This thesis utilises the personal papers of Sir Ronald Storrs, as well as other archival materials, in order to make a microhistorical investigation of Storrs' period as Military and Civilian Governor of Jerusalem between 1917-1926. Identifying Storrs as one of Galbraith's 'Men on the Spot', the thesis builds upon Edward Said's work on the Orientalist 'determining imprint' by arguing that Storrs took a deeply personal approach to governing the city; an approach that was determined by his upbringing, his education in the English private school system and his period as a British official in Colonial Egypt. It recognises the influence of these experiences on Storrs' perceptions of and attitudes towards Jerusalem, identifying how these formative years manifested themselves on the built environment of the city, and in the Governor's interactions with Jerusalemites of all backgrounds and religious beliefs. In doing so, this thesis also recognises the restrictions placed on Storrs' approach by his British superiors, Palestinians and the Zionist movement, together with the limitations imposed by his own attitudes and worldview. By placing Storrs' personality at the centre of discussion on early Mandate Jerusalem, a nuanced and complex picture is exposed; one where personality and politics collide to reveal that individuals as well as institutions have influenced the everyday life and built environment of one of the world's most revered cities.

Contents

Acknowledgements	1
Introduction	4
The British Empire in the Middle East	6
British Policy in Palestine	8
The Establishment of the Military Administration.....	11
Zionism as Settler-Colonialism	12
On Palestinian National Identity	14
Literature Review	15
A Brief Historiographical Overview of the Mandates System	15
A Brief Historiographical Overview of the British Mandate for Palestine	17
The Historiographical View of Storrs	18
Research Questions.....	27
Methodology	28
Orientalism and the Determining Imprint	28
The Microhistorical Approach	30
The ‘Man on the Spot’ and ‘Imperial Careers’.....	34
Archives	36
Chapter One – The Making of Ronald Storrs: 1881-1917	40
Family	42
Charterhouse: 1895-1900	46
Egypt: 1904-1917	60
Storrs and Lawrence.....	71
New Opportunities: December 1916-December 1917.....	73
Conclusion	76
Chapter Two – Storrs as Military Governor: The ‘Bliss of Arbitrary Rule’	77
Jerusalem in 1917	81
Storrs in Charge: Priorities, Politics and Pitfalls – From Dearth to Despotic Delight .	93
The Governor and the Communities of Jerusalem	100

Storrs and the Muslims	101
Storrs and the Zionists.....	107
Storrs and the British	117
Conclusion	123
Chapter Three – Attempting to mould the City in Storrs’ image: The Pro-Jerusalem Society.....	126
Designing and Dividing Jerusalem	132
‘I realised then the power of the name of Jerusalem’: other works carried out by the Pro-Jerusalem Society.....	150
The New City (Without the Walls)	159
‘Whilst subscriptions to Pro-Jerusalem steadily decreased’: The Pro-Jerusalem Society under Civilian Rule	162
Chapter Four – ‘Blood runs hot in the Palestine spring...’: The Nabi Musa Riots of April 1920	169
The Nabi Musa Festival.....	171
Warning Signs: January-March 1920	172
Storrs and the Riots: Conduct, Criticisms and Culpability.....	184
Conclusion	203
Chapter Five –‘There can be no question of surrendering the Mandate’: Civilian Rule, 1920-1926.....	206
From Military to Civilian Rule	208
Clubs and Societies: Where Culture, Religion and Politics Entwined	214
Further Unrest: 1921 in Palestine	223
A Roman Holiday.....	226
‘Let Him Go Down!’	229
1922: The Fallout.....	239
Triumphs, Tragedies and Tribulations: 1923-1926	249
Conclusion	267
Conclusion	269
Bibliography	277

Acknowledgements

Whilst ostensibly the product of one person, writing a PhD thesis is really the sum of numerous endeavours. This is especially the case when attempting to complete research in the midst of a global pandemic whilst also teaching History in a secondary school. I would therefore like to take the time to acknowledge all of those who made this project possible.

Archives are the lifeblood of historical research and I have been fortunate to have encountered archivists who have often gone above and beyond to assist me in my endeavours. A special debt of gratitude goes to Catherine Smith, archivist at Charterhouse School, who so clearly explained the intricacies of Charterhouse's form system and Storrs' academic progression within it, as well as recommending further reading on daily life at the school. Giora Katz at the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem provided invaluable information about the archive when I was intending to visit in March/April 2020, prior to this trip being scuppered by Covid travel restrictions. When parts of the world tentatively started to reopen in February 2021, Giora was able to swiftly digitise the documents I required and send them to me, allowing my research to continue at a time when it seemed multiple avenues remained closed. Staff at the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, and the Archives and Special Collections section at Royal Holloway, University of London, were warm and accommodating in my quest to study the microfilm of Storrs' personal papers. In particular, I would like to thank staff in the Inter-Library Loans team at my *alma mater*, Royal Holloway, and the Forum Library at the University of Exeter for coordinating the loan of Storrs' papers in May 2021 when I was unable to travel to Egham to view them. Finally, the staff at the remarkable National Archives in Kew provided an efficient and exceptionally Covid-safe work environment for my research in the summer of 2021.

I have been extremely privileged to have two supervisors of the highest order for my thesis. I appreciate all that Professors Ilan Pappé and Richard Toye have done in supporting me over the past four years. They have been prompt in their responses, clear and concise in their feedback, and perceptive in their thoughts and questions. Above all, they have been generous in the time they have spent

with me to help make this thesis the best it can be. My greatest hope is that I am able to offer the same experience they have given me to the students in my care in the classroom.

I wish to extend my thanks to the staff and students at St Peter's Church of England Aided School, Exeter, where I teach History to 11-16 year olds. Their interest in my research has been a key component in keeping me motivated throughout this process. In particular, I would like to thank the Senior Leadership Team at the school for agreeing to let me go to part-time hours, and my Head of Department, Marie Wilkinson, for so stringently putting the case forward that I should be allowed to reduce my timetable. Moreover, I would like to take the time to personally thank both Marie and Monica Parry for all of their help and support as I completed my thesis, and for all that they do to make the History Department at St Peter's the special place it is to work and learn at.

My friends and family have been invaluable in their support over the last four years. Special thanks goes to Eric Adlington, Sean Beverton-Tubbs, Shaun Gamble, Tom (DJ) Kennett, Jason Russell, Chelsea Starbuck and Phil Starbuck, amongst many others, for helping me remain sane and regularly checking in with my progress on the thesis. In particular, I am enormously appreciative to Shaun Gamble for proofing my PhD application and providing myriad advice on the ins and outs of various grammatical concepts, and to Chelsea Starbuck for offering such clear-sighted guidance on the different milestones of the process. I am indebted to my parents, David and Elaine, for giving me the confidence to go on and complete a PhD thesis, and for their love and support, together with that of my sister, Hannah-Louise and my Nanny, Joan Jackman, who have been constant sources of encouragement throughout.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to my wife, Maddie. A lot has changed since I started my research in September 2018: we have moved house twice, got engaged and then married after a slight (Covid-enforced) delay. However, your love and belief in my ability to complete this thesis has been a clear constant. Thank you for being so supportive of my initial decision to pursue a PhD and for encouraging me when things went wrong or didn't progress as I had hoped. You

will never know how much I appreciate all that you have done and continue to do for me.

Introduction

It had been often objected to the Zionist proposals that you could create a home for the Jews in Palestine, but you could never get them to go there. That in so short a time the home had been created and the Jews had gone to it was largely due to the statesmanship of Mr Storrs. That he had succeeded in carrying on a just and acceptable administration among the 70 jarring sects which inhabit the Holy Places and had been able to introduce many reforms showed the supreme importance of personality in government as opposed to mere technical efficiency.¹

Is there anyone who can say today that he has fathomed the character of this so-British official? One can read and reread his autobiography, *Orientations*, but he still remains a mystery. What is missing is the orientation of his overall personality.²

Few figures in Mandate Palestine elicited as much fury and vituperation as the British administrator Ronald Storrs. As the first Military Governor of Jerusalem under British rule between 1917-20 and the first Civilian Governor between 1920-26, he succeeded in angering and alienating both Palestinian and Zionist alike, whilst at the same time being lionised by T.E. Lawrence as 'the most brilliant Englishman in the Near East'.³ His period in charge of Jerusalem coincided with several seismic shifts within Palestine: the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by the British in 1917-18; the establishment of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South) to control the newly conquered territories; the move from a Military to a Civilian Administration of Palestine in July 1920; the formal establishment of the British Mandate for Palestine in 1923; and most crucially of all, the British commitment to implement the provisions of the Balfour Declaration in full as part

¹ "The New Jerusalem: British Governor on his Task", *The Manchester Guardian*, (Manchester, England), Wednesday, December 22, 1920, p. 14.

² Josef Nedava, "Jabotinsky and Storrs", in Nirit Shalev-Khalifa ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, (Tel Aviv, Eretz Israel Museum, 2010) p. 131.

³ T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, (London, Wordsworth, 1997, first published 1926), p. 40.

of this Mandate. The fulfilment of these dramatic and contentious changes would make governing any city a challenge but was made more difficult given Jerusalem's significance to the three main Abrahamic faiths (Christianity, Islam and Judaism). This – together with Storrs' position as an administrator for a recently conquering power – created a potentially dangerous situation. Within this context, it appears obvious why Storrs would be such a divisive figure: his role was to establish British control in the city, whilst at the same time facilitating the wishes of the Zionists without alienating the Palestinian population. Such contradictory policy aims were always likely to lead to a multitude of different views about his intentions, beliefs and actions.⁴

Storrs remains an underexplored figure. In particular, little work exists on his period as Governor of Jerusalem and the impact his tenure had upon the city, the built environment and its inhabitants. This is of especial importance given the wide agency that Storrs had as Governor. His personal interests and prior experiences saw him look to stamp his mark upon Jerusalem, particularly during the period of military rule. With the advent of civilian rule this power became diminished, but Storrs still held great influence in the new administration, both as a veteran of the period of military occupation, and in a literal sense as the boundaries of the territory under his Governorship expanded. This thesis takes a broadly chronological approach to redressing this shortage of research, although the chapter on Storrs' establishment of the Pro-Jerusalem Society is more thematic in nature. Chapter One considers his family, education at Temple Grove, Charterhouse and Cambridge, and early imperial career in Egypt between 1904 and 1917. It reveals an intellectually capable man who suffered terribly from homesickness and attempted to alleviate his struggles through the pursuit of personal interests, namely the curation and preservation of historic buildings and monuments and the cultivation of a wide and learned social network. Chapter Two explores the years of Military Government in Jerusalem between 1917-1920, detailing the social networks Storrs created in his new role with the divergent communities in the city and their impact on his ability to govern effectively. The establishment of the Pro-Jerusalem Society by Storrs in 1918 to preserve the built environment of Jerusalem and promote indigenous handicrafts is the focus

⁴ These different views will be considered in more detail later in this chapter.

of Chapter Three. Building on existing literature, the chapter shows how Storrs' personality was the driving force behind much of the Society's work, and that the Governor therefore left an indelible imprint on the cityscape of Jerusalem.

The period of military rule in Jerusalem culminated with the Nabi Musa riots of 4-7 April 1920. Chapter Four outlines the effectiveness of Storrs' response to this turmoil, assessing how he and his contemporaries (British, Palestinian and Zionist) perceived his management of the crisis and the later impact this had on his reputation as Governor of Jerusalem. The chapter builds upon research submitted for my undergraduate dissertation that considered the extent to which Storrs was personally responsible for the riots. With the introduction of civilian rule in June 1920 and formal establishment of the Mandate in 1923, the British had a far clearer role to play in Palestine. Chapter Five surveys Storrs' approach in this new reality, highlighting the tensions that existed between his personal interests and the changing political landscape in the country. Finally, the conclusion reflects on Storrs after Palestine, his attempts to establish himself as an expert on the region in the 1930s and 1940s, and his continued lobbying of policymakers as Britain's time in Palestine drew to a close. In doing so, it addresses the impact of Storrs' personality on his governing of Jerusalem and considers whether he was pro-Arab, pro-Zionist or truly for both as he claimed.

The British Empire in the Middle East

Britain's involvement in the Middle East throughout the 18th and 19th centuries is often primarily considered within the context of her involvement in India, first via the East India Company and later under the British Raj. Ingram argues that the main concern was the protection of communication and trade links with India, especially after France's occupation of Egypt in 1798 and the emboldening of the Russian Empire following Napoleon's defeat. Britain looked to develop links with Qajar dynasty in Persia throughout the early 18th century to safeguard their interests in the region.⁵ In contrast, Yapp suggests that British preoccupations with the route to India developed following the opening of the Suez Canal. Britain

⁵ Edward Ingram, *Britain's Persian Connection, 1798-1828: Prelude to the Great Game in Asia*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992).

had long opposed the opening of a canal connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, fearing that it would only benefit the Mediterranean powers. However, the canal's opening in 1869 meant that Britain's connection to India was now inextricably linked to Suez, and with it her wider policy towards the region.⁶ In any event, links to India were of great concern to the British by the start of the First World War in 1914.

London also took a keen interest in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte underwent huge structural changes throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, first with the centralising *Tanzimat* reforms from 1839 onwards, and later with the emergence of the constitutionalist Young Turks in 1908. These policies, together with the fragmentation of parts of the Ottoman Empire following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and subsequent Treaty of Berlin, left Britain anxious that France and Russia would increase their power in the region at her expense.⁷ Initially Britain was keen to avoid territorial partition, instead preferring to cultivate a system of friendly buffer states through soft diplomatic means, including trade treaties, loans and the provision of advice.⁸ However, the emergence of an increasingly aggressive and bombastic Germany under Wilhelm II from 1888 onwards provided a new threat and led to a reappraisal of this approach. In response Britain pursued a cautious policy towards the Ottomans, looking to preserve the status quo as much as possible whilst containing German ambitions. Kent argues that this approach broadly mirrored Britain's diplomatic attempts to maintain the status quo in Europe in the face of expanding German influence throughout first decade of the 20th century. The *ententes* with France (1904) and Russia (1907) meant that Britain's Ottoman policy was designed to limit German influence in the region, whilst at the same time preventing major disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent scrambles for land amongst the powers this would create.⁹ Heller agrees with Kent on the importance of the *ententes* but also emphasises how Britain's imperial interests, particularly in India, were also

⁶ M.E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East: 1792-1923*, (London, Longman, 1987), pp. 48-49 and p. 226.

⁷ M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923*, (London, Macmillan, 1966).

⁸ Lorenzo Kamel, *The Middle East from Empire to Sealed Identities*, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2018), p. 19n51.

⁹ Marian Kent, "Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire: 1900-1923", in Marian Kent ed., *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 173.

key considerations in her policy towards the Ottomans.¹⁰ This is evidenced by the terms of the Anglo-French *entente* which allowed Britain a free hand in Egypt (of key strategic concern for Britain's position in India) in return for France being granted freedom of action in Morocco; a condition that has been viewed as an example of British willingness to start to entertain partition as a potential option.¹¹

The First World War dramatically changed Britain's approach towards the Middle East. Despite not being formally allied with any of the Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire launched an attack on the Russian Black Sea fleet on 29 October 1914. By 5 November Russia, Britain and France had declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Up to this moment the *entente's* efforts to keep the Ottomans out of the war had been lacklustre at best, predicated on the misguided notion that Turkish involvement would have little impact on the war.¹² After this point, Britain refined its strategy towards the region in a bid to secure victory and protect its own interests in the post-war settlement. At the forefront of this policy was Palestine.

British Policy in Palestine

Having looked to uphold the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Britain now aimed to bring about its destruction. The war acted as a crucible through which Britain altered her policy, advocating that different nationalisms within the Ottoman lands would be propagated and encouraged in a bid to undermine the territorial integrity of Istanbul. In particular, Britain's efforts focused on Armenian, Arab and Jewish nationalist sentiment, a position unthinkable prior to 1914.¹³ Governmental change in London accelerated these efforts from 1916 onwards. New Prime Minister David Lloyd George viewed Palestine as a vital bulwark for

¹⁰ Joseph Heller, *British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914*, (London, Frank Cass, 1983), p. 158 and p. 162.

¹¹ Kamel, *The Middle East from Empire to Sealed Identities*, p. 19n51.

¹² Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East*, p. 267 and David Stevenson, *1914-1918: The History of the First World War*, (London, Penguin, 2004, reissued 2012), pp. 109-10.

¹³ Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921*, (London, Bowes and Bowes, 1956), pp. 27-28. See also James Renton, "Changing Languages of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East, 1917-1918", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 645-667.

Egypt against any German attempts to make Turkey a vassal state, and policy therefore focused on securing this area under British control.¹⁴

Yet British attempts to redraw the post-war Middle East pre-date this conviction. The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of July 1915-March 1916 promised the Hashemite Sharif Hussein of Mecca an independent state that appeared to include Palestine in return for an uprising against the Ottomans.¹⁵ The wording of this correspondence was deliberately vague and would later lead to Arab claims of duplicity by Britain.¹⁶ These claims became especially vehement when news of a second, secret, agreement was leaked by the newly established Russian Bolshevik government in November 1917. In May 1916, Britain, France and Russia had clandestinely arranged the Sykes-Picot Agreement, dividing the post-war Middle East into 'spheres of influence' and direct control.¹⁷ Most tellingly, the area that would later make up Mandate Palestine was now exempted from any new Arab state. Instead, the southern half fell under the British sphere of influence, whilst the northern half (including Jerusalem) was to be in an international zone administered by Britain, France and Russia. Indeed, as fears about aforementioned German aims regarding Turkey strengthened, Lloyd George even considered renegotiating Sykes-Picot in order to take Palestine under full British control.¹⁸

These concerns partly explain Britain's acquiescence to a third agreement over Palestinian territory. On November 2 1917 Britain agreed to the Balfour Declaration, an act that has been appraised by Khalidi as being akin to a declaration of war on Palestine.¹⁹ It promised the Zionists a 'national home' in Palestine, without prejudicing 'the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish

¹⁴ David French, *The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 134

¹⁵ Cmd. 5957, Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and The Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915-March 1916.

¹⁶ Storrs himself drafted large parts of the Correspondence in his role as Egypt's Oriental Secretary.

¹⁷ Sykes-Picot Agreement contained in Walter Laquer and Barry Rubin ed., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, (London, Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 12-15.

¹⁸ French, *The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition 1916-1918*, p. 134

¹⁹ Rashid Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonial Conquest and Resistance*, (London, Profile, 2020), pp. 18-54.

communities' already present.²⁰ London's motivations were multiple: an overestimation of the power of Russian Jewry to encourage the Provisional Government to maintain their war effort; concerns that Germany and her allies might link Zionism to their own colonial ambitions; misguided beliefs that American Jewry could encourage Washington to provide further support in the war and the personal convictions of Christian Zionists such as Lloyd George.²¹ Others have argued that Britain's intentions were purely imperialistic in nature. Palestine occupied a key geo-strategic position and support for a Jewish minority community there would help facilitate British control of the country. In this reading, the *Yishuv* were merely 'partners' in Britain's imperialist project; London had no intention of creating a Jewish state.²²

Such inconsistent policies have led to a wide range of different interpretations. George Antonius provided the original (and most outraged) account of the contradictory nature of British policy in his 1939 book *The Arab Awakening*. He reserves particular consternation for the Sykes-Picot Agreement, describing it as a 'shocking document': a product of 'greed at its worst' that 'stands out as a startling piece of double-dealing'.²³ In contrast, Isaiah Friedman argues that British policy was consistent, claiming that Palestine had been excluded from the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and therefore Sykes-Picot was not a contradiction. He further contends that the infamous series of letters was not legally binding and therefore Britain had acted in good faith.²⁴ In response to this, C.D. Smith suggests that 'if there were no specific contradictions between the pledges given to Hussein...it was only because McMahon did not intend to be precise in his letters to Hussein'.²⁵

²⁰ The Balfour Declaration, Letter from Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild, November 2 1917.

²¹ Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Second Edition)*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 67-68.

²² Eugene Rogan, "Neither Pro-Zionist nor Pro-Arab but Pro-Empire: A Reassessment of British Policy in the Palestine Mandate", Paper delivered online to the Balfour Project on 3/6/2021. Accessed online at <https://balfourproject.org/eugene-rogan/> on 2/8/2021.

²³ George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, (n.p., 1939, reprinted Safety Harbour, Simon Publishing, 2001) pp. 243-275. Quote is from p. 248.

²⁴ Isaiah Friedman, *The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918*, (London, Routledge, 1973), pp. 95-96, p. 112.

²⁵ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Fifth Edition) – A History with Documents*, (Boston, Bedford/St Martins, 2004), p. 67.

Clearly Britain had played fast and loose with Palestine. The three contradictory agreements illustrate the degree to which Arab - in particular Hashemite - and Zionist hopes were raised by British policy. The establishment of British Mandate for Palestine, with its incorporation of the wording of the Balfour Declaration, together with the repeated dismissal of warnings from Palestinian delegations and British officials in the region alike as to the efficacy of this policy, demonstrates the extent to which British and Zionist interests overlapped at this time.²⁶ A potentially volatile situation had been created out of London's short-term war requirements and long-term colonial ambitions.

The Establishment of the Military Administration

Whilst the politicians and diplomats were engaging in tactical subterfuge, British soldiers were busy fighting the Ottomans. Having pushed up through the Sinai, by March 1917 the Egyptian Expeditionary Forces were just south of Gaza and Beersheba. On 9 December Jerusalem fell and two days later General Allenby entered on foot, declaring that:

Since your city is regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of these three religions for many centuries, therefore, do I make it known to you that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer of whatsoever form of the three religions will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faith they are sacred.²⁷

The subsequent military regime established by Allenby was intended to be temporary but lasted until July 1920; a result of protracted post-war negotiations

²⁶ Kamel, *The Middle East from Empire to Sealed Identities*, p. 165.

²⁷ CAB 23/4 – War Cabinet Minutes, December 12 1917, The National Archives (hereafter TNA).

between the victorious parties.²⁸ Known as Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (O.E.T.A) South, it soon had to deal with the legacy of Britain's wartime agreements. In April 1918 the Zionist Commission arrived in Palestine to establish its position in any future settlement, creating tensions within the British ranks. Of particular importance in assessing the Military Administration in Palestine is the degree of conflict that existed between officials 'on the ground' in Palestine and the British Government over the commitment to Zionism. John McTague argues that in terms of actual policy enacted in Palestine it appears that there was little, if no dissent between the two branches of British governance.²⁹ Conversely Bernard Wasserstein suggests that:

British officials in Palestine were confirmed in their predominantly anti-Zionist views...Ever since 1918 they had been warning successive British governments of the dangers of a pro-Zionist policy; almost always their representations had been ignored, and they had found themselves obliged to administer a policy with which they fundamentally disagreed.³⁰

Despite any reservations, the British undoubtedly facilitated policies that aided the Zionist Commission. Whilst many officials had a clear and partisan position on this matter, others, like Storrs, looked to develop links with both Zionists and Palestinians to British ends.

Zionism as Settler-Colonialism

In his influential 1973 essay, *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?*, Maxime Rodinson forcefully put forward the case that the formation of Israel in 1948 'was the culmination of a process that fits perfectly into the great European-American movement of expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries whose aim was to settle new inhabitants among other people or to dominate them economically

²⁸ Bernard Wasserstein, *The British Mandate in Palestine – The Mandatory Government and the Arab Jewish Conflict, 1917-1929*, (London, Royal Historical Society, 1978), p. 18.

²⁹ John J. McTague Jr, "The British Military Administration in Palestine 1917-1920", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring, 1978), pp. 55-76.

³⁰ Wasserstein, *The British Mandate in Palestine*, p. 239.

and politically'.³¹ Such arguments had long been made by Palestinian and other Arab intellectuals for many years, but Rodinson's work helped to increase awareness and understanding of the notion of Zionism as a settler-colonial phenomenon in Western academic circles.³²

In doing so, Rodinson firmly located Zionism as part of the wider history of colonialism and imperialism. This development was also reflected in leftist academic circles in Israel. Following Israel's occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Sinai and the Golan Heights in 1967, analysis of Israel's policies towards the Occupied Territories by these academics shifted, with the argument being that only now was Israel behaving like a colonial power. This approach looked to mark 1967 as a watershed and shield the origins of Zionism and the early years of the Israeli state from accusations of settler-colonial intent. Yet Gershon Shafir has persuasively shown that Israel's actions after 1967 had its roots in the settler-colonial mindset of pre-1948 Zionism, forged in the early 1900s and the years of the British Mandate.³³

When discussing settler-colonialism, important distinctions must be made with classical colonialism. Firstly, settler-colonial societies are initially reliant on an imperial power to facilitate their aims, before later removing this power in order to establish their own national independence. Secondly, rather than being motivated solely by resources, settler-colonialism instead covets control of the land. Thirdly, settler-colonialists had the aim of establishing a homeland on the territory they controlled, as opposed to serving an already existing country.³⁴ Moreover, as Patrick Wolfe has argued, 'settler-colonialism destroys to replace'. This 'logic of elimination' manifested itself in settler-colonial movements through genocide,

³¹ Maxime Rodinson, *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?* (Monad Press, New York, 1973), p. 91.

³² Uri Ram, "Issues and Agendas: The Colonization Perspective in Israeli Sociology: Internal and External Comparisons", *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 327. See also Rodinson, *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?*, pp. 27-29.

³³ Gershon Shafir, "Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach", in Ilan Pappé ed., *The Israel/Palestine Question*, (Routledge, London, 1999), pp. 81-96.

³⁴ Ilan Pappé, *Ten Myths About Israel*, (Verso, London, 2017), pp. 41-42. See also Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010), pp. 2-12 for an overview of the historiography on the differences between colonialism and settler-colonialism.

ethnic cleansing and the establishment of discriminatory policies that looked to deny the rights of the indigenous population.³⁵ Throughout the Mandate period Palestinian rights were undermined and denied by the Zionist Commission, with the full collusion of the British and officials like Storrs.

On Palestinian National Identity

There is a long history of denying the existence of a Palestinian identity, propagated by the Zionists and their allies; Great Britain initially, and the United States of America later. This non-recognition has consequently been used as a tool through which to deny Palestinians their territorial and political rights.³⁶ Storrs himself was guilty of such oversight, failing to recognise that he was presiding over a city at time where an Palestinian identity was shifting and evolving. This thesis does not intend to consolidate his error. Instead it recognises the work of scholars such Rashid Khalidi, Muhammad Muslih, Haim Gerber and Louis A. Fishman, amongst others, who have written extensively on the emergence of Palestinian national identity.³⁷ They argue that rather than emerging in response to the threat posed by the arrival of the British and Zionism, a sense of Palestinian identity existed well before the Balfour Declaration, and in the case of Khalidi, Muslih and Geber, well before the first aliyah of Zionist immigrants to Palestine in 1881. Indeed, Gerber convincingly asserts the presence of a form of Palestinian identity dating back to the Crusades that centred on Jerusalem, the al-Aqsa Mosque and Palestine as a Muslim entity.³⁸ Evidence of such an identity is furthered through a strong tradition of oral storytelling in the Palestinian dialect. Muhawi and Kanaana's collection of Palestinian Arab Folk tales, *Speak Bird*,

³⁵ Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native", *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 2006), p. 388.

³⁶ Beshara Doumani, "Palestine Versus the Palestinians? The Iron Laws and Ironies of a People Denied", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Summer 2007), pp. 49-64.

³⁷ Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of a Modern National Consciousness*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1997), Muhammad Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1988), Haim Gerber, *Remembering and Imagining Palestine: Identity and Nationalism from the Crusades to the Present*, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008) and Louis A. Fishman, *Jews and Palestinians in the Late Ottoman Era, 1908-1914: Claiming the Homeland*, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2020).

³⁸ Gerber, *Remembering and Imagining Palestine*, pp. 42-79.

Speak Again, alludes to the presence of a 'stable social order, which no doubt characterised Palestinian society for hundreds of years before the advent of the British Mandate'.³⁹ This character, which prior to 1917 has been described by Fishman as *Palestinianism*, built upon a common sense of Palestinian identity that merged with other groupings such as being an Ottoman citizen, an Arab and a Christian or a Muslim. Crucially, this identity entered into the lexicon of Palestine, with phrases such as *Filastiniyyun* (Palestinians) and *al-Sha'b al-Filastini* (the Palestinian people) appearing in the local press.⁴⁰ The diversity present in *Palestinianism* serves to remind that identity as defined by the nation state is a modern construct that seeks to homogenise. The reality prior to the Mandate was the presence of a fluid Palestinian identity that incorporated different religious groups and confessions. Identities could overlap without negating one another.⁴¹ This *Palestinianism* fell short of the nation-state nationalism that would later emerge as a cornerstone of the Palestinian National Movement, with Zionism and the British Mandate helping to formulate and consolidate Palestinian nationalism. As such I shall use the term Palestinian to describe the Muslim and Christian Arab population of Palestine throughout this thesis.

Literature Review

A Brief Historiographical Overview of the Mandates System

As a result of the establishment of the Mandate System as part of the League of Nations Covenant signed on 28 June 1919, Britain, France, Italy and Japan met at San Remo in April 1920 to determine the nature of any future Mandates. In the Middle East, Britain received Mandates for Palestine and Iraq, with the French gaining Mandates for Syria and Lebanon. Transjordan would later be added to

³⁹ Ibrahim Muhawi and Sharif Kanaana, *Speak Bird, Speak Again: Palestinian Arab Folktales*, (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989), p. 12.

⁴⁰ Fishman, *Jews and Palestinians in the Late Ottoman Era*, p. 16.

⁴¹ For an insightful overview of the nature of defining identity in the Middle East see Kamel, *The Middle East from Empire to Sealed Identities*, pp. 21-44. This chapter highlights that whilst the focus on identity politics in academia is a relatively recent phenomenon, diverse senses of identity existed throughout the Middle East that were tied to religion, language, local and wider communities and an attachment to the land itself.

the Palestine Mandate after the Cairo Conference in March 1921, albeit under a separate administration led by Sharif Hussein's son, Abdallah. According to the terms of the Mandates, the trustees were to facilitate the development and ultimate independence of their respective countries.

At the time of their establishment, the Mandates were seen as a new novelty which captured the imagination of legal and administrative experts, and economists. As the Mandate system drew to a close, interest from British and French academics waned, with the exception Palestine which continued to generate much historiographic interest. This situation began to change from the 1960s and 1970s onwards as more consideration was given to Britain and France's involvement in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Transjordan. However, this research often involved studying the experience of each country in isolation.⁴² By the late 1990s, increased attention was instead being shown to the nature of these Mandates within a comparative framework that looked to ascertain the similarities and differences in approach and outcome between countries who were governed and those that governed them.⁴³

Broadly speaking, certain conclusions can be reached. Firstly, both Britain and France tried to minimise expenditure on their respective Mandates. In Palestine in particular, this was aided by the presence of the Zionist Commission who took on responsibility for many aspects of public administration that related to the Jewish communities. Secondly, both nations used landed and urban elites to help consolidate their position in the country, with the British providing more adept at this compared to the French. Finally, Britain and France struggled to adapt to increased demands of sovereignty and self-determination that were made by the inhabitants of the Mandate states, who viewed themselves as citizens of a future nation as opposed to subjects.

⁴² See Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan, "Introduction", in Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan ed., *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates*, (Routledge, London, 2015), pp. 5-7.

⁴³ For an early example of this see Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett ed., *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives*, (Brill, Leiden, 2004).

And yet for their similarities, the comparative approach has revealed certain key differences in how Britain and France controlled and interacted with their Mandates. French control in Syria and Lebanon saw a system of autonomous regions implemented in the former, with a unitary structure maintained in the latter. In contrast, Britain placed Hashemite monarchies in charge of Iraq and Transjordan, whilst recognising the Jews of Palestine as a people with collective rights, as opposed to the 'non-Jewish' population who merely had civil and religious rights.⁴⁴ This fateful approach conditioned not just the nature of British rule in Palestine, but also its future trajectory once the Mandate was terminated in 1948.

A Brief Historiographical Overview of the British Mandate for Palestine

In recent years, studies of the British Mandate for Palestine have shifted from nationalist historiographies towards a 'relational approach' that views Palestinians and Zionists as 'participants in the same narrative'.⁴⁵ This approach, developed by Zachary Lockman in his 1993 article on railway workers in Mandate Palestine, argues that 'the two communities were neither natural nor essentially monolithic entities; nor were they hermetically sealed off from one another...Rather, the two communities interacted in complex ways and had a mutually formative effect on one another'.⁴⁶ As the Mandatory power, the British were also responsible for these interactions. The Mandate gave Palestine clearly defined borders, and committed Britain to the facilitation of a Jewish 'National Home', whilst at the same time protecting 'the civil and religious rights' of Palestinians. In doing so, British officials had a responsibility to both parties that would lead to interactions between the two communities. Figures like Storrs, with his commitment to organisations like the Pro-Jerusalem Society, actively encouraged these links.

⁴⁴ Schayegh and Arsan, "Introduction", in Schayegh and Arsan ed., *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates*, pp. 3-5.

⁴⁵ Nicholas E. Roberts, "Re-Remembering the Mandate: Historiographical Debates and Revisionist History in the Study of British Palestine", *History Compass*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (March 2011), pp. 215-230. Quote from p. 215.

⁴⁶ Zachary Lockman, "Railway Workers and Relational History: Arabs and Jews in British-Ruled Palestine", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), p. 627.

Moreover, many studies of the British Mandate for Palestine adopted a teleological standpoint, working backwards from the formation of the state of Israel in 1948 towards the British occupation of Jerusalem in December 1917. Such an approach, focused on seemingly predetermined outcomes, fails to acknowledge that the establishment of Israel was by no means certain during the Mandate. It also neglects the multifaceted role that many individuals had during the British administration.⁴⁷ This is particularly true of Storrs and other British officials, who under the terms of the Mandate were working to facilitate a Jewish homeland, not a Jewish state. Indeed, one of the key aims of this thesis is to assess what Storrs believed he was doing at the time, as opposed to retrospectively labelling his actions.⁴⁸

The Historiographical View of Storrs

Discussion of Storrs' tenure in Jerusalem has often been reduced to the impact of Orientalism on his worldview⁴⁹ – or even more simplistically – that he was pro-Zionist and anti-Arab⁵⁰ (or vice-versa).⁵¹ Such approaches suggest he was a Governor with little agency, dictated by dogma alone. Unsurprisingly, Storrs saw things differently. In his memoirs, *Orientalisms*, Storrs asserts that:

Having loved Arabic throughout my career – with the Egyptians, who speak it best, and the Palestinians, whose citadel of identity it is;

⁴⁷ Lauren Banko, "Historiography and Approaches to the British Mandate in Palestine: new questions and frameworks", *Contemporary Levant*, Vol. 4 (2019), p. 2.

⁴⁸ For more on this see the sections on methodology and archives in this chapter.

⁴⁹ See Ilia Xypolia, "Orientations and Orientalism: The Governor Sir Ronald Storrs", *Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies*, Vol. 11 (Summer 2011), pp. 25-43 and Noah Hysler Rubin, "An Orientalist in Jerusalem: Ronald Storrs and Planning of the City", in Shalev-Khalifa ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, pp. 89-107. Both these texts will be considered later in this chapter.

⁵⁰ A.L Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914-1921*, (London, Luzac, 1978) contends that in Jerusalem 'everything Storrs forbade the Arabs was allowed at least to the Zionist Jews' (p. 319).

⁵¹ Several texts exist accusing Storrs of anti-Zionism, whilst some go as far as to accuse Storrs of being outright anti-Semitic. For accusations of anti-Zionism, see Motti Golani, "An Engima – Sir Ronald Storrs and Zionism" in Shalev-Khalifa ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, pp. 51-75, Nedava, "Jabotinsky and Storrs", and Rory Miller, "Sir Ronald Storrs and Zion: The Dream That Turned into a Nightmare", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul., 2000), pp. 114-144. For accusations of anti-Semitism, see William B. Ziff, *The Rape of Palestine*, (London, Longmans Green Co, 1938), p. 253.

having played a small part in the Arab National Movement; having studied and admired Jewry, having received much kindness from many Jews (and been pogromed in their Press as have few other Goys – or with less cause); above all, having been for the first nine years of the British Administration Governor of Jerusalem, striving according to my lights for the good of all creeds...Being neither Jew (British or foreign) nor Arab, but English, I am not wholly for either, but for both. Two hours of Arab grievances drive me into the Synagogue, while after an intensive course of Zionist propaganda I am prepared to embrace Islam.⁵²

Storrs clearly felt himself a neutral authority when governing Jerusalem. As such, his beliefs and their impact on the city should not be underestimated. Motti Golani contends that 'Storrs is responsible, almost personally, for the great improvement that Jerusalem saw after World War I, and the appearance of the city as we know it today...Post-Ottoman Jerusalem was built mainly by two people: Ronald Storrs and Teddy Kollek'.⁵³ According to Mazza, Storrs used a 'consistently personal approach' when governing the city,⁵⁴ whilst Hyman declares that he was the 'moving spirit' of the Pro-Jerusalem Society (an organisation set up by Storrs in September 1918 for 'the preservation and advancement of the interests of Jerusalem, its district and its inhabitants').⁵⁵ Given the constant emphasis on Storrs' importance to Jerusalem, it is remarkable that no scholar has made comprehensive investigations into his time governing the city, nor have they considered the personality of a man deemed to have had such a distinctive and individual character.⁵⁶ Indeed, a potentially volatile city could not have been peacefully administered through the simple dogma of being pro- or anti- a

⁵² Sir Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms (Second Definitive Edition)*, (London, Nicholson and Watson, 1945), pp. 339-340.

⁵³ Golani, "An Enigma", p. 55. Whether all Jerusalemites would agree that Storrs' actions resulted in 'great improvements' is a matter for debate.

⁵⁴ Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem: From the Ottomans to the British* (London, I.B. Taurus, 2009), p. 180.

⁵⁵ The Pro-Jerusalem Society Quarterly Bulletin, March 1922.

⁵⁶ See Xypolia, "Orientalisms and Orientalism", pp. 27-28 and Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 158. See also the Eretz Israel Museum's description of their 2010 exhibition on Storrs called *The First Governor*, accessed online at <https://www.eretzmuseum.org.il/e/20/> on 14/01/2019. This description states that 'the man, the greatly inspired conductor who orchestrated the events that took place in the Jerusalem arena, has still to be examined by scientific research'.

particular group; the day to day running of such an entity relies on the personalities and interactions of a variety of different individuals and groupings.⁵⁷ It is therefore of utmost importance to consider how Storrs' personality – together with his belief that he was (however misguided) operating in the best interests of all Jerusalemites – impacted on the political, social and urban environment of the city.

Existing works on Storrs' period as Governor of Jerusalem have largely focused on the impact of the Pro-Jerusalem Society on the built environment of the city and the various town plans developed by the British. In particular, the former comprised a key part of the most comprehensive exploration of Storrs to date. *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926* was published to accompany an exhibition of the same name held at the Eretz Israel Museum in 2010, and marked an important step in placing Storrs' outlook towards Jerusalem's landscape within the context of his attitudes towards the Palestinians and Zionists.⁵⁸ It identified that Storrs' belief in 'his far-reaching erudition and his awareness of the ways and mores of the East, alongside his genuine interest in the Zionist cause' led to deteriorating relations with both parties, culminating in the disturbances of 1920 and 1921. However, this work maintained the myth that Jerusalem had been neglected and forgotten under Ottoman rule, with Storrs' Governorship seeking to transform the city into 'a universal centre of inspiration and cultural and artistic creativity'.⁵⁹ Such an argument will be disputed in this thesis.

In her article on the evolving social and urban landscape of Jerusalem under British Mandate rule, Rana Barakat explores the 'intersection between colonial imaginations and contemporary realities' and their impact on the construction of the city by exploring the Society between 1918-26.⁶⁰ This approach places focus

⁵⁷ Public order and safety in Jerusalem was generally well maintained between 1917-1926. The Nabi Musa Riots of April 1920 represent the one major public order incident that occurred during Storrs' spell as Governor.

⁵⁸ Nirit Shalev-Khalifa ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, (Tel Aviv, Eretz Israel Museum, 2010).

⁵⁹ Nirit Shalev-Khalifa and Rachel Bonfil, "Preface", in Shalev-Khalifa ed., *The First Governor*, p. 10.

⁶⁰ Rana Barakat, "Urban Planning, Colonialism and the Pro-Jerusalem Society", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 65 (Spring, 2016), pp. 22-34 (quote from p. 22).

on the 1918, 1919 and 1922 Jerusalem Town Plans, in particular investigating the designs of the planners. Taking their cue from Storrs, British planners clearly wanted to maintain and preserve the Old City in a manner befitting the Biblical character of Jerusalem, whilst at the same time propagating a vision of the New City that chimed with Zionist and British notions of modernity and progress.⁶¹ As a result of this method, Barakat maintains that the indigenous residents of Jerusalem and the surrounding villages were disenfranchised from the city; their views and desires were supplanted by the imposition of British/Zionist colonial designs for Jerusalem.⁶² Whilst undoubtedly the case, little attempt is made to give agency to Storrs or any individual actor in this process. Instead actions are viewed as predetermined by structures and constructs such as 'colonialist imagination'. Yet such a viewpoint is predicated on the assumption that an overarching colonialist imagination uniformly impacted on each actor within the British Mandate. What makes Storrs such a multifaceted character is that his was a somewhat inimitable colonialist imagination, borne of the complexity of his personality and veneration of Jerusalem. He did not always display the same 'colonialist imagination' as his contemporaries.

Some scholars are uncomfortable using the word 'colonial' to describe the works of the Pro-Jerusalem Society and the designs of the British. Inbal Ben-Asher Gitler suggests that 'colonial' fails to recognise the unique approach Britain took to Palestine's urban areas.⁶³ Again focusing on the Jerusalem Town Plans of the early 1920s, Gitler asserts that designs clearly focus on forming 'an illusionary space of coexistence...[creating] the image of Britain as a neutral mediator, striving for a peaceful city and a unified urban plan'.⁶⁴ The Old City was central to

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 30. For a similar argument see also Nicholas E. Roberts, "Dividing Jerusalem: British Urban Planning in the Holy City", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Summer 2013), pp. 7-26. Roberts suggests that British planning had a clear pro-Zionist bias. Sectarian divisions were heightened because of the distinctions made in planning between the predominantly Palestinian Arab Old City and the Zionist dominated construction of the New City, laying the groundwork for the current divisions between East and West Jerusalem.

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 31.

⁶³ Inbal Ben Asher Gitler, "'Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity': Jerusalem City Plans during the British Mandate, 1917-1948", *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Fall 2003), pp. 39-58.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 54. It should be noted that Storrs was keen to present himself as a neutral party between Palestinian Arabs and Jews. Whether this had any bearing on the designs themselves is not clear.

this view, 'its historical narratives serving not as a reminder of the complexities of its multicultural space but as a symbol of a coveted peaceful coexistence'.⁶⁵ The Pro-Jerusalem Society itself became an organisational manifestation of this desired cohabitation, as a 'a democratic, unifying body with the active participation of the local population', although naturally it was British ideas that were implemented.⁶⁶ As a result, Gitler maintains the British developed a unique *mandate* approach to urban planning in Palestine (as opposed to a *colonial* approach). The uncertainty of Britain's position in Palestine prior to 1923, combined with a desire to manifest control over the country and recognition of 'the growing right of both Jews and Arabs to assert their own national identities' shaped this attitude.⁶⁷ This conceptual analysis of British urban planning in Jerusalem contextualises the difficulties faced by the British as they established their control of Palestine. It also acknowledges the unique circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Mandate. However, the influential role Storrs played in forming and developing the Pro-Jerusalem Society as a vehicle for his own aesthetics, his sense of civic and religious duty, and determination that the communities of the city should be involved in its government, are marginalised in this approach.⁶⁸

Benjamin Hyman's unpublished PhD thesis *British Planners in Palestine 1918-36* takes a similar line to Barakat and Gitler by studying the various Jerusalem Town Plans developed in this time period.⁶⁹ However, his work explores the impact and careers of individual planners in the design and construction of various project within Palestine. The thesis considers William Hannah MacLean, Patrick Geddes, Charles Robert Ashbee and Clifford Holliday each in turn, providing a biography and outlining their work before placing it into a wider historical context. In doing so, one can clearly see how each individual personality and background influenced the respective designs. As governor, Storrs appears throughout, but the focus is far more on the architectural development of Palestine as opposed to the daily management of the city under his rule.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 54.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 41.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 54.

⁶⁸ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 160.

⁶⁹ Benjamin Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine 1918-1936*, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 1994).

Power is at the forefront whenever Storrs is mentioned in this thesis. In contrast to Barakat, who suggests that British rule in Jerusalem explicitly facilitated Zionist colonisation, Hyman presents a Governor cautious of the potential influence of the Zionist Commission, keen to monopolise control of the planning of Jerusalem in his own hands.⁷⁰ This restriction of Zionist powers has been viewed by some as outright anti-Zionism (and indeed possible anti-Semitism), borne of a desire to create the Palestine of Storrs' imagination sans-Jews.⁷¹ Hyman instead suggests that Storrs' antipathy towards the Commission extended from his efforts to maintain the careful balance of power created by the Pro-Jerusalem Society between the city's main inhabitants.⁷² If so, little consideration is given as to how this balance was developed and maintained. Nor does it explain how Storrs was able to maintain working relationships with the Zionists in the face of his apparent antipathy towards them. This suggests a need for further research into Storrs' influence over the Society and his dealings with Palestinians and Zionists.⁷³

The notion of Storrs as a figure clamouring for power and control is developed in Yair Wallach's PhD thesis on public texts in Jerusalem between 1858-1948.⁷⁴ In his work, Wallach developed the idea of the 'textual economy' – the notion that different texts in a variety of forms intersected across different strata of society in Jerusalem: political, economic and social. According to Wallach:

Through the display of certain texts and the withdrawal of others, a new order was negotiated and pursued...Public texts were used by

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 141-142.

⁷¹ Rubin, "An Orientalist in Jerusalem", p. 91. Rubin asserts that Storrs "regarded the Jewish population, including members of the old *Yishuv* as well as the newly-arrived Zionists, as foreign to the landscape. These Jerusalem residents were incompatible with his image of the fitting character of the city". See also Nedava, "Jabotinsky and Storrs", p. 134 – "Sir Ronald Storrs was never really a friend of Zionism, even when he was animated by the Zionist idea of the Return to Zion and restoring its crown. He regarded Zionism not purely as an endeavour of settling the country, but as something that was beyond the concrete; something vague and an exalted belief, but nevertheless, his love of the East as it had been years ago was stronger". These claims of anti-Zionism are hard to substantiate given Storrs' role in promoting pro-Zionist British policy in the city.

⁷² *Ibid*, pp. 141-142.

⁷³ Indeed, the Pro-Jerusalem Society closed when Storrs left Jerusalem to become Governor of Cyprus in 1926, suggesting the influence he had over the organisation.

⁷⁴ Yair Wallach, *Readings in Conflict: Public Texts in Modern Jerusalem, 1858-1948*, (PhD Thesis, Birkbeck College, University of London, 2008).

writers – the state, local elites, and grassroots communities – to promote their vision and their interests; they were also used by readers, residents of Jerusalem, to negotiate their notions of identity and geography, as part of their everyday life.⁷⁵

Storrs was at the centre of this process through his decisions to rename streets, commission tri-lingual signs, regulate building materials and redefine the municipal borders of Jerusalem.⁷⁶ Wallach rejects the notion that Storrs governed Jerusalem using personal aesthetics alone. Instead he argues Storrs was a deeply political individual, proving himself to be ‘no less manipulative than future Israeli governments’ in his attempts to create a coherent, pseudo-Biblical Jerusalem shorn of its Ottoman legacy.⁷⁷ This tension between personal and political should be developed; as Governor of Jerusalem Storrs had to maintain and balance various interests. Not only was he a military (and later political) administrator, he had to contend with the views of his British superiors (both within and without Palestine), the Palestinians (both Christian and Muslim) and the Zionists, whilst at the same time remaining true to his own personal sense of duty. Storrs was clearly enamoured with his role as Governor, claiming that:

For me Jerusalem stood and stands alone among the cities of the world. There are many positions of greater authority and renown within and without the British Empire, but in a sense I cannot explain that there is no promotion after Jerusalem.⁷⁸

The clash between personal pride and the reality of governing Jerusalem is key to understanding how Storrs’ personality influenced and was constrained by the realities of managing the city.

In recent years Roberto Mazza has written extensively on the British impact upon Jerusalem, with particular focus on the transition from Ottoman to British rule,⁷⁹

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p. 248.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 154-164.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 154.

⁷⁸ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 440.

⁷⁹ Mazza, *Jerusalem*.

the Nabi Musa riots of April 1920⁸⁰ and the work of the Pro-Jerusalem Society.⁸¹ He is highly critical of the impact of Storrs' policies. Mazza surmises that the transitional period of 1914-1920 was 'more than a simple change in administrative patterns' from Ottoman to British control. Instead, this period saw the 'redefinition of ideologies (Arab Nationalism vs. Zionism) and identities (Arab and Jewish/Zionist)'.⁸² Against this background of change amongst the Palestinian Arabs and Zionists emerged a very personalised form of rule in the guise of Ronald Storrs. Mazza contends that far from achieving the harmonised city of 'peaceful coexistence' as outlined in British Town Plans, Storrs' administration instead created a confessionalised and segregated city that 'eventually created the framework for the development of structured urban violence' in the form of the Nabi Musa riots.⁸³ This confessionalisation of the urban landscape was the result of Storrs' policies to create a Jerusalem dressed in 'biblical clothes', with the Governor projecting 'his own British and Victorian ideals in order to preserve the 'celestial' character of the city',⁸⁴ destroying the Ottoman sectarian balance and transforming 'lives in common...into lives in isolation'.⁸⁵ Mazza acknowledges that Storrs created 'a Jerusalem which should be British but looking at the Biblical past', with the result that the Palestinians and Zionists became alienated to his vision, together with British officials who disagreed with policy in the country.⁸⁶ However, little research exists to explain personality of a man who undoubtedly had an enormous impact on the sectarian balance of the city.

⁸⁰ Roberto Mazza, "Transforming the Holy City: From Communal Clashes to Urban Violence, the Nabi Musa Riots in 1920" in Ulrike Freitag, Nelida Fuccaro, Claudia Ghrawi and Nora Lafi ed., *Urban Violence in the Middle East: Changing Cityscapes in the Transition from Empire to Nation State*, (New York, Berghahn 2015), pp. 179-194.

⁸¹ Roberto Mazza, "'The Preservation and Safeguarding of the Amenities of the Holy City without Favour or Prejudice to Race or Creed": The Pro-Jerusalem Society and Ronald Storrs, 1917-1926", in Dalachanis, Angelos and Lemire, Vincent ed., *Ordinary Jerusalem: Volume 1*, (Boston/Leiden, Brill, 2018), pp. 403-422

⁸² Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem During the First World War: Transition from Ottoman to British Rule*, (PhD Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2007), p. 289.

⁸³ Mazza, "Transforming the Holy City", p. 180, pp. 184-186.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 185.

⁸⁵ Mazza, "The Preservation and Safeguarding of the Amenities of the Holy City", pp. 421-422.

⁸⁶ Mazza, *Jerusalem During the First World War*, (2009), p. 180.

As mentioned, few have analysed Storrs' worldview and approach to Palestine. Rory Miller assesses his approach to Zionism with particular focus on his writings and proclamations during the 1930s and 1940s.⁸⁷ At this time, Storrs worked hard to present himself as an impartial expert on Palestine (hence his claim to be 'not fully for either, but for both'). Such a claim outraged the Zionist leadership, who felt that he was promoting an anti-Zionist approach under the cloak of neutrality.⁸⁸ Miller correctly asserts that Storrs had a sincere and heartfelt approach to Zionism but leaves it to the reader to decide the true nature of his beliefs, stating:

Whether one views Storrs as 'more sinned against than sinning' in his relationship with Zionism depends entirely on whether one views the Zionist claims to Palestine and Storrs' attempts to oppose them under a cloak of neutrality, as legitimate or not.⁸⁹

Whilst Miller assesses Storrs' views towards the end of the Mandate, he does not explore how his approach shifted over time. As a result of largely ignoring his spell in Jerusalem, Storrs' approach to Zionism lacks context. Thus it is necessary to further explore Storrs' character and beliefs during his time in Jerusalem. This has been undertaken by Ilia Xypolia, who was struck by what she described as 'Orientalist preoccupations' in his autobiography *Orientations*.⁹⁰ Xypolia recognises that Storrs was keen to appear 'as a friend of both Arabs and Jews and an impartial expert on Palestine'.⁹¹ His 'narration of...events as both witness and participant reflect his Orientalist lens', due to his consistent contrasting of 'Muslim society with that of the West'.⁹² As such, a compelling case is made that Storrs exhibited many of the behaviours and views of an Orientalist.⁹³ These views were no doubt acquired during his formative years in education.⁹⁴ However, Storrs arrived in Palestine with a variety of different influences: the Orientalism of his education was altered by his experiences in Egypt as a colonial administrator,

⁸⁷ Miller, "Sir Ronald Storrs and Zion"

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 126-7.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 138.

⁹⁰ Xypolia, "Orientations and Orientalism", p. 25.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 31.

⁹² *Ibid*, p. 40.

⁹³ Further consideration will be given to Orientalism in the methodological section of this chapter.

⁹⁴ Xypolia, "Orientations and Orientalism", pp. 28-29.

and altered still further by the interactions that he had with British officials, Palestinians and Zionists in Jerusalem. Whilst he may well have remained Orientalist in the broadest sense, personal circumstances will have influenced his worldview. As Monk has shown through his study of the Dome of the Rock and controversies surrounding al-Buraq, or the Western Wall, during the Mandate, these personal circumstances impacted on the political meanings ascribed to the built environment of the Holy City, complicating and challenging existing understandings of what the architecture of Jerusalem symbolised to its residents.⁹⁵ It is therefore imperative to unearth the motivations and intricacies of Storrs' own personality to understand his impact upon the city.

Research Questions

This thesis utilises two key concepts: John S. Galbraith's notion of the 'man on the spot' and Edward W. Said's concept of the 'determining imprint'.⁹⁶ It argues that Storrs took a very individual approach to administering the city, based largely on his own personal tastes and the social networks he created. In doing so it addresses three key questions. Firstly, how did Storrs' experiences before Jerusalem develop his personality and shape his outlook on the world? Secondly, how did Storrs' formative years manifest themselves in the administration of Jerusalem, and what was his effect on the built environment? Thirdly, what limitations did his British superiors, Palestinians and Zionists place on Storrs' power to govern and create his ideal Jerusalem? Moreover, what effect did Storrs' deeply personal approach have on his ability to effectively govern the city? By answering these questions a multifaceted view of Storrs' time as Governor is developed; one where personality and politics collide to reveal that individuals as well as institutions can exert great influence over the everyday life and built environment of one of the world's most contested and revered cities. In doing so the power of personal networks over cities and people is revealed within a colonial context.

⁹⁵ Daniel Bertrand Monk, *An Aesthetic Occupation: The Immediacy of Architecture and the Palestine Conflict*, (Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2002).

⁹⁶ Both will be considered in greater detail in the methodological section of this chapter.

Methodology

Orientalism and the Determining Imprint

Storrs...believed his vision of things Oriental was individual, self-created out of some intensely personal encounter with the Orient, Islam or the Arabs...[he] expressed general contempt for official knowledge about the East.

Edward Said, *Orientalism*.⁹⁷

From its publication in 1978, Edward Said's *Orientalism* generated waves of debate and controversy.⁹⁸ According to Said, Orientalism is a Western-centric concept for:

Dealing with the Orient - dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.⁹⁹

This *Weltanschauung* was so all-pervasive and authoritative that all Western individuals acting in or towards the Orient could not escape its influence.¹⁰⁰ Thus Orientalism can be summarised as a universal mindset amongst 19th century Western Europeans that enabled them to exert power, control and dominance over the Orient. Central to developing this control is the notion of difference between a civilised, rational, progressive and superior Occident and an uncivilised, irrational, static, regressive and inferior Orient. In other words,

⁹⁷ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, (London, Penguin Modern Classic, 2003, first published 1978), p. 237.

⁹⁸ For more on *Orientalism*'s reception see Gyan Prakash, "Orientalism Now", *History and Theory*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Oct., 1995), pp. 199-212. For a particularly scathing review of *Orientalism* see Bernard Lewis, "The Question of Orientalism", *New York Review of Books*, June 24 1982.

⁹⁹ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p. 3.

Orientalism always strived to create an 'us' and a 'them' in order to justify its power.¹⁰¹

Developing this idea further Said acknowledges that individuals could exert a 'determining imprint' on Orientalism.¹⁰² This in itself is problematic. On the one hand Said is in favour of the 'determining imprint of individual writers'; on the other Orientalism is all-pervasive and determines every interaction with the Orient.¹⁰³ Hallaq notes this inconsistency and questions why Said did not proffer any author who had a 'determining imprint' on Orientalism.¹⁰⁴ He argues that 'the ideological author begins – must begin – as an individual author, for there is no other place from which discursivity can begin'.¹⁰⁵ The individual is therefore placed firmly at the centre of discursive formation. This is important for two reasons: firstly, individuals have agency to shape and influence discourse; and secondly, analysis can shift beyond bracketing the individual into particular categories. In doing so, Said's acknowledgement of 'the density and interdependence of human life' can be fully more realised, recognising that human experience is governed both by our personal relations with one another as well as by larger forces.¹⁰⁶ This is especially the case with an individual like Storrs, who placed great importance on developing effective social networks.

Said develops the idea of individual agency, acknowledging that 'knowledge – no matter how special – is regulated first by the local concerns of a specialist, later by the general concerns of a social system or authority'.¹⁰⁷ It is therefore vital to understand what local concerns the specialist had in order ascertain their impact on any wider social system or authority.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 43.

¹⁰² Said, *Orientalism*, p. 23.

¹⁰³ Note how the quote at the start of this section states Storrs 'believed' his vision of the Orient was individual. In using the word 'believed', Said is clearly suggesting that a wider force is at play; one which Storrs cannot escape from nor exert influence over.

¹⁰⁴ Wael B. Hallaq, *Restating Orientalism: A Critique of Modern Knowledge*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2018), pp. 31-33.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 49.

¹⁰⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, p. xx.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 45.

The Microhistorical Approach

In order to fully uncover the local concerns that operated on Storrs I will be adopting a microhistorical approach. Microhistory has its roots in Italian academic circles, where proponents of *Microstoria* such as Carlo Ginzburg and Giovanni Levi advocated small scale research into individuals and events that challenged the existing macrohistorical understanding. Ginzburg's 1976 book *The Cheese and the Worms* is seen as one of the pioneering works in this field. In it, Ginzburg researches the life of a sixteenth-century Italian miller called Menocchio in order to reach wider conclusions about life and mentalities in rural Italy at this time.¹⁰⁸ In doing so he set the basic parameters of future microhistorical study, adroitly summarised by Sziárto as involving the following:

Microhistorians hold a microscope and not a telescope in their hands. Focusing on certain cases, persons and circumstances, microhistory allows an intensive historical study of the subject, giving a completely different picture of the past from investigations about nations, states or social groupings...Microhistorians...always look for the answers for "great historical questions"...when studying small objects...Finally, the third main feature of microhistory...is the stress put on agency. For microhistorians, people who lived in the past are not merely puppets on the hands of great underlying forces of history, but they are regarded as active individuals, conscious actors.¹⁰⁹

This focus on individuals as 'conscious actors' lends itself to a study of Storrs in Jerusalem. Whereas previous research has primarily focused on British town planning between 1917-1926, the aim here is to demonstrate how the individual can influence politics and the wider governing of a city. Furthermore, it looks to explain how the 'determining imprint' of the individual impacts upon the underlying

¹⁰⁸ Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms – Translated by John Tedeschi and Anne Tedeschi*, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, originally published in Italian in 1976). Other notable examples of microhistorical research include Giovanni Levi, *Inheriting Power: The Story of an Exorcist*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988) and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village, 1294-1324*, (London, Scholar Press, 1978).

¹⁰⁹ Sigurður Gylfi Magnússon, and István M. Sziárto, *What is Microhistory? Theory and Practice*, (London/New York, Routledge, 2013) pp. 4-5.

force of Orientalism. These aims form the 'great historical question' outlined above. In other words, it is the metanarrative for the study. This microhistorical approach therefore avoids simply being a biography of Storrs because it looks to the individual to highlight the wider culture that emerges from their outlook, beliefs and actions.¹¹⁰

Within any microhistorical study a tension remains between the microhistory of the individual and the metanarrative of the wider historical context in which they operated. Magnússon argues that making links between units of research and the metanarrative is 'downright dangerous', leading to a 'distortion' of history. Instead he advocates focusing solely on the microhistory, a process he terms the 'singularization of history', that 'brings into prominence the contradictions and inconsistencies in the mind of each and every individual and heightens the oppositions that move within each living person'.¹¹¹ Acknowledging these 'contradictions and inconsistencies' is vital but should not mean neglecting the metanarrative altogether. Instead, their recognition should be used to limit the 'truth claims' of a metanarrative. The diversity of human existence means there will always be exceptions to the rule.

In light of this, Kracauer's argument that 'the big can be adequately rendered only by a permanent movement from the whole to some detail, then back to the whole' carries merit.¹¹² By recognising the importance of both microhistory and the metanarrative a potential hybrid can be created. The question then emerges: is microhistorical study or the metanarrative more important?

Cerutti offers solutions, suggesting that in addition to asking 'great historical questions' of relevance to the wider metanarrative, one should also consider the 'great historical questions' for the individual concerned. For Cerutti:

¹¹⁰ Jill Lepore, "Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Jun., 2001), pp. 129-144.

¹¹¹ Sigurður Gylfi Magnússon, "'The Singularization of History': Social History and Microhistory within the Postmodern State of Knowledge", *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Spring, 2003), p. 720.

¹¹² Siegfried Kracauer, *History: The Last Things before the Last - completed by Paul Oskar Kristeller*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 122.

Analysis is...not a question of correcting actors' versions of the facts, or of revealing to actors a reality which they were presumably not aware of (objective constraints which determined their actions). It is rather a question of making their actions and arguments understandable, acceptable and legitimate [by] taking their actions and intentions into account in the analysis.¹¹³

Using this definition could *prima facie* be an exercise in legitimising Storrs' actions in Jerusalem. Such an outcome is manifestly not the aim of this thesis. Neither is using Storrs' papers and perspective designed to establish an authentic truth about his time as Governor.¹¹⁴ By making 'actions and arguments' understandable through study of Storrs' personality and intentions, a more rounded understanding is gained of his rationale and approach for governing Jerusalem. In this way, the tension between microhistorical study and the metanarrative of the 'great historical question' raised by Szijárto is abated. By placing the individual at the centre of investigation, colonialism and Orientalism become acts that are carried out by people in their daily interactions with others, as opposed to being an abstract and depersonalised force. This is crucial in understanding how such structures operate in the everyday.

Whilst the role of the individual is of central concern to this thesis, microhistorical study of one person alone offers only a partial answer to how Jerusalem was governed. As Governor, Storrs interacted with numerous individuals and groupings on a regular basis, acknowledging their interests alongside his personal views and the demands placed upon him by his British superiors. How, then, does one make the leap from the micro of personality to the macro of policy enacted? The figuration theory of German Sociologist Norbert Elias offers potential solutions to this issue. In his pioneering 1970 work *The Civilizing Process*, Elias advocates the belief that individuals form small scale units called

¹¹³ Simona Cerruti, "Microhistory: Social Relations versus Cultural Models?", p. 29.

¹¹⁴ Mary Fulbrook, "Life Writing and Writing Lives: Ego Documents in Historical Perspective" in Birgit Dahlke, Dennis Tate and Roger Woods ed., *German Life Writing in the Twentieth Century*, (Columbia, Camden House, 2011), p. 35. Fulbrook develops the idea of 'history from within'; analysing individual lives and the egodocuments they produced according to the wider political and social questions of the time (both when events happened and when they are recalled).

figurations that create change in society.¹¹⁵ Within the formation of figurations is the assumption that humans are by their nature interdependent and do not exist in solitude; a key point to acknowledge when studying a Governor like Storrs who made every effort to consult as wide a spectrum of Jerusalem society as possible. Elias also acknowledges that identity is formed alongside the prevailing social and historical trends of the time.¹¹⁶ In *The Court Society*, he articulates that:

While on the one hand the occupant's personal development therefore influences within certain limits that of his position, on the other the development of his social position as a direct representative of society as a whole influences the personal development of the occupant.¹¹⁷

This symbiotic relationship affirms Said's 'determining imprint', allowing individuals to influence as well as be influenced by the principal trends of the time.¹¹⁸

Two further interrelated points regarding figuration theory are worth consideration, particularly within the context of this study. The first regards the limits of human autonomy. It is vital not to ascribe too much freedom of choice and action to the individual, who is working within fixed limits of authority.¹¹⁹ In the case of Storrs, this means identifying those factors that restricted his ability to govern Jerusalem exactly as he desired. The second factor involves recognising that the interdependence created by the formation of figurations can be acrimonious as well as harmonious.¹²⁰ This is of great importance given that Storrs was in charge of several competing groups vying for influence. His actions and views would not just be determined by positive relations, but also by his ability

¹¹⁵ Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations – Revised Edition*, (Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, first published 1970), pp. 455-57.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 470-474.

¹¹⁷ Norbert Elias, *The Court Society*, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), p. 20.

¹¹⁸ As noted, Said viewed the 'determining imprint' of the individual as a concept that distinguishes his work from that of Foucault. Therefore, his work complements Elias' to some extent as both recognise that the individual can exert influence over the structures that form and control society. For more on the similarities and differences between Elias and Foucault see Dennis Smith, "'The Civilizing Process' and 'The History of Sexuality': Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 79-100.

¹¹⁹ Elias, *The Court Society*, p. 31.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 142.

to manage criticism and opposition, which in turn would limit his autonomy. In order to further understand how Storrs operated as a British imperial administrator, it is necessary to consider the concept of 'the man on the spot'.

The 'Man on the Spot' and 'Imperial Careers'

John S. Galbraith's work on the 'man on the spot' encourages historians to look beyond mere policy decisions and outcomes. He argues that colonial administrators 'saw the problems of his administration from the point of view' where he was based, 'rather than London, regardless of the instructions he had received on leaving England'.¹²¹ Thousands of miles from the centre of power, these men were not always in a position to wait for detailed instructions from Westminster or Whitehall. As a result, 'the nature of British commitments as they emerged was closely linked to the abilities, limitations and prejudices of individuals in the region' they operated in.¹²² In light of this, Alexander Schölch's description of the British government as 'the sorcerer's apprentice', failing to 'master of the spirits it had evoked' seems particularly apt, especially with regard to the contradictory policies enacted in post-war Palestine.¹²³ This meant that officials like Ronald Storrs often had to make snap decisions based on local conditions as opposed to chapter and verse from London. Indeed, Storrs himself recognised the 'bliss of arbitrary rule' during the early days of military governorship.¹²⁴ Whilst the imposition of O.E.T.A. and the Mandate later provided a framework for policy, he still maintained a certain autonomy from London in how he governed the city, not least in the social connections he made.

Recognition of the networks established by the 'man on the spot' is provided in *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire*. This informative collection of essays explores a series of 'imperial lives' and 'imperial careers', highlighting how administrators 'had opportunities to transcend their initial impressions' and

¹²¹ John S. Galbraith, "The "Turbulent Frontier" as a Factor in British Expansion", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan., 1960), p. 157.

¹²² John Fisher, "Man on the Spot: Captain George Gracey and British Policy Towards the Assyrians, 1917-45", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Mar., 2008), pp. 216-217.

¹²³ Alexander Schölch, "The 'Men on the Spot' and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), p. 785.

¹²⁴ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 317.

'insinuate themselves into personal, business, official, religious and friendship networks'.¹²⁵ This was undoubtedly the case with Storrs, who favoured strong inter-communal links and the development of personal relationships with key figures in Jerusalem. Furthermore, Zoe Laidlaw has demonstrated in her research of 'men on the spot' in New South Wales and the Cape Colony that the study of personal networks sheds light on 'imperial power, asking where such power lay, and how it was exercised, influenced and perceived'.¹²⁶ Together these works illustrate how ideas and beliefs evolved across 'multiple spaces' as the career imperialist moved from colony to colony.¹²⁷ Having worked extensively across the Middle East for 13 years prior to his posting to Palestine, Storrs neatly fits the criteria of being both a 'man on the spot' and an 'imperial life'. These prior experiences were undoubtedly to shape his approach to Jerusalem.¹²⁸

Centre-periphery tensions and the ingratiation of British officials into local networks are not the only forces that operated on the 'man on the spot'. Administrative organisation and unclear policy directives also led to the emergence of particular mentalities and behaviours by those individuals charged with enacting British policy. As Mary Innes has shown with the case of Egypt, the ambiguous nature of Britain's involvement in the country impacted upon the worldview of British officialdom in Cairo. Caught between a supposedly temporary but ever-prolonged occupation built upon Anglo-Egyptian co-operation, and an increasingly irate and powerful nationalist movement, British administrators in Egypt were at the forefront of recognising the weaknesses of the Protectorate, eventually convincing politicians and diplomats back in London such a system could not continue indefinitely.¹²⁹ Similarly, the uncertainties that existed under O.E.T.A. and the first years of civilian rule led to many British officials questioning their role in Palestine.¹³⁰ Not only did the 'man on the spot'

¹²⁵ David Lambert and Alan Lester, "Imperial spaces, imperial subjects" in Lambert and Lester ed., *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire*, p. 2.

¹²⁶ Zoe Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections, 1815–45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government*, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 2.

¹²⁷ Lambert and Lester, "Imperial spaces" in Lambert and Lester ed., *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire* p. 25.

¹²⁸ See Chapter 1 for the genesis of Storrs' 'imperial life'.

¹²⁹ Mary Innes, *In Egyptian Service: the Role of British Officials in Egypt, 1911-1936*, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, St Anthony's College, University of Oxford, 1986), pp. 326-333.

¹³⁰ McTague Jr, "The British Military Administration in Palestine", pp. 58-59.

have to deal with opposition from Palestinians and Zionists, they also had to placate the views of their compatriots, whilst at the same time pursuing the policies of His Majesty's Government and the League of Nations. Moreover, their responses did not occur in a vacuum of contemporary concerns. These administrators brought with them their own cultural, social and intellectual worldview born of their prior educational and professional experiences. Satia has demonstrated the influence this had on British reconnaissance in the Middle East during World War One, whilst Shepherd performed a similar task in her investigation of Mandate Palestine.¹³¹ To truly understand the responses of the 'man on the spot' it is therefore necessary to explore the formative moments of their lives.

Archives

A variety of different archival materials were used in this thesis. Storrs' own personal papers were utilised alongside his autobiography, *Orientations*, school reports and other materials from Charterhouse, together with official documents available in The National Archives at Kew, the Central Zionist Archives, and the Israel State Archives. Each of these present their own issues for the historian to grapple with. A fire at Government House in Cyprus in 1932 destroyed many of Storrs' personal papers, meaning that gaps exist in his correspondence from Jerusalem. Moreover, the 2020-2022 Covid-19 Pandemic meant that I was unable to carry out in-person research in the Israeli archives, instead relying on online searches and the help and direction provided by archivists in providing digital copies of the materials I needed. What is more, reliance on British and Israel archival sources risked marginalising the Palestinian viewpoint. As Khalidi notes, there is a disparity in archival resources between Palestine and Israel, most notably in the absence of a central Palestinian archive.¹³² Furthermore, my own lack of Arabic and Hebrew placed limitations on the resources available to

¹³¹ Priya Satia, *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) and Naomi Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917-1948*, (New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 2000).

¹³² Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, (Oxford, Oneworld, 2009), pp. xxxiv-xxxvii.

me. As such, secondary resources in English were used to develop the both the Palestinian and Zionist narrative where archival gaps emerged.

Archives are not mines of information; they – and the documents within them – ‘come layered with the received account of earlier events and the cultural semantics’ of their creators both individual and institutional¹³³. Understanding this layering becomes even more important when dealing with egodocuments – a term introduced by Jacques Presser to describe a ‘text in which an author writes about his or her own acts, thoughts and feelings’.¹³⁴ Given the nature of their approach, microhistorians tend to rely largely on egodocuments in their work. However, there should be a duality in their use: ‘as texts that raise new questions rather than answer old ones’.¹³⁵ Before any other question can be asked, the primary question must be ‘What did those who wrote autobiographically in earlier eras think they were doing when they put pen to paper?’¹³⁶ As mentioned earlier, Storrs’ *Orientations* is an exercise in self-justification, legitimising his position as an expert and impartial commentator on Palestine and Zionism.¹³⁷ His work also fits neatly with a glut of egodocuments published by British and Zionist officials both during and after the Mandate, possibly giving weight to Storrs’ need to promote his expertise. These include – but are by no means limited to – works by Chief Immigration Officer Albert Hyamson¹³⁸, Storrs’ successor in Jerusalem, Edward Keith-Roach,¹³⁹ the British Lieutenant General and Zionist notable F.H. Kisch¹⁴⁰ and Chief Political Officer Richard Meinertzhagen.¹⁴¹ Two things emerge

¹³³ Laura Ann Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance”, *Archival Science*, Vol. 2, Issue 1-2, (2002), p. 92.

¹³⁴ Rudolf Dekker, “Jacques Presser’s Heritage: Egodocuments in the Study of History”, *Memoria y Civilización*, (Vol. 5, 2002), p. 14.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 37.

¹³⁶ J.H. Chajes, “Accounting for the Self: Preliminary Generic-Historical Reflections on Early Modern Jewish Egodocuments”, *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Winter, 2005), p. 2.

¹³⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. xvi – ‘In striving that word may not differ from fact – *da fatto il dir non sia diverso* – my ambition is to present both sides, especially the less-known, of every question, and so perhaps to add to the material, raw but genuine, awaiting the future historian of the Near and Middle East’. Note the quote from Dante’s *Inferno*, one of Storrs’ favourite books.

¹³⁸ Albert M. Hyamson, *Palestine Under the Mandate, 1920-1948*, (London, Methuen, 1950).

¹³⁹ Edward Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*, (London, Radcliffe Press, 1994).

¹⁴⁰ F.H. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, (London, Gollancz, 1938).

¹⁴¹ Richard Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary, 1917-1956*, (London, Cresset, 1959).

about this flood of Mandate-related autobiography. Firstly, the differing views of each author suggests the contested nature of British involvement in Palestine. Secondly, the publication of these texts suggests that there was a ready and willing audience for these memoirs. This is especially in evidence with regards to *Orientalisms*, which was advertised as far afield as New York as ‘an event of international importance’ in 1937.¹⁴² Moreover, by advocating both Zionist and Palestinian rights, Storrs increased his chances of courting controversy, whilst lending weight to the claim he was ‘probably the greatest living authority on the Near East’. Indeed, the power of *Orientalisms* to enrage and frustrate is neatly shown by J.W. Robertson Scott, who recalls seeing ‘an irate reader of it hurry up on deck and, with bad language, fling his copy into the sea’ in the middle of an Atlantic crossing.¹⁴³ Thus another question that must be asked is not only how Storrs perceived his work, but also how others perceived his work and personality too.

Yet this thesis does not rely solely on autobiography. Other egodocuments – such as Storrs’ diaries and letters – have been used to construct his personality and life. Neither does this research exclusively depend on what *is* included in Storrs’ own papers and autobiography. What an egodocument chooses to leave out – or how it deals with certain key events – is often as revealing as what it includes.¹⁴⁴ One example of this is the limited analysis of the Nabi Musa riots of 1920, both in Storrs’ own personal papers and *Orientalisms*.¹⁴⁵ As a point of comparison, Storrs spends a similar amount of text describing the naming of the Streets of Jerusalem, pottery produced by ‘Dome of the Rock Pottery’ and the Jerusalem School of Music.¹⁴⁶ Clearly a decision has been made here. Either Storrs overlooked detailed analysis of Nabi Musa in order to cater to his audience, or his own personal preferences have risen to the fore. His analysis of the festival

¹⁴² Advertisement for Ronald Storrs’ Memoirs from Shalev-Khalifa, *The First Governor*, p. 110 (Hebrew section of the book).

¹⁴³ John William Robertson Scott, *The Life and Death of a Newspaper: An Account of the Temperaments, Perturbations and Achievements of John Morley, W.T. Stead, E.T. Cook, Harry Cust, J.L. Garvin and Three Other Editors of the Pall Mall Gazette*, (London, Methuen, 1952), p. 361.

¹⁴⁴ Fulbrook, “Life Writing and Writing Lives”, p. 28.

¹⁴⁵ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, pp. 330-332.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 314-16.

as 'rather pointless', together with his clear appreciation of music and architecture throughout the book, would suggest the latter.¹⁴⁷

When analysing egodocuments, it is vital not to allow imagination lead to unjustifiable speculation. Literary strategies that 'provide apparently direct insights into the minds of characters, perceptions of physical experiences, relationships [and] emotions' undoubtedly place the historians' craft on shaky ground.¹⁴⁸ Yet careful use of egodocuments, together with other archival materials, help place the individual at the centre of study. In doing so, personal actions become contextualised within the prevailing trends and beliefs of the time. Storrs' ability and limitations in pursuing his own interests – both personal and professional – come to the fore, revealing how personality impacted on policy in Mandate Jerusalem.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p. 330.

¹⁴⁸ Fulbrook, "Life Writing and Writing Lives", p. 35.

Chapter One – The Making of Ronald Storrs: 1881-1917

Alien rule is not easy to bear, save by the lowest savages. Without a modicum of human intercourse or the incentive of legitimate ambition, it may become unbearable.¹

Having explored the extant works on Storrs in Jerusalem it is necessary to survey how his contemporaries perceived him. Unsurprisingly a similar picture of contradiction and intrigue emerges. T.E. Lawrence's lionisation of Storrs is far from the final British word on his personality and character; other colleagues were much less complementary. The notably pro-Zionist Richard Meinertzhagen, Chief Political Officer for Palestine between 1919 and 1920, recorded in his *Middle East Diaries* that Storrs was a scheming individual. Propagating close relations with Palestinian Arabs meant that Storrs 'could be an enthusiast for Zionism' and the next day suffer from 'violent hebophobia. He was a dangerous man, not knowing the meaning of the words loyalty or sincerity'.² Whilst the veracity of Meinertzhagen's diaries has been questioned,³ his comments still reflect three key issues. Firstly, he highlights the divisions between British officials who were perceived to be pro-Arab and anti-Zionist (or vice-versa). Secondly, he demonstrates the difficulties Storrs faced trying to balance competing interests in Jerusalem. Thirdly, he acknowledges that Storrs looked to initiate positive relationships with both Palestinian Arabs and Zionists during his governorship.

Storrs' desire to maintain constructive associations between Palestinian Arabs and Zionists at this time was also recognised by Frederick Hermann Kisch, a former British Officer who later became Chairman of the Jerusalem Zionist Executive. From this unique background Kisch surmised that 'alone amongst the English officials Storrs does try to bring Jew and Arab together as his guests'.⁴ Yet these efforts went unrewarded by both Zionists and Palestinians, as

¹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 477.

² Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary*, p. 86

³ According to Brian Garfield, Meinertzhagen's diaries have been found to be 'memoirs, created and then re-created long after the events, with the author's retrospective (and often fictional) "spin"'. Brian Garfield, *The Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a Colossal Fraud*, (Washington, D.C., Potomac, 2007), p. 7.

⁴ Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, p. 184.

acknowledged by Chaim Weizmann, leader of the Zionist Commission for Palestine. Contrasting Storrs with the openly anti-Zionist Governor of Jaffa Colonel John Hubbard, Weizmann reflects that 'he was much more subtle in his approach. He was everyone's friend; but try as he might, he failed to gain the confidence of the Jewish community'.⁵ Similarly oud player, poet and chronicler Wasif Jawharriyeh (who performed for Storrs at Governorate House in Jerusalem) claimed that 'Sir Ronald Storrs was one of the most cunning colonists, and many incidents testify to this. On special occasions he presented himself as a loyal friend of the Arabs, but at the same time he presented himself to the Jewish settlers as a keystone of Zionism'.⁶

The difficulties that Storrs faced endearing himself to Palestinians and Zionists can be attributed to his position as a British official who was obliged by his role to perform certain contradictory policies. However, his aforementioned assertion of 'not being wholly for either, but for both', together with a willingness to socialise with Palestinians and Zionists, learn about Arab and Hebrew culture and take a dynamic role in preserving Jerusalem through the Pro-Jerusalem Society, suggests that these difficulties were not simply the result of blindly following British policy. In actively seeking to forge friendships and cordial relations with both parties, it was inevitable that would have to disappoint them at some point. He mixed the professional and the personal, raising hopes and dashing them as he looked to fulfil his duty as British Governor of Jerusalem.

But where were the seeds of this approach sown? Storrs' family background, formative years at school, university and his fledging career as a British colonial administrator in Egypt shed light on many of the key traits he exhibited in Jerusalem. His intellect, wit, sociable nature, ego, love of literature, architecture and the aesthetic, religious convictions and pseudo-intellectualism were all present at different moments of his life prior to his calling in Palestine.

⁵ Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann*, (London, Hamilton, 1949), p. 220.

⁶ Salim Tamari and Issam Nassar ed., *The Storyteller of Jerusalem: The Life and Times of Wasif Jawhariyyeh*, (Massachusetts, Olive Branch Press, 2014), p. 188.

Family

Ronald Henry Amherst Storrs was born on 19 November 1881 in Bury St Edmunds, the eldest child of Anglican priest John Storrs and Lucy Anna Maria Cockayne-Cust (daughter of Henry Francis Cockayne Cust MP). The following 15 years saw the couple have a further 5 children: Francis (b. 1882); Bernard (b. 1884); Monica (b. 1888); Christopher (b. 1889) and Lucy (b. 1896). In his autobiography Storrs recalls being ‘somewhat spoilt’⁷ as a child but fondly reflects that the first childhood home he could remember, 2 Grosvenor Gardens, was ‘the kindest and happiest that any boy ever had’.⁸

Orientations gives the reader brief vignettes of Storrs’ parents. Storrs writes warmly about his mother, recalling her ‘irregular brilliance and kindness’, ‘personal service...and personal loyalty to her family, or to anyone who had been kind to her, for better or worse until death’.⁹ She was his first port of call when writing home; he wrote to her throughout his formative years and many of the existing letters in his personal papers are addressed to his ‘Dearest Mother’. From her Storrs seems to have refined his taste in furniture and the aesthetic, noting that ‘her home, furnished in Queen Anne and Chippendale furniture against a background of clear greens and reds, and pleasantly free from “amusing Victorian revivals”, was beautiful and characteristic’.¹⁰ Indeed, his mother was a sounding post for home furnishing ideas, both during his time at Charterhouse¹¹ and in Egypt.¹²

Of his father, he notes that ‘from him I learnt at least to cherish the Church of England, to work for it when in authority and to realize the cheapness of some attacks upon the Anglican priesthood’.¹³ Yet these lessons were tainted by regret

⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 7.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 5.

¹¹ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1 – 1902 Diary, Early Letters and Family Papers. Here, Storrs asks his mother’s advice on how to decorate his study and makes some suggestions of his own.

¹² Storrs to his mother, 20/9/1916, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1. In this letter Storrs thanks his mother ‘a thousand times’ for suggesting he purchases a Queen Anne table.

¹³ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 4.

that his father 'was practically, but not deeply or widely read: a foolish disappointment later to an undergraduate son, who nevertheless learnt by experience that, for the parish priest (and maybe for his superiors) too many books spoil the cloth'.¹⁴ Such a recollection demonstrates the importance Storrs later placed on a wide breadth of knowledge and intellect. However, they do little to reveal how he perceived his family as a child. As a schoolboy it would appear that Revd. Storrs exerted a far greater influence on his son, leading the young Ronald to declare early in his Charterhouse career that he was contemplating following in his father's footsteps and becoming a vicar.¹⁵ Clearly factors external to the family unit influenced Storrs' eventual career path.

Thus the education that the young Ronald Storrs received at Temple Grove School and Charterhouse is of great importance. Both need to be analysed, not least because Storrs himself considered Charterhouse a 'repetition of Temple Grove' with regard to the emphasis on Classics in their curriculum.¹⁶ To neglect one in favour of the other would also ignore that many life skills were learnt at prep before boys went on to attend their public school.¹⁷ Moreover, the atmosphere in which boys were educated had a large influence on their upbringing and world view. They were often boarding, sent miles from the family home and inculcated into the prevailing values of their particular school for a large part of the year.¹⁸ Whilst these values reflected many of the preoccupations of Victorian elite society such as nationalism, empire and imperialism, this does not mean that all public schools were homogenous in their approach to curricular matters.¹⁹ Thus it is necessary to recreate the atmosphere and aims of both Temple Grove and Charterhouse, before considering Storrs' interaction with these institutions.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 3.

¹⁵ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1. The childlike quality of Storrs' handwriting would suggest that this letter was written early in his time at Charterhouse.

¹⁶ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 9.

¹⁷ Donald Leinster-Mackay, "The Nineteenth-Century English Preparatory School: Cradle and Creche of Empire?" in J.A. Mangan ed., *Benefits Bestowed? Education and British Imperialism*, (Abingdon, 2012) pp. 56-75.

¹⁸ Meston Batchelor, *Cradle of Empire: A Preparatory School through Nine Reigns*, (London, Phillimore, 1981), p. xiv.

¹⁹ Edward C. Mack, *Public Schools since 1860: The Relationship between Contemporary Ideas and the Evolution of an English Institution*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1941).

Temple Grove 1892-1895

Temple Grove School was based at East Sheen in the London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames. Throughout the nineteenth century, the institution achieved national prominence as one of the ‘famous five’ preparatory schools in the country,²⁰ yet by the time Storrs entered in 1892 the quality of teaching and moral standards appeared to be in decline.²¹ Despite this the school continued to provide students with ‘training for...the acceptance of responsibilities all over the world’, with an emphasis on ‘patriotism and individual leadership’.²² It achieved this via a curriculum that neglected mathematics and the arts, instead stressing the importance of religion and Classics.²³ Temple Grove gave the young Storrs his first introduction to ‘the perfection of Horace, the frightening excitement of *Oedipus Tyrannus*’ and ‘Gepp’s *Latin Verse* and Dean Bradley’s *Latin Prose*’, all of which continued to fascinate Storrs as an adult.²⁴

This classical grounding took place against a backdrop of austere living conditions. In the winter ‘snow frequently piled up on the blankets, and ice formed on the water-jugs’,²⁵ whilst according to Storrs ‘the lavatories would have been condemned in a slum tenement’.²⁶ Meals were plain and spartan; rumours abounded that the graves of dogs in the school grounds were really the final resting place for boys who succumbed to the poor fare on offer.²⁷ For young boys away from home for the first time this environment must have been a great shock. One method of coping was to make light of the situation, as immortalised in an end of term song sung by students:

²⁰ Peter Gronn, *The Making of Educational Leaders*, (London, Cassell, 1999), pp. 49-50.

²¹ Batchelor, *Cradle of Empire*, p. 42. Rev. Joseph Haythorne Edgar became headmaster in 1880 and remained in post until 1893 (1 year after Storrs joined). His period in charge was characterised by some as seeing “a certain falling off in the hitherto excellent moral tone of the school, a certain increase in cheating, intolerance and bullying, and a decline in respect for authority”. See also Simon Wright, *Waterfield’s School: A Preparatory School in its Victorian Heyday*, (Herons Ghyll, Herons Ghyll Press, 1994), p. 189.

²² Batchelor, *Cradle of Empire*, pp. 14-15 and p. 107. As early as 1874, 26 former students had addresses in India or “foreign parts”.

²³ Wright, *Waterfield’s School*, pp. 146-152; Batchelor, *Cradle of Empire*, p. 26.

²⁴ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 8.

²⁵ Batchelor, *Cradle of Empire*, p. 52.

²⁶ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 8.

²⁷ Batchelor, *Cradle of Empire*, p. 38.

This time next week, where shall I be?

Not in this acadamee:

No more Latin, no more Greek,

No more cane to make me squeak,

No more German, no more French,

No more standing on the bench,

No more greasy bread and butter,

No more water from the gutter,

No more spiders in my tea

Making googly eyes at me!²⁸

Whilst the food on offer to students was substandard, the school prided itself on being the feeding grounds for Eton and Harrow.²⁹ The Temple Grove Song acknowledges this fact, paying tribute to former students at Eton for distinguishing themselves in exams.³⁰ In this regard Storrs failed in one of the fundamental aims of the school; achieving an Eton Scholarship.³¹ No evidence survives of how Storrs reacted to this news at the time, but one can imagine his bitter disappointment at missing out on a prize which his school community held in such high regard. Such a setback had a personal connection; Harry Cust – an uncle on his mother’s side whom Storrs idolised – was an old Etonian held in high regard by his teachers and peers during his time at the school.³² However, from adversity came success, and within a year Storrs had achieved a Junior Scholarship at Charterhouse School, entering the school aged 13 and a half in Oration Quarter (Autumn Term) of 1895.³³

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 36-37.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 48. As Headmaster, Edgar was quoted as saying to a doubtful examinee: ‘My boy, I feed Eton and Harrow and don’t intend you to fail at a place like Marlborough’.

³⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 60-1.

³¹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 9.

³² Anita Leslie, *The Marlborough House Set*, (New York, Doubleday, 1973), p. 243.

³³ Storrs is likely to have sat examinations in a variety of subjects that Temple Grove had prepared him for. According to the 1904 Scholarship protocol, candidates sat examinations in Greek Translation, Latin Translation, Latin Composition (Prose and Verse), French, Mathematics (Arithmetic, Algebra, Euclid I, II, III), and English Dictation. See A.H. Tod, *Charterhouse*, (London, G. Bell and Sons, 1919), p. 134.

Charterhouse: 1895-1900

The form system at Charterhouse functioned solely on a boy's ability, not his age. Given the progress that Storrs made at the school, it is not remiss to say he excelled at Classics in his five years in Surrey. Upon arrival he immediately skipped several more junior forms to find himself in Remove B Form, where many of his classmates would have been much older than him.³⁴ Storrs was in this form for two Quarters (terms), working his way to the top of the class before being promoted to the Under V Form (B) in Cricket Quarter (Summer Term) of 1896. In July of 1896 he sat examinations in Classics, Mathematics, Natural Sciences and French, coming 15th out of 100 candidates in Classics, 85th out of 109 candidates in Mathematics, 35th out of 48 students in Natural Sciences and 32nd out of 106 in French. When one considers he had only joined V Form (B) at the start of that Quarter and that he was competing against boys much older than him, Storrs' performance was more than acceptable. Indeed, he won the class prize for Classics in this year.

Following this success, Storrs skipped the main Fifth Form and was promoted straight into the Under VI Form in Oration Quarter of 1896. Competing against the more senior Middle VI Form, Storrs posted respectable exam results at the end of Cricket Quarter 1897, finishing 20th in his new class for Classics. Further promotion followed, arriving in the Middle VI Form and staying in this class for two years. His results in Classics during Cricket Quarter of 1898 were fairly average, finishing 13th out of 26 students, but in Oration Quarter of 1899 he won a Classics Exhibition to Pembroke College, Cambridge – his father's alma mater. In the 1899 examinations he was top for Classics, with the form Classics prize the reward for his travails.³⁵

³⁴ Charterhouse operated a three form system. A and B Forms were classical forms which were taught parallel with each other and examined at the same time of the year. In 1877 C Form was introduced. This was an army class and only candidates for Sandhurst or Woolwich were initially admitted. Here the emphasis was less on Classics and more on modern languages such as French or German. See *Ibid*, pp. 121-24 for more on Charterhouse's form system.

³⁵ All Storrs' examination results are contained in the Blue Books, a register of exam results published annually by Charterhouse.

Despite his obvious abilities, letters from Storrs to his mother show that he suffered from many of the worries common to teenagers at a formative stage in their lives. Given Storrs' custom of not dating letters from Charterhouse – a habit which infuriated his mother³⁶ – it is difficult to identify an exact chronology of his time at the school. However certain key traits emerge. At times he suffered from homesickness having arrived back at Charterhouse after the holidays 'safely but sad';³⁷ in another moment lamenting 'oh, how I wish I'd never left my kind parents and my comfortable home'.³⁸ During examinations season he reports being 'despondent', urging his mother to 'not really expect much' as his 'classics might desert' him.³⁹ Mathematics remained a constant struggle throughout his time in Surrey, on occasions going 'capitally'⁴⁰ and on others holding back his progress through the forms.⁴¹

Notwithstanding these self-doubts, Storrs did not hesitate to report his successes. On several occasions he informed his mother with great pride that he was top of his form.⁴² His peers clearly knew of his reputation as a classicist, with Storrs recounting that:

8 fellows came in one night, all clamouring for Lat. Verses. I did them – very badly, with heaps of bad mistakes – and next day 8 boys were doing impositions. 8 boys who, I think will not come to me again.⁴³

³⁶ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 6.

³⁷ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

³⁸ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

³⁹ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1. In this letter Storrs also mentions Cambridge winning; presumably a reference to the Boat Race. This would date the letter in 1899 as Oxford had won the previous 10 races.

⁴⁰ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

⁴¹ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1. Storrs states his was briefly in VI Form but was moved back down temporarily due to his maths. This would date the letter at approximately 1896-97.

⁴² Various undated letters from Storrs to his mother, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

⁴³ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1. The underlining appears in the original letter.

With his academic abilities came power, and even as a schoolboy Storrs was willing to use this power to deceive those who took his word at face value.⁴⁴

Undoubtedly the largest influence on Storrs at Charterhouse was the Sixth Form Master, Thomas Ethelbert Page. Later Storrs would reflect that Page's lessons provided 'permanent inspiration in the great humanities' as 'one of the few who could inspire as well as teach'.⁴⁵ At the time, letters to his mother reflect the young Storrs' excitement at receiving a 'bene' from Page for his work on *Alcaeus*, a honour that was a 'great rarity'.⁴⁶ Page is the only Master who appears by name more than once in Storrs' missives back to his mother, demonstrating the regard with which the student held his tutor.⁴⁷

But what was the influence of this masterful teacher on his pupil? Storrs notes that Page had qualities as both a good don and a good schoolmaster, acknowledging that the art of teaching is not merely imparting knowledge but understanding the mentality and mindset of your students.⁴⁸ Later in life Storrs would similarly position himself as an expert who could both understand and allay Arab and Zionist concerns in Palestine through understanding their culture and grievances. Moreover, Page believed in constant efforts:

To give security against oppression and injustice even to the humblest, to lighten as far as may be those hardships which weigh and must weigh on great masses of our population, and to give to every man

⁴⁴ There is little context to the story in the letter. We do not know if the boys had behaved in a threatening manner towards him and, if they did, has Storrs engaged in some self-censorship so as not to alarm his mother? However, there can be little doubt in this instance that Storrs used his abilities in Latin to trick the boys in order to make his life easier.

⁴⁵ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 10.

⁴⁶ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

⁴⁷ Various undated letters from Storrs to his mother, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

⁴⁸ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 10. He makes this observation by comparing Page to the Headmaster of Charterhouse, Dr Rendall, who 'had noble qualities as a scholar, a writer and a gentleman' but 'knew nothing (and never at Charterhouse learnt anything) about boys'.

and woman at least some opportunity of putting to fruitful use whatever talents or capabilities they possess.⁴⁹

The direct impact of these views on his students, and on Storrs in particular, is not clear. However, when one considers that Page's students were not given merely 'the *ipissima verba* of immortal writers but the *ipissima verba* of T.E. Page'⁵⁰, it is hard to imagine he did not have some bearing on his students' outlook. Indeed, years later Storrs acknowledged that Page was a scholar of 'inspiration and remembrance',⁵¹ implying that his lessons lived long with his pupils. The emphasis on individual leadership across the Empire provided by Temple Grove met within Storrs a sense of civic duty provided by T.E. Page. Both would help formulate Storrs' outlook in Jerusalem. Indeed, as Storrs neared the end of his time at Charterhouse, he encouraged his mother to look for jobs for him in the Imperial or Domestic Civil Service.⁵² Three years under Page's tutelage had clearly turned Storrs' head away from the clergy and towards administration.⁵³

However, this was civic duty with a strong imperial predisposition. In many ways Charterhouse in the late 19th century provided the perfect breeding ground for a future colonial administrator like Storrs. The school maintained strong links with alumna serving in various roles across the globe, actively celebrating their achievements in *The Carthusian*, the school magazine which every student paid 6d a month for as part of their school fees.⁵⁴ These salutations reached fever pitch during the Second Boer War, where the Old Carthusian Lieutenant-Colonel

⁴⁹ Niall Rudd, *T.E. Page: Schoolmaster Extraordinary*, (Bristol, Bristol Classical Press, 1981), p. 45.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 58.

⁵¹ Humphrey Bowman, *Middle East Window: With an Introduction by Sir Ronald Storrs*, (London, Longmans, Green and Co, 1942), p. xv.

⁵² Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1. The letter can be approximately dated to 1899-1900 because it mentions dropping lessons in Maths. Storrs did not sit any papers in Maths in those years.

⁵³ On an unrelated note of possible interest, Page was offered the headship of Harrow and Shrewsbury but declined as both posts required him to take Holy Orders. According to Page, taking Holy Orders was 'not the subject of barter', Rudd, *T.E. Page*, p. 39.

⁵⁴ *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 231, April 1898; *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 245, November 1899.

Robert Baden-Powell was glorified in prose and verse for his actions.⁵⁵ His links to the school were constantly referenced by students, as this poetic submission attests:

But there was General Symons;
Good English blood was he;
And he did stand on the right hand,
'Twixt Glencoe and Dundee.

Lo, also Baden-Powell,
Carthusian great was he;
He did abide on the left side,
Defending Kimberley.

Brave Symons beat the Dutchmen
On Glencoe's bloodstained field.
A glorious fight! But he was dead
Ah, what a price to yield!

Next White at Elands Laagte
That victory who'll forget?
And Charterhouse at Kimberley
Is undefeated yet!⁵⁶

Here the school is projected into battle, as if Charterhouse itself were actually there fighting. The bond between alma mater and alumna transcended continents and oceans, creating a community where imperial duty and sacrifice was admired and aspired towards.

A similar strong connection between school and student was maintained by Storrs throughout his life, despite his overseas work. An “Entertainment” lecture

⁵⁵ *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 247, February 1900; *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 248, March 1900; Vol. 7, Issue 250, June 1900 and *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 252, August 1900.

⁵⁶ *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 247, February 1900.

delivered by British architect and designer C.R. Ashbee would later partially contribute to his appointment as Storrs' Technical Assistant in Jerusalem.⁵⁷ The school library regularly received copies of books related to Storrs' colonial position, cementing his bond with the school and highlighting the importance with which he viewed his career.⁵⁸ He also attended various functions hosted by the school: the celebration of Charterhouse's tercentenary in 1911,⁵⁹ 1924's Old Carthusian Day,⁶⁰ and a dinner for Saunderites (his old house) in 1936.⁶¹ Furthermore, he returned to the school in May 1947 and December 1948 to lecture on the 'Jewish problem' and T.E. Lawrence respectively.⁶² Clearly the strong bond expected between Charterhouse and her students rubbed off on Storrs.

And yet despite the importance of Charterhouse to his development and his maintenance of links with the school, the failure to get into Eton continued to haunt Storrs. In *Orientations*, he reflects that at Charterhouse:

There was not enough of that personal and individual interest in the boys exhibited for many decades at Eton, where music and other studies off the beaten scholastic or athletic track have been consistently tolerated and sometimes encouraged. Thirty-five years ago at Charterhouse one did one's music by stealth without the faintest fear of ever having to blush to find it fame...Our standard of schoolwork was low, and every sort of shirking considered correct.⁶³

⁵⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 312.

⁵⁸ In March 1919, Storrs sent the School Library a copy of the Palestine 1918-19 Budget statement. This was later followed by further books on Palestine and Cyprus in December 1930, June 1932, December 1948 and July 1953. See *The Carthusian*, Vol. 12, Issue 406, March 1919; *The Carthusian*, Vol. 15, Issue 8, December 1930; *The Carthusian*, Vol. 15, Issue 17, June 1932; *The Carthusian*, Vol. 20, Issue 2, December 1948 and *The Carthusian*, Vol. 21, Issue 4, July 1953.

⁵⁹ *The Carthusian*, Vol. 10, Issue 351, August 1911.

⁶⁰ *The Carthusian*, Vol. 13, Issue 440, July 1924.

⁶¹ *The Carthusian*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, February 1936.

⁶² *The Carthusian*, Vol. 19, Issue 14, May 1947 and *The Carthusian*, Vol. 20, Issue 2, December 1948. A review was provided for his talk on Lawrence which praised Storrs' 'very fortunate gift' of a 'good speaking voice'.

⁶³ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 11.

This despite Charterhouse providing a full and varied schedule of music in hall, as a cursory glance of any copy of *The Carthusian* will attest. However, behaviour in these concerts was far from satisfactory, suggesting that music was not valued highly by students, much to Storrs' later chagrin.⁶⁴

If Storrs' love of music was not agreeably catered for by Charterhouse, it appears that he found solace by participating in various other extracurricular activities. He was a keen chess player, representing his house in intermural and school in extramural tournaments,⁶⁵ whilst his dedication to the game reflected in his role as Treasurer of the Chess Club between 1898-1900.⁶⁶ In pursuing 'the king of games and the game of kings' at Charterhouse we see the influence of his family upon his school days. Storrs' father taught him how to play, claiming that 'once having acquired the love of chess you will never waste time or money on cards'.⁶⁷ This appreciation for chess would later come to the fore when in Jerusalem. Likewise his love of books developed at home⁶⁸ and flourished at Charterhouse, with one Master donating an edition of Horace to Storrs' 'bibliophile collection'.⁶⁹ Whilst Charterhouse may have shaped Storrs in some regards, his familial upbringing also helped mould him.

One extracurricular experience that Charterhouse definitely fostered was Storrs' membership of the Rifle Corps. The school had a proud history of marksmanship and had achieved success in the Ashburton Shield, an inter-school shooting contest.⁷⁰ Whilst Storrs never competed for the 1st VIII, he did participate in the mock operations organised by the Corps by helping his team win a field day.⁷¹

⁶⁴ *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 222, April 1897 and *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 226, October 1897. Complaints were made about the level of noise in music hall, which was deemed by many to be 'un-Carthusian'. Issue 226 laments the fact that no satisfactory solution had been found by staff to improve student behaviour during the concert.

⁶⁵ For his results see *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 220, February 1897; *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 222, April 1897; *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 223, May 1897; *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 233, July 1898; *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 237, December 1898 and *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 247, February 1900.

⁶⁶ *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 244, October 1899.

⁶⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 7-8.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 7. Storrs recalls reading 'with all the delight we could get'.

⁶⁹ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

⁷⁰ Tod, *Charterhouse*, p. 67.

⁷¹ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

When he left the school in July of 1900 he had reached the rank of Sergeant.⁷² Such a military organisation would have taught Storrs order, discipline, the importance of cooperation and team-work.

Similar skills would have been used by Storrs in his role as a monitor for Saunderites House. Housemasters had little to do with the everyday running of the house and so discipline was kept by half-dozen monitors. According to school code on discipline:

- I. ONLY the Head Monitor of the School, and the Head Monitors of the several boarding-houses, may inflict corporal punishment. The boys liable to such punishment are those who are below the Upper Fifth Form.
- II. Corporal punishment is not to be inflicted without the deliberate sanction of all the School Monitors, or of all the Monitors of the House to which the offending boy belongs, and is limited to those cases which in their joint opinion render such punishment absolutely necessary. The punishment must be inflicted by the Head Monitor, but not unless all the Monitors of the School or House (according to the circumstances) be present.⁷³

Such rules clearly outline the importance of cooperation and consensus, traits that Storrs was obliged to use as a monitor and later developed in Jerusalem.

This following of protocol was only reserved for those within the school community. For those outside it Storrs had a very different approach. In frenzied celebrations following a Charterhouse victory in the Ashburton Cup, he recounts seeing:

A great beast of the Godalming scum nearly knock over a master's wife and daughter, who were looking on and clapping in evening dress:

⁷² *The Carthusian*, Vol. 7, Issue 249, April 1900.

⁷³ Tod, *Charterhouse*, p. 83.

so I gave him one under the chin in very gallant style and received a [word undecipherable] pair of smiles and thanks in reward.⁷⁴

No doubt Storrs saw his actions as an exercise in chivalry and virtue. The reality is a display of arrogance and intolerance which would manifest itself at times later in life.

Cambridge 1900-1903

Storrs left Charterhouse 'vaguely unfulfilled and so disappointed', no doubt in part because the school could never live up to his Etonian ideal. Despite this he claimed he departed for his Classical Scholarship at Pembroke College, Cambridge with 'tears in my eyes'.⁷⁵ The college was his father's alma mater and it seems the young Storrs doubted he could make the grade, writing to his mother that he didn't think he would be a success.⁷⁶ Self-reprimands such as these would become a regular part of Storrs' psyche at Cambridge and beyond.

Few sources survive of Storrs' time at university. Those that do present Storrs as bold and gregarious in public but in private more pensive and self-critical. His 1902 diary – one of the few that survived the destruction of his personal papers in Cyprus – shows a man who had a strong social life, playing ping pong, tennis and chess. He had a clear work ethic and chastised himself when he fell short of the standards he set himself. Many entries note down the number of hours reading completed in a day, with great disdain shown if the day had been unproductive.⁷⁷ Storrs also makes numerous pithy judgements on how his day had been: either 'good day', 'bad day', 'fair day' or 'medium day'.⁷⁸ These

⁷⁴ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1. Godalming is a village near to Charterhouse.

⁷⁵ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 11.

⁷⁶ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1. The Headmaster of Charterhouse, Rendall, suggested that Storrs should go forward for the scholarship before then telling the unfortunate student that he didn't have 'much chance...but that it was a good thing to get used to it'.

⁷⁷ Storrs' Diary, 1902, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1. For evidence of Storrs's dislike of wasting a day see entries for 10/2/1902 ('Morning very depressing: read some useless rot') and 1/2/1902 ('Have read practically nothing lately...A very bad day indeed').

⁷⁸ Storrs' Diary, 1902, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

accounts, together with regular notation of the time he awoke and went to bed, suggests that Storrs was keen to maintain a semblance of order and discipline in his life, being 'conscious at the time...that I passed many hours in idleness and dissipation of energy'.⁷⁹ Such an approach worked as in 1903 Storrs graduated with a 'reasonably good First' in Classical Tripos, although by his own admittance only because he 'worked hard for two months' before the exam.⁸⁰ Blessed with a natural intellect, Storrs was able combine socialising and study at Cambridge (with emphasis on the former).

Later, Storrs would reflect that his time at Pembroke was 'a continuation of the public school system at its best' but there was an absence of 'chaleur communicative' within the College.⁸¹ He best found this spirit via his membership of the Decemviri, a 10-man debating society which considered topics as varied as 'The public school system is rotten'; 'That a polished coal is preferable to a rough diamond'; and 'That tolerance has become a vice'. Storrs himself opposed a motion that 'The state should prevent hardened criminals from adding to the population', although his contribution to the debate and its eventual outcome was not recorded.⁸² Nonetheless, his involvement with this elite club, whose membership at the time included John Maynard Keynes, Giles Strachey and Charles Tennyson, demonstrates the high regard that Storrs was held in socially and academically by his contemporaries.

It is Tennyson who provides the most complete portrait of Storrs at university. Writing on the 'Long Vacation' in June and July, where 'only those who really love Cambridge and find her life congenial take advantage of this opportunity to enjoy it'⁸³, he records coming upon a 'strange figure of so vehement a personality that you cannot understand how even the dead weight of propriety amidst which he lives can have so long concealed him from you'. This person added:

⁷⁹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 14.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p. 15.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 14. This desire for 'communicative warmth' in his relationships emerges throughout his time in Egypt and Palestine.

⁸² See various undated Decemviri invitations in Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

⁸³ Charles Tennyson, *Cambridge from Within*, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1913), p. 185.

A fresh quality to intercourse, which is neither wit nor humour but which none the less makes you laugh till your ribs ache and your whole system quakes in protest...You go back to tea with him, and find his rooms equipped with an austerity for which his rather florid taste in costume had not prepared you...Tea threatens to prolong itself to dinner-time. He opens the piano, and, for half an hour, entertains you with fragments of Bach, Wagner, and Beethoven, all of which he plays by ear with an excellent touch but little continuity, singing and whistling in accompaniment from time to time with extraordinary spirit and volume. Now he mimics the English horn through his nose, now strengthens a weak passage in his instrumentation with a spluttering imitation of the drum, now neighs in a manner strangely suggestive of the violin. You find yourself armed with a comb and a piece of paper to represent some other member of the orchestra. You even sing – to your own great surprise, and with an inaccuracy that elicits a howl of execration from your host. At seven o'clock you stumble out into Trumpington Street with your ears ringing and your mind in a whirl, and make your way back to the evening quiet of your own college weighted and stimulated with new experience.⁸⁴

Such was the wild and precocious talent that Storrs possessed whilst at university and throughout his career.

The 'austerity' described by Tennyson was enforced by debts that Storrs had accumulated as a student. In his entry of February 12th 1902 he notes 'a slight scuffle with mother about debts'.⁸⁵ Later correspondence with his father shows the financial impact educating Storrs and his siblings had on the household, with his parents moving out of the vicarage for four months 'just in order to try and get

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 191-194. Despite the anonymity of this extract, there are three signs that Tennyson is writing about Storrs. First, Storrs writes to his mother stating that a full pen-portrait of himself can be found in the chapter on the long vacation (see Storrs to his mother, 13/4/1913, Storrs Papers, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 2 – Egypt 1904-1913). Second, Storrs liked Bach and Wagner and had a 'passionate admiration' for Flemish Primitives (see Storrs, *Orientalisms*, pp. 14-15). Third, Pembroke College is on Trumpington Street.

⁸⁵ Storrs' Diary, 12/2/1902, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

out of debt and keep you all at Cambridge'.⁸⁶ Academic merit had earned Storrs his places at Charterhouse and Pembroke, although he seemed incapable of living within the financial parameters set by his scholarships.⁸⁷

Tennyson encapsulates much of the strength and vibrancy of Storrs' personality. This sense of mischief and joy undoubtedly came from Harry Cust, the uncle whose company Storrs described as drinking 'at that fountain of joy'. He became increasingly influential in Ronald's life during his later Cambridge vacations, opening his nephew's mind to new 'intellectual horizons' and treating him 'almost as a son'.⁸⁸ To Storrs he represented the pinnacle of intelligence and sociability, noting that:

Round his table in St James's Lodge, Delahay Street...you encountered, magically assimilated to the surroundings, a variety of social experience ranging from the presence together of a Ras Makonnen of Abyssinia and the Archbishop of Armagh, to a combination during the heat of some political controversy of Mr Asquith, Prime Minister, and Mr Balfour, leader of the Opposition.⁸⁹

Moreover, Cust's wit was of great renown. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt recalls in his diaries on October 2 1909 that:

Harry described to us Asquith's adventure with the Suffragettes at Lympne. He was there with Asquith and Herbert Gladstone, and the suffragettes assaulted Asquith, striking him on the face with their fists, or rather with their wrists (he gave a demonstration). He, Harry, was Secretary of the Golf Club and intervened, telling the women that

⁸⁶ Storrs father to Storrs, 7/3/1904, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

⁸⁷ This pattern would appear to repeat itself during Storrs' time in Egypt. In June 1907 he was summoned to appear in court for non-payment of 96 piastres worth of goods and services procured from Longdon and Co. in January 1905. The case was scheduled to be heard on October 29 1907, but one week before the trial date Longdon withdrew his action, presumably on receipt of payment. See FO 841/93/60 - W Longdon (Longdon and Co) v. Ronald Storrs, TNA.

⁸⁸ Storrs' tribute to Cust after his death on 17/3/1917, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

⁸⁹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 33. See pp. 27-35 for Storrs' full reflections on his uncle.

whatever their dispute with the Prime Minister might be it was impossible they should be allowed to walk on the grass, as it was against the regulations of the Club. This, he said, impressed them. Asquith defended himself, and caught hold of one of the women and Herbert of another, and eventually got away in a motor.⁹⁰

Yet Cust's life was one of unfulfilled potential and scandal. Acknowledged by a master at Eton as more likely than Curzon and Rosebery to become Prime Minister, he embarked on a career in law after graduating from Cambridge in Classics before then entering Parliament in 1890 as Conservative member for Stamford in Lincolnshire. In 1892 he was offered the editorship of the *Pall Mall Gazette* and immediately accepted, holding the position until February 1896 when he was dismissed following editorial disagreements with the newspaper's proprietor, Lord Astor. Having left Parliament in 1895, Cust was re-elected as MP for Bermondsey in 1900, serving until 1906. He was also a prominent member of The Souls, an elite social group made up of key figures of the later nineteenth and early twentieth century such as Lord Curzon, Arthur Balfour and Margot Asquith. Here they discussed the pressing matters of the day, wrote poetry and rhyme and engaged in battles of wits with each other.

His affiliation with The Souls was not without controversy. A notorious womaniser, in 1892 he fathered at least one illegitimate child with Lady Violet Manners, Duchess of Rutland, and was reputed to have sired many more with other women. Shortly after this he fell in love with Pamela Wyndham, whilst at the same time having a dalliance with Nina Welby-Gregory. Scandal ensued when Welby-Gregory announced she was pregnant and a loveless sham marriage soon followed, despite the fact that Nina never bore Harry a child.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *My Diaries: Being a Personal Narrative of Events 1888-1914*, (London, Martin Secker, 1932), pp. 688-689. Storrs provides his own version of this story that states Cust was not Secretary of the golf club. See Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 34. However, we do know that Cust was a member of Blunt's Crabbet Club, a collection of individuals who met at Blunt's Crabbet Park Estate.

⁹¹ For more on Cust's life and The Souls see Jane Abdy and Charlotte Gere, *The Souls: An Elite in English Society 1885-1930*, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984), Nancy Ellenberger, *Balfour's World: Aristocracy and Political Culture at the Fin de Siècle*, (Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 2015), Angela Lambert, *Unquiet Souls: The Indian Summer of the British Aristocracy, 1880-1918*, (London, Macmillan, 1984), Leslie, *The Marlborough House Set*, and Scott, *The Life and Death of a Newspaper*.

This lothario lifestyle was in direct contrast to Storrs' religious upbringing. Nonetheless, Cust's influence on his personality and outlook cannot be overlooked. Whilst acknowledging that Cust 'apparently did so little', Storrs asserts that 'his place in my life cannot be filled'.⁹² The breadth of his uncle's knowledge, his wit and wide social circle were all things that he tried to emulate in his life, particularly after Cust's death on March 2 1917. In the introduction to Cust's *Occasional Poems* (published by Storrs in Jerusalem in 1919), the true extent of the influence on his nephew is demonstrated:

Everywhere and every day there will be amongst the living the others of their generation – a fellowship of presences, some dim, some shining, but presences never to be wholly put away – plucking at their hearts, flooding sometimes their memories, seeming sometimes to touch their hands, masterful sometimes to govern and to save their souls. There will be a sort of national Golden Treasury, sacred and serene, into which men and women will enter at their need to find new faith, new courage, and unfathomed unexhausted consolation.⁹³

Clearly Cust's presence continued to be felt keenly by Storrs throughout his life.

This presence was not just in a personal sense. Storrs owed his subsequent career in Egypt to a chance encounter in 1903 between Cust and Baron Rennell, where his uncle became aware of an opportunity to work in the Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Service.⁹⁴ His Charterhouse ambitions were now becoming reality.

According to the General Instructions for candidates, the role of Assistant Inspector in Egypt or the Sudan was suitable for 'a man of real energy and administrative ability', with successful applicants being expected to 'overlook the work of the Native Officials'.⁹⁵ It was therefore necessary for Storrs to learn Arabic

⁹² Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 35.

⁹³ Quote in Scott, *The Life and Death of a Newspaper*, p. 387.

⁹⁴ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 15.

⁹⁵ General Instructions and Requirements for Candidates for the Anglo-Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Service, published in Peter Mellini, *Sir Eldon Gorst: The Overshadowed Proconsul*, (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1977), pp. 241-251.

for one year, which he did under the supervision of E.G. Browne; conveniently a Professor of Arabic at Pembroke College, Cambridge.⁹⁶ By summer 1904 he had passed the requisite exams and set sail for Egypt in September, leaving behind 'the dearest home and the most loving and loved of parents'.⁹⁷

Egypt: 1904-1917

In 1904 the British occupation of Egypt was in its 22nd year. Crucially, Egypt was not legally under direct British rule. Whilst nominally the Khedivate of Egypt remained part of the Ottoman Empire, Britain exercised *de facto* control over the country. The uncertainty of Britain's position in Egypt stemmed from the imposition of British control in 1882. Military intervention to preserve Khedival rule against the nationalist Urabi uprising, together with concerns about unilateral French actions in Egypt, led to an occupation that was initially intended as temporary but soon become increasingly long-term in its approach. With Lord Cromer as Consul-General, the key aims of British rule for Egypt were providing stable government, financial security and the development of public works. This was reflected in the structure of government in Egypt; with the British financial adviser forming the chief link between the Egyptian Government and the Consul-General. Moreover, the number of Britons working as assistants in Egypt had increased during this time period, from 286 in 1896 to 662 in 1906.⁹⁸ Their influence was such that no Egyptian official could afford to ignore their advice.⁹⁹

This anglicisation of power led to a public increase in Egyptian nationalist sentiment from 1892 onwards. The Denshawai Incident of 1906 and the assassination of Copt Prime Minister Boutros Ghali in 1910 saw marked increases in nationalist agitation.¹⁰⁰ This upsurge, combined with Britain's unclear

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 248, Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 15.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 16.

⁹⁸ Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East*, pp. 226-234. Vatikiotis suggests that such a policy was inherently contradictory, as Britain were attempting to prepare Egyptians for self-government whilst at the same highlighting the benefits of British rule. See P.J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, Fourth Edition*, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), pp. 177-178.

⁹⁹ Robert L. Tignor, *Modernisation and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 392-393.

¹⁰⁰ Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East*, pp. 236-238.

position in Egypt, led to debate on the nature of British rule. Throughout the time that Storrs was in Egypt, successive Pro-Consuls used a variety of different tactics. Under Cromer coercive methods were used (particularly after the Denshawai Incident). From 1907 onwards his successor, Sir Eldon Gorst, took a more conciliatory approach and looked to increase the number of Egyptians employed in government. With Gorst's death in 1911, Lord Kitchener scrapped his predecessors Egyptianisation policy, instead focusing on the development of a new Legislative Assembly with limited political powers.¹⁰¹

Against this backdrop of uncertainty Storrs began his administrative career. Initially posted at the Ministry of Finance in Cairo, he soon found that there was little work for him to complete. Within his first week in Egypt he was instructed to guide a 'high dignitary of the Anglican Church' around the capital, relying on what he deemed to be the two traits of Egypt; 'improvisation' and 'its first cousin, bluff'.¹⁰² Clearly the fledgling administrator already had these traits secured as he ably showed his charge around.

Storrs was lonely and homesick during his first six weeks in Egypt. Lack of work was making him restless and only Reuters news kept his mind occupied.¹⁰³ It was all a far cry from the wide and dynamic social circle he had back in Cambridge. These lonesome days would have a formative effect on Storrs. Desperate to avoid such feelings of isolation later in Jerusalem, he would seek to create opportunities to bring together his twin loves of culture and socialising. However, his prospects in Egypt soon improved when he was introduced to Ernest Richmond of the Buildings Department, with Storrs soon moving in with his new companion in December 1904.¹⁰⁴ A friendship soon emerged, with Storrs later recommending Richmond for positions in Baghdad and Palestine.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, pp. 237-238, Tignor, *Modernisation*, pp. 292-293.

¹⁰² Storrs, *Orientalisms*, pp. 17-19.

¹⁰³ Storrs to his mother, 29/10/1904, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1 – Egypt 1904-1909.

¹⁰⁴ Storrs to his mother, 19/12/1904, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹⁰⁵ See Ernest Tatham Richmond Special Collections Catalogue, University of Durham, accessed online at http://reed.dur.ac.uk/xtf/view?docId=ark/32150_s1fj236216r.xml on 04/06/2019.

Having a salaried job and a place to live, Storrs soon turned his mind to the aesthetic with his customary attention to detail. He wrote several letters to his mother regarding furniture he had commissioned for his new rooms and the correct form of brass handles on a chest of draws, even providing sketches of the handles with annotations.¹⁰⁶ Yet in spite of his new companionship and having a space to furnish, Storrs continued to struggle, not least because he found Egyptian furniture distasteful.¹⁰⁷ Even his appointment as Secretary of the Mines Department in February of 1905 failed to allay his concerns that coming to Cairo was a mistake, despite his initial optimism about his new role.¹⁰⁸ By April, Storrs was already considering his leave entitlement, writing to his mother that he was:

Getting more and more anxious about leave: I don't think I *can* do another year here before coming home: it may lead to success, but I'm far from certain success is worth it.¹⁰⁹

Worse was to follow. His superior in Mines, J.F. Wells, was signed off for 4 months in April, leaving Storrs with an increased workload and concerns that he may be denied leave.¹¹⁰ He needn't have worried, as he was granted a much needed respite in May and June.¹¹¹ Upon his return in July, he experienced 'homesickness approaching despair'.¹¹² Later in the month he was clearly in crisis, becoming:

More than ever certain that I'm not prepared to spend my life in Egypt: the conviction is so strong, that it's difficult to prevent it from shining through every thought and every expression...Have I, in any way, done best in coming to this country?¹¹³

¹⁰⁶ Storrs to his mother, 1/1/1905, 7/1/1905 and 23/1/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹⁰⁷ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 22.

¹⁰⁸ Storrs to his mother, 1/3/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹⁰⁹ Storrs to his mother, 5/4/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹¹⁰ Storrs to his mother, 11/4/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹¹¹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 26.

¹¹² *Ibid*, p. 36.

¹¹³ Storrs to his mother, 24/7/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

Noting that a career in Egypt was only suitable for ‘amateur professionals, technical men and university failures’, he placed himself in the latter category.¹¹⁴ By mid-September he considered a new career, requesting that his mother secured an application form for a position as District Inspector of Schools in London.¹¹⁵ Yet just three days later this request was rescinded, claiming it was ‘a fly’s last struggle in the treacle, the full advantage of which he doesn’t grasp. We none of us know what’s good for us’.¹¹⁶ It is not clear what changed Storrs mind; whether he received advice from his mother or a colleague is unknown. Despite several later complaints about work and loneliness, he decided to stay in Egypt.¹¹⁷

Storrs often longed to go on out-of-office missions, if only to escape the drudgery of his administrative work.¹¹⁸ When the opportunity finally arose in November 1905 to visit a ‘hitherto unexplored mining centre’ with Wells, he jumped at the chance, writing that he was ‘looking forward to it v. much...dismal office filing was beginning to cut into one a bit’.¹¹⁹ Whilst Storrs enjoyed the trip, it in no way altered his opinion of life in Egypt.¹²⁰ He was clearly ill-suited to a desk-job and viewed his role as 75% ‘pure office boy’.¹²¹ Later Storrs claimed he found solace from his boredom at work by ‘walking by the mosques and through the bazaars, trying to learn what the people in them really wanted and really thought’,¹²² although little evidence of these concerns exist in his letters home. Instead, Egyptians appear as individuals who were ‘prepared to give any information away for a fiver’,¹²³ stole clothes,¹²⁴ and were ‘the most ignorant people in the world’.¹²⁵

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Storrs to his mother, 12/9/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹¹⁶ Storrs to his mother, 15/9/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹¹⁷ Storrs to his mother, 17/10/1905 and Storrs to his mother, 4/11/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹¹⁸ Storrs to his mother, 5/4/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹¹⁹ Storrs to his mother, 18/11/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹²⁰ Storrs to his father, 5/12/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹²¹ Storrs to his mother, 17/10/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹²² Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 24.

¹²³ Storrs to his mother, 5/4/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹²⁴ Storrs to his mother, 19/7/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1. This letter recounts asking a local Sheikh if it was safe to swim in a lake. The individual did not give a straight answer and so Storrs decided to risk it, only to find that the Sheikh had stolen his clothes. Storrs caught up with the individual and beat him with his stick.

¹²⁵ Storrs to his father, 5/12/1905, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1. Whilst this comment was aimed at the camel men Storrs came across and not all Egyptians, it is indicative of the disdainful manner in which locals are mentioned in Storrs’ letters.

The haughty prejudices of his Charterhouse days, refined in a perceived climate of languor and frustration, were being replicated in Egypt.

Between 1906 and 1909, Storrs took on several different roles. Early in 1906 he was seconded to the Customs Administration as an Inspector, a job which would mean living outside of Cairo for the first time. He found this work amenable, not least because it provided a variety of different responsibilities away from a desk.¹²⁶ Within a year he was back in the capital as Assistant Private Secretary to the Financial Advisor. Working under Sir Vincent Corbett and Sir Paul Harvey, Storrs soon found that the workload had not increased with his absence in the Finance Ministry and he was once again underutilised.¹²⁷ Further reorganisation occurred, and by 1908 he had started a new role as a Government Auditor. The irony of auditing government finances was not lost on Storrs given his pecuniary history, as he succinctly noted that he had 'never managed to show one quarter's personal budget'. His new role also brought him more regularly into contact with ordinary Egyptians for the first time, where he found them to be both agreeable and courteous, albeit too prone to credulity.¹²⁸

Storrs' rapidly shifting employment was in part initiated by the new Consul-General, Sir Eldon Gorst, who succeeded an ailing Lord Cromer in April 1907. Irreconcilable differences between Gorst and Corbett led to the latter's resignation in October¹²⁹ and within a month Storrs was called to a meeting with approximately 200 others at the British Agency where Gorst outlined his vision for Egypt.¹³⁰ Central to this was the idea of 'Egypt for the Egyptians' and the expansion of native roles in administration. This policy was not entirely new; Cromer had been conscious of the need to accommodate suitable Egyptians in the mechanisms of government¹³¹ but Gorst's aim was to accelerate its

¹²⁶ Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 40-44.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 44 and p. 49.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 50.

¹²⁹ Storrs to his mother, 15/10/1907, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1. Storrs notes that Corbett's departure was met with few pleasantries from Gorst.

¹³⁰ Letter from Gorst to Storrs, 26/10/1907, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹³¹ Letter from Cromer to Corbett, 23/3/1907, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

implementation.¹³² Storrs' response was typical of the ennui he felt towards his position in Egypt, reporting to his mother that:

Last night at six Gorst gave a resume of his policy to about 200 of the British Officials here: it was plain, and though of necessity containing nothing new, instructive, and made one feel what folly it was for England to pledge herself never to make the place a protectorate. Our life here is one long postponement.¹³³

He continued to be frustrated by a lack of work and socialising throughout November, noting that he was 'getting rather tired of always eating alone with a book'.¹³⁴ However, Storrs' abilities and potential had not gone unnoticed, with his superiors suggesting that he could be promoted to Gorst's Private Secretary in due course.¹³⁵

His reward eventually came in September 1909 when he replaced Harry Boyle as Oriental Secretary. Boyle was viewed as Cromer's man and Gorst was keen to remove the old guard and promote like-minded individuals into positions of power.¹³⁶ Storrs had long been earmarked as an individual of great potential¹³⁷ and this role, which involved being the 'eyes, ears, interpretation and Intelligence (in the Military sense)' of the administration, would see him hone and refine his social skills in the pursuit of his work.¹³⁸

However, concerns existed that Storrs' penchant for socialising might be his undoing. Cairo-based family friend Hilda Hunter informed Lucy Storrs that Ronald

¹³² Mellini, *Sir Eldon Gorst*, pp. 154-156. Tignor suggests it was not only domestic concerns that motivated Gorst, arguing that the situation in Europe also influence this Egyptianisation. Britain could ill-afford to divert resources away from the arms race that they were engaged in with Germany and as such looked to a policy of reconciliation within Egypt. See Tignor, *Modernisation*, pp. 292-93.

¹³³ Storrs to his mother, 2/11/1907, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹³⁴ Storrs to his mother, 20/11/1907 and Storrs to his mother, 26/11/1907, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹³⁵ Storrs to his mother, 20/11/1907, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹³⁶ Tignor, *Modernisation*, p. 294, Mellini, *Sir Eldon Gorst*, pp. 175-176.

¹³⁷ Storrs to his mother, 20/11/1907, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1. Storrs reported with great excitement that several more senior administrators had noted his abilities, suggesting that he could eventually be promoted as Gorst's Private Secretary.

¹³⁸ Quote from Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 59.

often came across as 'unsettled and disconcerted' because 'he is so fond of society and there are so few of the people here of the sort he cares for'. Despite this, she held that Cairo was good for Storrs as if he were in London 'he would give himself up to much to society, and that would be a pity as he is much too clever to waste himself like that'.¹³⁹ His new role would allow Storrs to fully utilise his intellect whilst at the same time fulfilling his social needs.

By September 1909, Gorst's Egyptianisation of British rule in Egypt had reached its second year, despite facing considerable opposition from some in the British service who feared their career prospects would be harmed.¹⁴⁰ Describing the implementation of this policy as 'right, but hard',¹⁴¹ the new Oriental Secretary also had to contend with identifying his exact roles and responsibilities. Later, Storrs would reflect that his position was so ill-defined that it became in fact very much what he chose to make of it, foreshadowing the circumstances he would later find in Jerusalem.¹⁴² This freedom allowed him to refine the role to suit his own sociable nature. As early as October, Storrs informed his mother that he was 'trying to systematize the social side by having music, bridge and tennis lists',¹⁴³ whilst in mid-November he reported participating in a Shakespeare course.¹⁴⁴ For the first time in Egypt, Storrs comes across as settled and content.

As a result of his more senior position, Storrs increasingly used the language of Empire and geopolitics. Prior to 1909, his letters overwhelmingly focused on everyday concerns and his unhappiness at working abroad. After his appointment, they increasingly describe Storrs' interpretation of the political situation in Egypt and at home. Increasingly frustrated by the indeterminate nature of Britain's role in Egypt, he declared that someone needed 'the courage to proclaim that we are here incidentally for our own advantage (as well as the glory of the Trinity) and intend to annex or protect'.¹⁴⁵ This irritation towards policymakers and politicians was further compounded after the assassination of

¹³⁹ Hilda Hunter to Storrs' mother, 18/2 – no year given, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹⁴⁰ Mellini, *Sir Eldon Gorst*, p. 158.

¹⁴¹ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 69.

¹⁴² *Ibid*, p. 74.

¹⁴³ Storrs to his mother, 17/10/1909, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹⁴⁴ Storrs to his mother 28/11/1909, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1.

¹⁴⁵ Storrs to Nina Cust, 13/2/1910, Storrs Papers, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 2.

Coptic Prime Minister Boutros Ghali. Rallying against the Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, Storrs argued that 'it's all very well for Grey with, I presume, one eye on India, to say there is no fanaticism here, but does he imagine they would ever have murdered a premier that were Muslim?'¹⁴⁶ The 'man on the spot' was clearly forming his own dissenting opinions on Britain's position in the future governance of Egypt.

However, Storrs also held more mainstream beliefs on the Middle East. Like many of his peers in London and Cairo, he maintained that the Ottoman Empire was in decline and holding back Arabs across the region, whilst also rallying against the actions of Egyptian nationalists against British rule. Moreover, he took a more regional view of affairs as Oriental Secretary, becoming progressively more concerned about French intentions in Syria in particular.¹⁴⁷ Of course the removal of 'the Turk' did not mean that Egyptians or other Arabs across the region were capable of self-government yet; only the guiding hand of the British could ensure that, with Storrs arguing:

I have always maintained that the occupation might very well give effect to Gladstone's old tag of 'Egypt for the Egyptians' in the hot weather. Let them I say stew in their own juice during these months: let us retire and get strong upon clean air, full sized eggs and eatable fruit, returning for the last quarter of the year to pull them out of the various messes into which they have fallen. They might thus hope to develop a little self-reliance and independence, which they could hardly dare to abuse with an annual audit above their heads.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ Storrs to his mother, 25/2/1910, Storrs Papers, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 2.

¹⁴⁷ Storrs to his mother, 29/1/1910, Storrs to his mother, 23/10/1910 and Storrs to his mother, 17/11/1912, Storrs Papers, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 2. See also Letter from Storrs to Harry Cust, 22/2/1915, Storrs Papers, Reel 4, Box 2, Folder 3 – Egypt 1914-1915. By this point British was at war with Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Despite being allied with France, Storrs is adamant that they remain the key obstacle to British aims in the Middle East.

¹⁴⁸ Storrs to his mother, 21/4/1913, Storrs Papers, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 2.

By the time Storrs wrote these views Sir Eldon Gorst had died, together with the policy of Egyptianisation.¹⁴⁹ Clearly both men shared an interest in increasing Egyptian responsibility for their own government, else Storrs was unlikely to have been promoted when he was. This interest, at a formative stage in his career, no doubt influenced Storrs later. He became an outspoken critic of what he termed 'Empire without Imperial opportunity', arguing that 'the appeal to Empire sentiment is a mockery worse than useless unless accompanied by the offer of Imperial opportunities'.¹⁵⁰ Gorst, like Storrs, shared the view that Egyptians needed to be given tangible responsibilities for their own affairs.¹⁵¹

His successor, Lord Kitchener, halted this policy, instead favouring introduction of a fully elected Legislative Assembly with limited powers over the promotion of Egyptians into positions of power. However, in keeping with his elusive nature, Storrs was effusive with praise for both individuals and their policies. In *Orientations*, he records with admiration how Gorst implemented Egyptianisation before later expressing how welcome Kitchener's change of approach was.¹⁵² In a bid to argue the merits of both sides, Storrs opens himself up to accusations of duplicity.

The new Pro-Consul had a strong relationship with his Oriental Secretary.¹⁵³ They had near daily contact between 1911-1914, often dining together either for business or for pleasure.¹⁵⁴ In a chapter dedicated to Kitchener, Storrs rejected any accusations that his superior was wooden or dull, dismissing such claims as 'hearsay evidence'.¹⁵⁵ Instead, he presents the Pro-Consul as the 'Perfect Chief',

¹⁴⁹ Gorst died in 1911. By this point nationalist agitation was on the rise after the assassination of Copt Prime Minister Boutros Ghali and it was widely held that Egyptianisation as a policy was failing.

¹⁵⁰ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 477.

¹⁵¹ Mellini, *Sir Eldon Gorst*, p. 239.

¹⁵² For his views on Gorst see Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 77. For his views on Kitchener see *Ibid*, pp. 108-9.

¹⁵³ Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 126-127. When Kitchener was appointed Minister for War in August 1914 he wanted to make Storrs his Private Secretary. This move was overruled by the Foreign Office who preferred Storrs to remain in Egypt. Storrs' admiration for Kitchener was also noted by his dinner guests. See *Episodes of Lord Kitchener* by Mrs C.N. Williamson, July 1930, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1 which describes Storrs as ardently loyal to Kitchener.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 105 and p. 124, Storrs to his mother, 12/5/1912, Storrs Papers, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 2.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 105.

a man who despite having a fierce reputation for blunt mannerisms and behaviours, was also capable of sensitivity.¹⁵⁶ Storrs was appreciative of his unwavering loyalty and support when in Egypt, which no doubt were of great comfort to a man who so often felt homesick and unsure of his place in the country.¹⁵⁷ Ultimately, Kitchener's untimely death in June 1916 had a large impact on Storrs, leading to a failed attempt to write a biography of his deceased friend and mentor.¹⁵⁸

Despite this close relationship, old doubts and uncertainties could still emerge, especially during Egypt's long, hot summers. By 1913, Storrs returns to a familiar theme: boredom. At this point he had been Oriental Secretary for just under four years and the quietness of Cairo in May and June was taking its toll:

The last three weeks have proved for me one intolerable *longueur*: never have I so madly desired to leave the country; never has the flatness and staleness of three or four months daily attendance in the same Office so weighed me down. It has ended by destroying all continuity of thought or reading two excellent and important books upon which I had embarked – H. Chamberlain's "Foundations of the 19th Century" and the "Grands Initiés" I have had to scuttle in mid ocean, a thing I particularly dislike doing, though I suppose it is a sign of youth to desire to persevere in work which fills one with boredom.¹⁵⁹

Promotions and society alone were therefore not sufficient to keep Storrs amused. He collected art at a prolific rate, took a keen interest in Medieval Cairo and was rewarded with an appointment as a Member of the *Comité de Conservation des Monuments Arabes*. As part of this role he helped to establish a Coptic Museum, described by Storrs as a 'first taste...of creative foundation'. Indeed, he felt that he had never 'discovered any feature in politics, diplomacy or routine administration which confers a more abiding satisfaction'. This proclivity

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 103-27.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 127.

¹⁵⁸ Storrs to his mother, 11/8/1916, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

¹⁵⁹ Storrs to his mother, 20/6/1913, Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 2.

for preservation and collection was all part of a desire to physically present 'a lost world' and was to become central to Storrs' approach in Jerusalem.¹⁶⁰

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 occasioned major changes in the governing of Egypt and in Storrs' own career. In December, Britain's uncertain position occupying Egypt became more concrete with the declaration of a protectorate in response to Ottoman support for Germany. Kitchener's elevation to the War Office saw Sir Henry McMahon arrive as Pro-Consul. For Storrs himself, the war meant utilising all the skills he had developed as Oriental Secretary in secret negotiations with Sharif Hussein of Mecca.¹⁶¹

Storrs played a prominent role in these negotiations, making the initial suggestion that Hussein might be amenable and helping to draft the terms of the agreement.¹⁶² The great British fear was a Muslim insurrection in favour of the Ottomans across the Middle East, and most terrifyingly of all, India. Nerves were not calmed when the Ottoman government declared jihad against Britain and her allies in October 1914. Therefore Storrs and McMahon sought to propagate relations with Hussein in a bid to combat Turco-German influence in the region. The outcome of these negotiations, the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1914-15, led to the British promising support for an independent Arab state in return for an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks. Storrs was particularly delighted with the ambiguity of the concessions for the Arabs, especially the phrase that permitted Britain to only grant territory 'in which she can act without detriment to the interests of her ally France'.¹⁶³ Such ambiguity led Hussein and the Hashemites to believe they had been granted far more territory – including Palestine – than the British later claimed, and is evidence of Storrs' semantic ability which would later cause such consternation in Jerusalem. This ability was not limited to English. Responding to their initial correspondence in October 1914, Hussein himself noted that 'in his opinion that Mr Storrs was a Muslim...He was convinced of that by reason of Mr Storrs' numerous quotations from the Koran,

¹⁶⁰ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, pp. 94-96.

¹⁶¹ Hussein was the head of the Hashemite family from the Hejaz.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, p. 152. For more on these negotiations see James Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 1916-1918*, (New York, Norton, 2008), pp. 1-33.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 30.

and alluded to him as his brother'.¹⁶⁴ His years disseminating propaganda as Oriental Secretary were being put to use.

By May of 1916, Hussein and the British were in a position to launch the revolt. On May 23rd Storrs was urgently summoned by the Sharif's son, Abdallah, to meet him on the Arabian coast. This was to be the first of four voyages Storrs made to the Hejaz that year. Priya Satia has highlighted the cultural homogeneity of many of Britain's agents in the Middle East during and immediately after World War One, noting how their literary ambitions and strong social networks helped to shape their approaches to the region. As part of this cultural milieu, these voyages would consolidate a belief held by Storrs, but by no means unique to him, that immersion and interaction with Arabs gave him an innate understanding of the 'Arab mind'.¹⁶⁵ However, as the initiator of correspondence with Hussein, and given his membership of the newly established Arab Bureau, Storrs was viewed as an individual with influence. The Bureau itself was set up in January 1916 to streamline the gathering of intelligence from the Arab world. In doing so, its members looked to protect British interest and exploit the opportunities that Arab revolt and Ottoman decline presented.¹⁶⁶

Storrs and Lawrence

According to Storrs, his third voyage to the Hejaz in October 1916 was notable for transforming T.E. Lawrence into Lawrence of Arabia. Yet by his own admission, Lawrence appears in his diary with 'ludicrous infrequency and inadequacy',¹⁶⁷ suggesting there was no sense of how profound a voyage this would be for Lawrence's career. The pair had first met in Cairo in the winter of 1914 when Lawrence became a member of the Intelligence Branch of the Egypt Defence Force and soon became close friends. They shared a love of Latin and Greek and had similar literary tastes, albeit that Storrs preferred Dante to Homer

¹⁶⁴ Sherif of Mecca, Verbal Report of Unnamed Agent, 29/10/1914, Storrs Papers, Reel 4, Box 2, Folder 3.

¹⁶⁵ Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, pp. 5-6.

¹⁶⁶ Bruce Westrate, *The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920*, (Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania University Press, 1992), pp. xiii-xiv.

¹⁶⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 171.

and Theocritus above Aristophanes.¹⁶⁸ For Storrs, such a kindred spirit in Egypt must have been manna from heaven.

In *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Lawrence gives insight into the mannerisms and workings of one whose 'intolerant brain seldom stooped to company'.¹⁶⁹ Storrs is presented as a tough negotiator who 'always demanded a high standard from his opponent',¹⁷⁰ capable of dealing with 'suspicious or unwilling Orientals' in a way that no other Englishman could.¹⁷¹ However, he was not simply a hard-headed diplomat. He also used his customary wit and humour to defuse tense situations, such as when Egyptian General Sayed Ali insulted Abdallah's music during Storrs' third Hejaz voyage.¹⁷²

Together with Harry Cust, Storrs claimed that Lawrence made him feel 'close to the springs of life'.¹⁷³ Yet despite their warm friendship the two men were very different: Storrs an ambitious administrator who loved society; Lawrence the man of action who rejected the limelight.¹⁷⁴ Nonetheless similarities exist in how these two contemporaries have been viewed. Both are elusive characters who used autobiography to create powerful self-images once their time in the Middle East had passed.¹⁷⁵ Contemporaries viewed them as pro-Arab and anti-Zionist (or vice versa), with arguments put forward that they sympathised with Arab nationalism and Zionism.¹⁷⁶ Ultimately both men, by forging close links with key figures in the

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 188.

¹⁶⁹ Lawrence, *Seven Pillars*, p. 49.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p. 51.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.55.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, p. 60.

¹⁷³ Storrs' tribute to Cust after his death on 17/3/1917, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

¹⁷⁴ Michael Korda, *Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia*, (New York, Harper, 2010), pp. 7-8. See also Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 450 where Lawrence is described as 'hating Society, but loving company'.

¹⁷⁵ For more on Lawrence's elusive personality see Harry Orlans, "The Many Lives of T. E. Lawrence: A Symposium", *Biography*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 224-248. For Lawrence's use of autobiography to create a self-image see Stephen E. Tabachnick, "A Fragmentation Artist" in Tabachnick, Stephen E. ed., *The T.E. Lawrence Puzzle*, (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1984), p. 14 and Xypolia, "Orientations and Orientalism", p. 31.

¹⁷⁶ Tabachnick provides an adroit summary of how Lawrence has been viewed by Arabs and Zionists, as well as his support for both. See Tabachnick, "A Fragmentation Artist", p. 37. See also Bloom, Cecil, "T.E. Lawrence and Zionism", *Jewish Historical Studies*, Vol. 38 (2002), pp. 125-145 which presents Lawrence as supporting Zionism because of

region – Lawrence with Abdallah between 1917-1919 and Storrs with notable political leaders in Jerusalem – created personal bonds that inadvertently raised the hopes of the individuals they dealt with.

New Opportunities: December 1916-December 1917

Storrs' diary account of his Hejazi voyages, and later in *Orientations*, suggest his frustrations that the Arabs were too poorly organised to launch and sustain the revolt. They also show his knowledge of Arabic language and etiquette which he prided himself on.¹⁷⁷ However, these journeys, together with another change of Pro-Consul in Egypt, were taking their toll on Storrs' outlook. In November 1916 McMahon was abruptly relieved of his duties in a decision that Storrs felt was handled in an 'exceptionally and quite needlessly brutal manner.'¹⁷⁸ His replacement, Reginald Wingate, arrived with 'a consummate knowledge of the tricks and problems of this curiously complicated cypher lock of the British Empire' as a result of his time in the Sudan.¹⁷⁹ As a result, shortly before his fourth voyage to the Hejaz in December 1916, Storrs noted:

That after six or seven years with four separate Pro-Consuls, I am a little weary of the interesting but exacting role of brain pickee to the illustrious, and would indeed welcome even a kick so long as it propelled me in an upward, or still better, homeward direction.¹⁸⁰

A reduction in his duties as Oriental Secretary by Wingate gave further reason for weariness. Thus when Storrs was offered the role of Political Officer for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia in March 1917, he grasped the opportunity.¹⁸¹

the potential economic benefits a Jewish presence in Palestine could bestow upon the Arabs.

¹⁷⁷ See Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 155-187 for published versions of Storrs' diaries. The extant diaries can also be found in the Storrs Papers, Reel 5, Box 2, Folder 4 and Reel 6, Box 2, Folder 5.

¹⁷⁸ Storrs to his mother, 10/11/1916, Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1.

¹⁷⁹ Storrs to Carniole, 1/1/1917, Storrs Papers, Reel 5, Box 2, Folder 4.

¹⁸⁰ Storrs to Mrs Graham, 6/12/1916, Storrs Papers, Reel 5, Box 2, Folder 4.

¹⁸¹ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 203.

Baghdad had only recently been captured from the Turks and was the location of the Military GHQ for Mesopotamia, which also included the Political GHQ that Storrs had been seconded to. His journey to the capital was circuitous, taking one month via Suez, Aden, Bombay, Karachi, the Persia Gulf, the Tigris and Basra. Within a month of arriving in Baghdad Storrs appeared rejuvenated, telling his mother that he was 'as always when learning, enjoying the place madly'.¹⁸²

Storrs arrived in Mesopotamia at a time of great administrative uncertainty. Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour had expressed his wish that the legal status quo should be maintained as far as possible. However, Baghdad was nominally under the control of General Sir Stanley Maude, who had declared martial law. Chief Political Officer Sir Percy Cox expressed his concerns that fulfilling government policy and effectively administering the civilian population would be difficult in these circumstances. A power struggle between the military and the Chief Political Officer emerged, with Cox requesting greater influence for civilian and political considerations without prejudicing military supremacy. Storrs agreed, telegraphing the Foreign Office privately that:

Owing to the unsympathetic attitude of the military to the Chief Political Officer's advice and recommendations, we are in danger of losing ground with the population, on the whole very friendly disposed, with grave prejudice to the present and subsequent policy as enunciated by His Majesty's Government.

He added:

Prestige of Chief Political Officer is very high throughout the country, and anything done to strengthen his hand would tend to strengthen our hold on the sympathies of the best and most powerful elements without being in any way incompatible with the necessary supremacy of the military.¹⁸³

¹⁸² Storrs to his mother, Storrs to his mother, 10/5/1917, Reel 5, Box 2, Folder 4.

¹⁸³ Mesopotamia Administration Committee: Position of Chief Political Officer (Sir Percy Cox), 17/8/1917, Reel 5, Box 2, Folder 4.

In a premonition of his initial position in Jerusalem, Storrs was caught between the necessity of military control and the importance of good civilian and political governance. In order to progress forward he suggested a compromise that would strengthen his own position and influence as a Political Officer under Cox, whilst at the same time acknowledging the importance of military considerations.

Storrs' work in Baghdad did not go unnoticed. Upon his return to Cairo in July 1917 he was offered the position of Oriental Secretary by Cox but turned it down, stating he did not feel that 'he could start again on exactly the same conditions in a new and remoter country' where all his 'relations of life will have to be remade from the beginning'.¹⁸⁴ Requesting leave, he returned to England for the first time in three years, having survived his ship being torpedoed on the journey back. At the request of Sir Mark Sykes, Storrs worked in the Secretariat of the War Cabinet, noting that prior to the Balfour Declaration 'in the offices and along the passages there were Zionists and rumours of Zionists'.¹⁸⁵ He also acted as Secretary to a Committee on Egyptian Affairs before being seconded to the Hejaz once more in November to reconcile the rival claims of Sharif Hussein and Ibn Saud. Storrs notes in *Orientalisms* with typical flourish that the night before his departure he:

Went to say good-bye to a lady who having for years practised divination for pleasure had been induced by financial losses to do so professionally. She offered to read my hand, and immediately remarked that I was depressed. My lack of future at the Cairo Residency must have shewn in my face, and I told her that she must do better than this. She continued undaunted that, in spite of my gloom, I should in less than eight weeks be raised to a position which would be known all over the world.¹⁸⁶

Storrs never made it to the Hejaz. He arrived back in Cairo on November 24 without a house and without work, 'for you could not in the war expect to leave your duties in early April and pick them up where you left them at the end of

¹⁸⁴ Storrs to Sir Percy Cox, 18/7/1917, Reel 5, Box 2, Folder 4.

¹⁸⁵ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 259.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 261.

November',¹⁸⁷ the implication being that in peacetime in Egypt this was entirely possible. Whilst in Cairo he heard the news of Jerusalem's surrender and that Allenby would enter on December 9, declaring that he would have given his soul to be there. However, on December 15 Storrs was seconded once more. This time his destination was Palestine, where Brigadier-General Clayton required assistance in his new role as Chief Political Officer.¹⁸⁸ On December 19 Storrs set foot on Palestinian soil, arriving one day later in the city where he would make his name: Jerusalem.¹⁸⁹

Conclusion

By the time Storrs arrived in Palestine he had accrued 13 years of experience in the Middle East. Yet the circumstances that forged his outlook occurred many miles from Cairo, the Hejaz and Baghdad. His education at Temple Grove and Charterhouse gave him the academic and intellectual proficiency necessary to represent British interests in the region. Moreover, the influence of T.E. Page gave Storrs a sense of civic duty, which, combined with the imperialist overtones of education in these schools, meant that Storrs had accrued the necessary skills to be an effective British administrator. His regular bouts of homesickness at school were to be repeated throughout his time overseas, leading to a longing to create social circles in which he felt comfortable. This melancholy, together with his dissatisfaction with the repetitive nature of administrative work, also meant that Storrs looked to indulge his love of the arts through collecting and preservation. He was at his happiest when learning and socialising, and in this respect the influence of his uncle, Harry Cust, cannot be underestimated. These factors meant that Storrs arrived in Jerusalem with his own variant of Said's 'determining imprint'; a deeply individual Orientalism that advocated civic duty within an imperial context, patronage of arts and crafts and strong relationships with individuals. As a result, Storrs' personal interests were to leave their indelible mark on Jerusalem.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 272.

¹⁸⁸ Storrs was known to Clayton and had previously worked under him in the Arab Bureau.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 273-276.

Chapter Two – Storrs as Military Governor: The ‘Bliss of Arbitrary Rule’¹

I shall always look back to the first months in Jerusalem with peculiar affection: and I maintain that given sympathy with the place and the people, enthusiasm for the work and average strength and resourcefulness, there is no position in the world more satisfying than that of a Military Governor.²

Upon his arrival in Jerusalem, Storrs was in little doubt of the temporary nature of his secondment. He fully expected to work with Clayton for no more than 10 days before moving on to visit Abdallah at Wadi Ais in Arabia.³ This is not to say that Storrs did not have higher designs, noting in his diary on the day of his arrival in Jerusalem that ‘there was something human and winning about the country...and I should like to be Commissioner of Palestine’.⁴ Nor does it suggest he underestimated the task ahead of him, acknowledging with typical flourish that his role was to ‘help in restraining the two and seventy jarring sects’ in the city.⁵ He clearly relished the idea of being in Jerusalem, even if only for a few days.

Travellers are not empty vessels when they arrive in a new location. Palestinian historian Issam Nassar argues that:

It is place as an *idea* that we become conscious of when a place is mentioned...Recalling the place, in turn, is but recalling the meanings, memories, images or tastes connected with that experience...In other words...a place...has more than one identity, each designating a particular experience in time.⁶

Whilst Storrs was a new arrival in Jerusalem in December 1917, he did not observe the city through fresh eyes, both in a literal and a spiritual sense. To use

¹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 317.

² *Ibid*, p. 317.

³ *Ibid*, p. 274.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 276.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 273.

⁶ Issam Nassar, *European Portrayals of Jerusalem: Religious Fascinations and Colonist Imaginations*, (New York, Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), p. 2.

Nassar's phrase, his 'social setting and context' gave meaning to his arrival. He had last entered Jerusalem in seven years prior with his beloved Uncle, Harry Cust, and his wife, Nina. Viewing his trip in 1910 as a 'pilgrimage', Storrs recalled 'the brooding poignancy of the atmosphere', which, coupled with Cust's recitation of Tennyson's *In Memoriam* on the Mount of Olives, left a powerful impression as the sun's 'last rays wrapped the whole mountain in glory'.⁷ This trip, together with Cust's sudden death in March 1917, undoubtedly impacted on Storrs' early perception of the city. His first diary entry after his arrival on December 20 records that:

We drew into Jerusalem, silent, unlighted, and apparently deserted, about 7, and stopped, searching for Fast's Hotel at a street corner. I asked where we were, and somehow I know it was the door of the British Bible Society to which we had gone with Harry Cust on the morning of our arrival in 1910, yielding to his desire (of course vain) to possess a Bible printed in Jerusalem.⁸

Two key tenets emerge in how Storrs viewed Jerusalem: as a location with deeply personal memories wrought large through recent bereavement, and as a site of Christian veneration. The religious significance of British occupation was not lost upon officials both in Palestine and London, with much debate surrounding how to present the capture of the city from the Ottomans. Jacobson highlights how the British were acutely aware of the religious implications of a Christian power taking control of the Holy City, and their concerns about alienating Muslims around the world both through the occupation of Jerusalem and the advocacy of the Balfour Declaration. Moreover, she demonstrates how British officials attempted to downplay the occupation of Jerusalem as a political, religious or colonial manoeuvre, instead emphasising its military nature. They did this not only to protect religious sensitivities and avoid local resentment, but also to avoid antagonising their Christian European allies, in particular France and Italy.⁹

⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 32. In a later diary entry dated 26/12/1917, Storrs describes 'entering the little dome that marks the Ascension, where Harry Cust quoted *In Memoriam*', *Ibid*, p. 285.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 276.

⁹ Abigail Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem Between Ottoman and British Rule*, (New York, Syracuse University Press, 2011), pp. 118-130.

Official policy is one thing, deeply held personal beliefs quite another. The wider context of Biblical Orientalism, which used, and continues to use, carefully selected elements of religion to describe and control 'the Holy Land', provides the cultural background to Storrs' own views of the city. This phenomena, which builds upon Said's conceptual understanding of Orientalism, started in the 1830s with the publication of numerous books and travel diaries by visitors to the region. It sought to define the local residents of Palestine at that time, both Arabic and Jewish, through the prism of the Bible. Later, it would be appropriated by the British for political purposes through the creation of surveys and maps that created a Palestine suspended in Biblical time, allowing tourists and imperialists to make direct links between ancient religious tales and the land that they were currently in.¹⁰

As the son of a clergyman, Storrs had a clear understanding of the religious significance of Jerusalem, citing just the first line of Psalm 122 to open one of his chapters on the city in *Orientalisms*.¹¹ In quoting one line an assumption of knowledge is made by the author toward their audience, who would recognise that 'I was glad when they said unto me...' was a direct Biblical reference to the Holy City. In full, the Psalm reads:

- 1 I was glad when they said unto me, Let us go into the house of the LORD.
- 2 Our feet shall stand within thy gates, O Jerusalem.
- 3 Jerusalem is builded as a city that is compact together:
- 4 Whither the tribes go up, the tribes of the LORD, unto the testimony of Israel, to give thanks unto the name of the LORD.
- 5 For there are set thrones of judgment, the thrones of the house of David.
- 6 Pray for the peace of Jerusalem: they shall prosper that love thee.

¹⁰ Lorenzo Kamel, 'The Impact of Biblical Orientalism in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Palestine', *New Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 4 (2014), pp. 14-15.

¹¹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 286.

7 Peace be within thy walls, and prosperity within thy palaces.

8 For my brethren and companions' sakes, I will now say, Peace be within thee.

9 Because of the house of the LORD our God I will seek thy good.¹²

Here we see a religious and civic duty come together: the peace and prosperity of Jerusalem depends upon the prayers of the faithful. As Governor – and as one of the faithful – Storrs believed he could deliver these aims.

However, such lofty responsibilities seemed highly unlikely when Storrs set foot in Jerusalem in December 1917. General William Borton had been appointed Military Governor by Allenby following the occupation of the city on 9 December and had little love for the city, telling Storrs that 'the only tolerable places in Jerusalem were bath and bed'.¹³ Suffering from what Storrs described as 'melancholia', Borton was an unwell man who appeared to be on the verge of a nervous breakdown. By December 23 Allenby had become deeply concerned about the welfare of his Governor, and talk of a replacement began to circulate. On the same day, Storrs confessed to his diary that:

If he breaks down...I would give a great deal for the chance of succeeding him, and sincerely believe that with his present actual staff of quasi-experts I could do something with the position, which seems to require sympathy, energy, and imagination more than routine administrative experience. But it's hard to know and feel the cup so near.¹⁴

The challenges of governing a city like Jerusalem, with all of the connotations of the role, clearly appealed, as did the opportunity to avoid the desk work he so despised in Egypt.

¹² Ps. 122:1-9 KJV.

¹³ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 277.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 281.

The following days saw Storrs spend more time with the incumbent Governor, visiting on December 24 to help encourage an indecisive Borton to attend the Nativity Mass, and again on December 27 for a walk around the city walls. The next morning Borton – having resigned his commission – left the city, with Storrs himself preparing to return to Cairo.¹⁵ It was at this moment that Colonel Robert Rees-Mogg, the Acting Assistant Governor, beckoned Storrs ‘out with a mysterious gesture’ before stating he ‘should want another uniform after all’, showing him a telegram from G.H.Q. appointing Storrs ‘with the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, Military Governor of Jerusalem’.¹⁶ Possessing no military background, Storrs would instead rely on his knowledge of Arabic and administrative experience in Egypt to establish himself in his new role; facets that made him somewhat of an exception in the nascent military government of Palestine.¹⁷

Jerusalem in 1917

In *The Sphinx*, a Cairo-based English language magazine, Storrs’ colleagues lamented ‘the loss of a personality so richly endowed with wisdom and wit’, acknowledging that his new post in Jerusalem was a ‘position not unworthy of his powers’. Commenting on his wide-ranging interest in music, the arts and classical civilisations, the article goes on to declare that the newly appointed Governor was ‘interested first and foremost in men and women...of all sorts of opinions’ and the ‘broad problems that beset humanity’.¹⁸ Upon his arrival in Jerusalem, Storrs was certainly under no illusions of the ‘broad problems that beset’ city and who was to blame. In an appeal to G.H.Q. he notes that:

Jerusalem is as perfect a specimen of organized pauperism as you would wish to find...It is almost impossible to estimate the quantity of Wheat in the City or neighbourhood, but it should be remembered firstly, that the population, divided up into numerous and mutually

¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 282-285.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 285.

¹⁷ Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, p. 137.

¹⁸ “Colonel R. Storrs – The “Sphinx’s” Tribute”, *The Sphinx*, 23/2/1917, Storrs Papers, Reel 10, Box 3, Folder 5 – Press cuttings about the Jerusalem period.

hostile communities and subjected to centuries of organized pauperization, is both improvident and helpless; secondly, that the Turks have not the reputation (when they do leave the place) of leaving much that is eatable or moveable beyond them.¹⁹

In letters home, blame is also placed on the 'Turks' for the pitiable state of the city upon its occupation.²⁰ Whilst conditions were undoubtedly poor in the city as a result of wartime pressures, such a narrow focus serves only to develop a narrative of backward-looking, inept and cruel Ottoman rule and competent, modernising British rule. This approach views the modernisation of Jerusalem as a result of British benevolence, Zionist immigration and European influence. However, as Mazza contends, this is a 'limited perspective that does not take into account the internal dynamics within the city'.²¹ He argues that prior to British rule Jerusalem was experiencing modernisation, having become an independent *Sanjak* in 1872.²² The city had a *mutasarrif* (governor) appointed directly by Istanbul; a sign of increased centralisation courtesy of the *Tanzimat* reforms pursued by the Sublime Porte at the time. In 1910, Jerusalem became independent of the *Vilayet* of Beirut in judicial matters, although it still relied militarily on troops based in Damascus for security. Three organisations were charged with the responsibility of administering the city. Firstly, the *Meclis-i Belediye* (the Municipality of Jerusalem), led by the Mayor under the guidance of the *mutasarrif*, collected taxes and used this revenue to improve civic amenities for the city's inhabitants. Secondly, the *Meclis-i Umumi* (the General Council of the Vilayet) could approve or reject a budget, although the *mutasarrif* had the final say, and thirdly the *Meclis-i Idare* (the Administrative Council of the Jerusalem District) had oversight on resources collected through taxation, and landholdings. Ultimately, it fell upon the *mutasarrif* to implement reforms initiated by Istanbul,

¹⁹ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 286. p. 287.

²⁰ Storrs to Nina Cust, 9/1/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1 – Jerusalem 1918-1919.

²¹ Conde de Ballobar, ed., Eduardo Manzano Moreno and Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem in World War One: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat*, (London, I.B. Taurus, 2015), p. 5.

²² Ottoman administration categorised territory into *Sanjaks* (a province) and *Vilayets* (an larger province made up of several *Sanjaks*). By declaring Jerusalem an independent *Sanjak* the city became detached from the *Vilayet* of Syria. See Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 20.

although they did so with the cooperation and support of the key notable families of the city: the Husaynis, the Nashashibis and the Khalidis. These influential dynasties acted as intermediaries between the *mutasarrif*, European economic and political interests and the local population.²³

The complex interplay between local notables, the Municipality, the wider Ottoman Empire and European interests is best illustrated by efforts to construct a tramway in Jerusalem in 1909. Through their membership of both the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and the Banque commerciale de Palestine, key notables spearheaded efforts to build a new tram system to help connect the Old City to the newly emerging neighbourhoods outside of the city walls. Though these attempts never came to fruition under Ottoman rule, Dimitriadis shows that the impetus for improvements came not from Europe, but from the Empire itself. Cities such as Istanbul, Beirut and Salonika had seen major advancements in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries, which led to notables and businessmen in Jerusalem feeling a need to 'catch-up'. However, whilst part of the same Empire, Jerusalem was not like these other cities. A combination of geographic isolation driving up costs, together with the relative financial and political weakness of local institutions resulting from the strong presence of European diplomatic missions and the subsequent protections they received, led to the Municipality choosing not pursue the project.²⁴ Despite this failure, there remains ample evidence that Jerusalem started its modernising process under Ottoman rule. The 1880s onwards saw numerous improvements made: from improved sanitation as a result of paving main roads to the establishment of a Municipal Hospital that could be accessed by all inhabitants regardless of their nationality or religion.²⁵

²³ See *ibid*, pp. 18-32 for more detail on the administrative organisation of the city under Ottoman rule and examples of the civic improvements that took place at this time.

²⁴ In 1914 a deal for a new tramway, street lighting and a modernised water system was struck between the municipality and Evripidis Mavrommatis, a Greek Ottoman from Istanbul, but World War 1 placed the project on hold. Sotirios Dimitriadis, "The Tramway Concession of Jerusalem, 1908–1914: Elite Citizenship, Urban Infrastructure, and the Abortive Modernization of a Late Ottoman City" in Dalachanis and Lemire ed., *Ordinary Jerusalem*, pp. 475-489.

²⁵ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, pp. 22-23.

Moreover, the geographic footprint of the city increased in size under late Ottoman rule. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Jerusalem consisted of the walled city. Within these walls, the city was divided into neighbourhoods based not solely on confessional affiliation but on the common shared features of its residents; be it religion, tribe, place of origin, ethnicity or group.²⁶ By its very nature a walled city has limited opportunities for expansion, and this – coupled with population increases, Jewish immigration and a decline in sanitary conditions within the Old City – led to new developments being built beyond the walls. Jews were responsible for the majority of these new planned neighbourhoods, although Palestinian Arabs did undertake the construction of private residences outside of the city walls. Additionally missionary projects such as the Russian Compound on Jaffa Road were also erected.²⁷ The notion of the city as static prior to British rule was far from reality.

What of Storrs' claim that the population of Jerusalem was divided up into 'numerous and mutually hostile communities'? Such a viewpoint looked to place Storrs and the British as saviours who would return peace and order to the Holy City. That the city had an incredibly diverse population there is no doubt. Mere categorisation of the population into Muslims, Jews and Christians does a disservice to the sheer multiplicity of different faiths, rites and rituals present. Furthermore, as Wallach notes, it serves to obscure differences in class, ethnicity, language and area of residence.²⁸ Even the basic act of estimating the population of post-war Jerusalem is a highly difficult process. Mazza's careful corroboration of various extant sources, combining scholarly research and estimates by contemporary Western visitors to the city, results in the population of Jerusalem in 1914 being approximately 80,000; of which 50,000 were Jewish, 15,000 were Christian and 15,000 were Muslim. By the time World War One had ended, the population of the city had dropped to between 55,000 and 60,000 – no doubt a

²⁶ Adar Arnon, "The Quarters of Jerusalem in the Ottoman Period", *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January, 1992), pp. 7-12.

²⁷ Rochelle Davis, "Ottoman Jerusalem: The Growth of the City Outside the Walls" in Salim Tamari ed., *Jerusalem 1948: the Arab Neighbourhoods and their Faith in the War*, (Jerusalem, Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002), pp. 10-29.

²⁸ Yair Wallach, *A City in Fragments: Urban Texts in Modern Jerusalem*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020), p. 15.

result of mobilisation of Ottoman subjects and the deportation of Jews. Despite this, Jews remained the largest community in the city on the eve of British rule.²⁹

Within and between each community there existed divisions, and whilst relations could become strained, they were far from the 'mutually hostile' state of affairs presented by Storrs. Muslims were the largest community in Palestine but formed a minority in Jerusalem. According to Storrs this community differed from the Christian and Jewish population as it was not 'divided into rites, degrees or denominations but into two great partisanships, the Husaynis and the Nashashibis'.³⁰ The Jewish community was primarily split between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews. Both saw divisions according to their country of origin. The former, who spoke Yiddish, mainly emigrated from Germany and Eastern Europe in two '*aliyahs*' from 1882 onwards and between 1904-1910, whilst the latter were subdivided into Yemeni, Bukharian, Kurdish, Damascene, Georgian, Persian and Moroccan communities. The general identity of the Sephardim overrode these divisions and united them when necessary, whereas the Ashkenazim were further divided along religious lines between Orthodox, Ultra-Orthodox, Hasidic and Agudist sects. Some secular Jews also formed part of this community.³¹

Given this diversity, when did Palestinian Jewry begin to develop into a coherent national community? Contention exists around the exact timing. Fishman suggests that such a development occurred in the aftermath of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, uniting the disparate strands of Palestinian Jewry at this time – Ashkenazi and Sephardic, Zionist and non-Zionist, secular and religious – under a banner of pan-Hebrew identity as part of the Ottoman Empire.³² This identity does not mean that all the Jews in Palestine were now Zionist in disposition. Indeed, many members of the diverse pre-Mandate Jewish communities of Palestine remained largely ambivalent towards Zionism and its aims throughout the period of British rule.³³ As a result, Wallach posits that it is only by the 1930s that the *Yishuv* succeeded in becoming an entirely separate, Hebrew speaking

²⁹ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, pp. 36-40.

³⁰ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 401.

³¹ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, pp. 41-42.

³² Fishman, *Jews and Palestinians in the Late Ottoman Era*, pp. 134-171.

³³ Thomas Philip Abowd, *Colonial Jerusalem: The Spatial Construction of Identity and Difference in a City of Myth, 1948-2012*, (New York, Syracuse, 2014), p. 16n21.

Jewish society as per Zionist designs. Whilst recognising the importance of 1908, he argues that the early years of British rule still saw a large difference between the vision of a unified, Hebrew speaking *Yishuv* and the reality of fragmented Jewish communities within Palestine.³⁴ Storrs was himself cognisant of this fragmentation, noting in *Orientations* that certain strands of Orthodox Jewry in the city were 'not only pro- but violently anti-Zionist', desiring only 'to be left in peace and...practice...their religion'.³⁵

The three main Christian communities were the Armenians, the Greek Orthodox and the Latins (Roman Catholics). The Greek Orthodox were in the majority, and amongst the lower clergy were predominantly Arab in origin. As major landowners in the city, they suffered great financial insecurity with the fall of the Ottoman and Russian Empires. The Armenian community was predominantly made up of the clergy, but their numbers swelled as approximately 20,000 refugees from the genocide in Eastern Anatolia in 1915 arrived in the city. The Latins were viewed as the most powerful community and were split between 4000 Roman Catholics and 500 Uniate Catholics. Country of origin also created tensions amongst the Roman Catholics, with competition between the Italians, Spanish, Austrians and French, with the latter viewing themselves as the traditional guardians of Catholicism in the Holy Land. There were also Ethiopians, Copts, Anglicans and Protestants in the city.³⁶

Recent scholarship has focused on the relationships between these different communities as being fluid as opposed to binary in nature. Jacobson has demonstrated intercommunal relations and relief efforts in the city were shaped by both World War One and the transition from Ottoman to British rule. Early attempts to provide aid for the local population in 1914 were led by the Military Governor of Jerusalem, Zaki Bey, culminating in a one off meeting of Jews and Muslims in November 1914. This was important for two reasons: firstly, it represented Ottoman attempts to secure loyalty to their Empire, and secondly it

³⁴ Yair Wallach, "Rethinking the Yishuv: late Ottoman Palestine's Jewish Communities Revisited", *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2017), pp. 275-294.

³⁵ Storrs would forge a good relationship with the Orthodox Jews of Jerusalem and suggested that one possible reason for their sympathetic approach was as a result of Zionist attacks against him. See Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 415.

³⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 42-45.

demonstrated efforts by Jews and Muslims to create a united front against the Christians in the city, with the Sephardi community in particular concerned by Christian attempts to incite Muslims against the Jews.³⁷ She also notes that tensions existed within the Jewish community between New *Yishuv* and the Old *Yishuv*, and between Armenians who lived in Jerusalem and those refugees who arrived in the city after the Armenian Genocide.³⁸ However, intercommunal relief work was made possible through the auspices of the Red Crescent Society, whilst the locust plague of 1915 saw all residents of Jerusalem aged between nineteen and sixty commandeered by the municipality to collect locust eggs so that they could be burned.³⁹

Whilst confessional affiliation was undoubtedly important in late-Ottoman Jerusalem, it was not the only form of identifying oneself in the city. Using the diaries of Wasif Jawhariyyeh, a well-connected Jerusalemite musician, Salim Tamari contends that identity was primarily determined by the *mahallat* or neighbourhood unit. By drawing upon Jawhariyyeh's recollections of the city's inhabitants, it becomes clear that there was substantial intercommunal cooperation within different *mahallats*. This was especially the case during the numerous festivals hosted in the city, including Ramadan, Nabi Musa, Purim and Easter.⁴⁰ Moreover, the diaries of Conde de Ballobar, the Spanish Consul in Jerusalem during World War One, offer a revealing glimpse of how the different communities interacted with each other. On Christmas Eve 1915, the Muslim Zaki Bey attended the service at the Church of the Nativity – a 'thing that they would surely not imagine in Europe'.⁴¹ In November the year after during the observance of a Day of Remembrance, Ballobar notes:

In the minaret of the mosque which is across from the Holy Sepulchre there were two Franciscans, various Armenians and two Jews. One does not see this anywhere but Jerusalem.⁴²

³⁷ Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, pp. 32-34.

³⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 40-47.

³⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 35-37.

⁴⁰ Salim Tamari, *Mountain Against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture*, (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2009), pp. 71-92.

⁴¹ Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War One*, p. 84.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 114.

Thus Storrs' assertion of centuries of organized pauperism and mutual hostility are tempered. Whilst there was undoubtedly food shortages and great hardship in Jerusalem, they were the result of short term decisions made by the Ottomans during the war, not the result of hundreds of years of mismanagement.⁴³ In making these judgements, the new Governor was reflecting the dominant narrative that Britain had removed the Ottoman's 'barbarous yoke' from Jerusalem. The reality of life in the city (and in Palestine more widely) prior to British rule was somewhat different to these initial impressions.⁴⁴

The Establishment of Military Rule

Following the occupation of Jerusalem by the British in December 1917, a system of Military Rule was established. The eventual area conquered by General Allenby would be administered as Occupied Enemy Territory South (O.E.T.A. South) or O-EETA as it was colloquially called.⁴⁵ Overall command in Palestine rested with Allenby, who reported to the War Office back in London. Allenby himself was advised by a Chief Administrator, who acted as the link between the four regional Military Governors (of which Storrs was one). There were three Chief Administrators during the period of military rule: General A.W. Money, Major-General H.D. Watson and Major-General Louis Bols, all of whom were antipathetic towards Zionist calls for a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Indeed, the post of Chief Political Officer was created in recognition of the significant stake the Foreign Office held in Palestine as a result of the issuing of the Balfour Declaration. This individual advised the Chief Administrator and reported to the Foreign Office. Two men held this post between 1917-1920 – Major General Gilbert Clayton and Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen. In this administrative set-up, the War Office dealt with the day-to-day administration of Palestine whilst the Foreign Office handled its political future, although some work was interrelated.⁴⁶

⁴³ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, pp. 117-118.

⁴⁴ See Michelle U. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) for a scholarly refutation of Ottoman-era Palestine as an oppressed backwater.

⁴⁵ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 291.

⁴⁶ McTague, "British Military Administration of Palestine", pp. 55-76.

As Military Governor for the Jerusalem District, Storrs was responsible for the city and the sub-districts of Bethlehem, Jericho and Ramallah.⁴⁷ By April 1918, the administration of his Governorate was split into two branches: "A" and "Q". "A" Branch included the Deputy Military Governors of Bethlehem, Jericho and Ramallah, together with Storrs' own deputy in Jerusalem who had responsibility for discipline, civil and military personnel, dealings with G.H.Q., courts and proclamations.⁴⁸ This position was initially held by Colonel Rees-Mogg, who was replaced by Major Lord William Percy in February 1918.⁴⁹ Other key duties for "A" Branch included dealing with personal petitions, permits, prisons, the police and gendarmerie and medical services. "Q" Branch worked on supplies, transport, post arrangements, food control and relief and finance.⁵⁰ In a very short period of time a working administration had been established.

What were the experiences and expectations of the men who worked for O.E.T.A.? In somewhat comedic style, Storrs remembers them as:

The remnant of a small staff originally chosen for the purpose, with accretions of the officers placed by the Army in temporary charge of newly conquered areas: without expectation of long continuance, still less of permanency. And who were these officers? What had they been before the War? There were a few professional soldiers. Apart from these our administrative and technical staff, necessarily drawn from military material available on the spot, included a cashier from a Bank in Rangoon, an actor-manager, two assistants from Thos. Cook, a picture-dealer, an Army coach, a clown, a land valuer, a bo'sun from the Niger, a Glasgow distiller, an organist, an Alexandria cotton-broker, an architect (not in the Public Works but in the Secretariat), a Jewish Service London postal official (not in the Post Office but as a Controller of Labour), a taxi-driver from Egypt, two school masters and a missionary.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 292.

⁴⁸ Staff List of the Military Governorate, 16/4/19, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

⁴⁹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 302 and Clayton to Storrs, 20/2/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

⁵⁰ Staff List of the Military Governorate, 16/4/19, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

⁵¹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 360.

Such were the backgrounds of many of the men tasked with the role of governing Palestine.

The Status Quo

According to Storrs, the 'doctrine of the status quo was the bedrock' of Allenby's policy towards Palestine.⁵² That the British were legally obliged under Article 43 of the 1907 Laws of War to take all measures in their power 'to restore and ensure as far as is possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country' appears to have escaped his recollection.⁵³ In practice this meant that the administrative organisation of O.E.T.A. had a great deal of Ottoman influence. Allenby, ever keen to guarantee continuity, recommended maintaining the territorial integrity of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in order to ensure there was as little administrative upheaval as possible. Moreover, O.E.T.A. maintained the Ottoman governmental departments in order to minimize disruption, although it was recognised that public services such as sanitation, repatriation, aid for refugees and agriculture were essential and would require an increase in scope. Jacobson is right to acknowledge that the British disdain for the perceived Ottoman neglect of Jerusalem did not appear to extend to Ottoman bureaucracy. Whilst bound by the 1907 Laws of War to maintain the status quo, the adoption of Ottoman organisation by O.E.T.A. also marked an attempt at downplaying any political or colonial designs Britain had over Palestine (the Balfour Declaration and facilitation of Zionist aims notwithstanding).⁵⁴

Reflecting in *Orientations*, Storrs claims to have broken the status quo twice: 'once against my will and to my regret, and again deliberately and to my lasting satisfaction'.⁵⁵ The two examples given illustrate the personalised approach the new governor would take towards Jerusalem, whilst at the same time highlighting the extent and limitations of his power. The former instance saw the construction

⁵² *Ibid*, p. 297.

⁵³ Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annexes, The Hague, 18/10/1907.

⁵⁴ Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, pp. 136-137.

⁵⁵ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 299.

of a new chapel in the Garden of Gethsemane following pressure from the Custos of the Holy Land. As the Franciscans owned the land in the lower part of the garden there was little that Storrs could have done to prevent construction. However, his reasons for opposing the chapel are telling of his approach to governing Jerusalem, noting that he felt the Garden 'should be allowed to remain as it was in the time of Christ' and lamenting with Shakespearean flourish the destruction of:

Those holy fields
Over whose blessed acres walked those feet
Which fourteen hundred years ago were nailed
For our advantage to the bitter cross.⁵⁶

For Storrs, maintaining of the Biblical aura of Jerusalem was key, and would be a recurrent theme in his approach to the city.

In the latter instance another one of Storrs' key personal concerns comes to the fore. Ever the aesthete with strong tastes and opinions on architecture and design, the Military Governor initiated the removal of 'a hideous rubble wall some fifteen feet high, stuccoed battleship-grey and entirely blocking the view the gleam of the gilded ikonostasis and the dimmer distances of the apse' in the Grotto of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Noting – no doubt tongue in cheek – that the complexities of ownership necessitated the 'edict of a military despot' to destroy the wall, Storrs himself funded the cost of removal to provide an 'unscreening of great beauty'.⁵⁷ The Military Governor was rarely so happy as when the divine and the aesthetic collided.

Storrs acknowledged one further breach of the status quo by O.E.T.A.: that of Zionism. For him the Balfour Declaration gave any occupying power 'the right to assume...that the ultimate Government [of Palestine] would have to reckon with

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 300.

⁵⁷ Storrs ended up funding renovations because whilst both the Greek Orthodox and the Latins agreed to the removal of the wall, there existed some debate over who should have the right to pay for the work as 'payment for any modification of a site was held to establish ownership thereto'. Both parties agreed that Storrs would not claim ownership of the Church of the Nativity and allowed him to pay. *Ibid*, p. 301.

Zion'. As such, the Administration issued all public notices, official and municipal receipts in three languages – English, Arabic and Hebrew.⁵⁸ Moreover, the Military Administration accommodated the visit of the Zionist Commission on a fact-finding mission in April 1918, although Storrs recalls the shock with which the notification of their visit was received:

When...early in March, 1918, Clayton showed me the telegram informing us of the impending arrival of a Zionist Commission composed of eminent Jews, to act as a liaison between the Jews and the Military Administration and to control the Jewish population, we could hardly believe our eyes, and even wondered whether it might not be possible for the mission to be postponed until the status of the Administration should be more clearly defined. However, orders were orders; and O.E.T.A. prepared to receive the visitors.⁵⁹

He was not alone in sensing uncertainty around the Commission's visit. Reporting on the atmosphere prior to the Zionist's arrival, Major William Ormsby-Gore, a former member of the Arab Bureau and Assistant Political Officer to the Commission during their tour of Palestine, recorded that Arabs and Jews in Palestine were 'ignorant' of Zionist aims. He declared that O.E.T.A.'s efforts to dispel this ignorance were 'handicapped by the lack of information concerning Zionist activities throughout the world', and the lack of clarity surrounding Britain's rationale for committing to the Balfour Declaration.⁶⁰ The men on the spot in Palestine were left in the invidious position of interpreting policy that was not clear to them, or to the world at large.

For Storrs himself, consternation at the visit was not the product of anti-Zionism or anti-Semitism but emerged from 'a sense of previousness' and 'inopportunity'.⁶¹ He recognised that Zionism was a breach of the status quo and was comfortable with such a breach occurring at an appropriate moment for the

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 301.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 340.

⁶⁰ FO 371/3395 – Zionist Commission: 2nd Report of Political Officer (Ormsby-Gore), 19/4/1918, TNA.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 341.

Military Administration and the British Army, who were in April 1918 still in active combat with Ottoman forces north of Jerusalem. Thus the three infringements of the status quo recognised by Storrs in *Orientalisms* each exhibit key tenets of his approach to the Jerusalem: a strong desire to preserve the city as a site of Biblical imagination; a willingness to manipulate the built environment to suit his aesthetic tastes; and an outlook sympathetic to Zionist aims. Each trait would manifest itself at various points in his governorship.

By its very nature O.E.T.A. was intended to be temporary 'so long as military considerations made it necessary'.⁶² However, it would eventually last two and a half years. Its prolonged lifespan resulted from the uncertainty surrounding the post-World War One settlement in the Middle East, with the future of Palestine in proving particularly protracted.⁶³ This extended duration increased the likelihood of the status quo being breached by the British, and so it proved, with the occurrence of various infringements. Of particular note was the shift in approach by the Storrs and the British towards the notable families of Jerusalem, to be considered in further detail when discussing the Nabi Musa riots. Likewise, the establishment of the Pro-Jerusalem Society by Storrs in September 1918 – ostensibly to preserve and advance the interests of Jerusalem, its district and inhabitants – also served to alter the physical and political landscape of the city in a way that could hardly be viewed as conducive to maintaining the status quo.⁶⁴

Storrs in Charge: Priorities, Politics and Pitfalls – From Dearth to Despotism

Delight

A combination of the 1915 locust outbreak and Ottoman policy had left Jerusalem suffering severe food shortages. As previously mentioned, attempts at relief had been led by the Ottoman Military Governor, Zaki Bey. They were supplemented by the provision of soup kitchens from organisations such as the Arab Pious Foundation and American Colony, who, in a combined enterprise known as the

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 296.

⁶³ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 149. See also Margaret MacMillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War*, (John Murray, London, 2002), pp. 421-437 for more on the nature of negotiations that took place prior to the post-war settlement at Versailles in June 1919.

⁶⁴ For more on this matter see Chapter 3.

D'kieh could feed up to 6,000 people a day.⁶⁵ Securing regular and reliable supplies of food was therefore of great importance in ensuring the wellbeing of the city's inhabitants, a fact not lost upon Storrs. Reflecting on his early days in Jerusalem, he recalls that:

My nightmare anxiety was the scarcity of food amounting almost to a famine. One morning early in January I became aware of a crying and a screaming beneath my office window. I looked out on a crowd of veiled Arab women, some of whom tore their garments apart to reveal the bones almost piercing their skin. And the sight in the hospital of the children's limbs swollen with emptiness was not good; nor was the dread lest we should have delivered Jerusalem only to starve her to death.⁶⁶

An urgent appeal to G.H.Q. in Cairo highlighted that the city could not 'be considered self-supporting' and requested the delivery of 200 tonnes of grain a month from Egypt, which was met with approval.⁶⁷ These deliveries meant that by the third week of January 1918, Storrs could write home to his mother reporting that the regular supply of food had 'just turned the corner'. He also gave insight into his visible and personalised style of rule, explaining that:

Three times last week I went round the bakers shops myself, with two special gendarmes, and forced them to sell at my Tariff price. Women first, next children and men last. At that time there was not enough to go round but the knowledge that the Governor himself is looking after the thing himself inspires confidence.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Bertha Spafford Vester, *Our Jerusalem*, (London, Evans Brothers, 1951), pp. 257-260 and pp. 266-267. For more on the aims and organisation of the American Colony see Yaakov Ariel and Ruth Kark, "Messianism, Holiness, Charisma, and Community: The American-Swedish Colony in Jerusalem, 1881-1933", *Church History*, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 641-657.

⁶⁶ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 287. Storrs also highlighted his concerns about food shortages in a letter home to Nina Cust, Harry Cust's widow. Storrs to Nina Cust, 9/1/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 287-88.

⁶⁸ Storrs to his mother, 24/1/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

This proactive and visible style was borne of Storrs' dislike of office-based administration that he had experienced in Egypt. By taking to the streets Storrs aimed to demonstrate his attributes as a visible governor, whilst also indulging in his love of practical action instead of desk work. It also made him a physical reminder of the British presence in Jerusalem.

Storrs' delight at his change of role is neatly encapsulated in a further letter home to his mother, exclaiming 'But O the amazing difference between doing, and advising, suggesting and recommending, as I have done all these years'.⁶⁹ By March he enthused to a friend that his work in Jerusalem was:

Indeed interesting and even enthralling. Till I came here I had imagined Cairo to be the unique school for cosmopolitan and internal intrigues, but here you have the religious element in addition, and I take off my hat to Jerusalem. The Turk removed, as usual, everything that was removable, including all the heads of communities, not excepting the Moslem. So that the reconstruction and maintenance of an administration is in the beginning doubly difficult, for with our usual exaggerated punctilio we are not, as you might imagine, making a clean sweep of things, but doing our best to fulfil to the letter the tedious and minute regulations which govern the ruling of occupied enemy territory.⁷⁰

The freedoms granted Storrs as Military Governor, together with the religious complexities of the city, allowed him to involve himself in local politics and intrigue in a greater way than previously possible elsewhere in his career. This approach was not always well received by his superiors, nor the people he governed, as will be demonstrated later.

As Governor, Storrs was responsible for public security. With limited prior experience in such matters, he had feared that it would be among his more arduous roles, but with typical self-confidence soon confessed that it was 'very

⁶⁹ Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

⁷⁰ Storrs to Gabriel, 2/3/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

much less of a mystery than I had hitherto imagined'.⁷¹ One of his first actions in this area was to issue a notice requesting information on the whereabouts of any Turkish soldiers or officers in hiding in Jerusalem. If any inhabitants were found to be concealing any Turks, they would "be liable to be dealt with under Martial Law".⁷² Certainly rule by decree was one of the key features of his military governance, with Storrs claiming to 'wield the power of Aristotle's Beneficent Despot' by having the ability 'by word written, or even spoken, to relieve distress, to right wrong, to forbid desecration and to promote ability and goodwill'.⁷³ The civic duty espoused by T.E. Page was finding its genesis in Jerusalem.

Of course the righting of wrongs can be subjective in nature. It is telling that once the situation in Jerusalem had begun to stabilise, Storrs turned his attention to those issues that were of strong personal interest. He recalls that he had only been in Jerusalem 'but a few weeks when I was aware of a tendency to demolish the interesting and beautiful and substitute for them the cheapest and most immediate commonness in design or material that could be procured'.⁷⁴ This horror led to the following Public Notice being issued on April 8 1918:

No person shall demolish, erect, alter, or repair the structure of any building in the city of Jerusalem or its environs within a radius of 2,500 metres from the Damascus Gate (Bab al Amud) until he has obtained a written permit from the Military Governor.

Any person contravening the orders contained in this proclamation, or any term or terms contained in a license issued to him under the proclamation, will be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding £E.200.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Storrs to Mark Sykes, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

⁷² Notice from Military Governor on Turkish Soldiers, 31/12/1917, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

⁷³ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 317.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 310.

⁷⁵ C.R. Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the period of the British Military Administration*, (London, John Murray, 1921), p. v.

A similar proclamation soon followed forbidding the use of stucco and corrugated iron within the city walls, with the aim of 'respecting the tradition of stone vaulting, the heritage in Jerusalem of an immemorial and a hallowed past'.⁷⁶ These strict regulations on the use of specific forms of limestone in construction led to the development of 'Jerusalem Stone' as a commercial building material and were expanded to cover the entire municipal area by the 1936 Town Planning Ordinance. By the end of the Mandate, Jerusalem Stone was being used to clad buildings instead of as a construction material in itself, as specified by the 1944 Ordinance. This was continued by the Israelis with aplomb after 1967 with the use of a 6cm layer of stone to clad buildings, as opposed to 20cm under the British.⁷⁷ In passing these edicts, Storrs believed he was maintaining the 'aesthetic' status quo of the city.⁷⁸ Instead they marked a direct intervention into the 'built fabric' of Jerusalem.⁷⁹

Writing on the destruction of Thessaloniki's Jewish community during World War Two and the limited attempts made by the British and Americans at preserving its cultural heritage, Bailey highlights how 'perceptions of value depend on the observer'.⁸⁰ This was very much the case with the new Military Governor of Jerusalem. In his preface to the records of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, Storrs contends the notices were 'primal necessities' that 'ensured the temporary and provisional Military Administration against the charge of encouraging or permitting vandalism'.⁸¹ This approach demonstrates Storrs' attempts to preserve Jerusalem's Biblical aura as he understood it, whilst also highlighting the extent to which he was prepared to take administrative and ideological control of the built environment.⁸² Such orders infringed upon the modernising status quo that

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. v.

⁷⁷ Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation (New Edition)*, (London, Verso, 2017), pp. 27-31.

⁷⁸ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 310.

⁷⁹ Wallach, *A City in Fragments*, p. 147.

⁸⁰ Roderick Bailey, "Narrowed minds, destroyed communities: Anglo-American perceptions of Jewish heritage in Thessaloniki, 1943-46", in Lucy Wrapson, Sally Woodcock, Victoria Sutcliffe and Spike Bucklow ed., *Migrants: Art, Artists, Materials and Ideas Crossing Borders* (London, Archetype, 2019), pp. 119-129.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. v.

⁸² Mazza, *Jerusalem*, pp. 161-162. See also Annabel Jane Wharton, *Selling Jerusalem: Relics, Replicas, Theme Parks*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 212-219.

had emerged in the city prior to World War One. Plans to electrify Jerusalem and build a tramway between the city and Bethlehem were scuppered by the war but demonstrate that major works were on the horizon.⁸³ Whilst one could assert that the temporary nature of O.E.T.A. and the requirements of the 1907 Rules of War made such undertakings impossible, the issuing of such notices show that Storrs opposed the spirit of modernisation that had arisen in the last years of Ottoman rule and was prepared take concrete measures against it.⁸⁴ Even with the dissolution of O.E.T.A. and establishment of civilian governance in June 1920, Storrs stuck to this position. In a speech given to the Over-Seas League (now the Royal Overseas League) on December 22 1920, he maintained that proposals to run a tramway between Bethlehem and the Mount of Olives would be 'over the body of the Military Governor'.⁸⁵ In this way, the Military Governor can be seen as further breaching the status quo that existed in Jerusalem prior to British rule by pursuing his deeply personalised preservationist aims, whilst also concentrating power in his own hands.

The authority placed within Storrs' hands was not without its restrictions. In his bid to preserve the sacred nature of the city, policies were introduced that saw the prohibition of cinema and cabaret shows in the Old City, forbade the opening of drinking-bars, limited the consumption of alcohol to a table in a hotel or restaurant, and severely restricted the placement of advertisements, with the exception of 'one or two small authorized hoardings in commercial quarters, and out of sight of the walls of Jerusalem'.⁸⁶ However, the regulation of prostitution proved less straightforward.

The increased hardships faced by Jerusalem during World War One had seen approximately 500 women turn to prostitution in an effort to secure some form of

⁸³ Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, p. 5.

⁸⁴ For more on this matter see Chapter Four.

⁸⁵ "Jerusalem the Unchanging", *Daily Mail* (London, England), Wednesday, December 22, 1920, Issue 7709, p. 6.

⁸⁶ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 294 for policies towards beggars, p. 310 for policies on advertising and p. 394 for policies regarding alcohol and cabarets/cinemas. Later, when appointed Acting Chief Administrator in July 1920 Storrs considered whether he could extend the prohibition of drinking bars to all of Palestine. See Memorandum on bars and the sale of liquor, 13/7/1920, Storrs Papers Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2 – Jerusalem, 1920-1921.

income.⁸⁷ Such activity was hardly in keeping with Storrs' visions of a sacred Jerusalem. As early as January 1918, the Governor received a letter from the Committee of Jerusalem Ladies (established at Storrs' recommendation), suggesting:

That all peddling on the streets by girls and women be prohibited as this is frequently the catspaw used for leading to drink and vice. That areas inhabited by respectable families be purged of the sin and sinister influences which its pernicious and alluring presence cannot fail to exert over the innocent and unsuspecting. This promiscuous mixing up being the result of steps taken by the late Government to save the military from disease by suppressing the notorious dens, thus scattering the germs of evil.⁸⁸

Similarly, the Municipal Committee of the Ashkenazi Community petitioned Storrs in September 1918 about the damage prostitution did to the Jewish community and to those who lived in close proximity to the brothels, in particular young children.⁸⁹

Despite these appeals, it was not until 1920 that any ordinance prohibiting the operation of brothels in the city was issued.⁹⁰ Why such a delay when the issue was clearly of great concern to certain communities and to the Governor himself? Here the limitations of Storrs' power are shown. 26,000 British soldiers were stationed in Jerusalem after the conquest of the city, with the Military Government recognising that prostitutes were a 'vital necessity' for their men. In a bid to ensure the health and good conduct of soldiers, a regulated system was developed where brothels were allowed to operate in the neighbourhoods of Nahalat Shi'vah

⁸⁷ The figure of 500 prostitutes is quoted by Storrs in *Ibid*, p. 432. This number is further corroborated by The Municipal Committee of the Ashkenazi Community, albeit the women in question are specifically named as being Jewish. See Margalit Shilo, "Women as Victims of War: The British Conquest (1917) and the Blight of Prostitution in the Holy City", *Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies & Gender Issues*, No. 6, Women, War, and Peace in Jewish and Middle East Contexts (Fall 5764/2003), p. 72.

⁸⁸ Committee of Jerusalem Ladies to Storrs, 19/1/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

⁸⁹ Shilo, "Women as Victims of War", p. 74.

⁹⁰ See Chapter 5 for more on this policy and Storrs' explanation to the Pope of its success.

and the Milner Houses (both outside of the Old City), irrespective of Storrs' disquiet or that of Jerusalem's residents.⁹¹ No doubt the withdrawal of the British army in 1919 also played its part in reducing demand for sexual services, making it easier for brothels to be prohibited.⁹² Whilst Storrs was afforded remarkable individual scope in his role as Governor he was still an official of O.E.T.A., where military concerns would take precedent over personal proclivities.

The Governor and the Communities of Jerusalem

As Governor of a diverse city, Storrs came in to contact with a variety of different groups and interests throughout the course of a working day. A cursory glance of the hours of reception at the Military Governor's office on Monday 3 June 1918 is telling in this regard:

- 10.00 AM – Police and Gendarmerie Officers.
- 10.10 “ – The Grand Mufti and Kadi of Jerusalem and Officials of the Sharia Court and Olanas.
- 10.20 “ – The Grand Rabbi and other Rabbis of the Jewish Community.
- 10.30 “ – Ecclesiastical Heads of the different Christian Communities.
- 10.40 “ – Mayor with Members and Officials of Municipality.
- 10.50 “ – Law Courts Officials.
- 11.00 “ – Director General of Wakf and Wakfs Officials.
- 11.10 “ – Director of Public Education and Officials.
- 11.20 “ – Notables of Jerusalem.
- 11.30 “ – Notables of Villages.
- 11.40 “ – Officials of Administrative Office, Finance and Public Debt.⁹³

This schedule highlights the multitude of different interests Storrs had to consider when governing Jerusalem, although the ten minutes granted would hardly seem sufficient time to adequately understand the concerns of each community. The

⁹¹ Shilo, "Women as Victims of War", p. 73.

⁹² *Ibid*, p. 77.

⁹³ Hours of reception at the Military Governor's Office 3/6/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1. Storrs notes that the hours of reception overran and 'really went on until 12.50'.

tight timescale would suggest an approach to consulting the communities that was more performative than practical in nature. Notable by their absence on this day are the Zionist Commission, but they were to have a key influence on affairs in the city throughout the duration of the Military Administration.

Writing in early 1918, a somewhat surprised Storrs asserted that 'all these sects, creeds, nations and communities, though mutually hating and hated, are in the ordinary relations of life so far as we are concerned, friendly, agreeable, and not unentertaining persons, deserving of the closest attention'.⁹⁴ This was civic duty through an imperialist lens: the commendable attitude of the city's inhabitants towards the British made them worthy of assistance. In providing them with his attention, Storrs was to raise and dash the hopes of various communities throughout his time as Governor.

Storrs and the Muslims

Within days of his arrival in the city – and prior to his appointment as Governor – Storrs had sought out two of the key notables of the Husayni family: Mayor Hussein al-Husayni who was President of the Municipality and his cousin, Kamil al-Husayni – the Mufti of Jerusalem.⁹⁵ His initial impressions of the Mayor were that he possessed 'honest and obliging weakness', whilst Storrs bonded with the Mufti because of his knowledge of Egypt. Such visits were not mere pleasantries: Storrs' diaries note that throughout the course of his conversation with Kamil he was able to gather some '*faits divers*' regarding the Wakf and Orphanage Treasury.⁹⁶ The necessity of knowledge and the pleasures of socialising were already coalescing in his approach to key Jerusalemites, but nonetheless it marked the start of what was for Storrs a period of 'close and friendly contact' with the Mufti.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 401.

⁹⁵ The Mufti's role included interpreting Shari'a law and issuing *fatwas* on key issues using existing precedents from religious texts. Ilan Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis, 1700-1948*, (London, Saqi, 2010), p. 41.

⁹⁶ Mufti Kamil was educated for four years at al-Azhar in Egypt. Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 278-280.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 401.

The occupation of Palestine by the British saw the imposition of martial law, halting reforms for mayoral elections that had been proposed by the Ottomans. When in early 1918 Mayor Hussein al-Husayni died, the role of appointing a new Mayor therefore fell to the Governor. Tradition dictated the appointment of a relative of the deceased and Hussein's older brother, Musa Kazim al-Husayni was selected as the new mayor of Jerusalem.⁹⁸ With a background in provincial administration, Musa Kazim was one of the first urban notables to be integrated into the Ottoman administration.⁹⁹ This clearly impacted his approach to the mayoralty, with Storrs recalling that he had 'all the dignity and some of the good qualities of the traditional Ottoman Governor'.¹⁰⁰ However, the relations that Storrs cultivated with the Husayni family were not without their detractors. Palestinian intellectual and educationalist Khalil al-Sakakini tersely noted that Palestinian Arabs disliked Storrs because 'the Husayni family are the only people he knows. He listens only to their opinion'.¹⁰¹ Indeed, British commitments to fulfilling the Balfour Declaration saw their relationship deteriorate throughout the period of military rule, culminating in Storrs' removal of Musa Kazim as Mayor following the Nabi Musa riots of April 1920 and the appointment of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi as his successor. In doing so, Storrs sowed further discord amongst the notables of the city.¹⁰²

The Military Governor placed great importance on the celebration of Muslim ceremonies, viewing them as a 'testing ground for the paradigm of British rule in Palestine'. In particular, he viewed the Nabi Musa festival, held every April in Jerusalem, as 'an opportunity to establish a patronage relationship with the Muslim elite and to demonstrate his respect for Islam, thus rendering the transition from Ottoman to European rule more palatable'.¹⁰³ The 1918 festival was the first to be held under British rule and Storrs took on a key role on the first

⁹⁸ Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty*, p. 167.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 111-112.

¹⁰⁰ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 401.

¹⁰¹ Quote from Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, (London, Abacus, 2001), p. 107.

¹⁰² For more on this matter see Chapter Five.

¹⁰³ Yair Wallach, "The Oud Player and the Governor: Jerusalem Arabs' Relations with Ronald Storrs and the British Administration", Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, (Tel Aviv, Eretz Israel Museum, 2010) p.79.

day of festivities: the Friday of the Banners (*jum'at al-a'lam*). Greeting local notables and shaykhs at Government House, Storrs received the banners of the Prophet, two banners of *Nabi Da'ud* (Prophet David), and two of the Haram al-Sharif, saluting the banners after prayers. In doing so, the new Governor took on the mantle of his Ottoman successor.¹⁰⁴ Such an appearance was not merely an attempt at maintaining the much vaunted (but often vanquished) status quo. It represented an effort by Storrs to establish himself as an expert of Muslim and Arab tradition with the residents of the city, whilst also helping to establish relationships with key figures within the municipal and religious communities.¹⁰⁵

These relationships were further cemented by the hosting of parties, both at the Governorate and Storrs' private residence. As a noted poet and oud player, Wasif Jawhariyyeh played at several such events. He recalls in his memoirs how the Registry Room at Governorate House was often 'turned into a celebration hall where singing, dancing, and acting went on during business hours in the presence of various local guests' who attended on Storrs' invitation.¹⁰⁶ He further recalls a gathering at Storrs' residence which was attended by Muslim notables and civil servants from the Jerusalem district, where the Military Governor impressed his captive audience with a political speech in classical Arabic. Jawhariyyeh himself was requested by Storrs to dress in traditional Arabic attire whilst playing the oud.¹⁰⁷ As Wallach notes, it is as if Storrs himself believed that he understood 'the Middle East better than its local inhabitants, so much so that he could dictate their suitable attire'.¹⁰⁸ Likewise, Tibawi questions Storrs' claims to linguistic expertise, arguing that the Arabic contained in *Orientalisms* bely a 'pretentious amateur' in the subject.¹⁰⁹ In any event the efforts Storrs took to demonstrate an appreciation of Arabic and Islamic culture – no matter how inaccurate this understanding was – placed him in a small minority of British

¹⁰⁴ Awad Halabi, "The Nabi Musa Festival Under British-Ruled Palestine", *ISIM Newsletter*, Vol. 10 (2002), p. 27. Footage exists of this rather stilted and awkward ceremony: see Imperial War Museum (IWM) Film Collection 45, *The NEBI-NUSA [sic] FESTIVALS: scenes and incidents en route*, Jury's Imperial Pictures, 1919, accessed online at <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060022598> on 16/7/2020.

¹⁰⁵ Wallach, "The Oud Player and the Governor", pp. 78-79.

¹⁰⁶ Tamari and Nassar ed., *The Storyteller of Jerusalem*, p. 122.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 126.

¹⁰⁸ Wallach, "The Oud Player and the Governor", p. 78.

¹⁰⁹ Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, p. 69.

officials, who, like his more illustrious friend T.E. Lawrence, used this knowledge to inform their attitudes and approaches to the region.

The strengths and limitations of this approach are exhibited in a further anecdote from Jawhariyyeh's memoirs. Reflecting on a demonstration against the Balfour Declaration and the separation of Palestine from Greater Syria, the oud player described how the procession stopped outside of the Governorate, demanding to hear what Storrs had to say:

After some hesitation, he came out of the Governorate and stood behind the fence that overlooks Nablus Road. Behind him stood a cannon that had been left behind by the army and placed there for memory's sake. When the crowds saw the governor, they fell silent. Storrs then spoke in his rotund voice and said, "And make them ready for whatever you can of force," and went back in immediately. It was an extremely funny act but these comedies did not fool the patriotic Arabs that knew Storrs well.¹¹⁰

The Military Governor quoted the assembled crowd verse 60 of the eighth chapter of the Quran, the Surah al-Anfal. Verses 60-66 instruct Muslims to be ready for war to defend Islam, but also make peace if the other side wishes to.¹¹¹ In quoting this verse, Storrs utilised his knowledge of both Arabic and Islam – together with his quick wit – to establish his position as a reasonable intermediary and defuse the concerns of the demonstrators. However, as Jawhariyyeh notes, such an act did little to dampen growing discontent at British rule, and Storrs' role within it.

Shortly after the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, Britain and France published the Anglo-French Declaration. It took the form of an official communique from G.H.Q., with copies given to the press and posted on public noticeboards in towns and villages across Palestine, Syria and Iraq. The document declared that:

¹¹⁰ This quote is from the Quranic verse 8:61. Tamari and Nassar ed., *The Storyteller of Jerusalem*, p. 126.

¹¹¹ *The Quran*, 8:60-66.

The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War set in train by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.¹¹²

The day after the Declaration was publicised, Storrs arrived at his office to be greeted by Muslim and Christians looking for further clarification. In particular they wanted to know whether Palestine was included as part of Syria in plans to establish 'indigenous' government. In an example of the limited authority he had as Governor of a city, as opposed to being part of the national administration, he 'replied to them in general terms, and they left apparently satisfied'. Expressing his concern at the timing and content of the Declaration, Storrs declared he would 'do his best to stifle the manifestation' but this would be a hard job as 'they now consider themselves to have received a definitive mandate from the British and French Governments'.¹¹³

Palestinian notables and religious figures reacted to this news by establishing a 'Christian-Moslem Arab Committee', looking to push the advantage the Declaration had presented. They proposed that Sherif Hussein's should be pronounced as Caliph at Friday prayers on November 22 and that a signed petition should be sent to the French Commissariat expressing that Palestine should form part of Syria. Such a declaration would undermine British control in the region, and Storrs set about looking to scupper these plans. First he spoke to the Mufti, Kamil al-Husayni, in a bid to prevent Hussein's name being pronounced as Caliph. Mindful of the fact that he did not wish to interfere with religious matters, he sowed doubt in Kamil's mind by reminding him that such a statement had not been approved by Mecca itself, and could therefore backfire on the Mufti. After little persuasion, al-Husayni agreed not to declare the Sherif as Caliph, and also agreed to discourage the idea amongst those close to him.

¹¹² Anglo-French Declaration, 7/11/1918 in Antonious, *Arab Awakening*, p. 435.

¹¹³ FO 371/3386 – Confidential Report to HQ on the impact of the Anglo-French Agreement, 19/11/1918, TNA.

With regard to shutting down the petition to the French, Storrs sent for the Mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazim al-Husayni. In an approach redolent of his approach to those students who wanted their homework completed, Storrs informed the Mayor that:


While everyone was free to hold what political opinions they desired, they could not, so to speak, take their stand upon a political platform and continue to remain in the service of a non-political Military Administration. I was therefore instructing Arif Hikmat Nashashibi, Director General of Wakfs, to let me know at an early date whether it was his intention to opt for an administrative or political career, the two being for the present incompatible. The Mayor seemed grateful for this warning, which enabled him to say that he thought he would be more useful to his country as President of the Municipality.

Next Storrs turned his attention to the Latin members of the Committee, having eliminated in his mind the 'two chief members'. He gave the Latin Patriarch the names of his members who were on the Committee, and warned those who continued to pursue the petition that 'the British Government and the Allies were not in the mood for receiving sectional petitions on political matters at a time such as this'.¹¹⁴ In this way Storrs was able to pick-off any potential troublemakers, utilising the skills and expertise he developed at Charterhouse and honed in Egypt in the service of the British Government to the detriment of the Palestinians, Muslim and Christian alike, that he ruled over.

¹¹⁴ FO 371/3386 – Continuation of Confidential Report to HQ on the Anglo-French Agreement, 24/11/1918, TNA.

Storrs and the Zionists

The aforementioned arrival of the Zionist Commission in Palestine in April 1918 represented the first test of how Storrs would handle relations between the Palestinians and the Zionists.¹¹⁵ The Governor immediately went to task, bringing together key representatives of the Commission, the Mayor of Jerusalem and the Heads of the Communities at his office – an attempt to ensure that the meeting took place in ‘surroundings at once official and friendly’. However, the ‘Jerusalem faces were unassuring’. This initial encounter was followed up by a dinner party organised by Storrs, with the seating arrangements as follows:



The aim of this gathering was clear – ‘to clear away certain misunderstandings aroused by the visit of the Zionist Commission’. Weizmann used the opportunity to assure the assembled guests that Zionism’s intentions were not to seek political power but to work with the Arabs towards joint autonomy. Responding, the Mufti (courtesy of Storrs’ translation) thanked Weizmann for ‘allaying apprehensions’ and prayed for ‘unity of aim’.¹¹⁶

Reflecting on the ‘evening’s enthusiasm’, Storrs felt that ‘much good’ had been done ‘as the result of this frank and friendly exchange of programmes’. However,

¹¹⁵ Storrs also acknowledged the magnitude of the visit, noting that it ‘marked a turning point in the history of Palestine hardly less important than the British conquest’, Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 415.

¹¹⁶ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 341. Prior to his arrival in Palestine, Weizmann had met with Arab leaders in Cairo where he argued they had nothing to fear from Zionism. He also instructed members of the Commission to not be drawn on the question of Zionist aims for an independent Jewish state in Palestine, despite this being their overall aspiration. See Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, pp. 109-110.

such bonhomie was not unconditional and came with a caveat that was to foreshadow future events. The Governor noted how the 'Syrians present...united in agreeing that the Zionist programme and its acceptance were unthinkable save under one just and equitable Government, the identity of which it did not seem to occur to them to question'.¹¹⁷ Meetings in 'official and friendly' surroundings would only achieve so much.

Storrs' efforts to support the Commission did not go unnoticed and gave him some credit with Weizmann, the Jewish *Yishuv* and the Zionist movement. Indeed, he was a near exception amongst British officials for arguing in favour of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.¹¹⁸ His efforts to learn Hebrew also helped to establish enthusiasm for him and trust in his work.¹¹⁹ Edward Keith-Roach, who was to succeed Storrs as Governor of Jerusalem in 1926, recalls that Storrs had 'the gift of picking up a phrase or two of Armenian or Hebrew and producing it at the right moment, with just that effect that gave happiness to those addressed and considerable satisfaction to himself'.¹²⁰ This intellectual curiosity to learn new languages and explore new cultures – combined with the flair and showmanship that Storrs possessed (as shown by Jawhariyyeh's earlier anecdote) – helped to establish relationships with diverse communities but also raised hopes that he would always rule in their favour. Of course this was never likely to be possible: Storrs was first and foremost a British official beholden to the (contradictory and inflammatory) policies being pursued by London. The tension between the personal and the professional for Storrs is clear to see.

His loyalty to the British position was demonstrated just six days after the Commission's arrival in Jerusalem. In a letter to Ormsby-Gore, Weizmann expressed his disappointment at O.E.T.A. for not reconciling 'Arabs and Syrians' to the Balfour Declaration. He went on to state that:

¹¹⁷ FO 371/3395 - Note by the Military Governor of Jerusalem, 30/4/1918, TNA.

¹¹⁸ A.J. Sherman, *Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine, 1918-1948*, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 27.

¹¹⁹ Golani, "An Enigma", p. 57.

¹²⁰ Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem*, p. 75.

A striking illustration of this condition of affairs occurred in Jerusalem only last week. On the 11th of April the Military Governor of Jerusalem was present at a performance in aid of a Moslem orphanage. We have seen extracts from two speeches delivered by Arabs on that occasion...Both speakers used the kind of language which would be appropriate if an attempt were on foot to enslave and to ruin the Arabs of Palestine. They called on the Arab Nation to wake from its torpor, and to rise up in defence of its land, its liberty, of its sacred places against those who were coming to rob it of everything. One speaker adjured his hearers not to sell a single inch of land. Nor is that all. Both speakers took it for granted that Palestine was and must remain a purely Arab country. In fact, a map of Palestine bearing the inscription 'La Palestine Arabe' was prominently displayed...While the speakers had no scruple about avowing their unmistakably anti-Jewish sentiments in the presence of the representative of the Government, the Military Governor, as far as our information goes, uttered no word to suggest that there was any discrepancy between those sentiments and the Government's policy.¹²¹

The letter was forwarded on to the Foreign Office on 22 April, together with comments by Storrs himself. Having consulted with Hain Ben Attar, a 'Sephardi Jew of Moroccan origin', the Military Governor established that the 'objectionable phrases' had not been uttered until after his departure from the performance. He argued that the formation of the Commission meant that the 'Arab and Christian elements of Palestine had been labouring under grave disquietude which has not been allayed by the arrival of the gentlemen themselves'. Echoing the intentions of the dinner party at the Governorate, Storrs failed to agree that with Weizmann that it was the business of the Military Authorities 'to bring home to the Arabs and Syrians the fact that H.M.G. has expressed a definite policy with regard to the future of the Jews in Palestine'. Rather it was incumbent upon the Zionist Commission to make their case to the inhabitants of Palestine. He went on to argue that 'as a convinced Zionist', he could not:

¹²¹ Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, 16/4/1918 in Doreen Ingrams, *Palestine Papers, 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict*, (London, John Murray, 1972), p. 24.

Help thinking that the Commission are lacking in a sense of the dramatic actuality. Palestine, up to now a Moslem country, has fallen into the hands of a Christian Power which on the eve of its conquest announced that a considerable portion of its land is to be handed over for colonization purposes to a nowhere very popular people. The despatch of a Commission of these people is subsequently announced...The Commission was warned in Cairo of the numerous and grave misconceptions with which their enterprise was regarded and strongly advised to make a public pronouncement to put an end to those misconceptions. No such pronouncement has yet been made; and yet an inaccurate and unchecked account of an unimportant amateur performance in a small Boys School is considered a sufficient reason for asking the Commander-in-Chief to rub in to the people for whose moral and public security he is responsible for, and almost certainly unwelcome, details of His Majesty's Government's Zionist policy which have never yet been disclosed to the general public, nor, so far as I am aware, to any living soul.

Evidently Storrs, like many other British officials, was unclear on how exactly Britain's Zionist policy would be implemented in practice beyond the broad theme of a 'Jewish National Home' contained in the Balfour Declaration, and loath for O.E.T.A. to be placed in a position where they would have to promote the project to the Palestinian Arabs. In closing, he curtly dismissed Weizmann's complaints as a 'little display of petulance', criticising the Commission for issuing:

A communication of which neither fact nor the manner can be said materially to increase their reputation for practical statesmanship. It would be well if in the future before spreading themselves upon such unpromising material, they verified their facts and gave evidence of their belief (of what is after all the truth), that the Military Authorities are doing their best to help them – let them, in a word

Only be kind/And eke out our performance with their mind.¹²²

Later, he would recognise Zionist enthusiasm as being the product of an 'impetuous people' arriving in Palestine 'pardonably keyed-up to expectation of high immediacies' having waited two thousand years for permission to return home.¹²³ Nonetheless, Zionist questioning of British policy at the time served only to earn the Military Governor's annoyance as he attempted to maintain a semblance of the status quo and balance competing interests in a temporary military administration.

Despite his frustrations with the Zionists, Storrs continued to be sympathetic towards their work. During a meeting with Weizmann, in which it was stated several times that the Commission had full faith in the Governor's efforts to further their cause, Storrs travelled to a new Jewish colony, Mikveh Israel. The visit made a great impression, leading Storrs to confess that he 'not been aware of what could be done in this country under skilful and loving treatment', leaving him 'filled with new hope for the future'.¹²⁴ Clearly the Governor considered the Ottomans and the Palestinians themselves incapable of such 'skilful and loving treatment' of the land.

Tensions always rose in Jerusalem around November 2, marking as it did the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. Storrs would demonstrate his loyalty to British policy and sympathies towards the Zionist cause on the first anniversary of the Declaration, granting permission for a 'grand procession and assembly' by the Zionist Commission, whilst at the same time denying Palestinians the right to a counter-procession. Instructions were given ordering the immediate arrest of any person trying to disturb or disrupt the assembly. The only restrictions placed on the Commission were with regard to flags and the disbandment of the procession prior to the Jaffa Gate to avoid possible disturbances with Muslims and Christians.

¹²² FO 371/3398 – Jews and Arabs, Observations by Ronald Storrs, 22/4/1918, TNA.

¹²³ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 347.

¹²⁴ TNA, FO 800/221, Storrs to Sir Mark Sykes, 9/8/1918.

Storrs personally attended and addressed the assembly, before retiring around 17.00. He noted that with some minor exceptions the arrangements 'were well and efficiently carried out'. Following his departure, two of the school processions failed to disperse prior to the Jaffa Gate, with the result that 'ragamuffins of the lowest class', a Christian and a Muslim, took the teacher's banner and beat them over the head with it. Both were arrested and later received a sentence of four months in prison.

Reflecting on why the attack took place, Storrs rejected the notion that the incident was organised or anti-Jewish. Instead he blamed a prevalent anti-Zionist mood that prevailed over the city; a sentiment that was confirmed when he received a petition from Mayor Musa Kazim al-Husayni opposing the handing over of Palestine to any one of the three religions practised there. Criticism of his decision to allow the Zionists to march through Jerusalem also came from an unlikely source – some of Storrs' pro-Zionist Jewish friends. They questioned the wisdom of allowing a public demonstration that was likely to antagonise non-Jews when 'the gratitude of the Jewish people could have been equally well expressed by meetings within four walls and loyal telegrams to the British Government'.¹²⁵ This belief in ceremony over security was to have grave implications later as opposition to Zionism in Palestine continued to grow.

Storrs' pro-Zionist sympathies were also demonstrated by his approach towards the al-Buraq or Western Wall. However, he would soon be caught once again between Palestinian opinion and Zionist aims. The Wall is part of the border of the Haram al-Sharif and is understood to have been part of a supporting wall for the Second Jewish Temple in the Herodian period. For Muslims, it marks the site where the Prophet Muhammad tied his winged steed, the Buraq. Several attempts had been made by Jewish leaders (both Zionist and non-Zionist) to purchase the land in front of the Wall from the 1830s onwards.¹²⁶ This area was hemmed in by housing of the Moroccan Quarter, leaving a narrow walkway

¹²⁵ FO 371/3385 – Report from Storrs on the demonstrations on November 2nd 1918, 4/11/1918, TNA.

¹²⁶ Roberto Mazza, 'The deal of the century?: The attempted sale of the Western Wall by Cemal Pasha in 1916', *Middle East Studies*, (2021), DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2021.1895118, p. 3.

through which the Wall was accessed.¹²⁷ As recently as 1916, secret negotiations had taken place between Cemal Pasha, the Military Governor of Syria, and the Zionists, using Albert Antébi, a Syrian-born Jew, as interlocutor with regard to the acquisition of this area. Antébi, no supporter of Zionism, was seen by Cemal as the ideal intermediary because of his work supporting the Jewish communities of Palestine. The Ottoman Military Governor had various reasons for expediting a sale, including his own plans for the 'beautification' of Jerusalem, a need to remove an Arab past in favour of Ottoman heritage and the opportunity to raise money for the ongoing war effort. From the Zionist perspective, opinion was divided over the merits of purchasing the area in front of the Wall. Advocates of the proposal highlighted the political and spiritual reasons, whilst opponents objected on the grounds that it would unduly associate Zionism solely with religious symbols. Ultimately, concerns regarding Palestinian reactions to the purchase, coupled with a growing antipathy from Antébi to continue negotiations, ended discussions in July 1916.¹²⁸

The Wall remained an point of contention amongst the Jews during British rule. Ultra-Orthodox opposition towards the purchase of the Wall and its surrounding environs, and Zionism more generally, stemmed from concerns that both represented a secular and political pre-emption of the messianic age when Israel would be restored to the Jews. Keen to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the ultra-Orthodox, Weizmann resolved to purchase the Wall from the Abu Madian Waqf, a Muslim religious trust dating from the reign of Nur al-Din in the twelfth century.¹²⁹ Storrs, with the approval of Clayton and Money, heartily endorsed the acquisition by the Zionists of the Wall itself and six yards of pavement in front of it for Jewish worship for a considerable sum – £75,000. For Storrs, the sale of the wall also appealed because it would 'afford a legitimate satisfaction to the Zionists', whilst also providing 'a useful lump sum to local, deadly impoverished, Islam'.¹³⁰ Indeed,

¹²⁷ It was only after the occupation of Jerusalem by the Israelis in 1967 that this accommodation was demolished and the Western Wall Plaza was established. See Abowd, *Colonial Jerusalem*, pp. 110-144 for an excellent summary of the history of the Moroccan Quarter and Israeli actions since 1967.

¹²⁸ Mazza, 'The deal of the century?', pp. 5-8.

¹²⁹ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, p. 71. See Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 346 for more on the history of the Abu Madian Waqf.

¹³⁰ FO 800/221, Storrs to Sir Mark Sykes, 9/8/1918.

it was suggested that any payment would be used to rehouse the occupants and fund Muslim education in the city. However, the plan soon ran into opposition from the Jerusalem's Palestinian notables. By September 1918, and with parallel and unauthorised negotiations taking place over the future of the Wall, the Governor performed a volte-face and recommend the abandonment of the project. Much to his irritation, Storrs saw the failed negotiations as a missed opportunity that would have 'obviated years of wretched humiliations, including the befouling of the Wall and pavement and the unmannerly braying of the tragicomic Arab band during Jewish prayer, and culminating in the horrible outrages of 1929'.¹³¹

Such a viewpoint is idealistic at best. It is highly likely that a successful sale would have led to an immediate increase in tensions between Palestinians and Zionists, marking as it did a major departure from the status quo that was supposedly so sacrosanct to British military rule. Moreover, Storrs himself acknowledged the pressures placed on the Mufti to resist the sale of so sensitive an area to the Zionist Commission.¹³² Irrespective of their failure, the negotiations highlight Storrs' endorsement of Zionist objectives at this time and the limitations placed upon his ability fulfil such aims.

Storrs and the Festival of the Holy Fire

In many ways, the various strands of Storrs' *Weltanschauung* are demonstrated in his approach to maintaining order during the Greek Orthodox Festival of the Holy Fire at Easter. As the son of an Anglican priest, the Military Governor had a sound understanding of Christian traditions and festivals as marked by the Church of England. Celebrations in Jerusalem, although broadly following the same liturgical calendar, were a different matter to him altogether. Whilst Eastertide 'almost throughout the world' was the 'season when, if only for three days, the death of strife becomes the victory of peace', in the Holy Land and 'most of all in the Holy City', Easter meant 'for generations the sharpening of daggers

¹³¹ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 347.

¹³² *Ibid*, p. 347.

and the trebling of garrisons'.¹³³ With his awareness for trouble heightened following skirmishes between the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Churches in the Grotto of the Nativity in Bethlehem during their respective celebrations of Epiphany and Christmas (which happened to fall on the same day), Storrs prepared with great trepidation for the 1918 Festival of the Holy Fire.¹³⁴

The potential for trouble was further compounded by internal disputes within the Greek Orthodox Church. World War One had placed the Patriarchate in severe financial difficulties, with Patriarch Damianos secretly permitting the sale of land to the Zionists to help balance the books. Moreover, tensions existed between the Arab laity and the Greek hierarchy, with the former trying to take control of the Patriarchate from the latter.¹³⁵ Finally, and of most immediate concern to Storrs in his preparations, was the fact that the Orthodox Church possessed no Priest in Jerusalem higher than an Archimandrite, whose low status would preclude the ceremonies from taking place at all.

Ever aware of the politics of perception and sensitive to the fact that celebrations should take place with a 'maximum of decorum', Storrs wrote to O.E.T.A. H.Q. expressing the negative impact of any cancellation on the Christian community. He also viewed the ceremony as an opportunity to show 'fitting proof of the spirit of the new, as well as a contrast to that of the old administration' if the festivities could go ahead with 'a minimum parade of armed force'. Keen to avoid following the Turkish approach of deploying 600 troops to maintain order, the Military Governor, on the advice of petitions from both the Executive Committee of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the Lay Community, recommended the appointment of a high-ranking Prelate to oversee formalities.

Unsurprisingly the two organisations proposed different candidates: the Patriarchate advocated requesting a Metropolitan from the Patriarch of Alexandria, whilst the Lay Community recommended Porphyrios II, Archbishop

¹³³ *Ibid*, p. 304. Inter-religious violence was rare in late-Ottoman Jerusalem. In general, violence tended to be intra-religious. This was especially the case within the Christian community, where ownership and control of the Holy Places was often contested. See Mazza, "Transforming the Holy City", pp. 180-181.

¹³⁴ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 304.

¹³⁵ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, pp. 60-61.

of Mount Sinai. Storrs himself felt that His Beatitude Monseigneur Photios, Patriarch of Alexandria, would be best placed to take on such a task, were it not for his dislike of Damianos, the exiled Patriarch of Jerusalem and subsequent concerns that he would omit Damianos' name from the prayers. He also rejected asking Photios for a Metropolitan from Alexandria on the grounds that permitting entry 'to a high ecclesiastical dignitary of one denomination might involve similar concessions to other churches, which it is for the present undesirable to grant'.

Recognising the impracticalities of involving the Patriarch of Alexandria either directly or indirectly, Storrs requested that Porphyrios II be placed in charge of the ceremony. However, he was not simply following the advice of the Lay Community alone. The Military Governor knew the Archbishop of Mount Sinai personally and professed to having 'official and social relations' with him for the last ten years. Moreover, he was 'equally well known to General Clayton, and has, I believe, had more than one conversation with the Commander-in-Chief'. Storrs also recognised that Porphyrios 'would be the first to see the advantage to his own prestige if these difficult weeks could pass off under his presidency without disturbances'.¹³⁶ O.E.T.A. H.Q. accepted this proposal, with Porphyrios II being appointed *locum tenens* of the Patriarch for the duration of the ceremony.¹³⁷

The preparations the Military Governor made for the Holy Fire in 1918 are illuminating. As the first observance of the festival under Christian authority for several centuries, Storrs was eager for celebrations to mark a departure from what he identified as an inelegant Ottoman approach. His disapproval of their methods, together with his aforementioned perception of the city as a hotbed of sectarian violence and his strong beliefs in the sanctity and decorum of Christian festivities, led to him taking an active role in preparations. Concerns surrounding the management of 'two and seventy jarring sects' saw him utilise his knowledge of the internal affairs of the Greek Orthodox Church alongside own existing social network, appointing Porphyrios II as *locum tenens* in a bid to ensure that the

¹³⁶ All quotes on the preparations for the Ceremony of the Holy Fire are from Storrs to O.E.T.A. H.Q., 17/3/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

¹³⁷ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 306.

festival passed in a peaceable manner. Once more Storrs' approach entwined the personal and the political.

Storrs and the British

Storrs' handling of the first Ceremony of the Holy Fire in 1918 was a success acknowledged at the highest levels of the Administration. Writing to Money, Allenby recognised that the Military Governor's 'tact and skilful handling of a difficult and delicate situation could not have been surpassed. He has shewn himself to be an Administrator of a very high order'.¹³⁸ As a result Storrs was twice put forward for promotion to Brigadier-General, only to be rebuffed both times. Writing to Sir Mark Sykes in August 1918, he expressed his disappointment before explaining that:

It does not make much difference to me whether I wear crowns or swords upon my shoulders for a few months, when I will relapse into a toga at the end of the War. But, I see more and more in a Military Administration that rank does make a difference and augment the power of one's elbow in defending the interests of civilians before the brutal and licentious, and also in revealing to the intriguing and bluffing foreigner the outward and visible of the inward and spiritual backing of H.M.G.. The City with its various and grave responsibilities is surely deserving of this as the labourer of his hire, and I am faintly resentful of those obdurates who fail to see it.¹³⁹

Shortly after this letter Storrs received a temporary promotion: with the advance of British troops into Syria in September 1918 he was sent to establish a new northern branch of O.E.T.A. in Haifa. In December of the same year he was finally elevated to the rank of Brigadier-General when appointed Acting Chief Administrator with Money on annual leave.¹⁴⁰ His stock was so high that Money recommended Storrs for a C.B.E. (which he subsequently received in January

¹³⁸ Allenby to Money, 5/5/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

¹³⁹ FO 800/221, Storrs to Sir Mark Sykes, 9/8/1918.

¹⁴⁰ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 306 and p. 323.

1919) and confided that he wanted the Military Governor to be his successor as Chief Administrator.¹⁴¹ Relations between the two men were excellent, with Storrs recalling he had nothing but 'pleasant memories' of his dealings, both personal and official, with Money.¹⁴²

This period of professional triumph was not without personal tragedy. On 10 November 1918 Lieutenant Francis Storrs, Ronald's younger brother, died in Chelsea of Spanish Influenza. Storrs considered Francis to be 'closest in pursuits and outlook on life' to his own worldview, and, upon hearing the news of his brother's premature death on Armistice Day, spent the evening walking from the Mount of Olives through Gethsemane towards the North East corner of the Temple, recalling memories of their childhood together and Francis' various sporting and academic accomplishments.¹⁴³ One month later he would note that this moment was a 'heavy blow' at a time where he was taking on greater professional responsibilities.¹⁴⁴

These duties were assumed when concern towards London's policy in Palestine was on the increase amongst some members of O.E.T.A.. General Money was acutely aware of the problematic nature of Britain's commitment to the Balfour Declaration, arguing that both Muslims and Christians were apprehensive that Palestine was 'going to be handed over to the Jews'. He strongly felt that the British Government should clarify their position: that the Declaration supported a Jewish homeland in Palestine, not a state or sovereign government.¹⁴⁵ If Britain were to support a Jewish Government 'in any form' an Arab rising was guaranteed.¹⁴⁶ In response the Zionists lobbied Whitehall to pay no heed to arguments that aimed to soften Jewish expectations in Palestine, with London subsequently pressuring Money and Chief Political Officer Gilbert Clayton to amend their views. Both refused to do so and resigned their positions in 1919.

¹⁴¹ Storrs to ? (No recipient noted), 1/12/1919, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

¹⁴² Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 317.

¹⁴³ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 322.

¹⁴⁴ Storrs to ? (no clear recipient – possibly Nina Cust), 5/12/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

¹⁴⁵ Report from Major-General A.W. Money, Chief Administrator, O.E.T.A., Jerusalem, 20/11/1918 in Ingrams, *Palestine Papers*, pp. 44-45.

¹⁴⁶ In a meeting with Lord Curzon, Money emphasised the need to 'go slow' on Zionist aspirations. *Ibid*, Curzon to Balfour, January 1919.

Storrs, expecting to succeed Money as Chief Administrator, was overlooked in favour of Major-General Watson on the suspicion that he was not sufficiently pro-Zionist.¹⁴⁷

According to Storrs, Watson had been nominated for the position of Military Governor prior to his own appointment in December 1917. Recalling an incident in Fast's Hotel (his initial accommodation in Jerusalem), he found:

In the hall a Major-General, complete with A.D.C., inquiring for the best rooms. Mr Fast regretted that these had been taken by the Military Governor. "I *am* the Military Governor," replied General Watson, who in his haste to report for duty from South Palestine had not received the telegram countermanding his appointment. I gave him the "suite" for the night, and took him round the city.¹⁴⁸

Watson's return to Jerusalem in August 1919 saw the Military Governor receive the strongest criticism yet of his administration of the city. On leave until early October, Storrs returned to find that the new Chief Administrator had addressed H.M.G. on 24 September requesting that Storrs be dismissed from his post. Shocked by developments, Storrs 'begged and was justly afforded, the opportunity of confronting the Chief Administrator', who upon hearing his case withdrew the order for dismissal. Two accusations of impropriety were made. The first contended that the Military Governor was too preoccupied with religious politics, whilst the second maintained that Jerusalem was calmer when Storrs was away on leave.

Upholding his position, Storrs noted that it was not stated in which direction he was influenced by religious politics. Disputing the charge that he had a tendency to 'internal politics, whatever they may mean', he asserted pithily that:

¹⁴⁷ D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 198.

¹⁴⁸ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 287.

Jerusalem has seldom been in the past, and is unlikely to be in the future, and most certainly is not now, untinged by a certain interest in religion; I submit that a study and knowledge of these problems should not be condemned as necessarily hindering an effective grasp of the situation. And if by "internal" is meant an undue interference in the interior economy of religious establishments, I maintain, and can prove that this was never done in Jerusalem until my departure on leave, when the administration embarked on an arbitration between the contending Orthodox parties which, upon my return, had to be placed in my hands for settlement.

Moving on to defend his administration, he maintained that his custody of Jerusalem had seen 'constructive innovations, over and above the normal machinery of government, owing to my personal initiative', citing reforms to Jerusalem Prison, the regulation of food supplies, the establishment of a Municipal Library reading room, the founding of a Chamber of Commerce and a School of Music, the refurbishment of the Ophthalmic Hospital, and the creation of the Pro-Jerusalem Society as proof of his interventions.

On the second charge, Storrs reiterated his belief that Jerusalem in the spring was a tinder box due to the confluence of Muslim, Jewish and Christian festivals, making the city the 'political and religious storm centre of Palestine'. Because of this he refused to take leave until the 'arrival of the American Commission of Enquiry put all sections of all Communities upon their best behaviours'. The enquiry Storrs made reference to was the King-Crane Commission. Against the backdrop of the Paris Peace Conference, the Big Three (under strong US pressure) agreed to send two Americans, Henry King (a university professor) and Charles Crane (a manufacturer of sanitary fittings) to Palestine in June 1919 to identify the wishes of the people of Greater Syria with regard to their future. They found that the overwhelming majority of petitions favoured an independent and united Greater Syria, with Palestine incorporated in it. If there was to be a

Mandate, a majority favoured that it was administered by the Americans, or, failing that, the British.¹⁴⁹

Concluding his defence with what could be viewed as a subtle attack on the new Chief Administrator, Storrs accepted that:

Unpopularity for a time in certain political circumstances and with certain political sections, would even if true, not necessarily be discreditable. But the terms of friendship and confidence on which I have lived with the various Communities of Jerusalem for the last two years have been attested by many public expressions of good will, these sufficiently known to any adequately informed person, able and willing to keep himself in direct contact with the public.¹⁵⁰

In a position such as Storrs', strong friendships with the various groupings of Jerusalem could easily be alleged as showing an undue interest in internal politics. The Military Governor's need for a wide social and cultural network meant that the lines between the personal and the professional could easily become blurred.

With the freedom to pursue his own initiatives and a strong belief in inter-communal cooperation, Storrs turned to his great loves: chess and music. He founded a Chess Club with a Jewish treasurer, a Latin Catholic secretary and several Muslim members. As Club President, he organised a tournament which saw the first four prizes go to Jews, with the fifth prize being taken by the Military Governor himself.¹⁵¹ Similarly he established the Jerusalem School of Music, but his visions of music uniting Christian, Muslim and Jew alike were soon halted. Becoming increasingly irate with the lack of engagement from all sectors of society, Storrs haughtily wrote in the *Palestine Weekly* that 'it is for Palestinian

¹⁴⁹ For more on the King-Crane Commission and its findings see Andrew Patrick, *America's Forgotten Middle East Initiative: The King-Crane Commission of 1919*, (London, I.B. Tauris, 2015) and Lori Allen, *A History of False Hope: Investigative Commissions in Palestine*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2021), pp. 31-71.

¹⁵⁰ All quotes are from Storrs to ? (No recipient noted), 1/12/1919, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

¹⁵¹ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 316.

audiences to show themselves worthy of the opportunity they have been given'. Despite extolling 'the rhythmic despair of Chopin, the curious felicity of Ravel, the Shakespearean felicity of Beethoven and something of that very delirium of delicacy and strength – that tonnerre de la force bienveillante – revealed in the Greater Organ Fugue of Johan Sebastian Bach', 90 percent of the school's membership remained Jewish.¹⁵² With regret, he handed over the school to the Jewish Community on the condition that it continued to be called the Jerusalem School of Music and that it should remain open 'to all seeking instruction without distinction of race or creed'.¹⁵³ Later when relations between Storrs and the Zionists had soured, he would confess to the editor of Haaretz, Leib Yaffe, his upset at the lack of gratitude shown when control of the music school was handed over and his disappointment that he was not given the opportunity to participate on its committee.¹⁵⁴

For Storrs these enterprises were intended to be 'international and non-political'. He believed that:

Music is purer than visual art, and offers less opportunity for the cruder and more obvious forms of nationalistic propaganda...[when Jews were] unshackled by the tradition or necessity of producing specifically Jewish music, the natural genius of the Jews immediately attained an astonishingly high level of musical study and performance. The concerts of our Musical Society were an abiding pleasure, both from the quality of the music and from the spirit of the audiences enthusiastic for Gentile, pardonably delirious over Hebrew virtuosity. On such occasions the hall would be rushed with amusing indiscipline by a few scores of ticketless devotees, passionately convinced that they had as much right to be there as anybody else...It is my firm belief that with official encouragement as well as private support Palestine may well become a centre of solo, chamber and orchestral music not

¹⁵² "Music – Arieh Avilea", *The Palestine Weekly*, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 10, Box 3, Folder 5.

¹⁵³ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 316.

¹⁵⁴ Nirit Shalev-Khalifa, "Sir Ronald and the Knights of the Stone Order", in Shalev-Khalifa ed., *The First Governor*, p. 43.

inferior to Paris, Rome or even Vienna; with the additional and rare advantage that even a mixed Palestine audience could hardly extract political significance from a sonata, a quintet or a symphony.¹⁵⁵

Quite how establishing a school dedicated to Western classical music was a non-political action is not clear, especially given Storrs' position as a Military Governor of an occupying force under instructions to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine on the back of European Jewish migration. Moreover, Storrs' account of his music school and chess club in *Orientalisms* implies that Palestinian Arabs were not interested or capable of participating in cultural activities. As Xypolia argues, the 'peer "civilisation" that could cooperate with the superior culture of the West [as Storrs perceived it] was only the Jewish one'. By pursuing his own personal interests, he implanted a Western musical culture in Jerusalem which would more likely chime with the Zionists given their European origins.¹⁵⁶

Conclusion

On a personal level Storrs found himself extremely content with his position as Military Governor. No longer was he homesick for England; instead he yearned for Jerusalem when away from the Holy City for work.¹⁵⁷ A combination of religious reverence for the city – together with a genuine interest in his new role and the freedom to carve his own niche, pursue his own interests and govern with a large degree of independence – contributed to this satisfaction. Whilst the principles of military rule gave Storrs a great deal of independence, the realities of governing a diverse city within the post-World War One context, alongside the added complexity of the Balfour Declaration, meant at times that criticisms were levied from all sides and his autonomy impeded. In spite of this, Storrs maintained a visible governorship, often believing that his personal authority alone would suffice in enforcing rules and quelling unrest.

¹⁵⁵ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 423.

¹⁵⁶ Xypolia, "Orientalisms and Orientalism", p. 35.

¹⁵⁷ Storrs to his mother, 8/9/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

The thirty months of military rule saw Storrs establish many of the key features of his governorship of Jerusalem. Personal relations were forged with the key communities of the city and a keen interest shown in ensuring their representation in a range of different institutions, from chess clubs to music schools. In doing so, Storrs was fulfilling both a civic duty and a personal need for wide-ranging and interesting company.

Such an approach was not always without a political element, as his attitude towards the Syria and Palestine Relief Fund demonstrates. Established prior to the British occupation of the city, the Syria and Palestine Relief Fund was set up by the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, Rennie Maclnnes, to provide assistance to those in need without distinction between race and creed. Writing to his mother, he recounted that:

I have at last persuaded the Syria and Palestine Relief Society to co-opt a Moslem, Orthodox and Latin Catholic onto their wonderfully narrow and bigoted Committee. Not that either of those 3 communities will gain particularly by their adoption, or indeed had any particular complaint in the past; but rather that the S and P may usurp and momentary (and wholly undeserved) credit for broadmindedness and toleration. Maclnnes would not see it.¹⁵⁸

His eye for the politics of perception, honed in Egypt, was being put to use in Jerusalem. Yet it would be remiss to present Storrs as simply pursuing civic duty for altruistic ends. He was first and foremost a British administrator with no illusions about what British rule meant for Palestine and how it should be pursued. Writing to Sykes in the summer of 1918, he acknowledged that the 'non-Jewish' population would eventually take 'a lower place in the land which the others are in the end absolutely certain to possess'. It would therefore take 'months, possibly years, of patient work to show the Jews that we are not run by the Arabs, and the Arabs that we are not bought by the Jews'. Storrs went on to argue that 'it is one thing to see clearly enough the probable future of this country, and another thing to fail to make allowances for the position of the weaker and probably

¹⁵⁸ Storrs to his mother, 8/9/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

disappearing element. The results of the changes will be more satisfactory and more lasting if they are brought about gradually with patience, and without violent expressions of ill will, leaving behind them an abiding rancour'.¹⁵⁹

His attempt to avoid such rancour would reach its apotheosis in the activities of an organisation described by Storrs as 'personal, perhaps...too personal': the Pro-Jerusalem Society.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ Storrs to Sykes quoted from David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922*, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1989), p. 323.

¹⁶⁰ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 439.

Chapter Three – Attempting to mould the City in Storrs' image: The Pro-Jerusalem Society

The Pro-Jerusalem Society was then the Military Governor civically and aesthetically in Council, and the political effect of such a reunion round one table of differing, and very often, actively discordant elements bound together here by their common love for the Holy City is not to be underestimated.¹

Jerusalemites who today walk down Koresh Street most likely do so ignorant of its history. Located just half a kilometre from Jaffa Gate and running parallel with the more famous Jaffa Street, this non-descript road contains the rear elevation of the Mandate-era General Post Office (now the Jerusalem Central Post Office run by Israel Post). It was, upon the opening of the building in 1938, known as Storrs Avenue. With the 1948 conquest and division of the city by the Israelis, the street was Hebraized and renamed, in common with many roads named after British, Crusader and Christian figures.² The choice of Koresh, the Biblical name for Cyrus the Great who was responsible for freeing the Jews from their Babylonian captivity, serves to highlight that Jerusalem and its street names were once more being used by an occupying force to establish cultural ownership and alter the spatial and symbolic relationship between the city and its inhabitants. In this instance, it is ironic that the renaming of Storrs Avenue superseded the mastermind of this approach in the first nine years of British rule: Ronald Storrs himself.

As President of the Pro-Jerusalem Society and through his commissioning of several town plans, Storrs left a lasting legacy on the conceptual and built environment of Jerusalem, which in turn impacted upon relations between city's different communities. First established in September 1918, the Society built upon the early edicts issued by Storrs with regard to building materials and advertisements, and acted in many ways as the civic arm of the Military

¹ Ronald Storrs in Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, pp. v-vi.

² Wallach, *A City in Fragments*, p. 251.

Administration in the city.³ Its Charter pledged to ensure ‘the preservation and advancement of the interests of Jerusalem, its district and inhabitants’, with particular focus placed on:

1. The protection of and the addition to the amenities of Jerusalem and its district.
2. The provision and maintenance of parks, gardens, and open spaces in Jerusalem and its district.
3. The establishment in the district of Jerusalem of Museums, Libraries, Art Galleries, Exhibitions, Musical and Dramatic Centres, or other institutions of a similar nature for the benefit of the Public.
4. The protection and preservation, with the consent of the Government, of the Antiquities in the district of Jerusalem.
5. The encouragement in the district of Jerusalem of arts, handicrafts, and industries in consonance with the general objects of the Society.
6. The administration of any immovable property in the district of Jerusalem which is acquired by the Society or entrusted to it by any person or corporation with a view to securing the improvement of the property and the welfare of its tenants or occupants.
7. To co-operate with the Department of Education, Agriculture, Public Health, Public Works, so far as may be in harmony with the general objects of the Society.⁴

Storrs himself took great satisfaction at how the Society brought different communities together, expressing his pride that ‘the Mayor of Jerusalem, the British Director of Antiquities, the Mufti, the Chief Rabbis, the Presidents of the Italian Franciscans and the French Dominicans, the Orthodox, the Armenians and the Latin Patriarchs, the Presidents of the Jewish Community, the Anglican Bishop, the Chairman of the Zionist Commission, the Dominican Fathers Abel and Vincent, *Capitano Paribene* ... with other leading members of the British,

³ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. 18.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. vii.

Arab, Jewish and American communities' should all sit around one table.⁵ The practicalities of such a diverse council meant that French was chosen as the official language for discussion and minutes, although 'animated asides – sometimes even broadsides – were discharged in Arabic, Turkish, Hebrew, and even Armenian'.⁶ As regards funding the Society relied on subscriptions and donations, which Storrs adeptly managed to secure via his large social circle and powers of persuasion.⁷

As his Technical Assistant (and later Honorary Secretary and Civic Advisor to the City of Jerusalem), he chose Charles Ashbee, a disciple of William Morris who was leading light in the Arts and Crafts movement and a member of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings and the National Trust.⁸ Reflecting on the reasoning behind his appointment, Storrs recalled that Ashbee first entered his mind as a possible advisor because he had delivered 'almost the only good "Entertainment" lecture I had heard at Charterhouse'.⁹ He was 'a man of many attractions, amongst others of reading aloud with the utmost perfection', which no doubt appealed to Storrs' theatrical interests.¹⁰ The two men soon found common ground, not least through a shared love of the Book of Psalms and a belief that the work of the society would unite communities.¹¹ Storrs emphasised the former through his claims that the 'Psalms of David and a cloud of unseen witnesses seemed to inspire' their work, succinctly surmised by the Governor as 'Build ye the walls of Jerusalem'.¹² Emblematic of the latter was the Pro-Jerusalem Society's crest – an Islamic Crescent, the Star of David, and a Jerusalem Cross – designed by Ashbee and testament to his understanding of the unifying nature of his work.¹³

⁵ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 311.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 311.

⁷ See Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, pp. 72-74 and C.R. Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the First Two Years of the Civilian Administration*, (London, John Murray, 1924), pp. 96-97 for a list of financial contributors.

⁸ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. vi.

⁹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 312.

¹⁰ Storrs to his mother, 9/11/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

¹¹ Raquel Rapaport, "The City of the Great Singer: C.R. Ashbee's Jerusalem", *Architectural History*, Vol. 50 (2007), pp. 171-210.

¹² Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 312.

¹³ Rapaport, "The City of the Great Singer", pp. 181-182.

The emergence of the Pro-Jerusalem Society in September 1918 was the result of a confluence of events. A key factor was the arrival of a Governor with a keen perception of Jerusalem's Biblical aura, strong preservationist tendencies honed in Egypt through membership of the *Comité de Conservation des Monuments Arabes*, a robust taste in aesthetics and relative freedom in which to act. In a privileged position as a representative of the British occupation of Palestine, Storrs enjoyed a measure of autonomy in preserving the city as he saw fit, particularly prior to the introduction of civilian rule in July 1920, and used the Society as a vehicle for his aims accordingly. In contrast, contemporary efforts by UNESCO to protect the cultural heritage of Jerusalem find themselves mired between competing agendas. Dumper and Larkin have demonstrated how nationalist claims and sectarian divisions complicate UNESCO's preservationist work in the city on a scale that Storrs never had to deal with.¹⁴ Circumstance allowed the Governor to leave an indelible mark upon Jerusalem.

The end of war in November 1918 appeared to make the Pro-Jerusalem Society's mission even more important. Ashbee highlighted how the 'disaster of the Great War has forced upon all men and women the necessity of preserving all that is possible of the beauty and the purpose, in actual form, of the civilisations that have passed before'.¹⁵ Such 'beauty and...purpose' was not lost upon many of the soldiers of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, who, in their letters home from Egypt and Palestine, emphasised their experiences of Islamic heritage and culture over and above tales of Biblical deliverance and crusading rhetoric embodied by the British press and, in part, by Storrs himself.¹⁶

This was a time of high ideals, with many hoping to grasp the opportunity to see the world remade in a more equitable and harmonious fashion, not least through the spirit of co-operation that Storrs and Ashbee believed the Society

¹⁴ Michael Dumper and Craig Larkin, "The politics of heritage and the limitations of international agency in contested cities: a study of the role of UNESCO in Jerusalem's Old City", *Review of International Studies*, January 2012, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 25-52.

¹⁵ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. 4.

¹⁶ James E. Kitchen, "'Khaki Crusaders': crusading rhetoric and the British Imperial Soldier during the Egypt and Palestine Campaigns, 1916-1918", *First World War Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, (2010), pp. 141-160.

engendered. For Ashbee, this vision would be delivered through craftsmen of different ethnic backgrounds working together for the greater good.¹⁷ This attitude did not just involve the remaking of cities, but of citizens themselves. Echoing the disdain shown by Storrs towards the Ottoman mismanagement of the city, he argued that:

The people themselves are not as yet ready to act in accordance with the laws when these are made. They are still too dependent upon orders imposed from above. In some respects this makes our task as town planners easier, but in so far as we try as administrators to encourage the citizens to think, act, and legislate for themselves, we are handicapped because an ideal order is postulated.¹⁸

The aim was not merely to create a Jerusalem in their image, but Jerusalemites too. Such an approach was seemingly grounded in a benevolent rhetoric, with the guiding hand of British rule imparting knowledge and wisdom upon its colonial subjects. In reality it led the Palestinian population of the city to become increasingly marginalised as planning decisions were made by the British and Zionists, resulting in a Jerusalem that was more sharply divided along sectarian lines than it had been in 1917.

Rapaport's notion of conflicting visions provides a useful framework for understanding how Jerusalem was conceived by different groups and how the city came to represent sectarian divisions under British rule. It also helps identify where Storrs fit in this panoply of ideas. She identifies five main urban planning visions in Palestine during the Mandate: the New Crusader's vision (which looked to maintain the Biblical integrity of the city); the Utopian vision (attempting to mould the Holy Land into a 'perfect, egalitarian community'); the Garden Cities movement ('a practical utopia'); the Zionist vision (rebuilding a Jewish National Home in Palestine); and the Labour Zionist vision (the construction of a Socialist worker's communal state).¹⁹ She argues that where two or more of these ideas

¹⁷ Rapaport, "The City of the Great Singer", p. 190.

¹⁸ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. 18.

¹⁹ Raquel Rapaport, *Conflicting Visions: Architecture in Palestine During the British Mandate* (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cardiff University, 2005), pp. 241-42.

converged, they found fertile ground.²⁰ *Prima facie*, Storrs' personal and professional support for Zionism, as conceived by the Balfour Declaration, would see him identify with the fourth vision, but his true architectural interests lay elsewhere. Through the work of the Pro-Jerusalem Society he would combine the first two concepts to realise a hybrid Utopian New Crusader vision for the Old City.

That the canvas for this experiment should be Jerusalem played into Storrs' deeply rooted sense of the city as a holy site, to be preserved and venerated for global posterity. Recalling the start of his own involvement with the Society, Ashbee emphasised that members were encouraged to 'regard the Holy City as a Trust for all mankind, put the sectarian interests as far as possible on one side, and see what they could do'.²¹ Storrs was also acutely aware of how the wider world viewed Jerusalem as a significant religious site. British planning reflected these hopes in its attempts to preserve the Old City.²² Writing in April 1924, Storrs directly addressed the international significance of his work, noting that:

Of our benefactors, many who live in remote continents, may never witness the results of their generosity; of whom we can but say that, while some little of their achievement will be presented to their vision by picture and by plan, their true satisfaction will rest rather in the sure and certain knowledge that, through their loving carefulness Jerusalem will have been preserved nearer to the city of their faith and of their dreams.²³

Others around the world shared Storrs' fantasies for the city. As far away as Australia the work of the Society was viewed as restoring 'Jerusalem as it was in the days of wise King Solomon and of the Saviour' with 'many who looked upon

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 276.

²¹ Ashbee, C.R., "Pro-Jerusalem", *The American Magazine of Art*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (March, 1921), p. 99.

²² Meron Benevisti, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996), p. 139. Benevisti contrasts this British belief in global custodianship with Israel's attempts to solely legitimise their 'emotional, religious and national attachment to the city'.

²³ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. viii.

the project as more or less of a dream'.²⁴ Often these dreams were not the same as those of city's inhabitants. Wharton astutely concludes that whilst Storrs and Ashbee had a profound faith in the ability of Pro-Jerusalem to unite Jerusalemites around a common love for the city, it failed to acknowledge that the Jerusalems envisioned by the communities were not always the same, particularly when relations between Palestinians and Jews soured under British rule. The Biblical vision that Storrs promoted was detached from the truth on the ground: a city of faith and dreams and the lived reality were not the same thing.²⁵

Designing and Dividing Jerusalem

Throughout his tenure in Jerusalem, Storrs worked alongside several different figures who each contributed their own visions for the city. William H. McLean was invited by Storrs and produced the first town plan for the city in June 1918, drawing upon his experiences as town planner in Khartoum under the aegis of Lord Kitchener.²⁶ Further plans were submitted in November 1919 by the Scottish town planner and noted biologist Patrick Geddes (who was also appointed by the Zionists to design a Hebrew University for the city) and by Ashbee himself, who built on the previous two proposals.²⁷ Other notable individuals involved in Storrs' work include Ernest Tatham Richmond (otherwise known as E.T. Richmond), a British architect who consulted on the restoration of the Dome of the Rock and was known to Storrs courtesy of their work together in Egypt, and Clifford Holliday, who replaced Ashbee as Civic Advisor in 1922.²⁸ That such a collection of architects and advisors was assembled suggests that Storrs himself was not certain on how to implement his vision for the city.²⁹ Even as late as 1922, with the Governor having been in post for five years, Eunice Holliday (wife of Clifford) noted in a letter back to her parents that:

²⁴ *Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate*, Wednesday, 15 November, 1922, p. 2.

²⁵ Wharton, *Selling Jerusalem*, p. 217.

²⁶ Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine*, pp. 41-51.

²⁷ Rubin, "An Orientalist in Jerusalem", p. 99-101.

²⁸ See Storrs, *Orientalisms*, pp. 21-22 and p. 50 for more on his relationship with Richmond in Egypt. See Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine*, p. 432 for Holliday's appointment in Jerusalem.

²⁹ Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine*, p. 745.

When it comes to town planning, no-one here, not even Storrs, knows the first thing about civic design, and everything is done in the most haphazard way. For instance, the Mayor has a passion for making big new roads, so he suggests a route cutting through anywhere, utterly regardless of what may come in the way of it. Only the other day, Cliff was taken to see a very poor old Jew whose house stood in the way of one of the new roads, and was going to be knocked down, and he had nowhere else to live. And they never seem to dream of giving anyone compensation.³⁰

Such uncertainties led Storrs to implement several approaches at the same time, particularly during the early years of the Pro-Jerusalem Society.³¹ Moreover, it indicates that Storrs' vision for the city would take primacy over and above the needs and requirements of Jerusalemites themselves, who were no doubt perceived as being unready for such responsibilities. Perhaps most harrowingly, the removal of housing as part of these designs would foreshadow the demolition of Palestinian houses by the Israeli authorities in an attempt to Judaize urban spaces, particularly after 1967.³²

Whilst the Pro-Jerusalem Society itself did not commission any of the town plans produced by McLean, Geddes and Ashbee, there was clearly a close relationship between designs for the city and the work of the Society.³³ Upon his arrival in the city in March 1918, Storrs briefed McLean that he should aim 'not only to plan so much as to bring out regulations which will at any rate preserve the unique character and tradition of Jerusalem'.³⁴ In his records for the Society, Ashbee lauded McLean's vision for isolating the Old City in the centre of a park, 'thus recognizing the appeal it makes to the world – the city of an idea – that needs as such to be protected'.³⁵ Building upon his work in Khartoum and New Delhi, his

³⁰ Eunice Holliday to her parents, 20/10/1922 in Eunice Holliday, *Letters from Jerusalem During the Palestine Mandate*, (London, Radcliffe Press, 1997), pp. 12-13.

³¹ Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine*, p. 745.

³² For more on the demolition of Palestinian housing by the Israelis see Penny Green and Amelia Smith, "Evicting Palestine", *State Crime Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Palestine, Palestinians and Israel's State Criminality (Spring 2016), pp. 81-108.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 142.

³⁴ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 312.

³⁵ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. 12.

plan for the so-called New City outside of the walls of the Old City hinted at long-term imperial domination through the inclusion of new monuments and government institutions built on a grid system.³⁶ Writing to his mother in July of the same year, Storrs declared that he had appointed an 'oriental town planning expert' who had conceived an 'excellent plan' for the city, in particular expressing his delight that the Old City was to be completely untouched, with new regulations drawn up to ensure that this would remain the case. He wholeheartedly approved that McLean 'kept certain areas where there is to be no building at all, and I only regret that I was not here 50 years ago when Jerusalem would have been in practice, as it is in effect, an absolutely unique City in the world surrounded by its medieval walls (which are quite perfect) and without houses or monasteries concealing any part of them'. No mention was made of plans for the New City.³⁷

It is not clear how much influence Storrs had over the development of McLean's plan. There are certain areas of convergence, not least the focus on preserving and regulating the development of the Old City, and his letters home would suggest his satisfaction with these aspects of the plan, which would be carried forward into future conceptions of the city. However, he was decidedly non-committal on designs for the New City, suggesting to Geddes (who would produce a further plan for Jerusalem in 1919) that its purpose was merely to prevent land speculation and unsuitable buildings in that area as opposed to being a definitive proposal.³⁸ The inclusion of monuments and new government buildings, as in Khartoum and New Delhi, was also decidedly out of step with the temporary nature of O.E.T.A..³⁹ Moreover, Zionist concerns from 1919 onwards that the plan failed to sufficiently take into consideration Jewish interests or include designs for a Hebrew University, also led to Storrs' indifference towards McLean's vision of the New City.⁴⁰

³⁶ Gitler, "Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity", p. 43. For a diagram of McLean's plan see Illustration 21, Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*.

³⁷ Storrs to his mother, 22/7/1918, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1.

³⁸ Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine*, pp. 87-88.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 94.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 91-92 and p. 95.

The Geddes plan maintained the basic outline of McLean's blueprint for the Old City, including the necessity for parks around the city walls.⁴¹ Drawing upon a childhood fascination with Jerusalem from studying the Old Testament at school, he shared Storrs' belief in the importance of preserving much of the integrity of the walled city and the aims of the Pro-Jerusalem Society to foster co-operation between different faiths.⁴² That is not to say that the Old City was left completely untouched. He proposed the removal of some Jews and Arabs from within the walls to reduce overcrowding, whilst also suggesting the removal of a row of Arab houses from in front of the Western Wall to reduce friction between Muslims and Jews in a narrow and contested area.⁴³ Coming so soon after the failed Zionist attempt to purchase the land in front of the Wall, such a proposal would undoubtedly prove controversial and highlighted Geddes' pro-Zionist credentials, having been brought to Palestine by the Zionist Commission with a commission to draw up designs for a new Hebrew University. This brief was soon widened to include a town plan for the entire city. Opposition from the Foreign Office in August 1919 on the grounds that such a plan would encroach on the primacy of the Military Government in Palestine meant the wider plan was soon dropped, although Geddes did work with the Zionists on new settlements in Jerusalem and elsewhere in the country.⁴⁴

If Geddes was only commissioned by the Zionist Movement to design a Hebrew University and plan new Jewish settlements, how did he come to draw an entire plan for the city? The issue is clouded in some confusion, although it would appear that General Watson (who was introduced to Geddes via Dr. Eder of the Zionist Commission) requested input and comments on the feasibility of McLean's plan. Storrs even provided Geddes with copies of the plan to aid his work. Geddes then produced his report together with a preliminary plan for the

⁴¹ For a diagram of McLean's plan see Illustration 22 in Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*.

⁴² Philip Boardman, *The Worlds of Patrick Geddes: Biologist, Town Planner, Re-educator, Peace-warrior*, (London, Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1978), pp. 313-314. See also an interview with Geddes in *The Hebrew Standard of Australia*, Friday, 30 April, 1920, p. 15 in which he praised Storrs for being 'so actively interested in every detail of Jerusalem and bringing together representatives of the different religions and communities to co-operate in the improvement of the city'.

⁴³ Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine*, p. 131 and pp. 138-140.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 111-115.

city. He received no payment from the Military Government as he was ostensibly under the pay of the Zionist Commission.⁴⁵ Despite this misunderstanding, his designs are indicative of a confluence of interests between the Zionists and the British. Rejecting McLean's grid system, he took account of pre-existing roads and the natural contours of Jerusalem.⁴⁶ Proposals for new Jewish neighbourhoods were made that chimed with British notions of modernity and progress and reflected the interests of the Zionists, who had of course commissioned Geddes to design new Jewish settlements both in Jerusalem and elsewhere across Palestine.⁴⁷

Having completed preliminary reports on his Jerusalem plan in 1919, Geddes was not asked to expand on his designs when he returned to work with the Zionists in 1920. Geddes cited the lack of a proper survey as reason for his inaction, although it does little to explain why O.E.T.A. were keen to distance themselves from his plan. Hyman conjects that the initial Foreign Office opposition to Geddes completing a Zionist commissioned town plan in August 1918 stemmed from Storrs, who was in London at the time. His reasoning is threefold: firstly, the Military Governor had clearly established a precedent that town planning was within his remit through the commissioning of the McLean plan and was loath to concede power to the Zionists (or any other body). Secondly, the exact prerogatives of the Zionist Commission were yet to be finalised and establishing Zionist control of aspects of town planning may have unduly influenced any final agreement to Britain's detriment. Finally, accepting Geddes' plans would have disturbed the fine sectarian balance of the Pro-Jerusalem Society's work, especially as he was primarily commissioned and funded by the Zionists. When the report was initially delivered to Storrs in November 1919, it had been typed up by the Zionist Commission, and presented under Zionist auspices. Storrs' response suggests a moment where both the personal and political were in harmony. Given his wariness of being seen to favour one side over the other, the Governor distanced himself from the plan, although a lack of interest in designs for the New City no doubt played their part too.⁴⁸ It would

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 123-125.

⁴⁶ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. 12.

⁴⁷ Barakat, *Urban Planning, Colonialism and the Pro-Jerusalem Society*, p. 30.

⁴⁸ Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine*, pp. 141-144.

therefore remain for his Civic Advisor, Ashbee, to take the preferred elements of both plans and draw them into something tangible.

Ashbee's 1922 plan acknowledges the work of McLean and Geddes and saw the Old City of Jerusalem surrounded by an extensive park system. Notably the eastern part of the city, outside of the walls, is envisioned as a single extended park that covers vast swathes of what is presently Palestinian East Jerusalem.⁴⁹ In all three visions, the Old City effectively becomes cut off from its environs and is elevated to the status of something 'ethereal, to be preserved in its original configuration no matter the cost'.⁵⁰ An understanding of the importance of preserving and restoring the walled city was shared by both Storrs and Ashbee from an ideological and conceptual point of view, and much of the work of the Pro-Jerusalem Society was undertaken with this aim in mind. That the two men shared a spirit of conservation and restoration was of vital importance to Ashbee, whose position in Jerusalem was entirely reliant on Storrs. His very presence in the city resulted from an invitation by the Military Governor and his salary was paid for by the Pro-Jerusalem Society, not the Government or the Municipality.⁵¹ As such, Storrs exercised a considerable amount of power over his Technical Advisor, allowing him to pursue his personal aims for protection of his Jerusalem.

Where Ashbee's proposals differ from its predecessors is its plans for the New City. Benefitting from the support of the Civil Administration, the plan was the first to be completed with an accurate survey of Jerusalem (the Pro-Jerusalem Society had unsuccessfully lobbied the Military Administration to undertake such a survey).⁵² This enabled Ashbee to develop a more precise vision for the city, including the development of various zones – industrial, business, residential and military. The plan also included proposals for new roads, energy infrastructure, schools, art galleries and museums.⁵³ In contrast to the Old City, which was confessionalised by the British and split into quarters (Arab, Jewish, Christian and Armenian) that were alien to inhabitants more accustomed to the *mahallat* or

⁴⁹ Rapaport, "The City of the Great Singer", p. 178.

⁵⁰ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 165.

⁵¹ Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine*, p. 360 and p. 367.

⁵² Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. 16.

⁵³ Gitler, "Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity", p. 45.

neighbourhood system, Ashbee's New City made no mention of such denominational divides.⁵⁴ Gitler suggests this represents an optimistic vision that these zones would 'eventually blend into a homogenous residential fabric', reflecting official attempts to prohibit sectarian considerations in urban planning to be replaced by 'urban spatial flexibility'.⁵⁵ Certainly such a vision chimed with Ashbee and Storrs' image of a religiously harmonious city, but their actions in the Old City through the Pro-Jerusalem Society would later prove incompatible with this aim.⁵⁶

McLean's, Geddes' and Ashbee's proposals for Jerusalem were never realised in full and yet their impact is still felt in the city today. The basic principle of separating the Old City from the New City, the preservation of what is perceived to be holy and sacred, and the pursual of north-west and south-west axes of development continue to be key considerations for the Israelis.⁵⁷ Reliance on British planning has also manifested itself since the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 with the establishment of the City of David or Jerusalem Walls National Park in 1974 by the Israeli Ministry of the Interior.⁵⁸ Whilst designating the area around the Old City as a national park could be viewed as a positive for conservationists and archaeologists working in Jerusalem, the reality is more sinister. A plethora of regulations limit the development and growth of Palestinian neighbourhoods within the park boundaries; a principle that has not been applied to an application by Jewish settlers to construct the Kedem Center adjacent to the Old City walls.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ See Thomas Abowd, "British Jerusalem" in Suleiman A. Mourad, Naomi Koltun-Fromm and Bedross Der Matossian ed., *Routledge Handbook on Jerusalem*, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2019), pp. 133-145 for more on the British confessionalisation of the Old City.

⁵⁵ Gitler, "Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity", p. 45.

⁵⁶ In particular the renaming of the streets of the Old City, to be considered in more detail later.

⁵⁷ Elisha Erfat, "British Town Planning Perspectives of Jerusalem in Transition", *Planning Perspectives*, (Vol. 8, No. 4), 1993, pp. 377-393.

⁵⁸ Wendy Pullan and Lefkos Kyriacou, "The Work of Charles Ashbee: Ideological Urban Visions with Everyday City Spaces", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 39, (Autumn, 2009), p. 52.

⁵⁹ Nazmi Jubeh, "Patrick Geddes: Luminary or Prophet of Demonic Planning", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 80, (Winter 2019) pp. 23-24.

Perhaps the most important legacy of British plans for Jerusalem was the detachment Old City from neighbourhoods outside of the city walls, leading to Jerusalem becoming a predominantly Jewish city in the west and a predominantly Palestinian city in the east. The Old City became a homage to Storrs' vision of a Biblical Jerusalem, whilst the New City (of considerably less interest to the Governor) was conceived as a European metropolis replete with modern infrastructure and facilities. In this regard, British planning directly contradicted Ottoman policy which had started with modernisation of the Old City via lighting and municipal cleaning services before then rolling out this offer beyond the city walls.⁶⁰ Moreover, as Roberts has argued, the predominantly Arab population of the Old City became 'cast in the passive role of guardians of the city's religious heritage' with the result that 'they were neither expected or allowed...to actively participate in the planning and construction of Jerusalem'. This contrasted with the active role of Jews in the New City, who were viewed as a central pillar to the city's modern development and directly mirrored the position of Jews and Palestinian Arabs in the Balfour Declaration. The former were ascribed explicit national and political rights, whilst the latter only had their civil and religious rights protected.⁶¹ Here the inherent contradiction of Storrs' approach, the Pro-Jerusalem Society and British policy in Palestine are writ large: ostensibly the aim was to include all communities in planning for the future but the reality saw the marginalisation of the Palestinian Arab population.

It has been suggested that Storrs' attention on the Old City stemmed from a belief that Arab residents were the indigenous population, and that the Jewish population, including recent Zionist immigrants and the Old *Yishuv*, were alien to his concept of the city.⁶² Such a position attempts to paint Storrs in an anti-Zionist light and ignores the aforementioned marginalisation of the Palestinian Arab population, and his position, personality and approach in Jerusalem. As a British official, Storrs' first loyalty was to policy determined by London and the facilitation of the Balfour Declaration in both its parts (Jewish national and political rights balanced against Palestinian Arab civil and religious rights). This, together with

⁶⁰ Falestin Naïli, "The De-Municipalization of Urban Governance: Post-Ottoman Political Space in Jerusalem", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 76 (Winter 2018), pp. 11-12.

⁶¹ Roberts, "Dividing Jerusalem", p. 18.

⁶² Rubin, "An Orientalist in Jerusalem", p. 91.

Storrs' own sense of civic duty, helps explain the overarching aim of the Pro-Jerusalem Society to promote the city 'without favour or prejudice to race or creed'.⁶³ However, Storrs was also a man on the spot, and during the uncertain years of military rule when it was not clear exactly how such a policy was to be achieved, had the freedom to pursue his own aesthetic interests as Governor of the city. His second loyalty was therefore to his concept of a Jerusalem based not on the requirement of its inhabitants (be they Arab or Jew) but the necessity of preserving and restoring the Biblical aspect of the city based on his religious and aesthetic views. A by-product of Storrs' loyalty to the Old City was that the New City received less personal attention from the Governor, providing new opportunities for predominantly Jewish developments outside of the heavily regulated city walls, so long as they used the now mandatory Jerusalem stone. As a result of Storrs' governance, Jerusalem became a city that was visually uniform but conceptually divided.

'Zion is a city compact together' – The Pro-Jerusalem Society and the Dome of the Rock

Ashbee was very clear about how the Pro-Jerusalem Society viewed the Old City. It was regarded as a 'unity in itself' and it was this 'compactness or unity, so characteristic of Jerusalem, that the Society has set itself to preserve'. Its work would at various points involve 'cleaning', 'clearing', 'repairing' and 'restoring' those structures that were deemed most essential to Storrs and Ashbee's shared vision of preserving the Holy City.⁶⁴ Their focus was not purely on Christian sites of reverence. Indeed, one of the first major projects the Society commissioned was the restoration of the tiles on the Dome of the Rock.

In *Orientations*, Storrs provides a simple explanation of the need for reparations, contending that 'the severe winter of 1917-18 had a deplorable effect upon the wind-racked north-west façade of that utmost fulfilment of colour, rhythm, and geometry: the Dome of the Rock. The brilliant tiles were constantly falling from

⁶³ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. 71.

⁶⁴ Quotes in subheading and text from Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. 1.

the walls, and frequently to be found for sale in the city'.⁶⁵ Yet the Society were not the first to attempt to restore the Dome. Contrary to Storrs' perception of the Ottomans as ineffective guardians of Jerusalem's heritage, the Dome had undergone several restoration projects under Turkish rule. These restorations, including those carried out under British rule, were not purely preservationist in nature (as Storrs suggested) but instead represented attempts to gain primacy over the city.⁶⁶ As a site of Islamic religious significance, there also existed an element of realpolitik in the decision to restore the tiles. Concerns existed that failure to repair the Dome, or worse still to undertake shoddy repairs, would reflect badly on British custody of the city and turn Muslims in the Empire against them.⁶⁷ E.T. Richmond, enlisted by the Military Governor in 1918 to write a technical report on the restoration, argued that preserving the Dome would harmonise relationships between the British and the global Muslim community. The Foreign Office duly agreed to give his proposals some support.⁶⁸

Richmond's strong relations with the Mufti in Cairo and other leading Muslims preceded him, with the Mufti of Jerusalem granting Richmond full access to the Haram al-Sharif in order to conduct his research.⁶⁹ Such a decision would not have been taken lightly given the consternation that surrounded the Haram al-Sharif incident just eight years earlier. In April 1911 a British expedition, led by Captain Montague Parker, had undertaken archaeological digs inside the compound, burrowing under the Dome of the Rock. This work had been carried out with the full permission of the Ottoman Authorities; indeed, Ottoman gendarmes guarded the dig, which was carried out at night for fear of Muslim anger. When word got out of the excavations, fury was directed at the Ottoman government for their collusion. Subsequent rumours of stolen relics served only to incense Jerusalemites and the wider Palestinian community further. Muslims and Christians of all backgrounds and education levels were united in their anger,

⁶⁵ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 313.

⁶⁶ Beatrice St. Lawrence and András Riedlmayer, "Restorations of Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock and Their Political Significance, 1537-1928", *Muqarnas*, Vol. 10, Essays in Honour of Oleg Grabar (1993), pp. 76-84.

⁶⁷ Sato Moughalian, *Feast of Ashes: The Life and Times of David Ohannessian* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2019), pp. 156-157.

⁶⁸ Monk, *An Aesthetic Occupation*, pp. 50-51.

⁶⁹ Moughalian, *Feast of Ashes*, p. 161.

leading to what has been called 'a truly Palestinian opposition'. Growing concerns about Zionism were not the only unifying feature of Palestinian identity at this time, with the incident demonstrating the importance attached to the guardianship of the Haram as a site of Islamic veneration.⁷⁰

In his final report of March 1919, Richmond recognised that ensuring 'complete immunity from decay, especially in the case of the more modern tiles' was impossible. Acknowledging the efforts of previous restorations, irrespective of their relative success or failure, he posed one central question: should the policy of continuing to re-tile the Dome of the Rock continue as it had done for the previous 400 years? Richmond's answer anthropomorphised the Dome, asserting that:

The Dome of the Rock is not merely a building of archaeological interest, but also a symbol of something very much alive...there is something to be said for maintaining the outward and visible sign of that vitality. All skin decays, but so long as there is life in the body which it covers its tissues are continually renewed.⁷¹

Having established the vital importance of restoring the Dome, one further question remained: who should produce the new tiles? In early 1919 Richmond entered into debate with David George Hogarth (director of the Arab Bureau between 1916 and 1918 and keeper of the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford). The former advocated the production of tiles in the East, whilst the latter suggested sending examples of the fallen tiles to Europe so that investigations could be made into manufacturing the tiles there. Richmond continued to press his case, citing the poor quality of German made tiles used in a restoration of 1912, and later suggested that even if Western tiles were found that were superior they would lack historical authenticity, marking as they did a departure from the

⁷⁰ Louis Fishman, "The 1911 Haram al-Sharif Incident: Palestinian Notables Versus the Ottoman Administration", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Spring, 2005), pp. 6-22.

⁷¹ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, pp. 8-9.

technical skills of the Eastern craftsmen who had maintained and preserved the building for generations.⁷²

Whilst this dispute continued, Storrs had already started to make plans for the manufacture of the tiles. Keenly aware of the fact that the fallen tiles were being sold at markets in Jerusalem, he utilised his personal social network to find a solution. As early as November 1918, the Military Governor had discussed issues surrounding the refurbishment of the city's holy places with Mark Sykes – the diplomat behind the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The conversation soon turned to the restoration of the Dome of the Rock. As a guest at Sykes' ancestral home, Sledmere House in East Yorkshire, Storrs had seen the Turkish Room, decorated in 1914 with tiles made by David Ohannessian, a Christian Armenian ceramicist.⁷³ Also aware of the Turkish Room was Major William Ormsby-Gore, who added a handwritten note to a Foreign Office circular suggesting the possibility of contacting Ohannessian with a view to procuring the tiles, providing he had not been 'massacred' in the Armenian Genocide. The only difficulty remained finding the talented ceramicist. Having left Jerusalem in December, Sykes travelled to Aleppo, where he stayed in a rented building that was the provisional headquarters of the nascent British administration in Syria. Whilst there, he met with streams of Armenian refugees who recounted harrowing tales of massacre and degradation. It was during his stay in Aleppo that Sykes providentially came across Ohannessian, a refugee from the horrors inflicted by the Turks on the Armenian people. They discussed the restoration of Dome of the Rock and the ceramicist agreed to travel to Jerusalem to see for himself the required work. Sykes arranged travel documents and provided Ohannessian with the necessary introductions to both Storrs and Richmond.⁷⁴

Ohannessian's arrival in Jerusalem was a relief to Storrs, who gratefully received his new expert. Keen to contrast his efforts with those of his predecessors, he emphasised 'how near we were to disaster' as a result of a 'German architect supplied by the Kaiser four years ago for the same purpose' who proposed 'that

⁷² Monk, *An Aesthetic Occupation*, p. 49.

⁷³ Moughalian, *Feast of Ashes*, p. 145. For more on Ohannessian's work at Sledmore House, see pp. 93-98 and 101-103 of the same book.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 145-147.

the N.W. side of the Octagon, where winter rains and ruins have most disordered the porcelain shell, should be re-covered with cast-iron tiles from the Fatherland'.⁷⁵ Never again would such an idea be countenanced under Storrs' rule.

By this point, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Kamil al-Husayni, had appealed in the Arabic press to Islam for donations to help fund the restoration. Requesting around £E80,000 of contributions, he argued that the Dome of the Rock had been 'overlooked', suffered from 'decay' and was 'faded', before directly naming Storrs as the driving force behind the project for the rejuvenation of the building, asserting that:

When the men of the Occupying Power, and, in particular, H.E. Colonel Storrs, Governor of the Holy City, saw the ruined state in which stood the Mosque, and learnt that the revenues derived from its private wakfs (i.e. without even taking into account the difficulty of obtaining rents at all in those days) do not exceed what is required by way of expenditure for the maintenance of religious rights – when Colonel Storrs saw that, it was an eyesore to him, and he expressed his deep regret, and set about at once – may God watch over him – and applied for an able engineer of those who have specialised in the repairs of ancient places of worship.⁷⁶

This able engineer was Richmond, who first met Ohannessian in late December 1918 in Jerusalem and arranged for the ceramist to have access to the Haram al-Sharif. He soon noticed the ruins of some old furnaces and a nineteenth century kiln that had not been used for several decades. Ohannessian took a sketch of the kiln and in March 1919 began experimenting with its use.⁷⁷ Replicating the conditions and the materials he used in his Kutahya workshop (the traditional heartland of Turkish ceramics since the 15th Century) proved difficult, with the wood used failing to burn at the required temperature, colours

⁷⁵ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 314.

⁷⁶ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. 10.

⁷⁷ Moughalian, *Feast of Ashes*, p. 162-165.

running and pottery made from clay around Jerusalem sporadically crumbling after firing. He also lacked a team of workers to help manufacture the tiles. Disappointed but not despondent, Ohannessian proposed to Storrs in April 1919 that he should return to Kutahya to gather supplies and recruit skilled men for the project. In return for support from the Pro-Jerusalem Society, Ohannessian would part-finance the trip and open a school and atelier in Jerusalem. The Society agreed and he left for Kutahya in July 1919.⁷⁸

Ohannessian returned to Palestine in autumn 1919 accompanied by eight artisans. In addition to these skilled workers, arrangements had been made for the shipping of the necessary clays and minerals in order to produce ceramics of the same quality as those from Kutahya. Further appointments were made in Jerusalem: Ohannessian hired young Armenian and Arab men to learn the ceramics trade, and the American philanthropic organisation Near East Relief provided some boys to help crush the Kutahya clay in preparation for tile making. Following a successful run of tiles, Storrs and the Director of Wakfs signed a contract with Ohannessian on January 30 1920 for approximately 26,000 new tiles at a cost of £E8,000. The Wakf also reimbursed the Pro-Jerusalem Society the £E230 spent on the initial failed attempts at firing tiles. Uncomfortable with the establishment of an atelier on the Haram, the Mufti stipulated that the contract should find premises elsewhere and so a new site was found on the Via Dolorosa. Near East Relief continued their support for Ohannessian's endeavours, assigning fourteen orphans under his supervision in 1920. His workshop consisted of two wings: one for the production of tiles for the restoration, and the other producing pottery for the tourist/pilgrim trade. Ashbee dubbed the latter enterprise the Pro-Jerusalem Society's 'School of Ceramics'. The workshop itself was named by Ohannessian 'Dome of the Rock Tiles', with Ashbee ensuring that it received all funds necessary courtesy of the Society.⁷⁹

How the British perceived their new endeavour is shown by a business card from the Dome of the Rock Tiles workshop. Explicitly stating that the business operated 'under the auspices of the Pro-Jerusalem Society', the card goes on to

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 165-168.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 170-174.

state that one can purchase 'hand-made and hand-painted Jerusalem pottery, made upon the reputed site of the house of Pontius Pilate'.⁸⁰ The workshop's location cannot have been lost on Storrs himself, who was often compared to Pontius Pilate in his position as Governor, and even claimed to be Pilate's successor.⁸¹ With the expansion of the District under his control in 1922, he became Governor of all of Southern Palestine, an area he believed to be 'exactly coterminous with that administered by Pontius Pilate'.⁸² Here is the Pro-Jerusalem Society as envisioned by Storrs in action: reviving a traditional craft whilst highlighting and preserving the Biblical history of the city.

The esteem with which Storrs held Ohannessian and Dome of the Rock Tiles is demonstrated by his regular visits to the workshop with notable sightseers, to the point where Ohannessian's daughter, Sirarpi, could recognise his baritone voice when helping out in the studio after school. Storrs' patronage helped establish the workshop as an attraction for tourists, and its reputation was enhanced still further in 1922 when the Governor commissioned a miniature faience model of the Dome of the Rock on behalf of a group of Palestinian Muslims who wished to present Princess Mary with a wedding gift. Designed by Ashbee and executed by Ohannessian, the model is a tribute to the skills of its craftsmen and women.⁸³

Early in 1922 the British departed from their maintenance of an administrative status quo by establishing a new organisation, the Supreme Muslim Council, which took control of religious affairs from the *ulama*. Traditionally viewed as an ill-fated act of appeasement towards the Muslims in Palestine, more recent scholarship instead suggests the formation of the Council resulted from British attempts to use a local intermediary to help maintain control over their subjects.⁸⁴ Its first elections saw the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, returned as its president. Initially intended as a coalition of Palestinian notables from various families, the Council drew its income from religious properties. However, Hajj Amin was unsuccessful in forming lasting alliances with other groupings. Despite

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p. 179 for an image of the card.

⁸¹ Miller, "Sir Ronald Storrs and Zion", pp. 114-115.

⁸² Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 396.

⁸³ Moughalian, *Feast of Ashes*, pp. 182-183.

⁸⁴ Nicholas E. Roberts, *Islam under the Palestine Mandate: Colonialism and the Supreme Muslim Council*, (London, I.B. Taurus, 2016), p. 7.

this, the Council saw the Husayni clan expand their power base in Palestine, much to the chagrin of the rival Nashashibi family. In his role as President, Hajj Amin authorized renovations to the Haram school, whilst also establishing a museum and a library in the compound.⁸⁵ He also approached Richmond to serve as the chief architect for the restorations to the Dome of the Rock. Richmond declined, advising the appointment of a Muslim architect instead.⁸⁶ As a result, the Council invited the ceramicist Ahmet Kemalettin from Constantinople. He was an advocate, like Ohannessian, of the Ottomanist revivalist style of ceramics and was asked in August to manage the restoration.⁸⁷

The summer of 1922 proved to be a formative one for Palestine. On July 1 the British Government issued the Churchill White Paper in a bid to clarify their position in the country. This policy statement rejected Palestinian appeals to repudiate the Balfour Declaration, whilst also allaying concerns that 'Palestine would become as Jewish as England is English'. Committing the British to establishing a Jewish National Home *in* Palestine as opposed to in *all* of Palestine, the document also went on to reject Palestinian claims that the country had been promised to Sharif Hussein in the 1915 Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.⁸⁸ Later that month the League of Nations ratified the Mandate for Palestine, having originally awarded this position to the British in April 1920. This formalised Britain's role in the region, confirmed that Britain would facilitate a Jewish National Home in Palestine and enshrined their commitment to ensuring that 'nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities' in the country.⁸⁹

It is against this backdrop that the limits of both Storrs and the Pro-Jerusalem Society's power over the restoration are shown. In his report to the Supreme Muslim Council, Kemalettin rejected Ohannessian's appointment to manufacture the tiles, arguing that a Christian Armenian ceramicist should not be involved in the refurbishment of such a sacred Islamic building. As such, Dome of the Rock

⁸⁵ Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty*, pp. 222-223.

⁸⁶ Monk, *An Aesthetic Occupation*, p. 168n59.

⁸⁷ Moughalian, *Feast of Ashes*, p. 185. See also pp. 73-74 for more detail on Kemalettin.

⁸⁸ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 151-153.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 101-102.

Tiles were removed from the project by the Council and Ohannessian's involvement in the restoration of the Dome of the Rock ended. Kemalettin's alternative solution was not without problems, involving the manufacture of tiles in Kutahya, where large scale production was limited.⁹⁰ However, this was felt to be the lesser issue, coming at a time when religious sensitivities were heightened by persistent rumours that the Jews were going to take control of the Haram. A global fundraising campaign was subsequently launched by Hajj Amin capitalising on this speculation, resulting in donations totalling P£84,000 from leading Muslim figures around the world. Moreover, the successful campaign further established the Husayni's position of prominence within Palestine by associating them with the defence of the Haram.⁹¹

Husayni's eminence did not come without controversy. On 5 November 1923, two ex-members of the Council, Abdallah Mukhlis and Ya'qub Abu al-Huda, submitted a secret memorandum to the Palestine government claiming that the establishment of the Council had in effect privatised public policy into the hands of the Husayni family. Questioning the logic of removing the Jerusalem-based Ohannessian in favour of tile manufacturers in Kutahya, they alleged the decision was based on two kickbacks: Kemalettin receiving huge advances and members of the Husayni family receiving posts related to the restoration.⁹² The fallout from these accusations would reveal much about Storrs' loyalties and the divisions that existed between British officials in Palestine.

Following the completion of his report on the Dome of the Rock, Richmond had been appointed Assistant Civil Secretary (Political) to the Government in Palestine with special responsibility for Arab affairs. It is in this capacity that he attempted to frustrate any official response to the allegations, arguing that as the memorandum was sent confidentially it could not be shared with the Supreme Muslim Council itself. He further endeavoured to transfer attention away from the accusations of corruption against the Council by insinuating that the Jews were conspiring against Islam in Palestine. Such allegations were received with short

⁹⁰ Moughalian, *Feast of Ashes*, pp. 185-186.

⁹¹ Roberts, *Islam under the Palestine Mandate*, pp. 126-127.

⁹² Monk, *An Aesthetic Occupation*, pp. 61-62.

shrift by Storrs, who acknowledged that the charges made by Mukhlis and Abu al-Huda could hold some merit, but was more concerned by rumours emerging from India that the fundraising delegation sent by the Council were using the trip to encourage political agitation. Rebutting the Governor's claims, Richmond argued that such intelligence must have been gained via paid informers, rendering their claims doubtful, and suggested that forces were at work to discredit the Council's delegation in India.⁹³ In typically pithy fashion, Storrs annotated Richmond's report noting that its argument was 'eminently applicable to all unpalatable information'.⁹⁴ By now, Richmond's disagreement was not merely with Storrs, but with the whole of the Palestinian Government, whom he viewed as Zionist agents determined to destroy the Supreme Muslim Council and Arab nationalism in Palestine more generally.⁹⁵ Writing in 1923, he contended that:

District Governors in general and Storrs in particular had made representatives at Government House to the effect that their influence and authority are undermined by me and that I have too much power etc: that I receive 'natives', talk to them and let them air their views and grievances too much. Ronald Storrs is at present engaged in a campaign against the Mufti, Hajj Amin, and the Moslem Supreme Council. What he expects to gain by all this folly I cannot imagine.⁹⁶

Similar accusations would later be made against Storrs by Zionists and British officials alike. What is telling, however, is not the similarities between complaints made against Richmond and Storrs, but the differences in what they deemed best for British policy. For Richmond, British proximity to the Zionist Commission was to the detriment of its own interests, and Palestinian Arab nationalism more generally. On the other hand Storrs' loyalty was first and foremost towards the realisation of the Balfour Declaration. If the Supreme Muslim Council were accused of political agitation, this was his concern as it had the potential to jeopardise the British position in Palestine and their ability to enact the

⁹³ *Ibid*, pp. 62-63

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 170n75.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 63-64.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 170n72.

Declaration. This worldview, together with his desire to manage the different communities of Jerusalem in as harmonious a way as possible, explains his reluctance in accepting the arguments that Richmond made.

The saga surrounding the restoration of the Dome of the Rock highlights key facets of Storrs' governance of Jerusalem and issues in Palestine more widely. Firstly, it demonstrates how the aesthetic could rarely be detached from the political, despite Storrs' high aims for the Pro-Jerusalem Society. Secondly, the proposed refurbishment demonstrated how the Storrs utilised the Biblical aura of the city to help establish promote traditional crafts such as tile making. Thirdly, the Governor would always look to protect British interests in the city, which had become increasingly entwined with Zionist aims, as the deliberations between Richmond and Storrs show. Lastly, and perhaps most tellingly, the project highlighted many of the tensions present in Palestine under British rule in microcosm: sectarian divisions, factional disputes between Palestinian notables, and schisms within British officialdom itself.

'I realised then the power of the name of Jerusalem'⁹⁷: other works carried out by the Pro-Jerusalem Society

In *Orientations* Storrs argued that 'inhabitants of a place are not exhibits to be held back in picturesque discomfort in order that the sentimental tourist may enjoy her anticipated thrill...It is not enough to stop men doing ill: you must help them to do well'.⁹⁸ To this end Storrs tasked his administration, together with the Pro-Jerusalem Society to make improvements to the physical environment of the city. Some of these projects, such as the provision of a regular and efficient water supply for Jerusalem, were of clear benefit to the city's inhabitants.⁹⁹ However, far from liberating all Jerusalemites from their picturesque discomfort, the Society instead helped to reinforce the idea of a city suspended in Biblical time. In many cases these works also had a distinct political purpose, seeking to delegitimise

⁹⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 311.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 310.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 307-308. Eunice Holliday noted in October of 1922 that even Storrs' beloved Old City was not untouched by these works, with the streets being taken up to allow water pipes to be lay down. See Holliday to her parents, 10/11/1922 in Holliday, *Letters from Jerusalem*, p. 16.

Ottoman rule.¹⁰⁰ Nowhere is this made clearer than in the removal of the clock tower above Jaffa Gate.

Described by Storrs as an ‘offence’¹⁰¹ and by Eunice Holliday as a ‘horrible eyesore’¹⁰², the tower was originally erected in 1906 with funds raised by the local community and was appreciated by both the Palestinian and Jewish communities as an effective way of aiding local residents in managing their time. An ornate and elaborate structure, its location on Jaffa Gate was important; this area had gained significance during the late Ottoman period as a centre for banks, post offices, hotels and cafes – a far cry from the Holy City that Storrs and the Pro-Jerusalem Society envisioned.¹⁰³ In 1922, the tower was removed, shorn of its Baroque embellishments, and placed in front of the Post Office in Allenby Square with kiosks beneath it for rent from the Pro-Jerusalem Society.¹⁰⁴ Undoubtedly, its exclusion from the Old City represented ‘the most symbolic and material expression of British wishes to set back time in Jerusalem’.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, the exile of the clock tower to a development in the New City reflected a literal banishment of time from within the Old City walls, whilst also exposing British prejudices that existed against Ottoman contributions to the urban environment.

The removal of the clock tower formed part of the Pro-Jerusalem Society’s wider plans for restoration and preservation of Jerusalem’s city walls. Citing Psalm 48 with typical flair, Storrs recollected that:

We put back the fallen stones, the finials, the pinnacles, and the battlements, and we restored and freed from numberless encroachments the mediaeval Ramparts, so that it was possible to “Walk about Zion and go round about her: and tell the towers thereof: mark well her bulwarks, set up her houses”.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ Gitler, “Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity”, p. 51.

¹⁰¹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 438.

¹⁰² Holliday to her parents, 1/6/1923 in Holliday, *Letters from Jerusalem*, p. 25.

¹⁰³ Wallach, “The Oud Player and the Governor”, pp. 84-85.

¹⁰⁴ Hyman, *British Planners in Palestine*, pp. 471-472.

¹⁰⁵ Wallach, “The Oud Player and the Governor”, p. 85.

¹⁰⁶ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 312.

That the houses and business premises of Jerusalemites had to be demolished in order to facilitate the rampart walk was of little concern to the Governor. Ashbee defended the actions of the Society, arguing that a duty existed to prevent private encroachment onto public historic spaces.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, Ashbee was subverting Jerusalem's urban tradition by establishing a distinction between public and private space. The development of the rampart walk, whilst attempting to make Jerusalem a historical city, therefore served to make it more modern.¹⁰⁸ Describing the works of the Society in more detail, Storrs went on to recall that:

Of the interest and variety of these three sacred miles I never grew weary. We repaired, cleaned, and cleared of many hundreds of tons of modern Turkish barrack rubble, the Citadel, generally known as the Tower of David, which crowns the lower courses of the Hippicus and the Phasael towers recorded by Josephus. Much desecration we averted, but sometimes we were too late, and could only prosecute. The Roman staircase was saved, but already a building contractor had stolen some twenty tons of Roman stonework which he carried off by night on the backs of the donkeys. He was fined £50 and had to return the stones, but they could never be put back in the exact positions from which they had been taken.¹⁰⁹

The anguish Storrs felt that the stones could never be returned to their exact positions is palpable. Yet ultimately much of the Society's work served to produce a recreation of the past based on Storrs' interpretations, not an exact replica. Roberts describes these as 'creative anachronisms' and they were not merely restricted to the city walls. The restoration of the city's *suqs*, together with the recovery of ancient handicrafts and the establishment of traditional craft schools saw similar sleight of hand at play.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Roberts, "Dividing Jerusalem", p. 15.

¹⁰⁸ Alan Crawford, *C. R. Ashbee: Architect, Designer & Romantic Socialist*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985), p. 182.

¹⁰⁹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 312.

¹¹⁰ Roberts, "Dividing Jerusalem", p. 15.

Glass blowing was of particular interest to Storrs. He had 'met in the Cairo bazaars with occasional specimens of glasswork, coloured red blue or green, from Hebron, and having inspected the Hebron furnaces felt that we could not let die the blowing of these vessels, in the same shapes, by the same process, in the same place, and by men of the same race, as in the days of Abraham'.¹¹¹ In 1921 the Society financed the construction of a furnace at the Dome of the Rock Tiles in Jerusalem and hired glassblowers from Hebron – a further example of a 'creative anachronism'. However, the attempt to import a craft to Jerusalem from elsewhere in Palestine failed; transporting the necessary fuel from Hebron to Jerusalem was problematic and ultimately the glassblowers left the country altogether in search of work.¹¹²

Likewise attempts to establish a weaving industry in the city were unsuccessful. The Society took ownership of looms that had been used by the American Red Cross to provide work for Armenian refugees in the immediate period after the war. What was originally meant to be a temporary industry was given a supposed sense of permanence when the decision was made to locate the looms in the *Suq al-Qattanin* or the Old Cotton Market. The market was in a poor state, used as a 'public latrine, filled with ordure' and covered in debris 'lying five foot high'. As part of the repurposing of this building, and in a further example of the tensions that existed between modernity and preservation, a motorised flour-mill in an adjacent building was removed because its engine was damaging the masonry of the *suq*. By 1920 the industry had become known as the Jerusalem Looms with seventy people in its employ. Whilst not financed by the Society, an advance of £200 at five per cent was provided and the looms remained its property. The Society also initiated a system of indentured apprenticeships, providing scholarships to trainee weavers and paying the wages of the technical instructor.¹¹³ This system was short-lived and just two years later the apprenticeship system was abolished 'due to the inability of the Administration to carry out the Society's plans'. In its place, shops were leased direct to the master

¹¹¹ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 315.

¹¹² Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. 30.

¹¹³ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. 30-31.

weaver and some of his apprentices to maintain some trace of the weaving industry in Jerusalem.¹¹⁴

More fortuitous was the School of Ceramics, run under the auspices of Ohannessian and Dome of the Rock Tiles. For Ashbee, the 'Syrian potter, with his fine skill and his immemorial tradition' was 'one of the central facts of Eastern life'.¹¹⁵ An apprenticeship system similar to that for the Jerusalem Looms was established funded by both the Pro-Jerusalem Society and the newly established Department of Education.¹¹⁶ This joint enterprise no doubt reflected the importance placed upon the manufacture of tiles for the restoration of the Dome of the Rock. Whilst the tiles produced by Ohannessian were never used for their original purpose, the legacy of Storrs and the Society's patronage continues to this day. Descendants of two of the families Ohannessian brought to Jerusalem continue to manufacture and sell ceramics in the Holy City: Balian Armenian Ceramics on Nablus Road, and Karakashian Jerusalem Pottery on Greek Orthodox Patriarch Street.¹¹⁷ The latter workshop even goes so far as to name Storrs as an individual responsible for the introduction of Armenian pottery to Jerusalem.¹¹⁸ Unlike glass blowing or weaving, the introduction of Armenian ceramics proved its longevity as a result of the support of the Pro-Jerusalem Society and the Civilian Administration of Palestine, together with the entrepreneurial spirit of David Ohannessian.¹¹⁹ Moreover, ceramics manufactured by Dome of the Rock Tiles were used during the Mandate to help brand and mould the city to Storrs' design through the renaming of Jerusalem's streets.

¹¹⁴ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. 29.

¹¹⁵ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. 32.

¹¹⁶ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. 29.

¹¹⁷ Moughalian, *Feast of Ashes*, p. 285.

¹¹⁸ Karakashian Jerusalem Pottery, accessed online at https://www.jerusalem Pottery.biz/about_us/aboutus.htm on 03/11/2020.

¹¹⁹ It was only when the Pro-Jerusalem Society was disbanded in 1927 that Ohannessian took full control of his studio. See Moughalian, *Feast of Ashes*, p. 209.

Naming the streets of Jerusalem – controlling the ‘dumb soul of the City’

Lamenting the perceived defacement of the Holy City, Storrs observed that ‘a discerning conqueror in 1850 would have established the new shops, convents and hotels well away from the old City and have left the grey ramparts in a setting of grass, olives and cypresses’. Whilst the Pro-Jerusalem Society would work to rectify these abuses, ‘by 1918 the time was past for seeing Jerusalem adorned as a bride’. Nevertheless, as Governor of the city, Storrs reserved the right to ‘determine that for the dumb soul of the City the names at least of her streets in English, Arabic, and Hebrew, preserved by tradition or reverentially bestowed, should be proclaimed in blue or green tiles gleaming against the sober texture of her walls like chrysoprase and lapis lazuli’.¹²⁰

In her research on the relationship between Gaelic cultural identity and renaming in Ireland, Nash provides an overview of several different motives for changing the names of places: capitalist modernisation, colonial settlement, state formation, national independence and official commemoration.¹²¹ This list has since been added to by Shoal’s research on the renaming of street names in Acre for the benefit of tourism development.¹²² Whilst the British renaming of Jerusalem’s streets undoubtedly contained colonial motivations, it also reflected the personal worldview and interests of the city’s Governor.

¹²⁰ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 315. Most likely Storrs was thinking of the area around Jaffa Gate when describing the actions of a discerning conqueror.

¹²¹ Catherine Nash, “Irish Placenames: Post-Colonial Locations”, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 1999, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1999), pp. 457-480. For more on renaming as a process of capitalist modernisation see Allan Pred, *Lost words and lost worlds: modernity and the language of everyday life in late nineteenth-century Stockholm*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). Renaming as an act of colonialism is covered in Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Exploration of Landscape and History*, (London, Faber and Faber, 1987). Cohen and Kliot consider renaming as a process of state formation in Saul B. Cohen and Nurit Kliot, “Place-Names in Israel’s Ideological Struggle over the Administered Territories”, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 653-680. For more on renaming as an act of national independence see Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “Street-Naming and Nation-Building: Toponymic Inscriptions of Nationhood in Singapore”, *Area*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 298-307. Lastly see Maoz Azrayahu, “The Power of Commemorative Street Names”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 14 (1996), pp. 311-330 for more on renaming as an act of official commemoration.

¹²² Noam Shoal, “Street-naming, tourism development and cultural conflict: the case of the Old City of Acre/Akko/Akka”, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2013), pp. 612-626.

Following the introduction of civilian rule in July 1920 the new High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel, requested the renaming of Jerusalem's streets. Storrs and the Pro-Jerusalem Society were aware of how politically sensitive this could be and a sub-committee was established with Storrs' deputy, Harry Luke, as chairman. Forty-six streets were slated for renaming in the Old City and eighty in the New City, with the result being a list of street names 'full of history, poetry, and folk-lore'.¹²³ Storrs hinted at this peculiar miscellany of labels in *Orientations*, highlighting how:

In the old walled City such titles such as the Spice Market were preserved; *Harat al-Sharaf* – the Lane of Honour – became Honour Lane, and *Tariq Bab al-Sitti Mariam*, Our Lady's Street: *al-Wad* – the Valley – reverted (in its European version) to the classical Tyropaeum. There was Water Melon Alley, Dancing Dervish Street and Stork Lane, all literal translations. *Bab al-Magharbah* – the Gate of the Moroccans – was linked with London as Moorgate. On the seventh centenary of St Francis I named and formally unveiled the inscription-tile of St Francis Street, immediately outside the Franciscan Monastery – perhaps a worthier commemoration than the posters' "*Evviva il Serafino d'Assisi*" with which the grey city walls were then beplastered. For the new City without the walls we adopted St Paul's Road, Godfrey de Bouillon Street, Nehemiah Road, Tancred Lane, Allenby Square, Sulaiman Road, Couer de Lion Street, Saladin's Road, Street of the Maccabees, Queen Melisande's Way, and the Street of the Prophets.¹²⁴

Storrs himself lived on the lived on Street of the Prophets (previously known as Italian Hospital Street in Arabic and Consuls Street in Hebrew). Indeed, the pan-religious appeal of this name has led to suggestions that the Governor himself intervened in its naming as an act of self-aggrandisement.¹²⁵ Whilst some streets looked to promote harmony or were literal translations of previous titles, others

¹²³ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. 26.

¹²⁴ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 315.

¹²⁵ Wallach, *A City in Fragments*, pp. 153-154.

attempted to refashion and modernise existing customs. Storrs' contrast of the posters proclaiming "*Evviva il Serafino d' Assisi*" (Long live the Seraph of Assisi) with the new title of St Francis Street demonstrates how the naming campaign belittled local names for spaces, retitling them according to a 'enlightened' British standard.¹²⁶ This control was also formalised through the explicit links made between the Holy City and its new colonial master, illustrated by the anglicisation of the Gate of the Moroccans to the London-centric Moorgate. Yet the unique context of the Mandate meant that naming Jerusalem's streets could not merely reflect British control of the city; it also had to reflect the two communities with which Britain had been charged with protecting and developing.¹²⁷ Thus Jerusalem's street names under the Mandate became a curious hodgepodge of British, Arabic and Jewish tradition and folklore interpreted through the personalised spectrum of Storrs and the Pro-Jerusalem Society.

For those roads outside the city walls, a majority were named after key Biblical figures from the Old and New Testaments.¹²⁸ Names such as Allenby Square and King George V Avenue helped to project British power onto the landscape, whilst Godfrey de Bouillon Street and the Street of Baldwin I made directly associated Jerusalem within its Christian crusader past.¹²⁹ No mention was made of contemporary Palestinian, Arabic or Zionist figures to avoid arousing nationalist sentiments. Consequently the only streets in Jerusalem that made reference to modern persons were named after key British figures, with the implication that only Britain represented modernity in an otherwise ancient and sacred city.

Even the street signs themselves demonstrated a refashioning of Jerusalem's historicity according to British designs. Prior to British rule tiles were not typically used in architecture, with the exception of the Dome of the Rock. However, Ohannessian's Dome of the Rock Tiles were commissioned to create some of the new signs, boldly declaring the road name in English across the top, with Arabic and Hebrew beneath. Thus a direct visual link was being made between the city itself and the Dome of the Rock, positioning the British as guardians of

¹²⁶ Wallach, *Readings in Conflict*, p. 149.

¹²⁷ Gitler, "Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity", p. 54.

¹²⁸ Wallach, *A City in Fragments*, pp. 150-154.

¹²⁹ Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. 27.

the sanctity of the city. An additional commission was granted to Bezalel, the Zionist School of Arts and Crafts, with both workshops producing ornate designs with an emphasis on aesthetics as opposed to legibility.¹³⁰

How did the renaming of Jerusalem's streets impact upon everyday life in the city? Prior to British rule, addresses were given with reference to specific landmarks and as such required local knowledge in order to access them. Different communities often had different names for streets depending on which relevant buildings or organisations were present on them. 1858 saw the introduction of house numbering but this had a limited impact upon the mental geography of Jerusalemites.¹³¹ Despite the British street renaming programme, the city's residents continued to use their traditional mental maps, although some found themselves alienated by the introduction of new names. The decision to ignore new street names and keep with popular names, or avoid street names altogether, can be seen as a form of resistance against colonial intervention. However, European Zionist immigrants to the city decried the lack of street names and house numbers, viewing such details as an essential part of their identity and presence in Jerusalem, in what has been described as a 'reassuring sign of the colonial state on which they depended'.¹³²

Writing in 1937 on the future of Britain's colonies, a report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs adroitly argued that 'custom belongs to the community itself, but to remove from the community the right of interpretation and of transformation is an act of violence more serious, though less visible, than the confiscation of arable land or of forest'.¹³³ By committing to undertake the renaming of Jerusalem's streets, Storrs and the British imposed customs that were alien to many of the city's residents. That some chose to ignore the new reality inflicted upon them was a reassertion of their right to interpret their city according to their own traditions, not those imposed by a recently appointed governor. Yet in assuming the responsibility of renaming the city's streets, the

¹³⁰ Wallach, *A City in Fragments*, pp. 149-150.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, pp. 136-140.

¹³² *Ibid*, pp. 154-158.

¹³³ British Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Colonial Problem* (London, British Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937), p. 264. 64. Cited from S.J. Pierre Charles, *Le Problème des Centres extra-coutumiers*, p. 11.

British undermined the position of Jerusalem's notables and community leaders.¹³⁴ At the same time, the imposition of new street names helped to reorientate Jerusalem as a city that was geographically intelligible to its new colonial masters (the British) and what would become its future colonial masters (the Zionists), as opposed to its traditional inhabitants.

The New City (Without the Walls)

Whilst Storrs' efforts with the Pro-Jerusalem Society were primarily focused on preserving the Old City, the first years of British rule also saw significant developments in the New City. The British decision to delineate the city into Old and New sectors separated by parks, as proposed by various plans for the city, marked a departure from how Jerusalem was envisioned as an urban space and paved the way for current separation between East and West Jerusalem.¹³⁵ Initially, no land purchases were permitted under O.E.T.A. and rent increases due to shortage of accommodation were prohibited.¹³⁶ The introduction of civilian rule in 1920 saw a resumption in land sales and as the city expanded during the 1920s, its commercial heart drifted westwards away from the walled city by Jaffa Gate towards construction projects centred around the districts of Mamilla and the Downtown Triangle.¹³⁷ New residential areas were also built to the south and west of the city.

These changes were advanced by several developments in 1921. Firstly, a new Municipal Council was established. This council had to consult with the District Commission with regard to aesthetics and construction. Funding for development did not come from the government, but from local taxation. Secondly a Central Town Planning Commission was established to formalise planning and development processes.¹³⁸ Thirdly, Jerusalem's municipal boundaries were

¹³⁴ Wallach, *A City in Fragments*, p. 143.

¹³⁵ Roberts, "Dividing Jerusalem", p. 18.

¹³⁶ Ruth Kark and Michael Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs: Quarters, Neighborhoods, Villages, 1800-1948*, (Jerusalem, Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2001), p. 139.

¹³⁷ Ruth Kark and Michal Oren-Nordheim, "Colonial Cities in Palestine? Jerusalem under the British Mandate", *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1996-1997), p. 66.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 143.

redrawn, increasing the size of city from 13 square kilometres prior to World War One to 63 square kilometres. This, coupled with an ordinance declaring the entire city an urban planning zone, helped give a statutory basis to new building permits issued under British rule.¹³⁹ Expansion of municipal boundaries also had demographic consequences for the city. Generally speaking, the Zionist Commission were keen to keep boundaries to a minimum, as their extension often took in predominantly Palestinian Arab areas. Indeed, as boundaries were shifted throughout the Mandate period, they campaigned to keep some Jewish suburbs outside of the municipality. The drawing of boundaries was therefore not a neutral act; it was to form a key part of the political conflict over the city.¹⁴⁰

Fundamental to the development of the New City was the sale of lands close to the city walls by the Greek Orthodox Church, which had entered financial hardship and were forced to dispose of assets by a British committee. Prior to this point, new construction had taken place some distance from the Old City but these sales opened up new building opportunities in areas that had hitherto been unavailable for purchase. The lands available for purchase were split into plots, with both Palestinians and Jews alike acquiring different parts of the city. Talbieh and Nikephoriya were purchased by the former, whilst the Zionist Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC) obtained land in Mamillah, Ben Yehuda, Rehavia and Talpiot. Several public buildings were also constructed on land previously owned by the Greek Orthodox Church, including the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), the King David Hotel and the Franciscan College of Cardinals (Terra Sancta').¹⁴¹ Likewise new thoroughfares were built, most notably King George V Avenue, which linked Jaffa Road to Jerusalem's railway station to the south-west of the Old City. Upon its opening, Arthur Ruppin, founder of the PLDC, noted in his diary that 'the entire appearance of the town has changed and the new road has become its centre. It is the first street wide and long enough to invite one to walk here'.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Kark and Oren-Nordheim, "Colonial Cities in Palestine", pp. 61-62.

¹⁴⁰ Benevisti, *City of Stone*, p. 55.

¹⁴¹ Kark and Oren-Nordheim, "Colonial Cities in Palestine", pp. 64-65.

¹⁴² Quote from Martin Gilbert, *Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century*, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1996), pp. 110-111.

What were relations like between these new neighbourhoods? Markowitz contends that the New City had been increasingly sectarianised from 1860 onwards as new Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe chose to live in homogenous communities. This process was accelerated by the British, who did little to provide welfare for Jewish immigrants in Jerusalem. As such, immigrants affiliated themselves with organisations who could fill this gap, such as the Histadrut, Orthodox communities or the organised middle classes. Jewish communities in Jerusalem therefore developed sectorially, with distinct characteristics for each neighbourhood.¹⁴³ In contrast Abowd presents a more nuanced picture, where certain areas saw intercommunal cooperation whilst others remained divided along factional lines. For example, the wealthy district of Talbieh exhibited a degree of cultural hybridity where Palestinian Arabs, Jews and the British experienced a shared residential life. This contrasted with Rehavia where rigorous residential rules ensured that it remained a Zionist only enclave.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, Jewish areas of the city with strict residential controls served only to heighten Palestinian concerns regarding the future demographic of Jerusalem and their position within it.

Utilising Rapaport's aforementioned conflicting visions, it is clear that a certain crossover existed between British and Zionist interests in the development of the New City. Not only did construction cultivate the Zionist vision for Jerusalem (and Palestine more generally), but it also chimed with the emerging Garden Cities movement. Here British and Zionist aims were compatible; the Pro-Jerusalem Society placed great emphasis on the establishment of parks and gardens, whilst the PLDC advocated the establishment of several garden suburbs across the city, most notably at Talpiot.¹⁴⁵ The intersection of British and Zionist aims was noted and objected to by the Palestinian Arabs, who bitterly complained about Zionist land purchases from the Greek Orthodox Church and objected to the routing of sewage systems for Zionists through Arab areas of the new city. They also opposed British attempts to close the Muslim Mamilla Cemetery on the grounds

¹⁴³ Sarah Markovitz, *The Development of Modern Jerusalem: An Evaluation of Planning Decisions and the Effectiveness of the Planning Process*, (Senior Thesis, Princeton University School of Architecture and the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs, 1982), pp. 5-10.

¹⁴⁴ Abowd, *Colonial Jerusalem*, pp. 37-50.

¹⁴⁵ Gilbert, *Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century*, p. 104.

of public health as a ploy to remove Arab control over land surrounded by Jewish communities. The decision of the British authorities to brush aside these concerns, together with the privileged position of organisations such as the PLDC who appointed their own architects, agencies and neighbourhood committees, merely reinforced the dissatisfaction of the Palestinian Arabs with the government of the city.¹⁴⁶

It is perhaps ironic that at the very moment Storrs was placing all his energies in directing the eyes of the world to the preservation of the Old City, the New City started to develop as the main commercial and residential focal point of Jerusalem. Factors beyond his control, such as increased Zionist involvement in the city and financial struggles within the Greek Orthodox Church, helped facilitate this. Nevertheless, Storrs' dislike of the commercial centre outside of the Jaffa Gate, together with his emphasis that the Old City should be protected from new developments and preserved as in Biblical times for global posterity, allowed the case to be put forward that Jerusalem should continue the trend started by the Ottomans and grow further beyond its original city walls. The result was a city that was more factionalised than it had been prior to British rule, both in a geographical and a communal sense.

'Whilst subscriptions to Pro-Jerusalem steadily decreased': The Pro-Jerusalem Society under Civilian Rule

...it were a greater grief
To watch it withering, leaf by leaf
Than see it pluck't to-day.¹⁴⁷

Civilian rule in Palestine started with great optimism for Storrs and the Pro-Jerusalem Society. Not only had the Society been commissioned by Samuel to help with the renaming of Jerusalem's streets, by November it had also managed to secure an annual subsidy of between £500 and £2000 to help with its work.

¹⁴⁶ Roberts, "Dividing Jerusalem", pp. 19-20.

¹⁴⁷ Quote in the subtitle and extract from Byron's *Elegy on Thurza* in Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 439.

Notably this was only achieved after he threatened a tourist tax if the subsidy was not forthcoming.¹⁴⁸ The Governor, no doubt ebullient in the interests shown by the new High Commissioner in his works, drafted an invitation to King George V requesting the monarch to become a patron of the Society. According to the letter, this undertaking was made with the blessing of Samuel himself.¹⁴⁹ In response, Sir John Tilley (an Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office) bypassed Storrs altogether, informing the High Commissioner that 'His Majesty does not as a rule give his patronage to new undertakings until they have become firmly established, both financially and otherwise, and he very rightly points out that such a communication should have reached him through you and through this Department'. It was also requested that Storrs be made aware of this breach of protocol in order to avoid 'any repetition of such irregularity'.¹⁵⁰ Magnanimously, Samuel responded that Storrs should not be blamed for the request, and that responsibility lay upon the High Commissioner's shoulders.¹⁵¹ Such an episode represented an unusual diplomatic faux pas on Storrs' behalf, but Tilley's concerns regarding the financial status of the Society were to foreshadow future problems Storrs would have to face.

Aside from the annual grant that was secured by Storrs, the Pro-Jerusalem Society had always relied on subscriptions and donations. During the period of military rule, the 'personal enthusiasm' and 'magnetism' of the Governor helped to raise £5000, with contributions made from a wide range of figures and organisations, including the Jerusalem Municipality, the Grand Mufti and the Zionist Commission.¹⁵² The most expensive undertaking was the repair of the *Suq al-Qattanin* for £1000, whilst other significant expenses included the launch of the Citadel Gardens and the clearing of the Rampart Walk at £500, with investments in technical education costing £300 and the establishment of *Jerusalem Looms* coming in at £250. The research into tile manufacturing for the Dome of the Rock repairs also cost the same amount. On the eve of the new civilian government, Ashbee hypothesised two possible revenue streams for the

¹⁴⁸ Samuel to Storrs, 21/11/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2 – Jerusalem 1920-1921.

¹⁴⁹ Storrs to Lord Stamfordham, 6/8/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

¹⁵⁰ Sir John Tilley to Herbert Samuel, 30/8/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

¹⁵¹ Hebert Samuel to Sir John Tilley, 12/9/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

¹⁵² Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, p. 72-74.

future: charitable donations and profit from self-sufficient enterprises such as the weaving industry (from which it received interest on its initial investment) and monies received from the Administration for the technical education services it provided.¹⁵³

Despite this optimism, by December 1922 the Society's funds had become depleted and Storrs was granted permission by the High Commissioner to travel to America to gather new members. The Governor noted that the 'disconcerting practice whereby original contributors announced that their subscriptions had really been donations' was partially to blame for the lack of exhaustion of funds, although one must assume the failure of the *Jerusalem Looms* and glass blowing enterprises did not help matters. Storrs' cause was not helped by the fact that the Dean of Windsor was also visiting America at that time in a bid to raise funds for St George's Chapel, but despite this potential issue he returned to Palestine having secured new members for the Society. This process was not without revelations for Storrs, who was uncomfortable with soliciting charitable donations and surprised by the level of 'social anti-Semitism' in America. He expressed his surprise at the refusal of non-Jews to donate lest their funds should benefit Jews in Palestine, whilst some Jews rebuffed his approaches on the grounds that they did not want to further Zionism. He soon started tailoring his presentations to the audience present, recalling that:

The distinguished lawyer Mr Paul Cravath had been kind enough to ask a score of friends interested in Palestine to meet me at dinner. I gave my exposition under the impression that there were no Jews present. When I had finished, a fellow guest bearing a name honoured throughout American Jewry came up and expressed himself as so well satisfied with my thesis that he hoped I would lunch at his club and meet a Zionist gathering. I expounded my theme there on the same lines. As I was putting on my coat in the hall someone behind me muttered to his companion "Well, if that's all we're going to get..." and for a moment I felt I was back in Jerusalem.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, pp. 41-42.

¹⁵⁴ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, pp. 433-434.

Arguments and debates that raged in Jerusalem were being repeated thousands of miles away, highlighting how many communities watched the British Mandate in Palestine, and their work in the Holy City, with great interest.

The financial difficulties the Pro-Jerusalem Society faced demonstrates the tension between Storrs the aesthete preservationist and Storrs the British administrator. Despite being able to secure limited public funds for his works, the Palestine Administration (and the British Empire more widely) was designed to produce wealth as opposed to give it away.¹⁵⁵ Yet monetary restrictions were not the only reason for the Society's diminished influence from 1920 onwards. The temporary nature of O.E.T.A. allowed Storrs and the Pro-Jerusalem Society to carve out a niche for their works in the early days of British rule. However, the formalisation of British involvement in Palestine, together with the establishment of a functioning administration with Departments of Antiquities, Public Works and Education amongst others, increasingly encroached in areas that had hitherto been the Society's sole domain. In 1922, the Director of Antiquities, John Garstang, wrote to Ashbee expressing his belief that 'all executive action' should be taken by these departments in areas of their concern.¹⁵⁶ In this scenario the Society would have become a technical or advisory body only, as opposed to developing and enacting policy independently. In his response, Ashbee expressed his disagreement with the arguments made by Garstang, whilst also noting that no decision should be made without Storrs' input given that the Governor was in London at this time.¹⁵⁷ Storrs' view was even briefer, with a handwritten note on Garstang's original letter simply reading 'Infernal Cheek'.¹⁵⁸ Yet by 1925, the twin realities of lack of funding and limited remit had led to Storrs reconsidering the organisation's role. In an interview published in Washington DC's *Evening Star*, he acknowledged that 'we have come to see...that our job is not merely a matter of archaeology or the protection of ancient buildings, landscape, beauty of streets, sites, etc. Many more things have to be considered':

¹⁵⁵ Annabel Wharton, "Jerusalem Remade" in Sandy Isenstadt, Sandy and Kishwar Rizvi, ed., *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington, University of Washington Press, 2008), p. 47.

¹⁵⁶ Garstang to Ashbee, 15.5.1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3 – Jerusalem, 1922.

¹⁵⁷ Ashbee to Garstang, 16.5.1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹⁵⁸ Garstang to Ashbee, 15.5.1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

not least the limits of British power trying to alter the architectural status quo of the city. Storrs argued that:

Before all things, Jerusalem is a city in which idealists through succeeding generations have torn each other and their city to pieces, the city having changed hands over forty times. Perhaps because of this it has a singular grandeur and romance and beauty, and also because of this every time you turn to do anything, to a piece of sod or a scrap of stone, there is a historic association.

The actual bit of stone or the rubbish heap we want to clean up may, it is true, belong to some Greek or Moslem or Jew, but the Armenian, the English Protestant, the Abyssinian, the American missionary, the Italian, the Wakf in India, the Copt, the other fellow somewhere – they will have a word to say on the matter, and before we do anything we must wait to hear it.¹⁵⁹

The ratification of the British Mandate for Palestine in 1922, together with the formalised role that the Zionists would play in its enactment, increased intercommunal tensions in the city. The result was a more contested urban space, limiting the scope of the Pro-Jerusalem Society and undermining its original pledge to ‘promote the city without prejudice to race or creed’.

These internecine setbacks did not deter Storrs from Britain’s central mission in Palestine. Ending his interview on a note of confidence, he heralded the work of the Zionists in developing their Garden City vision, concluding that ‘before long...the attention of the world will be directed to this part of the country. Comparatively little is known on the outside what is actually going on here. Certainly anybody can foresee that sure and definite progress is destined for the Holy Land’.¹⁶⁰ For Storrs, Zionist construction in the New City represented progress, whilst progress in the Old City was ensured through its preservation as in Biblical times.

¹⁵⁹ *Evening Star*, Washington DC, Saturday 24 October 1925, p. 10.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 10.

Conclusion

In the summer of 1926, Storrs accepted the position of Governor of Cyprus. Within months of his departure the Pro-Jerusalem Society was wound up; perhaps the ultimate testimony to his influence over the organisation he helped create and a sign of how it had become increasingly obsolete under civilian administration. The extent of Storrs' authority is demonstrated not just by what the Society was interested in, but also in what it did not get involved with. He, and the wider society itself, remained largely ignorant towards the nascent Palestinian studio arts scene, including painting and sculpture, that was materialising during the early Mandate period. Emerging from European influences on the tradition of icon painting, easel painting was used as a method through which urban Palestinians could represent their cultural modernity. Such a development did not fit with Storrs' vision of traditional Palestinian arts and crafts, with the Society instead focusing its efforts on sponsorship of exhibitions for Jewish settler artists.¹⁶¹ This ignorance of the evolving Palestinian artistic community is highlighted Storrs' own recollection that he was enchanted to find any 'local' painters at all in Palestine after fourteen years in Egypt. For Storrs, local meant Reuven Rubin, a Romanian born painter, and David Bomberg, a British-Jewish artists commissioned by the Zionists to paint landscapes of Jewish settlements in Palestine. It did not mean Palestinian artists, with Storrs dismissing their contributions in the following way:

“Where is God,” asks van Gogh in a letter, “if not among the artists?” I cannot think He was invariably to be found with the painters of Palestine.¹⁶²

This is not to say that Storrs' efforts to promote culture and the arts in Jerusalem have not been praised. Offering a sympathetic appraisal of his works in the city, Nirit Shalev-Khalifa contends that:

¹⁶¹ See Kamal Boulatta, *Palestinian Art: From 1850 to the Present*, (Saqi, London, 2009), pp. 39-104 for more on the emergence of Palestinian artists throughout the late Ottoman and early Mandate period.

¹⁶² Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 422.

Ronald Storrs created in Jerusalem an impossible mosaic of East and West. The fabric he wove, and which the Pro-Jerusalem Society was its reflection, took place during his term of office. But when Storrs left, his endeavours came to a halt and it seems that all the hues and contrasts could co-exist in the complex Jerusalem reality only since they existed in Storrs' world and in his wide-ranging ideas.¹⁶³

Yet this idealistic assessment hides a more destructive truth. The central motif of Storrs' fabric was the notion of protecting the city *on his terms*, using Jerusalem 'as an appropriate vessel of aesthetic and religious experience'.¹⁶⁴ For all its pretences of uniting communities for the common good, the Society was a vehicle for the realisation of Ronald Storrs' vision of a Holy City preserved in Biblical time, and this, together with the British role in facilitating the Balfour Declaration, helped to alter both the physical and conceptual landscape of Jerusalem. Storrs' governorship resulted in a city that was more divided and less harmonious than the one he inherited. As a result, the streets of Jerusalem themselves were to become contested, not just in terms of the names they were ascribed, but also with regard to who had primacy over the city and Palestine more widely. An early sign of the difficulties that Storrs' 'impossible mosaic' helped create saw tensions erupt in what the Governor described as 'an agony of fear and hatred': the Nabi Musa riots of April 1920.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ Shalev-Khalifa, "Sir Ronald and the Knights of the Stone Order", p. 44.

¹⁶⁴ Wharton, *Selling Jerusalem*, p. 216.

¹⁶⁵ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 330.

Chapter Four – ‘Blood runs hot in the Palestine spring...’¹: The Nabi Musa Riots of April 1920 ²

5. That the Military Governorate of Jerusalem failed to make adequate preparations for a possible disturbance at the Nabi Musa Pilgrimage in spite of the receipt of warnings and ample knowledge of the situation, such failure being probably due to over confidence induced by the success of the police authorities in handling earlier demonstrations.

6. That in spite of the prohibition of political demonstrations no definite instructions were issued by the Military Governorate to the police to prevent the delivery of inflammatory speeches on the occasion of the Nabi Musa pilgrimage.

Findings of the Palin Commission Report of Inquiry into the Jerusalem disturbances ³

As no action was taken on the Report submitted by these sudden experts in Public Security of Jerusalem, and as it was never published, the only result of the Investigation was to humiliate and embarrass a number of public servants then standing in peculiar need of all possible support.

Ronald Storrs in his autobiography, Orientations ⁴

Post-war negotiations at Versailles saw the establishment of a League of Nations committed to establishing a Mandate system for various territories around the

¹ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 330.

² This chapter builds upon ideas developed in my undergraduate dissertation. See Christopher Burnham, *Were the Criticisms of Ronald Storrs Following the Nabi Musa Riots of April 1920 Justified?*, (Unpublished Undergraduate Dissertation, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2009).

³ WO 32/9614 – Overseas: Jerusalem Riots – Courts of Enquiry 1920 (Palin Commission), TNA, pp. 39-40.

⁴ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 330.

world, including Palestine. The realisation of this commitment came against the backdrop of the Nabi Musa riots of 4-7 April 1920; shattering the relative peace of British control in Jerusalem and highlighting the limitations of O.E.T.A.'s temporary military rule over Palestine. Several weeks later the future of Palestine (and the wider region as a whole) was decided the San Remo Conference, scheduled prior to the disturbances for 18-26 April. The French received Mandates for Syria and Lebanon, with dire consequences for Arab hopes of a Greater Syrian Kingdom including Palestine. Britain was granted a Mandate for Palestine that incorporated the Balfour Declaration into its conditions, along with mandatory control over Iraq.⁵ Thus the map of the post-Ottoman Middle East had been drawn, with a new era of civilian governance ushered in to Palestine from July 1920.

Yet the riots were more than just a curtain call for O.E.T.A.. They reflected the increased politicisation and polarisation of Jerusalem life, with the city becoming a microcosm of wider struggles emerging across Palestine. This was in part the result of Storrs' confessionalisation of the city, with identity in Jerusalem becoming increasingly linked to religious orientation as opposed to neighbourhood co-existence.⁶ Fishman traces the roots of this struggle still further, beyond the Balfour Declaration and into the late Ottoman era, arguing that the period following the 1908 Young Turk revolution saw Palestinians and Zionists lobby Istanbul for their respective causes in an attempt to 'claim the homeland'.⁷ Irrespective of their origin, the disturbances and their fallout represented the first direct and violent struggle between the Arabs and the Zionists for primacy within the city and the country as a whole.⁸ This early warning of discontent was clearly not heeded by British negotiators at San Remo who pressed ahead with their commitment to the Balfour Declaration, irrespective of the clear message the disturbances sent about Zionist involvement in Palestine.

⁵ See T.G. Fraser, Andrew Mango and Robert McNamara, *The Makers of the Modern Middle East: Second Edition*, (London, Gingko, 2015), pp. 191-197 for more on negotiations at San Remo.

⁶ Mazza, "Transforming the Holy City", pp. 184-186.

⁷ Fishman, *Jews and Palestinians in the Late Ottoman Era*, p. 3.

⁸ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, pp. 165-178.

From Storrs' perspective, the events of April 1920 also represented a direct challenge to his idealised vision of Jerusalem, embodied by the Pro-Jerusalem Society, in which all communities could be brought together under a benevolent British guiding hand. Instead, the riots would force Storrs to take a more active role in managing tensions between the communities of the city, leading to accusations of bias and bad faith from both Arabs and Zionist alike that would undermine his attempts to present himself as a neutral arbiter for the good of Jerusalem and Jerusalemites. It would also highlight how Storrs' background as a civilian administrator placed limitations on his understanding of military operations.

The Nabi Musa Festival

The Nabi Musa Festival was a week-long Muslim celebration held in honour of the Prophet Moses that fell at the same time as the Christian Orthodox Easter and the Jewish Passover. Traditionally the ceremony had been largely held at the shrine of the Prophet Moses, located 12 kilometres southwest of Jericho, but from the mid-nineteenth century Jerusalem took on a more prominent role in affairs. Several modifications were enacted by the Ottoman authorities, most notably that pilgrims should assemble within the Holy City ahead of visiting the shrine itself. As a result urban notables took on a greater role in the festivities than they had done previously, with new rites and rituals introduced to reflect this. Such changes reflected the increased centralisation of Ottoman governance at that time, shifting the balance of power between rural lords and urban notables and heralding new alliances between state representatives and key figures within Jerusalem. In essence a traditional celebration was being given new meaning by a modernising nation.⁹ It is against this backdrop of increased state involvement that the British took responsibility for the festival from 1917 onwards.

As previously mentioned, Storrs placed great emphasis on Nabi Musa as an opportunity to establish his position with the Muslim elites within the city, viewing

⁹ Awad Halabi, "The Transformation of the Prophet Moses Festival in Late Ottoman Jerusalem (1850-1917): From Traditional Pilgrimage to Civil Ritual", *Journal of Ritual Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2018), pp. 1-15.

his management of the festival as a 'delicate matter' given the demise of the Ottomans, which had seen 'the passing of thirteen hundred years' Islamic theocracy'.¹⁰ As such, it became a bellwether event for the maintenance of the status quo under O.E.T.A.. Yet Nabi Musa was not merely about maintaining the status quo. At a time when opposition to Zionism was increasing, the festival also represented an opportunity to negate Arab hostility by forming new alliances with the notables in the city.¹¹ Despite the political and symbolic significance of the festival, Storrs declared a certain weariness toward the event itself. He described the Nabi Musa as a 'blameless (if rather pointless) event, consisting of a week's hot sticky holiday by the Dead Sea, with mild feasting, booths of fruit and sweets, and shows ranging from an indelicate version of Punch and Judy to the circumcision of anxious little boys before a gaping assembly of proud relations'.¹² This condescending view is somewhat surprising given the elevated position that Jerusalem played within the week-long celebration. On the first day – the Friday of the Banners – the city (and the Haram al-Sharif in particular) was a focal point for various processions. Following the unfurling of the banners of the Prophet, two banners of *Nabi Da'ud* (Prophet David), and two of the Haram, the procession would tour the Old City and then head outside the city walls. It would then stop to attend a reception held by the mayor before proceeding on to the shrine of Moses. Over the subsequent days, pilgrims with sacred banners would attend from Nablus and Hebron, parading through Jerusalem's narrow streets accompanied by music, singing and dancing ahead of their journey towards Jericho.¹³

Warning Signs: January-March 1920

March 1920 saw Storrs' parents visit him in Jerusalem. This was a moment of great joy for the Governor, who noted with pride 'how immediately they gained the affection of the Communities'. Echoing his son's commitment to intercommunal relations via the Pro-Jerusalem Society, Reverend Storrs impressed in particular by showing an 'interest and willingness to learn from Moslems and Jews as well as from Christians'. The 'loving presence' of his

¹⁰ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 329.

¹¹ Wallach, *A City in Fragments*, pp. 196-197.

¹² Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 330.

¹³ Wallach, *A City in Fragments*, pp. 190-192.

parents was of great solace to Storrs at this time, who noted that 'in politics Jerusalem was growing more difficult and less agreeable'. Tensions were on the rise, meaning that:

Arab resentment against the Balfour Declaration was now louder as well as deeper. The growing success of violence in Egypt was an open encouragement to extremists, and plaintive grievances were now becoming truculent demands. Both Arabs and Jews were confronted with an Administration that was less of a happy family than the original O.E.T.A.; the difference perhaps lay between the beginning of a picnic, and the end. After eighteen months of peace, and still under purely negative instructions from home, the military and civilian elements began to react differently and not always consistently to the exactions and protests with which they were assailed. On the one side were the Jewish and Arab politicians supported respectively in England and in Egypt and expecting immediate yet detailed examination of complaints; on the other side a school of thought condemning as unsoldierly all "politika", which, so far as some of us could gather, seemed to mean dealing with people as reasonable beings.¹⁴

The aura of uncertainty shrouding Palestine led to an increase in tensions, both within O.E.T.A. itself as the limitations of military rule were exposed, and between Arabs and Jews as Britain maintained its support of Zionism. Established alliances between different communities were being redrawn at this time. Under late-Ottoman rule, Jews and Muslims had traditionally maintained good relations in opposing the Christians, who were viewed as European sympathisers as the Empire in the Balkans began to disintegrate. Arab concerns around the growing influence of Zionism in Palestine led to a redefining of this relationship, with Muslims and Christians forging a new alliance against the Zionists.¹⁵ Growing dissatisfaction led to the establishment of the Muslim-Christian Association (MCA) in 1918, with branches opened all over the country advocating support for Palestine's inclusion as part of a Greater Syria under the rule of Emir Feisal of

¹⁴ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 329.

¹⁵ Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, pp. 149-150.

the Hashemite dynasty. The MCA were also vocal in their opposition towards Zionism.¹⁶ Other organisations such as *al-Muntada al-Adabi* (the Literary Club) and *al-Nadi al-'Arabi* (the Arab Club) were established with the same political aims. These organisations based their arguments on the Arab's historical ties to Palestine and the demographic advantage they enjoyed over the Jews there.¹⁷ The notion of a Greater Syria was a cornerstone of negotiations between the Hashemites and the British in 1915, as the latter looked to entice the Arabs to rebel against the Ottoman Empire. The Damascus Protocol fed into these discussions. Developed by the Arab secret societies Al-Fatat and Al-Ahd, the document proposed that the western border of any future Arab state would include the whole of Palestine, Lebanon and Syria – a policy that was later incorporated into the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. Later, this position was partially reaffirmed by the First Palestinian Congress of 1919. Under the stewardship of the President of the Jerusalem MCA, 'Aref Pasha al-Dajani, the Congress argued for the unity of Palestine and Syria in any settlement, opposed continued Zionist influence in Palestine and rejected any notion of French mandatory control in this area. Instead, appeals were made to the British to uphold the provisions of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. Despite the clear stance taken by the First Palestine Congress, Palestinians did not receive a seat at Versailles press their case for a Greater Syria, instead having to rely on Feisal to press their claims for them against the Zionist delegation.¹⁸ Feisal's position as representative of the Arabs at Versailles suited British and Zionist interests, where the former could use him as a tool to promote their concerns. It also confirmed British prejudices against 'false Arabs' from the Levant, whose worldview and approach in the eyes of British officials made them a poor imitation of the 'true Arabs' like Feisal; the 'true Arabs' being those of the desert. From Feisal's perspective, the Emir saw collaboration with Zionism as a potentially

¹⁶ Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, pp. 80.

¹⁷ Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, p. 155.

¹⁸ Bernard Regan, *The Balfour Declaration: Empire, the Mandate and Resistance in Palestine*, (London, Verso, 2018), pp. 93-98.

beneficial force to his own ambitions for a future Syrian state, which was currently under threat by French ambitions in the region.¹⁹

This is not to say that a distinct sense of what it meant to be Palestinian, separate to that of Greater Syria as a whole, had not been present for several years prior to the King-Crane Commission. Khalidi has shown how a Palestinian identity had started to emerge through discussions about Jerusalem and her Holy Places as early as the Eighteenth Century, whilst Gerber extends this discussion still further to the Crusades.²⁰ Fishman's notion of *Palestinianism* mentioned in the introduction – a late-Ottoman identity that emerged in response to 'Ottoman centralisation, Jewish migration to Palestine, peasant displacement, the threat of European imperialism and Arab migration from Palestine', usefully proves this point. Whilst Palestine's notables maintained strong social and cultural links with Syria, sharing with them a sense of identity as Arab citizens in the Ottoman Empire, their *Palestinianism* marked them as different from their northern counterparts.²¹

The Paris Peace Negotiations led to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919, confirming the Allied stance towards a vanquished Germany. Affairs in the Middle East were to take longer to reconcile. Two and a half years after the occupation of Jerusalem no peace treaty had been agreed with Turkey. American President Woodrow Wilson's promises of a post-war settlement that would promote the principle of self-determination by the populations concerned raised hopes for the establishment of a Greater Syria.²² Rumours and propaganda abounded for various forms of national self-determination; whilst the ambiguities and inconsistencies of Britain's wartime policies towards the Middle East added further layers of intrigue. In their report the Palin Commission picked up on these

¹⁹ See Kamel, *The Middle East from Empire to Sealed Identities*, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2018), pp. 165-166 and n28, p. 177. In January 1919, Feisal and Weizmann signed an agreement committing the two parties to facilitating the Balfour Declaration through the encouragement of Jewish immigration to Palestine. Feisal added a handwritten caveat explaining that such a commitment was conditional on the realisation of the terms of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.

²⁰ Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, pp. 28-30 and Gerber, *Remembering and Imagining Palestine*, pp. 42-79.

²¹ Fishman, *Jews and Palestinians in the Late Ottoman Era*, p. 16.

²² Allen, *A History of False Hope*, pp. 31-39.

tensions, noting that 'alienation and exasperation' amongst the population of Palestine had been caused by non-fulfilment of promises made by the British, the irreconcilability of the Balfour Declaration with Palestinian self-determination, uncertainty about the intent of Zionists in Palestine and concerns of Jewish economic domination.²³ The non-publication of the King-Crane Commission (an American backed report which found that public opinion favoured an independent and unified Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine) in 1919 ignited fears that the Arabs were not going to receive their independence.²⁴ These concerns soon manifested themselves in Palestinian actions against the Jews in Palestine. Writing to his wife on 21 March 1920, Weizmann records that there had been 'killings in Upper Galilee, more attacks by armed bands on the Metullah: the Jews defended themselves, 6 were killed...demonstrations in Jerusalem'.²⁵

The wisdom of permitting demonstrations was questioned in late February by Dr David Eder, a leading member of the Zionist Executive. However the Chief Administrator of Palestine, General Louis Bols, permitted that they go ahead, acknowledging that such marches 'could be controlled and that they acted as a safety valve'.²⁶ Thus the British had set a precedent in allowing demonstrations and any subsequent attempt to alter this precedent would lead to accusations of breaching the status quo. Subsequently, the first protest went ahead on 27 February 1920. Events passed off peacefully, with the police successfully managing the crowd of approximately 2-3,000 Arabs, in spite of some provocation by Jewish bystanders who started singing Hatikvah at the demonstrators.²⁷

²³ WO 32/9614 pp. 2-20, pp. 38-39. The Palin Commission was very clear that the long term cause of the Nebi Musa riots was the great unease that many Arabs felt resulting from the uncertainty surrounding the future of Palestine, coupled with increased Zionist involvement in the area.

²⁴ McTague Jr, "The British Military Administration in Palestine", p. 67. For text of the King-Crane Commission see Appendix H in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 443-458.

²⁵ Letter 297, Chaim Weizmann to Vera Weizmann, 21/3/1920 in Chaim Weizmann ed., Jehuda Reinharz, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann – Volume IX, Series A – October 1918 - July 1920*, (Jerusalem, Rutgers University and Israel Universities Press, 1977), p. 324.

²⁶ WO 32/9614, p. 29.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 30.

The attacks at Metullah increased anxieties during a second, more volatile, anti-Zionist demonstration on 8 March. In Damascus, the Second Arab Congress announced their rejection of any mandate that included facilitation of Zionism in its terms and declared independence for Greater Syria with Feisal as ruler.²⁸ Against this backdrop, Palestinians and Jews engaged in stone throwing and scuffles, leading Eder to further request a ban on demonstrations for the safety of the Jewish community. With tension in the country rising, Bols issued a prohibition of political demonstrations on 11 March 1920.²⁹

Two weeks later Weizmann updated members of the Zionist Executive in London that Palestine was in a 'very serious position'.³⁰ By 29 March the situation had become 'dangerous and difficult' with Arabs 'raising their heads' to cause aggravation.³¹ Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, the pro-Zionist Chief Political Officer in Palestine concurred, noting that this was a period of 'increased political agitation against Zionism, and in anti-Zionist demonstrations.'³² Against this backdrop the Nabi Musa riots occurred.

Sunday 4 April was the day that the pilgrims from Hebron were due to arrive in Jerusalem. It was also Easter Sunday, and Storrs, not anticipating their arrival until midday, went with his mother and father to Easter Matins at St George's Cathedral. He requested that a member of staff alert him when the pilgrims were within half an hour of the city: no doubt so that Storrs, known for being a visible presence at such events, could greet the pilgrims as they entered Jerusalem. The notification never arrived, and so Storrs left the service with his parents to walk 300 yards from the Cathedral to the Governorate. As he approached the end of his short walk his orderly, Khalil, alerted him in Arabic that a man had been 'wounded to death' at the Jaffa Gate. 'It was though he had thrust a sword into my heart', Storrs recalled 17 years later, further noting that 'even now the mere

²⁸ Regan, *The Balfour Declaration*, pp. 77-78.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 30.

³⁰ Letter 299, Chaim Weizmann to Zionist Executive, 25/3/1920 in Weizmann, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, p. 325.

³¹ Letter 300, Chaim Weizmann to Vera Weizmann, 29/3/1920 in *ibid*, p. 330.

³² Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary*, pp. 72-73.

memory of those dread words brings back the horror of the shock'.³³ For several days his city of dreams was to become a city of nightmares.

Flashpoint in Jerusalem: April 4-7 1920

Reassured by the calm completion of the Friday of the Banners on April 2, spirits were high for what was hoped and expected to be a peaceful week of festivities. The arrival of the pilgrims from Hebron on the Sunday would traditionally follow a route down Jaffa Road towards Damascus Gate before heading to the Haram al-Sharif. According to the Palin Commission, the 1919 celebrations had seen a variance in this custom with the parade being delayed and speeches delivered along Jaffa Road. The procession of 1920 followed suit, with speeches of a political nature being delivered by the Mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Aref al-Aref and other notables. A portrait of Emir Feisal was produced and carried alongside the banners to cries of "King of Syria and Palestine".³⁴ The use of portraits and the Arab National Flag in the procession were also emblematic of a wider shift. No longer could the traditional banners of Nabi Musa communicate the strong nationalist sentiments felt by the marchers. Instead alternative symbols and imagery, such as portraits and flags, would reflect the new political reality emerging in Palestine.³⁵

It was as the procession passed through the Jaffa Gate that the first signs of trouble started. The Commission was not clear on what exactly started the conflagration but surmised that violence could have been easily triggered given the manner of the aforementioned speeches. What followed was a period of stone throwing and assault against Jewish bystanders and the looting of Jewish shops. Some Jews were armed and retaliated in kind, but they were very much in the minority. By midday order appeared to have been restored through a combination of British troops and police officers.

³³ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 330.

³⁴ WO 32/9614, pp. 30-36.

³⁵ Wallach, *A City in Fragments*, p. 189.

As night fell a sense of calm prevailed over the city. The Hebron pilgrims had spent the evening in Police Barracks and awoke the next day ready to leave via St Stephen's Gate towards the Nabi Musa shrine. No untoward incidents occurred as they left under military guard. However, by 9.30am disorder reared its head again within the city walls, with Arab violence towards Jews and vice-versa. Acts of looting and arson were carried out, with law and order only returning once the police had been withdrawn and martial law declared at 15.00.³⁶ All those entering or leaving the Old City were subject to being searched by British and Indian Military Police in the attempts to restore control.³⁷ Tuesday continued in a similar vein, with Jews from predominantly Arab districts seeking refuge in a synagogue as acts of looting and arson continued. Shooting continued throughout the day and two accusations of rape were reported. Eventually the violence and unrest ended and by evening the military had regained control of the city.

In all, 251 casualties were reported. The overwhelming majority suffered minor injuries, with 22 seriously wounded and 9 killed in the turmoil. As the Palin Commission noted, the statistics bear out that this was an attack against the Jews of the city. Of the total number of casualties, the Jews suffered 5 deaths, 18 serious woundings and 193 minor injuries, compared to 4 fatalities, 1 serious wounding and 20 minor injuries on the Palestinian Muslim side. Furthermore, 3 Christian Palestinians and 7 soldiers were reported wounded.³⁸

Reaction in Britain: Papers, Parliament and Palin

British newspapers first began reporting the disturbances on 6 April with reports from Reuters that a 'conflict' had occurred in the city leading to 188 casualties.³⁹ Further details emerged over the coming days, not least regarding the cause of the disturbances. Two days later a Reuters dispatch from Cairo published in *The*

³⁶ WO 32/9614, pp. 30-36.

³⁷ The Holy Riots in Jerusalem, April, 1920, Richard Adamson Collection, Ref:GB165-0001 Middle East Centre Archives (MECA), St Anthony's College, University of Oxford.

³⁸ WO 32/9614, pp. 30-36.

³⁹ "188 wounded in Jerusalem", *Daily Mail*, (London, England), Tuesday, April 6, 1920, Issue 7586, p. 5 and "Jews and Moslems fight in Jerusalem", *The Times*, (London, England), Tuesday, April 6, 1920, Issue 42377, p. 10.

Times stated that ‘it must be admitted that trouble had been brewing for some time. Travellers say that the acuteness of Arab feeling against the Jews is probably not realised in England. The religious festivals appear to have brought matters to a head’.⁴⁰ Writing in *The Sunday Times* on April 11, Leonard Stein looked to place the riots into wider context, surmising that they occurred ‘as a result of Arab hostility to the creation in Palestine of a Jewish national home... [leading to] relations between Jews and Arabs to become increasingly strained’. Citing the inflammatory influence of propaganda from Damascus, and reflecting contemporary prejudices against Muslims, Stein contended that ‘the Moslem mind...has become accustomed to regard the Jews, like other non-Moslems, as a natural inferior’, with the result that unrest in Palestine was imminent. He went on to argue that:

The whole of the neighbouring areas are in a state of ferment; the agents of interested parties, who have been active in Palestine ever since the Occupation, are busy fishing in troubled waters, and the interminable postponement of a settlement, which has at once confused and irritated the Arab mind, has created an atmosphere in which such ebullitions as those of which we are now hearing were only to be anticipated. The local police is wholly unreliable, and no one who is familiar with the situation will be surprised to learn that order was only restored on the intervention of the British garrison.⁴¹

It is notable that very little reporting or analysis of the riots was published in British newspapers beyond this, a factor that some British residents of Jerusalem were aware could be a possibility.⁴² A relatively similar silence appears to have occurred in Parliament, with the first question about the disturbances being asked by the Conservative MP Lord Robert Cecil in the Commons on April 14 following

⁴⁰ “Jerusalem Fight”, *The Times*, (London, England), Thursday, April 8, 1920, Issue 42379, p. 9.

⁴¹ “The Jerusalem Riots”, Leonard Stein, *The Sunday Times*, Sunday, 11 April, 1920, Issue 5062, p. 10.

⁴² Bidy L. Popham to Mrs Chesterton, 16.4.1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2. Writing several days after the disturbances, Popham notes ‘this whole business may attract very little attention in England - it just depends on what there is going on at the moment, but on the other hand, it is just the thing that might attract the British public’.

Easter recess. The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the Commons, Arthur Bonar Law, responded with a brief summary of events as they were understood at that time, stating that anti-Jewish riots had started in Jerusalem on the April 4, with rioting continuing the next day. The police had been withdrawn as a result of their siding with their co-religionists, to be replaced by the military who had the city under control. His contention that on April 6 the situation remained unchanged led Cecil to question whether the riots lasted for two or three days, to which Bonar Law replied he thought it meant that things had returned to normal in the city. Fellow Conservative Colonel Wilfrid Ashley then asked what steps had been taken to protect Jews 'in their own country, in other towns in Palestine, from attacks such as this?'. Deflecting the question, Bonar Law replied that he was sure General Allenby was taking 'all proper steps' to prevent further violence.⁴³

The next day further questions were asked. Reflecting the mood of uncertainty at the time, the Liberal MP Colonel Josiah Wedgwood asked whether rumours from America that Britain was about to renege on their commitment to the Balfour Declaration as a result of the riots were true. Bonar Law retorted that there was no change whatsoever in British policy.⁴⁴ With that, discussion and debate in Parliament around the Nabi Musa riots dried up.

The lack of debate or discussion on the disturbances can be better understood when placed in context. From the very first reports of trouble in Jerusalem, events in far-off Palestine were overshadowed by troubles much closer to home. Irish guerrillas (later to be known as the Irish Republican Army or IRA) had been steadily increasing attacks against British forces in Ireland, with 12 police officers killed in the first three months of 1920. Concurrent with the Jerusalem disturbances, British tax offices and abandoned Royal Irish Constabulary barracks were also targeted for arson. To add to the tension, a series of Republican hunger strikes were launched in Mountjoy gaol, Dublin in early April. By the middle of that month, the Dublin Castle agreed to release of the

⁴³ HC Deb, Wednesday, 14 April, 1920, vol. 127, col. 1674-1675.

⁴⁴ HC Deb, Thursday, 15 April, 1920, vol. 127, col. 1835.

prisoners.⁴⁵ Palestine was far from the only issue the British Government faced at this time.

Meanwhile in Palestine, O.E.T.A. had started their efforts to find out the causes of violence in Jerusalem. As early as April 5 the Assistant Administrator for Public Security, Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Bramley (later to become the first Commander of the Palestine Police), recommended the establishment of a Court of Inquiry. Its suggested remit included the origins of violence, the events of the previous day and the conduct of the police. Bramley emphasised the need for a rapid convening because of concerns regarding the origins of the riots and allegations made against Arab police officers by the Jewish community. The latter consideration in particular suggests that O.E.T.A. took the security of the Jews seriously, a point which was to be contended by the Zionist Commission in later evidence. From a practical point of view, Bramley also expressed fears that vital evidence could be lost should the inquiry be delayed. He further recommended that Captain Eugene Quigley (a colleague of Bramley's in O.E.T.A.'s Department of Public Security) and the Military Governorate be responsible for the collection and putting up of evidence in any such investigation.⁴⁶

This proposal was built upon by Allenby who on April 12 instructed Major General Philip Palin, a veteran of the conquest of Palestine in 1917, to head a commission with the responsibility of recording 'the evidence as to the circumstances which gave rise to the disturbances which took place at and near Jerusalem on the occasion of the Nebi Musa Pilgrimage on 4th April and following days'. Ten days later General Headquarters expanded the commission's remit to include 'the extent and causes of racial feelings that at present exist in Palestine'.⁴⁷ He was assisted by two fellow military men: Brigadier General E.H. Wildblood and Lieutenant Colonel C. Vaughan Edwards, along with a legal advisor from the Judge Court of Appeal in Egypt. The Commission would eventually produce their report following 50 days of investigations, in which 152 witnesses were examined

⁴⁵ David Leeson, *The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence*, (Oxford, OUP, 2011), p. 9.

⁴⁶ A114/39 – Lieutenant-Colonel Bramley to Chief of Staff, 5/4/1920, Central Zionist Archives (CZA).

⁴⁷ WO 32/9614, p. 1.

in no less than eight different languages: English, French, Arabic, Hebrew, Yiddish, Jargon, Russian and Hindustani.⁴⁸

Commissions such as Palin were a recurrent theme of British rule over Palestine. Reports into violent outbreaks, religious tensions and economic and political problems and potential solutions for the country were ordered no less than ten times between 1917-1948.⁴⁹ In her study of investigative commissions in Palestine, Allen argues that a key purpose of such reports was to 'put on display the liberal aims of international law, bring political opponents together in a shared framework of social and intellectual interaction that is posited as a level playing field – but never is'.⁵⁰ The fact that the Commission was initiated by a Military Administration with an uncertain future meant that its overarching findings – the desire for Palestinian self-determinism, together with discontent towards Zionism – were never likely to influence British policy. What Palin did show was the performative element of British rule within the emerging post-war Wilsonian liberal context. By bringing together Palestinian and Zionists to put forward their cases, the Military Administration could be seen as trying to resolve any potential conflict through reasoned and rational discussion. Ultimately decisions made by Britain, France, Italy and Japan at San Remo undermined the principles that Wilson advocated in any post-war settlement, leading to what Thompson has described as 'Wilsonism colonised'.⁵¹

In the meantime, the dearth of available information was noted by the former army officer and Governor of Bombay and Victoria, Lord Sydenham. In a debate on Palestine in the House of Lords some months later on June 29, he noted that the February and March demonstrations in the city were 'a plain warning' of what was to come. Sydenham expressed his displeasure of having 'heard very little' about

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ The list includes the King-Crane Commission (1919), the Palin Commission (1920), the Haycraft Commission of Enquiry (1921), the Bertram-Young Commission (1926), the Shaw Commission (1929-1930), the Hope-Simpson Commission (1930), the Peel Commission (1936), the Woodhead Commission (1938), the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry (1945-46) and the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) of 1947. See Allen, *A History of False Hope*, p. xix.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵¹ Elizabeth F. Thompson, *How the West Stole Democracy from the Arabs: The Syrian Congress of 1920 and the Destruction of its Historic Liberal-Islamic Alliance*, (London, Grove Press, 2020), pp. 179-195.

what he called the Easter riots, before surmising that Storrs had failed to take sufficient precautions to prevent violence.⁵² Later in the same debate, Sydenham moved for publication of 'the Report of General Lord Allenby on the Easter riots at Jerusalem' which he felt should be Parliament's possession.⁵³

Sydenham never saw his request for publication of the report realised. The Commission issued their findings on July 1, one day after the end of O.E.T.A.. With a civilian administration in place, Samuel suppressed its publication, noting in a telegram to the Foreign Office that 'amnesty has been declared, passions have subsided and atmosphere at present excellent. Publication must necessarily revive controversy. Eder, Zionist commissioner agrees'.⁵⁴ As such, the Palin Commission was not seen in public until its declassification several decades later. Despite not being released into the public domain, Storrs was very much aware of the findings of the Palin Commission. His response to the accusations made against him will now be considered.

Storrs and the Riots: Conduct, Criticisms and Culpability

As Governor of Jerusalem, Storrs took great satisfaction from his efforts to bring the different communities of the city together. In this he differed in many ways from his colleagues in O.E.T.A., not least because he was openly supportive of the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The accusations that would be made against him in the fallout of the Nabi Musa riots, not just by Palestinians and Zionists, but by the British themselves through the Palin Commission, would no doubt have wounded his pride. Moreover, Storrs' preparations before the Nabi Musa Festival and his subsequent response to the outbreak of disturbances reflected his own unique personality and approach as he attempted to manage the tensions that simmered within the city.

Almost singularly amongst British and Jewish testimony at the Commission hearings, Storrs insisted that the actual danger at the 1920 Nabi Musa festival

⁵² HL Deb, Tuesday, 29 June, 1920, vol. 40, col. 1010.

⁵³ *Ibid*, col. 1013.

⁵⁴ WO 32/9614.

was greater in the previous year.⁵⁵ He was not alone in sensing that the mood in Jerusalem was peaceful as the festival began. Writing to her husband on, Michael, on the morning of April 4, Nita Lange (daughter of British Zionist leader Herbert Bentwich) described Jerusalem as 'very Pessachdic, everybody scrubbing and polishing and garnishing'.⁵⁶ Indeed, the build up to the festival saw Storrs more concerned with the presence of a British military band as opposed to the potential for violence. The state had traditionally provided a military band and troops to escort the Friday procession.⁵⁷ However a decision had been taken prior to the festivities to make neither available.⁵⁸ In response, Kamil al-Husayni – the Mufti of Jerusalem – issued a strongly worded letter condemning the decision, imploring Storrs to reinstate the tradition 'in order to win the gratitude of the Moslem Community'.⁵⁹ The Governor complied, citing the need to avoid slighting the celebrations without due reason, and the Friday procession passed off without incident.⁶⁰ A determination to uphold status quo undoubtedly played a part in Storrs' efforts to provide a military band, although a characteristic sense of *éclat* no doubt also motivated his approach.

For Storrs the peaceful Friday procession confirmed his confidence that there would be no trouble and that extra reinforcements were not necessary. It fell upon the Chief Administrator to apply for extra troops if needed but no request was made, suggesting that O.E.T.A. also accepted the risk of trouble was relatively low. The decision making process was not Storrs' alone – O.E.T.A. held overall responsibility on the issue of reinforcements and the decision not to deploy extra troops showed that they felt the risk of unrest at the festival was minimal.

That is not to say that preparations had not been made to deal with violence in Jerusalem. Discussions had been held within O.E.T.A. throughout 1919 on

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 26.

⁵⁶ Nita Lange to Michael Lange, 4/4/1920 in Margery Bentwich, *Michael Lange – A Memoir*, (London, Chiswick Press, 1928), p. 145.

⁵⁷ Storrs to H.Q. O.E.T.A., Jerusalem, 3/4/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2 – Jerusalem, 1920-1921.

⁵⁸ Preparations for Nebi Musa, Jerusalem, 27/3/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2 – Jerusalem, 1920-1921.

⁵⁹ Grand Mufti to Storrs, 1/4/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2 – Jerusalem, 1920-1921.

⁶⁰ Storrs to H.Q. O.E.T.A., Jerusalem, 3/4/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2 – Jerusalem, 1920-1921.

securing the city in the event of civil disorder, culminating in September of the same year with Jerusalem Defence Scheme – a secret document that outlined British plans to put down any insurrection. It envisioned troops being used in two scenarios: in the event that the Arabs (and possibly the Armenians) instigated a massacre of the Jews, or on the outbreak of a general Arab uprising. The scheme did not rule out both occurring concurrently. Should either event break out, it was the responsibility of troops garrisoned in Jerusalem to keep order in the city, protect the Jews from harm (should a massacre be attempted) and secure key tactical points. Four main Jewish neighbourhoods were identified in the city, both within and without the city walls, with detailed instructions on how to safeguard its inhabitants. With regards to the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, it was advised not to send troops as ‘inhabitants would only be extricated at the cost of excessive casualties to ourselves and to them’. Instead it was proposed that troops should maintain control of Zion Gate and Dung Gate as evacuation points for the Jewish Quarter. Notably, the scheme made little indication of what would happen should anti-Jewish violence occur elsewhere in the city, working instead on the premise that it would be localised within areas identified as Jewish neighbourhoods.⁶¹ The British conception of the city, which emphasised religious affiliation over the traditional identification of Jerusalemites with their *mahallat* or neighbourhood unit, stunted their defensive strategies. When violence broke out by Jaffa Gate, between the Christian and Armenian Quarters, their plans were in disarray.

In an example of his belief in the importance of being a visible governor, Storrs toured the streets upon hearing of trouble, ascertaining the situation alongside Lieutenant Howes. He was then visited by the Zionists Pinhas Rutenberg and Vladimir Jabotinsky with a view to organising a Jewish Self-Defence Force in response to the disturbances. This volunteer group had been practising drills in public after the demonstration on March 8, although the Military Administration claimed to not be aware of this fact. Indeed, Storrs and others would later assert they assumed any request for arms was to defend Zionist settlements outside of Jerusalem, as opposed to being used as part of an armed militia within the city walls.⁶²

⁶¹ ISA 2/1/43 – Jerusalem Defence Scheme, Israel State Archives (ISA).

⁶² WO 32/9614, pp. 33-34.

Both men would later elicit praise from Storrs for differing reasons. The Governor believed there to be ‘no more gallant officer, no more charming and cultivated companion could have been imagined’ than Jabotinsky. The Revisionist Zionist leader had won Storrs’ admiration for his literary achievements, not least his translation into English of the Jewish poet Hayim Nahman Bialik and the Divine Comedy into Hebrew. Despite appealing to his love of culture, Storrs’ praise came with an air of caution, as he could ‘imagine no one man who, if allowed his extreme logical way, would more certainly than this Arch-Revisionist have involved Palestine, and perhaps Syria too, in unrest, riot and disaster’.⁶³ On the other hand, Rutenberg was a ‘faithful friend and I should think a particularly disagreeable enemy’; a man who in times of crisis ‘would be followed by all the Jews of Palestine, and as an impartial employer of Arabs as well as Jews, possibly by some of the Arabs also’.⁶⁴ Whilst it was not apparent at the time of the riots, Rutenberg would later become an advocate of binationalist parity between Jews and Arabs in Palestine based on economic integration – a policy that would appeal to Storrs’ notion of cooperation between the different communities.⁶⁵

Such matters were far from consideration at their meeting on Sunday morning. Once the two Zionists had been persuaded by Storrs to give up their personal arms, the conversation turned to safeguarding the Jewish community of Jerusalem. Jabotinsky was keen to see the Jewish Battalions that had served with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force utilised in a bid to restore calm to the city. Storrs was reluctant to commit to such a policy, arguing that such a decision had to be cleared with the Bols, the Chief Administrator. He also rebuffed requests from Jabotinsky and Rutenberg that their men should be armed by O.E.T.A., instead arguing that they should disclose the location of the weapons caches

⁶³ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 417.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 417. Rutenberg was responsible for the establishment of the Palestine Electric Company and the construction of hydroelectric power plants on the Jordan River. See Renate Dietrich, “Electrical Current and Nationalist Trends in Transjordan: Pinhas Rutenberg and the Electrification of Amman”, *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. 43, Issue 1 (2003), pp. 88-101 for details of his work regarding the electrification of Palestine and Transjordan.

⁶⁵ Gershon Shafir, “Capitalist Binationalism in Mandatory Palestine”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (November 2011), pp. 611-633.

used by their band of volunteers. It was agreed that they would meet again later that day.⁶⁶

At 4 p.m. on the Sunday afternoon, a conference was held at the Governorate involving Storrs and other military representatives to discuss preparations for the evening and the days ahead. It was agreed that all troops would be removed from the central areas of the Old City at 6 a.m. on Monday morning, with the exception of one platoon who would remain stationed in the Haram al-Sharif. This was to have calamitous consequences when trouble flared again on the Monday following the departure of the Hebron pilgrims towards the Nabi Musa shrine.

Exactly who was responsible for the decision to withdraw the internal pickets is not clear. In his evidence to the Palin Commission, Colonel Beddy of the 8th Brigade argued that their removal was militarily unsound and suggested that Storrs was behind the policy as he was keen to see normal business in the city resume as soon as possible. Storrs acknowledged that he was eager to reopen the city and to that end he advocated a policy of withdrawing the outer cordons so that produce could enter the city. According to his testimony he wanted the inner pickets to remain in place for as long as they were required. The Sephardic Rabbi, Dr de Sola Pool, appeared to contradict Storrs' version of events when he explained to the Commission that he met the Military Governor on Sunday night and was told that the military would be removed early the next morning.⁶⁷ Irrespective of responsibility, the episode regarding the withdrawal of troops from the Old City is indicative of the unusual position Storrs found himself in. For all intents and purposes Storrs was a civilian who had been given a military rank. His pedigree was as an administrator, not as a soldier. It is therefore hardly surprising that his priority was to restore the city to relative normality as quickly as possible.

As scheduled, a further meeting took place between Storrs, Jabotinsky and Rutenberg on the Sunday. It saw Storrs attempt to reassure the Jewish community that every step was being taken to protect them. Whilst the two

⁶⁶ WO 32/9614, pp. 33-34.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 34-35.

Zionists approved of the measures enacted thus far by the Governor, they relayed that complaints had been made against the conduct of Arab police officers and insisted that they were disarmed. In their place, Jabotinsky and Rutenberg offered armed Jewish youths under their command. Storrs refused to accede, and in a spirit of compromise Colonel Bramley suggested the establishment of Special Constables to patrol the city. Jabotinsky and Rutenberg agreed to this suggestion, but Storrs did not. With no agreement forthcoming, the Jewish leaders instructed their men to patrol the city and collect information on the evening and night of Sunday 4th April, having been given the impression by the Governor that they would not be arrested as long as they did not congregate in groups. Storrs forcefully denied making any such promises to the Palin Commission.

Following a further day of unrest, Rutenberg was summoned to the Governorate on Tuesday morning and informed by Storrs that the Administration did now require his men, on the condition that they were to be unarmed Special Constables. A request was made for one hundred men to report the next day in order to be sworn in. This process had nearly been completed when the decision was made to suspend the order and send the men home.⁶⁸ Arab volunteers who had been invited to join the security forces were also sent home.⁶⁹

On Wednesday 7 April Jabotinsky was arrested by the British in somewhat farcical circumstances. He had been in close contact with the Administration throughout the riots and was responsible for the selection of the men who were to be sworn in the previous day.⁷⁰ After the disbanded swearing in of the Special Constables, two of Jabotinsky's men, Nehemia Rubitzov (later to be father of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin) and Zvi Nadav entered the Old City in a bid to help organise the residents to defend themselves. Outside the city walls, further members of the Jewish Self-Defence Force engaged in a gun fight with an encampment between the Jewish neighbourhood of Mea She'arim and the Arab district of Sheikh Jarrah. Fearing the escalation of violence, the British

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 33-34.

⁶⁹ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, p. 134.

⁷⁰ WO 32/9614, pp. 34.

military began to search Jewish homes for weapons. None were found in Weizmann's apartment. However, Jabotinsky's house revealed three rifles, two pistols and 250 rounds of ammunition. The raids saw the arrests of nineteen men but not Jabotinsky. Infuriated at events, he went to the prison at the Jaffa Gate, the Kishla, and demanded to be arrested. The officers on duty at that time duly did so, only for Jabotinsky to be released after several hours by a military judge on the grounds that he was not at home when the rifles were found. Later that same day, he was arrested again and imprisoned at Moskovia, the Russian Compound in Jerusalem.⁷¹

Writing in *Doar Hayom* (a Hebrew language newspaper) after his incarceration, Jabotinsky recalled one evening suddenly hearing:

Footsteps in the corridor, squad footsteps, rulers' footsteps. The soles of our shoes have a special, personal "voice", intuition, and content. Among those shoes that walked to our door we immediately recognised one pair of rulers' shoes, the work of a master-shoemaker, one of the best that came from the capital city beyond the sea; even in their soft creaking one could detect a sort of habit of ordering and commanding. The outer wooden door opened, and beyond the iron grille, our inner door, which was still shut, the beams of a flashlight burst inside and a loud voice could be heard, asking my name in English. I sat up erect on my mat and asked "Commander Storrs?"

The Governor himself had come to visit to ensure that Jabotinsky was being properly looked after. Instructing Jabotinsky to gather his belongings (of which he had none), he led his charge into a room twice the size of the previous cell, replete with a metal framed bed with a mattress and a lit kerosene lamp. Storrs proceeded to show the prisoner the room:

With a polite and polished gesture of the hand, as would the owner of a place showing the parlour to his guest. Then he said: "This is for you, Sir, and you alone. You said you have no belongings? We will promptly

⁷¹ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, pp. 136-137.

bring you your belongings; I will bring them myself, because I do not want a police officer to go to your house and scare the ladies. But there is no furniture here! Mr P. (he turned to the police officer) – please bring, immediately, two chairs, and also a washstand and a ewer, and a dining room table, somewhat finer than this one. Now! I am going to his home, I will see you soon, Sir!”

Half an hour later Storrs returned with Jabotinsky’s belongings and his wife, Hanna. Pledging to return in one hour to escort Jabotinsky’s wife home, Storrs vowed to do everything in his power for the Jewish prisoners. Such goodwill was tempered by Hanna’s comment that the Governor had no alternative but to improve the conditions the inmates faced, having been instructed by London to treat them as political prisoners. However, she noted that Storrs was a ‘real darling’ who packed one of Jabotinsky’s suitcases himself and reminded Hanna not to forget books, paper and a fountain pen full of ink. It was also Storrs’ suggestion that Hanna should visit Jabotinsky in prison.⁷²

Several days after these surreal events Jabotinsky was put on trial, charged with possessing weapons and disturbing the peace. He was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, although he was later pardoned in July 1920 as part of an amnesty for Jewish and Palestinian Arab prisoners convicted during the rioting. Tellingly, as chief witness for the prosecution, Storrs claimed never to have heard of any self-defence organisation being set up by Jabotinsky and Rutenberg.⁷³ The Governor maintained this position in correspondence with Rutenberg, who on April 18 wrote to Storrs declaring that the Jewish Self-Defence Corps had been demobilised. Responding on April 21, he questioned what was meant by ‘Defence Corps’ as the administration had no record of such an organisation, an answer that the Palin Commission found to be ‘decidedly disingenuous’. In his evidence to the Commission, Rutenberg acknowledged that the formation of such a force went against the wishes of the administration but maintained that subsequent events proved its establishment worthwhile.⁷⁴ Storrs’

⁷² Nedava, “Jabotinsky and Storrs”, pp. 139-144.

⁷³ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, pp. 136-137.

⁷⁴ WO 32/9614, pp. 34.

denial is highly implausible, especially as he was in close contact with Rutenberg and Jabotinsky throughout the riots. However, if he was unaware of its existence, it begs questions of how well informed the Governor was about the city that he administered, particularly as he also denied knowledge of Jabotinsky's men carrying out marching drills as early as March 8.

Segev accurately views the circus surrounding Jabotinsky's arrest and treatment as indicative of the 'conflicts, the contradictions, the hesitations and the helplessness that characterised British rule from the very beginning'.⁷⁵ Yet this peculiar episode also highlights Storrs' own compromised position as Governor of Jerusalem. Having spent much of his first years in the city creating the illusion of consensus and harmony through the Pro-Jerusalem Society, his vision of being 'not wholly for either, but for both' was called into stark question by the disturbances. When required to fulfil his duty to ensure public safety and security in the city, Storrs found himself caught between two seemingly irreconcilable poles: a Palestinian Arab population fearful and discontented with the future direction of Palestine under British rule and Zionists mindful of the persecution they had faced in Eastern Europe and threatened by the events of April 1920. Add to this mix policy directives from London, together with Storrs' personality and position as a civilian administrator granted a military rank by O.E.T.A., and the inconsistencies in his approach to the disturbances begin to make sense. His determination on the Sunday evening to see life in Jerusalem returned to normal as soon as possible, alongside his reluctance to authorise the use of armed Jews to re-establish and maintain order, stemmed from a desire to restore an administrative sense of order as quickly as possible. It did not necessarily accurately reflect the situation on the ground, nor the extent of anger and fear that existed amongst the Arab and Jewish populations of the city. As soon as arrests started to be made, Storrs was further compromised by the directive from London instructing him to treat Jewish detainees as political prisoners, hence the unusual spectacle of the Governor visiting Jabotinsky in his cell to ensure his comfort, only to then be the lead witness for the prosecution at his trial some days later. Moreover, his subsequent denials regarding the definition of the Jewish

⁷⁵ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, p. 137.

Self-Defence Forces reflected a typical attempt use semantics as a defensive ploy.

Storrs' failure to ensure public security in Jerusalem, alongside his rejection of the use of armed Jewish volunteers during the riots and his role during Jabotinsky's arrest and imprisonment, led to fierce criticism from the Zionists. In their evidence to the Palin Commission the Zionists alleged that the riots amounted to a 'pogrom' – a word that made the Military Administration complicit in the violence. Further, O.E.T.A. was accused of being 'steadily biased against the Zionists and disloyal to the policy laid down in the Balfour Declaration'. This had the effect of encouraging the Arabs to 'think that a massacre of the Jews would be pleasing to the Administration'. They were further accused of failing to make adequate preparations for an attack which many within the Jewish community had thought imminent.⁷⁶ The latter accusations will be considered first as they establish whether the Military Administration had any motive to allow a 'pogrom' under their supervision.

In the days after the riots Storrs saw Menachem Ussishkin, Chairman of the Zionist Commission in Palestine. A formidable and uncompromising figure, the Governor would later reflect that when Ussishkin 'was announced for an interview I braced myself to take my punishment like a man, praying only that my subordinates might keep an equal control over their tempers'.⁷⁷ In this instance, however, Storrs was the one to be announced, visiting the chairman on an official condolence call following the disturbances. Expressing his regrets for the tragedy that had occurred, the Governor was soon interrupted and told by Ussishkin that a pogrom had occurred in Jerusalem. When Storrs attempted to deny the accusation he was reminded that he was an expert in administration, whilst Ussishkin was an expert on the rules of pogroms. He viewed the riots as a betrayal by the British and as such, Storrs' regrets were of no use. Storrs then asked whether he should resign. In response, Ussishkin pithily said that if he was a decent man, he would have resigned as soon as trouble began. In shock at the

⁷⁶ WO 32/9614, p. 20.

⁷⁷ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 330.

onslaught, Storrs offered no response and left, hoping that the pair would soon meet again in happier circumstances.⁷⁸

The accusations soon extended beyond conversations in Jerusalem, with Prime Minister David Lloyd George receiving a letter from Chaim Weizmann on 10 April 1920. Incandescent with anger, the Zionist leader stated that the 'policy [of an] Administration fostering anti-Zionist movement' had resulted in 'an unprecedented crime [in the] history [of] Jerusalem'.⁷⁹ Later Weizmann would soften his argument, recognising that some British Officers were sympathetic to the Zionist cause, but, to his disappointment, they rarely dealt in everyday matters with the population. Instead, the 'details of administration' were left to 'men of lower rank in the military hierarchy; and these were, almost without exception, devoid of understanding, vision or even of kindness'.⁸⁰ The British Director of Military Intelligence, Major-General Sir William Thwaites acknowledged as much in May 1920 when he reported that:

There is a general unwillingness among the British troops to support a pro-Zionist policy. They are not exactly pro-Arab, but prefer the Arabs very greatly to the Jews. There is a general feeling against the sacrifice of the lives of British and Indian soldiers in support of a policy of oppression of the local inhabitants in favour of the Jewish minority.⁸¹

British Officers in general pursued a more cautiously pro-Zionist policy, as a result of directives received from London, whilst rank and file servicemen were antipathetic towards Zionism.

Writing ten years after the events, Horace B. Samuel (a British Military Judge who served in Palestine) recalled that 'the whole tone of the British...was unquestionably hostile to the Jews'. The Nabi Musa riots 'were the logical

⁷⁸ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, pp. 137-138.

⁷⁹ Letter 303, Chaim Weizmann to David Lloyd George, 10/4/1920 in Weizmann, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, p. 334-335.

⁸⁰ For example, Weizmann acknowledged that former Chief Political Officer Gilbert Clayton in particular was 'so well disposed towards us'. See Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, pp. 274-275.

⁸¹ FO 14/624/1 - Memorandum by Major-General Sir William Thwaites, May 1920.

outcome of the anti-Zionist and pro-Arab policy which the Military Administration had systematically pursued'. He also suggested that the policies of Whitehall and the Military Administration were 'diametrically opposed' with regards to Zionism.⁸² However, the divisions between the two organisations were smaller than Samuel imagined. O.E.T.A. had facilitated the work of the Zionist Commission in Palestine to the point where, according to Bols, the 'presence of this [Zionist] administration within an administration' rendered 'good government impossible, the Jewish population looks to their administration and not to mine and the Moslems and Christians can only see that privileges and liberties are allowed to the Jews that are denied to them'.⁸³ This criticism is not the same as being diametrically opposed to Zionism; rather it is an expression of the invidious position the British had placed themselves in through their foreign policy commitments. Meinertzhagen echoed Samuel and Weizmann's criticisms of O.E.T.A.. Writing to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, after the riots, he claimed that the Administration was:

Almost without exception, anti-Zionist in their views. Whilst no member of the present Administration has actively opposed the policy of HMG regarding Zionism, I am convinced that the general anti-Zionist attitude of the Administration has been reflected among the Arabs of Palestine to the extent that they believe the Administration has their sympathy.⁸⁴

He further claimed in his *Middle East Diary* that the Arabs published posters stating 'The Government is with us, Allenby is with us, kill the Jews; there is no punishment for killing Jews'.⁸⁵

Inconsistencies abound between Meinertzhagen's letter to the Foreign Secretary and his diary. To Lord Curzon he wrote that he did 'not wish for a moment to infer that the Palestine Administration deliberately encouraged the recent disturbances'.⁸⁶ Yet in his diary he alleged that the day before the riots Harry

⁸² Horace B. Samuel, *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land*, (London, The Hogarth Press, 1930), pp. 59-62.

⁸³ FO 371/5119/5237 – Bols to War Office, 21/4/1920.

⁸⁴ FO 371/5118/3928 – Meinertzhagen to Foreign Secretary, 14/4/1920, TNA.

⁸⁵ Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary*, p. 82.

⁸⁶ FO 371/5118/3928 – Meinertzhagen to Foreign Secretary, 14/4/1920, TNA.

Waters-Taylor (Financial Advisor to O.E.T.A.) had met with Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Here he told the Palestinian notable that the Arabs 'had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world that the Arabs of Palestine would not tolerate Jewish domination' and that 'freedom could only be attained through violence'. He further stated that:

On the day of the rioting Waters-Taylor absented himself in Jericho for the day. Two days after the rioting he sent for the Mayor of Jerusalem – Moussa Kasim Pasha – and said 'I gave you a fine opportunity; for five hours Jerusalem was without military protection; I had hoped you would avail yourself of the opportunity but you have failed'. This conversation was confirmed from two sources.⁸⁷

Quite how much influence Meinertzhagen felt a Financial Advisor had throughout O.E.T.A. is hard to quantify. That Meinertzhagen, as a senior member of the British Administration in Palestine, would give credence to such claims shows how partisan affairs had become in the country.

It is highly unlikely that British officials would have openly and knowingly sanctioned violent behaviour by the Arabs against the Jews. Such actions would have greatly harmed the colonial prestige that Britain was so proud of, and would have heaped shame and embarrassment on their custodianship of a land they were aware held great significance around the globe. A more plausible explanation is provided by Horace B. Samuel, who wrote that it:

Would indeed have been absurd to suggest that these officers [soldiers of O.E.T.A.] in any way exhorted the Arabs to start attacking the Jews. What, however, they did do, and what was certainly open to challenge, was to make every Arab realise that it was absolutely an open question whether a Zionist or an Arab policy was to be eventually adopted.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary*, p. 82. The veracity of Meinertzhagen's diaries have been called into question. See Chapter 1, *n3*.

⁸⁸ Samuel, *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land*, p. 58.

As previously demonstrated, Samuel clearly felt that Whitehall were pursuing a pro-Zionist policy whilst O.E.T.A. favoured a pro-Arab approach. Such a view obscures the reality that divergence between Whitehall and the Military Administration resulted in many instances from the pace with which Zionist policies would be realised, rather than whether to pursue such policies at all. Weizmann's memoirs concur by highlighting the sympathies that many British officers felt towards Zionism. Many of the problems O.E.T.A. faced were a result of its temporary nature whilst it waited for definitive instructions with regard to Palestine. The Administration understood that they had to pursue a broadly pro-Zionist policy whilst also being obliged under international law to maintain the status quo. What they did not understand was the form this pro-Zionist policy was to take.

Why were some British soldiers antipathetic towards Zionism? Certainly with some anti-Semitism played a role. For others, Thwaites' memorandum rings true – they viewed a pro-Zionist policy as detrimental to both Britain and the Palestinian Arab population of Palestine. Instead, they favoured a pro-Arab policy to safeguard British interests in the region. Finally the attitude of the Zionists towards O.E.T.A. influenced many troops. The pro-Zionist Samuel recalls that 'the Jews...even when they were in the right were so clumsy, fussy and aggressive, as to derive very little more credit out of the business, than in the not infrequent cases in which they were in the wrong'.⁸⁹

A letter from Bidy Popham, a British resident of Jerusalem, to an acquaintance in Britain, is indicative of the attitudes of some within the Administration towards the Zionists and Palestinian Arabs. Concerned that reports on events in the city would be 'mostly pro-Zionist', Popham describes how 'both sides seemed to be quite in the mood for such a thing' on the morning of April 4. She criticised the Jews present at Jaffa Gate for not keeping Passover and alleged that several Jewish soldiers smelt of alcohol. Claiming there 'was no doubt that both sides were to blame', she expresses her anger at claims that the Arabs alone started the trouble. Popham goes on to offer her sympathies towards the 'poor old Jewish men and children' who had been killed or injured before arguing 'it is not fair to

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 35.

twist it round to meaning that the Arabs here are mere savages and the remedy is to plant Palestine with Jews.' The whole event left her feeling a bit 'sore', not least because Weizmann 'lay all the blame on the administration and the military authorities', and that it was 'only since the British occupation that Jews have dared to go about after dark...their life is a different thing to what it was under the Turk'. Drawing upon the uncertainty that surrounded the future of Palestine, Popham concludes that the administration were 'all rather sick of this thankless job, and unless we're given a definite policy soon, I should think a lot of people would clear out'.⁹⁰

Bols' criticism of an 'administration within an administration' would also have chimed with some British soldiers in Palestine. His dispatch was not opposed to Zionism as a principle. Rather it was a criticism of Jewish organisation in Palestine. The Zionists, as Samuel explains, 'expected to have the new dish of freedom served up to them on a nice gold salver with a suitable inscription in the Hebrew language, whilst the Arabs waited gracefully at the table'.⁹¹ They also wanted this salver sooner than was practicable without due regard for British and Palestinian Arab interests; the former being far more important than the latter in the eyes of the Administration.⁹²

Prior to the riots the Zionist Commission were concerned about how supportive some quarters of O.E.T.A. were to their cause. When violence broke out the Commission took this perceived lack of support and surmised it amounted to anti-Zionism. It did not. British Military personnel had other considerations beyond the Zionist cause, including the protection of their interests in the region and safeguarding the status quo. Whilst some O.E.T.A. officials were anti-Zionist, the Administration as a whole pursued a cautious pro-Zionist policy as per their instructions from Whitehall, whilst at the same time attempting to uphold the legal requirement to maintain the status quo. This was much to the chagrin of the Zionist Commission who expected a faster rate of progress. Notwithstanding the anti-Zionism of some soldiers, the Palin Commission argued that 'it does not

⁹⁰ Popham to Mrs Chesterton, 16.4.1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 35-36.

⁹² As demonstrated by Storrs' reaction to the visit of the Zionist Commission in March/April 1918 in Chapter Two.

seem to have occurred to the Zionists that it is possible to have a personal dislike for a type and do his duty conscientiously in spite of it'.⁹³ As a martial body, O.E.T.A. relied on the implementation of orders by superiors. Whilst individuals may have been reluctant to complete these instructions, orders were orders and had to be adhered to. Indeed, the Palin Commission found against accusations of anti-Zionism by O.E.T.A., noting instead that 'the Zionist Commission and the official Zionists by their impatience, indiscretion and attempts to force the hands of the Administration, are largely responsible for this present crisis'.⁹⁴

The Palin Commission therefore rejected Zionist allegations of a pogrom, whilst also blaming the Zionist Commission for the deterioration of the situation of Palestine. Given the worsening relations between Palestinian Arabs and Jews, what measures were put in place by Storrs to prevent bloodshed? Very few, according to the Commission. They found that the Governor had failed to make adequate preparations for any violence, and also neglected to instruct the police to prohibit any inflammatory speeches being given at the Nabi Musa Festival.⁹⁵ Storrs strongly objected to these accusations, submitting a lengthy defence of his conduct before, during and after the riots to the new High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, in August 1920.

Having reiterated his claim to the Palin Commission that the likelihood of trouble was greater the year before, the Governor defended this judgement by questioning the suitability of the committee itself to report on the disturbances. With faux modesty, he ventured:

To submit, with all humility, as [a] senior member of the Military Administration, that a general experience of the Near East longer and deeper than that of anyone else either in the Administration or on the Court, and the knowledge acquired by governing Jerusalem, under difficulties now acknowledged, for 2 ¼ years, without one untoward incident of any kind, entitle my estimate of the probabilities of the

⁹³ WO 32/9614, p. 21.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 39.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 39-40.

situation at Easter to a consideration at least equal to that of one evolved, after the event, from an examination by newcomers of excited, interested and mutually hostile witnesses.

Arguing that 'every reasonable precaution was taken by the Military Governor, the Police and the Administration', Storrs maintained that 'the actual outbreak was unpremeditated and took all parties by surprise'. To substantiate this claim he cited the Palin Commission itself, noting that the report established that 'the whole affair' had 'the appearance of spontaneity'. Moreover, he questioned the conclusion reached regarding political speeches, contending that the prohibition of political demonstrations did not extend to political speeches. Citing the oft quoted status quo, he insisted that the Nabi Musa procession traditionally involved addresses 'and it would not have been practicable to forbid speeches which have been customary for generations'. Finally, he maintained that the police did have orders to stop inflammatory speeches but had insufficient Arab to recognise their incendiary nature.⁹⁶

Back in London, the Foreign Office appeared to agree with Storrs' arguments, with the cover sheet to his defence noting that 'there appears to be much substance in Mr Storrs' remarks'.⁹⁷ Moreover, in the event that intelligence was received indicating that riots were being organised, it is not clear whether the Governor could have mounted an effective police operation. The police force in Jerusalem was understaffed and underfunded, comprising of eight officers and one hundred and eighty three other ranks. This marked a large shortfall in personnel when compared to the recommended size of the police force in the city: fourteen officers and three hundred and seventy other ranks..⁹⁸ Funding was also inadequate. Budgetary statistics from 1918-1919 show that O.E.T.A.'s revenue stood at £661,813, with expenditure coming to £738,649, leaving a deficit of £78,836.⁹⁹ With Parliament unlikely to permit extensive expenditure on a temporary administration, O.E.T.A.'s budget became tighter and tighter.

⁹⁶ FO 371/5122/10992 – Colonel Storrs' Conduct as Military Governor of Jerusalem, 18/8/1920.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ WO 32/9614, p. 27.

⁹⁹ The British Administration in Palestine, 31/1/1919, Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1 – Jerusalem, 1918-1919.

The police force itself was largely made up of Arab officers. When trouble broke out for a second day on Monday 5 April some of these men joined their co-religionists in the disorders. Such a possibility was recognised by the G.O.C. prior to the riots, who noted that 'in the case of universal internal trouble the three thousand police must be reckoned with as a potential hostile factor'.¹⁰⁰ When Storrs and the military became aware of this situation, the police were withdrawn from service to be replaced by the army as a peacekeeping force.¹⁰¹ For the Zionists, police officers turning against the Jews was yet another sign that the riots were a pogrom.¹⁰² However, given the limited resources available to him, it seems Storrs had acted effectively by withdrawing the police force when it appeared the loyalties of a sizeable proportion of constables had changed.

Who did Storrs blame for the riots? In *Orientations* his answer is unequivocal – 'the immediate fomenter of the Arab excesses' was Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the younger brother of Kamil al-Husayni, the Mufti.¹⁰³ He fled Palestine for Transjordan and was sentenced in absentia to ten years imprisonment for his role in inciting the crowds outside the Jaffa Gate on the Sunday of the riots, only to be pardoned in July 1920 as part of the same amnesty that had seen Jabotinsky's sentence quashed. Much to Storrs' annoyance, the police searched Kamil's house as part of their investigations. Rather than sending the police, the Governor contested that he would instead have sent a member of his staff to 'ascertain by enquiry' the whereabouts of the Mufti's younger brother. Nonetheless, he accepted that the police were within their rights to carry out the search and surmised that the Ottomans would certainly have acted in a similar manner 'without the slightest hesitation'. What followed was of great offence to Storrs. The Mufti complained to O.E.T.A. that the search had affronted his honour and he:

Handed back (as no longer safe from depredation) the C.M.G. [Companion of St Michael and St George] he had recently received. This grotesque insolence was actually tolerated and the Mufti, instead

¹⁰⁰ WO 32/9614, p. 27.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 35.

¹⁰² Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary*, p. 80.

¹⁰³ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 331.

of being struck off the Roll of Order, had his Insignia subsequently reconferred, almost with apologies, as if for renewed obligation.¹⁰⁴

Here we see two key facets of Storrs' personality: a hands-on, personalised approach to maintaining relations with notables in Jerusalem (as evidenced by his attitude towards the police searches), coupled with a belief that those who receive British honours should be grateful for the recognition and loyal to the nation who bestowed such rewards upon them, irrespective of any perceived wrong done against them.

Further upheavals were to occur amongst the city's Palestinian notables after the riots. The Palin Commission noted that Storrs had removed the Mayor, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, without any inquiry, replacing him with Ragheb Bey Nashashibi.¹⁰⁵ The Governor took great exception to this wording in his defence to Samuel. He maintained that the Mayoralty was a two year post, that a new mayor had been due to be appointed in January 1920 but was delayed for various reasons, and that there 'had never been any question of an "enquiry" or a "hearing" any more than there has been for the recent changes made in the Haifa Municipality'.¹⁰⁶ Yet Storrs gives a very different account in *Orientalism*, noting that the riots 'brought to a head the question of the Mayoralty of Jerusalem'. Far from being a routine appointment at the end of Musa Kazim's term, the Governor instead took a prominent role in removing the incumbent Mayor. Troubled by the thought that Musa Kazim was not impartially representing the three religious communities of Jerusalem, and increasingly concerned that he was taking an active role in opposing any prospective Mandate, Storrs gave the Mayor an ultimatum: politics or the Mayoralty. The Nabi Musa riots were the final straw for Storrs, who found Musa Kazim increasingly 'intractable' and 'defiant'. Having decided to remove the Mayor, he informed the Administration, who suggested appointing an English Mayor. Storrs dismissed this idea out of hand as it removed one of the few positions that a Palestinian could aspire to. Instead, he approach Ragheb Bey Nashashibi and offered him the Mayoralty as long as he confirmed

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 332.

¹⁰⁵ WO 32/9614, p. 27.

¹⁰⁶ FO 371/5122/10992.

his acceptance in writing there and then. 'I was glad I had done so', Storrs recalled, as:

Twenty minutes later I intimated to Musa Pasha (not without regret, for he had rendered service and proved himself on occasion a courteous Arab gentleman) that the time had come to make a change. The Pasha said: "Your Excellency is free to act, but I would recommend you wait, for I have certain knowledge that no Arab will dare to take my place." I handed him Ragheb Bey's letter. When he read it he rose, thanked me for my past support, assured me of his continued friendship, shook hands and walked erect and slow out of my office.¹⁰⁷

The appointment of a Nashashibi as Mayor at the expense of a Husayni marked a further breach from the status quo that Storrs claimed only to have violated twice. His intervention was to have a grave impact on the prospect of Palestinian unity as animosity between the two families grew. Ragheb Bey's acceptance of the Mayoralty hurt Musa Kazim deeply and caused consternation amongst the families. Although related by marriage, relations between the Husaynis and Nashashibis became increasingly fraught at a time when national harmony was of the essence for the Palestinians.¹⁰⁸ Storrs the British administrator, as opposed to Storrs the Arabist or Storrs the Zionist, had won out once more.

Conclusion

Four days at Easter 1920 saw all the contradictions of British involvement in Palestine come to the fore for the first time. The Nabi Musa riots underlined the political limits of O.E.T.A.'s temporary administration, challenged and renegotiated local alliances and increased the likelihood of future political clashes.¹⁰⁹ Centre stage was Ronald Storrs himself, who displayed many of the inconsistencies of British rule in microcosm through his response to the disturbances. In contrast to the upper echelons of O.E.T.A., who were military

¹⁰⁷ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 333-334.

¹⁰⁸ Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty*, p. 206.

¹⁰⁹ Mazza, *Jerusalem*, pp. 177-178.

men being tasked with roles that were increasingly administrative in nature, Storrs was a civilian administrator with political nous placed in a military role. This juxtaposition helps explain his determination to reopen the city as soon as possible after the first day of violence, and his approach to the arrest and subsequent trial of Jabotinsky. It also explains his consternation at how the police handled the search of Mufti Kamil's house.

Storrs' vision of a harmonious Jerusalem under benevolent British rule was challenged by the riots, undermining the rationale of the Pro-Jerusalem Society that he held so dear to his heart. Yet in many ways it reconfirmed the hierarchy that the Society established: British and Zionist concerns would be protected whilst Palestinian Arab interests would be undermined. One only has to look at the fallout from the disturbances to see this in action. Storrs' removal of Musa Kazim al-Husayni as mayor and his replacement with Ragheb Bey Nashashibi undermined Palestinian unity. Moreover, his insistence that Hajj Amin was to blame for the disturbances demonstrated a complete misunderstanding of the causes of tension in Jerusalem, and in Palestine more widely. In placing blame solely at his door, Storrs refused to acknowledge that the true roots of mistrust and anxiety amongst the Palestinian Arabs – British support for Zionism. He was not alone in failing to recognise this, as the terms of the San-Remo Agreement and subsequent adoption of the British Mandate for Palestine with its explicit commitment to Zionism testify. Indeed, it is little wonder that the Palin Commission was never published, containing as it did grave warnings about continued British support for Zionism. At the same time, the riots marked an ignominious passing of a military government in Palestine that had long been suspected by the Zionists to be thwarting their aims, but in reality had facilitated them to the best of its limited ability as a temporary organisation. Its replacement by a civilian administration with a clear pro-Zionist mandate, led by Herbert Samuel, himself a prominent proponent of Zionism, merely reaffirmed the bond between Britain and the Zionists.¹¹⁰ However, a new administration did not mean a new beginning for Storrs as Governor of Jerusalem. The mistrust that had

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 178.

erupted from both Palestinians and Zionists towards him after the Nabi Musa riots would continue to plague his remaining years in the city.

Chapter Five –‘There can be no question of surrendering the Mandate’¹: Civilian Rule, 1920-1926

In England, so far as one can judge from the daily Press, the chief opinion about officials is that they should be reduced or abolished altogether. The East has no use for the fugitive and cloistered functionary. The official should go for his office to the municipality, the school of music, the chess club, and the maternity hospital, and should make himself known throughout his district. He should see the people in their homes and be seen by them in his.²

Storrs' appointment as Governor of Cyprus in the summer of 1926 brought to an end nine years of highly personalised rule in Jerusalem. As was customary, several articles eulogising his tenure in charge of the city were published, and a number of meals held to celebrate his achievements. The World Zionist Executive, the Zionist Central Council of Manchester and Salford, the Council for Jerusalem Jews and the Jerusalem Municipality all held banquets in honour of the departing Governor.³ At the latter function the Mayor of Jerusalem, Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, commented that Storrs was 'as able as he was beloved', highlighting the Pro-Jerusalem Society as 'one of his splendid achievements. He also expressed thanks for the improvements in water supplies, street lighting and roads in the city.⁴ *Falastin*, the Arabic-language Palestinian newspaper, praised Storrs for his 'special sympathy' for the Arabs and noted that he 'was always amenable to Arab interests and opposed extreme Jewish demands, and held office by virtue of his broad-mindedness, tolerance and sagacity'.⁵ In a similar vein, at the event hosted by the Council for Jerusalem Jews, Jacob Meyuhas, President of the Council, noted his deep commitment to the Holy Land, culture

¹ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 378.

² "The Promised Land: Governor of Jerusalem and Officialism", *The Westminster Gazette*, 21/12/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 10, Box 3, Folder 5.

³ "Sir Ronald Storrs banqueted in London" and "Sir Ronald Storrs on the place of the Jews in Palestine", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Thursday, October 21, 1926, p. 3, "Farewell Reception to Sir Ronald Storrs", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Thursday, November 25, 1926, p. 1 and "Sir Ronald Storrs: A Brilliant Function", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Friday, November 26, 1926, p. 1.

⁴ "Sir Ronald Storrs: A Brilliant Function", *The Palestine Bulletin*, p. 1.

⁵ "Falastin" praises Sir Ronald Storrs", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Sunday, August 29, 1926, p. 3.

and art, whilst the Secretary of Va'ad Leumi, Mr Tschernowitz, appreciated the 'personality and deep esprit of Sir Ronald'.⁶ Drawing their conclusions on his time as Governor, the Council described Storrs as standing by 'the English principal of moderate evolution [and] patient progress'.⁷

However, behind these niceties existed reminders of more fractious times. Meyuhas acknowledged that any dissension between the Council and Storrs had been based on 'tactics, and not the fundamental points'. Tschernowitz chose to highlight the 'many disappointments between the British and Zionists'. Storrs himself chose to joke that had he tried to enter the Council buildings two or three years prior, he would not have done so without a police escort. Acknowledging the disappointments the Jewish community had faced, he reminded them to always consider the position of the British official in Palestine.⁸ This was a repeat of his sentiments at the banquet Zionist Central Council of Manchester and Salford, where he urged Zionists to 'back the men on the spot – because he could assure them that they were doing their best for the Mandate – and not call them "anti-semites" because they were not able to deliver all the goods all the time'.⁹ In their leading article, *Falastin* recalled the severe criticism of the Arabic and Hebrew press upon the Governor, noting the inevitability of such analysis given his position. Irrespective of the policies he pursued, which according to the newspaper were dictated to him, Storrs 'was a person who knew excellently how to comport himself'.¹⁰ Whether based on etiquette or actuality, all those who commented in public appeared keen to separate Storrs the British administrator from Storrs the person. Their tributes were a testament to the complex relationship between the Governor's professional duties and private interests. Indeed, the latter would on occasion be used by Storrs as a release from the criticism and stresses that his role entailed. The two were to entwine further with the introduction of civilian rule to Palestine in July 1920, with tensions between

⁶ "Farewell Reception to Sir Ronald Storrs", *The Palestine Bulletin*, p. 1.

⁷ A113/45 - Council of Jerusalem Jews on Storrs ahead of his departure to Cyprus, 24/11/1926, CZA.

⁸ "Farewell Reception to Sir Ronald Storrs", *The Palestine Bulletin*, p. 1.

⁹ Sir Ronald Storrs on the place of the Jews in Palestine", *The Palestine Bulletin*, p. 3.

¹⁰ "'Falastin' praises Sir Ronald Storrs", *The Palestine Bulletin*, p. 3.

Storrs' love of society and his political duties appearing at various points throughout the remainder of his time in Jerusalem.

From Military to Civilian Rule

Anxieties remained high in Jerusalem in the aftermath of Nabi Musa, especially between the British and Zionist representatives. Once again the Western Wall was at the centre of controversy, with the issue of its maintenance taking centre stage. On May 15 Storrs wrote to O.E.T.A. Headquarters outlining details of a meeting he held with Ussishkin, Slousch and Ben Yehuda about repairs being undertaken to repair the roof of the Wakf building overhanging the Wall and the Wall itself. Several stones had come loose and were threatening to fall. The representatives of the Zionist Executive complained that the works endangered Jews who prayed at the Wall, infringed upon their right of worship and impacted upon the archaeological preservation of the site. In response, Storrs suspended works on the Wall for the day and enlisted Ashbee, together with the Wakf architect Mr Shiber, to examine the upper parts of the wall for repairs. Tellingly, the decision as to the necessity of reparations would remain solely with Ashbee and not the Wakf, with Storrs rejecting Ussishkin's suggestion that a Zionist architect should be involved on the grounds of 'implied lack of confidence in Mr Ashbee's architectural competence and honesty'.¹¹ In his report, Ashbee rejected claims that the archaeological integrity of the Wall and confirmed the necessity of repairs, stipulating to Mr Shiber and the Wakf that no work of any sort should be completed during the hours of prayer. He also mandated that only the top 3 metres of the Wall required restoration at this time.¹²

The following day Ussishkin sent an animated letter to Storrs protesting the continuation of the repairs. Claiming that the works were 'sacrilege', he questioned their necessity, doubting 'the reality of any such danger' of the stones falling onto people below. Reflecting the tensions of the time, Ussishkin asked:

¹¹ Storrs to Headquarters, O.E.T.A. South, 15/5/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

¹² Ashbee to Storrs, 15/5/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

Why has the danger become so suddenly apparent - just at a moment when the minds of the inhabitants are disturbed by political events? Was there a need for these repairs to proceed on Saturday – when hundreds of Jews stand in prayer near the Wall? Are the religious feelings of Jews entitled to no consideration whatsoever?

Concluding his letter, Ussishkin demanded the immediate cessation of the repairs, an architectural survey to establish if an immediate danger was posed by the loose stones, and that any future works be carried out by the Jewish community of Jerusalem.¹³

This message led Storrs to write again to O.E.T.A. Headquarters on May 17, with the recommendation that the Inspector of Antiquities should make a further inspection of the wall with Ashbee.¹⁴ Following their report, the Zionists were informed that repairs to the upper Wall (hitherto undertaken exclusively by the Wakf) would continue to do so but under British supervision, with work on the middle and lower aspects of the Wall completed by the Government itself.¹⁵ This decision earned rebuke from both sides, with the Mufti lodging a 'sharp protest' at the limitations placed on Muslim rights of repair and the alteration of the status quo this created.¹⁶ Eder wrote to Storrs on behalf of the Zionists requesting that all works be suspended for four months until the establishment of a Mandate-sponsored "Holy Places Commission" had time to determine rights at the Wall.¹⁷ Uncertainties surrounding the future role of O.E.T.A. were being used to help further the Zionist cause at the Wall.

The shortcomings of the temporary nature of the Military Administration were again highlighted in Storrs' dealings with the establishment of a prospective Palestinian Congress in May 1920. Following the decisions made at San Remo and the announcement of the new civilian administration for Palestine,

¹³ Ussishkin to Storrs, 16/5/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

¹⁴ Storrs to Headquarters, O.E.T.A. South, 17/5/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

¹⁵ Mary Ellen Lundsten, "Wall Politics: Zionist and Palestinian Strategies in Jerusalem, 1928", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 8, (Autumn, 1978), pp. 8-9.

¹⁶ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 333.

¹⁷ Lundsten, "Wall Politics", p. 9.

Palestinian nationalists became increasingly aware of the diminishing likelihood of the country forming part of Greater Syria. Despite these setbacks, Palestinian nationalist sentiment and opposition towards Zionism remained. However, a sense of crisis prevailed amongst the nationalists at this time and ruptures began to emerge between key groups, particularly *al-Muntada al-Adabi* (led by the Nashashibis) and *al-Nadi al-'Arabi* (under the control of the Husaynis). Storrs' removal of Musa Kazim as Mayor of Jerusalem and his replacement with Ragheb Bey Nashashibi had increased the likelihood of hostilities between the two families, with several members of Husaynis adopting an increasingly anti-British position.¹⁸ Using the tactics of entryism, members of *al-Nadi* began to join *al-Muntada*, creating a breach between its pro-Nashashibi leadership and a more pro-Husayni membership. The split was compounded by tactical disagreements over the next steps for the movement. *Al-Nadi 'al-Arabi* took the position of continuing to support the possibility of a pro-Feisal revolt in Syria, whilst the Nashashibi family, together with the MCA, merchants and the Greek Orthodox community advocated working for Palestinian independence through cooperation with the British. To this end, demands were made that the MCA convene a congress of all their branches to co-ordinate the Palestinian response to the new reality they faced. Given the frictions surrounding the direction of Palestinian nationalism, and the heightened atmosphere in Palestine following Nabi Musa and San Remo, the Military Administration resolved to forbid the holding of such a congress.¹⁹

This was the line Storrs took when he was visited by a Palestinian delegation in mid-May 1920. They informed the Governor of a meeting they had held with the Chief Administrator instructing them to nominate delegates for a Palestinian Congress and potential mission to Europe. Confronted with this information, Storrs maintained 'a non-committal and even incredulous attitude' given his understanding that no congress should be allowed to assemble. Later, Storrs was to discover that negotiations about the potential establishment of a Palestinian

¹⁸ Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929*, (London, Frank Cass, 1974), pp. 100-104. Some members of the Husayni family looked to maintain their positive relationships with the British, not least Musa Kazim, who re-established relations with Storrs in May/June of 1920. See Pappe, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty*, p. 203.

¹⁹ Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, p. 102.

Congress had been ongoing at this time. However, he had been omitted from a circular to all Military Governors requesting they send two delegates from the MCA to Headquarters to put their views before the Chief Administrator. An irate Storrs wrote to O.E.T.A. Headquarters, expressing his annoyance 'that the already great difficulties of Jerusalem politics are greatly increased for the Military Governor unless he is kept continually and accurately informed of receptions and negotiations deeply affecting the public interest which are being carried on with the authorities by members of his district in his district'.²⁰ Whilst the British eventually refused permission for the congress to go ahead following their consultations with representatives of the MCA, this episode indicates the increased willingness of Palestinian nationalists to pursue their aims separate from Feisal in Damascus.²¹ It also demonstrates how the 'man on the spot' could be compromised in his role through administrative oversight.

Indeed, there appears to have been a certain amount of administrative confusion surrounding the exact future of the Military Administration following San Remo. The decision regarding O.E.T.A.'s future came as a surprise to Storrs and was 'tinged with comedy'. In late May 1920, he had been shown an 'elaborate scheme of an apparently permanent Military Administration, elegantly engrossed, and providing for a Chief-of-Staff, assisted by a galaxy of Colonels and Majors'. These plans were 'shattered' by the appointment of Sir Herbert Samuel as the High Commissioner of the Civil Government of Palestine, an appointment that was not 'universally welcome' to those whose position in the administration was now under threat. Storrs was not among these, having been informed by Samuel that he was to remain Governor of Jerusalem and take on the role of Chief Secretary ahead of the arrival of Colonel Wyndham Deedes.²²

Ever conscious of the politics of perception, Storrs argued with other senior figures in O.E.T.A. over the method of transport the new High Commissioner should use to arrive in Jerusalem. Even after Nabi Musa, the Governor prioritised how things were perceived over security considerations in his hierarchy of

²⁰ Storrs to Headquarters, O.E.T.A. South, 25/5/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

²¹ Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, p. 102.

²² Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 334.

importance. The Governor firmly believed that Samuel should travel by train, it being 'patent...that the railway arrival was not only politically more impressive but also safer from the point of view of public security'. However the Chief Administrator, Bols, disagreed and Samuel arrived in the city by car.²³

With regard to personnel, O.E.T.A.'s passing and the advent of civilian rule saw 'mostly the same men sat, still in uniform, performing the same tasks at the same desks'. For Storrs personally, it was a time of intense labour as the new administration was established. He recalled that he had 'never...worked harder or with greater satisfaction than as acting Chief Secretary throughout that July, August and September'. In his diary, Storrs noted his enjoyment at the change of pace, expressing his desire that he be 'half as useful to him [Samuel] as he is instructive to me'. He went on to note the difficulties keeping up with the pace of change, comparing it to being 'like making a bicycle and riding it at the same time. But the whole rush is definite Fun [sic], and I shall be almost sorry to be my own master again'.²⁴

The advantages of having Samuel, an experienced former Government minister, as High Commissioner also soon became apparent. The budget for Palestine had been withheld by the Treasury from O.E.T.A. since mid-April, paralysing any potential planning on behalf of the administration. Despite his political standing, Samuel was unable to entice Whitehall to approve the budget, so the new High Commissioner unilaterally declared it passed. This defiance of the Treasury was a decision 'before which the boldest Crown Colony Governor would have quailed' but it allowed the new administration to begin the task of making appointments and restructuring for civilian rule.²⁵

²³ Memorandum on the Arrival of the High Commissioner, 4/7/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2. Storrs reprints this memorandum in *Orientalisms* but with one significant change. Rather than mentioning Bols by name, he instead is known as *Gen. X* to preserve anonymity. See Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 335.

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 391-392.

²⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 391-393.

The first decade of civilian rule can be seen as a period of 'relative tranquillity', bookended by riots in Jaffa in May 1921 and Jerusalem in August 1929.²⁶ Storrs himself held similar views, claiming in January 1926 'that there was so much understanding between both parties.'²⁷ He echoed these sentiments upon his departure from Jerusalem in August 1926 by suggesting the Government's task would now be easier because of his work to establish an 'equilibrium between Jews and Arabs in Palestine'.²⁸ Such an interpretation implies that divisions between Palestinians and Jews only emerged in the 1930s, with the advent of increased Jewish immigration to Palestine from Nazi Germany and the subsequent communal conflict that emerged.

Yet this was a period of time where the conditions for polarisation (and eventual outright conflict) between Palestinians and Zionists were being formed, with some going so far as to argue that the roots of Britain's failure in Palestine were already visible to several British officials, including Samuel.²⁹ Decisions at San Remo meant that the dream of a Greater Syria was replaced by western tutelage under the Mandate system against the wishes of its inhabitants. In July 1920, the French claimed their Mandate for Syria by crushing the nascent independent Syrian state and ignominiously expelling its King, Feisal.³⁰ Britain's commitment to Zionism was formalised in 1922 through the incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into its Mandate for Palestine. Within its twenty-eight articles, seven explicitly mention privileges extended to the Zionists that facilitated the establishment of a parallel Jewish government to operate alongside and be supported by the British. In a deliberate act of 'colonial erasure', Palestinians or Arabs were not mentioned by name and were denied political and national rights, save the usual provisions that personal and religious rights would be protected, together with the status quo at

²⁶ Norman Rose, *'A Senseless, Squalid War': Voices from Palestine, 1890s-1948*, (London, Pimlico, 2010), p. 29.

²⁷ "Meet Sir Ronald Storrs", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Friday, January 8, 1926, p. 3.

²⁸ "Storrs sorry to leave Palestine", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Sunday, November 28, 1926, p. 2.

²⁹ Jeffrey Auerbach, "Before the Mandate: British Rule in Palestine, 1920–1922", *Israel Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, New Scholarship on the British Mandate in Palestine (Fall, 2021), pp. 5-23.

³⁰ See Thompson, *How the West Stole Democracy from the Arabs* for a full account of this affair.

sacred sites.³¹ The granting of these privileges to the Zionist Executive ultimately led to development of a separate and exclusively Zionist economy in the 1920s that highlighted disparities in opportunity and wealth between the Palestinians and the Jews, contributing to worsening relations between the two communities.³²

Despite the privileged position afforded the Zionists by both the Military and Civilian administration, relations remained strained between British figures in Jerusalem and the Zionists. T.E. Lawrence captured these tensions in a letter to Storrs in June 1920. In it Lawrence recounted a speech he attended delivered by the Bishop of Jerusalem, Rennie Maclnnes, that condemned the ‘pernicious action of local Zionists in causing anti-British feeling’, whilst praising ‘more responsible’ elements of the leadership for their ‘moderate desires and policy’. Claiming the ‘Bolshevik type of imported Jew’ had behaved in an arrogant manner in Palestine, the Bishop expressed his concern that such actions would harm the Zionist cause by turning the Arabs and Christians against them. Lawrence was surprised at how outspoken Maclnnes had been, noting that he had spoken ‘so wisely’ about the ‘unwise line taken by local Zionists’.³³ On the eve of a new administration, old tensions remained.

Clubs and Societies: Where Culture, Religion and Politics Entwined

Britain’s role in Palestine now had a sense of permanence courtesy of the decisions made at San Remo, with Storrs’ participation in establishing new clubs and societies after July 1920 reflecting this new reality. His social standing was recognised amongst British officials in Jerusalem, with the Director of Public Security, Percy Brooke Bramley, writing to the Governor in October of the same year to outline early ideas for a Ladies’ Club, Gentlemen’s Club and Sporting Club

³¹ Khalidi, *The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine*, pp. 34-37. See also Noura Erakat, *Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020), pp. 26-41 for more on the Balfour Declaration and the terms of the Mandate for Palestine as an act of colonial erasure.

³² Barbara J. Smith, *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920-1929*, (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1993).

³³ T.E. Lawrence to Storrs, 16/6/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2. The signature on this letter is not clear but the letterhead is from 14 Barton Street, Westminster (Lawrence’s address in London at the time). The letter also mentions Baker, a reference to Sir Herbert Baker, who allowed Lawrence to stay in this property.

in the city. Bramley wrote of 'a feeling amongst the British community...that the initiation of such measures should at least be carried out in full consultation with yourself, as the leading representative of British Society in Jerusalem, if not actually under your person direction and control'.³⁴ Storrs now had the opportunity to consolidate the social links and ties he so craved from his lonely first days in Egypt.

The establishment of a Sporting Club for Jerusalem captured Storrs' interest and he personally laid the foundation stone of the new Jerusalem Sports Club. The Governor's interests clearly influenced the nature of the club through its patronage of tennis tournaments and chess matches, as well as dances and receptions for its members. Like the Pro-Jerusalem Society, the Jerusalem Sports Club was designed to be non-denominational in its membership in an attempt to promote intercommunal harmony in the city.³⁵ The High Commissioner, Samuel, was the President, with Vice-Presidents including Storrs, the Senior Military Officer for Jerusalem and the city's Mayor.³⁶ Storrs' public school education had instilled in him the importance of sport in creating 'mutual respect' between potential enemies.³⁷ The reality was an organisation run on terms that Storrs and the British decided that would later benefit the Zionists.

By 1921 a new football league had been established in Palestine under the auspices of the Jerusalem Sports Club, replacing the old military league that had existed beforehand. Storrs was invited to become Vice-President of the nascent division, as well as providing a honorary 'kick-off' in the opening match between the Governorate and the Treasury.³⁸ Whilst nominally a national league, the teams all represented either the British military or government departments, with the only Palestinian or *Yishuv* participants being employed by the administration

³⁴ Percy Brooke Bramley to Storrs, 15/10/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

³⁵ Nicholas Blincoe, *More Noble Than War: The Story of Football in Israel and Palestine*, (London, Constable, 2019), pp. 58-59. In *Orientations* Storrs noted that he refused to support the foundation of the Club unless it were open 'to all races and creeds'. See Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 428.

³⁶ CO 733/72 – Jerusalem Sports Club: acquisition of the property by Government – Clayton (Officer Administering the Government) to Thomas (Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies), 25/8/1924, TNA.

³⁷ Blincoe, *More Noble Than War*, pp. 58-59.

³⁸ Parkhouse (Honorary Secretary, Government Departmental Football League) to Storrs, 28/10/1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

or the police.³⁹ Storrs drew upon prior experiences when limiting participation in this way. His time in Egypt had seen the establishment of *Al-Ahly*, or the National Club. The team, under the leadership of its honorary Chairman (and later Prime Minister of Egypt), Saad Zaghloul, would become associated with the Egyptian struggle for independence from the British, with its supporters forming a key part of the nationalist struggle. Keen to avoid a similar mass-mobilisation of Palestinians in their own nationalist cause, Storrs restricted the league's membership.⁴⁰

Storrs' departure for Cyprus in 1926 saw the league undergo changes. A new High Commissioner, Field Marshal Herbert Plumer, was appointed in 1925 with instructions to reduce the British military presence in Palestine. This was to have an impact on the level of football in the country, with military sides losing their best players and reducing the number of teams in the division. By 1927 it was decided that responsibility for the league should fall to Yosef Yekutieli, who harboured ambitions of FIFA membership for a Palestine Football Association and was a leading member of the Jewish Maccabi Sports Club founded in 1905. He had previously attempted to join FIFA in 1926 but the application was rejected on the basis that the Maccabi only represented Jewish players and not all the inhabitants of Palestine. The *Yishuv's* lack of qualified referees also meant they fell foul of FIFA regulations. However, with his newfound responsibility for league football in the country, Yekutieli could claim that the presence of British sides meant that his organisation was not sectarian. Eventually the new incarnation of the league kicked off in April 1928. Participants in the local Palestinian leagues of Jerusalem and Jaffa, which included Orthodox Christian and Islamic clubs, were not invited. Instead, Yekutieli's new division consisted of five military sides, six teams from the *Yishuv* and one club with Palestinian players, Sporting el-Carmel of Haifa. Later that year, Yekutieli held the inaugural meeting of the Palestine Football Association in advance of applying for FIFA membership.

The exact nature of this meeting is shrouded in intrigue and mystery. Yekutieli's application to FIFA lists the attendees of that day, including one Palestinian

³⁹ Blincoe, *More Noble Than War*, pp. 79-80.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 58-59.

referee named Nusseibeh, widely assumed to be Ibrahim Nusseibeh. He was the only qualified referee in Palestine, a tennis champion at the Jerusalem Sports Club and a founder member of *al-Araby*, the Jerusalem Arab Sports Club, in 1927. The importance of Nusseibeh's presence at the meeting was unquestionable given FIFA's reasons for rejecting Yekutieli's initial application in 1926. Yet it is unlikely that Nusseibeh was ever at the meeting given that it was held in Hebrew (a language he did not speak), his family members do not recall any mention of attendance and his family's role in opposing Zionism. In his application, Yekutieli also massively over-exaggerated the extent of the league structure in Palestine. Despite this, the Palestine Football Association was admitted to FIFA on a trial basis in December 1928.

Following the Buraq uprising of 1929, league football was banned in Palestine for three years. In a bid to maintain the momentum gained by FIFA membership, Yekutieli arranged for a "Palestinian" side to go on tour in Cairo. The squad consisted of nine British soldiers and five members of the Maccabi, with reports of one Palestinian being included, most likely as a translator. Wearing a kit featuring a large 'P' for Palestine and a small 'LD' beneath the curve of the taller letter for 'Land of Israel', the side went on to lose all three matches by considerable margins. If the tour was a sporting disaster, it was also a costly political mistake by Yekutieli, who looked to emphasise the strong relationship between the *Yishuv* and the British at a time when political rivals, such as the socialists and revisionist Zionists, were heavily critical of Britain's response to the riots of 1929.⁴¹

The history of football in Palestine, both during Storrs' tenure as Governor of Jerusalem and later under Yosef Yekutieli, is one of Palestinian marginalisation. It demonstrates the cultural links that were formed between the British and the Zionists to the exclusion of Palestinians for fear of encouraging nationalist sentiment, whilst at the same time legitimising the Zionist presence in the country. Storrs played a key role in this, drawing upon his experiences in Egypt to restrict participation in the league. The intercommunal ideals supposedly espoused by organisations like the Pro-Jerusalem Society and the Jerusalem Sports Club

⁴¹ *Ibid*, pp. 89-108.

were never truly realised, not because of Jerusalemites themselves, but because of the inherent support given to the Zionists by Storrs and other British officials at the expense of Palestinian rights under the Mandate.

British troop reductions in Palestine throughout the mid-1920s also impacted the Jerusalem Sports Club more generally. Upon the establishment of the club a loan of £E10,000 was taken out from the Anglo-Egyptian Bank. This was later subsidised with a further loan of £E1,000 in April 1921 to cover capital expenditures at the Club's headquarters 'in the select residential locality at the junction of the Greek and German Colonies, where most of the members of the British community reside'. The decrease in the number of British soldiers and officials in Palestine directly affected Club finances. In response, several senior members of the organisation had taken on the financial burden personally to help keep it open. This had little impact beyond increasing the financial exposure of those individuals and by 1924 the Club had failed to repay any of the capital charge on the £E11,000, which was due for complete repayment in October 1925.

In August 1924, Clayton wrote to James Henry Thomas, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in an attempt to safeguard the future of the Club. Extolling its virtues, Clayton argued that the Club was the only place in Jerusalem 'where residents and officials especially those of British nationality, can obtain healthy recreation'. As such he proposed that the Government should purchase the grounds for £E11,000, thereby servicing the loan. In return the Club would pay £E300 annually to lease the property.⁴²

In the Colonial Office the idea received short shrift. The Joint Head of the Office's Middle East Department, Roland V. Vernon, minuted that 'the whole scheme is a bad proposition' as 'there were obviously far too few members to run a large Country Club of this sort'. Recognising that further cuts were likely in Palestine, he surmised that the Club's reliance on 'the unofficial element' in Jerusalem would increase, thereby negating the need for Government support. However, he did request research into whether there existed a precedent for the

⁴² CO 733/72 – Jerusalem Sports Club – Clayton (Officer Administering the Government) to Thomas (Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies), 25/8/1924, TNA.

Government purchasing recreation grounds in any of the other Colonies, a claim that Clayton made in his despatch.⁴³

Responding to Vernon's request, Colonial Office official Gerard Clauson noted that no precedent existed on the scale of the Jerusalem Sports Club's proposals. When land had been given over to recreational use, it was often of limited size and did not incur any costs to the Government. Clauson recommended that 'the people in Jerusalem' should 'draw in their horns' and sell the land before finding cheaper property in a less expensive neighbourhood. Recognising the elephant in the room, Sir John Shuckburgh, the Assistant Undersecretary of State, noted in the marginalia that such a suggestion did not alleviate the Club of their financial obligations towards the Anglo-Egyptian Bank.⁴⁴ Such concerns did not stop Shuckburgh recording that after a full Council meeting it was decided to reject Clayton's proposal.⁴⁵

No progress was made for several months until Samuel proposed the purchase of the property using revenue raised from the sale of Government lands, thereby avoiding any charge to the Palestine tax-payer.⁴⁶ Vernon agreed that this was a possibility providing the value of the land could be shown to be £E11,000 and that the Club were prepared to pay 5% of that sum as annual rent, and suggested raising the matter with the new Conservative Secretary of State, Leo Amery.⁴⁷

By the time the potential rescue of the Club was discussed further, Plumer had replaced Samuel as High Commissioner. Amery wrote to Plumer asking whether he agreed with his predecessor's policy that the Club should be purchased using Government funds.⁴⁸ Plumer responded in the affirmative, arguing it was 'a matter of the highest importance to the British Community in Palestine and therefore to the country generally to have a ground suitable for outdoor recreation, and it is essential that the ground should be within easy access of the capital city'. To give up the land would be 'calamitous' as it was the only flat area

⁴³ CO 733/72 – Jerusalem Sports Club – Minutes by R.V. Vernon, 12/10/1924, TNA.

⁴⁴ CO 733/72 – Jerusalem Sports Club – Minutes by G. Clauson, 20/10/1924, TNA.

⁴⁵ CO 733/72 – Jerusalem Sports Club – Minutes by J. Shuckburgh, 29/10/1924, TNA.

⁴⁶ CO 733/72 – Jerusalem Sports Club – Proposal by Herbert Samuel, 21/4/1925, TNA.

⁴⁷ CO 733/72 – Jerusalem Sports Club – Minutes by R.V. Vernon, 25/5/1925, TNA.

⁴⁸ CO 733/96 – Jerusalem Sports Club – Amery to Plumer, 26/8/1925, TNA.

in the vicinity of Jerusalem.⁴⁹ With the ground having been valued at the requisite £E11,000, Amery gave permission for the Palestine Government to purchase the land and lease it back to them, thereby discharging the Club's financial obligation to the Anglo-Egyptian Bank.⁵⁰

Having been founded in 1920 in 'a great burst of enthusiasm' and the belief that the number of British officials in Palestine would continue to grow, the Jerusalem Sports Club ultimately had to be financially rescued just five years later.⁵¹ The Club serves as an example of the optimism that engulfed members of the new Civil Government, Storrs included, as Britain's commitment to Palestine became formalised. However, this clarity brought with it a further realisation: the cost of facilitating and defending Zionist settlement of the country would be far greater than in other colonial contexts.⁵² This helps to explain the reluctance of the Colonial Office to purchase the sports grounds outright. When it was suggested that the Palestine Government itself would take on the cost using the proceeds from land sales, a change of attitude occurred. The fact that both Samuel and Plumer were prepared to use this income in such a way suggests the importance placed upon the Jerusalem Sports Club and the link made between the welfare of British officials and the country more generally.⁵³

British welfare was not just focused on sport, with Storrs cultivating new social opportunities in the city. He was President of the Jerusalem Dramatic Society, an organisation that had 41 members in 1922, of which only 18 had formally subscribed.⁵⁴ In this role, he exercised control over the performances given by the society.⁵⁵ The extent to which this was an exclusively British pastime is

⁴⁹ CO 733/97 – Jerusalem Sports Club: Importance to the British Community - Plumer to Avery, 21/9/1925, TNA.

⁵⁰ CO 733/106 – Jerusalem Sports Club: Liquidation of Obligation to Anglo-Egyptian Bank and assistance from Palestine Government, TNA.

⁵¹ CO 733/72 – Jerusalem Sports Club – Minutes by R.V. Vernon, 12/10/1924, TNA.

⁵² Smith, *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine*, p. 60.

⁵³ See Plumer's letter to Avery, Chapter 5, n3.

⁵⁴ Minutes of the Jerusalem Dramatic Society, 7/11/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3 – Jerusalem 1922.

⁵⁵ For example, a performance of *The Dawn of Tomorrow* by Francis Hodgson Burnett was 'subject to the approval of the President and certain members of the society'. Minutes of the Jerusalem Dramatic Society, 2/2/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

intimated in an undated review from *Tachydromos*, a Greek-language newspaper based in Alexandria, Egypt, which stated that:

The English Community of Jerusalem may be proud for the triumphs of their Dramatic Society, as all friends of the theatre and especially those who love and admire English Literature, are applauding enthusiastically the valuable and instructive work of the Jerusalem Dramatic Society.

The Society has the encouraging support of all Communities in Jerusalem, but that of the English is entirely and devotedly their own. Yesterday, for instance, the Theatre was full. All the cream of the English Community was there.⁵⁶

Yet many Jerusalemites ignored Storrs' cultural pursuits. His failure in establishing European classical music in the city is illustrated by a response to a letter from an acquaintance of Storrs, a certain M. Weimer. Weimer enquired as to whether a friend of his should establish a violin workshop in the city. In response, Storrs regretted to say that 'there does not seem for the moment to be sufficient musical enterprise in Jerusalem to justify an expert violin maker risking his prospects in life to establish himself here'.⁵⁷ He was similarly rebuffed when attempting to establish a Palestine Opera Association. For Storrs, opera was 'like tapestry, a criterion of richer material civilisation'.⁵⁸ A meeting was held at the Governorate on October 22 1922 'for those persons interested in art and music in Palestine' who wished to become members of this new association.⁵⁹ By his own admittance, 'nothing came' of this gathering and its aim to introduce 'that less pure if more sumptuous and infinitely more costly form of music' to Palestine.⁶⁰ Given their inheritance of the Jerusalem Music School from Storrs, one would have expected the Zionist Commission to have been interested in such an endeavour. However, their trust in Storrs had been further eroded by events

⁵⁶ Translation from the Greek Newspaper *Tachydromos* of Alexandria, Egypt, no date, Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4 - Jerusalem 1923-1926.

⁵⁷ Storrs to M. Weimer, 10/1/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

⁵⁸ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 424.

⁵⁹ The Palestine Opera Association, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

⁶⁰ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 424.

in November 1921, as will be demonstrated. By 1923 the Palestine Opera Company had been established under the leadership of Mordechai Golinkin, a Ukrainian Jew who emigrated to Palestine that same year. Performing in Hebrew, the Company's first performance was *La Traviata* on 26 July 1923 in Tel Aviv. Further performances followed in Jerusalem and Haifa.⁶¹

Within a year the emerging Palestine Opera Company stumbled into controversy. Their staging of *La Juive* by Halévy in June 1924 elicited protests from the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, who objected to its depiction of a love story between the daughter of a Cardinal and a Christian who pretended to be a Jew. In correspondence with Storrs' deputy, Major Campbell, the Patriarch called for the cancellation of the opera. Having initially suggested he would be willing to make some changes to the appearance of the Cardinal and the clergy, Golinkin soon doubled down and refused to make any alterations to the performance after his correspondence with the administration was leaked to the Hebrew newspaper *Doar Hayom*.⁶² Storrs recalls in *Orientations* how the Administration suggested that the Cardinal be transformed into a Judge by way of compromise. In any event, the opera was not performed due to internal disagreements amongst its cast, with the Patriarchate expressing misguided gratitude towards the British for their 'just firmness' in prohibiting the production.⁶³

The controversy surrounding the performance of *La Juive* led to accusations of bad faith being made against Storrs. Most critical was the Hebrew and Yiddish language poet Uri Zvi Grinberg, who had immigrated to Palestine from Europe in 1923. In a series of four articles in different newspapers, Grinberg critiqued the attempts to alter the opera as an attempt by Storrs to 'make us feel that Jerusalem is Christian'. He argued that 'in Jerusalem, the cross decreed' at the expense of artistic expression and freedom.⁶⁴ Ultimately, the dispute surrounding *La Juive*

⁶¹ Jehoash Hirshberg, *Music in the Jewish Community of Palestine, 1800-1948: A Social History*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 70-71.

⁶² Tamar Wolf-Monzon, "The Hand of Esau in the Midst Here Too" – Uri Zvi Grinberg's Poem "A Great Fear and the Moon" in Its Historical and Political Contexts", *Israel Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2013), pp. 181-182.

⁶³ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 424.

⁶⁴ Wolf-Monzon "The Hand of Esau", pp. 182-183.

demonstrated how culture, politics and religion entwined during Storrs' time in Jerusalem.

Further Unrest: 1921 in Palestine

The mistrust shown towards Storrs by Zionists and Palestinians alike throughout the 1920s had its roots not just in the Nabi Musa riots of 1920, but in subsequent disturbances that occurred in 1921. To the relief of Storrs and other British officials in Palestine, the 1921 Nabi Musa festival passed off without incident, although this was in part due to the actions of Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Keen to demonstrate his leadership qualities to the British in a bid to become Mufti of Jerusalem following Kamil's death in March 1921, Hajj Amin demonstrated his religious sensibilities over political grandstanding by taking the head of the procession and delivering a conciliatory speech. His actions formed part of a wider campaign by the Husayni family to ensure their candidate became Mufti and were reflective of the deterioration in relations between their family and the Nashashibis. Four candidates for the role were put forward. Lacking a suitable candidate of their own, the Nashashibis nominated Husam Jarallah from the Jarallah family as their nominee. When elections were held on April 12 1921, Jarallah won, with Hajj Amin only securing enough votes for fourth place. Stunned by the result, the Husaynis launched a second campaign to change the outcome, successfully appealing to Muslims and Christians across Palestine to petition that Hajj Amin should be Mufti. The family also looked to make links between the Nashashibis and the Zionists, claiming they were conspiring to sell religious property in Jerusalem, including the Western Wall.

The British authorities were now in a bind: should they respect the outcome of the original vote proclaiming Husam Jarallah Mufti or succumb to pressure from Palestinians across the country and appoint Hajj Amin? Ultimately, Samuel decided that the Husaynis candidate should become Mufti. Ernest Richmond and Storrs were in agreement, with the latter indicating that the petitions received clearly showed Hajj Amin's popularity throughout Palestine. The Governor also persuaded Ragheb al-Nashashibi to withdraw his family's candidates for the

role.⁶⁵ Clearly Storrs was prepared to overlook his consternation towards Hajj Amin from the previous year, whilst at the same time limiting the power of the Nashashibi family emboldened by his appointment of Ragheb as Mayor of Jerusalem. Storrs' appointments were calculated to give him leverage over the notables of Jerusalem, enabling him to remind the Husaynis that their 'present position (which was somewhat assailed before the British occupation)' was:

Largely due to the action of the British authorities who decorated, and confirmed, the position of, the late Mufti, who nominated Musa Pasha Kazim Mayor of Jerusalem, and who strained the workings of the electoral procedure against the will of a large body of Moslem opinion in order to establish the present Mufti.⁶⁶

Storrs' loyalty to the British position was clear, as this example of divide and rule demonstrates.

Satisfaction at the peaceful passing of Nabi Musa and appointment of a new Mufti was to be short-lived. On May 1 1921, clashes broke out in Jaffa between the Jewish Communist Party, who had declared their intention to overthrow the British and establish a Soviet Union of Palestine in flyers distributed the night before, and Ahdut HaAvoda, who advocated a Zionist Palestine. Violence escalated when the disturbances spilled over into an Palestinian neighbourhood, with fierce attacks being made against Jewish residents and their property. Over the next seven days 47 Jews and 48 Palestinians were to lose their lives, with trouble spreading to the countryside surrounding the city.⁶⁷

Two days after the first disturbances, the Zionist Organisation in London contacted the Foreign Office expressing their concern about reports from the Zionist Commission in Palestine that violence had broken out in Jaffa. In language reminiscent of that used in their evidence to the Palin Commission, the

⁶⁵ Pappe, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty*, pp. 213-218.

⁶⁶ Reference interview of Abdul Kader al Muzaffar with A.S. (Pol) on 29/10/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

⁶⁷ See Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, pp. 173-183 for a vivid description of events in Jaffa and the surrounding areas.

cable stated there was 'general testimony to the participation of the Arab police in the riots and of the fanaticism of the murderers. The Arab crowd was stirred up by parties opposing the British Mandate and the Jewish National Home'. Minuting on this report, Foreign Office official O.A. Scott expressed his distaste towards the Zionist attempts to 'get their aspect of the case presented first', noting a similar attempt being made the year before at Nabi Musa. Claiming this approach merely reflected 'the lack of balance of the Zionists', he advised ignoring the telegram.⁶⁸

Of course such an approach was unlikely to be heeded. On May 7 Sir Thomas Haycraft, the Chief Justice of Palestine, was chosen by Samuel to report on the disturbances. Storrs' deputy, Harry Luke, was also appointed to the commission. Like the Palin Report before it, Haycraft found that the violence was not premeditated. However, opposition to Zionism in Palestine was such that bloodshed was likely to occur should the opportunity arise.⁶⁹

For Storrs, trouble in Jaffa and the surrounding environs meant the potential for trouble in Jerusalem. That none broke out suggests the localised and spontaneous nature of the disturbances. Tensions remained high in Jerusalem during the first week of May, where even the bolting of a horse outside the city walls gave cause for every shop to be shut and armoured cars being sent out on patrol.⁷⁰ The maintenance of peace in the city was recognised by Samuel, who praised Storrs for maintaining law and order 'without having recourse to the use of His Majesty's Forces'. His success in this aim bore 'eloquent testimony to the influence' of Storrs over the population of Jerusalem, and to the 'confidence' they placed in him.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Zionist Organisation to Foreign Office, 3/5/1921 in Ingrams, *Palestine Papers*, pp. 121-122.

⁶⁹ Cmd. 1540, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in Palestine, May 1921, with Correspondence Relating Thereto.

⁷⁰ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 331.

⁷¹ Deedes to Storrs, 9/5/1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2. Storrs was clearly held in high regard by both Deedes and Samuel. When he contracted Malaria in September 1920 and had to return to England for treatment, Deedes thanked Storrs 'for the manner in which you have ensured continuity in the administration during the passage between the Military and the Civil regime'. Likewise, Samuel wrote that 'If the new Administration has achieved some measure of success, it is to you that it is very largely due'. See Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 395.

In summer 1921 Storrs proposed widening his remit to include the international stage. Relations between the Holy See and the British Administration in Palestine had become increasingly fraught since the establishment of the Civil Administration, with the former expressing their suspicions of British aims in Palestine and their support of Zionism. With his star seemingly in the ascendency, Storrs suggested to Samuel that he should arrange an informal visit to the Pope in Rome in a bid to assuage any misconceptions and rebuild trust between the two organisations.

A Roman Holiday

The High Commissioner agreed to this unofficial mission, with Storrs providing the funding but not including it in his annual leave.⁷² He had first visited the Vatican in September 1919, where he was granted an audience with Pope Benedict XV and reassured His Holiness in Latin that the then Military Administration in Palestine had not used their position for Anglican propaganda. The Pope agreed and lamented that others had done so for theirs. Whilst in Rome he also met with the Cardinal Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, and Monsignor Cerutti, Under-Secretary at the Vatican.⁷³ Storrs would renew his acquaintance with these men on his second visit in August 1921.

Prior to his visit in 1919, Storrs had written that the 'Christian Communities have no idea of allowing Jerusalem to lose any of its prestige as the centre of the Christian religions, and are far from sympathetic to my efforts to place the Jews in every way upon an equality with the others'.⁷⁴ Catholic concerns with Zionism related to two issues: fears that the Jews would receive privileges over and above the Christians of Palestine, and anxieties surrounding the loss of control of the Holy Places. From their perspective, the Zionist Commission anticipated that the Roman Catholic Church would offer the main opposition to their aspirations in Palestine.⁷⁵ Storrs' mission therefore provided an opportune moment to allay

⁷² Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 432.

⁷³ *Ibid*, pp. 326-327.

⁷⁴ Ronald Storrs, *Lawrence of Arabia, Zionism and Palestine*, (Penguin, London, 1940), pp. 83-84.

⁷⁵ Kevin L. Morris, "Israel's Historic Suspicion of the Vatican", *New Blackfriars*, Vol. 83, No. 976 (June, 2002), pp. 290-294.

Catholic concerns whilst at the same time reassuring the Commission of Britain's support.

In his half hour audience with Benedict XV, the Governor looked to placate the Pope's trepidations over the status of Christians, and in particular Roman Catholics, in Palestine. The Pope expressed his concerns that the impartiality of the Palestine Government was being compromised by the 'influence' of the Jews, particularly in 'committees' of importance. In response, Storrs questioned which committees the Pope was referring to, and emphasised that in all instances Jews were in a proportion corresponding to their numbers. Attempting to reassure the Pope, he argued that the only committee on which Jews were a majority was the Zionist Commission.

Storrs went on to pacify the Pope's concerns, reassuring him that the Holy Places Commission would soon be published.⁷⁶ He also asserted that the British Government would uphold the highest standards with regard to the showing of films in cinemas, which had existed in Jerusalem prior to the British occupation. The Patriarchate had notified Storrs of one film that was deemed unsuitable and Storrs suppressed it. He also reminded the Pope that he had personally issued an order that no ball, public or private should take place within the Old City Walls.

According to Storrs, this 'mollified' Benedict, who went on to question whether 'ladies of doubtful reputation' were permitted. Storrs explained his actions towards this issue under O.E.T.A. and acknowledged that whilst some 'ladies of doubtful reputation' may remain, they were far fewer in number than had originally been in the City. He explained that 'it was difficult for any city, however holy' to have 'complete exemption from this particular form of abuse'. The Pope agreed. Storrs then suggested that the Palestine Government should send more frequent updates to the legation, in a bid to avoid misunderstandings of the sort that had been expressed. Concluding, the Governor wrote:

⁷⁶ This Commission, which was later included as Article 14 of the Palestine Mandate, was never established due to the inability of the international community to decide its composition. See Walter Zander, "On the Settlement of Disputes about the Christian Holy Places," *Israel Law Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (1978), pp. 331-366.

I derived from this audience the impression that the Pope had for some time been subjected to very great pressure, which had certainly succeeded in prejudicing him against the Palestine Administration. He remarked, for instance, significantly, that it would be a great disgrace to any mandatory if, after a certain period, the departure of the Turks should be openly regretted. He has, I gathered, great confidence in H.B.M.'s minister who, I venture to suggest, should be kept as fully informed as possible of everything relating to the Holy Land and especially the Holy Places.⁷⁷

Storrs was to repeat his suggestion that 'all relevant telegrams and dispatches from Palestine to the Colonial Office and from the Legation to the Foreign Office be repeated to the Legation and Palestine respectively' in a subsequent reunion with Cardinal Gasparri. Minuting, Clauson expressed his concern at the wide remit suggested by 'all relevant.'⁷⁸ Churchill agreed, later instructing Samuel to send a monthly copy of the Administrative Report to HBM Representative at the Vatican, 'together with copies of any other despatches addressed to me, of a non-confidential and narrative description, on subjects which would be of interest to the Vatican'.⁷⁹

This appointment with Gasparri also indicated the anti-Semitism that clouded the views of some members of the Catholic Church. In his record of the meeting, Storrs recorded how Gasparri felt:

It was not the mass immigration elements in Zionism which alarmed him so much as the preponderating influence in Palestine which might be acquired by a comparatively small number of Jews occupying high positions. He said that in Hungary the proportion of Jews was only 5% of the population but as high as 40 or 50% in the learned professions.

⁷⁷ CO 733/11 – Visit of Ronald Storrs to the Vatican – Memorandum on Visit to the Pope, TNA.

⁷⁸ CO 733/6 – Mr R Storrs' Visit to Rome, 30/9/1921, TNA.

⁷⁹ CO 733/6 – Mr R Storrs' Visit to Rome – Churchill to Samuel, 22/10/1921, TNA.

This inclined him and others to be sceptical when they saw high official positions given so soon to Zionist Jews.⁸⁰

No record exists of how Storrs reacted to this statement. Dormer (who was also present), provided his account of the meeting to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, and merely noted that 'the allusion, of course, was clear'.⁸¹ However, Storrs did find Gasparri's personal conviction as to the goodwill of the British Government in Palestine 'most reassuring'.⁸² These sentiments were shared by Dormer, who informed Curzon of the 'opportune' nature of Storrs' visit, which, it was hoped, would have an excellent effect in helping to remove some of the apprehensions which the Holy See has entertained in regard to the British Administration of Palestine'.⁸³ The influence of the Governor was now extending beyond his charge in Palestine, with praise from the powers that be in Whitehall forthcoming. However, events in Jerusalem were soon to supersede Storrs' international pursuits as November 2, 1921 approached – the fourth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration.

'Let Him Go Down!'

In the aftermath of the Jaffa Riots, Samuel looked to clarify Britain's role in Palestine and the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. Speaking on June 3 as part of the King's birthday celebrations, he expressed that Balfour meant:

That the Jews, a people who are scattered throughout the world, but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, should be enabled to found there their home, and that some among them, within the limits which are fixed by the numbers and interests of the present population,

⁸⁰ CO 733/6 – Mr R Storrs' Visit to Rome, 30/9/1921, TNA.

⁸¹ CO 733/11 – Visit of Ronald Storrs to the Vatican – C.F Dormer to Marquess Curzon 17/9/1921, TNA.

⁸² CO 733/6 – Mr R Storrs' Visit to Rome, 30/9/1921, TNA.

⁸³ CO 733/11 – Visit of Ronald Storrs to the Vatican – C.F Dormer to Marquess Curzon 27/8/1921, TNA.

should come to Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all its inhabitants.⁸⁴

With immigration to Palestine having been temporarily suspended in the wake of May's disturbances, the new restrictions on arrivals to the country being determined by the needs and interests of Arab Palestinians outraged the Zionists. Eder viewed Samuel's speech as a betrayal and even went so far as to suggest to Weizmann that the High Commissioner should be ousted from his position. He was eventually talked into boycotting official ceremonies at which Samuel was present instead. However, far from being a betrayal, Samuel's clarification of the meaning of Balfour was entirely consistent with his belief that Zionism should work slowly to achieve its aims. Cognisant of the anger aggressive Zionist policies would cause Palestinian Arabs, he urged caution so that the latter's economic, religious and cultural rights (but not political rights) were not undermined.⁸⁵

Samuel's clarification over what the Balfour Declaration meant did little to assuage Palestinian fears for the future of their country. At the Fourth Palestinian National Congress which took place after the Jaffa Riots, it was decided to send a delegation to London to oppose the pro-Zionist policy of the British Government. Five men eventually departed Palestine on July 19, with Musa Kazim al-Husayni as head of the delegation. They met the Pope in Rome on their journey to Britain, arriving in London in August 1921. Once there, the delegation held several discussions with officials at the Colonial Office and three meetings with the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill. Their demands for the annulment of the Balfour Declaration, an immediate cessation of Jewish immigration to Palestine, the restoration of Ottoman legislation that had been superseded by British rule and the right of Palestine to associate with its Arab neighbours fell on deaf ears. Further attempts to revive talks failed, with the delegation rejecting outright suggestions from the Colonial Office that they should meet directly with the heads of the Zionist Movement.⁸⁶ This recommendation would later backfire on the British, being used by Palestinian nationalists as further evidence that both the

⁸⁴ Speech by Samuel on the Occasion of King George V's Birthday, 3/6/1921 in Ingrams, *Palestine Papers*, p. 128.

⁸⁵ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, pp. 189-193.

⁸⁶ Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, pp. 137-143.

Palestine Administration and the British Government were not British in nature, but Zionist.⁸⁷

Prior to the departure of the delegation to London, Chief Secretary Wyndham Deedes wrote to Hubert Young at the Colonial Office, commenting that ‘for the moment things are quiet – but of course they are not *settled* (his emphasis)’. He noted Palestine would most likely remain quiet whilst the delegation were in London, but such a condition may well depend on the outcome of discussions.⁸⁸ It was to prove a prescient statement. As the fourth anniversary of the Balfour declaration approached, there were few immediate signs of unrest at the Governor’s office. Writing in late October, Ernest Richmond informed Storrs of the ‘wonderfully friendly spirit prevailing’ in his office, whilst noting that his personal quarters breathed out ‘a perfect Ronald atmosphere’.⁸⁹ Yet away from the offices of the Administration mistrust and opposition towards the aims of the British and Zionists remained high. With November fast approaching, Governors across Palestine were reminded that they had the power to prohibit any demonstrations if they were likely to result in disorder.⁹⁰ In mid-October, they were further reminded that whilst trouble was not anticipated, ‘experience has shown how easily disturbances may arise from the most trifling incident, and how difficult it is to arrest their course’. Whilst ‘full discretion’ was given to Governors in dealing with any disturbances, Samuel was of the opinion that:

The situation in the country is such as to demand the prompt and strong measures to suppress the first signs of trouble, and that to this end you [Governors] should not hesitate, when you consider that the occasion so demands, to call upon the police to use their arms or upon the Troops for their assistance.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Memorandum on the Political Situation in Palestine, 23/11/1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

⁸⁸ Deedes to Young, 11/7/1921 in Ingrams, *Palestine Papers*, p. 131.

⁸⁹ Richmond to Storrs, 31/10/1920, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

⁹⁰ CO 733/7 – Disturbance in Jerusalem on 2 November 1921: instructions issued to Governors and reports on special measures taken to prevent a disturbance – Deedes to District Governors, 6/10/1921, TNA.

⁹¹ CO 733/7 – Disturbance in Jerusalem on 2 November 1921: instructions issued to Governors and reports on special measures taken to prevent a disturbance – Keith-Roach to District Governors, 19/10/1921, TNA.

Days before the anniversary Storrs received notice of a circular from the Palestinian Association in Egypt expressing that November 2 should be considered a day of mourning in Jerusalem and that all Arab shops should close. There were also rumours that Jews intended to close their shops, instead viewing the day as a holiday. Storrs decided it best to allow the shops to close on this day rather than try to enforce legislation to keep them open. According to Storrs, at no point did he receive information that a demonstration was planned.

On the morning of November 2, some Jewish and Palestinian Arab shops did open. Given that it was All Souls Day, Catholic Arab shops did not open, and this fact, coupled with rumours of impending trouble led to the Jewish and Palestinian shops following suit. By 9.15am had Storrs informed the Police that they should permit no gatherings in the city, having heard that there were 'loafers idling by the Jaffa Gate'. Shortly after this time events began to escalate out of Storrs' control.

At 10.00am, the Governor was notified that a demonstration had started to move down the Jaffa Road. In an example of the visible form of leadership that Storrs employed at times, he travelled to the scene by car, where those involved in the march were told they should return home. Having dispersed the crowd, and trusting the police to move on any further 'loafers', Storrs returned to his office to request troop reinforcements at Jaffa and Damascus Gates.

Returning to the Jaffa Gate, Storrs again observed that there were people loitering and moved them on. It was at this point he was notified of the first casualty; a Jew who he found to be 'bruised and frightened but not seriously injured'. Shortly afterwards, (incorrect) news emerged that incendiary speeches were being given on the Haram al-Sharif. Storrs sent notice that all those present should return home in twos or threes after the service before returning to the Governorate. Here he heard that an Arab had been killed in the Old City. In response, further requests for troops to go on patrol in the Old City were made but before they could be dispatched, C.I.D. reported on disturbances at Chain Gate, one of the gates to the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

By 14.00 Storrs had come across two Jews who had been stabbed in the back, and notified of a further attacks against Jews involving the throwing of a bomb and the looting of a house at al-Wad. Proceeding on foot to the scene, he discussed the situation with a military patrol, who informed him that they were aware of the attack but could report nothing else untoward in the city other than the shop closures. Returning once again to his office, Storrs was told of two further casualties. Plans were made to meet several Palestinian notables, including the Mayor of Jerusalem and the Mufti, with the intention of proceeding with them 'through the more difficult quarters, enforce upon them their responsibility for the preservation of order, and, at the same time, enjoin the opening of shops [the] next day' so they might 'prove their loyalty to the Government'. According to Storrs, those notables present at the meeting 'sincerely' reinforced the fact that the outbreaks of violence were spontaneous and did not reflect their wishes or desires. Given this fact, they advised the Governor that the disturbances had run their course, leading Storrs to decide against imposing Martial Law in the city.

When Storrs and the notables set foot into the city they soon came across a crowd outside the Armenian Catholic Church, where three Jews who were rumoured to be carrying bombs were huddled 'in great fear and uncertainty of where to go'. Having marched the men through the 'menacing' crowd and into the Armenian Convent it was established that they were unarmed. With a curfew being announced by Town Crier for 17.00, Storrs and the notables left the Convent and continued their walk around the city, finding no trace of further disturbances.⁹² By the day's end, four Jews and one Palestinian Arab had been killed.

In the aftermath of November 2, Storrs experienced the most severe criticism yet of his Governorship from the Zionists. He would later recall experiencing 'such a tempest of vituperation that I am still unable to understand how I did not emerge from it an anti-Semite for life'.⁹³ Such a view is understandable given the strength

⁹² Storrs to Deedes, No date given, November 1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

⁹³ Storrs, Orientations, pp. 363-364.

of criticism aimed at him. Writing in the Hebrew periodical *Lev Hadash*, Avidgor Forstein questioned Storrs' prestige as an Englishman and commented that Jews had:

Made a mistake by considering you [Storrs] to be a son of the Glorious British Nation, a son of the civilized Nation of Balfour. No, Mr. Storrs, you are not an Englishman! A certain girl called your attention to an unhappy wounded man and asked for your sympathy, and you pushed her outside with your own hands. An Englishman? To be impolite to a young girl? No, Mr. Storrs, you are not an Englishman...you are a disappointment to us and the straightforward British Nation...we scorn you, your cunningness and power and all kinds of political diplomacy or murderous schemes.⁹⁴

Similar barbs were aimed in the Hebrew-language paper, *Haaretz*, who observed that 'the Jews have expressed their complete non-confidence' in Storrs and no longer recognised him as Governor of Jerusalem. Writing in capitals (as if to add extra virulence), the editorial finished by letting Storrs know that:

THE WHOLE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN THE COUNTRY
WILL NOT REST NOR KEEP QUIET EVEN FOR A MINUTE UNTIL
HE GOES DOWN.
LET HIM GO DOWN AT ONCE AND RETURN US TO OUR REST.
LET HIM GO DOWN!⁹⁵

Later the same newspaper questioned:

Why does the Jerusalem Governor always believe that peace will prevail, and why does he possess a feeling of quietness in his mind? What kind of politics does he keep in his light, playing hand which wakes up in us the sorrowful and bitter thoughts?

⁹⁴ Avidgor Forstein in *Lev Hadash*, No. 3, 7/11/1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

⁹⁵ Extract from *Ha'aretz*, 7/11/1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

After the blood is already spilt the Governor conveys to us the sorrow,
where is he before this is done?

Echoing accusations made against O.E.T.A. following Nabi Musa, the article continued:

Twice were pogroms arranged in Jerusalem, our Holy City, whilst she
was under thy Administration, in which innocent Jewish blood was spilt
– Go Ye Down!...

Every country, every state throws down the Administrator, if pogroms
are started within his scope of power – Go Ye Down!

We cannot rest, we cannot continue any normal life in this city – Go
Ye Down!

Storrs' decision to personally try to disperse crowds that had formed was also criticised, with the accusation made that the 'mob laughed, cheered and applauded him and once they raised him on their shoulders'. Emphasising the proximity of relationship between Storrs and the Palestinian notables who accompanied him through the streets of Jerusalem on the afternoon of November 2, it was claimed that as soon as 'the Governor and *his companions* (my emphasis) were gone the crowds reassembled and cried jubilantly and the cries of agony of the assaulted Jews could be heard mixed with their cries'.⁹⁶ Storrs' preference of being a visible governor, so prevalent during military rule, was now leading to accusations of duplicity.

One month later and *Haaretz* continued their attacks. In an editorial entitled 'The 30th Day', the paper lamented the lack of justice for the victims and repeatedly questioned why 'Mr Storrs' was still in office, claiming that 'the responsible one for the incident is still freely attending shows, visits and celebrations', an observation indicative of the social life that Storrs so enjoyed. Tensions between Arab and Hebrew-language newspapers were also present, with the former being accused of 'playing the innocent' over events in early November.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Extract from *Ha'aretz*, date not clear, 11/1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

⁹⁷ Extract from *Ha'aretz*, 5/12/1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

Support for Storrs in the press came from an unlikely quarter. *Beit al-Makdes*, a Jerusalem-based Arabic newspaper, directly refuted the criticisms aimed at Storrs by *Haaretz*, commenting ‘that he did nothing worthy of blame on the day of the disturbance’. However this defence was not without qualification. The paper noted that support of Storrs in this instance did not mean ‘he serves the Arab cause’ given that ‘on several occasions [he] upheld the Jews against them’.⁹⁸ For *Beit al-Makdes*, there were no illusions as to where Storrs’ loyalties truly lay.

Back in Britain there was limited discussion about the disturbances in Parliament, with the Leader of the House, Austen Chamberlain, merely acknowledging that the uprising reached only ‘trifling dimensions’ owing to ‘the prompt and effective action of the local authorities’.⁹⁹ The major papers remained similarly quiet. In their reports on the trouble, both *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times* recognised the role Storrs played in restoring calm by walking the streets of the city with Arab notables.¹⁰⁰ The latter paper would also report on Zionist demands to remove Storrs from office.¹⁰¹

Away from public eyes, the Palestine Government began their investigations into the events of November 2. The initial findings of the Director of Public Security, Bramley, were critical of Storrs. He argued that the Governor had paid no heed to warnings that trouble was possible; failed to take steps to adequately police a sensitive date; was in error over not challenging the shop closure; and had inadequately responded to the crowds outside the Jaffa Gate. In his response to Deedes, the Civil Secretary, Storrs questioned what more he could have done given the ‘lack of evidence to justify the assumption that November 2 was regarded otherwise than as a day providing an opportunity mistakenly considered suitable for giving expression in an orderly, peaceful and legitimate manner, to the opinions most unfortunately held in regard to the Balfour Declaration’. Placing

⁹⁸ Extract from *Beit Ul Makdes*, 19/11/1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

⁹⁹ HC Deb, Wednesday, 9 November, 1921, vol. 142, col. 396.

¹⁰⁰ “Riot in Jerusalem”, *The Daily Telegraph*, (London, England), Friday, November 4, 1921, Issue 20763, p. 11 and “Arab-Jewish Riot in Jerusalem”, *The Times*, (London, England), Friday, November 4, 1921, p. 10.

¹⁰¹ “The Jerusalem Riots: Dismissal of Mr Storrs Demanded”, *The Times*, (London, England), Thursday, November 10, 1921, Issue 42874, p. 9.

the disturbance in context, he contended that 'eighteen months is not a very long period to enable a new Government, constituted in unique circumstances'.

Storrs' strongest words were to be aimed at the author of the report, Bramley himself. He dismissed Bramley's claim that rumours were swirling amongst Palestinians of impending trouble as 'a normal and not surprising expression of the state of mind into which the uneducated are apt to fall at the least opportunity'. The Director of Public Security's attempts to implicate the notables were given similar treatment, with Storrs arguing that the Grand Mufti was not guilty of fomenting trouble simply because he was in close association with some individuals who had been arrested in the aftermath. For Storrs this argument was:

Characteristic of Colonel Bramley's current attitude of mind in respect of Moslem Notables, an attitude which, if adopted by many of the Executive Officials...would result in dangerously increased bitterness throughout the country. There would follow an obvious temptation, and there might be a tendency, to put up reports throwing suspicion on notables as promoters of disorder, reports which, if not acted upon, would expose the Government to charges of remissness, and if acted upon, would aggravate the situation for which the Governor is ultimately responsible.

Having taken apart Bramley's argument, Storrs acknowledged the difficult role the Director of Public Security faced in his 'harassing labours' given that work in Palestine was of a nature that would 'try the nerves of all who held responsible positions'.¹⁰²

The task of providing the final conclusions of the investigation to the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, fell to the High Commissioner himself. Samuel identified three precautionary measures that could have been taken by Storrs: binding over political agitators; allocating individual notables responsibility for an area of the city in the event of disorder; and ensuring that adequate reserves of armed and unarmed police were available. On the first charge the Governor was

¹⁰² Storrs to Deedes, 2/12/1921, Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2.

found to have committed an error of judgement, but only as a result of subsequent events, as opposed to the information he had at the time. On the second charge Storrs was found to be not culpable given the spontaneous nature of the disturbances. With regards to the final recommendation, Samuel's findings were more complicated. He criticised Storrs for 'the essentially dangerous character' of allowing the shops to close despite the assurances of the notables that there would be no trouble. Samuel further questioned why the Governor did not request the use of 50 officers from the Police Training School on the Mount of Olives as reservists. However, blame was ultimately ascribed to Bramley. It was found that his attitude in conversation with the Governor on the morning of November 2 was that no further action need be taken, and that Storrs therefore took his cue on the necessity of reinforcements from him.¹⁰³ In response Churchill suggested that Bramley should be removed from his role in favour of someone with military experience, proposing his friend and former Police Chief in Ireland, General Henry Tudor.¹⁰⁴ He was duly appointed as the head of the British Section of the Palestine Gendarmerie; a newly established riot squad for Palestine that soon gained the reputation of using methods akin to the Black and Tans in Ireland due to its recruitment of former Royal Irish Constabulary soldiers.¹⁰⁵ Initially Tudor worked alongside Bramley until the Director of Public Security retired in 1923.

Despite a further disturbance under his Governorship, it is clear that his superiors had great faith in Storrs' abilities. Samuel, in particular, had leapt to his defence at the expense of others, leading Storrs to recall in *Orientalism* that the High Commissioner 'never made me feel I had grown too big for my boots, and he never failed to support me through good days and through bad in the position, illogically superior to my post, which priority rather than merit had thrust upon me'.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ CO 733/18 – Samuel to Churchill: Conclusions on the Jerusalem Disturbances, 27/1/1922, TNA.

¹⁰⁴ CO 733/18 – Churchill to Samuel, 24/2/1922, TNA.

¹⁰⁵ Seán William Gannon, "The Formation, Composition, and Conduct of the British Section of the Palestine Gendarmerie, 1922-1926", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (December 2013), pp. 977-100. Gannon argues that whilst the composition of the British Section was predominantly made up of former RIC soldiers, its record of violence compared favourably with the methods used by British forces in Ireland.

¹⁰⁶ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 392.

1922: The Fallout

Whilst the Administration continued to offer their full support, Storrs remained concerned about how the Jewish backlash to the November 1921 disturbances would impact on his standing. When the newspaper publisher Lord Northcliffe visited Palestine on a fact-finding mission in February 1922, Storrs hosted a luncheon for him on behalf of the Pro-Jerusalem Society. Northcliffe was highly critical of British policy throughout and was set to send a lurid telegram back to Britain until the Governor managed to persuade him to tone down his language. Storrs' overriding concern was that the Zionists would jump to the conclusion that he had deliberately arranged for Northcliffe to be so pro-Arab and anti-Zionist in his reporting.¹⁰⁷ Two days after their meeting, *The Daily Telegraph* reported courtesy of a Reuters telegram that Samuel and Storrs were 'honoured by all, even by those holding extreme views'. However, Northcliffe expressed in no uncertain terms that Palestine was not the 'happy' country he could remember from his previous visits. The report continued that:

Since arriving in Jerusalem he [Northcliffe] had heard the most conflicting reports – worse than could be heard anywhere. His Zionist friends had an exaggerated idea that the only topic in England was Zion. This was not true. He found that the declaration of the British Government had been accepted by letter as if everyone in England agreed to it. He stated that he and many others did not agree in this sense... His opinion was that Palestine was going too quick, and if they were not careful and if great tact were not used, Great Britain would have another Ireland on her hands and not be in a position to support the burden.

Northcliffe went on to express how Orthodox Jews in Palestine opposed the aims of the Zionists before ending with advice for the Zionist Commission themselves.

¹⁰⁷ Notes on Lord Northcliffe's visit to Palestine, 8/2/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3. In the same memorandum Storrs noted that Northcliffe refused to join the Pro-Jerusalem Society because Jews were members. However, in 1922 he appeared on the list of the Society's subscribers. See Ashbee ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922*, p. 102.

He cautioned that ‘they should select immigrants with the greatest care, otherwise Palestine would get a reputation which would be linked with armoured cars’.¹⁰⁸

Keen to avoid Northcliffe’s stark warning, preparations soon began for Nabi Musa. Having been a flashpoint two years previously, and with two major disturbances occurring in Palestine in 1921, the arrangements made were far more stringent than in the past. Whilst the usual plans for a band and buglers were put in place, further security precautions were taken by the British to avoid a repeat of previous turmoil in the city. On March 25 it was decided to deploy 50 mounted men in Jerusalem in addition to the existing garrison of 100 infantry.¹⁰⁹ Permission was granted to search individuals and confiscate nabuts, knives and firearms, whilst a group of ten plain-clothes policemen had the power to arrest ‘suspicious characters’ throughout the festivities. The authorities also began to impinge on the substance of the festival itself, limiting the number of swords to be carried by the traditional escort to the banners to ten, with no further weapons being permitted. Officers in charge of outposts throughout the city also had responsibility for patrolling the rooftops on the day of processions.¹¹⁰ To the relief of the authorities, Nabi Musa passed without incident.

This outcome was partly due to the traditional Palestinian leadership’s rejection of violence as a method by which to achieve their aims and partly due to ongoing negotiations between the British and the Palestinian delegation in London.¹¹¹ Despite the impasse reached in negotiations in Autumn 1921, talks had resumed in December of that year. The British aimed to build upon Samuel’s statement of policy in June 1921 by clarifying that the Jews had been promised not a state but a national home in some, but not all of Palestine, and establishing the principle that immigration could only occur based on the economic prosperity of the population and the absorptive capacity of the land.¹¹² Storrs concurred with these

¹⁰⁸ “Lord Northcliffe: Views on Palestine”, *The Daily Telegraph*, (London, England), Friday, February 10, 1922, Issue 20846, p. 10.

¹⁰⁹ Keith-Roach for Civil Secretary, Memorandum on distribution of Gendarmerie, 13/3/1922, ISA 567/6 – Chief Secretary’s Circulars 1922, ISA.

¹¹⁰ Orders for Nebi Musa 1922, 31/3/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹¹¹ Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, pp. 134-135 and p. 145.

¹¹² *Ibid*, pp. 143-144.

sentiments. Responding to an article on Zionism published in the *Edinburgh Review*, he asserted that its tone was 'disingenuous' as 'the impression is given that the Zionists seek to restore materially the whole of Jewry scattered through the world – an impossible thesis which has been publicly contradicted by responsible Zionist leaders on many occasions'.¹¹³

Such clarifications did little to allay legitimate Palestinian concerns, with delegates contending that control of immigration should be transferred to a national government which could set its own quota. Attempts by Churchill in February 1922 to win over the Palestinians with the lure of a legislative council enshrined by constitution were also rejected on the grounds that it would be toothless without the powers over immigration. Instead, they proposed a parliament made up of representatives elected proportionately according to the pre-war population of Muslim, Christians and Jewish inhabitants of the country. Sensing that immigration was the key issue, Churchill proposed the establishment of an 'immigration committee' that would advise the High Commissioner on issues of immigration – a far cry from the autonomy that the Palestinians desired.¹¹⁴

Regardless of the stalemate in negotiations, London continued in its quest to clarify the British position in Palestine, culminating in the Churchill White Paper of June 3 1922. In it, the Colonial Secretary refused to disavow the commitments made under the Balfour Declaration, whilst also rejecting the notion that Palestine would become 'as Jewish as England is English'. A distinction was made between the power of the Palestine Zionist Executive (previously known as the Zionist Commission) to administer matters relating to the Jewish population of Palestine and 'assist in the general development of the country', but not to participate in its overall government. Further, a legislative council was proposed and immigration was to be limited according to Palestine's economic absorptive capacity. Finally, Churchill rebuffed any claims that Palestine had been included in the territory

¹¹³ Observations on Mr V. Gabriel's Article "Troubles of the Holy Land" in the "Edinburgh Review" No. 479 of January 1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹¹⁴ Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, pp. 143-144.

promised Sharif Husayn in his correspondence with Henry McMahon in 1915.¹¹⁵ The Zionist Executive accepted the provisions of the White Paper. Whilst acknowledging the limitations placed on immigration as a blow, the affirmation of British support for Balfour, together with the recognition that immigration would continue according to economic necessity, led Weizmann to assent to this statement of policy.¹¹⁶ In contrast, the Palestinian delegation could not accept the terms of the White Paper, expressing their concerns that self-government would only be granted when sufficient numbers of Jews were in the country.¹¹⁷

By the time Churchill had presented his White Paper to Parliament, Storrs had been back in England just shy of one month.¹¹⁸ However, throughout his time back home he was to be kept apprised of events in Palestine in the form of Political Resumes for the Jerusalem District. In late May he was informed that 'the political situation in general remains one of expectancy; and it would be unwise to regard the calm, which happily prevails at present, as anything but superficial. Fundamentally the feeling of discontent is...not less than it was in 1921'.¹¹⁹

A fortnight later controversy emerged over the rearrangement of the King's birthday celebrations, traditionally held on June 3. When a new date was proposed, Hajj Amin al-Husayni refused to attend, despite being reminded that his brother had a regular presence at the event. According to the resume, his attitude was 'one of general intransigence and unwillingness to act courteously by the Administration'; an administration that had hitherto ignored all Palestinian protests against the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. In a further attempt to encourage Hajj Amin to change his mind, and an example of British attempts to flatter and ingratiate themselves with the notables when it suited their interests, it was suggested that he should attend as the Supreme Muslim Council

¹¹⁵ Cmd. 1700, Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation.

¹¹⁶ Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, pp. 290-291.

¹¹⁷ Ingrams, *Palestine Papers*, p. 172.

¹¹⁸ "New in Brief", *The Times*, (London, England), Thursday, May 11, 1922, Issue 43028, p.9. Storrs arrived in England on Wednesday 10th May and soon departed London for the country. Whilst in England, he

¹¹⁹ Secret Political Resume for Jerusalem District for fortnight ended 31st May, 1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

was part of the Administration. Hajj Amin expressed his surprise at this statement and refused to shift his position, leading Harry Luke, Storrs' deputy to conclude that 'Hajj Amin's attitude...serves to throw into clearer relief the real loss caused to the Government by the death of his brother and predecessor'. It was also blithely reported that the movement for Friday closure of Muslim shops in protest at the provisions made in the White Paper were likely to 'fizzle out'.¹²⁰

Such a prediction proved short-sighted. One month later it was reported that the 'closing of Arab shops in Jerusalem was practically universal' on July 13 and 14, with many workers also downing tools. Many Jewish shops also closed, with the exception of those in Jewish areas of the city. Luke attributed the peaceful passing of the shop closure and strike to 'the general desire of responsible persons not to cause trouble, a desire undoubtedly stimulated in the leaders of this strike by the Government's warning that as to their responsibility in case of trouble'. For the first time the British Section of the Palestine Gendarmerie were deployed on the streets of Jerusalem, producing 'a very good effect...on both the over-bold and the over-timid'.¹²¹ No recognition was given by Luke to the efforts of the Palestinian notables to ensure that the strike passed off peaceably.¹²²

Following the publication of the Churchill White Paper and the subsequent confirmation of the terms of the British Mandate for Palestine one month later, the Palestine delegation arrived back in Haifa on 21 August 1922. Shortly after their return the Fifth Palestinian Congress was held in Nablus in a bid to formulate a response to Churchill. The main outcome of its eighteen-point plan was the decision to boycott any elections to the proposed legislative council, alongside a boycott of Jewish goods and efforts to stop the sale of land to Jews.¹²³ Such policies made Storrs uncomfortable. Writing to a friend in early September, he confessed that:

¹²⁰ Secret Political Resume for Jerusalem District for fortnight ended 16th June, 1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹²¹ Secret Political Resume for Jerusalem District for fortnight ended 15th July, 1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹²² Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, p. 148.

¹²³ Regan, *The Balfour Declaration*, p. 143.

Things [are] not easy here and like to be more difficult still before long. The Arab Delegation have returned from England and threaten boycotting the Jews, non-co-operation in elections and taxes, and, possibly, terroristic sniping of prominent officials, which the last policy I personally deprecate even more strongly than the two previous... The H.C. liked and respected personally even by Arabs, but resented as a Jew and a Zionist. Myself alternatively attacked by both sides, but more fiercely by the extremist Jews, though the moderates tend to support me. From the picturesque side of life, we are, as in Egypt and elsewhere, making the place cleaner, richer, and duller. Thou has multiplied the harvest but not increased the joy, is my epitaph for the British Empire.¹²⁴

Clearly Storrs, at his most invigorated when in pursuing culture, society and the arts, was feeling chastened by the political realities of governing Jerusalem. It is surely no coincidence that he would look to establish his ill-fated Palestine Opera Association shortly after this letter in a bid to rejuvenate his spirits.

On September 7 the various regional Governors of Palestine, including Storrs, met at Government House.¹²⁵ During their meeting they discussed the increasing levels of opposition they now faced, viewing the Congress' plan as nothing more than an attempt by the 'Arab opposition to advance its authority in the country at the expense of the Government'. As such, it was necessary to 'take early steps to check its activity and prevent unconstitutional methods which will inevitably develop into a dangerous situation'. In response, Governors proposed that Palestinian refusal to partake in any forthcoming census should be viewed as seditious. Moreover, it was recommended that in the future Congresses should submit their minutes to the Governor in question for his approval prior to meeting.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Storrs to Lloyd, 1/9/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹²⁵ Storrs had returned to Palestine in August. See "Court Circular", *The Times*, (London, England), Saturday, August 5, 1922, Issue 43102, p.9.

¹²⁶ Minutes of Meeting of Governors, Government House, Jerusalem, 7/9/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

One week later notice was given that Storrs had taken on the administration of Jaffa District in addition to his other duties in Jerusalem and the surrounding area.¹²⁷ With this expanded role came greater accountability regarding the completion of the census. District Governors were responsible for dividing each town or village into areas with approximately five hundred houses, whereafter an enumerator of the same faith as the household they were visiting was sent to compile the number of residents present.¹²⁸ Writing to Gertrude Bell on October 18, Storrs bemoaned that:

Here we are in the midst of census trouble. Some think it is being taken in order to increase taxation, others that the aim is military service. The agitators are informing their sectories that Jewish statistics will be enhanced to the disadvantage of the Arabs. All are aware that the census is the basis of the electoral register, and that the register precludes the elections, acceptance of which mean (in their eyes) recognition of the Constitution, and with it, of the Balfour Declaration. In consequence the closest supervision and the strictest measures are necessary.¹²⁹

Initially the Arab Executive (founded at the Third Palestinian Congress in 1920 to provide direction to Palestinian opposition towards Zionism and led by Musa Kazim al-Husayni) agreed to the census. Later they made their support conditional on the registration of Palestinians overseas, with the Palestine Government acceding to their demands. Utilising the argument that participation in the census was beneficial from a Palestinian perspective as it would demonstrate their demographic superiority, the Executive lobbied the Arab population to participate.¹³⁰ The findings of the census confirmed this numerical supremacy. Of the 757,182 residents of Palestine, 590,890 were Muslim, 83,794 were Jewish, 73,024 were Christian and a further 9,474 were recorded as

¹²⁷ ISA 567/6 – Chief Secretary's Circulars, ISA.

¹²⁸ J.B. Barron ed., *Report and General Abstracts on the Census of 1922*, (Government of Palestine, 1922), p. 1.

¹²⁹ Storrs to Gertrude Bell, 18/10/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹³⁰ Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, p. 151.

others.¹³¹ In Jerusalem the Jews remained in the majority, as they had done prior to the British occupation. 33,971 residents of the Holy City identified as Jewish, with 13,413 Muslims and 14,699 Christians.¹³² However, within the Old City the population breakdown was different, with 9,345 responding as Muslim, 7,262 as Christian and 5,639 as Jewish.¹³³

Whilst relations between Palestinian Arabs and the Zionist Executive took up a sizeable amount of the Governor's time, Storrs also at times found himself intervening in Christian affairs. This was especially the case when the actions of a particular sect or priest was felt to have impinged upon or offended the Palestine Government. One such example occurred in late October 1922. Storrs was informed by his Sub-Governor in Ramallah that a local Latin Priest had used a circular to encourage his congregation to refuse to contribute donations to the Ramallah National School, which was in deficit. The Sub-Governor (and Storrs himself) viewed this as an attack on the Government as they provided the Latin Community with a large grant-in-aid for educational purposes. Writing to the Latin Patriarch, Luigi Barlassina, Storrs requested that 'immediate and exemplary action' be taken against the Latin Priest of Ramallah for the perceived slight.¹³⁴

The Governor also had problems balancing his involvement with the different Christian denominations of the city. As early as 1919 he found himself under fire from an unnamed member of the Latin community for seemingly attending Orthodox services over Roman Catholic. In response, Storrs argued that he considered it his 'duty to go when asked to Orthodox, Armenian, Moslem and Jew' and contended that he had never been invited to a Latin service.¹³⁵ These difficulties would come to the fore later in his tenure in Jerusalem when the issue of repairs to the Shrine of the Holy Sepulchre in Bethlehem arose, as will be demonstrated later.

¹³¹ Barron, *Report and General Abstracts on the Census of 1922*, p. 3. It is worth noting that the Jewish population of Palestine had increased by 17,220 since estimates made in 1920.

¹³² *Ibid*, p. 7.

¹³³ *Ibid*, p. 15.

¹³⁴ Storrs to Latin Patriarch, 2/11/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹³⁵ Storrs, *Orientalism*, p. 403.

Not all the work that came across Storrs' desk involved balancing the competing interests of different nationalisms and religions. The remarkable tale of H.H. Shaw (or S.S. Hoare as Storrs renamed him in a personal copy of his despatch to Government House) illustrates the variety of issues that could come across his desk. Shaw lived in Jerusalem for six months, staying in a variety of hotels which he did not pay for. At Hensman's Hotel he threatened to commit suicide if any fuss were made about paying his debts, whilst at the end of his stay at Notre Dame de France he drew a service revolver and threatened to shoot the porter. The firearm was later confiscated by the police but this did not stop Shaw from threatening to shoot the waiters at the Grand New Hotel and the Bristol Gardens when presented with a bill for his time at both establishments. At a further hotel he was found to have entered the confidences of a British lawyer who he persuaded to buy him a drink. Later Shaw convinced the management that his bill should be added to that of the lawyer and proceeded to stay for a full week at the expense of his new acquaintance. He also left debts at the Allenby Hotel, the International Restaurant and the Police Mess.

Officers and Officials in Jerusalem also fell under Shaw's spell, lending him money to tide him over on the grounds that he would soon be receiving a remittance from his mother in England. Later he would forge the signature of an English lawyer to write to his mother announcing his own death. Upon his arrest for the forgery he was granted freedom on parole in the Police Barracks as there was no suitable accommodation for European prisoners. Unsurprisingly Shaw broke his parole only to be rearrested some three hours later.

Storrs' involvement in this extraordinary story is twofold. Firstly he gave Shaw the option of standing his trial or leaving Jerusalem altogether. Shaw chose the latter option, and the police, concerned that he would fail to uphold his end of the deal, escorted him to the Consular Services at Port Said, Egypt where he was to be placed on board a ship back to England as soon as possible. Secondly he was in communication with Shaw's mother, providing assurances that her son was alive and outlining the steps taken to assist him. He also aided the family of an Armenian girl in Alexandria who Shaw was accused of seducing.

With Shaw safely sailing back to England, Storrs received a letter from His Majesty's Consul in Port Said expressing their surprise at the nature of Shaw's expulsion, having taken his explanation of the story at face value. Whilst grateful for the assistance of the Consul, the Governor acknowledged that his 'action was better inspired than his inferences', reflecting that:

Had the subject of the edifying narrative remained for a few weeks, or even days, in the congenial atmosphere of Port Said it is probable that the Consul would have had the best of reasons for revising his estimate of "the amiable, the somewhat vacuous, the by no means vicious, and the very far from criminal" Mr H. H. Shaw.¹³⁶

The multi-agency nature of Storrs' work is clear, with liaison between local hoteliers and restaurateurs, the police, judiciary, immigration and consular services necessary in order to resolve the issue. Yet communication within the Administration could also be problematic. Like O.E.T.A. before it, Storrs found himself left out of the loop on issues he felt were within his purview. In one instance in October 1922, he was only made aware of passports for foreign travel being issued to Musa Pasha Kazim and Sheikh Abdul Kader Muzzafar as a result of a chance conversation with Samuel. As these were notable residents of the district under his command, Storrs felt that he had good reason to know of developments. Attempting to prevent such a situation occurring again, he proposed that all persons of interest required for interview by Government House go through the Governor so they remained aware of developments.¹³⁷ The influence of his days as Oriental Secretary are clear; knowledge and intelligence were central to how Storrs governed Jerusalem.

As 1922 drew to a close a dinner was held on December 27 to honour Storrs' fifth year in Jerusalem. Samuel presided, and attendees included the Grand Mufti, notable members of the Zionist Executive and other leading British officials.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Storrs to Assistant Secretary, Government House, Jerusalem, 1/11/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹³⁷ Storrs to Assistant Secretary (Pol.), 13/10/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

¹³⁸ "News in Brief", *The Times*, (London, England), Friday, December 29, 1922, Issue 43225, p.7.

Just days after this celebration rumours abounded that the Governor was due to relinquish his position in the city having reached the milestone of five years' service. The Colonial Office were forced to issue a statement denying this was the case, noting that Storrs' appointment was a permanent one in the Palestine Civil Service.¹³⁹ The presence of such rumours seemed a fitting end to a year in which his position was scrutinised more than ever.

Triumphs, Tragedies and Tribulations: 1923-1926

Storrs was to start 1923 with a trip to America in an attempt to raise funds for the Pro-Jerusalem Society.¹⁴⁰ His packed itinerary saw him visit various places across the North-East and Mid-West of the country and included reading the lessons in New York Cathedral, visiting Chicago as the guest of General Charles Dawes (soon to be famous for developing the Dawes Plan of World War One reparations for Europe) and being received at the White House by President Warren G. Harding for a half hour audience.¹⁴¹ He also met the founder of the Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford, drawing the ire of the official organ of the Zionist Organisation of America, the *New Palestine* newspaper. In an example of the increased scrutiny that Storrs found himself under after the disturbances of 1920 and 1921, the paper criticised the fact that he had refused to openly support the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine during his tour of the United States. It went on to state that:

What passed between Ford and the Governor, nobody knows, but rumour puts two facts together. Arabs in Palestine announce Mr Ford as their friend and that he intends to do some 'work' in Palestine. Immediately thereafter the Governor of Jerusalem pays the new found ally of the Arabs a formal visit and speaks in praise of his abilities...Governor Storrs may protest that he is a friend of the Jewish people, but he takes a strange way of exhibiting his friendship. First of all, his silence, when he should have spoken, then his visit paid to Mr.

¹³⁹ "News in Brief", *The Times*, (London, England), Saturday, December 30, 1922, Issue 43226, p.7.

¹⁴⁰ See Chapter 3 for more details.

¹⁴¹ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 434.

Ford which never should have been paid, and lastly the uncalled for praise of Mr. Ford which came as the last incident of a remarkable exhibition of tactless behaviour. It will take a great deal of explanation to remove the unpleasant inference that will be drawn from Governor Storrs' visit to the United States.¹⁴²

Such an interpretation failed to recognise the purpose of his visit across the Atlantic, which was both personal and professional in nature. Storrs used his platform in America to highlight the role of the Palestine Government. In addition he promoted the work of his prized creation: the Pro-Jerusalem Society. He told an audience at the Illini Country Club in Illinois that 'the British in Palestine are today the agents of the civilisation of the world. They are not there to satisfy any mercenary motives, but to satisfy humanity'.¹⁴³ Further invitations to talk soon followed, with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company requesting that Storrs appear on WEAJ Radio in New York to speak about Palestine.¹⁴⁴ His reputation as an authority on Palestine was growing.

Storrs returned to Palestine in March 1923 in time to prepare for the annual Nabi Musa, Easter and Passover festivities in Jerusalem. On 20 March a public notice in English, Hebrew and Arabic was issued to the city by Storrs outlining the regulations for public assemblies or demonstrations. Based on the Ottoman Law Concerning Illegal Assemblies, all such gatherings required the express permission of the District Governor. Where illegal assemblies did occur, a Government Official would make a maximum of three requests for the crowd to disperse. If the group were armed and did not move after the second request, the police and soldiers had permission to use force in order to disperse the assembly. However, if the crowd were not armed a third request to leave would be made. Non-compliance after this final request would also see the use of force. Cognisant of the potential for rumours to spread and lead to disorder, the Palestine Government had also introduced the Dissemination of False News Ordinance.

¹⁴² "Jerusalem Governor Scored by Official Zionist Organ", *The Reform Advocate*, (Chicago), Saturday, March 10, 1923, Page 24.

¹⁴³ "Storrs says British are in Palestine for Humanity", no publication, 12/2/1923, Storrs Papers, Reel 10, Box 3, Folder 5.

¹⁴⁴ Ross to Storrs, 17/2/1923, Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4.

Created in 1921, this regulation meant that anyone found 'by speech or writing or any other form of communication' to 'disseminate false news calculated to disturb the public peace' could be convicted by a Governor, Deputy Governor or Civil Magistrate and either be imprisoned for up to six months, fined, or receive both punishments.¹⁴⁵

Access to key religious sites was always a potential flashpoint in Jerusalem, not least when the festivals of three major religions coincided. As the festivities commenced in early April, concerns were raised by Kisch, Chairman of the Palestine Zionist Executive, who expressed his anger that Jews had been prohibited from visiting the Western Wall on the first day of Passover. The Governor denied knowledge of any such order being issued, and suggested that a subordinate Government official had prohibited access in error.¹⁴⁶ Once more, the three festivals passed off without incident, but the issuing of such draconian public notices suggested an administration that perceived itself to be under threat as opposed to one designed to 'satisfy humanity'.

Several weeks later Storrs was to experience 'the first overwhelming sorrow in most men's lives' – the death of his mother.¹⁴⁷ On May 21 *The Daily Telegraph* reported that he had returned to his family home at The Deanery in Rochester where his mother lay 'seriously ill'.¹⁴⁸ Five days after his arrival Lucy Storrs had died, with the funeral being held at Rochester Cathedral on May 30.¹⁴⁹ Reflecting on this difficult time, Storrs noted that the grief his family felt was 'illogically perhaps deepened by the sight of the Cathedral and the streets of Rochester crowded to overflowing as the great horses drew the farm-wains with their pyramids of flowers behind the woman from whom so many had known an individual kindness and encouragement'.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Public Notice, 30/3/1923, Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4.

¹⁴⁶ Z4/41428-3t – Kisch to Storrs, 3/4/1923, CZA.

¹⁴⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 434.

¹⁴⁸ "Court Circular", *The Daily Telegraph*, (May 21, 1923), Issue 21240, p. 9.

¹⁴⁹ "The Hon. Mrs Storrs", *The Times*, (London, England), Monday, May 28, 1923, Issue 43352, p.14.

¹⁵⁰ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 434.

Just over a month after this trauma Storrs married his cousin, Louisa Lucy Littleton, widow of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Clowes, at St Peter's, Eaton Square in London. His father, John, and brother, Reverend Christopher Storrs, officiated the ceremony, which took place on Monday 2 July. In a nod to Storrs' love of Bach, the organist played the German composer's Fugue in G minor when the bride entered, whilst Edward Marsh, sometime Private Secretary to Winston Churchill, was Storrs' best man.¹⁵¹ However, the death of his mother clearly weighed heavily upon Storrs, with *The Times* reporting there was to be no invitations or reception 'owing to the deep mourning of the bridegroom'. However, friends were welcome to attend the service.¹⁵² Given these instructions, it was a mark of the close working relationship that the Governor experienced with Samuel that the latter attended the wedding.¹⁵³

According to Storrs, his wife's arrival in Jerusalem was greeted with great warmth from the Muslim, Christian and Jewish municipalities. Louisa soon became acclimatised to life in Palestine, supporting her husband by managing the Musical Society and helping to establish a Harim maternity ward for the training of Muslim midwives at the Government Hospital.¹⁵⁴ Socialising also became a key part of their lives together, with the couple hosting an At Home every Sunday from four until seven, at which thirty or more people in equal proportions from all the communities would visit.¹⁵⁵ For Storrs, Jerusalem now had the additional emotional resonance of being the place where he 'started the happiness of...married life'.¹⁵⁶

Following the success of his tours to the Vatican and America, Storrs continued to expand his influence beyond Jerusalem. In a renewal of old acquaintances, he travelled in July to Amman to meet Abdallah, who by now was King of Transjordan, and his brother, the King of Iraq, Feisal, to discuss Ibn Saud, the

¹⁵¹ "Weddings", *The Daily Telegraph*, (July 3, 1923), Issue 21277, p. 13.

¹⁵² "Marriages", *The Times*, (London, England), Thursday, June 21, 1923, Issue 43373, p.17.

¹⁵³ "Marriages", *The Times*, (London, England), Tuesday, July 3, 1923, Issue 43383, p.17.

¹⁵⁴ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 435.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 428.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 440.

great rival of Hussein in Arabia, and the wider situation in the region.¹⁵⁷ Later he would submit a memorandum to the Chief Secretary on attitudes towards the Caliph which would be subsequently forwarded on to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire. In it, Storrs outlined that in 'Moslem countries' there remained an attachment to the idea of the Caliph 'not so much for love or admiration of the Turkish Sultan who bears the title, as from an instinct which impels them to recognise some central universal religious authority other than the secular power which dominates them'. In Palestine this belief was influenced by two factors: the work of Arab nationalists in getting 'the ignorant masses' to express their discontent with the Palestine Government, and the impact of the Egyptian press. He also recorded that at the beginning of the British occupation Friday prayers were offered at the mosque in the name of Hussein and Feisal. This changed with the latter's betrayal in Syria, with prayers being offered in the name of the Caliph again, leading Abdallah to express his discontent at the Palestinian notables and their 'attachment to Constantinople'.¹⁵⁸ Irrespective of the motivations behind the use of the Caliph's name, the report is redolent of the warning given to Storrs by the Pope in 1921 that it would be 'a great disgrace to any mandatory if, after a certain period, the departure of the Turks should be openly regretted'. The good will that greeted the British occupation in December 1917 was dissipating rapidly as a result of the events of the previous six years.

1924 was to begin with recognition of Storrs' work in Jerusalem by the British authorities as he was awarded a knighthood in the King's New Year's Honours List.¹⁵⁹ Further responsibilities were to follow, with Storrs presiding over a newly formed Local Government Committee designed to advise the High Commissioner on matters regarding local governance. This new position entailed further liaison with the Zionist Executive on a variety of matters, including education and municipal governance.¹⁶⁰ However, old suspicions and mistrust remained. In

¹⁵⁷ "Arab Chiefs Parley", *Daily Mail*, (London, England), Tuesday, July 31, 1923, Issue 8516, pg. 8.

¹⁵⁸ CO 323/901 – Palestine. Attitude of Moslems towards the Caliph, 27/8/1923, TNA.

¹⁵⁹ "New Year's Honours", *Daily Mail*, (London, England), Tuesday, January 01, 1924, Issue 8646, p. 9.

¹⁶⁰ Z4/41463-2t – Correspondence between Storrs and Kisch, CZA.

particular, Storrs' courtship of Jacob Israel de Haan, a Dutch-born journalist and lawyer, was deemed particularly problematic.

De Haan has traditionally been viewed as a traitor to the Zionist cause due to his advocacy of the rights of Palestinian Arabs. Nevertheless in the last decade his legacy has been reappraised. Rather than viewing De Haan as a traitor, Giebels instead argues that he remained a committed Jewish nationalist throughout his life who supported the establishment in Palestine of some form of homeland in which the Torah would be central. His support for the Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi community in Jerusalem earned the ire of secular Zionists as it challenged the narrative that they were the sole representatives of Jewry in Palestine. Having arrived in Palestine in 1919 as a member of the Mizrahi, the Orthodox religious branch within the Zionist Organisation, his services were consistently rejected by key figures within the Zionist Commission. Given that relations between the Mizrahi and the mainstream secular wing of the Zionists were often fraught, he found himself increasingly marginalised in his efforts, not least for his opposition to the Zionist boycott of Palestinian Arab labour.¹⁶¹

Storrs experienced a positive relationship with De Haan and enjoyed conversations with him, although he recognised that he would not employ him at the Governorate due to his being a 'difficult subject to place'; a sentiment that he acknowledged the Zionist Commission might also feel. Despite this, De Haan remained supportive of Storrs' work. When the Governor was facing a particularly fierce onslaught in the Hebrew Press after November 1921, De Haan left a copy of Baudelaire at Storrs' door with the inscription "When all my people are cursing you, I send you this for a token that I believe in you, and in what you are trying to do".¹⁶² Such an affiliation was always likely to be problematic to the Zionist Commission in the heightened atmosphere of Jerusalem in the early 1920s, with suspicions being raised by Kisch that Storrs himself was personally responsible for encouraging De Haan's perceived anti-Zionist attitude.¹⁶³ However, as

¹⁶¹ Ludy Giebels, "Jacob Israel de Haan in Mandate Palestine: was the victim of the first Zionist political assassination a "Jewish Lawrence of Arabia"?", *Jewish Historical Studies*, Vol. 46 (2014), pp. 107-129.

¹⁶² Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 420.

¹⁶³ Z4/41463-2t – Kisch to Stein, 19/5/1924, CZA.

Giebels has demonstrated, De Haan remained an ardent Jewish nationalist throughout his life. It just happened that his vision of a Jewish homeland in Palestine differed from that of the secular Zionists. In this respect De Haan and Storrs appear as kindred spirits. Both identified as Zionists but were targeted for their perceived anti-Zionism: the former for advocating the importance of religion in the quest for a Jewish homeland and the latter for looking to temper the pace with which Zionism was being introduced into Palestine.¹⁶⁴ Ultimately, De Haan was to pay for his opposition with his life. On 30 June 1924 he was assassinated on the streets of Jerusalem by Avraham Tohomi, a member of the Haganah, the Jewish Paramilitary Organisation established in the wake of the Nabi Musa riots in 1920. Storrs would ultimately reflect on his 'deep sympathy and regret for a man desperately alone'; sentiments that he had no doubt felt at times in Egypt and Jerusalem.¹⁶⁵

When Storrs heard news of De Haan's assassination he was in London. Arriving in mid-June, the trip gave him the opportunity to socialise and reacquaint himself with various personages in the capital and beyond. On June 30 Storrs returned to Charterhouse to participate in Old Carthusian Day.¹⁶⁶ The following day he was received by the Prince of Wales, Edward (later to become Edward VIII).¹⁶⁷ They had first met during Storrs' time in Egypt, with the then Oriental Secretary providing a tour of the bazaars of Cairo and noting how swiftly the Prince entered 'into the spirit of the place'.¹⁶⁸ The two men met again two weeks later, as the Governor of Jerusalem received his royal charge at the Palestine Pavilion of the British Empire Exhibition, held at Wembley Park.¹⁶⁹

The exhibition, conceived as a celebration of Empire, was designed to highlight the economic and cultural control that Britain held over its domains across the

¹⁶⁴ Shortly before Storrs left Jerusalem criticisms over the speed with which Zionism was allowed to establish itself in Palestine was summed up in the Hebrew language newspaper *Doar Hayom* as the 'Go Slowly System'. See Translation – The "Go Slowly" System (*Doar Hayom*, 27/6/1926), Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4.

¹⁶⁵ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 420.

¹⁶⁶ "Old Carthusian Day", *The Daily Telegraph*, (June 30, 1924), Issue 21585, p. 7.

¹⁶⁷ "Court Circular", *The Times*, (London, England), Wednesday, July 2, 1924, Issue 43693, p.17.

¹⁶⁸ Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 193.

¹⁶⁹ "Prince and Hull", *The Daily Telegraph*, (July 15, 1924), Issue 21598, p. 16.

world. The Palestine Pavilion was no exception as the present and the past collided. Alongside exhibits on agricultural and industrial progress were displays on archaeological finds and Palestine's cultural heritage in what Roberts has described as 'a careful blend of modernization and preservation'. However, as a mandated territory, the country was also unique in being the only nation that was not a colony on display in London. Further exceptionalism emerged from the fact that the Zionist Executive also exhibited in the Pavilion. This decision highlighted the relationship between the British and Zionist enterprise in Palestine, suggesting that the country's future would emerge from European-style colonialism combined with the return of an ancient people to their Biblical homeland.¹⁷⁰ The limited Palestinian handicrafts on display courtesy of the Pro-Jerusalem Society had the effect of reducing the culture of the Arab population to traditional and static, in contrast to the modernising zeal of British and Zionist cooperation.¹⁷¹

It has been suggested that the make-up of the Palestine Pavilion Committee, being comprised of 15 Britons, 4 Jews and 1 Arab, was reflective of this marginalisation, particularly when contrasted with the more inclusive nature of the Pro-Jerusalem Society.¹⁷² Whilst it is true that *prima facie* that Society appeared to represent a broader section of interests, the impression given of Palestine through its works remained broadly similar to that of the British Empire Exhibition: Palestine was an ancient and traditional country that required the guiding hand of British imperialism to preserve its archaeological gems for global posterity. The only difference was that the Palestine Pavilion also celebrated the impact of modernisation courtesy of the Zionist Executive.

Storrs arrived back in Jerusalem shortly before the return of Samuel, who had been taking a similar leave of absence during the summer months.¹⁷³ Ahead of the return of the High Commissioner, he was tasked with ensuring the city's

¹⁷⁰ Nicholas E. Roberts, "Palestine on Display: The Palestine Pavilion at the British Empire Exhibition of 1924", *The Arab Studies Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Spring 2007), p. 72.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, p. 84.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, pp. 75-76.

¹⁷³ "Court Circular", *The Times*, (London, England), Thursday, August 14, 1924, Issue 43730, p.13.

notables were present as part of the welcome party.¹⁷⁴ Clearly the Governor was seen by the Palestine Government as one of the British officials with the most sway and authority over the influential families of the city. In a further sign of his reputation within the Administration, Storrs was made Acting Chief Secretary in October 1924, replacing Clayton who had been temporarily promoted to Acting High Commissioner whilst Samuel travelled to Geneva to give evidence to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.¹⁷⁵ Yet recognition of Storrs' burgeoning reputation was not always reciprocated in Whitehall, as the reaction to the handling of renovations to the Shrine of the Holy Sepulchre would demonstrate.

On December 17 1924, Storrs wrote to the Armenian, Latin and Orthodox Patriarchs expressing the urgency of repairing the aedicule over the Holy Sepulchre, which was in an 'insecure and highly dangerous condition'. All three duly responded, stating that they would allow a Government architect, Mr Harrison, to conduct preliminary investigations. It was proposed by the Director of Public Works, H.B. Lees, that investigations should not take place until after the Easter celebrations to avoid disturbing religious ceremonies and traditions.

When arrangements had been made in late May Storrs wrote to the three Patriarchs explaining that work would be undertaken on June 2 1925 without cost to any of the communities concerned, the expense being covered by the Palestine Government. The Patriarchs unanimously responded that in order to maintain the status quo they would fund the repairs. Going further still, Luigi Barlassina, the Latin Patriarch, requested the nomination of his own architect to 'reach a mutual understanding as to what is required'. Storrs responded to all three acknowledging that the status quo would be upheld, but did not acknowledge Barlassina's request. The Patriarch sent several further letters requesting that Storrs allow him to appoint an architect. By June 2, Barlassina had issued a protest against the works taking place at the Holy Sepulchre due to

¹⁷⁴ ISA 568/1 – Chief Secretary's Circular No. 395: Arrival of His Excellency the High Commissioner, 30/8/1924, ISA.

¹⁷⁵ ISA 568/1 – Chief Secretary's Circular No. 414: Visit of His Excellency the High Commissioner to Geneva, 15/10/1924, ISA.

Storrs' failure to acknowledge his request. The works were subsequently delayed.

Responding to the chain of letters provided, officials in the Colonial Office minuted that it was 'clear from this mass of correspondence that Sir Ronald Storrs' handling of a matter, which was clearly likely to give rise to dissension on the slightest provocation, was not as tactful as the circumstances demanded and that the Latin Patriarch quickly seized every chance thus offered to him of being unpleasant and even went out of his way to be obstructive'.

Two fundamental errors were found with Storrs' approach. Firstly, he was in error writing to the three Patriarchs that the work would be carried out without cost to the Communities concerned. Secondly, he was mistaken in omitting to respond to Barlassina's request to be allowed to nominate an architect to assist Harrison. It was further argued that Storrs was remiss in offering to 'accept the services of an architect nominated by the three Patriarchs to participate in the work of preliminary investigations'. Instead, the Governor should have requested that the three Patriarchs carried out their own initial investigations and submitted their findings to the Government.¹⁷⁶ It was an embarrassing state of affairs for one who prided himself so greatly on his knowledge and perception of the traditions of Jerusalem.

Storrs soon found himself administering a policy that was to have repercussions far beyond its initial remit. Early in 1925 it was recognised that Jerusalem would soon experience a severe water shortage, owing to unusually low levels of rainfall in the preceding months.¹⁷⁷ This shortage soon resulted in an increase in the number of enteric diseases in the city.¹⁷⁸ The Government's response to the problem was threefold. An extra catchment area for rainwater was provided by restoring a dam across the Wadi el Biyar (the Valley of Wells). Water trains were run at great expense four times daily from Lydda to Jerusalem to supply a small reservoir near the train station. Finally, a spring at the village of Artas near

¹⁷⁶ CO 733/97 – Repairs to the Shrine of the Holy Sepulchre, TNA.

¹⁷⁷ CO 733/97 – Jerusalem Water Supply: Memorandum from Storrs, 8/9/1925, TNA.

¹⁷⁸ ISA 568/1 – Administrative Report for Quarter ending June 30th, 1925, ISA.

Bethlehem was, to use Storrs' word, 'tapped'.¹⁷⁹ This was to prove the most contentious of the three approaches.

As Governor, Storrs had first come under pressure to resolve the shortages in March 1925, when the Council of Jerusalem Jews demanded immediate action from the authorities alongside the right to elect two members to the Water Supply Department Advisory Board. This request was duly granted, meaning that the Board's membership consisted of four Jews, three Britons and one Arab, the Mayor, Ragheb Bey Nashashibi.¹⁸⁰ By May 25 Samuel had intervened, issuing a decree authorising the diversion of water from Artas so long as enough water was left for drinking, domestic purposes and the irrigation of farmland and watering of animals. Storrs duly complied with the ordinance in order to alleviate the severe drought Jerusalem was facing.

In response, the residents of Artas argued that diverting the water was in breach of Article 2 of the Mandate as the decision failed to safeguard 'the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race or religion'.¹⁸¹ Their claim was supported by the Arab Executive under the leadership of Musa Kazim al-Husayni. Prior to bringing the case to court, the Executive argued that the diversion from Artas served to primarily benefit the Jewish population of Jerusalem, particularly those who had recently emigrated to Palestine as they tended to use more water in their bathrooms and toilets. Moreover, they often lived in recently built properties that had been constructed without cisterns to gather rainwater. This stood in contrast with the Palestinian Arab population who, being only too aware of the potential for drought, had private cisterns and used traditional methods of hygiene such as *hammams* that required less water.¹⁸²

The case of *Murra v The District Governor of Jerusalem* soon made its way to the Palestine Supreme Court. On June 25 a verdict was reached: the Palestine

¹⁷⁹ CO 733/97 – Jerusalem Water Supply: Memorandum from Storrs, 8/9/1925, TNA.

¹⁸⁰ Vincent Lemire, "The Awakening of Palestinian Hydropolitical Consciousness: The Artas-Jerusalem Water Conflict of 1925", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 48, (Winter, 2011), p. 37.

¹⁸¹ Quincy Wright, "Some Recent Cases on the Status of Mandated Areas", *The American Journal of International Law*, Oct., 1926, Vol. 20, No. 4, p. 768-769.

¹⁸² Lemire, "The Awakening of Palestinian Hydropolitical Consciousness", p. 45.

Government had acted unlawfully in diverting the water from Artas. In their ruling it was noted that whilst the provisions of the Mandate were political, it fell upon the judiciary to give them practical legal value.¹⁸³ It was found that the decree was discriminatory and fell foul of Article 2 of the Mandate on the grounds that the diversion of water negatively impacted upon Palestinian Arabs to the benefit of the population of Jerusalem, of which the majority were Jewish. The Palestine Government immediately appealed, and the Supreme Court suspended their own decision until the appeal had been heard. This meant that pumping could continue until the case had been brought before the Privy Council.¹⁸⁴

The initial optimism felt by Palestinians that the British courts were prepared to defend their rights against various encroachments were soon dissipated when the Privy Council reversed the verdict of the Supreme Court in February 1926.¹⁸⁵ In overturning the decision, the Privy Council argued that it was not the place of the judiciary to ensure that the legislative and administrative acts of the Palestine Government were in accordance with the Mandate. Rather, it should fall upon the Authority itself to interpret that this was happening.¹⁸⁶

As Lemire has argued, the Artas Affair contains many of the internal tensions and contradictions that were present in Mandate Palestine, and Jerusalem more specifically, in the mid-1920s. It highlighted the increased mobilisation of the fellahin as part of the Palestinian national movement, whilst also signifying the emergence of water politics as an important strand of opposition to increased Zionist encroachment. Moreover, it acted as a microcosm of Palestinian politics in the 1920s. Through his support for the residents of Artas, Musa Kazim, under the auspices of the Arab Executive, placed himself in conflict with the man who replaced him as Mayor of Jerusalem, and member of the Water Supply Department Advisory Board, Ragheb Bey Nashashibi.¹⁸⁷ In Jerusalem itself, it demonstrated how the increased Judaization and the adoption of European-style housing and culture created pressure on the infrastructure of the municipality,

¹⁸³ Wright, "Some Recent Cases", p. 769.

¹⁸⁴ Lemire, "The Awakening of Palestinian Hydropolitical Consciousness", p. 49.

¹⁸⁵ Wright, "Some Recent Cases", p. 768.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 770.

¹⁸⁷ Lemire, "The Awakening of Palestinian Hydropolitical Consciousness", p. 34.

with a fault-line emerging between the east and west of the city in terms of water consumption.¹⁸⁸ Finally, it illustrated the bind that the Palestine Government found themselves in, with both the Council of Jerusalem Jews and the Arab Executive utilising the issue of access to water in nationalist terms.¹⁸⁹ The increased politicisation of everyday life would be a legacy that Storrs and the British were responsible for, and would increasingly have to deal with, as the Mandate progressed.

Storrs was fully aware of the dangers presented by this politicisation. In a staff meeting for the Jerusalem-Jaffa District held shortly after his return from Britain in August 1924, he noted the British public showed 'much interest' in Palestine. However, 'nobody of any party' wanted 'to hear anything of Palestine politics'. He implored his District Officers to 'impress this on the population', reminding them 'that abstention from political matters was the best hope for the return of the country to prosperity'.¹⁹⁰ Quite how his District Officers were meant to deliver this message, as representatives of a Palestine Government charged with delivering the Balfour Declaration, is unclear. Indeed, their task was made the more difficult by the very public appearances of their superior in support of Zionist development of the country.

The inauguration of the Hebrew University at Mount Scopus on April 25 1925 provides one such example of this trend. A foundation stone for the university had been laid by Weizmann some seven years earlier on July 24 1918, much to General Allenby's annoyance, who protested the inopportune timing given that the war was still ongoing and Jerusalem's position was not yet definitively secured. However, Weizmann was able to ensure the stone laying went ahead by bypassing Allenby and liaising with Balfour directly.¹⁹¹ For several years there were few developments on the ground beyond the initial designs for the university drawn up by Geddes. By 1922 Storrs himself took up the initiative for a higher education institute in Jerusalem, suggesting the establishment of an English

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p. 37.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 49.

¹⁹⁰ Minutes of Jerusalem-Jaffa District Staff Conference, 2/9/1924, Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4.

¹⁹¹ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, pp. 73-75.

University with instruction in English, Arabic and Hebrew.¹⁹² This, alongside the developing Hebrew nationalism, was to provide the stimulus for the formal establishment of the university. Having initially been conceived as an academic haven for persecuted Jews in Europe, the Hebrew University now became a cornerstone of the Zionist movement's plans in Palestine. Funds were raised in the United States to create a campus in Jerusalem and attract academics from around the world, and it was agreed that the language of instruction and research at the new institution was to be Hebrew.¹⁹³

By April 1925 the Hebrew University was ready to be inaugurated. The guest of honour was to be Arthur Balfour himself, by this stage a 77 year old man. Balfour's visit was the cause of much stress for the Governor, who wrote home that the visit of 'A.J.B.' was 'an event much wished for by the Jews, conspued by the Arabs, dreaded by the police'. Yet Storrs could not understand the resentment directed at Balfour. To him it seemed 'incredible that so distinguished and so delightful a person could be for the Arabs an abominated enemy, yet the anxiety that they might somehow succeed in treating him as such was upon me day and night'.¹⁹⁴ Evidently a polite countenance was more important to Storrs than judging Balfour by the impact of his declaration in 1917, for to do so would be to undermine the entire British project in Palestine. Indeed, Storrs himself was no doubt aware by this stage that personality itself could only take you so far in Jerusalem, having been on the receiving end of criticism from both Palestinians and the Zionist Executive.

The universities of the world sent their delegates to the inauguration, with Storrs' *alma mater*, Cambridge, being no exception. As a noteworthy alumni in the city of Jerusalem, he was chosen to by the Council of the University to read the Address of the Public Orator in Latin at the ceremony.¹⁹⁵ Whilst Storrs could

¹⁹² Joseph Klausner, "The Hebrew University in Jerusalem", *The American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 39 (September 6 1937 to September 25 1938), pp. 180-181.

¹⁹³ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, pp. 203-208. See also Diana Dolev, *The Planning and Building of the Hebrew University, 1919-1948: Facing the Temple Mount*, (Maryland, Lexington Books, 2016) pp. 25-58 for more on the efforts to fund and construct the university.

¹⁹⁴ Storrs, *Orientalions*, pp. 435-436.

¹⁹⁵ Note on address to the Hebrew University, Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4.

ostensibly argue that his attendance was on behalf of the University of Cambridge, his position of Governor of Jerusalem would supersede this argument. The establishment of the Hebrew University was not merely for academic purposes. As Joseph Klausner, Professor of Hebrew Literature at the new establishment, wrote in 1938, 'the University is one of the instruments for establishing the Jewish National Home. For it was not purely a local and Palestinian University that was established on Mount Scopus, but a great intellectual centre for the Jew scattered all over the world'.¹⁹⁶ Storrs' presence at so high-profile an event, one with such clear political overtones, would undermine his appeals for the population of Palestine to abstain from political matters.

Two major changes were to occur in Storrs' working life in the summer of 1925. Firstly, Samuel departed as High Commissioner, to be replaced by Field Marshal Herbert Plumer. Writing in *Orientations*, he looked fondly upon Samuel's time in charge and defended him against charges of bias from Palestinians and 'extreme Zionists' alike. Claiming to be 'a pro-man and not an anti-man', Storrs contended that he was against one thing in particular: 'anti-ingratitude and anti-disloyalty'. He felt that 'extreme Zionists' would render a 'poor service to Jewry if they make it impossible for a man to prove himself a good Englishman as well as a good Jew'. Continuing, he stated his firm belief that:

If a Gentile may express an opinion on Jewish affairs (Jews express themselves freely enough on ours) that the names of the dynamic four who will go down to history in the rebuilding of Zion will be Theodore Herzl, who saw the vision; Chaim Weizmann, who grasped the occasion; Arthur Balfour, who caused the world to renew the ancient Promise in a modern Covenant; and Herbert Samuel, who turned principle into practice, word into fact.¹⁹⁷

Secondly, the territory that Storrs administered was widened again following an administrative review. Having hitherto been Governor of the Jerusalem-Jaffa District, his area administration now took on the Southern District of Palestine,

¹⁹⁶ Klausner, "The Hebrew University in Jerusalem", pp. 191-192.

¹⁹⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 437.

included Beersheba, Gaza and Hebron.¹⁹⁸ Professional obligations were increasingly taking Storrs away from the city that he loved.

However, familiar problems still loomed large in Storrs' workload, not least the status of the Western Wall. Several benches had been placed beside the wall during the observation of Yom Kippur for the elderly to sit upon during their fast. Arab police officers soon ordered their removal, no doubt operating under the assumption that the placement of benches was a challenge to the status quo. A Jewish delegation later visited Storrs, who granted permission for seating to be placed by the wall.¹⁹⁹ Within days the Arab press began to criticise Storrs' decision. *Falastin* appealed to the Muslim Supreme Council to protect Muslim interests at the wall, and questioned why Storrs had agreed to the placement of benches in breach of previous precedent.²⁰⁰ Not to be outdone, the Hebrew press soon attacked Storrs over the behaviour of the Arab officers. In response, he defended his decision to allow the elderly to sit beside the wall during Yom Kippur, noting that he had granted permission for them to sit on oil drums with cushions, not on benches. Attempting to distance himself and the Palestine Government from the problems at hand and transfer blame elsewhere, he argued that the order prohibiting the placement of benches was only issued as a result of Muslim complaints about access to Wakf property near the site. Recalling the failed attempt by the Zionist Commission to purchase the land in front of the wall in 1918, Storrs blamed the 'Moslem owners who refused to complete the transaction because funds were not available at the last moment', somewhat conveniently forgetting his own volte-face on the matter. He further stated that he was preparing a report for Plumer that would allow the use of benches because he recognised 'that the Palestinian Jews were justified in their demand'.²⁰¹ The myth of defending the status quo was now plain to see.

¹⁹⁸ "New Appointment for Sir Ronald Storrs", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Sunday, August 02, 1925, Page 1.

¹⁹⁹ "The Wailing Wall Incident", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Tuesday, September 29, 1925, Page 1.

²⁰⁰ "Falastin Comments after the Wailing Wall affair", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Wednesday, September 30, 1925, Page 3.

²⁰¹ "Storrs Declares", *The Sentinel*, (Chicago), Friday, October 23, 1925, Page 35.

Christmas 1925 was to be Storrs' last in the city. In a letter to his father, Storrs betrayed feelings of weariness at the repetition of his current duties, complaining he was circulating daily 'from bazar to bazar, the scourge of this season – annually laid across our shoulders by schools, hospitals, churches, creches...orphanages, Syrian and Armenian refugees – in a word the entire population of Jerusalem, Palestine and the adjacent countries'. No longer were his duties focused solely on Jerusalem itself, a point evidenced by the fact that he had written an article on Jerusalem for *The Spectator* from Jericho rather than from the Governorate. The low ebb that Storrs found himself in was reflected in the harsh self-criticism Storrs gave himself for his submission, with the Governor finding his work to be 'not v. good' and wondering how his father would like the piece.²⁰²

Entitled "Jerusalem: Christmas 1917-1925", the article was published anonymously, with the author being recorded as 'an exceptionally well-informed correspondent who is resident in Palestine'. It reads a summary of British achievements in the city as viewed by Storrs, charting Jerusalem's journey from the near 'apocalyptic' city inherited from the Ottomans to the 'radical, and even startling' progress that had been made since. New roads, widened and cleanly streets, telephone lines and shops that provided 'frozen salmon and the latest thing in tennis balls' were all heralded. Any issues that remained in the city were the result of 'the heavy and unfortunately far from dead hand of the Pre-War Ottoman Concessionaire' that still pressed upon Jerusalem, despite 'every possible effort by the local authorities and the Palestine Government' to provide universally available electricity, sufficient water supplies and modern drainage. No mention was made Britain's mission in Palestine, the Balfour Declaration or the terms of the Mandate. Instead, Storrs chose to focus on the 'loving care' granted to the 'dumb soul' of the city in the form of the works of the Pro-Jerusalem Society. It is little surprise that his final remarks concerned the discovery and preservation of the grave of Philip d'Aubigne, a crusader from the Channel Islands, who now lay 'safe at last from the trampling of feet' before the Church of

²⁰² Storrs to his Father, 16/12/1925, Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4.

the Holy Sepulchre.²⁰³ In the face of intense political and personal criticism, Storrs could always find solace in the preservation of the aesthetic.

That is not to say that all communities in Jerusalem were consistently hostile to Storrs. As 1926 approached, the Kolliel Shomrei Hachomos Charity wrote to wish the Governor a Happy New Year. In the margins, he noted that 'Orthodox J's always supported me'.²⁰⁴ The Menorah Club for Jewish veterans of World War One invited him to participate in a chess tournament in January 1926,²⁰⁵ whilst the Armenian Patriarch wished Storrs a speedy recovery following the removal of his tonsils in May of the same year.²⁰⁶ Such niceties did not overshadow the loss felt with Samuel's departure. Writing in his diary, Storrs hinted at this void, recording that:

The Plumers have made a good start, but I, whose frequent vicissitudes have made me share Oxford's love for lost or departed causes, am always irritated by the chorus of adoration projected upon the rising sun. Everything that either of them does is construed to the disadvantage of their predecessors, and that by those who but a few months ago were roading for a prolongation of the Samuel regime.²⁰⁷

When offered the Governorship of Cyprus in the summer of 1926, Storrs leapt at the opportunity.²⁰⁸ In many ways this was an appointment highly suited to his personality and interests having studied and excelled at Classics whilst at Cambridge. Indeed, Storrs would recall arriving on the island 'eagerly Philokyprios and Philhellene'.²⁰⁹

As the day of his departure from the city, November 29 1926, approached, Storrs experienced the 'dread' of having to leave Jerusalem, with 'the reality being

²⁰³ "Jerusalem: Christmas 1917-1925", *The Spectator*, Dec 26, 1925; Vol. 135, Issue 5087, p. 117.

²⁰⁴ Kolliel Shomrei Hachomos to Storrs, 31/12/25, Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4.

²⁰⁵ Invitation from the Menorah Club, Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4.

²⁰⁶ Armenian Patriarch to Storrs, 15/5/1926, Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4.

²⁰⁷ Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 437.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 438.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p. 516.

sharper than I had ever dreamed'.²¹⁰ Reflecting in *Orientalisms*, he outlined the wide range of emotions felt at his leaving, declaring that he could not:

Pretend to describe or analyse my love for Jerusalem. It is not wholly sentimental, aesthetic or religious – still less theological or archaeological, aesthetic or religious; though I hope it contains something of all five. A little perhaps also that I had worked and enjoyed and suffered there so much; that after misunderstandings had always followed understanding; that I had shared the delight there of my father and mother; that I had begun there the happiness of my married life. Persons of wider experience and more facile emotions have often come there to pray and gone away to mock. For me Jerusalem stood and stands alone among the cities of the world. There are many positions of greater authority and renown within and without the British Empire, but in a sense that I cannot explain there is no promotion after Jerusalem.²¹¹

Conclusion

The advent of the Civilian Administration gave Storrs a sense of permanency through which he could pursue his personal interests by establishing and patronising several clubs and societies. That he did so was rooted in the loneliness and disaffection he felt from his time in Egypt, and was at times to compromise his position as Governor of Jerusalem. His focus on the artistic, the cultural and the social was to place him in conflict with the people he governed as they looked to pursue their own ambitions for the city. Yet even when things were at their most tempestuous he remained deeply loyal to his conception of Jerusalem, as his description of a meeting in March 1922 attests:

This morning a respectable young Christian Arab brought in to me his English fiancée who had come over from America, where she had originally met him, to marry him. I found the poor girl very much

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 438.

²¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 440.

depressed with the contrast of his description of Jerusalem and the actuality thereof. I, therefore, gave her a good harangue to the effect that only provincial, suburban and uneducated persons are disappointed with Jerusalem and that appreciation thereof is an index of culture. I ended by drawing such a picture that she said she never realised the place was like that and that she would proceed to the Altar in a very different frame of mind'.²¹²

However, drawing a picture and acknowledging reality are two very different things. As the fabric and future of Jerusalem became increasingly contested over this time period, Storrs' attempts to bring communities together without prejudice to race or creed' appeared increasingly futile and naïve. Whilst he would no doubt argue that such attempts were designed to increase political harmony, such an outcome would only have been possible had Storrs been a representative of a neutral arbiter. But he was not. Instead Storrs was an employee of a British administration that had been charged with facilitating the Balfour Declaration under the terms of the League of Nations Mandate. All his efforts to bring the communities of Jerusalem together and be a visible presence in the life of the city merely smacked of hypocrisy given this background and led to more vicious attacks in the press when disputes and discord arose. The personal and the political in Jerusalem could neither be separated, nor reconciled.

²¹² Notes on a dinner with the Milners, 18/3/1922, Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3.

Conclusion

I can see now that the lack of continuity in any one organized Government Office created in me an over-personal and un-departmental outlook.¹

Storrs remained as Governor of Cyprus for six years. During this time he succeeded in removing the island's debt payments to the Turks and worked to undermine calls for *enosis* or unification with Greece from Greek-Cypriot politicians.² As in Palestine, Storrs professed to feel affection for the people over which he governed. However, he never truly understood the depth of Greek nationalist sentiment present. Just as he created an idealised image of a harmonious Jerusalem, Storrs developed a romanticised notion of the Cypriots as a people who should embrace British rule, reject *enosis* and accept any concessions that were forthcoming, regardless of the reality on the ground.³ The result was as pitiful as it was predictable: pro-*enosis* riots broke out on October 21 1931, leading to the destruction of Government House and all his personal papers and belongings. Storrs' failure to understand the calls for *enosis* were further aggravated by his own claims to act as a philhellene par-excellence. The Greek nationalist politician N. Kl Lantis saw through the charade, describing Storrs as a 'philhellene British imperialist' who 'would gladly see the Greek flag on the ruins of Troy' but 'would not sacrifice even a rock of the most Hellenic Cyprus to Greece'.⁴ The parallels with Jerusalem are striking.

Following this ignominious episode, Storrs was offered and accepted the Governorship of North Rhodesia in 1932. This period of his life barely appears in *Orientations*, and save transferring the capital city from Livingstone to Lusaka, he failed to make an impression in his new role. After less than two years in Africa Storrs was invalided back to the United Kingdom. He would later go on to serve as a member for East Islington on the London County Council between 1937 and

¹ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 519.

² See *ibid*, pp. 456-517 for Storrs' recollection of his time in Cyprus.

³ G.S. Georghallades, *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis*, (Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 1985), pp. 231-232.

⁴ Quoted in *ibid*, pp. 88-89.

1945, whilst continuing to write and broadcast on his areas of interest and expertise: the Near East, T.E. Lawrence, Dante and Shakespeare.⁵ Despite no longer serving as a colonial official, he would continue his involvement with Palestine and Zionism through his association with the Committee for Arab Affairs, an organisation that looked to prevent the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine.⁶ As the years passed, Storrs' health would become increasingly problematic and he would die at St Stephen's Hospital in Chelsea, London on November 1 1955 at the age of 73.⁷ Whilst differing their focus on different stages of Storrs' life, contemporary obituaries all commented on his love towards and promotion of culture and the arts throughout his career.⁸ Yet what they fail to acknowledge is that circumstances in Jerusalem, particularly under O.E.T.A. allowed him to pursue these interests to a fuller extent than at any other point in his professional life.

This thesis set out three key questions about Storrs' time as Governor of Jerusalem in order to demonstrate how personality influenced politics, the built environment and relations between communities at a formative stage of the British occupation of Palestine. The first question asked how Storrs' experiences before becoming Governor developed his personality and shaped his outlook on the world. Three points would appear to be salient. Firstly, Storrs' parents were

⁵ See Harry Luke, "Storrs, Sir Ronald Henry Amherst (1881-1955)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed online at <https://doi.org/10.1093/odnb/9780192683120.013.36326> on 18/10/2021 and Ritchie Owendale, "Storrs, Sir Ronald Henry Amherst (1881-1955), colonial governor and Middle Eastern specialist", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed online at <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/36326> on 18/10/2021.

⁶ See Rory Miller, *Divided Against Zion*, (London, Frank Cass, 2000) for an exploration of the work of the Committee for Arab Affairs and other organisations that were opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The extent to which their work was consistent with Storrs' time in Jerusalem will be considered in more detail later in this conclusion.

⁷ Luke, "Storrs, Sir Ronald Henry Amherst (1881-1955)" and Owendale, "Storrs, Sir Ronald Henry Amherst (1881-1955), colonial governor and Middle Eastern specialist",.

⁸ The *Daily Mail* emphasised Storrs' work in fomenting the Arab Revolt of 1916, even going so far as to comment that the 'great Arab kingdoms of today are largely of his creation'. See "He Welded Arabs into Allies", *Daily Mail* (London, England), Wednesday, November 2, 1955, Issue 18520, p. 3. In contrast, *The Daily Telegraph* offered a brief overview of Storrs' career, whilst *The Times* honed in on his time as Oriental Secretary under Gorst in Egypt. See "Sir Ronald Storrs", *The Daily Telegraph* (London, England), Wednesday, November 2, 1955, Issue 31277, p. 4 and "Sir Ronald Storrs", *The Times* (London, England), Wednesday, November 2, 1955, Issue 53367, p. 11.

to have a large impact on his beliefs and values: from his father, John, came a deep faith in the Anglican Church and understanding of the Bible, and from his mother, Lucy, was inherited an eye for the beautiful and the aesthetic. Secondly, Storrs' education inculcated in him a love of Classics and languages more generally, which he would carry forward throughout his career. In particular, his time at Temple Grove and Charterhouse, coming as they did at a time of British colonial expansion and crisis in South Africa, instilled the young Storrs with a sense of imperial duty and leadership. This, combined with the influence of his mercurial teacher, T.E. Page, and his belief in civic responsibility, led him towards a career as a colonial administrator. Lastly, the loneliness Storrs experienced in Egypt, particularly at the start of his career there, led him to fill his leisure time with personal interests and a wide circle of friends and acquaintances.

The second question asked how Storrs' formative years manifested themselves on Jerusalem's built environment. His fascination with the visual and artistic was deeply rooted. For Storrs 'art and life should be inseparable, going through each other like the colour of a dye through silk and silk through the colour of the dye',⁹ with the extent of his feelings being manifested in his custodianship of the Pro-Jerusalem Society. That he was able to pursue such an interest was the result of circumstance; the wide-ranging freedoms available to him as Military Governor at a time when Britain's role in Palestine was far from clear enabled Storrs to carve his own niche. This freedom was to be curtailed as a more formal administration was established from July 1920 onwards. His emphasis that the Society should include membership from all sections of Jerusalem society was born of the civic duty inherited from his time in the English public school system, as was the imperialistic sense that the city should be preserved *on Storrs' terms*. At times, his obsession with appearance, ceremony and order would appear to overshadow his duties as an official in charge of public security, as evidenced by efforts to ensure the presence of a British military band ahead of Nabi Musa in 1920. This tension between Storrs the aesthete and preservationist and Storrs the British diplomat and politician directly leads into the third research question:

⁹ "Parents National Education Union", *The Palestine Bulletin*, Sunday, May 03, 1925, Page 3.

what limitations were placed on Storrs' ability to govern his ideal Jerusalem by his British superiors, Palestinians and Zionists?

In answering this question it is important to distinguish between factors that were of Storrs' own creation and those beyond his control. Often the two combined. The aforementioned tension between preservation and politics provides one such illustration, where the Governor's personal interests blurred the lines between the two. A further example includes the establishment of the Jerusalem School of Music; for Storrs a non-political act that looked to implant a 'superior' musical genre onto the population of Palestine. His determination to have access to a wide and diverse social circle also compromised his position by raising the hopes and expectations of those he socialised with. Storrs drew the ire of both Palestinians and Zionists alike because he remained a British official who was charged to carry out the duties required by his post, irrespective of the personal relations he formed. External factors also made Storrs' job more difficult; not least the policy that Britain was pursuing in Palestine at this time. On the one side, Palestinian notables soon came to view Storrs with greater suspicion as a representative of a government that threatened their political and economic rights through its support of Zionism. On the other side, the zeal of the Zionist Commission to realise their agenda for Palestine so soon after the Balfour Declaration, and the reaction of some members of this organisation to any perceived slight, damaged his reputation.

What of Storrs' claim to be 'not wholly for either, but for both'? Miller argues that by the end of the Mandate in 1948, Storrs had revealed his true colours and taken what was 'by the standards of the time an anti-Zionist position'.¹⁰ Through his work with the Committee for Arab Affairs, Storrs argued in favour of the provisions of the 1939 White Paper, which outlined Britain's future policy for the country. This document clarified that it was never the intention of the Balfour Declaration to transform Palestine into a Jewish state 'against the will of the Arab population of the country'. It reiterated that a Jewish National Home should be established in an independent Palestinian state, whilst also stipulating that Jewish immigration should be limited to 15,000 every five years, after which Palestinian

¹⁰ Miller, "Sir Ronald Storrs and Zion", pp. 117-118.

Arab acquiescence was required. This number was deliberately chosen to ensure that no more than one-third of the population were Jewish by the time that an independent Palestinian state was established in 1949. Should the country not be ready for independence by this time, Britain would consult with all parties in Palestine, neighbouring Arab states and the League of Nations to establish what would happen next.¹¹ Both parties rejected the 1939 White Paper: the Zionists on the grounds that it contravened international law and violated the promises made since the inception of the Balfour Declaration, and the Palestinians because it did not promise immediate independence or a halt to Jewish immigration.¹² Yet for Storrs the policy remained the only possible solution for Palestine. Recognising that the 'Zionists were from their point of view doubtless justified in registering their protest, for in Palestine unprotested decisions are apt to be registered as accepted and the case to have gone by default', he argued that 'the responsible mandatory Government is not only justified, but is bound in duty and in prudence to hold fast to the principles of the White Paper, and to see that both halves of the Mandate are faithfully and practicably maintained'.¹³

In many ways Storrs' support for the White Paper was entirely consistent with the views he held during his time in Jerusalem. He believed in the establishment of a Jewish Home in Palestine, not a Jewish State. Any policy that looked to fulfil this aim was entirely in keeping with the original spirit of the Balfour Declaration and meant that Britain had maintained its obligation to both parties in Palestine. What had changed was the official Zionist position. Within the Zionist movement divisions had emerged between the more gradualist approach of Chaim Weizmann, who advocated reliance on British policy and diplomacy, and David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency Executive, who promoted more direct methods of achieving statehood. At a conference held in the Biltmore Hotel in May 1942, American Zionist organisations declared that Palestine should become a 'Jewish Commonwealth'; in other words a Jewish State.¹⁴ The Biltmore Declaration, as it would be known, placed Storrs in opposition to the now dominant trend in Zionism: statehood. He was and remained a Zionist as defined

¹¹ Cmd. 6019, Palestine: Statement of Policy, May 1939.

¹² Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 142.

¹³ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 390.

¹⁴ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 165-166.

by the Balfour Declaration, which ultimately meant he remained loyal to the aims and objectives of the British Government as outlined by the 1939 White Paper.

This position by its very nature meant that Storrs was prepared to forgo the civil and political rights of the Palestinians in order to fulfil Britain's obligations to the Mandate. Despite claiming to be 'for both', his role as a British official meant supporting a Jewish Home at the expense of the existing population of Palestine. However, whenever a conflict arose between loyalty to Britain, loyalty to Jerusalem and loyalty to Zionism, the *patria* and the city always won through.

Golani hints at this allegiance when he argues 'Storrs was first and foremost pro-British and pro-Jerusalem. The order of the two is not always clear'.¹⁵ Indeed, I would expand this assessment by including two additional parties. Third in Storrs' hierarchy of priorities were the Zionists. Lastly, Storrs would consider the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, as these would regularly be compromised by the policies he pursued as a British official.

On a personal level, Storrs and the members of the Zionist Executive could be seen as the most natural allies. Summing up the Governor of Jerusalem, Christopher Sykes writes that in Storrs they found:

As they did not often find with Englishmen, a man who shared treasured interests with them...here was a man who understood their feelings and shared them in a world that was often hostile and usually lacking in sympathy.¹⁶

Similarly, Storrs could claim to share 'treasured interests' with the Palestinians through his knowledge and understanding of Arabic language and culture. However, it would be naïve to accept that shared interests were enough to ensure peaceable relations. Sykes is correct when he asserts that as a Government official, Storrs:

¹⁵ Golani, "An Enigma", p. 56.

¹⁶ Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel*, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 39.

Had nothing to give except this maddening British gift of fairness, and the fact that he gave it with a somewhat vagrant show of diplomatic good manners...merely increased the bitterness of disillusion and convinced his former friends that he was a monster of hypocritical intrigue.¹⁷

In many ways, Storrs' career in Jerusalem echoes *Translations* by Brian Friel. This play, based in the summer of 1833 at an Irish-language hedge-school in County Donegal, studies the impact of the first Ordinance Survey conducted by the British Royal Engineers in Ireland. Gaelic place names were transliterated into English as part of this process. The parallels with Storrs' time in Jerusalem are obvious, not least because of his actions in renaming what he considered to be 'the dumb soul' of the city: the very streets themselves.

As the play progresses a member of the British forces, Lieutenant Yolland, begins to feel a deep connection to Irish culture and falls in love with Maire, a Gaelic-speaking student at the hedge-school. As he grapples with his newfound feelings towards Ireland he declares:

Even if I did speak Irish I'd always be an outsider here, wouldn't I? I may learn the password but the language of the tribe will always elude me, won't it? The private core will always be...hermetic, won't it?¹⁸

Like Yolland, Storrs had a strong interest in Arabic and Jewish culture. However, in contrast to the young Lieutenant, Storrs did speak the languages of the two main peoples he governed: Arabic and Hebrew. Far from taking Yolland's view that the 'private core' would always be 'hermetic', Storrs used his linguistic and cultural prowess as a means through which he could attempt to claim ownership over this 'private core' and justify his approach to governing Jerusalem. He did so through a deeply personal imperialist lens, where allegiance to Britain and defence of his idealised Jerusalem suspended in Biblical time reigned supreme.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 39-40.

¹⁸ Brian Friel, *Translations*, (London, Faber and Faber, 2000), Act II, Scene I, p. 48.

Responding to Yolland's remarks, Owen, a successful businessman who returned to his home town of Baile Beag to serve as a translator to the British, observed that it was possible to 'decode' the Irish community.¹⁹ By positioning himself as an expert on Palestine and Zionism, Storrs certainly felt that he had decoded both, despite faux-modest claims that 'the East is a university in which the scholar never takes his degree'.²⁰ However, the mistrust and anger that was directed towards Storrs throughout his time in Jerusalem from both sides would suggest his decoding ended in failure.

Ultimately Storrs must be judged as a British imperialist. Despite his sincere love of Jerusalem as reflected by his writings and actions, he was representative of an attitude that, in the words of Edward Said, looked to commit acts of 'geographical violence, through which virtually every space in the world is explored, charted, and finally brought under control'.²¹ His knowledge, understanding and passion for Arabic and Hebrew cultures must be understood within this Orientalist mindset. But whilst he was influenced by the colonial zeitgeist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Storrs was also an individual whose outlook was shaped by the values of his family, the impact of educators, friends and colleagues and the successes, knockbacks and insecurities that form part of the tapestry of life. How people respond to and interpret the dominant *mentalités* of the time are as important as the overall *mentalité* itself. As such, Storrs' 'determining imprint' helped shape the city of Jerusalem in a way that continues to have consequences today.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, Act II, Scene I, p. 48.

²⁰ Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 385.

²¹ Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York, Vintage, 1994), p. 225.

Bibliography

Unpublished Sources

Charterhouse School

Blue Books of Examination Results 1895-1900
The Carthusian

Central Zionist Archives

A113/45
A114/39
Z4/41428

Imperial War Museum Film Collection

IWM 45, *The NEBI-NUSA [sic] FESTIVALS: scenes and incidents en route*, Jury's Imperial Pictures, 1919, accessed online at <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060022598> on 16/7/2020

Israel State Archives

ISA 2/1/43
ISA 567/6
ISA 568/1

Middle East Centre Archives (MECA), St Anthony's College, University of Oxford

Richard Adamson Collection, Ref: GB165-0001

The National Archives (TNA):

Cabinet Office Papers

CAB 23

Colonial Office Papers

CO 733

Foreign Office Papers

FO 14
FO 371
FO 800
FO 841

War Office Papers

WO 32/9614

Personal Papers

The Papers of Sir Ronald Storrs (1881-1955):

Storrs Papers, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1 – 1902 Diary, Early Letters and Family Papers

Storrs Papers, Reel 2, Box 2, Folder 1 – Egypt 1904-1909

Storrs Papers, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 2 – Egypt 1904-1913

Storrs Papers, Reel 4, Box 2, Folder 3 – Egypt 1914-1915

Storrs Papers, Reel 5, Box 2, Folder 4 – Egypt 1916-1917

Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 2, Folder 5 – Egypt 1916-1917

Storrs Papers, Reel 6, Box 3, Folder 1 – Jerusalem 1918-1919

Storrs Papers, Reel 7, Box 3, Folder 2 – Jerusalem 1920-1921

Storrs Papers, Reel 8, Box 3, Folder 3 – Jerusalem 1922

Storrs Papers, Reel 9, Box 3, Folder 4 – Jerusalem 1923-1926

Storrs Papers, Reel 10, Box 3, Folder 5 – Press cuttings on the Jerusalem Period

(Available as microfilm at the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford and at Royal Holloway, University of London, original documents held by Pembroke College, Cambridge)

PhD Theses

Hyman, Benjamin, *British Planners in Palestine 1918-1936*, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 1994)

Innes, Mary, *In Egyptian Service: the Role of British Officials in Egypt, 1911-1936*, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, St Anthony's College, University of Oxford, 1986)

Markovitz, Sarah, *The Development of Modern Jerusalem: An Evaluation of Planning Decisions and the Effectiveness of the Planning Process*, (Senior Thesis, Princeton University School of Architecture and the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs, 1982)

Mazza, Roberto, *Jerusalem During the First World War: Transition from Ottoman to British Rule*, (PhD Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2007)

Rapaport, Raquel, *Conflicting Visions: Architecture in Palestine During the British Mandate* (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cardiff University, 2005)

Wallach, Yair, *Readings in Conflict: Public Texts in Modern Jerusalem, 1858-1948*, (PhD Thesis, Birkbeck College, University of London, 2008)

Undergraduate Dissertations

Burnham, Christopher, *Were the Criticisms of Ronald Storrs Following the Nebi Musa Riots of April 1920 Justified?*, (Unpublished Undergraduate Dissertation, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2009)

Published Sources

Censuses

Barron, J.B. ed., *Report and General Abstracts on the Census of 1922*, (Government of Palestine, 1922)

Command Papers

Cmd. 5957, Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and The Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915-March 1916

Cmd. 1540, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in Palestine, May 1921, with Correspondence Relating Thereto

Cmd. 1700, Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation

Cmd. 6019, Palestine: Statement of Policy, May 1939

Hansard

HC Vol. 127

HC Vol. 142

HL Vol. 40

Reports

British Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Colonial Problem* (London, British Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937)

Books

Abdy, Jane and Gere, Charlotte. *The Souls: An Elite in English Society 1885-1930*, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984)

Abowd, Thomas Philip. *Colonial Jerusalem: The Spatial Construction of Identity and Difference in a City of Myth, 1948-2012*, (New York, Syracuse, 2014)

Allen, Lori. *A History of False Hope: Investigative Commissions in Palestine*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2021)

Anderson, M.S., *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923*, (London, Macmillan, 1966)

Antonius, George. *The Arab Awakening*, (n.p., 1939, reprinted Safety Harbour, Simon Publishing, 2001)

Ashbee, C.R. ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the period of the British Military Administration*, (London, John Murray, 1921)

Ashbee, C.R. ed., *Jerusalem 1920-1922: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the First Two Years of the Civilian Administration*, (London, John Murray, 1924)

Ballobar, Conde de, ed., Eduardo Manzano Moreno and Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem in World War One: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat*, (London, I.B. Taurus, 2015)

Barr, James, *Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 1916-1918*, (New York, Norton, 2008)

Batchelor, Meston, *Cradle of Empire: A Preparatory School through Nine Reigns*, (London, Phillimore, 1981)

Bentwich, Margery, *Michael Lange – A Memoir*, (London, Chiswick Press, 1928)

Blincoe, Nicholas, *More Noble Than War: The Story of Football in Israel and Palestine*, (London, Constable, 2019)

Blunt, Wilfrid Scawen, *My Diaries: Being a Personal Narrative of Events 1888-1914*, (London, Martin Secker, 1932)

Boardman, Phillip, *The Worlds of Patrick Geddes: Biologist, Town Planner, Re-educator, Peace-warrior*, (London, Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1978)

Boulatta, Kamal, *Palestinian Art From 1850 to the Present*, (Saqi, London, 2009)

Bowman, Humphrey, *Middle East Window*, (London, Longmans, Green and Co, 1942)

Campos, Michelle U., *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011)

Carter, Paul, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Exploration of Landscape and History*, (London, Faber and Faber, 1987)

Castrén, Anna-Maija, Lonkila, Markku and Peltonen, Matti ed., *Between Sociology and History: Essays on Microhistory, Collective Action and Nation-Building*, (Helsinki, SKS Finnish Literature Society, 2004)

Crawford, Alan, *C. R. Ashbee: Architect, Designer & Romantic Socialist*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985)

Dahlke, Birgit, Tate, Dennis and Woods, Roger ed., *German Life Writing in the Twentieth Century*, (Columbia, Camden House, 2011)

Dalachanis, Angelos and Lemire, Vincent ed., *Ordinary Jerusalem: Volume 1*, (Boston/Leiden, Brill, 2018)

Dolev, Diana, *The Planning and Building of the Hebrew University, 1919-1948: Facing the Temple Mount*, (Maryland, Lexington Books, 2016)

- Elias, Norbert, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations – Revised Edition*, (Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, first published 1970)
- Elias, Norbert, *The Court Society*, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983)
- Ellenberger, Nancy, *Balfour's World: Aristocracy and Political Culture at the Fin de Siècle*, (Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 2015)
- Erakat, Noura, *Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020)
- Fieldhouse, D.K., *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006)
- Fishman, Louis A., *Jews and Palestinians in the Late Ottoman Era, 1908-1914: Claiming the Homeland*, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2020)
- Foucault, Michel, *The Archaeology of Knowledge – Translated by A.M Sheridan Smith*, (London/New York, Routledge, 2002, first published in French 1969)
- Fraser, T.G., Mango, Andrew and McNamara, Robert, *The Makers of the Modern Middle East: Second Edition*, (London, Gingko, 2015)
- Freitag, Ulrike, Fuccaro, Nelida, Ghrawi, Claudia and Lafi, Nora ed., *Urban Violence in the Middle East: Changing Cityscapes in the Transition from Empire to Nation State*, (New York, Bergahn, 2015)
- French, David, *The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995)
- Friedman, Isaiah, *The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918*, (London, Routledge, 1973)
- Friel, Brian, *Translations*, (London, Faber and Faber, 2000)
- Fromkin, David, *A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922*, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1989)
- Garfield, Brian, *The Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a Colossal Fraud*, (Washington, D.C., Potomac, 2007)
- Georghallades, G.S., *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis*, (Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 1985)
- Gerber, Haim, *Remembering and Imagining Palestine: Identity and Nationalism from the Crusades to the Present*, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008)
- Gilbert, Martin, *Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century*, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1996)

Ginzburg, Carlo, *The Cheese and the Worms – Translated by John Tedeschi and Anne Tedeschi*, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, originally published in Italian in 1976)

Gronn, Peter, *The Making of Educational Leaders*, (London, Cassell, 1999)

Hallaq, Wael B., *Restating Orientalism: A Critique of Modern Knowledge*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2018)

Heller, Joseph, *British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914*, (London, Frank Cass, 1983)

Hirshberg, Jehoash, *Music in the Jewish Community of Palestine, 1800-1948: A Social History*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995)

Holliday, Eunice, *Letters from Jerusalem During the Palestine Mandate*, (London, Radcliffe Press, 1997)

Hyamson, Albert M., *Palestine Under the Mandate, 1920-1948*, (London, Methuen, 1950)

Ingram, Edward, *Britain's Persian Connection, 1798-1828: Prelude to the Great Game in Asia*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992)

Ingrams, Doreen, *Palestine Papers, 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict*, (London, John Murray, 1972)

Isenstadt, Sandy and Rizvi, Kishwar ed., *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington, University of Washington Press, 2008)

Jacobson, Abigail, *From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem Between Ottoman and British Rule*, (New York, Syracuse University Press, 2011)

Kamel, Lorenzo, *The Middle East from Empire to Sealed Identities*, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2018)

Kark, Ruth and Oren-Nordheim, Michal, *Jerusalem and its Environs: Quarters, Neighborhoods, Villages, 1800-1948*, (Jerusalem, Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2001)

Kedourie, Elie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921*, (London, Bowes and Bowes, 1956)

Keith-Roach, Edward, *Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*, (London, Radcliffe Press, 1994)

Kent, Marian ed., *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984)

Kisch, F.H., *Palestine Diary*, (London, Gollancz, 1938)

Khalidi, Rashid, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonial Conquest and Resistance*, (London, Profile, 2020)

Khalidi, Rashid, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, (Oxford, Oneworld, 2009)

Khalidi, Rashid, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of a Modern National Consciousness*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1997)

Korda, Michael, *Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia*, (New York, Harper, 2010)

Kracauer, Siegfried, *History: The Last Things before the Last - completed by Paul Oskar Kristeller*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1969)

Laidlaw, Zoe, *Colonial Connections, 1815–45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government*, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005)

Lambert, Angela, *Unquiet Souls: The Indian Summer of the British Aristocracy, 1880-1918*, (London, Macmillan, 1984)

Lambert, David and Lester, Alan ed., *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careerism in the Long Nineteenth Century*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006)

Laquer, Walter and Rubin, Barry ed., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, (London, Bantam Books, 1969)

Lawrence, T.E., *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, (London, Wordsworth, 1997, first published 1926)

Leeson, David, *The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence*, (Oxford, OUP, 2011)

Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel, *Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village, 1294-1324*, (London, Scholar Press, 1978)

Leslie, Anita, *The Marlborough House Set*, (New York, Doubleday, 1973)

Levi, Giovanni, *Inheriting Power: The Story of an Exorcist*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988)

Mack, Edward C., *Public Schools since 1860: The Relationship between Contemporary Ideas and the Evolution of an English Institution*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1941)

MacMillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War*, (John Murray, London, 2002)

- Magnússon, Sigurður Gylfi and Szijártó, István M., *What is Microhistory? Theory and Practice*, (London/New York, Routledge, 2013)
- Mangan, J.A. ed., *Benefits Bestowed? Education and British Imperialism*, (London, Routledge, 2012, first published 1988)
- Mazza, Roberto, *Jerusalem: From the Ottomans to the British* (London, I.B. Taurus, 2009)
- Meinertzhagen, Richard, *Middle East Diary, 1917-1956*, (London, Cresset, 1959)
- Mellini, Peter, *Sir Eldon Gorst: The Overshadowed Proconsul*, (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1977)
- Méouchy, Nadine and Sluglett, Peter ed., *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives*, (Brill, Leiden, 2004)
- Miller, Rory, *Divided Against Zion*, (London, Frank Cass, 2000)
- Monk, Daniel Bertrand, *An Aesthetic Occupation: The Immediacy of Architecture and the Palestine Conflict*, (Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2002)
- Moughalian, Sato, *Feast of Ashes: The Life and Times of David Ohannessian* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2019)
- Mourad, Suleiman A., Koltun-Fromm, Naomi and Der Matossian, Bedross ed., *Routledge Handbook on Jerusalem*, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2019)
- Muhawi, Ibrahim and Kanaana, Sharif, *Speak Bird, Speak Again: Palestinian Arab Folktales*, (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989)
- Muslih, Muhammad, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1988)
- Nassar, Issam, *European Portrayals of Jerusalem: Religious Fascinations and Colonist Imaginations*, (New York, Edwin Mellen Press, 2006)
- Pappe, Ilan, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Second Edition)*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006)
- Pappe, Ilan, *Ten Myths About Israel*, (Verso, London, 2017)
- Pappe, Ilan ed., *The Israel/Palestine Question*, (Routledge, London, 1999)
- Pappe, Ilan, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis, 1700-1948*, (London, Saqi, 2010)
- Patrick, Andrew, *America's Forgotten Middle East Initiative: The King-Crane Commission of 1919*, (London, I.B. Tauris, 2015)

Pike, Kenneth L., *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behaviour*, (The Hague, Mouton, 1967)

Porath, Yehoshua, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929*, (London, Frank Cass, 1974)

Regan, Bernard, *The Balfour Declaration: Empire, the Mandate and Resistance in Palestine*, (London, Verso, 2018)

Revel Jacques ed., *Jeux d'échelles: La micro-analyse a l'expérience*, (Paris, Gallimard, 1996)

Roberts, Nicholas E., *Islam under the Palestine Mandate: Colonialism and the Supreme Muslim Council*, (London, I.B. Taurus, 2016)

Rodinson, Maxime, *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?* (Monad Press, New York, 1973)

Rose, Norman, *'A Senseless, Squalid War': Voices from Palestine, 1890s-1948*, (London, Pimlico, 2010)

Rudd, Niall, *T.E. Page: Schoolmaster Extraordinary*, (Bristol, Bristol Classical Press, 1981)

Said, Edward W., *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York, Vintage, 1994)

Said, Edward W., *Orientalism*, (London, Penguin Modern Classic, 2003, first published 1978)

Samuel, Horace B., *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land*, (London, The Hogarth Press, 1930)

Satia, Priya, *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008)

Schayegh, Cyrus and Arsan, Andrew ed., *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates*, (Routledge, London, 2015)

Scott, John William Robertson, *The Life and Death of a Newspaper: An Account of the Temperaments, Perturbations and Achievements of John Morley, W.T. Stead, E.T. Cook, Harry Cust, J.L. Garvin and Three Other Editors of the Pall Mall Gazette*, (London, Methuen, 1952)

Segev, Tom, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, (London, Abacus, 2001)

Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, (Tel Aviv, Eretz Israel Museum, 2010)

Shepherd, Naomi, *Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917-1948*, (New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 2000)

Sherman, A.J., *Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine, 1918-1948*, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 2001)

Smith, Charles D., *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Fifth Edition) – A History with Documents*, (Boston, Bedford/St Martins, 2004)

Stevenson, David, *1914-1918: The History of the First World War*, (London, Penguin, 2004, reissued 2012)

Storrs, Sir Ronald, *Lawrence of Arabia, Zionism and Palestine*, (Penguin, London, 1940)

Storrs, Sir Ronald, *Orientalisms (Second Definitive Edition)*, (London, Nicholson and Watson, 1945)

Sykes, Christopher, *Crossroads to Israel*, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973)

Tabachnick, Stephen E. ed., *The T.E. Lawrence Puzzle*, (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1984)

Tamari, Salim ed., *Jerusalem 1948: the Arab Neighbourhoods and their Faith in the War*, (Jerusalem, Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002)

Tamari, Salim, *Mountain Against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture*, (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2009)

Tamari, Salim and Nassar, Issam ed., *The Storyteller of Jerusalem: The Life and Times of Wasif Jawhariyyeh*, (Massachusetts, Olive Branch Press, 2014)

Tennyson, Charles, *Cambridge from Within*, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1913)

Thompson, Elizabeth F., *How the West Stole Democracy from the Arabs: The Syrian Congress of 1920 and the Destruction of its Historic Liberal-Islamic Alliance*, (London, Grove Press, 2020)

Tibawi, A.L., *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914-1921*, (London, Luzac, 1978)

Tignor, Robert L., *Modernisation and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966)

Tod, A.H., *Charterhouse*, (London, G. Bell and Sons, 1919)

Vatikiotis, P.J., *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, Fourth Edition*, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991)

Veracini, Lorenzo, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010)

Vester, Bertha Spafford, *Our Jerusalem*, (London, Evans Brothers, 1951)

Wallach, Yair, *A City in Fragments: Urban Texts in Modern Jerusalem*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020)

Wasserstein, Bernard, *The British Mandate in Palestine – The Mandatory Government and the Arab Jewish Conflict, 1917-1929*, (London, Royal Historical Society, 1978)

Weizmann, Chaim, ed., Reinharz, Jehuda, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann – Volume IX, Series A – October 1918 - July 1920*, (Jerusalem, Rutgers University and Israel Universities Press, 1977)

Weizmann, Chaim, *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann*, (London, Hamilton, 1949)

Weizman, Eyal, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation (New Edition)*, (London, Verso, 2017)

Westrate, Bruce, *The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920*, (Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania University Press, 1992)

Wharton, Annabel Jane, *Selling Jerusalem: Relics, Replicas, Theme Parks*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006)

Wrapson, Lucy, Woodcock, Sally, Sutcliffe, Victoria and Bucklow, Spike ed., *Migrants: Art, Artists, Materials and Ideas Crossing Borders* (London, Archetype, 2019)

Wright, Simon, *Waterfield's School: A Preparatory School in its Victorian Heyday*, (Herons Ghyll, Herons Ghyll Press, 1994)

Yapp, M.E., *The Making of the Modern Near East: 1792-1923*, (London, Longman, 1987)

Ziff, William B., *The Rape of Palestine*, (London, Longmans Green Co, 1938)

Articles

Abowd, Thomas, "British Jerusalem" in Mourad, Suleiman A., Koltun-Fromm, Naomi and Der Matossian, Bedross ed., *Routledge Handbook on Jerusalem*, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2019), pp. 133-145

Ariel, Yaakov and Kark, Ruth, "Messianism, Holiness, Charisma, and Community: The American-Swedish Colony in Jerusalem, 1881-1933", *Church History*, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 641-657

Arnon, Adar, "The Quarters of Jerusalem in the Ottoman Period", *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January, 1992), pp. 1-65

Ashbee, C.R., "Pro-Jerusalem", *The American Magazine of Art*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (March, 1921), pp. 99-102

Auerbach, Jeffrey, "Before the Mandate: British Rule in Palestine, 1920–1922", *Israel Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, New Scholarship on the British Mandate in Palestine (Fall, 2021), pp. 5-23

Azrayahu, Maoz, "The Power of Commemorative Street Names", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 14 (1996), pp. 311-330

Bailey, Roderick, "Narrowed minds, destroyed communities: Anglo-American perceptions of Jewish heritage in Thessaloniki, 1943-46", in Wrapson, Lucy, Woodcock, Sally, Sutcliffe, Victoria and Bucklow, Spike ed., *Migrants: Art, Artists, Materials and Ideas Crossing Borders* (London, Archetype, 2019), pp. 119-129

Banko, Lauren, "Historiography and Approaches to the British Mandate in Palestine: new questions and frameworks", *Contemporary Levant*, Vol. 4 (2019), pp. 1-7

Barakat, Rana, "Urban Planning, Colonialism and the Pro-Jerusalem Society", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 65 (Spring, 2016), pp. 22-34

Bloom, Cecil, "T.E. Lawrence and Zionism", *Jewish Historical Studies*, Vol. 38 (2002), pp. 125-145

Cerruti, Simona, "Microhistory: Social Relations versus Cultural Models?" in Castrén, Anna-Maija, Lonkila, Markku and Peltonen, Matti ed., *Between Sociology and History: Essays on Microhistory, Collective Action and Nation-Building*, (Helsinki, SKS Finnish Literature Society, 2004) pp. 17-40

Chajes, J.H., "Accounting for the Self: Preliminary Generic-Historical Reflections on Early Modern Jewish Egodocuments", *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Winter, 2005), pp. 1-15

Cohen, Saul B. and Kliot, Nurit, "Place-Names in Israel's Ideological Struggle over the Administered Territories", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 653-680

Davis, Rochelle, "Ottoman Jerusalem: The Growth of the City Outside the Walls" in Tamari, Salim ed., *Jerusalem 1948: the Arab Neighbourhoods and their Faith in the War*, (Jerusalem, Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002), pp. 10-29

Dekker, Rudolf, "Jacques Presser's Heritage: Egodocuments in the Study of History", *Memoria y Civilización*, (Vol. 5, 2002), pp. 13-37

Dietrich, Renate, "Electrical Current and Nationalist Trends in Transjordan: Pinhas Rutenberg and the Electrification of Amman", *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. 43, Issue 1 (2003), pp. 88-101

Dimitriadis, Sotirios, "The Tramway Concession of Jerusalem, 1908–1914: Elite Citizenship, Urban Infrastructure, and the Abortive Modernization of a Late Ottoman City" in Dalachanis, Angelos and Lemire, Vincent ed., *Ordinary Jerusalem: Volume 1*, (Boston/Leiden, Brill, 2018), pp. 475-489

Doumani, Beshara, "Palestine Versus the Palestinians? The Iron Laws and Ironies of a People Denied", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Summer 2007), pp. 49-64

Dumper Michael and Larkin, Craig, "The politics of heritage and the limitations of international agency in contested cities: a study of the role of UNESCO in Jerusalem's Old City", *Review of International Studies*, January 2012, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan., 2012), pp. 25-52

Erfat, Elisha, "British Town Planning Perspectives of Jerusalem in Transition", *Planning Perspectives*, (Vol. 8, No. 4), 1993, pp. 377-393

Fisher, John, "Man on the Spot: Captain George Gracey and British Policy Towards the Assyrians, 1917-45", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Mar., 2008), pp. 215-235

Fishman, Louis, "The 1911 Haram al-Sharif Incident: Palestinian Notables Versus the Ottoman Administration", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Spring, 2005), pp. 6-22

Fulbrook, Mary, "Life Writing and Writing Lives: Ego Documents in Historical Perspective" in Dahlke, Birgit, Tate, Dennis and Woods, Roger ed., *German Life Writing in the Twentieth Century*, (Columbia, Camden House, 2011), pp. 25-38

Galbraith, John S., "The "Turbulent Frontier" as a Factor in British Expansion", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan., 1960), pp. 150-168

Gannon, Seán William, "The Formation, Composition, and Conduct of the British Section of the Palestine Gendarmerie, 1922-1926", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (December 2013), pp. 977-100

Giebels, Ludy, "Jacob Israel de Haan in Mandate Palestine: was the victim of the first Zionist political assassination a "Jewish Lawrence of Arabia"?", *Jewish Historical Studies*, Vol. 46 (2014), pp. 107-129

Gitler, Inbal Ben-Asher, "'Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity": Jerusalem City Plans during the British Mandate, 1917-1948", *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Fall 2003), pp. 39-58

Golani, Motti, "An Engima – Sir Ronald Storrs and Zionism" in Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, (Tel Aviv, Eretz Israel Museum, 2010) pp. 51-75

Green, Penny and Smith, Amelia, "Evicting Palestine", *State Crime Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Palestine, Palestinians and Israel's State Criminality (Spring 2016), pp. 81-108

Halabi, Awad, "The Nabi Musa Festival Under British-Ruled Palestine", *ISIM Newsletter*, Vol. 10 (2002), p. 27

Halabi, Awad, "The Transformation of the Prophet Moses Festival in Late Ottoman Jerusalem (1850-1917): From Traditional Pilgrimage to Civil Ritual", *Journal of Ritual Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2018), pp. 1-15

Jubeh, Nazmi, "Patrick Geddes: Luminary or Prophet of Demonic Planning", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 80, (Winter 2019) pp. 23-24

Kamel, Lorenzo, 'The Impact of Biblical Orientalism in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Palestine', *New Middle Eastern Studies*, No. 4 (2014), pp. 14-15

Kark, Ruth and Oren-Nordheim, Michal, "Colonial Cities in Palestine? Jerusalem under the British Mandate", *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1996-1997), pp. 50-94

Kent, Marian, "Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire: 1900-1923" in Kent, Marian ed., *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 172-205

Kitchen, James E., "'Khaki Crusaders': crusading rhetoric and the British Imperial Soldier during the Egypt and Palestine Campaigns, 1916-1918", *First World War Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, (2010), pp. 141-160

Klausner, Joseph, "The Hebrew University in Jerusalem", *The American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 39 (September 6 1937 to September 25 1938), pp. 179-192

Lambert, David and Lester, Alan, "Imperial spaces, imperial subjects" in Lambert, David and Lester, Alan ed., *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1-32

Leinster-Mackay, Donald, "The Nineteenth-Century English Preparatory School: Cradle and Creche of Empire?" in Mangan, J.A. ed., *Benefits Bestowed? Education and British Imperialism*, (London, Routledge, 2012, first published 1988), pp. 56-75

Lemire, Vincent, "The Awakening of Palestinian Hydropolitical Consciousness: The Artas-Jerusalem Water Conflict of 1925", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 48, (Winter, 2011), pp. 31-53

Lepore, Jill, "Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Jun., 2001), pp. 129-144

Lewis, Bernard, "The Question of Orientalism", *New York Review of Books*, June 24 1982

Lockman, Zachary, "Railway Workers and Relational History: Arabs and Jews in British-Ruled Palestine", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), pp. 601-627

Luke, Harry, "Storrs, Sir Ronald Henry Amherst (1881–1955)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed online at <https://doi.org/10.1093/odnb/9780192683120.013.36326> on 18/10/2021

Lundsten, Mary Ellen, "Wall Politics: Zionist and Palestinian Strategies in Jerusalem, 1928", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 8, (Autumn, 1978), pp. 3-27

Magnússon, Sigurdur Gylfi, "'The Singularization of History': Social History and Microhistory within the Postmodern State of Knowledge", *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Spring, 2003), p. 701-735

Mazza, Roberto, 'The Deal of the Century?: The Attempted Sale of the Western Wall by Cemal Pasha in 1916', *Middle East Studies*, (2021), DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2021.1895118

Mazza, Roberto, "'The Preservation and Safeguarding of the Amenities of the Holy City without Favour or Prejudice to Race or Creed": The Pro-Jerusalem Society and Ronald Storrs, 1917–1926", in Dalachanis, Angelos and Lemire, Vincent ed., *Ordinary Jerusalem: Volume 1*, (Boston/Leiden, Brill, 2018), pp. 403-422

Mazza, Roberto, "Transforming the Holy City: From Communal Clashes to Urban Violence, the Nebi Musa Riots in 1920" in Freitag, Ulrike, Fuccaro, Nelida, Ghrawi, Claudia and Lafi, Nora ed., *Urban Violence in the Middle East: Changing Cityscapes in the Transition from Empire to Nation State*, (New York, Bergahn, 2015), pp. 179-194

McTague Jr, John J., "The British Military Administration in Palestine 1917-1920", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring, 1978), pp. 55-76

Miller, Rory, "Sir Ronald Storrs and Zion: The Dream That Turned into a Nightmare", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul., 2000), pp. 114-144

Morris, Kevin L., "Israel's Historic Suspicion of the Vatican", *New Blackfriars*, Vol. 83, No. 976 (June, 2002), pp. 289-303

Naïli, Falestin, "The De-Municipalization of Urban Governance: Post-Ottoman Political Space in Jerusalem", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 76 (Winter 2018), pp. 8-13

Nash, Catherine, "Irish Placenames: Post-Colonial Locations", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 1999, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1999), pp. 457-480

Nedava, Josef, "Jabotinsky and Storrs", in Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, (Tel Aviv, 2010) pp. 131-145

Orlans, Harry, "The Many Lives of T. E. Lawrence: A Symposium", *Biography*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 224-248

Ovendale, Ritchie, "Storrs, Sir Ronald Henry Amherst (1881–1955), colonial governor and Middle Eastern specialist", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed online at <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/36326> on 18/10/2021

Prakash, Gyan, "Orientalism Now", *History and Theory*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Oct., 1995), pp. 199-212

Pullan, Wendy and Kyriacou, Lefkos, "The Work of Charles Ashbee: Ideological Urban Visions with Everyday City Spaces", *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Issue 39, (Autumn, 2009), pp. 51-61

Ram, Uri, "Issues and Agendas: The Colonization Perspective in Israeli Sociology: Internal and External Comparisons", *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 327-350

Rapaport, Raquel, "The City of the Great Singer: C.R. Ashbee's Jerusalem", *Architectural History*, Vol. 50 (2007), pp. 171-210

Renton, James, "Changing Languages of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East, 1917-1918", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 645-667

Roberts, Nicholas E., "Dividing Jerusalem: British Urban Planning in the Holy City", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Summer 2013), pp. 7-26

Roberts, Nicholas E., "Palestine on Display: The Palestine Pavilion at the British Empire Exhibition of 1924", *The Arab Studies Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Spring 2007), pp. 70-89

Roberts, Nicholas E., "Re-Remembering the Mandate: Historiographical Debates and Revisionist History in the Study of British Palestine", *History Compass*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (March 2011), pp. 215-230

Rogan, Eugene, "Neither Pro-Zionist nor Pro-Arab but Pro-Empire: A Reassessment of British Policy in the Palestine Mandate", Paper delivered online to the Balfour Project on 3/6/2021. Accessed online at <https://balfourproject.org/eugene-rogan/> on 2/8/2021

Rubin, Noah Hysler, "An Orientalist in Jerusalem: Ronald Storrs and Planning of the City", in Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, (Tel Aviv, Eretz Israel Museum, 2010) pp. 89-107

Schayegh, Cyrus and Arsan, Andrew, "Introduction", in Schayegh, Cyrus and Arsan, Andrew ed., *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates*, (Routledge, London, 2015), pp. 1-24

Schölch, Alexander, "The 'Men on the Spot' and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 773-785

Shafir, Gershon, "Capitalist Binationalism in Mandatory Palestine", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (November 2011), pp. 611-633

Shafir, Gershon, "Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach", in Pappe, Ilan ed., *The Israel/Palestine Question*, (Routledge, London, 1999), pp. 81-96

Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit and Bonfil, Rachel, "Preface", in Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, (Tel Aviv, Eretz Israel Museum, 2010) pp. 7-13

Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit, "Sir Ronald and the Knights of the Stone Order", in Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit ed., *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926*, (Tel Aviv, Eretz Israel Museum, 2010) pp. 15-50

Shilo, Margalit, "Women as Victims of War: The British Conquest (1917) and the Blight of Prostitution in the Holy City", *Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies & Gender Issues*, No. 6, Women, War, and Peace in Jewish and Middle East Contexts (Fall 5764/2003), pp. 72-83

Shoval, Noam, "Street-naming, tourism development and cultural conflict: the case of the Old City of Acre/Akko/ Akka", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2013), pp. 612-626

Smith, Dennis, "'The Civilizing Process' and 'The History of Sexuality': Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 79-100

St. Lawrence, Beatrice and Riedlmayer, András, "Restorations of Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock and Their Political Significance, 1537-1928", *Muqarnas*, Vol. 10, Essays in Honour of Oleg Grabar (1993), pp. 76-84

Stoler, Laura Ann, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance", *Archival Science*, Vol. 2, Issue 1-2, (2002), pp. 87-109

Tabachnick, Stephen E., "A Fragmentation Artist" in Tabachnick, Stephen E. ed., *The T.E. Lawrence Puzzle*, (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1984), pp. 1-49

Wallach, Yair, "Rethinking the Yishuv: late Ottoman Palestine's Jewish Communities Revisited", *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2017), pp. 275-294

Wallach, Yair, "The Oud Player and the Governor: Jerusalem Arabs' Relations with Ronald Storrs and the British Administration", Shalev-Khalifa, Nirit ed., *The*

First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918-1926, (Tel Aviv, Eretz Israel Museum, 2010) pp. 77-87

Wharton, Annabel, "Jerusalem Remade" in Isenstadt, Sandy and Rizvi, Kishwar ed., *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington, University of Washington Press, 2008), pp. 39-60

Wolfe, Patrick, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native", *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 2006), pp. 387-409

Wolf-Monzon, Tamar, "'The Hand of Esau in the Midst Here Too' - Uri Zvi Grinberg's Poem 'A Great Fear and the Moon' in Its Historical and Political Contexts", *Israel Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2013), pp. 170-193

Wright, Quincy, "Some Recent Cases on the Status of Mandated Areas", *The American Journal of International Law*, Oct., 1926, Vol. 20, No. 4, p. 768-772

Xypolia, Ilia, "Orientations and Orientalism: The Governor Sir Ronald Storrs", *Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies*, Vol. 11 (Summer 2011), pp. 25-43

Yeoh, Brenda S.A., "Street-Naming and Nation-Building: Toponymic Inscriptions of Nationhood in Singapore", *Area*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 298-307

Zander, Walter, "On the Settlement of Disputes about the Christian Holy Places," *Israel Law Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (1978), pp. 331-366

Newspapers and Periodicals

Daily Mail (London, England)

The Daily Telegraph (London, England)

Evening Star (Washington DC)

The Hebrew Standard of Australia (Australia)

The Manchester Guardian (Manchester, England)

Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate (Australia)

The Palestine Bulletin (Jerusalem)

The Reform Advocate (Chicago)

The Sentinel (Chicago)

The Spectator (London, England)

The Sunday Times (London, England)

The Times (London, England)

The Daily Telegraph (London, England)

Websites/Miscellaneous

Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex, The Hague, 18/10/1907

The Balfour Declaration, Letter from Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild, November 2 1917

The Pro-Jerusalem Society Quarterly Bulletin, March 1922

'The First Governor' – Description of 2010 Exhibition on Sir Ronald Storrs hosted by the Eretz Israel Museum, accessed online at <https://www.eretzmuseum.org.il/e/20/> on 14/01/2019

Ernest Tatham Richmond Special Collections Catalogue, University of Durham, accessed online at http://reed.dur.ac.uk/xtf/view?docId=ark/32150_s1fj236216r.xml on 04/06/2019

Karakashian Jerusalem Pottery, accessed online at https://www.jeruselempottery.biz/about_us/aboutus.htm on 03/11/2020