School of Media, Culture and Creative Arts

The Deleuzian Cineaste: placing movement at the heart of film analysis

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Declaration

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The development and realisation of this thesis rests absolutely on the working relationship with my supervisor, Robert Briggs. Of the many things that he has enabled, what I value most is that he allowed me the space and time to explore and define my topic. When it was time to shape the thesis, Robert's incisiveness and clarity came to the fore and I thank him very much for his accessibility and patience.

The completion of the thesis recalls its beginnings. The memory of Niall Lucy looms large for me. When we began the mapping process for this thesis, I asked him where I should start in terms of postmodern approaches to cinema. He said: "Well, you might start with Deleuze". Were he still alive, I would like to ask him if that was some kind of joke? Does one ever start with Deleuze and then think: "OK, I have had enough, what else can you show me"?

The Australian Association for the Teaching of English (AATE) and the South Australian affiliation, SAETA, have actively supported my interest in film studies. My first workshop was presented at the urging of then president, David Homer, and SAETA newsletter editor Bronwyn Doull was enthusiastic when I offered to write a supplement for the newsletter that I called *Vis* (on visual texts, but mostly on film — it ran to 31 editions). More recent opportunities have been offered by Alison Robertson and Erika Boas on behalf of the AATE Council. They are prominent names in a very supportive culture and I also acknowledge Lyn Wilkinson, Wayne Sawyer, Mark Howie, Sue Gazis, Eva Gold, Terry Hayes, Guy Bayley-Jones, Scott Bulfin, and Bill Green all of whom, in one way or another, have had an impact on this thesis.

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ABSTRACT

The figure of *Deleuzian cineaste* put forward in this thesis is constructed to denote a non-academic application of Gilles Deleuze's cinema project for teachers, students, critics, bloggers, aficionados and so on. Accordingly, the Deleuzian cineaste is the means to identify a systematic approach to filmic movement and a subsequent analysis based on movement. In comparison, the institutionalised field of film analysis — defined here as conventional formalism — draws on the aesthetics of painting and photography to present the visual image as the foundation of cinema studies. In effect, Deleuze's *Cinema* books displace the primary attention on visual images that is central to film analysis, but the books' arguments are philosophically-based, and dauntingly so. Consequently, most subsequent academic scholarship remains in the orbit of the philosophical project. If film is essentially about movement, the focus on movement enabled by Deleuze's philosophy should be fundamentally available at all levels of analysis. Nevertheless, Deleuzian cineastes are served neither by diluting Deleuze nor by unmediated exposure to his concepts. For this reason, this thesis develops not so much a handbook on Deleuzian film analysis as the sustained mediation on Deleuze's work that is necessary as a precursor to such a handbook. Chapter one frames a projected notion of Deleuzian film analysis (it was not his intention to provide a guide to film analysis) in terms of broad commonalities and at times acrimonious tensions with conventional formalism, but it also demonstrates, counter to Deleuze's iconoclastic reputation, parallel concerns with other film theorists of his time. Chapter two places the Deleuzian cineaste in the context of the existing field of scholarly cinema studies following Deleuze and finds that, despite some momentum away from overtly philosophical concerns, the field remains solidly Deleuzian in the explication of his concepts. Several representative scholarly collections expose practices that this thesis consolidates in terms of notions of *assemblage* as a broad methodological framework in which relation and change are made central to a general analytical practice. Chapter three presents a revitalisation of Deleuze's movement-image that is routinely regarded as facilitating regular patterns of movement and dismissed on those grounds as a prelude to the time-image. The chapter returns to the movement-image as the molecular

channelling of cinematic movement in a number of ways: from Jacques Lecoq's theatre work comes a theorisation of physical movement useful in discussing its representation in cinema; from C. S. Peirce comes the notion that the fundamental movement between cinematic images is a movement of *signification*; and, from electronic approaches to signaletic material comes a reassessment of communication potential with implications for cinema. In chapter four, the recognition of sound presents a clear opportunity to reverse the analytical priority afforded visual images and considers sound through a sustained analysis of examples and theorists whose work has informed conventional formalism somewhat but not to the point of parity with visual approaches. As sound emerges as at least an equal partner with visuals, the door is opened to a consideration of other types of image — haptic, performative, kinaesthetic, digital — making film analysis aware of and responsive to a range of approaches appropriate to a multimodal form. In chapter five, the abiding concern of how images are put into relation, how relations change, and how a sense of a whole is implicated places editing as central. The interstice between shots becomes of interest as the site of conceptual movement and as the means to grasp editing's cohesive function. Attendant complexities for Deleuzian film analysis are met with new or adjusted concepts — the "encompassing whole", "dynamic mise-en-scene" — as the kind of intermediary support necessary for the Deleuzian cineaste. In chapter six, a repertoire of approaches and models provides the Deleuzian cineaste with a series of dispositions that build on preceding chapters. Deleuzian film analysis is not just a matter of doing things differently, it is a matter of openness to potentiality, fluidity, relation and change — the same qualities that frame cinematic movement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

"[Philosophy] was trying to put motion into thought
while cinema was putting it into images".

— Gilles Deleuze [1]

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[1] Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972-1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 57.

Gilles Deleuze's *Cinema* books — *Cinema 1: the Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: the Time-Image*[2] — offer movement as a fundamental element of film analysis that includes physical movement, camera movement, and movement made possible through editing and, by valuing sound as an essential component of the image, extends the dimensions of movement available to analysis. Insofar as all of these movements work in concert to produce the images of a film, to track movement is to track thought: ideas, meanings and significance. An approach is offered that is radically different from conventional film analysis that usually begins with visual images — not even visuals and sound, which would at least invite some consideration of movement. When it is recognised, movement is usually described as connective and mostly in terms of assumed phases between images. Despite the potential for a reassessment of practices, film analysis grounded in movement is still marginal after three decades of scholarship following Deleuze's *Cinema* books.

Put differently, there has been no trickle-down effect from the *Cinema* books to general film analysis, to use a term from economics (where it also does not work). "General analysis" here refers to a practice of engaging with films that is not exclusively or principally academic, and is grounded in the fundamentals of film — moving with films rather than moving towards a film from a prior (principled, theoretical, aesthetic) position. Academic scholarship provides models of approach and a sophistication in grasping cinematic concepts, but a general practice of film analysis based on Deleuze — one that assumes little or no *direct* experience of, or expertise in, his other works — has not been systematically advocated. It is as if the means to grasp cinematic movement were encoded and available in the *Cinema* books for scholars who would scrutinise concepts and use them to feed particular lines of inquiry. Deleuze's cinematic concepts, having been couched in philosophical terms and having been achieved *as* philosophical practice, cannot so easily shake their philosophical traces and antecedents.

Film analysis was not Deleuze's direct concern, but the concern of this thesis is how to approach Deleuze's concepts in ways that would shift film analysis to a position where to analyse any film would be to analyse movement. This investigation seeks to distil from the *Cinema* books a general approach to film that values the movement-image as comparable to the way that conventional analysis takes as axiomatic the notion that visual elements such as camera angles and composition expose elements of the shot as meaningful. To make the process more material, the *Deleuzian cineaste* has been conceived as a lay person in the Deleuzian field of film analysis: the teacher,

[2] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). When joint reference is made, it will be to "the *Cinema* books".

student, blogger, reviewer, aficionado, and to an extent the academic scholar. The latter is more the cleric, demonstrating a facility with Deleuze and an awareness of working within Deleuzian parameters and, as such, becomes useful in creating a springboard for the set of models and dispositions for the Deleuzian cineaste (see Chapters 2 and 6), rather than providing a precise methodology that directly applies concepts. To that extent, this thesis does not produce a handbook that is of use to the Deleuzian cineaste, but rather provides a bridge for one.

What is at stake is the potential to generate new modes of non-academic film analysis. For this reason, the scenario of the high school student is not offered arbitrarily. The teacher and student engaged in film analysis in the setting of the English classroom[3] is a context that by its nature and with its history is well placed to accommodate Deleuzian approaches. Of all the incarnations of the Deleuzian cineaste, it is the one likely to seek theory to support practice. At the same time, English's sustained teaching of film provides an opportunity and a material context in which to situate the *Cinema* books and their focus on movement, even if such utility was not a direct objective in their generation. For there is already available a serviceable body of concepts and approaches to film in what will be understood here as *conventional formalism*, in which a language that values visual images is central to film studies (see Chapter 1), and routinely practised in high school English. The English classroom scenario thus serves as a useful construction for assessing both the necessity for, and the outcomes of, the notion of the Deleuzian cineaste. But it should be stressed that in foregrounding what will be termed "the high school avatar" — not as teacher nor student, rather as both engaged in the common activity of classroom learning — other embodiments of the Deleuzian cineaste are not being excluded. It remains important for anyone engaged in film analysis to systematically engage with cinematic movement. The English classroom provides a useful context because direct appeals to theory are never far from its concerns and because it is for many people their first experience of film studies (in many cases, their only experience). Accordingly, the educational context will be explored in more detail in this introduction before outlining a sense of complexities in approaching Deleuze and movement.

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[3] "English" will be used, as it is generally in Australia, as an umbrella term to describe high school courses that specialise in writing, reading, literature, speaking and listening, and text analysis (including analysis of film, theatre, speeches, and "visual texts" — photographs, advertisements, artworks, illustrations, etc.). The International Baccalaureate names the field "Language and Literature", and where the focus is on limited text types, "Literature". Similarly, "Language Arts" has currency, particularly in, but not limited to, America. In the 1990s in the UK, Richard Andrews and others argued for a change from "English" to "Rhetoric" in Richard Andrews, *Rebirth of Rhetoric* (London: Routledge, 1992).

The high school avatar: context

There are practical and autobiographical reasons for using the English classroom to situate the Deleuzian cineaste, but were there not, it would be difficult to find a context more accommodating of theoretical change in film analysis. In various curriculum frameworks, film is offered in some Art options and in Media classes, but the latter has shrunk due to successive rationalisations and the former is usually a specialist option for novice filmmakers. In comparison, film is a compulsory study in English in some educational settings and, in others, recognition of multimodality and diversity in text types is standard.[4] "The high school avatar" (of the Deleuzian cineaste) has been distilled, in my case, from extensive practice both in teaching English and in providing professional development in the use of film in the English classroom.[5] The avatar is a construction, but for me it has faces and exists in real (remembered as real) situations in the classrooms and workshops.

Of the many encounters in the English classroom, it is the encounter with texts that is privileged.[6] In determining what will be taught, how it relates to theory, and what is valued in assessment tasks, the following extemporised account essentially describes my practice and the practice of others that I have observed. It begins with the identification of a text and takes it from there:

> You *do* a film. You do a novel. You do *Romeo and Juliet*. Each texts brings with it critical baggage. If I teach Caryl Churchill's play, *Top Girls*, I need to grasp postmodernism and questions of gender. If I teach *Romeo and Juliet*, I can bring those same considerations into play, but I might be more drawn to the fact that there are two very good and useful movies that I can put into opposition. If I teach *Run Lola Run*, I am drawn to the dazzling array of techniques and to the film's nonlinearity that I can use intertextually to promote fresh approaches to the students' own creative writing. If I

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[4] *Curriculum* is being used here in a general sense of what is offered in a course of study. Its actual usefulness is conditioned by contexts, so one can talk of the International Baccalaureate Curriculum as concerned with *organising principles* rather than content. In Australia, there is a national curriculum: "The Australian Curriculum is designed to help all young Australians to become successful learners, confident and creative individuals, and active and informed citizens. Presented as a developmental sequence of learning from Foundation – Year 10, the Australian Curriculum describes to teachers, parents, students and others in the wider community what is to be taught and the quality of learning expected of young people as they progress through school." (https://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/f-10-curriculum/learning-areas/). In the Australian Curriculum, the concern is sequencing, values, and a mechanism for accountability. In the context of a school, "curriculum" is often synonymous with "syllabus" as an indication of what is on offer. Bill Green addresses the complexity in usage: "While curriculum remains one of the most widely used terms in the educational field, both formally and informally, it is one all too often taken for granted, as an always already known quality. In a quite precise sense, it tends to function as either a 'placeholder', a 'stop-word', or akin to an empty signifier and hence available to be filled according to need or purpose or whatever discourse is at hand." Bill Green, *Engaging Curriculum* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 1.

[5] I have taught English for 35 years — firstly, in South Australian high schools, and later in Japan at Osaka International School (International Baccalaureate). Since 1991, I have provided workshops, articles, and conference addresses on film for English teachers.

[6] The point was underscored by a collection of resources from teachers for use in English classrooms titled *Texts: The Heart of the English Curriculum.* The title was a clear statement of purpose and definition. Peter Adams and Helen Campagna-Wildash, *Texts: The Heart of the English Curriculum* (Adelaide: Curriculum Division, Dept. for Education and Children's Services, 1995).

teach a novel, say *Catcher in the Rye*, I am drawn to questions of characterisation that might be just as relevant to all other narrative texts but start to become pressing: why should we even care about Holden Caulfield? And as students write, I am profoundly aware of (and judge) their use of grammar, spelling and their facility with literary terms at the same time that I want them to be open and frank in their writing, as well as in their discussions in class.[7]

It is not altogether agreed that "text" is the best way to define a film, but the point is that the English teacher is poised and ready to activate a repertoire of approaches given a particular film "text", as a matter of routine practice. The English teacher is situated in a complexity of choices of texts, theories and approaches. State and national conferences of English teachers tend to have more the flavour of *expos* — sharing resources and approaches — than, of occasions for training or professional instruction, or the inculcation of one pedagogical perspective or another. The pedagogical theories that do frame and define English include some particularly influential theories that promote the choice of what happens in the classroom as a matter to be determined in concert with students.[8] The English classroom, then, presents as a Deleuzian event or situation (or the potential for one) making rhizomatic connections, cutting paths as lines of flight, and building assemblages, if not explicitly in those terms.

That is not to say that Deleuze is *never* explicit in classroom practice. Stephanie Springgay and Nikki Rotas's "How do you make a classroom operate like a work of art? Deleuzeguattarian methodologies of research-creation" is based on the following:

> a "willingness to theorize events . . . as encounters between ontologically diverse actants, some human, some not, though all thoroughly material" . . . It is through the situations and not the givens that a "classroom as a work of art" can make this

[7] These are my own reflections, based on experience.

[8] "In the 1980s the concept of curriculum negotiation was developed by the Australian curriculum specialist Garth Boomer and colleagues. We explore Boomer's ideas about curriculum negotiation and how his approach can: 1) enable students to become meaningful agents in curriculum design; 2) integrate student voice into the curriculum, and foster a more democratic educational environment; and 3) develop specific citizenship skills and graduate attributes". Jeroen Bron, Catherine Bovill and Wiel Veugelers, "Curriculum Negotiation: The Relevance of Boomer's Approach to the Curriculum as a Process, Integrating Student Voice and Developing Democratic Citizenship", *Curriculum Perspectives* 36, no. 1 (2016): 15-27. This was much more than of theoretical interest because Garth Boomer held a number of key and high-level positions and was charismatic, clear-headed and forceful enough to make things happen. The Middle Schooling Movement and the National Schools Network were national movements that took up the kinds of principles described above. They were concerned with structural and pedagogical reform in the upper primary and lower secondary years. Drawing on models from the United States, a number of targets were identified as ripe for reform: the conceptualisation of a middle level between primary and secondary school, with its own particular needs; collaborative practices in teaching and learning; "authentic" assessment tasks; the restructuring of the school day to allow greater immersion in topics; and productive connections between traditionally separate curriculum areas (subjects). Developments were complex and wide ranging. Breton Prosser provides a concise overview: Brenton Prosser, "Reinvigorating the Middle Years: a review of middle schooling" (Paper presented at the Australian Association for Research in Education Conference, Adelaide, 29 November 2006).

qualitative leap — a leap that produces the givens. It is through the problematic field of our entanglements that we can renegotiate the givens and what a classroom thus *does*.[9]

"Through the situations not the givens" is key and the implication of the classroom as a work of art, is that something is being created jointly by participants. Conservative objection along the lines that student lives are too important to be treated as works of art or that there are curriculum demands to be met, ignore the reality that in any classroom setting something is being created and maintained — a construction is being made — if not a work of art, then what is it? And that is more Springgay and Rotas's point.

Similarly, one chapter of David Cole's *Educational Life-Forms* is titled "Building relationships through Deleuzian teaching and learning practice and affect".[10] His construction of "Deleuzian teaching and learning practice" is not far from the intention of the Deleuzian cineaste: an identification of a practice indebted to Deleuze but requiring orientation to a particular setting. Other chapters present the notion of *learning-time* derived from Bergson-Deleuze's duration and "pedagogic epiphanies" derived from Deleuze's study of creativity in literature and used not simply to assert that teaching should be creative, but to understand the *generation* of educational life-forms in terms of creativity.

Cole uses Wittgenstein to characterise the learning situation as a "life-form". This is an unlikely theoretical pairing of Deleuze with Wittgenstein, given the former's antipathy to the latter,[11] but the pairing is not unexpected as a rhizomatic connection or an engagement of one assemblage with another. For Cole, that is, Wittgenstein provides the means to limit a learning context while Deleuze provides the concepts for exposing relational potentials within it.

In their different ways, Cole, Springgay and Rotas describe a learning situation as the site of complex relations, with Deleuzian theory employed on the grounds of usefulness and its attention on processes and encounters rather than givens, even if it is often (and probably necessarily) a

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[9] Stephanie Springgay and Nikki Rotas "How do you make a classroom operate like a work of art? Deleuzeguattarian methodologies of research-creation", *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 28:5, (2015), 568. The embedded quotation is from: Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), xiv.

[10] David Cole, *Educational Life-Forms: Deleuzian Teaching and Learning Practice* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2011), Chapter 6, 93–108.

[11] An extended interview (filmed) with Deleuze was structured as working through the alphabet with each letter prompting a significant term, concept, or person for Deleuze. "Parnet: Let's move on to 'W'. Deleuze: There's nothing in 'W'. Parnet: Yes, there's Wittgenstein. I know he's nothing for you, but it's only a word. Deleuze: I don't like to talk about that. . . For me, it's a philosophical catastrophe. It's the very example of a 'school', it's a regression of all philosophy, a massive regression. The Wittgenstein matter is quite sad. They imposed (*ils ont foutu*) a system of terror in which, under the pretext of doing something new, it's poverty instituted in all grandeur. . ." Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, avec Claire Parnet*, directed by Pierre-André Boutang (1996). Translation and Notes: Charles J. Stivale. https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/lectures/en/ABCMsRevised-NotesComplete051120_1.pdf.

partial usefulness or an incomplete adoption of theory: "This book takes from Deleuze what is necessary for the purpose of making changes happen in education".[12] One takes from Deleuze as Deleuze took what he needed from others. What is being taken in this thesis is the valuing of movement in a way that puts it at odds with the idea of film as a visual text.

Film as a visual text

Film found a place in the English curriculum as a *visual text,* valued as one of a number of text types. It is a mark of the authority of conventional formalism — its taken-for-grantedness — that to teach film was, and is, assumed to involve an essential decoding of the visual image. One might have thought that English teachers would be more interested in *film as an authored text* and approach a film through the script, with theoretical underpinnings in the French *auteur* theory and a focus on the realisation of ideas in film. The appeal in this as an approach is that it matches exactly English teaching's concern in the teaching of novels and poetry and, especially, plays (theatre is not approached through its performance conditions and outcomes).

In Australia in the 1980s, film analysis within secondary school English teaching developed from niche considerations — the film of the book, some voices from the fringe at conferences, and a peak over the fence at what was happening in media studies classes — to become a curriculum requirement with institutional validation of film as a *visual text* and a formal requirement to teach film. By then, there was at least a core of teachers who were confident in approaching film analysis, trained as they were in universities in the 1970s where the discipline of film studies was carving a place for itself, supported by the textbooks of David Bordwell, Louis Giannetti and others.[13] They remain foundational resources in many film studies courses (see Chapter 1).

Consequently, most of my film analysis, and that of colleagues, has been underpinned by conventional formalism, both as an assumed model of what it is to do film analysis and as underpinning other models. At the heart of conventional formalism is the isolation of the (visual) image for analysis: actually freezing the film to consider visual composition, or conceptually freezing the image in general terms to provide evidence for a point of theory or discussion.[14] The

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[12] Cole, *Educational Life-Forms,* 11 .

[13] Such as: David Bordwell, Kristin Thompson and Jeff Smith, *Film Art: An Introduction* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); James Monaco, *How to Read a Film* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Louis D Giannetti, *Understanding Movies* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972).

[14] It is not that the primary attention to visual qualities was mistaken. What it is to teach film as a visual text is made clear, for example by *The Education Standards Authority* in New South Wales: "Texts in which meaning is shaped and communicated by images

justified impression is that one is doing what comes naturally in arresting movement. As Massumi puts it: "The eyes . . . do not register movement without also registering its arrest, in other words form (the visual image insofar as it is susceptible to geometric expression; movement as captured in a still, a snapshot, or a tableau giving it measure and proportion). It is because vision interrupts movement with formed images that it must interrupt itself to see movement as such".[15] Film analysis as arrest has underpinned film courses.[16] The provocation from Massumi is to go beyond: to disrupt the disruption. How does one do that? Disruption might perhaps require a meta-theory, but in Deleuze's case what is offered is the opposite in a return to cinematic fundamentals that will become the organising concerns of this thesis: the image, editing, and sound. Alongside them is what can be considered Deleuzian fundamentals: the whole, interstice, particular ways of working, and the cinemas of movement (classical) and time (modern).

With few exceptions, what happens in classroom practice feels untheorised, undertheorised or it exists *in relation* to theory (pedagogical and organisational theory as much as film theory) rather than determined by it. Outcomes might be mandated, but theory exists in dialogue with the demands of the actual situations in which choices and relations have to be made. The important questions for pedagogy are, for Bill Green, ones of what to teach, how, and why? "This is to bring together knowledge and identity and pedagogy as a meaningful ensemble, or an assemblage, all of which are matters for continuing scrutiny and study, in themselves and together".[17]

Green's is not an overtly Deleuzian analysis, but he recognises parameters (or uncertainty of parameters) in explicitly Deleuzian terms: "I work with a view of pedagogy as inherently and ultimately undecidable, as teaching for learning (and never 'teaching as learning') and as operating within that space of *radical uncertainty* that exists between teaching and learning, a liminal space of

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rather than words. Visual texts use techniques, for example line, shape, space, colour, movement, perspective, angle and juxtaposition to shape meaning. Examples of visual texts include cartoons, billboards, photographs, film, TV, artworks, web pages and illustrations". https://educationstandards.nsw.edu.au/wps/portal/nesa/11-12/stage-6-learning-areas/stage-6-english/english-studies-2017/glossary.

[15] Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 59.

[16] Practical reasons for doing so at that time, no longer exist. Anecdotally, in the days when film studies was establishing itself in universities and high schools, roughly, the 1970s and 80s, access to films was limited. This was well before the DVD. I remember in 1979 showing the film, *Lord of the Flies* (Peter Brook, 1963) to follow our study of the novel. I had to order, weeks in advance, a 16mm print (it was a big deal technologically that what was only available in the cinema was now available on 16mm prints) that I rented for a week. It was a special event and so we booked a double classroom, with blackout curtains, and crammed in three classes to watch it. I was able to operate the projector because in my Diploma of Education, I had learnt how to do so and was, loosely, licenced (competence with a 16mm projector was one condition of a passing grade in a practical unit). There was no scope to rewatch the movie, and rewatching sections would have been difficult and very inconvenient. The necessity was to remember sections and to use stills in texts books, if available. The kind of access to film that allows me to *very easily* slow a film to frame-by-frame if needed, and to rewatch sections at the press of a button, permits analysis to be certain of details that would just flash by in a cinema viewing (as anachronistic as that experience is becoming).

[17] Green, *Engaging Curriculum*, 290.

becoming Other".[18] The English classroom is the site of complex intersections that invite Deleuze's attention to material and theoretical encounters. It was the turning of attention to theorised interactions in the classroom that cemented a place for film in the English curriculum.

Film was situated as part of a rising media awareness as mass media, multi-media or multimodal texts at the same time that English teaching grappled with a pedagogy that was shifting to student-centred teaching as the result of a conference at Dartmouth College (New Hampshire), in 1966.[19] It is no hyperbole to regard the conference as a watershed and Jack Thompson identified twelve post-Dartmouth developments that reshaped English teaching following from the conference. They are somewhat cumulative, beginning with learning processes and the relation of theory to practice, and include film specifically in several points: "The development of wider definitions of literature" (No. 7); "Developing understanding of multimedia technology and increasing mastery in using it" (No. 10); and new models for English teaching that included "the cultural studies or textuality model" (No. 12). [20]

Any education practice that focuses on the individual is going to be one fundamentally concerned with multiplicities[21] and moves away from totalising conditions that place the student as the object of curriculum delivery. Multiple theoretical voices are useful in developing a *repertoire* of practices to be employed as needed. In approaching film, English teaching surveyed a number of methodologies without understanding them to be oppositional. Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen used Michael Halliday's functional linguistics to take analysis of visuals to a level of theorised sophistication around multimodality.[22] Allan Luke, Peter Freebody, Bill Green, Hilary Janks, Ray Misson and Wendy Morgan (and others) worked in and around a hybridised cultural studies and critical literacy. More marginally (but important to my own practice and presentations)

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[18] Ibid., 290. [Emphasis added.]

[19] A report on the conference — John Dixon's *Growth through English* — according to Wayne Sawyer "remains one of the most influential books on English teaching ever written". Wayne Sawyer and Eva Gold, ed., *Reviewing English in the 21st Century* (Melbourne: Phoenix Education, 2004), 23. "The conference took place in 1966, August 20–September 16. The official title was the 'Anglo-American Conference on the Teaching and Learning of English', but it quickly became widely known as 'The Dartmouth Seminar.' It resulted in several highly influential publications between 1966 and 1968, including: *Teaching the Universe of Discourse* (James Moffett); *Growth Through English* (John Dixon); *The Uses of English* (Herb Muller). It moved the focus of the field from a 'transmission of content' and skills-driven model of curriculum sequencing, in force in the U.S., to a growth model as proposed most notably by participants James Britton and John Dixon". Christiane Donahue, "Impact of the 1966 Seminar", 50th Anniversary Dartmouth Institute and Conference, 2015, dartmouthwritinginstitute.wordpress.com.

[20] Jack Thompson, "Post-Dartmouth developments in English teaching in Australia" in *Reviewing English*, ed. Sawyer and Gold, 10-22.

[21] Both in the general sense of dealing with a significant number of people simultaneously and in the Deleuzian sense of essential relations and interactions as sufficient in grasping social structures: "The concept of multiplicity makes no reference to a transcendent realm of the world that contains the structures or laws of existence. Since we live among actual multiplicities (and are ourselves multiplicities), we are always elements and actors within the world. In this sense both philosophy and human existence are eminently practical". Jonathan Roffe, "Multiplicity", in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Adrian Parr, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 182.

[22] Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, *Reading Images* (Geelong, Vic.: Deakin University, 1996).

Gale MacLachlan and Ian Reid's *Framing and Interpretation* presented Derrida-derived analysis of context that situated film studies as a concern with context.[23] Through these, film became a more complex object of analysis, less concerned with representation and a quest to expose hidden meaning. But underneath it all was still the assumption that film analysis remained best approached in terms of what Bordwell expressed as form's "overall system of relationships among the parts of a film"[24] (still mostly visual) and the recognition that "any film combines formal and stylistic elements in such a way as to create an ideological stance, whether stated or implied".[25] What appeared to be a natural way of doing film analysis (working from the elements) was useful for English teachers for whom cinematic theory was not their main game, and not even their main game in studying a film.

The conflation, then, of pedagogical justifications for *why* we should be teaching film, met conventional formalism's presentation of *how* to go about it: making sense of the film by close and deliberate observation that was taken as a matter of principle. "An empirical inquiry is one which seeks answers to its questions from evidence available outside the mind of the inquirer. Film history is empirical in just this way; but so too are all varieties of film criticism, which base their interpretations on evidence inter-subjectively available within texts".[26] The statement crystalises a methodology at the same time that it raises difficult questions: to what extent is evidence available outside of the mind of the inquirer and how is evidence intersubjectively available? Still, the value of empirical inquiry — as opposed to empiricist, to acknowledge Bordwell's distinction[27] — along with the goal of valuing the engagement of students (a Dartmouth legacy) resulted in the production of a range of useful resources for teachers that would enable engagement and inquiry.[28]

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[23] Four organising concepts defined the scope of their work: *intertextuality,* between texts; *intratextuality*, within the text; *circumtextuality*, the text as conditioned by its presence as an object in the world, for example in the difference between a paperback and hardcover novel, or between a film in a cinema and online; and *extratextuality*, "depend[ing] on seemingly 'outside' information, unspecified by the text but felt to be presupposed by it".(3) The visual-patterning concern of conventional formalism was limited to intratextuality, and expanded approaches to context provided a more nuanced approach for critical literacy. Gale MacLachlan and Ian Reid, *Framing and Interpretation* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1994).

[24] Bordwell, *et al*, *Film Art*, G-2 [Glossary, second page].

[25] Ibid., 444.

[26] David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies* (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), n.63, Kindle ed. Loc.1109.

[27] "Many adherents of Grand Theory have confused empirical inquiry with empiricist inquiry. Empiricism names a philosophical tradition that places primary emphasis upon experience in explaining how humans acquire knowledge. Historically, empiricism has often embraced views that the mind is a passive receptacle and that concepts may be reduced to aggregates of sense impressions. No one in film studies espouses an empiricist position". Ibid., Loc. 1105, n.63.

[28] *Big Screen Small Screen* (Mark Howie, ed.) is a compilation of activities that have worked in the classroom and is full of prompts, worksheets, guides to viewing (such as Running Sheets for movies under consideration), pre-viewing activities and viewing guides. *Reading in the Dark* (John Golden) expands and annotates film terms (shot, mise-en-scene, lighting, etc), presents strategies for viewing, and considers literary categories (character, point of view, symbols) for film, with the intention of guiding the teacher. William Costanzo's *Great Films and How to Teach Them* is part theoretical overviews and part detailed descriptions of aspects of the film followed by questions and topics for study. Advice to teachers is practical: setting tasks, dealing with copyright, etc. Alan McKee's *Textual Analysis* is more a direct engagement with theory. And then there are technical supports like Thomas Caldwell's *Film*

If the impression is of openness to theories, an underlying tension found strident expression in an "anti-Theory" campaign and an overt political form in the so-call culture wars documented in Niall Lucy's *POMO OZ*.[29] It is a complex topic and outside of the scope of this thesis, except to make the observation that critical literacy as an alternative to conventional formalism — arguably the strongest at the time, and so strong as to be platforms in Tasmanian and Queensland education departments' curriculum statements for English and highly influential in other states — was not without challenge. Critical literacy was more part of the English teacher's repertoire than a sustained post-structuralism attributed to any single theorist. As Lucy explains, critical literacy is a practice — a critical practice or disposition — rather than a theoretical, let alone "ideological" approach.[30]

Thinking about movement

What this potted history of "the" English classroom shows is that the educational field might be predisposed to accommodate change — as it accommodates all kinds of theories. But it is not clear what it is being asked to accommodate in paying attention to movement in film. It is not a question of *what is movement?* but *how is it useful?* and *how is it made available?* While cinema draws heavily from painting and other visual arts, the form that it most resembles is music whose elements, like film's, set up certain flows. The Japanese conductor Seiji Ozawa observed something useful for film analysis when he discussed the difficulty of appreciating a work from its score. Here Ozawa is discussing problems he had in accessing a particular work:

Analysis Handbook and Brian Moon's *Viewing Terms* that focus on terms familiar to conventional formalism with (in both) guides and exercises to assist in exploring them.

[29] Niall Lucy, *POMO OZ: Fear and Loathing Downunder.* (Perth: Fremantle Press, 2010). The "anti-Theory campaign" in Bordwell and Carroll, *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies* was anti-dogma or in opposition to established theory such as Freudian, Marxist, Lacanian, Feminist, etc.

[30] It is, nevertheless, a theorised disposition. There is a confirmation of Deleuze's *transcendental empiricism* at play in critical literacy, that "philosophy must begin with the immediate given — real conscious awareness — without presupposing any categories, concepts or axioms". Cliff Stagoll, "Transcendental Empiricism", in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 288-289. Deleuze's position is not an argument for theoretical amnesia, but a requirement to *proceed* without supposition of any kind, so far as that is possible. It is an approach that values rhizomatic connections and Deleuze recognises it as an important aspect of filmmaking as much as analysis: "Godard's force lies in living and thinking and presenting the AND in a very novel way, and in making it work actively. AND is neither one nor the other, it's always in-between, between two things: it's the borderline, there's always a border, a line of flight or flow, only we don't see it, because it's the least perceptible of things." Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 45. Connections, borders, and rhizomes become important in that they assume two sides and the act of connection creates intervals and interstices. In Chapter 6, it will be argued that a Deleuzian cineaste's disposition should seek to identify oppositions and dualities (conditionally also understood as dialectics or quasi-dialectics) in order to expose and value movement in the interval (interstice, border). Deleuze's attention to Godard recognises such dualities at the molecular level of the image not by focusing on the opposition of different sides, but by focussing on the inevitable interval (at the edit point) and building out from there (See Chapter 5). It is a fine point, but it is typical of the kind of challenge that Deleuze offers traditional thinking about film.

... a musical staff has five lines, you know. And there's nothing at all difficult about the notes themselves. They're like the letters of the alphabet. But the more they pile up, the more difficult things become. You might know all your letters and be able to read simple words, but the more they're combined into complex sentences, the harder they become to understand and the more background knowledge you need to understand what they mean . . . It's precisely because the symbols used to write music are so simple — simpler than the written word — that when you don't understand something, you get seriously lost . . . I guess I had understood the harmonies, too, [as well as the rhythms] intellectually. But the second they started to move through time, I was lost. Music, of course, is an art that occurs through time.[31]

Leaving the importance of music in film and the necessary movement of other sounds for Chapter 4, Ozawa's comments resonate with film as an art that similarly occurs through time. Grasping the film director as comparable to an orchestra's conductor — at least as a correction to the *auteur* as a romantic model of the individual artist — is not a bad start for analysis, but what is of most interest in Ozawa's comments is an approach to fundamentals. Ozawa describes what can be understood as a vertical piling of notes, for example in a chord. The piling is multiplied significantly when an imaginary line is run down a score of orchestral arrangement showing all the notes played at any one moment. Then, there is the horizontal progression in time, without which the vertical arrangement is meaningless — and absolutely meaningless in music. Freeze a film and at least you get a frame; freeze music and you get silence. In this sense, music is always a state of becoming.

For film analysis, Ozawa is taken to be advising to account for the way images relate to each other: *all* images, sound and other varieties of image (haptic, kinaesthetic, time-images, etc) along with the visuals in their own relational complexity as *mise-en-scene*. However, it is only in the horizontal movement of the multiple relations that sustained significance and meaning arise. The subtle point from Ozawa is that analysis is an act of imagination both in the reading of the notes and in their realisation in performance, albeit an imagination cultivated and primed through sensitivity, learning, and experience.

What is imagined is *movement*. Movement has to be imagined (or imaged) in order to discuss it in analysis, but it is not imaginary. It is literally being imagined for Ozawa confronted with notes on

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[31] Haruki Murakami and Seiji Ozawa, *Absolutely on Music: Conversations with Seiji Ozawa* (New York: Vintage Books, 2017), 100–102. Ozawa is discussing his first time conducting Alban Berg's *Wozzeck*.

the page that express change, relation, transformation, and transition. The composer, conductor, orchestra and soloists also imagine and agree to share what is imagined (as do sound recordists, technicians, builders of performance halls, etc) in a performance that realises the movement. Music flows through them and is given certain characteristics by them. A film is no less a performance in this way with images assembled to imagine a certain movement. Images are partially describable as conduits making movement available to the senses. However, the conduits are not separate from the image or the flow, and so image is better understood, as Deleuze does, as image-types.

There is an emerging complexity here, that justifies Deleuze's view of movement "as a domain worthy of philosophy":

> I was a student of philosophy, and although I wasn't stupid enough to want to create a philosophy of cinema, one conjunction made an impression on me. I liked those authors who demanded that we introduce movement to thought, "real" movement . . .[32]

While it might seem careless or subversive to have subtitled the collection in which this passage appears "Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema", it can hardly be an oversight when the collection's main title, *The Brain is the Screen*, comes from the paragraph following the passage. In the field of cinema, for which movement is both essential and elusive, Deleuze used philosophical understandings and sources to provide an image *of* movement in his movement-image, rather than settle for descriptions of images of things that move. With the *Cinema* books and Stanley Cavell's *The World Viewed*, film analysis began to draw directly from philosophy.[33] Cavell used philosophy to examine film as a popular medium and to validate it as worthy of serious study. In contrast, Deleuze was *doing*, rather than applying, philosophy. Together they fused philosophy and cinema to the extent that lingering doubts about the "philosophy of cinema" became a matter of quibbling over the preposition.

Arguably, the film criticism of the French New Wave in *Cahiers du Cinéma*, especially from the 1950s and 60s, set the conditions for a sustained intellectual engagement with cinema laying the groundwork for systematic analysis based on critical approaches to film. The outcome was the

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[32] Gilles Deleuze *et al.*, "The Brain is the Screen: An Interview with Gilles Deleuze", in *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 366.

[33] "Stanley Cavell's *The World Viewed* is for many a founding text in film-philosophy . . . [*The World Viewed*] has generated an approach to film matched only by Deleuze in its philosophical breath and specificity. . . given that Cavell made his overtures more than a decade earlier than Deleuze, he could be said to have paved the way for every 'philosophical' approach (all the time remembering, however, that film studies itself had been mining philosophical ideas for decades beforehand)". John Mullarkey, *Refractions of Reality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 110. Stanley Cavell, *The World Viewed* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

consolidation and promotion of concepts (auteur, mise-en-scene, genre), theorised approaches to innovations such as cinemascope, and the recognition of the artistic merit of works of particular directors.[34] *Cahiers du Cinéma* expanded the cinematic domain and underpinned both conventional formalism and Deleuze's research (he drew on the writers heavily as critics, theorists, and filmmakers in his assertion of modern cinema). It is relevant to note that the effect of the criticism in *Cahiers du Ciném*a or in *Screen* in the UK was not inevitable, but an outcome of debates, schisms, grudges, conversations, polemics and uncertainties as well as shifts in directions and emergent theories.[35] The difference is between molar and molecular constructions will be of interest later in this introduction, but the relevance here is that the former, concerned with totalisation and organisation, permits discussion of the holistic "influence" of *Cahier du Cinéma*, while the latter foregrounds the kinds of flows and disruptions mentioned.

The validation of intellectual responses to films provided by *Cahiers du Cinéma* and, in the UK, by *Screen* and others,[36] is one thing, but the extent to which the Deleuzian cinema project is primarily philosophical is another. The project's great achievement as a philosophical treatise among others by Deleuze is, at the same time, its greatest stumbling block. In most film philosophy, it is important to be cognisant of two fields, cinema and philosophy, as they relate to the matter under investigation and in order to appreciate a productive interval between them. Instead, David Deamer situates Deleuze's analysis *at* the interval: "Deleuze wants the reader to explore, become lost, find their way once more, be tested and test themselves: for this is the purpose of his film philosophy — to create an atmosphere for thought".[37] Deamer identifies a useful principle for any film analysis that is just as applicable to studying film in the high school classroom as to reading the *Cinema* books or engaging in academic scholarship.

Conventional analysis is different. The impression is that to engage in film analysis is to place oneself (the more precisely, the better) behind the camera or at the editing bench (not so much at the

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[34] Among them, Alfred Hitchcock, Howard Hawks, Nicholas Ray, Orson Welles, Sam Fuller, and Douglas Sirk.

[35] "[Truffaut's] bitterest quarrels were with film-makers, whereas the bitterest quarrels of the New Critics in England and America were with other critics". Andrew Sarris cited in *Cahiers du Cinéma: The 1950s - Neo-Realism, Hollywood, New Wave*, ed. Jim Hillier, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 13. Sarris's account is part of an introductory account of the history of *Cahiers du Cinéma* and an account of debates, polemics, iconoclasm and a sense of participants writing for each other. Similar was observed with *Screen* and *Screen Education*, in the UK, described in Manuel Alvarado, Edward Buscombe and Richard Collins, *The Screen Education Reader* (London: Macmillan Press, 1993). The journal is described as a site of debate, arguments, shifts of focus, and competing theoretical positions: "one of the overarching influences on film and media studies in the 1970s was a quest for theory". (19)

[36] In a survey of journals committed to film criticism, David Bordwell identifies the following: *Screen, Film Culture, Sight and Sound, Definition, Motion, Movie, Oxford Opinion*, in the UK; *Film Culture, The New York Film Bulletin, Film Culture* in the USA; and *Positif* and *Cahiers du Cinéma* in France. David Bordwell, *Making Meaning,* Kindle ed. [Chapter 3, "Interpretation as Explication".]

[37] David Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books : Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), xvii.

sound boom).[38] If you are lost, in Ozawa's or Deamer's terms, you will find your way through a return to the conditions of production of the visual image. Key terms are overwhelmingly appropriated from filmmaking. In Bordwell's glossary, for example, there is precision in what the camera and editing is doing, with definitions of anamorphic lens, Academy ratio, graphic match, and cheat cuts. Abstractions such as form, meaning, style and theory find general dictionary definition and theoretical concepts such as gaze or terms relating to aesthetics, scriptwriting, and influential film theory are backgrounded if they are included at all. The term *auteur*, for example, is presented without a sense of its limitations or historical emergence: "the presumed or actual author of a film, usually identified as the director; also sometimes used in an evaluative sense to distinguish good filmmakers (auteurs) from bad ones".[39]

In comparison, Brian Moon's glossary of viewing terms is much more inclusive of thought processes and theory.[40] If Bordwell places the viewer with film production, then Moon's glossary recognised that discussions, disagreements and assessments go on around the camera. Intellectual and theoretical concerns are valued (in addition to the kinds of technical terms covered by Bordwell and situated in Moon's "Quick Reference" section). Deleuze's glossaries in the *Cinema* books are of another order and do not find a place, even obliquely, in either Bordwell or Moon. Perhaps it is because Deleuze's concepts have his signature all over them that they are not immediately accessible without more justification than is practical in a glossary. A short paragraph definitively describing the time-image would be a formidable task.

Ian Buchanan observes of Deleuzian concepts, "unless you take the work as a whole, [Deleuze] says, 'you just won't understand it at all'".[41] It is an observation reinforced by Claire Colebrook: "once you understand one term [one of Deleuze's terms] you can understand them all; but you also seem to need to understand all the terms to even begin to understand one".[42] The solution is not an accounting of Deleuze's processes and philosophical antecedents that generated the concepts, but

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[38] "You probably noticed that nearly every one of our analyses includes, early on, a statement about the film's underlying formal organization. This provides a firm basis for more detailed analysis. Here again, we're thinking like a filmmaker, because a breakdown into sequences is something that everyone in production, from the screenwriter to postproduction staff, must prepare". Bordwell, *et al*, *Film Art*, Kindle ed, WCA2, ["Writing a Critical Analysis" section].

[39] Ibid., G-1, [Glossary section].

[40] Brian Moon, *Viewing Terms: A Practical Glossary for Film and TV Study* (Perth: Chalkface Press, 2004). Moon devotes a section to Auteur Theory tracking its development and concluding with: "Auteur is a term applied to directors who achieve a high level of creative control in the movie industry, and whose film-making techniques are regarded as distinctive and innovative. The term is somewhat controversial because it implies that films reflect the director's work and vision to the exclusion of other contributors." (14).

[41] Ian Buchanan, *A Deleuzian Century?* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 7. The embedded citation is Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 85. Deleuze is making a general point but turns it to his discussion of Foucault. Clearly, Buchanan is claiming the point in relation to Deleuze's work.

[42] Claire Colebrook, *Understanding Deleuze* (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2002), xvii-xviii.

the question of grasping "why Deleuze should need these particular tools in the first place?"[43] Buchanan's and Colebrook's *whole* is not Deleuze's corpus, but its intentionality and practice: "You have to take the work as a whole, to try and follow rather than judge it, see where it branches out in different directions, where it gets bogged down, moves forward, makes a breakthrough; you have to accept it, welcome it, as a whole".[44] Buchanan's *Deleuzism* is recognition that the aim is not to champion Deleuze, but to track his concepts as the means to *engage*, in our case, with films.[45]

Openness to a cinematic encounter is essential. The inconvenience with Deleuze for conventional analysis, one of many, is that he does not allow the subjectivity that is central to conventional analysis's interest in cognitivism that, in one sense, accounts for an encounter. Approaches to the viewer sublimate, rationalise, or celebrate subjectivity often aided by explicitly theoretical analyses (Marxist, Freudian, Lacanian). Deleuze's observer (viewer, analysist) is non-subjective, rather than objective. He or she is strategically naïve: open to, and engaged in, encounter. The important *thinking* in film analysis is done by the film, and it can only be conveyed as movement. The subjectivity of the viewer is, then, an element of the cinematic experience, but not one with special priority, except *as* an element and, at times, as a direct concern of a particular film.

It was in films of Alfred Hitchcock, that Deleuze observed systematic use of subjectivity — as a point of indiscernibility and indetermination (Chapter 3) — as a departure from the conventions of classical cinema. Before Hitchcock "what the viewer perceived . . . was a sensory-motor image in which he took a greater or lesser part by identification with the characters. Hitchcock had begun the inversion of this point of view by including the viewer in the film. But it is now that the identification is actually inverted: the character has become a kind of viewer".[46] The archetypal example is Jeff in *Rear Window*, immobilised and forced to become a viewer, with his telescopic camera lens to intensify observations. In the observer state, another time state is introduced (events are unified and magnified in Jeff's sense of duration) and perception is no longer the prelude to action (convergent and channelled) but a condition for thought (divergent and, in Jeff's case, problematically open to interpretation). With the character-as-viewer in modern cinema, the processes of the actual viewer become less foregrounded.[47]

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[43] Ian Buchanan, *Deleuzism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 193.

[44] Deleuze, *Negotiations,* 85.

[45] "The ambition of Deleuzism is rather to suggest the possibility of an *other* reading of Deleuze that would enable his work to be systematically applied (not just applauded) . . . Its insistent question is 'how does it work?'" Ian Buchanan, *Deleuzism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 8.

[46] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 3.

[47] Examples from modern cinema of character as observer/viewer are legion and they place particular demands on the audience (beyond watching and understanding, and going along for the ride): Wim Wenders' character, Phillip Winter, takes random

A "bottom-up" theory: from encounter to organisation

Stephen Crofts Wiley and J. Macgregor Wise conclude their brief survey of the field of cultural studies — in which they consider Deleuze's influence on the growth of the field — with two questions derived from Deleuze and Guattari: "How might new concepts be invented and launched? How might cultural studies become a workshop for new practices, not only of conceptualisation, but of active intervention and transformation?"[48] Colebrook's assessment of Deleuze in the cultural studies field situates such questions in a broader context: "To put it crudely, and in contrast with structuralism and the dominant methods of cultural studies, Deleuze offers a 'bottom-up' theory of difference which is directly opposed to any notion of ideology".[49] The assessment finds support with a third question from Wiley and Wise: "How might familiar concepts be sharpened or retooled or deployed in new ways, or perhaps jettisoned?"[50] Deleuze's cinema concepts are taken to be familiar by now (at least to the initiated) and are ripe for redeployment. How do we, in Massumi's terms, get the formal and visual images of classical cinema to "interrupt [themselves] to see movement as such".[51] How to dislocate — dis-locate — movement from form? How to see movement? The question for the deployment of Deleuzian concepts refracted through the Deleuzian cineaste becomes *what is movement doing?* rather than *what is the image doing*?

Ultimately, it is not necessary (or even desirable) to place Deleuze in terms of cultural studies, but a cultural studies approach values encounter and reinforces licence from Deleuze (especially with Guattari) to cast a wide net, with notions like multiplicity, rhizomatic connection, and minoritarian films that tend not to make *a priori* distinctions between what is able to be included and what is not.[52] If the Deleuzian cineaste is a "democratic" formulation, then popular interest and eclectic

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photographs in *Alice in the Cities* and Travis in *Paris, Texas* is reduced to mute, shell-shocked watching; traumatic events are witnessed by children in *Rome, Open City*; Godard's jump cuts expose a different way of seeing (something like a cubist way); in *The Third Man* spaces lose their coordinates (as Deleuze's *any-spaces-whatever* are defined) and seeing becomes ambiguous or disorienting; in *Apocalypse Now* (for Willard) and *Easy Rider* (for Wyatt) a progressive loss of coordinates erodes certainty. The character-as-viewer erodes the primacy of the audience member as the one making sense of events. It is further eroded with a raft of films that invite multiple and relativist positions (in effect inviting the witnessing of encounters without clear and immediate comprehension of significance): Robert Altman's *Nashville* (and others), Paul Haggis's *Crash*, Paul Thomas Anderson's *Magnolia*, Alejandro González Iñárritu's *Babel* and *21 grams*, Quentin Tarantino's *Pulp Fiction*.

[48] Stephen B. Crofts Wiley and J. Macgregor Wise, "Guattari, Deleuze, and Cultural Studies", *Cultural Studies* 33, no. 1 (2018): 75-97.

[49] Claire Colebrook, *Understanding Deleuze* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin), Kindle ed., 43. [Chapter 2, "The Politics of Life and Positive Difference", "Sexual Difference" section.]

[50] Wiley and Wise, 91. [Ellipsis is in the original.]

[51] Recalling: Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, 59.

[52] Minoritarian: a valuing of minor literature, languages, and voices. "Deleuze describes this minor cinema as one that sets out, not to represent the conditions of an oppressed minority, but rather to invent new values and facilitate the creation of a people who have hitherto been missing". Constantine Verevis, "Minoritarian + Cinema" in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 168.

examples are to be valued.[53] A wide-ranging approach becomes part of the appeal of Deleuze for cultural studies, best exemplified by Brian Massumi's *Parables for the Virtual* and his choice of subject matter.[54]

That is not to say that definitional limitations are unnecessary. While Deleuze considered films that were most appropriate in order to appreciate the highest aspirations of filmmaking ("We are talking only of masterpieces to which no hierarchy of value applies"),[55] our limits are not the same. In seeking *application* of Deleuze for a broad field, licence is taken to be eclectic. We will consider, for instance, *Hondo,* a clearly flawed film of which the best might be said that it is a competent film in the John Wayne western genre and best appreciated in terms of the values of its time. Nevertheless, *Hondo* raises productive questions and, in its competence, some clear illustration (Chapter 5). More, if this thesis seeks a democratised Deleuzian cineaste, it is useful to consider references to a wide range of sources: Ozawa on classical music, David Byrne on contemporary music, John Wayne, science fiction, popular culture in *Run Lola Run,* and so on. They find a place alongside culturally-valued or arthouse films such as, for example, the films of Francis Ford Coppola and Andrei Tarkovsky.

While the central encounter in this thesis is with Deleuze, as the author of the *Cinema* books, one does not go far with his concepts without also encountering Félix Guattari. Gary Genosko and Jay Hetrick's collection of Guattari's writing, *Machinic Eros: Writings on Japan*, demonstrates clear interest in the practical application and articulation of concepts and so Guattari is of interest to the Deleuzian cineaste as a model. With all the theory (his, Deleuze's, his-and-Deleuze's, Lacan, psychoanalysis) that Guattari could have brought to his discussions with Japanese architects, dancers, broadcasters, and visual artists, his attitude was one of curiosity and engagement. Even when Guattari was talking about his and Deleuze's concepts (such as "assemblage"), it was not in a spirit of explication, as is often the case with Deleuze in interviews, but of exploration.[56] If, in Guattari's encounters in Japan, concepts are explained, it is through valuing the other's

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[53] Similarly in this thesis, interviews, course notes, handbooks, dictionaries, and encyclopedias, have been used to supplement academic sources.

[54] Massumi's *Parables for the Virtual* is both a demonstration and a review of cultural studies and covers diverse topics: from performance artist, Stelarc, to Frank Sinatra, to Ronald Reagan's preparation for a role, to the mechanics of perception and the perception of colour, to the role of the soccer ball in a game, (and so on) and ends in a review of the field of Cultural Studies. They have the common function for Massumi in focussing interest on of the body, corporeality, positions in space, and movement. The reminder is of cultural study's responsibility to material existence. The orientation is clearly Deleuzian as can be gleaned from the "*Movement, Affect and Sensation*" in the subtitle.

[55] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, x.

[56] For example, Deleuze's filmed *Gilles Deleuze's ABC Primer, with Claire Parnet* has a rehearsed quality about it, and he is seldom out in the field as it were (far less in another country) seeking conversation as Guattari was in Japan. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *L'abécédaire De Gilles Deleuze, avec Claire Parnet* [*Gilles Deleuze's ABC Primer, with Claire Parnet*], directed by Pierre-André Boutang (1996).

interpretations and applications. Correction and qualification are at times necessary, but they are given and received in a spirit of dialogue that is exemplary for the Deleuzian cineaste (Chapter 2).

Records of encounters with Deleuze provide a different kind of orientation through interviews, informal writings and letters.[57] They have been highly valued as a first port of call when the inevitable question arises: *what did he mean by that?* This has been important because as this thesis progressed, it took some time for me to stop seeing the *Cinema* books as resources for film studies alongside others. It took time to convince myself that the difficulty in Deleuze's concepts was not (only) in their inherent complexity and not in that they were supported by examples from complex films, but that there were processes that were unfamiliar to me. The question turned from *What does Deleuze mean?* to *What is he doing and how might he be used?* It is a question that motivates the structure of this thesis.

Movement was a radical notion 40 years ago. It is still a radical notion. The question is how to foreground movement and make it less radical and more essential to any analysis that claims to be engaging with *motion* pictures and *movies*, and yet routinely misses the clues in the terms. The problem is how to grasp the idea of movement and to consider it without stopping, assuming, or abstracting it. Accordingly, this thesis turns its attention to cinematic movement at its points of vulnerability and encounter: the image, and how the image facilitates movement from one "side" of the image to the other (it is a formulation that can only make sense if the image or something in the image is moving and at the very least significance is moving); sound, as inevitably moving and as a more important partner with visual images than is usually recognised; editing, as containing movement in sets at the same time that it exposes images to the very complex (when one tries to pin it down) notion of the *whole*.

To be more precise, Chapter 1 seeks points of differentiation between Deleuze and conventional formalism. To that end some definition of the field dominated by formalist approaches is necessary, but not the primary goal. It is already very clearly defined. What is of more interest is the resistance to formalised theory that places Deleuze outside of its concerns. Conventional formalism becomes a different assemblage in Deleuzian terms. Chapter 2 picks up and explores the notion of assemblage as a key concept in Deleuzian analysis. The fact that conventional formalism routinely ignores direct analysis of movement provides a line of flight (escape) to the assemblage of the Deleuzian cineaste. The chapter also considers the significant scholarly work in the emergent field of

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[57] Such as: Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*; *Desert Islands and Other Texts*; and *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews.*

Deleuzian film analysis, but of most interest is a development towards a study of *films* rather than of cinema, with scholarship becoming more aware of contexts other than Hollywood, classical cinema and exemplary films, for example in reconsidering Hollywood genres in terms of Deleuze (for whom genre was anathema to quality film making and a decline into cliched thought.) A more critical and contextualised approach to Deleuze's concepts is taken as a healthy reflexivity necessary for the Deleuzian cineaste.

The first two chapters provide context while establishing an orientation for the Deleuzian cineaste and for the centrality of movement in film analysis. While this thesis, seeks articulation of the Deleuzian cineaste, it is not its only concern. What is perhaps more important is the question of what the *practice* of the Deleuzian cineaste would look like. With the image, in Chapter 3, we return to fundamentals and rethink the shot: how does a determination to track movement require a shift in thinking about the image? It is the contention of this thesis that the movement-image is far more important than defining classical cinema as a completed project. Theatre's Jacques Lecoq is employed to consider physical movement in ways that expose, rather than limit or undermine, conceptual movement, and C S Peirce is revisited (after Deleuze's use of him) to find ways of approaching structural movement. While the cinematic image is usually synonymous with "visual image", Chapter 4 explores sound as providing an inevitable tracking of movement. Sound *is* nuanced movement. The chapter includes sustained film analysis in order to tease out implication in practice as well as reviewing sound theorists for direction not this time to describe sound, but to give it in analysis a significance equivalent, at least, to that of the visuals.

Chapter 5 is ambitious in that it seeks a sense of the *whole* in film. It is a difficult notion because it denotes several things simultaneously: the whole of, and in, the world of the film; a whole (an outside actuality) in relation to which the film exists narratively and essentially; a sense of the whole in which a character, viewer (indeed anyone) exists with a sense of identity (subjectivity or Bergson's centre of indetermination) in relation to a sense of otherness. It is important to be clear about what determination of the whole is being used because not to do so introduces and validates assumptions that are likely to skew or undermine analysis. The whole is approached through editing and so the idea that editing is simply connective is reassessed. A sense of the whole is available through editing because it creates spaces between images through which the whole finds a place or emerges. Finally, with a sense of the *Deleuzian cineaste* project and of what analysis with movement at its heart looks like, Chapter 6 consolidates a number of models and dispositions that identify the Deleuzian cineaste more clearly.

CHAPTER 1

The field of film analysis: theory and movement

"In film studies, rival theories to the Theory are rejected out of hand as politically pernicious.

One very popular gambit . . . is to argue that competing views are 'formalist.'

These 'arguments' are little more than ad hominem attacks."

— Noël Carroll[1]

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[1] Noël Carroll, "Prospects for Film Theory: A Personal Assessment" in *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies,* ed. David Bordwell and Noël Carroll (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 46.

Ostensibly, a field defined by moving images should find Deleuze's movement-image, or any systematic attempt to understand cinematic movement, axiomatic and welcome. Instead, in the work of film analysis, Deleuze's project in the *Cinema* books has largely been construed as primarily philosophical and as an exercise in the production of concepts (as Deleuze defines the role of philosophy).[2] The concern for this thesis is that routine film analysis has not engaged with the "conjunction of 'real' movement and thought"[3] as much as it might have in the decades since the publication of the *Cinema* books, preferring conventional understandings of meaning founded on the reading of visual patterns.

Standard textbooks on film analysis still rarely recognise depictions of movement as anything other than portrayals of crude movement of a body through space, editing to facilitate action, and camera movement in as much as it is necessary to define terms like *dolly* and *pan* and to consider their effects. While they are necessary considerations, movement itself — including the perception of movement, descriptions of movement, and movement of concepts and ideas — has not attracted sustained interest. For example, "movement" does not find an indexed mention in significant general reference books on cinema except in relation to camera movement.[4] This is not a criticism of writers of textbooks; rather it demonstrates that the field of film analysis has developed around the widespread *assumption* of movement and that there exists in film scholarship an underutilised potential to consider movement as a subject for analysis.

The field of film analysis

The field of film analysis that has developed on this foundation is pragmatic, with taken-for-granted approaches to film based on analysis of visual elements, and often informed by aesthetics from

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[2] "For Deleuze, philosophy cannot be a reflection on something else. It is, as we have said, a creation of concepts. But concepts, for Deleuze, are thought of in a new way. They are no longer 'concepts of', understood by reference to their external object. They are 'exactly like sounds, colours or images, they are intensities which either suit you or don't, which work or don't'. Concepts are the images of thought." Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, "Translators' Introduction" in Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* xi.

[3] Recalling from the introduction to this thesis: "I was a student of philosophy, and although I wasn't stupid enough to want to create a philosophy of cinema, one conjunction made an impression on me. I liked those authors who demanded that we introduce movement to thought, 'real' movement". "The Brain is the Screen: An Interview with Gilles Deleuze" in *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 366.

[4] In Thomas Caldwell, *Film Analysis Handbook*: there is no indexed reference to movement, but in the "Basic Terminology" section (2–9) camera movement is considered. Similarly, in the following, reference to movement is mostly in terms of camera movement. Brian Moon, *Viewing Terms: A Practical Guide for Film and TV Study*: no indexed reference. James Monaco, *How to Read a Film*: no indexed reference. David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, *Film Art*: no indexed reference. Louis D Giannetti, *Understanding Movies*: no indexed reference, but a section on movement ("Movement", 92–132 with sections on "Kinetics", "The Moving Camera" and "Mechanical Distortions"). Robert Edgar-Hunt *et al*, *The Language of Film*: no indexed reference. Susan Hayward, *Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts*: Movement itself is not listed in key concepts or in the subject index, although the *movement-image* is considered in the summary of Deleuze's *Cinema 1*.

visual art, particularly painting. Such approaches have provided important tools with which to consolidate a language of film analysis for what will be referred to throughout as *conventional analysis* and *traditional film analysis*, but also, more frequently — for reasons to be developed throughout this chapter — as *conventional formalism*. In this analytical language, the viewer is presented as engaged in the organisation of, and extrapolation from, patterns on the screen based on the assumption that reception of the cinematic image is natural or intuitive but lacking the recognition and articulation that analysis provides. The claim to widespread influence of this approach in the field of film analysis can be evidenced by reference to a number of core texts — David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson's *Film Art*, Louis D Giannetti's *Understanding Movies* and James Monaco's *How to Read a Film* — that have been in continuous publication since the 1970s when film studies as an academic discipline or interdisciplinary practice emerged.[5] Their model of analytical work is one of finding and organising patterns while insisting on independence from any theory that might skew this work, laying the foundation for a depiction of the field of film analysis based on a pragmatic methodology, not theoretical alignment. The glossary is the important thing and the body of textbooks brings the glossary to life.[6] In the glossary in *Film Art*, for example, terms are accumulated in a number of ways: drawing from filmmaking (180˚ rule, anamorphic lens[7]) and editing (cross cutting, continuity editing, cheat cut); drawing from cinematic theory but scrubbed clean of historical and theoretical associations (montage sequence, auteur, duration); and identifying broad organising concepts such as cinematography, narrative, and genre.[8] Where theory is included, it is usually as a list of alternative approaches relevant at a secondary level. The impression is that one does the analysis and then thinks about it in certain ways, if appropriate.

Bordwell is perhaps the most prominent figure in this consolidation and promotion of methodology: Kevin McDonald's survey of film studies recognises Bordwell's centrality through the use of such constructions as "Following the subsequent scholarship of David Bordwell and others…";[9] John Mullarkey titled one of his chapters on film philosophy, "Bordwell and Other Cogitators";[10] and

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[5] David Bordwell, Kristin Thompson and Jeff Smith, *Film Art: An Introduction* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); James Monaco, *How to Read a Film* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Louis D Giannetti, *Understanding Movies* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972).

[6] This is not far from Deleuze's taxonomy. However, Deleuze's taxonomy is a theorised (argued) production of concepts, while conventional glossaries take terminology/concepts to be already in existence and summarily defines or modifies them.

[7] It is Rick Altman's complaint that sound does not enjoy similar technical detail. (See Chapter 4 on Sound).

[8] "Film noir" is the only genre mentioned directly in the glossary, but generic concerns are present in some of the other definitions, for example, "transmedia storytelling" that is a kind of "intertextuality" that sees a text explored in various technical genres: Batman is an example with comic book, television and film forms and a variety of treatments: gothic, satirical-comic, tragic. Genre is essential to discussion throughout the body of the work, supremely the *Hollywood narrative*.

[9] Kevin McDonald, *Film Theory: The Basics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), Kindle ed., 103.

[10] "Bordwell and Other Cogitators" in John Mullarkey, *Philosophy and the Moving Image: Refractions of Reality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 29.

Wikipedia — offered here as evidence of widespread and popular acceptance of Bordwell's leading role — observes that "Bordwell's considerable influence within film studies has reached such a point that many of his concepts are reported to 'have become part of a theoretical canon in film criticism and film academia.'"[11]

Bordwell's influence (as well as Thompson's) is further exemplified in two books designed for the secondary school English teacher. Both emphasise accessibility and present key terms as well as practical advice and exercises. Thomas Caldwell's *Film Analysis Handbook* developed from the intention to make the book accessible to non-specialists. To that end, Caldwell preferred not to meticulously cite sources in the body of the book, but felt it necessary to acknowledge Bordwell and Thompson in the introduction:

> One significant reason for the terminology and concepts in this book being so widely used is the enormous ongoing popularity and influence of the book *Film Art: An Introduction* by David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson . . . [*Film Art*] is widely considered "The Bible" of film analysis. Without it, this book and many others would not have been possible.[12]

Brian Moon's *Viewing Terms* shares similar aims as a "practical glossary" and while he is not as explicit in his reference to Bordwell and Thompson, they are assumed:

> the concepts of *viewing practices* and *audience* are deployed as reference points against which purely theoretical claims must be tested. This move is very much in line with contemporary developments in film theory, where cognitive and empirical approaches now supplement the semiotic and psychoanalytical models that prevailed in previous decades.[13]

"Cognitive and empirical approaches" are presented as completions of interpretive models that draw on Bordwell. In the perceived absence of a dominant theory, books like Moon's and Caldwell's, exemplify conventional formalism's *standardisation* of a language of film and demonstrate the consolidation of cinema analysis around *form*. While Noël Carroll, in this chapter's epigraph, rejects description of conventional analysis as formalist, it is inescapable. In a polemic

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[11] "David Bordwell", *Wikipedia*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Bordwell, accessed 9 May 2022. The internal citation is Jakob Nielsen, "Bordwell on Bordwell: Part IV - Levels of Engagement", Blog, *16:9 Filmtidsskrift*, 2005, http://www.16-9.dk/2005-02/side11_inenglish.htm.

[12] Thomas Caldwell, *Film Analysis Handbook* (Melbourne: Insight Publications, 2011), x.

[13] Brian Moon, *Viewing Terms: A Practical Guide for Film and TV Study* (Perth: Chalkface Press, 2004), iv. [Emphasis in the original.]

designed to distinguish between theory as practice and (capitalised) Theory, a separation is argued between "empirical" and "empiricist" (as an application of theoretically based empiricism)[14] and formalism can be subject to a similar separation between Formalism as a Theory and formalism as a practice espoused by Bordwell.

Grounds for considering their methodology as *formalist* are established in Bordwell and Thompson's *Film Art: An introduction* (with Jeff Smith in later editions, from 2016). The book is organised into six sections, the second of which is "Film Form", and subsections identify form as: pattern, visual content, expectations and conventions, and in relation to feeling and meaning, before questions of evaluating form. *In situ* definitions arise: "Form is the overall patterning of a film, the ways its parts work together to create specific effects"[15] and "The choices come down to a matter of *form* . . . If you are a director or screenwriter, you face perpetual choices about form. As a viewer, you are responding to it at every moment."[16]

Notwithstanding Carroll's rejection of "formalist" as a description of conventional analysis, then, *Film Art* provides warrant to see a definition and application of *formalism* in film analysis as the seeking of patterns that convey meaning and establish a link between the filmmaker and the viewer. The patterns are primarily visual and exemplifiable by static pictures (frames and mise-en-scene) and reference to them as photographs, stages, and tableaus. The movement of the patterns is secondary and merely a means of getting from one pattern to the next.

Film as (visual) art: "standard consensus"

This core assumption of the reading of static frames has undoubtedly been useful and probably historically necessary. Martin Scorsese, for example, attributed his early cinema education to a much earlier book of annotated cinematic stills (Deems Taylor's *A Pictorial History of the Movies*, 1943) as the only book on film available to him.[17] Without the availability of films online or on

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[14] "Many adherents of Grand Theory have confused *empirical* inquiry with *empiricist* inquiry. Empiricism names a philosophical tradition that places primary emphasis upon experience in explaining how humans acquire knowledge. Historically, empiricism has often embraced views that the mind is a passive receptacle and that concepts may be reduced to aggregates of sense impressions. No one in film studies espouses an empiricist position." David Bordwell, "Contemporary Film Studies and the Vicissitudes of Grand Theory" in *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies,* ed. David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, 34.

[15] Bordwell, Thompson and Smith, *Film Art: An Introduction,* 3.

[16] Ibid., 51.

[17] Martin Scorsese and Michael Henry Wilson, *A Personal Journey with Martin Scorsese though American Movies*, film (United Kingdom: British Film Institute / Miramax, 1995). Deems Taylor, *A Pictorial History of the Movies* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943).

DVD and video cassettes, which would allow sections of film to be easily re-watched in analysis, the still frame at least provided examples of the visuals and an object for study. The static picture, moreover, did draw attention to the architectural and pictorial qualities of the mise-en-scene while also satisfying the need for illustration in print textbooks.

But it is as if necessity overstayed its welcome to become methodology. Bordwell argues for recognition of a "tableau style" derived from painting and theatre as underpinning film analysis in an article whose section title encapsulates his intention: "Film History as Art History: the Tableau Tradition".[18] There he argues that the tableau developed to incorporate the camera and so to define mature cinema. Considering cinema history in terms developed by art historian Heinrich Wölfflin, Bordwell endorses the perception of film as visual *art* to the extent that it demonstrates the poetics and aesthetics of painting. It is a position that is maintained confidently through consensus afforded by alignment with art history. "Once we have a sense of the standard consensus about cinema's stylistic development, we are in a better position to see how a cinematic poetics, drawing in part on Wölfflin's concepts, can create a richer and more refined account of historical change."[19] Cinema accepts limitation as a visual medium in return for the benefits derived from affiliating with the rich and long history of painting, and it is this, rather than ontological considerations, that frames the cinematic history.

> . . . the complex staging of the tableau style may have begun from theatrical and pictorial models, but they were transformed through trial and error into something that fitted the optical perspective of the camera. Filmmakers could borrow pictorial schemas from perspective painting and shape them to the constraints of movement and camera position.[20]

It is significant to note that the constraint is movement, not the tableau. The tableau is useful because it invites contemplation of a static mise-en-scene and so it invites analysis that is more complex than simple frame analysis in that it at least (and at last) *contains* movement. Accounting for the significance of movement becomes profoundly contextualised by the visuals with, for example, attention being directed at planar ("planimetric") and recessional dimensions drawn from baroque painting and, at the same time, from the theatrical stage. Bordwell's observations about

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[18] David Bordwell, "Wölfflin and Film Style: Some Thoughts on a Poetics of Pictures", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 73, no. 2 (Spring 2015), 181.

[19] Ibid., 178.

[20] Ibid., 187.

baroque art, transferred to cinema, preserve and reinforce a sense that film is a visual text to be read, decoded and organised.

> Most vivid is what Wölfflin called "the exaggerated foreground," which in baroque art "increased the suddenness of perspective reduction". Other features highlighted by Wölfflin are settings that favour depth such as corridors, dark foregrounds, and frames within the frame. All of these techniques can be found as well in 1940s Hollywood, and they lend support to our tendency to label such films "baroque". [21]

The interest here is curatorial, and movement within the frame supports assertions that tend towards completion and certainty, at least in terms of classification. Bordwell presents a persistent return to the frame (the picture and the tableau) to support convergence on a dominant Hollywood model of cinema approached through an analytical model based on painting and this forms a "*standard consensus* about cinema's stylistic development" evident in other film studies handbooks. Monaco adds a level of diversity by expanding the range and number of arts, so that film is approached as a form drawing on other art forms, an interplay or intersection.[22] Louis Giannetti titles the first section of his textbook, "Photography" and illustrations — from studio stills rather than the films, for practical reasons[23] — are integral to his book, reinforcing and rewarding close attention to the visual image. The stills are important for Giannetti as "ideological cells", by which he means that a framing of a shot exposes the ideology of the film (or simply the important ideas) and not that it is an application of an external ideology. Here he annotates one such still from *The Grifters*.

> The mise en scene reveals who's the stronger. In a predominantly light field, the darker figure dominates. The right side of the frame is heavier — more dominant — than the left. The standing figure towers over the seated figure. The top of the frame (Huston's realm) dominates the center and bottom.[24]

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[21] Ibid., 182. The internal citation is Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art* (New York: Dover, 1950), 84.

[22] Monaco begins his *How to Read a Film: Movies, Media, and Beyond*, with a discussion of the history of painting and a consideration of other types of art such as the novel, theatre, and music. He concludes that film is a kind of hybrid super art, especially in its ability to record other art forms: "The system of an art can generally be described in semiotic terms as a collection of codes. The unique activity of an art, however, lies in its tropes. Film can be used to record most of the other arts. It can also translate nearly all codes and tropes to common narrative, environmental, pictorial, musical, and dramatic arts. Finally, it has a system of codes and tropes all its own, unique to the recording arts". James Monaco, *How to Read a Film* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Kindle ed. Loc. 1062. [Chapter 1, "The Structure of Art" section.]

[23] "A word about the photos in this book. Most of the illustrations are publicity photos, taken with a 35-mm still camera. They are not frame enlargements from the movie itself, for such enlargements reproduce poorly." Louis D Giannetti, *Understanding Movies*, 9th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001), xii.

[24] Ibid., 65.

Classical films appear to justify and warrant this approach. This rational and purposeful thinking of classical cinema, which Deleuze, following Bergson, identifies in terms of the sensory-motor mechanism, informs analysis and is presented as the norm. What Giannetti sees as particular "ideological cells", can be understood (after Deleuze) as founded on image types that organise the images of perception, affection, and action that define classical cinema, with these patternings of visual aspects meshing with concerns of the sensory-motor mechanism. However, as analysis considers films that move further from that norm, the articulation of the "ideological cell" becomes more qualified. Giannetti's focus on patterns is less productive when the film *aims* to be more tentative, experimental, or idiosyncratic, and less driven (exclusively) by the linear narrative:

> Design is generally fused with a thematic idea, at least in the best movies. In *Jules and Jim,* for example, Truffaut consistently used triangular designs, for the film deals with a trio of characters whose relationships are constantly shifting yet always interrelated. The form of the images in this case is a symbolic representation of the romantic triangle of the dramatic content. These triangular designs dynamize the visuals, keeping them off balance, subject to change. Generally, designs consisting of units of three, five, and seven tend to produce these effects. Designs composed of two, four, or six units seem more stable and balanced.[25]

Whereas with *The Grifters* compositional rules are a gateway to considering the relations between the characters, with *Jules and Jim* rules of composition are more conditional. The triangle is not *necessarily* unstable and so the predictability of formal attributes is at odds with other elements of a film that is celebrated for an eclectic *fluidity* in Truffaut's incorporation of "newsreel footage, photographic stills, freeze frames, panning shots, wipes, masking, dolly shots, and voiceover narration . . . some of the postwar scenes were shot using cameras mounted on bicycles."[26] At what point does conventional formalism eschew the direct correspondences between patterns and thought evidenced in the static frame? At what point does one have to go along with the film, ride with it, rather than stop it in order to think about it?

Theory: post-theory, pre-theory and non-theory

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[25] Ibid., 65.

[26] Matthew Sheldon, "Jules and Jim (1962)", Blog, *Classic Art Films*, 2015, https://www.classicartfilms.com/jules-jim-1962, n.p.

Giannetti's analyses are arguably illustrative of what Bordwell describes as "reverse-engineering": "starting from plausible viewer responses and then looking for creative choices made by the filmmakers that seemed to fulfill particular functions."[27] The language of conventional analysis is designed to position analysis, retrospectively, in the production processes; most especially, analysis is with the camera and at the editing bench. At the same time, formalism's characterisation as a pragmatic methodology for analysing films is built on a particular, naturalistic image of the film viewer. As cognitivist Carl Plantinga recognises, "When Bordwell writes of the schemas, inferences, hypotheses, and assumptions used in film viewing, he assumes a spectator engaging in goal-directed, primarily non-conscious procedures to make sense of film narratives".[28]

The concern with proceeding from "plausible viewer responses" and common-sense processes serves as an implicit critique of the various interpretive models of film analysis. An antipathy to received theories underpins David Bordwell and Noël Carroll's *Post-Theory*. In their introduction they clarify the naturalistic stance common to the core texts as one that shuns *external* theory: "Is this book about the end of film theory? No. It's about the end of Theory, and what can and should come after."[29] As well as resistance to overtly political and psychoanalytic theory, the capitalised Grand Theory is understood in (their) terms of continental theory and culturalism (cultural studies) and while direct mention of Deleuze is brief, he is symptomatic. Citing Shaviro's claim to be "rejecting Freud and Lacan" and "draw[ing] instead upon a variety of theoretical sources: Benjamin, Bataille, Blanchot, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari",[30] Bordwell and Carroll remark: "The *maîtres a penser* bump into each other in the pages of film books far more often than on the Boulevard St-Michel. Why this reliance on Parisian sources?"[31]

Lines are drawn. Conventional formalism presents itself as scientific in its methods and common-sense in its disposition. It is an early scientific model of the theorising naturalist, extrapolating from close observations, updated with a central metaphor of the brain as a computer processor. In his "Case for Cognitivism", Bordwell acknowledges that metaphors of thought drawn from computing are "keenly contested" [32] in the field of cognitivism, but he finds discussions and reflections on artificial intelligence interesting: "Indeed, one of the pleasures of reading this literature is the

[27] David Bordwell, "Now You See It, Now You Can't", Blog, *David Bordwell's Website on Cinema*, 2010, http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2010/06/21/now-you-see-it-now-you-cant/, n.p.

[28] Carl Plantinga, "Cognitive Film Theory: An Insider's Appraisal", 21. *Cinémas* 12, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 21, https://doi.org/:10.7202/024878ar.

[29] Bordwell and Carroll, *Post-Theory*, xiii.

[30] Steven Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), ix.

[31] Bordwell, "Contemporary Film Studies and the Vicissitudes of Grand Theory", 8.

[32] David Bordwell, "A Case for Cognitivism", IRIS: *A Journal of Theory on Image and Sound,* 9, Spring, (1989), 15.

energetic and philosophically sophisticated debate about what constitutes computation."[33] In a similar move, Carroll draws a distinction between the dogmatic and the useful, and finds a foundation for film analysis in cognitivism: "Cognitivism itself is not a unified theory. Instead, it is a stance toward film research . . ."[34] Accordingly, established theories (cognitivism aside) are regarded pejoratively, and that includes capital-F Formalism.

Plantinga sees Bordwell and Carroll's project as an "intervention" of such force that "Hard feelings stemming from Bordwell and Carroll's original polemical attacks continue to dog cognitivists."[35] For this reason, Plantinga felt compelled to defend cognitivism against criticism of being anti-psychoanalytical, positivist, reductionist, and uninterested in cultural and political concerns — criticism that emerged with the adoption of cognitivism for cinema.[36] He nevertheless reproduces the underlying naturalism informing conventional formalism: "cognitive theorists are committed to clarity of exposition and argument and to the relevance of empirical evidence and the standards of science (where appropriate)."[37] And later, "most cognitivists . . . tend to favour naturalistic explanations of filmic phenomena that assume that we make sense of films in many of the same ways we make sense of the real world."[38]

Post-Theory's arguments against theory have been critiqued in detail elsewhere, especially by John Mullarkey,[39] but the key insight for our purposes is the identification of these cognitivist approaches as specifically formalist by virtue of their representationalism: "[Cognitivism] is always tied to an approach that sees film viewing as representational, as information *about* the world rather than a direct and worldly connection (which is, as we'll see, professed by Deleuze and Cavell)."[40] The cognitivist's concern with how information about the world is processed, then, assumes representation that is available and encoded in an image/frame /shot, the articulation of which is

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[33] Ibid., 16. Shaviro no less finds pleasure in a range of sources and, similarly, without the certainty that they are unimpeachable. There is a parallel activity at work here in finding and organising patterns, not only in the visual images of cinema, but also in a range of voices in analysis. One might even see it as evidence of Carroll's "localized theories and rigorous dialectical theorizing"(xiv) and radically "free and open debate" (46) were it not for his assertion of Theory as an imposition, often of "political correctness"(44). Bordwell and Carroll, *Post-Theory*.

[34] Carroll, "Prospects for Film Theory", 48.

[35] Plantinga, "Cognitive Film Theory", 20.

[36] As if to support Plantinga's claims of a broad research field, Mullarkey offers Slavoj Žižek as a Lacanian and Hegelian working productively with cognitivism, suggesting that the division between cognitivism and Theory is not at all a necessary one. Mullarkey, *Philosophy and the Moving Image,* 60–61.

[37] Plantinga, "Cognitive Film Theory", 20.

[38] Ibid., 22.

[39] John Mullarkey, "Bordwell and Other Cogitators" in *Refractions of Reality*, 29-57.

[40] Ibid., 56.

recognised by Mullarkey as an enduring achievement of the cognitivist approach and of Bordwell in particular.[41]

Mullarkey points to an irony that, despite the resistance to French theory on the part of conventional formalists, it was French theory (with *Cahiers du Cinéma*) that opened up the field. The adoption of an interest in filmic techniques and concepts of film production that beatified Hitchcock and established reputations of other American directors was promoted, privileging the *auteur* over the viewer, or regarding the viewer as primarily processing and validating production decisions made by directors. However the relation is depicted, it rests on what Dudley Andrew recognises as a significant dualism.

> Conscientious film theorists like Metz, Eco, and the editors of *Cahiers du Cinéma* recognized as indispensable, alongside their semiotic and structural base, a study of the process of textual production and reception. True to its methodological heritage, this expansion of concern has been carried out structurally, so that we can speak of film theory in the 1970's as developing a structural theory of spectator dynamics on the one hand and a structural theory of textual production on the other.[42]

Critical engagement as a means of accountability and steerage helps to explain conventional formalism's need for a theory like cognitivism to defend it from charges of being *laissez-faire*; cognitivism provides an external position from which to account for and justify observations. Inversely, the French New wave theorists in *Cahiers du Cinéma* had the theory; they needed a practical formalism. Andrew recognises a balancing between "developing a structural theory of spectator dynamics on the one hand and a structural theory of textual production on the other."[43] While Carroll bristled at the use of formalism as "*ad hominem* attacks", it seems uncontroversial, following Andrew, to recognise cognitivism in "spectator dynamics" and formalism in concerns of "textual production". In the perceived absence of a dominant *Theory* of formalism — recognising Carroll's complaint — conventional formalism's standardisation of a language of film analysis becomes more than supplementary. The film glossary, taxonomy, and the guide/handbook present a

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[41] Ibid., 55. "But it was Bordwell, by bringing a film theory previously fashioned by continental philosophy across to an empiricist paradigm of film studies (via cognitivism), who thoroughly promoted the new approach adopted by so many. That so many voices have maintained a similar position (despite certain, relatively small, internal differences) is a testament to the scientific method advocated for it by all."

[42] Dudley Andrew, *Concepts in Film Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), Kindle ed., 107.

[43] Ibid., 107.

consolidation of cinema analysis around form, providing the authority to act as the standard against which to test theoretical claims.[44]

It is a dubious proposition that conventional formalism can be independent or that it is value-free, objective or non-theoretical. But arguably, it has done its job of educating and grounding the field of film analysis by giving it a language, and consolidating the field to the point that *conventional* formalism presents as its own field and as distinct from the theorised formalism that had been in play since Eisenstein and his commitment to theory. For Laura Mulvey — a prototype of Theoretical approaches, working as she has at the intersection of Lacanian, Freudian and feminist perspectives — access to images remains in terms of formalism and its empirical approach. Mulvey's central work, "Visual pleasure and Narrative Cinema", uses a number of terms familiar to the conventional formalist project that was developing at the same time (in the 1970s): " the conventional close-ups", "conventions surrounding diegesis", "the illusion of screen depth" , "mode of representation" and so on, but also targets them as "the monolithic accumulation of traditional film conventions".[45]

Mulvey is emblematic of the field beyond conventional formalism that is defined by a grappling with theory and, in relation to which, conventional formalism places itself in opposition or as *a priori*. But Mulvey's theoretical positioning of the viewing experience, and research like it, is not adequately countered by pragmatic descriptions of visual images. Conventional formalism's enlistment of cognitivism was both as an answer to the "problem" of Theory (or the problem of seeming substantial and research-based in the face of Theory) at the same time as it was an answer to the problem of pinning down viewer response. What is clearly being contested in Mulvey's work is the neutrality of the viewer, the objective-scientific position, and the "plausible viewer response". She is explicit about her purpose in analysis and in the construction of the concept of gaze. "This paper intends to use psychoanalysis to discover where and how the fascination of film is reinforced by pre-existing patterns of fascination already at work within the individual subject and the social formations that have moulded him."[46] Grand Theory (to the extent that it is a useful term, and in her case, Lacan) is used not to assert its own dominance, but for an explicit purpose: "Psychoanalytic theory is thus appropriated here as a political weapon"[47] and "It is said that analysing pleasure, or

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[44] Recalling: "the concepts of *viewing practices* and *audience* are deployed as reference points against which purely theoretical claims must be tested." Moon, *Viewing Terms*, iv.

[45] Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema", in *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 27. [Originally published in *Screen* 16, no. 3 (1975): 6-18.]

[46] Ibid., 14.

[47] Ibid., 14.

beauty, destroys it. That is the intention of this article."[48] The question was one of how to approach "fascination", not one of how to apply theory, which is to say that it is a question of how to enlist theory rather than assert or prove it. Before returning to Mulvey later in the chapter, it is important to grasp the mechanics of an enshrined mistrust of theory in film studies, closing the door on Deleuze and others and, at the same time, on an approach to movement as fundamental to analysis.[49]

The enshrining of standard consensus

Despite some departures and debates, conventional formalism's hegemony is enshrined in a publication whose title connotes both authority and scope. Oxford University Press's *A Dictionary of Film Studies* demonstrates why Deleuze has not figured more prominently in the field (outside of academic circles). The process of accumulating the dictionary entries is relevant and outlined in its introduction. It includes surveys of film study curricula in the secondary schools and universities in the UK, reviews of major texts books, and an extensive literature survey, so there is legitimate claim to this being a survey of the field (at least in the UK).[50]

As if to confirm Mullarkey's point that the pluralist pantheon of theories in cinema studies serves neither philosophy nor cinema well, Deleuze is described as "heralding the discipline's recent turn to philosophy." Philosophy is perceived as *other* and as taking the discipline in another direction rather than sticking with cinema as cinema.

> Deleuze's work, and especially his books on the movement-image and the time-image,
> has become increasingly influential in film studies since English-language editions
> became available in the late 1980s — a development that may be regarded as heralding
> the discipline's recent turn to philosophy (see PHILOSOPHY AND FILM). However,
> Deleuze's concepts of the movement-image and the time-image condense complex

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[48] Ibid., 16.

[49] Not that theory needed anti-Theory to challenge it. In the UK, *Screen* had been the voice of "political overtones" and the promotion of theoretical stances: notably with *Screen's* publishing of Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema". *Screen* provided a channel for political and social theory in the 1960s and 70s (with inner turmoil as a necessary part of the consequences of open debate): ". . . part of *Screen's* editorial board resigned in protest against its theoretical direction [centred on French film theory] and its unwillingness to tolerate opposing views. In addition to this internal turmoil, *Screen* was simultaneously attacked from both sides of the political spectrum. More conventional film critics decried the journal and its theorists as a form of intellectual terrorism. Meanwhile, contemporary critics associated with journals like *Jump Cut* criticised *Screen* and its theoretical focus as a betrayal of its political radicalism." Kevin McDonald, *Film Theory: The Basics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016) Kindle ed., 134. McDonald also recognises the 1970s as the beginning of cultural studies in the UK. (159).

[50] Annette Kuhn and Guy Westwell, *A Dictionary of Film Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Kindle ed. Loc. 8776. [Introduction].

points of philosophy that are regarded by some as contentious. Philosophical debate aside, the movement-image/time-image distinction has been criticized on the more prosaic grounds that it offers nothing new, and in particular that it reprises aspects of the phenomenologically-inflected thinking on film set out by André Bazin and Christian Metz between the 1940s and the 1960s.[51]

This passage demonstrates an obligation to recognise Deleuze, but deliberately avoids engagement with his philosophy: it is presented as possible to sidestep his philosophy ("Philosophical debate aside"), and to consider the movement and time images on "prosaic grounds". That might be considered a practical editorial decision to limit the discussion's complexity, were it not for the fact that the entry does not result in a clearer definition of the images. Rather it establishes the grounds to dismiss Deleuze's approach to images without engaging with them. More, Bazin, Metz, and phenomenology are considered in evidence without explaining how they escape the ban on philosophical discussion that neuters Deleuze. This, in the same publication that, under the linked entry on "Philosophy and Film", identifies Deleuze and Cavell in this way: "Arguably, the writings of Cavell and Deleuze together represent the most substantial philosophical contribution to date to film theory."[52] Despite mentioning Deleuze's *Cinema* books in the body of the entry, he is not included in the list of titles for further reading (at all), while Carroll and Cavell are.

This is how hegemony works and how it marginalises. Bordwell's formalism is *natural* and Deleuze is *being philosophical* (that is, not directly cinematic). In the dictionary, there are thirty-five recommendations to Bordwell in "Further Reading" following entries; the three entries directly related to Deleuze are from Ronald Bogue and David Rodowick (important as they are). More, the little discussion of Deleuze's direct contribution to the field that does exist seems determined to summarily dismiss him on his own terms so that the impression is that he is at fault and so presents no challenge to hegemonic organisation.

> A more detailed point of contention is that the historical/expressive distinction between films of the movement-image and films of the time-image does not always hold up in the particular films cited by Deleuze: *the movement-image clearly does not disappear from postwar cinema*; while certain films designated under the time-image heading . . . *display a good deal of movement-image-type causality and narrative drive.*[53]

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[51] Ibid., loc. 19796. ["Movement-image/Time-image" entry. Parenthesis and emphasis in the original.]

[52] Ibid., loc. 21416-21417. ["Philosophy and Film, (Film-Philosophy)" entry].

[53] Ibid., loc. 19803. [Emphasis added.]

What is noteworthy is the use of the images as categorically defining historically-determined types of films, so the argument is that, if Deleuze is correct, the movement-image should disappear after the war and the time-image should not have causality and narrative drive.[54] This is at odds with Deleuze's insistence that his was not an historical project, but a conceptual practice.[55] Deleuze's contention was that Orson Welles — archetypally at ease with both classical narrative (where he was chronologically situated) and modernist invention — was the first to use the time-image, and he specifically discusses *Citizen Kane* in terms of the crystal-image (a time-image), thus blurring the historical and stylistic distinction between modern and classical eras, and so the "point of contention" is conceded without ever regarding it as being in contention. In addition, the final statement before the brief general conclusion of the *Cinema* books, points to a fluidity between the movement-image and the time-image: "it is always possible to multiply the passages from one regime to the other, just as to accentuate their irreducible differences."[56]

The point is not so much to demonstrate the ways in which various critics have misread or misunderstood Deleuze, but rather to identify the extent to which such (mis)readings are grounded in a central assumption of formalism as the very essence of film. Formalism based on a (seemingly) detached empiricism does not need to account for modern cinema: the imperative is still to watch the film (classical or modern) and identify patterns. Conventional formalism's role in developing a language of film analysis required distance from any single theory, but that does not justify a failure to engage with film history and its progress through a range of theories. Film theory has been a part of cinema, from its early days with Eisenstein: his recognition of committed approaches to editing; his respectful opposition to DW Griffith over humanist and dialectical approaches; and his more local debate with Vsevolod Pudovkin over the function of editing as either collision or linkage. The field is not served by totalisation or simplification such as the following:

> Despite many writers' claim to think historically, the dominant method in the field
> remains hermeneutics driven by Grand Theory. Once the Theory was derived from

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[54] The time-image itself does not enable narrative, but it often relies on there being a narrative for it to disrupt, making it indirectly part of the narrative. However, in the works of Terrence Malick especially Th*e Tree of Life* and *Song to Song* an argument can be mounted that he does use time-images to drive the narrative.

[55] "Cinema itself is a new practice of images and signs, whose theory philosophy must produce as conceptual practice. For no technical determination, whether applied (psychoanalysis, linguistics) or reflexive, is sufficient to constitute the concepts of cinema itself." Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 280.

[56] Ibid., 279.

Foucault or Lacan, now it comes from Zizek or Deleuze, but the conceptual and rhetorical moves are the same.[57]

Deleuze's relationship with history and hermeneutics is complex, but it *is* a relationship. Deleuze — who, after all, co-authored a treatise on anti-hermeneutics central to his oeuvre[58] — self-consciously works within and, at the same time, subverts hermeneutics. Nevertheless, Bordwell's assertion is not wild accusation; Deleuze is invested in seeking hermeneutic limits — genuine limits based on exhaustive analysis — in order to breach them, to move beyond them.[59] The *Cinema* books provide a model with the movement-image (classical cinema) setting hermeneutic limits that the time-image (modern cinema) breaches.

If cognitivism validates what is seen (and it *is* mostly a matter of visuals) — if it validates narrative patterns arising from close inspection by an unencumbered mind, but cued by concepts from art and film production — the question that may arise, therefore, is *where are we going with this?* One end, the historical one, is recognition of the Hollywood model of narrative film-making as normative, so that any developments (for example, experimental cinema, Third Cinema, anti-Hollywood movements like *Dogme 95*, and independent filmmaking) are regarded as departures from, or local developments of, the classical cinema of Hollywood.[60] As McDonald notes:

> This latter term [classical Hollywood cinema] provided a more thorough framework for analyzing narrative cinema's formal practices. As the theoretical innovations of the 1970s were integrated into a more formalized academic rubric, there was a tendency to minimize or erase the political overtones that were once an important influence.[61]

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[57] David Bordwell, "The Classical Hollywood Cinema Twenty-Five Years Along", Blog, *David Bordwell's Website on Cinema*, 2010, https://www.davidbordwell.net/essays/classical.php, n.p.

[58] The two-volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*: Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London: Penguin Books, 2009); Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

[59] Ian Buchanan understands Deleuze as aware of a role in relation to hermeneutics at a number of points: "constructs hermeneutics" (33), "hermeneutic revolution" (5), "build[ing] his entire hermeneutic program"(3), "hermeneutic apparatus" (147), and as offering "countless hermeneutic tips" (43). Ian Buchanan, *Deleuzism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).

[60] *Dogme 95* was a project of Thomas Vinterberg and Lars von Trier beginning in 1995 and lasting ten years. (http://www.dogme95.dk). It aimed to counter the excesses of Hollywood by requiring its (accredited) directors to work according to rules that, largely, forced directors to work in a low budget documentary style (colour, local sound, on location, no genre movies, etc). *Third Cinema* embodies Paul Willemen's aim to "expel the Euro-American conceptions of cinema from the center of both film history and critical theory": Paul Willemen, *Looks and Frictions* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 190. Independent filmmaking took on a much closer relation to mainstream Hollywood through production companies like Miramax and Castle Rock, and through indie studio offshoots of Hollywood corporations.

[61] McDonald, *Film Theory,* 103.

As a consequence, Deleuze, with his overtly anti-psychoanalytical stance (with Félix Guattari)[62] was, as McDonald suggests, out of step with the zeitgeist in cinema analysis in the formative 1970s and 80s that valued Freudian and Lacanian approaches.[63] Deleuze was further marginalised by the consolidation of theory (or its lack) around a Hollywood model. In identifying so closely with Hollywood, conventional formalism presents a very important contribution to cinematic history. Whether it grounds the *whole* field of film analysis is contentious if it cannot weather intrusions or opportunities afforded by theory, except by polemic and containment.

To approach limitations of conventional formalism another way: if analysis begins with a "plausible viewer response", what of implausibility? And might not cognitivism — as a field designed to account for viewer responses to observable elements of the film — be *particularly* interested in deviant or aberrant responses? It is not difficult to find filmmakers engaging with implausibility: David Lynch, Andrei Tarkovsky, Federico Fellini, Terrence Malick, and others. Their films rely on gut reactions, confusions, free-associations, unfamiliar juxtapositions, and so on rather than credible responses; while it is conceded that what is evoked might be a plausible response to the confusions presented, the attendant notion is a breach in predictability and certainty.

It is relatively easy to describe the aberrant in technical terms (for example the mismatch between sound and visuals in Tarkovsky), but it denies or tames the shock or the disconfirming that is inherent in the films and the unease in the viewer upon which these filmmakers rely, as confidence in a grasp of meaning is eroded. Narratives of classical cinema, already "make sense" and conventional formalism offers explanations of how. Analytical approaches derived from painting fit nicely when film is claimed as a *visual text.* However, the problem of movement is again sidestepped, giving credence to the cautionary observation that "a painting invites contemplation . . . while a film prevents it."[64] The appreciation of composition and other formal elements requires that a film be frozen, either actually or in principle (for example, in summary reference to a shot in the film).

Movement, in other words, presents a challenge for a conventional approach to film, and Deleuze gives film analysis the chance to embrace that challenge. Thus, where Bordwell takes from Wölfflin a particular appreciation of the visual tableau, Deleuze uses Wölfflin and baroque art to consider

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[62] "[*Anti-Oedipus*] wastes no time in discrediting the old idols [Marx, Freud and sign systems], even though it does have a great deal of fun with Freud. Most important, it motivates us to go further." Michel Foucault, "Preface", in *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (London: Penguin Books, 2009) xii.

[63] "Partly because of [*Anti-Oedipus*'s] rejection of psychoanalysis, Deleuze found little favor among film theorists in the 1970s and 1980s." McDonald, *Film Theory,* 146.

[64] Gale MacLachlan and Ian Reid, *Framing and Interpretation* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1994), 35.

formal elements of the image other than the directly visual. It would be hard to imagine a more polar opposition than with Bordwell on the Baroque; they are so different that one hardly impinges on the other.

> The Baroque refers not to an essence but rather to an operative function, to a trait. It endlessly produces folds. It does not invent things: there are all kinds of folds coming from the East, Greek, Romanesque, Gothic, Classical folds . . . yet the Baroque trait twists and turns its folds, pushing them to infinity. Fold over fold, one upon the other.[65]

Bordwell discusses the visual complexity, while Deleuze considers referential complexity in which conceptual movement is essential as an "operative function" and evident in the folding. In Deleuze's account of baroque art, the typical complexity, detail, exaggeration, and drama appear not as stylistic devices but as dialogues pushed beyond dialogue, and not as seeking resolution, but as blending without loss of identity, folding. Deleuze uses Wölfflin to consider "formal" elements of the image other than the directly visual. In this way, Deleuze develops "a highly materialist aesthetic that is inclusive of surface texture, sound, depth and density as well as abstraction."[66] Components of the image that are non-linguistic and not principally visual, draw attention to the interaction of elements within and between images. For example, "Deleuze connects the problem of depth of field in Orson Welles's invention of time-images to the decenterings of space in the Baroque, as read by Heinrich Wölfflin."[67] More generally and elsewhere, Deleuze recognises an altogether different problem in painting than composition: "The painter's problem is not how to enter into the canvas, since he is already there (the prepictorial task), but how to get out of it, thereby getting out of the cliché, getting out of probability (the pictorial task)."[68] It is a problem couched in terms of conceptual movement with notions of getting into and out of the canvas.

As useful as it is to discuss early and mid-classical films in terms of tableaus and in terms of the Baroque's obsessive attention to detail in the mise-en-scene, for Deleuze, once cameras and sound became mobile, cinema moved quickly to engage in creative thought untethered from place and certainly unconstrained by notions of consensus about the nature of cinema. But even as early as 1927, Alfred Hitchcock's *The Lodger*[69] (a silent film and pre-classical), was challenging the tableau

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[65] Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (London: Continuum, 2006), 3. As is common practice (but not for Deleuze), when the baroque is used adjectivally it will not be capitalised. When it identifies the era directly, it will be.

[66] Saige Walton, "'Folds in the Soul': Deleuze's Baroque, Wölfflin and Grandrieux's *Un Lac*", *Culture, Theory and Critique* 57, no. 2 (2016), 197.

[67] John Rajchman, "Deleuze's Time, or How the Cinematic Changes Our Idea of Art" in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, ed. D N Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 293.

[68] Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the Logic of Sensation* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 67.

[69] Alfred Hitchcock, *The Lodger: A Story of the London Fog*, film (UK: Piccadilly Pictures Ltd, 1927).

in a number of ways: a camera mounted in a newspaper delivery van permitted a movement through the streets; a glass ceiling (as a special effect) allowed viewers to see the pacing footsteps in the room above, from underneath; and transitions between tableaus were emphasised by stairs and doors that isolate, just as they connect, the very different events and moods in each space — most notably, the front door between a cosy and complacent inside and an outside where serial murders were being committed. External shots confused visual elements with the use of fog and darkness, and the confusion was exacerbated by impressionistic editing (and at times through the distortions of expressionistic editing). If one wanted to persist with the idea that these are tableaus of a different kind, at least it needs to be acknowledged that there is a fluidity between them that deserves critical attention and, at the very least, there is a dialogue between tableau and camera. It is still certainly possible to abstract the tableau from the moving picture, but for what purpose? For Deleuze, the interest is in relations without an appetite for resolution, but as relations that warrant the notion of folds. In comparison, conventional formalism is convergent, seeking clarity and certainty:

> The emphasis which Hollywood filmmakers place upon the resolution of the narrative indicates the importance of key thematic oppositions, such as man/woman, individual/community, work/play, order/anarchy. In order to resolve these contradictions, a mediating figure arises. Arguably, this binary approach to interpreting narrative structure is the most enduring legacy of 'cine-structuralism.'[70]

Resolvable binary opposition (and the necessity of a film to finally achieve some kind of resolution for the problems its sets), a mediating figure, and the rehearsal of key themes are important not only for defining a Hollywood genre, but, as apparent in the concluding sentence, also for establishing an analytical methodology whose dominance in cinema promotes conventional formalism as the industry standard.

Brian Massumi observed that there is no such thing as an inevitable hegemony or totalisation but that a molarity — Hollywood is such a molarity — "presents itself as stasis . . . it is in reality a productive process: a making the same."[71] It expends energy to keep its boundaries and limits clear, and Bordwell and Carroll's *Post-Theory* is an example of such a defence of boundaries. "Molarity is productive activity kept to the minimum necessary to guarantee relative closure."[72] In Massumi's

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[70] Bordwell, "Contemporary Film Studies and the Vicissitudes of Grand Theory", 6.

[71] Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999), 106.

[72] Ibid., 107.

terms, the mistrust of all theory would count as a necessary minimum, and the relative closure of the field places Deleuze's contribution to film analysis indisputably on the outside.

Deleuze and the positive roles of theory

David Lapoujade understands Deleuze as differentiating between logic and rationality: "Logic doesn't mean rational. We could even say that for Deleuze a movement is all the more logical the more it escapes rationality."[73] Breaks in rationality (a rationality that would be considered essential to hermeneutics) indicate a larger or different logic at work. The question becomes "What logic do aberrant movements obey?"[74] In these terms, if science is rational, the *logic* of science has been a concern of contemporary science, noting that chaos theory, brain plasticity, turbulence theory, quantum mechanics, and the field of theoretical physics seek a logic that embraces the aberrant data. There is a restlessness and a desire to move beyond what has been identified as clichés and molarity, and so the goal is not consensus, but an active seeking of "interferences and resonances,"[75] essential to Deleuzian practices of assemblage and rhizomatic connection.

The notion of the *haptic* in film provides a good example of such rhizomatic connectivity. Firstly, it is established, for film, not primarily in the *Cinema* books where mention is brief and not much more than a citation, but through other works of Deleuze on Bacon and Leibniz.[76] Secondly, as a concept, the haptic is not fixed, but open to revision and almost fractal attention:

> For while [the optical space of non-figurative art] breaks with "haptic" vision and close viewing, it is not merely visual but refers to tactile values, even though it still subordinates them to vision. In fact, what replaces haptic space is a *tactile–optical* space, in which what is expressed is no longer essence but connection . . .[77]

Thirdly, the uptake of concepts has been rhizomatic, which is to say, "a process of networked, relational and transversal thought" understood as mapping: "a way of being without 'tracing' the construction of that map as a fixed entity."[78] Laura Marks developed *haptic visuality* as an

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[73] David Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze* (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2017), 27.

[74] Ibid., 25.

[75] Rajchman, "Deleuze's Time", 300. It is Rajchman's conclusion that Deleuze presents a challenge to conventional criticism in seeking interferences and resonances between texts, practices, concepts, images and so on.

[76] Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017)*;* Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (London: Continuum, 2006).

[77] Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 87.

[78] Felicity Colman, "Rhizome" in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010): 232-233.

important term for cinema analysis that, in turn, provided triggers for other researchers, that go beyond scholarly citation to the building of assemblages.[79] The process is divergent and analysis is expected to enjoy unanticipated associations and to cast a wide net. Sycophantic adherence to Deleuze would be an impediment to such approaches: "When it comes to discussing the potential play of the haptic and of the 'affection-image' in film, however, the view that [Deleuze] offers is inadequate and unsatisfactorily literal. Rather than in his work on film, a theoretical contribution to the mapping of a haptic 'movement-image' is more productively found in Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'geo-philosophy'".[80] Mechanisms for challenging boundaries and moving beyond established understandings — lines of escape, the building of assemblages, schizoanalytical processes — have no interest for conventional analysis.

Take reference to "Deleuze" out of the discussion or assume him without explicit reference — and so move beyond a polarity essential to his usual assessment — and one appreciates a dynamic field that has progressed beyond classification and defence of theory to engagement with film, without expectation and without pre-existing limits. Deleuze's importance, in part, is as the galvanisation of voices and analytical foundations that preceded or were contemporaneous with his work. Placed in a dynamic field, Deleuze is less the iconoclast and maverick, and Mulvey and Jean-François Lyotard present a triangulation that helps to situate Deleuze's work amid contemporary directions in the field, as continuation rather than disruption.

One is struck by similarities between ideas in Mulvey's extended film project — beyond the single work with which she is most often identified — and Deleuze's.[81] Mulvey considers complex cinematic movement as linked to notions of modernity: "the sense of life as caught in a process of change"[82] and, drawing on Giuliana Bruno, "emotion contains movement . . . Cinematic space not only moves through time and space or narrative development but through inner space"[83] (evoking Deleuze's affection-images). Mulvey's discussion of "freez[ing] the flow of the action in moments

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[79] Laura Marks developed haptic visuality into a theory for applied film analysis: *The Skin of the Film*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000). Giuliana Bruno applied the notion of the haptic to architecture as Marks did for film: *Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture and Film* (London: Verso, 2018). Elena del Río considered movement-performance and affection: *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance*: *Powers of Affection* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). Jennifer Barker considered cinema as a deeply tactile and sensuous experience: *The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). Yoshitaka Ota, in "What is 'the Haptic'?: Consideration of *Logique de la Sensation* and Deleuze's theory of sensation", (*Aesthetics* no.17, 13-24, 2013), provides an historisation of the concept of haptic in Alois Riegl and Deleuze's use of his work in *Francis Bacon*.

[80] Giuliana Bruno, *Atlas of Emotion* (London: Verso, 2018), Kindle ed. Loc. 5986.

[81] Both were active in film over the same time period. Laura Mulvey, *Visual and other Pleasures* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), was first published in 1989. The collection includes, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema", (*Screen* 16, no. 3, 1975: 6-18) and places it with other work that together identify a more far-reaching film project, between 1975 and 1989. Deleuze's *Cinema* books were published in 1983 and 1985 in French and in English three and four years later, respectively.

[82] Mulvey, *Visual and other Pleasures*, 226.

[83] Ibid., 227.

of erotic contemplation"[84] and in a more sustained discussion of stillness, in a later publication, can be approached in terms of Deleuze's time-image.[85] More generally, Deleuze and Mulvey share a love/hate relationship with Hollywood. For both, Hollywood is not a privileged field, but an assemblage (a molarity) that claims authority and control over technical, financial and narrative practices, with cultural and psychological consequences, despite also recognising Hollywood cinema as a site of liberation and invention, historically.

Mulvey felt the need to clarify what others took as a *generalisation* of the masculine gaze as applying to all cinema: "… Hollywood, not cinema in general, was supremely suited to such an analysis [feminist psychoanalytic interpretation]."[86] She provides a separation from Hollywood as metonymy for film, but recognises it as an influential part of the field recognising (and using) Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Thompson as productively having mapped the territory of Hollywood cinema.[87] She recalls Hollywood as a liberation from prevailing attitudes of literary criticism and high culture in England at the time (the French New Wave found a similar attraction to Hollywood):

> Hollywood, on the other hand (not yet thought of as either 'classical' or 'realist') offered a disruptive alternative through its transcendent technology, formulaic plots and star personas with antecedents in fairground entertainment, popular novels and the music hall rather than the traditions of high culture.[88]

With Lyotard, as the second part of a triangulation with Deleuze, comes the recognition that sustained interest in cinematic *movement* was not limited to Deleuze. Commentators on Lyotard's four essays on cinema acknowledge that he is influential but, compared with Deleuze, underdeveloped in terms of a basis for analysis.[89] In his *Acinema,* Lyotard recognises the fundamental importance of movement*:* "Cinematography is the inscription of movement, a writing with movement, a writing with movements — all kinds of movements."[90] His interest is that

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[84] Ibid., 19-20.

[85] Laura Mulvey, *Death 24x a Second* (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), cited in Mulvey, *Visual and other Pleasures*, xvii.

[86] Mulvey, *Visual and other Pleasures*, xvi.

[87] "As Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson's detailed research has shown, the American cinema duly conformed to [Giovanni] Arrighi's model [of the growth of capitalism] achieving vertical integration and complex, bureaucratic, management structures as it became 'Hollywood'." Ibid., 217. Reference is to David Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson, *The Classical Hollywood Cinema* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

[88] Mulvey, *Visual and other Pleasures*, xi-xii.

[89] "In contrast to Deleuze's long plot and mise-en-scène descriptions (consistent with auteur theory), Lyotard's method is erratic and unsystematic. His work with painting or with theatre is a dialogue, a shared journey, but cinema comes after a philosophical inquiry which, most of the time, is about something other than the seventh art." Graham Jones and Ashley Woodward, *Acinemas: Lyotard's Philosophy of Film* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 16.

[90] Jean-François Lyotard, "Acinema" in *Acinemas: Lyotard's Philosophy of Film*, ed. Jones and Woodward, 33.

making a film is a matter of exclusion — *in sync* with Bergson and Deleuze's understanding of the mechanism of perception as one of exclusion:

> The central problem for both [cinema and acinema] is not the representational arrangement and its accompanying question, that of knowing how and what to represent and the definition of good or true representation; the fundamental problem is the exclusion and foreclosure of all that is judged unrepresentable because non-recurrent.[91]

Of particular interest is Lyotard's understanding that for every movement selected, there is a return. He considers that what is established and traded is *value*. It provides a revision, without contradiction, of Giannetti's "Every shot can be looked at as an ideological cell" as identifying the ideological in terms of value: a political economy that has image as "returning" something to the film's order.[92] The analytical approach to the shot becomes one of asking questions about this value, and in Chapter 3 it will be of interest in terms of Deleuze's approach to significance.

Mulvey and Lyotard contribute to a rhizomatic mapping of the field. However useful an impression of accord, the field can also be approached as moving beyond its own formulations whether it is breaching limits or "getting out of the cliché" or considering cinema beyond the classical. What matters most, for our purpose, is a multiplicity in the field that serves the seeking of partnerships and encounters in a spirit of scrutiny that ultimately serves the field, and if it is not too perverse to say so, the opposition of Deleuze and Bordwell has been a matter of such positive scrutiny. The question *what is analysis for?* is answered by the latter through a totalisation of the field in ways that return attention to the present and the past of a film's production, while the former is able to use the language promoted by conventional formalism to articulate assemblages and provide lines of flight in the spirit of what will be identified presently as research-creation.

The field of film analysis is identified *in relation* to theory rather than defined either *by* broad theory or by ignoring it. It is a conclusion that is too general to be of much interest, but it becomes more attractive in particular instances, some of which have been considered in this chapter. Most provocative is conventional formalism's articulation (principally via Bordwell and Carroll) of the role of theory via an outright denial of historical manifestations of Theory (nevertheless embracing cognitivism). In terms of its most productive implications, the argument becomes one for the creation of a space in which to value the encounter between film analysis untainted by external

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[91] Ibid., 39.

[92] "…every movement put forth sends back to something else, [which] is inscribed as a plus or minus on the ledger book which is the film." Ibid., 34.

ideologies and the positioned subjectivity of the viewer. Political positioning rather than political affiliation becomes the dynamic without which a grasp of the field's development, extending beyond conventional formalism, would be incomplete: Shaviro's deployment of Deleuze and Guattari claimed authority to recognise personal responses as worthy of analysis; Mulvey has used Lacan as a "weapon"; and Lyotard couched the cinematic image in terms of political economy and questions of value, order and exclusion.

Clearly, the assessment of the field of film analysis has been served by a number of oppositions (dualisms, dialectics, poles) between these approaches to theory and more generally: cinema and acinema, Hollywood and its others, spectator dynamics and textual production, Deleuze and Bordwell. There have been two substantial omissions in this survey of the field that will be taken up later in this thesis. The first is Christian Metz's semiotics, which will be considered in more detail in the chapter on sound (Chapter 4). The second is cultural studies which underpins discussion elsewhere in this thesis (see Introduction and Chapter 6), especially in relation to Brian Massumi's *Parables for the Virtual*, a critical survey of cultural studies.[93] Together, these directions, theories and methodologies (and clearly many others) start to accumulate as a field of film analysis, or they start to articulate its assemblage(s).

Jo Smith is among those who argue for a more nuanced understanding of complexities and developments of film theory: "For not all film scholars treat theory as doctrine, and not all, are blind to the implications of their writing."[94] Smith offers an important position for the Deleuzian cineaste, that relies neither on certainties of theory nor, to begin with, any other certainties beyond an *encounter*. The encounter is differentiated from conventional formalism's ostensibly untheorised viewing, by a more radical openness not available to conventional formalism that is bound to representation.

> Film criticism as an encounter suggests open forms that exceed expectation and that move in directions that cannot be anticipated by any overarching framework . . . The so-called dead end of Grand Theory does not mean a necessary return to the old myths of rationalism and pseudoscientific enquiry. Instead, it offers film critics the opportunity to treat theory as a productive and creative tool which affirms the intensities of filmic events and which devises strategies and tactics for engendering the new.[95]

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[93] Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual* Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.

[94] Jo Smith, "Film Criticism after Grand Theories", *Deep South* 4, no.1 (Autumn 1998), np.

[95] Ibid., np.

Theory as a productive and creative tool will be of interest in later chapters. For present purposes, Smith is modulating the oppositional placement of theories, not in favour of a relativist or even pluralist solution, but because there is another role for theory than its own maintenance and application, and that is creative engagement in the field. While "creative" might be open to platitudes, film studies is presented as more than an excavation site exposing truths or realities that had been buried in a film. Ian Buchanan observed that "Concepts should bring about a new way of seeing something and not simply fix a label to something we think we already know about."[96] Buchanan's statement considers concepts as generative and as doing work, and authorises a creative dimension to research, rather than seeing concepts as ends of research. Smith's "theory as a productive and creative tool" is evident elsewhere, in Robert Briggs' *critical-creative* and in Erin Manning and Massumi's *research-creation*.[97] They provide an important dualism for film analysis: on one side, research, a critical attitude, and analysis; and on the other, creativity, generation of concepts, and new ways of thinking. Taxonomy on one side, the assemblage on the other. In these terms, the patterns and language of *conventional formalism* rest firmly on the research side.

Deleuze observed that "The essence of a thing never appears at the outset, but in the middle, in the course of its development, when its strength is assured."[98] He was considering the (post-war) crisis in the movement-image that brought about a direct awareness of time that completed essential understandings of cinematic images. The essence appearing in the middle is also applicable to film analysis that developed to maturity as an area of academic study in the 1970s with the work of the cinematic formalists. They established conventions of film analysis and in that sense established the field's strength, but (to follow Deleuze's aphorism) they were yet to realise the cinematic essences of movement and time in analysis.

The challenge from Deleuze is that he presents a far more rigorous mistrust of theory than what he inspires in the depiction of him as a Theorist. His notions of assemblage, lines of flight and schizoanalysis are not an abandonment of theory as a foundation for analysis but a reclamation of

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[96] Ian Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory, or, the Future of an Illusion", *Deleuze Studies* 11, no. 3 (2017), 473.

[97] *Research-creation* developed as a research funding category introduced in Canada in 2003: "to encourage hybrid forms of activity promising to capture for research the creative energies of artists working within the academic institution. The turn toward the institutionalization of research-creation was framed in interdisciplinary academic terms: 'to bridge the gap between the creative and interpretive disciplines and link the humanities more closely with the arts communities.'" Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, *Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 84-85. Briggs proposes "a pedagogy [that] may need to engage with and transform not just apparently dated theories and methodologies of mass culture but also the received ideas and embodied techniques of 'interpretation' which define or constitute the popular art of reviewing popular art. Such a strategy can't be reduced simply to a popularist affirmation of popular culture. Rather, it would entail the dissemination of skills for conducting critical-creative readings of and responses to popular texts, skills which may be distinguishable from the more specialised sets of analytical skills that are privileged in current approaches in cultural studies to the question of interpretation." Robert Briggs, "Culture and Pedagogy: On the Popular Art of Reviewing Popular Art", *Cultural Studies Review* 13, no. 2 (2007), 131

[98] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 3.

the idea that in doing analysis one is doing theory. What saves Deleuze from accusations of recklessness is the standards of accountability that he placed on himself (for which philosophy is indispensable rather than a liability) and the *usefulness* that others have found in him. It is precisely to such usefulness that we turn in the next chapter, where we pursue the question of the extent to which the cinematic fundamental of movement has been put to use in the specifically academic field of Deleuzian film analysis.

CHAPTER 2

Deleuzian film analysis and its assemblages

Because of the strong philosophical underpinnings of Deleuze's cinema project, to consider his positive contribution as a *Deleuzian field of film analysis* is to move to academic scholarship, conceding the general field to conventional formalism. This matters because Deleuze offers a serious and sustained approach to movement that is absent from conventional formalism. For different reasons, neither approach is poised to provide a central place for movement in general analysis. For conventional formalism, movement is assumed as the raw material (as paint might be assumed in viewing a painting in a gallery). With Deleuze, the problem is one of accessibility and intention: film analysis is not the stated aim of the *Cinema* books, which are concerned with the generation of concepts more than their application: "A theory of cinema is not 'about' cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to".[1]

There is a fundamentally different approach between conventional formalism's tending toward consensus and the accumulation of descriptive terms, and Deleuzian analysis's continuation of a process of concept creation in which the revision and reorientation of existing concepts are underlined by a restlessness, responsiveness, and readiness to move in new directions. At its core is Deleuze's abiding interest in movement, which this chapter will argue warrants more explicit application. It is important, then, to understand conditions in the field of Deleuzian film analysis as it has emerged.

This chapter begins with William Brown's review of Elena del Río's *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance: Powers of Affection*,[2] which offers a concise account of an ultimately productive instability in Deleuzian film analysis as well as recognition of the need to cultivate a more general readership of Deleuze.[3] The review picks up tensions between the philosophical project of the *Cinema* books and the usefulness of concepts arising from the books.

Brown's review works as a prelude to a survey of the field of Deleuzian film scholarship in the second section of this chapter. Four collections will be taken as representative of the field's development: *The Brain is the Screen* (2000); *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy* (2010 based on proceedings of a conference in 2005); *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema* (2008); and *Deleuze and Film* (2012).[4] These can be regarded as indicative of the evolution of

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[1] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 280.

[2] William Brown, "*Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance: Powers of Affection* by Elena del Río", *New Review of Film and Television Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 2012).

[3] With David Martin-Jones, Brown was co-editor of *Deleuze and Film* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). That collection will be taken, in later sections of this chapter, to be indicative of recent developments in the field.

[4] Flaxman, Gregory, ed., *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack, ed., *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema* (London: Continuum, 2008). David Norman Rodowick, ed., *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); David

Deleuzian film analysis and also as identifying a number of more general methodological approaches to film. The immediate interest is in the extent to which the works provide a foundation for the Deleuzian cineaste.

The third section of this chapter will account for Deleuze's methodology, understanding it to be derived from practice and not the formulation of set practices. The Deleuzian cineaste still identifies as Deleuzian despite a generalist turn. How does the identification shape practice, especially in relation to a concern with movement? Deleuze might be approached through any of his major concepts, such as schizoanalysis, multiplicity, rhizomes, or territorialization; however, *assemblage* addresses issues of cohesion, relation and articulation directly and so recommends itself as useful in identifying important practices in the field and as an orientation for an essentially different way of working.

This chapter will find that scholarship offers a great deal in terms of Deleuzian practice but falls short of clearly identifying a foundational grasp of movement for the Deleuzian cineaste. The concluding section establishes conditions and predispositions of a generalist practice of film analysis derived from Deleuze. It will be the task of future chapters, then, to find ways of exposing movement to analysis.

In a nutshell, the problem is that we are not used to regarding movement as available for analysis. We are of course inevitably immersed in movement, but there is no need to confuse experienced movement with cinematic movement. Deleuze recognises a close relation, even a parallel calling: "I was trying to put motion into thought while cinema was putting it into images"[5] but, however close the relation between "real" movement and cinematic movement, our concern is with film analysis whereas Deleuze's concern was with the creation of concepts. These concerns meet at the *movement-image*. While it seems to provide the starting point for a heightened awareness of filmic movement, the return (what is it *really* about?) is usually to Deleuze and his concepts, and to philosophy, via Bergson and Peirce to begin with. It becomes possible, then, to appreciate a film based on a taxonomy of cinematic concepts, without necessarily grasping (seeing, hearing, consciously perceiving) movement in a film beyond obvious depictions and except as it feeds the

Martin-Jones and William Brown, ed., *Deleuze and Film* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). The fifty-three articles in these collections provide a survey of approaches and concepts and can be taken as representative of developments in the field over a decade.

[5] To recall from the introduction to this thesis: "I was a student of philosophy . . . I liked those authors who demanded that we introduce movement to thought, "real" movement". Gilles Deleuze, Pascal Bonitzer, *et al*., "The Brain is the Screen": An Interview with Gilles Deleuze" in *The Brain is the Screen, ed.* Flaxman, 366. It is expressed a little differently elsewhere: "I was trying to put motion into thought while cinema was putting it into images". Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972-1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 57.

development of concepts. The value of Deleuze's project for general film analysis is that it foregrounds movement and opens it to analysis. If we are not to assume expertise in philosophy or Deleuze, analysis at least needs to be secure in identifying movement and identifying it as the point that differentiates Deleuzian methods from most others.

Tensions, limits, and a place for the general reader

David Brown, in his review of Elena del Río's *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance* raises questions of what it is to work in Deleuzian analysis and recognises both a Deleuzian approach to film and an impatience with the Deleuzian label. Brown identifies that Deleuzian scholarship provides a correction for conventional analysis that is based heavily on representation, through work on *affection*, "Now that work on affect is catching up with work on representation, a detailed analysis of the complex relationship between the two is perhaps called for".[6] Nevertheless, the inference throughout the review is that the work on affect is a niche field both in its general sense of being exactly suitable for a small or clearly defined group, and in the business sense of being an opportunity to present something not offered by anyone else. Brown's argument is that with the Deleuze moniker, it will stay that way.

The work under review (del Río's) is discussed in superlatives, but Brown observes that the book merits a wider audience than it will find. It is worth noting that he was writing in 2012 and so the problem is not of a slow taking up of the works of Deleuze but occurs around 25 years after Deleuze's *Cinema* books became available in English. If Brown is indicating concerns, they are with mature Deleuzian analysis. The subtext is that the review is struggling to fully validate the "Deleuze" in the title of the book, though it is inconceivable that del Río would have been writing without Deleuze.[7]

> *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance: Powers of Affection* might unjustly be/become an overlooked work. The presence of Deleuze in the title might put off some readers, while the notion of performance might put off others. While essential reading to the (no doubt impressive) number of scholars working on performance and/or Deleuze

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[6] Brown, "Book Review: Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance", 309.

[7] "Deleuze's understanding of the body as an assemblage of forces or affects that enter into composition with a multiplicity of other forces or affects restores to the body the dimension of intensity lost in the representational paradigm. Even more directly relevant to the specific aims of this book, the conceptual proximity I posit between issues of affect and performance is one that I see already latent in Deleuze's own work". Elena del Río, *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 3.

in relation to film, the book is perhaps not relevant-seeming enough to other scholars to make their already sizeable reading list . . . And yet, this book should merit a place near the top of not just Deleuze- and performance-focused film scholars, but any film scholar's film scholarly reading list — if not their general one. [8]

The problem is not del Río's scholarship; it is Deleuze: "Abstract at best and confounding at worst, Deleuze is thought by some to make great unsubstantiated pronouncements about many aspects of existence".[9] Deleuze haunts, rather than informs, and he is presented as a liability. Accordingly, Brown recognises direct reference to Deleuze through qualifications — for example, when Deleuze and Guattari "pronounce . . . that affect is key to existence, they are not necessarily wrong to do so"[10] — and finishes with a conclusion that is argumentative and, almost in contradiction to earlier complaints of inaccessibility, opens thorny philosophical questions. Engaging with del Río's reference to "our customary state of numbness"[11] in response to cliches, Brown writes:

> If I were certain as to what real thought is, I'd perhaps agree with del Río here. However, rather than seeking aesthetic experience in the extremes, or in the canonically 'extreme' cinema that del Río puts to work here, perhaps we might see that there is no numbness. We do not and cannot live in a vacuum; we cannot wake up from an anaesthetic existence through aesthetic moments; instead, we must realise that cinema — and life itself — is only aesthetic, if by varying degrees of intensity, from curtains up to curtains down, and from screaming start to whimpering finish.[12]

This is more than an engagement with del Río's conclusions (though it is also that). Brown returns (del Río's) analysis to broad philosophical issues and creates an oppositional stance without discounting the value of the analysis. Deleuze holds that we are shocked into thinking.[13] Del Río and others argue that this is not necessarily a mental shock but that there can be a profound visceral trigger, an affective response, that also activates thought. Del Río can be taken as demonstrating Brown's "varying degrees of intensity" in cinema, as in life, with the numbness understood

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[8] Brown, "Book Review: Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance", 305.

[9] Ibid., 305.

[10] Ibid., 305.

[11] Del Río, *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance,* 210. "Instead, exposure to these images paradoxically has the effect of reinforcing our customary state of numbness, leaving us unable to engage in real thought or feeling. Invisibility, ignorance, forgetfulness, distance – these are our protective mantles against the world's affects, including our own". (210)

[12] Brown, "Book Review: Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance", 309.

[13] "Cinema can exacerbate the tendency to cliché, stereotype, and plot . . . If, however, the forms presented were a 'shock to thought', the brain would have to reinvent itself, struggle to come to terms with the images". Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2006), 12-13.

specifically in relation to cliches, that is to say of low (or tending toward dead) intensities. It is not enough to engage Deleuze's significant work with aesthetic moments, in his work on literature and painting (in order to evaluate del Río's claims in terms of sensation and Francis Bacon's resistance to cliché)[14] because shifting ground only returns us to Colebrook's observation that "once you understand one [of Deleuze's terms] … you can understand them all; but you also seem to need to understand all the terms to even begin to understand one,"[15] and that reinforces the perception that Deleuze is a liability.

Ultimately, if the perception is that a work so steeped in Deleuze as del Río's "is really about the cinema experience (and not really about Deleuze . . .)"[16] that bodes well, because it is exactly the issue for the Deleuzian cineaste to grasp the "Deleuzian" as orientation rather than orthodoxy. Brown's identification of a general readership recognises that works of Deleuzian scholarship are, or should be, of interest to readers who are not Deleuzian acolytes. Brown's point is that, even in the academic field where del Río's book will find readership, it will be limited to those with specialist interest in Deleuze.

By comparison, to use David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson's flagship text, *Film Art: An Introduction,* one does not need to understand cognitivism, art history or the structuralism of *Cahiers du Cinéma,* or to comment on Bordwell and Thompson's intentions. *Film Art* feeds both specialised interest and general readership; it serves academic needs — especially as required-reading in many tertiary courses on film study[17] — as well as popular levels of analysis. With its basis in concepts drawn from techniques of film production, conventional formalism provides an intermediary level between an articulation of the viewing experience and justifications of summative judgements about a film; a film can be appreciated via the techniques that produced it.

The question is *Can Deleuzian concepts find a similar intermediary level?* One does not follow Deleuze through the *Cinema* books; one cuts a path through them. Intermediary texts or handbooks are scarce and usually they do not escape a scholarly context. David Deamer provides one such

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[14] In painting, Deleuze's major work was on Francis Bacon and sensation. More broadly, Deleuze explored the Baroque period in relation to Leibniz. Literature concepts of minoritarian and minority literature were devised (with Guattari) in *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature* (1975). In *Essays Critical and Clinical* (1998), essays on authors including Lewis Carroll, Walt Whitman and T E Lawrence are included, as well as reflections on literature as a field ("Literature and Life").

[15] Claire Colebrook, *Understanding Deleuze* (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2002), xviii-xix.

[16] Brown, "Book Review: Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance", 305.

[17] A brief survey of some significant film studies courses lists Bordwell and Thompson course reading. None of them includes Deleuze. University of Exeter (https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/film/modules/EAS1034/description/); Harvard (https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/katrinschamun/files/syllabus_for_ves_70_the_art_of_film.pdf) ; New York University (http://www.ohadlandesman.com/pdf/Language_of_Film.pdf); School of Film and Media Studies Purchase College, State University of New York (https://www.academia.edu/40603349/_Introduction_to_Cinema_Studies_I_syllabus_SUNY_ Purchase_Fall_2019_); University of Sussex (https://www.sussex.ac.uk/study/modules/undergraduate/2021/P3029-analysing-film-b).

scholarly intermediary: "I wanted to lay my hands on some kind of explication — something that admitted the taxonomy as fundamental, something that explored the semiotic elements in such a context. The *Three Introductions* [his book] is a bit like the text I wanted all those years ago, and still wish was out there in the world".[18] By comparison, the disseminations of conventional formalism are legion. Is it possible to discuss assemblage, multiplicity, the virtual, the Whole, the time-image, and the unfamiliar terms in Deleuze's cinematic taxonomy (such as, noosign, lectosign, hyalosign), in approximate or casual terms without undermining the integrity of Deleuze's project? Is it possible to take from them *enough* for the analysis of filmic movement and so to cross over to Brown's "general readership"? They are questions that are not without history and context and require a grasp of the field of Deleuzian film analysis as it has developed.

An emergent field

The notion of *return* is useful in gaining clarity about the question of what the *Cinema* books offer the general practice of film analysis, since they offer a number of approaches. Ian Buchanan demonstrates return with Michel Foucault: "Take a thing like the prison: the prison is a form . . . this thing does not refer back to the word 'prison' but to entirely different words and concepts such as 'delinquent' and 'delinquency'".[19] In these terms, the return of the *Cinema* books is to philosophy and philosophical issues on the one hand, and to Deleuze's take on philosophy as the generation of concepts, on the other.

David Martin-Jones and David Brown argue that two paths — image analysis and philosophy — have defined scholarship from the beginning of Deleuze's availability in English translation.[20] One path saw Shaviro's liberated application of concepts as license for a playful and idiosyncratic analysis (without sacrificing rigour); the other stayed with Deleuze's philosophical project and developed through David Rodowick as film philosophy.[21] The challenge for both was the

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[18] David Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), xix.

[19] Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory, or, the Future of an Illusion", 471-472. Buchanan is recalling Deleuze and Guattari's use of the quotation in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 66.

[20] Martin-Jones and Brown, *Deleuze and Film*, 2.

[21] At times, film philosophy is written as two words, while at other times it is hyphenated. Film philosophy has been sustained by the journal of that name, *Film-Philosophy,* which originated with Daniel Frampton and had (by 2021) run to twenty-five volumes. A description is offered in the twentieth anniversary issue: "French philosopher Gilles Deleuze's work of film-philosophy has become more associated with film theory, perhaps because when his *Cinema* books appeared in the 1980s there was no such term as 'film-philosophy', and they [Deleuze and Cavell] were taken up by film theorists. Whatever the case, Deleuze and Cavell are among the first to explicitly claim that films can do or be philosophy". David Sorfa, "What Is Film-Philosophy?", *Film-Philosophy* 20, no. 1 (2016), n.p.

articulation of the meaning of Deleuze's concepts from the *Cinema* books and the question of how to deploy them, even if approaches were vastly different.

Mostly, the return has been to philosophy and this has kept Deleuze, almost exclusively, in academic scholarship, with a number of directions having emerged: embracing the *Cinema* books and riding them into related philosophical projects (Marrati, Rodowick, Colebrook); contextualising Deleuze's cinema project as a completed work and placing it in relation to competing theories (Mullarkey, Žižek); explicating Deleuze's taxonomy (Deamer, Colman, Bogue); applying Deleuze's concepts (Buchanan, MacCormack, Marks, Pisters, Rizzo); and, shifting attention directly to the cinematic field, but still deeply mindful of processes and concepts that led to their development — that is, remaining explicitly Deleuzian, if not overtly philosophical in orientation — (Deamer, Shaviro, Cole and Bradley, Powell) including an important branch in a focus on *affection* (del Río, Barker, Powell, Marks, Shaviro). The diversity of the field is exemplified by Shaviro's *The Cinematic Body*, which is early evidence that there is no clear expectation that a field that celebrates invention, contingency, multiplicity, and relation will be, or should be, unified other than by the turns it has taken.[22]

In a section of the introduction to their collection, titled "From Collected Edition to Edited Collections", Martin-Jones and Brown regard the scholarly collection as evidence of the development of the field and, for us, the four collections identified earlier will serve as a barometer of change in approaches to Deleuze. The collections will be useful throughout this thesis, especially in terms of directions of Deleuzian film scholarship and as a foundation or a springboard for the Deleuzian cineaste. What is being sought is a sense of a practice of film analysis based on the *Cinema* books and more particularly based on an exposition of movement. From that point of view, none of the collections deliver (nor do they aim to) a clear general methodology but approaches to analysis are constructive and offer direction.

The earliest of the four, *The Brain is the Screen*, was in a sense a project of mapping. Flaxman, in his introduction, specifically identifies mapping, "Mapping images", along with other sections: "Approaching images", and "Thinking images" but this was still regarded as a philosophical endeavour: "these three sections roughly reflect the philosophical areas to which Deleuze devoted himself: ontology, epistemology and ethics".[23] The collection becomes a work of orientation and is

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[22] Steven Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 1993.

[23] Flaxman, *The Brain is the Screen*, 11.

situated between philosophy and cinema with titles that include "cine-thinking", "cinema and the outside" and a "geology of cinema".[24]

Summary definition of the movement-image mostly provides a conservative model from which to consider an object of analysis at the same time that the collection depicts the time-image as providing much more attractive philosophical problems. The term "perceptual digestibility" is used in relation to the movement-image and Bergson's sensory-motor schema: "This dogmatic schema reduces images to a perceptual digestibility that determines an almost instinctive response, in the process governing the excitations of images, reducing them to an 'even flow'".[25] The implicit caution is that philosophy can also tend towards a dogmatic schema governing "the excitations of images". However, if movement and not its predictability is to be the concern, then the mechanisms of a reduction to an even flow (in the service of a narrative) should not be too quickly assumed and a certain resistance to the dogmatic schema becomes necessary. A return to the working explication of images, now armed with Deleuze's concepts (including those related to the time-image) will be demonstrated in relation to *High Noon* in the next chapter. The opening of the film presents a complex and sustained interplay of perception and affection images, not possible in a dogmatic model based strictly on processes of the sensory-motor system.

The project of *The Brain is the Screen* becomes one of renegotiated classification in which the cinematic image is approached in a spirit of deterritorialization and reterritorialization brought about by the time-image and, in the process, gaps, interstices and intervals are recognised and explored. It is an approach that is taken as warranted by Deleuze: "Broadly construed, movement-images are actualized under the conditions of normal perception, and this is what concerns Deleuze — not the lack of perfection but the regularity, the way thought evolves, settling into fixed norms and conventions".[26] The unsettling of fixed norms invites new assemblages, and this collection maps macro scales of assemblage, and in doing so necessarily backgrounds a detailed sense of the circuitry of images — without ignoring the employment of images — necessary to account for local movement.

The second collection, *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, extends the philosophical project, but in a different way and with an interest less in orientation and more in addressing the big

[24] Jean-Clet Martin, "Of Images and Worlds: Toward a Geology of Cinema"; Gregg Lambert "Cinema and the Outside"; Éric Alliez, "Midday, Midnight: The Emergence of Cine-Thinking", in Flaxman, *The Brain is the Screen.*

[25] Flaxman, *The Brain is the Screen*, 21.

[26] Ibid., 20.

philosophical questions of belief in the world, time, and ethics. David Rodowick sees the questions in both narrow philosophical terms of timeless issues and broader interdisciplinary concerns: "Moreover, it was important to me that the continually renewed life of Deleuze's cinema books be accounted for, not just in the light of contemporary film studies and world cinema, but also in the contexts of philosophy, literature, the history of art, and the history of science".[27] The shift, commensurate with the interest in philosophy, is to the time-image — "Image or Time? The Thought of the Outside in *The Time-image*", "What does Time Express?"[28] — and when attention turns to the movement-image, it is more nuanced than is often the case (less an object of categorisation). For example, James Chandler presents a separation of the affection-image from its usual setting between perception and action in the sensory-motor model: arguing for "the congruence of the affection-image and the movement-image".[29] In other words, Chandler recognises that the affection-image does more work than it is usually given credit for, and certainly more than what Chandler describes as inhabiting the interval between perception and action: the affection-image becomes the rationale for the movement-image. The affection image "transforms *this very process* [of movement from perception and to action] into a movement of expression, which might be called a different order of movement".[30]

Similarly, in terms of appropriation and redefinition of concepts, Ian Buchanan's speculative "Is a Schizoanalysis of Cinema possible?" poses the question (that he will answer in the next collection) of the use of a concept co-opted from outside of the cinema context. Elsewhere in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, speculative ways of working with Deleuze are surveyed in three sections "Becomings", "Experiments" and "Futures". The shift here is to a restlessness with potential: a sense of *where are we going with this?* and *where is it possible to go?* There is a readiness to build new assemblages and while there is no indexed mention of assemblage, Buchanan pre-empts it with schizoanalysis and the tenor of the collection — a seeking new connections and orientations — exemplifies it.[31] There is a searching for an articulation of forces

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[27] Rodowick, *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, xiv. It is not without its irony that we are still seeking a return to film studies and (with *Deleuze and Film*) to world cinema, and it is hard to avoid the observation that Rodowick overplayed their uptake of Deleuze.

[28] The focus on time in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's* Film is clear from titles: Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, "Image or Time? The Thought of the Outside in *The Time-image*"; D N Rodowick, "What does Time Express?" and "The World, Time"; Melinda Szaloky, "Mutual Images: Reflections of Kant in Deleuze's Transcendental Cinema of Time"; John Rajchman "Deleuze's Time, or How the Cinematic Changes Our Idea of Art".

[29] James Chandler, "The Affection-Image and the Movement-Image" in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film,* ed. D N Rodowick, *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy,* 253.

[30] Ibid., 246. [Emphasis in the original.]

[31] A note on schizoanalysis is necessary. At times, schizoanalysis is used in ways very close to assemblage. It relies on notion of assemblage and implicates a process of building alternative assemblages. As such it is purposeful: schizoanalysis's first job is to destroy an existing assemblage and then to rebuild according to a different logic or system of connections. But schizoanalysis departs from assemblage in that the "analysis" in the term is a tool that is a corrective of other analytical tools and molar assemblages

that hold a cinematic idea, notion or practice together (a very approximate definition of assemblage). In arguing for a schizoanalysis of cinema Buchanan is putting the cat among the pigeons. It will no longer be possible to simply assume movement (since schizoanalysis is concerned with the movement and channelling of flows of desire), nor will it be enough to be selective about Deleuzian concepts: "in order to engage with cinema as a whole we need to take Deleuze as a whole".[32]

Buchanan observes, elsewhere, that Deleuze's project should be considered as both completed and available: "Deleuze's work must then be treated as an arrow that has hit its target and now waits to be fired once more from a newly strung bow".[33] There is a certain canniness in identifying Deleuze's work as the arrow and not the bow, the launcher. The dynamic point of the metaphor is that Deleuze's work exists in its use and purpose. That does not resolve the tensions between analytical engagement and philosophical thought or between paradigmatic concerns and singular images, but recognises a relation between them *in situ*, that sees the movement-image as *both* image and concept: "[Concepts] are 'exactly like sounds, colours, or images, they are intensities which either suit you or don't, which work or don't.' Concepts are images of thought".[34] Because concepts arise from concrete circumstance, any attempt to apply them becomes redundant. They are already applied.

The "arrow waiting to be fired" suggests a potential for reapplication of Deleuzian concepts without losing their philosophical definition, coherence, and complexity. Perhaps that is why most academic scholarship in Deleuze's name returns the reader to philosophy or to Deleuze, rather than to the film: the impression is that one needs to be cautious and clear in employing Deleuze's concepts so there is still some way to go before film analysis, grounded in movement as a cinematic fundamental, can attain some measured distance from overtly philosophical work. On the other

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(Marxism, Freud, Lacan, Capitalism, molarities). Buchanan described schizoanalysis for cinema as a rereading of Deleuze's other works alongside the *Cinema* books and "we also aim to overturn the misguided and largely self-imposed injunction against interpretation that Deleuzians everywhere seem to feel they must uphold regardless of the fact that there is no basis whatsoever in Deleuze's work to support it". (Buchanan, *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*, 14.) Schizoanalysis is not of overt interest for our Deleuzian cineaste, because it is necessarily heavily theoretical. Schizoanalysis seems to be a particular, deliberate and often political (in broad and narrow senses) usage of assemblage and so in some ways a subset of it. But it is also that the disruption that schizoanalysis seeks can be achieved without its discourse: Guattari discussed his involvement in a radio project: "We don't necessarily need to create a discourse on schizoanalysis; it's enough to make free radio". (Guattari, *Machinic Eros: Writings on Japan*, 29.) The essential point is that schizoanalysis is a complex notion that relies on highly specialised terms such as body-without-organs, becoming, desire, and Oedipalisation. *Assemblage* can be taken to accommodate them where necessary without requiring them and so presents as more useful as a general application of Deleuze is sought.

[32] Buchanan, *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*, 4.

[33] Ian Buchanan, *A Deleuzian Century?* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 2.

[34] Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, "Translators' Introduction" in *Cinema 1,* xi. Internal quotation: Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (New York: Columbia University, 1987), 4.

hand, Deleuze himself, invokes a range of philosophical sources as he needs them, and often uses them in idiosyncratic ways, even as hostile and provocative readings,[35] and so specialisation is required to appreciate approaches — as well as some sympathy with Deleuze's aims — but analysis hardly needs to carry Deleuze's name if concepts are used in the sense that they "either work or don't".[36]

The cinematic concepts have a place in terms not of external fields, but of the work they do. Even the action-image as the seeming unproblematic anchor of the movement-image is open to re-evaluation: "It may be the case that every auteur constructs their action-image in their own way".[37] *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema* (the third collection) is, par excellence, a return to Deleuze, but to a different take:

> I am not suggesting we need to abandon the philosophical approach to cinema Deleuze advocates, but I am saying it needs to be supplemented by analysis — a schizoanalysis — of the dimensions of cinema that do not pertain to the production of ideas, namely those that pertain to desire and to interest, and this, I want to argue, is the signal advantage of a schizoanalysis of cinema over existing forms of film analysis.[38]

The "whole Deleuze" evokes his work outside of the *Cinema* books and especially, with Guattari, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Schizoanalysis is a strand that can be tracked through the four collections but finds full expression in *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*.[39] A critical reassessment of the *Cinema* books is invited as part of a radical approach to analysis: "We need to set aside the idea that desire has an intrinsic script it is supposed to follow and that all pathologies

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[35] For example, Deleuze's *bastardisation* of the source: "My book on Kant was something else. I like it, I wrote it as a book on an enemy . . . what really helped me to come off at that time was, I believe, to view the history of philosophy as a screwing process (*enculage* [also translatable as sodomy]) or, what amounts to the same thing, an immaculate conception. I would imagine myself approaching an author from behind, and making him a child, who would indeed be his and would nonetheless, be monstrous. That the child would be his was very important because the author has to say, in fact everything I made him say". Gilles Deleuze, "I Have Nothing to Admit", *Semiotext(E)* no. 3 (1977), n.p. Anna Powell observed that Deleuze himself is not immune from such "buggery", "when we use Deleuzian concepts as a way into the kind of mainstream cinema he actually rejects". Anna Powell, "The Daemons of Unplumbed Space: Mixing the Planes in *Hellboy*", in *Deleuze and Film*, 188.

[36] After all, the field of conventional formalism is not customarily called "Bordwellian analysis", even if there might be reason to want to do so.

[37] Buchanan, *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*, 6. Even if, as Buchanan continues ". . . but the end result is nonetheless still yet another action-image, each repetition a little more banal that the previous". (6) The point is, for analysis, a choice to focus on idiosyncratic construction of the action-image or on its image-type and Flaxman's "dogmatic schema".

[38] Ibid., 12.

[39] in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film,* Buchanan floats the idea ("Is a Schizoanalysis of Cinema Possible", 135-156) and co-editor of *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema,* Patricia MacCormack, follows with "Cinemasochism: Spectatorship as Unthought" 157-176, which in effect establishes conditions of passive (masochistic) spectatorship that schizoanalysis targets. Following *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*, *Deleuze and Film* treats schizoanalysis as an established methodology that warrants more deliberate use of component and related concepts such as body-without-organs, becoming, non-Oedipal desire, and powers of the false to give schizoanalysis precision and to make it a sharper analytical tool.

can be attributed to a failure to adhere to its dictates".[40] An outcome of attention on the channelling of desire and interest — inherent to schizoanalysis and sidestepping psychoanalytical approaches — is the generation of a string of other concepts providing (schizo)analytical templates for film analysis: "cinema of the brain", "delirium cinema" and "an ethics of spectatorship", with their attention on images of the face, disorientation, and spectacle.[41] Schizoanalysis provides a move beyond philosophical and cinematic dogma and, as an outcome, a more critical approach to the application of Deleuze is established and finds more localised use in the fourth collection.

Deleuze and Film, most recent of the representative group, demands more sustained attention because it represents a shift to the individual film, rather than to paradigmatic concerns of cinema, flagged by the fact that half the titles in the collection name particular films and the rest reconsider genre in terms of specific films. The collection begins with recognition of the concern for the Deleuzian cineaste: the film at hand, the one in front of him or her, which, for one reason or another, begs a response. With its emphasis on contextualisation of film analysis, critical approaches to concepts, and productive rhizomatic connections between works, *Deleuze and Film* offers itself, very nearly, as a "democratisation" of scholarly research and as validation and antecedence for the Deleuzian cineaste.

The welcome return to the film is partial because it is equally a return to Deleuze and his concepts that would preclude a general reader. What it does offer general analysis is an important reflexivity that marks *Deleuze and Film* as the development of a mature film analysis and that provides the foundation for *assuming* Deleuze in film analysis: that is, a displacement of a study *of* Deleuze by attention to concepts (made possible *by* Deleuze) is provided. "[M]any of the routes into Deleuze's filmphilosophy on offer here develop upon existing lines of flight that individual authors are pursuing in their independent research. However, as befits the newer generations, *Deleuze and Film* also offers novel interpretations of and approaches to Deleuze".[42] The novelty is not playful, but critical. Deleuzian concepts are approached critically, firstly, in terms of cultural and contextual positioning, and, secondly, in terms of a revision of the use of Deleuze's cinematic concepts.

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[40] Buchanan, *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*, 13.

[41] Gregg Lambert, "Schizoanalysis and the Cinema of the Brain"; Patricia Pisters, "Delirium Cinema or Machines of the Invisible"; Patricia MacCormack, "An Ethics of Spectatorship: Love, Death and Cinema" in *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema,* ed. Buchanan and MacCormack.

[42] Martin-Jones and Brown, *Deleuze and Film*, 3. It depends how a generation is measured. Martin-Jones and Brown see the generations in terms of publication: firstly, early interpretations of Shaviro and Rodowick; secondly, individual works of sustained argument and scholarship; and thirdly, consolidation in edited collections and journal articles that explore contextual and critical approaches and develop a sense of conversation.

Deleuze and Film is deliberate in its use and retooling of Deleuze's terms so that *schizoanalysis* and *assemblage* are not used broadly as organising concepts; instead, specific schizoanalytical concepts like the body-without-organs, nomadism, deterritorialization, and becoming-other are employed with the sense that these are terms in scholarly parlance. They generate a number of new concepts and hybrids that return attention to the film, often as redefinitions of genres or the creation of new genres — for example, quasi-interfaces, immanent virtuality, digital human assemblage — rather than to film philosophy or to Deleuze. Accordingly, there are analytical assignments that emerge in Amy Herzog's appreciation of popular genre through (Deleuze's notion of) symptomology and, with David Deamer, in a moderation of the perceived and celebrated gulf between the movement-image and the time-image.[43]

Assumptions about the key organising concepts themselves are called into question: "the movement-image/time-image binary is repeatedly unsettled".[44] Images and concepts are not positioned so much in terms of the two regimes of movement and time (the two *Cinema* books). Consequently, for example, the action-image is less exclusively described in terms of physical movement, and more in terms of motivated movement with interest in "the ideological role of the movement image" and "the ethical [action] image".[45] The important conclusion is that "The movement-image can be the grounds for original thought as much as time-image films"[46] (a tenet of this thesis), and the time-image, itself, becomes less the iconoclast waving the flag of modernism.

On the one hand, Martin-Jones suggests that the time-image has been devalued, and appropriated and normalised as something approaching a public relations tool in the South Korean film, *Traces of Love*.[47] On the other hand, it thereby becomes liberated from the specificity of being understood only as a product of the disruptions of post-World War Two. Other dislocations are recognised as defining modernist film: "the time-images in this film are more usefully seen as negotiating the nation's experience of the traumas of compressed modernity than as symptomatic of a global shift in the conception of time occurring around the second world war".[48] This does not detract from the

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[43] For example, in Deamer's, "An Imprint of *Godzilla*: Deleuze, the Action-image and Universal History" (18-36) and Herzog's "Fictions of the Imagination: Habit, Genre and the Powers of the False", (137-154).

[44] Martin-Jones and Brown, "Introduction: Deleuze's World Tour of Cinema", in *Deleuze and Film,* 15.

[45] Damian Sutton, "Philosophy, Politics and Homage in *Tears of the Black Tiger*", in *Deleuze and Film*, 43, 49.

[46] William Brown, "'There are as many paths to the time-image as there are films in the world': Deleuze and the Lizard", in *Deleuze and Film*, 101.

[47] "… *Traces of Love* actually demonstrates how national cinemas deploy time-images to engage with national history and simultaneously to gain international appeal, in this case by very deliberately promoting the nation as a tourist destination". David Martin-Jones, "Time-Images in *Traces of Love*: Repackaging South Korea's Traumatic National History for Tourism", in *Deleuze and Film*, 69.

[48] Ibid., 69.

function of the time-image as exposing the *image as image*, (a returning of the image *to* the image) but the point remains that it is experienced and understood in local conditions, and not necessarily with shared cultural assumptions between the filmmaker and the (western) viewer.

Reassessments of both context and concepts underscore the point that concepts work *in situ.* The movement-image is determined usually in terms of how component images signify and carry significance through a typical transition between perception, affection, and action. (See Chapter 3). Since this is a model, and variation is to be anticipated, the image types (subsets of both the movement-image and the time-image) are only really useful when they describe transitions in particular films and so advice on their application is offered. David Deamer asserts that "the first task of Deleuzian exploration of cinema can be to designate the dominant sign of the film".[49] Markos Hadjioannou urges analysis to "unhinge the cinematic image from the reign of indexicality . . . Whereas indexicality is based strictly on the premise of an invitation to 'look here' and 'see this', Deleuze's time-image is part of a regime to 'look here, *and* see what is missing".[50] Damian Sutton's "The character is permeated by the situation in which they find themselves, and bursts out from it" invites notions of assemblage and lines of flight to grasp how permeation is effected and escaped.[51]

The methodological steps take us back to the film in which cinematic concepts either apply or don't. "Film criticism faces twin dangers: it shouldn't just describe films but nor should it apply to them concepts taken outside of film".[52] Deleuze does not often make statements about film criticism (what has been understood, here, as *the analysis of particular films*) though he employs criticism extensively in his *Cinema* books.[53] The relation with external concepts needs clarification because on the face of it his taxonomy (the generation of which has been essentially philosophical and cinematic) is inherently "concepts taken outside of film" when "film" is read as *the* film, not the field. In *Deleuze and Film*, recognition of cultural settings is an important step in sustaining engagement with a film, resisting the antiseptic space of the philosophical example or the utility of a film in providing examples for other discourses. In his advice to philosopher, Jean-Clet Martin, Deleuze is unequivocal about the valuing of concrete circumstances:

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[49] Deamer, "An Imprint of Godzilla", 25.

[50] Markos Hadjioannou, "In Search of Lost Reality: Waltzing with Bashir", 108.

[51] Sutton, "Philosophy, Politics and Homage in *Tears of the Black Tiger*", 46.

[52] Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 57.

[53] Deleuze relies heavily on critics/theorists from *Cahiers du Cinéma* such as André Bazin, Jacques Rivette, Jean-Luc Godard, François Truffaut, *et al*, and other theorists like Jean Mitry. In director monographs, directors theorising their own works are partly what gives the *Cinema* books depth and authority from the point of view of cinema analysis.

I have only one thing to tell you: stick to the concrete, and always return to it . . . the more gifted a philosopher is, I believe, the more he or she tends to leave the concrete behind, at least in the beginning. Resist this tendency, at least from time to time, just long enough to come back to perceptions, to affects, which will redouble your concepts.[54]

The advice to Martin resonates with comments about Deleuze's own film viewing: "I'm what you would call a naïve moviegoer. I'm especially hostile to the notion of different levels . . . Every image is literal and must be taken literally".[55] *Deleuze and Film*'s turn to Asian cinema demonstrates such a literal approach to images and resonates with Laura Marks' haptic analysis that arose not from a desire to propagate concepts but in response to images that Marks observed had "quite specific reasons for appealing to the knowledge of the senses, insofar as it aims to represent configurations of sense perception different from those of modern Euro-American societies, where optical visuality has been accorded a unique supremacy".[56] Any anxiety about the applicability of concepts to other than exceptional and canonical films, which for Deleuze escape hierarchies of judgment, is displaced in favour of the sense that there is something to be discovered or resolved in a film, rather than explained, and one can do so armed with Deleuze's concepts as cinematic fundamentals that are generally applicable, not criteria for evaluating arthouse cinema.

In Richard Rushton's terms, "the aim of a Deleuzian analysis should be carefully to chart the traits, aspects, and components of the images and how they 'work'".[57] It is no less true for conventional analysis. The difference turns on the nature of the image and of assemblages. For conventional analysis the image is essentially visual, complete and discoverable in relation to an external world; for Deleuze the image is essentially moving, conditional and radically relational. The means by which we do Rushton's charting and account for the working is not encapsulated in a clear methodology, but more in a repertoire of approaches designed to be responsive.

As will be considered in Chapter 3, when Deleuze refers to the movement-image variously as concept, image, shot and sign, he is not courting an ontological essential; rather he is allowing a repertoire, the usefulness of which will be determined by the case at hand. It is within the definition of the movement-image to see the (synonymous) shot as process, concrete image, and conceptual

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[54] Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness* (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007), 367.

[55] Ibid., 215.

[56] Laura U Marks, *The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), Kindle ed. Loc 139. [Preface]

[57] Richard Rushton, "The Rebirth of the World: Cinema According to Baz Luhrmann", in *Deleuze and Film*, 86.

movement. It is not that definitive concepts are offered that find application, but concepts find definition *through* their application. It is in this sense that it is appropriate to speak of applying Deleuze and it is the application of various processes more than confidence and certainty in the products. From a Deleuzian perspective, what would be the point of an analysis where certainty was celebrated and the aim was to describe what was already understood?

To be clear, accountability and complexity in both language and concepts is to be expected and welcomed in scholarly analysis of Deleuze and his philosophy in relation to cinema. That might be the end of it, except that Deleuze offers analysis based on *movement* that, if it is fundamental to film, should be available to anyone undertaking film analysis, whether or not movement is also conceived as a philosophical problem.

Even in the examples considered in *Deleuze and Film,* where the return is more to the film, the return is equally to Deleuze and so to philosophy. Given the title it would be churlish to suggest that this is misplaced. Instead, what is being recognised is that there is room for the Deleuzian cineaste, whose approach is profoundly shaped by Deleuze's ideas, but who is not driven to return again and again to Deleuze's concepts as if they were always being respectfully borrowed. The relative complexity of Deleuze's concepts aside, the ultimate goal would be similar to Brian Moon's and Thomas Caldwell's handbooks (considered in the previous chapter), which are profoundly determined by Bordwell *et al* but find it sufficient to acknowledge this in the introduction, and then get on with the work of film analysis. An introduction to film analysis derived from Deleuze would signal a profound interest in how movement is motivated, channelled, and transforming.

Deleuzian modes of operation: assemblages and concepts

If ways of opening movement to critical attention are sought, assemblage presents as the best hope of providing direction because assemblage (like cinematic movement) is about patterns of relation. It is tautological that all patterns are relational, but the point here is that with Deleuze it is the relations that are exposed in order to grasp change as *shifting* patterns. Deleuze's cinematic concepts (some forty-four of them)[58] provide an inventory of kinds of relation pertinent to film. The cinematic concepts are defined in terms of relations. For example, *Movement-image*: "the acentered

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[58] David Deamer: "Ask a 'Deleuzian film philosopher' how many images or signs there are, what all the elements designate, or indeed, how the underlying framework is structured, and you are likely as not to get a shrug of the shoulders, to be told that it doesn't really matter, that such questions risk vacuous pedantry at best, that at worst you might be missing the point, that the taxonomy is a tool box from which you can select the most appropriate implement for the job at hand". Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books,* xix.

set (*ensemble*) of variable elements which act and react on each other".[59] In *Cinema 2,* concepts do not exactly describe relation, as much as indicate particular elements or points between which a relation emerges: *Crystal-image or Hyalosign*: "the uniting of an actual image and a virtual image to the point where they can no longer be distinguished".[60] Relation is explicitly part of the language of the *Cinema* books: there are 670 direct uses of and references to "relation" (including "relative" and "relate") in the 594 pages of the *Cinema* books.

Even isolated images are understood to have two relational dimensions: "The two components of the movement-image are found in what happens *between* parts or objects, and in what expresses the duration of a whole or a sum, that which might be indeed the world in the field of the image".[61] The "field of the image" promotes the idea of the image itself as an assemblage, or as a potential assemblage, formed from relations between parts and with the whole. More importantly, it provides a prompt to reconsider what we mean by image. It should be remembered that when, presently, we are exploring image and assemblage it is in order to get some purchase on movement. So habitual is the tendency to regard the image in terms of a visual picture (to which sound is added) it becomes necessary to check what we mean by image. Image becomes a way of delimiting material and analysis:

> Thinking, thinking cinema, can thus begin or end with the image. And the image — for Deleuze — is scalar, something fractal: a frame, shot, sequence, movie, or cycle of films (expressing an event, an idea of a director, cinematographer, actor or actors, a genre, theme, story, questions, problems, and so on).[62]

The static image is displaced from analytical centrality in favour of a tendency toward unity that, as Deamer asserts, is the beginning or end of research. The point of the term "fractal" is to recognise that the same cinematic idea is present and accessible at any level of analysis. Certainly, the image is available as conventional formalism's static frame, but it is not limited to it; at least one would want to consider what has gone on between one static frame and another. With the frame and any other determinations of the image suggested by Deamer, the question is what makes identified elements cohere as an image and how that feeds or determines analysis. The key question is *What work is the image doing?* And for analysis: *What work would one want the image to be doing?* The

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[59] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 217.

[60] Deleuze, *Cinema 2,* 335.

[61] Tom Conley "Movement-image" in *The Deleuze Dictionary,* 179.

[62] Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books,* 177.

designation of the dominant image of a film or a shot, then, provides the start of an analytical determination of how the sign captures, creates, orients, etc.

That the image itself is a matter of a coherence invites grasping it as an assemblage, but it is a notion dogged by a slippage between notions of assemblage-as-construction and assemblage-as-arrangement, which has been part of the etymology of the term since its translation into English.[63] What seemed like useful and essential tools (image and assemblage) start to seem less clear. This is not a crisis for the Deleuzian cineaste if, rather than making binding ontological definition the concern, their uses in realising and determining movement become the point of analysis. If a film is seen firstly in terms of situations (mobile sections), then questions of image and assemblage draw attention to *coherences* of meaning and significance facilitating certain relations. While there is no question that relations are formed in an assemblage, the contentious point is the extent to which construction is the *raison d'être* of the assemblage. Assemblage becomes a means to identify moving forces drawn into relation rather than a way of describing existent contexts or features that somehow contain or describe movement. Later in this section, more formal definitions will be considered to provide some clarity, but it is important to begin with a sense of the *spirit* of assemblage.

Félix Guattari's exchange in Japan with Butoh dancer and actor, Min Tanaka, offers an unsettling of the notion of assemblage in order to open a greater sense of clarity in its usage.[64] The interview is quoted here at some length because the point is in the nature of the exchange. It appears as a section of a longer interview, sub-headed "Assemblage".

> Guattari: By the way, I would like to present the layered structure as follows: a theatrical space that is also a world consisting of intensities of the body. As the latter sometimes collides with the former, how do we control these layers and what sanctions float within them?

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[63] "… the French word *agencement* comes from the verb *agencer*, 'to arrange, to lay out, to piece together.' The noun *agencement* thus means 'a construction, an arrangement, or a layout.' On the other hand, the English word 'assemblage,' according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, comes from the French word *assemblage* (a-sahn-blazh), not the French word *agencer*. The meaning of the English word 'assemblage' is 'the joining or union of two things' or 'a bringing or coming together". Thomas Nail, "What is an Assemblage?", *Substance* 46, no. 1 (2017), 21. This shift between the synonymous terms is also demonstrated in Brian Massumi's preference for "the more neutral" "assemblage" over "desiring machine" (an earlier synonym), "due to persistent subjectivist misunderstandings". Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 82.

[64] Common ownership between Guattari and Deleuze of the concept of assemblage is being assumed, as is conventional following *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Gary Genosko considers the linking of the two including the gently satirical "Guattareuze". Genosko observes the joint reference to the two authors as coming from a unified place. He quips "subjects do not enunciate; collective assemblages enunciate". (166). In other words, Deleuze and Guattari amount to an assemblage. Gary Genosko, "Deleuze and Guattari: Guattareuze & Co"., in *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 2021), 151-169.

Tanaka: It may take a long time to explain this point because what is determining these layers is not me but an agency outside of myself . . .

Guattari: That is exactly right. I am calling it an assemblage, which is collective. The collective assemblage does not imply the involvement of many people as it is an inhuman process. This inhuman process is a cosmic entity or a biological-hormonal history of abstract machines, and at the same time, can also be a history of rhythm that cannot be controlled by the logic of humanism.

Translator: In fact, Min's work consists precisely in detaching from this manipulative idea of assemblage.

Guattari: Beyond an individual assemblage . . .

Tanaka: It seems like a big mistake to treat something as if it were about my own event, given that an event happens outside of me [. . .] Through observing the dance, our senses themselves dance; then they are raised to the level of intelligence. A long continuation of the human/inhuman process, I think, arranges our dancing. My point is to return to the outside and surface of the body.[65]

By naming the section, in which the exchange appears, "Assemblage", in a chapter titled "Body-assemblage",[66] Guattari (or editors Gary Genosko and Jay Hetrick) is clearly offering an indirect definition. What is important is a sense of dialogue and the resistance of Tanaka to simplifications of external structures. The key objection to simple notions of assemblage, from Tanaka, is in the "as if it were about my own event, given that an event happens outside of me". He is describing movement as an experience (his dancing) that is at the same time intimate and outside, created and experienced, formal and improvised. Dance is not a display of subjective interpretation but a relation of his movement to, and through, a somewhat external or externalised form, that of dance. Tanaka's sense of being caught up in something serves as a useful rule-of-thumb definition for assemblage, which we will later see (following Buchanan) as a relation between expression and content.

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[65] Félix Guattari,"Body-Assemblage: Félix Guattari and Min Tanaka in Conversation" in *Machinic Eros: Writings on Japan, ed.* Gary Genosko and Jay Hetrick (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2015), 50-51. [Ellipses are in the original except for the ellipsis in parenthesis. More, ellipses in the original indicate interruption rather than omissions]

[66] Ibid., 45.

Guattari moves with the conversation, readjusting the expression of assemblage as he goes. He is using *his* notion of assemblage (that is, the notion he co-created) to conceptualise Tanaka's complex processes and positionings — to find links — but it is always Tanaka's practice that is afforded priority. Importantly, Tanaka and the translator understand the notion of assemblage, and want to keep its application to the situation at hand. Articulation of the notion of assemblage is born of several things: Tanaka's resistance and re-phrasings; Guattari's use of the idea of assemblage as a tool to grasp something outside of his direct experience; and the observations of Tanaka about his relation to his art form. A number of dualities set limits or identify the scope of the assemblage: body/space, in the performance; individual/collective, in agency; human/inhuman, in machines; and inside/surface, in situating an event. The assemblage, then, is presented as the articulation of relations in terms of the limits that give them identity, and the articulation involves the raising of events, experiences and relations to the level of a logic or, alternatively, investigating them to find the logic. In short, the assemblage becomes a means of delineating movement in order to investigate it without, counterproductively, immobilising it.

If there is a certain porousness or negotiability in the definitional limits of an assemblage there are, at the same time, boundaries that contain an assemblage. That boundaries are important can be seen in the defence of them: the translator's interjection; Guattari's return to his articulation of assemblage; and Tanaka's deferrals ("It may take a long time to explain"; "it seems like a big mistake"). However contradictory it might seem, the boundaries and limits are not there to contain, but to enable in particular ways.

Claire Colebrook recognises this dynamic sense of enabling to be at the core of Deleuze's analytical processes:

> Deleuze's philosophical commitment [is] to understanding what something is, not by looking at its common, repeatable or usual manifestations — the general — but by asking what something *might be* if its tendencies were pushed to the extreme. Thus, we understand cinema not by looking at what films are usually like, but by asking what it is that cinema *can do,* the cinematic powers that are different from novels or scientific treatises.[67]

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[67] Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2006), 127.

Tanaka is pushing dance to the extreme when he observes "I dance not in the place, but I dance the place".[68] He is proposing what dance can do, advancing notions of being inspired by and celebrating place. Tanaka's approach to dance is echoed in the indigenous dance of other cultures, in which a dynamic sense of place becomes assemblage, as a way of both expressing relations and keeping them fluid: the difficulty is in directly articulating them (so one dances them or paints them or evokes them through film). While Colebrook is not discussing assemblages directly, an assemblage has forward motion and divergence that, rather than being understood as a continuation of series, is understood in terms of the realisation and identification of potentials through movement. Tanaka brings into play the difference between articulation and enunciation as, more accurately, Guattari's "assemblage of enunciation". Tanaka's dance is the enunciation, determining a particular confluence of forces, concepts, events. It then requires articulation (description, expression) if it is going to be opened to analysis, that is, it requires that language takes over, but should remain mindful of the sense of enunciation:

> Enunciation is like the conductor who sometimes accepts his loss of control of the members of the orchestra: at certain moments, it is the pleasure of articulation or rhythm . . . A good conductor will not attempt despotically to overcode all the parts on the score, but will be looking for the collective crossing of the threshold at which the aesthetic object designated by the name at the top of the score is attained. "That's it! You've got it!" Tempo, accents, phrasing, the balancing of parts, harmonies, rhythms and timbres: everything conspires in the reinvention of the work and its propulsion towards new orbits of deterritorialized sensibility.[69]

The collective crossing of the threshold might be explained in terms of the elements listed, but they will not account for it; the assemblage is not the sum of its elements. What is of interest is the recognition of a cohesive relationship between elements, with the sense that conditions can be provided, but the realisation, the enunciation of the assemblage, works because it works. But this has little to do with fleeting moments as if assemblages were matters of chance. The assemblage is neither prior nor an outcome; it is not constructed. It is a question of relations to the point that Buchanan can claim, "I would even go so far as to say the assemblage does not have any content, it

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[68] Min Tanaka and Alanna Heiss "Conversation", "映画 HOKUSAI | Min Tanaka - Rin Ishihara - Madada Official Web Site", September 2007, http://www.min-tanaka.com/wp/?page_id=900.

[69] Félix Guattari, *Schizoanalytical Cartographies* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) 210.

is a purely formal arrangement or ordering that functions as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion . . . It does not consist of relations; rather, it *is* a relation, but of a very particular type".[70]

For Deleuze, the essential relations of assemblages are the business of cinema: "what interests [Alfred Hitchcock] is the problem and the paradoxes of relation. The frame for him is like a tapestry frame: it holds within it the networks of relations, while the action is just a thread moving in and out of the network".[71] This takes Deleuze to identifying mental images in Hitchcock and a "movement beyond the action image to something deeper. Mental relations, a kind of vision"[72] or raising relations "to a level of intelligence", to recall Tanaka. This starts to get to the idea of an enunciation of assemblage. It is hard to avoid the platitude that film analysis is about cinematic thinking, but it is not a descriptive thinking *about,* rather it is a facility *with* thinking and its generative potential. It is also a restless thinking that seeks inventive and fresh outcomes, not as a goal, but as an inevitability of a new correlation of forces:

> An assemblage transpires as a set of forces coalesces together . . . An assemblage emerges when a function emerges; ideally it is innovative and productive. The result of a productive assemblage is a new means of expression, a new territorial/spatial organisation, a new institution, new behaviour, or a new realisation. The assemblage is destined to produce a new reality, by making numerous, often unexpected connections. [73]

For Graham Livesey, then, a dynamism is essential in a continuing process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization for which "transpiring" and "coalescing" suggest conditional and emergent outcomes — provided, however and crucially, that they are rooted to a particular purpose ("when a function emerges"). Thomas Kuhn's description of emergent paradigms as not assuming sources,

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[70] Ian Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory, or, the Future of an Illusion", *Deleuze Studies* 11, no. 3 (2017), 465. Buchanan's defence of relations of a very particular type, is presented in opposition to a constructivist *Assemblage Theory* by Manuel DeLanda that tends to impute structural elements to relations and so give the assemblage a certain physicality in terms of its boundaries. DeLanda, in his introduction, outlines an approach to assemblage that includes "strata" and "assemblages within assemblages": "using strata and assemblages as distinct categories allows one to stress their very important differences, even if it complicates the discussion of their mutual transformations. The other change, conceiving of the components of an assemblage as themselves assemblages, is also harmless, as is the idea that the environment of an assemblage is itself an assemblage" Manuel DeLanda, *Assemblage Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016). Kindle ed. Loc. 224 ["Introduction"]. Buchanan criticises *Assemblage Theory* mostly because of its constructivist interpretation of assemblage: "First, the assemblage does not constitute a part-whole relation; second, the assemblage is not the product of an accumulation of individual acts; and third, the assemblage does not change incrementally". Ian Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents", 388.

[71] Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972-1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 54.

[72] Ibid., 55.

[73] Graham Livesey, "Assemblage" in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 18-19.

but as having to work from first principles, seems to be appropriate here.[74] The difference with assemblage is that, if it is emergent (that is to say fundamentally concerned with conceptual and physical movement), it is not a transitional state in which, according to the Kuhnian drama, the emergent paradigm will build critical mass and challenge the hegemonic paradigm to become the dominant paradigm. This play of molarities is itself directly undercut by Deleuzian notions of nomad, schizoanalysis, lines of flight and rhizomatic connections, and it is regard for them that would be a compass of the Deleuzian cineaste (albeit a counterintuitive compass that draws the map as it orientates it.)

Were there an intention to form and consolidate a paradigm, an essential playfulness, a picking up of loose potentials or the following of an instinct or reaction — things that often provide lines of flight and starting points for analysis (and new assemblages) — would be devalued. Nevertheless, in analytical terms, a paradigm challenge *is* presented, and it comes exactly from seeking articulations of relation and change (movement) and, from them, grasping and exposing, rather than assuming, a certain coherence. It is not that analysis is condemned to be chasing ineffability. Outcomes of assemblages are real. Buchanan identifies content and expression as approaches to assemblages, and makes clear the distinction between form of content and form of expression (both feed into the assemblage's enunciation):

> In practice, the assemblage is the productive intersection of a *form of content* (actions, bodies and things) and a *form of expression* (affects, words and ideas). The form of content and the form of expression are independent of each other — their relationship is one of reciprocal presupposition (one implies and demands the other but does not cause or refer to it, for example a sunset is an array of colours produced by the diffraction of light, but this does not cause us to see it as beautiful or melancholic . . .)[75]

What moves us in the sunset is the experience or realisation, the "enunciation of assemblage". Buchanan's determination of the assemblage as "structured and structuring"[76] invites investigation of what is structured in certain ways (form) and how and why — or the means by which — they are structured and continue to structure (expression).

[74] Thomas S Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[75] Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents", 390. [Emphasis added.]

[76] Ibid., 463.

Buchanan's preclusion of assemblage as a constructivist model suggests two things. Firstly, content might be constructed in certain ways and expression is necessarily structured in certain other ways, but the relation between them should not be assumed in analysis. The expressive form takes on a crucial function when Deleuze observes that "language is the only thing that can properly be said to have structure, be it an esoteric or even non-verbal language. There is a structure of the unconscious only to the extent that the unconscious speaks and is language . . . Even things possess a structure only in so far as they maintain a silent discourse, which is the language of signs".[77] We will return to language presently.

Secondly, structure is purposeful but not fixed or pre-determined. Guattari claims that relations are working either to build or decompose assemblages: "an analytic pragmatics will have to make micropolitical choices by opting, for example, for the acceleration or deceleration of an internal mutation of assemblages for the facilitation or prevention of an inter-assemblage transition".[78] From Guattari comes a sense of the purposeful movement of (and in) assemblages, and not stability: the processes are ones of acceleration or deceleration, facilitation or prevention.

If language is the only thing that has structure and structure is purposeful, what becomes interesting — and telling as we seek to understand Deleuze's processes rather than prescribed methodologies — is Deleuze's impulse to value the interruption of language in order to provoke new structures through what has been described as a *stuttering*: "Blue-eyed boy: a boy, some blue, and eyes — an assemblage. AND . . . AND . . . AND, stammering. Empiricism is nothing other than this".[79] That does not deny or simplify complex systems but draws attention to their foundation in molecular flows and relations.

> Deleuze introduces a certain obscurity into his language — a stuttering, or in his own words, a deterritorialization of language that prevents the kind of reliance on ready-made categories of thought that inhibits true philosophical engagement . . . It cannot simply remain at the level of stuttering, but instead needs to make this stuttering the foundation of a new method.[80]

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[77] Deleuze, "How do we recognize structuralism?" in *Desert Island*, 170-171.

[78] Félix Guattari, *The Mechanic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011), 184.

[79] Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 59.

[80] Henry Somers-Hall, "Introduction" in *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze,* ed. Daniel Warren Smith and Henry Somers-Hall, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5.

The stuttering is presented as strategic: in effect, the stuttering enables lines of flight (escape). It helps to reinforce the notion that an assemblage is built firstly on associations and relations, expressed or assumed (but available), that result in certain articulations that have material consequences. That is, the articulation of the assemblage exists in its language as much as in its objects. While conventional formalism employs semiotic approaches, Deleuze's recognition of language goes beyond linguistic structures to languages of costume, film stock, lighting, etc. In opposition, Deleuze understands Christian Metz's semiotics as converting cinematic images to linguistic utterances and then applying the logic of written and verbal language, that is, the return is to a dominant *grammar* of a language *of* cinema, and away from conventions of languages of its elements (lighting, sound, editing, script).

> Substituting an utterance for the image, [Metz] can and must apply to it certain determinations which do not belong exclusively to the language system (*langue*), but condition the utterances of a language (*langage*), even if this language is not verbal and operates independently of a language system. The principle according to which linguistics is only a part of semiology is thus realized in the definition of languages without a language system (*semes*), which includes the cinema as well as the languages of gestures, clothing or music. There is therefore no reason to look for features in cinema that only belong to a language system . . . [81]

The implication for film analysis is that an assemblage will take into account the movement, interactions, and relations of the multiple languages of film. Signaletic material will be considered in the next chapter in terms of Peirce's account of signs (semiosis) and the channelling of significance rather than as the building of a language system. One might consider a film's employment of the languages of gestures, clothing or music as well as the language of lighting and the language of the camera, and so on. The assemblage of the film will bring these into relation around one or more ideas that the assemblage, as a whole, expresses: "the assemblage is the yoke, not the product of the yoke . . . the assemblage is a virtual entity with actual effects".[82]

We have observed assemblage working at a processual level, a structural level and at the level of articulation. If assemblage seems like a magic bullet for analysis, then it is worth keeping Buchanan's caution in mind: "If everything is or must be an assemblage then the term loses its

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[81] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 25.

[82] Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory, or, the Future of an Illusion", 473.

precision, indeed it loses its analytical power all together".[83] The point is not to fret over what is or is not assemblage, but to regard assemblage as an enabling. The question of *what is being or has been enabled?* is only a sensible question in terms of a concrete situation but with a sense of the movement of ideas and concepts as the virtual entities with actual effects in the images and their mutations.[84]

Assemblage provides encouragement (or direction) to forge new links. It is possible to work to create an assemblage from a single point, for example from a reaction (as we will see with del Río), at the same time that assemblage at a macro level invites considerations of what is holding a shot or film together: what is the logic, force or gravity that exerts a force on all elements of a film?

Associated concepts with assemblage are lines of flight and rhizomatic connections. The former is an escape from an assemblage that potentially feeds the production of new assemblages. The latter serves a similar purpose but through more deliberate connection between one point and another, even if "deliberate" use arises from accident, non-rational impulses or creative intentions. If the impression is that rhizomatic connection is constructive (constructivist, structuralist), it is countered by its also being adventurous and exploratory, so that a rhizomatic connection is not made for the *purpose* of construction of a machine but as the accommodation and channelling of the forces that justify and require a resultant machine in order to give the force direction and intensity.[85]

If this seems to be inviting a circular approach to a description of the Deleuzian field, it is essential because the field is described not only by its content, but also by a different way of operating from conventional formalism. To demonstrate the difference, assemblage will be considered through a return to del Río, this time as a case study. Some important things about assemblages are shown, but the intention is also to suggest a broader operation of assemblage in analysis. It is important because something of the "Deleuzian" side of the Deleuzian cineaste becomes demonstrable in the form of certain predispositions and assumptions in relation to moving (or fluid) elements of a film.

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[83] Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents", 391.

[84] To recall, Guattari "the acceleration or deceleration of an internal mutation of assemblages for the facilitation or prevention of an inter-assemblage transition". Guattari, *The Mechanic Unconscious*, 184.

[85] "It is completely insufficient to only think of the machine in technical terms; before being technical, the machine is diagrammatic (in the sense of the semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce), which is to say, inhabited by diagrams, plans, equations, etc. The Concorde, for example, is not only made of steel, aluminium, electrical wires if one only retains the weights of steel and aluminium, that does not get very far! In particular, that does not allow flight through economic space and the space of desire. Besides, and in articulation with the technical, chemical and biological machines, it is necessary to admit the existence of machines that I call semiotic or diagrammatic, of theoretical and abstract machines, not to mention economic and political machines, etc". Félix Guattari and Gary Genosko, *A Guattari Reader* Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 126.

A comment by del Río that introduces *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance* begins with a reaction that provides a line of flight (or escape)[86] as a means of breaking away from routine responses. It provides a starting point for an analytical model and helps to demonstrate the Deleuzian field as divergent. Referring to a particular scene in *Written on the Wind*[87] in which Dorothy Malone's character, Marylee, is dancing, del Río writes:

> Each time I watch, I am moved and affected in my body and in my senses. The Oedipal significance of the scene will surface later, or it may have been thought of countless times before. For now, I am being overtaken by a whirlwind of emotions and sensations. And the more aware I become of their difference from rational language, the more compelled I feel to describe them. It is moments like this that inspire me to write about moving images that have an unlimited capacity to move us.[88]

For del Río, it was not a matter of close reading, nor of accounting for production elements that provoked analysis, but a visceral response to the film. It is too easy to dismiss Marylee as a stereotype of a "loose woman"[89] and del Río finds in her a sense of life that is not available to the other major characters. Del Río uses a scene to begin her analysis, in which Marylee is dancing alone but with a framed photograph of Mitch (Rock Hudson's character) to loud music in her bedroom. The sequence shows, in the privacy of Marylee's bedroom, what had been on display publicly at a party downstairs in an earlier scene: abandonment and enjoyment. At the party, Marylee danced *through* any embarrassment at other characters' unstated judgement; she dances with one partner then another. Mitch has rejected her continually (previously in the movie, and also here explicitly in his wooden, soulless dancing) and Marylee gives up on him at the party. She is driven by an energy that is celebratory and joyous.

This could all contribute to the movie's clumsy psychosexual overtones,[90] but del Río uses the image differently, seeing and hearing an image that is too full — of loud jazz, rich colours and

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86 "Escape" is sometimes added in brackets to suggest the dynamism that it is not a flight of fancy but a point of departure initiated by an aberrance, the seed of a new direction, a point of friction, or a new possibility or potential.

87 Douglas Sirk, *Written on the Wind*, film, (USA: Universal Studios, 1956).

88 Elena del Río, *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), Kindle ed. Loc.204. [Introduction].

89 In the IMDb synopses, Marylee is described in the following ways: easy woman, jealous, wild, free spirited, nymphomaniac, self-destructive. Her brother Kyle who is no less "self-destructive" is described as playboy, carousing, reckless. *Written on the Wind* (1956), IMDb, Last modified 2021, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0049966/.

90 In her bedroom, Marylee dances sensually with a photograph of Hudson's character. The scene is intercut with the father's climbing the stairs to confront Marylee and falling to his death. A link is established between Marylee's free spirit and sexuality and her father's death, visually if not exactly logically. The final shot in the movie has Marylee sitting at her late father's desk, caressing a

celebratory excess (dancing, laughing, joy in the moment) — recalling Shaviro's intrigue with the cinematic image as excessive: " [The image is an] excessive residue of being that subsists when all *should* be lacking. It is not the index of something that is missing, but the insistence of something that refuses to disappear".[91] It is precisely the case with Marylee that she and her impulses refuse to disappear.

It is not that del Río presents an understanding of an image as immediately available and meaningful, but precisely that she is interested because the image is not so. This, not a desire to explain, motivates research to seek and forge connections that are not neatly contained. Del Río has several things in play as the conditions of her asking questions about Marylee: Freudian and Oedipal significance; powerful emotional responses that do not find easy articulation; and questions of the representation of women on the screen. Nodes are set up as starting points for research, not as conclusions. For example, del Río is not seeking to prove that female characters are routinely depicted in terms of their sexuality, but to begin with it and use it and take it somewhere else.

Elsewhere, in "Feminine Energies, or the Outside of Noir" in *Deleuze and Cinema*, del Río redefines the role of the *femme fatale* and in doing so redefines the noir genre. Her article links directly to Amy Herzog's reassessment of genre: "Fictions of the Imagination: Habit, Genre and the Powers of the False".[92] In order to rethink genre movies as sites of creativity and worthy of fruitful analytical investigation, in opposition to Deleuze's general dismissal of them, Herzog begins with the claim that "framing genres in terms of the work they perform allows us to sidestep the trap of creating systems of dead categories, abstracted general forms".[93] Herzog builds not on Deleuze's antipathy for genre movies — categories that are dead both in terms of Deleuze's refusal of them and of the perception that they are clichéd and perfunctory — but on his attention to molecularities.

Herzog directs readers to Deleuze's understanding of *symptomology* in which Deleuze argues that generic categories are valid "provided we trace them to singular symptoms or signs, rather than general forms. Classification is always a symptomology".[94] Herzog recognises symptomology as

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model of an oil well tower (so blatantly phallic that it is almost parody) — with the portrait of her dead father behind her, at his desk, with the same model oil well tower in the painting (just in case with we missed the connection?).

[91] Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body*, 17. [Emphasis in the original.]

[92] Herzog, "Fictions of the Imagination: Habit, Genre and the Powers of the False", in *Deleuze and Film*, 137-154. Del Río, "Feminine Energies, or the Outside of Noir", in *Deleuze and Film*, 155-172. Herzog considers Deleuze's *symptomology*, after which del Río's article can be seen as a demonstration.

[93] 142.

[94] Deleuze cited in Herzog, "Fictions of the Imagination", 138. "[Deleuze]… makes clear that he finds a certain utility in what might appear to be traditional groupings, so long as those categories remain rooted in the materiality of that which they describe". (138)

working through del Río's performative gestures, which allow us to value expression in costumes, colour, sounds, and elements of the mise-en-scene, not in order to describe them or to determine what they mean, but in order to account for their disruptive effect ("performative deterritorialization").[95] In this way, Herzog suggests that "Del Río reads the gestures of the performative body as displacing or reorganising the narrative codes that would contain it".[96] The gestures and costume, presenting details that might be subsumed in dominant readings as narrative colour or quirky characterization, here provide the impetus for a new assemblage that is not an inevitable outcome of an accumulation of elements: the post-Oedipal noir. Once del Río demonstrates the role of the *femme fatale* in noir films in other than oedipal terms, the molar assemblage of noir is open to redefinition, or more, it requires it. In this way, analysis invites a consideration of a fairly tired (noir) genre in terms of new potentials arrived at through immersion in the film rather than critical distance. The demonstration, following Herzog, is that a criticism of Deleuze's conclusions about genre is required, but it is achieved through faithfulness to his own analytical concepts. The grounds for reconsidering the concept of genre are, in effect, established by Herzog and demonstrated by del Río.

The rhizomatic spreading of connections is complex and not always predictable but is led by a free-ranging interest that can be mapped. Del Río's article ("Feminine energies…"), without mentioning Malone's Marylee, positioned Marylee as a femme fatale even if it was not in the noir genre, and Herzog's criticism of genre supported del Río's exploration of noir. More, Herzog's article "Becoming-fluid" in Rodowick's *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy* considers dance and affective images, providing connection with del Río.[97] Rhizomatic connections are not necessarily the obvious, logical ones; serendipity becomes an analytical tool if it creates useful connections. In reading for this chapter, I had misremembered the reference to Marylee's dancing as appearing in the introduction to del Río's article "Feminine Energies, or the Outside of Noir". In actuality, I came to this example via Herzog's discussion of genre ("Habit, Genre and the Powers of the False"), which refers to del Río's memory of the shot as related in her *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance: Powers of Affection*. It was Herzog's article that made me want to seek out del Río's book and that fed back to del Río's article. There was an informal building of connections

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[95] Ibid., 141.

[96] Ibid., 151.

[97] Amy Herzog, "Becoming-Fluid: History, Corporeality, and the Musical Spectacle" in, *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy,* ed. Rodowick, 259-279. Herzog compares elements of musicals of Esther Williams with their often-ironic treatment in *The Hole* by Taiwanese director Tsai Ming-laing: "My objective in reading these works alongside one another is not to map an evolution of the musical, nor to posit Tsai as a simple corrective to the more conservative Williams-style musical. I am more interested in the ways in which these films are part of an ongoing process of de- and reterritorialization . . . My project here, then, rather than reflecting directly on Deleuze, will be an attempt to think through him, using his work on cinema and history to bring to light some of the affinities between these works". (262)

happening, for me at least, which might be taken as evidence of a successful assemblage at work, permitting slippage between sources, and opening productive connections.

Similarly, and more insistent on overt rhizomatic connections, the form of the scholarly audiovisual essay is well positioned to exploit connections and create assemblages. Adrian Martin's *Where I come from, Where I am going* and many other audiovisual essays work from idiosyncratic responses, juxtaposition, and aberrant connections that breed rhizomatic connections.[98] In *Where I come from . . .* for example, it is the remembering of a scene that was not there (with reference to a similar experience of Jacques Ranciere's)[99] and a meditation on the role of memory including an exploration of troubling, but unarticulated (until the essay) connections between music in the movies under consideration: Nicholas Ray's *They Live By Night*, and Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger's *I Know Where I'm Going*.[100] Martin finds rhizomatic connections with Ranciere, between the two movies, and between the past and present in the memories of a "younger self" juxtaposed with an experienced cinephile in the voice-over. The song works as a line of flight between the movies.

The form of the audiovisual essay turns, almost inevitably, to principles of montage and cinematically accommodate rhizomatic connections, sidelining the linearity of written argumentative prose. It is not that Martin and collaborator, Cristina Álvarez López, are explicitly working with Deleuzian methodology, but that their analysis is *in sync* with it. Martin and Álvarez López's grasp of the importance of montage for analysis is — as it is for film and in the *Cinema* books — much more creative, than functional.

> Where both these forms [the pedagogical and the overtly artistic] of the audiovisual
> essay meet is in the material they use to compose themselves: excerpts or extracts
> (sometimes very small slices) from pre-existing audiovisual works. Putting those pieces
> together to form a new work, pedagogical or poetic, is always going to be a matter
> of *montage*. Montage considered as a charged activity or practice goes well beyond, of
> course, mere, mechanical editing or simple joining end-to-end. Montage, as we all know

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[98] Adrian Martin, *Where I Come From, Where I'm Going*, audiovisual essay, 2014, https://reframe.sussex.ac.uk/audiovisualessay/reflections/intransition-1-3/adrian-martin/. The audiovisual essay and scholarly blog are significant and creative contributions to the field of academic film analysis. An important scholarly blog Catherine Grant's *Film Studies for Free*, includes a list of a cache of audiovisual essays as well as other blogs on Deleuzian scholarship: Catherine Grant, "Deleuzian Film Studies in Memory of David Vilaseca", Blog, *Film Studies for Free*, 2010, https://filmstudiesforfree.blogspot.com/2010/03/deleuzian-film-studies-in-memory-of.html.

[99] Jacques Ranciere, "The Missing Shot: The Poetics of Nicholas Ray", *Film Fables* (Oxford: Berg, 2006) 95-104.

[100] Nicholas Ray, *They Live By Night*, film, (Los Angeles: RKO Radio Pictures, 1948). Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger, *I Know Where I'm Going*, film, (Scotland: The Archers, 1945).

(at least in theory!), *makes* meaning, forges connections, creates juxtapositions.[101]

In this way, montage is engaged in assemblage-formation both for film and for analysis via the audiovisual essay, and facilitates (Deleuzian) processes described by Felicity Colman: "through the rhizome, points form assemblages, multiple journey systems associate into possibly disconnected or broken topologies; in turn such assemblages and topologies change, divide, and multiply through disparate and complex encounters and gestures".[102] The notion of encounters is particularly relevant to del Río's case, earlier, where there was a readiness to move from encounters to communities, or more accurately to provide assemblages that draw in communities.

Broadly, at least three rhizomatic mappings of assemblages relevant to analysis have been displayed so far: the academic, whose cross-references map and formalise connections through heightened accountability and precedence; the informal, that allows a free association that might expand or breach the limits of such maps; and the positioning of the researcher-as-viewer, tracking interests through a kind of participant-observer model for cinema. It is only the first that presents a limitation for the general viewer-analyser of film. The disposition of the Deleuzian cineaste is not directed (or not necessarily) to academic accountability and presentation, but to encounters that value informal observation — validating apparent mistakes, accidents and the awareness of responses that bug a viewer — as much as encounters that deliberately seek to explicate patterns of the image.

Del Río was open to an encounter with Marylee's dancing in a way that demonstrated the usefulness of assemblage articulated by Teresa Rizzo: "Applied to cinema, the concept of assemblages enables us to consider film viewing as an encounter that is embodied and open to new kinds of connections and durations that differ from our own, and new kinds of thought that challenge binary and hierarchical logic".[103] For Rizzo, the potential with film-as-assemblage is not only to think along with a film, but to engage in lines of flight and rhizomatic connection that feed creative (not simply descriptive) analysis arising from an encounter.

It is not a passive process that is being identified by Rizzo, but a fundamental shift in analysis that, despite embracing a fuzzy methodology, is nevertheless able to be articulated and enabled purposefully. "Processual" is a term employed extensively by Erin Manning and Brian Massumi to

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[101] Cristina Álvarez López and Adrian Martin, "The One and the Many: Making Sense of Montage in the Audiovisual Essay", *The Audiovisual Essay: Practice and Theory of Videographic Film and Moving Image Studies*, 2014, online, https://reframe.sussex.ac.uk/audiovisualessay/frankfurt-papers/cristina-alvarez-lopez-adrian-martin/, n.p.

[102] Felicity Colman, "Rhizome", in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 235.

[103] Teresa Rizzo, *Deleuze and Film: A Feminist Introduction*, (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012), 58.

enable and support divergent thinking and the making of new and creative connections as a deliberate goal of analysis. Adjectivally, "processual" is used by them in connection with recipes, contagions, exchanges, unfoldings, intercessions, and so on, but finds some definition in "a processual field of research-creation whose mission is to inside itself out [*sic*]. Its job is to generate outside prolongations of its activity that ripple into distant pools of potential".[104] Particular processual concepts generated in their research are, for example, research-creation, enabling restraints, speculative pragmatism, and modal location. It is not just that rhizomatic connections are encouraged, but processual concepts offer ways of keeping them available and productive and they become central as tools for enabling creative connections.

Towards a radical reflexivity

There is a sense in which the time-image and movement-image are themselves processual or enabling concepts. Components and definitions of the image-types are not as important as their providing a means of grasping a materialisation and channelling of movement without which analysis would flounder. Deleuze resists the idea that analysis exposes hidden depths. Instead, complexity comes with connections and assemblages that are never either static or stable (unless they are working hard to give that impression). Indeed, given Deleuze and Guattari's unremitting emphasis on becoming and multiplicity, one should not expect a field that is fixed or static and easily defined, but nor will it be open-ended or vague; that is the promise of assemblage. Attention is drawn to how images are working, and it is a consideration that requires an accounting for particular movement to consider why, minimally, an image goes in one direction rather than another. Unless we are able to *see* movement — see, hear, feel, experience, sustain attention — movement will only be given lip service.

For example, I am thinking at the time of writing, of *Apocalypse Now.* I recall a series of images in the opening of the film. Even if I remind myself that cinema is fundamentally about movement, I can extend some of the images to moving, but in a limited way. I do not have a sense of *accounting* for movement, but of jumping from image to image: The napalming of the jungle, the inverted image of Willard and the punching of the mirror, the meeting with officers (and I recall a young Harrison Ford), then I am with the boat on the river, Willard consulting a map, *etc*. Between each point is something I recognise (or recall) as generalised movement. It is the function of the image-

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[104] Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, *Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 151.

types in the *Cinema* books to name components of otherwise generalised movement. When I do get a sense of flow it is through The Doors' song, "This is the end", but the question of *what has moved?* — between the exploding jungle and the smashed mirror — to even begin to connect them, requires that I identify sections of movement and a layering of movement, each section and layering with distinct purposes. Questions arise. How are concepts, ideas, physical bodies and objects, editing, camera, shots, assemblages, moving? What gives them certain pace, fluidity, direction, amplification, translation and transformation? And what is there in a film to suggest otherwise and give the illusion of stasis? How does image movement become narrative flow? How does movement, once recognised, present itself as of analytical interest? These are questions for the remainder of this thesis.

An orientation has been elaborated in this chapter. Firstly, there is a need to limit or identify the scope of the interest in movement to a section, as I did above with the question of what has moved between the exploding jungle and the smashed mirror. The question can be asked between any two points in a film, and it becomes a way of making approaches to movement manageable. Secondly, it serves analysis to be wide-ranging in terms of what is moving: physical movement, camera movement, conceptual movement, movement of motifs and ideas, and the changing relation between the visuals and sound (and other images). Thirdly, if rigid methodologies are forfeited, it becomes necessary to account for analytical processes as Deleuzian analysis negotiates or employs complex concepts that even with clear definition are open to new application.

In terms considered earlier, Deleuzian film analysis is not a Kuhnian emerging paradigm, but a fully emerged paradigm with a radical and informed reflexivity at its heart. There is a particular attitude to analysis that emerges, and it is encapsulated by del Río:

> As I re-evaluate some key aspects of the noir genre, I seek neither to question the validity of previous scholarly contributions nor to manufacture confirmation of Deleuze's philosophy of cinema in the films of the noir period. Instead, I am inspired by a general Deleuzian stance also invoked by Ronald Bogue . . . which consists of cultivating a measure of scepticism towards past knowledge, and especially towards the ideas one holds most certain.[105]

This passage can be enlisted and paraphrased as a general definition of the Deleuzian cineaste as

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[105] Del Río, "Feminine Energies, or the Outside of Noir", 155.

one who re-evaluates some key aspects of film production (probably guided by conventional formalism), neither to question the validity of previous scholarly contributions nor to manufacture confirmation of Deleuze's philosophy of cinema. Instead, the Deleuzian cineaste adopts a general Deleuzian disposition, which consists of cultivating a measure of scepticism towards past knowledge, and especially towards the ideas one holds most certain.

While references to film philosophy remain in *Deleuze and Film*, they no longer justify analysis. But we are not so far removed from Deleuze that he is no longer available, if not necessarily in Powell's recalling of a spirit of buggery,[106] then at least in the spirt of Herzog's approval for leaving the nest and using Deleuze to criticise Deleuze. If our ensuing discussions of movement *could* have been approached without Deleuze, they weren't, so his concepts retain his signature. What is now called for, in del Río's terms, is the demonstrated scepticism toward past knowledge — with the weighty and unreconcilable apprehension that Deleuze is *both* the means to do so and part of the past knowledge.

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[106] To recall Powell, "Mixing the Planes in *Hellboy*", 188. "When we use Deleuzian concepts as a way into the kind of mainstream cinema he actually rejects, then we engage in the sort of 'buggery' that he himself describes when he speaks of 'taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous'" (Quoting Deleuze, *Negotiations, 6).*

CHAPTER 3

Tracking movement: image type as conduit

"We must understand cinema not as language,

but as signaletic material".

— Gilles Deleuze[1]

[1] Gilles Deleuze, Pascal Bonitzer, *et al.,* "The Brain Is the Screen: An Interview with Gilles Deleuze", in *The Brain is the Screen*, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 368.

In "Portrait of the Philosopher as Moviegoer", Deleuze provided refreshingly direct commentary on movement-images at the heart of cinema: "Every image is literal and must be taken literally. When an image is flat, you must not impart to it, even in thought, a depth that would disfigure it. What is most difficult is grasping how images are presented, in their immediacy".[2] Deleuze is warning against making an image other than what it is; if analysis is going to consider flat images, it needs to understand them as flat. How then to appreciate images as moving, in the face of the habitual tendency to fix the cinematic image? This chapter explores two assumptions about cinematic images: that images form *through* movement rather than as pre-existent images placed into movement; and, that movement occurs and images form because they (movement and images) are significant in some way, and so cinematic movement becomes a channelling of significance.

The aims of this chapter, then, are threefold. The first aim is to identify and construe the eddying, intangible aspects of images — affection, sensation, indetermination, interstice — as enablers or outcomes of movement and as fundamentally unstable. They present hurdles for the Deleuzian cineaste and to manoeuvre around them only underestimates Deleuze's project and limits analysis. Deleuze offers a way of thinking (approximate dialectics) that emphasises the movement of thought — seeking, creating and amplifying instability as one image or concept is put into relation with another. Nevertheless, it is not only the ineffable that requires explication.

The second aim is more concerned with the embodiment of movement as signaletic material finds physical manifestation and organisation in forms such as lighting, costuming, mise-en-scene, and other technical concerns. The obvious movement of bodies in space has been recognised but glossed over by Deleuze in terms of providing direct analytical tools, in favour of the other two ways of creating cinematic movement: montage and camera movement. To foreground images of physical movement, and so to find analytical advantage in mundane movement, the work of Jacques Lecoq and his Physical Theatre project will provide categories that support Deleuzian analysis.[3]

The third aim is to consider how the movement of thought is channelled in particular ways by the formation of patterns from images reacting with each other. Charles Sanders Peirce's focus on relations between images as emergent signs provides a place for thought in (not after) the image.

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[2] Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995* (Semiotext(e): South Pasadena, 2007), 215. [Originally an interview for *Le Monde*.]

[3] "Jacques Lecoq was probably the most influential theorist and teacher of what is now known as physical theatre. *Theatre of Movement and Gesture*, published in France in 1987, is the book in which Lecoq first set out his philosophy of human movement, and the way it takes expressive form in a wide range of different performance traditions". Jacques Lecoq, *The Theatre of Movement and Gesture* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), n.p. [Front matter.]

The impression, from Peirce via Deleuze, is that images feed cinematic narratives (patterns of patterns) through a fluidity in images. The sense is that, with its flows and channelling of significance, an image is a particular confluence of forces and could easily be otherwise. Approaches that value precariousness even as they *organise* analysis are of interest.

Indetermination and image type

The notion that "concepts become the means by which we move beyond experience so as to be able to think anew"[4] suggests that concepts related to movement and the movement-image should have thinking anew as their purpose. The "language" referenced in the epigraph works counter to thinking anew because it assumes a pre-existing structure or a grammar that directs thinking. For Deleuze, language is not denied, but postponed, and with it, confidence in representation as a starting point for analysis. Instead, the "signaletic material" (discussed shortly) turns attention to the material conditions of images and the formation of signs whose patterns of signification become the interest.

The epigraph, while brief, draws a clear line between Deleuzian analysis and the semiology of conventional formalism that fixes movement by taking as assured the stability of the (visual) cinematic image as sign. Images that are to be read closely adorn the pages of textbooks in glossy colour; the images are evocative, drawing the reader into the worlds of the films. The significance of each image is teased out in captions that draw attention to patterns and meanings existing just beneath the surface. There are no such images in Deleuze's *Cinema* books: "it is in fact our text alone which aspires to be an illustration of the great films, of which each of us retains to a greater or lesser extent a memory, emotion or perception".[5] Analysis of the visual image isolated from the film's flow is not the main game. However, that is not to suggest that the theorisation of the immobile visual image was of no interest to Deleuze or of no value in film analysis.

In *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze presents as the methodical author looking at works, thinking about them, thinking about what the painter has said, and what others have said. The study of Bacon is reassuring as a work of conventional scholarship (in form) because the opposite is often evident in Deleuze's oeuvre, with provocation the intention. Argument forges links

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[4] Cliff Stagoll, "Concepts", in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 54.

[5] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), xiv.

between Cezanne and Bacon and advances the concept of sensation, and paintings are appreciated in order of the simplest of Bacon's work to the most complex in terms of the concept of sensation.[6] The work on Bacon is a precursor to Deleuze's cinema project establishing concepts of hapticity, sensation, affection, cliché, indiscernibility, and "the role of black".[7]

However, while painting as a form can be problematic, its fundamentals are secure. The challenge with the *Cinema* books is that both fundamentals and the generation of new concepts are simultaneously of concern. While we know what painting is and can do, we are much less secure in understanding what *movement* employed in a creative endeavour is and can do, to the point that cinematic movement is not generally recognised as a cinematic concept. If one puts three paintings together in a triptych, the experience is of each panel continuing, contextualising, and relating to the other two.[8] The viewer is free to, and encouraged to, move between them. Put three cinematic images (shots) together through editing and a series is formed, a whole is evoked, and what was found significant in one image is passed on and transformed in the next (at a speed that resists sustained contemplation). Cinematic images exist in time. That is not to say that a meditation on the image is precluded, only that it happens at the expense of movement: "It is very odd. I have the feeling that modern philosophical conceptions of the imagination take no account of cinema: they either stress movement but lose sight of the image, or they stick to the image while losing sight of its movement".[9] The former appears in film analysis as generalised accounts of movement in discussions of plot and narrative that contextualise images. The latter is evident in the photographic nature of film that fixes images, and that Deleuze dismisses, in *Francis Bacon*, as largely "figurative" or representational.[10]

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[6] "Each of the following rubrics [chapters] considers one aspect of Bacon's paintings, in an order that moves from the simplest to the most complex. But this order is relative, and is valid only from the viewpoint of a general logic of sensation". Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), x. Chapters often centre on a concept from painting — figuration, triptych, analogy, colour — at times integrated with an emergent or pre-existing Deleuzian concept — "Painting and Sensation", "Body, Meat and Spirit, Becoming-Animal".

[7] "The role of black" is a section in Chapter 16, "Note on Color", Ibid., 101-107. It is introduced into the *Cinema* books early (Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 13) as a frame's tendencies to saturation or emptiness (both achievable through white or black frames) and then throughout black is implicated in oppositional qualities of the frame: "co-presence or application of black and white, of negative and positive, of place and obverse, of full and empty, of past and future, of brain and cosmos, of the inside and the outside". Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 215.

[8] "The triptych, in this sense, is indeed one way of going beyond 'easel' painting; the three canvasses remain separated, but they are no longer isolated; and the frame or borders of a painting no longer refer to the limitative unity of each, but to the distributive unity of the three". Deleuze, *Francis Bacon,* 60.

[9] Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972-1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 47.

[10] "[Photography] is dangerous not simply because it is figurative, but because it claims to *reign over vision*, and thus to reign over painting . . . the extraordinary work of abstract painting was necessary in order to tear modern art away from figuration". Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 7.

Deleuze situates the cinematic image between two unstable states and emphatically not as photographic images of an actual world. The first state is his account of what is going on in one's head while watching a movie: "This is a primitive language or thought, or rather an *internal monologue*, a drunken monologue, working through figures, metonymies, synecdoches, metaphors, inversions, attractions".[11] The second is the raw material of signs: signaletic material "which includes all kinds of modulation features, sensory (visual and sound), kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal, and even verbal (oral and written)".[12] The former is a precursor of organised thought and language; the latter is the precursor of the significant image, the sign. It is in the movement between thought and an image's material elements, each of which being itself already in flux, that signs and concepts form ("Concepts are images of thought").[13] In this way, the movement-image is situated at the intersection of concept, sign and image.

The prior states of drunken monologue and signaletic material — fragments without wholes and potentials without organisation — identify a state of indetermination, that defines subjectivity for Deleuze and Henri Bergson. Deleuze discusses Michelangelo Antonioni as delivering the viewer into a state of indetermination (variously, indeterminability and indiscernibility) — leaving aside for a moment that viewers are already in this state, so it is more the point that recognition of indetermination is provided.

> As for the distinction between subjective and objective, it also tends to lose its importance, to the extent that the optical situation or visual description replaces the motor action. We run in fact into a principle of indeterminability, of indiscernibility: we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, not because they are confused, but because *we do not have to know* and *there is no longer even a place from which to ask*. It is as if the real and the imaginary were running after each other, as if each was being reflected in the other, around a point of indiscernibility.[14]

[11] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 159.

[12] Ibid., 29. Rodowick understands the emphasis on signaletic material to be a criticism of Metz — "criticized by Deleuze for assuming that meaning is only linguistic meaning and for reducing the image by subtracting its most visible characteristic: movement" (6) — and as justification for a turn to Peirce: "Since Peirce's theory is a logic and not a linguistics, and since it understands signification as a process, Deleuze finds it more applicable for understanding the generation and linking of signs in movement". (6-7)

[13] Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* xi.

[14] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 7. [Emphasis added.]

Indetermination is not confusion or chaos, but a return, in terms of our discussion so far, to the two unstable states of loose thought and potential signs now existing around a centre that is taken to be no more, or less, than another image (setting up a definition of determination as a particular pattern of interference). Deleuze is pre-empting the time-image in the extract above, but the movement-image differs only in that it temporarily resolves indetermination, firstly by providing conditions that give images clear significance and then by giving significance direction and consequence — and exhaustion — in action. Arguably, the *time-image* still functions as a sign but, paradoxically, one of indeterminability. In the time-image, perception (the prerequisite for the movement-image or, indeed, any image) remains, but the sign that perception delivers is deliberately weak or incapacitated or, at the other extreme, tending towards the hallucinogenic.[15]

Conventionally and intuitively, subjectivity does the determining. However, a determining subjectivity only orders conditions that are indeterminate into action, and not into any determination that extends beyond the duration of the action. "Deleuze insists that subjectivity is not given; it is always under construction".[16] When Deleuze, following Bergson, understands subjectivity to be a centre of indetermination, the subject no longer acts in a predefined world, but it is engagement and an activity of making sense that defines the subject, and indeed, the world: "each one of us, the special image or the contingent centre, is nothing but an assemblage of three images, a consolidate [*sic*] of perception-images, action-images and affection-images".[17]

That is not to disregard the images of actuality or the physicality of the world, only their inevitability for subjectivity. There are, as Paola Marrati points out, gaps in which essential choices are necessary and so there exists an impossibility of being certain about what will happen next. Subjectivity becomes the site of a drama of signification that is essential to the affection-image.

> The gap between received movement and executed movement allows living images to choose their response and to act in the strict sense of the term. This is why Bergson calls

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[15] This is not universally agreed. Often the time-image is seen as pointing towards (Zen-like, perhaps) the ineffable, and it does, but it does so as part of a movie. The images do the pointing. The time-image is still a sign (perhaps one with a radically overblown interpretant). For all its ineffability, it is still communicated within the colour range, tonal qualities, compositional practices of other images in the film. There is no break in the viewing experience, nor confusion that we are watching a movie, and so cinematic fundamentals remain. If the affection-image is accepted as pointing to emerging internal states; the time-image might be approached as pointing to emerging external states.

[16] Constantin V. Boundas, "Subjectivity" in *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 274.

[17] Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* 66. [Parenthesis relating to translation only has been removed.]

living images "centers of indetermination": the impossibility of predicting an action coincides in this case with the possibility of creating the new.[18]

The sense is that one has choice — welcome or not, cognisant or not — that gives the world an orientation. The interval and choice to which Marrati refers is actual and, paradoxically, not necessarily conscious. Brian Massumi considers actual indetermination in terms of "the autonomy of affect", understanding affect as "a gap between *content* and *effect*".[19] He considers several clinical tests that demonstrate an actual gap between having perceived (he is not describing perception) and responding in action, quantifiable to .5 seconds — "the missing half a second"[20] — in situations where the response would normally be understood to be immediate or automatic, that is, "between the beginning of a bodily event and its completion in an outwardly directed, active expression".[21] The affection-image becomes a process whose function is to *limit* a world too full of images.

> For out of the pressing crowd [of incipiencies and tendencies] an individual action or expression *will* emerge and be registered consciously. One "wills" it to emerge, to be qualified, to take on sociolinguistic meaning, to enter linear action-reaction circuits, to become a content of one's life — by dint of inhibition.[22]

"Inhibition", as a function of the affection-image recalls Deleuze's "subtractive subjectivity" that defines perception for Marrati.[23] It might be hard then to see a distinction between affection and perception.[24] As Deleuze recognised, and as we will consider, perception is part of all images, so in a literal sense, the *perception-image* becomes "perception of perception".[25] It follows logically that there is the perception of affection, suggesting an important role for the affection-image in extending, or making explicit for cinema, the process of the missing half-second. A visual and material delimiting in the perception-image is immediately followed by an assessment in the

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[18] Paola Marrati, *Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 33.

[19] Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 24. "Autonomy of Affect" is the chapter title.

[20] Ibid., 29.

[21] Ibid., 29.

[22] Ibid., 30-31.

[23] Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* 63. Deleuze discusses the subtractive nature of perception: "We perceive the thing, minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs" (63). The notion is concisely termed "subtractive subjectivity" by Marrati. Marrati, *Gilles Deleuze, Cinema and Philosophy*, 34.

[24] Ibid., 34. " . . . the perception-image [perception as an act of exclusion of all that does not interest] is not limited to sorting; it incurves the universe around itself and gives a horizon to the world".

[25] Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* 67.

affection-image. Perception is extended into the process of answering the crucial affective question: *what's in it for me?*

The more airtime that the gap between perception and action is given by the affection-image, the more significant becomes the question of choice and the recognition of potentials; that is, the more significant the perception — the higher the stakes — the more internal processing is required. Amy Herzog indicates a value for filmmaking in sustaining the gap:

> Within each "living center" exists a potential delay between the moment of perception and the moment of action. The greater this delay or "zone of indeterminacy" becomes, the greater access the subject will have to an alternative axis of movement: that of intuition. [26]

The first sentence proposes a principle of life and is demonstrated by Massumi; the second provides more of a principle for cinema in the construction of an affection-image. The art is in the sustaining of affection: Bacon in sensation; Hitchcock in mental-images; Antonioni in shots in which nothing happens. The imperative for film analysis is to be aware of gaps (typically associated with introducing thought into the shot) through the means by which they are created for the viewer: affection-images, time-images, montage interstices. But there is a limit. The sustaining of an affection-image beyond a certain point is a powerful way of indicating a mental crisis. Antonioni's *The Passenger*, Sofia Coppola's *Somewhere,* Beckett's *Film*, and Paulo Sorrentino's *Youth*[27] are examples in which affection-images are sustained beyond their function as a fluid state between perception and movement.

An identification and mapping of affection-images through attendant questions provides a useful analytical task through which to plot the thinking in a film.[28] By asking what a character is *shown* to be thinking and considering — what questions are occupying him or her — such a map of thinking might supplement a parallel mapping of action in conventional plot descriptions. But the mapping of affection-images also highlights difficulties in working systematically with Deleuze's image-

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[26] Amy Herzog, "Images of Thought and Acts of Creation: Deleuze, Bergson, and the Question of Cinema", *In[ ]Visible Culture: An Electronic Journal for Visual Culture*, no. 3 (2000), n.p.

[27] Michelangelo Antonioni, *The Passenger* (1975); Sofia Coppola, *Somewhere* (2010); Samuel Beckett and Alan Schneider *Film* (1965); Paulo Sorrentino, *Youth* (2015). *Film* will be considered in detail later in this chapter.

[28] Certain question will expose greater specificity in the affection-image. Why that affection-image at that moment? What potentials are being considered? What is the logic or interest or momentum that determines alternative "axes of movement": the intuitive call to go one way rather than another? What is the effect of sustaining the affection-image? Not forgetting the direct question: what is a character thinking and how do we know?

types that are, in practice, not always easy to identify, with blurred boundaries and irregular sequentialities. Deleuze's model of the movement-image from perception to affection to action — which will be referred to hereafter as the *classical model* — is conceptual and provides the core of his taxonomy. In practice, it is difficult to approach a film expecting this model to hold in any but a general sense. Questioned about the centrality of the taxonomy in the *Cinema* books, Deleuze was clearly aware of a separation between the creation and application of terms, "Yes, there's nothing more fun than classifications or tables . . . It's not the essential thing, which comes next, but it's an indispensable work of preparation".[29]

The image-types seldom appear in the exact sequence that the classical model suggests. In the beginning of *High Noon*[30] (unquestionably a classical film, in Deleuze's terms), the first section of the film — the 13 minutes until Will Kane's decision to return to the town — is dominated by perception-images, but they are interspersed with affection images (or near affection-images) that do not extend to the close-up that traditionally identifies the affection-image nor do they involve a pause which often gives the affection-image prominence.

For example, Will Kane's face at his marriage is interesting to read. Far from expressing romantic feelings, his face is serious, full of doubt and unexpressed questions (and this is even before he is made aware of the immanent return of his nemesis), but his face is observed in a crowded mid-shot that includes the other characters at the wedding. This is purposeful and precise: the problem for Kane is not his own thoughts, it is other people. Similarly, as Amy flees with Kane in their carriage, she is intently reading his face. If the camera had cut to her point of view, we would have been seeing a typical affection-image. That we are seeing Kane's troubled thinking again in mid-shot and intercut with long-shots of the moving carriage, does not erode the point that the interest in the shot is as an affection-image. Close-ups in the scenes described would have over-stated the fact that Kane was thinking about his situation or given the impression that the situation was *not* the responsibility of everyone in the town.

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[29] Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen", 367.

[30] Fred Zinnemann, *High Noon*, Film, USA: Stanley Kramer Productions, 1952. *Plot summary:* The movie opens with Marshal Will Kane's wedding intercut with scenes waiting for a train to arrive (at noon). The train is carrying Frank Miller who has just been released from jail. It was Kane who sent him to jail, and his gang waits to help Miller exact revenge. Kane, with his marriage, has retired from law enforcement, in no small part because his wife, Amy, is a Quaker and opposed to violence. Kane is conflicted by a desire to protect the community from Miller's gang and, probably more importantly, because he does not want to be seen to be running away. Kane is very well regarded in the town and attempts to raise a posse, but one by one members of the community turn their backs on him until he is forced to face Miller's gang alone. The arrival of the train that sets things in motion is due at 12.00 noon and so the hour and a half (or so) until then is the real time duration of the movie.

The opening section of *High Noon* is not devoid of significant cinematic movement, but the real movement is *within* the perception-image as a movement between perception-image states: from gaseous — the railway station, the wedding, the news anticipating the arrival of antagonist Frank Miller as "purely objective in the sense of all images interacting with one another without hierarchy"; [31] to liquid — images flowing into a concentration on the spreading of the news, "it may be that the film captures an ensemble, each element of which occupies different spaces and different times, describing events which resonate between and flow into one another";[32] to the solid — each incipient plot strand intersects on Marshal Will Kane, "The privileged centre will be in every shot, centripetal and centrifugal forces operate upon this image from hub to periphery; this is the axis from which all other images spiral, to which all other images incurve".[33]

It is not that perception-images and affection-images are confused, but that they are purposefully intertwined. No character is uninvested in the perception of the situation, but none takes it through to decisive action. If clear identification of image-types is elusive, there comes an opportunity for analysis to discuss the conceptual boundaries of image-types and reasons for the blurring. One reason is that there are a number of perspectives at work: at least, Kane's, his wife's, what is happening at the station, the young deputy, and Ramirez — the owner of the hotel and previous lover of Kane (and of his nemesis). The movie is structured around them all perceiving, processing and acting (or not). And of course, the movie's awareness of the (ostensibly[34]) real time of the 90 minutes until 12 noon provides a mindfulness of the movement of time that, in this classical film, sets up time-images realised in Kane's walking through the empty streets just before noon and static shots of railway tracks almost merging at an infinite point, as the train is anticipated.

Deleuze's classical model underpins the structure and sequencing of image movement but not in a predictive way. In a film, divergence from the classical model is the norm and the divergence provides material for analysis that demands attention on movement between shot types. Each film then has a unique footprint in terms of interpretations and uses of the image-types of the classical model. Accordingly, David Deamer claims, "The first task of a Deleuzian exploration of cinema

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[31] David Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy Images* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 79.

[32] Ibid., 79.

[33] Ibid., 78.

[34] The first time we see a clock, a little into the movie, it shows that there are 85 minutes until noon. The film runs for 90 minutes. However, 12 noon (clock-time) occurs 15 minutes earlier than it should, ostensibly, to allow time for the shootout.

can be to designate the dominant sign of a film".[35] This provides an analytical heart of a film in relation to which other image-types can be considered.

In the third of three sections of his book, Deamer discusses forty-four films each identified by one of Deleuze's image/sign types, and so demonstrating dominant sign types.[36] Elsewhere, Deamer explores *Godzilla* in terms of the components of the action-image and its types. As has been suggested by the *High Noon* example, the designation of dominant signs and images is as useful for *sections* of films as for the whole film. In this case, it was the perception-image that dominated with movement through subsets (gaseous, liquid and solid) providing continuity and suggesting a potential for a vertical exploration (as it were) *within* the image type, in addition to lateral exploration between image-types. With analysis guided by the classical model, rather than seeking to assert the model, the dominant sign-type of *High Noon*, might be considered a perception-affection hybrid with perception the dominant partner, the effect of which is to defer or hinder the production of action-images. Such determinations expose the thematic concerns of the film through a clear link between the thinking and the structure that is made available through movement in and between image-types. The deferral of the action-image as a natural progression from perception and affection — rendering the film as stuck in an accumulation of affection-images and perception-images as it processes potentials — is precisely the narrative concern of *High Noon*.

If a clear link between images and themes is not made explicit in analysis, a conventional-formalist leap of faith is preserved that identifies elements of the shot as determining meaning but falls short of demonstrating how. The leap is between the detailed explanation of visual elements and patterns in the frame (as the focus of analysis) and the ideas for which they provide the examples. In Deleuzian scholarship, it can be the same leap, but in the other direction. The high-stakes interest is in philosophical discussion of Deleuze's concepts that provide the real interest for which movement-images deliver unproblematic illustrations. Consequently, with both leaps there is the risk of diminishing and simplifying the movement-image.

The designation of the dominant image-type of a film, then, provides the start of an analytical determination of how the sign works in a shot and it will be shown to have clear implications for sound, in the next chapter. If the image is moving, the determination of a dominant image can never be purely descriptive; it must, through movement, also become a means for disseminating and

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[35] David Deamer, "An Imprint of *Godzilla*: Deleuze, the Action-Image and Universal History", in *Deleuze and Film*, ed. David Martin-Jones and William Brown, 25.

[36] Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books,* "Section III –Third Introduction – Cinematographics (1995-2015)", 179-342.

channelling significance in certain ways and setting up particular relations (as we have considered with *High Noon*).

This is nearly enough to sustain a general approach to analysis sought by the Deleuzian cineaste but not quite. What is missing is an accessible account of the thinking that underpins a facility in juggling the image-types. So far, a number of oppositions or dualities have been observed in this chapter: between image and structure, between the model and its application, between the movement-image and the time-image. In relation to molecular aspects of the image, there are more dualities: between one image and the next, between perception and affection, between drunken monologue and signaletic material. Questions of dialectics at work are invited.[37]

Most discussion of Deleuze and dialectics is preceded by caveats in deference to his stated objection to formal dialectics.[38] Nevertheless, Ian Buchanan proposed a Deleuzian dialectics beginning with the idea that Deleuze's work is fundamentally dialectical in that it requires explication in terms of practice, and not simple application:

> . . . we are already on the brink of a dialectic because the minute function enters the picture we create a distinction between a body of work and the work it either does itself or otherwise enables. This is not dialectical in the sense Deleuze understands the term, it does not refer to or propose a theory of synthesis. It is rather a theory of the necessarily self-conscious relationship between models and their application . . . [39]

Capitalism and Schizophrenia is an example, with *Anti-Oedipus* positioned in opposition to many things (Freud, Marx, Lacan, psychoanalysis, capitalism, fascism). However, the kind of dialectic that Buchanan speaks of comes with Michel Foucault in the preface, when he announced the work to be "a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time" adding,

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[37] It is important to define *molecularity* and *molarity* because they will recur at points throughout this thesis. They are not of the same order nor a matter of a difference in scale. For Tom Conley, the distinction is that there are principles of *actualisation* in molecularities and of *organisation* in molarities, though they are not necessarily separate: "Molecules often aggregate and swarm into active masses of molar aspect and vice versa". Tom Conley, "Molar" in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 177. The difference is between "chemistries of being" for molecularity (178) and "aggregates of matter" for molarity (175)— chemical reactions and geographical topographies. Brian Massumi's caution is that "*the distinction between molecular and molar has nothing whatsoever to do with scale*"[37] (the forceful emphasis is his): "There are molarities of every magnitude (the smallest being the nucleus of the atom)". Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 54. As a rule of thumb, molecular identifies interacting forces and reactions, while molarity describes states of being or states of organisation.

[38] "What I detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and the Dialectic". Deleuze cited in *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari,* Brian Massumi (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1999), 143, n.4.

[39] Ian Buchanan, *Deleuzism: A Metacommentary* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 193. The concluding chapter considers positioning Deleuze's project as dialectical: "A Dialectical Deleuze?".

in parenthesis, "may its authors forgive me",[40] precisely because ethics *emerges* from a dialectic between the work and its explication and application (for psychoanalysis, for politics, for social research, for philosophy, and so on) not directly from its thesis. Questions of how to approach Deleuze, in various disciplines, have occupied significant academic scholarship. In more immediate terms, the Deleuzian cineaste is situated in a dialectical dynamic between the *Cinema* books and questions of their use in situations in which its philosophical underpinnings cannot be assumed and so the "self-conscious relationship between models and their application" is manifest.

Deleuze's more directly methodological approach to dialectics becomes clear when the opportunity arises directly in his discussion of Sergei Eisenstein and his dialectical theory of montage as conflict and collision. To use Eisenstein's example, dialectical montage is like an internal combustion engine: "the dynamics of montage serve as impulses driving forward the total film".[41] One shot is in opposition to another, with a productive outcome. It is not only in terms of an engine driving the film forward, but at the same time the creation of a whole: "If Eisenstein is a dialectician, it is because he conceives of the violence of the shock in the form of opposition and the thought of the whole in the form of opposition overcome, or of the transformation of opposites: 'From the shock of two factors a concept is born'".[42] Opposition is overcome by, or situated in, a whole not simply as the local creation of a third image or concept out of two oppositional images, but one that also sustains and justified the linking of the images.

Crucially, Deleuze recognises that something else is going on. As well as the movement from images to concept (and whole), comes a return back to the image and the foundation for sensation and the affection-image.[43] The movement to concept and the return to affection happen simultaneously. If we are still usefully in dialectical territory, it is complicated or evolved. And it evolves even further when Deleuze uses Godard to establish the interstice, recognising the dialectical and oppositional relation between two images as a gap or fissure in which a relationship is not given, but creates an entirely new potential: "it is the method of BETWEEN, 'between two images', which does away with all cinemas of the One. It is the method of AND, 'this and then

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[40] Michel Foucault, "Preface" in *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), xiii.

[41] Sergei Eisenstein "Collision of Ideas" in *Film: A Montage of Theories*, ed. Richard Dyer McCann (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1966), 36.

[42] Deleuze, *Cinema 2,* 158. (The embedded quotation refers to Eisenstein's "La cenrifugeuse et le Graal", *La non-indifferente*, Nature Paris UCE, Volume 1, 1976. [Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 308, n.5.])

[43] ". . . there is a dialectical circle or spiral, 'monism' (which Eisenstein contrasts with Griffith-style dualism) . . . This is why Eisenstein continually reminds us that 'intellectual cinema' has a correlate 'sensory thought' or 'emotional intelligence' and is worthless without it". Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* 159.

that', which does away will all cinema of Being = is".[44] The whole becomes a "constitutive 'and' of things" rather than the "One-Being";[45] in other words there is nothing for the images to exist within, beyond connection between them. But this is neither nihilistic nor existential, it is profoundly productive. Image, thought, concept, and sensation, and their emergent relations, are linked at a molecular level. Rodowick, in his consideration of approaches to truth, identifies linkages as a sense of qualified dialogue:

> This is not a dialectic in the sense of a negation that produces a higher unity, forging identity out of nonidentity in a process of totalization. *That* is the organic model of truth produced by the movement-image. Rather, it is dialogue, an interrogation, always a series of at least two terms, each of which is able to question, interrogate or falsify the other in a process that assures the temporalization of thought.[46]

Dialectical dialogue is a useful term connoting the toing-and-froing between mutually validating oppositions and not necessarily ones in symmetrical opposition. The sense is that what is required of analysis is a poise based on a repertoire of dialectical approaches; a readiness to move where the concrete situation (the film) takes us but armed with skills and methods that are applicable whatever the direction. The sense of a dialectical dialogue has been productive in a number of cases. Between perception-image and action-image, Deleuze identifies affection-image. In his study of Bacon, between abstraction and naturalism, he finds sensation. In cinema, between the actual and virtual, he finds the actual in the virtual and the virtual in the actual, and classifies the crystal-image. Between territorialisation and deterritorialization, he seeks reterritorialization. Between time and space, he finds cinema. And, in terms of this chapter's epigraph, between signaletic material and thought, Deleuze finds signs and an incipient language (for the particular film) that Rodowick terms "a dialectical motor": " . . . film language becomes the dialectical motor striking an identity between, on the one hand, the universal variation of movement-images as a prelinguistic signaletic material and, on the other, inner speech as the primitive language of thought." [47]

Paths are not sought towards reconciliation of dualities or evolution beyond them. Inna Semetsky identifies a "pedagogical triad" that does not regard the synthesised element (the outcome) as superseding the elements from which it arose but as able to enter into new relation with them; it is a

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[44] Deleuze, *Cinema 2,* 180.

[45] Ibid., 180.

[46] Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, 16.

[47] Ibid., 183.

further demonstration of Deleuze's "method of AND". It is possible to consider Bacon's *sensation* as arising from a dialectic between Cezanne's sensation[48] and abstraction (abstract expressionism at its extreme). However, as a pedagogical triad, Bacon's sensation, once articulated, takes on an independence that permits a series of dialogues between it and its antecedent thesis and antithesis: (Bacon's) sensation in dialogue with abstraction, sensation in dialogue with Cezanne, Cezanne in dialogue with abstraction. This comes close to the way that Deleuze discusses Bacon in his study of the painter. The self-sufficiency of the concept of Bacon's sensation (now a thing in the world) frees it to work independently of the strict conditions of its production. Not only are triadic relations exposed, but lines of flight are made possible from, for example, sensation in Cezanne, to sensation in Bacon, to sensation in film; and intersections with other concepts like hapticity are enabled. It is more than application; each step identifies and employs new potentials.

Approaches to Deleuze's use of dialectics and dualities, then, becomes another plank supporting an incipient methodology for Deleuzian film analysis — along with, so far, the classical model and the seeking of the dominant image-type (from Deamer). The dialectical motor loosens things up in terms of thinking, seeking and identifying oppositions that are perhaps capable of forming new concepts but certainly capable of enabling new relations and moving in new directions.

Signaletic material

If the cinematic image is taken to be generated from prelinguistic thought and signaletic material, a complex to-ing and fro-ing (dialectical dialogue) between image, thought, and signaletic material becomes possible, as definition of the cinematic image. Signaletic material is not a mystification or a reduction beyond what is experienced. Immediately following the statement in this chapter's epigraph —"We must understand cinema not as language, but as signaletic material "— Deleuze discusses an interest in tracking *particular* signaletic material and, in doing so, provides some clarity. "I'm attempting a classification of light in the cinema"[49] and that takes him to a consideration of how the quality of light is different, for example, between Antonioni and Ozu. No longer the problematic source material of images and signs, signaletic material becomes capable of

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[48] "Sensation is what is painted. What is painted on the canvas is the body, not insofar as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining this sensation (what Lawrence, speaking of Cézanne, called 'the appleyness of the apple')". Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 27.

[49] Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen", 368.

sustaining particular identity: for example, "Ozu's light" and in a spirit of dialectic dialogue (Ozu + light), a language emerges that is inseparable from the image.

Like *authored* light (Ozu's, Antonioni's), Edith Head's costuming in Alfred Hitchcock movies can be approached as significant signaletic material (drawing into significance colour, textures, patterns, moods, etc) identifiable in its own right as well as essentially bound to the narrative. Gregg Toland's camera work in *Citizen Kane* and Walter Murch's sound in Francis Ford Coppola's films give other signaletic material significance and a language. Yes, they are elements of cinema, but what distinguishes an interest in light as a signaletic material from lighting as a technical necessity for filmmaking is that it is taken to have a discrete role in conspiring to produce meaning. The quality of light, conventions of dress, an active camera that goes beyond recording, sound as independent of visuals are recast in terms of the relations that form assemblages. A dialectical dialogue invites consideration of signaletic material as more than raw material and more as a kind of DNA carrying meaning and predisposing outcomes. It is in this sense, signaletic as predisposing, that a shift in the signaletic material available to film came with electronic technology. [50]

Somewhat outside the scope of this thesis, based as it is on narrative films, but relevant in demonstrating signaletic material as more than a swarming of partial bits of information and image fragments and more than uncomplicated components of an image, Bodil Marie Stavning Thomsen identifies a return to interest in the electronic *signal* from the sign to the signaletic material. Signaletic material is recast as a productive medium.

Digital and electronic media's describing of an image through the moving of a single point (pixel, electronic signal) is a radical departure from the image as indexically determined, as an analogic photographic image. "The flow of information is inscribed in a (non-discursive) mathematical language and can neither be grasped as matter nor light".[51] A new concept of time is part of the signal: digital *real-time* or time coded to electronic signals.[52] If one were able to perceive the essential moment of the image, it would be a dot, a line, a scan without any possibility of meaning until the scan is completed, and in a radical linearity, it is never completed — the digital signal just starts and stops. With film, one can sensibly discuss an interstice between frames as separating and

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[50] The impact of electronics has been evident in other dimensions of cinema with digital formats becoming the predominant ways of viewing film now, even in cinemas. According to *Hollywood Reporter* in 2012, 75% of cinemas, worldwide, were digital. Adrian Pennington and Carolyn Giardina, "NAB: 75 Percent of Theaters are Digital Worldwide", Hollywoodreporter.Com, Last modified 2013, https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/nab-75-percent-theaters-are-434290/.

[51] Maurizio Lazzarato in Bodil Marie Stavning Thomsen, "Signaletic, Haptic and Real-Time Material", *Journal of Aesthetics & Culture* 4, no. 1 (2012), doi:10.3402/jac.v4i0.18148, n.p., ["The 'Signaletic Material' of New Media" section.]

[52] Ibid., n.p. ["What Characterizes the Signal?" section.]

forming a relation between two pictures, in video there is no such interstice: the gap between one scanned unit (video "frame") and the next is the coded instruction, that is to say an undifferentiated continuation of the scanning flow that incorporates a message to go to a certain point on a screen (the dimensions of which are determined by similar instructions).

Thomsen considers Deleuze and Peirce as straddling the digital future and the linguistic past that cinema is taken to be. With Peirce's observation that "the language system only exists in its reaction to a non-language-material that it transforms,"[53] Thomsen's interest in the potential of signaletic material is based on the transformation enabled by electronic and video media as "a general distinction between sign (and object) and signal (and interface), where the latter refers to the real time transmission of electronic and new media in particular, since manipulation, feedback operations, and control are integrated parts of both the electronic signal and the digital code".[54]

Thomsen discusses the work of Jon Kessler for whom the interest is in the application and malleability of concepts arising from the electronic dimensions of signaletic material, especially real-time creation and transmission: the real-time experience of one's self in third person, for example, in the presenter frame in the corner of a Zoom presentation or, for past generations, on a video monitor (Thomsen's time span goes back to the beginnings of television); degraded images of the surveillance camera or a low-resolution digital camera coming to signify unmediated reality; the plasticity of the image freed from analogic limits; the recording of works without a photographer or director. Terms are generated like "immaterial labour", "temporal indexicality" of the "real-time surveillant image", and "the haptic space of the scanned *now* on the real-time surface".[55] "Real-time" itself is not to be confused with natural time.

One of Kessler's works, *One Hour Photo,* creates the experience of a pilot flying into the World Trade Centre by flipping post cards (of the New York skyline featuring the Twin Towers) on an elaborate cycling loop in front of a fixed camera.[56] Viewers see the video image on the screen of a surveillance camera at the same time that they observe its production. The work, incorporating notions of real-time production, makes it difficult to dismiss the image as an illusion. It becomes more of a speculation; "it was probably like this" is more the sense. Nevertheless, the event — the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001 — is displaced and perhaps

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[53] Peirce in ibid., n.p. ["The 'Signaletic Material' of New Media" section.]

[54] Ibid., n.p. ["The 'Signaletic Material' of New Media" section.]

[55] Ibid., n.p.

[56] Jon Kessler, *One Hour Photo (2004)*, video, 2004, https://www.youtube.com/user/jkessler342/videos.

trivialised, even as it is recognised and re-experienced. The experience of flying into the towers is conveyed through postcards — expendable popular images — situated to swing toward the camera, to create a visual experience that references the seconds before impact but does so with the mechanism of production not just visible, but part of the show. The viewer is watching a work in the moment of its creation, that will nevertheless be repeatable, but not precisely, and the repetition neuroticises the moments before impact. Dialectics are opened up: real-time and natural time, digital and analogue, viewer and creator, the evocation of the remembered event experienced as work of art. Thomsen recognises ways of conceptualising this work, in Deleuze:

> With Deleuze's theory of the signaletic material of film and electronic digital media — the analytic divisions between both movement-images and time-images, and optical and haptic space — a new starting point is created for the analysis of film, video and digital audio-visual forms.[57]

Thomsen's use of Deleuze demonstrates that the *Cinema* books were more future-oriented than Deleuze is often given credit for. The justifiable desire is often to see his as a completed modernist project. Nevertheless, the break with conventional time, and the plaintive cries of the technology in *Cinema 2* — cinema's "Give me a brain then" and "Give me a body then"[58] — highlight a direction of technical independence implicit in Kessler. Deleuze's analysis emerges as having fresh currency. Far from being at the outer edges of Deleuze's film theory, Thomsen centralises his identification of the importance of signaletic material.

The effect of our detour into the use of signaletic material has been to move further away from unproblematic representation in cinema to the creation of "the signaletic images", that is images rooted in the potential of signaletic material in the way photographic images in classical cinema are rooted to capturing or appropriating a bit of reality (even if it is staged reality).[59] Thomsen returns to film in her work on Lars von Trier who is comfortable with the dialectics made possible by digital and optical overlap. Von Trier is of interest at both ends of the digital spectrum employing digitally degraded (or enhanced) images creating a haptic screen (*Medea*) and in the immediacy of

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[57] Bodil Marie Stavning Thomsen, *Lars Von Trier's Renewal of Film 1984-2014: Signal Pixel Diagram* (Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 2018), 43.

[58] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 189, 204. They are the opening statements of sections in the chapter "Cinema, body and brain, thought" and the two defining "figures" of modern cinema — the body and the brain, physical and intellectual cinema — are presented as poles of modern cinema. Deleuze regards "Give me a body then", as "the formula of philosophical reversal. The body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself, that which it has to overcome to reach thinking. It is on the contrary that which it plunges into or must plunge into, in order to reach the unthought, that is life" (190).

[59] Thomsen, "Signaletic, Haptic and Real-Time Material", n.p. [The 'Signaletic Material of New Media" section]

the digital camera (*The Idiots*, one of the key films in the *Dogme95* movement that sought a return to naturalism — or conventions of it — in the face of Hollywood blockbuster excesses).[60] His interest in both of these is in exploring potentials rather than applying technology. *Medea* is shocking for its haptic earthiness captured in von Trier's enhanced images that seem immediately applicable to its subject matter: a woman of the elements stranded in a world of materialistic ambition. It is the opposite with *The Idiots* whose subject matter — thinly disguised and easily triggered discomfort with the performance or presentation of mental disability when it exceeds certain social limits — requires a matter-of-factness that was the signature of the camcorder.

Nevertheless, von Trier highlights, as he straddles, an important difference in the relation between image and thought found in the kind of work Thomsen discusses and that which features in narrative cinema. Viewers can think *through* Kessler's *One Hour Photo*, but they are necessarily reflexive: thinking about the work and justifying an experience of thinking in relation to their visual experience and the object of attention. One is struck by a freedom, even liberation, in the mental engagement that takes the viewer to a certain headspace and does not require images to be connected in a line of thought.[61] But that does not mean that the line of thought in narrative cinema should be taken for granted. Narrative cinema (certainly after Deleuze) is less about *telling* a story, and more about *thinking* a story, the short history of which has been increasingly reflexive.

Ingmar Bergman describes (in a more analogical way) a process of giving form to a film through the images that evoke mental states; sustaining and connecting them as demonstration of what is now recognisable as Deleuze's signaletic material and prelinguistic thought:

> These [impressions such as a few bars of music, a bit of conversation, "a shaft of light across the street"] are split-second impressions that disappear as quickly as they come, yet leave behind a mood — like pleasant dreams. It is a mental state, not an actual story, but one abounding in fertile associations and images. Most of all, it is a brightly colored

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[60] *Medea* was a radical interpretation of the play for television. It was notable firstly for applying sophisticated cinematic techniques to an adaptation for television, but more importantly for using the plasticity of the video image to create certain moods and effects. Everything in *The Idiots*, beginning with the title, is provocative as the characters, as actors, *perform* mental disabilities in social situations. The film is in a documentary style. It was part of the *Dogme95* (dogma) movement, established by von Trier and Thomas Vinterberg, in 1995, that set codes (*Dogme95*'s Vows of Chastity) for narrative filmmaking drawn from documentary film. The movement lasted about 10 years. (http://www.dogme95.dk/dogma-95/)

[61] *One Hour Photo* is a relatively focused experience compared with *4 a.m. at the Palace* which has multiple sets and cameras but as with *One Hour Photo*, all the images are generated on site: "60 Mechanical sculptures, 300 video monitors and 6 miles of cable came together to form the piece that Kessler calls his *Apocalypse Now*, his trip up the river— trying to make sense of the insanity of war". Jon Kessler, "The Palace at 4 A.M", blog, *Jon Kessler*, 2016, http://www.jonkessler.com/the-palace-at-4-am.

thread sticking out of the dark sack of the unconscious. If I begin to wind up this thread, and do it carefully, a complete film will emerge.[62]

The thread — the threading of associations and images — is presented as fragile. Peirce becomes useful because at their most molecular, Peirce's signs value a mental state (interpretant) as a process that both gives form to the sign and permits a threading like Bergman's. When one sign is connected to another it is through interpretants.

> I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the later is thereby mediately determined by the former.[63]

Albert Atkin provides a commentary that reinforces the relational dimension of the interpretant: "The interpretant is the representational or interpretational process of taking the sign [more precisely, sign-vehicle[64]] /object relation to be significant. Every sign must have an interpretant and be a potential interpretant for some preceding sign".[65] Deleuze is in agreement, "The sign is an image which stands for another image (its object) through the relations of a third image which constitutes 'its interpretant'".[66] By identifying the interpretant as an image, Deleuze is requiring a degree of actualisation or articulation for film. The interpretant requires an image of significance or signification and the affection-image provides it. The perception-image has a role in clearing away all that is not of significance, but what remains is not the interpretant until what is perceived is *considered*.

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[62] Ingmar Bergman, "Film has nothing to do with literature" in Richard Dyer McCann, *Film: A Montage of Theories* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1966), 143. [Parenthesis added. Examples are from Bergman's preceding paragraph.]

[63] Peirce in Albert Atkin, *Peirce* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 128.

[64] The distinction between *sign* and *sign-vehicle* needs some clarification. "[There] are some potential terminological difficulties here. We appear to be saying that there are three elements of a sign, one of which is the sign. This is confusing and does not fully capture Peirce's idea. Strictly speaking, for Peirce, we are interested in the *signifying element*, and it is not the sign as a whole that signifies. In speaking of the sign as the signifying element, then, he is more properly speaking of the sign refined to those elements most crucial to its functioning as a signifier. Peirce uses numerous terms for the signifying element including "sign", "representamen", "representation", and "ground". Here we shall refer to that element of the sign responsible for signification as the "sign-vehicle". Albert Atkin, "Peirce's Theory of Signs", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/peirce-semiotics/.n.p. [Section 1.1.] Atkin doubts that sign-vehicle, as a term, is even directly attributable to Peirce: "So far as I am aware, 'sign-vehicle' is not a term that Peirce uses directly. We find him describing the sing as 'a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without', but the exact term is perhaps more closely associated with Charles Morris (1938)". Atkin, *Peirce*, 162, n 8.

[65] Ibid., 298. The "potential interpretant for some preceding sign," is a little convoluted. It is recognition signs flow through a series of interpretants (not objects or sign-vehicles). Since "Peirce takes all thinking to be through signs—there can be no thought without signs . . . " (134). Consequently, the series of signs connected through interpretants amounts to the flow of thought.

[66] Deleuze, *Cinema 2,* 30.

Signs, for Peirce, are endlessly generational, but the identification of particular meaning is bound in a movement between signs. As Atkin puts it, citing Peirce:

> "At no one instant in my state of mind is there cognition or representation, but in the relation of my states of mind at different instants there is". For Peirce, it is the semiotic process, the movement from one sign to another, that gives signs their meaning. Translatability, rather than in the individual translations, are where we must look for meaning.[67]

It might be objected that the Marshal's badge in *High Noon* represents authority independently of its use, but that is simply the initial position (leaving aside that it is the product of many translations in the past). The interest and meaning of the badge in the movie are precisely in the relation of states of mind at different instants. The badge has particular significance at various points in the film and is the marker of a number of things: public service and trust; the wearer as a good and serious person; a particular role in the legal system; a job that can be taken on or retired from; and the hollow symbol tossed into the sand at the end of the movie. One particular motif has the badge, when it is not being worn, attached to the holster, hung on the wall, containing a gun. It is its movement between all these states that gives the badge interest and particular significance. How the badge is presented (taken-for-granted, made significant through dialogue, in close-up, or otherwise highlighted) and how one presentation links to the next are critical concerns. The badge as sign is channelled in ways that Deleuze identifies as generalisable types of images/signs.

> We therefore take the term 'sign' in a completely different way from Peirce: it is a particular image that refers to a *type of image*, whether from the point of view of its bipolar composition, or from the point of view of its genesis.[68]

In effect, the image-type becomes a conduit channelling processes of thought and emotion in distinct ways. Deleuze's departure from Peirce is partly in terms of perception. Deleuze saw that Peirce assumed perception, but cinema could not follow suit because it is the function of certain images and shots to limit elements in play in the way that everyday perception does (as we have seen in the earlier discussion of indetermination).

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[67] Atkin, *Peirce*, 139.

[68] Deleuze, *Cinema 2,* 32.

Deleuze regards the perception-image sign category as *zeroness,* in relation to Peirce's sign categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness (discussed presently). Zeroness suggest that the perception-image is necessary in the way that an establishing long shot describes place but does not enter into the meaning or significance of a series of images in any but a general sense. Cinematic images are not possible without perception. Perception is, then, part of all movement-images: "'perception is strictly identical to every image' . . . In this way the perception-image disappears into all other movement-images instantaneously".[69] However, perception needs to appear, as the perception-image, before it disappears — it is not nothing or taken for granted — and its disappearance is partly through a transformation into affect, as thought and emotional responses are brought to bear on the perceived items. In this regard, the classical model as the site of translation starts with a perception-image as one "side" of the shot and an action-image at the other. This clearly owes a debt to Peirce:

> The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both of those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.[70]

It is not simply a matter of inserting reasoned thought (thinking *about*) into otherwise existent images, but of showing an idea or thought, or at least a mental state, as accumulating and processing images. If the space between the gates is between perception and action, then the space is positioned, in the classical model, as the site of the affection-image. If, for Peirce, it is the space between the perceived *object* of the sign and the fully fledged active *sign* (the *sign-vehicle)*, then the space is understood as the *interpretant*. In both cases, it is thought introduced into patterns of images, but in Deleuze's case the necessary movement between sign elements is more apparent because signs are rendered as cinematic images that bring a sense of domain and temporal space (duration). In Peirce, sign, sign-vehicle and interpretant are too close, making the distinctions between them more conceptual or definitional.

To stay with the gate metaphor, signs such as smoke as indexical for fire or the mole hill as an indication of the presence of moles (examples from Peirce) or the marshal's badge have, in effect, diplomatic passports; they go right on through. However, there are different paths possible from the holding space (the affection-image, interpretant). Different image-types facilitate alternative paths.

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[69] Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books*, 29. [The embedded citation is to Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 31.]

[70] Peirce cited in *Peirce's Theory of Signs*, T.L. Short (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Kindle ed., 84. [Chapter 3, Section 7 "The experience of causing".]

An image detained and questioned draws attention to the processing to become a mental-image, "mental-images actualise thought on-screen".[71] An extended stay between perception and action can be the "house arrest" of the time-image (doing time?) and a sustained affection-image. An alternative movement might be to a side gate to dream-images that "capture thought as hallucination, nightmares, dreams imaginations; and — at their most extreme — describe the whole world as if it were a dream".[72] Or, a loss of confidence in the system (as in modern cinema) might see the passport as just a bit of paper and so images become opsigns and sonsigns. There are options depending on the analytical purpose.

There is a danger of losing any advantage from an appreciation of the molecular movements if analysis returns too readily to conclusions about the world or narrative imperatives that make the nature of images secondary. The concern becomes how to keep relations open and fluid at all levels. Deleuze employs Peirce's organisation of signs in order to consider shifting patterns of relationality. He uses characters from burlesque as examples, providing the licence to consider the physical movement — movement of a body through space — that with montage and camera movement are the three ways of effecting cinematic movement. Before considering Peirce's sign categories in more detail, the theorisation of physical movement will be considered as providing a way of approaching bodily movement that opens it to more substantial analysis. Jacques Lecoq offers a way of staying with physical movement at a molecular level.

Patterns of movement: from images to structures

Not unlike Deleuze's project for cinema, Jacques Lecoq sought the categorisation of movement for theatre. His Physical Theatre project generated seven "Laws of Motion" that, identify qualities of movement that support Deleuze's image-types. The analytical outcome, for both, is to avoid the taken-for-grantedness of physical movement and to identify conditions of what Deleuze allows as "kinetic" signaletic material to form propositions. Lecoq's Laws of Motion are as follows:

1. There is no action without reaction.
2. Motion is continuous, it never stops.
3. Motion always originates in a state of disequilibrium

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71 Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books,* 122.

72 Ibid., 122.

tending towards equilibrium.

4. Equilibrium is itself in motion.

5. There is no motion without a fixed point.

6. Motion highlights the fixed point.

7. The fixed point, too, is in motion.[73]

The laws can be grouped into three propositions about movement for the object (including human) in space: motion is continuous and reactive (Laws 1 & 2); movement is towards equilibrium from disequilibrium (3 & 4); the perception of motion requires a relatively fixed point (5, 6 & 7). Each statement has a duality suggesting, usefully, that movement is understood in oppositional terms in relation to continuity, equilibrium, and fixed points, none of which is *given* in a film. Oppositional forces are a necessary part of Lecoq's theatre, without his referring to any form of dialectics directly; his is very much a handbook for students and teachers rather than a work invoking external theory.

> These principles can be elaborated by examining the results of the ceaseless play between forces in equilibrium and in disequilibrium: oppositions (in order to stand upright, man must oppose gravity), alternations (day alternates with night as laughter with tears), compensations (carrying a suitcase in the left hand forces one to compensate by lifting the other arm). These notions may appear abstract, but they are, physically, very concrete on the stage, and are central to my teaching.[74]

Our interest is in how the laws of motion can open discussion about cinematic movement and make analysis more productive. It is not a matter of defining movement but of providing prompts. As the title suggests, *Run Lola Run*[75] is a film heavily invested in movement and provides an example to illustrate Lecoq's laws.

1. There is no action without reaction.

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[73] Jacques Lecoq, *The Moving Body: Teaching Creative Theatre* (London: Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 2002), Kindle ed., 92. [End of Chapter 2: "Movement Technique"] "Motion" and "movement" are used interchangeably between Lecoq's translated texts: *The Moving Body* prefers "motion" while Lecoq's *Theatre of Movement and Gesture*, prefers "movement".

[74] Ibid., 92.

[75] Tom Tykwer, *Run Lola Run*, film (Germany: X-Filme Creative Pool, 1998). *Run Lola Run* involves Lola's attempts to raise 100,000 Deutsche Marks after her boyfriend, Manni, lost the same amount after a drug deal. The money is, in the time frame of the film, due to be paid to Manni's criminal boss in 20 minutes. The film is three different attempts (in real time) to raise the money. While they are self-contained, there is a conceptual and thematic progression between the three.

The reaction of Lola to the plight of her boyfriend sets the whole movie in train. At every step of the way there are more actions and more reactions, including *to* Lola. In the three interdependent stories that provide the structure of the film, Lola often has the same sets of interaction (the bully on the stairs, interrupting a conversation between her father and his lover, etc) but they are never repetitions. Even when it is precisely the same situation, running into a woman on the street, each reaction from the woman is slightly different and the flash-forwards are radically different.[76] The impression is that if you change the action even slightly, then you change the reaction. The movie begins with a chain reaction of dominos in a clip from Japanese television (experienced on a television set in Lola's room) presenting an image of branching reactions.

It is not much of a stretch to approach characterisation in terms of reactions, but to grasp reactions as patternings becomes more interesting because it provides an organic approach to structure; that is, structure becomes an outcome of reactions. In Lecoq's sense, performance, opposition, alternation, and compensation are apparent in Lola's running: the running is oppositional to the movement of other characters; she alternates between quiet composure and outbursts that can break glass; and running becomes a compensation for a bland life at home with emotionally absent parents, because in her running she finds solitude and clarity. On one level, these are reactive qualities that for an actor determine performance decisions. More broadly, when action is fundamentally thought of in terms of reaction, questions are set in train of visuals and sound forming patterns, providing another take on Bergman's processes of threading.

2. Motion is continuous, it never stops.

There is little point in limiting the second law to a film (or play) and arguing that a film does indeed stop, because the kind of motion here is more akin to Bergson's duration that Cliff Stagoll describes as "the immediate awareness of the flow of changes" and "as lived experience".[77] The narrative of *Run Lola Run* "stops" twice to re-set, but what is not reset is Lola's "lived" experience. In a simple demonstration, in the first story when Lola picks up a handgun, she is not aware of the safety catch and Manni has to tell her to release it. In the second story, she flicks off the catch automatically.

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[76] The *flash-forwards* are an invention of this movie. A series of still shots at rapid speed (24 stills in 8 seconds, in the first flash forward) project into the future of a character. Usually, it is a minor character who has fleeting contact with Lola. The film is non-linear in its three-part structure based on different versions of Lola's experience. The flash-forwards provide another dimension that introduces a sense of multiplicity into the non-linearity: every character has its own particular future, and they intersect at a certain point (change the point, even by a few seconds and you change the future for characters).

[77] Stagoll, "Duration (Durée)", 82, 83.

Lola learns from her accumulated experience and so becomes somewhat clairvoyant in the third story. In this sense, a continuous motion counter to the film's nonlinear structure is offered.

3. Motion always originates in a state of disequilibrium tending towards equilibrium.
4. Equilibrium is itself in motion.

Firstly, the movement from disequilibrium to equilibrium is a good way of describing the exhaustion of potential in the classical model: perception can be approached as the establishment of disequilibrium that action brings to equilibrium. Perception isolates certain objects for attention — a relation between them only exists because of the attention (and so it is unstable), and action exhausts the interests and so returns the possibly transformed object of attention to equilibrium (and probably then to a new disequilibrium).

More, equilibrium and disequilibrium are worth exploring in more theoretical terms or in molar terms. Jacques Ranciere describes Hitchcock's cinema: "The real object of his cinema are these games of equilibrium and disequilibrium developed around a few paradigmatic relationships . . ." [78] While the classical model suggests that there is a smooth movement between one and the other — disequilibrium and equilibrium — Ranciere's discussion considers disruptions of exhaustion, paralysis, and motor inhibition so that if everything is in motion, non-movement (or, since that is not possible, a tendency toward non-movement) can represent a disruption and a powerful way of indicating a mental crisis: disequilibrium is a mental condition in Hitchcock, but it is also the trigger for action, including a to-ing and fro-ing between disequilibrium and equilibrium.

5. There is no motion without a fixed point.
6. Motion highlights the fixed point.
7. The fixed point, too, is in motion

A fixed point is not static: "If everyone on stage moves simultaneously, the sense of movement disappears for want of a fixed point, becoming incomprehensible and impossible to make sense of".[79] The fixed point then is a point of orientation and concentration, functioning to ground (moving) relationality. In that sense, the fixed point need not be — and probably will not be — a stationary point. In his discussion of change as relational, Brian Massumi employs a metaphor of

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[78] Jacques Rancière, *Film Fables* (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 115.
[79] Lecoq, *The Moving Body*, 92.

the soccer ball's significance in a game.[80] The soccer ball is a dynamic fixed point whose movement makes the game comprehensible: "when the ball moves, the whole game moves with it" and it changes the distribution of potentials.[81] It is a fixed point of signification, and for a certain time: it loses powers of signification at the final whistle of the game. Lola is clearly such a fixed point in the film, but the camera is the other. As Lola runs, the camera puts objects in the foreground and background into motion as it keeps fixed attention on Lola.

While Lecoq is primarily understood in relation to the physical movement of a body on stage, in cinema, the camera is complicit and takes on a significant position in space and so takes on a body. The intention of the phrase "give me a body then" is "first to mount the camera on an everyday body. The body is never in the present, it contains the before and the after, tiredness and waiting. Tiredness and waiting, even despair are the attitudes of the body".[82] Without concerning ourselves too much with the concept of the body in the present, "attitudes of the body" shows Deleuze's interest in aligning mental states and spirituality with physicality, and aligning it with the camera. In effect, he gives the camera a complex physicality: "It is through the body . . . that cinema forms its alliance with the spirit, with thought".[83] In this way, the camera can take on a primary interest as image-maker and also as a body that externalises other bodies and either denies or is complicit with the implied human present-time (subjective presence). In Lecoq's terms, the camera becomes a fixed point.

The images produced by the camera move through montage and this provides a new dimension to Lecoq's laws. Editing as movement is unique to cinema, though there are developments of theatre that come close to it.[84] Montage facilitates reaction and shifts in fixed points, but in movement from disequilibrium to equilibrium, montage has the ability to radically reset disequilibrium on a scale that the theatre can hardly match.

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[80] Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, 71-79.

[81] Ibid., 73.

[82] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 189.

[83] Ibid., 189.

[84] Joan Littlewood's *Oh! What a Lovely War* comes to mind. It is cinematic in its structure, switching between England and the battlefields of WW1, and between personal experiences and satirised depictions of planning by leaders. Cinematic theatre is also taken to be a fusion of film and cinema with projections and audio-visual material (for example, the projection of death tallies in *Oh! What a Lovely War*). Caryl Churchill's cutting between places and times in *Top Girls* (between the first and second act, and between scenes in Acts 2 and 3, and between time periods in *Cloud 9,* are part of an epic theatre approach, inviting comparison with Bertolt Brecht who edits very effectively between dramatic scenes, direct narration, and songs. Musicals like *Hair*, *Les Misérables* — in fact all musicals — are edited as they cut between the reality of the action and song and dance. In these terms, in classical Greek Theatre, the chorus is edited in.

The interval is no longer that which separates a reaction from the action experienced . . . [but that which] will find the appropriate reaction in some other point, however distant it is ("to find in life the response to the treated subject, the resultant among the millions of facts which bear a relation to this subject"). The originality of the Vertovian theory [of influential Russian film maker Dziga Vertov] of the interval is that it no longer marks a gap which is carved out, a distancing between two consecutive images but, on the contrary, a correlation of two images which are distant (and incommensurable from the viewpoint of our human perception).[85]

Montage provided, for Vertov, a release from the strictures of a human perspective, while Lecoq's scale is precisely that of human perception. For Vertov, cinema presents no limit to what is connected in an edit, but at the same time an "appropriate reaction" is inescapable. Vertov conceives of editing as a radically synthesising force or tool of relationality. For example, when, without direct expression of a mother's grief over the death of her son, in *Tree of Life*, Terrence Malick takes the viewer to a sustained visual essay (17 minutes!) on the creation of life on Earth complete with volcanos and dinosaurs, we are compelled to relate it to the domestic context established before the death.[86] Movement is elevated to an operatic scale: "incommensurable from the viewpoint of our human perception" but the human scale (the "appropriate reaction") is present in the voice-over as a prayer or complaint to the mother's god. In this case the disequilibrium of the dreadfulness of a child's death is positioned against a timeless equilibrium of evolution and individual insignificance.

Lecoq and Vertov are not in opposition, but usefully identify scales of movement. Lecoq's account of movement at the human scale is no less concerned with gaps and intervals, but the gaps are of a different kind, more conceptual and expressible as neutrality and stillness. In effect, the neutrality provides a break in endless reactions and interminable processes of making sense, that are fundamental to the sensory-motor system. Lecoq's neutral mask is very close to the affection-image: "neutral mask: a perfectly balanced mask which produces a physical sensation of calm. This object, when placed on the face, should enable one to *experience the state of neutrality prior to action, a state of receptiveness to everything around us*, with no inner conflict. This mask is a

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[85] Deleuze, *Cinema* 1, 82. The embedded quotation is not identified precisely, but presumably it is a continuation of Deleuze's prior citation of Vertov: Vertov, *Articles journaux, projects* (Paris: Cahiers du cinéma / Union générale d'éditons, 1972.).

[86] See Chapter 5 for discussion of the film in terms of editing.

reference point, a basic mask, a fulcrum mask for all the other masks".[87] The direct link to functions shared by the affection-image increases confidence in assuming correlations with Deleuze.

Lecoq provides access to qualities of bodily movement that give analysis starting points, with categories and concepts that direct attention to physical movement. Recalling that the central question for us is how to appreciate images as moving in the face of the habitual tendency to fix the cinematic image, Lecoq's axiom that motion originates in a state of disequilibrium tending towards equilibrium is productive in linking narrative flows and structures, and in posing the fruitful question of what disequilibrium and equilibrium mean at various levels: for particular characters, situations, the world of a film. Given the movement from disequilibrium to equilibrium, the perception-image as the start of the series in the classical model is cast as disruptive (creating disequilibrium) and the action-image provides a return to stability of some sort.

It follows Lecoq fittingly that when Deleuze comes to consider Peirce's sign categories, it is in terms of relations between characters as entities, as bodies. Signaletic material forms into images, images are given significance as signs, and signs in narrative cinema are manifest (not exclusively, but importantly) in the physicality of characters. If Deleuze has identified a number of image-types, Peirce's sign categories describe typical interactions within and between them, so we turn to them to finally consider *patterns* of movement. Peirce offers analysis a way of tracking signification. Plot, action, motivation, and narrative direction are cast in molecular terms of a movement of what is significant (the interpretant in the sign) from one image to the next.

Peirce's sign categories articulate typical relations: *firstness* is "by virtue of some shared quality" between the object and sign-vehicle; *secondness* is "in virtue of some brute, existential fact — a causal connection between sign-vehicle and object" emphasising the external and often oppositional action, or at least responding to external forces of actuality; *thirdness* is "in virtue of some observed general or conventional connection".[88] In *Cinema 2*, Deleuze (recapping *Cinema 1*) explicitly links his image-types to sign categories: the affection-image is firstness; the action-image is secondness; thirdness is not the perception image since, as we have considered, perception is part of all images (zeroness) and so thirdness is an interaction between image-types. In his discussion of burlesque, character, image-type and interpretants are conflated. In the defining examples, Harry Langdon is 1, Laurel and Hardy are 2, the Marx Brothers are 3 (the use of numbers to represent the three sign

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[87] Lecoq, *The Moving Body*, 175. [Glossary. Emphasis added]

[88] Atkin, *Peirce*, 133.

categories is in the original.) While Peirce generalises relations (to be expected in a definition of categories in a work on logic), Manuel DeLanda recasts Peirce's categories in terms of direct attention on dynamic relations, which makes DeLanda useful when approaching a film.

Firstness is recognised by DeLanda to be an "*emergent property*: a property of the whole that is produced by ongoing reaction between its parts".[89] The property is not fixed or inevitable but is produced by an ongoing reaction. It recalls Massumi's observation that if something appears static or inevitable it is as a result of continuing efforts to present it that way: firstness is a *becoming* firstness (a becoming something).[90] But emergent from what? DeLanda, in a context of theoretical mathematics, returns to a zeroness as *phase space*, that evokes Deleuze's signaletic material and certainly Thomsen's recognition of its productiveness.

> Each point in this space, each possible state, may have the same or different probabilities of existing. A space in which all the points are equally probable is a space without any structure, and it represents a physical system in which states change in a completely random way.[91]

DeLanda recognises the definition of phase space as a controversial but "useful tool in the exploration of models" and that is the sense in which it is attractive for us. It draws together signaletic material, notions of becoming, and a radical application of Lecoq's movement from disequilibrium to equilibrium (understanding phase space to be an expression of disequilibrium, but *non-equilibrium* might be a better term). It is out of this state and by way of connections between certain (particular, not "random") elements that identity is forged.

Deleuze ties each sign category to a particular movement-image such that, the affection-image is the dominant image of firstness (remembering that affection is not simply reaction, but a state of reaction that does not immediately translate into action). The affection delays as it motivates action. "Langdon, indeed, is the affection-image in a purer state than it is actualised in any other matter or milieu, so that it inspires in him an irresistible sleep".[92] To the extent that Langdon is the site of

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[89] Manuel DeLanda and Graham Harman, *The Rise of Realism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), 11.

[90] "Molarity presents itself as stasis, but like becoming-other it is in reality a productive process: a making-the-same". Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* 106

[91] Manuel DeLanda, "Deleuze in Phase Space" in *Virtual Mathematics: the logic of difference*, ed. Simon Duffy (Bolton, Clinamen Press, 2006) 237.

[92] Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* 199.

actions (or inactions), he accumulates signs of purity and innocence — the wide eyes emphasised by pencilled eyebrows, pale face, vacant look and odd hats — that he draws into relationship.

Langdon is demonstration of a difference between indetermination and existential determination or definition. He is very clearly defined, but his engagement in the world is archetypally indeterminate: before all else, he is an image interacting with other images. Langdon is always processing, but purposeful movement seems to allude him; often in the middle of processing one situation and considering what action to take, something else happens to draw him into a second situation, and then to another, and so on. If action becomes purposeful it is often by accident and temporary. Editing has a connective function here, putting points into productive relation and creating what has been considered a fixed point (in Lecoq's sense) in a character whose movement changes the potentials of the narrative.

Secondness is understood by DeLanda in terms of "symbols and syntax".[93] This becomes interesting because it positions language (taking symbols and syntax to suggest language) in terms of Peirce's account of the "brutal facts" of external forces and introduces polarities, when language and symbols would be normally placed in thirdness (as having a unifying formal function). There are two implications. Firstly, for Deleuze, *languages of cinema* are possible only at a local level, rather than at a general structural level: a concern of the particular film, not of the whole field of cinema. Syntax understood as patterns in meaning creation is furthered by grasping it in terms of responses to often conflicting forces. Secondly, and more literally, DeLanda provides scope for a useful extrapolation of language to dialogue as identifying or cementing oppositional stands between characters. (See Chapter 4).

Secondness is a result of the tendency toward cohesion of firstness coming into contact with situations that challenge it: "[In] Laurel and Hardy there is the action-image, the perpetual duel with matter, the milieu, women, other people and with each other".[94] Where 1 is definitional, 2 is oppositional on two levels. The internal polar opposition between the two, the individual /Laurel/ *and* /Hardy/, is put into opposition in the "actual world" as a polarity of /Laurel-and-Hardy/ and a situation.[95] Unlike Langdon, movement is clearly reactive and founded on active relations. If one character does anything, it will necessarily cause a response in the other; if one has a problem (or

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[93] DeLanda, *The Rise of Realism*, 11.

[94] Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* 199.

[95] It is a pairing common in comedy: Harpo and Chico, Abbott and Costello, Dean Martin and Jerry Lewis, and in a particular form of stand-up comedy in Japan, *Manzai* (that is very much the Lewis/Martin model of straight person and zany sidekick).

even a reaction), it becomes a problem (or reaction) for the other. This indicates something important about action in cinema as arising not from an axiomatic need to keep moving, but from relations defined by forces tending towards poles. The action-image, then, becomes the site for activating and observing the consequences of relations, rather than movement *per se*.

Thirdness, for DeLanda, is the interaction of patterns: "patterns and forms interacting with each other as patterns or forms".[96] DeLanda is not only considering the articulation of patterns and forms that we might expect of a discussion of thirdness, but, usefully for cinema, he recognises them as contextualised or generated by relation to other patterns: a film can be approached in terms of interacting patterns of light, sound, speech, costuming, etc, and so, signaletic material can be approached as forming patterns that then interact in the creation or realisation of potentials. Film analysis that approaches thirdness in this way will not be seeking themes too quickly but will be identifying the qualities in patterns that have relation to other patterns. For Hitchcock, Edith Head's costuming interacts with German expressionist patterns of lighting, interacting with modernist architecture, and so on through whatever other signaletic material seems relevant.

Deleuze's discussion of the Marx Brothers is nuanced because Deleuze identifies in them 1, 2 and 3 individually, as discrete patterns, as well as collectively.

> The Marx brothers, finally, are 3. The three brothers are distributed in such a way that Harpo and Chico are most often grouped together, Groucho for his part looming up in order to enter into a kind of alliance with the two others. Caught in the indissoluble group of 3, Harpo is the 1, the representative of celestial affects, but also already of infernal impulses, voraciousness, sexuality, destruction. Chico is 2: it is he who takes on action, the initiative, the duel with the milieu, the strategy of effort and resistance . . . Finally, Groucho is the three, the man of interpretations, of symbolic acts and abstract relations. Nevertheless, each of the three equally belongs to the thirdness that they make up together.[97]

The final sentence — "each of the three equally belongs to the thirdness"— is more than tautology. Deleuze identifies that "the three kinds of images are not simply ordinal — first, second, third — but cardinal: there are two in the second, to the point where there is a firstness in the secondness

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[96] DeLanda, *The Rise of Realism*, 11.

[97] Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* 199.

and there are three in the third". [98] Deleuze's point finds clear articulation in the Marx Brothers, with Harpo as 1, Harpo and Chico as 2, and Harpo, Chico and Groucho as 3.

Groucho is the character of thirdness ("interpretations, symbolic acts and abstract relations"). If firstness has been identified in terms of the affection-image and secondness in terms of the action-image, and the perception-image is in all images, then thirdness is marked in part by the relation-image. The relation-image straddles the movement-image and time-image regimes. The relation-image is essential in order not just to recognise that images are related, but, as with thought in the sign's interpretant and emotion in the affection-image, the relation-image gives relationality direct expression and presence in the film injecting explicit awareness of significance and signification. "The relation . . . does not simply surround action, it penetrates it in advance and in all its parts, and transforms it into a necessarily symbolic act". [99]

Thirdness does not immediately identify molar organising forces. If the sign categories map patterns of signification, we are invited to consider signification at all levels and to finally approach thirdness as emergent and bound more to the film's narrative than to ideologies or external cultural narratives. In a sense, thirdness is something for the viewer to understand; that is, the symbolic act is, generally, not available to the characters who demonstrate and experience thirdness, but do not articulate it: "Each image in its frame, by its frame, must exhibit a mental relation. The characters can act, perceive, experience, but they cannot testify to the relations which determine them". [100]

It is not altogether given that the characters cannot testify to the relations. There are some that do, or come close to it, and some characters aspire to do so, or come very close to achieving testimony. There are often characters who are aware of "relations which determine them": a version of the *everyman* with whom a viewer can identify because they share a dramatic irony, clearly knowing more than other characters in the film. Such a character — determined by, aware of, or orchestrating thirdness — need not be the major character but the viewer sees him or her as knowing what is going on: Gaff in *Blade Runner*, Dick Hallorann in *The Shining*, Motorcycle Man in *Under the Skin*, The Stranger in *The Big Lebowski*. Through such characters, thirdness is given a material place in a film. [101]

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[98] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 30.

[99] Deleuze, *Cinema 1,* 201

[100] Ibid., 201.

[101] Each of them testifies to an understanding of rules or conditions and so makes thirdness explicit in the film. They demonstrate the existence of rules of behaviour and thought that assist in giving 'the Whole' definition (or definition for the world of the film). Often the narrator (the Woody Allen character/narrator in his movies, either played by Allen or by another actor doing a very good Woody Allen impression, Will Ferrell and Kenneth Branagh among them, as the script often requires.) There are other characters who testify

Other characters can be understood to experience thirdness through Lecoq's third law — "motion always originates in a state of disequilibrium tending towards equilibrium". Equilibrium can be extended in Lecoq's terms as that which thirdness tends towards, and often recognises more than achieves a state perfectly determined by the rules. Equilibrium will be recognised when the laws governing relations are understood, accepted, or uncontested. That is not to exclude a dystopian equilibrium or equilibrium as an accommodation created from characters deliberately engaging with conditions in disequilibrium, but consciously or not, striving towards an alternative equilibrium (with that striving determining movement) even if some final equilibrium is ultimately rejected. In other words, there are *kinds* of equilibrium and disequilibrium.

Disequilibrium and equilibrium can become poles and the character moves, one way then another, between them. Jack Nicholson's character in *Five Easy Pieces* (in fact, Jack Nicholson in many of his movies) embraces, enables and celebrates disequilibrium and moves toward resolution (equilibrium) only to reject it. In *Five Easy Pieces*, disequilibrium motivates his return to his privileged family to achieve reconciliation with his father and family. (His girlfriend, Rayette, brings another dimension of disequilibrium to the situation being much less sophisticated than the members of the over-achieving family). Despite what seems like the achievement of equilibrium both in terms of his family and in terms of his relationship with his girlfriend, it is radically overturned in favour of disequilibrium, when in the final scene of the film — at a petrol station, Rayette in the toilet, and his car being serviced — he hitches a ride (an escape) with a truck driver.[102] Equilibrium and disequilibrium and their determining or framing of patterns (as expressions of thirdness) are, in this way, useful for analysis in identifying tensions and poles that determine the narrative.

The important thing from a Deleuze/ Peirce/ Lecoq perspective is that a sense of thirdness is not presented as, *by definition*, more abstract, complex, ideological or literary. If it becomes any of these, it is because of compound interactions between qualities of 1 and 2, without which 3 would

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to relations that define them (or at least to the fact of the existence of such relations): Raymond in *Ghost Dog*, Nick Carlton (William Hurt's character) in *The Big Chill*. Thirdness has a presence as meta-narrative awareness in *Adaptation*, *I ♥ Huckabees*, *8½*, *Catch 22*, in which characters actively seek an articulation of thirdness, or the thirdness becomes the antagonist. In *Stranger than Fiction*, Will Ferrell's character engages with the film's (off-screen) narrator, in a meta-narrative. Often there is a vague awareness of thirdness that seeks (but often eludes) articulation, especially in films of Wim Wenders and Wes Anderson.

[102] It is a point for analysis to determine whether there is a *higher sense* of thirdness/equilibrium at work, found in embracing disequilibrium in order to achieve the higher equilibrium, or whether the ending suggests a destructive cycle, an immersion disequilibrium. It is a similar question for Wim Wenders' *Paris, Texas* when Travis reconciles his estranged son and his also estranged wife (and mother of the boy): the higher equilibrium might be suggested as a mother child reunion, but it remains an open question (coming as it does at the very end of the film) whether the reunion could possibly have positive consequences for any of the characters.

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be only a superficial description of a molarity. Complexity and abstraction arise from the first two sign categories such that, in this sense, thirdness is fundamentally relational: "Patterns and forms interacting with each other as patterns or forms".

In seeking ways of discussing all aspects of a film, it is important not to lose sight of the molecular workings of significance at an image level and to track them through connection with other images to the articulation of productive patterns. And then, as if this were only half the process, to track back from the patterns to the images. It is the *working* of the patterns that is valued. Peirce provides models of emergence that, as the model of the movement-image has been taken to do, informs and organises without determining meaning. One such important model for approaching structure in a film is Peirce's notion that two things placed in relation implies a third thing (the relation):

> A combination of two things is triadic, the whole being the third relatum. As a combination of two can be combined with another, it would seem that combinations of more than two can be reduced to a sequence of combinations of things taken two at a time. If so, all combination is triadic.[103]

The relatum is relevant to all levels of the categories. In 1, identity arises from the combination of elements, that can be determined in a series of qualities set between two poles, for example, with Langdon: action–inaction, sexuality–asexuality, pathos–irony, and so on. The relatum describes a character's identity. In 2, action arises from opposed qualities between characters as well as from opposition between the pair and aspects of the world, as considered earlier with Laurel and Hardy. The relatum identifies the particulars of, and as, the world of the characters. In 3, the category *of* relatum, the complex relation between 1 and 2 informs the film's structure determined by the moves that are permissible from the networks of potentials arising from firstness and secondness. The relatum at this level drives the narrative's structure and will be considered in three examples (two from cinema and one, because it provides a definitive example, from theatre).

Bertolt Brecht's socialism in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*[104] rises from particular situations put into opposition and culminating in the decision of the judge Azdak to give the child to the servant who raised her, rather than to the natural mother who abandoned her. The narrative outcome is generated from a series of triadic structures: the aristocrat and servant, where ethical concern of the protection

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103 Short, *Peirce's Theory of Signs*, 84 [Kindle ed. Chapter 3, Section 8: "3rdness".].

104 Bertolt Brecht, *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* (London, Methuen and Co., 1960).

of the baby serves as relatum; baby and Grusha (servant-"mother"), where motherhood is the relatum; natural motherhood and custodianship, where the law is the relatum. Of course, it is more complex with a parallel signification in terms of the scoundrel, Azdak, that positions him ironically as the judge, and in terms of property ownership. Brecht's agrarian socialism does not appear as a fully blown application of a political system or ideology. Precisely, it can be seen to be emerging from combinations of things and organised around successive relata.

The utility of Peirce's sign categories, especially thirdness, is not limited to cases where the relationships are clear but can be used to gain clarity where they are not. The categories help to expose an orchestration. In *Drive, f*or example, 1 patterns are stalled and problematic for the three main characters of Driver, Irene and Standard as each is unable or unwilling to trust and so to form relationships (literally).[105] However, we see a 2 emerging between the characters of Driver and Irene, even if it is tentative and cautious, and expressed only in small kindnesses and partial smiles. It is the return of the husband (Standard) that introduces a 3. But he does much more than introduce a third position, and even more than put two 2s (Driver-Irene, Standard-Irene) into opposition, which he does. His real role as 3 is literally to introduce questions of relation and to catalyse larger issues so that, through him, violence, organised crime, loyalty, innocence and complicity become organising concerns of the film. Thus thirdness is a collusion of patterns and the identification of assemblages. But Standard does this, entirely unaware of his thirdness function (whereas a Groucho delights in orchestrating forces of chaos).

Deleuzian approaches to film analysis

Deleuze had cause to wonder: "why does Peirce think that everything ends with thirdness and the relation-image and that there is nothing beyond?"[106] The question of beyond Peirce's categories will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5. Here, just as zeroness, phase space and signaletic material provided a *before* of the image (prior states), in some senses the time-image provides an after, a post-image; with the suspicion that pre- and post-image might turn out to be the same. In any case, the pertinent point is that if there is a beyond thirdness, it will not be described by images.

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[105] Nicolas Refn, *Drive*, film (USA: FilmDistrict, 2011). *Drive* concerns a freelance stunt driver attempting to break into professional racing. His ambitions are derailed when he meets a woman whose husband is about to be released from prison. Partly as a favour to the woman and her child and to help the husband get back on to his feet, Driver agrees to drive the getaway car for one last heist. It is bungled and sets in train a series of disastrous consequences for everyone as the crime boss, for whom the heist was organised, attempts to retrieve the stolen money.

[106] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 33.

Film[107] — the dominant image of which is the mental-image in its *demark* form[108] — is very much concerned with questions of a beyond of the image approached by what Deleuze describes as a reverse proof of the movement-image.[109]

Deleuze shows that the systematic attempt to extinguish the three major movement-image types (action, affection, and perception) does not leave a vacuum, but instead points to the generation of new relations to images, largely because perception (literally presented as perception of perception as the actor stares into the camera) and relation remain. *Film* is at the very limits of the movement-image. One by one, the main character O (Buster Keaton) dismantles images: tearing up photos, covering mirrors, presenting his back to the camera. Not only is this the "reverse proof" of the movement-image, but it is also presented as a liberation: a dismantling of visual images as a way to find (or attempt to find) an "acentered purity".[110] "How can we rid ourselves of ourselves, and demolish ourselves?"[111] The questions frame assumptions about the image as inseparable from "ourselves" and the purpose of the time-image as "demolishing ourselves".

Deleuze asks the questions, but at the same time recognises this as a vain quest because (on the movement-image plane) we will always be left with the perception of ourselves: "one perception at least will subsist as long as we live, the most awesome, that of the self by the self".[112] Here again is a demonstration of the ubiquity, and zeroness, of perception. Perception finally becomes the last target, when other images are demolished, and it is the ultimate target if only because, beyond it there is no film. This is why *Film* can be understood as a precursor of the time-image: it has gone as far as possible to the limits of the movement-image, and it has done so aggressively. At the image level, the triadic structure of signs has broken down; there is a refusal to form the interpretant that, when functioning normally, keeps significance with an image and passes it on to the next image. Finally, O is frozen at the point of a failure to generate any signs with the imminent danger (benefit?) of the "extinction of subjective perception".[113]

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107 Samuel Beckett and Alan Schneider. *Film*. (USA: Evergreen,1965). Deleuze attributes creative responsibility to Beckett rather than Schneider, as is often the practice. Schneider was principally a respected theatre director who, in a distinguished career, premiered Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* in the USA. In *Film*, the camera is the aggressive antagonist and O (Buster Keaton) attempts to avoid the camera. He is driven to do so, but the audience does not know the motivation. The film is a meditation on images and their significance. In the conclusion, O and the camera "stare" at each other in a kind of frozen defeat.

108 "Mental image (relation): *Mark*: designates natural relations, that is, the aspect under which images are linked by a habit which takes us from one to the other. The *demark* designates an image torn from its natural relations." Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 218.

109 Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 66-70. Section 3 of the chapter is titled "The reverse proof: how to extinguish the three varieties".

110 Ibid., 66.

111 Ibid., 66.

112 Ibid., 66.

113 Ibid., 67.

A *pas de deux* between the camera and, O ensues. The climax is a standoff between an exposed and "anguished" O and an "attentive" camera; "we are in the domain of the perception of affection, the most terrifying, that which still survives when all the others have been destroyed: it is the perception of the self by the self, the *affection-image*",[114] or at least, it is a singular kind of affection-image not intended to lead to an action-image. What separates it from Dreyer's striking image of Joan of Arc at the stake,[115] is the integral awareness of the camera. Indeed, awareness of the camera is one way in which the image "goes beyond itself" and transforms the affection-image into a time-image as noosign: "an image which goes beyond itself towards something that can only be thought".[116] This cinematic awareness is a "subjective finality", expressed neither in the face of O nor in the camera; it is between the two.

> [Subjective finality] is a question of attaining once more the world before man, before our own dawn, the position where movement was, on the contrary, under the regime of universal variation, and where light, always propagating itself, had no need to be revealed. Proceeding in this way to the extinction of action-images, perception-images and affection-images, Beckett ascends once more towards the luminous plane of immanence, the plane of matter and its cosmic eddying of movement-images.[117]

Lecoq's laws seem to be subverted, but they too are asserted by a reverse proof. "No action without reaction": the action that inspired *Film*'s chain of reaction is off screen, prior to the movie. *Film* is motivated by reaction to something to which we are not privy, but we don't need to be (and not knowing furthers the grasp of this as a modernist disposition). In terms of Lecoq's law, an assumed action will do, it is the reaction that is most important and in *Film*, reaction is amplified and intensified in a feedback loop, like acoustic feedback (and just as increasingly unbearable). "Motion always originates in a state of disequilibrium tending towards equilibrium" and "Equilibrium is itself in motion": a final equilibrium is equated with a lack of movement and motivation. At the same time, the awareness of the camera disturbs the stillness and becomes a source of recurrent disequilibrium. "The fixed point", the changer of potentials, is O and he is not comfortable in being so. Deleuze demonstrates that the destruction of the classical model is not by the time-image, but a

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114 Ibid., 67-68. [Emphasis in the original.]

115 Deleuze discusses Joan of Arc in his definition of the affection-image: "In the affective film *par excellence*, Dreyer's *Passion of Joan of Arc . . .* ", Ibid., 106.

116 Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 335.

117 Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 68.

subversion from within, highlighting the conditionality and an essential instability of images in the classical model. The time-image becomes more opportunistic than causal and has a positive purpose in the return to the luminous plane and Deleuze's seer that is doubly a spiritual seer and a seer (one who sees) of images as images. It might alternatively, be seen as a return to the signaletic material out of which it is possible to create something new (better?).

O is on the verge of being free of the false understanding that he is special and released into undifferentiated movement-images, becoming. The point is that if there is a beyond self and perception — and beyond thirdness — the sensory-motor apparatus will not and cannot take us there and so its recognition requires a new kind of image. The sense that the time-image is *between* the two elements of O's face and the camera, places the time-image awkwardly and unstably in a place that tends to both the immaterial and real. O's face as an affection-image is unable to situate action. The camera is active, but it too is unable to be signaletic: literally chasing its object before staring it down and seeming both aggressive and needy. This is horrifying to O and, if there are connotations of sublimity in "the luminous plane", O does not feel them: the plane is literally, and only, light and matter, and the cosmic eddying of movement-images hardly seems, in itself, something to aspire to.

But that is to consider the luminous plane in terms of ultimately futile descriptions of it, that is, from the side (as it were) of the sensory-motor mechanism, when the luminous plane is, precisely, freed from habits of mind that fix description. For Claire Colebrook, that brings the freedom to make connections; for Rodowick it is recurrent possibility; and for Deamer it is made possible through "disjunctive temporalities and displaced spatialities dissolving subjectivities".[118]

Samantha Bankston's concern is to identify processes that harness similar potentials. In her diagrammatic terms, the stare-down at the end of the film can be considered the foundation for a *line-bloc,* as two points forming a line-bloc "[passing] between two points creating a zone of proximity between these two unequal forms . . ."[119] The two points that form the line are the camera and the subject, but since we do not see the camera, the camera point can be taken as the awareness of being filmed. This line moves to describe a block (action, situation, dialectical relation): "It does not combine or mix two different fixed terms or elements [points] but creates a line of coexistence

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[118] Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books*, 41. David Norman Rodowick, *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), Kindle ed. Loc. 100 (also discussed as "eternal recurrence") . Claire Colebrook, *Understanding Deleuze* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002), 149.

[119] Samantha Bankston, *Deleuze and Becoming* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 96.

between them, dislocating them from their respective localizable positions. Points are given new function and enter into an assemblage; new worlds and systems are created through blocs of coexistence".[120]

In *Film*, (to exemplify Bankston's process) the point of O and the point of the camera form a line describing O's intense awareness of the camera. O is dislocated from localizable positions and becomes a victim of the camera's aggression; the camera's function is reduced to staring at the physical image, placing *Film* as a variety of the "surveillance films" identified as "the power politics of seeing and being seen".[121] Questions of politics brings into play questions of molarity and ethics: the camera is both obtrusive and objective. Deamer identifies *Timecode* as a film dominated by liquid perception and a surveillant attitude.[122]

It has been necessary with *Film* — situated as it is between the movement-image and the time-image — to use Deleuze's image-types as they recommend themselves rather than expect unproblematic application. Once released from concerns of their historical generation, the movement-image and the time-image can be considered in terms of complexities they offer analysis, rather than as posing questions of nomenclature and historical development. The affection-image, the interpretant, thirdness, and relatum become dynamic expressions of thought in a film, so it makes sense to regard analysis as thinking about the thinking in a film, with the film's thinking as inseparable from the movement of significance. The movement-image finds limits in the time-image and the limits do not so much close off and define the movement-images as situate them.

> There are many possible transformations, almost imperceptible passages, and also combinations between the movement-image and the time-image. It cannot be said that one is more important than the other, whether more beautiful or more profound. All that can be said is that the movement-image does not give us the time-image. Nevertheless, it does give us many things in connection with it.[123]

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120 Ibid., 96.

121 Serazer Pekerman, "The Schizoanalysis of European Surveillance Film", in *Deleuze and Film*, ed. David Martin-Jones and William Brown, 124. [Section heading; in the section, the notion of "surveillant assemblage" is examined.]

122 Mike Figgis, *Timecode*, film (USA, 2000). The screen is divided into quadrants. A surveillance camera is included, but mostly camera work is hand-held with continuous recording of structured improvisation (a separate one for each quadrant) that gives the film an immediate and surveillant quality.

123 Deleuze, *Cinema 2,* 270.

The time-image is not capable of limiting the movement-image — the movement-image does that to itself since it is based on a sensory-motor system that sets the image in terms of materiality, linearity and consequence. The time-image announces itself and is best considered in idiosyncratic terms; that it is not the movement-image is almost enough to define the time-image. Deamer understands the time-image to be in the virtual domain of thought, whereas the movement-image is in the material domain. They are different but relation-images and mental-images move between them. The movement-image is neither simple nor obvious. Through its formulation as the classical model, analysis is given a foothold founded on the fact that cinema is about movement, and movement is about changing relations.

It is evidence of the applicability of Peirce that our survey of approaches to movement can be organised in *his* terms: Deleuze's image-types provide a firstness concerned with the identity of images; Lecoq's laws of motion provide a secondness in the actuality and oppositional qualities of the movement of physical images; Peirce's sign categories providing a thirdness in the awareness of big picture "patterns of patterns" that recognise shifting and intersecting movements of images. Together they invite a repertoire of approaches to cinematic images. The principal task of analysis is the identification of the functioning of images following Deamer's imperative to consider the parameters of the image and, following Peirce, to understand that it is not the sign-object-image itself (as sign-vehicle) that is of interest, but it is the way in which significance is identified and transferred that is the concern. In that process is cinematic thought.

The question, as Deleuze would want it, concerns the usefulness and local applicability of analytical concepts: what is of use in making sense of a particular situation? "The importance of the interpretant for Peirce is that signification is not a simple dyadic relationship between sign and object, as it is for someone like Saussure. Rather, a sign signifies an object *only in the course of being interpreted*".[124] It is not as if a sign is created, then interpreted in some way towards final expression of its meaning by either the character or the viewer, rather that there is no sign without active interpretation — interpretation *is* the sign, which begs the question of interpretation by and for whom, and with what purpose?

Deleuze's analysis has been approached as a form of dialectical thinking employed for its utility rather than as an externally developed methodology (as, for example, in Eisenstein). Loose dialectics, dualities, polarities and oppositions have been identified in Lecoq and in Peirce

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124 Atkin, *Peirce*, 128.

especially in his secondness and in triadic structural patterns (relata). A film, any film, can be seen to progress through complex patterns of opposition starting with an awareness of oppositions and dualities.[125] Notions of dialectical dialogue and pedagogical triads help to keep a sense of interacting relations, rather than direct analysis, too prematurely, towards the generation of a "higher unity" or a synthesis as an end.

In many ways, the identification of affection is the achievement of *Cinema 1*. The affection-image and its conceptual cousins — the time-image, sensation, the sign's interpretant, and the relation-image — provide a dialectical engine. In the classical model, it is only with the affection-image that the viewer is *required* to perceive more than information in visual-photographic and sound images. If only because thought (and emotionally situated thought) necessarily enters the picture through the affection-image, becomes materialised in particular ways, and provokes classical or aberrant changes in image-types, the image is better approached as unstable, hence always moving, rather than as static and pictorial.

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[125] For example, in *High Noon*: Kane and Kitty; individual and group; law and lawlessness, church and legal system, ethics and revenge, military response (state sanctified violence) and pacifism (Quaker). It is not a question of how these are evident in the film but of how they *determine* and *describe* the way characters think.

CHAPTER 4

Hearing an image: the logic of sound

This chapter shares a goal with Gregg Redner in his discussion of film music. His complaint is that analysis of film music is at an impasse: "This theoretical roadblock was, I suggested, caused by the inability of music theory and film theory to speak to each other on a common theoretical plane".[1] The contention of this chapter is that the impasse extends to all forms of film sound (music, speech, effects, ambient sound) collectively classifiable as concerns of cinematic sound theory that is not on speaking terms with a film theory heavily biased toward visual analysis.[2] A film analysis based on movement can hardly ignore sound since there is no sound without movement: analysis of the (still) frame is always in one sense an analysis of a silent movie.

It is not just that sound theory is routinely described as fragmented. It is not even that a unified theory does not exist; there is Michel Chion's work over several decades. It is more that there is uncertainty about what to do with filmic sound apart from describing it directly. After audio elements are identified, what do they provide general film analysis? How does the Deleuzian cineaste reach the point that Chion becomes indispensable rather than available?

What if film analysis routinely began with the mapping of patterns of sound before approaching the visuals? A crude separation of visuals and sound might be necessary to begin with, but separation is not the ultimate objective. Analysis might consider songs and music, get a feeling for ambient sounds, account for speech patterns and structures, and consider the emotional impact of the particular noisiness or quietness of a film. Visuals could then be approached as a visualised melody line, providing continuity and specificity, set in the orchestration and affective key of the soundscape. The aim of this chapter is to find for general film sound what Redner seeks for the film score, that is, sound that "enters into a position of equality with other elements in the filmic universe [serving] as both establisher and catalyst for narrative meaning".[3]

Affective sensation as a bridge to analysis

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[1] Gregg Redner, *Deleuze and Film Music* (Bristol: Intellect, 2011), 173.

[2] The sense of a field of cinematic sound theory has been distilled from several collections: Rick Altman's editorship of *Yale French Studies,* no. 60 (special edition: *Cinema /Sound*); Altman's *Sound Theory / Sound Practice*; Elisabeth Weis and John Bolton's *Theory and Practice of Film Sound*; and Jay Beck and Tony Grajeda's *Lowering the Boom*. Michel Chion's *Audio-Vision* and his series of publications on cinematic sound offer a sustained theory.

[3] Redner, *Deleuze and Film Music*, 16.

The 1970s and 80s was a very productive time for sound both in filmmaking and for sound theory.[4] The question, then, is *why isn't grounded sound analysis commonplace in film analysis*? The bridge that Redner seeks is not provided by Deleuze as much as authorised. "What if we were to employ the *Deleuzian* concept of *sensation* as a common methodological platform. . . ?"[5] The proposal takes an analytical concept to provide a middle ground between molecular and molar concerns and at the same time, sensation, as the interaction of a number of image components, moves the discussion from simple to compound images. It might be a bold claim but, in terms of sound, sensation provides a correction to, or completion of, the movement-image by providing a sympathetic middle level concept or platform that is essentially inclusive of sound. Without sensation, the logic of the sensory-motor system is soulless.

Deleuze's *Francis Bacon* establishes sensation in the pithy (two paragraphs) of his foreword: ". . . But this order [of the chapters] is relative, and is valid only from the viewpoint of a general logic of sensation. All these aspects, of course, coexist in reality. They converge in color, in the 'coloring sensation,' which is the summit of this logic".[6] Deleuze presents sensation as a general logic providing an order and cohesion of elements. For painting, the pre-eminently cohesive element is color. For film, it is tempting to seek film's equivalent to colour and consider sound as a contender. However, if an application of sensation is being sought, it is already there in the movement-image of the classical model, in which percept and affect have been translated into perception-image and affection-image and precisely serve the role of enabling a general logic: that of the sensory-motor system. This is nearly enough to place sensation in film analysis, but not quite. A perception-image is not a percept; an affection-image is not an affect. A direct transference of the notion of sensation (including percept and affect) from painting to film will want to maintain something important that Deleuze recognises: "As a spectator, I experience the sensation only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensing and the sensed".[7] If colour is not a simple element but "the summit" of the logic of sensation — a unity that enables as it justifies a compounding of images — a logical system separate from both the sensory-motor's linearity or the time-image's aberrant logic becomes possible in the logic of the sensation in the sound space.

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[4] For example, through collaborations with Francis Ford Coppola, Walter Murch was active defining the role of *sound design.* Before him sound was considered a technical task of recording. Murch demonstrated inventive use of sound in *The Conversation* (1974) and developed sophisticated surround-sound systems and mixing in *Apocalypse Now* (1979). Stanley Kubrick with *Barry Lyndon* (1975), *A Clockwork Orange* (1971) and, just prior, *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968) demonstrated a use of music that was integral to both the thematic concerns and the scales of his topics. Robert Altman, *Nashville* (1975) pioneered the use of lapel radio mikes, multitracking, and portable editing benches, freeing actor from proximity to the fixed microphone and allowing for radical mixing of dialogue. And at the end of that period Rick Altman edited *Yale French Studies* (1980) serving as an important survey of the field.

[5] Redner, *Deleuze and Film Music*, 33.

[6] Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (London: Continuum, 2003), x.

[7] Ibid., 27.

Redner finds Deleuzian theory to be up to the job of bridge-building and each of his chapters employs a Deleuzian concept to achieve the task: sensation, nomadology, territoriality, becoming, and space. He begins with Guattari and Deleuze's concept of *affective sensation* with its *percepts* and *affects.*[8] Employing sensation as "a common methodological platform on which to consider the various interactions" between score, image, soundtrack, and narrative,[9] Redner envisages analysis in which sensation plays a primary role.

For cinema, the correspondence between sensation and the affection-image is not altogether clear, and there is not a lot of cross-referencing between the *Cinema* books and works that directly define affect and sensation*: What is philosophy?*, *Francis Bacon*, and *Spinoza.* Affect is central to both sensation and the affection-image, but there is more of a compounding of percepts and affects in sensation, which are, on the contrary, separated as perception-image and affection-image in cinema. A note in *Cinema 2* provides some illumination: "a film is not thought of as offering or producing sensations for the viewer, but as 'materializing them', achieving a tectonics of sensation".[10] The affection-image is more modest and self-contained and flags rather than creates affect. Defined as "that which occupies the gap between an action and a reaction, that which absorbs an external action and reacts on the inside",[11] the affection-image archetypally demonstrates reaction on the inside in the close-up whose obligation is to show that something is going on that is disconnected from the linear concerns of space and time of the sensory-motor system. The affect, on the other hand, for Eisenstein is an entity marshalling significant forces: "The affect is the entity, that is Power or Quality. It is something expressed . . . The affect is independent of all determinate space-time, but it is none the less created in a history which produces it as the expressed and the expression of a space or a time".[12] Accordingly he criticises filmmakers who do not fully realise the potential of images to transcend spatio-temporal limits:

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[8] "A bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects" Deleuze and Guattari, cited in *Deleuze and Film Music,* Redner, 33.

[9] Ibid, 33.

[10] "The tectonic or geological power of the pictorial image in Cézanne is not one feature among others, but an overall characteristic transforming the whole, not only in the landscapes, a rock or a mountain outline, but also in the still lifes. It is a new system of visual sensation which contrasts equally with the dematerialized sensation of impressionism, and the projected, hallucinatory sensation of expressionism. It is the 'materialized sensation' cited by Straub with Cézanne as his reference: a film is not thought of as offering or producing sensations for the viewer, but as 'materializing them', achieving a tectonics of sensation. cf. 'Entretien', Cahiers du Cinéma, no. 305, p. 19". Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 326, n.44

[11] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 217.

[12] Ibid., 97, 99.

> [W]hen Eisenstein criticised the others — Griffith or Dovzhenko — he reproached them for having sometimes failed in their close-ups because they allowed them to have a connotation of the co-ordinates of a place, of a moment, without attaining what he himself called the 'pathetic' which element is apprehended in the ecstasy or the affect.[13]

The affect exists on a spectrum between the painterly affect with the kind of ambitions expressed by Eisenstein and the cinematic affection-image as a component of the movement-image. Eisenstein was theorising the visual image that is also given primacy in the movement-image, but it is hard to imagine a purer dimension of affection than with sound, which by its nature is in relation to rather than defined by spatial coordinates and is archetypally implicated in the emotional appeal of a film. Sound precisely fits the definition of the affection-image as inhabiting the "gap between an action and a reaction" and as "on the inside". The affection-image is a passage between perception and action that, with sound, can be continued beyond the simple affection-image providing a sustained affect, as with *Barry Lyndon*, which we will consider presently. The result is a *plane* of affect that comes much closer to the intentions of sensation of "reaching the unity of the sensing and the sensed".

While sound is routinely *linked* to visuals, its greater potential is for co-creating a film's dynamic space. Giuliana Bruno illustrates a symbiosis between visuals and sound in her notion of a "picturesque of sound", and in describing Jacques Tati as "directing with sound more than sight".[14] Bruno discusses Rossellini's use of sound in describing Naples.

> If sound builds the urban landscape in movement, this is particularly true for Naples: it is not only a musical city, as we have seen, but a noisy one. Filmic city tours such as Rossellini's *Voyage in Italy* and Martone's *L'amore molesto* have interestingly "pictured" the Neapolitan cityscape through its sound . . . Here, then, the orgy of human sounds becomes even more pronounced and is an essential element of the filmic voyage. Sound is everywhere in the film: from the credit sequence on, it is a continuous presence that has an existence of its own, even outside of narrative motivations . . . This nondiegetic soundtrack is not at all a musical accompaniment, secondary to the picture. It is the picture — the very portrait of the city.[15]

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[13] Ibid., 96.

[14] Giuliana Bruno, *Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture and Film* (London: Verso, 2018). Kindle ed. Loc. 3618 [Chapter 5, Housing Pictures" section] and Loc. 6525 [Chapter 9,"Architecture is a Movie" section].

[15] Bruno, *Atlas of Emotion,* Kindle ed. Loc. 8184. [Chapter 11, "Views from Home"].

"Picturesque", "soundscape", and "sound as building the urban landscape" seem to contradict Eisenstein's requirement that affection should resist spatio-temporal co-ordinates. But the concern is still spatio-temporal, just without the co-ordinates. Bruno's point is an evocation of sensation "even outside of narrative motivations" that has less to do with emotion and a setting for visuals, than it does a plane of sensation parallel to a visual plane. In different ways Bruno and *Barry Lyndon* establish sound as the logic of sensation, and provide a way of thinking about a film. Later, analysis of music in *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy* will be considered in terms of sound as managing complexity and freeing the visuals to work much more simply.

Music has the potential to do the serious work of a film, rather than supplement the visuals. It is not that an ontological approach to sound will provide analytical methodology, but it does provide an orientation, beginning here with David Byrne's interest in the *experience* of ontological differences between visuals and sound. According to Byrne, the visual is experientially linear and specific, with its frames, perspectives and vanishing points; sound is ambient, contextual, multi-layered, and non-hierarchical — "it has no centre or focal point".

> In acoustic culture, the world, like sound, is all around you and comes at you from all directions at once . . . In visual culture an image is in one very specific fixed spot: it's in front of you. It isn't everywhere at once . . . In an acoustic universe one senses essence. Whereas in a visual universe one sees categories and hierarchies. [16]

The qualification is that sound has no *external* focal point. The vanishing point of visual perspective is out there; for sound the convergence is at the point of hearing or the point of *audition*. The spatio-temporal coordinates are with the auditor. Spatial awareness through sound and sound perspective is so precise that the acoustic experience of each person in a physical cinema is technically different.[17] It follows that, while *natural* sound has no centre or focal point (equivalent to vanishing points), acoustic events in cinema are organisable according to auditors' perceptions of sound in

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[16] David Byrne, *How Music Works* (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2012), 324.

[17] Altman's notion is that cinema is event, "in opposition to the notion of film as text" (2). It is a technical and material event with a large number of variables in the recording, then more in the projection process. The material event takes into account sound three-dimensionality that places other events in the orbit of the experience: "the kids in the front row, the air conditioner hum, the lobby cash register, the competing soundtrack in the adjacent multiplex theatre, passing traffic... "(6) It is an anachronistic description of the experience, but more contemporary references to the viewing/auditing experience only reinforce his point, being less routed to a particular controlled place (watching a film on a plane, on a television set, or on one's computer or smart phone). Altman argues for recognition of the heterogeneity of the experience of cinema that moves away from the assumption that there is an ideal experience of film sound. Rick Altman, "General Introduction: Cinema as Event", in in *Sound Theory Sound Practice, ed.* Rick Altman (New York: Routledge, 1992), 1-14.

particular spaces.[18] Acoustic events are positioned in relation to spaces, and not necessarily a realistic relation (as we will see with the intelligibility principle and Mary Ann Doane's often coexisting spaces of cinematic sound).

The field of cinematic sound: identifying sound images

The question for the Deleuzian cineaste is the extent to which sound is a particularly Deleuzian matter and whether the image-types in Deleuze's classical model essentially *include* sound or whether sound images constitute a different kind of image. Deleuze is comfortable with both propositions. He argues for a separation between vision and sound, with sound a "component of the image" in the penultimate chapter of his *Cinema* books, yet definition of the movement-image is cohesive of visuals and sound elements and does not rely on a distinction between them: in *Cinema 1*, the inclusive "visual and sound" or "optical and sound" is sufficient. More is required if sound is to break free of the hegemonic pull to the visual. It becomes important to find ways of becoming more specific and even moving beyond generic organisers such as music, song, dialogue etc.

As with David Deamer's advice for film analysis to consider the dominant image-type, it is analytically useful to consider, for sound, the dominant form and work from there to consider dimensions, durations, units and repetitions as well as the extent to which a dominant form contextualises other sound forms and other images. In Stanley Kubrick's *Barry Lyndon*,[19] for example, the orchestral score and the narration dominate, with visuals in danger of being relegated to illustration (but so gorgeous that the viewer is somewhat lost in their picturesque quality). Chion annotated a listing of *Barry Lyndon* with "Noted use of a Handel sarabande orchestrated in various ways — and in the final pistol duel, it is reduced to a sort of rhythmic skeleton of itself. Also, a distant nondiegetic narrative voice".[20] The potential is to consider the film in terms of the dominant form of the music's orchestration — or an orchestration and voice-over hybrid (sustained non-diegetic sound) — and to consider the film's structure in terms of repetitions and shifts in the

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[18] Theorists use various terms, usually consistently, to describe the listener: spectator, auditor, listener, and viewer (reasonably, assuming the viewer is also listening). They will be used interchangeably in this chapter. However, there might be specification in relation to a particular theorist: Altman prefers *auditor*, Mary Ann Doane prefers *spectator*; Scott Curtis prefers *audience*. By and large, they are not intended to suggest any significant difference.

[19] Stanley Kubrick, *Barry Lyndon,* film (UK: Columbia-Warner, 1975).

[20] Michel Chion, *Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen*, (New York: Columbia Press, 2019), 234. The list (216–247) is interesting. Chion provides a chronology of films significant in the development of cinematic sound and sectionises the chronology: *Barry Lyndon* is in section G: "Awareness of Sound and Institutionalization of Multitrack Sound". The chronological subgrouping is the 1970-80s, and Chion's list makes one aware of those two decades as an extraordinary period for cinema with *The Conversation, Tommy, Nashville, Dog Day Afternoon, The Passenger, Star Wars, Eraserhead, The Deer Hunter, Stalker*, and *Blade Runner* also among those listed.

phrases of the orchestration. This provides the means by which to consider relations with other sounds: dialogue, other more incidental period music, ambient sound and so on, and between sound and visuals.

In the case of *Barry Lyndon*, analysis would surely benefit from greater musical knowledge than is available to the typical film analyst (as with Redner's focus on orchestration), but analysis directed to be aware of intuited changes in the music is no less useful in drawing attention to transitions in the soundtrack. Song is more accessible, and no less structural and purposeful. "The Ballad of High Noon" (in *High Noon*)[21] contextualises dialogue through repeated quotations and rephrasings throughout the film. Song provides the dominant sound form of the film and, as with literary ballads, mythologises characters and their actions as it presents a clearly defined moral and ethical problem.

After identifying the dominant sound form, the ability to sustain productive analysis requires, at least, a vocabulary that provides conceptual tools. Advice to listen carefully to the film and to describe what one has heard is a starting point, but a *taxonomy* for sound is indispensable in providing precision and alerting analysis to subtleties and potentialities. Rick Altman articulates a challenge in finding the means to discuss film sound.

> With few exceptions film terminology is camera-oriented. The distance of a camera from its object, its vertical attitude, horizontal movement, lens, and focus all depend quite specifically on the camera's characteristics and provide the field of cinema studies with its basic language. Another set of terms concentrates on the noncamera aspect of the film's visual component: film stock, punctuation, aspect ratio, lighting, special effects, and so forth. While these terms and many others constitute part of the vocabulary of any introductory film course, the corresponding audio terms remain virtually unknown. The type and placement of microphones, methods of recording sound, mixing practices, loudspeaker varieties, and many other fundamental considerations are the province of a few specialists. [22]

Since Altman's writing, a number of important glossaries have been produced to alert the cineaste to the dimensions of sound in the way that conventional formalism has alerted the

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[21] Dimitri Tiomkin (Composer), Ned Washington (Lyricist), "The Ballad of High Noon" (variously "High Noon", "Do not forsake me", "Do not forsake me, O my Darlin"), song (USA: 1952).

[22] Rick Altman, "Introduction", *Cinema Sound*, *Yale French Studies*, no. 60 (1980): 3.

cineaste to dimensions of the visual image.[23] However, they fall short of giving sound traction in general film analysis, thus the need for something like Redner's bridge.[24] In many textbooks on film analysis, the discussion of visuals is routinely expanded into separate chapters on mise-en-scene, cinematography, editing as primarily visual, and shot theory. Sound is usually contained in a single chapter. In glossaries of creditable texts, the approximate ratio of sound terms to visual terms is about 1:7, supporting Altman's complaint.[25]

The introduction to a collection of articles on sound in 2008, *Lowering the Boom*, stated that it was "the first collection on cinema sound since Rick Altman's *Sound Theory / Sound Practice*, in 1992" and observed that the field is conceptually fragmented and remains emergent: "appear[ing] to remain forever in a state of becoming, never quite arriving".[26] In the introduction, Michele Hilmes questions, "Is there a field called sound cultural studies? And does it matter?"[27] The collection's, and the field's, accommodation of a lack of theoretical cohesion is reflected in the collection's organisation: a variety of theoretical perspectives, with cultural studies separated into its own section; eclectic organisation of sections on history and genre; and case studies. The real development of *Lowering the Boom* in comparison with earlier collections on film sound is the "Case Studies of Film Sound" section. In fact, most of the articles in the other sections are also case studies, based as they are on individual films, suggesting that the significant development has been in terms of confidence in approaching particular films in terms of sound and considering sound in its application, rather than aiming to advance or consolidate the field through technical interests.[28] This, in Deleuzian terms, is a good thing in that it begins with and returns to the concrete and resists

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[23] Glossaries include the following: Rick Altman, "Afterword: A Baker's Dozen Terms for Sound Analysis", in *Sound Theory Sound Practice* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 249-253; Stephen Handzo, "Appendix: A Narrative Glossary of Film Sound Technology" in *Film Sound, ed.* Elisabeth Weis and John Belton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 383-426; and Michel Chion, *Film, A Sound Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 465-500. The *Yale French Studies* special edition on cinematic sound includes a bibliography: Claudia Gorbman, "Bibliography on Sound in Film", *Cinema Sound*, *Yale French Studies*, no. 60 (1980): 269-286.

[24] The exception is Michel Chion. Others of Chion's publications (since 1982) contain extensive glossaries and he maintains an email link to his "100 Concepts to Think and Describe Sound Cinema," http://michelchion.com., accessed May 19, 2022.

[25] Thomas Caldwell, *Film Analysis Handbook*: "Sound is used to give meaning to visuals" (106); "Sound is used to highlight aspects of the visuals that the filmmaker wants the audience to focus on" (107). The chapter on "The Basics" is prefaced by "The first basic rule: Cinema is a visual art form". (1) In reaching the 1:7 ratio, I have only considered terms that are directly related to visual and sound, not terms related to cinematic history, editing and genre. The tendency to regard editing as visual would skew the ratio even more towards the visual. The ratio in particular texts, sound to visual, is as follows: Moon 17:122, Caldwell 10:80, Bordwell 11:67, Hayward 6:26. Incidentally, and not to be throwing stones in a glass house, 1:6 is the ratio of direct reference to sound to other cinematic concerns *in this thesis*. Brian Moon, *Viewing Terms* (Perth: Chalkface Press, 2004); Thomas Caldwell, (Mentone: Insight Publications, 2011); David Bordwell, Jeff Smith and Kristin Thompson, *Film Art*, (12th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2020); Susan Hayward, *Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts*, (New York: Routledge, 2018.)

[26] Michele Hilmes cited in Jay Beck and Tony Grajeda, "Introduction: The Future of Film Sound Studies," in *Lowering the Boom*, ed. Jay Beck and Tony Grajeda (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 1.

[27] Ibid., 1.

[28] For example, even in the section dedicated to theory, particular films are identified in some chapter titles: for example, "The Phenomenology of Film Sound: Robert Bresson's *a Man Escaped*" and "The Sounds of 'Silence': Dolby Stereo, Sound Design, and *The Silence of the Lambs*".

the temptation to totalise. In this sense, *Lowering the Boom* mirrors developments that have been observed in *Deleuze and Film*, which similarly based analysis on particular films and genres (see Chapter 2). The latter collection lacks a focus on sound; the former lacks Deleuze.

One of the observations in the introduction of *Lowering the Boom* is that "despite the renewed efforts of numerous theorists, critics, and practitioners, film sound still exists in the shadows of the image".[29] The use of "the image" as synecdoche for visuals is worthy of comment since it is conventional in significant scholarly film analysis. Altman, in his watershed *Yale French Studies* special issue on film sound, refers to "the image" by which he means the visual image.[30] Similarly, Chion, in *Audio-Vision* (2017), refers to "sound and image". Deleuze authorises the conflation of visuals and image in *Cinema 1,* as we have seen, where neither is of direct interest except as they relate to the real concerns of image-types and movement-images. Again, the risk is that, without direct reference to components, visual's hegemony remains unchallenged. The challenge does come in *Cinema 2*, with the emergence of a "sound image" in modern films as the realisation of something anticipated earlier in *Cinema 1*, "when we are in a position to analyse the sound image for itself".[31]

Further, in terms of usage, a cinematic "sound image" is distinct from Saussure's linguistic "sound image"[32] and Felicity Colman use of the hyphenated "sound-image" as an inclusive term similar to Deleuze's "visual and sound".[33] It is strategically useful to understand sound as image in order to force analysis to specify between kinds of images, extending to others such as haptic and kinaesthetic images. Furthermore, it is necessary to grasp sound as an image if sound is to be understood to signify, that is, to be capable of forming signs or to be capable of sustaining thought in the interpretant, without which any attempt to differentiate between sound and visual images would be merely descriptive.

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[29] Ibid., 2.

[30] Altman, "Introduction" *Yale French Studies*, 3-15.

[31] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 85.

[32] "The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. The *sound-image* is sensory, and if I happen to call it 'material,' it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, which is generally more abstract". Ferdinand de Saussure, "Ferdinand de Saussure, From Course in General Linguistics", http://faculty.smu.edu/nschwart/seminar/Saussure.htm., accessed 25 April 2020.

[33] Felicity Colman, *Deleuze and Cinema: The Film Concepts* (Oxford: Berg, 2011), 10, and throughout. "No matter what the content, the type of interface and/or gesture required to access and operate it, screen forms are moving sound-images on time-based platforms". (10) Colman identifies the question "How do screen-based forms become autonomous?" as one of three guiding questions for Deleuze's "cine-system". The other two questions are: *How does a screen form produce content?* and, *How does cinema produce philosophical concepts?* Ibid., 12.

When Altman discusses sound directly in terms of signs, he draws on Peirce but in a different way from Deleuze. Altman's particular aim was to demonstrate that, historically, sound had moved from the indexical to the iconic: "[substituting] constructed iconicity for recorded indexicality".[34] He depicted the break between "natural" or "realistic" sound and the visual image as a break in indexicality (sound that demonstrates direct correspondence to objects) in favour of the iconic (audio-images as analogy or some other likeness between the sign and its object): In classical cinema, for example and following Altman, a siren matched to the visual of an ambulance is indexical with the impression that it was recorded live as actuality (closely matched to the diegetic contexts established by the visuals). It is indexical even if we do not see the ambulance but know it to be describing the ambulance through context and through constitutive elements, such as pitch, volume, perspective, and reverberation, resulting in a sense of realism. With the modernist iconic sign, sound is freed: a siren's sound might highlight an emotional state through analogy.

The iconic permits greater freedom and creativity when it is understood that the link between visuals and sound is purposive rather than representational. The application of this understanding can be especially complex when it relies on an indexical-iconic slippage as, for example, in the opening scenes of *Apocalypse Now* between the chopper sounds in the field and the fan sounds in the hotel room. The slippage, itself, indicates Willard's mental state. More importantly for analysis, the viewer is being conditioned, from the very start of the film, to recognise iconic connections between images and a deliberate play of (and with) indexicality. Such conditional indexicality can take on a plasticity. For example, sound designer Walter Murch describes the process in which the chopper sounds are achieved: "We deconstructed the real helicopter sound into its various components and reproduced those components on the synthesizer. So then we had a synthesized blade thwarp, a synthesized turbine whine, a synthesized gear sound".[35] The depiction of Willard's mental state is, in other words, the product of sound images that are unhinged from naturalistic settings by various distortions and astute mixing.

The iconic sound image is demonstrated in its most extreme form in cartoons and Scott Curtis prefers the term, "isomorphic", that is, essentially iconic but based on undisguised analogy between a sound's and its object's "shapes" where "a character's wide-eyed blinks are accompanied by a couple of light, sprightly notes, buildings sway to the music" and where "the tempo of the music

[34] Rick Altman, "Introduction: Four and a Half Film Fallacies," in *Sound Theory Sound Practice, ed.* Rick Altman (New York: Routledge, 1992), 44.

[35] Vincent LoBrutto, *Sound-On-Film: Interviews with Creators of Film Sound* (Westport: Praeger, 1994), Kindle ed. Loc. 1424. [Chapter 9, "Walter Murch".]

and the image match, as when bass strings are plucked or wood blocks are tapped with each step".[36] The malleability of elements of the sound is enough to convince that a *sound image* is a useful formulation.

Accepting Altman's historical justification of the indexical and iconic eras as classical and modern invites the question of the third of Peirce's triad, the symbolic (and the implication of a symbolic era). William Costanza provides an example of symbolic sound: "The sirens that begin and end *Rebel without a Cause* are part of the storyline — the police are on the way — and also part of the film's symbolic structure, a metaphor for an anguished cry for help".[37] In the sense that Costanza used it, the symbolism is partly indexical: the sirens refer unproblematically to the object. However, the indexical siren comes to be understood as symbolic through its usage in the film as a repeated motif, the way that a novel might create symbolism: Holden Caulfield's red hunting hat in *The Catcher in the Rye* attains symbol status because it is "part of the storyline" with its repetition cementing association with important qualities for Holden and for the novel (isolation, idiosyncrasy, self-concept, protection).

This is different from Andrei Tarkovsky's use of distortions of a correspondence between sound and visual images: it is a less denotative representation of their *relation* that comes to symbolise a spiritual attitude (more later in this chapter). In her discussion of Tarkovsky, Andrea Truppin uses two terms that are useful in describing the indexical relationship between objects and sounds in a particular space: *auditory fingerprint* and *spatial signature* that recognise idiosyncratic patterns of elements of a particular sound in part because of the conditions and space in which it is experienced.[38] The same voice in an elevator will have a different fingerprint — expressed through reverberation, timbre, perceived volume, tone, pitch, *etc* — from in an open field that provides a different spatial signature. Truppin shows that Tarkovsky subverts expected correspondences between fingerprint (the idiosyncratic quality of the sound) and spatial signature (the particular environmental and contextual conditions). Far from being a specialist technique for arthouse movies, a fracture between fingerprint and signature is so routine in contemporary film that it has become the norm.

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[36] Scott Curtis, "The Sound of The Early Warner Bros. Cartoons", in *Sound Theory Sound Practice, ed.* Rick Altman (New York: Routledge, 1992), 201.

[37] William V Costanzo, *Great Films and How to Teach Them* (Urbana: National Council of Teachers of English, 2004), 8.

[38] Truppin, "And Then There Was Sound" in *Sound Theory Sound Practice, ed.* Rick Altman (New York: Routledge, 1992), 241. *Auditory fingerprint* and *spatial signature* have fed a complex sub-field in digital sound with application to music production, Artificial Intelligence, voice recognition, and so on.

Opening sound to analysis: defining and subverting the sound space

Altman identifies the *intelligibility principle* as an important departure from spatial signature that has become institutionalised. The principle — accepted as standard practice in sound recording — challenges the natural correspondence between sight and sound expressed through sound perspective and relative positioning in space. The challenge confuses visual and aural positions in space, not *as* confusion but as a new correspondence between sound and source. In Altman's terms, the separation is iconic, inviting a sense of the relation between sound and visual images and further inviting questions of the "ecology" of the soundscape. Sound perspective and spatial positioning in the recording of voice are sacrificed and with them, claim to be reproducing a natural or literal reality. Simply put, the intelligibility principle requires that we clearly hear every word from a character. Altman recognises this as a code of reality borrowed from theatre based on "theatre's commitment to understandable dialogue".[39]

The intelligibility principle is a negotiated agreement between elements that is only possible if sound is autonomous, and part of the autonomy is that sound is not bound to the limits of the frame. However, the autonomy is not the modernist phenomenon that it is for Deleuze in *Cinema 2*, but still in the service of action that is part of the sensory-motor system of classical cinema. The intelligibility principle was not inevitable for cinema; the quest for sound and visuals in a literal correspondence of perspectives was abandoned around 1938, after a decade of innovation trying to establish it.[40]

Oliver Stone's *Alexander* exemplifies the intelligibility principle but so will almost any contemporary film.[41] In one scene, Alexander the Great is addressing his troops at the start of a battle. Every word of his speech is heard clearly, despite the fact that the scene is intercut between long shots of him riding up and down the front line of his massed troops, point of view shots and

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[39] Rick Altman, "Sound Space", in *Sound Theory / Sound Practice*, ed. Rick Altman (New York: Routledge, 1992), 59.

[40] Speaking of the work of influential sound theorist and technician J.P. Maxfield, Altman notes: "Whereas in 1931 he was wholly concerned with the perspective of the *external auditor*, by 1938 Maxfield —and Hollywood as a whole— showed increased interest in the *internal auditor*. We are asked not to hear, but to identify with someone who will hear for us".
Ibid., 60. [Emphasis added]. For an historical account of the movement towards the technique and acceptance of the intelligibility principle, see also 48–49 and 55–60. Historically, the change in approach was not inevitable. It was a break with early directions in sound recording which attempted to maintain equivalence between shot and sound in terms of spatial position and movement direction. Early attempts, for example, involved placing multiple loudspeakers behind the screen and switching between them to approximate the sound movement and direction. If a character walked from left to right a sequence of speakers would be switched (initially, manually) sequentially to mirror the movement. The history of cinematic sound, especially technical considerations, is discussed in some detail in the "Historical Speculations" section of Altman, *Sound Theory / Sound Practice*, 113–54.

[41] Oliver Stone, *Alexander* (USA: Warner Bros, 2004).

reactions from particular soldiers, and the medium close-ups and medium shots of Alexander that justify an intimate sound distance between speaker and auditor. At times, he is reduced in wide-angle crane shots. At times, he is moving and there are cheers from his men. Throughout, we hear what he has to say as if he was close to the listener (given a performance of projection in the voice). That is, for the quality and clarity of the sound, an equivalent visual would have the actor speaking in a continuous medium shot or close-up.

In this sequence, there are some exceptions that recognise perspective, but they are self-contained and narrative driven. For example, we hear the speech as well as other sounds fade to inaudibility from the point of view of an eagle (a god's-eye view that could be read symbolically as Zeus's) gliding above, and the distant enemy line appears to be hearing the speech but only through association, non-diegetically, with the speech layered over visual images of the waiting army. Manifestly, all of these considerations are well beyond what physical distance and sound perspective would permit to reach more than a small group of the vast army hearing the speech, yet it seemed to have inspired them all.

Sound and visuals are held together in an "ecology" that allows the spectator to experience, without confusion, a degree of vocal intimacy from the character while simultaneously observing him or her in social settings and permitting creative filmic diversions (the eagle in *Alexander*). The relation of sound and vision as constructed and complicit is understood as "contingently obligatory": "coherence is not logical, but ecological . . . [Deleuze and Guattari's notion of *consistency*] means that things are irrevocably connected to one another, despite not having any sort of underlying element in common".[42] The notion of "contingently obligatory" is Manuel DeLanda's term, cited by Steven Shaviro, and relevant in terms of Peirce's thirdness expressed as DeLanda's "patterns interacting with other patterns as patterns".[43] Sound forms patterns in which patterns of music interact with patterns of ambient sound, with patterns of dialogue, and with what can be understood as patterns of visuals.[44] Consequently, DeLanda and Shaviro, both drawing on Deleuze, shift the analytical interest from the ontological *how does sound work?* to the question *how is sound working (here)?*

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[42] Steven Shaviro, *Without Criteria* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009), 108.

[43] Manuel DeLanda and Graham Harman, *The Rise of Realism* (Cambridge: Polity press, 2017), 11.

[44] Shaviro, *Without Criteria,* 109. The sense of a whole or a coherence comes from the connections between not elements but patterns of elements. Shaviro identifies "coherence" in Whitehead, "consistency" in Deleuze and Guattari, and "relations of exteriority" in DeLanda as "notions [that] posit a world in which everything is connected to everything else. However, these connections are not principles of internal definition or determination" (109).

The intelligibility principle recognises a different plane for sound and Mary Ann Doane further demonstrates sound's independence in its having different theoretical concerns in different spaces: the space of diegesis in which sound is denotative (but not necessarily natural or taking natural sound to be the standard); the visible dimensions of space of the screen (the frame) that provides a constant that is absolute for visuals but referential for sound that exists unproblematically beyond the frame; and the acoustical space of the theatre or auditorium as a space of reception in which the essential fluidity and enveloping quality of sound finds expression and containment in spatial limitations of the cinema.[45] Doane offers sound-space as similar to Redner's "common methodological platform" and what we have understood as a middle ground between molecular and molar concerns.

Alexander, for example, inhabits the first sound space of the diegesis, when we conceptualise Alexander's world as a cohesive product of what is seen and heard and also in terms of their conditions: the imperative to battle, strength of leadership, and an historical past (the milieu). The second sound space of the screen sectionalises and limits this diegetic world into a frame set by the limits of projection. Since the limit is visual, it is sound's relation to the limit that is important. Sound is not strictly defined by the limit as the visual is: it is possible to hear Alexander in close-up as we see him in long-shot. It is true that a visual world is assumed to extend beyond the frame, but the assumption is enough; we see what we need to see (and assume it to be more of the same). Doane is interested in the employment of sound from unseen sources, especially in the *voice-off* and *voice-over* and their potential for creative film making.[46] The *voice-off* — a character speaking without appearing on the screen, of which the voice-over is a special case — can simply demonstrate sound from diegetic space that extends beyond the frame, but in one of Doane's examples, *Kiss Me Deadly*, it is employed more creatively as the villain "remains out of frame until the last sequences of the film".[47]

The third sound space is the acoustic space of the cinema's auditorium: the physical conditions of the space in which the acoustic event of the film happens and is experienced. Actual (not narrative-generated) perspective, isolation from other sounds, and other technical considerations mediate and condition the reception of cinematic sound. It is not just that the auditorium is the place where sound is heard, completing a process of transmission. As Doane recognises, the third space is the

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[45] Mary Ann Doane, "The Voice in the Cinema: The Articulation of Body and Space", in *Film Sound: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elisabeth Weis and John Belton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

[46] Ibid., 165.

[47] Ibid., 167. Robert Aldrich, *Kiss Me Deadly*, film (USA: United Artists, 1955).

one that is not available to the characters. That is, it is outside the diegetic space, but it is not what is normally understood as non-diegetic. Rather, it is the space in which the sound of both diegetic and non-diegetic sound is experienced.

It is one thing for a filmmaker to pay close creative attention to sound reception and to make it a part of sound design, but it requires a cinema sound system capable of realising it. It is a complaint by directors who value sound quality that many cinemas are not equipped to realise artistic use of sound.[48] Surround sound and Dolby technology revolutionised the potential (at least) of Doane's third sound space, and Doane's interest is in what the third space means psychologically for the spectator experiencing the sound. It seems to tend toward a cognitivism for sound. However, Doane's attention on space defers psychoanalysis of the auditor. It is in the consideration of spaces and sites that Doane provides a model for analysis that stays outside of the head of the spectator to seek a psychoanalytical mechanism in a space that can be regarded in terms of Deleuze and Guattari's *territory* as a site of passage: "rather than being a sedentary place maintaining firm borders against an outside threat, territory is itself a malleable site of passage".[49] Doane does not shy away from psychoanalysis to inform generalised and theorised interpretation of the features of passage, but her interest is in the extent that psychoanalysis informs film analysis, not the extent to which it accounts for responses.

The *voice-off*, for example, can be approached through each of the three categories of sound space as a way of exposing relevant concerns of the film sound. The first two categories are definitional, while the third, rather than completing the definition with a theory of reception, keeps it open as a signifying process. Doane's interest in voices-off relies on a complex interaction between her three sound spaces: movement in an *assumed* diegesis of the voice, assuming a body that is situated in a space beyond the frame; the *apprehension* of indexical connections between observed and heard objects negotiating a relation to visuals limited by the frame; and a process of generating meaning that values the potential of sound and regards the auditorium as a creative space (beyond its function as a site for broadcast). The phantom bodies, the unseen reality, and the complicit engagement in creative processes beg psychoanalytical attention.

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[48] Even visual projection could be a concern: for instance, Stanley Kubrick "insisted that European theaters use the correct 1.66 lenses to project the movie [*A Clockwork Orange*]. His assistants got used to calling up and visiting movie theaters to make sure there were no catastrophic glitches when a Kubrick film was shown". David Mikics, *Stanley Kubrick: American Filmmaker* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 90.

[49] Kylie Message, "Territory" in Adrian Parr, *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 280.

Doane is clear about her interest in the voice-off: "As soon as sound is detached from its source, no longer anchored by a represented body, its potential work as a signifier is revealed".[50] Doane's specific concern is detachment of the voice from the visible body. She advances the concept of the phantasmatic body and a "presence-to-itself"[51] where an actual body is not visible, but necessarily assumed, "Just as the voice must be anchored by a given body, the body must be anchored in a given space".[52] Brian Willems similarly identifies "the pull to the origin of the sound" and an interest in interpretation that makes imputations about the origin. [53]

> When I speak, you can analyse my words for their sound, but actually you listen to them for their meaning. On the other hand, if you listen to my words to learn whether I have a cold, you do not pay attention to their meaning. Here the word serves as an "index". The effect of being open to the index is that your attention moves from interpreting the meaning to interpreting the process of the generation of meaning.[54]

Whereas indexicality can describe the unproblematic linking of sound and visual, it is not, in a particular speech event, necessarily a simple process. Willems alludes to multiple indexes in the same event. Similarly, Willems' "interpreting the process of the generation of meaning" supports Doane's interest in theoretical implications of a disembodied voice. She proceeds via Lacan and eventually to a critique of political processes that profit by "political erotics"[55] recognising a pull of the voice to a body: it is a call to origin in a baby's experience in the hearing of a mother's voice but also open to manipulation. Patricia Pisters and Altman, independently of each other, discuss radio of the 1920s and 30s, as territorialising: "political masses were created around the radio, through the hypnotic power of the disembodied voices of dictators that incited them to become subjects through strict identity politics and exclusion of everything foreign to the self-same identity (Jews, homosexuals, and all other minorities)".[56]

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50 Doane, "The Voice in Cinema", 167.

51 Ibid., 162.

52 Ibid., 164. Drawing on French psychoanalyst, Guy Rosolato, Doane establishes that, in infancy, sounds are primary, and the bodies constructed around the sounds are phantasmic to the child. Her thesis is that sound and voice work in a similarly phantasmic way in cinema, and that we connect through it to a visual, not the reverse, as common sense would have it. The intimate attention to the characters, through sound, is a source of pleasure for spectators and this takes Doane to Lacan.

53 Brian Willems, "Sound, Image, Index", in *Pierre Schaeffer: Mediart — Proceedings of the International Conference* (Croatia: Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art, 2011), 62.

54 Ibid., 62.

55 Doane, "The Voice in Cinema" 174.

56 Pisters continues: "The power of sound is, of course, even more obvious when we think of the power of Hitler's voice through the radio. Chion's concept of the *acousmetre* [from acousmatic — hearing without seeing] now can be explained in terms of territorializing forces of sound". Patricia Pisters, *The Matrix of Visual Culture*, 188–189. In a similar vein Rick Altman, in his foreword to Chion's *Audio-Vision*: "There were of course many more significant reasons for the rise of the Great Dictators [than sound through political speeches, radio and the advent of the talkies] in the twenties and thirties, and it is true that the silent film had sometimes

Doane's feminism theorises sound as presenting a wedge to disrupt what she calls an investment in realism and representation: "The ideology of the visible demands that the spectator understand the images as a truthful representation of reality, the ideology of the audible demands that there exists simultaneously a different truth and another order of reality for the subject to grasp".[57] The utility of Doane's sound spaces is not that she presents watertight analytical categories for sound. There is overlap between them: the first and second spaces are about diegetic sound; the second and third are about reception of sound; the first and second are experienced in the third. Certainty and inevitability of any is dislodged in favour of her central notion of heterogeneity as a recognition of multiple boundaries and conditions, and so an assumption of the dominance of one over another is understood to be overtly political. Her methodology is as much a process for creating heterogeneity as describing it. Chion sees such research as a freeing of methodology from "the causal yoke (the soundtrack has X because of Y) in favour of dynamic analysis — that is, an analysis that takes into account the evolving and changing nature of the soundtrack and image in time".[58] Doane's liberating methodology (and methodology of liberation) places cinematic sound as topographical:

> a series of spaces including that of the spectator — spaces which are often hierarchized or masked, one by the other, in the service of a representational illusion. Nevertheless, whatever the arrangement or interpretation of the various spaces, they constitute a *place* where signification intrudes. The various techniques and strategies for the deployment of the voice contribute heavily to the definition of the form that "place" takes.[59]

The "intrusion of signification" is an attractive notion because it problematises the relation between the sign and its object and refuses to acknowledge an inevitable signification. Doane's filmic body further problematises, even as it superficially seems to support, what was already a sticking point for sound theory in the need to definitively anchor sound, that is, to attribute sound to a physical source in a coherent, shared and assumed reality.

Christian Metz conceded the "sound object" without which it would be difficult to argue sound's status as an image: "from a logical point of view, buzzing *is* an object, an acoustic object in the

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been used to rally people around the flag, but it is nonetheless chilling to recall that Hitler's ascension to power marched in lockstep with the successful development of the talking film". Rick Altman in Chion, *Audio-Vision,* x.

[57] Mary Ann Doane, "Ideology and the Practice of Sound Editing and Mixing" in *Film Sound: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elisabeth Weis and John Belton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 55.

[58] Chion, *Audio-Vision,* 185.

[59] Doane, "The Voice in Cinema", 174.

same way that a tulip is a visual object".[60] But his concession was heavily qualified.[61] Metz's preferred position is that the visual object provides the crucial information about the sound, and that direct reference to the sound is adjectival: *rumbling* thunder, *crashing* waves, *loud* gunshot. The source of the sound, the noun, is evident (directly or indirectly) in the visual image, and for any accuracy in a description of the sound there needs to be reference to the source; *contra* Doane, Metz's source is unproblematic and singular.

With modern cinema, in relation to Metz, either the noun is of no great interest, but the adjective is, or the sound becomes the equivalent of a nominal phrase. In either case, the impression that we only have a single grammatical term (adjective or noun) to spend on sound and vision becomes too limiting, as if the "rumble of thunder" is not concise enough and one has to quibble over which term is expendable. The parsing would be of interest, and even necessary, if cinema were considered to have a common language. However, it is Deleuze's criticism of Metz that a linguistic approach provides structures and methodologies that are external to the film and not warranted if the process of analysis is one of discovery of a film's idiosyncratic syntax.

> The difficulty . . . is that, for Metz, narration refers to one or several codes as underlying linguistic determinants from which it flows into the image in the shape of an evident given. On the contrary it seems to us that narration is only a consequence of the visible (*apparent*) images themselves and their direct combinations — it is never given. [62]

It is out of the relations between images — between visual and sound, visual and visual, sound and sound, and other images (tactile, kinetic, time, linguistic, *etc.*) — that narrative meaning surfaces. Metz is valuable in a deliberation of sound because he raises the question of object-sound relations and he delivers a clear presentation of the argument that "We claim that we are talking about sound, but we are actually thinking of the visual image of the sound's source".[63] For him, off-screen sound is ontologically questionable because all sound is off-screen — "it could not possibly be situated

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[60] Christian Metz, "Aural Objects" in *Film Sound*, ed. Weis and Belton, 156.

[61] His qualification follows directly: "Language takes that into account — or at least the lexicon does, in the absence of discourse — since the great number of recognizable sounds, relegated to the rank of characteristics, still corresponds to nouns — this is a sort of compromise which doesn't prevent auditory traits from participating more weakly than others in the dominant principle of object recognition. On the other hand, as soon as it becomes a question of naming the concept or the aural object itself, it is necessary to add to the word 'object' the epithet 'aural'". Ibid., 156.

[62] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 26.

[63] Metz, "Aural Objects", 158.

within the interior of a rectangle or outside of it"[64] — and so off-screen is a term relevant to visual images and further evidence of his thesis of the primacy of the visual.

Consequently, Metz discounts sound, other than dialogue, as adjectival and secondary, for example, in a sound of gunshot, it is the fact of a gun being shot that is crucial and other concerns such as loudness or type of gun are secondary qualities: "For us [Metz] the primary qualities are in general visual and tactile".[65] Nevertheless, it is exactly what Metz discounts, that gives sound its power for Tarkovsky. Tarkovsky does not contradict Metz but refuses to make it all add up. In Doane's terms, the spaces are not aligned or even alignable. Outside of the frame is not at all given or accessible (the planet Solaris in *Solaris*, and the outlands in *Stalker* are never clearly understood) so clear reference back to an object existing in a shared sense of reality is repeatedly subverted.

The logic of sound

In *Stalker*, the physical givens are sabotaged by sounds: the tunnel responds to human presence and changes reverberation in a way that does not match natural acoustics of the tunnel;[66] the Room (the narrative goal and a place that grants deepest-held wishes) has ambiguous dimensions; paths don't take us where we expect and Stalker (the character) needs to mark their route with white cloth fragments weighted with bolts, so little is the physical world to be trusted. While Metz can seem pertinent — it *is* still the sound of a voice in a tunnel — the interest for Tarkovsky is precisely in the unhinged adjectival, or perhaps adverbial. If the sound does not take us unproblematically back to the source, where *does* it take us? Tarkovsky's spiritualism will be discussed presently, but the acceptance of aberration plays a significant part in it.

As with the opening sequence of *Apocalypse Now*, the nouns (jungle, helicopter, dust, explosion, fan) are the objects of sound, but the real object is a mental state not only of Willard but also of the spectator. The state relies on disjunctive relations between images: an exploding jungle, seemingly spontaneously, without corresponding sound, draws us to the awesome beauty of the image rather than to the event as destructive. The glossy visuals here and throughout the film give to the depiction

[64] Ibid., 157

[65] Ibid., 157.

[66] "At first the Writer's [a character] voice is flat as he speaks facing the tunnel's entrance. Logically, the large hollow tunnel would be an excellent echo chamber. Paradoxically, his voice becomes more reverberant when he speaks facing away from the tunnel's entrance". Truppin, "And Then There Was Sound", 242.

of the war a seductive aesthetic quality that, in this case, is enhanced by the lack of diegetic sound. The viewer is not pondering the futility of war as with the gritty *Saving Private Ryan*.

Apocalypse Now opens with the melancholy of the Doors' song that seems appropriate in describing a military apocalypse despite it being ostensibly about the end of a romantic relationship.[67] Sound, here, is complicit in exposing the concerns of the film: the confusion of the personal *and* the apocalyptic (agent and victim, immediate and distant, the regular guy — with other regular guys who surf, cook, love music, and like to get high — and the soldier who kills) are made indistinguishable, but not by description. An aberrant diegesis is achieved by working from the relation of one image to another, not by creating an external reality in which things happen. Diegesis is repeatedly subverted as the organising concern, rather images are formed around particular ideas justifying a certain plasticity in the employment of images.

> Eisenstein compared them [signaletic material, "all kinds of modulations"] first to ideograms, then, more profoundly, to the internal monologue as proto-language or primitive language system. But, even with its verbal elements, this is neither a language system nor a language. It is a plastic mass, an a-signifying and a-syntaxic material, a material not formed linguistically even though it is not amorphous and is formed semiotically, aesthetically and pragmatically.[68]

The discomforting thing for radically ontological or essentialist approaches to sound is that Deleuze recognises that the material is formed "semiotically, aesthetically and pragmatically". Images are formed around organising concerns and ideas, building a series of signs and sensations. Meaning itself does not need to be discovered as the outcome of analysis; it is already there in the idea as the germ of the articulation of an assemblage (in Deleuzian parlance) giving signaletic material form. Eventually, the analytical movement might be to language or a linguistic organisation of material and images, but "the language system only exists in its reaction to a *non-language-material* that it transforms".[69] From the point of view of conventional analysis, which has long discussed visuals in terms of a language of cinema, sound is the first and most prominent challenge of a non-language-material. Either sound is seen as supporting visuals or it is complicit in a broadened grasp of

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[67] The Doors, *The End*, Song Hollywood: Elektra, 1966. "[A goodbye song] Probably just to a girl, but I could see how it could be goodbye to a kind of childhood. I really don't know. I think it's sufficiently complex and universal in its imagery that it could be almost anything you want it to be". Jerry Hopkins, "Jim Morrison: The Rolling Stone Interview", *Rolling Stone*, 26 June 1969. https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/the-rolling-stone-interview-jim-morrison-73308/.

[68] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 29.

[69] Ibid., 29. [Emphasis in the original].

cinematic material, returning us to sensation. It is appropriate then to consider affect and percept in a little more detail. If it initially seems like a detour from sound, it is in order to establish an analytical framework that includes sound, visual and other images without prioritising or creating a hierarchy and, as we have already seen from Redner, there is a use for sensation in explicating sound that would be furthered with greater detail of its component concepts.

Cezanne is not appreciated because he painted apples, but because he makes demands on the viewer to share an experience through a particular organisation of paint, brush strokes, colour, and lines (*non-language-material*). The usefulness of the concept of sensation is that it does not demand linguistic organisation; it requires recognition that an *idea* or feeling or awareness has, or is, invested in the technical materials at hand. "The logic of colour" licences the question of the logic of sound (or any element) that, as a logic, directs and organises emergent meaning. In terms of sensation, the elements of the logic are the percept and affect as distillations of everyday sensory experience:

> By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations. A method is needed, and this varies with every artist and forms part of the work . . . [70]

In comparison, the movement-image *contains* perception and affection (elements of sensation) as image-types and results in the justification of action in the classical model, the logic of the sensory-motor system. However, accounting for the percept is not the same as accounting for perception. This is important as it recognises the percept as a compound image that requires a sense of complicity between sound and visuals. Again, the burning jungle that opens *Apocalypse Now* provides an example: it is not just the burning jungle, but the eruption of flames, clouds of dust in the foreground, the momentary passing of landing gear of the helicopter, the sound of tambourines, guitar chords and the words timed to the eruption of fire: "This is the end, the only end my friend". These form the full percept. The important thing is not to fall into the trap of regarding percept (and affect) as static or simple. Sensation, percept, and affect exist independently of a particular viewer's ability to sense, perceive, and feel but viewers (especially critics and analysts) might engage in a dialogue between the percept and what *they* perceive. Basically, the percept is a perception of

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[70] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 167.

perception, laying the rationale for the perception-image, but given different form that celebrates and sustains the *fact* of perception.

If there is an analytical method for appreciating affect and percept, it rests in grasping a site-specific confluence of forces expressed through cinema's tools, the equivalent of painting's colour and brushstroke. An example is Elena del Río's approach to Marylee's dancing in *Written on the Wind* (discussed in Chapter 2). We are invited to *watch* and to identify with Marylee (there are no subjective angles or close-ups that separate her from her surroundings). The vivid colors and blaring jazz music frame a situation that conspires to make this an emblematic and compound image: a sensation.

The question of whether Marylee's case is identified as an affect or a percept is best approached in terms of etymology and then considered in terms of the purpose of its usage. When Redner understands them to be sequential, he is using them properly in the terms of the classical model and their incarnations as perception-image and affection-image. Technically, however, they do not share a common root. Deleuze's use of affect comes directly from Spinoza and incorporates a strong sense of the *embodiment* of feelings in an image.

> It is certain that affect implies an image or idea, and follows from the latter as from its cause. But it is not confined to the image or idea; it is of another nature, being purely transitive, and not indicative or representative, since it is experienced in a lived duration that involves the difference between two states.[71]

The lived duration of Marylee's dancing at the party and later in her room places her between two states, on a plot level, of persistent love for Mitch (Rock Hudson's character) and his sustained rejection of her. It also places her between the "young" ("Girls just wanna have fun") Marylee at the mercy of sexual urges and the bitter Marylee who feeds destructive urges in her brother, as the transitive duration. The affect — here it is Marylee's dancing — is the embodied realization of that transition.

Percept, instead, is more Bergsonian, as is the blurring between the two: "there is no perception without affection. Affection is, then, that part of the inside of our body which we mix with the image of external bodies: it is what we must first of all subtract from perception to get the image in

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[71] Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 49.

its purity".[72] Both affect and percept, then can be approached in terms of the mechanism of perception that is elaborated in *Creative Evolution* and describes the distillation essential to them both:

> The cerebral mechanism is arranged just so as to drive back into the unconscious almost the whole of this past [the entirety of one's past[73]], and to admit beyond the threshold only that which can cast light on the present situation or further the action now being prepared — in short, only that which can give *useful* work.[74]

It is in the scale of this description that the percept is anticipated: the whole of one's past driven back into consciousness has an operatic scale about it. John Marks' definition of the percept in literature relates a character as inseparable from the landscape in a way that makes it *their* landscape as much as a landscape that shapes them.[75] It is as if when Bergson describes the driving back into unconsciousness, the percept requires that it be signified somewhere. In Marks' examples, Thomas Hardy's moor becomes the unconscious and T. E. Lawrence's desert pushes British privilege and imperialism into the unconscious. "Characters can only exist, and the author can only create them, because they do not perceive [the landscape] but have passed into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound of sensations".[76] Marylee's landscape is the family house (and excursions out of it for casual sex).[77] In terms of sound, the jazz is used diegetically in the house and symbolically outside, but in the duration of both, Maylee is free. Sound performs a similar function in other movies, and is indispensable to the way characters are perceived, understood, and empathised with: Barry Lyndon is inseparable from Handel's music; Rick Deckard from Vangelis's in *Blade Runner*.[78] Ordinarily, the objects of perception merely populate landscape/soundscape, but

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[72] Henri Bergson, "Images and Bodies," in *Henri Bergson: Key Writing,* ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2002), 135.

[73] The entirety is manifest in "all we have felt, thought and willed from our earliest infancy is there . . . pressing against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it outside" (5). Later, this entirety is described as present in the "impulse" that "it is felt in the form of tendency, although a small part of it only is known in the form of an idea" (5). Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (Dover Publications: New York, 1998), 5.

[74] Ibid., 5.

[75] John Marks, "Perception + Literature" in Parr, *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 204–205.

[76] Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* 169.

[77] Marylee's case is only one of many sustained percepts that mark a creative tension between a character and his or her landscape. What is perceived rises above concerns of setting, to encapsulate something essential both about the character and the landscape, in the percept. It is as if, by perceiving the landscape, one understands the character, or by understanding the character, one anticipates a certain landscape: Travis Henderson's alienation and the desolate landscape of *Paris Texas* (Wim Wenders, 1984); Willard's confrontational awakenings and the dangerous river in *Apocalypse Now* (Francis Ford Coppola, *Apocalypse Now,*1979); the ambiguous attraction and aloofness of the schoolgirls and the attractive and dangerous appeal of the Hanging Rock landscape in *Picnic at Hanging Rock* (Peter Weir, 1975).

[78] There is a natural nobility about Lyndon, which suits the music. The fact that he is duplicitous does not contradict his nobility or set up an irony with the music. On the contrary, it recommends his innate nobility more, given the company he keeps. For Deckard, Vangelis provides a *futuristic* ambience, not just a vision of the future as for example in a *Terminator* movie. Deckard's dilemma, as a

the percept retains a sense of what was excluded, if only as a weight, a half-remembered (for the character) awareness of what is excluded in the act of perception.[79]

Sensation has been discussed as a middle ground concept and, by Redner, as a methodological platform. In order to be effective, the two sides need to support the platform. The implication for sound is that a clear separation of sound and visuals is required in order to appreciate the purposefulness of sensation and establish a necessary relationship between the two.

> In modern cinema, visual and sonic images become fully separated from one another . . . As if two films were being constructed, one visual, another aural. But Deleuze stresses that modern films are not really double, that the problem of modern cinema is to maintain the autonomy of sound and sight and yet to establish a necessary relationship between them based on their difference . . . to produce new relationships through their conjunction.[80]

As part of the modernist revitalization of cinema, Deleuze in *Cinema 2* refers to a "pure optical-sound image",[81] recognising the autonomy of sound, and discusses the "sound-image" and the "sound crystal". In the preface, Deleuze anticipates "the relations and disjunctions between visuals and sound, between what is seen and what is said".[82] It is not just that Deleuze is alerting to a separation of components, but, on the contrary, that the shot — or percept, affect, or sensation (whatever the unit under consideration) — relies on a separation in order to fully appreciate a unity. This has a follow-on, or feedback, effect for visuals. The visual image is refreshed as a "new visible" — "when speech makes itself heard, it is as if it makes something new visible, and the visible image, denaturalized, begins to become readable in turn, *as* something visible or visual"[83] — that is, not as natural and photographic. What partly defines modern cinema is a "to-ing and fro-

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replicant who does not know it, in judgement of other replicants sets up tensions between the past and future exemplified in the tension between the noir mise-en-scenes and the synthesiser music, made more acute in versions that do not include Deckard's voice-over. Ridley Scott, *Blade Runner* (USA: Warner Bros., 1982). Most notable of reedited versions of the film (without the voice-over) are *Blade Runner: Director's Cut* (1992) and *Blade Runner: The Final Cut* (2007).

[79] See Chapter 3. The perception-image is discussed as an act of exclusion both philosophically with Bergson and actually in Massumi's account of the missing half-second.

[80] Ronald Bogue, "Gilles Deleuze", in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, ed.* Paisley Livingston and Carl Plantinga (New York: Routledge, 2009), 374.

[81] Deleuze, *Cinema 2,* 20.

[82] Ibid., xiii.

[83] Ibid., 229.

ing between speech and image" resulting in the new conception of the *audio-visual* image, from which the "sound image" was born.[84]

The transformation of the relationship of visuals and sound provided the culmination of Deleuze's cinematic project: "Henceforth, neither of the two faculties is raised to higher exercise without reaching the limit which separates it from the other, but connects it to the other through separating it . . . The visual image and the sound image are in a special relationship".[85] In this state, sound and vision complete each other, "What speech utters is also the invisible that sight sees only through clairvoyance; and what sight sees is the unutterable uttered by speech".[86] The "henceforth" suggests that modern cinema arrived at an understanding that any future analysis (of any film, irrespective of time period) would not be able to shake: the visual image and the sound image in a special relationship. The implication is that it was and is *always* special.[87] Once the sound image is established, it becomes possible to consider its types.

Sound signs via Peirce's sign categories

Since image-types in the classical model do not exclude sound, the aim in turning to Peirce is to be clearer about sound, sound forms, and their functioning as signs in relation to image-types, in the way that Deleuze was able to understand the visual close-up of the affection-image in terms of Peirce's firstness. The intelligibility principle demonstrates that there is no natural correspondence between sound and visuals in cinema, and so it is not enough in analysis to simply be inclusive by intermittently adding ". . . and sound". The sound-image is indistinguishable from its particular sound form, so each sign category will be approached by identifying a dominant form. The sign categories also provide a means to digest concepts that have arisen in the course of this chapter: object-sound relation, sound spaces, sensation, and principles of sound production. Firstly, Deleuze's determination of a zero state, established in our previous chapter, needs to be recognised as having implications for sound.

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[84] Ibid., 247, 251.

[85] Ibid., 260. It is presented as a crucial point and emphasised in the original.

[86] Ibid., 260.

[87] It is a separation that always existed and was celebrated in musicals, in Rouben Mamoulian's pioneering use of sound in other than indexical ways, and in the job of the Foley artist to present a carefully and deliberately constructed "natural sound" with roots in radio's sound effects (with the difference that Foley is postproduction, whereas early radio sound effects were live). It was also there in Eisenstein's resistance to sound, understanding it, not as a completion of a realist project, but as a distraction from the purity of communication through montage. The achievement of classical cinema was to present — and, technically, to find the means to present— a narrative unity of sound and visuals.

Zeroness is the *fact* of perception rather than an image of perception or a percept: "'perception is strictly identical to every image'. In this way, the perception-image disappears into all other movement-images instantaneously".[88] If, in cinema, all images are potential signs, not all are worthy of comment. A blue sky in a film might be the sign of fine weather and an optimistic turn of events — but so what? Some signs are more aesthetic or incidental than contributing to the symbolic system that drives action; perception, in those cases, forms a low-level or functional perception-image, at one end of a scale that has, at the other, the percept as a materialised perception of perception. For sound the difficulty is that the signaletically unimportant needs to be constructed as unimportant. It is not a matter of allowing incidental images — with the equivalent effect of the blue sky — into a shot. It is axiomatic, in the work of the Foley artist, that if we hear a sound, it was put there deliberately (ambient sound included).

The dominant sound form for zeroness (taking Deamer's suggestion that analysis should identify a dominant image-type and adapting it to the dominant form for sound[89]) is ambient sound — sound constructed to be experienced subconsciously. Zeroness for sound becomes a matter of intensity, "we could not imagine any quality unless there were the possibility of its zero intensity, the point where it would no longer make a difference or be felt".[90] Sound that does not make a difference is a good working definition of zeroness in sound, but where a state of actual nothingness is required, it has to be created.

There is no such thing as no sound in film.[91] Where a film needs to create no sound — *Gravity* and *2001: A Space Odyssey* — it must do so by strategically employing sound.

> Without sound, a space [or outer space] film might run the danger of becoming a cartoonish space without depth. Although *Gravity* is a film set in a space that carries no sound, it cannot afford to do without sound . . . It is also sound that infuses the

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[88] David Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 29. [The embedded quotation: Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 31.]

[89] See Chapter 3, this thesis.

[90] Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2006), 3.

[91] This is certainly true of "silent film". Rick Altman— "The Silence of The Silents", *The Musical Quarterly* 80, no. 4 (1996): 648-718— gives a detailed account of the sound that was used both to accompany the film and as part of the environment in which the film was experienced. Altman's epigraph is from Irving Thalberg: "There never was a *silent* film". The question of creating "no sound", which is to say diegetic silence, needs to avoid sound drop-out which is experienced as dead sound and notable as something different from silence in the ambient sound of a film. Dong Liang, following, explores Silence in movies set in space is explored in Dong Liang, "Sound, Space, Gravity: A Kaleidoscopic Hearing (Part I)", *The New Soundtrack* 6, no. 1 (2016): [insert page range].

immensity of the space with human presence, populates it and makes it palpable and therefore navigable.[92]

Cosmic space is only a particular example. The infusion of any cinematic space with a human presence is a good rationale for the intelligibility principle, as it is for perception-images and especially percepts. Once it has a human presence, a cinematic space (following Laing) becomes palpable and navigable. Zeroness as zero intensity in sound becomes a baseline, a natural background for a particular setting: traffic noise and possibly a distant siren for a city, a rustle of the breeze and birds chirping in the country. When they are noticed it is as indexical signs, but not as particularly purposeful, and cliches like those just mentioned are an effective way of employing images that do not engage the viewer in thought. Increased intensity is not for the sake of greater detail and embellishment, but towards a sound space with greater human presence, definition, and investment; sensation is the product of this kind of intensity. The formulation of the percept as character/landscape (T. E. Lawrence as inseparable from his desert) begins in zeroness but soon becomes a concern for firstness and identity.

Firstness has the character emerging from the landscape. Most likely, characters are not aware of the landscape; it is their world. When one changes, the other changes: Willard's journey up the river, in *Apocalypse Now*, is a journey into (his) consciousness — as of course in the novel that inspired it, Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*. In *Under the Skin*, emergence from zeroness to identity is literal — at the start, there is a sustained black silent screen, before a white dot, then audio interference, then sounds, then random images, then words, then patterns, before a landscape is shaped. Aurally, the movement from a black frame to consciousness is via what appears to be a series of learning tasks (it is perhaps the alien's learning, but it is certainly the audience's entry to a world in which images work in odd ways). The first coherent image of the motorcyclist on a winding road at night is experienced as patterns of light. It is a percept: the rider as a product of patterns, and as the first coherent formation of sensation in the film. The rider begins narrative interest: he is the first human presence — discounting for a moment that he is, given the narrative concerns, probably not human — and he precisely makes things palpable and therefore navigable.

Firstness for sound — an "*emergent property*: a property of the whole that is produced by ongoing reaction between its parts"[93] — binds sensation and identity, most clearly in the affect as an

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[92] Dong Liang, "Sound, Space, Gravity", 2.

[93] DeLanda, *The Rise of Realism*, 11.

embodiment of sensation. With Byrne's essential convergence of the visual and the divergence of sound, the visual image converges on the character (more accurately it converges on what is convergent for the character) at the same time that sound places him or her in patterns of divergence. Firstness can be understood as characterisation trapped (but also conceived) between the two: between convergent patterns of identity (especially in voice and a tendency to a personal silence) and divergent patterns of noise in the world.

In Tarkovsky's *Solaris*[94] sounds associated with Berton (whose discredited report of strange things happening on the Solaris space station begins the movie) move from indexical to iconic to symbolic; in doing so they describe his mental state. In a journey by car, sounds move from indexical engine noises of the driverless car in which he travels, to technical distortions that move in and out of diegetic traffic sounds: with low frequency traffic sounds heard as a sustained grumbling hum and the high frequency sounds synthesised, at times fully and at other times subtly exaggerating the metallic scrapes and whines of the engine. Visually, we are stuck in a sustained affection-image, a medium close-up of Berton, lasting nearly five minutes — with some cutaways to the road that are mesmeric and serve to support the intensity of the close-up. The only relief is the appearance of the child in the back seat, but this hardly distracts Berton. One would expect a two-shot with his son to elicit a reaction or conversation, but it does not. It is the relation of sounds with the visuals that points to Berton's emotional state. It is not so much that the sounds *represent* Berton's general mental state, but in the movement-image of this scene, that they precisely demonstrate his inability to resolve the affection-image into some sort of action, any action. In terms of Peirce's sign types, symbolism is stalled, but not discounted. The ineffability of Solaris — the planet, the state, the effect on characters and on the viewer — conditions a difficult secondness robbed of purposeful action and following a firstness of a conflicted identity.

Peirce's secondness describes sound as active in the real world. Occasionally, sound rises to become the subject, such as in *The Conversation*, *Blow Out,* and *Berberian Sound Studio*, in which a separation of sound and visuals is threatening (as it is when visuals provide the trigger for dislocation in *Rear Window* and *Blow Up)* or at least disquieting, as if the two make up the natural order and division between them creates division in the natural order. Secondness is the category of division: relations are achieved through dualities and for cinematic sound secondness produces its own set of general dualities: diegetic/nondiegetic; sound /vision; sound /silence; inside /outside the frame.

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[94] Andrei Tarkovsky, *Solaris* (Soviet Union: Mosfilm, 1972).

DeLanda's depiction of secondness in terms of "symbols and syntax"[95] draws attention to something like a dialectical arrangement of sounds placed in opposition. To recall Peirce from our previous chapter, "A combination of two things is triadic, the whole being the third relatum".[96] While thirdness's rules and assumptions, might describe the logic of resolutions and the concern of the relatum/whole, secondness describes *processes* of separation and connection. If zeroness is an ambient sound setting and firstness defines a personal sound space, secondness is an arena of dialogue. It has a special place in sound because its syntax can be taken literally in linguistic terms as well as contributing to the syntax of images (most often identified, via *auteur* theory, as the director's or writer's style). More, a syntax in *performed* dialogue identifies speech patterns that are significant in grasping a character. At the same time, dialogue puts one character in opposition to another as the primary exemplification of secondness as "the general category of our experience that captures existence, resistance and reality".[97] If firstness shapes identity, secondness sees it placed in an oppositional and existential space dominated by spoken language.

Scriptwriting specialist, Robert McKee, advanced "the principle of antagonism" in dialogue that engages opposition and duality on two levels. The first is interpersonal and the second is with the negativity that is at the root of the antagonism, something like a relatum. The principle states: "A protagonist and his [or her] story can only be as intellectually fascinating and emotionally compelling as the forces of antagonism make them".[98] It is a useful principle for analysis because it invites a clear (and embodied) identification of dualities, and the further question of what it is, exactly, that places them in opposition.

The following exchange is the first between Carol and Therese in Todd Haynes' *Carol.*[99] It is quoted at length, because the significance is not in a few lines. Rather, it is in subtle shifts and rhythms. If this does not seem like opposition yet, much less antagonism, it is the point from which antagonism emerges incrementally. A commentary is provided.

[95] DeLanda, *The Rise of Realism*, 11. DeLanda does not identify his discussion of patterns explicitly in terms of Peirce, but he identifies three levels that are being taken to correspond to Peirce (as discussed more generally for the image in the Chapter 3).

[96] Short, *Peirce's Theory of Signs*, 84.

[97] Albert Atkin, *Peirce* (London: Routledge, 2016), 300.

[98] Robert McKee, *Story: Substance, Structure, Style, and the Principles of Screenwriting* (London: Methuen, 1999), 317.

[99] Phyllis Nagy, *Carol*, film script (USA: The Weinstein Company, 2015), https://www.screenwritersnetwork.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Carol-Script.pdf. Accessed 19 May 2022.

[Immediately preceding the extract, Therese, a salesperson, and Carol, a wealthy customer, have noticed each other across the busy space of a department store floor at Christmas time. It is busy, but more a flow of people than clutter. When they begin speaking to each other background sounds are reduced and as we might expect, given the intelligibility principle, sound is intimate. Even more, sound speech is rich and deep, more like a loud whisper than full-blown conversation in a noisy department store. The *relationship* is becoming intelligible. Therese is at a desk in the toy section. Carol wants a doll for her daughter.]

Their eyes meet for a moment, before CAROL rummages inside her purse again. She produces a billfold, opens it, shows it to THERESE. It's a photo of RINDY, CAROL'S 4-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER.

<div align="center">

THERESE

</div>

She looks like you. Around the mouth. The eyes.

[She delivers the lines looking at the photo, not at Carol. Carol's features have been registered. Essentially, but not literally in the camera work, there is an affective zoom from the long shot of the department floor to the face of Carol. The visual space of the shots adjusts to suit the conversation: medium shots, narrow depth of field, two-shots. There are grounds for McKee's antagonism here — a reserve that keeps each in her place — but we are not sure.]

<div align="center">

CAROL

(glancing at THERESE)

</div>

You think so?

THERESE looks up, clocks CAROL watching her, looks down. A bit of an awkward moment that CAROL rescues:

> [It is awkward because Carol is anticipating an intimacy. Her question brings it back to the matter at hand (buying a Christmas gift for her daughter) but does so in a way that opens further intimacy between them — personal history, but in an innocuous way related to the immediate context. Positions are being negotiated.]

CAROL (CONT'D)

So what did you want? When you were that age?

THERESE
(no hesitation)

A train set.

CAROL

Really. That's a surprise. *(beat)*
Do you know much about train sets?

THERESE

I do actually. And there's a new model, just in last week. Hand-built with hand-painted cars — it's a limited edition of five thousand, with the most sophisticated electric switching system — it's quite...

THERESE checks her own enthusiasm, noticing CAROL'S eyes on her.

> [Personal, but not intimate. There is a power relation here and Carol is dominant or the initiator. But Therese is quirky and unconventional and does not shrink from engagement. She is undeterred by protocols of sales-customer relations, and unintimidated by Carol's obvious wealth and status. Carol's dominance does not seek Therese's submission. Now, informal power relations are being negotiated.]

<div align="center">**THERESE (CONT'D)**</div>

You may have seen it. Over by the elevators?

Just there —

THERESE points towards the train set and CAROL turns to look, mulling it over. THERESE watches her every move.

> [There is a release of tension as roles of sales/client are reestablished, but Therese is now demonstrating more overt attraction.]

<div align="center">**CAROL**</div>

<div align="center">*(turns back to THERESE)*</div>

Do you ship?

<div align="center">**THERESE**</div>

Special delivery. Or courier. *(beat)* You'll have it in two, three days. Two days. We'll even assemble it.

<div align="center">**CAROL**</div>

Well. That's. . . that. Sold.

> [Return to sales/client relationship]

They stand there, nodding at each other for a moment.

> [The sustained stares that were furtive are now open.]

<div align="center">**CAROL (CONT'D)**</div>

Shall I pay now?

<div align="center">**THERESE**</div>

Oh - yes, of course.

THERESE begins writing out a sales slip, then slides it over to CAROL with a pen, glancing up at her. CAROL snaps out of a brief moment of thought, a distance.

<div align="center">**THERESE (CONT'D)**</div>

We'll need your account details, your shipping address.

> [There is an exchange of personal details, justified in the sales context. And it is not abused. Therese does not use this information to deliver gloves — left behind by Carol —

<div align="right">157</div>

herself, but to make sure that they are included in the package to be sent.]

                    CAROL

Of course. *(She begins writing)* I love
Christmas. At least I love the preparation.
Wrapping gifts, all that. And then. . . you
somehow wind up overcooking the turkey
anyway.

She finishes, flashing a bright smile. THERESE doesn't quite follow her, but she doesn't
want CAROL to stop talking.

                              [It turns out that this is applicable to her
                              approach to a relationship. She loves the
                              preparation.]

                CAROL (CONT'D)

Done.

CAROL hands the pen and sales slip back to Therese.

                CAROL (CONT'D)

Where'd you learn so much about train sets,
anyway?

                              [The dialogue continues for a while. After
                              Carol leaves, Therese notices Carol's gloves
                              on the counter. The transaction is finished, but
                              the means to continue contact is found as
                              Therese makes sure the gloves are sent with
                              the gift. Later, Carol phones her to thank her.
                              The visuals return to the activity of the
                              department store, but the shallow depth of
                              field is maintained, other characters cross past
                              Therese's counter, out of focus. It is as if
                              something lingers.]

In the extract, Carol asks the questions, but their real purpose seems to be to keep the conversation going. Therese engages with frankness and (checked) verbosity. They want, on both sides, to develop the incipient relationship and the conversation is transformational for both. The situation between the characters is not being resolved, but it is becoming more charged. The nature of that emotional space and the charge is, indeed, the whole movie. A number of oppositions are in play in the simple exchange — roles, social positions, power, gender expectations, emotional distance, and attraction — but they are all reducible to the same single event: an actual relationship between Therese and Carol that, as the narrative progresses, generates antagonism (from others initially, and resulting tensions condition the relationship).

For the most part, Carol and Therese's relationship is demonstration of an important attribute of secondness: two worlds in negotiation (at least, Carol is very wealthy, and Therese is a young store clerk with artistic ambitions). The negotiations are set to continue through, and be projected beyond, the time frame of the movie. It is not that dialogue works functionally to bring characters together or defines characters that is of interest. Rather, dialogue is a process of intensification, which can only truly work if a duality between characters is maintained. It is an engaged difference that, if McKee's model is to work, might result in antagonism (and does in *Carol*). If resolution is to be found — a relationship established, a *relatum* recognised — it needs to arise from the "negation of negation" that is, a negation of the reason for the opposition and of the negativity that defines the antagonism.

The relationship, itself, was never the problem. The negation in *Carol* is the prevailing attitudes to a lesbian relationship in the 1950's. It is negated, in the only way, perhaps, that it could be in the face of hegemonic attitudes of the time, as a low-level implicit understanding between the two that ends the movie — after the couple has been torn apart and Therese has been emotionally damaged and Carol has been cut adrift from the privilege and family that had sustained her. The demonstration of this extract is that sound, as performed dialogue, is crucial in marshalling important narrative focus. It is not that the visuals are unimportant, but they are not, when dialogue is the dominant sound form, the most important or determining part of the compound image. Just as the background tends to an *any-space-whatever* in a close-up, background images in dialogue tends to become nondescript: they become ambient visuals.

Dialogue is quintessentially oppositional, but it has an organising function and provides the ground or the logic (thirdness) for other technical considerations. Tarkovsky's disinclination to align sound

with the visual image equally applies to his dialogue, that in *Stalker* is by turns, taciturn and verbose, but rarely naturalistic.

> As soon as the sounds of the visible world [taking this to include natural dialogue], reflected by the screen, are removed from it, or that world is filled, for the sake of the [visual] image, with extraneous sounds that don't exist literally, or if the real sounds are distorted so that they no longer correspond with the image — then the film acquires a resonance.[100]

Tarkovsky's tenet justifies his general use of sound, but it extends to dialogue as an important "sound of the visible world". In *Stalker*, the distortion is in terms of appropriate registers and dialogue without empathy. Far from fragmenting the film, these distortions point to the sense of another whole or other wholes that for Tarkovsky, offer a religious impulse. Truppin comments: "Tarkovsky uses sound to embody this internal process [ambiguous sound to trigger uncertainty] by drawing a parallel between two leaps of faith: that of accepting a sound provides the existence of an unseen object and that of believing in the existence of an invisible spiritual world".[101] Tarkovsky is important in a discussion of secondness because he presents the *relation* between points in a duality as material for creative work. Audio-images are, then, capable of entering, interdependently, into relationships with other images in the creation of meaning, and dialogue provides an organising dimension. In terms of sign categories, Tarkovsky presents thirdness as emergent, uncertain and even traumatic. McKee's antagonism is lifted to another level. Thirdness — "patterns and forms interacting with each other as patterns or forms"[102] — via Tarkovsky, is a reminder that thirdness does not, or need not, seek certainties, but raises questions of the nature of relations, encourages a sense of the improvisation of rules, and permits the emergence of new concepts.

Dialogue straddles thirdness (dialogue as demonstration of molar forces at work), secondness (in fundamental dualities), and feeds firstness (speech acts and patterns that are part of a character's identity). However, music is pre-eminently the dominant form of sound for thirdness for its ability to draw elements into relation and promoting an emergent sense of a whole. More, there is what is seen and heard in the diegetic reality of the film and, often, a third element of nondiegetic music, acting as a relatum.

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[100] Andrey Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 162.

[101] Truppin, "And Then There Was Sound", 236.

[102] DeLanda, *The Rise of Realism*, 11.

The classical score in *Barry Lyndon*, provides a unity or an articulation of the film's whole. Similarly, with Beethoven in *A Clockwork Orange* and Strauss Waltzes in *2001: A Space Odyssey*, Stanley Kubrick employs music as the large canvas that contains the film. Music and song can also punctuate, highlight or contextualise contrapuntally in Tarantino's and Scorsese's use of popular songs; emblematically in the phenomenon of the theme-song of the 1970s (*Love Story*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *The Godfather*, *Dr Zhivago*); and, of course, structurally in the musical where songs elaborate themes and characterisation.

By way of conclusion and given that sustained sound analysis is less familiar than sustained visual analysis, a demonstration is appropriate, one which shows sound's ability to contain action (secondness) and give nuance to characterisation (firstness) and to establish, continue, or to close, a narrative logic (thirdness). The song at the end of Thomas Alfredson's *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*, a live recording of "La Mer" (Julio Iglesias),[103] determines not only the limits of a complex shot (its duration), but also movements in time, ironic disposition and plot resolution, all as the sound moves from diegesis to nondiegesis, from a song on a record player at a party to the song overlaid on the rest of the film. In the use of "La Mer", the lyrics are not essential, although they do provide irony in that this is a love song concluding a movie in which love is treacherous. Love (romantic, sexual, and as loyalty) is a tool in espionage.

The important claim is that the song does more than provide cohesion. There is a logic of sound (as sensation) that is relatable to the logic of action (the sensory-motor system). It is not that sound is inherently emotional, but that it has the capacity to link a series of percepts and affects efficiently. Sound is able to produce a series that is not dependent on the rational series of the movement-image. The coordinates are neither those of the sensory-motor mechanism (the model of the shot as perception-affection-action-exhaustion of action) nor the lack of coordinates of the open duration of pure time in the time-image. Sensory-motor linkages are relevant in this section dominated by "La Mer" as the deferred completions of earlier actions.

The song establishes a flashback to a party. The evocation is to happier times recalling, for the viewer, a similar earlier flashback, but the characters are now (to varying degrees) sad drunks, misfits or adulterers, so there is a tainted nostalgia. Characters are dancing to the song, which gives it a diegesis heightened by the live recording of the song — the last few words of the 'live' introduction to Iglesias on the recording, are included and encourage this reading. Diegetically (in

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[103] It is the Julio Iglesias' version (1976) of the Charles Trenet song: "La Mer", France: Columbia, 1946. Tomas Alfredson, *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*, (UK: StudioCanal, 2011).

the second flashback), they are dancing to an LP played at the party, but the song is maintained over the rest of the movie and encloses vignettes of the isolated characters (often the frame contains a single character) as a series of percepts and affects: the assassination of Bill Haydon (the disgraced spy from the inner sanctum of MI 5) in the lockup; a passing in the corridors of Smiley and Peter — an essential relationship in the narrative — now with no acknowledgement but a wry smile to the camera from Peter; and the placement of Smiley as the next Control as he sits at the table to the neatly timed applause at the end of the song. The applause is well used here (as a mock-diegesis), ending the movie, seeming to support Smiley by acclamation, but we see him in the conference room alone; the others are dead or disgraced.

The series contained by the song is a series of affects and percepts, and as such it is not just that images, threads, and actions find completion. One significant affect is a long shot of Smiley, back turned to the camera, resting momentarily on the bannister before going into his wife in the adjoining room. Smiley who was always the reliable compass, seems fragile; he understands the full extent of his wife's affair with Haydon (Haydon used Smiley's marriage as his only exploitable vulnerability). None of this is made explicit in the shot, nor does it need to be if an affect is well placed and is used to work summarily.

The viewer is offered a percept, as Jim Prideaux, rifle on his shoulder, moves through the vegetation outside Bill Haydon's lock-up to shoot Haydon. It is not just that we are seeing where he is (in fact it is not immediately clear; he could be out hunting) but we understand this to be a moment of purpose and significance. It is more than a perception-image because it carried the weight of what is not included in the shot: the whole relationship between Prideaux and Haydon. The two instances, Smiley's affect and Jim's percept, are given a common sound-base in the song that is appropriate as indicating, for each, a nostalgia tainted with a spoilt love.

The tone of the song, and its French faux-sophistication, sets the mood. However, it does more than this; it provides the mechanism to link the past to the present and foreshadow a future. Presented initially as a song at the party, as it moves smoothly out of diegesis the song frees the visuals and allows editing to work in a *montage-style* (as collage) rather than as functional editing serving the action. For each fragment, a completion that had for different reasons been deferred, is enabled: the traitor facing personal and professional consequences; the completion of Smiley's investigation; as well as the series of vignettes of other characters. The final scenes are studies in isolation, affects and percepts cut adrift in the montage, and the sound's tempo and mood encourage a lingering on the shots so that they become fixed as final images of the characters.

162

The unity of the song has replaced and completed the unity of the sensory-motor mechanism. The song also displaces other sounds: we do not need dialogue; we have had so much of it in the rest of the movie and most of it was shown to be duplicitous. The visuals are presented in the absence of natural sound (were it not for the song, there would be screen silence); the exception is the crucial gunshot that fells Bill Haydon, but it is muted and not a distraction from the song.

If sound can be seen to work contrary to, or instead of, the sensory-motor system to provide continuity, it begs the question of sound as a time-image. In the use of "La Mer", duration is determined by the song. Cohesion and progression are not the linearity of the sensory-motor, and not the pure time of the time-image, but a conditional time: time that is bendable, circular, and fragmentable without claiming to expose pure time, but it *is* a different time. Part of the complexity in relation to time is that the song links the present to the past and is economical in drawing to conclusion a number of strands that are chronological and thematic threads; they are enabled directly by use of *refrain*.

"La Mer" works as a refrain in three senses: the musical sense in the diegetic space with the actual refrains in the song; the refrain *of* the song (as the song) in the first party, the second party, and then over the closing collage; and a thematic refrain of the corruption of love and loyalty. Ian Buchanan considers the concept of refrain for popular music, and it resonates with Tarkovsky's comments for film:

> I find music in film most acceptable when it is used like a refrain. When we come across a refrain in poetry we return, already in possession of what we have read, to the first cause which prompted the poet to write the lines originally. The refrain brings us back to our first experience of entering that poetic world, making it immediate and at the same time renewing it. We return, as it were, to its sources.[104]

It is a useful observation, but a little romantic for the song in *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy* that sets up deep irony and dangerous nostalgia. Rather, Buchanan observes that the reterritorialization (Tarkovsky's return) cannot be a return to the refrain *as it was*, but to a new version of it. In the interval, the verse (or events between one occurrence of the refrain and another) has taken us

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[104] Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time*, 158.

somewhere else ". . . the refrain recodes, or overcodes, which does not mean it restores order . . . rather it attempts to constrain variation by regulating it".[105]

Buchanan equates refrain in popular music with notions of the home (with its connotations of comfort, familiarity, refuge, a separation from the chaotic world). "The refrain is these three things at once, not in succession: it is a block of sound that is at once a way home, the very source of home, and the home-in-our hearts".[106] The observation is exactly appropriate for "La Mer". It is repetition of a popular song (by definition, a song that is recognised because of its repetition) that the viewer will recognise and that, in the diegesis, the characters similarly know and enjoy. The reterritorialising function of the refrain is a return to a foundation (home) and, as such, implies a measure of accountability. Simplistically, the verse is always accountable to the refrain, or more generally the (constantly renewed) significance of the refrain is understood by what has happened between its repetitions.

Literally, *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy* situates characters in terms of return and home: Connie Sach, the researcher, is trapped in her home, as she stares out through her window; Smiley returns home and seems for a moment fragile and private; Haydon is held to account legally and morally (for transgressions in a range of situations) and is "executed" in the physical space of a cage that serves as a replacement of home, appropriately because in many ways he was a threat to the homes of others, not the least of which being the transient home (a caravan) of his killer-lover, Jim. In the office, not home but not public, and certainly a defining space, relations are re-established, and the authority of the office is renewed (reterritorialised). Even more, in each of these spaces, accountability is the issue, and a re-coding or over-coding is urgent. In many ways, a song's refrain is only a specific case of a potential of all sound in its capacity for purposeful repetition and return, enunciated in Tarkovsky's "We return, as it were, to its sources" with the emphasis on return, not on (Metz's) sources.

What is immediately apparent is that by focusing on sound, one is also focusing on movement. It can hardly be otherwise — it makes no sense to stop the film to consider a frame (or a moment) of sound — and so film analysis beginning with sound provides a footing for movement that is not available in conventional approaches to visuals. Sound becomes an efficient way into our larger purpose of considering cinematic movement. Music and dialogue, in different ways, hold and direct

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[105] Ian Buchanan, *Deleuzism: A Metacommentary* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 184.
[106] Ibid., 184.

our concentration on concerns of the shot and the film. In *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*, sound provides linkage between past and future experienced in the film's present, especially through the notion of refrain.

Simple awareness of sound and visuals goes some way to exposing their roles, but it is through middle level concepts that they are made more readily available for analysis. They are "middle level" because they do not seek ontological elements, nor do they rush too quickly to the molarities of the film, both of which require different emphases in analysis. We have explored such middle level principles: the intelligibility principle, from Altman; sound's spatial dimensions, from Doane; the ontological as experiential — that sound is divergent whereas visuals are convergent — from Byrne; and dialogue as antagonistic, from McKee.

Once sound is, following Deleuze, strategically separated and then restored with a greater awareness of a relation to visuals, attention shifts to the working of a productive *relation*, not available in reductionist approaches to visual images. It results in what Chion terms *audio-vision* — or, recognising the importance of the spoken sound, *audio-(logo)-vision* — as "the type of perception specific to cinema and television".[107] Methodologically, features of the symbiotic relationship are also exposed and made available for analysis through middle level concepts more directly derived from Deleuze that consider the film and its sounds in terms of sensation, affect and percept.

The concern for the Deleuzian cineaste becomes, not the application and testing of concepts, but their utility in opening analysis to creative, fresh, or challenging dimensions. As Redner put it: "Certainly, there is much work to be done, both in the limitless application of Deleuzian philosophical concepts to film music, but also in terms of the creation of other methodological platforms".[108] What makes Redner's approach Deleuzian is a readiness to build bridges where and as they are required and the active generation of opportunities to do so when they are not apparent. It involves seeing the gap that might be bridged (here between sound-images and visual-images) and getting to work, armed with a repertoire of approaches and principles derived from Deleuze, and a bag of tools that have been preserved by Deleuzian scholarship or (especially in the case of sound) borrowed from neighbours.

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[107] Michel Chion, *Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen* (New York: Columbia Press, 2019) 203.

[108] Redner, *Deleuze and Film Music*, 176.

CHAPTER 5

The edited whole

"Montage is the determination of the whole . . .

montage is the whole of the film, the Idea".

— Gilles Deleuze[1]

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[1] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: the Movement-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1986), 29.

There is often something wanting when it comes to the discussion of editing in cinema. It shows in a tendency towards the apologetic that limits the scope of the discussion unnecessarily and from the very beginning.

> . . . it is impossible to isolate editing, to analyse cuts *per se*, that thin line, or "switching", that demarcates one shot from another. The upshot of this is both frustration and loss of interest: the study of editing seems elusive and not really desirable given that one must ultimately revert to the shot anyway, which leads to a sort of vicious circle.[2]

It *is* nearly impossible to isolate editing if we are looking at "cuts *per se*" in a sequence that is already complete and if the assumption is that the shot carries the meaning. Physically, there is nothing to identify an edit; the "switching" from one shot to the next happens at the same speed as from one frame to the next. It is not even a thin line. However, if editing takes into account that there is nothing inevitable about what the next shot will be, then the edit point becomes a site of vast potential.

Committed to the functionality of the edit, Orpen identifies three categories of books on editing: editors' handbooks, interviews with editors, and general textbooks on film including sections on editing.[3] A fourth category dedicated to theorising editing is absent.[4] Deleuze's *Cinema* books would find a place there, presenting a sustained survey of editing from a theoretical point of view. The history of cinema in the *Cinema* books is, by and large, the history of editing with Griffith, Eisenstein, Bazin and Godard featured prominently, with national cinemas defined by their approaches to montage, and with the introduction of the iconoclastic irrational cut in *Cinema 2*.

It is not that theory about editing does not exist. The problem is that it does not form a coherent field that feeds general analysis beyond an awareness of obvious and exemplary edits in films and beyond applicability to specific directors and theorists.[5] Consequently, the field of film editing is

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[2] Orpen, Valerie. *Film Editing: The Art of the Expressive* (London: Wallflower, 2003), 3. The work describes the field of film editing, as part of a series: "Short Cuts: Introduction to Film Studies". It began as a doctoral thesis (University of Warwick) supervised by UK film critic and theorist, V.F. Perkins. It is offered here as a serious and credible survey of the field.

[3] Orpen, *Film Editing*, 10.

[4] Orpen uses Bordwell and Thompson on connective properties and narrative coherence, to suggest that their chapter is ultimately technical rather than theoretical, concluding: "Very often critical scholarship on individual films can prove more useful than works on editing in general". Ibid, 10.

[5] For example, Michael Frierson, *Film and Video Editing Theory: How Editing Creates Meaning* (New York: Routledge, Kindle edition, 2018). Frierson organises chapters around individual practitioners: Herbert Zwetl; Noël Burch; Edward Dmytryk and Walter Murch; David Bordwell; Sergei Eisenstein; André Bazin; Andrei Tarkovsky and Maya Deren.

typically an accumulation of idiosyncratic approaches founded on the assumption that the edit itself is uncomplicated. Theories like Sergei Eisenstein's dialectical editing, D W Griffith's organic editing, Andre Bazin's opposition to all but necessary edits, and instructions like Walter Murch's "Rule of Six", tend more towards manifesto, than methodology. The aim of this chapter is to find a general approach to editing that equips the Deleuzian cineaste to appreciate the axiomatic tendencies of the movement-image (shot) to the series on one hand and to the whole on the other. The intention is to present editing as just as necessary a topic for analysis as visual and sound images, not merely as something that connects them.

Editing: the field

Orpen is by no means alone in her assessment of editing as a difficult field, based on editing's material elusiveness. In a special issue (on editing) of the Danish film studies journal, *p.o.v.,* Søren Kolstrup surveys a number of cinema resources noting a lack of precision in definitions of editing and montage: [6]

> We may ask ourselves whether "editing" can at all be called a notion or even worse a concept. Whether it is a notion or a concept, it is at least a very elastic one. It is surprising to see to what extent such a basic notion as "editing" can be used in different ways. [7]

On the one hand, Kolstrup bemoans the elusiveness, observing that if we compare film theory to linguistics, "it is obvious that film theory has never reached the same level of consciousness. What film theory offers is an endless stream of analyses of specific scenes or sequences of film".[8] On the other hand, he recognises a practical advantage in the elasticity and in leaving editing to be shaped "according to the goals and the point of view of the particular authors".[9] In his introduction to the issue, Mark La Fanu agrees that editing is best left to the editors and that, even if we want to discuss the "magic" of editing, the difficulty is compounded by our inability to make adequate reference to it: "the most the critic can do is to précis: that is, to reproduce, or attempt to reproduce in words the

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[6] The subjects of Kolstrup's survey are the following: David Bordwell: *Narration in the Fiction Film* (5th ed. 1997); David Bordwell, Kristin Thompson: *Film Art* (reprint 1995); Edward Branigan: N*arrative Comprehension and Film* (1992); Noël Carroll: *Theorizing the Moving Image* (1996); Bruce F. Kawin: *How Movies Work* (1992); Ira Konigsberg: *The Complete Film Dictionary* (1985)

[7] Søren Kolstrup, "The Notion of Editing", *p.o.v* No. 6 (1998), 39. http://pov.imv.au.dk/pdf/pov6.pdf.

[8] Ibid., 39.

[9] Ibid., 40.

effect of the extract he [or she] is talking about".[10] One seems doomed to paraphrase and approximate when it comes to a general approach to editing.

Elsewhere, Ronald Bogue, in more philosophical terms, reassures us that obsessing over editing is not the main game:

> When Deleuze elides the questions of specific montage, it is because seemingly identical techniques take on a new sense when in the service of a different conception of the whole . . . The shot is the movement-image, and the movement-image always expresses the whole of *durée*. If Deleuze's goal is to describe the characteristics of a given whole, then it matters little whether shots or connections among shots are used to delineate its features.[11]

Bogue's statement is accurate enough in relation to the delineation of sections of duration and to his context of the "specific montage" of national cinemas, as given wholes — for example, the Soviet "montage of opposition" and the German "montage of contrast". And yet, Deleuze's determination of national approaches is loaded and only really sensible as artistic movements (the way that fauvism or surrealism night signal certain commonalities about works).[12] Organising labels offer the whole such a sense of commonalities through the identification of similar techniques (or approaches to techniques), but not much in terms of the connection of one piece of film and soundtrack to another. Editing at a molecular level requires attention on its particular and different properties of each unit of duration. It becomes a matter of research interest, and to be clear, this chapter takes the differences at the level of the shot to create a sense of the whole, not the reverse.

The dilemma is that, beyond a certain point, clear definition of the whole is a distraction for film analysis, and yet a sense of the *nature* of the Whole is fundamental to an appreciation of the edit as more than connective. Minimally, a distinction between the Whole and the given whole of a film or shot — in some way, a film's recognition, accommodation, or employment of a notion of an open whole[13] — needs to be recognised to avoid circularity. In this chapter, the limit of edited

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[10] Mark Le Fanu, "On Editing", *p.o.v* No. 6 (1998), 8. http://pov.imv.au.dk/pdf/pov6.pdf. Accessed 20 May 2022.

[11] Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 64.

[12] Deleuze is acceptable if the unifying national labels are taken as providing clear examples of the montage of opposition, of contrast, of qualities of light, of numerical units. In that case, the nationality as any kind of useful whole, slips away in favour of technical concerns. Deleuze seems unaccountably Eurocentric. What of China, Japan, African nations, and so on? Mark Cousins considers a much more international cinema especially with Indian cinema but also inventive and politically radical cinema of Iran. Mark Cousins, *The Story of Film* (Chicago: Music Box Films, 2012).

[13] There is a need for clarity in uses of the term "whole". The capitalised "Whole "is from Bergson to suggest a cosmic whole as that unqualified sense of the term that is nevertheless not the sum of its parts, but the flows and relations of everything. Deleuze preferred "Open" on the basis that Whole (and even whole in general) still connoted conceptual boundaries or limits, and openness

movement-images (the logic and limits of shots and their series) will be recognised as an *encompassing-whole,* that exists in relation to an *open-whole.* The encompassing-whole, in the sense considered in the previous chapter, works as a middle level analytical concept. Editing is at the service of any notion of a whole but in different ways. In the encompassing-whole, editing connects images according to sensory-motor logic or a consistency, even an aberrant consistency, to establish a series. In the open-whole, editing is appreciated because of its essential ability to facilitate change and relation, and editing directs attention to the interstice between shots. The aim in this chapter is not to describe the whole, much less the Whole, but to consider the role of editing in the construction, presentation, and evocation of the whole.

For Deleuze, "montage is the determination of the whole . . . montage is the whole of the film, the Idea".[14] The capitalised "Idea" is something we will return to shortly, but for now, Deleuze has established the inseparability of montage, whole, and idea. Orpen's concept of "expressive editing", which develops from her commentaries on *Rear Window, Breathless* and *Raging Bull,* goes some way towards recognising montage that tends towards the whole. She positions "expressive editing" in opposition to the more functional "connective editing" for narrative coherence.[15] This does offer editing a cognitive process but, even for Orpen who is building towards theoretical cohesion, it only goes so far before the focus moves away from editing as such: "Rather than narrowing down the subject of editing to reveal its rhetoric, this study has had to expand it to incorporate other filmic elements".[16]

There is no argument with the fact that other filmic elements should be included in the discussion of editing, but we are proceeding in the conviction that the field of editing is complex enough to accommodate them, and that it is the determination of the whole — the *way* the whole is determined — not the discovery of the Whole, that is pertinent. Questions arise that are able to

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directed attention to its unrestrained interaction of flow of forces. This thesis prefers "open-whole" keeping Whole and Open for more theorised discussion, but still recognising Deleuze's concern to account for a sense of limitlessness. It also maintains a technical usage of the term such that the "open-whole of a film" is less ambiguous and more directed to conceptualising the whole than the "whole of a film". Still, the common-sense "whole" will be used where the context of the statement requires a general sense of the term.

[14] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: the Movement-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1986), 29. The capitalised *Idea* is from classical sources and connotes the realisation of an idea in form: "Eric Rohmer showed how the movements of expansion and contraction were apportioned between people and objects in a 'pictorial space', but also expressed genuine Ideas in the 'filmic space' – Good and Evil, God and Satan" (21). "For antiquity, movement refers to intelligible elements, Forms or Ideas which are themselves eternal and immobile". (4) "Movement, conceived in this way, will thus be the regulated transition from one form to another, that is, an order of poses or privileged instants, as in a dance."(4).The notion of *Ideas* taking on form has application in the more literary approach to film analysis that values themes and sees shots as the embodiments of themes.

[15] Orpen, *Film Editing*, 1-3.

[16] Ibid., 119. Such filmic elements include decoupage (planned edits and final cuts), point of view, the star in terms of editing and screen time, and mise-en-scene.

move analysis beyond the connective. If editing provides the potential for recognition of wholes, are successive edits cumulative so that we won't really grasp a film's whole until the end? Is it the same whole at each edit but refracted differently? Is it simply a *sense* of something bigger — something out there — that editing makes more expansive? Or is the whole no more or less than the forces that hold the movement-images in relation?

The production of the whole: analytical and synthetic orientations

As the movement-image establishes series, sequence, and patterns, it seems to provide a building-block model of the Whole as constructed from the shot. However, having begun with perception — in Bergson's and Deleuze's terms a process of exclusion of all but that which is of interest — it can only ever be an extension of a partial account of the whole. Instead, the open-whole of change and relation is placed in dualistic relation with the whole of the closed set that movement-images identify directly.

> The shot [movement-image] in general has one face turned towards the set, the modifications of whose parts it translates, and another face turned towards the whole, of which it expresses the — or at least a — change . . . The shot is movement considered from this dual point of view.[17]

The face turned towards the set is not as simple as it sounds. Internally, the movement-image comprises sets of component images (identified as image-types), while externally it engages in sets with other movement-images. The first thing to recognise is that the edit is not simply an inevitable point of demarcation. The edit has roles: internal to the shot, forming the compound unity of a movement-image (that is, connecting perception, affection and action images) and not, as in the conventional definition of a shot, between starting and stopping the camera;[18] between movement-images putting one shot in relation to another; between grouped shots that identify a *dynamic* (that is, fundamentally including movement) *mise-en-scene*; between dynamic mise-en-scenes in what we are identifying as the *encompassing-whole*, establishing and working within the material limits of the world of the film and the potential and realised limits of a series of shots.

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[17] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 19–20.

[18] "A shot is a continuous piece of filming without interruption from the time the camera is turned on and starts filming until it is turned off". Thomas Caldwell, *Film Analysis Handbook* (Melbourne: Insight Publications, 2005), 4.

Analytical sequentiality breaks down as attention switches to the face turned towards the whole. It is not being suggested that the virtual takes over to describe the whole. As with the discussion in previous chapters of the affect in the affection-image, the percept in the perception-image, movement in the movement-image, and the interpretant in the sign, the virtual — minimally, thought and ideas — is in constant dynamic relation at all levels: image, image-type, shot, mise-en-scene, encompassing-whole, and a *sense* of an open-whole. The open-whole, taken literally, is not permissible in such a list: it remains indescribable as a confluence of forces, but it finds recognition in different ways, film to film: *The Godfather'*s open-whole is not *Tokyo Story*'s. Constantin Boundas elaborates that, for Deleuze, ideas provide structures that make differentiation possible. Duration, often understood as defining the concept of the open-whole, "is an immanently differentiated dynamic process of the real whose nature is always to actualise itself in novel differentiations".[19] The interest in analysis is in the differentiation of wholes rather than their determination.

There is nothing haphazard or vague about the placement of shots in relation to each other and even films that rely on notions of the haphazard and vague, create or allow them purposefully. Shots establish and are established (communicated, developed, explored) by an idea. It is almost enough to leave it there and to task analysis with identifying the connection between editing and ideas. To progress is to seek scaffolding and articulations that support analysis to explore the connection, and not to get lost.

The idea — that which determines shot, set and whole — is not simply discoverable through analysis. It is not prior to the image but co-existent, and idea and image work to realise each other. We have considered (Chapter 3) that the cinematic image works as a sign and, as a sign, incorporates thought in the interpretant. From Deleuze, we grasp that the shot is accountable to both the set and the whole that it determines. In this way, Deleuze opens the possibility of the exploration of the open-whole not as amorphous and passive but as limited to an interest in the idea. Film editor and sound designer, Walter Murch, is clear about the idea as a cinematic unit, or at least an essential part of such a unit:

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[19] Constantin V. Boundas, "Virtual/Virtuality" in Adrian Parr, *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 301.

> … a shot presents us with an idea, or a sequence of ideas, and the cut is a "blink" that separates and punctuates those ideas. At the moment you decide to cut, what you are saying is, in effect, "I am going to bring this idea to an end and start something new". [20]

Murch elaborates that the cut "does not create the blink moment"[21] so the job is to shape the presentation of thought so that the edit works effectively as a blink. In this way, the shift at the interstice is between one actualised idea and another, which might be taken as an adequate cinematic definition of thought. Sensitivity to patterns of thought, for Bergson, is a condition of intelligence:

> In order that action may always be enlightened, intelligence must always be present in it; but intelligence, in order thus to accompany the progress of activity and ensure its direction, must begin by adopting its rhythm. Action is discontinuous, like every pulsation in life; discontinuous, therefore is knowledge.[22]

It is a particularly useful observation for film to link patterns and rhythms of visuals and sound directly with patterns of intelligent thought. The movement-image and images within it are pulses, and montage provides the intelligence by establishing the progress of activity, ensuring its direction, and adopting its rhythm — or creating such a close correspondence between editing and thinking that it seems to be an adoption of the rhythms of the film's ideas. Intelligence is more in a facility with ideas, than in an assessment of the quality of them, so it is in the *operation* of the whole that a sense of the open-whole can be identified.

If "the only generality about montage is that it puts the cinematographic image into a relationship with the whole",[23] then John Lechte is useful for film analysis in describing two directions for the operation of the relationship, as *synthetic* and *analytic*: respectively, "to build up from a given starting point" (with attention on the way that images build to create a sense of the whole) and "to dissolve something into its constituent parts" (with attention on the way that whole is derived from the relation between images).[24] They are not mutually exclusive and both describe a whole

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[20] Walter Murch, *In the Blink of an Eye: A Perspective on Film Editing* (Los Angeles: Silman-James Press, 2001), 63.

[21] Ibid., 63.

[22] Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 307.

[23] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 55.

[24] John Lechte, "Time after Theory: The cinema image and subjectivity,". *Continuum Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 16, no. 3 (November 2002): 299.

comprising relations between images, but they are helpful in distinguishing editing in terms of tendencies towards synthetic and analytical series and thought.

Sergei Eisenstein criticised Vsevolod Pudovkin for suggesting that editing is "linkage". While Pudovkin promoted natural linkage (organic), for Eisenstein, the proximity of one shot to another was a matter of collision: "linkage is merely a possible *special* case".[25] At the very beginning of theorised editing, two poles were thereby established in terms of synthetic and analytical editing. Eisenstein privileges the edit and works to intensify the values of images in the component frames (graphic direction, scale, volume, mass, depth) precisely in order to maximise and intensify the montage and the "explosive" (and dialectical) contact between shots.[26] The only way of creating a powerful interstice (if that is one's aim) is to make the images or ideas on either side of it work in a particular relation. It is the gap between them that becomes explosive.

The iconic edit between the jawbone and the spacecraft in *2001: A Space Odyssey*, the flickering flashing forward and back of Donn Cambern's edits in *Easy Rider*, and Godard's jump cuts, side with Eisenstein's analytical intensification of images and calling attention to act of editing. In synthetic editing, the sequence of movement — image to image, shot to shot — appears to be steered according to an established or emergent logic, with the editing at the service of seamless connection. Analytical editing asks the question, *what have we got here?* while synthetic editing asks, *where are we going with this?* In a sense, both ultimately aim for a synthesis: Pudovkin's organic synthesis and Eisenstein's dialectical synthesis as the outcome of thesis and antithesis (the more "explosive" the better). In a sense, both are concerned with the way elements are put together. To be useful, then, analytic and synthetic are taken to be orientations.

Tarkovsky is skilled in moving between the two to the point that his characters are often in constant states of confused negotiation between synthesised concerns of existing in the world and analytical concerns of determining how to proceed on the basis of existing fragments of ideas, situations, and images to the point that the meaning of recognisable objects is problematic. In *Stalker*, for example, there is an image of a discarded hypodermic needle observed, without comment, at the bottom of a clear stream of water and, later, the daughter psychokinetically moves a glass of water on the table. The question for analysis is what do we need to do with these images? Do we need to draw things together into cohesions of some sort and engage in a synthetic process? It might impute to the

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25 Sergei Eisenstein, "Collision of Ideas", in *Film: A Montage of Theories* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1966), 35.

26 "If montage is to be compared with something, then a phalanx of montage pieces, of shots, should be compared to the series of explosions of an internal combustion engine, driving forward the automobile or tractor". Ibid., 36.

daughter spiritual qualities and invite the conclusion that the whole film is about spiritual concerns. Or do we need to break things down and engage in analysis of components? Water as a motif (is there a link between the water that streams over the hypodermic and the water in the glass); the qualities of sound and vision in the shot; the positioning of the daughter in relation to the camera. Do we seek the constructive relations between images or the components of the image?

If, as has been observed, all editing is synthetic, Lechte identifies all editing as, in another sense, analytical — that is, breaking down into parts — and *analytical editing* is already established as a term describing the process:

> Analytical editing: A dominant style of editing where the scenic space is first shown in an establishing shot to show the relative positions of significant elements, and subsequently broken down into closer shots or "analyzed," ensuring that the viewer is spatially oriented. Often, if a character changes position or crosses the space, a wide shot is used to re-establish relative positions. Same as 'deductive visual approach'.[27]

But how is this not *synthetic*? The shots identified are shown to contribute directly to a synthesised whole (a spatial orientation) in the establishing shot, and wide-shots to re-establish relative positions, privileging the coherent whole that exists prior to component images. Of course, the important delineation is in what we are seeking from the images: analytically, their differentiated components juxtaposed in the service of either a problematic, given, or consequent whole; synthetically, the purposeful movement towards a unity (Idea, Whole).

The connective and constructive function of synthetic editing is familiar and conventional. Taken to an extreme, edit points are unnoticeable as they build coherence.

> Take, for example, the famous shot in King Vidor's *The Crowd*, what Mitry called 'one of the most beautiful tracking shots in the whole of silent cinema': The camera advances into the crowd, against the flow, makes its way towards a skyscraper, climbs up to the twentieth floor, frames one of the windows, discovers a hall full of desks, goes in to arrive at a desk where the hero is sitting.[28]

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[27] Frierson, *Film and Video Editing Theory*, Glossary.

[28] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 22. [No citation is provided for the Mitry quotation.]

Editing's role here is self-effacing, seamlessly connecting the shots. The camera consciousness ignores breaks in the shot. There are three edits and Deleuze does not remark on them (as presumably his source, Jean Mitry, did not) in what is usually understood as the uninterrupted movement of a tracking shot. If, conventionally, "Editing is the art of placing shots together in a specific order to generate a meaningful relationship between the shots,"[29] the editing here is not designed to be recognised. The interstice is technical and minimalised for the sake of a "meaningful relationship" that is unambiguous. There is a similar self-effacing editing in *Hondo*,[30] in the sustained walk out of the desert by Hondo that has the effect of a long take but was punctuated by several edits.

Analytical and synthetic become ways of gaining analytical access to the two faces of the shot: one towards the modification of parts, and the other towards the whole.[31] Deleuze does not make a separation, but understands them to be two coexisting faces, but they do start to position the image in terms of ways of thinking, one of which might be privileged.

Cinematic thought at the interstice

Editing establishes a concern for what is between shots and assumes the between to be purposeful. Any line between one shot and another (to return to Orpen's complaint at the start of this chapter) is more conceptual than actual. If it were a line, it would be a Euclidean line that has place but no width. But it is hardly even a marker; it is a matter of there being one image then a new one — the old one consigned to the film's memory and the new one brimming with potential. The edit has an analytical function of individuating component images, but also a synthetic function of building, and of moving the film into unexpected or creative directions. The edit, especially in the irrational cut, can be radically analytical in a derailing that does not undermine the film but sets it in new directions: "the images are certainly not abandoned to chance, but there are only relinkages subject to the cut, instead of cuts subject to the linkage".[32] From the point of view of editing, the unit is not

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[29] Caldwell, *Film Analysis Handbook*, 81.

[30] John Farrow, *Hondo*, film (USA: Wayne/Fellows Productions, 1953). It is discussed in more detail presently.

[31] Recalling: "The shot [movement-image] in general has one face turned towards the set, the modifications of whose parts it translates, and another face turned towards the whole, of which it expresses the — or at least a — change . . . The shot is movement considered from this dual point of view". Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 19–20.

[32] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 213-214.

the shot, but a *pair* of shots so that linkages (transitions, translation, transformation) become pertinent and foregrounded.

Far from being a technical necessity and self-evident, edit points start to take on features (as we have considered): synthetic, analytical; rational, irrational; fleeting, sustained. The edit becomes a cinematic object capable of supporting these adjectives, rather than an imagined, negative, or purely functional space, and so the *interstice* takes on substance and importance for film analysis.

> The interstice: something empty, something minute — a crevice, a chink, a narrow gap — yet, in spite of this definition of something apparently slight and inconsequential, one perhaps may make the claim that the interstice serves as a foundational element of film. The "intervening space", as the OED defines it . . . [33]

This, from an editorial in a special issue of *Alphaville* devoted to the interstice, presents the interstice as both literal and conceptual in a number of forms and contexts: formal, between photography and theatre; technical, between sound and visuals; intertextual, "the position of the spectator within intertextual and intermedial narratives";[34] cultural, between national cinemas and between Eastern and Western philosophical concepts; and so on with "fact and fiction, spatio-temporalities, artists' cinema versus classical cinema, and science versus art".[35] What they have in common is a commitment to the interstice as a productive space opened by the articulation of dualities. As useful as an expansive application of the term is in orienting research, the interstice of the edit in film has a physicality determined by the materiality of successive images tending towards, and at times achieving, duality. It is not the establishment of a dialectic since there is no expectation, at the molecular level, of resolution. It is the formulation of *image-gap-image* and is far from being self-evident. The cut or editing characterised as the same for all shots cannot be so because the interstice is identified in terms of what went before and after it.

Deleuze introduces the term interstice in *Cinema 2* as he considers the idea of an irrational cut, on his way to articulating the time-image: "Sometimes, as in modern cinema, the cut has become the interstice, it is irrational and does not form part of either set, one of which has no more an end than

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[33] Abigail Keating, Deborah Mellamphy and Jill Murphy, "Cinema in the Interstices: Editorial", Alphaville*: Journal of Film and Screen Media*, no. 5 (2013), http://www.alphavillejournal.com/Issue5/HTML/Editorial.html, n.p.

[34] Ibid., n.p.

[35] Ibid., n.p.

the other has a beginning: false continuity is such an irrational cut".[36] Both false and irrational are used as specialised terms, with irrational used in the mathematical sense of being outside a rational series and false continuity is a continuity built on an aberrant logic that is not the sensory-motor mechanism that drives classical cinema.

> [The irrational cut is] a means of creating disjunction and autonomy for both visual and sonic elements (pure optical and sound image, or *opsign* and *sonsign*). Deleuze pulls his terminology here from mathematics: the "irrational" cannot be classed within rational sets, and thus in cinema, the irrational cut lies outside the logic of the sets of shots it divides.[37]

The false continuity is rhizomatic (or at least it starts that way): "It is the method of AND, 'this and then that' . . . False continuity, then takes on new meaning, at the same time as it becomes the law".[38] Accordingly, the interstice becomes a fresh connection and a break in a series at the same time as it establishes a new series or, at least, the potential of a new series in the failure of the old series.

In filmmaking, an interstice is achievable in other ways, and it is useful to consider them so that a purposeful function of the interstice is recognised. A gap or break in the series becomes attainable when a shot is frozen (such as Thelma Schoonmaker's freeze frames[39]) or when sustained black or white sections are included, indicating, for Deleuze, the frame's most extreme tendency to "rarefaction".[40] In this sense, a break or a space between images becomes legible and an extension of the interstice. It builds on the existing and conventional functioning of editing: that is, the interstice is not a disruption, but a necessary feature of the edited unit (between two shots) that can be sustained or minimised. More, in modern cinema, its use can be extended to create time-images, opsigns and sonsigns, in a pause held longer than necessary, a lingering — long enough for an idea to become untethered or obsessive. Antonioni in *The Passenger*, holds, not the edit point, but the

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[36] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 181. [Emphasis removed from the original. Most was emphasised.]

[37] Virginia Bonner, "Deleuze and The Time-Image Study Guide (Cinematic Caesuras)", Virginiabonner.Com, 2003, http://www.virginiabonner.com/courses/cms4310/readings/deleuze_studyguide.html, n.p.

[38] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*,.180.

[39] Thelma Schoonmaker's use of freeze frames has become a trademark — more because of intelligent and incisive use than frequent use — in her editing of Martin Scorsese movies *Goodfellas, Raging Bull, The Departed* (and others). Her first Academy Award nomination was for editing *Woodstock* (1970), "a film which was noted for its innovative use of superimpositions and freeze frames …" https://courses.newschool.edu/archive/courses/NFLM3011/7509/ n.p.

[40] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 12. Felicity Colman discusses Jim Jarmusch's use of black sections as part of his style and as a device making "temporal modes of the characters" clearer as "they move around their worlds and as they encounter people and things or ways of being". They also provide "ruptures" that expose the false sense of unity created by movement-images. Felicity Colman, *Deleuze & Cinema: The Film Concepts* (Oxford: Berg, 2011), 27.

duration of a shot that, devoid of action, becomes a time-image; it opens a sustained visual interstice making manifest a fissure between real and assumed identities of the character, David Locke, who is stuck in a liminal existence.

 Conventional film analysis offers the tools to identify kinds of edits and their functions but is indifferent to the legibility of the interstice. Editing is seen as punctuation, as it must be when analysis privileges a literary reading of visual images. Once a cut becomes the object of critical attention a place is provided for approaching questions of significance beyond (but not to dismiss) the denotative properties of the images that frame the gap. Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier who tracks Deleuze's redefinition of the whole as *outside* (in modern film, identified through a loss of confidence in the whole) understands that the outside is manifest between the shots.

> If the totalization of images is hereafter obliterated, it is "in favour of an outside which is inserted between them" . . . the outside has found its place even if it is between places, and it is henceforth located at the frontier between the visible and the invisible, thereby warding off the disruption that characterizes it.[41]

Ropars-Wuilleumier is paraphrasing Deleuze as part of a critique that includes points of measured criticism that nevertheless ultimately result in a qualified acceptance of contradictions in his use of sources.[42] At its foundation is a separation between the outside and the inside that is not at all a simple one. What is set up is an opposition (not a dialectical one, which would assume a productive connection; not a dualism, which would assume some parity) that plays out in various forms and that replaces the whole with an outside. Ropars-Wuilleumier's interstice becomes the site of oscillation: "Becoming is only force, but Deleuze's outside, which follows on its heels, oscillates between form and force".[43] Deleuze and Guattari's conclusion to *What is philosophy?* is anticipated*:* "We require just a little order to protect us from chaos".[44]

Possibly the most audacious example of this "warding off disruption" and of the outside at the interstice is in Terrence Malick's *Tree of Life* when the death of a child finds a response in terms of

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[41] Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, "Image or Time? The Thought of the Outside in The Time -Image (Deleuze and Blanchot)" in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy,* ed. D N Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 17. The embedded quotation is Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 187

[42] Ropars-Wuilleumier is criticising an eclectic and approximate use of sources especially Blanchot whom she sees as having been accessed via Foucault and used to suit Deleuze's purposes. "Deleuze reads Blanchot through Foucault". Ibid., 19.

[43] Ibid., 23.

[44] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 201.

documentary-style visuals of the birth and evolution of the universe, sustained over 17 minutes, with a voiceover that is a one-sided quizzing of God. It is not a demonstration of universal or personal chaos or disruption, but the only thing that *prevents it* for a mother in distress and anguish over the loss of her child. An argument with God (recognised as outside: at least it is a god you can talk to) along with a sense that the whole of evolution must have been for something are the only things holding chaos at bay. *The Tree of Life* indicates crisis by employing a bold irrational cut: the inside scale of the mother's grief and the outside of the dispassionate birth and development of the universe are juxtaposed. A mother's grief is elevated to a commensurate cosmic scale. The interstice (at the edit point) provides a moment of realization that both the preceding and successive shots tend toward. Through this edit, a moment is created that is the intersection of strands — the death of a child, a state of mind, the evolution of life on Earth — that results, with the continuity of the music and the mother's voiceover, in the Jobian wrestling with God.

If the example above is on an operatic scale, it is only the scale that differentiates it from the normal operation of the edit as the interstice. The autonomous function of the edit is recognised in Deleuze's concept of *unlinking* — "[The irrational cut] will be defined ideally by a reversal where the image is unlinked and the cut begins to have an importance in itself".[45] The irrational cut that initiates a line of flight can be fundamentally disruptive or it can begin an irrational series (Malick's *Song to Song* is a movie based fundamentally on a series of irrational cuts).

Elsewhere, and despite his recognition of the interstice as the foundation for the irrational cut, Deleuze recognises interstices in the positioning of any two images: "Given one image another image has to be chosen which will induce an interstice *between* the two".[46] The term "induces" suggests something brought into being rather than evident (and echoes Eisenstein), and the imperative tone directs that it *must* exist between two images. The edit-as-interstice can be a slight movement between images in a jump cut or the bold leap in space and time in the cut between the bone and the spacecraft in *2001, A Space Odyssey*. It can be as intrinsic to the narrative as Michael Corleone's vows at the baptism of his godson in *The Godfather* (intercut with three grisly murders of opponents), or routinely disguised by overlapping sound and the close matching of shots (in the blinking between shots).[47]

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[45] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 213.

[46] Ibid., 179.

[47] Stanley Kubrick, *2001: A Space Odyssey*, film (UK/USA: MGM, 1968). Francis Ford Coppola, *The Godfather*, film (USA: Paramount Pictures, 1972).

The interstice is a productive synthesis: "a difference of potential is established between the two, which will be productive of a third or of something new".[48] In the examples, the bone and the spacecraft are now linked — one might consider what the link means, but the point is that the interest is now in the link, not the two objects. Michael accommodates the two sides of family and a ruthless pragmatism and redefines himself as positioned, forever after, at the interstice. Nevertheless, the interstice might be nothing more, or less, than a jolt causing the viewer to recalibrate in a coherent whole, or simply the awareness of potential, something undefined that exists not in the shots either side but between them. The interstice, fissure, and disruption are understood in the light of Deleuze's observation that "Something in the world forces us to think. That something is an object, not of recognition, but of a fundamental *encounter*"[49] and Claire Colebrook comments that "Deleuze demonstrates that life can only be thought adequately, and that we only release the full potential of thinking, when thought encounters what is *not* itself".[50] The interstice is concisely an encounter between the image and its not-itself.

The sense of interval or interstice as a negative space (gap) is displaced for a conceptual space that has found a variety of applications. Gregg Lambert draws on Eisenstein, Bergson and Deleuze, to identify the interstice as "the cerebral interval [that] becomes a deep 'gap' or 'void' that it [the interval] cannot fill, an immense distance or abyss that it cannot cross, emerging instead as the crack or fissure that . . . constitutes an 'outside' that it cannot express in language or present in the image".[51] In the example above, from *Tree of Life*, the immensity of the interstice opens then closes the birth of the universe sequence and provides the irrational cuts that bookend the sustained meditation: the cerebral abyss is between two irrational edits. The idea of interstice becomes a logical necessity: how can the whole be referenced in terms of only what we know or can conceptualise? To do so would be to place it as an encompassing-whole, and further suggests the need for such a term in film analysis.

For Lambert, the interstice is a cerebral interval: "that mute and formless region that appears at the center of the modern work of art,"[52] and it is a failure to grasp the whole that creates a crack and positions the whole as outside. For Ropars-Wuilleumier, the interstice is specifically the place of the outside, as if images keep at bay, even as they conjure, outside forces. In Roy Daly's reading of

[48] Deleuze, *Cinema 2,* 180.

[49] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 139.

[50] Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd, 2006), 4.

[51] Gregg Lambert, "Cinema and the Outside", in *The Brain Is the Screen*, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 264.

[52] Ibid., 264.

Jim Jarmusch, the interstice is *Ma* or *Mu* – a Japanese expression of emptiness, that is nevertheless "full and sufficient" which is to say (approximately) expressions of pure relation.[53] In all of these, an active and purposeful fissure is at play, and it resists the impression that the whole is just there and inevitably leaches into a film or that the interstice is disruptive.

Accessing the whole: the encompassing-whole and the dynamic mise-en-scene

As we have seen, in *Cinema* 1, Deleuze concludes his discussion of the whole with the claim "Thus in a sense movement has two aspects. On one hand, that which happens between objects or parts; on the other hand, that which expresses the duration or the whole".[54] This statement positions the whole as available through movement and manifestations of movement and is useful in that regard. Nevertheless, the identification of three levels of the whole is more useful because it offers a middle position for our *encompassing-whole*:

> (1) the sets or closed systems which are defined by discernible objects or distinct parts;
> (2) the movement of translation which is established between objects and modifies their respective positions; (3) the duration of the whole, a spiritual reality which constantly changes according to its own relations. [55]

The encompassing-whole — which has been introduced, but not theorised until now — is not directly related to the identified second level where it might be expected. Rather it is understood as a closed set, the limits of which are reached as the limits of possible translations and modifications within the set, so it is a combination of 1 and 2. The encompassing-whole is a necessary formulation because it extends the notion of sets and forms a bridge between sets and the spiritual whole (the Open or Whole). The "*sense* of an open-whole" has been used in this chapter and it describes the encompassing-whole as something that seems like an unlimited whole but is actually very deliberately constructed. It is more expansive than a set or series (rather it is that within which a set or series exists) — it is Peirce's thirdness, off its leash, but thirdness nevertheless.

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[53] Roy Daly, "Ma, Mu and the Interstice: Meditative Form in the Cinema of Jim Jarmusch", *Alphaville: Journal of Film and Screen Media*, no. 5 (Summer 2013), n.p.

[54] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 11.

[55] Ibid., 11. [Numbering is in the original].

The encompassing-whole becomes a means to account for the limits of potentials as much as providing an arena for images in the closed system of the shot and facilitating connections between shots.[56] The encompassing-whole can be understood as a cocoon for the concerns of characters, including the more or less realised understanding of the permeability of the cocoon. With the idea of characters as centres of indetermination incurving a whole, what needs to be considered is the nature of the incurving and that which is incurved.[57] "What you have to explain, then, is not how perception arises, but how it is limited, since it should be the image of the whole, and is in fact reduced to the image of that which interests you".[58] As well as comprising sets of images, the encompassing-whole also comprises particular sets of limited wholes — milieus and mise-en-scenes — that are themselves differentiated and edited into relation. One *dynamic mise-en-scene* is placed alongside another and offers a spatial unit of the encompassing-whole. The interest is not in a set or stage for action, as is conventional, but in the movement that the mise-en-scene itself engages in or makes possible. It invites a notion of a greater whole that contains them both. However far the series of dynamic mise-en-scenes goes, it cannot achieve the open-whole, but it does provide a way to describe the encompassing-whole.

The conceptualisation of an encompassing-whole relieves the open-whole of the (misplaced) burden of accounting for all "big picture" notions of context, drawing attention to the encompassing-whole's constructedness (a notion anathema to the open-whole) and its foregrounding of movement: "one misses the movement because one constructs a Whole, and assumes that 'all is given'".[59] The benefit of the encompassing-whole for analysis is that it prevents slippage between different notions of the whole — Whole/whole; whole/open; set/whole, etc. The encompassing-whole is the whole of what is "given or giveable" and provides accommodation; the open-whole is recognition of unconstrained forces of relation and change.

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[56] Encompassing derives from Deleuze's "*englobant*" in French: "to include, embody, bring together as a whole". Deleuze *Cinema 2*, xvii. Deleuze also offers "ambience" and "milieu" as alternatives. Milieu is discussed in some detail: Deleuze *Cinema 1*, 124-125.

[57] Paolo Marrati provides a concise definition (from Chapter 3): "The gap between received movement and executed movement allows living images to choose their response to an act in the strict sense of the term. This is why Bergson calls living images, 'centers of indetermination': the impossibility of predicting an action coincides in this case with the possibility of creating the new . . . the perception image is not limited to sorting: it incurves the universe around itself and gives horizon to the world". Paola Marrati, *Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 33-34.

[58] Henri Bergson, *Henri Bergson: Key Writings, ed.* Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2002), 121.

[59] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 7.

Bergson's kaleidoscope provides a useful analogy for the mechanics of *translation*[60] in the cinematic encompassing-whole as shifts in relations within clear limits. The analogy identifies shifting relations between narrative elements in a particular dynamic mise-en-scene. Recognising the fundamental importance of movement and relation, the mise-en-scene can no longer be simply background or set dressing.[61] Firstly, the mise-en-scene is the particular pattern of the beads — Bergson's "pieces of glass" — and all elements contribute to the pattern; it is not a matter of foreground and background. Secondly, in a classical film, the formation of mise-en-scenes is open until a certain point — the exposition phase, typically, the first ten minutes of a classical film — after which all of the beads and sets of beads are in place and it remains to arrange and rearrange them, indeed the movement of ideas and significance is in the rearrangement.

Remembering that Bergson is not describing cinema but observing that the "mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind,"[62] the reduction of the shot to the frames of a film strip was meant to show that the gaps were always there, however small, between static images. While cinema was available to Bergson, his interest was not in cinema as a field but in the apparatus.[63] It was little more than the understanding that film is a series of individual frames, projected in a sequence, and were it not for the projector perpetrating a kind of trick, there would be no appearance of movement. It was the kaleidoscope, rather than cinema, that Bergson preferred to demonstrate "cinematographical thinking" and to explore the interval or gap as productive. The shake of the kaleidoscope (the edit) becomes a kind of flickering of experience as we jump from one "frame" to the next.

> [T]he *mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.* Of the altogether practical character of this operation there is no possible doubt. Each of our acts aims at a certain insertion of our will into the reality. There is, between our body and other bodies, an arrangement like that of the pieces of glass that compose a

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[60] Transformation and translation are distinguishable in terms of Bogue's recalling of Bergson that sees "true movement" as "transformation rather than translation" Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, 24. The encompassing-whole becomes the site, or containment, of translation.

[61] "All the visual elements with the frame: setting, lighting, costumes and acting". Thomas Caldwell, *Film Analysis Handbook* (Melbourne: Insight Publications, 2005), 208. To this list Moon adds "photographic elements (such as framing, and composition)". Brian Moon, *Viewing Terms: A Practical Guide for Film and TV Study* (Perth: Chalkface Press, 2004), 109.

[62] Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (New York: Dover, 1998), 296.

[63] Donato Totaro observes that Bergson's "use of cinema was relatively inconsequential, merely a clever and topical analogy". Donato Totaro, "Time, Bergson, and the Cinematographical Mechanism", *Offscreen* 5, no. 1 (2001), https://offscreen.com/view/bergson1. In a brief interview, Bergson recognised cinema as having an effect on painting and theatre, as a documentary archive, and as an amusement. He also acknowledged an academic interest for historians, scholars and "even the philosopher", but his interest remained limited to it as an emergent technology. Louis-George Schwartz, "Henri Bergson Talks to Us about Cinema", *Cinema Journal* 50, no. 3 (2011): 79-82.

kaleidoscopic picture. Our activity goes from an arrangement to a re-arrangement, each time no doubt giving the kaleidoscope a new shake, but not interesting itself in the shake, and seeing only the new picture. Our knowledge of the operation of nature must be exactly symmetrical, therefore, with the interest we take in our own operation. In this sense we may say, if we are not abusing this kind of illustration, that *the cinematographical character of our knowledge of things is due to the kaleidoscopic character of our adaptation to them.* [64]

To paraphrase, there is an arrangement between bodies that is constantly rearranged, but we pay little attention to the act of rearrangement. Instead, we are drawn to the new arrangement for as long as it holds our attention. The shake creates the past by creating a new event. The interstice is situated, then, as an "insertion of our will into the reality". It is not that the will aspires to change reality, but that by perceiving — "the interest we take in our own operation"— we arrive at "our knowledge of the operation of nature". That knowledge is "symmetrical . . . with the interest we take in our own operation" is not an argument for solipsism but for the inevitability of a partial grasp of reality and the open-whole, and even more, as a statement of the importance of change, which is the real operation of nature. For the kaleidoscope the change is in the shake; for cinema it is in the edit.

The encompassing-whole is a shifting picture of kaleidoscopic patterns of a particular group of beads. The edit as interstitial shake provides the remixing of givens and with each resultant pattern comes the sense that there is a new discovery to be made: a new idea perhaps, a new angle on an old idea, or a new perspective (literally or figuratively) arising from the elements of the shot (the pattern of beads). The shake-edit also puts a stop to the previous pattern of images in the shot. In cinema, the new shot is a source of tension, anxiety or at the very least a displacement, and we are drawn to resolve it.

The fresh immediacy of a new shot is most pronounced in the first viewing, when we are discovering "the beads" (after which it is remembered discovery). The experience of the first viewing is that, up to a certain point, we are adding beads at each shake (which was common with the kaleidoscopes of Bergson's day). [65] Once the film has been viewed in its entirety, it can be

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[64] Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 306. [Emphasis is in the original.]

[65] Bergson's literary/philosophical reference to the kaleidoscope was not the only one. "For Charles Baudelaire the kaleidoscope coincided with modernity itself; to become a 'kaleidoscope gifted with consciousness' was the goal of 'the lover of universal life'. [Jonathon] Crary also pointed out that for Marx and Engels, 'the kaleidoscope had a very different function'. In their critique of Saint-Simon's *The German Ideology*, they used the kaleidoscopic image as a parable of ideological shams: its apparent variety is produced

approached retrospectively, as analysis must do. Awareness of and accounting for the rearrangements of elements invites the kaleidoscope metaphor. For example, Stanley Kubrick's *A Clockwork Orange,* is a movie of three sections: Alex's actions with his friends (violent, irresponsible, fun-seeking) in the first part of the film and the consequences in the other two, firstly in terms of formal legal punishment and then in the release back into society for a more karmic punishment. The initial viewing of the film involves a certain complicity between the viewer and Alex and his Droogs' misbehaviour, escalating to the point that it is beyond condoning, even for the guilty pleasure of entertainment.

The moral and ethical implications of the Ludovico technique as punishment, then, absorb our interest. In subsequent viewings, we watch the antics of the Droogs with the knowledge of Alex's punishment to come. We are now predisposed to see consequences and to be more judgmental or at least in a judgemental mode, even as we are watching that part of the movie that is not related directly to punishment. Whether we have the full set of beads, or three related sets of beads is more a question arising from the analogy than a concern for the aims and scope of film analysis. From the analogy, analysis takes the imperative to account for patterning. The shake of the beads, the edit, has both an existential purpose in an emergent narrative (the synthetic "what is going to happen next?") and invites a reflective role with the new circumstances placed in relation to past "shakes" (the analytic "so that is why that happened"). The latter is not possible without some clear account of the whole; the former is not possible *with* it, and after the first viewing, discovery becomes a record or account of discovery. As such, care must be taken to remember and value the dynamics and extemporaneity of discovery (Bergson's point).

Deleuze's repeated insistence that the movement-image (the shot) has "one face turned towards the set . . . and another face turned towards the whole" requires analysis to directly consider the whole. It is immensely difficult to get bearings in a discussion of the open-whole, but at times that is what a film will achieve, not the realization of the open-whole but a bearing or a pointing towards it. What is more achievable is the seeking of approaches to analysis that will expose the encompassing-whole and its relation to the open-whole. We will consider three examples that

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by repeating the same pattern *ad infinitum*. Such parables, which I call 'discursive kaleidoscopes', are encountered over and over again in textual and visual traditions; their significations are moulded by the contexts within which they are evoked". Erkki Huhtamo, "All the World's a Kaleidoscope: a Media Archaeological Perspective to the Incubation Era of Media Culture", *Rivista Di Estetica* 55, no. 139-153 (2014), https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.982. Jonathon Crary, *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1990).

demonstrate the usefulness of approaches. In the first, a classical film, *Hondo*, seeks articulation of the encompassing-whole through the notion of *dynamic mise-en-scene* and, with accumulation and interplay of dynamic mise-en-scenes comes the emergence of a world that contains them all. *Under the Skin*, makes the whole problematic and it is the intention of the film to keep it so. The comparatively simple process of describing dynamic mise-en-scenes is still useful, but the challenge is to account for a complex (with multiple dimensions) and unfamiliar whole. With the third example, *Run Lola Run*, the whole (or the idea of the whole) becomes more self-consciously an object for analysis.

Hondo and dynamic mise-en-scene

It is the contention of this section that, following Bergson's kaleidoscope as a metaphor for editing, the establishment and changing of patterns are made evident in and then between dynamic mise-en-scenes (all of which are achieved through editing). Questions for the Deleuzian cineaste arise that are best approached with an example. What causes or motivates the edit? What is it that was completed, exhausted or otherwise no longer of interest in the previous shot? Has the change been local or has it in effect introduced a new whole? The three mise-en-scenes at the beginning of *Hondo* will be considered. The following is written as viewing notes with commentary.

Again, and to be clear, mise-en-scene is being taken to be more than background and complicit in any discussion of movement and relation. Rather than, for example, identifying action in a particular setting with later action in the same setting as different shots, we would want to see it as the same dynamic mise-en-scene but having developed or been changed or been recalled. In the following, *elements* of the shot (images) are identified as *the beads* such that the shot becomes concerned with their patterning. If mise-en-scene is often described as the stage or set, dynamic mise-en-scene is the recognition that the stage/set conditions and channels movement; more, it is taken as a cinematic unit and editable in the way that a shot is editable (both as the product of editing and as the producer of new relations).

Mise-en-scene 1 (M1)

The beads
Cowboy (explicitly identified as John Wayne in the accompanying titles and a non-narratively motivated, signature shot of Wayne on horseback.) Typical western

landscape. Desert. No horse. Dog.

Dynamic mise-en-scene

Movement towards the camera. This is a familiar setting for westerns. The individual is dwarfed by the landscape and by circumstance. As Hondo moves closer to the camera, we see the exhaustion on his face. Because he is still palpably in the landscape in all shots, not detached from it (it is a percept), the close-up is only approximately an affection-image. To the extent that it shows his exhaustion, it is the completion of assumed action (an action-image) but to the extent that it shows desperation and a processing of thoughts as he approaches Angie (the woman at the homestead), it works somewhat as an affection-image.

It is not the static elements of mise-en-scene (set dressing, background, photographic qualities) that are of interest, but the positioning of the subject(s) and, in this case, movement within the mise-en-scene. The character is inseparable from the mise-en-scene: to read one is to read the other.

The encompassing-whole

Editing works to establish continuity. This establishing shot is very simple, pared back and assumes little, but it establishes the western as a (John) Fordian landscape dwarfing the individual: Hondo and his dog walk out of the vast desert landscape, towards the camera.[66]

There are six edits, but they are matched, so the walk seems continuous. In effect, it is a walk from a speck in the distance directly into close-up.[67] It is intercut three times with sequences on a ranch (M2), establishing the second mise-en-scene and placing the two into direct relation, and expanding the encompassing-whole.

The static mise-en-scene provides a sense of the epic, and we understand that it is telling us something about Hondo's ordeal. We don't need the details, yet; the interest is

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[66] The John Ford reference is not incidental. The director, John Farrow, had to leave shooting earlier than anticipated due to another commitment. As a favour to Wayne, John Ford directed the battle scenes that close the movie.

[67] This otherwise striking sustained shot would be much more impressive were it not overlaid with distractions. Before the shot, there is a gratuitous shot of Wayne on horse leaping out towards the camera. The lovely, sustained shot of the tired horseless cowboy walking from the desert and dwarfed by the vastness of the landscape is overlaid with thick red credits. The real point of the horse riding and the credits was to demonstrate 3D effects. The film was shot for 3D, but since it was released fairly late into the fad, it was rarely shown as such. Nevertheless, it does result in more dynamic 2D composition.

that he has been through something and survived. It is also a "star entrance" — a term Orpen uses to discuss editing's role in preparing for an entrance: "the star is disclosed in a tantalisingly — but expected — piecemeal way".[68]

Mise-en-scene 2 (M2)
The beads
Boy (Johnny) getting water. Green grass and trees. Mother (Angie) cooking on outside stove. Johnny spills water, from a bucket. Calls to Angie. Points. Angie gets a gun but hides it.

Dynamic mise-en-scene
Shots are active (in contrast to M1). It is noticeable that the "beads" in M2 are in terms of fragments of action (including bits of dialogue) whereas in M1 a state was being described. Editing rhythm is faster. Actions seem decisive.

In the interstice
Now that we have two mise-en-scenes it is possible to consider the gap between them: what has one to do with the other? They are opposites brought together in close relation by the intercutting: the harsh desert and nurturing homestead. Most importantly for the narrative, the relation between Hondo and Angie is anticipated in the two mise-en-scenes. It starts to become more explicit in the third dynamic mise-en-scene that can be read as an outcome of the previous two: "a difference of potential is established between the two, which will be productive of a third or of something new".[69] It would be odd to identify this as dialectical in such a conservative movie, with the logic of this film advancing by oppositions that find politically conservative resolutions. Opposition is set up for the sake of the resolution (that often comes too easily).

The creation (emergence) of an encompassing whole (M1+M2)
There is a conversation that, conventionally, we might want to see as a separate sequence or shot, but it is the two mise-en-scenes that set the conversation. Regarding the conversation as a separate sequence would be arbitrary sectionalisation; the focus on the mise-en-scenes preserves a continuity and shifts in relations. We cut between

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[68] Orpen, *Film Editing*, 87. It is one of the demonstrations that "rather than narrowing down the subject of editing to reveal its rhetoric, this study has had to expand it to incorporate other filmic elements" (116).

[69] Deleuze, *Cinema 2,* 180.

characters within their respective settings — Hondo with the desert in the background, Angie with the greenery of the homestead in the background — until a resolution when, Johnny (the son) essentially crosses to Hondo's mise-en-scene and immediately experiences a little of its danger (as opposed to the secure homestead) when the dog is aggressive towards him.

Mise-en-scene 3 (M3):

<u>*The beads:*</u>

Enclosed space in the cabin. Private. Domestic. Hondo. Angie. Feeding Hondo. A tentative intimacy. The dog = Independence.

<u>*Dynamic mise-en-scene:*</u>

The mise-en-scene serves to separate the two characters from the outside (including Johnny). In a common space (mostly in two-shot, with Hondo foregrounded at the table and Angie moving from the stove in the background to serve Hondo), the mise-en-scene is static but detailed so it maintains visual interest. Minimal movement occurs within it. There is a contrast between an outside public space and an inside private space. Hondo, previously dwarfed by landscape and circumstance, is now dominant and stable in the shot.

<u>*In the interstice:*</u>

The stability of the shot works against the notion of interstices, and that is appropriate because what is being offered is a unified space, a relationship. However, gaps enter the shot in a different way: the conversation provides the gap in that it is, from Hondo, about the merit and necessity of independence in opposition to Angie's compassion that is on display in her treatment of a stranger. The gap is underscored with the dog (Sam) as a visual metaphor. The door remains open, and Sam is in the doorway. Sam is explicitly identified in the dialogue as representing independence (wild but loyal). Dualities are in play: male/female; independence/need; outside/inside.

Understanding shots, sequences, or scenes through dynamic mise-en-scenes as narrative units, rather than as conventional shots, invites attention away from the action (they remain movement-images in which action is appropriately considered), and towards questions of relation and change. The introduction of *Hondo* builds a world that contains both the demonstrated security of Angie's ranch and Hondo's evident battles with hostile forces. In the establishing sequence of mise-en-

scenes (M1, M2, and M3), the beads are collected: the cowboy, the independent woman, the boy, the dog, the absent husband, the reason for his horse-lessness — killed by the Apache. While we have not seen any Apache yet, the real interest is in the relation to the Apache, and this has been established by Hondo's measured oppositional attitude and Angie's accommodation and support of local Apache.[70] These are the patterns that will be shaken into different relations as the movie goes on.

The cuts (editing) between and within the mise-en-scenes help to establish thematic oppositions by relative spatial dimensions. For example, in terms of gender relations, direct questions are asked of Angie about her being a woman surviving in a harsh environment and the whereabouts of her husband. In terms of mise-en-scene, Hondo is never seen in the outdoor cooking and waterside (M2). Later, when he is outside it is in the stable sharpening tools, and in the corral, horse breaking: the homestead's workspaces are clearly Angie's, but when Hondo is there, Angie becomes an observer. It is both a separation of roles in gender terms and a respectful and grateful inclusion of this stranger in the household. The encompassing-whole is the establishment of spatial patterns, not of action but of significance.

The editing in *Hondo* announces and intercuts situations or events that we have identified as dynamic mise-en-scenes. While edits defining the end of shots are usually seen as a sharp point of demarcation of the shot, there is often a transitional shot at the end of the sequences that comprise the mise-en-scene. In *Hondo*, the move from outdoors to inside (a public space to a private one) starts with the conversation becoming perfunctory and an odd glance between Hondo and Angie evoking a muted reaction from each, anticipating intimacy perhaps, and announcing the change of mise-en-scene to inside the cabin. The interior shot (M3) is completed when Hondo walks from the set, leaving Angie to reflect briefly on the conversation — she is nonplussed. It is not only the action that provides the interest, but a certain thought that requires completion, inviting closure and setting the motivation for perception and affection in the next shot, demonstrating, again, that a shot is defined and motivated by a particular idea. Dynamic mise-en-scenes are not stage dressings, as they are traditionally understood, but deliberate in physicalising ideas, thought and consciousness. As Deleuze remarks of the processes of the movement-image that divide and reunite durations:

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[70] The Apache are routinely referred to as "Indians" in the film, as well as "Apache". We will prefer the latter, because it is more specific in identifying them and less likely to stereotype; though that is the least of the problems with representation of Native Americans in the movie, and even Apache has its own limitations coming from a Zuni word meaning "our enemies". Their own names for themselves are *Ndee*, *Inday*, and *Dine'é*, which mean "the people" in the respective languages of groups that make up the Apache. http://www.native-languages.org/apache.htm. Hondo's attitude, including his violence, is conditioned (but not excused) by the fact that he is part Apache and because he has had a romantic relationship with an Apache woman who died.

Given that it is a consciousness which carried out these divisions and reunions, we can say of the shot that it acts like a consciousness. But the sole cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor the hero; it is the camera.[71] [We might want to add "and microphone".]

Consequently, it is a legitimate question to consider the sequences contained by the mise-en-scene as a unified series of ideas and editing to be the editing of thoughts. Recalling Bergson's intrusion of consciousness in the shaking of the kaleidoscope, the encompassing-whole becomes an accumulation of dynamic mise-en-scenes and further becomes the domain of phenomenological consciousness: *consciousness of*. Deleuze is faithful to Bergson in a general sense by depersonalising the cinematic consciousness and so, whatever subjectivities might enter the discussion, they rely on the camera's and microphone's consciousness as primary and preemptive.[72] For the encompassing-whole, the shift in ideas does not derive *from* the cut so much as *anticipate* the cut and give the transition from one idea to the next a place, so that the cut becomes an outcome: an idea is completed — to recall Murch's edit as a blink — in order that it might feed another thought.

Pinning down the open-whole: the limits of logic

Technically, the move beyond the encompassing-whole to the open-whole cannot be incremental; it is a difference in kind. If the encompassing-whole provides the world of the film, the open-whole provides its cosmos. Before our next example, it will be useful to consider the open-whole as a concept for analysis. For *Hondo*, the whole is condensed or deduced as theme — *Hondo's* manifest destiny, for instance — which is to say that it is profoundly limited, as one might expect for a classical film.

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[71] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 20.

[72] Depersonalise might not be the exact word since it assumes that something is personalised to begin with. However, the point is that consciousness is routinely seen as personalised or subjective or at least an attribute of an individual. For Bergson consciousness tends towards an impersonal and universal. "Thus is born the idea of a duration of the universe, that is to say, of an impersonal consciousness, as between these consciousnesses [of seemingly individual events] and the rest of nature". Bergson, *Henri Bergson: Key Writings,* 252.

The logic and rational development that is essential to classical cinema, once identified, raises the question of the extent to which such logic is universal. Is the open-whole presented as the ultimate limit of sets, logic itself, or not logic but a play of forces and flows in which rational logic is exceptional? Beyond the classical film, a willingness to acknowledge uncertainty and unpredictability is required, not as margins of error or as something to be overcome with more determined effort but as similar to their roles in quantum physics and chaos theory of providing re-conceptualizations that permit excursions beyond the common-sense. Without them, analysis becomes flat and descriptive, and creative synthesis becomes an emergent series of moves that in retrospect seems planned and inevitable.

The limits of logic mark the territory of Deleuze's time-image. However, as we have seen, the time-image returns us to the image-as-image now cut adrift or as the foundation of an aberrant logic with the irrational cut. An open-whole is evoked as time or as duration and, in an important sense, as outside of the images. Attention shifts to what is not explicit or available in the movement-images. The fact that, almost inevitably, a character engages with forces beyond themselves is the stuff of cinema, but the extent to which a character perceives an open-whole is a productive question. For cinema, and not necessarily for philosophy, the open-whole is demonstrated in relation to a character that is not reducible to neat descriptions of socio-economic forces or common thematic tropes. If the open-whole could be adequately described, it would be the encompassing-whole. Any definition of the open-whole is always provisional but comprises some common notions: a setting up of shots that, through editing, makes the interstice carry the implication and weight of an outside; a facility with techniques that value disorientation in order to provoke rather than describe a sense of the open-whole; and, the *sense* of a field of consciousness.

Raymond Ruyer describes the latter as a sensed or intuited world, rather than as one either prior to or as the product of perception. It is discussed by Paul Bains as "subjectless subjectivity" and elaborated by Elizabeth Grosz in her introduction to Ruyer:

> Before there can be an individual consciousness, particularly a human consciousness, Ruyer claims, there must already be a field in which the individual comes to be constituted: "the individualized field as 'absolute surface' precedes, in formation, the individual who will say 'I' of himself, or who will believe, without saying so, that he is acting like an 'I'".[73]

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[73] Elizabeth Grosz, *The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics, and the Limits of Materialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), Kindle ed., 210. (Embedded quotation: Raymond Ruyer, "There Is No Subconscious," *Diogenes* 36 (1988): 30.)

Ruyer's concept of *survol* is useful for film analysis. Survol is "absolute overview" or "survey" as Bains translates it and is the product of the idea that "'Being in the world' is a brain achievement".[74] In terms that we have been considering, the open-whole becomes an *intuition* of the open-whole. Ruyer's often used example (a "beginner's guide"[75]) is the act of looking at a chequered tablecloth. We perceive it from a particular point such that, because of perspective, light and distance, what we actually see is distorted, but we do not appreciate it as distortion. The regularity and cohesion of the geometric pattern of the tablecloth is understood, without the slightest confusion, as if observed from perpendicularly above. The actual perception is corrected or otherwise understood in relation to an intuited perception, and this is important for the creative works whose percepts and affects are distinct from everyday perception and affection. The implication for characters in film is that the dynamic mise-en-scene situates subjectivity in a particular way. For Bains (following Ruyer) subjectivity is ". . . not a denial of the process of individuation but the recognition that subjectivity deploys itself as much 'beyond' the 'individual' as before it".[76] It is a complex notion — Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari, Ruyer, and Whitehead are invoked by Bains — that is interested in both what the character perceives and how the character orients him or herself in terms of what is understood to be real (an exact concern of many of Alfred Hitchcock's films).

The sensory is relieved of *providing* a whole but is understood in relation to it. For Bains, this is a model of "qualitative multiplicity", not as a collection of parts, but as "an event, an actual occasion of experience".[77] The formulation then is of someone (a character) evaluating the evidence of their senses in relation to a whole that is "absolute overview" that "knows itself without observing itself";[78] it is neither investment in multiplicity nor is it subjectivity as a process guaranteeing perceptual validity. Instead, the intuited whole of consciousness and the sensory evidence of perception work in a relation that underpins the affection-image where the character is aware of something or processing something in an assumed consciousness. The open-whole from this perspective is intuited, but it is Ruyer's point that that should not suggest that it is any less real or actual, nor is it to be contained as psychological (in a conventional sense). This open-whole is evident in the percept in which characters are both, as we have seen (Chapter 4), inseparable from

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[74] Paul Bains, "Subjectless Subjectivities", *The Canadian Review Of Comparative Literature* 24, no. 3 (1997), 519, n.7.

[75] Ibid., 520- 521.

[76] Ibid., 514.

[77] "A qualitative multiplicity is not an aggregate of parts with an apparent unity constituted by the relation of separate numerical or physical existents (the Galilean world of purely external relations) but an *event, an actual occasion of experience* (Whitehead)". Ibid., 514.

[78] Ibid., 523.

and understood in relation to their setting. It is not that they are making assumptions; it is well before that.

Ruyer's survey, to the limited extent it is being used here, provides, a measure of identification of the whole and gives the whole a presence, resulting in the sense that one knows the world of the film. It can be particular as an embodied whole (Steven Spielberg's Amity Beach in *Jaws*), an antagonistic whole (Francis Coppola's *Apocalypse Now*, Martin Scorsese's *Goodfellas*), a whimsical whole (in most Woody Allen films), or an enigmatic whole that characters seek access to (in many of Sofia Coppola's films). Paolo Sorrentino is a director with a highly developed sense of an intuited whole to which the viewer is privy (*This must be the place*), partially privy (*Il Divo*), intermittently privy (*A Great Beauty*), and in the process of gaining access to an intuited whole (*The Hand of God*). Such considerations of a type of whole become more dynamic with Ruyer because the very act of perception includes the whole and does not simply assume it as available to perception or as, ultimately that which perception excludes. In Ruyer's sense, survey exists, prior to, in, and after the act of perception.

Deleuze advances the idea of the whole as a "brain achievement" in relation to Kubrick "If we look at Kubrick's work, we see the degree to which it is the brain which is *mis en scène*".[79]

> The identity of world and brain, the automaton, does not form a whole, but rather a limit, a membrane which puts an outside and an inside in contact, makes them present to each other, confronts them or makes them clash. The inside is psychology, the past, involution, a whole psychology of depths which excavate the brain. The outside is the cosmology of galaxies, the future, evolution, a whole supernatural which makes the world explode.[80]

Deleuze discusses Kubrick's devices for achieving this membrane, especially the black obelisk in *2001*. In *Cinema 2*, Deleuze has, in effect, made the whole accessible by making it outside and by then regarding editing as creating interstices that provide a place for the outside: "the cut has become the interstice, *it is irrational and does not form part of either set* . . . Thus, in Godard, the interaction of two images engenders or traces a frontier which belongs to neither one nor the

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[79] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 205.
[80] Ibid., 206.

other".[81] The idea that the editing can both be connective and an open frontier between images puts editing on a spectrum between the imperceptible and the frontier.

Competing wholes: *Under the Skin*

Jonathan Glazer's *Under the Skin* provides a catalogue of ways of creating and maintaining interstices and of using them for particular effect, largely because the film is about (alien) consciousness. In the film, aliens are on earth, preying on human beings.[82] In the presentation of a speculative open-whole of alien consciousness — which, unlike most science fiction, proceeds on the assumption that alien consciousness is not available to humans — interstices are used to create a conceptual space capable of accommodating the alternative consciousness. In the initial scene, a woman's body is undressed in order to take her clothes, by the alien in human form. The white space in which this happens is ambiguous, as later is the black space in which she harvests her (male) prey.

The white space does not have the dimensions of a room: there are no corners, furniture, openings — just *white*. We cut from the alien climbing into a van where the body has been placed, to the characters (alien and dead body) in what can only be described as pure white. The editing is seamless so that at first glance we seem to be inside the van, but immediately following the described sequence, the alien walks down a flight of stairs, indicating that the white has been in a room. It is an irrational cut, not to a new shot that requires some adjustment but to a partial opsign (". . . an image where the seen is no longer extended into action")[83] and the absence of anything on which to found a logic.

In this liminal space nothing is made clear: the dead woman sheds a tear, perhaps she is not dead; the alien picks up an ant from the woman's clothing and observes it in an extreme closeup of a macro-shot that seems irrelevant; and it is not clear why she needs the clothes of the woman, later she will go shopping and be shown to be capable of managing transactions.[84] Camera

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[81] Ibid., 181. [Emphasis in the original.]

[82] Plot outline: In Scotland, an alien who has taken female human form, searches for males. When she seduces one, she takes him to a house and in a dark room (with indeterminate dimensions), she dissolves him in what seems to be a black liquid (it has some but not all properties of a liquid). The search for human prey continues until she starts to develop compassion and then a curiosity about humans. It leads to her eventual exposure as an alien and her destruction.

[83] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 335 [Glossary.]

[84] In any case, she has a minder, "the Motorcycle Man", who could easily have provided her with clothes, presumably, since he is entirely functional in the human world, without having to kill someone to obtain them.

consciousness, such as it is, is reduced to witnessing. The edits cease to be explicitly motivated, and they force images to exist only in their durations: the time it takes to undress the woman and the movements of the ant. Irrational cuts, that took us into and out of these durations, then, enable floating durations, that as durations demonstrate an awareness of the passage of time and activity, but fall short of explicating or assuming the whole that gives them purpose. The irrational cut, here, is not a single cut, but instead a bracketing between two: getting into the back of a van and walking out of a building, bracketing the undressing of the woman in the white space.

Deleuze recognises blank screens of black or white as providing what can be understood as similar extended or sustained interstices, in effect expanding the gap as pure black or white screen so as to make something approaching a time-image (the interstice is literally given time). The alien and the dead woman inhabit such a sustained interstice with the white background. A sustained black screen starts the film, and the first three minutes comprises descriptions of becoming: becoming human, becoming literate, becoming aware, and for the audience, it is also becoming alien as we are learning to perceive and see that which is common to us as if it were not.[85]

At each edit point, the image is ambiguous, and the emergence of form is incremental: it is synthetic editing creating something that is beyond what prior elements can account for. The black opsign that opens the movie is later echoed in the pure black of the liquid in which men are dissolved. It is similarly, as with the white, synthetic and accountable in terms of Deleuze's rhizomatic "ANDs": there is the liquid AND it does not have the qualities of liquid, AND it is solid enough for the alien to walk over, AND the men gradually submerge into it as they walk, AND there are no waves or ripples, AND it has something to do with sexual desire. We are required to make an aberrant series. Logically, to use BUT at each point would withhold the sense of purposefulness, even if we do not know (and are never told) the purpose. The men are suspended in what appears to be Deleuze's black interstice; literally between life and death, between the desire that got them there and a zero state of no desire, a "zero intensity" or a "failure to live".[86]

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[85] The series of first images is this: sustained black screen, silence, then ambient sound, the sound of electronic interference understated but gradually growing, a dot of light in the black appears and is held before becoming like a star-burst that is held and gradually accumulates inscribed circles, a sequence plays with circular shapes, a donut-like shape emerges and resembles an eye (black centre and white tube), a female voice is making syllabic sounds and vocalisations before forming words, and practicing them and connecting words, the plastic eyelike shape becomes an actual eye, just the iris and some of the white, then there is a cut to another black screen, this one has some texture, it is a mountain scene at night, again a small dot of light appears, it moves in a curved path down the screen, then we see many coloured lights converging as some speed into the screen, before we realise that they are reflected on a motor cyclist's visor as he rides. The cyclist stops, disappears into the dark land beside the road, and reappears with the body of a woman — the formal narrative begins.

[86] Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2006), 3, 12.

Engagement with alien consciousness — with an alternative way of seeing events whose motivations are unclear (to us), and a persistent wondering *what is going on here?* (essential to the film) — is not limited to baffling spatial dimensions. There is a scene in *Under the Skin* that has a narrative that is easy enough to outline and it is the placement of the alien temperament in an uncomplicated mise-en-scene that makes it all the more chilling. The alien abandons a crying baby on the beach, his parents are taken by the strong waves and their would-be rescuer is killed by the alien woman. Rather than provide continuity, the edit points fragment events without disrupting a simple narrative continuity. There are all the marks of conventional analytical editing with an establishing long shot and an interplay of elements within it. But shots are held a little too long or cut to the next in a way that jars, and groupings of shots eschew the logic of the movement-image. Images seem thrown together and unmotivated. Characters are situated within haphazard groupings of situations that on one level are approachable as encompassing-wholes in the bigger encompassing-whole of the beach and the even bigger Scotland (under alien invasion without knowing it).

Contextualising does not account for the fact that editing provides interstices in which relations are exposed but not adequately articulated. It is possible to discuss the encompassing-whole in this way because it has dimensions, and characters are cocooned and defined by a sense of a whole relative to them, but Ruyer's sense of survey is undermined or in conflict with an alien survey, challenging assumptions and subjectivities.

In the following breakdown, each character or set of characters is determined by different wholes (cocoons, groupings of images, etc that define *their* encompassing-whole). Editing interrelates the wholes. The dynamic mise-en scenes are not working to a common purpose, and so they are harder to map than with *Hondo*. Analysis is returned to the shot but with a heightened awareness of their wholes as requiring the identification of competing wholes and accounting for their interaction. In effect we are grasping that if (with the encompassing whole), the whole is describable in terms of its limits, it is editable; the movie relies on a set of wholes. In the following, shots or close groupings of shots are numbered.

1. Dog runs into rough surf.
2. Long shot of family with mother on the shore and father and child further up the beach

We assume a connection between them. *Whole (A)* between 1 & 2 (and 6,7,8) is the family unit. It is assumed in 2 but demonstrated in 6–8.

3. Isolated alien, in mid-shot, watches and then turns her attention to an isolated swimmer in a slow pan that connects her to him.

There is no explanation of why she should be at the beach. She is dressed in the same clothes that she wore in the city scenes (and this, in a sense, provides a visual reminder of boundaries between wholes).

4. There is a sustained shot that has the swimmer walking out of the water towards the alien (40 seconds) giving us time to think about him as a potential victim, recalling the alien's history.

5. Intercut close-ups between the two in what we now understand to be her seduction patter.

Whole (B) between 3, 4 & 5 concerns the alien's predatory behaviour.

6. The swimmer notices the mother, fully-dressed, swimming out in the rough surf to rescue the dog.

7. The husband, also fully dressed, swims towards her, to help her as she apparently struggles in the surf. We hear nothing specific except the loud muffled sound of the surf. It intensifies the tension.

8. A series of short shots between the husband, the dog, and the woman, with each individually framed.

Whole (C) is the duration of the attempted rescue. Each shot is disorienting so that we first need to identify the person anew in each fragment before we can understand what is happening.

9. The alien watches dispassionately in a shot that has her in medium close up with the background of the grass, not the surf in which an emergency is happening.

Ultimately, the swimmer tries unsuccessfully to save the mother and father and as he lies exhausted on the beach, he is murdered, without apparent motivation, by the alien. The baby is left crying, abandoned and vulnerable on the darkening beach. It is a very unsettling final image that concludes this sequence, economically closing the durations of each whole: A, the family at the start is no more; B, the predatory alien is shown to be unmoved by a sense of compassion on any level; C, the rescue duration is completed, if unsuccessfully. What has been identified as wholes could also be identified as durations or compound durations. Editing's connective function is in linking durations and fragments and so it creates a compound (rather than rational) whole (D) that is the whole in which the other wholes exist.

The alien has a different role in each duration: distant objective observer of an actual situation (A), protagonist (B), observer as detached other (C), while she is the reference point and common element for D. Whole A assumes or connotes a culturally familiar situation in which we read

images as representative. It is family — mother, father, child, dog — out for a day at the beach. What is not known is why they are there on a treacherous windy beach or anything more about them. We are given only enough to understand this as a family and from there to assume relations that would see one willing to risk their life for another as circumstances shift. Whole B connects to other sections of the film and forms a thread of demonstrated alien consciousness throughout the film. Whole C has duration that is limited to this sequence; images are in pragmatic relation and committed to the action (approaching a classical movement-image) but with disjunctions. There are no affection-images as such, but a state of crisis is elicited through uncertainty about who we are seeing, highlighted by the amplified unfocused sound of crashing waves.

In *Under the Skin*, the incurving of patterns around the alien is a departure from conventional science fiction that sees the alien as other. The limits to the character's incurving are the taken-for-granteds of human consciousness. She is caught in an encompassing-whole or milieu of human society that values compassion. The alien discovers human consciousness, and it makes her vulnerable and ultimately open to the revulsion (the human opposite of the compassion that interests her) that leads to her destruction.

The whole is a useful analytical concept not only because it opens totalising concerns (duration, context, and cumulative, aberrant, or oppositional considerations), but also because, when the whole is understood in terms of the shot, it is valued in terms of both connective and differential concepts (including membranes, the outside, and interstices). The alien exists liminally more in the aberrant connections/separations than in narrative series. When *Under the Skin* does achieve narrative coherence, it signals the demise of the alien. The whole introduced as one side of the movement-image (and so open to reassessment as the movement-image changes) becomes fractally applicable at any scale (shot, dynamic mise-en-scene, encompassing-whole) and this availability produces a sense of an open-whole. The message for analysis is that the whole is trackable, not fixed as some kind of super-context.

The whole is not a notion that has been of much interest to Deleuzian film scholarship. Nor, according to Deleuze, is it of great interest to philosophers: "Many philosophers have already said that the whole is neither given nor giveable: they simply concluded from this that the whole was a meaningless notion".[87] It is not that scholars have ignored it, but that they have sought more

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[87] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 9. In the four collections that we have regarded as a survey of the field of Deleuzian cinema analysis (David Norman Rodowick, *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film*, 2010; Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack, *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*, 2008; Gregory Flaxman, *The Brain is the Screen* 2000; and David Martin-Jones and William Brown, *Deleuze*

definition and precision, directing attention to the whole as manifestations of change and relations, via the terms assemblage, becoming, multiplicity, and so on. The Deleuzian cineaste might follow suit, but there is something to be gained from treating the whole as a troubling concept. Most of the problem is that the concept of *whole* is, as contradictory as it seems, overextended or overreaching. Deleuze provides a simile that is useful in grounding the notion:

> Movement in space expresses a whole which changes, rather as the migration of birds expresses a seasonal variation. Everywhere that a movement is established between things and persons, a variation or a change is established in time,

So far so good, we can grasp a complex relation between movement and the whole. The bird does not cause or define the whole, just as the whole does not cause the bird to migrate. The relation is contingent and ecological as we have considered in relation to sound (Chapter 4). But then, Deleuze slips in the notion of an *open* whole:

> that is, in an open whole which includes them and into which they plunge. We saw this earlier: the movement-image is necessarily the expression of a whole; it forms in this sense an indirect representation of time.[88]

The simile restates the dual tendency towards series and whole that is established early in *Cinema 1*, with the shot described as having two facets in various ways: two poles, faces, facets, two sides of the coin.[89] The simile is valuable in demonstrating the ordinariness of the whole: "The shot, that is to say consciousness, traces a movement which means that the things between which it arises are continuously reuniting into a whole and the whole is continuously dividing between things".[90] The reuniting is satisfactory because we have the notion of an inclusive whole, but the dividing is problematic: when a whole divides, does it divide into parts (anathema to the concept of an open-whole) or does it produce a series of wholes. There is no question that the latter is more productive for analysis. If the open-whole is understood as a sense of the whole that escapes definition or the equivalent of a cinematic survey (Ruyer's *survol*) then recognition of the open-whole is recognition that we cannot know it directly.

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and Film, 2012), only one has 'whole' listed in the index. That listing is extensive, but entries are mostly from a single work: the chapter by Gregory Lambert: "Cinema and The Outside", in *The Brain is the Screen*.

[88] Deleuze, Cinema 2, 237-238

[89] Deleuze, *Cinema 1.* 19-23.

[90] Ibid, 20.

It becomes very difficult, and probably self-defeating, to attempt to define the open-whole except perhaps as a radical continuation of Deleuze's rhizomatic ANDs or as the existence of ineffable forces and relations both in and outside of assemblages. But movies sometimes reach for the ineffable.[91] *Under the Skin* is about the limits of the known, not only for the humans, but especially for the alien for whom our (human) knowns are her unknowns and *vice versa*. It is not that the connective function of editing fails — on the contrary, it is employed in the same way as in classical cinema, but in the service of different patterns of thought than conventional logic: not for novelty's sake, but because a certain situation or consciousness requires it.

The question of the unity of the open-whole arises in Peirce. Is the open-whole, in terms of Peirce's sign qualities, thirdness writ large (a super-thirdness), or does he acknowledge a beyond of the signs (a Spinozian unifying interplay of forces)? The answer is an anti-climactic both. In his "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God", Peirce identifies three "Universes of Experience" that are, nevertheless, still roughly equivalent to the three qualities of signs even if they are situated beyond the image. The first is the universe of "mere Ideas" such as the thought of the poet or of the pure mathematician (his examples). The second is the "Brute actuality of things and facts" of everyday existence, depicted in terms of clashes and conflicts (often presented as polarities). This is the bread-and-butter of the action-image, but in this case, it is presented as the principle behind it. The third "comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different universes".[92] Peirce's take on the open-whole, then, exists in ideas, existence and organising power.

Peirce, makes clear that his "Universes of Experience" are plural and pluralistic: "Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living constitution — a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social 'movement.'"[93] However far one goes with this, Peirce does not actually exceed thirdness as the limit of signs, except to propose an "active power" that establishes the rules of thirdness. It caused Deleuze to wonder: "why does Peirce think that everything ends with thirdness and the relation-image and that there is nothing beyond?"[94] As we have seen, Deleuze's perception-image as zeroness is a commentary on Peirce's limitation. At least,

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91 Among such movies: *2001: A Space Odyssey; I ♡Huckabees; 21 Grams; Vanilla Sky; The Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind; Big Fish.*

92 Charles Sanders Peirce, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God", *Hibbert Journal* 7, no. 1, (1908): n.p. [Section 1.] https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Neglected_Argument_for_the_Reality_of_God.

93 Ibid., n.p. [Section 1.]

94 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 33.

it proposes that there is something prior to the sign qualities, and prior to any sign, in the act of perception that assumes (to switch to Bergson) that when something is perceived, everything else is excluded (the "everything else" is an adequate description of the open-whole). Deleuze's demonstration of firstness, secondness, and thirdness (Chapter 3) show them to be fluid and interdependent, from which an open-whole can be inferred as an expression of the *interplay*, not as the qualities themselves.

The open-whole as cinematic object in *Run Lola Run*:

The interplay negotiated through images and signs (image-types and sign categories) allows the ineffable open-whole to find presence in a film. Tom Tykwer's *Run Lola Run* does not regard the open-whole as external, rather the functioning of the open-whole is identified and incorporated into the narrative concerns. In many ways, *Run Lola Run* does acknowledge a beyond of the film in fate, coincidence, and non-linearity, but each is returned to its movement-images that maintain sensory-motor mechanisms but identify a different unifying logic at work. Because of the direct return to the narrative, the film falls short of forming time-images.

Run Lola Run makes the whole(s) and questions of relation and duration unusually explicit because the titular action grounds the whole in a clear physical reality.[95] The films three versions of events have the same encompassing-whole, and it is change and relation (markers of the open-whole) that provide variation. The radical openness of relations is made available by unusual means, so that the open-whole becomes a distinct part of the film in three ways. Firstly, a slight shift in the start of each version of events (around 40 seconds, but exact variations are significant)[96] demonstrates the contingency of relations. Short delays have the same events (or at least the same starting points) play out in radically different ways.

Secondly, and the first point notwithstanding, Lola learns from one version (story, run) to the next, even though they are, logically, separated repetitions of events. It places her, and our interest, both

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[95] The premise is that Lola has to raise 100,000 Deutsche Mark, to repay a debt for her lover, Manni, who has lost the money from the sale of drugs. The transaction was a test to prove his reliability to his crime boss and Manni has to deliver the money, that he accidentally left in a bag on the subway, in 20 minutes time (at noon). That gives Lola a 20-minute deadline to raise the money and the movie is three alternative versions of what happens in those 20 minutes, with each story presented in real time.

[96] The first is 43 seconds; the second 52 seconds. The 9 second delay is because of the dog's snarling at her and the bully's tripping her giving her a slight limp; the third is 40 seconds as a super-confident Lola picks up time by leaping past the bully and his dog. Each time, the progression down the stairs is in cartoon form ostensibly on her mother's television as she absent-mindedly flirts with a would-be or recent lover.

with and outside of the events, as do the intervals between versions in which Lola and Manni have an intimate discussion, reflecting on their relationship, in a static red tinted frame.[97] The interludes and the learning between versions open the film to other levels of the whole. The viewer is forced to accept relations beyond the linear cause and effect of the sensory-motor system (even if each version relies fundamentally on a tight linearity); it places relations as the major interest, not linear actions as such.[98]

Thirdly, the prologue of *Run Lola Run*, sets conceptual limits as well as their porousness. It is, as it were, an address from the open-whole. The prologue is a quasi-Brechtian address to the camera by a character in costume, but out of narrative context on a hazy (due to an over exposed background) football field peopled with other costumed characters and others (a crowd) who are not in the body of the film. The bank guard character, Herr Schuster, is holding a soccer ball as he addresses the viewer: "The ball is round, the game is 90 minutes. That's a fact. Everything else is pure theory".[99] This positions the whole as a direct concern of the film, and as a leitmotif. Change is inevitable and beyond a certain point unpredictable, but it is contained within limits.

However, rather than suggesting clear limits (although they are precise), the prologue identifies the *idea* of limits and serves to focus on the point that the important thing is change within them. The only difference between the whole and the open-whole is one of limits. The principles are so broad. "Everything else is pure theory" invites us to an almost caricatured Deleuzian understanding of events as radically open and invites the open-whole, but it directs us to observe what is expressed in the event. If theory is to be articulated, it is as the "pure theory" of the experience, not of philosophical tenets. Also, Herr Schuster is a minor character, and the observations about the game of football, seem puerile or ironic, yet prove to be a fitting introduction. The plot works within a single encompassing-whole that accommodates the most tangential connections and unforeseen potentials.[100] Herr Schuster's statement seems apt: we cannot know potentials until we are in the event.

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[97] It is a double closeup, head-and-shoulders two-shot, no editing, in a red tinted frame, one of the effects of which is to normalise Lola's signature orange hair.

[98] One suggestion is that it is a video game mentality, that allows the player to restart and approach the next game with the accumulated skills of previous games. This notion is reinforced by Lola as a figure that stands out like a Lara Croft and that the aerial shots of her movement across a patterned ground evoke movement in video games. For more see: "Run Lola Run: In the Perspective of Video Games", Blog, *Academic Works on Lola Rennt*, 2018, https://filmstudiesju.wordpress.com.

[99] Tom Tykwer, *Lola Rennt* (*Run Lola Run*) (1998). Movie Script. https://www.scripts.com/script/run_lola_run_12752.
This is a quote from Josef "Sepp" Herberger, beloved German football player, manager and coach.

[100] There are a number of 'fast forwards' that depict the futures of minor characters in a series of still frames that last from between 5 – 9 seconds. Some are bleak, some positive, some humorous. The effect is that there are tangents to the lines of Lola's experiences

Lola is the precise point of intersection of many lines that are realigned through her actions. In this, she is not different from other major characters in movies, but she is unusually distinctive partly because the alignments and realignments happen three times. Repeatability is a function of the creativity and relationality and Adrian Parr's description of it seems very pertinent to *Run Lola Run*. "To repeat is to begin again; to affirm the power of the new and the unforeseeable".[101] Lola seems to understand this. Her third run is more spiritual, which is to say more in control of new and unforeseeable forces. Lola is a shaper of potentials, not through acts of volition or deliberate creativity, but precisely because she moves and is open to potentials that movement exposes and it includes potential beyond narrative, generic or conventional tropes.

Run Lola Run is not unique in this, in fact the film goes some way to describing cinema after the modernism that Deleuze designates as based on the time-image. Impulses that might result in a time-image (in what might be understood paradoxically as conventional modernism) are expressed through formal techniques and structures rather than shifts in image-type. Approaches to form that involve a reorganisation of time structures and assumptions include the following: the films of Joel and Ethan Cohen (generic subversion), Quentin Tarantino (intertextuality) and Paul Thomas Anderson (aberrant linkages). They might begin a list of films that seek and employ a different logic or self-awareness while not sacrificing a rich awareness of the open-whole's relation and change. They straddle classical and modern formulations but still seek what might be taken as pre-empted in Deleuze's modernist project:

> We have seen that the power of thought gave way, then, to an unthought in thought, to an irrational proper to thought . . . The question is no longer: does cinema give us the illusion of the world? But: how does cinema restore our belief in the world? This irrational point is the *unsummonable* of Welles, the *inexplicable* of Robbe-Grillet, the *undecidable* of Resnais, the *impossible* of Marguerite Duras, or again what might be called the *incommensurable* of Godard (between two things).[102]

If a filmmaker's task is to evoke a world worthy of belief, cinema *analysis* is not consigned simply to echoing and commenting on the film's efforts. Analysis has its own role to play in restoring a

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that we are following. The still frames and the sounds of the camera whirr and shutter crunches make those tangents formally distinct from the film (that is, from what is mostly Lola's reality).

[101] Adrian Parr, "Repetition" in Parr, *The Deleuze Dictionary Revised Edition*, 225.

[102] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 181-182.

belief in the world, by engaging in lines of flight and by treating aberrant images, fissures and failed thought as beckoning a logic greater than that which identifies them as such and by approaching a film-as-film (in the way that the time-image recognises image-as-image). That is to say, belief in the world can or must come in other ways than through direct representations of the world.

Direct representation starts to seem feeble and an avoidance of truths rather than an engagement. There is a shot at the very end of Alejandro Jodorowsky's *El Topo* — a hallucinogenic acid-Western — that has the camera pull back from the action to expose the camera crew, boom operator, director and assistants in a huddled group filming the final scene. It is a Brechtian gesture that exposed the film as imaginings or craft, and the existence of the present real world, a whole beyond the film. It is close to Deleuze's idea from *Cinema 2* that the seer or clairvoyant is a literal *seer* of images-as-images. But it was not sufficient. Afterall, what is beyond the camera that filmed the group filming? It felt like artifice, but you got the point. And it is why gaps and aberrance created by editing speak more convincingly than statements about the Whole. They point to a sense of the Whole that can only be appreciated *in situ*. The whole is not as much discovered or exposed, as appreciated.

This chapter has surveyed editing's capacity to connect, juxtapose and relate units other than the shot. Very often editing is reductionist and does not move from the shot. Rather than as a reductionist impulse, the process can be understood more as fractal, with similar (the same?) processes evident at different scales. The scales that have been considered are the dynamic mise-en-scene (dynamic as it recognises movement in and of mise-en-scenes) and the idea of the wholes that are themselves organisable and editable as wholes in accumulation and interaction with other wholes. Analysis is fractal in the sense that it can jump in at whatever level that seems appropriate to the film and work in any direction and find consistent patterns.

Deleuze offers a solution to Orpen's frustration with editing "as elusive and not really desirable given that one must ultimately revert to the shot anyway, which leads to a sort of vicious circle".[103] The solution involves grasping the two sides of the movement-image towards the set and the whole and attempting in analysis to balance interest in the shot with interest in the whole. *Under the Skin* moves freely and unpredictably between shot and whole, and between wholes. When aspirations are limited to the set, connective editing provides the tools to consider how sets are constructed. But

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[103] Orpen, *Film Editing*, 3.

with Deleuze, we can also ask: what kind of whole are we talking about in *this* shot and how does it relate to the kind of whole in the *next* shot? It is a vital question posed by editing.

CHAPTER 6

A Deleuzian disposition: "techniques of emergence"

"When we are no longer still, the world lives differently"

"What begins technically as a movement is *immediately* a movement of thought".

— Erin Manning[1]

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[1] Erin Manning, *Relationscapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2012), 1 and 15.

It is almost inevitable that the Deleuzian cineaste will be regarded as applying a bank of cinematic concepts, so that, camera angles, frame analysis, and lighting are complemented by the addition of duration, movement-image, and time-image (and subsets of image-types). However, concepts that value *change* and *relation* rather than describe pictures have been identified, and they warrant a more fundamental shift in what the film is understood to be doing and how it should be approached, beginning with the notion that cinema is about movement and that movement is a creative endeavour.

The aim of the Deleuzian cineaste — scholar, teacher, filmmaker, reviewer, aficionado engaging in formal or informal film analysis, and students of all ages learning to approach film (raising the question of what it means to teach Deleuzian attitudes to film) — is not the same as that of the Deleuzian philosopher. The Deleuzian cineaste relies on details not possible in a survey of the whole field of cinema in dialogue with the field of philosophy. Deleuze can make a statement like: "For Renoir, theatre is primary, but because life must emerge from it"[2] and provide supporting examples so that we believe the statement, but in two pages he will be on to Fellini. In those two pages, seven of Renoir's films will be mentioned in evidence. Sustained film analysis (comprehensive analysis of a particular film) is rare in the *Cinema* books, though there is also no doubt that it has happened.

The Deleuzian cineaste seeks specificity and exhaustive detail in order to expose the working and movements of a *particular* film, starting with a heightened awareness of movement as physical, temporal, conceptual, and relational. But they are adjectives that hardly clarify the task. On the contrary each confuses the other unless they are understood as possible approaches to movements, a repertoire of approaches to be called upon when the time is ripe, which is to say when a particular film demands it. Movement, when one tries to pin it down, is tricky and induces a swinging between the ubiquitous movement of life and the measurable distance of physical movement from one point to another. Erin Manning observes that "to still becoming into a lingering identity is to try to stop movement. What must be sought is neither a total becoming nor a fixed identity: the dynamic equilibrium between identity and individuation is *metastable*. This means that it converges on many planes at once, more stable on some, more active on others".[3] A film does present as a stable existence in the world, although, equally (and with a nudge from Deleuze), it also presents as a congealing of images of movement, over and over again.

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[2] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 86.

[3] Manning, *Relationscapes*, 11.

The Deleuzian cineaste is taken to begin with a shift in attention from the image as something to be read to the image as a conduit of forces to be encountered. The question is not, *what does the image look like?* but *what is the image doing to direct movement in certain ways? (And why?)* The cinematic shot has been considered in a number of ways in this thesis, each with their own appeal: in terms of moments when certain forces coalesce as flows of image-types; as presenting sensation, percept and affect that intensify significant moments; in terms of a whole without which there would be no sense of flow; and as a model of rational movement from perception to action.

The idea that a revision of film analysis, demanded by recognition of the centrality of movement, should herald a new paradigm in competition with what has been presented as a dominant paradigm of conventional analysis is antithetical. There is no appetite to replace one paradigm with another when Deleuze's work, particularly in his collaborations with Félix Guattari, presents a challenge to molar constructions that any dominant paradigm will employ. In any case, conventional formalism has its place in analysis when it becomes appropriate to consider static visuals. A responsive attitude is called for: a *Deleuzian disposition*. The Deleuzian cineaste has been a partial construction in previous chapters. This chapter will flesh out analytical dispositions and consider general methodological approaches in terms of models that frame the Deleuzian cineaste more clearly.

"A kind of provoked becoming of thought": dialectics and dualisms

Deleuze allows the notion of disposition, rather than application, in his relational approach to cinema and philosophy as "brought together in a continuing process of intercutting. This is philosophy as assemblage, a kind of provoked becoming of thought".[4] It is not that intermediary accommodation and compromise between philosophy and cinema is sought, but on the contrary, that the intercutting presents as a guerrilla tactic — get in, assess what needs to be done, do it, get out. A generalised expression of this process of intercutting is not of much use until it is made concrete by identifying a film's patterns of movement (and thus meaning) by paying attention to mobile sections between which intercutting might take place.

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[4] Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, "Translators' Introduction" in *Cinema 2: The Time Image,* Gilles Deleuze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), xv. Also: "Philosophy itself is not a reflection on an autonomous object but a practice of creation of concepts, a constructive pragmatism. This is a book of philosophical invention, a theory of cinema as conceptual practice" (xv).

Dialectics and dualities have shown themselves to be useful at a number of points in this thesis and we will return to them presently. They have been less pertinent in terms of providing methodologies than providing conditions for methodologies. Put simply between two points something happens and it is the first task of the Deleuzian cineaste to identify two points between which analysis will take place. It can be the two points starting and concluding a shot (movement-image) or the two points might be more arbitrary. They might be two points that mark a duration such as the exposition (typically the first ten minutes of a film) or a phase of development for a character, or they might manufacture connection as, for example, between a costume detail and a particular sound. The important thing is that between the points a productive space is recognised (duration, interval, interstice, gap, chasm) and that it is materially available to analysis. In this space, the goal might be Eisenstein's explosive connections, the emergence of Peirce's relata, the realisations of Redner's bridges and platforms, the articulation of a whole, or something new.

The interstice or interval between two points initially creates a space that is more liminal than determined, more available than describable. While liminality might be understood in terms of conceptual or abstract phases, such as between social identities in most anthropological and sociological applications, liminality finds (and must find) expression in concrete terms. The affection-image is such a liminal space between perception and action in which emotional passage is given precise form.[5] Recognition of the potential of this interval as creative is not a call to *be creative* (as narrowly novel or inventive for its own sake), but recognition that the role of the interval is one of encounter and change, the articulation of which becomes an important role for analysis.

In Chapter 3, we considered Ian Buchanan's proposal that a dialect central to the Deleuzian cineaste exists between a work or theory and the problem of its application: juxtaposing questions of *what it is to be Deleuzian* and *what it is to engage in film analysis* without seeking a neat synthesis that, in any case, "being-Deleuzian" would likely subvert. It is "a" dialectic to take Fredric Jameson's distinction ("the" dialectic is Hegelian). There is no clearly defined opposition between thesis and antithesis, and no basis for a negation. Instead there are two considerations, the *Cinema* books and

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[5] Liminality does not connote vague uncertainty. It has material form. Marriage rituals in some cultures have required actual withdrawal from society and re-emergence to be married: one identity extinguished to allow the emergence of another. Similar is evident in the concept of *engagement* with the wearing of a ring and the proscription/anticipation of certain behaviours. These are expressions of a liminality between different social identities that take on a concrete form. More, a teenager occupies a liminal phase between childhood and adulthood that has concrete and legally enforceable aspects: compulsory schooling, proscribed sexual relations, limits on behaviour (drinking, driving, voting). "Liminality is viewed as an in-between state of mind, in between fact and fiction (in Turner's language indicative and subjunctive), in between statuses". Stephen Bigger, "Victor Turner, liminality, and cultural performance", *Journal of Beliefs and Values* 30, no. 2 (2009), 212. What might be understood as virtual concepts of identity and status are given social concreteness and formal recognition; they become actual.

their use, brought into relation as a dialectic that begs a certain reflexivity, and the onus is on philosophy (via Deleuze) to provide it:

> a philosophy which does not include within itself a theory of its own particular situation, which does not make a place for some essential self-consciousness along with consciousness of the object with which it is concerned, which does not provide for some basic explanation of its own knowledge at the same time that it goes on knowing what it is supposed to know, is bound to end up drawing its own eye without realising it.[6]

"Drawing its own eye" encapsulates (almost literally) a tendency of conventional analysis to describe and order what it sees while eschewing theoretical support,[7] and convincing itself of, and providing detailed evidence for, a validity in a film that was already assumed. Too much of a sense of retrospective discovery forces analysis to become a process of confirmation: camera angles and composition *might* identify a character as dominant, but this only confirms what has already been clear in the character's actions and dialogue. At best, analysis becomes confirmation. When theory (Theory) is not dictating to vulnerable minds, it can provide a measure offering tenets and methods against which to position one's own. For Jameson, and Buchanan's use of him, the essential self-consciousness is not a means to check analysis and its outcomes, not a means of external accountability. When the aim is to engage in *original* analysis in one sense or another, reflexivity is a reminder to include the self-consciousness in the analytical process in order to recount one's steps and in doing so to maintain a scholarly rigour.

If dialectic is too loaded a word, it is nevertheless impossible to avoid duality. In the preceding chapters dualities have been recognised and employed: time/movement; inside/outside; set/whole; sound/visual; Deleuzian/conventional. Important dualities, or at least oppositional qualities, arising from the *Cinema* books have contextualised earlier chapters. Deleuze's appropriation of Peirce's sign categories identifies secondness as oppositional. Firstness then becomes the separation and definition of properties of that which enters into opposition, and thirdness demonstrates patterns of opposition. Sound has been understood as an independent image system capable of being placed in productive opposition to visual images. The whole has been understood in opposition to the set. Dualism is evident throughout Deleuze's oeuvre, overtly in *Difference and Repetition*, and in the

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[6] Fredric Jameson, *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism*, in *Deleuzism* Buchanan, 193.

[7] Overtly and polemically so in David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies* (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996). See Chapter 1.

construction, with Guattari, of schizoanalysis in opposition to Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxist social analysis. The *Cinema* books, themselves, present as the kind of irregular dialectic invoked by Buchanan in the proposition of a relation between cinema and philosophy, and in the resultant concern of another dialectic as movement (*Cinema 1*) is placed into relation with time (*Cinema 2*).

Research-creation

But all this seems to be drifting further from the desired *non-philosophical* approach of the Deleuzian cineaste. The understanding that holding on to the idea of two sides (points, ideas, concepts, things, or pairings of any of these) in dialogue is capable of producing unforeseen relations is enough to provide a foundation, with a little necessary expansion in order to make it a practice. Erin Manning and Brian Massumi's identification of *research-creation* that sustained a series of arts events in Montreal, provides orientation.[8]

> This idea of research-creation as embodying *techniques of emergence* takes it seriously that a creative act or design practice launches concepts-in-the-making. These concepts-in-the-making are mobile at the level of techniques they continue to invent. This movement is as speculative (future-event oriented) as it is pragmatic (technique-based practice.) [9]

Research-creation is not offered as a hybrid but as "a mode of activity all its own, occurring at the constitutive level of both art practice and theoretical research".[10] It is an important notion and considered elsewhere for example in the idea of art *as* research by Robert Briggs and Niall Lucy, and in audiovideo essays but especially those of Catherine Grant (discussed presently).[11] Consequently, Deleuzian cineastes are positioned at the crux of the forking between the pragmatic and the speculative both in their own practice and in the assessment of the practice of filmmakers. Inquiry is a movement *of* the forking rather than movement into one arm (of theory, philosophy, research) or the other (of creation, filmmaking, experiential viewing of film).

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[8] Events organised through SenseLab, discussed in *Thought in the Act* include the following: "Dancing the Virtual "(2006); "Society of Molecules "(2009); "Housing the Body Dressing the Environment "(2007); "Generating the Impossible" (2011); "Into the Mi(d)st" (2012). Erin Manning (Founder), "A Laboratory for Thought in Motion", *SenseLab – 3E*, http://senselab.ca/wp2/, n.p.

[9] Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, *Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 89. [Emphasis added]

[10] Ibid., 89.

[11] Robert Briggs and Niall Lucy, "Art as Research?", *Ctrl-Z: New Media Philosophy*, no. 2 (2012), http://www.ctrl-z.net.au/journal/?slug=issue-2/briggs-lucy-art-as-research/, n.p.

Research-creation values and foregrounds a relation between research and creativity such that one is not an outcome of the other but in dialogue. Manning and Massumi's "techniques of emergence" suggests that what is being sought are tools that expose and value conceptual and actual movement and keep out of its way long enough for it, ideally, to form new concepts. Processual concepts, as "enabling constraints",[12] might seem contradictory to creative intentions, but they were understood as necessary by Manning and Massumi to prevent creative processes from collapsing into self-indulgence (or at least a self-referential frame) on the one hand, and institutionalised thinking on the other: "before research and creation diverge into the institutional structures that capture and contain their productivity and judge them by conventional criteria for added value".[13]

For Manning and Massumi, processual concepts were generated to be used as needed: the *free radical* as a purposeful intervention,[14] *autistic receptivity* as a model of an open awareness to environments, and *strategic subversion* (or "*performative proposition*") exemplified by Manning, who dissolved the organising body partway into an event rather than let events ossify.[15] The dynamics of working at this point of intersection where both creativity and research are emerging is described similarly by Briggs and Lucy, "research might thus be seen less as a linear movement down a path mapped out in advance, than as a searching *as though for the first time*, as though one did *not* know the features of the terrain or where one was going; a search, in other words, that rewrites the map".[16] "As though for the first time" invokes a sense of discovery that is more than the *initiation* of a stable research event; rather it remains present in research's processes.

The movement-image and the time-image, and their progeny, work as techniques of emergence. Their usefulness is not in descriptions of images but in a setting up of paths that movement and significance might take and permitting (enabling and equipping) a potential "rewriting of the map" at any encounter with a film. They are seldom understood as directly applicable, but rather work as

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[12] Manning and Massumi, *Thought in the Act,* 93. "A term was adopted for relational technique in its event-conditioning role: 'enabling constraint'. An enabling constraint is positive in its dynamic effect, even though it may be limiting in its form/force narrowly considered". (93)

[13] Ibid., 89.

[14] The free radical is a prescribed role, usually not known to other participants, whose function is to disrupt paths that might be heading in predictable directions.

[15] Before the "Generating the Impossible" event, SenseLab's role was described as an organization dedicated to "the emergent and the ephemeral". At one point, the project was understood to be moving away from this goal. "SenseLab founder and pivotal person Erin Manning rather abruptly announced that the SenseLab was no more. The declaration of its passing was a performative proposition posing a number of unsaid questions to the collective". Ibid., 145. It was reinvented, later. In an interview, Manning described the importance of pauses and reinvention in SenseLab. Erin Manning and Leslie Plumb, *Interview with Erin Manning, on SenseLab*, video, 2016, https://senselab.ca/wp2/tangent/.

[16] Briggs and Lucy, "Art as Research?", n.p.

guiding discussion about a film in certain ways made available by Deleuze, but not determined by him. Why one would want to follow Deleuze is an open question, the short answer to which, in this thesis, is because he focuses on movement. But we are positioned then between a complex philosopher and a ubiquitous phenomenon. What becomes necessary is a series of "platforms", to use Gregg Redner's term (Chapter 4), bridges, or middle level concepts, the articulation of which is the goal of this chapter.

Research questions: orientating research

Deleuze offers advice for preventing theoretical muddiness by questioning the usefulness of direct ontological answers to questions in favour of ones that expose processes:

> It is not certain that the question *what is this?* is a good question for discovering the essence or the Idea. It may be that questions such as *who? how much? how? when? where?* are better — as much for discovering the essence as for determining something more important about the Idea.[17]

For example, considering the *whole* of a film is notoriously difficult (see Chapter 5), but becomes more accessible in terms of the questions — *who is the whole? how much is the whole? when is the whole?* With respect to *The Godfather*, *who is the whole?* is precisely the question, as the narrative whole is defined initially by Don Corleone, is contested subsequently by rival family heads, and rests finally with Michael (where it remains for the trilogy). It is not just a matter of the political power in the narrative. For the viewer, these shifts describe the concerns of the larger whole that enables the exercise of political power. Deleuze's questions keep us with the film: in what sense is it a particular character's whole, and what forces and exercises of power keep the world as his or her purview? If it is objected that of course there are other worlds and wholes, one might ask where, in the film, we see them in operation?[18] We are no longer trying to explain a notion of the whole (or even privileging a particular definition), but we are using the question of *whose whole?* to frame important questions of what is going on. That we are talking about the whole at all in this way, is

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[17] Gilles Deleuze, *Desert Islands and other Texts, 1953-1974* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 94.

[18] It is an important function of Kay (Michael's wife) to keep an awareness of alternative worlds in the minds of viewers. Her world (a world outside the family's and, thus, one that the audience can identify with) is one in relation to which the Corleone world is defined. It is a measure of the material existence of two worlds that Michael is prepared to marry again (without divorcing Kay) while he is in Sicily. The completeness and separateness of this other world of Sicily (distanced both in space and time) is evident also in the important flashback to the younger Don Corleone's life, in The *Godfather Part II*.

the product of theory and its refinement through scholarly research, as the framer of productive questions. Nevertheless, Deleuze's questions work in the same way as processual concepts in that they do not require explicit articulation of the theory that underpins them in order to be useful.

As anathema as the thought of applying Deleuze might be — fixing, externalising, privileging and molarising him — we are in a position now to ask directly *Who is the Deleuzian cineaste?* There are five groups or tendencies from which it will be possible to draw models, presented here as roles: discoverers of the interstice or interval; the line-of-flighters; the mappers of the intervals; the infiltrators; and the true believers. What they have in common is a willingness to run headlong into a quasi-dialectical interstice or interval, to get lost or at least immersed, and to use Deleuze to theorise a way out and if necessary, rewrite the map.

In some senses, the scholarly researchers, from whom the models are drawn, are themselves Deleuzian cineastes, but in our sense, their work is more clearly defined in terms of scholarly demands and formulations. Standards of accountability (including peer review) and expectations of contributing original insights to the field are not the concern of the Deleuzian cineaste who is more inclined towards the short essay, the blog, or informal analysis. There is, in other words, a distinction between formal scholarly research and general film analysis, though one feeds the other in its own dualistic relation.

Included, finally, is that budding cineaste — the high school student sitting down to watch a film chosen by his or her teacher and having to come to grips with it. This (so to speak) *high school avatar* of the Deleuzian cineaste provides a conclusion to the discussion of each model. It is a useful subgroup because it precludes overt philosophical concerns. Even if a teacher is aware of philosophical positions, the question is still how to make them available for students for whom, with exceptions, philosophy is not available.[19] Hence this chapter's preference for disposition rather than methodology: a compass, rather than a guidebook. A disposition connotes a poise, alertness, and openness in the practice of film analysis. In these terms, this chapter identifies, by way of conclusion, roles and principles in roles that will inform film analysis based on movement for the Deleuzian cineaste.

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[19] Students get an emerging sense of philosophy, especially in International Baccalaureate courses, with Theory of Knowledge as required coursework. Teachers might certainly be aware of philosophical underpinnings of curricula, but seldom have the time to explore them in detail. In spite of that, as an experienced teacher, I have no trouble identifying a significant number of teachers who have substantial theoretical/philosophical knowledge, with some active in academic scholarship, as well as some students who have solid theoretical orientations.

Model 1: Deleuzian cineaste as interrogator of the image and seeker of the interval: approaching movement as image

The first task of the Deleuzian cineaste is to delimit movement and to effect a shift from movement in general to movement in *this* mobile section or (as we have seen) this duality. The interval between two points becomes a positive space capable of accommodating transitions and translations between images and of founding new concepts and seeding lines of flight and assemblages. The Deleuzian cineaste is foregoing the certainty of convention in (visual) frame analysis in order to approach a unit of movement as dynamic so that identifying sections is not analytical work, but a matter of setting parameters to observe movement that is available to the senses. The question is one of how to proceed without falling back into counterproductive analytical habits that inordinately value the visual and the static, and in order to appreciate phases of (Bergsonian) duration as changes in thought or consciousness.

Describing shots and images might well be necessary, but it is not the end. In fact, difficulty in description — those points where gaps or jumps or fractures inhibit description or make it less confident — present an instability that invites analysis. If a film is not inherently unstable, as for example in the films of Tarkovsky, ways of making the shot or section unstable need to be found in order to pose compelling analytical questions and it is done so at the level of the Idea.[20] In *Hondo*, for example, each of the major characters is definable in terms of doublings and oppositions, but these, in themselves, do not pose analytical questions. Hondo's action can be understood as a doubling of warrior and father roles exacerbated by a liminal cultural position (a further opposition) between Apache and Westerner.[21] The film progresses through justifications for action that employ and validate doublings, finally justified by the overarching synthesis of manifest destiny. It is a synthesis that is ethnocentric, masculine, and reliant on heroic violence and yet, through the character of Hondo, made palpable and admirable. It is this that provides motivation for substantial analysis: the difference between the attractiveness of the character of Hondo and troubling outcomes of his actions.

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[20] Recalling that the capitalised Idea draws on classical philosophy to signal an embodied idea.

[21] Hondo is part-Apache and has had a close relationship with an Apache woman. These details allowed characterisation access to an understanding of Apache customs, limited as it was. Nevertheless, Hondo has no trouble siding with Western values. On the one hand, it is a neat character description that allows a certain complexity, but on the other hand, the characterisation sets potential analytical questions framed around ethnocentrism, masculine constructs, and reliance on violence that, through the character of Hondo, are presented as valid, tending toward inevitable.

Hondo finishes with a line that is a low-key apology for genocide: still on the battlefield where a small group improbably quelled the Apache force, and where Hondo has assumed the role of leader for the assembled carriages that are about to move off, Hondo's (and the film's) final line is: "Looks like the end of the Apache. Too bad, it was a good way of life. Forward, ho!" The future is indeed "forward, ho" for Hondo. In terms of the character, *how* is an opposition between a decent man with family values and a very efficient killer, resolved or approached? (Or celebrated?) This is the kind of open question that, it is being suggested, provides a foundation for analysis stemming from a disposition to seek unstable or emergent relations rather than those that contribute to simple character description. Nevertheless, analysis might proceed by critically examining other dualities when their broad purpose is included: Hondo/Apache in terms of cultural assumption; Hondo/other males in terms of playing out gender roles; Hondo/history (immediate and contextual) in terms of justification of action.

The image takes on an active role of channelling movement (of images, ideas, concepts, action, thought) in particular ways provided that the channelling is not taken as a displacement of existential certainties from the image to the conduit. The conduit is no less "real", given or pre-existing than the image: "The image itself is the system of the relationship between its elements".[22] The contingency of elements of the image and its circuitry is exposed by the time-image: "In short, pure optical and sound situation [of time-image, in this case] can have two poles — objective and subjective, real and imaginary, physical and mental. But they give rise to opsigns and sonsigns, which brings the poles into continual contact."[23] The fact that the "optical and sound situation" is exposed by the time-image does not negate its usefulness for the movement-image. "Optical and sound situation" and "opsign and sonsign" draw attention to the visual and sound components of the image that are taken for granted in the purposeful movement towards action in the movement-image but exposed in the time-image for which the *image* itself, not where it is going, is purposeful. Of greater interest is the fact that they bring poles into continual contact. That is, the tension and connection between poles is available through the visual and sound images; polarity is not an abstraction (even if it is identified in terms of abstractions), but inevitable in, and available through, the workings of images demonstrated in image-types; more, polarity is understood as an encounter.

Deleuze's image-types determine different ways (systems) of making contact and channelling movement, different potential encounters, and the *Cinema* books provide two meta-systems: one

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22 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, xii.

23 Ibid., 9.

(*Cinema 1*) in which the system is contained, purposeful and self-referential, while the other (*Cinema 2*) grasps the inadequacy of rational systems of images. Deleuze takes stock of what is at stake when the sensory-motor system has broken down or is no longer adequate, when the delivery of an action-image results in cliché and, put more positively, when there is a need to grasp "something intolerable and unbearable . . . a matter of something too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes too beautiful, and which henceforth outstrips our sensory-motor capacities".[24]

Steven Shaviro offers an orientation for our first model of the Deleuzian cineaste and a guide to unpacking the emotional forces that are channelled through an image's circuitry. In the first blush of Deleuze in English translation, he took Deleuze as license to reassess "the vapid 'givenness' of the image" as the image's "secret openness to passion and desire" and an invitation to excess.[25] *The Cinematic Body* presents film analysis as at the point of experience and realises cinema's potential for liberation: "cinema's capacity for freeing perception from the norms of human agency and human cognition".[26] As his analysis clearly demonstrates this is not an anti-intellectual approach, but the postponing of critical thought so that the analyst's attention is mediated through an idiosyncratic experience of the film:

> I seek to emphasize the roles of singularity and chance, against the objectifying scholarly tendency, which seeks to reduce particulars to generals, bizarre exceptions to representative patterns, specific practices to the predictable regularities of genre . . . This book is "personal" in the sense that it foregrounds visceral, affective responses to film, in sharp contrast to most critics' exclusive concerns with issues of form, meaning, and ideology.[27]

In Shaviro's approach, several oppositions are already in place: experience and critique, perception and thought, instance and generalisation, and personal and institutional. Recognition of the personal ("the involuntary, presubjective realm of visual fascination")[28] is not a trigger for a cognitivist or psychoanalytical approach. In fact, in Shaviro's hands, a challenge is presented to any analysis that regards the image as (too easily) representational and either completed by exact reference to the object it represents or, alternatively, lacking and reliant on external theories to complete and

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[24] Ibid., 18.

[25] Steven Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 18.

[26] Ibid., 31.

[27] Ibid., viii.

[28] Ibid., 19.

organise its meaning.

Rather than lack, Shaviro describes an "excessive residue of being that subsists when all *should* be lacking. It is not the index of something that is missing, but the insistence of something that refuses to disappear".[29] This is familiar in the viewing experience: the sense that many things are happening simultaneously — not all directly relevant.[30] All analysis cuts a path through them depending on its purpose. For the Deleuzian cineaste (with Shaviro), the path is based on a facility with the image and its reception is based on a trust, or at least an initial non-critical awareness, of one's responses and on a refusal to validate responses in terms of external and pre-existing factors: "Theory is neither re-presentation of reality nor a critique of representation, but a new, affirmative construction of the real".[31]

> I am trying to suggest that semiotic and psychoanalytic film theory is largely a phobic construct. Images are kept at a distance, isolated like dangerous germs; sometimes, they are even made the object of the theorist's sadistic fantasies of revenge. What is usually attacked is the emptiness and impotence of the image, its inability to support articulations of discourse or to embody truth.[32]

André Bazin's realism and the idea of a photograph of an object *from* the world bound with the idea of a photograph, itself, as an object *in* the world (relevant when cinema's inevitable photographic processes are elevated to semiotic significance) is denied when Shaviro finds images overfull.[33] The excess and the remainder become the bugs that motivate film analysis. The image is available to the senses but not entirely, and this recalls Ruyer's survey (see Chapter 5) and other intuitions of the whole as well as Bergson's notion that perception is always partial.[34] Strictly, perception and survey are not separable in this way, but for cinema and the world of the film, perception is not just a means of directly approaching or existing in the world. Any sense of a world is only available through flawed, limited, and multiple perceptions. The character perceives, and we perceive the character perceiving, and more, we perceive along with the character, but we might also perceive

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[29] Ibid., 17.

[30] In *Once upon a Time in Hollywood*, Brad Pitt carries awareness of his previous roles, awareness of previous collaboration with Tarantino, and star power essential to both a fascination with Hollywood and to the dramatic irony of Pitt's self-deprecating character in the film. The film is one that relies on excessive residue, such that a (younger) viewer seeing the film without any knowledge of Sharron Tate and Charles Manson could well conclude that the movie is "thin" and "obvious". Knowledge of background, in this scenario, might give such a viewer an awareness of the film's productive "excess".

[31] Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body*, 23-24

[32] Ibid., 16.

[33] André Bazin, *What Is Cinema?* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). Also discussed later in this chapter.

[34] "As Bergson says, we do not perceive the thing or the image in its entirety, we always perceive less of it", Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 20.

more than the character in a way that allows us to understand that we are perceiving differently from the character, and so on.

Even a rudimentary grasp of Ruyer's survey is useful in disabusing analysis of the idea that perception is complete and unproblematic as an approach to the limited world of the character or, indeed, of the viewer, so there will always be an excess. Conventional frame analysis on the other hand, regards visual patterns as sufficient in explicating meaning — as with a painting — and so they might be if notions of the whole and movement are unproblematically assumed, rather than exposed in all their difficulty.

The image finds places for the "excess": in the interpretant of the cinematic image (as sign);[35] in the inscrutability of the affection-image that indicates that *processing* of perception is taking place prior to action; and in the circuits of the crystal-image in which the cinematic image (modern or classical) is understood to channel rather than represent. Giving processes a sense of materiality is an important step in harnessing them for analysis and accounting for circuits of that which is channelled: the intuited whole, consciousness, memory, relation, and perception. But any talk of thought processes and excesses brings with it awareness of the limits and mechanisms of thought.

It is not simply that an alternative approach to the same cinematic problems and concepts is being offered. Deleuze has identified concepts such as indiscernibility and indeterminability that reposition the limits of thought in a similar way that "the uncertainty principle" of quantum mechanics repositioned scientific enquiry.[36] Indeterminability has been considered earlier (Chapter 3), but here it is recognised as a state that defines both modern cinema and exposes a model of thought (or rather, it is a model of thought that modernism exposed, but was always there) at the heart of Deleuze and Bergson.

> As for the distinction between subjective and objective, it also tends to lose its importance, to the extent that the optical situation or visual description replaces the motor action. We run in fact into a principle of indeterminability, of indiscernibility: we

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[35] Thought in the form of the interpretant is regarded, by Peirce, as essential to the sign. It provides "excess" in terms of introducing elements that are less controllable than *sign* and *object*.

[36] Deleuze's concept of indeterminability can be understood as related to quantum mechanics and Werner Heisenberg's *uncertainty principle* that "one can never be exactly sure of both the position and velocity of a particle; the more accurately one knows the one, the less accurately one can know the other". (187). Steven Hawking observes that "Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is a fundamental, inescapable property of the world. The uncertainty principle had profound implications for the way in which we view the world" (55). The interest, for us, is that uncertainty had to be accounted for as more than a lack of enough information. Stephen Hawking, *A Brief History of Time: from The Big Bang to Black Holes* (New York: Bantam Books, 1990).

no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask. It is as if the real and the imaginary were running after each other, as if each was being reflected in the other, around a point of indiscernibility.[37]

For cinema, the most important point is that indeterminability and indiscernibility are not negative but describe an outcome of modern cinema. The state is generalisable to classical cinema for example in the affection-image and in passages of dance and song that utilise liminal spaces. The difference is that, in classical cinema, indeterminability is quickly and efficiently reassigned to the action-image that provides determination and discernability. Deleuze's challenge for analysis is to recognise and appreciate indeterminability in terms of both its consequences for classical cinema and as a state in modern cinema. The disposition in Deleuzian film analysis is to approach the image as a *system* that processes thought, significance and especially desire and to seek and account for aberrance.[38] Nevertheless, film analysis becomes more than a matter of thinking about images and accounting for movement in an extracted section. A static unit of thought is a nonsense; and if it is objected that a concept is such a static unit, a concept is never just applied without a sense of the dynamics of its composition (including its history, antecedents, and connections to other concepts) and the effect of its application (possibly the generation of new concepts, but at least leading to a clearer grasp of a fluid situation).

For the high school avatar, a quasi-dialectical framework is useful, and it need not be complicated. If we have Point A (frame, shot, image, thought, idea, concept) and we consider Point B as different from Point A and not necessarily the same form — A might be an image and B a concept — then movement is the transition between A and B. This simple formulation provides, at least, a robust foundation for film analysis and for the Deleuzian cineaste who is then directed to consider and articulate the mechanics of the movement in terms of image types.

Simple movement might be described, resolution might be sought, a synthesis might be found (where they are possible or desirable), but equally so might a line of flight motivated by

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[37] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 7.

[38] Desire is recognised here, but in Deleuze's hands invites a critique of Lacan and Freud that is clearly outside the scope of this thesis, except as a model of mechanical processing that reinforces the idea of systems: "[D]esire works by creating mental matrices to trap, interrupt and divert the libido and . . . these matrices (which they call desiring-machines) can encompass matter and flows of every type". Ian Buchanan, "Five theses of Actually Existing Schizoanalysis of Cinema" in *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema,* ed. Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack, (London: Continuum, 2008), 13.

observations that worry analysis, such as when the conceptual space between thesis and antithesis, or just between A and B, is tenuous and unstable, and valued as such. For example, in the movement-image, perception does not directly feed action, rather it first becomes affection-image as a transitional interval between perception and action that — with the character having not decided what to do next — introduces instability and an inkling of what is at stake in change and what will be lost in a choice of potentials. The affection-image externalises and positions instability in a situation by transferring it to a character and then into action.

The question of what images are doing — at a molecular level and image-to-image — precedes what they mean. How an image takes something and through its circuitry, makes it something else or sends it in other directions, is a fundamental question. *Any* duality will usefully delimit analysis in order to expose flows of particular significance and so the analytical imperative is to place events, situations, characters, etc, in terms of dualities, poles or dialectics. Accounting for transitions between points is a means of focusing attention and not getting lost in all the variables. From Model 1, the dispositions of the Deleuzian cineaste are to seek productive dualities, to recognise idiosyncratic responses as at least potentially productive in analysis, and to engage in analysis as a creative process (that is, after the analysis something new will be available in the world).

Model 2: Workers at the interval: tracking circuits of movement and the crystal-image

Freed from assumptions that representation is sufficient to account for images, the second model rests on a determination to track flows of meaning, even into cul-de-sacs of time-images. The crystal-image exemplifies the image as doing work in creating circuits that channel movement and thought. Action is one such channelling, but so are "internal" circuits switching between artifice and actuality. Two things from Deleuze underpin working with circuits. Firstly, the image-type provides the circuitry of movement, so that the affection-image, action-image, and crystal-image, for instance, are differentiated on the bases of their facilitating different pathways of movement. Secondly, following Shaviro, circuitry is not a matter of generalities: everything in the frame as well as anything implied by and excess to it is also channelled and becomes grist to the analytical mill. Our second model uses image-types to track or trace movement of significance, localised meaning, and relations between images. The disposition in this model is to look at *image* and think *circuits*.

It is not just obvious movement that is of concern. The excessive residue in the material image can be approached as the insistence of an *other*: the ghost or imagining or actuality of a separate (virtual) world and a liminal zone between the present world and a past or speculated world. Quentin Tarantino's *Once Upon a Time in Hollywood* rests exactly in the liminal zone between the movie and the audience's (necessary) awareness of the past and actual world of Charles Manson and Sharon Tate. In Sharon Tate's watching herself on the movie screen, for example, the excessive residue — the poignancy of this carefree young person as a prelude to her murder that will not happen, and all the evocation of memories surrounding Tate in the actuality in which her murder did happen — is carefully crafted and determines the significance of the image. The whole movie is sustained in a liminal world between an idealised past and the actual past, and another between both pasts and the viewer's present. In Deleuzian terms, this is a complex crystal-image with the screen replacing the archetypal mirror in the scene described: Sharon Tate is watching the film as if looking into a mirror. It is also part dream-image, "describing the whole world as if it were a dream".[39]

Deleuze considered the presentation of other worlds or zones in a comparison of Stanley Donen's and Vincente Minelli's staging of dance as traversing a liminal zone between dream and reality or movement between one world and another.

> The relation between the set-description and movement-dance is no longer, as with Donen, that between a flat view and an organization of space, but [for Minelli] that between an absorbent world and the passage between worlds . . . [40]

Deleuze opposes a flatness in Donen's sets with Minnelli's use of colour. In Donen, a postcard or snapshot view of towns reduces the world to flat images that dance emerges from and transforms: "So dance arises directly as the dreamlike power which gives depth and life to these flat views".[41] It was different for Minnelli moving between a "plurality of worlds" through rich colour that was "highly absorbent, almost devouring".[42] Dance scenes are not simply diversions into fantasy, rather thought and significance are taken into a different circuit: "dance becomes the sole means [in Minnelli and Donen] of entering into another world, that is another's world, into another's dream or

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[39] David Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 122.

[40] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 64.

[41] Ibid., 62.

[42] Ibid., 63.

past".[43]

At the opposite end of the spectrum from dance but demonstrating a similar point, Shaviro considers the banality of Andy Warhol's images: "the decadent beauty of Warhol's films comes from their failure to refer, as copies, back to some authentic original, and therefore their irreducibility to Bazin's genetic model of the growth of flowers and snowflakes".[44] Warhol's images — John Cassavetes' films have a similar rawness — by rejecting artifice, take us to another world *in and as* the actual world. The attitude is, for the viewer, that it is clearly an actual world, but not their own. Attention is channelled, as with dance, into different realities or ways of being and deliberately place the viewer between worlds; between actual and virtual worlds.[45]

The crystal-image is the archetypal time-image and so will be considered in some detail as the mechanism that, in its molecular form, identifies the movement to other worlds and states. The crystal-image situates forces at work in an image to move in identifiable ways: between present and past; as flows expressed in musical terms as the gallop (forward) and ritornello (circular, return); between actual and virtual; between movement and time.[46] Specifically, Deleuze identifies four "processes of decomposition" (of time) in Luchino Visconti's films, as functions of the crystal-image, typically presenting a relation or conflict between a character's past and present. It is possible to create characters with this conflict as their explicit character description and arc, and to engage in nostalgia such as in Ron Howard's *Cocoon*, or in speculation as the computer screen replaces the mirror in *The Matrix*.[47] The crystal-image demonstrates pathways that direct time, meaning and significance and creates an experience of the dislocation, as much for the viewer as for the character.

Deleuze's discussion of Visconti employs two uses of the term crystal: the first is to *crystalise* a situation so that a set of images works as synecdoche; the second is to use devises that trap, reflect and refract the paths of significance (thought, concept development) as a crystal does light. The

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[43] Ibid., 63.

[44] Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body*, 19. Bazin argues that photography is the only art that does not essentially include the subjectivity or personality of the artist. A photograph remains part of the external world as it "re-presents" something in the external world. Bazin, *What Is Cinema?*, 13-14.

[45] The staginess of Stanley Kubrick's "Dawn of Man" scene in *2001: A Space Odyssey* is a case in point. Rather than shoot in an actual desert, the scene was shot in a sound studio with front projection and artificial light, with the significant complexities that both offered. There is a certain artificiality or staginess that results, which positions the viewer between a sense of reality and speculation — a believable speculation that is essential not only for this scene, but for the whole film. Production is described in David Mikics, *Stanley Kubrick: American Filmmaker* (Yale University Press, 2020), 93-109.

[46] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 90-97.

[47] *Cocoon* (1985) and *Cocoon the Return* (1988). The decomposition is one of aging. The memory of younger selves is made manifest after a rejuvenation from swimming in a pool in which alien pods were being stored before return to the planet, Antarea.

mirror becomes exemplary, splitting a perception into at least two paths in a single shot, perhaps recalling a past or establishing a duplicity or a hesitancy. The virtual mirror image is no less real than the actual image, especially given that the "actual" is, in a cinematic image, just another type of image.

The crystal-image facilitates complex pathways and — to switch metaphors from mirror to crystal — just as the cut crystal of jewellery refracts light from and through a number of planes, so the crystal-image refracts and reflects virtual elements (thought, sense of time, significance). John Mullarkey positions refraction as an experience of the world appreciated relative to a particular viewing point:

> [Thought] is the refraction of the object proper to me — *my* reflective outline of the object. I always see the world in my own image, in "a realised contradiction," says Bergson. This partiality whereby others' thoughts, inasmuch as they remain other, are *seen as* merely refractive is what Bergson calls a "half-relativism" . . . one that assigns mutability to others while retaining a static vantage point from which to cast aspersions.[48]

Deleuze observes four "processes of decomposition" in Visconti's crystal-images in order to expose different realisations of refraction. They demonstrate half-relativism, by presenting both the existent lives of characters and the reflection from another vantage point (the existent lives of others) without resolution. The first is the "crystalline, but like a synthetic crystal, because it is outside history and nature, outside divine creation".[49] Deleuze's example is the artificial "aristocratic world of the rich" (in Visconti's *The Leopard*) where the separation is between an anachronistic but existent world for a particular group and changed social and cultural conditions. The anachronistic world that once was the foundation of a group's social order is now outside of an existent social order. The Overlook Hotel in Stanley Kubrick's *The Shining* is another world that is separated by distance and weather (and a dawning realisation of a separation in time) from the outside world in which an ordinary psychological stability is maintained. The hotel's isolation provides a "static vantage point" that enables refraction of its grandness, echoing a lost world evident in the bar and in the photographs in the bar that close the film and, with it, less savory elements of the hotel's memory. Jack's writing, relationships and rationalisations are understood as simultaneously and

[48] John Mullarkey, *Refractions of Reality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 189. [Emphasis in the original.]
[49] Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 94.

dangerously divided into (refracted between) the two circuits of his personal history and that of the hotel.

The second process is an eating away from within, where "the crystalline structure feeds the process of decomposition"; it is as if the internal refractions contain and amplify circuits that become destructive. Francis Ford Coppola's *The Conversation* is an example in which Harry Caul's ability to get inside the reflective and refractive planes of sound (because of his expertise and equipment) situates him as lost in the aural equivalent of a hall of mirrors, and lead to his psychological unravelling.

The third is the decomposition of history, specifically as the playing out of unresolved historical forces. History that once justified actions has now decayed. *Saving Private Ryan* comes to mind, because of the decomposition of war's justification and purpose, evident in what war does to basically good people who might otherwise be leading productive lives.[50] In fact, it is a trope of contemporary war films that unresolved historical forces — the justification for engaging in war — are refracted through characters, and lead to personal crisis. What is also decomposed is the war films of John Wayne's and Audie Murphy's celebrations of heroism and personal achievement, with history on their side as victors, immediately post-World War 2.

The fourth is "when something arrives too late". The archetypal example in Visconti is "The shattering revelation of the musician in *Death in Venice* when through the young boy he has a vision of what has been lacking in his work: sensual beauty".[51] The images are not simply relaying information, but information is refracted. The same information is read in two different ways: the beauty of the boy on the beach in the actual world of the film and the boy as a trigger for the apprehension of a different world that might have existed but does not. The apprehension is real (to the character) and material in its consequences. To recall Manuel DeLanda's maxim: "patterns or forms interacting with each other as patterns or forms and having material consequences, must be regarded as material."[52]

These [the real-actual and imaginary-virtual of the crystal-image] are 'mutual images'

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[50] Also including: *The Third Man* (1949), *Oh what a Lovely War* (1969), *Apocalypse Now* (1979), *Platoon* (1986), *Full Metal Jacket* (1987). In *Apocalypse Now,* the French settlement and the Playboy bunnies present examples of the earlier crystal state (now in synthetic decomposition) in which the French settlement and the Playboy bunnies are presented as anachronisms; defiantly in the former; displaced (and misplaced) in the latter. Audie Murphy and John Wayne transferred the heroism of the war movies into the (prolific) Westerns of the immediate postwar period in America.

[51] Deleuze, Cinema 2, 96.

[52] Manuel DeLanda and Graham Harman, *The Rise of Realism* (Cambridge: Polity press, 2017), 11.

. . . where an exchange is carried out. The indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary, or of the present and past, of the actual and the virtual, is definitely not produced in the head or the mind, it is in the objective characteristic of certain existing images which are double in nature.[53]

David Deamer's discussion of Darren Aronofsky's *Black Swan* — a catalogue of crystal-images — demonstrates the complexity of "exchanges". Images are considered in terms of literal mirrors, self-concepts one mirroring the other, and processes of fragmentation, setting up the final conflict where one image is pitted against the other: the white swan and the black swan. Deamer discusses the hyalosign (crystal-image) as "the first of the time-images and the first coalescence of opsigns and sonsigns" — with opsigns and sonsigns understood as "pure optical and sound situations where 'the actual [image] is cut off from its motor linkages', thus enabling a 'coalescence of the actual image and its virtual image'".[54] Nina, the ballerina, is the coalescence, and changes in terms of her relation to where she is in the virtual space between the black and white swans.

With every new scene, Nina embeds or reinforces or redefines circuits, but the question is not whether they are real or not, or at least it is a question that needs to be postponed. Before that, as Deamer concludes, is the question of approaching "actual images of fragmentation" in relation to "the possibility of eventual transformation": "the actual propagates indiscernibility enacted by the virtual — non-actual — linkages between elements".[55] The actual is not in opposition to the virtual but seeks the virtual in order to change through it. Does fragmentation justify the transformation? It is a question with ethical dimensions.

The crystal image has been exemplified in some detail and with a number of examples, to show it as an essential concept asking questions of how thought is reflected, deflected, or refracted — that is, how it moves — through an image or a system of images. While it was generated in terms of the time-image, it is presented here as an essential question of the analysis of any film and one that combines concerns of image, thought, perception, and actuality/virtuality, and so provides a rich and dynamic way of approaching questions of the film's themes through its patterns of movement.

For the high school avatar, without access to image theory, the question of mirrors and mirroring

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[53] Deleuze, Cinema 2., 69.

[54] Deamer, *Deleuze's Cinema Books,* 307. Embedded quotations: Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 69, 127. The third section discusses particular movies, each an example of a dominant and sustained use of an individual concept.

[55] Ibid., 307-308.

can be asked of any film. Mirroring does not necessarily need a mirror. It might be displaced to a computer screen (*The Matrix*), window or frame-within-a-frame (*Citizen Kane*), a thematic-structural conceit (*Sliding Doors*), or be evident in a broader tendency of characters (Johnny mirrors Hondo in some ways in *Hondo*). Ways of tracking thought and attention are presented. In our first model, a disposition was to look for intervals and polarities; this second model considers what to do with them once they are identified, finding patterns through the tracking of movement /thought. Deleuze's image-types and his taxonomy demonstrate typical patterns that might be of use.

Initially, descriptive tracking and actually sketching them in the kind of diagrammatic thinking that Guattari was drawn to[56] may expose rhizomatic connections and provide lines of flight, considered in the next model. If Deleuze is not available to the cineaste (as has been the assumption), an actual mapping (pencil and paper) of movement is available as a precursor to creative analysis, at any level. The guiding concern for the mapper is how does movement work in this film with attendant questions: *movement from where to where?* and *what changes have been enabled?* The crystal-image encourages the understanding that the paths might not be linear (diagrams might not be neat).

Model 3: The Deleuzian cineaste as line-of-flighter and mapper: movement on larger circuits

The third model considers the utilisation of gaps, dualities or circuits identified in the first two models, as one might do very simply if conclusions about the character of Hondo were extended to other John Wayne films. Elena del Río (Chapter 3) is representative of this model in her recognising Marylee, in *Written on the Wind*, as inhabiting an interstice between her needs and the social conditions that repress them, crystalised in her behaviour. As we have considered in some detail, such attention sets up rhizomatic connection with the *femme fatale* in *noir* films and contributes to the mapping of the fields of affective and performative analysis. Typically, a line of flight becomes obsessed with a point and flies with it — takes it somewhere else — or makes new connections with other assemblages.

In "Film Theory of the Asymmetrical Prostate", Adrian Martin extolls the virtue of becoming obsessed with a detail from a film and sticking with it, as slow criticism: "philosophically slow criticism — slow like slow food or slow cinema, in defiance of the usual routines of consumerist

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[56] "It is completely insufficient to only think of the machine in technical terms; before being technical, the machine is diagrammatic (in the sense of the semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce), which is to say, inhabited by diagrams, plans, equations, etc." Félix Guattari and Gary Genosko, *A Guattari Reader* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 126.

thought and writing". Martin champions slow criticism as "an opportunity for film critics, journalists and scholars, to reflect on their practice, or on a theme, or to dwell in detail on a particular film screening in the Rotterdam program".[57] In such dwellings, lines of flight are made possible.

Cartographically, points move to form lines, or are positioned on a line that moves to describe a bloc in a process that Samantha Bankston defines in the following way.

> The line-bloc passes between two points creating a zone of proximity between these two unequal forms. It does not combine or mix two different fixed terms or elements but creates a line of coexistence between them, dislocating them from their respective localizable positions. Points are given new function and enter into an assemblage; new worlds and systems are created through blocs of coexistence.[58]

Using Deleuze and Guattari, Bankston makes two clarifications. Firstly, a line of becoming is not defined by points it connects or by points that compose it. On the contrary, it passes between points — it "comes up through the middle".[59] Secondly, "There is nothing 'linear' about the line".[60] That is, the progression is not linear, but might be more a pattern of rhizomatic connections. Along with the first clarification, the reminder is not to be too literal about lines or connections, but to understand a line of flight to be a force cutting through things. To this, Shaviro adds an ethical purpose when he considers an essentially creative role in engaging in lines of flight: "the reason that Deleuze and Guattari propose the second as an alternative to the first [lines of flight to mapping contradictions] is that they are trying to replace a thought of negativity with one of positive and multiple differences".[61]

This third model shows sustained interest in the line-bloc, on its way to establishing assemblages, using the energy and interest that sparked the line of flight to see things in a different light and to map the process. For example, Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack, with schizoanalysis, consider a number of triggers that establish lines that describe the desiring-machine and processes

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[57] Adrian Martin, "Film Theory of the Asymmetrical Prostate", *Ctrl-Z: New Media Philosophy*, no. 2 (2012), http://www.ctrl-z.net.au/journal/?slug=issue-2/briggs-lucy-art-as-research/, n.p. (The Rotterdam reference is to the film festival at which his slow criticism began.)

[58] Samantha Bankston, *Deleuze and Becoming* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 96.

[59] Ibid., 97.

[60] Ibid., 95.

[61] Cesar Kiraly, Diego Viana and Steven Shaviro, "Interview with Steven Shaviro", *Revista Estudos Políticos* 5, no. 1 (2014), 24.

of channelling desire. They provide a sense of characterisation in narrative film analysis as a shift from a character caught in social machinery to a purposeful channelling of desire in his or her own construction of machinery: "discovering in a subject the nature, the formation, or the functioning of *his* desiring-machines, independently of any interpretation".[62] The channelling of desire becomes the foundation for maps that at their most productive move through points, lines and blocs to describe or at least provoke new assemblages.

Line-of flighters — always on the alert for moments that escape routine patterns — come armed with a determination to seek, and to make use of, connections. It is only the scale and specificity that differentiates academic research from the informal analysis of the Deleuzian cineaste, and somewhere between the two is the audio-visual essay that functions to problematise viewing, provoke lines of connection and feed blocs. As such the audio-visual essay is a clear demonstration of research-creation.

A particular form, parallel viewing — watching shots of one film simultaneously presented with another, juxtaposed in a split screen (often without verbal narrative) and theorised by Catherine Grant in her "Establishing split: on *Requiem for a Dream*"[63] — is rhizomatic, and articulates an "AND" between aspects of images that are forced to exist simultaneously. A construction is created that resolves contradiction or competition, as *both* are valid at the same time. Deleuze does not regard cinema as in the present but as mapping the past, and in the split screen audiovisual essay, one past is being mapped in relation to another. The juxtaposition disallows the assumed privilege of one side over the other and the viewer is invited to do the work of articulating connections between the two, but not of making them. Bankston understands this process as dramatization: "Concepts are not static essences but dynamic processes. Drama occurs when a concept is examined in its resonance with other concepts and according to the specific (im)material plane upon which it is unfolded".[64]

Similarly, in a written rather than audiovisual form, Shaviro's juxtapositions expose resonances, "Andy Warhol and Robert Bresson — at first glance, no pairing seems more perverse and inappropriate".[65] It is a connection motivated by personal attraction to something in the works and

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[62] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack, *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema* (London: Continuum, 2008), 13. [Emphasis is in the original, as is the generalised masculine form.]

[63] Catherine Grant, "Establishing Split: On *Requiem for a Dream*", *Vimeo*, 1 November 2010, audiovisual essay, 4:51, https://vimeo.com/16397534.

[64] Bankston, *Deleuze and Becoming*, 11.

[65] Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body*, 241.

driven by a rejection of (or refusal to assume) the obvious differences between the two. From Shaviro, then, the viewer is active without reduction to a celebration of subjectivity or a symptomology. The job is to discern "multiple and continually varying interactions among what can be defined indifferently as bodies and images: degrees of stillness and motion, of action and passion, of clutter and emptiness, of light and dark".[66] A concrete purposefulness anchors analysis and has been apparent throughout examples: Shaviro's use of Warhol and Bresson; Martins' being bugged by forgotten details; the displacing of rigid assemblages by Grant's juxtapositions, setting up conditions for lines of flight; and, from Deleuze's analysis, hands in Bresson, the face in *Joan of Arc*, interior spaces in Ozu. These are not examples to support theory, but material and concrete images that beg theorization.

For this third model, if the mapping of circuits of images seeks social, industrial and cultural contexts (as it does for critical theory), it is contexts as equally available to analysis as the images. The aim is not to make the image disappear into what it means, rather images become lightning rods for cultural values and serve to problematise them: *Godzilla* providing covert catharsis in post-war Japan through its images of ruined cities or *The Lizard* forging links between clerical and pluralist directions in Iran.[67] Cultural and social concerns provide refractive planes. In the process of analysis, and as a positive outcome of self-reflexively employing concepts, Deleuze's concepts are considered critically with Deamer finding that the movement-image is underestimated and others finding the time-image to be overestimated.[68]

For the high school avatar, this model actively recommends finding points of departure and lines of flight motivated by committed enthusiasm. (*What really interests you in this film? What do you find confusing?)* Not that this is easy to achieve; it needs to be structured into teaching and classroom organisation if it is valued. But the results can be worth it in generating genuinely interesting analysis. For example, in analysing *Run Lola Run*, a film for which music plays an especially important role, a student with a highly developed interest in music might discuss changes in key as significant. Or, with Taika Waititi's *Boy*, a student might see that things were always being buried. In Bankston's terms, lines might be established by identifying all the points in the film where this

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[66] Ibid., 256.

[67] Kamal Tabrizi, *The Lizard* (Original title: *Marmoulak*): (Iran: Faradis, 2004). David Brown links Deleuzian analysis and the work of Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush in terms of becoming-spiritual, becoming-animal, becoming-other. William Brown, "There are as many paths to the time-image as there are films in the world: Deleuze and *The Lizard*" in *Deleuze and Film*, ed. David Martin-Jones and William Brown, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 88–103.

Ishirō Honda. *Godzilla*. Japan: Toho Co.,1954. David Deamer, "An Imprint of *Godzilla*: Deleuze, the Action-Image and Universal History" in *Deleuze and Film*, ed. David Martin-Jones and William Brown, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 18–36.

[68] See Chapter 2.

occurs and then describing a bloc — the observation that with objects, emotions were often buried — and productively opening the film to analysis as a film exactly about the burying of emotions. The audiovisual essay, as a means of achieving this kind of committed analysis and communicating it, is proving useful in high school contexts.[69]

Model 4: The infiltrators: becoming-Deleuzian (?)

The fourth model is founded on the infiltrators who work within scholarly conventions, to shift parameters of film analysis and assert Deleuze's usefulness in cinematic and critical enquiry. Typically, Deleuze is not championed, instead a particular concept is employed and then, because Deleuze's concepts are rarely self-contained and invite alternative ways of thinking, a Trojan Horse effect takes place. Amy Herzog exemplifies our fourth model: "My project here, then, rather than reflecting directly on Deleuze, will be an attempt to think through him, using his work on cinema and history to bring to light some affinities between these two works".[70] She considers the Hollywood musicals of Esther Williams in contrast with Tsai Ming-Liang's film, *The Hole*, which draws on musicals to ironically situate the musical's spectacle, positivity and objectification.[71]

In *"Becoming-Fluid"*, Herzog demonstrates what has been understood in this chapter as methodological dispositions of use to the Deleuzian cineaste such as an interest in identifying dualities: male/female; Hollywood/Taiwanese; wet/dry (in Esther Williams musicals); surface/depth; and so on. She also employs a line of flight from a comment made by Siegfried Kracauer: "sexless bodies in bathing suits".[72] As Herzog observes, "Kracauer describes the body found here as sexless, but it is nevertheless always decidedly female".[73] Herzog observes that Kracauer draws a distinction "between surface and depth [that] appears entirely at odds with Deleuzian theory, which rejects understandings of the real as something that exists beneath a veil of signs".[74] But while it seems that a sustained criticism of Kracauer is impending, Herzog's "thinking through Deleuze" is more demonstrated in her shift in focus that recalls Shaviro's assessment of

[69] See for example: Catherine Fowler and Sean Redmond, "Writing with Sound and Vision: The Audiovisual Essay in the Classroom", *Screen Education*, no. 96 (2019), http://www.screeneducation.com.au.

[70] Amy Herzog, "Becoming-Fluid: History, Corporeality, and the Musical Spectacle" in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, ed. D N Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 262. Also discussed in Chapter 2.

[71] Premise: In a seedy, rundown apartment a hole in the floor (the ceiling of the lower apartment) opens contact between the man above and the woman below to antagonism that shifts to compassion, in a disease-ridden dystopian setting.

[72] Ibid., 259.

[73] Ibid., 259.

[74] Herzog, "Becoming-Fluid", 259–60.

Deleuze and Guattari as "trying to replace a thought of negativity with one of positive and multiple differences".

The sense is that Deleuze is employed to identify a problem and to reorientate a teleological interest to a focus on questions of the nature of change and emergence. Her concerns are with de- and re-territorialising and becoming: becoming-other, becoming-fluid, becoming-animal. While the analysis of *The Hole* references Deleuze directly in the introduction and in the conclusion, the body of the analysis does not test or assert Deleuzian concepts; it assumes them in discussions of dream-images, "complex interaction between real and fantastic spaces" and "connections between human bodies and the bodies of the spaces they occupy".[75] One can cautiously conclude that while Deleuze might be understood as essential to this approach, he is not necessary in overt terms.

Elsewhere and similarly, Deleuze is clearly there to guide processes of invention in Manning and Massumi's project — *Housing the Body, Dressing the Environment* — which considered the relation between movement and architectural forms and developed strategies for working in a liminal space between body and building.[76] However, Deleuze is not centre stage. The resulting *proposals* — such as "Invent platforms for relation"[77] — actualise Deleuzian processes in ways that citing him directly might have undercut.

Elsewhere and continuing the body theme, Manning finds in Leni Riefenstahl (always ripe for criticism as the creator of *Triumph of the Will* and *Olympiad*)[78] the concept of the *biogram*, developed from Deleuze and Guattari's *diagram* to reconstitute images of the body: "the biogram is the becoming-body's intensive edge that makes bodyness felt at the conjunction of image and movement".[79] Manning's conclusions relate to the movement-image: "A movement-image is no longer an image 'of' something else. Movement no longer foregrounds a part-object — it

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[75] Ibid., 268.

[76] "Body and built surround were presented [in the project] as phase-shifts of the same process: forms of life taking architectural forms, their movements and potentials returning like an echo of the architectural surround to co-causal effect". Manning and Massumi, *Thought in the Act*, 101,

[77] Ibid., 100. "Proposal 7: Invent Platforms of Relation" is identified in Manning and Massumi's list of 20 proposals that are designed to enable and stimulate further in later or similar projects as much as identify project outcomes and conclusions. "*Practice immanent critique*: 1 Construct the conditions for a speculative pragmatism. 2 Invent techniques of relation. 3 Design enabling constraints. 4 Enact thought. 5 Give play to affective tendencies. 6 Attend to the body. 7 Invent platforms for relation. 8 Embrace failure. 9 Practice letting go. 10 Disseminate seeds of process. 11 Practice care and generosity impersonally, as event-based political virtues. 12 If an organization ceases to be a conduit for singular events of collective becoming, let it die. 13 Brace for chaos. 14 Render formative forces. 15 Creatively return to chaos. 16 Play polyrhythms of relation. 17 Explore new economies of relation. 18 Give the gift of giving. 19 Forget, again! 20 Proceed". Ibid., 83.

[78] Leni Riefenstahl, *Triumph of the Will* (1933) and *Olympiad* (1938).

[79] Erin Manning, *Relationscapes* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2012), 124.

transmutes the image".[80] The biogram is the transmutation, in Riefenstahl's case between body and statue, as statues are brought to life (in *Olympiad*), "from the very first shot the camera breathes life into stone, it plays with the dynamics of appearance".[81]

The "infiltration" in this model is more in Deleuze's thinking than his concepts. Herzog, Manning and Massumi have demonstrated work that has applied the spirit of Deleuze: in paying attention to concrete circumstance; in seeking to invent, reinvent or critique; and, in forming *propositions* of immanent critique, to find ways of proceeding that do not limit analysis. "The strategy of immanent critique is to inhabit one's complicity [in new *modes* of activity] and make it turn — in the sense that butter 'turns' to curd".[82]

It is hard to grasp the high school avatar as more than an apprentice infiltrator, but the sense of engaged critique seems available. As with Manning and Massumi's proposals, the aim is still, Deleuze or not, to find ways of keeping analysis open, centred on a clear (and concrete) interest, and predisposed to the production of concepts or making old ones "turn".

The Deleuzian cineaste is, itself, a processual concept informed by Deleuze, but it does not need to recognise Deleuze as an end. The project of previous chapters has not been to lift cinematic concepts fully formed from the pages of the *Cinema* books and apply them, but to consider their utility and to form a conception of Deleuzian work based on the utility: "our Deleuze in our pockets" is how Ranciere puts it.[83] Model 4, then, is more about setting up processes of finding fissures or opportunities, in fact creating them, not to introduce Deleuze, but to destabilise certainties about architecture, physicality, the classroom, films, and so on. In doing so, the intention is to grasp these forms and situations, as well as cinematic images, as intersections of particular forces. There is as much potential then in approaching Deleuze through practitioners and their works as there is in the reverse. *Under the Skin* has been a favourite film for me because so many Deleuzian concepts are on display.[84] They become ways of gaining access both to the film and to Deleuze.

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[80] Ibid., 129.

[81] Ibid., 119.

[82] Manning and Massumi, *Thought in the Act*, 87.

[83] Jacques Ranciere, *Film Fables* (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 31.

[84] Irrational cuts, interstice, black and white frames, opsigns and sonsigns, time-images, nonlinearity, becoming, to begin with. Giving them names, permits access to, or a return to, the film. They seem to provide a different logic rather than leave the shots to present as confusing. None of this simplifies or explains the film, but a greater acceptance of aberrant series is an outcome, and it becomes more possible to accept the images on their own terms.

Model 5: The Deleuzian cineaste meets the true believers: "immediate, unprepared encounter"

The fifth model comprises the true believers, the committed philosophers, and those who (unlike the previous model) overtly continue Deleuze's theoretical project with the aim of clarifying, expanding or directly applying philosophical concepts — or ones relevant to quasi- or broadly philosophical projects with ethical or epistemological dimensions. This is not a reneging on the determination to make Deleuze more accessible to those not steeped in Deleuze, rather it is accommodation of the centrality of the philosophical project and a desire to, in some way, place the Deleuzian cineaste in contact with the true believers, or at least in a more or less clearly articulated philosophical context. For Rodowick, who is credited with establishing the philosophical side of a bifurcation at the start of Deleuzian scholarship in English, film analysis has an ethical dimension:[85]

> For how we think, and whether we sustain a relation to thought, are bound up with our choices of a mode of existence and our relations with others and to the world . . . In Deleuze, the fundamental ethical choice is to believe in this world and its powers of transformation.[86]

Rodowick uses Stanley Cavell and Deleuze to form, differently,[87] the basis for an ethical "belief in the world" for cinema, and concludes that "The ethical choice for Deleuze, then, is whether the powers of change are affirmed and harnessed in ways that value life and its openness to change, or whether we disparage life in *this* world in fealty to moral absolutes and intellectual movements".[88] Foucault is less circumspect in identifying Deleuze's ethics in opposition to fascism in all of its various forms.[89]

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[85] Martin-Jones and Brown, *Deleuze and Film*, 2. "To provide our own history of English-language work on Deleuze and film, we might principally mention Steven Shaviro, who pioneered the appliance of Deleuzian ideas to cinema with *The Cinematic Body* (1993), and D. N. Rodowick, whose *Deleuze's Time Machine* (1997) marked the first major philosophical investigation into Deleuze's thoughts on film.

[86] Rodowick, "The World, Time" in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, ed. Rodowick, 99.

[87] They share, a "mutual interest in Nietzsche" and an "original way of asking ethical questions in ontological contexts" but Rodowick sees contrast in that "Deleuze turned consistently to philosophers from whom the division of the thinking subject from the world was ontologically irrelevant" while Cavell maintained mainstream "characterizations of the self in relation to being, the world and others". Ibid., 99.

[88] Ibid., 101.

[89] "I would say that *Anti-Oedipus* (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time . . . [Preferring] what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. [Believing] that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic". "Preface" in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), xiii.

Choosing as a positive ethical disposition is a theme similarly taken up by Ronald Bogue as evident in his title, "To Choose to Choose — to Believe in This World".[90] The problem is that post-*Trainspotting*, choosing seems a little dubious and awkward: the opening rant of the film presents a choice between rampant materialism and heroin.[91] The monologue parodies new-age sentiments (and t-shirts) but poses the challenge: where do we get the idea that we are free to choose in any significant kind of way? Humour, irony, and generational disappointment aside, the problem seems to be that there is no room for significant choice and so talk of ethics becomes a choice between one system of thought or another, one distraction or another, and one political preference and another.

It has been argued in this chapter that, with the interstice and interval, the interest should be *between* oppositions in a liminal space that invites a loss of certainty and perspective as a precondition of making choices. The films that interest Deleuze most are those that provide essential gaps and with it a notion of indetermination — assuming the term as catch-all for indescribability, indiscernibility and the unsummonable (etc).[92] Indetermination is not a vacuum, but a purposeful space that situates engagement: a space of indetermination is what Mark Renton in *Trainspotting* has to learn at great personal risk and cost in order to find some leverage in a chaotic life. *Under the Skin* narrativises indetermination as alien consciousness. *Hondo* is a model of *determination* and needs to be worked on to tease out the indetermination that will feed a form of analysis that Herzog identifies as a legacy of Deleuze's reading of Foucault's genealogical critique: "cinema is the creative process that can act to excavate, to provoke, to make the previously imperceptible perceptible".[93]

The choice is not between outcomes — models of the world or predetermined ways of existing in the world — but an existential choice requiring (from Rodowick), "a reflexive examination of self,

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[90] Ronald Bogue, "To Choose to Choose — to Believe in This World" in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film*, ed. R N Rodowick, 129. "Thinking differently entails choosing to choose, adopting a way of living that allows a belief in the world's 'possibilities in movement and intensities to give birth once again to new modes of existence.'" (129. Embedded quotation: Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, 74.)

[91] "*Choose* Life. Choose a job. Choose a career. Choose a family. Choose a fucking big television, choose washing machines, cars, compact disc players and electrical tin openers. Choose good health, low cholesterol, and dental insurance. Choose fixed interest mortgage repayments. Choose a starter home. Choose your friends. Choose leisurewear and matching luggage. Choose a three-piece suit on hire purchase in a range of fucking fabrics. Choose DIY and wondering who the fuck you are on Sunday morning. Choose sitting on that couch watching mind-numbing, spirit-crushing game shows, stuffing fucking junk food into your mouth. Choose rotting away at the end of it all, pissing your last in a miserable home, nothing more than an embarrassment to the selfish, fucked up brats you spawned to replace yourselves. Choose your future. Choose life... But why would I want to do a thing like that? I chose not to choose life. I chose somethin' else. And the reasons? There are no reasons. Who needs reasons when you've got heroin?" John Hodge [screenplay] and Irvine Welsh [novel], *Trainspotting*, 1996. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0117951/characters/nm0000191

[92] "The question is no longer: does cinema give us the illusion of the world? But: how does cinema restore our belief in the world? This irrational point [unthought in thought] is the *unsummonable* of Welles, the *inexplicable* of Robbe-Grillet, the *undecidable* of Resnais, the *impossible* of Marguerite Duras, or again what might be called the *incommensurable* of Godard (between two things). Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 182. [Emphasis in the original.] See also Chapter 5.

[93] Herzog, "Becoming-Fluid", 264.

in its possibility of knowing itself and others and in its openness to change or not".[94] The importance of indetermination goes further; it is not that everything is ever potentially determinable, but that as Stephen Hawking observes uncertainty is a "fundamental, inescapable property of the world".[95] Expressed in cinematic images, uncertainty is not limited to time-images, but is also found in the affection-image of the classical model as a space between perception and action.

Choice in the affection-image is hardly conscious (but we see *that* it is happening in the face in closeup) and always self-interested (or in the interest of the self). Philosophy's task in cinema can be understood as making explicit what goes on in the affection-image. That includes limits as a kind of paralysis of an impulse not translated to action but sustained, in the time-image, and diverted into aberrant circuits positioned between actuality and virtuality, but nevertheless real in their consequences. With the time-image, indetermination is not a state of confusion nor of abstraction — the objects that express it are clear and apparent — but an *image* of a state of confusion, uncertainty and abstraction that is a prelude to Rodowick's "reflexive examination of self".

A belief in the world is not necessarily blazingly heroic, and it is sometimes a positive that is demonstrated in the negative. At the end of *Rome, Open City,* a relentlessly bleak movie, the children watching the execution of the priest whistle a tune that has been a signal of underground resistance. The priest hears this before he is shot. The positivity of "choosing to choose" is in the spirit of resistance being carried on by the next generation, and a moment of comfort to the priest as acknowledgement by the children meant that his execution was being witnessed and understood. The question for this and other films is this: when and how does a belief in *that* world become a belief in *our (my)* world?

The ethical nature of Deleuze's project is most apparent in the fact that Deleuze saw the great film makers as pedagogical.[96] David Cole and Joff Bradley have directly explored the notion of a pedagogical approach to film analysis in their "pedagogy of cinema".

> The challenge for educators is to follow Deleuze and other theorists . . . to extend the
> analysis of film from its current state as a restrictive mode of critical pedagogy into a

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94 Rodowick, "The World, Time", 97.

95 Hawking, *A Brief History of Time*, 55.

96 "A whole pedagogy is required here, because we have to read the visual as well as hear the speech act in a new way. This is why Serge Daney refers to a 'Godardian' pedagogy, a 'Straubian pedagogy'. And the first manifestation of great pedagogy would be the last works of Rossellini". Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 247.

more expansive and creative enterprise. This is not a trivial task, and ultimately points to the way in which cinema can breakdown and break through cliché, repetition and monotony that the current state of engulfing image culture tends towards.[97]

For the high school avatar, ethics is sometimes approached by using films as case studies, but this falls short of evoking an ethical disposition. The question of ethics for the Deleuzian cineaste in an educational context is, in the first instance, one for the teacher. It is in the dynamics of the class that one would hope to find a spirit of discovery and investigation that necessarily values and models positive engagement in the world and finds room in analysis for students to explore what is of interest to them. A resultant work — the essay, or presentation or whatever form of conclusion a unit of study offers — should demonstrate commitment, involving the students as agents engaging themselves in their work, not as passive observers rehearsing received notions of film analysis.

Concluding with Spinoza

Deleuze sees in Baruch Spinoza a model that inspires confidence in our identification of a Deleuzian cineaste as a lay incarnation. In describing Spinozian legacy, Deleuze recognises — in a way that may anticipate Buchanan's dialectic "between the body of work and the work it either does itself or otherwise enables"[98] — an embodied position beyond academic scholarship or at least between philosophy and its application:

> . . . the individual who, without being a philosopher, receives from Spinoza an affect, a set of affects, a kinetic determination, an impulse, and makes Spinoza an encounter, a passion. What is unique about Spinoza is that he, the most philosophic of philosophers . . . teaches the philosopher to become a non-philosopher . . . the two are brought together, the philosopher and the nonphilosopher, as one and the same being.[99]

Deleuze might have been writing of his own legacy: affect, a set of affects, a kinetic determination, an impulse, an encounter, a passion. Each element of the set implicates an emotional investment expressed directly, for cinema, in terms of sensation, the time-image, and affection-images. Deleuze makes a distinction in the derivation of affect and affection between Spinoza's *affectio* and *affectus*.

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[97] David Cole and Joff Bradley, *A Pedagogy of Cinema* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2016), 155.

[98] Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, 193.

[99] Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 130.

While the former describes "state of the affected body", the latter is about passage between states, "*affectus* refers to the passage from one state to another".[100] Both are implicated in the affection-image, but the sense of passage is also part of the "kinetic determination". It is another demonstration of the ubiquity of movement that even the function of the affection-image, often shown in motionless close-up of the face, is there to signify passage.

This thesis began by seeking approaches to movement, or really, since the movement-image already offers this, our primary concern has been how to take them up. We have considered movement of forces as channelled through various circuits identified by Deleuze, for cinema, as image-types. Doublings, dualities, dialectics and oppositions are important, not for their ability to resolve analytical problems, but in their ability to sustain thought and movement in their intervals in which change of some kind occurs (transition, translation, emergence of new concepts). To take the interval as central to analysis is to heed Bergson's concern that scientific inquiry routinely ignores movement in the intervals in favour of attention on points that define the intervals.[101]

The durability of conventional cinema analysis's focus on the static pictorial frame in order to analyse it in terms of colour, line, composition, etc., is indisputable. However, it is limited and limiting, and if the reliance on frame analysis is too great, then sound, editing, and movement will be the first casualties. To recall Manning and Massumi: "Technique is therefore immanent: it can only work itself out, following the momentum of its own unrolling process."[102] How and why the extracted image came to be important, and representative, and how it works in a composite artistic environment are fertile grounds for inquiry, but it is necessary to avoid presuming that any element or technique has an intrinsic meaning: decontextualised technique is essentially meaningless. Daniel Smith identifies, as one of the principles of Deleuze's immanent criteria that "the claim that meaning is use is valid only if one begins with elements that, apart from their use, are devoid of any signification".[103] An image is held to be rigorously accountable in terms of its "own unrolling".

Techniques might exhibit conventional tendencies, but their function is to engage in the channelling of significance in certain ways. For example, Orson Welles and Gregg Toland's celebrated *deep*

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[100] Deleuze, *Spinoza,* 49.

[101] Not always, one hastens to add. Significantly, the University of Tohoku, in Sendai, Japan has *The Institute of Fluid Science,* continuing — since 1943, then named the Institute of High-Speed Mechanics — a commitment to the formation of theories regarding flow in areas that can be gleaned from the titles of its research divisions: Creative Flow Research Division, Complex Flow Research Division, and Nanoscale Flow Research Division. (https://www.ifs.tohoku.ac.jp/eng/research)

[102] Manning and Massumi, *Though in the Act*, 89.

[103] Daniel W. Smith, "Introduction: 'A Life of Pure Immanence': Deleuze's 'Critique et Clinique' Project", in *Essays Critical and Clinical,* Gilles Deleuze, (London: Verso, 1998), xxii.

focus works in a number of ways: to add a second narrative frame, to stretch the visual field to stage-like depth, to provide a visual disorientation, to isolate and emphasise significant objects without cutting. In *Citizen Kane* deep focus is used in all of these ways. A bank of techniques becomes a repertoire of approaches to the image, awaiting articulation for a particular instance, and equipping the Deleuzian cineaste to be responsive to choices made by filmmakers.

None of this alleviates the difficulty of describing movement, but questions are being asked of its progress and its relation to thought. The disposition is to regard the image as image and image-types as purposeful in channelling movement. Our models of the Deleuzian cineaste identify a number of encounters: between images, with new ideas, between modes of analysis, and with Deleuze and scholars who followed him, including Shaviro and a sense that one has to encounter oneself as a messy disordered but ecstatic viewer: the delirious spectator.[104] Reflexivity writes and rewrites maps and prevents analysis from slipping into solipsism, because attention is directed outwards to the encounter.

The cinematic encounter mapped in the *Cinema* books is presented as two encounters but, in a sense, the time-image and movement-image are distractions if they require that we place images and films in one regime or the other before sensible observations about movement can be made. If the movement-image and time-image designations have been important in the generation and organisation of image-types in Deleuze's taxonomy, it does not follow that they must be important in their application and use. The *Cinema* books need not present two analytical frameworks when movement is foregrounded as essentially common to them both.

Movement in its entirety is not an analytical concept but movement in certain ways, in particular circuits, is made available through Deleuze's taxonomy of cinematic image-types, which offers a repertoire of different ways of channelling movement. As such they stand on their own feet and we, scholars and Deleuzian cineastes alike, are able — or become more able — to use the concepts as they are required, without needing to read Spinoza, Bergson, or indeed, Deleuze (unless we want to).

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[104] Paul Sommer, "The Delirious Spectator: Opening Spaces in Film Studies", *English in Australia,* 52, no. 1 (2017): 15-26. Notions of delirium from schizoanalysis are set against (or with) influential educational theorist James Britton's distinction between spectator and participant roles in English classes (see for example: Joseph Harris, "The Spectator as Theorist: Britton and the Functions of Writing", *English Education,* National Council of Teachers of English, 20, no. 1, 1988). Presented as the Gath Boomer Memorial Address 2016 (Australian Association for the Teaching of English, National Conference, Adelaide, 2016), it was a way of contextualising Boomer's very significant legacy (and early work in negotiating the English curriculum) through a perspective informed by Deleuze.

Fundamentally, one image (one channelling of movement in a particular way, one passage from one state to another) is put into relation to another through editing that already goes well beyond simple connectivity, to complicity in managing a sense of the whole and establishing *circuits* of meaning, thought and significance. It is a complex relation that places the images in relation to a sense of something bigger — a series, a milieu, a survey, a sense of a world including a sense of the forces of the world as unconstrained Spinozian life forces. But the emphasis is on moving through this life. "The aim is not to make something known to us, but to make us understand our power of knowing. It is a matter of becoming conscious of this power: a reflexive knowledge, or the idea of an idea".[105] These potentials are available at all levels of film analysis.

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[105] Deleuze, *Spinoza,* 83.

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